THE SPECTRE OF PROMISCUITY
For Reinhard and Johanna in gratitude for all the support they have given me throughout my...
29 downloads
1030 Views
723KB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
THE SPECTRE OF PROMISCUITY
For Reinhard and Johanna in gratitude for all the support they have given me throughout my lifetime. They taught me to approach life with both empathy and a critical spirit.
The Spectre of Promiscuity Gay Male and Bisexual Non-monogamies and Polyamories
CHRISTIAN KLESSE Manchester Metropolitan University, UK
© Christian Klesse 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Christian Klesse has asserted his moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hampshire GU11 3HR England
Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401-4405 USA
Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Klesse, Christian The spectre of promiscuity : gay male and bisexual non-monogamies and polyamories 1. Homosexuality - Great Britian 2. Non-monogamous relationships - Great Britain 3. Homosexuality - Law and legislation - Great Britain I. Title 306.7'66'0941 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Klesse, Christian. The spectre of promiscuity : gay male and bisexual non-monogamies and polyamories / by Christian Klesse. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7546-4906-9 1. Gay men--Sexual behavior. 2. Non-monogamous relationships. I. Title. HQ76.K57 2007 306.84'23086642--dc22 2007023735 ISBN 978-0-7546-4906-9
Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire.
Contents
Acknowledgements Introduction
Beyond the Myth of Equality and Democracy Changing Directions – Sexuality Research and the Question of Power Nodal Points – Heteronormativity, Hegemony and Intersectionality Routes for an Intellectual Journey … the Structure of the Book
vii 1 2 10 17
1 The State of the Law: Heteronormative Citizenship and Sexual Counterpublics The Regulation of the Public/Private Distinction The Wolfenden Strategy: Permissiveness and Control Section 28 and Heterosexual Family Values Queer Counterpublics, Hegemony and Conflict
19 20 23 29 33
2 Researching Non-monogamies: Stories on Positionality, Intersubjectivity and Power Power and the Research Process Intersubjectivity, Identity and Politics Differences, Power and Research Relationships
39 40 42 46
3
Sex and Assimilation: Gay Male Non-monogamies and the Question of Equality Metaphorical Constructions: Anti-gay Promiscuity Discourses The Same-sex Marriage Debates
57 58 65
4
Gender Troubles: Bisexuality and Non-monogamy The Construction of Bisexuality and Non-monogamy Non-monogamy Debates in the Bisexual Movement Bisexuality, Non-monogamy and Marriage
77 78 82 86
5
Polyamory: Different Kinds of Love Stories 97 From Identity to Community and Politics 98 What’s in a Term? The Concept of Polyamory 102 Polyamory and Its ‘Others’: Different Styles of Non-monogamy 107
vi
6
7
The Spectre of Promiscuity
Negotiating Non-monogamy: Difference, Power and Intimacy Negotiation, Relationship Work and the Limits of Consent Differential Positioning, ‘Relationship Defining Power’ and Social Capital Between Resitance and Normalisation: Non-monogamy, Sexual Politics and Ethics Heteronormativity and Non-monogamy Heteronormativity, Hegemony and Politics Hegemony and Agency Publics, Counterpublics and the Politics of Public Sphere Inclusion The Question of Resistance and Transgression
115 116 124
133 134 138 139 142 147
Appendix The Study: Research Design and Methodology Qualitative Interviewing Initial Analysis Sampling Issues The Sample Focus Groups (Group Discussions) Participant Observation Discourse Analysis
153 153 154 155 156 157 158 159
Bibliography Index
161 197
Acknowledgments This book would not have been written without the help of many people. I am most gratefully indebted to all the research participants for their trust, time and consideration. Their stories and ideas have brought this project to life. My discussions with the members of the AHRC Centre for Law, Gender and Sexuality and in particular the group at the Keele Law School were an invaluable inspiration when I started to work on this book during my time as a postdoctoral research fellow with the Sociological Review. Over and over again I was struck by the kindness and generosity of my friends Matthew Weait, Ruth Fletcher and Nicky Priaulx who hosted me on uncountable occasions in their flat at Keele campus. At the same time, Paula Darwish, Necla Acik Toprak, Baran Acik-Toprak, Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodriguez and Shirley Tate wonderfully created a home for me in Manchester – a home which has now even turned into a more permanent one. I am also grateful to Yvonne Drew and Col Bashir for welcoming me to Manchester. I thank Robert Grimm and Rute Caldeira for their friendship and hospitality. The financial support by the Sociological Review during the academic year 2004–2005 enabled me to have an enormously productive time in terms of my research and writing. Without this privileged space it would have been difficult to write this book. I would like to express my thanks to Caroline Baggeley for being such nice company and cheering me up all along. I am grateful to Graham Allan who gave me valuable advice on my proposal. I am very fond of my friends in Hamburg who have supported me all along and have been home to me, even while I was crossing borders forwards and backwards between Germany and England. I would like to thank my housemates at Chemnitzstraße for our great life together. I am indebted to Aysel Adigüzel, Tatiana la Mura Flores, Daniel Beraky, Roberta Pagni, Florian Zellner, Burkhard Fischer, Tobias Völker, and Cigdem Sayman for their great friendship and encouragement. The same applies to my wonderful friends in London, Rabiye Cinar, Rosie Phipps, Umut Erel, Jin Haritaworn and Sevtap Genc. I am grateful to Chin-ju Lin and Jin Haritaworn for our extremely enjoyable co-operation on our special issue on polyamory for the journal Sexualities. Many thanks also to Umut Erel for her early input into this group. Our discussions around this editorial project have informed many insights of mine on non-monogamy and polyamory – and beyond. My co-operation with Umut Erel, Jin Haritaworn and Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodriguez on joint articles on intersectionality have also greatly inspired my theoretical thinking. Umut Erel, Jin Haritaworn, Bettina Fritzsche, Nicola Barker and Robin Bauer were so kind to give me constructive feed back on chapter drafts and other publications on the topic concerned. Many thanks go to my colleagues at the Sociology Department at MMU for having been so welcoming. I gratefully acknowledge the support through the Manchester Institute for Social and Spatial Transformation (MISST), who by the
viii
The Spectre of Promiscuity
means of a small grant set me free from some of my teaching responsibilities in the writing up period. If I think of this book as part of my overall academic career, I wish to thank Ken Plummer and Chetan Bhatt who supported my early writings and research into nonmonogamy. Very special thanks (with a twinkle in the eye) to Nira Yuval-Davis, who was the first one who ever suggested that I should go out to publish my work. I will also never forget the amount of intellectual and emotional excitement around the meetings of the Gender and Ethnicity Research Discussion Group during my years in London. They have had a lasting impact on my intellectual work. I am particularly indebted to my parents Reinhard Klesse and Johanna Klesse for their constant support. The death of my father struck us hard, when he unexpectedly died on the 10th of July last year. I was just about to move to England to start my employment at MMU. This loss has overshadowed my work on this book for long periods of time. With the kindest gratitude I wish to express my thanks – mixed with rich memories – to Umut Erel, Tobias Völker and Cigdem Sayman, who have been very close to me and nourished me – in different ways over different times. Merci. I hereby also acknowledge the permission to include material from previously published work in this book. Versions of parts of Chapter 4 have been published in two articles. ‘Bisexual Women, Non-monogamy, and Differentialist Anti-promiscuity Discourses’ appeared in the special issue on the Cardiff Conference ‘Pleasure and Danger Revisited’ of the Sage journal Sexualities 8 (4): 445–464. ‘Heteronormativity, Non-monogamy and the Marriage Debate in the Bisexual Movement’ appeared in a special issue on same-sex marriage of the Lesbian & Gay Psychology Review 8 (4), July 2006, 162–173. A version of the second part of Chapter 5 has been published under the title ‘Polyamory and its ‘Others’: Contesting the Terms of Non-Monogamy’ in the special issue on polyamory of Sexualties 9 (5), December 2006, 565–583. A section of Chapter 7 has been published in the first issue of the Polish Queer Theory On-line Journal Inter Alia as part of the the article ‘Beyond Visibility, Rights, and Citizenship – Critical Notes on Sexual Politics in the European Union’ (http://www. interalia.org.pl/numery.php?nid=1&aid=8). I am grateful for having received the permission to use this material, in particular in the cases, where the copy right lies with the respective journals. Christian Klesse July 2007
Introduction
Beyond the Myth of Equality and Democracy
Intimacy seen in this spreading way does generate an aesthetic, an aesthetic of attachment, but no inevitable forms of feelings are attached to it. (...) This is where normative ideologies come in, when certain “expressive” relations are promoted across public and private domains – love, community, patriotism – while other relations, motivated, say, by the “appetites” are discredited or simply neglected. (...) Likewise, desires for intimacy that bypass the couple or the life narrative it generates have no alternative plots, let alone few laws in which to clarify and cultivate them. What happens to the energy of attachment when it has no designed place? (...) the wish for normalcy everywhere heard these days, voiced by minoritzed subjects, often expresses a wish not to have to push so hard in order to have “a life”. To live as if threatening contexts are merely elsewhere might well neutralize the ghostly image of one’s own social negativity; and the constant energy of public self-protectiveness can be sublimated into personal relations of passion, care and good intention. (Berlant 1998: 285–286)
With its focus on gay male and bisexual non-monogamies and polyamories, this book explores some of these ‘alternative aesthetics of attachment’ and the narratives on relationships or intimacy, which ‘bypass the couple form’ or actively embrace the ‘appetites’ stimulated by erotic desire. The relative frequency of gay male non-monogamous relationship practice has been widely noted in research into gay male relationships. Although not much research has been conducted into bisexual relationships, the few studies which exist provide evidence that many bisexual men and women are non-monogamous. Yet gay male and bisexual non-monogamous and polyamorous relationships have rarely been studied in close detail. This book is based on a comprehensive multi-method empirical research, which has put gay male and bisexual non-monogamous relationship practice at the centre of its inquiry. By the means of qualitative interviews, focus groups, participant observation, documentary research and discourse analytical techniques, I have followed up questions not dissimilar to the ones Lauren Berlant has raised in the opening quote above. How are gay male and bisexual non-monogamous lives positioned with regard to a culture that tends to value love, community and patriotism? What role do they play in contemporary sexual politics? In interviews and group discussions I have talked with people about their views on sex and relationships and the gains and difficulties of non-monogamous relationship practices. They explained to me their motivations for being in open or multiple relationships and how others respond to their way of life. We talked about sexual health issues, power dynamics in their relationships and about different aspects of sexual politics. Is there a politics of non-monogamy; and if
2
The Spectre of Promiscuity
yes, what does it look like? How does heterosexism affect non-monogamous gay men and bisexuals? How relevant is the campaign for same-sex marriage rights to people who practice non-monogamy? In the course of these conversations and discussions I learnt a lot about the manifold and diverse personal, cultural and political issues at stake in the lives of gay men and bisexual men and women who prefer to be nonmonogamous. This book is based on the personal experience stories, ethical concerns and political opinions voiced in these encounters. Yet my intention is not to provide a comprehensive ethnography of gay male and bisexual non-monogamous relationship life in the UK. Rather, I address questions brought up by these narratives in the context of larger cultural themes. My main interest is to explore how non-monogamy is put into discourse and how it is negotiated in sexual politics. What discourses on non-monogamy circulate in the debates in the gay, bisexual and polyamorous movements? How is non-monogamy constructed with regard to partnership values such as love and intimacy? How do non-monogamous people respond to negative assumptions regarding their relationships or their character? What power issues do non-monogamous queers (have to) work through in their relationships?1 Changing Directions – Sexuality Research and the Question of Power This book is written against the grain in that it attempts to bring the issue of power (back) into the discussion of queer lives and relationships. By placing questions of power central to my discussion, I wish to challenge two unfortunate tendencies that mark current sociological writing on sexuality. The first problem regards the prevalence of narratives which hail the progressive nature of the current state of sexual politics. Within this perspective, UK or European culture is seen to be increasingly welcoming to sexual diversity. In such idealistic descriptions the specific problems that many queers continue to face in their everyday lives tend to be glossed over. The second problem relates to the tendency of recent work on samesex partnerships and polyamory to present these relationships as being in principle egalitarian. Here, too, we encounter an uncritical endorsement of European sexual culture as an intrinsically diversifying and civilising force. As I show in more detail, these two problems lead to an impoverished understanding of the complexity of power in intimate and sexual relationships and encounters. In order to develop a more comprehensive perspective, I critically explore the usefulness of some 1 In this book I use the term ‘queer’ in two different ways. In its first usage, ‘queer’ refers to a particular theoretical tradition or political project (as in ‘queer theory’ and ‘queer politics’). In its second (occasional) usage, ‘queer’ signifies an umbrella term for a range of sexual and gender subjectivities not condoned in hegemonic frames of heteronormativity (such as gay, lesbian, bisexual, queer, transgender and gender-queer identities in their various articulations). In the narrow context of my discussion in this book it includes everybody who considers them selves to be part of a ‘gay male’, ‘bisexual’ or ‘queer’ relationship. The emphasis on ambiguity in the term ‘queer’ makes such an application possible. I acknowledge that not everybody may feel represented by this term, but I prefer it over equally problematic alternatives such as ‘non-heterosexual’ (which reinforces the centrality of heterosexuality) or ‘LGBTQ’ (which assumes clear-cut and homogeneous identities).
Beyond the Myth of Equality and Democracy
3
prominent concepts in gender studies, sexuality studies and queer theory. To what degree can the negativity directed towards queer non-monogamous relationships be understood through the model of heteronormativity? Is it possible to step outside of heteronormative culture? Can the lives of non-monogamous and polyamorous queers be described as being transgressive? Drawing on the critique of feminists and queers of colour, I argue that an adequate analysis of power around sexuality needs to integrate the critique of heteronormativity into an intersectionality perspective which acknowledges the mutual interconnectedness of multiple forms of oppression. There is an urgent need for feminist and queer theory to step beyond the narrow frame of a single-issue analysis (Cohen 2001, Haritaworn 2007). Into a New Future? Sexual Diversity and Citizenship Discourse in the ‘New Britain’ Over recent years, some observers have adopted a more optimistic tone in their discussion of sexual politics in Britain. In an article titled ‘An Unfinished Revolution’, Jeffrey Weeks describes liberalisation (together with secularisation and diversification) as the most salient feature of the current transformation of British sexual culture. ‘What seems to be happening is a greater acceptance of the fact of homosexuality (“live and let live”) whilst there remains an ingrained refusal to see it as of equal validity with heterosexuality’, Weeks explains (2000a: 171). He concedes that this process is ambiguous and points to the lasting repercussions of the anti-gay backlash during the moral panics around HIV/AIDS throughout the 1980s. His overall analysis, however, suggests a tendency of increasing liberalisation of sexual attitudes which would have particularly pronounced effects with regard to the perception of homosexuality. This optimism leads Weeks to interpret the continuing state prosecutions of importuning and proselytising gay men, direct violence in the form of ‘queer-bashing’, and the prohibitive effects of Section 282 as ‘distorted responses to real changes taking place in attitudes to non-heterosexual behaviour’ (2000a: 171). The attempts of the New Right Government throughout the 1980s and early 1990s to forge a conservative hegemony through the combination of neoliberal politics with social and moral authoritarianism were doomed to fail, Weeks declares confidently (2000b: 239). Progressive social movement politics on gender and sexuality have succeeded in breaking the absolute hegemony of traditionalist normative discourses on sexual morality (1995: 59). On the whole, Weeks argues, the 1990s witnessed an increasing recognition of the values of individual autonomy, choice, and freedom with regard to matters of sexual lifestyle (2000b: 239–240). Are there indications that justify such a positive account? In terms of legislation there have certainly been major developments that have resulted in the removal of some of the most outrageous sources of discriminations of non-heterosexuals and transgendered people in the UK legal system. The equalisation of the of the age of consent through the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000, access to a registered partnership scheme for same-sex couples through the Civil Partnership Act 2004, the repeal of Section 28 in Scotland in 2000 and in England in 2003, 2 Jeffrey Weeks wrote this article before the repeal of Section 28 in Scotland and England.
4
The Spectre of Promiscuity
and the Gender Recognition Act 2004 are some of the most prominent examples (Waites 2003, Stychin 2003, Hale 2004). However, it remains questionable to what degree these legal changes can be read as the result of a new politics of tolerance and diversity. With regard to some of these reforms, the government was put under pressure to act by rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) or felt the need to catch up with the more advanced standard of (sexual) rights in other countries of the European Union (Epstein et al. 2000). Other reforms, like the repeal of Section 28, were subject to extremely controversial debate and were met with fierce resistance both inside and outside of Parliament (Rahman 2004, Taylor 2005, Moran 2001). It may be true that the outright homophobia linked to 1980s New Right family discourses is becoming increasingly marginalised. This is evident, for example, from the fact that Conservative opponents of the repeal of Section 28 did attempt to distance themselves from obviously homophobic positions in their contributions to the debates in Parliament. They often framed their arguments as a concern with vulnerable children (who run risk of being seduced into a homosexual way of life), rather than as a moral rejection of homosexuality per se (Stychin 2003: 32). A similar tendency has been observed with regard to the debates about the alteration of the age of consent (Epstein et al. 2000). At the same time, we should be careful not to overstate the transformations within New Right moralism. Already in the 1980s, Conservatives were ready to promise gay men and lesbians a place at the table, if they only were willing to subject to a heteronormative status quo (Smith 1994a). Moreover, some analysts of New Right Conservative rhetoric also point towards the persistence of classical moral-traditionalist themes. Both the Parliamentary debates on the equalisation of the age of consent and the repeal of Section 28 were marked by residual elements around an assertive philosophy of heterosexual familialism, privilege and power. More importantly, even if liberalprogressive arguments of supporters for reform set the tone of the debate, this does not mean that their discourse was free of heteronormative elements. Although New Labour has endorsed the repeal of some anti-gay legislation, it has at the same time stressed the moral and social significance of strong families. The former home secretary Jack Straw made this quite explicit in his introduction to the government’s consultation paper Supporting Families: ‘family life is the foundation on which our communities, our society and our country are built’ (Straw quoted in Stychin 2003: 30). From the Labour government’s point of view, the ideal family-type is both heterosexual and child-rearing. The double-earner family is perceived to be best equipped and most efficient for the task of producing responsible and (economically) active citizens. Some analysts have explained this pro-family agenda as a creative incorporation of Thatcherite themes into New Labour politics (Epstein et al. 2000: 24, cf. Phillips 1998). However, in distinction to the Thatcherite pro-family discourse in which the family was emblematic of an over-arching individualism, the Blairite version placed it squarely within a communitarian philosophy which links the family with both nation and community (Bell and Binnie 2000, Stychin 2003). New Labour’s discourse on citizenship is double-edged in that it ties its commitment to social inclusion not only to a discourse of rights but also to an emphasis on responsibilities. Rights are being made dependent on the fulfilment of duties and responsibilities (with employment being one of the major expectations placed on
Beyond the Myth of Equality and Democracy
5
the active citizen). There is consequently a strong disciplinary element entailed in New Labour’s citizenship discourse (Stychin 2003: 28). New Labour’s politics of strengthening families sits uneasily with its declared commitment to diversity, equality and multiculturalism. The economic and governmental utilitarianism of New Labour’s model of citizenship (which is clearly expressed in its family politics) seriously undermines the substance of its politics of diversity. In the government’s rationality for sexual law reform, active citizenship discourse merges with a selfcongratulatory narrative of national revitalisation and modernisation. ‘Law reform itself becomes implicated in the process of reconstituting the nation as progressive, modern, civilised, enlightened and inclusive; all of which are necessary in order for it to be competitive’ (Stychin 2003: 42).3 Finally, there is not really a great deal of space for the families of sexual dissidents and the opportunities for failing as a ‘bad family’ are manifold – as evidenced in the demonisation of single-headed or unemployed working class families (Ball and Vincent 2007). Recent debates, triggered by a speech by David Cameron on the significance of marriage, clearly demonstrate that the family continues to remain a political battleground with both Conservatives and Labour profiling themselves with a classical family value agenda (Woods and Smith 2007). If we look at party political and parliamentary discourse in closer detail, it appears questionable whether the ‘new Britain’ is really on the way of becoming a safer and more welcoming place for sexual dissidents. Polls and surveys on sexual attitudes in Britain of the last decade reveal the prevalence of a rather conservative morality with regard to questions of sexual lifestyle. Most polls show the persistence of widespread homophobia and a strong disapproval of same-sex sex and/or relationships. According to the national survey Sexual Behaviour in Britain more than two-thirds of men (70.2%) and more than half of women (57.9%) think sex between men to be always or mostly wrong. With regard to the sex between women the situation is not much different: 64.5% of men and 58.8% of women consider such activity as always or mostly wrong (Wellings et al. 1994: 253). Although there have been recent polls which suggest that the UK population is getting somewhat more tolerant towards homosexuality in general (Barnett et al. 1996, Weeks 2000b, Evans 2002), there are also indications that this long-term trend goes hand in hand with an elaboration of sharper distinctions between more and less ‘tolerable’ and ‘acceptable’ homosexualities (Evans 1993). ‘Even where homosexual pairings are tolerated, they are expected to imitate monogamous, heterosexual family life and remain tied to the same values’, argues Avedon Carol in her discussion of the culture of censorship in Britain (1994: 149). Non-monogamy and sex with multiple partners is clearly one of the more controversial topics. Opinion polls show widespread rejection of non-monogamy and sex outside of a firmly established partnership. The national survey Sexual Behaviour in Britain demonstrates a widespread condemnation of heterosexual non-monogamy among British citizens (Wellings et al. 1994). Out of fifty respondents, only one person held the view that extra-marital sex is not wrong at all. Four out of five respondents believed 3 See Ahmed (2000) for an excellent analysis of a similar mechanism with regard to race and multiculturalism.
6
The Spectre of Promiscuity
that it is always or mostly wrong (78.7% men and 84.3% women). Two-thirds of men and more than three-quarters of women disapprove of sexual relationships outside a live-in relationship. Sex outside a regular relationship is perceived to be always or mostly wrong by more than half of the men and two-thirds of the women. The authors argue that even the younger generations do not show higher degrees of tolerance. For the majority of British people, the authors argue, the question whether they approve of sexual acts or relationships is still dependent on monogamy and married couple status (pp. 249–251). More recent surveys indicate the persistence of such moral rigidity (cf. Barlow et al. 2001, Clarke and Thomson 2001). As I show throughout this book, non-monogamy – or as it is expressed in the language of moral condemnation, ‘promiscuity’ – tends to be associated with certain identities and collectivities. The assumption of promiscuity forms part of a racialised, classed, gendered strategy of sexual stigmatisation (LeMoncheck 1997). In hegemonic discourses, gay men, lesbians and bisexual men and women are framed as being promiscuous due to their nature – some even more than others, depending on their social positionality. What these opinion polls may tell us is consequently not necessarily a decline in homophobia (or biphobia), but a transformation of the ways in which it is articulated. Queer people who engage in non-monogamous relationships continue to find themselves in opposition to the dominant sexual morality. They are prone to being delegitimised, pathologised, marginalised and stigmatised. They are vulnerable to attacks on different levels, including ridicule, physical violence, state prosecution, interference into their families and child-rearing, and so on. The spectre of queer promiscuity haunts the national imagination. As a frequent point of reference in sexuality debates, promiscuity-allegations continue to unsettle lesbian, gay and bisexual politics. Anti-promiscuity discourses are part of a wider and complex network of power that encircles queer sexual and intimate lives. However, homophobia, biphobia and sex-negativity are not the only power dimensions understated in current sociological writing on sexuality. The common optimism extends to the celebration of contemporary relationships as being ‘in principle’ egalitarian. This discourse is particularly pronounced with regard to same-sex relationships. The Vanguards of Modernity? The Myth of Same-sex Relationship Equality There has been a pronounced tendency in sociological research to emphasise the egalitarian character of lesbian and gay relationships at least since the late 1970s. Researchers committed to lesbian and gay rights aimed to correct the common misrepresentation of same-sex relationship practices as bizarre copies of heterosexual gender scripts. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the bulk of academic research advanced such stereotypical representations. However, in the course of this positiveimage campaign by well-meaning academics, the nuances of the power relations that potentially structure any kind of relationship slipped out of focus (Carrington 1999: 3–28). In recent sociological debate the ‘equality myth’ has been revitalised through Anthony Giddens’ influential work on intimacy. Giddens’ thesis of the democratisation of intimacy has been widely discussed in British and continental European relationship and family sociology (for example, Silva and Smart 1999b,
Beyond the Myth of Equality and Democracy
7
Smart and Neale 1999, Weeks et al. 2001, Schmidt 1998, Schmidt and Strauß 1998, Schmidt et al. 2006). According to Giddens, the radical cultural transformations caused by processes of modernisation have brought to the forth a new type of intimate relationship. His concept of the ‘pure relationship’ stands for a relationship which is entered and maintained by choice and for its own sake. It is based on an active form of love, an endorsement of commitment and intimacy, and permanent re-working of trust through negotiation. The generalisation of the ‘pure relationship’, according to Giddens, carries the promises of true ‘emotional democracy’. Giddens’ model of the pure relationship has been widely criticised. In particular, feminists have rejected it as an inappropriate tool for understanding contemporary heterosexual relationship cultures. Lynn Jamieson’s (1998, 1999) review of empirical research shows that Giddens’ focus on a reductionist model of ‘disclosing intimacy’ (rather than ‘caring intimacy’) obscures the persisting division of labour in most heterosexual relationships. Moreover, the narrow focus on the dyadic couple relationship fails to take into account that intimate partners are usually part of wider kinship networks and may have responsibilities for dependents, such as young children. Since care work in general and child care in particular are effeminised, it is obvious that women’s labour is rationalised out of focus in the pure relationship model (Smart and Neale 1999, Silva and Smart 1999b). What is striking is that while the pure relationship has not been taken seriously as a suitable model for the study of heterosexual relationships, it has gained an enormous popularity in the literature on same-sex relationships. Among others, this is due to the fact that Giddens has positioned gay men and lesbians so benignly as the vanguards of a democratic relationship culture (Bech 1997, Weeks 1995, Weeks et al. 1996, Yip 1997). Lesbians and gay men have always been free from constricting relationship norms, Giddens argues. This is why they have pre-perceived the conditions of late modernity in their experience (1992: 135). Left without any binding norms and traditions, gay men and lesbians were put in the position to develop relationships of relative equality in their ‘everyday experiments’ in living (p. 15). Giddens further credits lesbians and gay men for being the vanguards of a democratic culture of recreational or ‘episodic sexuality’ as it has blossomed, for example, in gay male cruising and bath-house culture. I think we should welcome Giddens’ non-judgmental comments on gay male and lesbian casual sex and nonmonogamy. However, his equation of queer lives with the ‘pure relationship’ is at the same time utterly romanticising the reality. As David Bell and Jon Binnie rightly point out, such idealisation forecloses the analysis of power, violence and exploitation that resides in same-sex relationships as much as in heterosexual ones (2000: 216–217). As I have discussed in more detail elsewhere, Gidden’s work is illustrative of two tendencies that are widespread in current sociological writing on sexual relationships (Klesse 2006a, 2007a). It is due to these problematic assumptions that the equality myth regarding gay male and lesbian relationships can be upheld: Firstly, most researchers work with an impoverished and one-dimensional concept of power. Secondly, gay men and lesbians are frequently ascribed a privileged place in currently quite fashionable detraditionalisation discourses, according to which they are presented as ‘pioneers of intimate and sexual democratisation’. In the
8
The Spectre of Promiscuity
following, I will briefly illustrate with one example how these assumptions work in an empirical research context. Jeffrey Weeks has frequently taken recourse to the ‘pure relationship’ in order to make his points about ‘intimate democratisation’ and the diversification of sexual cultures (Weeks 1995, 1999/2000, 2000b). Weeks acknowledges the validity of the feminist critique of the concept, but has continued to apply it in his analysis of lesbian and gay contexts. Even if same-sex relationships are compromised by all kinds of power, Weeks suggests, they are ‘in principle’ relationships chosen by free agents (1995: 35). A similar ambivalence shapes the empirical work that Jeffrey Weeks has conducted with Catherine Donovan and Brian Heaphy on ‘non-heterosexual’ families of choice. In their early publications, the research team unequivocally endorses the pure relationship model (cf. Weeks et al. 1996). In their later work and in particular in their book Same-Sex Intimacies, the research team discuss Giddens’ work in a more nuanced way (Weeks et al. 2001). Although the authors now reject the thesis of the pure relationship as a descriptive concept, they insist that gay men and lesbians invest to a much higher degree than heterosexuals in the ideal of emotional democracy. ‘The key issue, we nevertheless argue, is the commitment to striving for an equal relationship, which is the prime characteristic of non-heterosexual ways of being’ (p. 109). Even if gay men, lesbians and bisexuals, too, rarely achieve truly egalitarian relationships, this firm commitment to egalitarianism sets them apart from heterosexuals. The research team describes non-heterosexual relationships as advanced because they are not constrained by hierarchical gendered relationship scripts nor even build their relationships in opposition to heterosexual codes (p. 50). Here the authors draw heavily on the work of Gillian Dunne (1997, 1998b). Dunne theorises gender as a process, that is, as something that people are doing and that is done to them. Stressing the relational dimension of gender performance, Dunne argues that it matters profoundly towards whom and in which context one is ‘doing gender’. The production and enactment of gender in the context of heterosexuality tends to affirm difference and to play down similarity. In the context of a lesbian relationship the compulsion to perform gender as difference is less accentuated and gender solidarity may be expressed as a ‘passion for sameness’. While differences and power imbalances are seen as a feature of lesbian relationships, Dunne is convinced that ‘lesbianism is about a preference for negotiating (balancing, valuing, offsetting) differences within the solidarity that comes from experiencing the world as women’ (1999: 79). A range of studies, including Dunne’s own empirical work, suggest that lesbians empower each other with respect to employment and education, reach fairly balanced arrangements in terms of allocation of waged and unwaged labour and have a more egalitarian approach to housework and child care (Dunne 1997, 1998a, Golombok and Tasker 1997). Other research contradicts the equality thesis. Among the same-sex families studied by Carrington (1999) only a tiny minority reached an egalitarian pattern in the ways they organised their domestic life (pp. 184–187). This group of families consisted of very affluent couples/families, who relied on the service economy or the labour of badly paid (usually immigrant) domestic workers, people with good employment conditions, and families who downsize domesticity. Carrington’s study powerfully illustrates that the ‘equality myth’ gets drawn into
Beyond the Myth of Equality and Democracy
9
question when class and labour issues and the wider economy are brought into the equation. Against the backdrop of his study we may also ask whether the fact that most non-heterosexuals want egalitarian relationships is really more important than that their relationships often are not. The thesis of enhanced same-sex egalitarianism rests on an analysis of power which prioritises gender (and sexuality) as the major axes of power. Although the research team acknowledge that class and race issues have got an impact on the power dynamics in non-heterosexual relationships they do not focus on these issues in their analysis to the same extend as they do on gender. Apart from such a prioritisation of gender as the major source of power, the thesis of non-heterosexual emotional democratisation further stems from the authors’ endorsement of detraditionalisation theories. Paul Heelas (1996) uses the term ‘detraditionalisation theories’ to refer to a diverse set of meta-sociological narratives which assume that the most significant feature of the late modern or postmodern condition consists of the strengthening of autonomous subjectivity and self-responsible agency in the face of fading certainties and binding cultural and moral codes. In particular within the paradigm of ‘reflexive modernisation’ (a position strongly associated with the work of Giddens, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim) the concepts choice, agency, creativity and self-invention gain enormous prominence (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002, Giddens 1991, Beck, Giddens and Lash 1995). Giddens’ work on the ‘pure relationship’ is just one example among many of the application of detraditionalisation theory to the field of sexuality and intimacy (cf. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995, Beck-Gernsheim 1997, 1998, Simon 1996, Bauman 1998, Plummer 2000, 2001a, Bech 1997). Whereas the bulk of this sociological meta-narratives on the effects of high modernity or postmodernity on intimate relationships is quite hetero-centric and does not have much to say on queer sexualities, gay men and lesbians tend to get attributed a privileged position in the work which includes them in analysis (Giddens 1992, Weeks 2000b). The influence of these kinds of theories has left a strong mark on the research report by Weeks et al. (2001). It is in the light of these theories that they drift – despite all attempts to keep a balance between structure and agency – strongly towards the side of agency in their analysis. Since the themes of detraditionalisation and individualisation are over-inflated in their guiding theoretical assumptions, choice emerges as a key concept in their analysis. Yet within the paradigm of choice, detraditionalisation gets easily conflated with democratisation. The overall effect is that power and processes of normalisation move out of focus. As I have shown elsewhere, a further problem with detraditionalisation theories of the intimate is that they tend to advance a racialised concept of modernity in that they clearly allocate the motor of (post)modernisation (and democratisation) in the West. Black or ethnic minority cultures both outside and inside the West consequently appear as being backward and traditional with regard to the question of gender equality and sexual rights (cf. Klesse 2006a, 2007a, Erel 2007). In the context of escalating anti-Islamic discourses after September 11, this theme has emerged as a particularly strong feature of new forms of racism, which allows (white) Europeans with a hegemonic ethnic or cultural background to project the problems of sexism and homophobia onto Islamic or Muslim cultures (Puar 2006, Haritaworn and Tauqir 2007).
10
The Spectre of Promiscuity
Many of the theoretical tools currently fashionable in the study of sexual relationships are consequently inadequate to account for the complex landscape of power relations in the context of which queer non-monogamous relationships are enacted. I suggest that a broad definition of heteronormativity as hegemony can be helpful to explain the persistence of some aspects of anti-gay and anti-bisexual sentiment and their specific articulation with anti-promiscuity discourses. However, theories of heteronormativity can only ever cover partial aspects of the power relations around sexuality. Previous analyses have mostly been flawed in that they failed to address that normative ideas on sexuality and gender are always mediated by discourses on class, race, ethnicity, age and the able body (Cohen 2001, Haritaworn 2007). Such a perspective has emerged from the debates among anti-racist feminists and queers of colour on how to theorise the intersection or simultaneous working of multiple forms of power (cf. Brah and Phoenix 2004, Erel et al. 2007). Moreover, most theories of heteronormativity lack a satisfying conceptualisation of agency. In this context, positive conceptualisations of power as the ‘ability to cause’ are much more appropriate, if we want take account of dynamics of power and/or resistance on the intersubjective level of relationship practice. Nodal Points – Heteronormativity, Hegemony and Intersectionality Queer theorists tend to read the power relations around gender and sexuality through the model of heteronormativity. The critique of heteronormativity has taken manifold forms and draws on a wide range theoretical traditions, including lesbian and materialist feminism, lesbian and gay theory, psychoanalysis, discourse theory and deconstruction (Wagenknecht 2007). Heteronormative power has been mapped via a critique of the heterosexual/homosexual binary (Fuss 1991, Sedgwick 1995), a denaturalisation of the heterosexual gender ‘matrix’ through a theory of performativity (Butler 1990, 1993), or a Foucauldian perspective of governmentality (Probyn 1996). In my study I have worked with a broad definition of heteronormativity as it is associated with approaches that define heteronormativity as a form of hegemony. Most definitions of heteronormativity assume that it works through a set of cultural practices and values which privilege (certain forms of) heterosexuality. ‘By heteronormativity we mean institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that make heterosexuality seem not only as coherent – that is, organized as a sexuality – but also privileged’, argue, for example, Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner (1998: 548n). Heteronormativity stands for a complex regime of moral assumptions and cultural practices, which have the potential to instil a sense of rightness in some individuals and a devastating feeling of shame in others. The mechanisms through which this is achieved are manifold, subtle, often unconscious and at times contradictory. Heteronormativity is about more than the celebration of heterosexual identity, the naturalisation of a particularly gendered object choice (that is, the ‘opposite sex’), or the condemnation of homosexuality and bisexuality. Discourses on heterosexuality are tied into a wider web of significatory practices which structure our understanding of subjectivity, identity, biography, destiny, achievement, community, culture and society. According to Diane Richardson
Beyond the Myth of Equality and Democracy
11
(2000), heterosexuality stands for a hegemonic representational system which governs dominant conceptualisations of sexual and gendered subjectivity, the body, relationships, the intimate, sexuality and the social itself. In a similar vein, Michael Warner suggests that ‘[w]estern political thought has taken the heterosexual couple to represent the principle of social union itself’ (1993: xxi). Drawing on Monique Wittig’s (1992) work, he claims that heterosexuality is always already present within the mental categories that we are using to decipher the social. The hegemonic dominance of heterosexuality depends on its ability to articulate complex and multiple equivalences between object choice, life course, relationship patterns, sexual roles and acts, and so on. This is the back drop against which Berlant and Warner claim that ‘[c]ontexts that have little relation to sex practice, such as life narrative and general identity, can be heteronormative (…), while in other contexts forms of sex between men and women might not be heteronormative’ (1998: 548n). Their argument has a variety of implications. Firstly, heteronormativity is a pervasive form of power which extends to the control and regulation of both sexual and social identities and practices. Secondly, although heteronormativity sets up discourses on proper sexual activity around an idealised image of heterosexuality, not all heterosexual practice is necessarily heteronormative. Thirdly, if heteronormativity does not equate with heterosexuality, sexual identities and practices other than heterosexual, too, may be drawn within its normalising spin. In her path-breaking essay Thinking Sex, Gayle Rubin (1984/1992) has demonstrated that heterosexuality is integrated into a wider system of sexual stratification which does not only privilege heterosexuality, but also couplehood, monogamy, marriage, and the privatisation of sexuality. According to Rubin’s analysis, sexual acts are attributed differential status depending on which identities, genders, body parts, relationship status, styles of touch, numbers of partners and emotional undercurrents are involved. Homosexual, unmarried, promiscuous, non-procreative sex, sex for money, sole, group or casual sex, cross-generational involvements, sex in public, BDSM,4 the use of sex toys or pornography, and so on, are located at the lower end of a continuum ranging from good, condoned or natural to abnormal, perverse or unnatural forms of sex. Combinations of these characteristics may result in differential or shifting judgment. As a discursive formation, heterosexuality thus normalises more than just gender and sexual identities (cf. Seidman 1997, Warner 1999). According to my reading, a theory of hegemony is implicit to most of the critiques of heterosexuality discussed above, even if not all use this conceptual language. ‘Good Homosexuals’ and ‘Dangerous Queers’ – Hegemony as Normalisation Anna Marie Smith (1994a, 1994b, 1998), in my opinion, has so far provided the most elaborated theory of heteronormativity as hegemony. Smith draws upon a refined understanding of hegemony derived from the post-Marxist social-linguistic theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) elaborate 4 BDSM stands for bondage & discipline, dominance & submission, sadism & masochism. Due to its more differentiated practice of naming, many prefer it over the term S/M.
12
The Spectre of Promiscuity
the Gramscian model of hegemony in the light of deconstructive theory with the aim of freeing the concept of its essentialist class core. They thereby try to bring about the full potential of the concept of hegemony by radicalising its central element articulation. In their conceptualisation articulation runs wild, so to speak. On the grounds of the assumption of différance rooted in an excess of signification, articulation is being pushed towards a radical logic of contingency. Articulation is defined as ‘any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as result of the articulatory practice’ (p. 105). As a practice of fixation or displacement it is the basic process which makes discourse possible and recognisable through a construction of ‘nodal points’, that is, privileged signs which regulate the flux of meaning. Because Laclau and Mouffe suppose that discursive closure is impossible, they describe hegemony as being always partial, unstable and constituted in ambiguity (cf. Smith 1998, Howarth 2000). As a strategy of power, hegemony regulates the frames of intelligibility (cf. Butler 1990, 1993). Any hegemonic articulation, Smith argues, due to its constitutive contingency, depends on the suppression of its alternatives. Heterosexuality as a hegemonic formation thus renders certain modes of heterosexuality the only valid and intelligible expressions of sexual desire and social identity. Since articulation only ever partially fixes meaning, the cultural representations, social subject positions, and relations of power articulated around heteronormative discourses are continuously contested and constantly evolving (Laclau 1994, Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000). In her analysis of New Right discourses on homosexuality in the Thatcher period, Smith shows that hegemonic defences of heterosexuality do not necessarily depend on the total demonisation of homosexuality per se (1994a, 1997a, 1997b). In Conservative arguments for the introduction of Section 28, the deployment of the imaginary assimilable ‘good homosexual’ (law-abiding, diseasefree, self-closeting who knows his/her place in society) went hand in hand with the demonisation of the ‘dangerous queer’ (promiscuous, diseased, flaunting, selfpromoting, angry and militant). By structuring their discourse around the ‘good homosexual’/’dangerous queer’ dichotomy, New Right populism avoided being read as crude extremism and disguised itself as a moderate ‘middle ground’. The ‘imaginary inclusion’ of the good homosexual, Smith keeps emphasising, was a matter of mere rhetoric. In fact the ‘good homosexual’, she maintains, cannot exist, except from complete self-annihilation (as social identity, community or political movement) through assimilation. The most interesting aspect of Smith’s analysis of (heteronormative) hegemony as normalisation is the demonstration how the discursive differentiation between ‘good homosexual’ and ‘dangerous queer’ may incite the desire for an ‘imaginary inclusion’ within the lesbian and gay, and I would like to add, bisexual ‘communities’. ‘Imaginary inclusion (…) can have a material effect on the identities of the social group which resembles the included figure, the promise of inclusion can be extremely seductive and give rise to all sorts of strategies of self-correction and voluntary assimilation.’ (Smith 1994a: 20).
Beyond the Myth of Equality and Democracy
13
Smith’s theory of ‘hegemony as normalisation’ powerfully demonstrates that normalisation transcends any subject position and any category of gender and sexuality in the sense that they all can be drawn into this form of power. No cultural terrain, no identity category and no political project is located entirely beyond the terrain of (hetero)normative hegemony. This insight renders a theory of hegemony particularly useful for the analysis of intra-social movement political conflict. As I will demonstrate throughout this book, the common denigration of gay, lesbian and bisexual promiscuity has repercussions in the debates about political strategy in the gay, bisexual and polyamorous movements. Empty Spaces – on the Drawbacks of Heteronormativity Analysis Queer theories of heteronormativity have their drawbacks, too. I discuss three of the major problems associated with heteronormativity perspectives: (a) their implicit single-issue-focus, (b) their lack of capacity to account for the relational dimensions of power and (c) their difficulty in theorising agency. Sexual dissidents of colour have rightly complained about the lack of concern white queer intellectuals have shown with regard to the fact that sexuality is always already classed and racialised. Cathy Cohen highlights the white bias at the heart of Michael Warner’s (1993) assumption that all queers would share a common knowledge due to their experience of oppression by heteronormative society. This claim denies differences in perspective of people who apart from being stigmatised in terms of sexuality, face the harsh and violent effects of other forms of oppression. ‘While heterosexual privilege negatively impacts and constraints the lived experience of “queers” of color, so too do racism, classism, and sexism’ (Cohen 2001: 209, cf. Skeggs 1997). The common denial of white mainstream queer theorists to reflect on the implications of white privilege makes it possible to posit a ‘uniform heteronormativity from which all heterosexuals privilege’ (p. 214). However, as Jin Haritaworn (2007) demonstrates in a study of part-Thai relationships and families in Britain and Germany, not all heterosexual genders are considered to be respectable. In contradistinction, hegemonic representations of, for example, Thai (heterosexual) femininities are over-determined by the discourses on sex work and trafficking. This means that Thai women have to frequently ward off offensive reactions born out of the stereotypes produced in sexualising, moralising, or victimising discourses. A further implication of a monolithic theory of heteronormativity is the tendency in queer politics to define ‘heterosexuality’ as the main target of the queer struggle. However, for Black and racialised ‘queers’ the struggle against racism may have more salience – in general or at certain times in certain contexts. The political alliance with heterosexuals therefore has got a completely different significance for many of them (Cohen 2001: 212). While a tendency to privilege certain forms of heterosexuality may cut across many cultural and political contexts, the major task consists in finding a theoretical language that can take account of the simultaneity of multiple forms of power and different modes of oppression. Heteronormativity can only provide a partial perspective or one element in a more comprehensive over-aching analysis of an ‘intersectional’ articulation of power. The same applies to the critical study of nonmonogamy and polyamory (cf. Haritaworn et al. 2006, Noël 2006).
14
The Spectre of Promiscuity
Contemporary queer theorising is marked by a strong Foucauldian legacy. Foucault’s insistence that sexuality is an effect of power and regulative discourses on subjectivity, the body and sexual desire is central to the queer theoretical trajectory (Bristow 1997, Halperin 1995). It is due to this legacy that queer theories tend to discuss (heteronormative) power primarily within a disciplinary paradigm. This has two problematic effects: Firstly, theories of heteronormativity do not usually tackle the inter-subjective and inter-personal power dimension of sexual relationships. Secondly, they tend to lack a conceptualisation of agency. A purely discursive conceptualisation of power which focuses on ‘normativity’ is inevitably quite specific and cannot take account of the full range of ways through which power may be exercised. According to Davina Cooper (1995), a complex analysis of power needs to address the following levels: distribution (symbolic and material resources and capital), textual politics (ideology, discourse, representation), discipline (surveillance, subjectification, normalisation) and force (manipulation, coercion, threat, violence) (pp. 21–24). Feminists have usually emphasised the need for a theory of power to provide answers concerning the personal level of articulation (Allen 1998). Cooper, whose ambition is to modify and expand the Foucauldian paradigm in order to suit a feminist analysis, works out a model of power which is both relational and productive. She suggests that both these aspects can be addressed in a definition of power as ‘the ability to create effects’. According to this perspective, power is rooted in the ability to induce certain effects, which may either transform or maintain the status quo of social, material or ideological relations. Such capacity conceptions of power have played a significant role in the feminist theorisation of power (Squires 1999: 32–46). Cooper believes that her approach is different from a simple theory of causation through her emphasis on the ‘differential ability to cause’ (p. 18). This aspect anchors a focus on inter-personal or inter-group relationships and renders an intersectional perspective a central criterion for a satisfying analysis. Her model of power is linked to an ethical orientation, which she calls an ethics of equal power, that is, a normative ideal that all individuals should have the same power to impact on their environment or to fulfil their wants or desires. According to my view, Cooper’s thoughts on both theory and ethics are highly useful for the analysis of the multiple forms of power around and within queer non-monogamous relationships. On Fisting and Friendship – Agency, Transgression and Resistance As I have argued earlier, the strong reliance of Foucault’s early work on disciplinary power renders queer theories of heteronormativity somewhat inadequate to theorise about personal agency and forms of resistance. Queer theory consequently shares a common dilemma of most Foucauldian approaches to power (Fraser 1989, McNay 1994, Freundlieb 1994). In order to carve out some theoretical space for agency and resistance, queer theorists – just like Foucauldian feminists – have frequently taken recourse to Foucault’s later work on the care of the self. Many queer theorists concerned with a theory of resistance as transgression have found great inspiration in the interviews that Michel Foucault gave in the early 1980s on gay identity and politics (Halperin 1995, Warner 1999, Sullivan 2003). In these interviews Foucault
Beyond the Myth of Equality and Democracy
15
develops an interesting outlook on sexual and relationship practice as resistance. For Foucault, resistance is not so much a matter of claiming the right to be a homosexual, but to become homosexual, that is, to engage in a cultural politics of inventive, progressive and counter-normative practices. As a way of life, the exploration of what it could mean to be gay draws on the rejection of existing lifestyles and aims at the transformation of self and social life. ‘I would say that one must use sexuality to discover and invent new relations. To be gay is to be in a state of becoming’ (1996a: 370). I think Foucault goes a step further here than in his rather individualistic ethics at the heart of his writing on the ‘care for the self’ (1985, 1986). There is a collective appeal in this statement that renders it a proposal to the lesbian and gay movement to adopt more cultural-revolutionary perspective. For Foucault, gayness is not simply a matter of the individual: ‘I would say that the homosexual consciousness certainly goes beyond one’s individual experience and includes an awareness of being a member of a particular social group’, he explains in a different context (1996b: 323). Foucault develops his vision of a transgressive politics on the terrains of the body, pleasure and relational creativity. He sees the seeds for such a cultural politics in gay men’s sexual practices in the bath-houses of New York and San Francisco, which he praises as ‘laboratories of sexual experimentation’ (p. 330). The complex deployment of power, of a mixture of rules and openness in S/M play, for Foucault, may result in the creation of ‘perpetual novelty, perpetual tension and a perpetual uncertainty’ (1996b: 331). For Foucault, S/M seems to promise the uninhibited, effervescent pleasures of a polymorphous perversity. ‘The idea is to make use of every part of the body a sex-instrument’ (p. 331). Fist fucking is one of Foucault’s prime examples on how it is possible to ‘produce pleasure with very odd things, very strange parts of our bodies’ (Foucault, quoted by Halperin 1995: 91). Fisting, for Foucault, symbolises a de-sexualised, de-genitalised, and de-centralised form of pleasure, an escape route out of the mental corset of ‘sexuality’ and traditional masculinity (cf. Halperin 1995). While most of Foucault’s references aim at the creation of a new culture of bodies and pleasures, he also raises questions around relationship practice (1996b: 324). This is most obvious in his interview ‘Friendship as a way of life’ (1996c). A ‘gay way of life’ as a cultural project could ‘use sexuality henceforth to arrive at a multiplicity of relationships’ (p. 308). The political aim of ‘freedom of choice’ aims at a societal climate in which diversity of social relationships is acknowledged and fostered. Due to the long history of denial and suppression, Foucault attributes gay men and lesbians a particular privileged role ‘to re-open affective and relational virtualities’ (p. 311). As a political and cultural project the lesbian and gay movement ought to multiply the erotic, intimate and sexual possibilities which at the moment are confined to ‘the two ready-made formulas of the pure sexual encounter and the lovers’ fusion of identities’ (p. 310). I think there is something extremely beautiful in this vision of becoming, creation and world-making. It is inspired by a strong and radical ambition to go beyond the existent – which, as many of us know only too well, often is restrictive and oppressive. Foucault’s interviews on sexual politics and his work on the ‘care for the self’ (of which they may be considered being part of) provide a rare outlook in
16
The Spectre of Promiscuity
Foucault’s writing on the possibility of stepping outside the forms of interconnected regimes of normativity. These ideas have provided significant elements for a major route through which transgression has been conceptualised in queer theory (Warner 1999, Halperin 1995, Sullivan 2003). It is certainly tempting to think about queer non-monogamous relationship practices through this perspective on transgression. However, as I will show in the following, there is also a range of problems with this approach. Even More Fisting – on the Limitation of the Transgression Discourse Many feminists have been highly critical of Foucault’s ethics around his theory of ‘practices of freedom’ in which he endorsed elitist, exclusive, masculinist and individualistic philosophical traditions from within Greek antiquity. Others feel that his ethics lack any normative orientation regarding which forms of power could be considered as being benign and which ones as problematic (Fraser 1989). Some consider Foucault’s later philosophy inconsistent and irreconcilable with his earlier work on disciplinary power. These criticisms notwithstanding, some feminists have critically drawn from this strand of thought to ground a feminist theory of autonomy (Grimshaw 1993, McNay 1994). However, in the context of my discussion the question whether a definition of resistance and queer politics on the level of sex, bodies and relationships – or for that matter, on the level of culture – does not result in a somewhat limited understanding of political activism is even more interesting (cf. E. Wilson 1993, Phillips 1993). Katherine Raymond expresses her doubts about the endorsement of transgressive sexual acts as an act of resistance as follows: ‘[I]t’s certainly true that the personal is political, in that sense that one’s identity, even in its most “intimate” components, is informed by a larger sociopolitical context. Yet the idea that individual sex acts will, over time, somehow permeate and alter collective social consciousness seems a bit suspect to me. The casual gaps between sex acts and political theory, to say nothing of those between theory and political practice, are vast and indefinable. It is difficult to make the argument that one female fist inserted into one male ass – or, for that matter, dozens or even hundreds of fists inserted into as many asses – can really make a difference for, say, lesbian mothers fighting for custody of their children’ (1997: 59).
Raymond takes on the argument that fisting symbolises an act of political resistance, which may have the potential to undermine heteronormative practices of gender and sexuality. Although Raymond does not necessarily refute the validity of the argument of transgression in the narrow terrain of sexual performance, she puts it into perspective by pointing to other fields of politics which she perceives as more relevant, namely reproductive rights and the construction of queer sexualities vis-àvis the state (cf. E. Wilson 1993, Johnson 1997). Diverse fields of politics cannot be addressed through a conceptualisation of resistance as transgression. Strategies of transgression ultimately are constricted to a limited terrain of struggle and operate through a reductionist analysis of the political. At the same time, the metaphor of transgression (as an act of over-stepping a limit) fosters a rather one-dimensional theorisation of power (Haritaworn 2005). If, for example, a group of bisexual
Beyond the Myth of Equality and Democracy
17
men and women lives in a multiple relationship, they may resist compulsory monogamy, hegemonic constructions of heterosexuality, normative ideas of the family, and so on. If they have queer sex, they may performatively undermine heteronormative matrices of gender and sexuality. However, if the women remain the primary care givers to the children, such an arrangement may at the same time reinforce normative practices and assumptions with regard to gender. If we stylise non-monogamous queer relationship practices as transgressive resistance this may make us less attentive to other power-issues within a relationship-context (whether based on gender, race, class, body ideals, and so on). The question of resistance is too complex to be grasped within a one-dimensional concept such as transgression. In this book I address the question of power around gay male and bisexual nonmonogamous relationships. The lines of my inquiry have been strongly influenced by work within the tradition of queer theory, among others on heteronormativity and transgression. At the same time, I hold quite ambivalent views about these categories and wonder how useful they are regarding their capacity to account for the complex forms through which power works in queer non-monogamous lives. My aim with this book is not only to provide novel insights about non-monogamous relationship practice and sexual politics in the UK, but to further generate innovative ideas which may broaden and refine the theoretical perspectives in critical sexuality studies. Routes for an Intellectual Journey … the Structure of the Book In Chapter 1, I continue to develop my theoretical framework. I turn to the question of the law and provide some examples of how the state regulates sexualities by policing the private/public distinction. The long tradition in UK legal practice to banish queer identities, sex and relationships from the public sphere attests to the fact that citizenship has been constructed in heteronormative terms. I further look at how social movements have contested hegemonic constructions of the public sphere and argue that a model of multiple public spheres, related in conflict and hierarchy, is adequate for understanding these forms of struggle. In Chapter 2, I explain my personal reasons for doing this research and discuss some aspects of the research process. The main focus is on questions of difference and power and the ways in which they impact on the intersubjective dynamics of the researcher/researched relationship. My discussion of questions regarding power relations around differential positionality in this chapter establishes an analytical perspective that is deployed throughout the whole book. This chapter also introduces the reader to some innovative debates with regard to research methodology, research ethics and epistemology. In Chapter 3, I highlight the centrality of anti-promiscuity discourses in homophobic representations of gay male masculinity. I further explore conflicts within the gay movement over non-monogamy, public sex and the same-sex marriage campaign. In particular, I engage with the argument (also held among gay men) that gay male promiscuity would damage the overall reputation of the gay community. With regard to the question of same-sex marriage I discuss the finding that many
18
The Spectre of Promiscuity
non-monogamous gay men, too, support the campaign for same-sex marriage despite their concerns that a politics of marriage may foster pressures to assimilate. In Chapter 4, I explain the prominence of the monogamy/non-monogamy debates in the bisexual movement with regard to widespread anti-bisexual promiscuity stereotypes. The chapter further explores the bisexual debate on both same-sex and other-sex marriage. The question of other-sex marriage seems to be even more contentious than the demand for same-sex marriage since it brings up worries about subjecting to heteronormative discourses. I also engage with the question of how other-sex marriage between partners can affect inter-personal dynamics in multiple relationship networks. In Chapter 5, I explore the discourses on polyamory. The relationship philosophy of polyamory is becoming more popular in the UK. My conversations with polyamorous people suggest that a commitment to polyamory is often linked to a distinctive social or sexual identity. Polyamory activists in the UK are currently engaged in shaping poly-networks and work towards the creation of a larger polyamory movement. There are different interpretations of the concept. While some claim polyamory to be an oppositional discourse, sex-radicals contest the over-emphasis on love and intimacy in the stylisation of polyamory as ‘responsible non-monogamy’. This conflict shows that polyamory creates its own margins of less condoned styles of non-monogamy which are to a stronger degree motivated by an endorsement of sexual pleasure. In Chapter 6, I explore how power relations affect the dynamics between non-monogamous partners. I argue that differences in social positioning in terms of age, gender, class, race/ethnicity, religion, sexual identity, and so on affect the ways in which people’s non-monogamy is perceived. Differences in positioning are furthermore linked up with power structures and imbalances that may complicate the negotiation of non-monogamous relationships between partners. The way the research participants described conflicts about non-monogamy in their partnerships illustrates that gender alone does not provide a sufficient perspective for the analysis of power dynamics in non-monogamous relationships. In Chapter 7, I draw together the main arguments which run through this book and develop the most significant theoretical insights gained from this study. I highlight the exclusive effects of certain social movement strategies and explain them through the ways in which the public sphere is politically constructed. The attempts by the gay and lesbian and bisexual movements to gain public sphere inclusion and full citizenship rights often deploy strategies of creating ‘positive images’, which tend to construct non-monogamy, sex with multiple partners, and episodic, recreational or public sex as the ‘outside’ of a respectable lesbian and gay or bisexual ‘community’. At the same time, queer alternatives tend to endorse a romanticist vision of radical alterity and counter-normativity that glosses over the contradictions and power relations that determine queer sex and relationship cultures. Although the chapters are intended to appear in this order, readers should feel free to progress in the way that responds to their immediate interests. Each chapter also stands on its own. All readers interested in the concrete design of the study should turn to the Appendix, where I provide detailed information on methods and research sample.
Chapter 1
The State of the Law: Heteronormative Citizenship and Sexual Counterpublics
The injustices of gay lifestyle annoy me. The fact that there are these ancient laws which discriminate against gay people, more than two men can’t have sex together, it’s illegal. That sort of thing really annoys me. (...) When I read, in the gay papers (…) about the Bolton Seven1 – as they’ve been called. The reaction of the Establishment against them makes my blood boil. And when I read those articles, I can feel my blood pressure rising. It annoys me. (...) And quite often I will not listen to the news or things on the radio and TV (…) because I get so emotionally involved with it, that it upsets me and I would rather not know about it, so I can’t get upset. But it’s that side of the gay world which does annoy me and I wish I knew what I, as an individual, could do to get things like that changed. Since I’ve left work I no longer have to conform myself. (Lee)
Scholars and activists alike have emphasised the privileged role of the state in the regulation of sexualities and genders (Duggan 1995, Smart 1995). Despite internal contradictions and the contestation of particular legal politics between and within different state institutions and its major actors, the state has remained a key obstacle to progressive sexual politics in Britain (Pringle and Watson 1992, Cooper 1995, Stychin 1995). This is not only because of the state’s prohibitive functions, but also because of its ability to construct sexualities, social formations, ‘the public’ and its constituents. From within a Foucauldian perspective on the law a close interrelation exists between legal discourse and sexual identities and the conditionality for the emergence and development of erotic cultures (Herman and Stychin 1995, Moran et al. 1998). Some have argued that the particularly enhanced effectivity of the law to construct and regulate sexuality rests in its ability to present itself as a superior form of truth. This particular authority of the law is derived from its ability to incorporate or to ally itself with other scientific discourses, such as medicine, psychology or social work (Smart 1989: 96). Legal practice and the emerging space of its contestation, consequently, are important aspects of the creation of heteronormative hegemony. The definition of the division between public and private has been central to the state’s ambition to regulate sexual and gender cultures. Through the discussion of 1 The term ‘Bolton Seven’ refers to a court case in which seven men were tried and convicted on January 12, 1998 (the sentence was then deferred to February 20, 1999) for consenting to group and same-sex activities in their private homes in Bolton, a town in northwest England.
20
The Spectre of Promiscuity
some key events in the legalisation of sexualities in Britain, I demonstrate how the law works to banish queer sexualities from the public sphere. I argue that it is largely through the containment of queer sexualities and identities in the private that full citizenship has been withheld to gay men, lesbians, bisexuals and other queers. Legal practice thereby works as a productive form of power that privileges hegemonic heterosexualities and delegitimises queer sex, relationships and identities. In the last part of the chapter, I suggest framing the attempts of the lesbian and gay, bisexual and feminist movements to challenge heterosexist state politics as a construction of counterpublics. I argue that a theory of multiple, intersecting publics that are related in hierarchy and based in struggle is helpful for understanding complicated processes of normativity, resistance and hegemonic conflict around alternate relationship practices. The Regulation of the Public/Private Distinction The distinction between the private and the public sphere is deeply embedded in our understanding of intimacy and sexuality, the social, and the political. In its manifold and distinct theorisations, the public/private dichotomy tries to take account of the complex interrelations between the state, civil society and the personal (Squires 1999, Young 2000). Feminists have shown that the public/private dichotomy has been inserted in political discourse in a way that justifies the exclusion, disenfranchisement and subordination of women. Often backed by essentialist discourses on sexual difference, women’s lives, work, roles and ‘virtues’ have been constructed as private (Moller Okin 1991/1998). In dominant political discourse the private tends to have no meaning and is supposed to add nothing to the understanding of society in general. For women, the civil freedoms supposed to flow from the social contract have always been undermined by a sexual contract that has defined the public and private in gendered terms and subordinated women in both spheres (Pateman 1988, Walby 1994). Feminists have consequently politicised and contested the dominant construction of the public/private divide. The slogan ‘the personal is political’ is based on a discursive strategy that attempts to shift the parameters of the traditional definition and stresses the interrelation and inseparability of the two spheres. It further highlights the constructed character of the boundary between them (Phillips 1993, Cooper 2001). ‘The private/public division is fluid, historically and contextually determined, contested and constantly struggled over and redefined’, argue, for example, Werbner and Yuval-Davis (1999: 29). They foreground the classed, gendered, racialised and culturally specific character of the divide, which tends to be drawn against the back drop of nationalist discourses. Moreover and most important for my argument in this chapter, the dichotomy is also sexualised (N. Duncan 1996, Richardson 2000). The Regulation and Contestation of Sexualities The flexible operationalisation of the public/private draws on the articulation of myriad connotations around sexuality, gender, race and class. These connotations
The State of the Law
21
render the distinction an effective tool for regulating access to certain social spheres and to police forms of behaviour possible therein. The transgression of the boundaries drawn by the hegemonic articulations of the public/private division may result in serious consequences for the ‘transgressors’, ranging from stigmatisation to physical violence (Myslik 1996, Valentine 1996). This is because transgressions are often experienced ‘not as merely theoretical, but as violation of deep instincts about sex and gender’ (Warner 2002: 23). The exclusive mechanisms that are activated in the public/private distinction revolve around a common sense of what is considered to be ‘appropriate’ behaviour in the context of a particular public sphere context (Cooper 2001). It also establishes differential criteria of entitlement (to presence, participation, certain forms of interaction, and so on). While many have highlighted the potential of the public sphere in enhancing participatory democracy, others have directed attention to the mechanisms by which the public sphere fosters discourses which exclude certain groups of people and styles of interaction (Cooper 1994). Among others this works through the construction of the public sphere as the arena of proper politics and critical-rational discourse (Habermas 1969, Calhoun 1993). Feminists have shown that the assumption of a single, universal public sphere dedicated to a rational debate and the enhancement of the ‘common good’ has been used to question the legitimacy of certain demands with the argument that they would be either particularistic or irrational in form or content. This way the body, sex, affection, feeling and passion could be marginalised in public realms. The same applies to certain groups of people that have been associated with physicality or sexuality (Young 1990a, 2000, Fraser 1997). However, if we want to fully understand the normative processes that work through the public/private divide, we should pay attention to the fact that it tends to be particular sexualities and bodies which are scrutinised in the public sphere. These have been in particular lesbigay, gender-queer, racialised and interracial sexualities, and so on (cf. N. Duncan 1996, Dawson 1995, Steinbugler 2005). From this perspective it becomes very obvious that, far from being static, the public/private divide is mediated by discourses on gender, race, ethnicity, class and sexuality. Heteronormativity and Citizenship Hegemonic interpretations of the public/private distinction have had an enormous impact on the conceptualisation of citizenship (Turner 1990). In the British debate on citizenship the work of T.H. Marshall has been extremely influential, if not paradigmatic. Marshall has defined citizenship as ‘a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed’ (1950: 14). Marshall’s primary concern was with social class and he stressed civil, legal, political and social rights as the basic components of a historically evolving citizenship status. Contemporary citizenship debates have gone far beyond Marshall’s framework by stressing the gendered, racialised and sexualised dimensions of citizenship discourses and practices. Marshall’s historical account has been criticised as androcentric (Lister 1997a, Yuval-Davis 1997). Moreover, more recently a range of authors has shown that the practices of citizenship are profoundly sexualised (Evans
22
The Spectre of Promiscuity
1993, Carver 1998, Weeks 1998, Plummer 2001a, Richardson 2000, Johnson 2002). Marshall’s theory has further been challenged for equating civil society with the national community (Werbner and Yuval-Davis 1999). Moreover, globalisation, post-war national migration flows, the growth of international organisations and agencies (such as UN and UNESCO), the gaining strength of human rights discourse and the emergence of multi-state polities (such as the EU) have resulted in the growth of postnational modes of citizenship (Soysal 1994, Turner 1993). National and postnational (or transnational) modes of citizenship coexist in interrelation. According to a widely held criticism, Marshall’s definition of citizenship as ‘full membership in the community’ fails to acknowledge that people are in fact involved in manifold communities or identity-based projects. This insight challenges the universalism at the heart of dominant citizenship discourse (Yuval-Davis 1997). It is only through an emphasis of the multi-layered character of citizenship that politics in the name of citizenship can take account of these complexities. In order to realise its full democratic potential, many argue, we have to sever the exclusive ties of the concept to the terrain of the nation state and need to accept that ‘full membership’ in any particular ‘community’ exceeds questions of legal entitlement and tends to be defined in much more subtle ways (cf. Werbner and Yuval-Davis 1999, Richardson 2000). In general, I agree with such a broad interpretation of citizenship. At the same time, I hold the position that the nation state and its legal practice continue to have crucial weighting in determining the degree to which people can access resources, participate in democratic processes, and communicate or realise their cultural and sexual identities (cf. Erel 2002). I use the concept of citizenship in this chapter as a primarily analytical concept in a mode of analysis first set out by David Evans (1993, 1995).2 Evans has shown that the boundaries of the national community is also constructed in moral terms and correspond with ethical codes associated with hegemonic heterosexualities. Moral disapproval on the level of public discourse and state politics results in a graduated and hierarchical system of citizenship in which certain sexualities and genders are confined to the margins of the social space of proper citizenship and respectability (cf. Carver 1998, Richardson 2000). In the following sections I provide a selective discussion of the legalisation of queer sexualities in the UK in order to show that the state through its legal practice constructs both the public sphere and the conditionality for citizenship in heteronormative terms. I strategically focus on significant legal ‘events’ in the history of UK law to illustrate ‘the intimate relationship between state form and practices and the organisation of sexuality’ (Cooper 1993: 191). I develop my argument along a critical analysis of (a) strategies within the practice of criminal law as they have been articulated in Wolfenden and the Sexual Offences Act 1967 and (b) the centrality of heteronormative family values expressed in the implementation of Section 28. Both acts of legislation aimed at shoring up a definition of the public sphere as heterosexual. The self-identification of the state in heterosexual terms is 2 Claiming citizenship rights has also become a significant strategy in lesbian and gay and bisexual politics (Herman 1993, Rahman 2000). As I will argue in more detail in Chapter 7, there are serious drawbacks linked to the promotion of the concept of citizenship as a rallying point for radical sexual politics.
The State of the Law
23
further evidenced in the stubborn denial (until very recently) to recognise queer relationships and families in British civil law. The Wolfenden Strategy: Permissiveness and Control The Wolfenden Report and the Sexual Offences Act 1967 (which was drafted in the spirit of the former) established a legal double-standard of privacy for male same-sex and heterosexual (and lesbian) sexuality. Only with the introduction of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 the provisions within criminal law regarding the offence of ‘public sex’ were formally equalised with regard to (male) same-sex and heterosexual behaviours (Bainham and Brooks-Gordon 2004). Benjamin (the pseudonym of a Jewish gay male activist whose life story I recorded in a previous research project) wrote in an unpublished essay in 1983: ‘For those who remember far back enough, pre-Wolfenden was a time of no hope for homosexuals. Keeping out of trouble and enjoying oneself, maybe as a couple, was the aspiration. Lily law, bosses, landlords and all were liable to persecute one with virtually no redress: after all you were a criminal pariah. This was the common expectation. All homos had to consider the possibility of a knock at the door by police or blackmailers. A low-level totalitarian situation’ (Benjamin, quoted in Klesse 1997: 60).
As a result of this existential threat many homosexual men were forced to lead a double life or to retreat into ‘the closet’, as this condition of life was later described in gay liberationist language (Chauncey 1995). Although Benjamin talks of a widespread aspiration of many homosexual men to have a long-term partnership, the threat of a jail sentence and a shameful loss of respectability made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for many men to build such a relationship (Porter and Weeks 1991). Many of my interview partners who have lived through the pre-1967 period remember it as a time of total repression, shame and anxiety. The risk of criminalisation enforced years of celibacy for some of them. During the 1930s an average of 500 men a year were arrested on the grounds of consensual same-sex activities. A set of partially very old penal laws which criminalised certain bodily, sexual or social acts provided the framework for an increasingly escalating police repression. During the years after W.W.II homosexuals suffered a new scale of police persecution. Arrests on the grounds of ‘buggery’ (referring to sodomy), ‘gross indecency’ (referring to – among others – oral sex) and ‘soliciting’ (indicating one’s interest in sex in public) reached the number of 1,666 in 1950 and 2,504 in 1955 (Miller 1995). Chain persecutions aiming at cracking down on homosexual friendship networks became common and the police started using entrapment tactics to get hold of cruisers and cottagers. This ‘excess of zeal’ in policing and prosecuting male same-sex cultures drew upon a culture of paranoia and a discursive repertoire in which anti-Communist cold war ideology merged with homophobic conspiracy theories (Weeks 1977/1990, Shepherd 1989). Hegemonic discourses constructed homosexuals (the prime example of the sexual pervert) outside of the (respectable) national community. The
24
The Spectre of Promiscuity
fact that some prominent men, too, were caught in the escalation of arrests resulted in a growing public awareness of ‘the problem of homosexuality’. The Wolfenden Committee and the Limits of Liberalism On August 24, 1954 the British government set up a committee to review the criminal law and the penal system with respect to its treatment of homosexuality and prostitution. Named after its chair, the Vice Chancellor of Reading University Sir John Wolfenden, the committee later came to be known as Wolfenden Committee. After three years of inquiry and sixty-two meetings during which the testimonial of two hundred different individuals and organisations were heard, the committee published its recommendations, the so-called ‘Wolfenden Report’ on September 4, 1957. With respect to homosexuality the committee recommended the partial decriminalisation of consensual male same-sex activity: ‘We accordingly recommend that homosexual behaviour between consenting adults in private should no longer be a criminal offence’ (HMSO 1957, quoted by Miller 1995: 283). The committee further recommended to fix the age of consent for homosexual consensual sex at the age of twenty-one. It took the Government about ten years to translate these recommendations into legislation with the Sexual Offences Act of 1967. What on the first glance looks like a movement towards sexual liberalism, permissiveness or an increased acceptance of male homosexuality turns out to be much more complicated. The Wolfenden recommendations, Stuart Hall (1980) suggests, were born out of an escalating panic at the increasing visibility of street prostitution and male homosexuality. The first experts to be heard on the issue of homosexuality by the committee were police representatives (Mort 1999). Although homosexuals, too, were later invited to speak to the Committee, analysis of historical documents reveals that the authority of naming and definition of homosexuality was confined to experts and ‘duly qualified’ speakers such as psychiatrists and prison doctors (Moran 1995). Hall (1980) attests the report’s opinions and recommendations a high degree of social orthodoxy. This is in particular the case with the ones referring to the subject matter of prostitution.3 With respect to homosexuality, too, Wolfenden’s liberalism had its drawbacks. Hall speaks of a moral ‘double taxonomy’ built into Wolfenden and the 1967 Sexual Offences Act. While the committee argued that ‘the laws of society must be acceptable to the general moral sense of the community’, it also suggested that the law should concern itself with matters of public morality only insofar as they directly impinged on the public good. According to the Committee members, the function of the law was ‘to preserve public order and decency, to protect the citizen from what is offensive and injurious and to provide sufficient safeguards against exploitation and corruption of others’ (HMSO 1957, quoted by Hall 1980: 12). 3 On prostitution the Wolfenden Report proposed a range of ‘tougher’ legislative measures: (a) an increase of the maximum penalty for persistent soliciting, (b) progressively higher fines for repeated offences (Greenwood and Young 1980). The Street Offences Act 1959 modelled in the spirit of these recommendations created the legal instruments to ‘clear the streets of prostitution’ (Hall 1980: 10, Bland et al. 1979).
The State of the Law
25
Although Wolfenden proposed the decriminalisation of certain private sexual acts between men, it made sure that this would not be misunderstood as a public approval of homosexuality by declaring male and female homosexual acts as ‘reprehensible from the point of view of the family’. The character or the limits of the Wolfenden report’s liberalism are expressed in its continued appeal to the ‘respectable’ public man or woman and its demand of ‘the privatisation of selective aspects of sexual conduct’ (Hall 1980: 13). The ‘moral economy’ of Wolfenden distinguished formally between immorality and illegality. It further sharpened sexual definitions of the public and the private. Moral regulation extended to both areas, whereas criminalisation was supposed only to apply to what is defined as the public (Mort 1980, Weeks 1985). This moral taxonomy has been extremely influential on British sexual politics over many decades. Plummer (1998) argues that it provides the key to understanding the creation of moral discourse in post-war Britain and the backdrop towards both early legal changes and later social movement activism. The Sexual Offences Act 1967 and the Privatisation of Gay Male Sexuality Wolfenden’s moral and legal philosophy strongly influenced the formulation of the Sexual Offences Act 1967. Here the relaxation of the law in the private sphere went hand in hand with the reinforcement of persecution and legal punishment of sexual ‘offences’ in the public. The law promised the exemption from prosecution of certain consensual male same-sex sexual activities between adults over twenty-one in England and Wales. The boundaries of the private were drawn extremely tight with respect to sex between men. Privacy was defined to end where more than two people were (or were likely to be) present. The aspiration to protect the ‘youth’ as a particularly vulnerable group resulted in an increase of the prison sentence for sex between adult men and men over sixteen but under the age of consent to five years’ imprisonment.4 The Sexual Offences Act 1967 did not remove the criminalisation of ‘buggery’ (anal sex) and ‘gross indecency’ (gay male acts other than buggery, for example, fellatio or mutual masturbation) which had been first laid out in the Labouchère Amendment and were later codified in Sections 12 and 13 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. Rather than being repealed, these sections were only watered down in the 1967 reform. It is appropriate therefore to interpret the law a contingent promise not to prosecute rather than as an act of decriminalisation (Waites 1998, Bamforth 1997). An immediate effect of the law was a backlash in terms of prosecution (Weeks 1977/1990). According to Simon Watney the ‘Wolfenden Strategy’ ‘led to a widespread displacement of sexual attention away from the home, in the larger direction of “public” places, which were henceforth to be rigorously – and at times obsessively – policed’ (1987/1997: 60). Lord Arran, who had been very supportive in bringing the act through the House of Lords, appealed to all homosexuals: ‘I ask 4 Because English law has only been applicable to England and Wales the partial decriminalisation of male same-sex activity did not apply to other parts of the UK such as Northern Ireland, Scotland, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands.
26
The Spectre of Promiscuity
those who (...) were in bondage and for whom the prison doors are now open, to show their thanks by comporting themselves quietly and with dignity’ (quoted by Evans 1993: 128). The ones who did not comply with this demand were subjected to even harsher treatment than before. The discourses and the strategies of policing around the law produced two types of homosexuals: the majority of ‘decent’ homosexuals who preferred to meet (other adult men aged twenty-one and over) in private and a ‘reprehensible’ minority who continued to indulge in public acts or chose under-aged partners (Greenwood and Young 1980). Moralising the public/private division the law worked through a dichotomy juxtaposing ‘good homosexuals’ and ‘dangerous queers’ (cf. Smith 1994a). The Sexual Offences Act 1967 had a thorough impact on the material construction of sexual identities, cultures and modes of representation. Frank Mort (1980) argues that the act constructed ‘a new type of homosexual subject, understood as operating in the private sphere; a subject who in matters of sexuality and morality is defined as consenting, privatised and person-focused’ (1980: 42). According to Mort, the individualised, pleasure-seeking and mostly apolitical character of the gay subculture has its discursive roots in this legal confinement. David Evans (1993, 1995) extends this analysis by placing the Sexual Offences Act 1967 in the context of a longer period of legal reformism and larger cultural and economic changes which gave rise to leisure-oriented lifestyles and new forms of consumerism. In this perspective, the reform of the legislation of gay male sexuality appears to be a response to the cultural requirements of capitalist market strategies rather than as the success of the struggles of the homosexual law reform movement (cf. Weeks 1977/1990). By diminishing restrictions on personal freedom through reform laws the legislators responded to the demands of salient forms of market-related ‘economic individualism’. In the context of these cultural and legal changes, new space emerged for the articulation of sexuality and pleasure. This development, however, was at odds with the central values of the love ethics at the heart of heterosexual monogamous culture. The ambiguity of Wolfenden’s liberalism emerged from this conflict between ‘amoral’ market interests and the state’s claim to act as a moral authority. In order to resolve this problem in a balanced way, marginalised sexual identities/groups had to gain the permission to express themselves to a certain degree in a limited public space, which could then be permeated by market strategies. Formal legal enforcement and informal social incorporation created the basis for specific forms of sexual citizenship that remained largely confined to part-time leisure and lifestyle spaces. This system of partial citizenship is based on heteronormative values and a double standard with regard to publicity and privacy (cf. Carver 1998, Richardson 2000, Cooper 2001). From this perspective, sexual citizenship provides a regulative machinery in which rights are granted on the basis of an adherence to certain codes of sexual behaviour and/or identity. A politics of compromise is written right into the heart of citizenship discourse, which David Bell and Jon Binnie summarise as following: ‘we will grant you certain rights if (and only if) you match these by taking on certain responsibilities’ (2000: 3). Because this ‘system of sexual citizenship’ (David Evans) promises the possibility of inclusion on the grounds of conformity, it presents itself not only as a regime of exclusion, but also as one of ‘normalisation’.
The State of the Law
27
Policing Queer Sex, Affection and Bodies in the ‘Public’ After decades of struggle, the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000 finally set an age of consent which did no longer distinguish in a discriminatory fashion between heterosexual and same-sex acts and relationships (Waites 2003). The revision of sexual offences policies in England and Wales which was first announced on January 25, 1999 has highlighted the principle of equality with the aim to remove laws which discriminate either between men and women or male-female and same-sex behaviours (Waites 2002: 337, McGhee 2004). The double standard of privacy expectations regarding heterosexual and gay male sex remained written into law until recently, when the Sexual Offences Act 2003 defined the penalties for public sexual activities irrespective of the gender of the participants (Bainham and Brooks-Gordon 2004). These changes now open up the legal possibility to extend prosecution to include public sex between men and women, a demand that has occasionally been aired in sensationalist tabloid press coverage on local ‘dogging’ cultures (Bell 2006). It is too early to judge whether these changes in law will really change patterns of prosecution. Traditionally police in the UK have considered it a high priority task to survey and arrest men who have sex with men in ‘public places’ (Burke 1993). For many decades the conviction rate for ‘gross indecency’ offences between men defined in the Sexual Offences Act 1967 has remained almost unchanged (Bamforth 1997). Around 30,000 men were arrested on the basis of these laws between 1967 and 2003 (Cooper 2007). During this long period of time ‘public sex’ was discursively framed as a problem of gay male sexuality. The recent announcement by Merseyside Police to crack down on male cruising activities in the Otterspool area in Liverpool is an example that male public sex cultures remain a target for policing (Outnorthwest 2007). To what degree the behaviours prosecuted over all these decades of police surveillance and interference can be unequivocally described as ‘public sex’ is open to question. The distinction between what is public and what is private is far from being self-evident. Like the identity of any space, the identity of the public and the private is multiple, shifting and potentially unbounded (Massey 1994, Hubbard 2001). ‘Both private and public spaces are heterogeneous and not all space is clearly private or public’, Nancy Duncan explains (1996: 129). The boundary between the two spheres is discursively constructed. Where exactly it is drawn is contextual, culturally specific, and a contested issue between different groups or discourses (Fenster 2000). Participants in so-called ‘public sex’ usually follow certain precautions (both in terms of interaction and the usage of space) which aim at precluding that the sex taking place can be witnessed by non-interested attendants who may appear on the scene by chance (Edwards 1994, Coxon 1995, Woodhead 1995). Califia’s (2000) analysis of policing strategies used to target dissident sexualities in the USA reveals important insights in the moral economy that regulates the discourse on ‘public sex’. According to Califia, most people who are presumed to pursue ‘public sex’ could righteously assume some privacy for their acts, was it not for police officers spying on them by overcoming physical barriers, cutting down bushes, climbing on toilet roofs or pretending to cruise themselves, and so on. Moreover, Califia emphasises, that police surveillance and harassment has not remained constricted to places of easy public access, such as cemeteries,
28
The Spectre of Promiscuity
fields, restrooms, public toilets, and so on. Police often targets ‘bath houses’ or ‘sex clubs’, which require membership or provide sufficient privacy in the sense that nobody would seek access, who does not in principle consent that sex takes place on the premises. Although the official allegation is one of ‘public sex’, the motivation for prosecution clearly springs from a heterosexist assumption that the sex in question is ‘unnatural’, ‘lewd’, ‘indecent’ or ‘perverted’. The discourse on ‘public sex’ is not simply defined by its spatial dimension. It is deeply saturated with moral assumptions (Altman 1982/1997). The Sexual Offences Acts 1956 and 1967 only criminalised sexual acts between men. Sex between women has not been specifically targeted in UK criminal law. Most analysts have seen this as a consequence of a profound denial of female sexual agency and autonomy which results in an erasure of lesbian and bisexual female sexuality from legal discourse (Weeks 1977/1990, Haste 1992). However, the absence of anti-lesbian regulations in the criminal law does not mean that sexuality between women would be beyond the scope of criminal law. For example, censorship laws have been frequently used to prohibit the representation of lesbian sex and culture (Smyth 1992). In the course of a changing discourse on the age of consent, sexual relationships between women which involve a significantly younger partner have also been subject to legal prosecutions, in particular since the 1990s (Waites 2002: 336/337). Moreover, gender and sexuality non-specific laws – despite their general applicability – are much more likely to be enforced for penalising queer sex and affection in public. Same-sex couples are much more likely to be convicted under the Public Order Act 1986 for expressing physical affection in public. This law is designed to punish the offence of ‘using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour within the sight or hearing of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby’ (Bamforth 1997: 31). The enactment of such laws aims at an erasure of queer visibility in public. They install a demand on same-sex couples not to be affectionate or sexual in public and to pass as same-sex friends rather than as lovers or sexual partners. The absence of effective legal redress against ‘queer-bashing’ further illustrates the limits of the state’s concern with the safety and well-being of citizens who do not subject to heteronormative codes of identity, behaviour and gendered embodiment. Moreover, the great success with which attackers can build their defence on the argument of either ‘homosexual panic’ or ‘provocation’ reveals the prevalence of a ‘common sense’ (which extends to the juridical system) that queers better be invisible in public (Bamforth 1997, Sedgwick 1994, Nardi and Bolton 1991/1998). The manifold ways through which queer sex, affection and bodies are policed in public spaces attests to the role of the law in the construction of the public sphere in heteronormative terms. Through legislation, the state constructs its own discourse on the ideal character of the public sphere and the nature of the citizens, who are supposed to express themselves therein. One of the most striking examples of the banishing of queer relationships from the public sphere (with regard to the realms of speech, representation and education) has been Section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988. The ferocity of the debates on the introduction of Section 28 in the late 1980s and about its repeal in the years around the turn of the millennium leaves out of question that in the UK there has been a strong ambition to represent the community of respectable citizens as heterosexual.
The State of the Law
29
Section 28 and Heterosexual Family Values An important strategy to bind popular sentiments was the self-presentation of the Tory party as the party of the family. Tory discourse constructed the heterosexual family as a natural and homogenous entity which embodies universal values (David 1986, Abbott and Wallace 1992). In Thatcherite philosophy the family assumed the role of the foundational unit of society. The strong emphasis on family values in Thatcherite discourse ideologically flanked the government’s anti-welfare politics. The emphasis on self-reliance, family care, individual economic initiative and consumption rights shifted social and political responsibilities from the state onto families and kinship relationships. This is the programmatic orientation at the heart of Thatcher’s unforgettable axiomatic statement: ‘There is no such thing as society, there are individual men and women and their families’ (quoted by Evans 1993: 135). With the equation of the family with the nation, the Thatcher government set up a discourse that idealised certain hegemonic identities (white, English and heterosexual) at the expense of marginalised ones (Black, racialised, immigrant, queer). ‘Let us remember we are a nation, a nation is an extended family’, Thatcher proudly announced, or: ‘A nation of free people will only continue to be great if family life continues, and the structure of the nation is a family one’ (both quotes in Evans 1993: 136). The normalisation and naturalisation of heterosexual marriage and family extensively drew on discursive strategies of ‘othering’ in which ‘normal’ (that is, heterosexual procreative English) families were juxtaposed with abnormal and perverted queer ‘lifestyles’. The gay and lesbian affirmative politics and ‘positive image campaigns’ of some progressive local governments provided the fodder for nasty attacks on both gay men and lesbians and the ‘loony left’ that allegedly provided them a forum (Reinhold 1994, Cooper 1994, Smith 1994a). The homophobic campaigns of the Tory government and moral right grassroots organisations (often in the form of parents groups) culminated in the introduction of the infamous Section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988 (and Section 2A in Scotland). It was designed to prohibit the ‘promotion of homosexuality’ by local governments, which is put in obvious terms in subsection 1: [1] A Local authority shall not [a] intentionally promote homosexuality or publish material with the intention of promoting homosexuality; [b] promote the teaching in any maintained school of the acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family relationship. (quoted by Pringle et al. 1991: 4)
Smith’s (1994a) analysis of the anti-gay discourses deployed by supporters of the bill interprets the campaign around the law as part of a strategic ‘homosexualisation’ of Leftist local governments, that is, the symbolic fusion of local Labour socialism with homosexuality in order to mobilise popular homophobic sentiments against this political enemy. The accusations against gay men were manifold: they were accused of being promiscuous, diseased and responsible for spreading HIV to the innocent heterosexual community. Gay men were described as paedophiles lusting to seduce kids and teenagers. According to manufactured conspiracy theories, local councils
30
The Spectre of Promiscuity
were run by queers who plotted the destruction of the family and the abolition of heterosexuality, and so on. According to Smith, lesbians were largely absent from the hate speech of Tory MPs and local campaigners. This feature of 1980s conservative anti-gay discourse reinforced exclusive constructions of the political as a sphere in which men are the only relevant actors. At the same time, the wording of Section 28 (the prohibition to ‘promote homosexuality’) for the first time included lesbians in antigay legislation (Hamer et al. 1991). Despite being a relatively weak law in terms of its formal enforceability in the courts, Section 28 has played a significant role in reinforcing the hegemony of a conservative moral agenda. According to Evans, Section 28 meant the ‘codification of prejudice of almost mythical proportions’ (1993: 134). In practice, the discourse around the section did not only feed popular homophobic sentiments, it effectively undermined – with a long-standing impact – gay and lesbian-affirmative politics on the local government level (Cooper and Monro 2003). Local governments and other institutions responded to the law with censorship and/or self-censorship in their cultural politics and funding decisions (Pringle et al. 1991, Evans 1995, Carabine 1995). Section 28 seriously affected the discourse on homosexuality in diverse public sphere contexts. Section 28 and Educational Politics Section 28 has been an important element in a conservative strategy in educational politics (Thomson 1993, Epstein 2000, Moran 2001). Most significantly, Section 28 has had an impact on the practice of sex education. ‘While the Section should not affect the teaching of sex education, there is evidence that it does make teachers wary of dealing with the issue of homosexuality’, argues Moran (2001: 87). However, the problem runs even deeper. The repeal of Section 28 has been subject to ongoing controversies in Parliament, the media and other political forums (including the streets). The intentions to repeal Section 28 by the New Labour government did trigger a well-organised campaign under the banner ‘Keep the Clause’ by homophobic, religious and moral right-wing forces (cf. Rahman 2004, Burridge 2004, Waites 2000, Wise 2000, Epstein 2000). Although the section was repealed in Scotland in June 2000, in the rest of the UK such a legal step was initially hampered by the organised resistance in the House of Lords. The law was finally repealed on November 18, 2003. In order to reach a compromise on this issue, the Labour government produced guidelines emphasising that teachers have a legal duty to teach ‘the significance of marriage and of stable relationships as key building blocks of community and society’. The proposed guidelines were even reinforced in March 2000 under the pressure of the Conservatives to put an even greater emphasis on the significance of marriage. An amendment to the Learning and Skills Bill declared that children would have to be protected from ‘inappropriate teaching and materials’ and propagated to teach children about the ‘nature of marriage and its importance for family life and for bringing up children’ (both quotations Moran 2001: 78). The repeal of the Section 2A in Scotland drew on very similar ‘compromises’ and was accompanied by the introduction of guidelines that reaffirm the hetero- and familycentric ethical paradigm that had led to the drafting of the Section in the first place.
The State of the Law
31
Even if the Labour Government and the Scottish Executive worked towards the repeal of Section 28, Moran argues, these ‘compromises’ show that their family and sex education policies largely converge with the family values agenda of the conservatives (cf. Bell and Binnie 2000, Stychin 2003). Education plays a significant role in the reproduction of the nation, and the conceptualisation of the ‘national community’ has a strong impact on dominant conceptualisations of the public sphere (Balibar and Wallerstein 1993, Epstein and Johnson 1998, Calhoun 1993). The move to silence discourses on lesbigay sexualities in the context of schooling therefore indicates an attempt at the exclusion of queers from the nationalised public sphere, that is, the public sphere context officially sanctioned by nationalist discourse. Such an interpretation is implied when Jeffrey Weeks argues that the major aim of Section 28 was to insist on ‘a return to the narrow interpretation of the 1967 Act’ (Weeks quoted by Moran 2001: 77). The discourses around both Section 28 and the Sexual Offences Act 1967 can be read as key invents in the UK history of regulating sexualities through legal politics. The stubborn resistance of UK legislators over many decades to recognise same-sex or non-heterosexual relationships and family practices is a further expression of this policy-orientation. The Legislation of Queer Relationships The practice of UK family law has privileged heterosexual unions above queer relationships on many levels (VanEvery 1991/1992, Carabine 1996, Bailey-Harris 2001). Until very recently same-sex partnerships were not recognised by the law. As a result they were denied a range of significant rights, such as immigration rights, pension rights, inheritance rights and tax privileges.5 This practice symbolises a conscious denial by the state to grant basic protection to non-heterosexual partnerships and families (Hunter 1995a). It is against this back drop that partnership rights have been high on the agenda of lesbian and gay campaigning groups over recent decades (Weeks et al. 2001). The question through which legal form the state ideally could indicate recognition of queer relationships and families has been subject to an ongoing issue of debate. Recent legal developments have led to the implementation civil partnership laws, which enable same-sex partners in the UK to claim rights similar to married couples if they decided register their relationship (Barker 2004, 2006). The first step in the direction was undertaken in London, where since September 2001 same-sex couples could officially register their partnership. The act was primarily symbolic and did not equip couples with any significant rights. With the Civil Partnership Act 2004 finally a national piece of legislation allows same5 In the debate about same-sex partnership rights in the USA next of kin rights have been of paramount importance, for example, to secure partners’ hospital visitation rights or their effective voice in decisions on medication. In the UK there are no legal constrictions on the status ‘next-of-kin’ which would limit it to a married partner of biological family member. However, this does not mean that lesbian, gay, bisexual or queer people do not have at times to confront attempts by homophobic hospital staff to exclude them from patient care (cf. Auchmuty 2004: 114).
32
The Spectre of Promiscuity
sex couples to enter an official partnership status, which grants many of the rights married partners can claim. Yet UK law still reserves civil marriage for heterosexual unions. The position that only same-sex marriage rights would safeguard formal equality and entry into full civic citizenship is still quite vocal in the lesbian and gay movement (Hegarty et al. 2006). While it is difficult to dispute that the denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples and the introduction of a special law for samesex couples indicates a persistence of a heteronormative bias in UK legal and social policy, some critics have suggested that the real problem of the civil partnership act lies in its exclusive concern with the validation of long-term monogamous romantic couple relationships (Barker 2006). Within such an approach it will remain impossible to recognise the true diversity of lesbigay relationships and families. I will discuss the arguments around marriage and civil partnership legislation in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4. Here it is sufficient to say that UK legislators had to be pushed hard in order to consider any recognition of same-sex relationships whatsoever. The step which they were finally ready to take meant only a partial integration of the relationships which come closest to the model of heterosexual companionate partnership. The heteronormativity of UK legislation is evidenced with regard to many more levels of family and relationship law. Lesbian, gay and other parents in a current same-sex relationship are very likely to lose custody rights to their ex-partners, if they claim a heterosexual identity or are living in a heterosexual relationship (Bamforth 1997, Griffin and Mulholland 1997, Griffin 1998, Alldred 1998). Judges do not seem to have been influenced in their decision by the increasing body of research that demonstrates that children raised by non-heterosexual (and in particular lesbian) families or individuals cannot be said to suffer disadvantageous development, despite strong societal pressure and processes of stigmatisation (Golombok and Tasker 1997, Saffron 1998). That the role of parenting is both heterosexualised and biologised is revealed in the fact that in cases in which non-heterosexual ex-partners go through legal conflict about child care, residence and contact rights are usually granted to the biological parent (Griffin and Mulholland 1997, Griffin 1998, Gavigan 1995). Although singular recent cases indicate that some judges are ready to assume a different position on this issue (McCandless 2005), the hegemonic definition of parenthood still emphasises biological kinship over primary care giving (Arnup and Boyd 1995, Cooper 1995). There has been significant legal development regarding the rights of queers to adopt. During the 1990s most of the gay men, lesbians and bisexuals who applied for adoption faced huge difficulties, even if the polices of agencies and the attitudes of individual case workers may have made a difference in this experience (Weeks et al. 2001). The introduction of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 created the legal possibility for same-sex couples to jointly adopt. Yet social discrimination against queers who entered the application process persisted. Only recently the government took initiative to tackle this problem by passing regulations which make it illegal of adoption agencies to discriminate against gay and lesbian couples (Wintour et al. 2007). The public debates about the legislation on new reproductive technologies in Britain have also been hegemonised by neo-conservative ideologies on family and
The State of the Law
33
sexuality (Smart 1995, Steinberg 1997, Richardson 2000). In particular with respect to donor insemination (DI) worries about the reproduction of gays and lesbians have structured the debate. The report by the Warnock Committee on Human Fertilisation and Embryology published in 1984 expressed a clear policy orientation towards privileging two-parent families with regard to the access to DI technologies. Consequently, infertility services should not be made available to single women, lesbians, gays, widows, unstable couples, and so on. In the debate in Parliament about the Human Fertilisation Embryology Act 1990 (HFEA) the position that reproduction should be limited to heterosexuals in general and heterosexual families in particular was expressed even more forcefully. The disapproval of the idea of queer reproduction and parenting among others led to the demand to consider the child’s need for a father (Cooper 1995, Sheldon 2005). Even if the law did not result in an effective full-scale exclusion of single and/or lesbian women from DI (because not all clinics adopted such a policy or women opted for informal arrangements, such as self-insemination) (cf. Haimes and Weiner 2000), HFEA established a discursive and disciplinary regime around the practice as a result of which paternalistic and heterosexual notions of reproduction, child rearing and family practices were reinforced. Positing a both anachronistic and exclusive normative vision, the law aimed to regulate access to new reproductive technologies to safeguard a notion of parenthood derived from the heterosexual nuclear family (Sheldon 2005). My critical reading of the discourses around Wolfenden and the Sexual Offences Act 1967, Section 28, and conflicts within family law clearly show the problematic construction of queer sexualities with regard to the state, citizenship and the body politics. In the UK, legislators and politicians have been stubbornly resistant to acknowledging the validity of queer relationships and family lives. Recent concessions and changes in the law do not alter a profound commitment of the New Labour government to heterosexual family values (Bell and Binnie 2000, Epstein, Johnson and Steinberg 2000, Stychin 2003). The politics of nonrecognition, exclusion from discourse and the denial of basic protection or access to rights, resources and services derives from the definition of the national community of citizens in heteronormative terms. As I have argued in the first part of this chapter, the definition of the public/ private distinction is always contested. Social movements around gender, race/ ethnicity and sexuality have challenged exclusive definitions of the public sphere. In the remaining part of this chapter I argue that against the back drop of these struggles it is appropriate to acknowledge the existence of multiple public spheres, which are related to each other in conflict and struggle. At the same time, I caution that attempts by social movements to create counterpublics do not result in the genesis of a unified socio-discursive space. Hegemony and conflict are at an inevitable part of the political process. Queer Counterpublics, Hegemony and Conflict State discrimination of alternate sexualities and intimacies through law and social policy has not gone unchallenged. Section 28 was subject to heavy contestation.
34
The Spectre of Promiscuity
Plans to introduce the clause were met with fierce resistance by the lesbian, gay and bisexual movements in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The fight against this law created strong alliances which, in terms of numbers and militancy, exceeded the scope of gay activism throughout all the previous years (Power and Barnett 1993). Weeks comments not without satisfaction on the paradoxical effects of Section 28: ‘It is not too much an exaggeration to say that Ms Thatcher, despite her rhetoric and actions, presided over the biggest expansion of the lesbian and gay community in its history’ (2000a: 171). The struggle around Section 28 is a prime example of an attempt by a social movement to change the modalities of discourse through the creation of counterpublics in order to influence the political process (Carabine 1995). Activists have not only challenged the boundaries between the public and private as they were drawn up in the proposals for Section 28. They also interfered with diverse publics (such as the media, the debates in Parliament, and so on). Moreover, they created or extended new public spheres (around campaigning groups, demonstrations, switchboards, lesbian and gay centres, the production of leaflets, publishing, and so on). Ken Plummer suggests understanding late modern gay and lesbian culture and politics through the model of a plurality of intersecting public spheres. These gay and lesbian public spheres may be seen as (a) developing their own visible and positive cultures, which (b) leak into the wider public spheres and cultures, whilst also (c) providing alternative, subaltern cultures. In doing this they shift the margins and the boundaries of the wider society. (2001a: 245)
Plummer’s model develops a critique of a monolithic conceptualisation of the public sphere, which has first been argued within feminist political theory. Marion Iris Young (1990a) successfully demonstrated that the ideal of an impartial public shores up exclusive conditions of access and interaction in dominant public sphere contexts. The assumption of a homogeneous public sphere thereby reinforces power relationships around gender, race, class and sexuality. According to Young, proposing a universalistic vision of culture and values results in a reductionist conceptualisation of politics. Young’s original critique was part of a larger enterprise to inscribe a discourse of difference into the representation of democracy. Nancy Fraser (1997) pushed Young’s argument even further, when she argued that already to claim that certain groups are excluded from ‘the’ public sphere would mean to subject to a regime of cultural domination which rests on a class-, race- and genderbiased representation of publicity. Fraser develops her argument as a critique of the shortcomings of Habermas’ (1969) influential historical work on the genesis of the bourgeois public sphere in Europe. From a detailed historical discussion she concludes that the bourgeois public was never the public. On the contrary, virtually contemporaneous with the bourgeois public there arose a host of competing counterpublics, including nationalist publics, popular peasant publics, elite women’s publics, black publics and working-class publics (Fraser 1997: 75).
Fraser calls these different public spheres ‘subaltern counterpublics’. They are defined as ‘parallel discursive arenas’ through which ‘members of subordinated social groups
The State of the Law
35
invent and circulate counter-discourses’ (p. 81). The twentieth-century US feminist movement provides her chief example for a ‘subaltern counterpublic’. Feminist subaltern counterpublics have evolved around journals, publishing companies, book stores, film and video companies, conventions, conferences, research centres, social centres, festivals, and so on. Fraser’s description hints at the necessity of a material or institutional basis for a subaltern counterpublic to emerge (cf. McGuigan 1996, Dawson 1995). Yet ultimately her model is based on a text-based notion of discourse. It is illustrative of widely shared common sense in the literature that a public is primarily established through the circulation of discourses (Warner 2002). Public sphere theory has proved to be quite helpful for the analysis of problems within lesbian and gay or queer social movement politics (Berlant and Warner 1998, Clarke 2000, Hubbard 2001, Warner 2002). A theory of multiple and intersecting public spheres can be particularly useful for thinking about normativity and hegemonic conflict in the context of sexual politics. I am convinced that a public sphere model is advantageous over the concept of ‘community’ which has been so prominent in writings about sexual politics. This is because the relation which is established in being part of a mediated public lacks the strong connotations of similarity, homogeneity, shared interest, emotional bonding, kinship, and so on, which commonly is associated with the term ‘community’ (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992). ‘The ideal of community, I suggest (....), privileges unity over difference, immediacy over mediation, sympathy over recognition of the limits of one’s understanding of others from their point of view’, Young summarises this line of critique (1990b: 300). In contradistinction, a public is generally conceived of as a link between strangers (Warner 2002). The notion of a public sphere emphasises discursivity and is prone to be more susceptible to the issue of difference. Yet even if the concept is pluralised, a risk remains that public sphere theory relapses into stereotypical notions of (cultural) difference (Holt 1995). Such a tendency is evident even in the work of Nancy Fraser, who is so strongly committed to infusing political theory with a sophisticated understanding of the problem of difference. Fraser is careful to use the term ‘public sphere’ in plural whenever she is discussing specific examples of counterpublic activities. She is adamant that the concept of a ‘public’ presupposes a plurality of perspectives that involves internal differences and antagonisms. Moreover, the political strategy of creating publicity has a tendency to entice inter-public sphere debates, she argues, which forecloses the risk of closure of any particular public. Fraser further emphasises that it is possible for individuals to partake in several public spheres. Despite all these attempts to keep the momentum of a dynamic and deferential theory of difference, Fraser’s discussion at times produces more stale or fixed notions of categorical difference, too. This happens, for example, when she defines counterpublics as ‘parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter-discourses, which in terms permit them to form oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs’ (1997: 81). The phrase ‘parallel discursive arenas’ implies separate and closed social entities. The central analytical terms are identities, interests and needs. All these concepts have been very prominent in community discourses and identity politics. Furthermore, Fraser refutes Habermas’ model of the bourgeois public sphere primarily by mans of a culturalist argument
36
The Spectre of Promiscuity
about difference. This is evident in her critique of the normative character of certain forms of habitus and styles of interaction. By collapsing identity, political interest, social and economic need, and cultural difference into each other Fraser’s model of multiple counterpublics runs risk to relapse into a rather orthodox theory of multiculturalism (Holt 1995). Partly, the problem derives from the fact that Fraser refers to these parallel or coexisting public spheres as ‘subaltern’ counterpublics. Warner (2002) rightly points out that there is no reason to assume that everybody who partakes in a particular counterpublic inhabits a subaltern social position (p. 121). It is questionable, for example, whether the label ‘subaltern’ is really appropriate for Fraser’s chief example, second-wave US feminism. The privileged positioning of the hegemonic constituencies in this movement with regard to class and race are out of question (hooks 1981, Josephs and Lewis 1981, Mohanty 1988). A public of such a variety, Warner maintains, is not limited to people marked by subaltern identities or social positions. Yes, counterpublics are certainly subordinated, yet this status does not necessarily reflect people’s social identities, but their wilful decision to enter a particular oppositional discursive space. I think a further clarification of terminology is required here. Both Fraser and Warner are using the term ‘counterpublic’ without normatively defining oppositionality. Fraser (1997) points out that some subaltern counterpublics may in fact be utterly reactionary and authoritarian. Warner (2002) includes the US Christian fundamentalists among his examples of counterpublics. The ‘counter’ in the term counterpublic derives its meaning primarily from a disadvantaged position with regard to other dominant publics. It is defined as a position marginalised, subordinated or stigmatised from the mainstream point of view. Despite being defined in such a formalistic manner, the notion of ‘counterpublics’ continues to evoke a sense of politically progressive resistance. Inasmuch as queer counterpublics are concerned, many writers clearly value their oppositional cultural and discursive potential, which is directed against heteronormative styles of intimacy, publicity and citizenship (Berlant and Warner 1998, Hubbard 2001, Clarke 2000). However, if we consider the unbounded character of public spheres, their implicit diversity and their mode of circulating discourse by addressing a potentially infinite number of strangers, a clear-cut definition of a particular public as oppositional or ‘counterpublic’ appears to be a rather difficult task. Warner himself (2002) has repeatedly pointed out that public spheres are shaped by struggle. These struggles within a public sphere extend to the question about what kind of ‘face’ the public is going to present or in which direction it is supposed to be going. I find the emphasis on struggle the most innovative aspect of Warner’s contribution to the debate on public spheres. The stress on political, cultural and ethical intra-sphere conflict opens up the question of hegemony for the public sphere analysis. If we focus on diversity, struggle, conflict, antagonism and division, it becomes quite obvious that it is difficult – if not impossible – to label certain public spheres as being either normative or counter-normative. Even if the concept of counterpublics invokes the notion of individual – if not collective – agency, questions of whether this kind of agency can be said to be ‘resistance’ remains open to further qualification. This insight is at odds with the tendency to idealise certain counterpublics under the
The State of the Law
37
signifier queer. There are certainly differences between public spheres with regard to political orientation, sexual practice and cultural identity. Yet even the ones which appear to be radical cannot be assumed to be beyond the regimes of power and normativity. In this chapter I have shown that UK legal practice and political discourses work to suppress queer identities, sex and affection in the public sphere. Policing the public/private distinction has been an important element in regulating gender and sexuality. The politics of containing queer sex, relationships and identities in the private reveals the heteronormative character of citizenship. Queers have only been granted partial or secondary citizenship, the degrees of which are dependent on their conformity. By challenging heterosexist culture and state practice, diverse sexual movements engage in the contestation of modes of publicity. At the same time, political debates around public sphere representation continue to create conflict about political strategy within these movements themselves. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5 I will explore in closer details how questions about non-monogamy are tied up with counterpublic discourses in the gay male, bisexual and polyamorous movements. However, before I will enter this analysis, I set out in the following chapter what has been at stake for me personally in the project of researching non-monogamies.
This page intentionally left blank
Chapter 2
Researching Non-monogamies: Stories on Positionality, Intersubjectivity and Power
I used the [time for] general announcements to introduce my research and explain the character of this group discussion. Although I tried to encourage women to contribute their views, the constriction of my focus on gay and bisexual male relationships did not help to raise women’s interest. Finally, it was a fairly small group of men, who started to discuss these issues in a separate room, while a much larger (mixed) group opted for the other discussion. I understood these women’s decision as a logical response to my rather awkward incorporation of women’s experiences in my research. (Excerpt from my research diary)
This book is based on qualitative research into gay male and bisexual non-monogamies, power and sexual politics. I designed the study around a combination of methods, namely interviews, focus groups, documentary research, participant observation and discourse analysis. Qualitative research methodology fosters an understanding that is principally multi-method in focus (Denzin and Lincoln 1994b). Researchers working with poststructuralist theories have understood their implicit emphasis on the fragmented and contingent character of social realities as a call for the need to develop complex research strategies conducive of the use of multiple research methods (Howardt et al. 2000, Klesse 2004). Most of my empirical data has been gained in qualitative in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. I conducted forty-four in-depth interviews with gay men and bisexual men and women with experiences in non-monogamous long-term relationships. My sampling strategy drew on snowball-sampling and theoretical sampling steps. I further organised four focus groups with gay male, gay and lesbian and bisexual groups that I had approached by letter, asking for support for my research project. I discuss my research methods and my core methodological assumptions in more detail in the Appendix. In this chapter, I engage with questions that do not frequently appear in published research texts. The chapter deals with (some aspects of) my personal research experience. My main focus is on how power relations have structured the intersubjective dynamics between me as a researcher and the research participants. How did my personal, theoretical, and political understandings and my diverse identities influence the direction I have taken in this research? How did my social location and my various identifications structure and at times complicate the research process? Embedded in a reflection of recent discussion in the literature on research methodology, I address the question how commonalities and/or differences with regard to the categories of gender, sexuality,
40
The Spectre of Promiscuity
race/ethnicity and nationality affect the researcher/researched relationship. Deploying both methodological and epistemological theories and personal experience stories, I explore the intersubjective dimension of researching non-monogamies. Power and the Research Process The widespread reception of social constructionism, poststructuralism and postmodernism on the debates on social science methodology has set the stage for pluralistic and relativistic epistemological positions to emerge (Goldberg 1997). In the light of a growing scepticism towards universalistic or objectivistic knowledge claims, calls for a critical and self-reflexive writing practice have gained momentum (Steier 1991, Denzin 1997, Denzin and Lincoln 1994a). Feminists have played a significant role in the creation of a self-reflexive research culture (Mies 1983, Stanley and Wise 1993, Acker et al. 1991, Fonow and Cook 1991). Feminists have attacked the myth of a linear progress of research according to a rigid and rational research design by reframing it as an unpredictable and relational social process. Moreover, the idea that knowledge is always partial, situated and social in character (cf. Haraway 1991, Hekman 1999) makes it plausible to call for an ‘open acknowledgement by the researcher of her or his assumptions, beliefs, sympathies and biases, especially those emanating from her or his sex, race, social class and/or sexual orientation’ (Lee and Renzetti 1993: 177). Only if researchers provide some information on their social location and communicate their interests, values and politics, we can put their knowledge claims into perspective. Against the backdrop of such reasoning, Sandra Harding has argued that contrary to the commonly held view, highlighting the subjective factor in academic writing may actually increase ‘objectivity’, rather than diminish it. Her theory of ‘strong objectivity’ de-constructs the idealised position of a de-personalised, dis-embodied Archimedean point of view at the heart of traditional research methodology (Harding 1991, 1998). Other feminists argue that by disclosing their stakes researchers have the chance to counter traditional power relationships between researchers and researched. The act of self-positioning can challenge the tendency of objectification implicit to classical research epistemologies (Stanley and Wise 1990, 1991, 1993). Feminist debates on methodology have been propelled by a strong concern with power relations (Lennon and Withford 1995, Maynard 1994, Gluck and Patai 1991). Apart from a structural critique of the active collusion of certain research knowledges in oppressive, exploitative or imperialist enterprises and a complex division of labour in research institutions (Yeatman 1995, Stanley 1990, Gunaratnam 2003), this included a problematisation of the acts of representation and interpretation. The term ‘representation’ captures the mental, social and material process of the production of meaning. The ‘critique of representation’ is concerned with the exploration of the cultural, historical and political contexts that enable certain representations to emerge. Representations play a role in legitimising and perpetuating social power relationships. In particular the representation of subordinate groups (from a dominant point of view) frequently involves processes of ‘othering’, which results in the production of stereotyped images and discourses (De Beauvoir 1976,
Researching Non-monogamies
41
Willkinson and Kitzinger 1996). A critical analysis of the legacies of colonial discourse within diverse scientific disciplines reveal the complicated ways in which power discursively structures and interferes with our representations of race/ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, the body, and so on (Gunaratnam 2003, Denzin 1997). Any production of politically responsible and useful research texts needs to break with stereotyped racialised, ethnicised, sexualised and gendered representations. This calls for a conscious reflection of our own subjectivities as researchers and the ways in which they corrsepond with those of our interview partners (Bhavnani 1994, Haritaworn 2001). This is necessary since these social positions are implicated in the process of interpretation (Uguris 2004). Power is an inevitable dimension of the subjection of research participants’ narratives to the analytical act of interpretation (Holland and Ramazanoglu 1994, Denzin 1994/1999). Researchers usually have an interest in constructing a particular type of (generally academic) knowledge, which is not necessarily shared by all the researched (Glucksmann 1994, Millen 1997). This may imply the application of certain theories for the reading of informants’ accounts. To place these narratives into the context of different theoretical or linguistic systems is an act of translation which inevitably transforms their vernacular (Mason 1996). In some cases, this processing of stories and information results in a situation in which participants do not recognise themselves in the academic texts produced on the basis of their narratives any more. Apart from the risk of alienation on the part of the research participants, the work of analysis can also result in serious interpretative conflict (Borland 1991, Klesse 1997) – who does finally control what is said and which version is disseminated in the publication of the research? I think it is fairly obvious that in most forms of research co-operation, it is the professional researchers who hold this power of control to a much higher degree (Stacey 1991). It is usually also the researcher who gains cultural or economic capital through publication. Looking at the research relationship from this critical angle, it is questionable as to whether it can really be described in such egalitarian terms as common in research textbooks. It also throws some doubt on the idealising and mystifying notions of empowerment at the heart of the intention to ‘giving a voice’ to the oppressed or marginalised (Patai 1991, Patai and Gluck 1991). Interpretation involves selection, emphasis, omission, de- and re-contextualisation. These choices are dependent on the standpoint, interest and the values and politics of the researcher (Denzin and Lincoln 1994b). Scientific writing is narrative production and as such necessarily fictitious (Denzin 1994/1999). Research texts are interpretations of interpretations and have therefore been described as second- or even third-order constructs (Geertz 1973, Denzin 1989, 1990). Diane Reay (1996) stresses the necessary imperfection and incompleteness of any interpretation: ‘There are many possible readings of interview transcripts. From where I am positioned, certain aspects of the data are much more prominent than others’ (p. 70). Yet the problem raised by differences in social positioning exceeds the issue of perspectival relativism (Megill 1994). Social divisions around race, ethnicity, sexuality, class and disability are constitutive of social structures, cultural formations and subjectivities. This means they do not only receive significance at the point of interpretation. They permeate the whole research process. Amongst others they impinge on research
42
The Spectre of Promiscuity
design and beyond this on all our interaction with our research contacts. In the following, I reflect on how aspects of my own location have influenced the direction of the research process and my relationship with research participants. I discuss how my personal subjectivity has both structured and been constructed in the process of researching non-monogamies. Intersubjectivity, Identity and Politics My research has focussed on how power relations both structure and interfere with gay male and bisexual non-monogamous relationship practices. This emphasis is not only an accidental feature of my research design. It also tells something about my interpretative stance that has been shaped by my ethical values. The wish to challenge hegemonic power relations has been a strong motivation of mine throughout adult life. Due to this concern, I have become involved in diverse groups and campaigns within leftist and anti-racist politics. My thoughts and theoretical leanings have been strongly inspired by debates within the social movements struggling around the social divisions of class, gender, race/ethnicity and sexuality. This has also impinged on the direction of my academic research. Autobiographical issues have played a significant role not only for the choice of topic but the research process in general (cf. Stanley and Wise 1993, Stanley 1993/1999). When I pondered on the first draft of my proposal for a research project into gay male relationship practices in 1997, I decided to focus on the issue of nonmonogamy, because I myself had been committed to non-monogamous relationships (with female and male partners) for many years. In the first draft of the proposal I concentrated primarily on power as normativity and decided to explore the political and cultural effects of the same-sex marriage campaign for people with a nonmonogamous life practice. At the time, my female (primary) partner criticised it for being too idealistic and uncritical about non-monogamous relationship practice itself. This was an important critique which helped me to develop a more comprehensive approach in my study as it developed. The sad aspect of it was that her critique was mot merely theoretical, but a reflection on our own non-monogamous practice. At this time we went through serious conflicts about our non-monogamous arrangement which, basically, she wanted to modify and I wished to maintain. These difficulties and disagreements became increasingly painful over the years. Our consensus about having a non-monogamous relationship faded. When we were negotiating this issue, my partner often criticised me for insisting on a male privilege. We could not resolve these problems as a result of which she broke up with me in early 2000. Although we decided to give our relationship a new try (under more exclusive conditions) some months later, the pain of this conflict kept overshadowing our relationship. Our compromise did not work for her and she decided to leave me again in September 2001. Other sexual and intimate long-term relationships, too, have been going through rough and difficult times in the subsequent years. My boyfriend broke up our partnership when our discussion about how close we wanted to live together reached a deadlock in 2005. Another long-term relationship of mine collapsed into trauma and destruction in just at the same time. I found myself in a situation when
Researching Non-monogamies
43
all the three relationships which had been most significant in my romantic, intimate and sexual life for the last fifteen years had come to an end. The problems which unsettled all these relationships were closely linked to the question how we were managing our non-monogamous practice. Arrangements that worked for some of us for some times – maybe even for many, many years – did not provide the basis for a satisfying or bearable relationship at other times and in other circumstances. As a consequence of my personal experiences, I have become more sceptical of the notion of ‘consensus’, which I had rather uncritically endorsed in my first research proposal. Consensus stands in for the idealistic imagination of a status of rational agreement and emotional equilibrium which cannot account for the emotional flows and counter-currents and the temporal contingencies and divergences which characterise the dynamics in multiple relationships. Moreover, the hegemonic representation of consensus is based on an imaginary relationship which posits the highly abstract liberal assumption of a sovereign subject un-restrained by power relations.1 The difficulties in my own relationships made me – and my partners – painfully aware of power processes around non-monogamy. Many of the questions in this research have also been questions of my personal life. Changes in my own life altered the way I felt about certain aspects of my research and expressed themselves as a new emphasis in that project. Identity Management and ‘Bisexuality’ as a Research Topic Personal identity issues frequently are interwoven with the development of research agendas – even if this is not always acknowledged. This does not mean that identity is necessarily directly articulated in research, but our identifications may leave their mark or surface in sometimes indirect and unforeseeable ways. The original title of my research was ‘Gay Male Non-monogamous Partnerships in the UK’. Its primary focus was the exploration of male same-sex non-monogamy in the context of lesbian and gay politics. Only in the course of the research I decided to open my perspective to include what could be called ‘bisexual relationships’. Yet I felt necessary to integrate a certain focus on bisexuality from the very beginning. Recent theories on identification posit that sexual identities are constructed, culturally specific, unstable and not necessarily indicative of sexual practice (Rutherford 1990a, Hall and du Gay 1996, Whisman 1996). The terms Men who have Sex with Men (MSM) or Women who have Sex with Women (WSW) popularised in 1980s and 1990s AIDS discourses make this phenomenon most explicit (cf. King 1993, Rodríguez Rust 2000a). If people define their relationship as gay or if their relationship is perceived as gay by others, this does not necessarily imply that everyone in the relationship is gay-identified. In fact, the whole act of labelling a relationship gay, bisexual or heterosexual, and so on involves a whole range of linguistic and theoretical problems (De Cecco and Shively 1983–1984/2000, Rodríguez Rust 2000d). Consequently, it
1 I am grateful for fruitful discussions on this topic with Matthew Weait and members of the Group for the Study of Law Gender, and Sexuality at Keele University. See Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion.
44
The Spectre of Promiscuity
was only sensible to assume that one or the other bisexual-, heterosexual-, or otheridentified man would appear in my sample anyway. As convincing as all these considerations may be, they do not fully account for the reasons why I did want to include bisexuality in my research. I also felt much more comfortable doing this project (as a bisexual-identified man), if I included an explicit focus on bisexuality. I believed to have more legitimacy to do this research, if it contained a focus on my ‘own’ identity category. This emotional reasoning reveals how much I was preoccupied with issues of legitimisation which were ultimately tied up with anxieties about acceptance. Being aware of the disapproval of bisexuality in wide parts of gay male and lesbian culture, I feared that some people may question my research only on the ground of my personal identity or sexual practice (cf. Eadie 1993, Hemmings 2002). By including a focus on bisexual men, too, I hoped my research would gain legitimacy – at least in the eyes of those, who draw strong boundaries between gayness and bisexuality. I suppose this issue should not have troubled me so much. The assumption that people should restrain themselves to study their ‘own’ collectivities had been challenged in both feminist and lesbian and gay studies (cf. Plummer 1981, Harding 1991). The inside/outside metaphor which structures our representation of sexualities had been deconstructed in queer theories (Fuss 1991). The fact that these concerns played such a salient role in my methodological choices reveals to what a strong degree my emotions were shaped by identity political rationalities. This was the case although I had spent a significant amount of time and intellectual labour in deconstructing the assumptions behind identity politics in a previous academic project of mine (Klesse 1997). Gender Worries Bisexuality finally assumes a significant role in my research. There has been a range of reasons for broadening my research agenda. Let me first comment on the personal reasons that (as so often) are also bound up with political ones. The inclusion of bisexuality in the early stages of my research can be described as rather half-hearted. By focussing primarily on male same-sex relationships (inclusive of the experiences of self-identified or behavioural bisexual men), my consideration of female bisexualities was limited, indirect and conditional. Because I had never intended to confine my research to the couple unit, dealing with male bisexuality would inevitably bring up female sexuality within the scope of my research. There was a huge likelihood that bisexual men in multiple relationships would also maintain significant relationships with women. In fact, this was exactly what my personal experience looked like. I always considered interviewing women in such relationship constellations. While I had already allocated some place for the participation of women in my research, I had made it dependent on quite specific conditions. Oddly, women were supposed to be in a relationship with a man (who also was supposed to maintain relationships with other men) in order to qualify them for participation in my research. This, of course, inscribed a profound androcentrism at the very heart of my research project. Originally, I felt that it would not be a good idea to make women’s experiences a primary focus of my research, because I believed that (as a male researcher) I would not be able to provide a comprehensive perspective on women’s sexuality
Researching Non-monogamies
45
and relationships (cf. Williams 1996). I was convinced that few women would be prepared to participate in research into sexuality conducted by a sole male researcher. This supposition was one of the major reasons for constricting my focus on male same-sex relationships despite my attempts to carve out some space for bisexuality as a research topic. My doubts about the (im)possibility of close co-operation with women in such a research project were shaped by my experiences of the political culture in the extra-parliamentary leftist opposition in Germany throughout at the late 1980s and early 1990s, in which feminist separatist ideas were quite influential. In the course of my research I realised that my worries were exaggerated, if not unfounded. When I participated at the UK annual bisexual conventions (BICONS) in 1999 and 2000, I was surprised how many women were interested in my study. Many were disappointed about its narrow focus and some politically disapproved of it. Because of my increasing discomfort with the awkward incorporation of women’s perspectives in my research, I decided to look at bisexuality more comprehensively and as a topic in its own right. It was the only way to acknowledge the diversity and complexity of bisexual relationships. It further meant realising that any meaningful work on bisexuality has to consider women’s perspectives as a central part of its inquiry. This decision further enabled me to explore in more detail the concept of polyamory, an under-researched relationship philosophy which was very present in bisexual movement debates, but virtually absent from gay male culture (Haritaworn et al. 2006, see Chapter 5). Although I did correct the course of my research, my initial ambivalence with regard to women’s participation resulted in a lasting bias of my evolving research sample. Although women make up about the half of my bisexual-identified research participants, women who exclusively or primarily maintain same-sex relationships are not strongly represented. A further problem of the revision of my research design in the light of a concern with the ‘inclusion of women’s perspectives’ was that it reinforced an approach marked by a dualistic perception of gender. Jin Haritaworn (2007) rightly points out that methodological strategies are frequently based on a gendered epistemology, which does not consider the realities of transgendered subjects at all. Being a ‘Kinky’ Academic – Doing Sex Research My decision to broaden the focus of my research and to study bisexual nonmonogamous relationships unconditionally and in their own right has been driven by theoretical, political, methodological and personal considerations. Identity issues have played a significant role. They influenced research design and process and also surfaced in the interaction with the research participants. Identification is always a relational process. It demands both self-identification and recognition by others. It is a process of self-location as much as it is one of interpellation (S. Hall 1992a, 1996, Calhoun 1994). Identity was permanently evoked by people I met in the course of my research. It was as if my research topic transferred identity onto me. Whenever I told people about my research question, they seemed to assume that I either was gay, bisexual, queer or simply a pervert (depending on the moral and political outlook of the person in question). Writing on sexuality and in particular on marginalised sexualities tends to render researchers ‘morally suspect’ from the mainstream point
46
The Spectre of Promiscuity
of view (Plummer 1981, Myers 1992, Lewin and Leap 1996b). Let me illustrate this issue with one example. One day, I was invited to a breakfast party at the house of the mother of a friend of mine (who is an academic herself). When she heard about my research topic she shouted ‘Yuck!’ twice and then started to point out the ‘scandalous’ character of my research to other party guests. I was quite annoyed with the fuss she made which I perceived as an inappropriate reaction. Although she has since apologised for her behaviour, which she says was meant as a joke, I find it difficult not to read her strong reaction as an indication of at least some ‘uneasy’ feelings about my work. Usually, people would not show their irritation or disapproval in such an obvious way. However, I did encounter quite a lot of rather awkward responses. Although I was rarely directly challenged because of my research interests, people were frequently surprised and shocked or withdrew from the conversation. Sometimes I could notice some disturbance flicker in the faces of my conversational partners. I could feel how they suddenly looked at me differently (I am referring to this brief moment when eyes tighten in a concentrated act of trying to re-place you).2 Sometimes people were so stunned that they could not come up with any line of response at all. Whatever the concrete reaction, talking about my research in a new social context usually felt like an act of coming out. Of course, identity was not always referred to in acts of negativity, but also in gestures aimed at creating the sense of a common understanding by politically progressive and/or ‘queer’ people: a smile was often enough to signal a shared understanding. Usually I would talk about my personal investments in my research anyway. In these cases, people did not need to speculate about my sexual identity. This has generally been the case with my interview partners, who would often go on to ask me in detail about my personal life. Differences, Power and Research Relationships Apart from inspiring my research in the first place, having been in non-monogamous relationships for most years of my adult life was also an enabling factor in my research. People who wanted to find out more about my study in order to make an informed decision on whether to participate usually asked me why I was interested in non-monogamy. I think these questions aimed primarily at finding out about my political stance. The information that I have been in non-monogamous relationships myself did not necessarily establish a shared identity, but it may have convinced people that it was rather unlikely that I would write in a dismissive or moralising way about their sexual lives. However, people were frequently even more concerned to find out about my sexual identity in terms of gendered preferences. The first thing people were eager to know was whether I was gay (or depending on the context) bisexual myself. Due to the broad perspective of my research, communicating my bisexuality could, of course, establish either commonality or difference in identity – depending on the identity or sexual preferences of the person inquiring. I do not think I can claim – as it is frequently done in methodology texts (cf. Plummer 2
See Finch (1984/1999) on the concept of ‘placing’.
Researching Non-monogamies
47
1981, Heaphy et al. 1998) – that a commonality of sexual identity has enhanced my research. I am further quite sceptical about such claims in general. I will discuss the problem of taken-for-granted assumptions of commonality based in identity in more detail below. Earlier I mentioned my initial anxiety that gay men would question my legitimisation for conducting this research on grounds of my bisexuality. It is noteworthy that nobody gave my bisexual identity as a reason for not participating in the study. This may indicate that claiming bisexuality (maybe contingent on the fact that I have been in a long-term same-sex relationship) was enough reason for the gay men inquiring not to fear that I would distort their accounts. Again, what I think is at stake here is the assumption of a shared political agenda on the basis of a declared identity (this assumption being justified or not) rather than a shared identity in itself. None of my gay male interview partners took an explicitly dismissive stance on bisexuality, although I occasionally encountered biphobic opinions when I visited local gay and lesbian groups to recruit for my research. In the context of the interviews, my bisexual self-identification may have even enabled certain communicative processes. It may have made it easier for some gay-identified men to talk about past heterosexual relationships or to speculate about the option of becoming erotically involved with women in an uncertain future. When gay men raised such issues, I felt that they did this primarily in order to show recognition of my bisexual location. Most of my interview partners’ comments are probably best understood as a sensitive and person-centred conversational attitude. The fact that I introduced myself as bisexual seemed to establish the theme of bisexuality as a hidden but present point of reference throughout the interviews with gay men. They would frequently relate to it in one way or the other. However, it is difficult to pin down in which way exactly our differences in identity shaped the interview situation. Power Relations and Interviewer Effects The methodological concerns with the identity-related issues discussed above are frequently cast as a matter of interviewer effects. There has been a lot of debate in particular on the effects of gender and racial differences or commonalities for the interview process (Gunaratnam 2003). Janet Finch (1984/1999) has made a strong point about the natural intimacy of the woman-to-woman interview. The commonality of gender, she argues, usually creates an enormous amount of trust. Women are consequently more likely to share intimate information with a female interviewer. Apart from the assumption of commonality in experience, the woman-to-woman research relationship is taken to be more egalitarian (Oakley 1981, Acker et al. 1991). Feminist research and analysis have demonstrated that styles of communication are gendered (Fishman 1995, Spender 1980, Devault 1990/1999). Against this backdrop there has been a strong conviction within feminist studies that research into women’s lives ought to be done by female researchers (Smith 1987, Stanley and Wise 1990, 1993).
48
The Spectre of Promiscuity
Others, however, have scrutinised the idea that commonality simply would emerge from a shared gender position. They have argued that the particular ease of female-to-female interview exchanges may rather flow from a shared (middle) class culture (Song and Parker 1995). There have also been political arguments against the idea that people should only do research into their own collectivities (Harding 1991). With regard to race and ethnicity, some have warned that such a stance would reinforce the separation of fields of study and result in the marginalisation of Black or ethnic minority researchers (Phoenix 1994, Rhodes 1994, Bola 1996). Within this paradigm, the concerns of Black or ethnicised people are set apart from research into white mainstream society. This leads to a no-win situation for Black or ethnic minority scholars, who get thrown back on issues concerning race/ethnicity – where their voice is usually questioned once again via the accusation of an alleged lack of objectivity. In practice, this may have the effect of their being denied employment in publicly funded research projects. Empirical research has further shown that the degree to which, for example, the mismatch of gender positioning of interviewer/ interviewee matters is strongly dependent on the research context and the subject matter in question (Padfield and Proctor 1996). Sexism, racism, classism and heterosexism play an important role in structuring research relationships. Whoever is privileged in these discourses of power and subordination may use or abuse this power in a research situation. This applies to both interviewers and interviewees. Many female researchers emphasise the difficulties involved in researching sexist men (for example, Stanley and Wise 1991, Ronai 1990, O’Connell Davidson and Layder 1994,) and many Black or ethnic minority researchers complain about having encountered racism by respondents of dominant ethnic/racial collectivities (Bola 1996, Simmonds 1997, Bhavnani 1994). The discussion about matching the identities of interviewers and interviewees thus takes a very different shape when considering either research crossing collective identities from a subordinated or dominant position (cf. Bola 1996, Phoenix 1994). Race has been a salient issue in the literature on self-reflexivity (Gunaratnam 2003). The general assumption has been that racial, ethnic or colour matching would be a precondition for the creation of non-biased accounts of Black people’s experiences (Rhodes 1994, Andersen 1993/1999). I think there are good reasons for such a strategy. Writing by white researchers on Black people’s lives has often been stereotyped, disfiguring or plainly racist. People of colour are therefore frequently sceptical about research undertaken by white researchers (Phoenix 1994, Rhodes 1994, Andersen 1993/1999). Consequently, white researchers find it often difficult to find interview partners of colour willing to participate in the research (Edwards 1993, 1996, Russel 1996, Paulin 1996, Lang 1996). As I will discuss in more detail below, I experienced similar problems in my study. Song and Parker (1995) argue that the methodological debates on identity matching lag far behind the developments within social theory on identity and subjectivity. The demand of a politics of matching would obscure the diversity of experiences, viewpoints and identities within different groups and preconceive their respective effects on interpersonal relations in the research process (cf. Fortier 1998, Ang-Lygate 1996, 1997). Cultural identities have to be conceived of as shifting, contextual and relational. They allow for multiple positioning. They may be evoked,
Researching Non-monogamies
49
elicited and negotiated in complex ways in a research situation. Researchers and participants may construct cultural identities in very different ways, even if they have, for example, a certain ethnic or racial background in common. They may refer to different categories, draw different boundaries or may attribute different significance to race/ethnicity in their lives. Notions of racial or ethnic belonging may be contested on a variety of grounds: geographic origin, generation in terms of migration history, skin colour, mixed origin, ethnic sub-division, caste, religious affiliation, compliance to expectations around gender behaviour, gender embodiment or sexual activity, cultural competencies, interests or orientation, and so on (cf. Erel 2002). More recent work on interviewer effects stresses the significance of the ways in which research relationships are constituted around race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality, but assume a much more complicated (inter)relationship. Many argue that the effects of a mismatch of salient identities of researcher and researched is context-dependent and cannot be predicted in any detail (Bhavnani 1994, Rhodes 1994, Padfield and Proctor 1996, Phoenix 1994, Fortier 1998). Moreover, the critical consideration of researchers’ subjectivity cannot be limited to any one single identity category. Rather we should focus on the interplay of the discursive power around gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, class, age and disability. In the following sections, I will give some examples of intersubjective processes around race, ethnicity and nationality in my research experience. Race/Ethnicity and Racism I carried through this research project as a white person in a multi-ethnic society shaped hegemonic racist practices and discourses. This had certain implications for the research process. I see my racial position as a white person as one of the reasons why a lot of the lesbian and gay groups that organised around shared ethnic or racial identities (or the experience of racism) did not respond to the letters I had sent out in order to convince groups to participate in the research. Because racial or ethnic identity was a criterion of membership in these groups, I did mention my own background in order to create an informed situation on the grounds of which we could have discussed the possibility and/or terms of a potential cooperation. The few groups which responded were all involved in HIV/AIDS prevention work. They had either commissioned or done research themselves or individual staff members held strong views on the necessity of research into queer sexualities to include Black or ‘ethnic minority’ perspectives. The rather low participation of people of colour, which I perceive as one the major weaknesses of my study, can certainly be interpreted as a response to the fact that I did this project as a sole white researcher. My own privileged position with regard to racialised social divisions further explains my frequently felt insecurities when I raised issues around race/ethnicity or racism with Black interview partners. At the same time, I felt that many of them were conscious of our racial/ethnic differences when they talked about issues related to racism. All the South Asian men in my study (whether in individual interviews or in the group discussion with Matai) spoke extensively about the racism they experienced on the gay male scene and how cultural differences and racism tend to complicate many
50
The Spectre of Promiscuity
of their inter-racial relationships. Sometimes I felt that they were sceptical of how I would position myself with regard to this problem and if I could really relate to it or fully grasp their concerns (cf. Phoenix 1994). Rizwan, for example, criticised racism in Britain and the stigmatisation he continuously experienced at his workplace in a gay male organisation. He further pondered on the cultural and racialised dynamics in inter-racial relationships. When I asked him to expand on this issue, I gained the impression that he did not reckon that I would have much of an understanding of the dynamics of racism. Christian: You were talking about mixed relationships looking at it from a white point of view. If you look at it from a South Asian point of view, is there anything else you would like to add? Rizwan: You’ve done Sociology, haven’t you? Christian: Yeah Rizwan: And you know the concepts of racism? You can’t have racism without power, and the South Asian community in this country doesn’t have any power. So we can’t be racists at all, can we? But we can have prejudices, we can have prejudices.
It seems as if Rizwan understood my question as if I wanted to insinuate that South Asian men, too, would behave in racist ways in white/South Asian inter-racial partnerships. His response shows that he was not sure at all whether I had understood his complex analysis of the dynamics in inter-raciality as a simple question of ‘mutual racism’. The fact that I am a white researcher may also explain the reluctance of most of my white interview partners to talk in depth about issues of race/ethnicity (cf. Padfield and Proctor 1996). With time I became aware that race/ethnicity was largely absent as a topic in most narratives of my white interview partners. This contrasted with my observations at local gay and lesbian group meetings. These groups were predominantly or even exclusively white in their composition. On these group evenings I gained the impression that race/ethnicity was a very present discourse among the group members. On some occasions I had conversations with people who were blatantly racist. Moreover, in all the groups which I visited, people came up with stories about their sexual interest in black-haired, black- or brownskinned people or about their sex holidays in Thailand, and so on. Stories about the dislike of certain ethnic groups on the one hand and about fantasies and sexual experiences with people of a fetishised ethnicity on the other hand were happily shared in the chatty atmosphere in pubs or private houses. As I said earlier, in the one-to-one interview sessions such issues were rarely mentioned at all. Maybe it was that people were more concerned about self-representation and political correctness in an interview situation. Maybe it was that race/ethnicity really did not appear to be an overtly important issue to them when I asked them to talk about their sexual and intimate lives. White people tend to naturalise and universalise their ethnicity to a degree of invisibility (Frankenberg 1993, Dyer 2006). The assumptions associated with such a taken-for-grantedness of whiteness are usually not expressed explicitly. Whatever the reasons, my experiences made me adopt a different and more straightforward interview strategy. I decided to bring up issues around race/ ethnicity in every interview – irrespective of the ethnic or racial background of my
Researching Non-monogamies
51
interviewees. However, the responses of my white interview partners (if they had not a politicised understanding of racism or had not been in inter-racial/inter-ethnic long-term relationships) usually remained brief and superficial. Nationality and Intersubjectivity My nationality was a salient issue in some research encounters, too. The facts that I was not raised in the UK and that I am not a native English speaker played a role in the interaction with some of my interview partners. Due to my accent people usually notice straightaway that English is not my mother tongue. Many people therefore assumed that I may not be familiar with certain terms or histories. If this was the case, they would halt and explain things to me in more detail. In my understanding, their reactions expressed sensitivity and a caring attitude towards conversation. In some interviews the frequency of references to my German background did go beyond such a person-centred conversational attitude. I assume that the salience of my German nationality in these encounters had very different reasons. In most cases, they were born out of a vivid memory of the history of Germany’s role in World War II, its responsibility for the Shoa and concerns about escalating racism and antiSemitism in contemporary Germany. Partly, they derived from certain (idealised) representations of Germanness. When Donald picked me up at the tube station where we had arranged to meet for the interview, he was very surprised to hear that I was German. He had misread my accent for French. Germany and Bavaria (the federal state were I was born) were the major topics of our conversation on the way to his home. Like many of my interview partners he raised the issue of German neo-Nazism with me. Donald asked whether the problem of Nazism in Germany had declined over recent years. From there we got into a discussion about racist violence and the strengthening of neo-fascist organisation in the years since re-unification. Whereas many research participants did inquire about my national background and stayed with this topic for a while, Donald did not stop referring to my German background. When he was so kind and hospitable as to prepare dinner for us in an interview break, he returned to this topic. This time he talked about German cuisine. Because I am German, he suggested, I probably would like to eat a lot of meat and consume huge quantities of beer. Oh yes, these huge beer glasses in Bavaria! I started to feel a bit uncomfortable with Donald’s generalisations about German culture. At one point in our conversation he responded to a statement of mine with a sigh and the comment: ‘Oh … you Germans, you are so intense’. I was both puzzled and a bit unnerved by these permanent references to my nationality. Finally, he explained to me that he once had a Bavarian boyfriend. Now everything seemed to fall in place! Then – just at the end of our interview – Donald told me that he is Jewish. When I asked him whether he had a secular or religious family background, he answered ‘I am supposed to be an Orthodox Jew’ and cut off the interview right at this point. He explained to me that he was tired now and offered me to bring me to the station straight away. Donald’s abrupt termination of our interview left me with a lot of questions. Was he not interested in discussing issues around Jewishness with me, because I am German? Was my German nationality such a salient topic in our conversation not
52
The Spectre of Promiscuity
because he once had a German boyfriend, but because of the Shoa, a crime organised and carried through by Germans in the name of the German Reich and for the sake of the German nation? Or was he just tired? Donald had mentioned at the beginning of our conversation that he had an acute health problem with his eyes. I did not ask him for a second interview session. This is why I can only speculate about the reasons for his abrupt termination of our interview and whether the continuing history of German anti-Semitism did play a role in it. I tend to assume so. Maybe this is the case, because I once had more explicit conflicts about my German nationality when I conducted life history interviews with Benjamin, a British Jewish gay male activist. At one time Benjamin argued with me, because I – as a German – had criticised Israel’s politics in a discussion of the Israel–Palestine conflict (cf. Klesse 1997). As I said, there are a range of other potential explanations for Donald’s permanent references to German character, culture and habits. The fact that he had a German boyfriend may just have triggered a stream of reminiscences. However, the fact that I am still pondering upon this experience deploying either the one or the other (or both) of these analytical narratives is an issue worth emphasising. It shows that the way in which ethnicity or nationality are constructed or perceived in research encounters should be understood as a relational process that draws both on larger scale cultural and political histories and on very personal life historical themes. The salience of my nationality in another interview encounter was supposedly primarily due to the latter issue. When I met Timo, he explained to me that he wanted to meet me for two major reasons: Firstly, he wanted to help me with my research. Secondly, I was German. That was indeed a stunning statement. He went on to add that, moreover, I was a particularly nice German. In the course of the interview, it became obvious that Timo had a quite peculiar relationship to Germans. He explained to me that his partner Buddy with whom he had been in a partnership for twenty-three years before his sudden death in a car accident was previously married to a German woman. In the years before his death, Buddy entered into a relationship with a gay man from Germany that grew very intense and threatened his partnership with Timo. Timo seemed to insinuate that his partner Buddy did erotically fetishise Germans. Did Timo’s interest in my German background derive from the erotic investment of his ex-partner in Germans? Was this the reason why the fact that I am German seemed sufficient reason to meeting me? After the interview Timo offered me to take me to the station by car. When I put on my jacket and boots (brown walking boots), Timo commented on my style of dress: ‘Oh you look like a real German!’ Pointing at my boots he started to elaborate on a particular stereotype of fascist German hypermasculinity: ‘Mostly these Germans are depicted wearing these high black military boots’. I thought this was a rather wilful association, because my appearance on this day had – if any – more of an androgynous touch – with large earrings, long hair, a colourful shirt with a flower pattern and an intensely red cord jacket. When we were about to leave, Timo opened his arms saying ‘Let me hug you’. I felt that this was a very nice gesture after the closeness of our interview. I happily embraced him, too. I realised that I had misinterpreted his gesture when Timo started kissing me. While I was trying to resolve our embrace, Timo grabbed my German legs and Bavarian backside. He made a few more advances while he was driving me to the station. It took me some time to make him realise my boundaries.
Researching Non-monogamies
53
Despite both of us being white Europeans, I found the ethnicisation of our relationship to be a strong feature in our interaction. Timo’s allusion to the image of the hyper-masculine militarist German further points to a particular sexualised ethnicised imagery. More recent work has foregrounded the manifold intersections of race and sexuality (Weekes 1997, Marshall 1996, Fung 1998, Somerville 2000). I think the story of my encounter with Timo is worth telling because it reveals that processes of ethnicisation and sexualisation may also be at work in white interethnic relationships in an intra-European context. More research and theorisation needs to being undertaken on this interrelation (cf. Garner 2006). Sexualising Research Relationships Timo’s story further shows that sexuality can be a salient factor in research encounters. Sexual attraction is a potential issue in any kind of social research. There are myriad ways in which research relationships may be sexualised. In particular certain qualitative research methods such as in-depth interviewing may involve high levels of intimacy. Both interviewers and interviewees may feel erotic or sexual desire in such an encounter. This desire may be one-sided or mutual. The people involved may ignore it, repress it, over-play it – or decide to articulate or even act on it.3 It has been argued that sexualisation is a particular salient feature in research encounters between gay/bisexual men (Heaphy et al. 1998, Bolton 1996, Kong et al. 2002). This is partly the case because sexuality is a prominent route to establishing intimacy and friendship in gay male culture (Nardi 1992b, 1999, Weeks et al. 2001). Research relationships are much more likely to become sexualised if the research explicitly deals with sexuality. Earlier I mentioned that researchers of sexuality frequently experience sexualisation and stigmatisation. My interest in non-monogamy was not only taken as a ‘clue’ about my sexuality by other academics or acquaintances of mine, but also by some of my research partners. Even if they did not construct me as ‘morally suspect’ or depraved (apart from few exceptions), they occasionally saw me as an easy-going person who was potentially available. I assume that at least some people were unsure whether my call for interview partners for a research into nonmonogamy was nothing more than a cleverly coded sex advert. One male interview partner of mine, for example, stated explicitly in our first telephone conversation that he would be available ‘for an interview only’ – implying not for sex. I guess he felt the necessity to assert that sex would be excluded from our meeting, because he was not entirely sure about the character of my research. My interview partner Sting, too, told me in our first interview break that he had not been sure whether I really wanted to do ‘serious research’. I explained my project again, affirmed its academic character and pointed out that I did not wish to become 3 It is would be inappropriate to discuss sexuality here only from the perspective of ‘desire’. In particular female researchers have written extensively about their experiences of having been exposed to sexual harassment, threatening behaviour or sexual violence by men while doing fieldwork (Ronai 1990, Moreno 1998, Kitzinger 1994/1999). Of course, researchers, too, may harass female or male respondents.
54
The Spectre of Promiscuity
sexually involved with research participants. The fact that Sting decided to ignore what I said turned the interview session with him into an extremely exhausting and disturbing experience. Although I made it very clear that I did not want to have sex with him, Sting repeatedly transgressed my boundaries. Sitting next to me in his living room, he touched me several times and finally attempted more forcefully to push me down in a lying position on the settee. I left his house completely upset and unnerved. Sting did not let pass the opportunity to grab my backside even in the moment when I left through the front door. Let me explain at this point my position on sex in research situations. When I started to work on this project I took a conscious decision not to become sexually involved with my interview partners. This does not mean that I did not feel attracted to some of them. I took this decision because I felt my research relationships would be less complicated, less ambiguous and more focused this way. At this time one of my partners was also insisting on a more exclusive arrangement. The reasons for my cautious approach were manifold and in some regards quite personal. Yet I also hold the general point of view that sex with research participants involves a range of ethical problems. According to my perception these tend to be glossed over in the current literature on this topic. Some recent publications (primarily from within anthropology or ethnography) have highlighted the erotic dimension of doing field research (Whitehead and Conaway 1986, Kulick and Willson 1998, Lewin and Leap 1996a, Lominé 2000). Drawing on feminist concerns with gender and sexuality and the postcolonial critique of sexualised and racialised ‘othering’, this debate stages a discussion on sexual desire in the research process. The most important arguments in this debate can be summarised as follows. The disciplinary taboo on sexuality and eroticism in the research experience has to be challenged because it only serves the gendered double standard. Whereas transgressions of traditional research ethics by men are silently condoned, women have reported harsh sanctions by representatives of their discipline (cf. Dubisch 1998, Willson 1998, Gearing 1998). The power relations enacted in sexualised research relationships can only be scrutinised if the taboo on researchers’ sexual feelings and experiences is broken (Lewin and Leap 1996b, Kulick 1998). Some discussants claim that erotic subjectivity can also provide the source for potential, partial and situated knowledge (Kulick 1998, Newton 1993/1996, Wafer 1996). Others go so far to suggest that sexual and intimate relationships in the fieldwork period are extremely helpful to the research and may enhance new and different forms of knowledge (Bolton 1996, 1998, Williams 1996, Newton 1993/1996, partly rejected by Murray 1996). Although I have some sympathy with some of the arguments brought forward, I fear that some of important ethical concerns regarding sexualised research relationships are glossed over in this discussion. Certainly, the gendered double standard in academia should be challenged and tabooing sexuality in research settings does not help at all. Since I perceive eroticism as a pervasive dimension of experience which potentially structures all our relationships (the ones defined as non-sexual, too), an emphasis of erotic and sexual knowing subject may indeed work against the hegemonic Cartesian mind/body split. Furthermore, I do not doubt that sexual relationships have helped researchers to progress with their
Researching Non-monogamies
55
research, gain access, cultural competencies or to feel just a bit more comfortable and less lost or alone (Bolton 1996, 1998, Williams 1996, Newton 1993/1996, Blackwood 1998, Morton 1998, Gearing 1998). However, this cannot be our major criteria, if our concern is with the ethical dimension of sexualised research practices. It has been rightly pointed out that qualitative research can foster very close and intimate relationships that may develop into deep friendships. Whereas friendship has been rejected as a source for bias in traditional methodological paradigms, it has been re-evaluated in recent literature on methodology (Sayigh 1996, Oakley 1981). Researchers have been encouraged to value such friendship and to embrace it as an enabling factor in research. At the same time, such closeness and intimacy can open the doors for the potential disappointment of trusting interview partners, who shared their life stories and experiences (Patai 1991, Stacey 1991, Finch 1984/1999). Just like friendships, sexual encounters, too, create a socio-psychic space of vulnerability and are prone to being subsumed to an instrumentalising research strategy (Skamballis 1998). This issue is not sufficiently addressed in the current literature, which frequently idealistically hails sex as ‘the ultimate dissolution of boundaries between individuals’ (Bolton 1998: 140). Since good sex bridges differences and transcends boundaries in an act of ‘merging’, Bolton values sex as being conducive to ethnography’s ultimate aim of diminishing the distance between ethnographer and the cultural context they wish to explore. Ralph Bolton (1996, 1998) argues explicitly for the commensurability of his sexual involvement with informants with an ethical approach to his ethnographic research around HIV/AIDS in the gay male scene in Brussels. He describes his relationships as egalitarian and consensual. He claims that his insistence on safer sex in an environment where this was far from being the norm had an educational character that fostered the goals of the research (pp. 151–153). He further insists that he never had sex with his informants with the purpose of data collection. Without wanting to question Ralph Bolton’s well-meaning intention and sensitivity, I am not convinced that it is possible to disentangle the motivations for becoming sexually involved with a person in a research context so clearly. In parts of his discussion the interest in sex and knowing seems to be much more closely interwoven: Sexual behaviour is not easily observed, and I learned more through participation than by simple observation or direct interviewing. Moreover, information obtained post-coitally (except in the quickie encounters in public places), when people tend to relax and open up about their lives, was always richer, more from the heart and more revealing than the data gathered in a more detached manner. Once one has shared physical and emotional intimacy, sharing other knowledge about oneself seems easier (p. 149).
Sex and data-collection is not clearly separated in this quotation. Bolton ascribes ‘post-coital’ information a privileged epistemological status. The risk of subjecting sex or intimacy to an instrumentalising logic can never be fully precluded. The call on researchers to uncover their ‘erotic subjectivity’ is too easily channelled into a discourse which legitimises sexualised research practices and underestimates ethical concerns. I think the debate could gain a lot from looking at the arguments of the ethical implication of friendship in research contexts, which I have briefly touched upon earlier. This debate has brought about, to a much stronger degree, the complexity
56
The Spectre of Promiscuity
and ambiguity of the ethical issues involved – without setting up prescriptive rules about behaviour at the same time. In this chapter, I have described how my personal experience, political values and diverse identities have influenced the course of my research into non-monogamies. The research process is always affected by inter-subjective issues that are tied up with our socio-political positioning. I have provided the reader with some basic information on my motivations for embarking on this journey to explore nonmonogamy and for collecting the narratives, which I will present and discuss in the following chapters. I have directed attention to the manifold power relations which structure research practice in general and sexuality research in particular. The social divisions which over-determine and complicate research encounters (such as race, ethnicity, class, gender and sexuality) do also impinge on the dynamics in non-monogamous relationships. I will apply a similar mode of analysis (which is concerned with positionality in the context of intersecting fields of power) in my discussion of the dynamics of power in and around non-monogamous relationships. Discourses on non-monogamy and the subjectivities of people who position themselves in relation to them deploy sets of meaning that are simultaneously sexualised, gendered, classed and racialised. Their effect on bodies and identities cannot be comprehended through an engagement with any one single category of sociological analysis.
Chapter 3
Sex and Assimilation: Gay Male Non-monogamies and the Question of Equality
I think (...) the evidence suggests that monogamous men see that having promiscuous, open or other relationships is going to cause difficulty for us to acquire rights. But it comes down to those men seeking the approval of them being gay. (…) It comes back, it’s directly related to: ‘Why (…) do you care so much about how the wider community sees the gay community?’ There are so many sanctions made about the gay community, that we’re all promiscuous, yeah. Some of us are and some of us aren’t, that’s fine. (…) Why is the gay community too quick to turn round and say, (…) ‘We’re not all promiscuous’? Why are we too quick to turn round and do this? (…) It’s one of the biggest questions targeted at the gay community: We’re promiscuous and we have crap relationships. I’m sorry; I don’t think that’s true. ‘I am promiscuous, I have multiple partners and I have a very strong relationship. How does what I’m doing hurt you?’ If we could start to do that with half the criticisms that are levelled at us, we’d have a lot stronger voice in the community, because our own community is so divided on the issue. (…) A part of our community has a real problem with it (...) because they want the approval. (Andrew)
Andrew works for a HIV/AIDS organisation in London. In the quote above he reflects on his experiences of organising workshops on gay men’s relationships as part of a comprehensive gay-affirmative HIV-prevention strategy. In the course of my research I interviewed three professionals who run workshops for gay men on sexuality, intimacy and partnership for two different HIV/AIDS and counselling organisations in London. A few hundred gay men attended workshops organised by these two organisations alone every year. According to the experience of Andrew, Bruce and David, the question of (non)monogamy was close to the heart of the men who attended these workshops. They report that there was a significant row about the question of non-monogamy at every single workshop they organised. A significant number of participants aspired to nothing more than a monogamous and faithful long-term relationship. Many had a lot of resentment with regard to the ‘gay male scene’, which they perceived as promiscuous, over-sexed, shallow and ignorant towards the values of true partnership. Andrew suggests that what is at stake in these arguments about non-monogamy is not only an issue of personal disappointment or preferences, but a conflict about politics. If gay men in the workshops clash on the issue of ‘promiscuity’ they often negotiate divergent stances on the politics of ‘visibility’. According to Andrew, a lot of the problems some gay men have with non-monogamy result from a defensive
58
The Spectre of Promiscuity
political response to the ‘promiscuity’ allegations levelled against the gay male ‘community’. The assumption that gay men are promiscuous has been a salient feature of homophobic discourses since the inception of the concept of homosexuality in the 19th century. This chapter explores how anti-gay promiscuity discourses impact on popular and scientific knowledges of gay male relationships and sexual politics. The chapter falls into three major parts. In the first part, I analyse the context and the parameters of the representation of gay men as over-sexed and promiscuous. In the second part, I explore the dynamics of a conflict about non-monogamy in one of the focus group’s discussions. Some arguments against non-monogamy combine a politicisation of sexual ethics with an integrationist vision and assimilationist agenda. In the third part, I highlight the prominence of the (non)monogamy question in debates about the demand for same-sex marriage rights. I conclude the chapter with the suggestion that a theory of multiple and partially antagonistic gay public spheres, rather than the notion of a gay male community, is helpful to understand the persistence of conflicts about (non)monogamy in gay male politics. Metaphorical Constructions: Anti-gay Promiscuity Discourses The category of ‘homosexual’ emerged in the 19th century in a discursive shift from a moral or legal concern with ‘sinful’ or ‘indecent’ sexual acts to a new understanding, according to which homosexuals (alongside of a range of other ‘perverts’ or ‘degenerates’) were a distinct type of human being. The idea of ‘homosexuality’ as a deep personality trait was the result of a range of intersecting discourses which came to dominate the understanding and the practice prevalent in a range of professions, such as law, medicine, psychiatry and the newly emerging discipline of sexology (Weeks 1977/1990, Foucault 1990, Bristow 1997). These disciplines produced an authoritative discourse, according to which male and female homosexuality was fraught with moral deviation and sexual excess. Sexual stereotypes played a role of paramount importance in the construction of what Anne McClintock (1995) has called the ‘abjected groups’ of the Victorian bourgeois imagination. Historical research has shown that in the Victorian period, the discursive production of stereotypes regarding a deviant, perverted, excessive, or promiscuous sexuality was a common feature to the representation of homosexuals, racialised groups, and the working classes (Gilman 1985, Skeggs 1997, Somerville 2000). According to the research of Sander Gilman, Black bodies – and in the particular Black female bodies – were the primary symbols in 19th century iconography for sexualised deviance. However, the promiscuity allegation worked not only to downgrade Black people, but also the ‘lower’ classes and homosexual men and women. In this interconnected web of a moral economy of bodies, it is difficult to clearly disentangle the categories of race, gender, sexuality and class. The pathologisation and criminalisation of homosexuality was emblematic of a cultural dynamic that demanded the abjection of uninhibited sexuality and pleasure. Representing the ‘Other’ in sexualised terms was an efficient strategy to evoke the connotations of illness and moral deprivation (Gilman 1985). While 19th century sources attest to the stereotype of female homosexuals as being sexually uninhibited
Sex and Assimilation
59
and aggressive, the discursive fusion of homosexuality and promiscuity has been more unequivocal with regard to male homosexuality. In both medical and popular texts, homosexuality was described as a contagious state of degeneracy, whose central focus was on an unrestricted transgressive sexuality. Even if the medical discourse on homosexuality shifted from a biological paradigm (degeneration, contagion or illness) to a psychological one (perversions, psycho-pathology), the association of male homosexuality with promiscuity persisted. Dominant representations of gayness have remained over-determined by an assumption of an excessive, contagious and promiscuous sexuality. In the common usage of the term, ‘promiscuity’ carries a range of negative connotations, such as indiscrimination, insatiability, irresponsibility and immaturity (Gove 2000). The fact that anti-promiscuity stereotypes are such an important element of anti-gay prejudice has complicated the communication of gay male non-monogamous knowledges and practices. It has contributed to a situation in which it appears to be problematic to claim non-monogamy as an integral part of gay male culture. Researchers committed to challenging homophobic sentiments have frequently seen their primary task in dispersing the myth that gay men are promiscuous and incapable of maintaining lasting intimate relationships. Most of the research into gay and lesbian relationships published since the late 1970s has aimed to challenge stereotypical representations of these relationships as pathological, unstable and non-egalitarian (cf. Carrington 1999). This effort went hand in hand with the demonstration that satisfying, egalitarian same-sex long-term couple relationships do in fact exist (Tuller 1988). At the same time, most research texts do acknowledge one major distinction between gay male and heterosexual relationships: the frequency of non-monogamous arrangements among gay male partners (Yip 1997, Weeks et al. 2001, for a good overview, see Weeks et al. 1996). According to a common pattern of argumentation gay male relationships are said to be healthy – even if non-monogamous. The ‘promiscuity’ allegation is usually countered by a focus on the couple relationship and an emphasis of the qualities of love, intimacy and commitment. Paradoxically, it has been in research motivated by the HIV/AIDS crisis that the full scope of diversity of gay male non-monogamies has entered social science discourse (Hickson et al. 1992, Weatherburn et al. 1992, Davies et al. 1993, Coxon 1995). However, due to its primary concern with epidemiology, this kind of work unfortunately lacks an engagement with the subtleties of meaning, language and the details of everyday practices (other than sexual ‘acts’). Other genres of writing and cultural production (such as film, theatre, novels, poetry, ’zines and pornography) rather than research literature therefore are more likely to describe gay male nonmonogamous culture in a more subtle manner (Gove 2000). HIV/AIDS and the Radicalisation of Anti-Promiscuity Discourses The AIDS crisis has triggered an enormous anti-gay backlash. Metaphorical constructions in government responses and public media discourses, of gay men as promiscuous disease carriers who pose a threat to the nation, mobilised and reinforced already existing anti-gay stereotypes (Watney 1987/1997, Chuter and Seidl 1987, McGrath 1994, Treichler 1987, Weeks 2000a). Public and medical discourses on AIDS
60
The Spectre of Promiscuity
established an intrinsic link between AIDS and gayness. The earliest acronym for the illness, introduced in 1981, was GRID (Gay-Related Immuno-Deficiency). Although this term was soon replaced by AIDS (Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome), since non-gay people, too, were affected by similar symptoms, the emergent moment of GRID continued to provide the frame for the popular understanding of the illness. According Simon Watney, homosexuality has been caught in a contagious discourse of blame, which ‘resolutely insists that the point of the emergence of the virus should be identified as its cause’ (Watney, quoted in Sharrock 1997: 358). The scientifically unsound representation of AIDS as a ‘contagious disease’ could be instrumentalised for the construction of gayness itself as a contagious disease (cf. Altman 1992, Weeks 1991a). The conflation of homosexuality with contagion mobilised resilient plague metaphors and promiscuity stereotypes derived from the 18th and 19th centuries in order to describe gay male cultures at the turn of the millennium. A similar mechanism works at the heart of the common equation of ‘high risk groups’ with ‘infected groups’. The category of ‘high risk groups’ emerged from early observations of the demographics of the evolving AIDS epidemic. Depending on the context a wide range of social groups was assigned to belong to this category: injecting drug users, Haitians (in the USA), haemophiliacs, prostitutes, gay men, bisexuals, African men and women (and – by extension – the sexual partners of all of these people). Critics raised their concern about the exclusive implications of this linguistic practice in which the notion of ‘being at risk’ was conflated with the stigma of ‘being diseased’. Drawing on racist, nationalist, sexist, classist and heterosexist discourses, the concept of ‘high risk’ groups has helped to construct a normal, innocent white and heterosexual national community in juxtaposition to diverse marginalised groups (Altman 1986, Cohen 1996, Cole 1996). Many pointed out that in the light of medical knowledge on HIV transmission, the category of ‘high risk group’ was misleading, because it is not sexual identity that puts people at risk, but the engagement in certain unprotected sexual behaviours.1 Promiscuity, and in particular gay male promiscuity, became the lynch pin in public media discourses on AIDS, too. By assuming sex to be a merely physical release or pleasure-seeking, gay men revealed promiscuity to be the foundation of their amoral natures. Many of my interview partners were only too aware of how promiscuity discourses are still instrumentalised in hegemonic politics of the anti-gay moral right. Patrick, a supporter of OutRage, complains about the demonising representation of gay men in British tabloids, which construct gay men as promiscuous agents of the AIDS epidemic: Patrick: Yeah, so many anti-gay campaigns are based on promiscuity. Nuts! I mean in that thing [referring to a recent tabloid article – C.K.] (…) it doesn’t mention promiscuity as such, but it implies promiscuity: ‘the homosexual mafia’, ‘perverted agenda’, ‘alternative lifestyles’, ‘sick perversions’, ‘a cult of death’. That’s the word: ‘Homosexuality is a Cult 1 Whereas the concept of ‘high risk groups’ was attacked by AIDS activists in the 1980s, some campaigning groups reassumed its usefulness in the early 1990s in conflicts about the allocation and distribution of funding. For some positions on this debate (which is generally referred to as the debate about the ‘de-gaying’ and ‘re-gaying’ of AIDS), see King (1993), Watney (1994), Bhatt and Lee (1997).
Sex and Assimilation
61
of Death’! I mean that’s implying that we’re all going to shag each other senseless, infect everybody else and kill the entire nation. That’s what they’re implying. We are going to kill every single child in the world. (…) It is used by anti-gay campaigners, by the mass media, as a way of showing that we’re completely decadent. I don’t see what’s the problem. (...) A bit of decent decadence, there we go!
The ‘invention’ and promotion of safe sex by gay, lesbian and bisexual activists has been motivated by an attempt to respond to the epidemic through the adaptation of protective techniques and behaviours, rather than with a denouncement of sex and a return to monogamy and romanticism (Altman 1986, Patton 1985, Watney 1994). Douglas Crimp countered the raging anti-gay and anti-promiscuity sentiments of the day by crediting promiscuity as an important skill and cultural knowledge, which enabled gay men to find a realistic and pragmatic response to the epidemic ‘Gay male promiscuity should be seen (...) as a positive model’ he suggests in a famous essay, and that it is due to ‘the lack of promiscuity and its lessons’ in heterosexual culture ‘that many straight people will have a much harder time learning “how to have sex in an epidemic”’ (1987: 253). Promiscuity is described as a competence rather than a problem. According to Crimp, it stands for a collective skill, which has stimulated the most pragmatic and effective responses to the epidemic. Yet not all gay men saw it this way. The anti-gay backlash of the 1980s had its repercussions within the gay, lesbian and bisexual movements, too. AIDS, the Romantic Turn and Gay Male Conservatism Certain strands of gay activism have taken an increasingly inimical stance towards gay male promiscuity, public sex and party culture. Sexual ethics have always been contested in gay male and lesbian politics. However, conservative reactions to the homophobic backlash around HIV/AIDS worked with a narrative of ‘collective maturation’, according to which AIDS marked a turning point in gay male culture; a moment when gay men finally realised that they had to abandon their ‘hedonistic’ lifestyles (Patton 1998, Nardi 1997, Seidman 1992, 1997). A new gay male romanticism claimed its ethical superiority to the allegedly irresponsible tradition of 1970s gay male liberationism (Sullivan 1995, 1998, Signorile 1997, Rotello 1997). The divisions between ‘romanticist’ and ‘liberationist’ sexual ethics have led to serious clashes between different factions of the lesbian and gay movement, for example, over the question of the closure of gay male bathhouses in larger US cities (Schulman 1994, Dangerous Bedfellows 1996). Romantic values have become a high ranking item on the political agenda of gay male assimilationism. In intrasocial movement conflicts regarding ‘public sex’, gay male assimilationists have often allied themselves with a new gay male white middle class conservatism, which has gained influence throughout the 1980s (Pendleton 1996, Warner 1999). Kirk and Madsen’s (1989) revision of lesbian and gay politics in the book After the Ball provides a good example. The problem of discrimination, they argue, is rooted in the inappropriate behaviour of gay activists on the fringes. The rights of the ‘silent majority’ of gay men (lesbians are rarely mentioned in the text) are best secured by a politics of self-policing. Their infamous proposal of a ‘code of conduct’ demands of
62
The Spectre of Promiscuity
gay men not to show affection or to talk about sex in public and to verbally ‘punish’ the ones who do (p. 357). Similar conflicts about public sex have surfaced in the UK. Andrew Sullivan’s popular book Virtually Normal (1995) also caused significant debate in the UK. Some gay groups welcomed the introduction of CCTV surveillance of Russell Square in order to keep cruisers out of the area. Occasionally, angry accusations against indecent and promiscuous non-conformers appear in the gay press. In an article titled ‘Not in My Backyard’, Adrian Crouch (1999) airs his anger about gay men cruising in his neighbourhood in the Pink Paper. In drastic words Crouch describes the ‘morally reprehensible’ behaviour of his fellow gays: Try to explain to a 9-year-old child why three men are stripped naked and buggering each other stupid. Try defeating homophobic neighbours, who find semen filled condoms on their doorsteps. Try looking your mother in your face as you walk past an old man too arrogant to stop blowing some guy on a bike. It’s little wonder the majority of heterosexuals would prefer us back in the closet. I don’t blame them. (p. 12)
The cruisers are described as the invaders of a heterosexual family space and heterosexual middle class neighbourhood. The title ‘Not in My Backyard’ reinforces the impression of a militant middle class protectionism. Not entirely without threatening sub-tones, Crouch concludes his article with an appeal to his fellow gays at least to be discrete: ‘Otherwise you’ll get what you deserve, police attention and the continued bigotry of heterosexuals’ (p. 12). Crouch implies that gay men have to blame themselves for the continuing homophobia, because of their indecent sexual behaviour. He worries about the negative impact that public sex may have on the representation of gay men as a collectivity. His vision of ‘public sphere inclusion’ is turned into an assimilationist obligation on the parts of gay men: they have to behave themselves sexually if they ever want to gain recognition in wider society (Clark 2000). As I will demonstrate in the next section, at least some gay men participating in the focus groups have had similar concerns regarding gay male promiscuity. Debating Promiscuity in a Focus Group with Gay and Bisexual Men The gay and bisexual men who attended the focus group discussions held very different views on the question of non-monogamy. There were clearly divergent degrees of ‘understanding’ for (some) gay men wanting to engage in casual sex in each group setting. In some groups, casual sex was talked about as a taken-for-granted feature of the gay male lifestyle. In others, non-monogamy was subject to heated debates about ethics and politics. While in some groups people jokingly shared anecdotes about their experiences at public sex venues, in others the disclosure of some men to be non-monogamous appeared to be quite confessional. These differences between focus groups notwithstanding, ethics of public and casual sex were discussed controversially in all the focus groups. The group discussion with the men of The Inner Circle was strongly polarised along the opposition of monogamy versus promiscuity. Many discussants used the
Sex and Assimilation
63
term ‘promiscuity’, irrespective of the speaker’s opinion on the question of nonmonogamy. Although the dominant discourse constructs promiscuity as stigma, its negative connotations are nevertheless not intrinsic to the term itself (Gove 2000). The arguments brought up for or against casual and recreational sex were personal, ethical and political. Neil was most vocal in condemning gay male promiscuity as damaging, irresponsible and immature. His argument starts with a quite personal reflection on his own life experience. Neil: I know that when I was younger I went through a stage when I was very, very promiscuous, I slept with hundreds of men. And if you’d talked to me at the time, I’d have talked about not following straight rules and stuff like that. But in reality what it was basically about was a lack of self-esteem and trying to think ‘oh the next person will make me feel good about myself’. (…) It was basically because of the fact that I had – this is just speaking personally – various problems to do with my childhood, which I was trying to fix or sort.
Neil concludes with some regret that he was wasting his time hanging out on the scene and not caring about his career or looking for solid friendship or partnership. From here Neil’s argument extends to a more general critique of gay male life. At this point his personal narrative taps into a discourse on gay male sexual culture which has strongly conservative overtones. Many gay men, he argues, abuse sex to avoid the ‘serious’ issues in life. This again forecloses the possibility of personal growth and development. Neil: I think when it comes to sex, a lot of people do choose to be permanent kids, and sometimes promiscuity can be part of (…) just being a teenager. There’s very few straight people in their thirties or their forties, who are in that frame of mind or state or really terribly interested in that frame of mind.
Serious adult relationships, Neil claims, are not about sex, but about intimacy, nurture and kindness and shared responsibilities. According to Neil, promiscuous and casual sex is immature and banal. Neil deploys elements of a discourse which is common in the popular literature on personal growth and self-help culture (Klesse 2007b). The normative effects of his arguments evolve around the values of intimacy and partnership, and an ideal work biography. However, there is also a political edge to his argument which centres on a concern with positive images. Neil: I think that if gay men want to be taken seriously by widestream society then we need to take ourselves seriously. (…) Why should you take a gay man seriously if he’s done lots of cruising and stuff like that. I’m not saying that you shouldn’t do that, or that it shouldn’t be available to him (…) but I do think that one needs to think about how one presents oneself to family and friends.
Although Neil constructs his critique around the question of self-representation with regard to family and friends, his argument is also about the perception of gay men in ‘widestream society’. The obvious implication of his argument is that cruising gay men do political damage to the gay male community.
64
The Spectre of Promiscuity
Although Neil is challenged by some group members, he also finds significant support for his claims by other discussants. Bill is one of the few people in the group who are ready to defend promiscuity as a value in itself. Bill: And I think that it [that is, promiscuity – C.K.] has its positive aspects. Because as we become more accepted and more visible, then […] maybe we can teach that being more fluid about our relationships can be a positive thing, rather than just having the sort of ‘wife and two kids’ and a mortgage and a very sort of shutdown life. (...) But ordinary homosexuals break out. It’s one way… [to show] our difference, you know, we are more promiscuous (...) and we can teach. We can say ‘this is a way forward, be more open about relationships’.
Bill welcomes promiscuity as an important feature of gay male culture. His point of view is supported by Mark, who argues that the basic model for gay male relationships is derived from friendship. In its ideal form friendship is a non-exclusive relationship. The fact that gay male relationships have been conceptualised around the inherently ‘promiscuous’ friendship form has resulted in the emergence of specifically gay male collective forms of attachment and socialised practices of sexuality. Mark and Bill were the only participants who endorsed ‘promiscuity’ as a cultural value in its own right. Others welcomed the lack of binding relationship scripts as a unique feature of gay male culture in this moment of history, but refrained from any ethical comment on the question of non-monogamy per se. Most participants articulated views that could be described as different versions of a relativistic argument. For them both monogamy and non-monogamy were valid options. Neil’s and Bill’s positions clearly marked the outer poles of the spectrum of opinions in the group. At the same time they were the most vocal participants. Roland, who usually moderates the group, tried to reconcile the divergent views with a contingent defence of non-monogamy based on a commitment to the universal value of intimacy. I find it worthwhile to explore his position in more detail, since Roland seemed to manage to create some common sense in the debate based on position which embraced the values of both ‘sexual freedom’ (autonomy) and ‘love’ and ‘intimacy’ (bonding). Roland: Would we have more of a consensus – I don’t think we necessarily disagree (...) if we came back to the subject about (...) our emotional lives and about how we express that in our friendships and in our relationships with other people. So that when we say yes, you can have all sorts of patterns of relating to people sexually, but actually we are all yearning for places where we can exchange love, deep knowledge and deep mutual respect, the ability to have your thoughts reflected back to you by somebody that knows in depth and to find one’s own selfishness shown up by the fact that someone else, who’s around enough, that you can’t avoid it. Whereas if you’re dealing with lots and lots of different people at a low level, you’re still able to avoid, to some extent, commitment, growth and these sorts of things.
Sex and Assimilation
65
Roland considers non-monogamy to be a valid option, as long as such a ‘lifestyle’ does not obstruct a person’s commitment to loving and stable relationships – the only kind of connection which may enable self-knowledge and personal growth. As discursive regimes or modalities of aesthetic attachment, intimacy discourses play a central part in the validation of sexual and relationship biographies. Within psychotherapeutic and psychological discourses, ‘intimacy’ is perceived as one of the most important humanist values in the context of interpersonal relationships. Lauren Berlant has suggested that the notion of the couple is implicated in most hegemonic understandings of intimacy as an emotional skill and value. ‘[D]esires for intimacy that bypass the couple or the life narrative it generates have no alternative plots, let alone few laws in which to clarify and cultivate them’ (1998: 295). Intimacy is generally presented as something that is impossible not to want. By capitalising on this universal appeal of intimacy, Roland manages to calm the storm of disagreement and to reconcile the polarised positions within the group. The centrality of intimacy in the debates about sexual ethics attests to its role as ‘a nodal point’ for the articulation of public opinions on sexual relationships and sexual acts (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). As a powerful asset in an interrelated regime of relational ideologies, the ability to claim that an ‘intimate relationship’ has been established has a significant impact on the question of whether such a relationship or encounter is perceived of being of any worth. Moreover, it has an effect on the question whether the person who engages in this relationship is considered to be a mature and decent citizen, whose voice in the political debate in public sphere should be taken seriously. The Same-sex Marriage Debates Over the last decades there has been a reorientation of the lesbian and gay political agenda away from a concern with identity and community to a politicisation of samesex relationships (Weeks et al. 2001). One feature of this emerging ‘relationship paradigm’ has been a tendency to incorporate the language of familialism in gay and lesbian political rhetoric and ideology (Weston 1991). The emergence of a lesbigay discourse on ‘families of choice’ indicates the engagement of queers in a battle over the meaning of family, kinship and relationships. The emergence of strong political campaign for legal recognition of same-sex partnerships and families in most Western countries is part of this wider cultural development. The question of whether legal recognition should take the form of civil marriage rights or access to civil union schemes has been a highly divisive issue in many movement contexts (cf. Sullivan 1997, Baird and Rosenbaum 1997, Wintemute and Andenœs 2000). A few countries currently afford same-sex unions the right to participate in marriage (Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands and Canada), but there has been significant development regarding either national or regional legislation about civil partnerships (Heaphy 2007). Mainstream campaigning groups have tended to put the demand for same-sex marriage high on the agenda of the struggle for civil equality. Authors like Andrew Sullivan have classed access to civil marriage as the ultimate criterion for full citizenship status. ‘The right to marry is understood as a given, almost definitional, of both human autonomy and political citizenship’ (1998: 75). On the basis of a
66
The Spectre of Promiscuity
definition of marriage rights as human rights, Sullivan reads the denial to gay men and lesbians to partake in this institution as ‘the most public affront possible to their public equality’ (1995: 179). Before the UK Civil Partnership Act 2004 (C.P.A.) came into force in December 2005 there were few provisions for same-sex relationships in UK legislation at all (Palmer 1995, Bailey-Harris 2001). The C.P.A. now provides a set of rights that come close to the ones tied to legal marriage (Glennon 2006). The debate about the introduction of the act was framed in a discourse according to which the C.P.A. is supposed to ‘promote and support stable relationships’ (Women and Equality Unit 2003) and realise a ‘parity of treatment’ (Baroness Scotland) between civil (same-sex) partners and married (heterosexual) spouses (Barker 2004, 2006). Although the act has been widely praised as a milestone in UK legislation on same-sex relationships, recent research indicates that many gay men and lesbians perceive civil partnership regulations (at least if conceptualised as special laws for same-sex partnerships) to fall short of establishing true equality in treatment (Clarke et al. 2006, Harding and Peel 2006). The experiences in other European countries which introduced civil partnership legislation (such as the Netherlands) provide reason to speculate that the struggle for full legal equality with the ultimate aim of obtaining civil marriage rights for same-sex couples to continue (Hegarty et al. 2006). Others have been critical of the act for different reasons. They argue that the codification of a romantic model of conjugality in the C.P.A. fails to embrace the full diversity of same-sex relationships. These critics suggest that the C.P.A. revolves around implicitly heteronormative relationship ideologies (Barker 2004, 2006). These voices indicate that intra-social movement tension, too, is likely to persist. Non-monogamy has been an important issue in the conflicts about marriage rights. Claims about gay male non-monogamy have permeated the arguments of both supporters and opponents of the demand for same-sex marriage rights. Marriage – A Civilising Institution? Apart from the stress of the civil or human rights aspect and an insistence on formal equality, many proponents of same-sex marriage have emphasised the cultural and socio-psychological benefits that marriage will bring for lesbians and gay men. Since marriage will provide role models, some argued that it will have traditionalising effects on gay and lesbian lifestyles. Some of these arguments are especially targeted at gay men. In particular, conservatives have tried to sell the idea of samesex marriage with the argument that marriage will ‘domesticate’ or ‘civilise’ gay men (Sullivan 1995, 1999, Rauch 1996/1997). Since the act of marriage signifies an endorsement of love, commitment and intimacy, marriage is said to open up a space for a deeply humanising experience for gay men. Marriage will provide an opportunity for gay men to reclaim their dignity by consciously turning away from idle hedonism and irresponsible promiscuity (Rotello 1997, Eskridge 1997, Signorile 1997). In the light of these arguments, marriage is presented as a means of moral and legal regulation of gay and lesbian culture. ‘Society has strong reasons to encourage the formation of stable domestic units by both heterosexual and homosexual couples’ suggests Martha Nussbaum, but ‘if gays cannot legally get married, their efforts to live in stable committed partnerships are discouraged, and a life of rootless or even
Sex and Assimilation
67
promiscuous non-commitment is correspondingly encouraged’ (1999: 202–203). While Nussbaum values marriage as a soft tool of regulation through encouragement, Jonathan Rauch sees its value as a means within a politics of stigmatisation. ‘If gay marriage is recognized, single gay people over a certain age should not be surprised when they are disapproved or pitied. That is a vital part of what makes marriage work. It is stigma as social policy’ (Rauch, quoted by Warner 1999: 111). In both arguments marriage is construed as a strategy to regulate lesbian and gay relational and sexual cultures. Opponents have pointed out that a politics which seeks equality through access to an exclusive system of privileges will cause further marginalisation of the unmarried, the uncoupled and those more visibly defined by sex (Smith 1994a, Bell and Binnie 2000). You cannot embrace the cultural institution of marriage, argues Michael Warner (1999), without reifying the values of life-long commitment, monogamy, domesticity and love. The politics of same-sex marriage fosters conformity and inevitably works against relationship and family diversity (Browning 1996/1997, Card 1996, Rahman 1998). Some lesbian and queer feminists have taken a more optimistic stance on the impact of same-sex marriage practices on relationship and family diversity. They have argued that the participation of lesbians and gay men (and other queers) in the institution may counter the heteronormative notions of gender differentness at the heart of traditional marriage scripts (Hunter 1995b, Graff 1996/1997). According to this perspective, bringing gender dissidence into the cultural space of marriage will ultimately transform this institutionalised practice. However, these voices have remained marginal to the general debate. Most critics see marriage steeped in heterosexual gender ideology to a degree which makes it unrealistic to deconstruct its symbolism from ‘within’. They consider it much more likely that marriage rights will increase the pressure on cohabiting partners to marry. Marriage status for some translates into the continuing marginalisation of the ones who refuse to marry. The problem of recognition therefore persists. The Equality Argument As we have seen, not all proponents of same-marriage rights perceive marriage as a moral institution. The most common argument for same-sex marriage has been couched in the language of classical liberalism. According to the liberal paradigm, in order for gay men and lesbians to be considered equal, it is necessary for them to have the same rights as heterosexuals to marry their partners (Eskridge 2001). Opponents have rejected this approach as short sighted. Their critique usually works on two levels: (a) a rejection of a political approach of claiming rights and (b) a problematisation of marriage as a legal construct and cultural practice (Ettelbrick 1989/1997, Lehr 1999, Cooper 2001). The politics of claiming rights has been criticised for a variety of reasons. Firstly, such a strategy focuses too strongly on the state. Secondly, demands for radical change – if translated into legal discourse – are reframed as the claim for individualised entitlements. Thirdly, rights-based movements depend on acceptance by the majority and consequently may be ready to conform to dominant values or preserve structural power relations for strategic reasons. A political strategy calling
68
The Spectre of Promiscuity
for ‘rights under the law’ consequently forecloses more radical and transformative political strategies. Finally, claiming rights chimes in well with developing a political voice as a minority. Rights-based politics therefore reinforce essentialist notions of sexual identity (cf. Hunter 1995b, Rahman 1998, Jackson 1998). Critics have further argued that state-sanctioned marriage provides a regulative tool for the selective distribution of privileges, rights and benefits that create inequalities. State marriage results in gaining a wide range of material, social and personal privileges regarding personal taxation, social security benefits, national insurance, inheritance taxes, mutual financial obligation, rights of succession, property claims in the case of divorce, societal approval, access to procreative technologies, adoption, parental rights, and so on (Bailey-Harris 2001). Critics have pointed out that these rights and privileges should not be restricted to people in a particular relationship or family form. Many of these benefits could be granted either to individuals or they could be extended to a multiplicity of relationship or household forms (Schenk 2000, Rankine 1996/1997). Many have argued that the lesbian and gay movements are better advised to challenge the inequalities that derive from privileging certain relationship and family practices, rather than to embrace with marriage a particularly classed and racialised family ideal. From this perspective, marriage discourse is problematic since it is tied up with normative imageries of the nation (as a community made up of married white dual-headed families) and of ‘proper place’ (of the family home as the ultimate space of bourgeois domesticity and privacy) (Cooper 2001, cf. McClintock 1995, Stacey 1996). Marriage, Equality and Ambivalence The debate about marriage in the lesbian and gay movement has been very heated at times. Pro- and anti-marriage arguments have been strongly polarised and often tend to carry a significant amount of ideological ballast. Same-sex marriage appeared to be the most controversial issue in most of the focus group discussions. Yet my in-depth interviews with gay men interestingly produced a rather different picture. Although many respondents did not feel comfortable with the idea of marriage, few straightforwardly rejected the campaign for same-sex marriage as a political mistake. It was as if the militant critique of marriage that has been so forcefully argued in public political and academic discourse was absent in the reflections of gay men, most of whom have been committed to non-monogamous relationships for most of their lives. It was in particular against the backdrop of this feature of my sample that I was struck by the virtual absence of a critical discourse on the politics of ‘spousal recognition’ in my interview partners’ narratives. Their position is probably best described as ambivalent. In the following, I will demonstrate that this ambivalence results from the hegemonic influence of a liberal framework of rights in the current moment of sexual politics in Britain (cf. Barker 2006, Harding and Peel 2006). The most salient feature of my interview partners’ discussion of the politics of same-sex marriage was an endorsement of the value of equality. Christian: Do you think the campaign for gay and lesbian marriage is important?
Sex and Assimilation
69
Rizwan: I think it is. (...) I think for me it’s about equality. It’s an equality issue. (…) We’re equal to all heterosexuals. Why can’t we have the same rights? (...) So, I think for me it’s about partnership, (...) about recognition through the law. Not necessarily through the Church, the Temple or the Mosques – just by law.
For Rizwan, formal equality in the sense of having the same rights as every heterosexual is the most important issue at stake in the marriage debate. Due to the strong anti-gay sentiments and the heterosexual and procreation-centred notion of marriage in most organised religions, Rizwan thought that the legal recognition of same-sex relationships will most likely take the form of partnership rights rather than of legal marriage. The introduction of C.P.A. shows that Rizwan was right on this point. Apart from the inhibition of a gay-rights agenda by organised religion, Rizwan suggested that it would certainly help the gay rights cause if more monogamous and stable gay male relationships were visible. Rizwan paired his demand for equal treatment with a normative appeal to other gay men to present or conduct their relationships in a particular way. Other interviewees were much more wary of such a normalising twist at the heart of the same-sex marriage campaign. However, most of them were ready to subordinate their concerns to their firm commitment to the value of equality. Bommi, for example, believes that being gay or bisexual opens up a space for non-conforming lifestyles. After having experimented with alternate ways of being in relationships, first as a bisexual, and later as a gay-identified man, all his adult life, marriage appears too be too limited to provide an attractive option. That notwithstanding, having the choice to get married, for Bommi, symbolises the central value of equality: Bommi: I think you need to separate conforming from equality. I mean, I’m very much about having equality in my workplace and pension rights and travel rights (...) Equality (…) the ability to be able to get married if I chose to, would be important. I don’t think I would take up the option of marriage now. And that’s partly about the lifestyle. The whole point about being gay is that you haven’t got to conform to society. You haven’t got to get married, you haven’t got to have kids, you haven’t got to take on, as a man, a dominant role, you can be passive with another man and … so in that sense, I don’t like conforming.
Many gay men in my study clearly rejected the idea of same-sex marriage. They often saw marriage as an intrinsically heterosexual institution. The aspiration to marry would undermine gay men’s difference. It would mean copying heterosexual lifestyles and values. In a rather different vein, some men, who called strong religious values their own, argued that marriage was not made for gays. Paulo, who is proud of his traditional values informed by Portuguese Catholicism, argues that the institution of marriage is based on reproduction. Because he does not morally approve of samesex couples striving for reproduction or parenting, gay men should not seek the right to marry. Paulo’s commitment to equality is compromised by his identification with a particular set of Catholic cultural values. The discussion group with South-Asian gay and bisexual men from Matai primarily explored same-sex marriage from within the paradigm of religious values, in particular with regard to Sikhism and Islam. From a Sikh perspective, Wijai argued that marriage is a sacred institution. Because
70
The Spectre of Promiscuity
homosexuality would fall outside of the morality circumscribed by this religion, gay men should neither want to marry, nor follow religion. Wijai’s position was highly controversial and several men contested his thesis of an irreconcilability of religion with homosexuality. Although some of the young men in the focus group described a life as an out-gay man as a valid option for themselves, few considered it a possibility that same-sex marriage could find approval in an explicitly religious context in the near future.2 This debate attests to the conflation of marriage with religious values in different cultural contexts. At the same time, this fusion of marriage with religious meanings is a reason for secular, agnostic or atheistic gay men and lesbians to reject marriage as a personal option, too (Clarke et al. 2006). Matthew insists on the necessity of clearly disentangling the legal dimension of marriage from its religious or cultural connotations. He asserts that it is necessary for society to legally recognise same-sex partnerships. At the same time he does not want gay men and lesbians to take on the traditional and religious values that are associated with this institution. Matthew: I think what’s important is partnership. (…) For me marriage isn’t really an issue. (…) I would like lesbian and gay partnerships to be legally recognised in areas such as inheritance and pensions, partnership rights. And … I don’t feel we necessarily need to copy or become part of heterosexual marriage (...) Well I guess there’s two aspects of it. There’s the religious aspect, religious in the sort of traditional aspect. And then there’s the legal aspect. And, erm … I don’t feel the need to share in the religious and traditional aspects of it.
The majority of the gay men, who saw marriage as an essentially heterosexual or out-moded institution, favoured the option of civil partnership rights outside the frame of marriage. They suggest that same-sex marriage is by far not the only strategy for gaining legal recognition and associated rights and benefits for samesex relationships. Apart from same-sex marriage the major legal alternatives have been described as (a) the ‘opt-in’ system of a registered partnership with defined consequences in certain areas of law or (b) a statute-defined qualifying relationship which usually is conceptualised either around the cohabitation model (‘living together as ...’) or around a definition that does not imply the need for a sexual 2 The main concern in this focus group session was with heterosexual or other-sex marriage. Most of the young men found themselves confronted with the expectation of their families to get married to a female partner. Many found it difficult, if not impossible, to refuse marriage or to disclose their sexual identities. Some of my interview partners, such as Ali and Irfan, talked about having been threatened or physically abused by family members when they were suspected or found out to be gay. ‘Getting married is a family obligation or duty. To not marry is to “defy the expectations of family and community”’, argue Patel and Maharaj (2000). Since in South Asian diasporic cultures the family trends to be positioned differently with regard to the public/private distinction, coming out and/or the refusal to marry may not only result in being ostracised within the family (‘the private sphere’), but also in the wider ‘community’ (the ‘public sphere’). Against the backdrop of these cultural dilemmas, most South Asian men in my study came up with a distinctive perspective on the same-sex marriage debate. See also Safra Project (2003) with regard to lesbian and bisexual Muslim women’s issues related to marriage.
Sex and Assimilation
71
relationship (for example, ‘associated person’, ‘home sharer’ or ‘close personal relationship’) (Bailey-Harris 2001: 607, Eskridge 2001). Proponents of same-sex marriage rights often describe such options as poor alternatives that ultimately perpetuate the exclusion of same-sex partners from one of the most valued institutions of society. Furthermore, if constricted to same-sex partners, such laws may result in specialist laws establishing a second-class marriage for queers.3 By contrast, others have argued that a demand for access to registered partnerships or statute-defined qualifying relationships for all (irrespective of gendered partner choice) creates the opportunity for fruitful political alliances with those heterosexuals who are critical of marriage (Cooper 2001, cf. VanEvery 1995). Some of my interview partners are very well aware of the fact that most registered partnership models lay out qualifying criteria that effectively exclude their own partnership(s) from any (future) provisions. Patrick: I think it would be nice to have that option (…) it wouldn’t be an option for Boris and I, because any partnership rights (…) would be based on people having lived together as partners for a certain amount of time (...). So it’s not an option for us, but I do think there is a case for … partnership rights. I mean even for basic things like succession of property (…) And up until gay partnerships are recognised in that respect, there still won’t be equality. I do think that if we were living together as a couple, we would like to have partnership rights. But we’re not so… it just wouldn’t enter into the equation.
Patrick does not believe that he will gain any partnership rights for his ten-year relationship with his partner, with whom he has never cohabited. Moreover, most proposals for statute-defined qualifying relationships tend to privilege the couple form. Even the ‘Unmarried Partners Act’ proposed by the more radical campaigning group OutRage! suggests limiting provisions, entitlements and obligations to two people, that is, the couple unit (Tatchell 1999, 2000). It struck me that none of my gay male interview partners criticised the normativity of the couple form at the heart of the campaign for same-sex partnership rights. This may be due to the fact that all gay men in my sample were either single or part of a non-monogamous couple arrangement (rather than a multiple partner network) at the time of the interview. As I will show in the next chapter, people who described themselves as polyamorous were much more likely to reject the ‘compulsory monogamy’ at the heart of most proposals for the legislation of same-sex relationships. Let me briefly summarise my discussion so far. Although few of my gay male interview partners envisioned living in married same-sex relationships themselves, all of them expected the state to provide legal protection and legal support for same-sex partnerships. At the same time, most of them had ambivalent feelings about the idea of same-sex marriage. Although many considered samesex marriage as an assimilationist cultural practice, they defended the demand for marriage rights as a principle of an uncompromised legal equality. My findings are very much in tune with those of Jeffrey Weeks, Brian Heaphy and Katherine Donovan (2001). Most respondents in their study equated same-sex marriage with 3 Harding and Peel’s (2006) multi-national online survey suggests that such a position is particularly prominent in the USA.
72
The Spectre of Promiscuity
assimilation, perceived it to be a hetero-patriarchal state-sanctioned institution or feared that the legislation of same-sex marriage would reinforce the discrimination of non-married relationships or would have preferred a legislation which does not constrict the transferral of rights to conjugal partners. My respondents, too, were ready to subordinate their worries about a normative politics of privilege to a principled demand for formal equality. Their dilemma is illustrative of the current hegemony in sexual politics of a form of political rationality which is derived from a liberal philosophy of rights. Deconstructing Community Recent research has emphasised the significance of the concept community for understanding gay male relationships and sexual cultures. Drawing on the theoretical work of Mark Blasius, Weeks, Heaphy and Donovan (2001) argue that ‘community knowledges’ are vital resources for gay men and lesbians to construct their relationships against the grain of heteronormative hegemony. Blasius (1994) claims that gay men’s and lesbians’ life practices are inspired by a ‘gay and lesbian ethos’ which evolves around the questions ‘How shall we live?’ and ‘What relationships shall we have?’. This lesbian and gay ethos is both public and collective in that it is based on the act of ‘coming out’, which he sees as the foundation of the lesbian and gay community. According to Blasius, this ethos presents itself as a form of community knowledge, which enables gay men and lesbians to choose a particular lifestyle based on autonomy, choice, informed consent and egalitarianism. There are a variety of problems with this thesis. Blasius does not consider that gay men and lesbians may have multiple identities (based on culture, race, ethnicity, class, gender and sexual tastes), a fact which ultimately complicates the notion of a shared commitment to a homogeneous set of cultural practices and ethical orientations. Blasius’ theory rests on a disavowal of differences among and between gay men and lesbians (Young 1997). The conflicts about non-monogamy and the battles about the rights and wrongs of a politics of same-sex marriage that I have discussed throughout this chapter are at odds with the assumption of any consensus regarding the question ‘How shall we life?’. The notion of a ‘community ethos’ obscures rather than highlights the diversity of experience, multiplicity of political voices, and prevalence of conflicts articulated in gay male spaces. Moreover, it rests on an utterly idealistic assumption regarding the role of community in queer people’s lives. Blasius claims that the lesbian and gay community is not created through exclusion and control. He insists that the lesbian and gay ethos is essentially different from the authoritarian self-policing codes promoted by Kirk and Madsen (1989) in their political manifesto After the Ball. This is implausible since Kirk and Madsen explicitly couch their plea to stop other gay men from behaving ‘indecently’ in public as a concern with the perception of the ‘gay community’ in the wider public (pp. 348–353, cf. Clarke 2000). If the gay community ever wants to gain reputation with the straight majority, they argue, it will have to conform to mainstream cultural values. Because the problem is seen to come from the fringes, the gay community has to purify itself for the sake of acceptance. The appeal to a ‘gay community ethos’ is central to their positive images campaign.
Sex and Assimilation
73
I do not deny that the concept of community has been extremely influential in the sexual politics of the gay, lesbian and bisexual movements (cf. Altman 1971, Weeks 1977/1990, 2000c). The concept of community has provided a powerful language for self-identification, belonging, cultural vision and solidarity. However, at the same time community processes also stand for social, moral and political pressure, control and exclusion (Young 1990b, Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992). My interview partners applied the term ‘community’ to a broad variety of social and cultural contexts. The communities they referred to ranged from groups formed around religion, race, ethnicity, sexual identity, sexual tastes and preferences, political movements, college mates, subcultural styles and musical trends. People often felt part of or moved in the discursive context of different (partly overlapping and partly antagonistic) ‘communities’ or cultural contexts. In many cases people felt that the values, lifestyles and identities that are favoured in one of these social contexts stand in opposition to the cultural norms and practices in others. Many found themselves negotiating either for themselves or with their partners, lovers, friends, co-activists and (sometimes) families the diverse moralities, life plans and political and cultural visions that are circulated within and across the boundaries of these different ‘communities’ (cf. Erel 2007). Irfan is particularly critical of the pressures around notions of authenticity and the exclusive regulation of boundaries that are associated with claiming communities based on identity. His scepticism towards communities emerges from his experience of being a part of various minorities. Christian: Do you feel that you are part of any communities or of some sexual community? Irfan: Of a community? Erm … I don’t really feel I associate myself with any one particular community. (…) I’m sure everybody’s unique, but I feel very … I’m Asian and in a really white culture. I’m Muslim and in a Christian country. I’m gay and living in a heterosexual society. I’m Scottish and living in England. Erm … and even in my profession, 80% are female. So I’ve always really been in a minority. (…) I’ve never really had that sense of wanting to have to belong to some place. (…) But belonging to a community? I would say that I feel I belong to the gay Muslim community, the gay Muslim Pakistani community. Yeah, I belong to the gay Pakistani Muslim community, as I do to the straight Pakistani Muslim community, or the Muslim community, or the community of physiotherapists or, you know, to the community of men. But I’ve never really associated myself with the gay scene as such. (...) Being part of the community for me is not something important.
Irfan foregrounds the ambivalent role of ‘communities’ in his life. He discusses in detail his difficulties with the Pakistani and the South-Asian communities in Britain. His major concern is what he perceives as a pronounced homophobia that pervades British South Asian diaspora space. Only recently he has found a place for himself in this context through his involvement with Al-Fatiha – a LGBTQ Muslim group. He further explains his distance to the gay male community with the strong Islamophobia he has experienced as an out-Muslim gay man among gay people (Haritaworn and Tauquir 2007, Puar 2006). Racism in the gay and lesbian scene has been a salient issue for all racial and ethnic minority gay men I have interviewed in the course of
74
The Spectre of Promiscuity
my research. Rizwan, a South Asian interview partner, who is working for a gay organisation, describes his experiences as follows: Rizwan: Let’s talk about how I’ve seen racism in the gay community. (…) When I first came onto the gay scene people saw me as someone, who is passive, who wouldn’t talk much, who was very exotic, and (…) they could tell their friends that they’d had a Paki boy, yeah? That’s racist. (...) I mean you only need to look downstairs [his workplace – C.K.] (…) Although, I mean for me, I (...) don’t want to notice it, but you can see that I’m the only Asian worker, who works here. I am the only Black worker. But you can see the white men looking at me and thinking ‘what’s this Paki doing here and why has he got our job’ and all this? [laughs] (…) They don’t say it, but you can feel it. You can feel it.
The pervasive racism and white cultural hegemony definitely marks the limits of the gay community discourse for Rizwan (and for many other racial or ethnic minority research participants) (cf. Ng 1997, Tagaki 1996, Gopinath 1996, Puar 1998). Rizwan is rather annoyed when I ask him whether he feels part of a gay community. Reminding me that the appropriate question to ask would have been which part of the community he would feel close to, Rizwan affirms his racial and cultural identity as a South Asian gay man. Apart from that, Rizwan is extremely sceptical of the concept community in general. ‘What’s a community?’ he turns back at me several times during the interview. Of course, the meaning attached to the term ‘community‘ differs according to the understanding of the individual using it. Its concrete application to the social and cultural networks of larger sexual movements such as in the ‘lesbian and gay community’, the ‘bisexual community’, the ‘queer community’, the ‘Black lesbian and gay community’, the ‘South Asian lesbian and gay community’, the ‘Jewish lesbian and gay community’ or the ‘Muslim queer community’, and so on, evokes a whole set of distinctive connotations regarding the respective collectivity. Partly, these hidden meanings refer to the question of the boundaries of the community, that is, questions of belonging or non-belonging and the nature of the relationships to other groups, collectivities or movements. Where to draw the boundaries of a particular community has created continuous conflict in probably all the social movements around gender and sexuality.4 ‘Community’ is a loaded term. In particular in Britain it has been imbued with the ideologies of official multiculturalism that have reproduced culturalist stereotypes about racialised/ethnicised groupings throughout the last decades (cf. Sahgal and Yuval-Davis 1992, Patel 1999). With both regard to race and sexuality, the term ‘community’ is charged with problems of assumptions of organic wholeness and homogeneity (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992, Young 1990b). There are a variety of shortcomings of the community discourse: It cannot take account of the diverse social positioning and multiple identities of the people who associate themselves 4 With regard to the exclusive processes around race/ethnicity, some have suggested forging sexual communities around diasporic identities (Ratti 1993). Others, for example Jasbir Puar (1998), have less enthusiasm about the attempts to create transnational queer diaspora affiliations. The concept of diaspora, too, Puar cautions, can easily be associated with nationalist politics or foster cultural hegemonies (cf. Gopinath 1996, 2005).
Sex and Assimilation
75
with gay movements. Many gay men think of themselves as being affiliated with different communities, each of which may have its own internal divisions and boundary conflicts. Moreover, since the term ‘community’ suggests shared interest and close affinity, it has a tendency to obscure antagonism, conflict, internal divisions, hierarchies and hegemonic domination. This is why I perceive a concept of multiple public spheres, which I developed in Chapter 2, as being more suitable for theorising these dimensions of sexual politics. Even if attacks on gay men’s ‘promiscuity’ or public sex may consciously appeal to ‘the community’, this discourse is ultimately governed by assumptions on how political inclusion works within public sphere contexts. As I argue throughout this book, public sphere theory may therefore be more useful to decipher the terms of politicised discourses on non-monogamy. The next chapter will explore how the spectre of promiscuity preoccupies bisexual identities and politics. Debates about non-monogamy in bisexual politics, too, are frequently concerned with the question which shape the emerging bisexual public sphere is going to take – and which impact this may have for a politics of integration and recognition.
This page intentionally left blank
Chapter 4
Gender Troubles: Bisexuality and Non-monogamy
Well, you see I don’t see anything wrong with being married to more than one partner and having other partners that I’m not married to, because it’s from the idea (…) [of] taking each relationship on its own merits and doing with each person what feels right. And certainly at the moment it would feel right for me to be married to Charles, but it wouldn’t feel right for me to be married to Sam because my life isn’t intermingled with him enough. Whereas, say with Silvia, if things work out with her, we could end up all living together (...) and then we might be in some kind of 4-way marriage, that sort of thing. So I don’t see there being inherently a contradiction. It’s just that the push towards [marriage] by gay and lesbian groups at the moment, is very much, ‘Look, we’re normal, we’re just the same as you, but we love people of our own sex’, and you know, going towards the marriage with kids and a dog and a table from IKEA ideal (...) Because people can’t see having more than one relationship without someone being hurt. That’s the problem. If people could see that, it would be very much easier. (Marianne)
Research into bisexual relationships in the UK is scarce (George 1993, 2002). US-based research suggests the relatively high frequency of non-monogamous relationship arrangements among bisexual-identified men and women (cf. Blumstein and Schwartz 1983, Lever et al. 1992/2000, Rust 1996, Rodríguez Rust 2000c, Weinberg et al. 1994). Bisexual non-monogamies are extremely diverse. Nonmonogamous relationships and families differ in terms of numbers of partners, degrees of closeness and commitment, legal relationship status, constellations of genders, social identities, household forms, parenting arrangements, and so on. Relationship forms include open couple relationships, polyamorous or polyfidelitious relationships, casual sexual encounters, swinger partners, fuck buddies, cuddle buddies, sexual friendships, open marriages and group marriages, among others (cf. Hutchins 1996, Pallotta-Chiarolli 1995, Paul 1997). The frequency and complexity of bisexual non-monogamies is one way to explain the existence of an intensive and lively debate about non-monogamy in the bisexual movement. In this chapter I explore a range of further explanations for this phenomenon. I begin with an analysis of how bisexual men’s and women’s non-monogamous relationships are framed in dominant discourses on bisexuality. I further explore lines of conflict in movement debates about non-monogamy and link them to an analysis of bisexual politics and modes of community conceptualisation. In this context I also deal with positions on same-sex and other-sex marriage. My overall concern is with the normative aspects of the discourses articulated in these debates.
78
The Spectre of Promiscuity
The Construction of Bisexuality and Non-monogamy Non-monogamy is a troubling issue for many bisexuals, because dominant discourse constructs bisexuals as non-monogamous by necessity. The assumption that bisexuals have to be non-monogamous or promiscuous flows from the traditional Western construction of sexuality in a dualistic scheme. If homosexuality and heterosexuality (thought as opposites) are perceived as the only ‘real’ and valid forms of sexual orientation, then bisexuality can only be thought of as a ‘mixed’ form of sexuality consisting in parts of homosexuality and heterosexuality (cf. Däumer 1992, Ault 1996/1999, Rordríguez Rust 2000c). The homosexual and the heterosexual ‘sides’ of an individual are perceived to be in permanent or at least potential conflict (Rust 1996). Marianne, one of my interview partners, argued that the dominant definition of bisexuality demands people to be, at any particular time, behaviourally or actively bisexual. According to this discourse, people can only call themselves to be truly bisexual if they maintain relationships with people of both male and female genders at the same time. Consequently, authentic bisexuality is only possible in the context of a non-monogamous life practice. Marianne: And you know, people either think that if you’re bisexual, you automatically want to have more than one partner. There are a lot of people who have trouble with the idea of having a monogamous bisexual, and it all depends on the definition of being actively bisexual. Some people say you can only be actively bisexual if you have a partner of each gender. But most of us think that’s a load of rubbish.
Although Marianne claims that many bisexuals in the movement would reject this definition, I have gained the impression that it still has quite a strong hold among many self-identified bisexuals. In group discussions at the Bisexual Conferences (BiCons) which I attended, several people declared that they would find it difficult to maintain a bisexual identity if they did not have concurrent relationships with people of both male and female genders. Monogamy with a partner of either sex tends to destabilise (certain) bisexual identity narratives (cf. Eadie 1996). Some research suggests that identity problems are particularly pronounced in the case of the absence of same-sex relationships in bisexuals’ lives (Blumstein and Schwartz 1977/2000, Hüsers and König 1995). The HIV/AIDS epidemic has reinforced the stereotype of bisexual promiscuity. In different sets of discourses both (behavioural) bisexual men and women have been constructed as ‘disease carriers’ that are responsible for spreading the virus from (high) risk groups to other ‘communities’. From the mid-1980s onwards, increasing worries about the possibilities of a ‘heterosexual AIDS epidemic’ fed into the representation of bisexual-identified men and non-disclosing MSM (Men who have Sex with Men) as the vectors of transmission between the ‘gay male community’ and the heterosexual population (cf. King 1993, Weinberg et al. 1994, Rodríguez Rust 2000a). The association of risk with particular gender and sexual identities (male and gay/bisexual) also influenced many bisexual men’s decisions with whom to practice safer sex or with whom to have sex at all (Boulton et al. 1996, Stokes et al. 1996, Davis et al. 1996). Risk perception regarding the likelihood of HIV transmission also affected the ways bisexual women have been framed in lesbian
Gender Troubles
79
AIDS discourses. The representation of lesbian sex as being principally safe – even without protective measures – provided the backdrop to a construction of bisexual women as a threat in that they might introduce HIV to a not-yet-affected lesbian population (Gorna 1996, Wilton 1997, Richardson 1987, 2000). The assumption that bisexual women would not take (sufficient) precautions in protecting themselves from the risk of HIV transmission is part of this imagery. Yet my interviews suggest that bisexual women do discuss HIV/AIDS and safer sex with their sexual partners and with friends and acquaintances in their wider social and sexual networks. Cath, who first came out during the heyday of the AIDS epidemic in the USA, stresses that safer sex is not only assumed, but openly discussed in the queer- and bi-identified scenes she affiliates with. She quotes a friend of hers, who kept saying: ‘I am part of the generation for which the hottest sound of the world is the snap of latex glove!’ Franca relates the story that she had to push a non-understanding medical professional at a sexual health clinic in London quite hard to supply her with gratis latex gloves, rather than simply with condoms, since condoms only would not provide sufficient protection for HIV transmission in the wide range of erotic practices she engages in. However, the association of bisexuality with an increased risk of HIV infection is only one trope in a complex set of discourses on bisexual non-monogamy. The hegemonic definition of bisexuality as essentially non-monogamous affects bisexuals in many different ways and presents one of the most pervasive anti-bisexual stereotypes. The Gendered ‘Double Standard’ and Differentialist Promiscuity Discourses Theories of biphobia tend to identify the assumption that bisexual men and women are promiscuous as an important trope in anti-bisexual discourses (Hansen and Evans 1985, Rust 1996, Udis-Kessler 1996). Robyn Ochs (1996, 2000) defines biphobia as prejudiced behaviour, discrimination and marginalisation. Like homophobia, biphobia draws on a set of stereotypes. A heightened sexuality, including essential non-monogamy or promiscuity, is a strong feature of biphobic discourses. The theorisation of promiscuity stereotypes within theories of biphobia usually does not pay very much attention to the fact that different people (depending on their bodies, identities and group associations) are affected differentially by stigmatisation through promiscuity discourses. As I have shown elsewhere in more detail, the specific meaning of the term ‘promiscuity’ is strongly determined by context, with the social location of both addressee and the person using the label being of high importance (Klesse 2005, cf. LeMoncheck 1997). Accusing a person of being promiscuous is part and parcel of a highly gendered, classed and racialised discourse on sexuality. Although certain masculinities, too, have been subjected to differentialist promiscuity allegations, it is due to the nuanced prominence of gender in anti-promiscuity discourses that I will focus in my discussion on the effects of such discourses on women’s lives. Feminists have highlighted that women are particularly vulnerable to the strategic deployment of anti-promiscuity discourses. Within the context of a ‘double standard’ of sexual morality, promiscuity discourses play a central role in controlling and policing women’s sexual behaviour and identities. The deployment of labels
80
The Spectre of Promiscuity
such as ‘promiscuous’, ‘slut’, ‘slag’ or ‘whore’ activates associations of impurity, unchastity and dishonour and functions as an attack on women’s reputations (cf. Wolf 1997, Holland et al. 1998, Cowie and Lees 1987, Lees 1993, Pheterson 1986). The promiscuity accusation is deployed to render offensive and unacceptable any form of female sexuality that does not subject to men’s desire to control. Often it aims to legitimise male sexual violence and abuse (Tanenbaum 1999, Edwards 1981, Smart 1987, 1995). Because women play a significant role as cultural symbols in the representation of the ‘nation’, ‘race’ or ‘community’, women’s sexual behaviour has been policed for the sake of interest-bound nationalist, ethnic or racial projects (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989, Yuval-Davis 1997, Cohen 1996). Furthermore, the cultural values promoted within religious discourses and movements often tend to discourage female sexual autonomy and agency (Herman 1997, Buss and Herman 2003, Sahgal and Yuval-Davis 1992, Bhatt 1997). A