The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology Innovation
The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Biot...
82 downloads
2072 Views
1MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology Innovation
The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology Innovation Edited by
David Castle University of Ottawa, Canada
Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA
© David Castle 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2009936223
ISBN 978 1 84720 980 1 (cased) Printed and bound by MPG Books Group, UK
Contents List of figures List of tables List of contributors Acknowledgements
viii ix x xiv
Introduction David Castle PART I
1
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN INNOVATION SYSTEMS
Introduction David Castle
19
1
Are intellectual property rights quanta of innovation? J. Adam Holbrook
24
2
Intellectual property rights and innovation systems: issues for governance in a global context Bjørn Asheim, Finn Valentin and Christian Zeller
3
Intellectual property rights policy for gene-related inventions – toward optimum balance between public and private ownership Koichi Sumikura
PART II
37
73
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY
Introduction Karen L. Durell
101
4
Fundamentals of intellectual property management Patrick H. Sullivan
105
5
Making a return on R&D: a business perspective Sharon Oriel
118
v
vi
6
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
Looking beyond the firm: intellectual asset management and biotechnology Karen L. Durell and E. Richard Gold
PART III
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN RELATION TO OTHER MEASURES OF INNOVATION
Introduction L. Martin Cloutier and David Castle 7
8
9
Increasing internal value from patents: the role of organizational arrangements Marc Ingham, Cecile Ayerbe, Emmanuel Métais and Liliana Mitkova
12
159
178
Measurement of innovation and intellectual property management: challenging processes L. Martin Cloutier and Susanne Sirois
202
BEYOND PATENT LENGTH
Introduction Amy J. Glass and Fabricio X. Nunez
11
155
Language system (LS) 3.0: an agenda for a model of innovation valuation Clinton W. Francis
PART IV
10
133
219
Open development: is the ‘open source’ analogy relevant to biotechnology? Alan G. Isaac and Walter G. Park
225
On the border: biotechnology, the scope of intellectual property and the dissemination of scientific benefits Christopher May
252
On the comparative institutional economics of intellectual property in biotechnology F. Scott Kieff
274
PART V
INNOVATION GOVERNANCE
Introduction Tania Bubela
331
Contents
13
14
15
Accessibility of biological data: a role for the European database right? Jasper A. Bovenberg
337
Biotechnology patents, public trust and patent pools: the need for governance? Timothy Caulfield
357
Agricultural biotechnology and trends in the intellectual property rights regime: emerging challenges for developing countries Sachin Chaturvedi
PART VI
17
18
The role of intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation: national and international comparisons Richard Y. Boadi Intellectual property, information and divergences in economic development – institutional patterns and outcomes circa 1421–2000 Ian Inkster Watch what you export: the history of medical exceptions from patentability Tina Piper
Index
369
NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL AND HISTORICAL COMPARISONS
Introduction Abdallah S. Daar and David Castle 16
vii
395
399
413
437
457
Figures 1.1 3.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 7.1 7.2 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.7 15.1 16.1
A national system of innovation Conceptual picture of a research tool consortium Elements of intellectual capital A value-creation view of intellectual capital Relationships among vision, strategy and intellectual capital Intangibles management model Managerial process and organizational arrangements at Air Liquide New organizational arrangements LS 3.0 Value formation The site of valuation Valuation View of an organization as an open system Drug discovery timeline From target identification to lead optimization to investigational new drug Short-term and long-term measurement of tangible and intangible assets in SD framework Access to database. Unlimited access to third parties’ databases necessary? Access to database. Do you have sufficient access to all databases needed? Ownership of database. Do you claim ownership? Ownership of database. Does your university claim ownership? Ownership of database. Does any public funding agency claim ownership? Do you grant access to your database to non-commercial institutions? Do you grant access to your database to non-commercial institutions even if your database is unique? Trends in IPR in US Patents awarded by the US Patent and Trademark Office in the area of crop biotechnology between 1985 and 2000 viii
26 93 109 110 112 124 170 172 181 187 189 196 205 206 209 210 344 344 345 345 346 346 347 386 401
Tables 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1 5.1 7.1 7.2 13.1 15.1 15.2
17.1 17.2
What should be made exempt from the effect of patent rights? Is a research tool consortium necessary? What is the most desirable scope of patented inventions handled by the research tool consortium? If there is a ‘research tool consortium’ would you offer your patented inventions to the consortium? IP value matrix US/foreign patent information Key financial data (in millions of Euro %) Increasing value from patents: tasks, actors, organizational arrangements and synergies Guidelines for a community resource system Average annual agricultural research expenditure A comparison of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs), US utility patent protection, the European Patent Convention (EPC) and the International Convention on the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) National patent systems and the international convention of 1883 United States corporate and individual patenting (patents issued) 1956–1980 (in thousands)
ix
84 89 90 91 113 126 164 174 341 374
380 419 425
Contributors Bjørn Asheim Department of Social and Economic Geography Lund University Lund, Sweden Cecile Ayerbe Departement Techniques de Commercialisation Université de Nice-Sophia Antipolis Nice, France Richard Y. Boadi Legal Counsel African Agricultural Technology Foundation Nairobi, Kenya Jasper A. Bovenberg Amsterdam Medical Centre Department of Health Law Amsterdam, The Netherlands Tania Bubela School of Business University of Alberta Edmonton, Canada David Castle Faculty of Arts and Faculty of Law University of Ottawa Ottawa, Canada Timothy Caulfield Health Law Institute University of Alberta Edmonton, Canada x
Contributors
Sachin Chaturvedi Research and Information System for Developing Countries New Delhi, India L. Martin Cloutier Department of Management and Technology L’Université de Quebec á Montréal Montreal, Canada Abdallah S. Daar Public Health Science University of Toronto Toronto, Canada Karen L. Durell Faculty of Law McGill University Montreal, Canada Clinton W. Francis School of Law Northwestern University Evanston, United States Amy J. Glass Department of Economics Texas A&M University College Station, United States E. Richard Gold Faculty of Law McGill University Montreal, Canada J. Adam Holbrook Centre for Policy Research on Science and Technology Simon Fraser University Vancouver, Canada
xi
xii
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
Marc Ingham International Management and Marketing International University of Monaco Monaco Ian Inkster Department of History Nottingham Trent University Nottingham, UK Alan G. Isaac Department of Economics American University Washington, District of Columbia F. Scott Kieff Washington University Law Washington University in St. Louis St. Louis, United States Christopher May Department of Political Economy Lancaster University Lancaster, United Kingdom Emmanuel Métais People, Markets and Humanities EDHEC Business School Nice, France Liliana Mitkova Université de Marne-la-Vallée – Paris XII Meaux, France Fabricio X. Nunez Department of Applied Economics University of Minnesota Minneapolis, United States
Contributors
Sharon Oriel Licensing Executives Society Australia and New Zealand Inc. Midland, United States Walter G. Park Department of Economics American University Washington, District of Columbia Tina Piper Faculty of Law McGill University Montreal, Canada Susanne Sirois Department of Chemistry L’Université de Quebec á Montréal Montreal, Canada Patrick H. Sullivan Intellectual Capital Management Group, Inc. Palo Alto, United States Koichi Sumikura National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies Tokyo, Japan Finn Valentin Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy Copenhagen School of Business Copenhagen, Denmark Christian Zeller Institute of Geography University of Berne Bern, Switzerland
xiii
Acknowledgements This book arose from a workshop that was hosted by the Intellectual Property Modelling Group which is housed at the Centre for Intellectual Property Policy at the Faculty of Law, McGill University. The IPMG is supported through by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The book’s editor, David Castle, is supported by Genome Canada through the Ontario Genomics Institute.
xiv
Introduction David Castle WHY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION? Intellectual property rights feature prominently in all innovation systems, yet characterizing their role is a difficult task, one that always fosters debate. Intellectual property rights (IPRs), particularly in the form of patent rights, are widely viewed as catalysts for innovation in high-value, knowledge-intensive sectors like biotechnology because they reward risktaking innovative behaviour while providing public access to invention disclosures. Some challenge this incentive–access paradigm, claiming that IPRs’ principal function is to coordinate actors in innovation systems. Others are sceptical about IPRs’ capacity to stimulate innovation, and point to cases in which IPRs act as impediments to innovation by setting a high entry barrier to an innovation system, generating patent thickets, creating anti-commons or leading to defensive or blocking behaviour. Moreover, differences of opinion about the correct description of the role of IPRs in innovation systems are typically aggravated when the discussion migrates from descriptive to normative issues. Heated disagreement dominates discussions regarding the design and reform of intellectual property systems, the rules, institutions and practices they support, and the conditions under which regional and national innovation systems thrive. At least four problems stand in the way of having a complete understanding of the role of IPRs in innovation systems. The first is that ‘innovation system’ is a term of art the meaning of which is often derived from the context in which the term is being used. Freeman, who coined the term, described innovation systems as ‘the network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies’ (Freeman 1987). While this definition encompasses the structures and dynamics of the social framework in which innovation can occur, its openness to interpretation means that it can be substantiated with many different kinds of real-life cases. Consequently, as will be amply demonstrated throughout this book, 1
2
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
‘innovation system’ can mean: all innovation, in some abstract or global sense; regional innovation systems spanning country borders; national innovation systems; sector-specific innovation, or clusters of innovation. This divesity is important to remember, for while no particular stand on what ‘really’ constitutes an innovation system will be advanced in this book, authors of chapters work with different conceptions of the term. Their focus is on IPRs; differing conceptions of ‘innovation system’ lurk in the background. The second problem arises because the relationship between IPRs and innovation is difficult to describe. The link between IP and innovation is difficult to delineate in a way that allows one to evaluate the effects of IPRs, particularly patents, on innovation. IPRs are among a number of elements in an innovation system. These elements include licence arrangements, trade secrets, contracts, business models, institutional culture, risk taking behaviour and other factors such as lead time generated by business practices, complementary asset management, financing, marketing and firm-to-firm collaboration. Innovation cannot be attributed to any one of these elements in isolation from the others, and yet IPRs, particularly patents, are often discussed as if their role can be wholly disaggregated from the other elements and treated in isolation. Given that innovation is a complex phenomemon arising in dynamic and quickly changing scientific, technological, business and governance contexts, attempts to understand the role of IPRs separate from other elements is not likely to be a fruitful approach. The implication is clear: to understand how IPRs contribute to innovation requires consideration of the entire system of innovation. The third problem is methodological. Studying IPRs is challenging because there are different kinds of intellectual property protection, each of which occupy a slightly different niche in innovation systems. These niches are not well-described, which means that evaluating the effects of patents on innovation, for example, is not a straightforward undertaking. Part of the problem is that governments, industry and universities frequently assume patents have a positive impact on the rate of innovation. The traditional argument takes the form of a positive feedback loop in which patents reward risk takers by providing limited-term rights to exclude others. Since the role of IPRs in innovation is not fully understood, the reliability of this feedback loop is questionable. What if growth in innovation and more patents are coincidental, not causal? Or what if there are better ways to manage intangible assets than patents in knowledge-intensive industries where patenting has not had a significant historical role? If either of these turns out to be true, then it is more than misguided to make policy based on the traditional view that IPRs provide an incentive structure that increase rates of innovation. In particular,
Introduction
3
such an analysis ignores not only potential negative feedback loops – for example, slowing the next generation of innovation – but other positive roles that IPRs may have. These may include, for example, coordinating the flow of information between people and institutions, creating distribution channels or acting as markers of technological capacity in order to attract foreign investment. In addition to the challenges raised about description and methodology, a gap in evidence dogs all discussions of IPRs in innovation systems. Empirical economic studies of IPRs are few in number, and have different methodologies and outcomes. The fourth problem, then, is that one cannot simply point to ‘the data’ and settle arguments about how patents are linked to innovation, and whether that linkage on balance stimulates or slows innovation. Innovation systems can be roughly divided into different sectors of activity, which further confounds the potential for having accurate and meaningful data from which to draw comparisons and generalizations. The IP protection the pharmaceutical industry believes necessary to protect its products in a costly and lengthy product development pipeline is not mirrored by the agricultural biotechnology sector, and the data available for each sector are rarely an apples-to-apples match of indicators. In addition, even the most thoughtful contributions of industry participants are inherently limited. They can report on how they believe that IPRs relate to their current business strategies and market structures, but can rarely say much about how different business models that rely less (or more) on IPRs would actually function. Experiential data will not settle the discussion about the role of IPRs in innovation in general. Furthermore, industrialized countries are likely to collect data, or have the collection done for them by international organizations, but developing countries do not tend to collect data. Consequently whatever data exist cannot lead to conclusions for the vast majority of countries. Motivated by ongoing disputes about IPRs, and in light of the problems of description, methodology and verification, the purpose of this book is to bring together into one volume a collection of original contributions on the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in near- and medium-term innovation. This book pursues two related objectives. The first is to bring clarity, rigour and fresh perspectives to the analysis of IPRs in innovation systems. Without good descriptive work that delves deeply into the main issues at the crossroads of innovation and IPRs, it will always be difficult to evaluate claims of the positive and negative impact of IPRs on innovation. The second objective is to evaluate how IPRs actually operate in innovation systems, not just from the perspective of theory but grounded in the contexts in which they appear – global, regional, national, present and historical. To meet these objectives, this book draws on perspectives
4
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
from several regions of the world and from a variety of disciplinary and professional perspectives. The aim is to uncover deeply held assumptions about the role intellectual property rights have in innovation systems and move debate beyond these assumptions by encouraging the authors of these original chapters to engage in frank exchange across regional and disciplinary perspectives. Each of the original contributions made in this book seeks to resolve aspects of the four challenges just mentioned, and they have come together in an effort to develop a more complete understanding of the role of IPRs in innovation systems. This approach will have immediate appeal to a diverse audience of scholars of science and technology innovation, academic and public or private sector specialists in IP, and to students of innovation theory, regulation and intellectual property law. Furthermore, there are five ‘unique selling propositions’ that are worth pointing out: first, this book situates IPRs within the broader context of innovation systems theory, an uncommon approach that facilitates the study of IPRs in their social and historical context unrestricted by economic and legal considerations alone. Second, the book provides new insights on IPRs’ capacity to foster or retard innovation in different jurisdictions and historical periods. Third, several chapters in the book provide useful methods for measuring the contribution of IPRs to innovation systems, and provide concrete examples demonstrating the consequences of making changes to IPR policies and practices. Fourth, taken as a whole, the book offers the beginning of a consensus view that the role of IPRs in innovation systems is less about strictly legal rights and duties and more about the economic and social impact of the ways in which researchers, industry and governments deploy IPRs to bring new technology forward. Finally, this book makes an important contribution by being among the first directly to investigate the role of IPRs in biotechnology innovation specifically, an area of intensive scientific and technological change, with correspondingly little research on the role of IPRs in biotechnology innovation. As life science and associated biotechnology continues to grow and diversify, knowing how to evaluate the contribution of IPRs to biotechnology innovation will become increasingly important.
THE STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK This book is comprised of six parts, each of which begins with a short introduction, followed by three chapters in which different facets of the role of IPRs in innovation are critically examined. The first part, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in Innovation Systems’, takes the view that intellectual
Introduction
5
property is one among many components that constitute an innovation system. Starting with innovation systems as the overall context for IPRs, it is then possible to make decisions about how IPRs are defined, measured, and how they are related to other factors comprising innovation systems. Furthermore, one can then study how IPRs are used by governments, industry and academe to achieve specific goals. For example, changes to university invention ownership policies are almost always deliberate, but do not always attain the goal of fostering more innovation. In this way, this part of the book provides the perspective necessary for thinking about IPRs within the broader context of innovation systems, and is the crucial first step toward evaluating the relative contribution of IPRs to near- and medium-term innovation. The second part, ‘Intellectual Property Management in Biotechnology’, begins by drawing the distinction between tangible and intangible assets in the portfolios of firms and other institutions. The idea of the knowledgebased economy may be relatively new, but in merely four or so decades since innovation and the knowledge economy became talking points it has become commonplace for a firm’s intangible assets to account for 80 per cent or more of the firm’s worth. This inverts the conventional ratio of tangible to intangible assets observed in the 1970s. IPRs, the most conspicuous form of intangible assets, need to be actively managed. A firm wishing to add value, or capture it from innovations, faces complex management decisions. It must evaluate options such as an intellectual asset focus versus a competitive intelligence focus, and it needs to make decisions about how it can make the most effective use of intellectual property within its organization and in competition or partnership with other organizations. This part provides an overview of management goals in the private and public sectors, an identification of the forms of intellectual property that are routinely overlooked, as well as those the importance of which are over-emphasized. The study of strategies for intellectual property management leads to a more subtle understanding of how firms believe that IPRs stimulate innovation, and the tactical steps they take to stay competitive. In addition intellectual property management highlights how factors such as market performance, capacity building and strategies for technology transfer subtly structure the relationship between firms managing IP portfolios and the rest of society. A measurement problem is one of the greatest obstacles to a full understanding of the role of IPRs in innovation systems. IPRs, particularly patents, are often promoted as measurable outputs of innovative activity. The third part, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in Relation to Other Measures of Innovation’, addresses the value and accuracy of using IPRs as measures of innovation, typically by counting the number of patents
6
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
filed and granted. Of course, measurement implies that an innovation, whether a product, process, organization or market, can be quantified with standardized units of measurement. The temptation to use patents as direct measures of innovative activity tends to arise in situations where the dominant discourse interprets patents as cash substitutes magically caught at the bottom line. IPRs may be poor substitutes for cash, with no impact on GDP, and yet they may be useful indirect measures of what is valued in an innovation system, by whom, and what social relations will be maintained to produce valuable goods and services. When the simple story about creating value by filing patents is discarded, the role of IPRs in measuring and valuing the output of innovation systems becomes much more complicated. Patent length is one of the most discussed aspects of IPRs since it is foundational to the nature of the limited monopoly granted to patent holders. Those who uphold the incentive–access paradigm will argue that longer patent length induces innovative activity because limited monopoly rewards accrue for longer. Innovators will see longer term patents as a way to off-set past losses and to balance taking greater risks in the future. Yet patent length is not the only method by which one can manipulate an innovation system to generate different kinds of outcomes, possibly even to trigger greater levels of innovation. The fourth part, ‘Beyond Patent Length’, considers different forms of incentives apart from patent length, and apart from patents themselves. It addresses the impact of various forms of intellectual property protection (patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, and plant breeders’ rights), and examines the effects on consumers, producers and governments of alternative strategics for stimulating innovation. These include identification and manipulation of underlying political-economic conditions, open source strategies and treating IPRs as mechanisms for coordinating knowledge flows between people and institutions. While often starting with generic issues in regional and national innovation systems, the chapters in this part anchor the discussion in biotechnology innovation. Additionally, since it could be conjectured that industrialized countries suffer innovation gaps only with respect to small differences in comparative advantage, this part also examines the pressing issue of how innovation can be stimulated in developing countries. Governments actively manage innovation. The fifth part, ‘Innovation Governance’, considers some of the mechanisms, pitfalls and issues that goverments need to consider as they adopt policies for controlling IPRs in innovation systems. The issues in this part are broad and diverse, covering the problems that arise in biotechnology innovation at institutional, national and international levels. Part of the issue for governance
Introduction
7
of innovation is to be clear about the economic, social and ethical goals of IPRs as a component of innovation governance and consider whether the stated goals are being met. Do people have access to valuable data for downstream innovation? Another problem to address is the quality and quantity of empirical evidence that can be gathered to make evaluations of innovation governance. Governments must also consider the social milieu in which there are ethically charged media portrayals of IPRs, such as patents that allegedly restrict access to crops, diagnostics and medicines. Similar issues arise in thinking about the difference beween the approaches to governance which are appropriate in industrialized versus developing countries. Governments have strong incentives to govern innovation systems optimally. Can they plan for the future? In the last part of this book, ‘National, International and Historical Comparisons’, lessons are drawn for our contemporary situation from other times and other places. Many studies of IPRs often seek general truths about the nature, benefits, challenges and remedies associated with IPRs, but fail to acknowledge the historical contingency of individual IPR systems and their associated innovation systems. Do IPRs have the same role in innovation in a G8 country with elaborate innovation cultures and systems, with access to financing and with legal and scientific infrastructures, as they would in developing countries lacking these significant elements? Equally, does it matter that an IPR system comes into force at a time when professional cultures of science and medicine develop in a similarly evolving legal system? One might ask what modern dynamics arise when developing countries lacking tens or hundreds of years of evolution of their intellectual property and innovation systems find themselves competing with industrialized countries in an environment of globalized world trade.
THE ORIGINS OF THIS BOOK The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology Innovation consolidates papers originally presented at a workshop held in the fall of 2005 at the Robert Schuman Centre for International Studies at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. The chapters were at first workshop presentations, and then became chapters. They are not all uniform in length, a function of the scope of the topic, length of the workshop presentation, ensuing discussion at the workshop the author wished to incorporate, and revisions in response to referees’ comments. In addition to the variation in length, author style is preserved as much as possible to let the diversity in the authors’ voices prevail.
8
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
This workshop was convened by the Intellectual Property Modelling Group (IPMG), a research group based at McGill University in Montreal, Canada. The following discussion of the IPMG’s goals and methodology provides background about the generation of this book and the program of research that led to its development. The Intellectual Property Modelling Group The Intellectual Property Modelling Group (IPMG) is a transdisciplinary group of researchers in the fields of law, economics, ethics, philosophy, management, political science and biomedical science coordinated through McGill University’s Centre for Intellectual Property Policy (www.cipp. mcgill.ca). The IPMG seeks new models of intellectual property better to describe, evaluate, and change intellectual property systems (Gold et al. 2002). In light of the complexity of the field of biotechnology intellectual property and the diversity of the IPMG membership, it was necessary for the IPMG to develop a common conceptual framework, vocabulary, and a set of complementary research methods to investigate biotechnology intellectual property. The result is a conceptual and empirical methodology that is designed to provide empirically grounded, systems-level alternative policy strategies to governments, universities and industry. Conceptual Methodology The basis of the IPMG methodology was the development of a set of critical questions that can be used to probe aspects of IP systems (Gold et al. 2004). The IPMG used a Delphi method modified to take into account the group structure and composition. The ‘probes’ were developed by enumerating the common assumptions made by specialized academic disciplines about the structure and function of IP systems. Cross-discipline comparison generated a shortlist of widely held assumptions about IP systems which were then problematized by reversing the assumption into a probitive question. With respect to this book’s subject, the role of IPRs in innovation systems, one common assumption made in several disciplines is that IPRs provide a necessary incentive to innovate, and that patents in particular are an optimal policy tool for stimulating research and development. As noted earlier, neither assumption is beyond dispute and neither has compelling empirical support. The development of the analytical probes allowed the IPMG to begin a process of mapping out IP systems, including all of the variables, and the relationships between them, that are involved in biotechnology IP systems. The IPMG was able to record the knowledge it was accumulating
Introduction
9
and share analyses among team members and between IPMG and other interested parties, including its research partners and advisory board. Over the course of a few years, the IPMG has developed two principal research tools that take the form of an ontology and the formulation of the dynamic hypotheses. The dynamic hypothesis is represented by an influence diagram, a two-dimensional diagram of empirically-grounded variables and their inter-relationships. Each variable is nested in a common set of definitions that cross traditional disciplinary boundaries. The ontology represents the relationship between the variables that the IPMG has identified (for example, providing funding to develop an invention prototype) and particular policies and strategies (for example, income tax credits for research and development expenditures). The ontology is used in the development of policy alternatives from the results of modelling the interaction of variables in the dynamic hypotheses. These research tools are further described in the following descriptions of the empirical methodology and the IPMG’s impact through the development of policy recommendations. Empirical Methodology The conceptual methodology developed by the IPMG provides a framework for analysing intellectual property. It goes further by providing justification for which data collection methods are appropriate, and for providing guidance in the collection and interpretation of data. Three inter-related data collection tools have been incorporated into the IPMG methodology: Dynamic simulation modelling, case studies, and workshops. 1.
Dynamic Simulation Modelling The IPMG provides such a framework by modelling IP systems as a dynamic system rather than as a static set of legal rules. The methodological basis is adopted from systems theory used by the IPMG to understand the interactions of various factors, or variables, in leading to the creation, dissemination and use of biotechnological innovation over time. Causal relationships between the variables, for example a relationship between patent terms and the availability of generic products, consist of probabilistic inferences in the form of either positive or negative feedback loops. The IPMG has identified approximately 130 variables and thousands of inferential relationships between them. It has also gathered empirical data on those variables necessary to perform a dynamic simulation of the process of biotechnological innovation under various real-world conditions. Where possible,
10
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
existing or researched data are collected. Where not possible, inferences from incomplete data sources are used. The IPMG’s simulation model begins with a dynamic hypothesis about relationships between variables in a qualitative representation of the IP system. This hypothesis is then translated into a computerbased simulation model built with dedicated simulation software in which variables are represented as stock and flow interactions on a diagram. The simulation model permits testing of the hypothesis, and enables predictions. This simulation model is generic, in the sense that it aims to show the behaviour of specific variables over time, based on the underlying theory that pertains to these variables, or other historical data and information available about that structure. Since the model is generic, the selection of some, and elimination of other variables allows for problem- or topic-specific models to be spawned from the generic model. For example, as discussed below, a model containing mainly variables relevant to the issue of IPRs in innovation has been developed, which allows for specific kinds of policy questions to be answered. In another respect, models of specific case studies can also be developed, discussed next. 2.
Case Studies Case studies have many purposes and are used extensively by the IPMG. Retrospective case studies are an effective way of validating the dynamic model. Prospective case studies use the validated model to make predictions about the value of individual variables and the relationships between the variables in the model. For example, it is possible to model the effect of increasing patent length on the value of a patent. There are currently six case studies being conducted by IMPG that are related to the topic of this book: plant-derived vaccines’ technology diffusion; Canada’s access to medicines regime; the politics around blocking patents; knowledge flows; a comparative case study of traditional and indigenous knowledge in Brazil, Kenya and Canada; and a case study on Indonesia’s phytomedicines industry. Case Study 1: Plant-Derived Vaccines Plant-derived vaccines involve the introduction of a gene into a plant species, such as a tomato or tobacco, to produce a vaccine for serious communicable diseases such as Hepatitis B. Plant-derived vaccines offer many benefits over their conventional counterparts, and may revolutionize the way that vaccines are delivered, particularly in developing countries. Challenges requiring scientific and technological innovation remain but, assuming they are overcome,
Introduction
11
regulatory obstacles (intellectual property, import/export, plant varieties legislation and environmental legislation) will determine the rate and extent of the technology’s diffusion. This case study compares different scenarios under which plant-derived vaccines can be manufactured and distributed, and includes a semi-quantitative, dynamic simulation model developed to surpass educated guessing and speculation about new technology innovation and diffusion. The case study will be published in book form by John Wiley and Sons in 2010. Case Study 2: Intellectual Property Governance and Non-State Actors: The Case of Bill C-9 This case study provides a greater understanding of how to bring nonstate actors (civil society and industry) into decision-making around health care innovation policy. Specifically, the project identifies ways in which non-governmental organizations contributed constructively to policy development in relation to health research, development and commercialization. The case study is based on interviews with leading members of civil society, documentary and media analysis, and analysis of the political debates. It explores how civil society influenced the passage of Bill C-9 in Canada – called the Access to Medicines Regime – and contributed to health, innovation and patent policy. The case study deals specifically with an amendment to the Patent Act to help provide medications through compulsory licensing to developing countries in need. The case study follows the work of non-state actors from the Cancun Ministerial Meeting in 2003 that provided a mechanism through which actually to import these medications to their lobbying for Bill C-9, An Act to Amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act, which aims ‘to facilitate access to pharmaceutical products in the developing world, in order to address public health problems, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics’. The Bill, the first of its kind among developed nations, became law on May 14, 2004. Only in the summer of 2007 did any country, however, actually make a request to use it. That country was Rwanda, which sought a first-line triple therapy for HIV/AIDS. Case Study 3: The Politics of Blocking Patents This case study examines how a small Utah biotechnology company’s patent and business model erupted into an international debate about blocking patents. The company is Myriad Genetics and the technology is a genetic predisposition test for breast and ovarian cancer.
12
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
Based on academic literature, news reporting, and a workshop of the principal industry and governmental actors involved with the dispute, the case study illustrates how communication and institutional failures combined with a lack of trust combined to transform a poorly adapted business model into an international cause célèbre. The case study points to the need for a greater recognition that biotechnology patents exist within a different cultural and social context from most other inventions and that those who fail to account for this may pay a significant price. Case Study 4: Knowledge Flows in Biotechnological Innovation Knowledge and innovation flows can be tracked with new methods in bibliometrics and scientometrics, for instance, by looking at the fields of mouse genomics and stem cell research. To analyse the flow of knowledge from pure science via technology innovation into public discourse, a case study will explore research methods in three distinct fields: (a) citation analysis for scientific publications and patent literature; (b) word and concept analysis for summaries or full texts of scientific, patent, policy and media documents; and (c) social network analysis. Different sources of data for large-scale analyses, and verified or obtained appropriate licences for large-scale searches and downloads have been identified, including Medline/PubMed, ISI Web of Science, Elsevier’s Scopus database, Delphion and national patent databases, Lexis/Nexis and Factiva for media and national government sites for policy documents, committee reports and political speech. Case Study 5: Comparative Case Study of Traditional and Indigeneous Knowledge As numerous international fora and organizations attempt to map out a strategy to recognize and protect traditional indigeneous knowledge, little attention has been paid to whether there is a coherent meaning to this knowledge that transcends the different cultures and societies involved. This case study remedies the gap by comparing the types, cultural meanings and legal protection offered to traditional and/or indigeneous knowledge in three places: Brazil, Kenya and Canada’s North. The goal of the study is twofold. First, it seeks to determine whether there is a single overarching concept of traditional knowledge that applies in all of these places. Second, it attempts to determine whether, given the nature and meaning of such knowledge, it is best viewed through the lens of legal ‘property’ or as a component of sovereignty and autonomy of the peoples involved.
Introduction
13
Case Study 6: Indonesia’s Phytomedicines Industry This case study explores how Indonesia can convert its advantages in plant diversity and in traditional medicine into the development of new medicines that address the country’s essential health needs. Indonesia – and, by extension, similar developing countries – could take full advantage of modern biotechnology to meet its health concerns, but three obstacles have been identified: first, there needs to be better alignment of health research with health needs in the country. Second, trained managers are needed to move innovative products from the laboratory to the patient. Third, finding ways to stimulate the Indonesian market to accept and encourage locally invented and produced medications is a must. 3.
Workshops The dynamic simulation model and the case studies are supported and cross-referenced by means of international workshops at which members of the IPMG adopted the view that workshops provided an obvious and important dissemination opportunity, but equally they provided an opportunity to collect and validate data that would be used in the model and in the case studies. Accordingly, the IPMG has held many workshops, of which the event in Florence that led to this book was the fourth. Participants were invited to the workshop to examine the role of IPRs in innovation systems, and to provide their views about this issue from their disciplinary and regional backgrounds. There was considerable diversity of opinion at the workshop, and the collected wisdom and expertise were crucial to the methodology of IPMG’s project insofar as they helped uncover deeply held assumptions about the role of intellectual property rights in innovation systems. The workshop was successful in not only generating this book, but also assisting IPMG members in their efforts to select, quantify and relate variables that are directly relevant to the issue of IPRs’ role in innovation systems. A similar workshop hosted by the IPMG was entitled ‘Intellectual Property, Biotechnology Capacity and Development’. This workshop was held in Buenos Aires on September 25 and 26, 2006, and was hosted by the Argentinian Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científica y Tecnológica, and the Centre for Intellectual Property Policy. The workshop brought together policy-makers, non-governmental organizations, industry and academics to examine how developing countries can configure their intellectual property systems to attract and retain scientists and investment in local research and development. The focus was on policy options available to Latin America and the Carribbean
14
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
to enhance their scientific infrastructure in the biotechnology field. These options include practices drawn from actual experience in developing and industrialized countries and new models put forward to overcome identified problems in innovation systems. Some of the novel mechanisms given special attention in this workshop are new venture capital structures for start-up technology firms, collaborative and open science mechanisms and novel reward systems for innovation. Perhaps the greatest issue identified in this workshop is how cutting edge social science research on innovation systems and intellectual property can be used to overcome the tremendous diversity in levels of innovation, diversity of resources, and social infrastructure in the region. The Impact of IPMG The IPMG has developed a conceptual model of how IP-related laws, practices and institutions actually work together to create or inhibit the production and dissemination of new knowledge in relation to biotechnological innovation. IPMG research demonstrates that: (a) IP laws do not operate in isolation from practices and institutions, and thus the implications of implementing particular legal rules cannot be assessed without a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between rules, practices and institutions; and (b) while policy-makers generally rely on IP rules to achieve policy objectives concerning innovation, these objectives could be met through complementary or alternative practices and different institutional structures. One of the challenges that the IPMG addresses is how to draw on this understanding of IP systems, better to develop understanding on how best to deploy IP laws, practices and institutions to meet social and economic goals. The IPMG distinuishes between ‘old’ IP and ‘new’ IP eras to highlight the changing attitudes toward the role of IP, the changing roles of institutions which rely on IP, and evolving IP practices. To make this transition, the final report of the IPMG, Toward a New Era of Intellectual Property: From Confrontation to Negotiation, describes a detailed framework of actions to be taken by governments, patent offices, universities and the scientific community (The International Expert Group 2008). These include: developing greater trust between actors; more and better communication; generating new models of IP; enhancing science, technology and engineering in the developing world; cross-cutting thinking about IP; and developing improved data sets and metrics. If followed, the framework of actions ought to increase short- to medium-term innovation levels; increase scientific infrastructure (particularly in developing countries and
Introduction
15
in economically or socially disadvantaged regions of developed countries); and increase access to technology. A simulation model specific to the issue of IPRs’ role in innovation has been developed. It incorporates the interactions amongst the selected variables, according to system dynamics modelling principles. At the time of writing, the model is being evaluated for its realism and accuracy using scenario analyses of policy changes that target specific variables to induce changes within the model. This evaluation includes checks for the model’s internal validity (consistency with theory, links amongst variables of specific feedback loops, expert knowledge, empirical evidence from research), the model’s external validity (consistent with historical data collected, gaps between calculated values from the model and historical data), and the sensitivity analysis of key parameters on overall model behaviour and performance on targeted policy parameters. The motivations for the book are quite clear when one considers that policy and academic literatures often portray IPRs as the catalyst for biotechnology innovation. This role is contested by some commentators, but, as mentioned above, the problem is that decisive empirical data are missing. More important to the IPMG is that even if the relevant data exist, they need to be collected and understood within a rigorous framework that takes into account the complexities of the IP system in biotechnological innovation.
REFERENCES Freeman C. (1987). Technology and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan. London: Pinter. Gold E.R., D. Castle, L.M. Cloutier, A.S. Daar and P.J. Smith. (2002). ‘Needed: Models of Biotechnology Intellectual Property’. Trends in Biotechnology 20:327–9. Gold E.R., W. Adams, D. Castle, G.C. de Langavant, L.M. Cloutier, A.S. Daar, A. Glass, P.J. Smith and L. Bernier. (2004). ‘The Unexamined Assumptions of Intellectual Property: Adopting an Evaluative Approach to Patenting Biotechnological Innovation’. Public Affairs Quarterly 18:299–344. The International Expert Group On Biotechnology, Innovation And Intellectual Property. (2008). Toward a New Era of Intellectual Property: From Confrontation to Negotiation. Available at www.cipp.mcgill.ca.
PART I
Intellectual property rights in innovation systems
Introduction David Castle It has become common parlance to describe innovation as taking place within a system. That is to say, innovation is thought to be a product of a system of integrated causes and effects, and the right way to analyse innovation is by thinking about a system. Gone from informed discourse about innovation is the caricature of the linear chain of events starting with the scientist-recluse and ending with with the monopolizing capitalist. The more sophisticated view of innovation systems does not, however, mean that we have answered all of the questions about how innovation works. Far from it in fact, as the chapters in this part reveal. Take, for example, the point that if innovation is a system-level phenomenon, it would be useful to know exactly how intellectual property rights contribute to the system. Yet as the contributions in this part point out, this question is not normally taken up directly, or at least not until now. Each of the chapters in this part finds its own way to this question, a fact which illustrates that IPRs play multiple roles in innovation systems, each of which can serve as an analytical starting point. In the first chapter, IPRs are the ‘quanta’ for the valuation of inventions, in the second chapter IPRs are policy tools for national and regional innovation system management, and in the third chapter IPRs are the source of tension about access to research tools and the impact on the development of genetic diagnostics and therapeutics. Adam Holbrook’s chapter begins with an account of what he calls the ‘national system of innovation (NSI)’ perspective on innovation systems and the role therein of intellectual property rights (IPRs). Holbrook’s central premise is that one’s view of innovation changes considerably if one abandons the Schumpeter conception of IPRs that restricts them to economic contexts. Holbrook’s view, by contrast, is that IPRs can be understoond in a broader social context of innovation in which economic factors feature among other drivers of innovation. By looking at innovation through social and economic lenses, one can see, first of all, that firms are networked into private and public sector institutions which interact in a multitude of ways to diffuse, or block diffusion, of knowledge. From the standpoint of NSI theory, the central issue is to understand the formal and 19
20
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
informal linkages are created between institutions, and how in turn those linkages modulate directly the flows of knowledge between institutions. Second, Holbrook points out that if one takes a systems approach to thinking about IPRs in highly networked systems of innovation, it casts a different light on how we think about intellectual property. A strictly economic analysis of innovation would study the flow of capital in a national system. Holbrook, by contrast, suggests that if we think that IPRs embody economic and other social factors of innovation, then tracking their flow, as one would money, in an innovation system can be enlightening. Holbrook draws an analogy with data packet flows in the internet to suggest that IPRs are traceable packets of social and economic data in an NSI. IPRs may be characterized as the measureable ‘quanta’ of an innovation system because they are the basic aggregations of social and economic data exchanged in an NSI. Paradoxically, Holbrook argues, very well-defined IPRs are good for trading and stand out as ‘units’ of innovation because they are easily counted. But often the most valuable knowledge created in IPRs is the tacit knowledge – of what works and what does not work – that defies measurement in traded IPRs. The role of the NSI approach is to try to understand how knowledge flows from contexts in which there is somewhat diffusely defined invention to rigidly described IPRs. Bjørn Asheim and his colleagues begin by noting that there are two large, but mostly independent, literatures on IPRs and innovation systems. Like Holbrook, they think that a national innovation systems perspective will bring to light the role of IPRs in innovation systems. Asheim et al. argue that an innovation systems approach is an important starting point for the discussion because one of the main reasons for supporting a national system of innovation is that it can bring the agencies of knowledge creation in close contact with private and public sector enterprise that will expand economic activity based on the knowledge. IPRs play an important role in generating the artificial scarcity necessary to drive the value of knowledge up, and to differentiate the value of different innovations that feed into a market system. IPRs, as Asheim and his colleagues point out, solve the knowledge valuation problem for markets. But IPRs do not themselves resolve issues about how different innovation systems ought to use the IPRs in pursuit of wealth creation, because the use of knowledge within different systems of capitalism defies a one-size-fits-all approach to integrating rules and practices about IPRs into an innovation system. Consequently, system-specific legislation, such as the Bayh-Dole Act, is unlikely to be usefully transferred to other innovation systems. Within both the European Union and the United States there has been explosive growth in patenting activity in the last two decades for almost
Introduction to Part I
21
all industries. The biotechnology industry’s growth spurt roughly corresponds to this period. The effects of biotechnology IPRs on the underlying science base and the production of applied science have been significant. Asheim et al. point out that the private receptor capacity in an innovation system is dependent on many things, but chief among them is being able to control the channelling of knowledge from public research institutions and keeping control of the valuation of that knowledge. An interesting dynamic between public and private institutions is created and maintained by IPRs insofar as they are part of the architecture for privately extracting value from otherwise public or ‘open’ science. Universities, having been at the centre of this social coordination of knowledge flows, have adapted their institutional mission along the way. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the changing role of US universities before and after the BayhDole Act where university assignees on patents increased. In the European Union, where the assignees have tended to be industry even if the university is the inventor, there are initiatives afoot to change national laws more closely to resemble the Bayh-Dole Act. Asheim et al. consider the effects of Bayh-Dole on three countries (Germany, Switzerland and Denmark) within the broader European context. They conclude that the increase in patenting activity is largely a result of economic and institutional changes, rather than a sign of significant innovative activity in the biotechnology sector, and that the changes to rules about patent ownership that reflect the Bayh-Dole Act do not always have corresponding positive effects, as was the case in Denmark. In this respect, Asheim et al. end on the same theme as Holbrook regarding the highly context-dependent role of IPRs to innovations systems. In the final chapter in this part, Koichi Sumikura considers the effects of IPRs, especially patents on disease genes, with respect to the development of molecular diagnostics and potential drug targets. Sumikura argues that there is a difficult balancing act that needs to be achieved to support the public’s interest in having new gene-based diagnostics and therapeutics. On the one hand, public disclosure of research results increases access, while providing leading biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms with traditional intellectual property rights protection that will enable them to undertake potentially risky projects. The problematic situations where the balance is not struck are well known – access to diagnostics, as in the case of Myriad’s BRCA tests, and licensing restrictions on research tools, particularly in cases where the intent is not to develop further commercializable technologies. Sumikura observes that Japanese university researchers have not been concerned until recently about the potential for IPRs to restrict their research activity. In a series of interviews of research scientists conducted by Sumikura a number of issues and events came to light that
22
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
are eroding researcher confidence in there being a strict line demarcating research from commercial use of licensed technologies. For these researchers, the threat of IPR incursion into basic science is seen as a real problem that threatens their institutions, academic freedom and their individual research programs. Researchers, sensing the tide change in their own institutions and abroad, may become increasingly reluctant to take on new research projects intensively based on licensed technologies. Sumikura considers the policy options that may address the concerns that have arisen in the literature about the negative impact of IPRs on research, and the concerns voiced by his study group. These include anti-monopoly provisions such as reach-through clauses and compulsory licences, but he notes that measures such as these can have the effect of destabilizing a patent system because they target a key provision – shortterm monopoly rights. Other policy options, may be more attractive. For example, gene patents could be recognized in an IP system, but research exemptions would be made for genetic diagnostics or for research tools: a view upheld by many of the scientists Sumikura interviewed. Another option is narrowly to limit the effects of patent rights on genes, thereby keeping the scope of the patent rights narrowed to the claims made at the time of application. Again, these approaches may not enhance confidence in the patent system, and so Sumikura considers a coordinated solution involving integrated management of intellectual property, the development of research tool consortia, reciprocal access to research tools with individually held patents, and university institutional ownership policies that provide free access to research tools within the institution. Only through a careful balancing act between researcher interests, state laws, and the demanding realities of innovation systems can the public interest in timely diagnostics and therapeutics be met. For Sumikura, simple remedies to the problem do not seem to be possible. The implication is that a satisfactory solution will likely be a complex negotiation that reflects the intricate web of interests that sustain IPRs in biotechnology. What is immediately striking about the three chapters in this part is that, despite being written from very different perspectives from industrialized countries that are not easily compared, there are important common themes running throughout. Notice, for instance, that in each chapter the place of IPRs in innovation systems is regarded as an important but under-studied issue. It is as if the descriptive project of saying what IPRs do for innovation systems had eluded the attention of the research community in general, and the authors of these chapters feel that they have to break new ground as they start to probe the question. Equally striking, however, is that each of the chapters takes on the issue by locating IPRs in national systems of innovation in order to be able to describe, within
Introduction to Part I
23
the boundaries of national research funding agencies, university systems, laws and culture. This strategy for tackling the problem generates equal suspicion among all of the authors of these chapters that generalizations stating the role of IPRs in innovation systems are not very likely to rise above the level of platitudes. For example, everyone knows that IPRs have a coordinating role between research universities and the private sector. But to go beyond the surface of this statement and answer, for example, a very complicated but relevant question about the impact of laws styled on the Bayh-Dole Act in other jurisdictions is quite difficult. Similarly, calling for reform in some generic conception of an IP system is an easy thing to do, but actually to see how reform would work in a specific country is quite different. Reform to the allowable scope of claims in a patent system might be feasible in Germany, but the same reform might not be feasible in Japan. This part of the book attempts to answer the difficult question about the role of IPRs in innovation systems. No doubt the results are constrained by the countries considered and perspectives offered. Does that suggest that the responses are simply idiosyncratic? One way to broach this question is to look at the other option. Perhaps there is one true-for-all-oftime theoretical account of the role of IPRs in innovation systems that transcend the particular details of any one national innovation system. Perhaps there are even general principles one can observe in single cases. The lesson from this part, however, is that the details of how IPRs are implemented in an innovation system, the institutions and practices they foster and legitmate, and the character and depth of the innovation system give rise to context-sensitive detail that puts into doubt the prospects of a general theory of IPR–innovation system interaction. That is not to say that the general descriptive project is hopeless, but it is to emphasize that much more descriptive work needs to be done before much credence is given to normative projects calling for changes and reform in innovation systems and IP laws.
1.
Are intellectual property rights quanta of innovation? J. Adam Holbrook
INTRODUCTION Policy makers in all levels of government are searching for means of understanding the role of innovation in the development of modern societies and for frameworks upon which they can construct their policies. In general, they are seeking economic frameworks; rarely do they use innovation policies as a lever to develop social policies. The reverse is not uncommon: education policies are sometimes used to foster a climate of innovation. The problem is simply that most analysts do not differentiate between innovation in general, a process that produces new ideas and intellectual property rights (IPRs), and specific innovations which can best be described through IPRs. Frequently policy makers start with the work of Josef Schumpeter (1961) who identified five forms of innovation: new products, new processes, new markets, new resources, new organizations. This categorization of innovations examined the economic effects of specific innovations, not the process itself. Thus there are clearly policies and programs in the economic field that can be used to stimulate Schumpeterian innovation. Even so, in policy terms, the concept of innovation is usually confined to that of technological innovation, as defined by the OECD in the Oslo Manual: Technological Product and Process (TPP) Innovations comprise implemented technologically new products and processes and significant technological improvements in products and processes. A TPP innovation has been implemented if it has been introduced on the market (product innovation) or used within a production process (process innovation) [OECD 1997, sec. 15].
This, of course, is a narrower definition than that proposed by Schumpeter, but in the domain of public policy it is usually the basis of the framework used for policy formulation. Many academics claim that there should be a broadening of this definition to encompass organizational and service improvements.1 24
Are intellectual property rights quanta of innovation?
25
Schumpeter thought of innovation as a phenomenon comprised of discrete units: innovations. These innovations have the potential to alter the economic milieu in which they occur. But arguably, innovation is also a process. It has a dual nature; it is not only an economic phenomenon but also a social one. Everett Rogers (2003), in his book, Diffusion of Innovations2 looked at how innovations are communicated, adopted and adapted. In particular he drew the distinction between an inventor, the individual who generates a new idea, and the innovator, who disseminates the idea to those who implement it. Innovation is as much a matter of communication as it is of invention. Thus, if innovation is regarded as a process, it is a process that is influenced by the environment in which it takes place. Innovation (in general, a phenomenon) thus takes place in an environment in which discrete innovations appear. These particles of innovation can flow from one element of the economic and social fabric of a locality, a region, a nation or part of the world to another. Thus the flow of knowledge embedded in these particles can be described in terms of a ‘system of innovation’, either through people, or through financial flows that permit the creation of knowledge in the recipient institution. A good working definition is that proposed by Metcalfe: A system of innovation is that set of distinct institutions which jointly and individually contributes to the development and diffusion of new technologies and which provides the framework within which government form and implement policies to influence the innovation process. As such is a system of interconnected institutions to create, store and transfer the knowledge, skills and artefacts which define new technologies [Metcalfe 1995].
Discrete innovations are unique pieces of knowledge. Scientific and technical knowledge (of which IPRs are a subset) is a unique commodity in that, while it can be created, it cannot (usually) be destroyed, although knowledge is often forgotten. IPRs that are traded are (usually) well defined, such as patents or licences. Similarly they can be transferred, as IPRs, but the inventor of the knowledge (usually) remembers the knowledge he/she transfers to the recipient. Thus, while the inventor can sell his/her IPR, the inventor retains two important pieces of tacit knowledge: ● ●
what worked, even if this cannot be exploited under the terms of the IPR transfer agreement, and, more importantly, what did not work. This knowledge is rarely codified and almost never sold, but nevertheless is extremely important for future development of the IP in question. What is usually not traded is the tacit knowledge of the original inventor – and it can
26
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
Regional Public Labs
University Labs
Public Sector S & T Users
Regional Government Rest of World (Including Multi nationals) National Government
National Public Labs
Private Sector Goods & Services Producers
Private Sector Labs
Flow of Knowledge Including knowledge embedded in goods & services
Financial Institutions
Flow of Financing
Figure 1.1
A national system of innovation (Holbrook and Hughes 1998)
be argued that often the knowledge of what did not work is more important than the knowledge of what did.
THE SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION APPROACH A national system of innovation (NSI) describes the system by which knowledge flows among its constituent organizations and institutions, and relations among the organizations in the NSI. These flows can be quantified through financial flows or movements of people. These can be described in many ways: one visualization, based on the Canadian NSI, is shown in Figure 1.1. The key characteristics of a NSI can be summarized as: ●
● ●
Firms are part of a network of public and private sector institutions the activities and interactions of which initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies. An NSI consists of linkages (both formal and informal) between institutions. An NSI includes flows of intellectual resources between institutions.
Are intellectual property rights quanta of innovation? ●
27
Analysis of NSIs emphasizes learning as a key economic resource and that geography and location matters (Holbrook & Wolfe 2000).
The NSI model of innovation tells us different things. On the one hand, the whole (the system) is much more than the aggregation of its parts. For instance, a national system of innovation is much more than the sum of its regional innovation systems. It also demonstrates that innovation from outside national boundaries is an important factor (indeed, in many countries external sources are the major source of innovations and IPRs: see the World Bank 2008). Thus one of the key elements of this type of policy analysis is the acknowledgement of the dependence of nations on sources of technology external to their NSI. A major policy objective of any national government must be to provide a suitable environment and mechanisms by which innovations can be brought into the nation and used for its social and economic benefit. This model is important in that it addresses issues of systemic interaction and performance. In this sense, the OECD notes that: a country’s innovation performance will depend not only on how it performs on each individual element of the NSI, but how these separate elements interact [OECD 2003].
The emphasis on the analysis of systemic failures was intended to shift policy analysis from promotion of state intervention by simple supply-side policies such as subsidies, to measures that ensure that the innovation system performs adequately as a whole. A key role for policy makers is ‘bottle-neck analysis’, to identify and try to rectify structural imperfections (Arnold 2004). Most studies of innovation systems reflect on innovations that are created within that particular national system. But for the large part of humankind this is not so – most nations, particularly emerging economies, import IP through their purchases of IPRs. While innovation, as defined by the OECD is ‘new to the world’, ‘new to the nation’ or ‘new to the firm’, there is often a fourth category: ‘new to the market which you serve’ (Holbrook & Hughes 2001). The innovator who brings new technologies to less developed regions of a country, or to less developed countries, is often, in both social and economic terms, far more important than the original inventor. Thus attempts to understand innovation systems, particularly in emerging economies, must focus on, and understand, how IPRs – codified innovations – are introduced into new markets (see Salazar & Holbrook 2004), and how these transactions are promoted.
28
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
Many inventions/innovations have occurred in one region or nation only to be ignored within that geographic socio-economic entity, taken up elsewhere, and developed to commercial success through a number of small, incremental (usually process) innovations. The example of the video-tape recorder is well known – invented in the United States, it was a useful piece of equipment for professional establishments until a number of incremental innovations in Japan made it possible to market the device as a consumer product. This example also provides evidence of another truth related to the analysis of systems of innovation: the input of innovations from abroad is probably the most important source of innovation in any economy, even in those economies which are highly innovative to start with. It is also, in this context, worth considering the changing nature of production. When Schumpeter was writing, production was relative tightly integrated within single factory complexes. Today, an increasing variety of final consumer products result from the integration of a vast variety of component and modular products and services that have been produced off-site, very often by unrelated firms and often in a different country. Thus we may need to add ‘architectural innovation’ (Henderson & Clark 1990) to Schumpeter’s original list. Wixted (2005) has shown that assembly of even technologically intensive ‘products’ (auto, aerospace and ICT in particular) rely heavily on imported parts. Wixted and Cooper (2007) have shown that, for ICT at least, the trend is towards greater reliance on imports. ‘Products’ is thus a vague term: what is a product for one company is an input for another.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS Intellectual property (IP) is a general term that can apply to almost any form of creative activity – from Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa to a state of the art integrated circuit design. We tend to apply the concept of IP to the creation of codified knowledge, as opposed to the art of creating an object or tacit knowledge (or a skill). An artisan has tacit knowledge of his or her trade, and that knowledge is their IP. In terms of the NSI, IP is the knowledge held by any single actor (or group of actors) in the NSI and it can be tacit or codified. Intellectual property rights (IPRs) on the other hand are usually (not always) thought of as codified knowledge that, as a consequence of its codification, can be traded or transferred among actors. In general one can describe four types of IPRs in the NSI:
Are intellectual property rights quanta of innovation?
29
1.
IPRs coming from IP that is in the public domain, and thus accessible by anyone. These are IPRs, but there is no single owner or user (such as open source software). They can be tacit as well as codified. 2. IPRs coming from IP that is not in the public domain – for example, a patent. The IP thus defined by the corresponding IPRs can be traded for money or other value. The trade can be for exclusive use of the IP or for a more limited licence to use the IP. 3. IPRs coming from IP contained in a product or service that is traded. A piece of electronic equipment may contain several IPRs, and by buying the equipment or service the purchaser is, in effect, buying a limited licence, the use of which is limited to the use of the equipment (or service). 4. Tacit knowledge, ranging from learned skills (which could be selftaught or learned, for a fee, from someone else) to ‘cultural’ knowledge that is the property of a social group. An IPR can retain its value even if it is not new. We also generally assume in these studies that IPRs are created and traded for positive purposes. But there are also many examples of patents that have been taken out to block other researchers’ lines of enquiry, even if the originator has no intention of following up that particular line of enquiry. This type of IPR activity creates barriers to innovation, and has to be recognized as a type of bottle-neck blocking the transfer of IP within the NSI. Foray has stated: Traditionally IPRs were considered one of the incentive structures society employed to elicit innovative effort. They co-existed with other incentive structures, each of which has costs and benefits as well as a degree of complementarity. We seem to be moving toward a new view, in which IPRs are the only means to commodify the intangible capital represented by knowledge. . . . [Foray 2002]
ARE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS QUANTA OF INNOVATION? As noted above, innovation must be seen through both economic and social lenses. Everett Rogers distinguished between inventors and innovators. He looked at innovation as a social activity, essentially the communication of ideas, the ‘selling’ of an idea, an invention, by an innovator to those who adopt the innovation. Thus innovations can have social value as well as economic value. Indeed, Rogers’ visualization could be described as a wave radiating through society (or an NSI). This approach differs
30
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
from the strictly economic view of innovation espoused by Schumpeter and his followers. Suppose we think of knowledge as the ‘fluid’ coursing through an NSI. If we think of that system as being similar to the Internet, the digital packets of the Internet are replaced by particles of knowledge, defined in terms of specific IPRs. These IPRs can be thought of as blocks of knowledge, or as ‘quanta’ of knowledge flowing through the system of innovation. These quanta vary in economic and social value, which is how we might characterize individual units of IPRs. Quantum theory was developed by physicists to explain how light could behave simultaneously both as a diffuse wave and discrete stream of particles. Quantum physics links the energy of a quantum to the degree of precision to which it can be located. Simply put, one can measure the magnitude of a photon (the quantum of energy) or its position accurately, but one cannot do both at the same time. The same might be said of particles of knowledge. Knowledge flows through the NSI like a fluid, but it can also be defined as discrete packets (IPRs). The more precise the description of the IPR, the more bounded it is and the more easily it can be valued or traded. If the knowledge content of an IPR can be more precisely defined, it has a higher degree of marketability (or higher value). If the knowledge is more diffuse (as in tacit knowledge), if it covers a greater area, and has a greater degree of imprecision over its boundaries, it is thus harder to value. But, as with quantum theory, it can be argued that one cannot have both a high degree of precision in defining the IPR and a wide span of the knowledge. If we think of the particles of knowledge flowing through the NSI as quanta, we can then appreciate the roles of the various institutional actors in the system, and how they act on each IPR – quantum – of knowledge. We can search for bottle-necks and we can appreciate (using the analogy of wave-particle duality) how a quantum can both ‘flow’ and yet be traded as a discrete entity. This is not simply a theoretical construct – if Foray (2002) is correct that we are moving towards an NSI where IPRs are the only means to commodify knowledge, then we have to understand the systemic constraints on the quanta of knowledge flowing through the NSI and the limitations of an approach that sees IPRs only as particles.
ACADEMIC PAPERS AND PATENTS How is a particular discovery modified by the environment in which it occurred? How can knowledge start out as something diffuse and yet wind up as a patent defined in legal language? In understanding the NSI for policy purposes we need to understand the process by which the NSI
Are intellectual property rights quanta of innovation?
31
acts on a quantum of knowledge to transform it into an IPR, regardless of whether it has commercial value. As with any information in a physical transmission channel, the movement of quanta of knowledge is subject to the addition of noise and distortion. It can be amplified or attenuated by one or other of the many institutions it passes through. Usually the process is one of filtering. Thus the language of processing wave-like data can be applied to the policy process. Yet, while it starts as a wave, it ends as a packet, an IPR. Patents are formal descriptions of IPRs, with the state granting exclusive privileges in return for disclosure, to stimulate innovation. Some patents (United States, and others with citations to previous patents) and some industries (chemicals, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals) can be analysed quantitatively. Patents with citations can be analysed statistically, for example, in the work of Francis Narin and CHI Research on patent bibliometrics.3 There also are ‘key’ patents at the head of ‘patenting trees’ identifying major new IPRs and the spread of those IPRs (these too can be measured bibliometrically). But this focus on patents might be beside the point for industries relying on speed to market or trade secrets; patent analysis may not be indicative of what the industry is doing. IPRs originating in the academic sector are made manifest in many ways. Both the system of academic publishing and the patenting system are formal methods of both publicizing and laying claim to IPRs. Academic papers contain IPRs, in that the authors are claiming priority of discovery. They are units of IPR, quanta, even though they may contain more than one individual piece of IP. These IPRs may be in the public domain,4 but they still have the property of a ‘right’, even if it is only a ‘moral’ right (these IPRs have value, as, for example, in determining hiring and promotion). But the quanta generated are often very diffuse pieces of knowledge since the inventor does not offer specific uses for the knowledge or seeks to contain its use. These quanta are often easy to quantify and measure, for example the ISI Citation Index5 is a useful method of measuring output by individual, by subject, by university, and other criteria. The science of bibliometrics is based on the analysis of publications and citations, and forms a rich field of data for looking at inter-relationships among generators of IPRs in the NSI. The link between academic research and commercial IPRs is becoming more important. The Bayh-Dole Act in the United States is often seen as the defining policy statement, mandating that IP generated in the academic world should be moved expeditiously into the commercial world.6 This policy of commercialization is contingent on accurate descriptions of IP generated in university laboratories. Yet the movement of these quanta of knowledge is often convoluted, as they must pass through a number of processes as they move from the original discoverer (often a graduate
32
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
student working under the supervision of a faculty member) to a commercial enterprise. It is often difficult to describe exactly where an IPR came from or what exactly it applies to. The differences between academic IPRs and commercial IPRs, and indeed the transition from academic knowledge developed in a laboratory of a publicly funded institution to specific IPRs with commercial value, are possibly best understood if the IPRs are thought of as quanta and the process thought of as the quantum of knowledge moving from a high degree of uncertainty in both magnitude and breadth to one of higher precision in either value or coverage.
QUANTIFYING IPRs: MEASUREMENTS AND SURVEYS If one takes the quantum theory analogy further, one can reflect on the fact that there is a direct, inverse, relationship between the physical size of a quantum and its energy: lE = Q, where Q is Planck’s constant, l is the wavelength (size) of the quantum and E its energy. Thus as its energy increases, its size decreases. As with the physical world, it can be argued that the more precisely an IPR can be defined the greater its marketability. Schumpeter argued that innovation is disruptive. Innovations move the state of an art from one level to another – a step function. But Rogers argues that the diffusion of an innovation follows an ‘S’ curve. It is no accident that the integral of a single wave is an ‘S’ curve, and that a step function is the limiting case of an ‘S’ curve. This argument by analogy creates a link between Rogers and Shumpeterian views of innovation. High impact innovations (and IPRs) are the commercial innovations that have value; slower and more incremental innovations pass through the NSI as waves, rather than as pulses, and have slower immediate effects, even if their long term effects are significant. When it comes to understanding the role of IPRs in the commercial world, we need to be able to distinguish between relatively common incremental innovations and the relatively rare, disruptive Schumpeterian innovations. In practical terms, identification of narrowly defined, ‘high energy’ innovations may be useful in that it helps identify which IPRs are worth registering and protecting, and which consequently may have market value. A more diffuse innovation may be more difficult to commercialize simply because it is harder to define. This would allow for an understanding of innovation based on the continuum between Rogers’ model
Are intellectual property rights quanta of innovation?
33
and Schumpeterian innovation, and other possible determinants such as innovation in large organizations versus small organizations. (It may be possible to broaden the range of influences on innovation processes that are not necessarily accounted for in current innovation surveys (Salazar & Holbrook 2004). For example, there have been suggestions that there are gender influences on the nature of innovation: female innovators tend to work incrementally and cooperatively as opposed to more ‘disruptive’ individualistic male innovators. Innovation in large organizations (and the public sector) is usually the result of social processes, is incremental, and thus less ‘catastrophic’ and less disruptive than the Schumpeterian innovation which usually comes from an individual or a very small group. Planck’s equation implies that the product of size and energy is a constant. This is likely not the case for IPRs, but it does point to the need to understand which innovations are diffuse and which are more tightly defined. Thus innovation surveys should clearly ask respondents not only: ‘Did you innovate?’ but also ‘How well-defined was your innovation?’.
CONCLUSIONS: THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF QUANTA OF IP – WAVES VERSUS PARTICLES? The systems approach to innovation provides a conceptual framework for doing ‘bottle-neck analysis’, that is, the identification and rectification of structural imperfections of the transfer of IP. This allows the development of ‘systemic’ policies in addition to ‘reinforcement’ and ‘bridging’ policies, the last two being the bulk of innovation policies in both developed and developing countries. The understanding of regional systems of innovation becomes important because these have ‘cultural’ influences on how IP gets transferred within a particular region. Cluster promotion, a fashionable policy these days, can be considered a systemic innovation policy. But without an understanding of the ‘whole’ system of innovation the policy is unlikely to be successful. There is an intriguing analogy one could explore with information communication theory – whether innovation system channel conditions affect the knowledge quanta moving through the channel, or whether, as some maintain, IPRs are neutral to the channel conditions. How does one quantify the transfer of tacit knowledge even though it cannot be codified (and thus quantified)? Are IPRs quanta because of the simple fact that they are codified, and thus can be traced through the innovation system, or are they simply artefacts of the legal rules within that system of innovation? But there is an even more simplistic differentiation between particulate and continuous innovation. Policy makers often develop their innovation
34
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
policies around two extremes: if IP is particulate, then policies should be put in place to encourage the development and registration of IPRs. On the other hand, if IP is a continuous (wave) phenomenon, then policy makers should try to develop the environment in which the creation of IP occurs – a more generalized approach to development of IPRs. Policy makers have to reconcile the differences between open-source transmission of IPRs (such as open-source software) and the more traditional commercially restrictive transfer of IPRs in their system of innovation. They are faced with the same problem as physicists: how do you know if a quantum is a particle or a wave? Should regional/national innovation policies promote the generation of waves or particles? There are many consequences of this policy dilemma. The traditional valuing of intellectual property as an IPR, with a finite boundary, provides the possibility for economic returns on its invention, transmission and exploitation. Much of our innovation policy is based on this (relatively) simple economic incentive, for individuals and institutions, to innovate. Equally evaluators of research performance have relied on statistics of the production of academic IP, the production of academic papers. Bibliometrics provide a great deal of useful information about the sociology of science, but it is arguable that using the production of academic papers to measure academic productivity is not a fair assessment of the quality of the work being performed by the researchers. The science of bibliometrics has been used to measure the performance of research teams in the academic world, sometimes with perverse results. More recently some innovation policy makers have moved towards the promotion of the creation of a highly qualified workforce – a variation on the principle ‘if you build it, they will come’. This is based on the assumption that if innovators can be trained, they will inevitably produce innovations. But will they produce incremental innovations or will they produce the ‘killer applications’, the disruptive innovative particles of Schumpetarian literature? Do many small incremental innovations when integrated over time have the same effect as a single highly energized innovation? Economic policy makers would prefer the latter, but it is questionable whether this ultimately leads to economic and social advancement. But the dichotomy is greater than simply one of size – whether the innovations produced by a generally better educated workforce are more intense, and thus of greater economic value. One could also ask whether a better educated workforce produces a greater number of innovations, even if they are small ones. If a nation or region invests in the development of human capital it provides an environment in which innovations can flow through its system of innovation. These pieces of knowledge may be ill-defined and they may also be facilitative: the development of tacit skills enables the
Are intellectual property rights quanta of innovation?
35
flow of knowledge from one individual to another. In such an environment is there a higher probability that less well defined pieces of knowledge, quanta, flow like ripples in a pond (waves) through the system? Arguably this may be a situation that depends on the mandates of individual policy makers. In Canada, policy makers at the federal level operate on economic policy, and thus, of necessity, focus on the creation of welldefined IPRs. Federal policies are thus designed to foster innovation that results in specific, quantifiable, IPRs. But under the Canadian federal system, provinces have responsibility for social affairs, including education policies. Thus the creation of an environment in which innovation can occur is the domain of the provincial (that is, sub-national or regional) policy makers. The consequence is that federal policy makers must think of IPRs as being particulate, while their provincial/regional counterparts must think of the qualitative environment in which IP occurs. Studies of systems of innovation help identify bottle-necks in the system of innovation. These bottle-necks restrict the flow of the quanta of knowledge. What are these bottle-necks? Are they social, legal, bureaucratic or inherent to the technologies that the quanta carry? The environment for the management of IPRs, such as the legal environment, may be one of the bottle-necks in the system of innovation (sometimes referred to as barriers to innovation). The flow of these quanta can be affected by a number of variables: the quanta vary in economic and social value over time, over place and among the various actors in the national system of innovation. Thus studies of IPRs need to look at at least these three dimensions. Policy makers need to consider two completely different tracks: how to promote the generation of IPRs, narrowly defined quanta of innovation, but also how to promote the more diffuse concept of innovation, the concept of ‘innovation’. Knowledge will flow through the system of innovation; the system itself must be prepared to accept the ‘wave’ of innovation.
NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4.
The latest version of the OECD’s ‘Oslo Manual’ addresses some of these issues. The most recent edition is the 5th edition published in 2003. Now found at www.ipiq.com. Leaving aside any consideration that the journal or book publishers may hold the copyright. 5. See www.isinet.com. 6. A summary can be found in The Economist, 24 December, 2005, at 109. However Mowery and Sampat (2005) argued that this model really only applied to the US, and not all OECD countries, and that even in the US the Bayh-Dole Act was ‘neither necessary nor sufficient for much of the post-1980 growth in university patenting’.
36
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
REFERENCES Arnold, E. (2004). ‘Evaluating research and innovation policy: a systems world needs systems evaluation’. Science and Public Policy, 13(1), 3–17. The Economist, 24 December, 2005, at 109. Foray, D. (2002). ‘Intellectual Property and Innovation in the Knowledge-Based Economy’, ISUMA, Vol 3(1), 71–8 (see www.isuma.net) Henderson, R.M. and Kim B. Clark (1990). ‘Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms’. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 35(1), Special Issue: Technology, Organizations, and Innovation (Mar., 1990), 9–30. Holbrook, J.A.D., and L.P. Hughes (1998). ‘Measurement of Regional Systems of Innovation: Innovation in Enterprises in British Columbia’, in J. de la Mothe and G. Paquet (eds), Local and Regional Systems of Innovation. Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 173–90. Holbrook, J.A.D. and L.P. Hughes (2001). ‘Comments on the Use of the OECD Oslo Manual in Non-manufacturing Based Economies’, Science and Public Policy, 28(2), 139–44. Holbrook, J.A.D. and D. Wolfe (2000). ‘Introduction: Innovation Studies in a Regional Perspective’ in J.A. Holbrook and D. Wolfe (eds), Innovation, Institutions and Territory – Regional Innovation Systems in Canada. Montreal and Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University Press. Metcalfe, S. (1995). ‘The Economic Foundation of Technology Policy: Equilibrium and Evolutionary Perspectives’ in P. Stoneman (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovations and Technological Change. Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell. At 409–512. Mowery, D.C. and B.N. Sampat (2005). ‘The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and University–Industry Technology Transfer: A Model for Other OECD Governments?’, Journal of Technology Transfer, 30(1/2), 115–27. OECD. (1997). Proposed Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Technological Innovation Data – Oslo Manual. Paris: OECD. OECD. (2003). A Strategic View of Innovation Policy: A Proposed Methodology for Assessing Innovation Policy and Performance. Paris: OECD, Working Party on Innovation and Technology Policy. Rogers, E. (2003). Diffusion of Innovations. New York: 5th edition, The Free Press. Salazar, M. and J.A.D. Holbrook (2004). ‘A Debate on Innovation Surveys’, Science and Public Policy, 31(4), 254–66 (a paper presented at a conference in honour of Keith Pavitt: ‘What do we know about innovation?’, SPRU, University of Sussex, November 2003). Schumpeter, J.A. (1961). The Theory of Economic Development. Translated by Redvers Opie. New York: Oxford University Press. Wixted, B. (2005). Systems of Innovation Beyond Borders: Linked Clusters and the Role, Scale and Spatial Structure of Extra-Territorial Interdependencies. Unpublished thesis, available at: http://library.uws.edu.au/adt-NUWS/public/ adt-NUWS20060407.100831/index.html. Wixted, B. and R. Cooper (2007). ‘OECD Cluster Networks 1970–2000: An Input– Output Study of Changes in Interdependencies between 9 OECD Countries in ICT Industries’, in R.J. Cooper, K.P. Donaghy and G.J.D. Hewings (eds). 2007. Globalization and Regional Economic Modeling. Heidelberg: Springer.
2.
Intellectual property rights and innovation systems: issues for governance in a global context Bjørn Asheim, Finn Valentin and Christian Zeller
INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS AN INNOVATION SYSTEM? This chapter deals with IPRs in innovation systems. Even if both innovation systems and IPRs as such have been studied extensively, the specific problematic of this chapter has hardly been analysed before. This is even more surprising as the form and extent of IPR regulations potentially have big impacts on the functioning of an innovation system. According to Granstrand (2005), ‘IPRs, particularly patents, play several important roles in innovation systems – to encourage innovation and investment in innovation, and to encourage dissemination (diffusion) of information about the principles and sources of innovation throughout the economy’ (Granstrand 2005, p. 280). Thus, the extent, intensity and type of interactions between firms and universities, which represent the constituting relations of an innovation system, will obviously be affected by the way the IPRs are constructed. This is especially the case in science driven activities, such as biotech, which is the focus of this book, being the object of the majority of implemented IPR regulations. This chapter will investigate this problematic through a comparative approach, looking at how IPRs are implemented and their consequences for industry–university collaboration in the US and Europe, with a special focus on Germany, Switzerland and Denmark. While the analyses of the US and Germany and Switzerland give a general account of changes in the IPR regimes, the section on Denmark specifically looks at the consequences for industry– university coloration in biotech by the introduction of Bayh-Dole inspired legislation. This represents a contribution to the analysis of the importance of national variations in institutional frameworks which, in addition to sector differences (which in this chapter are handled by the differentiated 37
38
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
knowledge based perspective), has been surprisingly little covered in the literature so far. The chapter starts with a short introduction to the innovation system concept as a national as well as a regional system. The concept of the innovation system (IS) – originally developed by Bengt-Åke Lundvall – is a relatively new one, and was first used by Chris Freeman in his analysis of Japan’s blooming economy (Freeman, 1987). The concept of a regional innovation system (RIS) appeared in the early 1990s (Cooke 2001), approximately at the same time as the idea of the national innovation system was becoming more widespread, thanks to the books by Lundvall (1992) and Nelson (1993). Characteristic of a systems approach to innovation is the acknowledgement that innovations are carried out through a network of various actors underpinned by an institutional framework. This dynamic and complex interaction constitutes what is commonly labelled systems of innovation (Edquist 1997), that is, systems understood as interaction networks (Kaufmann and Tödtling 2001). A set of variations on this approach have been developed over time, either taking as their point of departure either territories (national and regional) or specific sectors or technologies (Fagerberg et al. 2004). The National Innovation Systems approach highlights the importance of interactive learning and the role of nation-based institutions in explaining the difference in innovation performance and, hence, economic growth across various countries. The rationale of having territorially based innovation systems (national and regional) is either the existence of historical technological trajectories based on ‘sticky’ knowledge and localised learning that can become more innovative and competitive by promoting systemic relationships between the production structure and knowledge infrastructure in the form of national or regional innovation systems (a policy of ‘localised change’ (Boschma 2004)), or the presence of knowledge creation organisations the knowledge of which could be exploited for economically useful purposes through supporting new emerging economic activity (a policy of ‘structural change’ (Boschma 2004)). The ‘innovation system’ concept can be understood in both a narrow and a broad sense. A narrow definition of the innovation system primarily incorporates the R&D functions of universities, public and private research institutes and corporations, reflecting a top-down model of innovation. A broader conception of the innovation systems includes ‘all parts and aspects of the economic structure and the institutional set-up affecting learning as well as searching and exploring’ (Lundvall 1992), and, thus, has a weaker system character. The formation of innovation systems must be understood in this context of creating a policy framework aiming at a systemic promotion of knowledge creation and learning, in which universities play a strategic role, as well as an efficient transfer to industry in order to secure the innovativeness
IPRs and innovation systems: issues for global governance
39
and competitive advantage of nations, regions and firms (Freeman 1995; Cooke et al. 2000). According to Mowery and Sampat (2005) ‘governments have sought to increase the rate of transfer of academic research advances to industry and to facilitate the application of these research advances by domestic firms since the 1970s as part of broader efforts to improve national economic performance. In this ‘knowledge-based economy’, according to this view, national system of higher education can be a strategic asset, if links with industry are strengthened and the transfer of technology enhanced and accelerated’ (Mowery and Sampat 2005, 214).
IPRs IN REGIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS When discussing the role of IPRs in innovation systems it is specifically the second rationale for innovation systems which is of relevance, that is, securing the exploitation of new knowledge creation at universities for economically useful purposes, applying a narrow definition of an innovation system. According to Mowery and Sampat (2005) this can be achieved by two types of policies: ‘(1) policies encouraging the formation of regional economic ‘clusters’ and spin-offs based on university research, and (2) policies attempting to stimulate university patenting and licensing activities’ (Mowery and Sampat 2005, 225). Mowery and Sampat (2005) emphasise that especially the first type of policy typically takes place at the regional level, in the context of RIS, seeking ‘to spur local economic development based on university research, for example, by creating “science parks” located nearby universities campuses, support for “business incubators” and public “seed capital” funds, and the organization of other forms of “bridging institutions” that are believed to link universities to industrial innovation’ (Mowery and Sampat 2005, 210). An RIS is constituted by (1) the regional production structure or knowledge exploitation subsystem which consists mainly of firms, often displaying clustering tendencies, and (2) the regional supportive infrastructure or knowledge generation subsystem which consists of public and private research laboratories, universities and colleges, technology transfer agencies, vocational training organisations, etc. Thus, if the following two subsystems of actors are systematically engaged in interactive learning it can be argued that a regional innovation system is in place (Cooke 1998). From this it follows that clusters and RIS can (and often do) co-exist in the same territory. But whereas the regional innovation system by definition hosts several clusters, a cluster is not part and parcel of an RIS (Asheim and Gertler 2005). According to Mowery and Sampat (2005) also ‘the increased interests in
40
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
“Bayh-Dole type” policies is rooted in the motives similar to those underpinning policy initiatives that seek to create “high-technology” regional clusters’ (Mowery and Sampat 2005, 228). As with the Bayh-Dole Act, the majority of these initiatives to support university-based research for the promotion of innovation and economic performance emphasise the importance of codification of knowledge as a precondition to imposing property rights on individual inventions, based on the premise that the impact of university research primarily happens through the production of new knowledge by new knowledge for commercialisation (for example patented discoveries) (Mowery and Sampat 2005). According to Mowery and Sampat (2005), ‘in many respects, the Bayh-Dole act is the ultimate expression of faith in the “linear model” of innovation – if basic research results can be purchased by would-be developers, commercial innovation will be accelerated’ (Mowery and Sampat 2005, 229). The central role university research plays in contemporary economies with respect to the creation and diffusion of new knowledge has resulted in additional analytical frameworks – complementing the innovation system approach – pointing to the importance of strong links between universities, industry and government in knowledge-based economies. Two such concepts, the new interdisciplinary ‘Mode 2’ (Gibbons et al. 1994) and the ‘Triple Helix’ (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000) both argue that such interactions have increased (Mowery and Sampat 2005).
SPECIFICITIES AND CONTRADICTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE GENERATION With the increasing socialisation of knowledge production the knowledge produced by the enterprises themselves increases. For this reason they depend more on ‘intellectual common goods’ in the form of generally available qualifications, information and knowledge (Jessop 2000). The contradiction between increasing socialisation of production and private appropriation inherent in capitalism appears even more obvious with knowledge production. The production of knowledge and new technologies is a process based on division of labour in complex systems and networks. Often innumerable people take part in this process. The classic contradiction between economic and business rationality, thus between privatisation of the benefit and externalisation of the expenses, becomes a particular guise. The enterprises aspire to free access to knowledge and information, and at the same time they want to reserve as much private property thereof as possible. Knowledge production and its valorisation exhibit some characteristics which are crucial for the transformation of the regime of property rights
IPRs and innovation systems: issues for global governance
41
(Jessop 2000; May 2000; Husson 2001, 128; Thumm 2004, 531). In mainstream economics these traits are often described as market failure: First, intellectual activity enables considerable cumulative effects which bear much larger consequences than the productivity gains realised in material production. The benefits of science and information increase according to the number of people who use them. Knowledge develops and increases due to broad and free diffusion. These cumulative effects arise because codified information and knowledge can circulate extremely easily. They result from the collective and open character of intellectual activity (‘public good’ aspect and non-excludability of technological knowledge). Second, the production of scientific knowledge and of numerous new technologies requires very extensive, concentrated investments, similar to investments in fixed capital. Additionally, technological uncertainty investment leads to a general investment risk. The valorisation, however, can often be organised with only marginal additional costs. Knowledge-relevant information can be multiplied and used without large costs. For these reasons, by using intellectual property titles (patents, copyrights) and technical safety devices (for example, copy protection of computer programs) firms seek to limit the uncontrolled diffusion of their products and artificially to create scarcity. Intellectual property titles are designed to render this artificial scarcity legitimate in the area of knowledge (May 1998, 69–70; Sell and May 2001, 472) and to exclude others from its use or force them to pay royalties. Intellectual property is a power instrument and contributes to a further accumulation of power. But, in contrast to the power which arises for owners of scarce material goods, scarcity of intellectual property must be produced artificially by legal regulations.
SECTORAL DIFFERENCES IN IPRs As mentioned in the introduction, IPRs have potentially big impacts on the functioning of innovation systems. However, ‘the importance of these roles varies across sectors (industries) and countries, and over time’ (Granstrand 2005, 280). Granstrand underlines that especially with respect to patents the ‘differences across industries or sectors are strikingly large’ (Granstrand 2005, 282). Regions and nations display a large diversity when it comes to industrial structure, innovative capacity, competitiveness and economic growth. One way of analysing regional diversity within industrial sectors is to apply a differentiated knowledge base approach (Asheim and Gertler 2005; Asheim and Coenen 2005; Asheim et al. 2007). Despite the general trend towards increased diversity and interdependence in the knowledge generation process, Pavitt (1984) and others have argued that the innovation
42
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
process of firms is also strongly shaped by their specific knowledge base, which tends to vary systematically by industrial sectors. Pavitt’s typology has been further elaborated into a Synthetic-Analytical-Symbolic knowledge based typology, instead of the more narrowly defined traditional categories such as ‘scientific’, ‘engineering’ and ‘artistic’ knowledge bases, in order to capture the character of knowledge as output (Asheim and Gertler 2005; Asheim et al. forthcoming). More critically, this broader conceptual typology is intended to encompass the diversity of professional and occupational groups and competences involved in the production of various types of knowledge. As an ideal-type, synthetic knowledge can be defined as knowledge to design something that works as a solution to a practical problem. Analytical knowledge can be defined as knowledge to understand and explain features of the universe. Symbolic knowledge is knowledge to create cultural meaning through transmission in an affecting sensuous medium. As only the analytical (for example dominating pharmaceutical biotechnology) and synthetic knowledge (more important in agro-industrial and industrial biotechnology) bases are relevant with respect to biotech industry, the symbolic knowledge base will not be presented in more detail below. Analytical Knowledge Base This refers to industrial settings where scientific knowledge is highly important, and where knowledge creation is often based on cognitive and rational processes, or on formal models. Examples are biotechnology and nanotechnology. Both basic and applied research, as well as systematic development of products and processes, are relevant activities. Companies typically have their own R&D departments, but they also rely on the research results of universities and other research organisations in their innovation process. University–industry links and their respective networks are thus important and more frequent than in the other types of knowledge base. Knowledge inputs and outputs are more often codified in this type of knowledge base than in the other types. This does not imply that tacit knowledge is irrelevant, since there are always both kinds of knowledge involved and needed in the process of knowledge creation and innovation (Nonaka et al. 2000; Johnson et al. 2002). The fact that codification is more frequent is due to several reasons: knowledge inputs are often based on reviews of existing studies, knowledge generation is based on the application of scientific principles and methods, knowledge processes are more formally organised (for example in R&D departments) and outcomes tend to be documented in reports, electronic files or patent descriptions. These activities require specific qualifications and capabilities of
IPRs and innovation systems: issues for global governance
43
the people involved. In particular, analytical skills, abstraction, theory building and testing are more often needed than in the other knowledge types. The work-force, as a consequence, more often needs some research experience or university training. Knowledge creation in the form of scientific discoveries and technological inventions is more important than in the other knowledge types. Partly these inventions, under specific social and economic conditions, are susceptible to patents and licensing activities. Knowledge application is in the form of new products or processes, and there are more radical innovations than in the other knowledge types. Important routes of knowledge application are out-licensing activities of universities and publicly funded research organisations, and the creation of new firms and spin-off companies. According to Granstrand (2005), ‘patents are most likely to support the growth of knowledge-intensive industries in fields characterised by low ratios of imitation to innovation costs. Such low ratios are likely in areas with large-scale R&D projects, especially if the R&D results in highly codified knowledge, as in chemicals’ (Granstrand 2005, 283). This will typically be the case in sectors or industries based on an analytical knowledge base, for example, the biotech industry, particularly that related to human health sciences and pharmaceuticals. Synthetic Knowledge Base This refers to industrial settings, where the innovation takes place mainly through the application of existing knowledge or through the new combination of knowledge. Often this occurs in response to the need to solve specific problems coming up in the interaction with clients and suppliers. Industry examples include plant engineering, specialised advanced industrial machinery and production systems, and shipbuilding. Products are often ‘one-off’ or produced in short series. R&D is in general less important than in the first type. If so, it takes the form of applied research, but more often it is in the form of product or process development. University– industry links are relevant, but they are clearly more in the field of applied research and development than in basic research. Knowledge is created less in a deductive process or through abstraction, but more often in an inductive process of testing, experimentation, computer-based simulation or through practical work. Knowledge embodied in the relevant technical solution or engineering work is at least partially codified. However, tacit knowledge seems to be more important than in the first type, in particular due to the fact that knowledge often results from experience gained at the workplace, and through learning by doing, using and interacting. Compared to the first knowledge type, there is more concrete know-how,
44
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
craft and practical skill required in the knowledge production and circulation process. These are often provided by professional and polytechnic schools, or by on-the-job training. The innovation process is often oriented towards the efficiency and reliability of new solutions, or the practical utility and user-friendliness of products from the perspective of the customers. Overall, this leads to a rather incremental way of innovation, dominated by the modification of existing products and processes. Since these types of innovation are less disruptive to existing routines and organisations, most of them take place in existing firms, whereas spin-offs are relatively less frequent. However, this distinction refers to ideal-types, and most industries are in practice comprised of all three or at least two types of knowledge creating activities. For instance, biotechnology-based technology platforms or discovery tools also rely to a large extend on continuously improved engineering knowledge. The degree to which certain activities dominate is however different and contingent on the characteristics of the industry or phases of innovation processes within an industry (Moodysson et al., 2008).
‘VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM’ AND NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN IPRs Granstrand maintains that ‘these intersectoral differences in the importance of IPRs have led several scholars to criticize the “one-size-fits-all” design of patent system’ (Granstrand 2005, 283). This criticism becomes even more valid when national differences in institutional contexts, constituted by history, path dependence and institutional embeddedness, are taken into account. According to Mowery and Sampat (2005), the global diffusion of these policy proposals and initiatives – promoted among others by the OECD – display the classic problems of ‘selective borrowing’ from another nation’s policies from implementation in an institutional context that differs significantly from that of the nation being emulated. . . . Indeed, emulation of Bayh-Dole could be counterproductive in other industrial economies, precisely because of the importance of other channels for technology transfer and exploitation by industry’ (Mowery and Sampat 2005, 232–3). Lam (2000) underlines that learning and innovation cannot be separated from broader social contexts when one analyzes the links between knowledge types, organisational forms and social institutions in order to meet the needs of specific industries in particular with respect to learning and the creation of knowledge in support of innovations. Soskice (1999) argues that different national institutional frameworks support different forms of economic activity, that is, that coordinated market economies (for example,
IPRs and innovation systems: issues for global governance
45
the Nordic and (continental) West-European welfare states) have their competitive advantage in ‘diversified quality production’ (Streeck 1992), based on problem solving, engineering-based knowledge developed through interactive learning and accumulated collectively in the workforce (for example the machine tool industry based on a synthetic knowledge base), while liberal market economies (for example the US and UK) are most competitive in production relying on scientific based, analytical knowledge, that is, industries characterised by a high rate of change through radical innovations (for example IT, defence technology and advanced producer services). Following Soskice, the main determinants of coordinated market economies are the degree of non-market coordination and cooperation which exists inside the business sphere and between private and public actors, the degree to which labour remains ‘incorporated’ as well as the ability of the financial system to supply long term finance (Soskice 1999). While coordinated market economies on the macro level support cooperative, long-term and consensus-based relations between private as well as public actors, liberal market economies inhibit the development of these relations but instead offer the opportunity quickly to adjust the formal structure to new requirements using temporary organisations frequently. These differences – due to the impact of the specific modes of organisation of important social institutions such as the market, the education system, the labour market, the financial system and the role of the state – both contribute to the formation of divergent ‘business systems’ (Whitley 1999), and constitute the institutional context within which different organisational forms with different mechanisms for learning, knowledge creation and knowledge appropriation have evolved (Casper and Whitley 2004). Differences in capitalism between the liberal and the coordinated market economies can be observed when it comes to the ownership of IPR for inventions (either the academic institution or the researcher), the level of inter-university competition as well as the relative importance of private research universities. In Germany and Sweden, both typical examples of coordinated market economies, ‘researchers have long had ownership rights for the intellectual property resulting from their work, and debate has centered on the feasibility and advisability of shifting these ownership rights from the individual to the institution’ (Mowery and Sampat 2005, 232). This was changed in Denmark – another coordinated market economy, though with more liberalist traditions than Sweden and Germany – in 2000, when the Danish Law on University Patenting (LUP) became effective (see a later section for a discussion of its effects on university – industry cooperation within the pharmaceutical biotech industry). With the exceptions of the university systems of the US and Britain, typical representatives of liberal market economies, inter-university
46
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
‘competition’ has been limited in most national systems of higher education. Inter-university competition played an important historical role in the evolution of US universities and their collaboration with industry; especially when university patenting began to change after the 1970s, as private universities expanded their share of US university patenting in the same period as the share of biomedical patents within overall university patenting grew (Mowery and Sampat 2005). A good illustration of the key role of a well-funded, high-quality research university for establishing a successful industry–university collaboration is MIT. Not surprisingly, research has found that a model design of Triple Helix based on MIT works less efficiently in different contexts with more average universities and regions (for example Australia and Sweden) (Cooke 2005). While the US model of implementing IPR might function reasonably efficiently in the context of liberal market economies, these differences – based within a varieties of capitalism context – could lead to anomalies as well as dysfunctional situations and suboptimal allocation of resources in coordinated market economies. Mowery and Sampat (2005) mention several potential criticisms of, in particular the Bayh-Dole Act (Mowery and Sampat 2005, 230–32):1 – Firstly, that the commercialization incentive resulting from the Bayh-Dole could shift the focus on university research away from ‘basic’ and towards ‘applied’ research. – Secondly, another potentially negative effect of a higher level of university patenting and licensing is a ‘weakening of academic researchers’ commitments to ‘open science’, leading to publication delays, secrecy, and withholding of data and materials’. – Thirdly, in view of the importance of the ‘nonpatent/licensing’ channels of interaction with universities in many industrial sectors, it is important that these channels are not restricted or impeded by the strong focus on patenting and licensing in many universities. Thus, the ‘emulation of the Bayh-Dole Act is insufficient and perhaps even unnecessary to stimulate higher levels of university-industry interaction and technology transfer’.
FROM CLOSED TO OPEN INNOVATION – OR FROM OPEN SCIENCE TO PATENT-ENCLOSED INNOVATION? The question of the role of intellectual property rights in innovation processes is controversial. On the one hand, intellectual property rights are justified as an answer to the market failure of technological knowledge which is an outcome of the specific characteristics of knowledge generation such as the inseparability of research expenditures and the burden of huge
IPRs and innovation systems: issues for global governance
47
fixed costs for investors, the general investment risk that goes along with technological uncertainty, the ‘public good’ aspect, and the non-excludability of technological knowledge (Thumm 2004, 531). Thumm states that strengthening the patent system is likely to permit more trade in disembodied knowledge. Therefore, it is likely to facilitate the vertical disintegration of knowledge-based industries and to enable the entry of new firms that possess mainly intangible assets. Similarly Arora and Merges (2004) argue that a strong intellectual property regime supports vertical disintegration and the innovation activities of small firms. Chesbrough (2003a) describes the new configuration characterised by an increased vertical disintegration and a bigger share of extramural research activities, in a quite uncritical way as open innovation. On the other hand, David (2004) and Orsi and Coriat (2005) emphasise the questionable effects of the extension of intellectual property rights. This controversy recalls the crucial issue already raised by Dasgupta and David (1994), who argued that knowledge produced by academic institutions should retain the status of a ‘public good’. Coriat, Orsi and Weinstein (2003) emphasise a finance-driven model of innovation linked to institutional changes and the move from ‘open science’ to ‘patent intensive’ science (Coriat and Orsi 2002; Coriat et al. 2003; Orsi and Coriat 2005). They emphasise that the rules of the game shaped by institutions such as financial markets, labour markets, the intellectual property regime, public research funding, the division of labour between academic and industrial research and the underlying accumulation regime must be considered. New Industry Organization and Stronger Intellectual Property Rights The discussion on these issues has to be put into the context of a farreaching reorganisation of the industry organisation in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. Due to the enormous differentiation of drug discovery technologies and in order to minimise their own risk, large pharmaceuticals outsource numerous research activities to biotechnology firms and academic research centres. They systematically observe technological development on a global scale and acquire promising substances and technologies. Thus, ‘big pharma’ relies heavily on appropriating externally produced knowledge. This analytical knowledge is generated in a few regional innovation arenas (Zeller 2004). Publicly financed institutions play a central role in this generation. Out-licensing of drug candidates and technologies has become an important source of income for biotech firms and even universities. Biotechnology companies often have a mediating role. They transform and develop basic analytical knowledge generated in publicly financed institutes. They then can further develop promising projects together with pharmaceutical companies, or out-license.
48
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
The notion of open innovation and the problematic of knowledge transfer through channels and pipelines need to be clarified. In the sense of Chesbrough, open innovation means that ‘firms commercialise external (as well as internal) ideas by deploying outside (as well as in-house) pathways to the market’. The boundary between a firm and its surrounding actors has become more porous, enabling innovation to move easily between the interested players (Chesbrough 2003b, 37). However, the notion of ‘open innovation’ is misleading. Increased division of innovative activities, network membership and sharing of knowledge do not automatically mean augmented openness. On the contrary, exactly because the boundaries between a firm and its surrounding environment are more porous, intellectual property rights must be enforced as a consequence. Inand out-licensing are possible only when based on property rights. They have become bargaining chips for the exchange of technology between companies and for venture capital (Thumm 2002, 924). An increased but highly selective openness can be observed in the sense of intensified knowledge transfer from universities to firms and between firms. However, science and knowledge generation have not become more open in the sense of a free dissemination of knowledge and information. On the contrary, the stronger IPR regime encloses knowledge more than before. There is even the danger that knowledge produced by academic institutions loses the status of a ‘public good’ (Nelson 2004; David 2004). Open channels and closed pipelines of knowledge transfer closely interfere with one another (Owen-Smith and Powell 2004). Transactions are ‘pipelines’ when legally binding, confidential, contractual business is being transacted. But they rely on free contacts to ‘open science’. Publicly funded research institutes are major magnets for profit-seeking biotech firms and for large pharmaceuticals exactly because they operate with relatively open science conventions. However, in doing so, ‘big pharma’ tries to absorb a good portion of that knowledge exclusively (Zeller 2004). This shows that closed and open science are inseparably related; closed corporate innovation enclosed by property monopolies profits from open science in universities. How the processes of knowledge generation, acquisition and subsequent valorisation interact depends on financial constraints, regulatory conditions and power relations within an industry, between firms, and even within firms. Only codified knowledge can really be commercialised, either materialised in products or in the form of licences. The acquisition of knowledge through open channels is necessary in order to convert this knowledge into commerciable information. In contrast to the idealistic picture of open science and open innovation, in the regime of monopolised intellectual property rights, the economy is increasingly shaped by secretiveness and
IPRs and innovation systems: issues for global governance
49
patent disputes. Thus, technological progress adopts a quite specific face (Perelman 2002, 43). Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights and the Anti-commons Regime? The effects of the strengthened and extended intellectual property rights are increasingly the subject of critical discussions. Various studies show that an extensive granting of patents can block the free usage and accumulation of knowledge and hence hinder innovation processes (Coriat and Orsi 2002, 1504; Perelman 2002; Rai and Eisenberg 2003; David 2004; Nelson 2004; Orsi and Coriat 2005). First, this can happen if patents are granted too broadly and therefore close the gate on subsequent research in the same area. Second, there is the so-called anti-commons regime in biotechnology. If companies obtain private rights on DNA sequences, including fragments of a gene, before the corresponding gene, protein or the corresponding active substance has been identified, no one will be able to unify the rights or buy all licences. In such a case, various owners of fragmented goods are given the right to exclude all others, with the ultimate effect that the product will not be produced (Heller and Eisenberg 1998, 699). By creating the possibility of patenting gene fragments, regulatory authorities encouraged the race for private appropriation. However, the production of a recombinant protein drug and new genetic diagnostic test requires the combination of gene sequences. Third, innovation can be blocked if research tools, preliminary products for broad areas of research or key approaches are patented, and if the patent holder aggressively prosecutes unlicensed users or only grants one exclusive license (Nelson 2004, 464). Those who are willing to pay a large sum, generally speaking large companies, may be best capable of tackling those obstacles and creating monopoly-like situations with exclusive rights. In biotechnology, primarily in the area of genomics, different firms have practised a systematic accumulation of patents. This has permitted them to enclose whole areas of drug targets, substances or technologies and, accordingly, to impose an ‘immaterial toll’ to block other interested parties if they are not willing to pay licensing fees. Entire cascades of products, such as the sequence of a protein encoded by a gene, the antibodies of a protein, gene vectors, host cells and genetically manipulated animals used in the preclinical trials, are often based on patents on gene sequences. Patent holders can thus block future, still unknown usages and obtain rents from royalties (Coriat and Orsi 2002, 1498; Orsi 2002, 74; Cassier 2003, 71). Patents became a central valuation criterion not only for firms but also for academic research institutes. US universities increased their
50
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
licence-based income from 186 million USD in 1991 to 1.3 billion USD in 2001. Many universities depend to a large extent on such income to finance their research expenditures (Ernst & Young 2005, 123). The tendency to patent extensively and on an increasingly broad scale can hinder innovation processes. Companies which finance academic research require reliable and confidential results. This again discourages open interaction between researchers. But it is exactly in this way that academic research in the biosciences can distinguish itself from the business-oriented research (Cooke 2004, 167).
CHANGES OF IPR REGIMES AND NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS IN THE USA AND EUROPE All industrial sectors have experienced a drastic increase in the granting of patent during the last two decades. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) granted 76,748 patents in 1985, 107,124 in 1991 and 221,437 in 2002. A similar development happened in Europe. There were 42,957 applications for patents in 1985, 60,148 in 1991 and 110,640 in 2002 at the European Patent Office (EPO) (Khan and Dernis 2006, 51ff). From 1990 to 2000, the number of patents granted in biotechnology rose by 15 per cent a year at the USPTO and 10.5 per cent at the EPO, against a 5 per cent a year increase in overall patents. The number of gene patents granted has risen dramatically since the second half of the 1990s. In 2001, over 5,000 DNA patents were granted by the USPTO, more than the total for 1991–95 combined. Similarly, the EPO estimates it has approved several thousand patents for genetic inventions (OECD 2002, 8). Applications to the EPO for biotechnology patents rose from 2,453 in 1991 to about 6,200 in 2000, and slightly declined to 5,876 in 2002 (Khan and Dernis 2006, 34). The European Commission described this trend towards increased patenting activity as the ‘pro-patenting era’ (European Commission 1999, 14). This trend is expected to continue in the future, as different surveys have confirmed (Thumm 2004, 529). This inflation in patenting does not necessarily reflect an increase in inventive activity. It also expresses that patents are used for reasons other than the traditional appropriation function. This is generally known as ‘strategic patenting’ (Thumm 2003, 34; 2004, 529). This is not surprising in a context where knowledge and know-how in the form of patents have become a strategic commodity of firms. Kortum and Lerner (1999) explained this propatenting era with changes in management of innovation involving a shift towards more applied activities. Moreover, firms are more conscious of the importance of intellectual property rights. An increase in the bargaining
IPRs and innovation systems: issues for global governance
51
power of companies and higher product market competition are the most important factors underlying this trend in patenting (Thumm 2003, 15). These explanations need to be complemented with a broader social and economic perspective. The explosive expansion of intellectual property monopolies is less a result of technological breakthroughs than of farreaching economic and institutional changes. A new regime of intellectual property rights consisting of far-reaching institutional changes emerged. It was accompanied by a changed role for universities and publicly funded research, and cannot be separated from the ascent of concentrated financial capital, changes in financial markets and the entry of pension funds into venture capital. These complementing and reinforcing institutional complementarities strongly influence national and regional innovation systems (Coriat 2002a; Orsi 2002; Coriat et al. 2003, 240). The patent system is an important element of national innovation systems and of innovation policies in states. However, OECD countries are currently converging with respect to their policy designs in science and technology policies, which reflect similar constraints imposed by liberal policies. The US is the main model of reference for most changes and reforms (Braun 2004, 132). This convergence happens also in the field of intellectual property rights. In the context of globalisation of markets and the increasing importance of patents as means to secure investments the international patent system continuously increases its importance at the expense of national patenting procedures. The changes in the intellectual property regime in the US in the past three decades are crucial: first, because of the relevance of the US economy to global dynamics, and second because of the pioneer role of US policy. In the course of the implementation of the TRIPs (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) agreement, the US was able to enforce its ‘philosophy’ of intellectual property rights almost on a global scale (UNDP 1999; May 2000, 68ff; Coriat 2002b, 184). Below, first the major changes of the IPR regime in the US are presented. Then the measures towards homogenisation of intellectual property rights in Europe and the creation of a European IPR regime are described. Finally, it is shown how Germany, Switzerland and Denmark adapted their intellectual property rights regime to this changing framework.
BAYH-DOLE ACT AND CHANGING LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE USA Technologies developed over the course of the 1970s permit the modification of genetic substances. In 1980, the US Supreme Court for the first time
52
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
granted a patent for a genetically engineered micro-organism to General Electric (Diamond v. Chakrabarty). This decision marked a decisive turning point in US patent policy. Henceforth, inventors could enforce a monopoly claim on life-forms and gene sequences. Such patents unleash a considerably larger monopoly effect than one which monopolises only a production process (Coriat and Orsi 2002, 1498; Orsi 2002, 74; Cassier 2003, 69) A comprehensive change in the property rights regime then occurred: first, the judges decided that discoveries and not just inventions could be patented. Second, the directives of the USPTO in 1995 and the US courts also authorised patents which could be a basis for different further developments, even if their use could not be proven at the time of the patent application. The renunciation by the courts of industrial ‘utility’ as a criterion enabled the granting of patents on inventions the uses of which were in the very early stages of research (Orsi 2002, 71f). Thus scientific insights became the objects of systematic privatisation. Since research results can also be patented now at an early stage of the innovation process, it has become possible to block research activities which rely on these insights. Generally, the scope and reach of patents have been greatly extended. These institutional changes were conducted in light of a change in the universities’ role. In the 1970s and 1980s, universities were increasingly assigned the task of contributing to the re-establishment of the US economy’s international competitive position and technological leadership in certain areas. A cornerstone of this development was the Patent and Trademark Amendments Act, known as the Bayh-Dole Act, in 1980. It gave universities and public research institutes the chance to own property rights on results from research financed by federal money. The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, which could thus be viewed as ‘one part of a broader shift in US policy toward stronger intellectual property rights’ (Mowery and Sampat 2005, 228), was strongly promoted by US research universities active in patenting. Previously, universities once understood their mission to be the practice of open sciences and the elaboration of publicly accessible knowledge. Thus since 1980, universities have been able to patent their findings and subsequently commercialise them, be it by new start-up firms or through licensing of patents to other firms (Argyres and Liebeskind 1998, 435f; Coriat and Orsi 2002; Orsi 2002; Nelson 2004, 462).
HOMOGENISATION OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN EUROPE Although later, Europe is experiencing the same development towards stronger intellectual property rights. Two changes in the institutional
IPRs and innovation systems: issues for global governance
53
landscape are to be mentioned: first, in the context of the creation of a single European market, the harmonisation of intellectual property rights systems became more important. Second, the implementation of the TRIPS reinforced intellectual property right protection. Different national systems of intellectual property rights are in this political and economic context considered as non-tariff trade barriers. Intellectual property laws are usually nationally based, whereas competition is transnational. The national, European (European Patent Convention, EPC) and international (Patent Convention Treaty, PCT) patent rights exist in parallel within Europe. The use of the European patent system has risen tremendously during the last decade and has largely eclipsed the number of national patent applications in Europe (Thumm 2002, 921). The existing European patent system is based on the 1973 Munich Convention on the European Patent, in accordance with which the European Patent Organisation was established. The European Patent permits a patent application in an official language (English, French, German) of the European Patent Office (EPO) in a unified procedure to receive patent protection in all designated member states of the European Patent Convention of 1973. The European Patent Convention promoted administrative ease but did not introduce a single patent in the sense of enforcement with a material Europe-wide patent law (EPO 2006; Thumm 2002, 921). A European Community patent, covering with one right the entire territory of the European Union, has not yet been implemented. The proposal for a Community patent, made in 1975 (Convention for the European Patent for the common market) and again in 1989 (Agreement relating to Community patents), has still not been adopted. The Member States were reluctant to establish a European Community Patent because of the high costs of translation into all the official EU languages and because Member States still consider the granting of patents as a matter for national sovereignty (Thumm 2002, 921). Currently, the Community Patent is still the object of controversy. However, the European Commission launched a new initiative to move towards the implementation of a Community Patent on January 16, 2006 (European Commission 2002, 2006). This renewed effort is in line with the life sciences and biotechnology strategy demanding explicitly a European Community Patent adopted in January 2002 which is an element of the competitive agenda of the EU decided at its Lisbon summit in 2000. There is still a possibility of different interpretations by national laws and national courts in the European patent system. But during the 1980s, European industry increased its pressure to unify the European regulation
54
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
for biotechnological inventions and to obtain patents on life forms. Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, adopted after a 10-year debate, was a further step toward harmonisation (EP and EC 1998). The EU countries should have integrated it into their national law by July 2000. But the Directive still continues to be debated in some countries. The Directive does not create any specific patent law for biotechnological inventions. It rather makes adaptations and amendments which the national legislators must implement. National patent laws remain the essential basis for the legal appropriation of biotechnological inventions (Thumm 2002, 924; 2003, 44). Heavily discussed in European countries was the patentability of DNA sequences. The Directive excludes the human body and the discovery of one of its parts (for example a gene) or parts of it from patentability. However, a part of the human body (for example a human hormone, a human gene or nucleotide sequence) that is derived from genetic research and isolated from the human body by means of a technical procedure is patentable, even if the isolated part is completely identical to the natural part in the human body. In this respect, there is a convergence of patent policy in Europe and in the US. Both patent offices provided a large number of patents for gene sequences (Schöllhorn and Büchel 2002, 41; Thumm 2002, 926). A major difference between the patent systems in the European countries and the US concerns the timing of the patent application. The first to invent system in the US requires for novelty that an invention must not have been in public use or on sale or patented or described in a printed publication prior to one year before the US filing. The European system is a first to file patent system. The researcher applying first for a patent has priority over those having made the same invention but who arrived at the patent office later. In the US the researcher can profit from a so-called grace period of 12 months during which she/he can publish her/his results without making a later patent application impossible. The grace period is criticised in particular by industry representatives because it creates a period of uncertainty mainly in complex and competitive fields such as biotechnology. However, universities, research institutes and firms collaborating with public institutes also favour such a grace period in Europe (Schöllhorn and Büchel 2002, 44; Thumm 2002, 923). Bayh-Dole inspired legislation steps up the role of universities in taking out patents on the inventions of their employee scientists. Preparations for this legislation have not included systematic studies of the manner and the extent to which university scientists, prior to the legislation, were involved in commercial patenting. Nor was any consideration given to how this involvement could be affected by such legislation.
IPRs and innovation systems: issues for global governance
55
In the wake of this wave of legislation across Europe several recent studies demonstrate that university invented patents are far more prevalent than university owned patents, for example in Italy (Balconi, Breschi and Lissoni 2004), Finland (Meyer 2003) and Germany (Schmoch 2000). The same pattern is identified for single large universities, for example, the Louis Pasteur University (Llerena, Matt and Schaeffer 2003; Saragossi and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie 2003). A recent study offers a useful overview of these findings (Crespi, Geuna and Nesta 2005) and presents results from a large analysis of 9,000 EPO patents across six European countries, identifying one inventor in each. The sample also includes a small segment of 294 inventor contributions from university scientists, which gave rise to only 85 university assignments. University-invented, company-owned patenting turns up as a far more prevalent mode of academic contribution to technological invention than is the mode in which universities are assigned patent rights. For the overall contribution of academia to the technological performance of European companies it emerges as an important issue if that contribution is negatively affected by Bayh-Dole inspired legislation, and if, in that case, adequate new mechanisms appear as substitutes. These issues are addressed below based on an empirical study on the effects of the Danish version of Bayh-Dole.
STRONG FEDERALIST SUPPORT POLICY AND REGULATORY ADAPTATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT IN GERMANY For a long period Bayer and Hoechst were among the leading chemical and pharmaceutical companies in the world. This traditionally strong position was lost in the 1990s. No longer is there a German pharmaceutical company among the global top ten. Only specialised pharmaceutical firms such as Schering (acquired recently by Bayer) and large firms still owned by families such as Boehringer Ingelheim and Merck KGaA were able to defend their strong position. The biotech industry in Germany also emerged in the early 1990s, more than 10 years later than in the US. The rise of the biotech industry in Germany has been characterised by the economic and political ambition to catch up compared to the US and Britain. On the federal level, three political measures substantially influenced the evolution of biotechnology in Germany: first, the establishment of the genomics centres in Berlin, Heidelberg, Cologne and Munich between 1984 and 1989, second the adoption of gene technology law in 1990 and
56
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
its amendment in 1993, and, third, the BioRegio contest organised by the BMBF (Federal Ministry for Education and Research) in 1995. This BioRegio contest of 1995 played a crucial role. Actors in regions were invited to submit proposals and to describe how commercialisation of biotechnology in their region could be promoted. The winners, the three most organised regional organisations, Initiativkreis Biotechnologie München, BioRegio Rheinland and BioRegio Rhein-Neckar-Dreieck, each received €25 million over five years to invest in biotechnology. BioRegio Jena in East Germany was awarded a further grant of €15 million. This competition activated a start-up dynamic in these winner regions and also in other regions. The BioRegio contest was an expression of a deliberate policy to promote the commercialization process of the technological potential in order to improve national competitiveness. Due to the federalist structure of Germany this policy was implemented on a regional level, institutionally using the rivalry between regions in Germany (Adelberger 1999, 7; Giesecke 2000, 218; Reiss 2001, 143; Zeller 2001: 66). The BioRegio contest was followed by a series of further promotion programs of the BMBF. BioProfile supported the specialisation of established bioregions. BioChance launched in 1999 funded certain highly risky R&D projects conducted by small and medium-sized biotech companies. Until 2005 it supported young firms translating their biotechnology knowledge into new products totalling €50 million. Starting in 2003 BioChancePlus offered €100 million for project submissions to small and medium biotechnology firms. By means of the BioFuture contest the BMBF will finance young scientists in biotechnology and related fields totalling 75 million Euro until 2010 (Kaiser and Prange 2004, 402; Ernst & Young 2006b, 97). In the context of a so-called innovation offensive, the BMBF started a High-tech Masterplan in 2003 which aimed at better access to venture capital, the creation of a competitive tax environment and new collaboration models between public research and small enterprise. This plan was less specifically directed to biotechnology- than to technology-based companies in general. Additionally, on the level of the Bundesländer, especially Bavaria, the biotechnology industry was promoted by different cluster initiatives implemented by the Bundesländer (Ernst & Young 2004, 111; 2006b, 100). In parallel the German government began to adapt its regulatory framework, especially in the field of intellectual property rights, to the general trend in Europe which had began even earlier in the US. In June 2003 the German government decided to transpose European Community Directive 98/44 into national law, and in March 2004 the German parliament started consultations on the Directive. The biotechnology sector
IPRs and innovation systems: issues for global governance
57
strongly supported the swift implementation of the European Biopatent Directive (Reiss and Hinze 2004, 56). In Germany, university patents were traditionally regulated by the Inventions made by Employees Act (ArbNErfG). In order to promote freedom of research it included a so-called ‘professor privilege’, according to which the university inventor and not the university was the owner of the patent. This regulation was criticised by some practitioners and industry representatives. They argued that the research institutions had no incentives to support patent applications (Giesecke 2000, 211). In 2002 the ArbNErfG was amended, transferring responsibility for patent application from the inventor working at a university to the institution. The aim of this amendment consisted of encouraging patenting activities in universities. Accordingly, since February 2002 an inventor, if he wants to publish his results, has to present the invention to the employing research institution, which has to prove the need for applying for a patent. The institution can decide whether it wants to file a patent application or leave the invention to the inventor for application. Inventors receive 30 per cent of the profits (Reiss and Hinze 2004, 43, 55f). The abolition of the ‘professor privilege’ encouraged the universities to create their own structures for the commercialisation of inventions and patents. However, an inventor can abstain from publication and therefore impede or prevent a patent application. This possibility creates uncertainty for firms interested in collaborating with universities. This shows that, depending on the specific societal context, a regulatory amendment can provoke results which were not originally intended. However, the German biotech industry remained relatively weak compared to those in Britain and Switzerland, despite strong government support and the considerable public financing of the biotech sector. This raises the question of the extent to which such a promotion policy, applied in specific historical, economic and societal contexts and trajectories, can be an adequate means to improve so-called national competitiveness.
FEDERALIST LIBERAL SCIENCE POLICY AND ADAPTATION OF FAVOURABLE REGULATORY CONDITIONS IN SWITZERLAND Switzerland has traditionally applied a very liberal style in determining technology policy. Although Swiss governments, both at the federal and canton level, have always fostered the promotion of academic research, undertaking technological research was, for ideological reasons, mainly left to the business sector. Federal administration has traditionally been
58
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
weak (Braun 2004, 107f). Swiss government strategy consists in developing excellent research in some selected priority areas. Applied technological research is mainly concentrated in a few multinational enterprises. Particularly, in the field of the pharmaceutical and biomedical industries large transnational companies are responsible for the main part of research expenditure. The Swiss federal government has not conceived a more active technology policy. It focuses on providing a good infrastructure and favourable legal conditions. The innovation system worked almost without extra-university government-financed research institutes that could have been used for technology policy purposes. Switzerland has a long tradition of niche specialisation and the development of highvalue added products. This strategy has been highly successful including remarkable results in basic research (Arvanitis et al. 2003, 37ff, 65, 81; Braun 2004, 109f). The universities (Basel, Zürich, Lausanne and Geneva) as well as the Federal Institutes of Technology (ETH Zürich and EPF Lausanne) have been crucial for the creation of new ventures and technology transfer. Novartis and Roche, two major pharmaceutical companies both located in Basel, played another central role in the formation process of the Swiss biotechnology industry. Therefore, the large majority of biotech firms in Switzerland are concentrated in the same regions. In line with the policy mentioned above, which consisted in strengthening selected technological fields, the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF) launched the Swiss Priority Program Biotechnology (SPP Biotechnology) in 1992 with public funds. A total of six research modules in biotechnology and complementary activities in continuing education, information, communication, technology assessment and technology transfer were designated to receive state support over a period of 10 years, ending in December 2001. The SPP Biotechnology had the objective of promoting strategic, applied biotechnology research in Switzerland. This program contributed to the creation of 18 new companies. The program budget included SFr100 million allocated by the Swiss Federation. Additionally, some SFr40 million cause from industry, as well as more than SFr60 million of venture capital throughout the duration of the program (Carrin et al. 2003, 42). One outcome of the SPP was the creation of the technology transfer office, Biotectra, in 1996. Unitectra, the technology transfer organisation of the universities of Berne and Zürich and the SNF’s SPP Biotechnology was founded in 1999 and is the successor institution of Biotectra (Carrin et al. 2003, 28). The other universities created their respective technology transfer organisations. In 2001, the SNF launched the first 14 National Centres of Competence in Research (NCCR) which represented a new instrument of research and technology
IPRs and innovation systems: issues for global governance
59
policy after completion of the SPP. In the field of life sciences, four NCCRs have been started. They have focused on research in genetics, neurosciences, structural biology and molecular oncology (Carrin et al. 2003, 25f, 42). The CTI (Commission for Technology and Innovation) assumes an important role in the biotech promotion policy. The CTI has been a traditional key instrument of the Swiss federal government’s technology policy. In 2000, it became the ‘federal agency for applied research and development’. The CTI promotes applied research and development projects through public–private partnerships and supports start-ups. The CTI Start-up initiative begun in 1995 boosts entrepreneurship at the junction between universities and industry. It supports the commercialization process of products and especially companies in their start-up phase. It selects new firms for venture capital financing and grants them the ‘CTI Start-up label’ which qualifies them to access CTI support and venture capital. This label also helps to convince potential investors investing in a project. Through its Life Sciences section, the CTI backs applied R&D projects based on a public–private partnership model (50/50 funding as a basic rule) and facilitates a transfer from SNF to CTI funding. For example, it supports follow-up projects stemming from the National Centres of Competence in Research (NCCR) (Carrin, et al. 2003, 21, 62; Ernst & Young 2006a, 10f). In contrast to Germany, Switzerland does not recognise a socalled ‘professor-privilege’. According to the Swiss Law of Obligation (Obligationenrecht/OR), inventions made by employees in the course of their employment belong to the employer. Consequently, the universities and research organisations are the applicant and owner of the patents claiming such inventions. The government combined the liberal attitude with a careful adaptation of legal conditions. Although Switzerland is not a member of the European Union, its government has very consciously harmonised its regulatory framework in strategically important fields with the framework of the EU. In keeping with this pattern, in 1999 the parliament engaged the Federal Council to adapt the patent law to the European Biotech Directive, passed by the European Parliament and Council in 1998. This revision aims to bring the patent law into conformity with the EU Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions (Thumm 2003, 4). Mainly, the pharmaceutical and biotechology industries have lobbied for the revision. This revision also partially takes into account the interests of academic research in biotechnology. The draft revision of the patent law adopted by the Swiss Federal Council in November 2005 defines two major issues (Ernst & Young 2006a, 16f):
60
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation Patentability of genes: According to the EU directive 98/44, isolated genes as such are patentable. In Switzerland, however, naturally occurring genes would be excluded from patenting under the new law. This is a restriction of patentability that goes beyond the practice applied by the EPO. However, it would continue to be possible to patent ‘derived sequences’ such as the cDNA produced by PCR (Polymerase Chain Reaction), under the condition that at least one function of these sequences is known. This means that the properties and applications of sequences that are derived from gene sequences must already be described in the patent application. Adding them later is no longer possible. This is intended to prevent speculative patent applications. Patentability of human beings and their body parts: In agreement to European Directive 98/44, the human body as such and human physical components in their natural environment shall also be excluded from patenting. The subject of a patent is a technical teaching as to how human beings can utilize nature in a new way for commercial purposes. This technical beneficial effect makes the discovery an invention under patent law. However, isolated and perhaps technologically modified components of the human body outside their natural environment (such as isolated and possibly genetically modified blood cells) are patentable. Explicitly excluded in the new patent law and also corresponding to Directive 98/44/EC are cloning of human organisms, chimeras with human germ cells, modification of human germ line cells or unmodified human embryonic stem cells.
Role of Patents in Swiss Biotechnology There is not much empirical evidence available on the impact of intellectual property rights in biotechnology. In the context of the revision process of the patent law the Swiss government requested the Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property to analyse the impact of patents on biotechnological innovations and the economic implications of patents (Thumm 2003). The number of patent applications rises with firm size. However some very active small companies are strongly dependent on patenting and commercialisation. Small companies consider patents to be highly important for acquiring venture capital. They are also more innovative in terms of patent applications per employee in research and development. Similarly, research institutes consider their patents to be important for obtaining financing research and development. For most companies having participated in this survey patents are very important for collaborations with other companies and for timing their scientific publications. Particularly, large companies pay attention to patents when they examine possibilities for collaborations or mergers (Thumm 2003, 19, 23; 2004, 534). Not surprisingly and in line with the economic structure of the country the patent applications of Swiss firms are internationalised. This is expressed in a high number of triadic patents (patent applications
IPRs and innovation systems: issues for global governance
61
filed with the European Patent Office, the US Patent and Trademark Office and the Japanese Patent Office). Switzerland takes the eighth place in triadic patent families, and measured in patent families per million inhabitants Switzerland is the leading country, together with Sweden (OECD 2003). Swiss biotech firms normally apply also for European and US patents (Thumm 2003, 17ff).
EFFECTS OF BAYH-DOLE INSPIRED LEGISLATION ON THE BIOTECH INNOVATION SYSTEM IN DENMARK This section takes a closer look at some of the implications which BayhDole inspired legislation (discussed in previous sections) has had for the coherence of innovation systems (discussed in the first section of this chapter) in Denmark, focusing on the effects on industry–university (I–U) collaboration in biotech research (Valentin and Jensen 2006). In the 1950s both Denmark and Sweden enacted legislation explicitly excepting academic scientists from the general principle whereby employers hold the right to inventions produced by their employees. Referred to as the ‘teacher’s exception’ (similar to what in Germany was referred to above as the ‘professor’s privilege’, this principle has been maintained in Sweden until now, but was changed in Denmark on January 1, 2000 in the Law on University Patenting (LUP).2 The Act transfers to universities the ownership of inventions made as part of the work of employees. That also pertains to inventions resulting from collaborative work with third parties (for example firms), but in these cases the university may renounce the right to the inventions made by the project. Sweden has maintained its teachers exception, but is currently considering reforms in this area. Hence, comparing post-LUP patterns in I–U collaboration in Denmark with Sweden offers possibilities of a quasi-controlled experiment. Such a comparison benefits from the broad similarities between the two countries, and from the fact that regulations of university IPR uniformly affect all academic research, unmodified by national variations between for example, private v public universities, or by variations at lower levels of government (länder or states). This comparison is particularly informative if referring to a field in which I–U collaboration plays a significant role. That is the case in biotechnology where a number of studies have documented the strong reliance of firms on knowledge transfer from academic science (Santos 2003; Powell 1998; Liebeskind, Oliver, Zucker and Brewer, 1996; Fuchs 2003). Biotech is also a field in which the two countries are strikingly similar,
62
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
particularly when we focus on the segment of Dedicated Biotechnology Firms (DBFs) specialised in drug discovery. This segment emerged in the two countries at the same time during the 1990s, and has grown to the same number of firms, with quite similar patenting profiles. Denmark has 51 DBFs, of which 48 have filed patents. In Sweden 41 of the total of 44 DBFs have filed patents. The data by which the study compares Denmark and Sweden are extracted from all the 1,087 patents filed by these firms. Inventors listed (by name and area only) on each patent front page were identified and their organisational affiliation was established3 as per the date of patent application. These 3,640 inventor identifications permit the calculation of the share of university scientists for each patent, and of aggregated shares for each country, for specific periods. The effects of LUP on the share of university scientists in these patents are examined, defining the ‘event date’ with a lag of one year (that is, January 2001), since the law respects collaborative arrangements established prior to its enactment. Tests are made for LUP-related shifts (1) in the share of domestic scientists (that is, Danish university scientists contributing to patented inventions assigned to Danish DBF), and (2) in the share of non-domestic university scientists. For both share differences between pre- and post-LUP levels, comparing Denmark and Sweden, are tested by Difference-in-Difference (DD) regressions. Furthermore, to enhance the interpretation of DD findings, tests are made for LUP-related shifts in trends, of shares of university scientists, aggregated separately for the two countries by quarters. These tests bring out the following: ●
●
●
Since the mid 1990s the number of DBF patents in Sweden and Denmark as a whole has increased steeply, as has the number of academic scientists contributing to inventions in absolute number. An increase is also observed in academic inventors as a share of all inventors. Throughout the 1994–2004 period, academic involvement in Swedish patents was notably above what was seen in Danish patents. However, the Danish pattern, until the introduction of LUP, quite systematically converged towards the higher Swedish level. Compared to the Swedish control group, the DD regression identifies a drop of 12.6 per cent in the share of domestic academic inventors behind the Danish patents, specifically attributable to the event. In the trend analyses this appears as a reversal of the previous convergence towards the higher Swedish level into a sharp downward trend.
IPRs and innovation systems: issues for global governance ●
63
Non-domestic inventors on the whole are involved with notably lower shares as compared to domestic inventors, and also in this respect the Danish level is below that of Sweden. However DD regressions identify a significant increase in Danish non-domestic shares of 13.7 per cent, as compared to the Swedish control group, specifically for the post-LUP period. The trend analysis in this case offers only tenuous results, but they suggest a steep increase in the Danish post-event involvement of non-domestic inventors. Consistent yearly increases were observed over the four post-event years, bringing the level from 4.9 per cent to 11 per cent of all Danish inventor contributions.
Taken together these findings strongly indicate a Danish pattern, significantly distinct from the Swedish counterpart, of a post-LUP decrease in the involvement of domestic academic scientists. At the same time, non-domestic university scientists to a notable extent substitute for their domestic counterparts in Danish inventor teams. To see this decline in university involvement in context the study examines whether Danish academics in the life sciences instead redirect their inventiveness into university-owned patents, as indeed was one of LUP’s key objectives. The number of domestic academic inventor contributions to university-owned patents, in relevant IPC categories, filed following the LUP is identified. This number may be subtracted from the number of inventor contributions equivalent to the 12 per cent post-LUP decline detected in the DD regression. On this basis the study estimates the extent to which university owned patents provide a substitutive outlet. The two variations of this estimate presented in the study indicate substitutions at rates of 19 per cent and 26 per cent. University-owned patents, in other words, are very far from providing a substituting outlet for the inventive potential of university scientists previously mobilised for company-owned drug discovery patents. By far the largest part of this academic inventive potential simply seems to have been rendered inactive as an effect of LUP. To examine the causes behind observed LUP effects the study is underpinned by interviews with academics and DBFs selected from the patent data on which the study is based, identifying explanations consistent with quantitative results from other studies (D’Este and Patel 2005). The interviews bring out that collaborations typically are concerned with exploratory research, referred to by some firms as ‘pre-project research’. DBFs enter such collaborations well aware that it is highly uncertain if and how results will be commercially relevant, and that they become so only based on an unknown body of subsequent in-house R&D. Firms tend to find
64
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
this set-up inconsistent with the LUP principle that universities ex ante own the rights to resultant inventions, and reduce the involvement of Danish academic scientists accordingly. For their part, academic scientists typically collaborate in exploratory research to deploy some specialised research experience, which collaboration may be enhanced by offering better research funding, access to an interdisciplinary environment or to the specialised research facilities of the industrial partner. The academic scientist collaborates on such explorative research, in other words, based on skills and motivations which would not allow her to pursue equivalent patenting on her own. This explanation clarifies not only why LUP has brought about a decline in collaboration within exploratory research. It also explains why LUP would not necessarily have similar effects in university research operating in ‘down-stream’ fields closer to technology. Down-stream fields are less demanding in terms of complex, post-discovery development, so here academics are better positioned to invent on their own, without relying on clues and information from industrial partners. Furthermore, in cases where such downstream issues are addressed in collaborative projects, they also lend themselves more easily to ex ante allocation of IPRs. Implications for the Danish Innovation System in Biotechnology Several studies document that research collaborations in biotechnology are established with a strong preference for partners from the same country, even the same region (Allansdottir, Bonaccorsi, Gambardella, Mariani, Orsenigo, Pammolli and Riccaboni 2002; Coenen, Moodysson and Asheim 2004). The advantage of proximate research relationships is not derived from superior qualities of partners who just happen to be local. Rather it comes from the fact that proximate relations tend to be embedded in networks in which actors have repeated interactions and learn about each other over time via multiple channels (Powell 1998; Pyka and Küppers 2003). In this way networks become architectures capable of retaining and transmitting vastly richer information about each actor, as compared to arm’s-length relationships to partners who are distant (in the sense of not being part of the network) (Reagans and McEvily 2004). That is why networks offer superior capacity for searches, allowing actors with complex agendas to access the types of complementarity which give rise to effective research partnering (Valentin and Jensen 2002). However, depending on which activities are carried out and their respective knowledge bases, such networks can also have a global reach, as is the case with epistemic communities (Moodysson et al. forthcoming). For the issues in this chapter the implication of this argument is that an
IPRs and innovation systems: issues for global governance
65
important part of the value emerging from industry–academia collaborations lies in the quality of the network through which either side may undertake effective search so as to identify ‘the right complementarity at the right time’. Danish DBFs have no advantage above that of DBFs from other countries when it comes to the search in the global ‘market’ for academic collaboration. But they do have an advantage in the search in the Danish academic setting, since there are strong indications that they are particularly well connected with Danish universities. The authors behind the LUP analysis summarised above in another study identify all founders and board members affiliated with all Danish and Swedish DBFs through their first year of existence (Valentin and Jensen 2005). This study shows that the vast majority of founders and board members are recruited from Danish organisations. Founder teams involving Danish university scientists established more than half of Danish DBFs. Similarly academics were present on more than half of the boards that took firms through their first year of business. These compositions of founder teams and boards make them highly effective in subsequent search into the academic potential for research collaboration. These figures bring out the particular connectivity which Danish DBFs have into Danish academia. In turn this connectivity is a key asset for scientists from both the academic and the industrial side when they look for the complementarity of skills and agendas which is so important for making university–industry research collaboration effective and useful for both commercial and scientific objectives. The chapter demonstrates, consistently with this argument, that this composition of founders and boards matters for the ability of Danish DBFs to establish the diversity of inventor collaborations which in turn affects their commercial performance (Valentin and Jensen 2005). These observations substantiate that research networks are an important part of the Danish innovation system in biotechnology, and that it matters significantly for the inventiveness and competitiveness of firms. It is therefore cause for concern that LUP, as an unforeseen consequence, induced Danish biotech firms to disengage themselves from the national research network, substituting instead a search in the global market for academic research partners. It signifies that LUP, as an unintended side effect, seems to have induced an erosion of parts of the national innovation system of considerable value for Danish science-based competitiveness.
CONCLUSIONS IPR as a regulatory institution in innovation systems can play a decisive role with a potentially significant impact on the governance of the
66
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
innovation systems. In this chapter we have shown that across industrial sectors there has been a dramatic increase in patents granted during the last two decades both in the US and in Europe. In Europe, Switzerland is the leading country measured in patent families per million inhabitants, followed by Sweden. This reflects the strength of the pharmaceutical biotech industry in these two countries in contrast to Germany, the biotech industry of which has remained weak compared to those of Britain and Switzerland. However, this big increase in the use of IPRs is more a result of economic and institutional changes than of technological breakthroughs. A new regime of IPRs emerged accompanied by a change in the role of universities and publicly funded research, and thus, had major impacts on the functioning of regional and national innovation systems. The US has been the model of reference for most of these changes and reforms led by the introduction of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980. Also in Europe BayhDole legislation has been influential, for example in stepping up the role of universities taking out patents on the inventions carried out by their employed scientists. However, company-owned, university-initiated patenting represents a more important academic contribution to technological invention than university-owned patent rights. Moreover, the Danish example showed that the introduction of a Bayh-Dole inspired law has had negative impacts on university–industry collaboration in contrast to the situation in Sweden, which still deserves the principle of ‘teachers exception’. As shown in the chapter the consequences of introducing IPR differ according to sectors, knowledge bases, phases in the innovation process, and political-institutional frameworks. A patent based IPR makes a ‘better fit’ in certain sectors and knowledge bases than in others, and works better in specific political environments than in others depending on the types of institutional complementarities present. There may, for example, be a real problem with the current IPR system favouring radical innovations when biotechnology develops from early-phase, hi-tech to more generally diffused multi-tech. All this provides strong arguments against a global generic patent system.
NOTES 1. The Bayh-Dole Act policy can, however, have disadvantageous effects even in the US. However, the US system is a global system and only works reasonably well because it can attract values from other parts of the globe. 2. The Act on Inventions at Public Research Institutions of June 2, 1999 may be accessed at http://www.videnskabsministeriet.dk/cgi-bin/doc-show.cgi?doc_id=14206&leftmenu=
IPRs and innovation systems: issues for global governance
67
LOVSTOF. An English translation is available at http://www.videnskabsministeriet.dk/ cgi-bin/doc-show.cgi?doc_id=20047&doc_type=22&leftmenu=1. 3. The methodology for inventor tracking is described in Valentin and Jensen (2006).
REFERENCES Adelberger, K.E. 1999, ‘A Developmental German State? Explaining Growth in German Biotechnology and Venture Capital’, BRIE Working Paper 134, 24. Allansdottir, A., A. Bonaccorsi, A. Gambardella, M. Mariani, L. Orsenigo, F. Pammolli and M. Riccaboni. 2002, ‘Innovation and competitiveness in European biotechnology’, Enterprise Papers 7, Brussels: Enterprise DirectorateGeneral, European Commission. Argyres, N.S. and J.P. Liebeskind. 1998, ‘Privatizing the Intellectual Commons: Universities and the Commercialization of Biotechnology’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 35(4), 427–54. Arora, A. and R.P. Merges. 2004, ‘Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm Boundaries’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 13(3), 451–75. Arvanitis, S., H. Hollenstein and D. Marmet. 2003, ‘Die Schweiz auf dem Weg zu einer wissensbasierten Ökonomie: eine Bestandesaufnahme’. Studie im Auftrag des Staatssekretariats für Wirtschaft. Bern: Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft (seco). 186 Supplement. Asheim, B. and M. Gertler. 2005, ‘The Geography of Innovation: Regional Innovation Systems’, in J. Fagerberg, D. Mowery and R. Nelson (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Innovation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 291–317. Asheim, B. et al. (2007), ‘Constructing Knowledge-based Regional Advantage: Implications for Regional Innovation Policy’, International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management, 7, 140–55. Balconi, M., S. Breschi and F. Lissoni. 2004, ‘Networks of Inventors and the Role of Academia: an Exploration of Italian Patent Data’, Research Policy, 33(1), 127–45. Bathelt, H., A. Malmberg and P. Maskell. 2004, ‘Clusters and Knowledge: Local Buzz, Global Pipelines and the Process of Knowledge Creation’, Progress in Human Geography, 28(1), 31–56. Boschma, R. 2004 ‘Rethinking Regional Innovation Policy: The Making and Breaking of Regional History’, in G. Fuchs and P. Shapira (eds), Rethinking Regional Innovation and Change: Path Dependency or Regional Breakthroughs? Dordrecht: Kluwer International Publishers, pp. 249–720. Braun, D. 2004, ‘From Divergence to Convergence: Shifts in the Science and Technology Policy of Japan and Switzerland’, Swiss Political Science Review, 10(3), 103–35. Carrin, B.J., Y. Harayama, J.A.K. Mack and Z. Zarin-Nejadan. 2003, ‘Science– technology–Industry Network – The Competitiveness of Swiss Biotechnology: A Case Study of Innovation’, RIETI Discussion Paper Series 04-E-007: Geneva, Tohoku, Neuchâtel: Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry. Casper, S. and R. Whitley. 2004 ‘Managing Competences in Entrepreurial Technology Firms: a Comparative Institutional Analysis of Germany, Sweden and the UK’. Research Policy, 33, 89–106.
68
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
Chesbrough, H.W. 2003a, ‘The Era of Open Innovation’, Sloan Management Review, 44(3), 35–41. Chesbrough, H.W. 2003b, ‘The Logic of Open Innovation: Managing Intellectual Property’, California Management Review, 45(3), 33–58. Coenen, L., J. Moodysson and B.T. Asheim. 2004, ‘Nodes, Networks and Proximities: On the Knowledge Dynamics of the Medicon Valley Biotech Cluster’, European Planning Studies, 12(7), 1003–19. Cooke, P. 1998, ‘Introduction: Origins of the Concept,’ in H. Braczyk, P. Cooke and M. Heidenreich (eds), Regional Innovation Systems. London: UCL Press 2–25. Cooke, P. 2001, Regional Innovation Systems, Clusters, and the Knowledge Economy. Industrial and Corporate Change, 10(4), 945–74. Cooke, P. 2004, ‘The Molecular Biology Revolution and the Rise of Bioscience Megacentres in North America and Europe’, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 22(2), 161–77. Cooke, P. 2005, ‘Regionally Asymmetric Knowledge Capabilities and Open Innovation. Exploring “Globalisation 2” – A New Model of Industry Organisation’, Research Policy, 34(8), 1128–49. Cooke, P. et al. 2000, The Governance of Innovation in Europe. Regional Perspectives on Global Competitiveness, London: Pinter. Coriat, B. 2002a, ‘Le nouvau régime américain de la propriété intellectuelle. Contours et caractéristiques clés’, Revue d’économie industrielle 99(2), 17–32. Coriat, B. 2002b, ‘Du “Super 301” aux TRIPS: la “vocation impériale” du nouveau droit américain de la propriété intellectuelle’, Revue d’économie industrielle 99(2), 179–90. Coriat, B. and F. Orsi 2002, ‘Establishing a New Intellectual Property Rights Regime in the United States: Origins, Content and Problems’, Research Policy, 31(8–9), 1491–1507. Coriat, B., F. Orsi and O. Weinstein. 2003, ‘Does Biotech Reflect a New Sciencebased Innovation Regime?’, Industry and Innovation, 10(3), 231–53. Crespi, G., A. Geuna and L. Nesta. 2005, ‘Labour Mobility from Academia to Business’, DRUID Summer Conference, Copenhagen Business School, June 27–29, http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=2773&Cf=18 Dasgupta, P. and P.A. David. 1994, ‘Toward a New Economics of Science’, Research Policy, 23(5), 487–521. David, P.A. 2004, ‘Can “Open Science” be Protected from the Evolving Regime of IPR Protections’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 160(1), 9–34. D’Este, P. and P. Patel, 2005, ‘University – Industry Linkages in the UK: What are the Factors Determining the Variety of Interactions with Industry?’, DRUID Summer Conference Copenhagen Business School, June 27–29, http://www. druid.dk/uploads/tx_picturedb/ds2005-1447.pdf. Edquist, C. 1997, ‘Introduction’, in: C. Edquist (ed.) Systems of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions and Organisations. London: Pinter. European Parliament and European Commission. 1998, Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc? smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=31998LØØ44&mod el=guichatt European Patent Office. 2006, European Patent Convention. http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/index.html, accessed 8 May 2006.
IPRs and innovation systems: issues for global governance
69
Ernst & Young (ed.). 2004, ‘Per Aspera Ad Astra “Der steinige Weg zu den Sternen”’. Deutscher Biotechnologie-Report. Mannheim: Ernst & Young. Ernst & Young (ed.). 2005, ‘Kräfte der Evolution’. Deutscher BiotechnologieReport. Mannheim: Ernst & Young. Ernst & Young. 2006a, Swiss Biotech Report 2006. Basel, Zürich: Ernst & Young. Ernst & Young (ed.). 2006b, ‘Zurück in die Zukunft’. Deutscher BiotechnologyReport. Mannheim: Ernst & Young. Etzkowitz, H. and L. Leydesdorff. 2000, ‘The Dynamics of Innovation: from National Systems and “mode 2” to a Triple Helix of University-IndustryGovernment Relations’. Research Policy, 29, 109–1023. European Commission. 1999, ‘Strategic Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in the Context of Science and Technology Policy’, ETAN Working Paper. Prepared by an independent ETAN Expert Working Group for the European Commission Directorate General XII - Science, Research and Development Directorate AP - Policy Co-ordination and Strategy, Ftp://Ftp.cordis.europa. eu/pub/etan/docs/ipr-seminar-report.pdf. European Commission. 2002, ‘Life Sciences and Biotechnology – A Strategy for Europe’. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2002) 27. European Commission. 2006, Consultation and public hearing on future patent policy in Europe: The European Commission, Internal Market. Webpage 16 Jan. 2006, 3 July 2006, 16 Aug. 2006. http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ indprop/patent/consultation_en.htm. Fagerberg, J. et al. 2005, The Oxford Handbook of Innovation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Freeman, C. 1987, Technology Policy and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan. London: Pinter. Freeman, C. 1995. ‘The “National System of Innovation” in Historical Perspective’. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 19, 5–24. Fuchs, G. 2003, ‘Biotechnology in Comparative Perspective’, London: Routledge. Gibbons, M. et al. 1994, The New Production of Knowledge – The Dynamics of Science and Research in ConTemporary Societies, London: Sage (reprinted 1999). Giesecke, S. 2000, ‘The Contrasting Roles of Government in the Development of Biotechnology Industry in the US and Germany’, Research Policy, 29(2), 205–23. Granstrand, O. 2005, ‘Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights’, in J. Fagerberg et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Innovation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 266–90. Heller, M.A. and R.S. Eisenberg. 1998, ‘Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research’, Science, 280, 698–701. Husson, M. 2001, Le grand bluff capitaliste. Paris: La Dispute. Jessop, B. 2000, ‘The State and the Contradictions of the Knowledge-driven Economy’, in J.R. Bryson; P.W. Daniels, N. Henry and J. Pollard (eds), Knowledge, Space, Economy. London and New York: Routledge, 63–78. Johnson, B. et al. 2002, ‘Why All this Fuss about Codified and Tacit Knowledge?’, Industrial and Corporate Change 11(2), 245–62. Kaiser, R. and H. Prange. 2004, ‘The Reconfiguration of National Innovation
70
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
Systems – the Example of German Biotechnology’, Research Policy, 33(3), 395–408. Kaufmann, A. and F. Tödtling. 2001, ‘Science-Industry Interaction in the Process of Innovation: The Importance of Boundary-Crossing Between Systems’. Research Policy, 30, 791–804. Khan, M. and H. Dernis. 2006, ‘Global Overview of Innovative Activities from the Patent Indicators Perspective’, STI Working Paper No. 2006/03. OECD. Kortum, S. and J. Lerner. 1999, ‘What is Behind the Recent Surge in Patenting?’, Research Policy, 28(1), 1–22. Liebeskind, J.P., A.L. Oliver, L.G. Zucker, and M.B. Brewer. 1996, ‘Social Networks, Learning and Flexibility: Sourcing Scientific Knowledge in New Biotechnology Firms’, Organization Science, 7(4), 428–43. Llerena, P., M. Matt and V. Schaeffer. 2003, ‘The Evolution of French Research Policies and the Impacts on the Universities and Public Research Organizations’, in Aldo Geuna, Ammon Salter and W.E. Steinmueller (eds), Science and Innovation. Rethinking the Rationales for Funding and Governance, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 147–68. Lundvall, B.-Å. 1992, National Innovation Systems: Towards a Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning. London: Pinter. May, C. 1998, ‘Thinking, Buying, Selling: Intellectual Property Rights in Political Economy’, New Political Economy, 3(1), 59–78. May, C. 2000, A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights. The New Enclosures?, London, New York: Routledge. Meyer, M. 2003, ‘Academic Patents as an Indicator of Useful Research? A New Approach to Measure Academic Inventiveness’, Research Evaluation, 12(1), 17–27. Moodysson, J., L. Coenen and B. Asheim. (2008), ‘Explaining Spatial Patterns of Innovation: Analytical and Synthetic Modes of Knowledge Creation in the Medicon Valley Life Science Cluster’, Environment & Planning A, 40, 1040–56. Mowery, D. and B. Sampat. 2005, ‘Universities in National Innovation Systems’, in J. Fagerberg et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Innovation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 209–39. Nelson, R. 1993, National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nelson, R. 2004, ‘The Market Economy, and the Scientific Commons’, Research Policy, 33(3), 455–71. Nonaka, R.T. et al. 2000, ‘SECI, Ba and Leadership: a Unified Model of Dynamic Knowledge Creation’, Long Range Planning 33, 5–34. OECD. 2002, Genetic Inventions, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing Practices. Evidence and Policies. Paris: OECD. OECD. 2003, Compendium of Patent Statistics. Paris: OECD. Orsi, F. 2002, ‘La constitution d’un nouveau droit de propriété intellectuelle sur le vivant aux Etats-Unis: Origine et signification économique d’un dépassement de frontière’, Revue d’économie industrielle, 99(2), 65–86. Orsi, F. and B. Coriat. 2005, ‘Are “Strong Patents” Beneficial to Innovative Activities? Lessons from the Genetic Testing for Breast Cancer Controversies’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 14(6), 1205– 21. Owen-Smith, J. and W.W. Powell. 2004, ‘Knowledge Networks as Channels and Conduits: the Effects Spillovers in the Boston Biotechnology Community’, Organization Science, 15(1), 5–21.
IPRs and innovation systems: issues for global governance
71
Pavitt, K. 1984, ‘Sectoral Patterns of Technical Change: Towards a Taxonomy and a Theory’, Research Policy, 13, 343–73. Perelman, M. 2002, Steal this Idea. Intellectual Property Rights and the Corporate Confiscation of Creativity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Powell, W.W., 1998, ‘Learning from Collaboration: Knowledge and Networks in the Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical Industries’, California Management Review, 40(3), 228–40. Pyka, A. and G. Küppers (eds). 2003, Innovation Networks. Theory and Practice, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Rai, A.K. and R.S. Eisenberg. 2003, ‘Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine’, American Scientist, 91(1), 52–9. Reagans, R. and B. McEvily. 2004, ‘Network Structure and Knowledge Transfer: The Effects of Cohesion and Range.’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 48(2), 240–68. Reiss, T. 2001, ‘Success Factors for Biotechnology: Lessons from Japan, Germany and Great Britain’, International Journal of Biotechnology, 3(1/2), 134–56. Reiss, T. and S. Hinze. 2004, The Biopharmaceutical Innovation System in Germany. OECD Case Study on Structure, Performance, Innovation Barriers and Drivers. Stuttgart: Fraunhofer IRB Verlag. Santos, F.M. 2003, ‘The Coevolution of Firms and their Knowledge Environment: Insights from the Pharmaceutical Industry’, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 70(7), 687–715. Saragossi, S. and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie. 2003, ‘What Patent Data Reveal about Universities: The Case of Belgium’, Journal of Technology Transfer, 28(1), 47–51. Schmoch, U. 2000, ‘Wissens- und Technologietransfer aus offentlichen Einrichtungen im Spiegel von Patent- und Publikationsindikatoren’, in Ulrich Schmoch, Georg Licht and Reinhardt.Michael (eds), Wissens- und Technologietransfer in Deutschland, Stuttgardt: Frauenhofer IRB Verlag, 17–37. Schöllhorn, A. and D. Büchel. 2002, Patentes Wissen. Der Schutz des Geistigen Eigentums für biotechnologische Erfindungen. Basel: Interpharma. Sell, S. and C. May. 2001, ‘Moments in Law: Contestation and Settlement in the History of Intellectual Property’, Review of International Political Economy, 8(3), 467–500. Soskice, D. 1999, ‘Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s’, in H. Kitschelt et al. (eds), Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 101–34. Streeck, W. 1992, Social Institutions and Economic Performance – Studies of Industrial Relations in Advanced Capitalist Economies. New York: Sage Publications. Thumm, N. 2002, ‘Europe’s Construction of a Patent System for Biotechnological Inventions: An Assessment of Industry Views’, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 69(9), 917–28. Thumm, N. 2003, ‘Research and Patenting in Biotechnology. A Survey in Switzerland No. 1 (12.03). Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property: Bern. 97, http://www.ige.ch/e/jurinfo/documents/j10005e.pdf. Thumm, N. 2004, ‘Strategic Patenting in Biotechnology’, Technology Analysis and Strategic Management, 16(4), 529–38. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 1999, Human Development Report. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
72
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
Valentin, F. and R.L. Jensen. 2002, ‘Reaping the Fruits of Science’, Economic Systems Research, 14(4), 363–88. Valentin, F. and R.L. Jensen. 2005, ‘Entrepreneurship, Networks and Strategising in Biotech Start-ups’, 21st EGOS Colloquium – ‘Unlocking Organizations’, June 30 – July 2, 2005. Freie Universität Berlin in cooperation with Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. Valentin, F. and R.L. Jensen. 2006, ‘Effects on Academia-Industry Collaboration of Extending University Property Rights’, Research Centre on Biotech Business, Biotech Business Working Paper, http://ideas.respec.org/a/kap/jtecht/ v32y2007:3p251-276.html. Whitley, R. 1999, Divergent Capitalism: The Social Structuring and Change of Business Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zeller, C. 2001, ‘Die Biotech-Regionen München und Rheinland. Räumliche Organisation von Innovationssystemen und Pfadabhängigkeit der regionalen Entwicklung’, in R. Grotz and L. Schätzl (eds), Regional Innovationsnetzwerke im internationalen Vergleich. Münster: Lit-Verlag, 59–82. Zeller, C. 2004, ‘North Atlantic Innovative Relations of Swiss pharmaceuticals and the Importance of Regional Biotech Arenas’, Economic Geography, 80(1), 83–111.
3.
Intellectual property rights policy for gene-related inventions – toward optimum balance between public and private ownership Koichi Sumikura
INTRODUCTION This chapter discusses the use of patented genes in genetic diagnosis and the use of patented research tools in research and development (R&D) activities as cases illustrating typical problems with regard to intellectual property rights policy for gene-related inventions. Taking these problems into account, the chapter attempts to identify issues concerning possible measures to promote the public ownership of research results while granting ownership to frontrunners in technology. These measures include the application of anti-monopoly laws, compulsory licensing, new legislation allowing exemption from the effect of rights and new legislation allowing the limitation on the effect of rights. All these measures may be effective in maintaining the balance between the public and private ownership of technology. However, problems exist with these measures as they fail to provide the stability of rights and are not consistent with the relevant international conventions. Therefore, it is hoped that measures will be worked out to enhance access to patented inventions without changing the existence of the patent or the effect of the patent rights. One such measure considered in this chapter is the establishment of a patent distribution mechanism whereby patented inventions in a certain field of technology are gathered and managed by a single organization to facilitate the conclusion of license agreements for individual technologies. For instance, the establishment of a ‘research tool consortium’ to collect research tool patents and offer them for use in academic research activity would facilitate and enhance the use of patented inventions in academic research activities. The results of a survey of life science researchers, conducted by the author of this chapter, show that there is a substantial need among these 73
74
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
researchers for such a mechanism. The same survey also found that many researchers hope for a mechanism based on the principle of reciprocity with respect to patented inventions owned by individuals. Under this mechanism, a researcher offering his or her own patented invention for free would be entitled to use patented inventions of other researchers for free. Using the results of this survey as a reference, this chapter considers specific aspects of such a research tool consortium.
GENETIC RESEARCH AND MEDICINE There is no question that numerous genetic research projects are now being conducted at a broad range of institutions, such as universities, public research institutions, hospitals with research functions, and companies, and their research achievements are contributing greatly to the development of medicine. The identification of a disease gene leads to the development of a new method of genetic diagnosis. Meanwhile, by screening compounds that interact with proteins having certain genetic coding, candidate molecules for the development of new drugs can be identified. Under the patent systems in Japan and many other countries, genes are subject to protection by patent as an ‘invention of a composition of matter’. When a new gene is identified and the function of the gene sequenced, the polynucleotide chain having this particular base sequence will be patented, provided the designated patentability conditions of novelty, utility and non-obviousness, and description requirements for patent specifications are fulfilled. Gene patents thus granted have influence on genetic diagnosis as well as on the development of drugs using the patented genes. But the impact is more direct on genetic diagnosis than on the development of drugs, as genetic diagnosis using a patented gene cannot be made without permission from the patent holder. In comparison, in case of developing a new medicine using a patented gene, even if there is any influence of the patent with regard to the use of the medicine, it is indirect. In rare cases, genes themselves are used as a medicine. However, the general approach within the drug discovery industry today is to screen the compounds that interact with proteins having certain gene coding and to develop new drugs based on the screened compounds. Thus, the exercise of gene patent rights has no influence on the use of new drugs as a final product. But it should be noted that the screening of compounds involves the use of various research tools, such as cell lines, disease-model mice, analysers, research reagents and research kits, and thus the degree of ease with which such patented
Optimum balance in IPRs for gene-related inventions
75
research tools are used can influence the development of drugs and even the improvement of medicine as a whole. One important factor that must be taken into account in considering a patent system for genetic research is that R&D on drugs and diagnostic methods is being undertaken in today’s economic society, where decisions on R&D investments are made based on market principles. Corporations are able to conduct R&D by investing massive amounts of money because they are entitled to exclusive rights to their inventions under the patent system. Were it not for the patent system, they would make little effort to develop new drugs or diagnostic methods and there would be little improvement in the quality of medicine. However, there are also instances where patents inhibit the use of genetic diagnosis and the development of new drugs. Therefore, in order to ensure smooth access to newly-developed drugs and diagnostic methods while promoting the improvement of the quality of medicine through the development of new drugs and diagnosis methods, it is necessary to encourage downstream R&D activities by making research results public under certain conditions or by imposing some limitations on the scope of private ownership, but without changing the basic framework of an intellectual property rights protection system that allows frontrunners in R&D to obtain private ownership of research results. In other words, an appropriate ‘balance between public and private ownership’ must be realized. Based on this recognition, this study attempts to sort out what measures are available to realize such an appropriate ‘balance between public and private ownership’, to point out problems with each of the measures, and to present feasible policy measures.
WHERE THE PROBLEMS LIE: TWO TYPICAL CASES Genetic Diagnosis One example in which the existence of a gene patent resulted in the reduction of access to medicine is the case of Myriad Genetics, Inc. and its patents for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 breast and ovarian cancer genes.1 Using these genes, Myriad Genetics developed a method for diagnosing a predisposition for breast cancer and obtained patents in Japan, the United States, Europe, Canada and many other countries, for the genes and for the method for using the genes in diagnosis. Three patents were granted in Japan,2 eight in the US,3 and four in Canada.4 Where such patents exist, a license must be obtained from Myriad Genetics in order to provide genetic diagnosis for breast cancer. The company, however,
76
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
is pursuing a policy of providing genetic diagnosis on its own instead of licensing its patents to other parties, setting up a genetic diagnosis business called BRACAnalysis. With respect to the BRCA genes, four patents were granted in Europe, too.5 However, after a series of objections were filed against the BRCA patents, the European Patent Office (EPO) revoked one of the patents in May 2004 and substantially reduced the scope of rights of three other patents in January and June 2005.6 In Canada, Myriad Genetics holds a license agreement with MDS Laboratory Services to provide BRACAnalysis testing across the country. After acquiring Canadian patents for the BRCA1 gene in October 2000 and the BRCA2 gene in April 2001, Myriad Genetics began to request licensing fees from medical institutions providing genetic diagnosis for breast cancer. Prior to this, provincial governments had been offering genetic testing for breast cancer using BRCA genes at a cost of about 1,200 Canadian dollars per sample. But Myriad Genetics demanded that they pay 3,850 Canadian dollars in licensing fees. Responses have varied among provinces; some provincial governments continue to provide BRCA genetic testing by agreeing to pay the licensing fees to Myriad Genetics; other governments have temporarily halted the testing; while still others continue to provide diagnosis without paying licensing fees, in effect, ignoring the patents. In any event, it is clear that the existence of the patents is curtailing access to this particular diagnostic technology. Thus, the Myriad Genetics case is frequently referred to when discussing the negative effect of the gene patent system. In Japan, opposition to the BRCA patents is not as great as it is in North America and Europe. But potential risks always exist for the occurrence of similar cases in which the presence of a gene patent impedes access to medical services. Research Tools In addition to the aforementioned problem concerning the direct obstruction by patent rights of access to medicine, another problem in which a patent granted to a certain upstream technology hampers the R&D of downstream technologies and prevents the improvement of medicine, must be taken into account in considering intellectual property rights policy for gene-related inventions.7 Currently, in Japan and other developed countries, massive amounts of research funds including government funds are being poured into basic research conducted by universities and public research institutions in the basic life sciences. This academic research is funded without explicit expectations that application development is a direct goal. From basic academic research, a number of important innovations that will ultimately lead to
Optimum balance in IPRs for gene-related inventions
77
the development of new medicines are being created, but indirectly. As discussed below, however, the existence of patents for research tools can result in impeding the promotion of academic research, making it necessary to form a proper system. In gene-related R&D, various research tools such as cell lines, transgenic mice and vectors are used, and the presence of these tools has now become indispensable for conducting research. A ‘research tool’, as referred to here, is defined as a tool (including both composition of matter and methods) that is used in a laboratory, not for the purpose of improving itself, but to achieve a certain research goal. In cases where a certain research tool is patented, a license must be obtained from the patent holder, in the same way as with other patented inventions. Article 69(1) of the Japanese Patent Law stipulates that the ‘effect of the patent rights shall not extend to the working of a patented invention for experiment or research’. The ‘experiment or research’ as referred to therein, according to a study by Keiko Someno,8 falls into one of three categories: (1) patentability research, (2) function research, and (3) experiments for the purposes of improvement and/or development. It is held that the use of research tools falls into none of these three categories. That is, in deciding whether the use of a certain patented research tool in research activities constitutes the infringement of the patent, academic institutions such as universities are no exception, and it does not matter whether the research activities are conducted for a commercial or noncommercial purpose, or whether they are in the stage of basic research or application development. This position was adopted by the Industrial Structure Council, an advisory body to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, during its discussion in 2004,9 and coincides with the position held in the US and Europe. For instance, in a case where a certain enzyme used for gene amplification is patented, the use of the gene of the enzyme to synthesize, isolate and extract the enzyme in large volumes, after which the mass-produced enzyme is used in gene amplification experiments in a laboratory, would constitute the infringement of the patent.10 On the other hand, it is interpreted that research for the enhancement of the enzyme’s gene amplifiability does not constitute the infringement of the patent because it falls under the category of experiments for the purpose of improvement and/ or development. Until now, researchers have been able to use research tools virtually free from worry about the possibility of patent infringement, so long as they are engaged in academic research. It has been common practice within the research community for researchers freely to use research tools for academic purpose, provided patents for such tools are owned by an academic
78
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
institution or individual researchers belonging to such an institution.11 Also even in cases where a certain research tool is patented by a privatesector company, the risk that researchers may face litigation as a result of using the tool in academic research has actually been extremely low; as private-sector companies see little merit in exercising their rights against the use of their patented research tools in academic research. Interviews with life science researchers, conducted by the author from 2004 to 2005, revealed that anxiety among researchers in using research tools in academic research has risen to an unprecedented level. As reasons behind this, the following factors can be cited: –
–
–
–
–
With universities becoming more forthcoming in acquiring patents for their research results and selling them to industry, companies are coming to see universities as partners on an equal footing to pursue profits together in the market. On the other side of the same coin, universities are being recognized as competitors in businesses in which the possibility is growing for universities and their affiliated researchers to be sued by a patent-holding company for the infringement of a patent. Corporate patent strategies, particularly in case of companies holding patents for research tools (many of which are US or European venture businesses), are becoming stringent. For instance, a definite distinction is made between the use for academic purposes and the use for commercial purposes, or reach-through provisions designed to restrict the handling of resulting research results, such as those under which a patent-holding company would be entitled to receive any license resulting from research using its patented research tool and those obliging a company using the patented tool to report the research results to the patent holder prior to announcement to the public. In cases where researchers recognize the existence of a patent, researchers are often unable to get a clear-cut answer to their inquiry about the specific way of handling the patent; a company holding the patent or its agent would give a vague answer that leaves the possibility of the right being exercised in the future, saying that the use of the patented tool would not be an issue for now but there is no telling about the future. As a consequence of the growing awareness regarding patents among university researchers, competition among university researchers over academic priority may evolve into patent conflicts. As mentioned above, the Industrial Structure Council has confirmed that a license needs to be obtained for the use of patented research tools even when they are used in research for academic purposes, and
Optimum balance in IPRs for gene-related inventions
–
–
–
–
79
this position has been widely propagated among those engaged in academic research. And in fact, as a consequence of such development, many researchers, who were using research tools patented by others without feeling any anxiety, are now suddenly becoming quite concerned, having recognized that the long-established common practice concerning the use of patented tools, in fact, has no legal foundation. In the US, it has been established through a series of court precedents that a certain degree of exceptions for experimental use should be allowed. However, the ruling in Madey v. Duke University,12 in which the scope of exceptions was one of the contentious points, narrowly interpreted the ‘exceptions for experimental use’ and said that research activities conducted by the university do not fit the definition of the exceptions for experimental use. Though opinions are divided about the degree of applicability of this particular ruling, the fact that university research activities have been judged as not meeting the definition of exceptions for experimental use has found its own way to spread out and come to be shared by researchers in the field of life sciences. In universities and public research institutions, a mechanism has been established for transferring their inventions to private-sector companies. However, the reality is that neither the intellectual property offices of individual universities nor technology licensing organizations (TLOs) have the capacity to manage the use of patents held by others in research activities. In cases where research conducted by teaching staff is regarded as part of their duties and it is policy that any invention resulting from their research activities will be subject to institutional ownership, any patent infringement litigation that may arise from academic research will be filed directly against the institution concerned. Therefore, universities need to know what research tools are being used by their researchers and check for the existence of any patent for each of these tools. As mentioned above, however, it is virtually impossible for the institutions to carry out this task. Thus, it is expected that, in many universities, the task of checking for the existence of any patent and then acquiring the relevant license, should the need arise, will be placed on the individual teacher. Should this become a reality, it would impose a substantial burden on the individual teacher. Meanwhile, there is always the risk of litigation because it is difficult for individual teachers to check patent status and acquire a license for each of the research tools used in research.
Because of factors such as those described above, it is feared that researchers may become reluctant to make research plans requiring the use
80
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
of new research tools. Whether such research tools are actually patented or not cannot be determined without checking. However, irrespective of whether or not certain research tools are patented, the abovementioned situations are imposing constraints on the promotion of research activities. Measures of some sort must be implemented to change this.
MEASURES TO REALIZE AN APPROPRIATE BALANCE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP What can be said about both the two problems discussed in the previous section is that it is necessary to create a mechanism in which achievements resulting from R&D efforts will be made public to the greatest degree possible, and at the same time provide an opportunity to recoup R&D investments by allowing inventors to claim exclusive rights in their achievements under the patent system. In other words, it is necessary to find and realize the optimum ‘balance between public and private ownership’. Taking these two issues into consideration as the major points of concern, this section presents and examines policy measures to solve the problems. ‘Non-granting of patents’, which is the decision not to grant any patent to genes or research tools, would be a possible policy option if thinking only of public ownership. Indeed, as discussed above, Europe has opted for non-granting by rejecting certain BRCA patents. Of course, a nongranting decision would not pose any big problem if the decision were made on a specific case and were reasonable in the light of patent requirements. However, if the non-granting option, a trump card that should be kept in reserve, becomes a policy tool that is used in all time, it presents a huge problem. This is not a reasonable policy, because under such a situation those who have undertaken R&D would be unable to recoup their investments. Thus, non-granting of patents is not included in the policy categories discussed hereunder. In the explanation below, policy measures are sorted out from the standpoint of seeking partial public ownership, or public ownership under specific conditions, while acknowledging a certain degree of rights to frontrunners. Application of Antimonopoly Legislation One way of seeking the optimum balance between public and private ownership is through the application of competition policies. The exercise of intellectual property rights is treated as an exception under anti-monopoly and antitrust laws.13 However, such exceptional treatment is not granted
Optimum balance in IPRs for gene-related inventions
81
automatically because certain acts by patent holders, such as demanding unreasonably expensive licensing fees by taking advantage of the lack of alternatives for their patented technology, may be considered an abuse of rights. The anti-monopoly provisions that are potential options include reach-through provisions, essential facility theory and compulsory licensing. In light of anti-monopoly and antitrust laws, reach-through provisions are designed to extend the scope of rights to cover areas where patent rights have yet to be established. Similar cases include a clause under which the licensee (patent user) is obliged to allow the licensor (patent holder) to claim ownership in any improvements made by the licensee on the patented inventions (the so-called ‘assign-back’ clause) or another clause under which the licensee is obliged to allow the licensor to obtain an exclusive license to use any improvements made by the licensee (the so-called ‘exclusive grant-back’ clause). Both of these schemes ‘fall under the definition of unfair business practice (as defined in item 13 “transaction based on restrictive conditions” in the general specifications of unfair business practices set forth by the Japanese Fair Trade Commission) and are likely to be judged illegal’.14 On the other hand, such rules do not necessarily apply to reach-through provisions included in a license agreement for patented research tools, a scheme for handling ‘derivative inventions’ (coined by the author) derived from the use of research tools, because such provisions are, as is apparent from the definition provided above, not stipulated as an improvement on the invention. Yet, reach-through provisions are no different from assign-back and grant-back clauses, in that they impose restrictive conditions on transactions, and it is considered reasonable to make judgements by citing rules for improvement inventions. Thus, imposing an assign-back or exclusive grant-back obligation on licensees with respect to derivative inventions goes beyond the scope of exceptions granted for the exercise of intellectual property rights and may be deemed to fall under the definition of unfair business practice. As such, it is considered possible to set clear rules, by incorporating the existing criteria and standards for the handling of rights in a license agreement with respect to derivative inventions made through the use of research tools. Of course, an agreement will not present any problems even if it includes reach-through provisions, provided that reasonable licensing fees are set and that the licensee is able to save on the initial cost of obtaining the license by arranging the agreement to allow the licensor to earn fees contingent on success. This type of agreement is beneficial to both parties.15 What is called the ‘essential facility theory’ can be cited as one way to construct logical arguments for finding a certain patent to violate
82
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
anti-monopoly legislation, for instance, in cases where a gene patent unfairly prevents the implementation of genetic diagnosis or a research tool patent unfairly prevents the implementation of R&D. This is a theory that interprets a certain patent as violating anti-monopoly legislation if license refusal results in obstruction of access to an essential facility. The theory, though not yet clearly defined for the Japanese system, is being applied in the US to prohibit the monopoly of physical infrastructure such as electric cables and has been applied in some court cases in Europe.16 However, it seems that, even internationally, no clear consensus exists about the ‘essentiality’ and rational criteria have yet to be formulated. Under these circumstances, should this theory be arbitrarily applied to cases where the exercise of intellectual property rights is interpreted as preventing the public ownership of technology useful for human beings, the stability of rights would be undermined and the intellectual property rights system would exist only in name. Another way of achieving the optimum balance between public and private ownership is to establish a compulsory licensing right for patents used in genetic diagnosis and research tool patents. This is a system set forth under the patent laws of many countries. It is generally provided that the government may determine that a patent holder should be forced to allow the use of its patented technology by third parties if and when the presence of the patent is hampering the proliferation of technology deemed necessary for public health and welfare. In Japan, Article 93 of the Patent Law stipulates that should a party be seeking the use of a patented invention deemed necessary specifically for public interests, the party may request adjudication by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry if it fails to obtain the relevant license through its negotiation with the patent holder. In principle, a patent holder can freely decide to whom it will allow the use of its patented inventions. However, once adjudication proceedings have been carried out in accordance with the designated procedures, the patent holder, regardless of its own intentions, must issue a license (compulsory licensing) if so decided by adjudication. For such a license issued in accordance with the adjudication decision, the patent holder is entitled to receive a license fee, but cannot itself decide the amount of the fee by negotiating with the patent user. Article 31 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) also stipulates that compulsory licensing may be permitted only if the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions, and if such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time. Moreover, the Article also states that a member country may waive such requirement and immediately allow compulsory licensing in the case
Optimum balance in IPRs for gene-related inventions
83
of a national emergency, in other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use. Like the aforementioned essential facility theory, this compulsory licensing system appears to be an attractive scheme to cope with situations in which the presence of intellectual property rights is obstructing the public ownership of a useful technology. Indeed, in September 2001, France’s Minister of Research and Minister of Health and Social Protection issued a joint statement calling for applying the compulsory licensing system to genetic diagnosis.17 With respect to patented inventions used as a research tool, Strandburg (2004) calls for enabling patent holders to issue a license on their own terms and conditions for a period of five years, and applying compulsory licensing if they fail to offer a license on reasonable terms and conditions after the initial five-year period.18 Compulsory licensing rights have rarely been invoked in developed countries because such a move would destabilize the rights stipulated by the law. Japan is no exception; there has not been a single case subjected to adjudication, including adjudication in case of non-issuance of licenses (Article 83) or adjudication in cases where the use of a patent held by a third party is involved (Article 92). Arguments have been made calling for the application of compulsory licensing rights as a means to facilitate the proliferation of medical services, including drugs and diagnostic methods. However, the frequent application of compulsory licensing rights could discourage efforts to develop new drugs and diagnostic methods. Therefore, any problems that may arise from the existence of a patent, except in case of emergency, should be dealt with by other means, such as the purchase or assumption of payment of licensing fees by the government or an international organization. New Legislation Allowing Exemption from the Effect of Rights Another approach is establishing exceptions to the effect of rights by means of legislation or, in certain cases, by changing the interpretation of the law. Possible measures include setting forth provisions that acknowledge gene patents but designate genetic diagnosis as an exception to the effect of such patent rights, and provisions that acknowledge research tool patents but designate academic research at universities and public research institutions as an exception to the effect of such patent rights. With respect to the latter scheme, active discussions are being carried out in Japan and internationally on whether ‘experimental exceptions’ to academic research or non-commercial research at academic institutions should be permitted. As discussed above, it is generally perceived in Japan that the use of patented research tools does not fit the definition of an
84
Table 3.1
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
What should be made exempt from the effect of patent rights?
a. All research activities should be within the scope of the effect of patent rights. b. All research activities at academic research institutions such as universities and research institutes of an incorporated administrative agency (IAA) status should be outside the scope of the effect of patent rights whereas all research activities at private sector companies should be within the scope of the effect of patent rights. c. In addition to criteria specified in b., research activities at academic research institutes such as universities and research institutes of an IAA status should be outside the scope of the effect of patent rights so long as such research activities are carried out for non-commercial purposes, but should be within the scope of the effect of patent rights if they are for commercial purposes (for instance, if research activities are being conducted jointly with a private sector company or if a patent application has been filed for any achievement in the research). d. Criteria specified in b. should apply only to cases where a patent has been obtained in research financed by public funds such as research grants provided by the central government. e. Criteria specified in c. should apply only to cases where a patent has been obtained in research financed by public funds such as research grants from the central government. f. Others
13% 16%
56%
6%
7%
3%
exception provided for under Article 69(1) of the Patent Law, and thus any party wishing to use the tools must obtain a license from the relevant patent holder. However, a survey of life science researchers at universities and public research institutions (hereinafter referred to as ‘Life Science Researcher Survey’),19 conducted by the author and others in 2004, found that 56 percent of the respondents believed that non-commercial research at academic research institutions should be exempt from the effect of patent rights, whereas 13 percent believed that there should be no exemption from the effect of patent rights, and 16 percent that all the research activities conducted at universities and other academic institutions should be exempt (see Table 3.1). In creating a system that allows for certain exemptions from the effect of rights, possible categories for differentiating between what falls under the effect of patent rights and what does not include ‘non-commercial research and commercial research’, ‘academic research and non-academic
Optimum balance in IPRs for gene-related inventions
85
research’, and ‘basic research and applied research’ (with the former category being exempt from the effect of patent rights and the latter being subject to the effect of patent rights). However, it is difficult clearly to distinguish between ‘non-commercial research and commercial research’ because many of the technologies developed in basic research activities at universities are now being transferred to industry, and something that started out as research for non-commercial purposes may become a commercial research project from a certain stage onward. The distinction between ‘non-academic research and academic research’ would be made based on the nature of the organization undertaking the research. But then, a problem would arise as to how to handle research activities that are conducted at academic research institutions but in collaboration with a private-sector company. Although it is difficult to define ‘basic research and applied research’, it is possible to differentiate between them by establishing criteria for each type of research, such as whether the research is at the stage that is before or after clinical testing or of screening. Because differentiation is based on the stage of research development, there is a drawback in that it is difficult for those engaged in upstream research to recoup the cost of R&D investment. In addition to the abovementioned difficulties in setting guidelines, trying to designate exemptions by means of legislative measures is just as arbitrary as the aforementioned essential facility theory and compulsory licensing, and the social demerit caused by impairing institutional predictability poses a serious obstacle. New Legislation to Allow Limitations on the Effect of Rights A final policy option for research tools is the limitation on the effect of rights by introducing new legislation. This option is slightly more moderate than the one described in the foregoing section, under which patent holders would not be able to exercise their rights under certain conditions. Normally, frontrunner scientists who have discovered a new gene are granted a substance patent for the gene, which entitles them to exercise rights over any use of the gene. In recent years, however, gene sequencing and function prediction have become easier than in the past, presenting the problem that the scope of rights obtained by frontrunners is too broad for the actual degree of scientific contribution by them.20 Granting of a patent in a way to cover a disproportionately broad area compared to the actual result of research would hamper the subsequent development of circumventing inventions. That is, with other researchers becoming discouraged from attempting new challenges, progress towards innovation would be slowed.
86
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
To address this problem, a notable legislative step was taken in Germany. The revised Patent Act, which was approved by the Bundestag, the lower chamber of the federal parliament of Germany, on December 3, 2004, and then by the Bundesrat, the upper chamber, on December 17, 2004, was a domestic legislative step to implement EU Directive 98/44/EC. What is characteristic of the revised law is that if the patent is a substance patent obtained by discovering the functions of a naturally-occurring human gene, it limits the effect of patent rights to the use of the functions disclosed at the time the application for the patent was filed.21 The formation of this system is quite reasonable and intended to define the scope of privatization in accordance with the degree of scientific contribution, making public ownership possible for the remaining areas of the scope. However, this measure is meant to provide special treatment only for technologies of a specific area and may contradict Article 27(1) of TRIPS, which stipulates that patents must be granted without discrimination as to the field of the invention. Apart from legislating new law, it is possible to limit the scope of the effect of rights by applying stricter screening criteria or changing standards for court decisions. In the stage of granting a patent, this can be done by applying stricter criteria for the written description and enablement requirements, as well as for the support and clarity requirements for written descriptions of claims. Also, in the stage of interpreting claims, that is, in court decisions, the scope of the effect of rights can be limited by changing the criteria for applying the doctrine of equivalents to narrow the scope within which a new invention is judged as an equivalent to a certain patented invention.
FEASIBLE SOLUTIONS Although being intended to promote the facilitation of genetic diagnosis using patented genes, as well as of R&D activities using patented research tools, the policy measures discussed in the preceding section have, as pointed out earlier, their respective deficiencies. Applying the essential facility theory, establishing compulsory licensing rights and legislating new laws to set exemptions from the effect of patent rights would impair the stability of rights and even undermine the credibility of the patent system. Thus, none of them can be deemed realistic in practical application. Meanwhile, imposing a certain limit on the effect of patent rights with respect to certain subject matters, as practiced in Germany, has the possibility of causing a problem in maintaining consistency with the requirements under TRIPS, and thus it is unlikely this measure will spread
Optimum balance in IPRs for gene-related inventions
87
to many countries. In addition, should such arbitrary application of the patent system to a certain field take root, it would adversely affect other fields. Therefore, this section attempts to propose a measure for systematically solving the problem in a way that is different from those discussed thus far. This measure aims to increase the degree of public ownership by facilitating access to patented inventions while at the same time returning benefits to patent holders, without making any changes to the existence and effect of patent rights. Integrated Management of Patents Even where the existence of patent rights is presupposed, it is still possible to balance the goals of both public and private ownership of patented inventions by having patent holders issue a non-exclusive license under reasonable terms and conditions, instead of an exclusive license to a single licensee. Furthermore, the degree of public ownership can be increased by having patent holders issue a non-exclusive license to any applicant in a non-discriminatory manner, because such non-discriminatory issuance would effectively provide prospective users with inexpensive access to the patented invention. In other words, provide a license under reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) conditions.22 Patent holders, for their part, can also expect greater revenue by providing a license in this manner because they would be collecting fees, although small in amount per license, from a number of licensees.23 By offering a multiple number of patented inventions in a specific field for use under RAND conditions, that is, creating a bundle of licenses available under RAND conditions, the accessibility to inventions in that specific field can be effectively enhanced. Consequently, work and procedures for concluding a licensing agreement can be reduced compared to those required when such patented inventions are individually offered, thereby creating a situation where patented inventions become publicly available to a greater extent. The integrated management systems that are being used to create bundles of patents include the following: ●
●
Patent pools.24 One example of a patent pool is the MPEG-LA, which handles a series of essential patents including MPEG-2, a public standard for image compression technology. The MPEG-LA collects patents relating to specific public technology standards and provides a portfolio license for them under RAND conditions. Patent platforms.25 Under the 3G Patent Platform, a licensing regime handling patents for third-generation mobile communication systems, an essential patent holder and a licensee are, in principle,
88
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
●
to enter into a ‘Framework Agreement’ as a standard license agreement. However, a license agreement that is different from the standard license agreement (for instance, a cross license agreement agreed to by the parties concerned) may be concluded if so wished by both the patent holder and the licensee. Patent clearinghouse. This is the equivalent of a convenience store for patents, where patented inventions in a certain field of technology are gathered and a license agreement for each of them can be concluded in a simple manner. The Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture (PIPRA), an organization set up in the US for the purpose of facilitating the use of basic tools in the field of agriculture-related biotechnologies, is considered to be one form of a patent clearing house.26
Creating a mechanism for facilitating access to patented inventions by taking into account the characteristics of existing organizations such as those listed above would make it possible to promote the public ownership of R&D achievements with respect to patents used for genetic diagnosis and gene-related research tool patents. From now on, genetic research will make further advances and eventually almost all human genes, which form the foundations of research, will come to be known. When this happens, a patent will be obtained each time a disease-causing mutation of a specific gene is identified, which would easily bring about a situation where a multiple number of entities held patents for a multiple number of mutations of a single gene. In order to facilitate the provision of genetic diagnosis under such a situation, it is desirable to have a mechanism in which all such patents for mutations are gathered at and provided by a single organization. Furthermore, this mechanism can be an extremely convenient tool for genetic diagnosis providers, if the mechanism is designed in such a way that users, by accessing the organization, can easily search databases for gene patents held by the organization and conclude the necessary license agreement. The same can be said about research tool patents; if basic research tool patents for life sciences were gathered under a single organization, it would help facilitate R&D activities both at universities and private-sector companies. Moreover, in certain fields of inventions where both academic institutions, such as universities and private-sector companies, can become licensees, as is the case with research tools, it would be necessary to prepare two different sets of terms and conditions for licensing; one applicable to academic institutions and the other to private-sector companies. The discussion thus far has been made in consideration of the two cases, that is, genetic diagnosis and research tools. In the context that
Optimum balance in IPRs for gene-related inventions
Table 3.2
89
Is a research tool consortium necessary?
a Yes, it is. b No, it is not. c Not sure.
72% 4% 24%
academic institutions, such as universities, can be licensors and licensees, it is expected that research tools will require a more complex mechanism for patent distribution than was necessary for genetic diagnosis. Thus, a mechanism for facilitating the distribution of patented research tools will be discussed below. Aspects of a Research Tool Consortium A mechanism for the integrated management of patents can be referred to as a ‘research tool consortium’, and by focusing on this perspective, the optimum embodiment of a ‘balance between public and private ownership’ can be examined. The envisioned function of a research tool consortium is to gather all patents necessary for R&D and services in a certain specific field so that a licensing agreement can be concluded easily. A portfolio license, such as the one provided by the MPEG-LA, is rarely offered. In many cases, a convenience store-like system (called a patent clearinghouse), under which users would pick up only those products they need from the assortment available, would better fit the reality. The operator of a research tool consortium needs to negotiate, in principle, with all the patent holders and set terms and conditions for the licensing of their patents beforehand. On the other hand, licensees using the consortium would not have to negotiate with each patent holder. Thus, in cases where there are many licensees and the operator of a research tool consortium has an established capacity for concluding license agreements, transaction costs for society as a whole can be reduced. The necessity of a consortium-style organization has been acknowledged by 72 percent of the respondents to the Life Science Researcher Survey discussed earlier (see Table 3.2). The Survey (see Table 3.3) showed that 55 percent of those who responded felt it would be desirable for the scope of patented inventions handled by the consortium to encompass all the necessary patents, regardless of whether they are owned by privatesector companies or universities and public research institutions. Many of those holding research tool patents are bio-ventures in the US and Europe, most of which specialize in providing research tools. In order to incorporate patents held by such private-sector businesses, it would be necessary
90
Table 3.3
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
What is the most desirable scope of patented inventions handled by the research tool consortium?
a. Patented inventions owned by all sorts of organizations, including universities and private-sector companies (including those in overseas), should be handled. b. Only those owned by academic institutions such as universities should be handled. c. Only those derived from research financed by public funds such as research grants from the central government should be handled. d. Only certain types of fundamental patented inventions should be handled. e. Others
55%
31% 9%
2% 2%
to negotiate and conclude a license agreement with each of them to enable the consortium to provide their patents. On the other hand, the question posed in Table 3.3 also found that many people (31 percent) expressed the view that a consortium should be created based only on tools held by universities and other academic institutions. This is thought to be a realistic view. Because it is conceivably difficult to gather patented inventions for major research tools by negotiating with all the patent holders, these respondents feel it is desirable to launch a consortium covering patents held by some universities and public research institutions in the first phase and then in the next phase, build on that foundation by calling on even more organizations to participate. Inventions under Individual Ownership In the Life Science Researcher Survey, respondents were asked under what situation they would be willing to offer their patents to the consortium if they were patent holders. It was found that 46 percent of the respondents were in favor of a system based on the principle of reciprocity; in other words, they would offer their patented inventions for free use if they were entitled to the free use of patented inventions owned by others. They exceeded the 27 percent of the respondents who replied they would provide their patents if they received sufficient financial compensation (see Table 3.4). There were very few people who did not want to offer patented inventions under any conditions. Based on these findings, it is possible, at least as far as university researchers are concerned, to gather a certain number of patented inventions under a consortium if rules are set in such a way that researchers offering their own patented inventions and having
Optimum balance in IPRs for gene-related inventions
Table 3.4
91
If there is a ‘research tool consortium’, would you offer your patented inventions to the consortium?
a. I would offer my patented inventions for free if I could use other patented inventions for free. b. I would offer my patented inventions for free provided that the amount of fees is sufficient. c. I would not offer my patented inventions under any condition. d. I don’t know. e. Others
46% 27% 2% 20% 5%
given promises to licence them out under RAND conditions are entitled to use other patented inventions held by the consortium. If a situation emerges, however, where those offering only useless tools are allowed to use all the other tools, it will cause a sense of unfairness within the consortium, which is supposed to be an entity established based on the principle of reciprocity. This could lead to an increase in the number of those who seek to take but give little, called free riders, and if this situation continues, the whole scheme would cease to function. Therefore, in order for this sort of scheme to succeed, there must be a mechanism to attract many researchers and provide them with incentives to contribute good tools. One possible way to achieve this is to implement a system in which each use of a research tool is reported to the secretariat of the consortium, and the secretariat announces a ranking of the most frequently used research tools. This would encourage researchers to participate and offer good inventions to the consortium. On the other hand, venture businesses specializing in providing research tools would see no merit in joining a consortium based on the principle of reciprocity. Thus, as mentioned above, it is necessary for the operator of the consortium to negotiate with venture businesses and obtain licenses to use their inventions. Inventions under Institutional Ownership such as Those Owned by Universities Following the incorporation of Japanese national universities in April 2004, many universities and public research institutions have come to hold ownership of inventions made by researchers affiliated with them. However, many inventions that had existed before university incorporation belong to the individual researchers.27 Therefore, the situation today is that inventions under individual ownership and those under institutional ownership co-exist.
92
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
With respect to inventions under institutional ownership, such as those owned by universities, an invention made by a researcher affiliated with a certain university is theoretically available for free use by other researchers of the same university in research activities conducted within the university.28 This system can be expanded to cover a group of universities so that researchers affiliated with these universities can use each other’s research tools either for free or at minimal cost, while at the same time allowing external researchers, such as those who are not affiliated with any of the group universities, to use research tools by paying reasonable fees and by completing simple procedures. This is the basic concept of a consortium under institutional ownership. Possible Policy Measures The foregoing sections have discussed the idea of research tool consortiums. As to how to implement this idea, however, there are few policy actions available because decisions on conditions for licensing and participation in a research tool consortium are made, in principle, by individual patent holders. Specifically, possible measures are limited to: ● ● ●
financially assist the establishment of such consortiums and support the development of human resources, call on universities and individual researchers to participate, and make it a rule to have all the results derived from governmentfunded research projects placed under a consortium.
It would be reasonable for the government, as a condition for providing research grants, to make it a rule that those engaged in governmentsubsidized research activities must agree to allow any research results to be licenced out under RAND conditions or provide their patented research tools to a consortium to be offered out under a portfolio license. On the other hand, however, such policy actions are not binding for research activities not financed by the government. Thus, it is hoped that by setting up and operating certain consortiums, the practice will gradually expand to the whole research community.
SUMMARY This chapter has taken up genetic diagnosis using patented genes and R&D using patented research tools as cases illustrating typical problems with regard to intellectual property rights policy for gene-related
Optimum balance in IPRs for gene-related inventions
93
Aggregation of patents held by a university University A
Company D
University B
University C
Researcher X d m
Researcher Y d m
Offering for free
Offering for free
Offering for fees
s s Inventions under institutional ownership
Patents owned by companies Patents owned by researchers
Figure 3.1
Researcher Z d m
s s
Inventions under individual ownership
Research tool consortium * Participating universities and researchers are entitled to obtain a license for their desired tools for free. * The use of patents is counted and the ranking of most frequently used patents is published.
A license for a desired tool can be obtained under RAND conditions. Researchers and institutions in general
Conceptual picture of a research tool consortium
inventions. Taking these problems into account, the chapter has examined the feasibility of several possible options, including the application of antimonopoly laws, compulsory licensing and new legislation to allow exemptions from the effect of rights or to limit the effect of rights, as a means to promote the public ownership of research achievements while giving exclusive rights to frontrunners. However, problems exist with these measures as they fail to provide the stability of rights and are not consistent with the relevant international conventions. Thus, it is necessary to work out measures that can enhance accessibility to patented inventions without making any changes to the existence of the patent or the effect of the patent rights. As one way to achieve that end, the establishment of a consortium for integrated management of patents was examined, using cases such as patent pools as references. Figure 3.1 shows the characteristics of a research tool consortium, which was considered as one form of consortium. Specifically, the research tool consortium has the following characteristics: –
Participating universities have a collection of their institutionallyowned patents placed under the management of the consortium for free. Participating researchers have their individually-owned patents placed under the management of the consortium for free.
94
–
–
–
– –
–
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
The operator of the consortium builds its capacity for license negotiations, and then, negotiates and obtains the necessary licenses for certain patents held by private-sector companies and others, if the operator finds it necessary to make these patents available through the consortium. Participating universities and researchers are entitled to use any patents managed by the consortium for free or at a discount in return for offering their patents to the consortium for free. Different terms and conditions are set depending on whether use is by universities (in cases where all researchers affiliated with the university use a patent) or by individual researchers. Researchers, universities and other research institutions that are not offering any patents to the consortium may receive a license for patents held under the consortium by paying fees (under RAND conditions in many cases). Here again, terms and conditions are different depending on whether use is by individual researchers or for use by universities and other institutions. A license is provided for commercial use under different terms and conditions from those applicable to non-commercial use. For each research tool managed under the consortium, the number of times the tool is used is counted and a ranking of the most frequently used tool is announced. In cases where a research tool is to be created under a governmentsubsidized research project, those engaged in the project must agree to have the tool placed under the management of the consortium as a condition for receiving research grants.
It has been pointed out that Japanese researchers are feeling great concern about the possible existence and exercise of patent rights in using research tools for academic research. However, if most of the major research tools were managed under a consortium, such as the one described above, the researchers would be able to concentrate on their research without worrying about having to handle the rights for using research tools. Patents used in genetic diagnosis (patents for disease-related mutations) are different from research tool patents, in that universities are not end users. However, it is believed that the use of such patents can be facilitated by creating a mechanism very similar to the one used for research tool patents, to manage all the related patents in an integrated manner. As suggestive as this idea might be, as a mechanism for facilitating the use of patents the idea is still at a preliminary stage. It must be refined further by studying concrete issues such as pricing and the planning of license agreements.
Optimum balance in IPRs for gene-related inventions
95
NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
7. 8. 9.
10.
11.
12.
13. 14. 15.
16. 17. 18. 19.
For more details see Williams-Jones (2002) and Paradise (2004). The three patents are Patent No. 3241736 (substance patent for BRCA1), Patent No. 3455228 (substance patent for BRCA2), and Patent No. 3399539 (diagnosis method using BRCA1). See Paradise (2004). Ibid. Ibid. On May 18, 2004, EP 699754 for BRCA1 was revoked. In January 2005, two BRCA1 patents (EP 705902 on January 21 and EP 705903 on January 25) were reduced in the scope of patent rights with regard to specific gene probes but not their diagnostic applications. On June 29, 2005, the scope of patent rights of EP 785216 for BRCA2 was reduced to cover only the use of a specific mutant of the BRCA2 gene. The information is based on the EPO website (http://www.epo.org/about.us/press/releases/ archive/2005/29062005.html. Pioneering research works about this problem include Nakayama (2003) and Walsh, Arora and Cohen (2004). See Someno (1988). See ‘Issues Concerning Smooth Use of Patented Inventions’, a November 2004 report compiled by the Working Group on Patent Strategy Plan, Patent System Subcommittee, Intellectual Property Committee, Industrial Structure Council, available at http://www. jpo.go.jp/shiryou/toushin/shingikai/pdf/strategy_wg_prob/00.pdf. However, this does not constitute an infringement of the patent provided that the enzyme has been purchased from a distributor formally licensed by the patent holder and that it is used for the purposes designated under the agreement concluded at the time of purchase. In the case of research tools for which high reproducibility is difficult to realize, such as cell lines and mice, the general practice within the research community has been for a patent-holding researcher to offer his or her patented research tool to other researchers for free use and these researchers, in return, make reference to this when publishing their research results. Madey v. Duke University, 307 F. 3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Dr John Madey, a former Duke University professor, sued Duke University for infringing his patents by continuing to use certain equipment that had been installed in the university and contained devices covered by his patents even after his resignation from the university. The university lost the case. In Japan, Article 21 of the Anti-monopoly Law stipulates this. See Yamaki (2002), at 202. Similar ideas are provided in a June 2002 report compiled by a Fair Trade Commission study group examining issues on patents in new fields from the viewpoint of competition policy. See a news release at http://www.jftc.go.jp/pressrelease/02.june/02062603. pdf. See Basheer (2004). Press Release, Institut Curie, ‘The key dates’ (Sept. 26, 2002), available at http://www. curie.fr/upload/presse/keydates.pdf. According to Strandburg (2004). The survey was conducted at the Kobe Portopia Hotel in August 2004, during the conference of the ‘Four Genome Domains’ study group under a government-subsidized scientific research project in priority areas. A total of 172 individuals responded to the questionnaire. Of the 132 respondents whose affiliation could be identified, 130 were from a university or a public research institution, and only two were from a privatesector company. Of the 127 respondents whose title could be identified, 28 were university professors, 56 were researchers of other status (associate professors, assistants, post doctors, etc.), and the remaining 43 were students.
96 20. 21.
22. 23.
24. 25. 26. 27.
28.
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation See Sumikura (2001) and (2002). This is based on Section 1a (4) of the revised Patent Act of Germany, which stipulates: ‘[i]f the subject-matter of the invention is a sequence or partial sequence of a gene, the structure of which is identical to the structure of a natural sequence or partial sequence of a human gene, then its use, for which the industrial applicability has been described in concrete terms . . . , is to be included in the claim’. RAND conditions is a well-established term that is used in ‘patent declarations’, a document submitted by a company holding a patent to a standards organization, if the company’s patent rights conflict with the standards that are being set. As detailed in Watanabe and Sumikura (2002), the Cohen and Boyer patent for gene recombination, an invention that is believed to have generated the greatest amount of licensing fees for a technology transferred from an American university, has been licensed out to a number of licensees on a non-exclusive basis. See Sumikura (2003) and Ozaki and Kato (1998). See Kato (2001). See Atkinson (2003). The PIPRA website is: http://www.pipra.org/. Prior to the incorporation of national universities, inventions made by national university researchers were placed under either national or individual ownership. According to a 2002 report compiled by a working group of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Science and Technology on intellectual property, however, those under individual ownership accounted for 86.4 percent of inventions that had been subjected to deliberation by national university invention committees, an organ commissioned to decide the ownership of inventions. In relation to this, each university should create rules about how to return benefits to individual researchers for the use of their inventions within the university.
REFERENCES Atkinson, R. et al. (2003), ‘Public Sector Collaboration for Agricultural IP Management’, Science. 301: 174–175. Basheer, Shamnad (2004), ‘Block Me Not: Genes as Essential Facilities?’ Chizaiken Kiyo 2004, 82–87. Kato, Hisashi (2001), ‘Dai-San-Sedai Idotai-Tushin no tameno Patento Purattofomu Raisensu (Patent Platform License for Third-Generation Mobile Communications)’, Chizai Kanri, 51: 559–569. Nakayama, Ichiro (2003), ‘Nichibei-Hikaku kara Mita Tokkyoken to “Jikken no Jiyu” no Kankei ni tsuite: “Shiken/Kenkyu no Reigai” no Hensen to Kadai (Relationships between Patents and the “Freedom of Experiment” from the Viewpoint of Comparison Between Japan and the United States: The Development and Future Challenges of “Experimental Use Exceptions”)’, AIPPI 48: 436–472. Ozaki, Hideo; and Hisashi Kato (1998), ‘MPEG Patento Potoforio Raisensu (MPEG Patent Portfolio License)’, Chizai Kanri, 48: 329–337. Paradise, J. (2004), ‘European Opposition to Exclusive Control over Predictive Breast Cancer Testing and the Inherent Implications for U.S. Patent Law and Public Policy: A Case Study of the Myriad Genetics’ BRCA Patent Controversy’, Food and Drug Law Journal. 59: 133–154. Someno, Keiko (1988), ‘Shiken/Kenkyu ni okeru Tokkyo-Hatsumei no Jisshi (I) (Implementation of Patented Inventions in Testing and Research (I))’, AIPPI 33: 138–143.
Optimum balance in IPRs for gene-related inventions
97
Strandburg, K. (2004), ‘What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain’, Wisconsin Law Review, 73: 81–155. Sumikura, Koichi (2001), ‘Seimei-Kogaku to Tokkyo no Shin-Tenkai: GenomuTanpakushitsu Kaiseki to Tokkyo (New Developments in Biotechnology and Patents: Genome and Protein Sequence Analysis and Patents)’ and Aita, Yoshiaki; Hirashima, Ryuta; and Sumikura, Koichi “Sentan-Kagaku-Gijutsu to Chiteki-Zaisanken (Advanced Science Technologies and Intellectual Property Rights)” Chapter 1, Japan Institute of Invention and Innovation. Sumikura, Koichi (2002), ‘Idenshi Tokkyo (Gene Patents)’, Associe, 9: 60–70. Sumikura, Koichi (2003), ‘Sentan-Kagaku-Gijutsu ni okeru Tokkyo Puru no Katuyo (The Use of Patent Pools in the Advance Science Technology Field)’, Vol. 1 and 2, Bio Industry, 20(2): 42–52, 20(3): 55–62. Walsh, J.P., A. Arora and W.M. Cohen (2003), ‘Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation’, in W.M. Cohen and S.A. Merrill (eds), Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy. The National Academies Press, Washington, DC: 285–340. Watanabe, Toshiya and Koichi Sumikura (2002), TLO to Raisensu Asosieito (TLO and Licensing Associates) Tokyo: BKC. William-Jones, B. (2002), ‘History of a Gene Patent: Tracking the Development and Application of Commercial BRCA Testing’, Health Law Journal. 10: 121–144. Yamaki, Yasutaka (2002), ‘Q&A Tokkyo-Raisensu to Dokusen-Kinshi-Ho (Q&A: Patent Licensing and the Antimonopoly Law)’, Commercial Law Center, Inc.
PART II
Intellectual property management in biotechnology
Introduction Karen L. Durell Undoubtedly, intellectual property management (‘IPM’) is quickly becoming an important aspect of corporate strategies in a growing variety of markets. In fact, the term IPM has achieved almost buzzword status and is applied by groups as diverse as law firms to private-research organizations. Such indicators show that IPM is moving to the forefront of corporate interest, including in the biotechnology sphere. Of course, as a term becomes more broadly used, its meaning can be diluted. This part examines what IPM means in light of innovators’ need effectively to manage intellectual property (IP). The following three chapters will look at aspects of IPM and attempt to offer a broad-view approach to the issues related to its adoption in IP intensive innovation systems. Jointly, these chapters provide us with indications about the state of the art in IPM, and draw important linkages between it and IP. A common theme that runs through the chapters is the fact that although IPM is a frequently used term, not everyone who utilizes it ascribes it an identical meaning. IPM is not accompanied by an authoritative definition, and is therefore open to interpretations that are context and user dependant. Although each author will discuss IPM individually, we accept as a general statement that IPM refers to a strategic application and ordering of intellectual property rights (‘IPRs’) within an organization. The management strategies used by organizations evolve to facilitate the utilization of IPRs to achieve a specific, defined goal set by an organization. As the nature of institutions applying IPM will differ greatly one to another, so will the goals set by each. This in turn means that the IPM strategy will also differ. The result is that IPM can have many faces, and for this reason it can be hard to give a consistent definition, or a consistent set of illustrations drawn from the practical uses of IPM in the organizations. The first chapter is by Patrick Sullivan, a leader in IPM and one of the first people in the world to develop and implement IPM strategies. Sullivan provides us with a primer on IPM offering a consistent grounding in the issues that supports all subsequent discussion of the topic. As a starting point, Sullivan points out that IPRs are tools. Although the popular discourse often attributes certain outcomes to individual IPRs, 101
102
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
the reality is that how one exercises one’s right of IPR ownership is the outward manifestation of the strategic interest held by the IP owner. In this respect, IPRs are tools for strategic management, rather than being ends in themselves. As Sullivan makes clear in his chapter, an important starting point for IPM is to understand that IPRs are not the foreground, but will instead be subsumed in broader interests that structure the organization’s overall management strategy. Sullivan also explains the ways that one can find IPRs implemented. He acknowledges the many values that may be attributed to IPRs and explains that the value which IPRs represent to a particular corporation will be directly influenced by the goals of the organization. For example, IP can be managed in a way that is an explicitly offensive strategy, or the converse can be true and the approach will be defensive. Organizations will test the waters with new IP to find its value within their strategic purposes, which is one way that organizations can gain a sense of the accountable value of the IP assets. This is a key concept of IPM. Each firm that engages in IPM will design its strategies to promote its internal goals. Varying goals necessitate varying applications of IPR tools, so that no two corporations are likely to apply identical IPM strategies. For this reason, IPR tools will have different values to different corporations. For example, the IP may have revenue value, it may have a role in cost-reduction or strategic positioning value. There can also be regional differences if, for example, one takes the North American context in which IP is sometimes treated as if it were a substitute for cash, whereas in the European Union IP is often characterized in a social networking vein. Thus, IPRs that are not particularly useful to the internal workings of corporation A may glean significant value for the organization if they are licensed out to corporation B, that has a great need of the IPR. Thus, IPM is not merely about remaining internally focused. External relationships between corporations can be vital. These themes continue through the chapters that follow. Sharon Oriel, who has been involved in corporate IPM for many years, including 30 years at Dow Chemical, offers an example of the difficulty that is posed when an IPM term must be defined. She notes that confusion occurs even amongst IPM professionals, and yet in order for effective discourse to occur it is crucial that IPM terms be commonly understood. For the particular context in which she was anchoring her remarks – the biotechnology industry – this turns out to be very important because biotechnology firms tend to have a common profile, and that means the culture of a firm or the entire sector will have a significant influence on the IMP strategy that will be applied. Oriel characterizes biotechnology firms as being small, start-up organizations with a single product with no interest in diversification but
Introduction to Part II
103
which are keenly aware of the need to establish competitive advantage. In biotechnology firms, science tends to be paramount, but the business aspects of the firm take a back seat. What impact on IPM do these traits of biotechnology firms have? First, because of their small size and relative newness, biotechnology firms are often principally concerned with cost management issues. The result is that biotech IPM often emphasizes small-scale IPRs (for example, national patents rather than global patent portfolios achieved through PCT patent filings). Players within this sector are also often engaged in heated disagreements about issues of ownership and ethics relating to IPM strategies and thus, although IPMs applied in this sector are all likely to be small in scale, they will be diverse as regards the level of enforcement and retention of IPRs. A further consideration for the average biotechnology company involves considerations of value. As Oriel states, a biotech firm is responsible for delivering value to its stakeholders. This is another instance where clear definitions are crucial. The shift in terminology away from ‘shareholder’ is deliberate. It is indicative of Oriel’s view that many companies see themselves as having not only obligations to shareholders, but also obligations to a broader community of interests. In this respect, there is an expansion beyond the narrow group of parties who hold shares in a company to the wider group of parties who have an interest in the company’s ability to achieve success. In a limit case, one can perhaps imagine groups such as CAMBIA, or some other kind of open source organization, explicitly inverting the order from stakeholders to shareholders. In the final chapter in this part, Karen Durell and Richard Gold move away from the specifics of particular IPM strategies that may be adopted, which is the main focus of Sullivan and Oriel. Instead, Durell and Gold focus on the scope of the strategies themselves. The authors identify three different general IPM strategies – firm-centric, firm-networked and non-firm. Durell and Gold offer examples of the present application of firm-centric and firm-networked IPM, which are common. They argue that IPM is poised to expand to include a non-firm approach, an option that is not bound to function within either a firm internally, or inter-firm relationships. A non-firm approach has the potential to shift the foundation of IPM goals to a wider sphere of organizations, those that participate in a common market or sphere of innovation, which in turn has the potential to spur innovative uses of intangibles. Actions undertaken within a system of innovation, rather than a single firm, cause the organizations within the system to set a common goal and to create relationships that will aid in the attainment of that goal. An implication of moving IPM beyond the
104
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
boundaries of the traditional firm may be that the pool of decision-makers would expand to include policy-makers at the industry and government levels. This change could widen the range of IPM tools available, so as to encompass public policies, industry practices, international treaties and the regulatory environment. The goal of dynamic IPM may be stated as competition through cooperation. Moreover, non-firm IPM can alter the value of IPRs, as their use and potential for bundling are augmented in a wider sphere of management. Durell and Gold provide several examples, from the biotechnology sphere as well as other sectors, of firm-centric and firm-networked approaches. These are used to compare and contrast existing IPM approaches with the potential represented by non-firm IPM. In summary, these chapters provide an overview of IPM in biotechnology and a suggestion of the future progression of strategies in this field. As a relatively new corporate tool IPM has much room for growth and the authors attempt to point out how it may flourish in the biotechnology sector. As a final comment on the part, it is worth noting that several common themes ran through all of the chapters. Foremost amongst these is the observation that the category of intangible assets includes more than just intellectual property. For this reason it is crucial that an IPM strategy identify which intangibles it will address – for example tradeable IP, or non-tradeable business practices and culture. All of the speakers also agreed that firm culture has a significant impact upon IPM and will shape the strategies as it influences the goal of an entity. Linked to this issue is the fact that IPM should remain open to new methods and not become static. Open source initiatives may be an example of a progression which can be integrated into IPM and may therefore merit further consideration in firms previously not inclined to take open source seriously as an option. Particularly as non-firm entities become more important players, it will be important for firms to consider the full range of options they have available for valuing and managing their intellectual property assets.
4.
Fundamentals of intellectual property management Patrick H. Sullivan
The field of intellectual property (IP) management has developed significantly since the mid-1980s. IP has moved beyond the narrow purview of the corporation’s legal department into the broader arenas of business tactics and strategy. Any conversation about the role of intellectual property in a business or an industry, such as biotechnology, demands that participants be aware of the range of opportunities and practices that underlie IP and IP management. The rich and well-established business literature on IP management falls into two major groups: IP as a legal asset and IP as a business asset.1 These two views of intellectual property are quite different in nature, and are typically held by different sets of people within a corporation. Those who hold the ‘legal asset’ view of IP, usually attorneys or people with legal training, are interested in providing legal protection for the organization’s innovations. Their view is primarily (although not entirely) defensive: like builders of fortifications, their goal is to create a safe and strong set of walls to keep out attackers who threaten to steal the organization’s intellectual treasures. These people seek to create the strongest possible legal barriers to competitors and, with only rare offensive forays against individual infringers, position the organization behind strong defenses. On the other hand, those for whom IP is primarily a business asset tend to focus on maximizing the organization’s revenues and profits. For them, the management of IP is primarily an offensive activity: they use IP as one of several springboards for increasing the firm’s earnings. The information on IP and IP management in this chapter presents both of these perspectives.
WHY IS IP IMPORTANT? Intellectual property is an intangible. It represents a set of rights and has no physical substance. As an intangible, it falls within the set of ‘assets’ that have been called the firm’s ‘intellectual capital’. Intellectual capital or 105
106
Intellectual property rights in biotechnology innovation
intangibles (the terms may be considered synonomous) now represent a major portion of the market capitalization value of a firm. In recent years the number of companies the value of which lies largely with their intangibles has increased dramatically. In a study of thousands of non-financial, publicly traded firms in the Compustat database over a 20-year period, Dr Margaret Blair of the Brookings Institution reported a significant shift in the makeup of the value of company assets.2 In 1978, her study showed 80 percent of the average firm’s value could be attributable to tangible assets on its balance sheet, with 20 percent of the company’s value due to other factors. Ten years later, in 1988, the makeup had shifted to 45 percent tangible assets and 55 percent other factors. By 1998, only 30 percent of the value of the firms studied was attributable to the value of their tangible assets, while a stunning 70 percent was attributable to other factors. Blair concluded that the value not explained by the firm’s tangible assets was associated with the firm’s intangible ‘assets’. An Accenture study written in 2000 found similar patterns in the evolving size of the ‘other factors’ component of market capitalization, but came to different conclusions as to the explanation. The Accenture study concluded that the amount of a firm’s market capitalization not accounted for by its tangible assets represented the firm’s assets and activities not under active management.3 Significantly, the Accenture paper did not identify intangibles as the major component of firm value; rather, it only defined the nontangible component as those value-generating items and activities not under active management. This would include, but not be restricted to, the firm’s intangibles. It could also include factors such as investor expectations. The factors that contribute to a firm’s market capitalization are complex and difficult to pin down. They are largely made up of investors’ expectations of future revenue in addition to any value that they may attribute to the firm’s assets, both tangible and intangible. But if more than 70 percent of investor expectations relate to future revenue, with the value of the firm’s intangibles playing a significant role in those expectations, then it is fair to say that intangibles (including intellectual property) have assumed an increasing portion of the value of enterprises over the past two decades.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF IP LAW Intellectual property represents the legal rights to intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary and artistic fields. Intellectual property laws aim to safeguard creators and other producers of intellectual goods and services by granting them certain time-limited rights to control the
Fundamentals of intellectual property management
107
use(s) made of their creations. Intellectual property is traditionally divided into two branches: ‘industrial property’ and ‘copyright’.4 Until the latter half of the nineteenth century, there were no international agreements on legal rights for the owners of intellectual creations. Countries enacted their own laws to suit their individual interests and needs for protecting intellectual activity. As a result, it was difficult for an individual or a firm to obtain legal protection for intellectual works in another country because countries’ laws were so diverse. A patent application, for example, had to be made at approximately the same time in multiple countries in order to prevent a subsequent publication in one country from invalidating the novelty of the invention in the others. The spurt of technology development in the latter half of the nineteenth century made it imperative that a more internationally oriented and harmonious set of intellectual property laws be developed in order to facilitate the flow of technology as well as international trade. Under the auspices of the Empire of Austria-Hungary, the Congress of Vienna for Patent Reform was convened in 1873 and elaborated a set of principles on which an effective and useful patent system should be based. The Vienna Congress was followed by an International Congress on Industrial Property in Paris in 1878, which recommended that an international diplomatic conference be called to determine the basis for uniform legislation in the field of industrial property. A diplomatic conference in Paris in 1883 produced the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. Initially, two secretariats were created (one for industrial property and one for copyrights), but in 1893 the two secretariats were merged into one. The Paris Convention has been revised from time to time since 1883. Each of the revision conferences ended with the adoption of a revised Act of the Paris Convention. Although this string of ‘Acts’ still has historical interest, the great majority of the world’s countries