The Secret Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations in Oslo: Their Success and Why the Process Ultimately Failed (Durham Modern Middle East and Islamic World Series)

The Secret Israeli–Palestinian Negotiations in Oslo ‘As this book illustrates, Israelis and Palestinians are bound to cooperate, even if this is difficult to realize. The findings of this book will advance our thinking about how to reach peace with Israel.’ Ahmad Qureia, Former Prime Minister of the Palestine National Authority ‘The theory of games is not the first thing that comes to mind when devising a strategy for negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. But this book illustrates how useful it can be.’ Muhammad Shtayyeh, Former Minister of Public Works and Housing, Palestine National Authority ‘Telling the story of Oslo is one thing, explaining it another. The book is one of the few attempts to answer the question not only what happened in Oslo, but why it happened.’ Ron Pundak, Director General of the Peres Center for Peace

The Oslo secret negotiations from December 1992 to September 1993 were some of the most astonishing and at the same time successful negotiations in the Middle East, leading to mutual recognition between the PLO and Israel, despite their ultimate failure to establish the basis for permanent peace between the two sides. This book examines the Oslo negotiations and considers how they can best be explained. It argues that at the core of the negotiations was a fascinating dilemma of recognition, and a struggle to overcome it. The book documents how decision makers tried to communicate without being able to engage in face-to-face negotiations. It also analyses the role of third parties in the conflict resolution process, including the role of the European Union, hitherto neglected despite its importance in developing the conceptual foundations of the talks. Sven Behrendt is a leading expert in international negotiations and conflict resolution. He joined the World Economic Forum in Geneva, Switzerland in 2000 where he facilitates dialogue between the public and private sector on global policy issues. He initiated numerous secondtrack processes in the Middle East for the Bertelsmann Foundation and is co-editor of Bound to Cooperate: Europe and the Middle East.

Durham Modern Middle East and Islamic World Series Series Editor: Anoushiravan Ehteshami University of Durham

1. Economic Development in Saudi Arabia Rodney Wilson, with Abdullah Al-Salamah, Monica Malik and Ahmed Al-Rajhi 2. Islam Encountering Globalisation Edited by Ali Mohammadi 3. China’s Relations with Arabia and the Gulf, 1949–1999 Mohamed Bin Huwaidin 4. Good Governance in the Middle East Oil Monarchies Edited by Tom Pierre Najem and Martin Hetherington 5. The Middle East’s Relations with Asia and Russia Edited by Hannah Carter and Anoushiravan Ehteshami 6. Israeli Politics and the Middle East Peace Process, 1988–2002 Hassan A. Barari 7. The Communist Movement in the Arab World Tareq Y. Ismael 8. Oman – The Islamic Democratic Tradition Hussein Ghubash 9. The Secret Israeli–Palestinian Negotiations in Oslo Their success and why the process ultimately failed Sven Behrendt

The Secret Israeli–Palestinian Negotiations in Oslo Their success and why the process ultimately failed

Sven Behrendt

First published 2007 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2007 Sven Behrendt All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record has been requested ISBN 0-203-96487-X Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0–415–41592–6 (hbk) ISBN10: 0–203–96487–X (ebk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–41592–7 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–96487–3 (ebk)

Contents

Acknowledgements 1

Introduction

vii 1

The promise 2 Predetermining choices: The international system and domestic politics 4 Rational choice and constructivist approaches to negotiation analysis 5 Towards an explanation of Oslo 9 2

Israel and the PLO: Facing international and domestic challenges

11

Israel moves towards peace 11 The PLO in need of new options 17 Converging interests 24 3

Let’s argue: A constructivist approach to understanding the Oslo talks

29

Constructing the framework 32 Spilling over into the Oslo talks 46

The first stages 47

The quest for legitimacy 56 A constructivist interpretation of the Oslo talks 61 4

Cautious rapprochement: A rational choice approach to understanding the Oslo talks Sending signals 63

63

vi

Contents

Lifting the ban to talk 66 Engaging in direct talks 72 Oslo overshadows the multilateral and Washington talks 75 A rational choice based interpretation of the Oslo talks 80 5

Bargaining in Oslo

81

Caught in the negotiator’s dilemma 84 The Norwegians intensify their role 87 Final tests on both sides 89 Final drafting of the Declaration of Principles 103 Mutual recognition 105 Testing the explanatory power: Rational choice and constructivism 109 6

The success of the Oslo talks – and why the process failed

111

Appendix 1: Timeline Appendix 2: Documents Notes Bibliography Index

120 123 138 146 157

Acknowledgements

The secret negotiations between the leadership of the PLO and the Israeli government will go down in history as one of the most remarkable negotiation processes in world politics. Although they eventually did not result in what they had originally aimed at, a final settlement between Israelis and Palestinians, they were extraordinarily successful in breaking the ‘policy of silence’ between the PLO and the State of Israel. The negotiations were conducted by exceptionally courageous individuals. They were courageous in a political sense, as they shouldered the responsibility to develop a path to peace that nevertheless included huge risks for the peoples they represented. They also were prepared to question their own beliefs and assumptions, the foundations of their very own identity. I am honoured that many of those involved directly in the Oslo talks and those who supported them from the sidelines were ready to devote considerable time and patience to answer my questions. As the Oslo talks were highly personalised, the task of assembling the bits and pieces of information that mattered for this puzzle became an adventure in itself. In this endeavour, I was particularly supported by Yair Hirschfeld, Ron Pundak and Mohammad Shtayyeh. I am also grateful to the Palestinian Center for Regional Studies that enabled me to meet Palestinian leaders closely involved with the talks. Since the early stages of producing this book, my understanding of the Oslo process has been guided and shaped in particular by Thomas Risse, Bill Zartman and Gerald Schneider. They helped me to understand that the same political event can be interpreted in many different ways, which became an interesting and tempting experience. Political science is not straightforward; it rather provides the opportunity to assess and re-assess beliefs and assumptions, and to develop new ideas about promising avenues to resolve conflicts. I also had the opportunity to present my

viii Acknowledgements preliminary findings to distinguished audiences at the European University Institute in Florence and the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Washington D.C. Anoush Ehteshami was the one who finally convinced me to make my Ph.D. thesis accessible to a broader audience, and relentlessly pushed me to finalise the manuscript for this book. During a stay at the University of Durham, he and Emma Murphy repeatedly engaged in thoughtprovoking discussions that enabled me to sharpen many of the arguments presented in this book. In finalising the manuscript I was supported by two talented Ph.D. students of the University of Durham: Christian Barkei, who in the meantime acquired the academic credential of a Ph.D. himself, reviewed earlier versions of the manuscript; Katherine Harbord was essential in transforming later versions of the manuscript into a publishable form. I would also like to thank my parents who were a relentless source of inspiration. My biggest thanks go to Christina for her patience and determination.

1

Introduction

The quest for peace in the Middle East is one of the most challenging issues in international affairs. Generations of politicians and activists have tried to overcome the deep cleavages that have separated Israelis and Palestinians for decades. None of them has succeeded. The secret Oslo negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians that stretched from December 1992 to September 1993 and the process that followed came closer than any other attempt to bring peace to the Middle East. Yet, the Oslo process too failed to deliver a final settlement between Israelis and Palestinians on the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Many initiatives to work out a solution for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict followed, some of them sponsored by the USA, by the European Union, by other third parties. There are an infinite number of plans about how to resolve the conflict. All of them, like the Oslo agreements, have thus far proved unable to steer both sides towards reconciliation. Today, the stalemate continues and threatens to escalate into violence any moment – with deadly consequences felt not only in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Ramallah or Gaza City, but in many other parts of the world. Every day, the world holds its breath and watches anxiously how Israelis and Palestinians deal with each other. Looking back to the foundations of the Oslo process and identifying the reasons why this process failed might provide some insight about Israeli–Palestinian relations in the future. The political constellation today resembles in many aspects the situation of the early 1990s that paved the way for the Oslo talks. In the early 1990s, efforts by the international community, most notably the USA, to bring all sides to the negotiation table culminated in the Madrid peace conference. Today, these efforts are bundled in the ‘Road Map’ supported by the USA, the EU, Russia, and the United Nations – the so-called ‘Quartet’. At that time, the Middle East had just gone through a war with Iraq. Today, three years after the second Iraq war, the international

2 Introduction community understands that stability in the wider Middle East can only be achieved if the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is resolved. In the early 1990s, the first Intifada, which had begun in late 1987, had shattered the self-confidence of the Israeli public and eventually convinced the Israeli leadership that the conflict could not be resolved by continued occupation. At the same time, the Palestinians had learned that a continuation of violence would not bring them any closer to establishing a state for themselves. Today, Israelis and Palestinians are exhausted from a severe escalation of violence, starting with the beginning of the second Intifada in 2000. Terrorism and continued occupation have taken their toll. More than a decade ago, the Israeli and the Palestinian leadership knew that if they were unable to resolve their conflict, radicals on both sides would prevail. Today, Hamas has taken over a leading role, its resistance to resolving the conflict through negotiations resembling very much the position of the PLO before the breakthrough in Oslo. It is as if since the attempt of President Bill Clinton to mediate a final solution between the two sides in Camp David in the year 2000 the conflict has travelled backwards in history.

The promise When, on 13 September 1993, the Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin, and the Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Yasser Arafat, exchanged a handshake on the lawn of the White House, the world believed that one of the most long-standing conflicts in the Middle East had ended. By recognising each others’ rights towards former mandatory Palestine, Israel and the Palestinians, represented by the PLO, set out to resolve their differences through peaceful means. In the documents exchanged in Washington, both sides agreed to negotiate an interim framework granting autonomy over West Bank and Gaza Strip Territories via a step-by-step process to the Palestinians. This process was supposed to begin with the handover of Gaza and Jericho. Once autonomy had been reached, final status negotiations would begin. In these negotiations, the most contested aspects of Israeli–Palestinian relations were supposed to be settled, including final borders, Jerusalem, refugees, and security arrangements. Formally, the September 1993 agreements were based on a Declaration of Principles on an Interim Self-Government Arrangement including four annexes and ‘agreed minutes’ of understanding, signed by Shimon Peres, the Foreign Minister of Israel, and Mahmoud Abbas, as the representative of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, in Washington on

Introduction

3

13 September 1993; a letter from Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, dated 9 September 1993, to Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, recognising the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security; a letter from Yasser Arafat to Johan Jørgen Holst, the Foreign Minister of Norway, dated 9 September 1993, calling upon the Palestinian people, inter alia, to end violence and contribute to peace and stability; a letter of recognition from Yitzhak Rabin to Yasser Arafat, dated 10 September 1993, recognising the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.1 These documents were the result of a secret negotiation process between the PLO leadership and the government of Israel taking place mainly in Oslo from January to September 1993. Why did the PLO and Israel settle at that particular moment of history? Why did they need to engage in a secret negotiation process? Telling and trying to explain the story about the Oslo negotiations, this book is based on the accounts of participants in the process as well as close observers. Many have published their accounts of what happened 2 in Oslo. However, some important pieces of information are missing. This book tries to fill in these gaps by reproducing detailed information provided by personalities closely involved in the negotiation process and providing access to documents that have not yet been part of the debate about the success factors of the Oslo talks, but had a decisive impact framing the outcomes. It also establishes a theoretical framework for the analysis of the Oslo process. Without this framework we would merely tell the story once again. Yet we need to use the analytical tools that social sciences make available not only to uncover what happened in Oslo, but also to explain why things happened as they did. In doing so, I will argue that the confluence of three factors accounts for a comprehensive explanation of the Oslo talks. The first is established by the transformation of the international system after the end of the Cold War and the repercussions this had on the Middle East. The second relates to the change of preferences of the domestic constituencies on both sides. The third looks at the negotiation process in Oslo, assuming that the way the negotiations were organised constitutes a decisive variable accounting for a full explanation of why the two sides settled in the way they did on 13 September 1993. The following pages review some of the main claims that different theoretical approaches make, providing the framework that enables us to better understand the success of the secret Israeli–Palestinian negotiations in Oslo and why the subsequent Oslo process ultimately failed.

4 Introduction

Predetermining choices: The international system and domestic politics Theories of international relations have argued that the preferences of international actors for policy outcomes are rooted in the distribution of power in an anarchic international system. International actors are first and foremost interested in their survival, which is constantly threatened as realist approaches to international relations argue. The preferences for policy outcomes of any given actor are determined by the necessity to defend itself against hostile neighbours and, if possible, enhance its power position in order to be better equipped to deal with threats emanating from this environment. The distribution of power in the international system ‘. . . determines the context of interaction and the preference orderings of the interacting states . . .’ (Stein 1993: 48). These forces also worked on Israel and the PLO in the late 1980s and early 1990s, suggesting that the international environment was one of the determining factors that led both sides to develop preferences for engaging in direct negotiations. In which way then was the way the international system was structured conducive to conflict resolution in the Middle East? How did the balance of power system at the beginning of the 1990s and the pressures that Israelis and Palestinians were exposed to play out and induce an interest on both sides to engage? Second, Israelis and Palestinians were not only influenced by the pressures emanating from the international system. The positions that both sides held previously in their decades-old conflict were also challenged by the transformation of their respective domestic political constituencies. Liberalist approaches to international relations provide a conceptual framework to better understand how these transformantions worked on the leadership of both sides. Liberalists have challenged systemic perspectives and argue that the international system is one, although not the exclusive, determinant shaping actors’ preferences. Domestic politics matters and the domestic distribution of power fundamentally affects foreign policy (Jervis 1987: 327). Formally, liberalism relies on three core assumptions: first, not only nation states determine international politics, but also individuals and private groups who pursue different interests under the constraints of material scarcity and conflicting values. Second, liberalists place great importance on the assumption that different societal interests are directly translated into preferences of international actors (Moravcsik 1997: 516–20). Liberal theories make a third argument that is particularly important to better understand the emergence of the Oslo talks. Preferences shaped at the domestic level and transferred into the domain of international

Introduction

5

relations are confronted with the preferences of other international actors and in aggregate affect their behaviour. The international system and domestic politics may help to understand how actors develop preferences for certain international policies. Yet they cannot sufficiently explain foreign policy behaviour – as we will see in the case of the Oslo talks. Whatever the preferences are that one actor holds in dealing with its international environment, it will face the preferences of others that have their own distinct interests. And in the absence of an overwhelming power position, these structures may result in a situation marked by strategic interdependence ‘. . . in which the ability of one participant to gain his ends is dependent to a high degree on the choices or decisions that the other participant will make’ (Schelling 1980: 5). Or, to put it more simply, by a situation in which one ‘. . . actor’s returns are a function of others’ choices as well as its own’ (Stein 1993: 45). Caught in a situation of strategic interdependence, the behaviour of the actors and the realisation of their goals are conditioned by other actors’ behaviour (Moravcsik 1997: 521). As we will see later, in summer 1992, the two sides found themselves in a situation that qualifies as a situation of strategic interdependence. Both sides wanted something from the other side that they could not obtain by using force: recognition by the other party. Israel and the PLO for decades had pursued a policy of non-recognition, as recognition had implied the acceptance of the legitimacy of the claims made by Israel and the PLO respectively. For decades, neither of the two sides had any interest to move towards recognition that would satisfy the needs of the recognised party. Now, in summer 1992, the pressure on the Israeli and Palestinian leadership was so high that they both had to reconsider their positions. To be sure, recognition was not an end in itself. Yet recognition was necessary to establish both sides as legitimate players in the conflict over Gaza and the West Bank. Without mutual recognition there was no chance of a negotiated settlement and eventual peace.

Rational choice and constructivist approaches to negotiation analysis How did the two sides overcome the dilemmas inherent in a situation of strategic interdependence? An answer to this question leads us to the discussion of the third factor that must be examined to explain the outcomes of the Oslo talks: the analysis of the characteristics, twists, turns and dilemmas inherent in the negotiation process itself. Negotiations are the core vehicle to overcome situations of strategic interdependence.

6 Introduction Negotiations provide the means by which actors arrive at a policy outcome that all sides are comfortable with. Yet what the factors for successful negotiations are has been the source of a rich debate between rational choice and constructivist based interpretations of negotiations. Rational choice and constructivist schools of thought agree that negotiations help to make both sides cooperate and thus reach a mutually beneficial agreement and resolve a situation of strategic interdependence. However, the two approaches make divergent assumptions about what the key success factors are that enable negotiations to reach a successful outcome. Proponents of rational choice based theories assume utility-maximising unitary rational actors to be the principal unit in any analysis of social conflict, such as the government of Israel and the leadership of the PLO. Each decision of rational actors is based on a solid cost/benefit analysis. Options with the highest expected value are the preferred choice. When it comes to negotiations, in principle, such actors have two choices to make: first is the choice for or against engaging in negotiations. Negotiations bear material and immaterial costs. If these are not outweighed by benefits, actors will not engage in negotiations. In consequence, conflicting sides must have identified at least a slight chance that when they engage in negotiations an agreement is within reach. In that context, the relevance of information in international relations has been stressed, among others, by Robert Keohane, who argued that: High levels of uncertainty reduce the confidence with which expectations are held, and may therefore lead governments to discount the future heavily. . . . Information that reduces uncertainty is therefore an important factor in world politics. . . . Given a certain distribution of power . . . variations in information may be important in influencing state behaviour. (Keohane 1986: 196) International actors behave differently assuming different levels of information. And they engage in negotiations only if these promise a good return. When actors find themselves in a dilemma situation we can not assume a priori that they have all the information about the readiness of the other side to cooperate, i.e. to negotiate – or not. What these actors, i.e. governments, then try to do is to get as much information as possible about the intentions of the other side. For this, they are ready to pay a price. They engage in a signalling game in which both sides try to signal

Introduction

7

their strategic intentions without committing and giving away too much. They hope to stimulate a reaction from the other side that they then will be able to interpret. The beliefs about what the other side thinks and might do are updated as the interaction process gradually unfolds, by observing the other player’s moves and adjusting the private information that motivates him to follow a specific course of action (Downs and Rocke 1995: 28), i.e. a choice in favour of engaging in negotiations. Consequently, when trying to explain the first phase of the Oslo process, rational choice based approaches would attempt to find out how the PLO leadership and the government of Israel tried to gather and disseminate information about their readiness to engage in negotiations. The second element to negotiations emphasised by rational choice based theories covers the distributive aspects of an eventual agreement. If rational actors believe that the benefits of an agreement will outweigh its costs, then they will sign. If they have alternative options that seem to yield a higher benefit to them, they choose not to close a deal. In any negotiation process the participating sides are drawn in two directions: They want to close a deal because they value a deal highly – but not at any price. They have also a distinct interest in getting the best deal possible. This tension – the interest in reaching a negotiated outcome at all and the interest to realise the best possible deal for oneself – is at the heart of any negotiation process. Therefore, negotiation processes can be conceptualised as an exchange of cooperative and non-cooperative moves between concerned parties. Cooperation will lead the opponents closer towards a mutually satisfying agreement; non-cooperative moves seek to exploit the cooperative approach of creating value at the expense of the opponent (Hopman 1996: 59ff). Negotiations are a game in which cooperative and non-cooperative moves are exchanged and dilemma situations reproduced in the bargaining situation (Jönsson 1993: 205). We assume that these features too were present in the Oslo negotiations. In the context of this study, how would rational based approaches be able to explain the outcome of the Oslo talks? How were the two sides able to deal with the intrinsic dilemma situation that rational choice approaches would assume to have existed in the Oslo negotiations? The second school of thought that provides a promising framework for the explanation of the Oslo talks is based on constructivist ideas. Constructivist approaches to negotiations emphasise a joint learning process modifying previously held preferences and assumptions, eventually leading to an incremental erosion of the dilemma situation. Constructivists acknowledge that implementing cooperative moves or displaying cooperative behaviour is a matter of choice. Actors choose to

8 Introduction behave cooperatively, but what brings about decisions for cooperative behaviour and what the determining factors for this choice are is contested. Constructivists have called for a differentiated understanding of negotiations and proposed that persuasive aspects of negotiations should be emphasised, as ‘[n]egotiations proceed not only by bargaining, but also by persuasion; [which] in some cases . . . leads to solutions that neither side had previously thought of and that each comes to prefer to its original proposal’ (Jervis 1987: 328). In negotiations, actors do not solely engage in the exchange of moves and countermoves on the basis of strategic bargaining, as rational choice proponents suggest; they also try to persuade each other of the desirability of a particular interaction result. The actors engage in a process of argumentation which leads them to establishing a normative framework that shall guide the negotiations towards a substantial agreement. During the process of creating that framework, something happens with the actors themselves: The two (or more) parties develop a collective identity; they begin to work as a team for the resolution of their conflict and try to smooth out the tensions inherent in the dilemma situation that determines their relationship. Constructivists do not disagree with rational choice based explanations that at some stage in the negotiation process the concerned parties engage in strategic bargaining over the distributive elements of a settlement. However, they differ substantially about how negotiations are framed prior to the phase in which strategic bargaining takes place. They argue that this second phase can only be successful if the rules of the game have been set and all parties are convinced that a cooperative outcome is in everybody’s best interest. Processes that are based on persuasion and deliberation do not work without preconditions. What counts is the better argument which can be decoded by both sides to legitimately construct the norms of the subsequent interaction process and is thus able to persuade the actors of its appropriateness. Conclusively, the actors have to share a ‘common life world’ (gemeinsame Lebenswelt) which consists of collectively shared interpretations of the world and which provides them with a frame of reference to evaluate the ‘appropriateness’ of an argument. These interpretations might be provided by compatible ideational world views, common historical experiences, or culture. In addition, each party must have equal access to the discourse despite potential imbalances in their power structure; they must, in effect, accept each other as legitimate actors. Otherwise, the subsequent negotiation process will lack legitimacy and will not produce outcomes that the opponents can identify with.

Introduction

9

Finally, the two (or more) sides do have to develop some empathy, i.e. the ability to see things through the eyes of their opponent. Only if both sides develop some understanding for the views and perceptions of the opponent will the interacting parties be able to understand the meaning of the arguments put forward by the other side. A ‘common life world’ based on compatible ideational world views, shared historical experiences and/or culture; the ability to participate in the discourse; and the ability to develop understanding for the views of the opponent based on empathy are the necessary conditions for a truly communicative process to work. The parties will then be able to be receptive to the arguments of the other side and jointly develop norms governing their future negotiation process (Risse 2000). Without any doubt, strategic bargaining will occur in any negotiation process. However, the basis for the strategic bargaining phase of negotiations must be firmly established by a process that develops and clearly determines the rules of the game and ensures that all involved have a profound interest in coming to an agreement. All this suggests a fundamentally different interpretation of the Oslo talks. Rather than being confined to the decision makers on both sides, constructivist approaches suggest casting the net wider and assign considerable agenda setting power to other actors than the political leadership. They also assume that new ideas and new approaches to resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict became hugely relevant in making the Oslo talks a success. Here again, the reach of constructivist negotiation analysis is wider than rational choice based approaches, as it does not only look at the very precise demands of Israelis and Palestinians in negotiations, but tries to identify the broader ideational context in which both sides made their choices.

Towards an explanation of Oslo What do these approaches tell us now about the Oslo talks? How did the international and domestic environment in which the two sides found themselves move them closer to considering negotiations? Will rational choice and constructivist approaches to the interpretation of the Oslo talks contribute to developing a better understanding of what happened and for what reasons? In order to provide some answers to these questions, Chapter 2 will assess the international and domestic circumstances that drove both sides towards developing a fundamental interest in mutual recognition. Chapter 3 will then seek to make the case for a constructivist interpretation of the Oslo negotiations, trying to identify variables that indicate the relevance of the constructivist arguments.

10

Introduction

Chapter 4 makes the counter-argument and will try to explain the Oslo talks purely based on rational choice inspired assumptions. Chapter 5 will then take a closer look at how the final agreement was negotiated and which of its features can be explained by either of the two approaches. The concluding chapter then tries to produce an answer to the questions: Why Oslo? And why did the Oslo process fail?

2

Israel and the PLO Facing international and domestic challenges

The Oslo negotiations were a consequence of major changes in the international and domestic political and economic systems that determined the policies of the government of Israel and the leadership of the PLO towards each other.

Israel moves towards peace For Israel, the increasingly shaky Israeli–American relationship after the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the Second Gulf War 1991 became a key driver when pursuing alternative strategies in dealing with the PLO.1 Since the foundation of the state of Israel in 1948, the regional subsystem of the Middle East had been incrementally integrated into the global conflict between the two superpowers, the USA and the Soviet Union (Avineri 1993: 26f). Israel with its historical, cultural and demographic ties to the USA, was able to enter into a strategic relationship with the USA to counterbalance the Soviet influence in an area the USA had an ever-growing vital interest in. The US Administration perceived Israel as the only democratic state in the region. The memory of the Holocaust and the political and intellectual influence of the AmericanJewish community on the American political and economic system were additional factors which led the USA to pursue an engaging policy approach towards Israel (Avineri 1993: 28).2 As a result, since 1967 Israel enjoyed the full economic, political and military support of the USA.3 Until the 1980s, the American-Israeli patron–client relationship would remain stable; the Reagan Administration, perceiving Syria, and in particular the PLO, to be in the camp of, and fundamentally dependent upon, the Soviet Union, reaffirmed US policy that these regional forces had to be counterbalanced by a strong regional ally of the USA (Murphy 1994: 83). A stable ‘special relationship’ between the USA and its client in the Middle East had emerged (Ben-Zvi 1993: 177).

12

International and domestic challenges

Yet by the end of the 1980s, the close relationship between the USA and Israel had eroded. The gradual rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the USA in the 1980s fundamentally challenged the stability of the American-Israeli relationship. With Mikhail Gorbachev gaining power, the Soviet Union reduced its economic and military engagement in the Middle East. Military assistance to allied Arab states was cut. The Soviet leadership increased its efforts to improve its relations with Israel.4 The US administration came to the conclusion that the political and military influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East was declining, an assessment that was compatible with the dynamic evolution of the bilateral relationship of the two superpowers. The potential of the Soviet Union to threaten American interests in the Middle East was apparently decreasing. The USA gained influence, and thus had room for manoeuvre to recalibrate its Middle Eastern policies (Schmid 1993: 45ff; Murphy 1994: 82). Other factors such as American public opinion began to gain influence in shaping US foreign policy and the American-Israeli relationship. And American public opinion was increasingly sceptical when assessing Israeli policies towards its Arab neighbours. Many Americans perceived Israel to be primarily responsible for the continuation of the lethal conflict between Arabs and Israelis. The American public was becoming increasingly aware of Israeli human rights’ violations in the Occupied Territories. Israel’s military cooperation with the Apartheid regime in South Africa, and its adventure in Lebanon in 1982–85, were incompatible with an image of an ally sharing common values with the USA (Mekelberg 1994: 192f). All this caused a gradual erosion of the ‘special relationship’ between the USA and Israel (Ben-Zvi 1993: 179). The Second Gulf War of 1991 was an indicator of how the structural balances on the global level had shifted the balance of power in the Middle East and modified the foreign policy propositions of the regional players.5 The victory of a broad international coalition led by the USA suggested to the Bush administration that in times of crisis in the Middle East, the US administration was able to engage political and military support from individual Arab states. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and, most notably, Syria were ready to participate in the American-lead coalition against Iraq. In particular, the Syrian position in the Gulf War was a useful indicator of the new determinants of the changed regional system. Syria, a former client of the Soviet Union and one of the strongest opponents of Israel, tried to strengthen its links to the West and to overcome its uneasy relationship with the USA. In 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev had stated that

International and domestic challenges 13 Syria could no longer count on Soviet military support.6 Consequentially, Syria was forced to identify new foreign policy options in order to sustain its regional position. Redefining its relationship towards the West, Syria attempted to develop economic ties with new markets which could substitute its weakening ties to Eastern European countries. The Second Gulf War of 1991 was an eminent opportunity for the Syrians not only to fundamentally weaken the hostile regime of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad but also to prove to the West that Syrian foreign policy orientation had changed. In the aftermath of the Second Gulf War, Israel lost the benefit of being the only reliable partner of the USA in the region. Indeed, when Prime Minister Shamir insisted that Israel should have the right to defend itself if it was hit by Iraqi missiles during the conflict, Israel even proved to be an irritant to the Western efforts to liberate Kuwait. Once Iraqi Scud missiles had hit Israel, the Israelis were only prevented by heavy diplomatic pressure and the supply of defence systems from carrying out retaliation strikes and getting involved in the war. It became equally obvious that the pending Arab–Israeli peace process, which thus far had only produced the Camp David Accords with Egypt, was causing severe problems for Arab states seeking to be part of the alliance. In numerous Arab countries, as well as in the Occupied Territories themselves, the confrontation between the international community and Iraq was perceived as a proxy-conflict for the confrontation between Arabs and the West and mobilised major parts of the respective populations, putting serious pressure upon individual Arab governments (Karsh 1994: 42). This pressure endangered the amicable policy of Arab leaders towards the West (Ben-Zvi 1993: 180f). The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 also strengthened Israel’s regional strategic position. Both Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and his successor, Yitzhak Rabin, actively sought to develop good relations with the successor states of the Soviet Union (Freedman 1995a: 23ff). Thus, the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Second Gulf War had direct positive as well as negative consequences for Israel. Iraq’s military potential was severely damaged by the war. The Arab world was divided over how to engage in the Gulf War, which in the longer run also prevented a unified and therefore strong position against Israel (Telhami 1992: 49; Stellman 1993: 121f). And the successor states of the Soviet Union neither had the potential, nor did they develop an interest to replace the Soviet Union as strong allies of the Arab world.7 However, immediately after the end of the war, the Israeli government

14

International and domestic challenges

was pushed to comply likewise with the various UN resolutions dealing with the Arab–Israeli conflict, as the international community had invested heavily to implement the UN resolutions calling on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. In March 1991, President Bush outlined a new American Middle East policy to Congress: the USA would guarantee security and stability in the Gulf region and would launch an initiative to install effective disarmament mechanisms. It would promote the resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242 and the principle of land for peace. Finally, regional economic development was to be a cornerstone of the new American approach to the Middle East. Secretary of State James Baker launched an intensive round of shuttle diplomacy, which culminated in the international peace conference in Madrid in 1991 under the auspices of the USA and the Soviet Union (Tessler 1994: 749f). In the course of its efforts, the US government linked its economic support for Israel to political conditions. Guarantees for a US$10billion loan were made conditional upon the Israeli cessation of settlement activities in the Occupied Territories. The direct linkage between financial help and specific political behaviour by Israel made it clear that the USA would no longer unconditionally provide political or economic support. The ‘special relationship’ seemed to have transformed itself into a ‘normal relationship’ (Mekelberg 1994: 195). The issue of the loan guarantees illustrates the precarious situation of the Israeli government at that time, providing domestic social and economic needs through dependence on external funding. The transfer of resources from the USA to Israel had allowed Israel to build up a sound welfare system, as well as to finance – in particular since 1977 under the Likud government – an intensive settlement policy. And with the number of immigrants into Israel growing, the dependence on external financial sources increased accordingly during the mid-1980s (Stellman 1993). The average unemployment rate in Israel increased at the beginning of the 1990s, a trend which in particular affected the immigrants from the former Soviet Union.8 The fact that 16.9 per cent of Israelis lived below the poverty line put further pressure on the social cohesion of Israeli society. Consequentially, Israel had to face up to two options: either to increase external financial transfers or to reduce the costs of its social security budget and/or its settlement policy. The decision of the Likud government to go ahead with the construction of new settlements, as well as the expansion of existing ones, came with the cost of making cuts in the social security budget. As a result, members of the lower social strata

International and domestic challenges 15 turned towards political forces that wanted to limit or end settlement activities. The changing American-Israeli relationship and the following conflict over the Israeli settlement policy, as well as the debate over the loan guarantees, had a great influence on the political behaviour of the lower social strata and in particular on the voting behaviour of Soviet immigrants. The Israeli government now had to face the problem of either sticking to uncompromising behaviour vis-à-vis the PLO leadership, and expanding the settlements in the Territories and consequently facing difficulties mobilising needed resources from outside; or reconsidering its settlement activities and try to reach an agreement with the Palestinians, which would make it easier to mobilise external financial support and would also free assets which would otherwise have been spent on settlements. At the same time when the economic and social conditions produced considerable discontent with the current government, the Palestinian Intifada had great influence on Israeli public opinion.9 In January 1986 an opinion poll held that a huge majority of the Israeli population, 93 per cent of those questioned, were convinced that Israel could suppress a Palestinian uprising without major problems (Goldberg et al. 1991: 1). This perception changed after the eruption of the Intifada in December 1987. An opinion poll by Yediot Aharonot, a leading Israeli newspaper, in December 1988 discovered that 54 per cent of Israelis were of the opinion that the government should initiate talks with the PLO with regard to a solution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Most of those questioned were supporters of the Labour Movement. In March 1989, in another opinion poll, the New York Times found that even as much as 49 per cent of the Likud electorate would favour this option too. Polls addressing the same question conducted before the outbreak of the Intifada had come to a completely different result (Goldberg et al. 1990: 2f; Tessler 1994: 724f). According to the results of these and other surveys, the option to preserve the status quo and thus take an uncompromising position in the conflict with the Palestinians was now challenged by the wish for a solution of the conflict with the PLO and other Palestinian forces. Although an overall societal consent on this issue was absent, and there was no clear-cut concept on how a solution could be realised, most Israelis now favoured a compromise with the Palestinians (Goldberg et al. 1990: 58ff). This general public mood was translated into the results of the elections in summer 1992 when Yitzhak Rabin and the Labour Movement defeated the government of Yitzhak Shamir and the Likud. The discussion about how to deal with the PLO was of particular relevance in the

16

International and domestic challenges

debates preceding the elections (Inbar 1991: 11). The very real actual physical threat caused by different Palestinian forces, ideological reasons and – as the former discussion of the Israeli economic and welfare system has shown – the economic situation, led Israelis to opt for the moderate Labour Movement. The most decisive dividing line in these elections however was the position of the different parties with regard to a solution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Barzilai 1994: 139). The elections of 1992 were perceived as a referendum on the future course of the conflict with the Palestinians and on the issue of a territorial compromise. On one side there was Labour, which favoured a settlement with Palestinian forces; on the other there was Likud and the right wing which proposed to establish further settlements in the Territories (Shlaim 1994: 744). Because of the strong influence of the Intifada on Israeli public opinion and the translation of this opinion into the political debate and individual voting behaviour, the elections of 1992 were also known as the ‘Intifadaelections’ (Tessler 1994: 744). During the election campaign, Yitzhak Shamir, the incumbent Prime Minster and top candidate of the Likud, had immense difficulties explaining his ambiguous behaviour during the previous months. On the one hand, he had favoured an uncompromising position in the conflict with the Palestinians and ruled out any agreement with the Palestinian leadership. This caused moderate Likud supporters to rethink their decision to vote for Shamir. On the other hand, the right-wing electorate – after the concessions he had to make under pressure from the USA – saw him sitting beside and negotiating with Arab leaders in the Washington peace talks, which had begun in the meantime. Although Likud emphasised the importance of additional settlements in the Territories, Shamir was not able to gather support from the extreme right wing, which turned to smaller parties (Marcus 1992: 694). In contrast, Rabin had emphasised the necessity of an agreement with the Palestinians on the basis of territorial autonomy. He promised that after the elections the Labour Movement would work for a compromise with Palestinian forces within nine months (Marcus 1992: 696; Shlaim 1994: 28). With regard to the settlements, he argued that only settlements supporting Israeli security – in greater Jerusalem, the Jordan valley and on the Golan Heights – would be built (Marcus 1992: 696f). The Knesset election of 23 June 1992 resulted in a landslide victory for the Labour Movement. Overall, the victory of the left was interpreted by many observers as a consequence of Rabin’s declaration of moderate policy in the peace process and, in particular, his readiness to proceed quickly on the Palestinian track (Shlaim 1994: 27). It was an unequivocal

International and domestic challenges 17 vote by the electorate for a negotiated agreement with the Palestinians (Shlaim 1994: 10). The number of seats won by Labour was large enough to form a coalition with Meretz and the ultra-orthodox Shas Party. Soon after the formation of the new government, Rabin declared his programme for the coming legislative period. In his programme, the fate of Israel and the fate of its neighbours were closely connected to the worldwide political changes: Walls of hatred have crumbled, borders have been erased, superpowers have collapsed, ideologies have broken down, countries have been born and passed away, and the gates have opened to the immigration to Israel. (Yitzhak Rabin 1992) It was decisive for Rabin that Israel should further integrate itself into this changing international system, which was to be a more peaceful one and one which would accelerate the process of international cooperation. Only if Israel was able to pursue a process of reconciliation with its neighbours was it in the position to adapt to these changes. For these reasons, the most important project for his government was to be the resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict. He called upon the Palestinians not to miss an historic opportunity but to seize it. He offered serious negotiations with the Palestinians leading to autonomy, and emphasised that Israel was ready to share the costs of any future Israeli–Palestinian peace.10 In short, Israel, in principle, was ready to engage with the PLO.

The PLO in need of new options Like Israel, the PLO had to come to terms with the changing structure of the international system. And like Israel, the PLO leadership had to respond to comparable internal pressures, albeit from a different angle. In order to understand the forces at work that ultimately moved the PLO leadership into the Oslo negotiations, the evolution of the PLO as the leading political force representing the Palestinians must be reviewed. The foundation of the PLO in 1964 can be interpreted as the result of two converging developments. Influenced by the Algerian war of independence against the colonial rule of France, Palestinians began to develop their own national identity. This process was heightened by the fact that when Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser tried to unify the Arab world against Israel, he emphasised the fate of the Palestinian

18

International and domestic challenges

people and the injustice done to them. The success of the Algerian independence movement proved to the Arab world, and in particular to the Palestinians, that their armed struggle against the ‘Zionist entity’ might eventually be successful and that they too could acquire independence. In consequence, about 40 Palestinian groups had declared themselves representatives of the Palestinian people by the mid-1960s. A number of these groups were eventually integrated into the Palestinian Liberation Organization at a meeting of the Arab League in May 1964, in order to increase the awareness of the existence of a ‘Palestinian entity’ (Nassar 1991: 19). However, only with the rise of Fatah,11 led by Yasser Arafat, did the PLO engage in a coordinated armed struggle against Israel. Since 1964, Fatah had autonomously carried out small-scale military operations against Israel (Cobban 1995: 33f). However, until 1967 these operations were hardly successful. This changed only after the Six Day War of 1967 and the defeat of the Arab coalition, when an increasing number of guerrilla operations were successfully launched from the East Bank of the River Jordan. In the following years, in particular by referring in their propaganda to a successful battle with Israeli forces over the Jordanian frontier town of Karameh in March 1968, Fatah was able to mobilise larger numbers of the Palestinian people. The battle of Karameh was interpreted by the Arab public as successful revenge for the defeat of the Six Day War and ended the myth of an unbeatable Israeli army (Cobban 1992: 41f). Fatah was able to use its success to take over the leadership of the PLO from the old guard when Yasser Arafat was elected chairman by the Palestinian National Council in February 1969 (Selim 1991: 262). From now, the legitimacy of the new PLO leadership was based on the continued armed struggle against Israel, which later would put a heavy political burden on the organisation. Based in Amman, the new leadership tried to consolidate its power base. It developed the organisation’s institutions and integrated large parts of Palestinian society into its organisational structures. These institutions included the Palestinian National Council (PNC), which defined the basic outline of PLO policies, and in which the representatives of the different groups,12 trade unions, professional associations and independents were assembled. Only the PNC had the authority to change the Charter of the PLO by a two-thirds majority. The Executive Committee, as the highest body, implemented the basic guidelines set by the PNC and at the same time controlled the other institutions of the PLO within these guidelines. The Executive Committee represented the Palestinian people and was responsible for the budget of the PLO. Its members were

International and domestic challenges 19 elected by the PNC, mirroring the relative strength of the different factions within the PNC. The chairman of the committee, Yasser Arafat, was directly elected by the PNC. The other members were each allocated a different portfolio, such as the political department, the military department, the Palestinian National Fund, and others (Selim 1991: 269ff). The PLO also developed its position as a provider of social services and was thereby able to develop deeply rooted clientelist structures. In 1998, when King Hussein conceded Jordanian claims to the West Bank and thereby reneged on his responsibilities regarding social services and administration, the PLO took over. It maintained schools, kindergartens and hospitals in the Occupied Territories and refugee camps. It donated lump sum payments of US$3,000 to the families of those killed and US$750 to the families of wounded PLO fighters (Wallach and Wallach 1994: 57ff). By broadening the reach of its organisation, employing national symbols, founding mass organisations and establishing a relatively tight network of social services, the PLO was able to reach large parts of Palestinian society who had previously been only loosely organised, and thus provided a key factor contributing to the legitimacy of the PLO (Nassar 1991: 30; Sunderbrink 1993: 39ff). With acquiring internal legitimacy, the PLO had also to gain international recognition. Only if it succeeded in being accepted as the sole representative of the Palestinian people by the international community could it gain the necessary ability to act on the international level. The first push for international acceptance was the recognition of the PLO by the Arab League as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in 1974. The Arab League reaffirmed its support of the Palestinians to establish a Palestinian authority on every part of liberated Palestinian territory. Other international actors also paved the way for broad international awareness for the Palestinian cause. As President of the Executive Committees, Yasser Arafat, was invited to speak at the UN general assembly in New York in November 1974. The general assembly passed Resolution 3236, acknowledging the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, the right for self-determination, and the right for national independence and sovereignty. With Arafat’s diplomatic achievements came access to crucial financial sources, necessary to finance the clientelist structures that he had established between the PLO and the Palestinians. A number of Arab governments were willing to collect what was termed a liberation tax, comprising 5 per cent of the income of the Palestinians living within their respective countries, and to pass it on to the PLO. The second source consisted of direct payments by Arab states, as agreed at the second

20

International and domestic challenges

summit conference of Arab leaders in 1964. The amount of the transfers varied from year to year; the Arab Summit in Rabat in 1969 decided to allocate US$50 million, the Arab Summit in Baghdad 1980 was to allocate US$300 million over ten years to the PLO.13 Other states and private persons contributed further to the PLO’s budget.14 All in all, the PLO at that time managed a budget of approximately US$500 million (Selim 1991: 269). The PLO’s huge political and financial dependence upon international supporters and donors created a dilemma situation for the PLO: because of its financial dependence, it was forced to pursue a moderate policy vis-à-vis its Arab sponsors. The Arab states neighbouring Israel, in particular after the defeat in 1967, had no interest in the Palestinians launching attacks on Israel from their soil, thus potentially causing a military dispute between Israel and the Arab country concerned. However, the PLO had to achieve a high level of visibility in order to secure its political base among the Palestinians, and first and foremost, that visibility would be ensured by the armed struggle against Israel (Selim 1991: 269). Without the armed struggle against Israel, the very foundations of the PLO would be challenged. One of the best indicators of this dilemma was the conflict of interest between the government of Jordan and the PLO, which caused the serious military conflict between the PLO and Jordanian forces in November 1970 and culminated in the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan, the so-called ‘Black September’. Since the early 1980s, a number of developments had slowly seemed to challenge the legitimacy of the PLO and ultimately threatened the very survival of the organisation. This had serious implications on the PLO’s readiness to negotiate with Israel. The decline of the PLO leadership as the uncontested representative of the Palestinian people began with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in summer 1982. Until then, the PLO – after its expulsion from Jordan – had been able to establish a semi-autonomous territorial basis with differentiated parastatal structures in Lebanon. On 3 June 1982, Israeli forces invaded the south of Lebanon under the pretext of protecting the north of Israel against Palestinian raids from Lebanon. The organisational and support structures of the PLO in Lebanon were immediately targeted by the Israeli forces (Cobban 1992: 120ff). The Israeli mission achieved its objective, conquering the last Palestinian refuge bordering Israel (Nassar 1991: 211), which practically meant the cessation of direct military action of the PLO against Israel. Following the invasion, the PLO was compelled to evacuate Beirut and to re-establish its headquarters in Tunis. PLO structures began to disintegrate and infighting between

International and domestic challenges 21 Fatah and other groups contributed to the further weakening of the PLO (Sunderbrink 1993: 100f). Although the PLO was able to recover from its intra-organisational rivalries in later years, the Israeli army had achieved one of its principal objectives: separating the PLO leadership from the Palestinians on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. After its expulsion from Lebanon, the PLO’s influence in the Territories was severely restricted. The relationship between Palestinians residing in the Territories and those in the diaspora, including members of the PLO, weakened and it became difficult for the PLO leadership to maintain its integrative power (Cobban 1992: 177). In consequence, alternative social forces began to gain political influence in the Territories. Besides the re-emerging influence of traditional Palestinian elites within the Territories, Islamist forces were able to establish themselves as political and ideological alternatives to the secularist-nationalist PLO. In 1935, the Muslim Brotherhood reached out into Palestine and set up a branch in Jerusalem in October 1945 (Abu-Amr 1994a: 1ff). At that time, it focused its activities on providing cultural, educational and social services. These activities laid the foundations for its future powerful political role. It financed schools, kindergartens and libraries, donated scholarships to students and developed a system of income redistribution based on Islamic values. It increased its influence by gaining control over the mosques and made financial resources available for the construction of new ones. Under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the Brotherhood founded an ‘Islamic Center’ in 1973 in the Gaza Strip, controlling over 40 per cent of the mosques, and the Islamic University in Gaza became a stronghold of the Islamists (Sunderbrink 1993: 127f; Abu-Amr 1994a: 14ff). Conflict amongst Palestinians was the consequence. Nationalist and religiously oriented students began to clash in the universities (Abu-Amr 1994a: 43). With the outbreak of the Intifada in December 1987, the Brotherhood emerged as a major political force in the Territories and claimed responsibility for its outbreak, as did the PLO.15 Immediately after the events of December, the leadership of the Brotherhood founded the Islamist movement Hamas. Hamas was supposed to serve as a religious basis for the political activities of the Palestinians and thereby fill a vacuum left by the PLO. This gave many Palestinians within the Territories the opportunity to turn away from the PLO, being unsatisfied with the performance of its leadership in the struggle with Israel (AbuAmr 1994a: 66). Hamas was able to rely on the social and political infrastructure of the Brotherhood and quickly gained large influence over the

22

International and domestic challenges

political thinking of the Palestinians within the Territories, on a par with the influence of Arafat’s Fatah. Although the relative strength of Hamas could obviously not be determined by political election results, in elections to professional associations, trade unions and trade organisations, Hamas and other Islamist groups close to Hamas were able to attract 35–45 per cent of the votes (Abu-Amr 1993: 14f; 1994: 85f). In addition, Hamas broadened its financial base through its political visibility during the Intifada. It was supported by an Islamist system of income redistribution and relied on a well-established trans-national network established in cooperation with other Brotherhood organisations in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. Through this network, Hamas attracted donations by private individuals, thereby further increasing its leverage in the Territories. Governments also sponsored Hamas. Iran in particular proved to be generous; in addition to donations, it provided logistical support and military training camps for Hamas fighters (Abu-Amr 1994a: 88). Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, formerly key financial supporters of the PLO, began to re-channel financial support from the PLO to Hamas (Baumgarten 1993: 327). With the outbreak of the Intifada, Hamas and other Islamist movements emerged as a force in the Territories, challenging the predominance of the PLO. Societal interests were more and more represented and articulated by Hamas, which played an increasingly crucial role in socially and politically integrating the different parts of Palestinian society. All efforts of the PLO leadership to integrate Hamas into its organisational structures failed. The Islamist movement increasingly succeeded in integrating the lower social strata of Palestinian society. The position of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people vis-à-vis the international community was seriously challenged. International actors were able to channel resources to Hamas as a visible and alternative player within the Palestinian entity. On top of that, the end of the East–West conflict had serious implications for the PLO. Since the beginning of the 1970s, converging interests between the PLO and the Soviet Union had led to a stable relationship. For the Soviet Union, good relations with the PLO bought preferred political access to other players in the Arab world. For the PLO, the relationship brought all the benefits of being an ally of a global superpower (Reppert 1989: 110ff). The Soviet leadership began to support the PLO materially, in particular with military equipment and military training (Reppert 1989: 110ff). However, the end of the Cold War also brought an end to this relationship. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the PLO lost one of its major supporters (Murphy 1994: 91f).

International and domestic challenges 23 The events surrounding the Second Gulf War further challenged the leadership role of the PLO. The position of the PLO during the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi troops was ambiguous to say the least (Cossali 1996: 49; Wallach and Wallach 1994: 486f). The PLO leadership did not unconditionally oppose the occupation of Kuwait by Iraqi forces. Although it condemned the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq at the Arab Summit on 10 August 1990, it did oppose (together with Iraq and Libya) a resolution which called for the stationing of pan-Arab forces in Saudi Arabia. At the end of August, Arafat and Saddam Hussein published a common declaration which called for the unity of the Palestinian and the Iraqi people against a US-led military invasion and against the Israeli occupation of the Territories (Cossali 1996: 49; Gowers and Walker 1994: 496).16 The reasons for the ambiguous position of the PLO are threefold. First, a number of PLO fighters had fled to Iraq at the beginning of the 1980s following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.17 Second, the Iraqi government stepped in to finance the PLO when other former donors, in particular Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, re-channelled their support towards Hamas at the expense of the PLO (Baumgarten 1993: 326f). In the summer of 1990 there was even some speculation Arafat might move his headquarters from Tunis to Baghdad (Quandt 1993: 393). Third, after occupying Kuwait, Saddam Hussein established a linkage between the occupation of Kuwait and a solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. By this move, he hoped to gain the support of Palestinians in the Territories and of the PLO leadership (Cossali 1996: 49) and was applauded by Arafat (Wallach and Wallach 1994: 487). Also, Arafat tried to use the conflict to improve his political standing by trying to mediate between Iraq and the leadership of Kuwait. In doing so, he did not grasp the fact that the Arab world itself was internally split over the Gulf crisis. A negotiated settlement would have only been accepted within the Arab world if had it resulted in the complete withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait (Gowers and Walker 1994: 488ff). Only after the Gulf War did Arafat realise that his ambiguous position during the Gulf crisis had severely damaged his relations with the rich Gulf countries. The defeat of Iraq had massive consequences for the PLO leadership. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council stopped payments to the PLO. Iraq, since 1988 the most reliable donor to the PLO, was unable to continue payments.18 In addition, the PLO lost income from interest supposedly derived from investments in Kuwaiti banks. Arafat stated that as a consequence of the Gulf War the PLO suffered a loss of about US$10 billion.

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International and domestic challenges

As a result of its financial difficulties, the PLO had to cut down on the costs of its bureaucratic apparatus and army.19 In addition, it had to lower its contributions to hospitals and other social institutions in the region. Payments to around 18,000 Palestinian families of martyrs had to be reduced. Taken together, the PLO’s economic contribution to the Territories decreased from US$350 million in 1988 to US$120 million in 1990 and US$40 million in 1993 (Rubin 1994: 194). The existence of the clientelist structures between the PLO and the Palestinians in the Territories was thereby severely endangered. By February 1993, the Central Committee decided to introduce austerity measures and to set a specific expenditure ceiling.20 In June 1993, the PLO completely cut funding to some 60 media agencies and a number of public relations offices, most of which had been opened during the Intifada. All in all, the cuts in funding by the PLO to the Territories amounted to 85 per cent. In the previous years, some 7 million Jordanian dinars had been distributed among PLO institutions and families of injured, killed or imprisoned Palestinians in the Territories. In June 1993, all in all, only 700,000 dinars went to the Territories.21 Transfers made by Palestinians working throughout the Gulf were also affected. Much of the Palestinian work force had to leave the Gulf region, which was a tremendous blow to the incomes of many families residing in the Territories (Gowers and Walker 1994: 528f).22 How to escape this vicious circle? Oslo provided an opportunity.

Converging interests By 1992, both the leadership of the PLO and the government of Israel had to redefine their broader strategic interests based on structural international and domestic changes. After the Second Gulf War, Israel once more had to realise that its national strategic security interests went beyond the immediate regional context of the Mashreq. Not only did neighbouring Arab countries continue to pose a security threat but the proliferation of medium-range missiles now made attacks from relatively distanced Arab countries possible. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the special relationship between Israel and the USA suffered from tensions and Israel had to realise that its position as the sole reliable ally for the USA in the Middle East had become shaky. Although the USA was still a partner of Israel, the Bush administration was able to engage Arab parties in an alliance against Iraq, representing a formidable alternative. This in turn made Israel receptive to American pressures to move forward in the peace process. In addition, the Intifada was not a temporary phenomenon but remained a constant threat to Israeli individuals. Since

International and domestic challenges 25 its outbreak in December 1987, the Israeli security forces had tried hard to stop the Intifada. However, the Palestinians proved to be much more resilient to Israeli power than expected. More attention was also to be given to the emerging influence of Hamas in the Territories, which was slowly undermining the PLO’s and was possibly proving to be a much stronger opponent than the PLO. These developments caused the Israeli government to reconsider its policy vis-à-vis the PLO, as Israel had to look for alternative ways to face international security threats, strengthen US–Israeli relations and put an end to the Intifada. Coming to terms with the PLO would stop the Intifada, increase the security situation of the Israelis, open the door towards accommodation with her Arab neighbours and re-emphasise her relationship to the USA. By the beginning of the 1990s, the PLO had manoeuvred itself into political isolation. Arafat’s stand during the Gulf crisis was awkward to say the very least. The loss of the Soviet Union as an advocate for the Palestinians’ cause was another blow to international support for the PLO. Having lost its political, and thus material, support from former allies, and its position as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people by alternative forces such as Hamas, the PLO leadership had to look for alternative ways to regain international material and political support and to rebuild its influence within the Territories. Affected by the changing international and domestic structures, both actors had to reconsider their preferred outcomes in the conflict. For this, they had to get to the core of the conflict, i.e. the recognition of the other side’s legitimate rights to exist. For decades, both sides had pursued a policy of denial of the legitimacy of the claims of the other side towards mandatory Palestine. Since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the foundation of the PLO in 1964, neither side had recognised the claims of the other party. Now, under international and domestic pressure, both sides were ready to reconsider their positions. Both sides had to make the following calculations: •

•

•

hypothetically, both sides valued unconditional unilateral recognition by the other side, without having to reciprocate by the same move, higher than any other outcome; because of the underlying interests discussed above, both sides ranked mutual recognition as the second best outcome even though this would imply fundamental concessions; the third preference was the preservation of the status quo in terms of recognition, which was detrimental to the underlying international and internal interests of both parties;

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International and domestic challenges

•

the worst outcome for both was unconditional unilateral recognition of the other side not being accordingly reciprocated.

This new pay-off structure in the conflict between the Israeli government and the leadership of the PLO with regard to the issue of recognition resembles a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma (see Table 2.1). In a Prisoner’s Dilemma, there are two actors who have two choices: they can either cooperate (C) or defect (D). The preference structure of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is based on the following assumption: both actors value most an outcome in which they defect whilst the opponent cooperates. Further, the reward for mutual cooperation is higher than for mutual defection. The player who chooses to cooperate whilst the other defects loses all. The dilemma is expressed in the friction between individual and collective benefits. Although an alternative outcome exists which both sides would collectively prefer to the one in which an equilibrium is realised, the existence of a Prisoner’s Dilemma preference ordering creates the likelihood that the rational calculations of the individuals will lead to outcomes which are collectively sub-optimal – a classic case of a market failure (Stein 1993: 35ff). The conflict situation that the Prisoner’s Dilemma describes has been mirrored in the relationship between the PLO and Israel since summer 1992. As the Prisoner’s Dilemma suggests, two issues prevented the two sides from immediately implementing the beneficial outcome for both sides through mutual recognition: First, in summer 1992 both sides were unsure regarding the intentions of the other side and lacked information about what would happen if they took a step towards recognition. If the PLO was unilaterally accepting the legitimate rights of Israel and in consequence calling for a stop of the Intifada, revising its National Charter, renouncing terrorism and the like, could it be sure that Israel would reciprocate with an equally cooperative move? By the same token,

Table 2.1 Pay-off structure with regard to mutual recognition between the leadership of the PLO and the government of Israel in summer 1992 PLO

Israel

Recognition

Non-recognition

Recognition

3:3

1:4

Non-recognition

4:1

2:2

International and domestic challenges 27 if Israel had decided to accept the PLO and its Charter, then the PLO might have exploited the situation and could legitimately claim the immediate creation of a Palestinian state. What made the situation even more complicated was that mere communication with the other side implied its recognition, with all the political consequences. In the mid-1980s, Israel had introduced a law which prohibited Israelis from communicating with any member of the PLO. The Washington peace talks between Israel and Palestinian representatives were disrupted from the beginning by the unwillingness of the Israelis to negotiate directly with a Palestinian delegation. Arafat was clearly aware of this when he stated that: [Rabin] is afraid even to sit with the Palestinian[s] at the table because it will prove to the world that he is the occupier when I ask him to end the occupation of my people.23 (Yasser Arafat) The deeper meaning of ‘talking to the PLO’ and its political implications as well as the lack of information about how the other side would react to a cooperative move prevented direct and open negotiations. By the same token, the Palestinians were aware of the broader implications of direct talks with Israeli officials, but were less dogmatic on this question. Since 1974, the Palestinian National Council had authorised the PLO leadership to attempt to establish contacts with Israelis. Mahmoud Abbas, later a protagonist of the Oslo talks, was delegated to pursue this task, at the beginning being given only the narrow mandate to make contact with ‘anti-Zionist’ Israelis. This was later broadened to include ‘non-Zionist Israelis’, later broadened still further to incorporate any Israelis who supported the establishment of a Palestinian state, and, finally, any influential Israeli at all, regardless of ideology (Cobban 1995: 101). However, talking to Israelis: had always been a delicate and potentially explosive issue, both with the public and with our leadership. Traditionally, only collaborators or people with questionable national credentials had conducted talks with Israeli officials, particularly as popular perceptions represented such meetings as ‘normalisation’ under occupation or suspicious secret deals/sell outs. (Hannan Ashrawi 1995: 238) The crux of the problem was how the two sides were to negotiate mutual

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recognition when, at the same time, recognition was a precondition for engaging in negotiations. The following two chapters try to explain how the two sides tried to overcome this dilemma and eventually achieved a mutually beneficial outcome.

3

Let’s argue A constructivist approach to understanding the Oslo talks

As mentioned in Chapter 1, a constructivist approach to international negotiations argues that negotiations feature a process of persuasion in which concerned actors try to reframe their conflict in order to make its resolution more likely. They engage in a discourse to develop the rules of the game to enable them to overcome the dilemmas inherent in a situation of strategic interdependency. In this, they accept each other as legitimate partners on an equal footing, empathise with the opponent and share a common frame of reference. When trying to understand what happened in Oslo, we would then develop the hypothesis that Israelis and Palestinians met each other in Oslo eye to eye, empathising with the other’s concerns and sharing a common life world that would guide their discourse towards a mutually beneficial outcome. What is the evidence? An answer to this question requires a broader perspective. After the Gulf War, the Bush Administration developed new pillars of a future US Middle Eastern policy. In a speech on 6 March 1991, George Bush called for the creation of shared regional security arrangements and the control of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems. He called upon Israelis and Arabs to bridge their gaps on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle ‘land for peace’. And finally, he called for encouragement of regional economic development leading to ‘. . . economic freedom and prosperity for all the peoples of the region’.1 After intense mediation by the US administration, the peace process gathered momentum. The USA and Russia sponsored the Middle East peace conference convened in Madrid. The conference lasted three days (30 October to 1 November 1991) in plenary session and subsequently evolved in bilateral meetings between Israelis and a Jordanian–Palestinian delegation, Syrians, and Lebanese respectively.

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A constructivist approach

The conference also set up a series of multilateral talks. The ‘multilaterals’ were based on five working groups: Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS); Regional and Economic Development Group (REDWG); refugees; water resources; and the environment. Membership of these working groups comprised the conflict’s immediate protagonists (Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians), Arab states from the Gulf and the Maghreb, as well as a host of extra-regional participants. Each working group was chaired by an external power; the United States responsible for ACRS and the water resources working group, the European Union for REDWG, Japan for the environment, and Canada for refugees. The multilaterals were designed to provide a forum where the regional conflict parties could develop concepts and solutions which went beyond the narrow scope of the bilateral face-to-face bargaining framework. Whereas the bilateral talks focused on political aspects such as border demarcation, bilateral security arrangements, questions of sovereignty, and others, the multilaterals addressed issues of mutual concern from a functional perspective. Also, the multilaterals not only included the immediate conflict parties in the negotiation process and the co-sponsors Russia and the USA, but also other governments and international institutions, such as the European Union and the World Bank, which were regarded as crucial for the maintenance of the stability of an eventual peace settlement. The multilaterals were purposely designed to bypass possible obstacles at the bilateral level and even if Arabs and Israelis would negotiate themselves into a stalemate situation in the bilaterals, the multilateral level could be used as a diplomatic safety net.2 The concept of the multilateral talks was based on the functionalist conviction that through building a widening web of intra-regional economic, technical, and social cooperation, ‘spill over effects’ into the political arena would occur. This design very much resembled a number of major features of the European integration processes, in which the resolution of low profile questions would spill over into high politics so that economic, technical and social interdependencies would lower the risk of severe political or even military confrontation, and would instead ‘. . . create a new perception of shared needs’ (Peters 1996: 6). The work of the REDWG was particularly important for building the foundations of the Oslo talks.3 Under the guidance of the European Union, which acted as ‘gavel-holder’, a network of government and non-governmental actors emerged. This network lobbied regional governments and organisations to consider aspects beyond the known categories of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Regional actors began to develop

A constructivist approach 31 informal contacts serving as non-official lines of communication between opponents and providing the parties with the opportunity to assess the potential of economic gains that would come with a political solution. The European Union in particular was successful in promoting the regional economic agenda, thereby indirectly triggering the initiation of the Oslo talks – yet, the political role of the EU in the Middle East peace process has often been underestimated. It has been argued that the capabilities of the EU’s foreign policy instruments have been insufficient to meet the expectations which outside actors hold against it. However, the case of the EU’s role in the initiation of the Oslo channel goes against this hypothesis. The EU’s semi-political activities in the brief phase preceding the Oslo talks were in fact crucial for their initiation. The EU was successful in initiating back-door diplomatic activities without necessarily being aware of it.4 Although not in the very centre of European political leaders’ attention at the beginning of the 1990s, the EU’s Middle East policy became more accentuated. The European Council of Lisbon 1992 perceived the Middle East as being of superior strategic concern. Within this context, the EU Commission was able to use alternative instruments to contribute to the peace process. In a memo the EU made clear that: The prospect of economic co-operation that will benefit all parties concerned should prove a powerful source of motivation in the search for a lasting solution to a complex political problem. However, it must be clear from the outset that such economic co-operation can only consolidate, never take the place of a political solution.5 The ideas of the Europeans were consolidated in a communication from the EU Commission addressing ‘Future Relations and Co-operation between the Community and the Middle East’.6 This paper was prepared between the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993 by the then Director for Mediterranean affairs in the EU Commission, Eberhard Rhein, and was widely discussed by experts. The document was also passed via EU officials to Ahmad Qureia, responsible for economic affairs in the PLO leadership in Tunis and one of the later protagonists of the Oslo talks.7 It argued that a political settlement would allow the region to enjoy the benefits of economic integration. A sustainable process of cooperation in the Middle East should be promoted and common regional visions developed. The proposed guidelines for the realisation of these visions sought to establish the basis for a Middle Eastern Economic area, setting up a common infrastructure and exploiting common resources (e.g.

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tourism assets and the professional expertise of the regional work force). Problems like the shortage of water and pollution of the environment should be dealt with jointly. The EU was willing to support the process of integration in the Middle East: . . . because of its geopolitical situation, its close links with all the parties concerned and its own experience with regional co-operation, . . . It could also help to facilitate the rapprochement between the parties to the Arab–Israeli conflict by upgrading its own links with each of the countries concerned.8 The approach of the EU Commission was essential for integrating regional actors into an intense policy-formulating process. Also, the EU Commission at that time faced relatively few budgetary constraints and had some space for political manoeuvre without being constrained too much by the positions of the member states. The EU Commission therefore was able to finance small-scale research projects on the future of the region, catalysing the Oslo talks.

Constructing the framework Israelis and Palestinians themselves began to be receptive to these ideas. In order to complement the work of the multilateral working groups and the activities of the other international and non-governmental actors, the Palestinians within the Territories set up preparatory teams, ‘technical committees’, which developed policies covering all aspects of the multilaterals.9 The idea of the technical teams was to provide the Palestinian negotiators in Washington and the political decision makers in Tunis with information regarding the technical aspects of negotiating positions – for example economic cooperation with Israel, trade issues, investment, Jewish settlements, water, environment, land registration, the economic situation in the West Bank, and others. All in all, about 34 teams were established, their work mainly based on the efforts of volunteers. The various operations of the ‘technical committees’ were guided by a steering committee which received all reports, reviewed them, and put them in a political context. In the PLO headquarters in Tunis, a higher committee oversaw the negotiations on both the bilateral track in Washington and the multilateral tracks in the various working groups. Mahmoud Abbas was in charge of supervising the bilateral track. Ahmad Qureia covered the multilateral tracks. The technical committees had a close working

A constructivist approach 33 relationship with the PLO in Tunis and the reports which had been produced by the technical teams were in turn passed to Qureia.10 The technical teams were thus a crucial source of information and played an important part in providing the PLO with information for each of the working groups. Qureia himself formed a small group of advisors, consisting of three people: Maher el-Kurd who later participated with Qureia in the Oslo talks; Yussif Sayigh, Professor of Economics, and an Egyptian economist; and Mahmood Abdel Fadil, who worked with the PLO for about two years in Tunisia as an associate economist for Sayigh. This group prepared the background papers for the multilateral negotiations, the keynote speeches and the position papers, with various assistants that changed throughout the process.11 In the context of its operative tasks this group developed broader concepts of order for the Middle East: In the discussions with Abu Ala [Ahmad Qureia] we thought about looking forward, looking ten years from now [1991] in terms of full peace and . . . that the full peace will become warm and live. How would things look like and how would things be in the new Middle East. And whether economics play an important role in that. We developed a concept . . . of interdependency in economic terms which would be an indispensable factor in creating a durable peace.12 (Maher el-Kurd) The group came to the conclusion that mutual strategic economic interests existed between Israel and the Arabs and Palestinians. Once the group had summed up the points of mutual interest, they produced a strategic political reorientation based on two maxims – the identification of mutual interests and the possibility to eventually create regional interdependencies – as result of their internal discussions.13 These were bold ideas and one would not expect them to have been generated by an organisation that was determined to liberate Palestine by an armed struggle. However, the PLO leadership gradually identified with these new ideas. Visions of economic cooperation began also to resonate with the Israeli political leadership. The Basic Government Guidelines of the new Labour-led government envisaged the creation of a new Middle East based on strong economic foundations. The material resources of Israel were no longer to be directed towards a costly regional arms race but towards economic development based on economic, cultural and

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scientific cooperation.14 Shimon Peres himself promoted the concept of a New Middle East, based on strong economic interdependencies. In spring of 1993, during a visit of the EU Troika to the region, the government re-emphasised its commitment to the establishment of the New Middle East. Rabin sought to ‘. . . bring about a situation where additional investments which do not come from Israel are invested in the Territories, a situation where more Palestinians work there and less inside Israel’.15 The importance for the Israeli government of socioeconomic development in the Territories was further indicated by the approval of the Israeli Finance Ministry to allocate 200 million shekels to improve employment opportunities in the Gaza Strip.16 On 12 April 1993, Peres made clear that: Today’s yardstick is not the size of one’s territory or population. What determines the condition of people today is the size of their income. Whoever makes more money can afford better education, better housing, better health services, a higher quality of life, and greater freedom.17 (Shimon Peres) This view was echoed by Rabin on 25 April 1993: ‘I would like the Territories to become the focus for investments from the rich Arab states and European elements. So far, the Europeans have been paying more lip service than money.’18 How then exactly did the discussions about the economic dimensions of peace in the Middle East translate into the initiation of the Oslo talks? Amongst the numerous papers produced by the Palestinians on the economic aspects of peace in the Middle East, one piece in particular was fundamental for the initiation of the talks. The European Union sponsored a study entitled ‘Thoughts on the Prospective Dividend and Regional Economic Co-operation’ drafted by Ahmad Qureia.19 In his study, Qureia developed general concepts on the development of economic regional cooperation and the ways in which Europe could support the creation of a sound regional economic infrastructure. He attached a list of projects which could be sponsored by the EU. In addition, he assumed that the Middle East could become a more important trading partner for Europe, and that therefore financing projects and strengthening economic ties between the two regions would be in the self-interest of the Europeans. In the introductory statement he expressed his hopes that:

A constructivist approach 35 As the Middle East peace process unfolds, hope begins to be generated that, once a political settlement satisfactory both to the Palestinians and the other Arabs, and to the Israelis, has been reached, the political (and therefore the economic) environment would become more suitable for and conducive to intra-regional economic relations and cooperation. This would create the conditions necessary for the flow of investments into programmes and projects whose benefit could be regional or sub-regional, thus permitting the ‘peace dividend’ to materialize and spread widely where heretofore the immense costs of the conflict have for decades weighed heavily on the parties to the conflict. (Ahmad Qureia 1991:1) His memorandum was based on the premises that: . . . as the OPTs [Occupied Palestinian Territories] move away from occupation in a meaningful way, into a transitional phase with a substantive content and a large measure of economic decision-making power, and ultimately into the phase of self-determination and statehood, the Palestinian national economy ought at the same time to be the beneficiary of considerable investment and encouraged to be an energetic partner in the design and generation of sub-regional and regional economic relations and varied development-promoting endeavours. The Palestinian people, with its skills, determination, and the location of its territory in the heart of the Mashreq . . . would be ideally situated . . . to be a focus for economic co-operation, interdependence, and complementarity. For all these reasons, the Palestinians can rightly entertain promising economic expectations based both on their own efforts and on external help, from the region itself and the international community at large. (Ahmad Qureia 1991: 1) After calling for a political resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, he listed three premises essential for regional economic cooperation. First, the process of cooperation could only unfold gradually, given the ‘heritages’ of the conflict. Every successful project or program would be useful in strengthening this process. Second, the ‘peace dividends’ should be mutually realised and shared, so that no party would feel exploited or deprived of the benefits of the process. Mutual cooperation by no means should be designed to allow possible gains for one side at the expense of the other. ‘Interdependence can be what the word means only if every

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party involved realises that it will share in the returns as it has to share in the costs and burdens, even if the “shares” are not necessarily equal’ (Qureia 1991: 3). Third, he stressed the point that the levels of development reached in the different countries would vary to a large degree. Future schemes of cooperation with Israel, such as new projects and programs requiring technological skills, manpower, financial capabilities, and a much more advanced economy in general, should be allocated even-handedly to the benefit of both parties. He then identified a number of areas of cooperation to be exploited after a political settlement. In the transport, communications and telecommunications sector, roads could connect Egypt and the Maghreb countries with the Mashreq and the Gulf region via Palestine. The Egypt–Gaza–Palestine railway line should be rehabilitated and extended westwards to Maghreb countries and two airports, one in Jerusalem and one in Gaza, should be built, as well as a commercial seaport in Gaza able to handle international trade and travel. The telecommunications sector should be strengthened through launching regional TV programmes. In order to strengthen the energy sector, he proposed building petroleum pipelines between the Gulf countries and Gaza. Additional refinement capacities would create a petro-chemical industry in Gaza. A gas pipeline between Gaza and Egypt would add to the regional energy producing sector. Solar energy could be generated in the southern part of the Gaza Strip and in the southern parts of Palestine, Egypt and Israel. Through a ‘Two-Sea-Project’ with Palestine and Jordan, to link the Mediterranean with the Dead Sea and/or the Red Sea, additional sources of electricity could be developed. This ‘Two-Sea-Project’ would in turn strengthen the regional tourism industry by promoting tourism facilities (hotels, transport, recreation centres, etc.) and offering package arrangements, including combined travel to Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and other countries. According to Qureia, the whole area was full of tourist attractions only waiting to be opened up for foreign visitors. Qureia then listed ‘Programmes and projects for the development and use of natural resources’ (1991: 10). According to his ideas, water from the Jordan river basin was to be exploited jointly by Palestine and ‘other partners’ and the environment protected against excessive salinity, pollution and soil erosion. Projects would include joint action in agriculture, livestock breeding, and afforestation, amongst others. Palestine, Jordan and Israel were to utilise the resources of the Dead Sea, avoiding excessive exploitation which would inevitably lead to environmental deterioration. Desalination facilities would produce sweet water. In Gaza, a fishing port should be built together with an institute for research on

A constructivist approach 37 marine environment in the Mediterranean area. Hebron was to be the location of a cement factory and a regional federation of cementproducing industries was be set up. Sewage and domestic waste water should be recycled and used for irrigation and by industrial and construction industries. He then went on to propose a range of projects in trade, finance and other services sectors which could benefit from regional economic cooperation. Gaza and the Jordan basin could be the locations for free trade zones, in which mainly semi-finished products could be processed and re-exported. The establishment of a regional commercial bank and of a stock exchange would attract capital. He proposed a regional insurance centre and a regional centre/company for engineering consultancy and design in Jerusalem as well as a regional university in Jerusalem. The already initiated Al-Quds Open University was to serve for the benefit of the whole region. The establishment of a regional economic research institute in Jerusalem, as well as one in Jericho, would educate technicians and other service personnel. Finally, a regional centre should be established which would promote the complementarity of administrative systems, institutional development, financial, fiscal, and monetary systems, programming and the promotion of private sector responsiveness to investment opportunities and incentives. The ideas expressed in this paper seemed to indicate a fundamental reorientation by the PLO leadership. Among the people who read the paper with great attention was Yair Hirschfeld, Professor of History at the University of Haifa. The paper caught his immediate interest: ‘If I only wanted to meet one member of the PLO leadership, it was Ahmad Qureia, because his ideas were very much compatible with ours.’20 Hirschfeld too was asked by the EU Commission to draft a study defining the economic parameters of the future Middle Eastern market focusing in particular on the establishment of interdependent economic structures between Palestinians and Israel.21 This study would later become one pillar of the Oslo agreements. The choice of topic was not as clear cut as it seems. Initially, the Commission and its Israeli counterpart had envisaged a study in which the option of economic separation between the Israelis and the Palestinians should be discussed. Interestingly, the ‘terms of reference’ of the study started from the assumption that ‘Grassroots demand for greater separation of the Israeli and Palestinian societies and economies has become today a strong political force, both within Israeli and Palestinian society.’22 The initial purpose of the study, therefore, was not to explore the benefits of economic cooperation, as would become the later result,

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but to develop a concept for economic separation between the Palestinian and Israeli economies. Economic separation was to be a tool for the creation of over 100,000 new jobs within the Territories and was to provide the Palestinians with control over their own economic affairs. A Unilateral Economic Autonomy (UEA) was thus a suitable policy option. A proposal for relaxing Israeli control over the economic activities of the Palestinians was to be drafted as a blueprint for the introduction of the UEA, as well as a proposal discussing the details of a Palestinian administrative organisation that would supervise economic activities of the Palestinians. However, during the discussions of the frame of reference of the research project, the limits of its scope became evident: neither Palestinians nor Israelis were ready to accept the principle of economic separation. The Palestinians, because being suddenly cut off from the Israeli economy would increase their dependency upon other Arab actors, the Israelis because they would lose their Palestinian markets and would suffer a heavy blow to their aim of integrating into the wider emerging Middle Eastern markets. Consequentially, the frame of reference of the study was changed and now proposed to discuss how Israelis and Palestinians could establish a truly interdependent economic relationship. Interdependence for Hirschfeld meant that multiple dependency relationships be replaced by a situation in which joint interests could be realised and the necessity of mutual control and containment was obvious.23 Interdependent relationships should be established in several stages: first, the parties would agree on certain mechanisms for the transfer of authority to the Palestinians; then, in an interim stage, the infrastructure of a Palestinian entity should be established; and finally, the parties should move towards the creation of an institutionalised framework of regional cooperation. Hirschfeld proposed to develop a working programme supportive enough to overcome the difficulties which impeded Palestinian economic development. In his view, the principle cause for the poor state of the Palestinian economy was the lack of institutional guidance, direction and coordination. Therefore, a selfgovernment agency responsible for designing economic policies and authorised to negotiate formally on a political basis with the Israeli government should be established. In addition, the self-government institution should be enabled to obtain financial assistance from outside and be able to distribute the funds to the Palestinian people autonomously. These principles for Palestinian institution building were more clearly specified in a working programme resting on a number of components.

A constructivist approach 39 First, a Palestinian Development Bank (PDB) should be established, becoming the main economic instrument of the self-government authority. The bank would manage tax and other revenues, such as foreign aid payments for the self-government authority and establish an Economic Planning Unit, an Export Promotion Department, and a loan department, shekels and dinars being the currencies of the bank’s accounts. Second, the Israel Bank, the Central Bank of Jordan, the PDB, together with representatives of other non-regional countries and donor institutions, such as the European Investment Bank, US-AID and the International Monetary Fund, would create a Middle East Development Fund (MEDF). The fund would act as a guarantor for the PDB, finance regional cooperation projects, and ensure that private investors be safeguarded from political instability. Both the PDB and the MEDF would design a Palestinian export promotion programme, also aiming at ending the Arab boycott against Israel, maintain an Israeli–Palestinian free trade zone connected to the Arab countries and ensure that investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip be accelerated with overall positive impact on Palestinian economic development (Hirschfeld 1992: 83–86). Hirschfeld also presented a concept of coordinated regional planning. He thought it possible that both sides could engage in negotiations on a regional development plan for the eastern slopes of the West Bank mountain ranges. For the western slopes of the West Bank, negotiations over regional planning were more difficult, as certain areas, e.g. Tulqarem and Nablus, were populated by a majority of Israelis. When dealing with the development of the economic potentials of the Gaza Strip, it is worth noting that in his proposals Hirschfeld referred to Qureia’s paper of November 1991, which had already outlined a number of ideas in that respect. In particular, he referred to the proposed development of land transport connecting Gaza with Egypt and the other Maghreb countries, the construction of an airport and a commercial seaport in Gaza, the building of petroleum pipelines between the Persian Gulf and Gaza, enabling oil transportation to the Mediterranean, as well as the construction of refinery industries in Gaza (Hirschfeld 1992: 99– 100). The following five parts of the study dealt with the exploitation of water resources and agricultural development, electricity and energy, transport and communication systems, tourism, and labour relations. The exploitation of the local water resources was to be controlled by a negotiated water distribution plan. This plan would permit the Palestinians to control the management of their water resources and promote their

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agricultural sector, at the same time taking the vital Israeli interests into account. Regarding the question of regional electricity and energy generation Hirschfeld proposed a step-be-step approach in which at first the Jerusalem electricity company should be given the authority to meet the electricity demands of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Then the Palestinians should be allowed to establish their own power plant in Gaza, eventually linking Israel, Egypt and Jordan. The construction of a gas pipeline from Egypt to Gaza and Israel should be negotiated as well as an oil pipeline system connecting the system in the Gulf area, via Yanbu in Saudi Arabia, with the Eilat– Ashqelon oil pipeline. This pipeline would enable the regional parties to transport oil directly from the Gulf to the Mediterranean.24 In addition, a gas pipeline from Egypt to Gaza and Ashqelon should be envisaged. With regard to the establishment of a regional transport and communication system, Hirschfeld proposed to first construct a North– South axis to connect the north of Israel with Jerusalem and the West Bank with Israel, Syria and Lebanon. An East–West axis should then connect the West Bank with Gaza, as well as improve connections to Jordan, Israel and Egypt. The establishment of a seaport in Gaza would decrease the Palestinian economic dependency upon Israel. As an immediate step towards more independence, the Palestinian authorities should be enabled to hire a part of the port of Ashdod as well as the Kalandia airport north of Jerusalem. The most rapid growth to be realised through mutual cooperation, however, was by developing a regional tourism infrastructure. A Committee for the Development of Tourism should be established to evaluate the access to international tourism markets and opportunities to establish direct contact with the relevant business institutions. Two separate strategies should then be developed. One should work out an understanding on easing passage arrangements. These bilateral coordination efforts would be supplemented by broader ones involving Jordan and Egypt, so that on a multilateral basis, border regulations would be eased and the area in general would be opened up for free movement (Hirschfeld 1992: 115–16). Besides formulating a concept conducive to regional economic development, Hirschfeld also drafted a strategy to achieve a breakthrough in the Arab–Israeli negotiations. As a starting point, the strategy assumed that both the Israelis and their Arab opponents were afraid to weaken their relative power position vis-à-vis their respective opponent. In particular, the Palestinians feared that Israel would employ the bilateral negotiations to legitimise the existing Palestinian dependence on Israel and that the

A constructivist approach 41 multilateral talks and the promotion of economic cooperation structures between Israel, Jordan and Egypt would leave them isolated, and thus reinforce Palestinian economic and political dependency with all its negative consequences (Hirschfeld 1992: 59). On the other hand, the Israelis were anxious that the Palestinian negotiation team in Washington might coordinate its position with the PLO, Syria, Jordan and Egypt (although not being a party to the Washington talks), consequentially reinforcing the Palestinians’ dependency on these powers. This in turn might lead to a unified Arab front threatening to use the exit option, thus causing the peace talks to fail, triggering the turning away of the Americans and Europeans from the Madrid framework and potentially opening the door to a United Nations-imposed settlement. In a worst case scenario, a reunited Arab front might, after a period of reassessment, even prepare for war (Hirschfeld 1992: 59). Based on this analysis, the Israelis prepared a breakthrough strategy for negotiations, having three strategic options at their disposal: a minimalist one, which, based on political realism, built upon the lowest common denominator between the conflicting parties and the existing multiple dependencies. The second approach, the maximalist strategy, argued that both Israelis and Palestinians had an interest in establishing a stable equilibrium by realising meaningful gains, and would in turn be ready to make relevant concessions. The third option, following a compromise formula, would be to reduce the multiple dependency relationship carefully, and have the parties approach the problems in a gradual stepby-step strategy (Hirschfeld 1992: 59f). The three options were then described in further detail, of which short summaries will be given here. For the Israelis, the minimalist strategy was based on two aspects: that the Palestinians and the Israelis agreed that elections for a self-governing body were desirable, and also that economic development in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip be promoted. The Israelis had identified the Palestinian positions on those two particular issues by assessing statements made by the members of the Palestinian delegation to the first meeting of REDWG in Brussels. Hirschfeld suggested that the Palestinians nominate personnel from amongst themselves or from amongst experts residing in the Territories for two preparatory committees: one for elections and one for economic development. In Washington, a basic understanding had been achieved concerning the need of elections to a Palestinian self-governing body and the Israeli paper in consequence proposed a number of possible components of that body. Concerning the promotion of economic development, the strategy sought to combine Palestinian, Israeli and European approaches towards this issue. Based

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on the joint desire to promote programs providing for the generation of income for the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a common denominator could be identified between the conflicting parties. A working programme specifying the criteria for the distribution of funds in industry, commerce and tourism was to be worked out by Palestinians and Israelis, as well as a third party providing for the funds (Hirschfeld 1992: 60–64). The main criticism of this minimalist approach lay in the fact that the main obstacles between the two parties were circumvented, and thus no substantial transformation of the dependency situation would be achieved. As a result, without prior agreement on the powers, rights and duties of the self-government authority, the elected institutions could be accused of collaboration with Israel. In order to outbalance criticism, they would have to align themselves to radical demands, triggering a further deadlock situation in the negotiations with Israel, and block further arrangements. The advantage of the minimalist strategy, however, would rest with the fact that the Palestinians knew beforehand what kind of competences a Palestinian interim self-government would enjoy, and that the interim self-government and no alternative power was in charge of the erection of an economic infrastructure for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Hirschfeld 1992: 64). The maximalist strategy laid out in the document assumed that real progress in the negotiations was only to be achieved if the most difficult aspects of the bilateral relationship were dealt with directly. The first step should consist of the negotiation of a Jewish settlement freeze in the Territories. This proposal went back (amongst others) to a Palestinian demand of 17 February 1992, in which the Palestinians had presented their demand for the cessation of settlement activities in all their dimensions to US Secretary of State, James Baker, and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrey Kozyrev.25 At the same time, the USA had, as mentioned, linked the loan guarantees of US$10 billion to Israel to the Israeli acceptance of a settlement freeze. Hosni Mubarak had also linked the settlement freeze to the lifting of the Arab boycott against Israel. The negotiation of a settlement freeze might then lead to a formula by which Israeli negotiators together with the Egyptians and the USA could agree on the final lifting of the Arab boycott and the provision of the loan guarantees in exchange (Hirschfeld 1992: 65–67). In addition, the maximalist strategy proposed that the Israeli– Palestinian bilateral track be subdivided into three subcommittees: one covering economic development to negotiate a Palestinian Development Programme; a second negotiating the establishment of a Palestinian

A constructivist approach 43 police force and provisions concerning the Israeli–Palestinian fight against terror within the broader aspects of security relations; and a third dealing with the final transfer of authority and the creation of a Palestinian self-government authority. The advantage of this strategy from the Israeli point of view obviously rested with the fact that the parties were directly confronted with the most contentious issues of the Israeli– Palestinian conflict, taking into account that negotiations would only slowly produce results (Hirschfeld 1992: 67–68). According to the third approach, a compromise strategy would provide for the gradual establishment of a Palestinian Preparatory Authority (PPA), consisting of an institutional framework for a Palestinian selfgovernment authority. This institution would enable the Palestinians to organise their internal affairs by themselves in the interim period. Under the umbrella of the PPA a gradual transfer of authority could be carried out in cooperation with the relevant Israeli institutions. This framework could be negotiated with the Palestinians in Washington and thus the Israeli–Palestinian negotiation track would develop a unique authority to organise the smooth transformation process. The PPA should be established as soon as possible; this would ensure that the PPA would gradually acquire the relevant legitimacy and problems stemming from abrupt transfers could be avoided. The plan also listed the spheres for which the authority should have responsibilities: finance, education and culture, health, labour and social welfare, municipal affairs, housing and public works, industry, commerce and tourism, agriculture, transportation and communications, religious affairs, administration of justice, local police as well as civil services. Within these spheres the PPA would gain immediate responsibilities. In addition it would formulate the Palestinian Development Programme and negotiate a working programme with its Israeli counterparts. In addition, the PPA would elect a Chairman from among its members (Hirschfeld 1992: 68–69). After enumerating various issues of possible bilateral cooperation projects, the study assessed the chances of implementing a short-term working programme through negotiations. Hirschfeld, being aware of the pressures against progressive negotiations, identified three major obstacles: the first was the danger of symbolism. No Palestinian negotiator, so his assessment concluded, would be able to circumvent addressing the very symbols of Palestinian statehood, such as the future of a Palestinian state, the question of Jerusalem, and the Palestinians’ right to return. Second, the Palestinian delegation in Washington would have difficulty escaping pressure exerted on them by different actors, such as the various groups within the PLO, or other Arab states, such as Syria,

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Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In addition, their ‘constituents’ at home on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would demand that their fate would be emphasised in the negotiations. Third, the existence of different political and economic pressure groups, such as local Israeli businessmen, settlers, Israeli army circles, and economic interests in Egypt and Jordan might further jeopardise the talks, as well might domestic developments within the USA, Russia, and Europe. In conclusion, Hirschfeld demanded that a rigorous working plan be created and that the aim of every step of the further negotiations should be clearly defined (Hirschfeld 1992: 118). A negotiation plan with the goal of achieving an interim agreement ready for signing envisaged the following: the first stage of the negotiations was to last from 1 August to 15 October 1992, exploit all available channels and levels for negotiations, and move simultaneously forward on various tracks. Trilateral Israeli–American–Egyptian negotiations were to reach an agreement on the implementation of the Mubarak formula: the cessation of Jewish settlement activities in exchange for the US$10 billion loan and the end of the Arab boycott against Israel; the signing of an Israeli–Palestinian agreement covering coordination in the fight against terrorism and in the matters of security and stability; and elections to and the establishment of a PPA including Israeli–Palestinian committees directing and controlling the process of transfer of powers. With regard to the Syrian track, an Understanding of Principles between Israel and Syria was to be signed, and on the multilateral level, agreement was to be reached promoting regional cooperation and supporting the transfer of authority to the Palestinians (Hirschfeld 1992: 121). In the second stage, scheduled to run from 16 October 1992 to 15 June 1993, negotiations were to be intensified. On the Israeli–Palestinian track, the negotiations were to be moved to Israel where they would be officially conducted between the government of Israel and the PPA. Following a gradualist approach, the negotiations were to provide for the establishment of a local police force, the organisation of elections and the transfer of authority to the PPA. On the Syrian track, Israel was to push forward negotiations towards an interim agreement, and with the Lebanese, move towards reaching a security agreement. The multilateral negotiations at this stage were to provide for supportive measures. All these tracks were to be brought towards the goal of this second stage which was to be defined by: the signing of an Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement; elections for, and the establishment of, a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority (PISGA), as well as elections for municipalities and village councils; and the establishment of cooperation mechanisms between the government of Israel and PISGA combined

A constructivist approach 45 with a working programme for PISGA as agreed by the two parties. An Israeli–Syrian interim agreement was to be signed in parallel with an Israeli–Lebanese agreement. And finally, a Middle East Development Fund and a Regional Co-operation Programme were to be established (Hirschfeld 1992: 121–23). With regard to the role of outside powers, the Israelis saw the contributions of the external actors as follows: the USA would sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with both Israel and the Palestinians. The memorandum with Israel would include the development of Israeli defence capabilities against non-conventional attacks from Arab and Muslim countries (a demand which was directed against threats from Iran), a commitment to the enforcement of international rules of nonproliferation, and continued American economic and military assistance to Israel. This would also have a positive effect on the integration efforts of the Israeli government of Jewish communities from the former Soviet Union and other places of the Jewish diaspora. The USA would also coordinate its position with Israel with regard to the development of regional cooperation between Israel, Jordan, the Palestinians, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States. The American-Palestinian Memorandum in turn would cover aspects of coordination concerning the transfer of authority, and a clarification of the American position with regard to Palestinians outside the Occupied Territories and their participation in the multilateral negotiations. The USA furthermore was to clarify its role regarding Palestinian-Jordanian negotiations for the creation of a confederation and its role with regard to Syria (Hirschfeld 1992: 123–24). The European role in the peace process envisaged by the Israelis was less ambitious. Hirschfeld assumed that the Europeans would support the recognition of the PLO and the Palestinian right to self-determination. The Israeli side, for their part, were to ask for clarification regarding a paper which had been produced by the EU Commission for the Regional Economic Development Working Group.26 Aspects presented in this paper would have been acceptable to the Rabin government, and could be complemented by an intense European-Israeli dialogue. Likewise, Japan should underline its commitment to regional economic relations. As co-chairman of the Plenary Session of the Madrid Conference, the Russian administration was heavily involved in the day-to-day negotiation process. Russia and the other successor states could support the process in practical terms in particular by providing the regional parties with their experience in arms control and disarmament measures. The special relationship which Syria and the PLO had enjoyed with the Soviet

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Union before the end of the Cold War could be exploited using existing lines of communications. In addition, the example of the Black Sea cooperation efforts might be worth examining by the Middle Eastern parties (Hirschfeld 1992: 124–27). Many of these ideas would find their way into the final Declaration of Principles.

Spilling over into the Oslo Talks Although some have argued that ‘. . . it is often fruitless to locate and to reconstruct the moment when first contacts begin’ (Zartman and Berman 1982: 42), it is striking, however, that the initiators of the Oslo track were all engaged in the multilateral talks. Qureia oversaw the talks for the PLO in Tunis, Peres and Beilin, his Deputy Foreign Minister, were responsible for the multilaterals on behalf of the Israeli government. It was the framework of the Refugee Working Group (RWG) which eventually provided the operational linkage between the two sides (whilst the REDWG served as an intellectual linkage). The RWG dealt with the plight of the Palestinians displaced after the 1948 and 1967 wars. At the first plenary session of the RWG 13–15 May 1992 in Ottawa, the issues that would constitute the RWG agenda and the actors who should deal with them were identified: human resources development, job creation and vocational training (with the USA acting as ‘shepherd’), public health (Italy), child welfare (Sweden), economic and social infrastructure (EU), family reunification (France), and databases (Norway) (Brynen 1998: 282). The government of Norway entrusted a Norwegian social research institute, FAFO, with completing a database of living conditions in the West Bank and Gaza, which was presented to the May 1993 plenary session of the RWG (Brynen 1998: 289). The efforts of FAFO regarding the living conditions of the Palestinians dated back to the initiation of the study in 1990. The results of the study were later to serve as a database proposing strategies of economic development in the Territories.27 In order to conduct its work accurately, the researchers had to build up good contacts to both Israeli officials and their Palestinian counterparts, among them representatives of the PLO. Terje Larsen, the then director of the FAFO Institute, was successful in pursuing this goal and was able to establish good relations with both sides; an undertaking which was made easier by the fact that Norway had always maintained even-handed political relations. In the context of the study, Larsen met with Ahmad Qureia in Oslo during February 1992, where they discussed having direct contact with

A constructivist approach 47 the Israelis. This idea was then taken further three months later in May 1992, when Larsen met Yossi Beilin, then a member of Knesset for the Labour Movement. Beilin recognised that there was a need to establish a second channel besides the official talks in Washington, and that a direct contact between Israeli and PLO officials would be necessary. Larsen met Beilin twice more. At a meeting shortly after the Israeli elections, he proposed establishing a direct channel to the leading figures of the PLO. A second meeting took place on 10 September with the participation of the Norwegian Minister of State in the Foreign Ministry, Jan Egeland. During these talks, Egeland proposed to Beilin that Norway should act as a mediator between the PLO leadership and the Israeli government in the event of talks taking place. By the end of 1992, the ideas of Larsen, Beilin, and Qureia began to take shape; on 3–4 December, a session of the steering group of the multilateral peace talks took place in London. Responsible for the multilaterals for the PLO, Qureia was present as a covert coordinator. Hirschfeld was also in London and was highly interested to meet with the Palestinian whose thoughts were so similar to his own. Both were able to meet twice on the fringes of the meeting. Qureia and Hirschfeld both came to the conclusion that the bilateral track between the Israeli and Jordanian-Palestinian joint delegation would talk itself into a stalemate and agreed to establish a direct channel to discuss the problems of the Washington talks and identify creative solutions. When Hirschfeld signalled that the channel had the backing of Beilin, Qureia became fully convinced that this additional track could be useful (Makovsky 1996: 19). After his return to Tunis, Qureia decided after consulting with Abbas on 7 December 1992 to follow up this dialogue which seemed to have the potential to develop into a useful back-channel (Abbas 1995: 113).

The first stages The Israelis and Palestinians met for the first time on 20–22 January 1993 in Norway. Participants on the Palestinian side included Ahmad Qureia, and two advisors, Hassan Asfour and Maher el-Kurd. Yair Hirschfeld was accompanied by Ron Pundak, a former student of Hirschfeld, and a Ph.D. graduate from the School of Oriental and African Studies, London.28 The Palestinians told their Israeli counterparts that the Palestinian leadership wished to establish a track bypassing the talks in Washington. Within the Palestinian camp, the miserable situation of the Palestinian people in the Territories at that time was causing deep frustrations. The negotiations in Washington had until then failed to

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produce any meaningful results, and this was having serious repercussions on the economic, social and financial situation of the Palestinians within the Territories. Outlining the position the PLO had found itself in after the Second Gulf War, Qureia made it clear that although the Palestinian position in the Gulf War had been misinterpreted by the other actors and had been perhaps sometimes too harsh against Israel, by adjusting their position in the subsequent years the Palestinians had been able to re-establish their ties to their Arab compatriots, the Europeans and even to the Americans. One indicator of this changed approach was the Palestinians’ commitment to the Madrid peace process. The Palestinians had participated fully in the process and put forward various proposals to bridge the gap between their position and the Israeli position. As after two years no substantial progress of the talks had been detected, however, some voices within the PLO were calling for the suspension of the Washington talks. Because of the perceived lack of commitment from the Israeli side to the peace process, the Palestinians asked for a series of measures to be taken by the Israeli government: it would be a sign of Israeli commitment to the peace process if the government showed some flexibility regarding the future of the Palestinians deported since 1967; to rehabilitate the PLO and acknowledge its role in the peace process; to stop the settlement activities; and to start to deal with the question of ‘Gaza First’ (Abbas 1995: 119ff). The Palestinians then complemented their political demands by presenting their concept of regional economic development in the Middle East. The relevance of their presentation for their Israeli counterparts and the subsequent talks, was later explained by Ron Pundak:29 One of the unique things about Oslo was that it began with two sides dealing beyond politics, and engaging in the discussion about economic co-operation. . . . So basically the two sides, us and the Palestinians meaning Abu Ala [Ahmad Qureia] in this case, were looking at the economics dimension side by side with economic cooperation, not through economic co-operation but side by side. Take into consideration that the other senior member of the Palestinian delegation was Dr. Maher al-Kurd who later entered as a senior economic advisor of the chairman, Arafat, which had also its input. . . . We saw a paper which Abu Ala presented to the Europeans which was written sometime at the beginning of 1992, maybe even a year earlier. This paper very impressed us because it looked at the whole peace dialogue in a different dimension which was close to our idea

A constructivist approach 49 meaning Yair’s, myself and Beilin’s. This was very encouraging and we were very keen to meet Abu Ala, with no connections to the political peace process, but to the economic peace process. This paper was definitely for my point of view a sign of peace. . . . However, it is not right to say that we started to speak about economics and then through this kind of threshold we went into politics, no, we spoke about this as one comprehensive thing. It helped us to reach understanding on economy and to have common language through this, but one can not say we started dealing with economy exclusively. We dealt with this hand in hand together, although it was much easier to discuss for example the idea of ‘Gaza First’ when we already started to plan together the economic developmental ideas of joint areas for industry and commerce, things like this. . . . One can identify this kind of philosophy in the mindset of Abu Ala as well. The first message at the first meeting, was shocking from our point of view, when he came with a message which talks about economic cooperation and joint industries. It was even more clear in his speech than in his paper. He portrayed the future of the Middle East, I mean the Peres type of the Middle East and we were a good audience because we believed in this concept. This we had in common. (Ron Pundak) And Shimon Peres later confirmed: For the talks in Oslo, it was Abu Ala [Ahmad Qureia], who submitted an economic development plan for the Middle East that I read with great interest. Although I could not agree with all of it, neither could I ignore the tremendous amount of work involved in its creation. I liked its originality and, especially, its constructive approach. (Shimon Peres, 1993: 13) Based on these very first experiences, both Palestinians and Israelis tried to develop a first tentative normative framework on the basis of which the subsequent negotiation process could proceed. Both parties agreed that during the following exchanges, the only positions which were legitimate were ones based on expectations of shared gains to be realised by an agreement. According to this first normative framework, the exchange of positions based on perceptions of historical experiences was inappropriate. For the Israelis, this approach defined their fundamental assumption of the Oslo talks. Either the negotiations were to be conducted on a ‘justice oriented approach’, based on the moral categories

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of the respective interpretations of history by the two sides or the negotiations could be based on a ‘solution oriented approach’. This approach would assume the negotiations to be led by the mutual perceived beneficial outcome that reciprocal cooperation would yield.30 In conclusion, ‘. . . the idea was to try and find ways for the future and to do that in a rational and not an emotional way.’31 Like the Israelis, the Palestinians had developed a concept of how the Oslo talks could produce some meaningful results. Before the Palestinians went to Oslo, Qureia, Asfour, el-Kurd and Abbas had held a number of long preparatory sessions in Tunis: We realised if we want to talk about 1948, about historical rights, 1967, refugees, displaced, water rights, then of course we would not get anywhere. In our consideration there was a historical brief moment that needed to be utilised. . . . And in order to do that we needed two things: we needed the maxim of political separation and economic co-operation in order to give society an interest in peace through achieving economic gains. . . . Second, we will benefit from the five year interim agreement and we had the [assurance] that the final status will not be prejudiced by what was going on in the interim agreement. These ideas were preferred among the three of us before we went to Oslo. . . . When we had the first meeting with Hirschfeld and Pundak we told them: let’s not talk about the past, let’s not talk about who occupied the land and who made the aggression, let’s not talk about Jeff and Haifa and so on. Let’s talk about what we can achieve if we can achieve it in the coming five years and create a momentum and an interest on both sides in making peace based on the two state solution. We proposed not talk about the past but about political separation and economic co-operation.32 (Maher el-Kurd) The Palestinian approach to the Oslo talks was thus compatible with the Israeli one, and after the first meeting both sides agreed to substantially upgrade the channel. As a consequence, after his return to Israel and informing Beilin about the talks, Hirschfeld prepared a ‘draft zero’ as a shared point of reference which served in its various forms as a guideline for the talks until the final stages.33 During the drafting process between the first and the second session in Oslo, Hirschfeld sought to make use of a variety of papers and statements he had collected from the respective Israeli and Palestinian leadership. The Palestinians had previously presented various position papers to the Washington talks, in

A constructivist approach 51 which they had accepted the division of the negotiation process into an interim agreement and the question of the final status. Amongst others, on 3 March 1992, the Palestinians had presented a proposal entitled ‘Expanded Outline: Palestinian Interim Self-Government Arrangements: Concepts, Preliminary Measures, and Elections Modalities’ dealing with autonomy during an interim period. In September 1992, Hannan Ashrawi, the spokeswoman for the Palestinian delegation, whom Hirschfeld had close personal contact with, presented a ten-point ‘Draft Proposal: Framework Agreements for Palestinian Interim SelfGovernment’.34 In addition, Hirschfeld used the insight he had gained from numerous discussions with the Palestinians from inside the Territories. He also relied heavily on the study he had drafted for the EU Commission.35 The result of this drafting process in preparation for the second round of Oslo was a seven-page document, the ‘draft zero’ which from then onwards served as the basic point of reference for the negotiating process towards the final Declaration of Principles.36 The document was shown to Yossi Beilin, and Shimon Peres was informed, but did not formally approve it.37 The drafting process of ‘draft zero’ itself is an indicator of the negotiation style during the Oslo talks. In ‘draft zero’, the Israelis not only tried to present the Israeli perception and positions on the contested points, but always strove to emphatically take into account the Palestinian positions: The first draft already combined both our and their [the Palestinian’s] positions but not the positions we wanted them to portray but what we thought that they could not but put on the table. So we did not draft an Israeli position, we drafted . . . something which we believed could be already a first construction for a bridging draft and then it became, after amendments, . . . the first joint draft declaration of principles.38 (Ron Pundak) This approach to the Oslo talks and to the negotiations of a final draft indicates that both sides were eager to avoid negotiating along the lines of the old and known stereotypes of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. By employing an empathetic approach to the negotiations, they rather worked as ‘one team divided by two’39 with the draft. Both parties tried to identify the common ground of mutual interests to serve as a substantial foundation of a later agreement and the issue of economic cooperation enabled them to develop an empathetic approach to the talks. Based on

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that approach, they analysed where the respective positions differed and what the potentials for future cooperation were.40 The negotiation strategy was not only based on empathy. The Israelis believed that the talks could finally only be successful if the Palestinians at least implicitly accepted their lead during the negotiations in two respects. First, there could be no agreement without the public endorsement of the Israeli leadership (Rabin and Peres). Second, an agreement could only be achieved if the Israeli negotiation team were of the opinion that it would be subsequently accepted by at least 50 per cent of the Israeli public. In the view of the Israelis, the only ones able of helping the Palestinians towards that kind of agreement were they themselves.41 Initially, the Palestinians considered the Oslo talks a mechanism for solving the problems of the Washington negotiations, without seeking to formulate a Declaration of Principles independently from the bilateral talks between the Israeli and the Palestinian delegations. The draft agreement that Hirschfeld presented to the second meeting of the Oslo talks, however, caught the immediate attention of the Palestinians. Two key indicators signalled to the Palestinians that in Oslo, they finally had the opportunity to establish a linkage between the Israeli leadership and themselves that was able to produce meaningful results. The first indicator was that Hirschfeld’s draft argued in favour of full political separation whilst at the same time maintaining full economic cooperation during the interim period. This approach to an interim agreement was compatible with the concepts the Palestinians had developed, which emphasised independent political institution building in the Territories. At the same time they were aware of the negative repercussions of separating the Palestinians from Israel in economic terms. Hirschfeld’s formula on the one hand advocated political separation but on the other proposed preserving the existing structural economic interrelationship between the Israeli and the Palestinian economies. A relationship envisaging political separation and preserved economic interdependence had not been discussed in the Washington negotiations, but now was being articulated in Oslo by the Israelis, thus not only moving a major step beyond the Israeli official positions but also symbolising that the Israelis did not intend to keep an emerging Palestinian entity as weak and fragile as possible.42 The second indicator which the Palestinians detected in Hirschfeld’s draft and which caught their attention was the concept of gradualism. The draft stated that whatever the features and design of an interim period, it would not in any way prejudice the final status of the Territories. Like the economic component, the concept of gradualism had never

A constructivist approach 53 been accepted by the Israelis in Washington but was endorsed by the Israelis in Oslo from the very beginning. For the Palestinians that aspect was a corner stone for future discussions beyond the interim arrangements, as: Whatever would go right or wrong in the interim period, would not deprive us of making up in the final status. And that was accepted in the draft, which was never accepted in any draft that was discussed [previously]. When we saw these two things, the combination of political separation and economic co-operation on one hand, that whatever in the interim arrangement would happen, would not prejudice the final status. On these two things we can get an agreement. The details would come later . . .43 (Maher el-Kurd) Finally, the Palestinian leadership got the impression, that for the first time, the Israelis had taken their positions into account and had modified their approach accordingly, thus changing their general and historical approach to Israeli–Palestinian negotiations.44 In these first two rounds, understanding on three levels was achieved. First, Israelis and Palestinians agreed that the economic aspects of Israeli– Palestinian reconciliation should be emphasised. They should serve as an additional point of reference to any future Israeli–Palestinian agreement. Second, both sides agreed on the concept of gradualism. The Palestinians would be empowered to execute control gradually over ever-increasing parts of the Territories. The interim status would not prejudice the outcome of the final status negotiations. Third, both sides accepted each other as legitimate negotiating partners. The Palestinians agreed that for the time being, two academics would represent their negotiating partner. Only at a later stage would the Palestinians ask for the Israeli representation to be upgraded to an official level. Based on these three elements – economic cooperation and political separation in the interim phase, the concept of gradualism, and the recognition of the legitimacy of the positions of the other side – the two sides were able to develop a concept of future talks in Oslo. Despite their emphasis on the procedural aspects of constructing a negotiation process, both sides already engaged in some bargaining efforts. However, they did so relatively modestly, which may indicate that both parties had developed a mutual interest in making the Oslo channel a success. And they softened the positions that the leadership on both sides had adopted previously.

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For example, a logical consequence of the general concept of the Oslo process established in the first meetings was to discuss the idea of ‘Gaza First’. Transferring responsibilities to the Palestinians for the Gaza Strip first would be a test case for any future transfer of responsibilities. The Palestinians would be able to establish the political institutions to govern the territory; the Gaza Strip would remain connected to Israel in economic terms; ‘Gaza First’ implied that eventually other parts of the Territories would be added to Palestinian control based on the concept of gradualism; and finally, the PLO would be handed control over the political institutions and thus would be able to establish itself as the main political force in the Territories (Enderlin 1998: 615). A major point was also the future status of Jerusalem. For the Israelis, Jerusalem represented the indivisible and eternal capital of Israel, a position not only endorsed by the Likud but by the new Labour-led government as well; the Palestinians envisaged East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state. Therefore, it was a major Israeli concession that they were prepared to allow Jerusalem to be included in a Declaration of Principles, implying that the future status of Jerusalem was indeed open to negotiations (Enderlin 1998: 616). In the bilateral negotiations in Washington, Israel had always rejected including Jerusalem in an agreement in any form. Although Rabin would later strongly object to including Jerusalem in the Declaration of Principles, during the initial steps in Oslo, the Israelis did agree to negotiate the status of Jerusalem in final status negotiations (Makovsky 1996: 32). Another issue, elections and the future competences of a Palestinian Interim Council, constituted a related problem touching upon the territorial scope of the Council and the question of Jerusalem. According to Qureia’s proposal, all Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip according to the demographic record of 4 June 1967, including Palestinians from Jerusalem, should be able to participate in the elections. As this formula would have already anticipated the future status of Jerusalem, the Israelis rejected the Palestinian demand. The Israelis argued that the discussion of those non-negotiable items in turn could endanger the whole process and could lead to its collapse. Regarding the scope of authority of a Palestinian self-government, the Palestinians demanded that its jurisdiction should cover all the Palestinian Territories occupied in 1967 including East Jerusalem. Again, this demand was countered by the Israelis. According to their view, this formula would de facto bind the two parties to a specific outcome in the final status negotiations when it came to debating the territorial extent of a Palestinian entity. Once again, the issue of Jerusalem seemed to block any

A constructivist approach 55 arrangement. Therefore the two sides came to the conclusion that for the time being, the territorial dimension of the scope of the authority was to be considered at a later stage (Abbas 1995: 127ff). When Palestinians and Israelis met for the third time near Oslo on 20–21 March, their main focus was on finalising the draft of a first joint paper which was to serve as the basis for the following meetings: the Sarpsborg III document, named after the venue of the third round of negotiations. This document consisted of three parts: a Declaration of Principles containing 15 articles, a work programme and the framework of a regional Marshall plan. The Israelis agreed to completely withdraw from Gaza within two years. After that, a kind of UN-‘trusteeship’ would be established and a strong Palestinian police force would take over control. According to article two of the draft document, free, direct and general elections for a Palestinian council should then be held under international supervision. At the same time, the elections would mark the beginning of the interim phase and would prepare the ground for the realisation of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. An appendix specified the conditions under which Palestinians were to be able to participate in the elections, also referring to the Palestinians living in Jerusalem. They too would have the right to participate, as would Palestinians displaced before 4 June 1967. The ‘jurisprudence’ of the interim council was to cover the whole of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip but the competences of the council were not yet determined. An arbitration panel would settle those disputes between Israelis and Palestinians that the two sides were unable to solve on a bilateral basis. In order to give the agreement the backing of the international community, it was envisaged the panel be made up of Israel, the Palestinians, and the co-sponsors of the peace conference in Madrid, the USA and Russia (Makovsky 1995: 31ff; Enderlin 1998: 617). In the fourth round, 30 April to 1 May, Hirschfeld decided to bridge some of the remaining gaps with the Palestinians. It was obvious that some of the concessions Hirschfeld planned to make would not be endorsed by the Israeli government. However, he wanted to prove to the principals of both sides, to the Israeli officials as well as to the PLO leadership in Tunis, that a deal between Israel and the PLO was potentially possible, despite some existing obstacles. In his analysis, a jointly developed document would finally convince the Israeli leadership of the readiness of the Palestinians to compromise (Halter and Laurent 1994: 107f). Thus, for Hirschfeld, the beginning of this round of the talks was a time for stocktaking and reassessment. He stated that the channel had by now

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developed the necessary degree of legitimacy. Rabin approved the talks and the USA had been informed and appreciated the process.45 By now, the Israeli team was working to convince an increasing number of public figures of the channel’s usefulness. Hirschfeld made it clear to the Palestinians that Rabin had to move with great caution as the Likud was not informed about the talks. Qureia too confirmed that the channel had enough support from behind the scenes. However, he criticised the fact that too many outsiders were aware of the channel, which was putting the Palestinian negotiation team into a difficult situation. The PLO position was that using the Washington talks as cover, an agreement between the two sides should be brokered in Oslo. The Palestinian delegation in Washington had therefore been advised to negotiate with their Israeli counterparts only in general terms, in order to give the Oslo channel more time to complete its work (Abbas 1995: 139f). In addition to the discussions dealing with the structure of the channel, the delegations also engaged in substantial negotiations. Qureia agreed that the issue of Jerusalem would be excluded from interim self-rule. A second concession was made by the Palestinians with regard to the status of Jerusalem: the PLO softened its position on the issue of the right of the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem to vote and stand for elections for the interim self-rule authority. On the other hand, the Palestinians demanded reciprocal concessions. A component on the West Bank should be added to the ‘Gaza First’ offer. Any agreement not including a component of this kind would be interpreted by West Bankers as betrayal. When it came to the question of the final status of the process, Hirschfeld suggested discussing two ideas: either a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, or a tripartite model. Furthermore, the PLO itself should be gradually brought back into the scene. The suggested elections could be used as a framework through which PLO members could return to the Territories and thus gain seats in the emerging Palestinian institutions. The possible nomination of the candidates as well as the overall transfer of institutions from Tunis to Gaza should be discussed in Oslo (Abbas 1995: 138f).

The quest for legitimacy In spring 1993, the Oslo channel gained legitimacy with decision-making circles on both sides. At its beginning, the channel was constructed primarily as an academic exercise rather than as a fully fledged second

A constructivist approach 57 track channel. However, both sides were able to gradually integrate their principals – Arafat on the Palestinian side, and Rabin and Peres on the Israeli side – into the Oslo process. After his return from the first meeting in January, Hirschfeld briefed Beilin on the proceedings. Beilin, after having reviewed the minutes of the talks in detail, decided to inform Peres of the results of the first round. On 9 February, Peres in turn discussed the findings of the talks with Rabin (Enderlin 1998: 616). Peres stated that the PLO should be brought into the picture of the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations and that it should be allowed to move to Gaza. According to his reading of the first meeting in Oslo, the PLO was ready to do so. Rabin did not reject the formula to hand over Gaza first but was eager to consult with the American administration on this matter (Enderlin 1998: 616). The main argument for Rabin to continue with the Oslo channel at this stage was that the talks would produce additional information about PLO positions without Israel having to commit itself to the process (Makovsky 1996: 23). After the end of the second meeting, Ahmad Qureia and Mahmoud Abbas briefed Arafat in two long sessions. Arafat concluded that for the first time it might be possible for Israelis and the PLO to agree on a joint document. Arafat was also eager to make sure that information was leaked neither to the general public nor to the larger PLO decisionmaking bodies, such as the executive committee. The executive committee included numerous members who held assignments in the different Arab capitals, so any information received by this body could have easily found its way to other Arab leaders. He was particularly afraid that Syria’s leader, Hafiz al-Assad, would receive any information. He finally agreed that the delegation in Washington should be used as a cover for the Oslo talks (Halter and Laurent 1994: 96f). In the third round of the Oslo talks, the discussions concerning the organisation of the channel intensified. The Palestinians demanded that the channel be upgraded by the inclusion of Israeli government officials. The Palestinians became increasingly suspicious of the fact that the talks and the results produced so far were meaningless if no official Israeli representative was involved: Hirschfeld and Pundak until then had always emphasised that although they were close to the Israeli political establishment, they had no formal mandate to negotiate an agreement. At the fourth round of the talks in Norway, it was clear to the parties in Oslo that the document so far produced was not yet the final one for either of them. However, Hirschfeld’s tactic of convincing the parties that it was feasible to reach an agreement with the other side seemed to have been successful. Although the document which he brought back to

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Israel was criticised heavily by Beilin, who pointed out that the document included too many points the Israelis could not accept, Hirschfeld was able to convince him that the document was not a final agreement, but only reflected some of the Israeli and Palestinian negotiating positions. The Palestinians in turn knew that the draft document was not the final agreement, but formed the basis of an eventual compromise (Halter and Laurent 1994: 107f). In the fifth meeting, 8–10 May, the Palestinians again stressed the importance of the presence of an Israeli official at the talks. Qureia time and time again emphasised his rank within the PLO hierarchy, and demanded that the Israeli side be represented by a figure of equal status. Although the Norwegian mediators had often confirmed to Qureia that Hirschfeld was close to the Israeli decision-making circles, the Palestinians, after being prepared to offer substantial concessions in the drafting process of the Declaration of Principles, wanted to make sure that the results achieved had the backing of the Israeli government. Arafat wanted to make sure that, after having agreed to resume the talks in Washington, the back-channel talks would not be used by the Israelis only to extract concessions they otherwise could not achieve. Therefore, after the fourth round of talks, Qureia told the Norwegian mediators that the talks would be abandoned if the Israelis did not upgrade their delegation to an official level (Makovsky 1996: 43). On 11 May, Peres met Rabin and reported the events in Oslo to him. He tried to convince him to read the documents which had been produced and to continue with the channel. Peres emphasised that although the draft paper included many points the Israeli government could not agree on completely, the fact still remained that a common document had been produced. This indicated that the PLO was, in principle at least, willing to compromise with the Israelis. For a number of reasons, Rabin remained unconvinced of the viability of the Oslo track. He doubted whether the Palestinians in Oslo were completely privy to PLO negotiation policies. In particular, he was unsure about the standing of Qureia within the PLO hierarchy and about his mandate to negotiate a deal with Israel. Until now, the question of Jericho, although being discussed with Mubarak, had not been on the table in Oslo, a fact which seemed to indicate that Qureia was not completely aware of PLO negotiating tactics. In conclusion, Rabin did not want to rely solely on the Oslo track with the Palestinians. He also wanted to keep the talks in Washington alive. Issues blocked in Washington might be brokered or resolved in Oslo, and then re-channelled to Washington (Makovsky 1996: 42f). However, he did agree to meet Hirschfeld and Pundak three days later in

A constructivist approach 59 order to receive first-hand information on the proceedings in Oslo (Halter and Laurent 1994: 118ff). On 14 May, Peres, Beilin, Hirschfeld and Pundak met with Rabin to brief him again about what was happening in Oslo. Hirschfeld and Pundak described the atmosphere of the talks, the characters of the persons involved, and the substance of the discussions. Rabin was still not convinced of Arafat’s seriousness but stated that he was impressed by what Oslo had achieved until now. In his opinion, the PLO had made substantial compromises which he attributed to the severe crisis the PLO had manoeuvred itself into. Still, the decision whether to upgrade the Israeli team in Oslo was imminent. After the others had left, Rabin and Peres discussed under which terms the Palestinian demands could be fulfilled. Peres proposed he himself go to Oslo, which was immediately rejected by Rabin. The risk that the contact would be discovered, as well as the political costs associated with that possibility, was too high. But Rabin agreed to Peres’ proposal to send Uri Savir to Oslo. Uri Savir belonged to a small group of assistants to Peres, and at that time was General Director at the Foreign Ministry of Israel. He was eventually to be the first Israeli official to meet representatives of the PLO. In the sixth round of the talks on 21 May Savir was introduced to the specific atmosphere the talks had by then acquired. The individuals in Oslo by then had developed personal relationships which enabled them to speak informally about their perceptions of the conflict. As Hirschfeld and Pundak before him, Savir was impressed by Qureia’s ideas regarding the creation of economic interdependence in the region. That for him was an indicator of a new thinking within the PLO. In turn, it was important for Qureia to listen to an Israeli official, privately criticising the occupation of the West Bank (Halter and Laurent 1994: 126). The mandate Savir was given by Rabin was unambitious. He was asked to evaluate whether further talks with the Palestinians had the potential to produce an acceptable outcome, and if detailed negotiations could reach a settlement. For the time being, Savir was to avoid entering into detailed negotiations on items such as the future of Jerusalem or the question of Jericho, and was to make it equally clear that the Oslo talks would only go on if they were held in absolute secrecy and the Washington talks continued at the same time (Makovsky 1996: 46). For the Palestinians, the appearance of Savir at the Oslo talks on 21 May marked a fundamental turning point. This was the first time a representative of an Israeli government had met with PLO officials. But although Savir ranked high in the Israeli foreign ministry, the Palestinians were not convinced that Rabin was completely informed

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about the talks. Despite Savir telling the Palestinians that Rabin still was not convinced regarding the viability of the Oslo process, being seemingly short of alternative options, the Palestinians nevertheless decided to continue with the talks (Abbas 1995: 150). For the Palestinians, the main substantial messages from Savir were that the Israeli leadership had endorsed the Oslo framework and were eager to maintain its secrecy. The Palestinians came to the conclusion that the Israelis were pleased that the talks so far had focused on the overall picture of the Israeli– Palestinian relationship and had not been blocked by discussing technical questions. The talks were to be accelerated to quickly produce a positive result (Abbas 1995: 150f) and the Palestinians expected Savir to have a mandate to finalise the Document which had been produced on 21 March in Sarpsborg (Makovsky 1996: 46). Savir tried to convince his Palestinian counterparts of the new approach the Israeli government had taken with respect to the Palestinian track. He stressed that the new Labour cabinet had suspended 90 per cent of Israeli settlement activities, diverted financial resources targeted by the former government for the settlements on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip to other projects within Israel, and released Palestinian prisoners and deportees (Abbas 1995: 151; Enderlin 1998: 621). Stressing the broader regional environment in which both parties were acting, Savir reminded the Palestinians of Israeli fears at being caught on the defensive in a potentially unstable region. Any conflict in the broader neighbourhood of Israel would endanger its security, Iran and Iraq being the greatest threats. Israel’s reaction to this situation should not be determined by developing a ‘fortress mentality’ but by seeking security guarantees from its neighbours. One of the most prominent security guarantees was a regional process of democratisation in all Middle Eastern countries in general, and the democratic evolution of Palestinian institutions in particular (Abbas 1995: 151). If the Palestinians did want to reach an agreement with the Israelis, however, the immediate creation of an independent Palestinian state should be put aside as well as the discussion on the future of Jerusalem and the Jewish settlements. Only then could the talks produce serious results (Halter and Laurent 1994: 126). Savir returned to Israel confident that an agreement with the PLO could be reached. In a memorandum to Rabin, Peres and Beilin, he claimed that the Oslo talks offered Israel a unique opportunity for reconciliation with the Palestinians and that the gaps between the two sides could be bridged. Ahmad Qureia was a trustworthy negotiating partner who had the backing of Arafat. The economic dimension which

A constructivist approach 61 the Palestinians wanted to include in an eventual deal would give the Israelis the opportunity for realising gains above and beyond political ones. Savir also advanced the idea that Israel should formally recognise the PLO, which would lead to the PLO renouncing terrorism and ready to negotiate further concessions (Enderlin 1998: 621; Savir 1998: 23f).

A constructivist interpretation of the Oslo talks Interpreting Savir’s appearance as a fundamental turning point in the Oslo process, what then are the achievements of the first phase of the Oslo talks? Let’s recall some of the elements of the constructivist approach to successful negotiations: in a first phase of negotiations, through a process of argumentation participants develop the framework that guides subsequent negotiations. This process is based on empathy, equal opportunity to participate in the process, and a ‘common life world’. Interpreting the Oslo talks thus far along constructivist lines, Palestinians and Israelis intent on creating a new Middle East had developed a normative framework of secret negotiations which served as the basis of a subsequent bargaining process between the principals of two sides. It was based on mutual recognition, gradualism and the understanding that economic cooperation would be a fundamental element of Israeli–Palestinian reconciliation. Until now, both sides displayed a high degree of empathy, attempting to understand their respective positions in the conflict. In doing so, they accepted each other as equal partners. Both sides were able to relate to the concept of creating a new Middle East, based on economic integration and prosperity, serving as the ‘common life world’ in the discourse. The personalities involved in the negotiations on both sides incrementally developed a joint interest in reaching an agreement through negotiations in Oslo. In the initial phase, they focused on establishing the structure of the talks, rather than on the exchange of substantial positions. The joint interest in the success of the negotiations explains the relatively soft negotiation style on both sides up to this moment: both made major concessions in the initial phase of Oslo. And although this was necessary to reach agreement about the feasibility of the Oslo framework, it was not in line with the formal positions taken by the respective principals. Substantial positions had been given up in favour of the development of the structural features of the Oslo channel. Compromises had been made also to symbolise to the respective principals that the other side would be forthcoming in substantial negotiations. Finally, by the end of the sixth round of the talks ‘. . . a joint strategic approach had definitively begun to develop, one that assumed a

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partnership based on mutual legitimization, reciprocal security, and economic prosperity’ (Savir 1998: 39). However, according to the theory laid out in Chapter 1, from now on strategic bargaining between the two sides would commence and take the centre stage. This bargaining process would test the assumptions made in the first phase of the Oslo talks and test the hypothesis whether anything that was developed in that phase – the way in which the talks were structured and the conceptual approach developing a new economic order for the Middle East – would have a determining impact on the outcome. But before jumping to an analysis of the bargaining phase, what do rational choice based theories have to say about the time between December 1992 and May 1993 when the talks were upgraded?

4

Cautious rapprochement A rational choice approach to understanding the Oslo talks

The interpretation of the Oslo talks in the previous chapter argued that the initial phase of the Oslo talks was decisive for the successful development of the normative framework of a future strategic bargaining process. The Oslo talks were a ‘constructed process’ based on compatible ideational worldviews, mutual acceptance and empathy, and achieving principled understanding on the broader context of Israeli–Palestinian peace. Rationalist decision theory, however, offers an alternative approach to the analysis of the first stages of the process. According to the rational choice line of argument, the main function of communication processes between two unitary rational utility maximising actors is the exchange of information which reveals their underlying preferences over outcomes and strategies in the conflict. By 1992, Israel and the PLO had developed preferences conducive for conflict resolution and negotiations. Consequentially, if both sides wanted to reach an agreement, they had to inform the opponent of their willingness in principle to enter into talks. Once engaged in a bargaining process, the two sides would work towards reaching an agreement that was of higher value for both opponents than no agreement. How then did Israelis and Palestinians inform each other about their respective willingness to engage in negotiations? What kind of signals did they exchange and how did they interpret them?

Sending signals The beginning of this process can probably be identified in the ‘Labour Draft of Government Basic Guideline’1 of summer 1992, which outlined Israel’s bargaining positions in the negotiations with the Palestinians. This document stated that to reinforce the security of Israel, Jewish settlements along the confrontation lines should financially be favoured

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over the settlements within the Territories and the Gaza Strip. Rabin announced that the building of new ‘political’ settlements in the Territories would be frozen, a move he considered to be constructive with regard to future negotiation. Beyond this first immediate step of the new government, Rabin also specified the new approach towards peace negotiations with the Palestinians. In order to move the Israeli–Palestinian track of the Washington peace talks along, Rabin stated that he was willing to enter into continuous negotiations with the Palestinian delegation from the Territories about an agreement regarding autonomy and invited the Palestinian delegation to an informal meeting to Jerusalem. But he stressed his position: . . . to send a clear-cut message . . .: Forget that by violence, or by throwing stones, petrol bombs, or knifings that you will make Israel budge one millimetre territorially – one millimetre from what we are committed internationally for the political solution: to their autonomy.2 (Yitzhak Rabin) He also made it clear that the government would not agree to a permanent solution for the Territories or sign any peace treaty that would entail territorial concessions unless it was endorsed by prior elections.3 The PLO reacted cautiously to the statements of the new Israeli government. For Arafat, Rabin was ‘. . . Shamir but with a silk glove’.4 Nabil Sha’ath, political advisor to Arafat was more optimistic about the new Israeli government and noted that Rabin coming to power would represent ‘. . . an opening toward the establishment of a transitional Palestinian government and later the establishment of an independent Palestinian state’. Sha’ath had observed that Rabin dealt with the question of settlements in a more constructive way, differentiating between political and security settlements. This left room for optimism concerning the coming rounds of the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations.5 Mahmoud Abbas, responsible for Israeli affairs within the PLO, noted two progressive aspects in Rabin’s inaugural speech to the Knesset: Rabin’s commitment to allow autonomy to be established in the Occupied Territories and his emphasis on Palestinian elections.6 Impressed by the first remarks of the new Israeli leadership, the PLO instructed the Palestinian delegation to the Washington peace negotiations to assess whether a top-level meeting between the PLO and the new Israeli government was feasible. A high-level meeting might accelerate the peace process and reduce the obstacles impeding Israeli–Palestinian relations.7

A rational choice approach 65 Rabin’s proposal that the Palestinian delegation should start negotiations with the new Israeli government in Jerusalem itself and not in Washington, however, was rejected.8 In the ‘Government Basic Guidelines’, the new government had emphasised the role of Egypt as a prominent partner in advancing the peace process and for the preservation of the stability of the region. Accordingly, the first visit Rabin made after being elected Prime Minister was to Cairo, meeting President Mubarak on 21 July 1992. He was received with fresh optimism. Mubarak in particular appreciated Rabin’s decision to freeze settlement-building.9 In private meetings, Rabin discussed options for advancing the peace process. In a subsequent news conference, Mubarak spoke of ‘Israeli withdrawals’ in the context of establishing autonomy for the Palestinians.10 Mubarak added that if Israeli settlement activities in the Occupied Territories were stopped, Egypt would consider proposing an end to the Arab economic boycott against Israel.11 Usama al-Baz, Foreign Ministry First Under Secretary and Director of the President’s Office for Political Affairs, who later played a crucial role in organising the Oslo talks, had detected a fundamental shift in Israel’s policy towards the Occupied Territories. Whereas Likud’s policy approach towards the West Bank was based on religious and historical claims, and in consequence covered the whole of the West Bank with settlements, Labour was ready to trade ‘land for peace’ and accordingly was willing to halt settlement activities if it could gain higher levels of security in return.12 It seemed that Rabin’s visit had contributed to a ‘new climate’ in the peace process, as various commentators in the Egyptian press had observed.13 For much of the second half of 1992, no substantial progress was made in the Israeli–Palestinian talks. Only a few remarks by Rabin and Peres hinted that Israel was looking for a way out of the negotiation structure set up in Washington. But the tone began to change towards the end of the year. In a speech at the end of November 1992, Rabin spoke for the first time about direct contacts with the PLO. A number of direct links between the Israeli and the Palestinian political establishments were created. By the end of the year – although Rabin was still declaring that ‘both, Fatah and Hamas constitute terror’14 – members of Israeli decisionmaking circles were beginning to modify their positions and trying to break the deadlock in the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations. Beilin sought to establish direct contacts to the PLO through American mediation and in Rome, he tried to establish a linkage to Bassam Abu Sharif, one of Arafat’s advisors.15 After a visit to Cairo at the beginning of January 1993, where he met al-Baz, Beilin stated that the Egyptians were

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extremely optimistic concerning an eventual regional peace agreement and that such an agreement could be reached by spring 1993 and signed in autumn 1993.16 Besides these official interactions, Palestinians and Israelis were trying to establish channels of direct communication between the two leaderships. From October 1992, Israeli and Palestinian security experts held a series of meetings to discuss the security dimension of an eventual Israeli–Palestinian agreement and through Norwegian mediation, Israelis and Palestinians met to discuss the economic aspects of such an agreement. At the beginning of 1993, Peres made it clear to Rabin that he did not see any chance of the Washington talks producing any results. The Israeli government should therefore talk to the PLO ‘. . . to change radically what we were doing in that regard, to propose the “Gaza First” concept as the basic idea and to bring Arafat and his people to Gaza. . . . If you ask me, that moment was the watershed.’17 The faction within the Labour movement itself supporting to negotiate with the PLO became stronger. According to a poll, 33 of the 44 members of the Knesset favoured open negotiations with the PLO.18 As the Israeli government slowly modified its position, the rhetoric of the Palestinian leadership had also changed by the beginning of 1993. On the one hand, Arafat still reiterated that Israel, as an occupying power, was the enemy of the Palestinians’ rights. On the other hand, he did not exclude a substantial negotiated solution for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. In an interview, he rhetorically asked if there was ‘. . . any revolution or liberation movement that did not end up negotiating with their enemies . . . from the first and second Evian treaties on Algeria to Samora Machel’s agreements with Portugal to Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Namibia’.19 Despite the hesitations of some factions within his own Fatah movement, he declared that negotiations were one track amongst other options to be pursued, thereby signalling that he was open to direct negotiations with the Israeli government.

Lifting the ban to talk Another major substantial cooperative move was made by the Knesset. On 19 January 1993, it lifted a law banning meetings with representatives of the PLO which had been in force since 1986. The decision was supported by 39 coalition members and was opposed by 29 members of the Knesset.20 This move theoretically allowed the Israeli government to open direct negotiations with the PLO, although the government stated that the new legal situation would not imply that direct negotiations

A rational choice approach 67 would indeed be launched. The PLO leadership reacted positively to these developments and renewed its attempts to schedule a meeting between Palestinian officials and Shimon Peres to prepare for a summit between Arafat and Rabin.21 Mahmoud Abbas and Yasir Abed Rabbo stated that as the Knesset now had adopted a new position with regard to contacts with the PLO, the Israeli government should recognise the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and begin a direct dialogue with it.22 Despite these accommodative responses to the Knesset’s decision, some high-ranking Palestinian officials were still severely criticising Israel and thereby sending mixed signals to the Israeli government. The Israeli Foreign Ministry received the report of a statement made by Faruq Qaddumi, supposed to be the deputy to Yasser Arafat: The state of Israel is an artificial entity. If it had a role as a front line bulwark against Communism during the Cold War, then today it no longer plays that role. . . . If Israel withdraws to the 1967 borders, which is what we want, it will lose its vitality and will be unable to absorb more immigrants. Aliyah is Israel’s raison d’etre. Without aliyah it will lose its international legitimacy. Therefore the very definition of the Jewish state must be re-examined. One should look for another framework for the Jews to exist.23 (Faruq Qaddumi) Despite these mixed signals coming from the PLO leadership, the abolition of the law banning contacts with the PLO triggered another round of moves. Although Rabin and Peres denied any possibilities that they or other members of the Israeli government could meet the PLO and even negotiate with it, Yossi Beilin was more open towards a direct dialogue. He stated publicly that he had always opposed the law banning meetings with affiliates of the PLO and that he would not deny that some informal meetings between the representatives of the two might take place, thereby reacting to rumours that he had met Nabil Sha’ath in Cairo in the Ramses Hilton on 19 January.24 At the same time, a number of Israeli peace activists took advantage of the new legal situation and met with Arafat and other PLO affiliates. Abie Natan, an Israeli peace activist, met Arafat on 22 January 199325 and Yael Dayan, a member of the Knesset for Labour, met Arafat on 29 January.26 Some weeks later, Israeli Knesset Deputy Speaker Salih Tarif announced that it was planned to hold meetings between Israeli parliamentarians and representatives of the PLO.27

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Following this accommodative track, Rabin appeared on MBC Television on 21 January, the first time an Israeli Prime Minister had ever given an interview to an Arab television network. He reiterated his offer of Palestinian autonomy for a period of no longer than five years with the final status negotiations taking place at the beginning of the third year of autonomy. He also agreed to hold general political elections for the Palestinians – a major modification from the position of the Likud government who formerly had only suggested municipal elections for the Palestinians. The second deviation from Likud’s position was Rabin’s concept of the final status of the West Bank. He stressed that Israel had no intention of annexing the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with its 1.8 million inhabitants, as had been envisaged by Likud. However, the Israeli government would not retreat to the pre-Six-Day-War borders, implying that negotiations would have to produce a territorial compromise. To prove his good intentions, Rabin declared that he had cancelled the construction of 7,000 housing units planned by the Likud government in the Palestinian Territories.28 Addressing the National Press Club in Washington, Peres went even so far as to say that he could not see any reason why Jews could not live under non-Jewish sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.29 Rabin’s statement on elections was modified by a later report that Rabin strongly opposed a proposal of Peres to hold immediate elections in the Territories for Palestinian representatives tasked with negotiations with Israel and for an autonomy council.30 The next public move taken by Israel was to follow up on the ‘Gaza First’ idea. In the summer of 1992, Rabin had already discussed Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip during his meeting with Mubarak in Cairo. Shimon Peres had explored the possibility of an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in another meeting with the Egyptian President. Although not endorsed by official mandates, a number of hidden channels linking the respective political establishments had brought up the idea of ‘Gaza First’; a channel organised by the American Academy of Arts and Science on 29 January had discussed the option and this issue had also been raised in the Oslo channel on 21 January. However, the public debate on ‘Gaza First’ was triggered by Israeli Health Minister Hayim Ramon. On 2 March, he stated that once an agreement with the Palestinians had been reached, Israel would not remain in any of the parts of the Gaza Strip and the entire area would be turned over to Arab control. Ramon argued that the Gaza Strip was of less strategic importance than Judea and Samaria, where Israel had security interests. These security interests on the West Bank would, however, not necessitate Israel keeping control over the whole of the

A rational choice approach 69 territory.31 The Egyptian Ambassador to Israel, Muhammad Bassiouny, on 9 March tried to broaden the debate about Israeli withdrawal from Gaza by arguing that at the moment it made no sense to pull out of Gaza only, but rather that any Israeli move should include a pull out from other Palestinian areas as well.32 On 14 March, Yossi Sarid, another Israeli cabinet member, went further and proposed establishing a ‘PLOled Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip’.33 Despite the attempts of his cabinet members to signal some readiness for compromise on the side of Israel, Rabin ruled out any unilateral pull out from the Gaza Strip during a speech to settlers in the Gaza Strip.34 The fact that the Israelis were discussing the ‘Gaza First’ option caught the immediate attention of the Palestinians and caused cautious reactions. Arafat was supposed to meet with Mubarak by the end of March to discuss these new options35 and PNC secretary Muhammad Subayh stated on 24 March that the Palestinians were ready to take over the Gaza Strip if Israel withdrew, based on the 1974 PNC decision calling for the establishment of Palestinian national authority on any part of the Occupied Territories ‘evacuated by the enemy or liberated from occupation’. However, the Gaza Strip was not the only goal of Palestinian efforts to liberate the Occupied Territories.36 This view was confirmed by Hannan Ashrawi, who stressed that an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza only was not a feasible option for the Palestinians.37 A statement by Mahmoud Abbas on 13 March indicated that the Israeli messages had been seriously considered by the PLO leadership: responding to a statement by Hamas which had called for the establishment of a Palestinian state within the border of the Territories occupied in 1967 by Israel whilst not recognising Israel, he replied that ‘. . . this is a lame stand and political sophistry, because recognition of a Palestinian state should be reciprocal’.38 This was a first hint that the PLO finally was ready to recognise the legitimate right of Israel to exist. Peres again, on 25 March, called for a negotiated Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip,39 and on 28 March outlined his views more concretely in the light of the upcoming ninth round of the Washington talks. Peres stressed that many obstacles to the peace process had already been removed, such as the question of settlements, subsidies to the settlers, the law banning contacts to the PLO and the question of elections. The parties should thus get down to real business with a concrete proposal to link ‘. . . the temporary and the permanent solutions; namely, UN Resolutions 242 and 338 . . .’. Serious negotiations should include the final arrangements for the transfer of self-government to the Palestinians, elections, the functions and the size of the autonomy council, and the

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question of internal security. He added that ‘. . . in my opinion, Gaza should be handed over to the inhabitants of Gaza’.40 Developments within the Territories themselves were sending mixed signals to the opponents. In March, heavy clashes between Palestinians and the Israeli security forces occurred in the Territories. Arafat stated that Rabin had introduced a bone-breaking policy and emphasised that Israel, with all its military strength, could not suppress the Intifada and that Israel found itself in a costly struggle against the Palestinian people who would not surrender.41 Nabil Sha’ath also warned Rabin not to continue with his iron fist policy in the Territories: We are at war right now. We have ordered our men to set the Territories on fire. Rabin’s moves have brought on the present escalation. Rabin is doing what Shamir never dared. If he brings tanks into Gaza, there will be a disaster.42 (Nabil Sha’ath) Rabin sought to combine both, talking about handing over the Gaza Strip and the tough measures taken by him in the Territories, as a carrot and stick policy. In an address to the Knesset on 22 March, he outlined Israel’s security situation and what countermeasures the Israeli government would take to cope with the threats emerging from the Territories. It was obvious to him that although Israel had to deal with a terrorist organisation – without naming the PLO – a large majority of the Palestinians would still identify themselves with its goals. On the other hand, the Palestinians were able to move freely between the heartland of Israel and the Territories, causing difficulties in controlling the security situation. In order to cope with this situation, he re-emphasised the government’s objective ‘. . . to get Gaza out of Tel Aviv by means of an accord and not by unilateral withdrawal’. In order to reach a negotiated settlement, he reconfirmed his adherence to the framework of Madrid and confirmed that he would negotiate with Palestinians from inside the Territories. Besides negotiating, however, the government would also ‘. . . wage a ruthless war on terrorism with every means permitted by Israeli law’. As the government proceeded on these two tracks the Israeli public would ‘. . . witness a significant change [in 1993] – both in the sphere of politics and security’.43 Rabin clarified his Knesset statement on 30 March by certain actions. He imposed a closure of the West Bank, in addition to the existing closure of the Gaza Strip. This prevented 120,000 Palestinians from crossing the Green Line every day to work in Israel, reducing the risk of terrorist

A rational choice approach 71 attacks within the Israeli heartland. Second, he announced that the troops of Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) currently stationed in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reinforced in order to cope with the expected tensions in consequence of the closures. From his statements, it became clear that the clashes in March had seriously depressed Rabin and that he was looking for a way out of the political deadlock. Remarkable in this context was his emphasis on the security of Israelis residing within the pre-1967 borders and the distinction he made regarding the future developments of the Territories. In order to cope with security threats, he wanted to ‘. . . establish the separation, the isolation. Not to have them inside Israel. I did not want Gaza in Tel Aviv on a permanent basis through either a political or an immediate solution. . . . That is why we made separation.’ Although he took tough measures with regard to Palestinian attacks, he also tried to leave open a channel of negotiation to the Palestinians.44 On 1 April, Rabin again stated that peace could only be reached by concessions in negotiations ‘. . . rather than to run away unilaterally’. He emphasised his government’s policy not to annex territory, but at the same time was not willing to retreat the 1967 existing borders. On the other hand, he stressed his approach to fighting terrorism. Separation would be the only tool to achieve a secure situation for the Israelis.45 In order to proceed towards a general settlement, Rabin was willing to propose general elections to a Palestinian selfadministration council, to be held within eight months. An Israeli– Palestinian agreement on the nature of self-administration was a precondition for elections in the Territories.46 The response of Arafat to the cooperative moves of the Israeli leadership during and in particular at the end of March was rather cryptic. On 31 March, he stated that: So far, the Intifada is still in its sixth stage. We have not entered the seventh stage with all its dimensions. What they are now experiencing is simply violence in response to their violence. Journalist Salamah: What are the features of this seventh stage? Arafat: Salamah, let us keep it as a surprise.47 (Yasser Arafat) Shortly before the start of the ninth round of the Washington talks, Peres introduced yet another aspect into the public debate about ‘Gaza First’. He stressed that Israel had made a number of gestures to the Palestinians regarding autonomy; the Israeli government had proposed self-rule, which included Palestinians assuming responsibility for health,

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transportation, trade and agriculture. In addition, Peres proposed setting up a Palestinian police force. He added: ‘I think that just as we do not want to see Palestinian workers on our territory, we also are not interested in seeing Jewish policemen on other Territories.’48 On the same day, the Tel Aviv Hadashot confirmed that Rabin and Peres had agreed a plan to establish a police force headed by Faisal Husseini before autonomy had been achieved. Husseini was reported to have asked for more than 20,000 policemen, more than the current strength of the Israeli police force in the Territories, which was rejected by Israel. However, according to Israel’s view, the police force did need to number several thousand men.49 However, setting up a police force would not imply the establishment of a Palestinian state: According to my approach, which is not that of Greater Israel, a Palestinian entity, which is not a state, will come into being. [It will be] an entity similar to the Jewish community here at the time of the British mandate, which ran its own affairs. The interim arrangement must leave some options open. A Palestinian state, whose establishment I oppose, will not be the only option.50 (Shimon Peres 1993) Police Minister Moshe Shahal confirmed that former Police Minister Roni Milo had established a team, headed by Police Commissioner Rafi Peled, to deal with planning the autonomy police force, based on proposals worked out by Israel Police, Shin Bet and the IDF.51

Engaging in direct talks By that time, both sides had gradually to assess the option of direct talks. Both had signalled to the opponent that there was some room for compromise during direct talks and that these talks could finally bring about an agreement. Both sides therefore had to look for a mechanism which would allow them to discuss the different aspects of an eventual agreement directly. By March, the Palestinians considered the Oslo channel to be the most important of all existing channels and began handing over documents produced in Oslo to Mubarak, the Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa, and to Mubarak’s advisor, Usamah alBaz, who in particular emphasised the opportunities that the Oslo framework would offer.52 For the Palestinians, the Egyptians played a crucial role as an honest broker and emphasised to the Israelis the necessity of indirect Egyptian participation in the talks.53 The ‘Gaza

A rational choice approach 73 First’ proposal, which until then had only been articulated in the media but had never been an issue in the bilateral talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians in Washington, now had to be brought into a formal negotiation context. The well-established ties to Egypt, and in particular the personal relationship that both the Egyptian Ambassador Mohammad Bassiouny and Usamah al-Baz had to the Israeli political establishment meant that Israel was highly supportive of this manoeuvre, which led Peres later to express that: ‘If in Oslo we discovered the way to meet with the PLO leadership, in Egypt we found the spark to ignite the talks, maintain the energy, and find a creative solution’ (Peres 1993: 22). The diplomatic activity in March had shown that both sides in principle were willing to discuss ‘Gaza First’ but that Egypt was needed to translate the diffuse positions of both parties regarding this idea into a real object of negotiations. In particular, Peres was able to translate the vagueness of the ‘Gaza First’ formula by using the close relationship between Bassiouny and Nimrod Novik, a former assistant to Shimon Peres at the Prime Minister’s office, in the negotiations. By the beginning of April, Bassiouny and Novik had met:

. . . and we went to one of his [Bassiouny’s] meetings in Peres’ Tel Aviv office and Peres was in a very thoughtful reflective mood. Peres made a very brief comment, saying that ‘tell the President to take seriously and study the issue of Gaza First’ and started to elaborate, he did not elaborate for more than 45 or 60 seconds. As we always do, we left his office, sat down, because Bassiouny likes to listen to him and I take notes, then we sit down outside and . . . developed the concept, several papers came out of this conversation, and Bassiouny was on his way to Cairo to see the President which is also a common practise. He usually meets with the president tête-à-tête for an hour, two or three, depending on the agenda, which is rare. . . . And we developed a concept paper just on that, when Bassiouny . . . sat down with the President, he raised with him the various reports. Out of these various reports the President said about one, leave this one with me, and that was that particular one.54 (Nimrod Novik) This chain of events occurred at the same time as Mubarak remarked that Egypt would invite Rabin to visit, which Rabin agreed to accept55 which in turn caused Bassiouny to state that ‘. . . we are in an historic phase . . .’56 to achieve a breakthrough in the peace process.57

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Some days later, Shimon Peres went to Cairo to meet his colleague Amr Mussa. He also met Hosni Mubarak, and had a long personal conversation with him. When Hosni Mubarak asked Peres about the documents handed to him by Bassiouny and asked whether Israel was ready to accept Jericho as an autonomous area, Peres replied in the positive. After the meeting Hosni Mubarak told Arafat to come immediately to Cairo to discuss some new developments. He had not informed Arafat about the Gaza–Jericho option until then. When Arafat arrived on 12 April in Cairo, Mubarak asked him about his bargaining position with regard to the West Bank. Arafat answered that he would demand an Israeli withdrawal from all major Palestinian cities on the West Bank. Mubarak replied that the Israelis would under no circumstances accept this proposal. Instead, he suggested that Arafat should first propose an Israeli withdrawal from Jericho.58 Arafat, realising that this concept could open a window of opportunity to acquire control over at least some parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, had a map drafted with ‘Jericho the size of California’ (Novik), including a corridor linking the two areas, necessarily cutting through Israeli territory (Enderlin 1998: 618). Mubarak’s reaction to Arafat’s proposal was frank, telling Arafat that the corridor would not be feasible for the Israelis and Rabin would never accept his proposal. However, although Arafat’s proposal was not accepted at the time, it did emphasise the Palestinian position that the Gaza Strip and the West Bank were to be seen as one territorial unit. On 14 April, Yitzhak Rabin met Hosni Mubarak in Ismailiya. In a private conversation59 Mubarak handed him the map Yasser Arafat had drafted. According to this map, the PLO would be in control of the bridges linking Jordan with the West Bank, the Rafah crossing point linking Egypt to the Gaza Strip, and an ‘extraterritorial’ road linking Gaza with the West Bank. Rabin’s reaction was furious. Peres had not informed him of the Gaza–Jericho proposal Peres had put forward to the PLO via Egypt (Makovsky 1996: 37). Although he could not agree to many of the specifics of the Gaza–Jericho formula, he nonetheless showed his readiness to hand over ‘something’ on the West Bank but not the whole province of Jericho. Mubarak replied that the present map and documents did not constitute Arafat’s final position but only a bargaining one which could be negotiated. Following his conversation with Mubarak, in a press conference Rabin once again clarified his concept of a negotiated solution with the Palestinians; the letters of invitation for the Madrid peace conference and the principles of the Camp David Accords were to provide for the

A rational choice approach 75 beginning of negotiations in the third year after autonomy to reach a permanent peace based on Resolutions 242 and 338. Israel would not annex two million Palestinians but at the same time would not withdraw to the pre-1967 borders. And he added: ‘However, you must understand that territorial compromises are part of our policy.’60

Oslo overshadows the multilateral and Washington talks Yet another opportunity for both sides to show some public flexibility in their approach towards a compromise were the multilateral talks. Both Israelis and Palestinians signalled to the other side the seriousness of their intent to embark on purposeful negotiations by making small-scale compromises in the different fora of the multilaterals. One example of this was the meeting of the multilateral working group on water, on 27–29 April 1993 in Geneva, which came to the brink of collapse several times after the Palestinians had demanded that they be allowed to negotiate their water rights in the Territories. Their demand was rejected by Israel, asserting that water rights should be discussed within the bilateral framework of the Washington talks.61 On 17 May, however, during a meeting of the working group on refugees, Hasan Abu-Libdeh, the deputy head of the negotiating delegation’s technical committee, declared that the obstacles regarding the issue of water could be overcome.62 The Palestinians and Israel were able to sign a joint document during the session of the working group on refugees in Oslo stipulating that the water rights of the residents of the Territories would be discussed within the framework of the bilateral talks. The understanding between the two parties was reached after quiet, direct negotiations between Israeli representatives and Palestinian delegates.63 On another occasion, Yossi Beilin, assessing the first results of the multilateral talks, concluded that whenever PLO representatives steered the talks from behind the scenes, the Palestinians’ positions became more flexible. Taking the latest working group session on environmental issues in Tokyo, 18–19 May, as an example, he noted that as PLO representatives were not present, the Palestinian delegates had adopted extreme stands.64 The period preceding the ninth round of the bilateral talks in Washington scheduled for the end of April was another opportunity for both sides to signal their intentions with regard to serious negotiations. Both sides were able to agree on the fate of some 400 Islamist Palestinians expelled by the Israeli government in December 1992 to Southern Lebanon. The Palestinians made their presence at the Washington talks

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conditional upon the return of the deportees. After some toing and froing, Rabin stated on 21 April that all the deportees would be allowed to return before the end of the year. According to his views, the deportations of December 1992 were exceptional, and the Israeli government had no plans to resort to any further such actions. Rabin made it equally clear that after these accommodative Israeli moves the Palestinians would have to return to the negotiations.65 Arafat announced on 20 April after his meeting with Mubarak that the Palestinian delegation was ready to participate in the talks.66 He called upon Israel to keep its promises and declared: . . . we will see whether Israel complies with its promises or plays games, as it usually does with all international resolutions and with all our actions to establish a just and comprehensive peace in our region. . . . When I say just and comprehensive peace, Yitzhak Rabin must understand that I mean peace, not surrender.67 (Yasser Arafat) The Israelis in turn had been eager to demand flexibility in the run up to the Washington talks. On 9 April, Peres called upon the Palestinians to negotiate constructively: Negotiations are an exchange of gestures instead of an exchange of blows. What are the features of negotiations? Instead of coming with outstretched swords and a mouth full of abuses, you come to negotiations with goodwill. We will, of course be making gestures, and I expect the Palestinians will also do so. Negotiations are in fact a genuine search for the middle ground where the sides can meet in dignity and seriousness, and build a new life.68 (Shimon Peres) Beilin wanted to send a signal to the PLO as well. Asked in an interview whether it would not make more sense to negotiate with the PLO directly, instead of talking to the Palestinian delegation in Washington, which was steered from Tunis anyway, he answered referring to the latest resolutions of the party convention of the Labour Movement: ‘ I see no reason not to talk with our enemies.’69 The day after that statement, Peres spoke of gestures which should be made by both sides and expressed his hope that good relations with their Palestinian neighbours could be established in the near future:

A rational choice approach 77 For eight years we made no concessions whatsoever, and what did we gain? Terror and difficulties . . .. The question now is what we want from the Palestinians. What we actually want from them is peace, good-neighbourly relations, and a normal state of affairs. . . . Immediately after the 20th April there will be an exchange of gestures between us and the Palestinians. . . . We are not talking about a couple falling in love at first sight . . . I do not think we will remain in Gaza, and the option of ‘Gaza First’ is viable. It is preferable, however to achieve this through negotiations. . . . The separation should be the outcome of negotiations. There is no unilateral separation.70 (Shimon Peres) And again on 14 April, Peres said: . . . this is also a process of persuasion. The date plays a role in this persuasion effort, and we definitely want to persuade our neighbours that we are serious about the need to attain an arrangement and to make a decision in the course of 1993 so as to shorten the suffering of all sides: ours and theirs. (Shimon Peres) Another signal was given by the Israeli government at the beginning of April, when it refrained from vetoing the inclusion of Faisal Husseini in the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks in Washington. The Likud government under Shamir had refused to agree to Husseini’s participation in the Palestinian delegation to the Washington negotiations because he was a resident of East Jerusalem. In a change to the Israeli position, Husseini could now be included in the talks because he also had an address of residence in Jericho. The Israelis emphasised, however, that Husseini’s participation had no implications on the Israeli position with regard to Jerusalem, which Israel refused to discuss in the negotiations on the interim settlement.71 Husseini’s participation in the Washington talks sent a double signal to the PLO. On the one hand, Husseini was a senior PLO member and its representative in the Territories. The Israeli government talking to him in Washington represented a major step towards direct contacts with the PLO. On the other hand, this move bolstered Rabin’s distinction between the representatives of the PLO in the Territories and the PLO figures in Tunis at the latter’s expense.72 The reaction of Faisal Husseini himself was positive. He stated that this decision would be a ‘step in the right direction’ as the Israelis had realised

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that they had to deal with the facts on the ground. As he was the informal head of the Palestinian delegation to the Washington talks and at the same time the representative of the PLO in the Territories, the Israelis had implicitly endorsed the formal role of the PLO in the peace talks.73 The ninth bilateral round between Jordanian-Palestinian and Israeli delegations took place from 27 April until 13 May in Washington and ended without any visible progress. The optimism expressed by the decision makers prior to the negotiations had been inappropriate. Both sides had presented a number of proposals to give substance to the talks, but could not engage in serious negotiations or even begin to draft an agreement. At the end of the talks, the Palestinian delegation concluded that the Israeli side was not interested in progress of the negotiations, although at the beginning of the discussions the Palestinians had been optimistic due to Israeli promises and positive engagement.74 The Palestinian head of delegation, Haydar Abdel Shafi, had hoped to reach a mutually acceptable declaration and was frustrated that the talks had failed. He proposed to cancel the negotiation process altogether because even if the talks did proceed in the future, they would not achieve the required results.75 Elyaqim Rubinstein, the head of the Israeli delegation, stated that the talks could have been more successful if less time had been wasted on discussions about procedural matters.76 The Oslo channel, however, was already overshadowing the Washington talks, not only with regard to the public statements of both sides, but also regarding the negotiation tactics. Arafat had advised the Palestinian delegation in Washington to assume a hard position during the negotiations. For example, Arafat insisted on including the issue of Jerusalem in the talks; he also insisted on discussing Jewish settlements in the Territories.77 Both points were red flags for the Israelis. At the same time, and although generally the delegations came to a rather negative assessment of the results of this round in Washington, their principals were astonishingly optimistic about the progress made. On 14 May, Peres said that although the talks had failed to reach a draft ‘declaration of intentions’, the discussions had moved on from a procedural to a substantial level. He stressed the importance that working groups had been created and that agreement had been reached on other matters. He emphasised the value of the Israeli proposal of agreeing an interim solution before negotiating a final agreement. Only this way could the atmosphere between the Palestinians and Israelis be calmed and trust built between them.78 Two days later, Prime Minister Rabin made a rather similar statement. He was convinced that the talks with the Arab

A rational choice approach 79 delegations could be continued. Rabin also emphasised Israeli readiness to compromise.79 On 23 May, he proposed in a Cabinet meeting that a possible agreement between the two parties should refer to the Gaza Strip as a first step. Those members of the PLO who were aware of the secret talks in Oslo did send signals for compromise, as did their Israeli counterparts. Mahmoud Abbas said that the last round of negotiations had been marked by some progress. This was the first round where relevant documents had been put forward by both sides, symbolising a tremendous success, even if an agreement had not been drafted.80 Arafat himself seemed to be willing to proceed further in the process: Bassam Abu Sharif, an assistant to Arafat, revealed that during a visit to Vienna on 18 May, Arafat had passed a letter to the Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky, in which he had formulated some proposals. According to the letter, the Israeli army should first withdraw only from the Gaza Strip and be replaced by international forces.81 During a press conference in Vienna, attended also by Israeli journalists, Arafat stated that the Israeli army had to leave the Occupied Territories and that he would be ready for a ‘peace of the brave’. Arafat also said that a withdrawal from the Gaza Strip alone would not fulfil the Palestinian demands, but that part of the West Bank, namely Jericho, should be evacuated by the Israelis (Halter and Laurent 1994: 124). In a statement to the Knesset foreign affairs and defence committee, Rabin confirmed that the implementation of autonomy in ‘Gaza First’ could serve as a ‘pilot project’ for autonomy as a whole. Arafat had also suggested ‘a symbolic autonomy foothold somewhere on the West Bank’. However, Rabin did not confirm rumours that Arafat was referring to Jericho.82 On 14 June, Mohammed Bassiouny, the Ambassador of Egypt in Israel, expressed optimism about the prospects for progress of the talks. During a lecture at Haifa University, he told journalists, referring to the next round of peace talks in Washington: ‘I believe we will reach two agreements during this [the tenth round of the Washington negotiations] round – one on transferring authority to the Palestinians, except for security, and the other on a joint declaration of principles.’83 These public moves and gestures slowly increased the level of trust on both sides. Now, Arafat, Rabin and Peres had to identify ways through which direct negotiations could be launched. Several channels were available to them at that time.84 Yet, the two sides decided that Oslo was to be the main venue of the negotiations with the PLO. The Israeli government decided to send Uri Savir, Director General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Oslo.

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A rational choice based interpretation of the Oslo talks In the previous chapter, I offered a constructivist narrative of how Savir, i.e. the government of Israel, got to Oslo. Here I will make the case for rational choice based approaches. Again, let’s recall some of the rational choice based approaches to the analysis of international negotiations. Actors, based on stable identities and preferences engage in a process of interaction in which they negotiate for the best outcome. In this, they need to know about the preferences and strategic intentions of the other side, as the willingness of the other to be ready in principle to work for a cooperative outcome cannot be assumed a priori. Therefore they have to engage in a process of exchanging signals, hoping that these signals are correctly decoded by the other side. What matters most in this process are the statements and gestures of the top leadership, as they are the only ones who legitimately represent the other party. Other actors, such as NGOs and others, do not play a meaningful role. For Israelis and Palestinians it was particularly difficult to access relevant information. Talking to the other side meant recognising it – with all the political implications and costs that this would have. Therefore, both sides engaged in a very subtle process of sending signals, first tentatively, then ever more intensively to each other. In this, they used most prominently the bilateral and multilateral tracks. Other governments, such as the government of Egypt, served as conduits and facilitated the passing of messages. Other informal channels, such as Oslo, were useful in the sense that they allowed some positions to be tested here and there. Yet, the rational choice narrative would suggest that whatever was said and done in these channels did not have the slightest impact on the negotiations that would follow. Only with the introduction of Savir was the line opened for formal and direct communication. This was a risky step, but both sides were comfortable with it, as they had respectively gathered the necessary information in the preceding months to take the risk.

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The bargaining process that unfolded in Oslo between January and September 1993 provides the opportunity to assess in which way elements that rational choice and constructivist negotiation analyses deem important played out. What are the elements of this process that the two approaches can explain, and how can they explain the outcome of the Oslo talks? The appearance of Uri Savir in Oslo had convinced the Israeli government, that the Oslo channel offered a viable opportunity to reach an agreement with the PLO. Rabin decided to grasp this opportunity. In preparing the next round of the negotiations, he included Joel Singer in the Israeli negotiating team. Singer had participated as a lawyer in the negotiations of the Camp David Agreements with Egypt and enjoyed Rabin’s confidence. Singer would later conclude that it was coincidental that the Oslo channel was chosen and that any other channel could also have served the purpose. In his view, what had been discussed in Oslo was irrelevant and not binding. Even Peres never approved the documents which resulted from the first phase of the Oslo talks.1 His immediate reaction to the results of the Oslo talks achieved until then was moderate: The text which had been developed by Hirschfeld and Pundak was terrible. Full of economics. So we had to work on it. Because we could not get a totally new document, I introduced interpretations and understandings of the text, so it was made contingent upon these. In addition I changed some of the wording slightly which would give the document another meaning.2 (Joel Singer) Singer decided to include ‘Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of

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Principles’ in which some of the articles of the Declaration of Principles would be modified. Most important for Rabin was to establish that a Palestinian Council would cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that would be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis. These items were explicitly excluded from interim status negotiations and from the authority of the Council during the interim period. At the same time, the definite article ‘the’ in front of ‘the West Bank’ was left out, so that the Council’s authority would cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, but not all of it. During the negotiations, these two aspects were of crucial importance for Rabin.3 In preparing Singer for the talks, the Israelis specified their negotiating positions. Singer was to make clear that the Israeli army’s redeployment – first from the Gaza Strip and later from other parts of the West Bank – was exclusively dependent upon Israel’s unilateral decisions. No Israeli settlement was to be evacuated during the five-year interim period and both settlers and settlements were to remain under the protection of the Israeli security forces. The question of the future of Jerusalem was to be referred to the final status negotiations. Although Rabin and Peres had agreed to the ‘Gaza–Jericho First’ formula, Singer was to avoid raising the question of Jericho and concentrate on ‘Gaza First’. Only if the Palestinians demanded to discuss the future of Jericho should he enter into negotiations on that item, albeit stressing Israel’s refusal to relinquish control over the crossing points between Jericho and Jordan. Rabin, however, rejected Singer’s proposal to establish a UN trusteeship in the Gaza Strip, proposed by Qureia in the previous rounds. This arrangement would, in Rabin’s assessment, lead to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, which Rabin opposed (Segev 1998: 197f). Once they had established their first tentative formal negotiating positions, the Israelis developed their bargaining tactics for Singer’s first appearance in Oslo. Singer had already experienced the negotiating behaviour of Arab parties during the Camp David negotiations with Egypt. There he had discovered that Arabs were more accommodative in negotiations conducted orally rather than written. The Israelis decided to send Hirschfeld and Pundak to Oslo two days ahead of Singer. They were to tell the Palestinians that Singer represented Rabin and that the Oslo talks were now being conducted under the exclusive supervision of the Prime Minister. However, in order to convince Rabin to continue with the negotiations and to involve him further in the process, it was necessary to be as accommodative as possible. Moderate Palestinian

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demands would finally persuade Rabin that an agreement with the PLO was indeed possible to achieve. These preparations should soften the negotiating position of the Palestinians. At the same time, Singer planned not to put anything to the Palestinians in writing, but rather to ask them questions regarding their specific positions on particular aspects of an eventual agreement. Singer would then later integrate the answers of the Palestinians to his questions into a draft document, which the Israelis would then claim included the Palestinians’ positions.4 At the beginning of the talks in Oslo on 13 June, the Palestinians were surprised by the new developments and the inclusion of Singer in the Israeli delegation. They knew of his standing and his involvement as legal advisor in different Arab–Israeli negotiations. For the Palestinians, the presence of Singer represented the full participation of the Israeli government. They were aware that Singer was a close assistant of Rabin, and that his presence in Oslo symbolised that Rabin was now fully behind the channel (Abbas 1995: 151). Singer gave the Palestinians his short interpretation based on his perception of the achievements realised in Oslo so far. The general structure of the draft agreement was sound, but some deficits still existed concerning details of the document which were still too vague; Rabin also shared this analysis. Commenting on other attempts to open informal channels between the Israeli government and the PLO, he confirmed that the Oslo channel would have the exclusive legitimacy to reach a deal between the parties. Other attempts launched by individual Israelis or Palestinians would not be taken seriously (Abbas 1995: 152). After these introductory remarks, Singer then presented a long list of questions to the Palestinians.5 These questions were designed to clarify the PLO’s position regarding different aspects of an eventual agreement between the two and, as the Israelis had discussed among themselves, the answers – if forthcoming – were be included into a draft agreement. The questions covered in particular the institutional framework once the Israelis had withdrawn from Gaza and Jericho, before addressing mutual recognition. The Palestinian delegation tried to answer these questions using the available information and material that had been agreed upon by the Israelis and Palestinians in the previous rounds of talks in Oslo. Singer then told the Palestinians that their answers would be decisive in shaping Rabin’s opinion of the future of the Oslo talks. The Palestinians were thus aware that the talks had reached a crucial stage and they decided to await the Israeli reaction (Abbas 1995: 153ff; Enderlin 1998: 622f). In the meantime, the tenth round of negotiations between Israelis and

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Palestinians in Washington, convened from 15 June to 1 July, had ended without achieving any results. The heightened desire of the Americans to press for results and their demand to depart from established positions in the negotiations had no positive effect on the two sides.6 Despite the obvious failure of the official talks, again the principals on both sides came to astonishingly positive assessments of the situation. Rabin clarified the Israeli negotiation position on Radio Monte Carlo on 3 July, which differed in some aspects from the Israeli proposal of the ninth round of negotiations.7 (It is remarkable, though, that Radio Monte Carlo at that time partly belonged to the Palestinian National Fund and it was the first time that an Israeli Prime Minister had ever given them an interview.) Rabin made clear that the Israeli side was ready for concessions which would allow the establishment of a Palestinian Interim SelfGoverning Authority in the Territories. He offered to hand over powers such as education, tourism, agriculture, and public health to a Palestinian authority even before an agreement between both sides was achieved. He discussed redeploying the Israeli army in the Territories and withdrawing it from the larger cities. A Palestinian police force should be established to keep order within Palestinian cities, whereas Israeli security forces would guarantee the security of the Israelis in the Territories. During the interim period, which was not to exceed five years, the final status of the Territories was to be negotiated. Rabin deplored the fact that the Palestinians wanted to include items in the current negotiations which, in the view of the Israeli government, referred to the final status. However, and thereby he seemed to address the PLO leadership directly, he said: ‘I have no doubt the Tunis representatives are . . . interested.’ He called for small cooperative steps to build mutual trust and to change the status quo. The step-by-step transfer of powers would be a good way to achieve that goal. Otherwise, things could not change ‘drastically’.

Caught in the negotiator’s dilemma At the next round of the talks, which took place on 4–6 July in Gressheim, the Israelis produced the first formal document reiterating the principle of gradualism by an official Israeli delegation. The document proposed a three-stage process in which autonomy would be established in Gaza and Jericho first; to be followed by an interim agreement to be concluded on extending autonomy within the rest of the West Bank; and finally negotiations to be held on a permanent settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Savir 1998: 35). Although the Palestinians were furious that many of the achievements reached in the previous document had been

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undone, they nevertheless valued the fact that this was the first formal draft agreement the Israeli government had presented to them. After three days of negotiation, the so-called ‘Gressheim Declaration of Principles’ finally amended the Sarpsborg document in some relevant areas. Israel formally agreed to withdraw from Gaza and Jericho within a period of three months, considerably shortening the period of withdrawal of two years as envisaged in the Sarpsborg document. The idea of a trusteeship in whatever kind of form was dropped. The Palestinians were to receive full jurisdiction over Territories the Israelis had withdrawn from, but it was agreed that settlers, settlements, Israeli visitors to the Territories and military locations would remain under Israeli control. Concerning the question of ‘early empowerment’, the competences of the Palestinian authorities were restricted to education, health, tourism, welfare and taxation (Makovsky 1996: 55–58; Enderlin 1998: 626f). The Israelis envisaged the final accord to be signed in two stages: in the first stage the document should be signed by the PLO and a representative of the government of Israel in Oslo; in the second stage, the document should be signed on the occasion of a special ceremony in Washington by Shimon Peres and Faisal al-Husseini in the presence of the co-sponsors of the peace process, the USA and Russia. At that point the existence of the Oslo process would also be announced officially (Enderlin 1998: 627). For the Palestinians, the main points to be resolved in the subsequent meetings were the following: Although the Israelis agreed that they should withdraw from Gaza and Jericho simultaneously, they were still unclear about the depth of the withdrawal. The Israelis also continued to emphasise that Jerusalem could not be mentioned in the Declaration of Principles, in particular with regard to Palestinian elections, and they refused to introduce any reference to Palestinian refugees. Security questions had also not been dealt with in depth so far as the Israelis had only started to outline their concept of external and internal security. They were also critical of the idea of introducing institutionalised arbitration (Abbas 1995: 160f). But the Palestinian delegation accepted that the Israelis had now recognised the PLO as a real negotiating partner and as the only side with which the remaining issues could be negotiated and finally settled. At the end of the meeting both parties felt that they had made major progress, in fact had achieved a breakthrough,8 and that there were only a few issues left to resolve. Each side was to take the draft, the first draft in fact ever produced by an official delegation of the government of Israel and the PLO, back for approval by the respective principals.

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These developments caused Beilin to openly express his optimism on 8 July: It is a sort of a metaphor, but I do not believe anyone thinks the gap is currently the size of an ocean. I believe those who are conversant with the details of the negotiations share my feeling that the distance is very small, perhaps smaller than ever in the history of the Middle East.9 (Yossi Beilin) The following two rounds of the Oslo talks enabled the Palestinians to reciprocate what they had perceived as non-cooperative moves by the Israelis in the former rounds and to make their bargaining position more specific. At the same time, in the logic of the negotiator’s dilemma, the friction between the intentions to reach a mutually beneficial outcome but at the same time the best individual terms became apparent. On the one hand, at the meeting on 11–12 July, Qureia presented a letter by Arafat, for the first time addressing the Israeli leadership directly and speaking of ‘. . . a genuine historic chance in the history of [the Israeli Palestinian] conflict’,10 thereby reiterating his commitment to the Oslo negotiations. Both sides had the responsibility not to lose this opportunity. But Arafat added new Palestinian demands to his letter. He called for a prompt and significant withdrawal not just from Gaza and Jericho but also from a larger area, at the same time leaving the crossing between the West Bank and Jordan (the Allenby Bridge) at least in part under the control of the emerging Palestinian authorities. Elections for the Palestinian council were to be held in Jerusalem and Palestinian residents of Jerusalem were to be allowed to stand for election to the council. The Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem were to be formally linked to the council too. At the same time, he demanded that the autonomy council be given executive, legislative and judicial powers in the interim period. Reference should be made to the refugees displaced in 1967 and a mechanism should be created for their repatriation. The Palestinians also wanted the Israeli government to acknowledge the national rights of the Palestinian people and promise to implement Security Council Resolution 242 with regard to a future Palestinian state. Finally, the PLO wanted to establish mechanisms for outside arbitration and an international presence in the Territories in order to guarantee the fulfilment of the agreement (Abbas 1995: 162f, Savir 1998: 38f). The Israelis reiterated that the Israeli army would only withdraw from a symbolic part of Jericho, but would withdraw fully from Gaza with the

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exception of the settlements. No reference should be made to the corridor linking the two entities. There would be no isolated agreement on Gaza and Jericho; it would instead be incorporated into the Declaration of Principles. The authority of the police force in Gaza was to be greater than its powers in the other Territories (Abbas 1995: 164).

The Norwegians intensify their role In the context of the developments in Halvorsbole, the Norwegian mediators began to take a more active, mediating (as opposed to facilitating) role than before. On 11 July, a day after the talks at Halvorsbole had started, Foreign Minister Johan Juergen Holst was on his way to Tunisia for an official visit to Tunisian Prime Minister Abidine Ben Ali. Terje Larsen and his wife Mona Juul were accompanying him. During his visit, Holst was briefed by Juul and Larsen on the difficulties in Halvorsbole, which Holst was then able to discuss directly with Arafat on 11 July in Tunis. During a first meeting at a gathering of senior Palestinian figures, Arafat expressed his discontent with the proceedings of the talks in Washington. He was very pessimistic about the outcome in the Washington talks given that the latest proposal presented by the Americans was heavily biased toward the Israeli side. He had examined the text and marked the passages he thought were supportive of the Israeli and – vice versa – of the Palestinian positions and concluded that, all in all, 65 per cent of the text favoured the Israeli position and only 5 per cent the Palestinian. The rest of the text was made up of genuine American proposals. From his analysis, he concluded that because the Americans were biased in favour of the Israelis, he did not believe that the talks in Washington would produce anything substantial (Enderlin 1998: 628). In a subsequent private meeting with Holst, Arafat was eager to show that he was ready for a compromise and that an agreement through the Oslo channel should be concluded rapidly. Basically, he was very enthusiastic about the results of the Oslo channel and re-emphasised his commitment to it. The Oslo channel had produced more results than any of the Arab attempts to create a similar channel, including attempts made by the Egyptians. Holst demanded that the Palestinians adopt a realistic approach. Substantial results had been achieved in the Oslo talks and the subsequent versions of the draft documents. However, the proposals presented in the last round of the talks reversed some of the former Palestinian positions and at the same time constituted a major stumbling block for further negotiations. Holst pointed out that on his last visit to Israel he had had the impression in his talks with Shimon

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Peres and others that the current Israeli government was committed to reaching an agreement (Makovsky 1996: 60), but had to be careful not to allow Likud to organise substantial opposition to any future agreement. The Americans, and in particular, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, were fully informed about the developments in Oslo. Holst then asked Arafat to present his ideas on the Jericho question and the linkage with Gaza (Enderlin 1998: 628). Arafat made clear that any agreement reached with the Israelis had to include some part of the West Bank, otherwise he would be accused by the Palestinians of the West Bank for not taking their aspirations into account. He chose Jericho because this area comprised an important Palestinian refugee camp, but no Israeli settlements. Given the precondition that the Palestinians would control the ‘province’ of Jericho and not only the city, it would also be easier to control the Intifada from that position. However, he again emphasised the Palestinian position that under all circumstances Gaza and the West Bank were to be regarded as one territorial entity. The corridor he had proposed was not to divide Israel and need not necessarily be under the control of the PLO or other international forces. Israel just had to guarantee that the Palestinians had the right of free passage between the two areas (Makovsky 1996: 60; Enderlin 1998: 628f). Holst then sent Terje Larsen and Mona Juul to Jerusalem to confirm to the Israelis that Arafat remained serious about Oslo. Holst wrote a letter to the Israelis after his conversations with Arafat, stating that Arafat was committed to peace and was actively involved in the whole process. On 18 July, Larsen had a long discussion with Shimon Peres, Yossi Beilin and the rest of the Israeli negotiating team. Peres wanted three important issues to be discussed: the first was Jerusalem, where no further compromises on the side of the Israelis could be made as there was no majority in the Knesset for further concessions on this point; second, the security of Israelis in Gaza; and third, the necessity of maintaining overall jurisdiction over the Territories. Responding to a question from Larsen, he stated that there would be no possibility whatsoever of convening the Palestinian autonomous council in Jerusalem. The question of the linkage between Gaza and Jericho however could be dealt with flexibly. For the first time, the question of Arafat’s return to the Territories became a subject in the discussions. The Israelis did not object to his return, but he would have to renounce his current title of ‘President’. Most of the other members of the PLO would also be allowed back, and the armed forces of the PLO could be incorporated into the security services. Concerning the economic and social problems of the Palestinians, Peres would try to persuade the European Union, in particular Jacques Delors, the USA

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and Russia to send delegates to hold talks with Faisal al-Husseini from the Palestinian side. The donor community should focus its help on Gaza. The World Bank could also support the development efforts of the Palestinians. The Israeli government was aware of the financial crisis of the PLO and they also knew that Hamas would have an advantage in gaining popular support because of its financial resources (Enderlin 1998: 631ff). The final agreement was to be signed on the Palestinian side by Faisal al-Husseini and there would be several opportunities to arrange the signing ceremony. The agreement could be signed in secret between the two delegations and the Norwegians in Oslo. Alternatively, a ceremony could take place in public in the presence of the co-sponsors, and in the presence of Egypt and representatives of other North African countries. But the negotiations should be concluded first and Uri Savir and Ahmad Qureia would then initial the agreement. The Israelis in the next round of the negotiations demanded that the Palestinians come to the negotiation table constructively, presenting proposals which would allow the conclusion of the negotiations. Peres would then even be ready to meet with Arafat in person (Enderlin 1998: 632f). By then, it was clear to Peres and Rabin that although the Declaration of Principles would not be officially linked to mutual recognition, the former would not happen without the latter (Makovsky 1996: 62). The question of mutual recognition had until then not been put on the negotiation table for tactical reasons, as Peres had been concerned that overloading the negotiations would in the end be counterproductive and not achieve either result (Makovsky 1996: 62f).

Final tests on both sides Despite being represented by Singer at the negotiation table in Oslo, it was crucial for Rabin to test the thinking of the PLO independently of Oslo. The tenth round of the Oslo talks and the new Palestinian demands had given him a conflicting impression of the Palestinian positions. Central for Rabin was the question of the future of the settlements, Jerusalem, security arrangements, and the step-by-step approach linking an interim period to the final status negotiations.11 In order to receive information on these points from Arafat, Rabin asked Haim Ramon, Minister of Health and close to Rabin, to meet with Ahmad Tibi, a Palestinian Israeli medical doctor and Arafat confidant. Rabin asked Ramon to hand over four questions to test the seriousness of the PLO and at the same time to identify the bargaining position of the

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PLO with regard to a two-stage settlement, the Jewish settlements, security arrangements and Jerusalem (Abbas 1995: 75;, Enderlin 1998: 636; Segev 1998: 204f): 1 2

3

4

Is the PLO ready for a two-stage settlement – an interim period of five years, and then final status negotiations? Does the PLO agree that during the five-year interim period, not one single Israeli settlement is to be evacuated, and that the whole issue of settlements be referred to the final status negotiations? Does the PLO agree that during the interim period, overall security will remain under Israel’s responsibility and does the PLO understand that once an agreement is reached, it would have to refrain from all acts of terror and violence? Finally, does the PLO agree that the issue of the future of Jerusalem will be left to final status negotiations?

On 14 and 20 July, Ramon met with Tibi at the Israeli Ministry of Health, and passed on the questions to him. Some days later, on 26 July, Tibi, after having consulted with Arafat and Abbas, returned with the answers: The PLO agreed to the two stage-settlement, both a transitional and a final stage. The issues for the permanent status negotiations – Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders and other issues – were to be specified in the declaration of principles so that both stages were linked. The PLO furthermore agreed that the question of the future of the settlements should be discussed in the final status negotiations and until then would remain under the protection of the Israeli army. External security would be Israel’s responsibility during the interim period whilst internal security would rest with the Palestinian authority. A joint liaison and coordination committee should be established to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes. The PLO finally agreed to discuss the future of Jerusalem within the framework of a permanent settlement. However, Palestinians from Jerusalem were to be able to participate fully in the elections as candidates and voters (Abbas 1995: 81f; Enderlin 1998: 636). Already by the beginning of July, the Palestinians had used another channel in order to find out if Rabin supported the Oslo talks. In a private meeting between Rabin and Usama al-Baz, al-Baz asked if Rabin was aware of the channel, if he was completely in the picture about what was being discussed, and if he endorsed everything which was discussed. While giving positive replies to the first two questions, he did not answer the third one.12

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The next round of the negotiations, 25–26 July, was interpreted by both sides as being crucial for the hammering out of the final agreement, Savir stating that ‘Oslo had now reached the moment of truth’ (1998: 44) and Abbas noticing that that the negotiations ‘. . . felt like a countdown’ (1995: 166). Although Arafat had been very accommodating in his meetings with the Norwegians, the Palestinians presented their own draft document informed by the positions they had taken in the previous round. The Israelis reacted furiously. In their view, the Palestinians had gone back on their previous positions, completely ignoring the document negotiated on 6 July. Key parts of the document, which had been drafted by Arafat in April and had then been presented to Rabin in Ismailiya by Mubarak, had been inserted into this new document. These included demands for Palestinian control of the Allenby Bridge, an extraterritorial road between Gaza and Jericho, and that the Gaza and Jericho crossing points should be controlled by Palestinian forces. The Palestinian police forces should comprise 10,000 Palestinian policemen. The document demanded Israel withdraw from Gaza within three months and that the scope of every further redeployment should be determined by negotiations. The term ‘Palestinian Liberation Organization’ had been substituted in some places for ‘Palestinians’, implying that the PLO would be in control of the Territories from which the Israeli forces would withdraw (Enderlin 1998: 627; Savir 1998: 44). After the presentation of the re-emphasised Palestinian demands, the atmosphere of the talks became tense. Savir stated that the Palestinian amendments were unacceptable to the Israelis and that the agreement was seriously endangered. Abbas rejected Savir’s allegations. He stated that when Singer had been included in the negotiation process, the Israelis themselves had dismissed the compromise document already achieved. For the Palestinians, it was therefore legitimate to reconsider some points of the Declaration of Principles themselves once the negotiations had reached a serious stage. By now, the two sides were caught in the negotiator’s dilemma as both on the one hand had developed an interest in reaching an agreement in principle, but on the other, sought to get the best deal for themselves. In a strategic bargaining process structured by the concept of gradualism, the actors exchanged cooperative and non-cooperative moves in order to identify one specific joint strategy out of the set of all possible alternative eligible strategies. The concept of gradualism, developed in the first phase of the Oslo process, implied that competences would be gradually handed over to the Palestinians along three dimensions: a territorial dimension, a

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functional dimension and a time dimension. In the case of Gaza–Jericho, for example, gradualism in its territorial component meant that the two parties agreed that territory should be handed over to Palestinian control piece by piece. Consequently, the bargaining position of the Palestinians was to take control of as much territory as possible and that the territory received should be at as high a value as possible. In April, Arafat had presented a bargaining position to Mubarak which demanded that under any first agreement with the Israelis, all major Palestinian towns were to come under Palestinian control, whereas the Israeli position was to hand over the Gaza Strip plus ‘something’ of the Territories. Initially, Israel was only ready to hand over some symbolic minor piece of the West Bank. Both sides were bargaining then over the size of the territory handed over in a first step, which would be followed by others. The Israeli position was to offer as little as possible but enough to ensure that the Palestinians would sign the agreement; the Palestinian position was to demand as large and as valuable a piece of territory as possible, which at the same time would not touch the resistance points of the Israelis. The introduction of Jericho as a starting point for any preliminary settlement was essential to the Palestinians for various reasons. First, Arafat needed ‘something’ on the West Bank in order to demonstrate that he would not betray the aspirations of the Palestinians of the West Bank. Jericho would symbolise that the Gaza Strip and the West Bank would retain a territorial unity during the interim period. Second, the Allon Plan13 had emphasised that an Israeli presence in the Jordan valley was of crucial importance to Israel’s security and thus should be the last territory to be evacuated. For the Palestinians, claiming and receiving authority over Jericho would imply that the Israeli hold over the valley was being weakened. Finally, the PLO wanted to end all Jordanian claims towards the West Bank. In the 1980s, Jordan and Israel had secretly discussed how Jordanian influence on the West Bank could be revived. One option had been to make Jericho a Jordanian stronghold. If the PLO could move to Jericho, this option could never be realised. Thus, gaining authority over Jericho carried several advantages for Arafat. From the eighth round of the negotiations, with both sides having formulated their bargaining positions, the process became governed by this concept of gradualism. A priori, in that respect the aim of the Israelis was, following an initial cooperative move, to transfer as little territory as possible, as few competences as possible, and to do so as late as possible. By contrast, the aim of the Palestinians was to extract from the Israelis as many territorial concessions as possible, as many competences as

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possible and within the shortest period of time as possible. The applicability of this concept to the negotiation process can be demonstrated through a closer look at the available data. Table 5.1 includes the agreement and the positions taken by the parties at two different stages of the negotiations. The first stage is a first meaningful draft agreement achieved after the fifth round of the talks by Qureia and Hirschfeld. The table further includes the subsequent major points of divergence between the Israelis and the Palestinians as of 25–26 July, when the bargaining process was at its initial phase.14 The first draft and these points can then be compared to the final outcome of the two stages, i.e. the corresponding parts of the Declaration of Principles. Examples cited are Article I on the interim arrangements and the final status negotiations, Article V/3 on the final status negotiations, Article VII/5 on withdrawal of the Israeli military government, Article VIII on public order and security, Article XII on liaison and cooperation with Jordan and Egypt, and Annex I/3 on the mode and conditions of elections. Article I. Interim arrangements and final status negotiations Article I determines the linkage between the interim arrangement and the final status negotiation, providing for a gradual spill over from an interim to a final status arrangement. The Declaration of Principles of the fifth round was quite unspecific regarding the linkage between the two arrangements: there was no specific explanation as to how the interim phase and the final status would interrelate and in particular how Security Council Resolution 242 and Security Council Resolution 338 would be negotiated. At the meeting of 25–26 July, both parties agreed to link the interim arrangements with the final status negotiations which would lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Both the interim arrangements and the final status talks should be integrated parts of the overall peace process. However, the scope of the Security Council Resolutions was disputed: The Israeli position, that final status negotiations should lead to the implementation of an interpretation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 to be agreed upon by both parties, would have made the substance of both resolutions conditional upon some future negotiations which could change the overall reference of both. The Palestinians, on the other hand, desired as fully a comprehensive interpretation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as possible, intending that they should be implemented in all their aspects,

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole process leading to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Article I. Interim arrangements and final status negotiations

Article V/3. Final These negotiations will status negotiations cover the remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, sovereignty, borders and other issues of common interest.

Declaration of Principles, Fifth round of Oslo talks

Issue

It is understood that at these negotiations each party may raise any issues for negotiation.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the overall peace process and that the final status negotiations will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as agreed upon by both parties at the permanent status negotiations.

Israeli proposal, 25–26 July

Final Declaration of Principles It is understood that the interim agreements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations of the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours and other issues of common interest.

Palestinian proposal, 25–26 July It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the overall peace process and that the final status negotiations will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their aspects.

It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours and any other issues of common interest.

Table 5.1 Synopsis of the draft Declaration of Principles of the fifth round, subsequent Israeli and Palestinian proposals and the final Declaration of Principles

The two parties will negotiate an agreement to invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Interim Authority, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other, to promote cooperation between them.

Article XII. Liaison and cooperation with Jordan and Egypt

The two parties [the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Council] will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Council, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other.

. . . Israel will continue to . . . for defending against carry all responsibilities . . .. external threats or terrorist threats against the Israelis, as well as the responsibility for overall security of the Israelis.

Article VIII. Public order and security

After the inauguration of the Council, the [Israeli] Civil Administration will be dissolved.

[No mention of the Civil Administration and the Israeli military government.]

Article VII/5. Dissolution of the Israeli Civil Administration and withdrawal of the military government

The two parties will negotiate an agreement to invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing

The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel, the Council, Jordan and Egypt to look into, among other things, the means of cooperation, problem solving and modalities of the admission of persons displaced in 1967.

continued

. . . for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

After the inauguration of the Council, the [Israeli] Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

. . . for defending against external threats.

After the inauguration of the Council, the [Israeli] Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

1. Palestinians of Jerusalem have the right to participate in the election process as candidates and voters. All displaced Palestinians registered on 4 June 1967 have the right to participate in the election process. 2. Their future status will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.

Annex I/3. Mode and conditions of elections

The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4 June 1967 will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.

Israeli proposal, 25–26 July

Sources: Abbas (1995: 144–49, 171–73) and final Declaration of Principles.

Declaration of Principles, Fifth round of Oslo talks

Issue

Table 5.1 Continued

The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4 June 1967 will not be prejudiced if they are unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.

Palestinian proposal, 25–26 July

1. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there have the right to participate in the election process according to an agreement between the two sides.. . . 3. The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4 June 1967 will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.

Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.

Final Declaration of Principles

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leaving as few options as possible by which the Israelis could escape from realising the principle of land for peace. The outcome, however unimaginative, was that both relinquished their demands for the definition of the resolutions, so that in the end no interpretation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 was given. Article V/3. Final status negotiations The Declaration of Principles which was produced at the fifth round of the negotiations stipulated that the final status negotiation would include Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, sovereignty, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours, and other issues of common interest. This list had been produced before Singer was introduced into the negotiations and before Rabin gave his consent to it. When negotiating this list, in the eyes of the Israeli government, Hirschfeld and Pundak had been much too accommodating. Consequently, the Israelis, in their proposal of 25–26 July, had to withdraw from certain concessions that had been made. They now proposed that in the final status negotiations each party might raise ‘any issues for negotiation’. This phrase was rather unspecific and thereby avoided including items in the negotiation process which were highly controversial to the Israeli public. Mentioning sovereignty and borders, the Declaration of Principles of the fifth round already indicated that an independent Palestinian state with clearly defined borders would eventually come into being. Including Jerusalem in the list of negotiable items would even open the possibility that the Palestinians could demand part of Jerusalem, the ‘eternal and indivisible capital of Israel’, to become the capital of an independent Palestinian state.15 Although the Israelis had privately endorsed the establishment of a Palestinian state, in writing they could not accept the list of tradeable items. They backtracked by opening up the possibility for each party to raise any issue for negotiation in the final status talks. This Israeli approach was too vague for the Palestinians. They demanded as a matter of principle that the list of items to be negotiated in the final status talks should be preserved. The indeterminacy of the Israeli formula would weaken the Palestinian position with regard to the emergence of a Palestinian state as a result of negotiations. This debate eventually led to the explicit naming of the items to be included in the Declaration of Principles. To reduce the scope for the Palestinian demands for statehood in the final status talks, the Israelis insisted that the word ‘sovereignty’ be excluded from the list, in return offering reintroduction of ‘relations and cooperation with other neighbours’. This

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gave the Palestinians at least some hope that they would be allowed to act as an international actor developing relations with third parties independently from Israel once the final status talks were concluded. Article XII. Liaison and cooperation with Jordan and Egypt This article is a truly classic example of establishing a diplomatic safety net. Article XII stipulates that the Israeli government and the Palestinian Council should negotiate an agreement with each other to invite the governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between Israel and the Palestinian representatives. These should include the establishment of a Continuing Committee that would decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder, as well as other matters. The article itself represented no substantive agreement, only offering the possibility of an arrangement, dependent on ensuing negotiations. In other words it would only amount to anything if: first, Israelis and Palestinians after negotiations could agree to invite Jordan and Egypt to talk about cooperation agreements; second, Jordan and Egypt should decide to do so; and third, a Continuing Committee had been constituted among the four parties. Only then would the issue be discussed. This diplomatic masterpiece avoided two significant implications of the Palestinian position: First, the Palestinians had wished to be enabled to act as an independent actor and to participate in the consultations on equal footing. The Palestinian proposal of 25–26 July states that cooperation agreements should be concluded between the Government of Israel, the Council, Jordan and Egypt. The realisation of that proposal would have contributed to the establishment of an independent Palestinian actor. Second, the Palestinians had proposed that among other things the modalities of admission of the persons displaced in 1967 should be discussed. In Israeli eyes, that provision would have supported Palestinian demands for the return of the refugees to the West Bank. Annex I/3. Mode and conditions of elections The mode and conditions of elections for a Palestinian council were disputed regarding two aspects: One of the most contested items was Jerusalem. The Palestinians would have liked to gain some control over East Jerusalem as the potential future capital of a Palestinian state, while

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the Israelis on the other hand considered Jerusalem to be the ‘eternal and indivisible capital’ of Israel. The Palestinian desire for reference to Jerusalem in the Declaration of Principles and likewise the Israeli preference to omit any mention of Jerusalem had caused immense pressures against the agreement on both sides. The discussion on the voting procedure for the Palestinian council exemplifies these difficulties. The proposal of the fifth round stated that the Palestinians of Jerusalem had the right to participate in the election process as candidates and voters. However, according to the final reading of the Declaration of Principles Annex I/3, the Palestinians of Jerusalem ‘who lived there’ were to have the right to participate in the election process according to an agreement to be reached between the two sides. Again, this formula worked as a safety net with regard to the territorial breadth of the agreement. On the one hand, the Palestinians could argue that Jerusalem was in some way included in the Declaration of Principles; on the other hand, the Israelis could argue that this aspect which could even slightly determine the future of Jerusalem was still to be negotiated in the future. Second, the Declaration of Principles of the fifth round equally proposed that all displaced Palestinians registered on 4 June 1967 had the right to participate in the election process. Their future status would not be prejudiced because they were unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons. The main point of divergence regarding this article during the discussion of 25–26 July was whether the Palestinians would be unable to participate ‘because’ they were unable to vote or ‘if’ they were unable to vote. The Israelis were determined to include the word ‘because’, meaning that at the time of the signature of the Declaration of Principles, the Palestinians would be unable to vote and excluding any future possibility that they should be able to do so. Introducing the word ‘if’ instead of ‘because’ would have implied that the ability of the Palestinians to participate or not participate in the elections was specific at the moment in which they would be held. In succeeding in this respect, the Israelis made sure that the displaced Palestinians would not be able to participate following the signature of the Declaration of Principles. The development of Article VII/5 and Article VIII shows how the issue of competences was dealt with through the concept of gradualism. The Israeli position was that the Palestinians should receive competences regarding all aspects governing their daily lives, including limited security competences. On the one hand, the Israelis endorsed Palestinian efforts to curb terrorism and violence affecting the Territories as well as Israel, and on the other, they wanted to leave open the option of acting independently from the Palestinians in the Territories if required. The

100 Bargaining in Oslo position of the Palestinians was that as many competences as possible should be transferred to the emerging Palestinian authorities, including comprehensive security arrangements. The more competences the Palestinians could display, the closer they saw themselves to achieving a sovereign Palestinian state. Less competences meant less sovereignty. Article VII/5. Dissolution of the Israeli Civil Administration and withdrawal of the military government The two positions clashed accordingly with regard to the question of the withdrawal of the Israelis and the question of security. The Israeli proposal of 25–26 July stipulated that after the inauguration of the Palestinian Council, the Israeli Civil Administration responsible for the Territories would be dissolved. That position was compatible with the Israeli policy of handing over functional competences to the emerging Palestinian institutions. The Palestinians, on the other hand, argued that in addition to the dissolution of the Israeli Civil Administration, the Israeli military government should be withdrawn. The Israeli military government was one of the main instruments of Israeli occupation and the withdrawal of the military government would symbolise a huge political step toward sovereignty and at the same time would leave a security vacuum which should be filled by Palestinian, PLO-led, security forces. In Article VII/5 of the final Declaration of Principles, the Palestinians were seen to have won their point. Article VIII. Public order and security One of the main points of conflict between the two sides was the question of security competences. For the Israelis, their presence on the West Bank and their right to pursue terrorists into those Territories they had already evacuated were crucial components of the talks. On the other hand, for the Palestinians, Israeli withdrawal symbolised at least in part the end of the occupation. In their proposal of 25–26 July, the Israelis wanted to make sure that they would be responsible for defending the Territories against external threats and for defending Israelis from terrorist threats emanating from the Territories. They also wished to enjoy responsibility for the overall security of the Israelis living in the Territories. This formula would have empowered the Israelis to carry out any security measure if it was aimed at terrorist activities and would have enabled Israeli security forces to re-enter Territories under Palestinian control and seek Palestinians suspected of terrorist activities. These

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activities could also include preventive actions if necessary to curb terrorist activities. Consistent with their own approach, the Palestinians demanded removal of these provisions. The Israelis should only be responsible for defending the Territories against external threats. The final compromise formula was less precise than had been demanded by the Israelis. Israel was to be responsible only for the overall security of the Israelis and then only regarding their internal security and public order. Thus, the competences of the Palestinian authorities regarding security were limited by Israel remaining responsible for Israelis even though these Israelis might find themselves on territory controlled by the Palestinians. This round can be identified as a fundamental crisis point in the negotiations. Two explanations can be given why this crisis point occurred at that stage: one is based on rational choice, the other is based on the constructivist based interpretation of the Oslo talks. The rationalist approach suggests that both sides used distinct bargaining tactics in order to achieve an agreement close to their respective preferences, and that both pressured the opponent toward compromise by emphasising their respective resistance points, those points which have to be met if an agreement is to be more beneficial for the individual than no agreement. The second explanation brings the constructivist approach back in. This meeting can be identified as being the ultimate divide between the arguing and the bargaining phases of the process. As has been discussed in the previous chapter, the two sides had developed a normative framework for the bargaining process over the distributive aspects of an agreement. In this round of the talks a crisis point occurred as both sides had to realise that from now on the process was no longer characterised by a joint problem solving approach but by fierce bargaining over the details of an eventual agreement. The crisis was overcome however by reference to the initial rounds of the Oslo talks when both sides had developed converging interests in the success of the channel. Referring to this principle, Savir proposed that of the 16 remaining points, every delegation should name eight which were tradeable. Savir in addition brought a new aspect into the negotiations: mutual recognition. After the meeting on 29 July, Joel Singer reported back to Rabin, Peres and Beilin. In a detailed report, he listed the points which in his view were the most difficult ones to solve. These included the name of the Palestinian Council, the differing interpretations of how a reference to Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 could be introduced in the

102 Bargaining in Oslo Declaration of Principles, the inclusion of specific issues to be discussed in permanent status negotiations and the participation of the Palestinians living in Jerusalem in elections for the Council. New points of divergence with the Palestinians included the direct transfer of power after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho to the PLO; powers were to be transferred to the representatives of the Palestinian people and not only to professionals nominated by the Palestinian delegation at Washington. In particular, the text of the Declaration of Principles was to state that the PLO would take over in Gaza and Jericho after the Israeli withdrawal and that the PLO would remain in power until the elections for the Council had been held. In the context of this demand, the security forces of the PLO were to be allowed to deploy in Gaza and Jericho. All Palestinians were to enjoy the right of free passage between Gaza and Jericho and the bridge between Jordan and the West Bank, and the crossing point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt was to be controlled by the Palestinians. The Palestinians also demanded an acceptance of their national rights in the Declaration of Principles (Enderlin 1998: 638–41). In preparing for the final stages of the negotiations, Singer proposed a position of no concessions from the Israeli side to thereby increase the pressure on the Palestinian delegation. This would make the Palestinians accept the agreement in its present form. In order to emphasise the Israeli positions, Singer proposed that Rabin and Peres make public statements clarifying to the Palestinians that no more concessions could be made. He had the impression that the Palestinians would follow the statements of the Israeli leadership in the press closely and would thus most certainly get the message (Enderlin 1998: 643).16 As a result, Peres, on 3 August 1993 in an interview in the Voice of Israel did remind the PLO that it was in an unprecedented financial and economic crisis and that the Territories themselves were in a condition of crisis. He had the impression that the Palestinians needed ‘something’ to help them out of this crisis. The question of the journalist was: Like what? Peres: Like, the Gaza Strip, plus something else, as you know, because. . . Journalist: Gaza and something in the Jericho area? Peres: That is what they are demanding.17 He seemed thus to be offering Gaza and Jericho, but only if the parties reached an agreement. He also demanded that one should not concentrate on symbolic questions such as Jerusalem. The following day Beilin,

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also on the Voice of Israel, again emphasised the Israeli readiness to compromise and indicated that it was ready to accept the demands of the Palestinians and to negotiate on Jericho.18 On 9 August Peres gave another hint concerning the conclusion of an agreement. Asked to comment on the division between the PLO and the Palestinian delegation in Washington, he answered:19 I also know precisely whose opinion we would like to see winning. We would like the moderate, the peace-seeking party to win. We will follow this closely, seriously, without cynicism and without malicious joy. Question by journalist: It seems that in this crisis the moderate party is the one in Tunis. Will we have to talk to it? Peres: . . . Israel is waiting for a clear, responsible and moderate Palestinian stance. If the current differences lead to this result, it would be very good. . . . I believe that the differences have become sharper because we are closer to the time of making decisions. We are perhaps on the last quarter of the way, where each step has to be taken very carefully, while avoiding mistakes, unnecessary concessions and unintentional failures. Therefore, minds are now on the alert and the tongues are in position because we are near the moment of decision. I believe it is quite close. (Shimon Peres)

Final drafting of the Declaration of Principles The atmosphere of the next meeting in Oslo on 14–15 August was less tense than before. Although the Palestinians had not conceded outright on the eight points, they had eased up on a number of critical ones; for example, no longer insisting that the Palestinians living in Jerusalem could run for elections to the autonomy council. But the Israelis still demanded that once the Israelis withdrew from Gaza and Jericho the Council’s headquarters would be located in Jericho; that the Israeli forces would remain in charge of the ‘overall’ security of the Israelis in the Territories; that the withdrawal from Jericho would not include the bridges; and that withdrawal from Gaza would not be total and some troops would stay in place to protect the settlers. On the other hand, the Israelis did agree to speed up the withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho, opening the way for early empowerment and the recognition of the political (though not national) rights of the Palestinians. The issue of the size of the Jericho area was left open to later negotiations. Only five

104 Bargaining in Oslo points remained unresolved by the end of that meeting (Abbas 1995: 173f; Savir 1998: 53). These remaining points were resolved in an overnight negotiation session on 17–18 August. Shimon Peres was on an official visit in Stockholm and had decided with Rabin that the Israelis in Stockholm and the PLO in Tunis should now resolve the outstanding issues via Holst, who was also present in Stockholm. The outstanding points touched on Article I, on the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338; the specific items to be dealt with in the final negotiations; the dissolution of the Israeli military government after the inauguration of the Palestinian Council; and finally the specifics of the control of the crossing points from Gaza to Egypt and from Jericho to Jordan, being resolved by the formula in Annex II/4 that ‘. . . the agreement will include arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages: a. Gaza–Egypt; and b. Jericho–Jordan’. During the morning of 18 August, these points were finally resolved and the Declaration of Principles was initialled by the negotiators. Given the overriding emphasis on the political aspects of Israeli– Palestinian reconciliation, the question is valid whether the economic concepts which were a decisive component of the first phase of the Oslo talks survived the often fierce strategic bargaining process of the second phase. Despite the importance the economic concepts of Israeli– Palestinian reconciliation assumed during the first phase of the talks, they were pushed to the fringes of the discussion during the second by the political aspects. In the second phase the economic aspects of the agreement were discussed and negotiated only during the round of Savir’s first appearance and during the final round of negotiations on 19–20 August. The economic parts of the Declaration of Principles remained virtually untouched from the second meeting, when Hirschfeld had formulated the ‘draft zero’, until the final signing of the Declaration of Principles, and even Rabin, who since becoming fully involved in the talks had maintained authority over every word of the document, paid little attention to them.20 The economic ideas developed in the first phase of the talks were not completely dismissed however. The two sides agreed to incorporate them in Article 11 of the Declaration of Principles as well as Annex III, the ‘Protocol on Israeli–Palestinian Cooperation in Economic and Development Programs’ and Annex IV, the ‘Protocol on Israeli–Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Regional Development Programs’. Many points proposed by the appendices to promote regional economic development originated in the two studies Qureia and Hirschfeld

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had prepared for the EU Commission back in November 1991 and September 1992. Hirschfeld’s Chapter six entitled ‘Building Interdependence: The Short Term’ follows a similar structure as Annex III of the Declaration of Principles. In referred articles and in drafting the above-mentioned guidelines for a Working Program, Hirschfeld proposed projects to develop integrated financial services, coordination of regional planning, exploiting water resources and agricultural development, electricity and energy, developing the regional transport and communication system, tourism, and labour relations. These components were transferred from Hirschfeld’s study to the Declaration of Principles, a plausible argument for the case that major parts of his study laid the groundwork for Annex III of the Declaration of Principles. Qureia’s paper cannot be traced as easily and elegantly back from the Declaration of Principles, although some similarities are striking. In his study for the Commission, Qureia emphasised five areas of regional economic development to be promoted: transport, communications and telecommunications; energy; tourism; programmes and projects for the development and use of natural resources; and complementarity-promoting projects in trade, finance, and other service sectors. These five areas can be detected in Annex III/3 calling for the setting up of an Energy Development Program; in Annex IV/2/A3 proposing to set up an Infrastructure Development Program; and in Annex IV/2/B8 calling for a Regional Tourism, Transportation and Telecommunications Development Plan.

Mutual recognition Although the negotiations of the Declaration of Principles in the Oslo talks had taken centre stage until 19 August, the remaining obstacle to Israeli–Palestinian reconciliation was the negotiated mutual explicit recognition of the PLO and the state of Israel; the unconditional recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and the unconditional recognition of the legitimate right of Israel to exist in peace and security. The final agreed draft of the Declaration of Principles as of 19 August in its preamble still provided for ‘The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestinian team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the “Palestinian Delegation”), representing the Palestinian people . . .’ to reach the following agreement. The signatories to the agreement were to be the ‘Government of Israel’ and the ‘Palestinian Delegation’.21 Although with the appearance of Savir in Oslo in May at the sixth round of the Oslo talks, both sides had de facto recognised each other and each other’s

106 Bargaining in Oslo legitimate rights, both sides had now to agree a way to express their recognition publicly and politically. Until July, the Oslo talks had mainly dealt with drafting the Declaration of Principles. Mutual recognition had not been seriously considered. But as the Oslo process slowly gained pace and the Israeli government decided to engage in the negotiations, the issue of mutual recognition became more pressing. Discussions in Oslo and other contacts between the PLO leadership and the Israeli government had made it obvious that an agreement between the two sides would call for early empowerment, supposedly first in Gaza and Jericho. The question who exactly the empowered Palestinians were to be remained open however. Article VI/1 of the Declaration of Principles stated that: Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorized Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, [emphasis added] will commence. Who then were the ‘authorised Palestinians’? Consequentially, the question of recognition had both a political and an operative dimension. Mutual recognition was seen as a far-reaching political act that modified the very basis of both sides’ identity. On the Israeli side, recognition of the PLO meant an end to the ideological foundations on which the very concept of ‘Eretz Israel’ was based; recognition of Israel by the PLO implied the end of the struggle for the liberation of the whole of Palestine. On an operative basis, if Israel was to withdraw from parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, then the question of who among the Palestinians would be empowered to execute the competences as agreed in the Declaration of Principles had to be solved. The negotiation of mutual recognition unfolded gradually. The first indirect signals were followed by more direct ones in the face-to-face bargaining situation culminating in the negotiations of the conditions of mutual recognition in early September 1993 when the Declaration of Principles was already initialled. Since the beginning of 1993, the Israeli side had debated whether or not to include the PLO in the negotiation process of the Washington talks. At its final cabinet meeting in December 1992, an Israeli government for the first time had discussed the possibility of integrating the PLO in the Middle East peace talks. Although Rabin had rejected that

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proposal as well as the proposal to include Faisal al-Husseini in the Washington talks, this discussion did mark the beginning of a serious debate within Israeli decision-making circles of how to deal with the PLO in the future. In a cabinet meeting in May, Peres had again voiced his opinion that the government of Israel should seriously consider negotiating with the PLO.22 In July 1993, Peres again signalled his readiness for compromise regarding the recognition of the PLO: if the PLO renounced terrorism, changed its charter, and took acceptable steps towards peace, Israel would then be in a situation in which it would have to redefine its position.23 Beilin also showed some flexibility concerning the recognition of the PLO. Although a convention of the Labour Movement had not accepted a proposal to directly negotiate with the PLO, he was ready to lead a discussion on this subject.24 Recognition of the PLO by Israel was seriously considered when Singer came back from his first meetings with the Palestinians in Oslo. The Israelis realised that by the very act of officially negotiating with the PLO, it could be legitimised without needing to change its doctrine. The Israelis knew that they were talking to an organisation which continued to deny Israel’s right to exist. When Singer presented Rabin his assessment of the Oslo talks, he thus added his recommendations that an agreement on mutual recognition be reached. But only once Singer had been introduced into the negotiation team itself did Rabin allow him to extend ‘personal feelers’ on mutual recognition (Savir 1998: 35). Yet it took until the crisis point of 26 July for mutual recognition to be formally proposed by the Israelis, based on the following conditions:25 recognition of Israel’s right to exist in security and peace and commitment to peaceful coexistence; acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338; resolution of the conflict by peaceful means; resolution of differences through negotiation; renunciation of terrorism and other acts of violence; the PLO calling for a halt to the Intifada; rescinding the clauses of the Palestinian Convenant calling for the destruction of Israel or that otherwise contradict the peace process. On 5 August, Beilin again publicly spelled out the necessary conditions for official talks with the PLO: only a renunciation of terror, and a change to this effect in the PLO’s Charter, could lead to the talks. Although he would welcome such talks, Beilin declared, none of those preconditions had yet been fulfilled.26 On 9 August, Beilin once again stressed Israel’s readiness for negotiations if the PLO would accept these publicly known conditions.27 The proposal for mutual recognition reduced the tension which had built up during the crisis concerning the negotiations of the Declaration of Principles. In Israel, Rabin supported the initiative for mutual

108 Bargaining in Oslo recognition if the conditions were met by the PLO, and on the Palestinian side, Arafat accepted the conditions (Savir 1998: 53). Once the Declaration of Principles had been completed at the end of August, the discussions on mutual recognition intensified. The decisive moment was reached in Paris on 9 and 10 September. For the two sides ‘. . . those twenty-two hours [of negotiations] were perhaps the most significant, because we were attempting to eradicate the doctrines that had sustained the prolonged struggle between . . . two national movements’ (Savir 1998: 69). Both sides were now dealing with the ideological roots of the conflict and without a mutual change in the attitude of both the representatives of the Palestinian people and the government of Israel, the Declaration of Principles would remain meaningless (Savir 1998: 69). The negotiations culminated in the signing of letters of recognition by Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin on 9 and 10 of August. The exchange of letters between Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin again underlines the strategic dilemma both sides faced regarding mutual recognition. Although both sides had received enough information about the cooperative strategic intentions of the other side, thereby increasing the value of a cooperative approach to mutual recognition, both sides introduced formal safety nets with regard to the recognition procedure itself. The first to recognise the other was the PLO recognising Israel. In his letter to the Prime Minister of Israel, Yasser Arafat declared that: The signing of the Declaration of Principles marks a new era in the history of the Middle East. In firm conviction thereof . . .the PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security.28 (Yasser Arafat) The cautious drafting of the letter illustrates Arafat’s fears of an Israeli exploitation of his cooperative move as the letter makes recognition of Israel dependent upon the signing of the Declaration of Principles, thereby making his move dependent upon a cooperative move by Israel. That formula worked, therefore, as a safety net, opening the possibility to take back recognition, if Israel did not reciprocate. The cooperative move of the PLO was answered by Yitzhak Rabin by stating in a letter that In response to your letter of September 9, 1993, I wish to confirm to you that, in the light of the PLO commitments included in your letter,

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the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process.29 (Yitzhak Rabin) Rabin made it clear that his letter was a direct answer to the cooperative move of the PLO, and was valid only in the context of Arafat’s letter, making the fulfilment of Arafat’s commitments conditional upon Israel’s recognition of the PLO. The exchange of letters was thus based on a ‘titfor-tat’ approach, making it clear that a unilateral cooperative move was only valid if the other one reciprocated accordingly.

Testing the explanatory power: Rational choice and constructivism The second phase of the Oslo negotiations provides the battleground for constructivist and rational choice based analyses of the Oslo talks. Which one has more to offer when it comes to explaining the outcome? It seems rather inconclusive: both have many points to make. There are numerous valid points to be made by constructivists: First, the leaders on both sides chose the Oslo channel, when they had alternatives. They could have engaged Egypt or the US as honest broker. They could have sent special envoys to meet in May when it was clear that the other side was ready for a deal and start from scratch. They could have chosen other channels that were available. Yet, they chose Oslo. What was different between Oslo and other channels was that already early on there was a draft agreement on the table that the two sides empathetically worked on. There was fundamental understanding of the key parameters of the final outcome – even if that understanding left out many of the more complicated issues of Israeli–Palestinian relations. This aspect was not as strongly present in other channels. Second, both sides agreed on some of the frameworks that had been established in the first phase of the talks, most prominently the principle of gradualism and the principle that no development, either in the negotiation process or else, should pre-empt the outcome of any final status negotiation. Third, the two sides at critical junctures of the negotiations were able to fall back on a stable foundation of trust that had been established in the first phase of the talks. There was definitely a personal relationship that had emerged and that carried the parties through to the final deal. Yet, on the other hand, rational choice based arguments would make the following points: Most of the framework that was established in the

110 Bargaining in Oslo first phase of the talks was pushed aside. It was Savir and Singer that lead the negotiations in the second phase on the Israeli side – Hirschfeld and Pundak at that later stage had only limited input. Also, the document that had been developed in the first phase was fundamentally revised in the second phase. In particular, the economic elements in the agreement were pushed to the fringes of the process. They might have served the two sides to get the dialogue going, but when it came to negotiate the nuts and bolts of an agreement, economics did not matter. The two sides were rather caught in a fierce bargaining process, with each side trying to reach the best outcome for itself. A final assessment of this second phase of the Oslo talks would suggest that both constructivist and the rational choice based approaches explain some elements of the outcome in Oslo. Yet, some limits remain: The two sides still faced a dilemma situation that time and again challenged the stability of the channel. Israelis and Palestinians did not, as the constructivists would argue, ‘debate away’ their conflicting positions. The two sides were constantly tempted to fall back on old entrenched positions that they were comfortable with. Rational choice cannot explain fully the structure and outcome of the Oslo negotiations without making some reference to those elements of the talks that constructivists identify as some of the critical components for the success of the talk. Given these limitations and as both approaches emphasise on different success factors in the Oslo talks, it seems that comprehensive analyses of international negotiations need to merge elements of both approaches in order to provide a consistent framework for explaining why some negotiations fail and others do not.

6

The success of the Oslo talks – and why the process failed

The Oslo secret talks provide a tremendous conundrum to social science. What are the key success factors that account best for the success of the talks? What is a comprehensive and satisfactory approach that explains why Oslo happened and why it achieved such remarkable results? The answer, as this conclusion shows, is not straightforward. Different approaches explain different phenomena, and it seems that by combining them a comprehensive assessment of the Oslo talks is possible. First of all, the features of the international system and the domestic preferences were conducive to the initiation of the talks. The government of Israel and the leadership of the PLO faced domestic and international pressures that led them to reconsider the relationship with each other. After the end of the Cold War, the international system had changed substantially. The world had just gone through the Gulf War of 1990/91 and now was eager to bring permanent stability to the Middle East. This could only be achieved through a settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Thus, the US administration put tremendous pressure on the Israeli government to engage in the peace process. In this, the US was supported by the fact that new allies in the Arab world had offered their support during the Gulf War, thus rendering less strategic importance to Israel. Domestically, the Intifada had made a huge impression on the Israeli public. And the influence of the radical Hamas was rising, suggesting that if they gained the support of a wide spectrum of Palestinian society, the security situation would worsen even more. Realising that a policy of occupation would not result in more stability and security, the Israeli public was open for alternative avenues to pursue peace with the Palestinians. In consequence, Israel was ready to engage with Palestinians less radical than Hamas. The PLO, for its part, found itself politically, but also economically, in a precarious situation at the beginning of the 1990s. Based in Tunis, the

112 The success – and why the process failed PLO feared marginalisation by Palestinian forces residing in the Territories themselves, in particular Hamas. It had outmanoeuvred itself with its pro-Iraqi positions during the Gulf War of 1990/91 and had witnessed a radical erosion of its financial resources, essential to ensure the loyalty of Palestinians within the Territories. The only way out of this dilemma was to engage Israel in negotiations and return back to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These strategic calculations provided the motivation for both sides to engage with each other. Yet, before they could do so publicly, they had to recognise each other formally. They had to put an end to the policy of non-recognition that had blocked progress in Israeli–Palestinian relations for decades. Both being ready to make the necessary compromises, Israelis and Palestinians were stuck in a situation that resembles a Prisoners’ Dilemma. Both sides were unclear about the intentions of the other side, and without somehow communicating with the opponent, both would find it difficult to overcome the dilemma. Therefore, from December 1992 to September 1993, Israelis and Palestinians engaged in an intensive dialogue, exchanged signals and gestures, and participated in direct, secret negotiations that resulted in the Declaration of Principles and the exchange of letters. The Oslo secret talks were the main vehicle in this exercise. Yet, constructivist and rational choice based analyses provide alternative interpretations about what the contributions and key success factors of the talks were. The constructivist narrative for the success of the Oslo talks goes as follows: In the context of the peace process launched with the inaugural session in Madrid, a new paradigm was able to emerge. This new paradigm suggested that the future of the Middle East would rest upon economic cooperation that would trump political conflict in the long run. A settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbours was supposed to be an intermediary step of the much longer process of building a new order of economic cooperation and success in the region. The main vehicle for developing these new concepts were the multilateral talks and its five working groups, with the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG) being the most decisive in pushing the economic agenda forward. Numerous actors representing different constituencies were able to participate in the process, all trying to contribute to establishing a new Middle East. The policy suggestions that resulted from this process were conducive to paving the way for eventual direct negotiations between the PLO leadership and the government of Israel in two dimensions. First,

The success – and why the process failed 113 they provided a conceptual framework for the Oslo talks which was decisive for the first phase of the talks. The two sides would be able to refer to the economic dimension of any peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians, thereby re-framing the discussions about the core issues of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Second, on an operational level, they made it easier for Israeli envoys and government representatives and PLO representatives to come together – for the first time speaking directly to each other. The fact that the multilateral talks were organised in a rather loose manner, enabling many different actors to participate in the deliberations, proved to be tremendously helpful in opening up channels between the two sides, at relatively low political risk. The constructivists’ account of Oslo argues that its framework enabled both sides to get involved in negotiations on an equal footing. Both sides were able to recognise each other informally, which they were unable to do publicly, given the political consequences such a recognition would entail. The secrecy of Oslo provided the two sides with the opportunity to negotiate formal mutual recognition behind closed doors before stepping out into public. Empathy played a big role in that process. The two sides did not work against each other, but from the beginning of the talks tried to produce a solution that would be acceptable for both sides. Third, and perhaps most importantly, both sides had a vision for the future. This vision reached far beyond a mere political settlement, but described a bright future for the region, based on Israeli–Palestinian economic cooperation and eventually integrating other parts of the Arab world. Oslo was about the transformation of a perceived zero-sum relationship into a win–win situation, notwithstanding a balance of power that was heavily in Israel’s favour (Pundak 2001: 33). This common frame of reference, or ‘common life world’ as constructivists would argue, carried the two sides through the many impediments of the process towards political reconciliation. All these elements, so the constructivist argument went, were necessary conditions for the success of the Oslo talks and bringing about mutual recognition. Mutual recognition would be the basis for the journey towards the creation of a new Middle East, founded on peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours. How then would a rational choice based narrative be constructed? Rational choice would suggest that the sole relevant actors in the process were those at the very top of the political decision making, i.e. the Israeli government and the leadership of the PLO. No other actors were able to transform the process and inject new ideas that would transform the strategic calculus of the leadership of the two sides. The negotiations

114 The success – and why the process failed between the two sides were based on a give-and-take approach in which they would fiercely defend bottom lines and actively seek to extract as many concessions as possible. Certainly, the idea that negotiations would be supported by some visionary thinking about the gains to be achieved from cooperation was excluded. In this process, both the frequency of interaction and the intensity of the exchange are relevant. In the second half of 1992, a limited number of signals were exchanged here and there. However, in the first half of 1993, this early stage was followed by deeper interaction, in which statements during the bilateral and multilateral talks as well as statements in the media were exchanged much more intensively. At the same time, they became more and more precise and committed, suggesting that both sides were willing to embark on a true bargaining process. In the final stage of this dance, both sides sought agreement about the format and venue of direct talks, with Savir’s appearance in Oslo being the final move by the Israeli government in the process of establishing a direct line with the Palestinians. Yet, the rational choice based narrative suggests that whatever had happened in Oslo during the first half of 1993 was merely to be interpreted as part of a signalling game. The work that was done up to then was not binding. Oslo was one among many other channels. Only as a matter of convenience was that channel chosen in the end. The bargaining process between the two opponents began with Singer’s appearance at the seventh round of the Oslo negotiations. Israel wanted to be recognised by the PLO and make the PLO put an end to the Intifada, thereby enhancing the security situation of Israel. The PLO, on the other hand, wanted to be recognised by Israel and, based on that recognition, to return to the Occupied Territories and lead negotiations that would eventually result in establishing a Palestinian state. Both rational choice and constructivist based analyses have something to contribute in arriving at a comprehensive explanation of the negotiations in this final phase. Rational choice can explain the inherent tensions in the negotiations, both sides being torn between their willingness to reach a deal and their interest to get out of it as much as possible. Yet, time and again this tension would lead to crises in the talks. This is when the more advanced technique that was established in the first phase of the Oslo talks provided a safety net. The principles of fairness, equality and common objectives (Pundak 2001: 32) helped the two sides to overcome difficult moments. These factors together then explain the result of the Oslo negotiations in the form of the exchange of letters and the Declaration of Principles.

The success – and why the process failed 115 However, the Oslo process for which the foundations were laid in September 1993 failed to deliver results, and both sides have taken their share of the blame. Mostly, the reasons were attributed to the lack of willingness on both sides to deliver what the other side needed to proceed on the path towards peace. Israel failed to deliver a strong commitment towards the eventual establishment of a viable Palestinian state. The Palestinian leadership failed to deliver security for the Israelis. Yet once again we revert back to theory in order to arrive at a more pronounced explanation for why the Oslo process ultimately failed. In The Evolution of Co-operation, Robert Axelrod (1984) identified the parameters that are essential for two rational actors to arrive at a stable cooperative outcome. The most important of these parameters is that the game that the actors are playing is not limited to only one iteration. Preferably, the two players play the game for an indefinite number of times, or, alternatively, do not know when the very last game is being played. The players must care about what happens beyond the next immediate move and have a perspective about what outcomes they want to realise in the long run. In more technical terms: the perceived net present value of future earnings must be high enough for counterparts to cooperate. Axelrod’s findings suggest that under these circumstances the best strategy is ‘tit for tat’, the retaliation of whatever move the counterpart chose in the last round – cooperate or defect. Both sides at some stage – according to Axelrod’s assumptions – will realise that trying to deceive the other side will not be of benefit for them in the long run. Whenever they cheat, the opponent has the possibility to retaliate, which he/she will do applying a ‘tit for tat’ strategy. Both sides are worse off in the long run which, given that the net present value of future earnings is assumed to be high, they will try to avoid. This ‘Shadow of the Future’, as Axelrod poetically coined this phenomenon, has a profound impact on the choices that players make facing their next immediate move. Both in the long run want to be better off and they better start with the next move to achieve this objective. However, the moment the game might come to an end both sides get nervous. Faced with the very the last moves, neither side has the chance to strike back and punish the uncooperative behaviour of the opponent in a previous move. Therefore both sides opt preventively for defection towards the end of the game, because neither side wants to be cheated in the end. Therefore, endgames in negotiations are always difficult. Will a concession that has been offered in the last moment to facilitate a deal be reciprocated? Will it not be in the rational self-interest of the opponent

116 The success – and why the process failed to cheat in the last moment in order to maximise individual gains? Obviously, these calculations are only relevant if the two sides truly find themselves in an ‘endgame’. The moment they feel their relationship moving beyond the deal that they are going to make and begin to value that relationship highly, is when both sides will probably refrain from cheating. What do these findings contribute to a fuller understanding of the failure of the Oslo process? First, when both sides failed to implement commitments made in the Oslo process, they engaged in an exchange of ‘tit for tat’ of uncooperative moves which in the end made it impossible to establish the trust needed to arrive at the final resolution of their conflict. In the second half of the 1990s, the process began to get bogged down. The Palestinians failed to establish stable and transparent political institutions that would have provided the basis for a gradual integration of Palestinian society. They did not stop their propaganda against Israel, allowed illegal firearms, failed to agree with Israel on their police force, and – most importantly – did not sufficiently combat fundamentalist terrorism. Israel, for its part, failed to implement redeployment, to free political prisoners, to undertake the implementation of the safe route which was supposed to connect the West Bank and Gaza, delayed the permit to build the airport and maritime port in Gaza, prevented the transfer of funds belonging to the Palestinian Authority for extended periods of time, and continued to establish new settlements, to confiscate land for new settlements and to expand existing ones (Pundak 2001: 33–34). The principles of ‘tit for tat’ took a heavy toll during that period. Second, the Oslo talks allowed the extension of the ‘Shadow of the Future’ by introducing the notion of economic cooperation into the equation of Israeli–Palestinian peace. Through bringing in the concept of a ‘New Middle East’, the Oslo talks developed a vehicle that increased the net present value of future earnings. Peace between Israelis and Palestinians in the form of a settlement was supposed to be only one, yet an essential, component in the process towards establishing a new regional framework of cooperation. Yet, already during the Oslo talks, Arafat and Rabin felt uncomfortable with the economic elements supposed to provide one of the bases for eventual peace between the two sides. Their scepticism and that of the Israeli leaders that would follow Rabin eroded the concept throughout the 1990s. By the end of the 1990s, the economic dimension and the visionary approach to any cooperative future relationship between Israelis and Palestinians had faded away altogether with serious repercussions for the process.

The success – and why the process failed 117 The strategic calculus of each of the players changed. Short-term interests of the two sides became more pronounced. In Axelrod’s terms, the ‘Shadow of the Future’ had faded away. Gains realised more immediately were higher valued at the expense of a vision for the long term. The net present value of future earnings from cooperation was decreasing. This in consequence caused an environment, which – according to Axelrod’s findings – was substantially less conducive to establishing a stable cooperative outcome. Third, Axelrod also offers some guidance for a better understanding of the Camp David negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians in July 2000. After many attempts to rescue the peace process in the 1990s, Bill Clinton invited Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Yassir Arafat to Camp David in July 2000, shortly before the end of his presidency. Israelis and Palestinians were supposed to agree on a final deal between them. Yet, the negotiations failed miserably. The core explanation given for this failure is that the two sides were unable to agree on a convincing formula for peace. Barak and Arafat met only for a few times personally. Arafat feared an American-Israeli alliance bullying him into an agreement. Barak did not want the Oslo agreements to stand in the way of how he wanted to settle with the Palestinians.1 Other explanations argue that both sides came ill-prepared to the summit, not sufficiently understanding the red lines of the other side. There were deep divisions between, and within, the respective delegations, including the American mediators. Another application of Axelrod’s findings explains the failure of the Camp David negotiations from a different angle. Remember, Axelrod suggests that players reach a cooperative outcome only if they do not know the number of iterations of their game and when their game is likely to end. The Camp David negotiations in July 2000 between Yassir Arafat and Ehud Barak were conceptualised exactly as the opposite – as an endgame. Yassir Arafat came to the meeting with low expectations. He went to Camp David only so as not to alienate the US administration. Barak was much more ambitious about the summit. He came to Camp David in order to arrive at a final deal with the Palestinians. In a statement prior to his departure for the Camp David Summit he declared: One hundred years of enmity and struggle meet at this point in time. Behind me far too many lie buried, there has been suffering and anguish on both sides – because there is an unbearably high price not only to defeat but also to victory. The time has now come to put an

118 The success – and why the process failed end to the conflict, to give hope [to] the flower of our youth, that they may flourish undisturbed . . .. This is a moment of opportunity that will not reoccur. It is accompanied by major risks. And if, God forbid, we should fail, then the risks, and not the opportunities, will come true.2 (Ehud Barak) Addressed to the Palestinian leadership, he said: We are arriving at a decisive crossroads in the future relationship between us. The choice between us is between the peace of the brave, which will put the relationships between us on a positive track of good neighborliness and prosperity; or, God forbid, will lead to violent conflict, that will lead to further suffering and victims, and will not solve anything . . .. And I look forward to Yasser Arafat coming to Camp David with the full backing of the Palestinian people to achieve a historic peace. I expect him to come full of resolution and the ability to make a decision in order together to achieve our goal.3 (Ehud Barak) Barak presented his strategy for the negotiations with the Palestinians in an address to the Knesset on 10 July 2000, specifying the red lines that he would not cede: no return to pre-1967 borders; a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty; no foreign army West of the Jordan River; an absolute majority of settlers in Judea and Samaria living in settlement blocs under Israeli sovereignty; and no acceptance of any moral or legal responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem.4 These aspirations set the tone of the Camp David Summit: it was supposed to be the endgame between Israelis and Palestinians – and it ended in failure. Immediately after the end of the Camp David Summit, actors and commentators sought to identify and blame those responsible for the failure. Yet, it was argued that both sides had made substantial progress during the Summit and that a final deal might have been in reach. However, both sides did not make the concessions that were necessary to put an end to the conflict. There might be many substantial reasons why both sides did not jump in the end. Axelrod’s findings suggest that the causes for the failure rest in the process itself. For the two sides, it was an all-or-nothing game. And, as Axelrod suggests, both sides were particularly nervous about being cheated. This fear has little to do with the conflict that both sides

The success – and why the process failed 119 had gone through during the past decades, or the short history of the Oslo process and the results it had or had not achieved at that moment. Both sides were rather caught in a classic dilemma in which both sides were tempted to cheat and at the same time feared to be cheated – with no opportunity to respond flexibly to any given move of the opponent. A final deal signed in Camp David would not have been able to be renegotiated – it was supposed to be a final historic agreement. Thus the two sides did what was rational in this kind of dilemma situation – they both declined to cooperate. The experience of the Camp David Summit of July 2000 illustrates why negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians, in line with other negotiation processes, encounter such great difficulties when, once again, they reach the ‘endgame’ or ‘final status negotiations’. Either side is nervous about being cheated in the end, and therefore opts out of a compromise. In the years following the Oslo agreements, many attempts were made to orchestrate a final resolution of the conflict. The ‘endgame’ never succeeded. These findings lead to a conclusion that suggests that as long as final status negotiations are interpreted by Israelis and Palestinians as the ‘endgame’, they will not be able to resolve their conflict. During the second half of the 1990s the long-term vision of a prosperous and vibrant Middle East faded away. The focus of negotiations shifted towards final status issues, such as Jerusalem, refugees, and others. Little energy was spent on developing the common economic future that would extend much beyond final status issues. Final status negotiations symbolised the end of the negotiation process and the end of the opportunity to punish cheating. What the spirit of Oslo was all about was the extension of the motivation for cooperation beyond final status. A formal agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, resulting in a Palestinian state, was supposed to be only one step of many towards a brighter economic future for the Middle East. To put this in the context of game theory: the ‘Shadow of the Future’ was extended well beyond that agreement. The game that both sides were playing was supposed to be open-ended. However, with the demise of a common vision beyond political settlement, both sides have found it impossible to jump. Thus, the findings of this book suggest that without the reinvigoration of a joint vision for the future, peace is unlikely to settle on the Middle East.

Appendix 1 Timeline

The Oslo Process from January to September 1993 Date

Progress

21 January

First round at Borregard Manison in Sarpsborg, Norway. Participants: Hirschfeld and Pundak for Israel; Qureia, Asfour, al-Kurd for the Palestinians. Second round at Borregard Manison. Third round at Borregard Manison. Sarpsborg III document drafted. Fourth round in Holmenkollen Park. Israelis test Qureia’s authority. Fifth round in the Norwegian government’s guest house, Oslo. Palestinians threaten to leave if talks are not upgraded to an official level. Sixth round in Holmenkollen Park, Oslo. Negotiations become official when Israel adds Deputy Foreign Minister Uri Savir to the negotiating team. Seventh round in Holmenkollen. Israel adds lawyer Joel Singer to the negotiating team. Eighth round in the Halvorsbole Hotel, Oslo. Singer arrives with new document. Ninth round in the Gressheim farmhouse. Palestinians add lawyer Kush, and remove al-Kurd; Gressheim document is written. Tenth round in Halvorsbole. PLO negotiators bring 26 revisions to the Gressheim Declaration of Principles; Qureia produces letter from Arafat. Norwegian shuttle diplomacy. Holst, Larsen, Juul meet with Arafat and Qureia in Tunis (11 July).

11 February 20 March 30 April 8 May

21 May

13 June 27 June 6 July

10 July

11–21 July

Appendix 1: Timeline 121 Date

Progress

Larsen and Juul meet with Peres, Savir, Hirschfeld, and Pundak in Jerusalem; deliver a letter from Holst that details his meeting with Arafat (14 July). Larsen and Juul return to Tunis to deliver Peres’ letter to Holst, which he shares with Arafat (19 July). Holst send another letter to Peres concerning talks with Arafat (21 July). Juul and Larsen meet Pundak in Paris on way back to Norway to give the final details of meetings with Arafat. 25 July Eleventh round in Halvorsbole. Crisis point occurs. Round ends with Savir offering Qureia an eight-foreight concession swap tied to mutual recognition. 7 August Larsen-Juul arrange ‘non-meeting’ in Paris, Israelis send Hirschfeld, Palestinians send Qureia. A secret letter exchange between Rabin and Arafat ends the stalemate in Oslo. 14 August Twelfth round in Borregard Manison. Agreement made subject to approval; Qureia is unable to obtain consent from Abbas. 17 August Telephone Negotiations from Stockholm Peres, Holst, Singer and Gil, in Stockholm on official business, negotiate on the telephone with Arafat, Rabbo, Qureia, Asfour, Abbas in Tunis; Rabin in Tel Aviv; Savir in Jerusalem. Agreement is accomplished. 20 August Final meeting in Oslo Plaza Hotel Declarations of Principles initialled in a secret ceremony. 3–10 September Mutual Recognition Negotiations Peres and Holst meet in Paris and negotiate mutual recognition terms for two days with Arafat over the telephone. End without resolution (3 September). Holst, in Oslo, negotiates with Arafat through Mubarak and Rabbo (5 September). Meeting held in Paris between Israelis, Palestinians, and Norwegians (6–7 September). Arafat writes letter to Israel concerning mutual recognition (9 September).

122 Appendix 1 Date

Progress

13 September

Rabin writes letter recognising the PLO. USA resume dialogue with the PLO (10 September). Signing ceremony on the White House lawn.

Source: Putnam and Carcasson (1998: 256).

Appendix 2 Documents

Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements 13 September, 1993 The Government of the State of Israel and the PLO team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the ‘Palestinian Delegation’), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the, two sides agree to the following principles:

ARTICLE I Aim of the Negotiations The aim of the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the ‘Council’), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

124 Appendix 2 ARTICLE II Framework for the Interim Period The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.

ARTICLE III Elections In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

ARTICLE IV Jurisdiction Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

ARTICLE V Transitional Period and Permanent Status Negotiations The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

Appendix 2: Documents 125 Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.

ARTICLE VI Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorised Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.

ARTICLE VII Interim Agreements The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the ‘Interim Agreement’). The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of

126 Appendix 2 powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council’s executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any other Authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

ARTICLE VIII Public Order and Security In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

ARTICLE IX Laws and Military Orders The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.

Appendix 2: Documents 127 ARTICLE X Joint Israeli–Palestinian Liaison Committee In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli–Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.

ARTICLE XI Israeli–Palestinian Cooperation in Economic Fields Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli–Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.

ARTICLE XII Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.

128 Appendix 2 ARTICLE XIII Redeployment of Israeli Forces After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.

ARTICLE XIV Israeli Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Areas Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.

ARTICLE XV Resolution of Disputes Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles. or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

Appendix 2: Documents 129 ARTICLE XVI Israeli–Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Regional Programs Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a ‘Marshall Plan’, the regional programs and other programs, including special programs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.

ARTICLE XVII Miscellaneous Provisions This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof. Done at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993. For the Government of Israel For the PLO Witnessed By: The United States of America The Russian Federation

ANNEX I Protocol on the Mode and Conditions of Elections Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election process, according to an agreement between the two sides. In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the following issues: • • •

the system of elections; the mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their personal composition; and rules and regulations regarding election campaign, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station.

130 Appendix 2 The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4th June 1967 will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.

ANNEX II Protocol on the Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal. Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement. The above agreement will include, among other things: •

•

•

• • •

Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian representatives. Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, except: external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations, and other mutually agreed matters. Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt. Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers. A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon. Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes. An economic development and stabilization program, including the establishment of an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment, and financial and economic support. Both sides will coordinate and cooperate jointly and unilaterally with regional and international parties to support these aims.

Appendix 2: Documents 131 •

Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

The above agreement will include arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages: • •

Gaza–Egypt; and Jericho–Jordan.

The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority under this Annex II and Article VI of the Declaration of Principles will be located in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending the inauguration of the Council. Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in the interim period.

ANNEX III Protocol on Israeli–Palestinian Cooperation in Economic and Development Programs The two sides agree to establish an Israeli–Palestinian continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following: Cooperation in the field of water, including a Water Development Program prepared by experts from both sides, which will also specify the mode of cooperation in the management of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will include proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period. Cooperation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity Development Program, which will also specify the mode of cooperation for the production, maintenance, purchase and sale of electricity resources. Cooperation in the field of energy, including an Energy Development Program, which will provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, particularly in the Gaza Strip and in the Negev, and will encourage further joint exploitation of other energy resources. This Program may also provide for the construction of a Petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip and the construction of oil and gas pipelines.

132 Appendix 2 Cooperation in the field of finance, including a Financial Development and Action Program for the encouragement of international investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank. Cooperation in the field of transport and communications, including a Program, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza Sea Port Area, and will provide for the establishing of transport and communications lines to and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel and to other countries. In addition, this Program will provide for carrying out the necessary construction of roads, railways, communications lines, etc. Cooperation in the field of trade, including studies, and Trade Promotion Programs, which will encourage local, regional and inter-regional trade, as well as a feasibility study of creating free trade zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones, and cooperation in other areas related to trade and commerce. Cooperation in the field of industry, including Industrial Development Programs, which will provide for the establishment of joint Israeli– Palestinian Industrial Research and Development Centers, will promote Palestinian–Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer and science-based industries. A program for cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and cooperation in social welfare issues. A Human Resources Development and Cooperation Plan, providing for joint Israeli–Palestinian workshops and seminars, and for the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research institutes and data banks. An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this sphere. A program for developing coordination and cooperation in the field of communication and media. Any other programs of mutual interest.

ANNEX IV Protocol on Israeli–Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Regional Development Programs The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a Development Program for the region, including

Appendix 2: Documents 133 the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the G-7. The parties will request the G-7 to seek the participation in this program of other interested states, such as members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, regional Arab states and institutions, as well as members of the private sector. The Development Program will consist of two elements: • •

an Economic Development Program for the ‘West Bank and the Gaza Strip’. a Regional Economic Development Program.

The Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza strip will consist of the following elements: • • • • •

A Social Rehabilitation Program, including a Housing and Construction Program. A Small and Medium Business Development Plan. An Infrastructure Development Program (water, electricity, transportation and communications, etc.) A Human Resources Plan. Other programs.

The Regional Economic Development Program may consist of the following elements: • • • • • • • • •

The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, and a Middle East Development Bank, as a second step. The development of a joint Israeli–Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area. The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza) – Dead Sea Canal. Regional Desalinization and other water development projects. A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated regional effort for the prevention of desertification. Interconnection of electricity grids. Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources. A Regional Tourism, Transportation and Telecommunications Development Plan. Regional cooperation in other spheres.

The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups, and will

134 Appendix 2 coordinate towards their success. The two parties will encourage intersessional activities, as well as pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, within the various multilateral working groups.

AGREED MINUTES TO THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS A. General Understandings and Agreements Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these Agreed Minutes below. B. Specific Understandings and Agreements It is understood that: •

•

Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis. The Council’s jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres and authorities transferred to it. It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows:

•

• •

The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the authorised Palestinians who will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and any other authorities agreed upon. It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not be affected. Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These arrangements also will provide for the necessary adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes collected by the direct taxation office.

Appendix 2: Documents 135 •

Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will immediately commence negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer of authority on the above offices in accordance with the above understandings.

The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation. The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council. It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for cooperation and coordination between the two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police will be accomplished in a phased manner, as agreed in the Interim Agreement. It is agreed that, upon the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the Joint Israeli– Palestinian Liaison Committee. It is further agreed that each side will have an equal number of members in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee will reach decisions by agreement. The Joint Committee may add other technicians and experts, as necessary. The Joint Committee will decide on the frequency and place or places of its meetings. It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area. Done at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993. For the Government of Israel For the PLO Witnessed By: The United States of America The Russian Federation

136 Appendix 2

Letter from Yasser Arafat to Prime Minister Rabin (September 9, 1993) Mr. Prime Minister, The signing of the Declaration of Principles marks a new era in the history of the Middle East. In firm conviction thereof, I would like to confirm the following PLO commitments: The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security. The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process, and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations. The PLO considers that the signing of the Declaration of Principles constitutes a historic event, inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all other acts which endanger peace and stability. Accordingly, the PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators. In view of the promise of a new era and the signing of the Declaration of Principles and based on Palestinian acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Convenant which deny Israel’s right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant. Sincerely, Yasser Arafat Chairman The Palestine Liberation Organization

Letter from Yasser Arafat to Norwegian Foreign Minister (September 9, 1993) Dear Minister Holst, I would like to confirm to you that, upon the signing of the Declaration of Principles, the PLO encourages and calls upon the Palestinian people in

Appendix 2: Documents 137 the West Bank and Gaza Strip to take part in the steps leading to the normalization of life, rejecting violence and terrorism, contributing to peace and stability and participating actively in shaping reconstruction, economic development and co-operation. Sincerely, Yasser Arafat Chairman The Palestine Liberation Organization

Letter from Prime Minister Rabin to Yasser Arafat (September 10, 1993) Mr. Chairman, In response to your letter of September 9, 1993, I wish to confirm to you that, in light of the PLO commitments included in your letter, the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process. Yitzhak Rabin Prime Minister of Israel

Notes

1 Introduction 1 All documents are reprinted in Institute for Palestine Studies (1994); see also Appendix 2 of this book. 2 Peres (1993, 1995), Halter and Laurent (1994), King (1994), Abbas (1995), Ashrawi (1995), Makovsky (1995), Heikal (1996), Beilin (1997), Enderlin (1998), Savir (1998), Segev (1998) to name the most important contributions.

2 Israel and the PLO: Facing international and domestic challenges 1 For further analysis on the impact of the changes on the international level on the regional system, see Safty (1994), Miller (1995), Karsh (1997). 2 See also Ben-Zvi (1993: 178f), Mekelberg (1994: 186ff). For the influence of the Jewish lobby in the USA see Thorpe (1994). 3 US military assistance to Israel added up to US$10.6 million between 1958 and 1962; US$201.1 million between 1963 and 1967; US$2,629.4 million between 1968 and 1972; US$8,062.5 million between 1973 and 1977; US$7,091.2 million between 1978 and 1982; see Spiegel et al. (1988: 28). 4 Until the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Moscow had established full diplomatic ties to Israel. In particular, economic and cultural relations were fostered. In addition, the Soviet Union agreed to a proposal of the United Nations general assembly to cancel a resolution equating Zionism with racism (Freedman 1994: 198). 5 For an analysis of the internal decision-making processes during the crisis in Israel and the US, see Welch (1992) and Hybel (1993). 6 The leadership of the Soviet Union made clear to Syria that it would cease to support Assad’s goal of achieving ‘strategic parity’ with Israel. It would cut back Soviet military assistance and military advisors were to be withdrawn. See Avineri (1993: 29). For Syrian ‘strategic parity’ with Israel see Khalidi and Agha (1991: 186ff); and for subsequent reorientation of Syrian foreign policy see Hinnebusch (1994: 128ff). 7 For the constructive relationship of the former Soviet republics with Israel see Freedman (1994). 8 During perestroika, Soviet emigration policy became more liberal. At the same time, emigration of Jews was used to extract additional development aid (Schmid 1993: 51). In 1988, 2,283 Jews emigrated to Israel from the Soviet Union, in 1989, 12,932 and in 1990, c. 185,000 (Little 1994: 502). 9 For a description of the Israeli peace movement and its influence on Israeli politics see Bar-On (1996).

Notes

139

10 The different positions of Likud and Labour with regard to the West Bank become obvious with the response of the outgoing Prime Minister to Rabin’s speech. Shamir commented on the fact that Rabin did not mention the words ‘Eretz Yisra’el’ in his speech (Shamir 1992). 11 Fatah emerged in the 1950 from a students organisation at the University of Kuwait; the core leadership, which formed at that point around Arafat never gave away its position in the following decades (Khalidi 1991: 64). 12 In 1983 the following groups were represented in the PNC: Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Al-Sa’iqa, Arab Liberation Front (ALF), Popular Front General Command (GC), Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), and some ten trade union organisations (Selim 1991: 271f). 13 However, some Arab states did not stick to the rules and only transferred a few or no financial resources (Selim 1991: 268). 14 In Dubai hotel bills, flight tickets were liable to taxes in favour of the PLO; Kuwait withheld 1 per cent of teachers’ salaries which were transferred to the PLO (Selim 1991: 268). 15 An overview of the causes and the course of the Intifada is given by Shalev (1991); a description of the Islamist movements and their actions in particular during the Intifada by Abu-Amr (1994). 16 The PLO leadership was divided over this risky option. Close advisors had warned Arafat about the close relationship with Saddam Hussein (Gowers and Walker 1994: 499) – but to no avail. 17 Saddam Hussein had made available training facilities for 5,000 PLO fighters in Iraq (Wallach and Wallach 1994: 485). 18 In speeches made in Riyadh at the beginning of January to mark the 28th anniversary of the inauguration of the Fatah Movement, Mahmud Abbas and Subhi Abu-Karsh, the representative of the PLO in Saudi Arabia, regretted the Palestinian stand during the Gulf crisis (FBIS-NES-93-008, Radio Monte Carlo, 12 January 1993, Paris). Arafat expected that the official Gulf aid would be resumed and that it would be possible to reorganise the 5 per cent tax paid by Palestinians to the PLO (FBIS-NES-93-012, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 18 January 1993, London). 19 In November 1990, it had to reduce the salaries of 50,000 employees, see Jerusalem Post, 2 November 1990. 20 The Palestinian embassy in Saudi Arabia for example had to cut the salaries of its staff by 20 per cent (FBIS-NES-93-036, Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 23 February 1993, London). 21 FBIS-NES-93-112, Hadashot, 14 June 1993, Tel Aviv. 22 See Washington Post, 13 May 1993. According to an opinion poll of September 1967, 33 per cent of the Palestinian households in the Territories were supported by relatives outside the Territories, 41 per cent of them living in Jordan, 34 per cent in Kuwait and 6 per cent in Saudi Arabia (Baumgarten 1993: 279). 23 FBIS-NES-93-003, Al-Shira’, 4 January 1993, Beirut.

3 Let’s argue: A constructivist approach to understanding the Oslo talks 1 Excerpts from Speech by President George Bush, 6 March 1991, in Quandt (1993: 495–96). 2 See Joel Peters (1994, 1996) for a comprehensive overview of the multilaterals. 3 The REDWG meetings 11–12 May 1992 in Brussels, 29–30 October 1992 in Paris and 4–5 May 1993 in Rome are of particular relevance. Also significant are the

140 Notes

4 5 6 7

8 9

10

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

26 27 28

activities of numerous public agencies and NGOs in the context of the REDWG developing the idea of a new Middle East, such as the World Bank, Harvard University and the Commission of the European Union. Eberhard Rhein, personal communications. Commission of the European Communities (1992b). See, for the final version of the paper, Commission of the European Communities (1993). It was reported that during a meeting between Qureia and EU officials in midJanuary 1993, the EU Commission delivered ‘. . . blueprints and studies on the establishment of a Palestinian infrastructure during the interim period in the Occupied Territories’, FBIS-NES-93-016, Al-Quds, 26 January 1993, Jerusalem. Commission of the European Communities (1993: 6). The Palestinians were invited to send delegations to the multilateral talks, but Palestinians from outside the Territories were prevented from participating, according to the Madrid formula. Only in October 1992, did the new government of Israel agree that Palestinian delegates from the diaspora should be allowed to attend the meeting of the multilaterals, provided that they were not members of the PLO or the Palestine National Council (Peters 1994: 6). Sari Nusseibeh, personal communications. Yassir Arafat had close contact with the members of the Palestinian delegation, in order to emphasise that the Washington negotiations took place under his control. On 15 April 1992, for example, he received the entire delegation and its advisory committee in Cairo and again in Amman on 18 June 1992 (Mansour 1993: 18). Maher el-Kurd, personal communications. Maher el-Kurd, personal communications. Maher al-Kurd, personal communications. FBIS-NES-92-128, DAVAR, 1 July 1992, Tel Aviv, FBIS-NES-93-055, Channel 2, 22 March 1993, Jerusalem. FBIS-NES-93-056, Hadashot, 25 March 1993, Tel Aviv. FBIS-NES-93-068, DAVAR, 11 April 1993, Tel Aviv. FBIS-NES-93-078, Yedi’ot Aharonot, 25 April 1993, Tel Aviv. Abu Ala (1991). I quote this study in length as it contributes fundamentally to the emergence of the Oslo channel. Yair Hirschfeld, personal communications. Eberhard Rhein, personal communications. No title, no author, no date given, communication from the Commission of the EU. Hirschfeld (1992). Because of the outstanding importance of this study I present it in considerable length. These proposals are also in Qureia’s paper. The fourth round of bilateral peace talks between Israel and her Arab neighbours opened in Washington 24 February 1992. The beginning of the talks were overshadowed by remarks regarding settlements in congressional testimony by Secretary of State James Baker. Both Palestinian spokeswoman Hanan Ashrawi and Jordanian spokesman Marwan Muasher, welcomed Baker’s call for a settlement freeze in return for absorption loan guarantees. Ashrawi called Baker’s testimony ‘. . . a glimmer of hope . . .’ and said that US policy on the guarantees puts the peace talks ‘. . . on the right track.’ Yossi Ben-Aharon, Israeli chief negotiator on the Syrian track, said Israel would not bend to Baker’s demands, but would not give up hope of receiving assistance (Jerusalem Post, 25 February 1992). Commission of the European Communities (1992a). Heiberg and Ovesen (1993). Pundak in his dissertation describes Transjordan’s path to independence from

Notes 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

141

Great Britain, the 1948 war with special emphasis on Palestine, and the annexation of the West Bank by Jordan in 1950 (Pundak 1994). Ron Pundak, personal communications. Yair Hirschfeld, personal communications. Ron Pundak, personal communications. Maher el-Kurd, personal communications. Ron Pundak, personal communication. Both proposals are reprinted in Institute for Palestine Studies (1994: 45–51 and 1994: 65–67). Yair Hirschfeld, personal communications. Ave Gill, personal communications. Joel Singer, personal communications. Ron Pundak, personal communication. Ron Pundak, personal communications. Yair Hirschfeld, personal communications. Yair Hirschfeld, personal communications. Maher el-Kurd, personal communications. Maher el-Kurd, personal communications. Mamdouh Noufil, personal communications. Hirschfeld had informed State Department Officials about the talks, the Norwegian government had communicated with Secretary of State Warren Christopher. The PLO, because it had no lines of communication with the USA, informed the station head of the CIA in Tunis. The CIA, however, did not take the PLO message seriously (Palestinian source, CIA source, personal communications).

4 Cautious rapprochement: A rational choice approach to understanding the Oslo talks 1 FBIS-NES-92-128, DAVAR, 1 July 1992, Tel Aviv. 2 FBIS-NES-92-128, Qol Yisra’el, 27 June 1992, Jerusalem. 3 FBIS-NES-92-129, Qol Yisra’el, 5 July 1992, Jerusalem; FBIS-NES-92-135, Israel Television Network, 13 July 1992, Jerusalem. 4 FBIS-NES-92-138, Voice of Palestine, 12 July 1992, Algiers. 5 FBIS-NES-92-135, MENA, 12 July 1992, Cairo. 6 FBIS-NES-92-138, Voice of Palestine, 16 July 1992, Algiers. 7 FBIS-NES-92-135, MENA, 13 July 1992, Cairo. 8 FBIS-NES-92-138, MENA, 17 July 1992, Cairo. 9 See for media coverage FBIS-NES-92-140, MENA, 21 July 1992, Cairo, various reports. 10 FBIS-NES-92-140, Radio Monte Carlo, 21 July 1992, Paris. 11 FBIS-NES-92-142, MENA, 22 July 1992, Cairo. 12 FBIS-NES-92-143, MENA, 20 July 1992, Cairo. 13 FBIS-NES-92-140, various reports. 14 FBIS-NES-93-002, Qol Yisra’el, 5 January 1993, Jerusalem. 15 FBIS-NES-93-012, Israel Television Network, 20 January 1993, Jerusalem. 16 FBIS-NES-93-003, Qol Yisra’el, 4 January 1993, Jerusalem. 17 Ave Gill, personal communications. 18 Jerusalem Post, 1 January 1993. 19 FBIS-NES-93-003, Al-Shira’, 4 January 1993, Beirut. 20 FBIS-NES-93-012, Qol Yisra’el, 19 January 1993, Jerusalem. 21 FBIS-NES-93-012, Moroccan Kingdom Radio, 20 January 1993, Rabat. 22 FBIS-NES-93-012, WAKH, 21 January 1993, Manama; FBIS-NES-93-013, Voice of Palestine, 21 January 1993, Algiers; see other reports in FBIS-NES-93-012 and

142 Notes

23 24 25 26 27 28

29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51

52

53

FBIS-NES-93-013 on statements by Haydar Abdel Shafi, head of the Palestinian delegation, Muhammad Subayh, Secretary General of the Palestine National Council, Abdallah Franji, Spokesman for the PLO in Germany, Yasir Abed Rabbo and Ziyad Abu-Zayyad, members of the Palestinian Negotiating Delegation and Faruq Qaddumi, Head of the PLO Political Department. FBIS-NES-93-013, Yedi’ot Aharonot, 22 January 1993, Tel Aviv. FBIS-NES-93-023, IDF Radio, 4 February, 1993, Tel Aviv. FBIS-NES-93-019, Voice of Palestine, 22 January 1993, Algiers. FBIS-NES-93-019, Voice of Palestine, 20 January 1993, Algiers. FBIS-NES-93-027, MENA, 11 February 1993, Cairo. FBIS-NES-93-013, MBC Television, 21 January 1993, London. The new approach to settlements was implemented by Major General Dani Yatom and Major General Matan Vilna’i, the respective commanders of the Central and Southern Commands, endorsing a decree forbidding settlers from building in the Territories (FBIS-NES-93-028, Ha’aretz, 11 February 1993, Tel Aviv). Rabin reconfirmed this statement at a speech addressing Tel Aviv high school students on 16 February; see FBIS-NES-93-029, Qol Yisra’el, 16 February 1993, Jerusalem. FBIS-NES-93-030, Ha’aretz, 17 February 1993, Tel Aviv. FBIS-NES-93-028, Ha’aretz, 11 February 1993, Tel Aviv. FBIS-NES-93-039, Qol Yisra’el, 2 March 1993, Jerusalem. FBIS-NES-93-045, Qol Yisra’el, 9 March 1993, Jerusalem. FBIS-NES-93-048, Qol Yisra’el, 14 March 1993, Jerusalem. FBIS-NES-93-046, IDF Radio, 10 March 1993, Tel Aviv. FBIS-NES-93-050, Al-Quds, 14 March 1993, Jerusalem. FBIS-NES-93-055, MENA, 24 March 1993, Cairo. FBIS-NES-93-055, Ha’aretz, 24 March 1993, Tel Aviv. FBIS-NES-93-048, Radio Monte Carlo, 13 March 1993, Paris. FBIS-NES-93-057, IDF Radio, 25 March 1993, Tel Aviv. FBIS-NES-93-058, Israel Television Network, 28 March 1993, Jerusalem. FBIS-NES-93-054, Radio Monte Carlo, 22 March 1993, Paris. FBIS-NES-93-055, Ha’olam Haze, 24 March 1993, Tel Aviv. FBIS-NES-93-055, Channel 2 Television, March 1993, Jerusalem. FBIS-NES-93-060, Israel Television Network, 30 March 1993, Jerusalem. FBIS-NES-93-062, Qol Yisra’el, 1 April 1993, Jerusalem. FBIS-NES-93-062, Yedi’ot Aharonot, 2 April 1993, Tel Aviv. FBIS-NES-93-060, Radio Monte Carlo, 31 March 1993, Paris. FBIS-NES-93-077, Qol Yisra’el, 23 April 1993, Jerusalem. FBIS-NES-93-077, Hadashot, 23 April 1993, Tel Aviv. FBIS-NES-93-078, Yedi’ot Aharonot, 25 April 1993, Tel Aviv. FBIS-NES-93-084, Qol Yisra’el, 3 May 1993, Jerusalem. In reaction to these public announcements, members of the extreme Kach movement announced that they would set up their own police force called Judea police, as an alternative to the Palestinian autonomy police (Hadashot, 3 May 1993). Mamdouh Noufil, personal communications. A fourth Egyptian diplomat, Nabil Fahmi, then assistant to Amr Moussa, was gradually included in the discussions about the achievements in Oslo, so that – after all – only four Egyptians were aware of it (Nabil Fahmi, personal communications). In the first half of 1993, Egypt was a centre of diplomatic activities, both Israelis and Palestinians using Egypt’s status as an honest broker. Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Mussa visited Israel on 17 January; Arafat was supposed to visit Cairo at the end of January 1993 (FBIS-NES-93-014, MENA, 25 January 1993, Cairo); Usamah al-Baz travelled to Israel on 28 February and brought a message from Rabin to Mubarak (FBIS-NES-93-038, MENA, 1 March 1993, Cairo).

Notes

54

55 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

75 76 77 78 79 80 81

143

Before his meeting with Rabin, he had met with Beilin in order to discuss the multilateral talks (FBIS-NES-93-038, Qol Yisra’el, 28 February 1993, Jerusalem). Palestinian-Israeli interaction through Cairo intensified in March: Mahmud Abbas visited Cairo on 10 March 1993 (FBIS-NES-93-046, MENA, 10 March 1993, Cairo); Arafat visited Cairo on 19 March (FBIS-NES-93-053, MENA, 19 March 1993, Cairo); Arafat visited Cairo again on 28 March (FBIS-NES-93-058, MENA, 28 March 1993, Cairo) and again on 21 April (FBIS-NES-93-076, MENA, 21 April 1993, Cairo); Al-Baz visited Israel 21 April (FBIS-NES-93-076, MENA, 22 April 1993, Cairo); Yossi Sarid visited Cairo 21 April (FBIS-NES-93-076, MENA, 21 April 1993, Cairo). Nimrod Novik, personal communications. When and under what circumstances Peres himself developed the Gaza–Jericho idea is not yet exactly known. Halter and Laurent (1994: 104f) mention an unconfirmed report of Peres travelling to Egypt at the beginning of April where he met Ahmad Qureia and Mahmoud Abbas to exchange views on the Oslo channel. Among other demands, the Palestinians insisted that Israel should withdraw from the major cities of the West Bank. Although this proposal was rejected by Peres, the Palestinians insisted that an agreement would only be possible if the Israelis would be ready to a compromise and make a gesture of goodwill on the West Bank. FBIS-NES-93-063, Qol Yisra’el, 4 April 1993, Jerusalem; FBIS-NES-93-063, IDF Radio, 4 April 1993, Tel Aviv. FBIS-NES-93-063, Qol Yisra’el, 4 April 1993, Jerusalem; FBIS-NES-93-063, IDF Radio, 4 April 1993, Tel Aviv. FBIS-NES-93-063, Qol Yisra’el, 4 April 1993, Jerusalem. FBIS-NES-93-063, Qol Yisra’el, 5 April 1993, Jerusalem. Nimrod Novik, personal communications. FBIS-NES-93-071, MENA, 14 April 1993, Cairo. FBIS-NES-93-071, Arab Republic of Egypt Radio, 14 April 1993, Cairo. FBIS-NES-93-082, Israel Television Network, 29 April 1993, Jerusalem. FBIS-NES-93-096, Al-Quds, 18 May 1993, Jerusalem. FBIS-NES-93-105, Ha’aretz, 2 June 1993, Tel Aviv. FBIS-NES-93-104, Hamishmar, 2 June 1993, Tel Aviv. FBIS-NES-93-076, Government Press Office, 21 April 1993, Jerusalem. FBIS-NES-93-076, Qol Yisra’el, 22 April 1993, Jerusalem. SWB-ME/1670 A/5, Middle East News Agency, 21 April 1993, Cairo. SWB-ME/1660 A/1, Voice of Israel, 9 April 1993, Jerusalem. SWB-ME/1663 A/2, Israel Educational TV, 13 April 1993, Tel Aviv. SWB-ME/1664 A/1, Israel Broadcasting TV, 14 April 1993, Jerusalem. FBIS-NES-93-068, Qol Yisra’el, 12 April 1993, Jerusalem. FBIS-NES-93-068, DAVAR, 11 April 1993, Tel Aviv. FBIS-NES-93-068, Radio Monte Carlo, 12 April 1993, Paris. Jordan TV, 13 May 1993, Amman, interprets the statement of the speaker of the Palestinian delegation Hannan Ashrawi and head of negotiations Haydar Abd al-Shafi, the Syrian head of delegation Muwaffaq al-Allaf and the Lebanese delegate Suhayl Shammas. Regarding the ‘constructive atmosphere’ at the beginning of the talks, in particular with regard to the Israeli–Palestinian talks, see Voice of Israel, 4 May 1993, Jerusalem (SWB-ME/1680 A/1). SWB-ME/1695 A/1, AFP, 20 May 1993, Paris. SWB-ME/1695 A/1, AFP, 20 May 1993, Paris Mamdouh Noufil, personal communications. SWB-ME/1689 A/2, Voice of Israel, 14 May 1993, Jerusalem. SWB-ME/1692 A/2, Voice of Israel, 17 May 1993, Jerusalem. SWB-ME/1695 A/3, Middle East News Agency, 20 May 1993, Cairo. Bassam Abu Sharif , Kingdom of Morocco Radio, 22 May 1993, Rabat, (SWB-

144 Notes ME/1696 A/5). It’s interesting though that Chancellor Vranitzky visited Israel on 8–11 June 1993; see Keesing’s (Joffe 1996, 39: 39533). This suggests that Austria was involved too. Again, Peres and Christopher met in Vienna, 14 June 1993, and discussed the ‘Gaza first’ option and the question of early empowerment (Jerusalem Post, 15 June 1993). 82 Jerusalem Post, 15 June 1993. 83 Jerusalem Post, 15 June 1993. 84 See Agha et al. (2003) for an extensive discussion of ‘track-II’ exercises in the 1990s in the Middle East.

5 Bargaining in Oslo 1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9 10 11 12 13

14 15 16

Joel Singer, personal communications. Joel Singer, personal communications. Joel Singer, personal communications. Joel Singer, personal communications. The full list is published in Abbas (1995: 153ff). The Palestinians had always pushed for the US to play a stronger mediating role in the Washington negotiations, and expected to engage in Camp David-style negotiations. And indeed, during the tenth round of the talks, the American administration did come up with its own proposal: US draft of ‘Israeli–Palestinian Joint Declaration of Principles’, presented on 30 June 1993, Washington, D.C., in The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: A Documentary Record, Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington, D.C. 1994, 107–9. However, although the Palestinians could have regarded this as a success, Arafat refused to consider the American proposal, stating that it was not evenhandedly drafted. This position has to be interpreted in the light of a letter which Peres had sent to Arafat via the Oslo channel before the tenth round of the negotiations, stating that Rabin was keen on reaching an agreement in Washington with Faisal al-Husseini. But if the Washington talks, and indeed the tenth round of the talks succeeded in any way, then the Oslo channel was to be disallowed. Accordingly, Arafat advised Faisal al-Husseini not to accept the American proposal (Mamdouh Noufil, personal communications). SWB-ME/1733 A/1, Radio Monte Carlo, Paris, 3 July 1993. See Wallach and Wallach (1994: 57). Yair Hirschfeld, personal communications. SWB-ME/1737 A/1, IDF Radio, Tel Aviv, 8 July. Quote in Savir (1998: 38). Yair Hirschfeld, personal communications; Joel Singer, personal communications. Nimrod Novik, personal communications. The Allon plan, first conceived in 1967 and named after the then Minister of Defence of Israel, Yigal Allon, served as a guideline for the establishment of Israeli settlements on the West Bank. According to the plan, Israel’s borders should be based alongside the Jordan River, the Rift Valley and the Judean Desert. In order to guarantee the political legitimacy of the new borders, Israeli settlements should be established along this line. This chain of Jewish settlements would remain under Israeli sovereignty, thus avoiding the annexation of a large Palestinian population. The Allon Plan served as a basis for numerous Labour platforms in the 1970s and 1980s (Allon 1976). These are reproduced in Abbas (1995: 144–49 and 171–73). Israeli source, personal communications. Zartman (1997: 204f) argues that in the final weeks of the negotiations both sides made concessions between positions; concessions were made against time, post-

Notes 17 18 19 20 21

22 23

24 25 26 27 28 29

145

poning agreement on a number of items; and concessions were made against each other, meaning concessions in terms of mutual recognition. SWB-ME/1758 A/3, Voice of Israel, 3 August 1993, Jerusalem. SWB-ME/1759 A/3, Voice of Israel, 4 August 1993, Jerusalem. SWB-ME/1764 A/3, Voice of Israel, 9 August 1993, Jerusalem. Yair Hirschfeld, personal communications. See Final Agreed Draft of August 19, 1993, p.1 and p.9. Whereas the final pages of the ‘Declaration of Principles’ and the ‘Agreed Minutes’ carry the signature of Uri Savir, Joel Singer and Yair Hirschfeld for the Israeli side, and by Ahmad Qureia, Mohammed Abu Koush and Hassan Asfour for the Palestinian side, the remaining pages of the documents are initialled by Yair Hirschfeld and Ahmad Qureia only. FBIS-NES-93-084, Hadashot, 3 May 1993, Tel Aviv. SWB-ME/1734 A/4, Israel Educational TV, 4 July 1993, Tel Aviv. Arafat accompanied by Abbas visited Cairo on 5 July and spoke to Usamah al-Baz (SWB-ME/1734 A/5, Middle East News Agency, 5 July 1993, Cairo). The Palestinians denied any meeting between Peres and Abbas in Cairo on 6 July (SWB-ME/1744 A/6), Radio Monte Carlo, 16 July, Paris. SWB-ME/1736 A/3, Voice of Israel, 7 July 1993, Jerusalem. Savir (1998: 49f). Abbas (1995: 157f) claims that these points were presented to the Palestinian delegation on 27 June. SWB-ME/1761 A/1, IDF Radio, 5 August 1993, Tel Aviv. (SWB-ME/1764 A/4), Voice of Israel, 9 August 1993, Jerusalem. Letter from Chairman Yassir Arafat to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (Abdul Hadi, 1997: 142). Letter from Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to Chairman Yassir Arafat (Abdul Hadi,1997: 142).

6 The success of the Oslo talks – and why the process failed 1 For detailed accounts see, for example, Agha and Malley (2001), Beilin (2004), Ross (2004), Swisher (2004). 2 Barak, E. (2000) Statement by PM Ehud Barak prior to his Departure for Camp David Summit, 10 July 2000, Tel Aviv: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available online: www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+lead ers/2000/Statement+by+PM+Barak+prior+to+Departure+for+the+C.htm (accessed 28 April 2006). 3 Ibid. 4 Barak, E. (2000) Address to the Knesset by PM Barak on the Camp David Summit, 10 July 2000, Tel Aviv: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available online: www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2000/ Address+to+the+Knesset+by+PM+Barak+on+the+Camp+Dav.htm

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Interviews Alpher, Joseph, American Jewish Committee. Interview in Jerusalem, 25 September 1997. Aly, Abdel Monem Said, Al Ahram Center for Strategic and Political Studies. Interview in Cairo, September 1997. Dijani, Munthir, Palestinian Center for Regional Studies. Interview in Ramallah, 19 May 1998. el-Kurd, Maher, Ministry of Trade. Interview in Gaza, 27 May 1998. Fahmi, Nabil, Ambassador of Egypt, former advisor to Amr Moussa, Foreign Minister of Egypt. Interview in Frankfurt, 28 October 1997. Gill, Ave, The Peres Institute for Peace, former advisor to Shimon Peres. Interview in Tel Aviv, 21 May 1998. Hadi, Mahdi Abdul, Palestinian Academy for the Study of International Affairs. Interview in Jerusalem, 23 May 1998. Hirschfeld, Yair, Professor of History, Haifa University. Interviews in Ramati Shai, September 1997 and in Jerusalem, 20 May 1998. Khatib, Ghassan, Member of the Palestinian delegation to the bilateral peace talks. Interview in Jerusalem, 23 May 1998. Novik, Nimrod, Senior Vice President of the Merhav Group of Companies. Interview in Herzliya Pituah, 21 May 1998. Nusseibeh, Sari, al-Quds University. Interview in Jerusalem, 25 May 1998. Pundak, Ron, Economic Co-operation Foundation. Interview in Tel Aviv, 21 September 1997. Rabinovich, Itamar, University of Tel Aviv. Interview in Tel Aviv, 18 September 1997. Rhein, Eberhard, former Director to the Commission of the European Union. Interview in Brussels, 21 January 1998. Sayigh, Yezid, University of Cambridge. Interview in Cambridge, 12 November 1998. Shikaki, Khalil, Najah University. Interview in Nablus, 20 September 1997. Shtayyeh, Mohammed, Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction. Interview in Ramallah, 28 September 1997. Singer, Joel, lawyer. Interview in Washington DC, 16 June 1998. Steinberg, Gerald, Bar-Ilan University. Interview in Jerusalem, 25 May 1998. Zayyad, Ziad Abu, Member of the Palestinian Delegation to the Multilateral Peace Talks. Interview in Munich, 13 December 1996.

Index

Abbas, M. 2, 27, 32, 47, 48, 50, 55, 56, 57, 60, 64, 67, 79, 83, 85, 86, 90, 96, 104; recognition of Israel 69 Abu-Amr 21, 22 Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim SelfGovernment Arrangements 81–2, 134–5 Arafat, Y. 18, 19, 23, 27, 57, 58, 66, 69, 70, 71, 74, 76, 79; Camp David negotiations 117, 118; common declaration with Saddam Hussein 23; discussions with Holst 87; first letter addressing Israeli leadership directly 86, 87, 120; handshake with Rabin at White House 2; Jericho issues 74, 92; letter to Holst 3, 136–7; letter to Rabin 3, 108, 121, 135–6 Ashrawi, H. 27 Avineri, S. 11 Axelrod, R. 115, 117, 118 Barak, E.: Camp David negotiations 117, 118 Barzilai, G. 16 Bassiouny, M. 73, 74 Baumgarten, H. 22, 23 Beilin, Y. 46, 47, 50, 51, 57, 58, 59, 65, 67, 76, 86, 101, 102; recognition of PLO 107 Ben-Zvi, A. 11, 12, 13 Berman, M. 46 Brynen, R. 46 Bush, G.: Middle East policy 14, 29 Camp David negotiations 117; conceptualised as an endgame 117, 118, 119 Carcasson, M. 122

Clinton, B. 2, 117 Cobban, H. 18, 20, 21, 27 Cold War: end of 11, 13 ‘common life world’ 8, 9, 29, 51, 61, 113 constructivist approaches 7, 8, 61–2; ‘common life world’ 8, 9, 29, 51, 61, 113; developing the framework for negotiations 61; empathy 9, 29, 51, 52, 61, 113; joint learning process 7, 9; key success factors of talks 112–13; legitimate partners on equal footing 8–9, 29, 61, 113; persuasive aspects of negotiations 8, 29; preconditions for negotiations 8, 9; second phase of Oslo negotiations 109, 110 continued occupation and terrorism: effects of 2 cooperative and non-cooperative moves in negotiations 7, 115, 116 Cossali, P. 23 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements 2–3, 94, 95, 96, 123–34; aim of negotiations 123; dissolution of Israeli civil administration and withdrawal of military government 95, 100, 126; economic aspects 104–5, 110, 127, 131–4; elections 96, 98–100, 124, 129–30; final status negotiations 94, 97–8, 125; initialed by negotiators 104, 121; interim agreements 125–6; interim arrangements and final status negotiations 94, 97, 123; Israeli– Palestinian cooperation concerning regional development programs 129, 132–4; Joint Israeli–Palestinian Liaison Committee 127; jurisdiction 124; laws and military orders 126;

158 Index liaison and cooperation with Jordan and Egypt 95–6, 98, 127; miscellaneous provisions 129; preparatory transfer of powers and responsibilities 125; public order and security 95, 101, 126; redeployment of Israeli forces 128; resolution of disputes 128; transitional period 124; withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho areas 128, 130–31; see also Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements direct channel of communication: establishment of 46, 47, 48 dissolution of Israeli civil administration and withdrawal of military government 95, 100, 126 domestic environment 4, 5, 24, 25; conducive to initiation of talks 111, 112; Israel 14–17, 24–5; PLO 21, 22, 24 Downs, G. 7 economic cooperation 48, 49, 52, 53, 61, 104–5, 110, 112, 116, 127, 131–4; conducive to direct negotiations 112–13; Israeli visions of 33–4; Qureia’s thoughts on 34–7, 49 Egeland, J. 47 Egypt: liaison and cooperation with 95–6, 98, 127; role of 65, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74, 80 el-Kurd, M. 33, 50, 53 elections 54–5, 96, 98–100, 124, 129–30 empathy 9, 29, 51, 52, 61, 113 Enderlin, C. 54, 55, 57, 60, 61, 74, 83, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 102 endgames in negotiations 115, 116, 117, 118, 119 European Union (EU): role of 31, 32 FAFO Institute 46 Fatah 18 final status negotiations 94, 97–8, 125 Freedman, R. 13 ‘Gaza First’ idea 54, 68, 69–72, 73 Goldberg, G. 15 Gorbachev, M. 12 Gowers, A. 23, 24 gradualism 52, 53, 61, 84–5, 91–3, 99–100 Gressheim Declaration of Principles 84, 85, 120

Halter, M. 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 79 Hamas 2, 21; financial support for 22; influence of 21, 22, 25 Hirschfeld, Y. 37, 47, 56, 57, 58, 59, 81, 82, 104, 105, 110; compromise strategy 43; concessions to Palestinians 55; convincing parties of feasibility of reaching an agreement 57; coordinated regional planning 39; development of the Gaza Strip 39; ‘draft zero’ 50, 51, 52, 53; economic study 37–40; interdependent economic relationship 38; maximalist strategy 42–3; minimalist strategy 41–2; Palestinian institution building 38–9; strategy for negotiations 40–43; working plan of negotiations 43–6 Holst, J.: discussions with Arafat 87 Hopman, T. 7 Hussein, S.: common declaration with Arafat 23 Husseini, F.: Israel refraining from vetoing inclusion of 77–8; police force 72 Inbar, E. 16 interim arrangements and final status negotiations 93, 94, 97, 123 international system 4, 5, 11, 24, 25; conducive to initiation of talks 111, 112; distribution of power in 4; impact on Israel 11–14, 17, 24, 25; impact on PLO 22, 23 Israel : dependence on external finance 14; domestic situation 14–17, 24–5; election debates on Palestinian conflict 15, 16, 17; impact of international system 11–14, 17, 24, 25; importance of socio-economic development in the Territories 34; international security threats 24, 25; ‘Labour Draft of Government Basic Guideline’ 63–4, 65; lifting the ban on meeting with the PLO 66–7; Palestinian Intifida 15, 16, 24–5; public opinion towards talks with PLO 15; settlement activities 14, 15; welfare system 14 Israeli peace activists: meeting with the PLO 67 Jerusalem: future status of 54 Jervis, R. 4, 8 joint vision for the future: need for 119

Index Jönsson, C. 7 Jordan: liaison and cooperation with 95–6, 98, 127 Karsh, E. 13 Keohane, R. 6 Larsen, T. 46, 47, 88 Laurent, E. 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 79 laws and military orders 126 legitimate partners on equal footing 8–9, 29, 61, 113 liaison and cooperation with Jordan and Egypt 95–6, 98, 127 Madrid peace conference 1, 14, 29–30 Makovsky, D. 47, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 74, 85, 88, 89 Marcus, J. 16 Mekelberg, Y. 12, 14 Middle East: policies for 14, 29, 31–2, 34 Moravcsik, A. 4 Mubarak, H. 65, 69, 74, 76 multilateral talks 30, 32, 33, 46, 47, 112, 113, 129; small-scale compromises 75; see also Regional and Economic Development Working Group Murphy, E. 11, 12, 22 Muslim Brotherhood 21; see also Hamas mutual recognition 5, 53, 61, 69, 89, 101, 105–9, 121–2; exchange of letters between Arafat and Rabin 3, 108–9, 121, 135–6, 137; international and domestic pressures on Israel and the PLO 25–6; issues preventing negotiations on 26, 27, 28; opportunity to negotiate behind closed doors 113; pay-off structure 25–6, 26 Nassar, J. 18, 19, 20 negotiator’s dilemma 86, 91–2 net present value of future earnings from cooperation 115, 116, 117 Norway: intensifying role of 87, 88, 120–21; proposal to act as mediator of talks 47 Novik, N. 73, 74 Oslo talks 79; bargaining process 114; concessions in initial phases 61; conclusion of negotiations 89; crisis point in negotiations 91, 101, 102, 107; development of a normative

159

framework 49–50, 61; draft Declaration of Principles after fifth round 94, 95, 96; failure to deliver results 115, 116, 117, 118, 119; fifth round 58, 59; first round 47, 53; fourth round 55–6; Israeli government officials, inclusion of 57, 58, 59, 60; Israeli lead in negotiations 52; Israeli proposals (25–26 July) 94, 95, 96; joint strategic approach 61, 62; legitimacy of talks 55, 56, 57; modest bargaining 53, 61; open-ended game 119; Palestinian proposals (25–26 July) 94, 95, 96; participants 120, 121; Sarpsborg III document 55, 85; second round 52, 53; secrecy, need for 57; sixth round 59; third round 55; timeline 120–22; twelth round 103–4 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 2; alternate social forces, impact of 21, 22, 25; armed struggle against Israel 18; expulsion from Jordan 20; expulsion from Lebanon 20, 21; financial sources 19–20, 24; foundation of 17, 18; impact of international system 22, 23; infighting 20–21; international support for 19, 20, 25; legitimacy 18, 19, 20; organisational structure 18–19; provision of social services 19; Second Gulf War, consequences of 23 Peres, S. 2, 34, 46, 49, 51, 57, 58, 59, 66, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74, 78, 87–8, 101, 102; call for flexibility 76–7; division between PLO and Palestinian delegation in Washington 103; inclusion of PLO in negotiations 57; Jericho as an autonomous area 74; process of persuasion 77; proposing to go to Oslo 59 ; recognition of PLO 107 persuasive aspects of negotiations 8, 29, 77 Peters, J. 30 PLO see Palestinian Liberation Organization preparatory transfer of powers and responsibilities 125 Prisoner’s Dilemma 26, 112 public order and security 95, 100–101, 126 Pundak, R. 48–9, 51, 57, 59, 81, 82, 110, 113, 114, 116

160 Index Putnam, L. 122 Qaddumi, F. 67 Quandt, W. 23 Qureia, A. 31, 32, 33, 39, 46, 47, 48, 50, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 104, 105; economic cooperation 34–7, 49 Rabin, Y. 13, 15, 16, 17, 34, 54, 56, 57, 59, 65, 66, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 76, 78–9, 82, 101, 102; appearance on MBC Television 68; ‘carrot and stick’ policy 70–71; handshake with Arafat at White House 2; interview on Radio Monte Carlo 84; letter to Arafat 3, 108–9, 122, 137; mutual recognition issues 106, 107, 108; negotiated solution with the Palestinians 74–5; Oslo talks used for information about PLO positions 57; Palestinians unsure of his support for Oslo 90; ready to engage with PLO 17; testing thinking of PLO independently of Oslo 89–90; unconvinced of the Oslo talks 58, 59; willingness to enter into negotiations 64, 65 Ramon, H. 68 rational choice based theories 80; costs and benefits 6, 7; distributive aspects of agreements 7; second phase of Oslo negotiations 109, 110; signalling of intentions 6, 7, 63–6, 72, 75–6, 77–8, 79, 80, 112, 114; top leadership as sole relevant actors 80, 113–14 redeployment of Israeli forces 128 REDWG 30, 31, 112 Refugee Working Group (RWG) 46 Regional and Economic Development Working Group (REDWG) 30; importance of 30–31, 112 Reppert, J. 22 Risse, T. 9 Rocke, D. 7 Rubin, I. 24 RWG 46 Savir, U. 59, 60, 61, 62, 79, 84, 86, 91, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 114; mutual recognition 101; presence at Oslo perceived as turning point 59, 60, 80, 81, 120; private criticism of occupation of West Bank 59; tradeable points 101, 121 Schelling, T. 5

Schmid, C. 12 Second Gulf War: effect on international relations 12, 13, 23 Segev, S. 82, 90 Selim, M. 18, 19, 20 Sha’ath, N 67, 70; opinion of Rabin 64 ‘Shadow of the Future’ 115, 116, 117, 119 Shamir, Y. 13, 15, 16 Shlaim, A. 16, 17 short-term interests 117 Singer, J. 81, 110; Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements 81–2; Israeli negotiating positions 82, 83; legitimacy of talks 83; mutual recognition issues 107; opinion of Oslo talks 81; Palestinians’ perception of presence 83; points of divergence with Palestinians 101–2; questions to Palestinians 83; UN trusteeship in Gaza Strip 82 Soviet Union: collapse of 13 Stein, A. 4, 5, 26 Stellman, H. 13, 14 strategic interdependence 5; negotiations as vehicle to overcome situations of 5, 6 Sunderbrink, U. 19, 21 ‘technical committees’ 32, 33 Telhami, S. 13 terrorism and continued occupation: effects of 2 Tessler, M. 14, 15, 16 ‘tit for tat’ strategies 7, 115, 116 United States: changing relationship with Israel 11–12, 13, 14, 24, 25; economic support for Israel linked to political conditions 14, 42; new Middle East policy 14, 29; public opinion towards Israel 12 Walker, T. 23, 24 Wallach, J. and J. 19, 23 Washington talks: optimistic talk of progress 78, 79, 84 withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho areas 128, 130–31 Zartman, I. 46