The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin (St. Antony's Series)

The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin Jennifer G. Mathers

St Antony’s Series General Editor: Richard Clogg (1999– ), Fellow of St Antony’s College, Oxford Recent titles include: Craig Brandist and Galin Tihanov (editors) MATERIALIZING BAKHTIN Mark Brzezinski THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POLAND Reinhard Drifte JAPAN’S QUEST FOR A PERMANENT SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT A Matter of Pride or Justice? Simon Duke THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY Marta Dyczok THE GRAND ALLIANCE AND UKRAINIAN REFUGEES Ken Endo THE PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION UNDER JACQUES DELORS Ricardo Ffrench-Davis REFORMING THE REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA Macroeconomics, Trade, Finance M. K. Flynn IDEOLOGY, MOBILIZATION AND THE NATION The Rise of Irish, Basque and Carlist Nationalist Movements in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries Anthony Forster BRITAIN AND THE MAASTRICHT NEGOTIATIONS Azar Gat BRITISH ARMOUR THEORY AND THE RISE OF THE PANZER ARM Revising the Revisionists Fernando Guirao SPAIN AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE, 1945–57 Anthony Kirk-Greene BRITAIN’S IMPERIAL ADMINISTRATORS, 1858–1966 Bernardo Kosacoff CORPORATE STRATEGIES UNDER STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN ARGENTINA Responses by Industrial Firms to a New Set of Uncertainties Huck-ju Kwon THE WELFARE STATE IN KOREA Cécile Laborde PLURALIST THOUGHT AND THE STATE IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE, 1900–25

Julio Crespo MacLennan SPAIN AND THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 1957–85 Jennifer G. Mathers THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SHIELD FROM STALIN TO YELTSIN Eiichi Motono CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SINO-BRITISH BUSINESS, 1860–1911 The Impact of the Pro-British Commercial Network in Shanghai C. S. Nicholls THE HISTORY OF ST ANTONY’S COLLEGE, OXFORD, 1950–2000 Shane O’Rourke WARRIORS AND PEASANTS The Don Cossacks in Late Imperial Russia Laila Parsons THE DRUZE BETWEEN PALESTINE AND ISRAEL, 1947–49 Karina Sonnenberg-Stern EMANCIPATION AND POVERTY The Ashkenazi Jews of Amsterdam, 1796–1850 Miguel Székely THE ECONOMICS OF POVERTY AND WEALTH ACCUMULATION IN MEXICO Ray Takeyh THE ORIGINS OF THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE The US, Britain and Nasser’s Egypt, 1953–57 Suke Wolton LORD HAILEY, THE COLONIAL OFFICE AND THE POLITICS OF RACE AND EMPIRE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR The Loss of White Prestige

St Antony’s Series Series Standing Order ISBN 0–333–71109–2 (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin Jennifer G. Mathers Lecturer Department of International Politics University of Wales Aberystwyth

in association with ST ANTONY’S COLLEGE, OXFORD

First published in Great Britain 2000 by

MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 0–333–73742–3 First published in the United States of America 2000 by ST. MARTIN’S PRESS, LLC, Scholarly and Reference Division, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 ISBN 0–312–23578–X Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mathers, Jennifer G., 1964– The Russian nuclear shield from Stalin to Yeltsin / Jennifer G. Mathers. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–312–23578–X 1. Nuclear weapons—Soviet Union. 2. Nuclear weapons—Russia (Federation) 3. Soviet Union—Military policy. 4. Russia (Federation)– –Military policy. 5. Deterrence (Strategy)—History—20th century. I. Title. UA770 .M3877 2000 355.02'17'0947—dc21 00–031128 © Jennifer G. Mathers 2000 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 0LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. 10 09

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire

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To John and Mathew

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Contents Acknowledgements

viii

List of Abbreviations

ix

Introduction 1

1

‘Massive Retaliation’ and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defence, 1953–7 ‘We Can Hit a Fly in Outer Space’, 1957–62

17

3

From Cuba to Détente, 1962–68

37

4

Missile Defence and Arms Control Diplomacy, 1968–72

65

Missile Defence and the Decline of Détente, 1972–9

88

The Second Cold War and the Threat of SDI, 1980–5

107

‘New Political Thinking’ and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1985–91

125

Missile Defences and Yeltsin’s Russia

151

2

5 6 7 8

3

Conclusion: The Kremlin’s Missile Defence Policy during the Cold War and Beyond

175

Notes and References

181

Bibliography

207

Index

222

vii

Acknowledgements Many people have contributed to this book through their advice, guidance, and support. This project began as an M.Phil. thesis, inspired by a remark made by Lynn Davis, then of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in a seminar about SDI at All Souls College, Oxford. Professor Robert O’Neill encouraged me to tackle Soviet missile defence policy and supervised the M.Phil. thesis. Dr Alex Pravda supervised the D.Phil. thesis and urged me to turn it into a book. Christoph Bluth and Bill Tompson were both generous with their time and advice about source materials. Many thanks are due to the staffs of the Bodleian Library, the British Library, the Library of Congress, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Russian State Library and the Conflict Studies Research Centre at Sandhurst. Dr Harry Shukman kindly introduced me to General Dimitrii Volkogonov who, together with his assistant Gennadi Chernobrovkin, helped me find people in Moscow who were also interested in missile defences. A grant from the Ilchester Fund and study leave from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth enabled me to do research in Russia. With great efficiency and good humour Paul Holtom tracked down some of the material cited in Chapter 8. My D.Phil. examiners, Dr Roy Allison and Dr James Sherr, provided helpful comments on the thesis and suggestions for turning it into a book. Colin McInnes read draft chapters and gave much good advice. I would like to thank Frank Cass and The Journal of Strategic Studies for permission to quote from my article, ‘“A Fly in Outer Space”: Soviet Ballistic Missile Defence during the Khrushchev Period’, vol. 21, no. 2, June 1998, pp. 31–59, much of which is reproduced in Chapters 1, 2 and 3. My thanks go to all those named above, who have helped make this book better than it would otherwise have been. All the errors which no doubt remain are mine alone. JENNIFER G. MATHERS

viii

List of Abbreviations ABM ALCM CDSP CFE CIA CIS DOSAAF GPALS ICBM IMEMO INF IOC KGB LPAR MAD MBFR MEMO MFN MIRV MRV NATO NCA PRO PVO SAC SALT SAM SDI SLBM SRF SShA START TMD US USSR

Anti-Ballistic Missile Air-Launched Cruise Missile Current Digest of the Soviet Press Conventional Forces in Europe Central Intelligence Agency Commonwealth of Independent States Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation and the Navy Global Protection Against Limited Strikes Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Institute of World Economy and International Relations Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Initial Operating Capability Committee of State Security Large Phased-Array Radar Mutual Assured Destruction Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnie Otnoshenie Most Favoured Nation Multiple Independently-Targeted Reentry Vehicle Multiple Reentry Vehicle North Atlantic Treaty Organisation National Command Authority Anti-missile Defence Air Defence Forces Strategic Air Command Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Surface-to-Air Missile Strategic Defense Initiative Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Strategic Rocket Forces SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Theatre Missile Defence United States Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ix

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Introduction

Anti-ballistic missile defence (ABM) is, paradoxically, a concept whose time has never really come, but which has seldom been out of the news. The notion of creating a means of protecting one’s country from the attack of an enemy armed with nuclear missiles is one which provokes strong emotions, as anyone who has examined, lived through or participated in the debates surrounding US President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) can testify. But while the arguments made for and against missile defences in the United States and Europe are familiar to many Western students of international relations, Russia’s side of this story is far less well-known. This is despite the fact that, throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the Soviet Union amazed and alarmed the Western world by the persistence of its interest in developing and deploying a missile defence system. This book represents an attempt to explore the reasons behind Moscow’s drive for an ABM capability in the context of a military and political rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States which affected every aspect of international politics between the onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s and the collapse of the Soviet Communist Party’s rule and the disintegration of the USSR itself in 1991. The book has as its premise the notion that Soviet and Russian defence policy decisions were shaped by a combination of domestic and international factors and by the agendas and priorities of individual political and military leaders as well as the constraints and opportunities of the environments in which they operated. Each chapter therefore includes a section which discusses the context of domestic politics and policymaking and its implications for missile defence policy decisions. The pertinent issues of domestic politics include the balance of power within the ruling political leadership and whether 1

2 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

the dominant faction or individual held views about, for example, the way in which the USSR should conduct its international relations or the likely nature of future war, which would influence the leadership’s attitude towards missile defences. The extent of influence over security policy decisionmaking which was exercised by the Soviet military leadership during a given period is also considered, as is the role of economic issues in permitting or preventing an expansion in the Soviets’ ABM research, development and deployment programme. Each chapter similarly devotes attention to what is termed here the ‘international security climate’. This encompasses the prevailing attitudes towards the Soviet Union and Russia on the part of the world’s major powers and alliances together with the potential military threats which Moscow faced during that period and against which it might need to defend itself. In recognition of the role which technological developments can play in shaping defence policy decisions as well as in providing evidence of policy implementation, visible and reported progress in Soviet research, development and deployment of missile defence technologies is also considered for each period. The core of each chapter, however, consists of a discussion of the role which ABM occupies in Soviet strategic thought during the period under consideration. Because strategic thought in the Soviet Union was the concern primarily of the armed forces, considerable attention is devoted to the treatment of missile defences and related issues in military publications. The intention is to determine how those officers and Defence Ministry officials who concerned themselves with strategy viewed missile defences: on what bases it was either supported or opposed and by whom. Particular attention is paid to determining whether there is a strong relationship between an individual’s service allegiance and his position on ABM, or whether there is evidence of support for a Soviet missile defence capability cutting across service rivalries. But although members of the armed forces tended to dominate Soviet discussions about future war and how best to prepare for it, there was a body of civilian experts on international affairs who also considered such questions, and who rose to prominence during the Gorbachev period. The section of each chapter on strategic thought will therefore include some discussion of the views of these analysts. The aim of the book, then, is to weigh up the strengths of the various domestic and external pressures on policymakers in Moscow during each period of Soviet and post-Soviet ABM policy in order to come to some conclusions about which factors were most important in shaping the Kremlin’s missile defence decisions and the extent to which their relative influence changed over time.

1 ‘Massive Retaliation’ and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defence, 1953–7

Soviet interest in developing a defence against ballistic missile attack began at an early stage in the Cold War. The mistrust which divided the wartime allies into two opposing camps after 1945 was reflected in the deadly arms race which dominated international relations between East and West throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Stalin and his successors were convinced that the Americans would exploit their superior strategic position to the greatest extent possible, up to and including a direct attack on the USSR using nuclear weapons. Soviet military strategists devised scenarios for future world war which contained a crucial role for strategic defences, including defence against the most powerful of the latest weapons: long-range missiles with nuclear warheads. But while the country’s military leaders favoured missile defences as valuable weapons which would permit the USSR to wage and survive a nuclear war, the political leaders in the Kremlin were already beginning to see the possible political benefits of a Soviet anti-ballistic missile defence capability.

Soviet interest in missile defences in the late Stalin period Although the decision to develop a ballistic missile defence capability was probably not taken until after Stalin’s death, in many respects the foundations for future Soviet missile defence policy were laid in those first years after the defeat of Germany and Japan. At a very early point in the atomic age Stalin perceived the need to find a means of protecting the territory, key industries and armed forces of the Soviet Union from the attack of an opponent using this new weapon. Initially attention was focussed on detecting and intercepting aircraft carrying atomic bombs, and this is also the aspect of Soviet interest in strategic 3

4 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

defence which was most evident to the outside world. The Air Defence Forces benefitted from Soviet research and development in such areas as radar, jet propulsion, anti-aircraft artillery and anti-aircraft missiles.1 In 1948 the Air Defence Forces were reorganized and elevated to a separate service of the armed forces, receiving equal status with the Ground Forces, Air Force and Navy. In light of the Americans’ strength in long-range bombers, Moscow’s concentration on anti-aircraft defences was very prudent. But it did not take Soviet scientists or Stalin himself long to realize that missiles represented a superior means of delivering atomic bombs over great distances. Evidence which has become available in recent years gives support to the claim made by Khrushchev that the Soviets began research into ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) and ABM (antiballistic missile) technologies simultaneously. 2 We now know that some Soviet scientists as well as officials in the Ministry of Defence were considering the possibility of a defence against ballistic missiles as early as 1948.3 The large scale and frenzied pace of the Soviet atomic weapons development effort which took place during the early postwar years were carefully hidden from view and very successfully masked by Stalin’s public stance on the atomic question. The Soviet leader presented a picture of calm indifference to the acquisition of the atomic bomb by the United States, emphasizing instead the lessons learned from the Soviets’ experience in the Second World War and the supremacy of such ‘permanently-operating factors’ as the quantity and quality of forces and morale among the troops in determining victory in future conflicts. Although Stalin’s refusal to permit Soviet military strategists examining the implications of nuclear weapons for future warfare hindered the development of Soviet military thought at a particularly crucial moment, the Soviet leader’s course of action was a logical one given the circumstances of the time and brought with it certain benefits for the USSR. Stalin was painfully aware that the Americans had a monopoly on the atomic bomb. Although the Soviets formally ended that monopoly when they exploded their first atomic weapon in 1949, the US continued to be the only country with a de facto atomic capability until 1953. 4 To have done anything other than play down the importance of nuclear weapons would have only emphasized the strength of Washington’s strategic position and the weakness of that of the USSR. Stalin’s public dismissal of the significance of the atomic bomb was also part of a calculated attempt to diminish the political value of the new weapon. While the Soviet

‘Massive Retaliation’ 5

leader did fear a preemptive strike by the Americans, particularly on the USSR’s atomic weapons development facilities, he did not really expect a new war to begin for at least 15–20 years. 5 In this interim period, however, Stalin was greatly concerned that the US would use its position as the world’s dominant atomic power to gain political concessions from Moscow. Soviet concerns about the capabilities and intentions of their potential opponents in the West were strengthened by such developments of the early Cold War as the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, the formation of a separate West German state firmly in the capitalist camp and the prospect of its rearmament as well as the American-backed campaign of covert operations in the early 1950s intended to undermine the socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe.6

Soviet politics and policymaking after Stalin Even as Stalin lay dying on 5 March 1953 a handful of his closest subordinates gathered to divide among themselves the powers he had wielded. The new ‘collective leadership’ was formed from members of the Communist Party’s ruling Presidium. Georgi Malenkov became Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister), Nikita Khrushchev was made First Secretary of the Communist Party, Nikolai Bulganin took over as Defence Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov became Minister of Foreign Affairs and Lavrenti Beria retained his position as the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and State Security. Stalin’s successors were immediately confronted with the need to make a series of major decisions in both the domestic and foreign policy spheres, and in each case they had to decide how far they should or could deviate from existing practices. Although there was little, if any, support within the new leadership for slavish adherence to Stalin’s policies, any significant relaxation carried certain risks. At home, an easing of the use of terror against political opponents, real or imagined, might be followed by a loss of control. When it came to dealing with other countries, especially those outside the socialist world, the new Soviet leaders would have remembered Stalin’s frequent taunts about the disasters which would befall the Soviet Union after his death at the hands of the hostile imperialist powers. As Khrushchev later recalled: all during Stalin’s life, right up to the day he died, he kept telling us we’d never be able to stand up to the forces of imperialism, that the

6 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

first time we came into contact with the outside world our enemies would smash us to pieces.7 Without Stalin’s formidable presence, the new collective leadership could not be certain that they would be taken seriously in the world’s capitals. They feared that the USSR’s enemies would seek to take advantage of Stalin’s death to bully the Soviet Union into making concessions, or even to attack it.8 Stalin’s successors faced these daunting tasks handicapped by an astonishing ignorance of foreign affairs in general and issues of national security in particular. Stalin’s monopolization of defence policy decisionmaking and of anything related to military affairs, especially nuclear weapons, meant that his successors came to power with only the most rudimentary grasp of the facts and implications of the USSR’s development of the latest military technology. 9 Among them only Beria, who as chief of the internal security forces had supervised atomic weapons development, had any real understanding of nuclear issues, and he was deposed a matter of months after Stalin’s death. 10 The absence of any body of analysts outside the armed forces who were qualified to comment on defence issues meant that the military was virtually the only source of information and advice for the political leadership on defence policy options. Although the establishment in 1955 of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) did create a group of civilian researchers engaged in the study of international affairs, their lack of access to classified information, such as intelligence reports and the details of Soviet weapons and deployments, prevented them from being able to speak with the same authority as representatives of the armed forces when it came to issues of defence and national security. It is therefore not surprising that the new political leaders relied heavily on the military for policy advice, particularly in relation to the realities of the nuclear age, such as the implications of the explosion of the first Soviet hydrogen bomb in August 1953 and the desperate race against the West to develop an effective means for the delivery of the new weapon. The military’s strong position with regard to defence policy formation during these years was enhanced by the divisions within the political leadership. Before Nikita Khrushchev was able to consolidate his power by defeating the ‘anti-Party’ challenge to his leadership in June 1957, the Soviet political leaders were preoccupied with power struggles and disputes over ideological and policy issues. During these years the armed forces was probably the strongest institution in Soviet poli-

‘Massive Retaliation’ 7

tics. The Communist Party had not yet recovered from its diminution under Stalin’s rule, while the power of the secret police was deliberately reduced after the arrest of its chief, Lavrenti Beria, in June 1953 and his execution later that year. The influence of the government bureaucracy was seriously weakened as a result of Malenkov’s removal from his position as Chairman of the Council of Ministers in February 1955. With the political leadership divided into factions and individuals manoeuvring for the highest State and Party positions, the support of the armed forces was actively courted.11 The military’s support for the anti-Malenkov faction was, in fact, a crucial element in the outcome of the first post-Stalin leadership struggle, and one of its consequences was the elevation in the official position of the armed forces in Soviet politics. Second World War hero Marshal Zhukov became Defence Minister when that position was vacated by Bulganin’s accession to the premiership. Although it was not unusual for a professional military man to hold the post of Soviet Minister of Defence, it was unprecedented for him also to have a seat on the Party’s ruling Presidium. When Zhukov was made a member of the Presidium at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, he was the first member of the professional military formally to join the highest level of the Soviet political leadership, and the only one to do so until the Defence Minister’s membership of the Politburo was institutionalized in 1973. Until Zhukov was removed from his position as Minister of Defence (and also from his seat on the Presidium) late in 1957, the armed forces had a spokesman with regular access and input to the very highest level of decisionmaking, and one who could speak to the policymakers on an equal footing. One of the perennial problems for Soviet policymakers in which the armed forces had a clear interest was the setting of priorities in the allocation of resources between the military and civilian sectors of the economy, and between different missions within the military budget. The question of how to divide limited resources between defence-related sectors of industry and the civilian economy was the subject of a series of debates between Malenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the leading advocate of putting emphasis on improving living standards, and First Secretary Khrushchev and Defence Minister Bulganin, who argued for the continued dominance of heavy industry and defence. Malenkov was an opponent of large defence budgets and the concept of a traditional, war-fighting role for nuclear weapons. Malenkov was also the first Soviet political leader to acknowledge the devastating

8 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

effect which nuclear weapons could have on the USSR, and he stressed the importance of averting, through peaceful means such as negotiations, ‘fresh world carnage which, with modern means of warfare, means the ruin of world civilization’.12 Malenkov therefore argued that the combination of the easing of international tensions brought about largely by the ending of the conflict in Korea, and the terrible threat posed by nuclear weapons had decreased the likelihood of East–West war and therefore reduced the need to devote large quantities of resources to the foundation of military technology: heavy industry. It was a measure of Malenkov’s early influence that the official Soviet military budget was cut by almost 3 per cent in 1953 13 and by almost 9 per cent in 1954.14 Representatives of the military expressed their strong disapproval of Malenkov’s national security and economic policy priorities which, they feared, would deprive the armed forces of the means necessary to prepare to wage and win future wars.15 Khrushchev and Bulganin were the first prominent political figures to support the military in stressing the threat from capitalist encirclement and urge that defence be further strengthened, but they were soon joined by other prominent members of the political leadership. Early in 1955 Malenkov resigned as Prime Minister, was removed from the Party Presidium and the economic priorities he had championed were reversed. The same Central Committee plenum which removed Malenkov from power adopted a new budget for 1955 which returned to high levels of investment for heavy industry, and increased the allocation for defence by 12 per cent.16 The fact that this substantial increase in the defence budget occurred despite the demobilization of nearly two million troops in 1955 and 195617 is an indication of the military’s strong position and its ability to influence policy during this time. Malenkov’s rivals had clearly made ‘campaign promises’ to the armed forces that they would return heavy industry and defence to their former positions of top priority in order to make up the difference between Soviet and US military capabilities. The redistribution of scientific and technical manpower within the defence industries from conventional armaments to nuclear weapons and missile technologies which was begun in 1955, and the 23 per cent increase in employment in Soviet research and development institutions during the next two years18 also reflected the priorities of the military, who were very enthusiastic about nuclear weapons. The first intercontinental ballistic missile and Sputnik launches in 1957 indicate that efforts to develop military technology were intensified

‘Massive Retaliation’ 9

during the previous few years, while the fact that the first references to Soviet capabilities in ABM technologies also appeared in 1957 suggests that the missile defence programme was among the beneficiaries of the redistribution of resources and reordering of priorities.

Ballistic missile defence in Soviet strategic thought Discussions about whether ballistic missile defences would be a useful and desirable addition to the Soviet strategic weapons arsenal were closely linked to expectations of how future war would be conducted, and the extent to which strategic nuclear missiles would be used in it. A consistent theme in Soviet military writing on nuclear weapons during this period was the rejection of reliance upon the restraint or rationality of potential enemies to ensure the security of the Soviet Union. The American notion that the threat of punishment and assured second-strike retaliation would deter future wars was similarly unacceptable in light of the Russian and Soviet experiences of repeated invasion. Particularly vivid was the memory of the June 1941 attack by Hitler’s forces, when the Soviet Union did absorb an initial assault, with near-catastrophic results. It is therefore not surprising that the nuclear strategy which the Soviets developed during the 1950s and early 1960s incorporated such aims as the protection of the homeland, the defeat of enemy forces, and the survival of the state. The emphasis on these objectives even in the nuclear age was intended both to deter potential enemies from attacking the USSR and to ensure that Soviet forces would be prepared for any future conflict. Soviet military theorists began to explore the significance of nuclear weapons almost immediately after Stalin’s death, when an easing of the restrictions on the discussion of military strategy coincided with the entry of nuclear weapons into the Soviets’ operational arsenal. 19 Freed from the political necessity of ignoring the significance of nuclear weapons and bowing down before Stalin’s ‘permanently operating factors’, Soviet military strategists rapidly came to the conclusion that the efficient packaging of firepower offered by nuclear weapons meant that the new armaments could play a decisive role in future war and would be used from the very outset of a major conflict with the West. Military publications discussing the ‘scientific-technical revolution in military affairs’ focussed on the advantages of surprise attack, on the importance of seizing and retaining the initiative, and on the likelihood that the course of the initial period of war would determine the outcome of the conflict. The authors of these works apparently had

10 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

no doubt that the US was prepared to use nuclear weapons against the Soviets in a suprise attack.20 It was under these circumstances that Soviet military writers began to advocate a strategy which combined offensive and defensive forces, including a Soviet preemptive strike. Although the Soviets’ choice of a preemptive strike strategy at a time when their likely opponents enjoyed considerable strategic superiority may appear paradoxical, in fact preemption was a logical plan for Moscow. In the face of such overwhelming superiority the Soviets risked being disarmed by the United States if they did not strike first.21 A preemptive strike was also favoured to prevent the enemy from gaining the advantages of surprise and the initiative, as well as to limit the damage to Soviet military and civilian targets by destroying as many enemy strategic weapons as possible before they could be used against the USSR. Meanwhile a combination of antiaircraft, antimissile and civil defences would provide the country with some measure of protection from those enemy weapons which survived the preemptive strike.22 The capability of the armed forces to protect the homeland would contribute to the Soviets’ evident ability to survive a nuclear war, and was therefore an important component of nuclear strategy at this time. ‘Survival’ in this context had a broader meaning than the capacity to absorb a nuclear strike and launch a retaliatory blow. In order for the Soviet Union to conduct and, in any meaningful sense, to ‘win’ or prevail in a general nuclear war, the country’s political and military leadership, its industrial capacity and a substantial proportion of its population must remain intact and retain the ability to function. This helps to explain the Soviet emphasis on missile defences providing protection for the country rather than simply for the USSR’s strategic weapons. During the mid-1950s, discussions of anti-ballistic missile defence in Soviet military publications were concerned almost exclusively with the desirability of such a weapons system and the role which it would play in Soviet strategy for future war. It was generally taken for granted that a protection against attack from ballistic missiles could and would be developed. Typical of this attitude was the assertion in a 1954 issue of Krasnaya Zvezda that ‘ways are being devised for fighting off aircraft and other carriers of atom bombs’, 23 and the belief expressed by the scientist Peter Kapitsa in 1956 that in time a defence against nuclear missiles would be developed.24 Consideration of the technical requirements of ABM and more critical evaluation of its likely effectiveness only appeared later.

‘Massive Retaliation’ 11

Although Soviet military theorists in the 1950s were asserting the importance of missile defences to their comprehensive strategy for future war, a dissenting view was expressed by Peter Kapitsa. In an article which foreshadowed arguments used in the debates of the mid1960s and mid-1980s, Kapitsa warned of the political consequences of deploying missile defences. If one country or military alliance were to develop an effective defence against nuclear missiles, he argued, the possessors of such protection could be tempted either to launch nuclear strikes against their enemies in the knowledge that they were safe from retaliation, or to use the threat of such an action to extract political concessions from other countries. 25 There is, however, no evidence that Kapitsa’s warning was taken seriously during the Khrushchev period. Passages in Khrushchev’s memoirs suggest that the political leadership did not have a high regard for Peter Kapitsa, probably because he had preferred to live abroad after the Bolshevik Revolution and had refused to work on the atomic bomb and other military projects after being recalled to the Soviet Union in the 1930s. It is unlikely that Kapitsa’s views on ABM had any influence on Soviet missile defence policy, and no one else writing about ABM in Soviet publications at this time appears to have used the argument that missile defences could be destabilizing. The first visible sign of a Soviet ABM research and development effort came with the construction of the Soviet BMD (ballistic missile defence) test site near the city of Sary Shagan in Central Asia, which began in 1956.26 The Sary Shagan site was later identified as the centre for all Soviet BMD testing. Its location about 1000 miles from the ballistic missile range at Kapustin Yar made it ideal for testing the intercept capabilities of ABMs against long-range missiles. Although accessible by rail, the site was in a remote region of the USSR, and located far enough in the interior of the country to make Western monitoring from the periphery difficult.27 It was activities at Sary Shagan which convinced Washington that the Soviets were seriously interested in developing a defence against nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.

The international security climate in the early post-Stalin years During the mid-1950s the Soviet political leadership began to view an ABM capability as a useful asset for both military and political reasons. Although the main military threat from the West was still posed by the

12 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

bombers of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), ballistic missiles were viewed by both sides in the Cold War as the delivery vehicles of the future, and missile development was an area in which the West had a considerable lead. A ballistic missile defence system could provide a means of protecting the USSR in the event of an attack by the West. But more importantly from the perspective of the Soviet Union’s political leadership, by shifting the strategic balance in Moscow’s favour a Soviet ABM capability could also provide an important symbol of Soviet power as well as preventing the Western alliance from translating its military strength into political influence in its dealings with the USSR. During much of the 1950s, US Cold War rhetoric was very strident and was backed up by military hardware, in terms both of existing weapons and the commitment to future developments. The Eisenhower administration’s national security policy placed heavy emphasis on nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons and forward bases from which the bombers of the SAC could strike the Soviet Union. By the mid-1950s the Americans’ ability to launch a nuclear strike on the territory of their opponent greatly exceeded that of the Soviet Union. The SAC had over 400 medium-range B-47 bombers on bases in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, 175 long-range B-36s which could reach the USSR from the United States without inflight refuelling, and the first long-range B-52s had begun to enter service.28 The British Bomber Command also had a force of planes equipped with nuclear weapons, 29 and the development of Thor and Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles had been approved for deployment in Europe.30 Furthermore, the announcement of the doctrine of massive retaliation by US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1954 indicated that the United States was prepared to use its nuclear weapons against the USSR. By contrast, although the Soviets could easily reach Western Europe with their approximately 1500 medium-range Tu-4 (‘Bull’) bombers, the USSR lacked overseas bases close enough to the North American continent to threaten the United States, and was only just beginning to add intercontinental bombers (Mya-4 ‘Bison’ and Tu-95 ‘Bear’) to its arsenal.31 Soviet air defences against the threat from NATO were scarcely adequate: in the mid-1950s the Soviet Air Defence forces relied upon a primitive ground-based warning and control system, possessed only a few surface-to-air missiles, and lacked any interceptor aircraft which were reliable at night and in all weathers.32

‘Massive Retaliation’ 13

There was deep concern about US and NATO capabilities and intentions within the Soviet political and military establishments during these years. Assertions that the United States was preparing to launch a war against the socialist countries and that NATO intended to use its nuclear weapons in such a conflict were very common in both the civilian and military press, and the threat from the West was in the forefront of discussions about national security issues. Defence Minister Bulganin warned that the imperialists were not spending huge sums on armaments solely for the purpose of intimidation. 33 Khrushchev pointed to the creation of NATO and other military alliances, US participation in the arms race and the stockpiling of armaments, and American threats to use nuclear weapons in future conflicts as evidence of America’s hostile intentions. In his memoirs, Khrushchev remarked on the feelings of extreme vulnerability experienced by the political leadership during these years, and their expectation of ‘an all-out attack any day’.34 In 1953 Chief of the General Staff Marshal Sokolovskii declared that the ‘intensive preparations for a new war’ which were under way in the US required the ‘overall strengthening of the Soviet motherland’s active defense against enemy action’.35 Marshal Zhukov warned of the dangerous intent of the Western powers: ‘The military leaders of the United States and Britain openly announce that in the event of a new war they will make wide use not only of atomic but also of hydrogen weapons.’ 36 A 1953 article in the journal of the Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation and the Navy (DOSAAF), Voennie Znaniya, cited increased US military spending, expanding troop numbers and the establishment of NATO military bases as evidence that the US was ‘feverishly preparing for war against the Soviet Union’ with the goal of ‘the achievement of world supremacy’.37 Although the implications for a Soviet missile defence capability of the large and rapidly growing US strategic weapons force were not explicitly discussed by Soviet analysts and policymakers during this period, there is evidence that the Soviet military saw a direct connection between the Americans’ actions and the need for Soviet missile defences. According to Soviet missile defence scientist Grigorii Kisun’ko, it was an American missile test in the summer of 1953 which prompted a delegation of high-ranking military officers, led by the Chief of the General Staff Marshal Sokolovskii, to demand that the Central Committee authorize a research and development programme for missile defences.38

14 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

Stalin’s successors in the Kremlin had political as well as military reasons to look favourably on ABM. Khrushchev and his colleagues in the political leadership were anxious that the prestige and position of the Soviet Union be acknowledged by capitalist and socialist countries alike. The Soviets wanted to be seen as the equals of the Americans, as the rightful leaders of the socialist world and as providing a model of development for the newly-independent countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. This concern with the image of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the world is vividly demonstrated in the passages of Khrushchev’s memoirs dealing with the Geneva summit of 1955. Khrushchev recalled his and his colleagues’ perception of the summit meeting as a test of their ability to stand up to the intimidation of the other countries’ statesmen. Khrushchev also remarked on the Soviet delegation’s embarrassment at arriving in Geneva in a mere two-engine plane while the other leaders were transported in larger (and therefore superior) aircraft.39 Nuclear weapons, and nuclear missiles in particular, came to be even more highly prized by the Soviet political leadership for their prestige value than for their utility in deterring or waging a future war. Nuclear weapons were the most advanced weapons known to mankind, and were a potent symbol of the power and capabilities of the countries which were able to develop them. The existence of Soviet nuclear weapons were a visible sign of the USSR’s importance in the world and one reason why other countries – especially the United States – would have to take notice of Moscow and its views. Khrushchev’s missile diplomacy only developed fully in later years, but it is possible to see its beginnings in the Soviet leadership’s behaviour during the Suez crisis in 1956, when thinly-veiled threats were made to use Soviet missiles in retaliation for the British, French and Israeli attack on Egypt. Although the Soviet ABM programme was still in its infancy and was not yet sufficiently developed for public boasting (even by Khrushchev), missile defences nevertheless would come to be viewed by Moscow’s political leaders in much the same light as the Soviet nuclear offensive missile capability: as a political tool. Soviet antiballistic missile defence was one of a number of means of demonstrating the Soviet Union’s position in the world and of sending signals to its friends and potential enemies alike. In addition to demonstrating – and demanding recognition of – the Soviet Union’s importance, Moscow’s leaders were simultaneously pursuing the goal of reducing international tensions wherever possible. To a large extent the motive for this policy was simply to lessen the risk

‘Massive Retaliation’ 15

that the USSR would become involved in conflict. The leadership therefore acted swiftly after Stalin’s death to encourage an end to the war in Korea, and to improve relations with Mao’s China and Tito’s Yugoslavia. Another motive for this more conciliatory foreign policy approach lay in domestic political priorities: the desire to shift resources from defence into improving standards of living. As we have already seen, this goal was at the forefront of Malenkov’s policy agenda during the years that he was premier. And the only politically acceptable justification for reducing allocations to the defence sector in favour of the civilian economy was a reduction in the perception of the external threat facing the Soviet Union. Although Malenkov’s defeat in early 1955 was followed by a substantial increase in Soviet defence spending, this was a short-lived phenomenon motivated primarily by his rivals’ need to reward the armed forces for their support during the leadership struggle. As we will see in Chapter 2, as soon as Khrushchev had consolidated his position, he too began to look for opportunities to reduce defence spending. Even in the immediate aftermath of Malenkov’s defeat, there was no change in the general foreign policy line. In May 1955 the Soviets signed the Austrian State Treaty, whose provisions included the withdrawal of Soviet occupying forces. In June of that year West German Chancellor Adenauer was invited to Moscow to discuss the normalization of relations between the two countries. Then at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, Khrushchev gave the clearest indication to date of the leadership’s commitment to improving international relations when he rejected the inevitability of war between capitalist and socialist forces, and identified ‘peaceful coexistence’ as the governing principle in relations between East and West. The development and deployment of nuclear weapons would help to promote national security while being less expensive than the maintenance of conventional forces which could inflict equivalent damage on an opponent. As the Americans were discovering, reliance on nuclear weapons offered a more cost-effective defence capability with the prospect of being able to release limited resources to be deployed elsewhere in the economy. As was the case with the political value of nuclear weapons, during the mid-1950s the Soviet ABM programme was too new and untried to figure in calculations of cost-effectiveness. Nevertheless, ballistic missile defence would very soon become one of the beneficiaries of Khrushchev’s concern with putting more resources into agriculture and the consumer goods industry. A Soviet ABM capability would provide good value for money on two counts: it would

16 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

help to protect the USSR from nuclear missile attack while simultaneously reducing the effectiveness of the opponent’s most powerful strategic weapons.

Conclusions The period covered in this chapter saw ballistic missile defence established in Soviet strategic thought as well as in Soviet defence policy. Stalin’s death permitted the USSR’s military strategists to conduct a serious, detailed and relatively open discussion of the implications of the atomic bomb. This discussion laid the groundwork for a view of future conflict which included defence against attack from nucleararmed missiles. As we will see in later chapters, this view of future war with its emphasis on territorial protection proved to be remarkably enduring. Even decades later, when the dominant theme in Soviet strategic thought was the superiority of offensive weapons in the nuclear age, there was almost always a number of military strategists arguing in favour of strategic defence. It is tempting to attribute the Soviet decision to undertake a concerted missile defence research and development effort to the influence of the armed forces on defence policymaking during these years. Preparation for territorial protection (and thus ABM development) was an important priority for the Soviet military and the post-Stalin political leadership was particularly dependent upon the advice of the armed forces in formulating policy for national security. But although at times in the future the views of the political and military elites would differ considerably on the question of missile defences, during this period the two were in agreement. Khrushchev and his colleagues in the Kremlin shared the military’s belief in the hostile intentions of the Western powers, in particular of the Americans. But in addition to accepting the importance of developing the capability of protecting the USSR against ballistic missile attack in order to survive the cataclysmic conflict looming on the horizon, the Soviet political leadership was beginning to perceive a possible role for missile defences in the diplomatic and propaganda skirmishes of the Cold War.

2 ‘We Can Hit a Fly in Outer Space’, 1957–62

The period covered by this chapter marks the high point of Khrushchev’s political power, between the successful defeat of his opponents in the Anti-Party Group affair and the debacle of the Cuban missile crisis. This was a time of enormous optimism about the vitality and superiority of Soviet socialism. Buoyed by Soviet successes in the space race and by his belief that nuclear missiles held the key to winning future wars, Khrushchev authorized considerable resources for the ABM research effort, which initially produced promising results. Khrushchev was quick to recognize the potential for exploiting the Soviet image of technological success for political gain, and ballistic missile defence took its place in the Soviet leader’s game of bluff and misperception. During these years the beginnings of Washington’s interest in ABM technology was watched with great attention by Soviet policymakers, military analysts, academics and scientists, who were united in the view that the USSR should not fall behind the Americans in this field. Anti-ballistic missile defence was seen as playing a vital role in a Soviet strategy for future war which emphasized the role of nuclear weapons, the need to protect the homeland and the importance of a preemptive strike. During these years, the priorities of the political leadership dovetailed with the demands of strategy, the possibilities of technology and the potentials of diplomacy to ensure strong support for ballistic missile defence from all sides.

The domestic political context of Soviet ABM policy During the late 1950s and early 1960s Khrushchev occupied a position at the pinnacle of Soviet politics. Although (in comparison with Stalin) he acted slowly to remove all his rivals from positions of power, after 17

18 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

the Central Committee rallied to his support in June 1957 against demands for his resignation from a group of his Presidium colleagues, Khrushchev’s position was unassailable – at least for a time. Until the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 seriously weakened his position, all major Soviet domestic and foreign policy initiatives reflected Khrushchev’s priorities, even if they sometimes met with resistance and frequently failed to live up to the expectations which he raised about them. In sharp contrast to the aftermath of the power struggle which removed Malenkov from the premiership, the victor in 1957 did not feel it necessary to make significant concessions to the military for their support. On the contrary, in October 1957 Marshal Zhukov found himself removed from his position as Defence Minister and replaced with the more compliant Marshal Rodion Malinovskii. This was in spite of the valuable help which Zhukov gave to Khrushchev in June in making military transport available to the First Secretary’s supporters in the Central Committee to get them to Moscow quickly. Although there was still no other group of experts able to rival the military’s expertise in defence issues, the armed forces no longer occupied the same influential position with regard to defence policy which it had enjoyed just a few years previously. The loss of the Defence Minister’s seat on the Party’s Presidium meant that the military’s representative no longer attended its meetings as a full participant with an equal voice in policymaking. Khrushchev did continue to receive advice from senior military leaders but he did not necessarily feel obliged to follow it. During these years the First Secretary was feeling more sure of himself, and not only as a result of the consolidation of his position in the Kremlin. Khrushchev was no longer lacking in knowledge of his own country’s technological and military developments nor in experience of foreign affairs. By the middle of 1957 Khrushchev had met the leaders of many countries in a variety of circumstances and had weathered storms both within the socialist camp (uprisings in East Berlin in 1953 and in Poland and Hungary in 1956) and elsewhere (most especially the 1956 Suez crisis). During the late 1950s and early 1960s, therefore, the First Secretary was not only willing but eager to put his own mark on Soviet foreign and defence policies. For all these reasons, a central focus of this chapter will be on Khrushchev’s motives, perceptions and priorities. One of Khrushchev’s passions was a fascination with the possibilities of science and technology which in turn became an important factor

‘We Can Hit a Fly in Outer Space’ 19

shaping the climate in which security policy decisions were made. This fascination was not limited to Khrushchev, although he expressed it most vigorously, but was widespread among military and civilian analysts writing about national security issues. Justifiable pride at the Soviets’ successes in the nuclear weapons and space races grew into an obsession with the power of Soviet science, which was seen by many as a panacea for all the country’s problems. This is not surprising when the Soviets owed much of their standing in the international community to the appearance of military parity with the United States, which was in turn the result of early Soviet breakthroughs in missile technology. There was a prevailing atmosphere of great faith in the powers of technology, especially technology with military applications. 1 This meant that a weapons system such as missile defences which held out the prospect of still more Soviet successes, demonstrating that the USSR was on the cutting edge of science, was likely to be viewed favourably. Khrushchev’s enthusiasm for the latest scientific developments grew out of his belief that Soviet science and technology would provide quick and easy solutions to the intransigent problems faced by the Soviet Union. The appeal of a quick technological fix was demonstrated repeatedly throughout Khrushchev’s leadership. Just as the virgin lands campaign and the shift to maize production were expected to solve the USSR’s food production problems, so the development of space rockets, ICBMs and other advanced military technologies would ensure peace and, at a stroke, elevate the Soviet Union to a standing in the international community equal to that of the United States. Soviet ABM designer Grigorii Kisun’ko has portrayed Khrushchev as a man fascinated by technology and by the potentials of scientific developments to the point of being easily duped by unscrupulous scientists, who were able to gain his authorization for grandiose but impractical projects. Khrushchev’s interest in technology clearly included missile defences. According to Kisun’ko, one such self-seeking researcher, V.N. Chelomei, ‘enticed Khrushchev with the prospective creation of a single offensive-defensive missile system with a superpowerful nuclear warhead’.2 Khrushchev asserted that thanks to Soviet sputniks, the imperialists would never break the growing strength of the Soviet system. 3 The Soviet Union had become the most powerful state in the world from the military point of view. 4 And because the growing power of socialism made the West realize the riskiness of a military conflict with the USSR,5 the Soviet Union’s rocket and nuclear might was a decisive

20 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

factor in the maintenance of peace.6 According to Khrushchev, Soviet technological successes had not only strengthened the country’s military power and improved its economic standing in the international arena, but these successes were a potent demonstration of the superiority of socialism over capitalism.7 Khrushchev’s faith in the benefits of science and technology is closely connected to his own views on nuclear weapons and future war. The Soviet leader was convinced that any future war with the West would be determined by nuclear weapons, especially nuclear missiles. Such a conflict would be short, with the outcome decided in just a few hours. With such powerful weapons as nuclear missiles at their disposal, both the US and USSR would use them from the start, bypassing the preliminaries of traditional, conventional war and immediately destroying strategic targets located deep inside the territory of their opponent.8 Khrushchev’s emphasis on nuclear weapons can be attributed in part to his recognition of their value as political tools in his dealings with the West. It was primarily Soviet successes in nuclear and missile technology which brought significant international prestige to the Soviets, and provided the only way in which the USSR could hope to compete with the standing of the Americans in the short- to medium-term. Khrushchev also attributed Western restraint during times of heightened international tension (such as the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the Suez crisis) to Moscow’s success in developing Soviet military strength.9 Khrushchev therefore continually promoted the West’s belief in Soviet nuclear superiority and attempted to play on this illusion to make threats against the NATO countries which were intended to extract political concessions. Khrushchev did not mention missile defences in the future war scenario he described in speeches while in power, probably because his major statement on the course of future conflict was made in 1960, while his interest in ABM was not evident until the following year. There are nevertheless several indications of Khrushchev’s views on the significance of missile defences. In Khrushchev’s memoirs, the development of a Soviet antimissile system is described as a necessary, almost inevitable step in the evolution of Soviet nuclear weapons: Although we solved the ICBM problem, we needed a defense against nuclear attack. We decided to create an antimissile force. We needed to build a missile that could destroy an incoming missile with an atomic warhead. It was a very costly luxury and an extremely complex task; but we needed to solve the problem.10

‘We Can Hit a Fly in Outer Space’ 21

Furthermore, Khrushchev’s public statements about antiballistic missile systems closely followed the pattern of his early ICBM claims, suggesting that Khrushchev also planned to use ABM as a tool in international politics. In the autumn of 1957 Khrushchev introduced and repeated exaggerated claims for Soviet offensive missile capabilities in interviews with prominent Western journalists, while either omitting such claims entirely or toning them down significantly in his speeches to domestic audiences.11 Khrushchev similarly made his first and most sweeping claims for Soviet antimissile systems while speaking to American newspaper editors and correspondents. His other statements on ABM were modest by comparison, and often amounted to no more than mentioning missile defences as one of many Soviet military achievements. Khrushchev himself acknowledged the public relations aspect of his ABM claims in his memoirs: I wanted to give our enemy pause by saying that we had antimissile weaponry. I exaggerated a little. I said that we had the capability of shooting a fly out of space with our missiles.12 Apart from the fact that a missile defence capability could be a useful component in a war fought primarily with nuclear weapons, a Soviet ABM system, even one which was not completely effective, would have been a valuable tool in Khrushchev’s game of bluff and misperception. The very existence of a deployed ABM system in the USSR would have cast doubts on the effectiveness of the offensive missiles of the West. The political value of NATO’s strategic weapons would have been diminished while the flexibility of the Soviets to manoeuvre and put pressure on the West would at the same time have been increased. In fact, a further passage in his memoirs reveals that Khrushchev valued the Soviet ABM programme more highly as a political instrument than for its military utility: I used to say sometimes in my speeches that we had developed an antimissile missile that could hit a fly, but of course it was just rhetoric to make our adversaries think twice. In fact it’s impossible to intercept incoming ICBMs with pinpoint accuracy and total reliability; even if you knock down most of them, a few are bound to get through.13 One of Khrushchev’s main policy priorities during these years was to increase investment in areas of the Soviet economy which would

22 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

benefit the average citizen: agriculture and the consumer goods industry. Although the goal of improving living standards was frustrated in part by some of the policies which Khrushchev himself initiated, the main obstacle identified by the First Secretary was the allocation of vast resources to the defence sector. The expanded defence effort which followed Malenkov’s removal from power in 1955 quickly became a drain on the Soviet economy. After reaching a peak in 1954–1956, the rate of growth of the economy began to decline while defence expenditure kept rising, which increased the relative burden of defence spending.14 Khrushchev increasingly began to look for ways to reduce the defence burden and to direct more resources into agriculture and consumer goods. The declining growth of the Soviet economy after 1956 and the competing demands of the defence and civilian sectors created pressures on Khrushchev which were felt by every subsequent Soviet leadership. Khrushchev therefore began to make use of arguments remarkably similar to those he had disparaged when they had come from Malenkov. From the late 1950s onwards, the importance of improving the standard of living in the USSR was a constant theme in Khrushchev’s speeches, as was the link between reducing defence spending and increasing economic prosperity. Khrushchev repeatedly stressed that the economic goals of socialism could be achieved more rapidly in peacetime.15 The only beneficiaries of militarism and the Cold War, Khrushchev asserted, were the monopolies in the West which stood to make fabulous profits. Moreover, the perpetuation of the competition in ever higher levels of military spending was intended by the capitalists to divert the Soviets’ valuable resources from the task of building socialism.16 At the 21st Party Congress in 1959, Khrushchev announced an ambitious programme for economic development in the Seven-Year Plan, which required a reduction in the allocation to the defence sector if it were to succeed.17 The pressure of reconciling the various demands made upon the Soviet economy and the country’s resources was an important factor in Khrushchev’s preference for nuclear over conventional weapons. Concentrating the country’s defence effort onto nuclear weapons, which promised very high political as well as military returns, no doubt appeared by far more cost-effective than the maintenance of the full panoply of conventional forces spread across several services and including a large standing army. In the January 1960 speech in which he set out his view of future war and the characteristics of the armed forces best able to wage and win it, Khrushchev argued that the switch

‘We Can Hit a Fly in Outer Space’ 23

of emphasis to nuclear weapons would allow materials to be used more effectively, and would free up resources – including the labour of the more than one million young men who could be released from military service – for increasing the country’s economic power and the population’s standard of living.18 The research and development programmes for nuclear missiles – and also missile defences – were therefore shielded from the defence cuts that Khrushchev announced in January 1960, and that he repeatedly attempted to impose on the armed forces, until very late in the period. During the late 1950s and throughout 1960 the Soviets were publicly optimistic and confident about their whole nuclear weapons programme, and ABM was one of the beneficiaries in the switch in emphasis from conventional to nuclear forces. By the summer of 1961 a serious debate about resource allocations was underway, with Khrushchev urging a downgrading of the priority assigned to heavy industry, but coming under pressure to respond to the massive increases in US defence spending contained in the first Kennedy defence budget, published in March 1961. 19 In fact Khrushchev began to retreat, and during the course of the summer announced a series of measures including increasing defence spending, suspending the troop reductions he had announced the previous year, and resuming Soviet nuclear testing. 20 It was in the series of nuclear tests which followed this announcement that the ABM programme launched an interceptor missile which hit its target ICBM. 21 This impressive performance apparently came just in time to preserve the high-priority status which the ABM research and development programme enjoyed. Just before the 22nd Party Congress, which took place in October 1961, the political leadership was evidently deciding whether to pursue a warfighting or a minimum deterrent capability, and the continued allocation of significant resources to the missile defence effort was one of the issues under consideration.22 The decision was clearly in favour of ABM. Defence Minister Malinovskii left no doubt that he had full confidence in the technical capabilities of the Soviet missile defence system under development when he told the Party Congress that ‘the problem of the destruction of missiles in flight has been successfully solved’.23 The Soviet ABM programme apparently continued to enjoy immunity from the pressures to reduce the defence budget until the last two years of Khrushchev’s leadership. The technical problems which led to the abandonment of the partially deployed ABM system near Leningrad after 1962 probably made the missile defence programme

24 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

vulnerable to pressures to cut costs, particularly in light of the decision to concentrate on increasing the number of Soviet strategic offensive nuclear missiles after the Cuban missile crisis.24 However, the fact that the development and deployment of another ABM system, the Galosh system around Moscow, went ahead in the aftermath of these changes indicates that resource allocation for a significant portion of the missile defence programme was continued.

Ballistic missile defence in Soviet strategic thought The period of Khrushchev’s political dominance coincided with a high point for the Soviet anti-ballistic missile defence programme. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, ABM was the subject of considerable attention from Soviet military analysts and policymakers alike. As was the case with the period covered in Chapter 1, discussions and statements about ABM focussed primarily on its role in Soviet strategy for future war, although from the late 1950s onwards there was growing interest in the technical details of missile defence and in the question of how effective such a system was likely to be in providing protection from nuclear missile attack. Discussions about strategy in Soviet military publications during these years revealed broad agreement on the need for a preemptive strike strategy involving a combination of offensive and defensive forces. The main area of disagreement was over how heavily the USSR would be able to rely on nuclear weapons in the conflicts of the future. ‘Radicals’ – an opinion grouping within the armed forces during this period identified by Roman Kolkowicz – adopted Khrushchev’s approach to the importance of nuclear weapons and the obsolescence of conventional forces. ‘Conservatives’ argued that large standing armies and conventional weapons continued to be necessary, and warned against an over-reliance upon deterrence to prevent war.25 Not surprisingly, positions on these arguments were often linked to service affiliation, so that radicals were to be found predominantly in the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), the Air Defence Forces (PVO) and the submarine navy – those sectors of the armed forces which benefited most from the shift in official emphasis in favour of nuclear weapons. Conservatives tended to be found in the Ground Forces, the surface navy, the Rear Forces and the Tactical Air Forces. 26 One would, therefore, expect to find support for ABM expressed among officers of the Air Defence Forces (and especially from those assigned to its recently

‘We Can Hit a Fly in Outer Space’ 25

established Antimissile or PRO section), who had the most to gain from promoting missile defences in terms of status and resources, and also among radicals, who stressed the importance of nuclear weapons and deterrence. Approval of and support for missile defences was indeed expressed by Air Defence officers and radicals, but it was also voiced by military figures who cannot be placed in either of these groups. The common feature which tended to connect ABM supporters was a view of war and strategy in the nuclear era consistent with that developed in the early postwar period. This view assumed the continued importance of traditional military objectives in warfare, including the limitation of damage to one’s own territory and armed forces. Not all military analysts who subscribed to this ‘traditionalist’ view of strategy expressed support for missile defences, and not all those who explicitly favoured ABM spelled out their views on strategy in fine detail, but the two positions did often go together and frequently overrode the dictates of institutional affiliations or other groupings. Official endorsement of the importance of nuclear weapons came in Khrushchev’s speech on 14 January 1960 to the Fourth Session of the Supreme Soviet. Khrushchev declared that, although war between the Soviet Union and the forces of capitalism was no longer ‘fatalistically inevitable’, if such a conflict did occur it would take the form of a general nuclear war, beginning with missile strikes deep in the interior of every combatant country, and would affect all areas. 27 This speech was the starting point for one of the major debates within the Soviet military over doctrine and strategy. This was the debate over the character and course of future world war and the configuration of armed forces best suited to wage and win it which pitted radicals against conservatives. But while there were numerous fundamental disagreements between the opposing factions, members of both groups described the importance of strategic defences in general and missile defences in particular in their scenarios for future war. In one of the first open challenges to Khrushchev’s statement on military doctrine, General Lieutenant S. Krasil’nikov argued in November 1960 that future war could only be won with the use of mass armies and the combination of nuclear missiles with ‘other means of armed struggle’ and also described the ‘extremely important significance’ of antiaircraft and antimissile defence in protecting Soviet territory and forces from nuclear strikes. 28 Although the views expressed by Krasil’nikov on the combined arms approach and mass armies put him among Kolkowicz’s conservatives, support for missile

26 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

defences was also indicated by General Colonel Lomov, who was on the opposite side of this debate. Lomov followed Khrushchev’s line on the importance of nuclear missiles and the supremacy of the SRF and made no mention of the need for combined forces, but he too saw a role for strategic defences in future world war, describing as ‘especially important’ the complementary roles of the SRF and PVO forces in frustrating an opponent’s nuclear attack and seizing the initiative in the crucial initial period of war.29 Judging from their statements in military publications about strategy,30 a missile defence capability appealed to radicals because it promised to protect the country from the main, if not the only, type of weapon likely to be used in future war with the West. The presumed ‘constant combat readiness’ of ABM systems, their ability to spring into action instantly, at the touch of a button, would be a valuable characteristic in a war which would be determined quickly, in a matter of days or even hours. While the radicals envisioned a high-tech war, in which only the SRF, PVO and submarine navy would have the opportunity to participate, conservatives foresaw the potential for a more protracted conflict, in which the protection of the country’s economic and industrial bases and population would assume an even greater importance. The appeal of ABM for the conservatives was the role of missile defences as one link in the chain of forces which, acting in coordination, would defeat the opponent. Just as interest in missile defences came from conservatives as well as radicals, so too did it cross the boundaries between services, and in unexpected ways. The pervasiveness of assertions of the importance of developing defences against the enemy’s nuclear weapons makes it clear that support for a Soviet missile defence capability was neither limited to officers of the Air Defence Forces nor determined by institutional loyalties.31 It is also worthy of notice that all three editions of the book Military Strategy, edited by the former Chief of the General Staff Marshal Sokolovskii, favoured ABM systems. Originally published in 1962 and then amended and reissued in 1963 and 1968, Military Strategy has frequently been described in the West as ‘authoritative’, and is believed to have reflected the views of the most important Soviet military theorists in the 1960s. Although the book was ambivalent about the technical capabilities of ballistic missile defences, it did approve of ABM in principle and described a role for it in Soviet strategy.32 A stronger argument in support of BMD is contained in a devastating review of the 1962 edition of Military Strategy, in which the criticism

‘We Can Hit a Fly in Outer Space’ 27

was based in part on the author’s assertion that the book paid insufficient attention to strategic defence. Writing in the General Staff journal Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, A. Golubev argued that strategic defence was a vital component of the Soviet Union’s strategic operations, especially in the age of nuclear missiles, when however swiftly the strategic offence, it does not automatically protect the territory of our country from the strikes of the nuclear missile weapons and the aviation of an opponent.33 Golubev concluded that modern antiaircraft and antimissile defences were ‘a type of strategic defence without which it is impossible to win a war’.34 During the late 1950s and early 1960s the technical feasibility of missile defences was evaluated positively in Soviet military publications. The development of a Soviet missile defence capability was viewed as a realistic goal for the foreseeable future, although a great deal of further work would be required to realize it. Sustained interest in the effectiveness of missile defences dates from 1957, with the first lengthy discussion of the capabilities of BMD in a Soviet military publication, in which the authors expressed complete confidence in the feasibility of missile defences. This article described the construction and operation of ICBMs and discussed the various components of a system designed to counter missile strikes (i.e., radar, computerized control facilities, and the likely characteristics of the interceptor missile). The authors then came to the conclusion that the rapid progress of technological development would make the construction of such a system possible in the near future.35 In 1960 the first Soviet book devoted to the subject of missile defences was published. Snaryad protiv Snaryada by M.N. Nikolaev provided a detailed description of the characteristics and operation of an ICBM and of various methods for detecting, intercepting and destroying an attacking missile. Nikolaev did not minimize the technical difficulties involved, especially the need to complete all parts of the missile defence system’s operation in the approximately 30 minutes of the attacking missile’s flight, and the importance of sophisticated computers for the rapid calculation of the position of the enemy missile, and for the control of the interceptor and guidance to its target. Despite the unresolved problems, however, Nikolaev treated the task of creating an effective ABM system as achievable.36 During the course of 1961 the journal of the Air Defence Forces, Vestnik PVO, produced a series of articles which covered much of the

28 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

same ground as the Nikolaev book. Almost invariably using American research into BMD technologies to illustrate their points, the Vestnik PVO series provided an in-depth examination of several possible technologies. These articles discussed such questions as the comparative merits of using radar versus instruments which could detect the infrared or electromagnetic energy given off by ICBMs, 37 of conventional versus nuclear warheads for interceptor missiles,38 and of how to calculate the trajectory of an ICBM using its launch point, altitude and speed.39 As in Nikolaev’s book, the technical obstacles still to be overcome in order to develop an effective ABM system were not ignored. Several articles in this series referred to the low probability (25 per cent) of an interceptor missile hitting its target,40 and one described US research into measures to improve the capabilities of ICBMs to penetrate antimissile systems.41 The detailed examinations of ABM technology in Nikolaev’s book and in the Vestnik PVO series, and the frankness with which possible problems were discussed indicates that those in the Soviet military who had studied the technology and would be most closely involved in the project’s implemention were well aware of the difficulties. The tone of these studies, however, was consistently optimistic that technological developments would provide solutions to the various problems of BMD, and confident that an effective Soviet antimissile system could and would be created. Some ambivalence about missile defences was expressed in the first edition of Sokolovskii’s Military Strategy. As we have already seen, this book was very definite that missile defences, together with other forms of strategic defence, would play an important role in any future nuclear war. The first edition of the book, however, contained some statements which cast doubt on whether missile defences were technically capable of performing their assigned task. For although the book’s authors did state that ‘in our country the problem of eliminating rockets in flight has been successfully solved’,42 they also asserted that ‘the methods and means of nuclear attack unquestionably predominate over the methods and means of protection against them’. 43 In addition, some statements in the first edition suggested that effective missile defences were a possibility for the distant future rather than a present or imminent reality. Thus, readers were told that ‘in principle, the technical solution of this problem [of creating an effective antimissile defence] has now been found’,44 and that Ballistic missiles employed en masse are still practically invulnerable to existing means of PVO … only as special instruments of PRO are

‘We Can Hit a Fly in Outer Space’ 29

developed will it be possible to combat the massive use of missiles in the air.45 Members of the political leadership did not participate in the debate on the feasibility of missile defences until the early 1960s, when Khrushchev and Malinovskii made statements in which they evaluated the capabilities of the Soviet missile defence programme very positively. Shortly after the reportedly successful test of a Soviet interceptor missile in the late summer of 1961, Khrushchev gave an interview to a New York Times correspondent in which he described himself and the other Soviet political leaders as being ‘very satisfied with the work of those who produced the means for combatting such rockets [ICBMs]’.46 In his speech to the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961, Marshal Malinovskii went further and unequivocally declared that ‘the problem of the destruction of missiles in flight has been successfully solved’. 47 In July 1962 Khrushchev included antimissile defence in a list of recent Soviet military achievements in his speech to the Moscow Peace Congress,48 and just a few days later made his famous boast to a group of US newspaper editors visiting Moscow that Soviet antimissile missiles could hit a ‘fly in outer space’. 49 Unlike the September 1961 New York Times interview, at this meeting it was apparently Khrushchev who raised the issue of Soviet ABM development. The Soviet leader also volunteered the information that the Soviets had planned to show a film of their antimissile missile in action to delegates to the Peace Congress, but had decided against it on the advice of the Congress organizers, who were concerned that it might have been misinterpreted as a bellicose gesture. These open expressions of confidence in the Soviet ABM effort by Khrushchev and Malinovskii were followed by an increase in the number and frequency of pro-ABM articles in Soviet military publications. Virtually all of the articles after October 1961 on the technical capabilities of ABM which favoured missile defences either quoted or paraphrased the Defence Minister’s statement at the Twenty-Second Party Congress. It is interesting to note that the two types of issues which were raised in the ABM debates (political-strategic and technical) were treated very differently. Although the technical feasibility of ABM might be questioned, it was not apparently acceptable to assert that missile defences had no place in Soviet strategy, or even to frame strategy for future war in a way that excluded the damage-limiting role that ABM could play. On the contrary, the pervasiveness and persistence of expressions of interest in and support for missile defences in Soviet military publica-

30 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

tions during these years indicates the existence of a core of shared values among military strategists about fundamental questions of strategy and future war.

The international security climate During the years when Khrushchev was at the height of his power, the international arena presented the Soviet Union with a complex and rapidly changing picture of constraints on Soviet actions with opportunities to further Soviet interests. Moscow’s relationship with Washington continued to occupy a central place in the Soviet security policy agenda, although by the final years of the Eisenhower administration Khrushchev had come to the conclusion that the United States had no intention of attacking the Soviet Union. The fear of an imminent American attack which had been so acute immediately after Stalin’s death had been dispelled by the experiences of the intervening period. Of course the military threat from the West was still very real, and the view that the United States and the other NATO countries were more than adequately equipped with nuclear weapons which they were fully prepared – and, indeed, intending – to use against the USSR and the other socialist countries continued to be expressed with some vigour in Soviet publications.50 Although the Americans did not take serious steps towards deploying an ABM system until 1967 (principally because the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations did not consider the technologies advanced enough to provide an effective defence), the US Army had been experimenting with ballistic missile defence since the mid-1950s. In 1956 the Army began research into missile defence technologies, and in 1957 full-scale development of an experimental system known as Nike-Zeus was ordered. Later that same year the US Atomic Energy Commission completed feasibility studies on a warhead for the Nike-Zeus. The system was flight-tested in 1959 but never authorized for production, although research and development continued.51 The Soviets kept a close eye on American research into missile defence technologies. As we have seen, Vestnik PVO published a series of articles during 1961 on the operation of the different components of missile defences, using US research as illustrative examples, frequently mentioning the fact that the Americans were devoting considerable efforts to solving the task of missile defences and indicating that their attempts would be successful. One such article even asserted,

‘We Can Hit a Fly in Outer Space’ 31

erroneously, that the development of Nike-Zeus was so advanced that mass production was seriously under consideration. 52 The author of another piece on US ABM research dwelt on some of the more exotic techniques of missile interception being investigated by the Americans, such as neutron rays and lasers, clearly concerned that the West might be getting ahead of the USSR in advanced ABM technology. 53 In fact, the unwritten subtext of all these articles was that if the Americans were sufficiently interested in BMD technologies to devote vast sums to its research, and if the prospects for its future development were so rosy, then the Soviets should not fall behind in this field. But although the Americans were providing the Soviets with some excellent strategic reasons for continuing with their ABM programme, the United States nevertheless had demonstrated through its behaviour in a series of international crises that it was more likely to employ inflammatory rhetoric than weapons of mass destruction during periods of heightened tension. The US had, after all, refrained from the use of force in 1956 during the Suez crisis and the Soviet intervention to crush rebellion in Hungary, as well as in the face of the Chinese shelling of the Nationalist-held islands of Quemoy and Matsu in 1958. Moreover, Khrushchev now had a fund of personal knowledge of the US President and other Western leaders to draw upon. In the course of his meetings with leading statesmen, the First Secretary had discovered – much to his initial astonishment – that the Soviet Union was feared rather than despised by the Western powers. 54 Once it was clear that demonstrations of Soviet technological advances provoked awe and respect around the world, Khrushchev did his utmost to exploit their public relations value. For example, for several years after the first Sputnik launch in 1957 Soviet test launches were often timed to precede or coincide with Khrushchev’s major trips abroad.55 It is not surprising, therefore, that from 1959 Khrushchev began to adopt the position that ‘reasonable men’ were now in the majority in US ruling circles.56 By this, of course, he meant that American policymakers were increasingly recognizing Soviet economic and military strength. But although they might acknowledge Soviet strengths, the US and other Western countries were proving intransigent on certain important issues, such as finding a satisfactory solution to the German problem. At the same time Khrushchev was coming under pressure from China to take a tougher line in his dealings with the imperialist powers. Mao was infuriated by the conciliatory tone of ‘peaceful coexistence’, and could not understand why Moscow did not make greater use of its nuclear arsenal to advance the cause of international

32 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

socialism. What Mao did not know was that the Soviets’ ‘arsenal’ of nuclear weapons – in particular of nuclear missiles – was pitifully small. By December 1960 the USSR had only a handful of first-generation ICBMs.57 Early Soviet strategic missiles were plagued with technical problems. Faults in the electronic guidance system greatly reduced their accuracy, while the use of non-stable liquid fuel required lengthy prelaunch preparation.58 It is likely that such technical difficulties were a key consideration in the Soviets’ decision to devote resources to developing the next generation of ICBMs rather than to mass-produce an inferior version. Khrushchev’s stroke of genius – or his hubris – was the realization that the perception of Soviet military might could be just as valuable in political terms as the real thing, as well as a great deal cheaper. Khrushchev judged the opportunities for exploiting the image of Soviet strength to be great and the likelihood of the USSR becoming involved in conflict to be small. Although the Eisenhower administration proved disappointingly reluctant to be swayed by Khrushchev’s bluster and posturing, in many ways the First Secretary felt comfortable dealing with this President. From the time that John F. Kennedy entered the White House in 1961, however, Khrushchev was subjected to a series of shocks. The first unpleasant surprise was the announcement in March 1961 of the Kennedy administration’s first defence budget, which called for a $3 billion increase in US defence spending.59 According to Oleg Penkovsky, the Soviet agent who passed information to the West at the beginning of the 1960s, the Soviets assumed that the publicly announced US defence budget – like their own – revealed only a fraction of the true extent of spending on defence. Moscow therefore believed that the real increase by the new administration would be two or even three times higher. 60 It was not only the sums of money which Kennedy intended to spend but also the weapons to be developed which created Soviet concern. The planned production of the next generation of American ICBMs – the longerrange and more accurate Minuteman – was to be more than doubled. Plans were made for the deployment of the Minuteman into underground silos which would make them much more difficult to destroy in a Soviet strike. At the same time, the Americans planned a sharp acceleration of the Polaris programme. 61 Both of these developments would undermine Moscow’s reliance on a preemptive counterforce strike to limit the damage which the US could inflict on the USSR. In addition to the prospect of a qualitative and quantitative increase in the US strategic nuclear arsenal in the foreseeable future, in the

‘We Can Hit a Fly in Outer Space’ 33

autumn of 1961 the Kennedy administration made public the fact that previous American estimates of Soviet ICBM strength had been greatly exaggerated. Evidence from recently launched reconnaissance satellites had revealed that the USSR had deployed fewer than 50 ICBMs.62 Within the space of a few months, the United States had both dramatically increased the potential threat it posed to the USSR, and dispelled the myth of Soviet missile superiority. By its backing of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April 1961, the Kennedy administration also demonstrated its willingness to intervene to shift the global balance of power in the West’s favour. Although the Bay of Pigs incident did represent a humiliating failure for Kennedy, it also suggested that Washington was now more likely to use force to advance its foreign policy objectives. Soon after the episode in Cuba, Kennedy and Khrushchev met face-to-face in Geneva, where Khrushchev again failed to elicit concessions on vital questions such as the status of Berlin and a peace treaty recognizing the postwar borders of the two Germanies. None of these developments meant that the US was planning an imminent attack on the Soviet Union. They did, however, restrict Khrushchev’s room for manoeuvre against an American President who was proving to be an unpredictable opponent. As Michael Beschloss has argued, during the early 1960s Khrushchev would have been deeply worried that Washington would seek to exploit its very real military strength in order to ‘settle the Cold War on American terms’.63 Thus Khrushchev attempted his greatest gamble of all: deploying Soviet missiles in Cuba. Part of the appeal of the action for Khrushchev lay in its promise to solve a series of intractable problems at once. Soviet missiles in Cuba would protect this vulnerable outpost of socialism in the Western hemisphere while restoring the appearance of a balance of forces between the US and the USSR. The Americans would be made to feel the pressure of a military threat close to their territory which might make them less assertive in international affairs. Finally, the revelation of Khrushchev’s achievement would help to silence conservative critics of his policies at home and abroad. Although a missile defence capability did not lend itself to the kinds of threats and posturing that Khrushchev employed as easily as a reputedly large supply of strategic offensive missiles, the perception that the Soviets had an operational ABM system would have contributed to the general impression of Soviet strength and invulnerability which Khrushchev cultivated during these years, as well as creating doubts about the value of the Americans’ nuclear arsenal. Towards the

34 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

end of the period covered in this chapter we can see Khrushchev beginning to use missile defences in this way, but technical problems with the system then being deployed near Leningrad coincided with the spectacular failure of Khrushchev’s Cuban missile scheme. After October 1962 the period of Khrushchev’s missile diplomacy came to an end. While the Soviet ABM programme continued to be used as a political instrument by subsequent Soviet leaders, they did so in a far more subtle fashion.

Soviet ABM technology: the Leningrad system In the late 1950s US intelligence reports indicated that Soviet work on BMD technologies was producing encouraging results. This is consistent with the appearance of the first lengthy treatment of the technical capabilities of missile defences in Soviet literature in July 1957, before the first ICBM and Sputnik launches.64 By 1958 there were reports that the Soviets had established an independent PRO component for defence against missiles within the Air Defence Forces. 65 At about the same time there were tangible signs that the ABM project was progressing: the Soviets had begun to deploy very large early warning radars around the periphery of the USSR. These were similar to those used in American experiments with missile defences for tracking missiles. 66 Furthermore, photographs taken of the Soviet ABM test site near Sary Shagan by a U-2 flight in April 1960 confirmed both that BMD-related activity was continuing and that considerable progress towards the development of a missile defence capability had been achieved.67 During the Soviets’ resumption of nuclear testing in the late summer of 1961, missiles were launched from Kapustin Yar and exploded at high altitudes over the experimental ABM radar at Sary Shagan, probably to test the effect of the blackout caused by a nuclear explosion on the radar’s tracking ability. There were also widespread, but unconfirmed, reports that this test included the interception of an ICBM by an antiballistic missile equipped with a nuclear warhead. 68 There is confirmation of a sort that a breakthrough in ABM development was reached in this test in Khrushchev’s first clear references to ABM only a few days later. In addition to testing the effects of nuclear explosions on radar and the interception capabilities of their ABMs, the Soviets probably used the series of nuclear tests in 1961 and 1962 to aid in the development of the very high-yield warheads necessary for exo-atmospheric interceptors, as the Galosh ABM later deployed around Moscow proved to be.69

‘We Can Hit a Fly in Outer Space’ 35

In 1961 the Soviets moved from testing and the emplacement of radars along the periphery of the country to the deployment of what appeared to be a system capable of providing a defence against ballistic missiles. During that year, American reconnaissance satellites discovered that clearing and site preparation was taking place near Leningrad. The concrete foundation work was similar to the test beds at Sary Shagan, and the sites were placed across the flight corridors which US ICBMs or aircraft would take en route to the European regions of the USSR.70 The configuration of the launch sites around Leningrad greatly resembled Soviet anti-aircraft surface-to-air missiles, and it is likely that the Leningrad system represented an attempt to attain BMD capability through modifications to air defence technology. 71 The interceptor missile’s poor flight performance and the lack of adequate data processing equipment were thought to be the major faults of this system. Work on the sites around Leningrad stopped after 1962, and in 1965 they began to be dismantled. There was disagreement in the West about whether the Leningrad system could provide a defence against ballistic missiles. Since the system was never fully deployed, it is difficult to determine whether it was developed to provide protection against an aerodynamic or a missile threat. At best, the system might have had some capabilities against intermediate-range missiles, such as the Thor and Jupiter missiles based in Europe, but it would not have been effective against Atlas and Titan ICBMs fired from the American continent.72

Conclusions By the time that Khrushchev emerged as the victor from the Presidium infighting and began to put his own mark on Soviet defence policy, several factors ensured that he looked favourably upon the missile defence effort. One was Khrushchev’s fascination with the products of science and his faith in the ability of technology to provide quick and easy solutions to complex problems. Another was his belief that future war between socialist and capitalist countries would be fought almost exclusively with nuclear missiles. But probably more important than either of these were the political advantages which a Soviet ABM capability could bring. Another Soviet technological breakthrough with military applications could further enhance the international standing of the USSR and could be a valuable instrument in Moscow’s relationship with Washington. The years between 1957 and 1962 were filled with confrontations between the Soviet Union and the United States in

36 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

which Khrushchev attempted to use the Soviets’ reputed missile successes to gain political concessions from the West, or at least to prevent the Western alliance from making political gains out of Washington’s genuine lead in the technological race. Khrushchev’s views of and decisions about ABM policy were, therefore, also heavily influenced by external factors, but in a much broader sense than the simple desire to counter one weapons system with another. The Soviet leader’s perceptions of US intentions and actions and his views of how they might be affected played an important role in shaping his defence policy priorities in favour of nuclear missile – and antimissile – technologies. Although reducing the level of resources allocated to defence was an important policy goal for Khrushchev, it apparently did little or no harm to the Soviet ABM programme until very late in Khrushchev’s leadership. In fact, throughout the period covered in this chapter the missile defence effort was one of the beneficiaries of cost-cutting measures since part of their aim was to reduce the size of conventional forces to free resources for the development of nuclear missile technologies. It was only late in 1962 when a combination of external factors (the Cuban missile crisis) and technological failures of the Leningrad ABM system made the missile defence programme a target for defence cuts, and even then a substantial part of the research and development effort survived. Finally, during these years it is possible to see the establishment of a place for missile defences in Soviet strategic thought regarding nuclear weapons and warfare. Although service loyalty was an element shaping the views of Soviet officers about ABM, expressions of support for a Soviet missile defence capability also came from officers affiliated to services other than the Air Defence Forces. The pro-ABM opinion grouping which emerged during this period demonstrated that officers with little in common including institutional affiliation shared core traditionalist views about strategy for future war which included a damage-limiting role for missile defences.

3 From Cuba to Détente, 1962–8

This period marks a downturn in the fortunes of the Soviet ABM development effort. By the end of 1962 Khrushchev’s most ambitious bluff, the placing of missiles in Cuba, had been called by the Kennedy administration. After the crisis Khrushchev’s rhetoric underwent a noticeable shift, with greater emphasis on the importance of détente and deterrence and far less on how a nuclear war with the West could be fought. The Cuban missile crisis coincided with the abandoning of the first attempt at a deployed missile defence system around Leningrad, marking a significant setback in the Soviet ABM development programme. This meant that during the last two years of Khrushchev’s leadership his missile diplomacy was no longer in evidence and that the Soviet missile defence programme also received much less public attention. The overthrow of Khrushchev and his replacement with a new collective leadership headed by Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin in October 1964 brought to the fore a new set of political personalities and policy priorities. Although Khrushchev’s successors quickly committed themselves to an across-the-board buildup of military hardware (in part to pay their debt to the leaders of the armed forces for their support in the recent leadership battle), they nevertheless made it clear that their continued support for any weapons system would depend upon its demonstrated utility. In the first few years of Brezhnev’s leadership a number of patterns in Soviet ABM policy appeared which remained constant during the following decades. Divisions of opinion emerged, even among military analysts, about the wisdom and efficacy of missile defences. The resource base of the ABM development effort was threatened as the political leadership increasingly placed a high priority on freeing 37

38 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

resources from the defence sector for the benefit of the civilian economy. The Soviets came under twin pressures from the Americans on missile defences. At the same time that Washington was urging Moscow to place ABM on the negotiating table, it was becoming clear that the Soviets were losing the competition to develop superior offensive and defensive missile technologies.

Politics and policymaking during the transition from Khrushchev to Brezhnev The failure of Khrushchev’s gamble on placing Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba marked a watershed in his leadership, and the First Secretary spent much of his last two years in power attempting to restore his diminished personal prestige. As James Richter has pointed out, following the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev ‘had come to appreciate that the politics of strength could not provide security in a world of mutually assured destruction’. 1 Khrushchev’s policy agenda was clear: improve relations with the West, especially the United States, while making yet another effort to increase investment in agriculture and the production of consumer goods at the expense of the defence sector and heavy industry. By December 1963 Khrushchev unequivocally favoured improving living standards and proposed cuts in the Soviet defence budget and in troop numbers at the Central Committee plenum that month.2 The armed forces as an interest group were out of favour with the First Secretary, who now saw disadvantages both at home and abroad of emphasizing Soviet military capabilities. Khrushchev’s reckless behaviour in Cuba and his subsequent reluctance to support defence interests contributed in no small part to his downfall in October 1964 by ensuring that the leaders of the military joined the ruling groups of the Party and state bureaucracies in a successful bid to remove him from power. Khrushchev was succeeded by a coalition made up of the former colleagues who had conspired to remove him from office. As was the case in the aftermath of Stalin’s death, a ‘collective’ leadership was formed in order to prevent any one individual from concentrating too much power in his hands. The new ruling group was headed by Leonid Brezhnev, who took over leadership of the Communist Party under the Stalin-era title of ‘General Secretary’, and Aleksei Kosygin, who as Chairman of the Council of Ministers or Prime Minister oversaw the apparatus of the Soviet government. The personalities of Brezhnev,

From Cuba to Détente 39

Kosygin and their colleagues presented a sharp contrast to the flamboyant, risk-taking optimist they replaced. The new leadership was interested above all else in presiding over a period of calm and stability both at home and abroad after the turbulent years of Khrushchev’s rule. To this end they embarked upon a concerted effort to reverse some of Khrushchev’s most controversial decisions, such as deStalinization, easing restrictions on censorship and increasing the turnover in Party posts. The Brezhnev–Kosygin leadership also took to heart the lessons of their predecessor’s mistakes, in particular his tendency to alienate powerful interest groups in Soviet politics. In their desire to avoid suffering Khrushchev’s fate, his successors elevated the search for consensus to a level unprecedented in Soviet politics. And, of course, one way to promote consensus and ensure continued support for the leadership was to give something to everyone, especially in the allocation of resources. All of these factors suggested that the influence of the Soviet military on policymaking would be considerably greater than it had been during most of the Khrushchev period. There are indeed numerous indications that the leaders of the armed forces were in a strong position to have their views treated with respect by the Brezhnev-Kosygin Politburo.3 First, Khrushchev’s successors owed a debt to the military for their cooperation – or at least acquiescence – in his removal from power. Here we see the resumption of a pattern familiar from the early post-Stalin years, in which the winners of a power struggle move swiftly to reward the military for its support and to ensure its continued loyalty. Moreover, until Brezhnev consolidated his position in the Party in the early 1970s, no single member of the political leadership had sufficient personal prestige to flout the wishes of the military with impunity as Khrushchev had done at the height of his power. Finally, the increasing complexity of modern nuclear weapons placed a premium on professional expertise. Although there was by this time a growing number of civilian analysts specializing in foreign affairs, for example in the Foreign Ministry and in the Academy of Sciences research institutes, the Soviet military continued to hold a virtual monopoly on detailed information about the country’s defences, such as the characteristics and deployments of weapons systems.4 One indication of the status of the professional military during this period was the appointment of Marshal Andrei Grechko to fill the position of Minister of Defence following the death of Marshal Malinovskii in March 1967. While Grechko, as Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact forces, was an obvious candidate for the post, there

40 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

was a delay of several weeks in announcing his appointment. The delay was accompanied by rumours that a civilian Central Committee secretary, Ustinov, would be made Minister of Defence 5 – a move which would have emphasized the symbolic and effective subordination of the armed forces to the Communist Party. Although Grechko did not join the Politburo until 1973, in the years prior to that he was frequently sent on diplomatic tours that might have been expected to involve an official of the Party or of the Foreign Ministry. 6 Grechko’s high profile is a sign that, despite the unchanged formal status of military leaders at the top of the policymaking apparatus, the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff in effect had greater professional scope in managing the defence effort, and more opportunities for offering advice to policymakers.7 Unlike Khrushchev, members of the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership were not known for articulating distinctive philosophies on nuclear weapons and future war, but their backgrounds and public statements provide some clues about their views on strategic issues. By the mid-1960s Brezhnev had gained a reputation as a spokesman for military interests and a strong advocate for the development of new weapons. During the last few years of Khrushchev’s leadership Brezhnev consistently and publicly opposed some of the First Secretary’s most controversial defence innovations (especially the almost exclusive concentration on the Strategic Rocket Forces and the reductions in troop numbers). 8 During the first six months after Khrushchev’s removal from power there was no clear indication of the future direction of Soviet defence policy while his successors were engaged in a lengthy debate over the ordering of priorities for resource allocations. Brezhnev advocated a return to the traditional emphasis on the development of heavy industry and defence, and he eventually prevailed over those of his colleagues, such as Kosygin and Podgorny (Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet or Soviet President), who opposed any changes to the defence policies introduced by Khrushchev. 9 The new defence policy which was adopted initiated a general military buildup in both conventional and nuclear weapons in recognition that a future war with the West might include a conventional phase. This course of action reversed another of Khrushchev’s controversial policies, thus promoting a return to stability. It also promised to rectify the considerable imbalance between Soviet and American strategic forces, and the leadership recognized that allowing the sizable numerical Soviet inferiority to continue would create a situation which was not acceptable to the

From Cuba to Détente 41

Soviet armed forces. Moreover, the new leadership shared the military’s distaste for Khrushchev’s reliance on bluff and the appearance of a strong defence in his dealings with other countries. If the Soviet Union once again faced a crisis and potential conflict with the United States or any other major military power, the Brezhnev–Kosygin Politburo wanted to ensure that there were plenty of real missiles in the Soviet arsenal. Another clue to the way in which the new leadership approached security policy issues, including policy on missile defences lies in a passage from a speech made by Brezhnev in July 1965. This speech marked one of Brezhnev’s rare public references to missile defences, and he indicated in this address to Soviet military officers that ABM was a programme which the political leadership was willing to continue, provided it was effective and managed professionally. 10 These two criteria, effectiveness and efficient management, were important ones for Brezhnev and his colleagues and were often used as standards against which to judge the results of programmes and policies. The concern with effectiveness and good management was, in turn, closely connected to the leadership’s view of science and technology. In sharp contrast to Khrushchev, his successors looked upon Soviet achievements in science not as miracle cures for domestic and international problems, but as tools with certain, limited capabilities to be used for specific ends.11 As far as the Brezhnev-Kosygin Politburo was concerned, missile defences were merely one component of a much larger military programme, and not a component which was crucial to the leadership’s view of future war, or one which they could necessarily readily exploit to increase the USSR’s political leverage over the United States. Although the leadership was in general willing to support a strong defence and to listen sympathetically to the military’s pleas for particular programmes, the prevailing utilitarian attitude in the Kremlin indicates that they would only be prepared to support the Soviet ABM effort as long as it demonstrated its effectiveness, its value to the armed forces, and its usefulness in political dealings. If there were reason to believe that significant gains could be made by sacrificing all or part of the programme, the leadership would have no compelling reason to continue to back the development of missile defences. Economics was another important factor in the equation of Soviet defence policy during these years, as ever. Khrushchev’s successors initially resolved the perennial problem of how to allocate resources between the military and civilian sectors of the Soviet economy in

42 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

favour of defence. The large increases in appropriations for the military after 1965 enabled the Soviets to launch an across-the-board buildup of conventional and nuclear weapons, and in so doing to begin to remedy not only the imbalance in strategic weapons vis-à-vis the United States, but also Khrushchev’s ill-considered alienation of the military. In July 1965 Brezhnev declared that ‘economic planning is now taking into account the need to strengthen the country’s defense in light of the international situation’, and that the Eighth Five-Year Plan being developed for 1966–1970 would ‘spare no efforts to increase the defensive might of the USSR’. 12 The resources allocated to defence under the Eighth Five-Year Plan were nearly double those of the previous period, while the military budget rose a further 60 per cent in the Ninth Five-Year Plan,13 and every service of the armed forces benefited. An accelerated development and deployment of ICBMs began in the summer of 1966, which rapidly doubled and then quadrupled the number of Soviet long-range missiles. The Soviets also continued to develop their air- and sea-based delivery systems during the second half of the 1960s. A new class of nuclear-powered submarines comparable to the US Polaris was commissioned, and a new medium-range bomber (‘Backfire’) was developed to augment the existing force of long-range bombers.14 Appropriations for scientific research, much of which was for military purposes, also rose during this period.15 A major augmentation to the Soviet armed forces’ conventional capabilities was initiated in 1967, including increasing the infantry strength of tank armies and increasing field and anti-aircraft artillery.16 In addition to strengthening strategic nuclear offensive weapons and conventional forces, the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership authorized the continued development of ballistic missile defences. Site preparation around Moscow for the phased-array radar associated with ABM capability continued after Khrushchev was removed from office, and the interceptor missile intended for the system (‘Galosh’) was first displayed in the November 1964 military parade.17 But while resources were being shifted towards defence on a massive scale, the political leadership acknowledged the importance of the civilian economy, especially the need to increase the output of the products of agriculture and the consumer goods industry. This was true not only of Kosygin, who campaigned tirelessly for raising the standard of living, but also of Brezhnev, with his justified reputation as a strong advocate for the military and for defence interests. While Brezhnev’s early speeches as General Secretary described constant concern for

From Cuba to Détente 43

strengthening the country’s defence as ‘the most important task of the Soviet state’,18 he also stated the government’s intention to move from marked favouritism for heavy industry towards balancing investment more equally between the heavy and consumer goods industries.19 Khrushchev’s successors fully intended a sizeable increase in the production of both guns and butter and hoped that the economy would grow at a pace sufficient to support such a policy. Initially the new leadership’s optimism was rewarded. Soviet living standards improved while the defence sector enjoyed a substantial resurgence. But it rapidly became clear that this course of action was unsustainable. While military budgets rose substantially during the mid- and late1960s, investment in industry declined relative to the growth of the economy as a whole.20 By the summer of 1968 the economic situation in the USSR was not a matter demanding the Politburo’s urgent attention, but it was clear that economic considerations would play an increasing role in defence policy decisions. While Brezhnev and his colleagues had no intention of starving the military of the resources it needed to ensure a strong defence, the leaders of the armed forces could expect their demands for new or continued funding to be scrutinized closely to ensure that weapons development and production plans met the criteria of effectiveness. Finally, the failure of the very limited economic reform programmed launched by Kosygin in 1967 indicated that tinkering with minor details was not an effective method of halting or reversing the decline. If the situation did not improve in the near future, the political leadership would have to consider more drastic action: either a fundamental economic reform (which brought with it the danger of social instability) or injections of resources from outside the Soviet economy, especially in the form of trade with the major capitalist countries.

Ballistic missile defence in Soviet strategic thought During the last two years of the Khrushchev leadership the tone of discussions of strategy underwent a sharp change, with some of the top Soviet military and political leaders demonstrating a marked lack of enthusiasm, not only for missile defences, but for the whole strategy of preemptive strikes and damage limitation of which ABM was a component. This shift was almost certainly a consequence of the Cuban missile crisis, which marked the beginning of a brief period of détente between Moscow and Washington. During 1963 and 1964 Khrushchev

44 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

spoke more about the values of détente and deterrence and less about how a nuclear war with the West could be fought, and he no longer appeared to assume that the Soviet Union would automatically survive a future world war. The Cuban missile crisis occurred at approximately the same time as a significant setback in the Soviet ABM programme: the Leningrad antimissile deployment was abandoned in late 1962, apparently due to technical problems. This would have given the political leaders an additional reason to be less enthusiastic about missile defence. While the Commander of the Air Defence Forces and the Chief of the General Staff (himself a former Air Defence chief) remained firm in their support for missile defences, neither Khrushchev nor Malinovskii made any further mention of ABM systems after October 1962. Although civilian analysts were not involved in the BMD debate per se during the Khrushchev period, more sober assessments of what world war would entail in the age of nuclear weapons were also in evidence in articles in MEMO during these years. In one long article, published in two parts in August and September 1964, the authors expressed views very similar to those of Western analysts who argued that the only role for nuclear weapons was the deterrence of their use. They cited Lenin’s statement, that ‘there will come a time when war becomes so destructive that it becomes altogether impossible’, 21 and concluded: In thermonuclear war it is not possible to achieve the realization of any political aims without the risk of involving all mankind in a terrible catastrophe, fraught with unforeseen consequences. There is not and cannot be any aim which would justify the unleashing of thermonuclear war, which would make it advantageous for one side or the other.22 These passages represent the emergence of a view of nuclear weapons and war in the nuclear era which was sharply opposed to that of the traditions of Soviet strategic thought. This ‘progressive’ view developed during the late 1960s and early 1970s and was expressed most frequently by civilian analysts, who were in turn heavily influenced by Western debates about deterrence and nuclear weapons. Just as the traditionalist view discussed in Chapter 2 tended to be accompanied by support for missile defences, the progressive view often included opposition to ABM

From Cuba to Détente 45

on the grounds that it would undermine deterrence. During the Khrushchev period, however, the progressive view was only beginning to be expressed, and had not yet begun to incorporate arguments against missile defences. Discussions of the merits of missile defences in Soviet military publications became polarized during 1963 and 1964. Open opposition to ABM emerged from within the military, and more extreme positions were adopted by both supporters and opponents. However, the debate on missile defences was still remarkably one-sided, with articles by supporters of ABM outnumbering those by opponents by a ratio of about five to one. In addition, all of the opposition to ABM during these years was expressed by raising questions about the effectiveness of missile defences, which suggests that the technological failures of the Leningrad system played a role in influencing views about ABM. For example, in 1963 Strategic Rocket Forces Chief Marshal Krilov described strategic missiles as invulnerable in flight, and stated that ABM in its present state was not effective against nuclear missiles. 23 One participant in the ABM debate even changed sides: in early 1962 Colonel I. Zheltikov was the co-author of an article which claimed that the significance of antiair defence (including ABM) had increased, and used Malinovskii’s statement at the 22nd Party Congress as proof of Soviet achievements in this field. 24 Eighteen months later Zheltikov used the experiences of the US Nike-Zeus ABM programme to depict missile defences as a waste of effort and resources in pursuit of the unattainable.25 On at least one occasion the ABM debate, which was usually confined to the military press, appeared in the pages of Izvestiya. This was an exchange between the Chief of the General Staff (and former Commander of the PVO) Marshal Biryuzov and the SRF Chief Marshal Krilov. Krilov was responding to Biryuzov’s fulsome praise for the capabilities of ABM in comments on the November 1963 military parade26 with the uncompromising statement that ‘existing systems of antiaircraft and antimissile defence cannot withstand nuclear missile strikes’.27 Although the description of ICBMs as ‘invulnerable’ was sometimes a component of an argument against the effectiveness of missile defences, the appearance of the expression that Soviet ICBMs were invulnerable was not necessarily an indication that the author who made use of it was opposed to BMD or was questioning the capabilities of Soviet missile defences. Thus Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces General Colonel S. Shtemenko asserted:

46 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

We have such powerful and essentially invulnerable means as global rockets, [and] have successfully resolved the problem of the destruction of enemy missiles in flight.28 This apparent contradiction may be explained by the fact that Shtemenko was describing the invulnerability of Soviet strategic missiles. According to the Soviet propaganda of the time, Soviet weapons were the most advanced, modern and perfect in the world. Therefore it was no contradiction to assert the simultaneous invulnerability of (Soviet) offensive missiles and the complete effectiveness of (Soviet) means of defence against ICBMs.29 It is worth remembering that during the period of Khrushchev’s leadership ABM opponents did not argue against missile defences in principle, either on the grounds that they had no appropriate role in Soviet strategy for future war, or, apart from Peter Kapitsa, by asserting that ABM systems were destabilizing. The strongest argument in favour of ballistic missile defence ever to appear in Soviet publications in fact took just the opposite view. Writing in the October 1964 issue of International Affairs, Major General Talenskii based his support for missile defences on three broad arguments. First, the deployment of missile defences by a country was a sign of peaceful intent, because ABM systems were purely defensive weapons whose task was ‘to destroy the nuclear rocket means of attack … without striking the enemy’s territory’.30 Therefore only the aggressive and war-seeking would attempt to prevent the development of such a system. Secondly, the combination of offensive and defensive forces would enhance rather than undermine deterrence. If one country or alliance were getting ahead in either offensive or defensive weapons the opponent would be able to compensate for this by strengthening its capability in the other category.31 The third, and in Talenskii’s view the most compelling, argument in favour of ballistic missile defence was that an ABM capability would enable the USSR ‘to make its defences dependent chiefly on its own possibilities and not only on mutual deterrence, that is, the goodwill of the other side’.32 During the early years of the Brezhnev–Kosygin leadership, discussions about ABM continued to focus both on the likely political-strategic value of missile defences and on the question of ABM’s technical capabilities. The analysts who discussed political and strategic issues in the public debates about missile defences during these years can be divided into three distinct groups. Those in the first group expressed some degree of support for ABM in principle which can be linked to

From Cuba to Détente 47

traditionalist views about strategy and future war in the nuclear era. The second group, progressives, opposed missile defences because they accepted the argument that deterrence could best be attained when both the US and USSR possessed an assured second-strike retaliatory capability. Those who fall into the third group also opposed ABM, but mainly as one of a number of dangerous weapons systems under development by the Americans, and as such an indication of Washington’s hostile intentions towards the USSR. Discussions about missile defences in Soviet military publications continued to focus on the role of strategic defence in military strategy and in scenarios for future war. Although there was a gradual decline during these years in the frequency and intensity of claims for the effectiveness of antimissile systems, interest within the Soviet military in the concept of strategic defences, including missile defences, continued to be expressed. As was the case in Chapter 2, there was a high degree of correlation between adherents of traditionalist views about strategy in the nuclear era and support for a Soviet missile defence capability. The ‘radicals’ who argued that future war would be fought exclusively with nuclear weapons lost their main supporter when Khrushchev was removed from power, and as a result the core common elements of the traditionalist view expanded somewhat to include a combined forces approach to future war. This approach involved the planned use of large-scale conventional forces as well as nuclear weapons in any future conflict between the capitalist and socialist states, but it did not affect the role envisioned for antimissile systems and other forms of strategic defence in limiting damage to the territory, troops and vital economic and industrial centres of the USSR. Another continuity with the ABM debates of the Khrushchev period is the pervasiveness of expressions of the traditionalist view within the armed forces. Once again, it was an adherence which transcended service rivalries to a very large extent. A longtime supporter of missile defences, General Major M. Cherednichenko, set out a clear and detailed description of the approach combining offensive and defensive forces in 1966. Although he stressed the unprecedented destruction and suffering that a nuclear war between the capitalist and socialist blocs would entail and the consequent importance of preventing the outbreak of such a conflict, Cherednichenko argued that in the event of a general war, the coordinated application of both offensive and defensive forces (including missile defences) was the key to victory. 33 Similar assertions about the importance of the defence in a nuclear war were common in military

48 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

publications at this time such as the statement about the interaction and interdependence of the offence and defence made by General Lieutenant I. Zav’yalov. In 1967 Zav’yalov argued against the adoption of a defensive strategy, but favoured an active defence, including ABM systems, within the framework of an offensive strategy.34 From 1967 onwards there was a decline in the frequency and intensity of impressive claims for the technical capabilities of missile defences in the Soviet military press accompanied by a similar pattern in the appearance of direct references to ABM in articles discussing issues of doctrine and strategy. This shift may be linked to the problems which were experienced in the course of deploying the Galosh ABM system around Moscow. Deployment was halted during 1967 and when it was resumed in 1968 half of the original sites were abandoned. It is probably also linked to the decision of the political leadership in 1968 to go ahead with arms control negotiations with the United States in which missile defences would be included among those weapons to be limited. Nevertheless a number of articles in the military press did continue to discuss, or at least to allude to, the importance of the defence in modern warfare.35 And even at this stage, when ABM was coming under sustained criticism for the inadequacy of its technical capabilities, support for the principle of strategic defence in the future war scenarios involving nuclear missiles was still being expressed well outside the boundaries of service rivalries.36 The practical contribution which a system promising protection from the enemy’s most powerful weapons could make to a warwinning strategy appealed to Lieutenant Colonel E. Ribkin, who is probably best-known for refuting Nikolai Talenskii’s 1965 claim that ‘war with the use of thermonuclear weapons has outlived itself as an instrument of politics’. 37 It is intriguing that despite their different views of the utility of war and the possibility of victory in the nuclear age, Talenskii and Ribkin both favoured missile defences. Ribkin favoured the introduction of an effective ABM system, as an aid to achieving a ‘rapid victory’. 38 According to an interview given by the scientist Andrei Sakharov in 1967, missile defences were envisioned at this time as a means of reducing or eliminating Soviet vulnerability to nuclear weapons, and as such were seen as a factor contributing to the continued relevance of Clausewitz’s dictums about war in the nuclear era.39 On the other hand, articles written by Talenskii in 1960 40 indicate that he was very concerned about the enormous loss of life which nuclear war would entail, and viewed ABM as a means of saving lives in the event of such a conflict. Talenskii was also the author of the

From Cuba to Détente 49

vigorous and detailed argument cited above, which supported missile defences chiefly on the grounds that they were purely defensive weapons and would enhance deterrence.41 But Talenskii was virtually alone in making this particular argument. Most of those who discussed the deterrence implications of missile defences in Soviet publications were civilian analysts who followed the debate in the United States on the political consequences of ABM deployment, and took the opposite stance: missile defences would undermine rather than enhance deterrence because the deployment of defensive systems by one side would cause the other to improve and increase its offensive weapons in order to eliminate any advantages gained by its opponent. Thus the tempo of the arms race would be accelerated and the security of neither side would be increased. This acceptance of Western conceptions of deterrence and the likely adverse effects of missile defences on it is diametrically opposed to that of the traditionalists, and represents a distinct ‘progressive’ point of view which during this period is found exclusively among civilian analysts. Just as traditionalist views and support for missile defences tend to be found together, there is a close connection between progressive views and opposition to ABM, although only a relatively small number of those who articulated anti-ABM arguments at this time can be described as progressives. G. Gerasimov was one of the first Soviet analysts to advance progressive arguments against missile defences in print, and indeed was one of the most severe critics of ABM during these years. In a 1965 article which ostensibly criticized American strategic doctrine, Gerasimov launched a devastating attack on some of the fundamental elements of the Soviet military strategy developed during the Khrushchev period. These included the notions of a preemptive strike and a counterforce targeting strategy, the view that victory was possible in nuclear war, and the continued emphasis on a quantitative approach to nuclear weapons – the belief that more is better and the tendency to count the numbers of each side’s weapons to determine which one is ‘ahead’. 42 Gerasimov was equally scathing about ABM, deriding attempts to develop an effective system as expensive and futile efforts which would only result in renewing the momentum of the arms race. 43 Other Soviet analysts were by no means prepared to go this far in speaking out against ABM. In fact, after Gerasimov’s article there was virtually silence for nearly two years in the civilian press about the politicalstrategic issues related to missile defences, apart from an article in MEMO by retired military officer V. Larionov which described ABM

50 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

disapprovingly as a component in an American first-strike, damaginglimiting nuclear strategy.44 The next appearance of discussion about the political implications of ABM deployment came in the autumn of 1967, and was obviously in response to US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s announcement in September that the United States planned to deploy a limited antimissile system (‘Sentinel’). The Pravda report on the Americans’ decision stressed the high cost of the programme, speculated on the role of Sentinel as an arms race catalyst, and noted the pressures within the United States to expand the deployments to achieve a more extensive defence.45 Gerasimov re-entered the debate in October 1967, emphasizing the domestic political reasons for the Johnson administration’s shift to a pro-ABM stance. 46 He pointed out that Johnson had been coming under fire from hawks in the Republican Party for his refusal to approve antimissile deployment and feared losing the next Presidential election amid charges of an ‘ABM gap’ similar to the ‘missile gap’ which had helped to elect Kennedy in 1960. Gerasimov quoted Fortune magazine on the danger that the Soviets would interpret a US ABM system as a sign of American preparations for the launch of a disarming first strike, and warned that the only winner would be big business, which stood to make large profits from the Pentagon contracts for work on Sentinel.47 Despite the expansion of the Soviet ABM debates to include more abstract notions and overtly political implications, the technical feasibility of missile defences continued to be an important issue during this period. The feasibility question hinged upon whether the trend of technological development was judged to favour the offence or the defence. In other words, whether the advances of science could come up with more efficient ways to detect and destroy attacking missiles than it could ways to confuse, overwhelm or avoid existing and future defensive systems. The debate over technical issues was dominated by military analysts. Little attention was devoted to it in the civilian press apart from general statements that the American Sentinel ABM system would be ineffective. The defence was evidently in favour at the very beginning of the Brezhnev–Kosygin leadership, judging from the official commentary in Pravda on the November 1964 military parade. Pravda’s coverage of the Revolution Day celebrations included a photograph of the Galosh antimissile interceptor making its first public appearance, together with the claim that it was ‘capable of destroying any ballistic missiles of an aggressor at a tremendous distance from the defended objects’.48

From Cuba to Détente 51

Even Marshal Krilov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces and one of the most bitter critics of ABM, asserted that ‘in our country the problem of conflict with an opponent’s missiles in flight has been successfully solved, an effective capability of destroying any means of an aggressor’s air-space attack has been discovered’.49 But doubts began to be expressed by the spring of 1965. Thus while former Chief of the General Staff Marshal Sokolovskii continued to assert that the Soviets had ‘successfully solved the complex and vitally important problem of intercepting and destroying enemy missiles in flight’,50 this and other similar claims were refuted by Gerasimov, who asserted: The means of defence lag behind the means of attack. Today there is no absolute defence against a missile salvo. It is possible to expect to intercept and destroy part of the missiles but to intercept and destroy all of them is technically impossible. Yet, for hitting a target only one missile would suffice.51 In spite of the showing of a documentary film of an antimissile interceptor in action on Soviet television in May 1965 52 and Brezhnev’s assertion in a July that ‘further important headway is being made in developing Soviet means of antiballistic missile defence’,53 during the next twelve months scepticism about the capabilities of missile defences were apparently growing in the military. In March 1965 the journal of the Air Defence Forces devoted an article to highlighting the impressive research under way in the US into methods of overcoming ABM technology.54 In September 1965 an article in the General Staff journal Voennaya Misl’ also stressed the American development of antiABM measures and quoted an American scientist who argued that the offence was naturally superior.55 And in January 1966 two engineering officers (both of whom had given the prospects for the technical development of ABM components favourable treatment in 1961) discussed in Vestnik PVO the adverse effects of nuclear explosions on radar and communications.56 These implicit and explicit assertions that the offence was gaining the ascendancy technologically did not meet with firm rebuffs in the form of strong praise and ambitious claims for the capabilities of missile defences, as had been the case during Khrushchev’s leadership. In fact it was quite the reverse. Apart from Brezhnev’s July 1965 assertion, there was no defence of ABM technology, and the report in Krasnaya Zvezda on the November 1965 military parade was very even-

52 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

handed in its praise for the Air Defence and Strategic Rocket Forces. 57 In addition to these indications that all was not well with the technical development of Soviet missile defences was the first sign that the country’s political and military leaders were having doubts about the capabilities of their ABM system. In his speech to the 23rd Party Congress in April 1966 Minister of Defence Marshal Malinovskii stressed the importance of offensive nuclear weapons, describing the Strategic Rocket Forces and the nuclear missile submarine forces of the Navy as the recipients of the main efforts of the military industry for equipment, and the armed forces’ chief means of restraining aggressors and defeating them in warfare. The only reference to the Soviet ABM system came in the assertion that ‘our PVO means ensure the reliable destruction of any aircraft and many missiles of the opponent’.58 This suggestion that Soviet missile defences were not completely effective was repeated almost verbatim and was treated as the official line on ABM,59 virtually silencing ABM supporters. The only significant resistance to the new official line on ABM appeared more subtly, in one of the few Soviet books devoted entirely to the question of antimissile defence. E.K. Bragin and A.G. Kubarev’s Protivoraketnaya Oborona was given to the printers for typesetting in March 1966 (before Malinovskii’s speech to the Party Congress), but was not sent to press until August. This may account for the schizophrenic character of the book. On balance it presents a positive picture of the prospects for the development of a workable missile defence system. The authors discussed the difficulties involved in ABM and described possible methods for penetrating missile defences, but did not protray them as insurmountable obstacles. But the one-page conclusion is very pessimistic about the chances of (the United States) developing an effective missile defence system.60 Before the official announcement in June 1968 of Soviet readiness to begin arms limitation talks, the opposition to ABM which appeared in the Soviet press was most often expressed by questioning or criticizing the effectiveness of missile defences. This period coincided with a noticeable slowdown in the deployment of the Soviet ABM system including a halving of the number of missile complexes originally intended. Many military figures repeated Marshal Malinovskii’s assessment of ABM capabilities at the 23rd Party Congress 61 although Marshal Krilov, the head of the Strategic Rocket Forces, took this opportunity to advance his arguments against ABM. Krilov boasted that Soviet strategic missiles were ‘invulnerable to the opponent’s

From Cuba to Détente 53

antimissile defence’,62 revealing that Soviet offensive missiles had builtin anti-ABM devices, and strongly implied that hardened silos were a more effective and useful means of defence than ABM. 63 Civilian and military analysts focussed on the shortcomings of missile defence technologies used in the American research and development programme to make indirect criticism of the Soviet ABM effort. They stressed the limited capabilities of the proposed Sentinel system and its anticipated ineffectiveness against mass strikes, especially the strikes of missiles equipped with multiple warheads.64 The US Nike-X experimental ABM was also presented as an example of a weapons system on which vast quantities of resources had been lavished but which was rapidly being made obsolete by developments in technology.65 It is possible to see elements of both continuity and change in the discussions of missile defence in Soviet publications if we compare the period covered in Chapter 2 with the mid-to-late 1960s. In this later period there continue to be numerous examples of the ‘traditionalist’ view of strategy for future war which encompasses territorial defence, damage limitation and the pursuit of victory even in a conflict involving nuclear weapons. There is still considerable interest in strategic defences including missile defences as a component of such a strategy, and this interest to a large extent transcends service rivalries. Once again we see a decline in claims for the capabilities of anti-ballistic missile defence coinciding with technical problems encountered in a programme under development, in this case the Galosh system being deployed around Moscow. New patterns emerging include the appearance of a ‘progressive’ view of strategy for future war articulated by civilian analysts who adopt many of the arguments about mutual assured destruction which were prevalent in US debates about nuclear weapons. Progressives saw nuclear weapons as instruments for deterring war rather than for ensuring that the Soviet Union had the ability to wage war in the last resort. From this point of view, a missile defence capability was to be avoided because it would undermine deterrence. Finally, during the last few years of the period covered in this chapter, statements about ABM in Soviet publications are beginning to respond to policy changes in the United States – for example, the 1967 announcement of Washington’s intention to deploy the Sentinel ABM system. Previously Soviet comments on American actions regarding missile defences were confined to discussions of technical details in specialist publications such as the journal of the Air Defence Forces. From 1967 onwards we begin to see non-specialist

54 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

publications, especially newspapers, being used to send signals about Soviet responses and ABM intentions to an audience beyond the borders of the USSR.

The international security climate A brief period of détente with the United States followed the Cuban missile crisis. Although President Kennedy was willing to make few concessions to the Soviets in order to get agreement on contentious issues, nevertheless there was a noticeable reduction in his anti-Soviet rhetoric and he clearly welcomed Khrushchev’s more conciliatory attitude towards Washington. The fruits of this improvement in relations include the hot line agreement signed in April 1963 and the July 1963 treaty to end nuclear testing in the atmosphere, although the two sides’ inability to agree on terms for on-site inspections led to the collapse of talks on the banning of nuclear testing underground. Détente then stalled, in part because Kennedy’s assassination brought to the White House a President who was initially too preoccupied with domestic political issues to pursue improved relations with Moscow. Lyndon Johnson’s attention was focussed on his plans to end poverty in the United States and introduce a ‘Great Society’. Any energy the new US President did have for foreign policy was consumed in the quagmire of Vietnam. Prospects for détente diminished further as the US involvement in that region accelerated, with the bombing of North Vietnam beginning in February 1965 followed shortly by the deployment of US combat troops to the South. Speaking at the 23rd Party Congress in April 1966, Kosygin attributed increased allocations for the Soviet defence effort to the worsening international situation due in turn to American aggression, particularly in Vietnam.66 During the first few years of the Brezhnev–Kosygin leadership, not only did the international security environment appear more threatening and hostile, but the strategic offensive weapons development and deployment programmes of the United States, NATO, and countries with independent nuclear deterrents also provided the Soviets with excellent reasons for going ahead with their ballistic missile defence programme. At the same time the Soviet political leaders had no major causes for anxiety that the USSR’s Galosh ABM system would be unable to cope with the threats posed by opponents. But after 1967, American pursuit of a US missile defence capability combined with improvements in the performance of their strategic offensive missiles against

From Cuba to Détente 55

the Soviet ABM system raised the alarming prospect of the Soviet Union being outclassed by American offensive and defensive weapons technology. The USSR leadership became at first willing, and then increasingly eager, to enter arms control negotiations with the United States. Initially Khrushchev’s successors in the Kremlin had little to be concerned about regarding their position in the strategic weapons competition with the United States, in spite of the imbalance in nuclear weapons which existed when Khrushchev was removed from power (about 200 Soviet ICBMs compared with over 800 American long-range missiles).67 In November 1964 the Johnson administration announced that it did not intend to expand US strategic nuclear force levels beyond the numbers planned by its predecessor for 1965 (1054 landbased ICBMs, 656 SLBMs, and about 500 B-52 intercontinental bombers equipped with nuclear missiles). 68 This indicated that an effort by the Soviets to match (and possibly to exceed) the Americans in strategic nuclear forces would not be pointless. Furthermore, although the US began deploying multiple warheads (Multiple Reentry Vehicles or MRVs) on its submarine-launched missiles in 1964, 69 the Moscow missile defence system was believed to be capable of defending against MRVs, which cannot be aimed individually and land in closely-spaced clusters. They are dispersed so late in the flight of the ICBM that it is possible for the booster to be intercepted by an ABM before the warheads have been released. Of the other countries developing nuclear weapons of their own during the 1960s – the United Kingdom, France and the People’s Republic of China – none had progressed beyond the embryonic stages, and there was little prospect that any of them would deploy missiles in the near future which would be able to overwhelm the Galosh ABM system’s capabilities. Finally, the US research and development effort into missile defences showed no signs of receiving highlevel approval for deployment. The US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was adamantly opposed to strategic defences, which he considered destabilizing because they could call into question the assured destruction capability of countries which did not possess them. Thus the Soviet Union faced no immediate competition in the development of defensive weapons technology, and the Galosh complex looked likely to remain the world’s only deployed ABM system for the foreseeable future. But by 1967 trends were moving in a direction which was much more alarming for the Soviets. The most dramatic change was the

56 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

complete reversal of the Johnson administration’s position on missile defences. In September 1967 McNamara announced that the United States intended to deploy a partial ABM system to provide a ‘light’ defence against accidental missile launches and against an attack from the People’s Republic of China. By the end of 1966 the Johnson administration had been coming under strong pressure from some elements in Congress to allow ABM production and deployment. Improvements in the component radars and computers and the introduction of a short-range, high-acceleration missile in addition to the existing long-range antiballistic missile made the experimental US ABM Nike-X system more feasible than its predecessors.70 Moreover, by the late 1960s US Department of Defense analysts calculated that costexchange ratios actually favoured the defence for the first time in the nuclear age. The use of defensive systems would produce a limited decrease in casualty expectations at a lower cost than that of the offensive increment necessary to create an equivalent increase in the number of enemy casualties expected. 71 Evidence of Soviet deployments of an ABM system around Moscow and the belief that missile defences would be extended to other parts of the Soviet Union lent some urgency to the arguments of the pro-ABM lobby in the United States.72 During the mid-to-late 1960s American researchers were exploring several different forms of ballistic missile defence. These included mounting radars and interceptors on surface vessels (and, in the case of interceptors, on submarines) deployed in the northwest Pacific and north Atlantic Oceans. This Seaborne Anti-Ballistic Missile Intercept System was intended to eliminate the problem of discriminating between live warheads and decoys by intercepting ICBMs before the dispersion of re-entry vehicles. An Airborne Ballistic Missile Intercept System envisioned fitting components on aircraft which would be on constant patrol over the seas adjacent to major cities to defend against attacks from submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), while the Ballistic Missile Intercept System intended to use satellites to attack ICBMs in the first minutes after launch. 73 While a simpler and less expensive ground-based ABM system was eventually chosen, the public discussion of these other ideas would have indicated to the Soviets that the Americans were seriously interested in ballistic missile defences. The ‘Sentinel’ ABM system proposed by the Johnson administration contained four major components: two types of radar and two types of missiles. Perimeter Acquisition Radar, designed to track missiles as soon as they appeared over the horizon, was to be deployed along the northern

From Cuba to Détente 57

borders of the continental United States, while Missile Site Radar, located around cities, would determine when to launch the interceptors and would guide them to their targets. The Spartan long-range missile would destroy attacking missiles before they re-entered the atmosphere, and the Sprint, a short-range, high-acceleration missile, was intended to intercept any warheads which got past the Spartan.74 The deployment of between fifteen and twenty Spartan batteries was planned to provide area defence, while Sprint missiles might be used to defend Sentinel’s radars and some Minuteman ICBM silos. At the same time the Americans were placing more emphasis on building up the sea-based leg of their triad of strategic nuclear forces. The greater stress on submarine-launched ballistic missiles was significant for Soviet strategic defences because these weapons can travel along lower trajectories and be fired closer to their targets than land-based ICBMs. The first characteristic delays the offensive missile’s detection by ordinary land-based radars by several minutes, while the second shortens the period that it is in flight. The result is a reduction in the amount of time available for the defence to react. 75 SLBMs can also be fired from a greater number of locations than land-based ICBMs, which increases the number of directions which ABM radars must cover in order to be certain that the system will detect attacking missiles. At this stage there was apparently uncertainty in the Kremlin about how seriously to take the threat posed by active US interest in defensive systems, and also about how to respond to the repeated efforts of the Johnson adminstration to interest the Soviets in mutually agreed restrictions on ABM deployments. According to interviews conducted by Raymond Garthoff with two senior Soviet officials involved in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), opinion within the political leadership was divided on whether the Soviets should respond positively to American overtures to begin strategic arms negotiations. In 1967 the decision was taken not to enter talks at that time, but not to reject American proposals either.76 Garthoff’s findings shed some light on Kosygin’s remarks in London and New York during 1967 about ABM and the prospects for arms control talks. The reports of these statements which described missile defences favourably has been cited as evidence that Kosygin was an ABM supporter, and as an indication of the existence of a coalition of economic liberalizers who favoured missile defences.77 But the absence of references to missile defences in Kosygin’s other speeches calls this interpretation into question, as does the fact that Kosygin’s remarks in

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the United States about missile defences were not reported accurately in the accounts published in the Soviet press. Pravda’s version of Kosygin’s remarks to US reporters gave the impression that he spoke much more strongly in favour of ABM than he did. 78 It appears more likely that in 1967 Kosygin was simply expressing the current Politburo consensus on ABM and, if anything, was probably not sufficiently enthusiastic in carrying out his task to satisfy the rest of the political leadership in Moscow. The purpose of having a senior political leader publicly supporting the Soviet ABM effort was probably simply to improve the Soviets’ initial negotiating position in the event that arms control talks with the United States did take place. During the late 1960s several factors placed the prospect of arms control negotiations with the United States in a much more favourable light. First, the USSR was facing an imminent arms race in both offensive and defensive weapons just as Moscow finally had strategic parity within its grasp. Given the discrepancies between Soviet and US levels of technology, it was a race which the Soviets could not hope to win, at least not in the short term. The American ABM system under development employed technology superior to that which the Soviets were ready to deploy.79 The US was also about five years ahead of the Soviets in the development of offensive weapons technology, especially multiple warheads. While the Galosh system could probably cope with MRVs, from 1966 the Americans were actively engaged in research and development to create multiple warheads capable of being targeted separately (Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicles or MIRVs). In August 1968 the US began flight testing MIRVed warheads with the declared intention of deploying them on Minuteman and Polaris missiles as soon as possible. 80 The 1968 tests armed a Minuteman III with only three warheads, but it was clearly the Americans’ intention eventually to deploy missiles with many more warheads.81 While the Johnson administration had committed itself to a fixed number of missile launchers, it had made no such pledge regarding the number of warheads, meaning that Soviet defences could face an attack by thousands of warheads in the 1970s. This made the future direction of the US forces configuration very alarming from the Soviet perspective. If deployed extensively, the US ABM system could drastically reduce the political and military effectiveness of the Soviets’ single-warhead offensive forces, while the USSR’s own missile defences would soon be faced with an opposing force of offensive missiles armed with multiple warheads which could easily overwhelm them.

From Cuba to Détente 59

There were obviously greater advantages in pursuing an arms control agreement which might restrain the American programmes than in pushing ahead with their own deployments and causing the US to embark on a rapid buildup to close an ‘ABM gap’, a course of action which would in turn leave the Soviets even further behind. Arms control also appeared to be an attractive option for Moscow because recent events indicated that the Americans would not be in a position to strike a hard bargain when they came to the negotiating table. The Americans’ failure to retain their former overwhelming strategic superiority and their pursuit of a long and unsuccessful war in Vietnam were seen as indications that Washington faced great difficulties in conducting a course of confrontation. In addition, the growing pacifist sentiment in the US which had originated as a backlash against Vietnam also manifested itself in opposition to American military involvement abroad and in pressure for arms control superpower détente. Finally, the state of Moscow’s relations with Beijing was almost certainly another factor which made the prospect of détente with the West attractive. The Soviet Union’s relations with China deteriorated sharply following the Cuban missile crisis, with Mao accusing Khrushchev of ‘adventurism’ for placing missiles in Cuba and ‘capitulationism’ for removing them under pressure from Washington. Although there were some prospects for improved Sino-Soviet relations after Khrushchev was removed, these quickly vanished, and tensions between the two countries increased during the late 1960s. In January 1966 the Soviets signed a new defence treaty with Ulan Bator and began to rebuild military garrisons in that area. 82 The launch of China’s Cultural Revolution marked a formal split between Moscow and Beijing, and by 1968 there was a massive expansion in the number of Soviet troops stationed on or near the border with China. 83 It was clearly in the Soviets’ interest to improve their relations with the United States, both to prevent a Sino-US collusion against Moscow, and to enable the Soviet leaders to direct more attention and resources towards their problem neighbours to the south.

Soviet ABM technology: the Moscow system As we have seen, the abandonment of the Leningrad ABM system after 1962 coincided with a change in the tone of the ABM debate in the Soviet Union, and with the end to public statements in support of

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missile defences by senior political figures during the last two years of Khrushchev’s leadership. It also marked the beginning of a much higher profile for the Strategic Rocket Forces as the USSR began deploying ICBMs in more significant numbers, and the emphasis in military resource allocation shifted in 1963 from defensive to offensive weapons development.84 This indicates a degree of downgrading of the priority of missile defences in the wake of the disappointing capabilities of the Leningrad system, as well as the influence of the Soviet humiliation over the Cuban missile crisis in stepping up the offensive force production. Two cases of weapons deployment towards the end of the Khrushchev period would appear to contradict this conclusion, although upon closer examination they do not. The first such case is the appearance of the ‘Tallinn Line’. In 1963 construction was begun near the Estonian capital Tallinn, as well as at some of the sites cleared previously near Leningrad. As was the case at the earlier Leningrad sites, the foundation work resembled structures at the Sary Shagan test centre, but by this time radars which had previously been associated exclusively with tracking aircraft appeared at Sary Shagan.85 The complex near Tallinn was equipped with SA-5 (‘Griffon’) surface-to-air missiles. Over 40 Tallinn-type complexes were constructed during the 1960s in sites from Archangel on the Arctic Ocean to Riga on the Baltic Sea86 facing one of the NATO attack corridors to the Soviet Union. The sites were large and generally removed from major cities, suggesting the intention of area defence.87 However, the limitation of the Tallinn system’s radars88 and the absence of facilities for storing nuclear weapons near the complexes eventually caused Western analysts to conclude that the system was intended to provide protection from high-altitude aircraft rather than from missiles. The second apparent contradiction is the fact that despite the Soviet abandonment of the Leningrad system after 1962 work on deploying another ABM around Moscow began towards the end of that year and continued steadily.89 In fact, the two different missile defence development projects, Leningrad and Moscow, had probably been in progress simultaneously for some time. The Soviets would frequently assign more than one team of designers to the task of developing the same weapons system, and allow rival projects to continue through testing and even into some degree of deployment before deciding which one or ones should go into production. 90 If there was pressure to cut resources from defensive weapons after 1962, it would have been reasonable to sacrifice a project which had proved disappointing in favour of a rival design which was showing promise.

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There were signs that large, ABM-type radars were being built near Moscow as early as October 1962 although work on the site did not begin in earnest until 1964. 91 In the January 1966 annual US Department of Defense posture statement made to Congress, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara linked the Soviet exoatmospheric interceptor missile (‘Galosh’) first displayed in November 1964 with the defence complexes under construction around Moscow. McNamara estimated that this ABM system would achieve initial operating capability (IOC) by late 1967 or sometime in 1968 and would be able to provide a limited defence for the Moscow area against land-based American Minuteman ICBMs, although it would be a further year or two after that before the Galosh could provide an effective defence against US Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles.92 But the Moscow system evidently ran into serious technical problems and was several years behind McNamara’s estimates in reaching operational status. It was originally composed of eight ABM complexes, four each to the east and the west of the capital about 45 miles from the city, most of which were located on the sites of old anti-aircraft batteries. By 1967 work was continuing on only six of the complexes and in 1968 four complexes had been abandoned. Only four were activated when the system became operational in 1970 and the number of ABM launchers had been reduced from the originally-intended 96 to 64.93 The halt in deployment and the resumption of work on a smallerscale system coincided with a shift in the public discussion of ABM: the decline of explicitly stated support for missile defences and a parallel rise in the number of expressions of scepticism about the capabilities of such a system. Each of the deployed missile complexes was comprised of four engagement radars and 16 missile launchers in two batteries of eight, with two large battle-management radars for the system. 94 A network of large, long-range ‘Hen House’ radars, deployed near the periphery of the USSR, would supply early warning information. The radars had a detection range of about 6000 kilometers and used large ‘billboard array’ antennas, about 300 metres long and 20–30 metres high: two to scan in azimuth, two in elevations and one in a circular pattern.95 The Hen House network partly compensated for the Soviets’ lack of forward based early warning stations comparable to those in Alaska, Greenland and Britain which comprised the US Ballistic Missile Early Warning System.96 Battle management for the entire Moscow system was provided by two large ‘Dog House’ and ‘Cat House’ radars. These were A-frame

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radars with ranges of up to 3000 kilometres97 which provided the tracking radar with target acquisition information and assigned targets to both the tracking and the interceptor-guidance radars.98 The Dog and Cat House radars were of the phased-array type and used electronic beam steering developed in the 1960s. Previously, radars used mechanically operated scanners which required several seconds to move their beams across the sky: a long time considering the speed of incoming missiles and the rapidity with which a BMD system must perform its numerous functions. The development of phased-array radar permitted several beams to be generated at once, and to move across the sky in a matter of microseconds, enabling the radar to track several targets simultaneously.99 The battle-management radars provided target acquisition information to the Try-Add engagement radars which controlled the final stage of the BMD system’s operation. Each of the Moscow complexes contained a set of two identical installations with a larger (‘Chekhov’) target-tracking radar and two smaller but similar radars used for tracking and guiding the interceptor missiles to their targets. These engagement radars used the mechanical steering method, which limited the number of incoming re-entry vehicles or interceptor missiles which they could track at a time to one or two at most. This technical limitation was probably the reason for the deployment of two missile-tracking radars in association with each radar for target tracking, and with eight Galosh interceptors. This configuration suggested that two missiles would be launched against a single target and tracked by the two missile-tracking radars.100 The Galosh interceptor missile was described by Western analysts as a multi-stage, solid fuel anti-ballistic missile with a range of at least 200 miles and capable of carrying a nuclear warhead in the one–two megaton range. The Galosh, therefore, was intended for exoatmospheric interception and thus for area defence. The likely function of the Galosh was to provide a defence not only for Moscow and the surrounding area, but also for the northwestern part of the USSR, which contained a high proportion of Soviet industrial capacity and several major cities. Near the end of 1966 US intelligence indicated that the Soviets’ Galosh interceptor missile was capable of producing the ‘X-ray effect’: the ability to neutralize an ICBM’s guidance equipment and fissionable material at considerable distances from the ABM’s detonation. This suggested that the Soviets had made substantial progress towards an area defence capability. 101 In 1968 a more sophisticated version of the Galosh interceptor was revealed. This version possessed a

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loiter capacity: the ABM’s bus was able to coast once it had reached the highest point of its trajectory while ground radars distinguished attacking warheads from decoys. Once the target was identified, the ABM’s engine could be restarted and the interceptor guided towards the reentry vehicle.102 During 1967 work on the Moscow site was halted to allow modification to its radars and the testing of the improved ABM2. But although the resumption of activity in 1968 brought the introduction of Dog House phased array radars, the interceptor missiles which were eventually installed in 1969 and 1970 were the older, ABM-1 version.103 During the mid-1960s the Soviets reportedly initiated the development of a third version of the Galosh: the ABM-X-3. This version reputedly was to incorporate technology comparable to that used by the American ABM system, but by the time that the ABM Treaty was signed it was apparently still in the design stages.104

Conclusions Khrushchev’s successors were initially positive – although not enthusiastic – about missile defences but by the summer of 1968 they were willing to enter arms control talks which were in part intended to establish limits on ABM systems. As we have seen in this chapter, a range of foreign and domestic factors inclined the Soviet leadership towards this decision. Although the Brezhnev–Kosygin Politburo favoured a strong defence and initiated a significant expansion in Soviet military forces, the leadership did not give carte blanche to the armed forces. As a consequence both of economic pressures and of the leadership’s functionalist, utilitarian attitude towards technology, the declining technical and political utility of the Soviet ABM programme made it a prime candidate for scaling down. At the same time the political leadership was receiving conflicting views on missile defences from its military and civilian advisers. While there was still considerable support for ABM within the armed forces, doubts were being expressed both about its technical merits and about its desirability in principle. This is quite a different picture from the situation we saw in Chapter 2, where virtually the only reservations expressed about missile defences were about the level of technical capability thus far achieved. Entering arms control negotiations with the United States and including ABM in the agenda for the talks offered Moscow the prospect of several gains and few losses. The military value of retaining a substantial missile defence programme was diminishing substantially in

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the face of US advances in both offensive and defensive weapons technology. The Soviets were, however, fast approaching parity with the United States in strategic offensive nuclear weapons, and arms control talks provided an opportunity to formalize a stable balance of strategic forces, or at least to prevent the Americans from surging ahead once again. Although during this period the Soviet ABM capability was not used as a political tool in the style of Khrushchev’s missile diplomacy, missile defences were nevertheless clearly seen by Khrushchev’s successors as bargaining chips. American concern about Soviet missile defences greatly increased the programme’s political value and meant that Moscow could trade restrictions on this system for concessions in other areas, such as limitations on US strategic offensive weapons. Finally, in this chapter the United States continues to be the major focus of Soviet attention regarding missile defences. The Sino-Soviet split plays a part in making Moscow look favourably on arms control and détente with Washington, but chiefly in order to shut China out of a rapprochement with the Americans. While the nuclear threat from China is on the horizon, it is not perceived by the Soviet political leaders during these years as a cause for immediate concern.

4 Missile Defence and Arms Control Diplomacy, 1968–72

This chapter focuses on the Soviet internal debates and policy decisions which took place while the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) I and ABM treaties were being negotiated. The first attempt at strategic arms limitation talks between the superpowers was abandoned after Warsaw Pact troops crushed the Prague Spring reforms in August 1968. The Czech experience of economic reform set a dangerous precedent in the view of the Brezhnev Politburo and contributed significantly to the leadership’s preference for trade over domestic reform to shore up the already-ailing Soviet economy. In agreeing to the strict limitations on ballistic missile defences set out in the ABM Treaty the Soviet leaders were acting in response to a variety of political, economic and technological pressures. The Nixon administration made it clear that progress on trade would be linked to progress on arms control, and ABM was the single issue which most concerned the Americans during the course of the SALT I negotiations. Brezhnev and his colleagues in the Politburo hoped that an arms control agreement would impose restrictions on the US weapons development programme which would make the arms race both more predictable and less costly for Moscow. Recent American breakthroughs in multiple warhead technology and sustained US interest in developing an advanced ABM system provided a vivid demonstration of the strength of the competition which the USSR would face in an unrestrained strategic nuclear arms race. Accepting restrictions on missile defences was a price which the Brezhnev Politburo considered well worth paying for the potential gains of détente. The Soviet signature on the ABM Treaty was the result of a pragmatic policy shift, not a sign of a fundamental change in Soviet strategic thought. Although there was a discernible anti-ABM sentiment in the Soviet press during this period, 65

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the degree of support for missile defences continued to be remarkably strong given the political leadership’s decision to accept limitations on this system.

Politics and policymaking during the SALT I negotiations During the period covered in this chapter we see a gradual but definite shift in the balance of power within the Soviet political leadership. Whereas in the first few years after Khrushchev was removed from office his successors ruled more or less as equals through a collective leadership, during the late 1960s and early 1970s Leonid Brezhnev began to eclipse his colleagues in the Politburo. Brezhnev’s emergence as the most important and powerful member of the political leadership was accomplished more slowly and subtly than the dramatic power struggles of the Khrushchev years. Rather than stage or permit open disputes which visit defeat and humiliation upon the loser, Brezhnev preferred to edge out his rivals by encroaching on their responsibilities. For example, in a speech to the Central Committee in December 1969, Brezhnev implicitly criticized Prime Minister Kosygin’s handling of the economy. This speech marked the beginning of Brezhnev’s campaign to gain personal control of the Council of Ministers. Within a few years it was Brezhnev rather than Kosygin who was making the major pronouncements on Soviet economic policy.1 Similarly, a March 1970 visit by Brezhnev to Minsk to review spring army manoeuvres unaccompanied by any other senior political leaders apart from the Defence Minister cast the General Secretary in the role of supreme commander of the armed forces. From at least 1971 Brezhnev was also clearly taking a leading role in another area which had previously been Kosygin’s special responsibility: foreign policy.2 In the early months of that year Brezhnev took personal charge of Soviet relations with the United States and West Germany, as well as of the Soviet positions in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.3 Brezhnev took over from Kosygin the role of advocate for SALT and détente. It was Brezhnev who was at the Moscow end of the back-channel negotiations which took place during 1971, and Brezhnev who closed the internal Party debate on the policy to be announced at the upcoming Party Congress by committing his personal prestige to the policy of normalizing relations with the United States. 4 The process of Brezhnev’s emergence as supreme Soviet leader was completed at the 24th Party Congress in March 1971, when the General Secretary appointed four of his supporters to the Politburo, took clear

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command of economic policy, endorsed the SALT negotiations and expressed the Soviets’ desire for positive results from the arms control process.5 A major preoccupation of the Soviet leadership during these years was the increasing pressure on resources which was the result of the early stages of a long-term decline in the Soviet economy. It is against this background that Soviet national security policy decisions during the SALT negotiations should be evaluated. As we saw in Chapter 3, Khrushchev’s successors had come to power determined to retain the support of all the significant groups in Soviet politics, and their chief means of so doing was the open-handed distribution of resources. By the end of the 1960s, however, the slowdown in Soviet economic growth was putting this practice under threat. Although Soviet political leaders were not accountable to the population in the same way as their counterparts in some other countries, Brezhnev and his colleagues nevertheless were unwilling to risk the social unrest which might follow a sharp drop in living standards after a generation of steady improvement. The leadership therefore found itself in a dilemma: it was necessary for political survival both to ensure that no major constituency (especially ones as important as the armed forces and the defence industry) was subjected to significant cuts, and to secure a reasonable improvement in the output of the agricultural and consumer goods sectors. Economic reform initially appeared to offer a solution to this problem. In 1967 Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin initiated a series of measures intended to combine decentralization, greater reliance on financial levers to guide the economy and a measure of increased trade beyond the socialist bloc. 6 Limited though these measures were, they met with great resistance which significantly diminished their impact. By late 1968 the recent Czechoslovak experience served to discredit the very concept of reform in the eyes of the Soviet leadership. Alexander Dubcek’s ‘socialism with a human face’ had begun with economic liberalization and decentralization and developed rapidly into the relaxation of controls on the press and on cultural life. The enormous popular response to the ‘Prague spring’ caused the leaders of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact members to fear the loss of Communist Party control in Czechoslovakia and the spread of the contagion of political instability to their own countries. After Warsaw Pact troops intervened in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 to end the Prague spring experiment and replace Dubcek with the more conventional Party functionary Gustav Husak, the Soviet leadership

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closed the door firmly on economic reform in the USSR and began to search for alternative means of alleviating resource constraints. In these circumstances an expansion of trade with the major capitalist countries looked like an appealing substitute for serious reform of the Soviet economic system rather than a complement to it. And the United States, especially under the administration of the newly-elected President Richard Nixon and his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, made it clear that improvements in economic relations with the US would be dependent upon progress in arms control. In addition to the expectation in Moscow that a relaxation of international tension would lead to increased trading and economic links between the Soviet Union and the West, participation in strategic arms limitations also held out the prospect of permitting a reduction – or at least the avoidance of increases – in the Soviet military budget. As we saw in Chapter 3, by the late 1960s the Soviets were facing a competition in both offensive and defensive weapons technology which the Americans were poised to win, at least in the short- to medium-term. Some kind of an agreement with Washington which established base lines for future weapons deployment could enable Moscow to avoid the otherwise open-ended costs of an unrestricted arms race. There was a noticeable emphasis in Brezhnev’s speeches during the SALT negotiations on the importance of raising living standards. While Brezhnev had described strengthening defence as ‘the most important task of the Soviet state’ in 1966, by 1969 ‘the paramount task of socialist society’ was raising the standard of living.7 The downward revision of the economic goals which were set for the 8th Five-Year Plan (1966–70) and Brezhnev’s criticism of the performance of the Soviet economy in 19698 suggests that the political leaders, and Brezhnev in particular, were feeling pressure to find ways to relieve the defence burden on the Soviet economy. By the time that Brezhnev addressed the 24th Party Congress in 1971, he made only a cursory mention of the importance of defence and made explicit the link between domestic economic pressures and Soviet involvement in arms control: We are engaged in negotiations with the USA on a limitation of strategic armaments. Their favourable outcome would make it possible to avoid another round in the missile arms race, and to release considerable resources for constructive purposes.9 It was during these years that economic issues were raised for the first time in some discussions of ABM to support arguments against missile

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defences. During the Khrushchev period, the question of the link between resources and missile defences was only made in brief and occasional references to the amounts of money that the Americans were devoting to their ABM effort. The underlying message of those remarks was to urge the Sovets not to fall behind their rivals in developing this new technology by being miserly with resource allocations. This kind of message continued to appear in some military publications, especially Vestnik PVO, during the late 1960s when the future of the Soviet ABM effort was in doubt,10 and was clearly a plea on the part of ABM supporters for the continuation of the programme. In sharp contrast, articles in civilian publications (such as newspapers and journals produced by research institutes specializing in international affairs) began to spell out the adverse economic implications of high spending on ABM in the United States and used this as an argument against the development of missile defences. 11 Several such pieces identified clear connections between the size of the US missile defence effort and the heavy burden of defence spending on the American economy.12 Other analysts introduced an argument which was used in Soviet discussions over the course of the next twenty years when they emphasized that the arms race in general, and the US development of missile defences in particular, only benefited the interests of powerful military monopolies and the Pentagon.13 The message that high levels of spending on the armed forces (and missile defences) were accompanied by social and economic problems and that the only real beneficiaries were the military and the defence industries could, of course, also be applied to the Soviet situation. This was an argument which was only found in the civilian press, and some of the analysts who used this argument against ABM were also among those who expressed ‘progressive’ views about nuclear weapons, deterrence and missile defences. The appearance of economic arguments on both sides of the ABM discussions indicates the seriousness of the resource constraints which the Soviet Union was facing. The armed forces had obviously received the message that the economic pie would be divided up more parsimoniously in future, and analysts with an interest in security policy were making arguments for their preferred priorities.

Ballistic missile defence in Soviet strategic thought During the SALT negotiations there was considerable expansion in both the breadth and depth of discussions about ballistic missile defence in Soviet publications, although these discussions continued to

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be concerned with the two broad categories of political-strategic and technical issues. The participants were almost exclusively professional analysts, either civilian or military. During this period members of the political leadership seldom gave indications of their positions on the issue of missile defences. A striking feature of these discussions was the way that remarks about ABM appeared to be made in response to external stimuli. For the most part these discussions did not have the character of ‘debates’ between colleagues with differing views who were replying to each other’s comments. Instead, the participants appeared to frame their remarks in response to actions taken by the United States, pronouncements of the Soviet political leaders and the apparent capabilities of the USSR’s ABM system. The ABM discussions of these years were not confined to the pages of Soviet military publications. With the upsurge of interest in missile defence in the United States in the late 1960s, Soviet civilian analysts suddenly had access to a wealth of information about ABM, including detailed and informed arguments about both the political and the military implications of this weapons system. Researchers at the Academy of Sciences institutes were quick to make use of information from foreign sources in order to enter the debate and broaden its focus. Therefore, while discussions of missile defences continued to include questions about ABM’s technical feasibility and its role in Soviet strategy, they moved away from the close focus on requirements for future war which were characteristic of the Khrushchev period to encompass more abstract concepts such as the impact of missile defences on the superpower arms race and its implications for deterrence. Of the civilian analysts who participated in the discussions about ABM during these years, some were clearly joining in an orchestrated campaign against the American missile defence effort which was linked to Soviet participation in the arms control process and to furthering the aims of the political leadership. The statements which fit this category tended to appear in national newspapers, and drew upon a common fund of arguments which could, and often were, applied to other American weapons development programmes. The other group of civilian analysts, the ‘progressives’, evidently opposed all missile defences in principle although they too framed their arguments in terms of the Americans’ missile defence effort. Progressives accepted the Western view that the most stable basis for nuclear deterrence was the acquisition by both superpowers of an assured retaliatory strike capability, and they opposed ABM because they believed it undermined the credibility of deterrence based on the threat of punishment.

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Progressives tended to be affiliated with prestigious research institutes whose members were called upon from time to time to provide the political leaders with analysis of foreign policy issues. Although the extent of real influence over policy choices which these analysts exercised was probably small, they were able to make their opinions known to the country’s political leadership, and those opinions included adamant opposition to missile defences. As was the case in Chapters 2 and 3, there is a degree of correlation between views about missile defences expressed in Soviet military publications and the authors’ service affiliations. Expressions of interest in strategic and missile defences appeared more frequently in the pages of the journal of the Air Defence Forces, Vestnik PVO, which suggests an attempt to assert the significance of a mission which was the special responsibility of that service. 14 Judging from published statements, however, support for the principle of strategic defences in future war scenarios involving nuclear missiles continued to be widespread within the Soviet armed forces, even when ABM was increasingly coming under criticism for its technical failings and no longer enjoyed the unqualified support of top political and military leaders. As was the case during the Khrushchev leadership, there was a strong connection among military analysts between traditionalist views of future war and strategy, which stressed the need for damage-limitation and for the combination of offensive and defensive forces, and support for missile defences. Debates on several other military-strategic issues occurred during this period and overlapped with the discussions on missile defences. There was, firstly, the ongoing debate about the most appropriate strategy and doctrine for the Soviet Union to adopt in the nuclear era. Issues in this debate included the relative emphasis and importance of conventional and nuclear weapons, the feasibility and desirability of a warwinning strategy, and how much faith, if any, should be placed in the ability of nuclear weapons to deter war. Several Western scholars, including Michael MccGwire15 and Bruce Parrott,16 have argued that in the late 1960s the predominant view within the Soviet armed forces of strategy and future war was shifting towards greater emphasis on the deterrent ability of offensive nuclear forces and away from the combination of offensive and defensive forces. Although the traditionalist view continued to be articulated throughout these years, the steady increase in the expressions of scepticism about the capabilities of missile defences from within the armed forces suggests that there were growing doubts about the continued efficacy of an offensive–defensive

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strategy in a period when both superpowers’ nuclear arsenals were expanding at enormous rates. One of the distinctive characteristics of the discussions on missile defences during these years was the way that they appeared in successive bursts. At the beginning of this period there was a sharp drop in the frequency of the appearance of articles which dealt with ABM while there was considerable uncertainty over the status and future of missile defences in both the USSR and the USA. This uncertainty began with Foreign Minister Gromyko’s announcement in June 1968 that the Soviet Union was prepared to begin talks with the US on limiting both offensive and defensive strategic weapons. Although the negotiations were cancelled following the Warsaw Pact’s military intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the imminent US Presidential election left the future of both superpower arms control and the American ABM programme in doubt. In March 1969 the new US President Richard Nixon confirmed the Americans’ commitment to missile defences, albeit in a slightly altered configuration to protect Minuteman ICBM silos instead of cities and with the new name ‘Safeguard’. The flurry of articles which appeared in Soviet publications in response to this announcement represented the most sustained and intense barrage of criticism to which missile defences had thus far been subjected. There are several interesting features about the anti-ABM articles which appeared in 1969. First, all the articles were published in daily newspapers. The fact that a wide range of papers printed pieces about ABM looks like the result of a concerted effort to reach a broad section of the domestic population and, very likely, to ensure that the antiABM message was also noted abroad, particularly in the United States. The remarks about missile defences were not dominated by a few specialists. While the 1969 debates included articles by well-known foreign affairs analysts such as Gerasimov, who had already taken a stance on ABM, many of these articles were written by the various newspapers’ American correspondents, and by other journalists who made no previous or subsequent appearance in the debates. Finally, the authors of the articles on ABM published in 1969 tended to draw upon a common supply of points to construct their arguments. While most articles emphasized some aspects more than others, the following points can be found in the vast majority of them: • The American decision to go ahead with ABM deployment was made for domestic political, not military-strategic reasons.

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• The US ABM decision was meeting with widespread popular and Congressional opposition. • The opposition to ABM in the US represented a more general disapproval of Washington’s high military spending. • Safeguard was an expensive system and might in the end cost even more than official estimates. • ABM represented a gold mine for the US military-industrial complex, in the form of lucrative Pentagon contracts. • Safeguard would be the catalyst for a further acceleration of the arms race. • Safeguard was viewed as a trump card by the Americans, who expected it to improve their position in the upcoming negotiations on arms limitations, but in fact it would have an adverse effect on the arms control process.17 Very few of these articles discussed the deterrence implications of missile defences, and progressive views were not expressed, apart from Gerasimov’s contributions. The arguments made in this barrage of criticism of ABM condemned Safeguard as evidence of hostile American actions and intentions. The American missile defence programme was criticized in much the same terms as other US weapons programmes under development, rather than as a system which was particularly dangerous because of its own characteristics and the logic of deterrence. The next Soviet expression of concerns about the political consequences of ABM did not appear until the early months of 1970, coinciding with the break between the first two rounds of the SALT negotiations and with US Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird’s request to Congress for supplementary appropriations for several weapons programmes, including Safeguard. In contrast to the 1969 series, many of the articles in this group appeared in the major scholarly journals discussing issues of international affairs and foreign policy. These analyses tended to stress the dual role of Safeguard as a stimulus for the nuclear arms race and a threat to the arms control process, and to lace their arguments with disparaging remarks about the Safeguard system’s limited capabilities. In addition, they began to discuss ABM and MIRV together, as two complementary factors promoting the arms race. 18 This group of statements also included a number of expressions of progressive views. Analysts were critical of the war-fighting, damagelimiting strategy which they ascribed to the United States, and of the role of missile defences in it.19 The Safeguard programme was also criti-

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cized by progressives as a component in the Americans’ ‘technical approach’ of using military means to solve political problems, 20 a phrase which became familiar in connection with Gorbachev and New Political Thinking in the late 1980s. The last cluster of articles which appeared during the SALT negotiations opposing missile defences came in the late summer of 1971, coinciding with the fifth round of the arms control talks. This was the first formal meeting of the two sides after the agreement reached on 20 May 1971 to concentrate primarily on finding a solution to the problem of ABM. Articles in Pravda and Izvestiya continued to stress the effects of US ABM deployment on the arms race and on the arms control process,21 while in Krasnaya Zvezda a sterner note was struck in a warning that US attempts to gain strategic superiority would force the Soviet Union to match the Americans in weapons deployment and in the end US security would not be enhanced.22 The articles in specialist journals, however, also used missile defences (and sometimes ABM and MIRV together) as an example to illustrate other points, such as the high levels of US military spending.23 From this point onwards there was a sharp decline in the frequency with which Soviet publications explicitly addressed the issue of missile defences and within a few months the question virtually disappeared from the military and civilian press, not to reappear until the controversies over the American Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s. The explanation for this phenomenon is not difficult to discern. Supporters of missile defences found it was no longer politically expedient to continue to state their position, while ABM opponents could turn their attention to other subjects for precisely the opposite reason: with serious negotiations in progress to hammer out the final details of a treaty restricting ABM development and deployment, the argument had been won and, more important, the relevant Soviet policy decisions had been taken. Throughout this period technical issues were seldom raised by those who favoured missile defences. Those who did and asserted the ABM technologies were effective tended to be found in Vestnik PVO and used indirect methods to make their point. For example, in the August 1968 issue of Vestnik PVO, Colonel K.M. Popov discussed the US research effort into defensive systems, and quoted a foreign press report that the main technical issues of ABM had been solved in the United States.24 The ambiguity of Popov’s citation indicates the political difficulty which supporters of ABM had in putting forward their arguments after the Soviet leadership had decided that the USSR’s

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antimissile system would be placed on the negotiating table. A notable exception to this pattern was a February 1970 article by Marshal Grechko, in which Grechko stated, ‘we have combat means capable of reliably hitting both the planes and the missiles of the opponent’. 25 There are several indications that Grechko’s assertion was aimed at the Americans. The chosen vehicle for this statement was the Communist Party newspaper Pravda, widely read both at home and abroad. The publication of the article also came hard on the heels of a request by the US Secretary of Defense for resources to expand the US ABM system following the inconclusive first round of the SALT negotiations. Grechko’s remarks in fact were intended as a message to the leaders of the United States that the Soviet Union had the upper hand technologically and was prepared to continue the competition in defensive systems if necessary. If the Defence Minister’s statement had reflected a sudden and dramatic improvement in the performance or prospects of the Galosh ABM, it would almost certainly have been accompanied by a chorus of claims for the system’s superiority, primarily from among the Air Defence Forces themselves. The fact that Grechko’s assertion contained the sole unambiguous claim for an effective Soviet ABM between the middle of 1967 and the signing of the ABM Treaty indicates that the Minister of Defence was simply conveying a signal to Washington and was probably chosen as the messenger because his position ensured that his words would be noted by the Nixon administration. Opposition to missile defences in military publications was expressed exclusively in terms of questioning or belittling the technical capabilities of ABM systems. The criticism of ABM’s feasibility was probably connected to technical problems with the Galosh missile defence system being deployed around Moscow during this period, which was delayed and scaled down in the late 1960s. Another likely influence was the decision of the political leadership to place ABM on the negotiating table during the SALT talks. This indication that the Politburo was no longer completely supporting the missile defence effort would have encouraged the expression of underlying doubts. The frequent contributions of Marshal Krilov, head of the Strategic Rocket Forces, to the debates on the side of the ABM opponents suggests that service rivalries also played a role. Finally, the evidence of doubts about the capabilities of weapons of the defence and the increasing emphasis on the technological strengths of offensive nuclear weapons suggests that this was a transition period towards greater reliance upon the deterrent powers of an offensive, retaliatory capability.

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As we have seen in previous chapters, the common meeting point of virtually all those who expressed interest in and support for missile defences in Soviet publications during this period was a set of shared ‘traditionalist’ views about the appropriate strategy for war in the nuclear era. By 1970 there was an opinion being articulated about nuclear weapons, deterrence and missile defences which was diametrically opposed to that of the traditionalists. This progressive view was based in the Academy of Sciences research institutes, and was evidently shared by some scientists such as Sakharov. In the years immediately before the ABM Treaty was signed, progressives were putting forward a coherent argument which challenged the traditionalist view being expressed to the political leadership by many representatives of the armed forces. It is difficult to judge how much influence civilian analysts had over national security policy decisions. Although the Brezhnev–Kosygin leadership did make a point of consulting the opinions of experts in various fields, access to decisionmakers does not necessarily equate with influence over policy. Nevertheless, the statements of the progressive view indicates that strong opposition to missile defences and to the strategy of deterrence through denial of victory was being expressed by at least one group of foreign policy experts.

The international security climate Although the Soviets were initially undecided about accepting the Johnson administration’s invitation to participate in strategic arms limitation talks, over the next several years a combination of external pressures and opportunities made the Brezhnev Politburo willing and then increasingly eager to participate in arms control negotiations and indeed to achieve results. Whereas Lyndon Johnson appeared to be an ineffectual President, under attack at home for his continued support for American involvement in Vietnam and anxious to improve relations with the Soviets and bring them to the negotiating table, his successor in the White House presented a very different image. With his long history as a prominent anti-Communist, Richard Nixon took a much tougher public stance than Johnson on a range of foreign policy issues, and quickly demonstrated his willingness to back up his rhetoric with action. As soon as he entered the White House the new President ordered a review of the US position on strategic weapons development and arms control. By March 1969 Nixon announced that he intended to go

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ahead with missile defences but under the new name of ‘Safeguard’ and reoriented to protect ICBM launchers rather than cities from missile attack.26 A total of 12 ABM sites were planned for deployment around the country in order to provide a thin area defence of much of the continental United States as well as ‘point’ defence of missile silos. Only the first phase of the programme (comprising four sites) was authorized, however, and Congress later limited appropriations to allow the completion of only two: at Malmstrom, Montana and Grand Forks, North Dakota.27 In addition to its commitment to missile defences, the Nixon administration was clearly forging ahead in the development of strategic offensive technology. US test flights of MIRVed warheads for ICBMs continued unimpeded, and there were no signs that the new President was willing to hold back on the development and deployment of other strategic weapons. Indeed, while the SALT negotiations were under way US Defense Secretary Melvin Laird asked for and received Congressional approval for an accelerated offensive weapons programme including the Trident submarine and B-1 bomber. Although Nixon and Kissinger were very interested in pursuing a strategy of détente with the Soviet Union in which strategic arms control was a key component, they were careful both in their public statements and in their policy decisions not to appear too eager to sit down at the negotiating table with the Soviets. At the same time, the new administration’s willingness to continue and indeed escalate the US involvement in the war in Vietnam was intended to convey the message to the Brezhnev leadership that it could either engage Washington in a dialogue which held out the prospect of improved relations or abandon the attempt at détente and live with the consequences of an unrestrained American arms buildup and an aggressive US foreign policy. Of course, there was a country which posed a more immediate political and military threat to the Soviet Union than the United States: the People’s Republic of China. Relations between Moscow and Beijing deteriorated still further during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Tensions between them increased following the August 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, when Beijing feared that the Soviets would try to apply the ‘Brezhnev doctrine’ (the USSR’s self-proclaimed right to intervene with force in order to defeat threats to socialism) to China.28 Between March and September 1969 a series of clashes along the disputed border between the two countries resulted in casualties on both sides and caused the Soviets to accelerate their buildup of troops

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and weapons in the Far East.29 And although the military threat posed by China’s conventional capabilities was most immediate and pressing, there were uncomfortable reminders that Beijing was continuing its pursuit of nuclear weapons state status. In September 1969 there were two successful nuclear tests at the Chinese test site at Xinjiang, followed by the launch of the first Chinese earth satellite in April 1970, indicating that the development of a long-range delivery vehicle for a Chinese nuclear warhead would not be far behind. The Chinese during these years also kept up the political pressure on the Soviet Union, challenging Moscow for the leadership of the socialist world. In April 1969 at the Ninth Chinese Communist Party Congress, the leadership formally declared that Maoism held a position equal to that of Marxism-Leninism, and denounced Moscow for its ‘revisionism’. 30 A final factor in the Chinese equation which was a cause for Soviet concern was the possibility of a Sino-American rapprochement. This was a very real prospect from 1969, when the US began making warm diplomatic overtures to the Chinese. Moscow’s fears were realized when the US announced in July 1971 that President Nixon would be visiting Beijing the following February. The shifting dynamics of the Sino-Soviet-American relationship during these years gave the Brezhnev leadership an additional incentive to pursue a relaxation of tensions with the United States in the hope of preventing the development of an alliance between Beijing and Washington. As well as creating pressures which helped to push the Soviets towards détente and arms control, the international security environment also demonstrated ways in which an improvement in relations with the West could provide opportunities for Moscow. One example of this was the development of détente in Europe, especially through the new West German Chancellor’s Ostpolitik or Eastern policy. In October 1969 the Social Democrats came to power in the Federal Republic of Germany, and for the next several years the country was led by a man – Willi Brandt – who was eager to improve relations between the two German states. Brandt signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in November 1969, thus alleviating the Soviets’ long-standing fear of a nuclear-armed West Germany. The Federal Republic under Brandt’s leadership then went on in 1970 to sign a non-aggression pact with the USSR (the Treaty of Moscow) and a treaty with Poland accepting the Oder–Neisse line as the border between Poland and Germany. These agreements were followed in 1971 with a Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, in which the Soviets gained implicit recognition

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of East Berlin as the capital of the German Democratic Republic and a reduction of the Western military presence in West Berlin in exchange for the guarantee of unimpeded access of civilians to and from West Berlin and the recognition of its ties to the Federal Republic. Furthermore, in December 1969 NATO ministers made their first positive – although still cautious – response to the Warsaw Pact’s most recent call for a Europe-wide conference on security. Through détente in Europe, then, the Brezhnev leadership was able to accomplish many of the goals which Khrushchev had pursued so unsuccessfully. Finally, during the late 1960s and early 1970s the Soviet Union was becoming much more actively involved in other parts of the world, especially the Middle East. This was the continuation of a process begun under Khrushchev’s leadership of expanding Soviet influence beyond Europe and those regions contiguous to the borders of the USSR. In this context, détente was viewed by the Brezhnev Politburo as a means of reducing the likelihood of conflict between the superpowers, thus freeing up Moscow’s resources and enabling the Soviets to turn their attention to developing their interests elsewhere.

Negotiating the ABM treaty The acceptance of the USSR as a power equal to the United States was an important Soviet objective of the détente process as a whole, just as the US recognition of Soviet strategic parity was undoubtedly at the forefront of the specific objectives which the Soviets had for the outcome of the SALT negotiations. The Soviets repeatedly refused to consider American proposals which would have sanctioned numerical superiority for the United States, and on several occasions during the talks reminded the Americans that neither country had a greater need for an agreement than the other.31 Other Soviet objectives which were related to ballistic missile defence almost certainly included denying the US an unlimited buildup in both ABM and MIRVed warheads while avoiding the impediment to the Soviet Union’s arms modernization that a ban on testing MIRVs would have created.32 In addition the military probably placed a high priority on preserving the maximum flexibility for research and development programmes33 including retaining some form of deployed ABM system, preferably around Moscow. The maintenance of even a limited ABM would have both provided some protection from the incipient missile threat posed by the People’s Republic of China and given Soviet troops practical experience with

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missile defence in case ABM proved more technically and politically viable in the future. The Soviet military was in a strong position to exercise influence over decisionmaking on SALT issues. Both an indication and a source of this influence was the considerable military presence in the Soviet SALT delegation which included representatives of the Defence Ministry, the General Staff and the defence industry. 34 The principal Soviet military delegates held high ranks, both in the military and in the Communist Party. For example, Colonel General Nikolai Ogarkov, a principal delegate for the first three sessions of SALT, was appointed first deputy chief of the General Staff in 1968, and was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee in 1966.35 The Soviet delegates were authorized to decide a number of lesser questions on a collegial basis without Moscow’s specific approval. 36 However, the Soviet leadership kept a close watch over the progress of the negotiations, as indeed did the Nixon administration, and members of the American delegation learned that any major new Soviet initiatives were presented shortly after the weekly (usually Thursday) meetings of the Politburo. 37 Several members of the American delegation noticed the marked compartmentalization of information among the Soviets. 38 In the course of the negotiations it became obvious that the civilian members of the Soviet delegation had little specific knowledge of their own weapons. Indeed, towards, the end of the negotiations the leader of the American delegation took his opposite number aside and explained the numbers of ballistic missilelaunching submarines which the Soviets had deployed, and the current rate of their construction. 39This division in responsibilities between foreign affairs and military personnel was a reflection of the situation in Moscow. The main locus of the work on the preparation of SALT positions was in the Ministry of Defence, to which was also reserved the initative in proposing direct limitations on weaponry. The civilian agencies, in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the staff of the departments of the Central Committee, had a larger role in developing Soviet responses to American initiatives.40 However, the scope of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ participation was apparently limited to the diplomatic and political aspects of the negotiations, including the drafting of proposal and treaty language, and the provision of a supplementary method of communication with the White House in the form of the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin.41

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During the SALT negotiations the Soviet political leadership apparently solicited the advice and analysis of both civilian and military organizations to a greater extent than had been the case in previous arms control talks, and SALT was reportedly responsible for the establishment of a joint Ministry of Defence–Ministry of Foreign Affairs working group in the late 1960s. The group was created to study SALT issues and draft positions for higher-level review, 42 and was the first and possibly the only institutionalized form of regular contact between defence and diplomatic staff. The convention of ad hoc bodies to recommend resolutions to difficult problems involving both defence and foreign policy interests was apparently the usual practice. 43 However, the actual influence of this working group, and the extent to which it increased the influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on SALT policymaking, is uncertain. The sharp divisions in access to specialized information on strategic weapons within the Soviet SALT delegation between diplomatic and military personnel indicates that inter-agency issues were still, for the most part, addressed at higher levels – probably in the Defence Council and the Politburo – and that members of the foreign affairs community continued to be excluded from playing a major role in issues involving technical questions. There were three major issues involved in the SALT negotiations which concerned ballistic missile defence: whether offensive or defensive weapons would be accorded primacy in the talks; the number and missions of any ABM systems which would be permitted; and the specific limitations on the components of those systems. Soviet positions on each of these issues were very consistent throughout the negotiations, which were conducted in seven separate rounds between November 1969 and May 1972. Each round lasted for several months at a time, and they were held alternately in Helsinki and Vienna. It was evident in the first round of SALT negotiations in November and December 1969 that the Soviets were primarily interested in obtaining an agreement on ballistic missile defence, although at that time the political leadership in Moscow had not yet decided that a broad arms control agreement with the United States was either possible or desirable. The opening statement made by the leader of the Soviet delegation, Vladimir Semenov, reiterated a number of arguments used by those in the West who favoured arms control. In particular Semenov acknowledged the existence of mutual deterrence and the fact that this condition is based on the ability of both the US and the USSR to inflict damaging retaliatory blows. 44 The strategic arms

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race was characterized as a futile method of pursuing security and ballistic missile defence in particular was described as a destabilizing factor.45 The eventual decision to combine a treaty restricting ABM with a less formal interim agreement on offensive weapons was apparently one which Moscow had considered and favoured for some time. In May and June 1970, the Soviets hinted through both informal contacts at the SALT negotiations and the Dobrynin–Kissinger channel that in light of the impasse which had developed on the offensive weapons negotiations (over whether or not to include US forward-based systems in Europe in the tally of the Americans’ strategic nuclear forces), the best chance of progress was in concentrating on an agreement on ABM alone, and postponing the question of offensive arms control. 46 The Soviet delegation eventually proposed this course of action formally in December 1970 at the third round of talks.47 The second major issue in the SALT negotiations which affected missile defences was how many, if any, ABM sites each country would be allowed to deploy and the nature of their missions. The possibility of a ban on missile defences was never ruled out by the USSR, but the Soviets’ clear preference was for an agreement which would allow them to maintain a deployed ABM system around Moscow. The American delegation’s April 1970 proposal limiting ABM to a single site for the defence of each country’s ‘National Command Authority’ (NCA) or capital was swiftly accepted by the Soviets. 48 When the US subsequently proposed a complete ban on missile defences the Soviets reaffirmed their preference for a single ABM site protecting the national capital. The USSR continued to adhere to this position in the face of subsequent American proposals, firstly to permit the United States to retain an ABM system protecting its ICBM launchers and secondly to give each country the opportunity to choose between defending either its NCA or one ICBM field. 49 Throughout the negotiations the Soviet delegation stressed the importance of numerical parity and homogeneity of purpose in any permitted ABM systems. In addition, the Soviets obviously believed that the protection of a country’s leadership was a stabilizing factor, and during the negotiations at least one Soviet official argued that the US should deploy an ABM defence around Washington.50 There was an exception to the Soviets’ emphasis on NCA defence, and it is an interesting one. Through contacts with their American counterparts in the course of the negotiations a number of Soviet military officials had become intrigued by the concept of hard-site defence,

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or using ABMs to defend ICBM launchers. By the fourth round of talks in the spring of 1971 there was an obvious division of opinion within the Soviet delegation on the most important mission for missile defence, with the military pointing out the advantages of hard-site defence and the civilians maintaining the primacy of the need to protect the capital.51 According to Dobrynin, this division was also present in Moscow as early as January 1971. 52 In addition to attempting to present options acceptable to the Americans, Soviet proposals which made provisions for hard-site defence for one or both sides may have reflected their own military’s interest in this concept. After he had returned to Washington from the 24th Party Congress in the spring of 1971, however, Dobrynin indicated to Kissinger that Moscow was no longer seriously considering hard-site defence, and that the USSR was committed to retaining an ABM system to protect its capital.53 While the Soviets obviously preferred to retain the Galosh ABM system to defend Moscow, a total ban on missile defences was evidently regarded as the second-best option if an acceptable agreement limiting ABM proved impossible to reach. Although a ban was offered in proposals by both the US and the USSR, it was not discussed seriously until the summer of 1971, when the question was raised by a Soviet official in an informal exchange with Raymond Garthoff, the general secretary of the US delegation.54 Informed of this sign of interest, Gerard Smith approached Semenov on the subject. Semenov replied that the Soviets would like to hear US proposals for a ban in more detail, and indicated that the USSR would be receptive. That same day another Soviet official approached an American informally and urged the US to raise the issue of a ban, saying that Moscow was interested in the possibility, and implying that the Soviets would respond positively. The possibility of a total ban was never explored fully by the Americans, however, who were deterred by Dobrynin’s indications to Kissinger that a ban would not be acceptable to Moscow. President Nixon decided definitely against a ban in August 1971, and the possibility was apparently not seriously discussed again during the negotiations.55 The third major issue which affected the negotiations on missile defences was the specific limitations to be placed on the systems which each side was permitted to deploy. Throughout the talks the Soviets were reluctant to agree to specific, detailed limitations to components of their ABM systems. During the first three rounds of talks, the members of the American delegation were struck by the lack of

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precision in Soviet statements about weapons, and their reluctance to confirm or deny deploying numbers and types of weapons which US intelligence attributed to them.56 One explanation for this reluctance is the frequently-noted Soviet aversion, particularly marked among the military, to discussing in detail the characteristics of their own weapons, lest defence secrets be inadvertently revealed. The dislike of specifying detailed limitations in arms control agreements is also consistent with the frequent Soviet emphasis on the spirit rather than the letter of such agreements. Indeed, Robin Ranger has suggested that the Soviets viewed arms control agreements as documents which solidify political understandings, rather than as technical means of controlling weapons development.57 In addition, Moscow may have been less concerned with spelling out details in the knowledge that an open and investigative American press and the need for Congressional approval for defence budgets would quickly make public any violations by the United States. It is very interesting, however, that the Soviet delegation was much more willing to discuss technical details after the 24th Party Congress in March 1971. The 24th Party Congress is considered the point at which the Soviets became seriously committed to reaching an agreement through SALT. Before the Congress, the Soviets’ avoidance of specificity may have reflected the lack of consensus among the ruling group in Moscow about the future of the negotiations. It was especially noticed that in the fifth round of talks, which were held from July through September 1971, the Soviets were negotiating with much greater precision than previously. (Another factor contributing to this change in behaviour may have been the July 1971 announcement that Nixon was soon to visit Beijing. This announcement probably stimulated the Soviets’ desire for progress in their relations with the United States.) The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems signed in May 1972 permitted the US and the USSR each to deploy two ABM systems, one for the defence of the national capital and the other to defend an ICBM field. (The number of permitted ABM sites was reduced to a single deployment for each country in the 1974 Protocol to the Treaty, which allowed each country to deploy its missile defence at either its NCA or an ICBM field.) The ABM Treaty and its associated Agreed Interpretations prohibited the deployment of a nationwide ballistic missile defence, as well as the deployment of permitted ABM systems within 1300 kilometres of each other. The number of ABM launchers and interceptors was limited to 100 at each site, and restrictions were placed on the size, power and location of radars with ABM

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capabilities, regardless of whether they are deployed as components of authorized ABM systems. Upgrading surface-to-air missile systems to perform an ABM role was prohibited, and the two countries agreed to limit the ABM capabilities of any missiles, launchers and radars not classified as missile defence components.58 The US and USSR undertook not to give early warning radars the capabilities of performing an ABM role, not to test them in an ABM mode and not to deploy them in future except at locations along the periphery of national borders and oriented outwards.59 The Soviet political and military leaders were probably satisfied with the agreement on missile defences with the exception of the leaders of the Air Defence Forces, who lost the prospect of overseeing a nationwide ABM system and had to accept severe restrictions on the ABM deployments which were permitted. Although the Treaty was far more detailed in specifying the capabilities of authorized ABM components than the Soviets would have preferred, it did provide for precise numerical parity in those ABM deployments which were allowed, and it prevented the US from expanding its Safeguard system into a thick area defence.60 The preservation of a Moscow missile defence system together with the authorization of continued development and testing of land-based ABM probably appeased those who wanted to keep open options for the future development of missile defences. The limitations on deployment would have helped allay the concerns of Brezhnev and his Politburo colleagues that money and manpower would be wasted on an unrestricted race in both offensive and defensive weapons which the Soviet Union was poorly equipped to win in the short term. The Soviets, then, accepted restrictions on an unpromising weapons system in exchange for the assurance that the Americans would not expand their ABM programme which would have appeared to the USSR to be greatly superior to their own. In addition, the ABM Treaty would have removed some of the impetus behind military pressure on the political leadership for high levels of funding for missile defences.

Conclusions The Brezhnev Politburo was still sceptical about the benefits of superpower arms control when in June 1968 Moscow agreed to begin negotiations with the United States to limit strategic nuclear weapons. Over the course of the next four years, however, a combination of domestic and international factors made the process of détente and arms control far more appealing to the Soviet leadership than the alternatives of

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high levels of tension in their relations with the United States and an unrestricted arms race. Some kind of formal limitations on each country’s strategic nuclear weapons deployments would introduce an element of stability and predictability into the superpower arms competition which would enable the USSR to avoid an open-ended commitment of resources to the defence sector. At the same time, progress on arms control was the price exacted by the Americans in exchange for the prospect of increased trading links with the West, which was seen by the Brezhnev leadership as the chief means of alleviating the Soviet economic decline after the possibility of significant reforms had been ruled out. The fruits of Willi Brandt’s Ostpolitik in Europe demonstrated that the détente process could bring real benefits to the USSR, while heightened tensions in the relationship with China and Moscow’s ambitions to exert its influence on a global scale meant that any improvement in superpower relations which would enable the USSR to devote its attention to threats and opportunities elsewhere would be a real advantage. The main focus of Soviet attention during the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty talks was on achieving agreement on limiting ballistic missile defence. By the time that the negotations began in late 1969 the Brezhnev Politburo was anxious to prevent the Nixon administration from following through on its declared intention of deploying an extensive ABM system using technology which was considerably more advanced than that incorporated in the troubled Galosh missile defence then partially deployed around Moscow. The clear Soviet preference throughout the SALT negotiations was for an agreement which combined limitations on deployment with sufficient flexibility to permit continued research and development into missile defence technology as a hedge against technological breakthroughs which might make anti-missile systems a more attractive option in the future. In this chapter we again see two familiar patterns in Soviet ABM policy and policy debates. First, missile defences were used by the political leadership as tools in their relations with Washington. The timing of the statements about ABM in Soviet publications to coincide with key points in the SALT negotiations and with the announcements of US ABM policy decisions makes it clear that these comments were being used to send signals to the Americans about the Soviets’ concerns, priorities and intentions. Second, expressions of interest in the concept of strategic and missile defences continued to be widespread among representatives of the armed forces, although such interest had to be expressed indirectly as it became clear that the political leader-

Arms Control Diplomacy 87

ship had decided to accept limitations on ABM in the arms control talks. The continuation of such support for missile defences is surprising given the strength and scale of anti-ABM statements during these years, and indicates the persistence of traditional views of strategy and future war among Soviet military officers.

5 Missile Defence and the Decline of Détente, 1972–9

In many ways Soviet ABM policy was at its least interesting stage during the years covered by this chapter. There was little visible interest in the issue, and the Soviet development and deployment effort continued quietly in the background. The USSR’s continuation of the research, development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence is somewhat surprising given the restrictions on such systems which Moscow accepted as part of the ABM Treaty. The Soviet tradition of emphasizing territorial defences only partially explains this decision. It was instead the consensus-seeking style of the Brezhnev Politburo and the strength of entrenched bureaucratic interests in the Soviet militaryindustrial complex which ensured that routine and gradual upgrading of the ABM system surrounding Moscow continued. Another surprising decision taken during these years was the approval given for the construction of a radar near the Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk. This radar was repeatedly the target of American claims of Soviet cheating and the Gorbachev leadership eventually acknowledged that the Krasnoyarsk radar did indeed violate the terms of the ABM Treaty. But the construction of the radar was the result of a failure of decisionmaking rather than malign intent on the part of the political leadership. The Politburo simply accepted the recommendation of the Defence Ministry that the radar should be built without subjecting the proposal to serious scrutiny. Another ABM development during the 1970s was the reconfiguration of the Galosh missile defence system around Moscow to imitate the short-lived American Safeguard ABM. The Soviet political leaders took this decision in spite of considerable opposition from their own scientists, who warned that the technique used in the American system was an inappropriate and even dangerous choice for a system intended to protect a densely populated area. This incident 88

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underlines the extent of the Soviet leadership’s obsession with the United States when it came to security issues.

Politics and policymaking during the Brezhnev period Leonid Brezhnev’s political power reached its peak during the mid1970s. His position in the leadership was strengthened by the defeat and removal from power of the last of his potential rivals in the Politburo: Piotr Shelest in 1973 and Aleksander Shelepin in 1976. The death of Marshal Grechko in 1976 removed from the scene a Defence Minister who had become overly vociferous both in his demands for ever-increasing resources for the military and in his reservations about détente with the West.1 Brezhnev’s position as ‘the recognized leader’ of the Soviet Communist Party was formally confirmed at the 25th Party Congress in the summer of 1976. 2 Finally, in 1977 Brezhnev added the Soviet Presidency and Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces to his titles. Although the Politburo arrived at decisions through consensus, Brezhnev’s views carried more weight in that forum than those of his colleagues. The domestic and foreign policies pursued by the Soviet Union during these years, therefore, reflected the priorities of the General Secretary. In the late 1970s, however, both the Soviet political and economic systems and the decisionmaking process itself descended into stagnation. The emphasis on consensus and stability meant that decisions on controversial issues were postponed, often repeatedly, unless and until a solution acceptable to the whole political leadership could be found. The ‘stability of cadres’ policy introduced in the mid-1960s achieved its aim of providing Party officials with reassurance and job security following the upheavals of the Khrushchev years, but that same security of tenure also resulted in an aging political elite, fixed in its ideas and approaches to problems. The situation was exacerbated by the declining physical health and deteriorating mental condition of the General Secretary himself. During the final years covered by this chapter the initiation of any new policy or the reconsideration of a previous decision was typically impeded by the need to obtain Brezhnev’s personal approval, although there were few, if any, obstacles in the path of the continuation of programmes already under way.3 An important feature of the policymaking climate during these years was the attempt by the leaders of the armed forces to gain greater influence over Soviet defence policy. The Brezhnev leadership gave

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senior officers considerable freedom to discuss issues related to military policy and to offer their advice.4 To an extent this was an extension of the practice of asking representatives of the armed forces together with other experts to advise on policy issues, with the aim of more ‘scientific’ decisionmaking. Military influence on defence policy was also enhanced by the expansion of Politburo membership in 1973 to include the Defence Minister, together with the heads of the KGB and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For the first time since Marshal Zhukov sat on the Politburo in the 1950s, the armed forces had a representative expressing the views and defending the interests of the military at the highest levels of policymaking. But although these practices gave the leaders of the armed forces greater opportunities to make their opinions known, when it came to sensitive issues likely to affect relations with other countries, such as détente, or on which the political leadership had well-defined views, such as increasing living standards in Soviet society, pressure from the armed forces for a change of policy would have been resisted. From the mid-1970s the Soviet political leadership was also more secure in its hold on power and therefore less concerned about offending the armed forces than had been the case in the late 1960s. The main area of dispute between the Soviet political and military leaderships during this period was the familiar and continuing struggle over the division of resources between the civilian and defence sectors of the economy. As we saw in Chapter 3, Khrushchev’s successors initially took great pains to placate the military as part of their campaign to avoid their predecessor’s mistake of alienating possible sources of support. Part of this strategy involved increasing the allocation of resources to the defence sector, although the greater priority given to defence also reflected the values and concerns of the new political leaders. According to CIA estimates, in the decade following Khrushchev’s ouster Soviet expenditures on defence increased annually by between 3 per cent and 5 per cent. But from 1976 until at least 1982, the annual rate of increase in Soviet defence spending declined to about two per cent, and there was virtually no growth in weapons procurement. Moreover, the total outlay for the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Air Defence Forces declined in absolute terms during most of this period.5 This suggests that there was no expansion of the Soviet ABM effort from the mid-1970s. Indeed, those involved in the research and development programme for missile defences may have had to fight off rival departments from within the Air Defence Forces to maintain their project at the existing level.

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This decline in the rate of growth of defence spending reflects the political leadership’s 1974 decision to constrain the Soviet defence budget.6 The decision to shift resources away from defence was included in the ‘peace programme’ Brezhnev presented to the 25th Party Congress in 1976, which stressed improvements in Soviet–US relations and indicated a higher priority for raising standards of living compared with military spending. 7 The main reason for the two-year delay in implementing the slowdown in defence spending was the staunch resistance of the Minister of Defence, Marshal Grechko, who was determined to maintain existing levels of resource allocations for the armed forces.8 The appointments of Dimitri Ustinov as Minister of Defence and Nikolai Ogarkov as Chief of the General Staff following Grechko’s death in 1976 were intended to create a leadership in the Defence Ministry which would accept and support the priorities of the political leadership on arms control, détente and the size of the military budget. Ustinov was a long-time friend of Brezhnev, a supporter of the General Secretary’s arms control policy and also had a background in the defence industry, rather than in the armed forces9. The fact that he did not have a strong institutional loyalty to the military, and his relative lack of clout among the top political leaders made Ustinov appear a good choice for a Minister of Defence to preside over the armed forces during a period of retrenchment. For his part, Ogarkov realized that the USSR could not meet the threat from high-technology weapons being developed in the West without some significant restructuring and strengthening of the Soviet economy. This in turn would require a reduction in the defence burden in the short term.10 The appointment of Ustinov, however, was not entirely successful in removing military pressure on the political leadership. The new Defence Minister rapidly acquired a sense of loyalty to the armed forces and did his best to defend their interests. Although Ustinov was not as effective as Grechko had been in this respect, Brezhnev’s declining health during the late 1970s provided the military leadership with increased opportunities to encroach on defence policy. 11 The later years covered by this chapter were characterized by an ongoing struggle between the leaders of the armed forces, in their attempt to gain more resources and greater influence over the direction of defence policy, and the political leadership, which stressed positive, less alarmist interpretations of the international situation in order to undermine the logic of the military’s arguments.12 During the mid-to-late 1970s, then, a combination of factors helps to explain the otherwise puzzling decision by the Soviets to continue

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research and development of missile defence technologies in spite of the considerable restrictions which the ABM Treaty placed on their deployment. From the mid-1970s the Soviet political system was characterized by: a cumbersome and bureaucratic decisionmaking process which raised the search for consensus to unprecedented heights; a political leader with considerable power but whose ability to use it was declining steadily; and a military leadership determined to fight for its share of the state’s limited resources. To complete this picture of the domestic political context shaping Soviet ABM policy decisions, it is necessary to add one further actor: the defence industry. The Soviet defence industry was the largest and most powerful component of the Soviet industrial sector. It comprised nine ministries and thousands of individual enterprises and employed millions of people. The supremacy of the defence sector was established by Stalin in the 1930s and continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union in spite of efforts by successive political leaders to downgrade it. The Soviet defence industry enjoyed access to the highest quality as well as the greatest quantity of resources, both human and material, and the alliance of the defence industry with the armed forces created a formidable interest group.13 The appointment of Dmitri Ustinov as Defence Minister strengthened the position of that entity. Ustinov’s background in that sector and his new position as head of the armed forces ensured that he would be an excellent spokesman in the Politburo for the militaryindustrial complex. So although no significant new ABM initiatives were likely to be approved during these years – because of the restrictions imposed by the ABM Treaty and the political leadership’s emphasis on constraining the weapons procurement budget, as well as the difficulties involved in introducing new policies – the continuation of routine research and development of missile defence technologies was a logical course of action. It provided both the defence industry and the armed forces with a consolation prize which did not require new expenditures and which would not involve the Soviets in disputes with the United States over ABM Treaty violations. Once the policy decision had been taken to continue modernizing the Galosh system around Moscow and research and development within the terms of the ABM Treaty, that decision was unlikely to be reversed or amended in the absence of a reason powerful enough to force the political leadership to reassess the situation. This same combination of factors also helps to explain one of the Soviet ABM policy decisions which Western observers found most mys-

The Decline of Détente 93

tifying: the siting of a large phased-array radar (LPAR) in the Krasnoyarsk region of Siberia.14 The radar at Krasnoyarsk was one of a network of nine intended to provide early warning against attack from ballistic missiles, but the location of the Krasnoyarsk site, far from the borders of the Soviet Union and with its antenna facing the interior of the country, contravened the terms of the ABM Treaty.15 Until the late 1980s Soviet officials insisted that the radar was intended for space tracking, which is permitted under the ABM Treaty, but Gorbachev’s Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze finally admitted that Krasnoyarsk was indeed a Treaty violation. For years analysts and policymakers in the West speculated about why the Soviets had chosen to build the forbidden radar, assuming either that the USSR deliberately violated the Treaty or that the Krasnoyarsk facility was intended to fill a gap in the Soviets’ early warning radar coverage, and was not, after all, intended to contribute to the Soviet Union’s missile defence capability.16 None of the Western theories about the Krasnoyarsk radar, however, was borne out by an account which emerged from the USSR during the late 1980s. According to this account, conveyed to an American journalist by unnamed Soviet officials in 1987, the Ministry of Defence planned the entire network of LPARs in the late 1960s. The Krasnoyarsk site was chosen over other sites simply ‘to save money’. Politburo approval for the construction of the network was given in the early 1970s, about the same time as the signing of the ABM Treaty. Defence Minister Ustinov did not mention the fact that the radar near Krasnoyarsk was a potential violation of the Treaty, and his colleagues in the political leadership apparently did not raise the issue.17 Although the Krasnoyarsk radar became a source of international dispute and helped to reinforce the Reagan administration’s claims that the Soviets were not trustworthy partners in arms limitation agreements, this account does not indicate an intention to violate the terms of the ABM Treaty at the Politburo level, with the exception of Ustinov, and his motives are unclear. Indeed, Ustinov himself may not have understood the implications of the siting of one of the radars in the planned network. According to this account, it was lower-ranking officials in the Defence Ministry who realized that Krasnoyarsk would violate the new agreement, and they planned to respond to American objections with counterclaims of US violations which would then, they hoped, be permitted to cancel each other out.18 This account demonstrates just how heavily-bureaucratized the Soviet political system was during the Brezhnev era. The Politburo was

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simply unable to monitor the fine points of every project under way and therefore relied heavily on officials in the relevant ministries to work out the details. This episode also illustrates the way in which Brezhnev’s leadership style favoured the continuation of projects already under way. Far from providing proof that the Soviets intended a large-scale and clandestine breakout of the ABM Treaty, the glasnostera revelations about the Krasnoyarsk radar indicates how easily important defence policy decisions could be taken without serious scrutiny during Brezhnev’s leadership.

Ballistic missile defence in Soviet strategic thought The existence of the ABM Treaty created a set of restraints both on Soviet missile defence policy and also on public discussion of missile defences in the USSR. By signing the ABM Treaty the Soviet leadership had committed themselves to observing strict limitations on the development and deployment of this weapons system. Although the Soviets were permitted to maintain and improve their deployed ABM system and to conduct research and development within the stated restrictions, no significant additional Soviet ABM effort could be expected while the Treaty was in effect. The Moscow summit in May 1972 therefore marked the end of public statements by the Soviet leadership about missile defences, apart from those made in support of the Treaty. Most military and civilian analysts followed this convention, which meant that it was unusual to find any explicit mention of missile defences in Soviet publications between 1972 and 1983, when Ronald Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ speech put ABM back on the agenda. After the ABM Treaty was signed Soviet political leaders also ceased to make public statements which might indicate adherence to a warwaging military strategy. Brezhnev’s speech in Tula in 1977 took this further by unequivocally disavowing any Soviet aspirations to military superiority, and renouncing the idea of victory in a nuclear war.19 This suggested that the Soviet political leadership recognized the existence of the condition of mutual assured destruction (MAD) between the superpowers. Brezhnev’s 1982 announcement that the Soviet Union would not be the first to use nuclear weapons was another indication that Soviet policymakers had accepted the primacy of the offensive in the era of nuclear weapons. 20 By the end of this period there was no longer any logical place for missile defences in the political leadership’s view of strategy for future war in the nuclear era.

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Discussions about ballistic missile defences in Soviet publications during this period fall into two distinct stages. During the first stage, which began with the signing of the ABM Treaty in May 1972 and continued through 1977, support for missile defences was expressed almost exclusively in the pages of Vestnik PVO, the monthly journal of the Soviet Air Defence Forces. Elsewhere the issue of Soviet ABM was either ignored entirely or treated as settled by the ABM Treaty. The second stage, beginning in 1978, saw references to ABM disappear completely from Soviet publications, but this was accompanied by a marked show of interest in the broad question of strategic defences, especially in the pages of the journal of the Institute of Military History, Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal. As was the case in previous periods, the analysts who participated in discussions about missile defences can be divided into two broad categories: traditionalists and progressives. Traditionalists could usually be found writing in the military press, and were often serving or retired officers. Their views were characterized by expectations about future war and the use of nuclear weapons which were first expressed during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Traditionalists expected future war to begin with a surprise nuclear strike by the enemy and they tended to stress the need for a damage-limiting capability, including extensive strategic defences, to ensure the survival and continued functioning of the Soviet armed forces, government, industry, economy and society. Supporters of a Soviet ABM capability were usually traditionalists, although traditionalists did not always explicitly or implicitly favour missile defences. Progressives tended to emphasize the beneficial effects of arms control and détente, the importance of using political rather than military means to solve international problems, and the senselessness of the open-ended accumulation of stocks of nuclear weapons. Progressives were most often civilians although this period marks the first appearance of progressive arguments from military officers. As we have seen in previous chapters, the discussions about missile defences in Soviet publications during this period indicate a relationship between support for ABM and service loyalties. Virtually the only explicit advocacy of missile defences in these years was found in the journal of the Air Defence Forces. But at the same time the traditionalist position continued to be expressed in a range of publications and by officers with other institutional affiliations. Although these analysts did not specifically declare support for ABM, their view of future war and strategy in the nuclear era contained a logical place for missile defences as a component in a combination of offensive and defensive

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forces. The debates about missile defences during these years were made in the context of a broader discussion about views of future war and the role of nuclear weapons. There was still a sizeable body of opinion within the armed forces which favoured traditional interpretations of strategy for future war despite the growing interest among military analysts in an offensive-dominated deterrence posture discussed in Chapter 4, as well as the recognition that future war against the West might have a conventional phase and that the use of nuclear weapons might even be avoided entirely.21 During the first of the two stages identified above, 1972–1977, there was a strong link between support for a Soviet missile defence capability and the traditional interpretation of how a future war would begin and be conducted. According to this interpretation, the opponent (that is, the United States and its NATO allies) was planning to begin a future war by surprise attack using nuclear missiles in an attempt to seize the initiative and gain the military and psychological advantages of striking the first blow. In order to foil these plans the USSR should be ready to launch a preemptive counterforce strike and must have in place extensive damage-limitation measures to protect the country and its armed forces from the strikes which could be inflicted by the range of offensive weapons available to the Western alliance. The argument here, made in various forms, was that missile defences had a role as one component in the network of measures to limit damage to the USSR in the event of attack by an enemy using nuclear missiles.22 A 1976 book by military theorist V.M. Bondarenko stressed the continued significance of the offensive–defensive dynamic in weapons development. Although Bondarenko did not explicitly advocate missile defences, his book did strongly imply support for the further development of ABM technology: If potential enemies possess weaponry for a mutual strike, then the side which first creates the means of defense against it receives a decisive advantage. The history of the development of military technology is full of examples in which a weapon that had seemed irresistible and intimidating after a certain time was opposed by a sufficiently relible means of defense.23 Although explicit support for a Soviet ABM capability was mainly limited to the pages of Vestnik PVO, this traditional view of future war and the enemy was more widespread and even enjoyed policy status. Through research in the East German military archives Beatrice Heuser has confirmed that Warsaw Pact planning included preemptive strikes

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against the enemy forces as late as 1982.24 Furthermore, foreign officers who studied at Soviet military academies in the 1970s have reported that they were instructed about the military uses of space and about the need for defences against attack from space.25 In sharp contrast to traditionalists in the armed forces who stressed the importance of continuing the arms race to ensure Soviet defence capability against hostile imperialist states, several civilian analysts during these years viewed the international situation very differently. Writing in the first 18 months after the signing of the ABM Treaty and SALT I, these analysts praised the agreements highly, and were optimistic about the benefits of arms control and détente for both the Soviet Union and the United States. They argued that the United States was interested in containing its own defence spending, and that the improvement in relations with Moscow was reducing the influence of hawks in Congress and the Pentagon. 26 Some analysts went much further than this, expressing views which later became incorporated into Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking some fifteen years later. Georgii Arbatov, for example, argued that East–West security relations in the era of arms control and détente was a positive-sum rather than a zero-sum game.27 Others stressed the importance of solving the problems of relations between socialist and capitalist states by using political rather than military means, and even suggested that an action-reaction cycle of restraint in offensive and defensive weapons might be possible.28 During the second stage of the discussions, which began in 1978, no explicit links were made between the traditionalist view of future war and missile defence capabilities. But although references to missile defences virtually disappeared from Soviet publications after 1977, there remained numerous expressions of elements of traditionalist views of future war and the intentions of the Soviets’ likely opponents in it. In the opinion of these analysts, who were writing mainly in Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, the imperialists were still planning to launch a surprise attack on a global scale against the socialist countries, which the armed forces of the USSR and its allies in the Warsaw Treaty Organization must be prepared to rebuff at a moment’s notice. 29 In contrast to the traditionalist views expressed before 1978, the emphasis in these articles was not on the limitation of damage to the USSR through the actions of the Air Defence Forces, but through the retaliatory strikes of the Strategic Rocket Forces. The timing of this development is probably related to Brezhnev’s 1977 Tula speech and to the changing views within the armed forces about the basis of deterrence.

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There was a rare direct reference to missile defences during this period in an article in Kommunist by Chief of the General Staff Marshal Ogarkov, in which Ogarkov suggested he was sympathetic to the need for a greater research and development effort into missile defence technologies. He invoked the image of the eternal interaction between offensive and defensive weapons, and asserted: This applies fully also to nuclear-missile weapons, whose creation and rapid growth impelled military-scientific thought and practice actively to work out means and measures of countering them.30 Although the Chief of the General Staff would have made a formidable spokesman for the pro-ABM lobby, this contribution by Ogarkov to the ABM debates is probably a product of his concern about the resource levels being allocated to defence and the neglect of the development of military technology, rather than a sudden conversion to the benefits of missile defences. During the mid-to-late 1970s, then, the advantages of a Soviet missile defence capability were being explicitly advocated by only a small minority of officers, most of whom were affiliated to the Air Defence Forces. Although the traditionalist view of strategy and future war was still being expressed, it was increasingly challenged by a concept of war prevention and war-waging which emphasized the primacy of offensive weapons. There was less value in a defence against strategic nuclear missiles if the favoured future war scenarios envisioned a secure second-strike retaliatory capability or indeed the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons altogether. The absence of a unified position in favour of missile defences, both between military and civilian analysts and also within the military, would have weakened the arguments made by the pro-ABM lobby to policymakers. Those who favoured a more substantial Soviet missile defence effort were not sufficiently numerous or strong enough to overcome the combined forces of the inertia and stagnation of the decisionmaking process, and the political leadership’s commitments to constraining defence expenditure and adhering to the ABM Treaty.

The international security climate The deterioration of superpower détente together with the continuation of a high level of tension between the USSR and the People’s Republic of China were important factors shaping the Soviets’ view of

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the international security environment during these years. As we have seen in previous chapters, Soviet attention was focussed most closely on the relationship with the United States and on US strategic policies. During the height of optimism about détente in the early 1970s, prospects for the continuation of good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States were evaluated very positively by Soviet analysts.31 But the honeymoon period did not last for long. In spite of the goodwill generated by the understandings reached at the Vladivostok summit in 1974, the negotiations for a SALT 2 agreement quickly became stalled in arguments over technical points. Although by 1979 terms for SALT 2 had been agreed it was doubtful that the US Congress would agree to ratify the new treaty. And even while the arms control talks were under way the United States continued to enhance the capabilities of its strategic nuclear forces, focussing on improving accuracy and reducing vulnerability to preemptive strikes. 32 Altogether during the period covered in this chapter, the United States under the leadership of Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter: developed the multiwarhead MX missile; converted its SLBM force to more accurate multi-warhead Poseidon missiles; continued the development of Trident; modernized the B-52 bomber force; developed cruise and Pershing 2 missiles; and continued research and development on the Stealth bomber. The strategic threat facing the Soviet Union from the United States and its NATO allies thus increased considerably during the 1970s, culminating in the December 1979 NATO decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe. 33 Soviet military analysts were quick to draw attention to the continuation of the strategic arms race on the part of the Americans, and proponents of missile defences argued that the hostile actions of the United States made an ABM capability vital for the USSR.34 The continuation of the American military buildup following the signing of SALT I was an important factor contributing to the Soviets’ disillusion with détente. As we saw in Chapter 4, the Soviet political leadership embraced arms control with the United States in part to make future superpower arms competitions more stable and predictable. But in order to make the agreement acceptable to sceptics in both countries, limitations were set at levels too high to achieve that goal. The Soviets wanted in particular to avoid restrictions on their development of MIRV technologies, although they paid the price for that in the years that followed, when the Americans forged ahead in precisely that area.

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Détente failed to live up to Soviet expectations in other ways as well. Brezhnev and his Politburo colleagues had hoped to expand trade with Western countries, and especially with the United States, in order to alleviate the effects of the Soviet economic decline. In July 1972 the United States agreed to sell wheat to the USSR, and in October of that year a general economic agreement was signed between the two countries which included the granting of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trading status to the Soviet Union following the approval of Congress. In 1973, however, the Jackson–Vanik amendment was attached to the Trade Reform Bill, making increased Jewish emigration from the USSR a condition for MFN status. Moreover, in September 1974 the Stevenson amendment limited Export-Import Bank credit to the USSR. When the Trade Reform Bill was finally signed by Gerald Ford in January 1975, the Soviets refused to comply with its terms, regarding any benefits it would bring as extremely limited and at the unacceptable cost of American interference in Soviet domestic affairs. During the first SALT negotiations the Brezhnev Politburo also expected that improved relations with the United States would enable the USSR more easily to expand its influence in the world. But the Soviets found that Washington was not willing to step aside for them. In the Middle East the Americans repeatedly excluded the USSR from playing a role in any peace process. Brezhnev’s proposal for a joint US–Soviet peacekeeping force following the Yom Kippur War in 1973 was rejected by Richard Nixon, who furthermore initiated a worldwide nuclear alert in response to Brezhnev’s intention of sending in a Soviet force. The most significant Arab–Israeli agreement reached during the 1970s was the Camp David accord of 1978, brokered by President Carter without any Soviet involvement. Soviet influence in the Middle East was dealt a major blow when Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat demanded the withdrawal of Soviet military advisers in July 1972 and then proceeded to draw ever closer to the United States. Egypt had been Moscow’s most important ally in the region, and Sadat’s defection left the Soviets to search – ultimately unsuccessfully – for a replacement. Although the USSR turned to other countries, such as Syria, Libya and Iraq, it was never able to find an ally of sufficient strength and political stability to make up for the loss of Egypt. In the years following the SALT I agreement the Soviets were particularly active in the Third World, supporting the regimes and factions of its choice by offering military advisers, Cuban troops and Soviet-made weapons. During these years the USSR was involved in the civil war in Angola, the war between Ethiopia and Somalia, and North Vietnam’s

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defeat of South Vietnam and its subsequent invasion of Cambodia, as well as conflicts in South Yemen, Mozambique, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Afghanistan. Moscow was not able to ensure secure areas of Soviet influence in Africa, and gained little from the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua.35 The expansion of Soviet client states in the Third World, which appeared to Washington to be significant gains for the Soviets, actually contributed to the USSR’s long-term foreign policy problems. The Soviets found themselves locked into support for Vietnam, which proved to be a difficult and uncontrollable ally whose invasion of Cambodia cost the USSR dearly in its relations with other states in south-east Asia. The Soviets’ December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan similarly undermined Moscow’s efforts to portray itself as the friend and champion of Islamic states. The Soviet Union paid high political and economic prices for the more assertive foreign policy pursued in the 1970s. Indeed, the image of an expansionist and aggressive Soviet Union was used to justify the very weapons buildups, particularly by the United States, which increased the military threat to the USSR. The fourth major benefit which Soviet political leaders expected from détente was the prevention of a Sino–American accord and thus the reduction in the threat posed by China. In this area, too, Moscow was disappointed. As we saw in Chapter 4, the Nixon administration made overtures to Beijing even while détente with the Soviet Union was being constructed. In the years following the signing of the SALT I agreement Washington’s links with Beijing continued to expand, with diplomatic relations established and a trade agreement signed in 1979. Most-Favoured Nation trading status, which Moscow had found so desirable and so elusive, was granted to China in 1980. Meanwhile Moscow’s relations with Beijing continued to be tense, in part as a result of Soviet support for Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. The death of Mao, the reinstatement of Deng Xiaoping and the introduction of economic reforms in China all took place without any improvement in relations with the USSR. During the late 1970s tension between the two Communist countries remained at a high level. The Soviets continued their military buildup in the Far East with the deployment of SS-20 missiles aimed at China, while Beijing began buying modern defence equipment from Western Europe.36 The Chinese nuclear weapons capability developed at a slow but steady rate, with regular tests and the gradual introduction of a small ICBM force capable of reaching Moscow.37 Although during the height of détente the Soviet political leadership was unlikely to sanction a significant increase in the USSR’s ABM

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programme, by the late 1970s the logic of external events would seem to dictate a renewed missile defence effort for the Soviet Union. The military threat from the Western alliance increased considerably and tensions between the Communist neighbours remained high. With détente in tatters, Moscow would not have been deterred from expanding its missile defence programme by the damage that such a policy shift would do to superpower relations. Moreover, the chances that a renewed Soviet ABM effort would spark a defensive arms race with the United States had never been smaller: by 1976 the US had dismantled the Safeguard site at Grand Forks and funding for missile defence research and development had been greatly reduced. Yet what would seem to be ideal international conditions for the Soviets to surge ahead in ABM development and deployment clearly did not lend sufficient weight to the arguments of the missile defence enthusiasts, indicating the need to look elsewhere – in particular at domestic political factors – to explain Soviet ABM policy during these years.

Soviet ABM technology During this period the Soviets continued to make incremental improvements to the Galosh ABM system deployed around Moscow while also exploring avenues which might prove useful for missile defences in the future. This pattern of activity was detected through Western intelligence and arms control monitoring measures, and confirmed in some instances by Soviet officials in the late 1980s. Arthur Alexander’s hypothesis of the importance of the bureaucratization of the system during the Brezhnev era has a great deal of explanatory value for Soviet ABM policy during the years covered in this chapter. Once the political leadership had set the general guidelines – to continue missile defence research and development within the boundaries established by the ABM Treaty – the programme moved forward under its own momentum, without close scrutiny by the political leaders unless their attention was drawn to the project by some extraordinary event. Research and development into possible missile defence technologies during these years focussed on improvements to the Galosh ABM system, the upgrading of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to give them ABM capabilities, and research into more exotic technologies, such as lasers, which could have missile defence applications. The only one of these three areas which unambiguously had ABM capabilities was the

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Galosh system. The 1974 protocol to the ABM Treaty reduced the number of ABM systems each side was permitted to deploy from two to one and halved the number of interceptor launchers to 100. During the 1970s the Soviets made no attempt to deploy the total permitted number of ABM launchers but instead focussed their attention on improving the existing system. Between 1972 and 1976 some 55 Soviet ABM test launches were reported, including tests of high-acceleration missiles which used more advanced (inertial and infrared) guidance systems than the Galosh. 38 During 1978–80 half of the 64 deployed Galosh launchers were dismantled, and the above-ground launchers began to be replaced with underground silos. 39 This step alone represented a significant improvement in reducing the interceptors’ vulnerability. In 1990 Soviet ABM designer Grigorii Kisun’ko revealed that even the technical aspects of the USSR’s missile defence system were influenced by the Kremlin’s obsession with the United States and US policy decisions. Kisun’ko reported that the technology and configuration of the American system so impressed the ‘political dilettantes’ in the Soviet leadership that ‘in the beginning of the 1970s it was hit upon to “perfect” the system of ABM around Moscow according to the type of the American system “Safeguard”…’ 40 The designer denounced the folly of such blind imitation of a US weapons system and argued that, while a system employing an endoatmospheric nuclear-armed interceptor might be appropriate for the defence of ICBM silos (Safeguard’s mission), it was a disastrous choice for a system such as the one around Moscow, which was intended to protect a densely populated area. Such a defence could cause more death and destruction than the offensive missiles it was designed to counter.41 Kisun’ko’s account indicates the powerful influence which American actions could have on Soviet ABM policy decisions. The choice of the direction and configuration of the modifications to the Moscow ABM system was made primarily in response to American actions, even against the dictates of common sense. Fundamental differences in the missions of the two systems were apparently ignored in the belief that whatever the Americans were developing must be superior and therefore should be imitated. In the course of the improvements made to the Moscow ABM system, the radars on which the system depended were also upgraded. The Dog House and Cat House radars which supported the original version of the Galosh system were replaced by the faster and more efficient large phased-array radars (LPARs), capable of detecting and tracking many objects simultaneously. The LPARs, and in particular

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the enormous ‘Pillbox’ radar, would perform the battle-management tasks of identifying incoming warheads and the points at which they would strike the earth, assigning targets to the interceptors and transmitting information to the ABM radars. 42 This network of LPARs included the controversial Krasnoyarsk radar, although Soviet officials denied until 1989 that it was part of the early warning network. Soviet efforts to upgrade surface-to-air missiles to give them the capability to hit ballistic missiles as well as aircraft were focussed on the SA5, a highly modified version of the Griffon missile which appeared briefly in the early 1960s. In 1973 and 1974 the SA-5’s radars were reportedly tested about 50 times in conjunction with strategic ballistic missile flights.43 Although the missile probably did have some ABM potential, it was limited by its comparatively modest acceleration rate and its vulnerability to saturation by decoys or multiple warheads due to its mechanically steered radars. 44 By 1981 the US Department of Defense evidently regarded any ABM capability of the SA-5 as negligible, and began describing the missile as a long-range anti-aircraft interceptor.45 While the Soviets did not manage to acquire an ABM capability by improving their anti-aircraft missiles, Moscow’s continuous efforts at SAM upgrading provides a further indication of the strength of the forward momentum generated by development projects, once set in motion. The case of attempting to develop an ABM capability using antiaircraft missile technology can be traced back to the abortive Griffon system which was partially deployed near Leningrad in the early 1960s. In spite of the enormous technical difficulties involved in pursuing missile defence capabilities by this route, and a history of past failures, this aspect of the Soviet ABM effort managed to survive. Although the strongest Soviet interest in missile defence technologies was observed in developing ground-based components designed to intercept a warhead in the final stages of its flight, the Soviet ABM effort also included research into advanced technologies with possible missile defence applications in the earlier boost and post-boost phases. Beginning in the late 1970s US Department of Defense officials began to assert that the Soviets were making large investments in the military applications of directed energy, especially lasers, although they were sceptical that this research would lead to practical results. 46 By 1980 the Soviets reportedly had over six major research and development facilities for high-energy laser development, including test ranges and, and more than 10 000 scientists and engineers at work. 47 Soviet research into the military applications of particle beams is believed to

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have been under way during the 1970s, and Soviet interest in radiofrequency or electromagnetic pulse weapons to provide defence against missiles was noted by US officials from 1979.48

Conclusions In many respects the late 1970s would have been the perfect time for a significant expansion in the Soviet ABM effort. There was an increase in the nuclear missile threat to the Soviet Union posed by China as well as by NATO. The United States was demonstrating a marked lack of interest in pursuing missile defences, thus greatly reducing the danger of a costly and possibly unwinnable race in defensive weapons technology. And the benefits of the détente process had turned out to be far fewer than Brezhnev and his Politburo colleagues had anticipated during the SALT negotiations. By the end of the 1970s there was very little point in refraining from ABM policy decisions to which the Americans would object in order to preserve détente. In addition, there continued to be widespread interest among Soviet military analysts in traditionalist views of future war which included the need to limit damage to the territory inflicted by nuclear missiles, indicating that there were advocates of an expanded Soviet ABM effort within the armed forces. But policy advice from the Soviet armed forces was divided on the subject of missile defences. Although some officers continued to adhere to a traditionalist view, others were convinced that offensive weapons had achieved primacy in the nuclear age and that a state of mutually assured destruction existed between the superpowers. Individual leaders, most notably Brezhnev, evidently agreed, and the Soviet political leadership as a whole was committed to abiding by the 1972 ABM Treaty. But the most convincing explanation for the Soviets’ failure vigorously to pursue missile defences during the late 1970s lies not in arguments about nuclear strategy or in political commitments to international treaty obligations, but in the conditions of the policy process itself. By that time Soviet politics and policymaking had ossified to such an extent that any deviation from pre-existing policies was difficult if not impossible in the absence of some extreme stimulus. The essential elements of Soviet missile defence policy had been determined shortly after the ABM Treaty was signed in May 1972: the Soviets would continue to conduct research, development and deployment of missile defences within the terms of the Treaty. By the late 1970s Brezhnev’s power within the Soviet political system had

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so increased that his approval was required for any new course of action or major policy change. Ironically Brezhnev was so mentally and physically incapacitated by that time that he was unable to give that approval, ensuring that Soviet ABM policy continued on a course of methodical upgrading of the Galosh system deployed around Moscow combined with the incremental exploration of alternative ABM technologies.

6 The Second Cold War and the Threat of SDI, 1980–5

During the early 1980s the Soviet Union lacked effective political leadership, particularly in the area of security. The rapid succession of three seriously ill General Secretaries meant that any policy initiatives were sporadic and inconsistent. Leonid Brezhnev was capable of very little in the last few years of his life. Although Yuri Andropov had his own policy agenda, his attention was focussed primarily on reform in domestic politics, and even there he had little time before his failing health prevented him from acting on his intentions. Konstantin Chernenko’s brief regime represented an attempt to preserve the status quo ante as far as possible. As the political leadership grew weaker, the armed forces became more prominent in security policy, but in contrast to the mid 1950s, this combination did not result in a vigorous ABM programme. By the time that the Americans were once again posing a serious technological challenge in the shape of Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the Soviet military was seriously divided on the issue of missile defences. The discussion of SDI in the Soviet press reveals not only the extent of Soviet alarm about many aspects of the American project, but also the absence of a policy or even a consensus about how the USSR should respond to it.

Politics and policymaking during the interregnum The political and economic stagnation which began in the late 1970s deepened during the final years of Brezhnev’s life and the brief period when the USSR was under the control of Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko. As we saw in Chapter 5, although policies, once approved, tended to create their own forward momentum, any policy changes had come to depend on the personal decisions and 107

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interventions of the General Secretary at the very time when Leonid Brezhnev was becoming least able to exercise that power. The nuclear scientist Roald Sagdeev depicted Soviet bureaucracy in the early 1980s as stagnating and virtually paralyzed, with government officials unable to get decisions taken on pressing issues.1 During the early 1980s the practices introduced by the Brezhnev leadership became deeply entrenched. This can be seen, for example, by looking at the practice of emphasizing security of tenure for senior bureaucrats. Stability of personnel in senior Party posts continued and, indeed, was carried to unprecedented and even absurd lengths: at the 26th Party Congress in February 1981 the entire memberships of both the Politburo and the Central Committee’s Secretariat were re-elected without a single change.2 Andropov did manage to make some personnel changes at the senior levels of the Party before ill health forced him to retire from an active role in politics in August 1983, but the Politburo and Secretariat were still overwhelmingly dominated by long-serving and elderly officials by the time that Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary in March 1985.3 The lack of an effective Soviet leadership was especially notable in the field of security policy. The Politburo’s efforts tended to be directed primarily at ameliorating the domestic problems facing the Soviet Union. Andropov attempted to tackle some aspects of the Soviet Union’s economic decline, chiefly through campaigns intended to reduce corruption and alcoholism and tighten up discipline in the workplace in order to improve productivity. The effects of these campaigns and of the limited experiments with greater autonomy for industrial enterprises were partial and short-lived, but Yuri Andropov did at least have an agenda for his leadership and made efforts to see policy changes implemented while his health permitted. The absence of such a programme for change on the part of Konstantin Chernenko was seen as a virtue by his colleagues in the Politburo, who chose him to be next General Secretary in order to protect their own positions from the effects of any significant reforms. If domestic concerns occupied the greater part of the political leadership’s attention during the early 1980s, then much of their remaining efforts were focussed on coping with the most pressing of foreign policy issues, such as defusing the economic and political crisis in Poland (and, even more important, preventing repercussions from reaching the USSR and threatening the position of the Soviet ruling elite) and trying the manage the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan. Although each of the three General Secretaries who ‘governed’ the USSR during

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this period committed himself to continuing the policy of détente and superpower arms control, none was willing or able to depart significantly from Soviet proposals and statements honed over the years. In short, not one of the Soviet Union’s political leaders during the early 1980s was able to come up with policies which were new and innovative enough to revive a moribund process and meet the challenges posed by the Reagan administration. This period saw a continuation of the trend introduced early in the Brezhnev leadership towards making greater use of a range of experts to advise the Politburo, but the precise role of civilian analysts in defence policymaking during this period is uncertain and it is likely that representatives of the armed forces continued to play a dominant role in this field. Leading civilian analysts from the research institutes, such as Georgii Arbatov, were regularly invited to provide the political leadership with analysis of foreign policy issues and were often sent abroad on public relations missions. But the extent of their involvement in policy decisions which touched on issues of national security is likely to have been very limited, and there is no evidence that restrictions on the availability of sensitive information were eased during these years. Andropov was said to have been searching for an institutional alternative to the General Staff as a source of defence policy advice and analysis during his brief period as Soviet leader, which indicates that no such satisfactory alternative existed by the early 1980s.4 The leaders of the Soviet armed forces continued to disagree fundamentally with the political leadership over the direction of security policy as well as the ordering of priorities for resource allocations at home. Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko were all firm in their support for détente and arms control with the United States in spite of the clear indications of serious decline in east–west relations. The political leadership was also adamant in its commitment to raising living standards for the Soviet people. But the military leadership continued to press for even more resources to be devoted to defence in line with their gloomier interpretation of international events. The Chief of the General Staff Marshal Ogarkov argued vigorously in favour of more resources for the armed forces in the light of the decline of détente, the American military buildup initiated by the Carter administration and the NATO decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe.5 The paralysis of the political process at the highest levels weakened the political leadership and gave the armed forces an opportunity to enlarge the scope of their influence on policy and thus to further their

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own agendas. This opportunity was enhanced by the election in 1980 of Ronald Reagan to the US Presidency. Reagan’s uncompromisingly harsh anti-communist and anti-Soviet rhetoric shocked many senior Party figures, recalling the early years of the Cold War and providing the most favourable atmosphere for some time for the arguments of the Soviet high command for more emphasis on defence capabilities.6 The introduction of a new American military threat from March 1983 in the shape of Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) considerably increased the pressure on the General Secretary and his colleagues to increase the level of resources allocated to defence. The fact that the Soviets did not embark on a major programme of new defence expenditure in the face of both internal and external pressures to do so demonstrates the strength of the leadership’s commitment to the priority of the civilian sector and to raising living standards in the USSR. The Polish crisis of the early 1980s reinforced the Soviet political leaders’ concern for satisfying the economic aspirations of the population in the cause of domestic stability.7 The continued and progressive decline in Soviet economic growth, which might have been exacerbated further by increasing the defence burden, provided another excellent reason for the Politburo not to expand the Soviet defence sector. Soviet economic growth during the second half of the 1970s was estimated at 3.9 per cent per year, 8 and by 1980 the rate had dropped to about 2 per cent. 9 Thirdly, as we will see later in this chapter, the leaders of the armed forces themselves could not agree on what steps to take to counter the new threat posed by Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ project. This lack of consensus on the relative importance of a renewed Soviet missile defence effort (compared with the development of high-technology conventional weapons) considerably weakened the military’s case for a significantly greater share of the Soviet Union’s limited resources. Moreover, by late 1984 the military’s window of opportunity for exercising greater influence over Soviet security policy was closing as Mikhail Gorbachev strengthened his position as the next General Secretary and began to play a more significant role in policymaking.

Ballistic missile defence in Soviet strategic thought Initially references to missile defences in Soviet publications continued to be constrained by the political leadership’s commitment to the ABM Treaty. As we saw in Chapter 5, this meant that references to missile

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defence systems effectively disappeared from Soviet military literature and only surfaced in other publications when the author was expressing support for the Treaty. There was similarly a continuation in the Soviet military’s interest in deterrence which relied on a second-strike retaliatory capability as well as in the possibility of any war between the major alliances being confined to a conventional phase only. US President Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ speech of March 1983 marked a return to open discussion of missile defences in Soviet publications, although references to ABM systems were made almost exclusively in the context of expressing opposition to the American Strategic Defense Initiative. The analysts who participated in the discussions of this period fall into the familiar categories based upon their attitudes towards nuclear weapons and future war which we have encountered in previous chapters: traditionalists and progressives. Traditionalists tended to be found among officers writing in the military press and stressed the continuing need for a damage-limiting capability while progressives tended to be civilians who emphasized the importance of deterrence in preventing warfare and the use of nuclear weapons. As was the case in Chapter 5, virtually the only explicit advocacy of missile defences made during this period was found in the journal of the Air Defence Forces. But at the same time the traditionalist position – which contained a logical place for missile defences – continued to be expressed in a range of publications and by officers with other institutional affiliations. The series of articles in Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal discussed in Chapter 5 which focussed on strategic defence continued through 1984. As we have seen, in this series military analysts used examples from history, mainly the Soviet Union’s experiences in the Second World War, to draw attention to the importance of the defensive. These articles show significant continuities with the traditionalist view of future war. Several of the authors discuss the need to prepare for strategic defence in advance of the outbreak of a war, with the worstcase scenario that the USSR’s future enemy would launch a surprise attack reminiscent of Operation Barbarossa in 1941. 10 The combined forces approach was widely favoured, although there were differences of opinion regarding how strategic defence should be accomplished in an age of nuclear weapons. 11 Although conceptions of what constituted strategic defence were evidently changing during the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was still support among military analysts for a defence capability including damage-limitation, which would leave the door open for missile defences as one of its components.

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There was a return to the open discussion of missile defences in Soviet publications following Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ speech. Subsequent Soviet references to ABM were, however, made exclusively in the context of SDI and uniformly expressed opposition to the American programme. As was the case for the responses to the earlier American ABM programmes in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the published statements about SDI were clearly the result of an orchestrated campaign which drew on a common set of themes. Spokesmen were drawn from a variety of backgrounds, including scientists and officials as well as academics, civilian researchers and military officers. The anti-SDI campaign was set in motion by Andropov in an interview in Pravda shortly after Reagan’s speech, where the Soviet leader warned that the Americans would continue to modernize their offensive forces while developing an ABM system in order to acquire the capability to launch a disarming first strike against the USSR. 12 This was among the most frequently-used arguments, and it was widespread in both the civilian and the military press.13 The argument that Washington was in pursuit of a disarming first-strike capability often included references to the deployment of INF weapons in Western Europe.14 There were a number of points made in the Soviet discussions about the American Strategic Defense Initiative which focussed on the economic consequences of the project. Many analysts drew attention to the expense involved in the research and development for a space-based system of missile defences. 15 Some who made this point went into great detail about the likely costs of SDI, citing US publications and statements by American officials for added emphasis. One such article in the military press focussed on the planned twelvefold increase American spending on research and development for space-based laser systems and on the reported trillion dollar price tag of a space-based antimissile system,16 while another drew attention to the significant increases in US annual spending on space developments compared with the growth in the US military budget as a whole.17 These analysts were clearly drawing attention to the scale of the US effort in order to urge policymakers not to fall behind the West in this field of weapons development. There were other cases, however, where attention was drawn to the high costs of the American programme to warn of the Reagan administration’s intention of exhausting and weakening the Soviet economy by forcing Moscow to engage in a costly tit-for-tat arms race in space. This was obviously an argument against Moscow succumbing to such a

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temptation and blindly imitating American actions. Although one would expect this argument to be made by progressives, it was also made by some traditionalists such as Colonel E. Ribkin, whose contribution to the debates on political-strategic issues related to ABM in the mid-1960s places him in that category. Ribkin described SDI as one component in the Americans’ broad strategy for the destruction or weakening of the USSR and the other socialist countries,18 and asserted that the US was developing a range of new weapons, including spacebased defences, which were intended to enable the Americans to achieve a devastating surprise first strike against the USSR following the exhaustion of the Soviets in a new round of the arms race. 19 The fact that this argument was used by analysts on both sides of the traditionalist–progressive divide suggests that, at this stage, even some traditionalists were wary of the economic consequences to the Soviet Union of following the Americans into the realm of space-based defences. Many of those who participated in the debates about SDI focussed on the project’s implications for the arms race, warning that it would be the catalyst for a new spiral in the superpower weapons competition. Colonel V. Chernyshev thus asserted that the development of SDI ‘will lead only to an expansion of the arms race according to the law “action generates counter-action”’. 20 In a variation on this theme others expressed the concern that SDI would result in the militarization of space.21 The adverse effect of SDI on the ABM Treaty also received attention, with warnings that the American programme would undermine the Treaty.22 A distinction should be made between arguments presented thus far, which were directed at the specific characteristics of the American programme, and those which contained the most devastating and comprehensive criticism of all: that SDI would undermine the existing strategic stability. Those who made this argument were addressing the fundamental principles behind missile defences, and their comments could just as well be levelled at the Soviet ABM effort as at the Americans’ initiative. G. Gerasimov, who had been one of the most vocal opponents of ABM in the debates of the 1960s and 1970s, couched his criticism of SDI in terms which addressed the preemptive strike, counterforce strategy characteristic of the traditionalist view of the appropriate preparations for nuclear war. Gerasimov argued, ‘antimissile defence can do almost nothing for a country subjected to a nuclear surprise attack; it most suits an attacking country trying to reduce the strength of a retaliatory strike’.23 Similarly, Alexei Arbatov of

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the Institute of World Economy and International Relations questioned the definition of ‘defence’ in the nuclear weapons age, and concluded that it lay with a retaliatory capability: Given the accumulated arsenals of nuclear weapons, defense is not primarily based on the capability for direct protection against these weapons, but on the capability to inflict an annihilating counterstrike in the event of an opponent’s attack. The means of protection turn into their very opposite, that is, they serve the purpose of aggression inasmuch as they are able to degrade or neutralize the counterstrike of the side that has been subjected to an attack.24 Most of the pieces in Soviet publications which discussed missile defences during this period focussed on political and strategic issues. There were a few articles which referred to technical issues relating to missile defences before Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ speech in March 1983 and chiefly provided updates on the status of research into ABM technologies abroad.25 But the most significant discussion of technical issues during this period was conducted with reference to the Strategic Defense Initiative. There was a clear division among those who referred to technical issues between those who emphasized problems specific to the Strategic Defense Initiative and those who stressed the weaknesses of missile defences per se. Arguments against SDI which used technical issues specific to the American programme were very qualified, and could conceal an interest in missile defence capabilities for the USSR. For example, the early claims by the Reagan administration that the American space-based antimissile system would be ‘absolutely impregnable’ were often derided.26 But then Soviet ABM supporters had never argued that missile defences must be ‘absolute’ or leak-proof in order to be worthwhile. Apart from the exaggerated claims for Soviet missile defence capabilities made in the Khrushchev period, those who expressed interest in ABM usually did so on the assumption that missile defences would be one component in a larger system of strategic defences. The link between qualified criticism of SDI based on characteristics unique to that programme and interest in improving the Soviet missile defence effort is borne out by the ways in which those who made such remarks suggested that the Soviet Union should respond to the American programme. Criticism of specific features of SDI was often accompanied by the assertion that the Soviets would defeat Washington on its own terms. Thus Colonel G. Lukava, who criticized

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the Americans for planning to use space for military purposes, also quoted Defence Minister Marshal Ustinov’s statement that the USSR was being forced to create corresponding modern weapons systems to prevent the US from attaining superiority in this field. 27 In similar fashion Colonel E. Buynovskii and L. Tkachev both stressed the technical impossibility of developing SDI and warned that the Soviets would not permit themselves to be inferior in laser weaponry.28 By contrast, those who pointed out the weaknesses inherent in missile defences of any sort were making arguments which could be extended to the Soviet ABM effort. Thus it was asserted that ‘there are no effective defensive measures in a nuclear war’ 29 and that it was impossible for either superpower to attain a disarming first-strike capability.30 The emphasis was on the unsuitability of missile defences for ensuring protection – including protection from a retaliatory strike launched by the victims of a preemptive strike – given the enormous size of the nuclear arsenals possessed by each of the superpowers. These discussions of missile defences and SDI indicate a closer correlation between service affiliations and views about missile defences than was found in some of the previous chapters. But although explicit support for a Soviet ABM capability was largely confined to the pages of the Air Defence Forces journal, adherence to the traditionalist view of the most suitable strategy for future war continued to be expressed more widely in the armed forces. This indicates that many Soviet military analysts still saw a role for ABM in a combined offensive and defensive force posture, even in the face of growing interest in an offensive-dominated deterrence, and in scenarios for future war which did not involve nuclear weapons. And while some analysts tended to put forward arguments against SDI which were sweeping in their condemnation of any form of missile defence, the very qualified criticisms which others, particularly military analysts, made of the American Strategic Defense Initiative also suggests a continued interest in missile defences within the Soviet armed forces.

The international security climate During the early 1980s the international security environment was a very hostile one from Moscow’s point of view. The Soviet Union was suffering the consequences of the foreign policy line and military buildup which it had pursued throughout the 1970s. On every side the Soviets saw their influence in the world declining and the actions of

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the USSR portrayed in the most unflattering light. There was a continued (and in some cases, a dramatic) increase in the military threat to the Soviet Union posed by the Americans and their allies in Western Europe as well as by the Chinese, while many countries which were not capable of threatening the USSR militarily used the diplomatic means at their disposal to demonstrate their displeasure with Moscow’s policies. As we have seen so often in the past, centre stage was occupied by relations with the United States. The Carter administration adopted a much tougher approach towards Moscow following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. In March 1980 the US created a Rapid Deployment Force intended mainly for use against Soviet forces or their proxies in the Third World. 31 A few months later the US adopted Presidential Directive 59 revising the American nuclear war plan and introducing a ‘countervailing’ strategy including plans to target Soviet command and control facilities. The Soviets – in particular the Soviet high command – viewed it as an attempt by Washington to gain a first-strike capability.32 The perception that the US was pursuing military superiority was reinforced by President Carter’s decision in 1980 to initiate a serious buildup of strategic weapons including the MX intercontinental ballistic missile. The results of the November 1980 US presidential election made a bad international security environment even worse. During his first term in office Ronald Reagan’s anti-Soviet rhetoric was harsh and uncompromising, and it was reflected in US policy decisions. Although the Reagan administration did make some attempts to pursue better relations with the USSR during the early 1980s, for example through occasional personal letters from the President to the General Secretary and in private talks between the Soviet Ambassador to the US and the US Secretary of State, these efforts were very subtle. They were at odds with, and ultimately drowned out by, the steady barrage of condemnation which Washington directed at Moscow. A substantial component of Reagan’s crusade to make America feel proud again was his approach to relations with the USSR. Reagan and his right-wing supporters believed that previous US administrations had given the USSR the opportunity for an unchecked expansion of Soviet military power and influence in the world. It was the stated goal of the Reagan presidency to halt and reverse that trend through a combination of building up US conventional and nuclear weapons arsenals and challenging what it perceived as the Soviet Union’s domination of the developing world. Ronald Reagan entered the White House with a

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public commitment to increase US defence spending by 7 per cent per year in real terms and less than two weeks after taking office he called for an immediate increase in the defence budget of $32.6 billion. To a large extent this was intended to send a signal to the Kremlin that the new administration was determined to rebuild America’s military strength.33 Between 1981 and 1986 US defence spending underwent its largest-ever peacetime expansion, rising from $171 billion to $376 billion. Most of the resources were devoted to conventional weapons, although the number of US nuclear warheads was increased and the B1 bomber programme was restored to the budget after being cut by the Carter administration.34 During the first half of the 1980s the Soviet leadership was therefore confronted with the prospect of a significantly greater US military threat in the foreseeable future. The threat to the USSR from American strategic offensive weapons was compounded beginning in March 1983 by Ronald Reagan’s personal commitment to pursuing strategic defences – the first sign that an American administration was seriously interested in this type of weapons system since the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972. Reagan’s speech announcing the Strategic Defense Initiative and the introduction in 1984 of a 5-year research and development programme costing $26 billion 35 revived the Soviets’ worst nightmare of trying and failing to compete in an arms race run according the rules of a new technology – this time space-based missile and satellite defences – in which Moscow was hopelessly inferior. As we have already seen, the prospect of a major US effort to develop a defence against missile attack caused serious concern on the part of Soviet political leaders, senior military figures and civilian analysts alike. The view that the ‘Star Wars’ project was an indication of US hostile intentions towards the USSR was very widespread. It is not surprising that, in the midst of a military buildup on so large a scale, superpower arms control scarcely figured at all on the Reagan administration’s policy agenda. Indeed, arms control and its twin brother détente had been portrayed by the Republican Party during the 1980 presidential election campaign as the main reasons for Soviet strength and American weakness. Once in office Ronald Reagan had no intention of concluding any further arms control agreements with the USSR unless their terms were favourable to the United States. In practice this meant that American negotiating teams were instructed to make proposals which were heavily biased towards American force structures and political-strategic interests, and which the Soviet side was not expected to accept. For example, during the negotiations on

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intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) the US delegation suggested that the ‘zero option’ should be the basis of any agreement. While the proposal of eliminating all weapons of this type from the European theatre was superficially very attractive, in order to achieve this end the Americans would forgo a deployment not yet begun (the Pershing II and cruise missiles due to be stationed in Western Europe) in exchange for the removal of weapons which were already in place (the Soviet SS4, SS-5 and SS-20 missiles). This proposal was rejected by Moscow, which regarded it as an attempt by the US to get something for nothing, and as a violation of the principle of numerical equality of weapons reductions for both sides which the Soviets had established early in the SALT I process and insisted on in all subsequent talks with the Americans. The Reagan administration’s approach to the third series of SALT negotiations (renamed by Reagan the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks or START) was similarly and predictably unacceptable to the Soviet Union. The American position that no more than half the number of nuclear warheads permitted by any START treaty should be on landbased weapons was seen by the Soviets as a transparent attempt to undermine the strongest component of their strategic nuclear forces, especially considering the absence in the US proposal of any such restrictions relating to warheads on air- or sea-based missiles. Meanwhile the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks continued in Vienna without results or even visible progress, and Washington resisted all Soviet attempts to include in superpower arms talks the new American weapons project which most concerned Moscow: SDI. Furthermore the Reagan administration’s repeated public accusations that the Soviets had violated existing treaties emphasized the hostility of the Americans towards the entire arms control process. In December 1983 the American deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles began in Western Europe on schedule and the Soviets suspended their participation in all arms control talks in protest. But while Moscow had intended by its action to shock the United States into halting the deployment and adopting a more constructive approach to negotiations, it found itself instead portrayed as the villain for bringing these diplomatic contacts to an end. In addition to increasing the military threat which the US posed to the Soviet Union, the Reagan administration initiated a series of challenges to the USSR’s position around the world. Washington openly condemned Moscow’s repression of dissidents within the Soviet Union and its control over Eastern Europe, while the ‘Reagan doctrine’ committed

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the United States to using force if necessary to ‘roll back’ those regimes and movements in the Third World which were under Soviet influence. During the early 1980s Washington opposed through a variety of open and covert means pro-Soviet regimes or movements in Angola, Afghanistan, El Salvador, Grenada and Nicaragua. During this period Moscow’s relations with many countries around the world were under serious strain as a consequence of the foreign policy line pursued by the Kremlin in the preceeding years. The Soviet Union paid a high economic and political price for the extent of its commitment to clients in the Third World. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to preserve a Marxist regime sparked off a wave of revulsion which extended far beyond the United States and other Western countries which frequently condemned the USSR’s policies. Decades of efforts by successive Soviet leaders to portray the USSR as the friend and champion of developing countries were undermined overnight. On 14 January 1980 the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and just a few weeks later the invasion was also condemned by the Islamic Conference.36 Moscow also found itself criticized for actions taken by client states over which the Soviets had little control. One example of this is the invasion and subsequent occupation by Vietnam of its neighbour Kampuchea late in 1979. Throughout the early 1980s the Soviet Union was regularly castigated for Vietnam’s actions, especially by the People’s Republic of China, which made progress on the issue of Cambodia a condition for improving relations with Moscow. The Soviet Union’s influence in the Middle East during this period was very low, especially following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 and the poor performance of Syria, the USSR’s main ally in the region, against Israel’s armed forces. Although Moscow was willing to provide the Syrians with weapons, the Soviet leadership was anxious to avoid getting drawn into conflicts in the region which could lead to dangerous confrontations with the United States and was therefore not prepared to give its Middle East allies any more direct help nor was it willing to provide material support for the Palestine Liberation Organization.37 The Soviets’ risk-avoiding strategy in the Middle East may have kept them out of the firing line but it was a policy which was deeply resented by Syria and helped to prevent the USSR from exercising any significant influence in the region. In Europe the USSR was undergoing difficult times with allies and opponents alike. Martial law was imposed in Poland in December 1981 with Moscow’s blessings after more than a year of strikes triggered by

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increases in the price of food and the activities of the recently legalized independent trade unions. Although the state of emergency was formally suspended after twelve months, tensions within the Warsaw Pact remained at a high level as the events in Poland provided a vivid reminder to the leaders of the other member states of the fragility of their hold on power. Meanwhile the imposition of martial law in Poland had an adverse effect on the Soviet Union’s image in the western half of Europe, where Moscow was also condemned for the part it played in increasing the number of nuclear missiles deployed on the continent. Although the Soviets made every attempt to portray themselves as the seekers of peace and the Americans as irresponsible warmongers, their efforts were largely unsuccessful. There were also few reasons for Soviet optimism regarding relations with China, which insisted on Moscow’s fufilment of three conditions before relations between the two countries could improve: the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; the cessation of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia; and the reduction of Soviet forces stationed on the Sino-Soviet border. The strategic nuclear threat which China posed to the USSR was further augmented during these years.38 Although the Chinese continued to rely primarily on medium-range missiles and bombers as delivery vehicles for their nuclear warheads, by the late 1970s Beijing had developed an ICBM with sufficient range to reach the European USSR.39 During the early 1980s Beijing continued its programme of nuclear testing and slowly but steadily built up its forces of ICBMs, MRBMs and SLBMs. 40 Judging from statements in the Soviet military press, there was serious concern within the armed forces about the threat from China, and especially about the danger posed by the improved relations between Beijing and Washington after Mao’s death. 41 During much of this period, the Chinese leadership took steps to improve relations with Japan and Western Europe, so from Moscow’s point of view its great communist rival was strengthening its position militarily and diplomatically at a time when the USSR was struggling to retain its place in the world. There were, however, some opportunities during this period for an improvement in relations between the two countries. Sino-American links were not as strong as they may have appeared to Moscow, as China began to distance itself from the US, especially on Third World issues, and the status of Taiwan caused strains between Washington and Beijing. 42 After Brezhnev’s death negotiations resumed between China and the USSR on disputed border regions and it looked as though the change of leadership in the Kremlin might

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permit a reappraisal of the Soviet approach to its largest neighbour. The opportunity was lost, however, due to China’s insistence on progress on the three issues described above and Moscow’s inability or unwillingness to take any action in these areas. The Sino-Soviet talks were broken off and in just a few months the Chinese signed an agreement with the United States which provided for a significant increase in trade between those two countries.43 At the end of Chapter 5 we noted that the centralized and bureaucratic policymaking environment of the mature Brezhnev period made any significant shift in Soviet ABM policy unlikely in the absence of some extreme stimulus. The American Strategic Defense Initiative announced by US President Ronald Reagan in March 1983 would appear to be just such a catalyst and provide a golden opportunity for the Soviet Union to increase its efforts in ABM research and development in imitation of the US project. By the early 1980s Moscow had very little left to lose from the perspective of its standing in the international community by taking such a step. The gains of détente had proved to be very short-lived indeed and the USSR was facing a renewed threat from NATO in the shape of the INF deployment in Western Europe as well as an increase in the military capabilities of the US and China. The Soviet Union was the object of widespread condemnation for its foreign policy actions, especially in Afghanistan, and conditions would seem to be ripe for Moscow to adopt a bunker mentality towards the outside world and focus its efforts on building up its defensive capabilities, including its missile defences. The explanation for why the Soviet Union did not follow such a course of action is to be found not in events taking place outside the USSR but in the preoccupations of major actors in its domestic political scene.

Soviet ABM technology During the early 1980s the USSR continued to concentrate its missile defence research and development efforts on three areas: improving the Galosh ABM system around Moscow; giving surface-to-air missiles the capabilities to perform missile defence missions; and research into less traditional technologies with possible missile defence applications. From 1980 new interceptor missiles began to be deployed in the underground silos of the Galosh missile defence system, promising to provide more effective protection against attack. The single-layer system was modified to include a second layer of shorter-range, higheracceleration missiles, which could take advantage of atmospheric

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filtering to distinguish more easily missile warheads from chaff, decoys and other false targets. There were two new interceptor missiles deployed around Moscow in the early 1980s: the SH-04, which was credited with the capability of stopping and restarting its engine to enable command facilities to discriminate attacking warheads from decoys,44 and the SH-08 or Gazelle, with a very short range (less than 100 km) and armed with a low-yield nuclear warhead. 45 These improvements, together with the construction of the more sophisticated radars discussed in Chapter 5, made the Moscow ABM system potentially much more effective as well as making it resemble the US ‘Safeguard’ missile defence system of the late 1960s and early 1970s.46 The upgrading of surface-to-air missiles was concentrated on two particular systems: the SA-10 and the SA-12. The SA-10 began to be deployed in 1980, and has been described as roughly equivalent to the US Patriot.47 Although the SA-10’s radars were thought to be more advanced than those of earlier SAM systems, the interceptor missile was believed to be too slow to be effective against ballistic missiles. 48 The SA-12 was considered by Western experts to be the most ABMcapable of all the Soviet surface-to-air missiles to date, 49 but Soviet attempts in field tests to bring down medium-range missiles using the SA-12 met with little success. 50 Although these surface-to-air missiles may have had some ABM capability, there would have been numerous technical problems in attempting to use them to protect the Soviet Union against attack from ballistic missiles. Soviet SAMS were remarkably inefficient in performing even their anti-aircraft roles (in combat as many as 50 to 100 SAMs sometimes had to be fired in order to shoot down a single plane51). It would have been a very optimistic Soviet planner who relied upon SAMs to be able to hit ballistic missiles, even assuming that SAM radars would be able to identify objects significantly smaller than airplanes, which would probably have been accompanied by decoys or fragments of booster rockets.52 During the early 1980s the Soviets also continued their research into the application of more ‘exotic’ technologies to the task of providing a defence from ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads. They focussed in particular on the uses of high-energy lasers and particle beams. But although Soviet scientists were believed to have made considerable progress in the field of directed energy research, the USSR was seriously lacking in crucial complementary technologies such as computer hardware and software, microelectronics, radar and guidance and navigation. Without a corresponding advanced capability in these areas, any attempt by the Soviets to apply directed energy weapons to

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the task of ballistic missile defence would have been very difficult if not impossible.53

Conclusions The early 1980s was a time when the Soviet Union faced enormous strategic and foreign policy challenges from its major rivals in Western Europe and North America as well as from China. The US military buildup initiated by Carter and enthusiatically continued by Ronald Reagan, the deployment of INF weapons in Europe and the steady increase in Beijing’s arsenal of nuclear weapons all provided Moscow with excellent strategic reasons for expanding its missile defence programme. The American Strategic Defense Initiative should have been the final nail in the coffin of the Soviets’ commitment to the ABM Treaty and to superpower détente. Contrary to the expectations of many Western analysts, however, the Soviet Union did not follow the logic of the action–reaction arms race scenario identified by former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. The Soviet Union’s refusal to initiate a major missile defence effort can be explained by three separate factors, each of which was the result of developments taking place within the USSR. Firstly, successive Soviet political leaders were unwilling to renounce one of the few enduring successes of the SALT process: the 1972 ABM Treaty. Both Brezhnev and Andropov committed themselves publicly and unequivocally to pursuing détente, even in the absence of indications that Washington wanted to continue the superpower dialogue. During much of the brief period that Konstantin Chernenko was General Secretary, Gorbachev was strengthening his position and was exerting his growing influence to help revive the moribund arms control process. Although the extent of Soviet economic decline was not acknowledged by the political elite during this period, the leadership in Moscow was nevertheless aware of the finite nature of available resources and the crisis in Poland served as a vivid reminder of the potential political consequences of ignoring the needs of the ordinary citizen. A massive increase in defence spending might have created more problems for the political leadership in the Kremlin than it would have solved. The second factor which helped to prevent the USSR from embarking on its own version of ‘Star Wars’ was the lack of consensus among the Soviet military elite. The Soviet military leadership was simply not able to take advantage of this period of weak political leadership to

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press for a renewed ABM effort because they could not agree among themselves on the most suitable Soviet response to SDI. Few statements by military officers during these years offered specific suggestions for Soviet action, and most of those which did contradicted one another. There were signs that even officers who held ‘traditionalist’ views about warfare, nuclear weapons and the importance of strategic defence questioned the wisdom of making an enormous and openended commitment of scarce Soviet resources to compete with the Americans in an area of technological development – space-based defensive systems – which the USSR had not yet managed to distinguish themselves. Finally, there were no indications that Soviet science and technology was on the verge of a major breakthrough which would have enabled the USSR to compete effectively with the United States in a race to develop and deploy space-based missile defences. On the contrary, the Soviet ABM programme was continuing to upgrade the Galosh system incrementally, using techniques copied from American plans which were more than a decade old. Progress on using surface-to-air missiles to defend against attack from ballistic missiles was limited, and work on exotic technologies such as directed energy weapons was hampered by the limitations of Soviet capabilities in computers and electronics.

7 ‘New Political Thinking’ and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1985–91

Although ‘New Political Thinking’ introduced a new approach to Soviet security policy, old patterns of behaviour with regard to missile defences proved remarkably enduring. Gorbachev followed in the footsteps of his predecessors in the Kremlin in his attempts to use the ABM issue to gain concessions from Washington, in this case trying to persuade US President Ronald Reagan to end or restrict the Strategic Defense Initiative. Under Gorbachev’s leadership the Soviet missile defence research and development effort and the maintenance and modernization of the Galosh ABM system deployed around Moscow both continued on the paths set out for them in the mid-1970s with remarkably little deviation. Given the Soviet leader’s view that strategic defences undermined rather than enhanced international security, indications of any changes to the USSR’s ABM policy were very slow to appear. It took the Gorbachev leadership four years to acknowledge that the Krasnoyarsk radar was a violation of the ABM Treaty and decide to dismantle it. Resources for the missile defence programme were similarly were not targeted for cutbacks until very late in the Gorbachev period. The argument in this chapter is that Gorbachev was unable, rather than unwilling, to act on his belief that missile defences are destablizing and diminish security. The discussions of SDI in Soviet publications during this period reveal sharp divisions in opinion within the armed forces about defences, nuclear weapons and future war, with traditionalist views on these issues continuing to be expressed. An extraordinary feature of this period is the appearance of a disparate group of ballistic missile defence advocates who did not share a commitment to a traditionalist strategy for future war. Instead this loose coalition of scientists, military officers and academic ‘new thinkers’ based their support for ABM on the need to protect the USSR 125

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from third party attack or accidental nuclear missile launch during the transition from the Cold War to an uncertain future.

Politics and policymaking during the Gorbachev period During Gorbachev’s leadership all policy issues, including those relating to national security, were discussed and decided in the context of the reform programme introduced by the new General Secretary. ‘Perestroika’, or restructuring, was a series of efforts by Gorbachev to remove the most damaging political and economic legacies of his predecessors in the Kremlin. Gorbachev’s intention was to make the Soviet economy more efficient and Soviet politics more democratic and accountable. The new leader used two methods in his attempts to revitalize tired and discredited institutions and practices: replacing longtime occupants of key posts in the Party and State bureaucracies with supporters of reform; and seeking a partnership with Soviet society. Gorbachev planned to use the practice of glasnost’ or openness about certain negative aspects of Soviet life to rouse popular feeling in favour of reform. The new General Secretary hoped through a combination of pressures from above and below to overcome the resistance to change on the part of self-serving bureaucrats whose careers and ways of thinking were formed during the ‘period of stagnation’, as Brezhnev’s leadership was described. One of the most obvious differences in the Soviet policymaking climate during this period was the physical and intellectual vigour of the new leader. The Soviet Union and its leading Communist Party finally had a General Secretary who was comparatively young, in good health and who came to power with a policy agenda which had clearly defined goals, even if his views on the methods of achieving those goals evolved over time. Gorbachev also differed considerably from his most recent predecessors in the Kremlin in the extent of his intellectual curiosity. Although he too was a product of the Communist Party apparatus, the period which Gorbachev spent as a student at the law faculty of Moscow State University provided him with an introduction to the world of ideas and to those who devote their careers to the quest for knowledge, which had a profound effect on his approach to policymaking. Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader since Lenin who had a serious interest in abstract concepts. He seemed genuinely to want to know, for example, what ‘security’ meant in the late twentieth century and

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how states could achieve it, and the absence of any period of military service in Gorbachev’s background meant that he was far more likely to turn to civilians for answers to defence policy questions than he was to seek the advice of leading figures in the armed forces. Indeed, one of the most dramatic changes which Gorbachev made to the process of defence policy decisionmaking was to give civilian advisers much greater access to the political leadership and consequently much greater prominence than they had previously enjoyed. Gorbachev sought through personnel changes and the frequent use of external advisers to create new authoritative sources of policy options to counterbalance those offered through traditional (especially military) channels. Ambassadors and academics were formally made part of the foreign policy system. To name just two prominent examples, Aleksandr Yakovlev directed the Institute of World Economy (IMEMO) between leaving his post at the Soviet embassy in Canada and joining Gorbachev’s team, while Anatoli Dobrynin was brought back from Washington to head the Central Committee’s International Department, expanding its focus from party-to-party relations to encompass East–West relations more broadly and providing a kind of National Security Council for the Politburo.1 The Gorbachev leadership also frequently called upon the expertise of civilian analysts for advice on aspects of security policy. IMEMO’s department for disarmament studies, headed by Alexei Arbatov, was closely involved in advising the political leaders on arms control issues and members of the department’s staff regularly accompanied Soviet delegations to arms control negotiations.2 None of this was good news for the Soviet armed forces. A healthy and vigorous General Secretary with his own agenda who looked to civilians for defence policy advice was not the sort of leader who could easily be persuaded by the arguments of military leaders. Although Gorbachev came to the leadership with little experience of foreign and defence policy issues, he soon adopted an approach to security policy which was heavily influenced by his civilian advisers and which many military officers viewed with horror. New Political Thinking represented a shift in official Soviet views about such fundamental issues as what constituted security and how it could best be ensured. Gorbachev made use of the social science concept of interdependence to emphasize the vulnerability of all states to global threats such as environmental pollution and nuclear weapons. He removed the remaining notion of ideological conflict contained in ‘peaceful coexistence’ by declaring

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that the needs of humanity, or all-human values, must take priority over national, class or other interests. Similarly, Gorbachev argued that in the age of nuclear weapons it was impossible for one state to increase its security at the expense of the security of another. Any actions which reduce the security of one’s neighbours in the international community, he asserted, would quickly reduce one’s own security as well, by instigating a counteracting military buildup or other similar action. True security, therefore, could only be mutual or common.3 Gorbachev established the notion of reasonable sufficiency as a measure of the levels of a state’s armed forces. He introduced the concept in a speech to the Supreme Soviet in November 1985, calling on the US and USSR to ‘reach a common understanding of what level of weapons on each side could be considered relatively sufficient from the point of view of its reliable defense’.4 While reasonable sufficiency should provide the basis for the future development of combat capabilities, those forces should also be configured according to the criteria of defensive defence: suitable and sufficient for defence but not for attack. Although the concept of ‘defensive defence’ sounds as though it would be compatible with the American Strategic Defense Initiative, Gorbachev’s advisers were careful to deny any such suggestion. The notion of defensive defence was applicable only to conventional forces, they argued. Strategic defences against nuclear weapons were destabilizing because they represented an attempt to increase the security of one side at the expense of another.5 Although the military continued throughout Gorbachev’s leadership to be a powerful actor with which he had to contend, his years in the Kremlin did mark a downturn in the fortunes of the armed forces as an institution in Soviet politics. When the harsh light of glasnost’ was turned on the military during the late 1980s, the revelations of widespread drug and alcohol abuse, institutionalized bullying and the high suicide rate among conscripts dealt the armed forces a serious blow. In addition to symbolic gestures, such as reducing the number of military parades through Red Square each year, Gorbachev removed from senior positions many of the older officers whose careers were formed during the Brezhnev period. The breaching of Soviet air defences by a young West German amateur pilot in May 1987 gave the General Secretary the opportunity not only to dismiss senior officers of the Air Defence Forces but also to launch a series of high-level personnel changes in the armed forces.6 The Minister of Defence Marshal Sokolov

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was replaced with a relatively junior general, Dmitri Yazov. This pattern was repeated the following year, when Marshal Akhromeev retired from his position as Chief of the General Staff and was replaced by General Mikhail Moiseev.7 Both Yazov and Moiseev were promoted over the heads of more senior officers in an attempt by the Kremlin to create a military leadership more conducive to new ideas. The armed forces found itself under increasing pressure to reveal previously secret information to civilians and to elected bodies. Indeed, one of the indications of the decline of the armed forces as an institution was the evidence that the military was being forced to ease the tight grip which it had maintained since Stalin’s death on any information with national security implications. From 1987 specialist journals dealing with foreign policy increasingly focussed their attention on questions which were very closely tied to defence and national security. Analysts addressed issues which previously had been exclusively in the domain of the Soviet armed forces, such as the role of command and control8 and the strategic defensive operations carried out by the USSR during the Second World War.9 Furthermore, the new Supreme Soviet established as a result of the first multi-candidate elections in 1989 created several committees which were given the task of ensuring greater accountability and political control over the armed forces, although the experiences of the Committee on Defence and State Security and the Committee on Military Reform demonstrated that the armed forces did not relinquish their former privileged position easily. Military leaders resisted the attempts of the Committee on State Security to address the issue of reform in the armed forces and the Frunze and General Staff academies refused to cooperate with the Committee.10 As we have seen so often, the distribution of resources between the military and civilian sectors of the economy was a source of considerable friction between the Soviet military leadership and the politicians in the Kremlin. Economic issues were especially prominent as the need to revitalize the Soviet economy was one of the motivating factors of perestroika. A vital component of Gorbachev’s plans for domestic restructuring was a significant shift of resources from the sectors of the economy which served defence and the military in favour of civilian production. Shortly after becoming General Secretary, he reportedly met with a group of senior military officers in Minsk and warned them that the armed forces would in future be allocated fewer resources. 11 The goal of limiting the defence budget was closely linked to

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Gorbachev’s desire to reduce international tensions and successfully negotiate arms reduction agreements, as he indicated when he told a Central Committee plenum in June 1985 that the Party would do its utmost to promote disarmament and thus reduce military spending.12 The economic imperative of shifting precious resources away from defence together with Gorbachev’s stress on the importance of finding political solutions to international problems were powerful reasons for the political leadership to oppose the continuation or expansion of the Soviet missile defence programme. At the same time the technological challenge posed by the American SDI programme created strong pressure from the military and the defence industry to increase resource allocations for missile defences further in order to compete effectively against the United States. 13 The Soviet missile defence programme in the mid-1980s, therefore, looked ready to become a voracious beast, devouring resources and expertise which could otherwise be used to improve the technological level of the economy as a whole – one of Gorbachev’s stated goals for perestroika.14 The discussions about SDI in Soviet military publications during these years give some indication of these pressures on the Soviet political leadership to commit greater resources to their missile defence effort. Several articles published in the military press in 1990 and 1991 warned that the Americans were continuing to spend large sums on SDI, and suggested that the Soviets might, as a result, be compelled to increase their own outlays on defence.15 Considering the importance of reducing defence spending for the success of Gorbachev’s reform plans one would have expected to see cuts announced and implemented at an early stage in his leadership. It was, however, January 1989 when Gorbachev first announced specific reductions to the Soviet defence budget.16 This long delay indicates the ability of entrenched interests in the military-industrial complex to resist pressures for change even when they came from the highest level of the Party and State leadership and in spite of the considerable loss of prestige experienced by the armed forces. This factor was also at work in preventing cuts to the Soviet ABM programme, which, according to the logic of New Political Thinking, should have been an early target. The fact that pleas in the military press for a more substantial missile defence effort in order to keep up with the Americans only appeared in 1990 suggests that this portion of the Soviet defence budget had only recently come under threat.17 As we will see in this chapter’s section on ABM technology, the Soviet missile defence research and development

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effort was apparently unaffected by perestroika until very late in the Gorbachev period.

Ballistic missile defence in Soviet strategic thought Virtually all of the discussions about ballistic missile defence in Soviet publications made some reference to the American Strategic Defense Initiative, and most made the US project the central focus. These public discussions of SDI served several purposes. Probably most important, statements about Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ programme were used by the Kremlin to send signals to the Americans about Soviet concerns and intentions. Most of these comments were clearly orchestrated by the political leadership in an attempt initially to push Washington into making concessions on SDI and later to encourage progress in on-going negotiations on arms reduction. Some of those who wrote about SDI either emphasized or played down the threat posed by the American programme in order to exert pressure on the political leadership to reconsider its allocation of resources. In some cases it was representatives of the armed forces who seized the opportunity to lobby for more resources for the military and the defence industry, but many reform-minded civilians also joined in to argue against the military receiving even more funding. Finally, the debate about the Strategic Defense Initiative was a forum used by civilian and military analysts alike for exploring solutions to the country’s security problems, in particular the question of the nature of future war and how the USSR could best survive it. It was in this last category that analysts began to move away from making comments on SDI and instead began the frankest discussion of the merits of missile defence capabilities which appeared in Soviet publications since the ABM Treaty was signed. In some cases a given statement about SDI clearly served one of these purposes, but as we will see, it was not unusual for a single intervention in the discussion to combine two or even all three. Western scholars who have written about the Soviets’ SDI debates have tended to focus on the regime-orchestrated aspect of the campaign at the expense of the differences between the arguments which were used.18 Although the discussions were clearly coordinated and performed an important diplomatic function for the Kremlin, there were also some significant differences between the arguments which appeared. The most notable of these are related to the opinion groupings of traditionalists and progressives which we have seen in previous

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chapters. Traditionalists’ views of future war showed significant continuities with the Soviet military thinking of the 1950s and 1960s, while, in this period, progressives made arguments which were consistent with the tenets of Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking. Although there were large areas of common concern about the dangers of SDI – especially the threat of expanding the arms race to space – traditionalist criticism of the Strategic Defense Initiative tended to be made of SDI as one component in the overall strategic threat posed by the United States, rather than as a unique and specific danger. This qualified criticism of the American programme was often accompanied by some support, sometimes explicitly stated but usually only implicit, for a Soviet ABM capability. Progressives tended to go beyond the standard Soviet arguments advanced against SDI to assert that any defensive system against nuclear weapons developed by any country was inherently destabilizing. Other progressive arguments asserted that missile defences undermined the basis of deterrence, and that ‘defence’ in the age of nuclear weapons meant the possession of a convincing capacity for a devastating response. Some progressives even openly questioned the value of the ABM system deployed around Moscow and called for its removal. Many of those who expressed progressive views about SDI and related security issues were closely involved in the genesis of New Political Thinking. Broadly speaking, the division between traditionalists and progressives can be seen as a split between military and civilian analysts respectively. But by no means did all military analysts argue the traditionalist view, nor did all civilian analysts go as far as the progressives in their condemnation of the concept of defensive systems. Service loyalties and rivalries do not provide a very satisfactory explanation for the views expressed by members of the armed forces about SDI and other issues related to missile defences. Views consistent with approval for ABM were expressed by Air Defence officers and in the Air Defence Forces journal, but neither played a leading role in the SDI debates. Discussions about strategy for future war and SDI were carried out in a wide range of Soviet military publications. Traditionalist views about future war and how best to prepare for it continued to be expressed by Soviet officers. Many perceived a world in which war between the superpowers was possible and asserted that any such war would be characterized by the pursuit of decisive and mutually exclusive aims, ruling out the possibility of compromise.19 In this view any conflict between the USSR and US which involved the use of nuclear weapons would swiftly become a total war.20 The advantages of

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surprise attack for the side striking first in the context of such a decisive nuclear conflict were also stressed, 21 and the initial period of war was considered to be of great importance in determining the course of the conflict and probably also in influencing its outcome.22 In light of these assumptions about the nature of future war and the belief that the United States had made surprise attack the centrepiece of its strategy for the use of nuclear weapons, 23 Soviet military analysts stressed that the USSR had learned the lesson of 1941 and would not be caught unawares again.24 The optimal force structure proposed to meet challenges of future conflict continued to be a combined forces approach, including the use of both offensive and defensive systems and strategies. 25 The view of future war expressed by traditionalists at the outset of Gorbachev’s leadership was compatible with an interest in missile defences. As we have seen in previous chapters, there is a logical place for defences against nuclear missiles in a perception of future conflict which stresses its decisive aims and global nature, and which the opponent is expected to begin with a disarming first strike. A weapons system which would provide some protection against such an attack would be a valuable component in the Soviets’ war-survival strategy. Throughout the Gorbachev period representatives of the armed forces stressed the importance of maintaining strategic parity with the United States in both qualitative and quantitative terms. 26 Military analysts argued forcefully that the military threat posed by the imperialists required the Soviet armed forces to possess ‘sufficient military technical might, perfect weapons and technology’. 27 The stress on equipment and technology was clearly part of the struggle for resources going on behind the scenes under the leadership of a General Secretary determined to reduce the defence burden on the Soviet economy and shift resources into the civilian sector. But while some interventions in the SDI debates were obviously intended to make the case for greater resources for the defence industry, economic issues were frequently raised in the SDI debates to make arguments against missile defences and thus to attempt to prevent the military-industrial complex from benefiting from Soviet concern about the American programme. Both traditionalists and progressives asserted that SDI was part of a plan by the Reagan administration to force the USSR into an endless arms development competition with the aim of wasting Soviet resources and ultimately undermining the Soviet economy.28 Progressives used the assertion that the Americans were trying to

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bankrupt the USSR to suggest that the Soviets should not fall into the trap of blindly copying American moves in the arms race without regard for their own interests and priorities. Traditionalists employed this argument to indicate that the Soviet Union was strong enough to meet this latest challenge. 29 Some analysts stressed the high cost of the American programme compared with the comparative cheapness of the counteracting measures available to the USSR. This was an argument used almost exclusively by progressives.30 The logic of this argument suggested that the Soviets would be foolish to imitate the American SDI programme when they could instead use various cheap and effective measures to reduce greatly the effective operation of any space-based missile defence which the Americans would develop. Opponents of missile defences also warned that the only beneficiary of the US programme would be the American military-industrial complex, 31 suggesting that the USSR would only strengthen the US defence industry by taking actions which increased the importance of SDI for the Americans, such as a crash programme to build a Soviet space-based defence. This argument implied that imitative measures on the part of the USSR would represent a real gain for the Soviet defence industry at the expense of the rest of the country’s economy and society,32 a point at which progressive analysts in the ABM debates of the late 1960s and early 1970s had also hinted. A number of those who commented on the ‘Star Wars’ project pointed out the burden which it was placing on the American economy and questioned whether even the United States could afford such a programme.33 The implications for the Soviet ballistic missile defence programme were clear: if the United States could barely afford SDI and the project was proving to be a drain on the economy of one of the world’s capitalist giants, a similar undertaking was likely to stretch the Soviet system to the breaking point. One of the arguments most frequently made against SDI in Soviet publications was that the programme was part of a larger American buildup in both offensive and defensive weapons intended to provide the US with a disarming first-strike capability. 34 Both progressives and traditionalists made this point and its appearance can be linked with the course of the INF negotiations. The argument reached its peak in terms of the frequency and the extent of its use in 1985 and 1986, when Gorbachev was insisting on US acceptance of a complete ban on any development, testing and deployment of a space-based ABM a condition for progress in the arms control negotiations. Gorbachev’s attempt at linkage failed completely, and over the course of the follow-

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ing months and years the Soviet leadership steadily backed away from its original position. In the summer of 1985 Gorbachev conceded that ‘basic’ research of the sort which could be conducted inside a laboratory was acceptable,35 and by the time the two countries’ leaders met at Reykjavik he had reduced to 10 years the period of compulsory adherence to the ABM Treaty on which Moscow was insisting.36 In the light of Reagan’s intransigence over SDI at the Reykjavik summit the Soviet leader evidently decided that a breakthrough in arms control and the benefits which it would bring were more valuable than futile attempts to stop the Strategic Defence Initiative. Arms control was separated from the issue of SDI, permitting the negotiation of the INF Treaty to go forward. Soviet observers’ use of the argument that SDI was part of a US plan for a first strike capability sharply declined from this point onwards. This argument about a US first strike capability did reemerge in the military press in 1989, suggesting concern on the part of some in the armed forces at the lengths to which the political leadership was willing to go in order to improve relations with the United States. The argument was evidently resurrected to warn against the unilateral nature of the concessions which the USSR was making in a series of arms control negotiations and to strengthen the case that greater attention be paid to Soviet research and development of high-technology weaponry. Another argument made in the course of the Soviet discussions about SDI focussed on the implications for the arms race of the development and deployment of an American space-based defence. Aleksandr Yakovlev, who became one of Gorbachev’s closest advisers, warned that the Strategic Defense Initiative ‘will become a powerful stimulus for the further perfection of both defensive and offensive strategic weapons…The arms race in this case is proving to be transferred into space with completely unforeseen consequences.’37 The fact that this argument was most prevalent during 1985–87 and then virtually disappeared indicates that it is another example of the Soviet political leadership making use of the SDI debate to send signals to Washington. The successful negotiation of the INF Treaty and optimism about the prospects for START made it far less important – and possibly even counterproductive – to argue that SDI would necessarily fan the flames of the arms race. The change of strategy away from a hard line on SDI was accompanied by a shift in rhetoric, in part because impassioned statements against the programme were proving counterproductive if the aim was to convince Americans and their

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leaders to cancel the project. If anything, the obvious signs of Soviet concern were seized upon by some American politicians and activists as evidence that there was something worthwhile in a project which so greatly upset the Russians. The Gorbachev leadership may have also decided that the likelihood of a fully developed and deployed SDI was very slim. Scepticism was growing in the US about the feasibility of space-based defences, and there was every possibility that Reagan’s successor in the White House would lack his predecessor’s zeal for SDI and be glad of the opportunity quietly to run the project down. A related argument was the likely adverse effect of SDI on arms control and in particular on the ABM Treaty.38 Expressions of concern about the programme’s impact on arms control were also most frequently seen in the period 1985–87. They dropped off considerably during the course of 1987 to avoid hindering the INF Treaty negotiations although they continued to appear after 1987 in the context of discussions about the prospects for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.39 Warnings that SDI would undermine the basis of the ABM Treaty continued to be used well into 1988, chiefly by progressives. A typical example is the assertion that SDI was intended to demolish the ABM Treaty, which was in turn the most important obstacle to another arms race.40 References to the importance of the ABM Treaty are largely absent from articles about SDI in the military literature. This is not surprising, since its continued existence effectively prevented the development and deployment of a larger and more advanced Soviet missile defence system. Progressives also put their case against missile defences by arguing that SDI – and indeed any form of defensive system in the nuclear era – would be dangerous and destabilizing. They used the argument which had been raised in the West against SDI and previous American plans for missile defences: a defensive system, whether total or partial, would increase the likelihood in a crisis that the side protected by it would launch a preemptive first strike against its unprotected opponent.41 In 1987 a variation on this argument began to appear in Soviet publications stressing the importance of the capability of both sides for a retaliatory second strike for the maintenance of strategic stability.42 The most comprehensive argument against SDI employed by the progressives was that in an era of international relations characterized by the possession of large nuclear arsenals, attempts to protect and defend states by using weapons was not only inadequate but also irrelevant and doomed to failure:

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today not one state can any longer sustain the illusion of its relative invulnerability with the aid of military-technical means alone, even by creating the most powerful defence, either on Earth or in space.43 This argument is closely linked to some of the central tenets of New Political Thinking: the inability of states in the nuclear era to solve disputes by military rather than political means, and the impossibility of ensuring the security of one state at the expense of the security of another.44 It was often used in 1986, then dropped out of sight until the very end of the decade, re-emerging in 1989 and 1990, possibly to counter the backlash from conservatives in the armed forces who were making greater use of other anti-SDI arguments at this time. In 1989 an opinion grouping on the issue of missile defences emerged which was distinct from both the traditionalists and the progressives: a small group explicitly in favour of ABM for the USSR. The views of these proponents of missile defences were sometimes expressed in the context of suggestions for a joint project with the United States to provide both countries with protection from attacks by third parties. The project’s supporters expressed varying degrees of enthusiasm for it, and it was in the main presented as a necessary step in light of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Those who put forward this plea for missile defences were a very disparate group. Several had links with the military or with the defence industry, although there were some ABM advocates who worked under the auspices of the civilian research institutes. The first suggestion of a Soviet–US defence came in a very brief article in Pravda in July 1989, in which Professor V. Etkin of the Space Research Institute urged the joint development of a defensive system, even if only a limited defence, which could protect Americans and Soviets from the accidental use of missiles or from strikes launched by extremists.45 Etkin’s call was followed by a dozen or so articles in support of missile defences in both military and civilian publications during the course of the next two years.46 Some proponents of a Soviet missile defence effort referred only to the importance of enhanced Soviet defences rather than a joint system with the United States. For example, Colonel O.A. Bel’kov urged, in light of the recent experience of the Gulf War, the development of an ABM system intended for protection from missiles which developing countries could have at their disposal in the foreseeable future. 47 Bel’kov warned that any such defensive system should not affect the general strategic balance of

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forces, which suggests a limited, point defence, along the lines of the US Patriot system rather than an undertaking on the scale of SDI. Others proposing some form of ABM for the Soviet Union expressed their interest in defensive systems in even more qualified terms. 48 V.F. Davidov, for example, raised the possibility of the deployment of a point ABM for Europe to defend the common European home from nuclear attack, but he only did so as an undesirable alternative to a complete ban on nuclear weapons, which he presented as preferable, although less likely.49 As was the case in earlier periods, discussions of ballistic missile defence focussed on the technical capabilities of defensive systems as well as on political-strategic issues. A number of arguments in this category addressed the capabilities of the Strategic Defense Initiative and the most frequently made was that SDI simply would not work. One reason given for the programme’s ineffectiveness was SDI’s likely vulnerability to cheap countermeasures and the ease with which defensive systems could be overcome.50 Some analysts questioned the capabilities of various components which were being considered for SDI such as the reliability of computers 51 or the limitations of directed energy weapons.52 These arguments were made by both progressives and traditionalists, although as we have seen in previous chapters, traditionalists tended to stress the technical shortcomings which were specific to SDI, implying that the principle of missile defences was sound and that it was the American approach which was at fault. 53 Progressives, however, tended to set the claims that SDI would not be effective in the context of a broader argument against defensive systems. The suggestion in the progressives’ argument was that if a programme such as SDI, which had the benefit of generous American financial support and technical expertise, would not be effective in performing its assigned mission, then the notion of an effective missile defence was unlikely to be realized. Some progressive analysts pushed the point even further, questioning whether any form of ABM could be effective. Numerous articles asserted the impossibility of creating an antimissile system which would be ‘perfect’, ‘100 per cent effective’, or ‘impenetrable’. 54 Alexei Arbatov took this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion in 1989 when he warned that ‘in the sphere of nuclear arms hopes of direct military technological defence are a costly and counterproductive illusion’ and went on to question the value and effectiveness of Soviet antiaircraft and antimissile defences, arguing that ‘it would be useful to

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think once again whether it is advisable to maintain and modernize the ABM complex around Moscow’.55 The final factor in these broad arguments against missile defences was the most comprehensive of all those involving technical issues and capabilities. This was simply that any attempt to find a ‘militarytechnical means’ of protecting a country from attack by nuclear weapons was futile and doomed to failure. This argument was closely linked with the basic principles of New Political Thinking, which emphasized the inappropriateness of applying military solutions to political problems, and condemned measures which sought to enhance the security of one state or alliance at the expense of another. Technical issues were raised in discussions of possible Soviet responses to SDI. During the first few years of Gorbachev’s rule there was no clear signal from the political leadership as to how the USSR would or should respond to this challenge from the Americans, nor was there any consensus among military analysts. Some senior officers, including Defence Minister Sokolov 56 and Chief of the General Staff Marshal Akhromeyev57 argued explicitly that Moscow must build up its offensive and defensive capabilities in light of this new threat from the West. But most analysts at this time did not go beyond vague promises to find an effective response, 58 suggesting uncertainty at the highest levels about what form the Soviet response to SDI should take, possibly as a result of reconsideration of Moscow’s official position following Gorbachev’s accession. After the Reykjavik summit in 1986 Gorbachev set out the official line on the Soviet response to SDI: it would be asymmetrical, and not imitative. 59 This position was immediately adopted by analysts writing about SDI and remained the standard line whenever possible Soviet reactions were discussed.60 The debates about missile defence issues and SDI ranged across the spectrum of possible positions on the question of whether or not the USSR should continue to maintain and expand its ABM capability. At one pole were the progressives, some of whom were instrumental in developing the New Political Thinking about security and defence issues. In their view, the pursuit of a missile defence capability was a futile and outdated attempt to solve political problems by military means, and risked undermining the existing international stability by taking measures which sought to enhance one side’s security at the expense of the security of another. Diametrically opposed to this was the position taken by traditionalists, who continued to argue for a deterrence strategy which combined offensive and defensive forces in

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order to be prepared to withstand a nuclear war if deterrence failed. Although the division between traditionalists and progressives was broadly a division between military and civilian analysts, this distinction did not always hold true, and some military officers expressed progressive views about missile defence issues. The third position which emerged towards the end of this period, openly advocating missile defences, contained elements of both traditionalist and progressive views. Several of those who argued explicitly for ABM continued to describe prospects for future war in traditionalist terms, while others in this group had links to military industry, and were probably expressing this view in the hopes of stimulating a new research and development effort. Still others, including those affiliated to research institutes, were reluctant advocates of ABM. The tone of their remarks indicates that they were considering missile defences as one method of coping with the uncertainties of the post-Cold War world.

The international security climate When Gorbachev became General Secretary in 1985 the Soviet Union faced formidable threats to its security as well as considerable hostility from most of the world as a result of the military expansions and foreign policy adventures of the 1970s and early 1980s. In many respects a logical response to this security environment would have been a further entrenchment of the USSR’s position and a renewed defence buildup including an expansion of the Soviet missile defence programme. But the logic of New Political Thinking turned upside down the traditional Soviet responses to security threats and arms races and dictated a very different reaction, one based on asymmetrical responses and on actions intended to increase the security of all sides. Although Gorbachev’s new approach to security made a crucial contribution to the ending of the Cold War and thus a significant reduction in the military threat to the USSR, towards the end of the Gorbachev period growing Soviet concern about the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons prompted renewed interest in missile defences. This time, however, the mission envisioned for ABM was to protect the USSR from attack by actors which had not previously been regarded by Moscow as serious threats to Soviet security. The military threat to the Soviet Union continued to increase during much of the Gorbachev period. During the mid and late 1980s the

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United States was in the process of modernizing its existing offensive nuclear weapons systems and developing new ones, such as the MX and Trident D-5 missile, the Stealth bomber, the Midgetman ICBM and the conversion of B-52 bombers to carry air-launched cruise missiles(ALCMs).61 Furthermore, the Reagan administration demonstrated that it was not prepared to restrict its weapons development to the terms set by the unratified SALT 2 treaty when, in November 1986, the US exceeded SALT 2 limits for the number of ICBMs equipped with MIRVed warheads and the number of bombers fitted with ALCMs.62 In Europe the deployment of the Pershing 2 and cruise missiles continued to pose a formidable threat to the USSR during the first two years of Gorbachev’s leadership, while Britain and France continued to maintain and improve their independent nuclear deterrents.63 China continued to develop its nuclear forces at a steady but very slow rate. The Chinese only had between six and eight ICBMs deployed at any time between 1985 and 1991. Two of those had been tested with MIRVed warheads, but there was no evidence of any deployment of Chinese MIRVed ICBMs. Only one or two strategic submarines were in service during this period, although three more were under construction by the end of the 1980s. China’s supply of medium-range ballistic missiles was somewhat larger during this period, although 60 were retired in 1989, apparently without being replaced.64 It is interesting to note that although China did pose a nuclear threat to the USSR there was virtually no discussion of it in Soviet publications dealing with nuclear weapons and Soviet national security. There was certainly no suggestion that Soviet missile defences were a good idea because of the danger of an attack from China. It may have been that the Galosh ABM system around Moscow was judged to provide sufficient protection against a force composed of a very small number of missiles, few of which (if any) would be equipped with multiple warheads. Another possible explanation is that the greatest threat, that posed by the United States and NATO, simply diverted the attention of those analysts who concerned themselves with national security issues. They failed to discuss the threat from the East because the need to address it seemed much less urgent in comparison with the threat from the West. Gorbachev’s response to this threatening international security climate was to launch a charm offensive aimed at the very countries whose weapons were trained on targets in the USSR. Gorbachev began with a series of visits to Western capitals in order to meet the countries’ leaders and convince them of his desire to improve East–West relations

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and to reform the Soviet political and economic system. Improving relations with Washington was, not surprisingly, at the top of the Soviet leader’s agenda, and this is reflected in the unprecedented number of high-level meetings involving the United States: at least one summit meeting with the American President took place in every year of Gorbachev’s leadership. The new General Secretary recognized that ending the arms race was the key to reducing international tensions and thus to implementing his reform programme at home, and he therefore made arms control a top priority. Gorbachev’s approach to arms control was characterized by flexibility and a willingness to seize the initiative and take chances.65 During the course of the INF negotiations the Soviet team stunned their American counterparts by accepting such conditions as intrusive on-site inspections to ensure treaty compliance and asymmetrical reductions, with the USSR agreeing to dismantle more weapons than the United States. Such terms had been rejected by the Soviet Union in all previous arms control negotiations. Once the INF Treaty was signed in December 1987, Gorbachev turned his attention to making progress on limiting conventional forces and reducing strategic nuclear weapons. In both cases the greater flexibility and seriousness with which the Soviets approached the talks resulted in agreements: the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in November 1990 and the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in July 1991. Although many policymakers and observers in the West had initially treated Gorbachev’s pronouncements on security policy with considerable caution, by the end of the 1980s many of his sternest critics abroad were convinced that Gorbachev was qualitatively different from his predecessors in the Kremlin. By taking such steps as withdrawing Soviet forces from Afghanistan, actively encouraging diplomatic solutions in Angola and Namibia and most of all by permitting the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe to collapse in 1989, Gorbachev demonstrated his commitment to using political rather than military means to solve the problems of international security. Gorbachev also showed himself willing to address the concerns of his neighbours in the East. By 1988 the Soviets had made progress on fulfilling all three of the conditions laid down by Beijing for improving Sino-Soviet relations. Moscow had agreed to end its military involvement in Afghanistan, Vietnam announced that it was withdrawing its forces from Cambodia, and the elimination of Soviet medium-range missiles from Asia as part of the INF Treaty in addition to the resumption of

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negotiations over the disputed Sino-Soviet border helped to reduce tensions between the two great Communist powers. By the end of the 1980s, then, Gorbachev was beginning to reap the benefits of his new approach to security issues. The Soviet Union was no longer regarded as an international pariah state and indeed for the first time in its history the USSR enjoyed warm relations with most of the countries of the world. US President Ronald Reagan renounced his condemnation of the Soviet Union as the ‘evil empire’, saying on his trip to Moscow in 1988 that he had been referring to another era. 66 Even Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ project lost most of its threatening nature. Although American interest in the Strategic Defense Initiative was present throughout the Gorbachev period, the degree of enthusiasm for the project diminished considerably once it became clear that the INF Treaty would be concluded. The INF Treaty was the first concrete sign that the Gorbachev leadership was serious about arms control and was seen as an indication that further agreements would follow, which in turn helped to remove much of the urgency from Washington’s quest to develop a space-based defensive system to protect the United States from Soviet missile attacks. Another reason for the slowing of the impetus behind SDI was growing scepticism within the United States about its prospects for success. After 1987 the size of the budgets which Congress was willing to authorize for the Strategic Defense Initiative began to diminish and by 1990 funding for the project had been reduced to $3.8 billion and the emphasis had been narrowed to focus mainly on ‘Brilliant Pebbles’.67 With the tide of international opinion turning in Gorbachev’s favour and the first cuts in Soviet defence spending announced, we might have expected to see a sharp curtailment of the Soviet ABM effort in line with the political leadership’s approach to security issues, which regarded missile defences as destabilizing. Instead, as we will see in the next section, work on improving the Galosh ABM system deployed around Moscow and research and development into potential new missile defence technologies continued along the lines set out while Brezhnev was in power. Although there is evidence to suggest that resources for the ABM programme were coming under threat about this time,68 there are no indications that the Soviet missile defence effort was seriously at risk. Some of Gorbachev’s leading advisers made their opposition to missile defences very clear, and regarded the value of the Galosh ABM system for Soviet security to be negligible, if not negative. Knowing as we do that Gorbachev shared many of these analysts’

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views on security issues, why did he not simply have the Galosh system dismantled and bring the missile defence research and development effort to a halt? This would have earned the Soviet Union even more praise from the West and would have enabled Gorbachev to redirect the resources devoted to missile defences into more constructive projects. The answer to this question lies in the dynamics of internal Soviet politics. As Gorbachev discovered, the Soviet political and economic systems were heavily bureaucratic and highly resistant to change. 69 This was particularly true of the Soviet defence industry, where the development and deployment of a weapons system, once authorized, would generate its own forward momentum from those with a stake in its existence. In order to bring an end to a long-established programme such as the Galosh ABM system Gorbachev would have had to invest considerable time, effort and political capital in overcoming the deeply entrenched self-interests of a myriad institutions. While the Soviet leader showed himself willing and able to do battle with self-interest and bureaucracy in the name of reform, by the time that Gorbachev was probably in a position to curtail the Soviet missile defence programme, more pressing problems claimed his attention. In the late 1980s and early 1990s the effects of perestroika were beginning to be felt and were generating enormous criticism, not only from conservatives who wanted to turn back the clock but also from liberals who believed that Gorbachev had not gone far enough and fast enough down the path of reform. The limited economic reforms which had been introduced exacerbated rather than alleviated the shortages of foodstuffs and consumer goods which had become central concerns for most Soviet citizens. At the same time Moscow was facing a groundswell of demands from several of the USSR’s republics, first for greater autonomy and later for independence. The newly-created Congress of People’s Deputies, chosen in the first multiple candidate elections since 1917, provided an ideal platform for Gorbachev’s critics from all sides and contributed to the impression that the Kremlin was no longer in control of events. The armed forces was yet another source of criticism for perestroika. Many in the military leadership were deeply unhappy with Gorbachev’s approach to security and to the consequences of his New Political Thinking for the USSR. A series of concessions in arms control negotiations, unilateral cuts in Soviet forces and finally the loss of Eastern Europe were all seen as factors which had undermined Soviet security. If Gorbachev had actively sought the dismantling of the

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Galosh ABM system or brought a halt to research and development for missile defences at this stage, he would have exposed himself even further to criticism from the right at a time when he was particularly vulnerable to attack from that direction. Fortunately for Gorbachev, he was not required to do battle over the Soviet ABM programme. The goodwill which had been generated in the West by Gorbachev’s new style of diplomacy and his actions in other areas allowed him to take a leaf from Khrushchev’s book and substitute words for deeds in the case of missile defences. We can see an illustration of this practice in the way that the Soviets handled the disputed Krasnoyarsk radar which, as we have seen, the Americans had long claimed was a violation of the ABM Treaty. Early in Gorbachev’s leadership Soviet officials offered to halt construction in Krasnoyarsk in exchange for US renunciation of plans to modernize radars in Greenland and Britain, although without acknowledging that the Krasnoyarsk facility was a treaty violation. By 1987 Moscow evidently felt the need to display some willingness to act on this issue. In February Georgi Arbatov said publicly that work on the radar had been ‘deliberately halted’, while in April a senior Soviet military officer reported that the Soviet government was willing to destroy it even though it was intended for space tracking. 70 In September a group of representatives from the US Congress were pemitted to visit the site, and the following month Soviet officials told their American counterparts that work at Krasnoyarsk was being suspended for a year. 71 In September 1989 Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze announced during a visit to the United States that the Soviets had decided to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar in order to demonstrate that Moscow was sincere in its wish to avert competition in missile defences. One month later he admitted publicly that the radar did indeed violate the ABM Treaty.72 Progress on the Krasnoyarsk radar was remarkably slow given the speed with which Gorbachev had demonstrated that he could act. In fact although Gorbachev did not sanction an expansion of the Soviet ABM programme to compete with SDI, neither did he preside over its demise, a step which would have been consistent with his views about security and his priorities for the allocation of resources. Instead he avoided serious confrontations with the military leadership over this issue, reserving his energies for those policy battles which could not be postponed. It is likely that he would have returned to the Soviet missile defence programme and probably would have inflicted serious damage on it had he remained in power for a longer period.

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The end of the Cold War and the relaxation of East–West tensions did not mean an end to the perceived need for missile defences among some Soviet observers. As we have seen, in the final years of the Gorbachev leadership there were signs of concern about the military threat posed to the USSR by third parties, and a number of military officers, scientists and academics viewed some form of ABM system as a means of addressing it. The issue of third party threats and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was illustrated for many of these missile defence proponents by the 1990–91 Gulf War, when Saddam Hussein used Scud missiles against his opponents in the Middle East.

Soviet ABM technology Given the Gorbachev leadership’s public and principled opposition to any form of missile defences, it is very striking just how many of the ABM policy decisions made in the years before Gorbachev became General Secretary continued to be carried out after 1985. The deployed ABM system around Moscow continued to be upgraded and research and development efforts were observed in each of the other two areas with possible missile defence applications identified in Chapter 6: explorations of the ABM capabilities of surface-to-air missiles, and research into exotic technologies. By the time that Gorbachev came to power significant progress had been made towards upgrading and augmenting the Galosh ABM system. Two improved missile interceptors, the SH-04 and the shortrange SH-08, had already been introduced in the early 1980s, giving the Moscow ABM similar capabilities to that of the US Safeguard system of the late 1960s and early 1970s. 73 The focus of attention turned next to increasing the number of antimissile launchers towards the 100 permitted by the 1974 protocol to the ABM Treaty, with the 100th interceptor installed by 1989.74 Construction work also continued on the very large ‘Pillbox’ phased-array radar located at Pushkino, north of Moscow. This radar was built to provide overall battle management for the Galosh ABM system. It would receive missile-tracking data from Soviet early warning systems and was believed to be capable of tracking as many as 1000–2000 targets simultaneously as well as guiding the long-range interceptors to their targets. 75 It became fully operational in 1990.76 Work on the construction of the controversial large phased-array radar in Krasnoyarsk region of Siberia also continued during the second half of the 1980s.

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The modified Moscow ABM was believed by Western analysts to represent significant improvements on the pre-Treaty Galosh system, especially in the use of underground silos to house the interceptor missiles, the improved early warning capabilities, the more extensive use of phased-array radars, and the addition of a second layer of endoatmospheric interceptors. But the most important problems of the old system remained unsolved, primarily the vulnerability of the system’s large radars to attack and blackout effects. The limitations of the mechanical steering of its guidance and tracking radars meant the system could still be easily overwhelmed by a heavy and sustained attack especially if missiles with multiple warheads were used, while there is little or no evidence to suggest that the Soviets made significant improvements in the advanced computer technology necessary for the rapid processing of radar signals. In sum, the modified Moscow system still provided only a very limited missile defence capability. Work on upgrading the capabilities of surface-to-air missiles continued during Gorbachev’s leadership. By the end of the 1980s more advanced versions had been deployed of two of the Soviet SAMs which were believed by Western analysts to have BMD capabilities. A mobile version of the SA-10, described as being roughly equivalent to the US Patriot surface-to-air missile, was under development from the early 1980s77 and was deployed from 1987.78 By 1989 the SA-10 system was believed to make up about 15 per cent of all Soviet strategic SAM launchers, and was sited primarily near Moscow. 79 An improved version of the high-performance, mobile SA-12, the ‘Giant’ was also deployed during these years. Research into advanced or exotic technologies with possible missile defence applications evidently continued during the late 1980s. During Gorbachev’s leadership there were repeated allegations in the West that the Soviets possessed operational ground-based lasers capable of reaching satellites in low orbits,80 and the USSR was attributed with as many as nine facilities for laser development as well as with prototypes for ground-based lasers capable of attacking satellites.81 Confirmation of assertions by Western intelligence agencies that such work was still being conducted was provided by the deputy director of IMEMO, O. Bikov. Bikov was a frequent participant in the SDI/ABM debates, and in 1988 he acknowledged that research within the permitted boundaries of the ABM Treaty was being conducted in the USSR on a basis similar to that of SDI. 82 But Soviet research and development efforts apparently met with little success in developing a laser beam weapon effective against ballistic missiles. The Soviets concentrated on

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areas which the US had abandoned as less promising and less likely to lead to deployable weapons, such as gas dynamic and electrical discharge lasers. And although the USSR may have built prototypes of ground-based lasers, they were not believed to have had much success in developing lighter-weight, fuel-efficient lasers with greater potential for space-basing.83 Similarly, while the Soviets had developed a powerful magneto-hydrodynamic generator and were thought to have made advances in large segmented mirrors,84 a 1982 study by the US General Accounting Office concluded that the USSR was up to ten years behind the US in most technologies related to space-based lasers, such as optical systems, miniaturization, computers, light-weight spacecraft and microelectronics.85 Finally, despite repeated claims during the 1980s that the Soviets had an operational ground-based anti-satellite laser, a delegation of US scientists visiting the Soviet laser facility at Sary Shagan in 1989 concluded that this laser facility, at least, could not pose any threat to US satellites.86 The possibility of using particle beams as weapons in ballistic missile defence reportedly received a great deal of attention in the Soviet Union despite the fact that work in this area was thought to be considerably less advanced than work on lasers. Although in the mid-1980s the US Department of Defense estimated that the USSR might then be capable of testing a prototype weapon intended to disrupt the electronics of satellites,87 a variety of organizations which monitored Soviet research and development activities (including the US Air Force and the Office of Science and Technology) consistently concluded that the Soviets were not even close to an operational system using particle beams.88 Exploration into the use of kinetic energy and radio-frequency technologies as bases for BMD were also reportedly under way in the Soviet Union, although the evidence for the levels of development reached and their feasibility as weapons was even more fragmentary (and contradictory) than is the case for laser and particle beam research. Allegations of Soviet research into kinetic energy weapons in the 1980s asserted a likely capability of deploying ‘in the near future’ a space-based system capable of attack over short ranges, probably using manoeuvring satellites. It was thought, however, that such a weapon would only be effective against other satellites, and that it would be some time (beyond the year 2000) before a similar long-range weapon could be developed.89 The Soviets were also reportedly strong in the technologies appropriate for radio frequency (or electromagnetic pulse) weapons intended to overload electronic receivers of missiles (or satellites).90

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The evidence of ABM policy implementation during the Gorbachev years is mixed. There are, on the one hand, abundant signs of the continuation of work under way or planned for years, including research and development in areas which Western observers judged extremely unlikely to produce successful results. This suggests that the system of weapons development and deployment was very strong indeed. The forward momentum of projects once under way, underpinned by the entrenched interests of those with a stake in their continuation, managed to evade the reforming zeal of the Gorbachev leadership and to cling to enough resources to give a convincing performance of business as usual. This is doubly impressive in the light of Gorbachev’s emphasis on improving relations with the United States, which depended so heavily upon arms control and upon convincing Washington that the Soviets’ intentions were benign. On the other hand, Gorbachev did manage to slow some of the forward momentum of the missile defence effort, in particular with regard to halting work on the Krasnoyarsk radar. More importantly, though, the Gorbachev leadership prevented an expansion in the Soviet ABM effort in response to the Strategic Defense Initiative. His decision that the Soviet response to SDI would be asymmetrical and non-imitative permitted Moscow to avoid a costly and open-ended technology race.

Conclusions Soviet missile defence policy during the Gorbachev period provides an excellent example of the uneasy and at times contradictory coexistence of old and new which characterized the perestroika years. On the one hand, the goals which Gorbachev set for economic reform and the priorities dictated by his approach to security and international relations were formidable obstacles in the path of any expansion of the Soviet ABM programme. Gorbachev regarded a substantial diversion of resources from the armed forces and the defence industry as vital for the success of economic reform as well as for improving relations with other countries, in particular with the United States. Given Washington’s history of concern about the scope and intentions of the Soviet missile defence effort, Gorbachev would have had little to gain and much to lose by strengthening the USSR’s ABM programme. The Americans needed no encouragement in their pursuit of a space-based antimissile system and would probably have viewed an accelerated Soviet ABM effort as an excellent reason to press ahead with SDI.

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The increased role of civilian analysts as officials and advisers with input into national security policy also discouraged a more extensive Soviet missile defence effort. These analysts had helped to develop concepts of New Political Thinking such as mutual security and reasonable sufficiency and were firm in their belief that missile defences were destabilizing and would undermine rather than enhance security. The decline in the prestige of the armed forces and the loss of their previously unchallenged status as defence policy advisers diminished the impact of the arguments presented by the strongest advocates of antimissile systems. The impact of these new and even revolutionary features of Gorbachev’s security policy on the Soviet ABM programme were mitigated, however, by the persistence of old ways of thinking and old patterns of behaviour. The ability of the Soviet system to resist attempts at reform from above was remarkable and helps to explain why the changes to Soviet ABM policy actually implemented during Gorbachev’s leadership were so limited. Making some reductions in resource allocations, determining that the response to SDI would be asymmetrical and admitting guilt about the Krasnoyarsk radar are really not very impressive policy outcomes given the high profile of missile defence issues during much of this period. Gorbachev’s failure to achieve more radical changes in Soviet ABM policy can also be ascribed to the fact that the focus of his efforts on this issue was less on effecting change at home than on using the ABM issue to shape international – especially American – views about the USSR. Viewed from this perspective the Krasnoyarsk radar admission was a significant success. Shevardnadze’s announcement about Krasnoyarsk and his pledge to dismantle the radar brought political gains in the shape of American goodwill which more than outweighed the strategic loss of a facility not yet operational. Traditionalist views of strategy, future war and missile defences persisted during the Gorbachev period although a degree of overlap arose between the arguments of traditionalists and progressives, with some military officers making both progressive and traditionalist points with apparently equal conviction. This indication of an evolution of views is borne out by the appearance of a group of missile defence proponents towards the end of this period. This was a very diverse group of people who shared no obvious common interest in advocating ABM systems, and it included some who approached the question from a progressive position. These were reluctant ABM supporters, who appeared to be searching for ways of creating security in the post-Cold War world.

8 Missile Defences and Yeltsin’s Russia

Although the ending of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union significantly changed the context of relations between Moscow and Washington, during these years missile defences continued to play an important role in Russian diplomacy. In his first address to the United Nations Security Council as President of an independent, postSoviet Russia, Boris Yeltsin called for the Americans to join Russia in a research and development effort to create a new global system to protect their territories from attack by nuclear missiles. Yeltsin’s speech was intended to send a signal to Washington that Moscow’s attitude towards the West was friendly and that it was willing to cooperate in all fields, even those which were formerly the most sensitive. By the end of Yeltsin’s second term, however, this proposed cooperation on missile defences had not materialized in any substantial form and instead Russia was under pressure from the United States to agree to amendments to the ABM Treaty which would permit the Americans to deploy a theatre missile defence – a development which many Russians feared would be the first step towards a national missile defence for the United States. Throughout the 1990s there were considerable and contradictory pressures on Russian ABM policy. Supporters of an expanded Russian missile defence effort were more vociferous than ever, referring in their arguments to an increase in regional threats to Russia as well as cool relations with an expanded NATO alliance. The armed forces – many of whose analysts favoured missile defences – were in a stronger position to influence security policy than their civilian counterparts, who no longer enjoyed the direct access to policymakers which many had experienced during the Gorbachev years. There was at the same time, however, deep concern that any statements from Moscow indicating 151

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an increase in the Russian missile defence programme would further undermine the ABM Treaty and encourage the Americans to move still faster towards a national defence of their own. But the deciding factor which prevented a significant Russian ABM effort during the 1990s was the continual financial crisis experienced by the state budget, which could barely afford to maintain the existing Galosh system deployed around Moscow, let alone embark on a new missile defence project.

Politics and policymaking in post-Soviet Russia During Yelstin’s leadership political life in Russia underwent some remarkable transitions.1 In some respects politics in Yeltsin’s Russia was more democratic than at any time in the Soviet period. Regular elections for the State Duma (parliament) involving multiple candidates and multiple political parties became an accepted fact of life. Russia gained a constitution approved by referendum, an independent judiciary including a constitutional court and its President successfully campaigned for re-election in 1996. But while some institutions and practices have developed in a democratic manner, the same cannot be said for policymaking, in particular for policy decisions affecting national security, which continued to be made by a small group of ministers and advisers who surrounded the President. Although Yeltsin had risen through the ranks of the Communist Party, serving as First Party Secretary in Sverdlovsk and later leading Moscow’s Party organization, during the perestroika period he gained a reputation for being a champion of the ordinary people. Yeltsin’s opposition to the Party’s practice of providing a comfortable and privileged life for its elite won him much popularity. Although his impatience with the slow pace of reform and his criticism of Gorbachev at a meeting of the Central Committee in 1987 cost him his high-profile post, he managed to rebuild his political career, increasingly looking outside the Party for allies and eventually breaking with it entirely, dramatically resigning his membership in 1990 and going on in the following year to win the newly-established post of President of the Russian Federation. The early months following the failure of the August 1991 coup attempt was a time of enormous optimism for many in Russia. Yeltsin was widely seen both at home and abroad as a democrat and a reformer. But in spite of the promise of a new, post-Soviet era, old political habits proved hard to overcome. Yeltsin and his team of reform-minded ministers and advisers soon became locked in

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lengthy and increasingly bitter disputes with parliament over the extent and pace of economic reform. The parliament took full advantage of its extensive powers under the constitution, which had been drawn up during the Soviet period, to overturn Yeltsin’s decisions and to influence the composition of his cabinet. With neither side willing to compromise, the conflict between the executive and legislative branches came to a head in September 1993, when Yeltsin dissolved parliament, suspended his Vice President Aleksander Rutskoi (who had by then joined the ranks of the President’s critics) and took emergency powers. A small group of parliamentary deputies led by Rutskoi and Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov barricaded themselves inside the White House (where parliament had been meeting) and called for support from the people and the armed forces. Very little support was forthcoming, however, and in early October the military, acting under Yeltsin’s orders, stormed the building and arrested the rebels. A new constitution, this time heavily favouring the presidency in its allocation of powers, was quickly drafted and presented to the electorate in December 1993, coinciding with elections for a new parliament, to be known as the State Duma. But if Yeltsin had hoped that the new parliament would be more amenable than its predecessor, he was to be disappointed. The political parties which were the biggest winners in December 1993 were not those which favoured more radical economic reforms but Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. From this point onwards there was little hope for a constructive working relationship between the executive and the legislative branches. Yeltsin took full advantage of his new, extensive powers to rule by decree, while the Duma was reduced to a forum for the airing of opinions, usually those critical of the President. The Duma deputies organized committees, held hearings, conducted debates and passed legislation, but they knew that the real power was wielded in the Kremlin, not in the refurbished Gosplan building which housed the Duma. In an echo of politics and policymaking in the Brezhnev period, a dramatic increase in the powers of the Russian Presidency during the 1990s coincided with the steady decline in the health and abilities of the holder of that office. From 1995 onwards Boris Yeltsin’s physical condition deteriorated considerably. With the help of modern medicine Yeltsin managed to give the impression that he was healthy and vigorous long enough to win re-election in 1996, but almost immediately after his inauguration he was whisked away for urgent heart

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surgery. Throughout his second term of office Yeltsin was an ailing and enfeebled figure, who disappeared from public view for long stretches at a time. The course of Yeltin’s physical decline was accompanied by a political metamorphosis which is no less startling. The outsider of the 1980s became in the 1990s a holder of enormous power and defender of the status quo. The once-populist Yeltsin became a remote figure distant from the people who elected him. Once in office he who was formerly the harshest critic of the Soviet elite’s comfortable life of privilege was himself accused of accepting bribes from foreign businesses. The democrat and reformer showed less and less interest in supporting principled positions, until, in his final years in office, Yeltsin’s actions were apparently motivated by little more than the desire to hold on to power for its own sake as he sacked a series of prime ministers apparently because he distrusted their popularity and doubted the extent of their loyalty to himself. Unlike Gorbachev (or, indeed, any of his recent predecessors in the Kremlin) Boris Yeltsin was never noted for articulating distinctive views about security, defence policy or Russia’s relations with the rest of the world. There was no set of guiding principles for Russian foreign and security policy comparable to New Political Thinking, détente, or peaceful coexistence. Instead Yeltsin apparently had a purely utilitarian approach to international relations and was motivated by a general desire to promote good relations with other countries in order to extract maximum short-term benefits for Russia, whether those came in the form of economic support from the West or much-needed cash for the ailing defence industry from arms sales to developing countries. Also unlike Gorbachev, Yeltsin was not interested in ideas or abstract concepts. He did not surround himself with academics and intellectuals or seek out the advice of independent experts on issues related to security policy. Although a number of the liberal academics who had helped to shape perestroika did indeed flock to Yeltsin’s camp during the final years of Gorbachev’s rule when Yeltsin appeared to have the more impressive democratic and reformist credentials, their allegiance to the Russian President was, in most cases, short-lived. Many soon departed, disillusioned with Yeltsin’s failure to deliver radical political and economic reform, and with them went the strongest and most articulate advocacy close to the President of a pro-Western Russian foreign policy. In the absence of a set of guiding principles, Russia’s security policy was influenced by shifts in the popular and political climate and by the consequences of another feature of the transformations of this period:

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the concentration of policymaking power in the hands of a small number of those in Yeltsin’s inner circle. Formally Russian security policy was discussed in the Security Council, which was originally set up as an advisory body to the President but swiftly expanded considerably in size, scope and powers. The Security Council’s mandate was a broad one which encompassed all issues related to any form of security, from environmental degradation to the stability of the currency to the threat of war (although after October 1996 defence policy issues were discussed in a separate body known as the Defence Council). Its composition was flexible and reflected the range of its responsibilities, but regular members would include the Minister of the Interior, Minister of Defence, Minister of Foreign Affairs and of course the President, who chaired its meetings. But although there was a formal structure for deliberating security policy issues, in practice policy on defence and other matters was influenced most of all by the agendas of those close to Boris Yeltsin. The position of individual actors or institutions and their influence on policy decisions was thus determined to a large extent by whether they were in favour with the President’s inner circle, which at times included his former bodyguard, Alexander Korzhakov, and members of his immediate family. It is not surprising that many Western and Russian analysts alike regard foreign policymaking in Yeltsin’s Russia as even more secretive and opaque than it was during the Soviet period.2 The absence of a particular policy approach on the part of the executive together with the decline in the position of civilian security advisers compared with the Gorbachev period offered the Russian armed forces an opportunity to regain their former influence over the direction of security policy. The military’s bid for a return to their old role was enhanced by Yeltsin’s reliance upon the support of the armed forces, in particular to carry out the October 1993 assault on the parliamentary rebels in the White House. There was real doubt at the time that the military leadership would agree to carry out Yeltsin’s orders and intervene on his side in what a number of senior officers viewed as a dispute between two political factions.3 The military’s crucial role in October 1993 put Yeltsin in the debt of the armed forces and helped to give the Defence Ministry greater leverage over Russian security policy decisions. The Russian military leadership was most successful in using this leverage to influence the development of strategic thought, including military doctrine, and the identification of threats to Russian security.4 This greater military influence was most often linked to a more active and assertive Russian foreign policy and a greater willingness by

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Moscow to intervene militarily in peacekeeping missions in the ‘near abroad’ (other former Soviet states). The end of Communist Party rule is another important factor which permitted the armed forces to play a more active part in political life. The dissolution of the Party’s Main Political Administration, the organization responsible for ensuring the subordination and loyalty of the armed forces to civilian authority, was vital in this respect.5 This is yet another case of post-Soviet Russia reaping what Gorbachev sowed during the 1980s. The military was not immune from the short-lived but heady enthusiasm for political activism which swept the Soviet Union in the final years of Gorbachev’s leadership. In the place of boring lectures, grudgingly attended, political education in the units became opportunities for real discussion and debate about the events transforming Soviet politics. The experience of the Gorbachev years increased considerably the political consciousness of many officers. After the collapse of the USSR, the absence of strictly defined boundaries between military and civilian responsibilities permitted the armed forces as an institution as well as individual soldiers to become more involved in Russian political life. At the same time the perception increased within the military that it was their individual and collective duty to become more politically active in order to safeguard the future of the armed forces and the country. As a result officers stood for parliament, with varying degrees of success, and organized themselves into groups to press their concerns on Russia’s political leaders.6 But while the military in the 1990s came to be treated by politicians and political parties as an important constituency (especially during those crucial last weeks before an election), the armed forces had only limited success in translating that attention into specific gains. Perhaps the most striking illustration of this point is the fact that the military was no longer able to command the lion’s share of the country’s resources. Although the Soviet military leadership may have always argued for yet more resources, by Soviet standards the armed forces was an extraordinarily well-funded institution. The high degree of secrecy which still surrounds Russian military spending make it difficult to estimate what proportion of Russia’s budget or its gross domestic product is devoted to defence, but although analysts may disagree about the details, there is no doubt that the amount of money which Russia spent on its armed forces and defence industry declined considerably in the 1990s.7 While the Russian military of the 1990s was a great deal smaller than its Soviet predecessor, the state nevertheless did not provide sufficient funds for it to pay its electricity bills and feed

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and clothe its servicemen and women, let alone maintain existing weapons systems and commission the development of new ones. 8 Although numerous political parties and Duma deputies were happy to claim the mantle of champion of the armed forces, when it came to determining the budget parliament resisted the temptation to follow the Soviet example. Since 1992 Russia lurched from one economic crisis to another, experiencing enormous difficulty in collecting sufficient tax revenue to fund any of its public services or indeed pay the salaries of state employees in a timely manner. Taking into consideration the wider context, it is not surprising that the Russian military was not an economic heavyweight. The state of politics and policymaking during the Yeltsin period has a number of implications for Russian missile defence policy. First, the political leadership itself apparently had no strong views about missile defences in general or the Russian ABM programme in particular. Second, most of those academics and civilian analysts who during the Gorbachev leadership were the strongest opponents of missile defence were absent from security policymaking circles in the 1990s. Third, the military leadership was in a good position to influence the Yeltsin administration on such questions as the source and nature of threats to Russian security, although the Defence Ministry could not hope that its recommendations for countering those threats would be funded very generously. This suggests that the political leadership was open to the arguments of the armed forces on an issue such as missile defences, especially if ABM could be used as a diplomatic tool to extract economic or political benefits from the United States or to further the goals of Russian foreign policy.

Ballistic missile defence in Russian strategic thought One of the most striking developments in discussions about missile defences in strategic thought during the Yeltsin period is the open manner in which they were conducted. As we have seen, Soviet analysts writing after the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972 were constrained in their comments about Soviet missile defence programmes by the political leadership’s commitment to that agreement. As a result, until the very last years of the Gorbachev period, advocates and even sceptics of the Soviet ABM effort had to frame their remarks either in very general terms or as comments on developments elsewhere, particularly in the United States. During the 1990s, however, there was a great deal of open discussion in military and civilian publications alike about the

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benefits and drawbacks of the Russian ABM programme. The opinion groupings of traditionalists and progressives, which we have seen throughout this book, continued to be visible in Russian discussions about strategy, future war and missile defences. Traditionalists still warned of the likelihood of devastating future war beginning with a surprise attack and waged against an enemy equipped with the most modern weapons known to man. They were deeply concerned about the need to protect Russia’s industrial capability, its military forces and command structure and some proportion of its population from whatever weapons the enemy would employ against them. The arguments of progressives, on the other hand, were variations on those we saw in Chapter 7 which were made in connection with Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking. They placed a high priority on preserving international strategic stability and opposed any action by Russia (such as expanding its missile defence programme) which could undermine that state of affairs. Most of those who expressed traditionalist views were officers or had close links with the armed forces or the defence industry, while the majority of progressives were civilian analysts or scientists. Service loyalties provide a better predictor of officers’ views in this period than was the case in Chapter 7 and indeed in most previous periods. Many (although by no means all) of those who argued strongly in favour of expanding Russia’s ABM programme were associated with the Air Defence Forces. To a large extent this can be explained by the restructuring which began in the Russian armed forces during the 1990s. This reform was intended to streamline the military by reducing the number of services from five to just three. The Air Defence Forces was the earliest and most visible loser in this process. In 1992 the Air-Space Forces were created as a new interservice force and by early 1998 it had been given many of the responsibilities, troops and weapons which were formerly part of Air Defence, including ABM or ‘space missile defence’ as it was termed.9 Some of the arguments about missile defences became caught up in Air Defence officers’ pleas to permit their service to survive. Members of the Air Defence Forces were looking for ways to impress the importance of their mission upon leading figures in the Defence Ministry, and highlighting the dangers of ‘air-space’ attacks by enemy missiles was one way of making this point. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of Communist Party rule in the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the USSR caused many analysts to come to the conclusion that Russia and the Western countries

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would no longer pose any military threat to one another, and could become friends and even allies. This belief was reflected in Russian military publications in the early 1990s, which were remarkably optimistic about the future of Russian security. Officers asserted that Russia had no enemies in the West, that there was considerable scope for security cooperation with the United States and other NATO members, and that Russian security policy in the future would be guided by the principles of mutual security, reasonable sufficiency and defensive defence introduced in Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking. 10 This degree of optimism soon faded, however, and by the mid-1990s it was rare to find articles in Russian military publications extolling the benefits to Russia of the ‘new world order’. By the end of the decade the balance of opinion within the armed forces had shifted, and it was far more common for the United States and NATO to be described as continuing to pose a significant military threat to Russia, albeit among other, postCold War threats such as radical Islam, Turkey’s interests in the Caucasus, the proliferation of weapons in regions close to Russia and the political, social and economic instability in many of the other former Soviet states.11 Many of the analysts who argued that the West was still a source of danger to Russia justified their position by referring to the fact that NATO countries not only continued to possess nuclear and other powerful weapons but were also devoting considerable resources to their modernization.12 And although there may no longer be an ideological struggle between Russia and the West, events perceived in Moscow as anti-Russian (such as the eastwards expansion of NATO and Americanled bombing campaigns against Iraq and Serbia) created political and diplomatic differences with Western countries and the United States in particular which could develop into military confrontations. 13 If an armed conflict should break out between Russia and the West, many military analysts suggested that it would follow the pattern established during the 1990–91 Gulf War against Iraq. Russian strategists have come to view the Gulf War as establishing many of the principles on which future war involving the West would be fought. These include: the use during the initial period of heavy bombardment from the air (and from space in the event of the use of ballistic missiles or even space-based offensive weapons); the use of satellites in providing intelligence about the opponent’s military capabilities as well as in relaying targeting information for missile defence systems; the extensive use of the most technologically advanced weapons (such as cruise missiles); and the limited use of ground troops at a relatively late stage in the

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conflict, essentially in order to secure gains already achieved through other means.14 With this model in mind, a number of Russian officers described the need for some form of missile defence capability in order to repel the opponent’s attacks from the air and space which would occur early in such a conflict. 15 In many respects, the Gulf War provided Russian military strategists with an updated version of the scenario which their Soviet predecessors developed in the 1950s, in which they envisioned a cataclysmic war against a Western alliance, beginning with devastating air and missile strikes (possibly taking Russia by surprise) and incorporating the most technologically advanced weapons. The solutions devised by Russian officers in the 1990s have a great deal in common with the original version of the traditionalist views which we first encountered in Chapter 1. The protection of key sites was treated in Russian military literature of the 1990s as of the utmost importance. Analysts warned that the failure to take adequate steps to counter an enemy’s air and missile strikes could result in the loss of Russia’s strategic parity with the West and this in turn would diminish the deterrent capability of Russia’s nuclear forces.16 They argued that a weak air and missile defence capability might tempt an enemy to attempt a disarming first strike against Russia’s strategic nuclear forces, and that ABM could play a vital role in ensuring the survival of the country’s retaliatory strike capability. 17 Russian strategists in the 1990s were also far more realistic about the extent of protection which existing or prospective missile defence systems could provide, recognizing the impossibility of creating an impenetrable wall of defence which would keep out all the enemy’s attacking missiles and aircraft. Instead they argued for a concentration of defensive efforts, focussed on providing protection for Russia’s strategic forces, its vital political and military command centres and essential industrial and energy capabilities.18 An excellent illustration of the more open discussions about the benefits of a Russian missile defence system in future war during the 1990s can be seen in a 1997 article by General-Colonel V.F. Miruk, who was at that time the First Deputy Commander of the Air Defence Forces. In this article Miruk put the case for ABM forcefully and eloquently, using many of the same arguments in favour of missile defences made by an earlier champion of ABM, General Talensky, back in 1964. Miruk wrote that deterrence which relies solely on offensive weapons is flawed because it assumes that all the parties involved are reasonable and will act with restraint, and this is an assumption which

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no responsible state leaders can afford to make of their potential enemies. Moreover, without a defensive capability a state can only respond to an attack with retaliatory action, which does nothing to prevent potentially devastating damage to the state’s own territory. A potential enemy would only be deterred from attacking by the understanding that such an action would be truly futile – it would not inflict the damage intended.19 Progressive analysts in the 1990s were no more convinced by this argument than their predecessors in the 1960s. They continued to believe that the basis of deterrence is the ability of each side to inflict enormous damage on the other, even after suffering a surprise first strike.20 Far from ensuring strategic stability and international security, progressives in Yeltsin’s Russia warned that a country’s possession of ABM capabilities could cast doubt on the effectiveness of its potential opponent’s offensive weapons and thus undermine deterrence.21 This danger is particularly acute at a time when there is a relatively small number of strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the major powers.22 Therefore any new impetus towards missile defences would be the catalyst for another round in the arms race, to the detriment of every state’s security.23 Offensive forces continue to enjoy the technical advantage, although a state facing what its leaders believed to be an effective or even partly-effective ABM system would undertake a considerable expansion of the offensive weapons in its arsenal in order to be sure of offsetting the opponent’s defences, thus reversing the recent trend of reducing strategic nuclear weapons.24 Indeed, some Russian analysts arguing the progressive position pointed out that the success in reducing the strategic nuclear arsenals of the major powers ironically helped to create pressures for missile defences: with fewer missiles to be countered, ABM systems begin to look more feasible.25 There were also sharp differences of opinion on another issue related to missile defences: the research and development of missile defence technologies to be carried out jointly by Russian and American scientists. The possibility of a joint Russian–American ABM effort was raised in Boris Yeltsin’s January 1992 speech to the United Nations Security Council, when he called for the two countries with the largest nuclear weapons arsenals to work together to create some form of global defence against the threat posed by third parties. Russian military and civilian analysts alike were sceptical of this scheme, although for rather different reasons. Military analysts tend to favour the principle of a multi-national missile defence network, possibly even providing global

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coverage. Several articles in the Russian military press in the late 1990s argued that a defensive system for any country in the world which chose to use it should be developed under the auspices of some international organization such as the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 26 Such a comprehensive system would be designed to provide safeguards against accidental launch or the use of nuclear missiles by terrorists. But while a number of Russian military strategists supported the creation of such a global system, they were not convinced that a joint project with the US was the way to achieve it, chiefly because they doubted that the Americans were acting in good faith. Instead they warned that the US government was only interested in exploiting the hard-won technical knowledge of Russian science,27 and that through this work some of Russia’s defence secrets could be lost.28 Most civilian analysts, by contrast, saw no advantage in the development of missile defences to provide protection at the global level or any other. They warned that such projects would violate the ABM Treaty, undermine deterrence and strategic stability and even provide an impetus to the development of space-based offensive weapons.29 Even more worrying than a joint missile defence effort was the possibility that the Americans would simply develop and deploy their own missile defence system. This scenario was one which concerned all the analysts who wrote about this question, whether they were civilians or military officers, progressives or traditionalists. There was widespread agreement that US interest in ABM grew rapidly during the late 1990s, and that the Americans already had the technological means to deploy a defence against attack from shorter-range missiles and would soon be able to introduce a nationwide ABM system designed for territorial protection. Differences arose over the likelihood of such a deployment in the near future and how Russia should respond. Military strategists tended to emphasize the impressive nature of the Americans’ ABM technology and its advanced state (especially in comparison to its Russian equivalents) and to highlight the maximalist ambitions of some in Congress for the speedy deployment of a national missile defence. The successful tests of US ABM components were detailed at some length, 30 and the lavish degree of American funding for its research and development effort was emphasized. 31 A persistent theme in Russian military publications in the late 1990s was the imminent nature of an American ABM deployment. Analysts warned that Congress was eager for such a system, citing, for example,

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the approval of a bill by the US Senate in 1999 which authorized the creation of a national ABM system.32 Washington’s interest in identifying distinctions between tactical and strategic missile defence capabilities was seen as another indication that the Americans intended to develop their own ABM system. In November 1993 US representatives to the Standing Consultative Commission established by the ABM Treaty raised this issue with their Russian counterparts, who were reluctant to create what they regarded as artificial and arbitrary distinctions between tactical and strategic missile defences. As some Russian observers pointed out, many of the components of a tactical missile defence system (including the interceptor missiles) would have some capability against strategic missiles. 33 The Americans’ persistence in pursuing this issue was interpreted by many Russian analysts as a sign of US ambitions for a national missile defence system. According to this view, once Washington secured Russia’s agreement on a demarcation of tactical and strategic ABM (which was given at the Helsinki summit in March 1997), the US could deploy a tactical missile defence system and make substantial progress on strategic ABM components while still formally adhering to the ABM Treaty. Russian fears would thus be lulled and Moscow would be less likely to take countermeasures than if the Americans had openly withdrawn from the ABM Treaty.34 Few Russian analysts writing on this subject doubted that the US would undermine the ABM Treaty in the near future. This might come as a result of the Americans acting in defiance of the spirit of the agreement, bullying Russia into accepting amendments which fundamentally dilute its force, or simply withdrawing from it altogether. There was also widespread agreement that such a development would damage Russian security and international strategic stability, and that the fate of the ABM Treaty was closely linked with that of the START process. The continued adherence of both the US and Russia to the ABM Treaty has been a vital precondition for the radical reductions in both sides’ strategic offensive nuclear forces specified in the START I and START II agreements. It is deeply ironic, then, that the very reductions in strategic offensive forces which the ABM Treaty permitted have also put its future in danger. With far fewer and less sophisticated missiles in each country’s arsenal, missile defence technologies again became more feasible from a technical point of view, giving both the US and Russia new incentives to develop their ABM capabilities. The important difference between the two countries was that while

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the Americans might have been able to afford to fund another investigation into missile defence technologies, the Russians most certainly could not. Russian analysts differed considerably over how Russia should respond to the renewed American interest in missile defences. Some (including some civilians) favoured an active response, urging Russia to expand either its offensive weapons arsenal in order to overwhelm any US ABM system or increase its defensive capabilities. 35 Indeed, one such article went even further, recommending that Moscow seriously consider withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, the START process and even the INF and CFE Treaties.36 But most Russian observers disagreed, advising instead that Moscow make use of diplomacy and political pressure to keep the US within the ABM Treaty regime and prevent its interest in missile defences from getting out of control.37 They pointed out that Moscow had little ability to shape US policy decisions in its favour, but that hostile rhetoric from Russia could easily tip the balance in precisely the opposite direction. Russian withdrawal from the START process or a Russian buildup of offensive or defensive weapons would strengthen the position of those American ‘hawks’ who favoured the construction of a national ABM for the territorial protection of the United States. Russia’s only hope of preventing the erosion of its strategic deterrent forces was to be flexible and cooperative in its dealings with Washington, and to use continued Russian participation in the arms control and reduction process as a bargaining chip to prevent the Americans from deploying a national missile defence network.38 In addition to the role of missile defences in Russian views of future war, concerns about the implications of joint research and development projects with the Americans and deep disquiet over the prospect of a unilateral US ABM effort, some Russian military officers in the 1990s also expressed strong support for the development of a Russian theatre missile defence (TMD) capability. One senior Air Defence officer proposed the development of a mobile combined air and missile defence system which could be rapidly deployed to any region of the country which was under threat of attack.39 Another suggested making use of existing air defence components as far as possible in constructing a defence against medium- and short-range missiles.40 Views about the likely source of medium-range missile attack on Russia varied, from those who warned of the dangers from the proliferation of nuclear missile technology to the Third World,41 to others who saw a potential threat of missiles launched from the new NATO members in Eastern

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Europe.42 It should be noted, though, that the proposal of a theatre missile defence capability for Russia was firmly opposed by some prominent progressives, including then-Deputy Minister of Defence Andrei Kokoshin and Duma Deputy Alexei Arbatov. Both acknowledged that the temptation to develop some form of defence against short- and medium-range missiles was considerable in light of the many regional threats which Russia faced, but that the country’s leaders should resist these pressures. They argued that Russia could best ensure its security by continuing to adhere to the ABM Treaty and making use of the deterrent capabilities of its nuclear and conventional weapons arsenals.43

The international security climate During the 1990s Moscow’s relationship with the United States continued to dominate the international security climate in which Russia operated. But whereas the Gorbachev period witnessed a marked improvement in relations with the West, Yeltsin presided over a steady decline. Once the euphoria created by the collapse of Communist rule had dissipated, Russian political and military leaders began to doubt their recent confidence that Russia’s security interests would in future be synonymous with those of the West. The end of the Russian–American honeymoon coincided with a greater realization in Moscow of the problems created by political, economic and social instability within the former Soviet Union and in Russia itself, as well as the threats which regional powers in the Middle East and Asia could pose to a Russia which was considerably poorer and less powerful than its Soviet predecessor. This rather painful process of self-discovery was reflected in Russia’s missile defence policy during the 1990s. The post-Soviet period of Russia’s international relations began with Boris Yeltsin’s call for Russians and Americans to work together to develop a means of protecting both countries from nuclear missile attack. As the twentieth century drew to a close, however, there was little to show for the grandiose plans for a global missile defence. Instead the Americans were on course to deploy their own system while the Russians were trying desperately to preserve the integrity of the ABM Treaty and to resist the growing temptation to develop a theatre missile defence against regional threats. The defeat of the August 1991 coup attempt marked a decisive turning point in the fortunes of both the Soviet Communist Party and

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Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin. The actions taken by the coup plotters in the name of the Party and the USSR served to discredit both institutions as well as Gorbachev, the man who had led them. In the short term Yeltsin proved to be the main beneficiary of the collapse of Communist rule and the disintegration of the USSR. Once it was clear that the days of Gorbachev’s rule were numbered, Western countries were more than willing to work with Russia’s first democratically elected leader and the man who had defied the tanks sent to fire on the White House. Yeltsin enjoyed a hero’s welcome during his trips to the West. Officials in the Russian Foreign Ministry, the President’s office and even the Defence Ministry were affected by the prevailing optimism about Russia’s future role in international affairs. The dominant themes in the speeches of Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev were those of cooperation and partnership with Western Europe and North America. Military officers argued in favour of strengthening international security institutions, including NATO, and even expressed the hope that Russia would one day become a member. 44 Russian expectations of a rosy future were raised by public promises from Western leaders including US President George Bush that substantial economic assistance would be forthcoming in support of Russia’s fledgling democracy. In such an atmosphere it seemed unthinkable that Russia and the Western countries would ever again pose military threats to one another. In May 1992 Russia supported Western moves to impose economic sanctions against Yugoslavia, thus siding against Moscow’s traditional ally Serbia. In January 1993 Bush and Yeltsin signed the START II agreement, which reduced the number of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of both sides to the levels reached in the late 1960s and imposed a total ban on the ‘heavy’ ICBMs with multiple warheads which were the central pillar of the Soviet strategic nuclear force. It is against this background that we should view Boris Yeltsin’s January 1992 speech to the United Nations, in which he called upon Russian and American scientists to work together to develop a joint missile defence system. Although Yeltsin and his advisers may have genuinely believed that such a project was feasible, they must nevertheless have realized that in the short term his proposal’s effects were bound to be primarily political. Here we can see Yeltsin conforming to the same pattern of behaviour as his predecessors in the Kremlin: using missile defence policy as a diplomatic tool in his dealings with the United States. By referring to ABM in the context of collaboration

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rather than competition, Yeltsin was indicating his willingness to cooperate with the West in every conceivable area. If the Russians were prepared to work with the Americans on missile defences, an issue which had been so bitterly contested in the past, then surely any remaining doubts on Washington’s part about Russia’s intentions must be laid to rest. Unfortunately Yeltsin’s proposal served neither of its likely purposes. Although Yeltsin and Bush agreed to establish a joint Russian–American facility for early warning of missile attack and some Russian scientists joined their American colleagues on ABM-related projects, by the end of the 1990s the collaboration had achieved few concrete results. By the same token, if Yeltsin had hoped his expression of goodwill towards the Americans would loosen Washington’s purse strings and encourage the US to regard Russia as a friend and equal in the international community, then he was to be deeply disappointed. The Russians soon discovered that the extent of economic aid from the West was not as generous as they had hoped, nor was it without conditions. At the same time, it was becoming clear that Moscow and Washington had very different expectations about the way in which their new ‘partnership’ would work. During the early 1990s Russia fell in line with Western policies on a range of international issues to an extent almost unimaginable even just a few years earlier, at the height of Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking. But the West, and in particular the United States, seemed to take Russia’s cooperation for granted and showed little appreciation for the considerable efforts which Moscow was making in maintaining its pro-Western foreign and security policies. Moreover, Western attempts to restrict Russian weapons exports (one of the few sources of income for its declining defence industry) and reluctance to permit Russia to purchase the most modern technology was interpreted by many Russian officials and observers as a desire on the part of the Western countries to prevent Russia from becoming a powerful actor in the international community.45 Russian disillusion with the ‘new world order’ was reflected in the official Russian foreign policy concept, adopted in April 1993. This document set out the guiding principles behind Russian foreign policy, and reflected a widespread shift in the views of Russian policymakers and other members of the intellectual and political elite away from an uncritical pro-Western position and towards a more assertive and even Russian nationalist stance on a number of issues. Although a high priority continued to be placed on maintaining good relations with the

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West, from mid-1993 onwards Russia became far more willing to adopt positions which opposed Western policies on issues which Moscow felt affected the national interests of Russia or those of its friends and allies.46 For example, Russia expressed public criticism of the Westernled use of force against Iraq over its failure to comply with UN weapons inspectors and against Serbia for its ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Although Russia eventually agreed to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace, it nevertheless vehemently opposed the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to include former members of the Warsaw Pact. Russia also took an active role in peacekeeping operations in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and sent troops to help other CIS members patrol the borders of the former Soviet Union. Along with Russia’s realization that its security interests did not always coincide with those of the West came a growing concern about the likelihood of a serious imbalance developing between Russian and American strategic forces. This unease focussed primarily on the terms of the START II agreement and on the persistence of US interest in unilaterally developing a missile defence capability. As we have already seen, START II was negotiated and signed in the early days of postSoviet Russian foreign policy, when Yeltsin and his advisers were eager to demonstrate their willingness to cooperate with the West. There are, moreover, some excellent reasons for Russia to agree to and implement this treaty, many of them economic. Russia simply cannot afford to maintain a vast arsenal of nuclear weapons. The advantage to Russia of reducing its stockpiles within the framework of a bilateral agreement is that it binds the United States to the same terms. But although both sides’ adherence to START II should therefore ensure a balance between their strategic forces, many Russian analysts, especially those in the armed forces, argued that the terms of the treaty could remove Russia’s greatest strength (large ICBMs with multiple warheads) while leaving the Americans’ (submarine-launched missiles) unaffected. Russian concern about a strategic imbalance in offensive forces caused by START II was heightened by the growing American interest during the 1990s in developing and deploying a US missile defence system, including a national system for territorial protection. Although much of the impetus behind the Americans’ Strategic Defense Initiative died away as strategic nuclear arms reduction treaties were negotiated, the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, a research and development project into advanced missile

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defence technologies continued, albeit on a smaller scale than that originally envisaged by Ronald Reagan. In January 1991 US President George Bush announced that SDI would be reoriented towards producing a Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) as a safeguard against accidental or unsanctioned missile launches. Upon entering the White House in 1993 Bill Clinton introduced further modifications to the American missile defence programme. The pursuit of space-based interceptors would be abandoned, together with the intention of creating a large-scale ABM system. Instead efforts would be focussed on developing theatre missile defences to provide protection for forces within a particular locality. To this end, the Army, Navy and Air Force would each develop their own version of a theatre-level defence against missile attack.47 As a direct result of this decision to develop theatre missile defence systems, the Clinton administration in November 1993 approached the Russians with a proposal to define the technical characteristics of strategic missile defence to ensure that TMD could not be modified to counter strategic offensive missiles. This proposal met with considerable resistance from the Russians, who argued that the dividing line between strategic and sub-strategic missile defence can be a fine and indeed arbitrary one. Washington and Moscow eventually came to an agreement at the Helsinki summit in March 1997 as part of a package in which Russia gained entry to meetings of the Group of 7 most industrialized nations and the promise of talks about a START III agreement which would resolve the imbalances created by START II. But while the Russians and Americans were arguing over the velocities and ranges of missile interceptors, the mood within some sections of the US political elite had shifted in favour of the rapid deployment of a national missile defence system. The 1994 American elections resulted in a Republican-dominated Congress, many of whose members had campaigned on the issue of a national ABM to protect the United States from missile attack. Their interest in ABM was spurred not by any military threat from Russia but by the efforts of such countries as North Korea and Iran to develop missile technology. Under pressure from Congress, the Clinton administration in 1996 introduced the ‘three plus three’ programme for national missile defence, in which the first three years would be spent developing elements of a national system so that deployment could, if desired, be achieved within a further three years. Although the White House emphasized the importance of a theatre missile defence and

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played down the possibility of a national ABM, the momentum for the latter grew steadily. In January 1999 US Defense Secretary William Cohen announced a further $6.6 billion for the defence budget earmarked for a national missile defence system and hinted that the US might withdraw from the ABM Treaty if satisfactory amendments could not be agreed with the Russians. 48 By the end of the summer high-level talks had begun between the two sides on amending the Treaty. By the end of the 1990s the Russians were facing a situation which was even worse than that which their Soviet predecessors had confronted in the late 1960s. Before the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks began Moscow was on the brink of an arms race against the United States in both offensive and defensive weapons technology which the USSR would not win in the short term. Thirty years later Moscow once again watched the Americans move towards the deployment of more sophisticated missile defence technologies than Russia could hope to develop in the foreseeable future, which threatened to undermine Russia’s strategic deterrent. This time, however, Russia lacked any real leverage over Washington’s policies for two important reasons. First, the US defensive weapons buildup was not directed at countering a Russian threat, so there was little Moscow could do to convince the Americans that they had no need of a national ABM system. Second, the Russians simply could not afford to expand their arsenal of strategic offensive weapons in order to have the capability of overwhelming American missile defences. The Soviet Union in the 1960s could not afford such a massive buildup of strategic weapons either, but the Americans had not realized that. Thirty years later Russia’s economic problems were plain for all to see. Finally, Moscow was concerned that the Americans’ renewed interest in national missile defence could damage Russian security indirectly, by initiating compensatory offensive weapons buildups by third countries, in particular China. Sino-Russia relations were very good during the 1990s, helped in no small measure by Moscow’s willingness to avoid incurring Chinese displeasure on virtually any issue. Russia therefore shunned official links with Taiwan, supported Beijing’s stance that Tibet is an integral part of China and worked to resolve remaining disagreements over the Sino-Russian border. Towards the end of the twentieth century China also became Russia’s single largest weapons consumer, purchasing tanks, aircraft, surface ships and submarines.49 In spite of this rosy picture, however, Moscow was well aware that the potential military threat to Russia would increase considerably should Beijing decide to

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embark upon a rapid buildup of its missile capabilities in response to an American ABM programme.

Russian ABM technology During the Yeltsin period there were enormous problems confronting the daily operation of the deployed ABM system around Moscow as well as impediments to the further research and development of alternative missile defence technologies. In spite of ambitious plans for joint work with the Americans and practical assistance from the United States, there was little visible progress resulting from Russia’s missile defence research programme. During the 1990s Russia struggled to maintain the Moscow ABM system at the level which it had reached during the Gorbachev period. The number of interceptor missiles was held steady at the 100 permitted by the ABM Treaty, composed of a combination of long-range and short-range, high-acceleration missiles, but there was a marked decline in the extent of radar support for their operation. Although the system could still rely upon the ‘Pillbox’ phased-array radar at Pushkino to provide battle management, the three over-the-horizon radars were no longer regarded as ‘operational’ by authoritative sources such as London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies, 50 which also ceased to list two of eight large phased-array radars formerly described as supporting the Galosh system. By the end of the 1990s three of the remaining six LPARs were still under construction and another was built but undergoing testing.51 One of the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union was that Moscow lost its former control over the integrated network of radars providing early warning of missile attack. A number of these radars were built near the international borders of the USSR, which meant that from 1992 onwards they were on the territory and therefore under the control of newly-independent post-Soviet states, namely Belarus, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Kazakstan. In order to have access to these facilities and the information which they received, the Russian government had to negotiate agreements with their new owners. This was just one aspect of the difficult process of untangling networks linking the Soviet republics with one another and with Moscow which incorporated transport, communications, and the distribution of raw materials and finished products as well as the troops, weapons and support facilities of the Soviet armed forces. Although the necessary agreements were reached to enable the Soviet-built early warning

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system to continue to function, such arrangements were affected by each state’s relations with Russia. These agreements were also subject to change, suspension or termination. An example of the problems which could restrict Moscow’s access to such facilities was Kazakstan’s temporary withdrawal of permission for Russia to use Baikonur for launches in 1999 following the crash of a Russian rocket which scattered debris over a large area of Kazak territory. Indeed, in 1994 Yeltsin took the first step towards ensuring full Russian control of such facilities when he signed a decree authorizing the construction of a space centre at Plesetsk and a cosmodrome in the Far East. 52 During the 1990s there was certainly some pressure from within the armed forces for Russia to build replacements for the early warning radars which were not on Russian territory, but so far there is no indication that the necessary funding for such a project is forthcoming.53 The issue of funding is the key factor affecting the future of Russia’s ABM programme. Remarks in the Russian military press indicate that routine maintenance on even such essential components as early warning radars was virtually halted,54 while the lack of visible progress in any of the alternative missile defence technologies supports the view that such projects were starved of funds. 55 Indeed, a modified SA-10 surface-to-air missile was only rescued by the creation of a joint stock company to sell SAM technology abroad. The new SA-10 was unveiled at the Moscow Air Show in August 1997 amid claims that its performance against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles was superior to that of the US Patriot, 56 but it is not an indication of a strong Russian research and development effort in alternative missile defence technologies. The company which controls its production and marketing is unlikely to be able or willing to invest sufficient funds in basic research on technologies which might not yield commerciallyexploitable results for years, if ever. And although there were reports that allocations for the space-missile defence component of the Defence Ministry’s budget rose by more than 10 per cent in the late 1990s, there are as yet no indications of how that money might be spent.57

Conclusions During Yeltsin’s Presidency Russian ABM policy was subjected to strong and contradictory pressures. The armed forces contained a number of missile defence proponents, many of whom subscribed to a

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‘traditionalist’ view of future war familiar to us from previous chapters which emphasized the importance of protecting elements of Russia’s territory, population and key military and industrial targets from attack by enemy nuclear missiles. But while traditionalists tended to stress the possibility of a conflict with the West, other military analysts urged the development of a Russian theatre missile defence capability as a protection against existing and potential missile threats from regional powers. Although the views of missile defence supporters were opposed by ‘progressive’, mainly civilian, analysts who argued that such weapons were inherently destabilizing and would undermine international security, their ability to influence policymakers in Moscow had declined significantly since Gorbachev left the Kremlin. Boris Yeltsin’s lack of interest in abstract concepts and guiding principles together with his increasing reliance on the military leadership for support in domestic political power struggles helped to ensure that the armed forces regained much of their former influence over the formation of strategic concepts and security policy. But although these factors encouraged an expansion in Russia’s missile defence effort in the 1990s, there were even stronger forces pushing in the opposite direction. The delayed realization in Washington that the post-Cold War world would continue to pose threats to American national security resulted in a Republican-led drive to develop and deploy some form of US missile defence capability. Calls from Congress for a national ABM system were accompanied by a serious research and development programme for theatre missile defences and the Clinton administration’s efforts to amend the ABM Treaty. This renewed US interest in missile defences resurrected deepseated Russian insecurities about their ability to compete with the Americans in a technology race which, this time around, Russia obviously could not afford. Although Washington’s search for protection against missile attack in the 1990s was not inspired by Russia, Moscow analysts and policymakers were well aware that Russian attempts to build up either their strategic offensive or defensive weapons could be seized upon by ABM supporters in Congress and used as an excuse to accelerate a process which many Russians feared would undermine their strategic position and ultimately their security. Instead in the 1990s Moscow played a cautious game, emphasizing its desire to cooperate with the West in the management of strategic weapons and urging the Americans to remain within the ABM Treaty regime. The conservative nature of Russian missile defence policy was dictated above all by economic necessity. The Russian government could barely

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afford to maintain the Moscow ABM system at the level which it had reached during Gorbachev’s leadership. The only steps visible steps forward during this period were seen in surface-to-air missile technology with missile defence capability which could be exploited commercially in the international arms market.

Conclusion: The Kremlin’s Missile Defence Policy during the Cold War and Beyond

The remarkable endurance of Moscow’s interest in developing and deploying a missile defence system can be attributed to a combination of factors, the most important of which were the military’s need to find a means of protection against nuclear missile strikes to ensure the country’s survival and even ‘victory’ in any future major war, and the desire of successive political leaderships to use the country’s ABM capability to influence the policies of other governments, especially that of the United States. Missile defence policy was consistently used by the leaders of the Soviet Union and Russia in attempts to put pressure on Western states and to resist political pressure exerted on it by Washington. This pattern was established by Nikita Khrushchev in the 1950s, when he set about using the Soviets’ apparent successes in ABM technology as one component in his strategy of bluff and misperception to convince Western countries of the USSR’s impressive military capability and to intimidate them into making concessions on political issues. Brezhnev and Kosygin carried on this tradition when they used the Soviet missile defence capability as a bargaining chip before and during the SALT I negotiations, ultimately giving up the opportunity to deploy an effective national defence in exchange for limitations on the Americans’ offensive and defensive weapons and, perhaps more importantly, for the anticipated benefits of détente. Gorbachev tried and failed to persuade Washington to restrict its plans for the Strategic Defense Initiative, but had much greater success in gaining American goodwill through his depiction of the Soviet ABM programme as a symbol of past mistakes to be renounced and rectified by his more enlightened leadership. This approach was displayed in the treatment of the controversial Krasnoyarsk radar, which was publicly admitted to be a violation of the ABM Treaty and ordered destroyed. In the Yeltsin 175

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period we again saw Moscow using its ABM policy to send a signal to the West. This time it was to demonstrate Russia’s desire to be a friend and ally to the West that Yeltsin called for joint Russian–American research and development of a global defence against attack from nuclear missiles. The political leaderships’ desire to exploit the diplomatic potential of a missile defence system was accompanied by the military’s persistent concern with developing and deploying a protection against attack from nuclear missiles, a concern which survived in spite of a growing acceptance within the Soviet armed forces of the logic of deterrence based on a secure, second-strike retaliatory capability. Interest in missile defences also transcended service loyalties and rivalries to a very great extent. Support for a Soviet ABM capability was predictably expressed by members of the Air Defence Forces, especially at times when the status and future direction of the missile defence effort (or, indeed, the service itself) was under threat. But even at times, such as the mid- to late-1970s, when most military analysts outside the Air Defence Forces followed the official line by avoiding direct comment on missile defences, there is evidence of advocacy for a Soviet ABM capability which crossed service boundaries. The best explanation for the persistence of this interest in missile defences within the Soviet and now Russian armed forces seems to lie in the existence of a widely shared set of views about future war and the optimum strategy for it which recommends a combination of offensive and defensive weapons and emphasizes the importance of territorial protection. The need to protect the country’s territory, industrial capacity, population, political leadership, military command structure and essential elements of the armed forces appears to be deeply embedded in the mindset of the Soviet and Russian military, going beyond the furthering of personal or institutional interests and undoubtedly shaped by the experience of the invasion of Nazi forces in 1941. The focus of Moscow’s attention in determining virtually every aspect of its ABM policy was on Washington. The American-centred nature of the Soviet Union’s concern with missile defences was a consistent feature over time and visible at every level at which ABM policy was considered. Although it will come as no surprise that the Soviets were interested first and foremost in the actions of their rival superpower, other states – such as Britain, France and, especially, China – did pose ballistic missile threats to the USSR. One might therefore expect Soviet debates about ABM to have considered those states’ potential threats, but the discussions of the benefits and drawbacks of a

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missile defence capability in Soviet civilian and military publications were framed almost exclusively in terms of what the Americans were doing or might do in the future. The obsession with Washington’s policies was certainly shared by the top political leadership, and extended to ordering the reconfiguration of the Moscow ABM system to make it resemble the American Safeguard missile defence planned in the 1970s even against the advice of Soviet scientists, who warned that the American-style use of short-range interceptors was unsuitable for defending a densely populated area. The Soviets’ overriding concern with the United States not only reflected Moscow’s belief that the Americans were most likely to be their opponents in any future largescale war but also a deep-seated conviction that American methods and especially technology must be superior to anything which the Soviet Union could produce. Only in the late 1980s did military strategists and policymakers appear seriously to consider the need for missile defences in relation to the potential threats posed by other countries, in particular by the proliferation of nuclear missile technology, but even then the main emphasis in discussions about ABM continued to be placed on American actions. The views of those to whom the political leaders turned for advice on security policy issues were also of considerable importance in shaping Soviet and Russian ABM policy. The armed forces occupied the dominant place as defence policy advisors during most of the postwar period by virtue of their tight control over security-related information, and this fact, together with the persistence of military interest in missile defences helps to explain the presence of ABM in the Soviet and Russian weapons arsenal. But the military was not unanimous in its support for missile defences. Indeed, sharp divisions of opinion within the armed forces about the benefits and feasibility of ABM from the mid-1960s onwards prevented the military from exploiting its institutional strength to press for an expanded ABM effort. In addition, the views of military advisors, while influential, did not dictate Soviet missile defence policy. The political leaderships’ own priorities ensured that détente and good relations with the United States were often pursued at the expense of an expanded ABM effort. Another factor with a significant impact on Soviet ABM decisions was the progress of missile defence technology, although it usually acted as a brake rather than an accelerator. The lessons of Soviet ABM technology reinforce those which have been learned about the development of other types of Soviet weapons: progress was slow and incremental, and rarely marked by sudden breakthroughs. Although some

178 The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin

well-timed successes on the test range raised Khrushchev’s hopes for the early deployment of a Soviet ABM system, the USSR’s missile defence technology never lived up to the expectations of Khrushchev or other ABM supporters. The Galosh system near Moscow was beset with delays and technical problems at every stage of its development and deployment. In the early days its radars were slow and vulnerable to electronic countermeasures and its interceptors could not have coped with MIRVed warheads. Indeed, delays in Galosh’s initial deployment and the appearance of technical problems coincided with the Soviets’ decision to include defensive as well as offensive weapons in the first SALT negotiations. Although steps were taken to modernize the system, by the time that this process was nearing completion the USSR collapsed and with it went Moscow’s control over the integrated early warning radar system which was vital for the functioning of a missile defence capability. It is unlikely that the Galosh ABM ever provided an effective defence against the missile threat posed by the United States, and this was the only operational system which the Soviets managed to deploy. They had even less success in developing missile defences based on ‘exotic’ technologies such as lasers, while any capability which Soviet anti-air defence weapons may have had was very limited indeed. In other words, Soviet policymakers were not tempted by dramatic technological breakthroughs to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and increase their missile defence coverage. Instead the Soviets’ slow but steady progress in ABM technology reinforced the political leaders’ decision to maintain and gradually improve the Galosh ABM system deployed around Moscow and to continue research and development within the terms of the ABM Treaty, but otherwise not to expand the Soviet missile defence effort. The strength of entrenched institutional interests, especially that of the defence industry, is a powerful reason why the Soviet missile defence programme did not suffer significant reductions following the signing of the ABM Treaty. The policy of authorizing routine maintenance and research was established by Brezhnev, who placed considerable emphasis on providing something for all the powerful constituencies in Soviet politics. It was a practice which satisfied groups within the armed forces and the defence industry alike, and as such proved remarkably resistant to change, even during the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev who was a vocal opponent of missile defences. Finally, while bureaucratic self-interest may provide the definitive key to understanding why the Soviet ABM effort managed to continue during the late twentieth century, the future of Russia’s missile defence

The Cold War and Beyond 179

programme is likely to be shaped above all by the availability of resources. The demands of military restructuring, peacekeeping commitments in the Commonwealth of Independent States and civil conflicts within the Russian Federation will all require substantial funds and are likely to squeeze out the more expensive routes to an improved missile defence capability. Although Russia is unlikely to abandon missile defences entirely, economic constraints will probably dictate that Moscow’s efforts will be directed primarily at the modification of existing technologies rather than the pursuit of the more ambitious and exotic means of protecting its territory from missile attack.

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Notes and References

1

‘Massive Retaliation’ and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defence, 1953–7

1. For a more detailed discussion of early developments in Soviet anti-aircraft defence, see David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994) pp. 235–7. 2. C.L. Sulzberger, ‘Khrushchev Says He is Ready to Meet Kennedy’, New York Times, 8 September 1961. 3. See O.V. Golubev et al., Proshloe i nastoiashchee rossiiskikh sistem protivoraketnoi oborony (vzgliad iznutri) (Moscow: Research Center, Committee of Scientists for Global Security, 1993), p. 5; and P.L. Kapitsa, Pis’ma o nauke (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1989) pp. 286–91, 294–5, both cited in Holloway, Stalin, p. 438, footnote 37. 4. Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1995) p. 13. 5. Holloway, Stalin pp. 151–3. 6. Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 119. 7. N.S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, translated and edited by Strobe Talbott (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1974) p. 375. 8. Khrushchev, p. 220 and N.S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (London: Little, Brown & Company, 1971) p. 393. 9. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, pp. 11, 45–6. 10. Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1996) p. 152. 11. Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958) pp. 52–3. 12. ‘Speech by G.M. Malenkov at a Meeting of Voters in the Leningrad Election District’, Pravda, 13 March 1954, translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP) 6/11, p. 8. 13. ‘Speech by Malenkov to Session of USSR Supreme Soviet’, Pravda and Izvestiya, 9 August 1953, translated in CDSP, 5/30, p. 3. 14. Carl G. Jacobsen, Soviet Strategy–Soviet Foreign Policy: Military Considerations Affecting Soviet Policymaking (Glasgow: Glasgow University Press, 1972) p. 32. 15. Garthoff, p. 24. 16. Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy: A Historical Analysis (London: Faber and Faber, 1966) p. 48.

181

182 Notes and References 17. Michel Garder, A History of the Soviet Army (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966) p. 141. 18. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens Jr and Franklyn Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament 1954–1964 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966) pp. 41–2. 19. Kurt Gottfried and Bruce G. Blair, eds, Crisis Stability and Nuclear War (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) p. 127. 20. Herbert S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union: Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962) pp. 181, 186–7, 192–4. 21. Gottfried and Blair, p. 128. 22. Michael J. Deane, The Role of Strategic Defense in Soviet Strategy (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1980) p. 38. See also Lieutenant Colonel A. Makarov, ‘Nekotorie Voprosi Primeneniya Atomnogo Oruzhiya i Zashchiti ot Nego po Amerikanskim Vzglyadam’, Voennii Vestnik (September 1954) 75. 23. Professor B. Olisov, Major General of Engineering and Technical Corp, ‘Atomic Weapons and Atomic Defense’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 3–4 August 1954, translated in CDSP, 6/31, p. 3. 24. Peter Kapitsa, ‘The Paramount Task’, New Times 39 (1956) p. 11. 25. Kapitsa, ‘The Paramount Task’, p. 11. 26. Grigorii Kisun’ko, ‘Stroki iz Biografii’, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 5 August 1990. 27. Sayre Stevens, ‘The Soviet BMD Program’, in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds, Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1984) p. 192. 28. Johan Jorgan Holst, ‘Comparative US and Soviet Deployments, Doctrines, and Arms Limitation’, in Morton A. Kaplan, ed., SALT: Problems and Prospects (Morristown: General Learning Press, 1973) pp. 77–8. 29. Air Vice Marshal SWB Menual, ‘Air Defence of the Homeland’, in Ray Bonds, ed., The Soviet War Machine: An Encyclopedia of Russian Military Equipment and Strategy (London: Salamander Books Limited, 1977) p. 52. 30. Holst, p. 79. 31. Robbin F. Laird and Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet Union and Strategic Arms (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984) p. 13. 32. Laird and Herspring, p. 13. 33. See: ‘Rech’ Marshala Sovetskogo Soyuza N.A. Bulganina, 1 Maya 1953 goda na Krasnoi Ploshchadi v Moskve’, Voennii Vestnik (May 1953) 4; and ‘Speech by N.A. Bulganin at Meeting of Voters of Moscow Urban Election District’, Pravda, 11 March 1954, translated in CDSP, 6/10, p. 12. 34. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, p. 220. 35. Marshal V. Sokolovskii, ‘Glorious Anniversary of Soviet Armed Forces’, Pravda, 23 February 1953, translated in CDSP, 5/8, p. 30. 36. Marshal G. Zhukov, ‘Tenth Anniversary of the Great Victory’, Pravda, 8 May 1955, translated in CDSP, 7/17, p. 3. 37. For other examples of concern about US and NATO capabilities and intentions in the military press, see: E. Soldatenko, ‘SShA: Tsentr Reaktsii i Agressii’, Voennie Znaniya (March 1953) 21–2; ‘Vernii Strazh Sotsialisticheskoi Rodini’, Voennii Vestnik (February 1954) 7; and Lieutenant Colonel M. Duseev, ‘Zabota Kommunisticheskoi Partii o Vsemernom

Notes and References 183 Ukreplenii Aktivnoi Oboroni Sovetskoi Rodini’, Voennii Vestnik (February 1954) 19–21. 38. Kisun’ko. 39. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 393, 395.

2

‘We Can Hit a Fly in Outer Space’, 1957–62

1. See, for example: L. Dikin, ‘Plani Razmeshcheniya Raketnogo Oruzhiya SShA v Zapadnoi Evrope’, MEMO (March 1958) 101–2; N. Inozemtsev, ‘“Atomnaya Diplomatiya” SShA: Proekti i Deistvitel’nost’’, MEMO (March 1958) 38; and B. Artemov, ‘O Sovetsko-Amerikanskikh Otnosheniyakh’, MEMO (November 1958) 21. 2. Grigorii Kisun’ko, ‘Den’gi na Oboronu’, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 5 August 1990. 3. ‘International Significance of the October Revolution’, from the report ‘40 Years of the Great October Socialist Revolution to the Jubilee Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 6 November 1957’, in N.S. Khrushchev, Speeches and Interviews on World Problems: 1957 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958) p. 257. 4. ‘Speech at a Meeting in Kabul, 4 March 1960’, in N.S. Khrushchev, On Peaceful Coexistence (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961) p. 216. 5. ‘World Peace is the Will of the Peoples of All Countries, Speech at Veshenskaya, 30 August 1959’, in N.S. Khrushchev, World Without Arms, World Without Wars, Volume 2 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961) p. 18. 6. N.S. Khrushchev, General and Complete Disarmament is a Guarantee of Peace and Security for All Nations (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962) p. 31. 7. See, for example: ‘Velichaishaya Pobeda Tvorcheskogo Geniya Sovetskogo Naroda’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 9 (May 1961) 5; ‘Sotsializm i Mir’, MEMO (December 1957) 4. 8. N.S. Khrushchev, Disarmament for Durable Peace and Friendship (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960) p. 49. 9. Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe: 1945–1970 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970) p. 88. 10. N.S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, translated and edited by Jerrold L. Schecter and Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1990) pp. 187–8. 11. Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1966) pp. 43–4. 12. Khrushchev, Glasnost Tapes, p. 188. 13. N.S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, translated and edited by Strobe Talbott (London: Little, Brown & Co., 1974) p. 533. 14. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens Jr and Franklyn Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament 1954–1964 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966) pp. 107–8.

184 Notes and References 15. ‘Speech at a Meeting of the Working People of Leipzig during a Visit of the Soviet Party and Government Delegation to the GDR, 9 May 1957’, in Khrushchev, Speeches and Interviews on World Problems: 1957, p. 175. 16. Khrushchev, ‘International Significance of the October Revolution’, p. 253. 17. Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967) p. 152. 18. Khrushchev, Disarmament for Durable Peace and Friendship, p. 50. 19. Michael J. Deane, Political Control of the Soviet Armed Forces (London: Macdonald & Jane’s, 1977) p. 75. 20. Deane, p. 76. 21. John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: US Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength (New York: The Dial Press, 1982) p. 153. 22. John Thomas, ‘The Role of Missile Defence in Soviet Strategy and Foreign Policy’, in John Erickson, ed., The Military-Technical Revolution: Its Impact on Strategy and Foreign Policy (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966) pp. 192–3. 23. ‘Rech’ Tovarishcha R.Ya. Malinovskogo’, Pravda, 25 October 1961. 24. Alexander Otto Ghebhardt, ‘Implications of Organizational and Bureaucratic Policy Models for Soviet ABM Decisionmaking’, PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, 1975, p. 46. 25. Roman Kolkowicz, ‘The Military’, in H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds, Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973) p. 147. 26. Kolkowicz, ‘The Military’, p. 150. 27. Khrushchev, Disarmament for Durable Peace and Friendship, pp. 30–1, 49. 28. General Lieutenant S. Krasil’nikov, ‘O Kharaktere Sovremennoi Voini’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 18 November 1960. 29. General Colonel N. Lomov, ‘O Sovetskoi Voennoi Doktrine’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 10 (May 1962) 19–20. 30. See, for example: Colonel I. Sidel’nikov, ‘O Sovetskoi Voennoi Doktrine’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 11 May 1962. 31. See, for example: Lieutenant Colonel I.V. Viktorov, ‘Protivoraketnaya Oborona’, Vestnik Vozdushnogo Flota (April 1958) 93. 32. V.D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy, edited by Harriet Fast Scott (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1975) pp. 199, 203, 251, 285, 296. 33. A. Golubev, ‘O Nekotorikh Voprosakh Voennoi Istorii v Knige “Voennaya Strategiya”’, Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal (May 1963) 94. 34. Golubev, p. 94. 35. V. Petrov and A. Sochivko, ‘Mezhkontinental’nie Ballisticheskie Snaryadi’, Voennie Znaniya (July 1957) 14–16. See also Viktorov, p. 92. 36. M.N. Nikolaev, Snaryad protiv Snaryada (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960). 37. Engineer Colonel Ya. I. Faenov, ‘Radiolokatsionnie Stantsii Obnaruzheniya Ballisticheskikh Raket’, Vestnik PVO (May 1961) pp. 29–33. 38. Major V.A. Belokhvostov and Engineer Captain N.I. Sizov, ‘Boevoe Snaryazhenie Protivoraket’, Vestnik PVO (July 1961) 21–4. 39. Engineer Colonel V.N. Anyutin, ‘Osnovnie Parametri Poleta Ballisticheskoi Raketi’, Vestnik PVO (March 1961) 25–9. 40. Faenov; M.G. Mimrin, ‘Printsipi Bor’bi S Ballisticheskimi Raketami’, Vestnik PVO (April 1961) 24–7. 41. Mimrin. 42. Sokolovskiy, p. 298.

Notes and References 185 43. Sokolovskiy, p. 204. 44. Sokolovskiy, p. 251, emphasis added. 45. Sokolovskiy, p. 193. For a similar statement, see B. Uzen’ev, ‘Ob Ekonomicheskoi i Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Osnove Voennoi Moshchi Gosudarstv’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 6 (March 1961) 53. 46. C.L. Sulzberger, ‘Khrushchev Says He is Ready to Meet Kennedy’, New York Times, 8 September 1961. 47. ‘Rech’ Tovarishcha R. Ya. Malinoskogo’. 48. ‘Vseobshchee i Polnoe Razoruzhenie – Garantiya Mira i Bezopasnosti Vsekh Narodov, Rech’ N.S. Khrushcheva na Vsemirnom Kongresse za Vseobshchee Razoruzhenie i Mir’, Pravda, 11 July 1962. 49. Theodore Shabad, ‘Khrushchev Says Missile Can Hit a Fly in Space’, New York Times, 17 July 1962. 50. See, for example: I. Gareev, ‘Novoe Uvelichenie Voennikh Raskhodov i Voennogo Proizvodstva v SShA’, MEMO (July 1957)124–5; Dikin, pp. 101–3; A. Gorbunov, ‘Sozdanie Bezatomnoi Zoni – Neotlozhnaya i Real’naya Zadacha’, MEMO (April 1958) 38; and Inozemtsev, pp. 31–2. 51. Prados, p. 152. 52. Mimrin, p. 27. 53. Engineer Colonel M. Pavlov, ‘Neitroni i Luchi’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 15 September 1962. 54. William J. Tompson, Khrushchev: A Political Life (London: Macmillan in association with St Antony’s College, Oxford, 1995) p. 149. 55. Tompson, p. 187. 56. William Zimmerman, Soviet Perspectives on International Relations 1956–67 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969) pp. 221–2. 57. John M. Collins, US-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities 1960–1980 (New York: McGraw-Hill Publications, 1980) p. 32. 58. James E. Dornan, Jr, ‘Strategic Rocket Forces’, in Ray Bonds, ed., Soviet War Machine: An Encyclopedia of Russian Military Equipment and Strategy (London: Salamander Books Limited, 1977) p. 207. 59. Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1982) pp. 50–1. 60. Oleg Vladimirovitch Penkovsky, The Penkovsky Papers, translated by P. Deriabin (London: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1965) p. 140. 61. Michael MccGwire, ‘Soviet Strategic Weapons Policy 1955–70’, in Michael MccGwire, Ken Booth and John McDonnell, eds, Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975) p. 495. 62. David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, 2nd. edn (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984) p. 11. 63. Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years. Kennedy and Khrushchev: 1960–1963 (London and Boston: Faber & Faber, 1991) p. 702. 64. Bloomfield, Clemens and Griffiths, pp. 41–2. 65. Prados, p. 77. 66. Johan Jorgan Holst, ‘Comparative US and Soviet Deployments, Doctrines, and Arms Limitation’, in Morton A. Kaplan, ed., SALT: Problems and Prospects (Morristown: General Learning Press, 1973) p. 64. 67. Sayre Stevens, ‘The Soviet BMD Program’, in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds, Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1984) pp. 191–2.

186 Notes and References 68. 69. 70. 71. 72.

Prados, p. 153. Bloomfield, Clemens and Griffiths, pp. 205–6. Prados, p. 153. Stevens, p. 192. Berman and Baker, p. 148.

3

From Cuba to Détente, 1962–8

1. James G. Richter, Khrushchev’s Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994) p. 155. 2. William J. Tompson, Khrushchev: A Political Life (London: Macmillan in association with St. Antony’s College, Oxford, 1995) p. 265. 3. The name of the Party’s ruling body, the Presidium, was formally changed to Politburo in 1966, but for convenience the term ‘Politburo’ will be used throughout this chapter when referring to the post-Khrushchev leadership. 4. Thomas W. Wolfe, ‘Soviet Interests in SALT’, in William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr, eds, SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973) p. 35 and footnote 36 on pp. 51–2. 5. Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielmann, Jr, Soviet Decisionmaking for Defense: A Critique of US Perspectives on the Arms Race (London: Praeger, 1972) p. 41. 6. Malcolm Mackintosh, ‘The Soviet Military’s Influence on Foreign Policy’, in Michael MccGwire, Ken Booth and John McDonnell, eds, Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975) p. 36. 7. Wolfe, pp. 34–5. 8. Paul J. Murphy, Brezhnev: Soviet Politician (Jefferson: McFarland & Co., Inc., Publishers, 1981) pp. 191–2, 231–2. 9. Murphy, p. 263. 10. John Erickson, Soviet Military Power (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1971) p. 101. 11. See, for example: L.I. Brezhnev, 47th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1964); ‘Otchetnii Doklad Tsentral’nogo Komiteta KPSS XXIII S”ezdu Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 29 Marta 1966 goda’, in L.I. Brezhnev, Izbrannie Proizvedeniya v Trekh Tomakh, Tom I 1964–1970 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1981); ‘Lenin’s Cause Lives On and Triumphs’, in L.I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin’s Course: Speeches and Articles (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972). 12. Murphy, p. 265. 13. Murphy, p. 266. 14. Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe: 1945–1970 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970) pp. 434–5. 15. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 432. 16. Mark E. Miller, Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine: The Quest for Superiority (Washington, DC: Advanced International Studies Institute for the University of Miami, 1982) p. 79.

Notes and References 187 17. John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: US Intelligence and Russian Military Strength (New York: The Dial Press, 1982) p. 157. 18. Brezhnev, ‘Otchetnii Doklad Tsentral’nogo Komiteta KPSS XXIII S”ezdu Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza’, p. 188. 19. Brezhnev, ‘Otchetnii Doklad Tsentral’nogo Komiteta KPSS XXIII S”ezdu Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza’, pp. 155–6. 20. Roman Kolkowicz, Matthew P. Gallagher and Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Soviet Union and Arms Control: A Superpower Dilemma (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970) p. 5. 21. V. Gantman, A. Nikonov, D. Tomashevskii, ‘Mirovie Voini XX Veka i Dialektika Istorii’, MEMO (August 1964) 6. 22. V. Gantman, A. Nikonov, D. Tomashevskii, ‘Mirovie Voini XX Veka i Dialektika Istorii’, MEMO (September 1964) 39. 23. Marshal N. Krilov, ‘Strategicheskie Raketi’, Izvestiya, 17 November 1963. 24. Colonel V. Glazov and Colonel I. Zheltikov, ‘Rastushchee Mogushchestvo Sovetskikh Vooruzhennikh Sil’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 6 (March 1962) 26–35. 25. Colonel I. Zheltikov, ‘Poligonnaya Likhoradka’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 13 October 1963. 26. Marshal Biryuzov, ‘Moguchaya Sila’, Izvestiya, 8 November 1963. 27. Krilov. 28. General Colonel S. Shtemenko, ‘Nauchno-Tekhnicheskii Progress i Ego Vliyanie Na Razvitie Voennogo Dela’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 3 (February 1963) 27. For another example of apparently mutually exclusive claims for both offensive and defensive capabilities, see Biryuzov, ‘Moguchaya Sila’. 29. For another example of praise for Soviet accomplishments in developing both offensive and defensive missiles, see I. Anureev, ‘Imperialisticheskaya Agressiya v Kosmose’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 15 (August 1962) 17–23. 30. N. Talensky, ‘Anti-Missile Systems and Disarmament’, International Affairs (Moscow) (October 1964) 16–17. 31. Talensky, p. 17. 32. Talensky, p. 18. 33. General Major M. Cherednichenko, ‘O Sovremennoi Voennoi Strategii’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 7 (April 1966) 64. 34. General Lieutenant I. Zav’yalov, ‘O Sovetskoi Voennoi Doktrine’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 31 March 1967. 35. Colonel B.G. Zabelok, ‘Razvitie Taktiki i Operativnogo Iskusstva Voisk PVO Strani’, Vestnik PVO (February 1968) 17–25. 36. For an example, see: Rear Admiral V. Andreev, ‘Dialektika Sootnosheniya Sil’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 13 December 1967. As a naval officer, Andreev had no professional interest in promoting a component of the Air Defence Forces. 37. N. Talensky, ‘The Late War: Some Reflections’, International Affairs, (Moscow) (May 1965) 15. 38. Lieutenant Colonel E. Ribkin, ‘O Sushchnosti Mirovoi Raketno-Yadernoi Voini’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 17 (September 1965) 55. 39. Quoted by David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, 2nd edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984) pp. 165–6.

188 Notes and References 40. See, for example, articles by Talenskii in Kommunist 7 (1960) and International Affairs, (Moscow) (October 1960) cited by Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1966) p. 79. 41. Talensky, ‘Anti-Missile Systems and Disarmament’, pp. 16–17. 42. G. Gerasimov, ‘The First Strike Theory’, International Affairs (Moscow) (March 1965) 39–45. 43. Gerasimov, pp. 44–5. 44. V. Larionov, ‘Razvitie Sredstv Vooruzheniya i Strategicheskie Kontseptsii SShA’, MEMO (June 1966) 74–81. 45. Yu. Petrov, ‘Novii Tolchok Gonke Vooruzhennii?’, Pravda, 24 September 1967. 46. G. Gerasimov, ‘Pro PRO’, Literaturnaya Gazeta 41 (11 October 1967) 9. 47. Gerasimov, ‘Pro PRO’. 48. I. Kirillova, V. Grishin, V. Golovachev, N. Denisov, ‘S Imenem Lenina, Pod Znamenem Oktyabrya!, Parad Voisk i Demonstratsiya Trudyashchikhsya Na Krasnoi Ploshchadi’, Pravda, 8 November 1964. 49. Marshal N. Krilov, ‘Nadezhnii Shchit Mira’, Pravda, 19 November 1964. 50. ‘Marshal Sokolovsky on the Soviet Armed Forces: Excerpts from a Statement Made on 17 February 1965’, New Times 9 (3 March 1965) 4. 51. Gerasimov, ‘The First Strike Theory’, p. 45. 52. Horelick and Rush, p. 206. 53. Murphy, p. 267. 54. Engineer Major V.V. Galin, ‘Sposobi i Sredstva Proriva Protivoraketnoi Oboroni’, Vestnik PVO (March 1965) 72–4. 55. Engineer Lieutenant Colonel V. Aleksandrov, ‘The Search for a Solution to the Problems of Antimissile Defense in the US’, Voennaya Misl’ (September 1965) 20. 56. Engineer Colonel Ya.I. Faenov, Engineer Major I.S. Krasil’nikov, ‘Vliyanie Yadernikh Vzrivov Na Radiosvyaz’ i Rabotu RLS’, Vestnik PVO (January 1966) 88–90. 57. G. Davidov, L. Ermakova, V. Kalistratov, A. Medvedev, S. Frolkin, ‘Nas Ozaryaet Svet Oktyabrya!, Parad i Demonstratsiya Na Krasnoi Ploshchadi’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 10 November 1965. 58. ‘Rech’ Marshala Sovetskogo Soyuza R.Ya. Malinovskogo’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 2 April 1966; ‘Rech’ Tovarishcha R.Ya. Malinovskogo’, Pravda, 3 April 1966. Emphasis added. 59. See, for example: ‘XXIII S”ezd KPSS o Dal’neishem Ukreplenii Oboronnoi Moshchi SSSR i Povishenii Boevoi Gotovnosti Sovetskikh Vooruzhennikh Sil’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 10 (May 1966) 68; Army General V. Ivanov, General Major A. Ovsyannikov, Colonel M. Galkin, ‘XXIII S”ezd KPSS o Voennoi Opasnosti i Zadachakh Ukrepleniya Oboronosposobnosti Strani’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 12 (June 1966) 15. 60. E.K. Bragin, A.G. Kubarev, Protivoraketnaya Oborona (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1966). 61. See: Marshal R. Malinovskii, ‘Na Strazhe Zavoevanii Velikogo Oktyabrya’, Pravda, 23 February 1967; General Major I.I. Anureev, ‘Sovetskaya Nauka i Vooruzhennie Sili SSSR’, Vestnik PVO (April 1967) 11; Marshal A. Grechko, ‘Armiya Oktyabrya’, Izvestiya, 23 February 1967.

Notes and References 189 62. Marshal N. Krilov, ‘Raketnaya Moshch’ Rodini’, Pravda, 19 November 1967. 63. Marshal N. Krylov, ‘The Nuclear Missile Shield of the Soviet State’, Voennaya Misl’ (November 1967) 15, 18. 64. Engineer Colonel V. Bezzabotnov, ‘The US Limited ABM System “Sentinel”’, Voennaya Misl’ (May 1968) 72. 65. I. Grishanko, ‘Apologetika “Deshevoi” Yadernoi Voini’, MEMO (January 1967) 124–6. 66. Wolfe, ‘Soviet Interests in SALT’, p. 39. 67. Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1964–65 (London: ISS, 1965) p. 22. 68. Miller, p. 81. 69. Norman Polmar, Strategic Weapons: An Introduction (London: Macdonald & Jane’s, 1976) pp. 61–2. 70. Office of Technology Assessment, US Congress, Strategic Defenses: Ballistic Defense Technologies, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures and Arms Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) pp. 45–6. 71. Carl G. Jacobsen, The Nuclear Era: Its History, Its Implications (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Guan & Hain Publishers, Inc, 1982) p. 35. 72. Office of Technology Assessment, p. 46. 73. William Schneider, Jr, ‘Missile Defense Systems: Past, Present and Future’, in Johan J. Holst and William Schneider, Jr, eds, Why ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1969) pp. 11–13. 74. Scope, Magnitude and Implications of the United States Antiballistic Missile Program, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, US Congress, 6–7 November 1967 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1968) pp. 10–11. 75. Carl G. Jacobsen, Soviet Strategy – Soviet Foreign Policy: Military Considerations Affecting Soviet Policy-Making (Glasgow: Glasgow University Press, 1972) p. 100. 76. Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985) p. 196. 77. Alexander Otto Ghebhardt, ‘Implications of Organizational and Bureaucratic Policy Models for Soviet ABM Decision-Making’ (Columbia University, PhD Dissertation, 1975) pp. 80–1. 78. Bruce Parrott, The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense (Boulder and London: Westview Press with the Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1987) pp. 24–5. 79. Miller, p. 101. 80. Miller, pp. 172–3. 81. Polmar, p. 62. 82. R. Craig Nation, Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy 1917–1991 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992) p. 266. 83. Nation, p. 266. 84. Ghebhardt, pp. 27, 33, 45. 85. Prados, p. 155.

190 Notes and References 86. Prados, pp. 155–7. 87. Lawrence Freedman, US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat (London: Macmillan Press, 1977) p. 91. 88. Prados, p. 157. 89. Freedman, p. 88. 90. Holloway, p. 142. 91. Freedman, p. 88. 92. Prados, p. 160. 93. Freedman, pp. 88–90. 94. Bill Gunston, ‘Soviet Missiles’, in Ray Bonds, ed., Soviet War Power (London: Corgi, 1982) p. 253. 95. David R. Jones, ‘National Air Defense Forces’, in David R. Jones, ed., Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, Volume 2 (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1978) p. 99. 96. John M. Collins, US-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities 1960–1980 (New York: McGraw-Hill Publications, 1980) pp. 159–62. 97. Jones, p. 99. 98. Sayre Stevens, ‘The Soviet BMD Program’, in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds, Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1984) pp. 197–8. 99. Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 91st Congress, Part I, March 6, 11, 13, 21, 26, and 28, 1969 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1969) p. 24. 100. Stevens, p. 198. 101. Carl G. Jacobsen, ‘Ballistic Missile Defense: The Evolution of Soviet Concepts, Research and Development’, in David R. Jones, ed., Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, Volume 1 (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1977) p. 169. 102. Jacobsen, Soviet Strategy – Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 103. 103. Office of Technology Assessment, p. 49. 104. Miller, p. 101.

4

Missile Defence and Arms Control Diplomacy, 1968–72

1. Harry Gelman, The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Détente (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984) pp. 127–8. 2. John Dornberg, Brezhnev: The Masks of Power (London: Andre Deutsch Ltd, 1974) pp. 23–4. 3. Marshall D. Shulman, ‘Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy’, in Michael MccGwire, Ken Booth and John McDonnell, eds, Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975) p. 5. 4. Shulman, pp. 5–6. 5. Samuel B. Payne, Jr, The Soviet Union and SALT (Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 1980) p. 75. 6. Bruce Parrott, ‘Soviet Foreign Policy, Internal Politics, and Trade with the West’, in Bruce Parrott, ed., Trade, Technology, and Soviet-American Relations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985) p. 40.

Notes and References 191 7. L.I. Brezhnev, For Greater Unity of Communists, For a Fresh Upsurge of the AntiImperialist Struggle (Moscow: Novosti, 1969) p. 47. 8. Thomas W. Wolfe, ‘Soviet Interests in SALT’, in William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr, eds, SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973) p. 24. 9. ‘Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, March 30, 1971’, in L.I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin’s Course: Speeches and Articles (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972) p. 352. 10. See, for example: Engineer Colonel K.M. Popov, ‘Poiski Putei Postroeniya PRO v SShA’, Vestnik PVO (August 1968) 83–5; Lieutenant Colonel V. Bondarenko, ‘Sovremennaya Revolyutsiya v Voennom Dele i Boevaya Gotovnost’ Vooruzhennikh Sil’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 24 (December 1968) 22–9; Colonel P.F. Plyachenko, ‘Razvitie Sistemi PRO v SShA’, Vestnik PVO (August 1966) 86–7. 11. See, for example: A. Bogdanov, ‘Starie i Novie Problemi Respublikanskoi Administratsii’, MEMO (January 1971) 70–3; V.V. Larionov, ‘Strategicheskie Debati’, SShA (March 1970) 20–31; G.N. Tsagolov, ‘Voenno-Promishlennii Kompleks: Nekotorie Obshchie Aspekti’, SShA (November 1970) 21–30; V. Bol’shakov, ‘PRO: Protiv Kogo?’, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 9 August 1969. 12. See, for example: V. Matveev, ‘Vooruzheniya i Razoruzhenie’, Izvestiya, 13 March 1969; Yu. Arbatov, ‘SShA: Bol’shie Raketnie Debati’, Izvestiya, 15 April 1969. 13. See, for example: ‘Mezhdu Khel’sinki i Venoi’, SShA (January 1970) 60–4; and V. Paramonov, ‘Raketi i Biznes’, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 26 March 1969. 14. See, for example: Colonel B.G. Zabelok, ‘Razvitie Taktiki i Operativnogo Iskusstva Voisk PVO Strani’, Vestnik PVO (February 1968) pp. 17–25; Colonel V.S. Yakushkin, ‘V.I. Lenin o Zashchite Sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva’, Vestnik PVO (January 1969) pp. 8–12; General Major S.Z. Golikov, ‘Rol’ V.I. Lenina v Sozdanii Osnov Sovetskoi Voennoi Nauki’, Vestnik PVO (March 1969) pp. 7–11; Marshal P.F. Batitskii, ‘Rukovodstvo Voiskami – Na Prochnuyu Nauchnuyu Osnovu’, Vestnik PVO (July 1969) pp. 2–10. 15. Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987) pp. 3, 29, 31, 56, 242. 16. Bruce Parrott, The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense, SAIS Papers in International Affairs Number 14 (Boulder and London: Westview Press with the Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1987) p. 26. 17. Articles in this debate include: G. Gerasimov, ‘Pro PRO’, Pravda Ukrainu, 23 March 1969; Paramonov; B. Orekhov, ‘“Sentinel” – Parol’ Voennogo Buma’, Pravda, 13 March 1969; B. Strel’nikov, ‘Opasnii “Predokhranitel”’, Pravda, 31 March 1969; Matveev; Lieutenant Colonel V. Nekrasov and V. Berezin, ‘Na Altar’ Voennogo Biznesa’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 28 March 1969; Arbatov; B. Strel’nikov, ‘Yadernii Kot v Meshke’, Pravda, 10 June 1969; Bol’shakov. 18. ‘Mezhdu Khel’sinki i Venoi’, p. 60. For other anti-ABM articles which appeared at this time, see: G.A. Arbatov, ‘Amerikanskaya Vneshnyaya Politika Na Poroge 70-kh Godov’, SShA (January 1970) 21–34; Colonel A. Leont’ev and V. Berezin, ‘Snova Voznya Vokrug “Seifgarda”’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 9 January 1970; A.G. Aleshin, ‘Uslovie Uspekhi’, SShA (February

192 Notes and References

19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27.

28.

29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44.

1970) 55–7; Larionov; ‘Vazhnaya Problema’, Pravda, 7 March 1970; V. Kulish, S. Fedorenko, ‘Po Povodu Diskussii v SShA o Strategicheskikh Vooruzheniyakh’, MEMO (March 1970) 41–9. See, for example, Larionov, and Kulish and Fedorenko. M.V. Belousov, ‘Tekhnicheskie Aspekti Sistemi “Seifgard”’, SShA (May 1970) 118–123; ‘Mezhdu Khel’sinki i Venoi’. See, for example: V. Shestov, ‘Chto Skrivaetsya za Propagandistskoi Zavesoi’, Pravda, 3 February 1971; V.Viktorov, ‘Nekotorie Itogi i Perspektivi’, Pravda, 7 July 1971. Colonel V. Kharich, ‘V Storone ot Realisticheskogo Podkhoda’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 13 July 1971. See, for example, R. Faramazyanom, ‘Gonka Vooruzhenii i Militarizatsiya Ekonomiki v Imperialisticheskikh Stranakh’, MEMO (August 1971) 151–7. Popov. Marshal A. Grechko, ‘V Boyakh Rozhdennaya’, Pravda, 23 February 1970. US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Strategic Defenses: Ballistic Defense Technologies, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures and Arms Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) p. 48. J.P. Ruina, ‘US and Soviet Strategic Arsenals’, in Mason Willrich and John P. Rhinelander, eds, SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond (New York: The Free Press, 1974) p. 61. Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985) p. 200. Garthoff, p. 208. Robin Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) p. 49. Gerard Smith, Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1980) p. 33. Robbin F. Laird and Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet Union and Strategic Arms (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984) pp. 114–15. Raymond L. Garthoff, ‘The Soviet Military and SALT’, in John Baylis and Gerald Segal, eds, Soviet Strategy (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1981) p. 161. Chalmers M. Roberts, ‘The Road to Moscow’, in Willrich and Rhinelander, pp. 25–6. Roberts, p. 26. Smith, p. 59. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, p. 196. See, for example, Smith, p. 59 and Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, p. 196. Newhouse, p. 238. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, p. 186. Marshal D. Shulman, ‘SALT and the Soviet Union’, in Willrich and Rhinelander, pp. 110–11. Raymond Garthoff, ‘The Soviet Military and SALT’, in Jiri Valenta and William C. Potter, eds, Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984) p. 155. Wolfe, p. 32. Smith, p. 83.

Notes and References 193 45. Sayre Stevens, ‘The Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Program’, in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds, Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1984) p. 202. 46. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, p. 145. 47. Smith, pp. 191–2. 48. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, pp. 142–3. 49. Garthoff, Détente and Controntation, pp. 145, 150–1. 50. Smith, p. 266. 51. Newhouse, pp. 233, 237. 52. Smith, p. 227. 53. Smith, p. 232. 54. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, p. 153. 55. Smith, pp. 257–60. 56. Newhouse, pp. 192–3. 57. Robin Ranger, Arms and Politics 1958–1978: Arms Control in a Changing Political Context (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979). See the introduction for an elaboration of this view. 58. Smith, p. 269. 59. Smith, pp. 269–70. 60. Edward L. Warner, III, The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Institutional Analysis (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977) p. 249.

5

Missile Defence and the Decline of Détente, 1972–9

1. Thomas M. Nichols, The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security 1917–1992 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993) p. 102. 2. Robin Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) p. 158. 3. For a discussion of Soviet policymaking during Brezhnev’s last years, see Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) pp. 53–4. 4. David Holloway, ‘War, Militarism and the Soviet State’, in Erik P. Hoffmann and Robbin F. Laird, eds, The Soviet Polity in the Modern Era (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1984) p. 381. 5. Cited in Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet High Command 1967–89: Personalities and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) p. 154. Jack Snyder also discusses the struggle between the political and military leadership over resources during this period. See: Jack Snyder, ‘The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?’, in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller and Stephen Van Evera, Soviet Military Policy: An International Security Reader (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989) p. 85. 6. Bruce Parrott, The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense, SAIS Papers in International Affairs Number 14 (Boulder and London: Westview Press with the Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1987) p. 32. 7. Nichols, p. 111. 8. Herspring, pp. 114–15.

194 Notes and References 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21.

22.

23. 24. 25.

26.

27. 28. 29.

Herspring, p. 122. Herspring, pp. 154–5. Nichols, p. 99. Nichols, p. 103. David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, second edition (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985) pp. 117–20. For an extensive discussion of the impact of bureaucratization on Soviet weapons procurement policy, see Arthur Alexander, Decision-Making in Soviet Weapons Procurement, Adelphi Papers Numbers 147–148 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1978–9) pp. 6, 9. Parrott, p. 41. Parrott, pp. 41–3. Walter Pincus, ‘US Says ABM Extension Depends on Soviet Radar’, International Herald Tribune, 15 December 1987, cited in David Yost, Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western Alliance (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1988) p. 373, footnote 66. Pincus. Alan B. Sherr, The Other Side of Arms Control: Soviet Objectives in the Gorbachev Era (Boston and London: Unwin Hyman, 1988) p. 88. Sherr, p. 93. Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives and Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987) pp. 3, 29, 31–2, 43; Franklyn Griffiths, ‘Current Soviet Military Doctrine’, in Murray Feshbach, ed., National Security Issues of the USSR (Dordrecht: Martinus, Nijhoff Publishers, 1987) pp. 242–3. See, for example: Colonel V. Logachev, ‘Nauchno-Tekhnicheskaya Revolyutsiya i Oboronosposobnost’ Strani’, Vestnik PVO (February 1974) 15–16; General V. Kulikov, ‘Protivovozdushnaya Oborona v Sisteme Zashchiti Sovetskogo Gosudarstva’, Vestnik PVO (April 1973) 4; Colonel V. Kozlov, ‘V Interesakh Zashchiti Sotsializma’, Vestnik PVO (May 1975) 87; Colonel N. Tabunov, ‘V Dukhe Lichnoi Otvetstvennosti’, Vestnik PVO (June 1975) 11; and Marshal G.V. Zimin et al., Razvitie Protivovozdushnoi Oborony (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976) pp. 191–2, quoted in Parrott, p. 35. V.M. Bondarenko, Sovremennaia Nauka i Razvitie Voennogo Dela (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), p. 132, quoted in Parrott, p. 33. Beatrice Heuser, ‘Warsaw Pact Military Doctrines in the 1970s and 1980s: Findings in the East German Archives’, Comparative Strategy 12 (1993) 444. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity, Formulation, and Dissemination (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988) p. 87. For articles which make these arguments, see: G.A. Arbatov, ‘Sobitie Vazhnogo Mezhdunarodnogo Znacheniya’, SShA (August 1972) 3–12; O. Bikov and S. Fedorenko, ‘Appetiti Pentagona’, MEMO (August 1972) 70–1; V. Viktorov, ‘Na Putyakh k Razoruzheniyu’, MEMO (August 1972) 3–9. Arbatov, p. 12. See: O. Bikov and D. Tomashevskii, ‘Real’naya Sila Mezhdunarodnogo Razvitiya’, MEMO (July 1972) 8; and V. Viktorov, p. 8. General Colonel V. Dement’ev, ‘Nauchno-Tekhnicheskii Progress i Razvitie Voennogo Dela’, Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal (March 1979) 8–15.

Notes and References 195 30. N. Ogarkov, ‘Voennaya Nauka i Zashchita Sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva’, Kommunist 7 (1978) 117, quoted in Parrott, p. 39. 31. For examples of this, see: Arbatov, p. 12; G.A. Trofimenko, ‘SovetskoAmerikanskie Soglasheniya ob Ogranichenii Strategicheskii Vooruzhenii’, SShA (September 1972) 3–16; O. Bikov and D. Tomashevskii, pp. 4–15; and Viktorov, pp. 3–9. 32. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1973–74 (London: IISS, 1973) p. 1; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1975–76 (London: IISS, 1975) p. 3. 33. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1979 (London: IISS, 1980) p. 31. 34. See for example: Kulikov, p. 4; Marshal P.F. Batitskii, ‘Idti Dal’she, Dobivat’sya Bol’shego’, Vestnik PVO (November 1974) 5; Bondarenko, Sovremennaya Nauka, pp. 32, 130–1; and Zimin et al., pp. 92–5. 35. R. Craig Nation, Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy 1917–1991 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992) p. 276. 36. Edmonds, pp. 173–4. 37. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1974–75 (London: IISS, 1974) pp. 48–9; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1976–77 (London: IISS, 1976) p. 49; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1978–79 (London: IISS, 1978) p. 55. 38. David Yost, Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western Alliance (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1988) p. 30. 39. Jeanette Voas, Soviet Attitudes towards Ballistic Missile Defence and the ABM Treaty, IISS Adelphi Paper Number 255 (London: Brassey’s for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990) p. 27. 40. Grigorii Kisun’ko, ‘Den’gi na Oboronu’, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 5 August 1990. 41. Kisun’ko. 42. Voas, pp. 27, 39, 41. 43. Yost, p. 39. 44. John Pike, ‘Assessing the Soviet ABM Programme’, in E.P. Thompson, ed., Star Wars (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985) pp. 57–8. 45. Yost, p. 40. 46. Yost, p. 55. 47. Yost, p. 57. 48. Yost, pp. 58–9.

6

The Second Cold War and the Threat of SDI, 1980–5

1. Roald Sagdeev, The Making of a Soviet Scientist: My Adventures in Nuclear Fusion and Space from Stalin to Star Wars, edited by Susan Eisenhower (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1994) p. 280. 2. Robin Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years (Oxford and London: Oxford University Press, 1983) p. 204. 3. Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) pp. 65–70.

196 Notes and References 4. Stephen M. Meyer, ‘The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking on Security’, in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller, Stephen Van Evera, eds, Soviet Military Policy: An International Security Reader (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989) p. 116, footnote 14. 5. Meyer, pp. 155–7. 6. Thomas M. Nichols, The Sacred Cause: Civil–Military Conflict over Soviet National Security 1917–1992 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993) p. 108. 7. Jack Snyder, ‘The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism’, in Lynn-Jones et al., p. 85. 8. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1979 (London: IISS, 1980) p. 40. 9. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1980–81 (London: IISS, 1981) p. 46. 10. See, for example General M. Kozlov, ‘Organizatsiya i Vedenie Strategicheskoi Oboroni po Opitu Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voini’, VoennoIstoricheskii Zhurnal (December 1980) 9–17. 11. General M. Kozlov, ‘Osobennosti Strategicheskoi Oboroni i Kontrnastupleniya i ikh Znachenie dlya Razvitiya Sovetskogo Voennogo Iskusstva’, Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal (September 1981) 28–35. 12. Yuri Andropov, Interview with a correspondent of Pravda, 27 March 1983, quoted in David B. Rivkin Jr, ‘What Does Moscow Think?’, Foreign Policy 59 (Summer 1985) 96. 13. For examples, see: G.A. Trofimenko, ‘Voennaya Strategiya SShA – Orudie Agressivnoi Politiki’, SShA (January 1985) 3–15; A.A. Kokoshin, ‘Diskussii po Tsentral’nim Voprosam Voennoi Politiki SShA’, SShA (February 1985) 3–14; and Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Mikhailov, ‘Za Kosmos Bez Oruzhiya’, Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika (December 1983) 44–5. 14. E. Fedulaev, ‘“Evroraketi” i Illyuzii Yadernikh Man’yakov SShA’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 3 (1984) 87. 15. See, for example: Colonel V. Eshchenko, ‘Illyuziya Yadernogo Prevoskhodstva’, Vestnik PVO (June 1984) 77–80; Colonel G. Lukava, ‘Voennoe Ravnovesie i Bezopasnost’ Narodov’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 23 (December 1984) 19–26. 16. General Lieutenant V. Shatalov and General Major L. Shishov, ‘Ispol’zovanie Soedinennimi Shtatami Ameriki Kosmosa v Voennikh Tselyakh’, Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal (October 1984) 73. 17. Mikhailov, 44; see also Colonel E. Buynovskiy and L. Tkachev, ‘The Pentagon’s Orbital Arsenal’, Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika (August 1984) 10–11 (English translation: CSO: 9144/478). 18. General Major M. Kozlov, ‘Iz Istorii Razvitiya Voenno-Strategicheskikh Kontseptsii SShA’, Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal (October 1983) 75. 19. Colonel E. Ribkin, ‘V.I. Lenin, KPSS ob Imperializme kak Postoyannom Istochnike Voennoi Opasnosti’, Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal (April 1983) 8–9. For an example of this argument used by a progressive, see Kokoshin, 3. 20. Colonel V. Chernyshev, ‘In the Role of Petitioners for the “Space Umbrella”’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 6 February 1985, quoted in Mary C. Fitzgerald,

Notes and References 197

21. 22.

23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40.

41.

Soviet Views on SDI, Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, Number 601 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Center for Russian and East European Studies, 1987) p. 20. See, for example: Mikhailov; and Eshchenko. See, for example: General Lieutenant D. Volkogonov, ‘Strategiya Avantyurizma’, Zarubezhnoe Voennoe Obozrenie (May 1984) 5; Eshchenko; and Marshal D.F. Ustinov, Serving the Country and the Communist Cause, translated by Penny Dole (Oxford and New York: Pergamon Press, 1983) p. 5. G. Gerasimov, ‘Current Problems of World Policy’, MEMO (July 1983): 100, quoted in Fitzgerald, p. 7. A.G. Arbatov, ‘Limiting Anti-Missile Defense Systems: Problems, Lessons, and Prospects’, SShA (December 1984) 17, quoted in Fitzgerald, p. 7. See, for example, Lieutenant Colonel G. Kryakvin, ‘Radiopromivodeistvie Sisteme PRO’, Vestnik PVO (December 1984) 83–4; and Colonel Engineer L. Milunov, ‘Bor’ba s Ballisticheskimi Raketami’, Teknika i Vooruzhenie (June 1982) 6–8. Ye. Velikhov, ‘The Illusions of “Star Wars”’, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 21 April 1985, quoted in Fitzgerald, p. 32. Lukava, p. 19. Buynovskiy and Tkachev, 10–11. A. Kokoshin, ‘Space is Not an Arena for Confrontation’, Vek XX i Mir (December 1983), quoted in Mary Fitzgerald, p. 21. Fedulaev, p. 88. Edmonds, p. 185. Nichols, pp. 107–8. Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American–Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994) p. 33. Peter G. Boyle, American–Soviet Relations from the Russian Revolution to the Fall of Communism (London and New York: Routledge, 1993) pp. 201–2. Garthoff, p. 514. Edmonds, p. 190. Garthoff, p. 690. While the British and French continued to maintain and upgrade their independent nuclear deterrents during these years, Soviet publications tended to treat the threat from the West as a single entity, with the exception of the possibility of Germany acquiring nuclear weapons. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1977–78 (London: IISS, 1977) pp. 52–3. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1982–83 (London: IISS, 1982) pp. 78, 80; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1983–84 (London: IISS, 1983) p. 84; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1984–85 (London: IISS, 1984) p. 91; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1985–86 (London: IISS, 1985) pp. 111, 113. See, for example: General Colonel V. Dement’ev, ‘Naucho-Tekhnicheskii Progress i Razvitie Voennogo Dela’, Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal (March

198 Notes and References

42. 43. 44.

45. 46.

47. 48.

49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

7

1979) 9; and Colonel V. Khrobostov, ‘V.I. Lenin, KPSS ob Istoricheskoi Otvetstvennosti za Bezopasnost’ Sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva’, VoennoIstoricheskii Zhurnal (January 1981) 6. Garthoff, pp. 635–6. Joseph L. Nogee, ed., Soviet Politics: Russia after Brezhnev (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985) p. 222. Paul Rogers, Guide to Nuclear Weapons, Bradford Peace Studies Papers: New Series Number 2 (Oxford and New York: Berg Publishers Limited, 1988) p. 50. David S. Yost, Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western Alliance (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1988) pp. 34–5. Jeanette Voas, Soviet Attitudes towards Ballistic Missile Defence and the ABM Treaty, IISS Adelphi Paper Number 255 (London: Brassey’s for IISS, 1990) pp. 27–8. John Pike, ‘Assessing the Soviet ABM Programme’, in E.P. Thompson, ed., Star Wars (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985) p. 58. US Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1981 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1981) p. 67; Rip Bulkeley and Graham Spinardi, Space Weapons: Deterrence or Delusion? (Cambridge: Policy Press, 1986) p. 145. Yost, p. 42; Pike, p. 58. Voas, pp. 34–5. Pike, p. 56. Pike, p. 57. Parrott, pp. 36–7.

‘New Political Thinking’ and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1985–91

1. Stephen Shenfield, The Nuclear Predicament: Explorations in Soviet Ideology, Chatham House Papers Number 37 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1987) p. 82. 2. This information was confirmed by Aleksander Pikaev and Gennadi Lednev, both members of the disarmament department at IMEMO, in interviews with the author in March 1992 and December 1992 respectively. 3. Walter C. Clemens, Jr, Can Russia Change? The USSR Confronts Global Interdependence (Boston and London: Unwin Hyman, 1990) p. 168. 4. Quoted in Dale Herspring, The Soviet High Command 1967–89: Personalities and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) p. 233. 5. Stephen M. Meyer, ‘The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking on Security’, in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller, Stephen Van Evera, eds, Soviet Military Policy: An International Security Reader (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989) p. 137, footnote 82. 6. Herspring, p. 218. 7. Herspring, p. 276. 8. A. Arbatov, A. Savel’ev, ‘Sistema Upravleniya i Svyazi Kak Faktor Strategicheskoi Stabil’nosti’, MEMO (December 1987) pp. 12–23. 9. A. Kokoshin, ‘Razvitie Voennogo Dela i Sokrashchenie Vooruzhennikh Sil i Obichnikh Vooruzhenii’, MEMO (January 1988) pp. 20–32.

Notes and References 199 10. G. Sturua, ‘Peripetii Voennoi Reformi’, MEMO (July 1990) pp. 87–92. 11. Herspring, p. 245. 12. ‘The Key Issue of the Party’s Economic Policy: Report at a Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee on Accelerating Scientific and Technological Progress, 11 June 1985’, in M.S. Gorbachev, Selected Speeches and Articles, 2nd updated edition (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1987) pp. 100–1. 13. Roald Z. Sagdeev, The Making of a Soviet Scientist: My Adventures in Nuclear Fusion and Space from Stalin to Star Wars (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994) p. 273. 14. For Gorbachev’s views on the importance of scientific and technological progress in promoting the revitalization of the economy, see, for example: ‘Immortal Exploit of the Soviet People, Report at a Meeting in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses on the 40th Anniversary of the Soviet People’s Victory in the Great Patriotic War, 8 May 1985’, in Gorbachev, p. 58; ‘The Key Issue of the Party’s Economic Policy’, in Gorbachev, p. 99. 15. ‘Bezopasnost’ Strani i Mestnicheskii Egoizm’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 23 (December 1990); Lieutenant Colonel A. Epifanov and Lieutenant Colonel S. Stetsun, ‘Razoruzhenie: Net li Kamnya za Pazykhoi?’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 22 (November 1991); ‘Global’naya Bezopasnost’: Novii Rakurs’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 17 (September 1991); and Colonel B. Deinega, ‘Oboronnii Byudzhet i Ego Realizatsiya’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 3 (February 1990) pp. 31–3. 16. Daniel Calingaert, Soviet Nuclear Policy under Gorbachev: A Policy of Disarmament (New York and London: Praeger, 1991) p. 37. In January 1989 Gorbachev announced that the defence budget would be reduced by 14.2 per cent over 2 years and six months later that the share of Soviet national income devoted to defence would be reduced by one-third and one-half by 1995. 17. Paul Mann, ‘US Predicts Further Cuts in Soviet Defense Spending’, Aviation Week and Space Technology (7 May 1990) p. 69. 18. See, for example, David S. Yost, Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western Alliance (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1988), and Mary Fitzgerald, Soviet Views on SDI, Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, Number 601 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Center for Russian and East European Studies, 1987). 19. Marshal O.A. Losik, ‘M.V. Frunze i Sovetskaya Voennaya Nauka’, VoennoIstoricheskii Zhurnal (March 1985) p. 38. 20. Captain A. Bel’yaev, ‘Nauchnie Predstavleniya o Sovremennoi VoineVazhnii Element Soznaniya Sovetskogo Voina’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 7 (April 1985) p. 28. 21. Minister of Defence Marshal S. Sokolov, ‘Velikaya Pobeda’, Kommunist 6 (April 1985) p. 68. 22. General Colonel M.A. Gareev, ‘Tvorcheskii Kharakter Sovetskoi Voennoi Nauki v Velikhoi Otechestvennoi Voine’, Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal (July 1985) p. 29. 23. Colonel K. Vorob’ev, ‘Vooruzhennie Sili SSSR: Sotsial’nie Grani Razvitiya’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 16 (August 1985) p. 10. 24. General A. Epishev, ‘Radi Zhizni Na Zemle’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 8 May 1985. 25. Losik, p. 38.

200 Notes and References 26. Colonel V. Kandibo, ‘Istochniki Voin: Istina i Fal’sifikatsii Antikommunistov’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 16 (August 1986) p. 80. 27. Colonel A. Dmitriev, ‘Boevoi Potentsial Sovetskikh Vooruzhennikh Sil’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 22 (November 1986) p. 22. 28. General Major M. Yasyukov, ‘Problema Voini i Mira – Ostreishaya Problema Sovremennosti’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 10 (May 1986) p. 16; Yu. Krasin, ‘Strategiya Mira – Imperativ Epokhi’, MEMO (January 1986) p. 11. 29. Yasyukov, p. 16; Lieutenant Colonel V. Roshchupkin, ‘Reik’yavik i Orbiti “Zvezdnikh Voin”’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 23 (December 1986) pp. 84–8. 30. A.A. Kokoshin, ‘Sokrashchenie Yadernikh Vooruzhennii i Strategicheskaya Stabil’nost’’, SShA (February 1988) pp. 3–12; and A.A. Vasil’ev, M.M. Gerasev, A.A. Kokoshin, ‘Assimmetrichnii Otvet (Vozmozhnie Meri Protivodeistviya SOI)’, SShA (February 1987) pp. 26–35. 31. Yu. Kulikov, ‘“Zvezdnie Krestonostsi” Ne Ynimayutsya’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 11 (June 1988) pp. 82–3; and B. Surikov, ‘“Zvezdnie” Illyuzii’, MEMO (December 1988) pp. 78–9. 32. Other articles in the SDI debate which used this argument include: L. Gromov, A. Nikolin, ‘Kapitalisticheskoe Voennoe Proizvodstvo i VoennoPromishlennie Kompleks’, MEMO (May 1986) pp. 45–57; A. Kireev, ‘Ekonomicheskie Aspekti Amerikanskikh Planov Militaritsatsii Kosmosa’, MEMO (November 1986) pp. 110–15; N.D. Turkatenko, ‘Posle Zhenevi’, SShA (January 1986) pp. 61–6. 33. A.A. Vasil’ev, A.A. Konovalov, ‘Nekotorie Aspekti Vozdeistviya Programmi SOI na Ekonomiky SShA’, SShA (December 1986) pp. 13–15. 34. Sokolov, pp. 64–5; and E. Velikhov and A. Kokoshin, ‘Yadernoe Oruzhie i Dilemmi Mezhdunarodnoi Bezopasnosti’, MEMO (April 1985) p. 39. 35. ‘Answers to Time Magazine’, in Gorbachev, p. 179. 36. ‘Press Conference at Reykjavik’, in Gorbachev, p. 42. 37. A. Yakovlev, ‘Istoki Ugrozi i Obshchestvennoe Mnenie’, MEMO (March 1985) p. 12. 38. General V.M. Shabanov, ‘Ne Dopustit’ Militarizatsii Kosmosa’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 November 1985; V.M. Berezkhov, ‘Posle Reik’yavika: Bor’ba Za Mir Prodolzhaetsya’, SShA (December 1986) pp. 5, 9. 39. D. Klimov, ‘Ugroza Strategicheskoi Stabil’nost’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 23 (December 1988) p. 85; and M.I. Gerasev, A.A. Konovalov, ‘V Poiskakh Kosmicheskoi Doktrini’, SShA (May 1988) p. 26. 40. R.G. Bogdanov, ‘Sovetsko-Amerikanskii Dialog: Trudnosti i Perspektivi’, SShA (November 1987) p. 52. 41. Velikov and Kokoshin, p. 39; and A. Kozirev, ‘Kosmos i Vseobshchaya Bezopasnost’’, MEMO (September 1986) p. 39. 42. A. Arbatov, A.A.Vasil’ev, A.A. Kokoshin, ‘Yadernoe Oruzhie i Strategicheskaya Stabil’nost’’, SShA (September 1987) p. 9; Kokoshin, ‘Razvitie Voennogo Dela’, p. 25. 43. V. Petrovskii, ‘Bezopasnost’ Cherez Razoruzhenie’, MEMO (January 1987) p. 3. 44. These points are made in the context of discussions about SDI in the following articles: ‘Za Mir Bez Voin i Nasiliya’, SShA (May 1986) pp. 3–9;

Notes and References 201

45. 46.

47. 48.

49. 50. 51.

52. 53. 54.

55. 56. 57. 58.

59. 60.

61.

I.E. Malashenko, ‘Politiko-psikhologicheskie Aspekti Programmi “Zvezdnikh Voin”’, SShA (July 1986) pp. 3–14; N.B. Yaroshenko, ‘Plani “Zvezdnikh Voin”: 1945–1986’, SShA (November 1986) pp. 61–5. V. Etkin, ‘Ot Skrytnosti K Doveriyu’, Pravda, 20 July 1989. Lieutenant M.Vinogradov and General Major V. Belous, ‘Dogovor Po SNV i Nasha Bezopasnost’’, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 23 August 1990; and B.T. Surikov, ‘Kak Predotvratit’ “Sluchainuyu” Yadernuyu Voinu’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 23 (December 1991) pp. 42–3. ‘Novoe Mishlenie i Voennaya Politika, “Kruglii stol” v Voennoi Akademii imeni M.V. Frunze’, Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil 7 (April 1991), p. 30. G.S. Khozin, ‘Ekonomicheskie Problemi Kosmonavtiki’, SShA (January 1990) pp. 21–30, especially page 29; and General V.M. Lobov, ‘Voennaya Reforma: Istoricheskie Predposilki i Osnovnie Napravleniya’, VoennoIstoricheskii Zhurnal (November 1991) p. 3. V.F. Davidov, ‘XXI Vek: Stoletie Raketno-Yadernikh Pigmeev’, SShA (February 1991) pp. 8, 13. ‘Illyuzii “Zvezdnikh Voin”’, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 21 April 1985; and N.I. Bubnova, ‘Debati Vokrug SOI’, SShA (September 1986) p. 71. Lieutenant Colonel N. Kovalevskii and G. Korotkov, ‘“Zvezdnie Voin” Bez Shirmi’, Kommunist Vooruzhennnikh Sil 17 (September 1986) p. 85; and S.A. Kulik, V.N. Sergeev, ‘SOI, Komp’yuteri i Strategicheskaya Stabil’nost’’, SShA (November 1987) pp. 112–19. O.F. Prilutskii, S.N. Rodionov, ‘Uchenie Provodyat Pereotsenku Kosmicheskogo Oruzhiya’, SShA (July 1988) pp. 28–9. Shabanov; and General Lieutenant M. Kir’yan, ‘V Interesakh Bezopasnosti Narodov’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 31 January 1986. Arbatov, Vasil’ev and Kokoshin, p. 8; R. Sagdeev, S. Rodionov, ‘K Voprosu o Strategicheskikh i Ekonomicheskikh Posledstviyakh SOI’, MEMO (May 1986) p. 15; Yu. Tomilin, ‘Kosmos: Protivoborstvo ili Sotrudnichestvo?’, MEMO (September 1987) pp. 3–4; and O. Bikov, ‘Novaya Kontseptsiya Yadernogo Razoruzheniya’, MEMO (February 1987) p. 3. Alexei Arbatov, ‘How Much Defence is Sufficient?’, International Affairs (Moscow) (April 1989) pp. 38–9. ‘Otveti Ministra Oboroni SSSR Marshala Sovetskogo Soyuza S.L. Sokolova Na Voprosi Korrespondenta TASS’, Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 May 1985. Sergei Akhromeyev, ‘We Will Find the Proper Reply to SDI’, New Times, 8 September 1986, pp. 4–5. A. Lebedev, ‘Imperativi Khel’sinki’, MEMO (August 1985) p. 10; and ‘Leninskaya Strategiya Stroitel’stva Kommunizma i Ukrepleniya Mira’, MEMO (December 1985) p. 12. ‘Press Conference at Reykjavik’, p. 46. Vitaly Zhurkin, Sergei Karaganov and Andrei Kortunov, ‘Reasonable Sufficiency – Or How to Break the Vicious Circle’, New Times, 12 October 1987, p. 14; and Arbatov, Vasil’ev and Kokoshin, p. 24. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1985–86 (London: IISS, 1985) p. 3; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1990–91 (London: IISS, 1990), p. 12; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1984–85 (London: IISS, 1984) p. 3;

202 Notes and References

62. 63.

64. 65.

66. 67. 68. 69.

70. 71. 72.

73.

74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81.

82. 83.

International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1987–88 (London: IISS, 1987) p. 11; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1988–89 (London: IISS, 1988) p. 13. The Military Balance 1987–88, p. 11. The Military Balance 1987–88, pp. 60, 79; The Military Balance 1989–90 (London: IISS, 1989) pp. 62, 81; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1991–92 (London: IISS, 1991) pp. 55, 75. The Military Balance 1985–86, p. 111; The Military Balance 1988–89, pp. 146–7; The Military Balance 1991–92, p. 150. There are many studies which provide detailed discussions of the arms control negotiations of the Gorbachev period. See, for example: Coit D. Blacker, Hostage to Revolution: Gorbachev and Soviet Security Policy 1985–1991 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993); Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994); and Alan B. Sherr, The Other Side of Arms Control: Soviet Objectives in the Gorbachev Era (Boston and London: Unwin Hyman, 1988). Garthoff, p. 352. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1988–89 (London: IISS, 1989) pp. 35–6; The Military Balance 1989–90, p. 11. See page 8. For a detailed discussion of the resistance to reform displayed by the Soviet ministries, see Stephen Whitefield, Industrial Power and the Soviet State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) pp. 178–205. Yost, p. 214. Clemens, p. 235. Matthew Evangelista, ‘Soviet Policy Toward Strategic Arms Control’, in Bruce Parrott, ed., The Dynamics of Soviet Defense Policy (Washington, DC: The Wilson Center Press, 1990) p. 293. Jeannette Voas, Soviet Attitudes towards Ballistic Missile Defence and the ABM Treaty, Adelphi Paper Number 255 (London: Brassey’s for the IISS, 1990) p. 27. The Military Balance 1989–90, p. 34. Yost, p. 37. US Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1989 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1989) p. 52. US Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1983 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1983) p. 29. US Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1987 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1987) p. 61. Soviet Military Power 1989 p. 51. Nicholas L. Johnson, Soviet Military Strategy in Space (London: Jane’s Publishing Company Limited, 1987) pp. 173–4. John Pike, ‘Assessing the Soviet ABM Programme’, in E.P. Thompson, ed., Star Wars (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985) p. 62; US Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1986 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986) p. 47. O. Bikov, ‘Novoe Politicheskoe Mishlenie v Deistvii’, MEMO (February 1988) p. 18. Pike, pp. 62–3.

Notes and References 203 84. Rip Bulkeley and Graham Spinardi, Space Weapons: Deterrence of Delusion? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986) p. 150. 85. Rebecca Strode, ‘Space-Based Lasers for Ballistic Missile Defense: Soviet Policy Options’, in Keith Payne, ed., Laser Weapons in Space: Policy and Doctrine (Epping: Bowker Publishing Company, 1983) p. 122. 86. ‘Soviets Display Laser Facility at Sary Shagan’, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 17 July 1989, p. 27. 87. Soviet Military Power 1986, p. 47. 88. Paul Stares, Space Weapons and US Strategy: Origins and Development (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1985) p. 192. 89. US Departments of Defense and State, Soviet Strategic Defense Programs (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985) p. 16; Terry McNeill, ‘The Soviets and SDI’, in Stephen Kirby and Gordon Robson, eds, The Militarization of Space (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987) p. 155. 90. Yost, pp. 59–60; Hans Binnendijk, ed., Strategic Defense in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: US Department of State Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1986) p. 48.

8

Missile Defences and Yeltsin’s Russia

1. For more detailed discussions of politics in post-Soviet Russia, see: Gail W. Lapidus, ed., The New Russia: Troubled Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); John Lowenhardt, The Reincarnation of Russia: Struggling with the Legacy of Communism 1990–1994 (Harlow: Longman, 1995); Thomas Remington, Politics in Russia (New York: Longman, 1999); Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, 2nd edition (London: Routledge, 1996). 2. For an example of this view, see A. Arbatov, ‘Dogovor po PRO i Protivoraketnaya Oborona Teatra Voennikh Deistvii’, MEMO (January 1996) pp. 116–26. 3. Jonathan Steele, Eternal Russia: Yeltsin, Gorbachev and the Mirage of Democracy (London: Faber & Faber, 1994) pp. 371–87. 4. Roy Allison, ‘Military Factors in Foreign Policy’, in Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison and Margot Light, Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) pp. 251–77. 5. Allison, p. 241. 6. For a discussion of the extent of political involvement of the Russian armed forces, see Allison, pp. 232–51. 7. For a range of different estimates and a discussion of the ways in which they were reached, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1998–99 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) pp. 103–6. 8. For discussions on the state of the post-Soviet Russian armed forces, see: Dale R. Herspring, ‘The Russian Military: Three Years On’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 28, no. 2 (1995) pp. 163–82; Richard B. Spence, ‘Servants or Masters? The Military in the “New Russia”’, in Constantine Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker, eds, Civil–Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996) pp. 13–34. 9. General-Major V. Men’shikov, ‘Voenno-Kosmicheskie Sili Rossii’, Armeiskii Sbornik 2 (February 1994) pp. 9–13.

204 Notes and References 10. For examples of expressions of these views in Russian military literature, see: General-Colonel A.A. Danilevich and Colonel O.P. Shunin, ‘O Strategicheskikh Neyadernikh Silakh Sderzhivaniya’, Voennaya Misl’ (January 1992) pp. 46–54; General-Lieutenant V.Ya. Petrenko, ‘Chto Pokazivaet Analiz Proekta Voennoi Doktrini’, Voennaya Misl’ (January 1992) pp. 11–16; Colonel A.F. Klimenko, ‘O Roli i Meste Voennoi Doktrini v Sistema Bezopasnosti Sodruzhestva Nezavisimikh Gosudarstv’, Voennaya Misl’ (February 1992) pp. 11–21; and Lieutenant Colonel G.A. Kuznetsov and Major S.P. Strelyaev, ‘Mnogo Polyarnii Mir i Voprosi Dostatochnosti SNV’, Voennaya Misl’ (May-June 1995) pp. 36–41. 11. See: Captain A.B. Logunov and Colonel S.L. Pechurov, ‘Kontseptual’nie Osnovi Viyavleniya i Neutralizatsii Ugroz Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii v Oboronnoi Sfere’, Voennaya Misl’ (May-June 1998) pp. 13–19; Colonel V.V. Cheban, ‘Rossiya v Sisteme Sovremennikh Voenno-Politicheskikh Otnoshenii’, Voennaya Misl’ (April 1993) pp. 2–9; General-Colonel V.M. Barin’kin, ‘Voennie Ugrozi Rossii i Problemi Razvitiya ee Vooruzhennikh Sil’, Voennaya Misl’ (January-February 1999) pp. 2–7; Radii Zubkov, ‘Est’ li y Rossii Veroyatnii Protivnik?’, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie 26 (9–15 July 1999) pp. 1, 4; Retired General-Major I.N. Vorob’ev, ‘Kakie Voini Grozyat Nam v Budushchem Veke?’, Voennaya Misl’ (January–February 1997) pp. 18–24; Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Gatsko and Colonel Sergei Sukhov, ‘Istochniki Yadernoi Ugrozi’, Armeiskii Sbornik 3 (March 1998) pp. 16–19; and E.M. Sushkevich, Colonel V.I. Dumenko and Colonel A.A. Petrov, ‘Osnovnie Problemi Obespecheniya Bezopasnosti Yadernogo Oruzhiya v RF na Sovremennom Etape’, Voennaya Misl’ (May-June 1997) pp. 15–23. 12. Barin’kin, p. 2. 13. Sushkevich, Dumenko and Petrov, p. 16. 14. Retired Colonel V.V. Krisanov, ‘Osobennosti Razvitiya Form Voennikh Deistvii’, Voennaya Misl’ (February 1992) pp. 42–5; General-Lieutenant A.B. Zapadinskii, General-Major N.P. Kolesnikov and Lieutenant-Colonel V.V. Bondarev, ‘Natsional’naya Bezopasnost’ Strani i VoennoStrategicheskoe Ravnovesie’, Voennaya Misl’ (May-June 1997) pp. 2–5; General-Lieutenant Stanislav Ermak, ‘Probil Chas Kosmonavtiki’, Armeiskii Sbornik 2 (February 1995) pp. 14–17. 15. See, for example: Colonel Sergei Volkov and Colonel Yurii Kovtunenko, ‘Chtobi ne Ostavit’ Nebo “Besprizornim”’, Armeiskii Sbornik 5 (May 1994) pp. 8–10; Colonel N.K. Utkin, ‘O Strukture Soderzhaniya Ponyatiya i Sposob Vedeniya Oboronitel’noi Operatsii’, Voennaya Misl’ (May-June 1995) pp. 42–6; Colonel Anatolii Panchenko, ‘Komu Otdat’ Brazdi Pravleniya’, Vestnik PVO 2 (1993) pp. 9–10; General-Lieutenant Viktor Prudnikov, ‘Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona’, Armeiskii Sbornik 4 (April 1995) pp. 6–10; Vorob’ev, pp. 18–24. 16. Colonel Vasilii Nesterchuk, ‘Ser’ezno Govorit’ o Problemakh PKO’, Armeiskii Sbornik 2 (February 1998) p. 35. 17. General-Colonel Viktor Miruk, ‘Reformirovanie PVO: Problemi i Protivorechiya’, Vestnik PVO 9 (September 1993) p. 2. 18. General-Major N. Kozlov, ‘PVO: Quo Vadis?’, Vestnik PVO 4–5 (April-May 1992) p. 22.

Notes and References 205 19. General-Colonel V.F. Miruk, ‘Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona kak Faktor Strategicheskoi Stabil’nosti’, Voennaya Misl’ (March-April 1997) p. 2. 20. Deputy Minister of Defence Andrei A. Kokoshin, ‘Yadernii Shchit Strani’, Armeiskii Sbornik 7 (July 1995) pp. 6–7. See also Lieutenant Colonel S.V. Kreidin, ‘Global’noe i Regional’noe Yadernoe Sderzhivanie: K Sisteme Printsipov i Kriteriev’, Voennaya Misl’ (July-August 1999) pp. 73–80. 21. Kreidin, p. 79. 22. Colonel Anatolii Bukharin, ‘I Sputniki “V Pogonakh” Nuzhdayutsya v Zakonakh’, Armeiskii Sbornik 4 (April 1998) p. 26. 23. Retired General-Major Vladimir Belous, ‘Trudnaya Sud’ba Dogovora po PRO’, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie 1 (9–15 January 1998) p. 6. 24. Yulii Tsiba, ‘Odnostoronnie Resheniya Vedut v Tupik’, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie 11 (26 March–1 April 1999) p. 6. 25. Mikhail Pervov, ‘Strategicheskim Raketam net al’ternativi’, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie 5 (12–18 February 1999) p. 6. 26. See, for example: General-Lieutenant N.S. Zaitsev, Colonel Yu.M. Krokunov and Colonel V.Ya. Chernopyatov, ‘Global’naya Sistema Zashchiti – Element Obespecheniya Mezhdunarodnoi Bezopasnosti’, Voennaya Misl’ (January–February 1995) pp. 13–17; General-Lieutenant Aleksandr Skvortsov and General-Major Nikolai Turko, ‘Strategicheskaya Stabil’nost’ – Klyuch k Natsional’noi Bezopasnosti’, Armeiskii Sbornik 1 (January 1996), pp. 4–8; and General-Colonel V.F. Miruk, ‘Protivoraketnaya Oborona ot Nestrategicheskikh Ballisticheskikh Raket’, Voennaya Misl’ (March-April 1996) pp. 15–19. 27. Zaitsev, Krokunov and Chernopyatov, p. 14. 28. Vladimir Mukhin, ‘Oboronnaya Storona Transparentnosti’, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie 4 (5–11 February 1999) p. 3. 29. A. Pikaev, ‘Nastupatel’nie Kosmicheskie Vooruzheniya: Ugrozi i Real’nosti’, MEMO (June 1992), pp. 30–1. 30. Colonel Igor’ Golovanev and Lieutenant Colonel Anatolii Bukharin, ‘Mutant ot SOI’, Armeiskii Sbornik 12 (December 1996) pp. 87–9. 31. Golovanev and Bukharin; General-Major Vyacheslav Bezborodov, ‘Konkurentsiya na Orbitakh’, Armeiskii Sbornik 12 (December 1995) pp. 20–3. 32. General-Lieutenant Vladimir Medvedev, ‘Voina Rasstrelyala Veru v Dogovorennosti’, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie 15 (23–29 April 1999) p. 1. 33. Arbatov, p. 124. 34. For examples of this view, see: General-Lieutenant Aleksandr Suslov and General-Major Yurii Levshov, ‘Rossii Nuzhna Nestrategicheskaya PRO’, Armeiskii Sbornik 10 (October 1998) pp. 31–3; and Belous, p. 6. 35. Aleksei Podberezkin and Anton Surikov, ‘Dogovor, Dayushchii Preimushchestva SShA’, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie 7 (20–26 February 1998) p. 6; Tsiba, p. 6; and Suslov and Levshov, p. 33. 36. Medvedev, pp. 1,3. 37. See, for example, ‘Bolivar ne Viderzhit Dvoikh’, Armeiskii Sbornik 3 (March 1999) p. 15. 38. For examples of this argument, see: Sergei Rogov, ‘Protivoraketnii Vizov Vashingtona’, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie 6 (19–25 February 1999) p. 4;

206 Notes and References

39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

48. 49.

50. 51. 52. 53.

54. 55. 56. 57.

Anatolii D’yakov and Pavel Podvig, ‘V Poiskakh Vikhoda iz Tupika’, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie 25 (2–8 July 1999) pp. 1, 4; and Arbatov, pp. 116–26. Miruk, ‘Protivoraketnaya Oborona ot Nestrategicheskikh Ballisticheskikh Raket’, p. 18. Colonel Vladimir Saenko, ‘Protivoves ‘Ustrashitelyam’’, Armeiskii Sbornik 10 (October 1995) pp. 23–4. See: Miruk, ‘Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona kak Faktor Strategicheskoi Stabil’nosti’, p. 4; and Suslov and Levshov, p. 32. Ivan Erokin, ‘Nesimmetrichnii Otvet’, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie 24 (25 June–1 July 1999) p. 4. Kokoshin, p. 8, and Arbatov, p. 125. Danilevich and Shunin, p. 46. Margot Light, ‘Foreign Policy Thinking’, in Malcolm et al., Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, p. 69. For a detailed discussion of the debates within Russia about the direction of its foreign policy, see Light, pp. 33–100. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1994–95 (London: Brasseys, 1994) p. 16. For details of the US theatre missile defence programmes, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1998–99 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) pp. 44–50. Strategic Survey 1998–99, p. 43. For a more detailed discussion of Sino-Russian relations in the 1990s, see Rajan Menon, ‘The Strategic Conversion between Russia and China’, Survival, vol. 39, no. 2 (Summer 1997) pp. 101–25. The Military Balance 1998–99, p. 108. The Military Balance 1998–99, p. 108. General-Lieutenant Vladimir Ivanov, ‘Zemnie Zaboti Truzhenikov Kosmosa’, Armeiskii Sbornik 1 (January 1995) p. 28. General-Lieutenant V.M. Smirnov and Colonel V.F. Grin’ko, ‘Sistema Preduprezhdeniya o Raketnom Napadenii: Tendentsii i Problemi Razvitiya’, Voennaya Misl’ (June-July 1992) p. 18. Smirnov and Grink’ko, p. 18. For an article arguing that Russian missile defence research is badly underfunded, see Mukhin, p. 3. Vovick Karnozov, ‘The Favorite Defense System’, AeroWorldNet [http://www.aeroworld.net/1ra11107.htm], 4 October 1999. Dmitrii Paison and Sergei Sokut, ‘Klyuch k Pobede’, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie 5 (12–18 February 1999) p. 6.

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Index Adenauer, K. 15 Afghanistan 100, 108, 116, 119, 120, 121, 142 Akhromeev, S. 129, 139 Alexander, A. 102 Andropov, Y. 107, 108, 109, 112, 123 Angola 100, 119, 142 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems American: Airborne Ballistic Missile Intercept System 56; Ballistic Missile Early Warning System 61; Ballistic Missile Intercept System 56; debates about 49, 53, 56; interceptor missile 57; national missile defence 151, 162–3, 164, 168, 169–70, 173; Nike-X 53, 56; Nike-Zeus 30–1, 45; Patriot 122, 138, 172; radar 56, 57; research 30–1, 51, 53, 55, 56, 74, 101, 162, 168–9; Safeguard 72, 73, 77, 85, 88, 102, 103, 122, 146, 177; Seaborne AntiBallistic Missile Intercept System 56; Sentinel 50, 53, 56; tests 30, 34, 162; theatre missile defence 151, 164, 169, 173; see also Brilliant Pebbles; GPALS; SDI joint Russian–American 137–8, 151, 161–2, 165, 166–7, 171, 176 Russian: capabilities 171; funding 172, 179; Galosh (Moscow) 152, 171, 179; military views of 151, 157–8, 160–1, 172–3, 176; opposition to 157–8, 161, 165; political use of 157, 166–7, 175–6; radar 171–2; role in future war 160–1, 173, 175, 176; technology 171–2, 179

Soviet: capabilities 27–9, 34, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54–5, 57, 58, 61–3, 70, 71, 75, 97, 103–4, 121–2, 141, 146–7, 177, 178; early interest in 4, 13; funding 9, 17, 23–4, 35, 37, 69, 125, 130–1, 143–4; Galosh (Moscow) 24, 34, 42, 48, 50, 53, 54, 55, 58, 60–3, 75, 83, 86, 88, 92, 102–4, 106, 121–2, 124, 125, 139, 141, 143–5, 146–7, 177, 178; Griffon (Leningrad) 23, 35, 36, 37, 44, 59, 60, 104; military views of 13, 16, 24, 45–9, 51–3, 63, 71, 74–5, 86, 95–8, 105, 107, 110, 111, 113–15, 123–4, 132–3, 150, 176, 177–8; opposition to 44–7, 49–50, 52, 53, 63, 69, 70–4, 75–6, 87, 95–8, 112–15, 133–4, 136–7, 138–9, 150; political use of 3, 11–12, 14, 16, 19, 21, 34, 35–6, 58, 63–4, 86, 125, 131, 135, 150, 175; radar 34, 42, 60, 61–2, 63, 88, 93–4, 103–4, 122, 125, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 175, 178; role in future war 10, 16, 25–7, 29, 47, 48, 53, 62, 70, 71, 82–3, 88, 95, 96, 103, 105, 111, 132–3, 139–40, 150, 175, 176; Tallinn Line 60; technology 17, 34, 38, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51, 61–3, 92, 96, 102–5, 117, 121–3, 124, 143, 146–8, 177, 178; tests 23, 29, 34–5, 103, 178; see also Krasnoyarsk radar Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty 63, 65, 74, 75, 76, 84–5, 88, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 102, 103, 105, 110, 111, 113, 117, 123, 125, 135, 136, 145, 146, 147, 151, 152, 157,

222

Index 223 162, 163, 164, 165, 170, 171, 173, 175, 178 Standing Consultative Committee 163 Arbatov, A. 113, 127, 138, 165 Arbatov, G. 97, 109, 145 arms control 48, 52, 55, 57, 58, 59, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 81, 84, 85, 86, 87, 91, 95, 97, 99, 102, 109, 117, 118, 123, 127, 130, 134, 135, 136, 142, 143, 144, 149, 164; see also détente; and see under individual treaties arms race 3, 13, 19, 49, 50, 65, 68, 69, 70, 73, 74, 81–2, 86, 97, 99, 102, 105, 113, 117, 123, 132, 134, 135, 140, 142, 161, 170 Austrian State Treaty 15 Azerbaijan 171 Baikonur 172 Belarus 171 Bel’kov, O. 137 Beria, L. 5, 6, 7 Berlin 18, 33, 78, 79 see also Quadripartite Agreement Beschloss, M. 34 Bikov, O. 147 Biryuzov, S. 45 Bondarenko, V. 96 Bragin, E. 52 Brandt, W. 78, 86 Brezhnev, L. 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 46, 50, 54, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 76, 77, 78, 79, 85, 86, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94, 97, 100, 102, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 120, 123, 126, 128, 143, 153, 175, 178 Brezhnev doctrine 77 economic policy 40, 41–3 view of ABM 41, 43, 50, 51 Brilliant Pebbles 143 see also GPALS; SDI Britain 14, 55, 61, 141, 145, 176 British Bomber Command 12 Bulganin, N. 5, 7–8, 13 Bush, G. 166, 167, 169 Buynovskii, E. 115

Cambodia 100, 119, 120, 142 Camp David Agreement 100 Canada 127 Carter, J. 99, 100, 109, 116, 117, 123 Chelomei, V. 19 Cherednichenko, M. 47 Chernenko, K. 107, 108, 123 Chernyshev, V. 113 China 15, 31, 55, 56, 59, 64, 77–8, 79, 84, 86, 98, 101, 105, 116, 119, 120–1, 123, 141, 142–3, 170–1, 176 Clausewitz, K. von 48 Clinton, W. 169, 173 Cohen, W. 170 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 168, 179 Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) 5, 7, 39, 66, 80, 89, 108, 126, 152, 156, 158, 165, 166 Central Committee 13, 18, 38, 40, 66, 80, 108, 127, 130, 152 Main Political Administration (MPA) 156 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty 142, 164 see also MBFR talks Cuban missile crisis 17, 18, 24, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 43, 44, 59, 60 see also Khrushchev Czechoslovakia 65, 67, 72, 77 see also Prague Spring Davidov, V. 138 Deng Xiaoping 101 détente 43, 54, 59, 65, 66, 77, 78, 79, 85, 89, 90, 91, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 105, 109, 117, 121, 123, 154, 175 see also arms control; SALT I; SALT II Dobrynin, A. 80, 82, 83, 127 Dubcek, A. 67 Dulles, J. 12 Egypt 14, 100 Eisenhower, D. 12, 30, 32 El Salvador 100, 118

224 Index Ethiopia Etkin, V.

100 137

Ford, G. 99, 100 Fortune 50 France 14, 55, 141, 176 Garthoff, R. 57, 83 Germany 3, 5, 31, 33, 66, 78, 79 Gerasimov, G. 49, 50, 51, 72, 73, 113 Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) 169 see also Brilliant Pebbles; SDI Golubev, A. 26 Gorbachev, M. 74, 88, 93, 97, 108, 110, 123, 125, 126–8, 129–30, 131, 133, 134–5, 136, 139, 140, 141–5, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 159, 165, 166, 167, 171, 173, 175, 178 view of ABM 125, 128, 130, 143–4, 146, 178 see also glasnost; New Political Thinking; perestroika glasnost 94, 126, 128 see also Gorbachev Grechko, A. 39–40, 75, 89, 91 Greenland 145 Grenada 119 Gromyko, A. 72 Gulf War (1990–1) 137, 146, 159, 160 Heuser, B. 96 Hungary 18, 20, 31 Husak, G. 67 Hussein, S. 146 Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) 6–7, 114, 127, 147 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty 135, 136, 142, 143, 164 International Affairs (Moscow) 46 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 171 Iran 169

Iraq 100, 159, 168 Islamic Conference 119 Israel 14, 119 Izvestiya 45, 74 Japan 3, 120 Johnson, L. 50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 76 Kapitsa, P. 10, 11, 46 Kapustin Yar 11, 34 Kazakstan 171, 172 Kennedy, J. 23, 30, 32, 33, 37, 43, 50, 53 Khasbulatov, R. 153 Khrushchev, N. 5, 6, 7–8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 30, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 51, 55, 59, 60, 63, 65, 66, 69, 70, 71, 79, 89, 90, 114, 145, 175 economic policy 7–8, 21–3, 35, 38 fascination with science 18–20, 35 missile diplomacy 14, 20–1, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35–6, 37, 41, 64, 175 peaceful coexistence 15, 31, 127, 154 relations with Kennedy 33, 43, 53 removal from power 37, 38, 40, 42 view of ABM 15, 19, 20–1, 29, 33–6, 178 view of nuclear weapons 15, 17, 20, 22–3, 25, 26, 35, 44 see also Cuban missile crisis Kissinger, H. 68, 77, 82, 83 Kisun’ko, G. 13, 19, 103 Kokoshin, A. 165 Kolkowicz, R. 24, 25 Korea 8, 169 Korzhakov, A. 155 Kosovo 168 Kosygin, A. 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 46, 50, 53, 57–8, 63, 66, 76, 175 economic reforms 43, 67–8 Kozyrev, A. 166 Krasil’nikov, S. 25 Krasnaya Zvezda 10, 51, 74

Index 225 Krasnoyarsk radar 88, 93–4, 104, 125, 145, 146, 149, 150, 175 see also ABM Systems (Soviet) Krilov, N. 45, 51, 52, 75 Kubarev, A. 52 Laird, M. 73, 77 Larionov, V. 49 Lebanon 119 Lenin, V. 44, 126 Libya 100 Lomov, N. 26 Lukava, G. 114 Malenkov, G. 5, 7, 8, 15, 18, 22 Malinovskii, R. 18, 23, 29, 39, 44, 45, 52 Mao Tse Tung 15, 31–2, 59, 101, 120 MccGwire, M. 71 McNamara, R. 50, 55, 56, 61, 123 Military Strategy 26, 28 Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnie Otnoshenie (MEMO) 44, 49 Miruk, V. 160 Moiseev, M. 129 Molotov, V. 5 Moscow Peace Congress 29 Mozambique 100 Multiple Independently-Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) 58, 73, 74, 77, 78, 99, 141, 178 Multiple Reentry Vehicle (MRV) 55, 58 Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks 118 see also CFE Treaty Namibia 142 New Political Thinking 74, 97, 125, 127–8, 130, 132, 137, 139, 140, 144, 150, 154, 159, 167 see also Gorbachev New York Times 29 Nicaragua 100, 118 Nikolaev, M. 27, 28 Nixon, R. 65, 68, 72, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 83, 84, 86, 99, 100, 101 Non-Proliferation Treaty 78

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 5, 13, 20, 21, 30, 54, 60, 79, 96, 99, 105, 109, 121, 141, 151, 159, 164, 166, 168 Ogarkov, N. 80, 91, 98, 109 Operation Barbarossa 111 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 162 Ostpolitik 78, 86 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 119 Parrott, B. 71 Partnership for Peace 168 peaceful coexistence see under Khrushchev Penkovsky, O. 32 perestroika 126, 129, 131, 144, 149, 152, 154 see also Gorbachev Plesetsk 172 Podgorny, N. 40 Poland 18, 78, 108, 119–20, 123 Popov, K. 74 Prague Spring 65, 67 see also Czechoslovakia Pravda 50, 58, 74, 75, 112, 137 Protivoraketnaya Oborona 52 Quadripartite Agreement see also Berlin

78–9

Ranger, R. 84 Reagan, R. 1, 93, 94, 107, 109, 110, 114, 116–19, 123, 125, 131, 133, 135, 136, 141, 143, 169 Reagan doctrine 118–19 ‘star wars’ speech 94, 111, 112, 114, 117, 121 see also Strategic Defense Initiative Ribkin, E. 48, 113 Richter, J. 38 Russia armed forces: Air Defence Forces 158, 160, 164, 176; Air Space Forces 158; involvement in

226 Index Russia, armed forces continued power struggles 155, 173; policy advice role 151, 155–6, 157, 173; SA-10 172; size 156 defence budget 156–7, 172 Defence Council 155 defence industry 154, 156 economy 152, 173–4 military strategy 159–61 Ministry of Defence 155, 157, 158, 166, 172 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 166 relations with US 151, 158–9 Security Council 155 State Duma 152, 153, 157 Rutskoi, A. 153 Sadat, A. 100 Sagdeev, R. 108 Sakharov, A. 48, 76 Sary Shagan 11, 34, 35, 60, 148 Semenov, V. 81, 83 Serbia 159, 166, 168 Shelepin, A. 89 Shelest, P. 89 Shevardnadze, E. 93, 145, 150 Shtemenko, S. 45, 46 Sokolov, S. 128, 139 Somalia 100 South Yemen 100 Sputnik 8, 19, 31 Smith, G. 83 Snaryad protiv Snaryada 27 Sokolovskii, V. 13, 26, 51 Stalin, J. 3, 4–5, 5–6, 7, 9, 15, 16, 17, 38, 39, 92, 129 Strategic Air Command (SAC) 12 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I 57, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 73, 74, 75, 77, 79–87, 97, 99, 100, 101, 118, 123, 170, 175, 178 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) II 99, 141 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I 118, 135, 136, 142, 163, 164 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II 163, 166, 168

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) III 169 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 1, 74, 107, 110–15, 118, 121, 123, 124, 125, 128, 130, 131–7, 138, 139, 143, 145, 147, 149, 150, 168, 175 see also ABM systems (American); Brilliant Pebbles; GPALS; Reagan Suez Crisis 14, 18, 20, 31 Syria 100, 119 Taiwan 120, 170 Talenskii, N. 46, 48, 49, 160 Tallinn Line, see under ABM Systems (Soviet) Tibet 170 Tito 15 Tkachev, L. 15 Treaty of Moscow 78 Turkey 159 Ukraine 171 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) armed forces: Air Defence Forces 4, 12, 24, 25, 26, 27, 34, 36, 44–51, 52, 53, 71, 75, 85, 90, 95, 97, 98, 111, 115, 128, 132, 176; Air Force 4, 24; antiaircraft defences 4, 10, 12, 25, 27, 35, 45, 104, 138, 178; Backfire bomber 42; General Staff 40, 80, 91, 98, 109; Ground Forces 4, 24, 45; involvement in power struggles 7, 15, 37, 38, 39; Mya-4 (Bison) bomber 12; Navy 4, 24, 26, 52; policy advice role 6, 7, 8, 16, 18, 39–40, 80, 81, 89–92, 107, 109–10, 123–4, 127–9, 150, 177; SA-5 60, 104; SA-10 122, 147; SA-12 122, 147; size 8, 23, 38, 40; SS-4 118; SS-5 118; SS-20 101, 118; Strategic Rocket Forces 24, 26, 40, 45, 51, 52, 60, 90, 97; Tu-4 (Bull)

Index 227 bomber 12; Tu-95 (Bear) bomber 12 civil defence 10 defence budget 7–9, 15, 22–4, 35, 38, 41–3, 54, 60, 68, 86, 89, 90–2, 98, 109–10, 123, 129–31, 133, 143 defence industry 7, 8, 40, 80, 88, 91, 92, 130, 131, 133, 134, 137, 140, 144, 149, 178 defence policymaking 6, 18, 71, 76, 81, 89–92, 93–4, 102, 103, 105–6, 107–10, 127–9, 150 economy 7, 15, 21–3, 43, 65, 67–8, 86, 89, 91, 100, 107, 108, 110, 112, 123, 126, 129, 130, 133–4 Institute of Military History 95 KGB 90 military strategy: deterrence 9–10, 24–5, 46, 47, 49, 71, 97, 111; preemptive strike strategy 10, 24, 32, 43, 49, 96, 113; role of ABM in 10–12, 16, 17, 25–7, 29, 36, 37, 46, 47, 48, 53, 94, 95–8, 105, 111; warfighting 7, 9, 23, 71 Ministry of Defence 2, 40, 80, 81, 88, 90, 91, 93 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 39, 40, 80, 81, 90 nuclear tests 23 relations with the US 30–3, 35–6, 38, 41, 53, 66, 68, 77, 78, 86, 97, 99, 100, 109, 116–18, 135, 142, 149 United States (US) armed forces: B-1 bomber 77, 117; B-36 bomber 12; B-47 bomber 12; B-52 bomber 12, 99, 141; cruise missile 99, 118, 141; Jupiter missile 12, 35; Midgetman ICBM 141; Minuteman ICBM 32, 57, 58, 61, 72, 77; MX missile 99, 116, 141; Pershing II missile 99, 118, 141; Polaris SLBM 32, 58, 61; Poseidon SLBM 99; Rapid Deployment Force

116; Stealth bomber 99, 141; Thor missile 12, 35; Trident submarine 77, 99, 141 Atomic Energy Commission 30 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 90 Doctrine of massive retaliation 12 intentions to attack USSR 13, 10, 30, 33, 50, 96, 112, 117 Presidential Directive 59 116 relations with China 78, 101, 120, 121 relations with USSR 30–3, 35–6, 38, 41, 53, 66, 68, 77, 78, 86, 97, 99, 100, 109, 116–18 135, 142, 149 U-2 plane 34 United Nations 119, 151, 161, 162, 166 Ustinov, D. 40, 91, 92, 93, 115 Vestnik PVO 27, 28, 30, 51, 69, 71, 74, 95, 96 Vietnam 54, 59, 76, 77, 100–1, 119, 120, 142 Voennaya Misl’ 51 Voennie Znaniya 13 Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal 26, 95, 97, 111 Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation and the Navy (DOSAAF) 13 Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact) 65, 67, 72, 79, 96, 97, 120, 168 Yakovlev, A. 127, 135 Yazov, D. 129 Yeltsin, B. 151, 152–5, 157, 161, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 171, 172, 173, 175, 176 Yom Kippur War 100 Yugoslavia 15, 166 Zav’yalov, I. 48 Zheltikov, I. 45 Zhirinovsky, V. 153 Zhukov, G. 7, 13, 18, 90