The Sovereignty Dispute Over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands (Malvinas Islands)

THE SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTE OVER THE FALKLAND (MALVINAS) ISLANDS

This page intentionally left blank

The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

LOWELL S. GUSTAFSON

New York Oxford OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1988

Oxford University Press Oxford New York Toronto Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi Petaling Java Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo Nairobi Dar es Salaam Cape, Town Melbourne Auckland and associated companies in Beirut Berlin Ibadan Nicosia

Copyright © 1988 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc., 200 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced. stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, w i t h o u t the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Cuslafson, Lowell S. The sovereignfy dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. Bibliography; p. Includes index. I. Falkland Islands — International status. 2. Argentina — Foreign relations— Great Britain. 3. Great Britain — Foreign relations — Argentina. 1. Title. JX4084.F34G87 1988 341 .2'9'097 1 1 87-25032 ISBN 0-19-504184-4

10987654321 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free Paper

To Connie

This page intentionally left blank

Acknowledgments

This book reveals my intellectual and personal indebtedness to many people. Professor David Jordan introduced me to numerous themes, some of which are developed in this study. I appreciated that Professor Inis Claude, Jr. was willing to suggest stylistic and substantive improvements throughout the book. I also benefited from the comments of others who read parts of the manuscript at different stages of its development. Professor Beatriz Bozzi de Kirchner of the Institute de Filosofia Practica, Mr. Joe Davaney of the White Burkett Miller Center of Public Affairs, and Ambassador Adam Watson of the Center for Advanced Studies at the University of Virginia read early versions and made helpful criticisms. Adrian Hope of Cardenas, Hope, and Otero Monsegur suggested improvements on the two chapters on self-determination. Professors John Norton Moore and Charlotte Ku of the University of Virginia suggested clarifications of the legal arguments in Chapter 1. I appreciated that Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Mendez of Argentina was willing to read and discuss sections of the study. Professor Whittle Johnston of the University of Virginia also provided me with valuable insights during our conversations. I remain indebted to Professors Zenos Hawkinson, Mel Soneson, and Charles Wiberg of North Park College for setting me on the course which led to this study. I am grateful to Dr. Guido Soaje Ramos, Professor Augusto Jose Padilla, Dr. Mariano Castaneira, Oscar Russo, Carlos Newland, and Rolando Picazzo for their hospitality while my family and I lived in Buenos Aires for the 1983-84 academic year and the summer of 1986. Their assistance made our stays pleasant and my work productive. I am also grateful for the financial assistance from the Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, and the Ivy Foundation, which allowed me to study in Buenos Aires in 1983 and 1984, and for the assistance of the Fulbright Commission which allowed me to return to Argentina in 1986. Of course, none of these individuals or institutions are responsible for any of the flaws in the studyJudy Mintz, Marion Osmun, Susan Rabiner, Paul E. Schlotthauer, Valerie Aubry, and Rachel Toor of Oxford University Press have provided valuable assistance in the preparation of this book.

viii

Acknowledgments

My father and mother deserve far more than my expression of gratitude for their support. My wife, Connie, supported this project with good-natured patience far beyond the call of duty. Our children, Anna and Erick, did the most to keep the importance of this book in perspective. September 1987 Villanova, Pennsylvania

L.S.G.

Contents

Introduction

xi

1

Historical Rights

2

Self-Determination and British Sovereignty

3

Two Principles of Self-Determination

4

Sovereignty Redefined: Oil and the Falklands Dispute

5

Sovereignty and the External Causes of the War

119

6

Sovereignty and the Internal Causes of the War

143

7

The Effect and the Future of the Falklands Conflict

Notes

3

Recent Articles 248 Interviews 253 League of Nations Documents 253 United Nations Documents 254 Index

55

209

Bibliography 237 Books 237 Government Publications 246 Current Journals and Newspapers

261

37

247

81

177

This page intentionally left blank

Introduction

The case of the sovereignty dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in the South Atlantic ocean, over which Argentina and Great Britain fought a war in 1982, raises fundamental issues of world and domestic political order. Internal sovereignty is said to be the "concept of supremacy or superiority in a state by virtue of which some person or body or group in that political society is supreme and can, in the last resort, impose his or its will on all other body and persons therein." 1 Without a sovereign, there would be no one and no way to settle disputes; one could always appeal to another person or group, who claimed another basis of supremacy, such as the law of God or nature. External sovereignty is the idea that a slate in international relations has total control of its policies and thus is not ruled directly or indirectly by any outside group. 2 The state has territorial sovereignty or has the legal right to exercise actual control over parts of the earth's surface. This territorial sovereignty may be "acquired originally by occupation or by accretion, or derivatively by cession or other consent, by award of international conference, conquest, or prescription. To be legally effective occupation there must be actual possession and exercise of administration. Acquiescence or recognition by a competing claimant is evidence of the existence of sovereignty." 3 These legal definitions of sovereignty may not adequately help us to understand practical sovereignty or to establish domestic and world order. While such persons or bodies as monarchs and cabinets may be granted legal, nominal sovereignty as defined above, these sovereigns often, if not always, defer to and act in accordance with many other governmental and extragovernmental persons and groups, such as political parties, trade union leaders, foreign leaders, or others. De jure, legal, nominal sovereignty usually or maybe always operates with de facto limitations. "Even the most absolute despot must at least retain the respect and obedience of his praetorian guard or janissaries or they will turn on him, and what he must do to retain their support is a practical limitation on his unfettered sovereignty. In practice, sovereignty is always limited and never absolute." 4 Legal sovereignty cannot be saved by arguing that it is located in the constitution, nature, or God. All of those sources require some person or group authoritatively to interpret and enforce laws derived from them. And

xii

Introduction

any such person or group with such authority will be subject to practical limitations. Sovereignty is ultimately the political, practical, complex, limited, and temporal way in which people organize themselves. Legal definitions may help in pointing to the methods and individuals used at any specific time to establish political order. Taken too literally, these definitions may add more to disorder than order by placing restrictions on the search for order within a changing political environment. Practical definitions of sovereignty may add to the search for order by articulating and thereby helping to make more understandable the current way in which competing groups have devised a limited order. The question of which nation has sovereignty over, or legal title to, the Falkland Islands can be divided into two parts. The first concerns historical rights. When did which nations exercise sovereignty over the islands? To what degree do these historical rights affect contemporary claims to the islands? The second part of the sovereignty question is about self-determination. How is the principle to be applied in the case of the Falklands? Can this principle be used to establish title to the islands? Argentina has a superior historical right because either it inherited Spain's sovereignty over the islands under the principle of uti possidetis—by which newly independent Latin American nations claimed to replace former Spanish administrative boundaries with national ones—or it established its own title to islands that had been res nullius, or no one's property. Spain had legal title to the islands because it purchased the first colony, which had been founded by the French, and maintained it until 1811. Britain founded a colony on the islands after the French but abandoned it in 1774. The British left a plaque affirming their intention of maintaining legal title, but made no objections for almost sixty years when Spain and then Argentina publicly claimed sovereignty over the entire set of islands. When Argentina formally declared its independence in 1816, the Spanish colony had been evacuated for a few years. Since no other nation had claimed or inhabited the islands, Argentina took possession of them either as part of the viceroyalty of Buenos Aires or as islands that were not legally claimed by anyone. Although the United States declared the islands res nullius in 1831, Argentina disputed this and acted as if it had maintained sovereignty over the islands. So when Britain invaded the small Argentine colony in 1833, it did so with a poorly founded claim to the islands. Since 1833, however, Britain's claim to the islands has increasingly been based on the right or acquisitive prescription, which states that after all nations have acquiesced to one nation's de facto control of territory for a period of time, often fifty years, that nation gains legal title to that territory. Argentine complaints have been regular enough since 1833 to qualify Britain's right to title based on the principle of acquisitive prescriptions. That qualified right may have been improved by the principle of self-determination. This principle has been used in the criticism ol Argentina's historical claim. Historical rights can seem abstract when compared to the right of living people to

Introduction

xiii

choose their political associations. The principle of limited acquisitive prescription has been used in the criticism of Argentina's position also. This principle would provide title even in the absence of complete acquiescence by every nation. Historical rights infrequently claimed by one nation can be dangerous in a world threatened by the prospect of nuclear war and worried by the memory of two world wars. How should the principle of self-determination be reconciled with the trend toward greater interdependence? When the values of self-determination and international cooperation clash, which should take precedence? The challenge of the Falklands to leaders and populations alike is to integrate the competing principles of historical rights, which in part define living communities, with the right of self-determination. It would be no mean accomplishment to integrate these two elements in a way that would maintain the uniqueness of national communities while nations cooperated and compromised rather than fought.

This page intentionally left blank

THE SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTE

OVER THE FALKLAND (MALVINAS) ISLANDS

This page intentionally left blank

1 Historical Rights

DISCOVERY Authors have usually introduced arguments about the Falklands' history in order to establish one nation's legal title to them. Since discovery is one of the bases for claims to legal title, the debate about the islands begins with the log entries, diaries, and autobiographies of the early European sea explorers. With their lack of technical sophistication, the explorers did not make accurate estimations of their positions. Their descriptions of sea conditions and the positions of land masses are equally imprecise. Autobiographies of the explorers were written years after the fact, sometimes with motives other than to give a brief and unbiased description of the past. 1 It is these data that various authors have used to make evaluations about who discovered the islands. The purpose of these evaluations has often been to prove the beginning of a nation's unbroken claim to the islands. The December 1982 issue of the Argentina Gaceta Marinera states that the islands were discovered by the Spaniards (perhaps by Americo Vespucio) at the service of Spain or, more probably, by navigators of Magellan's expedition, in 1520, and what is more certain, by that of the bishop of Plasencia in 1540.2

British author Mary Cawkell asserts that "they were discovered on 14 August 1592 by John Davis," whose ship, the Desire, was caught in a storm and driven from the second expedition of Sir Thomas Cavendish. Cawkell does admit that "a plausible case" exists for the claim that a ship from the Camargo expedition of 1540 wintered in a Falklands harbor. 3 The British government agrees with Cawkell, stating in its 1982 booklet, The Disputed Islands: The Falkland Crisis, A History and Background, that "the Falkland Islands were probably first sighted by the English Captain John Davis." 4 In its 1829 complaint to Argentina, Britain made the same claim. The first man who settled the islands, a Frenchman named Bougainville, believed that Amerigo Vespucci first sighted them. 5 Jeffrey D. Myhre concludes from these conflicting assertions that "discovery is usually attributed ... to the Dutchman van Weerdit in 1598."6 Discovery by assertion is perhaps the only way one explorer can confidently be given credit for the first sighting the islands. Data to incontestably support confident assertion do not exist. 7

4

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

The claims about discovery are important to the degree that discovery can provide title. A claim based on discovery is weakened when discovery is seriously disputed and when discovery by one state is followed after an extended period by another state's act of possession. Christian Wolff in 1772 argued that one who encloses a territory within bounds, or destines the land to some use by an act not merely transitory, or he who declares upon the land so enclosed, in the presence of other men, that he intends the land should belong to him, takes possession.8

And in 1758 Emmerich de Vattel in the first edition of Le Droit des Gens wrote: All mankind have an equal right to things which have not yet fallen into the possession of any one, and those things belong to the person who first takes possession of them. When, therefore, a nation finds a country uninhabited, and without an owner, it may lawfully take possession of it, and after it has successfully made known its will in this respect it cannot be deprived of it by another nation. Thus, navigators going on voyages of discoveries furnished with a commission from their sovereign and meeting with islands of other lands in a desert state have taken possession of them in the name of the nation; and this title has been usually respected provided it was soon after followed by a real possession.9

The act of discovery would be of legal significance if there was soon afterward a dispute between states about the right to occupy the territory. If Davis was the first to discover the islands in 1592, this event could have given the British the right to object to a foreign occupation of the islands. But no one occupied or in any way used the islands until the French did in 1764—172 years after the alleged British discovery. The extended interval between a disputed British discovery and French occupation weakens Britain's claim to title by discovery. Discovery as a basis for claiming title has been qualified by modern as well as early international law. In the 1928 decision in the Island of Palmas case, Judge Max Huber argued that discovery alone, without any subsequent act, cannot at the present time suffice to prove sovereignty. . . . An inchoate title of discovery must be completed within a reasonable period by the effective occupation of the region claimed to be discovered.10

Huber's argument was the same as Vattel's. When discovery is not followed by acts of authority over the territory, it does not provide title in the presence of effective apprehension of the territory by another state. Unless sovereignty is exercised subsequent to discovery, a state has no title to a territory over which another state is displaying authority. The Clipperton Island arbitration of 1931 would suggest that intermittent acts of authority carried out by state A after a disputed discovery by state B gives A the better claim. In this case, Mexico claimed title to the island as an inheritance of Spain's title by discovery. However, the arbiter found that Spain's discovery was not proven, and that by 1858 the islands were capable of

Historical Rights

5

appropriation. France's intermittent exercise of authority over the islands from 1858 to 1897 gave it the better claim in 1931.11 France's intermittent authority over the Clipperton Island through almost four decades distinguishes its claim from the British claim to the Falklands based on transitory occupation. The British government has rested its claim to the title not only on discovery, but also on the "secure historical and legal foundation" provided by the first recorded landing—on 27 January 1690, by British Captain John Strong.12 Strong noted the water and game on the islands, but this activity cannot be interpreted as an occupation. More important, no British permanent occupation followed for seventy-six years. If there had been no other more substantive possessions of the islands, this landing perhaps could have given title to Britain. A single, transitory occupation that is later opposed by a more permanent one provides a weak justification for title. Roman law recognized title to previously unowned territory when occupation was of some economic significance or when the land was affected by the occupation. Wolff demanded a use of the land that was not merely transitory. Huber preferred an effective possession of a territory that had previously been uninhabited to disputed discovery. Discoveries and landings, or a single transitory occupation, would provide a justification for a claim to previously unowned territory in the absence of a more permanent occupation. However, this is not the case in the Falkland Islands.

PAPAL DECREES Early modern and modern international lawyers have not recognized the abstract claims based on discovery and landings alone, especially when other claims based on occupation have been made. Nor have they recognized title based on even more abstract papal grants. St. Augustine argued that the whole world was the property of God. The pope, as God's viceregent on earth, could rightfully grant unoccupied lands to Christian monarchs for the purpose of converting the indigenous pagans. Henry II of England implied acceptance of this doctrine when he used Pope Hadrian's grant of Ireland to him to justify his conquering of Ireland. On 3 and 4 May 1493 Pope Alexander VI issued bulls that granted Spain exclusive right of occupancy and control over the region west of a line 100 leagues west of the islands "commonly called de los Azores y Cabo Vierde" and running from pole to pole.13 The Treaty of Tordesillas of 3 June 1494 between Spain and Portugal altered the pope's line, moving,it 270 leagues farther west. Spain and Portugal agreed not to enter each other's territory for the purpose of discovery, trade, or conquest. Henry VII implied recognition of this treaty when in 1501 he granted a group of English and Portuguese merchants a royal patent to explore lands within Portuguese territory. One of the Portuguese merchants had in 1499 received a patent for exploration from King Manuel of Portugal. The joint English-Portuguese grants to the group authorized it to possess and govern discovered lands. Henry Vll's 1502 patent, granted to the reorganized merchants, warned them:

6

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

In no manner shall they enter upon or hinder those countries, nations, regions or provinces, heathen or infidel, which have been previously been found by the subject of our most dear brother and cousin the King of Portugal, or of any other prince, friend or neighbor of ourselves, and which already are in possession of said princes. 14

Henry VII recognized that if England's trade was to advance into Portuguese territory without Spanish opposition, it would be best to work in close association with the Portuguese. The continued economic cooperation between Portugal and Britain was not primarily motivated by reverence for the pope's authority, of course. After his break with the Catholic church in 1534, Henry VIII continued the British connection with the Portuguese while embracing the Protestant reformation. After the English freebooters like Drake and the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 had shown Spain's vulnerability, the English were able to begin more directly to challenge Spain's claims to territories. Not grants from the pope but British acknowledgments of Spanish sovereignty over territory in treaties signed with Spain would henceforth be the basis of Spanish claims to territory recognized by international law. In fact, international law was developed largely because Christendom led by a pope in Rome became fractured in the early sixteenth century. Sovereignty did not depend on the pope and God. Sovereignty was not a theological but a political attribute. It was granted by monarchs to themselves through the recognition of other monarchs. Previous implications that England accepted the right of the pope to grant sovereignty had become politically and legally meaningless. ENGLAND AND THE SPANISH EMPIRE England rejected the notion that either God or Clio had granted Spain a rightful monopoly of trade within the territory specified by Pope Alexander VI. Phillimore wrote that "these papal grants to, and arbitrations between, Spain and Portugal . . . were always utterly disregarded by Great Britain, France, and Holland."15 The treaty of 1604 with Spain and the 1630, 1667, and 1670 treaties of Madrid all codified the growing English economic pressure in the Spanish territories. 16 Strong's 1690 visit to the Falklands was a small part of England's relentless pressure to penetrate Spain's empire. The War of the Spanish Succession was fought in large part over the control of American trade by Spain, France, or England. In the Stanhope Treaty of 10 July 1707, Spain granted England the slave trade monopoly. France had lost its right to the assiento (slave trade). The assiento was to help the English pay the ruinous costs of the war. No longer could freebooters and slave traders from the French port of St. Malo on the English Channel at the mouth of the Ranee visit the La Plata region. The South Sea Company was organized slightly before the 1713 Peace of Utrecht and received from the British crown the assiento monopoly. The Spanish had not given up hopes to regain economic supremacy and battled

Historical Rights

7

England again in 1718. The South Sea Company's outposts in the Americas were seized, thereby cutting back much of England's economic penetration. Spain's opposition to British penetration of its former trade monopoly in the Americas led to its capturing twenty-one British ships from 1732 to 1737.17 By 1749, Spain had reasserted enough of its control of territory granted it originally by the pope to make England cautious in its policy of penetrating the Spanish empire. It still had enough economic power to frustrate English efforts to take over Spanish territory or pirate Spanish goods on the oceans. Admiral Anson of England had learned from his experience in the War of Jenkins' Ear—which began in 1739 and became part of the War of the Austrian succession that was concluded by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748—that England needed some base in the South Atlantic to interrupt Spanish naval routes. He had in 1740 proposed the Falklands as a possibility for this base.18 From 1740 until 1744, Anson led a sea voyage whose main purpose was to incite wars of independence from Spain in Chile and Peru. 19 Anson's chaplain, Reverend Richard Walter, wrote of the Falklands that "it is scarcely to be conceived, of what prodigious import a convenient station might prove, situated so far to the southward, and so near Cape Horn." They could, "in time of war, . . . make us masters of those seas."20 By 1749 Anson was the chief executive officer of the admiralty and wanted to send a naval expedition to the area to see if the Falklands would be adequate for this purpose. The Spanish ambassador in London, an Irishman in the service of Spain, heard of the plans and complained to the English government that the British navy had no right to be in the area. Spain argued that Britain had accepted Spain's possession of the islands in the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht. The British replied that their expedition was only a scientific one. The Spanish offered to supply any scientific information and rejected the right of the British navy to be in the region. The British thought that for the moment they could gain more from Spain by trading with it than by penetrating its territories. Negotiations for what became the Treaty of 1750 were underway, so Britain agreed not to send military ships into Spain's territory. Britain informed Spain that His Majesty could in no respect agree to the reasoning of the Spanish ministry as to his right to send out ships for the discovery of the unknown and unsettled parts of the world, as this was a right indubitably open to all; yet, as his Britannic Majesty was desirous of showing his Catholic Majesty his great complacency in matters where the rights and advantages of his own subjects were not immediately and intimately concerned, he had consented to lay aside for the present every scheme that might possibly give umbrage to the court of Madrid. 21

This statement indicated British recognition not of Spanish right to the area but only of current Spanish predominance there. Spanish overseas territory was recognized as such not as a matter of eternal right, but because Spain at the mornenl had enough power to maintain its claim. Thirteen years later, England thought Spain's power was again declining. By declaring war on Spain on 2 January 1762, England showed it was no more reluctanl to take Spanish than French colonial territory. The outcome of

8

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

the Seven Years War (1756-1763), which had been primarily against France, was most advantageous to Britain. Florida and all of Spain's North American possessions east of the Mississippi were surrendered to England. France in essence lost its colonial empire. France tried in 1764 to regain a greater colonial presence by occupying part of the Bahamas, but retreated after British protests.

SETTLEMENT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS France then believed it could rebuild its colonial power at the expense not of the British, but of the Spanish. The French minister of foreign affairs, the due de Choiseul, considered colonizing the Falklands. 22 A young officer, Antoine Louis de Bougainville, who had served under Montcalm at the battle of Quebec, had known of the islands from his relatives who lived in St. Malo. He had also read Anson's book, in which the English lord discussed the Falklands' strategic value. Bougainville offered to lead the first settlers to the islands. He set sail from St. Malo, France on 15 September 1763 with his government's consent, arriving on 31 January 1764 in Les Malouines, the French name for the Falklands and the derivative for the Spanish "Malvinas." (This was not rare, for St. Malo had been the port from which many Frenchmen sailed through the sixteenth century to attack British shipping and overseas economic interests.) 23 Fort St. Louis was erected on the islands on 17 March, 1764. In January of 1765 Bougainville sailed to the Strait of Magellan to find a supply of timber for the colony, which then had 150 settlers. Dom Pernety, the priest accompanying the French expedition, wrote "one of the most delightful accounts of a pioneering group arriving in a new land." 24 He wrote of the plentiful wildlife, wild celery, "turf (to be burned for heat), strawberries, and other goods. He said that sea-lion tongue was preferable to ox or calf, that penguin ragouts were as good as hare, and that the geese there were delicious whether boiled, roasted, or fricasseed. Having lost to England so much of its North American territory, Spain did not wish to lose to France pieces of its South American possessions. Spain feared that if France were allowed to settle in the area, Britain would follow suit. Britain's 1749 agreement with Spain not to send military ships to the Falklands would be meaningless if France were allowed to settle the Falklands in 1764. So in September 1764 Spain initiated negotiations with France about the settlement and offered to purchase it outright. The French government, not wishing trouble with Spain after having just lost the Seven Years' War to Britain, instructed Bougainville to sail to Madrid to make his terms with the Spanish. In April of 1766 Bougainville accepted just over 618,000 livres for the colony. The French never made claim to the islands after the purchase. This event is the beginning of "The Spanish Intrusion" 25 or of Spain's title. The formal act of ceding Port Louis took place on 1 April 1767. France's Port Louis became Spain's Puerto Soledad—Port Solitude— which seemed to some like a good name for the new Spanish colony. The

Historical Rights

9

new Spanish chaplain lamented, "I tarry in this unhappy desert, suffering all for the love of God."26 The new governor, Don Ruiz Puente, did comment on the good pasture land. The Spanish settlers bred the 60 cows and 6 horses inherited from the French so that by 1782 they had 534 cows and 50 horses. The Spanish had exercised enough military control over the area to extract from the British an agreement not to send its forces to the Falklands. This action and Spain's papal claims to the area had not stopped France from first settling the islands. However, France did not wish to press its claim based on occupation when Spain did finally object to the French settlement. So Spain inherited from France the rights to the Falklands based on first occupation. Exercising military control over the area and occupying a permanent settlement in existence since 1764 improved Spain's claim to the islands. Still, Spanish fears that a French settlement might be followed by a British one in fact came true. On 21 June 1764, nearly three years before the official Spanish control of the French settlement, Commodore John Byron left England on the H.M.S. Dolphin, allegedly for the East Indies. 27 Only after the ships reached the Brazilian coast did the British government acknowledge that Byron was to call on the Falkland Islands. Perhaps the secrecy was kept to avoid another Spanish complaint before the expedition left. Byron reached the islands on 4 January 1765. He named a point in Byron Sound Port Egmont, after the first lord of the admiralty, and claimed the islands for Britain. Byron had left England before the French announced on 3 August 1764 their settlement on the Malouines. He did not explore the islands sufficiently to discover the already established French settlement. His surgeon did plant a vegetable garden. Showing that nothing can be too trivial in the history of the Falklands dispute, this garden has been mentioned as proving possession.28 Byron reported that "the whole navy of England might ride here in perfect security from all winds." The soil was good and there was an abundance of wild celery, "the best antiscorbutiks in the world." 29 Byron's favorable report about the Falklands reached London on 21 June 1765 aboard the Florida, Byron's store ship. On 20 July 1765, the secretary of state for the Southern Department, Henry Conway, advised the lords of the admiralty to send a settlement expedition to the islands. A frigate, a sloop, a store ship, military equipment, and twenty-five marines were to go there. The secretary argued that the garden had been the beginning of the settlement. If anyone else should be found on the islands, they would be infringing on the sovereignty of the king and should be evicted. It was supposedly contrary to Conway's expectation to find any other settlement there, even though the French had publicly announced almost a year before that there was. Lord Egmont, the first lord of the admiralty, was convinced that the islands were undoubtedly the key to the whole Pacifick Ocean. This Island must command the Ports and trade of Chile, Peru, Panama, Acapulco and in one word all the Spanish Territory upon that sea. It will render all our expeditions to those parts most lucrative to ourselves, most fatal to Spain.

10

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

The lord believed that the first nation that could establish a "firm footing there" would be able to make "prodigious use" of the Falklands.30 Egmont's interest in a base that would be fatal to Spain's empire made him hope the Falklands would provide something more than "a base from which to protect Britain's growing trade routes." 31 He saw no legal impediment to Britain's control of the key to the Pacific. He was unable to recollect any treaty that gave Spain the right to the islands and he found it impossible that the pope's grant gave Spain anything but a pretended title. The attempt by France to explore the islands confirmed his argument, he believed. Britain's claim to the islands, Egmont later said, was based on first discovery of the islands and simultaneous settlement with France. Britain did not know of any French interest in the island until a paragraph in the foreign gazettes first mentioned in September 1764 that some frigates had returned to St. Malo from the Malouines. He mentioned no knowledge of a French settlement, though he suspected they were planning one. This was months after Byron's expedition was planned and six or seven weeks after he had sailed. Egmont did appreciate the advantage of first settlement and urged immediate action lest the French have too long a head start. If the French became well established before England settled the islands, then "it would probably be out of our power to expell, at least without direct and avow'd hostilities which may bring on an immediate rupture both with France and Spain, whereas . . . this will be less likely to ensue, if as things are now circumstanc'd we take our measures sooner or at least as soon as France." 32 Egmont's immediate purpose in urging the prompt sending of an expedition to the Falklands was to have England challenge the French right of occupation and to found a settlement soon enough after the French one's founding to be in effect simultaneous. Combined with first discovery, a challenge to the French settlement and a nearly simultaneous British settlement would retain title for Britain. Title continued to elude Egmont because discovery remained disputed, an extended interval had separated discovery and anyone's occupation, and France did found a settlement almost two years prior to Britain's. Egmont's long-term purpose in an expedition was to take over Spain's empire along the Pacific coast. The islands would give the British navy a valuable port from which the Spanish frigates could be countered. It was with these purposes that Captain John McBride was instructed to sail for the Falklands, where he arrived on 8 January 1766. This was two years after the French had landed. With winter only some months away, the erection of a blockhouse armed with the ship's guns and a fort manned by twenty-five marines took precedence over exploration. One reason why the development of the colony so long delayed exploration was because of the poor selection of a site. Facing south to Antarctica, his gardens fared poorly. He wrote of constant gales of wind, barren mountains, the lack of trees and the poor soil. A sailor at heart, he was impressed only by the port facilities. His description of the islands was quite different from that of the French priest, Dom Pernety. Concentrating at first on settlement at Port Egmont rather than on exploration, he did not suspect a French settlement until 20 September 1766.

Historical Rights

11

CONFLICTING SETTLEMENTS If he did not already know about it, McBride discovered the French settlement on 2 December 1766. The southern hemisphere's summer had allowed surveying to resume, and while McBride was anchored in Pembroke Sound, one of his officers went on shore. Ascending a mountain overlooking Berkeley Sound, he saw the French settlement. On 4 December McBride sent a note to the governor of the settlement asking by whose authority it was founded. This prompted steps to defend the settlement and a dispatch from de Nerville, the governor of Port Louis, who stated that the French king had ordered the settlement's establishment and that he would defend himself against any aggressors. McBride told the French to leave British sovereign territory, and then he left for Port Egmont. The British believed their settlement and their objection to the French colony had challenged France's rights to the islands soon enough to deny them title based on first occupation. The Spanish, who had already purchased but not formally taken control of the French colony, would argue that it was public knowledge that France had settled on the islands before anyone else. Spain's purchase of the islands gave it the legitimacy France's title had enjoyed because of first settlement. Having bought the colony in April 1766 and planning to take control of it in April 1767, Spain was most interested in the Anglo-French disagreement of December 1766. The Spanish ambassador to London, Prince Masserano, counselled his government to destroy the British colony before an English fleet arrived to fortify it. He argued that the eighth article of the Treaty of Utrecht had guaranteed the Spanish rights to exclusive possession of the Americas and their adjacent islands. While Britain itself had wanted this guarantee so as to exclude the French from the area, the article and Britain's 1749 acknowledgment of Spain's right meant that the English had no right to be on the islands and could be forcibly evicted. However, since Spain had not yet taken possession of the colony, Masserano's superiors found his advice extreme. Masserano did have reason to fear an English fleet would be sent to fortify Port Egmont. Lord Chatham (William Pitt the Elder) had become the leading supporter of the Falklands colony after Lord Egmont resigned and was calling for the prompt dispatch of a fleet to the islands. The French were as anxious as the Spanish to check England's imperial growth. The French foreign minister, Choiseul, told the British ambassador in Paris that Spain had obtained the Malouines from France and that all others were excluded from the islands. He mentioned England's acknowledgment in 1749 of its faulty claim to the islands. Choiseul hoped to persuade the British not to inflame Madrid by sending a fleet to the Falklands, which would give Masserano's advice a more receptive audience. Choiseul did not think France and Spain were prepared to fight Britain about the English settlement. Lord Shelburne, the British secretary of state, affirmed to Masserano British rights to the island and said the settlement was too well established to be abandoned. The French charge d'affaires in London, Durand, wrote that England was ready to go to war rather than give up Port Egmont. Choiseul did

12

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

not think Lord Chatham could force England to go to war unless he was given a pretext. Choiseul wanted to avoid giving him one for at least eighteen months, by which time Spain and France might be ready for war. He suggested to the Marques de Grimaldi, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, that a Spanish fleet be sent to destroy the English settlement. By the time the news got back to Britain, eighteen months would have elapsed. Choiseul considered Lord North, Britain's Prime Minister, to be a weak leader prone to vacillation. There was a good chance he would opt against war. Choiseul later changed his mind, and on 5 March 1767 the Spanish court received his note, in which he said that war should be postponed indefinitely. The Spanish decided that they would have to act unilaterally and then present both France and England with a fait accompli. They hoped that then France would support Spain. So on 25 February 1768 an order was sent to the captain general of Buenos Aires. The Spanish foreign ministry told Don Francisco P. Bucareli, the captain general of Buenos Aires, that no English settlements were to be permitted and that if those colonists did not leave peaceably, force should be used to expel them. In November 1769, the governor of the Spanish colony on the Malvinas, Don Felipe Ruiz Puente, sent a ship to survey the islands. A few days after first being warned by Captain Hunt of Port Egmont to leave the port, the ship returned. Its pilot, Angel Santos, wrote to Hunt that his presence on the islands was a violation of treaties and a breach of faith. Hunt replied the islands were British "by right of discovery as well as settlement."33 If the Spaniards tried to survey the islands, Hunt said he intended to fire on them. Ruiz Puente had a reply sent that the English must leave their settlement. Hunt merely repeated his position. In December 1769 Bucareli sent two frigates to Port Egmont. The captain of the Santa Catalina, Don Fernando de Rubalcava, sent a letter to Hunt when he arrived at Port Egmont on 20 February 1770. In it he told Hunt that the English were there in violation of treaties. Hunt replied that the islands belonged to Britain by right of discovery and that the Spaniards must evacuate. Rubalcava left after eight days and returned to Buenos Aires. Bucareli organized an expedition strong enough to forcibly expel the English. Don Juan Ignacio de Madariaga was put in command of four frigates and about 1,400 troops, about 280 of which were veterans. The fleet left Montevideo on 17 May 1770 and arrived at Port Egmont on 4 June. A series of notes indicated no peaceful resolution of the differences could be reached. The English frigate the Favourite, which was the settlement's sole source of protection, was moved closer to shore. Madariaga fired two shots over the frigate, landed his troops, and overtook the settlement after a few shots had been exchanged. The terms of surrender provided for the abandonment of the settlement. Madariaga sent a frigate to Madrid with the report but kept the Favourite in port for twenty days before allowing the English to return to Britain, so as to give Spain time to decide on its policy. The Spanish court was hesitant to hurry France and Spain into war against England. The Spaniards would prefer owning the Malvinas without having to

Historical Rights

13

fight for them. But Choiseul, now hoping to silence internal opposition by shifting attention to a possible war, assured the Spanish that they "could count on all occasions" upon the French. 34 Masserano was nevertheless instructed by the Spanish court not to provoke the English. France's support had not been steady. He told the British court that the Spanish governor of Buenos Aires had unilaterally expelled the British colonists on the Falklands. He added that he hoped an act without royal authority would not endanger the good relations between Spain and England. The British secretary of state, Weymouth, replied that he did not see how some steps in retaliation could be avoided. Maserano's diplomatic niceties had not succeeded in placating Britain. By August 1770 Spain and England were preparing for war. France's support was again wavering. Choiseul did not think France was ready yet to fight Britain. The British charge in Madrid, Harris, thought that the Spanish were not prepared to fight Britain. Spanish authorities assured Choiseul that they were not afraid of war and tried to convince him that France should more actively support Spain. Spain wanted to avoid war with Britain until it was assured of French support. The enthusiasm in Britain for war made Choiseul fear that North might be pressured into using force. This concern deterred Choiseul from supporting Spain since France was still not fully prepared for another war. With French support lacking, Spanish policy turned to pacification. The Spanish offered to negotiate about the immediate events, not about the sovereignty dispute that had led to the crisis. Concentrating on the immediate crisis, rather than on the basic dispute about title, would make negotiating with Britain easier. The British government of Lord North was being pressed by the opposition, led by Chatham, to more vigorously prepare for war. Chatham said that by continuing to negotiate with Spain, the government was showing its lack of patriotism. Chatham argued: Since, for reasons unknown to me, it has been thought advisable to negotiate with the court of Spain, I should have conceived that the great and single object of such a negotiation would have been to have obtained complete satisfaction for the injury done to the crown and the people of England. But, if I understand the noble lord [Weymouth], the only object of the present negotiation is to find a salve for the punctilious honour of the Spaniards. . . . Will you shamefully betray the King's honour so as to make it a matter of negotiation whether his Majesty's possessions should be restored to him or not? 35

His argument that negotiations revealed unpatriotic purposes would be made again in the 1960s and 1970s, The French charge in London reported to Choiseul that the 40,000 English seamen and 20,000 additional soldiers, which Parliament was expected to fund, showed that Chatham's pressure to fight was succeeding. North told the charge, Frances, that he was afraid that Spain was ready to fight. He said Masserano had advised all Spanish ships to leave the Thames. North also told the French charge that England found the expense of the Falklands colony to be excessive and that England was more committed to

14

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

peace than keeping the islands. North reminded the charge that Admiral Hawke had said a year before that the settlement should be abandoned. A SECRET UNDERSTANDING When Masserano compared the report of this conversation against the reports of Britain's war preparations, he doubed North's good faith and again advised his court to prepare for war. North, with a gain in his domestic political power after the recent elections, had less to fear from Chatham's bellicosity. According to Goebel, he tried to convince Masserano of his good faith by offering to treat the Port Egmont incident as an injury to George Ill's honor rather than to his possessions. An injury to honor required reparation only for the incident and would not have any implication for matters of right. If Spain would repair the insult to the king's honor, England would concede on the matter of right. Masserano had hoped that a mutal evacuation might dispose of the matter of right. "What North was now proposing was the evacuation by England alone, not indeed secured by any declaration, but by a mere verbal engagement, as a consideration for the Spanish agreement to make reparation." 36 For domestic reasons, North could neither publicly promise the abandonment of the colony nor agree in writing to Spanish reservation of rightful control of the islands. If Spain would placate the English hardliners by restoring Port Egmont to England, North would privately agree to abandon the settlement later when the domestic furor had blown over. This is the so-called Secret Understanding that has so enlivened the Falklands dispute ever since 1770. North wanted to restore British honor by being able to publicly point to the Spanish return of Port Egmont.37 Some in Spain and Argentina would argue that he wanted to avoid war with Spain by privately agreeing to abandon a tiny colony to which he had no commitment and which he suspected of being of little value to England. France's king, Louis XV, advised Spain's Charles III to accept the compromise. The "spirit of independence and fanaticism" had spread in his realm. "War in these circumstances would be a fearful evil for me and my people," he said.38 The dismissal of Choiseul, whose image was somewhat mistakenly that of being prowar, was seen in Madrid as a firm French rejection of military support for Spain. Masserano was instructed to offer to restore conditions in Port Egmont as they were before 10 June 1770. The agreement must, however, not prejudice the anterior rights of his Catholic Majesty to the Islands called Malvinas and by the English Falkland, but is solely to restore things as a matter of law and of fact, to the state they were before the expulsion of the English from the establishment in question.

The Spanish court also wanted an assurance that the English "will evacuate the Falklands later." It would accept this assurance "although it be merely verbal." 39 Goebel and Moreno argue that the Spanish received these assurances and agreed to the compromise.

Historical Rights

15

The compromise required that the usual diplomatic practice of jointly signing the same document be replaced by each government issuing its own documents. The British document stated, in part, "all things shall be immediately restored to the precise situation in which they stood before the 10th of June 1770."40 At the signing, the British representative allegedly said that England would never make war over the Falklands colony, whose preservation was not in the national interest. 41 According to Goebel, the following day, George III told Masserano at his levee that Masserano would learn the usefulness of trusting to his good faith and the advantages of establishing it between two such great courts as theirs. Masserano replied that it was in reliance on this good faith that the king, his master, had directed him to do what he had just done and that his Catholic Majesty would be very pleased to learn by his intermediary that his Britannic Majesty had said that they could rely upon his good faith in the treaty.

Goebel goes on to argue that to the bystanders these words no doubt were hollow amenities appropriate to the occasion. They were, however, more than this—they were the royal ratification of the promises of North and his colleagues that the island was to be abandoned, in reliance upon which the satisfaction had been given. 42

F. S. Northedge rejects Goebel's hypothesis that this exchange publicly guaranteed anything. "If the Spanish," he wrote, "after their long experience of British diplomacy and of Great-Power politics in general, really relied upon such nods and winks as guarantees of their rights, they must have been naive indeed."43 He argues that the existence of any verbal agreement, publicly guaranteed or not, is in doubt. Northedge found "nothing in the relevant documents to suggest" that the British had agreed to accept the restitution of Port Egmont, which occurred on 15 September 1771, as a mere act of satisfaction. 44 Palmerston too had read all the relevant papers from the British Foreign Office's Volumes of Correspondence with Spain when in 1834 he was preparing his response to an Argentine protest. He found "no allusion whatever to any Secret Understanding between the two governments." This conclusively implied to Palmerston that "no such Secret Understanding could have existed."45 Neither Palmerston nor Northedge has proved the nonexistence of a secret understanding by not finding it written in official correspondence. If there was an understanding that North initiated, he would have taken some pains not to have it written in official papers. He could not have risked Chatham's getting hold of those papers. Palmerston and Northedge have only proved the alleged secret agreement was not public or official. Northedge's more serious objection to the claim that a secret understanding existed is that such an understanding would have been made because "Britain was the weaker party in the negotiations with the Franco-Spanish alliance . . . and had no alternative to submit all along the line, provided some gesture was made to save face. But the opposite was the case."46 France had just been

16

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

decisively defeated by Britain in the Seven Years' War from 1756-1763. Spain faced military, naval, and financial problems that the British charge d'affaires in Madrid, James Harris, considered "more secure pledges of peace than any we may infer either from their protestations or good disposition of those who guide here toward us."47 France was clearly unwilling to go to war, and Spain was unwilling and unable to fight without France. Even as allies they were probably unable to defeat England in 1771. Given their military inferiority, they had no ability to force Britain to accept something it did not desire. The problem with this objection is that the Falklands were not valuable in North's opinion. In the House of Commons, North defended the declarations by saying that the Spaniards had taken a barren, desolate rock and had restored it as barren and desolate as they found it. 48 North's government hired the best pen in the land, Dr. Samuel Johnson, to write a pamphlet supporting its position. Drawing on Captain McBride's dismal reports rather than on Father Dom Pernety's more optimistic observations, Johnson belittled the islands' value. In his "Thoughts on the Late Transactions respecting Falkland's Islands," Johnson could not resist spending some invective on Chatham. He called Chatham's speeches "a feudal gabble" and wrote that his war party "sat like vultures waiting for the day of carnage." But his real theme was the unimportance of the islands. He admitted that the crown's honor and superiority had been maintained, but complained: What have we acquired? What, but a bleak and gloomy solitude, an island thrown aside from human use, stormy in winter and barren in summer; an island which not even the southern savages have dignified with habitation; where a garrison must be kept in a state that contemplates with envy the exiles of Siberia; of which the expense will be perpetual and the use only occasional; and which, if fortune smiles upon our labours, may become a nest of smugglers in peace, and in war the refuge of future buccaneers. 49

The secretary of state, Rockford, said Port Egmont was "neither more nor less than a small part of an uneconomical naval regulation." 50 These were not islands worth causing trouble with anyone. 51 Britain had showed in 1749 that it was aware of Spain's sense that the islands were within the latter's sphere of influence. While probably weaker than England, Spain and France had shown great agitation about the English settlement at Port Egmont. The prime minister of England was not committed to the settlement, his weaker but still formidable adversaries strenuously objected, and England sensed it was moving into Spain's territory. These factors could have been combined to make North want to avoid conflict with continental powers over the Falklands. The Secret Understanding would not be the result of weaker adversaries forcing Britain to surrender a major and important outpost. The British did not have to give up their long-term purpose of taking over much of Spanish control of or trade with the Americas. They only had to conclude that this tactic was potentially too expensive and that others might be better. It is not bad imperial policy to make different attempts

Historical Rights

17

at penetration and retreat from those that become too dangerous. Egmont's purpose of taking over Spain's Pacific holdings need not have been rejected just because Anson's tactic of using the Falklands as a naval base was. If anything, restoration could prove that Britain was the stronger party, able to force Spain to embarrass itself by apologizing for taking over a British colony. A secret agreement to leave unimportant islands could have been the sop to Spanish pride. The alleged British acceptance of the Secret Understanding maintaining the Spanish rights to the islands was deplored by Chatham and his followers, who well remembered the unqualified British glory after the Seven Years' War. If others doubted the existence of the Secret Understanding, these men were convinced of some such treachery. Later Britons and some contemporary observers have also suspected the existence of the secret agreement. On 1 November 1836, Hon. George Grey wrote that "the Spanish Government restored Port Egmont and, it has always been supposed, with the secret proviso that England was to abandon the Island upon the plea that the Establishment was not worth the expense."52 Alfred P. Rubin, Professor of International Law at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, concludes that "after a review of what survives of the Spanish internal correspondence, and close examination of the events of [the years from 1770-1774], it appears that there was an unrecorded British promise to repay the Spanish apology by dismantling the British settlement."53 Clearly this was also the conclusion of Chatham's group in 1771. On 22 January of that year, MP Colonel Barre sent Chatham a letter in which he claimed that a secret agreement had been reached.54 On 25 January in the House of Lords, Chatham's ally, the Duke of Manchester, declared that the British declaration was inadequate and insufficient. Chatham blasted the declaration as being ignominious. "It was not satisfaction, nor reparation; the right was not secured and even restitution was incomplete, for Port Egmont alone was restored."55 Chatham was concerned lest Britain's acceptance of Spain's reservation of right diminish Britain's right. The lord chief justice of the Court of Common Pleas advised Chatham that only the status quo ante had been restored. Spain's reservation of right did not touch Britain's claim. It only meant that the previous dispute over sovereignty continued. If Chatham was afraid the Spanish reservation would diminish Britain's right, others have argued the Spanish restoration of Port Egmont diminished Spain's right. Actions speak louder than words. Metford writes that "Spain's action in restoring the status quo has much embarrassed successive generations of proponents of the Argentine case"56 Spain may or may not have had verbal promises, but Britain had Port Egmont again. If Britain had tacitly acknowledged Spain's right to the Falklands in 1749, Spain had tacitly recognized Britain's right in 1771. The status quo ante had not been restored. Britain's claim had been strengthened by the implications of a treaty. This argument was made in 1829 by the British charge d'affaires in Buenos Aires, Woodbine Parish. He argued that Britain's claim was founded on first discovery, subsequent occupation, and "an additional

18

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

sanction from the restoration by his Catholic Majesty, of the British Settlement in the year 1771, which in the preceding year, had been attacked and occupied by a Spanish force." 57 The restoration is as inconclusive a foundation for the British claim as discovery or occupation. The existence of the Secret Understanding is disputed. There is no written evidence of a British agreement and intention to leave the Falklands to Spain. But the unilateral drawing of implications from matters of fact does not conclusively prove Spain's intentions either. Spain's restoration to Britain of Port Egmont has no necessary implications for Spain's right to title, as Metford implies. The British document of 1771 did say, as quoted earlier, "all things shall be immediately restored to the precise situation in which they stood before the 10th of June, 1770." This statement makes the restoration less embarrassing. BRITISH ABANDONMENT OF PORT EGMONT The Spanish might have feared that they were naive if they thought that nods and winks had guaranteed any secret understanding. If they did have an agreement from North to abandon Port Egmont, it was not put into practice as quickly as they had expected. If Britain did not voluntarily honor its agreements with Spain, what could be done? Could Spain evict the English settlers again? This would certainly lead to war. Spain's inability to force Britain to leave the Falklands after the 1771 declarations were exchanged shows its relative weakness. The Spaniards could only hope that the islands were as disproportionately expensive to Britain as North had said. Over the next three years, Masserano often discussed with the secretary of state for the Northern Department, Rockford, if England could assure Spain of its intention to fulfill its verbal agreements. 58 Each time he asked only further demonstrated Spain's disadvantage. England would not abandon Port Egmont even before it had repossessed it, especially when Chatham's group maintained their vigorous opposition to abandonment. Colonel Barre continued to charge the government with the intention of ceding Port Egmont to Spain. Only when this charge became politically unimportant could England evacuate a strategically unnecessary position. Masserano advised the Spanish court to stay armed in order to put what pressure it could on England to leave the islands. Rockford was unimpressed, telling Masserano that if England went to war over the Falklands, it would be a big war and that no treaty of peace would cede the islands to Spain. Military victors do not surrender the spoils of war. There was little else for Spain to do at least in public, if not private, than commit itself "to a policy of patient waiting."59 Spain's analysis that Britain would eventually abandon a strategically unnecessary and expensive colony turned out to be accurate. Spanish protests to Britain about how long it was taking to leave the islands perhaps added just enough to the islands' expense to encourage the British government to abandon them as soon as it became possible in domestic politics to do so. In

Historical Rights

19

December 1773, Lieutenant Clayton received instructions to evacuate all the seamen and mariners as well as all their equipment, from the Falklands. "But previous to your departure from the Falkland Islands, you are to take the strictest care to erect on the principal parts of the Port Fort and Islands proper Signals and Marks of Possession, and on Its belonging to His Majesty."60 On 11 February 1774, Rockford informed Lord Grantharn, the British ambassador at Madrid, of the speech he had given in the House of Commons a few days before. The speech, he said, had mentioned the intention of reducing our Sea Forces in the East Indies, as a material object of Diminution to the number of Seamen, and at the same time hinted, as a matter of small consequence, that in Order to avoid the Expense of keeping Seamen or Marines at Falkland's Islands, they would be brought away afterwards, leaving there the proper Marks or Signs of Possession and of its belonging to the Crown of Great Britain. As this measure was publickly declared in Parliament it will be naturally reported to the Court of Spain, and though there is no necessity of your Lordship's communicating this notice to the Spanish Minister officially, since it is only a private Regulation with Regard to our own Convenience, yet I am inclined to think from what passed formerly on this Subject that they will rather be pleased at this Event, your Lordship may, if they mention it to you, freely avow it without entering into any other Reasoning thereupon. It must strike your Lordship that this is likely to discourage them from suspecting designs which must now plainly never be entertained in our minds. I hope they will not suspect, or suffer themselves to be made to believe that this was done at the Request, or to gratify the most distant wish of the French Court, for the real Truth is neither more nor less than that Lord North intends (is desirous) to lessen a small part of an economical Naval Regulation. 61

North had not said he was fulfilling any obligation. He was affirming what he had always said. The islands were expensive and unimportant. He had apparently made the evaluation that now, three years after the restoration, the opposition could not make a political issue out of the abandonment. Much has been made of the fact that Lieutenant Clayton, who lead the evacuation of Port Egmont on 22 May 1774, left an inscription on a lead plaque. Be it known to all nations that the Falkland Islands, with the fort, the storehouses, wharfs, harbors, bays, and creeks thereunto belonging are the sole right and property of His Most Sacred Majesty George the Third, King of Great Britain, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, etc. In witness whereof this plate is set up, and his Britannic Majesty's colors left flying as a mark of possession by S. W. Clayton, commanding officer at Falkland Islands, A.D. 1774.62

Captain Juan Pascual Callejas brought the lead plaque to Buenos Aires in 1775, and in 1780, under instructions from Viceroy Vertiz, burned the old English fort. In 1806, when British General Beresford captured Buenos Aires, he took the plaque and sent it to London. 63 The abondonment of Port Egmont in 1774 is more important than the disputed existence of a secret agreement, or British intentions in 1774 to keep or surrender right to the islands, or protests against acts of sovereignty by Spain and then Argentina over all the Falklands, including West Falkland, on

20

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

which Port Egmont had been established. After 1774 there was a lapse until 1829 of fifty-five years in asserting a questionable claim while other states exercised sovereignty. In addition, Britain signed treaties with Spain and Argentina during this period in which it made no reservations about its right to the islands and in which it implied recognition of the other states' claim. The effect of fifty-five years of nonassertion on Britain's claim was significant. Even if there was no secret agreement, and Britain had intended to maintain its claim to the islands, the principle of extinctive prescription would jeopardize Britain's claim, especially after more than fifty years. The longer a nation goes without exercising sovereignty over a territory, especially when other nations are doing so, the weaker the first nation's claim to a territory becomes. If first occupation of territories res nullius provides the best title, continuing that occupation maintains it. Perhaps the two-year jump the French settlement had on the English was too little to make a difference in creating title. The English settlement was founded not long after the French and in professed ignorance of it. But the abandonment of the English settlement would have transferred England's title to Spain as inheritor of France's right. As years wore on, the title given by Britain's intention to keep it, as shown by the plaque, became so abstract as to be meaningless. If Britain was in 1774 merely fulfilling the 1771 secret agreement, then its claim was surrendered when the documents were signed. The abandonment was simply carrying out that agreement. In this case, title could not deteriorate after 1774 because it was completely absent after 1771. Since this interpretation is dependent upon the secret agreement argument, it is less persuasive. After the British abandonment of Port Egmont, the Spanish colony that was to become Argentina began to administer the Malvinas. In 1776 Spain made Buenos a vice royalty. The viceroy in Buenos Aires, whose administrative unit included the islands, in 1777 ordered the buildings at Port Egmont destroyed so that British and American shippers could not use them. Spanish governors of the Malvinas were appointed regularly. On 25 October 1790 England and Spain signed the Nootka Sound Convention. In one section of the treaty, it was agreed with respect to the eastern and western coasts of South America and the islands adjacent, that the respective subjects shall not form in the future any establishment on the parts of the coast situated to the south of the parts of the same coast and of the islands adjacent already occupied by Spain; it being understood that the said respective subjects shall retain the liberty of landing on the coasts and islands so situated for objects connected with their fishing and of erecting thereon huts and other temporary structures serving only those objects.64

Spain had conceded that the southern seas were open to British fishermen, who could use nearby land for shelter. Any occupation of that land was prohibited. England had agreed to this only if no third party established new colonies in the South Pacific or South Atlantic. Nevertheless, for the time being England had agreed not to occupy islands then occupied by Spain. The Malvinas were among the islands then occupied by Spain. Spain had surren-

Historical Rights

21

dered its claimed exclusive right of navigation and fishing in the area in return for Britain's recognition of Spanish sovereignty over occupied regions. If Britain ever had claim to the Falklands, it seems to have been seriously compromised in this treaty. Hugo and Berrutt conclude that Britain had affirmed and guaranteed "the exclusive juridical power of Spain, excluding all other sovereigns from the region where the islands were situated."65 The Spanish population, which occupied the islands until 1811, further strengthened Spain's claim. ARGENTINE CLAIMS The British made it their goal to take over Spain's trade with the area and changed their tactics. They would aid legitimist or liberal revolutionary movements against a Spain now ruled by the Buonaparte family. In June 1806 Britain could spur Latin American independence movements while helping the Spanish push France, Britain's most powerful European rival, out of the Iberian peninsula. Buenos Aires was captured by Britain's Lord Beresford. On hearing this news the governor of the Malvinas, Juan Crisostomo Martinez, fled. The colony remained, governed by a junta. The Argentines recaptured Buenos Aires within weeks, and the revolt against Spain continued. The strengthening revolt caused the governor of Montevideo to order the abandonment of the Malvinas colony. In 1811, the Malvinas were once again unoccupied. Metford argues that the islands were res nullius after this point.66 But it could be said that Spain held sovereignty over the territory until the revolutionary movement succeeded. As time went on, Spain's right may have deteriorated. But Spain was preoccupied with its unsuccessful attempt to quell a rebellion, after which it would presumably have resettled the Malvinas. Exactly when sovereignty is lost and gained during a chaotic revolutionary period is unclear. A revolutionary movement at the outset of its operations might declare itself the legitimate authority over a territory. But any sovereignty it might claim in its own name could not be recognized until it took de facto control of the former colony. At that point, by the principle of uti possidetis, the new Latin governments claimed sovereignty over the territory, usually defined by the former colonial boundaries. The principle of uti possidetis as understood in nineteenth-century Latin America meant that possession of a former colony was exercised by the new government when it defeated the Spanish and began administering the new country. Any new administration will be halting and inefficient, but sovereignty does not rest on management theory. Perhaps the islands could have passed under the sovereignty of another country after 1811 if any other country had occupied them or even made claim to them. If England had claimed or settled the islands from 1811-1820, its claim would be stronger. No nation did occupy or claim the islands after the 1811 evacuation, until the Argentine government sent Colonel Daniel Jewitt to the islands in November 1820.67 Finding fifty vessels of various nationalities

22

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

there, Jewitt notified them that he was taking possession of the islands in the name of the new Republic of Argentina. He did this under the principle of uti possidetis. He exercised at the very least the right of any nation to lay claim to and possess territory that is res nullius. Cawkell disputes whether there was as yet an Argentine government to send Jewitt. She argues that there were some twenty-four Argentine governments in 1824. The men trying to create order in Argentina were obviously preoccupied with matters other than the Malvinas. But at the very least, Jewitt had publicly claimed possession in the name of Argentina, whose government could later confirm or deny his claim. The government would confirm Jewitt's claim. The new republic claimed the right to regulate fishing around the islands, and in 1823 Don Pablo Aregusti was appointed governor. Britain recognized Argentine independence in 1825 without making any reservations about Argentine acts of sovereignty over the Malvinas. In 1823 the new government gave a concession of land on East Falkland to Don Jorge Pacheco and Louis Vernet. Their first expedition failed to establish a cattle and fishing business, largely because foreign vessels did not recognize them as having exclusive rights to the business. Britain recognized the new government in 1825 without making any reservations about Argentina's attempts to exercise its sovereignty over the Malvinas. By this failure to protest Jewitt's or Vernet's acts of possession in the name of the new republic, the 2 February 1825 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation weakened England's claim. Britain did not protest when Vernet's second expedition to the islands in 1826 succeeded in establishing his business interests under a concession granted by the Argentine government. To give Vernet more authority, on 10 June 1829 the Argentine government granted his request for an exclusive grant of the fisheries. The grant claimed that the islands had belonged to Spain when the 25 May 1810 revolutionary movement was begun. The new government claimed inheritance of Spain's rights over the islands and appointed Vernet governor. The problem with inheritance of the Malvinas claimed from Spain in 1810 is that on that date Spain still had a colony on the Malvinas and had not accepted defeat by the revolutionaries. As late as 1818 the Spanish governor at Montevideo had contemplated using the islands as a base from which to subdue Argentina. Monica Pinto's claim that Spain transferred its title to Argentina in 1810 follows the usual Argentine claim but is not derived from any Spanish actions or statements. 68 If this claim is accurate, Spain had title and possession of the islands until 1810. After 25 May 1810 it had only possession, with title being transferred to Argentina. In 1820, Argentina began acts of possession. If title is to mean anything, it cannot be had by merely claiming it. Perhaps title was not inherited by Argentina from Spain at a specific point. Perhaps it began flowing partially from Spain to Argentina when the revolution began, completing its gradual transfer when the revolution succeeded, when Jewitt took possession of the islands, or with the 10 June 1829 decree. One problem with imagining title as something that is divisible and flowing is that critical dates become difficult to find. Another problem is the meaning

Historical Rights

23

of the term flowing title. The purpose of a title is to give a nation the right to a territory. What does partial right to a territory mean? What is the status of title under the theories of acquisitive or extinctive prescription fifteen, twentyfive, or forty-nine years after the critical date? Does a nation have fifty percent title after twenty-five years, or does it have no title at all on the 364th day of the forty-ninth year? When it is said that title flowed from Britain after 1774 and to Argentina after 1810, is the purpose of having titles forgotten? However ambiguous a flowing title is, its advantage is that it fits the history of the Falklands. The transfer of complete and absolute titles on certain critical dates assumes that certain key times can be pinned down and that their meanings are clear. As this is not the case with the Falklands, critical dates mark the beginning of processes that suggest meanings. Britain did not renew its claim to the Falklands until after the 10 June 1829 Argentine decree. By this time, if the title can be seen as flowing, it had mostly flowed from Spain to Argentina. Parish, the British charge in Buenos Aires, made his protest on 19 November 1829, five months after the law had been passed. He wrote that the British claim was based on first discovery, occupation, the restitution of Port Egmont, and the intention to resume occupation as indicated by Clayton's acts. Perhaps Britain objected in 1829 when it had not since 1820, the year Argentina began acts of possession, because the Argentine decree affected fishing rights. Other Argentine concessions had been of land. Jewitt's attempts to regulate fishing were very minor, and in 1829 Britain may have been more concerned with the surrounding waters than the land. Argentina's claim to the land gave it a right to regulate fishing, but Britain did not dispute that claim until Argentina acted on that right. Given the rest of the history of the Falklands, it is difficult to accept that the British were reviving their claim to the islands because of its legal validity. Perhaps they thought that a naval base could now finally be had without the opposition of a country with significant military power. The Falklands had not been worth a possible war with Spain. The islands, or maybe fishing rights, were worth an exchange of notes with the still disunited provinces of Argentina. The British had revived their claim just as Argentina's colony began to thrive. Vernet had trained his horses to run on the soft island soil. With the 20,000 wild cattle on the islands, he was supplying a growing number of ships with beef. He was exporting beef and fish to Brazil and wool to London. With this eighty trained horses, he planned to tame all the cattle within two or three years. The colony had grown to ninety settlers. A cultivated man whose library had books in Spanish, German, and English and whose wife impressed visitors with her singing, Vernet was finally demonstrating he had business sense as well.

THE LEXINGTON INCIDENT The gentleman businessman had become confident enough to try to tame not only the wild cattle but also the rather more unruly shippers, prompting a series of events in 1831 that provided the English with the opportunity to take

24

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

the Falklands. In an attempt to enforce the fishing regulations approved by the Argentine Government, Vernet seized two United States ships that were violating these regulations. One of these, The Harriet, had been warned in 1829 against violating the regulations, but had returned in 1831. The other ship was required to give security against its reappearance and released. The Harriet and its captain were taken to Buenos Aires to stand trial. The U.S. representative in Buenos Aires, John M. Forbes, had recently died, and the less experienced George W. Slacum had replaced him. Slacum was indignant about Vernet's actions, writing to the Argentine minister of foreign affairs that he could not imagine what gave Vernet the right to capture an American ship engaged in lawful trade. He rejected the decree of 10 June 1829 under which Argentina claimed it could regulate fishing off the islands. The U.S.S. Lexington happened to be in Buenos Aires when its captain, Silas Duncan, discussed the matter with Slacum. Duncan declared that it was his duty to protect American citizens. Slacum informed the Argentine government that Duncan would sail to the Falklands on 9 December if U.S. property was not restored. Duncan demanded that Argentina surrender Vernet as a pirate or prosecute him as a robber. Argentina did neither. Slacum discussed the problem with the British consul general, Parish. Parish told him that Argentina had no legitimate claim to the islands, that the British claim had never been surrendered and that Britain intended to revive their rights when it was convenient. Slacum was disquieted by what England might do, but the Argentine affront to the United States was more immediate. On 28 December 1831 Duncan arrived in the Lexington just off Port Soledad. He and his men went ashore, took the colony's weapons, burned its powder, razed the buildings, seized some sealskins, and arrested most of the inhabitants. He declared the islands res nullius and left with six Argentines in irons. The Argentines were freed in Montevideo. The government in Buenos Aires responded by complaining to Slacum about the incident as well as his irregular use of language in his official notes. It requested that Slacum be replaced. Slacum rejected the request, but the government still refused to deal with him. If the government expected better treatment from some other U.S. official, it was mistaken. President Jackson had received word of the incident, probably through the crew of the ship Vernet had released, the Breakwater. In his 6 December 1831 annual message, Jackson said that a band of pirates had pretended to act under the authority of the government of Argentina. He urged Congress to provide a naval force adequate to protect Americans fishing and trading in the South Atlantic. The U.S. secretary of state, Edward Livingston, characterized Vernet's acts as lawless and piratical. The new charge d'affaires, who had replaced Slacum at Buenos Aires, Francis Baylies, was instructed to inform the government there that the United States had the perfect right to freely use the fisheries on the oceans and unfortified bays, gulfs, and inlets. Baylies also told the British minister, Fox, that the United States laid no claim to the island, only to the right of fishery. The United States, he said, would maintain this right against Britain as well as Argentina.

Historical Rights

25

Metford states "President Jackson appoved of Duncan's action and the islands became once more res nullius."69 The meaning of this sentence is not clear. Its lack of clarity is similar to the uncertain significance of Duncan's declaration. Are Jackson's approval and the islands' new legal status unrelated, or did Jackson's approval cause the new status? Did the islands become res nullius not when Duncan declared them so but only when the U.S. government approved of his actions? And did the U.S. government or Duncan have the authority to decide the status of property? Had the United States implicitly recognized the Argentine claim because of its earlier recognition of the new government in Buenos Aires without reservations against Argentina's attempts to exercise its sovereignty over the islands? Then did Duncan use force against territory the United States recognized as Argentine? And are islands res nullius when two nations are actively in dispute over title? Britain said its claim had never lapsed, and Argentina appointed Juan Mestivier to succeed Vernet. He was to take charge of the penal colony at San Carlos in East Falkland. Juan Mestivier is even less notable for his success in exerting control over the Malvinas than Vernet. The ships of other nations would not yield to Vernet's authority, and Vernet had lost his business interests on the islands. Mestivier's own forces would not accept his authority and mutinied, and Mestivier lost his life on the islands. Nevertheless, Argentina was clearly trying to exercise sovereignty over the islands. Lawlessness in outlying areas during the formative period of a country does not necessarily lead to loss of national sovereignty. If so, many a nineteenth-century Western town in the United States must have legally but otherwise unnoticeably slipped out of its sovereign territory. The Malvinas were not indisputably res nullius after the Lexington incident.

THE INCIDENT OF 1833 Many elements gave Britain the opportunity to consider reviving its claim to the islands: Duncan's attack on the Falklands, Jackson's approval of the attack, the shaky control Argentina had over the Malvinas, the unsettled state of the new republic, and the United States' claim to the right to fish off the Falklands whether owned by Argentina or Britain. The revolution had made the status of the islands unclear. How the principle of uti possidetis was to be applied in the Falklands, mainland Argentina, and other areas of Latin America was still being contested in 1831. Argentina had made several attempts since 1820 to exert sovereignty over the islands, but whether any were stable and established enough to give Argentina clear title is questionable. The islands were not res nullius, but they were not yet clearly recognized by the international community as being under one nation's sovereignty. Britain hoped to use this fluid situation to finally solidify its claim. Two British warships, the Clio and the Tyne, arrived at Port Egmont on 10 December 1832. On 2 January 1833 Commander Onslow anchored the Clio off

26

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

Port Louis. 70 Also at Port Louis was Don Jose Maria Pinedo's Sarandi, whose crew had just tracked down Mestivier's murderers. Onslow informed Pinedo that he would exercise the British right of sovereignty over the islands by raising the British flag on 3 January. Pinedo protested, but Onslow's forces landed the next day, raised the British flag, and lowered the Argentine one. Sarandi sailed on 5 January, with all the soldiers and convicts of the penal colony and those remaining Argentine settlers who wished to leave. The other settlers, who were of various nationalities, remained at Port Louis. The superior force of the Clio and Tyne convinced Pinedo that he should not resist. The fact that shots were not fired does not mean force was not used. The most successful use of force is to show it, not actually to fight. Nevertheless, this incident is not the British forcible ejection of Argentine settlers that has become the myth in Argentina. Argentines have waxed eloquent about the British use offeree in 1833. Rhetoric about the islands' history has often been needed to create drama, which has in fact been lacking. The myth of the British use of force in 1833 is much more persistent than the memory of the more violent U.S. raid in 1831. The reason for this is probably that the U.S. raid did not in practice deny Argentina's title. The United States is criticized most not for the Duncan raid but for its failure to apply the Monroe Doctrine in 1833. After having it suggested to him by Lord Canning, who was interested in stopping the French from gaining any more Caribbean colonies, Monroe declared in 1823 that no European powers should try to establish new colonies in the Western Hemisphere. By not protesting the 1833 incident, the United States implied that it considered the Falklands an established, not a new, British colony. The Monroe Doctrine depended on British sea power to block European expansion. So even if the United States had thought Britain was establishing a new colony, it would have been prudent to be silent about what it was powerless to change. Furthermore, before the late nineteenth century the United States was really concerned only that the doctrine be respected by Europeans in the northern half of the hemisphere. Nevertheless, the United States had declared the islands res nullius in 1831, mentioned in 1831 the possibility of British control of the islands, failed to oppose the 1833 incident, and refused to pay back Argentina for anything Duncan had taken. Thus, the United States was something of the criminal's accomplice, in Argentine opinion. The use of force by the British on the Falkland Islands in 1833 was less dramatic than later Argentine rhetoric has suggested. The change in the island's status afterward was significant. As with so many events during the island's history, the exact significance of the 1833 incident is not clear. The incident has been interpreted in many ways. At the time, and since, British spokesmen have often asserted that the status of the islands actually did not change because of the Clio's actions. Britain was merely reasserting its already well-established claim. The islands' history prior to 1833, and much British policy after 1833, tend to discount this as a serious position. It might be that Argentina did have title to the island by 1832, but that nineteenth-century

Historical Rights

27

international law recognized the transfer of title after aggression had succeeded. Title was transferred to Britain because Britain conquered the islands and has subsequently maintained control of them. Maybe Britain's title was not well based on discovery, first occupation, or conquest and was better based on acquisitive prescription. Britain can argue that since 1833 it has had an increasingly convincing claim to the occupied islands. Argentina might argue that 1833 was not a legally critical date. Argentina was not conquered, did not agree to a transfer of title as Spain had with Gibraltar, and has subsequently not acquiesced. It has regularly protested what it has called Britain's usurpation. Its title remained as secure in 1982 as it was in 1832. If Argentina's protests have qualified Britain's title based on acquisitive prescription, perhaps Britain's title developed along with the principle of self-determination. What the 1833 incident meant is not yet settled. The hard and cold facts of history have an annoying habit of becoming soft and slippery upon examination.

TITLE TRANSFERRED BY CONQUEST If the islands were res nullius as Captain Duncan and President Jackson had proclaimed, then the new colony the British established was simply the first colony on ungoverned territory. Since it has been maintained since 1833, the British colony has created a British title based on exclusive and continuous settlement. But Duncan's and Jackson's proclamations had failed to convince the Argentines, who continued to claim sovereignty over the islands after the Lexington's raid. Also, the British have not claimed title based on occupation of terra nulla (unoccupied land which belongs to the first occupant). Parish in 1829 and Palmerston in 1834 both argued that Britain had an established title since Davis' discovery. First discovery, subsequent occupation, the restoration of Port Egmont by the Spanish, and the lead plaque provided title. The meaninglessness of disputed discovery, the first occupation by France being sold to Spain, the possibility that Britain secretly agreed to abandon title, and Britain's actual abandonment from 1774 to 1832 tip the scales against the Parish/Palmerston argument. Perhaps they should have argued that all the events before 1833 are interesting but legally unimportant, or that while might doesn't make a right, it does make title. Sir Anthony Kershaw admitted in the House of Commons in 1985 that the claims about the pre-1833 period were "confusing." The post-1833 period was quite clear."The British occupation in 1833 was a legitimate and legally respectable action," he asserted. 71 As John Lindsey argued, perhaps the significance of 1833 is that "the English stole the Falklands through petty conquest." 72 Transferring titles by using force successfully had been done before 1833. To have denied that transfer of title by force could be legal would have in the nineteenth-century put international law too far beyond the actual practice of states. Law that is too abstract loses any of its practical value. As Sir John Fischer Williams wrote, to "say that force cannot give a good legal title is

28

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

to divorce international law from the actual practice of nations in all known periods in history." 73 Positive law before 1928 did recognize title transferred by conquest. It might also be that Britain could have in the nineteenth-century acquired title by conquest but did not in fact conquer the Malvinas in 1833. A 1833 judgement by the Permanent Court of International Justice stated that "conquest only operates as a cause of loss of sovereignty when there is war between two States and by reason of the defeat of one of them sovereignty over [the] territory passes from the loser to the victorious State."74 Britain did not declare war on Argentina in 1833, nor did Argentina disappear as a political entity. Pinto states that "therefore, it cannot be argued that Great Britain acquired the Islands by debellatio [from war, by conquest] ,"75 It is unconvincing to argue that Britain could not forcibly acquire title to the Falklands because it did not formally declare war and utterly defeat Argentina. A formal state of war was not in 1833 required to transfer title, according to Lindsey. 76 That it is required in the twentieth-century is disputed. R. Jennings argued that "there may presumably be a title by subjugation or conquest, even where there has been no war or even hostilities in the technical sense, where the territory has nevertheless been seized by a display of armed force." 77 The failure to formally and utterly defeat Argentina has no meaning for British title to the Falklands. Sir John Fischer Williams wrote that "it would be a strange law that would give to the author of a homicide advantages which it denies to a mere highway robber."78 Just because the 1833 incident was a small one does not mean it had no legal significance. Little, informal conquests were just as legal as big, formal ones in the nineteenth century. It might be that conquest, like discovery, is only the first stage of acquiring title and must be followed by settlement. Lindsey argues that conquest must be followed by "a subjugation of the territory." 79 British explorers maybe did not discover the Falklands. Even if they did, no British settlement followed for almost 200 years. This lapse was not repeated after 1833. Not long after the 1833 incident, Britain founded a settlement that became permanent. Conquest was perfected by settlement. This line of reasoning would conclude that British title is secure because settlement consummated what conquest initiated. What was unfortunate for Argentina in 1982 was that international lawyers had changed their minds about the legality of transferring titles by conquest. The role of international law had had to change because of the increase in the level of destructiveness of twentieth-century wars. A comparatively little incident in the Balkans set off the Great War, which destroyed much of Europe as well as the self-confident, nineteenth-century idea of progress. World War II was even more destructive and concluded with a demonstration of weapons that could make a Third World War the last. The use of force has become disproportionately dangerous in the interdependent modern world. Acts of aggression against occupants of territory now create dangers for world order that far outweigh the possible realization of unilaterally held notions of justice. Even if historical claims are persuasive, the dangers to world peace of adjusting

Historical Rights

29

borders by force are unacceptable. As Farooq Hassan argued, the 1982 use of force by Argentina illustrates the potential dangers of even limited aggression prior to negotiations. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were involved peripherally on opposite sides and could have become thoroughly enmeshed in the military operations. Regardless of how limited a conflict may appear initially, it may threaten world peace. . . . These dangers alone warrant acceptance of an international law prohibiting the use of aggression in territorial disputes. 80

Many had long worried about the possibility of a cataclysmic confrontation erupting because the superpowers became drawn into the cauldron of the Middle East. Unanticipated conflicts would be even more dangerous because quick reactions could have uncalculated results. The sudden appearance of a cauldron in the South Atlantic was just the sort of unexpected incident that could draw the superpowers into conflict. Thomas Franck changes the analogy, but his fears are similar. He worries about the frequency of small wars like the Falklands war of 1982, which "are becoming endemic in world brittle as a tinderbox." 81 Some tiny war could be the event that sets off a general nuclear war between the superpowers. Argentina endangered the world by lighting a match in the tinderbox. The first use of force has often in the twentieth century been said to be unacceptable because it can begin a process in which the use of force escalates vertically to the level of countervalue nuclear war. It is also unacceptable because in an age of interdependence the impact of force can spread horizontally to the many other minor disputes in the world. 82 The world is not only a tinderbox that can just blow up but also a crazy quilt of intersecting domino rows. If the use of force pushes one down, hundreds of others start falling. John Norton Moore feared the effect of the 1982 Falklands war on fifteen other island disputes and on "hundreds of [other] land and sea boundary disputes."83 During the Falklands debates at the United Nations, the Belgian representative warned that if the use of force were to be rewarded, this would encourage any state with territorial ambitions to follow suit. . . . The reaction of many small countries in the world to the Argentine invasion demonstrates . . . that this danger has been understood.84

Had the Argentine use of force been accepted in international opinion, the restraints on more powerful countries that have disputes with less powerful ones would be dangerously relaxed. Weaker countries everywhere would live in a state of increased terror. The first use of force, such as that by the Argentines in 1982, is dangerous because it can begin a process that either consumes the world in nuclear war or engulfs it in hundreds of little conventional wars. The increase in the destructiveness of weapons and the interdependence of the world have changed the role of international law. To the degree that

30

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

positive international law before World War I realistically recognized and codified the violent practices of states, it recognized title gained by conquest. In the twentieth century international law could not merely be those rules to which nations consent. Nations did not become notably more peaceful and law-abiding in the twentieth century than in the nineteenth. It was precisely because they had become more violent that a change in the role of international law was necessary. After the Kellogg-Briand treaty following World War I and U.N. Charter Article 2(4), aggression became illegal because its results were so potentially dangerous. Law now had to be based on legal principles, or as Franck writes, "the important rules of civilized conduct for which the Falkland war was fought." 85 Law should be heuristic, not always being limited by what laws states accept. The Falklands war signals a return to "war on behalf of abstract principle, common in the era of the Crusades.86 The problem with the world is that "the international community has not very ardently tended even its most basic principles." 87 And as John Norton Moore writes, "no principle is more important than that enshrined in Article I of the United Nations Charter that international disputes shall be settled by peaceful means and not on the basis of armed force."88 One role of international law is to maintain the goal of world order, which may cause irresponsible states enough embarrassment to modify their behavior. 89 Perhaps international law has always had a bit more moral exhortation in it that hardheaded positivists have maintained. If twentieth-century international law stands ready to be used in the condemnation of twentieth-century aggression, it cannot be used to condemn the aggression of former ages. If it were, its purpose of maintaining world peace would change to subverting world order. Too much of a good thing can cause bad results. Historical titles should not be "dug up and examined against the contemporary rather than the intertemporal law (because) there can be few titles that will escape without question." 90 Under contemporary international law, Argentina does not have the right to take title from Britain by using force. In any talks with Britain about the Malvinas, Argentina can ask for their return and try to convince Britain that keeping them is not in Britain's interest. If Britain voluntarily decides to abandon the islands, than Argentina's historical rights make it the state with the best claim to them. But Argentina has no current claim on which it can legally demand title. Argentines have tried to get around twentieth-century international law's condemnation of aggression by asserting that the 1982 incident was a domestic one without international implications. Professor Emilio J. Cardenas has argued for Argentina that if a state has a clear titled to a piece of territory possessed by another state, then its use of force to recover its legal possession is not a violation of U.N. Charter Article 2(4). He quotes R. Jennings, who wrote: If in fact \a state's] claim is justified, that is to say if it does indeed have the legal title to the sovereignty, then it would seem that this is not an employment of force

Historical Rights

31

contrary to the provisions of Article 2(4) of the Charter. It cannot be force used against territorial integrity or political independence of another State because the actor State is merely occupying its own territory. The matter is one within its domestic jurisdiction. 91

The Argentine invasion of 1982 was not a threat to world peace because it was not an attempt to redraw borders. It was the attempt of the Argentine government to reassert its still-existing sovereignty over the islands. John Norton Moore has criticized Cardenas' position, claiming that it fails to satisfy Jennings' criterion that Argentina holds a legal title to the islands. Moore notes that Jennings also wrote that a state has the right to use force only "if the claim to possess title is indeed well founded. ... It is not to be expected that a particular issue of title will usually be so very clear as to justify forcible action by a claimant State on the mere strength of its own case."92

Britain's petty conquest and settlement in the nineteenth century give it de facto control of the clearly defined territory. Argentine de jure and historical claims were used to jusifty its landing of troops on British controlled territory. By the standards of twentieth-century international lawyers concerned about the escalation and spread of violence, this is an act of aggression and not a matter within a state's domestic jurisdiction, Argentina's lack of title, recognized by twentieth-century law, makes its use of force illegal and dangerous. 93

TITLE ACQUIRED BY PURCHASE OR BY PRESCRIPTION Not all Argentines were outraged by the 1833 British takeover of the islands. Argentine dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas thought the Malvinas were a minor issue. Although he protested the takeover in December 1838, he told Argentina's minister to London, Manuel Moreno, to see if Britain would cancel an 1824 loan in return for Argentina ceding its title to the islands. Moreno pursued the offer, but by 1841 had to admit, "as long as this government denies Argentine sovereignty over the islands, as it has done up to now, there is no way of persuading it to cancel the debt in exchange for this dominion." 94 Lord George Aberdeen, the Foreign Secretary in the Peel administration, saw no reason for Britain to purchase what it already possessed. Rosas let the relatively unimportant matter drop. After all, "cows and sheep not whales and seals were the preoccupation of his principal supporters." 95 Had Britain purchased the islands from Rosas in the late 1830s, it would have ended Argentine claims to them. By trying to sell them, Rosas showed that although he was unsentimental about them, he still assumed that Argentina had a right to the islands after the British conquest. By not selling them, Argentina did not alienate this right. British diplomats argued first that the 1833 actions were simply a reassertion of British historical rights. They did not in fact claim title based on conquest.

32

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

Conquest was never an officially popular basis for title even in the nineteenth century. Since then, the 1833 use of force has embarrassed many in the Foreign Office. The 1833 actions, however unpleasant, created a de facto situation in which a de jure title was acquired over time. 96 In 1910, the British Foreign Office began to entertain doubts about the historical right England had to the Falklands that supposedly made the 1833 incident a mere reassertion of right. Some feared that the incident had indeed been unjustified, that conquest, at least in the twentieth century, did not provide title, and that a basis other than historic right and conquest should be emphasized. All of this was precipitated by Argentina's continuing protests. In 1908 Argentina objected to the Rome Postal Union Convention because it included the Falklands as a British possession. In 1910 the Malvinas were frequently mentioned during the centenary celebrations of Argentina's independence. A new generation in the Foreign Office, not surprisingly uninformed about the Falklands, requested that Gaston de Bernhardt, the assistant librarian, write a report on the dispute. 97 The 7 December 1910 forty-nine-page report, according to Peter Beck, "implied various weaknesses in the traditional British case for sovereignty. It began to seem that in 1833 Britain had seized control of a legitimate Argentine possession."98 After December 1910 various British diplomats began questioning British title. Gerald Spicer, the head of the Foreign Office's American department, had said in June 1910 that Britain's claim to the Falklands "cannot be seriously contested." On 12 December he said that "from a perusal of this memo it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Argentine Government's attitude is not altogether unjustified, and that our action has been somewhat highhanded." Ronald Campbell, an assistant secretary in the American department, wrote in July 1911 that Buenos Aires, having inherited Spain's title, had the best claim to the Falklands. "We cannot easily make out a good claim," he wrote, "and we have very wisely done everything to avoid discussing the subject with Argentina." After Sir Malcolm Robertson, the British ambassador in Buenos Aires in the late 1920s, read the 1910 report he wrote, that "The Argentine attitude is neither 'ridiculous' nor 'childish.' ... I confess that, until I received that memorandum myself a few weeks ago, I had no idea of the strength of the Argentine case nor of the weakness of ours. ... I had assumed that our right to the Falkland Islands was unassailable. This is very far from being the case."99 The British had come to suspect that the Argentine demand for the return of the Malvinas was more than a people's aspiration. The acceptance by some in Britain of Argentina's better historical right led others to look for a new basis for Britain's claim. The Colonial Office despatch of 13 November 1933 to Joseph O'Grady, the Falklands governor, stated that title based on prior discovery and settlement would be weak. But now that British control of the islands had lasted a century, acquisitive prescription gave Britain title. A hundred years of possession transformed a de facto possession into a de jure one. In 1934 the Foreign Office's P. Mason wrote, "Our best title is of prescription." Anthony Eden in 1936 concurred with the switch in

Historical Rights

33

emphasis from a pre-1833 to a post-1833 criterion. One Foreign Office legal advisor doubted that the islands were terra nullius in 1833. John Troutbeck of the American department wrote in 1936 that "the difficulty of our position is that our seizure of the Falkland Islands in 1833 was so arbitrary a procedure as judged by the ideology of the present day" that it would not "be easy to explain our position without showing ourselves up as international bandits." 100 The difficulty in satisfactorily explaining its position was why Britain refused to discuss sovereignty over the islands with Argentina and to submit the dispute to arbitration throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Argentina requested in 1884 that the case be submitted to arbitration. Argentine has been the only nation ever to make this request. Britain offered in the 1940s and 1950s to submit only the Falkland Island Dependencies to arbitration. Britain's refusal to arbitrate weakened its claim. Jennings wrote that "there must be a strong presumption against the validity of such an alleged title where the claimant is not willing to have that claim properly determined in a Court of Law."101 After World War II, the Foreign Office expected Argentine protests in the United Nations about British presence in the Malvinas, and had a position paper written in September 1946. It noted the confusing nature of pre-1811 events and the weaknesses of a claim based on first discovery, first settlement, and the L774 plaque. The 1811-1833 period did provide some evidence for Argentina's claim. The report concluded that acquisitive prescription was the best basis for Britain's title. "The British occupation of 1833 was, at this time, an act of unjustifiable aggression which has not acquired the backing of prescription." 102 Many informed Britons have perhaps always suspected their government's claim to the Falklands. As early as 1829 the duke of Wellington wrote that he had "perused the papers respecting the Falkland Islands. It is not at all clear . . . that we have ever possessed the sovereignty of these Islands."103 The consistent refusal by Britain to discuss sovereignty with Argentina or to submit the dispute to arbitration for over a century also suggests British selfdoubt. Certainly, after 1910 many of those responsible for Britain's Falkland policy doubted British claims based on pre-1833 criteria. Because of these doubts, a new basis for the claim was sought in prescription. Even if the 1833 conquest was now no basis for title, occupation is a method of acquiring title to territory which is res nullius (i.e., no man's land), and precription is a means of acquiring territory, which originally belonged to somebody else and whose title is destroyed by the fact that the acquirer has successfully maintained possession.104

But Britons have not been satisfied with resting their claim on prescription. Some in Britain have doubted that the original owners' title can be destroyed if the current occupant took possession of land that was not res nullius and if the original owner continues to object. D. H. N. Johnson wrote that a state could acquire title by prescription if it has "exercised its authority in a continuous,

34

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

uninterrupted, and peaceful manner . . . provided that all other interested and affected states . . . have acquiesced in this exercise of authority." 105 Argentina and the rest of Latin America have not ever acquiesced to British occupation of the Falklands.106

ARGENTINE TITLE SECURE AFTER 1833 Argentines have disputed that conquest or prescription have given title to Britain. The title that they either inherited from Spain or created for themselves cannot, especially by the norms of the twentieth century, have been suddenly lost because of British aggression. Nor can it have been gradually lost because of British settlement, because Argentina has never acquiesced in the British usurpation. On 16 and 22 January 1833 Argentina protested the British use of force. On 24 April 1833 the Argentine minister plenipotentiary in London, Don Manuel Moreno, asked Palmerston for satisfaction. Moreno reopened the question on 29 December 1834. In 1841, the Argentine minister to the United States, General Alvear, presented his government's claims for losses sustained during Duncan's raid. U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster replied that any determination about satisfaction would have to await settlement of the sovereignty dispute. By 1853 the United States still considered that dispute alive, for then it was Britain that captured and released a U.S. vessel. The Department of State complained, saying it considered the sovereignty dispute still unsettled. When Argentina revived its claims against the Lexington raid in 1884, President Cleveland said in his 1885 annual message that Duncan did no more than to break up a piratical colony. Secretary of State Bayard stated on 18 March 1886 that no decision could be made until the question of sovereignty was settled. The Argentines subsequently have not renewed their demands for satisfaction from the United States. The Argentines have continued to regularly register official protests against the British. After Moreno's second protest in 1841, they protested in 1849, 1884, 1888, 1908, 1927, 1933, 1946, and yearly thereafter in the United Nations. Argentina has refused to accept letters mailed to it from England with Falkland Islands postal stamps. It has maintained its right to the Malvinas even in its municipal law. For example the Federal Court of Rio Gallegos decided in 1935 that a man born in Port Stanley of non-Argentine parents could not petition for naturalization because he was already an Argentine citizen due to his birth on the Malvinas.107 Argentina did go for thirty-five years, 1849-1884, without objecting, but its 1849 objection stated that lack of future protests did not mean that Argentina had abandoned its claim. Most writers in international law, including Hugo Grotius and L. Oppenheim, argue that an uninterrupted span of fifty to a hundred years is required before title is prescripted. 108 So this thirty-five year silence is not important, especially since Argentina signed no treaties that implied recognition of Britain's claim. Britain's absence of 1774-1833 was over

Historical Rights

35

fifty years. Britain's lack of protest, and recognition of Spain's and Argentina's claims, does imply its acquiesence in its loss of title during that period. TITLE REMAINS DISPUTED It may be that the acquiescence of all states is not necessary. It may be that the state that conquers and manages to hold another state's territory earns the de facto recognition of its control by other states. This recognition gives it a qualified title. A complete title may not have flowed to Britain, but enough of one may have flowed to give it a better title than Argentina. Title based on prescription without acquiescence of the former owner is akin to title based on conquest. With the former, the use of force creates a situation that causes title to pretty much flow to the conqueror. With the latter, the use of force immediately creates full title. Prescription without full acquiescence depends on the international community being realistic about how borders have actually been defined. By granting de facto recognition to borders drawn by the tip of a sword, the hope is that they will not be violently redrawn so often in the future. Maybe Argentina still holds some title to the islands, but Britain, by means of controlling them for so long, holds a better title. Protests about past injustices cannot be allowed to produce current disorders that may be quite dangerous. The granting of superior, though not exclusive, title to Britain based on prescription without acquiescence is a negative grant. The international community wants to legally set aside past illegalities so that future ones can be controlled. It wants to avoid future problems. Sovereignty is assigned to one state because forcing a change in title would be worse for world order. No positive rights are being advanced, and it does not create full title. There remains a sense of discomfort. Many in Britain came to suspect that Argentina held claim to the islands in 1833 by uti possidetis acquisition of Spanish rights or at least by occupation of terra nullius. The British sense of fair play and twentieth century international law made them question if title had been legally transferred in 1833. Prescription requires acquiescence if it is to produce full title, so that principle's application in the case of the Falklands was not satisfactory. Because of this, Britons wishing to bolster their claim have turned to the principle of selfdetermination as its basis. Self-determination would be the positive basis that, when joined to the negative one of prescription without acquiescence, would produce full title. Not only were future problems to be avoided, but the rights of people were to be protected and advanced. The principle of self-determination was perhaps the leading positive principle of the twentieth century. The right of people to democratically choose their political associations and their way of life was what gave Britain sovereignty. Britain would not nurse antiquated abstractions but would defend a democratic peoples' right to make choices. This principle bolsters Britain's claim if the pro-British islanders are accepted as a self entitled to freely and independently determine its political

36

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

association. The principle does not bolster Britain's claim if the islanders are not an independent self, or if the principle has become very similar to the principle of uti possidetis. While being the strongest basis for Britain's claim, the principle of self-determination is double-edged, and full title continues to elude Britain's grasp.

2 Self-Determination and British Sovereignty

Argentina's superior historical claim to the Malvinas is apparently balanced by the British claim derived from the principle of self-determination. However, this is the case only if the islanders are a self and if the principle is applicable in this situation. This principle has become one of the leading international principles of the twentieth century. If the islanders are a self, with the inalienable right of self-determination, the principle would strengthen Britain's title. Argentines and others have disputed the claim that the principle does strengthen Britain's title. The set of interpretations of the principle that would turn the tables and give Argentina the better claim to the islands will be discussed later. Arguments for and against applying the principle of self-determination in the Falklands question have seldom begun with a clear definition of the principle. The British have historically been among the best analysts of the principle, often arguing that there are no clear definitions of it. Since World War I, various British observers have noted that the principle is Utopian unless not tempered by other more pragmatic considerations. Sir Ivor Jennings went so far as to write in 1956 that Woodrow Wilson's famous principle of selfdetermination was ridiculous but somehow widely accepted as a sensible proposition. "On the surface it seemed reasonable; let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people."1 Defining the self has been the primary problem with the principle for two hundred years. Defining what the self should determine and how, were the next problems. A layperson might think that a self is an individual and that determination is that individual's implementation of personal choices of political association, religion, ideology, occupation, and so on. With this understanding, self-determination is difficult to distinguish from the idea of republican government. The principle of self-determination applied within a country would mean having republican government. The flip side of this internal self-determination would be external selfdetermination, or national sovereignty. A people cannot enjoy republican

38

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

government if it is suffering foreign occupation. The republican nation must also be sovereign. The self must be free from the external control especially of unrepublican nations. This splitting of the principle into internal and external sides of the same coin fails to clearly indicate that the heads are quite different from the tails. The first self is an individual. The second is a nation. An individual does not have sovereignty in international politics. And a nation does not have democratic rights. Concern for the rights of the individual is not primarily what first motivated the developers of the principle of national self-determination. The eighteenth and nineteenth century pioneers of the principle contended that a nation, usually defined ethnically, had the right to be represented by its own state. Within the same state, nations tended to develop hostile attitudes. Since one nation often dominated the state, the others were often mistreated by the political institutions. If the state was not actively harassing the subordinate nations, it was perhaps trying to assimilate them. The latter course had the virtue of being less violent but ignored the subordinate nations' sense of uniqueness and desire to survive as a group. Even if the state was helping the subordinate nations to flourish as unique selves, they were not free. They were not directing their own political affairs. Their right to survive as a nation depended on the goodwill of others. All of this led some to advocate a Europe divided politically along national lines. The problem was drawing the lines. How could a nation be defined so that it could know it wanted its own state? Language, race, religion, a common history, geography, and other objective criteria did not always define a group of people who subjectively felt that they were a nation. At the times when nations could be defined, they were often so geographically intermixed that to create separate states for each would be a political nightmare. Immense resettlement schemes were expensive and impractical. They also ignored the fact that people can have mixed loyalties. They might consider themselves to be part of one nation and prefer to live where their ancestors had lived, even if it was in the middle of other nations. In addition to the problems of defining the self and then figuring out how to establish states for each self there is the problem that the successful exercise of self-determination by one self can often mean the denial of it to another. The secessionist self cannot reconcile its position with a unionist self. The claims of different ethnic selves to the same territory can become the bases for long-term strife. Defining who the competing selves are in various situations can be just the beginning of figuring out how the principle of self-determination should be applied.

DEFINING THE SELF AND ITS RIGHTS IN THE FALKLANDS Three broad groups in Britain have made various definitions of the self and its rights. The first group argued for the existence of a single self, though they

Self-Determination and British Sovereignty

39

differed about the definition of that self and its rights. This group could be broken into three subgroups. Led during her administration by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the first subgroup has argued that the Falklanders are the self with the full right of self-determination and that Britain's duty is to defend their right. The second subgroup has agreed that the islanders are a self, but that objective factors have made it unwise for Britain always to protect their right. The third subgroup has made the argument that all Britons are the self and that Britain must clearly define its own self-interest. The second broad group sees the existence of competing selves. This group can also be broken into three subgroups. These subgroups differ about (1) whether Britain and the Falklanders are two allied selves in league against the Argentines, (2) whether Britain, the kelpers, and the Argentines are all opposed to each other, and (3) whether Britain and Argentina are united in differing with the islanders. A third broad group questioned whether British policy was much affected by discussions about selves and their rights. THE FALKLANDERS HAVE THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION The idea that the islanders are a self with the right to internal and limited external self-determination has been the predominant British interpretation. A self that has been established on a clearly defined territory for a century and a half has earned the right to continue determining its political association. If that self wishes continued association with the state from which they or their ancestors emigrated, then it should be able to expect that state's support. This interpretation was not quickly developed in 1982 to justify a military response to Argentina's invasion. In August 1964 elected representatives of the islanders had told the United Nations Committee of 24, the Decolonization Committee, that they wanted to continue their association with Britain and not become independent. On 16 September 1964 the British representative at the United Nations, Cecil King, told the committee that his government stood by the principle of self-determination. The islanders should be able to determine their own status, he said. Britain was prepared to consider any proposals for changes in status that the islanders might advance. Britain could not ignore the islanders' wishes and follow the recommendations of the Committee of 24, whose purpose was to implement General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960. That resolution had demanded the end of colonialism in all its forms. On 18 September the Third Subcommittee of the Committee of 24 recommended that Britain and Argentina enter into negotiations to settle their dispute. King expressed surprise that no mention of self-determination was made in the recommendation. The subcommittee had merely recommended that the interests of the territory's people be borne in rnind. The Times (London) found the recommendation as ironic and disappointing as King had. The editors thought that

40

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

something a bit more forthright might have been expected from a committee dedicated to the principle of self-determination. The usual definition of self-determintion is that what matters is the wishes of the people. That there was no mention of wishes is presumably because it was all too well known what the people wanted. They want to stay as they are. . . . Such obstinacy is intolerable to anti-colonialist doctrines, so the wishes of the people ... of the Falkland Islands have to be glossed over. Instead the word "interests" is revived, with all its fine old colonial connotations. This is the language of the mandates, and of Governments, like the South African, which made special arrangements for looking after native interests. There may be a lot to be said for paternalism, for good government instead of self-government, but it is curious that it should be left for an anti-colonial committee by implication to revive it. 2

The editors of the Times criticized the committee for not favoring the definition of the self as the islanders. The committee had made a retreat from its usual advocacy of the right to self-determination. The committee controlled by the Third World states had placed itself in the colonial and South African camps; a delicious irony for the editors. If the committee would not defend the principle, Britain would. The Times editorialized again on 30 September 1966 that "obviously Britain has to stand by the wishes and interests of the residents" of the Falklands. Many in Britain felt that they had to stand by the islanders' right because the United Nations was ready to run roughshod over it. The British delegate to the United Nations again complained in 1977 that prior resolutions of the General Assembly had not taken into account the desires of the islanders. Reports of the committees involved in the case did not mention the principle of self-determination. He did not accept that the Falklands were a special case where the principle was inapplicable. "The people of the Falkland Islands have the right to be consulted and have their desires taken into account with respect to their own future." 3 The governor of the Falklands two years later told the Committee of 24 that "a very ample cooperation (with Argentina) will be possible only on the basis of an acceptance of the principle that the desires of the islanders concerning their future should be recognized as constituting the primary principle." 4 The United Nations preferred condemnations of colonialism to unqualified support of self-determination, especially when the principle upheld colonialism. So Britain had to step in to protect the principle. The United Nations, and Britain, were almost surprised by this decoupling of self-determination and decolonization. The United Nations, as will be discussed later, tried to use the higher principle of decolonization to justify the nonapplication of self-determination in this case. Britain, after having its empire beaten with the stick of self-determination since World War II, was pleasantly surprised that the principle could have a procolonial application. MP loan Evans said, "we believe in self-determination, but we never thought that certain peoples would determine that they did not want to leave the influence of Britain. That is one of the problems of self-determination of which we never thought." 5 It turned out that the principle was anticolonial only

Self-Determination and British Sovereignty

41

when the people of a colony wanted independence. The principle did not mean that a self defined objectively by its former colonial borders must become an independent state. Not the objective criteria of anticolonial elites, but the subjective wishes of a people should be consulted. MP Bernard Braine criticized the United Nations's adherence to objective criteria rather than to people's wishes. He said that it would be "ironic in the extreme that the one dependency that [would] be denied self-determination is one where the population is wholly British, where there is no ethnic minority, no split allegiance and no desire for independence."6 Perhaps Britain and the United Nations were both surprised that a self, such as was the case with the Falklanders, would determine it did not want independence and that it did want the continuation of colonialism. But surprise or not, selves had the right to make whatever choices they wanted. International organizations and states alike had the responsibility to respect those choices. Britain had respected the right of peoples to self-determination when those peoples had opted for independence. Since World War I, when Britain controlled nearly a third of the globe's land mass, most of the empire had been relinquished under the direction of that right. Now when that right led to continued dependence, was it to be casually discarded? Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher answered the question in the negative. She told the House of Commons on 11 December 1980 that it was up to "the islanders to decide between the various options for the future. We will, of course, accept their decision."7 During the 1982 crisis, she frequently affirmed that the islanders' wishes were paramount. 8 "They have the right ... to choose their own way of life and determine their own allegiance."9 Michael Foot, the leader of the opposition Labour party, agreed that Britain had a "moral duty, a political duty and every other kind of duty to ensure" that the islanders' right of self-determination was sustained. 10 The self was the islanders. Britons could have particular empathy for them because, as Thatcher said, they are, "like that people of the United Kingdom ... an island race."11 This official position of the government did not change after the war. On 28 September 1983 British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Geoffrey Home told the U.N. General Assembly, "We will continue defending the right of the people of the Falkland Islands to self-determination." 12 The self was the islanders, but because of Britain's special relationship with them, it would defend their right.

BRITAIN IS UNABLE TO PROTECT THE ISLANDERS' RIGHT There were British officials who said that the Falklanders were the self with the right to self-determination, but that rational people in a democracy must make prudent judgments based on objective facts. These officials thought the islanders would have to, and would, remember the factors that had been causing the dissolution of the British Empire since World War II. Self-determination did not mean that a self could imagine out of existence such factors as geography

42

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

and Britain's declining economic and military power. A journalist wrote in the Times in 1977, "Falkland Islanders cannot find shelter behind their much beloved British flag until it drapes their coffin. They have to face economic reality." 13 Another wrote that the Falklanders could not reverse the tides that U.N. Resolution 1514 (XV) had so clearly revealed.14 MP Betty Boothroyd said, during the 1982 crisis, We cannot back turn the clock. I believe that the islanders are aware of that. They must be aware that we cannot provide a large and permanent military and naval presence in the area. ... I believe that the islanders may be more realistic about negotiated settlement . . . than perhaps some of us give them credit for. 15

MP David Owen thought that the islanders were "sensible people" who would adjust to the changed circumstances. They would "recognize that it was in their interests for some form of accommodation to be reached with the Argentines." 16 ALL OF BRITAIN IS THE SELF There was a hint of the problem in defining the self when the prime minister argued that the Falklanders "are British in stock and tradition, and they wish to remain British in allegiance."17 They were not merely an independent island country on which Britain happened to take pity. They were a British colony populated with people who well remembered their United Kingdom backgrounds. After the Falklands war, the British Nationality Law was amended to make them full citizens. The very fact that the Foreign Office had negotiated with Argentina about the Falklands indicated that the Falklanders lacked full external self-determination. The islanders had a right to internal self-determination, or municipal democracy. But they were not sovereign. In questions of foreign affairs, the self was all of the British people as represented by the government. This definition of the self opened possibilities not contained in the first definition. MP Frank Hooley applied to the Falklands the argument Professor Allen of the University of East Anglia had made about Gibraltar. Allen had argued that the Gibraltarians' demand to remain indefinitely in exactly their present status, especially at very considerable cost to the United Kingdom taxpayer, may be unjustifiable, if not impossible to grant. The heart of the matter is the indissoluable tie in the majority's mind between citizenship and territory; it is the end for the majority of United Kingdom citizens, as represented by the British Government and parliament of the day, to decide what is and shall remain British territory. 18

And as others argued, the issues arising from Britain's remaining colonies around the world could not be determined by the Falklanders. 19 Eighteen hundred people could not determine how all of Britain would use its armed forces. The islanders could not hold a veto over Parliament. 20 Tony Benn

Self-Determination and British Sovereignty

43

begged his fellow members of the Commons not to allow the 1,800 islanders to think that their idea of self-determination meant a task force could be drawn from Britain at any time. 21 Julian Critchly agreed that the House of Commons, not the islanders, made British foreign policy. 22 Former prime minister Edward Heath reminded his listeners that Britain had other interests in Latin America and that the Falklanders could not determine all of Britain's South Atlantic strategy. 23 Andrew Faulds bluntly said there should be "less cant about the self-determination of a minute settler community." 24 The assumption here was that the islanders did not hold the unabridged right to external self-determination. The Falklands were not a sovereign country. The Falklands executive and legislative councils did not make British policy. The Falklands' governors were appointed by the queen of England. The self was the British people, in whose interests Parliament and the Foreign Office made foreign policy. The costs and benefits of innumerable situations, of which the Falklands was only one, had to be balanced against each other. No minority could make excessive demands on the majority, especially when the minority's well-being could be secured under a different, less costly arrangement. If this were not true, then self-determination would become otherdetermination. The right to determine one's own future could be exercised only at the expense of many others. Any reluctance of those others to pay in blood and treasure would be vetoed. That favorite pastime of so many, tweaking the tail of the British lion, would become ever so much more important if it became apparent that the tail was wagging the lion.

A UNITED SELF A fourth group's interpretation of the self will be discussed at greater length in the next section on interdependence and is mentioned now only in passing. Many of the policies pursued by the Foreign Office from the late 1960s until 1981 suggested that some British diplomats might have wished to define the self more broadly. Had it been approved by all concerned, a lease-back scheme might have successfully granted Argentina sovereignty over the territory while maintaining British sovereignty over the people. This fudging of the sovereignty issue depended on the British, the Falklanders, and the Argentines sharing at least a limited sense of selfhood. If all three groups could have shared interests in the islands and cooperated in the islands' economic development, the very distinct selves would have been somewhat merged. The attempt to define the self so inclusively of course floundered.

COMPETING SELVES Of the second broad group, which viewed the problem as one of competing selves, one subgroup defined one self as Argentina and Britain and the other as the kelpers. This subgroup could be further broken into one small group

44

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

suspicious of the kelpers and another suspicious of the Anglo-Argentine self. The former position was taken by Brigid Brophy, who argued that the two states should determine a peaceful settlement to the dispute even if the inflexible islanders rejected it. She suspected that Thatcher had been "outwitted and outwilled" by the islanders. "The war was between sides who were really on the same side, but had failed to make it clear to one another, with the result that it was the wishes of the Falkland Islanders that prevailed in defiance of them both." 25 The wily farmers and sheepherders had thrown dust in the eyes of the foreign ministries of Argentina and Britain. Confused by the islanders' machinations, the real self developed schizophrenia and battled itself. Brophy stood at the extreme end of the position that the islanders and their lobby were able to influence events more than their small numbers would have suggested was possible. They were able to do this because so few others in Britain were interested enough in the Falklands to oppose them. If anyone was usually suspected in Britain of plotting against the true self, it was not the islanders but the Foreign Office. Many Britons and most islanders feared that it harbored a sly group of potential traitors who were scheming to hand over fellow Britishers to foreigners who would impoverish and harass them. This theme, which produced some of the most colorful writing on the dispute, is formed by combining a few ideas. The islanders had the right to selfdetermination. The islanders had determined that they wanted to keep the islands under British sovereignty. The islands had little to offer Britain and were too expensive to protect and maintain. The Foreign Office said it accepted the islanders' right to self-determination as the preponderant factor but kept on negotiating with an Argentine republic whose professed aim was to gain sovereignty over the Malvinas. Thus, the Foreign Office must in secret have been trying to undermine the islanders' right and find a way to sneak the worthless islands under Argentine authority. Only by vigilantly and frequently blowing the whistle on it could the Foreign Office-Argentine foreign ministry condominium be stopped. This group accepted Brophy's contention that the groups lined up as British and Argentine diplomats versus the Falklanders but said the Falklanders were the good self and the diplomats were the bad self. The diplomats had to be prevented from "making an agreement over the heads of local inhabitants" (the islanders). Their negotiations were ready to produce at any time an agreement, made without consulting the islanders, to hand over the islands to Argentina. 26 In fact, if Britain had refused to negotiate, the Committee of 24 might have given Argentina even more support. Britain could reject negotiations only at the risk of bringing down on itself and the islanders the full wrath of the decolonizationists. Britain's negotiating with Argentina under the auspices of the anticolonial Committee of 24 caused the pro-colonial islanders to form their own committee. The Committee of 24 wanted an end to colonialism. Michael Clark Hutchison, Conservative MP for South Edinburgh, was sympathetic to the Falkland Islands Executive Committee and was "utterly opposed to any negotiations whatsoever with the Argentine Government about the Falkland Islands." 27 Caught between committees with conflicting purposes, the

Self-Determination and British Sovereignty

45

Foreign Office could satisfy neither. Any attempts at compromise or integrating the conflicting purposes would take skill and time, and would be seen by one committee as an attempt to hang on to an anachronistic colonialism and by the other as a plot for the eventual selling out of a people's right to selfdetermination. The Foreign Office's opposition could not imagine that, given the Argentine and U.N. calls for a transfer of sovereignty, the talks were the best available way to protect the islanders' wishes. As long as the talks continued without substantial progress, the Argentines might be calmed while the islanders remained British. A Foreign Office spokesman noted: One of the reasons why the talks have taken so long and have not come to a conclusion, and may well not come to an agreed conclusion, is because we have insisted on the paramount importance of the wishes of the islanders, and we cannot agree to any transfer of sovereignty against those wishes.28

He was arguing that the longer the talks went on, the greater the proof of Foreign Office commitment to the islanders' rights. The longer the talks went on, the more it became evident that the Foreign Office was not identifying itself with the Argentine foreign ministry but was representing the islanders. This argument was accepted by few outside of Whitehall. The Times editorialized on 5 December 1968 that the Foreign Office was pressuring the government to sacrifice "the Falklanders on the altar of Anglo-Argentine relations." And one could not trust Government assurances because the government did not know "its own mind," did not have "any firmness of purpose," and did not have the "habit of keeping its promises" or standing up to the world. The Argentine claim "must either be accepted or rejected." Continued exchanges of view and "elaborate British attempts to sidetrack the issue" were leading to a "British surrender." Lord Caccia agreed with the idea that this was a blackand-white issue. He said in the House of Lords on 6 December that there are occasions when it is right in diplomacy as elsewhere to say plain things plainly. In May, 1940, Sir Winston Churchill said "Surrender, No. Never to Surrender." Would it have had the same impact on our friends or foes if he had said, "Surrender. Not against the wishes of the Islanders?"29

In the same way, when Argentina and Britain agreed to improve communications, transportation, and trade between the islands and the mainland, some saw this as the first step on the slippery slope to complete Argentine sovereignty. The agreement, initiated 1 July 1971 in Buenos Aires by British and Argentine representatives, did not convince Falklander Marion Betts that Argentina would not "try any tricks after communications with the mainland have been started."30 The Times warned the Government in its 22 June editorial not to broaden the talks from functional benefits to the islanders to questions of sovereignty. In fact, the Government should give the Argentine "dream" of restored sovereignty "a knock on the head." The Government did not give the Argentine dream a knock on the head, so by 1977 Lord Mordis considered it necessary to table a question in the House

46

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malviiias) Islands

of Lords asking the Government "what steps have been taken to deny the Times newspaper's assertion . . . that 'Britain is anxious to get rid of the islands as of all its remaining colonial possessions and thus alleviate the obvious distress which the report has caused.'" 31 Bernard Levin responded to government policy by writing, When the Government tells a group of people dependent upon it that there is going to be no "sell-out" of their interests, we may be reasonably confident that a sell-out has been decided on in principle, and when they are in addition promised that nothing will be done "behind their back," it can be taken as certain that the method by which sell-out will be effected has already been devised in outline, and that a subcommittee of officials in the appropriate ministry is engaged upon working out the details. . . . Thus it is with the Falkland Isles, or Las Islas Malvinas, as we shall no doubt shortly be learning to call them. It is obvious that if the Argentinians could stop killing one another long enough to mount an expeditionary force, they could seize the Falkland Islands before the appropriate Government spokesman in London had finished preparing a promise that the Islanders, as British subjects, would be entitled to the full support of the Mother Country, which support, however, would not, for technical reasons, actually be forthcoming. Yet the knowledge does not in any way inhibit the Falklanders' behavior, determination or feelings. 32

The perception of the Government trying to get rid of the islands was reinforced in 1980 when its work on a reformed British Nationality Law was widely discussed. On 12 September 1980 the Falkland Islands office in London protested the White Paper the Government had produced, which, the office maintained, conferred "second class citizenship on several hundred Falkland Islanders who do not have grandparents who were born in the United Kingdom, but whose pure British nationality extends unbroken since the early nineteenth century, when the islands were first settled." 33 MP Frank Hooley thought it was "supremely ironic that the Government, who claim to be so concerned about the interests of the Falkland Islanders, have devalued their nationality, made them second-class citizens, and denied them the right to come back to the United Kingdom if they wish."34 The Home Office seemed to be saying that the longer the islanders remained on the Falklands, the more they were becoming a self distinct from the British people. The geographical isolation over generations changed their legal status. Physical separation gradually caused a degree of legal separation. Having been on the islands for three generations meant the islanders had forfeited the right to return to Britain. The critics of second-class citizenship for the islanders were not primarily concerned with the islanders' right to return to Britain. The islanders' right to self-determination had meant their right to stay in the Falklands under British sovereignty. The islanders' right to return to Britain was a symbol of their status as a part of the British self. Just as any other part of Britain, they had a right to internal self-determination and should be able to rely on the Government's wisdom in conducting foreign policy. Wise foreign policy did not include giving away parts of one's self to unattractive Latin regimes. The Falklanders were of British stock who happened to live on islands some

Self-Determination and British Sovereignty

47

distance away. Just like other good Britons, they celebrated the Queen's Silver Jubilee in 1977.35 They were described as "passionate believers in parliamentary democracy [who] listen to and watch everything" said and done in Parliament. "Even the most obscure written parliamentary question is followed and debated in the Falkland Islands." 36 Loyalty to the constitutional monarchy made them part of the political nation. Their English language, family connections, cultural heritage, and so on made them part of the cultural nation. The islanders were part of the British self, which had no less right to self-determination than other nations. Many Britons shared MP Russell Johnston's concern that "shameful schemes for getting rid of the islands had been festering in the Foreign Office for years."37 Penelope Tremayne suspected the Foreign Office was devising "a trick" that would "make a present of the Falkland Islands to Argentina." Those devising this trick could be found in a "spot deep in the viscera of the Foreign Office, which neither Labour nor Conservative ministers can reach. From this bureaucratic deep shelter, it seems, rises an implacable resolve to yield to blackmail . . . and to sell the islanders down the River Plate."38 The image of the Foreign Office as the bastion of betrayers remained after the Argentine invasion. MP David Lambie said on 7 April 1982 that the islanders had never had faith in the Foreign Office. "The people in the British embassy were pro-Argentina and anti-Falkland Islands . . . [and] were there to brainwash us so that we would tell the [islanders] that they should capitulate." 39 MP John Furr advised his colleagues on 29 April 1982 to also take a fresh look at the people in the Falkland Islands' section of the Foreign and Commonwealth office. It seems that there has been ... in that section an element which has persisted through successive Governments which finds the Falkland Islands to be rather an embarrassment from imperialistic days. Let us clear them out. . . . Let us put into that section . . . young, enthusiastic people who believe that there is a future in the Falkland Islands. 40

The problem all along the way had been caused by people with insufficient selfconfidence, enthusiasm, and loyalty. It was not that different people had come up against a similar set of intractable problems and had reacted similarly with hesitation and uncertainty. The solution had never been stymied by the conflicting and equally legitimate purposes of the islanders, the Argentines, and Britain. The solution had been stymied by urbane government officials who had more in common with their foreign counterparts than the people of their country. In contrast to these cosmopolitan elites who casually sold out their own people stood the pristine principle of self-determination that alone should have guided British policy in the Falklands. Many felt relief to be away from the worldly ways of the traitorous diplomats and to be part of the heavenly world of the single principle, universal and monolithic. Prime Minister Thatcher stated that Britain had a "long and proud history of recognizing the right of others to determine their own destiny. . . . That right must be upheld universally." 41 David Owen noted that "one of the sacred principles of the United

48

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

Nations is the right to self-determination." 42 MP John Eden believed that if British sovereignty over the islands was modified "there would be no opportunity for any kind of self-determination." 43 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Francis Pym noted, "The wishes of the islanders are all-important to us." 44 Sir Bernard Braine discovered that "the islanders' right to self-determination is enshrined in the United Nations charter." 45 MP Stanley-Newens stated, "The principle of self-determination is sacrosanct." 46 Some of those who were this self-assured in their principles found no room for compromise. Others even suspected that their government's pragmatism or even just its diplomatic language revealed treason. THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION VERSUS BRITISH POLICY Various groups differed as to who the self was, what it had the right to determine, and whether capabilities existed to defend that right. Another position was that all the talk about self-determination was the conscious design of a cynical British leadership to mask its true imperial objectives. Argentines could be expected to take this position and seldom failed to do so. They often argued that Britain had not been the true friend of self-determination that Argentina had been. One Argentine delegate to the United Nations reminded his colleagues that the British delegate had expressed his doubts about the universal applicability of self-determination during the debate in 1960 about U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV). He did well not to remind the United Nations about Argentina's moderate position on colonialism during that same debate. During that debate the British delegate had argued that the principle of self-determination must be considered in light of other principles of the U.N. Charter such as that of territorial integrity. This indicated the moral reasoning for which many Britons had long been famous. Moral reasoning rejected that political morality could adhere to a single principle. It accepted the idea that leaders and constituents should be prudent in their pursuit of their nation's interest, trying as best they could to approximate a variety of moral goals, many of which are usually in conflict. The sudden dedication to one principle was uncommon in the British tradition. Argentines questioned whether Britain's commitment to self-determination had been demonstrated in 1833 when it used force to remove the Argentine islanders so that it could add to its global network of naval bases. In 1973 an Argentine delegate to the United Nations wrote to the secretary general that Britain's "preoccupation" with the right of self-determination would have been more legitimate had it taken a plebiscite of the original population's wishes before forcibly displacing them. 47 The principle had been an important one since the 1789 French Revolution and in 1833 was not unknown in the settlement of international disputes. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, the Argentine foreign minister, in 1976 told a U.N. committee that "Great Britain puts much emphasis on this principle only

Self-Determination and British Sovereignty

49

when it suits its interests." Britain used the principle in order to maintain, not dismantle, colonialism. 48 Some in Britain also doubted their government's honest commitment to the principle of self-determination. Anthony Barnett wrote that hardly a word uttered about it was meant by those who actually insisted upon a military consummation of the 1982 crisis. All the MPs' statements about it were "yaboo, custard pie politics [because] the parliamentarians are hypocrites. What is new? Such noises are in fact the stuff of Parliament itself and the whole British 'debating' tradition, with its empty sounds." 49 Others felt that Britain had selectively applied the principle of self-determination. MP Stanley-Newens recalled that "British Governments of both parties [have] not been very vocal about the principle of self-determination in a number of cases of armed aggression or removals of populations by superior force that have arisen in recent years." 50 He cited the lack of British support for the principle in response to Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in 1975, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, South Africa's invasions of Angola, and the removal of Diego Garcia's people without their consent. Britain's responsibility for protecting the principle of self-determination in East Timor seemed rather tenuous. The 1975 Indonesian invasion was of a Portuguese, not a British, colony. Of course, if Britain sets up the principle as universal and sacrosanct, perhaps it should make vigorous protest whenever the principle is endangered. A more serious criticism might be made of the U.N. General Assembly, which by its apparent acceptance of the Indonesian fait accompli seems to have defined colonialism as the armed subjugation of non-European by European, but not of non-European by non-European. The cases of Cyprus and Diego Garcia are better examples of Britain paying attention to other factors besides the principle of self-determination. Some four-fifths of the population of Cyprus is Greek and has wanted to be politically unified with Greece. Achaeans began arriving around 1400 B.C., colonizing the island and introducing Greek culture. The other fifth is Turkish and rejects the idea of unification with Greece. Britain since the 1930s has argued that the island is ten times as far from Greece as from Turkey and that historically the island has been Egyptian, Persian, Roman, Genoese, and Turkish, but Greek only for a short time in the fourth century B.C. Since 1878 the British have been using the island to defend Turkish possessions against Russia and to defend its own Middle Eastern interests. Britain has argued that the application of self-determination in this case would threaten international peace and stability. History, geography, and geopolitics have, not necessarily incorrectly, superseded self-determination in British policy towards Cyprus. The principle has been balanced by other considerations in other cases. Diego Garcia is a remote, small island in the Indian Ocean. Once part of Mauritius, it was separated before that nation's independence in 1968 and remained a British colony. The 1,400 islanders in the late 1960s and early 1970s were removed against their wishes and shipped to Mauritius because the island had b'een leased to the Lnited States in 1966 as a military base. After

50

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

eight years of lobbying, the Diego Garcians obtained £4 million as final compensation for their removal. In return, they had to agree not to return to the island. In June 1982 the new socialist government of Mauritius nevertheless claimed Diego Garcia had been part of that country when it was still a colony and should be returned to Mauritian sovereignty. Another case was the Pacific island of Banaba.51 Most of the islands in the Gilbert group became a British protectorate in 1892, and a British colony in 1916. Ellice Islands, now called Tuvalu, broke away from the Gilbert Islands and became independent in 1975. Ocean Island, now called Banaba, was administered by the British as part of the Gilbert islands. The Banabans claimed they had always been different culturally and historically from the Gilbertese. The existence of phosphates on Banaba complicated relationships. According to a British judge who in 1976 presided over a long court case brought by the Banabans, the British Phosphate Commissioners (BPC) and the British government in 1928 persuaded the small, commercially inexperienced population to part with land they did not wish to lease for excavation.52 The resident British commissioner threatened to destroy their village and forcibly acquire their land for "any old price," and then went on to prescribe the royalties given to the islanders after their land had been compulsorily purchased. 53 In 1947, after having just suffered hardships under the Japanese, the islanders were persuaded to part with the remaining two/fifths of Ocean Island. The colonial administration prohibited their advisor, who had previously been appointed by the British government, from participating in negotiations about the island's phosphate deposits. The 2,500 residents were moved in 1945 to Rambi, an island of the Fiji, not Gilbert, islands group. The phosphates were sold below world market prices to New Zealand and Australia. The strip mining left most of the land uninhabitable and looking like a "lunar landscape." 54 A larger proportion of royalties from the island's phosphates went to the Gilbert Islands than to the Banabans. The Banabans in 1971 initiated in court what became the longest and most costly action in British legal history. The case ended in High Court after 221 working days and legal costs just under £1 million. The islanders claimed that the BPC had paid about £21 million too little in royalties. They wanted this and enough money to restore their island's original landscape. "The Banabans," wrote the editors of the Times, "have a strong case for saying that they have systematically been paid less than their fair share from the benefits of the phosphate on their island." 55 Justice Robert Megarry of the High Court heard the case and toured the South Sea Islands for 15 days before writing a judgment as long as Vanity Fair. The judgment was read for five days, and argued that since the island's landscape could not now be restored, damages of about £1.2 million should be paid by the BPC to the islanders. This award was reduced in July 1977 to less than £10,000, or under £50 per acre.56 The Banabans further learned that they could not even use this reduced award to finance replanting of their island because of laws protecting against importation of pests and plant diseases. 57 The judge denied the islanders' demand for over £21 million. He wrote that former British governments' treatment of

Self-Determination and British Sovereignty

51

their wards "could not possibly be called good government," but that former colonial abuses of this nature could not be rectified in court because they had not been illegal.58 The Reverend Tebuke Rotan, head of the island's group which brought the case to court, was unsurprisingly disappointed. "We have failed in law," he said, "because there is no English law to protect us from the exploitation we had suffered for a long time from the British government." 59 The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, David Owen, in May 1977 announced that the government would offer £6.5 million to the Banabans to help with their future economic development, which was in doubt now that the phosphates were expected to run out in 1979. The payment would be made on an ex-gratia basis, without admitting any liability. 60 It would also be made on the condition that the islanders would agree in return to make no further claims against Great Britain. The Conservative Party MP from SouthEast Essex, Sir Bernard Braine, consistently advocated the islanders' interests. He noted that the proposed sum was worth only "one-fifth of what the Banabans would have earned from their phosphates if they had been given proper advice and information in 1947 and if there had not been grave breaches of trust by the Government." 61 The islanders said that they would accept the money only if they were granted independence or association with Fiji. 62 The Gilbert Islands, which were scheduled for independence in 1979, opposed granting independence to the island that had been administered by the British as part of the Gilbert Islands. Naboua Ratieta, Chief Minister of the Gilberts, said "We believe Ocean Island to be an integral part of the Gilbert Islands and we are not prepared either now or in the future to see it taken away either as an independent island or to be integrated with another colony." 63 David Owen said the British government agreed that "there are . . . strong legal, constitutional, and historical objections to making territorial changes."64 Banabans boycotted the British-led talks to negotiate a constitution for the soon-to-be independent Gilberts. Some islanders even used isolated acts of violence against miners. 65 When the Gilbert Islands in July 1979 did become independent, Banabans boycotted the festivities. None of this prevented the new Gilbert Islands government from administering to the Banabans royalties and other finances. Cyprus had been a case of passive rejection of the principle of self-determination. By not countenancing a change in status, the British supported the denial of the Cyprian Greeks' right to self-determination. The cases of Diego Garcia and Banaba were an active rejection of the principle. In physically removing the islanders, the British denied them the right to self-determination. All these cases differ from that of the Falklands in that the Falklanders were of British stock. One might say that a state can only be reasonably expected to uphold the principle of self-determination where its own nationals are concerned. After World War I, minority rights that were observed by host states were respected largely because of the interest shown by the minority's kin state. 66 No state has the power or the interest in protecting everybody's rights. But because of their limited interest, they cannot be criticized when they show

52

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

an active interest in protecting the rights of their fellow countrymen in another land. And if the principle of self-determination was not treated as universal and sacrosanct in some cases, this does not prove that it was not sincerely upheld in the Falklands. It perhaps does show that states may be more prone to accept their own people's right to self-determination while other people must fend for themselves. A PRINCIPLE FOR THE PEOPLE Many in Britain would not have discussed the Falklands dispute in terms of principles, rights, or other abstractions. If self-determination had great appeal to many it was not because it was a sacred principle but because it had to do with people. Sovereignty may be a majestic principle, but it seems cold, distant, and impersonal. Tony Benn proclaimed that not sovereignty, but the welfare of the people, was what Britain wanted. 67 Oil may excite the imaginations of heartless company executives and new left historians, but it does not unify national support for foreign policy. One member of Parliament said, "There may be oil on the outskirts of the islands. I do not know. There are certainly fish. The dispute is about people. . . . The human rights of the Falkland Islanders are the most important issue of all."68 Another said "our retention of the administration and sovereignty of the Falkland Islands does not relate to the possibility of there being gas or oil in the region. We are not there for a commercial purpose. . . . We are there because the islanders . . . have made it clear that they wish us to be there."69 Questions of history are academic when compared to the families who have lived on the Falklands for generations.70 Perhaps Britain was wrong in Suez, which was a fight in 1956 about property rights. But Suez offered no precedent for the Falklands, which was about human rights.71 The responsibility was to the Falklands' "people, and not to any isolated territory." 72 There were of course some in Parliament who in debates during the war did not accept the principle that the people was the paramount issue. Michael English argued that Britain was not defending either the islands or the islanders. The purpose of the military task force, the first ship of which set sail for the islands from England on 9 April, was to defend "the rule of law in the world. We are defending democracy and law. . . . We are defending civilization against barbarians. ... If some of them (the islanders) are killed" in the defense of these ideals, "that is not necessarily the most important thing."73 J. Enoch Powell found it "impossible in the last resort to distinguish between the defense of territory and the defense of people." Because of this, one did not have to "be too nice about saying that we defend our territory as well as our people."74 For most Britons, though, it was compatriots, not the rule of law, that were the issue. The Daily Express" front page one day in early April was dominated by a picture of a large group of Falklanders and the caption "We MUST Defend Them." 75 The tabloids did not sell by proclaiming a defense of principle. The

Self-Determination and British Sovereignty

53

task force would not be sent just to prevent any violation of the principle of self-determination. It would be sent if fellow Britons were threatened. The British self did not have the right to cut a minority off from itself against that minority's wishes. Britain did have an obligation to defend them against an invasion that would deny them their human rights. The aggressor was labelled in Parliament as being among the most dictatorial and fascist of the South American military juntas. 76 Argentina was governed by a "tinpot Fascist junta" 77 that by its territorial ambition was denying the "democratic rights of the islanders."78 The "Fascist gangsters" were a clear threat to the islanders' human rights.79 The problem in the negotiations was that the British Foreign Office had become too close to the Argentine. The Foreign Office had not taken into account that "those who sup with the devil need a very long spoon. . . . Appeasement does not work. ... In negotiating with despots reasonableness can easily be mistaken for weakness."80 Thatcher concluded that the islanders' wishes could not be expressed or implemented "while the present illegal Argentine occupation continues."81 Because the main issue of the Falklands was the people to whom harm was being done, the forces causing that harm must be repulsed. A task force was therefore justified. Without the successful British use of force, the islanders' right to self-determination would be trampled on by the same "Fascist junta which has imprisoned, tortured, illtreated and murdered thousands of its political opponents over the past few years."82 The majority of Parliament and the nation agreed with Thatcher that "the liberty of the Falkland Islanders must be restored. . . . They have enjoyed self-determination. Why should they lose that freedom and exchange it for dictatorship?"83

The identification of the people and their welfare as the key issue was also used by those who opposed the sending of the task force. Their argument was that the people were so important that the risk to the islanders from any use of force would be disproportionate to the potential success of the military operation. The people could be saved without a war, so a war could be useful only to uphold principle and the prime minister's vanity. Tony Benn feared that a British counterinvasion would be "the death sentence on those who live in the Falkland Islands and whose welfare must be our prime concern."84 Their welfare could be secured by surrendering abstract sovereignty over the islands to Argentina and offering the option of resettlement to any islanders who would desire it. They could be resettled and keep their British nationality or stay and become Argentine citizens. MP Frank Allaun asked "Would it not be right to offer those people the opportunity to take either of those courses rather than .to fight a war about it?" The cost to resettle all 600 families would be only some £18 million, "which is chicken feed compared to the task force."85 To resettle the islanders in Britain would require the amendment of the British Nationality Act, which Tony Benn called for on 29 April 1982.86 Alexander W. Lyon did not think that the islanders' rights included that of determining whether all of Britain would "expend not only money, ships and aeroplanes, but people's lives in order to ensure that the 1,800 islanders are entitled to maintain [their] way of life." What he cared about "is whether

54

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

human beings are to lose their lives in order to preserve the British Empire . . . [which] is over."87 The most human of all people's rights was the right to survival and life. The issue was the people on the islands and on the task force. Whatever could protect them was right. This theme might have become more widely accepted if the war had dragged on through the South Atlantic winter or if Britain had suffered high casualties. Britain might have become divided if the war had become protracted. Since the war was brief and casualties comparatively low, the argument remained politically unimportant.

3 Two Principles of Self-Determination

The principle of self-determination would not support Britain's title to the Falklands if the islanders were not a self entitled to exercise the right because they were imported by a colonial power. The principle would support Argentina's claim to title if the self was the nation whose territory was defined by its former colonial boundaries. The anticolonial members of the United Nations held two general and conflicting definitions of self-determination. Argentina, the Committee of 24, and the General Assembly stressed that the principle of self-determination should not be applied at the expense of decolonization even though selfdetermination had come to be almost equated with decolonization. The predominant British interpretation of the self and its rights seemed to be partially accepted by the United Nations and Argentina. The tensions created between Argentina and other anticolonialists in the United Nations because of the mixed definitions resulted in Argentina's being denied the right to use force to satisfy her claim to the Malvinas. The two conflicting definitions of the principle held simultaneously by many of the United Nation's members might be called the republican definition and the modern anticolonial one. In the republican definition, the individuals who feel themselves to constitute a group and who are well established in a territory have the right to determine their political association by means of a secret ballot. In the modern anticolonial definition, the self is defined by political elites and by the borders of colonies. External self-determination is applied originally at the time of independence. After independence, external selfdetermination is the continuing status of the new state as sovereign and equal to other states. Membership in the United Nations symbolizes this status. Internal self-determination is not necessarily republican government and may be the definition by the political elite of the interests of the nation's population. Anticolonial self-determination was in some ways similar to the principle of uti possidetis often applied in nineteenth-century Latin America. Much of Argentine political philosophy and history further complicates its understanding of self-determination. The traditional Catholic thought of many Argentines and the nation's almost exclusively European ancestry make it difficult for Argentines to easily fit in with the Rousseauian and anti-racial discrimination elements of modern anticolonial self-determination. Many Ar-

56

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

gentines were antimodernists as well as anticolonialists. When Argentines argue that the prinicple of self-determination is not applicable in the Malvinas dispute, they are accepting the British interpretations of the principle. In doing this they have not wished to identify themselves too closely with the interpretations of self-determination developed since World War II. The Africans and Asians, who have done the most since World War II to develop the principle, have kept their distance from Argentina as well. Anticolonialism made Argentina and Africa allies, not brothers. After World War II many Africans and Asians did not consider colonialism to be a political relationship that might be mutually beneficial but could be corrupted; it was essentially evil. Argentines hoped that the developing global antipathy towards colonialism might breathe new life into their claim to the Malvinas. The new higher law of decolonization might be used to define the self as all the people living within the territory of the former Spanish colony. Since the Malvinas had been part of this territory, the islanders were part of the larger Argentine self. Argentina had from 1976 until 1983 a de facto government that was in its words attempting to foster a process of national reintegration. This did not make the Argentine elites any less sensitive to the legitimate interests of the islanders than of the Argentine people.

TWENTIETH-CENTURY ANTICOLONIALISM

REVIVES ARGENTINE CLAIM

The 135-year-old dispute over the Falklands could hardly have seemed anything other than rather innocuous by the early 1960s. Argentina could be expected to continue making regular protests about the British presence in the Malvinas. Argentines had registered official protests in 1833, 1841, 1849,1884, 1888, 1908,1927,1933, 1946, and yearly thereafter in the United Nations. The Argentines had supported the creation of a United Nations not only as an international body ensuring the peace by organizing collective security, "but also as a system to further the just solution of international problems, especially those derived from the colonial system." 1 The Argentine delegate to the United Nations stated on 11 December 1946 that Argentina did not recognize the British sovereignty over the Falklands. 2 The General Assembly took note of this and many other countries' reservations on 14 December 1946.3 Britain agreed to give the United Nations yearly reports on the Falklands as a nonautonomous territory. The Argentines just as regularly reported that this transmitted information in no way affected the Argentine sovereign rights over the Malvinas. 4 These complaints had been made for so long with so little effect that very few people outside Argentina ever considered that sovereignty over the islands would ever be exchanged. It would not have been impossible to wonder how seriously the Argentines made the complaints. Was the Malvinas dispute kept barely alive in hopes not so much of regaining sovereignty over the islands as of maintaining some issue that could unify widely divergent domestic groups?

Two Principles of Self-Determination

57

Peronists, radicals, communists, traditional Catholics, the military, portenos (those who lived in the port city of Buenos Aires), landowners, bankers, and others found few symbols to evoke a common sense of nationalism. A common external enemy was one of the few symbols available. British control of the Malvinas was a particularly evocative bete noire because of Britain's previous record of military and economic intervention. Juan Peron would list Las Islas Malvinas as first among the "many forms of aggression" that Latin America had suffered. The 1833 "attack on the Malvinas by British forces and its violent occupation" of the islands had been supported by the usually pro-British United States, "the most powerful American nation." 5 In the U.N. debates of 1982, Argentine foreign minister Costa Mendez reminded his listeners that "in 1840 and in 1848 the Government of Great Britain organized naval blockades against the Republic of Argentina." 6 The British had allegedly supported guerrilla and revolutionary movements in Argentina. 7 The theme of British economic exploitation of Argentina had long been developed by writers such as Rodolfo and Julio Irazusta, Raul Scalabrini Ortiz and others. A British-American condominium aimed at the exploitation of Argentina could hardly be defeated by Argentina alone. After the two superpowers had divided the world into two spheres of influence at Yalta, it seemed to Argentines as though their country might remain in the grip of the condominium. There was a glimmer of hope that other states would come to follow the Peronist idea of a third way beholden to neither the communist Soviet Union nor the monopoly capitalist United States. Justicialismo (the official Peronist ideology) would show the way for sovereign nations that did not want to take sides in a cold war from which they could not benefit. By the 1960s there were many states in the Third World which wished to be nonaligned. The bipolar world was becoming multipolar. Japan, Western Europe, and China, had increased their strength and their independence. The growing anticolonial pressures and the weakened state of colonial powers provided Argentina with broad support to counter a weakened Britain. Perhaps the United States-British condominium was no longer so strong. Perhaps with international support, Argentina could break the continued bonds of neocolonial dependency and the British colonial presence in the Malvinas. Argentines hoped that the two great anticolonial movements could be combined to finally evict the British from the Malvinas. Argentines had joined many of their fellow Americans in the first anticolonial period, achieving political independence during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. A Spain with a liberal Bourbon king installed by revolutionary France no longer had the legitimacy to rule conservative Catholic criollos (native born people with Spanish ancestry) and peninsulares (Spanish-born people) in South America. A Spain that tried to control Latin trade, collect taxes, and inhibit the growth of infant industries made itself unattractive. Argentines and other Latins would think of themselves as pioneers in the anticolonial movement. Their long experience gave them the wisdom to advise and lead countries that later strove to become independent. They had begun

58

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

and fostered a worldwide process that doomed colonialism everywhere. 8 Their anticolonial movement was defined by the principle of uti possidetis. This principle usually was used to define the borders of the emerging nations by maintaining the borders Spain had used to define its provinces. Once independent, the Latins did not forget their commitment to anticolonialism. Many years later in the United Nations their support of the principle of self-determination had helped the process of decolonization prevail. Many states in Africa and Asia had become independent in part because of Latin and Argentine support. Ortiz de Rozas in a 1973 U.N. Security Council meeting noted "in passing the valiant and decisive contribution which the Latin American countries made in the first years of the United Nations towards an anti-colonial attitude," which only years later was affirmed by the African and Asian states. He did not want his listeners to "forget that in this period the composition of the United Nations was very different than presently, that the Afro-Asian countries which had joined the UN could be counted on one hand." He added that "it is indisputably true that the Latin American countries had tipped the scales in the anti-colonial struggle." 9 When the United Nations was dominated by the two superpowers and the former metropolitan powers, Latin America had resolutely supported anticolonialism before that movement swept across Africa and Asia. It would only be proper for the newcomers to be grateful for the support of experienced anticolonialists. Experience in anticolonialism had taught the Argentines to be prudent in pursuing it. Not everything about colonialism had been bad. In 1960 the Argentine delegate to the United Nations recalled that the European imperialists had "the most extraordinary qualities of intelligence [and] inventiveness and [were the] most enterprising people that humanity has known." They had expanded "their creative genius" into new areas because they had too little territory at home. The colonialists had left many treasures, including their language, victories over diseases, the work of missionaries, and the constructive force of technology. Colonized peoples were not "without exception worse off morally or materially than before the colonizers had arrived." The colonial system was a combination of "splendors and miseries" depending on the era, colonized country, and metropolitan country. "Extreme complexity" characterized the "colonial phenomenon." Some of the bad aspects had been exaggerated. "A definitive judgement" on the system was "premature." Like colonialism, neocolonialism was at times good. The collaboration of a former metropolitan country with its former colony could produce valuable material, technical, and financial help for the former colony. "Who knows better the country [and] who has more experience with its needs . . . than those who have a long familiarity in dealing with it?" the Argentine delegate asked. As long as the continued relations were based on equality and mutual respect and did not hide a clandestine dependency, he could "applaud the continuation of the friendly collaboration between the ex-colonies and their old metropolis." He warned his listeners not to overaccelerate the process of decolonization by setting an immediate date for its completion. It was true that colonialism

Two Principles of Self-Determination

59

"does not correspond to the political structures of our time." But colonialism should not be singled out for ringing condemnations when there were also other forms of oppression such as those suffered in much of Europe and Asia. He warned Africans and Asians not to become too optimistic and euphoric over decolonization. 10 Bolivar too had been optimistic at the beginning of the process in Latin America, only later to express his pessimism about his accomplishments. At the end of his life, he said he was unsure that he had done anything more than plow the sea. TWENTIETH-CENTURY ANTICOLONIALISM: A NEW MOVEMENT Africans and Asians, who were less likely to make a mixed analysis of colonialism, failed to supinely accept Latin American leadership of their twentiethcentury anticolonialism. Their distinct historical experience and the influence of modern European political thought made the second wave of anticolonialism different from the first. The nineteenth-century anticolonialists had not been the original population. They were descended from those who had immigrated from Europe to the new territories. The twentieth-century anticolonialists were descendants of the original populations, ethnically different from the Europeans. The African and Asian elites were as likely to be influenced by the French as the American Revolution. Anticolonialism was combined with modernism. The white man's burden of civilizing or at least Europeanizing the populations had gradually been shifted on to the backs of the indigenous elites. They had learned the gospel of the equality of sovereign states and the right of nations to form their own state. Employed as bureaucrats by the Europeans, they sensed their racial distinction from Europeans while they exercised leadership of their own peoples. Could they not better lead their people to modern nationalism if they were independent of Europe? The indigenous elites found the opportunity to bring colonialism to an end when Europe's capabilities and self-confidence precipitously declined because of the two world wars. Those who had taken it upon themselves to civilize the darker and exotic continents twice turned on each other with sophisticated savagery. Even the victors in the two wars lost enormous amounts of blood and treasure. Their capabilities to govern now-resitive colonies had diminished. The confidence that they were leading the progress of the world was missing in the thought of many postwar thinkers. Albert Camus characterized his age with the myth of Sisyphus. Europe had watched its boulder of grandeur roll to the bottom of the hill, and many wondered if enough meaning could be recreated to justify pushing it back up. As far as the colonies were concerned, all of Europe had lost the world wars. Europe's, or the center's, greatly weakened condition opened the prospect of an end to all colonialism. The possibility of ending Europe's domination would be justified with a European concept. Colonialism had not only brought

60

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

technology and bureaucratic management techniques to Africa, it had also taught the principle of self-determination. The assurance that one is on the cutting edge of progressive historical movements like the development of the principle of self-determination had shifted from Europe to its colonies. Indigenous bureaucrats who had studied in London and Paris had learned, among other things, that that principle had been applied selectively during the Paris Peace Conference at the expense of the defeated states of World War I. They saw no reason not to repeat another type of selective application after World War II. The former colonies led by the indigenous elites should be the selves deserving statehood. Less educated and less modern tribal leaders could not represent selves with the right to self-determination. They did not lead modern nations. The elites represented modern nations that were yet to be built. It was these modern nations-to-be that had the right to national selfdetermination. Language, a common culture, a common religion, or a sense of being a group did not define these nations. Their former colonial boundaries defined them. The African selves were largely determined territorially by the arbitrary drawing of lines in Berlin in 1886 and politically by the indigenous political leaders. Groups of Africans became selves according to where imperial Europeans had drawn lines to maintain the European balance of power and because their elites told them they were now selves. Because the elites had inherited the colonial bureaucracy and control of the military, they could deny the tribal selves the right to tribal self-determination. Only the Europeans, not the indigenous elites, had lost their power and self-confidence. The indigenous elites were in effect the African and Asian victors of World War II. Just as in Versailles after World War I, the victors would not want to apply the principle of self-determination at their own expense and at the expense of order. Unfortunately, they sometimes denied their tribal competitors even the most basic minority rights.11 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY ANTICOLONIALISM The definition of the nation by its political elite showed Africa's indebtedness to the Rousseauian variant of self-determination. The French theories of popular sovereignty, from which the principle of self-determination was largely derived, were more hostile to aristocratic government than they were friendly to republican government and individualism. The French Revolution was inspired by the thought of the philosophes of the Enlightenment. They had argued that human reason, rather than divine revelation, provided the highest form of knowledge. The democratic right of the rational people, not the divine right of kings, provided political legitimacy. The people was not for French revolutionaries a shorthand term for a set of individuals. The republican theorists of the American revolution thought that the idea of the people as a homogeneous entity suffered the fallacy of mis-

Two Principles of Self-Determinalion

61

placed concreteness. The people do not exist, persons do, they would have said. But in the French Revolution "the people ceased to be an atomic dust of individuals; it took shape and form, became a whole, was called a Nation, endowed with sovereignty, and identified with the state."12 Republican government is designed and ratified by the majority to protect the liberties of individuals. Revolutionary government is designed by the revolutionary leaders so that a centralized government can continue to interpret the general will of the people. The nation or the people was a homogeneous group that had a General Will (so called by Rousseau) best articulated by the political elite. An individual who followed his or her particular will and not the General Will was not a good member of the nation. If one was not in harmony with the nation one lost one's right to participate in the right of national self-determination. An individual not sharing the nation's traditions, mores, and values was not part of the nation. Nationalism is a "complex of cultural, sociological, psychological, and political factors." The nationalist identified "the state as a social organization."13 The Lockean distinction between government and society was rejected. Citizenship is not granted to an individual merely because he or she participates in a republican political structure. One is a citizen if one is a member of a social organization. Not consent to limited government but acceptance of the General Will granted the individual the right to participate in acts of national self-determination. The French Revolution has had such importance for the development of selfdetermination because its disciples have spread its gospel and held political offices not only throughout Europe, as Metternich and other nineteenthcentury conservatives had feared, but throughout the world. "Western Europe has been the seedbed of the dynamic forces which have been at work revolutionizing mankind in the last centuries."14 While defensive, feudal reactions have often developed among the "propertied elites" in response to this trend, modern nationalism, which forms the basis of the right to self-determination, has usually triumphed. 15 Nationalism in Asia, Africa, and to a significant degree in Latin America "is a forward-looking and not a reactionary force, a spur to revolution and not a bulwark of the status quo."16 Western educated elites may not best represent their indigenous cultures, but they do represent the modern ideas of popular sovereignty and a money economy. When the majorities of the Third World countries have felt a closer identification with the propertied than the monied elites, with religion and tradition than with strict rationality, with feudalism than with modern economies, with tribes than with nations, and with the status quo than with the revolution, the modern political elites have taken it upon themselves to bring their people into the twentieth century by encouraging them to accept the objective criteria of modernity. If there is no modern nation to desire a state, the disciples of the French Revolution must create a nation so that it can be desired. If the people do not experience the right subjective feelings, certain objective values must be propagated long enough, in concordance with coercive measures, so that the proper feelings are initiated or at least not publicly denied.

62

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

There is a similarity between Rousseau's theory of the General Will and Lenin's practice of democratic centralism, or between the French and Russian revolutions. This similarity perhaps reveals that the concept of the people upon which modern political legitimacy is based is not defined from below by persons with subjective feelings, but from above by political leaders, who intend to change the people's feelings and control the people. One method of control is the threat of modern excommunication, or suggesting that a person is not really a member of the nation if he does not accept the modern revolutionary principles. Once excluded from membership in the modern nation, the damned can be dealt with appropriately not by a vengeful God, but by a vengeful people's leadership. Argentina's problem was how to accept enough of twentieth-century anticolonialisrn to gain that movement's support. Traditional Argentines could not accept the new ariticolonialism's secular basis. A country that even in its tourist brochures described itself as a Christian country would be more apt to justify itself by discussing God's will than the General Will. The two anticolonial movements did not share the same racial characteristics. The African and Asian unconditional criticism of colonialism was not shared by Argentina. The anticolonialism that Latin America had helped develop in the nineteenth century could not lead the very different twentieth-century variant. The new movement was too enthusiastic to be harnessed by the much older movement. And yet the new movement was Argentina's hope to gain support for its claim to the Malvinas. With many new anticolonial states joining the United Nations, one Argentine spokesman saw "a new perspective" being "created in our over one-hundred-year-old claim for the islands."17 The new perspective had been created by the newly independent states' taking over leadership of the anticolonial movement.

ARGENTINA'S CLAIM PARTIALLY ACCREDITED The new perspective was codified by the Argentine-supported 1960 United Nations "Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples," or Resolution 1514 (XV). Some have argued that the resolution did little more than restate the conflicting principles of self-determination and sovereignty or territorial integrity. 18 As far as many of the states supporting the resolution were concerned, there was no conflict here. The two principles would have competed only if the self-determination afforded to all peoples meant that a people could subjectively define themselves and have their own state. If the people were defined by the political rulers of a sovereign state, the people within the territorial boundaries of the state were by definition the people with a right to self-determination. Peoples defined tribally, linguistically, culturally, or by some subjective criteria were not selves. Self-determination had come to mean "the end of colonialism in all its manifestations." 1 9 It was colonialism that had prevented international economic cooperation, economic development, and universal peace. Armed action

Two Principles of Self-Determination

63

directed against dependent peoples and for the maintenance of colonialism was the unjust use of force. The process of liberation from colonialism was irresistible and irreversible; only a rearguard and doomed reaction by metropolitan countries threatened to make the path from colonialism to sovereign statehood a rocky one. In resolution 1514, the General Assembly had gone beyond resolution 1541, passed a day after resolution 1514. In resolution 1541, the General Assembly had said that self-government could be defined as "(a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State; (b) Free association with an independent State; or (c) Integration with an independent State."20 Resolution 1514 called only for full independence. Insofar as Resolution 1514 was the great eviction notice sent by the Third World to the old colonial powers, Argentina could take comfort. Much of the world was rejecting colonialism, so why should not a copy of the notice be tacked up on the Malvinas? If anticolonialism had become so closely identified with self-determination, and if the self was defined by colonial boundaries, Argentina was the self that had sovereign rights over the Malvinas. Selfdetermination had merged in part with uti possidetis. Argentina's problem was that Resolution 1514 was not only the great eviction notice but also the global emancipation proclamation. 21 Colonialism was "associated" with "all practices of segregation and discimination." It was "the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation," which constituted "a denial of fundamental human rights." 22 The salt-water test was helpful but not the most reliable litmus paper to use when looking for colonialism. If a body of salt water seperated dominator from dominated, colonialism existed. The racial test was infallible, usually. Were European whites administering non-Europeans? If this test was positive, then one was dealing not with a relationship that could be mutually or unilaterally beneficial depending on the circumstances but with an inherently evil phenomenon that required eradication. The differences had kept Argentina at arm's length from twentieth-century anticolonialists. The lure of international support for their claim to the Malvinas, however, motivated the Argentines to find room for accommodation. The moderate position on colonialism taken by Argentina during the 1960 debate on Resolution 1514 had perhaps made Africans and Asians wary of Argentina. To gain their trust and support Argentina began to change its position. Argentines, not always consistently, began to submerge their claim of being anticolonialism's leader. Their affirmations of African and Asian interpretations became more common. By 1962 Argentine delegates to the United Nations would repeat the language of Resolution 1514 concerning "the elimination of colonialism in all its manifestations and forms." 23 In 1970 an Argentine delegate declared that "decolonization is an irreversible process which admits of no exception." 24 No longer was colonialism a mixed bag of benefits and disadvantages. As the Africans usually thought, it was evil. Since Argentina has accepted the evil-incarnate theory of colonialism, it could unabashedly applaud twentieth-century decolonization. The Argentine delegate said in 1963 that "the retreat of colonialism constitutes one of the most important historical phenomena of the century in which we live." 25 In

64

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

1965 an Argentine delegate urgently stated, "Obtaining decolonization is the] imperative of the historical moment in which the world now lives."26 And in 1971 the Argentine delegate congratulated the United Nations by saying, "It is in the field of decolonization that the United Nations had perhaps written the most brilliant pages in its history." 27 The Argentine courting of the twentieth-century anticolonial movement paid off in that movement's support of Argentina's claim. But that support came after the Africans and Asians had clearly institutionalized their leadership of anticolonialism. Argentina was not leading an anticolonialist movement that would of course support its Malvinas claim. It was asking for accreditation from the twentieth-century movement's Committee of 24. Argentina's antiquated anticolonialism forced the Committee to ponder the Argentine claim before granting limited accreditation. Not until five years after the adoption of Resolutions 1514 and 1541 was Argentina's claim recognized as an anticolonial issue by the General Assembly. Resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965 declared that "Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 was prompted by the cherished aim of bringing to an end everywhere colonialism in all its forms, one of which covers the case of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)." It noted the dispute over sovereignty and invited the disputants to proceed with negotiations, "bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) and the interests of the pupulation of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)." Argentina's nineteenth-century claim had become a twentieth-century issue. The most visible dispenser of international legitimacy had recognized Argentina's claim. The anticolonial eviction notice had been served on the British.

TWO SELVES, ONE OF WHICH IS NOT A SELF It is interesting that in Argentina's arguments, which the Committee of 24 and the General Assembly accepted, the principle of self-determination was said to be inapplicable in this case of decolonization. The conflicting arguments indicate that distinct definitions of the principle were simultaneously held. The Argentine delegate first argued that the islanders were not a self entitled to the right of self-determination. Then he argued that if self-determination was applied, the higher cause of decolonization would not be served. This latter argument assumes that the self would be the islanders and not all the Argentine people or the territory of the Spanish colony of Argentina including the Malvinas. The islanders would be the self because they were well defined and established, considered themselves a group, and had freely determined their desired political association. The argument made by Dr. Jose Maria Ruda in front of the Committee of 24, an argument made by Argentines before and after his presentation, was that the islanders were not a people entitled to the right of sell-determination. They were originally a settler population brought in by the British after Britain had "wrested" the islands from its previous Argentine inhabitants, by an act of force and against their will. The Malvinas had been part of Argentina and were

Two Principles of Self-Determination

65

still part of Argentina. Any inhabitants of the islands would have all the rights of Argentine citizens. The next part of the argument stressed that it was really Argentina that was the self. Argentina had never subsequent to the British use of force in 1833 accepted the British usurpation of its territory. The Argentines who had lived on the Malvinas had not been consulted before being forcibly displaced. Argentines who did not live there had subsequently been denied the right to move to or invest in the islands. Ruda did not conclude that all Argentines had thus been denied their right of self-determination. Rather, he contended that because the Malvinas was not a "classical colonial case," the principle of selfdetermination should not be applied. He warned the committee against "the indiscriminate application of the principle of self-determination to a territory so sparsely populated by nationals of the colonial power. . . . The basic principle of self-determination should not be used in order to transform an illegal possession into full sovereignty under the mantle of protection which would be given by the United Nations." The committee was reminded that the "main aim" of Resolution 1514 was "to end colonialism in all its forms" and that the "national unity and territorial integrity of a country" are protected by the United Nations Charter and Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1514.28 It was self-determination not in the British sense but in the decolonizing sense that had been applied by the Africans. But Argentina was afraid that the lingering acceptance of the British definition might in this case frustrate decolonization. Since the self might be the islanders, the principle should not be applied. As in the case of Mayotte, the higher law of decolonization would make the principle of territorial integrity applicable in the Malvinas. Claims for self-determination, which conflicted with the territorial integrity of an existing third world state, were ignored in the Mayotte case. The people of this Comoro Island in a referendum indicated their desire for continued association with France, which according to resolution 1541 indicated selfgovernment. Still, the General Assembly rejected the desires of the people of Mayotte, and endorsed the claim of the Comoro Islands government to this island. As a Kenyan delegation previously had written in 1963 in a memorandum on the Somali question, "the principle of self-determination has relevance where foreign domination is the issue. It has no relevance where the issue is territorial disintegration by dissident citizens."29 When the two principles of self-determination and territorial integrity should be used was still being worked out. Another Argentine delegate quoted Judge Petren of the International Court of Justice. Petren had said that the law of decolonization was still in a formative period. A body of sufficiently developed rules to cover all situations was not yet established. The reason the Argentine delegates frequently questioned the universal application of self-determination was that they had not convinced themselves or the United Nations that the islanders were not a self. Self-determination would uphold colonialism and violate Argentina's territorial integrity only if the self was the islanders. And so Ruda began by denying that the islanders were a self and saying that the self should be all Argentines. If the self was Argentina, and if Argentines could determine the political

66

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

association of the Malvinas, the principle would again have an anticolonial effect. Argentine sovereignty over Anglo-Saxons living on the Malvinas would not be a new form of colonialism. The kelpers would be a minority perhaps with special rights of limited autonomy within the Argentine self. They would have the same status as the Aaland Islanders. ISLANDERS NOT A SELF: THE AALAND ISLANDS CASE Well before the Committee of 24 had been founded in 1961, the case of the Aaland Islands was decided by the League of Nations against the wishes of the islanders. 30 After World War I Sweden had claimed the Aaland Islands, which it had lost along with Finland to Russia in the early nineteenth century. When Finland became independent during the Russian Revolution, the islands remained part of Finland. The League accepted that 92.2 percent of the population of the islands were Swedish in origin, habits, language, and culture and that they desired to be incorporated in Sweden.31 But in 1920 a Leagueappointed commission of jurists concluded that there was no legal right of national self-determination. "In the absence of express provisions in international treaties," the jurists contended, "the right of disposing of national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every State."32 A second League commission reported in 1921 that even though the islanders feared the Finns more than the Russians, they did not have the right of selfdetermination. To allow a minority this right would "inaugurate anarchy in international life."33 The self was therefore defined as the entire state of Finland, of which the Aaland Islanders were a minority entitled either to minority rights or, as the jurists suggested, a special autonomy regime. Argentina's claim might also have been bolstered by the precedent of AlsaceLorraine after World War I. The population there in 1919 was not accepted as a self that could determine its future. "The historic rights of an earlier community were preferred over the desires of the existing inhabitants, and all the Allies agreed that conducting a plebiscite in this case would be "insultingly illegitimate." 34 These precedents bolstered the claim that Argentina, with its historic rights and original borders, was the self entitled to self-determination and that the islanders were a minority entitled only to minority rights. Ruda argued that Argentina was "respectful of fundamental human rights" and that it would "bear well in mind the welfare and the material interests of the present inhabitants of the Malvinas Islands."35 THE GOA DOCTRINE: A SELF CAN USE FORCE A more dramatic and current case that qualified the right of all peoples to selfdetermination and set a precedent for the Argentine invasion was the December 1961 invasion by India of Portuguese Goa, Damao, and Diu. This

Two Principles of Self-Determination

67

invasion marks the beginning of the use of the modern principle of anticolonial self-determination to justify using force against metropolitan countries. Argentina's 1982 invasion of the Falklands created a situation that was, according to Foreign Minister Costa Mendez, "absolutely identical" to that one of "22 years" before "in the case of Goa, when Portugal was hanging on to its colonial power." The resolution that Portugal proposed had "sought to deny India its territorial rights." 36 The citing of the Goan precedent won Panama's support for the Argentines. The Panamanian ambassador to the United Nations argued that "in 1961 in Asia ... in the face of the unreal and absurd aspiration to maintain a Portuguese colonial empire, India, too, its patience exhausted by its years-long serach for a solution to that problem—exercised its sovereign rights in the Territory of Goa. In that case India, too, received support and respect from Latin American public opinion." 37 The justification India gave for the invasion was not that Goa had been part of colonial India and had been wrested from India by Portugal but that it had belonged to India before India's colonial days and that Portugal's military occupation in 1510 had not conferred good title. Portugal's continuous presence in Goa for 450 years constituted an act of so-called permanent aggression against which, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, India had the right of self-defense. The arguments against India's right to invade Goa were better founded in positive international law. Portugal's presence in Goa for 450 years, especially when the Goans were not pressing for independence or integration with India, gave Portugal a clear de facto right of administering the colony. Disputes about de jure rights based on conflicting interpretations of history could be allowed to justify aggression only at the expense of world order. Aggression was not committed by Portugal, as India claimed, if by aggression one means the first use of force by one state against another. Portugal did not launch attacks against India from bases in Goa. What India called permanent aggression was in fact Portugal's de facto right to maintain its presence in Goa. Aggression is not a permanent state of being, but an act of rather short duration. Maybe Portugal's 1510 military occupation of Goa could be criticized, but after the passage of time, especially when India did not actively and forcibly contest it, that occupation became recognized by international law as legitimate. 38 The founders of the United Nations argued that historical aggression did not justify modern aggression because in the more integrated world of the nuclear age war tended to spread and/or escalate. International law's protection of Portugal's right was not based on the desire to protect an unjust status quo but to prevent more inclusive, frequent, or destructive wars growing from a comparatively minor act of aggression. Given its danger in the twentieth century, war was to be avoided, irrespective of the merits of a dispute. The complicated tangle of disputes in the Balkans had led to World War I, and Hitler's European invasions had brought the entire world into World War II. Local aggression could not be allowed to bring the world into a cataclysmic World War III. In this line of reasoning the U.S. ambassador, Stevenson, had protested the Indian invasion. "Resolution 1514 (XV)," he had argued, "does

68

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

not authorize the use of force for its implementation. It does not and it should not and it cannot, under the Charter. . . . Resolution 1514 (XV) does not and cannot overrule the Charter injunctions against the use of armed force."39 The majority of the Security Council agreed but did not pass a call for cease-fire and withdrawal of Indian forces because of a Soviet veto. The majority of the General Assembly agreed with India that the argument against India's invasion were superfluous because they could not be reconciled with the "New Higher Law of Anticolonialism." 40 It might be that "the significant feature ... of the Goa situation was that many of the new states, and also the Soviet Union, felt that colonialism was such an evil that the use of force to eliminate it should be tolerated." "Natural justice" was perceived by those states to invalidate positive international law and to provide a "source of international law superior to such positive sources as treaties and custom." 41 One author wrote, The doctrine that India invoked in the Goa case has not been universally accepted, but the United Nations is moving steadily in that general direction. The collective legitimization of anti-colonialism has been very nearly completed in the United Nations, and almost any anti-colonial tactic can be expected to gain the endorsement of the organization. 42

The point was not that the Goans did not want to become integrated with India. The point was that only with an Indian invasion would the Portuguese be pushed out of Goa. The virtue of eliminating this bit of colonialism was cited by the Indian representative, C. S. Jha, in defense of the seizure of Goa, "an argument reminiscent of the medieval doctrine of 'just war,' but clearly not permissible under the United Nations Charter, which seeks to exclude the merits of the case from the problem of breach of peace."43 The Indians believed the aggression was permitted under the U.N. Charter as revised by Resolution 1514. The anticolonialist might agree that, in cases that could lead to nuclear holocaust or world war, peaceful resolution of disputes was imperative. But few disputes in the Third World were such cases. The major powers exaggerated the interconnectedness of conflicts. Were the superpowers so trigger-happy that nuclear war would result from almost any use of force? Was the false interconnectedness perhaps a device of the major powers to inhibit any peaceful change? If conflict in the Third World was not inevitably linked to the outbreak of World War III, could not justice in the form of anticolonialism be advanced by force if necessary, without endangering world peace? Could not the merits of these cases outweigh the minimal dangers of escalation resulting from the first use of force?

WEST IRIAN: THE SELF DETERMINES THE PEOPLE'S INTERESTS Somewhat similar to the Indian claim to Goa was Indonesia's claim to West Irian, the western half of the island of New Guinea which was left ior future negotiations to settle by the 1949 Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty signed by

Two Principles of Self-Determination

69

the Netherlands and Indonesia. Indonesia took its claim to the United Nations, calling for negotiations whose agenda would include the way sovereignty over West Irian would eventually be transferred. It argued that Indonesia, of which West Irian was a part, was the self which had determined in 1945 to declare its independence. Indonesia stated that "West Irian is and always has been— historically as well as constitutionally (legally)—an integral part of the territory of Indonesia; that is to say, also, of the former Netherlands East Indies."44 Former colonial boundaries determined who the self was. The Netherlands contended that its administration of West Irian, like Indonesia, was "a peaceful endeavour to create conditions for the self-determination of a population." 45 The Netherlands' good form of colonialism was trying to teach a people how to determine its own fate. The Netherlands argued that Indonesia and New Guinea, like Goa and India, had never been united in an independent state, so the territorial integrity of Indonesia would be unaffected by any future act of self-determination by the Papuan people. The Papuans were not connected by race or culture to Indonesia, whose claim to West Irian rested solely on the fact that Indonesia and West Irian had both been administered during colonial times from Batavia. There had certainly been no legal connection between the two since Indonesia's independence from the Dutch in 1949. That the Netherlands had never officially separated the administrative unit, as the British Parliament did with India, Pakistan and Burma, was without significance. This fact was of utmost significance to Indonesia, which argued that Indonesia was populated by many distinct peoples. Its nationalism was not racial or cultural but political. Their common government unified the peoples of the former colony, which included West Irian. The General Assembly did not clearly endorse either argument, but "the failure of the General Assembly to determine whether West Irian was a NonSelf-Governing Territory or not after the settlement of the territorial claims can be interpreted as an implicit acceptance of the Indonesian view that the territory was part of Indonesia."46 If the people of a colony do not want to become independent, it is better for them to become integrated with a nonEuropean state. Its incorporation of the territory would be based not on neocolonialism but on modern political nationalism. Indonesian military occupation of West Irian since 1963 followed the 1962 New York agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands, in which Indonesia had agreed to hold an act of self-determination by 1969. When the act of self-determination was carried out in West Irian, the Indonesian system of musyawarah (conference) was followed. This meant that only the West Irian regency council members, who had been appointed by the Indonesians, were consulted, because most Papuans were allegedly too backward. When Papuan rebels resisted, the Indonesians reacted fiercely. The more common U.N. practice of sending an impartial team to observe, or even to conduct a plebiscite following a one person, one vote rule in which somewhat educated voters participated, was not implemented. The U.N. representative noted that "tight political control" was exercised over the population "at all times" by Indonesia. Nevertheless, he reported that "an act of free choice has taken

70

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

place in West Irian in accordance with Indonesian practice, in which the representatives of the population have expressed their wish to remain with Indonesia." 47 The degree of support for incorporation with Indonesia among the Irianese who were consulted was striking. Among the 1,022 Irianese leaders who were consulted, not one voted against incorporation. 48 One might wonder what: else even a highly educated people would have done after six years of Indonesian military occupation. The principle of self-determination in this instance did not mean presenting the choice—among independence, free association with an independent state, or integration with an independent state—to an informed people in a democratic plebiscite free of any prejudicing military occupation. The way the problem of West Irian was solved was remembered by the Indonesian ambassador to the Security Council during the 1982 Falklands crisis. He noted that the Falklands dispute might be settled as the West Irian dispute had been settled. He urged the Security Council to "recall . . . that episode of two decades ago. That settlement epitomizes the spirit of accommodation displayed by both parties to the dispute." 49 The ambassador had forgotten that White House pressure on the Dutch to accept the demands of Sukarno, the Indonesian President whose contribution to political philosophy was the concept of "guided democracy," not a spirit of accommodation, had helped to resolve the crisis in Indonesia's favor. Kennedy's concern with the United States' image in the Third World, not the department of state's concern with NATO, had been the decisive factor in U.S. policy. The U.S. support of Indonesia had meant that the Indonesian forces, not the Dutch forces that had moved into the area, would determine the outcome of the negotiated settlement. If the West Irian precedent were followed in the Malvinas, the United States would have to support Argentina and the United Nations would recognize as legitimate the presence of Argentine troops on the islands. After a number of years Argentina could lead discussions, after which the Falklanders could do little besides ratify Argentine possession. THE NEW JUST WAR DOCTRINE Anticolonialism justified the first use of force by one state against the metropole, the presence of military forces to influence a people's choice, or the use of force by guerrilla groups fighting to bring a colony to independence. There were not good and bad forms of colonialism any more than there were good and bad forms of crime, which is what colonialism was according to U.N. Resolution 2632 (XXV) of 12 October 1970. It was not the police but the criminals who needed monitoring. Thus in 1963 when Portugal asked for investigation of attacks by guerrillas from Senegal against Portuguese Guinea, and in 1969 for investigations of attacks from the Republic of Guinea against its neighbor, Portuguese Guinea, the General Assembly decided it did not need an investigation committee to find the facts in order to condemn Portugal for resisting these attacks. However, when Senegal and the Republic of Guinea lodged

Two Principles of Self-Determination

71

complaints in 1971, the Security Council sent fact-finding missions to report on border incidents with Portuguese Guinea, or Guinea-Bissau. The Republic of Guinea complained that "the failure by Portugal to apply the principle of self-determination in Guinea-Bissau had an unsettling effect on conditions in the area."50 U.N. recognition of so-called national liberation movements against the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique continued in this tradition of linking self-determination with the use of force in the service of anticolonialism. Again, self-determination did not mean the majority of individuals of a group or nation deciding issues by means of secret ballot. The national liberation movements supported self-determination from above as a single act against either an external metropole or an internal but nonindigenous white minority regime. Self-determination did not mean, either before or after that single act, ongoing internal self-determination or democracy. The Committee of 24 and the General Assembly from 1960 to 1982 were developing a new just war doctrine. Peace was not a higher value than justice, which was defined as anticolonialism and antiracism. Aggression, or the first use of force, was permitted, justified, desired, and even mandated by the good cause of overturning evil. Article 7 of General Assembly Resolution 3314 of 14 December 1974 would state that nothing in that resolution prejudiced "the right to selfdetermination, freedom and independence ... of peoples forcibly deprived of that right . . . particularly people under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these people to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support." This resolution followed Resolution 2131 (XX) of 21 December 1965, 2326 (XXII) of 16 December 1967, 2908 (XXVII) of 2 November 1972, and 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974, all of which were passed by overwhelming majorities. Together, they conferred "international legitimacy upon wars of national liberation, wars to achieve national selfdetermination, wars to end racial oppression, and the like."51 A good cause converted aggression into a just war. In 1973 Ortiz de Rozas hinted that Argentina might feel it had to use the United Nations' budding doctrine of a just war if the United Nations' purpose of finding just settlements to colonial problems could not be realized peacefully in the Malvinas case. He found "very serious questions concerning the effectiveness of our Organization in obtaining its objective . . . [of] eradicating colonialism." When the United Nations "loses control" over decolonization, the states most directly affected by colonialism must do some serious reflecting. He pointed to Guinea-Bissau as a place where the United Nations had not been able to control decolonization and where it was not possible to further postpone a war of independence against the metropole. 52 WHY DIDN'T ARGENTINA INVADE SOONER? Why, after the 1960 Resolution 1514, the 1961 proclamation of the so-called Goa Doctrine, the 1965 accreditation of Argentina's cause, the periodic renew-

72

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

als by the Committee of 24 and General Assembly of that accreditation, and the development of a new just war doctrine, did Argentina not invade the Malvinas during the 1960s and 1970s? Dahomey had learned quickly from the Goa Doctrine and annexed the Portuguese enclave of Sao Joao Baptista de Ajuda also in 1961. And Indonesia used its military forces to influence West Irian to become free of the Netherlands, if not Indonesia. Why did not Argentina follow suit? It is even more difficult to explain why possible historical events did not occur than to explain why actual events did occur. The exercise can reveal why options are rejected or accepted. Perhaps Argentina did not use the Goa Doctrine from 1962 to 1965 because its claim had not yet been admitted into the internationally recognized club of officially anticolonial causes. Its brand of anticolonialism was of nineteenth-century vintage, and perhaps historical claims, unlike wine, deteriorate with age. As the Kenyan ambassador said during the 1982 crisis, "No Argentinian living or dead could claim to have lived under colonial rule over the last one hundred years." Argentina's nineteenth-century anticolonialism was just too old, unlike the young African anticolonialism. Africans had been "born and bred under colonial rule which we struggled to eliminate. Our own people and part of our continent are still under the vilest form of colonialism."53 Had India invaded Goa before resolution 1514, it might well have found stiffer opposition. But with the late-model 1960 justification, an event of 1510 in which Portugal colonized Goa had become a modern issue. Harping for decades about age-old injustices does not seem to build effective coalitions. Proclaiming oneself to be on the cutting edge of a brave new world excites the imaginations of potential sympathizers and gives one's opponents the dreaded image of protecting a reactionary status quo. Argentina could not justify its use of force while it had only its ancient complaints. Perhaps one reason it did not invade was that it still needed the revised U.N. Charter provided by Resolution 1514. Perhaps before 1965 Argentina had not been dispensed one of the prerequisites for conducting a just war in the anticolonial age. This reason was perhaps not more important than Argentina's economic and military inferiority to Britain. Why, then, was the evolving definition of self-determination not used to justify an Argentine invasion after 1965? The United Nations certainly did not withdraw its accreditation of Argentina's claim. On 20 December 1966, 19 December 1967, 16 December 1969, and in 1971 the General Assembly adopted consensuses noting the progress in the negotiations between Argentina and Britain but stressed that the "elimination of ... this colonial situation ... is of interest to the United Nations." 54 In 1973 the General Assembly recalled Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and expressed concern that "eight years have elapsed since the adoption of resolution 2065 (XX) without any substantial progress having been made in the negotiations."55 It again called for a "way to put an end to this colonial situation" by means of peacefully resolving the conflict over sovereignty. It expressed "gratitude for the continuous efforts made by the Government of Argentina ... to facilitate the process of decolonization and to promote the well being of the population

Two Principles of Self-Determination

73

of the islands." Finally, it urged the governments of Argentina and Britain to "accelerate the negotiations." In 1965 the General Assembly tacked up a copy of the more general 1960 eviction notice on the Malvinas; now in 1973 it was impatiently saying to Britain to hurry up and go.56 Resolution 31/49 of 1 December 1976 again requested the negotiations be expedited. Most of the states that supported Argentina at the United Nations were also members of the nonaligned movement. The 1975 "Final Declaration of the Fifth Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries" made at Lima, Peru, states that while the non-aligned countries affirmed the principle of self-determination in other territories, it "strongly supported the just claim of the Argentine Republic" in the case of the Malvinas Islands, and urged the United Kingdom to restore that territory to Argentine sovereignty and put an end to that "illegal situation." After 1975, the non-aligned movement has reaffirmed this position at subsequent meetings. 57 Self-determination as a general right for all peoples did not mean illegal colonial situations could be allowed to persist. It was not for want of U.N. and the nonaligned movement's blessing that Argentina did not in the 1960s and 1970s use force justified by modern anticolonial self-determination. But it may have been because of the type of blessing the anticolonialists bestowed on Argentina. Like the Masons with their thirty-three degrees of membership, the anticolonialists saw no reason that they could not have a system of graduated blessings, and were willing to confer them on Argentina. Argentina's problem was that the bona fide anticolonialists believed the Argentine representative's admission that the Malvinas dispute differed from the classical colonial situation, where nonwhites want independence from whites. Perhaps it was true that the Malvinas were part of Argentina when it was a colony, that Argentina's political rulers defined the islanders as a minority of the Argentine nation, that the islanders were not entitled to a plebiscite in which they picked the options because they were an imported population not entitled to self-determination, and that by the salt-water test Britain had a colony in the South Atlantic. But the Argentines were not ethnically non-Europeans struggling for independence from ethnic Europeans. No U.N. resolution could update that part of their nineteenth-century anticolonialism. And many Argentines continued to resist those ideas of the French Revolution that had given birth to the important modern principle of national self-determination. These differences perhaps qualified U.N. support of Argentina more than the rhetoric and long list of resolutions suggested. Qualified support would have meant that Argentina had an anticolonial case that was good enough to make it an ally in the fight against colonialism but not good enough to justify use of the Goa Doctrine. The General Assembly supported negotiations aimed at evicting Britain from their South Atlantic colony, but in this situation it meant what it said about resolving the dispute peacefully. Perhaps Argentina's anticolonialism was not modern or antiracial enought to justify the use of force. Argentine delegates seemed to fear this was the case. Even after Resolution 2065 (XX) had been passed, Argentine delegates stated that the reason

74

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

self-determination was not applicable was because the Malvinas case was not a typical case of colonialism. There was no Argentine population there any more, and even if there had been, it would not have been nonwhite. The lingering sense that subjective, political self-determination was important, and that their claim to the Malvinas was not fully modern in its anticolonialism, in part dissuaded Argentines from following India and Dahomey. Or perhaps Argentina refrained from invading during the 1960s and 1970s not for want of full U.N. accreditation but because it hoped that Britain would transfer sovereignty over the islands by means of negotiations. When negotiations had failed to produce the desired result, Argentina may well have expected U.N. support for its fait accompli. The Committee of 17, which had later become the Committee of 24, had first been presided over by the representative from India, which had invaded Goa. Could not Argentina expect a U.N. response similar to that enjoyed by India in 1961? WHY WAS ARGENTINA'S INVASION NOT SUPPORTED? By 1982, the theory that colonialism was permanent aggression justifying the use of force as self-defense for the good cause of anticolonialism had been developed by members of the General Assembly for over twenty years. In practice, the theory was mostly unencumbered by the interpretation of selfdetermination that emphasized human rights, democracy, and individualism. Foreign Minister Costa Mendez addressed the Security Council on 3 April 1982, the day after the Argentine act of sovereign repossession of territory. He explained that it was Britain who was the aggressor since a part of Argentine territory had been "illegally occupied by the United Kingdom in 1833 by an act of force." That act "displaced by force the Argentine population" living there and "cannot give rise to any right at all" since it is merely "one more reflection of the imperialist policy which the European States carried out in the nineteenth century at the expense of America, Africa and Asia." The original British use of force made 1833 the critical date. The British act of aggression denied Argentines their rights of self-determination and sovereignty. The republic of Argentina had "never consented to that act of usurpation. ... All the successive Governments of Argentina, regardless of party or faction, have remained united" in their protests "against that arbitrary occupation." The only way Britain could have kept its possessions in the South Atlantic in the face of Argentine reaction was to commit permanent aggression against Argentina. Argentina had "borne with a situation of continued usurpation of its territory by a colonial power for 150 years."58 Costa Mendez would repeat this argument on 25 May 1982 when he said that it was Great Britain which was the first to threaten to use and then to use force. . . . Great Britain occupied the islands by force 149 years ago and maintained—also by force—that usurpation, repeating day after day t h a t i n i t i a l act, which was as u n l a w -

Two Principles of Self-Determination

75

ful as it was violent. For underneath the apparent calm and tranquillity of colonial possession there always exists a basic and necessary underlying element, and the punitive expedition is always ready. . . . Colonialism is an act of force and it is permanent aggression. . . . [It] is the root cause of conflicts and violence. . . . The maintenance of colonialism is a crime. 59

He later added, "We can say today that this is a colonial problem in the most traditional sense." The Argentines were full members of the anticolonial club, suffering from the violence of colonialism. He said that it was in the most traditional sense of anticolonialism that "one of the last vestiges of colonialism on Latin American territory ended yesterday." It was the mopping up of the "irreversible march of history typified by decolonization."60 The anticolonial justification for the use of force made it

not an act of aggression but of self-defense. As the ambassador from Paraguay argued, if "the Malvinas are part of Argentine territory, and British occupation of these islands was perpetuating an unacceptable colonial situation," then "Argentina has not invaded foreign territory but merely rightfully recovered a usurped part of its national territory." The Spanish amabassador insisted that the decolonization of the Malvinas "should be carried out by restoring Argentine territorial integrity." It was "the prolongation of these colonial situations," not the Argentine invasion, that was the "source of tensions." Argentina and its sympathizers now unequivocally learned that only the colonialism that was combined with racism was always evil and justified the use of force. Only the colonialism where white ruled nonwhite was universally bad. In other cases the first use of force became, as the Ugandan ambassador said, "a dangerous precedent . . . [for] the similar, though not identical, disputes in other parts of the world." Argentina had a "just claim," but not just enough to warrant the use of force. 61 The ambassador from Togo defined the Security Council's "major responsibility" as the "maintenance of international peace and security." Justice did not always precede order. Guyana, Togo, Uganda, and Zaire would all favor Resolution 502, which called for the withdrawal of Argentine troops and a negotiated solution to the dispute. The issue, apparently, was not colonialism's inherent evilness, but the danger of accepting the first use of force. The critical date was not 1833. That was too long ago to constitute the first use of force. As the British ambassador argued, this was not the time to "discuss the rights or wrongs of the very-long-standing issue between Britain and the Republic of Argentina over the islands in the South Atlantic." The problem was the Argentine armed invasion, which had occurred when Britain was completely prepared to continue negotiations. The problem was not the British act of self-defense or colonialism. Indeed, as the Kenyan ambassador said, it was only to "some perverted reasoning" that "aggression started when the British forces moved to the Falkland Islands." 62 The issue was self-determination. Maina would not accept Argentina's rejection of the principle of self-determination in this case because the islanders were an imported and not indigenous population. All of North and South

76

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

America were peopled as a result of colonization. 63 It was "the protection of the interests and respect for the wishes of the small population of the Islands" that was Britain's concern. 64 If only Panama was to support Argentina while the Africans would not, the Soviet Union would criticize colonialism but not veto Britain's proposed resolution as it had vetoed Portugal's resolution condemning India's invasion of Goa. Had Togo, Zaire, or Uganda indicated that Africans or Asians might define Argentina's claim as a fully anticolonial one, then the U.S.S.R. could vote in support of Third World liberation. If the Argentines were only partial members of the anticolonial club, then the best the U.S.S.R. could do for itself was make the requisite bow to anticolonialism and abstain on the vote. Costa Mendez was dismayed that the Security Council had lent its "support to an obsolete colonial situation born in a period when America, Africa and Asia were a field in which imperialist Powers, without any respect, infringed upon the sovereignty and freedom of other peoples."65 Argentine ambassador Ros complained of "the serious shortcomings of resolution 502 . . . because it did not note the fact that this is an anachronistic colonial case." Argentina could not allow the Falklanders to misuse the principle of self-determination to justify British aggression because "the hour of colonial restoration has gone for ever."66 The Africans would limit Argentina's claim to the Malvinas because of the Falklanders' claim of the right to self-determination. They did not feel that they had compromised their commitment to anticolonialism by voting for resolution 502 because they did not define the Malvinas issue as truly and wholly anticolonial. Not only the Malvinas but the entire Western Hemisphere had been colonized. The states of those countries could not be wholly anticolonial because their populations were almost all imported. "The peopling of the two continents is the result of colonial history," the Kenyan ambassador, Mr. Maina, noted. Perhaps the 100,000 Argentine Indians could exercise the right of self-determination and say the nonindigenous groups should not have forced their way in and should return. Perhaps Argentina was itself a colonial power. Argentina, which is itself a product of colonialism, cannot claim any right to impose its own form of colonialism on the people of the Falkland Islands." Argentina was not a self defined by its colonial borders, which included the Malvinas. Argentina was really little different from a European country whose claim was historical and territorial. The United Nations could not "bend the principle of decolonization of peoples to look like the redistribution of territories" or it would be "in real trouble," Maina said. Historical and territorial claims did not justify the use of force. The use of force justified by these types of claims threatened to "lead this planet to endless war and destruction."67 It

was colonialism, or really white domination of nonwhite, that was the source of global tensions. Since both Britain and Argentina were white and colonial, an Argentine takeover of the Malvinas would not eliminate this case of colonialism. It would only set a precedent for more intracolonial squabbling. Moreover, justification of Argentina's use of force to maintain colonialism

Two Principles of Self-Determination

77

might even threaten black Africa. "Our own people," Maina noted, "and part of our continent are still under the vilest form of colonialism." There were hints that instead of being justified by anticolonialism, Argentina's use of force might even be condemned by it. If Maina's rather extreme interpretations had been widely accepted, then Argentina would have been compared not to India in its invasion of Goa but to South Africa in its raids on Angola. Many suspected that Argentina was favorably inclined towards forming a South Atlantic Treaty Organization with South Africa as a member. Coming to the Security Council to seek full admittance to the anticolonialism club, Costa Mendez had come close to being completely rejected. Not all the full members the anticolonialist club wished to deny Argentina the fruits of its use of force. The originator of the Goa Doctrine, India, sought in late May 1982 to stop the war, speed up negotiations, and restore the Malvinas to Argentina. 68 Opposition in the United Nations to Britain's retaliatory use of force was increasing not because of a change of heart about Argentina's graduated anticolonial accreditation, but because such an act of aggression is condemned for only a short time before its fruits are protected, and because of the widespread unease with any use of force for any reason. Maybe all of the Africans and Asians would have echoed India's support of Argentina from the onset of the invasion that it occurred earlier, when anticolonialists were in need of support. By the time Argentina finally used force in 1982 the fight against colonialism was all but won. The Argentine delegate to the United Nations worried as early as 1974 that the Malvinas "constitutes today one of the very few colonial cases" remaining. The single act of external self-determination had been made by most of Europe's former colonies. Allies in the fight were not needed very much anymore. The twentieth-century wave of anticolonialism had picked up the old Malvinas dispute along its way. But now the great historical wave had reached its goal and, sinking into the sands of time while other great historical waves followed behind it, left the Malvinas dispute washed up on the beach unresolved. Argentina's attempt to use anticolonialism to resolve the dispute now gave it the distinction of being an outdated twentieth- as well as an outdated nineteenth-century anticolonialist. The former colonial selves had determined their independence and now, faced with the sometimes seamy job of nationbuilding, tended to agree with Robert Lansing's evaluation that the phrase selfdetermination was "loaded with dynamite." 69 As Africans observed the Nigerian civil war, Somali's claims of tribal self-determination, and the Polisario's strategy in Western Sahara, they agreed with Lansing that self-determination raised hopes that could never be realized. Colonialism was no longer the important component of the African and Asian principle of self-determination it once had been. Democratic or tribal self-determination still threatened the nation-builders. The principle of selfdetermination as the good cause justifying- violence now was reduced to antiracism. Britain, France, Belgium, or Portugal were not immediate problems any more. South Africa was. That nation's regime was a reminder and remnant

78

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

of colonial days, so even though the Afrikaners were not ruling in the name of a European state and had been established for centuries, they were still aliens. Their sins were also easier to categorize than those of black African nationbuilders. Colonialism, at least as defined by the salt-water test, was no longer looming as much of a threat. Memories of colonial days, even in Africa, were becoming dim. The commitment to state boundaries coinciding with colonial boundaries now developed into the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the nation as defined by its boundaries since independence. They were selves now not because they had been administered by Europeans from one location but because they were administered by blacks from one location. Claims to readjust territories justified by nineteenth-century colonial boundaries did not by 1982 appeal to the African desire to legitimize state borders by imitating colonial borders, and threatened to undermine those borders by pressing historical claims. Selves were defined by the borders of a nation as they were drawn at the time it became a member of the United Nations.

ARGENTINA'S ACCREDITATION LOWERED Even Argentina's limited membership was diminished by its use of force. No state had voted against the 1965 Resolution 2065 (XX), which had first admitted Argentina into the anticolonial club, and no black African state had abstained. This was also true of the vote on Resolution 3160 (XXVIII) of 1973. Only fourteen nations abstained on each of these two votes. While thirty-two states did abstain on Resolution 31/49 of 1976, that number climbed to fiftytwo on the vote for resolution 37/9 of 4 November 1982 and to fifty-four on the 1983 resolution. Bangladesh, Chad, Guyana, Kenya, Lesotho, Maldines, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, United Republic of Cameroon, and Zaire were among those that abstained. The resolution still passed by ninety to twelve, but support of Argentina's anticolonialist justification of its claim to the Malvinas had been shaken by the invasion. Resolution 37/9 did again contend that "the maintenance of colonial situations is incompatible with the United Nations ideal of universal peace." It also recalled resolutions 1514 (XV), 2065 (XX), 3160 (XXVIII) and 31/49 in which the cause of anticolonialism and the Malvinas were combined. But it also expressly reaffirmed the Charter principles of "the non-use offorce or the threat of force in international relations and the peaceful settlement of international disputes." 70 The claim to the Malvinas was anticolonial enough to warrant negotiations but not to justify the use of force. Ambassador Kamanda wa Kamanda from Zaire explained to the General Assembly that his government not only opposed Argentina's act of aggression on 2 April 1982 but questioned whether this was "truly a problem of decolonization." He first admonished Argentina that their use of force could have set a dangerous precedent for "the strongest nations to settle certain international disputes by the use of force, by scorning the principles of the Charter and the principles of international law." "Situations deriving from the law of conquest do not all

Two Principles of Self-Determination

79

fall within the strict framework of decolonization, within the terms of resolution 1514 (XV), nor are they all necessarily just." He then asked if resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV) were concerned with people and not territory. Suggesting Argentina's claim was territorial, he believed that principles other than decolonization were applicable in this case. The problem was that the right of self-determination conflicted with the principle of territorial integrity in the Malvinas case, unlike the traditional colonial cases. Since they did conflict, only negotiations respecting positive international law could justly resolve the dispute. But since the interests of the islands' population, which had the right to self-determination, must be taken into account, those negotiations could not have the single purpose of transferring sovereignty when that population did not favor a transfer. 71 Not everyone questioned Argentina's anticolonial credentials. Madagascar's representative admitted that Argentina had been defeated in 1833 and in 1982 but said that "might does not make right." Indeed, "the United Kingdom admits that it is not the holder or depository of the right of sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, because it recognizes the colonial situation of those islands." Madagascar defined the situation in terms of colonialism and not the islanders' right of self-determination. Since it is colonialism that creates tensions, the "uncertain" and lengthy negotiations before 1982 had made war "inevitable." British claims that it only meant to protect the islanders' right to self-determination made him "suspicious." One of the possible effects of Argentina's limited membership in the anticolonial club on the development of anticolonialism and self-determination is that it gave rise to a qualification of colonialism's evilness. The idea that Britain had a colonial relationship with the Falklands remained commonly accepted throughout and after the war. Yet it was also accepted that the first use of force might be a greater evil than colonialism. If colonialism was still bad, it at least was not always the most evil problem. Perhaps the twentiethcentury anticolonialists were coming around to Argentina's original position, leaving Argentina with their original position.

CONCLUSIONS Perhaps the events of 1982 indicate that colonialism no longer constitutes an evil whose overturn is justified and mandated in and of itself. Perhaps a neo-just war doctrine is applicable only when racial oppression also exists. Under this doctrine the United Nations and its secretary general, like the Catholic church and the pope in medieval times, judge the arguments of a war's participants and legitimize collective pressure to deny success to the unjust and ensure the victory of the just. The unjust are deemed to be so because of their initiation of the use of force. The just warrant the support of the international community to repel the aggression. The United Nations is no longer expected actually to organize the collective security response, but by being willing to legitimize the collective response of other

80

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

international organizations and of alliances, it may deter possible future acts of aggression. The anticolonial definition of a self had revitalized Argentina's claim to the Malvinas in 1965. By 1982 it had largely fulfilled its purpose of liberating Africa and Asia from European political rule. If British possession of the Falklands was a holdover of colonialism, Argentina's claim to the Malvinas, when justified by post-World War II self-determination, had become in part a holdover of anticolonialism. Africa and Asia's limited blessing of Argentina's anticolonial status resulted in the denial of Argentina's claim that its use of force had been just. Their lingering sense that the islanders should have the right to self-determination indicated a tempering of their anticolonialism. They were anticolonial enough to think that Argentina should have some right of sovereignty over the islands. But they accepted the islanders' right to self-determination enough not to grant Argentina the right to use force to regain sovereignty. The Argentines and the islanders had legitimate but conflicting rights. Both had good arguments for controlling the islands. But two nations cannot have sovereignty over the same territory. If they cannot agree which one should have the right to hold sovereignty, they can either go to war or modify their ideas of national sovereignty. These were the alternatives faced by those who pondered how sovereignty, historical claims, and self-determination might be combined with interdependence in the Falklands.

4 Sovereignty Redefined: Oil and the Falklands Dispute

SPREADING SOVEREIGNTY OVER A SPECTRUM By the time the United Nations called in 1965 for negotiations between Argentina and Great Britain, both nations had persuasive arguments in favor of their claims to the islands. Argentina had maintained for 130 years that its superior historical right made the 1833 incident and Britain's settlement on the islands illegal. A colonial, nonindigenous population was not a self entitled to determine its political association, although it would be granted special rights within the Argentine nation. If the islanders were a self, then the principle of self-determination was not applicable in this case because it would thwart the higher law of decolonization. Argentina maintained that neither historical right, conquest, acquisitive prescription, nor self-determination could give Britain full legal title to the Malvinas. Britain argued that disputations about the rights and wrongs of history were futile. As was the case with their parents and grandparents, the people who now lived on the islands had been born there. They were as indigenous as any European group in the Western Hemisphere. To deny their desire to retain their political association with Britain would threaten the principle that, however distorted it had become, had so inspired twentieth-century humanity to nurture republican government and liberty. Colonialism was bad only if a colonized people thought it was. If the people wanted to be in a colony, why should a foreign elite have the right to overrule their decision? A foreign elite could especially not be allowed to use force to set off a process in which war could uncontrollably spread or escalate. Argentina's claims were too abstract to provide title. The means it could employ to achieve control of the islands without Britain's consent were too dangerous. Even if no nation had clear title, it was best to leave the administration of the islanders with Britain. The entwined issues of decolonization, self-determination, historical right, acquisitive prescription, and sovereignty made the work of the negotiators unenviable. Trying to untangle them promised only to antagonize one side or the other. Thus it was not surprising that some of those involved in the probem welcomed the possibility of enlarging the definition of sovereignty. If sover-

82

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

eignty could be redefined so that both Britain and Argentina could have title to the islands, the formerly entangled issues might be arranged neatly. To do this the negotiators would have to be able to maneuver within a broadened spectrum of ideas about sovereignty. They would have to move away from the idea of impermeable national sovereignty at one end of the spectrum. Hardliners who favored this idea wanted their nation's politics, economics, and culture to exist without a corrupting foreign influence. National boundaries were clearly drawn and protected to keep out not just foreign armies but foreign ideas that could even more effectively enslave a people. Hardliners favored self-sufficiency and feared dependence. 1 Softliners, on the other hand, argued that the idea of sovereignty could include a nation's acceptance of or even search for the influence and cooperation of other nations and groups. They acknowledged that nations would probably continue to be the main actors in world affairs, but that these nations did not exist in a Hobbesian state of nature. Nations were institutionalized groups of people, and people can be as good at cooperating as they are at competing. Softliners argued for the existence of a set of norms that international society accepted. Just because there was no world government did not mean that nations do not want international agreements and the peace to be kept. Softliners feared nations that became impermeable billiard balls, knocking each other about and causing other collisions. They wanted sovereignty to be permeable. If bureaucrats in one government could cooperate with their counterparts in other governments and with multinational nongovernmental groups, perhaps the people of their country could learn where their interests merged with those of foreigners. Their people may even come to identify those foreigners as part of their self in some circumstances. Cooperation leading to limited integration was possible only if there was something to cooperate about. Working together on a common project that is mutually beneficial can create a sense of selfhood. Functionalists had hoped for much of the post-World War II period that states might learn to cooperate politically if they first cooperated on nonpolitical tasks. 2 They had hoped that economics was an apolitical, heuristic field offering technocrats the opportunity to educate politicians. David Mitrany had been the functionalists' primary theoretician. He had hoped that functional cooperation could make people forget about or evade sovereignty issues. Confrontation about territorial jurisdiction could be replaced by cooperation about more practical concerns. The functionalists seldom appreciated that attempts by internationally minded government officials and multinational businessmen to cooperate could exacerbate the political tensions between states. As will be seen hereafter, statesmen and nationalities who leaned towards hardline sovereignty might feel forced to move further in that direction when confronted with hasty attempts by others at cooperation. The spill-over effect of functional cooperation could be as likely to increase international tension as foster a transnational sense of self. What, functionalists saw as a chance for apolitical cooperation could be seen by nationalists as a threat to their independence.

Sovereignty Redefined: Oil and the Falklands Dispute

83

The potential for economic development of the oil and fish resources around the Falkland Islands began to be increasingly discussed in the late 1960s. Softliners in Argentina and Britain hoped that the potential wealth would be the motivation for the two nations to set aside their mutually exclusive claims to title and to cooperate in its exploration and exploitation. They tried to control the exploration for oil so that the effort would generate trust between the two governments and between their peoples. As early as 1969, Britain's Foreign Minister James Callaghan thought that Britain and Argentina "should have joint control of the tests" for oil around the islands.3 Hardliners saw the potential wealth as just another reason for the importance of their country's original claim to title. The oil could be exploited by binational or national companies, depending on the results of the struggle between softliners and hardliners in Argentina, Britain, and the Falklands.

OIL EXPLORATION AND THE SEARCH FOR RELATIVE SOVEREIGNTY The political importance of potential oil deposits around the Falklands was first perceived in 1969. The potential was discussed at a British cabinet meeting on 24 October 1969. In his Diaries Richard Grossman who was Lord President of the Council, Leader of the House of Commons, and cabinet member, wrote that no one knew if there was any oil there or not. He was struck by the fact "that the Foreign Office said that the only thing to do was to conceal the suggestion and prevent any testing."4 The Foreign Office's representative feared that public discussion about oil could heighten political tensions betwen Argentina and Britain over the Falklands to the extent that the Argentines would land an army on the islands. The search for oil by companies under British license would annoy the Argentines. Various companies from Britain, the United States, and Canada had applied to the Governor of the Falklands for licenses to explore the islands' offshore area. Argentina's La Nation reported that until some political solution was found, the Foreign Office was correct in thinking that the Argentine authorities would interpret British concessions as prejudicing the negotiations about sovereignty. 5 Oil might lubricate the grinding gears of machinery. In a territorial dispute between two sovereign nations it had an opposite effect. Even if the search for oil around the Falklands was blocked, the assumption that it was there was strengthened by the positive results of Argentineauthorized exploration of other areas in the South Atlantic. Argentina had granted a license for oil exploration to Shell Capsa (Compania Argentina de Petroleo S.A.), a subsidiary of the Anglo-Dutch firm, Royal Dutch Shell. That company, in the summer of 1969-1970, conducted explorations at a cost of $1.5 million in the Argentine Sea, between the Malvinas and the continent. The granting of this license had been a subject of dispute between Argentine hardliners and moderates. The hardliners would have preferred to wait until

84

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

the state-owned oil companies had the ability to explore the oceans for oil. The moderates argued that the wait would be too long and that Argentina should authorize foreign, private companies to do the work. The moderates had the support of Argentina's Law of Hydrocarbons 17.319, whose Article 14 stated that any company could be authorized to explore for oil within Argentina or in Argentine waters. Shell sent data on some 100,000 square kilometers of the South Atlantic to Geocom, Inc., a United States firm specializing in the interpretation of such information. Its 1971 report concluded that the Malvinas basin might hold significant oil reserves.6 Geocom considered its findings promising enough to advertise them in the June 1971 edition of World Oil. The map used in the advertisement included southern Argentina, the offshore area, and the Falklands. The rumors of potential oil in the South Atlantic rekindled the internal Argentine debate about national oil policy. General Roberto Marcelo Levingston had replaced General Ongania as president of Argentina on 8 June 1970. On 17 June the junta issued a formal statement about their so-called National Policy. Point 124 of it stated, "The state will have to develop a leading role in the extraction and marketing of oil and gas." The two state-owned companies, Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF) and Gas del Estado, were to have primary responsibility in developing the nation's hydrocarbons, with private and foreign companies playing a secondary role. National Policy Point 124 was to replace the Law of Hydrocarbon 17.319. National interests were to replace private and foreign ones. In his so-called report to the Argentine People of 4 February 1971 Levingston reaffirmed that "the State is the owner of the country's petroleum and the logical regulator of Argentina's petroleum policy."7 Moderates within the government disagreed with the hardliners about what Argentine oil policy should be. Levingston's secretary of state for energy, Jorge Haiek, said at a press conference on 27 January 1971 that the participation of private oil companies should be increased. He signed the military government's Decree 22 on 19 January and Decree 59 on 22 January. These decrees authorized the application of Law 17.319 in any future bidding for offshore blocks. He would allow any company to bid for blocks of up to 97,000 square kilometers. This was about the size of the area that Shell had explored in the South Atlantic with favorable results. Argentine oil policy remained split after Alejandro Lanusse replaced Levingston on 23 March 1971. The administrator general of YPF, Coronel Manuel Reimundes, on 2 and 30 April 1971 sent petitions to Haiek, who had kept his old position in the new regime. Reimundes requested that areas one through seven in the Southern Atlantic be reserved for YPF exploration. These areas, from the Malvinas to the south, admittedly had problems "of great complexity" for oil explorers. But YPF, Reimundes argued, had experience in exploring for oil under the ocean, and "the high interests of the Nation" should be considered. 8 The staff of Shell Capsa must have been aware of Reimundes' request, because on 5 and 27 April they sent letters to the secretary general of

Sovereignty Redefined: Oil and the Falklands Dispute

85

the president of the nation, Genereal Rafael A. Panullo. Panullo's popular name at the time was Mr. Ten Percent because he allegedly would ask for 10 percent of the sum being negotiated for himself. General Catan, who had been on the army's general staff and was now working for Shell, wrote the second letter to Panullo of 27 April. He wrote that he had "become aware of the YPF's president's fear that Shell would discover 'a new Kuwait' in the [Southern] zone." He argued that Shell had invested 1.5 million in an area YPF had shown no previous interest in, that Shell possessed the needed technology, which YPF lacked, and that Argentine oil reserves were currently low. When Argentina needed the oil and its state oil company lacked the interest and the ability to find new reserves, why should Shell not be allowed unencumbered access to the area? He argued that by granting a license to a foreign private company to explore the waters near the Malvinas, Argentina would in fact be occupying that area. This occupation would strengthen Argentina's claim to the islands. Work on a submarine platform in front of the Malvinas would be "an affirmation of national sovereignty" and would add a "strong economic emphasis to the political" demands. "The best argument is to use what you claim," he said.9 If, on the other hand, no discovery were made, Argentina would not have to pay the costs of exploration. Catan, who worked for Shell, was not as bold as Haiek, who had suggested that to encourage exploration of the South Atlantic Argentina should pay Shell's $1.5 million exploration bill.10 A very large block must be granted to Shell, Catan argued, because of all the possible areas in which oil might be found, probably only a very few could become income-producing fields. A company could not accept the risk of paying the high cost of exploration when it could gamble on only a few areas. Granting a 97,000 square kilometer block to a foreign company would at worst do no harm to Argentina and at best could help it regain sovereignty over the Malvinas. Catan's critics contended that the relative sovereignty Argentina would exercise over its continental shelf if Shell was awarded this block would prefigure the type of sovereignty it might gain over the Malvinas. Adolfo Silenzi de Stagni thought it was "surprising that [Catan] could think that national sovereignty over the Malvinas could be reaffirmed if we granted Shell, an English oil company which was the second largest multinational company in the world, a concession to explore and exploit" the waters of the South Atlantic. 11 Author Osiris Troiani marvelled that Catan could have made his argument without intending to be humorous. General Jorge Raul Calcagno, who had replaced the retired Reimundes as administrator general of YPF, said on 19 August 1971 that the national oil policy should be in concordance with the National Policy, meaning that YPF should be given preference over Shell. He added on 24 August that this pertained especially to the Gulf of San Jorge, which is between Puerto Descado and Camarones and is some 400 miles from the Malvinas. Calcagno persuaded President Lanusse's staff to begin work on a new Hydrocarbon Law that could be ready by 3 June 1972, the fiftieth anniversary

86

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

of YPF's founding. The law had been drafted but not approved by 1 June 1972. It provided for most of what YPF wanted. Oil fields in Argentine territory, it stated, were the "inalienable patrimony of the National State, and their exploration [and] exploitation . . . are the exclusive business of the State companies." YPF and Gas del Estado. None of the oil development could be delegated to private companies, stated Section I, Article 2. The area covered by the law included the Argentine Antarctic and the islands of the South Atlantic. 12 On 3 June La Nation reported that the YPF would not get the new law for its anniversary. The government had decided not to replace Law 17.319 because of steps taken by "international financiers." Dr. Carlos S. Brignone of Argentina's Central Bank had said that a $119.4 million loan was being postponed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). La Nacion suspected that this postponement was attributable in part to the expected change in the hydrocarbon laws. Others suspected that YPF's limited resources rather than international cabals had affected the government's decision. The initial costs of development were expected to be about $700 million, far exceeding YPF's capabilities. If the foreign private corporations were not allowed to develop Argentina's oil and YPF was unable to do so, it was estimated that Argentina would run out of oil for export and have to begin importing about 25 million cubic meters a year. 13 Some thought YPF could meet the challenge. YPF had increased production steadily since 1960, when it produced just over 9.5 million cubic meters of oil. By 1965 production had reached over 15 million cubic meters, and by 1971 it had reached 24.5 million. The Brazilian firm Petrobras had five mobile platforms, one built exclusively in Brazil. They had dug eighteen offshore wells, three of which were productive. 14 There was no reason why a growing Argentine firm could not learn from the example of another Latin firm. Hardliners who had been disappointed by Lanusse were more pleased when his successor Juan Peron initiated Malvinas Day, which would celebrate the anniversary of the 1829 Argentine decree announcing Argentine sovereignty over the islands. Peron also forbade foreign oil companies to build new facilities or expand old ones. He was suspicious of the international interest in the possibility of "another Kuwait" around the Falklands, as reported in the 3 December 1973 issue of U.S. News and World Report. Even if Argentine firms were unable to quickly develop the oil, it was thought better not to give the multinational corporations free rein. Surrendering too much control to the multinationals in the South Atlantic would deny Argentina sovereignty over its offshore area without delivering absolute sovereignty over the Malvinas. The British Foreign Office decided that the best way to avoid offending Argentina, while yielding to pressure to find out if there was oil, was for the British government to discretely make its own explorations of the Falkland waters. The Foreign Office commissioned its first study of the geology around the Falklands in 1970. Donald H. Griffiths and P. F. Parker of the geology department at the University of Birmingham presented their report in 1971. Their preliminary conclusion was that the geological formations around the islands indicated that oil might be found there. The chance of finding oil was

Sovereignty Redefined: Oil and the Falklands Dispute

87

sufficiently high to warrant the expense of further study. So in 1971 H.M.S. Shackleton was sent to make gravimeterical measurements of 2,100 square kilometers around the Falklands, In 1972 H.M.S. Endurance continued the task, expanding the distance explored to 4,200 square kilometers. In 1973 the Shackleton returned to study 6,700 square kilometers. The information accumulated during these expeditions was analyzed by Griffiths. He concluded "that the kind of sediments in which oil is found do occur at least in places around the Falkland Islands."15 Britain was being prodded during this time by Falklanders and their sympathizers to allow private companies to develop the oil up to 200 miles around the islands as a way to exercise sovereignty in the offshore area. The Falkland Islands Times reported in its November/December 1974 issue that the governor of the islands had received many requests for licenses to explore for oil. On 4 December 1974 the Legislative Council of the Falklands passed two motions urging the governor to invite requests for licenses of explorations so that the islands' economy might be strengthened. By February 1975 the companies that had requested these licenses included Asamara Oil, Sunlight Oil Canada, Tanks, Oil and Gas, Coral Petroleum, and Ashland Oil Canada. Conservative MP Michael Clark Hutchison supported the unilateral development of oil and fishing industries on the islands. The British, whose country was suffering economic hardships, could be somewhat cheered by the prospect reported in the Times that "huge new oil deposits in the south Atlantic" might equal or exceed "Britain's North Sea oil reserves." 16 Biparty support for the Falklands oil development came in November of 1975 when MP Colin Phipps supported the development of oil fields near the Malvinas or in the San Jorge basin. Some feared that the Foreign Office could not successfully steer British policy between the pressure from the islanders for British sovereignty and private oil exploration and the pressure from the Argentines for a transfer of title. The Foreign Office was reluctant to bow to the wishes of the islanders and their supporters. It continued to reject requests from oil firms to explore for oil within the Falklands waters. This annoyed "the commerce-hungry Falklanders no end" and disappointed the fifty applicants. 17 The Foreign Office could not agree to Argentine demands either. Argentina's foreign minister said in July 1974 that unless negotiations on transferring sovereignty over the Malvinas were accelerated Argentina's "friendly policy would be reappraised." On 2 April 1975 Argentina's representative to the United Nations told the General Assembly that his country did not recognize Britain's right to explore for oil in the south Atlantic. 18 It was perhaps too much to ask the Foreign Office to steer between the two shoals. Britain's Sunday Telegraph reported on 9 March 1975 that military clashes between Argentina and Britain were a likely result of the fifty oil companies' mounting pressure on the Foreign Office to allow exploration for oil around the Falklands. War between two sovereign nations whose interests clashed in the Falklands seemed possible by 1975. Some in both countries hoped to avoid war by changing the definition of sovereignty. On 3 April 1975 the Financial Times reported that Argentine demands for sovereignty over the islands and British demands for the island-

88

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

ers' right of self-determination might be harmonized if an Anglo-Argentine condominium could be established over the islands. This condominium would be conditional on the freezing of discussions about sovereignty and on binational exploitation of the petroleum. This proposal reflected the advice of the British ambassador to Buenos Aires, Derek Ashe. He had learned that some Argentines had already reappraised their friendly policy towards England, when a demand for the islands was inscribed in blood on the embassy walls and a bomb killed two of his thirteen guards. He advised England to develop the oil in cooperation withArgentina. The Argentine minister of the economy, Jose Gelbard, advised Isabel Peron not to accept the YPF's latest plan to unilaterally develop the oil. The so-called YPF to the Sea plan of Coronel Mario Jose Blanco, the new administrator general of YPF, called for the purchase of three platforms and the drilling of fifty exploratory offshore wells from 1976 to 1980. Gelbard was characteristically opposed to hardline interpretations of sovereignty. One Argentine negotiator, Carlos Garcia Mata, followed Gelbard's position. He hoped that Argentina could enjoy limited sovereignty over the Malvinas and revenue from economic development. He suggested that Britain transfer title to Argentina in return for Argentina's promise to rent all of Argentine waters south of the forty-second parallel to the European Economic Community (EEC). He sent this plan to the Argentine ambassador in Washington, D.C.19 His use of terms such as indisputable sovereignty, which he said Argentina must have over the islands before any oil wealth could be enjoyed, made him sound like a hardliner. His realization that Argentina could develop the oil only with foreign help belied his terminology. Those in favor of complete sovereignty would not have requested credit from the eurodollar market, as he did. And what would be indisputable about this so-called complete sovereignty if Argentina, as he advocated, would be "obligated" to send the petroleum from its waters to the European market? Garcia Mata was part of the group of Argentines and Britons who were trying to soften the definition of national sovereignty in order to develop the oil reserves and avoid war. The Foreign Ministry sent Garcia Mata's report to YPF and to the state oil workers' union, the union of petroleum workers (SUPE), which rejected the proposal. Workers and management agreed that Argentines alone should control the oil around the Malvinas without binding clauses. One of the wild cards in the Falklands dispute has been the United States. How it would respond to actions taken by the disputants has seldom been predictable. Its action had been important before, in 1831. It might be again. The question was now about how the U.S. government would deal not with U.S. seal catchers and fishermen but with U.S. oil companies. The interest of U.S. oil companies in the South Atlantic oil was brought to the attention of the U.S. government, which commissioned a study of the propsects for oil in that area. The Department of the Interior in 1975 published Geological Survey Bulletin 1411 by Bernardo F. Grossling, entitled Latin America's Petroleum Prospects in the Energy Crisis. Grossling noted that "giant-size accumulations" of oil like that found in the Middle East might be found in the Argentine

Sovereignty Redefined: Oil and the Falklands Dispute

89

continental shelf. He identified five promising sedimentary basins: Salado, Bahia Blanca, San Jorge, Magallanes, and Malvinas. He wrote that "one would be justified in estimating for the Argentine continental shelf an upper bound for the potential at least four times as great as that for the U.S. Atlantic continental shelf," estimated at 10-50 billion barrels. This meant the Falklands were near a shelf holding up to perhaps 200 billion barrels of oil, which even at only $30 per barrel represented $6 trillion. This estimated amount was even larger than the proven Saudi Arabian reserves of 119 billion barrels of oil and much larger than the 35 billion barrels under the North Sea. He calculated that some $500 million would be required to explore the Argentine continental shelf. He suggested that foreign companies assist with service contracts, technical assistance, financing, exploration, and development. He claimed that only international petroleum corporations had the skilled petroleum executives, geologists, geophysicists, petroleum engineers, financial capability, and willingness to invest the large amounts of risk capital that would be required to assess and develop these new fields. How U.S. interest in the South Atlantic oil would affect the debate among hardliners, moderates, and softliners was unclear. U.S. oil companies could cooperate with the Falklanders, the British, the Argentines, or any combination of the three. The U.S. government had consistently refused to take a stand on the sovereignty dispute. U.S. interest in the oil would add to the pressure felt by the participants to resolve that dispute.

THE SHACKLETON MISSION The Foreign Office's problem was how to steer a course through the conflicting interests of the Falklands' lobby, the oil companies, and Argentina. It hoped that quiet government studies rather than studies by licensed private companies could mollify the Argentine government. Government studies could include political assessments that cooperation with Argentina was necessary. Officials from the Foreign Office hoped that another government study of the Falklands might persuade hardliners to modify their definitions of sovereignty. Sailing between "the islanders' effective Westminster lobby"20 and the YPF planners would not be easy. Many hoped the task might be accomplished by Lord Shackleton, the son of the Antarctic explorer Sir Ernest Shackleton. Lord Shackleton had demonstrated his sensitivity to the feelings of disgruntled groups before. A former Labour MP, he had told the House of Lords that no one could disagree with the goal of socialism, which was to alleviate the plight of the poor. His long experience in international politics had shown that he had "a feeling for people who live in far away places."21 Shackleton also had feelings that could make the multinational corporations trust him. He had in 1975 been appointed as a member of the board of directors of Rio-Tinto Zinc Corporation. This mining conglomerate, of which conservative Lord Carrington was also a board member, would later successfully integrate its Rhodesian interests with the plans of Mugabe's Marxist govern-

90

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

ment of Zimbabwe. Rio-Tinto had significant investments in British Petroleum, which was interested in the Falkland oil. Some people in faraway places like Argentina were afraid that Lord Shackleton's mission was Britain's attempt to exercise unilateral sovereignty by developing the oil and fish. Not only had Britain usurped the Malvinas, now it was to usurp Argentine waters. Within six days of the Foreign Office's announcement on 16 October, 1975 of its plan to send the Shackleton mission to the islands, the Argentine Foreign Ministry stated that the economic survey mission would be an unwelcome disturbance of Anglo-Argentine relations and would hinder a peaceful solution to the dispute over sovereignty. 22 Shortly afterward Argentina's representative to the U.N. General Assembly repeated his government's objection. Despite these objections, Shackleton arrived in the Falklands aboard the Endurance on 3 January 1976.23 Argentine nationalists responded angrily to Shackleton's arrival. On 7 January a Peronist congressional deputy proposed confiscating all of British property in Argentina without compensation until Britain surrendered the Falklands. Another member called for the removal of all signs in English from Argentine airlines. Several Argentine newspapers ran stories hinting that an invasion to occupy the Malvinas would boost Argentine morale, not to mention newspaper sales. Official displeasure was registered on 13 January when Argentina asked Britain to withdraw its ambassador because of British refusal to include the problem of sovereignty in negotiations over the Falklands. Manuel Arauz Castex, the Argentine foreign minister, summoned the British ambassador, Derek Ashe, to request the recall. Arauz Castex also said that Dr. Manuel de Anchorena, Argentina's ambassador to Britain, would be remaining in Buenos Aires. On 14 January Arauz Castex explained that this request to recall Ashe did not mean a break in diplomatic relations with Britain. Communication facilities between his country and the Falklands would be maintained, he said. In other words, requesting the British to recall their ambassador was a measured Argentine response intended to send a message to the British while maintaining communications with them. It was also an action for domestic consumption, an attempt to silence the more extreme reactions to Shackleton's economic survey. The message was received in Britain. In its first front-page story on the Falklands, the Times noted on 14 January that "the Argentine action follows official anger over the sending of a British mission ... to investigate the economic prospects of the Falklands." The disagreement over sovereignty, compounded by growing interest in the islands' economic potential, had caused a complication in the diplomatic relations between Argentina and Britain. Arauz Castex was himself fired by President Isabel Peron two days after he had summoned Ashe. His firing was done for domestic reasons and was not taken by the Times as rejection by Peron of his warning to Britain. The Tines reported that his "dismissal . . . had been expected for some time and is not seen as indicating a concession to the British Government." 2 4 Ashe departed from Buenos Aires four days after Arauz Castex departed from his job.

Sovereignty Redefined: Oil and the Falklands Dispute

91

The Radical Civic Union (UCR), Argentina's main opposition party, not pacified, wanted an even stronger warning sent to Britain. On 28 January it requested information from Peron on the state of relations with England. Antonio Troccoli, leader of the radical bloc in the Chamber of Deputies, Argentina's lower legislative body, proposed that the chamber ask the government to show "what other measures, other than the withdrawal of ambassadors, are being considered following Britain's decision not to continue negotiations on the sovereignty of the Malvinas, in spite of United Nations resolutions to do so." Troccoli wanted to know if the withdrawal of ambassadors was all Argentina would do to punish Britain's poor conduct or if something more energetic was planned. 25 Softliners were dismayed by the recall. A spokesman for the Foreign Office lamented that Argentina had not yet been able to "transform the area of dispute concerning sovereignty over the Falklands into a bridge for cooperation between the two countries." 26 Foreign secretary Callaghan was sorry that the two nations had not yet been able "to transform the sovereignty of the islands into a factor making for cooperation between the two countries, which could be consonant with the wishes and interests of the Falkland Islanders."27 He regretted that no way had been found to bridge Britain's proposal for talks on economic cooperation with Argentina's demand for the transfer of sovereignty. Others doubted whether the mood of most Argentines would enable a bridge to be built. The Economist reported on 24 January 1976 that after the Shackleton mission arrived in the Falklands "suspicious Argentine minds concluded that the British were after the islands' only other likely asset: oil." The bombing of the British Cultural Institute at Cordoba on 15 January had been an ominous sign of Argentine feelings. With many Argentines convinced that Britain was trying to steal their nation's natural resources, conflict had become more likely than compromise. The Economist speculated that "a discovery of oil would lead to further trouble between the two governments." perhaps even to an Argentine invasion, against which "the islands' first line of defense would be a marine garrison of thirty-seven men." Labour MP Bernard Conlan also feared the increased likelihood of armed aggression by Argentine forces. Perhaps trying to influence Argentine policy more than describing it, Callaghan stated that he was "certain that the Argentine Government will not resort to armed attack." 28 On January 16 an Argentine navy tank landing ship, the Cabo San Gonzalo, had unloaded 750 tons of equipment and fifty army engineers at Port Stanley. Jack Abbott, chairman of the lobby called the Falkland Islands Committee, said the islanders thought this signaled an invasion by Argentina. 29 He called Francis Mitchell, the London-based managing director of the islands' largest economic concern, the Falkland Islands Company, saying the islanders thought it was unusual to have so much material unloaded at this tense time. The Foreign Office assured the islanders that their easily aroused suspicions of an invasion were unsubstantiated. It issued a statement confirming the legitimate purpose of the Cabo San Gonzalo.

92

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands This ship is visiting the Falkland Islands with the full knowledge and approval of both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Government of the Falkland Islands in order to bring materials to extend the temporary airstrip. This arrangement follows from the 1972 agreement with the Argentine Government under which they constructed the temporary airstrip. 30

The Argentine air force had in 1971 bought a portable aluminum airstrip from the U.S. air force and rebuilt it between Port Stanley and Cape Pembroke in 1972. It was 785 meters long and 30 meters wide, sufficient for weekly passenger aircraft service between the airstrip and Comodoro Rivadavia on the Argentine mainland. The extension would allow aircraft bigger and faster than the Fokker F27 Friendship passenger aircraft to use the facility. Britain had allowed this upgrading of the facility to further economic cooperation. The Foreign Office had hoped that peace could be ensured in the Falklands if success in functional areas such as the airstrip could spill over to creating political cooperation. The islanders remained wedded to the notion that such cooperation with an unreliable nation could mean that the Foreign Office was either selling the Falklands down the river or was unwittingly allowing the Argentine's to prepare for an invasion. They feared that the purpose of "the [Shackleton] mission is to convince British public opinion that the islands are not economically viable and that it is in the islanders' interests to integrate with Argentina."31 Frank Mitchell, managing director of the Falkland Islands Company, said that he was being given the runaround by the Foreign Office. He expressed the fear on 22 January that the islanders were "being sold down the River Plate by Westminster." 32 Michael Frenchman bolstered the idea that the British government was about to abandon the Falklands with his 20 January Times article headed "The Falkland islanders may be no more than pawns in a game Britain does not want to win." His opening paragraph noted that "the slippery slope to appeasement with Argentina over the sovereignty of the islands began in the late 60's and has now accelerated." The British government, he continued, seemed prepared to let the islanders "become the victims of a losing diplomatic battle." The Shackleton commission was caught between two extremes. The Argentine hardliners held the opinion that the Shackleton mission was intended to foster unilateral British sovereignty over the Falklands and its resources. The islanders and their supporters believed that the Foreign Office was plotting the surrender of all British rights to the islands. Argentine supporters in the Organization of American States (OAS) took an equally dismal view of the Shackleton mission. The juridical committee of OAS issued in Rio de Janiero on January 16 a declaration alleging that the British survey team lead by Lord Shackleton was a "unilateral innovation" that violated U.N. resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII) about the Malvinas. Unilateral acts of sovereignty by Britain over a colonial territory threatened international peace and all of Latin America. Whatever weight this stance gave, the OAS lent it to Argentina's position that the exploration of the Falkland economic potential was a threat to hemispheric security.

Sovereignty Redefined: Oil and the Falklands Dispute

93

THE ALMIRANTE STORNI INCIDENT Argentine hardliners feared that British economic exploration would enlarge the area under British colonial domination from the islands to their surrounding waters. The limited warning of the demand for a mutual recall of ambassadors had failed to convince Britain that flouting U.N. resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII) was unwise. Argentine officials decided to send a stronger, if still limited, warning. It may be unfortunate, but there is nothing so effective in gaining an opponent's serious attention as to threaten to use or actually use a little force. So on 4 February the Argentine destroyer Almirante Storni shadowed the British exploration ship Shackleton for six hours and then fired across its bows when it refused to stop.33 The incident began when the Almirante Storni radioed to the British vessel, "Stop your machines, or I shall open fire." Captain Philip Warne of the Shackleton said that the captain of the Argentine ship opened his exchange by calling "Endurance, Endurance, Endurance" apparently mistaking the Shackleton for a Royal Navy ice patrol vessel of that name. Both ships were painted red, so the mistake is possible. If the Argentines were trying to intercept the Endurance, their intended detainee may well have been Lord Shackleton's team, who may have been thought to be leaving the island on the Endurance. The team had arrived on the Endurance in early January but had actually left Port Stanley for Brazil on the fleet auxiliary, Tide Surge. The interception of any British ship was not wholly unanticipated, as the Argentine Foreign Ministry had sent a note to the British government on 14 November 1975 protesting the practice of British ships' sailing in what Argentina considered to be its territorial waters. Given Argentina's rejection of the British right to explore the offshore resources, and its fear that positive results of such an exploration might make its claim to sovereignty less likely to succeed, an attempted abduction of the exploratory team perhaps would have made a dramatic indication that Argentina would make no de facto recognition of British right to carry out such a survey. If Argentina was willing to intercept a survey team, the signal to potential investors and oil companies who might otherwise be interested in building exploratory drilling rigs would be unmistakable. Though Argentina had intercepted the Shackleton rather than the Endurance, the message was little less clear. The Shackleton had been carrying out research in the southwest Atlantic, studying continental drift. The ship, in addition to its thirty-man crew, had carried up to thirty-two members of the Falklands survey team. It was also carrying explosives for geoseismic research. The twenty-year-old, 1,100-ton exploration ship with a maximum speed of only eleven and a half knots was more threatening than the island's garrison of thirty-seven Royal Marines. The Shackleton represented a future of British economic exploitation of the offshore oil and krill. To allow exploration by either Lord Shackleton or others to continue without incident would be a de facto recognition of Britain's right to continue its plans to diversify the islands' economy. The incident, the most serious confrontation to date, was still only a limited

94

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

message. The Almirante Storni, formerly the U.S.S. Cowell, could easily have either forced a boarding of the Shackleton or even sunk her. The Almirante Storni, with a maximum speed of thirty-five knots, had four-inch guns, antiaircraft guns, torpedo tubes and racks, and depth charges. Clearly the reason the Argentine warship fired only warning shots and shadowed rather than stopped the Shackleton was not its lack of capability to do more. Foreign Secretary Callaghan summoned Rafael Gowland, the Argentine charge d'affaires in London, to receive a protest from Edward Rowlands, the parliamentary undersecretary. The Foreign Office also instructed John Shakespeare, the British charge d'affaires in Buenos Aires, to ask for an explanation of the incident. Rowlands and Shakespeare were told by the Argentines that the Shackleton had been in Argentine territorial waters in violation of Argentine sovereignty. The underlying message was that Argentina would make increasingly energetic moves to block unilateral exploration and development. Argentina was willing to escalate its signals of dissatisfaction in order to bring Britain into serious negotiations. For many in Argentina serious negotiations meant an agreement to transfer sovereignty over the islands before their economy was diversified. Nine days after the Shackleton incident, Argentina requested that the United Nations decolonization committee examine the question of the Malvinas as soon as possible.34 Argentina hoped that its limited show of force would be seen by the United Nations as a legitimate means to bring Britain to the point where it would be willing to negotiate a solution satisfactory to Argentina. The committee did not condemn the Argentine attack on the Shackleton. The United Nations had again tacitly accepted the limited use of force to hasten the process of decolonization. By 17 February some seemed to think that the Argentine strategy was succeeding. The ascent of the ladder of threats from the diplomatic to the limited military level had produced negotiated results. Raul Quijano, the Argentine foreign minister, and Edward Rowlands, the British undersecretary of state at the Foreign Office, had agreed in talks at the United Nations that "Britain should withdraw the research ship Shackleton from waters claimed by Argentina." 35 If true, this would be a victory in blocking British exploration of the offshore areas. However, the British Foreign Office later denied the rumors that any such British concession had been made, stating that both countries had only discussed ways of resuming the dialogue over the islands and of normalizing diplomatic relations. On 9 March Ivor Richard, the British representative to the United Nations, sent a letter to the U.N. decolonization committee that reaffirmed the legitimacy of British sovereignty over the islands and its concomitant right to survey their economic potential. In the letter Richard also denied that a British warship like the Endurance threatened the peace and security of the continent or violated international rules on intervention. The letter seemed to put to rest the idea that Argentina had escalated the conflict to the level necessary to change British policy. Firing salvos over a British research ship had left Argentina with nothing better than the status quo in the South Atlantic. Many Argentines still wanted undiluted sovereignty over the

Sovereignty Redefined: Oil and the Falklands Dispute

95

islands, all Falklanders wanted British sovereignty to continue, and the Foreign Office was trying to get some economic cooperation from all the concerned parties. Argentine hardliners were back to asserting their claim. Raul Quijano, Argentina's foreign minister, said: the center of our discussions is ... sovereignty. . . . We cannot move forward. If the United Kingdom does not wish to discuss this issue we cannot talk about the other ones. Of course we are very much interested in economic cooperation and communications, but without the sovereignty issue these are very much peripheral subjects. 36

FUNCTIONAL COOPERATION: MARTINEZ de HOZ AND LORD SHACKLETON AGREE Two days after Quijano's reaffirmation of the hard sovereignty position, Isabel Peron's government was overthrown by the armed forces. The junta publicly justified the 24 March 1976 coup by the widespread concern about the increasing use of violence by leftists and about the perceived ineffectiveness of Peron's leadership. Under the new goverment of General Jorge Videla, Dr. Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz became minister of economics. He rejected Quijano's position, favoring Gelbard's ideas of soft sovereignty. The new minister approached Argentina's problems as a pragmatic economist, not a nationalist politician. His goal was to cooperate with the international financial institutions that influenced so much of Argentina's potential prosperity. One of the issues that concerned Martinez de Hoz during his five trips during 1976-1980 to London, and when members of the Foreign Office visited him in Buenos Aires, was how Argentina could economically cooperate with Britain in exploiting the resources of the South Atlantic. His first trip to London was in mid-July 1976, with the primary purpose of securing new loans for Argentina. The report of the Shackleton mission had just been completed, and the Labour Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, was hoping that Martinez de Hoz could be a person in the new military government of Argentina with whom they could talk about economic cooperation. 37 Martinez de Hoz met with Edward (Ted) Rowlands, from the British Foreign Office, and spoke to the Confederation of British Industry. The Financial Times of Britain reported that Martinez de Hoz favored cooperation in the development of the island's resources, not confrontation. 38 For Rowlands and Martinez de Hoz, economic cooperation was the central issue and hard sovereignty the peripheral one. The Shackleton report, publicly released on 20 July 1976, and subsequently quoted in the Times (London), argued that the one-product economy of the islands was weak, and economic cooperation with Argentina to develop the oil and fish was necessary to diversify it. Shackleton had argued, the Times reported, that the one cause for hope was that the "development in international affairs which has led to regional cooperation between different nations is as relevant to this part of the world as to other areas where economic cooperation has been achieved. ... It is logical therefore that in any major new developments of the islands' economy, especially those relating to

96

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

the exploitation of offshore resources, cooperation with Argentina—even participation—should, if possible, be secured."39 The authors of the Shackleton report assumed that such economic cooperation could be achieved while the islands' "political status . . . remain [ed] the same as during the past one and a half centuries."40 If this cooperation could be realized, the Times quoted the report as saying, the "world's largest untapped sources of protein" located in the offshore area, could be developed to help keep world population trends from leading to starvation and undernourishment. The possible catch of 100 million tons per year of krill, a shrimp-like crustacean, could not only diversify the current one-product economy of the Falklands but also provide a "significant resource of mankind as a whole." There was no reason for both countries could not benefit from feeding the world. The Russians and Japanese, who in the last years had each caught up to 450,000 tons of krill per year at rates of up to 40 tons per hour off South Georgia, were already benefitting. 41 With the hope that Argentina might be persuaded to cooperate economically, copies of the report were sent to the Argentine government. The report's suggestions for economic development were linked to the need for Argentine cooperation. The Foreign Office knew that Argentina could physically disrupt economic development and might well be seen by most members of the United Nations and OAS as justified in doing so. On the other hand, Argentina could not develop the oil without Western support and Britain's North Sea experience. These seemed to Shackleton, Martinez de Hoz, and others to be good reasons for cooperation.

INITIAL REJECTIONS OF BINATIONALITY The Argentine Foreign Ministry reacted unfavorably to the Shackleton report. On 22 July the Argentine Foreign Ministry responded to it by making "no comment," again stressing that the fundamental problem, sovereignty, had been left unaddressed. The ministry statement said, Regarding an hypothetical cooperation between Argentina and the United Kingdom to develop industry arid oil in the Malvinas, the Foreign Ministry repeats the Argentine Government's position, namely that the essential issue to solve is the dispute on sovereignty, and has therefore no comments to make on matters which are not directly related with that.

The Minister of foreign affairs, Admiral Cesar Augusto Guzzetti, said on 22 July 1976, "Sovereignty is the priority in the Malvinas."42 The new Videla government was as split as previous governments had been on the sovereignty issue. Guzzetti's opinions differed from those of Martinez de Hoz. One of the reasons for the hardliners' desire to control all of the Malvinas' oil wealth was reported by the Times on 25 July 1976 in an article entitled "Britain fights for Falkland oil deal." It noted that

Sovereignty Redefined: Oil and the Falklands Dispute

97

between the Falkland Islands and the continent of Latin America lies the last of the great unexplored oil basins of the world. Oil, or more likely gas, is the key to the future of these South Atlantic islands and the 2,000 people who live on them.

It also noted why Argentina was waging a bitter diplomatic battle with B ain for control of the islands and the seas between. . , . Argentina owes so much in international debts that her finance ministers are scouring the world for cash, and only a week ago in London they got enough on account to keep going another six months.

The Times reporter suspected that Argentina would prefer selling oil from the Falklands' waters to taking out new loans to finance its debts. Argentina might try to manage the exploration and development without the British government's cooperation. There was reason for this suspicion. Even before the Shackleton report had been released, on the day after Isabel Peron was ousted by General Jorge Videla, an official from Exxon had been flown into Buenos Aires and the government had announced it would seek to use a pool of private companies to develop the oil.43 It has announced that plans were being made for a trial auction of six blocks by September, at least one of those blocks being in the Falklands basin. On the day the Shackleton report came out, Bruce Wilson, an international trace consultant working for a North American consortium including Ashland Oil Canada and Asamira Oil, repeated that his group was ready to discuss the possibility of obtaining a license from Argentina to conduct preliminary exploration for oil in the Falkland offshore waters. 44 The Argentine state oil company, YPF, was seeking international tenders for exploration in six licensing blocks between Tierra de Fuego and the Falklands. Wilson's group was ready to work with YPF. Having North American-based firms help Argentina was not the type of sovereignty YPF arid SUPE wanted. But to have multinational oil companies working under only Argentine license was not as soft as having them work under a joint Anglo-Argentine license. British groups, no less than Argentine ones, were pressing for unilateral development of the resources and for hard sovereignty. A number of groups interested in the islands, such as Alginate Industries, the Upland Goose Hotel at Stanley, and Charrington's Industrial Holding, owner of the Falkland Islands Company (FIC), took out a two-page advertisement in the Times of 26 August 1976. The Falkland Islands Sheepowners' Association Limited stated in the paid supplement that a "change of sovereignty would undoubtedly destroy what has been built ... by the sweat and skill of the original emigrants from Britain, their descendants and new emigrants from Britain . . . [who] are eager to remain British. . . . Please, Please, Please do not sell us down the river." The Falkland Islands Committee and the Friends of the Falkland Islands, of which Lord Shackleton was a member, noted in its section of the ad that "the prospects for undersea oil in the shallow waters between the Falkland islands and South America are encouraging. The strata extend round the islands." It

98

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

also noted the fishing and alginate potential. The committee appealed, "Please support the Falkland Islanders." The author of one article in the special section wrote that the value of Lord Shackleton's long-awaited masterful economic survey, which lays many pointers towards the islands' future growth, is seen by some observers, particularly in Latin America, as a means of distracting Argentina from the main issue. This has been done by rightly concentrating on a policy of closer economic cooperation between Argentina, the U.K. and the Falklands.

Lord Shackleton, in his letter to the Times of 2 September 1976, repeated the conclusion he had made in the report. "There is no doubt," he wrote, "that if political obstacles were removed and exploration blocks were leased/licensed, there would be a response from oil companies, assuming the terms offered were not unreasonable." Shackleton was not trying to distract the Argentines from the main issue of sovereignty; he was trying to encourage the development of a more flexible idea of sovereignty. Shackleton had yet to persuade Carlos L. Blanco the Argentine charge d'affaires in London. In Blanco's 21 September 1976 letter to the Times, he stressed that the Islas Malvinas were "a part of the Republic of Argentina." Argentina must first have full sovereignty over the islands. After that, the Argentine government would decide how best to develop the resources according to its national interest. Shackleton had convinced Anthony Crosland, the secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, who on 2 February 1977 released a statement in which he expressed governmental support of the Shackleton recommendations. He approved of the report's statement that any development of the offshore resources would require the cooperation or participation of Argentina. With this, he said, "the Government agrees. Such new developments require a framework of greater political and economic cooperation in the region as a whole." The British government would retain the position that discussions of "the broad issues which bear on the future of the Falkland Islands could continue" but would be primarily concerned with "the possibilities of cooperation between Britain and Argentina." The familiar reservations would be kept. Her Majesty's Government would wholly reserve their position on the issue of sovereignty, which would in no way be prejudiced. Secondly, any changes which might be proposed must be acceptable to the Islanders, whose interests and wellbeing remain our prime concern. In sequence, thirdly, there must be full consultation with the islanders at every stage; nothing will be done behind their back. 45

In order to learn what the islanders were currently thinking, and to discover the potential for Argentine cooperation, Crosland sent Edward Rowlands to the Falklands and to Buenos Aires in mid-February. Crosland said that any progress in the Falkland's economy would require "greater political and economic cooperation in the region as a whole." 46 The purpose of his trip was "to see whether terms of reference can be agreed for further more formal

Sovereignty Redefined: Oil and the Falklands Dispute

99

talks between the parties concerned." Britain hoped that Argentines and islanders might yet agree to have negotiations on the topic of economic cooperation. Rowlands could not have been blamed for expecting to find little opportunity to persuade the islanders of the virtues of cooperation. The islanders were as adamantly opposed as ever to significant cooperation with Argentina. Even limited cooperation, perhaps calculated to gain Argentina's approval of unilateral British development of the resources by using the vocabulary of joint development, made the islanders suspicious of the Foreign Office's intentions. To avoid being sold down the river, the Falkland Islands Research and Development Association had been established in early 1977 to raise money for the United Kingdom Falkland Islands Committee. The committee, whose members included Frank Mitchell of the Falkland Islands Company, wanted attention to be paid to the need for research and development of island resources by non-Argentine groups. The chairman and managing director of the Association was Major-General Nigel St. George Gibbon, who had been chief of allied intelligence at Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe until 1972. He had previously worked for the Foreign Office and had been on an earlier Shackleton mission that had negotiated with the South Arabian Liberation Front in Geneva. Gibbon would run an agency with some £20,000 at his disposal for 1977. Leif Barton, an islander and general secretary of the Association, said that "the bulk of the money has been raised by commercial interests." 47 Bill Hunter Christie, a barrister and honorary secretary, said both individuals and commercial interests had made subscriptions. With a London-based organization, top intelligence experience, and money, the Falklanders had something in addition to British public opinion to protect their hardline position opposing transfer of sovereignty and favoring offshore resource development. The Foreign Office continued to try to foster cooperation. Rowlands met with Guzzetti on 15 February 1977. After two days of talks, they announced that talks about the islands had been raised to the status of negotiations, and that ambassadors would be reappointed. Rowlands said on 21 February that the agenda for the negotiations would indicate that Britain was not locked in to its previous positions. Upon returning to Argentina from a five-day visit to the Falklands, Rowlands issued in Comodoro Rivadavia a statement to the press that coincided with a statement released by the Argentine Foreign Ministry in Buenos Aires. In their statement the British declared their willingness to discuss the issue of sovereignty. The sovereignty issue would be discussed in the upcoming negotiations.48 The Argentine statement declared that Argentine intentions in the negotiations would be the recovery of the Malvinas. The Foreign Office now would not try to distract Argentina from the main issue of sovereignty; it would try to use the possibility of economic cooperation to get Argentines and kelpers to soften their ideas of sovereignty. It did seem by 1977 that there was a chance of softening the kelpers' idea of hard sovereignty. The Falkland Islands government had, according to Rowlands, "approved the intention of the British Government to try to establish a basis

100

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

for negotiations with the Government of Argentina." 49 The Falkland government did not of course always perfectly mirror the opinions of the Falklanders. The appointed governors had supported economic cooperation for as long as the British Foreign Office had. The previous governor, Neville French, had said in August 1976, "We must have cooperation with Argentina ... it makes very good sense and is absolutely essential." He had complained about the Falkland Islands Committee and objected to the islanders' sending telegrams to London. He thought that he should be the communications channel between the British government and the islanders. The government had supported French's stands. A Foreign Office spokesman had said in August 1976 that as Governor of the Falkland Islands, Mr. Neville French implements the policy of the Government, whose conviction that the wishes of the Falkland Islanders must be respected is well known. . . . But the Government is of the opinion, as were its predecessors, that the long-term interests of the islanders will be served best by close and friendly relations with Argentina. 50

Islander demonstrations against French may have helped cut his tenure in the Falklands to eighteen months and hastened his midterm leave. The appointment in November of the new governor, James Parker, did not delight the islanders either. He could still be expected to argue in favor of the Shackleton report's recommendations about cooperation with Argentina. The Times criticized the inclusion of the issue of sovereignty in the negotiations. In its 23 February 1977 editorial it noted that this appeared to be a concession to the Argentine claim to the islands, a claim hitherto rejected. Granting that negotiations had not yet even begun, and that Rowlands had only discussed with Guzzetti the terms of reference of future negotiations, the Times still found "some disturbing elements" in the apparent policy change. The Times wanted to follow the old line of gaining Argentina's cooperation without discussing sovereignty. The Falkland Islands are a British possession by right and in law. There should be— and should have been—no question of even discussing that issue, however many safeguards are promised. There should especially be no discussions on sovereignty with a government which is running its own country with such disregard for basic human values. . . . On even the most conservative view many thousands of people are kept in detention without trial. Thousands more have disappeared. The systematic use of torture as a tool of state policy has been proven beyond doubt. Even by South American standards, the government of Argentina is an exceptionally nasty one. ... It is not a country with whose government Britain ought to consider even talking about the future status of one of its colonies.

One should not discuss transferring control over British subjects to a state that disregarded basic human values, a country whose government was so brutal as to seem almost subhuman. It was much preferrable to keep a hard definition of sovereignty. Reporter Michael Frenchman differed from his editors' position. He was sympathetic to the islanders, who "are adamant in their desire to remain

Sovereignty Redefined: Oil and the Falklands Dispute

101

British and rightly fear that any economic deal may eventually lead to closer political involvement." But he also had concluded that "the key to an eventual solution of the Falkland Islands problem and their development lies with the acceptance by the islanders that there should be economic cooperation with Argentine commercial interests." He noted that no serious commercial development could occur until the Falklands airfield was lengthened to international standards, at a cost of £6.5 million, beyond the range of British taxpayers. He saw no reason Argentina should not consider picking up the tab. "This might be done as a gesture of long-term goodwill to the islands in return for a 25-year moratorium on the sovereignty issue, similar to that agreed for the Antarctic territories, and as part of a EEC export deal."51 Rowlands flew back to London after a nine-day visit to Argentina and the Falklands, and the House of Commons and the press gave him a chilly reception. MPs criticized his willingness to discuss sovereignty. The Daily Telegraph and the Daily Express carried stories headed "Falkland Fear of Sellout" and "This Island Larder We Can't Afford to Give Away." Some Argentines thought the way to cripple British opposition to transferring sovereignty would be by crippling the Falkland lobby. One Argentine tried to buy the Falkland Islands Company, the Falkland lobby's most stalwart contributor. This would have perhaps dealt a severe blow to the lobby, because an Argentine-owned FIC would probably not have supported it. In late January 1977 Charrington, a prominent islands' investor, was approached by Sir James Goldsmith's Paris-based Banque Occidentale pour 1'Industrie et le Commerce on behalf of unnamed clients about the possibility of selling its company. Goldsmith was told that the FIC must know who his clients were and that it would not sell stock to Argentines. Hector Francisco Capozzolo, an Argentine businessman who had bought other properties from Charrington, said he was hoping to buy FIC, making him Goldsmith's probable client. After news of the offer was made public, Rowlands announced in the Commons in March that "no land [on the islands] can be alienated on the Falkland Islands without the permission of the Falkland Islands Government itself; the British Government would not support such a move."52 Charrington did not sell FIC, and it continued supporting a lobby that advocated hard British sovereignty over the Falklands. This was not the first time that Argentina had sought to resolve the Falklands dispute by a financial deal. In 1953, Juan Peron sent the acting president of the Argentine Senate, Rear Admiral Alberto Teisaire, to the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II. While he was in London for the festivities, he went to the Foreign Office to offer to buy the islands from Britain. It would, he said, put Anglo-Argentine relations on a firm basis. The Foreign Office rejected the offer, fearing that a sale could bring down the government of Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Adding insult to injury, Foreign Office official Kenneth Pridham noted that Admiral Teisaire attended the coronation without a uniform or decorations so that "at the major functions he looked unhappily like a rather inferior waiter." 53

102

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

Argentine hardliners in the 1970s feared not only the Falklands lobby but also Argentine softliners. They feared the softliners were being manipulated by an Anglo-Argentine alliance that was being supported by the CIA. The po ntial of Falklands oil was incorrectly said to have been discussed in a CIA report sent to President Jimmy Carter. He used the report in his preparation for his so-called moral equivalent of war speech on 19 April 1977, in which he called for energy conservation and synthetic fuels development programs in an era of resource scarcity. A desensitized version of the report was made public on the same day as the speech. The report concluded that, beginning in the mid-1980s, demand for oil and natural gas would exceed supply, and the wholesale price of oil might be increased 300 percent. The by-then-familiar repetition of projections of oil shortages made still-untapped oil and gas deposits that much more important. The Times (London) claimed that the CIA had analyzed the political and technical factors preventing development of the Falklands' oil. the CIA apparently says that the Falkland Islands have vast oil and gas potential. But Britain's dispute with Argentina over the territory, together with the time-lag in developing the necessary technology, makes it likely that these reserves will not become available before the next century. 54

Some Argentines feared that the former head of allied intelligence in Europe now employed by the Falklands lobby and, they suspected, the CIA, might cooperate with just enough Argentines to develop the oil for the benefit of Britain and the United States. They wondered if the interest of the intelligence community might evolve to the point that the CIA, the Falklands lobby, or some other Anglo-American group might try to influence events by enlisting the support of any involved Argentine officials.55 What might a lucrative oil deposit be worth? Could all involved Argentine officials resist the benefits of cooperating with foreigners? Hardliners might well suspect that international cooperation really meant corruption of some national officials. Argentine nationalists felt that their autarkical form of nationalism was threatened by what they saw as domestic leftist terrorism and the pressure from internationalist businessmen and bureaucrats for cooperation. The Montoneros and the ERP could be fought by state terrorism in what was called the dirty war; the internationalists were more difficult to oppose.56 Guzzetti continued to oppose the cooperation favored by Martinez de Hoz and the Foreign Office. He had resolved "to go ahead with commercial exploitation of marine resources in seas which Britain regards as hers."57 Argentina now required that all companies harvesting hake around the Falklands as well as in other Argentine coastal waters apply to it for licenses. The Argentine foreign minister was reported to have said that his government would "prevent any company from exploiting marine resources around the islands" unless it was done in cooperation with Argentina.

Sovereignty Redefined: Oil and the Falklands Dispute

103

LIMITED ACCEPTANCE OF BINATIONALITY British and Argentine hardliners remained opposed to and suspicious of each other and of the softliners. Those who were searching for relative sovereignty progressed toward their goal in spite of the hardliners' opposition. Argentina's secretary of energy, Dr. Guillermos Zubaran, said that foreign oil companies were being invited by Argentina to bid for oil tenders. He was not only a moderate trying to arrange cooperation between Argentina and the multinational corporations, he was also a softliner. Zubaran had also talked with British officials from the British National Oil Corporation, the Offshore Supplies Office, and other commercial groups in Britain "in an attempt to secure some kind of cooperation over the supply of equipment and technical expertise.58 Zubaran believed that a convergence of interests was possible. Britain's agreement to discuss sovereignty helped those in the Argentine government who wished to cooperate. Development that might provide benefits to Argentina could proceed while nationalists were quieted by the hope of eventually gaining sovereignty. Negotiators would try to maintain this delicate situation in the talks in Rome beginning on 12 July and lasting three days. The head of the Argentine delegation, Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary Senor Gualter Oscar Allara, was said to have indicated that Argentina was somewhat prepared to recognize the significance of the islanders' wishes. Britain came to the new round of negotiations publicly stating that sovereignty was not a closed issue, although there could be no change of status without the consent of the islanders. The joint communique issued at the end of the first round of talks in July 1977 had stated that these talks had led to "a better awareness of the position of each side as a basis on which to continue to seek understanding." Some mutual flexibility had been demonstrated. The softliners could have some hope. The British and Argentine governments had announced on 26 April 1977 that agreement had been reached on the terms of reference for negotiations about the islands. Negotiations were to be held starting June or July 1977 and would be concerned with future political relations, including sovereignty and economic cooperation, in regard to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands, and the Southwest Atlantic in general. David Owen, the British secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, had stated in Parliament on 26 April 1977 that the negotiations would be directed to the working out of a peaceful solution to the existing dispute on sovereignty between the two states, and the establishment of a framework for AngloArgentine economic cooperation which will contribute substantially to the development of the Islands, and the region as a whole. 59 Britain hoped to resolve the political impediments to oil development. David Spanier, apparently unaware of the now well-established role of oil in the dispute, reported that "joint oil exploration is emerging as a new element in

104

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

the diplomatic efforts now under way to reconcile British and Argentine interests over the Falkland Islands." He noted that this attempted reconciliation would be discussed in the upcoming negotiations. He observed that the possible exploitation of oil had "attracted the attention of all the major oil companies" and of "the American Central Intelligence Agency." He also thought that British experience in the North Sea would be advantageous in explorations in the Southwest Atlantic. The crux of the problem, as always, was that politically, "development of any of the islands' resources would be impractical without some agreement between Britain and Argentina." 60 Fabians were disapointed that the Rome negotiations in the second week of July did not produce a clearer agreement to cooperate in oil development. The Fabian Society had given its support to the position that the dispute could be settled during the negotiations if the islanders, the British, and the Argentines could agree on the methods to explore for oil. Colin Phipps, a Labour MP and petroleum geologist, wrote in a Fabian pamphlet entitled "What Future for the Falklands" that clearly some kind of catalyst is needed which will bring all three sides—Falklanders, the British Government and the Argentines—together in mutual self-interest. Careful consideration of the position would suggest that the prospect of off-shore oil presents the best catalyst available. 61

Even if no oil or gas were found, ten years of useful cooperation would create habits of significant value in resolving the dispute, he argued, in the tradition of the functionalists. The editors of the Times had agreed that the July communique had "hardly suggested much progress." The editors noted with apparent satisfaction that the Argentines seemed prepared to recognize the importance of the islanders' wishes. This had shown that the Argentines "realized that the islanders' wishes do impose a constraint on the British Government's liberty to dispose of the islands."62 The Times' editors had softened their view also, recognizing the sincere Argentine claim to the Malvinas. On 18 July, three days after the talks ended, they wrote, "The recovery of the Malvinas is to Argentines of all ideologies and of all European antecedents a national obsession, a patriotic imperative, unrelated to economics." The Times' editors were still concerned that Argentines were so obsessed that they would not cooperate with Britain but continue to "demand British surrender." The Times hoped Britain could support the islanders' "heart-warming" opposition to full Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas while coopting Argentina in the development of the oil.63 Many islanders had no interest in supporting any delicate balances that accommodated Argentine hardliners. On 27 July 1977 a group of kelpers visiting London enjoyed a reception at the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association offices at the House of Commons. One hundred and forty backbenchers from all parties signed a motion noting the islanders' determination to remain British and Parliament's demand to have explained any suggestion that sovereignty might be transferred. In this motion the MPs also rejected "a

Sovereignty Redefined: Oil and the Falklands Dispute

105

policy which deliberately places their [the Falklanders'] air communications with the outside world in the hands of a state which denies fundamental human rights." John Biggs-Davison, chairman of the group of MPs sympathetic to the cause of the Falkland Islands, declared it was time to sound the alert against the breaking-down of the islanders' will to remain British. These MPs would support the islanders' rejection of the surrender of any degree of sovereignty. The Falkland lobby and its supporters continued to be disturbed by the speculations that the Foreign Office would "give away the Falklands" if British petroleum companies were granted Argentine licenses to develop the South Atlantic oil fields.64 With these restraints on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the negotiations of 13-15 December in New York offered little chance for a breakthrough. Edward Rowlands, who had initiated this series of negotiations with his February trip to Argentina and the Falklands, did think that progress was being made since the July 1977 talks in Rome. The suspicions of Argentine and Falkland hardliners perhaps would not be transformed into trust until the softliners presented them with fait accomplis. A degree of economic cooperation had already been achieved. The Argentine air force's transport wing, Lineas Aereas del Estado (LADE), has been providing transport service to the Falklands since 1971. Ambassador Raul Medina Munoz, director of the Malvinas and Antarctic department, which was the ministry set up to formalize Argentina's rather mythical governance of these areas, had suggested that Argentina pay for the runway extensions at the Port Stanley airport and that the latest seismic surveys in the islands' offshore waters done by Geophysical Services be sent both to British and Argentine oil companies.65 The purpose of negotiations now was to further the economic cooperation that had already begun. The negotiators in New York would be discussing further aspects of economic cooperation, not just the main issue of sovereignty. The process of cooperation was already well along in practice. If it could just continue long enough, politicians and nationalists might soften their political ideas. When that round of negotiations ended on December 15, Rowlands and Captain Gualter Allara jointly announced that two joint working parties would look further into the two issues of sovereignty and economic cooperation. Rowlands was searching for "a method of reconciling two irreconcilable positions."56 The British choice of cochairman on the sovereignty working committee was noteworthy. George Hall, an assistant undersecretary at the Foreign Office, had also been the British delegate and chairman of the Antarctic treaty conference held in London in September and October in order for the 13 signatory countries of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty to review the accord, due for renegotiation in 1991. The thirteen nations that had signed the Antarctic treaty in 1959 had agreed not to raise the issue of sovereignty over the territory they claimed in the area until 1991, or for thirty two years. This agreement by the signatories of the Treaty of Antarctica had kept the frozen continent demilitarized and open to scientific exploration. It represented a promising alternative model for negotiation for the Falklands dispute.

106

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

Another possible solution brought by the British delegation was the idea of a Hong Kong type of lease-back arrangement. Argentina might be granted political sovereignty over the Malvinas in return for acknowledging Britain's right to participate in the economic development of the islands and the islanders' right to continue their way of life. The Hong Kong solution, which would be discussed frequently over the next few years, was not favored by the strict nationalists in Argentina. With the potential of great resource wealth now generally known, they could not be expected to unreluctantly give away the economic benefits of sovereignty in exchange for the verbal accouterments of the concept. If economic cooperation had been unacceptable to some in Buenos Aires because it would mean retreating from the claim of absolute sovereignty, they could be little more enticed by a Hong Kong solution that gave them only limited sovereignty over the Malvinas. The verbal victory would ring hollow, and accusations of deception or being duped would likely be heard from nationalists in Argentina. YPF and British National Oil were unable to cooperate in the development of the Falklands oil.67 This was the case in part because YPF was willing to go only so far as to discuss the halfway house of cooperating not with Britain but with foreign oil companies. President Raul A. Ondarts of YPF said that Argentina would begin an all-out effort to increase development drilling.68 Argentina's government had decided to reopen its doors to private oil companies that would work under Argentine license. Esso and Shell were said to be favorably impressed by what they saw as a new era of risk contracts with Argentina. The Oil and Gas Journal found a "distinct possibility" that bidding on blocks close to the Malvinas would begin before the end of 1978. YPF leaders felt that there were "enough seismic prospects within undisputed Argentine waters to begin evaluating the area." The trade journal did warn that if drilling within the disputed area was "to finally begin, a U.K./Argentinian ownership dispute may have to be settled first."69 Argentina was actively developing the offshore oil potential in waters that were clearly hers, but it was working slowly toward the Malvinas. The December 1978 round of negotiations in Geneva gave some hope that Argentina might cooperate with Britain in developing the Malvinas. On 20 December Rowlands and Allara announced that their governments had agreed in principle to cooperate in scientific research in the islands. The search for oil would be among the scientific activities. 70 The negotiators could hardly be blamed if they felt pleased that such a step had been accomplished. Britain's willingness to risk discussing sovereignty had paid off in moving negotiations to the point of agreement to jointly explore for oil. There was reason to believe a peaceful resolution to the dispute could be achieved. Argentines and Britains might even come to identify themselves with each other to a limited degree if they could successfully work together.

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY REASSERTED Reasons to doubt that such a resolution could be achieved also existed. A group of backbench MPs marked the second anniversary of Rowlands' trip to

Sovereignty Redefined: Oil and the Falklands Dispute

107

the Falklands and Argentina by supporting a motion tabled on 13 February 1979 by Sir Nigel Fisher. In this motion Fisher urged the British government to develop the islandss' resources, presumably without Argentine help. Softliners and hardliners in both countries were interested in the increasing information about the resource wealth around the Falklands. Public disclosure was made in December 1979 of some of the seismic studies that had been done around the Falklands. This provided more evidence that the commercial oil potential was promising. Michael Frenchman reported that the U.S. Geological Survey's estimation that the oil deposits near the Falklands totaled as much as nine times that of the North Sea "was greeted with some incredulity at first, but now seems to be treated with less scepticism."71 The recent studies, he wrote, were carried out by Geophysical Services and Western Geophysical. They covered the 400-rnile-wide ocean floor between the Falklands and the Argentine mainland, a total of some 200,000 square miles of the sea bed. British National Oil called the results of the oil potential surveys "more encouraging than discouraging." Sedimentary rock layers, which commonly indicated oil deposits, had been found in five of the main rock basins on the continental shelf from the Straits of Magellan, which divides Tierra del Fuego from the mainland, to Weddell Island in the Falklands. An oil-bearing rock layer was discovered 4.5 degrees west of Weddell Island at a depth of some 3.5 kilometers. To Alexander MacDonald of MacDonald Drilling and Offshore Services, this evidence meant that there was "the possibility of a major hydrocarbon deposit on or around the continental shelf. Looking for oil there is now an economic proposition and many major oil companies are very interested in participating in exploration." YPF had awarded two blocks, TDF El and Ell, totaling 14,000 square kilometers, to Esso. The two blocks to the east of these, CMA-Y and CMA-5, were in the southern Malvinas basin and were expected to contain oil. Adolfo Silenzi de Stagni, an Argentine oil expert, expected these blocks between southern Argentina and the Malvinas to contain "gigantic petroleum deposits" comparable to those in the Middle East.72 Alexander MacDonald of MacDonald Drilling and Offshore Services and Metra, an Anglo-French consulting firm, stressed the importance of the Falkland Islands as the only practical base from which oil rigs could be serviced.73 Lord Shackleton remained sensitive to the still-ominous possibilities for conflict, which he believed the speculative articles by Michael Frenchman in the Times only aggravated. In a letter to the Times he accused Frenchman of giving a misleading picture on the current situation. . . . First, there is no justification for postulating at this stage the size of possibly hydrocarbon deposits in the Malvinas sedimentary basin between the Islands and the Argentinian mainland. The results of the recent seismic surveys indicate only that in some areas the structure and size of the sedimentary section are such as to justify proceeding to the next stage of exploration—i.e. drilling.

He also claimed that "all responsible professional opinion would reject the estimates in the 1975 Geological Survey . . . based as they were on a series of quite unsustainable hypothetical assumptions." Furthermore, while servicing

108

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

of the offshore rigs could be conveniently done from the Falklands, it could be done from other locations. Shackleton concluded by urging a cautious approach by the United Kingdom and Falkland Island government to offshore oil exploration. Speculation of the kind indulged in in Mr. Frenchman's article can only further unsettle a community already disturbed by years of political and economic uncertainty. 74

Shackleton was concerned about the problems with Argentina that inhibited oil exploration. Enthusiasm such as that generated by Frenchman's article would only stimulate old suspicions. Shackleton and the FCO preferred gradual and often not well-publicized progress that might nurture a cooperative spirit in Argentina and in the Falklands. Quick, decisive action and bold statements would alienate both the Argentine hardliners and the islanders. There was at the beginning of 1980 enough cooperation to warrant moving on to the stage of drilling. But the development of resources could not race ahead of the level of cooperation, if conflict was to be avoided. The Canberra conference about the Antarctic in late May 1980 indicated that international cooperation in the South Atlantic was possible. An usually cautious Lord Shackleton was quoted as saying that the conference had been "one of the most strikingly successful scientific and international examples of cooperation in the world today." The Times also reported that he was bothered by accusations that there had been skulduggery and a conspiracy at Canberra, as though there had been some wicked cabal meeting there to down the res! of the world. Man was going to move into the Antarctic and strong rules should be brought into effect without any waste of time. This was the basic case for the convention reached at Canberra.

It went on to report that he believed that credit was due to the governments, which "had been far ahead of public opinion." 75 Shackleton and the FCO were working at Canberra for some of the same goals they had in the Falklands dispute. Argentine minister of economy Martinez de Hoz joined Shackleton in trying to use his government office to lead public opinion. Martinez de Hoz was in London in early June 1980 to speak with Prime Minister Thatcher and other British officials about Anglo-Argentine cooperation in offshore oil exploration and the development of fishing in the waters around the Falklands. "Some progress has been made," he said, and there is a little light on the horizon . . . and I. think the economic side can help. We have two common interests, which could be oil and fishing. So long as some sort of discussions on sovereignty can go on at the same time we might be able to reach some kind of agreement on joint oil exploration or fishing which would be the beginning of a get-together on that issue. We want you British to hurry up and be partners in our economic development. 76

He also said that Britain would likely be able to expand the Argentine market for her products. He intended to develop these ideas in talks with Lord

Sovereignty Redefined: Oil and the Falklands Dispute

109

Carrington, the foreign secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, the chancellor, Peter Walker, the minister of agriculture, fisheries and food, and John Nott, the trade secretary. If successful, he would lead Argentina away from the more absolutist ideas of sovereignty and the restoration of territorial integrity. A pragmatist, he was willing to allow adamant nationalists to have "some sort of discussions on sovereignty" as long as Britain and Argentina could commence economic cooperation. Argentine policy had not yet moved as far as he wanted. It remained at its halfway house, cooperating only with non-British foreign oil companies. Oil and Gas Journal reported on 25 August 1980: The drilling/production surge in Argentina could be the beginning of a major new boom. Government and industry leaders share high expectations. And both are committed to see that those hopes become reality. . . . Argentina's present policy is to attract as much outside technology and capital as possible. The government has established tax incentives, clear-cut investment laws, and protection from currency problems. Most importantly, Argentina has opened an immense area of promising geology. Virgin areas are still available for only the commitment to explore. . . . This new business climate gives foreign investors a fair chance to make a profit and repatriate it. ... Hottest propsects seem to be the offshore portions of the Malvinas, Austral and San Jorge basis. [The offshore blocks acquired by Esso, with water depths between 100 and 200 meters, were considered promising.] Compared to the North Sea conditions off Argentina are less severe. Winds of 95 mph and waves of 55 ft. are the highest recorded. The area is generally free of icebergs, though somewhat colder than the U.K. North Sea.

The journal did caution its readers that although the sedimentary rocks eastward from southern Argentina past the Malvinas indicated a reasonable prospect for finding more than six billion barrels of oil around the islands, "to drill outside that portion of the Malvinas basin which is clearly Argentine would require some accommodation with the U.K. None is in sight."77 Minister of State Nicholas Ridley tried to persuade the islanders to accept a modified idea of sovereignty so that Argentina might cooperate not only with the multinationals but also with Britain. He went to the islands from 22 to 29 November 1980. He outlined four alternatives to the islanders. (1) The leaseback formula. Sovereignty would be returned to Argentina, but Britain would lease the islands either without a time limit or for some period such as 99 years. Some even suggested 999 years. (2) A complete transfer of sovereignty that would grant Argentina satisfaction of all its demands. (3) A freeze on the sovereignty issue for some period such as 25 years. (4) A rejection of discussing sovereignty altogether. Just mentioning a complete transfer of sovereignty was enough to send Falklanders off to call the Falklands lobby in London, which then contacted the media. In a front-page article on 26 November 1980 the Times of London reported what B. G. Frow of the Falkland Island Committe in London had heard from his constituents. 78 "Britain is suggesting that the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands be transferred to Argentina," the article ominously opened.

110

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

Frow also said that Ridley had told the islanders that "Argentina was getting impatient at the lack of progress in the attempts to solve the problem." "Mr. Ridley suggested that it would be in the islanders' best interest if they agreed to a transfer of sovereignty. The other options are a 25-year freeze over the sovereignty issue, and a lease of the islands similar to that in force for Hong Kong." Only after implying that Ridley was pressuring the islanders to accept the option of complete transfer of sovereignty did the Times article state, "Frow said that the lease-back solution, which has been raised before, is the one which is preferred by Whitehall." The Falklanders and their lobby had inferred from Ridley's presentation of the options that the FCO was trying to arrange a complete sellout. This demonstrated more the Falklanders' extreme sensitivity than an objective understanding of the FCO's policy. In the best tradition of option presentation, the FCO had offered three unacceptable options and then the one it wanted, the lease-back formula. Not even an analyst for the FCO could have believed that Parliament, the Falklands lobby, public opinion, or the media would allow a complete transfer of sovereignty from Britain to Argentina. The option to freeze the sovereignty issue is precisely the strategy the FCO had used from the late 1960s until the Rowlands 1977 agreement to discuss sovereignty. The Argentine government clearly could not agree to freeze the sovereignty issue, given its domestic constraints. Breaking off the talks together or rejecting any claim of Argentine sovereignty over the islands would obviously antagonize Argentina and preclude any hope for economic cooperation. Thus it was not diplomatic duplicity that caused the Foreign Office to reject Frow's reports that the FCO had proposed a transfer of sovereignty. The FCO spokesman said, The Government has been considering since the April exploratory talks with the Argentine Republic how best to achieve a solution of this difficult problem which would be acceptable to all parties. Mr. Ridley is now consulting the islanders to establish their views on a basis for further talks with the Argentines. . . . The important thing is the wishes of the islanders. If they agree, we can explore the possible basis for a solution. However, no solution can be finally agreed [to] without the endorsement of the islanders and Parliament. 79

Lord Carrington repeated a day later, on 6 November, the guarantee of agreeing only to what the islanders accepted. He did add, in a BBC interview, that "the Argentines have got a claim on the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands which we dispute, and that claim is not going to go away. What we want to do is come to an amicable agreement with the Falkland Islands and with Argentina." He stressed that nothing would be done contrary to the wishes of the islanders. 80 The editorials of the Times applauded Carrington's commitment to honoring the islanders' wishes. They stated, "There can be no question of simply handing [the islanders] over to Argentina against their will. This would be true whatever the type of government that held office in Argentina, and is particularly true in view of the bloodstained record of the present military regime." The editorial did note that the status quo left the islanders in

Sovereignty Redefined: Oil and the Falklands Dispute

111

a kind of limbo in which they could not "take full advantage of their economic potential" and in which they would constantly be threatened by their neighbour. The Times hoped to influence the islanders to favor the lease-back arrangment because of the idea's merits. "The advantage of the lease-back option," the Times argued, "was that it nominally meets the Argentine requirement on sovereignty, while leaving the islanders to maintain their own pattern of life. It would provide the basis for agreements on oil exploration and fisheries." 81 Ridley agreed with this assessment when he told the Falkland Islands Sheepowners' Association that with the lease-back option their "lifestyle would not be changed and there would be new financial benefits from fishing, tourism, and oil which would commence as soon as possible after the change."82 The sheepowners appeared to prefer the status quo. The Falkland Islands Committee in London reported that the islanders resented Ridley's lease-back plan. An spokesman for the office said, "Most people present were in favour of maintaining the status quo." The islanders came to send Ridley off on 1 December, shouting abusive phrases and playing a recording of "Rule Britannia."83 The effort to persuade the islanders to accept the lease-back plan had failed. Ridley received a reception in Parliament as vituperative as his sendoff from the Falklands. All sides of the House united in giving Ridley an unusual drubbing during his report on 2 December. 84 MPs from around the House called attention to the apparent contradiction between Ridley's assertion that the British government had no doubt about British sovereignty over the islands and his proposal to the Commons that the islanders might find a solution to the dispute if they would agree to exchange the title of sovereignty against a long lease-back to Britain. Peter Shore, the Opposition spokesman on foreign affairs, said "the proposal for a leasing arrangement was a major weakening of our position on sovereignty on the islands. To make that proposal in so specific and public a manner was likely only to harden Argentine policy and undermine the confidence of the islanders." Conservative MP Julian Amery told Ridley that the lease-back arrangement was profoundly disturbing. Amery lamented the longheld FCO desire to get rid of the islands, which had an important role to play in the future of the South Atlantic. Conservative MP Viscount Cranbourne found Ridley's position disquieting. It would encourage the islanders to think that "they did not enjoy the support of their mother country." When asked if the FCO would accept the islanders' desire to maintain the status quo, Ridley comforted no one when he said, "We shall have to wait to see how the situation develops."85 If anything was learned from Ridley's experience in Parliament, it was that political unanimity could be promoted by favoring a hardline position on the Falklands. The desire to protect compatriots and their right to remain British could unite Liberals, Conservatives, and Labourites. The MPs, the Falkland lobby, and the islanders failed to see the FCO's leaseback option as merely a tip of the hat to the Argentine nationalists' demands

112

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

for sovereignty. The FCO wanted to facilitate the plans of those in the Argentine government who like Martinez de Hoz wanted to cooperate with Britain in the islands' offshore development. By seeing the lease-back option as the first step down the slippery slope to a complete transfer of sovereignty, the hardliners outside the FCO kept the positions irreconcilable and undercut the position of Martinez de Hoz. Argentines in favor of economic cooperation would now be harder put to point to even verbal progress in the sovereignty issue. It was not Ridley's public support of the lease-back option that hardened Argentina's position. The MPs' opposition to the option was what furthered international polarization. Of course, if everyone in Britain had applauded the lease-back option, Argentina might still have rejected it. The lease-back scheme had been perhaps the best compromise suggested up to that point, but its nominal satisfaction of Argentine demands for sovereignty would probably not have been sufficient. To have the Malvinas as anything less than completely reintegrated with the rest of the Argentine nation would not have been satisfying for the majority of Argentines. Argentines were tired of almost 150 years of claiming the Malvinas. They had now resolved to exercise sovereignty over the waters around the islands. Only one day after the House of Commons drubbed Ridley for his lack of commitment to British sovereignty over the Falklands, Argentina was reported to be putting its latest offshore oil exploration block for tender. 86 This block, Magallanes Este, would bring Argentine licensed oil drilling within ninety-six nautical miles of the Falklands. Esso, Exxon, Shell, Total, and Deminex had already joined in a $300 million investment in oil exploration just off the Strait of Magellan and Tierra del Fuego with promising results. The Argentine government would award the highest bidder a tender for twenty years, which could be later extended for another five years.87 As the block straddled the median line between Argentine and British claimed waters, the British hardliners were anxious about Argentine intentions. Lord Avebury officially asked the government on 3 December if Argentina had agreed with Britain about the location of the median line. He was dismayed when the Argentine government rejected the British protest about putting up the Magallanes Este block for tender, saying Britain had never formally declared a 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Avebury wanted Britain to take legal action against any company that explored for oil within the new block. Oil companies had previously hesitated to explore in the offshore waters because of uncertainty about Argentine responses. Britain had refused to grant exploration licenses for the same reason. Now these companies were being offered licenses by Argentina. Argentina announced in mid-February 1981 the biggest offshore oil strike to date, near the Patagonian coast where the Shell consortium had been drilling. The capped well had a potential of 2,000 barrels per day, making the find red hot, according to oil analysts. Located between Tierra del Fuego and the Falklands, the well was adjacent to the Magallanes Este block. Shell was reported to be willing to spend some $41 million over seven years for exploring

Sovereignty Redefined: Oil and the Falkland* Dispute

113

the Magallanes Este block, or at least the area east of where Shell was then operating, which was toward the islands.88 The new round of negotiations began on 23 February 1981 in New York. As Ridley left London he revealed the paralysis that had been brought upon the FCO when he said that at the talks "we shall be stalling, just stalling for time."89 The FCO had tried to redefine the sovereignty issue while gradually nurturing convergence through Anglo-Argentine economic cooperation. Unilateral Argentine development was outpacing cooperation. Parliamentary support for the Falklanders was consistent and unified. Softliners in the FCO were able to do little more than stall and hope for the best. The best did not come. In January 1981 the Falklands Legislative Council had voted in favor of freezing the sovereignty issue. Because of the constraints placed on him by the Falklands lobby and its Parliamentary sympathizers, Ridley had little choice at the negotiations but to propose to freeze the sovereignty issue only while economic cooperation was discussed. The lease-back option was not even discussed at the negotiations because of the previous objections in Britain. Argentina's deputy foreign minister, Comodoro Carlos Cavandoli, rejected the freeze option, proposing instead that Argentina regain sovereignty over the islands with the guarantee that the islanders' democratic form of government, legal system, customs, and education would be left unchanged. The islands would become Argentina's "most pampered region."90 The final communique did not contain even the originally planned restatement of each side's positions. It simply stated that further negotiations would take place. Blocking Argentine development of the offshore resources was about all the FCO could do now. On 30 April 1981 the FCO published an advertisement in the International Herald Tribune warning oil companies to take the legal implications "into full account in considering whether to place tenders" in the Magellan East block. An FCO spokesman said that placing such a warning notice was a most unusual step and that he believed it was the first time it had been done. Similar warnings had been made in more traditional modes ever since the block had been put up for tenders the previous November, but the FCO had not been satisfied with the attention paid to them. General Carlos Suarez Mason, the president of YPF, rejected Britain's right to threaten legal action against oil companies interested in exploring oil as close as ninety-six miles to the Malvinas. He said Argentina had never agreed to the median line or even the British right of sovereignty over the islands. "YPF will go wherever the government believes it should," the YPF chief declared.91

SOVEREIGN NATIONS IN CONFLICT It now seemed possible that a lack of negotiated progress on the sovereignty issue might force Argentina to militarily occupy the islands. 92 This estimate was made by British intelligence, which reported in June of 1981 that Ambassa-

114

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

dor Anthony Williams' frequent cables warning about a possible Argentine invasion of the islands might well prove accurate if the British stalled on a compromise on sovereignty. British intelligence reported that Argentina could be expected to denounce Britain in the U.N., cut off air travel and fuel to the islands, threaten Britain's investments in Argentina, harass foreign ships at Stanley, land troops on South Georgia, occupy an uninhabited island, or mount a full-scale invasion. As it unilaterally directed exploration of oil increasingly close to the islands, Argentina became more confident that it could gain control of the offshore resources. Control of the islands themselves came to seem tantalizingly possible. That growing confidence was not slowed by the major oil companies' apparent unconcern about the British threat to take legal action against companies drilling in the Magallanes Este block. Instead of backing away from the block, by October 1981 two consortiums were competing for exploration and development rights to the area. One consortium led by Mobil and another led by Brazil's Petrobras, which included West Germany's Deminex, Spain's Hispanoil, Argentina's Bridas and Britain's Hudbay, were negotiating with Argentina for the 13,000-kilometer-square block. A spokesman for the Brazilian-led consortium said "Our chances are low, but should not be written off. For us to get a look in, the negotiations between Mobil and YPF need to hit difficulties. We must admit that the U.S. group has some first-class negotiators and good operational experience."93 The U.S. consortium was anxious to win the contract since it knew of the possibilities from other U.S. companies. Exxon's well close to the new block had been tested at 3,100 barrels per day, Shell's at 5,360. The Wall Street Journal reported that in this new block, YPF thought "they are on to something big."94 Estimates of the basin's reserves now often mentioned 6 billion barrels, and there were predictions that Argentina could export 300,000 barrels per day within a few years. Britain's diplomats were backed to the wall. Domestic restraints foreclosed the lease-back option, making any compromise on sovereignty impossible. This in turn made economic cooperation impossible. Argentina was moving ahead with oil exploration of the offshore resources on its own, despite British protests. Negotiations could no longer solve the dispute; Britain could only stall while the situation continued to deteriorate. Instead of gaining an area comparable to the North Sea and the chance to strengthen its economy, Britain could lose its de facto claim to the offshore area. Would this loss carry over to diminish the strength of its claim to the islands as well? Would the powerful oil lobbies soon favor Argentina's claims at least to the waters around the Malvinas? Even if Britain kept its right to the islands, London would lose its chance to improve both the islands and Britain's economy. If stalling was all London could do, all was lost but the islanders' life-style and their 600,000 sheep. The Falklands lobby had taken the initiative from the FCO by overrestraining it. Britain was on the defensive now. Its threats were not taken seriously by the oil companies. The Argentine softliners had lost the initiative to the hardliners. There seemed little else to do but give in to the same trends that had forced Britain from so much of her empire. It was ironical that just

Sovereignty Redefined: Oil and the Falklands Dispute

115

when the Falkland lobby had finally succeeded in fusing its interests with FCO policy Britain was forced into a position of accepting the flow of title to Argentina. British resignation to another retreat from its former imperial glory seemed imminent when serious discussion began on saving money by scrapping the lone British patrol ship, the Endurance. Although the ship's demise had been coming up in discussions for five years, this time Thatcher and defense secretary John Nott agreed to scrap the ship. An Argentine official at the embassy in London telephoned Shackleton to ask if this meant Britain had lost interest in the islands. Shackleton said he did not know. Then the British government decided to close the British Antarctic Survey base on South Georgia. This move was also to save funds. It began to seem that so many funds were going to be saved that the experience of 1774 would be repeated. The Falklands lobby was not resigned to accepting British retreat from the islands. B. G. Frow, secretary of the Falkland Islands Committee, who had warned the British media about Ridley's retreat on the sovereignty issue, now criticized the decision to scrap H.M.S. Endurance. He urgently supported keeping the lone "guardship for the Falkland Islands," which, he said, "provides a Royal Navy presence in the South Atlantic." He cautioned loyalists: Its planned withdrawal has been heralded in the Argentine press as an indication that Britain lacks real interest in the [South] Atlantic and the Falkland islands; it is interpreted by the patriotic Falklanders as another sign that they are quietly being deserted. It would seem that the Government is prepared to sacrifice the potential wealth of Antarctica in order to rid themselves of her Majesty's most loyal posses-

sion.95 Rear Admiral Sir Edmund Irving and Sir Vivian Fuchs, joined in the criticism of Thatcher's decision to scrap the only British vessel in the area that could work on ice. They warned that this reduction "of British interest in the present international activity in the Antarctic . . . [would] have very serious implications for our long-term future." The area was important for its krill, they said, whose potential permissible take is estimated at between 50 and 100 million tons. Yet it is probably oil which arouses the greatest interest. . . . With all these increasing commercial interests in train, the present seems a most inappropriate moment for this country to show declining interest in the region by removing its only polar naval vessel. ... In view of the growing international interest in Antarctica there would seem to be a case for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office once more to exert pressure to retain HMS Endurance.96

One of the most important critics of the decision to scrap the Endurance was former Prime Minister James Callaghan. He told Luce, the new minister of state, that some type of invasion was "likely as soon as the withdrawal of the Endurance became known to Argentina." 97 The sesquicentennial of the British takeover of this part of Argentina's national territory was in January 1983. A place in Argentine national history would be assured any leader who righted that wrong by the upcoming anniversary.

116

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

Argentina's unilateral development of the oil, and the Falklands lobby, had forced British policymakers to largely give up hopes for economic cooperation. Since Britain was largely powerless to exercise sovereignty over the Falklands waters, she had seemed to accept that the game was almost over. All that was left was a policy of verbal bellicosity. Ridley, famous for his preference for compromise, had been replaced as minister of state by Richard Luce. On 3 March 1982 Luce told the House of Commons, as he had told Argentina's representative at the 26 and 27 February 1982 negotiation at New York, that "the British Government had no doubts about British sovereignty and that no solution could be agreed which was not acceptable to the islanders and to the House of Commons." MP Kevin McNamara asked Luce if he would give assurances "that under no circumstances whatever [would] the Government countenance the transfer of sovereignty to a country which denies human rights, imprisons trade unionists, denies free elections, and in every way acts against traditions which the people of the Falkland Islands hold dear." Luce replied that "without a shadow of doubt there can be no contemplation of any transfer of sovereignty without consulting the wishes of the islanders, nor without the consent of this House." The wishes of the islanders and the sense of the House were clearly known. Luce had "no doubts whatever about our sovereignty in the Falkland Islands."98 This hardened position on sovereignty was taken with the knowledge that it would antagonize Argentina. The Times reported that Argentina was threatening "to take coercive action against the islanders if [Argentina did] not get a satisfactory response from Britain" concerning sovereignty. "Argentina has the military capacity to take over the islands," defended by less than 100 men."

CONCLUSIONS By March 1982 Argentina was perhaps on its way to exercising de facto sovereignty over the seas around the Malvinas. There was no legal precedent for acquiring title to waters by economically developing them, nor was there precedent for acquiring title to land by first acquiring title to its surrounding waters. Argentina's creeping title would have been at best political and de facto, little worse than Britain's title to the Falklands based on contested acquisitive prescription. Had Argentina continued to license oil exploration around the islands, it is difficult to imagine how Britain could have stopped it. A use of force by Britain against foreign corporations working under a Third World nation's authorization would have been most unlikely. U.S. support for such a use of force would have been equally unlikely. Only first use of force by Argentina, which threatened not only British oil interests around the Falklands but also world peace and the kelpers, could have created European and North American support for England. Had Argentina continued the policy of unilaterally oil development that it had been following since the late seventies, it would have taken de facto sovereignty of the Falklands' waters. Without

Sovereignty Redefined: Oil and the Faiklands Dispute

117

justification or ability to oppose this, Britain could have only blustered about its sovereign rights. With the decision to close a scientific station and scrap of the Endurance, Britain showed it was once again considering the Faiklands an unnecessary expense. Argentina had by early 1982 initiated a process by which title to the Malvinas was beginning to flow back to it. Had the Endurance actually been scrapped in 1982 as planned, and had oil companies under Argentine license begun to explore Malvinas waters, the sesquicentennial of the 1833 incident could have marked a new critical date from which title would largely flow to Argentina. It is ironic that just when limited title perhaps began peacefully to flow back to Argentina, the junta attempted forcibly to retrieve complete control of the Malvinas. The use of force succeeded only in strengthening British commitment to the Faiklands. The unilateral development of oil and the use of force marked the failure of the softliners to redefine sovereignty. The islanders, their British supporters, and the Argentine nationalists were not convinced of the merits of relative sovereignty and economic cooperation. Were the softliners romantic visionaries who tried to bring their more pedestrian compatriots to a new understanding of selfhood that would include Argentines, Falklanders, and Britains? Were they a secret cabal that tried to confuse the majority and bribe the necessary few so as to manipulate the potential oil wealth? Were they pragmatists simply searching for a way to find out if there was any oil without offending anyone? Perhaps the softliners had encouraged conflict by failing to assume during their negotiations that one nation or the other would have to make its de facto control of the islands clear. Peace is maintained when nations know what their opponents want and know that they cannot change a de facto situation. Good fences make good neighbors. When most people in a nation feel that they are a distinct group, perhaps elites should more carefully consider trying to lead them to a more inclusive feeling by blurring the international fences with notions of relative sovereignty. To do so may only increase suspicions. The purpose of negotiations is to manage distinct national interests, not build a new world. Yet softliners like Martinez de Hoz cannot, of course, really be blamed for the outbreak of war. It was not he but his critic Adolfo Silenzi de Stagni who in 1981 called on the military junta to "assume the historic responsibility to occupy the Malvinas . . . before 3 January 1983."100 Negotiations had begun in 1965 because the United Nations called for the application of Resolution 1514 in the Faiklands (Malvinas) case in order to resolve the sovereignty dispute. England's claim to sovereignty based on the principle of self-determination and limited acquisitive prescription and Argentina's historical claim were, in one negotiator's word, irreconcilable. The attempts to resolve the dispute by granting both nations some sovereignty over the islands failed because most people in the concerned states agreed, with Ben Franklin, that being a little bit sovereign is like being a little bit pregnant. The hardening positions on sovereignty meant that the claims could not be slipped

118

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

together by lubricating them with oil. Some began to think that the sovereignty issue would have to be resolved in favor of one state or the other by means of force. What dismayed the hardliners, and was so typical of the dispute over title to the islands, was that the use of force not only failed to resolve the sovereignty dispute, but aggravated it.

5 Sovereignty and the External Causes of the War

DEBATES ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY The Falklands war was an ominous sign of the future for those who believed that the concept of sovereignty was really only a glittering mask disguising the realities of international disorganization and national irresponsibility in a nuclear age. On the surface, national sovereignty and nationalism are attractive to some, but these ideas only help perpetuate the dangers of international anarchy. For those who understood sovereignty as another word for liberty, the war was a minor and carefully escalated conflict. Did sovereignty guarantee the independence of states internationally, just as democracy supposedly guarantees the liberty of individuals? Or was sovereignty an excuse for national leaders to manipulate the principles of international law that were supposed to regulate and restrain them? Was the freedom that sovereignty was supposed to ensure worth the dangers it brought? A tradition adamantly opposed to national sovereignty as the root of all international evil had been established well before the Falklands war. In 1980, Robert C. Johansen wrote that "the decentralized structure of world power and authority, distributed among many sovereign states, perpetuates a relatively anarchic international system in which the danger of war, the shortage of food and other resources, and the presence of persistent ecological hazards threaten the survival of many people, if not, in the long run, of all human civilization." ' This position was restated after the Malvinas war also. In 1983, Richard Falk wrote that "an accelerated nuclear arms race, military modernization on a global scale, and a high incidence of costly warfare are awakening increasing numbers of people everywhere to the deficiencies of a world order system constituted by sovereign states. At the same time, the persistence of this system seems assured this side of catastrophe." 2 A war about sovereign rights between a nuclear, albeit second-level, power and a state that either had or was developing nuclear power was enough to give those within this tradition the jitters. They were not primarily afraid that the superpowers might get drawn in and fight each other over the Falklands. After all, the Soviet Union had not even considered the conflict worth a U.N. veto. This particular conflict was

120

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

not necessarily the spark that could ignite a general nuclear war, although that was possible. It was not the war itself, but the pinciple over which the war was fought, and which still characterized international disorganization, that worried them. For Anthony Barnett the war raised "the larger questions of sovereignty . . . which could equally be applied to a larger international war of the great powers." He feared not a minor conflict in the South Atlantic, but "the logic' of national sovereignty itself." Quoting from Jonathan Schell's The Fate of the Earth, Barnett agreed that "national sovereignty lies at the very core of the political issues that the peril of extinction forces upon us." 3 How could it be pragmatic to defend a principle that threatened human survival? The Falklands was a war to the wise. Thanks to it, we could "see more clearly . . . the dangerous mix of high technology and the 'sovereignty' of nation-states." The world was lucky this time to be given a miniature sneak preview of what could happen if people do not become wise enough to renounce sovereignty. If the handwriting on the wall is ignored and the "international system of competing sovereignties" continues to exist, "the world will continue to be ruled by those who are likely to ensure its destruction."" Some took issue with the idea that the war really was about sovereignty. If the war was not a contest between two nations over sovereignty, it would have a different meaning. Alexander Haig believed that at least Prime Minister Thatcher was not primarily concerned about sovereignty. Sovereignty, he said, "was the key point in Argentina, but not in London. The key point for Mrs. Thatcher was self-determination—the desires of the islands' inhabitants."5 On 29 April 1982, while the naval task force was en route to the islands but before it had attacked Argentine troops or vessels, Thatcher herself had stated, "If Argentina, withdrew, we should immediately cease hostilities and be ready to hold negotiations with a view to solving the underlying dispute," which was Argentina's claim of sovereignty. 6 In the United Nations debate of 1 April 1982, called just hours before the Argentine invasion of the islands, Sir Anthony Parsons declared that he "had not come ... to enter into the rights and wrongs of the problem of sovereignty." He too was more interested in the people of the islands.7 The British leadership had evolved to the point where it was trying to lead the Argentines beyond the goals of sovereignty that had made them so bellicose. This was not an anachronistic war about an outworn but still dangerous principle of sovereignty. It was a progressive war in which one nation was trying to bring another into a higher state of international relations. If the Argentines, like the British, could evolve beyond their commitment to sovereignty, there would be some hope. The problem was that "the Argentines . . . will not agree to anything that would involve accepting that their claim to sovereignty is negotiable. That is the crunch issue," MP David Owen suggested.8 Indeed it was. The Argentines had invaded because Britain had been so reluctant to discuss the transfer of title to Argentina. Argentina's negotiating position during the war was that a withdrawal of Argentine troops was contingent upon Britain's agreeing to a specific date of termination to negotiations, and that these negotiations would

Sovereignty and the External Causes of the War

121

accept the General Assembly's pronouncements on sovereignty over the islands, which supported Argentina's claims. On 9 May 1982 Costa Mendez flatly stated on CBS's "Face the Nation" that Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas should be the objective of negotiations. 9 Even the Communist Party of Argentina declared its "unequivocal support for the restoration of national sovereignty over the archipelago" and insisted that "Argentina should under no circumstances relinquish its sovereignty over the islands."10 Argentina certainly was committed to gaining sovereignty over the Malvinas. However, if it was commitment to sovereignty that caused the war, Argentina was not the only villain. If Haig did not think Thatcher and the other British leaders were very concerned with sovereignty, it was not for lack of evidence. As early as 1968 Lord Caccia wanted the foreign secretary to state plainly that "HMG [Her Majesty's Government] do not consider that [sovereignty] is negotiable." 11 In that same year Sir Alec Douglas-Home was unable to see "any point in talks continuing if sovereignty is included." 12 In 1982, Prime Minister Thatcher had she said, "absolutely no doubt about our sovereignty" over the Falklands.13 She later added, "We do not negotiate sovereignty." 14 Her parliamentary supporters agreed. "British sovereignty itself is not up for discussion," they said. It was "not a subject for debate," and neither the islanders' "sovereignty nor their soul" was "for sale."15 "The most important point" gleaned by MP John Eden from Thatcher's 3 April 1982 address to Parliament was that the Falklands must "remain British" and be returned "to British sovereignty." 16 Opposition leader Denis Healey worried, "The Government are not insisting on British sovereignty as a result of the settlement that might be reached." He feared this, he said, "because the Prime Minister added on Saturday that if there is to be a change of sovereignty it must be with the consent of the islanders and with the approval of the House."17 He seemed to be arguing that not even with the consent of the islanders and Parliament should sovereignty be transferred. Sovereignty was not something to be decided by mere prime ministers, diplomats, members of Parliament, and residents. Thatcher was willing to risk the lives of British servicemen in order "to defend British sovereign territory, the British way of life, and the rights of British people to determine their own future." 18 For that reason, as she told both radical MP Tony Benn and conservative President Ronald Reagan, she did "not intend to negotiate on the sovereignty of the islands in any way" with the Argentines.19 MP Stan Thome lamented that "the negotiations between Argentina and Britain . . . [had] been doomed from the beginning. Both sides in the dispute [had] made it clear that . . . sovereignty [was] not negotiable."20 Sovereignty was known with absolute certainty and was not to be discussed with others for fear of somehow violating it. It was not amenable to compromises. This was just what worried its critics, who thought it made its adherents cantankerous and unsociable. They feared the great interest it held in London no less than in Buenos Aires. MP Arthur Palmer observed that "national sovereignty can never, in the modern world, be absolute, if we are to have in the long run an overriding world order." 21 Relative sovereignty could be

122

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

discussed by sociable people who wished to avoid wars. Lord Stamp hoped a "broader concept of the use of sovereignty" might be developed in order to help diminish "the spectre of another world war." 22 Instead of sovereign nations fighting over the Falklands, perhaps the islands' economy could be developed along the lines suggested by Willy Brandt's Programme for Survival, a programmatic outline for international social democrats, Stamp suggested the creation of a Falklands foundation, under the aegis of the New World Development Fund proposed by Brandt, that could develop the Falklands' resources for the benefit of the entire world and serve as an example for future development of Antarctica. This, he concluded, "would be a fitting epilogue to the history of the British Empire."23 Those who wanted to use the Falklands war as another case study in the debate about world order versus national sovereignty failed to address some of that debate's age-old questions. (1) If national leaders were as committed to national sovereignty as some feared, how were we to get from the evil state of competing sovereignties to the blessed one of world order? By what means was the goal to be realized? (2) Were nations still really so committed to sovereignty? Had not the history of twentieth-century international organizations showed that sovereign states could cooperate as well as compete and even delegate portions of their sovereignty? After all, all U.N. members not permanently on the Security Council agreed to be bound to Security Council decisions made even without their consent. Was not humanity somewhere on the way to world order and away from the disorder of irresponsibly competing sovereign states? Was the balance not rather encouraging between the poles of freedom and order? (3) Why, with the continued existence of civil, guerilla, and subversive wars, was it so likely that a politically unified world would not be plagued by violence?

A RATIONAL REACTION TO EXTERNAL LIMITATIONS There were some who admitted that the Falklands war had been fought because of the decisions of leaders of sovereign states but did not see this as reason to blow the bugles heralding a new world order. These observers tended to be either resigned to the likelihood of states remaining sovereign or in favor of this continuity as the best way to ensure the liberty of diverse peoples. The maintenance of independent states, even at the cost of limited war, was seen as desirable. They did not like war, but they preferred the idea of limited war to a scheme for world government that would be dangerous to freedom, were it not so unrealistic. War was not the endemic disease of the sovereign state system, it was one of two general methods to try to resolve arguments. States were not the only groups of people who used force to gain an objective unattainable through peaceful means. There is no reason to single states out for opprobrium as long as they use only as much force as is necessary to achieve well-defined and reasonable objectives.

Sovereignty and the External Causes of the War

123

It is perhaps not surprising that the leaders of nations have been the people who adhere most vigorously to the idea that rational decisions should be made to use limited force in order to gain what could not be gained peacefully. Haig believed that Argentina probably invaded because it had been involved in "a long dispute with which . . . the Argentine leaders felt frustrated," just as they had felt frustrated "with the [British] diplomacy and inaction." This frustration with peaceful attempts over 150 years to regain sovereignty over the islands was "the dominant factor" in the decision to invade. 24 It was obvious that Argentine leaders had long planned for such an alternative. We have previously noted Argentine statements since the mid-1960s about the possibility of reviewing Argentina's friendly policy towards Britain if progress in negotiations was not made. The head of the Argentine navy during the war, Admiral Araya, said that plans for an invasion had been discussed at least since 1977.25 When he decided that Britain would never voluntarily cede the islands, he backed the proposal to use force. Galtieri said that he too had thought about the possible use of force in resolving the Malvinas dispute before becoming president in 1981. After Galtieri became president, Argentina's ambassador to London, Ortiz de Rozas, told him that the "problem was not going to be resolved diplomatically in this century." 26 For this reason, he began to plan for Operation Alfa, a code name for the installation of a military base on South Georgia. This would be patterned after Operation Thule, which from 1974 to 1976 was to have established a base on South Sandwich Island in order to strengthen Argentina's claims to the Malvinas and the Antarctic. Oscar H. Camilion, a former Argentine foreign minister, said that a major objective of the Argentine government since President Viola took power was to marshal U.S. support for Argentina's claim to the Malvinas. 27 On 24 January 1982 La Prensa reported, Washington has reportedly expressed its support for any action leading to the recovery of the islands, without excluding military actions. . . . Both in the United States and in Europe it is believed that if the next Argentine attempt to resolve the negotiations with London fails, Buenos Aires will take over the islands by force this year.

Washington never did in fact consciously and officially give Argentina a green light to attack the islands. Although they were mistaken in thinking they had received it, some Argentine leaders had been trying for years to get the backing of the world's preponderant military power. This fact indicates a calculated and rational plan to use force if peaceful means failed. Whether or not people who do such planning are given the image of being devious and morally inferior, they are not reacting instantly and emotionally to passing events. They are deciding on the relative importance of foreign policy objectives, whether they warrant the use of force, and at what point the attempt to use peaceful means becomes insufficient.

124

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

A WAY TO GET ON THE WORLD'S PEACETIME AGENDA Plans to use force do not necessarily mean that the planners think the force itself will realize their goal. There is a well-established pattern of states and non-state groups using force in order to have their issues taken seriously in more peaceful forums. Hooting and hollering about grievances is too commonplace to be sufficient to gain top priority on the world's problem-solving agenda. Shooting seems to work better. Argentines had reason to often feel their foreign policy concerns were not attracting much global attention before 1982. When President Viola went to the United States in 1977 to help President Carter with the Panama Canal treaties, the American press all but ignored him. Immediately after the invasion, when the Argentine ambassadors to the U.N., OAS, and Washington landed in the United States, the media swamped them. Ambassadors Roca, Quijano, and Takacs could even feel privileged enough to worrry about CIA bugs in their offices and hotels, an honor usually reserved for the very important. 28 In September 1981 Conciller Camilion complained that "for the English, the Malvinas are 242d in the priority of their foreign policy." 29 The British have recognized the difference in interest also. The Franks Commission, a Parliamentary committee which met at the end of 1982 to study the government's policies toward the conflict, issued a report in January 1983 in which it noted, "For all Argentine Governments repossession of the 'Malvinas' was always a major issue of policy and a national issue. The dispute has not held the same place in the attention of British Governments or of the British people."30 While the nonaligned nations had supported the Argentine cause in their own movement and in the General Assembly, the British ambassador to the United Nations, Sir Anthony Parsons, is probably correct in reporting that, at the beginning of the Falklands crisis, "few delegations were knowledgeable about the Falklands." 31 The change in the Falklands' anonymity was well expressed in the Soviet journal Novoje Uremya on 14 May 1982. At first few people took the Anglo-Argentine clash over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) seriously. Some Western observers even chuckled at what they saw as the "musical comedy" nature of the conflict. But in six weeks the conflict has developed into extremely fierce fighting. . . . The Thatcher government clearly did not expect British warships to go to the bottom as well as Argentine ships. 32

Costa Mendez would defend the invasion by saying, "The 2d of April changed the future of the Malvinas. Before that, Great Britain had decided to freeze the negotiations and the world did not know the Argentine right over the islands. The Malvinas issue did not interest anyone. Today it is known by the world and the United Nations will have to confront it." 33 Losing the war was not so important if just fighting it improved the chances later for a negotiated solution. From this point of view, the policy of the Alfonsin government may be selfdefeating. Alfonsin in his first press conference in January 1984 and again ori

Sovereignty and the External Causes of the War

125

2 February expressed hope that the controversy between Argentina and Britain over the Malvinas could return to "the state in which it was found before the conflict" of 1982.34 He hoped that the British-imposed zone of exclusion could be lifted and the policy of fortifying the islands reversed. Costa Mendez had argued that the high cost of a base that served no vital strategic or economic purpose was necessary for Britain because of the threat of another Argentine move. To consciously remove this threat by calling for a return to a pre-April 1982 situation would allow the issue to drop from world attention and off the backs of the British taxpayer. The islands could be indefinitely maintained at very low cost again. Alfonsin was disassociating himself from the former military regime, at the cost of Argentina's aspiration of regaining sovereignty over the Malvinas. Returning to the pre-April 1982 situation guaranteed that very few outside Argentina would be interested in or anxious to solve the Malvinas dispute. Alfonsin was perhaps hoping the the United States, Britain, and the United Nations would not insist on Argentina's continuing to shoot its way onto their agendas. Having thrown a temper tantrum under the military government, Argentina could now use the peaceful arts of persuasion. The unpredictability of Argentine politics was enough to keep the fear of a second war in the back of everybody's mind. The situation could not return to the way it was before 2 April 1982, but by saying this was his desire, Alfonsin would not be appearing to force any concessions from the British. This would give the British an honorable way out of an expensive and unnecessary dilemma.

THE SIMMERING PIT THEORY The above view emphasizes that there are groups in many if not all sovereign states that coldly calculate when young men will have to fight and die. Another view stresses that the relations between sovereign states are often simmering and that a single, relatively unimportant issue is all it. takes to set off an explosion. Just because the guns are silent for a period of time does "not mean that potentially explosive conflicts are not still simmering." The trick is, according to the Jordanian U.N. ambassador, to "tackle simmering issues in a timely and dynamic manner before they erupt." 35 Of course if international relations really are like boiling tar pits, it might be wiser not to jump in and tackle issues but to hope they will just go on simmering. Some problems, if they cannot be solved, are best dealt with by living with them. The trick may be more to stop some foolish person from absentmindedly tossing in just the catalyst that will set off the explosion. The problem, of course, is how do you know that it is the student standing near a bridge in Sarajevo who will set off a world war or a scrap merchant named Davidoff who will set off a war in the South Atlantic? The idea that the Falklands war was set off by an unplanned catalyst is most forcefully argued by Virginia Gamba, an advisor to the Argentine military. She writes that "the incident of 19 of March 1982 began the crisis which ended in

126

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

an armed conflict between Great Britain and Argentina." It was "the single most important determining factor in the beginning of the war." 36 After 150 years of simmering, the catalyst set off the explosion. Constantino Davidoff, an Argentine scrap metal merchant from Buenos Aires, made an unauthorized expedition to Leith, South Georgia, in 1981. The disused whaling stations there were his to dispose of under contract wth Christian Salvesen, an Edinburgh firm that had been managing the Crown leases for the stations. Failing again in February 1982 to obtain the necessary authorization from Britain to land in South Georgia, Davidoff landed his workmen there on 19 March anyway. 37 Gamba argues that the British wildly overreacted to this by sending warships to threaten Davidoff's crew, an affront to Argentina, to which it responded by invading the Malvinas. Why Argentina did not fight to protect South Georgia, or just bring Davidoff's crew home and apologize to Britain for the misunderstanding, is riot clear. Haig believes that the Davidoff incident was deliberately created and that the decision to invade had been made well before March 1982.38 The governor of the Falklands believed the same thing at the time. He said that the Argentine navy was "using Sr. Davidoff as a front to establish an Argentine presence on South Georgia, and that "if the British reaction was placatory, more illegal landings would follow, the next time probably on the Falkland Islands." 39 This was no bolt out of the blue; this was the revelation of careful planning. The reality about the causes of war probably falls somewhere between the chaos and anarchy of nations always so hostile that anything could begin a war, and, the carefully controlled but devious calculating of war planners who determine exactly when and where wars are fought. There had been planning for an invasion, but the plans first had called for an invasion in November or December 1982. As of March the planning was still incomplete, according to Galtieri. 40 Anaya claims that the junta was "surprised by the Davidoff episode." 41 Just because the junta had discussed setting up a military base on South Georgia does not mean it wanted it there by March. The sending of British ships to Leith prompted Galtieri to advance the invasion date from November or December to 15 May 1982.42 If an invasion was being planned anyway, a convenient excuse to push it up a few months could not hurt. The Franks Committee arrived at the same conclusion, reporting that there was no evidence at the time, and none has come to light since, suggesting that the whole operation was planned either by the Argentine government or by the Navy. . . . When the incident grew more serious it was seized on to escalate the situation until the Junta finally decided to invade the Falkland islands.43

The early date was in fact a serious blunder, according to General Menendez, head of the invasion force. The occupation was premature, and the use of the South Georgia incident to justify the earlier date was "a fundamental error." 44 Coordination between the branches of the armed services was lacking and supplies had not been organized.

Sovereignty and the External Causes of the War

127

MISSIGNALS AND MISCALCULATIONS External factors may also have influenced the outbreak of war by virtue of their sheer number and complexity. There are too many complicated factors in world politics, perhaps, for harried strategists to comprehend. Sovereign states may have calculating planners in warrooms, but rather than making rational judgements and determining events or even responding to single unexpected events, these planners are overwhelmed by masses of information that they cannot even hope to wade through, much less understand and use in their planning. They become not planners but unintentional misjudgers and misinformants. The planners do not make rational calculations about exactly when forcible methods will have to replace peaceful methods in order to realize objectives. They send their nations to war at the wrong times and in the wrong conditions because they have rnisanalyzed that part of the available information about which they had time to learn, and because their counterparts have done the same. States are brought to war not by devious calculators to be feared and respected from afar but by ineffective operators who should be either pitied or held in contempt. The governments of Argentina, Britain, and the United States have all been criticized for sending mixed and confusing signals or for misreading the signals coming from other nations. Ships of state, which should have kept on passing each other in the night, collided. Because of this, an unnecessary and avoidable war cost over 1,000 young men their lives, the combatant nations billions of dollars, and the Western world some of what unity it had.

BRITAIN'S MISSIGNALS Great Britain's primary interests were not in the South Atlantic. Its decisions about actions in the North Atlantic area were not primarily made with possible implications for the Falklands in mind. Britain's post-World War II dilemma has been to match dwindling resources with its commitments to NATO and its overseas interests. British leaders have had to make difficult distinctions among its interests east of the Suez, European security, and its special relationship with the United States. Britain has had to decide whether to concentrate on the Soviet threat to Europe or various threats to its secondary worldwide interests. Within NATO, Britain has had to choose a primarily naval or landbased role. It also has had to decide what, if any, purpose its own nuclear weapons would serve. Limited resources have nudged policymakers toward a "continental commitment," which would inhibit the maintenance of a global intervention capability. By 1981 the government of Prime Minister Thatcher had announced a plan to keep the British Army of the Rhine but reduce Britain's maritime presence in the Eastern Atlantic. 4 5 This decision meant that reductions would be made in Britain's surface fleet, a painful decision given Britain's long tradition as a strong and global naval

128

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

power. H.M.S. Invincible was to be sold and the lone patrol boat in the Falklands, H.M.S. Endurance, withdrawn. Furthermore, some of the recommendations made by Lord Shackleton in his 1976 report, such as extending the Falklands airfield, were indefinitely postponed because of the budget priorities. The Franks report added other possible actions that could have sent misleading signals of British disinterest in the Falklands: the perceived weakness of Britain's response to the establishment of an Argentine presence on Southern Thule in 1976, . . . the Government's preparedness, subject to certain restrictions, to continue arms sales to Argentina, . . . and the failure in the British Nationality Act to extend British citizenship to those inhabitants of the Islands who either were not themselves patrial or did not have a United Kingdom-born grandparent. 46

This latter decision was perhaps made with primary reference to the many people in Hong Kong who are not British citizens who might wish to flee to Britain after 1991 when the lease with China expires. Nevertheless, it perhaps sent a signal to the South Atlantic. The Economist concluded that "the British government was sending a series of unintentional signals to Buenos Aires suggesting a reduced commitment to British possessions in the South Atlantic."47 It was in retrospect easy to compile a list of policy decisions that were made about other areas and about the Falklands that could have been construed in Buenos Aires as revealing British disinterest in the Falklands. As we have previously noted, some in the Falklands lobby and even James Callaghan argued at the time of the decision to scrap the Endurance that it would send the wrong signal to Buenos Aires. The Franks report states, "It was inadvisable for the Goverment to announce a decision to withdraw HMS Endurance and ... in the light of the developing situation in the second half of 1981, they should have rescinded their decision to pay off HMS Endurance at the end of her 1981/82 tour." 48

ARGENTINA'S MISSIGNALS Argentina too might be criticized as having sent signals that were too few or too confusing. British leaders often criticized Argentina for ending the final negotiations before the war with a low-key public statement about the talks but then publishing in Buenos Aires a statement highly critical of Britain's position at the talks. If this was confusing, the fact that there were not many more signals to clarify Argentina's feelings made matters worse. Had Argentina begun an air and fuel embargo of the islands, acted against British economic interests, or harassed British ships in the area while telling Britain it meant business this time, perhaps Britain could have been motivated to negotiate seriously without having to stand up to Argentine military aggression. Of course, Argentina had sent such signals as the 1976 incident, but after January 1982 it escalated the dispute too quickly for Britain to respond diplomatically. Choosing to mount a

Sovereignty and the External Causes of the War

129

surprise invasion meant rejecting a gradually escalated conflict intended to quicken negotiations. Calculating how actions will be understood by foreign leaders is clearly part of the policymakers job, but caution must be displayed when criticizing how well these calculations were made. The action carried out by A towards B may well reveal something of interest to C through Z. The lessons of A's actions towards B may be different and multiple for each of the bystanders who happen to be aware of it. The way the act will be understood by B is little less complicated. B's temperament, the conditions within which B is responding, and the history of B's relations with A all influence B's interpretation of A's act. One problem with interpreting A's act may be that A itself is not sure what it wants the act: to mean. A may be a pragmatic sort, taking an action based on simple budgetary considerations and not thinking it will have any wider implications.

BRITAIN'S MISCALCULATIONS The two nations have been criticized as much for misinterpreting each other's clear signals as for sending confusing or insufficient ones. Gabriel Marcella of the U.S. Army states that "both Argentina and Britain gravely miscalculated each other's domestic and international situation." 49 The Economist criticized the British government's "failure to predict and pre-empt the Argentine invasion."50 For this group, the problem was not that misleading signals had been sent from Argentina, but that Argentina's clear signals had been misunderstood or ignored in Britain. One MP asked, "Did the Goverment misjudge the situation? Is it not a fact that whenever the tinpot Fascist junta that rules Argentina is in deep trouble at home it threatens the Falkland Islands, and were not the signs there to be seen some time ago?"51 He apparently thought the signs this time had been more forceful and clear than in the past. Michael Foot asked, "What has happened to British diplomacy?" 52 Julian Amery said, "It was in February, well within sailing time to the islands, that the Argentine Government first began to speak in a tone which all of us who know anything about the Falkland Islands detected as quite unusually aggressive."53 Denis Healey found a "history of indifference to an evident threat." 54 John Gilbert declared, "General Galtieri has never made the least secret of his intentions. Like Adolf Hitler before him, he made it clear from the day he arrived in office that his principal preoccupation was to regain sovereignty of the Falkland Islands for his country. We have misread the signs at our peril." James Callaghan noted that the prime minister receives the same information as the Foreign Office and the Defence Ministry. In not interpreting that evidence correctly "she made a gross blunder." 55 Journalist Alan Protheroe mocked the Foreign Office for not having read the available intelligence correctly. "The BBC and several newspapers had teams down in the South Atlantic, trying to get into Port Stanley before it was too late." The journalists knew the invasion

130

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

was planned, and "only the Foreign Office failed to read the entrails. (But, then, they often do.)"56 Even the Franks Committee was cautious about absolving the government. It only concluded that the government could not be blamed for the Argentine junta's decision to invade the islands on 2 April 1982.57 It stated that "the invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2 April could not have been foreseen."58 Its use of the specific date is noteworthy. The British government probably could not have predicted an invasion on 2 April early enough to have a deterrent force land in the Falklands before the invasion. But the Franks report does say that the Foreign Office "recognized clearly that the situation was moving towards confrontation" and that an invasion was possible "before the second half of the year."59 The failure was not to predict the possibility of an invasion but to predict its exact time, or that events could move up the date of the invasion. There is a possibility that Britain was sending clear signals and reading Argentina's just as clearly but had no option but to let Argentina invade if it wanted to. Britain had correctly decided that the NATO area was most important to its security and said so. It had clearly stated that the Falklands was not worth much military or economic investment. It also knew that Argentina might invade in 1982, but that there was no consensus to do anything about it in advance. One MP explained that Britain had always been consciously "following a policy of high risk in the Falkland Islands. . . . We always knew that we could not defend the islands," and that a large, permanent garrison there, or an organization of an armada every time the junta rattled its sabres, was too expensive. 60 The Argentine invasion, of course, changed these attitudes in Britain, creating the consensus which had previously been lacking. Perhaps the only way to gain domestic and allied consensus for maintaining British sovereignty over the Falklands was to let the fascist junta mobilize support for Britain by attacking the defenseless islands. The interpretation that the FCO sent nothing but missignals and made only misjudgements attributes too much inadequacy to the Foreign Office. The interpretation that they foresaw and welcomed war attributes too much cunning perspicuity to it. The Foreign Office is manned neither by bumbling idiots nor by divine soothsayers.

ARGENTINA'S MISCALCULATIONS The Argentine government has come under even more criticism for misjudging Britain's position. 61 The Rattenbach Committee, the Argentine military commission which investigated after the war the junta's handling of the conflict, criticized the government for not foreseeing the reaction of Britain and the United States to the invasion, the position of the U.N. Security Council, the possibility of global isolation of Argentina, and for nothing less than failing to evaluate "the world situation with the necessary profundity." 6 2 The committee did not specifically say so, but this last criticism about lacking profundity may have sprung to mind when naval chief Anaya testified that the junta had

Sovereignty and the External Causes of the War

131

thought the most favorable opportunity for an invasion would be in July or August when "they take their vacations in Europe."63 With Thatcher and her cabinet on the beach, how could an effective military response to Argentina's reoccupation of the Malvinas be organized? After all, Latin militaries almost never implement their plans to have golpes de estado, or overthrows of government, until the summer is over and conspiracies can no longer be discussed in the beach houses. What's true for Latin America must be true for Britain. Not only did the junta invade the Malvinas before Englanders took their vacations, it never tried to learn how England might respond to an invasion. The Rattenbach Committee criticized Costa Mendez for failing to consult with the Argentine ambassador to London, Ortiz de Rozas, as plans to invade were developed. 64 Rozas presumably could have cautioned the junta, as did the Argentine ambassador to the OAS, Raul Quijano, when he finally learned of the plans in February 1982. Quijano said to Costa Mendez for Argentina to invade the Malvinas "would be craziness!"65 General Menendez complains that Galtieri would not listen to his words of caution. Galtieri called up Menendez on 2 March 1982 to ask him how his English was coming and to tell him he was to lead the attack on the Falklands. Menendez asked about the expected British reaction to the attack, then planned for November or December. Galtieri replied, "That is not your problem." He added, "England doesn't know now what to do with the Malvinas." Menendez pressed the point, asking about "the direct or indirect consequences that Argentina will suffer after the military action." Galtieri told him that he "could not be thinking about that." He assured Menendez that, "We in the Junta have already thought about it. ... We have studied it."66 One of the things the junta had not carefully studied was the possibility of a British military response to an invasion. Galtieri said on 13 June 1982, "we did not believe that Great Britain would mobilize for the Malvinas. We did not see it as a probability." 67 The reasons for this, he later told the Rattenbach Committee, was "the low socio-economic state of Great Britain, the reductions in their navy . . . the "Endurance" was to be removed from service . . . the distance between Great Britain and our Malvinas Islands, the evolution of humanity and the world and of the society of nations since the second world war."68 He prudently chose not to elaborate on how the evolution of humanity and the society of nations supported the evaluation that Britain would not militarily respond. Galtieri was not alone in making this evaluation. The Argentine commander of naval operations, Juan Jose Lombardo, was asked by Galtieri on 15 December 1981 to draw up plans to reoccupy the Malvinas. A first draft was ready in five days. No complications from the handful of British infantrymen or the Endurance, which was scheduled for withdrawal after the attack, were expected if the operation was a surprise. There is no indication in the plan that Lombardo considered how to repel a British counterattack. 69 The plan called for extreme care to avoid any British casualties, which might aggravate the British. 70 There remains some bitterness in Argentina that Britain counterattacked, causing the loss of life on the Belgrano and during the land war, when

132

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

Argentina had taken such pains not to inflict any British casualties during its invasion. 71 After the Argentine invasion but before the British one, Galtieri made a helicopter tour of the islands. While surveying them he marvelled, "How big the islands are!"72 However accurate the comment was, it did not inspire confidence in fellow passengers like Menendez that Galtieri knew everything that needed to be known about the Malvinas. It seemed to be just another thing about the Malvinas that Galtieri had not known. As one Argentine government source said, "there was a web of misunderstandings, miscalculations, and confused signals. The last thing anybody expected was a war with Britain and a confrontation with most of the NATO powers."73 Galtieri was surprised by everything from the size of the islands to the world's response to the Argentine invasion. The effects of the failure to plan for a possible British military response clearly emerged once the British armada neared the islands. A frantic effort was made to fly in equipment and thousands of 18 and 19 year old green conscripts. This effort did not compensate for the lack of coordination between the three armed services and the lack of such basic equipment as infrared telescopic lenses for fighting at night. 74 It was not surprising that the Argentine defense of the Malvinas collapsed so quickly. The Argentine leaders had not considered that such a defense would be required.

UNITED STATES MISSIGNALS AND MISCALCULATIONS There is a general theory that often appears in revisionist histories about any problem in the world. This theory holds that however remote the problem and however little the United States had been involved in it, the United States probably caused it. Behind the smoke of wars from the Great War to the Malvinas war there can dimly be seen the faces of men from Wall Street or the Pentagon. It was somewhat in this tradition that an editor of the New Republic wrote, President Galtieri's decision to seize the Falklands by force can only be attributed to a sequence of mixed signals from the numerous civilian and military officials of the Reagan Administration who came to the Argentine capital during the last year in a stream of goodwill missions. . . . General Vernon Walters and other recent U.S. military visitors were more directly responsible by giving sympathetic, or at least ambiguous, responses to their Argentine colleagues who expressed a yearning for the "recuperation" of the archipelago.75 Likewise, Gabriel Marcella argues that "the United States . . . also provided unclear political signals to Buenos Aires during the first two years of the Reagan Administration." 76 David Luken, a U.S. analyst of Latin American politics, said that the United States wanted to appear willing to back Argentine claims on the Malvinas, and didn't want to specifically rule out that they would support some sort of military feint to bring the negotiations to a head. He adds, however, "they didn't expect Argentina to take the step it did." 77

Sovereignty and the External Causes of the War

133

Responding to the visit to Argentina of General Edward Meyer, the U.S. Army chief of staff, Galtieri in October 1981 went to Washington to attend the annual conference of the Chiefs of the American Armies. 78 It was at this conference, before Galtieri had become president of Argentina, that according to one Argentine journalist the plan to reoccupy the Malvinas was formed. 79 The plot was hatched in Washington and nurtured by U.S. government officials while in Buenos Aires. U.N. Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, U.S. Roving Ambassador Vernon Walters, U.S. Undersecretary for Latin America Thomas Enders, and others from the United States, including Henry Kissinger, visited Argentina within a year before the war. One Argentine diplomat said, "It was like stepping into a warm bath. Suddenly everyone who had been freezing you out was giving you bear hugs."80 Carter's criticism of Argentina on human rights grounds had been replaced by Reagan's apparent courting of her. This change strengthened Costa Mendez's argument that the United States would at worst be neutral during a more intense dispute over the Malvinas. The United States wanted Argentine cooperation in fighting Central American Marxists, in staffing the Sinai peacekeeping force, and in fighting South American Communists. The United States had been in favor of Egypt during the Suez crisis and could be expected at worst to be neutral in a crisis involving Argentina and Britain. Costa Mendez asked Enders during the latter's visit to Buenos Aires of 6-8 March 1982 about the North American attitude towards the Malvinas problem. Enders was quoted as responding that the United States had a "hands off" attitude, which, if he said it, probably meant that the United States had kept its historical position of not taking a position on the sovereignty dispute.81 Haig later said that Enders had been misquoted and that Enders had probably said something about the United States not intervening in a bilateral question between two other countries and that the dispute should be negotiated by peaceful means.82 Enders cannot remember using the phrase "hands off." Whether he said it or not, "this attitude" of Enders, characterized by the phrase, was, according to three Argentine journalists, "the most solid argument of the Argentine government in accelerating the military action."83 That such an attitude was a strong argument for invading is perhaps a good indication of the clarity of the junta's planning for the retaking of the Malvinas. Vernon Walters, who visited Argentina at the beginning of 1982, has been accused by some of having promised either U.S. neutrality or support in an Argentine war against Britain. 84 Walters has repeatedly denied this allegation and there exists no evidence or realistic and possible motivation that would indicate that he had made such a promise.85 It is more likely that U.S. diplomats, preoccupied with other issues, were not thinking carefully about Argentine intimations about their Malvinas policy or about how U.S. statements might be understood. Nevertheless, Galtieri and others in his regime believed that the United States would not oppose an Argentine move against the Falklands. It is this feeling that turned into a sense of having been betrayed when the United States actually supported Britain. The feeling that the United States would be an ally against Britain had been as strong as the feeling that Britain

134

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

would not retaliate. The United States could not persuade the junta to change either feeling before the sinking of the Belgrano. In his telephone call to Galtieri just before the Argentine invasion, Reagan warned that ArgentineUnited States relations would deteriorate if Argentina invaded and that the United States was a close friend of Britain. George Bush told Esteban Takacs, Argentine ambassador to the United States, that in the event of a conflict, "we could not be neutral." 86 On 1 April 1982 Haig too told Takacs that the United States would support Britain if a conflict broke out. 87 Haig later recalled: There were two attitudes held by the Argentine leaders that worried me greatly. The first was that they never thought the worst was going to occur. Simply, they could not imagine that this was going to end in a confrontation and a loss of blood. Second neither did they think that the United States would ally itself with a tired Europe against a hemispheric nation. 88

Even if an undersecretary of state or a roving ambassador had told Argentines that the United States would support them, which they probably did not, the assurances to the contrary by the U.S. president, vice-president, and secretary of state should have made the junta reconsider their evaluation of U.S. policy. They did not. Galtieri insists that he cannot remember anything from Takacs about the latter's conversations with Bush or Haig.89 Even after 1 April Galtieri believed "that in a conflict within the West and in America, the U.S. would maintain an even-handed position."90 Galtieri testified to the Rattenbach Committee that even the public announcement made by Haig just before noon on April 30, 1982 of U.S. support for Britain in no way influenced the junta's decisions. One amazed committee member asked, "The fact that a power like the United States was to be a possible enemy, as was Great Britain, did not in any way influence strategic decisions?" Galtieri repeated, "It did not."91 For most of April 1982, Haig flew repeatedly to London and Buenos Aires trying to find a peaceful solution to this dispute between two U.S. allies. Haig says that he told the junta during these negotiations that Britain would win a war because it had better equipment and professional soldiers. He said that war would be a suicidal policy for the junta. He tried to assure Galtieri that Britain had the will to fight. But, he laments, they "didn't believe me, they doubted it."92 Instead of reconsidering the likelihood of success, Anaya called Haig an agent of the British, and the junta turned the recovery of the Malvinas into an assertion of southern hemispheric unity against northern hemispheric imperialism. The public statements, during Haig's negotiations, about U.S. neutrality caused many in Britain to question U.S. opposition to the first use of force and the United States' friendship with Britain. One MP wondered if Argentina's "intransigence" in the negotiations was caused by "the junta's interpretation of the position of the Government of the United States." He worried about Haig's having once suggested that there was "some legitimacy in the Argentine claim" to sovereignty. "Argentine intransigence," he continued, "stems to some extent from the expectation that the United States will pressurize the British Government into some sort of compromise amounting to surrender of

Sovereignty and the External Causes of the War

135

sovereignty."93 Another MP likened United States' neutrality to a fire department offering its good offices to a fire and a burning building. Even a year after the war one British author argued, "There is little doubt that if the United States had been willing to make it clear to Argentina from the moment it offered to mediate that, in the event of hostilities, it would come down on the side of Britain, Argentinian calculations both about the likelihood of conflict and about its outcome would have been very different." The United States' "evenhandedness . . . foredoomed all efforts to mediate and ensured that war would follow."94 The first criticism of the United States is that its officials did not from 1980 to late 1981 clearly tell Argentine officials that it would not support Argentina in a war it did not know was being planned. This allowed the junta to plan for a war that it believed would have U.S. support. The next criticism is that although U.S. officials repeatedly told the junta before the Argentine invasion and before the British counterinvasion that the United States would support Britain, these warnings either did not reach the junta or were not made convincingly enough. The Argentines never could be made to believe the United States would gang up against them, and so they proceeded with the occupation. Although Haig has seldom been accused of excessive attention to clarity of expression, it does appear that his words were clear and repeated enough on this point. If his warnings did not affect Argentine planning, at least the war was not fought because of U.S. "evenhandedness" or ambiguity. A third criticism is that disagreement within the administration sent mixed signals to Argentines, making them think the U.S. position could be reversed if the internal U.S. policy debate could be won by their sympathizers. U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and Senator Jesse Helms from North Carolina were the most outspoken critics of Haig's position. Haig lamented that "anyone could listen to what they wanted to listen to ... in the office of Mrs. Kirkpatrick [or] in the office of Mr. [William] Clark [head of National Security Council during 1982], in the White House. If one moves around sufficiently, he will finally hear what he wants." 95 Indeed, it was "the total lack of discipline" and "the total lack of organized structure" that prompted Haig to quit his post after the Falklands war. The British publicity campaign conducted in April 1982 to win U.S. public and official support for Britain's Falkland policy was, according to one British diplomat, "the biggest single operation we had mounted since World War Two."96 Britain's ambassador to the United States, Sir Nicholas Henderson, used his abilities of persuasion on numerous television shows and in the offices of bureaucrats, senators, congresspeople, and newspaper columnists. In his endeavors he "found a natural ally in Secretary of State Alexander Haig, whose instincts from the start were to support Britain but who needed to ... placate the Latin American faction within the State Department." 97 His natural proclivity to accept Britain's position prompted Kirkpatrick to picture Haig and his aides as "Brits in American clothes." She thought his support of Britain was a "Boys' Club vision of gang loyalty—why not just disband the State Department and have the British Foreign Office make our policy?"98

136

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

Haig returned the fire, accusing Kirkpatrick of being "mentally and emotionally incapable of thinking clearly on this issue because of her close links with Latins."99 Kirkpatrick had written her doctoral dissertation on Argentine strongman, Juan Peron, and had in large part landed her job in the Reagan administration by impressing candidate Reagan with her November 1979 article in Commentary, in which she defended authoritarians in Latin America and elsewhere. The exchange of verbal vollies inspired a Mike Peters cartoon of two U.N. peacekeeping soldiers discussing the call to bring in more forces, not between Israel and Lebanon, but between "Haig 'n Kirkpatrick." 100 Newsweek entitled its story on the issue "Reagan's Aides at War."101 Washington political analysts were wont to believe that the shooting wars in the South Atlantic and the Middle East were but pale reflections of the political intrigue in the U.S. federal bureaucracy. The Falklands battle in the war between Haig and Kirkpatrick began when the U.N. ambassador went ahead with a long-planned banquet given for her by Esteban Takacs, the Argentine ambassador, on 2 April. Among the other guests were Tom Enders, Haig's deputy Walter Stoessel, and U.S. military leaders. With these officials attending a dinner on the night of the invasion, hours after the small British garrison had surrendered, it could be thought that at least they wanted a hands-off policy towards the Argentine invasion. Having visited Argentina twice and having written her dissertation on it, she was thought to be friendly toward it. This was confirmed to dismayed Englishmen when she theorized on CBS television, "If the Argentines owned the Falklands, the moving in of troops is not armed aggression."102 However much Kirkpatrick fumed, she did not offer the Argentines a realistic hope that U.S. policy could change. She might infuriate Haig, but she was still his subordinate. The Washington Post political cartoon of 2 June 1982 got the situation right. A crying Kirkpatrick pleaded with a sympathetic Galtieri to understand that "my folks don't understand me." Even the U.N. vote change in June showed that Haig held the upper hand. At the beginning of June, Spain and Panama proposed a resolution calling for a cease-fire and mutual withdrawal. Britain was on the verge of a complete military victory and did not by then intend to accept anything but British administration of the islands. Britain was sure to veto the proposal, but Kirkpatrick wanted the United States to support the Latins at least as far as to abstain on the vote. Haig was in Paris with the president's entourage, so Kirkpatrick could communicate only with those of Haig's aides who were still at the State Department. Haig did not have a direct line to her because, he later said, she was a "company commander," and "you don't talk to a company commander when you have a corps in between." Kirkpatrick retorted that such military terms "may be more meaningful to Secretary Haig, who is, after all, a general, than they are to me, who am a professor in ordinary life. Armies are very hierarchical and universities are very informal, egalitarian places which don't attach much importance to titles." 103 This of course came as a revelation to most university people, who had thought that titles, chaired

Sovereignty and the External Clauses of the War

137

professorships, and other accouterments of status and tenure were taken quite earnestly. Kirkpatrick did not succeed in her lobbying and, along with Britain, followed the instructions to veto the proposal. Five minutes later Haig's decision to yield to Tom Enders' advice on placating the Latins came through the circuit, and Kirkpatrick told an astonished United Nations that she understood that U.N. rules prohibited a vote change, but that if it could the United States would change its vote from a veto to an abstention. The Washington Post thought the mixup "clouded . . . the president's image in Europe."104 Since by this time the United States was publicly supporting Britain's war effort, the vote did not inhibit Thatcher in giving the president "an extraordinarily warm welcome which," she said, "I think we must attribute to the way in which President Reagan has appealed to the hearts and minds of our people."105 The Sunday Times (London) headlined that Mrs. Thatcher was really fuming in an "Angry Silence," and a Daily Telegraph headline read "Thatcher Dismay at U.S. about Turn."106 Haig soothed British nerves when he affirmed that the vote mix-up "should in no way be interpreted as any lessening of the United States' support for the principle involved, which Great Britain is upholding."107 Whatever momentary irritation the switch caused, it clearly showed Kirkpatrick as a recipient of Haig's orders on matters of policy. She was a mouthpiece, not the source of U.S. policy. IMPERIALISM Causation of the Falklands war has so far been attributed to the nature of the sovereign state system, the deliberate plans of national leaders who could not achieve their goals peacefully, leaders who thought their goals could be achieved peacefully if the dispute became a world issue, and governments that confused each other in part by being confused and disorganized themselves. Another causation theory for the war is based on the theory of imperialism. This view holds that Britain, or the entire West, fought a war to teach a lesson to all Third World states. The Third World was not to try to escape from the already established international capitalist system. Britain led a war to protect the status quo against the challenge of Argentina. The flip side version is that Argentina was conducting an imperialistic policy in the sense of trying to upset the status quo in order to strengthen its Antarctic claims, pressure Chile to relinquish its hold on the Beagle Islands, and achieve regional if not continental predominance. British and/or U.S. imperialism in Latin America, and more specifically in Argentina, is usually discussed as informal or economic imperialism. There have been few significant uses of force to sustain U.S. and English dominance in South America. The Anglos have been able to cooperate with local elites at the expense of the majority in an imperialism of free trade, some argue. This has been a nonpolitical or nonformal type of imperialism. 108 Perhaps even this

138

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

concept of informal imperialism should be restricted to forms of political domination. It might be better to use the notion of influence to discuss European success in collaborating with local elites.109 The European, albeit usually Spanish, elites in Latin America could often be ideal collaborators with British traders, making the costs of formal, political, and military colonization unnecessary. Manuel Belgrano, for whom, ironically, the destroyed Argentine battleship was named, and Mariano Moreno were important advocates of British political and economic principles early in Argentina's history. Belgrano wrote that "the nearer a state is to complete liberty in its internal and external trade, the nearer it is to a steady prosperity. If it is fettered, its steps toward prosperity are slow and far apart."110 Belgrano was among the first to protest the Spanish trading monopoly, preferring to open Argentine trade to Britain. Moreno was another liberal porteno, or resident of Buenos Aires, who in 1810 demanded free commerce.111 This liberal movement led part of the Argentine effort for independence from Spain. Bernardino Rivadavia, as minister of government and then President of the newly independent republic from 1821 to 1829, wanted financial systems like those already developed in Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States under Alexander Hamilton. These included (1) a state whose taxes not only met current expenditure but also serviced the loans that tied the monied interests to the state, (2) banks that pooled money to finance commerce, and (3) joint-stock companies that pooled resources to finance production. He also signed a treaty in which Britain recognized Argentina, and which offered Britain freedom of economic intercourse. 112 The problem for the British was the continued existence of the backland elites whose prosperity did not depend on exports and imports. Liberals had to contend with General Juan Manuel de Rosas and other "barbarians," as President Sarmiento later called the rural anti-British caudillos and gauchos, or small landowners and cowboys. However, after Rosas' defeat in 1852 a laissez-faire system dominated in Argentina. An export-import oligarchy of porteno merchants and bankers, and cattle and grain estancieros, or owners of vast ranches who usually lived in, or at least traveled to, Buenos Aires, ruled uncontested well into the twenthieth century. Did this indicate that British diplomats (not British soldiers, except on occasions in 1806, 1807, and the 1840s) initiated British policy in order to economically control Argentina? 113 Or that financiers and traders acted alone, usually without any help from the British government, and were able to threaten Argentina only with denial of credit, not with force? Did this relative weakness force British economic elites to collaborate with the stronger local elites?114 And was the British government, not a tool of economic elites, simply doing what it could to meet the ultimate goal of any government to improve existing economic structures by aiding big business and big finance? 115 The questions concerning the political effect of British economic interests have been long discussed. Lenin quoted one author who had written in 1906, "South America, and especially Argentina, is so dependent financially on London that it ought to be described as almost a British commercial colony." 116

Sovereignty and the External Causes of the War

139

Lenin argued that the new, monopoly, financial capitalists had defeated the old, competitive, productive capitalists in Europe and now dominated such nations as Argentina and Chile in part by loaning them money. After excessive loans had been made, local elites could keep a cut of the take as long as they ran their local economies well enough to use export revenue to service the debts.117 Elites in Argentina and other periphery nations oppressed their national masses. The elites enriched themselves but sent exports and most export revenue to the European elites, which distributed a small portion of the income to European workers. European workers, thus bought off by the welfare state, surrendered their revolutionary role to the workers of the financially colonized periphery. There were disagreements about the role of European, especially British, governments in First World economic policy toward Argentina and the rest of Latin America. British and, after World War I, American economic influence in the region was widely debated. What distinguished this economic policy from that toward Africa and Asia was the general lack of direct political or military control. Not until the era of decolonization did European and American capitalists develop regional empires without colonies in Africa and Asia. They had done so in certain countries, such as Egypt, until the collaborative system became overloaded and imperialists had to intervene directly and militarily. 118 Even then, colonial administrators had tried to have native mediators act as buffers between them and the native masses. If the Falklands war had anything to do with imperialism, it was a far different thing than the indirect, economic, informal imperialism or influence that the North had usually practiced in South America. In the Caribbean and Central America the United States carried out direct, military interventions, but this was extremely rare on the continent. Nevertheless, the term imperialism was frequently used to describe the United States-backed British use of force in the Falklands war. Certainly Soviet propagandists said that military force was being used to maintain the long-standing economic imperialism practiced by the Anglos in South America. They often argued that oil was "the reason for the Anglo-Argentinian conflict over the Falkland Islands." The Moscow paper TRUD went on to explain, "The waters of the Falklands archipelago contain more oil reserves than the North Sea."119 Colonel Ponamarev stated in Krasnaya Zvezda on 7 April 1982 that the Falklands' waters held thirteen times the North Sea reserves.120 The Soviets broadcast to all Latin America that the islands' oil reserves were about 200 billion barrels. 121 TASS considered it a foregone conclusion that "whenever there is an indication of the existence of oil in some other area, the imperialist circles hasten to send their warships there." 122 Argentine naval chief Anaya told Haig during the negotiations before the war that "the English are pressing it because they want the Malvinas' oil." Haig's argument that Britain's interest in this circumstance was to protect the islanders' right of self-determination and British honor, not oil, fell on deaf ears. Even within the EEC there was some talk about the effect of oil on British policy. The Irish Times suggested that "Britain's attitude appeared to stiffen (in late 1981 and early 1982) when

140

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

Argentina offered oil companies various services for drilling off the Falklands."123 Argentine Communist Mario Jose Grabivker believed Washington was trying to use the conflict to advance its own interests, since it was well known that it had long wanted to "seize control of the wealth of the Malvinas" and exercise "economic, political and military control of the whole of Argentina's Patagonia."124 PRAVDA revealed that it was "not for nothing" that the "ubiquitous Rockefeller oil octopus—Exxon—[is] already drilling" around the Falklands.125 Soviet propagandists differed as to whether the United States was using Britain, Britain was using the United States, the two states were cooperating in order to gain joint control of the islands' resources, or the United States and Britain were fighting each other for unilateral control of the Falklands' oil. As the war went on the dominant theme emerged that there was a conspiratorial "plot between plunderers" on the part of the U.S. and Britain to control Argentine oil and fishing.126 The Falklands war, Literaturnaya Gazeta theorized, is not a clash . . . between British colonialism and the Argentine Armed Forces. Imperialism, whose shock detachment is the NATO military bloc, headed by the United States, is giving battle there against the entire so-called Third World, against all the developing countries. In effect, they are being warned: today Argentina, anyone could be next. 127

On 23 May Moscow Domestic Television told its audience, "the imperialist powers have united against the developing countries. They have decided to teach Argentina a lesson."128 The Soviet author Victor Lunin took note of a statement reported in Clarin, a Buenos Aires newspaper. "Our conflict on the Malvinas," it had written, "is a result not of confrontation between East and West but of the hostility of the rich North toward the underdeveloped South. That conflict has become part of the struggle of all those who come out for a just international economic order and against the remnants of colonialism."129 It became clear to Moscow that the U.S./Britain team wanted the Third World to remain dependent, and that the West was the real threat to Latin independence. The West was soaking the Third World while holding it in dependence. There was also the accusation that the West was motivated to regain the Falklands by military imperialism. One Argentine author held that Reagan's so-called Free Oceans Plan, or the National Security Council Plan of 1980, called for bases on Diego Garcia, Ascension, and the Falklands in order to secure the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.130 The plan had stated, "Great Britain's presence in the Falklands will be of great strategic importance for the security of the free world." For this reason the plan recommended that the United States and Britain should put a nuclear base on the islands.131 The reason the United States was "trying to ... strengthen its own position in the South Atlantic" was clear to Moscow. "As is known, from the Falkland Islands one can control means of access to the Antarctic, communications between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans and also the entire South Atlantic zone as far as Africa." 132 The Falklands would be important if the Suez or Panama canals

Sovereignty and the External Causes of the War

141

closed, Krasnaya Zuezda noted. 133 Prime Minister Thatcher also stressed the Falklands' "strategic importance, not only in shipping terms because of the shipping lanes but because they are the entrance to the Antarctic." 134 Yuri Khrunov noted that Great Britain had leased Diego Grarcia in the Indian Ocean to the United States and that the Malvinas were to play the same role in the South Atlantic.135 The United States and Britain were planning to use a Falklands military base to create a global empire. The sudden recognition of their islands' crucial strategic importance no doubt had gratified the Falkland islanders, who before 2 April 1982 could not persuade Britain to keep one patrol boat in service or more than 25 marines on the islands. Not since Lord Anson in the 1700s had anyone been so enthusiastic about the strategic value of the Falklands. No one seemed prepared to explain why before 1982 all that guarded this strategic gateway were 600,000 sheep and 1,800 tenant farmers. For the British imperialists for 150 years to have overlooked the key point from which to control half the world was not in their nature. It is probably safer to assume that the Falklands' true strategic worth is better revealed by the decision to scrap the Endurance than by the post-April 1982 Argentine and Soviet rhetoric, although it is true that the Free Ocean Plan had indicated limited U.S. interest in Falklands' bases. The Soviets were trying to score propaganda points about economic and military imperialism. Thatcher was hoping no one in NATO would notice that she wanted Europe and the United States to help shoulder the expense of a military base that was aimed against Buenos Aires, not Moscow, according to Argentine President Alfonsin in 1987. Britain had since 1945 surrendered former colonial territories whose natural resources far outvalued the now-discredited 200-billion barrel estimate of the Falklands oil. It: is not very believable that Britain went to war for the 6 billion or so barrels of oil in those most hostile waters. Propaganda from Moscow could be quoted to show that the Soviets considered the Falklands of utmost strategic value, but NATO, for good reason, failed to accept Britain's offer to allow it to build a base on the Falklands. The oil was now no more able to start a war than it had been able to fuse Argentine and British sovereignty. As of this writing, the United States has not requested or received a base on the Falklands. Imperialism is not the concept to use in understanding the British or American responses to the Argentine invasion. A question about the imperial interests of some Argentines might also be raised. Colonel Luis Alberto Leoni Houssay of Argentina called in September 1983 for a continuation of the war against Britain and for necessary action to recover the Beagle islands.136 In December 1983 Dr. Enrique de Gandia claimed that Argentine forces were three times superior to Chile's and two times better than Brazil's. It was primarily the fear of British and American opposition that inhibited him from advocating an attack on Chile to regain the Beagles. He too saw the Malvinas as a major global chokepoint, or a landbase which could be used to inhibit sea travel and advocated that Argentina help Latin America see that "the hour of America has arrived." Hispanic American countries and others in Africa could become the most powerful in the world.137

142

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

Most Argentines do not have such regional or global ambitions for their country, and, if the democratic regime can influence military planning, such pretensions need be taken with only a degree of seriousness. There is also not much evidence to suggest that the junta's attack on the Malvinas was expected to initiate a series of attacks. Galtieri, notwithstanding British comparisons to Hitler, did not intend to rule his continent.

6 Sovereignty and the Internal Causes of the War

The interpretations of the war's causes discussed in the previous chapter have not gamed the widest currency. The most popular explanations pointed to the internal causes of the war, Causation is attributed to various domestic factors that happened to find an outlet in a war with another state. The war was not primarily caused by the system of sovereign states, the intended or unintended actions of states toward each other, or an attempt either to maintain or alter an imperialistic status quo. 1 It was caused by the failings of either the leaders or the people of a nation. Of these two, the failings of the national leaders have been most often cited. The political leaders, or such eminencesgrises as bankers and arms merchants, were cynical, or preferred force over negotiations, and were ignorant, prideful, incapable of controlling events, or too inflexible. Such characters were so dangerous because they tended to equate national sovereignty with their own rule. Military rulers and Tories who were suspected of being closet aristocrats were thought to believe I'etat c'est moi. These leaders were happy to let their peoples pay for their personal positions of power. Such captains of ships of state thought it was only honorable for the ship to go down with its captain. There is a theoretically simple antidote to war caused by the equation of national sovereignty with de facto rulers and demagogues: build democracies. Join national to popular sovereignty, and the wars of ambitious, corrupt, and autocratic rulers will disappear. If the people who have to pay the awful price of war can decide their own fate, they will always choose to remain at peace. Street theater and outdoor craft fairs will replace wars if the people can decide questions of war and peace. A less idyllic scenario results if the people are seen as having the same flawed nature as their leaders. The human failings of leaders can be bad enough. The failings of individuals in a very large group, such as a nation, can be compounded until the evils (lone by the people far outpace the evils done by their leaders. The goal here is not to give unrestricted power to the people, it is to keep the howling mobs out of quiet, cozy rooms where reasonable diplomats can discuss compromises.

144

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

LEADERS' CYNICISM The attempt by national leaders to use their power to gain personal advantage at the expense of the rest of the nation or of other nations has been often claimed to be the reason for the Falklands war. Galtieri, the other members of his regime, Thatcher, bankers, arms merchants, and Haig have all been accused of cynically manipulating power and causing the war. Leopoldo Galtieri, former president of Argentina, has taken the hardest lumps on the issue of cynicism. It is true of course that he has often done what he could to give ammunition to his critics. When he announced the successful invasion of the Malvinas on 2 April to the cheering crowd at the Plaza de Mayo, he was not reluctant to take personal credit for the popular move. He acted as if it was his personal affair, saying many times, "I decided to occupy the islands," and "I ordered the occupation." After the war had been lost and his decisions had become unpopular, he was asked why on 2 April he had attributed the decision exclusively to himself. "Verbal expression," he answered. "Simple verbal expression." 2 It was the reasons attributed to him for deciding to invade the Malvinas that earned Galtieri his reputation for cynicism. Francis Pym, then the new British secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, stated the case as well as anyone. On 7 April 1982 he asked: Why did Argentina's ruler suddenly decide in the last days of March to resort to arbitrary and brutal aggression? I suggest that part of the answer lies in the very brutality and unpopularity of the Argentine regime itself. Inflation is raging in Argentina, at the rate of 140 per cent a year. The regime is notorious for its systematic contempt of all human rights. Only a few days before the invasion of the Falkland Islands there had been riots in Buenos Aires. Harassed by political unrest at home, and beset by mounting economic difficulties, the regime turned desperately to a cynical attempt to arouse jingoism among its people. 3

Even one Soviet reporter made this analysis, The world press has been discussing the question in a lively manner, and is discussing the motives which forced the Argentine authorities and the Argentine regime to turn to such decisive actions now. Many connect them with the difficult economic and political situation inside Argentina and with the growing mass dissatisfaction in the country. On 30 March the largest, they said, demonstration in the whole history of military rule was held in Buenos Aires, and on that day—30 March—the authorities arrested approximately 2,000 demonstrators. Two days later Argentine troops landed on the Malvinas Islands. If there was a precalculation, then the generals calculated correctly. All Argentina celebrated and a patriotic—a nationalistic, if you will—wave swept away the anti-government moods. 4

There was little question that after six years of military rule the promises made when the armed forces had seized power in March 1976 had not been fulfilled. The government had called itself the Process of National Reorganization and promised to end inflation, increase productivity and wages, defeat leftist terrorists, and protect national, Western, and Christian values. They

Sovereignty and the Internal Causes of the War

145

largely succeeded, by the beginning of the 1980's, in defeating the terrorists, but at the expense of becoming a pariah state in the West because of their excessive and often irrational use of force. Pope John Paul II in 1979 questioned the government's human rights policies and asked for speedy clarification of the "disappeared" cases. The Alfonsin government which came into power after elections in 1983 would use due process to convict many of the junta members of illegally conducting the war against the Montoneros and People's Revolutionary Army. The government's chief prosecutor agreed that terrorists did threaten Argentine security, but that the military government did not follow its own code of justice in defeating it. By killing some 10,000 people, using inhumane and illegal techniques of punishment and detention, and persecuting many people who had no relation to the terrorists, the juntas of the late 1970s did immeasurable harm to their own nation. It was doubtful how well they protected the national sovereignty, as they had promised to do. They increased Argentina's foreign debt faster than any previous regime. (Foreign debt, not the level of import of goods, has long been an important yardstick by which Argentines have measured their dependence.) They allegedly made deals with the Bolivian regime to cooperate in the international drug traffic. The International Committee of Jurists and the pope sided with Chile on the Beagle case, which did not deter the regime from pressing its demands for the return of Picton, Nueva, and Lennox islands. The Argentine rate of inflation became one of the world's highest, and so on. The woeful litany was repeated by almost everyone who wrote on the Falklands invasion. Having so largely failed at home, the junta turned to action abroad in order to regain domestic support. The Guardian reported: Port Stanley seemed the obvious next stop to recover lost military dignity. . . . Political expedience . . . decided the move on Port Stanley. It was this Argentine government, more humiliated and more battered than any other in its political dignity, that needed the islands back. 5

Argentina's General Menendez agreed. He said, "A triumph in the Malvinas would have historically justified the government of the Armed Forces."6 The Rattenbach Committee concluded that Galtieri confused a circumstantial objective of internal politics, [which was] the need to revitalize the Process of National Reorganization, with a legitimate historical revindication, and tried to give an interpretation which tried to capitalize [on the occupation] for his political gain.7

Galtieri denies these charges, saying "it was not in the background of my thought" to revitalize the Process by having an invasion. These charges are merely the repetition of British propaganda, he charged.8 Galtieri received the unexpected support of Haig on this point, who argued that the frustration with British diplomacy and the sesquicentennial of the British occupation of the islands were the dominant factors in the decision to invade. "It was only afterwards," Haig said, "that some experts came up with the theory that it had

146

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

been a political decision intended to strengthen the position of the junta." 9 It was not really true that this idea was an afterthought by experts. Many newspaper accounts mentioned this thesis in the first days of April. 10 Some have suggested that the enthusiastic reaction of most Argentines to Galtieri's gamble in the Malvinas appealed to his temperament. 11 He had cynically hoped to use the Malvinas to gain support for his tottering regime. His vanity made him inflexible when the progovernment demonstrations appeared to show that the gamble had paid off. The fruits of his cynicism mesmerized him in a "syndrome of the Plaza," which blinded him to the later deterioration of his position and led ultimately to his fall from power. 12 He thought of himself as the "new caudillo" of Argentina. 13 If Thatcher was the Iron Lady, he could be the Steel President. 14 He compared himself to General Patton of World War II fame, and became "seduced by the idea of power." 15 With the stimulant of the crowds' cheers, he thought his place in Argentine history could rival that of Peron. 16 The crowds made him more inflexible. 17 On 10 April, during the talks with Haig, he went to the balcony of the Casa Rosada to address 150,000 cheering people. He proclaimed, "If they [the British] want to come, let them come; we will fight them." He admitted later that he had not planned to take this hardened position; the speech had been "improvised." 18 The crowds and the speech were supposed to show Haig how united Argentina was; all they accomplished was to make Haig fear that this was like the Iranian situation, where the United States had had to deal with irrational crowds and fanatical leaders. Galtieri had tried for a world role by sending troops to Central America and the Sinai, but the invasion of the Malvinas had much more effectively distinguished him as a world figure in the eyes of the Argentines. And he liked the distinction. How should these claims be evaluated? Was Galtieri acting like the prototypical authoritarian military leader who starts a war when the domestic going gets rough, even if the odds are that he will succeed only in dragging his country into economic ruin with his fall from power? The crowd in the Plaza de Mayo on 15 June, the day after the surrender, was ready to give Galtieri as much blame as it had given him credit on 2 April. One of the crowd blamed everything on "a bastard of great proportions called Galtieri." 19 There are arguments against the thesis that Galtieri started the war only to strengthen his political position. Argentina has gone through numerous periods of instability since the first military coup of 1930. Why had previous military presidents not invaded the Malvinas, if they tend to start wars whenever there is domestic unrest? Argentina had not fought a war for about a century, although it had gone through numerous revolutions and other forms of domestic turmoil. If Argentine military leaders brought their country to war every time there was domestic strife, Argentina would have one of the most experienced armed forces in the world. The single case of the Malvinas war can hardly establish a rule that Argentine military leaders begin wars in order to consolidate their domestic power. If it is not typical of Argentine leaders, was it at least true that Galtieri started a war for cynical reasons? There was widespread dissatisfaction with

Sovereignty and the Internal Causes of the War

147

the so-called process, but Galtieri had been in power only since December 1981. The many problems in Argentina could not be blamed on his leadership. An organized opposition to him personally was just beginning to form. The dirty war had been fought mainly in 1976-1978, so Galtieri was not blamed for most of its excesses. A drastic change of ministers, a so-called bold new economic program, or some other domestic move could still have been made by the new president to try to generate domestic support. He had not exhausted all his domestic possibilities within four months in office. It is probably more true that the domestic unrest hastened than that it caused the decision to invade. Galtieri had originally planned the invasion for the end of the year. The Davidoff incident had by 26 March spurred him to move the date to 15 May. It is possible that the antigovernment riots of 28 March and the calls for more demonstrations the following week prompted Galtieri to invade on 2 April. If there is some question about how much Galtieri hoped to strengthen his political position by invading the islands, there is little question that he lost that position by losing the war. He had earlier explained the excesses of the dirty war of the late 1970s by saying, "in any war there are people who disappear." As one commentator pointed out, in the Falklands war "he was among the most prominent to go."20 Galtieri tried to keep his power even though the war was lost. He did not explain from the balcony of the Casa Rosada to the rioting crowds in the Plaza de Mayo why Argentina had been forced to surrender after it had been winning the war. He did make a televised speech on 15 June in which he told prospective demonstrators that "taking advantage of the situation is an insult to the blood of those that fought, and defeatism will be treason." 21 He wanted to unite the honor of a lost cause, the security of the sovereign nation, and his own leadership. The military did not agree with this any more than most Argentines, and General Christine Nicolaides replaced him as new Army commander, after which retired General Reynaldo Bignone became the new president. One political cartoon showed a looming figure draped in black having a dismayed Galtieri read a scroll. The scene was entitled "The Reckoning."22 Somewhat opposed to the idea that Galtieri was a cynical man cleverly plotting a war as a way to manipulate domestic opinion is the idea that he was a simple-minded man who blundered into the situation. The Process president who preceded Galtieri, Roberto Eduardo Viola, had thought he was a simple man. Viola defined him as "a good soldier, a good commander of troops. He knows little or nothing of politics. He is primitive." According to three Clarin journalists, he was known for his "simple and emotional character" and for his use of "easy words," a cardinal sin to the literati. 23 There was for Argentina an unfortunate mismatch between its deep and complicated problems and a shallow leader. How such a simple man rose to presidential power is sometimes explained by the behind-the-scenes support given him by Anaya. Although the navy was not powerful enough to have its own man lead the junta, Anaya was savvy enough to be kingmaker.

148

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

The suspicion that Argentina blundered into a war because a simple man had such tunnel vision that he thought all economic, social, and political problems could be erased by a good brouhaha can be questioned. One cannot be lacking in any political skill if one not only survives military politics but rises to the top military position. Even if he had limited political acumen, he was not alone in the Casa Rosada. Whether or not Galtieri was indebted to Anaya for his power, he certainly was aware that he shared power with Anaya and Lami Dozo, head of the air force. He often referred to the other members of the junta as his "Senate," who had to ratify any decisions he might favor. 24 Lami Dozo was said by Haig and others to be more flexible and willing to consider peaceful solutions than the hardline Anaya. The range of views within the junta ensured that Galtieri did not quickly decide on the first simple idea that popped into his head. Accusations of cynicism have been made against others in Argentina. J.R. Lallemant asked if his fellow Argentines knew that Costa Mendez had worked for "yankee" and British businesses and banks.25 Even the Rattenbach Committee found Costa Mendez' multinational corporate connections worthy of note. 26 There was no available evidence that Costa Mendez or others in the junta had conspired with foreigners to conduct the Malvinas crisis against Argentine interests. Nevertheless, as in Germany after World War I, a myth developed among some in Argentina that the military leadership had sold out to foreign interests. Argentines have suspected since long before 1982 that powerful foreign influences have operated through their leaders. What was understood as possible treason was probably more like inexperience in conducting a war or petty corruption. Baked goods and the products of innumerable sewing bees across the country were supposed to be sent to the valiant soldiers on the Malvinas. It became rumor that these goods were showing up in kiosks in Bahia Bianca, sitting in warehouses on the continent, or being used by officers who had stayed on the continent. Whether or not this was true, it is doubtful that it could be explained by a pact between the military and the multinational corporations to subvert the war effort. As far as Costa Mendez is concerned, his mistaken analysis that the United States and Britain would not respond militarily to the invasion, and his failure to achieve more support in the United Nations and OAS, can have easier explanations that treason. The final charge of cynicism came with the pope's visit of 11-13 June. The pope made a hastily arranged trip to Argentina in order to balance his trip to Britain in May. His British trip had been planned well before the war, and its purpose was to aid the reconciliation between Anglicans and Roman Catholics. Nevertheless, former Argentine minister Rear Admiral Jorge Fraga said, "The decision of the pope to go to Great Britain at this time is a profound error." 27 Some Argentine journalists thought the papal visit to Britain would be good for the British. A Clarm reporter announced on May 29 that the pope's message of peace had filled Britain's Roman Catholics and Anglicans with "a feeling of guilt." La Nacibn on the same day reported that the papal visit to Britain revealed the British hypocrisy. Us headline was "The Pope Spoke of Peace; London Doesn't Forget the War."

Sovereignty and the Internal Causes of the War

149

The Buenos Aires leadership did not intend to forget the war when the pope visited Argentina. Costa Mendez welcomed the pope's "very presence," which could "mean a great uplift toward the end of aggression in the establishment of a peace which represents our rights." 28 The national Catholic clergy welcomed the pope's visit as a way to bolster their support of the war. Archbishop Vicente Zaste, who had vigorously criticized the government's human rights policies, had defined the war as "a threat to our fatherland." 29 The pope said his trip to Argentina was, as had been the one to Britain, "above all political intent." 30 He had come to Argentina as a "father in faith with his children in pain." Many suspected that the junta, indeed by 12 June in pain from how the war had gone, at least was not above political intent in welcoming the pope. Galtieri, Anaya, and Lami Dozo were anxious to be seen and photographed with the pope. Galtieri hovered near the pope with an umbrella when it rained, and pictures of the junta receiving communion from him were well distributed to newspapers. The pope was scheduled to celebrate mass at the Cathedral of Lujan. The Virgin of Lujan is Argentina's patron saint. One banner in the crowd asked, "May God Bless Our Just War." The pope's speech in the Plaza de Mayo was made to almost as many Argentine flags as people. State-controlled television played the pope's messages superimposed on pictures of Argentine soldiers marching through Port Stanley and preparing for war. None of this could reverse the steady British advances towards Port Stanley, but it did seem to give the junta, at least in its own eyes, the backing of the pope. Two days after the pope's departure, during the antigovernment riots, it did not seem that this impression would be enough to keep the junta in power. The junta was not the only leadership suspected of cynicism. The Soviet news agency TASS made unsurprising criticisms of Thatcher's cynicism. On 10 April it reported, "London's 'Argentine tango' can be largely explained by internal political reasons. The Tory position has been greatly undermined . . . as a result of the serious economic difficulties." 31 Thatcher's domestic opposition also made such accusations liberally against her. MP Nigel Spearing said, "The fleet is really that of HMS Government, whose purpose is not only to right the wrongs over the Falkland Islands but to retrieve the reputation of the Government." 32 Thatcher had been caught unprepared by the invasion and now had to show herself in control. Those to the left of the Prime minister often suspected that she had been looking for some time for something to divert attention from the results of her economic policy. The Falklands war offered her an opportunity to raise jingoism from the dead in order to dazzle the three million unemployed workers. Tony Benn accused the entire Conservative Party of seeing, he said, "in this a diversion from the issues of unemployment and the destruction of the Welfare State. It is not only General Galtieri for whom the Falklands war is a diversion from domestic failure." 3 3 MP Stan Thome declared that Galtieri and Thatcher "desperately" need a "diversion that could transfer concern from domestic plight to national pride." He claimed unemployment was rising and would reach five million by 1983. "Our standard of living continues to deteriorate,

150

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

and . , . there have been more riots in Toxteth during the past week as a consequence of the Government's failures on several social and economic fronts." 34 Others doubted that, with all these problems, Thatcher's government could be reelected in another two years. Journalist John Cole argued that not only was Mrs. Thatcher's government suffering from mid-term unpopularity, aggravated by the worst world recession for half a century. This was also the year when council seats which Labour had lost in 1978, during the Callaghan government's unpopular phase, would come up again.35

If Thatcher went to war with one eye on the local elections to be held in May, the bet paid off. Many in Britain saw a so-called Falklands factor operating in the Conservatives' favor, and indeed they did better than many had expected in the elections. The Washington Post reported that Thatcher herself was "the main political beneficiary of the war in the Falklands."36 When in 1983 she decisively beat her main rival Michael Foot in the national elections, many believed the Falklands were still one factor in her favor. Her opponents continued after the 1982 conflict to be concerned about how the Falklands factor was being used by Thatcher to labor's disadvantage. MP Andrew F. Bennett in 1985 wondered why so much money had to be spent securing the Falklands instead of using the money to help secure full employment at home. 37 In 1986, when Thatcher had a 150 mile fishing conservation zone established around the Falklands, Labour Party critics were sure it was done at that time to improve her sagging popularity. 38 The critics of Galtieri and Thatcher feared that the two leaders went on a foreign adventure because they did not know what to do about domestic problems and were unwilling to solve them because of their conservative ideology. Their adventure cost their countries large amounts of blood and treasure. They were willing to allow others to pay the price for their improved political position. The only differerence was that Galtieri's gamble did not ultimately pay off, and Thatcher's did. Politicians may of course do what they think is to their political advantage. But in democracies at least, the voters are willing to let them gratify their ambition as long as they serve what the voters think are their interests. Even if Thatcher did fight the war only for her political advantage, most Britons believed the war should have been fought and were willing to reward Thatcher's efficient handling of it. Maybe her philosopher-king critics believed that she and the majority of voters were wrong about the need for the war and her other policies, but they had not convinced their fellow citizens of this. One of the ideas of democracy is that leaders will want to stay in power by winning regular, free elections. In order to stay in power, they will have to conduct the nation's affairs as the voters want them to be conducted. Whether or not they are all mistaken is beside the point. Democracy attempts to use human nature, or leaders' ambition, in the defense of the majority's interests. This is not cynical, but calculated to devise institutions which use leaders' arnbilions to promote public good, using private cyncism to further public virtues.

Sovereignty and the Internal Causes of the War

151

Haig too was accused of cynicism. Some Argentine journalists believed Haig had offered to initiate negotiations after 2 April just because he hoped to be given a Nobel Peace Prize.39 Having worked for Kissinger, Haig hoped to imitate his former boss's shuttle diplomacy. 40 While these journalists thought Haig's cynicism might serve the cause of peace, others said it would only further the war. Argentine naval chief Anaya thought Haig was negotiating just to "gain time for the British to get their armada into position." 41 A Washington Times reporter believed that Haig had "deliberately deceived the Senate in winning congressional support for Britain in the Falklands crisis." 42 Another author was not surprised that Haig would want a war since he had been president of United Technology Corporation, an arms industry. 4 3 Not only individuals but institutions were criticized for their cynicism. On 6 April TASS claimed that the British "campaign for launching a strike against [Argentina] is being whipped up by the country's top brass." 44 Virginia Gamba was more specific. She believed the surface navy saw a Falklands war as a valuable opportunity to show its indispensability. 45 Moscow's Domestic Service reported on 11 April 1982 that it was all the fault of the British press. "The rightwing press of Great Britain, heating up chauvinist imperial passions in the country, is publishing articles which go all out to portray variants of a possible military clash with Argentina." The elitist publishers did not care about the "heavy burden" that would fall "on the shoulders of the taxpayers." 46 Tony Benn suspected that the City, London's financial district, was controlling British policy. "What effort did the Government make to bring pressure to bear on the Argentine Government through the world bankers?" he asked. Had they refused to reschedule the debts, they could have brought the Argentine Government to their knees. What effort did the Government make? None whatsoever. ... If the Argentine Government had not had their debts rescheduled we might have seen something approaching the collapse of the world banking system. . . . To rational people it appears that the Prime Minister was prepared to protect the bankers and to send the soldiers instead. 47

To the armed forces, the press, and the bankers were added the merchants of death and other capitalists as causes of the war. On 3 June Moscow Domestic Service reported that "the military expedition in the South Atlantic has already cost Britain one billion pounds. Well, for the arms barons this is just profit, for it means they will get big new orders." 48 Britain's Socialist Standard reported the profits British and other EEC arms suppliers had made selling arms to Argentina for years. It concluded that "wars are not fought for moral reasons—the only justice of significance to the capitalists as a class is that which ensures their own economic power." 49 A cartoon of Thatcher showed that she was more interested in profits than wages, and that British merchants were ready to load arms to Argentina again as soon as possible. The Washington Post reported on 1 June, after the United States had publicly come to Britain's support, that L.S. firms were aiding Argentina's military. Ford Motor Argentina had donated sixtv trucks to the Malvinas effort, and Union Carbide

152

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

Argentina had given $40,000-worth of flashlights and batteries. The improved public image was worth what these donations cost the companies' profits, one assumes. The American Chamber of Commerce in Buenos Aires, constituted in part by Citibank, Exxon, Goodyear, Coca-Cola, and other U.S. firms, sent Reagan a telegram supporting Argentina's war effort. 50 On 22 June Britain's arms industry held its biannual weaponry show in Wool, England. African, Asian, and Latin American countries sent representatives to look at the same type of Scorpions, Canberra bombers, Tigercat missiles, and Type-42 destroyers that had just been used in the Falklands war. 51 Suspicions about arms merchants, bankers, and other capitalists leading the people to the slaughter in order to make some profit have been held by Marx, the members of the Nye Committee, and new left authors who by now are getting old. When the theory was raised again during the Falklands war, it was even less convincing than it had been after World War I. Since the arms merchants had been selling their wares to Argentina for so long and had so much power, why had they not arranged wars in the South Atlantic earlier and with more frequency in order to keep their market in need of replacements? Because some profit from a war does not mean they caused it. The fear that the public had once again been duped worried some. Their leaders had again confused their own leadership with national sovereignty. They were willing to risk or sacrifice their peoples' lives and well-being in order to keep power or make a profit. The fact that the Argentine and British peoples generally supported their countries' war efforts only showed how crafty the leaders were in beguiling the people.

PREFERRING FORCE OVER NEGOTIATIONS Another theory stressed not that the leaders necessarily wanted to mislead their countries into a war for their personal benefit, but that their blindness to anything other than military solutions transformed what should have been a minor diplomatic tiff into a war. At every stage Galtieri and Thatcher had preferred military to negotiated solutions. Being wedded to the idea that force and not diplomacy can solve political questions was exceedingly dangerous in an interdependent world full of nuclear weapons. Theorists of this bent were apt to think, as did Matthew Stevenson, that "the Falklands affair . . . was a diplomatic failure disguised as a military victory." 52 Liberals considered it fitting that a fascist military leader and a conservative prime minister should have used force to resolve their dispute. Liberals tend to congratulate themselves on having complex analyses of complex problems and to accuse conservatives of having simplistic answers for yesterday's questions. Negotiations are a higher, more complex level of international discourse, which break down when conservatives succeed in using the more primitive methods of force. It was lamentable but not surprising that Galtieri, a "bargain basement Mussolini" according to one liberal MP, and Thatcher, the

Sovereignty and the Internal Causes of the War

153

Tory who was unconcerned about unemployment, should be "hell-bent on the use of military force." 53 After the war, Labour party leader Neil Kinnock in a public forum criticized Thatcher's handling of the war. One heckler shouted, "at least Mrs. Thatcher has got guts." Kinnock replied, "And it's a pity that people had to leave theirs on the ground at Goose Green in order to prove it."54 In this view, there is a great divide between peaceful and forcible means in international relations. Crossing from the first to the second set is to descend from using good to using bad means. It reveals the failure of diplomacy and political leadership. To use force while negotiations are still in progress reveals treachery, for the use of force inevitably undermines or even destroys the chance of a negotiated solution. And only negotiated solutions can stand the test of time. Military solutions merely breed revanchism and the conditions for the next war. There was a feeling that a degree of international consensus had been reached that any use of force was bad. Its use revealed the poverty of the user's position and could be counted on to gain the world's disapproval. Thatcher remarked that Britain had "been helped by the widespread disapproval of the use of force which the Argentine aggression has aroused across the world." 55 Unlike Thatcher though, her critics did not make a distinction between the first use of force and self-defense. For them, the use of force itself was wrong.56 Since it was generally considered wrong, it would cost international support. On 7 April Denis Healey said that a conflict between Britain and Argentina would "cost us the support of the United Nations and world opinion." He and MP Frank Hooley argued that there was nothing in U.N. Security Council Resolution 502, passed immediately after the Argentine invasion, that gave Britain the right to use force or even to send a task force. 57 Hooley worried, "If we pursue a policy of war ... a vast coalition in the world would be against us." Healey repeated on 29 April that "if we were responsible for initiating a long and bloody war . . . the support that we have enjoyed so far would melt away like snow in the sun."58 Their predictions were borne out to a degree. The retaking of South Georgia, the sinking of the Belgrano, and the invasion of the islands caused Latin Americans at the OAS meeting on 26 and 27 April to use harsh rhetoric against Britain. 59 It also caused numerous Third World states in the United Nations to criticize Britain's aggression and made EEC support for Britain waver. Ireland and Italy would not renew their economic sanctions against Argentina after the British use of force. As early as 9 April, the Irish Times reported, "Ireland is . . . among those member states [of the EEC] . . . who do not want to be associated too closely with Mrs. Thatcher's military preparations and warlike talk." 60 Dario Lobo, the Hondurari ambassador to the United Nations, criticized British "acts of aggression which are causing loss of human life."61 Chamoro Mora of Nicaragua launched into a long tirade at the United Nations against Britain's "colonialist military repression of which the sister Republic of Argentina is a victim." This was an "unjustified British attack ... on the

154

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

sovereignty of the Latin American peoples." He urged Britain to "immediately . . . cease hostilities." 62 Nicaragua may have been as interested in reintegrating itself with Latin America by criticizing U.S./British imperialism as in criticizing British aggression, but the antiforce theme was useful. Other Third World states outside of Latin America were critical of Britain's use of force, as noted previously. Many in the U.S. government were also reported to be as much against Britain's use of force as they had been against Argentina's. 63 Nevertheless, the United States did not withdraw its support for Britain after it had used force, the OAS gave Argentina moral but little if any economic and military support, the EEC generally maintained its sanctions against Argentina, and there was enough Third World criticism of Argentina to keep the United Nations from passing resolutions favorable to it. Thatcher was in fact encouraged by the lack of critical world response to the retaking of South Georgia. The recapture of South Georgia has not diminished international support. No country that was previously with us has turned against us. ... The world has shown no inclination to condemn Britain's exercise of the right of self-defense. 64

All Michael Foot could say after Thatcher's report on South Georgia was that "the opposition remain firmly . . . committed to fresh initiative in the search for a peaceful settlement." 65 Thatcher's critics also argued that there was a domestic consensus that opposed the use of force. On 4 May Tony Benn cited a Sunday Times poll estimate that 60 percent of Britons opposed a strategy to regain possession of the Falklands that would cost the lives of any British soldiers. 66 In light of this poll, MP Michael Meacher said, [the] military option could not be played without a violent polarisation of opinion in Britain. When the carnage inexorably mounted ... it would not be without strong opposition from the majority. 6 7

Although British deaths ultimately reached 257, Britain's majority supported the short, limited war. Since British victories came in rapid succession at comparatively low cost in human lives, no strong popular opposition developed. There was less domestic and international consensus against any use of force than Thatcher's critics had believed. The opposition of Thatcher's critics to the use of force when negotiations were still proceeding came from the absolute divide they made between negotiations and force. Certainly the British government criticized Argentina for invading when negotiations were still in progress. Argentines and Thatcher's domestic opposition made the same criticism when Britain used force beginning in late April. MP Frank Allaun said on 29 April, "It is incredibly wrong that we should attack while negotiations are taking place." He acknowledged that the Argentines had, "but if we do the same we are equally wrong." 68 To pass to bad means when good means were still being used was indefensible. To use force while negotiations were in progress was also wrong because

Sovereignty and the Internal Causes of the War

155

once the great divide had been spanned, no return was possible. Since the British surely knew this, Costa Mendez has argued that the sinking of the Belgrano was a deliberate attempt to sink the prospects for a negotiated settlement no less than the Argentine ship. The British wanted to subvert the Peruvian peace plan then on the table because it would not give British uncontested sovereignty over the Falklands. When the British said after the sinking of the Belgrano that they were still interested in negotiations, the Argentine foreign minister called it British "black humor."69 The Argentine authors of one history of the war agree that with the sinking of the Belgrano, "the last possiblity of an agreement between Argentina and Great Britain" sank also. The president of Peru, Belaiinde Terry, was also indignant that the British had attacked while his proposal was still being discussed.70 That the alleged antipathy of Thatcher toward negotiation made inevitable some action like the Belgrano's sinking was the major criticism used by Thatcher's opponents after the war to chip away at the so-called Falklands Factor, or at the reason for much of her post-war popularity. Arthur Gravshon and Desmond Rice in their 1984 book The Sinking of the Belgrano conclude, "Mrs. Thatcher's war cabinet decided in principle on the use of force the day Argentina occupied the Falklands, and . . . only unconditional surrender by the Junta could have prevented a killing war. . . . British leaders were never really seriously interested in negotiating." 71 Earlier in their book they state, "Mrs. Thatcher and her ministers appeared bent on total victory." 72 This is a misrepresentation of the Thatcher position. She wanted to regain administration of the islands, not Argentine acquiescence to British claims to rightful sovereignty. She and others in her cabinet did resolve soon after the Argentine invasion to regain British control of the Falklands. The Argentine determination to forcefully gain and maintain control of the Malvinas made negotiations unproductive. This led to Britain's forcible response. The real argument Gravshon, Rice, and Labour MPs like Tarn Dalyell had with Thatcher was cast in terms of force and negotiation but was really about the proper goals of Britain's Falklands policy. Since they thought that Britain should have transferred sovereignty of the islands to Argentina, they argued against using force to maintain British title. Their error was to criticize Thatcher's means, when it was her ends with which they disagreed. Given her ends, she acted prudently, rationally, and not with excessive force. Nevertheless, Thatcher's critics tried after the war to use the Belgrano incident as an indication of her unwillingness to negotiate. The strongest allegation came from Dalyell, who claimed that Thatcher approved of the orders to torpedo the vessel in order to destroy the agreement President Belaiinde of Peru had worked out with the Argentines. Belaunde, Galtieri, and Costa Mendez were on the verge of an agreement just when the Belgrano was sunk, forcing the Argentines into a more uncompromising mood. Haig, who was meeting with Pyrn, Britain's foreign secretary, was kept advised of the Belaunde negotiations. Hence Pym must have known about the talks before the order to torpedo was approved. It is likely that Pym either did communicate with London about the Peruvian plan before the approval, in which case

156

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

Thatcher decided she preferred an escalation in the conflict to further negotiations, or that he had already been told not to bother communicating such negotiations because they were not going to affect Thatcher's policies. If this is true, Thatcher torpedoed the ship and the peace plan just barely in time. Belaunde had gotten so far that he announced on 2 May 1982 (at 7:00 P.M. Argentine time) that Britain and Argentina would that evening announce the end of their hostilities. A plan drawn up by Haig had made the cease-fire possible. Unknown to Belaunde, the Belgrano had been torpedoed three hours and thirty-three minutes earlier. His plan for peace had been killed, along with 368 young Argentine men, before it was announced. Was Belaunde simply announcing an agreement between Haig, as Britain's representative, and the Argentines? 73 Or was he publicizing a plan he found reasonable and ultimately favorable to the Argentines as a way to pressure Britain to remove its forces and transfer title? Thatcher's critics make the first interpretation. Gravshon and Rice admit that once Galtieri had implemented his decision to invade the Malvinas, popular opinion in Argentina would make it difficult to remove the troops without a publicly stated British agreement to transfer title. 74 Argentina was flexible during negotiations subsequent to the invasion concerning timetables for mutual removal of forces as demanded by U.N. Resolution 502. What Galtieri could not accept was an arrangement that left Britain or its principal ally, the United States, with a predominant role in postwar administration of the islands and no firm commitment to transfer title to Argentina by a specific date in the near future. The Argentine peace proposal of 19 April 1982 had called for free Argentine migration to the islands, proportional representation of the Argentine population, the Argentine government's authority to appoint the head of the islands' government and administration, and, in effect, transfer of title to Argentina by 31 December 1982.75 Both Argentina and Britain wanted peace through negotiations, but at the expense of the other's control of the islands. Costa Mendez could not accept Haig's proposals during his shuttle negotiations because the suggested interim government, which would have administered the islands after a mutual removal of forces, would have kept Argentina in a permanent minority. Britain and its allies would continue to administer the islands, while a few powerless, token Argentines would be given just enough influence to mollify Argentine public opinion. Haig's plan would also take account of the islanders' wishes and interests, putting self-determination above decolonization and U.N. Resolution 2065.76 This, along with no set date for final resolution of the sovereignty dispute, meant a return in effect to the status quo ante. Argentina could accept a proposal that lacked a final solution to the sovereignty issue if it was given majority status in an interim government. It could accept minority status if it was publicly guaranteed transfer of sovereignty by a specific date. Negotiations could be used to choose one of the two and to work out details. Since Thatcher's goal was to maintain British sovereignty over the Falklands by regaining their administration, the purposes

Sovereignty and the Internal Causes of the War

157

of the two countries were too mutually exclusive for negotiations to suceed. This was not due to a lack of will to negotiate. The analysis of Thatcher's critics confuses mutually exclusive policy goals with a lack of willingness to negotiate. Gravshon and Rice argue that Divisional General Jose Antonio Vaquero, chief of the army's general staff, Basilio Lami Dozo, commander-in-chief of the air force, and perhaps Admiral Anaya met with Galtieri on the evening of 1 May. 77 They allegedly told him that they did not want a war. The authors claim that since these military leaders had put Galtieri in power just four months before, he was obliged to negotiate. Additionally, they claim, the United States, hence Britain, knew of this meeting because the CIA had penetrated the highest levels of Argentina's government. 78 No source other than Tarn Dalyell is given concerning whether Vaquero, Lami Dozo, Anaya, or Galtieri was the CIA plant. Certainly Argentines would desire somewhat more specific substantiation for this charge of duplicity than such statements as, "South America, then as now, was in the CIA's backyard." The claim is that by 1 May Argentina's military leadership desired to avoid war with Britain and negotiate. Senior Argentine military officers were no longer blinded by "the trienfalismo—the blind optimism and euphoric selfdeception" that had horrified Belaunde during their visit to Lima earlier in the conflict. 79 Although they wished to negotiate, they lacked confidence in Haig. He had shown himself early in the crisis to be not just a mediator but a surrogate on Britain's behalf. 80 He had, after all, proposed Argentine withdrawal of troops, minority status in the interim government, and no set date for transfer. Worse, he had not communicated Argentina's five peace proposals to the U.S. Senate, misleading it to support Britain because of Argentina's alleged intransigence. 81 Argentina was neither intransigent nor unwilling to negotiate; it simply needed a fair mediator. President Belaunde of Peru was well placed for this task. He knew and got on well with both Galtieri and Haig. He had an excellent relationship with Britain's ambassador to Lima, Charles William Wallace, and had been childhood friends with the ambassador's wife. Good personal relationships with everyone involved gave Belaunde an edge in the attempt to find a negotiated solution. Belaiinde's proposal, as he told Galtieri, had seven points: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Immediate ceasefire. Simultaneous and mutual withdrawal of forces. Third parties would govern the islands, temporarily. The two governments would recognize the existence of conflicting viewpoints about the islands. 5. The two governments would recognize the need to take the viewpoints and interests of the islanders into account in the final solution. 6. The contact group that would start negotiating at once to implement this agreement would be Brazil, Peru, West Germany, and the United States. 7. A final solution must be found by 30 April 1983 under the contact group's guarantee. 82

158

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

He discussed these with Galtieri on 2 May, 1:30 A.M. Buenos Aires time, and said that Haig and Pym would be meeting in Washington at 10:00 A.M. that morning. He also said that Haig had dictated these seven points, and if Galtieri would agree, they would have the basis for a solution. Galtieri told Belaunde, "we're not going to change sovereignty for anything. . . . After a hundred and fifty years, a year or two doesn't bother Argentina. What worries me isn't one year more, but fifty." 83 The 1 May meeting with his generals had perhaps produced a desire to negotiate, but it had not changed Argentine policy goals. Later that morning Belaunde and Costa Mendez talked by phone. 84 Costa Mendez insisted that the islanders' "viewpoints" could not be included if that was another way to discuss "wishes" and the principle of self-determination. He also insisted that "the third parties would have to replace everything that was British administration," which meant that "the U.S. shouldn't be in the administrating group." They agreed that "viewpoints" meant lofty aspirations, and not "wishes." This made the word acceptable. Belaunde implied that Haig had accepted that instead of the United States and Peru being in the interim government, two other countries acceptable to Argentina and Britain would be found. Costa Mendez said that the junta would approve of the plan at 7 P.M. Buenos Aires time. Belaunde phoned this to Haig around midday on 2 May. Costa Mendez insists that Haig had this information while he met with Pym on 2 May. The foreign secretary, and therefore probably Thatcher, knew of the imminent agreement three or four hours before the torpedoing of the Belgrano.85 Belaunde assumed the agreement had been reached and at 4:30 P.M. in Lima announced its imminence. Haig later said that the Belaunde proposals had "provided hope that a settlement could be reached."86 Peru's foreign minister, Manuel Ulloa, phoned Haig during the latter's meeting with Pym, told him of the agreement, and reported that Haig was sympathetic. Haig and Peru's government had come to an agreement. Pym insists that he did not relay all of this to the British Prime Minister because it contained nothing new. Whether or not he did communicate it makes little difference. There was nothing substantially new. Argentina still wanted sovereignty or majority status in the interim administration. The seventh point of the Belaunde plan called for a final solution by 30 April 1983, which meant a transfer of title by that date. Britain would have had to acquiesce to Argentine claims to the Malvinas and fundamentally change its policy goals. Argentina's first use of force would have led to negotiations granting it sovereignty over the Malvinas. If Thatcher had been prepared to accept this, she would not have sunk the Belgrano nor sent the task force. Since she never had accepted these goals, she intended to escalate pressure on Argentina to the point necessary to achieve her own. The Belaunde plan was not acceptable in light of Thatcher's goal of regaining control of the Falklands. The plan was never authorized by Britain. Haig was not authorized to accept anything on behalf of the British government. That a mediator who was sympathetic to Britain believed the plan provided some hope does not reveal British acceptance of the plan. Haig's proposals were unacceptable to Argentina for the same reason Belaiinde's were unacceptable to Britain; they would have awarded title to one country while the

Sovereignty and the Internal Causes of the War

159

other refused to relinquish its claim. Belaunde's plan presented no diplomatic solution to the underlying sovereignty dispute. The issue of negotiations versus force has been complicated, in post-war Britain, by secondary criticisms of the decision to sink the Belgrano, and of the government's subsequent handling of the dispute about the issue. The main secondary issue has been whether the sinking was a sound military decision or caused a needless loss of human life with no military gain. One position holds that by demonstrating Britain's naval supremacy early in the conflict, the Argentine navy was removed as a factor in the subsequent battles. This left only the Argentine air force, operating at the edge of its limits, to threaten a naval task force thousands of miles from home and in hostile waters.87 The Times editorialized on 7 November 1984, "The legal right of self-defense clearly entitled Britain to take any necessary steps against those warships anywhere on the high seas and not just in that particular area of the exclusion zone which had already been identified. It is thus a quibble to criticize the War Cabinet for ordering the sinking of the Belgrano without first warning Buenos Aires." The critical position is that the Belgrano was not a threat to the task force. It was a vintage World War II vessel bought from the United States and incapable of fighting Britain's modern fleet.88 Furthermore, the Belgrano was 250 nautical miles, fourteen hours' sailing time, away from the nearest British surface vessel. It was sailing towards Argentina, not toward the fleet as originally reported by the British government. On top of that, it was outside the 200-mile radius around the Falklands, labeled by Britain the Total Exclusion Zone, (TEZ), in which any Argentine ship or plane would be attacked. Although Britain had not said it would not attack vessels outside the TEZ, it might have been more humane to warn Argentina that it intended to extend the zone before killing men on a ship of dubious military value. By sinking the ship outside the announced TEZ, the sense of fair play was violated. Britannia not only ruled the waves, it waived the rules. The concern about the sinking of the Belgrano continued after the war. It was intensified after Clive Pouting, a Ministry of Defense bureaucrat, leaked documents to MP Tarn Dalyell on 16 July 1984. The internal memorandum concerning the circumstances of the sinking contradicted some public government statements, and a letter of Ponting's boss, Michael Heseltine, recommended that information be withheld from the House of Commons' Committee on Foreign Affairs. Ponting argued that his primary responsibility was to Parliament, not to his minister or to the state, defined as the government of the day. That did not square with the Official Secrets Act of 1911, and Ponting was charged with its violation on 18 August. The act had been passed in 1911 and allows the prosecution of any government worker for the unauthorized discussion or passing of any information to any person, even if the information does not directly affect national security. This suggested to some an attempted government cover-up, with the implicit admission that something it had done was worth covering up. Social Democratic Party leader David Owen saw "a campaign of misinformation beginning to reach into the heart of democratic government . . . We are in the early stages of a Watergate." 89

160

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

On 22 August the New Statesman reported that Thatcher had ordered the sinking of the Argentine aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo while Haig was still conducting negotiations in April 1982. Foreign Secretary Pym and Attorney General Michael Havers allegedly had counselled against the decision but were overruled. This was disputed by Pym and Havners. 90 Had H.M.S. Splendid, the submarine, not failed to find the carrier in time, Thatcher's use of force would have sunk her own allies' attempts at negotiations. David Steel, the Liberal leader, called for a Commons inquiry. David Owen asked in the Commons on 26 September 1984 why Thatcher had told that body on 4 May 1982 only that the Belgrano and not one of its accompanying destroyers had been hit. The Belgrano had been hit at 4 P.M. on 2 May 1982 with two torpedoes that exploded, and the destroyer with one that did not. Owen also questioned the government about its knowledge of the position and course of the Belgrano.91 On 8 October, Thatcher, in a letter to Owen, admitted it would have been better had the government been more forthcoming about information concerning the Belgrano. She said she had not been aware until six months after the war that the Belgrano had changed course and was heading away from the task force when orders to torpedo were given. She allowed that her ministers had not corrected their inaccurate statements concerning the Belgrano made in the Commons but she thought the Belgrano's course was irrelevant. 92 The questions were getting to sound like those of the Watergate hearings; what did the prime minister know and when did she know it? 93 Secretary of State for Defense Michael Heseltine thought the Labour MPs were questioning an action taken to protect British servicemen and the national interest for their own narrow political reasons.94 In early November it was learned that the log kept in the navigating control room of H.M.S. Conquerors, the submarine that torpedoed the Belgrano, had been mysteriously lost. Then it appeared in Labour MP George Foulkes' hands.95 Comparisons to Watergate's so-called Deep Throat were not uncommon. A bizarre turn of events occurred in December 1984, when Dalyell accused British police of a killing associated with the cover-up. Miss Hilda Murrell was the 78-year-old aunt of Commander Rob Green, who had held a naval intelligence position during the war and had physically sent the order to sink the Belgrano. He had considered the whole war unnecessary and after the war had taken an early retirement after twenty years in the navy. The government allegedly thought the lost documents might be in his aunt's home, so it had intelligence service officials go in for a look while Miss Murrell was away. She unfortunately returned during the search, things went wrong, and she was killed in a scuffle. Her body was cremated in an indecent hurry. The family's request for an independent autopsy was denied.96 Commander Green believed DalyelPs allegations might be true. 97 Minister of State for the Home Office Giles Shaw "unreservedly" denied the "absurd" allegations. Dalyell was not satisfied. 98 A ten-week inquiry by police followed, concluding with a statement that there was "not one shred of evidence" that British intelligence was involved in the murder. Even so, Dalyell said he still believed British intelli-

Sovereignty and the Internal Causes of the War

161

gence was involved." Dalyell was sceptical because the police had not found Murrell's killer fifteen months after the crime, although they insisted it was an ordinary burglary "gone wrong." Also, the police report was not made public."100 More important, after the secret police report had concluded that there was no possibility of intelligence service complicity in Murrell's murder, Special Branch detectives continued their investigations. Police officers from West Mercia were conducting interviews in the case in August 1985, and were asking people if they knew of the practices of government departments. 101 Labour Weekly, the Labour party's paper, became so enthused that in April 1986 it accused Prime Minister Thatcher of complicity in the murder. 102 By May 1986 the Tricycle Theatre in London was presenting a play called "Who Killed Hilda Murrell?", and had MPs Paddy Ashdown and Jeff Rooker discussing the play with the audience on opening night.103 One reviewer of the play commented on the case's "hornets'-nest of imponderables," and concluded that it seemed unlikely that her murderer was a random psychopath.104 If the British public was being treated to a curious series of irregularities concerning the Belgrano incident, the jury in the Ponting case had its own share of incongruities. They heard testimony from Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse about civil servants altering the official accounts of the sinking. They heard Ponting's testimony that MPs were being intentionally misled by ministers. The presiding judge, Justice McCowan, was clearly unimpressed. At one point the defense attorney had to persuade him that he could not just direct the jury to convict Ponting. Before sending the jury into deliberation, he told them that Ponting had acted legally only if he sent the papers to Dalyell in his official capacity in the interests and at the directive of the government of the day. He said Ponting's motives were irrelevant, as were the jury's views on the Official Secrets Act. Nevertheless, the jury took only three hours at the end of the two-week-long trial to deliver their verdict, which contradicted the judge's view. The Parliamentary opposition and the Argentines were as delighted as Ponting about the acquittal. The Parliamentary opposition's spokesman for legal affairs, John Morris, called for a debate on the misuse of the Official Secrets Act and whether the Attorney General, Michael Havers, should have used it to prosecute Ponting. He said the verdict was as much a conviction of the government as an acquittal of Ponting. 105 In Argentina, Douglas Tweedale reported "a mixture of quiet satisfaction that justice is finally being done and smugness at the discomfort the revelations are causing Mrs. Margaret Thatcher." Senator Adolfo Grass, chairman of the Argentine senate foreign relations committee, said, "The Belgrano was Argentina's loss, but now the consequences are being felt in London too." 106 If Thatcher was uncomfortable, at least she did not show it. She confidently told journalist David Frost after the Ponting acquittal that she and her cabinet colleagues had been correct in ordering the Belgrano's, sinking, that the Government had been as open as it could without revealing intelligence sources, and that critics were being "pernickety" about insignificant, little points

162

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

concerning a difficult and brilliant campaign 8,000 miles from Britain. "Everyone accepts that the Belgrano had to be sunk, at least I hope they do," she again asserted. "I would make the same decision again." Her statement in 1983 that the Belgrano had not been sailing away from the Falklands when it had been sunk had been inaccurate, but this was a minor, irrelevant point. The Belgrano was an enemy military vessel sailing near the Falklands and the exclusion zone. For her to know every exact detail about every vessel, she would have to spend her "days prowling round the pigeon-holes of the Ministry of Defence to look at the chart of each and every ship." If Frost thought she did that, he "must be bonkers." 107 Thatcher's famous self-confidence, combined with the majority report on the Belgrano affair of the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, pushed the issue off the front pages and denied the Labour critics a tool to chip away at Thatcher's Falklands Factor. The majority report expressed satisfaction that the sinking was a reasonable wartime decision. It did find that there had been inaccuracies in government statements to the Commons, but concluded that these had been the result of caution rather than deliberate mendacity. The Times editorialized that Dalyell and the Labour minority found conspiracy where there had in fact only been muddling through on that day. Labour's tabling of another thirty questions and a call for another parliamentary inquiry seemed like meanspirited quibbling when "the affair has already been subjected to the most exhaustive and impressive inquiry they are likely to see emerging from Parliament. The principal questions have been asked and satisfactorily answered to all but those who will never be satisfied." The Times said that a Labour minority had been opposed to the war in principle from the very start and would never forgive Thatcher for her popular military victory.108 The majority report denied that the Peruvian peace plan had intentionally or in fact been scuppered by the sinking. Dalyell, by now nicknamed Belgrano Tarn by some, still argued that the British use of force had been deliberately intended to torpedo Peru's peace proposals. The use of force had not in fact had such terminal effects on negotiations. The Argentine invasion of the islands had not precluded the negotiations conducted by Haig. Three Argentine journalists who first stated that the Belgrano's sinking destroyed the last hope for an agreement stated sixteen pages later that "the conversations continued without pause."109 Gravshon and Rice, who are critical of the decision to sink the Belgrano, note that Galtieri did not reject the diplomatic route even after the sinking. In fact, "the Argentine Ambassador to the United Nations continued to discuss possible peace terms with the UN Secretary General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, throughout the period from the 2nd to the 19th of May." 110 Hence it cannot be argued that the death of the Belgrano put an end to negotiations. They do argue that the sinking caused a delay in talks, during which Argentina retaliated on 4 May by destroying the Sheffield. "Once the Argentines too had drawn blood, both sides had their political survival at stake if the dead did not buy victory." One act of force must be responded to by another, raising emotions so that the continued use of force is inevitable. If she had

Sovereignty and the Internal Causes of the War

163

thought sinking the Belgrano would solve anything, Thatcher was wrong, her ciritics thought. The sinking of the Belgrano was just what those who diametrically separated negotiations and force had feared. MP Allaun had warned on 29 April 1982 that "once a ship is sunk on either side, it will be far harder to reach peace."111 MP Robin Cook was unhappy "when the task force was dispatched. . . . Now that its intentions on arrival are clear, I am even more unhappy. 112 The only thing the task force achieved was to put pressure on Britain itself to "adopt a military solution." Just having warships in a crisis area was temptation to go down to wrong path and use them. As the warships approached the islands, Britain approached "the brink of a major escalation," which no MP could deny was "hazardous." British Communists were most adament on this point. Gerry Pocock flatly said: The communists rejected completely the notion that Britain had to send the task force in order to bolster its negotiating hand. It is [a] disastrous belief . . . because it completely undermines the principle that must be the basis for international relations: renunciation of the use of force, and settlement of disputes by negotiation. 113

Military solutions are chimerical ones because they ignore the so-called socio-economic-political conditions which caused the crisis. MP Tarn Dalyell argued that "military options are not options; they are constraints." The military solutions themselves compound the problem. Healey reminded his colleagues that even Haig, when announcing public U.S. support for Britain, said that "a purely military outcome cannot endure over time. There will have to be a negotiated solution." 114 Negotiated solutions, supposedly, do not constrain peacemakers; they open up the possibility that the real causes of the crisis can be dealt with. In addition to not solving the immediate problem, the use of force in retaliation aggravates it. Perhaps the Argentine invasion was wrong, but if Britain invaded the situation would become only that much more wrong. Wars do not begin when there is an invasion but when there is resistance to an invasion. And wars have become so dangerous in the twentieth century that they are unthinkable if not, given their common existence, undoable. For this reason, MP Ray Powell pleaded with Thatcher on 13 May to "talk, talk, until the Government can find a negotiated settlement for the sake of peace and humanity." 115 A military solution, utterly unlike a negotiated solution, "raises the prospect of war, escalation, and possible world war involving nuclear weapons."116 Belaiinde did not have such a pessimistic view. He thought the score had been evened after the sinking of the Sheffield and that both nations were now sobered by the reality of war. The original hoopla of sending off the boys had been transformed to the grim-faced counting of the dead. Thus the Peruvian peacemaker could call Galtieri soon after the Sheffield sinking, congratulate Galtieri on the military success, and tell him, "Great Britain has a different attitude now. She's receptive to the idea of an arrangement and a ceasefire." 117 Leaders in Argentina, Britain, and the United States did not subscribe to the view that negotiations and the use of force are completely distinct and that the

164

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

former is always preferable to the latter. Galtieri argues that his reason for the invasion was to create "better conditions for negotiating." "The negotiations were not advancing," he said, "and we saw no light on the horizon which permitted us to be optimistic about obtaining the political objective by diplomatic action. . . . The objective in the use of military power was to contribute to the diplomatic attempts to gain sovereignty of the Malvinas. ... It was not an objective in itself."118 Costa Mendez has said that the original invasion plans called for a quick invasion shortly followed by an almost total withdrawal of forces. The purpose would be to stimulate the talks with Britain. The British leadership also saw the use of force in the service of negotiations. Thatcher argued: It would be totally inconsistent to support the dispatch of the task force and yet to be opposed to its uses. ... It would be highly dangerous to bluff in that way. . . . Argentina would doubt out determination and sense of purpose. The diplomatic pressure would be undermined. 119

John Nott, the British secretary for defence, said that the first purpose of the task force was to "put increasing pressure on the . . . Argentine Government, to recognize our resolve and to accept a peaceful withdrawal." The threatened use of force would not take on a life of its own, he said, because "the task force has been under political control." 120 The British leadership used increasing pressure along a continuum of means, from private diplomatic protests, to public criticism, to the search for U.N. requests for the withdrawal of Argentine troops, to economic sanctions, to the search for allied support, to the sending of the task force, to the retaking of South Georgia Island on 25 April 1982, to attacks on ships off the islands, and finally on 21 May, to the invasion of the islands. The possibility of an unlikely and even unstrategical attack on the Argentine mainland was cultivated to encourage the spreading of Argentine resources. Secretary of State Francis Pyrn explained to Parliament the increasing pressure Britain planned to exert in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields. 121 Each escalation was carefully controlled and limited. Britain was willing to increase its pressure until its political objective was achieved. These leaders were not personally committed to the use offeree due to some failing in their character; they were planning how far up the ladder they were willing to go to persuade another state to change its position. Had Britain been unwilling to use force, then it would have had to accept the political results of an unchallenged Argentine occupation of the islands. Whether a huge occupation force or as Costa Mendez expected, merely a small contingent of troops would be left on the Malvinas, the de facto title would quickly have changed hands and the islanders would have had to accept a situation against their will. Britain's ambassador, Parsons, believed that this was probably what most of his colleagues at the United Nations expected to happen. They thought

Sovereignty and the Internal Causes of the War

165

the Falklands crisis would follow the pattern of so many events [which the Security Council had debated]—a violent change in the status quo followed by an interminable negotiation leaving the altered situation unredressed: the Middle East, Afghanistan, South-east Asia being good examples. 122

Haig thinks that "the failures of the democracies" during the 1970s to reverse the forcible changes of the status quo in Vietnam, Ethiopia, Angola, and Iran could have influenced Argentine leaders to think the Western democracies were unwilling or unable to protect their interests and values.123 Haig's former boss, Henry Kissinger, was also concerned about the tendency of the West to search for peace and negotiations when it needed to use force in the protection of liberty. Kissinger warned Britain's Royal Institute of International Affairs on 10 May during the Falklands crisis that the democracies' desire for peace, if divorced from a commitment to defend freedom, could turn into a weapon of blackmail in the hands of the ruthless. . . . Negotiation could be an element of strategy. But carried too far, it runs the risk of abdicating any share of responsibility for a cohesive Western strategy toward the USSR or toward anti-Western radicalism in the Third World. 124

Britain did have a strategy that included both negotiations and the use of force to protect its sovereignty of the Falklands. British leaders agreed with Kissinger that negotiations alone would have allowed the Argentines to change negotiations into blackmail. Sir John Thomson, the British ambassador to the United Nations in November 1982, said that "negotiations" was one of those good words [that] can be subverted. . . . Even the Devil can quote scripture. . . . The word negotiations has a loaded meaning. Successive Argentine Governments have made it abundantly plain . . . that negotiations are only to achieve one result, namely, the transfer of sovereignty over the islands from Britain to Argentina. . . . For them, negotiations mean discussions about the date on which they will acquire control of the islands. They do not admit that the negotiations means a process in which the result is not predetermined and in which many outcomes are possible. 125

There is little question that the Argentines thought of negotiations as Thompson described. Their negotiating positions from 2 April until almost the end of the war stipulated a termination date for negotiations about the islands' sovereignty in light of General Assembly resolutions. After the war, Anaya was asked if he had understood "agreement" to be a synonym of "negotiation." "Yes," he replied, "the objective was to recuperate the sovereignty of the Malvinas."126 The Argentine position was that Britain thought of negotiations in the same way. 127 Britain did not believe negotiations could have many outcomes. As long as British troops were on the islands, Britain had one result it wanted from negotiation: to maintain its sovereignty while it tried to fool Argentines and other people that the talks were open-ended. The problem was that the two countries held opposing positions on sovereignty that they could not be peacefully persuaded to change. This is what caused the escalation of pressure to be used by both countries.

166

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

It is the concern for sovereignty that has caused many to make the distinction between criticizing the first use of force and making a blanket criticism of any use of force. Criticizing the first use of force is really criticizing a state for threatening the freedom or independence of all states. It is not a criticism of the use of force as such. If a state commits an act of aggression that causes the victim to lose either part or all its territory and independence, either other states will follow the example or the aggressor state will continue gobbling up its neighbors. Unchecked aggression can both teach the crooks of the world that crime pays and turn the first crook into a kleptomaniac. The result would be either regional empires or a world empire. All but one or a handful of deeply antagonistic states would have lost their sovereignty. For this reason, the threat to use or the actual use of force either to deter or to reverse acts of aggression is laudable. Some in Britain hoped that the Falklands war would stir the world to return to its belief in collective security. MP Robert Mellish asked: What was [World War II] all about? . . . One result of the last war was a strengthened League of Nations, together with a dream and a hope that never again would there be world war because the might of all nations, united together, would avert it.128

Thatcher had the idea of collective security a little clearer when she said: I hope that out of this tragic and peculiar affair there may come a fresh vindication of the United Nations Charter and a fresh vindication of the idea that no nation should resort to force or seek to establish its way through aggression against other nations. 129

Mellish would have been more to the point if he had said all nations should oppose not war, but threats to each other's sovereignty. Thatcher did not mean she thought that no nation should resort to force; Britain used force just weeks after she said this. What they both probably meant to say was that they favored the idea that all states should agree to prevent or suppress aggression by any state against any other state, by presenting to potential aggressors the credible threat and to potential victims of aggression the reliable promise of effective collective measures, ranging from diplomatic boycott through economic pressure to military sanctions, to enforce the peace.130

It was no surprise that in 1982 Britain would have liked the commitment to collective security to be held by more nations. Latin states generally gave Argentina their blessing if not their assistance, and England's European allies gave it little more. There was no thought of the United Nations rallying Europeans, Latins, and everyone else against the Argentine aggressors. Europe was sufficiently opposed to aggression to join in symbolic economic boycotts of Argentina and to denounce the act of aggression but generally considered its interests unaffected by the crisis. France, one of Britain's most vocal supporters, stopped a team of technical experts from going to Argentina after the invasion to make adjustments on Exocet missiles. It forgot to recall a team

Sovereignty and the Internal Causes of the War

167

already there, which did help to make adjustments on the French-made missile that enabled Argentina to sink the Sheffield. The call of some MPs for military help from England's allies was rhetorical flair. In Latin America, Chile may have given Britain some sympathy and perhaps some support because of its fear that Argentine aggression could be next aimed against the Beagle Islands. Most others in South America would have considered British requests for military or even diplomatic support to be in very poor taste. There was too little global consensus to make collective security an effective deterrent, and even too little regional consensus to make the war into a battle between alliances. It was primarily a contest between two states, each with a group of cheerleaders on the sidelines, but only one believing that the international status quo at least in this one case should not be changed by an act of aggression. To agree that aggression should be checked by the use of forces does not mean to agree that the retaliation should be unlimited and aimed at unconditional surrender. The use of force can be escalated in very precise steps while negotiations continue. Thatcher said, after Britain had retaken South Georgia, "The Government lacks no vigour or will to pursue negotiations. ... It is the Government's most earnest hope that we can achieve those objectives by a negotiated settlement." 131 And as noted above, the U.N. negotiations followed the sinking of the Belgrano and H.M.S. Sheffield. It was not until the war was nearing its end that French External Affairs Minister Claude Cheysson could complain that he had not heard the word "negotiations ... in British mouths in recent days."132 A day before that, on 3 June, President Reagan was reported to have joined the French in an appeal to Thatcher to "stop one step short of total military victory in the Falklands war and allow time for a negotiated settlement." 133 TASS had in late May portrayed British reluctance to negotiate as proof of Thatcher's militaristic attitudes. "The British side has been blocking the recent effort to prevent a military confrontation," TASS reported on 23 May. "Britain now turns down negotiations at all, while the Government of Argentina stands for continued negotiation." 134 On 6 June PRAVDA accused Britain of a "flagrant challenge to the international community" for vetoing the June U.N. proposal for a cease-fire made by Spain and Panama. 135 It was true that as the war progressed Thatcher became less willing to make compromises with the junta. However, the failure to reach a negotiated solution was not due to lack of time or to her attitudes. During the weeks while the task force leisurely sailed to the Falklands and until the beginning of May, the British objective of regaining administration of the islands and following the wishes of the islanders could not be integrated with Argentina's demand that its sovereignty over the Malvinas be recognized. The dispute had reached the point where the methods of persuasion leaned more towards the use of military than negotiated means. To some this has revealed the failure of diplomacy. 136 This idea is again based on the presupposition that diplomacy is distinct from power, that diplomatic settlements are necessarily peaceful and nonviolent. Certainly dip-

168

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

lomatic settlements can be peaceful and are almost always less expensive and risky when they are peaceful. But diplomats do not conduct negotiations without any reference to the military or economic capabilities of their states. Often the solutions diplomats find are somewhat less magnificent than those achieved by war, but they avoid the costs of war by referring to possibilities of it. Country A's diplomats often during wars use the latest battle results to persuade their counterparts from B to accept A's objective. As long as this objective is prudent, a war that achieves it with the least possible use of force can be considered a diplomatic solution. The threat to use or the actual use of force can be part of a strategy of negotiations. States escalate their use of force until their objectives must be accepted by the other. As long as armed force may be used for the purpose of achieving a prudent political objective, war and diplomacy, force and negotiations, military and negotiated solutions are linked. Compulsion is the extreme means of persuasion. Britain's objective was prudent. It wanted to regain administration of the islands. To do so, it had to reconquer them. If it had wanted Argentina's recognition of the British right to administer the islands, it would have had to extend the war to the continent and subdue Buenos Aires. In the sense that the war did not resolve the dispute over sovereignty, it can be said that the use of force did not create a political solution to the dispute. This was not, however, the objective of the war. The objective was to regain administration of the islands and to oppose Argentine aggression. This was a prudent position and refutes the notion that those in the British leadership were personally wedded to military solutions and uninterested in negotiated ones.

PRIDE Another personal failing attributed to Galtieri, Thatcher, and other leaders and said to have contributed to the war is the deadly sin of pride. Starting with Argentina's criticism of the negotiations after the last talks in February 1982 and during the Davidoff incident and the fighting of the war, the leaders made harsh statements, angry denunciations, and indignant denials. Having become personally involved in the dispute, in this view, they could not compromise their honor arid prestige. The war may have seemed anachronistic to some because it had the aura of an eighteenth-century duel over whether or not one's honor had been questioned. One might expect a military leader to be quite concerned with his or her own or the nation's honor, as Galtieri was. On 10 April he took time out from his talks with Haig to tell the cheering crowd in the Plaza de Mayo that he felt "pride and satisfaction in this first meeting with the representatives of the United States government to maintain the dignity and honor of the Argentine nation, which is not negotiated by anyone." 1 3 7 He complained in his May Day speech a few weeks later, "We have been slandered and insulted. . . . We have been the victim of all sorts of unimaginable manoeuvers to discredit us."138 He

Sovereignty and the Internal Causes of the War

169

explained after the war that the decision to retake the Malvinas "was the only one that fit from the point of view of national dignity and honor." 139 During the war he quoted to Balaiinde Terry the declaration made by the Spanish Communist Dolores Ibarruri during his country's civil war of 1936: "I prefer to die on my feet than live on my knees." 140 Of course, Galtieri did not have to do either; he could sit on his chair while the eighteen-year-old conscripts died in the cold mud. Anaya too was concerned with honor and dignity. He explained that the junta decided to invade because, he explained, there had been an affront to "the national dignity and honor. I would not permit further humiliation to the country." 141 Even after all the "grief" caused by the war and the defeat, he still thought that the war had been a "positive thing. . . . Argentina returned to having ... a dignity not seen in many years."142 He had explained to Haig during the negotiations that Argentines were just as courageous and had just as much blood to offer as the British. He added that "I myself have a son among the combatants and as his father, I can assure you that it would be an honor that he offered his life fighting the colonial aggressor." Haig replied, "I understand that, admiral. But I also know that you can say that because you have never had the experience of seeing the bodies return from the battle front in plastic bags."143 Then Haig told him the British would fight not for oil, but for honor. One American author claimed that the entire Argentine military was to blame, saying it had been "lusting for a war of glory to make up for the 'dirty war' it fought against left-wing terrorists." 144 MP Tam Dalyell warned his countrymen on 13 May the Argentine "conscripts will fight as if they are fighting in a holy war." 145 On 7 May Argentine diplomat Enrique Ros said that the military would fight until "peace with dignity" could be found. After the war General Thome of Britain warned, the Argentines "will be preparing to recover their lost honor. I think they will try an attack" again sometime. 146 On her side of the Atlantic Thatcher too seemed quite concerned with her country's honor. A week before the invasion she spoke of "this ancient country rising as one nation. . . . Too long submerged, too often denigrated, too easily forgotten, the springs of pride in Britain flow again."147 The Intelligence Digest reported, "Britain has found in Mrs. Thatcher a renewed pride and self-respect."148 MP Churchill was concerned on 7 April that the failure to restore British administration of the islands would harm "Britain's standing and credibility in the world."149 Other MPs complained that misplaced concern with honor was just the problem. Nigel Spearing said that the Parliament's response to the Argentine invasion was "reminiscent of punctured pride, which is not a good basis for long-term successful strategy."150 Julian Critchley worried, "our honour has become enmeshed and entangled with our interests. Our honour demands the withdrawal of Argentine forces, while our interests demand that there is no long-term United Kingdom commitment to defend the Falkland Islands." 151 A British serviceman who fought: on the Falklands, David Tinker, wrote letters

170

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

home also describing how the war was being fought for a misplaced sense of national honor. 152 Relatives of the dead in Britain gathered three years after the war for a commemoration service at St. Paul's Cathedral. Many of them could muster no pride in their sons' deaths. Futility and meaninglessness rather than a sense of honor characterized one father's belief that "it was all for nothing." Or another's that the war was "a waste." Or a mother's question, "But what was it for?" Hugh Tinker, David's father, asked, concerning the postwar defense of the Falklands, "Was there ever such a massive military commitment with so little point or purpose? 153 Others might take pride in having defended their nation's honor; these people grieved for senseless loss of life. If the reason for the outbreak and continuance of the war was the leaders' sensitivity about their pride and honor, then the peacemakers' role was to offer suggestions for the peace with dignity on which Ros and others insisted. One MP asked on 29 April, "How could the issue of sovereignty be put in a way that would save the face of the Argentines?" 154 Negotiators from the Argentine, Britain, the United States, Peru, and the United Nations looked for ways that might or might not solve the sovereignty dispute but would give the warring nations a dignified way out of the immediate flare-up. Each country that offered proposals to settle the sovereignty issue hoped that the other country could accept a defeat if it was honorable and not called a defeat. These proposals of course could be interpreted as devious attempts to trick the simple-minded. Argentina proposed on 19 April to have both nations' militaries withdraw, to set up an interim administration composed of Argentines, Britons, and Americans, to have all three nations' flags fly on the islands, and to have laws governing property, commerce, and residence that applied equally to Argentines and Britons. The evenhandedness of the proposal was called into question by the provision that the period of transition would end by 31 December 1982, by which time the principles of territorial integrity and of U.N. Resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2065 (XX) (anticolonialism) would be implemented. 155 The British were willing to have an interim administration and to allow an Argentine flag to fly over the Argentine administrators' quarters, if there were fewer Argentines than Britains, if the islanders' wishes were respected, and if there were no outcome fixed in advance for the subsequent negotiations about the underlying dispute. These positions tried to realize the proposing nation's goal concerning sovereignty while offering the other an honorable way out of the islands. Some hoped to sidestep the irreconcilable dispute over sovereignty for the time being while arriving at a peace with dignity. Argentine generals Jose Rogelio Villareal and Reynaldo Bignone wanted Galtieri to offer a joint administration of the islands and binational cooperation in exploring the offshore resources but not to set a specific date by which negotiations would have to settle the sovereignty issue. They believed that the demand for a fixed conclusion date would not be accepted by Thatcher or Haig. Galtieri rejected the proposal, proclaiming that the old English lion was not going to threaten Argentina. 1 5 6

Sovereignty and the Internal Causes of the War

171

Haig and Walters could not convince Galtieri that Britain could not only threaten Argentina but could win a war. Nor could they convince Galtieri that it would be more dishonorable to bring his country to economic ruin and emotional grief by fighting and losing an avoidable war than, after making Argentina's point that it was serious about regaining the Malvinas, to make a strategic retreat before it was too late. It is doubtful whether Galtieri would have felt honorable if he had withdrawn his troops before the armada arrived and declared that now England must negotiate or face intermittent harassment. It might have been more productive. Galtieri did not believe it was more honorable to maintain international order than to threaten it. He may have lost for Argentina a chance to gain international recognition of a national goal while making the English look silly for overreacting to a short occupation made for propaganda purposes. It may have been unfortunate for Argentina that Galtieri did not have a more flexible notion of how to keep his honor. National honor and sovereignty seem to go together. The English occupation of Argentine territory for so long had long been an affront to both. The Argentine invasion was taken as a challenge to Britain's honor. Britain's sovereignty over the Falklands would be taken from it if the affront was not redressed. One can say that nations should be no more sensitive about their honor than about their sovereignty or independence, but one wonders if the state system would exist if they were not. If national leaders did not attach their personal honor to the nation's it would be surprising. Thatcher accepted Lord Carrington's resignation only because he had made it a point of honor that he had not as Foreign Secretary predicted and deterred the Argentine affront to British honor. His supporters feared he had been made a scapegoat, but as a leader he had a personal sense of responsibility for his nation's honor. Leaders can not be criticized for having a personal stake in how well they defend the nation's honor. They can be criticized for what means they choose to maintain their nation's and their own honor.

INFLEXIBILITY AND PRINCIPLES Related to the notion that the nations were driven to war by pride is the idea that they could not be flexible enough to avoid war because of their excessive dedication to principles. This idea is born of the notion that international politics should be and usually is the means by which nations adjust their interests in an ever-changing balance of power. International politics should be or is a pragmatic affair where compromises are made by realists and then presented publicly in whatever principles seem fashionable at the time. The problem arises when the negotiators start believing in the principles, or when populations force them to act as if they do. A diplomat cannot sit down at the negotiating table if he has to stand up for his principles. The pragmatic business of compromising becomes difficult, and diplomacy cannot function very well when ideologues are at the bargaining table. Political crusades unite some groups or nations at the expense of unalterably dividing them from

172

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

others. This is safe so long as the supposedly unprincipled other is far away and unlikely to do much harm. Indeed the more remote the enemy the better, for then sweeping moral judgments can be made without many having enough firsthand experience to know how silly the judgments are. The problem arises when for some reason the unprincipled heathen comes in contact with the defender of the faith. There is then little alternative but a trial by fire. Such holy wars have the disadvantage of often being fought for unlimited objectives that require unconditional surrender. This can make nations willing to fight longer and with more destructiveness than they would if the war is fought to gain some limited interest. Galtieri, Thatcher, and others presented the dispute as concerned with one or another principle: anticolonialism, territorial integrity, self-determination, or the first use of force being prohibited from resolving international disputes. Each upheld his or her principle without trying to integrate it with the other principles said to be at stake or without acknowledging that the other nation had any principles at stake. Prime Minister Thatcher was said to be exasperated with American journalists who kept asking her if she did not consider her reelection to be more at stake than her principles. She told Parliament that the cost of the expedition was unimportant when principles were at stake. 157 Sir John Thomson told the United Nations in November 1982 that "fundamental principles are at stake" and that Britain fought in defence of noble principles which are not to be brushed aside as being of no account. We believe with total conviction that we are standing for principles . . . that matter to the whole world. . . . On these fundamental principles there can be no compromising . . . and no negotiating to make them mean something else.158

Galtieri was as emphatic as he could be that to accuse him of planning the Malvinas invasion for national economic gain or personal political advantage "hurts rny principles, rny good name, my military career—all that I have tried to preserve in my life."159 His principles during the Falklands were not exactly the same as those he had defended earlier in his life. When he had been in the United States in 1981 he had explained to U.S. officials that the Third World War between the ideologies of democracy and communism was already being fought. 160 The Falklands war was one between good anticolonialists versus bad colonialists. U.S. figures were no less dedicated to principles. Kissinger told the Royal Institute for International Affairs, "in the Falklands crisis, Britain is reminding us all that certain basic principles, such as honour, justice and patriotism, remain valid and must be sustained by more than words.161 President Reagan told the British Parliament on 8 June that Britain's young men were fighting for a "cause" that should inspire all in their "crusade for freedom." 162 Fighting for principles when one's enemy obviously lacks them makes one feel that (he choice between right and wrong is clear. Peter Viereck, a Pulitzer Prize-winning poet, believed such a clear choice finally existed again. In "A Falkland 'No' to Fascists Right and Left," he wrote:

Sovereignty and the Internal Causes of the War

173

We pre-Viet vets of the last just war, Once knowing what Britain was bleeding for, Now hoped for one clear NO or YES; Are her daughter islands motherless? 163

Columnist Mary McGrory believed the war was a "completely comprehensible, clear cut, old-fashioned confrontation, the choice between our oldest ally and ... a fascist, tin-horn junta." 164 She later discovered that, contrary to what she had believed of herself during the Vietnam war, she was not against the use of force. This time she was enthusiastic about Britain's using it. The Washington Post's editorial page cartoon of 7 April 1982 mocked Reagan for saying the United States was friendly with both countries when the choice between the two was so clear. Complex analyses and the balancing of pros and cons were no longer fashionable. Some wondered if the sudden defense of principles was akin to the sudden discovery of patriotism. Samuel Johnson had considered patriotism to be a scoundrel's last refuge. William Raspberry became suspicious of the use of principles. "Were it not for principle," he wrote, "which on occasion may be defined as the justification for doing things that, under other circumstances, would be patently stupid, would either side consider the Falklands worth the loss of life and material already incurred?" 165 Perhaps a war about strategically and economically unimportant, islands can only be understood as a war over principles. Author Bernard Crick believed this was, lamentably, the case. At a teach-in at a Friends Meeting House in London during the war, he rejected the claim that absolute principles about force, historic claims to territory, sovereignty, or self-determination were much to the point. 166 There were enough ambiguities to inspire doubt that peoples' lives should be lost for the sake of conflicting and overlapping principles. Crick, however, was leading neither Argentina nor Great Britain at the time, and his arguments largely stayed in the meeting house, where they could do the least damage to the war effort being so strenuously made outside of it. After the war, the Labour party did what it could to chip away at Prime Minister's popularity from her Falklands policies by portraying themselves as reasonable, pragmatic, and flexible, and her as inflexible and unreasonable. Labour leaders such as Neil Kinnock, John Gilbert, and others stressed that if their party came to power, it would negotiate all aspects of the Falkland Islands issue. This was unlike the Prime Minister, who after the 1982 conflict took a stand on principle against discussing the sovereignty issue.167 Principles are not unimportant in international relations, nor should they be. However, as in discussion about Plato's world of the forms or the work of God in history, it is becoming for people to be cautious about their application to the changing, confusing, present-day world. Peoples in different nations can have a sense that they are being guided by different higher principles or by a natural law whose content changes in different groups and times. 168 It can be dangerous to believe that because others ascribe different content to natural law, the sense of following it is absent in them.

174

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

WAR AND WOMEN It seemed as though some believed that the war broke out because the prime minister of Britain had a personal failing that was not in her character but in her sex. How seriously this position was taken could be questioned, but leaders from the United States, Panama, and Argentina indicated they suspected Thatcher's judgment on this account. Vermon Walters, Haig's advisor, feared Thatcher's response to the Argentine invasion because "the machismo of women is even more sensitive than that of men." 169 Panama's U.N. ambassador, Jorge Illueca, attributed the prime minister's over reaction to "the glandular system of women." 170 Jearie Kirkpatrick appropriately complained that Illueca's comment was "outragously sexist." If there was anything interesting in the remarks it is that they indicate that these two men believed women may be more warlike than men. It has often been assumed, probably mistakenly, that women are less likely than men to use force as leaders. Golda Meir, Indira Gandhi, and Margaret Thatcher have not been noticeably more or less reluctant than male leaders to use force. Radical president Raul Alfonsin took the position that women are less rational than men. He said that "the problem is that Mrs. Thatcher is a woman and it's hard to argue with women. I would rather speak to Mr. Thatcher." 171 This was a surprising comment from a leader who calls himself a "progressive." The idea that Thatcher had a personal tendency to be excessively warlike or was irrational because of her sex reveals the views of some towards women rather than the causes of the war. The other ideas about the personal failings of leaders adding to the causes of the war have often been overstated. The leaders were no more cynical than any others. They were not more committed to using force nor were they more prideful or inflexible. All of these factors could be observed to a limited degree, but none of them is a satisfactory explanation of the war.

THE PEOPLE We don't want to fight but by jingo if we do We've got the men We've got the ships We've got the money too. 172

One always hesitates to make any criticisms of the people, who in so much of popular political philosophy are the fount of all goodness, virtue, and beauty. Nevertheless, some brave souls have been willing to do so. The fact that there were economic and social problems in Argentina and Britain can be used to blame the people as well as the leaders. Maybe leaders did use the war to strengthen their political power. But maybe the people, tired of their individual woes, forced their leaders to some grandiloquent adventure that would amuse them. A war far from home where there are no TV cameras to show everyone the blood and guts

Sovereignty and the Internal Causes of the War

175

during dinner is better than futbol or rugby. It was as entertaining as a video game, which was as graphic as television reporting could become. On TV screens green dots representing missiles came from gold crosses representing planes and hit blue rectangles representing ships. No red lines representing blood had to appear. Maybe this was cynical leaders again managing the news, or maybe this was the type of war that weary populations wanted.173 Matthew Stevenson reported: I was in London when preparations for the Falklands flotilla were under way. What impressed me profoundly was the depth of the war fever—how the nation, fed up with having been endlessly humiliated in the process of losing its empire, was spoiling for this fight with an enemy it thought it could beat. . . . Those few who spoke in favor of a negotiated settlement were thought nearly traitorous. 174 MP Jack Ashley noted: There is a startling and remarkable resemblance in the attitudes in Britain today to those of early 1914, before the so-called Great War. We have the flag waving, the emotional farewells to the troops, and the growing hatred for the enemy, all of which are redolent of that fateful period in British history. . . . The public are becoming quite hysterical about the present situation. ... In this respect, we are no different from the people of Argentina, who are behaving in a similarly primitive fashion. 175 The Falklands war turned out to be what World War I was supposed to have been: a short war with a comparatively easy and quick victory. Even leftists, not ordinarily anxious to shake their finger at the people, noted the popular acclaim for the war. Anthony Barnett wrote: The Falklands conflict was not just Thatcher's war. . . . The left should not forget the powerful feelings of nostalgia and solidarity that the fighting engendered, sentiments that apparently engulfed a majority in all social classes.176 Before the British invasion the Washington Post reported a poll that showed two-thirds of Britons in favor of a war if it was necessary to regain control of the Falklands and a Gallup poll showed 90 percent of Argentines in favor of a war to keep control of the Malvinas. 177 Galtieri said he "considered it almost impossible" to withdraw troops, given the "emotional state of the country's population." 178 Argentine military leader Lombardo warned the junta that any negotiated compromise would have to be explained to the people.179 The junta was not cynically manipulating the public; the public was driving the junta forward to battle. The same was true in the United States and Britain. Haig said it was dangerous to overstep the patience of democratic peoples. "I always have said this about the democracies. They have a high level of tolerance. But when that level is exceeded the democracies react with a brutality and insensibility without precedent." 180 That the people were in favor of the war does not of course show that they were part of its cause. The secrecy of the junta's plans shows that while it may have kept one eye on possible effects on public opinion, the public did not participate in the decision to invade. Had the Argentine public not been misled

176

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

by official news bulletins, it is questionable whether they would have stayed in favor of the war until 14 June. Nor carl one characterize public attitude in Britain as favoring brutal, insensible, or unprecedented responses to the Argentine invasion. The public supported Thatcher's graduated increase of pressure; there were few calls for attacks on mainland Argentina and suggestions to use nuclear weapons were never seriously made. To the degree that public opinion affected the war, that effect was reasonable and calculated. There can be no exact measurement of how much each possible factor contributed to the outbreak of war between Argentina and Britain in 1982. Post-facto explanations, written by academics, that claim to show the predictability of the war by pointing out certain factors are clearly out of order. No academic or anyone else predicted a Falklands war much before 2 April 1982. Perhaps the best that can be done is to describe the situation on 2 April. The two nations had disputed the title to the islands for 150 years and had negotiated under U.N. auspices for seventeen years. The use of force to achieve what peaceful means could not had been discussed in Argentina for many years. Argentine leaders believed that the United States and Britain were preoccupied with other more pressing problems. They were under pressure at home to show that they could do more than fight leftists. There was an unexpected flare-up of tension in South Georgia and an increase in domestic dissatisfaction with the government in March. The junta decided to move up the date of a tentative invasion to 2 April and go ahead with the action. The invasion was very popular and the junta felt confident enough to maintain its objective. Britain recovered quickly from the surprise of the invasion and acted to restore the Falklands' administration. The Tories' popularity increased as Thatcher achieved her objectives. The British did not exceed their war aims. They showed that they opposed the first use of force in the changing of a status quo in which they were directly involved. The question facing them after the war was whether they would have to fight again in the future to reestablish that principle.

7 The Effect and the Future of the Falklands Conflict

The Argentine junta's attempt to impose a resolution of the sovereignty dispute by the use of force failed. Had Britain not responded militarily to the 2 April 1982 invasion or had it lost the war of May and early June, Argentina would probably have achieved de facto control of the islands. It is unlikely that a Falklands myth would have developed in Britain that would have inspired the mounting of an armada at some future time to right the wrong of 1982. Had the British not responded as quickly as they did, they probably would never have responded. Of course, Galtieri's hope that the British would suffer in silence proved to be mistaken. The British military victory of 1982 did not settle the sovereignty dispute, although it did allow Britain to regain the administration of the islands. The sovereignty dispute has proved itself to be more durable, foiling the attempts of hardliners, functionalists, diplomats, and soldiers to resolve it. It may well continue to be a dispute to be lived with rather than resolved. The question for speculators is how it might be lived with or even how some might still hope to resolve it. How would different plans affect the domestic politics and the foreign policies of Argentina and Britain? What was the effect of the Falklands conflict? What might be the future of the Falklands? POLARIZATION The effect of the war for at least four years after Menendez's surrender in June 1982 was to aggravate the sovereignty dispute and to severely strain relations between Argentina and Britain. The British government's position was that British title to the islands was secure and after Argentina's invasion there would be no talks with anyone about surrendering or sharing it. To ensure that Britain's de facto control of the islands would not again be threatened by a sudden invasion, Britain would build airport facilities that had been discussed and postponed for years. In addition a significant amount of military equipment and personnel would be stationed at the Falklands base. The Argentine

178

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

invasion had changed British priorities so that what had not been worth a few million pounds' investment before 1982 was worth hundreds of millions of pounds afterward. There were to be no mixed signals this time about Britain's commitment to protect its sovereign territory. Argentines recommitted themselves to regaining sovereignty at some future date, and many Britons committed themselves to defending the sovereignty they had just maintained at relatively high cost. Professor Juan Carlos Grisolia concluded his post mortem of the just war fought to restore the natural order and the common good by proclaiming, "We will return" no less than fourteen times in two pages.1 Soldiers who had just fought under poor planning and with inadequate equipment and training often said they were ready to have another go at it whenever possible.2 The Argentine junta seemed no more repentant than the soldiers and the nationalist intelligentsia. Captain Alfredo Corti, head of Argentina's naval aviation subcommission in Paris, had purchased Super-Entendard fighters and AM3a Exocet missiles from France before the war. He was reported after the war to be trying to buy on the black market up to 20 Exocets at a total cost of up to $30 million. 3 The missiles could not be bought directly from France because President Francois Mitterrand had kept the arms embargo against Argentina. The British were especially skittish about the Exocets because during the war Exocets destroyed two British ships, H.M.S. Sheffield and the troop transport Atlantic Conveyer. After the war the Royal Navy's ships still patrolling the waters around the Falklands had some protection provided by Phantom fighter-bombers, but the Phantoms lacked early warning radar reports from the islands. Argentine attacks with Super-Extendards, which could fire their Exocet missiles thirty miles from their targets, continued to worry Britons, especially since Argentina had not formally ceased hostilities. Adding to the British concern were reports of flights by Argentine military aircraft toward the Falklands as late as six months after the war's end. The new junta seemed to want to harass the British garrison. The Argentine position forced Britain to spend considerable amounts of money. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said that the Falklands war had cost Britain about $1.19 billion. 4 The airport facilities to be built on the islands, which would permit transoceanic flights between Britain and the islands, were to cost $600 million, about ten times the total value of the islands' land, livestock, buildings, and civilian equipment. 5 Some estimated that the cost of the war, and maintaining a garrison of over three thousand marines on the islands, replacing equipment lost during the war, and keeping the navy's ships on patrol, would reach almost $5 billion within four years.6 The expense of protecting islands of dubious strategic and economic value in part led to the creation of the South Atlantic Committee, whose purpose was to counter the Falkland Islands lobby. Founding member MP George Foulkes had been an opponent of Thatcher's policies during the war and had found a more receptive audience for his ideas after the war's end. He helped organize a vociferous press campaign to change the British government's expensive commitment to the Falklands. It was often argued that the government's only

The Effect and the Future of the Falklands Conflict

179

achievements with its present Falklands policy were to worsen relations with Argentina and cost Britain a lot of money. The United States government did not go nearly as far as the South Atlantic Committee in trying to change Britain's official position but did support the idea that negotiations between Argentina and Britain should begin. The United States supported the U.N. resolutions in November of 1982 and 1983 that called for renewed negotiations between the two countries over the question of sovereignty. The United States took this stance even though Britain's ambassador at the United Nations, Sir John Thomson, in 1982 called the resolution "ill-timed and ill-considered" when the Falklands war dead were "still being mourned." 7 Prime Minister Thatcher was said to have asked President Reagan to order a U.S. abstention on the 1982 vote. After the vote Britain's Foreign Minister Pym called in the U.S. ambassador to Britain in order to express British "dissatisfaction." 8 Pym told Parliament hours before the 1982 vote, "We cannot accept a call for negotiations on sovereignty after an unprovoked attempt to force the issue by invasion." 9 Britain was no longer saying that it opposed the first use of force. It was saying that it opposed negotiating a dispute that had led to the first use of force. Argentina's invasion, the war, and the British victory had hardened Britain's position, making the dispute unnegotiable. Sir John Thomson thought that the resolution could encourage the Argentines "to think they could get away with renewed pressure on the Falklands." He added, "The Argentines continue to make it clear that they expect to have what they call a second round and are preparing for it."10 Britain feared that Argentina would consider this resolution to be international support of its threat of renewed hostilities and that Argentina was not yet interested in peaceful settlements of disputes or in unprejudiced negotiations. Therefore, the U.S. support of the resolution was, according to Thatcher, "unbelievable" and had caused her "very deep disappointment." She added, "We've always been true to the values which we and the United States share— values of freedom, justice and democracy. I find it incomprehensible that [the U.S.] should vote with Argentina." The resolution would not change Britain's position. "I'm not negotiating with Argentina. We are confident of our title to sovereignty."11 Relations between the United States and Britain were somewhat strained a year later when the United States again voted in favor of a similar U.N. resolution and announced it would resume arms sales to Argentina. The arms embargo against Argentina, initiated by President Carter as a protest against Argentine human rights violations, had been affirmed by the Reagan administration during the war. Prime Minister Thatcher told Parliament on 10 November 1983 that her government had protested "in the most vigorous manner" the U.S. plan to renew arms sales to Argentina. She said Britain could not understand how the United States could renew arms sales before the end of hostilities. 12 Britain's commitment to maintaining sovereignty caused the British to lobby against a U.S. vote in favor of the 1983 U.N. resolution calling for renewed negotiations and against the United States' decision to renew arms sales. The United States disappointed Britain on both matters.

180

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

The United States maintained its new position in every international action concerning the question. On U.N. votes and at the OAS, from 1982 until this writing in 1987, the United States has always favored negotiations which include all aspects of the issue, including sovereignty, and are intended to resolve the dispute. 13 The U.S. support of these U.N. resolutions indicated a significant shift of U.S. policy regarding the Falklands. The United States, like Britain, Canada, Portugal, France, and nine other Commonwealth and European states, in 1965 had abstained on Resolution 2065 (XX), which had first called for negotiations. The United States had joined a similar group in 1973 in abstaining on the vote on Resolution 3160 (XXVIII), which had called for negotiations to facilitate the process of decolonization. The United States' general position since 1833 had been that it took no position on the sovereignty dispute over the islands. It was a dispute between other countries and did not directly concern the United States. To have joined in the chorus at the United Nations calling for negotiations would have been in effect to take a position on sovereignty. Resolutions that noted the dispute over sovereignty and called for negotiations and decolonization were in effect calling for transfer of sovereignty. If there was not a transfer of sovereignty, there could be no resolution of the dispute or decolonization. After the war, the United States voted in favor of negotiations whose purpose was to settle the dispute. A fight among U.S. allies had made the issue of direct concern to the United States. More frequent questioning in Latin America about the values of the OAS and the Inter-American Treaty of Defense had not served U.S. interests. British forces in the Falklands were not helping NATO. During the war the United States had aided Britain and opposed the first use of force. The United States did not wish to have the dispute go on so that the performance would have to be repeated. Thus the United States told Argentina and Britain directly that it would like them to settle the dispute and it called at the United Nations for negotiations. This had the value of appearing neutral but in effect it was a call for the transfer of sovereignty. There was no way the dispute could be settled if sovereignty was not transferred. Negotiations about the Falklands would eventually face the sovereignty issue. The war had therefore caused a decrease in Third World support for Argentina but an increase in U.S. support. The fourteen abstainers in 1965 had been European and mainly white Commonwealth states. The fifty-two abstentions on the 1982 vote included many African and other Third World states. Even with U.S. pressure, Britain refused to discuss the sovereignty question with the Argentine military government. Sir John Thomson argued that the lame-duck military regime was "discredited." 14 The islanders' government was an elected one representing its inhabitants' wish to remain British. Britain would not discuss the transfer of sovereignty over a democratically governed island to a dc facto military regime that had just recently "landed an army of 10,000 men in somebody else's territory [the Falklands] and subdued the population [the islanders] which was totally opposed to them." 15

The Effect and the Future of the Falklands Conflict

181

The criticism of the junta was icing on the cake, because Britain had also stated that it would not discuss sovereignty with the newly elected democratic Alfonsin administration. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Geoffrey Howe said it would be wrong to think that a changeover to a democratic government would change Britain's position concerning sovereignty. "More desirable than a change of regime would be a change of attitude towards the rights of the islands' inhabitants," he said.16 FLEXIBILITY AND NORMALIZATION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS The newly elected government of Argentina seemed to be taking a position that would keep the two countries at odds. Hugo Gobbi, an Argentine U.N. official appointed by the new civilian government, said during the November 1983 U.N. debate on the Malvinas that the Alfonsin government would seek a peaceful resolution of the dispute after it took office on 10 December but would insist that the sovereignty issue be on the agenda of any negotiations with Britain. 17 When the government assumed power in December Alfonsin sent Thatcher a telegram saying that "where there's a will, there's a way" to improve relations between the states.18 The way that Alfonsin decided to take was to declare his peaceful intentions and his flexibility concerning the sovereignty issue. When Alfonsin went to Caracas in early February 1984 to attend the inauguration of newly elected Venezuelan president Jaime Lusinchi, he took advantage of the international publicity he was receiving to announce his new Malvinas strategy. Journalists who were used to reporting the list of miseries suffered in Argentina now would have the opportunity to report the flexible position of peace taken by the charismatic democratic leader. Alfonsin called for a U.N. peacekeeping force to ultimately replace the British garrison, talks on lifting the exclusion zone around the islands imposed by Britain against Argentine ships, a de jure cessation of hostilities, and a return to bilateral relations as they were before the conflict. 19 The fly in the ointment was the statement, "Argentina will never renounce its legitimate rights to the Malvinas." London needed only one day to decide to reject the Alfonsin proposal. Thatcher had not fought a war to regain British control of the islands just to hand them over to an anticolonial United Nations. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Geoffrey Howe said, "The government and the protection of the Falkland Islands is clearly the responsibility of the British."20 Britain hoped to lessen the distance between the two positions by offering "specific ideas" and "waiting with interest for the Argentine response."21 Britain was interested in a so-called normalization of bilateral relations but not in talks about the islands. Britain wanted a peace treaty after winning a war; Argentina wanted to reopen the dispute after losing a battle. Britain wanted to resume commercial, cultural, and diplomatic relations, to return the bodies of Argen-

182

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

tine soldiers killed on the islands during the war, and to resume flights between London and Buenos Aires. Alfonsin was reported on 18 February to have accepted this British agenda if the 150-mile exclusion zone around the islands and the Fortress Falklands policy were dropped. 22 London's Daily Mail on 18 February 1984 reported an interview with Alfonsin in which he said that Argentina would be prepared to start talks with Britain with an open agenda and that sovereignty need not be on the agenda at first. Alfonsin repeated that he would like to return to the prewar status quo. Argentine foreign minister Dante Caputo added that sovereignty could not be indefinitely excluded from the negotiations. Alfonsin seemed to hope that by postponing talks about the sovereignty issue he could begin the negotiating process that would eventually get to the issue. The normalization of relations with Britain would help ease Britain towards talks on sovereignty. Thatcher was opposed to discussing sovereignty now, that maybe later she would change her mind. Oscar Raul Cardoso, a journalist writing in Clarin, speculated that Alfonsin was hoping to normalize relations with Britain in order to take another step in reintegrating Argentina with the countries of Europe. Social democrats in France, Spain, and Italy would be more likely to support Argentina if it took a more flexible position on the Malvinas. Alfonsin perhaps was also hoping that Britain and the other members of the EEC might then be more likely to help Argentina with renegotiating its U.S. $40 billion foreign debt. 23 Alfonsin was perhaps also hoping for a domestic as well as an international payoff from his new flexibility on the sovereignty issue. He had campaigned for office with the promise to make Argentina safe for democracy for 100 years. One threat he saw to democracy came from the military. The military's loyalty was to the patria more than to the constitution. This loyalty, added to the sense of hierarchy and the command relationships within the military, made it inherently antidemocratic, he thought. Whenever the nation faced difficulties, the military could feel it had the higher calling of saving the nation. If this came at the cost of democracy, it considered the price bearable. To safeguard democracy, he set out to change the military. After his inauguration, Alfonsin immediately initiated legal prosecution of former military leaders for human rights abuses committed during the late 1970s. The trials concluded with the convictions of five junta members and prison sentences ranging from four and one-half years to life. He retired over half of the generals and admirals deemed irredeemable from a democratic standpoint. The curriculum for officers' training, which formerly advocated the national security doctrine, now stressed support for the constitution. Perhaps the most important change was the reduction of the military's size and budget. To justify these cuts, Alfonsin wanted to show that political solutions to Argentina's security problems could be found. Diplomatic resolutions of the Beagle Channel dispute with Chile arid the Malvinas conflict with Great Britain were sought with one eye on the Argentine military. Opposition to Alfonsin's reductions in the armed forces came in part from those who worried about the unresolved Beagle Channel and Malvinas dis-

The Effect and the Future of the Falklands Conflict

183

putes. One cartoon in La Nueva Repiiblica shows a telegram which reads "we are enthusiastically in favor of the proposal to make military service optional and to drastically reduce the military. Signed: Margaret and Augusto." 24 Thatcher and Chile's Pinochet were the main beneficiaries of the reduction in armed forces, some thought. So Alfonsin moved, within his first three months in office, to promise an early resolution with Chile over the Beagle islands, and to try to initiate a normalization of relations with Britain. Alfonsin seemed prepared to let Chile keep the three islands in the Beagle Channel, as the British and papal mediators had advocated for years, but to retain the bioceanic principle, by which Chile retained only a Pacific naval presence and Argentina an Atlantic one. Previously, British and papal negotiators had favored Chile's claims to the islands. The Argentine military government had rejected their advice, and in 1978 had come close to war with Chile over the issue. Alfonsin accepted their advice, and preferred the use of diplomacy. An agreement acknowledging Chilean sovereignty to the islands was presented with administration support to the Argentine electorate on 25 November 1984 and was approved by eighty per cent of the voters. The treaty was ratified by the Argentine senate on 15 March 1985. Although the Beagle dispute could no longer be used to maintain a bloated military, Alfonsin would not be as fortunate with the Malvinas conflict. Unlike in the Beagle case, Alfonsin was not willing in the Malvinas dispute to attempt resolution by advising Argentines to relinquish their claim to the territory. However, any real concessions from his adversary were just as unlikely. In the face of opposition parly criticism and a changing public opinion, Thatcher was holding true to her principles in early 1984. Labor party leader Denis Healey was arguing that Britain ought not to refuse to discuss sovereignty. He said that Thatcher had negotiated with a communist dictatorship in China without consulting the four million inhabitants of Hong Kong, and asked how she could refuse to talk with a democratic regime in Buenos Aires because of the wishes of 1,800 people. Healey also returned to the domestic economic issue, disagreeing with the priorities of a government that allowed £750 million per year to be spent on a Falklands base while denying annual social security payments of £100 per family in Britain. David Owen, leader of the Social Democrats, thought that the Alfonsin position on the Malvinas was "positive," he said, "because it eliminates the prerequisite" of negotiating sovereignty at the outset. He was anxious to "help Alfonsin and show the Argentines that they can achieve more than democracy" than with dictatorships. He favored protecting the interests of the islanders without giving them a veto. 25 British public opinion by early 1984 was almost evenly split between the hardline and flexible options. A Harris poll showed that 46 percent of Britons were against negotiating with Argentina over sovereignty. However, 43 percent favored such negotiations if the life-style of the islanders was guaranteed. By August 1986, 48 percent of Britons expected a change in status of the Falklands, although 38 percent remained convinced they would remain British. 26 Thatcher had yet to be persuaded by her opposition to change her position on sovereignty. Thatcher had good reason to think she could indefinitely reject talks on

184

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

sovereignty. There was very little that Argentina could do to force her to talk about the transfer of sovereignty. The war and the Fortress Falklands policy, or the policy of maintaining an enlarged base on the islands, had been expensive for Britain, but the war had been no less expensive for Argentina. The new Radical economy minister, Bernardo Grinspun, estimated that the Malvinas war had cost Argentina about five billion dollars. 27 Even if Argentina wanted to have a second round, it could hardly afford it. Argentina would go into another war knowing it would receive the opposition of the U.N. Security Council, a mixed Third World response at best, and a joint U.S.-British opposition. Argentines could not be expected to try another round. There could be no miscalculation as before the first war, which had cost the Argentine junta their jobs and by 1987 had led to their arrest and conviction. Argentina had been hoping to force Britain off the islands by keeping tensions taut enough to make Britain build a base that was too expensive to maintain. This policy was dropped in February 1984 when Alfonsin saw that Thatcher was perfectly willing to pay the price and that he might gain more by flexibility. Alfonsin's peaceful intentions and his desire to return to a prewar status quo meant that the threat of Argentine military actions against the Falklands was even more remote. An expensive Fortress Falklands policy might be less necessary after a time. For this reason Britain could consider cutting the garrison by half by 1986, from 4,500 to between 2,000 and 3,000 men. With the airport completed, reinforcements could be sent quickly if tensions increased again. By 1985, Britain's secretary of state for defense could report that defense costs per islander were £288,000 in 1985-1986, and were expected to fall to £234,000 in 1986-1987, and to £156,000 in 1987-198828. The Alfonsin policy of returning to the prewar status quo might work out differently than he had hoped. Britain might be able to secure (he islands with a relatively small garrison, the Malvinas might become enough of a nonissue to make U.S. and Third World pressure on Britain decrease, and any possible talks with Argentina could again indefinitely postpone a transfer of sovereignty. The longer Britain could wait out the flurry of world interest in the issue, the fewer people would care enough to bother Britain about it. By February 1984, 60 percent of Argentines were disquieted by their economy while only 6 percent were disquieted by the Malvinas. 29 Argentina cannot force the British off the islands and may well lose enough world and domestic interest to finesse them off. Thatcher may well be wise in biding her time. If she can keep the islands at decreasing cost then the situation will indeed have returned to the prewar status quo. Yearly U.N. General Assembly resolutions condemning Britain will simply fill in the landscape. INDEPENDENCE It might be that the future of the Falklands will be a more independent one that excludes Argentine and British claims to title. If the islands became an

The Effect and the Future of the Falklands Conflict

185

independent country, the islanders could retain their life-style, and the British presence on the Malvinas that so irks the Argentines could be decreased or removed. The island state could foster economic relations with Latin America and the EEC and could have its security guaranteed by a group of nations including Brazil, Chile, Argentina, the United States, Canada, Britain, or others. Resolution 1514 (XV) stressed that self-determination is best realized by a colony's independence. The disadvantages of this option are: (1) the islanders do not want independence, (2) many Argentines would still want sovereignty, and (3) many Argentines would be irritated with any nations' guaranteeing the islands' independence, thereby creating new disputes without resolving the original one. Some have rejected the option of independence for the Falklands because the islands are not capable of being self-sufficient. They are not economically viable, it has been often said. To make this the criterion for being recognized as an independent nation would threaten not only the Falklands, but many other presently recognized larger states. Is Chad economically viable? Which nation is selfsufficient? Some even in the United States and U.S.S.R. worry about resource wars that might threaten foreign supplies of raw materials. The notion that the Falklands could not be independent because of its tiny population is unconvincing after so many other mini- and micro-states have been admitted to the United Nations. THE FALKLANDS UNDER AN ANTARCTIC AUTHORITY It might be that the Falklands could be included in the Antarctic Treaty in some way. The Antarctic Treaty has succeeded in freezing national sovereignty claims over the included territory, reserving the Antarctic for peaceful and scientific purposes.30 In 1985, MP David Owen reminded the House of Commons that "the real problem behind all this is the Antarctica treaty, involving the vast continent of Antarctica and its economic, commercial, strategic and social implications. . . . Let us consider the relationship between the Falklands and Antarctica." 31 Argentina and Britain have been able to avoid confrontation over their conflicting claims to sections of the Antarctic. Even during the Falklands war, meetings including the two nations about the Antarctic economic resources were held as planned with no political complications. 32 One writer for The Economist has suggested that "the best future for the Falkland Islands ... is within the Antarctic Treaty." The islands could be included in the treaty, which is not reviewable until 1991. This would give Argentina and Britain enough time to cool down and discuss the islands under the same rules that apply in discussing the Antarctic. Those rules are simple and have been scrupulously followed by all signatories, including the Soviet Union and the United States: no military activity in the area; no pushing of competing claims; everybody to lend a helping hand with scientific research and

186

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

explorations; if there is mineral wealth to be developed, at least let's keep it to ourselves rather than to have the United Nations breathing down our necks. For the Falklands, such a treaty would be a godsend. 33

For the Antarctic, it might be unfortunate. The theory that the successes of the Antarctic Treaty might be extended to freeze the Falklands dispute could be stood on its head. The Antarctic might not cool the Falklands enough to put the sovereignty dispute in a state of suspended animation until some cure could be found. The Falklands instead might heat the Antarctic, thaw the Antarctic's currently frozen sovereignty disputes, and spread them. The treaty should perhaps be left unchanged to keep the southernmost continent quarantined. What has worked so well for the Antarctic may not continue to work if the treaty is extended to include areas of such contention as the Falklands. As one writer warns, "there is a danger that the Falklands question will add a destabilizing factor to the Antarctic area. . . . The Antarctic treaty system has its own difficulties to overcome, including the minerals issue, and any additional burdens should be avoided." 34 Even if not included in the treaty, the Falklands might trouble the Antarctic. Some in Argentina have threatened that Argentina will not sign any new agreement concerning the Antarctic after 1991 if the Malvinas dispute has not been settled. 35 This of course is not a major concern, since it is not in Argentina's best interests to take on all the other signatories of the treaty, but Argentina could cause some anxietv in the matter.

THE HONG KONG MODEL Some have argued that a lease-back solution along the lines of the Sino-British agreement concerning Hong Kong would be the best solution. The 1983 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee stated in an interim Falklands report that a lease-back scheme "remains the most elegant solution of all, for it combines the principles of British administration with the immediate introduction of the principle of national Argentine sovereignty." 36 An immediate transfer of titular sovereignty, to be followed eventually by a transfer of administration with guarantees for the islanders' rights, would resemble the 1984 Peking agreement concerning Hong Kong. In Britain, Labour MP George Foulkes urged his government to apply the Hong Kong model in the Falklands case.37 Argentine foreign minister Caputo said in 1984 that Argentina could consider "transitional arrangements." 38 Alfonsin said, "We could accept a Hong Kong type solution measured in months, not in years, or we could accept that the Islands are returned to us in five years, three years, but not in twenty-nine years."39 Alfonsin wanted a lease-in-our-time. The fundamental problem with this proposal is that the British government would be negotiating away title to the islands just after it had significantly increased its commitment to them because of the Argentine invasion and

The Effect and the Future of the Falklands Conflict

187

subsequent British deaths. Thatcher would negotiate normalization of relations with Argentina, but when Argentina insisted even on discussing the sovereignty issue during Anglo-Argentine talks in Berne on 18-19 July 1984, she instructed her diplomats to cease ongoing talks. Even if Thatcher would be willing to discuss sovereignty, she would be concerned about Alfonsin's assurances that islanders' rights would be guaranteed. 40 First there is the concern about the stability of democracy in Argentina since 1930. Would a possible military government in the future respect Alfonsin's promises? This is a secondary issue, however. Chinese governments since 1930 have not been a model of pristine continuity, and Britain has signed Hong Kong away. The main difference is that China has an economic interest in allowing Hong Kong to maintain its distinct status. Britain has learned long ago to trust that nations will follow their interests irrespective of their promises. Now that it does not seem that large oil deposits will be found near the Falklands, there is no long-term economic interest for Argentina in maintaining the islanders' life-style. This does not mean that future Argentine civilian or even military governments would dishonor Alfonsin's guarantees, but it is cause for British pause.

MAINTENANCE OF THE STATUS QUO The most likely future for the Falklands is that they will remain with the status they have held since 1833. John Cheek, a member of the Falklands' Legislative Council since 1981, argued in favor of this option before the United Nations' Committee of 24, or the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.41 His family had settled in the Falklands four generations before; his wife's family arrived in 1842, making their children sixth generation islanders. He believed that his children had even more reason to maintain the islands' dependency on Britain than previous generations. Since the 1982 invasion of the islands by Argentina, there had been significant political and economic progress. He noted the establishment in 1984 of the Falkland Islands Corporation, which conducted fishing surveys that led to new exports of crabs from the islands in 1986. Its market survey in Europe showed a demand for a specialized tourist industry in the Falklands, which led to plans for small hotels in wildlife centers. The Corporation also oversaw the gradual subdivision of the large absentee-owned farms, allowing more islanders to own the land they worked. The Falklands' economy looked even brighter with the opening in 1985 of the Mount Pleasant airport, which was capable of accommodating 747s. Exports and imports could be transported more quickly, and the economic progress that was made in other areas could be secured at reduced cost. The reduction of cost because of reduced troop levels on the islands was possible because reinforcements could be reintroduced quickly. Britain's ambassador to the United Nations rejected the fear of some that this airport was

188

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

meant to be either a NATO base or a threat to Argentina. That this base would be used to attack mainland Argentina or in any other way threaten Latin American security certainly seemed unlikely. It is a defensive base meant to deter another Argentine attack, he argued. Political progress was most obvious with the islands' new constitution of 30 October 1985. The overwhelming majority of islanders wished the Falklands to continue as a dependent territory of Britain, but to have greater control over their internal matters. To realize this objective, the 1948 constitution's grant of authority to the islands' governor to appoint members of the Executive Council was abolished, as was the right of British appointed officials to vote in the Legislative and Executive Councils. Britain's ambassador to the United Nations noted that this showed Britain's commitment to the U.N. Charter, whose Article 73b expects colonial powers to "develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement." The maintenance of the status quo in the Falklands depended in part on returning to the status quo with Argentina. Britain wanted to reestablish working, if not cordial, relations with Argentina while not discussing the sovereignty issue. To do this, in September 1982 it fully implemented an agreement reached with Argentina's government to lift financial restrictions imposed during the 1982 conflict. In May 1983 Britain proposed to reestablish the bilateral Air Services Agreement, which allowed commercial airflights between the two countries, that Argentina had denounced in June 1982. Britain repeatedly offered to allow bona fide relatives of Argentine war dead to visit their graves on the islands or to transport their remains to Argentina. Argentina did not fully implement the financial agreements of 1982, accept the airline proposal of 1983, or accept the visitation offers. Argentina's position was that all aspects of the dispute, including sovereignty, had to be discussed simultaneously. The Alfonsin administration's early flexibility quickly changed. By the time talks in Berne began in July 1984, Argentina demanded that sovereignty be included on the agenda. For Britain, this threatened not the pre-1982 status quo, but that of pre-1964, when the United Nations first demanded talks about the dispute. Alfonsin had long been critical of the 1982 military actions taken by the military government. By early 1984, however, he wanted a return not to the pre-1964, but to the pre-1982 status quo. He wanted Britain to discuss sovereignty with Argentina. He could understand the islanders' ill-feelings towards a military regime which invaded the Falklands and fought a seventy-three day war. For Argentines who had seen the military conduct a seven year internal war which cost some 10,000 their lives, empathy was not hard to find. However, past tragedies did not make future improvements impossible. Establishing a political community based on trust between Falklanders and Argentines was no more impossible, if no less difficult, than making improvements in the political community within Argentina.

The Effect and the Future of the Falklands Conflict

189

The problem was not with memories of past tragedies; the problem was with the lack of current commitment in Britain not only to resolve the dispute, but to discuss it. Argentina's foreign minister, Dante Caputo, told the General Assembly in 1985 that "my government once again denounces the continuation of the illegal occupation of part of Argentine territory by the United Kingdom. In spite of the repeated appeals of the international community to the parties to find a just, peaceful, and final solution to the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas Islands, the United Kingdom continues to refuse to engage in serious and comprehensive negotiations." 42 Argentines wanted a return to the pre-1982 status quo, which contained an option to find a "final solution" to the dispute. In some ways, Britain did return to this status quo. The British accepted that the Argentines made a claim to the islands' title arid that it had a right to present its claims in international forums. The British, as they had before 1982, recognized that Argentina disputed British title.43 More like the period before 1982 was Britain's efforts in the mid 1980's to sidestep the sovereignty issue and talk about economic cooperation. The resurrection of the functionalist approach was repeatedly discussed this time not in relation to oil, but fish. Hardliners this time were calling not for British licenses being sold to oil companies, but that Britain unilaterally declare a 200 mile limit around the islands to guarantee exclusively British rights to the fish. Functionalists like Sir Geoffrey Howe wanted to work "actively for the establishment of a multilaterally-based fisheries conservation and management regime around the Falkland Islands." 44 He had already dismissed the chance that Britain would discuss sovereignty with a country that had invaded the islands and tried to deny them their right of selfdetermination.45 However, he added that "the improvement of commercial and economic relations is a natural starting point. Both sides have a clear interest in improved trade." 46 These joint economic ventures would have to be in nonoil areas, because in December 1984 the British government issued a license to Firstland Oil and Gas to prospect for oil around the Falklands. 47 One other difference from the pre-1982 functionalist policy was the length of time Britain was willing to pursue it after the war. After Britain unsuccessfully tried to coopt Argentina into joint fishing ventures, by 1986 it was prepared to drop the policy and exercise unilateral control. On 29 October 1986, Sir Geoffrey Howe announced Britain's new 150 mile fishing conservation zone around the islands. Britain could have claimed up to 200 miles, but he said it did not want its claim to overlap a similar claim by Argentina to territory off its mainland coast. All vessels fishing within the 150 mile limit would henceforth need licenses from Britain. To conserve the fish, the number of vessels which had fished the area in 1986 were to be cut from 600 to 200 in 1987. This cutback would most affect the Soviet Union and Japan. However, in a show of Hispanic unity, it was Spain which was first to say it would not respect Britain's new policy. 48 Latin American nations, too, within days indicated their support for Argentina. 4 9 It has yet to be seen, as of this writing, if Britain would be more successful in enforcing this announcement than the 1982 one concerning the need for oil companies obtaining British licenses.

190

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

THE EFFECTS OF THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS During the 1982 Falklands war there was a good deal of speculation on the effects of the conflict on future relations among Argentina, Britain, the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the countries of NATO, the EEC, and the OAS. Would Argentina be pushed into the Soviet camp? Would Latin Americans organize a security organization independent of the United States and even aimed against it? Would Argentina become more integrated with Latin America? Who could have predicted that the war would aid the coming of Argentine elections, which produced an Argentine president anxious to identify Argentine foreign policy more closely with that of the European social democracies?

THE SOVIET BLOC Some observers expressed during and after the war the fear that the Soviet Union would be the main beneficiary of the war. In trying to dissuade Galtieri from ordering an invasion, President Reagan said that only the U.S.S.R. would gain from an intra-Western conflict. 50 A Chicago Tribune cartoon showed Brezhnev walking into the junta's planning room through a hole, shaped like South America, that had been made in the wall by an explosion. 51 Haig warned the OAS in April that "the enemies of the West could find new opportunities for looking for a position of influence in the American terra firma for which they have been looking for some time." 52 The worst that could be imagined was that Argentina would feel desperate enough to ask for Soviet military equipment or even Soviet military support. It was felt that this would create a strong obligation to Moscow. MP David Owen suspected as early as 7 April that "as our Navy is heading for the South Atlantic, so is the navy of the Soviet Union." 53 In addition to causing worries about an escalation of the conflict, this caused worries about Soviet influence in Latin America. MP John Browne stated: The overall aims of Russia are ... to fish in troubled waters and to continue to subvert Central and South America. . . . The Russians want to spy on the Royal Navy—first, to give aid to the Argentines in the location of our ships and submarines. ... I wonder whether Russia has already had a hand in the operations to date. When I look at Argentina and consider the sophistication of the invasion, my suspicions are aroused. 54

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak worried that Moscow would "gratefully accommodate" any Argentine requests for military aid in return for "a toehold in Argentina." Argentina's anti-United States government could well give their new Soviet "best friend" naval ports for its "growing fleet of submarines." 55 These fears were not put to rest by reports of Soviet Primordye-class intelligence-gathering ships twice shadowing the British troop ship Canberra. The first time, the Soviet spy ship followed the Canberra for 1,000 miles when the

The Effect and the Future of the Falklands Conflict

191

British ship was only twenty-four hours out of its Southampton port. The second time it came so close it could be easily identified through binoculars. 56 The Soviets denied that their submarines or any other vessels were shadowing the British fleet but did confirm that their ships were in the area on "routine exercises," according to Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Illichev. 57 The British suspected that this and other intelligence about Britain's movements was being sent to Buenos Aires. Britain would chase off Argentine spy ships, but not Soviet ones, wishing to avoid an incident with the U.S.S.R. The fear of escalation was enhanced by reports of Soviet help for Argentina's nuclear program. MP David Atkinson said that he had reason to believe that the Soviets were helping Argentina build a nuclear bomb. 58 Journalist Jack Anderson reported that the Soviets agreed in April 1982 to sell Argentina forty-five pounds of enriched uranium. 5 9 It disturbed Anderson that the Argentine navy was running the nuclear program. The navy was thought to be the most nationalistic of the armed services in a country that had not joined international nuclear nonproliferation and inspection programs. It was known that after President Carter stopped all sales of nuclear technology to Argentina, Canada, West Germany, and Switzerland became suppliers. 60 The question was whether, once the EEC and the Commonwealth boycotted the aggressor of 2 April, Argentina would be forced to accept only Soviet aid. Would an invasion intended to regain sovereignty over the Malvinas result in greater Argentine dependence on the Soviet Union? And would the Argentines feel desperate enough to use the bomb to prevent Britain from retaking the islands? The Argentines encouraged speculation about their friendship with the Soviet Union. On the one hand Galtieri, Anaya, Lami Dozo, and others frequently made statements about buying equipment from the Soviets. Galtieri told journalist Oriana Fallaci that "if Great Britain puts Argentina in a situation which calls for military help, we will accept it from anybody," including Cuba or the Soviet Union. 61 At the same time, lower-level Argentine military officials were said to be informing the governments of Western nations that the junta had decided while still planning for the invasion that it would not accept Soviet aid even if the conflict with Britain worsened. They also said that Soviet advisors at a hydroelectric project and in Bahia Blanca, near a major naval base, were not and would not be working on any military project. 62 That the junta had decided not to accept Soviet aid even if the war with Britain went against Argentina implies that the junta drew up contingency plans for a war with Britain. This seems unlikely, as the junta probably never seriously considered that there would be a war. Had they thought that Britain would retaliate and they might lose, the Argentines would have prepared better, attacked later, or not attacked at all. Gravshon and Rice assert, without citing any sources, that the Soviet ambassador to Argentina, Sergei Striganov, offered arms to Enrique Ros, the Argentine deputy foreign minister, after the invasion. Striganov then repeated the offer directly to Galtieri, saying that sales would go indirectly, perhaps through Libya. Allegedly, he said his price for making arms available included:

192

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

(a) Immediate withdrawal of all Argentine military advisers from Central America, and no others to be sent. (b) Argentina should abstain from now on in all votes against the Soviet Union in the United Nations on issues such as the occupation of Afghanistan. (c) The Soviets should be granted facilities to build fishery installations at Ushuaia— which presumably would involve rights to develop a communications system covering the South Atlantic. (d) Argentina should immediately cease its support for General Torelio's right-wing military government in Bolivia. 63 Galtieri found this price too high and would accept nothing more than Soviet satellite intelligence, which came without such high price tags. Argentine dependence on the Soviets because of arms sales was probably never as likely as some feared. Costa Mendez said after the war that the risk of internationalizing the war was considered on various occasions, and because of this, in no case—at least through me—did Argentina ask for military support from the Soviet Union or the countries under its influence, among them the Republic of Cuba. 64 If this is true, it suggests that the Argentines no less than the British wanted to keep the use of force at the minimum level in the rational pursuit of a political objective. The regaining of sovereignty over the Malvinas was not worth a war involving or coming under the influence of the IJ.S.S.R. There are more likely reasons for Argentina's not enjoying the military support of the IJ.S.S.R. than that the junta had previously decided against it or that the junta was afraid the acceptance of some Soviet arms would cause an escalation of the war. Argentina could get arms through Latin American sources and Israel. In addition, the Soviets did not want to support the Argentine junta militarily unless they received the benefits stated above. The Soviets had more to gain by publicly supporting the Argentine anticolonial cause in its propaganda and privately hoping the junta would fall, to be replaced by a less anticommunist regime. Costa Mendez had asked for and been denied a Soviet veto on U.N. Security Council Resolution 502; why would he think a request for arms would be filled without having to pay an excessive political price. Argentina just before the war had received twenty-four Skyhawks, military aircraft, from Israel and was said to be negotiating with Israel during the war for other sales. Two planeloads of spare parts and some Exocet missiles from Iraq were said to have arrived from Libya during the war. Peru and Venezuela were believed to be conduits for munitions being purchased by Argentines. 65 The Brazilians were said to have sent two surveillance planes to Argentina. The Soviets sent no known military supplies to Argentina during or shortly before the war. The idea that the Soviets would be Argentina's most eager suppliers was not accurate.

The Effect and the Future of the Falklands Conflict

193

The Soviets heatedly denied that they were arming the Argentines. They were aware that their support of Argentina's anticolonialism could not go so far as to support its regime. Mikhail Bruk said the U.S.S.R. was not "taking the side of a fascist military government in Argentina." The U.S.S.R. was not sending the Argentines information from its satellites or spy ships. The Soviets advocated peaceful settlements of disputes. 66 Nikolay Chigir comforted his Latin listeners when he broadcast, "The Soviet Union, strictly complying with the norms of international law and the principles of the UN Charter, strongly opposes any use of force in international relations." 67 The U.S.S.R. had little military interest in the South Atlantic. The Soviets would give Argentina moral but not military support. One source reported: The Soviet position is voiced daily in clear support for Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas and in attacks against the London government for having sent a fleet to the area, but for the moment there is no other support for Buenos Aires from Moscow. . . . The Soviet position is more anti-British than pro-Argentine. 68

The Soviets contended that they were not a threat to the sovereignty of Argentine and other Latin American states. The threat to Latin independence came not from the mythical Soviet military threat, but from the combined military resources of Britain, the United States, and the other NATO countries, who wanted to make an example for any other Third World state that was planning to try to break out from its dependence on the imperialists. The West was going to militarily crush Argentina's bid for strengthening its sovereignty because this threatened the whole imperalist system. 69 Some in the West were concerned that Argentine sovereignty would be compromised by an increasing economic dependence on the Soviets. Perhaps the Soviets would gain access to Argentina not through selling arms, but through trade of other sorts. Worry about growing Argentine-Soviet trade relations had not begun with the 1982 war. The Carter administration had failed to persuade Argentina to join the grain embargo of the U.S.S.R. in retaliation against the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Argentina had increased its sales of grain to the U.S.S.R. and Soviet supplies had remained secure. By 1981 the U.S.S.R. had bought $3 billion worth of Argentine goods, including 85 percent of Argentine grain exports and 100,000 tons of Argentine beef.70 This made Argentina the Soviets' biggest trading partner outside the socialist bloc, and its leading supplier of raw materials. 71 The deteriorating economic relations with the West after 2 April were in contrast to the still vigorous Soviet-Argentine trading relationship. A trade mission from Moscow headed by Vice Minister Alexei Manzhulo arrived in Buenos Aires on 2 April 1982 to persuade the Argentines to buy more Soviet goods. Argentina was buying oil industry machinery and thermoelectric powerhouse equipment from Moscow, but only about $50 million-worth per year. 72 Argentina agreed to double this to $100 million per year for five years. The ceremonies for signing the new agreements were made with much fanfare at the Foreign Ministry a week after the invasion. 7 3

194

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

The editors of one Argentine magazine were concerned that "bilateral trade relations between the Soviet Union and an Argentina isolated from her Western friends would be on terms dictated by Russians, not by Argentines." The Soviets had been "trying to make matters worse ever since the dispute began." By abstaining on the U.N. Security Council vote on Resolution 502, the U.S.S.R. had encouraged Britain to send an armada. If the junta lost the war and fell, one of the statist parties would win the elections and make Argentine policy more favorable to the U.S.S.R. 74 The relationship between the trade and the political influences is difficult to assess, but it is certainly not accurate to assume that military or grain sales can be translated directly into political influence. The Soviets were no doubt pleased about an unexpected rupture within the West that provided them with an opportunity to renew their criticisms of NATO imperialism. But it cannot be argued from available evidence that the Soviets influenced Argentina to invade or participated in the planning for it. It is likely that the Soviets did not consider the military regime in Buenos Aires to be a reliable ally worthy of a Soviet veto in the United Nations and did not believe that the issue was important enough to Soviet interests for a veto. There is no certainty that Britain would not have sent a task force had the U.S.S.R. only opposed Revolution 502. Initial reactions by the Soviets indicated that they were as surprised by the Argentine invasion and as unsure of how to react as everyone else. The initial reports of the issue were often factual and without any clear propaganda line. There was often even a hint of understanding that the United States had been placed in a difficult position not of its own choosing. Moscow Radio Peace reported on 10 April, "The Reagan administration is in a difficult position in the conflict" because it was an ally of Britain and Argentina. 75 One contributor to Literaturnaya Gazeta, as late as 19 May, was unsure of what to make of the war. "History can show strange wars. What is now happening over the Falkland Islands or Malvinas probably transcends the limits of anything seen so far." 76 Alexander Bovin noted that domestic troubles influenced the decision to invade and that "by resorting to force, Argentina violated international law, violated the UN Charter." 77 Budapest Radio reported: The islands differ from the classic colonies in that their population is not indigenous, but of British stock. And against the Argentine claim of "historic rights"—which are not recognized in a single internationally valid legal code—Britain had proclaimed . . . that the islands' status can only be decided in accordance with the islanders' own wishes. It is also undeniable that they want to remain British. 78

Izvestia reported: We have this patriotic hullabaloo in Argentina and in Britain. It is all very paradoxical. Those left wing forces which have always waged a struggle against the military regime are now basically in solidarity with it. Considerations stemming from nationalistic notions are providing stronger than social differences.

The Effect and the Future of the Falklands Conflict

195

One observer thought Izvestia was complaining of an attitude in Argentina characterized by the motto, "My country, right or left." 79 These reservations, added to the mixed reaction to Argentina's invasion from the Third World, made the U.S.S.R. hesitant to put its prestige on the line by vetoing a U.N. resolution or by materially supporting Argentina. The Soviets did not, as one author claims they did, immediately try to make the conflict a struggle between good and evil. 80 They did clearly favor Argentina's anticolonialism in their propaganda. The frisk Times more accurately reported on 6 April 1982: The Soviet leaders are always cautious in international disputes when they do not see an obvious ideological advantage, and in this case they probably have not yet worked out the implications of the crisis or decided how the affair will end. In such cases they tend to report things factually without any ideological bias.

They propagated an ideological bias as it was developed but did little more to support Argentina. The Soviet Union remained Argentina's main grain buyer in 1983, purchasing 41.1 percent of Argentina's grain exports. 81 The elected government of Alfonsin has usually been perceived as much more liberal than the military government, but how this will help the Soviets is unclear. It was the military government that in December of 1982 stopped the Argentine covert operations against Nicaragua's Sandinista government. 82 Alfonsin did argue that a socialist regime in Central America should not be seen by the United States as a security threat, but he also criticized the lack of pluralism in Nicaragua and called for open elections. He may have learned from Nicaragua that nothing attracts North American attention so much as to say that a dispute should not be viewed in an East-West context. The very denial worries Washington that there may be Soviet influence. Latins are seldom sure if they dislike U.S. intervention or disinterest more. Nothing quite gets U.S. interest more readily than public worrying about Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan influence. Perhaps for this as well as other reasons, Alfonsin has tried to improve Argentina's relations with Nicaragua, Cuba, and the U.S.S.R. A three-day meeting of the Political Youth of Latin America and the Caribbean was held in the San Martin Cultural Center in early December 1984. Alfonsin sent a message to the group, which met to support democracy in Argentina and to oppose U.S. military intervention in Nicaragua. In early January Vice President Victor Martinez, Deputy Foreign Minister Elsa Kelly, and advisors Luis Caeiro and Raul Rieardez went to the inauguration of President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua. A group of 120 young Argentines went at the same time to help in the coffee harvest. Jorge Garra, head of this "Liberatador General San Martin Brigade" complained that the U.S. embassy had pressured the Argentine government not to allow the group to go.83 Upon his return from Managua, Martinez stated that his government would expand its relations with Nicaragua. 84 On 27 February 1985 Alfonsin met with Ortega in Montevideo, at Sanguenetti's inauguration. Alfonsin was said to be prepared to tell U.S. officials that Argentina has "acled most consistently and directly" in support

196

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

of the Sandinistas, and that it will "continue acting in accord with its principles."85 On 8 March 1985 Foreign Minister Caputo said that the United States was a threat to Central America and that Reagan's policies were causing a "serious deterioration with other countries." 86 Alfonsin, in spite of Argentina's economic crisis, has given Nicaragua credits of over $45 million, and Cuba credits of $600 million over the next three years to buy Argentine grain. The Soviet Union purchased 7.5 million tons of cereal grains in Argentina for delivery in 1985. Discussions were being held about Argentine purchases of turbines to equip the Piedra de Aguila hydroelectric plant. The Soviets remained in 1985, as they had been in 1984, the main purchaser of Argentine grains. They bought 34 percent of Argentine grain exports in 1984.87 Trading relations have, of course, an uncertain effect on political influence. However, one Alfonsin aide is reported to have said, "We know we are susceptible to Soviet pressure when they are our major grain buyer." 88 One question is whether the Soviets will misuse recent agreements with Argentina to allow Soviet use of the Buenos Aires port to resupply Soviet fishing vessels. One agreement signed in July 1986 allows for use of Argentine port facilities and for 30 percent of the total Soviet catch to be bought from Argentine fishing companies.89 If this makes Argentina into a base for Soviet spy ships doubling as fishing trawlers, this might indicate a significant development in Soviet-Argentine relations. Foreign Minister Caputo said on 16 May 1985 that the Falklands dispute could be transformed by a newly opened British airfield on the Malvinas into a possible scenario for East-West conflict. 90 Alfonsin told the U.S. congress in March 1985: The delay in solving this controversy produces international intranquility for it nourishes a situation of tension, it creates a critical focal point in the South Atlantic, and the danger that both our territory as well as the area in general will find itself involved in strategic plans alien to our region.91

Fears about Argentine dependence on the Soviet grain market dissipated in the summer of 1986. By then, the United States and Europe were competing for the same market. President Reagan had rebuked former President Jimmy Carter for opposing the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with nothing more than a boycott of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow and a refusal to sell them U.S. wheat. Reagan, long known for his hostility to the evil empire, decided to stand up to the Soviets by reestablishing and subsidizing U.S. wheat sales to them. The Soviet Union was to buy about five million tons of Argentine wheat in 1986, but in July Argentina's undersecretary of agriculture, Fidel Braceras, had to report that it might not buy more than 600,000 tons. 92 The Argentine Economy Minister complained that of every 100 tons the United States would sell to the Soviets, it would now add another twenty tons for no charge.93 Between lost sales to the U.S.S.R., and the price of wheat declining from S80 to $70 per ton during one week in Augsut 1986, Argentines saw their export revenue threatened. That U.S. and European actions should make it more difficult to pay the interest on loans to Western banks seemed like a bitter

The Effect and the Future of the Falklands Conflict

197

irony to most Argentines. 94 The economy minister said he would ask for better terms on the loans to compensate for losses of grain revenue. A leading Peronist senator, Antonio Cafiero, wanted to suspend all interest payments in retaliation. 95 Argentina would sell less grain to the Soviet Union, but the effect was to worsen Argentine-United States relations. The prospects for Argentine grain exporters and for Soviet-Argentine relations improved by the fall of 1986, but without improving U.S.-Argentine relations. By August, Alfonsin's trip to Japan produced an agreement whereby that country would in 1987 buy three million tons of grain. 96 Alfonsin's October 1986 trip to the U.S.S.R., the first such trip by an Argentine president, had trade at the top of its agenda. The Soviets agreed during that trip to reaffirm the contract obligating them to buy at least four and one half tons of grain each year between 1986 and 1990 and to make up in 1987 for the low purchases of 1986. In return, Argentina pledged to increase its purchases of machinery and to enlarge Soviet participation in Argentina hydroelectric, rural electrification, and port projects. 97 The U.S.S.R. had successfully pressured the Argentines to import from it something more than one tenth of the value of their exports to it, which was the rather usual imbalance of trade between the two countries. Even with the restoration and increase of Soviet-Argentine trading relations, the United States had little to fear. Foreign Minister Caputo assured the United States that his country did not take "a neutral position" in world affairs. "Argentina is not a country equidistant from world positions," he stressed. "It is a completely western country, meaning it opposes authoritarianism and holds to individual freedom as the way of economic and political life."98 Alfonsin stressed Argentina's role of independent arbiter between the superpowers. He was the first to meet with Soviet chief Gorbachev after the latter's Iceland summit with President Reagan. This allowed Alfonsin to claim that "we have become the valid interlocutors of the most important rulers of the world, whatever the ideologies on which their systems are based."99 Alfonsin was maintaining Juan Peron's third position, one of the first expressions of non-alignment by which Argentina would remain equidistant from the two superpowers while it remained firmly committed to Western values. Argentine trade with the United States, Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union would grant the country most freedom from either superpower, a right to claim a leadership role in the non-aligned movement, and enough confidence to offer its good offices in managing Soviet-American tensions. Unlike Peron, Alfonsin's style made him and Argentina's world role acceptable to most of the international community. Argentina's winning of the world cup in soccer at the 1986 competition in Mexico helped show Argentines that their participation in world affairs, be they sports or politics, could lead to considerable prestige. Argentina is hardly a Soviet toehold in Latin America at the present. The attempt by Alfonsin to fashion a new nationalism in Argentina will probably be used to continue Argentina's traditional attempts to remain relatively independent of either superpower. Argentina owes the Soviets no debt because of anything done during the Malvinas war. Because of this, and Alfonsin's

198

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

reluctance to threaten the use of force, the British can keep control of the islands at decreasing cost and without risk of alarming the United States about increased Soviet influence in Argentina.

LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION The fears that Argentina would become dependent on the Soviet Union because of the war were probably as exaggerated as the hopes that Latin America would become more integrated because of it. The professions of Latin unity during the war were so profuse because most Latin states were unwilling to do much more to support Argentina. The Soviets and some Latins hoped the antiAmerican rhetoric would develop into a regional organization excluding the United States and defining the enemy as someone other than the Soviets or international communists. The Cuban government enthused on 3 May 1982 that "this is the hour of Latin American solidarity. The cause of the Malvinas is the cause of the Argentine people and consequently the cause of Latin America and the Caribbean; it is our cause!"100 However, the divisions within Latin America remained pronounced after the war and the lack of an immediate extrahemispheric military threat made an exclusively Latin alliance unlikely. The most Latins would do was keep reminding the United States that its intervention in Latin states' domestic affairs was bad behavior. Argentines tried during the war to use the threat of a united Latin America in league against the United States and Britain just as they tried to use the threat of a closer relationship with the U.S.S.R. Galtieri told Haig during the latter's attempt at shuttle diplomacy that all of the Americas south of the Rio Grande would explode if the United States aided Britain. 101 An Argentine diplomat said it would result in the destruction of the whole inter-American system. The split in the OAS that came from Cuba's conversion to communism would be minor in comparison to this. 102 If the rhetoric used at the OAS meetings in April and May had been followed by significant material aid to Argentina or by a reorganization of the OAS without the United States, the dire predictions would have come true. There was, however, rather less to the rhetoric than met the ear. The OAS meeting of 26 and 27 April was requested by Argentina after Haig had twice been in Buenos Aires and London and had failed to convince the Argentines that Britain would fight and win a war with U.S. support if Argentina did not accept U.N. Resolution 502, in which the Security Council had called upon Argentina to withdraw its troops from the islands and resolve the dispute diplomatically. The British had just finished retaking South Georgia, the step before sinking the Belgrano, as the meeting got under way. The attack by Britain on South Georgia had left almost twenty Argentine soldiers dead. The British had portrayed the incident as a minor one; after it the Argentine military commanders had been "entertained on board one of her majesty's ships," 103 a British Defence Ministry spokesman said. Many Latins saw it as armed subjugation of the Argentines and a threat to hemispheric

The Effect and the Future of the Falklands Conflict

199

security. Venezuela's Jose Alberto Zarnbrano Velasco fumed that "an extracontinental power" had attacked "our hemisphere," which obviously "affects us all." He rejected "imperialist hegemony" and believed that "the armed attack on the part of any state against an American state will be considered as an attack on all the American states." Latin America would not allow colonial enclaves to be maintained by force. One reason for Venezuela's vehemence may have been: "My country, Venezuela, knows and suffers these circumstances" of colonialism. 104 Venezuela blamed Britain for taking the Esquibo region and giving it to Guyana in the nineteenth century. Guatemala's Alfonso Alonso Lima took a position similar to that of Venezuela for similar reasons. "Guatemala [had] suffered an affront" by Britain just as Argentina had. Britain had ignored "the legitimate historical, juridicial, geographical, political moral rights of my country over its territory of Belize, conceded it a fictitious independence, and tried to despoil Guatemala of 23,000 square kilometers" of land. 105 Guatemalans seldom miss a chance to restate their claim to Belize. Ecuador too said the invocation of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) would be appropriate. Luis Valencia Rodriguez favored "the mutual help, the common defense of the American Republics" and said that "the situations of injustice or the controversies which exist in America, in all their many aspects, should be an object of hemispheric solidarity." 106 One of those situations was along a seventy-eight-kilometer stretch on the Ecuadorean-Peruvian border. Peru, Ecuadorans claimed, had unjustly denied Ecuador its legitimate access to the Amazon River. The dispute had led to an incident in 1981 that cost the lives of 200 people. In another, less deadly, incident in January 1984, one Ecuadoran soldier had been killed in clashes between the two nations' armies. Nicaragua's foreign minister, Miguel D'Escoto, was as enthusiastically in favor of Argentina at the OAS as Nicaraguan representatives had been at the United Nations. Nicaraguan spokesmen had been expected on 1 April to denounce in the United Nations Argentine anti-Sandinista activities in Central America. Before these denunciations could be made, Argentina invaded the Malvinas and Nicaraguans' attitudes were transformed. Suddenly, Argentina was helping all Latin America break away from imperialist domination. The U.S. support of Britain had revealed the hypocrisy of the United States, which had professed to protect Latin America but had always actually subjected Latins to its hegemony. What was supposed to guarantee the peace, security, and sovereignty of Latin states was being used in aggression against them. Argentina was not alone in suffering the treason of the United States; D'Escoto explained that Nicaragua too had suffered its treasonous aggression. D'Escoto wanted to resurrect the vision of Bolivar for a Confederation of Iberoamerican States "which would exclude the United States." Nicaragua, with Argentine anticolonialists, would lead the path to genuine Latin independence in consonance with the vision of Latin America's first liberators. 107 Also, Nicaragua claimed title of islands controlled by Colombia. So it had an interest in a precedent of title to islands changing hands.

200

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

If Nicaragua hoped the Malvinas war would help it lead a newly organized Latin America, and if other states hoped it would help them gain control over other disputed territory, they were disappointed. Colombia's Carlos Lemos Simmons was one of those who broke the image of Latin unity for which Argentina had hoped. He argued that a state could not invoke the TIAR if it had used force first, and he denied that this was a case of extracontinental aggression. He supported Argentina's claim to sovereignty over the islands, but not its forceful means.108 To help Argentina through the treaty "would serve simply to sterilize the power of the [treaty] and to weaken the system of collective defense when we really find ourselves faced with an extracontinental aggression."109 Chile's Pedro Daza V. took essentially the same position, warning that to use the TIAR against Britain in this case would put "the peace of America in danger."110 Mexico's Rafael de la Colina reminded his colleagues about "the persistence in Latin America of a good number of territorial conflicts, some of which are as old as that of the Malvinas." To allow a "military solution" for the Malvinas dispute could lead to "a grave danger to the peace of the continent." He also reminded his listeners that Article 9 of the TIAR treaty, like Paragraphs 1-4 of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), had defined aggression as "the unprovoked, armed attack by a state against the territory, the population, or the land, naval or air forces of another state." Section B said that an invasion against "a region which is under the effective jurisdiction of another state" is aggression. The first use of force would constitute prima facie proof of an act of aggression. De la Colina admitted that Argentina had been the victim of aggression a century and a half before but held that the Falklands was now under the effective jurisdiction of Britain and that Argentina had committed aggression for which it could not receive the support of Latin America. 111 Despite the split in opinion, the delegates gave Costa Mendez a standing ovation and listened in silence to Haig. Nevertheless, the delegates could not be unmindful of Haig's warnings that the TIAR should not be invoked in a way that could complicate "territorial disputes with one or more of [a member's] neighbors."112 The OAS passed a resolution criticizing Britain for aggravating the crisis by its use of force, urged it to cease hostilities, recognized Argentina's rightful sovereignty over the Malvinas, and deplored the EEC's adoption of "coercive means of an economic character" against Argentina. If Argentina had committed aggression, this was hardly a call to arms against the aggressor under the banner of collective security. Nevertheless, the concern with collective security that had been a key element in the writing of the U.N. Charter was not without effect on the policies of Latin states during the Falklands war. The OAS adopted no punitive measure against Britain. Costa Mendez took accurate enough note of the delegates' mood not to ask the OAS to come to Argentina's aid under the collective security provisions of the Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947) or to impose sanctions against Britain. Even the mild resolution that was proposed could not gain the support of Colombia, Chile, Trinidad-Tobago, and the United States. Although all the

The Effect and the Future of the Falklands Conflict

201

other members voted in favor of it, the lack of any organized material opposition to Britain made the resolution a halfway house between collective security and simple alliance antagonism. Latins were not ready to fight Britain, the United States, or NATO over the Malvinas. Perhaps in a world devoted to the principle of collective security, they should have deplored Argentina's aggression and even aided Britain. Yet how the OAS could so pristinely have supported the principle of collective security when the United Nations had not done so is not clear. The division of the world soon after World War II into communist and free-world blocs, in addition to Arab and black African blocs, has always kept the principle an ideal to be striven for more than a rule to be faithfully carried out. It may be that a literal application of the principle of collective security in the OAS in April 1982 would have been harmful to what regional community there is in Latin America. Rhetorical affirmation of Argentine sovereignty would not leave bitter feelings of betrayal. At the same time, the rhetorical opposition to any use of force would not stop the expected U.S.-British victory over the Argentine aggressors. The defeat of aggression by somebody else could leave the continent no more dangerous than before without causing hard feelings that might thwart future cooperation. Britain perhaps did the OAS a good turn by playing the villain. Because the OAS did not condemn Argentina, Argentines can remember "the generosity with which the countries of the area" supported Argentina. "All Latin America," writes one Argentine military advisor, "responded to the justice of Argentina's cause, and this could be seen reflected in the growing support for the country within . . . the OAS."113 Journalists from Clarm could recall that the OAS resolution was "without doubt important." 114 It might be argued that the OAS did increase its support of Argentina when at the end of May it passed its second resolution concerning the Malvinas conflict. The arguments were similar to those used in the first debate. The difference was that this resolution urged Latin states to support Argentine military efforts, urged the United States to stop assisting Britain, and called for an immediate end to U.S. sanctions against Argentina. There was still no formal invocation of the 1947 Rio Treaty nor was there a dramatic increase in individual states' military support of Argentina. Britain had already landed its troops on the islands and was advancing steadily. Galtieri had admitted that Argentina was fighting an unequal battle against the so-called Anglo-Saxons and that he was prepared to blame the United States if Argentina lost the war. 115 Largely rhetorical calls in the OAS for military support of Argentina were too little and too late to help Argentina win the war. They did sound appropriately tough. After the war, Torcuato di Telia thought that the war had taught Argentines that they "belong in Latin America, and that it is better to be a part—maybe one of the heads—of this strife torn continent rather than a forlorn province of Europe." He met with Gabriel Valdes, a former minister in Chile under former president Frei, who suggested that Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina could work together on renegotiating their external debts. Di Telia thought this

202

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

would be a significant result of the sense of belonging created during the war. 116 One of the fears of the rest of Latin America had always been that Argentina would not want to be a political part of the continent unless it could be a leader. One reason that some used to explain this fear was the racial differences between areas of Latin America. The Washington Post explained: There is the Indian Latin America, which extends from Mexico through much of Central America down the Andean spine of South America to the northern borders of Chile and Argentina, the African Latin America of slave-descended plantation societies, which skips from the Caribbean islands to the South American mainland down through much of Brazil, and the white European Latin America, whose main redoubt is the Southern Cone complex of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. 117 The descendants of Europeans were thought to have kept their sense of being superior. This led to the standard joke about the best possible business venture being buying an Argentine for what he is actually worth and selling him for what he thinks he is worth. Any hope that the sense of belonging forged during the war would spill over into closer economic cooperation on one of Latin America's most pressing problems was not sustained by later events. By early 1984, individual countries were still working out their own external debt renegotiations. The new Radical government in Argentina had increased its reserves from $200 million on assuming power in December 1983 to $700 million by February 1984 with an ultimate goal of $3 billion. This was at times said to be a war chest to threaten foreign banks that Argentina could go it alone if it defaulted because of foreign financiers' intransigence. This threat of national economic warfare aimed against the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and foreign commercial banks had as much to do with stealing a Peronist theme and forging a new, Radicalled nationalism as with renegotiating better terms on the foreign debt largely accumulated by the military government. Alfonsin developed the theme that the IMF's major contributor, the United States, was hostile not only to Argentina's claim to the Malvinas but also to democracy in Argentina and the rest of Latin America. The United States wanted to collect interest payments even at the expense of democracy and the territorial integrity of Latin nations. This theme was useful to a nationalist democrat trying to appeal to historically anti-United States Peronists and socialists. Alfonsin has argued that because of the East-West conflict, the United States has favored and supported totalitarian Latin regimes that could impose national security and fight communism. 118 According to Foreign Minister Caputo, Argentina was part of what the industrialized countries saw as the periphery of the international economic system; a periphery that could run the risks of taking sides in a renewed cold war, but could not gain from it. By having allowed itself to be part of the stage on which the East-West conflict was played out, Latin America had succumbed to the whipsaw process of terrorism and repression, both of which Caputo vaguelyattributed to outside interference. Caputo said in February 1984 that this process was "not just the expression of domestic problems" but also the

The Effect and the Future of the Falkland® Conflict

203

consequence of the East-West conflict, which "marks every international situation."119 As long as Latins allowed the United States and the U.S.S.R. to use their continent as a battleground, Latin democracies would be sacrified to U.S. security interests. The alternative was for Latin America to unite in refusing to be a battleground and calling for a renewed North-South dialogue. The only way Latin America could uphold its end of the dialogue was if it spoke with one voice. For Alfonsin, this meant an economic, strategic, and political integration of Latin America. From Alfonsin's point of view, not only inflation and the foreign debt were conspiring with the military and the unions against democracy. The United States was seen as an economic enemy of Argentina after the widely publicized economic reports of two U.S. financial advising firms, Beri South America, and Frost and Sullivan. These firms predicted the likelihood of Alfonsin not finishing his term, the inability of Argentina to pay its debts, and the inadvisability of investing in Argentina. Argentines reacted vigorously to these reports. Although the U.S. undersecretary for South America, Lowell Kilday, told Caputo after the two reports came out that the United States supported Argentine democracy, many Argentines perhaps correctly feared that important sectors in the United States valued their own profits more than Argentine democracy. Rogelio Frigerio, vice president of the party known as Movement for Integration and Development, called the reports part of a "psychological action" being conducted against Argentina. Cesar Jarolavsky, the president of the Radical bloc in the Chamber of Deputies, said that sectors of the "financial fatherland" were behind the report. The financial fatherland was another name for the local financial oligarchy, that nebulous group that Alfonsin has often suspected is in league with foreign financial elites and other reactionaries to impose authoritarian political structures on Argentina. The economic reports from the United States that were skeptical of Argentine economic viability were added to the U.S. military and diplomatic support to Britain during the Malvinas war. All this made the United States seem to some Argentines more enemy than friend. Alfonsin had told a meeting of Democratic parties of America in Quito in September 1982 that the TIAR was impractical and inefficient. In April 1983 in Madrid he proposed a new alliance that would include Spain and would be founded on the principles of human rights, territorial integrity, and anticolonialism. He called for a system that would guarantee the "security of all Latin American countries faced with any extra-continental aggression." It was not Cuba, Nicaragua, or the U.S.S.R. that threatened Argentina and Latin security, in the 1982 war and by the Fortress Falklands policy, it was Britain, NATO, and the United States.120 Argentina needed Latin American integration to protect not only its economy and its security, but also its democracy, in the face of U.S. opposition. Alfonsin said that South-South dialogue is needed to "struggle against injustice, colonialism, and the presence of imperialism." 121 Alfonsin fears many of those conducting the U.S. policy towards Latin America under the Reagan administration, especially those of the Committee of Santa Fe, a group that had advised presidential candidate Reagan on Latin

204

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

American policy, some of whose members were appointed as U.S. ambassadors to various Latin countries under the Reagan administration. Alfonsin thinks they are concerned with defending U.S. security more than Latin democracies.122 They do not think, Alfonsin has written, that Latin America can sustain pluralistic democracy. The best they want for Latin America is for it to remain founded on private, productive capitalism, which for Alfonsin is a code word in Latin America for the privilege of the few and the misery of the many. Alfonsin rejects Jeane Kirkpatrick's distinction between authoritarianism and totalitarianism. She says that military regimes in Latin America are usually authoritarian, or less oppressive than the totalitarian regimes in communist countries. The only difference, Alfonsin says, is that authoritarians are "our" tyrants while totalitarians are "theirs." The U.S. support of Latin authoritarianism has become more sophisticated. The Big Stick, the multinational corporations, and the Trilateral Commission are ever more sophisticated forms of supporting Latin authoritarianism, he says. The type of integration that the multinationals and the Trilateral Commission favor is but a new form of the imperialism previously practiced by colonial Spain and Britain. 123 President Reagan's announcement to the U.S. Congress that the progressive social movements in Central America are threats to U.S. security reveals the "contradictions" of U.S. politics. 124 The United States struggles to defeat social progress and to support authoritarian regimes throughout Latin America by cooperating with privileged elites, which in Argentina are the fascists. In order to protect Argentine and other Latin democracies, Alfonsin has called on Latin democratic parties to cooperate. Latin American and Iberian Peninsula politicians attending Alfonsin's inauguration signed the "Buenos Aires Democratic Charter." The charter, signed by democrats from ten countries, stated that "respect for human, individual, and social rights is the necessary basis of the authenticity of governments." It rejected violence as "a method of solving political problems," upheld the "principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries," and emphasized the "illegitimacy of dictatorial governments." The historical, political, racial, and economic divisions among and within Latin states make regional integration no easier after the Malvinas war than before it. Latins were not so committed to each other as to be much more willing than Africans to support Argentina in its use of force against colonialism. Their moral support of Argentina's claim to sovereignty over the Malvinas did not spill over into cooperation in other matters, nor did their criticism of the United States for its conduct during the war spill over into any significant opposition to the United States after the war. As a Reagan administration official said during the war, in the end, every country is a prisoner of its geography and its trade. For every country in Latin America, except Cuba, which is an unnatural case, the ties lead firmly to the United States and Western Europe. They may be mad at us; they may not like us; but sooner or later, they have to face the necessity of coming to an accommodation with us.125

The Effect and the Future of the Falklands Conflict

205

It could be argued that the U.S. invasion of Grenada was more widely criticized in Latin America than U.S. support of Britain's fight in the South Atlantic. Even the Grenada invasion had a limited effect, since most Latins are unsure whether communism or Yankee interventionism is worse. Both episodes helped to maintain the United States' image of dominance over Latin America that was widely accepted before 1982. Nevertheless, Latins have not formed a debtors' cartel in which they jointly make specific commands. Nor have they formed a security organization independent of the United States. Perhaps unfortunately, Latin integration was not much helped by the Falklands war.

CONCLUSIONS The history of the Falklands dispute begins in the sixteenth century. It nearly caused a war in 1771; it did cause a war in 1982. As the dispute continues and projections are made about what course it may take in the future, many of the problems and questions that have existed for a long time remain. How might historical rights and the principles of acquisitive prescription, self-determination, and interdependence be arranged and defined so as to make it possible either to solve or to live with the dispute? One of the key questions for the Falklands dispute is how sovereignty should be understood. The term was originally applied to God, who was said to have supreme power over all the earth. Even God had to fend off attacks on this sovereignty by the devil, who led humanity into sin and continued to upset what had begun as a good world. Theologians were left with the problem of explaining why these attacks seemed so often to be so successful. When the monarchs became the primary powers within the states of a crumbling Christendom, they appropriated the concept to convince others that they had supreme powers, derived from God, within their territory. The prepositions often used are indicative. Sovereignty is something exercised over a territory. It still sounds like a spirit hanging over, protecting, and controlling those on a part of the earth. Sovereignty to a piece of territory has more of a legal connotation. Sovereignty to the Falklands means title to the Falklands. The problem is how to make a legal argument clear enough to be understood by all rational people, who will of course then agree on who has title. Sovereignty to the islands has been difficult to establish legally because two nations have had a sense that they possess sovereignty over the islands. This sense is not created or discredited exclusively by legal arguments. Sovereignty in the Falklands dispute has usually meant defining the borders of a nation's territory, but this has been just the beginning of the problem. There is a wide range in the degree of permeability of those borders. Hans Morgenthau argues that if a nation is to be called sovereign, its borders cannot be penetrated by an external lawgiving authority. No extranational authority can be allowed to enact or enforce laws within a nation's borders if that nation is sovereign, he argues. Independent nations are equal to each other not in

206

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

size, power, or wealth but in legal supremacy within their borders. States may consent to the "weak and ineffective" rules of a decentralized international legal order and they may enter into treaties with each other. 126 Neither of these activities threatens a nation's sovereignty. Sovereignty is defined by Morgenthau as "the supreme legal authority of the nation to give and enforce the law within a certain territory." 127 Hence, a nation would lose that sovereignty if it allowed another nation to have veto power over its laws or to make laws through its agents in the country or through local authorities. "One single legal stipulation made by an extranational authority "is in itself sufficient to destroy the sovereignty of the nation." 128 This is so because "sovereignty over the same territory cannot reside simultaneously in two different authorities; that is, sovereignty is indivisible."129 The notion that sovereignty is an indivisible legal authority within a nation's borders has led Morgenthau to the similar position that there can be only one supreme lawgiving authority within the nation. There is no "quasi-sovereignty" either between or within states. "If sovereignty means supreme authority, it stands to reason that two or more entities . . . cannot be sovereign within the same time and space. He who is supreme is by logical necessity superior to everybody else. . . . Sovereignty cannot be divided in political actuality." 130 As John Calhoun said, How sovereignty itself—the supreme power—can be divided—how the people of the several States can be partly sovereign and partly not sovereign—partly supreme, and partly not supreme, it is impossible to conceive. Sovereignty is an entire thing;—to divide, is,—to destroy it.131

There cannot be groups, agencies, or persons within states competing for sovereignty, unless there is civil war and the problem of who is supreme is still being resolved. Morgenthau argued that "there must be a man or a group of men ultimately responsible for the exercise of political authority." 132 This "unfettered authority" might flatter domestic subordinates by calling the system federal but will in fact exercise supreme authority. One should not confuse the flattery with reality. 133 It is not clear how Morgenthau understands the concept of popular sovereignty in relation to the idea of a single, supreme legal authority. He mentions the concept of popular sovereignty only once in his chapter on sovereignty and then only in passing reference to its use by the "national democratic" state as a potent political weapon.134 Since sovereignty cannot mean that individuals in a democracy are sovereign, Morgenthau might mean that the supreme authority of democratic states has used the doctrine of popular sovereignty against its adversaries within the nation arid in other nations. The person or group of persons who are the sovereign authorities speak for the nation. Rousseau integrated the notions of popular sovereignty and the supreme power of one leader or a small group. The political elite is the articulator and formulator of the General Will, and the will of the supreme authority becomes

The Effect and the Future of the Falklands Conflict

207

the law of the land. To question the authority of the sovereign leader is to question popular sovereignty. There are alternatives to defining sovereignty as an indivisible, supreme lawgiving authority of one person or perhaps one group in a defined territory. The alternative definitions are often made by those who place less emphasis on logical deductions from a literal understanding of supremacy. When leaders say that their nation is sovereign, they are often trying to persuade rather than describe. Proclaiming sovereignty may be the best tactic when one is worried that the IMF will insist on a devaluation before it will make another loan, when a fluctuating foreign market forces a government to change its export, or import laws, or when the political systems of powerful foreign countries influence the political preferences of those in weaker countries. When leaders most vividly defend and describe their nation's sovereignty, they often have realized how much less than supreme they are but hope that others might be persuaded to overlook the reality if they can be dazzled with the rhetoric. Leaders can then make the needed practical adjustment without surrendering their supremacy. This is not so much hypocrisy as it is defining sovereignty as a relative term. Morgenthau has said that "sovereignty is not actual independence in political, military, economic, or technological matters."135 But this is precisely how many people understand the term. Sovereignty does not in reality disappear when one must ask how sovereign a nation is in different areas. Complete sovereignty would mean undivided national supremacy in legal, political, military, economic, or technological matters within a nation's borders. Nations feel they lose a degree of sovereignty if they need to import technology. They feel they are not completely sovereign if they cannot pursue independent domestic and foreign policies. They feel less sovereign if the IMF calls for a change in their government's budget and exchange rate, if the United Nations calls for changes in their human rights practices, or if foreign nations favor a change of government. They nonetheless think they are sovereign nations. And they are. The IMF does not send a team to run every aspect of the economy. The United Nations does not send down provisional governments. States may well do what extranational groups desire, in order to avoid unwanted pressure or because they come to agree it is better, but their acceptance of some foreign law does not make them utterly subservient. Accepting one single devaluation insisted upon by the IMF does not make a government a creature of international capitalism. If sovereignty to the Malvinas is transferred to Argentina and Argentina makes guarantees to Britain about the islanders' life style, this would be a commitment by the nation to limit the authority of future Argentine governments to pass laws contrary to the position of the British negotiators. Argentina would gain sovereignty to the Malvinas by qualifying its sovereignty. Nor is sovereignty necessarily so easily located within each nation. Even in military governments, and certainly in democratic ones, there is a long process of consultation and emerging consensus before a law is made or enforced. Even

208

The Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands

a military leader consults his colleagues and takes public opinion into account before making any rules. One of the key jobs in any executive's administration is bringing large numbers of groups in for advising sessions before making "his" or "her" decision. The person at the top of an organization whose position is accepted by its members should not necessarily be thought of as supreme. If sovereignty did mean supreme authority, it would be logical to think that one person or small group has lawmaking power. If sovereignty means the degree of independence on any given issue, then it is more logical to look for who shares the sovereignty and how they collectively arrive at a decision. It is questionable whether complete sovereignty would be desirable. Do nations really want to be completely independent? It is true that nations are more anxious to send than receive missionaries, but the continual interchange of information between those who make and enforce laws affects the making and enforcing of laws. Congresspersons, presidents, state governors, and other lawmakers go abroad and receive foreign delegations, expecting to have their legal proposals affected by foreign influence. The domestic lawmaker's authority is questioned whose proposals are criticized by responsible foreign spokesmen. Legal authority can be divided by domestic and foreign political actualities. The divisions within, and relative degrees of, different areas of sovereignty do not explain the concept away. Because borders are permeable does not mean they do not exist. A war in the South Atlantic over sovereignty was not a battle over a chimera. The sovereign nation's borders are another limit in the everexpanding group identification made by the individual. Because one has a family does not mean one no longer enjoys periods of solitude. Because one joins a club does not mean one wants one's family to live with the whole club. Because one is affected by and maybe even at times identifies oneself with extranational groups does not mean one is less loyal to the distinctive elements of one's own nation. To insist on either the complete impermeability or the total erasing of various limits is to threaten the richness of peoples' lives. To hope to reduce the tensions between the various groups to which individuals belong by indiscriminately trying to fuse the groups is as likely to cause tensions as to alleviate them. Individuals and groups desire a degree of selfhood, of distinction from their fellows, or sovereignty. Individuals and groups can no more cooperate than they can compete if they are homogenized into a General Will. Individuals and groups who enjoy liberty can compete and cooperate. The amorphous mass whose elite leadership interprets the General Will is compelled to work in the new industrial army. 136 There perhaps will not be unruly competition, but there certainly will be no cooperation if there are no distinct selves to cooperate. Beings who share a General Will belong in a beehive, not in nations. Perhaps human existence is threatened by sinful sovereign states. Until all peoples consent to a global republican government, whatever salvation our secular society can secure may best be ensured by the recognition of national sovereignty as a spectrum.

Notes

Introduction 1. 2. 3. 4.

David M. Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law, (1980) p. 1163. Ibid., p. 1164. Ibid., p. 1213; for "title" also see p. 1221. Ibid., p. 1165.

Chapter 1 1. See Mary Cawkell, The Falkland Story: 1592-1982, (1983), pp. 2, 3. 2. Gaceta Marinem. December 1982, p. 2. 3. Cawkell, Falkland Story, p. 5. The argument that Britain's explorers first discovered the Falklands can also be found in: Viscount Palmerston to Don Manuel Moreno, 8 January 1834, 22. British and Foreign State Papers (1833-1834), p. 1384.; Nina L. Kay Shuttleworth, in her book. Sir Woodbine Parish, also argues that John Davis discovered the Falkland Islands in 1592 and that "the British rights to those islands originated in their discovery and occupation by Englishmen." p. 359. 4. See The Disputed Islands, The Falkland Crisis, A History and Background, HMSO, London, p. 11. 5. Louis-Antoine Bougainville, Voyage autour de Monde (1771), p. 47. 6. Jeffrey D. Myhre, "Title to the Falklands-Malvinas under International Law," Millenium: Journal of International Studies 12 (Spring 1983), p. 29. 7. For detailed discussions about the discovery period, see Julius Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands (1982), Chapter 1; Cawkell, op. cit., pp. 1-8; and Paul Groussac, Las Idas Malvinas (1982), Chapter 2; Camilo Barcia Trelles, El problema de las Islas Malvinas (1943); Manuel Hidalgo Nfeto, La cuestion de las Malvinas (1947), Chapter VI; V. F. Boyson, The Falkland Islands (1924); Ricardo R. Caillet-Bois, Las Islas Malvinas (1948), Chapter 1; I .aurio H. Destefani, Las Malvinas en el epoca hispana (1600-1811) (1981), Chapter II. 8. Christian Wolff, Institutions du droit de la nature et des gens (Luzad ed., 1772); quoted in Goebel, Struggle for the. Falkland Islands, p. 262. 9. Emmerich de Vattel, Le droit des gens; quoted in Goebel, Struggle for the Falkland Islands, p. 263. 10. Louis Herikin et al, International Law: Cases and Materials (1980), p. 258. 11. See ibid., p. 262. 12. The Falkland Islands: The Facts (1982), p. 3. 13. Quoted in Goebel, Struggle for the Falkland Islands, p. 52.

210

Notes

14. Quoted in ibid., p. 58. 15. Robert Phillimore, International Law (1854), p. 200. 16. For reproductions of these treaties, see Perl, The Falkland Islands Dispute (1983), pp. 125-140. 17. Ibid., p. 188. 18. See Admiral Anson, A Voyage Round the World in the Years 1740, 1, 2, 3, 4 (1974), pp. 97,98. 19. Richard Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies 1739-63 (1936), pp. 7577, 106. 20. Richard Walter. In Admiral Anson, A Voyage Round the World (1769 ed.) pp. 126-127. 21. Quoted in "Commentary by the International Commission of Jurists," reprinted in Conflict in the South Atlantic: Documents on the Falklands/Malvinas Crisis (1983), P. 32. 22. For a detailed discussion of the settlement of the Malvinas, see Groussac, Was Malvinas, Chapter 3. 23. Leon E. Seltzer, ed. The Columbia Lippincott Gazetteer of the World (1962), p. 1640. 24. Cawkell, Falkland Story, p. 11. 25. Ibid., p. 17. 26. Ibid., p. 17. 27. Ibid., p. 18. 28. See Goebel, Struggle for the Falkland Islands, pp. 233, 234. 29. Cawkell, Falkland Story, p. 13. 30. In Goebel, Struggle for the Falkland Islands, p. 236. 31. The Sunday Times of London Insight Team, War in the Falklands: The Full Story (1982), p. 34. 32. Quoted in Goebel, Struggle for the Falkland Islands, pp. 236, 237. 33. Captain Hunt to Ruiz Puente, 10 December 1769, in Papers Relative to the Late Negotiations with Spain and the Taking of Falkland's Island from the English (1777), p. 15; quoted in Goebel, Struggle for the Falkland Islands, p. 274. 34. Quoted in Goebel, Struggle for the Falkland Islands, p. 284. 35. The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803, Vol. 16: 1765-1771 (1813), p. 1094. 36. Goebel, Struggle for the Falkland Islands, pp. 314, 315. 37. See "Protestation du government des provinces unies du Rio de la Plata par son ministre plenipotentiare Londres" of June 17, 1833, in Raphael Perl, The Falkland Islands Dispute in International Law and Politics: A Documentary Sourcebook (1983), pp. 299-322. For a well-researched argument in favor of the Secret Understanding, see Ricardo Zorraquin Becu, Inglaterra prometid abandonar las Malvinas (1975). 38. Quoted in Goebel, Struggle for the Falkland Islands, p. 339. 39. Quoted in ibid., p. 343. 40. The Spanish document read: His Britannick Majesty having complained of the violence which was committed on the 10th of June 1770, at the island commonly called the Great Maloume, and by the English Falkland's Island, in obliging, by force, the commander and subjects of his Britannick Majesty to evacuate the port by them called Egmont: a step offensive to the honour of his crown;—the Prince de Masserano. Ambassador Extraordinary of his Catholick Majesty, has received orders to declare, and declares, that his Catholick Majesty, considering the desire with which he is animated for peace, and for the maintenance of good harmony with his Britannick Majesty, and reflecting

Notes

211

that this event might interrupt it, has seen with displeasure this expedition tending to disturb it; and in the persuasion in which he is of the reciprocity of sentiments of his Britannick Majesty, and of its being far from his intention to authorise anything that might disturb the good understanding between the two Courts, his Catholick Majesty does disavow the said violent enterprise,—and, in consequence, the Prince of Masserano declares, that things shall be restored in the Great Malouine at the port called Egmont, precisely to the state in which they were before the 10th of June, 1770: For which purpose, his Catholick Majesty will give orders to one of his Officers, to deliver up to the Officer authorised by his Britannick Majesty the port and fort called Egmont, with all the artillery, stores, and effects of his Britannick Majesty and his subject which were at the place the day above named, agreeable to the inventory which has been made of them. The Prince de Masserano declares, at the same time, in the name of the King, his master, that the engagement of his said Catholick Majesty, to restore to his Britannick Majesty the possession of the port and fort called Egmont, cannot nor ought in any wise to affect the question of the prior right of sovereignty of the Malouine Islands, otherwise called Falkland's Islands. In witness whereof, I the under-written Ambassador Extraordinary have signed the present declaration with my usual signature, and caused it to be sealed with our arms.

The British acceptance read: His Catholick Majesty having authorized the Prince of Masserano, his Ambassador Extraordinary, to offer, in his Majesty's name, to the King of Great Britain, a satisfaction for the injury done to his Britannick Majesty by dispossessing him of the port and fort of Port Egmont; and the said Ambassador having this day signed a declaration which he has just delivered to me, expressing therein, that his Catholick Majesty, being desirous to restore the good harmony and friendship which before subsisted between the two Crowns, does disavow the expedition against Port Egmont, in which force has been used against his Britannick Majesty's possessions, commander, and subjects; and does also engage, that all things shall be immediately restored to the precise situation in which they stood before the 10th of June 1770; and that his Catholick Majesty shall give orders, in consequence, to one of his Officers to deliver up to the Officer authorized by his Britannick Majesty, the port and fort of Port Egmont, as also all his Britannick Majesty's artillery, stores, and effects, as well as those of his subjects, according to the inventory which has been made of them. And the said Ambassador having moreover engaged in his Catholick Majesty's name, that what is contained in the said declaration shall be carried into effect by his said Catholick Majesty, and that duplicates of his Catholick Majesty's orders to his Officers shall be delivered into the hands of one of his Britannick Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State within six weeks; his said Britannick Majesty, in order to shew the same friendly disposition on his part, has authorized me to declare, that he will look upon the said declaration of the Prince de Masserano, together with the full performance of the said engagement on the part of his Catholick Majesty, as a satisfaction for the inquiry done to the Crown of Great Britain. In witness whereof, I the under-written, one of his Britannick Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, have signed these presents with my usual signature, and caused them to be sealed with our arms.

Quoted in ibid., pp. 358-360. 41. Ibid., p. 360. 42. Ibid., p. 361. 43. F. S. Northedge, "The Falkland Islands: Origins of the British Involvement" International Relations 1 (November 1982), p. 2182. 44. Ibid., p. 2178. 45. Viscount Palmerston to Don Manuel Moreno, 8 January 1834, in Perl, Falkland Islands Dispute, p. 323. 46. Northedge, "Falkland Islands," p. 2179. 47. Quoted in Goebel, Struggle for the Falkland Islands, p. 291. 48. Ibid., pp. 367, 368.

212

Notes

49. Samuel Johnson, "Thoughts on the Late Transactions respecting Falkland's Islands" (1771). 50. Quoted in "Commentary by the International Commission of Jurists," in Conflict in the South Atlantic, p. 35. 51. Not everyone would so despise the Falklands. In the late 1830s the famous botanist Joseph Hooker visited them and called the indigenous tussac "the golden glory of the Falklands." Its long evergreen leaves made the "tree plant" look like a palm tree. It had high nutritive value, which made the Falklands good grazing land. The plant did disappear after sheep overpopulated the island. Maybe after the plant's disappearance Hooker would have agreed with Dr. Johnson. 52. In "Commentary by the International Commission of Jurists," in Conflict in the South Atlantic, p. 35. 53. Alfred P. Rubin, "Historical and Legal Background of the Falkland/Malvinas Dispute," in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Ared, eds., The Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy, and International Law (1985), p. 13. 54. Barre to Chatham, 22 January 1771, in Correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham (1839), Vol. 4, p. 72. 55. Paraphrased in Goebel, Struggle for the Falkland Islands, p. 66. 56. J. C. J. Metford, "Falklands or Malvinas? The Background to the Dispute," Introduction to Goebel, Struggle for the Falkland Islands, p. xvi. 57. Quoted in Perl, The Falkland Islands Dispute in International Law and Politics, p. 188. It is this evidence that made Samuel Eliot Morsion hastily conclude that Spain ceded her claims to England in 1771. Samuel Eliot Morsion, The European Discovery of America: The Southern Voyages 1492-1616 (1974), p. 377. 58. See Goebel, Struggle for the Falkland Islands, pp. 376-408. 59. Ibid., p. 407. 60. Secret Instructions to Lieutenant Clayton, 22 December 1773, Adm. 2/1332, pp. 205-207. Quoted in Vincent T. Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire 1763-1793 (1952), Vol. 1, p. 32. 61. Quoted in Goebel, Struggle for the Falkland Islands, p. 409. 62. Quoted in ibid., p. 410. Britain's Sir Robert Phillimore has rejected the argument that this inscription, when left unaccompanied by acts of a de facto possession, could maintain British sovereignty. He wrote that "the mere erection of crosses, landmarks, and inscriptions is ineffectual for acquiring or maintaining an exclusive title to a country of which no real use is made." Robert Phillimore, International Law (1854), p. 201. 63. Jose Arce, The Malvinas (Our Snatched Little Isles) (1951), p. 83. 64. In Perl, Falkland Islands Dispute, pp. 145-150. 65. Rodriguez Berrutti and Camilo Hugo, Malvinas, ultima frontera del colonialismo (1975), p. 11. 66. In J. C. J. Metford, "Falklands or Malvinas?" in Goebel, Struggle for the Falkland Islands, p. xvii. 67. See ibid., p. xviii. Yehuda Z. Blum mistakenly claims that there were no acts of occupation after 1820 and no effective control by Buenos Aires authorities, whose only act, he says was to appoint a governor who "never visited the islands." Yehuda Z. Blum, Historic Titles in International Law (1965), p. 109. 68. Monica Pinto, "Argentina's Right to the Falkland/Malvinas Islands," Texas International Law Journal 18 (Winter 1983), p. 3. 69. In J. C. J. Metford, "Falklands or Malvinas?" in Goebel, Struggle for the Falkland

Notes

213

Islands, p. xx. The idea that occupation can establish sovereignty over a territory not subject to another state is a well-settled principle. See L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (1955), p. 555; W. F. Hall, A Treatise on International Law (1924), p. 125; J. Westlake, International Law (1910), p. 98; and R. Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (1962), p. 6. For the latter incident of 1833, it would therefore be important if the islands were res nullius as of 1831. It is noteworthy that the U.S. captain acted in 1831 without instructions from Washington, D. C. and certainly without prior instructions from Andrew Jackson. Samuel Eliot Morison erroneously states that "President Jackson ordered U.S.S. Lexington (Commander Silas Duncan) to clear out the offenders; he did so in 1832." Morison, European Discovery of America, p. 377. 70. British historian W. F. Boyson set aside the more usual British penchant for understatement when he described the Clio as "the embodiment of dazzling order, discipline and restraint." How anything could embody dazzling restraint is wisely left unexplained. (Quoted in Sunday Times Insight Team, War in the Falklands, p. 39.) Morison is mistaken when he writes that "when the Falklands were temporarily unoccupied, the British moved in, and there they have stayed." Morison, European Discovery of America, p. 377. 71. Parliamentary Debates, Hansard; Commons, 6th series, Vol. 75, 14 March 1985, col. 505. 72. John M. Lindsey, "Conquest: A Legal and Historical Analysis of the Root of United Kingdom Title in the Falkland Islands," Texas International Law Journal 18 (Winter 1983), p. 30. 73. Quoted in ibid., p. 30. 74. Quoted in Pinto, "Argentina's Right," p. 4. 75. Ibid. 76. Lindsey, "Conquest: A Legal and Historical Analysis," p. 31. 77. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory, p. 53. 78. Quoted in Lindsey, "Conquest: A Legal and Historical Analysis," p. 31. 79. Ibid., p. 31. 80. Farooq Hassan, "The Sovereignty Dispute Over the Falkland Islands," Virginia Journal of International Law 23 (Fall 1982), p. 65. 81. Thomas M. Franck, "Dulce et Decorum Est: The Strategic Role of Legal Principles in the Falklands War," American Journal of International Law 77 (January 1983), p. 109. 82. For discussions about these disputes, see D. Downing, An Atlas of Territorial and Border Disputes (1980), and Dr. Robert D. Hodgson, International Oceans Boundary Disputes, Oceans Policy Study 37 (April 1978). 83. John Norton Moore, "The Inter-American System Snarls in Falklands War," American Journal of International Law 76 (October 1982), p. 830. 84. U. N. Doc. S/PV. 23 63 at 48-50 (1982). 85. Franck, "Dulce et Decorum Est," p. 124. 86. Ibid., p. 110. 87. Ibid., p. 123. 88. Letter of John Norton Moore to editors of American Journal of International Law 77 (July 1983), p. 610. 89. D. P. O'Connell, International Law (1965), Vol. I, p. 496. 90. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory, p. 70. 91. In Letter of Emilio J. Cardenas to editors of American Journal of International Law 77 (July 1983), p. 607.

214

Notes

92. Quoted in Moore letter to editors, American Journal of International Law 77 (July 1983), p. 612. 93. Moore letter to editors, American Journal of International Law 77 (July 1983), pp. 610-615. 94. Moreno to Arana, 5 April 1843, in John Lynch, Argentine Dictator: Juan Manuel de Rosas 1829-1852 (1981), p. 267. 95. Ferns, Argentina (1969), p. 232. 96. Myhre, "Title to the Falklands/Malvinas," p. 26. A leading article on acquisitive prescription defines it as the means by which, under international law, legal recognition is given to the right of a state to exercise sovereignty over land or sea territory in cases where that state has in fact, exercised its authority in a continuous, uninterrupted, and peaceful manner over the area concerned for a sufficient period of time, provided that all other interested and affected states (in the case of land territory the previous possessor, in the case of sea territory neighboring states and other states whose maritime interests are affected) have acquiesced in this exercise of authority. Such acquiescence is implied in cases where the interested and affected states have failed within a reasonable period of time to refer the matter to the appropriate international organization or international tribunal or—exceptionally in cases where no such action was possible—have failed to manifest their opposition in a sufficiently positive manner through the instrumentality of diplomatic protests. D. H. N. Johnson, "Acquisitive Prescription in International Law," British Yearbook of International Law 27 (1950), pp. 332, 353-54. 97. Memorandum by de Bernhardt, 7 December 1910. Quoted in Peter Beck, "The Anglo-Argentine Dispute Over Title to the Falkland Islands: Changing British Perceptions on Sovereignty Since 1910," Millenium: Journal of International Studies 12 (Spring 1983), p. 12. 98. Beck, "Anglo-Argentine Dispute," p. 12. 99. Quoted in ibid., pp. 12, 13. 100. These are quoted in ibid., pp. 15, 16. 101. Quoted in Moore to editors, American Journal of International Law 11 (July 1983), p. 612. On Argentine proposals to Great Britain for arbitration of the Malvinas dispute, see Groussac, Islas Malvinas, pp. 11-22. 102. Beck, "Anglo-Argentine Dispute," p. 17. 103. Quoted in ibid., p. 19. 104. Ibid., p. 19. 105. Johnson, "Acquisitive Prescription in International Law," p. 353. 106. See Adrian F. J. Hope, "Sovereignty and Decolonization of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands," Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 6 (Spring 1983), p. 428. Hope notes that the British position on acquisitive prescription changes that concept to a version of the Roman law concept of usucapio, which was invoked to cure a "defect in title resulting from usurpation of territory of another's sovereignty by the consent and acquiescence of the former sovereign." This latter consent of course has been missing in the Malvinas case. 107. Judgement of 11 February 1935, Camara Federal de la Plata, Rio Gallegos, Argentina, 1935, 49 Jurisprudencia Argentina (J. A.) 188, reprinted in Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases 180 (1941). 108. Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pads, in J. B. Scott, ed., The Classics of International Law (1952), Book 2, Chapter 4, Section 7, p. 224; also Oppenheim, International Law, pp. 526-529.

Notes

215

Chapter 2 1. Quoted in Michla Pomerance, "The United Nations and Self Determination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception," American Journal of International Law 70 (January 1976), p. 16. As Adrian Hope has pointed out to me, another author, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, has argued that "juridically, the notion of a legal right of self-determination is non-sense (for can ex-hypothesi (an) as yet juridically nonexistent entity be the possessor of a legal right?). Alternatively, if an entity does possess such rights, then it is already 'determined internationally' and the case is no longer one of 'self determination." Gerald Fitzmaurice, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (1973), p. 233, n. 85. 2. Times, 21 October 1964, p. 13. Hereafter, "Times" refers to the Times (London), unless otherwise noted. 3. U.N. Doc. A/32/33 includes A/AC. 109/L. 1200 at 11 (1977). 4. U.N. Doc. A/34/23/Add. 7 includes A/AC. 109/L 1339 at 10 (1979). 5. Parliamentary Debates, Hansard; hereafter referred to as Hansard Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 22, 29 April 1982, col. 1045. 6. Ibid., Vol. 24, 20 May 1982, col. 534. 7. Ibid., Vol. 995, col. 428. 8. Ibid., Vol. 21, 2 April 1982, col. 634. 9. Ibid., col. 636. Also see Vol. 21, col. 1146. 10. Ibid., Vol. 1, 3 April 1982, col. 638. Also see cols. 657; 7 April 1982, cols. 963, 978, 1044; 14 April 1982, cols. 1205-1207. 11. Ibid., p. 634. 12. La Prensa, 29 September 1983. 13. Times, 23 February 1977, p. 1. 14. Ibid., 27 February 1977, p. 10. 15. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 21, 14 April 1982, col. 1171. 16. Ibid., Vol. 23, 13 May 1982, col. 982. 17. Ibid., Vol. 21, 3 April 1982, col. 634. 18. Ibid., 7 April 1982, col. 1018. 19. Ibid., 14 April 1982, col. 1179. 20. Ibid., cols. 1185, 1194. 21. Ibid., Vol. 22, 29 April 1982, col. 1022. 22. Ibid., col. 1024. 23. Ibid., Vol. 23, 13 May 1982, col. 966. 24. Ibid., Vol. 24, 20 May 1982, col. 511. 25. Quoted in Cecil Woolf and Jean Moorcroft Wilson, eds., 100 Authors Take Sides on the Falklands (1982), p. 20. 26. Times, 12 March 1968, p. 1. Also see Metford, "Falklands or Malvinas" in Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands, p. xxv: "Argentina's best ally at the present time may well be, paradoxically, British officialdom. [The islands] are no longer important . . . [and] are scarcely worth retaining;" and Times, 14 March 1968, p. 7 and 15 March 1968, editorial. In 1968 H. S. Ferns wrote that "the islands have the power to touch British neuroses. . . . The reaction to the mild rationality of Lord Chalfont, the British Minister of State at the Foreign Office, on the subject has demonstrated that it is more possible to talk sense about the Falkland Islands in Britain than it is in Argentina." H. S. Ferns, Argentina (1969), p. 254. See also Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 761, 18 March 1968 and cols. 31, 32; Times, 27 March 1968, p. 6; 28 March 1968,

216

Notes

p. 1; 27 November 1968, p. 6; 29 November 1968, p. 1; 14 December 1968, p. 1; 4 December 1968, p. 1; and 5 December 1968, p. 8. 27. Times, 12 March 1968, p. 1. 28. Ibid., 5 December 1968, p. 8. 29. Ibid., 6 December 1968, p. 13. 30. Ibid., 8 June 1971, p. 6. 31. Ibid., 16 December 1977, p. 11. 32. Ibid., 23 February 1977, p. 14. 33. Ibid., 12 September 1980, p. 13; also see 2 October 1980, p. 15; Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 995, 11 December 1980, col. 425; Vol. 996, 11 December 1980, col. 260; and Vol. 22, 21 April 1982, col. 272. 34. Ibid., Vol. 21, 7 April 1982, col. 1018. 35. Ibid., Vol. 917, 20 October 1976, col. 479. 36. Ibid., Vol. 21, 3 April 1982, col. 650. 37. Times, 3 December 1980, p. 8. 38. Ibid., 8 December 1980, p. 13. 39. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 21, 2 April 1982, col. 1038. 40. Ibid., Vol. 22, 29 April 1982, col. 1041. 41. Ibid., Vol. 21, 14 April 1982, col. 1146. 42. Ibid., pp. 1154, 1155. 43. Ibid., p. 1180. 44. Ibid., p. 1207. 45. Ibid., Vol. 22, 19 April 1982, col. 25. 46. Ibid., 29 April 1982, col. 1031. 47. U.N. Doc A/9287 (1973). 48. U.N. Doc A/C./4/31/SR.23 (1976). 49. Anthony Barnett, "Iron Britannia," New Left Review Number 134 (August 1982), p. 72. 50. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 22, 29 April 1982, col. 1030. 51. See Martin Honeywell and Jenny Pearee, Falklands/Malvinas: Whose Crisis? (1982), pp. 105-107. 52. Times, 4 December 1976, p. 4. 53. Ibid., 10 January 1977, p. 12. 54. Ibid., 4 August 1977, p. 13. 55. Ibid., 9 February 1977, p. 15. 56. Ibid., 4 August 1977, p. 13. 57. Ibid., 11 August 1977, p. 6. 58. Ibid., 4 December 1976, p. 4. 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid., 28 May 1977, p. 4.

61. Ibid. 62. Ibid., 3 June 1977, p.6.

63. Ibid., 13 August 1977, p.4. 64. Ibid., 28 May 1977, p.4. 65. The Daily Telegraph (London), 19 February 1979, p. 6; 20 February 1979, p. 17; 21 March 1979, p. 5. 66. See Inis L. Claude, Jr., National Minorities: An International Problem (1954), chapters 1, 2. Claude defines kin-state as "a state which regards itself as standing in a special relationship to a national m i n o r i t y in another state, by reason of ethnic affinity," p. 5.

Notes 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87.

217 Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 21, 7 April 1982, p. 997. Ibid., col. 1028. Ibid., col. 1154. Ibid., 3 April 1982, col. 657. Ibid., 7 April 1982, col. 963. Ibid., col. 978. Ibid., cols. 1024, 1025. Ibid., 14 April 1982, col. 1159. Honeywell and Pearce, Falklands, p. 118. See Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 996, 18 December 1980, col. 647. Ibid., Vol. 21, 2 April 1982, col. 572. Ibid., 3 April 1982, col. 634. Ibid., 7 April 1982, col. 1007. Ibid., col. 1007. Ibid., col. 1146. Ibid., Vol. 22, 29 April 1982, col. 1030. Ibid., Vol. 24, 20 May 1982, col. 478. Ibid., Vol. 21, 7 April 1982, col. 997. Ibid., 14 April 1982, cols. 1011, 1168. Ibid., Vol. 22, col. 1027. Ibid., Vol. 21, 14 April 1982, col. 1179.

Chapter 3 1. U.N. Doc. A/5800/Rev. 1 Add. 8 part 1 para. 24. 2. U.N. Docs. A/C. 4/SR.25 (1946). 3. See U.N. Doc. General Assembly Resolution 66 (I) 14-12-1946. 4. See U.N. Docs. A/C. 4/SR.52. I (1948); A/C. VSR. 110 (1949); A/C. 4/SR.180 (1950); A/C. 4/SR.211 (1951); A/C. 4/SR.256 (1952); A/C. 4/SR.324 (1953); A/C. 4/SR.411 (1954); A/C. 4/SR.472 (1955); A/C. 4/SR.600 (1956); A/C. 4/SR.670 (1957); A/C. 4/SR.819 (1959); A/C. 4/SR.967 (1959); A/C. 4/SR.1005 (1960); and A/C. VSR. 1171 (1961). 5. Juan Peron, Los vendepatrias: las pruebas de una traicibn (1972), p. 180. 6. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2350 (1982). 7. Peron, Los vendepatrias, pp. 65, 118. 8. See U.N. Docs. A/5800/Rev. 1 paras. 34, 40. 9. U.N. Docs. S/1697 para. 85. 10. U.N. Doc. A/PV. 927 (1960). 11. See Rupert Emerson, "The Fate of Human Rights in the Third World," World Politics 27 (January 1975); for the idea that human rights violations in Africa are caused by remaining neocolonial institutions see Christopher C. Mojekwu, "Self-Determination: The African Perspective," in Yonah Alexander and Robert A. Friedlander, eds., Self-Determination: National, Regional and Global Dimensions (1980). 12. Alfred Cobban, National Self-Determination (1945), p. 5. 13. Harold S. Johnson, Self-Determination Within the Community of Nations (1967), pp. 19-23. 14. Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (1962), pp. 203, 204, 224; also see Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society (1984), see especially chapters 1, 3, 8.

218

Notes

15. Ibid., p. 241. 16. Ibid., p. 206. 17. H. E. Dr. Jose Maria Ruda, "Statement by the Representative of Argentina, H. E. Dr. Jose Maria Ruda, Before the Subcommittee III of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," in Raphael Perl, ed., The Falkland Islands Dispute in International Law and Politics: A. Documentary Sourcebook (1983), p. 367. 18. Michla Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine in the United Nations (1982), p. 12. 19. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). 20. Quoted in W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, The Principle of Self-Determination in International Law (1977), pp. 119-120. 21. See Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization (1971), p. 365. 22. U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). 23. U.N. Doc. A/PV.1174 (1962); see also A/PV.1212 para. 165 (1963). 24. U.N. Doc. A/PV.1854 (1970). 25. U.N. Doc. A/PV.1267 (1963). 26. U . N . Doc. A/C. 4/SR.1552 (1965). 27. U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/PV.830 para. 18 (1971). 28. U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). 29. Quoted in Seymour Maxwell Finger and Gurcharan Singh, "Self-Determination: A United Nations Perspective" in Yonah Alexander and Robert A. Friedlander, SelfDetermination (1980), p. 339. 30. See James Barros, The Aaland Islands Question: Its Settlement by the League of Nations (1968). 31. R. Rigo Sureda, The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination: A Study of United Nations Practice (1973), p. 29. 32. "The Aaland Island Question: Report of the Committee of Jurists," League of Nations. Official Journal, Special Supp. No. 3 (October 1920). 33. "Report of the Commission of Rapporteurs," 16 April 1921, League Council Doc. B. 7.21/68/106. 34. Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice, p. 2. 35. Ruda, "Statement by the Representative of Argentina," p. 371. 36. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2350 para. 17 (1982). 37. Ibid., paras. 48-50. 38. See Quincy Wright, "The Goa Incident," American Journal of International Law 56 (July 1962), pp. 622-629. 39. U.N. Doc. S/PV.988 (1961). 40. Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization (December 1964), pp. 1, 19-22. 41. Wright, "Goa Incident," p. 629. 42. Inis L. Claude, Jr., The Changing United Nations (1967), p. 61. 43. Wright, "Goa Incident," pp. 618, 619. 44. Sureda, Evolution of the. Right of Self-Determination, p. 143. 45. Ibid., p. 78. 46. Sureda, Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination, p. 151.

Notes

219

47. In Potnerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice, pp. 32, 33; see also Bernhard Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century, trans. P. S. Falla (1971), pp. 256-259. 48. M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia (1981), p. 275. 49. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2363 (1982), para. 55. 50. Sureda, Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination, p. 338. 51. Inis L. Claude, Jr. "Just Wars: Doctrines and Institutions," Political Science Quarterly 95 (Spring 1980), p. 95. 52. U.N. Doc. A/PV.2174 (1973). 53. U.N. Doc. A/PV.2364 (1975). 54. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 109/436 (1973). 55. Ibid. 56. See U.N. Doc. General Assembly Resolution 3160 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973. 57. Quoted in Richard L. Jackson, The Non-Aligned, the UN, and the Superpowers (1983), p. 169. 58. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2350 (1982) paras. 3-21. 59. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2366 (1982) paras. 55, 56. 60. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2350 (1982). 61. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2350 (1982) para. 91. 62. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2364 (1982) para. 27. 63. Ibid., para. 25. 64. Ibid., para. 27. 65. U.N. Doc. A/37/PV.55 (1982). 66. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2360 (1982) para. 16. 67. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2364 (1982) para. 26. 68. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2366 (1982) paras. 38-42. 69. Robert Lansing, "Self-Determination," Saturday Evening Post, 9 April 1921, pp. 101-102; quoted in Michla Pomerance, "The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception" (1976), p. 10. 70. U.N. Doc. A/37/PV.55 (1982). 71. U.N. Doc. A/37/PV.53 (1982) paras. 92-100.

Chapter 4 1. This question has been debated since the time of Plato and Aristotle. In The Laws, Plato has an Athenian Stranger say, for although a land's proximity to the sea affords daily pleasure, the sea really is a "briny and bitter neighbor." It infects a place with commerce and the moneymaking that comes with retail trade, and engenders shifty and untrustworthy dispositions in souls; it thereby takes away the trust and friendship a city feels for itself and for the rest of humanity. In this regard there's comfort in the fact that the city will he productive in every way, while the roughness of the terrain obviously prevents it from being both productive of great quantities and, at the same time, fertile in all respects. If it were, that would mean large exports and a resulting infection of silver and gold money. And on balance there is nothing that does more harm, so to speak, to a city's acquisition of well-born and just dispositions.

Plato, The Laws (1980), p. 90, see also pp. 351-356.

220

Notes

Aristotle disagreed, arguing that "people must import the things which they do not themselves produce, and export those of which they have a surplus." In part, that is the reason the ideal state is "conveniently situated for both sea and land." Aristotle, The Politics (1981), pp. 406, 407. 2. See Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: The Progress and Problems of International Organization (1971), Chapter 17; Ernest B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization (1958); David A. Mitrany, A Working Peace System (1966); Kenneth Thompson, Ethics, Functionalism, and Power in International Politics: The Crisis in Values (1979). 3. Richard Grossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister Vol. HI (1977), p. 697.

4. Ibid., pp. 696-697.

5. La Nacion, 29 November 1969. 6. See Interpretation Report of the Geocom-Bahia Grande Argentine-Marine Seismic Survey (1971). 7. Quoted in Adolfo Silenzi de Stagni, Las Malvinas y el petroleo (1982), Vol. 1, p. 29. 8. Colonel Manuel Reimundes to Secretary Haiek, 30 April 1971, quoted in Stagni, Las Malvinas y el petroleo, p. 32. 9. General Catan to General Panullo, 27 April 1971, quoted in Stagni, Las Malvinas y el petroleo, p. 33. 10. See Osiris Troiani, Operacion Malvinas—/: Martinez de Hoz en Londres (1982), p. 37. 11. Stagni, Las Malvinas y el petroleo, p. 35. 12. "Proyecto de ley de hidrocarburos," Section 8, Article 24, reprinted in ibid., pp. 45-51. 13. La Nacion, 3 June 1972, also see Analisis, Number 586 9-15 June 1972; and Mercado, 6 July 1972. 14. Troiani, Operacion Malvinas—/, p. 38. 15. D. H. Griffiths to Lowell Gustafson, letter of 27 October 1982. 16. Times, 25 November 1974; see also Ibid., 2 December 1974. 17. Ibid., 20 January 1976 see Wall Street Journal, 15 July 1975. 18. See U.N. Doc. A/10023/Add. 8 (Part 3) including A/AC. 109/L. 1044 at 16 (1975). 19. See Carlos Garcia Mata, "El petroleo argentino y las Islas Malvinas" in Stagni, Las Malvinas y el petroleo, pp. 91-94. 20. Times, 18 October 1975. 21. Ibid. 22. See Stagni, Las Malvinas y el petroleo, p. 162. 23. Ibid., p. 165. 24. Times, 16 January 1976. 25. Ibid., 29 January 1976. 26. Ibid., 14 January 1976. 27. Ibid., 15 January 1976. 28. Ibid. 29. The Falkland Islands Committee was a lobby organized in 1968 by the Falkland Islands Company. That company was a descendent of Samuel Fisher Lafone's Royal F a l k l a n d Land, Cattle, Seal, and Whale Fishery Company, which was granted a royal r h a r t r r in 1852 by Queen V i c t o r i a . The company went on by 1982 to buy 1-3 million a c r e s on the i s l a n d s . nearly o n e - h a l f of the t e r r i t o r y . Most of the islands' labor force w o r k e d for the company. C i m i p u m l a n d . houses. stores, ships, warehouses, and banking facilities dominated thethe local local economy economy. facilities dominated

Notes

221

According to the Times of 26 August 1976, the members in the United Kingdom of the Falkland Islands Committee were: Sir John D. Barlow, Bt.; (Chairman) Sir Miles Clifford, K.B.E., C.M.G., E.D. Hon., F.R.C.S.; (Vice-Chairman) D. G. Ainslie; Mrs. D. I. Barton; John Biggs-Davison, M.R.; C. R. Buxton; Mrs. Anne Cameron; William Clark, M.P.; Bernard Conlan, M.P.; Sir Nigel Fisher, M.C., M.P.; W. J. Grierson, M.B.E.; Michael Clark Hutchison, M.P.; Eric Ogden, M.P.; David James, M.P.; James Johnson, M.P.; Russell Johnston, M.P.; Clifford Kenyon, C.B.E., J.P.; R. R. Merton; Captain R. R. S. Pennefather, R.N.; Leolin Price, Q.C.; Sir Peter Scott, C.B.E., J.P., D.S.C.; Major P. Spafford, R.A.; Donald Stewart, M.P.; M. J. Dodds; (Northern Branch Committee) Maurice Drake, D.F.C., Q.C. (Welfare Committee). Joint Hon. Secretaries: E. W. Hunter Christie, F. G. Mitchell. The "friends" of the Falkland islands were: Vice-Presidents: The Right Honourable Lord Shackleton, K.G., O.B.E.; The Right Honourable Viscount Boyd of Merton, C.H.; The Right Honourable Viscount Thurso of Ulbster, J.P.; W. I. Grierson, M.B.E., Chairman; Mrs. J. Lewis, Vice-Chairman; Mrs. S. E. Blake, Hon. Secretary. The members of the "local branch" of the Falkland Islands Committee were: Jack Abbott, Chairman; Neil Watson, Vice-Chairman; J. Stanley Smith, Hon. Secretary. 30. Times, January 1976. 31. Ibid., 20 January 1976. 32. Ibid., 22 June 1976. 33. For accounts on the Storni Incident, see, e.g. Ibid., 5 February 1976, 6 February 1976, 12 March 1976. 34. Ibid., 14 February 1976. 35. Ibid., 28 February 1976.

36. Ibid., 22 March 1976.

37. Stagni, Las Malvinasy elpetrbleo, Vol. 2, p. 30; also see La Nacibn, 22 July 1976. 38. The Financial Times, 21 July 1976. 39. Times (London) 21 July 1976. 40. Economic Survey of the Falkland Islands (Economist Intelligence Unit) (1976),as reported in Ibid. 41. Ibid., 21 July 1976. 42. Stagni, Las Malvinas y el petrbleo, Vol. 2, p. 30. 43. Times, 25 July 1976. 44. Ibid., 21 July 1976. 45. Ibid., 3 February 1977. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid., 17 February 1977. 48. Ibid., 22 February 1977. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid., 26 August 1976. 51. Ibid., 23 February 1977. 52. Ibid., 21,22 March 1977. 53. Washington Post, 3 January 1984. 54. Ibid., 18 April 1977. 55. Corruption of Argentine officials by foreigners would hardly be new. Most recently there had been the charge that a Dutch cabinet minister and the Netherlands Central Bank had approved a £6-million bribe paid in 1951 by a Dutch company to Argentine officials i n c l u d i n g Juan Peron. This charge had been made when the president of the bank in 1951 was appointed in February 1976 by the Dutch government to investigate allegations t h a t Prince Bernhard hud received $1.1 m i l l i o n in bribes from

222

Notes

Lockheed Corporation. The 1951 bribe to Peron had included a luxury private train and £6,000 worth of jewelry for his wife, Evita. The £6-million bribe was made to clinch a £130-million order from the Dutch firm. Ibid., 13 March 1976. 56. For activities of the Montoneros, see Richard Gillespie, Soldiers of Peron Argentina's Montoneros (1982). 57. Ibid., 2 May 1977. 58. Ibid. 59. See Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 930, Written Answers, 26 April 1977, cols. 273, 274. 60. Times, 29 April 1977. 61. Ibid., 16 July 1977. 62. Ibid., 18 July 1977; for 15 July 1977 communique, see 16 July 1977 Times of London. 63. Ibid., July 1977. 64. Observer, 25 September 1977. 65. Times, 13 December 1977. 66. Ibid., 16 December 1977. 67. Financial Times, 23 May 1978. 68. See Alvaro Franco, "Latin American Report," Oil and Gas Journal, 5 June 1978, pp. 71, 72. 69. "Newsletter," Ibid., 11 September 1978, p. 6. 70. Daily Telegraph, 21 December 1978. 71. Times, 17 December 1979. 72. Ibid., 8 July 1980. 73. Ibid., 17 December 1979. 74. Ibid., 14 January 1980. 75. Ibid., 22 May 1980. 76. Ibid., 13 June 1980. 77. W. D. Moore III, "Argentina primed for new boom," Oil and Gas Journal, 25 August 1980, pp. 76-90; and Richard Nehring, "The outlook for world oil resources," Oil and Gas Journal, 27 October 1980, pp. 170-175. 78. Times, 26 November 1980. 79. Ibid. 80. As reported in Ibid., 27 November 1980. 81. Ibid., 28 November 1980. 82. Ibid., 27 November 1980. 83. Ibid. 84. Ibid., 3 December 1980. 85. Ibid., 3 December 1980. 86. Ibid., also see Wall Street Journal, 3 June 1981. 87. Economic Information on Argentina, Ministry of Economy, Treasury, and Finance, Government of Argentina (June 1981), Number 118, p. 5. 88. Times, 23 February 1981. 89. Ibid. 90. Ibid., 3 March 1981, also see 27 February 1981. 91. Quoted in Latin America Regional Reports: Southern Cone, 22 May 1981. 92. Latin America Regional Reports: Southern Cone, 4 September 1981. 93. Ibid., 9 October 1981. 94. Quoted in ibid. 95. Times, 30 October 1981.

Notes

223

96. Ibid., 26 October 1981. 97. Ibid., 24 March 1982. 98. Ibid., 4 March 1982. 99. Ibid., 5 March 1982. 100. In Stagni, Las Malvinas y el petrbleo, p. 19.

Chapter 5 1. Robert C. Johansen. The National Interest and the Human Interest: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy (1980); The debate about the need to change world politics from international anarchy to world government was intense well before the 1980s. To see this, one need only look at, among others, Grenville Clark, A Plan for Peace (1950); Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (1962); Norman Cousins, In Place of Folly (1961); Gerard J. Mangone, The Idea and Practice of World Government (1951); Cord Meyer, Peace or Anarchy (1947); Frederick L. Schuman, The Commonwealth of Man (1952); or K. C. Wheare, Federal Government (1947). 2. Richard Falk, The, End of World Order (1983), p. ix. 3. Anthony Barnett, "Iron Britannia," New Left Review Number 134 (August 1982), p. 93. 4. Ibid., p. 96. 5. Siete Dias, 21 December 1983, p. 13; for Alexander Haig's role in the Americanled negotiations between Argentina and Britain after 2 April 1982, see Alexander Haig, Caveat, chapter thirteen. 6. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 22, 29 April 1982, col. 982. 7. U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2350 para. 72. 8. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 22, 29 April 1982, col. 999. 9. Quoted in 0. R. Cardoso, R. Kirschbaum, E. Van Der Kooy, Malvinas: La trama secreta (1983), p. 258. Costa Mendez later tried to explain that he was "trying to eliminate the word 'sovereignty' from the discussions, preferring to discuss the point of view but not the desires of the islanders . . . and a termination point for the negotiations." Gente, 8 December 1983, pp. 68-71. The two conditions set the stage for a return of the Malvinas to Argentine sovereignty, stated so or not. 10. World Marxist Review (July 1982), p. 49. 11. Times, 6 December 1968, p. 13. 12. Ibid. 13. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 21, 3 April 1982, col. 633. 14. Ibid., Vol. 25, 15 June 1982, col. 738. 15. Ibid., Vol. 21, 2 April 1982, col. 575; 7 April 1982, cols. 1029, 1031. 16. Ibid., 3 April 1982, col. 656. 17. Ibid., 7 April 1982, col. 966. 18. Ibid., Vol. 25, 15 June 1982, col. 732. 19. Ibid., col. 734; Washington Post, 22, 24 June 1982. 20. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 23, 13 May 1982, col. 988. 21. Ibid. 22. Contemporary Review 242 (January, 1983), p. 5. 23. Ibid., p. 6. 24. Siete Dias, 21 December 1983, p. 5. 25. Gente, 8 December 1983, p. 18. 26. Ibid., pp. 12, 13.

224

Notes

27. New Republic, 28 April 1982, p. 9. 28. Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, pp. 117, 118. 29. Ibid., p. 45; Haig also notes how unimportant the dispute was for the United States. See Alexander Haig, Caveat, p. 263. 30. Falkland Islands Review: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors. (L983), p. 74. (Hereafter Franks Report.) 31. Anthony Parsons, "The Falklands Crisis in the United Nations, 31 March14 June 1982," International Affairs 59 (Spring 1983), pp. 169-178. 32. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS), 20 May 1982, p. DD3. 33. Siete Dias, 30 November 1983, p. 14. 34. Clar'm, 2 February 1984. 35. U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2366 (1982) para. 21. 36. Virginia Gamba, La cuestion y la crisis (1983), p. 99; and Virginia Gamba, The South Atlantic Conflict: An Argentine View (1982), p. 20. 37. Franks Report, pp. 48-54. 38. Siete Dias, 21 December 1983, p. 5. 39. Franks Report, pp. 50, 51. 40. Gente, 8 December 1983, p. 14. 41. Ibid., p. 23. 42. Ibid., p. 15. 43. Franks Report, p. 86. 44. Siete Dias, 23 November 1983, p. 6. 45. See Great Britain's Secretary of State for Defence, The United Kingdom Defence Programme: The Way Forward (June 1981). 46. Franks Report, p. 76. 47. Economist, 27 November 1982, p. 24. 48. Franks Report, p. 78. 49. Gabriel Marcella, The Malvinas/Falklands War of 1982: Lessons for the United States and Latin America (1983), p. 6. 50. Economist, 27 November 1982, p. 23; for Alexander Haig, the Falklands crisis "was a case study in miscalculation." Alexander Haig, Caveat, p. 261, also pp. 295-297. 51. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 21, 2 April 1982, col. 571. 52. Ibid., cols. 638-641. 53. Ibid., col. 648. 54. Ibid., col. 964. 55. Ibid., col. 974. 56. Listener, 3 June 1982. 57. Franks Report, p. 90. 58. Ibid., p. 74. 59. Ibid., p. 80. 60. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 21, 7 April 1982, col. 989. 61. Marcella, The Malvinas/Falklands War, p. 6. 62. Siete Dias, 23 November 1983, p. 71. 63. Gente, 8 December 1983, p. 27. 64. Siete Dias, 23 November 1983, p. 6. 65. Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, p. 49. 66. Ibid., pp. 65-68. 67. Washington Post, 13 June 1982, p. c,5. 68. Gente, 8 December 1983, p. 14. 69. Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama. secreta, p. 18.

Notes

225

70. Ibid., p. 85. 71. Interview with Sr. Manrique Gonzzales Avellaneda, Capitan de Fragata, Marina de Guerra, Intelligencia, (Captain in Marine Intelligence) 19 November 1983, Buenos Aires. 72. Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, p. 283. 73. New Republic, 9 June 1982, p. 13. 74. See Siete Dias, 23 November 1983; and La Semana, 12 November 1983, pp. 96, 97. 75. New Republic, 9 June 1982, p. 12. 76. Marcella, The Malvinas/Falklands War, p. 8. 77. Listener, 24 June 1982, p. 2. 78. It is usually obligatory for authors, when referring to this trip, to mention that Galtieri also went to the theater in New York and to Disneyworld at U.S. expense. This is supposed to show how the L'.S. military unconscionably corrupts Third World military leaders. There is a certain justice in it. If New York theater corrupts New Yorkers, it may as well corrupt the Third World. One can only wonder what Hitler would have been capable of had he ridden a Florida roller coaster. 79. See Adolfo H. Terragno, "Why Does London Want the Islands?" Clarin, 2 June 1982, p. 15, cited in Carlos J. Moneta, "The Malvinas Conflict: Its Role in Argentine Foreign Policy and in the World Context," Estudios Internationales 15 (October-December 1982), p. 378. 80. The Sunday Times of London Insight Team, War in the Falklands: The Full Story (1982), p. 378. 81. Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, p. 62. 82. Siete Dias, 21 December 1983, p. 4. 83. Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, pp. 62, 63. 84. Peter Calvert, "Latin America and the United States During and After the Falklands Crisis," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 12 (Spring 1983), p. 72. 85. Interview with General Vernon Walters, August 9, 1983, Washington, D.C. 86. Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, p. 97. 87. Gente, 8 December 1983, p. 6. 88. Siete Dias, 21 December 1983, p. 8. 89. Gente, 8 December 1983, p. 16. 90. Ibid. 91. Ibid., p. 17. 92. Siete Dias, 21 December 1983, p. 10; also see Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, pp. 148, 163. 93. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 23, 13 May 1982, col. 1016. 94. Philip Windsor, "Diplomatic Dimensions of the Falklands Crisis," Millenium: Journal of International Studies 12 (Spring 1983), p. 91. 95. Siete Dias, 21 December 1983, p. 12. 96. Sunday Times Insight Team, War in the Falklands, p. 115. 97. Ibid., p. 117. 98. Newsweek, 7 June 1982, p. 29. 99. Ibid. 100. Washington Post, 12 June 1982, p. A. 15. 101. Newsweek, 7 June 1982, p. 29. 102. Sunday Times Insight Team, War in the Falklands, p. 116. 103. Washington Post, 12 June 1982. 104. Ibid., 8 June 1982, p. 1. 105. Sunday Times Insight Team, War in the Falklands, p. 258.

226

Notes

106. See editions of 6 June 1982. 107. Washington Post, 1 June 1982, p. A17. 108. See John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," The Economic History Review, 2nd series, 6 (1953), pp. 1-15. 109. See John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, with Alice Denny. Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (1961). 110. Quoted in Miguel Jorrin and John D. Martz, Latin-American Political Thought and Ideology (1970), p. 60. 111. Ibid., p. 61. 112. See H. S. Ferns, Argentina (1969), p. 78. Also see David Rock, Argentina: 1516-1982 (1985), pp. 96-102. 113. See Raul Scalabrini Ortiz, Pol'itica Britanica en el Rio de la Plata (1981), p. 55. 114. See Desmond C. M. Platt, "Economic Factors in British Policy during the 'New Imperialism,'" Past and Present 39 (1968), pp. 120-38; Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy: 1815-1914 (1968); "The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some Reservations," The Economic History Review, 2nd series, 21 (1968), pp. 296-306; Latin America and British Trade 1806-1914 (1972); "Further Objections to an 'Imperialism of Free Trade': 1830-60," The Economic History Review, 2nd series, 26 (1973), pp. 77-91. 115. Harry Mogdoff, "Imperialism Without Colonies," in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe, eds., Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (1983), pp. 162, 163. 116. V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1979), p. 85. 117. Ibid., p. 116. 118. Ronald Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration," in Owen and Sutcliffe, Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (1983), p. 139. 119. FBIS, 6 April 1982, p. Kl. 120. Ibid., 8 April 1982, p. K2. 121. Moscow in Spanish to Latin America, 15 April 1982, in ibid., 15 April 1982, p. DD2. 122. TASS, 9 April 1982, in ibid., 12 April 1982, p. DD14. 123. Irish Times, 3 April 1982, p. 5. 124. World Marxist Review, July 1982, p. 49. 125. PRAVDA, 24 May 1982, in FBIS, 26 May 1982, p. DDL 126. See Sovetskaya Rossiya, 6 May 1982, in ibid., 13 May 1982, p. DD4. 127. Ibid., 25 May 1982, p. DD2. 128. Ibid., p. DD4. 129. Quoted in Victor Lunin, "Latin American Solidarity" in "Social Sciences Today," Editorial Board, The Malvinas (Falklands) Crisis (1984), pp. 68, 69; also see Andrei Goncharov, "Introduction" in ibid., pp. 5, 6. 130. J. R. Lallemant, Malvinas: Norteamerica en guerra contra Argentina: Proyecto colonialist: Free Oceans Plan (1983), p. 111. 131. Ibid., p. 112. 132. Moscow Domestic Service, 2 April 1982, in FBIS, 5 April 1982, p. K2. 133. Ibid., 8 April 1982, p. K2. 134. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 25, 15 June 1982, col. 740. 135. Yuri Khrunov, "The South Atlantic in Imperialism's Plans" in "Social Sciences Today" Editorial Board, The Malvinas (Falklands) Crisis (1984), p. 31. 136. Colonel Luis A. Leoni Houssay, ";Debcmos contmuar la guerra contra Gran BretaiTa?" Revista de temas militares (September 1983), p. 22.

Notes

227

137. See Enrique de Gandia, "'El Beagle, las malvinas, y la ruptura del equilibrio geopolitico," Revista de temas militares (October-December 1983).

Chapter 6 1. This would be a contradictory phrase for Hans Morgenthau, who argued that imperialism was a policy intending to acquire an empire, not to maintain one. See Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (1978), Chapter 5. His effort to make an ethically neutral and objective definition of imperialism had the disadvantage of rejecting the meanings attached to the word by many people in the last centuries. When a state is criticized for being imperialistic, it is usually being criticized for either placing or maintaining another state in an unequal and disadvantageous condition. 2. Gente, 8 December 1983, p. 16. 3. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 21, 2 April 1982, col. 959. 4. See FBIS, 21 April 1982, p. DD4. 5. Guardian, 11 April 1982, p. 6. 6. 0. R. Cardoso, R. Kirschbaum, and E. Van Der Kooy, Malvinas: La trama secreta (1983), p. 39. 7. Siete Dias, 23 November 1983, p. 70. 8. Gente, 8 December 1983, p. 12. 9. Siete Dias, 21 December 1983, p. 5. 10. See New York Times, Washington Post, Irish Times, Guardian, and London Times of first week of April, 1982. 11. Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, pp. 21, 22. 12. Ibid., p. 137. 13. Ibid., p. 144. 14. Ibid., p. 151. 15. Ibid., p. 22. 16. Ibid., p. 162. 17. Interview with Nicanor Costa Mendez, Buenos Aires, 17 February 1984. 18. Gente, 8 December 1983, p. 17. 19. Washington Post, 16 June 1982, p. A17. 20. New Leader, 29 November 1982, p. 18. 21. Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, p. 310. 22. Washington Post, 15 June 1982. 23. Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, pp. 31, 34. 24. Ibid., p. 164. 25. J. R. Lallemant, Malvinas: Norteamerica en guerra contra Argentina: proyecto colonialist: Free Oceans Plan (1983), p. 8. 26. Siete Dias, 30 November 1983, p. 12. 27. Washington Post, 30 May 1982, p. A3L 28. Ibid., 11 June 1982, p. A25. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid., 12 June 1982, p. 1. 31. TASS, 10 April 1982, quoted in FRIS, 13 April 1982, p. DD2. 32. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 2 1 , 7 April 1982, col. 1034. 33. Ibid., Vol. 22, 29 April 1982, col. 1021.

228

Notes

34. Ibid., col. 1014. 35. Listener, 13 May 1982. 36. Washington Post, 5 July 1982, p. A23. 37. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 80, 4 June 1985, cols. 140, 141. 38. Washington Post, I November 1986, p. A13. 39. Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, p. 167. 40. Ibid., p. 140. 41. Ibid., p. 192. 42. Williams Wright, unpublished article, sent July 1, 1982 (#ZCZC CLS405). 43. Lallemant, Malvinas: Norteamerica en guerra contra Argentina, p. 124. 44. Quoted in FBIS, 6 April 1982, p. Kl. 45. Virginia Gamba, La cuestibn y la crisis (1983), p. 109. 46. Quoted in FBIS, 12 April 1982, p. DDL 47. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 24, 20 May 1982, col. 495. 48. Quoted in FBIS, 4 June 1982, p. DD2. 49. Socialist Standard, July 1982, p. 124; August 1982, p. 149. 50. Washington Post, 1 June 1982, pp. 1, A12. 51. Ibid., 23 June 1982, p. A24. 52. New Leader 29 November 1982, p. 17. 53. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 21, 14 April 1982, col. 1146. 54. Quoted in David Butler and Gareth Butler, British Political Facts 1900-1985 (1986), p. 280. 55. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 21, 56. The extreme position of this was the growing if still minority opinion in Britain after the Falklands war that Britain should not retaliate to a first strike by the Soviets' nuclear forces. 57. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 21, 7 April 1982, cols. 966, 1019. 58. Ibid., Vol. 22, 29 April 1982, col. 1047. 59. See Malvinas: Los Debates en la OEA: Version oficial des los discursos pronunciados en la vigesima reunion de Consulta de Minstros en Relaciones Exteriores (n.d.). 60. Irish Times, 9 April 1982, p. 1. 61. U.N. Docs. S/PV. 2363, para. 12 (1982). 62. Ibid., para. 17. 63. Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, p. 209. This data would be more useful had the authors said who in the U.S. government held that view. 64. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 22, 29 April 1982, col. 983. 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid., Vol. 23, 4 May 1982, col. 26. 67. Ibid., col. 1004. 68. Ibid., Vol. 22, 29 April 1982, col. 1038. 69. Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, pp. 230, 231, 240, 241, 244. 70. Interview with Terry Belaiinde, Charlottesville, Virginia, 22 October 1985. 71. Arthur Gavshon and Desmond Rice, The Sinking of the Belgrano (1984), p. 177; also see p. 36. 72. Ibid., p. 163. 73. Ibid., pp. 93, 94. 74. Ibid., p. 31. 75. Ibid., pp. 186-188. 76. Ibid., p. 192. 77. Ibid., p. 81.

Notes

229

78. Ibid., p. 82. 79. Ibid., p. 53. 80. Ibid., p. 59. 81. Ibid., pp. 64, 65. 82. Ibid., p. 84. 83. Ibid., p. 88. 84. Ibid., pp. 90, 91. 85. Interview with Nicanor Costa Mendez, Buenos Aires, 17 February 1984. 86. Gavshon and Rice, Sinking of the Belgrano, supra n. 62, p. 94. 87. See, e.g., Roger Scruton, "Why the Belgrano had to be sunk," Times, 18 September 1984, p. 88. Gavshon and Rice, Sinking of the Belgrano, supra n. 62, p. 111. 89. Times, 18 September 1984. 90. Sunday Times, 26 August 1984. 91. Times, 27 September 1984. 92. Ibid., 9 October 1984, 21 November 1984. 93. See Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 73, 18 February 1985, esp. cols. 764772. 94. Ibid., 8 November 1984. 95. Ibid., 30 November 1984. 96. Ibid., 21 December 1984. 97. Ibid., 22 December 1984. 98. Ibid., 29 December 1984. 99. Ibid., 27 June 1985. 100. Ibid., 28 June 1985. 101. Ibid., 6 August 1985. 102. Ibid., 6 April 1986. 103. Ibid., 17 May 1986. 104. Ibid., 22 May 1986. 105. Ibid., 12 February 1985. 106. Ibid., 19 February 1985. 107. Ibid., 10 June 1985. 108. Ibid., 25 July 1985. 109. Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, supra n. 62. 110. Gavshon and Rice, Sinking of the Belgrano, supra n. 62, p. 120. 111. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 22, 29 April 1982, col. 1039. 112. Ibid., col. 1034. 113. World Marxist Review, July 1982, p. 51. 114. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 23, 4 May 1982, col. 24. 115. Ibid., 13 May 1982, col. 1021. 116. World Marxist Review, July 1982, p. 51. 117. Gavshon and Rice, Sinking of the Belgrano, supra n. 62, p. 123. 118. Gente, 8 December 1983, p. 13. 119. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 22, 29 April 1982, col. 982. 120. Ibid., Vol. 23, 13 May 1982, cols. 1029, 1030. 121. Ibid., Vol. 22, 29 April 1982, cols. 1052, 1053. 122. Anthony Parsons, "The Falklands Crisis in the United Nations, 31 March14 June 1982," International Affairs 59 (Spring 1983), p. 122. 123. Siete Bias, 21 December 1983, p. 12. 124. His speech is reproduced in The Listener, 20 May 1982.

230

Notes

125. U.N. Doc. A/37/PV. 51 para. 52, 53 (1982). 126. Gente, 8 December 1983, p. 26. 127. U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2360, para. 31 (1982). 128. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 21, 14 April 1982, col. 1154. 129. Ibid. 130. Inis L. Claude, Jr. Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 4th ed. (1971), p. 247. 131. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 22, 29 April 1982, col. 980. 132. Charlottesville Daily Progress, 4 June 1982, p. 1. 133. Washington Post, 4 June 1982, p. 1. 134. In FBIS, 24 May 1982, p. DDL 135. Ibid., 10 June 1982, p. DD2. 136. Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, p. 249. The New Leader, 29 November 1982, p. 17. 137. Washington Post, 11 April 1982, p. A14. The idea that the Argentine invasion was intended to increase the country's prestige in the eyes of Latin Americans, North Americans, and Europeans is also asserted by Cynthia Ann Watson. She argues that the Malvinas war was begun not because Argentine leaders thought that (1) the islands were an integral part of the nation, (2) oil export revenue could be increased, (3) or domestic unrest could be reduced. "The Falklands campaign was to show the world, especially the states of the North, that Argentina was able to defeat a major world power and that it too is a state to be reckoned with, rather than to be shunted to the periphery in international affairs." (Cynthia Ann Watson. "Will Argentina Go to the Bomb after the Falklands?" 1984, p. 75) 138. Listener, 6 May 1982. 139. Gente, 8 December 1983, p. 14. 140. Quoted in Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, p. 241. 141. Gente, 8 December 1983, p. 28. 142. Ibid., p. 23. 143. Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, p. 184. 144. New Republic, 12 May 1982. 145. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 23, 13 May 1982, col. 1021. 146. Listener, 23 December 1982. 147. Anthony Barnett, "Iron Brittanica," p. 91. 148. Intelligence Digest, 1 July 1982, p. 14. 149. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 21, 13 May 1982, col. 1021. 150. Ibid., col. 1033. 151. Ibid., Vol. 22, 29 April 1982, col. 1023. 152. See Hugh Tinker, ed., A Message from the Falklands, the Life and Gallant Death of David Tinker, lieut. R.N. (1982). 153. See Hugh Tinker, "The Falklands After Three Years," The Round Table (October 1985), pp. 339-341. 154. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 22, 29 April 1982, col. 1000. 155. See Proyecto Argentine 19 de abril de 1982, 16 horas, reprinted in Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, pp. 327-329. 156. Ibid., pp. 140-142. 157. Ibid., p. 179. 158. U.N. Doc. A/37/PV. 51, paras. 54, 56 (1982). 159. Washington Post, 13 June 1982, p. C5. 160. Ibid., 16 April 1982, p. 1.

Notes

231

161. Listener, 20 May 1982. 162. Washington Post, 9 June 1982, p. 10. 163. New Leader, 3 May 1982, p. 3. 164. Washington Post, 6 April 1982, p. A3. 165. Ibid., 24 May 1982, p. A15. 166. New Statesman, 11 June 1982, p. 3. 167. U.N. Doc. A/40/PV.5 (1.985), and La Nacion, Edicion International, 12 January 1987. 168. See Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization, 1. P 169. Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, p. 260. 170. Washington Post, 24 May 1982. 171. Buenos Aires Herald, 12 February 1984, p. 12. 172. Jingoism is the British word for national chauvinism. It originated during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 when British ships were sent to Gallipoli to deter the Russians. Supporters of British policy were called "jingoes" because of the refrain of the song they often sang. 173. See article by Dana Contralto, Washington Post, 6 June 1982, p. C8. 174. New Leader, 29 November 1982, p. 17. 175. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 24, 20 May 1982, col. 517. 176. Barnett, Anthony, Iron Britannia (1982), p. 517. 177. Washington Post, 7 April 1982, p. 1; Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, p. 223. 178. Cerate, 8 December 1983, p. 17. 179. Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, p. 172. 180. Siete Bias, 21 December 1983, p. 12.

Chapter 7 1. Juan Carlos Grisoha, Malvina e islas del atlantico sur: aportes para una estrategia (1983). 2. Interview with Manrique Gonzzales Avellaneda, Buenos Aires, 19 November 1983. 3. Times, 31 Oclober 1982, p. 1. 4. Washington Post, 27 Oclober 1982, p. A26. 5. Ibid., 10 November 1982, p. A28. 6. Ibid., 13 December 1982. 7. Ibid., 3 November 1982, p. A6. 8. Ibid., 4 November 1982, p. A31, 9. Ibid., 5 November 1982, p. A25. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid., 6 November 1982, p. A25. 12. La Nacion, 11 November 1983. 13. See U.N. Doc. A/39/L.8 (1984); A/40/L.19 (1985); Facls on File, Vol.46, No. 2401, 28 November 1986, p. 884; OAS Doc. AG/Res. 815 (XVI-0/86). 14. Buenos Aires Herald, 15 November 1983, p. 1. 15. Ibid. 16. La Nacion, 14 November 1983, p. 2. 17. Buenos Aires Herald, 12 November 1983, p. 2.

232

Notes

18. Times (London), 12 December 1983. 19. See "Comunicado oficial de la secretaria de informacidn publica" in Clarin, 2 February 1984, p. 3. 20. Clarin, 3 February 1984, p. 3. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid., 18 February 1984, pp. 2, 3. 23. Ibid. 24. La Nueva Republica, 21 February 1984, p. 2. 25. Clarin, 20 February 1984, p. 4. 26. Ibid.; also see La Nacion, 8 August 1986, p. 9. 27. Buenos Aires Herald, 22 February 1984, p. 7. 28. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 80, 4 June 1985, cols. 140, 141. 29. Clarin, 20 February 1984, p. 4. 30. See the Antarctic Treaty, in F. M. Auburn, Antarctic Law and Politics (1982), pp. 298-303. 31. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 75, 14 March 1985, col. 507. 32. C. Beeby, "Toward an Antarctic Mineral Resource Regime," New Zealand International Review (1982), pp. 8-10. 33. Economist, 2 April 1983, p. 10. 34. Peter J. Beck, "Britain's Antarctic Dimension," International Affairs' (1983), p. 440. 35. Interview with Emilio Cardenes, January 15, 1984, Buenos Aires. 36. Foreign Affairs Committee 1982-83, Draft Report, p. X/viii, quoted in Peter J. Beck, "The Future of the Falkland Islands; A Solution Made in Hong Kong?" International Affairs (Autumn 1985), p. 647. 37. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 75, 14 March 1985, col. 501. 38. Dante Caputo, "Brass Tacks," BBC Television, 12 December 1984, quoted in Beck, "The Future of the Falkland Islands," p. 654. 39. Raul Alfonsin, 24 September 1984, Foreign Affairs Committee 1983-84, Report, Vol. 2, pp. 156-57, quoted in ibid., p. 654. 40. See "Argentine government comments on the constitution of the Malvinas Islands," official press release by the Argentine government, 16 February 1985, p. 2, as quoted in Times, 17 February 1985. 41. His comments are recorded in U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/PV1285 (1985). 42. U.N. Doc. A/40/PV. 5 (1985); The insistence on resolving the sovereignty dispute was not shared by everyone. In mid-1986, Maximo Bomchil, former foreign minister Oscar Camilion, and former ambassadors Arnaldo Musich and Carlos Helbling, all of the Center for Studies of the South Atlantic (CEAS), visited London and then returned to Argentina advocating that Argentines and British first discuss normalization of relations, and then perhaps the Malvinas sovereignty dispute. See La Nacion 1 and 8 August 1986, and Bomchil et al., La Argentina-Reino Unido, Un andlisis de sus relaciones (1986). 43. U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/PV. 1285 (1985). 44. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 81, 20 June 1985, col. 201w. 45. Ibid., Vol. 75, 14 March 1985, cols. 493, 497. 46. Ibid., col. 499. 47. Ibid., col. 503.

48. Facts on File, Vol. 46, No. 2398, 7 November 1986, p. 828; Vol. 46, No. 2401,

28 November 1986, p. 884. 49. Washington Post, ] November 1986, p. A13.

Notes

233

50. 0. R. Cardoso, R. Kirschbaum, and E. Van Der Kooy, Malvinas: La trama secreta (1983), p. 174. 51. Washington Post, 12 June 1982. 52. Malvinas: Los Debates en la OEA (n.d.), p. 33. 53. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 21, 7 April 1982, col. 988. 54. Ibid., 14 April 1982, col. 1199. 55. Washington Post, 16 April 1982, p. A29. 56. Ibid., 2 May 1982. , 57. See Lusaka Domestic Service, 3 May 1982, in FBIS, 3 May 1982, p. DDL 58. Hansard, Commons, 6th Series, Vol. 24, 20 May 1982, col. 521. 59. Washington Post, 1 June 1982, p. C15. 60. Listener, 22 April 1982, pp. 2-5; also see Cynthia Ann Watson, "Will Argentina Go to the Bomb after the Falklands?" in Inter-American Economic Affairs, Spring 1984, p. 69. 61. Washington Post, 10 June 1982, p. A20. 62. Ibid., 10 June 1982, p. A20. 63. Arthur L. Gavshon and Desmond Rice, The Sinking of the Belgrano (1984), p. 74. 64. Gente, 8 December 1983, p. 32. 65. Washington Post, 10 June 1982, p. A20. 66. FBIS, 23 April 1982, p. DD3. 67. Moscow in Spanish to Latin America, 17 May 1982, in FBIS, 18 May 1982, p. DD4. 68. Madrid EFE in Spanish, 30 April 1982, in FBIS, 30 April 1982, p. DD1; also see Paris AFP in English, 27 April 1982, in FBIS, 27 April 1982, p. DD3. 69. See TASS, 30 April 1982, in FBIS, 30 April 1982, p. DD4; Moscow Domestic Television Service, 5 May 1982, in FBIS, 1 May 1982, p. DD4; PRAVDA, 4 May 1982, p. 5, in FBIS, 7 May 1982, p. DD4; TASS, 10 May 1982, in FBIS, 10 May 1982, p. DD1; TASS, 9 May 1982, in FBIS, 10 May 1982, p. DD2; Moscow Domestic Television Service, 23 May 1982, in FBIS, 25 May 1982, p. DD4. The Soviet theme was that the United States-British attack on Argentina's Malvinas islands was an attempt by the imperial Western core to enforce the periphery's continued dependence. This view had a familiar ring to it. In The Age of Imperialism (1969), Harry Magdoff had developed Kautsky's old line that wars would not be caused by capitalist infighting, but by global capitalists blocking the periphery's development towards socialism. This was, he said, the reason that the United States was fighting in Vietnam. There was "a concerted effort by the U.S.-led Western bloc to reconquer that part of the world which had opted out of the imperialist system and to prevent others from leaving the imperialism network" (quoted in Norman Etherington, Theories of Imperialism, 1984, p. 244). The Falklands episode showed that Western imperialists would not allow any independent action even by a state still within the imperialist network. For further development of this theme, see also Jan Knippers Black, Sentinels of Empire: The United States and Latin American Militarism. 70. Washington Post, 15 May 1982, p. A18. 71. Review of the River Plate, 7 April 1982, p. 366. 72. Ibid., pp. 365, 366. 73. Washington Post, 16 April 1982, p. A23. 74. Review of the River Plate, 21 April 1982, pp. 406, 408. 75. In FBIS, 12 April 1982, p. DD4. 76. In FBIS, 25 May 1982, p. DDL 77. In FBIS, 19 April 1982, p. DD6.

234

Notes

78. Listener, 15 April 1982. 79. Ibid., 27 May 1982. 80. Howard M. Hensel, "The Soviet Perspective on the Falklands War," The Round Table (1983), p. 396. 81. Buenos Aires Herald, 22 February 1984, p. 3. 82. Washington Post, 18 December 1982, p. A16. 83. Latin America, January 7, 1985, p. B3. See The New Republic, 9 June 1982, p. 18. 84. FBIS: Latin America, January 14, 1985, p. B2. 85. Ibid., February 28, 1985, p. Bl. 86. Ibid., March 8, 1985, p. Bl. 87. Ibid., February 22, 1985, p. B3. 88. U.S. News and World Report, February 18, 1985, p. 32. 89. See FBIS, 30 July 1986, p. B-7. 90. Peter J. Beck, "Falklands or Malvinas? The View from Buenos Aires," Contemporary Review (September 1985), p. 136. 91. Quoted in ibid., pp. 140, 141. 92. Clann, 22 July 1986, p. 5. 93. FBIS, 6 August 1986, p. B-2. 94. This was emphasized to me when I spoke at the University of Mendoza and Catholic University in Buenos Aires in August 1986. 95. FBIS, 6 August 1986, p. B-2. 96. Ibid. 97. Washington Post, 4 November 1986, p. A12. 98. Ibid. 99. Ibid. 100. Granma, 3 May 1982. 101. Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, p. 178. 102. See New Republic, 9 June 1982, p. 18. 103. Washington Post, 27 April 1982, p. 1. 104. Malvinas: Los Debates en la OEA, pp. 69-76. 105. Ibid., p. 35. 106. Ibid., pp. 29-31. 107. Ibid., pp. 49-52. 108. Ibid., pp. 19-21. 109. Ibid., p. 21. 110. Ibid., p. 25. 111. Ibid., pp. 43-47. 112. Ibid., p. 33. 113. Virginia Gamba, La cuestidn j la crisis (1973), p. 118. 114. Cardoso et al., Malvinas: La trama secreta, p. 210. 115. Ibid., p. 306. 116. See Torcuato S. di Telia, "Liberalization by Omission: Argentina after the War," Government and Opposition (Autumn 1982), p. 396. 117. Washington Post, 30 May 1982, p. A24. 118. Raul Alfonsin, Ahora: M: Popuesta Politica (1983), p. 108. For a discussion of how the Falklands war could be seen as adding to debt-related tensions between the industrialized West and Latin America, see Anthony Sampson, "What the Falklands Could Cost the U.S." in Parade Magazine, Washington Post, 20 November 1983, pp. 18-19.

Notes 119. 120. in USA 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 5th ed. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136.

235 Clarin, 19 February 1984, This theme is also developed in Elisabeth Reimann, Las Malvinas: traicion made (1983). Clarin, 16 December 1984. Alfonsin, Ahora, supra n. 94, p. 122. Ibid., pp. 34, 52, 61, 96, 126, 131. Ibid., pp. 67, 68. Washington Post, 30 May 1982. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (1978), p. 316. Ibid., p. 321. Ibid., p. 320. Ibid., p. 323. Ibid., p. 329. Ibid., p. 330. Ibid., p. 331. Ibid., p. 331. Ibid., p. 316. Ibid., pp. 320, 321. See Edward Bellamy, Looking Backward (1926).

This page intentionally left blank

Bibliography

Books Academia Nacional de la Historia. Catalogo de la exposition histbrica de las Islas Malvinas, Georgias del Sur y Sandwich del Sur. Buenos Aires, 1976. Academia Nacional de la Historia. Los derechos argentinos sobre las Islas Malvinas. Buenos Aires, 1964. Academia Nacional de la Historia. El episodic ocurrido en Puerto Soledad en Malvinas el 26 de Agosto de 1833. Buenos Aires, 1967. Alexander, Yonah, and Friedlander, Robert A., eds. Self-Determination: National, Regional, and Global Dimensions. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1980. Alfonsin, Raul. Ahora: Mi: Popuestapolitica. Sudamerica/Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1983. Allardyce, William Lamond. The story of the Falkland Islands, being an account of their discovery and early history, 1500-1842. Printed at the Government Printing Office by. William J. Worthy, 1909. Altamira, Luis Roberto. Primeras capillas y templos de las islas Sanson y Patos (Malvinas), sus capellanes y parrocos. Institute de estudios americanistas, Cuaderno de historia, XII, Cordoba, 1947. Anson, George Admiral. A Voyage Round the World in the Years 1740, 1, 2, 3, 4. Compiled from his papers by Richard Walter, edited with an introduction by Glyndwr Williams. Oxford University Press, London, 1974. Arce, Jose. Las Malvinas; las pequenas islas que nos fueron arrebatadas. Institute de Cultura Hispanica, Madrid, 1950. The Malvinas (Our Snatched Little Isles) Nunez de Balboa, Madrid, 1951. Areco, Isaac P. Titulos de la Republica Argentina a la soberania y posesibn de las Islas Malvinas. Buenos Aires, 1885. Aristotle. The Politics. TV. T. A. Sinclair. Penguin Books, New York, 1981. Auburn, F. M. Antarctic Law and Politics. Hurst, London, 1982. Barcia Trelles, Camilo. El Problerna de las Islas Malvinas. Editora Nacional, Espana, 1943. Barnett, Anthony. Iron Britannia. Allison & Busley, London, 1982. Barros, James. The Aaland Islands Question: Its Settlement by the League of Nations. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968. Basilico, Ernesto. La armada del obispo de Plasencia y el descubrimiento de las Islas Malvinas. Institute de Publicaciories, Centre. Naval, Buenos Aires, 1967. Bellamy, Edward. Looking Backward. Houghton, Boston, 1926.

238

Bibliography

Beltran, Juan G. El zarpazo ingles a las Islas Malvinas, M. Gleizer, Buenos Aires, 1934. Benn, Tony. Tony Benn on the Falklands War. Spokesman for the Bertrand Russell Place Foundation, Nottingham, England, 1982. Bermudez Couso, Ramos. Una Revindication argentina, Las Malvinas. Santiago, 1943. Berrutti, Rodriguez, and Hugo Camilo. Malvinas, ultima frontera del colonialismo. Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 1975. Biedma, Jose Juan. Cronica historica del Rio Negro de Patagones (1774-1834). Buenos Aires, 1905. Bishop, Patrick, and Withrow, John. The Winter War. The Falklands. Quartet Books, London, 1982. Blum, Yehuda Z. Historic Titles in International Law. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1965. Bomchil, Maximo; Oscar Camilion, Arnaldo Musich, and Carlos Helbling. La ArgentinaReino Unido: Un Andlisis de sus relaciones. Centre de Estudios del Atlantico Sur, Buenos Aires, 1986. Bougainville, Louis-Antoine. Voyage autour du monde, 1971, 2 vols. Sailland et Nyon, Paris, 1772. Boyson, V. F. The Falkland Islands, with notes on the Natural history by Rupert Vallentin. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1924. Bull, Hedley, and Adam Watson, eds. The Expansion of International Society. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984. Burns, Robert Andrew. Diplomacy, War, and Parliamentary Democracy: Further Lessons from the Falklands. University Press of America, Lanham, Maryland, 1985. Caillet-Bois, Rieardo R...Una tierra argentina: las Islas Malvinas, ensayo basado en una neuva y desconocida documentation. Peuser, Buenos Aires, 1948. Calvert, Dr. Peter. The Falkland Crisis: The Rights and Wrongs. Frances Pinter, London, 1982. Calvi, Mario J. Malvinas: El mito destruido. Ediciones Devoto, Buenos Aires, 1982. Cantillo, Alejandro del. Tratodos, convenios y declaraciones de paz y de comercio que han hecho con laspotencias estranjeras los monarcas espanoles de la Casa de Borbon desde el ano 1700 hasta el dia. Madrid, 1843. Carballo, Cap. Pablo Marcos. Dios y los halcones Siete Dias. Buenos Aires, 1982. Cardoso, 0. R., R. K. Kirschbaum and E. Van der Kooy. Malvinas: La trama secreta. Sudamerica/Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1983. Carranza, Angel J. Campanas navales de la Republica Argentina. Vol. 3. Buenos Aires, 1916. Carril, Bonifacio. The Malvinas/Falklands Case. Camara de Industrials Graficos de la Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1982. Cawkell, Mary. The Falkland Story: 1552-1982. Anthony Nelson, Shropshire, England, 1983. Ceron, Sergio. Malvinas, gesta heroica o derrota vergonzasa. Editorial Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 1984. Chevalier, Jean-Marie. The New Oil Stakes. Tr. Ian Rock. Allen Lane, London, 1975. Cichero, Felix E. Malvinas, grieta en el mapa argentino. Sticograf, Buenos Aires, 1968. Claude, Inis L., Jr. The Changing United Nations. Random House, New York, 1967. . National Minorities: An International Problem. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1954. . Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization. 4th ed. Random House, New York, 1971. Cobban, Alfred. National Self-Determination. Oxford University Press, London, 1945. Coleccibn de docianentos relativos a la historia de las Malvinas. (Documents connected to

Bibliography

239

the history of the Malvinas), Copilado bajo la direccion de Ricardo Caillet-Bois. Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 1961. 2 vols. Coll, Alberto R., and Ared, Anthony C., eds. The Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy Diplomacy and International Law. Allen & Unwin, Boston, 1985. Conflict in the South Atlantic: Documents on the Falklands/Malvinas Crisis. Commission of Churches on International Affairs, World Council of Churches, Geneva, 1983. Corominas, Enrique V. Como dejendi Malvinas. El Ateneo, Buenos Aires, 1950. Crbnica Documental de las Malvinas. Editorial Redaccion, Buenos Aires, 1982. Grossman, Richard. The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, volume 3. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1977. Cura, Maria. Islas Malvinas, Georgias, Sandivic del Sur y Antartida, Argentina. AZ Editoria, Buenos Aires, 1982. Debat, Alejandro. Argentina, the Malvinas, and the End of Military Rule. Verso, London, 1984. Dalyell, Tarn. One Man's Falklands. C. Woolf, London, 1982. . Thatcher's Torpedo. C. Woolf, London, 1983. Danero, E. M. S. Toda la historia de las Malvinas. Buenos Aires, 1947. Danvila y Collado, Manuel. Reinado de Carlos III. Madrid, 1891. Dauss, Federico A. Resena geografica de las Islas Malvinas. Imprenta de la Universidad, Buenos Aires, 1955. del Carril, Bonifacio. El dominio de las Islas Malvinas. Emece, Buenos Aires, 1964. Destefani, Laurio H. El Alferez Sobral y la Soberan'ia Argentina en la Antartida. Institute de Publicaciones Navales, Buenos Aires, 1975. . Caza Maritima en nuestras costas. (Marine hunting in our coast.) pp. 119-152. Fundacion de Estudios Maritimos, Buenos Aires, 1976. . La cuestibn de las Malvinas. Chapter 15 of temas de historia maritima argentina. Fundacion de Estudios Maritimos, Buenos Aires, 1970. . El descubrimiento de las Islas Maritimos. Tall. Graf, de la DIAB, Buenos Aires,

1981. . Las Malvinas en la epoca hispana (1600-1811). Ediciones Corregidor, Buenos Aires, 1981. . The Malvinas, The South Georgias and the South Sandwich Islands, the conflict with Britain. Edipress, Buenos Aires, 1982. . Los marinos en las invasiones inglesas. Historicos Navales, Buenos Aires, 1975. , and Donald Cutter. Tadeo Haenke y el Final de una Vieja Polemica. Departamento de Estudios Historicos Navales, Buenos Aires, 1968. Diaz Cisneros, Cesar. Limites de la Republica Argentina, Fundamentos histbrico-juridico. Editorial Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1944. Discuillo, Alfredo. Malvinas 1983 Argentine Contraataca! Montevideo Artecolor Argentina, 1983. Dobson, Christopher. The Falklands Conflict. Coronet Books, Falmouth, Cornwall, 1982. Down, E. C. The Falkland Islands Dispute. University of Cambridge. Downing, David. An Atlas of Territorial and Border Disputes. New English Library, London, 1980. Emerson, Rupert. From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1962. . Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization. Occasional papers in International Affairs, Number 9. Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, December 1964.

240

Bibliography

Escuela Naval Militar. Historia (Curso Preparatorio e ingreso a primer ano), Rio Santiago, 1948. Bolilla 9: "Las Islas Malvinas," pp. 5-22. The Falklands War: The Official History. Latin American Newsletters, London, 1983. Farinella, Jorge. Volveremos! Editorial Rosario, La Plata, 1984. Ferns, H. S. Argentina. Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1969. Ferrando, Raul Ignacio. El mensaje del Presidente Monroe ante la cuestibn de las Islas Malvinas. Buenos Aires, 1924. Ferrer del Rio, Antonio. Historia del reinado de Carlos III en Espana, Madrid, 1856. Ferrer Vieyia, Enrique. Problematica juridica. de las Malvinas y de la Antartida argentina. Universidad de Cordoba, Cordoba, 1982. Fitte, Ernesto. La Agresibn norteamericana a las Islas Malvinas. Emece, Buenos Aires, 1966. . Crbnicas del Atlantico Sur. Emece, Buenos Aires, 1974. Fitzmaurice, Gerald. Livre du Centenaire. Institut du Droit International, Bale, 1973. Foulkes, Haroldo. Las Malvinas: una causa nacional. 2nd ed. Corregidor, Buenos Aires, 1982. . Malvinas: 74 dias aleicinantes en Puerto Argentina. Corregidor, Buenos Aires, 1984. Fraser Ramsey, John. Anglo-French Relations, 1763-1770, A Study of Choiseul's Foreign Policy. Publications in History 17: 3, University of California, Berkeley, 1939. Gallagher, John, and Ronald Robinson, with Alice Denny. Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism. Macmillan, London, 1961. Gamba, Virginia. La cuestibn y la crisis. Buenos Aires, 1983. . Malvinas: Confidential. Publinter S. A., Buenos Aires, 1982. . The South Atlantic Conflict: An Argentine View. Grafica Patricios, 1982. Garcia, Eduardo D. Islas Malvinas: apuntes para sit comprensibn estratega. Aconcagua, Buenos Aires, 1982. Garcia, Lupo. Diplomacia secreta y rendicibn incondicional. Legasa, Buenos Aires, 1983. Gavshon, Arthur L., and Rice, Desmond. The Sinking of the Belgrano. Seeker & Warburg, London, 1984. Gil Munilla, Octavio. Malvinas: el conflicto anglo-espanol de 1770. Escuela de Estudio Hispano-Americanos, Sevilla, 1948. Gillespie, Richard. Soldier of Peron: Argentina's Montoneros. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982. Goebel, Julius. The Struggle for the Falkland Islands, A Study in Legal and Diplomatic History. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1982. Gomez Langenheim, A. Elementos para la historia de nuestras Islas Malvinas. El Ateneo, Buenos Aires, 1939. 2 vols. . La tercera invasion inglesa. Editorial Tor, Buenos Aires, 1934. Greenberg, Susan. Rejoice! Media Freedom and the Falklands. Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom, London, 1983. Grisolia, Juan Carlos. Malvinas e islas del atlantico sur: aportespara una estrategia. Mater Dei, Rosario, Argentina, 1983. Grotius, Hugo. De Jure Belli ac Pads, in J. B. Scott, ed. The Classics of International Law. Tr. Francis W. Kelsey. Wildy & Sons LTD., London, 1952. Groussac, Paul. Las Islas Malvinas. Editorial del Congreso, Buenos Aires, 1936. Guerra de la, Malvinas y del Atlantico surpartes oficiales comparativos: Argentina, Gran Bretana. Editoria & Distribudora, Buenos Aires, 1983. Haas, Ernest B. Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958.

Bibliography

241

Haig, Alexander. Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy. Macmillan, New York, 1984. Hall, W. E. A Treatise on International Law. 5th ed. Oxford, Clarendon Press, London, 1904. Hambo, Eduardo. Jurisprudencia de la Corte Internacional de Justicia. A. W. Sijthoff, Leyden, 1952. Hanrahan, Brian. "/ Counted Them All Out and I Counted Them All Back": The Battle for the Falklands. Chivers Press, Bath, 1982. Harlow, Vincent T. The Founding of the Second British Empire 1763-1793. Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1952, vol. I. Harris, Robert. Gotcha! The Media, the Government and the Falklands Crisis. Faber and Faber, London, Boston, 1983. Hastings, Max. Battle for the Falklands. W. W. Norton, New York,, 1983. Henkin, Louis, et al. International Law: Cases and Materials. West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1980. Hidalgo Nieto, Manuel. La cuestibn de las Malvinas, contribution al estudio de las relaciones hispano-inglesias en el siglo XVIII. Consejo Superior de Investigaciones cientificas, Institute Gonzalo Fernandez de Ouiedo, Madrid, 1947. Hodgson, Robert D. International Oceans Boundary Disputes Oceans Policy Study 37. Center for Oceans Law and Policy, University of Virginia School of Law, Charlottesville, Virginia, April, 1978. Hoffman, Fritz. Sovereignty in Dispute: the Falklands/Malvinas 1493-1982. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1984. Honeywell, Martin, and Pearce, Jenny. Falklands/Malvinas: Whose Crisis? Latin American Bureau, London, 1982. Hurst, Gerald Berkely. British Imperialism in theXVHlth-Century. A. Constable, London, 1908. Ibarguren, Carlos. Juan Manuel de Rosas, Su vida, Su tiempo, Su drama. 2nd ed. Libraria "La Facultad" de J. Reldan y cia, Buenos Aires, 1930. Ingram Priestley, Herbert. France Overseas through the Old Regime, A Study of European Expansion. Appleton Century Co., New York, 1939. Interpretation Report of the Geocom-Bahia, Grande Argentina-Marine Seismic Survey. Geocom, Inc., 1971. Jackson, Richard L. The Non-Aligned, the UN, and the Superpowers. Praeger Special Studies, New York, 1983. Jennings, Robert Yewdall. The Acquisition of Territory in International Law. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1963. Jimenez de Arechago, E. Curso de derecho international publico. Centre de Estudiante de Derecho, Montevideo, 1961. Johnson, Harold S. Self-Determination Within the Community of Nations. A. W. Sijthoff, Leyden, 1967. Johnson, Samuel. "Thoughts on the late transactions respecting Falkland's Islands," in Political Tracts. T. Cadell, London, 1771. Jorrin, Miguel, and John D. Martz. Latin-American Political Thought and Ideology. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1970. Kanaf, Leo. La Batalla de las Malvinas. Tribuna Abierta, Buenos Aires, 1982. Kasanzew, Nicolas. Malvinas: A Sangre y Fuego. Siete Dias, Buenos Aires, 1982. Knaplund, Paul. El imperio britanico, 1815-1939. Mexico, 1935. Kon, Daniel. Los chicos de la guerra. Editorial Galerna, Buenos Aires, 1982. Laffin, John. Fight for the Falklands. Chivers Press, Bath, England, 1982.

242

Bibliography

Lallemant, J. R. Malvinas: Norteam'erica en guerra contra Argentina: proyecto colonialist: Free Oceans Plan. Avanzar, Buenos Aires, 1983. Laver, Margaret Patricia Henwood. An Annotated Bibliography of the Falkland Islands and The Falkland Islands Dependencies. The University of Cape Town Libraries, Cape Town, South Africa, 1974. Lenin, V. I. Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. International Publishers, New York, 1979. . The Right of Nations to Self-Determination. International Publishers, New York, 1951. Letters from M. Louis Vernet to the Rt. Hon. Lord Stanley, Secretary of State for the Colonies, concerning his claims on the British Government, and the neglect of the Colony of the Falkland Islands. Jarold and Sons, London, 1858 (?). Libra Azul & Blanco de las Islas Malvinas. Ediciones AP, Buenos Aires, 1982. Lynch, John. Argentine Dictator: Juan Manuel de Rosas 1829-1852. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981. MacKay, D. I., and Mackay, G. A. The Political Economy of North Sea Oil. Martin Robinson, London, 1975. Mafezzini, Angel V. Diario de un cura soldado: el factor espiritual en la guerra de las Malvinas. Palabras Liminares, Republica Argentina, 1982. Las Malvinas, Conflicto Americano? Centre de Investigaciones Economicas y Sociales de la University de Lima, Lima, 1982. The Malvinas Crisis: the Causes and Consequences. "Social Sciences Today." Editorial Board, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1984. Malvinas: Los Debates en la OEA: Version oficial de los discursos pronunciados en la vigesima reunion de Consulta de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores. Coleccion documentos de temas militares, Dirigida por Armando Alonso Pineiro, Buenos Aires, n.d. Malvinas: Georgias y Sandwich del Sur: diplomacia Argentina en Naciones Unidas 19451981. Vols. 1 and 2. Consejo Argentine Para Las Relaciones Internacionales, Buenos Aires, 1983. Manning, William R. Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Inter-American Affairs 1831-1860. Vol. 1. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 1932. McGowan, Robert. Don't Cry for Me, Sergeant-Major. MacDonald Press, London, n.d. Menendez, Mario. Malvinas: Testimonio de su governador. Editorial Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 1983. Miaja de la Muela, Adolfo. La emancipacibn de los pueblos coloniales. 2nd ed. Tecnos, Madrid, 1968. Michielli, Julio. Son Uriguayas las Malvinas? M. Pesce, Montevideo, n.d. Migone, Mario Luis. Treinta y tres anos de vida malvinera. Bibliotecas Populares, Buenos Aires, 1948. Military Lessons of the Falklands: Views from the US. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1984. Mitrany, David A. A Working Peace System. Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1966. Moneta, Jose Manuel. fNos devolveran las Malvinas? Super, Buenos Aires, 1970. Montenegro, Nestor J., and Aliverti, Eduardo. Los Nombres de la Derrota. Nemont Ediciones, 1982. Moreno, Juan C. Nuestras Malvinas. El Ateneo, Buenos Aires, 1956. . La Recuperacibn de las Malvinas. Plus Ultra, Buenos Aires, 1973.

Bibliography

243

Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 5th ed. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1978. Morison, Samuel Eliot. The European Discovery of America: The Southern Voyages 14921616. Oxford University Press, New York, 1974. Munoz Azpiri, Jose Luis. Historia Completa de las Malvinas. Oriente, Buenos Aires, 1966. 3 vols. Nicolson, Harold. Diplomacy. 5th ed. Oxford University Press, London, 1945. Observations on the forcible occupation of the Malvinas, or Falkland Islands, by the British Government, in 1833. Charles Wood and Son, Poppin's Court, London, 1833. O'Connell, D. P. International Law. Vol. 1. Stevens & Sons Ltd, London, 1965. Odell, Peter R. Oil and World Power: A Geographical Interpretation. Penguin Books, New York, 1970. Oppenheim, L. International Law H. Lauterpacht, ed. Longmans, Green, London, 1955. Owen, Roger, and Bob Sutcliffe, eds. Studies in the Theory of Imperialism. Longmans, New York, 1983. Palacios, Alfredo. Las Islas Malvinas, archipielago argentino. Editorial Claridad, Buenos Aires, 1934. Pares, Richard. War and Trade in the West Indies 1739-63. Oxford University Press, London, 1936. The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803 vol. 16 AD 1765-1771. T. C. Hansard, London, 1813; Johnson Reprint Corporation, New York, 1966. Pereya, Ezequiel F. Las Islas Malvinas, Soberan'ia argentina. Buenos Aires, 1968. Perl, Raphael, ed. The Falkland Islands Dispute in International Law and Politics: A Documentary Sourcebook. Oceana Publications, London, 1983. Peron, Juan. Los vendepatrias: Las pruebas de una traicibn. Editorial Freeland, Buenos Aires, 1972. Phillimore, Robert. International Law. T. & J. W. Johnson, Philadelphia, 1854. Phipps, Colin. What Future for the Falklands. Fabian Society, London, 1977. Plato. The Laws of Plato tr. Thomas L. Pangle. Basic Books, New York, 1980. Platt, Desmond Christopher Martin. Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy: 1815-1914. Oxford University Press, London, 1968. . Latin America and British Trade 1806-1914. A. and C. Black, London, 1972. Pomerance, Michla. Self-Determination in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine in the United Nations. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1982. Puig, Juan Carlos. Malvinas ye Regimen Internacional. Ediciones Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1983. Quellet, Ricardo Luis. Historia Politica de las Islas Malvinas. Revista de la Escuela Superior de guerra Aerea de la Fuerza Alread Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1982. Quesada, Hector C. Las Malvinas son argentinas (Recopilacion de antecedentes). Publicacion de la Subsecretaria de Cultural (July 1948). Quesada, Vicente G. La Patagonia y las tierras australes del contiente americano. Buenos Aires, 1875. Rachkov, Boris. Oil, Nationalism, and Imperialism. People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1967. Ramos Gimenez, Leopoldo. Las Islas Malvinas y la Antartida Argentina. Atlas documental, Buenos Aires, 1948. Randle, Patricio H. La guerra inconclusapar el Atlantic. Sun. Oikos, Buenos Aires, 1982.

244

Bibliography

Ratio, Hector Raul. Actividades maritimes en la Patagonia durante los siglos XVII y XVHI. Buenos Aires, 1930. Ravenal, Eugenio. Isles of Discord: A File on the Falklands. Siboney & Ventura Books, Geneva, L983. Reginald, R. Tempest in a Tempest—the Falklands War. Borgo Press, San Bernardino, California, n.d. Reimann, Elisabeth. Las Malvinas, traicion made in USA. Ediciones El Caballito, Mexico City, 1983. Ricklefs, M. C. A History of Modern Indonesia: c. 1300 to the Present. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1981. Rippy, Alfred J. Rivalry of the United States and Great Britain over Latin America (18081830). Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1929. Rizzo Romano, Alfredo. La cuestion de limites con Chile en la zona del Beagle. Pleamar, Buenos Aires, 1968. Roth, Roberto, (Despues de Malvinas que? La Comparia, Buenos Aires, 1982. Rotondo, Eduardo A. Alerta Roja. Barpress, Buenos Aires, 1982. Rovira, Alejandro. Malvinas Ahora. Montevideo Artecolor, Montevideo, 1982. Ruiz Guinazu, Enrique. Proas de Espana en el Mar magalldnico. Peuser, Buenos Aires, 1947. Ruiz Moreno, Isidore. Historia de las relaciones exteriores Argentinas (1810-1955). Editorial Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1961. Sainz Ramirez, Jose. Imperios coloniales. Madrid, 1942. Saldias, Adolfo. Historia de la confederacion Argentina, Rozas y su epoca. Vol. 2. 3rd ed. Buenos Aires, 1911. Salz de Vernet, Maria. El diario de una mujer en las Malvinas. Buenos Aires, 1984. Sayan de Vidaurre, Alberto. Para la inmediata restitucion de las Malvinas, gestion ante el embajador de los Estados Unidos de America en la Repiiblica Argentina. Union Nacional y Democratica Inter-America, Buenos Aires, 1943. Scalabrini Ortiz, Jorge. La Industria del petroleo en Argentina y la politico petrolera. Buenos Aires, 1977. Scalabrini Ortiz, Raul. Politica Britanica en el Rio de la Plata. 8th ed. Editorial Plus Ultra, Buenos Aires, 1981. Segreli, Carlos. Tres archipelagos Argentinos historia de un compromiso nacional. Cordoba,

R.S., TA.P.AS, 1983.

Seltzer, Leon E., ed. The Colombia Lippincott Gazetteer of the World. Columbia University Press, New York, 1962. Shuttle-worth, Nina L. Kay. A Life of Sir Woodbine Parish, K.C.H., F.R.S. (1796-1982), sometime secretary to Lord Castlereagh, charge d 'affairs and Minister plenipotentiary to the Provinces of the River Plate, etc. Smith, Elder, and Co., London, 1910. Silenzi de Stagni, Adolfo. Las Malvinas y el petroleo. Vols. 1 and 2. El Cid Editor, Buenos Aires, 1982. . El petroleo Argentina. 4th ed. Problemas Nacionales, Buenos Aires, 1955. Smith, John. 74 Days: An Islander's Diary of the Falklands' Occupation. Century, London, 1984. Solari Yrigoyen, Hipolito. Asi son las Malvinas. Hachette, Buenos Aires, 1959. Solberg, Carl E. Oil and Nationalism in Argentina. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1979. Starushenko, G. The Principle of National Self-Determination in Soviet Foreign Policy. Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1963. Strange, Ian. The Falkland Islands. Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1983.

Bibliography

245

Sullivan, Sir Bartholomew James. Derrotero de las islas Malvinas. Imprenta nacional, Santiago de Chile, 1882. The Sunday Times of London Insight Team. War in the Falklands: The Full Story. Harper & Row, New York, 1982. Sureda, R. Rigo. The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination: A Study of United Nations Practice. A. W. Sitjhoff, Leyden, 1973. Tanzer, Michael. The Political Economy of International Oil and the Under-developed Countries. Beacon Press, Boston, 1969. Taylor, W. S. and J. H. Pringle. 4 vols. A selection of letters from the one hundred bundles of Chatham's papers at Britain's Public Record Office, 1839. Thompson, Kenneth. Ethics, Functionalism, and Power in International Politics: The Crisis in Values. Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1979. Tinker, Hugh, ed. A Message from the Falklands, The Life and Gallant Death of David Tinker, lieut. R.N. Junction Books, London, 1982. Torres Revello, Jose. Bibliografia de las Islas Malvinas; obras, mapas y documentos. Facultad de Filosofia y Letras de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, Institute de Investigaciones Historicas, Buenos Aires, 1953. . Mapas y pianos referentes al Virreinato del Plata Conservados en el Archivo General de Simancas. Publicaciones del Institute de investigaciones historicas, Number 73. Facultad de Filosifia y Letras de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 1938. Torres Lanzas, Pedro. Relacibn descriptiva de los mapas, pianos, etc., del Virreinato de Buenos Aires existent.es en el archivo general de Indias. 2nd ed. Publicaciones de la Seccion de Historia, Number 7. Facultad de Filosofia y Letras de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 1921. Traba, Juan. Las Malvinas, pasado, presents, provenir. J. Traba, Rosino, Argentina, 1983. Troinai, Osiris. Operation Malvinas: Martinez de Hoz en Londres. El Cid Editor, Buenos Aires, 1982. Turolo, Carlos M. Asi lucharon. Editorial Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 1982. Umozorike, Umozorike Oji. Self-Determination in International Law. Archon Books, Hamden, Connecticut, 1972. Velazquez, Carlos M. "Las Naciones Unidas y la descolonizacion," Anuario Uruguayo de Derecho International 2. Facultad de Derecho de Montevideo, Montevideo, 1963. Viola, Oscar Luis. La derrota diplomatica y militar de la republica Argentina en la guerra de las Islas Malvinas. Tinta Nueva, Buenos Aires, 1983. Walker, David M. The Oxford Companion to Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980. Ward, A. W., and Gooch, P. P. The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 17831919. Vol. 2, 1815-1866. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1933. Watson, Adam. Diplomacy. New Press, New York, 1983. Westlake, J. International Law. 2d ed. 1910. Whitington, G. T. The Falkland Islands. Smith, Elder and Co., London, 1840. Winchester, Simon. Prison Diary, Argentina. Chatto & Windus, The Hogarth Press, London, 1983. Woolf, Cecil and Wilson, Jean Moorcroft, eds. 100 Authors Take Sides on the Falklands. C. Woolf, London, 1982. Zorraquin Becii, Ricardo. Inglaterra prometio abandonar las Malvinas: estudio histbrico y juridico del conflicto anglo-espanol. Libreria Editorial Platero, Buenos Aires, 1975.

246

Bibliography

Government Publications Annual report on the Falkland Islands and dependencies. 1947+ Great Britain, Colonial Office, HMSO, London, 1948+. Annual report on the social and economic progress of the people of the colony of the Falkland Islands and its dependencies. 1931-1938. Great Britain, Colonial Office, HMSO, London, 1932?-1940. Argentine Republic Treaty Series Number 26. HMSO, London, 13 September 1974. Argentine Republic Treaty Series Number 30. HMSO, London, 1975. Britain and the Falkland Crisis: A Documentary Record. Reference Services, Central Office of Information, London, November 1982. British islands in the southern hemisphere, 1945-1951. Great Britain, Colonial Office, HMSO, London, 1951. "Discovery" expedition, first [second] annual report, 1926-1927/28. Great Britain, Discovery Committee, London, 1927-29. Carnara Federal de la Plata, Rio Gallegos, Argentina, 1935, 49 Jurisprudencia 188; reprinted in Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases, 180. Butterworth and Co., London, 1941. The Disputed Islands, The Falkland Islands: a history and background. HMSO, London, 1982. Economic Information on Argentina. Ministry of Economy, Treasury, and Finance, Government of Argentina, Buenos Aires, June 1981. Economic survey of the Falkland Islands. Prepared by the Economist Intelligence Unit, ltd.; presented to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. London, 1976. Falkland Islands. Great Britain, Foreign Office, Historical Section. HMSO, London, 1920. Falkland Islands Review. Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors. Chairman: The Rt. Hon. The Lord Franks, presented to Parliament by the prime minister by command of Her Majesty, Cmnd. 8787. HMSO, London, January 1983. Falkland Islands and dependencies. Great Britain, Colonial Office. HMSO, London, annually from 1920-31, 1946-69; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1970-73. Falkland Islands Economic Study 1982. Chairman: The Rt. Hon. Lord Schackleton. Cmnd. 8653. HMSO, London, 1982. Falkland Islands, Return to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons, 31 March 1843. G. W. Hope for the Colonial Office, Downing, 3 April 1843. The Falkland Islands: The Facts. HMSO, London, 1982. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Executive Office of the President, U. S. Government, Washington, D.C., 1960-1987. Gazetteer of the British Antarctic Territory, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands. Great Britain, Antarctic Place-Names Committee, Foreign Office. HMSO, London, 1962. Gazetteer of the Falkland Islands dependencies. Great Britain, Antarctic Place-Names Committee, Foreign Office, London, 1955. Gazetteer of the Falkland Islands dependencies. Great Britain, Antarctic Place-Names Committee. HMSO, London, 1977. Grossling, Bernardo F. "Latin America's Petroleum Prospects in the Energy Crisis," Geological Survey Bulletin 1411. Department of the Interior, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D. C., 1975.

Bibliography

247

Parliamentary Debates. Hansard; Commons. 5th Series, Vols. 761-999; 6th Series, Vols. 1-81. HMSO, London, 1968-1985. Marcella, Gabriel. The Malvinas/Falklands War of 1982: Lessons for the United States and Latin America. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1983. Official Journal of the European Communities: Debates of the European Parliament: 19821983 Session. Report of Proceedings from 19 to 23 April 1982 and from 14 to 18 June 1982. Papers relative to the late negotiation with Spain; and the taking of Falkland's Island from the English. Great Britain, Foreign Office, Printed for J. Almon, London, 1977. Report on the Interdepartmental Committee on Research and Development in the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands, with appendices, maps, etc. Great Britain, Interdepartmental Committee on Research and Development in the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands. HMSO, London, 1920.

Argentine Republic Protestation du gouvernment des Provinces Unie du Rio de la Plata par son ministre plenipotentiare a Londres sur 1'arrogation de souverainete dan les lies Malvines, ou Falkland, par la Grande Bretagne, et I'ejerction de Tetabissement de Buenos Ayres a Port Louis. Cunningham et Salmon, Londres, 1833. Comision Nacional de Antartico Las Islas Malvinas y el sector antartico argentino. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores Culto, Buenos Aires, 1948. Comision Protectora de Bibliotecas Populares. Las Islas Malvinas. Compendio de la obra de Paul Groussac. L. J. Rosso, Buenos Aires, 1936. Congreso. Camara de Senadores Las Malvinas han sido, son y seran argentinas. Imprenta del Congreso de la Nacion, Buenos Aires, 1951. Direccion de Bibliotecas Populares Soberartia: contribucion bibliografica a la afirmacion de derechos argentinos sobre las Malvinas, islas, y sector antartico. Ministerio de Cultura y Educacion. La Direccion, Buenos Aires, 1975. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Coleccion de documentos oficiales con que el gobierno instruye al cuerpo legislative de la provincia del origen y estudo de las cuestiones pendientes con la Republica de los E.U. de Norte America, sobre las islas Malvinas. Imprenta de la Independencia, Buenos Aires, 1832. Papers relative to the origin and present state of the questions pending in the United States of America, on the subject of the Malvinas (Falkland Islands) laid before the legislature of Buenos-Ayres by the government of the province charged with the direction of the foreign relations of the Argentine Republic. Printed at the Office of the Graceta Mercanlil, Buenos Ayres, 1832.

Current Journals and Newspapers Analisis Armed Forces Buenos Aires Herald Charlottesville Daily Progress

Clarin Contemporary Review The Daily Telegraph The Economist

248 The Financial Times Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Gente Guardian Illustrated London News Intelligence Digest Irish Times Latin American Regional Reports: Southern Cone The Listener Manchester Guardian Mercado La Nacion The New Leader The New Republic New Statesman

Bibliography New York Times La Nueva Republica The Observer Oil and Gas Journal La Prensa Review of the River Plate La Semana Siete Bias Socialist Standard Sovetskaya Rossiya The Spectator The Times of London U.S. News and World Report Wall Street Journal Washington Post World Marxist Review

Recent Articles "Americas: Argentine Invasion of Falklands: Government Response. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review 32 (April-June 1982), p. 33. Asseff, Alberto E. "Chile, Magellanes y Las Malvinas." Ceinar 8 (November 1982). Auburn, F. M. "The Falkland Island Dispute and Antarctica." Marine Policy Reports, College of Marine Studies, University of Delaware (December 1982). Harriett, Anthony. "Iron Britannia." New Left Review Number 134, (August 1982), pp. 1-96. Beck, Peter J. "The Anglo-Argentine Dispute over Title to the Falkland Islands: Changing British Perceptions on Sovereignty Since 1910." Millennium: Journal of International Studies 12 (Spring 1983), pp. 6-24. . "Britain's Antarctic Dimension." International Affairs (1983), p. 440. . "Cooperative Confrontation in the Falkland Islands Dispute: The AngloArgentine Search for a Way Forward, 1968-1981." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 24 (February 1981), pp. 37-58. . "Falklands or Malvinas? The View from Buenos Aires." Contemporary Review 247 (September 1985), pp. 136-142. "The Future of the Falkland Islands: A Solution Made in Hong Kong?" International Affairs 61 (Autumn 1985), pp. 643-659. Beeby, C. "Toward an Antarctic Mineral Regime." New Zealand International Review 8 (1982), pp. 8-10. Bollini Shaw, Carlos. "El problema de las Islas Malvinas." Revue Egyptienne de droit international 23 (1967). Bologna, Alfredo Bruno. "Argentine Claims to the Malvinas Under International Law." Millennium: Journal of International Studies 12 (Spring 1983), pp. 39-48. Bryant, Sir Arthur. "The Freedom of the Southern Seas." Illustrated London News (January 1983), p. 19. Burzio, Humberto F. "Ro/as, el emprestito ingles de 1824 y las Islas Malvinas." Boletin del Centra naval 62, 0564 (1944), p. 641.

Bibliography

249

Caillet-Bois, Ricardo R. "La controversia del Nootka Sound y el Rio de la Plata." Humanidades 20 (1929), p. 341. . "La historia de ias Islas Malvinas a traves de una nueva documentacion." Boletin de la Junta de historia y numismatica 9 (1936), p. 35. . "Un capitulo de la historia de las Malvinas, Bougainville y la negociacion, franco-espanola." Anuario de la Sociedad de historia Argentina (1939), pp. 65-83. Calvert, Peter. "Latin America and the United States During and After the Falklands Crisis." Millennium: Journal of International Studies 12 (Spring 1983), pp. 69-78. Canter, Juan. "La negociacion de Palicieu Falconel y la cuestion de las Malvinas." Boletin del Institute bonaerense de numismatica y antiguededas (1943), p. 50. Claude, Inis L., Jr. "Just Wars: Doctrines and Institutions." Political Science Quarterly 95 (Spring 1980), pp. 83-96. Connell-Smith, Gordon. "The OAS and the Falklands Conflict." The World Today 38 (September 1982), pp. 340-347. Corradi, Juan E. "Argentina: A Story Behind a War." Dissent (Summer 1982), pp. 285293. Cortazzo, Alberto P. "El dictator Rosas y las Islas Malvinas." America (August 1942). Daoudi, M. S., and Dajani, M. S. '"'The Impact of Sanctions." The World Today 38 (April 1983), pp. 150-160. de Gandia, Enrique. "El Beagle, las Malvinas, y la ruptura del equilibrio geopolitico." Revista de temas militares (October-December 1983), pp. 15-23. Destefani, Laurio H. "Las siete invasiones inglesas." Revista Historia 1 (1981), pp. 3658. Dickens, Paul E. "El conflicto de las Islas Falkland entre los Estados Unidos y Argentina." Revista Chilena 13 (November-December 1929), nn. 115-116. Discoli, Alberto T. "Dia de las Malvinas Argentines." La Gaceta delforo (3 July 1936). di Telia, Torcuato S. "Liberalization by Omission: Argentina After the War." Government and Opposition 17 (Autumn 1982), pp. 394-396. Doxey, Margaret. "International Sanctions: Trials of Strength or Test of Weakness?" Millennium: Journal of International Studies 12 (Spring 1983), pp. 79-87. "Ejercito Argentine en Malvinas." Armas y Geostrategia 2 (May 1983), pp. 17-70. Emerson, Rupert. "The Fate of Human Rights in the Third World." World Politics 27 (January 1975), pp. 201-226. "The Falklands War: Military Lessons of the Falklands Campaign." Strategic Survey 1982-1983, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Cambridge, England, Spring 1983, pp. 116-123. Fawcett, J. E. S. "The Falklands and the Law." The World Today 38 (June 1982), pp. 203-206. Fitte, Ernesto. "Cronologia maritima de las Islas Malvinas." Investigaciones y ensayos, vol. 4, Buenos Aires, 1968, pp. 153-189. . "Las Malvinas bajo la occupacion Britanica." Investigaciones y ensayos, Academia Nacional de la Historia, vols. 4-7, 1969, pp. 63-87. Franck, Thomas M. "Dulce et Decorum Est: The Strategic Role of Legal Principles in the Falklands War." American Journal of International Law 77 (January 1983), pp. 109-124. . "The Stealing of the Sahara." American Journal of International Law 70 (October 1976), pp. 694-721. Franco, Alvaro. "Latin America's Petroleum Surge Gathers Momentum." Oil and Gas Journal (5 June 1978), pp. 67-74.

250

Bibliography

Freedman, Lawrence. "British Defence Policy after the Falklands." The World Today 38 (September 1982), pp. 331-339. . "The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982." Foreign Affairs (Fall 1982), pp. 196210. Friedman, Norman. "The Falklands War: Lessons Learned and Mislearned." Orbis (Winter 1983), pp. 907-940. Gallagher, John, and Ronald Robinson. "The Imperialism of Free Trade." The Economic History Review, 2nd series, 6 (1953), pp. 1-15. Gallardo, Carlos R. "Tierra argentina bajo bandera inglesa." El Pueblo (26 August 1984). Gelb, Norman. "Thatcher's Victory: The Falkland Factor." The New Leader 65 (July 12-26, 1982), pp. 5-6. George, Bruce, and Coughlin, Michael. "British Defence Policy after the Falklands." Survival (September-October 1982), pp. 201-210. Giovanni, 0. de. "Las islas Malvinas y el respeto a la soberania de los pueblos." La Accibn (14 November 1935). Grabendorff, Wolf. "The United States and Western Europe: Competition or Cooperation in Latin America." International Affairs 58 (Autumn 1982), pp. 625637. Grabivker, Mario Jose, and Pocock, Gerry. "The Anglo-Argentine Conflict and the Attitude of the Communists." World Marxist Review 25 (July 1982), pp. 48-50. Gueritz, Rear Admiral E. F. "The Falklands: Joint Warfare Justified." RUSI (September 1982), pp. 46-52. Guido, Jose Thomas. "Las Malvinas," El Plata cient'ificoy literario, Revista de los Estados del plata sobre legislation, jurisprudencia, econom'ia polltica, ciencias naturales y lileratura 6 (May 1855), pp. 73-80. Hallman, J. Nef, and Hallman, F. "Reflections on the Anglo-Argentine War." International Perspectives (September-October 1982), pp. 6-10. Hassan, Farooq. "The Sovereignty Dispute Over the Falkland Islands." Virginia Journal of International Law 23 (Fall 1982). Hensel, Howard M. "The Soviet Perspective on the Falklands War." The Round Table (1983), p. 396. Hickey, John. "Keep the Falklands British? The Principle of Self-Determination of Dependent Territories." Inter-American Economic Affairs 31 (Summer 1977),

pp. 77-78. Hope, Adrian F. J. "Sovereignty and Decolonization of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands." Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 6 (Spring 1983), pp. 391-446. Houssay, Colonel Luis A. Leoni. "jDebemos continuar la guerra contra Gran Bretana?" Revista de temas militares 2 (September 1983), pp. 13-25. Hurrell, Andrew. "The Politics of South Atlantic Security: A Survey of Proposals for a South Atlantic Treaty Organization." International Affairs 59 (Spring 1983), pp. 179-193. "Inter-American Security." Great Decisions 1983. Foreign Policy Association, New York, 1983, pp. 69-78. Johnson, D. H. N. "Acquisitive Prescription in International Law." British Yearbook of International Law 27, p. 332. Johnson, Richard. "The Future of the Falkland Islands." The World Today 33 (June 1977), pp. 223-231.

Bibliography

251

Lamberg, Robert F. "Territorial Tensions in Latin America." Swiss Review of World Affairs 32 (July 1982), pp. 14-15. Lee Brown, Vera. "Anglo-Spanish Relations in America in the Closing Years of the Colonial Era." The Hispanic American Historical Review 5 (August 1922), p. 335. Lewis, D. K. "The Prospects for Hong Kong." Conflict Studies 142, pp. 1-26. Lindsey, John M. "Conquest: A Legal and Historical Analysis of the Root of United Kingdom Title in the Falkland Islands." Texas International Law Journal 18 (Winter 1983), pp. 15-35. Llaver, Maria del C., and Ricci, Maria Susana. "El Atlantico Sur en la Estregia Mundial." Universidad de Belgrano, Buenos Aires, 1983. Menaui, Air Vice-Marshall Stewart W. B. "The Falklands Campaign: A War of Yesterday?" Strategic Review (Fall 1982), pp. 82-91. Moneta, Carlos J. "Antarctica, Latin America, and the International System in the 1980s: Toward a New Antarctic Order?" Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 23 (February 1981), pp. 26-68. . "The Malvinas Conflict: Its Role in Argentine Foreign Policy and in the World Context." Estudios Internationales 15 (October-December 1982). Moore, John Norton. "The Inter-Arnerican System Snarls in Falklands War." American Journal of International Law 76 (October 1982), pp. 830-831. Moore III, W. D. "Argentina Primed for New Boom." Oil and Gas Journal (25 August 1980), pp. 76-91. Moorer, Admiral Thomas H., and Cottrell, Alvin J. "In the Wake of the Falklands Battle." Strategic Review (Summer 1982), pp. 23-28). Moreno, Juan C. "Voces castellanas en las Malvinas." Boletin de la Academia Argentina deletrasd (1938), pp. 21-22. Myhre, Jeffrey D. "Title to the Falklands-Malvinas Under International Law." Millennium: Journal of International Studies 12 (Spring 1983), p. 29. Nailor, Peter. "Lessons of the Falklands Crisis?" International Relations 7 (November 1982), pp. 2158-2166. Nehring, Richard. "The Outlook for World Oil Resources." Oil and Gas Journal (27 October 1980), pp. 168-182. Northedge, F. S. "The Falkland Islands: Origins of the British Involvement." International Relations 1 (November 1982), pp. 2167-2189. Parsons, Anthony. "The Falklands Crisis in the United Nations, 31 March-14 June 1982." International Affairs 59 (Spring 1983), pp. 169-178. Pearce, Joan. "The Falkland Islands Dispute." The World Today (May 1982), pp. 161165. Pecourt, Garcia. "El principio del estoppel." Revista Espanol de Derecho Internacional (1962). Pinto, Monica. "Argentina's Right to the Falkland/Malvinas Islands." Texas International Law Journal 18 (Winter 1983), pp. 1-10. Platt, Desmond Christopher Martin. "Economic Factors in British Policy during the 'New Imperialism'." Past and Present 39 (April 1968), pp. 120-138. . "Further Objections to an 'Imperialism of Free Trade': 1830-60." The Economic History Review, 2nd series, 26 (February 1973), pp. 77-91. . "The Imperialism of Free Trade: Some Reservations." The Economic HistoryReview, 2nd series, 21 (August 1968), pp. 296-306. Pomerance, Michla. "The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives in the

252

Bibliography

Wilsonian Conception." American Journal of International Law 70 (January 1976), pp. 1-27. Ratio, Hector R. "A Proposito de una clausula secreta sobre las Malvinas en el tratado de 1771 entre Gran Bretana y Espana." La Prensa (22 December 1946), p. 2, col. 4-6. . "El descubrimiento de las Malvinas." La Prensa (3 September 1933). Rubin, Seymour. "The Falklands (Malvinas), International Law and the OAS." American Journal of International Law 76 (July 1982), pp. 594-597. Ruiz Moreno, Isidore, Jr. "Transacciones territoriales en America, una negociacion sobre las Malvinas." La Prensa (11 July 1941), p. 11. Sampson, Anthony. "What the Falklands Could Cost the U.S." Parade Magazine, Washington Post (20 November 1983), pp. 18, 19. Sanchez, Miguel Antonio. "Self-Determination and the Falkland Islands Dispute." Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 21 (Winter 1983), pp. 557-584. Sanders, Thomas G. "Argentina Before and After the War." University Field Staff International Reports Number 33 (1982). Sigmund, Paul E. "New Pals for Argentina." Worldview 25 (July 1982), pp. 5-6. Smithers, Peter. "Lessons of the Falklands Episode." Contemporary Review 242 (1983), pp. 242-247. Stamp, Lord. "The Challenge of the Falklands." Contemporary Review 242 (January 1983), pp. 1-6. Stevenson, Matthew. "The War Nobody Won." The New Leader 65 (29 November 1982), pp. 17-19. Stewart-Gordon, T. J. "Argentina Offers Something for Everyone." World Oil (1 February 1980), pp. 41-48. Symonides, Janusz. "Acquisitive Prescription in International Law." Polish Yearbook of International Law (1970). Tinker, Hugh. "The Falklands After Three Years." The Round Table Number 296 (October 1985), pp. 339-344. Vaky, Viron P. "Inter-American Security: Lessons from the South Atlantic." Worldview 26 (January 1983), pp. 17-20. Vela, David. "Nuestro Belice, Guatemala." Publicaciones de la Revista de la Facultad de Ciencias juridicas y sociales. October 1939. Vernet, Luis E. "Las declaraciones del Presidente Cleveland sobre la colonia de Malvinas, Las piraterias del capitan Duncan, Opinion de un ministro norteamericano." (The Declarations of President Cleveland about the Malvinas Colony, the acts of piracy of Captain Duncan, the Opinion of an American minister). Boletin del Institute geogrdfico argentine 7:cuaderno 3, marzo (1866), p. 54. Viereck, Peter. "A Falkland 'No' to Fascists Right and Left." The New Leader 65 (3 May 1982), p. 3. Waldock, C. H. M. "Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies." (In private Malvina Islands Collection of Cardenes, Hope, & Monseigner.) Watson, Cynthia Ann. "Will Argentina Go to the Bomb after the Falklands?" InterAmerican Economic Affairs 37 (Spring 1984), pp. 66-80. Williams, Phil. "Miscalculation and Crisis Management." The World Today 38 (April 1983), pp. 144-149. Windsor, Philip. "Diplomatic Dimensions of the Falklands Crisis." Millennium: Journal of International Studies 12 (Spring 1983), pp. 88-96. Wright, Quincy. "The Goa Incident." American Journal of International Law 56 (July 1962), pp. 622-629.

Bibliography

253

Interviews Aja, Espill Jorge, vice president, Argentine Council on International Relations (CARI), 8 June 1986, Buenos Aires. Ascher, Mario, partner in Ascher, Fiz Hernandez, Muchnik y Asoc., 15 July 1986, Buenos Aires. Belaunde Terry, Fernando, former president of Peru, 22 October 1985, Charlottesville, Virginia. Blasco, Armando, vice president, Institute of Economic and Social Policy, 30 July 1986, Buenos Aires. Cardenas, Emilio, partner of Cardenas, Hope and Otero Monsegur, 8 December 1983, 15 January 1984, 23 July 1986, Buenos Aires. Costa Mendez, Nicanor, former foreign minister of Argentina, 14 August 1986, 17 February 1984, Buenos Aires. Gamba, Virginia, consultant and author, 20 December 1983, Buenos Aires. Gonzzales Avellaneda, Manrique, captain of Argentine Marine Intelligence, 9 November 1983, Buenos Aires. Griffiths, D. H., British geologist, letter to Lowell Gustafson, 27 October 1982. Hope, Adrian, partner of Cardenas, Hope and Otero Monsegur, 17 February 1984, 14 August 1986, Buenos Aires. Imbaud, Carlos A., director of the Adalberto Wimer Institute of Social Formation and Union Training, Argentine Federation of Light and Power Workers, 18 July 1986, Buenos Aires. Joy, David, British foreign officer, 20 February 1984, Buenos Aires. King, Frank, U.S. foreign service officer, 23 February 1984, Buenos Aires. Koessler, Rodolfo W., president, Open Table of Peronist Unity, National Justice (Justicialista) Movement, 1 June 1986, 17 July 1986, Buenos Aires. Levingston, Roberto, former president of Argentina, 4 July 1986, Buenos Aires. Loss, Dante, director of Foreign Relations, Institute of Economic and Social Policy, 30 July 1986, Buenos Aires. Llados, Jose Maria, director, SOMISA (Sociedad Mixta Siderurgia Argentina), 4 August 1986, Buenos Aires. Nino, Carlos, director, Commission on the Consolidation of Democracy, 28 July 1986, Buenos Aires. Noguera, Felipe, partner of Aftalion, Mora y Araujo, and Noguera, 15 July 1986, Buenos Aires. Pugliese, Juan Carlos, president, Chamber of Deputies, Argentine Congress, 29 July 1986, Buenos Aires. Ribas, Armando, formerly of International Monetary Fund, 24 July 1986, Buenos Aires. Vallimarescu, Serban, U.S. foreign service officer, 15 July 1986, 21 July 1986, Buenos Aires. Vanosi, Jorge, Radical Party senator, 25 July 1986, Buenos Aires. Walters, Vernon, U.S. Department of State. 9 August, 1983, Washington, D.C. Watson, Adam, retired British foreign service officer, 15 May 1983, Charlottesville, Virginia.

League of Nations Documents "The Aaland Islands Question: Report of the International Committee of Jurists." Official Journal, Special Supplement 3 (October 1.920). Council Minutes, 13th Sess., pp. 41-42.

Bibliography

254

"Report of the Commission of Rapporteurs." 16 April 1921, League Council Document B.7.21/68/106. Special declaration by Finland addressed to the Council of the League of nations. The Aaland Islands: Guarantees to Be Given to the Population. Adopted by the Council of the League of Nations, 27 June 1919, p. 16. 9 Treaty Series, pp. 211-221. United Nations Documents 32/412 33/413 34/414 35/412 36/416

(1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981)

A/31/23 Rev. 1 (1976) A/31/55 (1976) A/31/PV.18 (1976) A/32/23 (1977) A/32/110 (1977) A/32/168 (1977) A/32/PV.15 (1977) A/33/23/Add.7 (1978) A/33/57 (1978) A/33/210 (1978) A/33/PV.11 (1978) A/34/23/Add.7 (1979) A/34/23/Rev.l (Vol. IV) (1982) A/34/65 (1979) A/34/342 (1979) A/34/PV.10 (1979) A/35/23/Part. V (1980) A/35/23/Rev.l (1982) A/35/222 (1980) A/35/PV.9 (1980) A/36/155 (1981) A/36/412 (1981) A/36/522 (1981) A/36/PV.7 (1981) A/37/12 (1982) A/37/23 Rev.l (1982) A/37/193 (1982) A/37/225 (1982) A/37/226 (1982) A/37/227 (1982) A/37/353 (1982) A/37/362 (1982) A/37/389 (1982) A/37/531 (1982)

A/37/540 (1982) A/37/553 (1982) A/37/582 (1982) A/37/592 (1982) A/37/L.3/Rev.l (1982) A/37/PV.7 (1982) A/37/PV.9 (1982) A/37/PV.10 (1982) A/37/PV.12 (1982) A/37/PV.14 (1982) A/37/PV.15 (1982) A/37/PV.20 (1982) A/37/PV.23 (1982) A/37/PV.25 (1982) A/37/PV.26 (1982) A/37/PV.29 (1982) A/37/PV.30 (1982) A/37/PV.32 (1982) A/37/PV.33 (1982) A/37/PV.34 (1982) A/37/PV.51 (1982) A/37/PV.52 (1982) A/37/PV.53 (1982) A/37/PV.54 (1982) A/37/PV.55 (1982) A/37/PV.84 (1982) A/38/23 (1983) A/38/7 (1983) A/38/496 (1983) A/38/532 (1983) A/38/563 (1983) A/38/567 (1983) A/38/577 (1983) A/38/578 (1983) A/38/584 (1983) A/38/722 (1983) A/38/1,.12 (1983) A/38/PV.5 (1983) A/38/PV.9 (1983) A/38/PV.15 (1983)

Bibliography A/38/PV.16 (1983) A/38/PV.24 (1983) A/38/PV.26 (1983) A/38/PV.33 (1983) A/38/PV.44 (1983) A/38/PV.45 (1983) A/38/PV.46 (1983) A/38/PV.54 (1983) A/38/PV.57 (1983) A/38/PV.59 (1983) A/38/PV.85 (1983) A/39/23 (1984) A/39/359 (1984) A/39/373 (1984) A/39/589 (1984) A/39/615 (1984) A/39/765 (1984) A/39/L.8 (1984) A/40/2 (1985) A/40/23 (1985) A/40/72 (1985) A/40/89 (1985) A/40/97 (1985) A/40/132 (1985) A/40/177 (1985) A/40/317 (1985) A/40/345 (1985) A/40/349 (1985) A/40/468 (1985) A/40/478 (1985) A/40/496 (1985) A/40/516 (1985) A/40/646 (1986) A/40/662 (1986) A/40/734 (1986) A/40/L.19/and Add.l A/40/PV.5 (1986) A/40/PV.6 (1986) A/40/PV.9 (1986) A/41/112 (1986) A/41/529 (1986) A/5800/Rev.l A/6000/Rev.l (1965) A/6160 (1965) A/6261 (1966) A/6261/Add.l (1966) A/6300/Rev.l (1966) A/6661 (1967) A/6700/Rev.l (1967) A/7200/Rev.l (1968)

255

A/7467 (1968) A/7623/Add.7 (1969) A/7785 (1969) A/8234 (1970) A/8368 (1971) A/8423/Add.7/Part.IV (1971) A/8723/Rev.l (1972) A/8730 (1975) A/9023/Rev.l (1973) A/9121 (1973) A/9287 (1973) A/9623/Add.6/Part.II (1974) A/9824 (1974) A/10023/Add.8/Part.Ill (1975) A/C. 4/31/SR.ll (1976) A/C. 4/31/SR.18 (1976) A/C. 4/31/SR.18/Corr./ (1976) A/C. 4/31/Sr.23 (1976) A/C. 4/32/SR.15 (1977) A/C. 4/36/SR.25 (1982) A/C. 4/37/9 (1983) A/C. 4/37/9 Add.l (1983) A/C. 4/37/9 Add.2 (1983) A/C. 4/37/9 Add.3 (1983) A/C. 4/37/9 Add.4 (1983) A/C. 4/37/SR.10 (1983) A/C. 4/37/SR.ll (1983) A/C. 4/37/SR.12 (1983) A/C. 4/38/5 (1984) A/C. 4/38/5 Add.l (1984) A/C. 4/38/5 Add.2 (1984) A/C. 4/38/SR.4 (1984) A/C. 4/38/SR.8 (1984) A/C. 4/38/SR.12 (1984) A/C. 4/38/SR.16 (1984) A/C. 4/39/3/Add.2 (1985) A/C. 4/39/SR.8 (1985) A/C. 4/39/SR.9 (1985) A/C. 4/39/SR.10 (1985) A/C. 4/39/SR.12 (1985) A/C. 4/39/SR.15 (1985) A/C.4/40/7/Add.l (1986) A/C.4/40/7/Add.2 (1986) A/C.4/40/SR.2 (1986) A/C.4/40/SR.4 (1986) A/C.4/40/SR.15 (1986) A/C.4/40/SR.23 (1986) A/C.4/682 (1966) A/C.a/703 (1967) A/C.4/804 (1975)

256 A/C.4/1795 (1968) A/C.4/1798 (1968) A/C.4/L802 (1965) A/C.4/SR.25 (1946) A/C.4/SR.36 (1947) A/C.4/SR.47 (1947) A/C.4/SR.52 (1948) A/C.4/SR.110 (1949) A/C.4/SR.180 (1950) A/C.4/SR.211 (1951) A/C.4/SR.256 (1952) A/C.4/SR.324 (1953) A/C.4/SR.411 (1954) A/C.4/SR.472 (1955) A/C.4/SR.479 (1955) A/C.4/SR.480 (1955) A/C.4/SR.496 (1955) A/C.4/SR.498 (1955) A/C.4/SR.498 (1955) A/C.4/SR.600 (1957) A/C.4/SR.670 (1957) A/C.4/SR.819 (1958) A/C.4/SR.967 (1959) A/C.4/SR.1005 (1960) A/C.4/SR.1171 (1961) A/C.4/SR.1414 (1962) A/C.4/SR.1506 (1963) A/C.4/SR.1552 (1965) A/C.4/SR.1554 (1965) A/C.4/SR.1556 (1965) A/C.4/SR.1559 (1965) A/C.4/SR.1560 (1965) A/C.4/SR.1669 (1966) A/C.4/SR.1674 (1966) A/C.4/SR.1675 (1966) A/C.4/SR.1679 (1966) A/C.4/SR.1755 (1967) A/C.4/SR.1801 (1968) A/C.4/SR.2074 (1973) A/C.4/SR.2076 (1973) A/C.4/SR.2120 (1974) A/AC. 109/66 (1964) A/AC.109/511 (1976) A/AC.109/513 (1976) A/AC. 109/517 (1976) A/AC. 109/520 (1976) A/AC.109/573 (1978) A/AC.109/615 (1980) A/AC.109/670 (1981) A/AC.109/712 (1982)

Bibliography A/AC.109/712/Add.l (1983) A/AC.109/721/Add.l (1983) A/AC. 109/756/Add. 1 (1983) A/AC. 109/788 (1984) A/AC. 109/793 (1984) A/AC.109/835/Corr.l (1985) A/AC.109/842 (1985) A/AC.109/L.98/Add.2 (1964) A/AC.109/L.125/Add.3 (1964) A/AC.109/L.329/Corr.l/Add.l (1966) A/AC.109/L.401/Rev.l (1967) A/AC.109/L.494 (1968) A/AC.109/L.584/Corr.l (1969) A/AC.109/L.660 (1970) A/AC.109/L.660/Add.l (1970) A/AC.109/L.750 (1971) A/AC.109/L.763 (1972) A/AC.109/L.898 (1973) A/AC.109/L.964 (1974) A/AC.109/L.1044 (1975) A/AC.109/L.1105 (1976) A/AC.109/L.1200 (1977) A/AC.109/L.1258 (1978) A/AC.109/L.1339 (1979) A/AC. 109/L.1402/Add. 1 (1982) A/AC.109/L.1486 (1983) A/AC.109/L.1525 (1984) A/AC.109/L.1569 (1985) A/AC.109/PET.455 (1966) A/AC. 109/PET.530 (1966) A/AC.109/PET.554 (1966) A/AC.109/PET.555 (1966) A/AC.109/PET.556 (1966) A/AC.109/PET.557 (1966) A/AC.109/PET.558 (1966) A/AC.109/PET.703 (1967) A/AC.109/PET.1016 (1968) A/AC. 109/PET. 1021 (1968) A/AC. 109/PET. 1024 (1968) A/AC.109/PET.1025 (1968) A/AC. 109/PET. 1026 (1968) A/AC. 109/PET. 1027 (1968) A/AC. 109/PET. 1028 (1968) A/AC. 109/PET. 1029 (1969) A/AC. 109/PET. 1050 (1969) A/AC.109/PET.1051 (1969) A/AC. 109/PET. 1052 (1969) A/AC.109/PET.1100 (1969) A/AC.109/PET.1101 (1969) A/AC. 109/PET. 1102 (1969)

Bibliography A/AC. 109/PET. 1132 (1970) A/AC. 109/PET, 1133 (1970) A/AC. 109/PET. 1146 (1970) A/AC. 109/PET. 1250 (1973) A/AC.109/PV.830 (1971) A/AC.109/PV.939 (1973) A/AC.109/PV.941 (1973) A/AC. 109/PV. 1055 (1976) A/AC. 109/PV. 1056 (1976) A/AC. 109/PV. 1206 (1982) A/AC. 109/PV. 1224 (1982) A/AC. 109/PV. 1225 (1982) A/AC. 109/PV. 1238 (1983) A/AC. 109/PV. 1239 (1983) A/AC. 109/PV. 1240 (1983) A/AC. 109/PV. 1261 (1984) A/AC. 109/PV. 1281 (1986) A/AC. 109/PV. 1284 (1986) A/AC. 109/PV. 1285 (1986) A/AC.109/SC.IV/1 (1964) A/AC.109/SR.311 (1964) A/PV.64 (1946) A/PV.155 (1948) A/PV.927 (1960) A/PV.944 (1960) A/PV.1065 (1961) A/PV.1149 (1962) A/PV.1174 (1962) A/PV.1212 (1963) A/PV.1267 (1963) A/PV.1292 (1964) A/PV.1337 (1965) A/PV.1386 (1965) A/PV.1398 (1965) A/PV.1420 (1966) A/PV.1485 (1966) A/PV.1500 (1966) A/PV.1569 (1967) A/PV.1641 (1967) A/PV.1697 (1968) A/PV.1744 (1968) A/PV.1765 (1969) A/PV.1835 (1969) A/PV.1854 (1970) A/PV.1862 (1970) A/PV.1948 (1971) A/PV.2028 (1971) A/PV.2043 (1972) A/PV.2139 (1973) A/PV.2174 (1973)

257

A/PV.2202 (1973) A/PV.2240 (1974) A/PV.2317 (1974) A/PV.2357 (1975) A/PV.2431 (1975) A/S-12/29 (1982) A/S-12/30 (1982) CD/PV.170 (1982) General Assembly Resolutions 66 (I) 14-12-1946 146 (II) 3-11-1947 1514 (XV) 14-12-1960 1541 (XV) 14-13-1960 1654 (XVI) 27-11-1961 1810 (XVII) 17-12-1962 2065 (XX) 16-12-1965 2621 (XXV) 12-10-1970 3160 (XXVIII) 14-12-1973 31/49 (XXXI) 1-12-1976 S/1697 (1973) S/11973 (1976) S/14940 (1982) S/14942 (1982) S/14944 (1982) S/14946 (1982) S/14947 (1982) S/14949 (1982) S/14950 (1982) S/14956 (1982) S/14961 (1982) S/14963 (1982) S/14964 (1982) S/14966 (1982) S/14968 (1982) S/14973 (1982) S/14974 (1982) S/14975 (1982) S/14976 (1982) S/14978 (1982) S/14979 (1982) S/14981 (1982) S/14984 (1982) S/14987 (1982) S/14988 (1982) S/14997 (1982) S/14998 (1982) S/14999 (1982) S/15000 (1982) S/15001 (1982) S/15002 (1982)

258

S/ 15003 (1982) S/ 15006 (1982) S/15007 (1982) S/ 15008 (1982) S/15009 (1982) S/15010 (1982) S/15014 (1982) S/15016 (1982) S/15017 (1982) S/15018 (1982) S/15021 (1982) S/15022 (1982) S/15023 (1982) S/15024 (1982) S/15025 (1982) S/15026 (1982) S/15027 (1982) S/ 15028 (1982) S/ 15030 (1982) S/15031 (1982) S/15032 (1982) S/15036 (1982) S/15037 (1982) S/15040 (1982) S/15041 (1982) S/15044 (1982) S/15045 (1982) S/15046 (1982) S/ 15047 (1982) S/15048 (1982) S/15049 (1982) S/15050 (1982) S/15052 (1982) S/15053 (1982) S/15055 (1982) S/15057 (1982) S/ 15058 (1982) S/15059 (1982) S/15060 (1982) S/15061 (1982) S/15063 (1982) S/15068 (1982) S/15069 (1982) S/15070 (1982) S/15071 (1982) S/15073 (1982) S/ 15074 (1982) S/ 15078 (1982) S/ 15081 (1982) S/ 15082 (1982)

Bibliography

S/15083 (1982) S/15084 (1982) S/15085 (1982) S/15090 (1982) S/15092 (1982) S/ 15097 (1982) S/15098 (1982) S/15099 (1982) S/15100 (1982) S/15101 (1982) S/15102 (1982) S/15104 (1982) S/15105 (1982) S/15106 (1982) S/15108 (1982) S/15110 (1982) S/15111 (1982) S/15112 (1982) S/15115 (1982) S/15116 (1982) S/15117 (1982) S/15119 (1982) S/15122 (1982) S/15123 (1982) S/15125 (1982) S/15126 (1982) S/15128 (1982) S/15129 (1982) S/15131 (1982) S/15134 (1982) S/15136 (1982) S/15137 (1982) S/15139 (1982) S/15140 (1982) S/15142 (1982) S/15143 (1982) S/15144 (1982) S/15145 (1982) S/15146 (1982) S/15147 (1982) S/15148 (1982) S/15151 (1982) S/15152 (1982) S/15154 (1982) S/15155 (1982) S/15156 (1982) S/15159 (1982) S/15160 (1982) S/15169 (1982) S/15172 (1982)

Bibliography S/15173 (1982) S/15176 (1982) S/15177 (1982) S/15181 (1982) S/15182 (1982) S/15189 (1982) S/15192 (1982) S/15198 (1982) S/15199 (1982) S/15201 (1982) S/15202 (1982) S/15203 (1982) S/15204 (1982) S/15205 (1982) S/15206 (1982) S/15207 (1982) S/15212 (1982) S/15213 (1982) S/15214 (1982) S/15215 (1982) S/15217 (1982) S/15218 (1982) S/15228 (1982) S/15229 (1982) S/15230 (1982) S/15231 (1982) S/15232 (1982) S/15234 (1982) S/15237 (1982) S/15241 (1982) S/15249 (1982) S/15253 (1982) S/15307 (1982) S/15313 (1982) S/15361 (1982) S/15369 (1982) S/15373 (1982) S/15377 (1982) S/15378 (1982) S/15409 (1982) S/15427 (1982)

259

S/15452 (1982) S/15464 (1982) S/15474 (1982) S/15475 (1982) S/15496 (1982) S/15547 (1983) S/15575 (1983) S/15668 (1983) S/15774 (1983) S/15849 (1983) S/15873 (1983) S/15918 (1983) S/15938 (1983) S/16125 (1983) S/16135 (1983) S/16136 (1983) S/16137 (1983) S/16210 (1983) S/16136 (1984) S/16336 (1984) S/16430 (1984) S/16782 (1984) S/PV.2345 (1982) S/PV.2346 (1982) S/PV.2349 (1982) S/PV.2350 (1982) S/PV.2360 (1982) S/PV.2362 (1982) S/PV.2363 (1982) S/PV.2364 (1982) S/PV.2366 (1982) S/PV.2368 (1982) S/PV.2371 (1982) S/PV.2372 (1982) S/PV.2373 (1982) S/RES/502 (1982) S/RES/505 (1982) ST/ADM/SER/A1084 (1966) UNCIO Restrict. Doc. 552 11/4/23 (1945)

This page intentionally left blank

Index

Aaland Islands case, 66 Aberdeen, George, 31 Acquisitive prescription, principle of, xii, xiii, 23, 27, 32-35, 81, 203 Africa, 56, 58-65, 72, 75-78, 139, 141, 180, 204 Aggression, 30, 31, 67, 71, 74, 76, 78, 167, 168, 200, 201 Aix-la-Chapelle, Treaty of (1748), 7 Alexander VI (pope), 5, 6 Alfonsin, Raul, 124-25, 141, 145, 174, 181-84, 186-88, 195-98, 202-4 Alsace-Lorraine, 66 Alvear, Carlos de, 34 American Revolution, 59, 60 Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Treaty of, 22 Anaya, Jorge, 123, 126, 130, 134, 139, 147-49, 151, 157, 165, 169, 191 Angola, 49, 71, 97, 165 Anson, George Lord, 7, 8, 17, 141 Antarctic Treaty (1959), as model for Falklands dispute, 105, 185 Anticolonialism, 172 and Argentina, 55-59, 62-64, 72-75, 80, 193, 195, 199 influences on, 59-62 and "just" wars, 70-71 in the twentieth century, 59-65 and use of force, 66-68, 71, 74-80 Argentina. See also Anticolonialism; Decolonization claims of, over Falklands, xii, 17, 1935, 37, 56, 62-66, 73, 74, 76, 7981, 104, 110, 117, 120, 121 criticism of, over Falklands, xii-xiii, 29-31, 35, 53, 78-79

delay by, of invasion of Falklands, 7174 and England, 3, 14, 20-23, 25-35, 37, 39, 40, 42-48, 53, 56, 64-66, 7277, 79, 80-83, 87-114, 116-26, 133-35, 137-42, 171, 176-81, 185 missignals from and miscalculations of, re Falklands, 128-32 and oil, 83-84, 86, 88, 97, 103-9, 112-14, 116-18 and principle of self-determination, 55, 56, 62-66, 76 and sovereignty, esp. regarding Falklands, 34-35, 65, 125, 158, 159, 165, 167, 170, 171, 184, 187, 201, 204 and Soviet Union, 190-98 and Spain, xii, 21, 22, 34, 35 traditional authoritarianism and human rights violations, 55-56, 6264, 73, 100, 104, 116, 133, 179, 182 U.N. support for Falkland claims of, 62-64, 67, 71-74, 121, 124 and U.S., 24-26, 34, 57, 70, 89, 92, 132-42, 151-52, 168, 180, 190-98 war of, with Great Britain over the Falklands (1982), xi, 29-31, 39, 5254, 66-68, 74, 116-42, 144, 147, 153, 155, 156, 162, 163, 167, 171, 175, 176, 179, 186, 191, 195, 199 Asia, 56, 58-64, 76, 77, 80, 139 Austrian Succession, War of, 7 Balkans, 28, 67 Banaba (formerly Ocean Island), 50, 51 Barnett, Anthony, 49, 120, 175 Barre, Isaac, 17, 18 261

262 Bayard, Thomas F., Secretary of State of U.S., 34 Baylies, Francis, 24 Beagle Islands dispute, 137, 141, 145, 167, 182-83 Beck, Peter, 32 Belaunde Terry, Fernando, 155, 157-59, 163, 169 Belgrano incident, 138, 153, 155, 156, 158-63, 167, 168 Benn, Tony, 42-43, 52, 53, 121, 149, 154 Beresford, William Carr, 19, 21 Bernhardt, Gaston de, 32 Berrutti, Rodriguez, 21 Bignone, Reynaldo, 147, 170 Bolivar, Simon, 59, 199 Boothroyd, Betty, 42 Bougainville, Antoine Louis de, 3, 8 Braine, Bernard, 41, 48, 51 Brazil, 23, 86, 93, 114, 141, 185, 192, 201 British Nationality Act, 42, 46, 53, 128 Bucareli, Francisco P., 12 Buonaparte family, 21 Byron, John, 9, 10 Caccia, Lord, 45, 121 Callaghan, James, 83, 91, 94, 95, 115, 128, 129, 150 Camargo expedition of 1540, 3 Campbell, Ronald, 32 Canada, 83, 180, 185, 191 Canberra conference about the Antarctic (1980), 108 Canning, George Lord, 26 Caputo, Dante, Foreign Minister of Argentina, 182, 186, 196, 197, 202, 203 Cardenas, Emilio J., 30, 31 Carrington, Peter, 89-90, 109, 110, 171 Carter, Jimmy, 102, 124, 133, 179, 191, 193, 196 Cavendish, Thomas, 3 Cawkell, Mary, 3, 22 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 102, 104, 124, 157 Charles III (king of Spain), 14 Chile, 137, 139, 141, 145, 167, 182, 183, 185, 200, 201

Index China, 57, 128, 183, 187 Choiseul, Etienne Franpois, Due de, 8, 11-14 Churchill, Winston, 45, 101 Clayton, S. W., 19, 23 Cleveland, Grover, 34 Clipperton Island arbitration (1931), 4 Collective security, 200-201 Colonialism, 56, 58-59, 62-64, 68, 71, 75, 78, 79, 81, 204 Costa Mendez, Nicanor, Foreign Minister of Argentina, 57, 67, 74-77, 121, 124-25, 131, 133, 148, 149, 155, 156, 158, 164, 192, 200 Critchly, Julian, 43, 169 Cuba, 191, 196, 198, 203, 204 Cyprus, 49, 51 Dalyell, Tarn, 155, 157, 159-63, 169 Davidoff, Constantino, 125, 126, 147 Davis, John, 3, 4, 27 De Nerville, Governor, 11 De Vattel, Emmerich, 4 Decolonization, 55-59, 62-66, 76-79, 81 Diego Garcia, 49-51, 140, 141 Discovery, and claim to territory, 3-5 Drake, Francis, 6 Duncan, Silas, 24-27, 34 Eden, Anthony, 32-33 Eden, John, 48, 121 Egmont, John, Earl of, 9-11, 17 Enders, Thomas, 133, 136, 137 England. See Great Britain English, Michael, 52 Enlightenment, 60 Europe, 59-61, 102, 123, 127, 134, 138, 139, 166, 197 European Economic Community (EEC), 88, 101, 139, 151, 153, 154, 182, 185, 191, 200 Evans, loan, 40 Extinctive prescription, principle of, 20, 23 Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. See also Argentina; Falkland Islands war; France; Great Britain Almirante Storni incident, 93-95

Index and anticolonialism, 55-59, 62-64, 71-80 binational approach to, 82-83, 88, 95106, 181-84 British 1833 invasion of, xii, 2S--28, 31-33, 57, 64, 74, 75, 81 discovery of, 3-6, 10, 12, 23, 27, 33 economic and strategic value of, 7-10, 140-41 and fish, 83, 95-96, 102, 111, 115, 140, 189 force to resolve conflict over, 116-21, 123, 124, 126, 130, 132, 134, 137, 144 historical rights to, xii, xiii, 79 negotiations regarding, 72-74, 80-83, 90, 94-96, 98-100, 102-6, 109-13, 117, 133, 176, 180, 198 oil and, 81-89, 96-98, 102-9, 111-13, 139-41, 187 population of, 38-48, 51, 66, 73, 76 as res nullius, xii, 21, 22, 24-26 secret understanding (1771) re, 14-18 and self-determination, xii, xiii, 27, 35-54, 64-66, 72-74, 76, 88, 103-5, 116, 120-29, 139, 167, 175, 181, 187-89 settlement of, 8-14, 17, 27-29, 31, 32 Shackleton mission regarding, 89-93, 95-100 sovereignty conflict over, xi-xii, 8-14, 17, 21-35, 81-83, 85-88, 92, 96, 98-100, 103, 105, 106-22, 125, 129, 137, 143, 156, 165-67, 176, 188-89, 192-205 and Spain, 8, 27 Falkland Islands Committee, 44, 91, 97, 99, 100, 109, 115 Falkland Islands Company (FIC), 91, 92, 97, 99, 101 Falkland Islands war effects of, 177-84, 190-208 force vs. negotiations in, 155-60, 162-68, 170 future after, 119-22, 184-89 numerous causes of, explored, 119-76 women and war and the, 174 Falklands Legislative Council, 87, 113, 187 Fiji Islands, 50, 51

263

Finland, 66 Flexibility, regarding Falklands, 181-85, 188 Foot, Michael, 41, 129, 150, 154 Force, 173, 202, 204. See also Falkland (Malvinas) Islands; Falkland Islands war first use of, 166, 172, 176, 179, 180, 200 as self-defense, 154, 159 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and Falklands issue, 105, 108, 110-14, 130 Foulkes, George, 160, 178, 186 France, 5, 6, 8, 15-16, 77, 166-67, 180, 182 claim of, to the Falklands, xii, 5, 8-10 and England, 7-14, 21 occupation of Falklands (1764) by, 4, 9, 20, 27 and Spain, 8-14, 16, 21, 27, 57 Franck, Thomas, 29, 30 Franks Commission, 124, 126, 128, 129 French Revolution (1789), 48, 59, 60, 62, 73 Frenchman, Michael, 92, 100-101, 107-

8

Galtieri, Leopoldo, 123, 126, 129, 13134, 142, 144-50, 152, 155-58, 16264, 168-72, 175, 177, 190, 191, 198, 201 General Assembly (U.N.), 41, 55, 62, 64, 73, 87, 121, 124, 184 criticism of, 49, 70-71 and just wars, 71, 74 Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960 (anticolonial resolution) of, 39, 42, 48, 62-65, 67-68, 71, 72, 78, 79, 117, 170, 185 Resolution 1541 (XV) of, 63-64, 79 Resolution 2065 (XX) of, 64, 72, 73, 78, 92, 93, 156, 170, 180 Resolution 2131 (XX) (1965) of, 71 Resolution 2326 (XXII) (1967) of, 71 Resolution 2908 (XX) (1972) of, 71 Resolution 3160 (XXVIII) (1973) of, 78, 92, 93, 108 Resolution 3281 (XXIX) (1974) of,

71

264

Index

General Assembly (U.N.), (continued) Resolution 3314 Article 7 (1974) of, 71, 200 Resolution 31/49 (1976) of, 73, 78 Resolution 37/9 (1982) of, 78 and West Irian case, 69 General Will (Rousseauian theory), 61,

62, 206-8 George III (king of England), 14, 15 Gibralter, 27, 42 Goa Doctrine, 66-69, 71-74, 76, 77 Goebel, Julius, 14, 15 Grantham, Thomas Lord, 19 Gravshon, Arthur, 155-57, 162, 191-192 Great Britain, 5-6, 8, 16, 17, 23, 27, 64, 77, 127. See also Argentina; Falkland (Malvinas) Islands; Falkland Islands war criticism of, regarding selfdetermination, 48-52 and force regarding Falklands, 116-18, 148, 154, 155, 159, 164, 167, 171 and France, 10-14 historical claim of, over Falklands, xii, 5, 9, 10, 12, 17, 20-36, 100, 111, 116, 117 and Latin America, 137-42, 154, 201, 204 missignals from and miscalculations of, re Falklands, 127-30 and oil, 83-84, 86-87, 90, 91, 93, 102-9, 112-14, 116-18 and principle of acquisitive prescription, xii, xiii, 27, 32-34, 81, 117 and principle of self-determination, xii-xiii, 27, 35-51, 65, 81, 117, 120-21, 139 and sovereignty, 119-21, 130, 155, 158, 159, 165, 167, 170, 175 and Soviet Union, 190, 191, 194 and Spain, 6-21, 27 and U.S., 24, 57, 89, 133-35, 137-41, 151-52, 154, 156, 157, 179, 180, 184, 199, 203, 205 Grenada, 205 Grey, George, 17 Grimaldi, Marques, de, 12 Grotius, Hugo, 34 Guyana, 75, 78 Guzzetti, Cesar Agosto, 96, 99, 100, 102

Haig, Alexander, 120, 121, 123, 126, 133-37, 139, 144-46, 148, 155-58, 160, 162, 163, 165, 168-71, 174, 175, 190, 198, 200 Harris, James, 13, 16 Hassan, Farooq, 29 Hawke, Edward, 14 Healey, Denis, 121, 129, 153, 163, 183 Heath, Edward, 43 Historical rights, and the Falklands, xii, xiii, 1-36, 205 H.M.S. Endurance, 93, 94, 115, 117, 128, 131, 141 Holland. See Netherlands Hong Kong model (lease-back solution) proposed for Falkland Islands, 106, 109, 111, 114, 186-87 Hooley, Frank, 42, 46, 153 Howe, Geoffrey, 41, 109, 181, 189 Huber, Max, 4, 5 Hunt, Captain, 12 Hutchison, Michael Clark, 44, 87 Imperialism, and the Falklands war, 134, 137-43, 154, 193, 199, 204 Incident of 1833, 25-27, 33 India, and invasion of Goa, 66-69, 72, 74, 76, 77 Indonesia, 49, 68-70, 72 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR; 1947), 180, 199201, 203 International law, 6, 119 and aggression, 30, 31, 67, 71, 78-79, 167, 194 and dangers of force in twentieth century, 28-31, 35, 67-68, 78-79 and settling disputes peacefully, 30, 67-68, 194 and transfer of title by conquest, 2728 Ireland, 5, 153 Islas Malvinas (Spanish name for the Falklands). See Falkland (Malvinas) Islands Jackson, Andrew, 24, 25, 27 Japan, 57, 96, 189, 197 Jenkins' Ear, War of, 7 Jennings, Ivor, 37

Index Jennings, R., 28, 30-31, 33 Jewitt, Daniel, 21-23 John Paul II (pope), 145, 148-49 Johnson, D. H. N., 33-34 Johnson, Samuel, 16, 173 Johnston, Russell, 47 Just war doctrine, 68, 70-72, 79, 122, 123, 178 Kellogg-Briand treaty, 30 Kershaw, Anthony, 27 King, Cecil, 39 Kirkpatrick, Jeane, 133, 135-37, 174, 204 Kissinger, Henry, 133, 151, .165, 172 Lambie, David, 47 Lami Dozo, Basilio, 148, 149, 157, 191 Latin America, 61, 97, 98, 131, 141, 153, 154, 166, 185, 189, 192, 204 and Africa and Asia, 58, 59 and anticolonialism, 56-59, 62, 67 attempted integration of, 198-205 ethnic differences of, 202 and imperialism, 56-59, 62, 67 League of Nations, 166 Levin, Bernard, 46 Lexington incident (1831), 23-25, 27, 34 Lindsey, John, 27, 28 Livingston, Edward, 24 Locke, John, 61 Louis XV (king of France), 14 Lyon, Alexander, 53-54 Madrid, 12-14, 19 Madrid, treaties of (1630, 1667, 1670), 6 Malouines, Les (French name for the Falklands). See Falkland (Malvinas) Islands Malvinas Islands. See Falkland (Malvinas) Islands Martinez, Juan Crisostomo, 21 Masserano, Prince, 11, 13-15 Mauritius, 49, 50 Mayotte case, 65 Megarry, Robert, 50-51 Menendez, Mario, 126, 131-32, 145, 177 Mestivier, Juan, 25, 26 Metford, J. C. J., 17, 18, 21, 25 Metternich, Klemens von, 61

265

Mexico, 4, 200, 201 Missignals and miscalculations, and the Falklands war, 143. See also relevant sections under Argentina; Great Britain; United States Mitchell, Francis, 91, 92, 99 Monroe Doctrine (1823), 26 Montagu, George, fourth Duke of Manchester, 17 Montcalm, Louis-Joseph de, 8 Montevideo, 21, 22, 24, 195 Moore, John Norton, 29-31 Mordis, Lord, 45-46 Moreno, Manuel, 14, 31, 34 Morgenthau, Hans, 205-7 Murrell, Hilda, 160-61 Myhre, Jeffrey D., 3 National liberation movements, 71 Nationalism, 61-62, 69, 119 NATO, 70, 127, 130, 132, 140, 141, 180, 181, 188, 193, 194, 201, 203 Netherlands, 6, 69, 70, 72, 138 New Guinea, 68, 69 Nicaragua, 153-54, 195, 196, 199, 200, 203 Nonaligned movement, 23, 57, 73, 124, 197 Nootka Sound Convention (1790), 2021 North, Frederick, 12-19 North Sea, British oil in, 87, 89, 96, 104, 107, 109, 114, 139 Northedge, F. S., 15 Official Secrets Act (1911), 151, 161 Onslow, John James, 25-26 Oppenheim, L., 34 Organization of American States (OAS), 92, 96, 124, 131, 148, 153, 154, 180, 190, 198-201 Ortiz de Rozas, Carlos, 48-49, 58-59, 71, 123, 131 Owen, David, 42, 47-48, 51, 103, 120,

159, 160, 183, 185, 190

Pacheco, Jorge, 22 Palmas, Island of, case, 4 Palmerston, Henry Viscount, 15, 27, 34 Panama, 67, 77, 136, 140, 174

266 Papal decrees, 5-7, 10 Parish, Woodbine, 17-18, 23, 24, 27 Parsons, Anthony, 120, 124, 164 Peacetime agenda of the world, use of force to get on, 124-25, 137 Peel, Robert, 31 Perez de Cuellar, Javier, 162 Permanent Court of International Justice, 28 Pernety, Dora, 8, 10, 16 Peron, Isabel, 88, 90-91, 95, 97 Peron, Juan, 57, 86, 101, 136, 197 Peru, 7, 73, 155, 158, 170, 192, 199 Phillimore, Robert, 6 Pinedo, Jose Maria, 26 Pinochet, Agosto, 183 Pinto, Monica, 22, 28 Pitt, William (the Elder), Lord Chatham, 11-18 Plaque (1774), and British title to Falklands, xii, 19, 27, 33 Ponting, Clive, 159, 161 Popular sovereignty, 206-7 Port Egmont, 9-12, 14-21, 23, 25, 27 Port Louis, 8, 11, 26 Port Stanley, 34, 91-93, 105, 129, 145, 149 Portugal, 5, 6, 49, 66-68, 70-73, 76, 77, 180 Puerto Soldad, 8, 24 Pym, Francis, 48, 144, 155-56, 158, 160, 164, 179 Quebec, battle of, 8 Quijano, Raul, 95, 124, 131 Rattenbach Committee, 130, 131, 134, 145, 148 Reagan, Ronald, 121, 132-34, 136, 137, 152, 167, 172, 173, 179, 190, 194, 196, 197, 203 Res nullius, xii, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 33, 35 Rice, Desmond, 155-57, 162, 191 Ridley, Nicholas, 109-13, 115, 116 Robertson, Malcolm, 32 Rockford, William, Earl of, 16, 19 Roman law, and title to previously unowned territory, 5 Ros, Enrique, 76, 169, 170, 191 Rosas, Juan Manuel de, 31, 138

Index Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 55, 60-62, 206-7 Rowlands, Edward, 94, 95, 98-101, 105, 106 Rubalcava, Fernando de, 12 Rubin, Alfred P., 17 Ruda, Jose Maria, 64-66 Ruiz Puente, Felipe, 9, 12 Russia, 66, 96. See also Soviet Union Russian Revolution of 1917, 62, 66 St. Malo, 6, 8, 10 Salt-water test, of colonialism, 63, 73, 78 San Jorge, Gulf of, 85, 87, 89, 109 Santos, Angel, 12 Secret Agreement (1771) alleged between England and Spain regarding Falklands, 14-18, 20, 27 Security Council (U.N.), 58, 68, 70, 71, 75-77, 122, 130, 184 Resolution 502, 75, 76, 153, 156, 192, 194, 198 Self-determination, principle of, 36, 37, 52-55, 77, 173, 205 and Argentine claim to Falklands, 55, 62-66, 71-79 and British sovereignty in the Falklands, xii-xiii, 27, 35-55, 75, 81, 120, 121, 139 competing selves and, 39, 43-48 and just war doctrine, 70, 71, 122, 123 the self and force, 66-68, 71, 73, 7680, 116-18, 122-23 the self and its rights in the Falklands, 38-41, 81, 120, 121, 185 the self and the people's interests, 6870, 187-89 the self defined, 37-48, 62-66, 69, 71, 78, 80, 81 and twentieth-century anticolonialism, 55-65, 67, 71, 73, 74, 79 two conflicting definitions of, 64-66, 71, 72, 120, 121 Seven Years War (1756-1763), 8, 16, 17 Sexism, 174 Shackleton, Lord, 89-93, 95-100, 107-8, 115, 128 Shackleton mission, to Falklands, 89-93, 95-100 Sheffield incident, 162, 163, 167, 178

Index Shelburne, Lord, 11 Simmering pit theory, of sovereign states, 125-26 Slacum, George W., 24 Somalia, 65, 77, 78 South Africa, 40, 49, 77-78 South Atlantic Committee, 178-79 South Georgia, 103, 114, 115, 123, 126, 153, 154, 164, 167, 176, 198 South Sea Company, 6-7 Sovereignty, xi-xiii, 4-6, 20, 21, 23, 43, 52, 74, 208 dangers of, for world order, 119-22, 125, 137, 143, 148, 165, 208 and external causes of the Falklands war, 119-42 and force vs. negotiations, 152-68 hardliners on, 82, 84-85, 89, 93, 9597,99-105, 107, 109, 111, 112, 114, 117, 118, 148, 183 and inflexibility and principles, 171-73 and internal causes of the Falklands war, 143-76 and leaders' cynicism, 144-52 limitations of, xi, 122-23 and the people, 174-76 popular, 206-7 and pride, 168-71 redefining, 81-82, 87-89, 113, 117, 205-8 softliners on, 82, 84, 91, 95, 102, 106, 108-10, 112-14, 117-76, 183 and war and women, 174 Soviet Union, 29, 57, 68, 75, 76, 11921, 124, 139-41, 144, 149, 151, 167, 185, 189-98, 203 Spain, 14-23, 27, 32, 34, 114, 136, 182, 203, 204 anticolonialism and, 57-59 and secret agreement with England (1771), 14-18,20,27 title of, to Falklands, xii, 8, 9, 12-23, 27,32 Spanish Succession, War of, 6 Stanhope Treaty (1707), 6 Strong, John, 5, 6 Territorial integrity, 75, 79, 170 vs. self-determination, 65, 69, 79, 172, 173

267

Thatcher, Margaret, 127, 137 and the Falklands war, 39, 41, 44, 47, 53, 108, 115, 120, 121, 124, 131, 141, 144, 146, 149-58, 160-63, 166, 167, 168-76, 178, 179, 181-84, 187 Third World, 40, 57, 61, 65, 68, 70, 76, 116, 137, 140, 153, 154, 172, 180, 184, 195 Thomson, John, 165, 172, 179, 180 Thome, Stan, 121, 140-50, 169 Tierra del Fuego, 97, 107, 112 Title that flows, 22-23, 35, 115, 117 Title transferred by conquest, 27-32 Title transferred by purchase or by prescription, 31-34 Tordesillas, Treaty of (1494), 5 Transfer of Sovereignty, Charter of (1949), 68-69 Trilateral Commission, 204 Tuvalu (formerly Ellice Islands), 50 United Nations, 29-31, 33, 34, 45, 67, 68, 71, 122, 199, 200, 201 Committee of 24 (the Decolonization Committee), 39, 40, 44, 55, 64, 66, 71, 72, 74, 94, 187 and conflicting view of selfdetermination, 47-48, 55, 62-66, 71 criticism of, 39-41 and decolonization, 55-59, 64-65, 68, 71,76 and Falklands issue, 56, 57, 62-65, 72-73, 77, 81, 87, 96, 114, 117, 119, 120, 124, 125, 136, 137, 148, 153, 156, 166, 170, 172, 176, 179, 180, 184, 185, 187, 188 and peaceful settlement of disputes, 67-68, 78-80, 194 Resolution 2632 (XXV) (1970), 70 and West Irian case, 69-70 United States, 26, 49, 174, 175. See also Argentina; Great Britain criticism of, 132-35 and Falklands, xii, 24-26, 29, 70, 90, 116, 124, 125, 130, 132-34, 136-37, 141, 148, 151-52, 170-72 and Falklands oil, 84, 88-89, 102, 106, 107, 114

268 United States, (continued) and Grenada, 205 and Latin America, 137, 139-41, 200, 201, 203, 204 missignals from and miscalculations of, re Falklands, 132-37 and Soviet Union, 29, 190, 191, 19498 Uti Possidetis, xii, 21, 22, 25, 35, 36, 55, 58 Utrecht, Treaty of (1713), 6, 11 Vernet, Louis, 22-25 Vertiz y Salcedo, Juan Jose, 19 Vespucci, Amerigo, 3 Videla, Jorge, 95-97 Vietnam, 165, 173 Viola, Roberto Eduardo, 123, 124, 147

Index Walter, Richard, 7 Walters, Vernon, 132, 133, 171, 174 Watergate, 159-60 Webster, Daniel, 34 Wellington, Duke of, 33 West Irian case, 68-70, 72 Weymouth, Secretary of State, 13 Williams, John Fischer, 27-28 Wilson, Woodrow, 37 Wolff, Christian, 4, 5 World War I, 28, 30, 41, 51, 60, 66, 67, 132, 139, 148, 152 World War II, 28, 33, 40, 41, 56, 60, 67, 82, 127, 135, 146, 159, 166, 202 World War III, 28, 67, 68 Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF), 84-86, 88, 97, 106, 107, 113, 114