The Role of International Organizations in Social Policy
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The Role of International Organizations in Social Policy
The Role of International Organizations in Social Policy Ideas, Actors and Impact
Edited by
Rune Ervik Nanna Kildal Even Nilssen Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies, University of Bergen, Norway
Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA
© Rune Ervik, Nanna Kildal, Even Nilssen 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2009928602
ISBN 978 1 84720 976 4 Printed and bound by MPG Books Group, UK
Contents List of figures List of tables List of contributors Preface
vi vii viii ix
1. Introduction Rune Ervik, Nanna Kildal and Even Nilssen 2. Comparing social policy ideas within the EU and the OECD Nanna Kildal 3. Directly-deliberative polyarchy: a suitable democracy model for European social policy? Milena Büchs 4. Combating social exclusion in the European Union Even Nilssen 5. Policy making and application of law: free movement of persons and the European Court of Justice Aksel Hatland and Even Nilssen 6. EU and OECD advice and changes in German family policy: can reforms be attributed to participation in learning processes? Tord Skogedal Lindén 7. Policy actors, ideas and power: EU and OECD pension policy recommendations and national policies in Norway and the UK Rune Ervik 8. In search of a new approach to pension policy: the International Labour Office between internal tension and external pressure Remi Maier-Rigaud 9. Towards a European convergence in pension policy outputs? Evidence from the OMC on pensions Axel West Pedersen and Henning Finseraas 10. Global health policy: what role for international governmental organizations? Christof Schiller, Henni Hensen and Stein Kuhnle Index
1 20
49 72
94
111
138
165
190
212
247 v
Figures 7.1. 7.2. 8.1. 8.2. 9.1.
9.2.
9.3.
9.4. 9.5. 9.6. 9.7.
9.8. 9.9. 9A.1.
Reference to country/international organizations in the Norwegian Pension Commission report Reference to keywords in the 2004 UK Pension Commission report International Labour Organization and Office The new Social Security Department and competing ideas Gross replacement rates first pillar (2004) versus change in gross replacement rates first pillar (2004–2050), representative worker Gross replacement rates first pillar (2004) versus change in gross replacement rates first pillar (2004–2050), low-wage worker Gross replacement rates first pillar (2004) versus change in gross replacement rates first pillar (2004–2050), broken career Total net replacement rates (2004) versus change in total net replacement rates (2004–2050), representative worker Total net replacement rates (2004) versus change in total net replacement rates (2004–2050), low-wage worker Total net replacement rates (2004) versus change in total net replacement rates (2004–2050), broken career Gross replacement rates second pillar (2004) versus change in gross replacement rates second pillar (2004–2050), representative worker 205 Gross replacement rate, low-wage/gross replacement rate, representative worker (2004 versus 2050) Net replacement rate, low-wage/net replacement rate, representative worker (2004 versus 2050) Projected growth in old-age and early pension expenditure 2005–2050 versus change in gross replacement rate first pillar (2004–2050)
vi
151 158 168 171
199
200
201 202 203 203
206 207
211
Tables 2.1. 2.2. 4.1. 6.1. 7.1. 7.2. 9.1. 9.2. 9.3. 9.4. 10.1. 10.2. 10.3. 10.4. 10.5. 10.6.
Denmark: social policy recommendations Germany: social policy recommendations The ideational foundation of the EU Social Inclusion Strategy Main characteristics of old and new parental leave schemes OECD recommendations for the Norwegian pension system: OECD Economic Surveys 2005 and 2007 OECD recommendations for the UK pension system: OECD Economic Survey 2005 Gross replacement rates, first pillar Net replacement rates, first pillar Growth in second pillar (representative worker) Replacement rates, low-wage/replacement rates, representative worker (2004 versus 2050) Organizational capacity of the WHO Organizational capacity of UNICEF Organizational capacity of the World Bank Organizational capacity of the WTO Comparison of organizational capacities Comparison of health policy ideas and health care approach
vii
28 29 89 116 148 154 202 204 205 208 222 224 230 236 239 240
Contributors Milena Büchs, University of Southampton, UK Rune Ervik, Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies, University of Bergen, Norway. Henning Finseraas, NOVA, Norwegian Social Research, Oslo, Norway. Aksel Hatland, NOVA, Norwegian Social Research, Oslo, Norway. Henni Hensen, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, Germany. Nanna Kildal, Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies, University of Bergen, Norway. Stein Kuhnle, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, Germany. Remi Maier-Rigaud, Social Policy Department, University of Cologne, Germany. Even Nilssen, Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies, University of Bergen, Norway. Christof Schiller, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, Germany. Tord Skogedal Lindén, Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies, University of Bergen, Norway. Axel West Pedersen, NOVA, Norwegian Social Research, Oslo, Norway.
viii
Preface The background of this book is a workshop, International Actors and National Welfare Policy, held in Bergen at the Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies in June 2007. The workshop was part of an ongoing research project financed by the Norwegian Research Council, Policy Discourses, International Actors and National Welfare Policy: Norway in Comparative Perspective, directed by senior researcher Nanna Kildal. The editors and three other authors are involved in this project. The aim of the project and the workshop is to gain insight into how welfare policy is shaped by the interplay of the national and the international levels, emphasizing the role of ideas, and the actors carrying these ideas. We would like to take the opportunity to thank all the participants in the workshop for their active and inspiring involvement in the discussions on the submitted papers, and for their original contributions to this volume. We would also like to thank the Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies at the University of Bergen, which has hosted our project. Rune Ervik, Nanna Kildal and Even Nilssen Bergen
ix
1.
Introduction Rune Ervik, Nanna Kildal and Even Nilssen
In the rapidly growing literature dealing with the impact of globalization and Europeanization on welfare states, the focus has been more on economic and technological forces than on ideational ones. This book addresses this topic by venturing into several kinds of welfare policy themes that have occurred on the political agenda, in the EU, the OECD, the ILO, the WHO, the World Bank and the WTO, but with a major focus on the EU and the OECD. The intention is to examine the content of ideas that the international actors are promoting through recommendations and decrees concerning various systems of social welfare and health policy. A second research topic is to ask if and how these policy ideas might influence national policies. How important are international actors in the shaping of national welfare policy, in which ways do actors on these levels interact and influence each other in different policy areas, and how do the national institutional arrangements of welfare states impact upon these policy processes? The chapters of this book deal variously with these main questions, but a common point of reference is the policy ideas of international and national actors. Currently, many different discourses on welfare policy are present at the national and international levels, where certain normative ideas contain an important part of the vocabulary, for example concepts like ‘dependency’, ‘individual responsibility’, ‘work incentives’, ‘freedom of choice’, ‘normalization’ and so on (Fraser and Gordon 1994; Kildal 2001, 2005; Nilssen 2000, 2006; Schmidtz and Goodin 1998; White 2003). Hence, international debates concerning social problems and welfare policies include normative concepts and discourses founded on various conceptions of the social world. The international literature on policy transfer has traditionally undercommunicated the importance of ideas and primarily concentrated on material forces and self-interests (Campbell 1998, 2002; Stone 2004). Nevertheless, several studies have demonstrated the impact of ideas and discourses on policy formation (Armingeon and Beyeler 2004; Béland 2005; Blyth 2002; Campbell and Pedersen 2001; Campbell 1998, 2002; Ervik and Kuhnle 1993; Hall 1992; Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1996; 1
2
The role of international organizations in social policy
Schmidt 2000; Weir and Skocpol 1985). This book will add to the knowledge contained in these studies.
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL POLICY Ideas on social policy have travelled between countries since modern forms of workers’ protection legislation were initiated in the 1840s in Britain, followed by social insurance legislation in Germany in the 1880s. A host of conferences and congresses were arranged, and organizations established, to address the social questions or the worker questions of the day, where representatives from national authorities, various social scientists and knowledge bearing groups, and representatives from charity and church, met to discuss the new risk landscape created by industrialization and urbanization and to exchange ideas on specific institutional solutions (Kuhnle 1996; Nowotny 1991; Schweber 1996; Wittrock, Wagner and Wollmann 1991). Much of the history of social policy is also a record of learning between countries in addition to factors reflecting the specific national and local contexts of institutions, ideas and social forces (Kuhnle 1981). Many aspects of globalization and increased economic integration have reinforced the inter- and trans-national aspects of social policy. Increased flows of goods, services, capital and labour, other forms of migration and demographic changes, all have consequences for national social policies, and create common institutional challenges across different types of welfare states, increasing the interdependence between different national welfare systems. Ideas of social policy travel more easily now than 100 years ago and the degree of exposure to such ideas, and other cultural aspects, has vastly increased and has become one of the defining characteristics of globalization itself. In addition, the establishment of international organizations and other actors with a global or broad international reach in the aftermath of the two World Wars, has added a new dimension to questions of social policy. Whereas the International Labour Organization, right from its establishment in 1919, was concerned with labour issues and questions of social security, the key focus of the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund) was initially on macroeconomic questions and on the need to secure a stable system of currency as a prerequisite for international free trade, and to guarantee a relative autonomy for national macroeconomic policy (Deacon, Hulse and Stubbs 1997; Held et al. 1999). Over the past two to three decades, social policy has increasingly been addressed by these institutions in tandem with the growth of the welfare state, the expansion of
Introduction
3
the public sector, and its consequences for effective markets and economic growth. In a European context, this increasing attention towards social policy is evident both within the OECD and the EEC/EU. Since its foundation in 1961, the OECD has of course been engaged in furthering economic growth and economic cooperation, but social policy as an explicit field was not part of its original mandate. Today this has changed, not in terms of the stated goal of the organization, but in terms of an increased attention to, and resources directed towards, a whole range of social policy matters, from labour market policy and pensions to family policy. Clearly the OECD report, The welfare state in crisis (OECD 1981), was seminal in setting the mainly negative tone towards the welfare state, reflecting the general paradigmatic shift of economic ideas from Keynesian inspired thinking towards monetarism, supply-side economics and public choice theories; in short, the rise of neo-liberal thinking, both outside and inside the organization.1 It is fair to say that the OECD today has a more nuanced picture of the welfare state, but scepticism towards public sector solutions is still vivid. However, the OECD possesses no means for getting its advice directly on to national agendas. The organization makes use of a kind of ‘soft regulation’, which means that it has no option but to play what is called the ‘idea game’, using a practice of ‘naming and shaming’ (Marcussen 2002, 2004). Social policy has traditionally not been an area for supranational interference within the European Community. The national welfare state is a major source of legitimacy for national governments, and the EU has no direct legal or regulatory mandate to determine the social policy agendas of the member states. Following the establishment of the internal market and an increasing focus on European integration, social policy has nevertheless become a supranational topic. This has happened partly because of decisions made by the European Court of Justice, for example, case law concerning the coordination of social benefits within the union, and partly because of the establishment of soft law coordination of social policy through the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). The OMC is similar to the ‘soft regulation’ used by the OECD, and highlights a process of mutual learning by the use of measures such as open-ended guidelines and benchmarking (Trubek and Trubek 2005). Originating as a tool in the coordination of EU employment policy, the method has expanded to more and more areas of welfare policy (social exclusion, health, pensions and care). The OMC lacks any formal sanctions against member states which do not comply with the general objectives worked out at the Community level. Compared with the OECD, however, the EU possesses potentially more power, for instance through the European Court of Justice and the
4
The role of international organizations in social policy
Maastricht Treaty, in terms of fiscal discipline (see Leibfried 2005 and Chapter 5 in this volume). Because these international organizations are acting as producers and/ or mediators of social policy ideas in the search for solutions to conceived welfare problems, social policy processes themselves have become globalized. A new international and global agenda on social policy has been established. In this way, the social policy struggles of globalization take place at the international level as well as the national and local political levels (Deacon 2007; Deacon, Hulse and Stubbs 1997; Orenstein 2008; Yeates 2001). In this arena we find actors such as national governments, representatives of capital and labour, non-governmental organizations and international organizations. This trans-nationalization of social policy leads to a situation where: The social policy of a country or locality is no longer wholly shaped (if it ever was) by the politics of the national government. It is increasingly shaped . . . by the implicit and explicit social policies of numerous supranational agencies ranging from global institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund through supranational bodies such as the OECD and the European Commission. (Deacon, Hulse and Stubbs 1997, p. 10)
Our main focus here is on one type of actor, namely international organizations. These are particularly interesting since they are given their mandate from member states; thus their legitimacy partly rests on the member states and their assumption that these international organizations provide more efficient means of solving problems of common interest across nations than if each state tackled the problems on its own. But the question of legitimacy is complicated by the fact that the power differentials of member states are reflected within some of these international organizations. This implies that international organizations (IO) could also be considered as a dependent variable in the question of ideational development, that is, that the ideas emanating from an IO result from interactions between member states and IOs, and some nations, for different reasons, may be more successful in terms of placing their own ideas on the policy agendas of IOs than others. Thus, also at the international level, Stein Rokkan’s famous dictum: ‘votes count, but resources decide’ (Rokkan 1978 [1966], p. 105) seems to be valid. In their classification of multilateral institutions, Bøås and McNeill (2004, pp. 210–213) find that Bretton Woods institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF are characterized by a high degree of donor control and power, whereas the ILO is typified by a low degree of such control and power. Combining a strong degree of donor control and power in terms of financial resources enables some states, notably the US, to exert a strong
Introduction
5
influence on the ideas and policies promoted by these institutions. Within the area of development policy, we can find examples of member states that are under a strong coercive pressure to introduce policy requirements as a condition for obtaining loans from these multilateral institutions. The examples in this book concern more symmetrical power relationships between these organizations and member states. The focus is on recommendations, in terms of policy ideas characterizing the context where these organizations have few means of directly coercing states to adopt their policy advice. Instead it is the power of these ideas, in terms of their knowledge and normative bases, which is ideally assumed to constitute their authority and legitimacy and convince the member states that a correct course of action would be to incorporate these ideas into more concrete policy measures.2 The general intention of this book is to grasp the kind of ideas that the international organizations are promoting through recommendations and decrees concerning various systems of social welfare and health issues. The underlying assumption is that these policy discourses influence policy makers in their handling of policy problems and solutions.
IDEAS AND DISCOURSES IN SOCIAL POLICY Ideas are means to understand a multifaceted social world by applying certain concepts that help to reduce complexity. In addition, ideas may also provide a normative function by analysing the social world by invoking various concepts of justice. Both the cognitive and normative aspects of ideas enable individual and collective action, for instance by building and/or changing institutions. Policy ideas, as understood here, are specific in terms of containing both the normative and cognitive functions, as well as prescriptions for actions. The literature on ideas and discourses applies a variety of concepts to denote the role of ideas and how these interact with institutional structures (Pochet 2003; Radaelli and Schmidt 2004; Schmidt 2002; Taylor-Gooby 2005). Thus, Hall (1993) applies the concept of paradigms to represent an interpretative framework which involves ‘a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing’ (p. 279). Schmidt and Radaelli (2004) define a policy discourse in terms of its content: ‘as a set of policy ideas and values, and in terms of its usage, as a process of interaction focused on policy formulation and communication’ (p. 184). These policy ideas, policy discourses, policy paradigms, or policy stories could be understood as a whole,
6
The role of international organizations in social policy
consisting of a description of reality, a specific framing of problems, and a provision of solutions wherein normative and factual assessments are interwoven (Béland 2005; Campbell 2002; Hall 1989, 1993; Ney 2000, 2003; Rein and Schön 1993). The policy ideas that different actors propagate influence political solutions, because they tell us how the social world is constructed, what is to be considered just and fair, why things go wrong, and what has to be done to correct what has been messed up, or is malfunctioning. In this way, the values, content and direction of policies are provided by such policy ideas. This ideational perspective stresses the non-reducible role of ideas and their relative independence from material self-interest and power. There is a need to differentiate between various aspects of ideas and to distinguish between levels of ideas. Elaborating on this will also serve to clarify the focus of this book, which concentrates more heavily on some ideational aspects than others. Following Radaelli and Schmidt (2004), a discourse is understood as containing two dimensions, the ideational and the interactive. These dimensions further contain two essential activities each. Within the ideational dimension there is, firstly, a cognitive activity, enabling actors to make sense of reality, involving knowledge, policy analysis and information about problems, actors and resources, and secondly, a normative activity that assesses and judges reality and thus belongs to the framework of norms and values (Radaelli and Schmidt 2004, p. 364).The interactive dimension consists of the coordinative activity taking place when policy actors try to construct an agreed-upon policy, and a communicative activity, wherein policy actors present the policy for public deliberation and legitimization (p. 365). In a 1998 article, John Campbell distinguishes between four main types of ideas, based on two dimensions. The first dimension differentiates between concepts and theories in the foreground of debate and underlying assumptions in the background of the policy debate. The other dimension distinguishes between a cognitive and a normative level. Combining these dimensions provides four main types of ideas. Paradigms are cognitive background assumptions delimiting the range of policy solutions considered to be useful for policy-making elites. Public sentiments are normative background assumptions constraining action by delimiting the range of alternatives that elites perceive as being acceptable and legitimate to the public. In the foreground of policy debates we find programmes which are cognitive concepts and theories that facilitate action among elites by detailing how particular policy problems are to be solved. Finally, frames are normative concepts that elites use to justify programmes to the public. Paradigms and public sentiments are second-order concepts, because they constitute the underlying ideas which the first order concepts, programmes and frames, rest upon (Campbell 1998, p. 385). In a later contribution,
Introduction
7
Campbell (2002) has made an adjustment to this differentiation of ideas, distinguishing between cognitive and normative background frameworks (paradigms and world views) on the one hand, and foreground programmatic ideas (cognitive) and frames (both cognitive and normative) on the other. Hence, in a policy discourse, a programmatic idea may relate both to normative and/or cognitive frameworks and be justified by both normative and cognitive arguments. To a varying degree, the chapters of this book distinguish between various types of ideas and activities inherent in policy discourses, but overall there is a stronger focus on background frameworks, programmatic ideas and frames, rather than on public sentiments. In terms of activities, this implies that the cognitive and normative activities are in the foreground of the analyses, whereas the coordinative and communicative activities mostly reside in the background. The reference to level of ideas is important and is also closely related to the categorization referred to above, that is, ideas may range from whole ideologies, world views and cultures, to detailed and specific conceptual tools and ideas on particular topics (Pierson 2004, pp. 38–40). Thus a paradigm, for instance in economics, may form the basis for several specific programmes within different policy sectors (Béland 2005, p. 8). The discourses analysed here will be placed at different levels of generality. Analysing the content of policy discourses and ideas on social policy is at the forefront of our interest, and constitutes a common theme across most of the chapters.
TRACING IDEATIONAL INFLUENCE Keeping in mind the internationalization of social policy, presented previously, a further complexity to the relationship between ideas and institutions is added when we ask how welfare policy is shaped by the interplay between the national and international levels. Exploring what consequences the discourses of international organizations have for national welfare systems, we assume that causality works both ways, that is, from the international to the national and vice versa, over the course of time. This points toward an interactional perspective, focusing on the actors at both levels, carrying the ideas that build the various aspects of the international social policy discourse. How important are international actors in the shaping of national welfare policy, and in which ways do actors on these levels interact and influence each other in different policy areas? And how do the national institutional arrangements of the welfare states impact upon these policy processes?
8
The role of international organizations in social policy
Three general perspectives on how to trace the effects of ideas on policies can be identified according to Yee (1996): co-variational analysis, the congruence procedure and process tracing. The first approach argues that the effect of ideas is demonstrated if these ideas correlate with changes of policies. But very often the relationships between ideas and policies are non-linear and highly contingent on other factors, and reveal disparities in time lags between ideational and policy change. In these situations a lack of co-variation does not prove the absence of a relationship (Beyeler 2004, p. 8). The second approach is less ambitious in terms of establishing decisive proof of influence when compared to the co-variational approach. Instead it aims at revealing indications of the possible influence of ideas on policies. This method compares the content of policy ideas, in our case the policy ideas of international organizations, with the substance of policy decisions, in order to establish whether there is congruence or not between ideas and policy. If congruence is established, this is indicative of possible influence. However, in this case, the contingency of other factors, for instance other international organizations with congruent ideas, also complicates the question of influence. As a way of addressing this snag, one OECD study (Armingeon and Beyeler 2004) tries to pinpoint instances where domestic actors explicitly refer to the OECD in national reform discourses. Process tracing is a third approach to studying the influence of ideas on policy, based on thorough analysis of the different steps and sequences of policy making, and pinpointing how specific actors carry certain ideas into the policy discourse, how they interact with each other and how institutions constrain and enable certain actors and ideas in this process. Specific actors may be epistemic communities, transnational actors, advocacy coalitions, policy communities and expert groups. Often what is addressed in policy ideas are various societal institutions and hence there is an important linkage between ideas and institutions. Through policy stories and discourses, existing institutions are scrutinized, criticized, delegitimized, defended and legitimated by actors engaged in political struggles on how the institutional landscape ought to be shaped in different sectors of society. One example of this perspective is Mark Blyth’s analysis (2002) of the changing economic ideas underlying the rise and fall of ‘embedded’ liberal institutions in Sweden and the US.3 Blyth’s analysis suggests important roles for ideas or discourses in situations where contemporary agents consider the specific event as unique and where the actors are unsure of what their interests are, and thereby also of the means to realize them (Blyth 2002, p. 9). In situations where agents’ interests are not fixed or given, economic ideas are crucial in influencing institutional change. Firstly, in periods of economic crisis, ideas facilitate reduction of
Introduction
9
uncertainty by providing interpretive frameworks which confer understanding of how the economy works. A similar point has been made by Goldstein and Keohane (1993), seeing ideas as roadmaps and hence as a means to reduce uncertainty. Secondly, the reduction of uncertainty following from the interpretive framework enables collective action and coalition building. Thirdly, agents use ideas as weapons in order to contest existing institutions. Ideas also function as institutional blueprints by providing alternative institutional solutions to the existing ones. Finally, when ideas have been solidified into institutions, these provide intersubjective understanding and conventions, and hence strengthen institutional stability (Blyth 2002, pp. 34–45). This book sheds light on several of the roles of ideas pointed out in Blyth’s account. In addition, the movement from embedded to disembedded liberalism is also central, in terms of creating a more general ideational background for our focus on social policy discourses. The economic ideas of disembedded liberalism have influenced the social policy discourses addressed in the chapters to follow. Previous research within the area of pensions has shown the importance of new paradigmatic ideas, based on a broader framework of economic thinking, in challenging existing Pay As You Go (PAYG) paradigms and institutions of pension provision, and also in terms of providing blueprints for new institutional solutions (Ervik 2005; Orenstein 2005). It could also be argued that many of the challenges of social policy, in terms of demographic transformations, the new social risks and economic globalization, represent situations of enhanced uncertainty and hence are states of affairs where ideational factors are decisive in different sequences of institutional change and interest formation. Institutional constraints or facilitations are identifiable at various levels in the book. In Chapters 6 and 7, national cases (Norway, the UK and Germany) are analysed, reflecting different constellations of institutions in terms of welfare state regimes, types of welfare state and models/variants of capitalism (Barth, Moene and Wallerstein 2003; Esping-Andersen 1990; Hall and Soskice 2001; Kuhnle and Alestalo 2000). The point here is that these institutions create stickiness and path dependencies that influence and frame the effects of, and receptiveness towards, new ideas (Campbell 2002, p. 31; Pierson 2004, p. 43). Being sites of knowledge and idea production, possessing resources and capacities, international organizations are themselves organizations that invite institutional perspectives and frameworks, as described above. In addition, and with relevance to the overall topic of this book, some of the most central dimensions on which regimes or types differ are also key terms in ongoing social policy discourses. Examples are the discourse on targeting, as evidenced within the debate on principles of selectivity
10
The role of international organizations in social policy
and universalism as the normative basis for the welfare state. Another instance is the discourse on the redistributive principle of social policy, ranging from advocates of social insurance schemes based on principles of strict reciprocity, to those favouring schemes based on redistributive social insurance logic. In this way discourses on targeting and redistribution directly engage with aspects of welfare regime classification and specific institutions of social policy. Finally, at the general level, these welfare regimes also enter into the ongoing discourse on the sustainability of the welfare state. The sustainability discourse concerns the social, moral and economic challenges of the welfare state, and whether these will undermine or severely dismantle the historical accomplishments of this state structure. As several chapters point out, this overarching discourse, especially in a version informed by a focus on the economic aspect of sustainability, strongly frames discourses in particular fields of social policy. Thus, the intrinsic legitimacy of social policy, in terms of securing social rights, is being partly subordinated to a discursive logic, where the legitimacy of social policy rests on its instrumentality in obtaining goals of economic growth and competitiveness. Analysing policy discourses thus implies addressing ideas, actors and institutions, and their interaction. In scrutinizing the various political discourses, the contributors to this volume study policy documents, and some have interviewed policy actors and experts, in order to elucidate the ideational content of policy discourses. Interviews with key actors and informants, both at the level of international organizations as well as at the national policy level, provide valuable knowledge of how policy makers at both levels think and act in relation to the specific welfare discourses selected. In addition, the interviews are helpful in charting the interaction and contact between actors from the two levels, as well as within each of the levels, and within national case studies. In this way they complement the systematic survey of documents in tracing possible processes of policy transfer not revealed in the written policy documents.
STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK The chapters of this book address different policy fields: social inclusion, labour markets, labour migration, health, pensions and family policy. These ambits of the welfare state are being given increasing political attention and they constitute areas where the interests and ideas of international organizations are increasingly being voiced in discourses on social policy. The first three contributions concentrate on the content of some of the core ideas in the field of social policy within the OECD (Chapter 2) and
Introduction
11
the EU (Chapters 2, 3 and 4). In Chapter 2 Nanna Kildal explores the normative content of the policy ideas furthered by the EU and the OECD in the areas of employment and social protection. After having analysed the two organizations’ policy guidelines and recommendations, general and country-specific, their policy ideas are compared and examined within a framework of justification and legitimacy. Three social policy discourses are brought to light: the discourses on ‘social rights’, ‘rights and duties’ and ‘make work pay’. Furthermore, as the EU and the OECD have had a long-standing cooperation in various policy areas, the chapter also directs attention to their collaborative efforts and working methods in these policy fields. A conclusion is that there are extensive similarities in ideas and working procedures between the EU and the OECD, and that the policy advice given is instrumental in character and mainly justified with pragmatic arguments. In Chapter 3, Milena Büchs starts from the assertion that social policy and democracy are mutually related and co-dependent. Western national welfare states institutionalize and stabilize this relationship in a particular way. However, the specific relationship between social policy and democracy is becoming porous through European integration. With the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), the European Union has adopted a new governance tool to both strengthen and establish a new relationship between democracy and social policy. The most significant approach to theorizing about this new relationship is directly-deliberative polyarchy. This chapter critically discusses the OMC and questions whether it can be legitimized by this directly-deliberative polyarchy model. It argues that whilst directly-deliberative polyarchy provides useful insights into current problems, it needs to be embedded more coherently into the principles and institutions of constitutional and representative democracy. In Chapter 4, Even Nilssen elaborates on the founding ideas and policy discourses of the EU Social Inclusion Strategy (SIS), as expressed through the Open Method of Coordination. Following Campbell’s differentiation of ideas (2002), Nilssen identifies three basic discourses containing different kinds of ideas. The most important programmatic ideas are expressed through a discourse on active social inclusion, which emphasizes that the best way to fight poverty and social exclusion is to incorporate people into the labour market. The secondary discourse – the discourse on targeting – states that this is most effectively achieved through a focus on target groups and an individualization of social policies. Although these discourses have important normative implications, they are expressed in a purely instrumental way. Nilssen claims that this has to be understood against the background that these programmatic ideas are framed through a discourse on the sustainability of the welfare state. This mainly economic
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The role of international organizations in social policy
discourse embraces problems such as globalization and the demographic changes within the member states (an ageing population), leading the SIS in a material-instrumental direction, where social policy is primarily understood as labour market policy. At the same time this ‘materialization’ of social policy is interpreted as the main reason for the relatively extensive support for the SIS among the member states. Chapter 5, written by Aksel Hatland and Even Nilssen, takes as a starting point one of the founding ideas of the EEC/EU – the free movement of workers – and elaborates on how this idea has been developed by the rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The ECJ has established the supremacy of European law over national law, and it has formulated general legal norms of great political and practical importance. The Court has contributed to extended rights for EU citizens to move freely between the member states of the union and to reside wherever they want. Hence, the ruling of the ECJ has also influenced the development of social rights within the EU (for example, through interpretations concerning the coordination of social benefits between member states). The chapter discusses how this strong political role can be explained. It emphasizes the often vague nature of community law, which gives the Court a strong interpretive power, the judicial style which stresses the purpose of a rule more than a literal interpretation and the multilingual character of community law, which also makes literal interpretations more ambiguous. The court has often been criticized by political actors for legal activism and interference with questions that are essentially political. But there are no examples of a member country refusing to accept the Court’s decision. Traditionally, international organizations have not focused on family policy. The EU does not even have a mandate for developing policy in this field. Still, in recent years organizations like the EU and the OECD have taken a greater interest in family policy issues, mainly due to their significance for economic issues and performance. Consequently they have expressed policy advice and commented on member states’ policies, mainly reconciliation policies such as parental leave and provision of child care. Tord Skogedal Lindén’s contribution (Chapter 6) connects two fields of comparative social policy research: the literature on ideas and learning, and family policy. It does so by considering theoretical perspectives that explain how actors change ideas, based on advice from international organizations. It relates these perspectives to the case of recent German family policy reforms. The potential influence of international organizations in the field of family policy has so far received insufficient attention. Lindén addresses this lack, based on interviews with national and international stakeholders, as well as a careful reading of EU, OECD
Introduction
13
and German governmental policy documents. He finds correspondence between EU/OECD policy advice and German reforms, and argues that the EU/OECD policy line may have enhanced and maintained family issues on the agenda. However, international organizations served more as mediators than as producers of ideas. Individual countries such as Sweden are more important than the EU/OECD in developing ideas. Thus, direct learning between countries is crucial for dissemination of family policy ideas and must be considered too. The three subsequent chapters (7–9) deal with various aspects of pension policy, an area where important changes have taken place in many countries, in terms of the provision of income security in old age and normative underpinnings of pension institutions. International organizations such as the ILO and the World Bank are actively promoting ideas and learning processes in pension policy. In a European context, both the OECD and the EU have been increasingly engaged in facilitating pension reforms to secure future sustainability and adequacy of pension provision in member countries. In Chapter 7, Rune Ervik explores the role played by the OECD and the EU in shaping the central ideas of national pension reforms in Norway and the UK, through an interactional and relational process with member states. In addition, important bilateral (and multilateral) exchanges of ideas between countries, taking place outside the realms of these international organizations, is also scrutinized. His focus is on specific key actors within the EU and the OECD, involved in explicit pension policy advice and recommendations. The chapter finds that the EU and especially the OECD could be seen as selective or biased ‘reform boosters’. They have a role as reform agenda framers influenced by a specific knowledge base and an interpretive framework strongly based on economics. However, rather than being a process where pension reform ideas are developed at the European or OECD level and then applied directly to the national level, they are the results of negotiation, debate and the exchange of views between these two levels. Finally, both for the UK and Norway, multiand bi-lateral contacts with neighbouring countries are identified to be of stronger importance than those with the international organizations, in terms of providing ideas and examples to learn from. In Remi Maier-Rigaud’s contribution (Chapter 8), the recent search for a new approach to pension policy by the International Labour Office is analysed. The Office (and more specifically the Social Security Department) is identified within the International Labour Organization as the main provider of ideas and expertise that go beyond pure social standard setting. Thus, the unitary actor assumption is displaced in order to take a closer look at the internal composition of this international
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organization, and how it relates to changes in policy ideas. This perspective yields several findings: the restructuring of the Social Security Department in 2005 enabled the drafting of a new, possibly more coherent, approach to pension policy. It reduced the omnipresence of social insurance orthodoxy, traditionally endorsed by the Office. Instead, the role of universal social pensions has been strengthened in order to reach higher coverage rates, especially in developing countries. In addition, external factors have affected the pension policy of the Office on different levels. Since the global pension policy discourse is dominated by the World Bank, it has also left imprints on the new approach of the Office. The impact is most visible on the programmatic level, and concerning the framing of the policy recommendations. The paradigmatic foundation is less affected, although the economic underpinning of the Office’s position has resulted in a phase of disorientation which could lead to a paradigm shift. Therefore, internal tension and external pressures are identified as driving forces behind the search for a new approach to pension policy within and by the ILO’s secretariat. In Chapter 9, Axel West Pedersen and Henning Finseraas explore whether the pension reforms enacted by EU member countries over the last decade exhibit common trends and/or real convergence in the degree and pattern of income security offered to wage earners. The authors use data that have been generated by the OMC process on current and so-called prospective replacement rates for hypothetical cases of ‘typical workers’. They find a general downward trend in gross replacement rates offered by the respective national pension systems, but little sign of convergence in terms of relative differences between countries. For net replacement rates, including private occupational pensions, the downward trend is significantly smaller, and there is no evidence of convergence. However, when it comes to the structure of income protection, measured by the share taken up by private pensions, both a common growth trend and a strong tendency in the direction of convergence are identified. Finally, Pedersen and Finseraas find evidence of declining preferential treatment of low-wage earners, and some convergence towards an overall proportional pension system. In recent years, health issues have increasingly appeared on the agenda at the international level, due to the spread of a number of new infectious diseases. The need for strengthened international cooperation regarding health policy is generally acknowledged, and the growing number of international organizations has become more important in global health policy. In Chapter 10, Christof Schiller, Henni Hensen and Stein Kuhnle analyse global health policy discourses by studying the World Health
Introduction
15
Organization (WHO), UNICEF, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Bank. The aim is to map the organizational field of the global health debates over time, and to study how the main important health policy proposals have travelled between and within these organizations. The organizational capacity of each body is examined and compared in order to find out how a possible shift in health policy proposals has been reflected by a change in such capacities of the various organizations over time. One conclusion is that the ideational influence has shifted away from the WHO as the prime actor. Furthermore, the chapter indicates that the focus in the debate has shifted towards specific priority diseases, in contrast to the time of the Alma Ata declaration in 1978, when there was a focus on comprehensive health care approaches. The global health debate has become increasingly ‘technical’. The chapters presented above present a range of international organizations dealing with social and health policies. The contributors unfold and analyse their ideas and policy outcomes, stressing the internal struggles of these organizations, and thus advancing their demystification, spelling out clearly their heterogeneous character. All chapters stem from new research and provide insights into the ideas and interactions between international and national actors. Some of the contributions reflect recent interviews with key policy actors both in international organizations and at national level. The book describes a complex relationship between the international and national social policy makers, as well as between different international organizations operating in the fields of social and health policy. The book reveals a dynamic and reciprocal pattern of influence, rather than clear unidirectional causal relationships.
NOTES 1. ‘Neo-liberalism’ is a political orientation, originating in the 1960s, that blends liberal political views with an emphasis on economic growth. According to Webster’s Dictionary, ‘neo-liberalism’ describes a political-economic philosophy that rejects positive government intervention in the economy, focusing instead on achieving progress by encouraging free-market methods and less restricted operation of business. 2. Other forms of power are of course relevant in our context, and ideas are important also in contexts characterized by a high degree of more coercive means. In the first case, even within these more symmetrical relationships, there are differences between countries in terms of resources donated and influence obtained. Thus the US contributes about 25 per cent of the OECD budget and so has a more dominant position within the organization than smaller countries such as Norway. An additional point is that these organizations are not necessarily coherent actors, as there are important internal divisions and struggles taking place on policies. Different policy paradigms have been institutionalized to various degrees and so posit unequal abilities to influence within the organizations. As for the latter case, even here ideas are central in terms of justifying the need of reform
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programmes and institutional change. Thus the point is that ideas, institutions, interests and power are interlinked and mutually constitute each other. 3. ‘Embedded liberalism’ refers to a specific form of state, characterized by relatively closed capital markets, demand-side fiscal policies, a belief in an active state, and an understanding of the causes of unemployment as rooted in insufficient demand. ‘Disembedded liberalism’ designates a counter-movement away from Keynesian thinking and its institutional configuration towards ideas such as monetarism, supply-side economics and public choice, promoting a belief in a non-interventionist pro-market state, independent central banks and high capital mobility, and seeing unemployment as dependent on the market clearing price of labour (Blyth 2002).
REFERENCES Armingeon, Klaus and Michelle Beyeler (eds) (2004), The OECD and European Welfare States, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar. Barth, Erling, Karl O. Moene and Michael Wallerstein (eds) (2003), Likhet under press utfordringer for den skandinaviske fordelingsmodellen, Oslo: Gyldendal akademisk. Béland, Daniel (2005), ‘Ideas and social policy: an institutionalist perspective’, Social Policy and Administration, 39 (1), 1–18. Beyeler, Michelle (2004), ‘Introduction: a comparative study of the OECD and European welfare states’, in Armingeon, Klaus and Michelle Beyeler (eds), The OECD and European Welfare States, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar, pp. 1–12. Blyth, Mark (2002), Great Transformations, Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bøås Morten and Desmond McNeill (2004), ‘Ideas and institutions: who is framing what?’ in Morten Bøås and Desmond McNeill (eds),Global Institutions and Development, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 206–224. Campbell, John L. (1998), ‘Institutional analysis and the role of ideas in political economy’, Theory and Society, 27, 377–409. Campbell, John L. (2002), ‘Ideas, politics, and public policy’, Annual Review of Sociology, 28, 21–38. Campbell, John L. and Ove K. Pedersen (eds) (2001), The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Deacon, Bob (2007), Global Social Policy and Governance, London: Sage Publications. Deacon, Bob, Michelle Hulse and Paul Stubbs (eds) (1997), Global Social Policy: International Organizations and the Future of Welfare, London: Sage Publications. Ervik, Rune (2005), ‘The battle of future pensions: global accounting tools, international organizations and pension reforms’, Global Social Policy, 5, 29–54. Ervik, Rune and Stein Kuhnle (eds) (1993), Kunnskap, risiko og sosialpolitikk: institusjonelle perspektiver på skandinavisk utvikling, Bergen: Alma Mater. Esping-Andersen, Gösta (1990), The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge: Polity Press. Fraser, Nancy and Linda Gordon (1994), ‘A genealogy of dependency: tracing a keyword of the U.S. welfare state’, Signs, 19 (2), 309–336. Goldstein, Judith and Keohane, Robert O. (eds) (1993), Ideas and Foreign Policy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
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Hall, Peter A. (1989), ‘Introduction’, in Peter A. Hall (ed.), The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 3–26. Hall, Peter A. (1992), ‘The movement from Keynesianism to monetarism: institutional analysis and British economic policy in the 1970s’, in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (eds), Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 90–113. Hall, Peter A. (1993), ‘Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: the case of economic policymaking in Britain’, Comparative Politics, 25, 275–296. Hall, Peter A. and David Soskice (eds) (2001) Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathon Perraton (1999), Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, Cambridge: Polity Press. Kildal, Nanna (2001), Workfare Tendencies in Scandinavian Welfare Politics, Geneva: International Labour Office. Kildal, Nanna (2005), ‘Changing normative foundations of Nordic welfare state institutions?’ In Nina Möntmann (ed.), Art and its Institutions: Current Conflicts, Critique, and Collaborations, London: Black Dog Publishing, pp. 18–26. Kuhnle, Stein (1981) ‘The growth of social insurance programs in Scandinavia: outside influence and internal forces’, in Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer (eds), The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, pp. 125–150. Kuhnle, Stein (1996) ‘International modelling, states and statistics: Scandinavian social security solutions in the 1890s’, in Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), States, Social Knowledge, and the Origins of Modern Social Policies, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 233–263. Kuhnle Stein and Matti Alestalo (2000), ‘Introduction: growth, adjustments and survival of European welfare states’, in Stein Kuhnle (ed.), Survival of the European Welfare State, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 3–18. Leibfried, Stephan (2005), ‘Social policy: left to the judges and the markets?’ In Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Mark A. Pollack (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 243–278. Marcussen, Martin (2002), OECD og idéspillet: Game over? Copanhagen: Hanz Reitzels Forlag. Marcussen, Martin (2004), ‘Multilateral surveillance and the OECD: playing the idea game’, in Klaus Armingeon and Michelle Beyeler (eds), The OECD and European Welfare States, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar, pp. 13–31. Ney, Steven (2000), Inception Report PEN-REF Project (Deliverable D1), Vienna: ICCR. Ney, Steven (2003), ‘The rediscovery of politics: democracy and structural pension reform in continental Europe’, in Robert Holzmann, Mitchell Orenstein and Marek Rutkowski (eds), Pension Reform in Europe: Process and Progress, Washington, DC: World Bank, pp. 79–110. Nilssen, Even (2000), ‘Alternative skoler og normaliseringsideologiens grenser’, in Jan Froestad, Per Solvang and Mårten Söder (eds), Funksjonshemmede, politikk og samfunn, Oslo: Gyldendals akademiske forlag, pp. 227–249.
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Nilssen, Even (2006), The EU Fight against Poverty and Social Exclusion: Activation, Targeting and the Sustainability of the Welfare State, Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies, Working Paper 8-2006, Bergen: Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies. Nowotny, Helga (1991), ‘Knowledge for certainty: poverty, welfare institutions and the institutionalization of social science’, in Peter Wagner, Björn Wittrock and Richard Whitley (eds) Discourses on Society: The Shaping of the Social Science Disciplines, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 23–41. OECD (1981), The Welfare State in Crisis: An Account of the Conference on Social Policies in the 1980s, OECD, Paris, 20–23 October 1981 [i.e. 1980]. Paris: OECD. Orenstein, Mitchell A. (2005), ‘The new pension reform as global policy’, Global Social Policy, 5, 175–202. Orenstein, Mitchell A. (2008), Privatizing Pensions: The Transnational Campaign for Social Security Reform, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Pierson, Paul (2004), Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Pochet, Phillipe (2003), ‘Pensions: The European debate’, in Gordon L. Clark and Noel Whiteside (eds), Pension Security in the 21st Century: Redrawing the Public-Private Debate, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 44–63. Radaelli, Claudio M. and Vivien A. Schmidt (2004), ‘Conclusion’, West European Politics, 27, 364–379. Rein, Martin and Donald Schön (1993), ‘Reframing policy discourse’, in Frank Fischer and John Forester (eds), The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp. 145–166. Rokkan, Stein (1978 [1966]) ‘Norway: numerical democracy and corporate pluralism’, in Robert. A. Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, pp. 70–115. Rueschemeyer, Dietrich and Theda Skocpol (eds) (1996), States, Social Knowledge and the Origins of Modern Social Policies, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Schmidt, Vivien (2000), ‘Values and discourse in the politics of adjustment’, in Fritz W. Scharpf and Vivien A. Schmidt (eds), Welfare and Work in the Open Economy, Vol. 1: From Vulnerability to Competitiveness, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 229–309. Schmidt, Vivien A. (2002), The Futures of European Capitalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schmidt, Vivien A. and Claudio M. Radaelli (2004), ‘Policy change and discourse in Europe: conceptual and methodological issues’, West European Politics, 27, 183–210. Schmidtz, David and Robert E. Goodin (1998), Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schweber, Libby (1996), ‘Progressive reformers, unemployment, and the transformation of social inquiry in Britain and the United States, 1880s–1920s’, in Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), States, Social Knowledge, and the Origins of Modern Social Policies, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 163–200. Stone, Diane (2004), ‘Transfer agents and global networks in the “transnationalization” of policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, 11, 545–566. Taylor-Gooby, Peter (ed.) (2005), Ideas and Welfare State Reform in Western Europe, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
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Trubek, David M. and Louise G. Trubek (2005), ‘Hard and soft law in the construction of social Europe: the role of the Open Method of Co-ordination’, European Law Journal, 11 (3), 343–364. Weir, Margaret and Theda Skocpol (1985), ‘State structures and the possibilities for “Keynesian responses” to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain and the United States’, in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back in, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 107–163. White, Stuart (2003), The Civic Minimum: On the Rights and Obligations of Economic Citizenship, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wittrock, Björn, Peter Wagner and Hellmut Wollmann (1991), ‘Social science and the modern state: policy knowledge and political institutions in Western Europe and the United States’, in Peter Wagner, Carol H. Weiss, Björn Wittrock and Hellmut Wollmann (eds), Social Sciences and Modern States: National Experiences and Theoretical Crossroads, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 28–85. Yeates, Nicola (2001), Globalization and Social Policy, London: Sage. Yee, Albert S. (1996), ‘The causal effect of ideas on policies’, International Organization, 50, 69–108.
2.
Comparing social policy ideas within the EU and the OECD Nanna Kildal
INTRODUCTION This chapter is part of a broader project that asks how national social policy is shaped by the interplay between international and national levels; the first level is represented by the EU and the OECD, the second by European welfare states: Germany, Norway and Denmark. The present study explores the normative content of the policy ideas furthered by the EU and the OECD in the areas of employment and social protection, by analysing their respective policy guidelines and recommendations.1 These are compared and examined within a framework of justification and legitimacy, which is a condition for obtaining authority (Weber [1919] 2004). Three social policy discourses are brought to light; the discourses on ‘rights’, ‘rights and duties’ and ‘make work pay’. Furthermore, as the EU and the OECD have had a long-standing co-operation in various policy areas, the chapter examines their collaborative efforts in these policy fields. The reasons for choosing the EU and the OECD for this comparative study of social policy ideas may not be obvious. Yet these organizations share some important features. Firstly, they were established in the same period, in 1957 and 1961 respectively, both as organizations for economic co-operation and development, and both have increasingly and almost simultaneously directed attention to social policy issues during the last thirty years. More importantly though, neither of them possesses the competence for getting their respective analyses and recommendations directly on to national agendas as regards the social policy areas; their functions are limited to moral pressures. This means that they both have no option but to play what is called the ‘idea game’ (Marcussen 2004). Ideas may have profound effects on the development of social life, and it is obvious that one of the most important tasks of every social science is to arrive at a rational understanding of the ‘ideas’ for which men struggle, and to ‘judge’ them critically (Weber [1904]1969, pp. 53f.). This is the main aim of the current study. 20
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IDEAS, DISCOURSES AND LEGITIMACY Various types of ideas include policy prescriptions, principles, conceptual models, norms, world views, cause–effect beliefs and so on, which may be cognitive or normative in character (Campbell 2002). As cognitive ideas are descriptions of how things work, being about cause-and-effect and means–end relationships, they depend on empirical observations, while normative ideas define what is right or wrong, just or unjust.2 Cognitive ideas are often perceived to be furthered by ‘epistemic communities’, networks of experts in policy making that develop within and around international organizations, where the experts share the same norms and causal beliefs (Stone 2004). Actually, these ideas often derive authority from the fact that they are espoused by these communities or by other relevant elites (Tannenwald 2005). That cause-and-effect ideas may have significant normative implications for society will be demonstrated later in this chapter. Ideas are the central elements of policy discourses. Although the definitions of ‘discourse’ are manifold, a common denominator is the notion that language is constitutive of social reality. This does not imply the ontological position that reality as such is socially constructed, but simply that discourses represent specific interpretations of reality. In the project, we use the concept in line with Encyclopædia Britannica as “an extended expression of thought on a subject”, or more precisely as “coherent systems of ideas that link normative judgements about policy goals to practical accounts of the policies likely to reach them” (Taylor-Gooby and Daguerre 2004, p. 14). This definition not only provides an adequate analytical tool for this study, but also illustrates the prevalent fusion of cognitive and normative ideas. Basic institutions and normative orientations naturally differ between welfare states, and thus discourses vary too; they express different national institutional options and moral logics. Yet, there are some shared and frequent themes in current welfare discourses that transcend national borders. For instance, a salient social policy discourse that became widespread across the Western world during the 1990s concerns the balancing of citizens’ rights and duties, welfare and work, well captured in Giddens’ slogan No rights without responsibilities (Giddens 1998, p. 65). Since the millennium this has to some extent been succeeded by the catchphrase Make work pay. This discursive change will be discussed below. Discourses give insights into causes and reasons for welfare reforms that generally have consequences for the citizens. The legitimacy of the policy recommendations advanced by the OECD and the EU is therefore one of this chapter’s concerns. Justification and legitimacy are vital to the stability of democratic social
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institutions. Political decisions and arrangements can no longer be justified with reference solely to tradition or impersonal market relations; they have to be supported by ‘good reasons’ based on common principles and ideals (Rawls 1996, p. 137). Thus, the question of legitimacy presumes that citizens are reasonable and rational, free and equal. Basically there are three forms of argument that may be used in justifying a policy decision: pragmatic, ethical and moral (Habermas 1993, p. 2). As the ethical and moral approaches concern the normative questions of ‘the good’ and of ‘social justice’, we may limit the justifying reasons to two – pragmatic and normative – which may be considered respectively ‘output’ and ‘input’ oriented justifications of a decision in accordance with Scharpf’s dual conceptualization of legitimacy (1999). While pragmatic justifications are purposive and always have reference to the results, the ‘output’ – normative validations are based on some more or less universal moral or ethical standards.
POLICIES CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL PROTECTION Both the OECD and the EU grew out of the war experience. The OECD evolved from the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), which was set up in 1948 to co-ordinate the Marshall Plan. In 1961 the OECD was established with the aim of assisting governments in achieving sustainable economic growth, employment and rising standards of living. The European Economic Community (EEC), founded through the Treaty of Rome in 1957, grew out of the Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of 1951, with the aim of ending the frequent wars between neighbouring nations. Peace should be secured through trade and economic development by pooling the member states’ resources under supranational authority.3 Nevertheless, both have expanded their focus over the years, from economic to social policies. The Treaty of Rome contained only a few provisions on social and labour market policies with the aim of protecting the workforce. In the 1970s it was realized that setting common goals for member states in macro-economic policies would be useless and ineffective unless accompanied by some co-ordination of social policies (Leibfried 2005, p. 248). Concurrently the OECD recognized that a wide spectrum of policy areas, especially social policies, was closely linked to economic policies. In an influential publication from 1981, The Welfare State in Crisis, the OECD’s experts emphasized the strong negative correlation that exists between levels of social benefits and economic growth, and the significant trade-off
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that is present between equality and economic efficiency. Since then both organizations have gradually widened their sphere of interest to contain social policy issues. Content analyses of the summarizing chapters of the OECD Economic Surveys4 in the period from 1970 to 2000 in 14 European countries have revealed, for example, that while social policies, excluding labour market policies, were hardly mentioned in the 1970s and early 1980s, social policy issues regarding health, education, old age and the social security system were entering the surveys in the late 1980s and 1990s (Armingeon and Beyeler 2004). The OECD Employment Outlook series started in 1983 in order to give annual assessments of labour market developments and prospects. At this time the OECD member countries were characterized by a coincidental increase in employment and unemployment, with record levels of longterm unemployment in some countries (Sorrentino 1991). In response to the high and increasing unemployment problem, the OECD in 1992 commissioned a study to examine the factors underlying the weakening of labour market performance in the OECD countries. The resulting diagnosis was presented in the report The OECD Jobs Study: Facts, Analysis, Strategies (1994), together with a wide-ranging set of policy recommendations that were designed to improve the capability of economies to adapt to change. The diagnosis, not unlike the one from 1981, states that “Policies and systems have made economies rigid, and stalled the ability and even willingness to adapt” to (. . .) “a world of new technologies, globalisation and intense national and international competition” (1994, p. 4). Also within the Union it became obvious during the 1980s that the traditional regulatory tools did not work very well as regards the labour market. Thus Jacques Delors, President of the Commission from 1985 until 1994, made great efforts to put social policy and the idea of a ‘European Social Model’ into the centre of EU policy making: in 1989 the EU presented the report Employment in Europe, that has been produced annually since then, and in 1993 a White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment (CEC 1993). The interpretation of the European unemployment problems was quite similar to The OECD Jobs Study: unemployment was mainly understood as caused by too high levels of social expenditure, too comprehensive social protection systems and lack of labour market flexibility. As nothing changed during the 1990s, the Union strongly needed a policy tool that could carry out the co-ordinated European approach to employment that Delors had initiated in the White Paper. In 1997 a separate Employment Chapter (Title VIII) was included in The Treaty of Amsterdam (signed 1997), and the European Employment Strategy (EES) was developed, which undertakes the co-ordination of member states’ employment policies in the form of Employment Guidelines and National
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Action Plans (NAPs). The Union developed the EES into what is known as The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) or the ‘Lisbon method’, the aim of which is to release the social dimension in the EU from the constraints of ‘hard law’ and make the necessary link between the social and economic aspects of European integration (Borrás and Jacobsson 2004, p. 186). By the use of open-ended guidelines, monitoring and benchmarking instead of rules, a new form of EU governance was introduced (Article 128), instituting a framework for a country surveillance procedure in order to improve convergence towards the main EU goals. Central to the new employment strategy, as it is to the OECD (Torres 2006), is the idea that employment and social policies are closely linked. As the Commission repeatedly put it after the Amsterdam Council, “the successful implementation of an employment strategy requires, at national as well as European level, a parallel and complementary process on the modernization of social protection” (CEC 1999, p. 10, my italics). The Council had already adopted a Recommendation in 1992 that established a ‘convergence strategy’ regarding the member states’ objectives and policies in the area of social protection (ibid., p. 5). The objectives should be commonly held and act as guiding principles in its development, although the organization and financing of the various systems should be exclusively under the authority of the member states. In the three documents: The Future of Social Protection: A framework for a European debate (CEC 1995), Modernizing and Improving Social Protection in the European Union (CEC 1997) and A Concerted Strategy for Modernizing Social Protection (CEC 1999), a general understanding is that, far from being an economic burden, social protection systems can act as a ‘productive factor’ which may help European economies to perform better. They could and should be more ‘employment-friendly’ and more efficient. The normative message is clear: ‘“Modernizing’ social protection means to make best use of its potential as a productive factor” (CEC 1999, p. 7), which implies ‘a strong focus on the incentive structures of these systems’ (ibid., p. 9, my italics).
EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL PROTECTION GUIDELINES General Guidelines The OECD Jobs Study presented nine recommendations for macroeconomic and structural policy reform designed to reduce unemployment (see Appendix 2.1).5 Together, these broad recommendations from 1994,
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backed up by almost 70 detailed policy statements of advice, constitute the so-called OECD Jobs Strategy. The recommendations regarding employment and social protection were repeated over and over again in the following years. They may easily be summed up by three catchwords: flexibility, activation and reform of benefit systems. Among the recommendations that were essentially formulated to accommodate higher labour supply, the advice to relax employment protection legislation became especially controversial (Appendix 2.1, no. 6). The alleged impact of employment protection on labour market performance has also received much attention from researchers, who in general have found that the link between protection legislation and the unemployment rate is uncertain and highly dependent on national contexts. Nevertheless, according to the OECD there is evidence that too strict legislation will hamper labour mobility, reduce the dynamics of the economy and restrain job creation (Swaim 2006, p. 6) In the OECD Restated Jobs Strategy of 2006, based on a 10-year assessment of the original recommendations, population ageing and globalization were pointed out as the main new challenges that have emerged since 1994 (OECD 2006a; DELSA 2006). As it was perceived that these challenges would make the labour force shrink dramatically in coming years, new policies to boost employment and keep welfare systems afloat were needed. As a result, the Restated Jobs Strategy broadened the policy focus by giving more weight to the promotion of labour market participation and by taking a comprehensive approach to benefit programmes, including long-term sickness and disability schemes. The Strategy builds upon four pillars which are considered to be vital for the labour market performance of OECD countries. The countries should: 1. 2. 3. 4.
set appropriate macro-economic policy; remove impediments to labour market participation as well as job search; tackle labour- and product-market obstacles to labour demand; and facilitate the development of labour-force skills and competencies.
Even though all countries need to ensure that each one is solid, the OECD realizes that there is no single successful approach to labour market participation (OECD 2006b, p. 20). The Restated Strategy is all about promoting work incentives, either through cutting benefit levels and duration of benefits, or through welldesigned, effective activation policies. These have proved successful in the counterbalancing of work disincentive effects, according to the Head of the DELSA (Torres 2006). 6 He repeatedly states that the Jobs Strategy is
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The role of international organizations in social policy
not the enemy of social protection, which is one of the myths that has been acting as an obstacle to the labour market reform process. Even though work incentives may be strengthened by the reduction of benefit levels, new evidence suggests that innovative reforms like activation and tax– benefit remodelling can also improve re-employment chances for those out of work (Torres 2006, p. 16). These create labour market dynamism, as well as provide workers with adequate protection (ibid., p. 6); a policy commonly called ‘flexicurity’.7 The discursive development in the EU concerning problem formulation and policy recommendations has not been very different from that of the OECD. The first set of annual Employment Guidelines (1998) introduced four overarching goals (Appendix 2.2): 1. 2. 3. 4.
Improving employability; Developing entrepreneurship; Encouraging adaptability of businesses and their employees; Strengthening the policies for equal opportunities.
During the following years, the guidelines dealt directly or indirectly with the social protection systems. The first overarching goal, ‘improving employability’, is translated into, among others, a guideline that commits the member states to increase significantly the number of persons benefiting from ‘active measures’. Other guidelines commit the states to refocus their benefit and tax systems and provide incentives for unemployed or inactive people to seek and take up work, and to provide measures to enhance their employability, very similar to the original OECD Jobs Strategy as well as to the Restated one. Other guidelines match the OECD guidelines as well, for example that overhead costs and administrative burdens for businesses should be considerably reduced, and that any obstacles which may exist regarding self-employment within tax and social security regimes should be removed. From 1999 onwards, the guidelines have also included the elderly, by urging that all labour market policies, including social protection, should encourage older workers to participate actively in working life. In 2000 The Lisbon Summit agreed upon a new 10-year strategic goal: “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (European Council 2000, p. 2). This required a new overall strategy where “modernizing the European social model, investing in people and combating social exclusion” became one of the three overarching pillars (ibid., pp. 6–9). The Council also set up a Social Protection Committee (SPC) to promote co-operation between the member
Comparing social policy ideas within the EU and the OECD
27
states and the Commission on social protection policies.8 The Commission formulated four key objectives that the committee should pursue: 1. 2. 3. 4.
To make work pay and provide secure income; To make pensions safe and pension systems sustainable; To promote social inclusion; To ensure high quality and sustainable health care.
In 2002, the Barcelona Council stated that the EES needed to simplify and streamline the process of economic policy, and in 2003, a European Employment Taskforce was established by the Commission. This concluded that the Lisbon Strategy 2010 target of a 70 per cent overall employment rate would be missed without further action, and recommended that the Lisbon targets should be narrowed down to ‘job creation’ and ‘economic growth’ (Kok 2003). At the spring Council in 2005, the relaunched Lisbon strategy, Strategy for Growth and Jobs,9 established new governance structures with a clear division of responsibility between the Council and the national level. As part of this, all member states drew up three-year national reform programmes on the basis of the Employment Guidelines that from now on were issued for a three-year cycle. The three new overarching goals for the EES were still not very different from the goals from 1998: 1. 2. 3.
Full employment; Improving quality and productivity at work; Strengthening social cohesion and inclusion.
A main aim of the relaunched Lisbon Strategy was to integrate employment policies with macro- and micro-economic policies, and the new Guidelines (2005–2008) consisted of an integrated package of employment and economic policy guidelines (Appendix 2.2). Guideline 21 is one of the first formulations of the ‘flexicurity’ policy that later became one of the EU’s main policy models for solving Europe’s unemployment problems, based as it is on the assumption that employment flexibility and social security are mutually supportive. As mentioned above, the OECD has also recently embraced this idea of ‘flexicurity’ as a possible way between deregulation and overprotection. In the next section, the policy recommendations to the three countries, Denmark, Germany and Norway, will be described briefly as an illustration of the similarity of the policy ideas spread by the EU and the OECD, and the similarity between the general guidelines and specific country recommendations.
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Country Recommendations Denmark, Germany and Norway The EU’s country-specific recommendations were introduced in 2000. Each year since, Denmark has been praised for its labour market performance. Nonetheless, the country is perceived to have some current or emerging challenges, and recommendations were repeatedly addressed to Denmark in the years 2001 to 2004, that it should reduce the overall fiscal pressure on labour in order to make work pay, and increase incentives to take up or remain in employment – including the removal of incentives for early retirement.10 This recommendation to reduce taxes and benefit programmes is the same as the guidelines given to all member states since 1998 (see Appendix 2.2), and it was repeated annually to Denmark until 2005, when the Council renewed the Lisbon Strategy by introducing the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs.11 Several of these guidelines for 2005–2008 also stress the importance of reforming the tax and benefit systems, which the EU sees as a key priority to promote higher growth potential – very similar to the OECD (Appendix 2.1). In 2007 the Commission’s assessment of Denmark’s National Reform Programme for Growth and Jobs concluded that Denmark had been making very good progress in implementing its National Reform Programme over the 2005–2007 period. Denmark nevertheless still has some challenges regarding social policies.12 In the OECD’s Economic Survey of Denmark (2008), the positive comments and recommendations, are along the same line (see Table 2.1).13 The evaluations of Germany’s employment policies are not as favourable as those of Denmark’s. In 2000, the EU wanted Germany to examine disincentives within the tax and benefit system which might discourage labour market participation of all groups, especially older workers; to bring down the fiscal pressure on labour by reducing taxes and social Table 2.1
Denmark: social policy recommendations
The EU 2007 ● ● ● ● ●
Improve the employment of older workers and immigrants Better match of unemployed with vacancies Improve incentives to work Speed up education reform Encourage immigration
The OECD 2008 ●
● ● ●
Help marginal groups, like older workers and immigrants, to get a foothold in the labour market Benefit reforms and activation Improve labour supply and skill acquisition through tax reforms Capital taxation needs attention
Comparing social policy ideas within the EU and the OECD
Table 2.2
Germany: social policy recommendations
The EU 2007 ● ● ● ●
29
Integrate the low-skilled into the labour market through: Better access to qualifications Comprehensive tax and benefit reforms More efficient employment services
The OECD 2008 ● ● ● ● ●
Lower the disincentives for second earners to work longer Increase the supply of child care Lower the strict employment protection Avoid too high minimum wages Phase out early retirement options
security contributions; and to reduce the burden for setting up new undertakings in the service sector.14 The OECD Economic Survey 2001 also identified structural reforms in product and labour markets in order to generate jobs and thereby strengthen future growth prospects.15 It recommended that Germany should exercise strict spending control and increase the flexibility of labour markets. Labour taxation should be reduced further in order to increase work incentives and labour demand. In 2007, the Commission’s assessment of Germany’s National Reform Programme for Growth and Jobs expressed satisfaction with the country’s progress, and it was commented that there had been some policy response to the recommendations of the Council.16 The OECD’s assessment of Germany’s development in recent years has likewise been quite positive.17 Table 2.2 shows the organizations’ respective recommendations, which are not alike, but still express similar policy ideas. Norway is not a member state of the EU and accordingly does not receive country-specific policy recommendations. Yet the recommendations Norway is offered from the OECD may advance the understanding of the OECD’s ideational stand. In the aforementioned study of the OECD’s social policy recommendations to Norway and 13 other European countries in the period 1970–2000, the interesting result was that while the consistency in the recommendations given to these welfare states was undeniable, their effectiveness was rather low; direct consequences of the OECD recommendations on national welfare reforms are hard to discern (Armingeon 2004). Concerning consistency, the annual reports from 1977, when the OECD grew more concerned about the Norwegian management of the economy, to 2000, frequently expressed scepticism regarding Norway’s employment and income policies (Kildal and Kuhnle 2004, p. 61). Since 1998 the OECD has been rather concerned about the pension schemes, which are still one of its main issues. And although the assessments from 2000–2008 are quite positive on the performance of
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The role of international organizations in social policy
the Norwegian economy, the OECD recommends further efforts to reform disability and sickness leave schemes, and it warns against a development where immigration is used as a remedy for disincentives to labour market participation.18 The OECD is also is concerned that Norway is not making the best use of its education expenditure. In sum, this brief overview of social policy recommendations within the EU and the OECD demonstrates a striking similarity and consistency in their respective social policy ideas. Furthermore, these ideas tend to deal with urgent macro-economic issues rather than the urgent needs of people.
COMPARING THE EU AND THE OECD The increasing number of international and intergovernmental organizations that have emerged since World War II has resulted in disagreements and competition within and between them. A study of pension systems advocated by the World Bank and the ILO illustrates this: whereas the ILO argues that pension schemes should provide universal coverage on the basis of social rights, the Bank strongly advocates a principle of actuarial fairness (Ervik 2003). Also, the EU and the OECD are often pictured as two quite different organizations. Studies comparing policy ideas of the EU and the OECD however, display varying results. A study carried out by Noaksson and Jacobsson asserts that even though both the EU and the OECD “have access to the same facts and figures”, their respective analyses occasionally result in very different employment recommendations (2003, p. 10). The main reason for this seems to be that the OECD recommendations are ‘decontextualized’, that is, they are “addressed to other actors ‘from a distance’”, while the EU strategy is more ‘contextualized’, “negotiated among a wide range of stake-holders” (ibid., p. 10). Whereas the EU is a political organization characterized by a pragmatic use of knowledge, the OECD is an expert organization; a ‘truth seeker’ and ‘truth teller’ with a more dogmatic relationship to knowledge: “while the EU attempts to adapt knowledge to fit reality, the OECD attempts to adapt reality to fit existing knowledge” (ibid.). These organizations can therefore be considered as competitors in the production of ideas in the labour market field: “The European Member States cannot at the same time follow the advices of both” (ibid., p. 69). These characterizations of the relationship between the EU and the OECD might reflect a common opinion. Yet they are weakly substantiated in the report, which rather tends to emphasize the increasing co-operation between the two organizations (ibid., pp. 52–55), and conflicts of interest within them (ibid., pp. 15, 30, 51, 64).
Comparing social policy ideas within the EU and the OECD
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One argument in support of the picture of competition between the two international actors is that the EU, contrary to the OECD, recommends preventive and active policies and revisions of benefits systems when discussing labour market problems (ibid., p. 37). A similar argument is furthered in a comparative study of the OECD Jobs Study and the European Employment Strategy (Casey 2004); while the EU considers the national welfare states as potentially productive, the OECD tends to regard them as impediments. However, the OECD thinking seems to have changed. As mentioned above, the Head of DELSA repeatedly states that the OECD Jobs Strategy is not the enemy of social protection (Torres 2006, p. 16). And according to the OECD’s homepage: “Well-designed social protection is not a cumbersome inheritance from the past, but an asset that is critical for sustaining social development”.19 The two actors’ perceptions of current labour market problems are obviously not strikingly different; both tend to view social security systems as ‘productive factors’. This means that the welfare of the citizens is not a prime concern for either of them; it is only a concern as long as it serves the ultimate EU and OECD goals of economic growth. Studies carried out by Casey (2004) and Dostal (2004) produce somewhat different conclusions from those of Noaksson and Jacobsson, as both researchers find close similarities between the two organizations’ policy ideas. Dostal even states that the OECD frequently acts as the ‘first mover’ regarding the definition of policy problems. He studied the way the OECD Directorate for Education, Employment, Labour and Social Affairs (DEELSA)20 influenced the EU’s welfare and labour market reform agenda from 1994 to 2001 (2004, p. 451), and he found more similarities than dissimilarities between Delors’ White Book on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment from 1993 (CEC 1993) and The OECD Jobs Study (1994). The two strategies provided each other with additional legitimacy and set the agenda for welfare market reforms in these and the following years (Dostal 2004, pp. 440–441). Furthermore, the ten guidelines put forward in The OECD Jobs Study (1994) share many features with the four pillars of the EES from 1998 (see Appendix 2.2), like reduction of taxes, restructuring of benefit systems and so on. Only the fourth pillar on equal opportunities and the closing of the gender gap in the labour market is not expressed explicitly in the Jobs Study (Dostal 2004, p. 452). The gender issue has however also entered the OECD agenda. What separates the OECD and the EU regarding social and labour market policies is not their policy recommendations, according to Dostal, but rather the EU’s “lack of a single institutional discourse”, of a unifying ideological platform like the neo-classical one that the OECD’s recommendations is based on (ibid.). The EU deliberations are based rather
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The role of international organizations in social policy
on interest group representation and pluralism. However, this difference between the two policy actors is not significant. In interviews with six OECD and seven EU high-level bureaucrats and experts in February/ March 2007, it appeared that the earlier quite consistent OECD discourse had been loosened up a bit, and that its thinking had become “more social”. As one of the experts expressed it: I came exactly fifteen years ago . . . the whole world in the 90’s was very Reaganesque and these ideas in structural policies, the supply side was to be king, and governments did a lot of reform and I think now there is a slight, you know, recalibration with this political economy . . . social aspects. Not just in the OECD, but we reflect what’s going on in the member governments. There’s a little of a softer approach. (OECD Interview No. 6, 2007)
The interviews revealed that the communication between the two organizations was good, which could be attributed to “more social thinking” within the OECD, but also to a common ideological basis for the thinking in both organizations. After all, the two organizations have had a long-standing co-operation on various policy areas. In 1982 The OECD Local Economic and Employment Development Programme (LEED) was created to stimulate employment at the local level through the implementation of active employment policies favouring self-employment and enterprise creation. The programme has many members, one of the more prominent being the European Commission. Our interviews confirm the close co-operation between the EU and the OECD. The OECD work, for example with micro-modelling, is much more sophisticated than the EU can do, and so it supports the work of the OECD financially. The two organizations also jointly develop indicators, for example, for pensions and for ‘make work pay’ policies. “This is very technical work” (EU Interview No. 5, 2007) which the OECD is thought to be better at than the EU. Obviously, indicators are not neutral instruments – they represent interpretations of policy goals and thresholds that may be expressions of various normative ideas. Thus the jointly defined indicators may be said to be expressions of common policy ideas in the two organizations: Very frequently the OECD is called up to present its findings and we build upon that referring to those findings. But we feel that they are OECD work so they should also apply in Australia, New Zealand, Japan, USA that in our view are very different social settings. So we do not want to be compelled by these OECD analyses; we insist to translate this into the, in our view, more typically European social model. But we want to build on the strength of the OECD, not to be put in a situation of competition with the OECD. That we cannot do, even if we have, of course, our own expertise, on social issues based on the work of the EUROSTAT and a lot of investment in social indicators. (EU Interview No. 1, 2007)
Comparing social policy ideas within the EU and the OECD
33
The interview illustrates that the relation between the EU and the OECD in the area of social policy may rather be characterized as co-operative than competitive, even if their respective characters and functions are different. The relations to their respective member states are also becoming gradually more similar. The kind of multilateral surveillance carried out by both of them is very similar: they both rely on soft law and their recommendations are all based on extensive contacts with the member states and on peer reviews. The following description of the OECD working procedure when making the Economic Surveys thus seems to be a long distance from the description of a remote expert organization: We need to gather a lot of facts, so we go to the country, but we also discuss the budget and that kind of thing, although in a very technical type of way. That usually, let’s see, it’s usually maybe half a year before the final report is done. And before that we send a questionnaire, detailed questionnaire . . . and our contact point in the government is the ministry of finance . . . along with the questionnaire we send a list of institutions or people . . . some times . . . we like to see also people outside government, because, you know . . . you want more objective opinions sometimes, because government has its policy line, . . . but the government helps us find those people as well, it’s very cooperative. (OECD Interview No. 6, 2007)
The OECD surveillance is thus a two-tiered process consisting of a preparatory and a discussion phase (Schäfer 2006, p. 73), which must ultimately end up in a consensus between the OECD and the examined country regarding problem definition and recommendations (OECD Interview No. 3, 2007). Summarizing the comparison between the social policy ideas promoted by the EU and the OECD, and their respective characteristics and working methods in the social policy field, the conclusion is that far from competing with each other, the EU and the OECD are playing the idea game with similar cards. Even if the nuances matter in the social policy fields, there is a lot of convergence to be seen when looking at the OECD and the EU from a distance. This convergence was clearly expressed by a member of one of the DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunity units, who had earlier been working within the OECD. He described the good co-operation the two organizations have on pension statistics and pension analysis, and also recently on health issues. In the employment field, they had also always had good co-operation: We go to their meetings, we invite them and if you look at the seminars we organise we will usually have an OECD speaker. But we also do direct cooperation together, for example pension statistics and pension indicators. (EU Interview No. 2, 2007)
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The role of international organizations in social policy
According to him, the two organizations are not recommending different things – they recommend very much the same – even if the EU is more specific and has a clearer set of objectives. The OECD framework is broader. But in spite of some slight differences, the recommendations are the same: ‘Both organizations recommend us to work longer, to look after our personal savings, to look at adequacy’ (ibid.). This comparison between the EU and the OECD regarding more general social policy ideas and working methods also contributes to the picture of the two organizations as, although different, also quite related. And the difference seems to decrease. In the next section, I will critically analyse three kinds of discourse that the EU and the OECD ideas are part of, and subsequently I will discuss the justification of them – the input and the output legitimacy.
THREE SOCIAL POLICY DISCOURSES ‘Making work pay’ (MWP) has been a key message in OECD employment strategies since the 1980s and it soon became a key priority for the EU’s Social Protection Committee after its establishment in 2000. In 2003 ‘making work pay’ became one of the ten guidelines of the European Employment Strategy. MWP policies cover a series of reforms which aim is to make work pay more than not working. Generally this implies a mixture of social protection and employment policies, like stricter eligibility criteria, tax reforms, lowering of benefit levels and the use of activation programmes – the key ideas being incentives and activation. The often-repeated request to ‘modernize the incentives structures’ of the social protection systems and to implement ‘active social policies’, emphasizes the urge to change the focus from insuring individuals and protecting them against various social risks, towards investing in their capabilities and making use of them to the best of their potential at every stage of the life course (OECD 2005, p. 3). The ideas of incentives, activation and making work pay also relate to a normative and cognitive framework that may be labelled ‘the sustainability discourse’. Generally, this discourse addresses questions about the social and economic challenges of the welfare state as such, and whether these will undermine or cause the dismantling of the historical accomplishments of this state structure (see Chapters 4 and 7). Both the EU’s and the OECD’s social policy recommendations, being fairly consistent over the last ten years, express supply-oriented ideas that originated in the late 1970s. At that time, policy recommendations incompatible with supply-side recipes vanished from the OECD’s country
Comparing social policy ideas within the EU and the OECD
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surveys. And even if it is questionable whether the OECD still has “a coherent ideational strategy” (Armingeon and Beyeler 2004, p. 228), it is fairly clear that both the EU and the OECD are promoting ideas that belong to a neo-liberal tradition. The stress on work incentives, deregulation of employment protection, reduction of taxes and public expenses, the removal of obstacles to business activities and reduction of public employment, are all central policy pillars of the EES and of the OECD Jobs Strategy as of the neo-liberal ideology. Their policy thinking is strongly market-oriented.21 The MWP discourse has been dominating the social policy debates and reforms on both international and national levels for the last ten years, although the policy message is much older. Even if the core of the discourse is of an economic nature, it is closely related to the moral discourse on ‘rights and duties’ which dominated the social policy agenda in Europe (and the US) during the 1990s. This was in turn a successor of a discourse that had been alive since the development of the welfare states after World War II, about ‘social rights’. Thus, during the last 25 years the influential social policy discourses in Europe have passed through important normative transformations, from citizenship-based social rights to contribution-based entitlements and ultimately to incentive-based social benefits. Although the discourse of social rights has many facets, a central understanding is that the normative goal and policy tool is the securing of adequate living standards for all citizens through equal opportunities and the equal treatment of them. During the 1980s this discourse came under attack for the policies’ alleged demoralizing, counterproductive effects. Rather than improving the citizens’ prospects for a better life, it was claimed that ‘social right’-based welfare policies reduced the clients’ well-being through passivity, dependency and social marginalization, but first and foremost, through disincentives to work. Thus, the ‘social rights discourse’ was subsequently replaced by the moral discourse on ‘rights and duties’, which highlights the citizens’ personal responsibility for their own welfare. This discourse shares certain social policy ideas with the MWP discourse, like activation and sanctions for not fulfilling the citizen’s duties, the last being an indirect, negative incentive to work. Yet incentives do not yet play a main role in the discourse; they are still part of a broader moral package where duties and social rights are the important ingredients. Today the moral concepts of rights and duties have been pushed into the background and replaced by the concept of incentives. The movement indicates a shift in the discourse from a morally coloured definition of, and solution to, current welfare state problems, to a more calculated, selfinterested description and answer that lack any kind of moral sensibility. The fact that morality has become a weaker argument at the expense of the significance given to personal economic gain does not imply, however, that
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The role of international organizations in social policy
the recommended policies are exclusively based on cognitive ideas, lacking values and normative substance. The normative message is just not put on the public agenda. This may be illustrated briefly by the transformation of the idea of justice. While the ‘social rights’ discourse expresses a resourcebased egalitarian notion of justice, including ideas of redistribution, equal opportunities and equal respect, a ‘rights and duty’ discourse argues explicitly for justice as reciprocity. In this idea of justice, the moral correlation between contributions and benefits is essential: “The needy should receive aid, but only in return for some contribution to the society” (Mead 1997, p. 221). The rhetoric surrounding ‘equal opportunity’ has become less powerful than the one around ‘the duty to work’; needy citizens whose contributory duties have not been fulfilled may be denied public assistance to survive.22 In the last discourse the moral message about rights and duties has been toned down; the MWP policies rather guide the citizens in the direction of economic calculations. The idea of reciprocity is still strong, yet it is more explicitly influenced by utilitarian thinking that defines morality in terms of maximum possible welfare of a society as a whole. A main problem with utilitarianism as a theory of justice is that it allows the rights of some people to be sacrificed for the greater benefit of others; it is only concerned about distribution to the extent that this contributes to some suitable conception of utility across the community. Thus, a utilitarian theory of justice might award too much compensation to the ‘wrong’ people and too little to the ‘right’ ones (Dworkin 2000, pp. 328f.). This brief normative analysis reveals how different normative ideas are embedded in the various social policy discourses and reforms, and thus the importance of laying bare the governing ideas and principles in a political community. These should be known and available for public consideration and examination, defence or rejection (Bertram 1997; Waldron 1993, p. 61). Transparency is crucial for the legitimacy of any political system.
LEGITIMACY There are two aspects of legitimacy – the inputs and outputs of public policies. Input-oriented legitimacy is based on the citizens as the only legitimate source of power – ‘government of the people’ – while legitimacy on the output side – ‘government for the people’– meets the criterion of efficiency in solving the citizens’ problems and reaching their goals (Scharpf 1999). International organizations are generally described as lacking input legitimacy, while the outputs may advance the legitimacy of their actions. For instance, the EU often meets complaints about ‘democratic deficit’, and concerns are often expressed regarding the EU’s lack of a collective
Comparing social policy ideas within the EU and the OECD
37
identity, solidarity and culturally based civic trust, which Scharpf regards as preconditions for achieving a legitimate government of the people. However, in the EU and the OECD, both input and output legitimacy seem to be lacking in the policy areas of employment and social protection; studies confirm that it is highly questionable whether these policy actors have the capacity for effective problem solving in areas dominated by ‘soft law’. Researchers have concluded that although the European Employment Strategy and the Open Method of Coordination have proved useful in helping to define common concepts, aims and indicators, there is to date no convincing empirical base for evaluating the policies’ effectiveness in terms of results (Jacobsson and Schmid 2002, p. 89; Zeitlin 2005, p. 449). A lack of documented effects of the OECD recommendations is also a conclusion in the previously mentioned comparative study of 14 European countries (Armingeon and Beyeler 2004). Also, Scharpf’s requirement for input-oriented legitimacy – a ‘collective identity’ based on cultural homogeneity – makes it almost impossible to achieve legitimacy for the proposals put forward by international organizations. There are however reasons to ask whether cultural homogeneity is a necessary precondition for civic trust and solidaristic policies. There are other ways to establish collective identities; for instance a constitution may constitute a basis for collective identity beyond cultural similarity and the nation state (Habermas 2001). Solidarity may be rooted in a legalpolitical community – consider the strong constitutional patriotism in South Africa. According to Risse (2006), deliberative democracy, based on arguing and persuasion, constitutes a significant means of increasing the democratic legitimacy of a political community, particularly in situations where democratic representation is not an option. This is in line with the ideas of Weber ([1919] 2004), as well as Bertram (1997) and Waldron (1993): the legitimacy of political decisions, institutions or systems depends on the basic governing ideas being available for a rational understanding, consideration and evaluation. This understanding is essential for the question raised in this chapter, specifically how ideas and discourses expressed in policy proposals put forward by the EU and the OECD may justify social policy reforms in a way that make them acceptable for the citizens in their member states. And a main result regarding the input justifications is that these are, first and foremost, pragmatic, instrumental and outputoriented, referring to efficiency and economic growth as the main reasons for reforms in the areas of employment and social protection policies. Thus, the normative messages in the OECD’s and the EU’s social policy initiatives regarding reforms and goals, represent a striking contrast to the normative ideas expressed in the justifications of national social policies in Europe. As pointed out, the OECD and the EU recommendations
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express a very clear normative message, in contrast to the national welfare institutions that express a mixture of partly conflicting reasons for welfare. Furthermore, even though national welfare policies are justified by a mixture of pragmatic and normative arguments, strong normative ideas like equality, solidarity, social justice and human dignity are generally important parts of that mix. Historically, these ideas have played an important role in working against the humiliation, stigmatization and loss of dignity that was attached to the old poor relief system (Beveridge 1942; Kildal and Kuhnle 2005, p. 23). Today it is a matter of dispute whether equality still belongs to the normative basis of these states; ‘growth and efficiency’ seems gradually to have brought forth a normative turn in the Nordic countries (Hort 2005, p. 163). If that proves to be true, the national and the international goals of welfare policy might be described as ‘converging’ and moving far away from normative ideas concerning solidarity and social justice. The welfare of the people seems to be secondary to the well-being of the economy, at least in the EU and the OECD. Distributional questions tend to be important to the degree that redistribution furthers economic growth. Obviously, welfare systems are heavy financial burdens, for the state, for the industry and for the citizens. On the other hand, welfare systems undeniably contribute to the performance of the economy, for example, by cultivating and bringing out the population’s productive potential through various institutional arrangements. But to justify social policies primarily by economic goals is highly questionable. Today, there is an increased level of expectation of democratic polities among the citizens; this makes reference to basic governing principles critical, especially justice (Kohli 2006). In order to get support for the policies and goals prescribed in their economic discourse, appeals to social values are thus essential, either to traditional welfare state values, or to the ‘higher values’ of the collective good (Schmidt 2002). To justify a retrenchment policy in order to strengthen the economy in such a way that we may again build up a welfare system (CEC 1999, p. 8), is not very convincing for citizens who are concerned with moral questions. The justifications need to transcend the demands from the economy in order to be accepted.
SUMMARY The aim of this chapter has been twofold: partly to explore the normative content of the policy ideas furthered by the EU and the OECD through their guidelines and recommendations in the policy areas of employment and social protection; and partly to study the relationship between the two international policy actors, their co-operative efforts and their respective working methods in the same fields of policy.
Comparing social policy ideas within the EU and the OECD
39
The social policy proposals promoted by the EU and the OECD have been quite consistent and closely related during the last 10–15 years. Furthermore, they are evidently results of rather pragmatic utility considerations (see also Chapter 4 of this book). Additionally, the policy recommendations and guidelines, as well as the discourses that surround them, are filled with implicit norms and values. For instance, both organizations are important actors in the ‘making work pay’ discourse with its key cognitive ideas of incentives and activation, the aim of which is to contribute to the increase of labour market participation and ultimately economic growth. Yet they have important normative implications that may finally reduce the input legitimacy of the recommendations. The two organizations’ declarations, that economic, employment and social policies can and should reinforce each other, is obviously not yet transformed to a real policy, their relationship still being more of a hierarchical kind. Given the competition that is said to prevail between the increasing numbers of international organizations, not least between the EU and the OECD, an important outcome of this study is the similarities that have been found. As the promoted ideas are closely related, the formulations of their recommendations and guidelines tend also to be quite alike. This also applies to their respective working methods. They both rely on soft law and their recommendations are results of, i.e., peer reviews and frequent contacts with the respective member states. They attend each other’s seminars and meetings and jointly elaborate policy measures and indicators. This analysis thus supports studies that have found broad similarities in ideas and working procedures between the EU and the OECD. The generally accepted picture of the OECD as an expert organization versus the portrait of the EU as a political one is also somewhat blurred in this study. Although these labels may to some extent be correct, both organizations appear to be a mix of politics and expertise. After all, ideas and knowledge are always impregnated with some kind of values.
NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4.
A guideline is a term that generally refers to broad advice, while recommendations refer to advice given to each member state. However, the organizations do not use the concepts consistently. Rueschemeyer (2006) includes people’s preferences as a third category of ideas in addition to normative and cognitive ones. This category is however not relevant for this study of policy recommendations. Today the EU comprises 27 member states in Europe, while the OECD consists of 30 member states all over the world. Economic Surveys are published for each OECD country every 1½–2 years. They
40
5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.
13. 14. 15. 16.
17. 18. 19. 20.
21. 22.
The role of international organizations in social policy analyse what the OECD considers to be the main economic challenges faced by the country and present some policy recommendations to meet them. In 1995 a tenth policy area was added regarding product market competition. DELSA is the Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs. ‘Flexicurity’ is a policy that “facilitates hiring and firing decisions while also providing efficient re-employment services and income support to job losers” (ibid.). The Committee was established in order to facilitate closer co-operation among the member states on the modernization of social protection systems within the EU, under a mandate given to it by the Council. Jobs and Growth, and Growth and Jobs are used interchangeably within the EU. http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_strategy/recomm_en.htm, accessed 17 March 2008 http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_strategy/recomm_en.htm, accessed 17 March 2008 http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/european-dimension-200712-annual-progressreport/200712-annual-progress-report-DA_en.pdf, accessed 7 October 2008. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference5MEMO/07/569&format5H TML&aged50&language5EN&guiLanguage5en, accessed 7 October 2008. http://www.oecd.org/document/27/0,3343,en_2649_33733_40069339_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed 6 October 2008. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri5OJ:L:2000:052:0032:0040:E N:PDF, accessed 7 October 2008. http://puck.sourceoecd.org/vl52838017/cl515/nw51/rpsv/cw/vhosts/oecdjournals/03766438/v2001n9/contp1-1.htm http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/european-dimension-200712-annual-progressreport/200712-annual-progress-report-DE_en.pdf, accessed 7 October 2008. http:// europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference5MEMO/07/569&format5HTML &aged50&language5EN&guiLanguage5en, accessed 7 October 2008. http://www.oecd.org/document/8/0,3343,en_2649_34111_40352840_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed 7 October 2008. http://tinyurl.com/6paa40, accessed 12 December 2008. http://www.oecd.org/document/17/0,2340,en_2649_37419_35515857_1_1_1_37419,00. html, accessed 17 March 2008. DEELSA lost its education section in 2002 and was transformed into DELSA. That there are some policy conflicts between the DELSA and the Economics Department (the ‘soft’ and the ‘hard’ departments) of the OECD, as between the DG Employment and DG Ecofin within the EU Commission, is a fact that is interesting in a study of the origin of ‘travelling ideas’. For this study, it is not important which department within the respective organizations has ‘ownership’ of the policy recommendations. One of the interviewed OECD experts was asked if at any time they had recommended any country to increase public employment, and the answer was “normally, no (laughter) . . . we . . . I can’t think of any country . . . No, no sorry.” (OECD Interview No. 6, 2007). Obviously some citizens will always have legitimate exemption from the contributive duty. The question is where the boundary is drawn.
REFERENCES Armingeon, K. (2004), ‘OECD and national welfare state development’, in K. Armingeon and M. Beyeler (eds), The OECD and European Welfare States, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar, pp. 226–241. Armingeon, K. and Beyeler, M. (eds) (2004), The OECD and European Welfare States, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar.
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Bertram, C. (1997), ‘Political justification, theoretical complexity, and democratic community’, Ethics 107 (4), 563–583. Beveridge, W.H. (1942), Social Insurance and Allied Services, Cmd 6404, London: HMSO. Borrás, S. and Jacobsson, K. (2004), ‘The open method of co-ordination and the new governance patterns in the EU’, Journal of European Public Policy 11 (2), 185–208. Campbell, J.L. (2002), ‘Ideas, politics, and public policy’, Annual Review of Sociology 28 (2002), 21–38. Casey, B.H. (2004), ‘The OECD Jobs Strategy and the European Employment Strategy: two views of the labour market and the welfare state’, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 10 (3), 351–329. CEC (1993), Communication from the Commission ‘White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment: The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century (the Delors White Paper), COM (93) 700 final, 5 December 1993, http://aei.pitt.edu/1139/, accessed 14 March 2008. CEC (1995), Communication from the Commission ‘The Future of Social Protection: A Framework for a European Debate’, COM (95) 466 final, 31 October 1995, http://aei.pitt.edu/5000/, accessed 14 March 2008. CEC (1997), Communication from the Commission ‘Modernising and Improving Social Protection in the European Union’, COM (97) 102 final, 12 March 1997, http://aei.pitt.edu/4734/, accessed 14 March 2008. CEC (1999), Communication from the Commission, ‘A Concerted Strategy for Modernising Social Protection’, COM (99) 347 final, 14 July 1999, http://aei.pitt. edu/3562/, accessed 14 March 2008. DELSA (2006), ‘Jobs and incomes: the restated OECD Jobs Strategy’, Newsletter, 3. Dostal, J.M. (2004), ‘Campaigning on expertise: how the OECD framed EU welfare and labour market policies – and why success could trigger failure’, Journal of European Public Policy 11 (3), 440–460. Dworkin, R.M. (2000), Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Employment Guidelines (1998), The 1998 Employment Guidelines, Council Resolution of 15 December 1997, http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/ employment_strategy/98_guidelines_en.htm. Ervik, R. (2003), Global Normative Standards and National Solutions for Pension Provision: The World Bank, ILO, Norway and South Africa in Comparative Perspective, Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies, Working Paper 8, 2003, Bergen: Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies. European Council (2000), Lisbon European Council: Presidency Conclusions, 23–24 March 2000, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm, accessed 14 March 2008. Giddens, A. (1998), The Third Way, Cambridge: Polity Press. Habermas, J. (1993), ‘On the pragmatic, the ethical, and the moral employment of practical reason’, in J. Habermas, Justification and Application, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Habermas, J. (2001), The Postnational Constellation, Cambridge: Polity Press. Hort, S. (2005), ‘After equality? Normative innovations from Lindbeck to Svegfors – towards a dynamic conservatism?’ In N. Kildal and S. Kuhnle (eds), Normative Foundations of the Welfare State: The Nordic Experience, London: Routledge, pp. 149–168.
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Jacobsson, Kerstin and Schmid, Herman (2002), ‘Real integration or just formal adaptation? On the implementation of the National Action Plans for Employment’, in C. De la Porte and P. Pochet (eds), Building Social Europe Through the Open Method of Co-ordination, Brussels: P. I. E. Peter Lang, pp. 69–97. Kildal, N and Kuhnle, S. (2004), ‘Norway: an amenable member of the OECD’, in C. Armingeon and M. Beyeler (eds), The OECD and European Welfare States, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar, pp. 60–74. Kildal, N. and Kuhnle, S. (2005), ‘The Nordic welfare model and the idea of universalism’, in N. Kildal and S. Kuhnle (eds), Normative Foundations of the Welfare State: The Nordic Experience, London: Routledge, pp.13–33. Kohli, M. (2006) ‘Aging and justice’, in R.H. Binstock and L.K. George (eds), Handbook of Aging and the Social Sciences, Sixth Edition, San Diego, CA, and London, UK: Academic Press, pp. 456–478. Kok, W. (2003), Jobs, Jobs, Jobs: Creating More Employment in Europe, Report of the Employment Taskforce, http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_strategy/pdf/etf_en.pdf, accessed 12 March 2008. Leibfried, S. (2005), ‘Social policy’, in H. Wallace, W. Wallace and M.A. Pollack (eds) Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Marcussen, M. (2004), ‘Multilateral surveillance and the OECD: playing the idea game’, in K. Armingeon and M. Beyeler (eds), The OECD and European Welfare States, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar. Mead, L. (1997), ‘Citizenship and social policy: T.H. Marshall and poverty’, Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (2), 197–230. Noaksson, N. and Jacobsson, K. (2003), The Production of Ideas and Expert Knowledge in OECD: The OECD Jobs Study in Contrast with the EU Employment Strategy, Score Rapportserie 2003:7, Stockholm: Stockholm University, http:// www.score.su.se/pdfs/2003-7.pdf, accessed 19 March 2008. OECD (1981), The Welfare State in Crisis: An Account of the Conference on Social Policies in the 1980s, OECD, Paris, 20–23 October 1981 [i.e. 1980]. Paris: OECD. OECD (1994), The OECD Jobs Study: Facts, Analysis, Strategies, Paris: OECD. OECD (2000–2008), OECD Economic Surveys: Denmark, Paris: OECD. OECD (2001–2006), OECD Economic Surveys: Germany, Paris: OECD. OECD (2001–2007), OECD Economic Surveys: Norway, Paris: OECD. OECD (2005) Extending Opportunities: How Active Social Policy can Benefit Us All, Paris: OECD. OECD (2006a) OECD Employment Outlook: Boosting Jobs and Incomes, Paris: OECD. OECD (2006b) Boosting Jobs and Incomes: Policy Lessons from Reassessing the Jobs Strategy, Paris: OECD. Rawls, J. (1996), Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press. Risse, T. (2006), ‘Transnational governance and legitimacy’, in A. Benz and I. Papadopoulos (eds), Governance and Democracy: Comparing National, European and International Experiences, London: Routledge. Rueschemeyer, D. (2006), ‘Why and how ideas matter’, in R. Goodin and C. Tilly (eds) The Oxford Textbook of Contextual Political Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schäfer, A. (2006), ‘A new form of governance? Comparing the open method of
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coordination to multilateral surveillance by the IMF and the OECD’, Journal of European Public Policy 13 (1), 70–88. Scharpf, F. (1999), Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schmidt, V.A. (2002), ‘Does discourse matter in the politics of welfare state adjustment?’ Comparative Political Studies 35 (2), 168–193. Schmidtz, D. and R. Goodin (1998), Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sorrentino, C. (1991), ‘OECD Employment Outlook: July 1991’, Book review, Monthly Labor Review 114 (9), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1153/ is_n9_v114/ai_11358732, accessed 17 March 2008. Stone, D. (2004), ‘Transfer agents and global networks in the “transnationalization” of policy’, Journal of European Public Policy 11 (3), 545–566. Swaim, P. (2006), Reassessing the OECD Jobs Strategy: What Have We Learnt? Paris: OECD Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, http:// dev2.theworkfoundation.com/Assets/PDFs/Paul_Swaim_050706.pdf, accessed 17 March 2008. Tannenwald, N. (2005), ‘Ideas and explanation: advancing the theoretical agenda’, Journal of Cold War Studies 7 (2), 13–42. Taylor-Gooby, P. and Daguerre, A. (2004), ‘The new context of welfare: state of the art paper for the FPV project: welfare reform and the management of societal change’, in European Commission, EU Research on Social Sciences and the Management of Societal Change, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, pp. 5–29, ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/citizens/ docs/eur20789_screen_en.pdf, accessed 17 March 2008. Torres, R (2006), Labour Market Reforms: Lessons from OECD Countries, http:// tinyurl.com/5lpnhk, accessed 12 December 2008. Waldron, J. (1993), Liberal Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weber, M ([1904] 1969), ‘Objectivity in social science and social policy’, in M. Weber The Methodology of the Social Sciences, New York: The Free Press. Weber, M. ([1919] 2004), ‘Politics as a vocation’, in D.S. Owen and T.B. Strong (eds) The Vocation Lectures, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. Zeitlin, J. (2005) ‘The Open Method of Co-ordination in action’, in J. Zeitlin, P. Pochet and L. Magnusson (eds), The Open Method of Co-ordination in Action: The European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies, Brussels: Peter Lang, pp. 447–503.
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APPENDIX 2.1
THE OECD
OECD Jobs Study 1994 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
Set appropriate macro-economic policy Enhance the creation and diffusion of technological know-how Increase working-time flexibility Nurture an entrepreneurial climate Increase wage and labour cost flexibility Reform employment security provisions Strengthen the emphasis on active labour market policies and reinforce their effectiveness 8. Improve labour force skills and competences through wide-ranging changes in education and training systems 9. Reform unemployment and related benefit systems – and their interactions with the tax system 10. Enhance product market competition so as to reduce monopolistic tendencies and weaken insider–outsider mechanisms while also contributing to a more innovative and dynamic economy. These recommendations represent the OECD Jobs Strategy. OECD Recommendations to Denmark The essential OECD recommendations to Denmark 2000–2008 regarding employment and social protection policies: 1. Change the relevant work incentives 2. Reduce time for studying by tightening the provisions of grants and loans, increasing the speed of human capital formation 3. Tighten eligibility criteria for unemployment benefit 4. Abolish the early retirement scheme 5. Apply activation measures to all workers right up to retirement age 6. Improve educational attainment and language skills among immigrants by introductory programmes and increased emphasis on activation 7. Tax cuts. OECD Recommendations to Germany The essential OECD recommendations to Germany 2001–2006 regarding employment and social protection policies:
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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
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Comprehensive labour market reform needed Public sector services need to be priced more closely to the market Expenditure cuts in public spending Quick implementation of some measures proposed by the Harz Kommission Hurdles to labour force participation of older employees and females need to be further reduced A tax reform reducing the welfare costs of taxation Remove fiscal distortion Improve incentives to supply and demand labour.
OECD Recommendations to Norway The essential OECD recommendations to Norway 2000–2007 regarding employment and social protection policies: 1. Increase outsourcing of auxiliary services 2. Measures are needed to contain the inflow into the sick leave and disability pension schemes in order to avoid a drop in labour force participation 3. The AFT scheme should be abolished and replaced by a system of flexible retirement where benefits should be actuarially adjusted 4. Further efforts (other than a temporary disability benefit) should be made to reduce attractiveness of the disability schemes and to counter abuses facilitated by complaisant doctors and weak controls. Moreover, independent audits of disability claims should be instituted 5. Reforms within the current public old-age pension system should be on the agenda 6. It is crucial that concrete measures are taken soon to attain improvement of public sector efficiency. More competition between public and private sector providers is required 7. The private sector should play a larger role in the provision of public services and user charges should be introduced or raised to reduce excessive demand 8. It is very important that the authorities pursue a reform that strengthens work incentives and thus helps to ensure the sustainability of the scheme. Consideration should be given to a more direct and transparent linkage between actual contributions and actual benefits for those between the pension floor and ceiling whatever their age at retirement
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9. Activation programmes should be aimed at speeding up the return of long-term sickness recipients to work. In addition, in order to curb possible abuse, controls and sanctions to achieve active participation in job search should be enforced.
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APPENDIX 2.2
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THE EU
The European Council in Essen, December 1994, agreed on five key objectives to be pursued by the member states (The Essen Strategy): 1. The development of human resources through vocational training 2. The promotion of productive investments through moderate wages policies 3. Improvement of the efficiency of labour market institutions 4. Identification of new sources of jobs through local initiatives 5. Promotion of access to the world of work for some specific target groups such as young people, long-term unemployed people and women. The 1998 Employment Guidelines (Council Resolution of 15 December 1997) Goal I. Improving employability 1. Tackling youth unemployment and preventing long-term unemployment 2. Transition from passive measures to active measures; ensure that benefit and training systems actively support employability 3. Encouraging a partnership approach 4. Easing the transition from school to work. Goal II. Developing entrepreneurship 1. Making it easier to start up and run businesses 2. Exploiting the opportunities for job creation 3. Making the taxation system more employment friendly. Goal III. Encouraging adaptability in business and their employees 1. Modernizing work organization 2. Support adaptability in enterprises. Goal IV. Strengthening the policies for equal opportunities 1. 2. 3. 4.
Tackling gender gaps Reconciling work and family life Facilitating return to work Promoting the integration of people with disabilities into working life.
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Employment guidelines 2004 (Council Decisions of 22 July 2003 and 4 October 2004) 1. Active and preventive measures for the unemployed and inactive 2. Job creation and entrepreneurship 3. Address change and promote adaptability and mobility in the labour market 4. Promote development of human capital and lifelong learning 5. Increase labour supply and promote active ageing 6. Gender equality 7. Promote the integration of, and combat the discrimination against, people at a disadvantage in the labour market 8. Make work pay through incentives to enhance work attractiveness 9. Transform undeclared work into regular employment 10. Address regional employment. Employment Guidelines 2005–2008 (Council Decision of 12 July 2005) Integrated with the macro-economic and micro-economic guidelines, the Employment Committee and the Social Protection Committee have formulated a joint opinion on the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs: Nos 17–24: 17. Implement employment policies aiming at achieving full employment, improving quality and productivity at work, and strengthening social and territorial cohesion 18. Promote a lifecycle approach to work 19. Ensure inclusive labour markets, enhance work attractiveness and make work pay for job seekers, including disadvantaged people and the inactive, through “continual review of the incentives and disincentives resulting from the tax and benefit systems”, among other strategies 20. Improve matching of labour market needs 21. Promote flexibility combined with employment security and reduce labour market segmentation, having due regard to the role of the social partners 22. Ensure employment-friendly labour cost developments and wagesetting mechanisms 23. Expand and improve investment in human capital 24. Adapt education and training systems in response to new competence requirements.
3.
Directly-deliberative polyarchy: a suitable democracy model for European social policy? Milena Büchs
INTRODUCTION Directly-deliberative polyarchy is a new model of decentralized democracy and social policy recently applied to legitimize the Open Method of Coordination (Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002; Eberlein and Kerwer 2004). To be able to discuss the appropriateness of directly-deliberative polyarchy for legitimizing the Open Method of Coordination, it is crucial to reflect on the relationship between democracy and social policy more generally. The introduction discusses this relationship and claims that social policy and democracy are related to each other in a circular way: social policy can provide output legitimacy whilst at the same time it needs to be based on input legitimacy.1 It is very difficult to institutionalize this particular relationship at the European level, and each governance model of EU social policy must therefore be scrutinized regarding its effects on the relationship between social policy and democracy. This chapter examines this question in relation to the Open Method of Coordination. In modern welfare states, social policy and democracy are mutually co-dependent. In comparison to other policy areas, social policy requires a particularly solid legitimacy basis. On the other hand, social policy is a precondition and stabilizer of mass democracy. This chapter argues that the special relationship between social policy and democratic legitimacy has been put under pressure by European integration and that a new relationship between these two spheres must be established within the multilevel governance system of the European Union. One underlying assumption of this chapter is that redistributive social policies are still in demand within European societies. For example, it has been argued that a strong political tradition still exists in continental Europe, promoting a ‘social democratic welfare state’ based on ‘Christian social doctrines’, the workers’ movement and social liberalism (Habermas 49
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2001, p. 10). The argument that European citizens still support the welfare state is also supported by empirical studies conducted by Wincott (2006, pp. 749f.) and Taylor-Gooby (2004).2 In addition, it is likely that demand for redistributive social policy will increase in the next couple of decades due to a range of economic and social changes. These include the phenomenon of ‘jobless growth’, as increasingly divided labour markets create social inequalities, firstly between the employed and the workless and secondly between those with well-paid full-time jobs and those in precarious low-wage employment (the ‘working poor’). Furthermore, the ageing of European societies generates higher demand for social security and health care in old age. If the assumption that European electorates still support redistributive social policies and expect governments to provide solutions to these current social problems is correct, a range of democracy-related issues arise within the present state of European social policy.3 The relationship between social policy and democracy can be perceived to be cyclical, firstly because social policy-making procedures must conform to certain democratic standards if the output is to be accepted as legitimate, and secondly due to the crucial role of social policy within the establishment of mass democracy and its importance for the maintenance of functioning democratic systems. It has been argued by authors such as Scharpf (1997, p. 20; 1999, pp. 22f.), Majone (1998, p. 28) and Habermas ( [1998] 2001), that social policies must be adopted in processes of ‘democratic will-formation’ (Habermas) or ‘input-legitimacy’ (Scharpf) since social policy potentially involves redistribution and touches upon fundamental normative orientations within society, and is therefore likely to be highly controversial. In other words, the controversial nature of redistributive social policy requires politicization, public debate and democratic decision making. Such policies cannot be delegated to expert networks or independent or unaccountable bodies. However, many authors (for example, Majone 1996, p. 133; Scharpf 1999, pp. 8f.; Bellamy 2006, p. 742) believe that if majoritarian institutions (such as parliaments) decide upon redistributive policies, a sense of common political identity (or a ‘European demos’) is required by those affected, as the defeated minority will accept the majority’s decision only if it is felt that fellow citizens can be trusted. This argument has consequences for the prospects of adopting redistributive policies at the EU level. For example, Majone claims that EU institutions can only legitimately adopt regulatory policies, such as ‘market-making’ provisions promoting a single market or ‘negative integration’ with no redistribution entailed. In his view, these regulatory EU policies must be detached from democratic processes to be trustworthy and effective (Majone 1998, p.
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17). Scharpf similarly argues that EU governance mechanisms must rely predominantly upon output legitimacy since procedures based on input legitimacy are not feasible at the EU level (Scharpf 1999, pp. 9, 22f.). The logical consequence of Scharpf’s and Majone’s perspective is that the EU cannot legitimately engage with redistributive social policy in its current form, and therefore social policy must be provided by the member states. One must note that this ‘European demos’ view has been criticized by the ‘rights-based’ view (Bellamy 2006), equally promoted by authors such as Habermas (2001; [1998] 2001) and Fossum and Menéndez (2005, pp. 13f.). They maintain that European citizenship inclusive of social rights and a European constitution should not only be perceived as deriving from, and therefore requiring some form of ‘European demos’, but that a common political identity can also be generated by democratic procedures of constitution making. Furthermore, Habermas emphasizes that a ‘European identity’ cannot be conceptualized as a ‘community of fate shaped by common descent, language and history’ (2001, p. 15), but as a voluntaristic citizenry based upon the mutual acceptance of difference and need for European-wide solidarity, which would complement existing national identities (see also Offe and Preuss 2006). Whilst the theory behind these arguments is highly appealing, it can be regarded as a justification for European constitution building that might become relevant in the long run but is not yet accepted as a legitimation for redistributive EU policies. In fact, the relevance of national and sub-national identities and scepticism regarding European integration appear to be increasing, as reflected by the demise of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005. A different strand of thought takes into account the role of social policy for the functioning of democracy and for the formation of nation states, national identities and mass democracy (Rokkan 1999, pp. 131f., 265; Moreno and McEwen 2005, pp. 5ff.; Wincott 2006, pp. 750f.). This can be applied to the formation of European identity and democracy in a prospective sense (Habermas 2001; [1998] 2001). Certain social provisions can be regarded as a precondition for the functioning of mass democracy. For example, the availability of universal education delivered by a public school system is required for citizens to participate in democracy and make informed decisions within that role. Social policy also provides social security and a safety net for those who could not otherwise cope, thus potentially reducing social inequalities and conflict. The containment and institutionalization of social conflict can be regarded as contributing to social and political stability, thus facilitating democracy.4 Furthermore, claims that redistributive social policy requires a common political identity can be reversed by arguing that social policy contributes
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to the development of a common political identity. This argument is also used in the debate regarding welfare state development, in which some authors state that, in some cases, welfare state development created or supported the development of national identity (Rokkan 1999, pp. 131f., 265; Moreno and McEwen 2005, pp. 5ff.). Similarly, as discussed above, it has been argued by Habermas (2001; [1998] 2001) that social rights embedded in a European constitution could contribute to the development of a European political identity. Finally, social policy can provide output legitimacy for a political system if it successfully addresses social problems and thus legitimizes the current political system and government.5 If these assumptions are accepted, it becomes obvious that European integration creates problems for the relationship between social policy and democratic legitimacy. This is because on the one hand, European integration limits member states’ capacity to design their own social policy, regarded by Scharpf as a reduction of national governments’ potential to generate output legitimacy (Scharpf 1999, p. 83) and by Held (1995, pp. 16f.) and Habermas (2001; [1998] 2001) as a threat to national democracy. On the other hand, as the EU becomes increasingly involved in social policy, a unique multi-level governance system of social policy is emerging. However, authors such as Scharpf (1999), Majone (1996, 1998), Bellamy (2006) and Weiler (2002) maintain that it is virtually impossible to establish democratically legitimate redistributive EU social policy or refuse this option for political reasons. One aim of introducing the Open Method of Coordination was to reconstitute a healthy balance between democracy and social policy at the EU level. It is therefore important to evaluate whether the Open Method of Coordination can ‘deliver’ this goal (see below). This chapter continues by briefly illustrating the argument that European integration limits national democracy, via discussing the possible impacts of ‘negative integration’ on the welfare state. It then presents the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) and its aim to help cope with some problematic side-effects of ‘negative integration’ by strengthening EU social policy and legitimacy. The OMC operates without binding polices but is rather based on ‘soft law’, evaluation, peer review and policy networks. Its specific form of governance raises novel questions regarding democratic legitimacy. In this context, a fundamentally new model of democracy, directly-deliberative polyarchy, has become prominent in theorizing and justifying coordinated EU social policy. Within directly-deliberative polyarchy, decision making and implementation are devolved to local units which consist of all ‘stakeholders’ affected by the policies. In return for their autonomy, local units must provide information on experiences and performance to the central administration, which pools and diffuses
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this information to other local units. This chapter will examine whether directly-deliberative polyarchy is an appropriate democracy model to legitimize the Open Method of Coordination. Therefore this model will be discussed in detail along with a number of options which aim to maintain positive elements of directly-deliberative polyarchy in the OMC whilst strengthening institutions of representative democracy and the OMC’s transparency, accountability and democratic legitimacy.
THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION Since the early 1990s, the European Union has developed a new governance method to coordinate member state labour market and social policy. This method was formally adopted in 1997 through the European Employment Strategy, which was then integrated into the newly defined Open Method of Coordination (OMC) at the Lisbon European Council in 2000. The adoption of the OMC can be understood only in the context of implications of European integration and the formation of a single market for national democracy and European welfare states. ‘Negative integration’ is achieved by market-creating measures that focus on removing barriers to free trade or undistorted competition. Examples of ‘negative integration’ measures are the abolition of tariffs and quantitative limits as well as competition law. The standard legitimation for ‘negative integration’ is that all member states have voluntarily, that is based on democratically legitimate decisions, transferred their sovereignty in affected policy fields to the EU (Weiler 2002; Follesdal 2006, p. 445). Authors such as Scharpf (1999), Habermas ([1998] 2001), Offe and Preuss (2006) and Wincott (2006) assume that ‘negative integration’ law limits member state governments’ abilities to design their welfare states, with potentially detrimental effects for social standards and national democracy. For example, whilst it is likely that product standards can be maintained in a common market, standards related to the production process, which increase the costs of the product but do not improve its quality, are likely to come under pressure through free trade in a single market (Scharpf 1999, pp. 96ff.). Examples of production process standards being under pressure through EU integration include social security related non-wage labour costs, employment security and workplace health and safety. In addition, monetary union entails the requirement for all member states to meet certain budget criteria, for example not to exceed an annual additional state deficit of three per cent and an overall public debt of sixty per cent of GDP. Consequently, governments that are members of the
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Euro-zone are restricted regarding the size of public deficits, and therefore state expenditure, potentially creating a need to find ways of cutting expenditure against a backdrop of ageing societies and relatively high unemployment rates. Habermas (2001; [1998] 2001), Offe and Preuss (2006), Streeck (1996) and Scharpf (1999) also maintain that the restriction of policy options available at the member state level limits democratic autonomy. National governments’ ability to respond to electoral demands is reduced, as it must be assumed that electorates expect solid social policy provisions as ageing societies increase requirements for social security and health in old age as well as an increase of labour supply, assuming that retirement ages are raised and early retirement is decreasing, which potentially produces higher unemployment, larger groups of ‘working poor’ and consequently more extensive social inequalities. European integration therefore produces a need to compensate for the loss of democratic autonomy and the ability to design effective social policies. The difficulty that exists is that this cannot be achieved by establishing a European ‘super’ welfare state based upon institutions of representative and liberal democracy as they exist at the national level. Firstly, the national political and welfare systems are historically grown and European citizens would clearly dismiss the prospect of these systems being replaced by a European ‘super state’. In addition, although heavily disputed, it has been argued that a fully-fledged European welfare state cannot be established due to the non-existence of a European ‘demos’ required to create institutions at the EU level which could facilitate inputlegitimate majoritarian social policy making (Majone 1996; Scharpf 1999). Without a common political identity and fully-fledged institutions of majoritarian democracy, redistributive social policies need to be adopted by unanimity in the Council and Parliament. Given the huge variety of interests and positions towards European social policy within an EU of 27 member states, virtually no consensus could be reached about these issues at the EU level if unanimity were required. The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) was designed as a compromise solution in response to the dilemma that whilst European measures are required to safeguard European welfare states and democracy, this cannot be done by establishing a European super welfare state. On the one hand the OMC strengthens social policy coordination at the EU level; on the other it remains informal, leaving member states’ social policy authorities formally intact. This construction is intended to facilitate mutual learning and bottom-up policy innovation through the regular exchange of ideas, peer review and ‘naming and shaming’ (Jacobsson 2004; Trubek and Trubek 2005; Zeitlin 2005; Kröger 2006).
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Within the OMC, the EU has the role of setting non-binding objectives, quantitative indicators and targets, guidelines and recommendations, whilst member states are obliged to regularly develop plans and reports regarding the ways in which these objectives will be implemented. Subsequently, the EU Commission and Council evaluate and compare member state practices. The EU presented the OMC as legitimate, since it subscribes to the principle of subsidiarity, and as a means of improving European democratic governance, for example through the involvement of key stakeholders at the European, national and sub-national levels (European Council 1997: para. 13f., 18). However, a number of problems related to transparency, accountability and legitimacy can be identified within the OMC (see for example, Joerges and Rödl 2004; Büchs 2007). Accountability and transparency are key criteria for assessing the democratic quality of political systems or policy procedures. In an ideal world, parliamentary democracies are based on the principle that the government (agent) is accountable to the parliament (principal), that is, the parliament has the right to scrutinize the government and to monitor whether it correctly implements all legislation. In extraordinary crisis situations the parliament also has the right to dismiss the government. In addition, the government is indirectly accountable to the electorate through the publicity of government activities. The electorate holds the government accountable through elections since it has the power to vote for a new government if it is dissatisfied with the current one. Transparency is the precondition for accountability. If its activities and decisions are opaque, government cannot be held accountable by the parliament and electorate. In short, accountability and transparency are crucial mechanisms to control and limit government, a key characteristic of democratic government (Manin et al. 1999, p. 16). Regarding the participation of stakeholders, empirical studies have demonstrated that the participation of social partners, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and regional and local authorities in OMC processes has increased (for example, Zeitlin 2005; Friedrich 2006). However, no guidelines exist at the EU level concerning which actors should be consulted in the development of OMC objectives and who should participate in the development of National Reform Programmes. This is because different traditions of stakeholder involvement exist within different member states, so the EU wished to leave decisions regarding involvement with the member states. Stakeholders are therefore involved to different degrees in producing national reports. The EU Commission and Council then use these reports to issue country-specific recommendations. However, these procedural differences in producing national reports potentially create difficulties for the acceptance and legitimacy of the country-specific
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recommendations because a country with well-established traditions of social partner or NGO involvement might not be willing to be compared to another country whose report has been produced without any proper stakeholder involvement (and vice versa). Even more problematic is the fact that no guidelines exist regarding the rights and responsibilities of stakeholders participating in OMC processes. Therefore the type of involvement naturally varies between member states, and it remains unclear to electorates whether stakeholders were involved as advisers or whether they drafted parts of the National Reform Programmes independently. In other words, the degree of influence different stakeholders have within OMC processes remains opaque; it is also unclear whether this influence is equally distributed between different stakeholders and whether their role can be regarded as legitimate. An additional problem in relation to participation is that parliaments at all levels are only marginally involved in OMC processes. The EU Parliament has the right of information in the European Employment Strategy but not in other social policy areas covered by the OMC. National parliaments do not participate in the development of national reform programmes and are normally only informed after the programme has been adopted (Zeitlin 2005; Büchs 2007). Moreover, the overall construction of the Open Method of Coordination poses considerable problems in terms of transparency, accountability and democratic legitimacy. Firstly, the OMC processes are complex and the general public is not well-informed about these processes or about the roles different institutions and actors play at the EU and member state levels in OMC policy making (the majority of EU citizens are not even aware that the OMC or Lisbon strategy exist (European Commission 2006: fn 14). One example of the opaqueness of OMC processes is evident in the important role played by the Employment and Social Protection Committees. Both Committees are crucial in developing quantitative indicators and discussing proposals for guidelines and objectives, with each consisting of two member state representatives and a member of the European Commission. The Committees may consult experts, interest groups and voluntary organizations. However, no clear rules exist to govern these consultations, meeting minutes are not publicly available and the Committees’ influence upon the development of the European Employment Strategy and OMC objectives remains unclear. A further example is apparent within the roles that different member state governments play in negotiations regarding the OMC. As the minutes of Council discussions are not publicly available, the positions and arguments presented by government representatives are not transparent. Therefore national citizens cannot discover the role their government,
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and other member state governments, played in OMC decisions. This weakens the accountability of national governments to their parliaments and electorates. Sabel and Zeitlin (2007) argue that even if the OMC does not stand up to traditional criteria of principal-agent accountability, it does provide for ‘dynamic accountability’ through peer review. This concept is based on the notion that in situations where ‘actors . . . learn what problem they are solving, and what solution they are seeking, through the very process of problem solving’ (ibid., p. 37), accountability is not about compliance by the agent to the rules set by the principal but about mutual and deliberative control between actors in networks. In this model, rules are no longer set by a centre or principal (such as the EU) but by a network of actors, in the case of the OMC, the EU Commission, the Council (national governments) and a variety of stakeholders at the European and national levels. The implementation of the rules set by actors responsible for the implementation is monitored through peer review, that is by other members of this network. This leads to the identification of the policy approaches that do or do not work, and in turn to the formulation of new objectives. The problem with this model is that national parliaments play only a marginal role in this dynamic accountability; they are no longer principals to whom governments are accountable, but they implement the agendas and objectives adopted by the network of the Commission, national governments and ‘stakeholders’. Another problem is that negotiations regarding OMC objectives and National Reform Programmes are barely discussed in the media, so European electorates are largely unaware of these processes. This lack of publicity also brings into question the effectiveness of peer review within these European networks. If a particular government is ‘named and shamed’ by network members, is this effective if it does not threaten the government’s reputation before its national electorate? Finally, the OMC’s democratic legitimacy can be discussed more generally. One can argue that there is no legitimacy issue regarding the OMC because none of the guidelines, objectives, indicators and recommendations are legally binding. If member state governments decide to change their policies in the light of these objectives, it is their voluntary decision based upon a change of law adopted by national parliaments. This general assumption would be true if the link between domestic policy making and the OMC were more transparent and explicit to national electorates. However, OMC objectives and potential national implementation plans are currently decided without parliamentary participation and without public discussion. If domestic policy reforms are open to OMC influence, national policy agendas are no longer primarily defined in public arenas
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by national parliaments, but in relatively exclusive forums at the EU level. In addition, due to the opaqueness of OMC policy-making processes, member states can use the OMC in order to pressure for unpopular policy change without any transparency of a government’s role in OMC negotiations to its electorate (Büchs 2008).6 Furthermore, the non-binding objectives of the European Employment Strategy (EES) have become more closely linked to the European Social Fund (ESF) in the new structural fund period 2007–2013. The European Social Fund regulations require that the projects it supports are consistent with and support the objectives of the European Employment Strategy as well as the OMC in social inclusion. It also requires that indicators in Operational Programmes reflect the EES indicators, and that ESF evaluations scrutinize whether projects supported the implementation of the EES.7 Consequently, the European Employment Strategy gains a considerable influence over the implementation of EU redistributive policies, although the objectives of the European Employment Strategy have not been adopted in the normal EU decision-making processes (that is, without co-decision by the European Parliament) and are not legally binding. This is possibly the most problematic OMC issue in terms of democratic legitimacy, as via the link to the structural funds, the nondemocratically decided EES gains influence on the implementation of one of the key areas of EU expenditure policy. This would pose no problem if the majority of EU citizens agreed to EES objectives and its overall orientation. However, it is unclear whether general support for EES objectives would be found amongst EU citizens. Even if it were, one can argue that the trustworthiness of the EES objectives is limited because it is not democratically controlled. This in turn affects the legitimacy of national policies, which are to some degree directly influenced by the EES.
DIRECTLY-DELIBERATIVE POLYARCHY Soon after the introduction of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), the concept of directly-deliberative polyarchy began to be applied within the literature to theorize the OMC’s legitimacy as well as a new democracy model for the EU more generally (Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002; Eberlein and Kerwer 2004).8 The model of directly-deliberative polyarchy was initially developed in more detail by the American scholars Cohen, Dorf and Sabel in the late 1990s and was presented as an alternative to constitutional and representative democracy (Cohen and Sabel 1997; Dorf and Sabel 1998; Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002, p. 294). Its basic argument is that representative and
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constitutional democracy is no longer a desirable and workable model due to the increasing volatility and diversity of society. Directly-deliberative polyarchy therefore proposes that decision making and implementation should be undertaken by local political units whilst central administration, parliament and courts only provide, monitor and guarantee the framework for such decentralized decision making (Dorf and Sabel 1998). This system is called ‘polyarchy’ because the core areas of policy making and implementation are devolved to lower level units, thus creating ‘a permanent dis-equilibrium’ of political power (Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002, p. 292; see also Sabel and Zeitlin 2007).9 It is directly-deliberative because a wide range of political actors participate in local decision making which is reached by deliberation, that is, the exchange of arguments mutually acknowledged as being rational (Cohen and Sabel 1997, p. 320). The main novelty of directly-deliberative polyarchy is that in return for greater policy-making authority, local units must provide central and higher level units with information regarding their solutions, experiences and performance, which can then be disseminated and made available to other local units. Therefore, local policy making is publicly scrutinized, benchmarked and criticized. The authors hope that this will enhance accountability and foster mutual ‘policy learning’ between local units (Cohen and Sabel 1997, p. 314; Dorf and Sabel 1998, p. 267), whilst these units develop policies that are both legitimate, due to direct participation, and effective, since solutions are tailored to local problems. Directly-deliberative polyarchy criticizes the uniformity and preciseness of law that seeks to tackle problems at the national level and guarantees equal social rights and social service access. Cohen and Sabel argue that uniformity of law does not take regional differences and social diversity into account and cannot respond to highly volatile social environments (Cohen and Sabel 1997, p. 324). From the directly-deliberative polyarchy perspective this applies not only to secondary, but also constitutional law. The proponents of this concept therefore suggest that participants within local units consider general constitutional principles whilst constitutional courts restrict themselves to taking an overview of the application of directly-deliberative policy making’s general principles and procedures by local units (Cohen and Sabel 1997, pp. 327, 335). Furthermore, since the creation and implementation of rules need to be more flexible and responsive to rapidly changing social contexts, directlydeliberative polyarchy assumes that policy solutions are only found during the problem-solving process (Sabel and Zeitlin 2007, p. 37). This means that rule makers and rule takers can no longer be clearly distinguished but mutually depend upon one other. Therefore, strict separation of powers is not workable and decision making and implementation are merged in
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local units in which citizens, interest groups and private and voluntary organizations participate. As a consequence of this new arrangement, the roles of the constitution, central parliament and government are redefined. The constitution provides merely a general framework, enabling deliberative and experimental local decision making but containing no substantial rules (Cohen and Sabel 1997, p. 335). Constitutional courts should therefore no longer make substantial decisions, but monitor the procedural requirements of directly-deliberative decision making. Central legislatures support local deliberation via the definition of areas that are open to this type of decision making. Since most policies are locally implemented in this architecture, administrative agencies merely ‘provide the infrastructure for information exchange between and among units’ (Cohen and Sabel 1997, p. 334).
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF DIRECTLYDELIBERATIVE POLYARCHY The model of directly-deliberative polyarchy is thought-provoking because it seeks to radically remodel democracy and is based on relevant insights into the challenges contemporary societies pose for democracy and the welfare state. However, a range of criticisms can also be levelled at this model, and this section discusses whether it is suitable for legitimizing the Open Method of Coordination and whether it successfully redefines the relationship between democracy and social policy in a multi-layered European Union. Firstly, the model of directly-deliberative polyarchy correctly emphasizes that contemporary economies and societies are rapidly changing. Through the internationalization of the economy, businesses and capital have become more mobile, as the increasing rate of technological innovation leads to the development of new production forms and products so that both production and consumption increasingly underlie rapid change. The employment sphere is affected by that since new skills are required and employment sectors generated whilst more traditional jobs disappear. In addition, societies become more diverse through migration, and despite ‘globalization’, the significance of regional and local identities rises in a range of places worldwide. However, it is difficult to measure empirically the scope of these changes in comparison to earlier phases of economic and technological change. In addition, it is not entirely clear which political consequences have to be drawn from these economic and social changes and whether they require an approach as radical as that suggested by directly-deliberative
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polyarchy. This is not the place to find answers to these issues; I intend only to raise the question whether directly-deliberative polyarchy identifies the right degree of change, and if so whether these changes require the abolition of constitutional and representative democracy. One can argue, for example, that in times of rapid social change and high job insecurity, national or even supra-national provisions are necessary to enable job mobility, social security in periods of temporary unemployment or further education. Such ‘uniform’ social security provision could be a precondition for the success of a flexible economy. Secondly, directly-deliberative polyarchy is in accord with the scholarly debate that attests a serious crisis of representative democracy and rule of law in developed Western economies. It is equally true that the establishment of a federation with a fully-fledged parliamentary democracy at the EU level is seen as unfeasible. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the necessary consequence must be the abolition of representative democracy and rule of law, or whether it is in fact important to search for new ways through which these principles can be upheld but reformed to be workable in the contemporary context of economy and society and be strengthened at the European level. For example, there are very good reasons behind the principle of the separation of powers in liberal democracies, even if this can probably never be fully realized. Powers are divided between the legislature, executive and courts in order to inhibit authoritarianism and monopolization of power through effective ‘checks and balances’. Rule makers are thereby prevented from creating self-serving rules unresponsive to the requirements of the ‘common good’ or will of the citizens. The main arguments brought forward by directly-deliberative polyarchy against the rule of law and representative democracy are that the production of rules by such institutions is too time-consuming and that they are too rigid and uniform to respond to diversity and volatility. However, if directly-deliberative polyarchy is seriously practised it is far from clear that its procedures will be less time-consuming and more responsive to social change than those of representative democracy (Scheuermann 2004, p. 118). Moreover, the rules produced would have only local or regional coverage, which restricts the mobility of economic actors and renders any type of longer-term planning, still required to a certain degree by public and private organizations, unfeasible. The most significant problem with directly-deliberative polyarchy is, however, that assumptions regarding the way in which constitutional principles will be realized seem to be overly optimistic. Sabel, Cohen and Dorf suggest that instead of providing courts with the responsibility of overseeing compliance with constitutional
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principles, participants in local units are required to take the general constitutional principles and requirements of directly-deliberative rulemaking into account (Cohen and Sabel 1997; Dorf and Sabel 1998). Participants in local units are not only citizens but also interest groups, private and voluntary organizations, NGOs and so on. The underlying assumption is that these different actors are dependent upon one another in such a way that, after closer inspection, all participants are equally powerful and rules are created that equally serve the interests and needs of all participants (Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002, p. 293). However, this belief is extremely idealistic since it is highly likely that local actors are differently dependent upon one another, and have different capabilities and capacities to organize themselves and influence policies; thus power asymmetries between local actors will exist. This is particularly the case in the area of social policy with potentially redistributive consequences. Those in precarious situations and in need of support are regularly less able to organize themselves and in danger of being overruled by those actors who have to pay for this support due to the latter’s short-term self-serving interests. Directly-deliberative polyarchy’s normative idea that diverse political actors can collaborate deliberatively on an equal footing, without differences in interest and power affecting the outcome and regularly violating the rights or needs of the weaker participants, is laudable but unrealistic. Finally, directly-deliberative polyarchy promotes the localization of policy making and implementation, arguing that this is the best way of generating locally tailored solutions through the direct involvement of those local actors affected by the rules produced. In contrast to directlydeliberative polyarchy, democratic welfare states seek to provide equal social rights or even life chances and living standards across the country to level out regional disparities. Even if the central level does not prescribe precise policies in such a setting, it must be responsible for financial redistribution between different social groups and regions. Directly-deliberative polyarchy is relatively inexplicit about its design in relation to these issues. On the one hand, it perceives itself as a model ‘after the welfare state’ (Cohen and Sabel 1997, p. 362) but on the other, as an alternative to market liberalism and rigorous deregulation (Cohen and Sabel 1997, p. 315; Scheuermann 2004, p. 102). It believes that the decentralization of policy making to local units will accommodate ‘weak interests’ at the local level because the powerful will realize that their success depends on the powerless (Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002, p. 293). As discussed above, this is a fairly idealistic assumption since the question of whether weaker actors are able to influence more powerful actors in any significant way very much depends upon the issue at stake and the degree of dependency of the stronger actors on the weaker. It also remains unclear whether the central
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level can play a role in regional redistribution and support for deprived areas. Directly-deliberative polyarchy states that central legislatures can be responsible for providing resources to local bodies which meet basic requirements in terms of membership and benchmarking (Cohen and Sabel 1997, p. 334). If funding of local-level policies is entirely dependent upon these criteria, it might emerge that the most deprived areas are least likely to be able to meet them and are thus in danger of becoming even further impoverished. In turn, this can limit the legitimacy of local units’ authority and the whole policy design more generally. The discussion of directly-deliberative polyarchy has so far addressed some of its general principles but has not specified whether they apply to the national or the European level. Originally, the model of directlydeliberative polyarchy was developed by American scholars, with predominantly the United States in mind as a potential country of application (Cohen and Sabel 1997; Dorf and Sabel 1998; Fung and Wright 2001). However, it has also been applied to the European Union (Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002; Sabel and Zeitlin 2003; Sabel and Zeitlin 2007) and the OMC in particular (Eberlein and Kerwer 2004; Smismans 2005). It is fair to say that European integration places additional pressures upon representative democracy and rule of law because policy making has become even more complex given the diversity between European member states and because European citizens do not share a common political identity. Consequently, European parties and a European public sphere are currently virtually non-existent, whilst European law and capital mobility across the European Union weaken national institutions of representative democracy. Given the problems with directly-deliberative polyarchy, it is, however, questionable whether this model provides a suitable alternative to the current system as well as to other potential reform options. For example, in the EU’s current design, rule of law is guaranteed through a complicated system of checks and balances with an independent Court of Justice responsible for overseeing adherence to the Treaties of the European Community and European Union. A complex system of division of powers exists between: the Commission and other Executive Agencies as the executive branch; the Commission (having the right of initiative); the Council and the European Parliament co-operating in EU law making; and finally the European Court of Justice as the judiciary branch of government. Furthermore, representative democracy is an important principle at the EU level. The members of the Council are (indirectly) democratically legitimized because they have been selected in national parliamentary elections whilst the members of the European Parliament are directly elected in EU elections. Even if the European Parliament remains the weaker partner in EU law making overall, as in some areas it is only
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consulted by the Council, it has been transformed into a proper second legislative chamber on par with the Council in the co-decision procedure (Article 251, Treaty of the European Community). Gerstenberg and Sabel (2002) and Sabel and Zeitlin (2007) certainly do not suggest abolishing this existing EU design and replacing it with an ideal model of directly-deliberative polyarchy. However, they apply directly-deliberative polyarchy to legitimize developments such as comitology and the Open Method of Coordination. However, when Gerstenberg and Sabel praise the increasingly significant role of comitology, for example in the area of product standards, this is perceived as an alternative to the approach in which the European Court of Justice decides upon the appropriateness of standards. They therefore promote a move away from more traditional European governance approaches towards directly-deliberative polyarchy. Sabel and Zeitlin (2007, pp. 39ff.) also suggest that directly-deliberative polyarchy could work very effectively if it was employed in the context of a ‘default penalty’, which would be the threat that policy solutions would be sought by institutions of traditional policy making if directly-deliberative polyarchy failed.10 They believe that this threat would be so powerful that participants in directly-deliberative polyarchy would ‘deliberate in good faith’ to prevent the default penalty, which they perceived as completely unworkable (Sabel and Zeitlin 2007, p. 41). Whilst this appears to be an attractive idea, greater experience with these modes of governance and more empirical research is required to reveal whether their promises will deliver. The main argument I wish to put forward here is that even if elements of directly-deliberative polyarchy that complement other established modes of EU governance might be a workable and justifiable solution, directlydeliberative polyarchy is more difficult to justify in the area of European social policy. The main reasoning behind this view is that in the areas covered by the Open Method of Coordination, no such ‘default penalties’ exist because the EU does not have any further authority in these fields. In addition, since the areas covered by the OMC concern long-standing traditions of social policy at the national level and therefore touch upon core values and interests related to redistributive policies, it is difficult to perceive how the EU’s informal role as agenda setter can be democratically justified if the EU and national parliaments do not play a stronger role in this process.11 In other words, the Open Method of Coordination causes problems as it does not fulfil the complex requirements regarding the relationship between democracy and social policy, and the model of directly-deliberative polyarchy is not sufficient to legitimize this sort of arrangement. The final section of this chapter is concerned with presenting potential
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reform options in relation to the Open Method of Coordination with the aim of strengthening its transparency and accountability and providing a framework of parliamentary democracy.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: EMBEDDING THE OMC IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY Social policy in Europe is increasingly organized in a multi-level governance system which can neither be reverted to a system of nationally independent and autonomous welfares states nor transformed into a European super welfare state. This chapter argues that the new multi-level governance framework poses considerable problems for the relationship between democracy and social policy (see introduction), both in terms of a ‘democracy deficit’ in EU social policy making and European social policy’s restricted capacity to generate output legitimacy. Regarding the first dimension, one can claim that due to its potentially redistributive effects, social policy requires particularly sound procedures of democratic policy making, providing for public discussion, will formation and input legitimacy. These requirements are arguably fulfilled to a certain degree in the areas of binding regulatory and redistributive EU social policy, because the European Parliament has the right of codecision in most of these areas, such as the adoption of directives on health and safety at the workplace,12 coordination of social security systems13 and the implementation of the European Social Fund.14 One important exception is the Common Agricultural Policy, which has redistributive effects, but in which the EU Parliament has no right of co-decision. Strengthening the EU Parliament’s role in this area would therefore present a significant improvement in terms of democratic legitimacy. The democratic quality of binding EU social policy would be further enhanced if other issues relating to the EU’s democracy deficit could be tackled, such as the lack of ‘contestation for leadership and policy’ (Follesdal and Hix 2006). As demonstrated in the above discussion regarding the OMC, the requirements of input legitimacy, transparency and accountability are less sufficiently fulfilled in relation to this new governance method. This conclusion will therefore concentrate on reform options in this area. With regard to the second dimension, the role of social policy for the legitimacy of political power and the functioning of democracy, the dilemma is that European integration and the internationalization of the economy generally put national welfare states under pressure. Whilst this would not be a problem for output legitimacy if electorates were content with declining welfare states, it can prove problematic if there is a stable
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or increasing demand for public social security provisions against a backdrop of flexible, rapidly changing labour markets and ageing societies. Nonetheless, the national welfare state cannot be rebuilt at the supranational level. However, welfare state retrenchment potentially limits output legitimacy or even poses a threat to the stability of democracies due to increasing social inequality and conflicts. The OMC has been developed as a response to these dilemmas of European social policy, but its compromise character cannot overcome these fundamental tensions. One radical proposal may involve the abolition of the OMC based on the argument that it is not effective enough in strengthening social Europe and that more is gained by leaving the responsibility for social policy with the member states. However, despite its numerous inherent difficulties, the abolition of the OMC would be a step in the wrong direction. The need to coordinate social policies at the EU level is undisputable, and therefore energies should concentrate on improving the OMC’s design. The model of directly-deliberative polyarchy has been developed in order to theorize and justify the OMC. As previously discussed, directlydeliberative polyarchy stems from relevant observations regarding the economic and social context of contemporary democracy and social policy. However, the model presents a radical departure from principles such as the rule of law and representative democracy. This chapter therefore argues that an ideal-type directly-deliberative polyarchy would not be a viable and appropriate model for national or European democracy and social policy. However, directly-deliberative polyarchy could provide useful elements within the EU’s multi-layered polity if it is firmly embedded in the principles and institutions of representative democracy and the rule of law. From this perspective, an alternative reform option consists of making a set of very general OMC objectives legally binding through their adoption by the co-decision procedure at the EU level. Member state governments would then be obliged to implement these aims. Authors such as Habermas, Offe and Preuss would argue that this could be legitimized by a new concept of European citizenship which is not so much based on assumptions about shared ‘European’ characteristics as centred around the recognition of the requirement for mutual solidarity among the citizens from the various member states (Habermas 2001; Habermas [1998] 2001; Offe and Preuss 2006). This concept is very attractive and may have future political relevance if it is accepted and promoted by key European political actors. Yet it is likely that policy makers and citizens would currently object to its employment in justifications of legally binding OMC. However, a range of proposals can be made to improve the transparency,
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accountability and input legitimacy of the OMC. For example, even if OMC objectives are adopted as non-binding guidelines, the European Parliament should have the right of co-decision whilst the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Council should be consulted in the adoption of these objectives. This would enhance the OMC’s publicity and enable open political discussion regarding its goals. Council discussions preceding the adoption of OMC objectives should be transcribed and made publicly available in order to strengthen the transparency and accountability of national ministers to their national parliaments and electorates. The same should apply to discussions in the Social Protection Committee and Employment Committee as they undertake crucial decisions concerning quantitative indicators and targets within the OMC. Moreover, whilst the current situation provides no political consensus for rendering OMC objectives legally binding, there could be legally binding rules regarding the decision-making procedures of OMC objectives at the EU, as well as national, levels. OMC processes at the national level could, for example, require national governments to consult with national parliaments before the objectives and guidelines are adopted at the EU level. Most national governments already consult with other key political actors such as social partners, NGOs and sub-national authorities about the OMC objectives. However, governments should be required to provide detailed and publicly accessible information concerning the actors involved as well as the methods of their involvement. This may include whether they were consulted or allowed to contribute parts to the national reports or programmes and the ways in which governments are obliged to respond to their proposals. Furthermore, if OMC guidelines and objectives are decided within the ‘normal’ processes of decision making at the EU level, national parliaments should in turn be obliged to discuss whether, and if so, how, these objectives could be linked to national policy making. This would provide a basis for a public and transparent discussion regarding the link between EU social policies and national policy making. The obligation for this discussion does not imply that national parliaments must adopt the objectives. Parliaments would be allowed to reject an implementation of OMC objectives after providing justifications raised in the debate. This process would limit the current dominance of executives in the OMC process and strengthen the legislative branch of policy making. This discussion remains an initial inconclusive draft of proposals and is intended only to illustrate the ways in which transparency, accountability and parliamentary democracy could be strengthened in relation to the OMC. Additional theoretical and empirical research is required in order
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to examine ways in which directly-deliberative polyarchy could be embedded in representative democracy to establish a new and viable relationship between democracy and social policy in the EU.
NOTES 1. Policies are output-legitimate when they meet the interests of the citizens affected by these policies, that is, when these policies are effective in the sense that they contribute to solve problems (‘politics for the people’). Policies are input-legitimate when they reflect the will of the citizens, which is normally provided for by procedural arrangements related to the majority rule (‘politics by the people’) (Scharpf 1999, pp. 6ff.). 2. Wincott (2006, pp. 749f.) concludes from analysing Eurobarometer surveys that citizens rate the welfare state positively in countries with more generous welfare arrangements whilst they complain about the (malfunctioning of the) welfare state in countries where provision is weak (mainly Southern and Eastern European member states). Taylor-Gooby (2004) maintains that although European citizens are becoming more sympathetic to open market principles, they still support ‘mild egalitarianism’. 3. When I use the term European social policy, I am referring to the interplay between EU and national social policies, whilst EU social policy denotes only social policies adopted at the EU level. 4. A similar argument has been made by De Swaan to explain the establishment of the ‘caring’ welfare state. He claims that the welfare state was a project of the ‘rich’, who are dependent on the ‘poor’ to stabilize public order and labour productivity (De Swaan 1988, p. 3). 5. Some recent studies explain declining support for the EU as being caused by high unemployment and social inequality (Nissen 2004, p. 23; Moreno and McEwen 2005, p. 8); this can be interpreted as a lack of output legitimacy provided by the EU. 6. This might not be the default mode of OMC usage at the domestic level, but there is evidence that some governments use the OMC in this way, for example in Germany (Büchs 2007), the Netherlands (Visser 2005, p. 199) and France (Erhel et al. 2005, p. 217). 7. See the new regulations on the European Social Fund (European Parliament/Council 2006), preamble paras 7, 13, 15, Articles 4.1, 4.4 and 4.5. 8. In the literature, different variants of directly-deliberative polyarchy exist. This model is sometimes also called directly-deliberative democracy (Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002, p. 295), democratic experimentalism (Eberlein and Kerwer 2004) or experimentalist governance (Sabel and Zeitlin 2007). 9. However, Cohen and Sabel (1997, pp. 317f.) use the concept of ‘polyarchy’ in Dahl’s (1989) sense of a political system in which basic democratic principles are guaranteed, such as right of suffrage for all adult citizens, right of assembly and access to information and the election of the government. 10. Sabel and Zeitlin refer to the Florence Electricity Forum as an example (2007, p. 40). 11. This view stands in stark contrast to Smismans’ (2005, pp. 121f.) judgement regarding the OMC, claiming that this method is still far too centralized to fulfil the criteria of directly-deliberative polyarchy. 12. According to Articles 137, 1a and 2b Treaty of the European Community (TEC). 13. Article 42 TEC. 14. According to Articles 148 and 162 TEC. However, the assent procedure applies to decisions on the general structural fund framework; see Article 161 TEC.
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REFERENCES Bellamy, R. (2006), ‘Still in deficit: rights, regulation, and democracy in the EU’, European Law Journal, 12 (6), 725–742. Büchs, M. (2007), New Governance in European Social Policy: The Open Method of Coordination, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Büchs, M. (2008), ‘The Open Method of Coordination as a “two-level game”’, Policy and Politics, 36 (1), 21–37. Cohen, J. and C. Sabel (1997), ‘Directly-deliberative polyarchy’, European Law Journal, 3 (4), 313–342. Dahl, R. (1989), Democracy and its Critics, New Haven: Yale University Press. De Swaan, A. (1988), In Care of the State: Health Care, Eduction and Welfare in Europe and the USA in the Modern Era, Cambridge: Polity. Dorf, M. C. and C. F. Sabel (1998), ‘A constitution of democratic experimentalism’, Columbia Law Review, 98 (2), 267–473. Eberlein, B. and D. Kerwer (2004), ‘New governance in the European Union: a theoretical perspective’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 42 (1), 121–142. Erhel, C., L. Mandin and B. Palier (2005), ‘The leverage effect: the Open Method of Coordination in France’, in J. Zeitlin, P. Pochet and L. Magnusson (eds), The Open Method of Co-ordination in Action: The European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies, Brussels: Peter Lang, pp. 217–247. European Commission (2006), European Employment and Social Policy, Special Eurobarometer 261, available under: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ archives/ebs/ebs261_en.pdf, download 29 May 2007. European Council (1997), Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg Extraordinary European Council Meeting on Employment, 20 and 21 November 1997, available under: www.europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference5DOC/97 /23&format5DOC*aged5/?>language5EN?>5guiLanguage5en, download 12 December 2008. Follesdal, A. (2006), ‘Survey article: the legitimacy deficits of the European Union’, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 14 (4), 441–468. Follesdal, A. and S. Hix (2006), ‘Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: a response to Majone and Moravcsik’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44 (3), 533–562. Fossum, J. E. and A. J. Menéndez (2005), Democratic Constitution-Making: Reflections on the European Experiment, ARENA working paper No 18, May 2005, available under: http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/workingpapers2005/papers/wp05_18.pdf, download 28 May 2007. Friedrich, D. (2006), ‘Policy process, governance and democracy in the EU: the case of the Open Method of Co-ordination on social inclusion in Germany’, Policy and Politics, 34 (2), 367–383. Fung, A. and E. O. Wright (2001), ‘Deepening democracy: innovations in empowered participatory governance’, Politics and Society, 29 (1), 5–41. Gerstenberg, O. and C. F. Sabel (2002), ‘Directly-deliberative polyarchy: an institutional ideal for Europe?’ In C. Joerges and R. Dehousse (eds), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 289–341. Habermas, J. ([1998] 2001), The Postnational Constellation. In: J. Habermas, Political Essays, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 58–112.
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Habermas, J. (2001), ‘Why Europe needs a constitution’, New Left Review, 11 (Sep./Oct.), 5–26. Held, D. (1995), Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press. Jacobsson, K. (2004), ‘Between deliberation and discipline: soft governance in EU employment policy’. In U. Mörth (ed.), Soft Law in Governance and Regulation: An Interdisciplinary Analysis, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar. Joerges, C. and F. Rödl (2004), ‘Social Market Economy’ as Europe’s Social Model? EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2004/8, Florence: European University Institute. Kröger, S. (2006), When Learning Hits Politics, or Social Policy Coordination Left to the Administrations and the NGOs? European Integration Online Papers, available under http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop/article/viewFile/2006_003a/18, download 17 June 2006. Majone, G. (1996), ‘Which social policy for Europe?’ In Y. Mény, P. Muller and J.-L. Quermonne (eds), Adjusting to Europe: The Impact of the European Union on National Institutions and Policies, London/New York: Routledge, pp. 123–136. Majone, G. (1998), ‘Europe’s “democracy deficit”: The question of standards’, European Law Journal, 4 (1), 5–28. Manin, B., A. Przeworski and S.C. Stokes (1999), ‘Introduction’. In A. Przeworski, S. C. Stokes and B. Manin (eds), Democracy, Accountability and Representation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–26. Moreno, L. and N. McEwen (2005), ‘Exploring the territorial politics of welfare’. In N. McEwen and L. Moreno (eds), The Territorial Politics of Welfare, London/ New York: Routledge, pp. 1–40. Nissen, S. (2004), ‘Europäische Identität und die Zukunft Europas’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 38, 21–29. Offe, C. and U. K. Preuss (2006), The Problem of Legitimacy in the European Polity: Is Democratization the Answer? Webpapers on Constitutionalism and Governance beyond the State, No 6, Year 2006, available under http://www. bath.ac.uk/esml/conWEB/Conweb%20papers-filestore/conweb6-2006.pdf, accessed 10 March 2008. Rokkan, S. (1999), ‘State formation, nation building, and mass politics in Europe’. In P. Flora, S. Kuhnle and D. Urwin (eds), The Theory of Stein Rokkan, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sabel, C. F. and J. Zeitlin (2003), ‘Active welfare, experimental governance, pragmatic constitutionalism: the new transformation of Europe’, Draft prepared for the International Conference of the Hellenic Presidency of the European Union, The Modernization of the European Social Model and EU Policies and Instruments, Ioannina, Greece, 22–23 May. Sabel, C. F. and J. Zeitlin (2007), Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the European Union, European Governance Paper No. C-07-02 (EUROGOV), May 10 2007, available under http://www. connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-07-02.pdf, download 21 May 2007. Scharpf, F. W. (1997), ‘Economic integration, democracy and the welfare state’, Journal of European Public Policy, 4 (1), 18–36.
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Scharpf, F. W. (1999), Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford/ New York: Oxford University Press. Scheuermann, W. E. (2004), ‘Democratic experimentalism or capitalist synchronization? Critical reflections on directly-deliberative polyarchy’, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 17 (1), 101–127. Smismans, S. (2005), ‘Reflexive law in support of directly deliberative polyarchy: reflexive deliberate polyarchy as a normative frame for the OMC’, in O. D. Schutter and S. Deakin (eds) Social Rights and Market Forces: Is the Open Coordination of Employment and Social Policies the Future of Social Europe? Brussels: Bruylant, pp. 99–144. Streeck, W. (1996), ‘Neo-voluntarism: a new European social policy regime?’ in G. Marks, F. W. Scharpf, P. C. Schmitter and W. Streeck (eds), Governance in the European Union, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 64–94. Taylor-Gooby, P. (2004), ‘Open markets and welfare values: welfare values, inequality and social change in the silver age of the welfare state’, European Societies, 6 (1), 29–48. Trubek, D. and L. Trubek (2005), ‘The Open Method of Coordination and the debate over “hard” and “soft” law’. In J. Zeitlin, P. Pochet and L. Magnusson (eds), The Open Method of Co-ordination in Action: The European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies, Brussels: Peter Lang, pp. 83–103. Visser, J. (2005), ‘The Open Method of Coordination as selective amplifier for national strategies of reform: what the Netherlands want to learn from Europe’. In J. Zeitlin, P. Pochet and L. Magnusson (eds), The Open Method of Co-ordination in Action: The European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies, Brussels: Peter Lang, pp.173–215. Weiler, J. H. H. (2002), ‘A constitution for Europe? Some hard choices’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (4), 563–580. Wincott, D. (2006), ‘European political development, regulatory governance, and the European Social Model: the challenge of substantive legitimacy’, European Law Journal, 12 (6), 743–763. Zeitlin, J. (2005), ‘The Open Method of Coordination in action: theoretical promise, empirical realities, reform strategy’. In J. Zeitlin, P. Pochet and L. Magnusson (eds), The Open Method of Co-ordination in Action: The European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies, Brussels: Peter Lang, pp. 447–503.
4.
Combating social exclusion in the European Union Even Nilssen
INTRODUCTION Historically social policy has been covered by the principle of subsidiarity and has thus been a national responsibility within the EU. This is still the case, but since the late 1980s, questions concerning poverty and social exclusion have gained increasingly more attention at the supranational level. This may be due to the perceived problems of globalization, an ageing population, unemployment and the establishment of the internal market (Trubek and Trubek 2005; Lopez-Santana 2006). The discourse on ‘social exclusion’ originally came to prominence in EU discussion in the late 1980s in preference to the language of ‘poverty’, due to the hostility of some national governments to talking about poverty and to the adoption of the language by the research community to define a research agenda for the analysis and measurement of the multidimensional phenomenon of exclusion (Armstrong 2005). Combating social exclusion became an important goal at the EU level after the Lisbon Council of March 2000, and later that year the new Open Method of Coordination was launched to address this field of social policy. This method differs primarily from the traditional Community method in a lack of binding rules and sanctions in the implementation of policy. OMC is primarily a system of mutual learning based on objectives, guidelines (in some areas), indicators, national action plans, peer reviews and benchmarking. This chapter concentrates on the content of this process in the field of social exclusion, focusing primarily on the Joint Reports from the Commission and the Council. What are the founding ideas, how do they relate to each other and how is a coordinated social inclusion strategy in the European Union legitimized? Hence, the aim of the chapter is not to analyse the effect of OMC inclusion on national policy making, but to elaborate on the kinds of ideas that the EU is attempting to spread through the process of the Open Method of Coordination in this field of social policy. 72
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STUDYING IDEAS AND DISCOURSES: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK As demonstrated in the introduction to this volume, the literature on the globalization and Europeanization of welfare states has primarily focused on economic and technological forces and less on the transmission of political ideas and values, or more-or-less directly expressed systems of meaning and knowledge. Ideas and policy discourses are an underresearched topic within the literature on international organizations and policy transfer (Campbell 1998, 2002; Stone 2004). Where such research has been undertaken, these studies have demonstrated the significance of discourse formation and ideas for policy solutions (Weir and Skocpol 1985; Hall 1992; Ervik and Kuhnle 1993; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1996; Schmidt 2000; Beland 2006; SeeleibKaiser and Fleckenstein 2007). This chapter primarily concentrates on the different ideas that form the basis of the EU discourse on combating poverty and social exclusion. What kinds of ideas are permeating the EU Social Inclusion Strategy and the Open Method of Coordination in the field of social inclusion and social protection, and how are they related to each other? To study ideas implies that attention is directed to theories, conceptual models, norms, world views, frames, principled beliefs and the like, rather than self-interest (Campbell 2002). Ideas may have both a normative and a cognitive foundation. Following Campbell (2002) I will make a distinction between four kinds of ideas: Cognitive frameworks (which Campbell calls cognitive paradigms and world views); normative frameworks; frames; and programmatic ideas. Cognitive frameworks are what we may call cognitive background ideas, which policy makers more-or-less take for granted when they are making policy choices. We may speak of cognitive paradigms and theoretical analyses that specify cause and effect and limit the range of alternatives policy makers are likely to perceive as useful (op. cit, p. 22). It may for instance be different kinds of macro-economic theories such as Keynesianism or supply-side economics. Normative frameworks are also background or taken-for-granted ideas, but they are different from cognitive frameworks because they concern norms rather than theories about causes and effects. They primarily contain assumptions about values, attitudes, identities, morals, ethics and other ‘collectively’ shared expectations. Policy makers may operate according to a logic of social or ideological appropriateness rather than a logic of instrumentality or consequentiality. Neo-liberal thinking may for instance function as a normative (ideological) framework for policy
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makers rather than a cognitive macro-economic theory about economic causes and effects. Frames are orientated towards how policy makers present policies in order to make them politically acceptable. These are not background ideas, but (normative or cognitive) ideas put in the forefront of the political argumentation process. They concern how a certain policy or policy proposal is justified in public. For instance, the concept of economic globalization was used as a frame to justify shifts towards conservative, neo-liberal policies in many countries during the 1980s and 1990s (Campbell 2002, p. 27). Programmatic ideas are precise instrumental (cognitive) ideas that facilitate policy making among elites by specifying how to solve particular problems. While cognitive paradigms are ideas which provide an overarching understanding of the world, and what political institutions and policy instruments ought to be like in order to achieve certain goals (they are not explicitly referred to in the policy process), programmatic ideas “are more precise guidelines about how already-existing institutions and instruments should be used in specific situations according to the principles of wellestablished paradigms” (Campbell 2002, p. 28). Changes in policy may, for instance, stem from new programmatic ideas or a rediscovering of old ideas. In studying the EU discourse on social exclusion, programmatic ideas will certainly be in the forefront of our attention. Another concept which seeks to grasp the ideational aspects of policy making, and which is commonly used in the literature, is the concept of ‘policy discourses’. Following Taylor-Gooby and Daguerre (2002) policy discourses may be defined as: coherent systems of ideas that link normative judgements about policy goals to practical accounts of the policies likely to reach them. Such discourses may legitimate particular policy direction to the extent that they reflect widely held values. (p. 6)
This does not imply another analytical perspective, but the concept of policy discourses is useful for several reasons. First, a policy discourse may help to link together different kinds of ideas, for instance normative frameworks and programmatic ideas. Second, it focuses on the relationships between normative (and cognitive I would add) judgements about goals and more instrumental policy ideas. Different ideas may be attached to certain goals and different goals may be attached to certain ideas. Third, as Schmidt (2001) has pointed out, policy discourses consist of both a set of policy ideas and an interactive process of policy construction and communication. The first dimension contains the cognitive and normative content of the discourse, which in our case relates to the different kinds
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of ideas accounted for above. The second, communicative, dimension is closely attached to what we called framing ideas, or more precisely how different policies are framed (by providing a common language) in order to persuade the public and other relevant actors that the policies developed are necessary (cognitive function) and appropriate (normative function) (Schmidt 2001, pp. 249–50). Focusing on how different policy ideas are framed may also contribute to explaining why they are widespread or accepted (or why they are not). The general approach in this chapter is what Beckman (2005) calls an “idea-centred” perspective. This means that the analysis is directed towards arguments rather than the different actors who offer them. The focus of attention is the content and relationship between ideas in the EU battle against social exclusion. It is, however, important to note that ideas do not develop and spread in a social vacuum. At the supranational level attempts are made to spread ideas through the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), which of course entails a close relationship between the EU supranational level and the member states. Before turning to the ideational analyses, I will give a brief account of the institutional dynamics of OMC inclusion.
THE INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF OMC INCLUSION Traditionally, social exclusion policies have not been seen as positive policies in their own right at the EU level (Daguerre and Larsen undated). Until the 1990s, such questions were given little attention due to the revival of liberal ideology and the idea that social policy should above all help to complete the internal market. The Social Rights Charter of 1989 sought to guarantee minimum standards of social assistance within the EU. The fourth anti-poverty programme was vetoed in 1994 as member states argued that poverty should be dealt with at the national level (that is, the ‘subsidiarity’ argument). At the Lisbon Council of March 2000, however, the member states agreed that they should coordinate their policies on combating poverty and social exclusion on the basis of an Open Method of Coordination.1 This was seen in the light of the Union’s overall strategic goal of becoming, by 2010, “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”. The Lisbon European Council agreed on the need to take steps that would have a decisive impact on the eradication of poverty by 2010. The Council stated that:
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The role of international organizations in social policy Investing in people and developing an active and dynamic welfare state will be crucial both to Europe’s place in the knowledge economy and for ensuring that the emergence of this new economy does not compound the existing social problems of unemployment, social exclusion and poverty. (quoted in O’Connor 2005, p. 346)
The main objectives set for the OMC inclusion process were: 1) to facilitate participation in employment and access resources, rights, goods and services for all; 2) to prevent the risk of social exclusion; 3) to help the most vulnerable; and 4) to mobilize all relevant bodies in the process. The European Council relaunched the Lisbon process in March 2005 and sharpened the context into which work on social protection and inclusion must fit. The revised Lisbon strategy concentrates on policies to boost growth and employment. At the same time, reflecting the European Council’s vision of “growth and employment-making for social cohesion”, policies within the revised Lisbon agenda should contribute to social cohesion and inclusion (COM (2005) 706). The application of OMC inclusion consists among other things of a process involving the submission of National Action Plans (NAP inclusion) on the part of the member states and their assessment by the Commission and the Social Protection Committee (SPC), resulting in a Joint Report of the Council and the Commission. In February and March 2001 the Commission held bilateral meetings with each member state in order to assist them in drawing up their National Action Plans (Ferrera, Matsaganis and Sacchi 2002). The first NAP inclusions were worked out during 2001 and the next were available in 2003. Currently, the NAPs2 are worked out annually as part of the streamlining of social inclusion and social protection, pensions, health and long-term care. The aim of ‘streamlining’ was twofold: to create a stronger process, and to integrate better with the Lisbon process, in particular the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) and the European Employment Strategy (COM (2005) 706). The Social Protection Committee plays an important role at the supranational level in the field of social protection. The SPC was developed in spring 2002 from a high-level working group for exchange of information in the field of poverty and social exclusion. This committee is, in contrast to the implementation committees (the Comitology under the Commission) and the preparatory committees (under the Council), formally both under the Commission and the Council; it has, among other things, the overall responsibility for developing indicators in the field of social exclusion. Most members of the SPC belong to ministries for social affairs or labour market ministries in the member states (high-level bureaucrats). There is, however, also a sub-group – the indicator group – which consists mainly of experts, primarily in economics and statistics. This group has
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continued working over the past years to refine the original list of ‘Laeken indicators’. Membership of the indicator group and of the SPC mostly does not overlap. The SPC is primarily a deliberative political group oriented towards building consensus among the member states in the field of social protection, pensions, health and long-term care. The committee works closely with the Employment Committee (EMCO) and (less closely) with the Economic Policy Committee (EPC). Focusing on the actors of the OMC process, De la Porte and Pochet (2002) note that the member states are the key players and the European Commission is the orchestrator, influencing the game in a more subtle manner than in its former role as a fully-fledged political player. The Council is important in setting the overall objectives for action to combat poverty, while the SPC participates together with the Commission in the assessment of the NAPs and has the main responsibility for the preparation of social indicators. The European Parliament and the European Court of Justice play minor roles, if any role at all.
THE BASIC IDEAS OF THE EU SOCIAL INCLUSION STRATEGY We will now turn to the analysis of the basic ideas permeating the EU battle against poverty and social exclusion – what is generally called the Social Inclusion Strategy (SIS) – principally concentrating on the Joint Reports produced by the Commission and the Council, as mentioned above. Each Joint Report is primarily an assessment of developments in the member states based on the National Action Plans (NAPs) and the central objectives developed at the EU level. Certain policies in the member states are highlighted and, although benchmarking is not very well developed in the field of social inclusion, highlighting and descriptions of best practices may be said to contain an element of benchmarking. The reports represent the basic documents in the general (written) communication between the supranational and the national level within the process of the Open Method of Coordination, and are thus the main source in exploring the founding ideas of this process. However, other EU documents will also be utilized in order to place the Joint Reports in a more general EU policy context. The Primary Discourse: Active Social Inclusion through Work The most striking discourse in the EU battle against poverty and social exclusion is what we may call the ‘active social inclusion discourse’ (ASID). Generally, this discourse seeks to strengthen the relationship
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between traditional social policy (distribution/redistribution) and labour market policy (Kildal 2001; Lødemel and Trickey 2001). In the Scandinavian countries, active labour market policies (ALMP) have a long history. In western Europe the idea of an “active society” has also become more important in the field of social policy and labour market policy since the early 1990s, due among other things to high unemployment rates and an increasing number of people dependent on different kinds of public benefits. ‘Policy makers have been concerned with the notion that “passive” benefits provided to workless people contribute to the rigidities that complicate macroeconomic policy and imply slow adjustment to changing economic realities” (Lødemel and Trickey 2001, p. 12). This is reflected in the Joint Reports: “Member States are increasingly adopting “active inclusion” as the preferred route to promoting social and labour market integration” (Joint Report 2007, p. 52). At the EU level, the dominant motto of the Social Inclusion Strategy is closely linked to the European Employment Strategy, and can be expressed as: “the best safeguard against social exclusion is a job” (see de la Porte and Pochet 2002). Employment is considered a key factor for social inclusion, not only because it generates income but also because it can promote social participation and personal development. In the Joint Report (2004) some measures to promote employment emphasized in the National Action Plans are highlighted: ●
●
●
●
Several member states promote active ageing by means of improving the working conditions for older workers, reducing early retirement schemes or stimulating demand on the part of employers as well as labour supply. Most member states refer to the active involvement of employers in the creation of more open and inclusive labour markets. Besides the more traditional instrument of employment subsidies to employers, this is done mainly by employment campaigns in favour of specific target groups, particularly disabled people and migrants, measures to stimulate social corporate responsibility, and general actions focused on combating discrimination. Member states offer personalized guidance to the unemployed or job seekers, which means that an individually-tailored combination of measures is used to create pathways towards employment. Various approaches concerning families are identified – the extension of child facilities, the provision of financial support for families with young children, the creation of family-friendly working environments, the increase in flexible or part-time working patterns, reviewing the parental leave and maternity schemes and raising
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awareness of employers about the importance of creating familyfriendly working environments. Promoting employment stands as the main objective in fighting poverty and social exclusion. This trend is followed up in succeeding Joint Reports. The new Employment Guidelines (integrated guidelines package 2005– 2008) address the problem of integration of those furthest from the labour market by encouraging member states to: introduce work incentives in support of preventive and active labour market measures, including early identification of needs, job search assistance, guidance and training as part of personalized action plans; provide the social services needed to support the labour market inclusion of disadvantaged people; and contribute to social and territorial cohesion and the eradication of poverty (Integrated guideline no. 9). Furthermore, the above guidelines propose a continuous review of tax and benefit systems, including an effort to make work pay and to ensure adequate levels of protection (COM (2006) 44). The Joint Report 2007 states that: Member States acknowledge more clearly that economic and labour market reforms must contribute to strengthening cohesion and social policies must support economic and employment growth. Active inclusion policies can increase labour supply and strengthen society’s cohesiveness. Increasing child wellbeing will help more people to develop their full potential and contribute fully to society and the economy. (Joint Report 2007, p. 4)
On the supply side of the labour market, the report emphasizes the need to equip individuals with the skill and knowledge required by today’s labour market, to provide them with the right incentives to participate actively in society and to support them in their job search. On the demand side, antidiscrimination and labour law, and financial incentives for employers to hire (for example, wage subsidies) are mentioned. In 2006 the Commission claimed that successful policies to make work pay must find a proper balance within what is called the “challenge triangle” of increasing work incentives, alleviating poverty and avoiding unsustainable budgetary cost (COM (2006) 44). Active social inclusion implies combining three elements: 1. 2. 3.
a link to the labour market through job opportunities or vocational training; income support at a level that is sufficient for people to have a dignified life; and better access to services that may help to remove some of the hurdles encountered by some individuals and their families in entering
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mainstream society, thereby supporting their reinsertion into employment (for example, counselling, healthcare, childcare, lifelong learning to remedy educational disadvantages). Thus, the core elements of the programmatic ideas of the ASID may be said to contain: ●
● ●
active labour market policies to tackle lack of employability – in particular through investment in education and training and job counselling (for example, targeted human capital policies); “make work pay” and financial incentives to work (for example, interaction between tax and benefits); non-financial incentives and the removal of social obstacles to entry into the labour market (for example, reconciliation of work and family life).
Such policies embrace both incentive and deterrent measures to further self-reliance to work, for example, supply-side measures to help ease the transition from benefit to work and to make work pay, including voluntary training programmes, arrangements to support childcare and in-work benefits (incentives), and tighter conditional rules and stricter eligibility criteria within social assistance provision (deterrents) (Lødemel and Trickey 2001, p. xii). Kildal (2001) distinguishes between three kinds of activation policies: Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP), Workfare and Welfare to Work. ALMP may be seen as the traditional Scandinavian policy for integrating people into the labour market (a remedy for full employment) and may involve both universal and selective instruments (op. cit, p. 2). Traditionally, these policies have been founded on voluntary agreements and rights rather than obligation and coercion though they include both carrots and sticks. Recipients of (universal) unemployment benefit are for instance required to actively seek work. Workfare, which has been particularly important in the US, implies programmes which oblige able-bodied recipients to work in return for their benefits on terms inferior to comparative work in the labour market, and are essentially linked to the lowest tier of public maintenance systems (op. cit, p. 3). Welfare to Work is exemplified by the Labour (UK) Government’s “New Deal” programmes, which imply a partnership between public and private sectors and an offer of four options for certain groups of welfare recipients (aimed at those most at risk of social exclusion): a six-month subsidized private-sector job, six months with a non-profit organization, paid training or education (for those without basic qualifications), or work in a new ‘environment
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taskforce’ (Kildal 2001, p. 4). Welfare to Work shares with Workfare the work requirement and the compulsory element in the lowest safety net and there is a coercive element to all three activation policies. However, it is only Workfare that lacks training elements and options and that implies inferior working conditions (op. cit, p. 4). There exist, of course, different mixes of these kinds of policies at the national level in the EU (see Clasen 2005; Lødemel and Trickey 2001). However, there seems to have been a development in the member states towards a stronger use of work requirements (obligations) in this field of social policy. In many member states the entitlement to benefits has been made conditional on active job search, availability for work or participation in training. In some instances, this takes the form of an individual contract, stipulating the duties of the recipient in terms of participation in different activation schemes (COM (2006) 44). “Active inclusion emerges as a powerful means of promoting the social and labour market integration of the most disadvantaged. Increased conditionality in accessing benefits is a major component” (Joint Report 2007, p. 2). The Joint Report (2007), though, expresses a mild warning regarding this development “this must not push those unable to work further into social exclusion” and “more attention needs to be given to ensuring adequate levels of minimum income”. According to the report, the need to guarantee adequate minimum income levels receives insufficient attention in many of the National Strategy Reports (former NAPs). There are no indications in the documents that the EU on a supranational level is pursuing or recommending Workfare policies as defined above. Although activation seems to imply more conditions and coercion, it also contains educational measures, vocational training, and so on. Active social inclusion also implies “income support at a level that is sufficient for people to have a dignified life” (COM (2006) 44). People who are not able to work need access to ‘quality services’, although this concept is hardly elaborated on in the Joint Reports. The active social inclusion discourse touches upon some important normative assessments which are not part of the explicit framing of such policies at the supranational level and thus may be perceived as ideas constituting a normative framework of the discourse. The ASID is connected to a more general discourse on ‘rights and duties’. The idea of a ‘new welfare contract’ between the citizen and the state is salient in current western policy discourse, crossing national and political borders. The idea may be summarized as follows: access to welfare benefits is conditional on certain duties the citizen has to meet, above all, the duty to work (Kildal 1999; White 2003). Today, the idea of social rights, which has been coupled to the notion of citizenship, seems to
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give way to a principle of reciprocity,3 the essence of which is to combat a policy of ‘something for nothing’ by balancing benefits and contributions, rights and duties (Mead 1997, p. 221). The general idea of reciprocity is certainly not homogeneous and it may be expressed in many different ways in various policy areas. Active social inclusion represents but one such potential way, highlighting the citizen’s duty to participate in work-related activities in order to be supported by the welfare state. The language of the EU Social Inclusion Strategy (SIS) is only indirectly related to a language of morals or justice and ideas of individual rights and duties. It concerns questions of justice in the sense that the idea of combating social exclusion and poverty itself embraces moral assessments. In the SIS, however, the main concerns are to determine the best means to obtain the overall objective of social inclusion. The language of the Joint Reports is primarily instrumental. Active social inclusion is not justified in terms of rights and duties, but as the best way to achieve social inclusion for people at risk of poverty and social exclusion. However, the increasing emphasis on deterrents in social policies and the strengthening of labour market policies in the field of social inclusion implies a move towards emphasizing duties rather than rights. Using Levitas’s conceptual distinctions (1998) between a redistribution discourse (RED) which contains rights to resources and a social inclusion (through work) discourse (SID) which favours the obligation of self-reliance, there has been a strengthening of the latter discourse in European social policy. This does not mean, however, that activation and rights are logically antagonistic – one may have a right to activation services – but activation measures as presented in the Social Inclusion Strategy are more concerned with the material and social importance of self-reliance than the political–moral question of equal autonomy (see Weale 1983). In this context, an active citizenship becomes closely related to a person’s connection to the labour market. To receive public benefits implies a subordinated role (socially and morally) as a passive citizen. The Secondary Discourse: Targeting Social Services ‘Targeting’ is another important concept in the current international debate about the development of the welfare state (Gough et al. 1997; Hatland 2001). The concept of ‘targeting’ is generally understand to apply to the kinds of welfare policies emphasizing that welfare measures as far as possible should reach the persons in most need of help. Such a principle may contradict a principle of universality, although it does not necessarily do so (Kildal and Kuhnle 2005). Targeted policies may be complementary to universal ones for example in the form of supplementary measures for people with special needs (Titmuss 1968). Targeting will, however, imply
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some kind of differentiation of welfare contributions. It may be related to: 1) the concepts of inclusion and exclusion, which imply a differentiation of welfare contributions according to social groups (for example, membership), 2) a fine-meshed differentiation of social categories, for instance of the terms of eligibility or need, what we may call tailoring, and 3) the division between legal rights and local assessments of needs in the distribution of welfare services, for instance by the use of means testing (Nilssen 1999). Here targeting indicates the increase of the scope of the local (for example municipal or professional) use of discretion in the process of welfare distribution (Hatland 2003). The combination of target groups (inclusion), tailored according to needs and local discretion is a prominent part of the idea of targeting in the SIS. In the Joint Report of 2004, the trends in the member states are described as follows: ●
●
●
●
●
The NAPs particularly highlight the challenge of developing tailored and individualized supports to those who are most disadvantaged and distant from the labour market. While many measures are planned to continue and reinforce a universal welfare system, there are measures on specific areas and attempts to tackle the problems of the most vulnerable people. Some countries, whether or not they have universal welfare systems, adopt a more individualistic approach directed towards those at risk. More and more member states rely on packages where personalized guidance is offered to the unemployed or job seekers. An individually tailored combination of measures is used to create pathways towards employment. Member states continue to devote particular attention to delivery mechanisms as a means of developing more effective programmes. The trend towards greater decentralization continues.
Of course the most important general group at risk of poverty and social exclusion are those out of work (specifically long-term unemployed), or people with very low income. Within these general groups, a lot of different subgroups are mentioned as targets for different kinds of integration policies (immigrants, substance abusers, disabled people, lone mothers and so on). Currently at the EU level it seems that some groups are emphasized as specifically important: immigrants, ethnic minorities and disabled people. The European Council has for instance identified disabled people as one priority for increased labour market participation (Joint Report 2007). Tackling child poverty is another priority:
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The role of international organizations in social policy While the overall approach is universal, complementary measures targeting the most disadvantaged children and families are often parts of the strategy. Two aspects stand out: ensuring equal opportunities with respect to education, including early intervention, and promoting parents’ participation in the labour market. (Joint Report 2007 Supporting document 44 (SEC (2007) 329))
The ideas of ‘active social inclusion’ and ‘targeting’ are very closely integrated in the policies against poverty and social exclusion. This is also reflected in the future key priorities in the field of OMC inclusion, stated in the Joint Report of 2004: ●
●
●
● ● ●
promoting investment in and tailoring of active labour market measures to meet the needs of those who have the greatest difficulties in accessing employment; ensuring that social protection schemes are adequate and accessible for all and that they provide effective work incentives for those who can work; increasing the access of the most vulnerable and those most at risk of social exclusion to decent housing, quality health and lifelong learning opportunities; implementing a concerted effort to prevent early school leaving and to promote smooth transition from school to work; developing a focus on eliminating poverty and social exclusion among children; making a drive to reduce poverty and social exclusion in immigrants and ethnic minorities.
Targeting is interpreted as an effective strategy in the attempt to get people activated. Possible problems related to effectiveness, stigma and social control (see Marshall 1965; Titmuss 1974) are not discussed. However, the 2006 Joint Report asked for an assessment of the impact of some of the activation measures on the most vulnerable groups: The growing emphasis on benefit conditionality is not, to date, accompanied by systematic monitoring of its impact on the most vulnerable groups. The trend towards decentralising responsibility to the regional and/or local level has considerable potential for integrated delivery of social protection and social services. Again, however, the impact needs to be monitored. (Joint Report 2006, p. 5)
As a programmatic idea, targeting is considered to be secondary because it is submitted to the active social inclusion discourse, that is, it is primarily instrumental in helping the most vulnerable groups to be integrated into the labour market. Even tackling child poverty is primarily framed by such
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arguments, the main objectives being to hinder exclusion from work in the future and to help families by reconciling work and family life. Targeting may, however, be understood from a more ideological approach, that is, as a normative framework. As pointed out by Mkandawire (2005) ideologies play an important role in the choice of instruments used to address problems of poverty, inequality and insecurity: The technical nature of the argument cannot conceal the fact that, ultimately, value judgements matter not only with respect to determining the needy and how they are perceived, but also in attaching weights to the types of costs and benefits of approaches chosen. Such a weighting is often reflective of one’s ideological predispositions. (Mkandawire 2005, p. 1)
The normative idea of targeting is often seen as antagonistic to the idea of universalism, although on a logical level these concepts are not necessarily in opposition. As mentioned above we may find targeting within universalism, for example, extra resources to people in need within a universal benefit scheme. However, targeting may be seen as an alternative to universal measures. Such arguments often rest on an ideology where individual responsibility and a limited role for the state are put in the forefront. Mkandawire argues that it is this neo-liberal ideological position, which sprouted up in the 1980s and 1990s, that has set the limits on social policy and underpins the preferences for ‘user fees’, ‘means testing’ and market delivery of social services or ‘partnerships’ in their delivery. He also points out that this ideology “has also eliminated the equity concerns that have been central to all successful experiences of poverty eradication” (op. cit, p. 2). Of course many elements in the discourse on targeting might have a neo-liberal foundation, for instance market solutions and ‘partnerships’ in service delivery, and a comprehensive use of (professional) discretion might seem contradictory to universal rights (see Marshall 1965). However, the programmatic idea of targeting in the supranational context of the EU is not strongly attached to neo-liberal ideology as understood above. Firstly, targeting in its relation to active social inclusion does not imply a retrenchment of the state, at least not in the short run. Secondly, neo-liberal thinking is more closely linked to Levitas’s redistribution discourse (RED) (1998) than the social inclusion discourse (SID). Means testing, user fees and market delivery are instruments in the distribution of resources rather than instruments for social inclusion (through work) although the market may play a part in the latter types of policies too. Means testing and ‘work testing’ are oriented towards different considerations – the first to reach the ‘deserving poor’ in the distribution of resources, the second to integrate the ‘undeserving poor’ (that is, those who can work) into the
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labour market by the use of active policies (incentives and deterrents). In this way, targeting in relation to the active social inclusion discourse is considered to be a secondary discourse decoupled from independent normative ideas. This does not, however, mean that the use of such measures has no normative implications. The influence of a combination of more local discretion and benefit conditions may for instance infringe on citizen’s rights and legal security, and the differentiation of target groups will always be in danger of causing stigmatization. However, the idea of targeting in the Social Inclusion Strategy is primarily connected to perceptions of efficiency. As we have seen, the ASID is also presented in a purely instrumental way, although this discourse contributes to a greater extent than targeting to specifying the main goals in the EU fight against poverty and social exclusion (that is, social inclusion through work).
FRAMING THE FIGHT AGAINST SOCIAL EXCLUSION: THE DISCOURSE ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF THE WELFARE STATE The discourses on active social inclusion and targeting are of course attached to the general overarching goal of fighting poverty and social exclusion. Although these goals may be seen primarily as ethical or moral objectives (for example, as honouring our collective ethical obligation towards fellow human beings or as securing basic (moral) human rights), this is actually not the way these goals are framed in the process of the Social Inclusion Strategy. Another discourse plays an important role in the framing of activation and targeting as programmatic ideas, and it has a material–economical foundation rather than a normative–moral one; the discourse on the sustainability of the welfare state. This concerns the definition of problems that legitimize the use of certain programmatic ideas in European social policy. Generally, this discourse addresses questions about the social and economic challenges of the welfare state and whether these will undermine or cause the dismantling of the historical accomplishments of this state structure. In the modern form, the concerns about and critique of the welfare state include strong statements and certainties, for example that welfare state provisions: contradict the basic logic of capitalism; hinder the function of market mechanisms; create dependent people instead of making them autonomous; create disincentives to work; and create insurmountable fiscal burdens for the state because of uncontrollable costs, which in their turn would undermine economic growth. In the mid-1990s, Europe was experiencing an acute crisis with high
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unemployment rates, adverse demographic conditions, transformations of household structures and external threats such as intensified international competition (Lopez-Santana 2006, p. 481). Most European counties raised the question of the sustainability of their welfare states given such conditions: The matter in question was how to achieve coordination to reform and modernize existing social policies and institutions, and how to spread them where they have been missing (e.g. new member states), while maintaining and restructuring member states’ welfare institutions. Common problems suggested a supranational European-wide response. (Lopez-Santana 2006, pp. 481–82)
This was also an integrated part of the Lisbon process. The Lisbon Council of March 2000 emphasized the importance of investing in people and developing an active welfare state in order to relieve the existing problems of unemployment, social exclusion and poverty (O’Connor 2005). The relationship between growth and employment on the one hand, and social cohesion on the other, was reinforced by the European Council’s relaunching of the Lisbon process in March 2005. As mentioned above, the revised Lisbon strategy concentrates on policies to boost growth and employment (COM (2005) 706). At Hampton Court in October 2006, the Heads of State and Government discussed how social systems could be sustained in the face of three major challenges: global competition, the impact of new technologies and an ageing population. The conclusion called for “strengthening instruments like the EU’s integrated guidelines for growth and jobs, and reinforcing their interaction with more effective EU level co-ordination in the area of social protection” (Joint Report 2006, p. 3). One of the most conspicuous problems of the effort to modernize social protection systems in the EU has been changes in the characteristics of the ageing population in the European member states. The Commission presents the general problem like this: In the coming decades, the size and age-structure of Europe’s population will undergo dramatic changes due to low fertility rates, continuous increases in life expectancy and the retirement of the baby-boom generation. Ageing populations will pose major economic, budgetary and social challenges. (COM (2006) 574) In the renewed EU Sustainable Development Strategy, the June 2006 European Council proposed continued EU support to the effort by member states to modernize social protection systems and ensure their sustainability (ibid.)
The Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion (2005, p. 7) states:
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The role of international organizations in social policy In order to achieve their key role in European society and economy, social protection systems need to be responsive to wider social trends. The complex set of demographic, economic and societal factors that have driven and will continue to drive structural changes across the EU have put societal protection systems under pressure to adapt and modernise.
The Report maintains that the shifts in age structure of the population will have important implications for the full range of social policies. Social protection systems need to be shaped so as to respond to the economic and social needs of the future. Social inclusion policies are not only important to prevent and combat poverty “but may also contribute to increasing labour supply, through developing people’s capacity to work and action to make work pay” (Joint Report 2005, p. 8). The Joint Report (2004) concludes that several member states have also considered active ageing by way of improving the working conditions for older workers, reducing early retirement schemes or stimulating demand on the part of employers as well as labour supply: Faced with demographic ageing, all EU Member States must modernise their social protection systems in order to ensure adequate pension and healthcare provision in the future without jeopardising the stability of public finances. (Joint Report 2004, p. 51)
The EU’s sustainable Development Strategy (COM (2001) 265; COM (2005) 37) outlines long-term aspirations for European society and threats and challenges to be addressed if these challenges are to be met. Social policy is concerned with the aspirations of a cohesive society, and the challenges of a gap between rich and poor and of an ageing society. In the OMC process, however, the problem of sustainability is at the centre of attention: The perspective of sustainability places long-term dimensions of social protection and social inclusion policies firmly in the policy frame, giving added impetus to focus on child poverty, through which poverty and exclusion pass from generation to generation and Europe’s future human resources are diminished. (Joint Report 2006, p. 6)
Hence, even the priority of combating child poverty may be grasped from the sustainability discourse. When considering the content of the OMC inclusion process, it is important to see the programmatic ideas of active social inclusion and targeting in relation to such ideas of sustainability. The strength of the ASID, both at the national and supranational level in the EU, has to be understood in relation to the common interpretations of the sustainability problem in general and the problem of an ageing population in particular. This does
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The ideational foundation of the EU Social Inclusion Strategy General objectives Combating poverty and social exclusion
Framing ideas Programmatic ideas
The discourse on the sustainability of the welfare state The active social inclusion discourse (primary) The discourse on targeting (secondary)
not, however, mean that ethical and moral considerations are absent, but I will contend that the discourse on the sustainability of the welfare state constitutes the most prominent legitimizing idea in the framing of the EU fight against social exclusion.
FINAL REMARKS Combating poverty and social exclusion has become a part of the more general Lisbon process in the EU, and from 2000 the problems of social inclusion and social protection have been a part of the Open Method of Coordination. These questions are not directly attached to the legal processes of the EU (hard law), but are, rather, submitted to a softer and non-binding policy coordination within the Union. The analysis of this coordination is summarized in Table 4.1. By framing the fight against poverty and social exclusion with ideas founded in the discourse on the sustainability of the welfare state, the general objective is turned in a material and economic direction. The whole project becomes primarily a material-instrumental project with few references to any normative (moral or ethical) frameworks. Simultaneously, this may be seen as the reason for the relatively extensive support of the SIS among the member states. It would probably have been much more difficult to legitimize institutional action on a supranational level while framing such problems on purely normative arguments. The discourse on the sustainability of the welfare state is tied to the perception of more general economic problems in the member states (for example, due to globalization and an ageing population) which intersect across several policy fields at the EU level, entailing a strong acceptance of the need for coordinated action. This also implies a very close connection between social policy, employment policy and general economic policy. Social policy becomes to a large extent labour market policy. Active social inclusion and targeting appear to be the most dominant set of programmatic ideas within the framework of the Social Inclusion
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Strategy. This seems to involve a general strengthening of duties, conditionality, compulsion and local discretion in social policy. Although access to quality services for those who cannot work is considered important, the subject of redistribution is not very thoroughly elaborated on at the EU level. Hence, the strong focus on the ASID may obstruct a debate on redistribution. As Wacquant (1996) points out, it may require an unrealistically high level of economic growth to make employment by itself solve the problem of social exclusion. Although there are traces of neo-liberal thinking in the EU Social Inclusion Strategy (for example, the emphasis on work incentives), neoliberalism does not constitute the founding normative or cognitive frameworks of the process. There is no strong push towards a retrenchment of the state (although public savings is a long-term objective), workfare (as defined above), residual welfare measures or privatization. The strategy may rather be seen as a part of a growing attention within the European Employment Strategy to what is termed “flexicurity”. Flexicurity principles aim to combine sufficient flexible work contracts with effective policies to support labour market transitions. On the supply side this means: ● ●
●
Effective active labour market policies supporting transitions between jobs, as well as from unemployment and inactivity to jobs. Credible lifelong learning systems enabling workers to remain employable throughout their careers, by helping to cope with rapid change, unemployment spells and transition to new jobs. Modern social security systems, combining the need to facilitate labour market transition with the provision of adequate income support during all absences from the labour market.4
The Commission states that “Active inclusion . . . is fully complementary to the “flexicurity” approach while targeting those at the margins of the labour market” (COM (2007) 620). One of the major challenges ‘flexicurity’ is supposed to meet is the problem of sustainability: The considerable ageing of European societies, together with relatively low employment rates on average, (assuming unchanged policies), are projected to put at risk the financial sustainability of social protection systems. (COM (2007) 620)
In this context, EU policy makers have directed their attention to welfare states such as Denmark and the Netherlands rather than liberal (residual) Anglo-American welfare regimes.
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Summing up, the analysis of the relationship between the dominant ideas and discourses in the EU fight against social exclusion has shown: 1) that these ideas are primarily material although they do have strong normative implications (for instance on the balancing between rights and obligations); 2) that the strength of the ideas of active social inclusion and targeting involve a strengthening of social policy as labour market policy, at the expense of redistribution; 3) that this must be seen in connection with the way the EU Social Inclusion Strategy is framed – the legitimizing ideas are primarily founded in the material discourse on the sustainability of the welfare state; and 4) that this may be one important reason for the increased attention given to social inclusion policy at the supranational level following the Lisbon process.
NOTES 1. According to de la Porte and Pochet (2002), the Blair government played a dynamic role in putting the question of poverty and social exclusion on the top of the European agenda during the Portuguese Presidency. 2. Currently termed National Report on Strategies for Social Protection and Social Inclusion. 3. The principle of reciprosity generally implies a kind of balance between individual contributions (often understood as duties) and collective distributions of welfare resources. 4. European Commission 2006 – Employment in Europe p. 76.
REFERENCES Armstrong, K. (2005), ‘How open is the United Kingdom to the OMC process on social inclusion?’ In Zeitlin, J. and Pochet, P. with Magnusson, L. (eds) The Open Method of Co-ordination in Action: The European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies. Brussels: Peter Lang. Beckman, L. (2005), Grundbok i idéanalys. Stockholm: Santérus Förlag. Beland, D. (2006), ‘The social exclusion discourse: ideas and policy change’, Policy and Politics 35 (1), pp. 123–139. Campbell, J. (1998), ‘Institutional analysis and the role of ideas in political economy’, Theory and Society 27, pp. 377–409. Campbell, J. (2002), ‘Ideas, politics, and public policy’, Annual Review of Sociology 28, pp. 21–38. Clasen, J. (2005), Reforming European Welfare States: Germany and United Kingdom Compared, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Daguerre, A. and Larsen, T. (undated), The EU Inclusion Strategy and the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC). EU Policy Maps, Working Papers for WRAMSOC. Canterbury: University of Kent. De la Porte, C. and Pochet, P. (2002), Building Social Europe through the Open Method of Co-ordination. Brussels: Peter Lang.
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Ervik, R. and Kuhnle, S. (eds) (1993), Kunnskap, risiko og sosialpolitikk: institusjonelle perspektiver på skandinavisk utvikling. Bergen: Alma Mater. European Commission (2006), Employment in Europe, http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_analysis/employ_2006_en.htm, accessed 11 December 2008. Ferrera, M., Matsaganis, M. and Sacchi, S. (2002), ‘Open coordination against poverty: the new EU “social inclusion process”’, Journal of European Social Policy 112 (3), pp. 227–239. Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R.O. (eds) (1993), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Gough, I., Bradshaw, J., Ditch, J., Eardley, T. and Whiteford, P. (1997), ‘Social assistance in OECD countries’, Journal of European Social Policy, 7(1), pp. 17–43. Hall, P.A. (1992), ‘The movement from Keynesianism to monetarism: institutional analysis and British economic policy in the 1970s’, in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (eds), Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hatland, A. (2001), ”Mer målrettet velferdspolitikk?”, Horisont 4. Hatland, A. (2003), “Lokalt skjønn i gammel og ny sosialpolitikk”, in Benum, Haave, P., Ibsen, H., Schrumpf, E. and Schiøtz, A. (eds) Den mangfoldige velferden: festskrift til Anne-Lise Seip. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk. Joint Report (2004), Joint Report by the Commission and the Council on Social Inclusion. Brussels. Joint Report (2005), Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion. Brussels Joint Report (2006), Joint Report by the Commission and the Council on Social Inclusion. Brussels. Joint Report (2007), Joint Report by the Commission and the Council on Social Inclusion. Brussels. Kildal, N. (1999), ‘Justification of Workfare: the Norwegian case’, Critical Social Policy 19 (3), pp. 353–370. Kildal, N. (2001), Workfare Tendencies in Scandinavian Welfare Policies. Geneva: International Labour Office. Kildal, N. and Kuhnle, S. (2005), ‘The principle of universalism: tracing a key concept in the Scandinavian welfare model’, in Kildal, N. and Kuhnle, S. (eds) Normative Foundation of the Welfare State. London: Routledge. Levitas, R. (1998), The Inclusive Society? Social Exclusion and New Labour. London: Palgrave. Lødemel, I and Trickey, H. (2001), An Offer you Can’t Refuse: Workfare in an International Perspective. Bristol: Policy Press. Lopez-Santana, M. (2006), ‘The domestic implications of European soft law: framing and transmitting change in employment policy’, Journal of European Public Policy 14 (4 June), pp. 482–499. Marshall, T.H. (1965), Class, Citizenship, and Social Development. New York: Anchor Books. Mead, L.M. (1997), ‘Citizenship and social policy: T.H. Marshall and poverty’, Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (2), pp. 197–230. Mkandawire, T. (2005), Targeting and Universalism in Poverty Reduction. Programme Paper Number 23. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
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Nilssen, E. (1999), Penger, makt og velferd: en studie av trygd og forsikring, Sefos Rapport 1/1999. Bergen: Sefos. O’Connor, J. (2005), ‘Policy coordination, social indicators and the social-policy agenda in the European Union’, Journal of European Social Policy 15 (4), pp. 345–361. Rueschemeyer, D. and Skocpol, T. (eds) (1996), States, Social Knowledge and the Origins of Modern Social Policies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Schmidt, V. (2000), ‘Values and discourse in the politics of adjustment’, in Scharpf, F.W. and Schmidt, V.A. (eds) Welfare and Work in the Open Economy, Vol. 1: From Vulnerability to Competitiveness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schmidt, V. (2001), ‘The politics of economic adjustment in France and Britain: when does discourse matter?’ Journal of European Public Policy 8 (2 April), pp. 247–264. Seeleib-Kaiser, M. and Fleckenstein, T. (2007), ‘Discourse, learning and welfare state change: the case of German labour market reforms’, Social Policy and Administration 41(5), pp. 427–448. Stone, D. (2004), ‘Transfer agents and global networks in the “transnationalization” of Policy’, Journal of European Public Policy 11 (3 June), pp. 545–566. Taylor-Gooby, P. and Daguerre, A. (2002), State of the Art Paper: The New Context of Welfare, Working paper. http://www.kent.ac.uk/wramsoc/workingpapers/firstyearreports/backgroundreports/soavii.pdf, accessed 6 December 2008. Titmuss, R. (1968), Commitment to Welfare. London: George Allen and Unwin. Titmuss, R. (1974), Social Policy. London: George Allen and Unwin. Trubek, M. and Trubek, L. (2005), ‘Hard and soft law in the construction of social Europe: the role of the Open Method of Co-ordination”, European Law Journal 11(3), pp. 343–364. Wacquant, L. (1996), ‘The rise of advanced marginality: notes on its nature and implications’, Acta Sociologica 39 (2), pp. 121–141. Weale, A. (1983), Political Theory and Social Policy. London: Macmillan Press. Weir, M. and Skocpol, T. (1985), ‘State structures and the possibilities for “Keynesian responses” to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain and the United States’, in Evans, P.B., Rueschemeyer, D. and Skocpol, J. (eds), Bringing the State Back in, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. White, S. (2003), The Civic Minimum: On the Rights and Obligations of Economic Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5.
Policy making and application of law: free movement of persons and the European Court of Justice Aksel Hatland and Even Nilssen
INTRODUCTION A major characteristic that separates the European Community from other international organizations like the UN and the OECD, is that the implementation of their policies is carried out by a powerful court of law, the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This court has proved to be much more than an obedient servant that fulfils its political masters’ political will, as it is also a policy-making body that creates new rights and duties through its case law. And it is a watchdog that controls other institutions of the EU, like the Commission and the European Parliament, and acts in accordance with the treaties that constitute the framework for political cooperation in the European Union. The ECJ is a referee that supervises the other political institutions of the European Community and the member countries, to ensure that they adhere to the rules of the game. The European Court of Justice is composed of one judge from each member state. That all member states are represented should strengthen the legitimacy of the Court’s decisions. Partly to protect the judges from pressure from their home land, the individual votes are not made public and minority opinions are not issued. The ECJ speaks with one voice.1 There seems to be broad agreement among students of European politics and law that the ECJ has been a powerful actor in shaping the development of the European Union in many fields (see Dehousse 1998; Beach 2001; de Burca and Weiler 2002; de Burca 2005; Ferrera 2005). The platform for these powers of the Court follows from the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (below called the Treaty). According to Article 220 of the Treaty “[t]he Court of Justice . . . shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed”. The concept “law” covers more than written statutes. This is clearer in other languages than English. In the Danish version of 94
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the Treaty, for instance, the wording værne om lov og ret is used and in the German version sichern . . . die Wahrung des Rechts. The Court has understood this use of the concept ‘right’ (ret or Rechts) as a mandate not only to interpret written law, but also to find unwritten law, and thus fill the gaps the lawmakers have left open, to create a consistent legal system (Sejersted et al. 2004, p. 52). This has proved to be a powerful tool in the hands of the judges in Luxembourg. This chapter will describe and explain the political role of the ECJ in the field of welfare policy, using free movement of persons and their connected social rights as an illustrating example. By ‘political role’ we mean that the court not only applies written law on individual cases, but that it creates new rights and duties both for individuals and for political institutions. An important characteristic that distinguishes the ECJ from more purely political institutions is that it reacts proactively. It does not choose freely what issues it will engage in, but must make a decision whether it likes it or not. Freedom of movement and social rights have constituted an important part of the ECJ’s caseload since the Court was established in 1958. During the period 2000–2007 the Court completed 3132 cases. Of these, 104 were about freedom of movement and 265 about social policy and social security for migrant workers.2 Self-employed people’s rights to establishment and to provide services across country borders is an issue that surpasses the framework of this chapter. The issue is well covered in Arnull (2006, chapter 13). When reading this contribution, it is important to bear in mind that community law does not prevent the application of national legislation or administrative arrangements providing for more favourable treatment.
SUPREMACY AND DIRECT EFFECT AS A POLITICAL PLATFORM Some fundamental questions were not clarified by political institutions in the treaties that established the European Communities. The Court had to solve these questions itself. The first principle concerns the relation between community law and national law. The Treaty says nothing directly about how conflicts between the legal systems should be solved. In a landmark decision in 1962 (Van Gend and Loos, Case 26/62), the ECJ established the principle of supremacy. A Dutch transport company objected to national duty rules in the Netherlands. The Court said: that the states have acknowledged that community law has an authority which can be invoked by their nationals before those courts and tribunals. The
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The role of international organizations in social policy conclusion to be drawn from this is that the community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only member states but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of member states, community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the member states and upon the institutions of the community.
The doctrine of supremacy states that Community norms that produce direct effects are not merely the law of the land but the “higher law” of the land (Weiler 1994). There is a clear parallel here with the system of judicial review in nation states, where supreme courts can declare acts of laws to be in conflict with the constitution of the country and thus invalid. A second basic problem that was unsolved by the legislators was whether community law was binding only for the member states or if it had direct effect on citizens and companies. Could the citizens of a member country use community law against their own states? The ECJ here formulated far-reaching principles in its judgment in a case between an Italian lawyer and a nationalized electricity company (Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64). The Court stated: By creating a community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the states to the community, the member states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves.
From this strong legal platform, the judges in Luxembourg have produced a huge amount of case law that has had profound effects on citizens’ rights to move freely across borders, to reside in whatever member state they wish and to claim social rights in the country where they stay or live. But although these rights have been expanded both by political decisions and by ECJ rulings, they are still not unlimited.
FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS There has been a clear trend in EU policy to expand the rights of citizens in the European Economic Area (EEA) to move freely across European borders and to take up residence in countries where they are not national
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citizens. To understand the conflicts these policies have created, it is helpful to make a distinction between a full-time economically active person or service provider, on the one hand, and social assistance recipients, criminals and terrorists, on the other. Among the great majority of European politicians, the first group is looked upon as a positive contribution to economic development in Europe, while the second group is looked upon as an economic burden and a risk to public security that they do not want to take responsibility for. The development has taken place between those two extremes, gradually expanding the right to cover other groups than the economically active segments of population. The vanguards in creating free movement for persons have been the workers. Free movement for this group is a major political measure to reduce unemployment and increase the Community’s workers’ chances of finding work. It is a cornerstone of European cooperation. The principle of free movement of workers is put into words in Treaty Article 39: 1.
Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community. 2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.
The political institutions of the communities have clothed these naked principles somewhat with regulations (see Arnull 2006, pp. 444–445). Of special importance is Regulation 1612/68. It provides that a worker who resides in a member state other than his own is entitled to be joined by his family, so long as he is able to provide for them. There is also a right for the worker to have his or her children educated on the same terms as nationals of the member state. But much of the policy development in the area of free movement is left to the European Court of Justice.
WHO IS A WORKER Since workers have much stronger rights to move freely and to take up residence in countries where they are not national citizens, it is vital to determine who is defined as a worker. But the Treaty is silent on the matter, and it has been left to the Court to define this. There is a huge caseload on the issue. The ECJ has held that this is a matter of community law, not of national law. If the member states’ own definitions of who they recognize as workers were respected, it would be possible for member states to undermine the principle of free movement.
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A main issue has been whether a person working for a below-subsistence wage, and who is partly dependent on social benefits, should be recognized as a worker and thus have a right to stay in a country. Repeatedly the member states have wanted to refuse residence permits to citizens of other European countries who cannot support themselves. In the Levin Case (Case 53/81), a British woman wanted to settle in the Netherlands, but the Dutch authorities claimed that her income was not sufficient for her subsistence. The Court rejected this argument and said: The provisions of community law relating to freedom of movement for workers also cover a national of a member state who pursues, within the territory of another member state, an activity as an employed person which yields an income lower than that which, in the latter state, is considered as the minimum required for subsistence, whether that person supplements the income from his activity as an employed person with other income so as to arrive at that minimum or is satisfied with means of support lower than the said minimum, provided that he pursues an activity as an employed person which is effective and genuine.
The Court defined guiding principles in the Lawrie Blum case (Case 66/85). Lawrie Blum was a non-German citizen who wanted to participate in a teacher-training programme with a small and insecure income. The Court defined a worker as: a person [who] performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration.
In principle, the purpose of the employment was irrelevant. Shaw, Hunt and Wallace (2007, p. 285) discern three elements from this definition: 1) the employed person must perform services of economic value, although not of a purely economic nature; 2) the employed person must be carrying out services for, and under the direction of, another person; 3) the employed person must receive remuneration, although that remuneration need not be sufficient to provide a minimum level of subsistence. They conclude (p. 286) that “while the Court has tried to expand the concept of worker as widely as possible, it is still, at heart, an economic concept”. A famous court case which illustrates the ECJ’s power to secure freedom of movement is the Bosman case (Case 415/93). It allowed professional football players in the European Union to move freely to other clubs at the end of their term of contract with their present team. A player could sign a pre-contract with another club for a free transfer if the player’s contract with their existing club has six months or less remaining. The ruling also prohibited domestic football leagues in EU member states from imposing
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quotas on foreign players to the extent that they discriminated against nationals of EU states. According to its wording, the Treaty (Article 39) states that there should be freedom to accept offers of employment in another country. It says nothing about unemployed persons’ freedom to look for work in another member state. But again the ECJ chose an expanding interpretation of the Treaty. In Case 292/89 the Court found that jobseekers fell within the scope of Article 39, although a member country, after a “reasonable” period of time, may require that a job seeker who has not found work should leave the country. This principle was later codified into EU legislation, now Council Directive 2004/38 on Citizens’ Rights.
DISCRIMINATION AS AN OBSTACLE TO FREE MOVEMENT Prohibition against discrimination on grounds of nationality is a main principle of European Community law. It is of great importance for the free movement of persons. There is a huge caseload of ECJ rulings on this principle. The question of discrimination on grounds of language requirements is one of the most difficult. In the Groener case (Case 379/87) a Dutch art teacher working in Dublin applied for a full-time post at an art college. Under Irish law it was required that applicants for such posts should hold a certificate of proficiency in the Irish language. She could not fulfil that requirement and the case was brought before the European Court of Justice. The Court accepted the requirement and stated: The importance of education for the implementation of such a policy must be recognized. Teachers have an essential role to play, not only through the teaching which they provide but also by their participation in the daily life of the school and the privileged relationship which they have with their pupils. In those circumstances, it is not unreasonable to require them to have some knowledge of the first national language.
It follows that the requirement imposed on teachers to have an adequate knowledge of such a language must, provided that the level of knowledge required is not disproportionate in relation to the objective pursued, be regarded as a condition corresponding to the knowledge required by reason of the nature of the post to be filled within the meaning of the last subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 1612/68. It must also be pointed out that where the national provisions provide for the possibility of exemption from that linguistic requirement, where
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no other fully qualified candidate has applied for the post to be filled, community law requires that power to grant exemptions to be exercized by the Minister in a non-discriminatory manner. An example of a case where linguistic requirements were not accepted is that of Angonese (Case 281/98). Angonese applied for a job in a bank in the province of Bolzano, where both Italian and German are spoken. Angonese was perfectly bilingual, but he lacked a formal certificate issued only by the authorities in Bolzano. The ECJ found that this was discrimination contrary to Article 48 of the EC Treaty (after amendment, Article 39). Discrimination on other moral grounds was brought up in two joined cases (Cases 115 and 116/81). Two French women were working in Belgium as “waitresses in a bar which was suspect from the point of view of morals”. They were refused a permit to reside in Belgium. Prostitution was, however, legal in Belgium. When the cases were brought before the Court, it stated: A member state may not . . . expel a national of another member state from its territory or refuse him access to its territory by reason of conduct which, when attributable to the former state’s own nationals, does not give rise to repressive measures or other genuine and effective measures intended to combat such conduct.
If a profession is legal in a member state, the national authorities cannot discriminate against citizens of other member states.
ECONOMICALLY INACTIVE PERSONS’ RIGHTS TO FREE MOVEMENT Over time it became more and more obvious that the directives and regulations of the European Community were insufficient to grant the principle of free movement to all European citizens. During the last 25 years, however, this right has been gradually expanded to different groups of economically inactive persons. These developments have taken place in a complex interplay between the legislative powers of the European Communities and the ECJ (see Shaw, Hunt and Wallace 2007, pp. 289–291). The principles are now unified in the Citizens’ Rights Directive. A landmark decision in extending rights to economically inactive persons was the Martinez Sala case (Case 85/96). Martinez Sala was a Spanish citizen who had been a German resident since she was a child and who had been economically active for some periods. When she had a child, she applied for a child-raising allowance, which was turned down. The Court argued that since she was a citizen of the Union and lawfully
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residing in Germany, she had the right not to be discriminated against on grounds of nationality. The decisive argument was no longer that she was economically active, but that she was a European citizen. The principles for students’ rights to study freely on a non-discriminatory basis, now included in the Directive mentioned above, are chiefly based on the ECJ’s Case 293/83. A French citizen studied in Belgium and was required to pay a fee that Belgian students did not have to pay. The Court found that discriminating. Retired people’s rights to residence have gradually been expanded and now cover the whole group, if they are able to support themselves. This follows from the Citizens’ Rights Directive. People of “independent means” are also granted rights to entry and residence in accordance with Council Directive 90/364. But there are still important legal exceptions from the principle of free movement. In a welfare policy context, the most important of these exceptions affects recipients of social assistance. It is a recurrent theme in EU law that members of this group may be expelled from a country they visit. The Citizens’ Rights Directive (Directive 2004/38) Article 7, paragraph 1, for instance states: All Union citizens shall have the right of residence on the territory of another Member State for a period of longer than three months if they . . . have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State.
The principle of freedom of movement is, according to Article 39, “subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health”. In Régina v. Bouchereau (Case 30/77) the Court drew up guiding principles on the concept of public policy. The questions arose within the context of proceedings against a French national who had been employed in the United Kingdom since May 1975 and who was found guilty in June 1976 of unlawful possession of drugs. But the Court did not accept this as a sufficient reason to lose his residence permit. It stated: The existence of a previous conviction can, therefore, only be taken into account in so far as the circumstances which gave rise to that conviction are evidence of personal conduct constituting a present threat to the requirements of public policy.
In Bonsignore (Case 67/74) German authorities wanted to expel an Italian citizen who was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Mr Bonsignore had accidentally caused the death of his brother by his careless handling of a firearm. The Court again interpreted the Treaty strictly. It stated:
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According to article 3 (1) and (2) of directive no 64/221, measures taken on grounds of public policy or of public security shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned . . . [and] previous criminal convictions shall not in themselves constitute grounds for the taking of such measures. . . . These provisions must be interpreted in the light of the objectives of the directive which seeks in particular to coordinate the measures justified on grounds of public policy and for the maintenance of public security envisaged by articles 48 and 56 of the treaty, in order to reconcile the application of these measures with the basic principle of the free movement of persons within the community and the elimination of all discrimination, in the application of the treaty, between the nationals of the state in question and those of the other member states.
On the other hand, the Court has accepted that a member state may expel a person who is a member of an organization considered socially harmful, for instance supporting political violence, although that organization is not illegal (Case 41/74). Restrictions justified with reference to “public health” are an area regulated by political authorities. Directive 64/221 contains a list of diseases that are accepted as legal reasons to deny a residence permit.
IMPORT AND EXPORT OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS The European communities’ role in social protection legislation has been controversial since the establishment of the European Community in the 1950s, but so far nation states have had the upper hand. The legal authority of this principle is now Treaty Article 137 paragraph 4, which states that the measures adopted by the Community “shall not affect the right of Member States to define the fundamental principles of their social security systems”. There are, however, important exceptions from the main rule, of which the coordination of benefits from different national systems is of special importance. Coordination is closely linked to the right to move freely between states. If people lose their social protection rights, this would undermine the right to move freely across borders. For workers, this link has been acknowledged since the creation of the European Community. Today the link is legally anchored in Treaty Article 42, which states: The Council shall . . . adopt such measures in the field of social security as are necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers.
There is a tremendous caseload from the European Court of Justice on these issues, which has gradually moved the European Community in a more mobility-friendly direction (see Leibfried 2005).
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Recent examples of the ECJ’s role in this area are Molenaar (Case 160/96), Jauch (Case 215/99) and Leclere (Case 43/99), all of which concerned frontier workers who had paid contributions to social security schemes in countries where they had worked but did not live. They claimed different benefits for care of family members and the ECJ supported their claims. According to Martinsen (2005, p. 109) the rulings of Jauch and Leclere demonstrate “that although the social ministers of the Member States have collectively decided to tie certain benefits to national territory, and although it is a political decision to which benefits this special rule applies, the political autonomy to administer according to that special rule is not free from judicial supervision.” These Court decisions all affect the disputed areas between earned social security rights for the economically active population, where there is broad agreement on the principle of exportability, and social assistance, where there is almost as broad a consensus on non-exportability. The main conflicts take place in the middle ground between these two extremes. In 1992 for instance, the Council overturned the ECJ’s interpretation of Regulation 1408/71, which the ministers of the Council found opened up the export of social assistance type measures (Shaw, Hunt and Wallace 2007, p. 354). In June 1992, Regulation 1408/71 was amended to include a new category of ‘special non-contributory benefits’ that were exempt from export. Following this ch