The Road to Oran: Anglo-French Naval Relations September 1939–July 1940

THE ROAD TO ORAN

CASS SERIES: NAVAL POLICY AND HISTORY Series Editor: Geoffrey Till ISSN 1366-9478 This series consists primarily of original manuscripts by research scholars in the general area of naval policy and history, without national or chronological limitations. It will from time to time also include collections of important articles as well as reprints of classic works. 1. 2.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18.

19.

Austro-Hungarian Naval Policy, 1904–1914 Milan N. Vego Far-Flung Lines: Studies in Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman Edited by Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars Rear Admiral Raja Menon The Royal Navy and German Naval Disarmament 1942–1947 Chris Madsen Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas Milan N. Vego The Pen and Ink Sailor: Charles Middleton and the King’s Navy, 1778–1813 John E. Talbott The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism, 1935–1940 Robert Mallett The Merchant Marine in International Affairs, 1850–1950 Edited by Greg Kennedy Naval Strategy in Northeast Asia: Geo-strategic Goals, Policies and Prospects Duk-Ki Kim Naval Policy and Strategy in the Mediterranean Sea: Past, Present and Future Edited by John B. Hattendorf Stalin’s Ocean-going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and Shipbuilding Programmes, 1935–1953 Jürgen Rohwer and Mikhail S. Monakov Imperial Defence, 1868–1887 Donald Mackenzie Schurman; edited by John Beeler Technology and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century and Beyond Edited by Phillips Payson O’Brien The Royal Navy and Nuclear Weapons Richard Moore The Royal Navy and the Capital Ship in the Interwar Period: An Operational Perspective Joseph Moretz Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power Thomas M. Kane Britain’s Anti-submarine Capability, 1919–1939 George Franklin Britain, France and the Naval Arms Trade in the Baltic, 1919–1939: Grand Strategy and Failure Donald Stoker Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century: An International Perspective Edited by Christopher Bell and Bruce Elleman

THE ROAD TO ORAN Anglo-French Naval Relations September 1939–July 1940

David Brown Introduction by Geoffrey Till

FRANK CAS S LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published in 2004 in Great Britain by Taylor & Francis Ltd 11 New Fetter Lane London EC4P 4EE This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004. and in the United States of America by Taylor & Francis Inc 29 West 35th Street New York NY 10001 Copyright © 2004 Margaret Brown British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Brown, D.K. (David Keith), 1928–2001 The road to Oran: Anglo-French naval relations, September 1939–July 1940. – (Cass series. Naval policy and history; 20) 1. Mers-el-Kebir, Attack on, 1940 2. World War, 1939–1945 – Naval Operations, British 3. World War, 1939–1945 – Naval operation, French 4. Great Britain – Military relations – France 5. France – Military relations – Great Britain 6. Great Britain – Military policy I. Title 940.5′423 ISBN 0-203-49911-5 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-58215-2 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-7146-5461-2 (cloth) ISSN 1366-9478 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Brown, David, 1928–2001 The Road to Oran: Anglo-French naval relations, September 1939–July 1940/David Brown; introduction by Geoffrey Till. p. cm. – (Cass series – naval policy and history) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7146-5461-2 (cloth) 1. Mers-el-Kébir, Attack on, 1940. 2. Great Britain–Military relations–France. 3. France–Military relataions–Great Britain. 4. World War, 1939–1945–Naval operations, British. 5. World War, 1939–1945–Naval operations, French. 6. Mers el Kébir (Algeria)–History, Naval–20th century. I. Title. II. Series. D766.99.A4B76 2003 940.54′23–dc21

2003048998

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher of this book.

Contents

List of illustrations

Series Editor’s Preface Foreword by Contre-amiral Jean Kessler Preface Dramatis Personae 1939–40 Introduction by Geoffrey Till 1 Anglo-French Naval Staff Planning and Cooperation on the Eve of War 2 The Phoney War 3 The Mediterranean, 27 March–27 May 1940 4 Dunkirk to Bordeaux, 4–15 June 5 Political Collapse, 16 June 6 Pétain’s First Day, 17 June 7 Last Meeting of the Admirals, 18 June 8 Bordeaux, 19–21 June: Armistice or Africa? 9 The Other Side of the Hill, 17–21 June 10 The Armistice Terms, 22 June 11 23 June 12 24 June 13 The Armistice, 25 June 14 The Cruise of the Richelieu, 25–26 June 15 27 June 16 28 June 17 29 June 18 30 June 19 1 July 20 Orders for Operation ‘Catapult’, 2 July 21 Mers-el-Kébir: The Parley, 3 July 22 The Bombardment of Mers-el-Kébir, 3 July Bibliography Index

vii

ix xi xv xix xxiv 1 8 19 25 34 41 50 58 72 78 88 97 110 119 129 137 149 156 163 171 182 198 206 209

List of illustrations

Between pages 92 and 93 1. The action during the Battle of Oran. 2. In the heat of the battle French sailors attempt to put out the flames on deck. 3. The battleship Strasbourg fires on the British squadron before breaking away on her high-speed run to France. 4. Vice-amiral Godfroy’s Force X warships alongside British vessels in harbour at Alexandria prior to the armistice. 5. French leaders grouped prior to the fall of France, including Paul Reynaud, Premier of France and Minister of Defence until 16 June 1940, and Général de Gaulle. 6. Amiral Darlan meeting with Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, American General, Mark Clarke, and General Anderson in Algiers following Operation ‘Torch’, the successful Allied invasion of North Africa in November 1942. 7. The French battleship Jean Bart. 8. Admiral Sir Dudley Pound on board HMS Prince of Wales examining charts with Sir John Dill and Sir Wilfred Freeman. 9. The French battleship Richelieu as she returned to Oran in the service of the Allies in 1943. 10. The harbour at Mers el-Kébir. Panoramic view taken as British warships returned to the harbour in 1943. 11. The French battleship Strasbourg alongside a scuttled French cruiser, possibly Colbert or Algérie, in Toulon harbour. 12. The effects of the bombardment on Oran, taken from the Queen’s Baths. 13. The first bombs falling on the jetty. 14. The battleship Bretagne taken before she was sunk at Mers el-Kébir. 15. Bombs falling around the battleship Provence. 16. Commodore (Vice Admiral Retd) N A Wodehouse RN. Acknowledgements: photographs 1–11 courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London; photographs 12–16 courtesy of the Naval Historical Branch, Ministry of Defence, London.

Series Editor’s Preface David Brown began writing this book towards the end of his long period of service as Head of the Royal Navy’s Naval Historical Branch (NHB) from 1977 to 1999. The task of the Branch during that turbulent and sometimes difficult period was to ensure that a wellargued historical perspective informed contemporary debate about the purposes, functions and composition of the Royal Navy. Further, by capturing and recording recent and existing data the aim was and is to make it possible for future generations of naval policy-makers to have the same advantages. In addition to this, David became a noted naval historian in his own right, starting off in the area with which he had been most familiar as a naval officer – carrier aviation. He master-minded the fiftieth anniversary conference on the Battle of the Atlantic held at Liverpool in 1993, which produced an excellent book edited by Stephen Howarth and Derek Law, and what is arguably the definitive work on the role of the Royal Navy in the Falklands war of 1982. The Road to Oran was his last work, but tragically, in August 2001, David died before it could be completed. Although David’s prose speaks for itself in very large measure, he was aware of the need for an overarching review of all the detailed material he had so meticulously assembled, but sadly had too little opportunity to supply it himself. While some might feel that the book may not in fact need such a review, it was generally felt that the following might help the uninitiated reader into the complexities of the subject that this book addresses. In large measure, this analysis is based on David’s own work, on an early Admiralty Study, RN, by Commander Stitt, on a commentary on this by Professor E.L. Woodward, Official Historian of the War in the Mediterranean, and on documents to be found in the Somerville Papers as published in 1995 by the Navy Records Society. The Series Editor acknowledges with real gratitude the help of Captain Chris Page and his team at the Naval Historical Branch in completing this project, which is respectfully dedicated to the fond memory of its author, David Brown, historian extraordinary. Geoffrey Till Series Editor

Foreword

At 5.54 p.m. on 3 July 1940, after a day of fruitless negotiations, Admiral Somerville’s ‘Force H’ opened fire on the ships of the French ‘Force de Raid’. These ships, which were lying in the harbour of Mers-el-Kébir and included the modern battle cruisers Dunkerque and Strasbourg and the older battleships Bretagne and Provence, were being decommissioned in accordance with the terms of the armistice agreed between France and Germany on 22 June. Thirteen hundred French sailors lost their lives in this confrontation, which was little short of fratricidal given the close and active cooperation, and friendly relations, which had existed between the two navies during the war up to the collapse of the French front and France’s request for an armistice. This dramatic event is the best known of the various operations undertaken by the Royal Navy to secure French warships wherever they might be (moored in British ports, or stationed in Alexandria, Africa or the Caribbean). For, despite the measures taken by the French Navy to prevent its principal ships from being seized by the Germans (as exemplified by the escape of the unfinished Jean Bart from St Nazaire on 18 June) and the repeated assurances of the French Admiralty and the French government that the fleet would never fall into the hands of the Axis Powers, it was impossible for the British Prime Minister to believe for one moment in the German promises contained in the provisions of the armistice agreement relating to the French fleet (the notorious Article 8). The process which culminated in this tragedy after a month of contacts, meetings, difficult communications, garbled messages and, perhaps, hidden agendas has been studied for a long time on both sides of the Channel. The respective situations of the two Allies fostered mutual incomprehension: France was anxious to limit the consequences of its defeat in the Battle of France, while the United Kingdom sought to assert its unwavering determination to continue fighting and to obtain the assistance of the United States to win this world war. But, whether in the case of memoirs or historical works, the emotion with which French writers have approached the subject

THE ROAD TO ORAN

and the understandable concern to justify the action shown by British writers have hardly been conducive to objective analysis of the operation which the French have referred to for many years as the ‘attack’ on Mers-el-Kébir (which David Brown calls a ‘one-sided action’). No such criticisms can be levelled at The Road to Oran, which was originally written on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the event. The anniversary was commemorated at Brookwood military cemetery on 3 July 1990 by a ceremony (attended by Sir Julian Oswald, First Sea Lord, and David Brown, Head of the Naval Historical Branch) in honour of the French sailors who died at Mers-el-Kébir; the work most probably played a part in the decision to hold that official ceremony, which is greatly to the credit of the Royal Navy. David Brown’s book chronicles, almost day by day from 17 June onwards, the tragic course of events as they were perceived on the British side by the Admiralty, in direct contact with the Cabinet, the commanders-in-chief and the liaison officers appointed to the various French commands. The author does not pass judgement. His systematic analysis of the British archives, supplemented by French archives, enables him to present facts in the order they occurred, report the various protagonists’ impressions and intentions as they expressed them at the time and record the liaison officers’ perception of the will of the French sailors, who were shattered by the scale of their country’s military collapse, to keep on fighting. The account shows, by reference to first-hand British sources, how the Cabinet, driven by the overriding need to demonstrate the strength of its resolve, decided at a very early stage to take action to eliminate the threat. We see the manifest lack of enthusiasm with which the British admirals, sometimes influenced by memories of past cooperation but always in the light of their assessment of the military situation, carried out the Admiralty’s orders; we see also how each of them resolved, in his own way and in accordance with the relative freedom of action conferred by their remoteness from the Admiralty, the grave problem they had to face. In adopting this approach, The Road to Oran makes an exceptional contribution to historical knowledge, while providing the reader – whether British or French – with an indispensable aid to gaining an objective understanding of the events which poisoned Franco-British naval relations for so long. I fear that I might be suspected of a less than objective opinion of the importance of this work in view of my close friendship with David, on a professional as well as a personal level. So let me cite – and fully endorse – the view of Hervé CoutauBégarie and Claude Huan, the authors of the most complete book on the subject,1 in my opinion, that has been published in France to date. These writers, who were authorised by David Brown to draw on his xii

FOREWORD

work, considered his study to be a major contribution, of exceptional interest, which they looked forward to seeing published. It is impossible for any fair-minded person to ignore this contribution to the contemporary history of Franco-British naval relations, and I hope that it will also be made available to French readers some day. I offer my warmest thanks to Margaret Brown for enabling me, when she asked me to write the Foreword to this book, to pay tribute to David Brown, the rigorous historian and the friend who left us too early. Contre-amiral Jean Kessler, former head of the French Naval Historical Section October 2002 NOTE 1.

Hervé Coutau-Bégarie and Claude Huan, Mers-el-Kébir (1940): La rupture franco-britannique, Paris, Economica, 1994.

xiii

Preface

The majority of Englishmen, if asked to identify their country’s ‘traditional enemy’ would probably reply, without much hesitation, ‘France’. This goes back not to the Hundred Years War of the age of chivalry but to the later series of wars about successions – Spanish and Austrian, revolutions American and French, disputes between powers and principalities and family quarrels which were allowed to affect the wider world. These lasted for 127 years, from William of Orange setting his new kingdom against France in the Low Countries until the defeat of Napoleon in the same general area. They were followed by 125 years of peace between the two countries; peace, furthermore, punctuated by alliance and cooperation, beginning in the waters of the Peloponnese, assisting the Greeks to gain their independence, continuing through the Russian War of 1854–56 and culminating in the First World War, whose shared awful experience should have given the two countries a common heritage which could be used in common cause. In fact, when the ambitions of individuals who had created totalitarian states began to upset the peace in the mid-1930s, the two allies met again to plan for co-operation in war and arrangements for the co-ordinated conduct of a war at sea were established through interAdmiralty and inter-Command talks held at intervals in 1938 and early in 1939. Anglo-French naval co-operation at staff and operational levels was effective from the outbreak of the Second World War on 3 September 1939. The cooperation, and the amity which grew from it, faltered under the intolerable strains of the military collapse of the alliance in the second week of June 1940 and foundered as a new French Government sought and obtained what it regarded as acceptable terms for an Armistice in the third week. It disappeared completely as British mistrust turned to enmity in some quarters, leading, in the closing days of the month, to the decision to take offensive action against the former Ally. This book attempts to examine, from the British point of view, the process of disintegration which culminated in the order, given to a reluctant Royal Navy commander, to open fire on 3 July 1940 on the French Navy squadron at Mers-el-Kébir.

THE ROAD TO ORAN

The first published accounts of the events leading up to the action at Mers-el-Kébir were largely those which appeared in the memoirs of politicians, diplomats and warriors: few were free of stern rebuke or wistful exculpation based on ‘what might have been’, qualities which endured in some later works when the full benefit of hindsight became available. As early as 1949, the British Admiralty’s Naval Historical Section, acting on behalf of the Cabinet Office, which had commissioned the Official History of the Second World War, approached the French Naval Staff with the suggestion that documents concerning the development of the crisis should be exchanged. The Service Historique de la Marine, resonpded warmly and co-operated fully, providing copies of correspondence and certain, but not all, signals and reports; the omissions, it is believed, were not deliberately withheld – they were not asked for. The French material permitted Commander George Stitt RN, the naval historian commissioned to write the maritime content of the first volume of the Official History, to concentrate on the sources which were available to the British political leadership and to the Admiralty from day to day as the drama was played out and to examine and recount ‘what was’. Winston Churchill returned to power in 1951, just as Stitt’s chapter was completed. The latter’s findings contradicted the former’s published memoirs and did not find favour: an account less critical of the British attitude, actions and political leadership was published when Volume 1 of ISO Playfair’s The Mediterranean and Middle East appeared in 1954, a year after Churchill received a Nobel Prize for Literature. The British papers sent to Vincennes were edited by Dr Hervé Cras*, who skilfully combined them with the French material to produce L’Armistice de juin 1940 et la crise franco-britannique, published in 1959. This very detailed work provided a wealth of material, for like Capitaine Caroff ’s histories of the Atlantic and Mediterranean theatres published by the SHM between 1958 and 1961, it quoted the essential signals traffic in full, with full citations. Unlike Caroff ’s histories, no copy was passed to the Naval Historical Branch, which remained unaware of its existence until after the first version of this present work was completed, just in time for the 50th anniversary of the event. In the interim, the relaxation of British and French legislation and the restitution of German records gradually made possible reconstruction and analysis by historians unburdened by the baggage of personal involvement or policy constraint which had limited the memoirs and official accounts which appeared up to 1959. But national perspectives continued to dog even the most determined attempts ‘to get at the *

Médecin en chef de 1re classe, senior archivist at the SHM and a well-known naval writer under the nom de plume of ‘Jacques Mordal’

xvi

PREFACE

truth’ throughout the three later ‘Phases’ of the treatment of the Mers el-Kébir history identified by Capitaine Yves Rochas in his 1993 book, and even when trying to eschew prejudice most authors had at least one villain and one ‘pet theory’. The present author admits his debt to those who have gone before and makes no claim to greater insight or impartiality, but suggests that a history based only on what was known to the authorities on one side or the other will not suffice. Key French messages were received in Britain only in a fragmentary or garbled form which belied, concealed or simply missed the true intention of the full text, and reports were received of French activities which were either factually inaccurate, unintentionally misconstrued or quite deliberately distorted. That there were two sides to this tragedy was obvious and Cras’ work made it clear that inaccuracy and misconception were not restricted to the British. Hervé Coutau-Bégarie and Claude Huan’s biography of Amiral Darlan and their collection of his papers provided evidence that distortion and personal animosity were also to be found on the other side of the Channel and that the French, too, misunderstood direct warnings as well as straws in the wind. Sixty years after the Royal Navy turned and smote its erstwhile ally it seems that personal will ultimately outweighed all other considerations. Two men, Churchill and Darlan, with totally different conceptions of the nature of navies and misconceptions as to the limits of sea power exercised their judgement and their powers of command and took their decisions under stress, when perspectives were limited by the blinkers of the needs of day-to-day national survival; the legacy of bitterness has endured because the viewpoints of posterity have been hedged by national emotion. As history, past and present, demonstrates, this is not unique to Britain and France. There can be few who do not deeply regret the events of 3 July 1940. Perhaps, one day, they may be recognised as marking the moment when the history of the two navies finally became inextricably entwined. David Brown

xvii

Dramatis Personae 1939–40

ABRIAL, Amiral d’escadre Jean-Marie ALEXANDER, Albert V. ATTLEE, Clement AUBOYNEAU, Capitaine de Vaisseau P.M.

Amiral Nord ( at Dunkirk) November 1939 to 4 June 1940 First Lord of the Admiralty, May 1940 Deputy Prime Minister, May 1940 (Ami de Darlan (ADD)) French Naval Liaison Officer (FNLO) with Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, at Scapa Flow to May 1940; with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet from May 1940 (ADD) Deputy Chief of French Naval Staff

AUPHAN, Capitaine de Vaisseau Gabriel A.J.P. (Contre-amiral June 1940) BNLOs (British Naval Bizerta Liaison Officers) Brest Casablanca

– Spearman – Bissett – Pleydell-Bouverie, Mackintosh Dakar – Rushbrooke Dunkirk – Henderson Force de Raid – Collett BARNOUIN, Contre-amiral Port Admiral, Bordeaux BAUDOUIN, Paul Minister for Foreign Affairs, June 1940 BISSETT, Captain BNLO with Amiral Ouest, Brest, then A.W. La T., RN Casablanca BLAKE, Vice-Admiral Sir Assistant Chief of Naval Staff Geoffrey (Foreign) BOS, Capitaine de Frégate FNLO with Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches, Plymouth BOURRARAGUE, (ADD) Deputy Chief of French Naval Contre-amiral Staff, 1939; Flag Officer 4th Cruiser Division (Algiers), June–July 1940 De BRYAS, Capitaine de FNLO with Flag Officer Commanding, Frégate North Atlantic, Gibraltar

THE ROAD TO ORAN

BURGES WATSON, Rear-Admiral F. CAMBON, R. CAMPBELL, Sir Ronald CAMPINCHI, MCésar CASTEX, Amiral Raoul CAYOL, Vice-Amiral Lucien M. CHALMERS, Vice-Admiral W.S. CHAMBERLAIN, Neville CHARLES-ROUX, François CHAUTEMPS, Camille CHURCHILL, Winston S. COLLETT, Commander, RN CORBIN, Charles CUNNINGHAM, Admiral Sir Andrew DALADIER, Edouard DARLAN, Amiral de la Flotte Jean Louis Xavier François DENIS de RIVOYRE, Capitaine de Vaisseau DILL, General Sir John DROGOU, Lieutenant de Vaisseau François DUFF-COOPER, Alfred DUNBAR-NAISMITH, Admiral Sir Martin

Despatched to Bordeaux to supervise British demolition operations Minister, French Embassy, London British Ambassador, Paris, Tours, Bordeaux Minister of Marine to 16 June 1940 Amiral Nord (at Dunkirk) to November 1939 Commander, Brest Sector to June 1940; Senior Officer, French naval units at Portsmouth, June–July 1940 Admiralty Liaison Officer (with foreign naval attachés in London) Prime Minister to May 1940; Lord President of the Privy Council from May 1940 Secretary-General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs Member of Council of Ministers to June 1940; Vice-President of Council from June 1940 First Lord of the Admiralty to May 1940; Prime Minister and Minister of Defence from May 1940 BNLO with Force de Raid French Ambassador in London Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet (at Malta to May 1940, Alexandria from May 1940) Premier of France to March 1940 Chief of Naval Staff and Commanderin-Chief, French Fleet; additionally Minister of Marine from June 1940 Naval Attaché, London Vice-Chief of Imperial General Staff from April 1940; CIGS from May 1940 Commanding Officer, submarine Narval Minister of Information Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches (at Plymouth) xx

DRAMATIS PERSONAE 1939–40

DYEVRE, Capitaine de Frégate EDEN, Anthony

FNLO with Flag Officer, Dover to December 1939 Colonial Secretary to May 1940; Secretary of State for War from May 1940 ELDIN, Lieutenant de FNLO with Flag Officer, Dover from Vaisseau (Réserve) December 1939 ESTEVA, Amiral Jean-Pierre Amiral Sud, at Toulon to May 1940, then Bizerta FNLOs (French Naval Alexandria – Auboyneau Liaison Officers) Dover – Dyévre/Eldin Gibraltar – de Bryas Malta – Gayral Plymouth – Bos Portsmouth – Gélix FORD, Vice-Admiral Sir Vice-Admiral, Malta Wilbraham Le FRANC-GUYADER, Commanding Officer, battleship Paris Capitaine de Vaisseau FRANCO y Bahamonde, Spanish Head of State Generalissimo Francisco de GAULLE, CO 4th Armoured Division March– Brigadier-General Charles May 1940; Under-Secretary of National Defence 6–16 June 1940; leader of Free French from June 1940 GAYRAL, Capitaine de FNLO, Malta corvette Jean GELIX, Capitaine de Frégate FNLO with C-in-C Portsmouth GENSOUL, Vice-amiral Flag Officer Commanding Force de d’Escadre Marcel B. Raid, based at Brest to April 1940, then Mers-el-Kébir GODFROY, Vice-amiral Flag Officer Commanding Force ‘X’, René Emile based at Alexandria from May 1940 GORT, General Lord Commander, British Expeditionary (Viscount) Force, 1939–40 HALIFAX, Lord (Viscount) Foreign Secretary HANKEY, Lord (Baron) Minister without Portfolio to May 1940; Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster HENDERSON, BNLO with Amiral Nord, at Dunkirk Commander, RN HERRIOT, Edouard Former Premier; President of the Chamber of Deputies xxi

THE ROAD TO ORAN

HILLGARTH, Captain Alan H., RN HOLLAND, Captain C.S., RN

British Naval Attaché, Madrid

British Naval Attaché, Paris and ‘Marceau’ to April 1940; Commanding Officer, HMS Ark Royal from May 1940; envoy to Amiral Gensoul, 3 July JAMES, Admiral Sir William Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth JEANNENEY, Jules President of the Senate KENNEDY-PURVIS, Commander-in-Chief, America and Vice-Admiral Sir Charles E. West Indies (at Bermuda) LEBRUN, Albert President of the French Republic LÉGER, Alexis Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to May 1940 LELONG, Général Military Attaché, London; Head of French Military Mission Le LUC, Contre-amiral (ADD) Chief of Naval Staff; naval Maurice A. representative, armistice delegation LLOYD, Lord (Baron) Colonial Secretary from May 1940 LOTHIAN, Lord (Baron) British Ambassador, Washington LYON, Vice-Admiral Sir Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic Guy d’Oyly (at Freetown) MACKINTOSH, BLNO with Amiral Afrique, at Commander, RN Casablanca, from February 1940 MANDEL, Georges Minister for the Interior to 16 June 1940 MARZIN, Capitaine de (ADD) Commanding Officer, battleship Vaisseau Richelieu MITTELHAUSER, Général Governor-General, Syria Eugène D. NÉGADELLE, Capitaine (ADD) Assistant Chief of Naval Staff de Vaisseau J.L. NOGUS, Général Auguste Resident-General, North Africa NORTH, Admiral Sir Dudley Flag Officer Commanding North Atlantic, at Gibraltar, from November 1939 ODEND’HAL, Vice-amiral Head of French Naval Mission, Jean E. London OLLIVE, Vice-amiral Amiral Afrique, at Casablanca, from d’escadre Emmanuel November 1939 ONSLOW, Captain R.F.J. Commanding Officer, carrier HMS RN Hermes PÉTAIN, Maréchal H. Vice-Premier of France from 18 May Phillipe 1940; Premier from 16 June xxii

DRAMATIS PERSONAE 1939–40

PHILLIPS, Vice-Admiral Tom S.V. PLANÇON, Contre-amiral PLEYDELL-BOUVERIE, Captain the Hon. E., RN POUND, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley R.P. REYNAUD, Paul ROBERT, Amiral Georges A. ROOSEVELT, Franklin D. RUSHBROOKE, Commander J., RN SANSON, Capitaine de Frégate SOMERVILLE, Vice-Admiral Sir James SPEARMAN, Lieutenant Commander A.Y,. RN SPEARS, Lieutenant General Sir Edward TENNANT, Captain W.G., RN VANSITTART, Sir Robert WALTON, Petty Officer R.W., RN WAVELL, General Sir Archibald WELLS, Vice-Admiral Lionel V. WEYGAND, Général Maxime

Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff Flag Officer, French West Africa, at Dakar BNLO, Amiral Afrique, at Casablanca, to February 1940; Naval Attaché and BNLO ‘Marceau’ from April 1940 First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff Premier of France and Minister of Defence to 16 June 1940 Amiral Antilles, at Martinique, from October 1939 US President BNLO, French West Africa (at Dakar) Head of Naval Intelligence Division Flag Officer, Force ‘H’, at Gibraltar from 28 June 1940 BNLO, with Amiral Sud, at Bizerta Military Attaché, Paris, then British Liaison Officer to Minister of Defence (Reynaud) Naval Officer-in-Charge, evacuation operations, Dunkirk Career diplomat, Diplomatic Adviser to Foreign Secretary British Naval Attaché Paris, wireless operator Commander-in-Chief (land forces), Middle East Vice-Admiral, Aircraft Carriers; in command of Force ‘H’ at Gibraltar until arrival of Somerville on 28 June 1940 Commander-in-Chief, Levant; Allied Military Commander-in-Chief from 18 May 1940; Vice-Premier of France and Minister of Defence from 16 June 1940

xxiii

Introduction

July 1940 was a bad time for the British. Their campaign in Norway had ended in failure. Their expeditionary force to France had been rescued at considerable cost from Dunkirk, and was depleted of equipment and licking its wounds back in Britain. The Germans were beginning a ferocious air campaign against shipping in the Channel and a battle for air supremacy over south-east England. They were widely expected to be preparing to try to invade Britain itself, and the army was in no fit state to stop them. France, Britain’s main ally, was negotiating its exit from the war, and the Italians had entered it. The Russians were unsympathetic and in any case unable to help; the Americans were better able to help but completely divided about if, when and how they should. Many countries around the world expected Britain to succumb to the German war machine, as everyone else had done. Some Britons thought this too. Shortly after 1730 on 3 July 1940, a British naval officer, Captain C.S. Holland, departed from talks with Britain’s major ally, the French Navy, at Mers-el-Kébir. As Holland passed the battleship Bretagne in his motorboat, the Officer of the Watch saluted smartly. Minutes afterwards, at 1754, the Royal Navy’s Force ‘H’, waiting just outside the harbour to the north-west, opened fire without further warning. The Bretagne was instantly hit, enveloped in a sheet of flame and blew up, covering the harbour in a pall of smoke, with the loss of 37 officers and 940 men. In the confused fighting that followed, the French Admiral Gensoul ordered his ships to head for the open sea but, in their attempts to do so, two more battleships, the Dunkerque and the Provence were completely disabled and the light cruiser Mogador had its stern blown off by a 15-inch shell as it tried to negotiate the mined harbour entrance. The French ships and their shore batteries opened fire on the British, but to very little effect, apart from superficial splinter damage to the battlecruiser Hood and injuries to one officer and one rating. At 1810, Admiral Somerville in Force ‘H’ ceased firing and temporarily turned away, believing that he had accomplished his objective

INTRODUCTION

and that the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir had been completely immobilised. In fact, he was wrong. Under the cover of the dense smoke that now enveloped the harbour, the battlecruiser Strasbourg and five light cruisers managed to wriggle their way out through the entrance onto the open sea and sped off to the east, hoping to rendezvous with other French ships from Algiers. They engaged several British destroyers, were pursued by the Hood and attacked three times, without effect, by aircraft from the carrier Ark Royal using bombs and torpedoes. The French were determined to defend themselves and the British lost three Swordfish torpedo-bombers and two Skua fighter-bombers, although the crews of all but one of the Skuas were recovered. Afterwards the captain of one of the light cruisers, the Kersaint, recorded his state of mind. On the one hand, he thought he should make every effort to torpedo the Ark Royal if he could; on the other, in his heart of hearts, he felt that if he succeeded in this he would have rendered a disservice to the cause of liberty. At 2020, Admiral Somerville called off the pursuit and Force ‘H’ returned to Gibraltar. Strasbourg and the other survivors from the British bombardment of Mers-el-Kébir reached Toulon in metropolitan France and entered the harbour to a great ovation from every warship there. Two days later, the British launched a further air strike on the crippled Dunkerque back in the still smoking port of Mers-el-Kébir and did still more damage. All told, the operation had cost 1,297 Frenchmen their lives and left wounded many more. The strategic consequences of this lamentable affair were far-reaching indeed, although it did not precipitate the full-scale war between the new French government and its erstwhile ally that many had expected. The assault nonetheless complicated and poisoned relations between the British and the French for years to come. It contributed to the failure of the British/Gaullist operation against Dakar in French West Africa the following September; it made infinitely more difficult General de Gaulle’s task of rallying French opinion and effort to the Allied cause; it reinforced the French perception of the British as ‘perfidious Albion’ in a way that was to affect Franco-British political relations for the rest of the century. So, how had all this come about? In this book, David Brown meticulously retraces the complex events that led up to this tragic affair. His work shows that the tragedy needs to be understood at two levels. First, at the level of grand strategy, where France and Britain had political and strategic interests that potentially now competed, at least to some degree. Second, at the operational and tactical levels there was enormous scope for genuine breakdowns in communication and misperceptions. xxv

THE ROAD TO ORAN

Certainly, as David Brown shows so convincingly, the matter was extremely important to both the British and the French. Strategically, the fate of the French Navy, and especially of its powerful modern capital ships, Richelieu, Jean Bart, Dunkerque and Strasbourg, was vital to a Royal Navy already stretched to deal with its global commitments, and now facing a new adversary in the Mediterranean – the Italian battlefleet. Away to the east, the Japanese Navy was already menacing British interests. Against this background, the British were simply not prepared to take the risk of such ships as these falling into the hands of the Germans or the Italians. They knew that the terms of the armistice (signed on 24 June) talked of the demobilisation of the French fleet in their normal ports in metropolitan France, but were concerned about how safe this made them, even in the parts of France that were currently unoccupied. This could change, and nothing in British experience so far seemed to indicate that the word of the Führer that he had no aspirations in this area could be relied on any more than it could in any other area. Moreover, how binding on their successors would be any agreement with the Reynaud or Pétain administrations, or with Admiral Darlan himself, on their successors? The British, accordingly, regarded the demobilisation of the French fleet in metropolitan France as little more than a form of ‘deferred surrender’ of the fleet to Germany, and accepting it would simply be too big a strategic risk to take. The fleet at Oran posed a particularly interesting issue, because here, at least, the British could hope to do something to avert the situation, and there is evidence that they contemplated worst-case action here quite early on. This was partly inspired by the British Admiralty taking a rather gloomy view of how long it would take the Germans to make use of the French warships if they could seize them. According to the First Sea Lord, it could be a matter of only two to three months; were this timetable to be put into effect, the strategic consequences for the British would be grave indeed. In fact, as we now know, neither the Germans nor the Italians seriously considered taking them over. Both were, however, very anxious that they should not fall into British hands. Theirs was a mirror-image of the British attitude. They would have preferred the French fleet to be safely demobilised far away from the British, in metropolitan France. Failing that, they could be interned in some reliably neutral waters such as those of Spain or Portugal. Interestingly, they did not consider the United States to be neutral enough for this responsibility. For their part, the two French administrations under both Reynaud and Pétain, and the French Navy’s chief, Admiral Darlan, were adamant that firm instructions had been sent to the effect that whatever else might happen, French warships would not be allowed to fall into xxvi

INTRODUCTION

the hands of the Germans or the Italians. Further, the French were confident that they could render the fleet secure against a surprise takeover even in Marseilles or Toulon, and the events of Toulon in 1942 could suggest their faith in this was not misplaced. But the British wondered whether France’s declared confidence about this in fact did little more than reflect the fleet’s political importance to patriotic Frenchmen, understandable though that might be. Keeping the fleet safely under the control of the French government would provide a bargaining counter in the negotiations and implementation of the armistice. On the other hand, and as Admiral Darlan explained to Churchill in December 1942 long after the event, breaking the armistice terms (for example, by allowing the fleet to sail to British ports as the Royal Navy wanted) might provide the Germans with an excuse to drive a far harder bargain over the armistice terms, or even to take over more of metropolitan France or North Africa. For the British too, the matter was politically important. They were aware that much neutral opinion had concluded that they would shortly be following the French down into defeat. Decisive action to eliminate the threat of the French fleet’s being taken over by the Germans might help prevent such ideas gaining ground in important neutral countries like the United States or, more locally, Turkey. Getting the French fleet safely away into British ports or, failing that, to some far-off French colony could also rally opinion to the side of General de Gaulle. Sorting the problem out, moreover, would be a much-needed fillip for battered British morale. In this confusing and anxious time, it was not perhaps surprising that there should be so much mutual misunderstanding. Communications were extremely difficult. France’s government and Admiralty were more or less continuously on the move at this time. British negotiators lost physical touch as the Germans advanced. Admiral Darlan himself was aware of the dangers of this even within the administration of the French Navy and told senior commanders to ignore any signal or message that did not contain the codename signature ‘Xavier 377’. Moreover, his status changed too. Before 16 June he was the well-respected professional head of the French Navy; afterwards, he was also a minister in the new Pétain government, and therefore potentially under the malign influence of Pierre Laval, another minister, who was known to advocate close cooperation with Germany in order to assure France of its continued status in the new Europe. In which capacity, therefore, should Darlan’s signals, both explicit and implicit, be understood? Professional head of the navy – or collaborationist politician? There were three critical moments when all these confusions came to a head. The first was on 16 June, when the British thought they xxvii

THE ROAD TO ORAN

had responded to the French request for permission to seek armistice talks with Germany ‘provided, but only provided, that the French fleet is sailed for British harbours pending negotiations’. The response was given to the French at a turbulent time but withdrawn in conditions of some ambiguity when the desperate idea of a Franco-British Union overtook the first British policy response to France’s request. Implicitly, this too would have required the French fleet to continue to fight alongside the British, and so the British thought they had made the matter plain and that as far as the fleet was concerned, there was no difference between their first and second responses. As far as the British were concerned, the French must have understood the condition for permission to negotiate with the Germans, namely that the fleet should go to British ports. By seeming now to renege on that agreement, if for the most understandable of reasons, the French were guilty of bad faith at best, treachery at worst. Or maybe the French authorities were simply not in control of events and could not be expected in the circumstances to regain it. In which case, how much could anything they agreed to be relied on? As David Brown shows here, it was not hard to find evidence that cast doubt on the French Navy’s ability to command its own destiny. The British were very dismayed to hear of Darlan’s order of 21 June that all ships currently in British ports should leave for North Africa, and the completely unexpected break-out of the Richelieu from Dakar on 25–26 June alarmed them still further. Plainly assuming it to be heading for a British port, Darlan ordered it back. Equally plainly expecting it to be making a run for France, the Admiralty ordered nearby British forces to ‘capture’ it, but without quite explaining how. Plainly anticipating British obstruction, Captain Marzin in the Richelieu told two submarines to deal with the British carrier Hermes should she seek to interfere. In such a situation, it was no wonder that communications between the British and the French could so easily break down. For their part, the French did not accept that the condition that the fleet should go to British ports had been made clear, and considered that the safe demobilisation of the fleet was a sensible and entirely honourable compromise that should be acceptable to their late allies. They reacted very badly to implicit accusations of deceit and sought refuge in lofty conceptions of the national honour which had been so severely dented by the strategic events of the preceding months, and which so urgently needed restoration. Those sympathetic to this viewpoint would point to the second instance of confusion and misperception, namely Admiral Darlan’s message of 24 June, which was sent to all French units hours after the signing of the armistice, but of which the British were insufficiently xxviii

INTRODUCTION

aware. The third paragraph of this very significant message said that in the event of the Armistice Commission ever seeking to challenge the undertaking that the French fleet was to be kept out of the hands of the Germans, then ‘warships are without further orders to be despatched to the United States, or alternatively scuttled, provided that no other action is possible to escape the enemy. Under no circumstances are they to fall into enemy hands.’ Holland, learning of this message late on the fateful day of 3 July, when it was already too late, remarked to his aide: ‘If only we had known this before, it would have made all the difference.’ Afterwards, Somerville agreed. Perhaps, but there would still have been two problems with accepting this message at face value, even if the British had been aware of it. First, did the French have, and could they be expected always to retain, the physical ability to do what they promised in the event of a German attack? Second, how could the British be assured that such a policy meant what it said and would never change? The British did not know of it but a message from ‘Xavier 377’ the very next day casts some doubt on this. ‘Given the unfriendly attitude of the British authorities and their undisguised spite at not being able to intern our Fleet in England, I ask you to keep your relationships with the Royal Navy to an essential minimum … Be on your guard against all attempts at the destruction or sabotage of our ships which remain one of the essential elements of our international situation.’ The situation was aggravated by a well-known semantic problem as well. The armistice terms stated that French warships were to demobilise under the ‘contrôle’ of the Germans; that word in fact means supervision, but all too often it was loosely understood by the British to mean ‘control’ – a very different and, for them, more dangerous concept. But the misunderstanding was not simply semantic. General de Gaulle, who presumably understood the distinction between the two words very well, was nonetheless quite adamant on 26 June that ‘Our Fleet, our aircraft, our armoured vehicles, our arms to be delivered intact into the hands of a powerful adversary who will use them against our real allies’. But, of course, the General was adamantly opposed to the armistice in any case. Finally, there were the misunderstandings and breakdowns at Mers-el-Kébir itself on the critical day of 3 July 1940. For a start, there was some confusion in the terms of the ultimatum the British delivered. Were they prepared to offer, or to accept if the Admiral Gensoul offered, the option of the French demobilising their ships at Mers-el-Kébir rather than to sail them to some more distant or neutral port? It would seem that the British would not offer this option, but might be prepared to accept it, under certain conditions, from the French if nothing better came up. This was an awkward and xxix

THE ROAD TO ORAN

ambiguous strategy for the British to follow in a situation where the negotiations were intermittent and confused, and may well have played a part in Captain Holland’s failure to take up Gensoul’s hint that this process was already partially under way and could be developed further and faster. On-site and immediate demobilisation would have been difficult to achieve within the very tight six-hour deadline set by the British ultimatum perhaps, but it was just about possible. The trouble was that negotiations never really got started in the first place, and so this could not be a compromise that both sides could gracefully fall back on. It went badly from the start. Captain Holland, the commanding officer of HMS Ark Royal, was fluent in French, recently naval attaché in Paris and a well-known Francophile. On the face of it, he was an ideal emissary. But Gensoul chose to be upset by the fact that he was a mere captain, and that Somerville had not come himself. Gensoul was angry at the imputation of treachery implied by the first part of the British ultimatum, by the threat of force clearly implied by the presence of a powerful British squadron off the harbour entrance and by the fact that his and Admiral Darlan’s assurances were evidently insufficient. Moreover, he knew that the British had already seized French warships in British ports. He was stiff, unbending, uncooperative; he refused to meet Holland until too late and his state of mind may be inferred from the misleading summary of the situation he signalled back to Admiral Darlan at 1320 on 3 July: ‘Initial British ultimatum was either to join up with the British fleet or destroy ships within six hours to prevent them falling in to German or Italian hands.’ This omitted the possibility the British offered of the French fleet sailing to Martinique or some other distant French colony. Unsurprisingly, this stiffened Darlan’s response in turn. But whether this proposal, if fully understood by the new French government, would have made any real difference to the outcome is very debatable. Accepting this offer, even if they had known about it, might have satisfied the terms of the 29 March agreement with the British, but it would have violated the armistice with Germany and, as far as the Pétain government was concerned, that now mattered much more. David Brown tracks this process of escalating misperception and extending deadlines to its final culmination when HMS Hood finally opened fire on the Bretagne. Could things have turned out differently? Certainly, the leading players on the British side thought they could. Admirals Cunningham and Somerville and Captain Holland all wondered what was the rush to resolve the matter and thought that patient negotiation would achieve better results, but were pitchforked into action by urgent representations from London. Churchill and the First Sea Lord, Admiral Pound, thought that from intelligence and other sources they xxx

INTRODUCTION

had a clearer strategic picture than their local representatives and insisted that their will be done, but were content to leave many of the details to their reluctant subordinates. The situation needed to be handled differently in other ports. In Alexandria, Portsmouth and Plymouth, where the conditions were so much more favourable for the British, the ships were dealt with at the expense of only a few tragically unlucky casualties and much less resentment, but there were still difficulties, and the complexities continued for another two years or so. French warships at Toulon and Algiers were not interfered with at all, and in fact never did come under German control. Shortly after the Torch landings in November 1942, Darlan, now on the Allies’ side, ordered Admiral Laborde, who commanded the French fleet at Toulon, to leave and come over to join him. Instead, on 27 November, Laborde ordered one battleship, two battlecruisers, four heavy and three light cruisers, 24 destroyers and 10 submarines to scuttle themselves in Toulon harbour. This event can be read either way. On the one hand, it shows that, even as late as 1942, some French sailors still stuck to the letter of what they took to be the armistice terms. On the other hand, the virulently anti-British Admiral Laborde demonstrated Darlan’s lack of control over the navy by absolutely refusing to obey his orders, even though the strategic tide had so obviously shifted in favour of the Allies. Outcomes were dependent on changing and very local circumstances. At Oran, in a situation where there was so much at stake, where the future interests of the erstwhile Allies differed so markedly and in circumstances which radically obscured free communication between the parties, errors, mistakes and tragic consequences were perhaps inevitable. In the last analysis, however, it is for the reader to judge. Geoffrey Till

xxxi

THE ROAD TO ORAN

Map: Admiralty on the Move: September 1939–July 1940

xxxii

1

Anglo-French Naval Staff Planning and Cooperation on the Eve of War

Staff talks between the French and British navies were initiated in 1935, at commander-in-chief level, during the Abyssinian crisis. They were resumed during the Spanish Civil War and during 1938 agreements were reached on operational matters in the Mediterranean, including areas of responsibility and exchange of intelligence and information.1 Among the most practical results of the 1938 staff talks was the provision of facilities in Paris and London for naval liaison staffs, with direct-line telephones running from the war headquarters under the Ministère de la Marine to the Admiralty switchboard, while the French Naval Liaison Office in London was given a teleprinter line for cypher messages. The offices were not occupied in peacetime but would be taken up when necessary by the respective naval attachés and their staffs.2 Other dormant appointments included liaison officers who would serve with principal commanders and at major bases in times of crisis and war. The Franco-Italian crisis which arose in January 1939 did not develop sufficiently to initiate the exchange of liaison officers, although the First Sea Lord, Sir Roger Backhouse, regarded hostilities, and British involvement, as inevitable. On 13 February, he was informed that the French and British governments had agreed in principle to comprehensive staff talks, to be held before the end of the month to establish strategic principles as quickly as possible, in order to permit detailed planning to begin.3 The preliminary ‘talks about talks’, conducted in Paris by the British Naval Attaché, Captain C.S. Holland, acting as the British Naval Staff ’s intermediary, actually went on beyond the first deadline: the immediacy went away in early March, thanks to the easing of tension between France and Italy, but returned in mid-month when Germany occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia and Hitler refused to accept the French and British Notes of Protest. The series of meetings began in London on 30 March, the Director of Naval Plans, Captain V.M. Danckwerts, hosting the Deputy Chief of 1

THE ROAD TO ORAN

the French Naval Staff, Contre-amiral Bourragué. The identification of Germany as the most probable enemy permitted Danckwerts to move the centre of gravity of discussion from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, and in the course of seven separate meetings between 30 March and 4 May the staffs covered virtually every aspect of operational control and cooperation, areas of responsibility and assistance, including technical, personnel and matériel. In most areas of discussion there was sufficient common maritime ground to enable the staffs to reach early conclusions for recommendation, but there were also major divergences in fundamentals, some of which were so basic that they foreshadowed problems for the collaboration which both participants urgently desired. The protection of trade shipping was, as ever, the Royal Navy’s first preoccupation, but this key role did not enjoy anything like the same priority in France, which imported only half the tonnage required to keep Britain working and relied on neutral bottoms for more than half of the cargoes. The French Navy had in recent years built two superb modern fast battleships and a powerful force of large destroyers, as well as the largest submarine force in the world, but it was sadly deficient in vessels suited to the monotonies of convoy escort or minesweeping. Thus, while the British planned to introduce an ocean convoy system as soon as possible, the French had intended to rely upon independent sailings and the gap could only be bridged by the British agreeing to escort ocean convoys on key routes while the French would escort one in four of the inbound convoys from their arrival in the South-West Approaches until they cleared the English Channel northbound. French material deficiencies for escort duties would be made good in the first instance by the supply of Asdic sets and technical drawings, together with technical support to assist in installation, and operator training. Arrangements were made for the construction of four of the recently approved whaler-type escort vessels4 in British yards and the first four hulls were laid down as early as July 1939, when a supplementary order for a dozen more was placed. The Dover Barrage had, in the last year of the First World War, proved to be an efficient anti-submarine barrier and the staffs agreed to review the minefield and net defences required, each country taking responsibility for its end of the line. Fixed defences elsewhere were also discussed and one of the instances of direct material assistance which followed the talks was the provision of additional net and boom defences for Mers-el-Kébir, supplied from the Royal Navy’s depot at Rosyth a month before the outbreak of war.5 The French Navy was also informed of radar developments and requested five powerful air warning stations, four mobile stations and eight searchlight direction 2

PLANNING AND COOPERATION ON THE EVE OF WAR

sets, mainly for the Mediterranean area and all for delivery by the end of 1940.6 The only meeting to be held in Paris, on 17 April, appeared to reach an important agreement, whereby commanders-in-chief would be authorised to liaise with their counterparts to coordinate operations. Six days later, however, a discussion between Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet, and Vice-amiral Abrial, whom Pound had believed to be his French opposite number, revealed that the two Admiralties had such significantly different interpretations of ‘coordination’ that this was potentially a major obstacle to cooperation. Pound, who enjoyed almost complete autonomy in his Mediterranean Fleet area, was irked to learn that Abrial was so closely controlled by Amiral Sud, the senior French officer in the Mediterranean, and even directly by the Chief of Naval Staff, Amiral Darlan, that he had no discretion to agree to measures to achieve coordination; from Pound’s point of view, the talks were of little value and he reported to London that it would be unprofitable to continue them.7 The matter of coordination in the Mediterranean and the control of the principal French raider-hunting group in the Atlantic, the Brestbased Force de Raid, was raised at the last Naval Staff conference, held in London on 4 May. Contre-amiral J.E. Odend’hal, who had replaced Bourragué, confirmed that Darlan himself would direct Mediterranean naval operations and coordination would be achieved by consultation between the two Admiralties, who would give orders to their fleet commanders. Similarly, all raider-hunting operations would be controlled by the two naval headquarters, Paris keeping London informed of the intended activities of the Force de Raid for dissemination to local commanders; the only concession made was that the vice-admiral commanding the force was permitted to inform British commanders-in-chief of movements in their areas. Only in two areas would there be any integration of forces: two French sloops would join the East Indies Fleet and a British aircraft carrier would operate from Dakar with a French cruiser hunting force. Elsewhere, the areas of operational responsibility were clearly defined and each navy would employ whatever means it thought to be most effective. Such a degree of centralisation was unthinkable in the Royal Navy of 1939, but informed officers such as Captain Holland explained it in terms of the French Navy’s indebtedness to Amiral Darlan. The navy had lacked national influence prior to Darlan’s appointment as Chief of the Naval Staff at the end of 1936, but he was an able administrator, much respected in his own Service and an accomplished manipulator of politicians, so that under his firm hand the French Navy had grown in stature as well as strength. The entire 3

THE ROAD TO ORAN

fleet, including virtually all the flag officers, was utterly loyal to this individual whose judgement was trusted as well as scrupulously and unquestioningly obeyed.8 The British First Sea Lord’s position was rather different. As Chief of the Naval Staff, his centralising function was limited to the business of Admiralty, where he pulled together the work of his deputy and assistant chiefs of the Naval Staff to take responsibility for decisions before his political master, the First Lord of the Admiralty. Directives were given to commanders-in-chief, who executed them as best they could with the forces they had in hand, using their own judgement of the local situation. First Sea Lords were first and foremost exceptional seamen and administrators and as such were professionally respected, not adulated, and while commanders-in-chief appreciated assistance and advice they were liable to resent what seemed to them to be unwarranted interference. Admiral Backhouse fell sick during the late spring of 1939 and, in June, Admiral Pound returned from the Mediterranean Fleet to relieve him, a year earlier than had been intended. Pound had not been an enthusiastic supporter of the staff talks, but this did not affect the development of the relationship between the two navies, which drew up and promulgated the instructions necessary for coordination and collaboration and went on to agree on the methods to be used to implement the naval control of shipping and a contraband control system; the last major collaborative plan to be finalised before the outbreak of war concerned the transport of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to France and its subsequent maintenance. The climate in the Mediterranean was actually improved by Pound’s departure, which was followed by that of Vice-amiral Abrial. Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, the new Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet, met Vice-amiral Ollive, commanding the Flotte de Haute Mer, in Malta in late July, to discuss their plans in the event of war with Italy. This encounter was much more cordial and successful than their predecessors’ talks and the two admirals, who clearly enjoyed one another’s company, ‘were in complete agreement and decided to coordinate our respective attacks on the Italian seaboard’.9 There was one more high-level meeting before the deteriorating situation in Europe led to the exchange of liaison officers during the last week in August 1939. On 8 August, Amiral de la Flotte Darlan, invited by the Board of Admiralty to attend the Royal review of the Reserve Fleet, arrived at Portsmouth flying his flag in the large destroyer Volta. Darlan accompanied His Majesty on his inspection of the 130 ships assembled in Weymouth Bay on 9 August and returned to France on the following day. His visit was not purely ceremonial, for while his staff met their opposite numbers in the British Naval Staff, he 4

PLANNING AND COOPERATION ON THE EVE OF WAR

discussed the previous months’ agreements with the First Sea Lord and brought up three fresh issues. The first item came as a complete surprise: the transfer of a French division from Syria to Salonika was proposed and as the shipping route lay wholly within the British area of responsibility Royal Navy protection would be necessary. As revealed to the unsuspecting British, this arose from a French Army project to open a southern front in the event of war with Germany. Originated by General Gamelin, its purpose was to overcome the stalemate created in the west by the impenetrable Siegfried and Maginot Lines; as in 1918, a successful Allied offensive would be mounted from Salonika but this time the Balkan powers would be drawn in on the Allied side. Success, which was represented by the massing of 100 divisions on the southern flank of ‘the Reich’ would depend upon the neutralisation of Italy, whose intervention on the side of Germany was not only expected but hoped for. A French Mission led by General Charles Huntziger to Ankara in July had obtained Turkish agreement to the project;10 to Pound’s somewhat lukewarm reception of the news, Darlan declared that as not only the Turks but also the Romanians set great store by the plan it would be as well to consider and study it, whether or not it was ever executed. Pound reassured the Frenchman that if the expedition was ordered then the Admiralty would order the Commander-inChief, Mediterranean, to furnish the necessary escort. Asked where the troops would embark and who would provide the shipping, Darlan responded that it had not yet been decided whether to use Beirut or Izmir and that the transports would be Turkish, Greek or French. Darlan’s next concern was the attitude of Spain in the event of war. He made no attempt to hide the fact that rather than a ‘malevolent neutrality’ which would favour the Axis Powers he and his fellow Chiefs of Staff would prefer declared hostility which would allow France to take direct action, particularly against Spanish Morocco. Pound left his French counterpart in no doubt that he personally was opposed to the pre-emptive action which Darlan appeared to be advocating; it seemed to him that the Spanish problem was military rather than maritime – if Spain joined the war it would mean another land front and the threat of air attack against the aircraft industry in southwest France. If action was contemplated against Spanish bases then a proper ultimatum was essential. Finally, Darlan commented upon a British proposal to establish a ‘Supreme Allied Council’ to advise on the higher direction of the war. As suggested by Neville Chamberlain, this would consist of the French and British prime ministers, each assisted by a junior minister, and the ambassadors of other Allied countries; this body, which would meet in London, would not have the authority to take definitive decisions, 5

THE ROAD TO ORAN

much less enjoy executive powers, but it would present suggestions and proposals to the Allied governments. The Council would be supported by a military staff, on which the three Services of both countries would be represented, the role of this staff being to coordinate allied strategic planning and to present an agreed common line of advice to the politicians. It was suggested that this joint military staff should be established immediately, the present arrangement of staff meetings being judged to be too ‘sporadic’. Darlan did not support these proposals, apparently fearing a diminution in his own power. He disliked the idea of an independent Allied military staff which would, he foresaw, overrule the existing national chiefs of staff without being limited by actual responsibility; such a staff would, furthermore, risk ‘dragging France too far down the tracks of British Imperial strategy’. It had not been settled that the French defence ministers would be included in the Council and Darlan’s opinion was that the Service Chiefs, who would alone be responsible for the conduct of operations, should be members of the Supreme Allied Council, represented in their absence by delegated staff officers. Pound, whose conduct of operations was subject to greater political control, replied cautiously, stating that he understood clearly that the ‘Supreme War Council’ would not propose any recommendation which had not been wholeheartedly approved by the Chiefs of Staff.11 General Gamelin had, prior to Darlan’s visit, suggested the creation of a Comité d’études militaires (CEM), on which each of the French chiefs was represented, which would work sometimes in London, sometimes in Paris, and these officers, whose appointments he approved on 19 August, took up their posts in London in late August, leading their Services’ liaison missions as well as serving on the CEM. The French Naval Mission, led by Contre-amiral Odend’hal, occupied their appointed quarters in the Admiralty and began a relationship with the First Sea Lord and the British Naval Staff which was marked by personal friendships and a genuine spirit of cooperation.12 In Paris, Captain Holland and his small staff moved the short distance from the Embassy to the Ministry of Marine, in the Rue Royale. Holland had been in post as the Naval Attaché since January 1938 and was in the fortunate position of being quite well known to many of the officers on the French Naval Staff and thus enjoyed confidences which he was able to pass directly to the First Sea Lord, to circulate or withhold at the latter’s discretion. Elsewhere, on both sides of the Channel and in the Mediterranean, naval liaison officers were exchanged between headquarters whose areas of operations or of interest overlapped. Wherever possible, direct telephone and teleprinter links were established to permit rapid communications between the headquarters, and Amiral Nord, at 6

PLANNING AND COOPERATION ON THE EVE OF WAR

Dunkirk, was connected by a special telephone to the French Naval Mission in London. The individuals, and their immediate access to high levels of authority, were to prove to be invaluable, particularly when strains were imposed on the alliance. The naval attaché organisation was greatly expanded at the same time that the liaison network was activated. Up to July 1939, only six British naval attachés were accredited to 22 European capitals – Captain Holland, for example, was responsible for Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands as well as France – but by October, there were 14 in post, and that after Berlin had been vacated and Warsaw overrun. This expansion broadened the range of contacts between British and French naval officers, who frequently pooled the information they were gleaning and assessing in the neutral countries. NOTES 1. The progress of the 1935–38 naval discussions is described in M.A. Reussner, Les conversations franco-britanniques d’État-Major (1935–39), (Vincennes, Service Historique de la Marine (SHM), 1969). 2. Public Record Office (PRO) File No. ADM 1/9786. 3. PRO ADM 205/3. 4. The ‘Flower’ class, later designated as ‘corvettes’. 5. PRO ADM 116/5458. 6. Reussner, Les conversations, p. 242. 7. Ibid. 8. PRO ADM 205/4. 9. Andrew Cunningham, A Sailor’s Odyssey (London, 1957), pp. 211–12. 10. Reussner, Les conversations, p. 244. Huntziger will feature again later in this account, leading another French mission. 11. Ibid., pp. 243, 289. 12. PRO ADM 116/5458.

7

2

The Phoney War

On 4 September 1939, the day after the Anglo-French declarations of war, the key departments of the French Admiralty moved out of the Rue Royale to a purpose-built war location in the grounds of the duc de Noailles’s Château de Maintenon, near Chartres. The nearby small town was well served by road and rail communications with Paris, which lay 40 miles to the north-east and was expected to be made untenable by air bombardment; the French Army headquarters moved no further than to Vincennes, on the eastern outskirts of the capital, while the Armée de l’Air was 35 miles east of Paris, at St Jean les Deux Jumeaux, near Meaux. For reasons of security, the new naval headquarters was referred to only by its code-name – ‘Marceau’ – even in highly classified documents, but by the end of September, Radio Stuttgart revealed in propaganda broadcasts that the Germans were aware of the move.1 Wireless and landline communications with naval commands in France and overseas, including the direct links with Whitehall, were fully operational from the outset and there was virtually no disruption of the headquarters’ routine during the move.2 The British were also exercised by the air-power visionaries’ prophecies of wholesale destruction. Although it was believed that the sub-ground basements of the Admiralty buildings would afford protection to the staff, some Admiralty departments were dispersed from Whitehall, principally to Bath, whence many never returned. The Naval Staff remained where it had been in peace-time, close to the seat of government, directing the subordinate Commands, fleets and individual ships by means of its very extensive landline and wireless communications network.3 Odend’hal, promoted Vice-amiral at about this time, was provided with a small suite of offices for himself and his liaison staff. As soon as it became apparent that the Italian government intended to remain aloof from the war, for the time being at least, the Admiralty redeployed the greater part of the Mediterranean Fleet to operate in the Atlantic, where the escorts in particular were greatly in demand following the early introduction of ocean convoy. The French Admiralty, on the other hand, remained cautious and retained a powerful fleet 8

THE PHONEY WAR

in the Western Basin, somewhat to the dismay of the British, who would have preferred to see the modern destroyers operating outside the Straits of Gibraltar, supplementing the rather limited French escort forces. Pound, writing to Darlan on 15 September, offered assistance to improve the French Navy’s anti-submarine capability and in early October four trawlers fitted with Asdic were collected by French crews.4 Darlan for his part relaxed his grip sufficiently to agree, on 17 September, to direct cooperation between l’Amiral Commandant en chef des Forces maritimes du Sud (Amiral Sud – Amiral Jean Esteva) and the British Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet to ensure the escort of convoys within the Mediterranean.5 Despite these helpful exchanges at high level, the Royal Navy liaison officer (RNLO) in Paris was beginning to encounter repeated frustration in his dealings with the French Naval Staff and, in particular, Capitaine de vaisseau Auphan, the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, who, it seemed, invariably opposed any redeployment of French forces, even when this was suggested by his superiors.6 At the same time, Captain Holland was quietly informed that the Minister for Armaments had stated confidentially that work on warships could be halted as the Royal Navy could be left to do all the work at sea; what might otherwise have been dismissed as gossip was confirmed by observation. In the same letter which reported this alarming development,7 Holland passed on a complaint from Darlan himself that the Rear-Admiral at Gibraltar was regarded as ‘isolationist and unapproachable’ and was not cooperating with the local French forces. Swift action was taken: Vice-Admiral Sir Dudley North was appointed out of retirement on 1 November to take charge at Gibraltar and left by sea ten days later, to relieve Rear-Admiral N.A. Wodehouse, who had been in post only since August and was given no warning of his slaughter on the altar of alliance; less than a year later, North too was to be dismissed, again on suspicion of harbouring incorrect sentiments towards the French. Having made the propitiatory public sacrifice, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, went in person to Maintenon to take up the matter of the French building programme, accompanied by RearAdmiral T.S.V. Phillips, the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff. In the first high-level meeting to be held at ‘Marceau’, on 8 November, Churchill thanked Darlan for the French Navy’s ‘remarkable assistance, which goes far beyond pre-war promises or engagements’. He then offered to supply every French vessel capable of escort duties with Asdic and to train the operators, starting immediately and preferably with the modern destroyers and avisos. Pointing out the impending completion of the German and Italian navies’ new battleships and the large Japanese building programme, Churchill besought Darlan to expedite the completion of the Jean Bart and Richelieu, to maintain Allied superiority 9

THE ROAD TO ORAN

in capital ship numbers. The Amiral was able to reassure his guests that he had obtained his government’s decision to press on with those ships which could be completed in the course of 1940, including the battleships. Darlan also explained that César Campinchi, the Ministre de Marine, was excluded from discussion of operational matters. Churchill, in his extraordinary self-conceit, commented to the Amiral that ‘the First Sea Lord and I are as one’, and did not recognise the irony when he wrote, ‘It was his [Darlan’s] obsession to keep the politicians in their places as chatterboxes in the Chamber’8 – it was only 25 years since Churchill had been dismissed from the same job after another First Sea Lord resigned over his interference in operational matters. The First Lord had learned nothing in the interim and was to cause untold damage in the months to come by meddling in matters which he did not truly understand. The staff conference which followed the meeting of the great men was largely concerned with trade protection – convoy escorts, raider hunting groups and anti-submarine measures. Under the last category, the French requested the provision of powerful floodlights to illuminate the nets of the Dover Barrage, the laying of which was not yet complete. The requirement for the eight trawlers and the additional 12 corvettes ordered from British yards in July was confirmed; the French wished to build six corvettes in their own yards but asked for the machinery to be supplied for these ships. The British delegation was heartened to learn that the French thought that as many as five colonial sloops might become available for escort duties, and overjoyed that Darlan was ready to release 18 destroyers from the Mediterranean to Brest: the joy was short-lived – Holland had to point out that their comprehension had been imperfect and that only three destroyers were involved, to bring the total at Brest up to 18. A week later, Darlan offered to base eight submarines at Halifax, under British operational control, to provide anti-raider protection in the Western Atlantic.9 The destruction on 17 December of the Graf Spee reduced the need for such a deployment, but the fact that the offer was made reflects the happy relationships which had developed between the hunting forces and the Allied commanders. Vice-Admiral D’Oyly Lyon, the British C-in-C South Atlantic, enjoyed what he described as a ‘splendid liaison’ with Vice-amiral Duplat, commanding Force ‘Y’, a raider-hunting force which consisted of the fast battleship Strasbourg, a heavy cruiser, the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes and a screen of French destroyers. Relations within this integrated force were excellent, not least because the carrier did not ‘go home at weekends’ but remained at the base of Force ‘Y’ at Dakar, with its aircraft using the facilities at the local airfield. 10

THE PHONEY WAR

D’Oyly-Lyon was informed in mid-November of Darlan’s decision to create a new command, that of Amiral Afrique, with headquarters ashore at Casablanca. Whitehall’s translation of the appointment as ‘Commander-in-Chief, Africa and South Atlantic’, coming hard on the heels of the swift removal of Wodehouse from Gibraltar, gave the British admiral ‘some terrible moments wondering whether it was a device of the Admiralty to get rid of me’, but Vice-amiral Ollive himself reassured D’Oyly Lyon.10 The creation of the new command at Casablanca followed the disbanding of the French Mediterranean Fleet. Darlan and his immediate staff were to exercise direct command and control over the three main squadrons in the area, two based on Toulon and the third on Bizerta, whither Amiral Sud (Esteva) moved, to be closer to the British naval Commander-in-Chief, whose headquarters were in Malta. Still remaining on the French mainland were Amiral Nord and Amiral Ouest, the former at Dunkirk and the latter at Brest. The Dunkirk appointment was originally held by Amiral Raoul Castex, who was junior only to Darlan himself in the French Naval List; various reasons have been proposed for his being limogé11 on 17 November, but that given to Captain Holland was that Castex had drawn up and forwarded a most pessimistic appreciation of the vulnerability of Dunkirk, advocating planning for the evacuation of the town and demolition of its harbour facilities in the event of a German offensive through Belgium,12 and had pointed out the vulnerability of the Belgian and French Channel ports, which he prophesied would be ‘bombed out of existence’. Castex had in fact gone further and had already collaborated with Rear-Admiral A.L. Lyster in drawing up plans for collaboration in the demolition and blocking of Dutch and Belgian ports.13 Amiral Abrial was appointed as the new Amiral Nord and the good relations and agreement between the Allied commanders in the North Sea and Channel survived what was a purely internal, Franco-French disagreement. Pound visited Maintenon for the second time on 1 December,14 but the final major Allied Naval Staff conference of the year was held in London on 20 and 21 December in the shadow of grand strategic planning. Darlan came in person to meet Pound and to repeat the request for more trawlers and corvettes but when the First Sea Lord offered to fit anti-submarine gear and weapons in as many trawlers and large yachts as could be sent to England, he admitted that his government had refused to sanction the requisitioning of any more vessels of the type, despite the French Navy’s obvious need of them. A British request that French building yards should undertake work on the Royal Navy’s behalf was regretfully rejected as all the small craft building capacity was fully occupied. On the positive side, Darlan 11

THE ROAD TO ORAN

was able to report that the French Navy was making good progress with an Allied tactical signals code which had been devised in consultation with the Director of the Admiralty Signals Division.15 At the highest level of alliance – the Supreme War Council – the Allied leaders had devised three strategic schemes, the First Lord of the Admiralty leading on the two madder ideas while the French introduced a plan which was sensible and practical in its intent but weak in the method, at least as far as the naval and air aspects were concerned. Little needs to be said about Operations ‘Catherine’ and ‘Royal Marine’ – the former was skilfully played out of court by Pound, who eventually managed to persuade Churchill that the Baltic was no place for a British fleet unsupported by aircraft, while French fears of reprisals delayed the seeding of the Rhine, Saar and Moselle with floating mines until after the German offensive in the west had opened.16 The French plan, which had begun to take shape in October, was for the seizure of the Dutch island of Walcheren in the event of a German invasion of the Netherlands and Belgium. The operation, to be mounted only if the two victims of attack asked for assistance, would be a French military undertaking, supported by three naval ‘layers’ – distant cover provided by the Royal Navy in the southern North Sea, patrols by French destroyers outside the line of banks lying parallel to the coast and, close inshore, a small number of Royal Navy anti-aircraft vessels – destroyers and sloops – whose task was to protect the French 7th Army’s main supply route along the coastal road from air attack. By 23 January 1940, joint planning by Amiral Nord and Flag Officer Dover had advanced sufficiently for Pound to meet Abrial to endorse acceptance of the Royal Navy’s part in the scheme.17 Just a few days earlier, on 19 January 1940, discussion of a fourth major strategic scheme was set in train by a proposal to the French government by the Finnish ambassador that the Allies’ contribution to his country’s war against the Soviet Union should take the form of a blockade of Petsamo by Polish warships operating from Britain and supplied by Polish-manned merchant ships. The Admiralty rejected out of hand the proposal to use Polish ships and showed little enthusiasm for a plan advanced jointly by Darlan and General Gamelin at an Allied Chiefs of Staff meeting at Vincennes, on 30 January, for a British-led military expedition to northern Finland. The only gain which would make the risk of war with Russia acceptable to Britain was the occupation of the main German source of iron ore, around Gallivare, in Sweden; left unsaid was the ‘violent’ opposition from the British Dominions – self-governing countries who were making a significant contribution to the war at sea – to any violation of Norwegian or Swedish neutrality. 12

THE PHONEY WAR

The obviously lukewarm attitude of the British Chiefs of Staff to this impractical intervention plan was taken amiss by some members of the French Naval Staff, who ‘passed it down the line’. Thus, on 20 February, Captain the Hon. Edward Pleydell-Bouverie, RN, the Liaison Officer on Amiral Sud’s staff (and soon to relieve Captain Holland at ‘Marceau’) reported: I am inclined to think that the French are still not sure that we are really going all-out to win the war … That they are going all out in aiding us and their independent efforts I have no doubt … My impression is that many French feel that there is too much scrupulousness and not quite enough resolution higher up.18

It is evident from a letter written to Pound by Captain Holland (coincidentally on the same day as Pleydell-Bouverie’s) that the feelings were not one-sided: I felt during my last visit to the Admiralty there was a growing impression that the French as a whole were not trying … The apparent lack of activity is, I think, due more to the Directive at the French Admiralty than to other causes. I think you know to whom I am referring as I have talked to you about this on previous occasions.19

The British view, where critical of the French contribution at sea, reflected the problems encountered in supplying Allied economies and war production, problems which, in the absence of air and military activity, could be gauged in terms of effort and losses at sea: up to the end of February 1940, 169 Allied and neutral merchant ships had been lost to U-boats and only nine of these were French-flagged. Even taking account of the relative sizes of the merchant fleets, this seemed to be an unequal sacrifice and for the British Merchant Navy, in particular, the expression ‘Phoney War’ had a very hollow ring. The French servicemen’s frustration mirrored that of the public, and parliamentary frustration with the political leadership led on 20 March to the resignation of the Daladier administration. The new Premier, Paul Reynaud, laid out in a letter to the British government his ideas for a more positive conduct of the war: present procedures, he argued, did not secure the necessary speed of decision and the Allies were too legalistic in their attitude to neutrals – they must be prepared to act dictatorially if need be, disregarding formalities and niceties. The Allies had to gain a psychological initiative and the solution as he saw it was to take firm action, first to deny Germany free navigation in Norwegian waters, occupying Norwegian territory 13

THE ROAD TO ORAN

if need be, then to cut off the Caucasus oilfields, accepting a rupture with the Soviet Union if need be.20 On 28 March 1940, the Allied Supreme War Council met to discuss future strategy. The French overcame British scruples over the mining of Norwegian waters to cut off the ore trade and it was agreed that, following a warning to Norway and Sweden on 1 April, the northern Leads should be mined on 5 April.21 The quid pro quo was that the mining of the German rivers would begin on 4 April, from French soil. At the same meeting, the Allied governments agreed to publish the text of a declaration that neither would seek a separate peace to terminate hostilities. The main purpose of the declaration was to counter German propaganda aimed at dividing the Allies and their populations. It did not, and could not, anticipate the politically unthinkable military collapse of one or other signatory. Negotiations to arrive at an acceptable formula had taken several months, and it is of some interest in view of later events that the first paragraph was of British origin and the second was included at the request of the French government (a third paragraph dealt with post-war aims): [The British and French Governments] mutually undertake that during the present war they will neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement. They undertake not to discuss peace terms before reaching complete agreement on the conditions necessary to ensure to each of them an effective and lasting guarantee of their security.22

The British Cabinet approved the decisions of the Supreme War Council on 29 March, but three days later learned that the corresponding French political body had refused to sanction the fluvial mining and had proposed its postponement by three months, by which time French air defences against reprisal raids would be stronger. Rather than initiate a campaign against a neutral without an accompanying blow at the enemy itself, the Cabinet decided to delay the warning to the Scandinavian governments in the hope that the French War Committee would change its collective mind.23 The result was, of course, that the mining of the north Norwegian Leads took place only hours before the German invasion of Norway. The development of the Norwegian campaign was so swift that the Allied naval staffs had, perforce, to do most of their planning standing up. Neither the enemy nor the inept British military command, compounded by Churchill’s interference, permitted them the leisure of conducting the war at sea in the way that the navies would have wished. Suffice to say that the French units placed under the command 14

THE PHONEY WAR

of the British Home Fleet proved to be most competent members of the ‘team’. True ‘jointness’ saw the Foreign Legion landed from British craft in the first opposed amphibious assault of the war by the Allies, and in the final advance to occupy Narvik the Royal Navy’s ships supported French, Norwegian and Polish (but not British) troops. But even before this unquestionable strategic success – the Allies’ first in the war – was attained, the Supreme Council had decided to abandon northern Norway to the Germans. Victory in the north had been overtaken by overwhelming defeat in the theatre which really mattered. The lessons learned during the first month of the Norwegian campaign could not be fully absorbed or implemented in time to influence the conduct of the campaign which opened in the southern North Sea on 10 May when the German invasion of the Low Countries began. The plan which had been drawn up by the Admiralties between October 1939 and February 1940 was immediately implemented, and while the Royal Navy laid mines off the Dutch coast and took demolition parties to Dutch and Belgian ports, French mechanised troops drove up the Belgian coast and, passing over the Breskens–Flushing ferry, established a bridgehead on Walcheren Island. As had been agreed at the 23 January meeting between Pound and Abrial, this French Army thrust was supported by Royal Navy destroyers, the first two of which came under Amiral Nord’s control on 11 May, on arrival at Dunkirk. While the Armée de l’Air was responsible for the defence of the coast road from the landward side, air attacks coming from seaward, and, in particular, against the chokepoints formed by Nieuport and Furnes, were the responsibility of the ships. By some curious quirk of logic, the ships would in turn be protected by French naval fighters and RAF long-range fighters.24 Today, with long, hard experience of sea–air warfare, the concept seems very naïve but it should be remembered that this was the first attempt at such cooperation between so many arms of different Services of different nationalities and that even though 40 years had passed since Marconi had given the Royal Navy the potential to outpace Ariel, technical advances had been relatively slow. Only one common and overcrowded wireless-telegraphy channel was available for all communications – in the event that ‘instant telephonic communications’ was essential, the ship concerned was to land an officer to find and contact the nearest French military authorities and demand to be put in telephone contact with Amiral Nord’s staff (how the latter was to contact a ship in a hurry was not explained). The tactical orders were equally primitive: the anti-aircraft destroyers were to cruise at slow speed by day and concentrate when advised of raids on specific areas ‘under heavy scale of attack’. The 15

THE ROAD TO ORAN

fighters protecting the ships were to remain out of gun range but if necessary would make the appropriate recognition signal ‘and endeavour to fly at low level and in a manner devoid of menace’. Potential difficulty in identification of aircraft was recognised but the naval staff officers who framed the orders had been advised by the RAF that ‘it is possible to distinguish fighters from groups of enemy planes which they are pursuing’.25 From 11 to 19 May, six Royal Navy destroyers took part in this operation, unfortunately code-named ‘FA’, escorting French troop transport and covering the coast road and the ferries by day, and returning at night to replenish ammunition at Dunkirk. The scale of German attack was heavy and by diverting attention to themselves the destroyers achieved at least part of the aim of the operation, at the cost of two ships sunk and a third badly damaged by aircraft and another put out of service by collision with a wreck. The two undamaged survivors reverted to Royal Navy control on 19 May and were thereafter fully employed in maintaining communications with Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne. Captain Holland had been relieved at ‘Marceau’ on 9 April by Captain Pleydell-Bouverie, who had been at Casablanca with Amiral Afrique; before his departure, Holland was invested as a Commander of the Légion d’honneur by Darlan. The new RNLO kept the First Sea Lord in touch with the French view of developments, anticipating the Ardennes offensive on 15 May and reporting three days later, after the disaster at Sedan, that the staffs at Maintenon were confident that ‘the French Army has recovered from its initial shock and … will attack the Germans and knock them one they will not forget’.26 Both Pleydell-Bouverie and Vice-Admiral, Dover, Sir Bertram Ramsay, recognised on 19 May that the position of the British Expeditionary Force was precarious but while the RNLO ‘could not see how they could be got out of it’, the Admiral set his staff to work to plan the complete evacuation of Allied troops from northern France. The German Army reached the Channel near Abbéville on the next day and Boulogne fell on 24 May, after a brave defence in which five French and nine RN destroyers not only provided gunfire support but also ran the port facilities and blew them up at the end. On the same day, Pleydell-Bouverie made his first strong criticism of the French Naval Staff:27 Maybe the Army authorities realise that the position of the BEF and other Allied forces in the north is critical but senior naval officers do not … I am left with the feeling that few of the really higher command here have ever realised the speed with which it is necessary to act against

16

THE PHONEY WAR

the Germans … the lack of quick decision over here is frightening and the practice of ‘laisser aller’ is equally so.

The Allied C-in-C at Dunkirk, Amiral Abrial, was informed that contingency plans had been drawn up for evacuation from the Dunkirk area, but he was not consulted before the British War Cabinet authorised the execution of Operation ‘Dynamo’ and the Admiralty signal ordering its implementation was despatched in the early evening of 26 May; Pleydell-Bouverie was informed five hours later, at 0300 on 27 May, but the message failed to reach General Weygand, who arrived at Dover that morning for a meeting to discuss army collaboration in the event of evacuation and was disconcerted to learn that the evacuation was already under way. Amiral Nord remained unaware of the implementation of ‘Dynamo’, although his liaison officer at Dover knew of it, and French feathers were ruffled by the failure of the new Senior British Officer, Dunkirk, failing to pay the elementary courtesy of a call on arrival. One can certainly sympathise with Amiral Abrial, not least because he was so completely cut off from his national authorities that he was wholly dependent upon his direct line to London for communications with Paris and Maintenon. As late as 29 May he believed that the bridgehead could be held indefinitely and he acceded only reluctantly to Weygand’s orders, not to him but to the French generals within the perimeter, that the defence should be sustained only to permit a ‘progressive’ evacuation; not until two days later did the Supreme War Council appoint Amiral Nord to take charge of the Allied evacuation. This period of command was brief, Abrial and his staff departed for Dover late on 3 June and the last British destroyer left Dunkirk at 0340 on the following morning with 383 French soldiers and the commanding general of the Flanders Garrison on board. Although there remained on the part of the French a marked degree of admiration for the Royal Navy, which, despite obvious exhaustion, had spared no efforts during the last two nights of the evacuation to retrieve over 65,000 French troops, there was in some quarters a complete loss of confidence in the British Army coupled with open criticism of the independent – or as some would have it, selfish – attitude of the British government. NOTES 1. A. d’Antin de Vaillac, L’Amirauté française â Maintenon et sur les routes, offprint from periodical supplied to author by Service Historique de la Marine (SHM) without attribution. Capitaine d’Antin de Vaillac commanded the Fusilier Marins

17

THE ROAD TO ORAN

2. 3.

4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

company which guarded the Amirauté from the outbreak of war until after its arrival in Vichy. Paul Auphan, Proceedings of the US Naval Institute (Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 1956) p. 597. An alternative out-of-town headquarters was planned, for occupation in the event of an invasion, but once this threat had subsided, in early 1941, the ‘Citadel’ was built at the rear of the Admiralty – this ugly bomb-proof derelict broods over the Mall to this day. Four more trawlers were delivered by RN crews to Brest at the end of November. Pound, in his haste to assist the French, made no conditions of transfer and the need to inform the Treasury was overlooked; the latter inevitably got wind of the matter and ex post facto sanction had to be obtained in December 1942 (PRO ADM 1/10311). PRO ADM 205/4. PRO ADM 116/5458. BNLO Paris, Letter of 25 October 1939, in PRO ADM 205/4. W.S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm, pp. 448–9 (London, Cassell, 1949). PRO ADM 205/4. Ibid. This elegant euphemism originated during the First World War and was derived from the appearance in towns far from the front line, and particularly in Limoges, of generals removed from their commands supposedly for incompetence. Castex’s concern echoed that of the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Ironside, who in ‘a Note on the Strategic Situation in Europe’, written as early as 16 September 1939, had predicted that the main German advance would come through the Ardennes. PRO ADM 1/10563. This visit caused a stir among the civil population of the small town, who believed, for no good reason, that no lesser personage than the King of England was involved. D’Antin de Vaillac, L’Amirauté française. PRO ADM 116/5458. PRO ADM 205/2 and 205/3. PRO ADM 1/10568. PRO ADM 205/4. Ibid. The individual was, of course, Capitaine de vaisseau Auphan. PRO War Cabinet Paper (50), p. 109. Ibid., p. 107; the British Foreign Office was opposed in principle to the violation of Scandinavian neutrality. Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol. I (HMSO, London, 1970), p. 288. Minutes of War Cabinet meeting (WM(40) 78, 4). PRO ADM 1/10568. Ibid. As the Allied fighters – twin-engined Potez 630s and Bristol Blenheims – were scarcely, if at all, faster than the (twin-engined) German bombers with which they were engaged, this was a doubtful proposition. PRO ADM 205/4. Ibid.

18

3

The Mediterranean, 27 March–27 May 1940

A month before war broke out in earnest with the invasion of Norway, Italian activity began to cause the Allies concern. The Italian Army’s forces in Libya and Albania were substantially reinforced, reservists were mobilised on 15 March and the pattern of Italian Navy activity altered quite significantly, while the tone of the press became markedly anti-British and from early April rumours of action against Franco-British interests were passed on by attachés in Spain and the Balkans. As early as 27 March, the Admiralty warned all commandersin-chief that it might be necessary to reinforce the Mediterranean Fleet at short notice; at the same time, depot and repair ships and some submarines were despatched to Alexandria, where the Fleet infrastructure ashore had been greatly expanded during the preceding five months.1 The French Amirauté took immediate steps, moving the Atlantic Fleet (otherwise known as the Force de Raid), consisting of the battlecruisers Dunkerque and Strasbourg, a cruiser squadron and a contre-torpilleur flotilla,2 to the new but still incomplete base at Mers-el-Kébir, 3 miles (5.5 kilometres) to the north-west of Oran, in Algeria. The fleet left Brest on 2 April and reached Mers-el-Kébir on 5 April. From that base, only 12 hours’ steaming to the east of Gibraltar, this fast and capable force could deter any opportunistic Italian moves in the western basin of the Mediterranean while remaining within easy reach of its Atlantic area of responsibility, which extended as far as the Azores between the latitudes of Ushant and the Cape Verde Islands. Four days after its arrival, the German attack on Norway resulted in the fleet returning to the Atlantic. Even as the ships were on passage back to Brest a spate of rumours seemed to indicate that the Italians might be tempted to take advantage of the Allied preoccupation with Norway to undertake some adventure in the Mediterranean.3 It also seemed to the French Naval Staff that steps should be taken to counter the possibility, however improbable, that a German heavy unit, cut off from its northern bases, might try to force the Straits of Gibraltar to seek asylum in Italy. On 12 April – the day that the Atlantic Fleet reached Brest – Mussolini mobilised 19

THE ROAD TO ORAN

the Italian Navy, the Amirauté decided to reorganise its main forces in the Mediterranean, allocating the modernised dreadnoughts of the 2ième division de ligne (2nd Battle Squadron) to Mers-el-Kébir and ordering a build-up of submarines at Bizerta, the main naval base in Tunisia, to deter any attempt on the Balearic or Ionian islands.4 The Royal Navy’s strength in the Mediterranean was at a very low ebb, with no capital ships or modern cruisers or destroyers; two aircraft carriers which had been taking advantage of the ‘safe’ waters to train their squadrons were under orders to return to the United Kingdom, where they would immediately be committed to the Norwegian campaign. On 16 April, the Admiralty asked, through the French Mission in London, whether, in the event of the entry of Italy into the war, the French Navy would be willing to take operational responsibility for the whole of the Mediterranean, with support from British forces. The Amirauté agreed without hesitation and immediately began a study into the command organisation in the Mediterranean, but a week later, on 23 April, the Allied Supreme Council would not give its approval to the proposed single (French) command, preferring to maintain the existing structure of British command in the eastern basin and French in the west. The command arrangements were made more flexible than hitherto, with the rigid boundary in the central Mediterranean being abolished to enable the two navies to operate in one another’s zones according to the local situation. The French also considered that an air and surface base was needed in the Aegean; Greek agreement would be needed and General Maxime Weygand, commanding French forces in the Levant, was tasked with examining the geographical options. German losses off Norway and the lull in surface raiding activity made it possible for the Royal Navy to decide, on 24 April,5 that three, and possibly four, battleships were being sent to Alexandria, to be joined in mid-May by three modern light cruisers and two destroyer flotillas. For their part, the French would redeploy the Atlantic Fleet to Mers-el-Kébir and the older battleships to Bizerta; the former was henceforward known as the Force de Raid. The Italian fleet was based principally at Augusta in Sicily and Taranto, on the heel of Italy, and as the passage through the Mediterranean of the first two British battleships, HMS Malaya and Royal Sovereign, coincided with reports of a concentration of Italian submarines in the Dodecanese, Winston Churchill, still the First Lord of the Admiralty, took advantage of the meeting of the Supreme Council to ask for French naval support as the battleships had a screen of only four destroyers. Darlan’s initial response was to order the three battleships of the 2ème division de ligne to protect the British force between Algiers and Bizerta, where the three light cruisers of the 3ième division 20

THE MEDITERRANEAN, 27 MARCH–27 MAY 1940

de croiseurs would take over and provide an escort as far as Malta.6 This cooperation was stronger on political impact than on tactical practicality; the two British battleships were more than a match for the two Italian capital ships at that time in actual service, while the addition of three more heavy ships, whether the old dreadnoughts or the modern cruisers, would have added to the British destroyers’ anti-submarine defence difficulties had this escorting force been in company. Two days later, Darlan decided to ‘protect’ the British force from end to end of its Mediterranean passage;7 the 2ième division de ligne continued to the east, joined off Bizerta by two contre-torpilleurs and a destroyer. The somewhat ‘top-heavy’ group arrived at Alexandria without incident on 3 May and was joined by two heavy cruisers on the next day, when the eight French ships were formally designated Force ‘X’.8 Admiral Cunningham was not enthusiastic about the decision to concentrate this unbalanced force of five (soon to be seven) battleships and three heavy cruisers at Alexandria, where as yet he had only nine destroyers, no minesweeping force worth mentioning, just eight trawlers for anti-submarine escort duties and inadequate aviation support until the arrival of a carrier. The shore facilities were as yet barely capable of supporting his own fleet and the air defences of Alexandria were virtually non-existent: this last can scarcely have escaped the notice of the Italians, for in a remarkable concession on the part of the British Foreign Office, considering the state of relations between the two countries, Italian bombers en route for Abyssinia were given permission to stage through Alexandria on 19 May.9 One can sympathise with the C-in-C, for the deployment was of no strategic value at this stage, other than as a political statement, and whether the latter was directed at Italy or Britain is unclear. It has been suggested with some authority10 that Darlan’s underlying motive was to take personal command and control of the whole Mediterranean, where the entire French fleet was to be concentrated, leaving the Royal Navy to look after the Atlantic and Norwegian Sea. Certainly, by moving his battleships away from Bizerta, Amiral Darlan was leaving the initiative with the Italian fleet, should the latter be ordered to make a surprise move in the central Mediterranean, and though his recorded intention was to respond to an Italian coup in the Adriatic or Ionian Sea by operating against Crete, it seems probable that his wish to dominate the Aegean was a step on the route to Salonika.11 It is, however, difficult to understand why Darlan deployed Force ‘X’ to Alexandria, under British command (however nominal) and relying on British facilities, rather than to Beirut, where there was a French naval base. An entirely practical reason for the move to Alexandria is that Darlan may have believed that he was obtaining protection for his older ships ‘on the cheap’. 21

THE ROAD TO ORAN

The French official naval historian suggested that Cunningham may have feared that the prolonged presence of the French squadron might detract from his authority, particularly as the British C-in-C’s headquarters were at this time in Malta, and reduce his area of responsibility.12 On 5 May, the Admiralty suggested that, as tension appeared to be diminishing, Force ‘X’ should return to the western Mediterranean. Darlan was reportedly angered by this proposal for he was at that moment explaining his concept of the Mediterranean as the critical theatre to a conference of the Comité de guerre which was being held on the eve of the German offensive in the Low Countries.13 This offensive had already started when, on 10 May, the Amirauté replied to London that it preferred to keep the ships at Alexandria, to be ready; if circumstances permitted, the force would visit Beirut and then return to Bizerta, whence it would return if needed. Beginning on 12 May, the Amirauté, becoming more nervous about the prospect of war in the Mediterranean, began to transfer ships from the active theatres in the west, ten contre-torpilleurs and destroyers being ordered to leave Brest for the Mediterranean, followed by six sloops which had been the French Navy’s most useful contribution to the defence of trade convoys but which would no longer be available for the UK–Gibraltar route. On 13 May, Amiral Sud, Amiral d’Escadre Esteva was ordered to move his headquarters from Toulon to Bizerta, where he arrived on the 17 May. The Admiralty in London seems to have been less well informed about the situation in the Mediterranean. One signal, broadcast on 14 May to all authorities by the usually wellinformed Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Foreign), so lacked the usual crisp authority of the Admiralty as to seem rather uncertain: The situation with regard to Italy has apparently deteriorated during the last few days, and although it is not considered likely that war is likely to break out in the very near future a close watch should be kept on Italian shipping.14

The British Mediterranean Fleet was being brought up to strength during this crise: the battleships HMS Warspite and Ramillies arrived in Alexandria without the need for a French escort, the aircraft carrier Eagle joined from the Far East, modern cruisers arrived from the distant stations where they had been guarding against raiders and 20 destroyers were transferred from the Home Fleet and South Atlantic. On 14 May, Admiral Cunningham, whose headquarters had been ashore in Malta since November 1939, hoisted his flag in the Warspite, to take charge of the fleet whose size and shape would remain unchanged for several months. 22

THE MEDITERRANEAN, 27 MARCH–27 MAY 1940

The two Admiralties promulgated a revised command organisation for the Mediterranean on 16 May, confirming that the Force de Raid and Force ‘X’ came under the direct orders of the Commander-inChief of the Navy himself but that in the event of war with Italy the latter would remain in the eastern Mediterranean under the command of the British Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet. British submarines based on Malta would be directed by the French Flag Officer, Submarines, at Bizerta, while the French submarines at Beirut could be handed over to the C-in-C, Mediterranean Fleet. In the event of important, wide-ranging operations, the Mediterranean would be treated as a whole, under a single commander who would be identified according to circumstances by agreement between the two Admiralties.15 Three days after this adjustment to the Allied command arrangements, the Amirauté decided that the situation in the western Mediterranean was sufficiently serious as to require the return, as a matter of urgency, of the battleships Provence and Bretagne from Alexandria to Bizerta, escorted by both of the contre-torpilleurs. Their departure, on 20 May, was compensated by the allocation of a heavy cruiser from the Far East, a light cruiser from Brest and two destroyers,16 so that the strength of Force ‘X’ remained eight ships. The Provence and Bretagne reached Bizerta on 23 May but Darlan decided to concentrate all his heavy ships at Mers-el-Kébir and the two ships joined the Force de Raid on 27 May. The pieces which were to be central to the later tragedy were now in their positions. The allied politicians had decided to evacuate Narvik, the German armoured columns had reached the English Channel and Darlan had so distributed the main strength of the French Navy that the closest major units were over 1,200 miles (2,200 km) from the nearest significant naval action. More significantly, perhaps, the Force de Raid was far beyond the reach of the Luftwaffe and at least 500 miles from the nearest bases of the Regia Aeronautica, the Italian Air Force, which was still an unknown quantity. By the end of the third week of May 1940, both the French Army and the Armée de l’Air had suffered crippling defeats: the evidence suggests that Darlan had no intention that ‘his’ navy should suffer in a similar fashion, even if it meant distancing its excellent ships and courageous men from the enemy. Distances from Oran Brest 1,155nm (2,130km)

Gibraltar Algiers Toulon Bizerta Sardinia La Spezia 220 (440)

195 (360)

530 (975)

23

520 (960)

520 (960)

680 (1,250)

Malta 780 (1,440)

THE ROAD TO ORAN NOTES 1. Admiralty Signal 2030, 27 March 1940, PRO ADM 199/2201 Admiralty War Diary. 2. The cruisers Georges Leygues, Gloire and Montcalm, and the contre-torpilleurs Mogador, Volta, Le Fantasque, Le Terrible, L’Audacieuse, L’Indomptable, Le Triomphant, Le Malin. The Royal Navy was at a loss how to rate the contretorpilleurs, which were all over 3,000 tons, armed with 138mm (5.4in) guns and capable of over 37 knots under trials conditions, and frequently described them as ‘light cruisers’, which overrated their capability. 3. On 10 April the French naval attaché in Madrid learned of an imminent ItaloGerman assault on Gibraltar, with Spanish assistance; on 11 April, his colleague in Athens reported that the Italians were loading tanks, artillery and trucks for a coup de main to take Corfu, to be followed by a descent on Crete, and on 12 April the man in Madrid heard that the Italians were putting pressure on Spain to permit an Italian occupation of the Balearic Islands. Capitaine de frégate Caroff, Le Théâtre Méditeranéen, Vol. I, du 2 septembre 1939 au 25 juin 1940 (Vincennes, SHM, 1960), pp. 20–1, 227. 4. The 2ième division de ligne consisted of the Lorraine and Bretagne (from Toulon), and the Provence (from Dakar); Caroff, pp. 21, 49; Robert Mallett, The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism, 1935–40 (London, Frank Cass, 1998), p.183. 5. Coincidentally, on this day the German merchant raider Orion sank the first victim of the next phase of the German surface raiding campaign. 6. Amirauté signal 0900, 28 April 1940, cited in Caroff, Le Théâtre, p. 22. 7. Amirauté signal 1045, 30 April 1940, ibid. 8. Besides the three modernised dreadnoughts (see above, Note 4), Force ‘X’ consisted of the 8in (203 mm) cruisers Duquesne and Tourville, and the contre-torpilleurs Tigre and Lynx and the destroyer Forbin. It is almost ungentlemanly to point out that, with the exception of the last-named, these were the oldest French ships of their types in the Mediterranean, the cruisers being virtually unarmoured and the big destroyers being very short range. 9. PRO ADM 186/800, Naval Staff History, Mediterranean, Vol. I (London, Admiralty, 1954), p. 134; another group passed through on 26 May. 10. H. Coutau-Bégarie and C. Huan, Darlan (Paris, Econimica, 1989), pp. 208–9. 11. Caroff, Le Théâtre, p. 23. 12. Ibid. 13. Coutau-Bégarie and Huan, Darlan. 14. Admiralty Signal 2327, 14 May 1940; ADM 199/2204, Admiralty War Diary. 15. Caroff, Le Théâtre, pp. 23–4. 16. Ibid., p. 49: heavy cruiser Suffren, light cruiser Duguay-Trouin, destroyers Basque and Le Fortuné.

24

4

Dunkirk to Bordeaux, 4–15 June 1940

The Dunkirk evacuation operation was formally terminated at 1030 on 4 June 1940. On the same day, there began the evacuation of Allied troops, undefeated but strategically out of place, from northern Norway; as at Dunkirk, French troops provided the rear-guard which covered the final embarkation but on this occasion no one was left behind. Within 24 hours, the German Army in France began the next phase of its offensive, to break through the Somme–Aisne line. By 7 June, the defences were sufficiently dented for the British Foreign Office and the Admiralty to begin contemplation of the aftermath of a complete military defeat and the withdrawal of France from the war – the unthinkable was happening and, as far as the British government was concerned, the unacceptable had to be prevented. Local cooperation, not high-level coordination, marked the retreats, evacuations and naval support of the next two weeks. Up to the last minute, the Norwegian campaign was a success for the British and French navies, who could afford their losses of two cruisers and eight destroyers and sloops better than could the German Navy, smaller than either, the three cruisers and 12 destroyers which they had lost in the taking of Oslo, Bergen and Narvik. On 8 June, however, the aircraft carrier Glorious unexpectedly encountered the battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and was sunk with its two accompanying destroyers, with the loss of over 1,500 officers and men of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. It was not known at the time that one of the destroyers had managed to torpedo the Scharnhorst, thus reducing the number of German capital ships fit for combat to one – the Gneisenau.1 The question of the future of certain French assets had been under discussion since 27 May, when Lord Hankey, the former Secretary of the Cabinet and Minister without Portfolio in Winston Churchill’s new government, had written to Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary. Hankey’s theme was the conditions which Britain might be entitled to demand if the French asked to be released from the 28 March undertakings, and his main topic was the French Navy and merchant marine which, he suggested, should be removed to British ports at the 25

THE ROAD TO ORAN

British government’s request. The Foreign Office commented that it was doubtful whether the French government would accede to such a request, since to do so would be likely to increase the severity of any armistice terms; in any event, no approach could be made to the French until they had made a decision to surrender.2 The British Ambassador in Paris, Sir Ronald Campbell, was asked his opinion on 3 June and replied on the next day: the French government might agree to the surrender to Germany of the fleet if so demanded as a condition of an armistice. The only solution that he could suggest was that Amiral Darlan should be persuaded to order the fleet to British waters, in defiance of his government, and take personal command. Campbell could not be sure that Darlan could be so persuaded but suggested that Darlan might agree if secretly urged by a delegation of senior British officers.3 The Ambassador’s views were discussed at a meeting at the Admiralty on 7 June, at which the main participants were the First Sea Lord, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and his Permanent Secretary. It was generally agreed that it was most unlikely that Darlan or any other admiral would order the French fleet to Great Britain or the United States. Admiral Pound had no reason to believe, from what he knew of Amiral Darlan, that the latter would send the ships to Britain, either to fight on under their own flag or under the White Ensign, and he was firmly of the opinion that the French government should be encouraged to order the fleet to be scuttled, to eliminate any possibility that it could be used as a bargaining counter. ViceAdmiral Sir Geoffrey Blake, the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Foreign), was earmarked to make representations on behalf of the Admiralty to Admiral Darlan should the eventuality arise.4 The Foreign Office wrote to the British Ambassador outlining the recommendations of the Admiralty meeting. This letter arrived in Paris on 10 June but the Ambassador and his Naval Attaché had scarcely time to discuss the contents before they received word that the French government departments were evacuating Paris in the face of the German advance.5 The rumour went round ‘Marceau’ that Brest was to be the fall-back HQ but this was possibly wishful thinking on the part of the naval personnel, for the government had decided on Touraine.6 During the afternoon, the Ambassador moved to Cléré, near Tours, and the Naval Attaché from Maintenon to Montbazon, a few miles to the south of the Loire. It was several days before Campbell and Pleydell-Bouverie communicated again. The Amirauté personnel and effects, less a twin 37mm AA gun whose breech-blocks were buried in the grounds of the chateau, left Maintenon by train and truck that evening. The Italian government chose 10 June, when the disruption of government in France was becoming serious, to give polite notice that, 26

DUNKIRK TO BORDEAUX, 4–15 JUNE

as of midnight (Zone + 1) on 10/11 June, Italy would consider itself at war with France and Great Britain. On 11 June 1940, Winston Churchill, accompanied by Anthony Eden, the Secretary of State for War, and General Sir John Dill, the Chief of Imperial General Staff, flew to Briare, 100 miles from Tours, to confer with Paul Reynaud, Maréchal Henri Pétain (Vice-Premier since 18 May), General Maxime Weygand (Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies since 20 May) and their military advisers. Campbell, at Cléré, did not learn of the visit until after the British party had arrived. Churchill had with him a Foreign Office ‘line to take’ memorandum which advocated, among other topics, the scuttling of the fleet before the French government requested an armistice,7 but the subject of the French fleet was not discussed at either of the two meetings, despite the presence of Amiral Darlan at the second. However, as Churchill was leaving on 12 June, he took Darlan aside and asked what was to be done about the fleet. The latter declared emphatically that he would never surrender the French Navy to the enemy and that in the last resort he would send it to Canada, although there was a danger that he might be overruled by the politicians.8 On his return to London, Churchill reported this conversation to the War Cabinet and then sent a personal message to President F.D. Roosevelt in which, after describing the pessimism of the French generals, he again asserted that Darlan had said that the French fleet would be sent to Canada. Churchill returned to France on 13 June for what was to be the last meeting of the Allied Supreme War Council. At Tours, Reynaud informed him that General Weygand had said that it would soon be necessary to ask for an armistice and that the Council of Ministers had asked him (Reynaud) to enquire what would be the attitude of Great Britain if France had to seek an armistice. Churchill replied that while in no case would Britain waste time in reproaches and recrimination, that did not mean that it would consent to action contrary to the 28 March agreement. He suggested that Reynaud should appeal to Roosevelt in the strongest terms and that together they should await the United States’ reply before the matter of British consent to a separate armistice was again discussed. Once again, the question of the fate of the French fleet was not specifically addressed, although Foreign Office and Admiralty advice was still in favour of scuttling before the French government sought an armistice.9 The timing of such a suggestion would always have been difficult for Churchill and he could not have known either that the opportunity would not recur or that this meeting was to be his last with Reynaud. In London, Vice-amiral J.H. Odend’hal, was approached by RearAdmiral W.S. Chalmers, appointed for liaison duties with the Allied Naval Missions in London. The British Admiralty, concerned for the 27

THE ROAD TO ORAN

safety of the new battleships Richelieu (nearing completion at Brest) and Jean Bart (fitting out at St Nazaire), would willingly give them refuge in a British port. Odend’hal wrote on the same day to report the offer to Capitaine de vaisseau G.A.J.P. Auphan, the Deputy Chief of the French Naval Staff.10 The French Amirauté was currently in an unenviable situation, in ad hoc quarters in 14 separate locations along the Indre, with the Naval Staff and the operational headquarters in the Château la Guéritaulde. Communications were inadequate and for much of the working day the staffs were deprived of the leadership and direction of the Chief of Naval Staff, who was in constant demand at meetings of the War Cabinet. It was not until the forenoon of 13 June that the British Naval Attaché met Capitaine Auphan to discuss the general war situation, and, in particular, the British concern for the safety of the French fleet. Auphan insisted that the French Navy would never give in and told Pleydell-Bouverie that he thought that the British Admiralty was overpessimistic with regard to the immediate future and its fears for the fleet.11 Whatever reassurance Pleydell-Bouverie may have derived from Auphan about the general war situation was soon dispelled, for before he left la Guéritaulde to return to his own office at the Château du Puy d’Artigny12 he learned that the French government was proceeding to Bordeaux, accompanied by the British Ambassador, who had already left Cléré. During a second visit to la Guéritaulde, the Attaché met only junior staff officers, who passed on well-founded rumours that an armistice might possibly be sought. Early on 14 June, Sir Ronald Campbell met Georges Mandel, the French Minister for the Interior, who informed the Ambassador that the Council of Ministers had discussed the fate of the navy in the event of an armistice, and that although no conclusions had been reached, general opinion had been in favour of scuttling if President Roosevelt rejected Reynaud’s appeal. Mandel strongly advised the British government to make clear to the Council any intention that France should not be released from the ‘no separate peace’ undertaking. The information and advice were reported by Campbell to London at 0315 on 14 June.13 The telegram was discussed by the British War Cabinet on 14 June, but neither the previous Foreign Office suggestion that the French should be invited to consider scuttling the fleet, nor the quite independent opinion of the Council of Ministers that the fleet should be scuttled before overtures were made for an armistice was raised.14 There is, furthermore, no evidence to suggest that the Admiralty was ever informed that such close harmony of British and French ideas had been reached. Certainly, the Naval Attaché at Montbazon had no idea of any such suggestions. His communications with the Admiralty were at this time 28

DUNKIRK TO BORDEAUX, 4–15 JUNE

excellent, for his staff included a cell equipped with a portable wirelesstelegraphy set. He was thus probably better acquainted with the overall naval picture than his hosts, who were attempting to direct the operations and administration of an entire navy with inadequate, improvised wireless and land-line (civilian teleprinter) facilities. Acting on his latest brief from the Admiralty, the Attaché returned to la Guéritaulde to persuade the Naval Staff to make ‘cast-iron arrangements regarding the Fleet’, discussing the matter first with Capitaine de frégate Sanson (the Director of Naval Intelligence) and subsequently with Capitaine Auphan. He stressed to the latter the British Admiralty’s view that, as a precaution, the French fleet should be out of harm’s way should an armistice be sought and that all British bases and facilities were at the disposal of the French Navy. Auphan repeated his belief that the British Admiralty was taking a pessimistic view – the French Navy was still fighting and would continue to do so. To PleydellBouverie it seemed that Auphan did not appreciate the danger of keeping the entire French Navy in French ports and he attempted to induce the latter to agree to a written undertaking from the French Admiralty to hand over the fleet to British control in the event of an armistice, again as a precaution, to forestall any attempt by the Germans to seize it. Auphan rejected this idea – such an agreement ‘would not be worth the paper it was written on’. He thanked the Naval Attaché for his remarks and said that he would pass them on to Amiral Darlan, who had already left for Bordeaux with the government. Pleydell-Bouverie reported his morning’s activities to the First Sea Lord at about noon, adding his impression of the situation: morale in the French Admiralty appeared to remain high but that of the army ‘seemed to have gone completely’, and none of his contacts ‘seemed too sure of the civilian and aged element in the Government’. He recommended that, to forestall an adverse political decision, immediate steps should be taken to propose to the French the transfer to the United Kingdom of ‘naval strength and material’.15 The matter was promptly raised with Vice-amiral Odend’hal by the Vice-Chief of Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral T.S.V. Phillips, and Odend’hal followed up his letter of 13 June to Auphan with a signal.16 At 1930 that evening, the First Sea Lord sent the first warning signal to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet, Sir Andrew Cunningham, whose forces, based at Alexandria, included a French naval squadron – Force ‘X’ – comprised of an old battleship, three heavy cruisers and four smaller surface ships, commanded by Vice-amiral R.E. Godfroy: There is a possibility that France may consider making a separate peace, in which case the disposal of the French Navy would be a matter of the

29

THE ROAD TO ORAN

first importance. If you can arrange for French ships in Eastern Mediterranean to be with you at Alexandria it might ensure that these ships are disposed of in accordance with our wishes.17

Cunningham makes no reference to this signal in his memoirs, nor has any trace been found of a reply from him. For the time being, at least, it had no practical effect on cooperation within the Mediterranean Fleet. The British Ambassador, en route to Bordeaux, was out of touch with London and the French government during much of 14 June. Not until late evening did he learn from Reynaud that a telegram had been sent early that morning, appealing to President Roosevelt for armed intervention. Campbell received the impression that the Premier was wavering under defeatist pressure from the majority of his Council and, urged by Mandel, he requested from the Foreign Office a statement, intended to strengthen Reynaud’s position, making it plain that the British government would not condone a breach of the ‘no separate peace’ agreement.18 The Ambassador was labouring under considerable practical difficulties, not the least of which were his communications with London, which were reduced to the grossly overloaded public telephone and telegraph networks. Incoming messages were particularly affected, so that Campbell had to rely largely on his own judgement during these critical days, but there was clearly an internal communications problem in London as well, for the response to this crucial request for support was not transmitted by the Foreign Office until the afternoon of the following day. Pleydell-Bouverie, however, was still in direct contact with the Admiralty and at 0237 on 15 June, the First Sea Lord signalled to him that, following his own recommendation, he was to seek the transfer to the United Kingdom of the Richelieu and Jean Bart. The Royal Navy would provide the necessary escort and, if required, tugs for this move, but the French Navy was requested to assist with the transport of ordnance, ammunition and stores to support the ships. The British Naval Attaché was also ordered to request the transfer of the Force de Raid, and particularly the fast battleships Dunkerque and Strasbourg, from its operating bases at Algiers and Oran/Mers-elKébir to Gibraltar. These instructions received retrospective agreement from the War Cabinet during the 1000 meeting on 15 June.19 There was a growing concern, particularly on the part of the Prime Minister, that the powerful Richelieu and Jean Bart, armed with 15in guns, would be completed by the Germans if captured and employed in the Atlantic alongside the two German battleships which were also nearing completion.20 30

DUNKIRK TO BORDEAUX, 4–15 JUNE

The Naval Attaché visited la Guéritaulde on the morning of 15 June and discussed the general situation with senior staff officers, including Sanson and Capitaine de vaisseau J.L. Négadelle, the Assistant Chief of the French Naval Staff, who appeared to be markedly opposed to the movement of any French ships to Britain. He then met Auphan and passed on the British Cabinet’s requests, all of which were politely turned down, although ‘as regards Richelieu and Jean Bart, they will go to England if danger from air attack is too great or if grave eventuality should arise’. This statement, which could not be forwarded to London until 2300, was taken by the British Admiralty to be a firm and unconditional promise.21 The French Naval Staff had assumed that Pleydell-Bouverie was aware that the French Admiralty was on the point of moving to Bordeaux – in fact he learned of the move almost by accident on return to le Puy d’Artigny, where he was told by the camp commandant that no detailed plans existed but that ‘a party had gone to requisition the necessary accommodation. Thus, once again, the whole Admiralty would move without any proper organisation for their reception at the other end.’22 Returning for the last time to la Guéritaulde to inform the Naval Staff of his intention to proceed to Bordeaux, the Attaché had the opportunity to see Auphan once again and to learn that, for the time being, the latter was remaining at Montbazon with a small staff owing to the lack of communications facilities at Bordeaux. Auphan ‘expressed his private opinion that Bordeaux was quite the wrong place to go to and said that, in his view, Toulon or Marseilles would be very much better as there were excellent communications at both places’.23 The British Ambassador, who was witnessing at close range the rapid deterioration of the political situation, would doubtless have agreed wholeheartedly as he awaited the Foreign Office response to his request for a firm statement from the government. Campbell had obtained the text of Reynaud’s appeal to President Roosevelt, from which he learned that the Premier had stated unambiguously that France would be obliged to capitulate if the United States would not undertake to enter the war in the very near future. The sense of this was transmitted to London at 1330, followed at 1445 by Campbell’s impression that ‘things are slipping fast’. A further telegram, received in London at 1805, reported that Reynaud was holding a Council of Ministers meeting at 1600 and had previously told the Ambassador that he would resign if he failed to get enough support for his opposition to what he would regard as a dishonourable peace; if support was forthcoming, then Reynaud expected at least four or five ministers, including Pétain, to resign. 31

THE ROAD TO ORAN

The British government’s response to Campbell’s appeal on 14 June for a supportive statement of policy arrived too late to influence the meeting of the Council of Ministers. It was transmitted at 1445 on 15 June but not until 2350 that night, in the course of a telephone call to London, did Campbell learn of its existence. The main points were conveyed in veiled terms: the French should be reminded of the understanding on which the last conversation had ended (namely, that the British government was not prepared to release them from the March agreement); on no account should a final decision be taken without a personal exchange of views with the British government. If these arguments failed, then Campbell was to urge the Council of Ministers to follow the example of the Dutch government and leave France.24 NOTES 1. The ‘pocket battleship’ Lützow had been damaged by a British submarine at the beginning of the Norwegian campaign and the Admiral Scheer was in a lengthy refit which was not completed until the autumn of 1940. The two new battleships, Bismarck and Tirpitz, would not be ready until the spring of 1941 at the earliest. 2. Foreign Office (FO) C7074/5/18. 3. Ibid. 4. PRO ADM 205/4 and FO C7074/5/18. 5. NA’s Diary, 10 June 1940 (typescript copy in NHB). 6. D’Antin de Vaillac, L’Amirauté. 7. FO C7074/5/18. 8. Churchill’s report to the War Cabinet, 1700, 12 June 1940 (WM(40)163); this does not accord with J. Benoist-Méchin’s account (Sixty Days that Shook the West: The Fall of France, 1940, London, G.P. Putnam, 1963, p. 308), who quotes Darlan as concluding ‘Orders to scuttle will be given in case of danger’. It is tempting to speculate that Churchill’s highly suspect ear for the French language may have rendered ‘en cas de danger’ as the more welcome ‘en Canada’. 9. FO C7074/5/18. 10. Odend’hal’s letter of 16 June 1940 to Darlan (courtesy of the SHM); no British account of the meeting has been traced. 11. NA’s Diary, 13 June 1940. 12. The Château du Puy d’Artigny was a relatively modern building, owned by René Coty, the parfumier. Built of shining white stone, someone decided to render it less visible from the air by toning down its brilliance with dark paint applied by spraying the walls with fire hoses (d’Antin de Vaillac, L’Amirauté, and NA’s Diary, 13 June). 13. FO C/7541/65/17 and 7182/5/18. 14. WM(40)166. 15. WM(40)167 (Confidential Annex); NA’s Diary, 14 June. 16. Odend’hal’s letter to Darlan, 16 July 1940. 17. ADM 199/2206, Admiralty War Diary, 14 June. 18. FO C7263/65/17.

32

DUNKIRK TO BORDEAUX, 4–15 JUNE 19. WM(40)167. 20. The Bismarck (operational in May 1941) and Tirpitz (September 1941). The Jean Bart was expected to complete in the summer of 1941. 21. Capitaine de frégate Caroff, Les Forces Maritimes de l’Ouest (Vincennes, SHM, 1954), p. 383. 22. NA’s Diary, 15 June. 23. Ibid. 24. FO C7263/65/17.

33

5

Political Collapse, 16 June

It must be questioned, in the light of what was known even then of the defeatist elements in the Council, whether a timely formal statement of the British government’s attitude would in practice have affected the outcome of the afternoon meeting on 15 June. At 0120 on 16 June, the encrypted text of a personal message from Reynaud to Churchill was read out, group by group, over the telephone. The opening four items clearly reflected the closest approach possible to a Council consensus and the fifth was a personal appeal from Reynaud: 1. The Council of Ministers at their meeting this afternoon held that the departure of the Government from France, thus abandoning the French people at a moment when the enemy is about to occupy whole of national territory and to impose cruel privations and sufferings, might give rise to a violent reaction on the part of public opinion if it is not established that peace conditions … were unacceptable as being contrary to honourable and vital interests of France. 2. The Council does not doubt that these conditions would in effect be unacceptable but considers it indispensable that this should be proved beyond doubt, in default of which Government would break up, refusing to leave the soil of France. 3. In order to learn German and Italian conditions the Council decided to seek the British Government’s authorisation to enquire through the US Government what armistice terms would be offered to France … 4. If British Government authorises French Government to take this step the President of the Council [that is, Reynaud] is authorised to declare to British Government that surrender of French fleet to Germany would be considered an unacceptable condition. 5. In the event of British Government withholding its consent to this step, it seems probable in the light of opinions expressed at today’s Council meeting that the President of the Council would have no alternative but to resign. 6. The President of the Council has just received answer of President Roosevelt who declares himself unable to give Allies the military help asked of him.

34

POLITICAL COLLAPSE, 16 JUNE

7. At meeting held in Tours last Thursday it was agreed at your suggestion that question of authorising a request for an armistice would be reconsidered if President Roosevelt’s reply was negative. This eventuality having materialised the question must now be put afresh.1

The first two items dashed at a stroke the British hopes that military surrender in the field by the French Army would not necessarily involve complete political surrender and that a government in exile could be established. No great reliance could be placed in the armistice terms being unacceptable and the implication of Reynaud’s fifth paragraph was that some ministers did not consider the ‘no separate peace’ agreement to be binding under the circumstances. The offer of the guarantee that the French fleet would not be surrendered was conditional upon Britain releasing France from the agreement and it contained two uncertainties: what would happen if the British government refused to give the authorisation, and, as only non-surrender to Germany was specified, what was the situation vis-à-vis Italy? Campbell, in his follow-up telephoned cypher telegram (received by the Foreign Office at 0400), made it clear that Reynaud could not guarantee that, in the event of his resignation, his successor would maintain the decision that the surrender of the fleet would amount to an unacceptable condition for an armistice. According to several sources, Campbell concluded his message, Amiral Darlan had nevertheless said that in no circumstances would the French Navy submit to surrender.2 While this lengthy exchange of vital political matters was in progress, the British First Sea Lord was sending a no less significant message, via the excellent Admiralty communications network, to the commanders at either end of the Mediterranean – Admiral Cunningham at Alexandria and Admiral North, the Flag Officer Commanding, North Atlantic Station (FOCNA), at Gibraltar: In view of the possibility that France may make a separate peace, the French Admiralty has been asked to send the Force de Raid [at Algiers and Mers-el-Kébir] to Gibraltar, where it would be under our control. In the event of their not doing this and there being a risk that ships might fall into enemy hands, you may in the last resort be ordered to destroy them, in particular Dunkerque and Strasbourg by gunfire and torpedo fire from destroyers and/or Resolution.3

This message, the first indication outside Whitehall that Royal Navy action was contemplated against an ally who was still fighting, was despatched after the receipt, at 2300 on 15 June, of PleydellBouverie’s signal reporting that Auphan had declined to move the 35

THE ROAD TO ORAN

Force de Raid to Gibraltar. It could only have been originated with the authority of the Prime Minister himself and, furthermore, it was sent without any prior discussion by the War Cabinet, which had not met during the intervening four hours. No reply was required from Cunningham or North to this preparatory message, which gave them no initiative in the matter – they would be ‘ordered’ to take action – and neither admiral has left any record of his reactions on receiving it. Within the Admiralty, however, there were private qualms: that evening, the Deputy Director of the Operations Division (Home), Captain Ralph Edwards, noted in his diary: ‘It is desperately important that it [the French fleet] does not fall into the hands of the enemy. But we mustn’t go sinking it out of hand. It’ll put us out of court vis-à-vis the USA.’ The British War Cabinet next met at 1015 on 16 June, the main topic being Reynaud’s plea to be permitted to enquire possible armistice terms. Churchill himself explained the issue: The French Government were insisting that before they left French soil they must at least find out what the enemy’s terms for an armistice would be. This would seem to imply that, if the terms were too harsh, the French Government might be willing to carry on the struggle from outside France.4

This was a travesty of the message received from Reynaud: no such implication was suggested in the original – indeed, quite a different conclusion could be drawn, namely that certain members of the French government would not leave France whatever the outcome. On the other hand, the threat implicit in the conditional declaration that the surrender of the fleet would be unacceptable was well taken and provided the strongest argument for acquiescence to Reynaud’s appeal. The War Cabinet agreed to send a message to Reynaud stating British readiness to release the French government from the March undertaking, though only to the extent necessary to enquire terms of Germany, and then only on condition that the French fleet was ordered to British harbours. The text of the Cabinet’s reply was transmitted to Campbell at 1235: Our agreement forbidding separate negotiations, whether for armistice or peace, was made with the French Republic and not with any particular French administration or statesman. It therefore involves the honour of France. Nevertheless provided, but only provided, that the French Fleet is sailed forthwith for British harbours pending negotiations, His Majesty’s Government give their full consent to enquiry by the French Government to ascertain the terms of an armistice for France.

36

POLITICAL COLLAPSE, 16 JUNE

His Majesty’s Government, being resolved to continue the war, wholly exclude themselves from all part in the above-mentioned enquiry concerning an armistice.

This (Foreign Office telegram No. 368) arrived fairly promptly but, before the message could be delivered to Reynaud by Campbell, the War Cabinet had second thoughts and at 1510 a second cypher telegram (No. 369), stating that the British government expected ‘to be consulted as soon as any armistice terms are received’ and setting out specific areas of British interest in French military assets,5 was despatched at the same time as a plain-language telegram instructing the Ambassador to ‘delay’ action on No. 368. The cypher message reached Campbell immediately before a meeting with the French Premier, but the plain-language call did not, and not until 1645 was it delivered, at the same time as a second uncyphered message, which instructed the Ambassador to ‘suspend’ telegram No. 369 as well. The two plain-language messages were originated by Churchill, who had that morning met General Charles de Gaulle, the French Under-Secretary of National Defence. At the end of the meeting of the War Cabinet in the afternoon of 15 June, there had been discussion of a memorandum proposing an expression of Anglo-French unity, to take the form of joint parliaments and a joint cabinet. The proposal had not been supported by the Cabinet, Neville Chamberlain, the Lord President of the Council, in particular, considering it to be generally doubtful and ill thought-out, but Churchill nevertheless raised it with de Gaulle. De Gaulle supported the notion and, on the basis of his advice, namely to join with Reynaud in announcing the constitution of an Anglo-French union which would carry on the war, Churchill decided to ask the latter for a meeting in Brittany on 17 June. The General was to telephone the French Premier to acquaint him with the proposal of union. The British War Cabinet met again at 1500 on 16 June, shortly before de Gaulle’s telephone call to Bordeaux. The Prime Minister explained his actions of the morning and early afternoon (including his orders to hold back telegrams Nos 368 and 369). Informed that the French Council of Ministers was to meet at 1700 and that Reynaud felt able to hold his position if he received a favourable answer by that time, the British ministers discussed the draft declaration of union, the fundamental issue of which was: ‘The two Governments declare that France and Great Britain shall no longer be two nations but one Franco-British Union.’ Although there were within the War Cabinet reservations about some of the details, notably the post-war status of the Union, the consensus was that the proposal ‘gave the resolute 37

THE ROAD TO ORAN

elements in France a chance to hold their own’. Before the deadline was reached, a draft was approved and Churchill invited to meet Reynaud at the earliest possible moment to discuss the joint proclamation.6 In France, Campbell, unaware of countermanding instructions and without any idea of the impending major démarche, formally delivered telegrams Nos 368 and 369. 1. [The Premier] did not take them well and at once remarked that withdrawal of French Mediterranean Fleet to British ports would invite immediate seizure of Tunis by Italy as well as create difficulties for British fleet. 2. He had got no further than this when Prime Minister’s message telephoned by General de Gaulle came through. It acted like a tonic on M. Reynaud who said that for a document like this he would fight to the last … 3. M. Reynaud then left with a light step to read the document to the President of the Republic [Albert Lebrun]. 4. Immediately after he had gone we were able to send a messenger after him to say that the two earlier messages should be considered as cancelled.7

Sir Ronald Campbell, ill-briefed and at the end of an extremely poor line of communication, had made an error. The Prime Minister’s two delayed plain-language telegrams had first ‘delayed’ and then ‘suspended’ the qualified approval for investigation of possible armistice terms which the War Cabinet had authorised – Campbell, reading the fresh instructions in haste, had officially informed the French that the messages had been ‘cancelled’. The French Council of Ministers was insufficiently impressed by Reynaud’s account of the offer of union – too many members were now in favour of ascertaining armistice terms and they could not be persuaded that the British offer held any real hope for the immediate future. The Premier received general assent to his spoken assumption that ministers would still regard the surrender of the fleet to be an unacceptable armistice condition but, properly, he withheld any mention of the two ‘cancelled’ messages laying down the British preconditions. No vote was taken on any of the issues. Sir Ronald Campbell and General Sir Edward Spears, the senior British Liaison Officer,8 attempted to encourage Reynaud to dismiss the defeatist elements in his Council and to remain in office. They then went on to call on J. Jeanneney, the President of the Senate, to use his influence with Lebrun to persuade the President of the Republic to insist that Reynaud should form a new government; Jeanneney was ‘begged’ to make it clear to President Lebrun that the offer of union 38

POLITICAL COLLAPSE, 16 JUNE

could not be extended to a government which had entered into negotiations with the enemy. British communications at Bordeaux improved dramatically in the afternoon with the arrival of the Naval Attaché’s portable wireless set. By evening, direct touch had been gained with the Admiralty in London and, shortly afterwards, the brand-new destroyer HMS Berkeley, which had previously called at St Nazaire to drop off a naval party to control the major evacuation from that place (see below, pp. 48–9), arrived in the Gironde to serve the Ambassador as a communications link. The Attaché himself had arrived before noon on 16 June; after some difficulty, he eventually tracked down the whereabouts of the French Admiralty, which had established itself at Blanquefort, some 10 miles outside the city, with a small section in the centre of Bordeaux. He was unable to re-establish contact with the French Naval Staff until the following day. At 1845, before he learned the outcome of the meeting of the Council of Ministers, Campbell was advised that a British delegation, including the Prime Minister, C.R. Attlee (the Deputy Prime Minister) and the three Service Chiefs of Staff would arrive at Concarneau, Brittany, at noon on 17 June, aboard a cruiser; General de Gaulle had thought that the time and venue would be convenient for Reynaud and Churchill suggested that the conference should take place aboard the ship. At 2000, while engaged in his urgent lobbying, Campbell received a further message,9 explaining the reason for the suspension of telegrams Nos 368 and 369 and instructing him to submit to Reynaud the proposed text of the joint declaration of union, which was being forwarded ‘at once’. The text had still not arrived by 2200, when Reynaud told Campbell and Spears that he considered himself beaten and that he had handed in his resignation. In combination, Pétain and Weygand had been ‘too much for the weaker members of the Council upon whom they had worked by waving the spectre of revolution’. Campbell lost no time in reporting to London, at 2210, that a ministerial crisis had occurred, that he hoped to have the results of President Lebrun’s urgent consultations by midnight, and that the intended Concarneau meeting could not be held. Churchill and his party had already left for the railway station to take the train to Plymouth, where they were to have embarked, and they were recalled to Whitehall.10 The French political crisis became public knowledge at 2330, with a radio announcement from Bordeaux that the Council of Ministers had resigned and Maréchal Pétain had been asked to form a new administration, in which C. Chautemps would be VicePresident of the Council. 39

THE ROAD TO ORAN NOTES 1. FO C7263/65/17. The exact time of receipt of Roosevelt’s message is not known, but it would appear to have arrived after the conclusion of the meeting. 2. Ibid. 3. 1SL’s Signal 0255, 16 June 1940, MSS copy held by NHB. 4. WM(40)168, Confidential Annex. 5. FO C7263/65/17. 6. WM(40)169. 7. HBMA’s Despatch, C7294/65/17. 8. Spears had been appointed by the British Minister of Defence (Churchill) to serve as the special liaison officer to the French Minister of Defence (Reynaud). 9. HBMA’s Despatch. 10. FO C7294/65/17.

40

6

Pétain’s First Day, 17 June

The new French government moved quickly. At 0100 on 17 June, the British Ambassador was summoned by P. Baudouin, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The latter explained the decision to ask for armistice conditions in terms of the military defeat and internal conditions in France: The new Government had therefore felt compelled to ask through Spanish Government (this choice being due to Marshal Pétain’s friendship with General Franco) for cessation of hostilities and to be informed on what conditions armistice would be granted. If conditions were such that their acceptance would be a stain on the honour of France they would be refused … Among such conditions [the] most dishonouring would be surrender of the Fleet and he was authorised to give me Government’s assurance that although they expected this to be one of the conditions it would in no circumstances be accepted. The appointment of Admiral Darlan as Minister of Marine should afford His Majesty’s Government additional guarantee if it were needed … Whenever M. Baudouin repeated the assurance about the fleet, which he did several times, I said that I took formal note of his words in behalf of my Government. Apart from expressing great distress that a French Government should have gone back on the signature of an agreement expressly designed to prevent such a thing happening … I thought it well to restrain myself from indulging in any severe recrimination such as might create an impression that His Majesty’s Government will henceforward wash their hands of France, and thereby give any who would be ready to grasp at it the shameless pretext to the claim that the Government was released from its understanding about the fleet to which it is essential to hold them.1

In the same telegram, Campbell advised London that Pétain would broadcast to the French people at noon on 17 June and that he had also seen Amiral Darlan. Asked for a personal assurance about the fate of the French fleet, Darlan had replied: ‘As long as I can issue orders [to the fleet], you have nothing to fear.’ 41

THE ROAD TO ORAN

The omens were unpropitious. Campbell’s comment on the ‘understanding about the fleet’ was a misunderstanding: only the first of the two ‘delayed’ telegrams (No. 368) had referred to the French fleet as a pawn in the British acceptance of the armistice gambit and he himself had informed the government of the hour that the conditional offer of release had been ‘cancelled’: having decided to abrogate the March declaration, nothing bound the new government other than its own sense of honour and its wish to continue to abide by such of its predecessor’s promises as could still be reasonably fulfilled. Darlan’s reassurance had an ominous ring to British ears – how long would his freedom last to issue personal orders to the fleet? The British Naval Attaché had been fully occupied since his arrival at Bordeaux, on 16 June, in a mass of administrative matters, answering demands for the evacuation of ‘every kind of valuable material’ and organising the evacuation of refugees aboard merchant ships and the British naval vessels that were beginning to arrive in the Gironde and off ports to the south. Not until mid-morning on 17 June was he able to pass the responsibility for refugees to the Assistant Naval Attaché, to free himself for the more important task of resuming his liaison duties with the French Admiralty. On arrival at the Ministry of Marine, Pleydell-Bouverie was fortunate enough to obtain a short interview with Amiral Darlan himself. He handed over the First Sea Lord’s messages offering British naval base facilities2 and discussed the matter for a few minutes before the Admiral had to leave for a meeting of the Council of Ministers. Darlan thanked the Attaché for the offer and once again gave the assurance, ‘as I had been told so many times before, that we need not worry about the French fleet. It was still fighting and would never be allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy.’3 Doubt existed at the Foreign Office in London as to whether Sir Ronald Campbell had shown No. 368 to any French ministers and, to make certain, he was instructed to give this message, and No. 369, to Maréchal Pétain.4 It was, of course, already too late to revive conditions: the approach to Germany had already been made and, during the morning, before the fresh instructions arrived, the Ambassador was told by Baudouin that the Papal Nuncio had been asked to inform the Italian government, via the Vatican, that France wished ‘to seek the basis of a lasting peace’. Baudouin’s personal opinion was that the Italian terms would prove to be totally unacceptable.5 The British War Cabinet met at 1100 to discuss the Ambassador’s early-morning telegram. There was considerable confusion as to the situation, for, despite being informed at the previous afternoon’s meeting that Nos 368 and 369 had been delayed, some ministers were so convinced that the stipulations which they had agreed to at the 42

PÉTAIN’S FIRST DAY, 17 JUNE

meeting 24 hours earlier (and which were contained in No. 368) were binding upon any French government that they had fully expected the French fleet to sail before Pétain sought an armistice. The Cabinet could not know that Campbell had, in fact, cancelled the message or that Pétain had been unaware of the pre-conditions, and the ministers agreed that ‘the French Government must understand that the vital condition on which the assent of His Majesty’s Government was given has not been fulfilled’. Campbell was instructed not to cease from urging the French government to sail the fleet at once if France persisted in seeking an armistice.6 The preoccupation with the future of the French fleet was understandable. Although it was still desirable that a French government should continue resistance from North Africa or elsewhere, the main burden of war would now fall on Great Britain and, by the dictates of geography, it would be a maritime war for the foreseeable future. The importance to the Axis Powers, as well as to Britain, of a large, intact fleet with an ambiguous future could not be exaggerated, nor could it be overlooked by either side. The British government and its representatives, diplomatic and naval, had no choice but to be importunate, reasoning, nagging, begging French ministers and officials at every meeting to put the fleet in a place of safety – in British ports, under British control. In contrast, the Axis, and in particular Germany, could afford to appear to be almost accommodating in their demands, a point which was not lost on Hitler, who, it would transpire, was prepared to disappoint his own naval Chief of Staff in pursuit of greater political gain. Between the former allies, a seed of bitter misunderstanding had already been sown: as far as certain British ministers were concerned, the Pétain government, in seeking an armistice, had disregarded a condition laid upon its actions by an ally with whom France had signed a solemn undertaking – it was seen as an act of betrayal. From the French point of view, the new government stood accused of disregarding a condition which had been cancelled before it came into power. But no defence could be offered by the French, then or afterwards, to the charge of breaking the undertaking not to sue for a separate armistice, for there had been no attempt on Pétain’s part to sound out, as Reynaud had done, Britain’s attitude. The War Cabinet was still in session when word was passed to the meeting that at 1230 (1130 in London) Pétain had broadcast to the French nation the news that he had sued for an armistice with Germany. Unfortunately, the message also contained the erroneous information that the French Army had ceased fighting at 12407 and thus British ministers found no reassurances in Baudouin’s subsequent announcement that though France might have asked for conditions it 43

THE ROAD TO ORAN

had not abandoned its arms, and ‘Frenchmen would sacrifice their existence rather than their honour’. Two days passed before it was appreciated in Britain that the French Army had not ceased to fight on 17 June. Shortly before this broadcast, Campbell met Pétain. The question of the fleet was raised (by coincidence, the Naval Attaché was simultaneously discussing the same subject with Amiral Darlan), and a solemn reassurance was given that in no circumstances would the fleet be handed over to the Germans. Campbell then insisted that it was ‘absolutely essential’ that it should be in British control and therefore no longer at the disposal of the French government should the Germans make the surrender of the fleet a condition of granting an armistice. The new Premier’s own preference was for scuttling the fleet – it will be recalled that, ten days earlier, Admiral Pound had recommended that the French Navy should be encouraged to take this course. Campbell also raised the question of the denial of the facilities of the French ports and naval bases to the Germans. Pétain replied that the enemy would soon be able to take them at will but that he would see that they were made unusable.8 The Royal Navy authorities were already attempting to deal with this and a more immediate problem, that of clearing shipping from ports in north-west France, now under threat from the German Army. At 1117, the Admiralty gave preparatory directions for the clearance of all British, Allied and neutral ships from French Channel and Biscay ports, other than those operating on Admiralty instructions for evacuation duties; three hours later, the orders were put into effect.9 During the morning of 17 June, the Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches, Sir Martin Dunbar-Naismith, received two reports from Brest – a letter written on the previous day by the British Naval Liaison Officer, Captain A.W. LaT. Bissett, and an oral report from Capitaine de frégate Bos, the French Naval Liaison Officer on his own staff, who had been despatched to discuss the evacuation of warships and demolitions to deny use of the dockyard and naval base to the enemy. Bissett reported that the French authorities were almost oblivious to the situation and are all awaiting guidance from higher authorities, who were moving across the S of France yesterday. They have no ideas whatever of moving their warships or M/Vs [i.e. merchant vessels]. There is no antagonism but merely laissez faire. If an evacuation is at all likely I should like as many destroyers as possible here to assist and would suggest the destruction of as many M/Vs as possible either by torpedoing them on our way out or by an aircraft raid very soon after the armistice. It would be criminal to leave so many good ships to the enemy.10

44

PÉTAIN’S FIRST DAY, 17 JUNE

Capitaine Bos’s report was scarcely more reassuring. Amiral de Laborde, Amiral Ouest, would not take any steps to organise demolitions unless ordered to do so by higher authority and although, like all the French Navy, he would prefer to continue to fight, the Admiral would obey the government’s orders. ‘Ordinary’ Frenchmen believed that the British had evacuated Dunkirk without consulting the French and that the same procedure was being repeated in Brittany. It was evident that any demolition work undertaken without local support would be carried out in the face of the strongest French opposition and, if attempted before the evacuation of the BEF, would result in the sacrifice of the remainder of the British troops. Bos’s own opinion was that the Richelieu could be torpedoed but that the Jean Bart, lying in a lock, was immune to this form of attack; the idea of scuttling either of these new battleships appeared to be ‘repugnant’ to the local French commanders.11 In the midst of this Anglo-French uncertainty, an apparently unrelated crisis emerged. The first known notification was a signal at 1125 from the British Naval Control of Shipping Officer (NCSO) at Lisbon: ‘Until situation here clarifies, request only urgent secret matters should be sent to me. Am destroying non-essential matters now.’12 An hour later, the much-respected British Naval Attaché at Madrid, Captain A.H. Hillgarth, RN, provided some explanation for this extraordinary message: French NA has received report from French Consul Huelva that Portuguese Consul has informed his Govt. that attack on Gibraltar is imminent by Italian and German aircraft and Spanish ground forces. … In my opinion this is a confirmation (?) of version of enemy plan involving some unauthorised Spanish elements. I have taken steps to see that Spanish authorities are privately informed.13

The Flag Officer, North Atlantic, made no comment that has been traced (other than a signal on the following day to announce that there was no danger of invasion), but at 1755 the Air Officer Commanding (AOC) No. 200 Group RAF, the Royal Air Force headquarters at Gibraltar, signalled: ‘Intelligence points to Spain opening hostilities very soon by heavy attack all arms on Gibraltar probably with aid Italian air and ground and German air forces in which event all seagoing units Navy would leave Gibraltar immediately.’14 It seems probable that the NCSO Lisbon and AOC 200 Group were overcredulous victims of a deliberate Axis or a freelance pro-Axis Iberian disinformation operation, either to create ‘noise’ to distract decision-making or to influence the French government. The effect on the French authorities is not known, but in conversation a week 45

THE ROAD TO ORAN

later, the Amiral Afrique gave his opinion that a defeat by Spain would be regarded in France as more humiliating than that by Germany.15 Vice-amiral Ollive, whose headquarters were at Casablanca, had been, at the time of the ‘scare’, the French naval commander closest to the threatened area and his position would scarcely have been tenable had Spain joined the Axis: French Morocco was completely dominated by Spanish colonies, with Rio del Oro to the south, the Canary Islands offshore and Spanish Morocco between Casablanca and the French Mediterranean ports. The British government did not react at all and, in fact, there was no threat to Gibraltar. The decision to despatch naval reinforcements16 to Gibraltar had been taken before and completely independently of this local panic, and although the sailing of these ships, which left their British bases on 17 and 18 June, is usually interpreted as a consequence of the French political collapse, the formation of the force had been planned by the Admiralty in September 1939, to be implemented in the event of Italian intervention in the war.17 Soon to be designated Force ‘H’, its role was to contain the Italian fleet in the western Mediterranean; it would be present from the outset to fill the vacuum which was to be created in that area by the now likely withdrawal of the French Navy was a fortunate coincidence. HBMA Madrid asked the Foreign Office on 17 June what response he should make to any demands which the Spanish government might make on Gibraltar; in the event, before guidance was received from London, the Spanish Foreign Minister and Franco himself assured the Ambassador, on 18 and 22 June respectively, that Spain was determined to remain nonbelligerent. Neither raised the subject of Gibraltar, but gave the clear impression that Spain’s interest lay in Morocco.18 During the early afternoon of 17 June, the Attaché visited the French Admiralty at Blanquefort, where I found exactly the same state of chaos as had existed at Mont Bazon [sic]. This time, however, it was worse as they had practically no communications and the chateau, which had not been occupied for some five years, had neither heating, light, water or drainage. Most of the officers appeared to be wandering about rather aimlessly for in the general confusion it was quite impossible for any of them to settle down to real work. They were depressed but still, as far as I could make out, determined to continue the struggle.19

He returned to Bordeaux, where he managed to obtain a brief meeting with Capitaine Auphan, who had just arrived from Montbazon. The ACNS was extremely busy and although he listened to PleydellBouverie’s renewed appeal to sail the French fleet to British ports and, 46

PÉTAIN’S FIRST DAY, 17 JUNE

a new appeal, to order demolitions, he was obliged to be ‘short almost to the point of rudeness and I got very little change on the subject’.20 Sir Ronald Campbell also had a trying afternoon and evening, largely as the result of heightened anxiety in London following Pétain’s broadcast and continued confusion as to the status of telegrams Nos 368 and 369, of which, it was still assumed, the new Premier had been aware before he sought armistice terms.21 Campbell, in his dealings with the new government, had been using the appropriate form of words throughout the day but he now asked F. Charles-Roux, SecretaryGeneral at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to bring, formally and in writing, the contents of Nos 368 and 369 to the attention of the Council of Ministers.22 At 1845, the Ambassador reported that Baudouin had informed him that the German armistice terms had not arrived; Campbell had insisted that the British government should be consulted before the terms were accepted but he doubted whether he would be heeded – the new government had already broken their word by violating their agreement not to ask for a separate armistice and were unlikely to hesitate again before a second violation. Later, however, he was able to inform London that Baudouin had at least given him a formal undertaking to inform him when the German terms were received. Campbell also met C. Chautemps, who had led the pro-armistice faction in Reynaud’s Council of Ministers. Chautemps told Campbell that he and his supporters were as strongly determined as ever to reject dishonourable armistice terms and that while his own view was that the surrender of the fleet would be the most dishonourable possible condition, he considered that Pétain’s government contained elements whose opinions he (Chautemps) could not guarantee beyond doubt. The Ambassador, in turn, ‘very forcibly’ informed Chautemps that the British government expected to be consulted before a reply was sent to the Germans and that they expected the French fleet to be sent forthwith to British ports. The French Minister agreed, but considered that time might not permit full consultation; with regard to the question of the fleet, he would not commit himself, other than to repeat that it would not be surrendered.23 In London that evening, Admiral Pound summoned Vice-amiral Odend’hal and General Lelong, the head of the French Military Mission, to inform them that he wished to make a fresh attempt to secure Amiral Darlan’s agreement to the removal of the French fleet to British ports before the conclusion of an armistice. Odend’hal explained that it would be difficult for a Frenchman to visit Bordeaux on such an errand: so vital was the matter to British interests, a British official should make the journey. Pound then announced that, if he 47

THE ROAD TO ORAN

could obtain the Prime Minister’s approval, he intended to go to Bordeaux in person, that night.24 Churchill duly gave his approval and, accompanied by A.V. Alexander, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the First Sea Lord left by air early on 18 June. Before he left, Admiral Pound was handed a memorandum from Rear-Admiral J.H. Godfrey, the Director of Naval Intelligence, who quoted the opinion of Lord Tyrrell, the British Ambassador in Paris between 1928 and 1934, that ‘Darlan was a twister’. ‘Pound was incredulous – to him it seemed unbelievable that Darlan was anything but an honest, straightforward sailor.’25 As will be seen, the First Sea Lord remained faithful to his own opinion. But 17 June was to be attended by tragedy as well as disaster. The British authorities estimated that 44,000 British personnel, mainly second-line troops and Air Force personnel but also including some civilian refugees, had assembled in the St Nazaire area and on 16 June HMS Berkeley, en route for Bordeaux, brought a naval staff to take charge of the evacuation. By midnight, 12,000 men had already been ferried in French tugs and British destroyers to four large liners lying in the estuary of the Loire. These ships got away and returned safely to Britain, as did a hospital ship which had loaded casualties at a quay in the basin. Two more passenger liners, the SS Oronsay and Lancastria, arrived on 17 June and began loading in the roads. German air-raids occurred intermittently throughout the day but failed to inflict any significant damage until mid-afternoon when the Lancastria, which had embarked at least 7,500 Service personnel and refugees, was hit by four bombs. Casualties from the bombing were heavy and although the ship sank relatively slowly, without major fires and in calm conditions, the loss of life in the water was very heavy, partly because of the large quantity of fuel oil but mainly because no lifeboats could be lowered and there were only 2,000 lifebelts on the ship.26 The precise number of casualties could not be established as it was not known how many were on board the liner – some contemporary estimates were as high as 11,000, but at least 3,500 servicemen, merchant navy personnel and civilians, including some women and children, lost their lives. An empty freighter was also hit and sunk, but this was the only other serious casualty of the St Nazaire evacuation. By noon on 18 June, when the operation ended, 54,000 British and Allied Service personnel and civilians had been ‘saved’ from St Nazaire, Nantes and La Pallice. Simultaneously, over 92,000 others were being lifted from Cherbourg, St Malo and Brest, without the loss of a single ship. The commandersin-chief at Portsmouth and Plymouth, who were responsible for the implementation of Operation ‘Aerial’, would not have a clear idea of the numbers until the transports had arrived and deposited their 48

PÉTAIN’S FIRST DAY, 17 JUNE

passengers at eight ports between Southampton and Liverpool, and, given the poor state of communications within France, it is unlikely that the authorities at Bordeaux had any idea of the extent of this success, which brought the number of personnel evacuated to Britain since 20 May to over half-a-million. NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26.

HBMA’s telegram, 0440 17 June 1940 (in FO C7294/65/17). See above, p. 29 (14 June). NA’s Diary, 17 June 1940. FO C7294/65/17. Ibid. WM(40)179. Ibid. Ibid. PRO ADM 199/2207, Admiralty War Diary, 17 June. Ibid.: BNLO Brest, quoted in C-in-C Western Approaches, signal, 1145, 17 June 1940. Ibid.: C-in-C Western Approaches, signal, 1251, 17 June 1940. Ibid. Ibid.: NA Madrid signal, 1229, 17 June 1940. Ibid. BNLO Brest signal, 1430, 24 June 1940 (see below). An aircraft carrier, a battlecruiser and nine destroyers under the temporary command of Vice-Admiral L.V. Wells, the Vice-Admiral, Aircraft Carriers. PRO ADM 205/2. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Vol. I, pp. 435–8. NA’s Diary, 17 June 1940. Ibid. FO C7301/65/17. Ibid., HBMA’s telegram despatched 2345. Ibid. Odend’hal’s letter to Darlan, 16 July 1940 (via SHM); no record of this conversation has been traced in Admiralty files. Godfrey’s unpublished memoirs, cited by P. Beesly, Very Special Admiral: The Life of Admiral J.H. Godfrey, CB (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1980); Sir William Tyrrell, who was British Ambassador in Paris between 1928 and 1934, was a noted francophile. J. de S. Winser, BEF Ships Before, At and After Dunkirk (Gravesend, World Ship Society, 1999), p. 48.

49

7

Last Meeting of the Admirals, 18 June

Two encouraging signals reached the Admiralty from British Naval Liaison Officers during the night of 17/18 June. The first, from Captain Bissett at Brest, reported that all shipping, except French, had been cleared out of the harbour and that at least part of the French naval force would have sailed in time to avoid capture. He intended to remain as long as there was any chance of French warships, particularly the Richelieu (estimated as being a month short of completion), being brought out.1 The other signal was from Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, forwarding a report from the Liaison Officer at Dakar. The local French naval commander, Contre-amiral Plançon,2 had received a telegram from Darlan ordering him to continue [to fight].3 Admiral at Dakar stated even if later this order is reversed navy at Dakar will join British … British MLO [Military Liaison Officer] reports shore battery and AA personnel have offered their services and equipment to British.4

This was the first statement that a French commander would be prepared to fight on from a colonial base and later in the day Admiral Cunningham reported from Alexandria that Vice-amiral Godfroy expressed horror at idea of handing over French ships to Germans; said he would sooner scuttle them. He also asked if there was no possibility of continuing fighting under British Flag. Also said morale of French sailors was high. I have highest opinion of Godfroy.5

In Britain, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, sent messages to France and the United States, respectively, during the night of 17/18 June. Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador in Washington, was instructed to point out to President Roosevelt that in seeking an armistice Maréchal Pétain had acted in complete disregard of the British government’s stipulations and that the latter could have no confidence in anything else he might do if he could not be 50

LAST MEETING OF THE ADMIRALS, 18 JUNE

encouraged to abide by the principal condition upon which France had been released from its ‘no separate peace’ obligation; it was hoped that the President would put immediate pressure on the French government to send the fleet to British ports before the conclusion of an armistice. Churchill’s message was a personal one, to be handed by the Ambassador to Pétain, with copies for Darlan and President Lebrun. The text was a ‘toned-down’, shortened version of a draft originally proposed by Sir Robert Vansittart, the diplomatic adviser to Lord Halifax:6 I wish to repeat to you my profound conviction that the illustrious Marshal Pétain and the famous General Weygand, our comrades in two great wars against the Germans, will not injure their Ally by delivering over to the enemy the fine French fleet. Such an act would scarify their names for a thousand years of history. Yet this result may easily come by frittering away these few precious hours when the fleet can be sailed to safety in British or American ports carrying with it the hope and the future and the honour of France.

Pétain was not reported as reacting to the message, apart from once more assuring Campbell that he need have no misgivings about the fleet and promising to read Churchill’s letter to Weygand before the Council of Ministers; the latter was greatly offended and subsequently told the Ambassador that he ‘could not allow anyone to use such language to him’. This was not the only unwelcome message to be received by the French government that morning, for the US Ambassador delivered President Roosevelt’s response to Lord Halifax’s request for pressure on France. This bluntly worded appeal, warning the government that they would lose the friendship and goodwill of the United States if they did not sail the fleet to a place of safety before negotiating an armistice, was strongly resented by the French. It was an ‘intolerable interference’ by a neutral who had failed signally to come to France’s aid when urgently requested to do so.7 Immediately before the meeting of the Council of Ministers, Campbell was reassured by Baudouin, who announced that the decision about the fleet had been taken and that it required only confirmation by the Council – His Majesty’s Government could set their minds at rest.8 Campbell telegraphed London optimistically, stating his expectation that the Council would take a ‘satisfactory’ decision about the fleet. At 1350, however, he had to report that this decision had not been ratified but that the Council had agreed unanimously to refuse any terms which involved surrender of the fleet. The reason for the change of heart, the Ambassador was informed, was that the ministers had 51

THE ROAD TO ORAN

been persuaded that, as a point of honour, France should receive the armistice terms with the army and fleet still fighting. The decision taken, unanimously, was that any terms which included the surrender of the fleet should be rejected and that if it was included then France would continue to fight as long as possible. Before the army surrendered, the fleet would rally to join the Royal Navy or, if this was not possible, would scuttle itself. Campbell believed that Amiral Darlan’s reluctance to give up effective control of the French Navy while it was still fighting was largely responsible for the new decision, but he also believed that he detected a stiffened attitude in the government.9 It was at this juncture that Admiral Pound and Alexander, the first representatives of the War Cabinet to visit France since Churchill’s departure on 13 June, flew into Bordeaux to learn at first hand from Amiral Darlan what French intentions were regarding the fleet. The inclusion of Alexander, the political First Lord of the Admiralty, reflected a change in the official relationship between Pound and Darlan. The former was ‘only’ the professional head of his Service, whereas, under Pétain, Darlan had become, in addition, the Minister of Marine, a political appointment which carried more responsibility than that of the British First Lord of the Admiralty, for he was accountable for the merchant service as well as the French Navy. In any approach which might affect wider issues than purely naval policy and operations, the diplomatic niceties, even in time of crisis, meant that Darlan as Minister of Marine had to be approached through the proper channels, either minister to minister, or through the medium of the Foreign Office. A preliminary discussion was held with Sir Ronald Campbell and Captain Pleydell-Bouverie. From the men on the spot ‘Their Lordships’ learned that, contrary to what was believed in London, the French had not ceased to fight and that Darlan was ‘somewhat hurt’ at the suggestion that the fleet should be sent away while it was still fighting. The meeting with Darlan, which lasted between an hour and an hour and a half, was extremely cordial and Alexander and Pound were impressed by the former’s sincerity and determination. Once again, firm assurances were given: Amiral Darlan … said that he would on no account ever surrender the French Fleet, that the French Navy would go on fighting until an armistice was called. During the armistice discussions the Navy would naturally have to cease fire, but if the armistice terms were dishonourable to France, the Fleet would fight to the end and anything that escaped would go to a friendly country or would be destroyed. Amiral Darlan said that he himself would remain in the country unless he at any time

52

LAST MEETING OF THE ADMIRALS, 18 JUNE

found himself in the position of a rebel to the French Government of the day.10

To Alexander’s comment that the British government would like to know of the French plans against the eventuality of political demands for the removal of the French fleet from French ports, Darlan replied: nothing would induce him to surrender the Fleet, that if the Germans want it he would refuse, but in the last resort he would destroy the Fleet. As far as he could he would make every endeavour to avoid destruction. He said that it was not a political matter and he was fully aware there might be a fall in the morale of the Government, but he himself was fully determined on his course of action and the matter was one of honour rather than one of politics.

On the subject of his immediate intentions: He stressed the point that any ship which is not fit to take her place in the battle line but can steam will be sent away from French ports and those that can fight will remain at their war stations until other orders are issued.

The visitors were told that Richelieu was due to leave Brest that day for Dakar. Notwithstanding the previous orders11 to remove this ship and the Jean Bart to British ports, the destination had been changed by an Amirauté signal instructing Amiral Ouest to despatch all vessels that could steam but not fight12 to rally to North Africa. Ships that could not steam would be scuttled, as would, probably, the Jean Bart, for after 20 June there would be insufficient water to float it out of the lock at St Nazaire. Darlan suggested that the Richelieu might eventually be fitted out and worked up in Canada or the United States; if this was attempted in ‘England’, it would be liable to ‘a heavy scale of air attack’. Pound appeared to accept this reasoning, commenting that ‘we sent our ships away from England now during their working up period’. Although hindsight might lead one to believe that these were unduly pessimistic steps, it should be recalled that the Allied air forces had been unable to defend targets in France and that the effectiveness of the RAF’s Fighter Command UK defence organisation had yet to be demonstrated in combat. The new battleship left at 1750, as Darlan was speaking, in company with the destroyer Le Hardi, which had Amiral Ouest, Amiral de Laborde, embarked; the leading German troops entered Brest 24 hours later. Darlan went on to explain that ‘he had arranged that all French merchant ships lying in those ports likely to 53

THE ROAD TO ORAN

fall shortly into the hands of the Germans, especially those ships carrying war material, should clear from French ports and sail to Great Britain’. The French Navy was unable to block the major ports in northwest France, but Darlan suggested that British forces should do this, either just before or as the German Army arrived. He also agreed to British parties undertaking demolitions in the ports, provided that they reported to the senior French naval officer on arrival and informed him that they were there with Darlan’s consent; the senior naval officers would be informed to this effect. These officers also had been given orders for the destruction of oil supplies. Amiral Darlan, who in common with his ministerial colleagues did not believe that Britain could sustain the war alone, was clearly interested to know how Britain proposed to continue to fight at sea if France did accept an armistice. He stated his belief that Spain would permit German forces to cross its soil to reach North Africa and to (at least) besiege Gibraltar. Pound explained the purpose of the recent formation of the squadron at Gibraltar (Force ‘H’) and that, even if all friendly bases between Freetown and Britain were lost and Gibraltar or a Spanish port and Brest were used by the German Navy, convoys from the Indian Ocean could be routed via the West Indies, Canada and the north-west approaches, to the north of Ireland. Admiral Pound flew back to London that evening, but the First Lord remained at Bordeaux, at the request of the War Cabinet, to be joined by Lord Lloyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who was directly concerned with questions of continued resistance in the French colonies. Campbell, who had attended the naval chiefs’ meeting, reported to London that Pound and Alexander had found Darlan to be ‘very friendly’ and were convinced that the French fleet would obey any order that he might give.13 Auphan’s account of the meeting gives a different picture:14 the British made a poor impression on Darlan by their cold demands, made without offering any recognition of the French Navy’s achievements or of any sympathy for the nation’s predicament. Darlan himself in writing to his wife described the British visitors as ‘seeming like heirs who come to reassure themselves that the dying man has really left them a bequest’.15 These accounts are, however, at complete variance with the notes made by Captain E. Bellars, Deputy Director of Plans, who wrote: At the outset of the meeting the First Lord expressed the sympathy of this country to France at this hour and reiterated the unanimity of the Government in the ‘Declaration of Union’ message sent by the Prime Minister. He said how much we admired the fact that the French were

54

LAST MEETING OF THE ADMIRALS, 18 JUNE

fighting and had taken action against the Italian coast line and that they had sunk two submarines.16

This last meeting between the Chiefs of the British and French Naval Staffs marked the last agreements between the two navies. Unfortunately, the activities of the British government, and specifically the Prime Minister, late on 17 June seemed almost calculated to cut the ground from under the feet of Pound and Alexander and to dissipate whatever goodwill the trip to Bordeaux might have generated. Even before Pound’s departure from Whitehall, the Trade Division of the British Admiralty had broadcast a series of signals forbidding merchant ships of all nationalities from proceeding to French ports.17 A further precaution was taken during the evening by a general broadcast: ‘Merchant ships of all nationalities are warned that as French Broadcasting stations are now under German control they should disregard any messages or instructions issued by such stations.’ These orders stemmed from a decision by Churchill (taken without War Cabinet consultation), and it was common sense to concluded that some French broadcasting stations were under enemy control; by omitting to specify which French stations were concerned, the signal inferred that all must be regarded as suspect. Shipping bound for unoccupied French ports, which were now being mined nightly by German aircraft, was heavily dependent upon broadcast warnings and only the ‘free’ French stations could supply such information. The authority behind this information cannot be identified, but it was followed by a further signal, made on the instruction of the Prime Minister, that shipping bound for metropolitan and colonial French ports should be detained in British harbours ‘until the situation should become clearer’.18 If either Amiral Darlan or Admiral Pound were aware of these developments, neither made any mention of them during their discussion. The French Admiralty learned of the restrictions from the French Naval Liaison Officer at Gibraltar, Capitaine de frégate de Bryas, who reported a British Admiralty signal broadcast at 1314 on 18 June, instructing HM ships encountering Allied or neutral shipping bound for France to send them to a Contraband Control Station or a UK port ‘for detention and enquiry’. At 2025 a signal was sent by the Amirauté to Vice-amiral Odend’hal in London, demanding that he inquire into and report the situation. At some stage, the sense of the Admiralty’s order had become somewhat garbled: the British 1314 signal referred to all Allied and neutral shipping, but this was relayed to Odend’hal as all French merchant ships, and no reference was made to the alternative of Contraband Control Stations, which were an Allied concern, operated by the French Navy, as well as the Royal Navy. 55

THE ROAD TO ORAN

The Amirauté signal added: ‘This conduct is unacceptable for ports to the south of the Loire and all Mediterranean ports.’19 While it was reasonable to claim exemption for ships bound for Mediterranean ports, the concept that there was a west coast ‘safety line’ on the Loire was new and certainly had not been communicated to any British naval authority. Darlan himself, during the afternoon, had said that French ships in threatened ports were to go to Britain, and Amiral Ouest, outbound from Brest in company with the Richelieu, had diverted an inbound convoy of laden French store ships to Milford Haven;20 neither of these commanders, the most senior officers in the French Navy, had suggested routeing ships to the southern Biscay ports. No record has been found of any approach by Vice-amiral Odend’hal to the Admiralty in consequence of this signal; he was suffering from atrocious communications with Bordeaux, his signals traffic, routed via the French Embassy in Madrid, taking up to 48 hours in either direction. This was balanced by the French Foreign Ministry becoming aware of a message which British Consuls had been instructed to communicate to French civil administrators and military commanders overseas. Approved by the War Cabinet on 17 June, after Maréchal Pétain’s broadcast had given the impression that the French Army had ceased to fight, it promised British assistance to those territories which wished to fight for their freedom.21 The response from the colonies was mixed: Tunisia would fight on – Amiral Esteva said that under no circumstances would the ships under his command be surrendered and that he was ‘firmly convinced’ that the French fleet would join Britain;22 Syria would fight on, whatever orders were received; the Governor of French Somaliland would obey orders, but if he did, then his own General Officer Commanding would use force against him. The Governor-General of Algeria reported the message to Bordeaux. The timing of the British government’s appeal message was particularly inept, for it undercut the efforts of Pound and Alexander on 18 June and the day-in day-out work of the Ambassador and Naval Attaché. Charles-Roux summoned the Ambassador, deploring the effect that such an approach would have when the French Army was still fighting and saying the government intended to continue fighting if the armistice terms were not acceptable. The British government was asked not to ‘render more difficult the task of those here who were working in the direction we should wish them to go’.23

56

LAST MEETING OF THE ADMIRALS, 18 JUNE NOTES 1. PRO ADM 199/2207: BNLO Brest’s signal, 2325, 17 June 1940. 2. Commandant de la Marine, Afrique Occidentale et Equatoriale Française. 3. ‘Ordre de continuer toutes opérations de guerre aéronavales avec la plus farouche énergie jusqu’à nouvel ordre de ma part. Darlan’, Amirauté telegram No. 8413, 1300, 17 June 1940, cited by Caroff, La Théâtre, Vol. I, p. 293. 4. PRO ADM 199/2207: C-in-C SA’s signal, 2359, 17 June 1940. 5. Ibid.: C-in-C Med’s signal, 1345, 18 June 1940. 6. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, p. 293n; FO C7301/65/17: Vansittart chaired a joint Anglo-French Committee which continued to meet after the FrancoGerman armistice. 7. HBMA’s telegram, early 19 June 1940; FO C7301/65/17. 8. HBMA’s Despatch (FO 7541/65/17). 9. FO C7301/65/17. 10. Notes of the meeting are in PRO ADM 205/4. 11. Amirauté signal, 1120, 15 June. 12. Amirauté signal, 0908, 18 June; the expression used was ‘tous les bâtiments devenus inutiles’ (Caroff, Les Forces Maritimes de l’Ouest, p. 383). The old battleships Paris and Courbet were already on their way to Plymouth, with other vessels. 13. FO C7301/65/17. 14. Auphan, L’Honneur de servir (Paris, France-Empire, 1978), p. 276. 15. Coutau-Bégarie and Huan, Darlan, p. 268. 16. Record of Conversation held at Bordeaux on 18 June 1940, PRO ADM 205/4; an Italian submarine, Provana, had been sunk off Oran the previous day but this was the only ‘kill’ by French forces up to the date of the Armistice. 17. Admiralty signals, 1110 and 1914, 17 June 1940. 18. WM(40)171. 19. ‘Cette manière de faire n’est pas admissible pour ports au sud de la Loire et tous ports méditerranéens’, Amirauté telegram No. 6779, 2025, 18 June 1940. 20. PRO ADM 199/2207. 21. FO C7278/65/17. 22. FO C7343/7327/1. 23. FO C7316/65/17.

57

8

Bordeaux, 19–21 June: Armistice or Africa?

Against all expectation, the Jean Bart managed to get away from St Nazaire at 0100 on 19 June. It was the most splendid achievement on the part of the dockyard workers and the French Navy, who worked strenuously day and night, not only to get the ship ready for sea but to dredge a channel into deep water, a major undertaking which involved blasting away solid rock. Once out of the lock, Jean Bart was fuelled and began the passage under its own steam to Casablanca. The battleship was hardly fit for sea, let alone war, with only one hastily assembled boiler-room and two of its four screws, but one of its main turrets had all four 15in guns installed and it had been provided with anti-aircraft weapons, with which it beat off two attacks at daybreak. At Bordeaux, Captain Pleydell-Bouverie’s schedule was somewhat disrupted by the decision by the Ambassador that the majority of British officials and staff should be evacuated. The Attaché was obliged to make arrangements for the personnel to be taken down river by the Berkeley for transfer to the cruiser Arethusa, which had been lying off Le Verdon, at the mouth of the Gironde, since 16 June; in addition, he had to requisition an aircraft to take the First Lord back to England and organise transport to take 12,000 Polish troops to Bayonne. In spite of these distractions, he still managed to visit the French Admiralty twice during the forenoon, meeting Capitaine Auphan on both occasions. The ACNS repeated the assurances about the fleet and stated that all arrangements had been made for future demolitions; beyond this strict ‘party line’ he would not be drawn.1 No mention was made during either meeting of the question of the Admiralty’s order concerning shipping bound for France, which had occasioned the previous evening’s signal to Vice-amiral Odend’hal; had Auphan known of the matter, or felt particularly strongly on the subject, it is difficult to conceive that, knowing of Pleydell-Bouverie’s good communications and direct access to the First Sea Lord, he would not have stated the Amirauté’s position. Auphan did have other concerns. At about 1100, his immediate superior, le Luc, was summoned by Darlan and told that he had been chosen as one of the plenipotentiaries who were to ascertain German 58

BORDEAUX, 19–21 JUNE

terms for an armistice; the delegation would be led by General Huntziger and the other members would be Ambassador Léon Nöel, LieutenantGeneral Parisot and Armée de l’Air Brigadier-General Bergeret. Le Luc was warned to be ready to leave at short notice and was then told, to his great surprise, that he had been promoted to Vice-amiral.2 Auphan, in turn, was told that he was to take on the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff ’s tasks and was promoted to Contre-amiral. Godfroy, commanding Force ‘X’ at Alexandria, was elevated to Vice-Admiral. The British War Cabinet met during the forenoon. The Prime Minister described a message from Admiral Pound and Alexander on their meeting with Amiral Darlan as encouraging, and the First Sea Lord himself arrived during the meeting to give his personal views on the session: Darlan had been ‘very calm and determined’, the French Fleet could not ‘desert’ France while the army was still fighting and there would be time for the fleet to get away to safety during armistice negotiations. On the matter of continued resistance by the French colonies, the Foreign Secretary reported that the situation was generally favourable to Great Britain but, in view of Campbell’s report of the adverse reaction in Bordeaux to the approaches through the consulates, he counselled caution in following up the initial approach. Alexander and Sir Ronald Campbell had meetings with Pétain and Baudouin during the morning. The Spanish Ambassador had informed the French government that the Germans would indicate a time and place for meeting to negotiate terms when French plenipotentiaries had been nominated. The Council of Ministers, wishing to reserve the final decision on terms offered, had appointed delegates, without plenipotentiary powers; this was not entirely correct, for the delegation sent to meet the Germans did have plenipotentiary powers,3 but it may be that the Maréchal and the Foreign Minister wished to give the impression that they retained some control over the terms. Alexander and Campbell were also informed that the Council had decided that when the Germany Army approached Bordeaux, the three Presidents – of the Republic and of the two parliamentary Chambers – would go overseas to continue the government, probably from Algiers.4 It was likely that General Weygand would also go to North Africa to coordinate the French war effort overseas: while it was good news that the French might yet fight on, Weygand’s continued leadership was not news calculated to inspire the British, who were already aware of the General’s attitude to his Ally and who mistrusted him as a defeatist. This was not what Darlan subsequently recalled.5 Shortly before his assassination in December 1942, the Amiral wrote that the Council of Ministers had decided that if an armistice were refused by the Germans or if the conditions were unacceptable, then the government would be transferred to Algeria to continue the war; the population would not 59

THE ROAD TO ORAN

be abandoned – Pétain would remain to receive the conquerors. The orders given to the navy on 19 June certainly confirm that the Council took concrete measures to prepare for a continuation of the war, for Esteva was instructed to despatch passenger and cargo vessels to Sète, on the Mediterranean coast between Narbonne and Montpellier, and he and General Noguès, the Résident in North Africa, were to make arrangements for the establishment of headquarters at Algiers. Three destroyers were sent to Port Vendres, close to the Spanish frontier, to collect an advance party from the Amirauté, including its records, and the passenger vessel Florida was to be held at readiness in the same port to embark the government. For those senators and deputies who wished to escape from Bordeaux direct,6 Darlan made available the liner Massilia at le Verdon, at the mouth of the Gironde. The most important diplomatic meetings of the day were between Lord Lloyd, Alexander and French ministers, during the evening. The Colonial Secretary had brought from London an offer of sea transport from Mediterranean ports for the evacuation to North Africa of as many men and as much material as possible; empty British merchant ships within 48 hours’ steaming of Toulon and Marseilles had already been ordered thither.7 Lloyd raised the issue of the French fleet with Pétain, from whom he obtained the strongest reassurances that it would not be handed over, but might be scuttled, in the event that the armistice terms were otherwise acceptable. Alexander requested of Pétain that French destroyers were not scuttled but were instead handed over to Britain – the latter considered it unlikely that the French government would agree to this proposal. This last request was prompted by the Royal Navy’s acute shortage of destroyers following the Dunkirk campaign and the War Cabinet’s fear of an early German invasion; Pétain took the view that Britain would have no difficulty in resisting an invasion.8 On the whole, this was not as successful a series of meetings as that between the two professional seamen on the previous day. Pound and Darlan had at least enjoyed a rapport in discussing the relatively narrow maritime issues that they understood so well; this could not be shared to the same extent between politicians who were considering broader matters from widely differing points of view and not necessarily with any great depth of mutual understanding. Thus the two Allies clutched at different straws – the British at any slight indication that Pétain’s government intended to fight on, from France or from the colonies, and the French at any possibility of ending the fighting on terms that would leave them with a shred of self-respect. The British reaction to Alexander’s discussion with Baudouin on 19 June illustrates the anxiety at this stage to accept optimistic auguries. On the basis of his understanding of his discussion that 60

BORDEAUX, 19–21 JUNE

morning, reported in the British Ambassador’s telegrams on the subject, the impression was given that members of the French government and parliament would proceed overseas. This belief was reflected in the Director of Naval Intelligence’s midnight situation report to Commanders-in-Chief:9 French have decided that on approach of enemy to Bordeaux President of Republic and Ministers will proceed overseas to carry on Govt. It is possible Weygand will go too. The position of French appears to be similar to that of the Dutch, namely that the army has been overwhelmed but the Govt. and the Fleet will continue to function from overseas.

But this was not the situation as of the afternoon, when Baudouin admitted to Lord Lloyd, Alexander and Campbell that the Council of Ministers had accepted the principle that the President and Ministers should leave France, but that final ratification of a decision would have to wait until the next day; he hoped that the party leaving France would set out in the early afternoon of 20 June.10 Once again, Admiral Cunningham provided helpful indications at the end of the day. Summing up the general situation,11 he reported: All French Services at Beirut have met and decided to fight on, basing this on a message from Darlan to fight on to the end, and have asked their decision to be conveyed to General Wavell12 and myself. In general therefore all French Mediterranean Forces appear intended to continue the fight. I have sent suitable messages to Senior Officers concerned giving them my sympathy and assuring them of all the support in my power.

The message from Darlan had been shown to him by Amiral Godfroy and was passed on in paraphrase: ‘no Armistice yet signed and that all Naval Forces are expected to fight on, to fall back on North Africa if necessary, and to blow up or scuttle themselves in emergency. Order is based on one issued by Pétain.’ This lacked some of the sense, and the impact, of the original, which had been transmitted at 2240 on the previous evening: Amirauté to Amiraux Nord, Ouest, Sud, Afrique, Force X, etc. (Nos 5025–5026) 1. President of the Council reminds all front-line troops that no armistice is yet in force and that their duty is to pursue maximum resistance. I intend that this order will be particularly well understood in naval circles.

61

THE ROAD TO ORAN

2. In case of necessity, the rallying point for all vessels and aircraft is North Africa. Any warship or aircraft unable to reach it or at risk of falling into enemy hands without a fight should be destroyed or scuttled following orders from a senior authority. Slow or small vessels of little military value should destroy only their weapons. XAVIER 37713

As important as the message was the authenticating signature. This was the first ‘Xavier 377’ signal to come to the attention of the Royal Navy but it is not certain that Admiral Cunningham was shown a text or, if he was, that he appreciated the significance. On 17 June, before the public announcement that armistice terms were being sought, Darlan had sent a cypher signal to his senior commanders: The civil and military situation has induced the Government to make overtures for a peace acceptable to our enemies. Whatever developments ensue, the Navy can rest assured that in no circumstances will the Fleet be surrendered intact. Any instructions on this subject will only be authentic if bearing the signature ‘XAVIER 377’, otherwise they are not valid.

While it is understandable that Darlan and his admirals would wish to restrict the circulation of such a message to the smallest possible group, it is regrettable that Vice-amiral Odend’hal was not on the distribution list, for it is not improbable that a private message of this nature, containing reassurances to a peer-group among whom Darlan could not afford to lose ‘face’ and a safeguard to ensure continued privacy, would have impressed the British War Cabinet and might have somewhat allayed their strong fears. There was almost immediate evidence that the safeguard worked. At 1145 on 19 June, French warships in the English Channel14 received a broadcast signal in the French naval cypher: No. 8440 à tous bâtiments de guerre. Référence mon message de 13h00, le 17 juin. Ordre de cesser immédiatement toutes opérations de guerre – tous bâtiments de guerre rallieront immédiatement port français le plus proche – pas, je dis pas, suivre ordres anglais – Vive la France. DARLAN.15

Capitaine de vaisseau Le Franc-Guyader of the battleship Paris was suspicious and at 1420 broadcast to all warships: ‘Considérons message No. 8440 de 1245/18/6 [sic] comme douteux – cet ordre ne sera exécuté qu’après confirmation.’16 The 1145 broadcast had, in fact, been transmitted by the German Navy at the suggestion of the ‘B-Dienst’, 62

BORDEAUX, 19–21 JUNE

the signals monitoring service, but although it was repeated by routine French broadcasts to shipping none of the French warships bound for British ports obeyed the bogus instructions. Although this was regarded as a worthwhile exercise by the Seekriegsleitung – the German Naval Staff,17 it betrayed at a very early stage the German possession of French naval cyphers and put both the Allied navies on their guard against further attempts at deception. During the night of 19/20 June, the Luftwaffe delivered an air raid on Bordeaux. Little damage was caused but the French government decided to move to Perpignan, where the Council of Ministers could hold a meeting in greater safety to discuss the German armistice terms, close to Port Vendres, where the liner Florida was waiting to remove them to Algiers. The delegates left Bordeaux for Tours at 1400 on 20 June and it was expected that they would be able to report the terms during the night of 20/21 June. It was planned that after this meeting, the President of the Republic and the Presidents of the two Chambers, accompanied by more ministers than had originally been envisaged, would leave for North Africa.18 The Ambassador and his few remaining staff were informed of these plans in the early afternoon and the first indication to the Admiralty of the move to Perpignan appears to have been a signal from the Naval Attaché, announcing that his W/T set was being dismantled at 1600, followed by a brief statement of his destination.19 After receiving further details, via the Ambassador’s telegrams, the Admiralty ordered the Flag Officer Commanding, North Atlantic, to despatch forthwith a destroyer from Gibraltar to transport the Ambassador and a small staff from Port Vendres to North Africa.20 It was against this background that Pleydell-Bouverie visited the French Admiralty at Blanquefort and Lord Lloyd and Sir Ronald Campbell met Amiral Darlan at the Ministry of Marine. The Naval Attaché had a depressing meeting with Capitaine Négadelle, at which the two navies’ current operations were discussed, but Pleydell-Bouverie could get little out of him regarding the French attitude. More than ever was I impressed that this Officer was not to be trusted at all. Had also some talk with Capitaine de Corvette ‘X’ [who] told me that I must be very much on my guard for a great number of those whom I had always regarded as my friends no longer were.21

Pleydell-Bouverie would have been less than overjoyed had he known that Négadelle was about to leave for Port Vendres, leading an advance party of the French Naval Staff bound for North Africa.22 He might, however, have been somewhat reassured had the Frenchman told him that the Préfet maritime of the 3rd Region (South of France) had just 63

THE ROAD TO ORAN

been ordered to despatch to the 4th Region (Algeria and Tunisia) all serviceable combat aircraft for which there was no immediate use.23 The discussions at a higher level seemed to be productive. Lord Lloyd sought further reassurances about the French fleet and was told by Darlan that the fleet would remain French or it would ‘perish’, and that all necessary arrangements had been made to ensure this. He was then shown the draft of a personal signal from Darlan to his senior subordinates: 1. The Admiral of the Fleet believes that he will be able to retain the command of the naval forces, and he is making the necessary arrangements for this. 2. Should the Admiral of the Fleet be unable to exercise this command without restraint, the naval forces will come under the orders of Amiral de Laborde [Ouest], alternatively Amiral Esteva [Sud] and Amiral Abrial [Nord], or lastly under Amiral Gensoul [Atlantique – Force de Raid]. 3. All these Flag Officers or those who might be called upon to succeed them are to conform to the following general orders: 3. a. to fight vigorously to the end as long as a regular French Government – independent of the enemy – has issued no orders to the contrary; 3. b. to disobey all other governments; 3. c. whatever orders are received, do not let the enemy take possession of any intact warships. XAVIER 377

In this message,24 Darlan ensured that his grip would not be loosened even by his departure: not only did he lay down the order of succession to continue his policies, but he denied any successor the leeway to countermand his instruction to scuttle or sabotage ships in danger of capture or seizure. Indeed, so firm was the line ‘whatever orders are received’, that it can be assumed he even precluded any afterthought of his own. This was, then, probably the most significant statement of policy and intent shown to any high-ranking British official or minister throughout the entire period under study. Lord Lloyd’s reported immediate response was: ‘Then we are still Allies!’25 It is probable that this reaction was to the instruction to continue to fight vigorously, rather than the reassurance that the French fleet would not be allowed to fall into enemy hands. Certainly, the order to ‘disobey all other governments’ was not regarded sufficiently seriously, then or later, although it was well known in British political and naval circles that even before he became a government minister Darlan had regarded the French Navy as a personal fief and 64

BORDEAUX, 19–21 JUNE

that the Navy was in its turn wholly loyal to him. There is nothing in the brief report to the British War Cabinet of this meeting with Darlan to suggest that the significance of this second ‘Xavier 377’ to be sighted was better understood than that of the first. In the late forenoon, the Naval Attaché learned that the destroyer HMS Beagle was on its way to Bordeaux. He was unaware of the purpose of its visit until the commanding officer and Rear-Admiral F. Burges Watson arrived at the British mission, the former to explain that his ship was relieving the Berkeley and the latter that his orders from Whitehall were that he was to supervise demolition of the oil tanks. Pleydell-Bouverie and Campbell were clear in their own minds that the demolition work could only be carried out ‘at the request of the French’ and the Attaché took Burges Watson to meet Contre-amiral Barnouin. Unfortunately, the latter knew nothing of the agreement between Pound and Darlan on the subject of demolitions and the Attaché, who was now running out of time before he was due to depart for Perpignan, had to request the French admiral to check with the Amirauté at Blanquefort to confirm the necessary instructions.26 At about 1700, as the British Mission was about to set off for Perpignan, the word came through that the French government had postponed its move. The reason for this last-minute change was that the Germans had offered to open the telephone link between Tours and Bordeaux and the government had decided to remain in Bordeaux to hear the terms for an armistice; the French delegates had not arrived until mid-afternoon, being delayed en route by the destruction of bridges. The terms were expected to be received during the night. The full details of the reasons for the French government’s fresh decision and their subsequent intentions took some time to come through and the Naval Attaché, having dismantled his personal W/T set, was now wholly dependent upon the Beagle for communications with the Admiralty. Unfortunately, the ship’s wireless was ‘somewhat old and in need of repair’ and the Germans were now jamming naval frequencies; only by routeing wireless traffic through HMS Galatea, which was off Arcachon, was it possible to send messages to London. Thus it was that the Attaché’s signal reporting the change of plans, though timed at 2000, was not re-transmitted to reach the Admiralty until 0655 the following morning.27 On this occasion, the Ambassador’s communications were swifter and more reliable, for his telegrams, giving more detail than the Attaché’s brief signal, were received by the Foreign Office from 0400 on 21 June. During the evening, the French Admiralty sent a further message on the subject of merchant shipping to Vice-amiral Odend’hal in London. The tone this time was much stiffer and anticipated a postarmistice situation: 65

THE ROAD TO ORAN

As the result of various measures, British are trying to lay hold of our [merchant] tonnage and envisage a blockade in the event of a separate peace. Do not hide from British that this attitude could have incalculable repercussions on the current negotiations. Will you in any event make every effort [to ensure] that attitude adopted will be neutral and not hostile. Despatch to French ports every ship held in British ports that you can reach.28

As on the previous occasion, no indication was given of the identity of the originator, or of the time of receipt by the French Mission in London, which was still enduring communications problems. By this time, however, it was the case that, following a War Cabinet decision,29 shipping was being withheld from French metropolitan ports and also from Mediterranean colonial ports, although some latitude was permitted to British local naval commanders in the latter area. The decision had been taken, not with the object of laying hold of French tonnage for British purposes, but to deny the enemy the use of the cargoes and the ships themselves; certainly, there was at this stage no discussion of a post-armistice blockade of France. It is of some interest, and hardly a coincidence, that German propaganda was already accusing Britain of exactly these motives, and also of treating France as an enemy. At dawn on 21 June, the French battleship Lorraine took part in a short but effective bombardment of Bardia by a Mediterranean Fleet squadron. This was to be the first and last offensive operation in which Vice-amiral Godfroy’s Force ‘X’ was to participate. No further word reached Bordeaux from the armistice delegates after they reached Tours during the afternoon of 20 June and when Sir Ronald Campbell telegraphed London in mid-morning it was believed that they had been taken back to Paris. Baudouin had sent a note which included the news that the terms were not now expected until later in the afternoon. Campbell had earlier reminded the French government that the British government expected to be consulted on the terms (privately he believed that no effective consultation would be possible). He proposed to repeat the British commitment to the French cause if a government was established overseas – although he did not consider that French determination on this had weakened, he personally would not feel satisfied until the Presidents and Ministers had actually left metropolitan France.30 The Ambassador also sent a summary of his view of the situation, including his belief that the instructions which Darlan had shown to him and Lord Lloyd had safeguarded the question of the French fleet. Captain Pleydell-Bouverie, with whom he had discussed the matter at length, was becoming much more pessimistic; having been put on his 66

BORDEAUX, 19–21 JUNE

guard, the Attaché had become generally mistrustful of any and all French statements. The Attaché visited the French Admiralty three times during the day, meeting Capitaine Auphan on each occasion. The first visit was with Rear-Admiral Burges Watson, to explain the latter’s presence at Bordeaux. Auphan, having attended the Pound–Darlan meeting, readily understood Burges Watson’s mission, but explained that General Weygand, as Minister of Defence, had assumed responsibility for demolitions and had ordered full preparations to be made, but that these could not be carried out without his direct instructions.31 The clear inference from the new situation was that Darlan, however well intentioned, could not deliver on a promise so recently made. The Attaché took Burges Watson back to Contre-amiral Barnouin, who although found to be in ‘a much more accommodating frame of mind’, would still not permit demolition work without orders from his government. No moves were made to take independent action as the Ambassador did not wish to antagonise the French as long as there was any hope that some agreement could be obtained about their fleet. Pleydell-Bouverie returned to the Admiralty to attempt to obtain a firm commitment about the disposal of the French fleet. To his surprise, he learned from Auphan ‘that the Richelieu had left Brest the day before for Dakar and that the Jean Bart was leaving St Nazaire today’. Why the Attaché should have been surprised that the Richelieu was bound for West Africa is not clear – he had been present when on 18 June Darlan had informed Pound and Alexander of the ship’s destination – but his immediate reaction was to ask why the destination of the ships had been changed when Auphan himself had said that they were to go to Britain to be completed. The ACNS replied that ‘it was the orders of the C-in-C’;32 only after the meeting did Pleydell-Bouverie discover ‘that he was 24 hours out in both cases’. In fact, Auphan had been even more liberal with dates and times, for the ships had sailed 48 hours earlier than he had admitted – the reason for this quite deliberate deceit is not clear, unless the ACNS simply wished to avoid being the bearer of yet more unwelcome news. Capitaine Auphan did not raise the question of the detention of French merchant ships, although this meeting again provided an excellent opportunity to air Franch’s dissatisfaction with its Ally’s conduct, whether or not as a counter-balance to the continuous burden of British complaint. Communications with the Admiralty via the Beagle deteriorated so badly that the Attaché’s portable W/T was set up again. Very good communications were immediately re-established with Whitehall but these lasted only 75 minutes before the frequency was subjected to jamming. Petty Officer Telegraphist R.W. Walton, the competent and 67

THE ROAD TO ORAN

experienced operator, reported that he was certain that the interference was coming from a station in Bordeaux;33 whether Walton was correct or not, this was yet another unfortunate step in Pleydell-Bouverie’s growing disenchantment. Campbell learned of the presence of the Massilia at le Verdon from E. Herriot, the President of the Chambre des Deputés, who claimed that he had arranged for the ship to take off a number of deputies whose names might be on a German ‘black list’; these included Daladier and Mandel. Campbell feared that, with the more prominent résistants out of the way, the next step would be to abandon the plan to send the President of the Republic and a nucleus of government to North Africa. At about the same time, Pétain told the Ambassador that if the British torpedoed a ship taking a French government overseas, he would have no regrets.34 This report was drafted at 1230, despatched at 1700 and received by the Foreign Office in London at 2040, but a further report, of a meeting at 1600 with Baudouin, suffered even more serious delays, on this occasion occurring in Britain. Baudouin stated that the French government had not changed its intention of sending abroad the nucleus government headed by President Lebrun and that Amiral Darlan had been instructed to provide a warship at St Jean de Luz for their passage. This telegram was drafted at 1800 and despatched at 1843, but not until 1425 on the next day did it reach the Foreign Office, owing to unaccountable delays after reception. No opportunity was thus given for the British government to offer the services of the Royal Navy which, by this time, had a cruiser standing by off the coast to the south of the Gironde for precisely this purpose.35 The state of communications between London and Bordeaux was such that the British War Cabinet could not make ‘real-time’ appreciations of the situation, take decisions which could favourably influence the French government or even proffer useful advice to Sir Ronald Campbell, in whom, fortunately, they had complete and (usually) justifiable confidence. When, therefore, the War Cabinet met at noon on 21 June, the latest information from France available to ministers and officials was 20 hours old. One of the main discussions on French topics concerned a meeting between the French Ambassador, C. Corbin, and the Foreign Secretary at which the former had requested that French ships loaded with ‘food &c’ should be allowed to proceed to unoccupied ports in metropolitan France. This was opposed by the Prime Minister, on the grounds that there was no evidence that food cargoes were being stopped and that he believed that most of the ships affected were loaded with coal. His colleagues nevertheless decided to invite Corbin ‘to give definite information as to the ships and cargoes which he suggested should be allowed to 68

BORDEAUX, 19–21 JUNE

proceed to ports in Metropolitan France and as to which particular ports he had in mind’.36 The Amirauté that evening gave a direct order to Vice-amiral Odend’hal: ‘Order all warships or merchant ships present in British territory to put to sea and make for a French port to the south of Noirmoutiers.’37 It was as well that this signal did not come to the attention of the British Admiralty. While it was true that the German Army had not yet occupied the coast south of St Nazaire, the Biscay ports were under immediate threat and all were subject to nightly aerial mining to which the French had no counter. From an Admiralty still at war, this was a highly irresponsible order. Even as the French Admiralty was originating this signal, the British Naval Liaison Officer on Amiral Sud’s staff was reporting from Algiers38 that he had been informed by the Chief of Amiral Esteva’s Staff that practically all French Fleet now in British or French North African ports. General intentions French fighting forces is to carry on war from Africa regardless of terms agreed to by French Govt. Naval authorities very anxious to continue cooperation with British. Morale of 3 Services excellent.

Three ships which were in neither area were now exercising the attention of the British. The light cruiser Emile Bertin, with $300 million in gold on board, was at Halifax, Nova Scotia, where her sailing had been delayed on the instructions of the Canadian government. The French Ambassador in London had requested its release and, on 21 June, the British War Cabinet agreed to send a temporising message.39 The commanding officer was being extremely cooperative and on 20 June had even advised the local naval commander that he had intercepted a French Admiralty signal ordering two ships in the West Indies, the training cruiser Jeanne D’Arc and the aircraft carrier Béarn, to proceed to North Africa. The Emile Bertin was ordered on 21 June to proceed to Martinique and the British Commander-in-Chief, North America and West Indies station, Vice-Admiral C.E. Kennedy-Purvis, supported approval for the move, reporting40 to the Canadian Chief of Naval Staff that Contre-amiral Robert, at Martinique, had given his assurance of his intention to continue the war in full cooperation with British forces. The Emile Bertin sailed, unhindered, that evening, accompanied by HMS Devonshire, which had been ordered to shadow the French ship, to ensure that the French ship did not make off across the Atlantic with the gold.

69

THE ROAD TO ORAN NOTES 1. NA’s Diary, 19 June 1940. 2. Coutau-Bégarie and Huan, Darlan, p. 240; Hervé Cras, L’Armistice de juin 1940 et la crise franco-britannique (Vincennes, SHM, 1959), p. 26. Changes in the flag list at this time became known as the ‘Promotion de Défaite’. 3. Hervé Cras, L’Armistice. 4. FO C7301/65/17. 5. Coutau-Bégarie and Huan, Darlan, p. 241. 6. Darlan, writing to his wife, at Nérac, was contemptuous of the politicians whom he characterised as abandoning in a cowardly fashion the people of France who would greet them on their return with ‘pommes cuites’ and would go ‘à la lanterne’; cited in Coutau-Bégarie and Huan, Darlan, p. 241. 7. Admiralty’s signal, 1845, 19 June 1940. 8. WM(40)173. 9. DNI’s signal, 0031, 20 June 1940. 10. FO C7301/65/17. 11. C-in-C Med’s signal, 1815, 19 June 1940. 12. General Sir Archibald Wavell, C-in-C Middle East. 13. Caroff, Le Théâtre, Vol. I, p. 293. 14. One ship at Greenock also picked up the signal and reported it to the local Royal Navy commander (WM(40)173). 15. ‘No. 8440 to all warships. Reference my 1300/17 June signal. Order to cease immediately all warlike operations – all warships will imediately proceed to the closest French port – do not, I repeat not, follow English orders – Vive la France. DARLAN’, Les Forces Maritimes de l’Ouest, pp. 326–7. 16. Ibid., ‘[We] consider No. 8440 as dubious – this order will not be executed until after confirmation’. 17. Seekriegsleitung (SKL) War Diary, 19 June 1940. 18. HBMA’s telegrams, FO C7352/65/17. 19. NA’s signals, 1400 and 1415, 20 June 1940. 20. Admiralty signal, 2246, 20 June 1940. 21. NA’s Diary, 20 June 1940: the Capitaine de corvette is not named. 22. Caroff, Le Théâtre Méditerranéen, p. 268. 23. Ibid., pp. 92–3; in the event, approximately 60 front-line aircraft of the Aéronavale managed to reach Algeria from France between 21 and 25 June. 24. Contained in Darlan’s telegrams Nos 5057–59, transmitted at 1330, 1335 and 1340, 20 June 1940; Darlan also informed Général Noguès of the intention that the fleet would never be surrendered and that he had ensured that this order would survive his own demise (H. Coutau-Bégarie and C. Huan, Lettres et notes de l’Amiral Darlan (Paris, Economica, 1992), pp. 209–10). 25. Amiral Darlan’s note of meeting, supplied by SHM. 26. NA’s Diary, 20 June 1940. 27. Rear-Admiral, 2nd Cruiser Squadron’s signal, 0655, 21 June 1940. 28. Amirauté signal No. 6882, 2005, 20 June 1940. 29. WM(40)174. 30. FO C7352/65/17. 31. NA’s Diary, 21 June 1940. 32. Ibid. It is not clear from the attaché’s notes which commander-in-chief was meant, Darlan as C-in-C of the Navy, or de Laborde, the Amiral Ouest who issued the order to the battleships to proceed to West Africa (see p. 29, 18 June).

70

BORDEAUX, 19–21 JUNE 33. Ibid.; Walton was mentioned in despatches in September 1940 for ‘Good Services and Resourcefulness in France’. 34. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, p. 303n; FO C7352/65/17. 35. FO C7352/65/17; Woodward, British Foreign Policy, p. 304n; and WM(40)174. Either Baudouin or Campbell was in error – Darlan had ordered three destroyers and a passenger ship to standby to pick up members of the government from Port Vendres, on the Mediterranean coast (see above, p. 60). 36. WM(40)174. 37. Amirauté signal No. 3088, 1900, 21 June 1940. 38. BNLO Algiers’ signal, 1858, 21 June 1940. 39. WM(40)174. 40. C-in-C NAWI’s signal, 1402 (local), 21 June 1940.

71

9

The Other Side of the Hill, 17–21 June

Two weeks previously, on the other side of the Atlantic, the Devonshire had been carrying a different kind of ‘high value freight’. On 7 June the ship had left Tromsø with the Norwegian royal family and members of the Cabinet embarked for evacuation to Britain. On the following afternoon, unaware that the German battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were searching for Allied ships leaving the Narvik area, the Devonshire passed within 100 miles of where the carrier HMS Glorious and two destroyers were being despatched by the German pair. Encumbered as it was by the VIPs and over 400 British Army personnel, there was little that the out-gunned Devonshire could have achieved against the two German ships, but the destroyer Acasta, before it was sunk, scored a torpedo hit on the Scharnhorst, obliging it to withdraw to Trondheim. The German Naval Staff, the Seekriegsleitung (SKL), was critical of the local commander’s handling of the squadron and when he withdrew the undamaged Gneisenau with no attempt to intercept the evacuation convoys he was relieved from his post. As his successor was occupied in organising and escorting the transport of German forces along the Norwegian coast and re-establishing the German position at Narvik, it was not until 19 June that the change of command was effected. This latest British success, though bought at a terribly high price, had left the German Navy with one serviceable battlecruiser, one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, ten Fleet destroyers and nine torpedo-boats.1 Reduced to these straits, the SKL on 17 June proposed, in response to an Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) call for the naval opinion on the terms for a French armistice, that the whole of the French Navy and its supporting facilities – bases, arsenals, fuel stocks – should be handed over to be used in the Axis war against Britain.2 The Italian Naval Staff was of like mind and was in tune with Mussolini, who recognised the importance of sea-power in his main theatre of operations, where the Italian Navy had only two reconstructed First World War battleships operational in mid-June. Despite the obvious weakness of the Axis in capital ships, Hitler did not agree that the surrender of the French Navy should be an absolute condition of the armistice, 72

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE HILL, 17–21 JUNE

recognising that this was likely to represent a point of honour for the French. Meeting Il Duce at Munich on 18 June to discuss the terms of the armistice which were to be offered, he renounced any intention of using the French fleet for German ends. Churchill can never have imagined that his antagonist’s objective paralleled his own so closely – the Führer’s main aim was to keep the French fleet out of British hands so that it could not be used against Germany. Furthermore, the best solution, in his opinion, would be for the French to scuttle their ships.3 Mussolini had no choice but to yield to Hitler’s insistence, though he tried to stipulate that French warships could be demilitarised in Spanish ports. Admiral Erich Raeder was summoned to discuss the proposed armistice terms with Hitler on 20 June and was told, in effect, that the most the German Navy could hope for, besides bases in France and in the African colonies, would be minesweeping and local defence forces.4 The invasion of England and a projected occupation of Iceland were also discussed; the former had not been considered by either Hitler or OKW prior to 17 June, ‘due to its extraordinary difficulty’,5 but the SKL had already drawn up an appreciation of the possible landing areas and of the shipping and craft required. The Iceland project had already been opposed by Göring, and Raeder gave his opinion that although such an operation would occupy whatever strength the German Navy could muster it would still be impossible to maintain continuous resupply of a garrison.6 The German Navy was about to be further weakened. As Hitler and Raeder conferred in mid-afternoon on 20 June, both the battlecruisers left Trondheim, the Gneisenau, flying the flag of the new Flottenchef (Commander of the Fleet), Vize-admiral Lütjens, bound in company with the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and a single destroyer for an offensive sweep in the Iceland area, while the damaged Scharnhorst began its return to Germany, screened initially by a destroyer and two torpedo-boats. The latter group was not detected by the British submarine or air patrols off Trondheim but shortly after 2200 the British submarine Clyde sighted the Gneisenau some 60 miles up the coast from the northern entrance to the port; the submarine commander reported the sighting as ‘a battleship and a battlecruiser’ and despite heavy seas managed to make an undetected attack, scoring a hit forward on the Gneisenau, whose speed was reduced to 17 knots as it shipped 300 tons of water. Unwilling to risk the Admiral Hipper, now the most powerful serviceable unit in the German fleet, without an escort, Lütjens took his raiding group back into Trondheim, where the Gneisenau remained, undergoing emergency repairs, until 20 July.7 The British Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, received the Clyde’s report of the successful attack at 0245 on 21 June and, assessing that 73

THE ROAD TO ORAN

the damaged ‘battleship’ would head for a German port for repairs, at 0345 he ordered two battlecruisers, two heavy cruisers and four light cruisers to rendezvous to the east of Aberdeen and proceed to intercept it off south-west Norway, under the local command of the Flag Officer, 18th Cruiser Squadron;8 a submarine was ordered to the same area. Unfortunately, the surface ships were in two locations, at Scapa Flow and Rosyth, but due in large measure to the late departure of the Rosyth contingent, ascribed principally to local ciphering delays, they never did concentrate.9 The use of cipher was literally a waste of time, for the German wireless monitoring service, the B-Dienst, was reading and decrypting the Home Fleet’s signals and the German naval command knew in near ‘real time’ of the orders despatched to the cruisers at Rosyth – fortunately for their own peace of mind, the German commanders believed these ships to be divided between the Orkneys and a position west of the Hebrides and, because wireless was not needed to give orders to the battlecruiser group at Scapa, they were for several hours as unaware that a really powerful force was in the chase as the British were that they were chasing the Scharnhorst. The battlecruisers left Scapa Flow at 1130, 12 minutes after an RAF reconnaissance aircraft sighted the Scharnhorst, now escorted by two destroyers and two torpedo-boats, north-west of Bergen. A succession of shadowing aircraft maintained contact for several hours, despite attempts by German fighter patrols to drive them off, and although the Admiralty subsequently complained that they had used misleading coordinates to report the progress of the Scharnhorst the positions supplied were sufficiently accurate to enable three separate air strikes to find and attack the battlecruiser. Unfortunately, these attacks were uncoordinated and only the attack by six naval Swordfish10 could have inflicted other than superficial damage on the armoured Scharnhorst; no hits were obtained and six of the 24 aircraft involved were lost during the afternoon – the Germans claimed to have shot down 13 of about 36. As the last air attack petered out the German monitoring service advised that the Royal Navy’s battlecruisers were closing the Norwegian coast. At 1645, acting on this warning, Gruppe West, the shore command responsible for the operation, ordered the Scharnhorst to take refuge in Stavanger overnight and to find an anchorage where it would not be vulnerable to torpedo attack;11 Gruppe West subsequently assessed that the Renown and Repulse were within 35 miles of the Scharnhorst when the latter was ordered into Stavanger.12 At approximately 2100, the British commander at sea, Vice-Admiral Edward-Collins, signalled his assessment that the German group had put into Haugesund, north of Stavanger; he was not hopeful of success, believing that aircraft or submarines would provide the best chance of attacking the enemy. 74

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE HILL, 17–21 JUNE

The Admiralty’s appreciation was based on inaccurate and out-of-date aircraft positions and signalled at 2105: ‘The destruction of Scharnhorst at present time is of such importance that it is justifiable to take more than ordinary risk with any of your force to achieve it.’13 The Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, Admiral Sir Charles Forbes, had no better information but he thought it possible that the enemy had entered Stavanger. He did not believe that blind risk was justified, forcing an entrance into a harbour without certain knowledge that the quarry was present. Both the British surface groups had been found by German reconnaissance aircraft and both were attacked unsuccessfully during the late evening. Eventually, Admiral Forbes gave Edward-Collins discretion to return to base if the man on the spot considered that the Scharnhorst had slipped past him or had put into Stavanger; otherwise he was to pay heed to the Admiralty’s earlier exhortation. At 0250, Edward-Collins ordered his ships to return to base.14 The Germans were aware from signals intelligence of these moves and when the Scharnhorst left Stavanger early the following morning, not only were they confident that it ran no risk of interception by surface ships, but they also knew the patrol positions of two of the four patrolling submarines.15 No British aircraft made contact and the group was safely in the southern Kattegat by the evening of 22 June. The Gneisenau remained at Trondheim, undergoing emergency repairs to restore its seaworthiness, until 20 July, when it returned unhindered to Germany; like its sister-ship, it was in dockyard hands until November 1940 and did not return to operations until the following January. There was considerable friction within the German Navy during and after this episode. The SKL was annoyed by what it saw as Gruppe West’s ultra-cautious direction and the fleet’s inactivity between offensive operations. The ‘front-line’ staffs were unconvinced by the assurances from Berlin that signals intelligence and the Luftwaffe were sure shields against British numerical superiority at sea and even after the abrupt dismissal of the fleet commander who had scored the major success of sinking the Glorious, Gruppe West frequently acted as it saw best to preserve what remained of the fleet, rather than as the Naval Staff wished. It is not difficult to understand the frustration of the office-bound operations staff of the SKL; although its bold planning had resulted in the seizure of all the vital objectives in the opening phase of the Norwegian campaign, the German Navy had played no significant part in the offensives in the west, where the Dutch, Belgian and British armies had been brushed aside and the French Army utterly defeated in the field in the space of six weeks. In the jealous world of German 75

THE ROAD TO ORAN

High Command relationships, the German Army and the Luftwaffe had occupied the high ground and now, by decree of the Führer himself, the Kriegsmarine was to have no share of the spoils from France. Furthermore, so weakened was the surface fleet by the casualties during the Norwegian campaign, that the navy would be relegated primarily to a transport role in any invasion of England; lacking the forces to defend the shipping, it would be dependent upon the Luftwaffe for protection against the Royal Navy, which would be the front line of Britain’s defences. For these reasons, great store had been set by the ‘public relations’ impact which, it was believed, a successful raiding cruise would have made. At the time of the Scharnhorst’s ‘escape’ to Germany, the SKL attributed the British determination to intercept the ship to motives akin to its own, commenting on 21 June: It must be taken into consideration here that the British fleet is doubtless doing all in its power, on the day when the Armistice conditions were handed over to France, to gain a large-scale operational success which will increase its prestige.16

Certainly, the ‘more than ordinary risk’ signal transmitted by the Admiralty during the evening of 21 June had a distinctly Churchillian ring about it and there can be no doubt that the Prime Minister would have set a high value on such a success, but the Royal Navy needed no rhetorical exhortation to seek out and destroy an enemy capital ship. The Germans did, however, draw the inference that the Admiralty would not be deterred by the threat to its ships of air attack and, provided that the chance of success was sufficiently high, their lordships would not hesitate to risk ships.17 NOTES 1. That is, the Gneisenau, heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper, modern light cruiser Nürnberg and obsolescent light cruiser Emden. The torpedo-boats should not be confused with light craft of the MTB or E-boat types – they were, in effect, light destroyers of some 1,300 tons’ full-load displacement; there were similar ships in the French Navy and, in larger numbers, in the Italian Navy. 2. Seekriegsleitung (SKL), RM 7/92, 17 June 1940 (Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv); SKL War Diary, 18 June 1940, Part B, Vol. V. 3. Hannsjörg Kowark, Hitler et la flotte française (Nantes, Marines Editions, 1998), p. 11. 4. A. Martiienssen (ed.), Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs (London, Brassey’s, 1948), 20 June 1940. 5. SKL War Diary, 18 June 1940, ‘Survey of the Situation’. 6. Unbeknown to the German leadership, this project had already been forestalled

76

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE HILL, 17–21 JUNE

7. 8.

9.

10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

by the arrival on 16 June of a sizeable Canadian Army contingent to relieve the British troops who had occupied the Reykjavik area in early May. SKL War Diary, 20 June 1940, ‘Norway’. Repulse and Renown (each six 15in guns), Sussex (eight 8in), and Newcastle (12 6in) from Scapa Flow, with two destroyers; York (six 8in), Manchester (flag, Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Edward-Collins, CS.18), Sheffield and Birmingham (all 12 6in) from Rosyth. PRO ADM 199/2207, ‘Admiralty War Diary’ 21 June 1940; PRO ADM 234/372, Home Waters and the Atlantic, Vol. II, pp. 137–9 (London, Admiralty, 1961). The three light cruisers at Rosyth had been detached to the Nore Command for anti-invasion duties but after this fiasco they returned to the Home Fleet. This was the first ‘squadron strength’ air torpedo attack to be delivered in anger by any naval or air force. The aircraft were drawn from one of the Ark Royal’s squadrons and from one of the Glorious’ squadrons, left behind when that ship left to ferry RAF fighters to and from Norway. The other strikes were provided by bomb-armed Bristol Beauforts and Lockheed Hudsons of RAF Coastal Command. SKL War Diary, 21 June 1940, ‘Northern Waters/North Sea’ and ‘Enemy Plans’; Gruppe West assessed that the Renown and Repulse were within 35 miles of the Scharnhorst when the latter was ordered into Stavanger. E. Weichold, GHS/4: ‘German Surface Ships – Policy and Operations in the Second World War’ (unpublished study, London, Admiralty, 1949), p. 38. PRO ADM 199/2207; PRO ADM 234/372, p. 138. Ibid. SKL War Diary, 21 June 1940, ‘Enemy Plans’. Ibid. Weichold, ‘German Surface Ships’, p. 38.

77

10

The Armistice Terms, 22 June

At 0300 Captain Pleydell-Bouverie was informed by Sir Ronald Campbell of the armistice terms. These had not been received by the French Council of Ministers until midnight, for the Germans had insisted on holding the preliminary talks in the Forêt de Compiègne, on the site of their own surrender in November 1918. As the Attaché wrote in his diary: ‘It was quite clear that our worst fears had been realised.’ The main British interest lay in one article of the 24 presented as the German terms for an armistice. Article 8 read: The French Fleet (with the exception of that part which is left at the disposition of the French Government for the protection of French interests in the colonial empire) will be concentrated in ports to be determined and will be demobilised and disarmed under the supervision of Germany or, respectively, Italy. The peace-time home bases of these vessels will be used to designate these ports. The German Government solemnly declares to the French Government that it has no intention of using during the war for its own purposes the French Fleet stationed in ports under German supervision, other than the units necessary for coastal patrol and mine sweeping. It further declares solemnly and formally that it has no intention of making claims in respect of the French Fleet after the conclusion of peace. With the exception of that element of the French Fleet to be determined which will be allocated to the defence of French interest in the colonial empire, all warships at present outside French territorial waters should be recalled to France.’1

If the article could have been taken at its face value, it might have provided some reassurance to the British government, but few of those in any position of authority had any remaining faith whatsoever in German promises, however solemn and formal. From the British point of view, these terms, if accepted, placed the French fleet in Axis hands, for whatever use the Germans and Italians chose to make of it. 78

THE TERMS, 22 JUNE

At no stage, then or later, does the succeeding Article 10 appear to have been considered by any British official or politician. This forbade the French government from transferring any assets or men to Britain and proscribed as franc-tireurs any individuals who left France to serve another state against Germany – they would be outlaws unprotected by any laws of war. The Germans had provided evidence during the First World War of their merciless attitude to those whom they adjudged to be franc-tireurs2 and Article 10 was to be a powerful disincentive to many French servicemen who would otherwise have fought on. Campbell had spent the small hours between learning of the receipt of the terms and informing Pleydell-Bouverie in urgent enquiry and lobbying, before and after the first meeting of the Council of Ministers. He was accompanied and supported in this activity by the Canadian and South African Ministers but succeeded only in obtaining a broad outline. After the ministerial meeting he had a somewhat heated encounter with Baudouin, demanding to be told of the precise nature of the German demands and the Council’s reply; only with difficulty did he manage to persuade the Foreign Minister to hand over a copy of the full German terms. Baudouin told Campbell and his colleagues that a counter-proposal had been suggested by Amiral Darlan, requesting that the fleet should be allowed to proceed to North African ports, where it could be disarmed. To the British Ambassador’s demand that it be moved to more distant waters, outside the Mediterranean, where it might fall into Italian hands, Baudouin replied that, if there were any such danger, the fleet would be scuttled, in accordance with the Council’s earlier decision and orders.3 Campbell’s feelings were expressed in a telegram which he drafted at about 0700: Diabolically clever German terms have evidently destroyed the last remnants of French courage. If, as I presume to be certain, Germans reject French counter-proposal as regards the fleet, I do not believe for a moment that the French, in their present state of collapse, would hold out against original German condition to recall the fleet to French ports, and might even reverse scuttling order. They could still square their conscience by saying ships could not be used against us. We are thus thrown back on Darlan’s pathetic assurances to First Lord of Admiralty [i.e. Alexander, on 18 June].

The Naval Attaché went to the French Admiralty at 0800 and met Auphan, who had been promoted to Contre-amiral on the previous evening. I found him in absolute despair in consequence of the terms of the Armistice, but he continued to assure me that the Fleet would never be

79

THE ROAD TO ORAN

allowed to fall into enemy hands and would be destroyed in the last resort. He told me they were suggesting French colonial ports in lieu of normal Base Ports as the place of internment and said they hoped to use places as far off as Madagascar. I tried to explain that it was even yet not too late to order them to sea and send them to us but this he said could not be done without orders from the Government.4

Pleydell-Bouverie later returned to the French Admiralty, this time primarily to obtain permission for Rear-Admiral Burges Watson to commence demolition work. Auphan again refused to allow this without orders from General Weygand – orders which Auphan would not seek. Elsewhere in the Admiralty, the Attaché found some of his French friends ‘in the deepest gloom’, from which he was unable to arouse them:5 ‘The general attitude taken was “nous sommes vaincus”. None of them seemed to be able to hoist in that their Fleet and Colonial Possessions were far from “vaincu”.’ Sir Ronald Campbell had meanwhile met Maréchal Pétain, in company with Baudouin, immediately before the Council of Ministers began their discussion of the draft French reply to the armistice terms. He made an impassioned plea, which included a reminder of the ‘no separate peace’ agreement, ending with his belief that the recall of the fleet to metropolitan ports to be disarmed under German control was tantamount to surrender. Pétain interrupted to repeat the assurance that the British government need have no ‘qualms’ about the fleet – the French government hoped to get it away to African ports (mentioning Dakar and Madagascar) but it would be sunk if it were ever in danger of falling into enemy hands. After the meeting, the Ambassador obtained ‘with the utmost difficulty’, a copy of the proposed French amendment to Article 8 of the terms. This involved modification (here italicised) to the first of the three paragraphs of the article:6 The French Fleet (with the exception of the component left at the disposition of the French Government to safeguard French interests in her colonial empire) after decommissioning and de-ammunitioning under German or Italian control, as appropriate, will be based in French African ports. The crew numbers of each ship will not exceed half the normal peacetime ship’s company.

Campbell considered that this amendment did not make the clause any more acceptable and ‘forced his way’ into Baudouin’s house, demanding to be received at once. Baudouin pointed out (accurately) that most of the ships of the fleet were already away from their base ports and that, under the terms of the amendment, the Germans 80

THE TERMS, 22 JUNE

would be invited to send commissions to the ships to supervise demobilisation. In the case of ships in base ports, the scuttling order would be carried out if any attempt were made to remove or interfere with the French crews. Campbell pointed out that such action would leave the French government open to charges of breach of faith, but the Foreign Minister continued to argue that the scuttling order was ‘the key to the situation’. He suggested that Campbell should meet Darlan – he would instruct the Amiral to show the Ambassador the orders so far given with regard to the fleet.7 This offer by Baudouin was followed up by the Attaché who, on Campbell’s instructions, went to Amiral Darlan’s office to request an interview for the Ambassador and himself. Darlan was out of his office, but his secretary promised to telephone Pleydell-Bouverie during the course of the day. The British War Cabinet met at 1000, unaware of the situation at Bordeaux; although Campbell’s first telegram8 arrived at 1040, it reported only that the German armistice terms had been received and that hostilities would not cease until after the French government had also concluded a separate agreement with Italy. Details of the naval terms would follow. In the absence of the Prime Minister, the First Sea Lord raised the matter of French warships and merchant ships. Vice-amiral Odend’hal had been ordered to direct all French warships in British ports to leave for Africa; Alexander understood that they were to sail for Dakar. This was not the case – the French Admiralty’s instructions had been that the ships were to leave for any port south of the Loire9 – but the War Cabinet agreed that ‘it was not desirable to run the risk of upsetting Admiral Darlan by making difficulties about the French warships leaving British ports’. In consequence, at 1412, VCNS signalled the Commanders-in-Chief at Plymouth and Portsmouth: ‘French NLO at Admiralty has received instructions from French Admiralty to sail certain French warships now in British Ports for North Africa. All facilities should be accorded.’ For similar reasons, it was agreed that the cruiser HMS Devonshire, shadowing the cruiser Emile Bertin, was to be called off, to allow the French ship to continue to Martinique unaccompanied. Referring to the previous decision to prevent merchant ships from reaching French ports, the French Ambassador had agreed to supply details of cargoes and ships which the French regarded as essential. The Cabinet agreed that, for humanitarian reasons, ships carrying food (but no other cargo) should be allowed to proceed to unoccupied French ports and that no restraint would be placed on ships bound for the colonies outside the Mediterranean. British policy on the French merchant fleet was dictated by the need ‘to conserve for the Allied cause as much as possible of the French shipping which remained out 81

THE ROAD TO ORAN

of Germany’s reach’, and was influenced by reports of the large quantity of French shipping which had fallen intact into German hands in the ports of Brittany and Normandy.10 Some cause for alarm was given by a German ‘Transocean’ Press Agency report, broadcast at 1130 on 22 June, that four submarines under construction at Le Havre had been taken over by the German Navy.11 Amiral Sud’s staff showed Amiral Darlan’s ‘Xavier 377’ of 20 June on the subject of the command succession to the British Naval Liaison Officer at Bizerta, Lieutenant-Commander G.P.Y. Davies, who reported the substance to Whitehall at 0826 on 22 June. No background information exists and it must be assumed that the timing of this revelation (already made to Lord Lloyd by Darlan himself on 20 June) was conditioned by receipt of the news of the German armistice terms and the wish to reassure the local Royal Navy representative. The War Cabinet met again at 2130 that night, to discuss the armistice terms, specifically Article 8, the text of which (despatched at 1009 by the Ambassador in Bordeaux) reached the Foreign Office at 1440, followed by Campbell’s accounts of the events of the forenoon. The First Sea Lord set the current naval context, opening the proceedings by outlining the current deployment of the French fleet. The Richelieu, which he described as ‘the most powerful battleship afloat in the world today’ was expected to arrive at Dakar in the near future – although not yet worked-up, it had a full crew and stocks of ammunition and its armament was complete. The Jean Bart would soon arrive at Casablanca – it was not complete ‘and probably had no fighting value at all at present’. The signal from the BNLO at Bizerta was quoted by Admiral Pound. Although he had misconstrued the form of succession, reporting that the nominated admirals would form a committee, the First Sea Lord expressed his view that the orders to fight on and not to accept any order from a foreign government accorded with Darlan’s previous assurances and ‘showed that he had taken all possible steps to safeguard our interests’. The Prime Minister, who had been absent from the 1000 meeting, was not convinced and took a very ‘hawkish’ line: in a matter so vital to the safety of the whole British Empire we could not afford to rely on the word of Admiral Darlan. However good his intentions might be, he might be forced to resign and his place taken by another Minister who would not shrink from betraying us. The most important thing was to make certain of the two modern battleships Richelieu and Jean Bart. If these two fell into the hands of the Germans, they would have a very formidable line of battle when the Bismarck commissioned next August [1940].

82

THE TERMS, 22 JUNE

… Strasbourg and Dunkerque would certainly be a great nuisance if they fell into the hands of the enemy, but it was the two modern ships which might alter the whole course of the war. Oran was a strongly defended harbour and it would be very difficult to sink the two battlecruisers behind such strong defences … … at all costs the Richelieu and Jean Bart, particularly the former, must not be allowed to get loose. It would have been better if we could have put our own ships alongside them on the high seas in order to open a parley with their captains, but this must now be done when the ships were in harbour. A strong force must be sent and the Richelieu should be dealt with first. If the captains refused to parley, they must be treated as traitors to the Allied cause. The ships might have to be bombed by aircraft from Ark Royal or they must be mined into their harbours … In no circumstances must these ships be allowed to escape.

Churchill’s ministerial colleagues who, it will be recalled, had earlier been unwilling to upset Darlan, did not entirely share this readiness to use force. The Foreign Secretary, in particular, believed that every means of persuasion should first be exhausted and he suggested that effort should be concentrated on successful ‘parleys’ by means of ‘the right sort of propaganda’. On the subject of propaganda, but in the context of a different topic for discussion, the First Lord opposed a proposed broadcast by General de Gaulle – Pétain had renewed his assurances regarding the fleet and the strong language of the broadcast might alienate many Frenchmen; Alexander was in a minority and the Cabinet agreed to the broadcast in the form which had been presented to them. Admiral Pound pointed out that whatever proposals might be made to the commanding officers of ships they would inevitably be referred to Amiral Esteva – no French captain would act on his own initiative on such an important subject. Esteva, who was in command of all French Mediterranean naval forces and one of the successors named by Darlan (a ‘quadrumvirate’ as misunderstood by Pound) was a man of high principles and ‘a determined character who could be trusted’ – it was therefore of the utmost importance to send an envoy to win him to the British side; if successful, then not only the battleships but also the battlecruisers might follow. The Cabinet finally agreed to send a further appeal to Darlan from the First Lord and First Sea Lord and that the latter should send a personal message to Amiral Esteva. A proposal to send the Vice-Chief of Naval Staff and Lord Lloyd to appeal in person to Esteva, who was believed to be at Oran, was held over by the Prime Minister, to await the development of the general situation. The Admiralty was made responsible for ensuring that the Richelieu and Jean Bart did not leave Dakar and Casablanca.12 83

THE ROAD TO ORAN

It would not be fair to say that the British War Cabinet’s decisions had been overtaken by events in Bordeaux and Compiègne. So far removed were the two seats of government from one another, not only in terms of ‘real time’ communications but also in terms of shortterm pressures, that there could be no hope of cause and effect; there were, as there had been for several days, simply two widely differing views of reality. In Bordeaux, the Naval Attaché called again at Amiral Darlan’s office at 1800, having had no response to his earlier request for an interview for the Ambassador. Pleydell-Bouverie was received by an unknown staff officer who told him that Darlan was very busy and was on the point of going to a meeting of the Council of Ministers. Pressed by the Attaché to tell the Admiral that the matter was urgent, that the Ambassador would not detain him for longer than a few minutes on what was likely to be a formal farewell call, the staff officer brought back the following message: ‘Tell your Ambassador that he can be absolutely sure that the French Fleet will never fall into enemy hands. All our dispositions are taken. Anyway, we have a formal assurance from the Germans that neither during the period of the Armistice nor under the Peace Treaty will the French Fleet be used by the Germans.’ I asked him what he thought was the value of a German formal assurance, at which he repeated the statement and said goodbye.13

As Pleydell-Bouverie was returning to Darlan’s office, Campbell was meeting Charles-Roux. The latter had been instructed to let the Ambassador know ‘secretly’ that Darlan had made arrangements that ‘no ship would be utilisable, were the attempt to use it be made’. This was hardly a new revelation and Campbell strongly rejected the Secretary-General’s assertion that the decision gave Britain complete satisfaction, stating that the fate of the French fleet might mean ‘just the difference for us between victory and defeat’. At the end of this discussion, the Ambassador announced that he intended to leave with his remaining staff as soon as news was received that the armistice had been signed. Asked for his reasons, he stated: he had been accredited to a free and Allied Government. He did not think that his Sovereign or his Government would wish him to stay with a French Government which in a few hours might be under enemy control. Furthermore it would be futile to suppose that in these circumstances the Germans would allow him to communicate with the French Government. Since he could be of no further use in France, he ought in any case to go home and report.

84

THE TERMS, 22 JUNE

This statement was framed with the intention of avoiding either giving the impression that France was being altogether abandoned, or encouraging the French government to believe that it was free of its obligations or of the undertaking to scuttle the fleet, rather than allow it to be used against Britain.14 Campbell later called on General Weygand, accompanied again by the Dominion ministers. The Ambassador now learned that the armistice had been signed at Compiègne at 1735; the French revision to Article 8 had not been accepted, but the Germans did not dismiss out of hand the principle of demobilising the French fleet in colonial ports – the question was ‘a measure of application falling within the competence of the Armistice Commission’.15 Campbell repeated to Weygand the statement which he had made to Charles-Roux and later, at 2200, informed Baudouin of his intention to leave immediately. The Foreign Minister was surprised by the decision but like CharlesRoux and Weygand he accepted it on hearing the reasons. The Ambassador asked if he could see Maréchal Pétain, but Baudouin replied that the 85-year-old Prime Minister was in bed and must not be disturbed. Sir Ronald Campbell’s final call was on the President of the Republic; Lebrun, too, was in bed. Captain Pleydell-Bouverie had made all the necessary preparations for the departure and he was instructed to go ahead after the Ambassador learned of the signature of the armistice. He then contacted Rear-Admiral Burges Watson, who obtained the Ambassador’s agreement to commence demolitions after the diplomatic party had left Bordeaux. Petty Officer Telegraphist Walton, who had been handling all the Embassy’s cypher traffic during the hectic preceding 24 hours (with the Attaché acting as cypher clerk in addition to his other duties), was left with the portable wireless to maintain communication with the Admiralty until the last minute and would be evacuated aboard HMS Beagle. The Naval Attaché left the hotel which had been serving as the British Embassy for Arcachon at 2330, followed 30 minutes later by Sir Ronald Campbell and the two Dominion ministers. As Pleydell-Bouverie set out from Bordeaux, the British War Cabinet, still in session, learned that the Germans had broadcast an account of the signing of an armistice. The first result of the news was a reversal of the decision to permit French warships to leave British ports. After the meeting, Churchill and Halifax agreed to postpone the visit by Lord Lloyd and Vice-Admiral Phillips and to watch developments over the next 24 hours.16 The previous days had closed with encouraging reports from foreign stations – the French Navy at Alexandria, Bizerta and Martinique was maintaining its morale and intending to fight on. At 2315 on the 22nd, 85

THE ROAD TO ORAN

there came less cheerful news from Casablanca, where Captain Bissett had just arrived with Amiral Ouest and his staff, passengers in two destroyers accompanying the Jean Bart. ‘BNLO Brest at Casablanca’, as Bissett styled himself, began by reporting the order of succession signal (unambiguously phrased to indicate that it was not a committee), and its orders to fight on. He continued with his impressions: Senior officers appear almost resigned about the future of the fleet and quite expect may have to be sunk in consequence. Junior officers show considerable feeling against possibility which is described as treason. Two main arguments are a. French families are in the power of the enemy and hands of officers and men are therefore tied b. present Government knows best and orders must be obeyed whatever they are. Request that liaison officers may be kept up to date with progress of negotiations (such knowledge lends authority) and prior information as to any British move which may be used to influence French naval officers.17

Bissett’s signal marked a watershed. It was not simply the first on-thespot report from a force in refuge to indicate that French naval morale might be deteriorating – it introduced a new phase, in which the British naval liaison officers became the main source of up-to-date information on French naval attitudes and intentions. Hitherto, the Naval Attaché in Bordeaux had been the most important direct link between the two Admiralties; with his departure, this link was completely broken and the continued presence in London of Vice-amiral Odend’hal was not an adequate substitute for this one trusted link with the French Naval Staff. Henceforward, privileged insight into Darlan’s post-armistice policy – which, for the British government, meant scrutiny of his trustworthiness – would depend upon the relationships between the individual French naval commanders, themselves remote from the seat of naval and political power, and their attached BNLOs. The value of the latter, whose tenure could not now be expected to last more than a few days, would be proportional to the trust and goodwill to the British cause of their hosts, who, it would transpire, were usually less informed about current developments than the British. The only other sources of information on French naval policy would be inferential and gained by observation of the pattern of naval activity after the armistice. Only if activities and apparent intentions fitted in all respects with what the British hoped for would any reassurance be forthcoming from this quarter. As in every other area of interest and endeavour in these troubled days, hope varied with perspective and the viewpoints of the naval authorities, tempered 86

THE TERMS, 22 JUNE

by their appreciation of the practical realities, did not always accord with those of the politicians, particularly when the latter had been so profoundly disappointed in their expectations. A deep mistrust of France, caused by what was viewed as the Pétain government’s flagrant disregard for the ‘no separate peace’ agreement sometimes meant that pragmatic analysis by the Naval Staff was liable to be overruled by intuitive reaction on the part of politicians (particularly the Prime Minister). At the same time, it should be appreciated that the question of the fate of the French fleet was but one of several areas critical to national survival. NOTES 1. ‘La flotte de guerre française (à l’exception de la partie qui est laissée à la disposition du Gouvernement français pour la sauvegarde des intérêts français dans son empire colonial) sera rassemblée dans des ports à déterminer et devra être démobilisée et désarmée sous le contrôle de l’Allemagne ou respectivement de l’Italie. Les ports d’attaché du temps de paix de ces navires serviront pour la désignation de ces ports. Le Gouvernement allemand déclare solonellement au Gouvernement français qu’il n’a pas l’intention d’utiliser pendant la guerre ses propres fins, la flotte de guerre française stationée dans les ports de contrôle allemand, sauf les unités nécessaires à la surveillance des côtes et au dragage des mines. Il déclare en outre solonellement et formellement qu’il n’a pas l’intention de formuler des revendications à l’égard de la flotte de guerre française lors de la conclusion de la paix. Exception faite de la partie de la flotte de guerre français déterminer qui sera affectée à la sauvegarde des intérêts français dans l’empire colonial, tous les navires de guerre se trouvant en dehors des eaux territoriales françaises doivent être rappelés en France’, Woodward, British Foreign Policy, p. 330. 2. The German Navy was particularly harsh in its treatment of such offenders – at least one First World War merchant captain who attempted to ram a U-boat was executed when he subsequently fell into German hands. 3. FO C7375/7362/17. 4. NA’s Diary, 22 June 1940. 5. Ibid. 6. Quoted in Woodward, British Foreign Policy, p. 331. 7. NA’s Diary, 22 June 1940. 8. No. 511, despatched at 0850, FO C7375/7362/17. 9. See above, pp. 55–6. 10. WM(40)175; it should be noted, however, that no French warship in the Channel or Atlantic ports fell into German hands in a usable state. 11. War Diary, Vol. XVII, p. 438; only one of these submarines was ever launched (but not completed) under German control. 12. WM(40)176 and Confidential Annex. 13. NA’s Diary, 22 June 1940. 14. FO C7375/7362/17; Woodward, pp. 310–11. 15. Quoted in Woodward, p. 331. 16. WM(40)175 and 176. 17. BNLO Brest’s signal, 2315, 22 June 1940.

87

11

23 June 1940

The destroyer Beagle had remained at Bordeaux after the departure of the British Ambassador and Naval Attaché, to act as a communications link and also to support the demolitions party under Rear-Admiral Burges Watson. At the last minute, the British Admiralty had second thoughts and at 0039 signalled that the sabotage was not to be carried out without permission from the French authorities. Fortunately, the signal was not delayed, for the charges were already in position and final preparations were being made for firing. No reason for this eleventh-hour change of heart is recorded, but it is possible that the risk of the oil fuel depot and other stores falling into German hands was regarded as more acceptable than that of alienating French opinion just as final high-level appeals were being made. The personal appeal to Amiral Darlan by the First Sea Lord1 was transmitted via the Beagle in the early hours of 23 June. After emphasising the importance of not allowing the modern capital ships to fall into the hands of the enemy, Admiral Pound concluded: Also can we rest assured that should it be decided now or at any time that the French Fleet should not continue fighting that the condition on which His Majesty’s Government agreed to the French Government making a proposal for an armistice should now be fulfilled. This condition was that the French Fleet shall be sent to British ports so that we may be able to make certain that they will not fall into the hands of our enemies.2

This was not Pound’s only personal message of the night. Two hours later, he sent another, as agreed by the War Cabinet,3 to Amiral Sud, via the BNLO at Bizerta. After stating the British understanding that Esteva was one of Darlan’s ‘heirs’, Pound expressed concern as to the future of the French fleet.4 It was known that the armistice had been signed, but the definitive form of Article 8 was not known: We believe that Admiral Darlan’s intention is to continue to fight and we hope with all our might that this is correct. If the original sense of

88

23 JUNE

Article 8 is preserved, our task, which is to win the war, will become much more difficult. If the Germans gain some control over ships such as Richelieu, Jean Bart, Dunkerque and Strasbourg, they will most certainly use some excuse to delay their demilitarisation, in order to incorporate them in their fleet at some later date. You will understand, I am sure, that such a thing must not (I repeat must not) occur. If it was decided not to continue the fight, may we have your assurance that the condition under which His Majesty’s Government agreed to the request for an armistice will be fulfilled? That condition was that the French Fleet should be sent to British ports, thus providing the certainty that it will not (I repeat will not) fall into the hands of the enemy. This is an agonising period for us, as you will surely understand, as long as we cannot be certain of this. I would be very grateful if you could reassure me on this point.

There was no call to disobey orders, but this message illustrates an aspect of British (and specifically London) ‘diplomacy’ which French officials and Service personnel noted at the time – a lack of any compassion. The acquaintance between Pound and Esteva dated back to 1937, when they had worked together in maintaining the neutrality patrols during the Spanish Civil War, and they had also met during the Franco-British Naval Staff talks in 1938 and 1939, when a combined strategy for the naval war against Italy had been agreed. The war in the Mediterranean had been brief, but the French Mediterranean fleet had cooperated loyally and could in no way be blamed for the military débâcle or the political manoeuvrings which had led to the armistices. And yet, in what was likely to be a valedictory letter from the British First Sea Lord to a senior French commander, there was no word of thanks for his contribution or of commiseration that his intact fleet had been eliminated without a real chance to come to grips with the Italian Navy. It should have been apparent to Sir Dudley Pound that these were days as agonising for the undefeated Esteva, deprived of his task of winning the war – the benefits of sympathy at this stage cannot possibly be assessed, but the resentment aroused by its omission has been noted. An hour earlier, a signal had been sent to Bordeaux by the First Lord – the political parallel, Minister to Minister, of Pound’s very similar message to his professional counterpart. Both were passed by the Beagle to the French Admiralty, where they arrived on 23 or 24 June. That from Alexander was not ‘logged in’ until 9 July, but both had been anachronisms from the time of their origination: the War Cabinet was aware of the terms of Article 8 and by the time that the 2130 meeting had broken up the members knew that the armistice had been 89

THE ROAD TO ORAN

signed. There had never been any sign that the Pétain administration was prepared to heed any British conditions for seeking a separate peace and it was unrealistic to suggest to Darlan either that as Minister of Marine he should violate the armistice terms which he had accepted in his political capacity, or that as Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy he should disobey the orders of a government whose legality he could not dispute while he remained a member. That Churchill, at least, doubted the legality of the French government was made plain in a statement broadcast with War Cabinet approval at midday on 23 June: HM Government have heard with grief and amazement that the terms dictated by the Germans have been accepted by the French Government at Bordeaux. They cannot feel that such or similar terms could have been submitted to by any French Government which possessed freedom, independence and constitutional authority. Such terms if accepted by all Frenchmen would place not only France but the French Empire entirely at the mercy and in the power of the German and Italian Dictators. Not only would the French people be held down and forced to work against their Ally, not only would the soil of France be used with the approval of the Bordeaux Government as the means of attacking their Ally, but the whole resources of the French Empire and the French Navy would speedily pass into the hands of the adversary for the fulfilment of his purpose.5

The statement went on to appeal to all Frenchmen, ‘wherever they may be, to aid to the utmost of their strength the forces of liberation which are enormous and which … will assuredly prevail’. A Foreign Office telegram had already been despatched early that morning to British diplomatic representatives in all French colonies, renewing the directive to seek the local authorities’ support and to give financial and economic undertakings to those who stood by Great Britain;6 originated at 0406 BST, it was also passed to British commanders-in-chief. According to the Foreign Office, responses on the previous day had been encouraging and they continued to be so through 23 June: General Mittelhauser in Syria was determined to fight on and it was reported that the Governor-General of French West Africa had been in touch with other colonial governors and was convinced that a government would be formed to represent the will of the French Empire to continue resistance.7 Whatever this campaign might have achieved in the colonies was vitiated by impatience in London, particularly on the part of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, for a recognisable central form of leadership around which French overseas resistance could crystallise. While the issue was not 90

23 JUNE

central to the question of the future of the French fleet, it was relevant to the state of mind of the leaders in the French colonies and explains in part why, after a promising beginning, support for the Allied cause fell away. This, in turn, provoked bitter disappointment and further British mistrust. The War Cabinet, meeting at 1000, first heard Lord Halifax’, suggestion that General de Gaulle might provide ‘the centre around which some of the most resolute French statesmen might rally’, and was subsequently persuaded by Churchill to agree to a declaration recognising a ‘Comité National Français’ or ‘Council of Liberation’ whose outlines had been proposed to him by de Gaulle. The War Cabinet did not fully commit itself, for the agreement was only given in principle and the Foreign Secretary was invited to examine the proposals ‘as a matter of great urgency’.8 Churchill and Halifax then met de Gaulle, who explained that the Council of Liberation was intended merely to assist in the formation of a government in exile and suggested the names of several possible heads of such a government, including that of Reynaud. Churchill explained the views of the War Cabinet and, leaving the general to complete his plan, promised that the British government would prepare a draft stating their readiness to support it.9 Evidence was soon forthcoming that de Gaulle’s stature as a rallying point was less than the general himself had claimed. Corbin, the French Ambassador, whom de Gaulle had believed to be a supporter, and A Léger, formerly the Secretary-General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, voiced to Lord Halifax their grave concern that support was being given to the general’s ‘movement’ and the Ambassador expressly requested that he should not be allowed to make a broadcast. This request, and a last-minute recommendation from Sir Robert Vansittart that the text should be amended, were unavailing; approved by the Foreign Secretary, General de Gaulle broadcast to France late that evening, announcing his intention of forming a national committee which would ‘take under its jurisdiction all French citizens at present in British territory and will assume the direction of all military and administrative bodies who are now, or may in the future be, in Great Britain’.10 This was followed immediately by a statement in French, issued on the authority of the British government, that as the terms of the armistice effectively reduced the Bordeaux government to a state of complete subjection and deprived it of the right to represent free French citizens, the British government could not recognise it as that of an independent country. The Comité National Français, fully representing independent French elements, would be recognised as the channel for dealing with all matters concerning the prosecution of the war as long as it continued to represent all French elements resolved to fight the common enemy. 91

THE ROAD TO ORAN

Whether it was intended or not, the terms and tone of the British statement were such as to leave no choice between the opposite poles of acceptance of either Pétain’s or de Gaulle’s leadership. The statement certainly caused uncertainty in at least one British colony. The official censor in Freetown interpreted the BBC broadcast as an announcement that the British government no longer recognised the French government in Bordeaux and detained official telegrams, pending confirmation of the rupture of relations. They were later released. Corbin lost no time in telling Lord Halifax that he was alarmed both by the general’s announcement and the British government’s recognition of the Comité, and that he believed the wrong approach to stimulating continued French resistance was being adopted. An unrepresentative committee constituted in Britain, with British support promised even before it had been formed, would not appear to French eyes to be any more independent than the Bordeaux government. To the Foreign Secretary’s argument that de Gaulle’s committee provided a nucleus for rallying opinion, the Ambassador replied that any nucleus of resistance must have the appearance of independence if it was to have any credibility among Frenchmen.11 The last British communication to France on 23 June was made at the highest level – a personal message from His Majesty the King to the President of the Republic – and reverted to the question of the future of the French fleet. Received by the Beagle at Bordeaux, it was passed to the cruiser Galatea off St Jean de Luz, whither the British Embassy party was bound aboard HMCS Fraser, having spent a very uncomfortable, wet and windy forenoon off Arcachon in a hired sardine drifter, waiting four hours for the Canadian destroyer to arrive. Instructions to deliver the message were received during the evening and Sir Ronald Campbell telegraphed the contents to Bordeaux, where they appear to have arrived promptly: I learn with deep anxiety and dismay that your Government, under the cruel pressure of these tragic days, contemplate sending the French Fleet to North African ports where it would be dismantled. This must, in effect, leave the French Fleet where it would be in danger of falling into hostile hands. I need not remind you, M. le President, should this occur, how great would be the danger involved to our common cause, and I rely on the solemn and explicit word of France, already given to my Government, that in no circumstances would your Government assent to any condition that involved this consequence.12

The question of the French merchant fleet was also discussed by the War Cabinet. The existence of Amiral Darlan’s signal of 21 June, 92

1. The action during the Battle of Oran. [Imperial War Museum CP.4059.A]

2. In the heat of the battle French sailors attempt to put out the flames on deck. [Imperial War Museum CP.4055.]

3. The battleship Strasbourg fires on the British squadron before breaking away on her high speed run to France. [Imperial War Museum CP.4053.A]

4. Vice-amiral Godfroy’s Force X warships alongside British vessels in harbour at Alexandria prior to the armistice. [Imperial War Museum KY.9614.A]

5. French leaders grouped prior to the fall of France, including Paul Reynaud, Premier of France and Minister of Defence until 16 June 1940, and Général de Gaulle. [Imperial War Museum HU.2282]

6. Allies once more? Amiral Darlan meeting with Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, American General, Mark Clarke, and General Anderson in Algiers following Operation ‘Torch’, the successful Allied invasion of North Africa in November 1942. [Imperial War Museum A.13120]

7. The French battleship Jean Bart. [Imperial War Museum A.14191]

8. Admiral Sir Dudley Pound on board HMS Prince of Wales examining charts with Sir John Dill and Sir Wilfred Freeman. [Imperial War Museum A.4830]

9. The French battleship Richelieu as she returned to Oran in the service of the Allies in 1943. [Imperial War Museum A.20299]

10. The harbour at Mers el-Kébir. Panoramic view taken as British warships returned to the harbour in 1943. [Imperial War Museum A.14412]

11 The French battleship Strasbourg alongside a scuttled French cruiser, possibly Colbert or Algérie, in Toulon harbour. Photograph taken during the ceremonial re-entry of the French Fleet into the port on 14 September 1944, 17 days after the port’s re-capture by the Allies. [Imperial War Museum A.25666]

12. The effects of the bombardment on Oran, taken from the Queen’s Baths. French official photograph. [Naval Historical Branch T30182/1]

13. The first bombs falling on the jetty. French official photograph. [Naval Historical Branch T30182/2]

14. The battleship Bretagne taken before she was sunk at Mers el-Kébir. French official photograph. [Naval Historical Branch T30182/3]

15. Bombs falling around the battleship Provence. French official photograph. [Naval Historical Branch T30182/4]

16. Commodore (Vice Admiral Retd) N A Wodehouse RN. Wodehouse was replaced by Sir Dudley North as Rear Admiral at Gibraltar after Darlan accused Wodehouse of being ‘isolationist and unapproachable’. Wodehouse lost his life on 4 July 1941, while serving as Commodore of Convoy OB 337. [Naval Historical Branch T5496]

23 JUNE

ordering all French merchant ships, and ships chartered by France, to return to unoccupied ports13 was reported to the Admiralty early on 23 June by the British Naval Liaison Officer at Bizerta (who ended his signal ‘Accelerate delivery HM Govt UK’), but it is unlikely that this influenced the Cabinet. The latter was now aware that Article 11 of the armistice terms called for the return to France or to neutral ports of the French merchant fleet and this decided the Cabinet to continue to hold shipping, particularly if there was risk that it might comply with the terms. If necessary, it was agreed, this action could be explained as being taken in the name of de Gaulle’s Council of Liberation. At 1929 that evening, the Admiralty broadcast a general signal, cancelling all earlier instructions referring to French merchant shipping. Henceforth, French ships were not to be allowed to sail from British ports. Bizerta was the source of further useful information on 23 June.14 Amiral Esteva told the BNLO frankly that as long as he wore his country’s uniform his duty was to obey his commander-in-chief and that if he were to succeed to supreme command he would then obey all government orders, but whatever his position he would never obey an order to surrender the fleet or any other units. Esteva did not mention, but the BNLO knew, that notwithstanding this promise of obedience, he had already ordered the suspension of loading iron ore at North African ports for France. The Admiral did inform him that he had sent an officer that morning to France to seek orders from Amiral Darlan but gave no details.15 The Liaison Officer reported less favourably on French naval morale: Generally an air of resignation is set in. Officers who often themselves have lost all, would like to continue with British, but do not appear prepared to demand sacrifice from their men of loss of families, upon whom reprisals are indicated.

Captain Bissett had reported in such similar vein from Casablanca on the previous day, although without the detail that a threat to naval families was actually indicated it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this rumour either had been started by German propaganda or had been circulated through French naval communications channels. Apparently unknown to the BNLO at Bizerta, Vice-Admiral North was preparing to meet Amiral Esteva. The British War Cabinet had decided to delay the proposed visit by Alexander and Lord Lloyd to Oran until the situation in North Africa clarified, but the First Lord ordered the Flag Officer Commanding, North Atlantic to make contact with the French Navy. Admiral North left Gibraltar in the evening of 23 June, under the impression that Esteva was at Mers-el-Kébir, and 93

THE ROAD TO ORAN

not until several hours later did he learn that Amiral Sud was at Bizerta and was unable, under current circumstances, to proceed to Oran. Matters were more simple at Alexandria, where Admiral Cunningham had been instructed16 to discuss the situation ‘very frankly’ with Vice-amiral Godfroy. Cunningham reported the results late in the day:17 Godfroy … has not yet any official intimation of terms of Armistice. He says Darlan still in control of Fleet but has issued no instructions since Armistice terms agreed. Darlan urging that he should fight on and he is obviously considering his position should his ships fight under British crown in the event of there being no French Govt willing continuance of struggle at sea. He considers good proportion of his men would volunteer to continue to fight their ships. He shows no inclination to leave Alexandria, in fact states he cannot leave. I think, however, he will be influenced by orders he receives and for that reason I do not intend to take French Squadron to sea for operations. Godfroy also stated if it had not been for Spanish Govt. threatening to join Axis the French would have continued the war from N Africa.

Within an hour, the military mission in Syria signalled to the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East (General Sir Archibald Wavell) that French naval morale in Beirut was high. The signal recalling French merchant ships to France had been received on the previous day but, as it was suspected that it had been transmitted by a German station using French cyphers, Contre-amiral Carpentier had ‘no intention of carrying out such orders’.18 If the auspices within the Mediterranean were favourable, they were less so in West Africa, particularly at Casablanca. The BNLO on Amiral Afrique’s staff signalled in mid-afternoon to Admiral North at Gibraltar: ‘Consider there is no prospect of effective resistance in Morocco. Expect French Fleet to sink itself. Am hastening to reload stores.’ He changed his opinion slightly during the next few hours,19 and reported direct to the Admiralty that he was now ‘Convinced French ships to avoid scuttling would surrender willingly to small display of British naval force. Matter is urgent.’ The earlier report prompted the Admiralty to signal their own representative at Casablanca, Captain Bissett, who had been provided with a communications link in the form of the destroyer Watchman from Gibraltar, instructing him to impress upon the French authorities Britain’s intention of fighting on and the hope that they would do so too. In his reply to the Assistant Chief ’s message,20 Bissett, who was still styling himself ‘BNLO Brest’, to avoid confusion between himself and BNLO Casablanca, repeated the tone of his message of 22 June and plainly was less convinced than 94

23 JUNE

his colleague that the Jean Bart could be rallied: ‘Jean Bart now at Casablanca. Situation: SO apathetic. Many junior officers and men willing to continue. Possibly French ship would sail with small armed guard under British escort.’ British warships were still based at Dakar, which was a much more convenient station than Freetown. The captain of the small aircraft carrier Hermes, Captain R.F.J. Onslow, who was the senior British naval officer present, first asked for information about the allegiance of the French ‘Mediterranean Fleet’ which, he believed, would be of great value in persuading the authorities at Dakar to accept the British government’s offer of assistance. But neither Contre-amiral Plançon nor the British Consul-General was able to persuade the GovernorGeneral to do so and, when Onslow reported to the Admiralty a few hours later,21 he had formed a very different impression of the attitude of the local authorities from that of the BNLOs in Casablanca. He had also gathered some inaccurate intelligence concerning the Richelieu, which had meanwhile arrived: ‘Decide that British intervention most undesirable at this juncture. Richelieu has only AA ammunition on board and main armament is incomplete. Great importance attached to pronouncement from some form of recognised Govt. in North Africa.’ That this second signal was heeded in the Admiralty only became plain later, when the SNO’s flawed information could have had very serious consequences. In the United Kingdom, Vice-amiral Odend’hal visited the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, Admiral Sir William James, on 23 June to discuss the future of the French naval units at Portsmouth and Southampton; he had little alternative but to agree that ships ordered to proceed to North Africa should remain in Britain. Vice-amiral Cayol, commanding the French units at Plymouth, informed the Commanderin-Chief, Western Approaches, Admiral Sir Martin Dunbar-Naismith, that he wished to continue to fight and asked that his ships be allowed to proceed on patrol, but this was forbidden by Odend’hal. Cayol managed to organise a wireless link between the French Admiralty and the Naval Mission in London, thus ending Odend’hal’s four-day isolation from the naval command. The latter was now in a position to play a much more effective part as the only remaining channel of communication between Amiral Darlan and the British government. NOTES 1. WM(40)176, p. 52. 2. 1st SL’s signal, 0124, 23 June 1940. 3. See pp. 60–1.

95

THE ROAD TO ORAN 4. 1SL’s signal, 0339, 23 June 1940 (cited in J.-J. Antier, Le drame de Mers-el-Kébir, (Paris, Presses de la Cité, 1990), but not sighted in files held in PRO). 5. Quoted by Woodward, British Foreign Policy, pp. 313–14. 6. FO Circular No. 32, cited in WM(40)177. 7. FO C7380/7327/17. 8. WM(40)177. 9. FO C7389/7389/17. 10. Cited in Woodward, British Foreign Policy, pp. 324–5. 11. WM(40)178. 12. HBMA’s Despatch (FO C7541/65/17). 13. 1900, 21 June 1940 (see Note 2). 14. Signals to Admiralty 0744 and 2230, 23 June 1940. 15. Esteva was more belligerent than the BNLO was given to understand. Capitaine de frégate Braxmeyer ‘était chargé de remettre à l’Amiral Darlan une lettre personnelle de l’Amiral Sud, rendant compte des esprits en Afrique du Nord et de la volonté unanime qui l’animait, de poursuivre la guerre’, Caroff, Le Théâtre Méditerranéen, Vol. I, p. 244. 16. 1st Sea Lord’s signal, 0338, 23 June 1940. 17. C-in-C Med’s signal, 1851, 23 June 1940. 18. No. 8 Military Mission’s signal, 1920, 23 June 1940. 19. BNLO (C-in-C S. Atlantic)’s signals, 1519 and 1920, 23 June 1940. 20. ACNS (Foreign)’s signal, 1939 and HMS Watchman’s signal, 2359, 23 June 1940. 21. SNO Dakar’s signals, 1350 and 2030, 23 June 1940.

96

12

24 June 1940

The last useful information to reach the Admiralty from Bizerta arrived in the early hours of 24 June, although it had been originated the previous morning.1 In contrast to the qualified optimism of the Liaison Officer’s report on the French Navy, it painted a gloomy picture of civilian will in Tunisia: ‘Not much fight in Civil Administration from Resident-General downwards. Estimated partly due instructions and partly personal weakness. Censor prohibits publication of anything conducive in slightest degree to strengthen will of Colonies to resist.’ A French Admiralty signal was also delayed. Originated at 1700 on 23 June, it was received by Amiral Godfroy early the next day. He promptly passed the message to Admiral Cunningham, who reported to the Admiralty:2 05123. If armistice is signed between France on one side and Germany and Italy on the other you are to cease all operations or hostilities and return to French ports, to which I shall order you, probably Bizerta. You are to embark French Naval Liaison Officers and disembark BNLOs. Acknowledge. 2. It is of course my intention that French ships shall not leave Alexandria.

The words of the first sentence of these instructions were poorly chosen. The armistice with Germany had already been signed, nearly 24 hours previously, but under its terms hostilities were to continue until six hours after the Germans learned that a separate FrancoItalian armistice had been signed. The French naval commanders to whom this signal was addressed were all aware that an armistice had been signed, but not all (and certainly not Godfroy) knew of the terms and there was no indication in the message that a second armistice was the ‘enabling instrument’, pending which they should fight on. Amiral Sud at Bizerta acted on the signal within 24 hours of its origin, expelling the British Naval Liaison Officers from Bizerta and Oran at a few hours’ notice. By 1900, the destroyer Trombe had left Oran for Gibraltar with the BNLOs and their staffs embarked. 97

THE ROAD TO ORAN

Admiral North had already met Vice-amiral Gensoul, Amiral Atlantique, commanding the Force de Raid, at Mers-el-Kébir, during the forenoon. His instructions from the First Lord were to assess the probable reaction of the French fleet if an armistice was signed with Italy, but he had also instructions3 ‘to obtain full information as to the berthing positions of the French ships, in case it might be necessary to take drastic action against them’. Gensoul made it plain that he felt bound to carry out the orders of a legally constituted French government as long as it existed; in the absence of such a government, he would assume control and continue the fight but was very averse to any suggestion that the fleet should be turned over to British control. He repeated the now well-known order of Darlan that under no circumstances was the fleet to be handed over intact. North’s report to the Admiralty4 concluded: It appears that conditions of armistice will be carried out provided they do not include handing over of the French Fleet. I understand necessary instructions exist for scuttling and wrecking of vital material. Fleet has recently been to sea and morale is good but officers very dejected. Gensoul unfavourably impressed by speech of Mr Churchill’s;5 most distressed at possibility of any cleavage between Britain and France. He thought French North Africa would not continue the fight owing to insufficiency of material and ammunition.

Morale in the French ships at Portsmouth was causing concern. The Commander-in-Chief reported to the Admiralty that the morale of the crews was ‘deteriorating rapidly’ as the spectre of German reprisals against families had now been aroused and that he doubted whether the officers would be able to check the tendency. Admiral James recommended that all the crews should be removed and repatriated,6 with the exception of those who volunteered to remain and fight; this, he suggested, would permit the French to tell the Germans that they had had to bow to force majeure. He also suggested that essential parts of the propulsion machinery should be removed from the larger ships. This matter of morale was drawn to the attention of the War Cabinet at all of the three meetings held on 24 June, at 1200, 1800 and 2230. It was agreed that the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth’s recommendations should be adopted, a belief being expressed that ‘No reliance could possibly be placed upon them [the crews], in view of the known Communist tendency of the French Navy before the war.’7 No decision was taken as to when or how to execute the policy. The current Admiralty assessment of the broader issues of the future of the French fleet was summarised in a signal made to the Hermes 98

24 JUNE

at noon, in response to Captain Onslow’s request of the previous afternoon. The message,8 cleared for transmission immediately before the First Sea Lord went to the first Cabinet meeting of the day, began with confidence, continued with wishfulness and ended on a note of fantasy: From reports just received, indications are:– 1. Under no circumstances will Fleet be allowed to fall into German or Italian hands. 2. Their future action will largely depend on whether some provisional Government, possibly functioning from North Africa, can be formed. 3. If strong lead is given Fleet might fight on. 4. Darlan has urged that Fleet fight on, but issue will depend on orders received from Esteva.

It is not at all clear on what information the final paragraph was based. None of the intelligence from Bordeaux had indicated that Amiral Sud had such influence or might exercise it against Amiral Darlan’s instructions: in the latter’s own ‘Xavier 377’ of 20 June, Esteva was second in the line of succession, after Amiral de Laborde, and the BNLO’s report from Bizerta on 23 June had stated that Esteva was loyal to Darlan, from whom he was actively seeking orders. Amiral Sud would assume the level of importance credited to him in the signal only if the British government’s wish to see a French government formed in North Africa were fulfilled and if Esteva became the senior French naval commander to recognise that government. Admiral Pound’s near-public confidence in French promises to keep the fleet out of Axis hands was clearly not shared by the Prime Minister when the latter read out to the midday War Cabinet a letter from Reynaud, who pleaded that there should be no recriminations against the present French Government, and attempted to argue that, notwithstanding the terms of the armistice, the British Government would be safeguarded against the enemy obtaining possession of the French Fleet. It was clear from this message that M. Reynaud could no more be relied on than the other members of the Bordeaux Govt.

Churchill continued that as the French government had broken their treaty with Britain, and were now ‘completely under the thumb of Germany’, they would allow all their resources to fall into the hands of the Axis and be used against their former allies. Moreover, the French 99

THE ROAD TO ORAN

would inevitably be drawn more and more into making common cause with Germany and we must expect that soon we should be the object of the deepest hatred of France. So long as the position of the French warships was unsecured, they would be used as a blackmailing threat against us. We must at all costs ensure that these ships either came under our control or were put out of the way for good.9

Four weeks earlier, the first discussions on the subject of the French fleet had centred on persuading the French to scuttle the fleet and this had been the objective until shortly before the armistice. Now that scuttling had become wholly dependent upon a French initiative, it seemed to have become less desirable to the British government and thus it was that the most depressing news of the day came from Amiral de Laborde’s squadron, at Casablanca, after this meeting of the War Cabinet. Captain Bissett had already been instructed to continue to attempt to discourage the French from scuttling their ships and to persuade them to fight on, sailing for British ports if need be. At 1120 (1220 London time) he had to report:10 Situation deteriorated beyond point suggested. Senior Officer preparing to demilitarise Fleet to support Pétain Govt. Some COs might disobey order to scuttle, but demilitarisation in French or French Colonial harbours seems probable, though many Junior Officers might re-act against demilitarisation if given the chance. If North African Govt. accept peace terms, force will be required to release French Fleet.

Bissett’s next signal, sent three hours later,11 reported the attitude of Vice-amiral Ollive, Amiral Afrique, ashore at Casablanca: France defeated. 2. French Navy will take orders only from French Govt. 3. There will be no break between France and North African Colonies. 4. Fear of defeat by Spain which would be worse than capitulating to Germany. 5. North Africa without sufficient troops or material.

Following this unwelcome information, Admiral North’s report on his meeting with Amiral Gensoul was almost neutral. North was, furthermore, seeking a second opinion from Casablanca and he obtained Admiralty approval to despatch Captain C.S. Holland, formerly the Naval Attaché in Paris and now commanding the Ark Royal. Holland, on whom the authorities at Gibraltar were to depend heavily in the days to come, was about to leave by air for Casablanca ‘to clarify situation and help in pressing our views’. 100

24 JUNE

In contrast with the pessimistic naval reports from Morocco, the British Military Mission in Algeria was advocating positive initiatives, particularly in the form of statements of support for continued resistance by the French authorities, led by General A.P. Noguès, the ResidentGeneral. All military opinion disgusted with armistice and looking for sign British help which is thought to be always too late. Political opinion here is extremely defeatist; doubtful whether Noguès will continue war … Much depends on immediate support well broadcast.12

That the support or broadcast could be other than well chosen was indicated by a further signal13 which confirmed the fears of the Ambassador in London: [I am] urging need for formation of authoritative French Government without delay. Prestige of de Gaulle insufficient to carry masses with him and presence in London facilitates German propaganda that he is under British influence. Already false instructions continually received. Suggest broadcast by Prime Minister, but voice of new cadre French Govt. should first be heard otherwise danger suspected [of] too great British influence.

Corbin’s views on de Gaulle’s broadcast on 23 June and the subsequent British declaration of support for his Comité had been made known to the first Cabinet meeting on 24 June and the Foreign Secretary had suggested that the British government should ‘go rather slow for the present’ in withdrawing recognition from the Pétain government, to reduce the potential for German propaganda that Britain was already treating France as an enemy. After the noon Cabinet meeting, R. Cambon, the Minister at the French Embassy, called upon the Foreign Office to deliver an official communication from his government. Corbin had been unwilling to undertake the task in person. The statement began by complaining that the BBC had been placed at General de Gaulle’s disposal for an appeal over the head of the French government. It requested that the British Consul-Generals at Rabat, Tunis and Algiers be recalled and that the Foreign Secretary should explain their conduct in appealing to French overseas territories to abandon the metropolitan government. In ‘withdrawing from the struggle’, the French government had not lost sight of its responsibilities to Britain and had been preoccupied with ensuring that neither France nor any aspect of French activity could be used against its former ally. None of the armistice conditions was considered to set aside this preoccupation and, in particular, it 101

THE ROAD TO ORAN

was thought ‘certain’ that the French fleet could not in any event be used against Great Britain. Finally, the French government wished to make certain observations concerning the Prime Minister’s recent statements, which had made a ‘very painful impression’ in France. Despite repeated formal assurances about the measures to safeguard the French fleet, The attitude of His Majesty’s Government, and the remarks of the Prime Minister, had given the impression that the solemn declarations of the French Government had not been received in London with the complete confidence which they deserved. Whatever difficulties might be caused by the present situation ought not to be allowed to break the moral and political front which the two Governments had maintained hitherto.

Particular exception was taken to the implications in recent statements that the French government was unconstitutional and lacked public support: If the terms used by the Prime Minister were any guide, the Prime Minister seemed to regard the present French Government as not accurately representing French public opinion, or as representing only part of it. It was important to emphasise that there was no ‘Government of Bordeaux’. There was only one Government of France, which interpreted the feelings of Frenchmen and was fully supported by them.14

Cambon gave his personal advice that the French government’s statement about a ‘common’ front should not be overlooked. Unless this point was properly dealt with in any reply, the French were likely to pretend that the British government had rejected the proffered hand of friendship. He also hoped that the British government would not say anything that would provoke the closure of the French Embassy in London – it was the sole remaining link between the two governments and it would be ‘disastrous’ if it were to be broken. Lebrun’s reply to the King’s appeal also arrived during the afternoon:15 I received the personal message with an emotion which Your Majesty can easily understand. In the cruel circumstances in which my country finds itself, having exhausted the last possibilities of armed resistance to an invasion whose blow was sustained almost entirely by our own forces, I can only remind Your Majesty of the repeated assurances given by my Government to the British Government, namely that the French fighting fleet cannot in the future be used against Great Britain. I would like to hope that these assurances will be of such a nature as to keep

102

24 JUNE

Your Majesty’s Government in the path of friendship which my country hopes to be able to pursue.

The British War Cabinet, meeting at 1800, did not discuss these two communications in detail, merely ‘taking note’ of the French government’s statements and agreeing that ‘it would not be necessary to advise HM the King to send any further communication’. Immediately before the meeting Churchill had held a discussion with officials who had recently been dealing with General de Gaulle, including Vansittart and General Spears. During the discussion it had been suggested that the British declaration which had followed de Gaulle’s broadcast on 23 June had gone too far, in that it implied an intention to sever relations with the Bordeaux government. According to the Prime Minister,16 The declaration had not, however, gone as far as this. But in any event those present at the discussion had agreed that we could not draw back. The waverers [in France and her colonies] would be influenced only by strong action on our part. If we hesitated, they would give way all along the line. If they had no stomach for continuing, they would find other pretexts for withdrawing. In these circumstances, it would be best to continue to express our sympathy and to avoid recriminations, but to act solely in accordance with the dictates of our own safety. He [the Prime Minister] agreed with this line, which he proposed to take in a statement to be made in Parliament. We could not be expected to release ships, aircraft and gold, all of which would afterwards be turned against us by the enemy.

In effect, then, the olive branch had been rejected. The sense of betrayal by the Pétain government, the growing loss of faith in French assurances, the total lack of trust in German intentions, and the desperately solitary position in which Britain now found itself were individually sufficient to induce hesitation, even without Churchill’s own personality and his belief in the one man whom he believed represented ‘Fighting France’. In combination, they virtually ensured rejection of continued association with the Bordeaux government if the infamous prophecy17 that ‘In three weeks, England will have her neck wrung like a chicken’ was not to be self-fulfilling. The Cabinet discussion18 about the French fleet was very lengthy and went into considerable detail, much of it erroneous. The underlying assumption was – and it remained unchanged during the period under review – that ‘Whatever assurances the French might have received from the Germans, we could not prevent the enemy obtaining possession of the ships unless they were scuttled or taken in possession by us.’ 103

THE ROAD TO ORAN

Any pretext of French non-fulfilment of the armistice terms was seen as providing a temptation to Germany to seize ships when they came into ports under Axis control to be demilitarised, and the open-ended requirement stated in Article 8 for the German use of ships for coastal surveillance and minesweeping meant to the members of the Cabinet that no reliance could be placed on any safeguards in the terms. The statements of Esteva and Gensoul, who had both avowed allegiance to their government, similarly gave no reassurance, for the only government in France was the discredited (in British eyes) Bordeaux government. The best hope of obtaining control of the French fleet lay in the establishment of a French government in North Africa, whose orders might be accepted by French officers. The prospects of this were realistically described as ‘none too bright’ and therefore ‘we should have to act quickly’ if the ships were not to be handed over to the Axis. Having agreed the situation, discussion turned to practical considerations. Apart from the two modern battleships which had taken refuge in West Africa, where they were expected to present no difficulties, the most useful parts of the French fleet were in the Mediterranean and only the least valuable elements were within British control (where, it was decided, they would remain for the duration). Even the repatriation of the crews of the ships in Britain might, however, be regarded as a virtual act of war, giving Amiral Darlan the excuse to state that, under the circumstances, he could not be expected to fulfil his previous assurances that no ships would be allowed to fall intact into enemy hands. British options were limited. Immediate action could be taken to ensure that the French fleet did not fall into enemy hands and ‘if necessary, we should not scruple to use force to secure this end’. But an attack on the Force de Raid was recognised to be a formidable task. Morale was ‘comparatively’ high, the harbour defences at Oran/ Mers-el-Kébir were powerful and air torpedo attack on the ships was impractical in their present berths.19 It was agreed that the use of force against the French ships was to be avoided and that they should therefore be allowed to proceed to the ports appointed by the French government, shadowed by forces prepared to take action at once if any risk was seen of the ships falling into German hands. Prompt action on the part of the Admiralty was now required, for only six hours would elapse between the Franco-Italian armistice signature and the Germans giving effect to the terms; the enemy might even fly personnel to North Africa to expedite an immediate effect. The War Cabinet decided that the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary should draft a formal ultimatum to the French government, stating that the British government could not accept the clear risk of the 104

24 JUNE

French fleet falling into German hands and that the ships should therefore be scuttled within a time limit to be specified; otherwise British forces would take action against them: On receipt of such an ultimatum, some of the French ships now in harbour might put to sea. This would be to our advantage since it would be much easier to deal with them there than if they were in harbour under the protection of their own guns. It was not to be expected that the French crews would put up any very serious resistance in any case. (emphasis added)

The Cabinet minutes do not reflect who was responsible for this extraordinary idea, but it may be reasonably ascribed to the individual who commented during the noon meeting on the ‘Communist tendency’ in the French Navy.20 In view of the earlier appreciation that the morale of the Force de Raid was ‘comparatively high’ and the knowledge that Darlan had given strict orders that no ships were to pass to the control of any foreign power, it represented a contemptuous, foolish underestimation of a potential enemy which could not be excused by pressure of events. Having come to the conclusion that the use of force might be necessary, the Cabinet invited the First Lord to arrange for the preparation of a naval staff appreciation of the action which would be involved. Alexander was also to consider changes in Fleet dispositions which might be needed at short notice. Discussion about French merchant shipping was much more brief but was decisive. French ships on the high seas should be diverted to British ports and it was confirmed that French ships should not be allowed to sail from British (and British-controlled) ports, except at the discretion of naval authorities who could be satisfied that the intended voyage would end in a ‘safe’ port; Indo-China was cited as being loyal to the Allied cause. The decision that no ship, of any flag, should be allowed to proceed to any port in occupied France was, in effect, a decision to blockade the entire west coast of France; furthermore, as the Royal Navy controlled both entrances to the Mediterranean, metropolitan France was cut off from all but its North African colonies. As the meeting neared its end, the news arrived that the FrancoItalian armistice had been signed at 1815 London time. The next meeting, to discuss the Naval Staff appreciation, was therefore fixed for 2230. The First Sea Lord, at this late meeting, began his résumé of the Naval Staff paper21 by stating his own opinion that as soon as any attempt was made to take over or sink units of the French fleet, the crews of the remaining ships would become actively hostile, thus 105

THE ROAD TO ORAN

reducing the chances of securing more than a small part of the fleet. Additionally, the Germans would immediately take more ‘stringent measures’ to obtain the remainder. The Naval Staff paper introduced a note of professional realism which had been completely missing up to this time. In previous discussions, the Cabinet had appeared to assume that German possession equalled immediate capability: there had been no consideration of where the German Navy would find the trained manpower to operate a large number of ships whose general layout, machinery and armament were totally unfamiliar. Now it was pointed out that some time would elapse before the French submarines or capital ships could be operated efficiently by the putative new owners: the Naval Staff ’s estimate – that the Germans would need ‘some two months’ and the Italians three to achieve this state – was very much a worst-case assumption. Consideration was given as to whether, if force became necessary, it would be better to attempt to seize the French capital ships or submarines. The utility of the latter could be minimised by the routeing of Allied ships through more northerly waters, but the reinforcement of the Italian fleet, which it was believed would soon have five or six capital ships of its own,22 by two modern French ships would pose serious problems. The Royal Navy force at Gibraltar would have to be strengthened to contain the Italian fleet within the Mediterranean; if Spain entered the war on the Axis side, Britain would be unable to maintain effective control of the western exit from the Mediterranean. Assuming that a choice had to be made, then the French capital ships, specifically the battlecruisers Dunkerque and Strasbourg, rather than the submarines should be eliminated. The battlecruisers were ‘reported to be in a new harbour not far from Oran’,23 lying with two older battleships, a score of destroyers and an unknown number of submarines, under the protection of 6in shore batteries. The British force available to deal with the Force de Raid consisted of two 15in capital ships and an aircraft carrier, which were also ‘marking’ the Richelieu and Jean Bart while closing the exit from the Mediterranean to the Italian fleet. The carrier’s aircraft could carry out bombing attacks, but torpedo attack was not thought to be feasible within the confines of the harbour. The only real chance of success, it was considered, lay in a surprise dawn gunfire attack, delivered without any form of prior notification or warning to the French government or any other French authorities. The possibility that the Italian fleet might arrive off Oran to take delivery of the French squadron could not be ruled out. The assessment concluded that the operation might well result in the loss or disablement of both British capital ships; not only would this be a handicap in dealing with the Richelieu and Jean Bart, but there was a danger that command of 106

24 JUNE

the western Mediterranean would be lost. The First Sea Lord went on to say that the probable loss of our two ships seemed a heavy price to pay for the elimination or partial elimination of the Force de Raid. Admiral Darlan and other French Admirals had maintained the consistent attitude that in no circumstances would the French Fleet be surrendered, and it would seem more likely that we should achieve our object by trusting in these assurances, rather than by attempting to eliminate units of the French Fleet by force. He did not therefore recommend the proposed operation.

Discussion after the First Sea Lord’s résumé provided humanitarian and political perspectives to the practical considerations: The decision to order the destruction of people who had only 48 hours before been Allies would be hard to make. If French sailors were to be killed in action with the British Fleet, the French and German Governments would declare that England was making war on France and the sympathy of the entire French Empire would probably be lost to us.

The Prime Minister was for the time being, at least, apparently persuaded against an attack on Oran, commenting that an attack on the Force de Raid would ‘undoubtedly’ prove very costly and might not be successful. But he then stated that ‘the ships which mattered most were the Jean Bart and Richelieu which were at present unarmed and should prove easy to secure once they left the shelter of the French [West African] ports’. This was, of course, not the view of the Naval Staff, who had virtually discounted both ships in their appreciation. The Jean Bart was many months from completion and far from the fully competent dockyard which it needed for fitting-out, and the Richelieu had been reported as lacking main armament ammunition – a different matter from being ‘unarmed’. What Churchill meant by ‘easy to secure’ was to become apparent within the next 24 hours. There was lengthy discussion of the draft communication prepared by the Foreign Office, demanding that the French government should arrange to sink forthwith warships which might be in danger of falling into Axis hands. It was eventually agreed that further consideration should be held over until the following day, but only after the First Lord had urged strongly that no such message should be sent if a surprise attack on Oran was still contemplated. In discussion, Neville Chamberlain and Clement Attlee, respectively Lord President of the Council and Lord Privy Seal, had emphasised different aspects of the room for manoeuvre which the armistice terms appeared to give to Germany, but the Prime Minister dismissed a 107

THE ROAD TO ORAN

comment by the Minister of Information based on Amiral Gensoul’s repetition of the promise that the French fleet would not be handed over intact: too much weight should not be attached to these private messages. The situation had to be faced in the light of public documents and in view of the terms of the Armistice to which the Bordeaux Government had agreed. The covert suggestion that the French authorities might scuttle their ships could not be relied on.

Sublimely oblivious to the contradiction implicit in not accepting the value of information reflecting up-to-date thoughts among senior French commanders who remained loyal to the French government, while he himself had taken decisions based on advice from a ‘disloyal’ junior general, Churchill went on to point out what he conceived to be the difference between armistice terms and peace terms: It must be remembered that the protection given by the Armistice did not necessarily apply to the peace terms … Once the German occupation of France was complete, and the French Government were entirely at their mercy, there was nothing to stop Germany from imposing peace terms more onerous than those to which the French had agreed for the purpose of the Armistice.

The Cabinet decided to defer a decision on any action to be taken on ships not under direct British control until it was seen how the situation developed in the light of the Franco-Italian armistice. At the same time, it was decided to send Duff Cooper and General Lord Gort to Morocco, where ministers who had served in Reynaud’s administration were reported to have arrived, to persuade them to set up a French government in North Africa or Syria, where, it will be recalled, General Mittelhauser had only recently declared his determination to fight on and disobey orders from Bordeaux.24 Gort was, perhaps, not the best choice of British military representative: he had been the commander of the British Expeditionary Force and he had on 25 May disobeyed Weygand’s orders to withdraw to the south, and although this permitted the evacuation through Dunkirk, the fact of his disobedience assumed great significance in some circles in France.25 NOTES 1. BNLO Amiral Sud’s signal, 0744, 23 June 1940. 2. C-in-C Med’s signal, 1059, 24 June 1940.

108

24 JUNE 3. 4. 5. 6.

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

WM(40)178, Confidential Annex. FOCNA’s signal, 1400, 24 June 1940. That is, the midday broadcast on 23 June. WM(40)178, Confidential Annex and C-in-C Portsmouth’s signal, 1303, 24 June 1940; in mid-morning, all French naval personnel who had been accommodated ashore were moved to Aintree, near Liverpool, where they were to be ‘processed’ for repatriation or continued active service. WM(40)178, Confidential Annex; the author of this sweeping supposition is not identified. 1st Sea Lord’s signal, 1159, 24 June 1940. WM(40)178. BNLO Brest’s signal, 1120, 24 June 1940. Ibid., 1430, 24 June 1940. No. 3 Military Mission’s signal, 0055, 24 June 1940. Ibid., 1710, 24 June 1940. WM(40)179, Confidential Annex. Quoted in Ce Matin (Paris), 20 December 1949. WM(40)179, Confidential Annex. Ascribed to Weygand by Churchill, whom other writers have followed. WM(40)179, Confidential Annex. Neither of the latter assertions was true – the harbour defences, particularly the anti-aircraft defences, at Mers-el-Kébir were incomplete and subsequent events were to demonstrate that air torpedo attack was possible. See p. 98. WM(40)180, Confidential Annex; the original Staff paper has not been traced. The 15in gun battleships Littorio and Vittorio Veneto were completed before the end of 1940. That is, Mers-el-Kébir. Military Mission, Beirut, telegram, 2000, 24 June 1940. Pierre Varillon, Mers-el-Kébir (Paris, Amiot Dumont, 1949), p. 28.

109

13

The Armistice, 25 June

The armistice between France and the Axis powers came into effect 35 minutes after midnight on 24/25 June. A quarter of an hour later, the Flag Officer Commanding, North Atlantic, assuming that, as the French were no longer allies, liaison officers should be withdrawn, ordered the destroyer Watchman, at Casablanca, to embark all British Service personnel and return to Gibraltar. The Admiralty, however, had no intention of withdrawing the officers, who were serving as antennae, until French demands became insistent and subsequently reversed Admiral North’s order to leave Casablanca,1 before the Watchman could sail. Vice-amiral Godfroy received orders soon after midnight to sail for Beirut. He formally requested permission of Admiral Cunningham to leave harbour and was, inevitably, refused. Despite this, as the British Admiral reported at 0131, Our relations exceptionally friendly and I rather feel he and many of his officers are very glad to have to bow to force majeure. I anticipate no difficulty. I hope the intention with regard to these ships may soon be made known to me as soon as possible as Godfroy may have trouble with ships’ companies.2

There was confusion and concern in London as to the exact terms of the Franco-Italian agreement. It had come to be understood that under the Franco-German terms the demilitarisation of the French fleet would be permitted in the colonial ports where the ships were lying, but the BBC had intercepted a broadcast announcing the Franco-Italian armistice which stated that the fleet would have to return to metropolitan ports.3 The actual terms of Article 8 of the Franco-German armistice (see above) had stated that they would be ‘assembled in ports to be determined to be demobilised and disarmed’; the Franco-Italian terms reported by the BBC agreed that the peacetime basing of ships would be a determining factor in the choice of ports for demobilisation and disarmament. The First Sea Lord explained the situation when signalling to Cunningham: ‘presumably they [the terms] must be the 110

THE ARMISTICE, 25 JUNE

same. Before HM Government can come to a decision it is essential that the true terms must be known. In the meantime, French ships must be prevented from sailing.’4 There was no recorded discussion by the War Cabinet on 25 June of the discrepancies perceived between the version of the armistice terms supplied by the French and that reported by the BBC, but it is clear that by the close of the day the latter had come to be regarded as reflecting more accurately the agreement between the French and the Axis powers.5 In default of any informed source of denial or modification, this view did not change during the days which followed and it therefore coloured the attitude and approach of all the British authorities in London, military and political, during the most critical week which followed. Notwithstanding the Prime Minister’s comments at the third meeting of the War Cabinet during the previous evening on private utterances and opinions, Admiral Pound sent a personal signal to FOCNA asking him if he considered that ‘there would be any prospect of French ships at Oran surrendering to us if British force arrived off port and summoned them to surrender’. This was followed by a near-identical signal to the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, the only change being the substitution of Casablanca and Dakar for Oran.6 Admiral North replied very quickly: ‘From my interview yesterday with Gensoul I am sure they would not surrender. Commander Collett, late of French battlecruiser Dunkerque, holds the same opinion.’7 Vice-Admiral Sir George d’Oyly Lyon, in whose area were the two French West African naval bases, delayed his reply until Captain Holland could report on his visit to Casablanca. Lyon eventually made his theoretical prognostications 28 hours later, by which time he had been thoroughly distracted by practical developments. Captain Pleydell-Bouverie and Sir Ronald Campbell arrived in London during the forenoon of 25 June and went their separate ways to report to the Admiralty and the Foreign Office. They had been out of touch with developments for two vital days while aboard the Galatea, but their reports were given great weight, as being those of the British representatives most recently in direct contact with the French government. Neither could give more reassurance than that which had already been received and, to a greater or lesser extent, doubted by members of the War Cabinet, and both made comments which tended further to depress confidence. The Ambassador gave his reasons for leaving Bordeaux and went on: They [the Pétain government] had violated the no-separate-peace engagement; they had broken their word, recently renewed in writing, to consult HM Government on receipt of German terms; they were meeting

111

THE ROAD TO ORAN

my representations with evasions and were treating me personally with discourtesy; and they were on the point of falling under enemy control.

On the subject of the French fleet, Campbell made no recrimination about ‘broken promises’ to send the ships to Britain – a theme which was to occur only later – but restated the last official assurances: Up to the last, every French Minister whom I saw from Marshal Pétain downwards, continued to assure me in the most categorical terms that HM Government need have no anxiety in regard to the Fleet which in the last resort would have to be scuttled.

He could only have ‘reasonable faith’ in the honour of Amiral Darlan.8 Pleydell-Bouverie’s written report was in the form of a diary of events, supplemented by a covering letter which included subjective impressions. He had been upset to discover that during the last days of his stay at Bordeaux a number of those whom he regarded as his particular friends in the French Admiralty had been forbidden to speak to him and this may have coloured the opinions which he passed on to the British Admiralty: Regarding the French Fleet I was convinced at the time the First Lord and First Sea Lord arrived [i.e. 18 June] that the French would never turn their Fleet over to us but I did not think they would cave in to the terms imposed in the way that they did. Admiral Darlan’s actions will always remain something of an enigma to me though I am sure that there was some background of political intrigue. He was certainly much influenced by his senior staff in regard to the sending of the Fleet to British ports and I think there was some political opposition to any such action. In all my arguments I could never get them to go beyond their oftrepeated assurance that the Fleet would never be allowed to fall into enemy hands. I appealed to their honour and to their obligations to us, begged them to understand that the control of their ships would remain theirs even though they might be based at a British port, etc. To none of these arguments did I ever get a real response, only the repeated assurances to which I have referred. Having seen how hopelessly unprepared they were for many other situations for which they told me preparations had been made I could have little real confidence in the assurances regarding their Fleet. No real fighting lead was ever given to the more junior members of the Admiralty Staff by their Seniors and they were constantly and to an ever-increasing extent kept in the dark as to the real march of events. These facts plus the appalling conditions under which they had lived

112

THE ARMISTICE, 25 JUNE

and worked must largely be responsible for the complete collapse of their morale and with it of the Fleet.9

To the professionals, coming from one of their own, who had watched the collapse at close hand, this was a damning indictment of the French Navy’s will. The doubt which it cast upon Darlan’s own freedom of decision was particularly unwelcome at a time when Admiral Pound was basing his opposition to direct offensive action on trust. Writing personally to the First Sea Lord,10 after he had been invited to give his opinion on possible courses of action, Pleydell-Bouverie was less uncertain about Darlan’s authority in the fleet – its commanders still trusted him and would in all circumstances obey his orders: The conclusion that I come to … is that it seems likely that the French Fleet will be ordered by Admiral Darlan to its ‘Home Ports’, there to be disarmed under the terms of the Armistice but that insufficient preparation will have been made for the eventuality which is almost certain to happen [i.e. the seizure of the ships by the Axis]. The question now comes to what, if any, action can be taken to prevent the French Fleet going to its Home Ports and to this there seem to be only two answers:– a. The setting up of a French Government in Africa which would take control of the remaining Colonial Possessions and fighting strength of France or b. Naval action by ourselves to prevent the French Fleet from reaching its Home Ports. The possibilities of (a) are beyond me for I have no knowledge of what has happened to any of the French Statesmen who command sufficient respect to carry out such a proposition. (b) bristles with difficulties and it is quite certain that political reaction of [sic] such a course might be adverse and very far reaching. In my opinion (a) above would solve the problem but as an immediate action the best it appears possible to do seems to be to try, and by whatever means are to hand, the effect of suggesting to French Commanders-in-Chief the utter folly of allowing their ships to go to French Home Ports whilst the atmosphere of defeatism exists. In conclusion I cannot believe that there are not many in the French Fleet who will give up without a kick but they have all been such ‘Unwise Virgins’ up to date that they have need of a strong lead from somewhere, if they are not to fall into the trap so obviously being laid for them.

The First Sea Lord now received his first direct word from the French Admiralty for several days, through the medium of Vice-amiral Odend’hal. The latter had reported to Bordeaux early on 23 June that the French warships in British ports were being detained and the 113

THE ROAD TO ORAN

Amirauté had replied in cypher at 1350 on 24 June. The sure but awkward communications link via the French wireless guardship at Plymouth meant that the Naval Mission in London did not receive this until the morning of 25 June. The attaché then translated this into a letter to Admiral Pound, which he delivered in person:11 I just received a message from Admiral Darlan stating that the dispositions of the Armistice have been accepted on the only condition that the French Fleet must definitely remain French under the French Flag with a French reduced complement and is to remain French finally. Admiral Darlan considers that these dispositions have nothing contrary to the British interests.12 But he has been sadly impressed in learning that the British Admiralty opposed the departure of the French warships now in the United Kingdom ports; such a position, if maintained, could only be considered as unfriendly by the French Government. Therefore, Admiral Darlan requests me to ask you most pressingly to alter your decision at an early date.

No British account exists of the interview which followed, but Amiral Odend’hal described the First Sea Lord as being a little shaken (ébranlé).13 The communication, Pound said, was interesting but action on the matter depended upon the War Cabinet, which needed to know the precise text of the armistice before reaching a decision. Odend’hal enclosed a copy of the first part of the signal itself with his letter, but he omitted to make any mention of a far more significant message from Darlan – the last ‘Xavier 377’ to all senior commanders and ships afloat, which was authorised at 1245 on 24 June and transmitted in three parts: The clauses of the Armistice are being sent to you by other means. I am using this last opportunity of sending you instructions by cypher to acquaint you of my thoughts on the subject. 1. The demobilised warships will stay French, under the French Flag, with reduced French crews, remaining in French metropolitan or colonial ports. 2. Secret preparations for auto-sabotage are to be made in order that an enemy or foreigner seizing a vessel by force shall not be able to make use of the same. 3. Should the Armistice Commission charged with interpreting the text, come to a different decision from that in para 1, and as soon as action on any such decision is attempted, warships are without further orders to be despatched to the United States, or alternatively

114

THE ARMISTICE, 25 JUNE

scuttled, provided that no other action is possible to escape the enemy. Under no circumstances are they to fall into enemy hands. 4. Ships that seek refuge abroad are not to be used in operations of war against Germany or Italy without prior orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy. XAVIER 377

The French Mission in London was not an addressee, but Odend’hal had received the first two parts, which provided the first three paragraphs of Darlan’s ‘thoughts’, from the Plymouth guardship. In view of the First Sea Lord’s obvious anxiety to obtain the terms of the armistice, it is inexplicable that the Attaché made no reference, then or later, to the opening sentence, particularly in view of the statement that the message would be sent en clair. Some restraint might have been necessary in respect of the ‘thoughts’, but it might have been beneficial had the British War Cabinet been given the opportunity to draw the appropriate conclusions from the order that sabotage was to deny ships to ‘an enemy or foreigner’ using force, and comfort from the order that no further orders were needed to scuttle ships or make for the United States if the Armistice Commission violated the essential ‘French-ness’ of the fleet. Even less explicable than Vice-amiral Odend’hal’s silence on this signal was the fact that Vice-amiral Godfroy also made no comment to Cunningham. His readiness to inform the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean of Amirauté instructions, before and after this final general ‘Xavier 377’, was in such marked contrast that it seems possible that he did not, in fact, receive it, although his Force ‘X’ was one of the addressees. The penultimate ‘Xavier 377’ never came to British attention. Godfroy was a recipient but again it is not clear whether he actually received a copy. While therefore irrelevant to the War Cabinet’s deliberations, it was nevertheless of considerable interest and importance, not least for the influence it exercised on the admirals in Algeria and Morocco through a threat of air attack which implied Spanish acquiescence if not intervention: 1. Exhaustive study of military situation shows continuation of struggle [from] North Africa and colonies would provide an illusory outcome, with enemy able to dispose of the entire European coastline from the North Cape to Gibraltar and Trieste as well as the Balearics, Canaries and perhaps the Portuguese archipelagos [Madeira, Cape Verde Islands and the Azores]. The few North African ports would be practically asphyxiated by aviation.

115

THE ROAD TO ORAN

2. Military and air armament state of Great Britain, and distancing of British bases [from sources] – Gibraltar, Malta easily neutralised – mean that for many months any British assistance [to us] would be il lusory, particularly if Britain’s own soil were attacked. 3. In these circumstances, given the state of the essential centre of the [French] Empire, government has considered it indispensable to acknowledge our defeat and to ask to cease hostilities. The Armistice Clauses will not contain any clause contrary to honour. No North African territory will be occupied and the Italian occupation will be limited to positions acquired by that country’s army. German occupation will be more extensive and will be reduced as soon as the war between England and the Axis is concluded. As far as the Fleet is concerned, it will remain French and will be stationed in French ports. Present [English] attitude tends moreover to favour the situation of our fleet. 4. Government, recognising admirable service yielded by Navy, intends to use numerous personnel in reorganisation of country. 5. I ask you to remain calm and disciplined. Stop. High [profile] personality of Maréchal Pétain will in itself suffice to soothe worries which selfish propaganda is striving to spread. Stop. All my previous orders remain in force. Xavier 377

The underlying logic of certain passages cannot be denied but, even at the eleventh hour, coming from a commander-in-chief whose refrain for the past week had been that his Service was unbeaten, the overly apocalyptic side of the first and second paragraphs may provide an insight into Darlan’s actual capacity for strategic vision, as opposed to his unquestionable skill at political manoeuvre. There was still no justification for believing that air power could actually deny the exercise of, let alone ‘asphyxiate’, maritime power – after all, the evacuation of the French ports had taken place in the teeth of a hitherto-unknown intensity of air attack, the Royal Navy was still using its east and south coast bases although they were within easy reach of enemy aircraft, and neither the Luftwaffe nor Italy’s Regia Aeronautica had so far inflicted any measurable damage in their attacks on Toulon and Marseilles, even though the fighter defences had proved to be completely inadequate. Whether the remainder of the message struck the note of reassurance that was intended by the last three paragraphs could only have been answered by a contemporary French recipient, and none of the addressees appears to have left a mémoire on this matter. But the final sentence of the third paragraph – ‘Attitude actuelle est d’ailleurs de nature à favoriser situation notre flotte’ – begs a 116

THE ARMISTICE, 25 JUNE

further question. Would Darlan have been prepared to provoke a hardening of British attitudes to soften those of the Axis negotiators? The War Cabinet, meeting for the first time on 25 June at 1130, discussed little of importance to the question of the French fleet. The members were, however, informed of the French government’s case as outlined in a statement presented to the US government. The statement regretted the critical attitude adopted by the British government since the Franco-German armistice and, surveying the events which led up to this, pointed out the British failure to mobilise men and resources or to despatch to France the 26 army divisions which had been promised; a French Press delegation had commented unfavourably on laggardly war production; from these and other indications, it was ‘obvious’ that Britain had believed more in the blockade of Germany than in the provision of material assistance to its late ally. Politically, the most serious charge was that: The British Government had been asked what action they would take if France found herself unable to continue the struggle and felt obliged to ask for peace. In reply, the British Government had expressed its intention of continuing the struggle but would not reproach France for her default. Subsequently, due to intervention by M. Mandel and others, the British Government had adopted quite different attitude.15

Churchill commented that the statement was ‘false from beginning to end’ (however, ‘not quite true’ would perhaps have been a more accurate description, certainly in respect of the matter of the British government’s attitude to French withdrawal from hostilities). He proposed to explain the situation before the House of Commons that afternoon and make a policy statement to the effect that ‘in our future relations with the Bordeaux Government we would take what action we thought necessary to ensure our own security and the successful prosecution of the war’.16 The Secretary of State for War (Anthony Eden) reported that, in Syria, General Mittelhauser had been loudly applauded by the officers of the Beirut garrison when he had announced that in no circumstances would he accept orders from the Bordeaux government. A report from the Military Mission at Beirut was somewhat more cautious – Mittelhauser was still determined to carry on despite feeling the weight of the responsibility of his decision to break with Pétain, but he needed reassurance that Britain did not intend to absorb Syria into its possessions; he had cabled Noguès, whose attitude was regarded as critical, but from whom he had received no reply.17 According to the Military Mission in Algiers, Noguès himself had reportedly issued, on orders from Bordeaux, a proclamation stating that there was no 117

THE ROAD TO ORAN

question of abandoning North Africa without a fight,18 but the British Naval Liaison Officer, who had apparently escaped Amiral Sud’s 24 June purge, had earlier reported that the French Navy, lacking ammunition, stores and adequate bases in North Africa, would not support the Resident-General should he resist, but neither would they surrender their ships to the enemy.19 The French cruiser Emile Bertin arrived at Martinique from Halifax with a cargo of gold during the forenoon of 25 June, preceded by the old British light cruiser Dunedin, which had been ordered thither on the previous day. Captain C.E. Lambe of the Dunedin went to call on the Amiral Antilles, Contre-amiral Robert, who was also serving as the Resident-General in the French West Indies colonies, on arrival and reported:20 Admiral Robert’s attitude is weakening. He still awaits orders from Bordeaux Government particularly from Darlan. Vital that British Government keep him officially informed to maintain his spirit and influence his future policy. He particularly requests official information re 1. Armistice terms; 2. French Committee in London.

NOTES 1. FOCNA’s signal, 0050 and Admiralty signal 2235, 25 June 1940. 2. C-in-C Med’s signal, 0131, 25 June 1940. 3. The actual terms of Article 8 of the Franco-German armistice had stated that ships would be ‘assembled in ports to be determined’; the Franco-Italian armistice reported by the BBC agreed that the peacetime basing of ships would be a determining factor in the choice of ports for decommissioning and disarmament. 4. 1st SL’s signal, 0255, 25 June 1940. 5. Admiralty Communiqué No. 54, Admiralty War Diary, Vol. XVII, p. 502. 6. 1SL’s signals, 1025 and 1035, 25 June 1940. 7. FOCNA’s (Admiral Sir Dudley North’s) signal 1220, 25 June 1940; Commander G.K. Collett had been the BNLO on the staff of Amiral Atlantique. 8. HBMA’s Despatch, FO C7541/65/17, 27 June 1940. 9. Naval Attaché’s Diary. 10. Preliminary Report on the Situation Regarding the French Fleet, PRO ADM 205/4. 11. PRO ADM 205/4; Amirauté Telegram No. 5147, 1350, 24 June 1940. 12. ‘Ne lésent pas les intérêts britanniques’ in the original. 13. Odend’hal’s Report to the Minister of Marine, 16 July 1940 (SHM). 14. ‘Xavier 377’ signal, 1115, 24 June 1940 (qpoted in Caroff, Le Théâtre Méditerranéen, Vol. II, p. 132). 15. WM(40)181. 16. Ibid. 17. Military Mission, Beirut’s telegrams, 1415 and 1800, 25 June 1940. 18. Military Mission, Algiers’ telegram, 1411, 25 June 1940. 19. BNLO Algiers’ signal, 0945, 25 June 1940. 20. Dunedin’s signal, 1836, 25 June 1940.

118

14

The Cruise of the Richelieu, 25–26 June

As these indications of waning determination in the colonies were arriving, a melodrama was opening off West Africa. Containing all the unfortunate elements which had dogged the previous week’s affairs and which were to persist thereafter – slow communications, poor intelligence, political interference in professional matters and, above all, misunderstood intentions – it was to cause utter confusion and consternation in the London and Bordeaux Admiralties.1 The Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic had been ordered by the Admiralty to proceed to Dakar in an attempt to stabilise what appeared to be a rapidly deteriorating situation by ‘showing the flag’.2 As Admiral d’Oyly Lyon approached the port, early in the afternoon of 25 June, in his flagship, the seaplane carrier Albatross, the Richelieu was unexpectedly sighted, heading outbound. The only British ship at Dakar when it left had been the aircraft carrier Hermes, whose reaction was delayed due to the French ship informing it that only a change of anchorage was intended. When it was realised, at 1415 (GMT), that the Richelieu, accompanied by the destroyer Fleuret, had actually left, Captain Onslow ordered an aircraft to find and shadow the pair; this it managed to do until 1700, when it had to return to base. The cruiser Dorsetshire, which had left Gibraltar (1,500 miles to the north-east) on 23 June for Dakar, was ordered by Admiral Lyon to intercept and shadow the Richelieu, a signal which was repeated by the First Sea Lord personally at 1900. The Admiralty had now taken direct operational control of the hunt. This change was the result of a decision taken by the War Cabinet, which had met for the second time that day, at 1800.3 Informed that the Richelieu had left Dakar, the Cabinet had Authorised the Admiralty to take the best measures in their power to capture the Richelieu, and also the Jean Bart if she should put to sea. Every step should be taken to avoid bloodshed, and no more force should be used than necessary. No communication should be made to the French Govt. until the operation had been completed.

119

THE ROAD TO ORAN

It is difficult to imagine a wilder notion than this outdated, romantic conception that the most modern twentieth-century battleship afloat could be persuaded to surrender on the high seas at all, let alone without bloodshed. There was no British ship of comparable force within 1,500 miles to support the lightly armoured Dorsetshire: even if successful, it would be hard put to survive the accurate broadside ‘pour le drapeau’ which was the least that Franco-British naval tradition would expect. At 2236, the First Sea Lord ordered the Hermes to follow the Richelieu and locate it,4 but Admiral d’Oyly Lyon demurred, pointing out that as half of the small carrier’s aircraft were ashore and it was capable of only 21 knots he had considered it improbable the previous afternoon that it would be able to gain contact at dawn on 26 June. He personally needed the presence of the ship to bolster his own authority at Dakar and, furthermore, he advised the Admiralty, ‘CO Hermes is convinced that Captain of Richelieu will never hand over his ship to enemy. It is possible he may have received orders from Admiral Afrique proceed Casablanca.’5 The Watchman, still at Casablanca, was ordered to shadow the Jean Bart should it leave harbour.6 This signal crossed with one from Captain Holland, who had arrived in Casablanca to sound out the local naval officers and civil officials. Like Captain Bissett before him, Holland was not optimistic:7 Situation as regards Navy has deteriorated. French Officials ashore here are unanimously decided to obey orders of Pétain Govt. on the grounds of maintaining national unity. Attacks on Govt. by British Prime Minister objected to by them. Two days ago BNLO’s opinion was that show of force would have desired effect but this is no longer true as French views have since changed, apparently on receipt of official information that the fleet will be allowed to remain in French Colonial ports. Declaration of peace terms may however cause a further reversal of feeling in which case show of force might prove acceptable alternative to scuttling, dictated by Darlan’s repeated orders.

The First Sea Lord had, for the time being, more urgent preoccupations. Having made provision to watch the Jean Bart, he next ordered the Vice-Admiral, Aircraft, to take the Ark Royal, Hood and five destroyers to sea from Gibraltar to ‘proceed with despatch’ towards the Canaries and followed this up with instructions to Admiral North to bring the battleship Resolution, also at Gibraltar, to 2 hours’ notice for sea;8 the ‘utmost secrecy’ was to be maintained. A few minutes later, Pound signalled that the Richelieu was heading ‘presumably for the 120

THE CRUISE OF THE RICHELIEU, 25–26 JUNE

Straits of Gibraltar’.9 Whether this assessment was based on intuition or intelligence is not clear. The French naval authorities at Dakar, Casablanca and Bordeaux would have been grateful at this moment for any insight into Capitaine de vaisseau Marzin’s intentions. The latter had gathered the impression on Richelieu’s arrival at Dakar that official sentiment in the colony was decidedly pro-British. Captain Onslow, during a courtesy call in the forenoon of 24 June, tried to persuade him to man the Richelieu with volunteers and take it to Freetown, where they would be paid and victualled at British expense. Marzin took very unkindly to this persuasion and next called on Contre-amiral Plançon, whom he told frankly and heatedly that he felt that he was being treated as an enemy and that, furthermore, the atmosphere in Dakar was one of betrayal. Learning early on 25 June that the Dorsetshire and Albatross were expected to arrive, Capitaine Marzin and Capitaine de corvette de Torcy of the Fleuret decided to leave Dakar. The cooperation of the two submarines based there was requested, to take action against the Hermes should it attempt to interfere with the departure; this was not granted. Amiral Plançon reported the sailing to Amiral Ollive at Casablanca in a brief signal which ended ‘probablement vers vous’. The element of doubt in this message led Amiral Afrique first to signal at 1850 (GMT–1) a direct order to the Richelieu to return to Dakar and then to pass the news of the break-out to the Admiralty at Bordeaux. As the night passed, the latter took counsel of its fears and became convinced that the battleship was making for either a British or a neutral port.10 At midnight on 25/26 June, neither the French Navy nor the Royal Navy knew where the Richelieu was, or where it was heading. The Dorsetshire had expected to intercept it at midnight but had been basing its estimate on an out-of-date course and speed and at that time was 30 miles to the west and heading away. The First Sea Lord sent instructions to Vice-Admiral, Air as to how to deal with the Richelieu. After explaining that this was a government decision, that every step should be taken to avoid bloodshed and that minimum force should be used, Admiral Pound went on that this was an 1. unpleasant task to be carried out in as considerate a manner as possible. 2. Understood Richelieu has HA [i.e. anti-aircraft] ammunition but no main armament ammunition on board. 3. After Richelieu located preferable she should be captured by Hood so that she is faced by overwhelming force, but if risk that she might be lost to sight before Hood arrives or if she is endeavouring to enter

121

THE ROAD TO ORAN

neutral port such as La Luz [Canaries], Dorsetshire should take action. 4. Richelieu is to be taken to Gibraltar.11

The second paragraph was based on the report made from Dakar two days previously and indicated that the largest calibre of gun that the French battleship could use was 5.9in (150mm), which fired a shell half the weight of the Dorsetshire’s 8in (203mm) main armament. Hard on the heels of this signal to Vice-Admiral Wells came another to Admiral North,12 instructing him to use the Resolution to intercept and capture the Jean Bart should it leave Casablanca. All the means available to the Flag Officer Commanding, North Atlantic were to be employed to prevent this ship from passing the Straits of Gibraltar. The Richelieu did not respond to Amiral Afrique’s order to return to Dakar. There is a strong possibility that this was due to a belief on the part of Capitaine Marzin that the signal had not been originated by Amiral Ollive; certainly, Contre-amiral Plançon during the previous days had become extremely suspicious even of signals which had actually been originated in Bordeaux and this suspicion may have been communicated to Marzin. The latter, already nursing dark suspicions of Dakar’s loyalty, would then have felt unable to trust anything but his own judgement, for signalled orders might be originated by either the Germans or the British. There could be no doubt about the authenticity of the signal transmitted from Bordeaux from 0645 to 0650:13 J’apprends avec stupeur votre appareillage de Dakar. Vous n’avez pas le droit de disposer de votre bateau à votre gré ou au bénéfice d’une autre puissance que la France. Toutes les nouvelles anglaises sont fausses et de nature à faire éclater à leur profit une guerre civile qui ruinerait définitivement notre Patrie. Restez à Dakar jusqu’à nouvel ordre de vos chefs. DARLAN – XAVIER 377

One can only sympathise with Capitaine Marzin, who for the right reasons had done the wrong thing in the eyes of his superiors. According to his report of the sortie, he received Amiral Afrique’s signal of the previous evening at 0800 and at 0830 the Richelieu reversed course. The change of course was observed and reported by the Dorsetshire’s reconnaissance aircraft, which had found the battleship 11 minutes earlier (and timed the about-turn as occurring at 0840). The cruiser was then some 40 miles south of the Richelieu, with over 10 hours of daylight left to overhaul it and settle down to 122

THE CRUISE OF THE RICHELIEU, 25–26 JUNE

shadowing; had the battleship not turned back, it is improbable that it could have avoided contact with Vice-Admiral Wells’s force. In the event, the Dorsetshire did not actually sight the Richelieu until 1540, for its aircraft (an amphibian) was unable to find the ship when returning from shadowing and landed on the sea at 1030. The cruiser’s captain, correctly assessing that the French ship was heading back to Dakar, spent two and a half hours in an unsuccessful search for the aircraft before heading off after the Richelieu. While the Dorsetshire was thus engaged, a cautionary note was sounded from Casablanca. Captain Bissett had seen the Admiralty signal informing Admiral Wells that the Richelieu had no main armament ammunition – as the former BNLO Brest he was able to correct this misconception, ‘Richelieu worked day and night embarking 15in ammunition before leaving Brest. Amount on board unknown but gun trial not yet complete. Consider probable that Captain Marsin [sic] of Richelieu would join us given the chance.’ In fact, the battleship had embarked nearly a full outfit of 15in projectiles but it had propellant charges for only 49 rounds and the ammunition supply machinery was not yet fully efficient. His assessment14 of Capitaine Marzin’s loyalty, however, was very much in error: The news that the Richelieu had been found had not reached London by 1130, when the War Cabinet met, chaired by Chamberlain.15 The Admiralty’s orders for the capture of the ship were approved but, at the Foreign Secretary’s request, it was agreed that it was preferable that, to avoid offending Spanish susceptibilities, it should be brought back to Britain and not to Gibraltar. Also at Lord Halifax’s suggestion, a more conciliatory tone was to be adopted for a communication by Vice-Admiral Wells to the captain of the battleship; although already irrelevant for its intended purpose (that of inducing the Richelieu to proceed to Britain), the instructions as transmitted16 indicate some aspects of Cabinet understanding and attitudes. Beginning with reassurance as to the British government’s continued credence in Amiral Darlan’s good faith and intention that no ship should fall into enemy hands, the signal continued: It must however be observed that under the armistices now signed with Germany and Italy, French naval vessels have to be demobilised and disarmed under German and Italian control [i.e., be handed over as fighting units to Germany and Italy]. From that moment Admiral Darlan will no longer have the power, though he would no doubt have the inclination, to carry out his promise, and we should have nothing to rely on by German and Italian promises, which are obviously valueless. HM Government are quite prepared to discuss the future of French naval units and are only concerned to make absolutely secure that in

123

THE ROAD TO ORAN

execution of the Armistice Terms no unit of the French Fleet should fall into German or Italian hands.

In discussion,17 the Cabinet had been presented with a somewhat different wording, with a considerably different explicit meaning, for the sense of the second paragraph: ‘We should, of course, be ready to discuss the matter with the Bordeaux Government, and we should be glad if they could satisfy us that there was no danger that units of the French Navy would fall into German hands.’ Direct contact with the French government would at least have cleared up the uncertainty surrounding the exact terms of the Franco-Italian armistice, although these might have proved no more reassuring than the rumours, but this Foreign Office proposal marked no more than a momentary levelling-out of an otherwise steep downward trend in British government thinking and no attempt was made to establish an official dialogue. The Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic reported to the Admiralty at 1355 that he had been informed by Contre-amiral Plançon that the Richelieu had been ordered back to Dakar. At 1529, the Dorsetshire made a sighting report and two hours later signalled:18 Richelieu in easy visual signalling distance. Relations appear cordial. Her guns not trained on sighting. She regretted unable to comply with my request to cooperate in search for my aircraft owing to her having no aircraft on board but she telegraphed to Dakar for French plane to assist. In view of her declared intention to proceed to Dakar am presuming you would not wish me to apply paragraph 3 of your 0345 26th June. Intend to follow Richelieu as ordered by Dakar.

The captain of the cruiser was correct in his presumption – the Admiralty no longer wished him to capture the battleship and confirmed this in a laconic signal – ‘Shadow only’.19 Admiral d’Oyly Lyon had meanwhile sailed the Hermes at 1700, with the alternative missions of supporting the Dorsetshire by means of an air striking force or (as was to be the case) searching for the cruiser’s missing aircraft. Although the Admiralty had clearly decided against an attempt to capture the Richelieu, the Vice-Chief of Naval Staff informed Admiral North during the evening of 26 June that the instructions regarding the Jean Bart had not been put in abeyance – should it sail it was to be captured and brought to the United Kingdom. At Casablanca, Captain Bissett had been following the events with interest and immediately after his signal about the Richelieu’s ammunition he made a request and a report:20 124

THE CRUISE OF THE RICHELIEU, 25–26 JUNE

Most important BNLOs have earliest possible information if Richelieu is captured and whether willingly or not. re Admiralty 0346/26 Jean Bart still at Casablanca. Hands from Brest joined ship 24/6 probably [for] accommodation only. Considered unlikely [to] sail within next 24 hours.

Although the presence of the destroyer and the BNLO at Casablanca must have been an embarrassment, if not an irritant, during 25 June and 26 June, Amiral Afrique awaited instructions from Bordeaux before, at midday on 26 June, asking Captain Bissett to leave Casablanca. The latter agreed to sail in the Watchman at 1800, informing the Admiralty21 that he would remain on patrol to keep watch on the base from outside territorial waters. Bisset later reported that he had formed the impression that no orders for action were contemplated for the Jean Bart or any other warships at Casablanca. Further, the enthusiasm of junior officers for continuing the war had been cooled by their belief that the French fleet would be allowed to remain in colonial ports. He had taken formal leave of Amiral de Laborde who had told his BNLO that he expected to be ordered to proceed to Algiers to take charge of the demobilisation of the fleet.22 Relations ashore with the colonial government in Morocco had shown other signs of deterioration during the day. The British government delegates – Duff Cooper and Lord Gort – had arrived at Rabat by air late on 25 June to meet the French ministers who had arrived from Bordeaux on the previous day. The ministers had not been permitted to land from their ship and were denied all contact with the shore; Duff Cooper and Gort were unable to obtain any relaxation of this quarantine on 26 June and were obliged to fly home emptyhanded. Admiral d’Oyly Lyon eventually replied at 1705 to the First Sea Lord’s signal asking his views on the prospect of French ships at Casablanca surrendering to a British force arriving off the port. Much had happened in his parish since 25 June and his opinion was definite:23 I consider there is no prospect of such an eventuality [i.e., a surrender to a show of force] and shore defences would definitely take necessary action against any hostile action on our part. Opinion in Naval, Military and Civil circles has hardened in favour of obedience to Bordeaux Govt.

At about this time, Contre-amiral Plançon, acting on Amiral Darlan’s instructions, informed the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic that the Royal Navy’s presence at Dakar was contrary to the Armistice; he 125

THE ROAD TO ORAN

did not, apparently, request d’Oyly Lyon to leave. The latter reported to the Admiralty that he had replied that he ‘must’ remain until further instructions from the Admiralty; he had also asked for assurances from Darlan that if British ships were not to be allowed to use the base, neither should enemy ships. D’Oyly Lyon felt confident that no ship at Dakar, including the Richelieu, would permit itself to be surrendered to the enemy.24 The other main focus of attention was Martinique, where Contreamiral Robert was being encouraged by signals from the Commanderin-Chief, America and West Indies and by visits from Captain Lambe of the Dunedin. Vice-Admiral Kennedy-Purvis had pointed out the ‘obvious trap’ of the armistice terms and considered that ‘some forcible pressure from home and possibly from French Committee is required’. He also offered Lambe the services of the cruiser Fiji, then approaching Martinique, to permit Amiral Robert to take the excuse of force majeure as a way out of his ‘predicament’. The Fiji arrived a few hours later and cruised offshore, outside French territorial waters. The British War Cabinet had found another means of applying pressure to Martinique.25 Quite apart from the need to prevent the gold aboard the Emile Bertin from falling into Axis hands, its ownership was now in doubt following a representation from the Polish Ambassador enquiring whether the consignment included bullion which the French government had undertaken to ship to Canada. As long as uncertainty remained, there would be a valid pretext for preventing the Emile Bertin from leaving. The First Sea Lord instructed the Dunedin accordingly:26 Captain of Emile Bertin should be informed that HM Govt. now learns there are serious doubts whether gold in his ship is entirely French … and you have been told to inform him in the circumstances his ship must remain at Martinique for the present. You should inform him that as your instructions are that you are if necessary to use force to prevent sailing of Emile Bertin you sincerely hope that he will consent to remain in harbour until the question of the gold has been settled.

One French vessel declared its intention to fight on this day. The submarine Narval, manned by an improvised volunteer crew, was brought into Malta by Lieutenant de vaisseau F. Drogou during the forenoon. He informed the Royal Navy authorities that the Germans had obtained the French naval codes and were transmitting messages purporting to be originated by Amiral Darlan. He also showed to the Flag Officer, Malta a copy of the ‘Xavier 377’ which Lord Lloyd had seen on 20 June and the gist of which the BNLO at Bizerta had reported to the First Sea Lord on 22 June.27 Vice-Admiral W.T.R. Ford reported this to his Commander-in-Chief at Alexandria, laying stress on the 126

THE CRUISE OF THE RICHELIEU, 25–26 JUNE

ending of this ‘last apparently genuine order’ from Darlan – ‘Whatever be the orders received never abandon to enemy a ship of war intact’. The Admiralty intercepted this signal28 and seized upon the contents to provide the main themes of a broadcast, ostensibly originated by the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Foreign), to all ships and authorities in contact with the French Navy: To further our policy of obtaining effective cooperation of units French Navy point out to French Authorities with whom you are in contact that we have evidence to show Germans have obtained French Naval codes and are issuing instructions to the French Navy and Marine purporting to come from Admiral Darlan. It can be assumed that this procedure has been used since 20/6. Under these circumstances policy of waiting to receive orders from Admiral Darlan can only result in playing still further into German hands. Emphasize that Darlan’s last message dated 20th June finished by saying:– ‘Whatever be the orders received, etc.’

Certain aspects of this signal29 do not ring entirely true. The First Sea Lord was still professing to believe Darlan’s word that the French fleet was to be scuttled rather than surrendered; his policy therefore depended upon the loyalty of the French fleet to Darlan’s orders and the sowing of seeds of doubt in the one fixed point remaining in most French officers’ kaleidoscopic view of events could have been counterproductive in the extreme, had it been successful. Rather, the instruction was the result of opportunist use of what someone believed to be upto-the-minute intelligence, forgetting or unaware that it had been known for a week that the Germans had used captured cyphers to transmit orders to French warships.30 Other than the supposition of a junior French officer, however, there had been no suggestion, let alone evidence, that Amiral Darlan’s personal cypher had been obtained or his name taken in vain; as it is improbable that any member of the Naval Staff would have reached such a conclusion it is reasonable to suggest that the originator was in fact the Prime Minister himself. NOTES 1. Details of the French side of this incident are to be found in Caroff, Le Théâtre Atlantique, Vol. II, pp. 152–7. 2. Admiralty signal, 0137, 24 June 1940. 3. WM(40)182, Confidential Annex. 4. 1SL’s signal, 2236, 25 June 1940. 5. C-in-C SA’s signal, 2330, 25 June 1940. 6. 1SL’s signal, 2335, 25 June 1940.

127

THE ROAD TO ORAN 7. Captain Holland’s signal, to 1SL 2245 (local), 25 June 1940. 8. 1SL’s signals, 2336 and 2340, 25 June 1940; the latter mistakenly refers to the Renown. 9. 1SL’s signal, 2357, 25 June 1940. 10. This assessment must have caused Amiral Darlan considerable personal pain. Marzin was one of a côterie of favoured friends – ‘les Amis de Darlan’ (ADD) – singled out for their loyalty to Darlan himself and rewarded by opportunities for promotion. Of all the ‘ADD’ only one, Capitaine de vaisseau Auboyneau, serving as FNLO to Admiral Cunningham at Alexandria, was to choose to fight on alongside the Royal Navy, latterly as the Commander of the Free French Naval Forces. 11. 1SL’s signal, 0345, 26 June 1940; all times in this passage dealing with the Richelieu incident are expressed in GMT. 12. 1SL’s signal, 0346, 26 June 1940. 13. Caroff, Le Théâtre Atlantique, Vol. II, p. 156. 14. BNLO Brest’s signal, 1129, 26 June 1940. 15. Churchill was touring Kent coastal defences. 16. Admiralty signal, 1537, 26 June 1940. 17. WM(40)183, Confidential Annex. 18. Dorsetshire’s signal, 1730, 26 June 1940. 19. Admiralty signal, 1902, 26 June 1940. 20. Watchman’s signal, 1130, 26 June 1940. 21. BNLO Brest’s signal, 1400, 26 June 1940. 22. Watchman/BNLO Brest’s signal, 2015, 26 June 1940; de Laborde was the local commander at Toulon in November 1942, where his arrangements for scuttling the French fleet proved to be highly efficient. 23. C-in-C SA’s signal, 1705, 26 June 1940. 24. Ibid., 1831, 26 June 1940. 25. WM(40)183. 26. 1SL’s signal, 1538, 26 June 1940. 27. Darlan’s telegrams, Nos 5057–59, 20 June 1940 (see above, pp. 64, 68). 28. FO Malta’s signal, 1355, 26 June 1940. 29. ACNS(F)’s signal, 1910, 26 June 1940. 30. See above, p. 39.

128

15

27 June

During the night of 26/27 June, three British destroyers made a final search of the Gironde to carry off any neutral merchant shipping which might be in danger of falling into German hands. Only French ships were found and these were scrupulously left alone. Vice-amiral Odend’hal called on the Admiralty during the forenoon of 27 June, to request the release of warships and merchant shipping held by Britain. The First Sea Lord was not available but Vice-Admiral Phillips, the Vice-Chief of Naval Staff, explained that the embargo would remain in place at least until the full terms of the Franco-Italian Armistice were known. Vice-amiral Godfroy plainly had no illusions and a certain amount of sympathy concerning British intentions. Early in the day he offered to discharge the oil fuel from his ships in order to save Admiral Cunningham the ‘embarrassment’ of having to keep a large force in harbour at Alexandria to watch over them. In return, he requested an assurance that there was no intention of seizing the ships of Force ‘X’. Cunningham, reporting this to the Admiralty, added his personal view that Godfroy would in due course have to request that his crews be repatriated.1 At Martinique, Captain Lambe delivered the First Sea Lord’s message concerning the doubts as to the ownership of the gold to the captain of the Emile Bertin and to Contre-amiral Robert. The Admiral subsequently informed Vice-Admiral Kennedy-Purvis that in the absence of instructions from France he had ordered the disembarkation of the cruiser’s cargo for safe custody in Martinique; he also gave assurances that the gold would not be allowed to fall into German hands. Operationally, the major excitement of the day was again created by the Richelieu. Arriving off Dakar at 0720, it exchanged searchlight signals with the shore and then headed out to sea once again, accompanied by the Fleuret. The Hermes and Dorsetshire were far to the north, searching for the cruiser’s missing aircraft,2 but the Albatross sent one of its seaplanes in pursuit and it was able to shadow the battleship until 1200, when it was some 80 miles north of Dakar. By that time, Vice-Admiral d’Oyly Lyon had learned from Contre-amiral 129

THE ROAD TO ORAN

Plançon that the Richelieu had now been despatched to meet and escort a group of armed merchant cruisers bound for Dakar (and whose impending arrival had been notified to the BNLO at Dakar, Commander J. Rushbrooke). The British carrier and cruiser were ordered to patrol to the north of the rendezvous point, to be ready to shadow the battleship should it make another run towards Casablanca. The Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic’s first signal, informing the Admiralty of the Richelieu’s departure, did not reach London until after the follow-up message which explained the battleship’s mission and was itself much delayed in reception.3 The War Cabinet, meeting at noon (1100 GMT), was thus unaware of, and therefore uninfluenced by, the latest alarms and excursions off West Africa. The First Sea Lord, in giving his situation report on the French Navy, told those present that the Richelieu was on the way back to Dakar under French orders; the Royal Navy had been asked to leave Dakar but would not do so until an assurance had been given that enemy ships would not be allowed to use the port. Pound then turned to the question of the neutralisation of the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir. He suggested three options – mining the ships into the harbour, a submarine blockade and action by a surface force. The first involved the laying of magnetic mines by aircraft, informing the French the action had been carried out; only Royal Air Force aircraft operating from the United Kingdom could carry out such an operation ‘at once’ and they would have to land in French North Africa afterwards. If a three-day delay (while the mines were transported to Gibraltar) could be accepted, then the Ark Royal’s aircraft could lay the mines. No explanation was needed for the idea of a submarine blockade but the threat of use of a powerful surface force offered options to the French – demilitarisation under Royal Navy control, sailing for British ports or scuttling – failing which the French ships could be dealt with by bombardment. Four capital ships4 and the carrier Ark Royal, a force far stronger than the Force de Raid, could be off Oran by 3 July. In discussion, the Prime Minister stated his opposition to using United Kingdom-based minelaying aircraft ‘as he did not think it likely that the French ships would leave Oran immediately’. It was most important that action should be taken to ensure that the French fleet could not be used against Britain: ‘Public opinion was strongly insistent that we should take action on the lines of the measures taken at Copenhagen against the Danish Fleet.’5 Exactly what expression of public opinion was being alluded to is not clear from the notes of the Cabinet meeting.6 There had been articles and letters in newspapers speculating as to whether (and what) action might be taken against the French fleet but this, it was agreed by Cabinet members, was undesirable and it was recommended that instructions should be 130

27 JUNE

issued by the Ministry of Information (the Minister was still on his way back from Rabat) to ensure that Press speculation on this topic should cease. The notes are also inadequate, in that no attribution was given to the originator of a suggestion that internment in US ports might be offered to the French – the first mention of such an option, and seriously inadequate in covering discussion of action against the Force de Raid, which the Prime Minister summarised: ‘He thought that the War Cabinet approved in principle that the operation proposed should take place on 3 July. It might be combined with further operations in the Mediterranean, or with operations designed to secure the Richelieu and Jean Bart.’ The proposal concerning the offer of internment in the USA ‘would require consideration from the political point of view. Meanwhile, plans for the operation should be drawn up, and should be considered later at a Meeting of the Ministers directly concerned, with their Advisers.’ The Cabinet invited the First Lord and First Sea Lord to arrange for the planning of the operation to be taken in hand forthwith. The Prime Minister would chair the meeting of ministers to discuss any detailed points which arose from the Admiralty’s report on the plans. In effect, the main body of the War Cabinet was thus to be excluded from the planning process, although it would have a final say in the decision to proceed. It is unfortunate that there are no separate accounts of this meeting to supplement the sparse notes kept and there is nothing to indicate why the question of the French fleet was dealt with so urgently on this day. It cannot even be surmised why Admiral Pound chose this meeting to enunciate in such detail the British options: the French Navy was showing no signs of imminent activity to comply with even the worst-case terms of the Franco-Italian armistice; Admiral Cunningham appeared to have Force ‘X’ well in hand; the gold was being landed from the Emile Bertin; and, as far as the Admiralty knew, the Richelieu was heading for Dakar. Thanks to the defection of the Narval on the previous day, the Royal Navy was now in possession of the most recent French Navy cyphers, but these were still in transit and not until 1 July did the first decrypts become available.7 As far as the other ministers and officials present at the meeting were concerned, the indications from the French colonies up to the time of the discussion were no more discouraging then they had been for several days and it was never alleged that the French fleet posed more of an immediate threat to national survival than the German Army. Churchill, in his Second World War memoirs, did not even give the date of the crucial Cabinet meeting whose opinions he thought he had interpreted and of which he wrote8 ‘The War Cabinet never hesitated … This was a hateful decision, the most unnatural and 131

THE ROAD TO ORAN

painful in which I have ever been concerned.’ Later in the meeting, the unwelcome news was received that the Military Missions in Algeria and Syria had reported that those colonies had decided to obey the Bordeaux government’s orders. General Mittelhauser had been waiting for a lead from General Noguès but had given up hope when it became clear that no French government would be established in North Africa. Captain Pleydell-Bouverie, who had been given the task of studying all the available signals from the French colonies, commented on the preceding five days’ vacillation in a report delivered to the First Sea Lord on 27 June:9 The confusion of thought was, I think, due to the French capacity for talking an awful lot about any problem which presents itself and which, in this case, was extremely difficult of solution due to the lack of any definite lead from their Government.

He stated his belief that the French fleet would obey Darlan and return to ports in France. Anglophobia, to which he had referred in his earlier report, was very strong in the Pétain administration: ‘This leads me to the conviction that Admiral Darlan and several others of his staff who outwardly used to meet me on the frankest of terms are no longer any friends of ours.’ At 1530, the First Sea Lord summoned to his office Vice-Admiral Sir James Somerville and informed him that he was to command the force then being assembled at Gibraltar: The initial task of this force, to be known as Force ‘H’, would be to secure the transfer, surrender or destruction of the French warships at Oran and Mers-el-Kébir, so as to ensure that these ships could not fall into German or Italian hands. 2. At a later interview with the First Lord and the First Sea Lord, it was explained to me that while every preparation was to be made to employ force in order to complete the task of Force ‘H’, it was hoped that the necessity would not arise. 3. The opinion that I held after this meeting was that the French collapse was so complete and the will to fight so extinguished, that it seemed highly improbable that the French would, in the last resort, resist by force the British demands.10

Somerville is stated to have regarded this task with repugnance but was given clearly to understand that the government regarded it as being ‘in the interests of the safety of the nation’.11 Which of his masters was responsible for giving the false impression of a total disintegration of French morale is not known: both had been told by 132

27 JUNE

North that this was not true of the Force de Raid, whose morale remained good and which would resist. The reasons for the choice of Somerville are not clear. Pound himself is quoted as explaining that the force had to be collected in a hurry and Somerville was selected on the basis that he was an experienced Flag Officer and was immediately available in London.12 The First Sea Lord, who had been his Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean some years previously, thought highly of him as a seagoing flag officer, but this does not explain why Vice-Admiral Lionel Wells, who was already commanding the force at Gibraltar after ably leading the carrier squadron during the Norwegian campaign, was overlooked, or why another vice-admiral with recent sea service was not chosen. Somerville had actually retired from the Royal Navy on the grounds of ill-health less than a year before; he had been serving in a supernumerary technical development post in the Admiralty and his only recent ‘combat’ experience had been off Calais and Dunkirk, where he had shared with Vice-Admiral Ramsay the overall direction of the evacuation. In consequence, Somerville’s undoubted organisational ability had come to the attention of the Prime Minister. More understandable was the somewhat unconventional command structure adopted. Admiral North was in command at Gibraltar, where Force ‘H’ was to be based, but Flag Officer Commanding North Atlantic’s eastern boundary lay on 5° West (some 15 miles east of Gibraltar) and he was therefore not eligible to direct operations off Algeria; Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham was responsible for the whole of the Mediterranean east of 5° West but from his base at Alexandria he could not be expected to exercise close control over an operation taking place 1,700 miles to the west. The Flag Officer, Force ‘H’ was therefore placed under the direct command of the Admiralty for all purposes other than the defence of Gibraltar. Somerville himself had little discretion as to what activities he undertook or how he executed the orders which would be passed to him by the First Sea Lord or Vice-Chief of Naval Staff. The Admiralty replied at 181513 to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean’s report of Vice-amiral Godfroy’s offer to discharge the fuel from his ships: Discharge of oil fuel would be welcomed. Assurance that ships will not be seized should not, repeat not, be given. If discharge of oil fuel is coupled with this assurance you should not press it. We have no intention that French ships at Alex. should pass out of our hands into those of the enemy. We should naturally prefer to use them with British crews but if that is not possible, they must be sunk outside the harbour. Do you consider that Godfroy would sink his ships at their moorings if you demanded that they should be handed over to us intact?

133

THE ROAD TO ORAN

The final sentence was prompted by concern lest the anchorage at Alexandria should become congested by sunken ships, but it is not clear from the remainder what the First Sea Lord had in mind. Defuelled, the French ships were very effectively immobilised and, as long as Egypt could be defended against the Italian Army, they did not need to be seized or even scuttled to be denied to the enemy. Vice-amiral Odend’hal paid a second visit to the Admiralty on 27 June, arriving at Admiral Pound’s office during the evening to deliver the toned-down version of a demand which he had received from Amiral Darlan concerning the detention of the French squadron at Alexandria.14 I learn that Force X is being withheld in spite of my orders to Alexandria where I left it until the last moment in complete trust. Before an extreme solution which would be catastrophic for all, I ask you for an urgent démarche to avoid the gulf which is opening between France and England widening and becoming permanent. The French Admiralty understands and shares the British disappointment and hopes for English victory. But the state of disarray of the army and the vast migration of refugees did not permit continuation of the struggle. Resistance in North Africa would have been brief and without practical significance. Murdered France asks to be treated as neutral and not hostile. No other solution was ever envisaged during the recent conversations at Bordeaux between Admiral Pound and Amiral Darlan. In conclusion, I ask for Force X, Pasteur, and all other French vessels in England. Acknowledge receipt. Via NA Madrid.

The message itself, originated on 25 June, was ‘undoubtedly authentic’ for it had come via the French Embassy in Madrid, but the letter presented to the First Sea Lord was a paraphrased and weakened version15 of the original message: Admiral Darlan points out that he intended to show you his will to fight up to the last, by allowing Force ‘X’ to cooperate with Admiral Cunningham up to the conclusion of the Armistice. He was fully confident and could not imagine that this force might be prevented from sailing away after the armistice. He feels averse, for the present, from giving orders which might lead to a very grave incident, and previously asks me to approach you with a very pressing request.16 It is his foremost desire not to widen the gap between Great Britain and France. The French Admiralty understand the disappointment which the British felt when they saw France compelled to come to terms; they eagerly wish for a British victory … The French Government, after

134

27 JUNE

careful survey of the situation, came to the conclusion that the carrying on of fighting in North Africa could only be possible for a short time and could not have practical results: therefore they have decided to come to terms. But crippled France asks to be treated not as an enemy but as a neutral Power: Admiral Darlan states that there never was any question of such unfriendly treatment in the course of his conversations with you in Bordeaux. I have therefore been instructed to ask you most pressingly for instructions from the British Admiralty to allow the sailing of Force ‘X’ from the United Kingdom ports and the liner Pasteur from Halifax.

Although he obviously realised that the purpose of his visit would be unwelcome, the Attaché found the First Sea Lord in no mood to compromise or indulge in niceties. Pound noted the points that he had made during the interview: The one object we had in view was winning the war and that it was as essential for them as for us that we should do so. That all trivialities such as friendship and hurting people’s feelings should be swept aside. That though there was not the slightest doubt that we should win the war it is essential that we should prevent, as far as possible, the scales being weighted against us at the present time. I asked him to ask Admiral Darlan to remember this whenever anything occurred which seemed to him unfriendly. As Admiral Darlan has wished to protest against the retention of their ships … he [Odend’hal] asked whether, if their ships attempted to leave Alexandria, they would be fired on and I replied ‘Yes’ and that now that Admiral Darlan knows about it and taking into account the reasons for our action, the responsibility for any incident would rest on him.17

The First Sea Lord continued by pointing out that the armistice terms so far received in Britain were contradictory and requesting him to obtain ‘at the earliest possible moment the exact terms’. Pound did not note (but Odend’hal reported) that he also commented that he considered that Darlan had been the one man who, had he gone to North Africa and continued the fight, would have been able to save the French colonial empire.18 The Attaché’s signalled account of the interview,19 re-transmitted by the Madrid Embassy 24 hours later, communicated none of Pound’s vehemence, nor did it contain the explicit warning that the Royal Navy would certainly open fire in at least one set of specific circumstances. By avoiding being the medium of unpalatable news, Vice-amiral Odend’hal deprived his superior of up-to-date confirmation 135

THE ROAD TO ORAN

of the considerable hardening of British attitudes and his host of the true depth of French feeling and intent. NOTES 1. C-in-C Mediterranean’s 1131, 27 June 1940. 2. The aircraft was found at 1107 and, with its crew little the worse for wear after 26 hours afloat, recovered by the cruiser itself. 3. C-in-C SA’s 0942 and 1146 (GMT), 27 June 1940. 4. HMS Hood, Valiant and Resolution (each with eight 15in guns) and Nelson (nine 16in guns). 5. That is, 2 April 1801. Churchill subsequently used the same analogy in his own account (The Second World War (London, Cassell, 1948–52), Vol. II, p. 206). The most significant parallel between the operations was, however, the lack of high-level communications: in 1801, the British government had no way of knowing that the Tsar, who was the main architect of the ‘Armed Neutrality’ against which the British fleet had been ordered to act, had been assassinated ten days before the destruction of the Danish Fleet. 6. WM(40)184, Confidential Annex. 7. F.H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War (London, HMSO, 1979), Vol. I, pp. 152–3. 8. Churchill, Second World War, Vol. II, p. 206. 9. PRO ADM 205/4. 10. FO ADM 199/391, Force ‘H’’s Report of Proceedings, 26 June 1940. 11. Viscount Alexander, House of Lords debate, 26 July 1954. 12. A. Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran: Studies of the Royal Navy in War and Peace, 1915–1940 (London, Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 229. 13. 1SL’s signal, 1815, 27 June 1940. 14. PRO ADM 205/4. 15. Amirauté signals 5156–58, 1738, 25 June 1940; via SHM, held only in translation. 16. The passage in the Amirauté signal reads: ‘Before grave measures are taken, which would be catastrophic to everybody, I ask [Odend’hal] to intervene urgently to avoid the irreparable widening of the gulf between France and England.’ 17. PRO ADM 205/4. 18. Odend’hal’s Report, 4 July 1940 (via SHM). 19. Odend’hal’s signals 3146–49, relayed by Madrid, 1730, 28 June 1940.

136

16

28 June

Admiral Pound’s last task of 27 June had been to draft a lengthy personal signal to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to summarise the current situation as viewed from London and to give warning of the intended operation off Oran. Transmitted shortly after midnight, it contained little that has not been covered in the account of the events and decisions of 27 June but it provides a useful timed ‘snapshot’ of the First Sea Lord’s views.1 It is clear that there is now no hope of further French resistance in North Africa or from the French Navy. A. We have not yet received the authentic terms of the Armistice regarding the French Fleet. The original German terms were that ships had to be delivered to a specified port whilst the BBC version of Italian terms is that they have to be delivered to French Metropolitan ports for de-militarisation under German or Italian control. This is probably correct and would probably result in their eventually falling into German or Italian hands and being used by them. The French however seem to be believing or hoping that they will be allowed to retain them and demilitarise them in French Colonial ports. B. For the above reason we feel it is essential that they should not reach French Metropolitan ports. C. As soon as an adequate force has been collected at Gibraltar drastic action against ships at Oran will probably be taken if they are still there. D. Valiant is on her way to Gibraltar and Nelson follows but we may not wait for latter. Somerville will command Western Mediterranean Force. E. Submarines are required to watch Oran until surface forces are available. Instructions for them follow. They will be returned to you as soon as possible. F. French Liaison Officer has just brought me a message from Darlan protesting against retention of ships at Alexandria, Portsmouth and Plymouth. I replied that we had got to win the war not only for

137

THE ROAD TO ORAN

ourselves but for them and all trivialities and sob stuff about friendship and feelings must be swept aside. He asked whether their ships would be fired upon if they attempted to leave Alexandria and I replied yes and now they knew it the responsibility would be theirs.

Paragraph F was almost certainly a veiled warning to Admiral Cunningham, who had referred on several occasions to the friendship and cordial relations which existed between himself and Vice-amiral Godfroy. Pound had the greatest respect for Cunningham’s ability and judgement: he would not have wished to see the forthright Commanderin-Chief replaced if he were to fall foul of the Prime Minister. The news of the Richelieu’s second sally appears to have reached the Admiralty early in the morning. At 0221, the First Sea Lord ordered FOCNA to despatch the Hood and Ark Royal (which were refuelling at Gibraltar after their previous sortie) towards the Canaries at 20 knots and, nearly an hour later, Vice-Admiral Phillips sent a superfluous signal2 to the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic – ‘Richelieu must be located’. The French battleship had, in fact, failed to find the convoy of auxiliary cruisers and was returning to Dakar with the Fleuret. The Dorsetshire overhauled them at dawn and at 0600 reported that the Richelieu was in sight, 10 miles off Dakar. This signal was received in London much more quickly than those transmitted on the previous day and at 0755 Admiral Wells was ordered to return to Gibraltar.3 Late on 27 June the Admiralty had replied to the Commander-inChief, South Atlantic’s signal reporting the French warning that the Royal Navy could no longer call at Dakar: ‘The new situation with its many implications is under examination by HM Government, and a decision will be communicated to you as soon as possible.’4 ViceAdmiral d’Oyly Lyon’s polite refusal to leave without instructions from home was approved for the time being, but he had still not received this signal when, at 0706 GMT, he sent a lengthy report on the situation in the colony: Most definite impression is that as far as Admiral Plançon and Navy is concerned, pressure is being brought to bear by German influence in French Government to make them do all they can to deny use of Dakar to British Warships and Shipping. (b) A message was yesterday read to Naval and Air personnel purporting to come from French Admiralty and asserting Germany and Italy were [the] only friends of France and that England was working against her. (c) I have been requested to stop use of aircraft of HM Ships at Dakar. In this connection Richelieu reported she had been shadowed by

138

28 JUNE

Naval aircraft. While agreeing with above restriction I have formally reserved right to use aircraft when necessary for A/S [anti-submarine] duties. (e) Berth alongside for HM Ships will not be allowed in future. The Admiral refuses to question authenticity of any signal he has received.

The Admiral’s relations with the Governor-General and military authorities remained very friendly; they had not received anti-British messages and it had not yet been suggested that the British Military Liaison Officer at Dakar should be withdrawn. D’Oyly Lyon considered that no further help could be expected from the local naval authorities ‘as long as they submit to instructions purporting to come from French Admiralty’.5 The army, though friendly, would resist any British attempt to assume control in the colony – such an attempt would necessitate the use of powerful forces. At the same time, the General commanding had assured him that any Axis infringements would be resisted and would be regarded as violations of the armistices. As this signal was being transmitted, the Dorsetshire was approaching the entrance to Dakar harbour. A request to enter was answered by a refusal from the authorities and a request from Contre-amiral Plançon that it should comply with the French Admiralty’s order that Royal Navy ships were not to use Dakar. Vice-Admiral d’Oyly Lyon despatched the cruiser to Freetown to refuel and reported the development to the Admiralty. He subsequently ordered the Dorsetshire to return, after refuelling, to patrol to the north of Dakar.6 The British Naval Liaison Officers who had been attached to French commands in the Mediterranean were gathered at Casablanca7 and pooled their impressions of French attitudes in North and West Africa. First, however, Lieutenant-Commander A.Y. Spearman, who had been the liaison officer on Amiral Sud’s staff, sent his independent summary: Following undertakings obtained verbally before leaving Bizerta. From Admiral Esteva that if orders for giving up Fleet or units were received from Government and not his chief he would not obey. From Prefect of Maritime that he would never give up Dockyards. Charges already in place to blow nerve centres.8

A joint report was despatched an hour later:9 the BNLOs did not restrict themselves to their impressions for they made suggestions of relevance to the Cabinet’s current plans: 1. French Army and Air Force at present much more determined than Navy to carry on war in North Africa and to resist attack,

139

THE ROAD TO ORAN

although no attempted resistance can be maintained without supply of munitions. 2. French Navy. Morale of crews [at] Dakar deteriorating, some ships have failed to be paid, others fear the same. British Government offers of pay and pensions probably not known by men. Promised terms published in papers today must have caused strong feelings. Pay and immediate lead would undoubtedly influence them to follow their officers who are unanimous in desiring to continue war. 3. The best form this lead could take would be arrival of British Squadron outside territorial waters Oran. Morale would then immediately improve and Admiral Commanding [i.e., Gensoul] might launch last appeal to French Admiral and his COs. If French battleships put to sea all forces would probably follow suit. 4. Reference BNLO Sud’s 1003/28. British Admiral could stress undertakings given by Admiral Esteva and Rivet which if carried out would render treaty null, therefore French Admiral’s action in taking fleet to sea would be in keeping with these undertakings.

Unfortunately, the views of these relatively junior officers were not only out of date, they were also somewhat naïve – how, precisely, would showing the flag off Oran improve morale at Oran when the presence of a British carrier and Commander-in-Chief had not ‘stopped the rot’ at Dakar.10 Furthermore, they apparently discounted or were not aware of the rumours about reprisals against families which had swept through the French ships overseas, a consideration which was likely to weigh more even heavily than pay or pension. By not spelling out the ‘terms published in the papers today’ they were likely to cause irritation to authorities in Britain who were starved of recent official pronouncements from France. Of far more value to the Admiralty and the War Cabinet was Admiral Cunningham’s reply to Pound’s midnight signal;11 this had the virtues of currency and authority and of particular interest was a reference to the intentions of the Force de Raid at Mers-el-Kébir. To the First Sea Lord’s hint that friendships might be disposable under the circumstances, Cunningham responded in his final paragraph with his own practical advice, coupled with a firm reassurance: Admiral Godfroy has given me his word and that of his captains that no attempt will be made to leave Alexandria. I, therefore, do not intend to ask for discharge of oil fuel unless it appears that the Admiral is losing control. There is no sign of this at present. Godfroy is evidently hoping against hope that something will turn up to enable him to fight again on our side with his squadron, but on what this is based I am not sure. The French liaison officer states today Friday

140

28 JUNE

that Godfroy had received information from Admiral Gensoul that he had decided not to take his ships back to France. Am endeavouring to obtain confirmation. If Godfroy is told we intend to take over his ships consider he would take them to sea and sink them. If this were not permitted I would not be sure of his reaction if forcible steps were taken to seize them in harbour. I would emphasize frank and cordial relations existing here and feel more can be done by friendly negotiations than by threatening forcible measures. In any case the ships will not go to sea.

Admiral North, too, repeated his views, reinforced by those of Captain Holland and Commander Collett:12 (i) Majority of French Fleet will fight but only under their own Admiral’s propaganda [?] and not under coercion. (ii) It is of greatest importance to find quickly a French Admiral with initiative who will lead them against the order of the Bordeaux Government.

As to who this hoped-for French admiral might be, North had no suggestions. Indeed, even at this juncture it was doubtful whether any senior officer could have been found to provide a counter-attraction to the prestige and power of Amiral Darlan, or to the authority of the heirs to whom he had assigned the fleet – de Laborde, Esteva, Abrial and Gensoul, or who would accept the primacy of General de Gaulle. This point was made by Captain Holland, whose report on his visit to Casablanca between 24 and 26 June arrived in the Admiralty on 28 June, as did a review by Commander Collett.13 Holland had also met Contre-amiral Muselier, who had escaped from Marseilles;14 the latter, who apparently had ‘a grudge against Darlan’ and was ‘very much mixed up in Politics’, listed those senior officers whom he believed would fight on – de Laborde was too disciplined to disobey Darlan, Esteva lacked the character to do so, Gensoul and Ollive would not fight but (among others) Godfroy probably would. Holland agreed with the assessment of de Laborde, whom he admired, and described Ollive as lacking character15 and being in a completely defeatist frame of mind: ‘He expressed the opinion that our only course of action was to sue for the best terms as soon as possible.’ Collett, who reported on his experiences with the Force de Raid, described Gensoul as a ‘cool-headed man’ who had decided to follow Darlan’s orders despite personal bitter resentment at the role which he had been allotted. The majority of his men wished to fight on and Gensoul was confident that if he did order them to follow him to a 141

THE ROAD TO ORAN

British port, they would follow. Of Darlan, Collett expressed some puzzlement: It appears Darlan may be under pressure from Pétain, because the Navy was the only thing that Pétain had left to bargain with. But there is something about the attitude of Darlan and the Bordeaux Government that it is very difficult to follow.

Captain Holland, too, was baffled by Darlan and tried to find an explanation: Admiral Darlan is a fighting man with character, determination and energy. What appears to be his present conduct is completely at variance with what one would expect of him and the only plausible explanation appears to be that he is not a free agent … The lack of orders from him or of leadership by him is at total variance with his character, and is evidently incomprehensible to the Senior Officers. The only interpretation of his conduct that appears to be compatible with his character is that he has decided to remain in close contact with the Government although their policy may not be his, and in so doing he has found his hands more and more tied until he is virtually a prisoner of the German Directorate.

What Holland meant by this term, which is not to be found elsewhere, is not precisely understood, but it implies that he or his recent contacts believed that French government policy was dictated directly by Germany. Both officers stated their firm opinion that the French fleet would not be handed over to the enemy and that the use of force by Britain would be resisted, but it does not appear to have occurred to either Holland or Collett that Darlan was no longer ‘a fighting man’ but had become a politician – the Navy was no longer his tool, it was his power-base. The British War Cabinet had already met, at noon, but the only near-current, first-hand impressions which it considered had been gathered by Lord Lloyd during his fruitless visit to Morocco; these were scarcely favourable. He had also submitted a proposal for the despatch of a military expeditionary force to Morocco, to seize the ships at Casablanca and rally pro-British elements;16 the Chiefs of Staff were invited to examine and comment on this proposal, the first known suggestion to the Cabinet that unoccupied French soil should be taken by British troops. The French politicians who had left Bordeaux on 22 June were anxious to get to Britain, but the ship in which they were still isolated would certainly not be allowed to leave; the Cabinet agreed that it would be desirable to get the ship away but 142

28 JUNE

that such an action should not prejudice the success of any operations undertaken to obtain control of the French fleet. The Foreign Secretary reported that a request had been made through diplomatic channels for the release of Vice-amiral Godfroy’s squadron; on hearing the First Sea Lord’s account of his blunt warning in response to Vice-amiral Odend’hal’s similar request, the War Cabinet invited Lord Halifax to reply to Cambon in similar vein. The Prime Minister informed the Cabinet that it had been decided on the previous day to repatriate from Britain all French personnel, about 20,000 in all, who did not wish to continue to fight. He was not prepared to use French ships in British ports for the purpose as they would undoubtedly be detained on arrival, and, as he was unwilling to wait until ships were sent from French ports, he proposed to use British vessels to transport them, taking the wounded direct to France instead of to the colonies. The Foreign Secretary welcomed the opportunity to maintain contact with the French government and was invited to negotiate the return of the wounded and safe-conduct for the ships carrying them.17 Vice-amiral Odend’hal was at last able to supply an outline of the Franco-Italian armistice terms, obtained from the diplomatic staff and not from his Admiralty, in the afternoon of 28 June, in a note addressed to Vice-Admiral Phillips:18 The main points stipulated in the Franco-Italian Armistice Convention, notably as regards the Mediterranean basin, are as follows: Demilitarisation within 15 days and up to the end of hostilities between Italy and Great Britain of the following ports and bases: Toulon, Bizerta, Ajaccio and Oran (Mers-el-Kébir). In the above, French civilian and military authorities and necessary police forces are to remain in office. Conditions for the carrying out of this demilitarisation are to be fixed on the spot by an Italian Armistice Commission. French Naval units, except such as are found necessary for the safeguard of French Colonial territory, are to be demobilised and paid off in French ports to be stipulated and under Italian or German supervision. All units to be recalled to a metropolitan port. The Italian Government are to be notified of minefields and French minesweepers may eventually be commandeered during the Armistice. The Italian Government have declared that they do not intend to make use in the present war of the French naval units under their supervision nor to put forward any claims to the French Fleet when peace is concluded. … As regards zones to be occupied, they are to be defined by the lines actually reached by the Italian forces on all theatres of operations. Thus the French Mediterranean coast remains free as a whole except from

143

THE ROAD TO ORAN

some points adjoining the frontier where Italian forces have succeeded in establishing themselves.

Phillips passed this note to Pound without comment, on the same day. Comment seemed to be unnecessary, for it confirmed to the British their perception of the essential difference between the French version of the German terms and the BBC report of the Italian terms: whereas the former had said that the French fleet was to be assembled for demobilisation in ports to be determined, and the French were known to have attempted to hold out for this to take place in colonial ports, the subsequent Italian terms spelled out ‘in French ports’. That there could be variations in the Axis allies’ terms was inconceivable in Britain. In practice there were none – the Italian terms, in the original French text,19 were virtually identical to those agreed with Germany (see p. 110), but Odend’hal had presented a translated paraphrase, not a verbatim copy of the original, and the linguists were given no opportunity to draw the appropriate conclusions. This may also have caused the key word ‘supervision’ to be overlooked – the French Embassy in London’s interpretation of the word ‘contrôle’, which featured in the same context in the originals of both the agreements, more accurately reflected the French meaning of this word than the English translation and understanding of what appeared to be a near-identical word. The sense of direction and restraint explicit in the English is missing in the French, which implies checking or verification,20 not the absolute authority which the Admiralty and the War Cabinet believed it to confer on the Axis. It is most unlikely that the difference would have been seen by the British authorities in late June 1940 as more than a point of mere semantics, overshadowed by the physical presence of enemy personnel in the French fleet, but it was of critical importance to French naval commanders, who understood that their ships would be demobilised and disarmed under supervision but that they themselves would retain ‘commandement’ and, therewith, their honour. Vice-Admiral Somerville sailed from Portsmouth at 1500 in the cruiser HMS Aurora, which had also embarked an outfit of air-laid magnetic mines for transfer to the Ark Royal. The Admiralty signalled the composition and ostensible purpose of Force ‘H’ to all Flag Officers21 – few were aware that the first intended task was to be an attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir: 4. Subject to any instructions which may be given by Admiralty the tasks of Force ‘H’ will be:(a) To prevent units of the Italian Fleet from breaking out of the Mediterranean.

144

28 JUNE

(b) To carry out offensive operations against the Italian Fleet and Italian coasts.

A later signal22 instructed Somerville that the Admiralty was to be informed in advance of any intended operations against the Italian coast. Throughout the day, Captain Lambe of the Dunedin and the British Governor of Trinidad had been active at Martinique, using their best offices to persuade Contre-amiral Robert, to disregard his government’s orders. In this they failed, and Captain Lambe reported at 1701: Despite every effort by Governor [of] Trinidad, and self, Admiral Robert has declared himself bound to Bordeaux Government. He has today heard from Admiral de Laborde, now off French African coast, that he intends to carry out armistice terms and undoubtedly Robert intends to do the same. Orders bearing Darlan’s secret signature group23 were received from French Admiralty today saying no supplies or communications with the shore were to be afforded British warships in French ports. Robert does not intend to apply this order here. Also French Admiralty have warned French ships to be prepared for attack owing to hostile attitude of British Navy.

From the subject matter, this communication by Robert or his staff summarised the contents of two Amirauté signals. The first of these24 had ordered the withdrawal of British and French liaison officers and then warned addressees and their subordinates ‘Se méfier d’attaques britanniques possibles’. The second25 was an ‘Xavier 377’ which gave reasons for this attitude: 1. Given the unfriendly attitude of the British authorities and their undisguised spite at not being able to intern our Fleet in England, I ask you to keep your relationships with the Royal Navy to an essential minimum. 2. Be on your guard against all attempts at the destruction or sabotage of our ships which remain one of the essential elements of our international situation.

It was not to be expected that Darlan would explain that the ‘undisguised spite’ of the British was caused largely by the failure to honour what the latter believed to be an undertaking to send the French fleet voluntarily to British ports, but the warning on 23 June to beware of possible attack was somewhat premature, for such thoughts were being nursed only within a very small circle in Whitehall at that stage. 145

THE ROAD TO ORAN

Lambe next reported26 on French activity at Martinique – the Emile Bertin had started unloading its gold and, due to congestion in the harbour, the training cruiser Jeanne D’Arc and the carrier Bearn were to leave for Guadeloupe, where the latter would unload its cargo of US-built fighters and dive-bombers before returning to France. Vice-Admiral Kennedy-Purvis made a last personal appeal to Contreamiral Robert at 2203: I make my last request to you to keep your ships in West Indies ports. If these return to French ports the enemy will surely use them against us. I ask you to consider the last part of Admiral Darlan’s telegram of June 20: ‘Regardless of orders given to you, never to give up undamaged ships to the enemy.’27

Half an hour later, the British Commander-in-Chief gave orders that, pending further instructions, no ships carrying cargoes of any description were to proceed to French West Indian colonies. The British War Cabinet met for a second time in the late afternoon of 28 June. No naval topics were discussed, but it was decided28 that a broadcast that evening by General de Gaulle would be followed by a formal statement: ‘His Majesty’s Government recognise General de Gaulle as the Leader of all free Frenchmen, wherever they may be, who rally to him in support of the Allied cause.’ The Prime Minister left for his official residence at Chequers after the meeting. One of the guests at dinner was A. Léger, Charles-Roux’s predecessor (until 18 May 1940) as Secretary-General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Churchill, encouraging him to speak frankly, asked how the goodwill of the French people could be maintained even if, as seemed possible, the government went to war with Britain. Léger replied, first, that it was important to maintain contact with the French government and that a chargé d’affaires should be sent to France, so as not to leave Britain unrepresented. He went on to recommend the ‘clever use of propaganda’ – the BBC was more widely received in France than was French broadcasting and it would now be expected to be the sole source of ‘untainted’ news; like the newspapers, it should be sympathetic in tone and avoid recriminations. Second, the British government should not do anything unnecessarily provocative which might antagonise French sentiment: As regards the fleet, which was, he agreed, the major problem of the moment, he suggested that the French might be asked to invite a third party to act as an intermediary in keeping it immobilised in French ports. This the Axis powers would refuse to allow, and then we should have a good pretext for seizing as much of the fleet as we

146

28 JUNE

could with the probable compliance of the French navy and approval of the people.

This was a completely new idea, not previously aired, and it was not a totally impractical suggestion, assuming that a third party acceptable to France and Britain could be identified. But whether because such a diplomatic démarche would have been too timeconsuming or for policy reasons, ‘Winston was not impressed by this suggestion: he is contemplating violent action against French ships in African ports.’29 NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

1SL’s signal, 0006, 28 June 1940. VCNS’ signal, 0315, 28 June 1940. 1SL’s signal, 0755, 28 June 1940. Ibid., 2343, 27 June 1940. C-in-C SA’s (Vice-Admiral Sir Guy d’Oyly Lyon’s) signal, 0606, 28 June 1940; unknown to C-in-C SA, Plançon had at least twice challenged the authenticity of signals, even to the extent of doubting an ‘Xavier 377’ sent on 23 June, Caroff, Le Théâtre Atlantique, Vol. II, p. 153. C-in-C SA’s signals, 1102 and 1514, 28 June 1940. How they came to be there is not known; from the Admiralty War Diary note (PRO ADM 199/2207) of the originator and the incorrect styling of FOCNA, it is possible that the signals were relayed via the British Consul. BNLO Sud at Casablanca’s signal, 1003, 28 June 1940. BNLOs at Casablanca’s signal, 1108, 28 June 1940. The BNLOs did not know that the local French naval commander had recently been considered so well disposed towards Britain that the captain of the Richelieu had nursed such dark suspicions that he left for what he hoped was a more loyal port. C-in-C Mediterranean’s signal, 1355, 28 June 1940. FOCNA’s signal, 1516, 28 June 1940. PRO ADM 205/4. Muselier was to become the founding commander of the Force Navale de France Libre. A comment with which Darlan would certainly have agreed, according to Coutau-Bégarie and Huan, Darlan, pp. 190, 243. WP(40)226. WM(40)185. PRO ADM 205/4. Article 12 of the Franco-Italian Armistice agreement, cited in Cras, L’Armistice: Les unités de la Marine de guerre française seront concentrées dans les ports qui seront désignés, elles seront démobilisées et désarmées sous le côntrole de l’Italie ou de l’Allemagne. Feront exception les unités dont les Gouvernements italien et allemand autoriseraient l’emploi pour la sauve-garde des territoires coloniaux français. L’emplacement des unités navales en temps de paix sera un élément déterminant pour le choix des ports visés ci-dessus.

147

THE ROAD TO ORAN

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

Tous les navires de guerre éloignées de la France qui ne seraient pas reconnus nécessaires à la sauvegarde des intêrets coloniaux français seront rappelés dans les ports métropolitains. Le Gouvernement italien déclare qu’il n’a pas l’intention d’employer, pendant la présente guerre, les unités de la Marine de guerre française placées sous son contrôle et que, etc. ‘Passport Control’ is an English parallel usage; the German Kontrolle and Italian contròllo convey the principal French sense. Admiralty signal 1724, 28 June 1940. Admiralty signal 1738, 28 June 1940. Holland and Collett had also mentioned in their reports the existence of such a group but had not identified the phraseology (i.e. Xavier 377). Amirauté telegram No. 5136, 0819, 24 June 1940. Ibid., No. 5159–60, 1805, 25 June 1940. Dunedin’s signal, 1702, 28 June 1940. That is, Darlan’s telegrams, Nos 5057–59, transmitted at 1330, 1335 and 1340, 20 June 1940 (see p. 64). WM(40)186. John Colville, The Fringes of Power: Sir John Colville’s Downing Street Diaries (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1985), pp. 174–5; Colville was an Assistant Private Secretary to the Prime Minister at the time.

148

17

29 June

Unknown to the British, and possibly to Vice-amiral Odend’hal, the French Admiralty was on the move once again, as, indeed, was the French government. Bordeaux was in the zone designated to be occupied by the Germans and it had been decided that the city of ClermontFerrand was to be the administrative capital of unoccupied France.1 On the outskirts, at Royat, the Amirauté’s Direction des Services de l’Armistice began its work of supporting the French armistice delegations at Wiesbaden and Turin. During the forenoon of 28 June, Amiral Darlan and the naval operations headquarters had moved to the small country town of Nérac, 70 miles south-east of Bordeaux, where the Post Office was to be the nerve-centre of the French fleet during the coming crisis. Advance elements of the remainder of the French Naval Staff and administrative divisions arrived early on 29 June at Royat, 150 miles north-east of Nérac. Coincidentally, Nérac was Darlan’s birthplace and his wife and sister, moving from Brittany ahead of the German advance, had taken refuge there; Darlan joined them on 1 July. The effects on French naval communications of these moves and the geographical separations are best left to the imagination. They could certainly not be imagined in Britain, where the network of diplomatic and Admiralty overseas communications were functioning unimpaired, as were all normal internal networks. In the forenoon of 29 June, the First Sea Lord summoned a meeting in London attended by the Second Sea Lord,2 VCNS, the principal Naval Liaison Officer to Allied Navies,3 the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff,4 the Director of Plans,5 the Director of Personal Services,6 the Commanders-in-Chief at Portsmouth and Plymouth, the latter accompanied by Capitaine de frégate Bos, and two senior members of the Admiralty’s civilian secretariat. Admiral Pound welcomed Bos, thanking him for his efforts, in particularly difficult circumstances, at Plymouth and asking whether there was more that the Royal Navy could do for the French personnel. Capitaine Bos replied that both he and Vice-amiral Cayol were ‘extremely satisfied’ – the port accountant at Devonport was lending money to pay the sailors and to buy necessaries, a quarter of the 4,000 men were enjoying leave ashore each day and 149

THE ROAD TO ORAN

articles of uniform were being supplied from Royal Navy stores. The nutritional merits of the English and French diets were also discussed and improvements promised before Bos withdrew, accompanied by Admiral Tait and Admiral Power and the two civil servants. Viceamiral Odend’hal, on learning on the previous day of this meeting, had nursed suspicions that the main topic of the conference was to be the future of French ships in British ports, but these had been allayed by the inclusion of Bos in the party and subsequently by the latter’s impression that discussion of the topic had ended with his departure.7 However, Odend’hal’s suspicions were well founded for. Admiral Pound now laid before the remaining admirals the overall situation as viewed by the War Cabinet. The misunderstandings concerning the ‘differences’ between the German and Italian armistice terms were repeated; the situation was visualised in which the Germans would remove the guns from ships, only to replace them and recommission the ships on some pretext that France had not observed the armistice terms; and, in connection with the blockade of France which has been announced, the Germans would say to the French that Great Britain was now the enemy and would work on the French to declare war on us, in which case the French Fleet would be brought into action against us.

It was therefore essential that the French fleet should be brought under British control or sunk and, with this object, a force was being concentrated at Gibraltar for action at Oran: Originally it was intended that our ships should appear off Oran and issue an ultimatum saying that either the French ships should be sunk or, if they were not sunk, force would be used to overpower the ships’ companies. After consideration, however, it was realised that the French would put the point that under the present Armistice terms they were going to get their ships back eventually, whereas the ultimatum would offer no such chance. Telegrams have therefore been sent to Admiral Somerville telling him that the following alternatives should be offered:(1) That the French ships should be steamed to a British port (2) That they should be scuttled (3) That if necessary we would destroy them by gunfire. The disadvantage of the last alternative would be that civilians would be bound to be killed during the bombardment.

The War Cabinet Minutes for 27 June, the day that Churchill had talked of a ‘Copenhagen-style’ operation, had not recorded the telling point about the French retaining their ships under the armistice terms but the ministers had decided on offering ‘non-violent options’ before, 150

29 JUNE

and shortly afterwards, Somerville had been briefed for his command by Pound himself.8 At Alexandria, Vice-amiral Godfroy and Admiral Cunningham had ‘come to terms. The French Admiral was hoping that he would be able to go on fighting but there was, of course, no chance of that.’ Darlan had requested that ships under British control should be permitted to return to French ports, but he had been informed that this would not be allowed and that force would be used, if necessary, to prevent it. After this summary, Pound stated that the War Cabinet’s intention was to take action simultaneously at Oran, Portsmouth, Plymouth and Alexandria. The meeting had been called with the object of deciding the best method of dealing with the French ships in the two home ports. Discussion was very lengthy and dealt with repatriation and the possible subsequent utilisation of the French ships, besides the means to be adopted for their seizure. Both commanders-in-chief favoured an appeal to the French admirals – if this succeeded, then they would leave it to the national commanders to make the necessary signals to transfer control of the ships to the Royal Navy; if not, then the admirals would be detained and appropriate signals would be made by the British staffs. In common with Phillips, they believed that the French ships would not open fire, dependent as the latter were on British-supplied fuel and rations. Admiral Pound made it clear that he preferred a coup de main to an ultimatum demanding surrender which might be refused and lead to fighting within the dockyard ports; following the use of force to take over the ships, the crews could be separated into those who wished to be repatriated and those who might volunteer to remain to serve with the Royal Navy. The decision of the meeting was, however, that the commanders-in-chief would await Admiralty instructions regarding repatriation, which was to be arranged, if possible, by VCNS in consultation with Vice-amiral Odend’hal, and not until completion of repatriation would the Admiralty issue orders for the seizure of the ships; the latter, it was considered, would be best achieved by the surprise use of boarding parties, arriving in overwhelming force in the middle of the night. The admirals returned to their bases and set in hand the planning for this contingency.9 The Director of Plans lost no time in organising transport for the repatriation of French personnel and three hours after the beginning of the meeting, 15 liners and packets had been allocated to embark the soldiers and sailors at Liverpool (on 30 June), Newport, Avonmouth (Bristol) and Plymouth (all on 1 July). A dozen of the slower ships sailed with a convoy10 which left Liverpool for Casablanca on 1 July, while three fast ferries proceeded direct from Plymouth on 3 July, escorted by destroyers. 151

THE ROAD TO ORAN

The Admiralty meeting coincided with the day’s War Cabinet meeting, chaired by Neville Chamberlain in Churchill’s absence – the Prime Minister was resting at Chequers – while the ACNS (Foreign)11 deputised for the First Sea Lord. The First Lord reported the previous day’s developments at Dakar and Martinique, drawing the appropriate conclusion from the information let slip by Amiral Robert that he had been warned to be on his guard to resist attacks by British ships: ‘It could be assumed that similar instructions would have been received at Oran and other French Colonial ports.’ The Naval Staff were planning the Mers-el-Kébir operation and the draft instructions to Admiral Somerville would be submitted to the War Cabinet for approval; the Admiral had been asked for his views. Chamberlain, wishing to take advantage of whatever sympathy might exist among junior French officers, assumed that the plans would not exclude the chance of capturing the ships, the Foreign Secretary stressed the value of making contact with the ships’ companies if at all possible, and the Minister of Information suggested that dropping leaflets on the French ships should be considered. The Cabinet also noted the Foreign Secretary’s report that the US Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, had stated that in the view of the American Government the surrender of the French Fleet was the most degrading surrender in history. The United States Government had been given most explicit undertakings that the Fleet would not be surrendered. It seemed safe to assume that any action which we might take in respect of the French Fleet would be applauded in the United States.12

The military planners agreed with this last political assessment, but could otherwise see little merit in the projected operation. Tasked by Pound on 28 June to produce an appreciation of the likely consequences, the Joint Planning Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff produced its report in the afternoon of 29 June.13 The acquisition by the German Navy of French cruisers and destroyers, thus compensating in part for the heavy losses of the Norwegian campaign, would be a serious matter, but far more dangerous would be the hostility of the French empire: We cannot gauge the French reactions to the proposed naval action against their ships. At the worst, the French reactions might be extremely serious and would then immensely complicate the already heavy task. If, therefore, there is a genuine danger that the action proposed would lead to the active hostility of France and of her colonial possessions, we do not consider that the destruction of these French ships by force would be justified.

152

29 JUNE

At 1346, the Admiralty ordered submarine reconnaissance patrols to be initiated off Oran and Algiers. An error by the staff of ViceAdmiral, Malta, who was the operational commander of the British submarine force in the western Mediterranean, resulted in the Proteus being instructed to proceed to patrol off Marseilles instead of Oran – a mistake which was not corrected until 20 hours later and then only after the staff at Alexandria had pointed it out.14 Daily air reconnaissance missions had been flown from Gibraltar since 27 June and the late afternoon sortie on 29 June confirmed that the Force de Raid was still present at Mers-el-Kébir. Late that night, it was decided that a destroyer patrol was to be established 30 miles to the west of Oran, to cover against an attempt to concentrate the French fleet in West Africa; in one of the stupider signals to be sent, ostensibly on Pound’s authority but with the Prime Minister’s stylistic hallmark, Vice-Admiral Wells was instructed that, should the Dunkerque and Strasbourg sail to the west, they were to be captured at sea.15 Off Dakar, the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic was instructed by the First Sea Lord to observe Dakar more closely, stationing a ship as close as the edge of the 3 mile (6.5 km) limit of territorial waters. Admiral d’Oyly Lyon complied and reported to the Admiralty that his sole source of information from Dakar was now the British ConsulGeneral, the British naval and military liaison officers having left on the previous night. Admiral Cunningham brought the Admiralty up-to-date with Viceamiral Godfroy’s intentions and opinions and, unaware that the decision had been taken in London that forcible seizure of the French ships had already been decided, gave a further reason why this should not be attempted:16 Admiral Godfroy has since made following points: A. Darlan informed him that he had given way far too quickly and had made things far too easy for us. Godfroy very angry and has low opinion of Darlan. B. Darlan stated further orders will be coming. If these order French to break out, Godfroy will first ask permission to withdraw his present parole not to leave harbour and then ask to sail with a British unit in company in order to scuttle all his ships outside. C. If orders in [para.] B received in absence of British Fleet, Godfroy would await our return. D. Godfroy maintains that until General de Gaulle’s declaration French ships could have remained in Colonial ports, but thereafter Italian armistice terms insist on return of warships to France. E. Gensoul still considering whether to return to France and is having trouble with reservists. French morale here, however, is good.

153

THE ROAD TO ORAN

F. Godfroy states that whatever his orders nothing would induce him to fire a shot at the British Fleet. The best solution might now be for us to offer to allow the ships to remain here with skeleton crews and to give undertaking that we would only use them if the Germans or Italians broke the terms of the armistice. It is for consideration whether forcible attempts seize, with the likely result of a fight in Alexandria harbour and of ships sinking at their moorings, counter-balances the advantages of having the use of the ships.

Cunningham’s solution, though eminently sensible (and the one eventually adopted at Alexandria), indicates the distance by which his thinking was separated from that of the Admiralty, as stated during the forenoon meeting in London. To the latter, it was not sufficient that French ships in British ports would be manned only by volunteers willing to fight on – complete physical control of the ships was essential. And while Admiral Cunningham appeared to believe that the reason for seizing the ships was to make use of them in British service, no decision on that score had yet been reached London, despite considerable debate.17 Vice-amiral Odend’hal called once more upon VCNS during the afternoon of 29 June, to clarify, at Admiral Phillips’s request, the translation of certain passages in the terms of the Franco-Italian agreement.18 The French Admiral took advantage of the meeting to ask the British authorities not to make a final judgement on the armistice until the decisions of the Armistice Commissions became known. This request followed the lines of the French Admiralty’s long-delayed response19 to Odend’hal’s signalled demand for the terms of this agreement: Very general armistice terms cannot be understood or appreciated without knowing the discussions in progress within the Armistice Commission. Beg the British Admiralty to abstain from any judgement before the conclusion of negotiations. In particular the demand already formulated to immobilise the fleet in unoccupied French ports will probably be agreed. I repeat that the Fleet will remain French or there will be no Fleet. To avoid the worst, ask the British Admiralty again to lift the blockade measures and consider the unoccupied French coast as neutral.

Phillips made written notes of the request to abstain from judgement and of the French hope that the ships would be ‘interned’ in unoccupied ports, but he refused to discuss the question of the blockade – he had not studied the matter and it was the responsibility of the Department of Economic Warfare, not the Admiralty. 154

29 JUNE

Odend’hal returned to the French Embassy to write a personal letter to Amiral Darlan, explaining his interpretation of the views of Pound and Phillips.20 The Admiralty, he explained, did not doubt Darlan’s good faith but did profoundly distrust Axis intentions – while demobilisation in colonial ports afforded some safeguards, these were by no means guaranteed in metropolitan bases, even in unoccupied France, which could be seized on a whim justified by some alleged breach of the armistice conditions. The letter was entrusted to Lieutenant de vaisseau de St Père, who proceeded to Plymouth on 30 June and embarked on a French packet intended for Bordeaux. The sailing of this vessel was, regrettably, delayed and it had not sailed by 2 July. Thus was lost what was, effectively, the last opportunity for Admiral Darlan’s confidant in London to make the British point of view understood in France. NOTES 1. In the event, the spa town of Vichy was selected as the definitive capital of the unoccupied territory and became such on 1 July; Clermont-Ferrand was used for only a few days by advance parties. 2. Admiral Sir Charles Little, also Chief of Naval Personnel. 3. Admiral Sir Gerald Dickens. 4. Rear-Admiral A.J. Power (who, five years later, was to include the Richelieu in his Eastern Fleet battle squadron). 5. Captain C.S. Daniel. 6. Rear-Admiral W.E.C. Tait. 7. Odend’hal’s letter, 16 July 1940 (via SHM). 8. See p. 132. 9. These minutes were the last item to appear in 1SL’s personal file (PRO ADM 205/4) prior to the Mers-el-Kébir operation. 10. Convoy OG.36, which arrived safely on 9 July. 11. Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Blake. 12. WM(40)187, Confidential Annex. 13. Captain C.S. Daniel RN, Air Commodore J.C. Slessor, Brigadier I.S.O. Playfair; CoS(40)505(JP) (PRO CAB80/14). 14. Admiralty signal, 1346, 29 June; C-in-C Med’s signal, 1341, 30 June 1940; VA Malta’s signal, 1705, 30 June 1940. 15. 1SL’s signal, 0015, 30 June 1940. 16. C-in-C Med’s signal, 1545, 29 June 1940. 17. PRO ADM 205/4. 18. Unfortunately, Odend’hal, the only source for this interview, did not give details as to which passages required elucidation, Odend’hal’s letter of 16 July 1940 (SHM). 19. Originated at 1705 on 25 June, the signal from London did not arrive at Bordeaux until 1405 on 27 June. The reply was actually transmitted at 2055 on 27 June (four hours after it had been originated) and was received in London, with the two parts in reverse order, during the afternoon of 29 June, Cras, L’Armistice de juin 1940, p. 115. 20. Odend’hal’s Report, dated 16 July 1940.

155

18

30 June

After the hectic activity and exchanges of signals of the preceding ten days, the forenoon of Sunday 30 June was relatively peaceful, the only event of note being the departure at 0740 from Gibraltar of the first pair of destroyers for the Oran patrol. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean had received late on 29 June a signal from the First Sea Lord,1 informing him that seizure of Force ‘X’, to occur simultaneously with the Mers-el-Kébir operation, was under consideration; once the French ships at Alexandria had been secured, it was desirable that the ships at Sfax (Tunisia) should be dealt with in a manner similar to that to be employed at Mers-elKébir. Cunningham’s views were sought on the best procedure to be adopted to minimise the risk of bloodshed and hostilities on the part of the French Navy. The response2 should have come as no surprise to Pound, following a series of signals which had quite plainly stated the Commander-in-Chief ’s views: I cannot see what benefit is to be derived from forcible seizure of ships in Alexandria, and am most strongly opposed to the proposal. Request urgent consideration of the following points:– 1. Apparently situation at Alexandria is quite different from that elsewhere in Mediterranean … 2. If ships are to be seized, what is the object? If it is to prevent ships falling into enemy hands, that has already been achieved. 3. I am convinced French would resist most strongly, so that if it is desired to obtain ships for our own use it is unlikely to be achieved by forcible seizure. Such action would be more likely to result in ships being scuttled at their moorings, a harbour filled with wrecks and unnecessary British and French casualties. 4. Moreover, the effect is likely to be disastrous in the Middle East, particularly in the Suez Canal and at Djibuti, where French cooperation is vitally important, and in Syria, whose friendly attitude is very necessary. 5. On the other hand, it is quite likely that if things are allowed to go on as they are, the ships may drop into our hands under pressure of lack of pay and food …

156

30 JUNE

6. However, this appreciation makes no allowance for the repercussions which would follow the use of force at Oran. I am strongly opposed to such action there if it can possibly be avoided. I am not in full possession of the facts, but may remark that the whole of the friendly French element may be alienated, and in particular I would mention the effect in North Africa where friendly attitude may greatly affect naval operations later on. 7. No reports of French ships at Sfax have reached me. Request information. Owing to critical ammunition situation I am unwilling to engage my cruisers in any action except against the enemy.

There was a triple sting in that final paragraph – intelligence in London did not accord with that in the theatre, the supply of ammunition to the Mediterranean Fleet lagged behind demand and Cunningham did not regard the French as the enemy. No clearer message to the British government could have been passed. Sir Andrew Cunningham was a competent occupant of what was regarded as the Royal Navy’s senior operational post and one which usually led directly to the office of First Sea Lord.3 While the holder was geographically distanced from the communications and intelligence centre, he was not subject to political pressure of such intensity as to distort perspectives and objective assessment and was thus able to weigh what he did know and could assess in more balanced terms than was possible in London. The Chiefs of Staff4 reviewed the Joint Planners’ appreciation during the afternoon and did not accept the main points, particularly those concerning the reinforcement of the German fleet by French units and the undesirability of incurring the active hostility of France. The Directors of Plans were invited to resubmit their paper, to reflect this criticism, in time for the evening meeting of the War Cabinet. In the event, no such redraft was submitted, for the Chiefs of Staff themselves prepared a paper5 which was more attuned to their own opinions. If Cunningham’s signal had been received, his opinions were not reflected in their deliberations or conclusion. After reviewing what they saw to be the options – which ran from a request to the French Navy to continue to fight against Germany, through demilitarisation in British ports ‘under our supervision and inspection’ (not ‘control’), to taking no action at all and waiting to see what happened – the Chiefs stated:6 We have given the most careful consideration to the implications of taking action against the French Fleet at Oran and, after balancing all the arguments both for and against such action, we have reached the conclusion on balance that the operations contemplated should be carried out.

157

THE ROAD TO ORAN

In reaching this conclusion we have studied the following main considerations:– a. The likelihood of the French ships falling into the hands of the Germans, if the action is not taken. b. The balance of capital ship strength which would eventuate if Germany obtained possession of the ships. c. The effect which the action contemplated would have on the home defence situation, having regard to the probability of imminent invasion. d. The effect on the general situation if, as a result of our action, France becomes hostile.

The paper then reviewed these considerations with stark brevity (with one notable exception), taking the form of unchallengeable ex-cathedra pronouncements apparently designed to reassure the members of the War Cabinet that the political decision to undertake the operation was militarily sound. Thus, on the subject of the likelihood of ships falling into German hands, the Chiefs commented that In the light of recent events we can no longer place any faith in French assurances, nor could we be certain that any measures, which [we] were given to understand the French would take to render their ships unserviceable before reaching French metropolitan ports, would, in fact, be taken. Once the ships have reached French metropolitan ports we are under no illusions as to the certainty that, sooner or later, the Germans will employ them against us.

It is not known where the understanding originated that the French Navy would incapacitate its ships before arriving in home ports: the British authorities had been unremitting in their efforts to ensure that the French fleet would not return to metropolitan France at all and, in discussing its capture on the high seas, the Cabinet had been given to understand a week previously that the task would be simplified by French lack of morale, not matériel. There had certainly been no assurances, formal or informal, from the French on this point. The Chiefs of Staff were more worried than the Joint Planners had been on the score of the transfer of capital ships: while the balance of strength between Britain and the Axis powers was ‘not unsatisfactory’: If, however, the two French battle cruisers were to fall into the hands of the Germans apart from such heavy ships as they might acquire, and we were to suffer a reduction of capital ship strength as a result of submarine or air attack the situation would be extremely serious.

158

30 JUNE

Again, none of the three Chiefs appears to have considered the difficulty of simply not finding enough trained seamen and technicians to man sophisticated ships of foreign design, unfamiliar construction and unknown equipment, all of which can imply quite different – not to say alien – philosophy in many basic areas, not the least being operational. The summary of the ‘Effect of the Operations on the Home Defence Situation’ consisted almost entirely of an attempted explanation as to how it was that, with the United Kingdom facing ‘the imminent threat of invasion’, a sizeable proportion of the fleet, larger than the heavy squadron which the Admiralty intended to retain in the Western Mediterranean, could be deployed 1,200 miles distant: Although we agree that any avoidable dispersion of force, which militates against the concentration of the maximum strength available in the United Kingdom, is highly undesirable, we are prepared to accept the detachment of the force … for the operations against the French Fleet … We are faced with grave issues at home. It is therefore of paramount importance that the uncertainty regarding the French Fleet should be dissipated as soon as possible in order that the ships now shadowing the French Fleet can be released for operations elsewhere.

The spectre of universal French hostility, with cruisers and submarines operating against British shipping from bases in West Africa and Madagascar, dominating the Cape Route to the Mediterranean, India and Australia, did not haunt the Chiefs of Staff as it had their Joint Planning Sub-Committee: We realise that the action contemplated may result in France becoming actively hostile to us. In weighing up the implications of this possibility, we take the view that if we carry out our intention of including France in the blockade [of Europe], it will only be a matter of time before the French become, in any case, actively hostile. In our view, the implications of hastening French hostility are not such as to over-weigh our previous arguments. Conclusion To sum up, we consider that, from the military point of view, Operation ‘Catapult’ should be carried out as soon as possible.

Vice-amiral Odend’hal met Vice-Admiral Phillips who requested that decisions by the Armistice Commission, rightly regarded as being of great importance by the British Admiralty, should be communicated as soon as possible; these had already been demanded by the French Ambassador and, indeed, an essential detail of the preliminary agreements was on its 159

THE ROAD TO ORAN

way from Royat. This signal, announcing that the Italian Commission had accepted the principle of French ships remaining in North Africa with reduced complements and that similar agreement was hoped from Germany,7 actually arrived within a few hours, but in such corrupt form that it appeared to Odend’hal to convey no more than a hope that agreement would be reached with the Italians. The Foreign Office replied to the French aide-mémoire of 28 June which had requested the release of Amiral Godfroy’s squadron. In refusing, ‘with great reluctance’, the armistice clause calling for the return of the French fleet to metropolitan ports was identified as the reason. Admiral Cunningham had orders to use force, if necessary, to prevent the departure of Force ‘X’. The War Cabinet met at 1900, with Churchill once more in the chair. He informed the ministers that he had concluded that the battleship Nelson, which had left the Clyde for Gibraltar on the previous day, should not take part in Operation ‘Catapult’: if Force ‘H’ awaited its arrival, the operation would have to be delayed until 5 July, whereas it could be mounted two days earlier – ‘on the whole, the sooner this operation was carried out the better’. Additionally, the Prime Minister believed that it would be wiser to retain it in Home Waters, with the implication that it would bolster the country’s defences against invasion. The Cabinet expressed general agreement with the view that early action was desirable and noted the suggestion that the operation should take place on 3 July. There was also agreement that simultaneous action should be taken to ‘establish full control’ of French warships in British ports, at Alexandria and, at Martinique, the cruiser Emile Bertin. It was decided in discussion that, in addition to the options which were to be offered to Amiral Gensoul, a personal message would be sent, stating the British government’s determination to continue the war against Germany, and emphasising that the interests of France, too, depended upon British victory; this would be drafted by the Prime Minister. Further attention was given to the matter of informing the French ships’ companies of the British government’s invitation and ultimatum and the Minister of Information was requested to consider whether it would be possible to broadcast a message which could be received by the French sailors at Mers-el-Kébir.8 Vice-Admiral Somerville had arrived at Gibraltar as the Cabinet meeting began. His first action was to call on the Flag Officer, North Atlantic, to discuss the security of Gibraltar in the event of a Spanish attack. He also disclosed to Admiral North the War Cabinet’s intentions concerning Oran. North was strongly opposed to the use of force – the French would probably fight and Amiral Gensoul had made it clear that he would not submit to any power taking control of his ships.9 160

30 JUNE

Somerville then summoned a meeting of flag officers, senior commanding officers and staff officers, to which Admiral North was invited. This gathering was held primarily to discuss the tactics to be adopted. The restricted area of the harbour and defensive nets would prevent destroyer torpedo attack, and Vice-Admiral Wells considered that air torpedo attack against active anti-aircraft opposition would be ‘difficult and unproductive’. With the favoured ship-killing weapon, the torpedo, thus ruled out, it was finally decided that, in the case of Mers-el-Kébir, a round or two (aimed not to hit) should be fired to show that we were in earnest, and if this failed to bring acceptance of our terms, a limited period of gunfire and/or bombing should be used to cause evacuation of the ships, final sinking being effected by torpedo-bomber attack or demolition, according to circumstance. It was thought that to complete destruction by gunfire would require a great deal of ammunition and cause very great loss of life.10

The port of Oran itself was to be included in the operation. Here, it was agreed, the use of gunfire would cause very severe civilian casualties and it was hoped that the example of Mers-el-Kébir would induce the French to scuttle ships at Oran. Somerville summed up the general opinion of those present on the proposed methods: ‘The view I held, and which was shared by others present at the meeting, was that it was highly improbable that the French would use force to resist our demands.’ This did not accord with Admiral North’s beliefs and, after the meeting, he again expressed himself to Somerville as being strongly opposed to the use of force, as did Admiral Wells and Captain Holland. All three officers considered that there was little risk of the French allowing their fleet to fall into German hands. NOTES 1. Cited in Cunningham’s autobiography, A Sailor’s Odyssey, p. 244, and thence in Caroff, Le Théâtre Méditerranéen, Vol. II, p. 190, but not traced in British records. 2. C-in-C Med’s signal, 1105, 30 June 1940; Admiral Somerville received a copy two hours before he arrived at Gibraltar (PRO ADM199/391) but, again, no copy has been traced in British records and the text is that quoted in Cunningham, A Sailor’s Odyssey. 3. As it had done for his predecessor (Pound) and was to do for him. 4. That is, Pound, Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall and General Sir John Dill.

161

THE ROAD TO ORAN 5. 6. 7. 8.

CoS(40)510 (PRO CAB80/14). CoS(40)201 (PRO CAB79/5). No. 5202, 1430, 30 June 1940; cited in Cras, L’Armistice de juin 1940, p. 116. WM(40)188, Confidential Annex; the Cabinet, throughout, referred to ‘Oran’, rather than Mers-el-Kébir, and it is by this geographical name that the operation is generally known in Britain. 9. Somerville’s Report of Proceedings, dated 26 July 1940 (PRO ADM199/391); FOCNA’s Letter X.163/465, dated 4 July 1940 (NHB). 10. PRO ADM199/391, Somerville.

162

19

1 July At 0230, HMS Nelson, in company with four destroyers 300 miles to the west of Ireland, was ordered back to Scapa Flow. Force ‘H’ was thus deprived of the services of one of the most powerful battleships afloat. Without its 16in (406mm) guns, Somerville’s three big ships could deliver 10G tonnes of shells per broadside – slightly more than the four French ships could – but, if there was to be a response, Force ‘H’ would have to engage up to four targets.1 In an action against an anchorage, each French ship was a serious threat, for the slow speeds of the Bretegne and Provence would not be so much of a handicap as in the open sea. Immediately before the Nelson was recalled, the Admiralty had informed Somerville of the options to be offered to Gensoul:2 First:– To bring their ships to British harbours and fight for us. Second:– To steam their ships to a British port in which case crews would be repatriated whenever desired. The ships would be handed over at the peace and would not be used against Germans or Italians unless they break the terms of the Armistice. Full compensation paid to France for any loss or damage during the war. Third:– To demilitarise immediately their ships to our satisfaction. Fourth:– To sink their ships. … (f) In view of the strength of the defences at Algiers and the impossibility of avoiding the destruction of the town it is not considered justifiable to carry out a separate operation against that place. (g) In the communication to be made to the French it will be noted that ships at other ports are included in the hope that our pressure at Oran will gain the demilitarisation of their ships also. (h) Should acceptance of the terms for ships at Oran and Mers El Kebir [sic] be jeopardised on account of the demands on ships at other ports you may drop the latter as a last resort.

Somerville replied at 0812, confirming that Operation ‘Catapult’ could be staged in the forenoon of 3 July at the earliest and that he intended to withdraw the patrols watching Casablanca, the Straits and 163

THE ROAD TO ORAN

Mers-el-Kébir in order to provide sufficient destroyers to screen the heavy ships of Force ‘H’.3 He recommended that Captain Holland, whom he had nominated as the British emissary because of his long association with the French Navy, should arrive at Mers-el-Kébir on the afternoon of 2 July, so that whichever option was adopted by the French, it could be completed by dusk on 3 July. As an afterthought, Somerville asked, in typically tactful naval language, for clarification of an important point which he felt had not been adequately covered in his pre-departure briefing or in the subsequent instructions: ‘I presumed that the final instructions for ‘CATAPULT’ would contain orders as to the action to be taken should the French refuse all four alternatives.’4 Somerville was being unnecessarily and ponderously disingenuous. Well aware that in the last resort force would have to be used – his meeting the previous evening had been called to plan for that eventuality – he was now attempting to ensure that the ultimate responsibility for opening fire on the French fleet would not be his. The Flag Officer, Force ‘H’, was under considerable pressure. All the local advice, not least from Sir Dudley North, his senior but not his superior, was against the operation and Somerville had become extremely doubtful about the operation, to the extent that he was considering making an independent protest to the First Sea Lord. At North’s suggestion, Somerville had a further meeting, at 1000, to hear the views and proposals of Captain Holland, Commander Spearman and Lieutenant-Commander G.P.S. Davies.5 They were unanimous in their opposition to the use of force, primarily on the grounds that the entire French nation would be immediately alienated: ‘Once we kill one Frenchman by direct and deliberate action, the game is up, and all chance of concerted anti-German action in North Africa has gone. The French Navy will never forgive us.’6 They were also convinced of the sincerity of the assurances that in no circumstances would the Force de Raid be turned over intact to the enemy and, from this, it was clear to them that there was ‘little or no possibility of German or Italian forces taking possession of any French ships in African waters within the immediate future’.7 It was unimaginable that a French admiral, with his high sense of ‘Honour’, would not spurn an ultimatum backed with force. If the subsequent action did not achieve its object in full, and it was pointed out that no action was to be taken at Algiers, where a cruiser squadron was based, the most likely consequence would be that ships would take refuge in the only ‘safe’ haven available – those in metropolitan ports, where they would be in even greater danger of falling into the hands of the enemy. Finally, a fresh psychological argument was ranged, as Lieutenant Commander Davies recorded: 164

1 JULY

Those of us with recent experience with the French Navy were aware of the dislike of the Senior French Naval Officers to be hustled into making decisions. They were, however, always open to argument and given time and careful and tactful handling could usually be brought round to see our point of view, but try and rush them and they became as stubborn as mules. It was our opinion that if our proposals could only be made known to the more junior French Officers their influence might well sway the Admiral into accepting one or other of our propositions for it was apparent that all but those in the closest touch with the Admiral were quite unaware of the state of affairs of the moment.8

If the French accepted none of the options then, the ex-BNLOs advised, Force ‘H’ should depart, setting a high moral tone by letting it be known that the Royal Navy could not bring itself to fire on an ally in adversity. Somerville could scarcely not be swayed by the common opinions of such witnesses and at 1220 he despatched a long signal9 to the Admiralty, reporting the meeting and submitting alternative proposals. I have had further opportunity to discuss situation with Holland, Spearman and Davies and am impressed by their view that use of force should be avoided at all costs. They consider now that armistice terms are known there is distinct possibility of French accepting first alternative. To achieve this and, in accordance with their experience of the French, they propose – Holland arrives at 0800 and signals in P/L [plain language] ‘The British Admiralty have sent Captain Holland to confer with you. The British Navy hopes their proposal will enable you and your glorious French Navy once more to range yourself side-by-side with them. In these circumstances the ships would remain yours and no-one need have anxiety for the future. A British Fleet is off Oran waiting for you.’ One hour after Holland enters harbour Force ‘H’ arrives off Oran and repeats same message addressed to French Admiral using signal projectors turned on as many ships as possible. This is to ensure purport of message is received by officers and men other than the French Admiral. If French refuse first alternative they consider second alternative must be amended as follows: French to proceed to sea with a minimum steaming party, i.e. demilitarised, and allowing themselves to be captured by Force ‘H’, strictly ensuring ships being returned intact to France on completion of hostilities. France can plead they acted under force and that unable to contest British action. Third and fourth alternatives to be in form of invitation to French. They [i.e. Holland & Co.] hold strongly that offensive action on our part would immediately alienate all French wherever they are and transform a defeated ally into a defeated enemy. They believe our

165

THE ROAD TO ORAN

prestige would be enhanced if we withdrew from Oran without taking offensive action. These views based on very recent contact with French naval authorities. Unless Their Lordships have more definite and contrary information I consider proposals merit very careful consideration. Very early reply requested as possible acceptance of first or second alternative depends on immediate action.

Although the counter-proposals were also influenced by arguments in addition to that of probable alienation, Somerville had not referred to these. Though further repetition of his belief in French assurances as to the future of the fleet would probably have carried little weight, the effects of a less-than-complete success which could drive the fleet into less-than-safe ports and the likely French attitude to a timelimited ultimatum might have been useful inputs for the decisionmakers in London. There was an unspoken plea in the signal ‘Unless Their Lordships have more definite and contrary information …’. According to Admiral North,10 both he and Somerville suspected that the British government did know more than the men on the spot: As regards the question of mediation, it must be remembered also that we always had to allow for the possibility that there was still a secret link between our own Government and the French, and that what was being done was done with the knowledge of the French ‘high ups’ behind the scenes. Admiral Somerville held this opinion rather more strongly than I did. It did seem almost incredible to us that some sort of secret liaison had not survived between us and our recent Allies.

Somerville, in reporting his proceedings to the Admiralty, said as much in explaining his motives for sending the 1220 signal: Whilst I fully realised that Their Lordships were no doubt in possession of information which was not available to me, I felt that I should be failing in my duty if I did not represent as fully as possible the very strongly expressed views of officers who had been so recently in contact with the French.12

It may have been this misplaced faith that induced Somerville to continue to believe that although the French might be prepared to resist, it was improbable that they would do more than ‘fire a few token shots before abandoning their ships’.13 There is no evidence, implicit or explicit, from the wide range of sources now available, that any secret links existed between the governments. In Britain, the War Cabinet was being managed by the Prime Minister, who appeared to be led by his own intuition, modified by 166

1 JULY

advisers whose influence varied in proportion to the degree of agreement with Churchill’s perception of the problem and its solution. There is, however, a basis for suggesting that on this day the Prime Minister had access to information which he did not share with his Cabinet colleagues. On 30 June, the British cryptanalysts read their first Amirauté signal, using the French cyphers supplied by the Narval. This was none other than No. 5202,13 which had been received in corrupt form by Vice-amiral Odend’hal but which had been read in its entirety by the British and passed to the Director of Naval Intelligence on 1 July. It is unthinkable that Rear-Admiral Godfrey did not pass this vital signal to the First Sea Lord, who would have been duty-bound to draw it to the attention of the Prime Minister. Furthermore, the known practices of the latter suggest the strong probability that, spending as he did much of his working day with the Chiefs of Staff and in the operational headquarters in Whitehall, and habitually (but selectively) reserving to his own uses some high-grade intelligence material, Churchill was aware that: ‘Italian Government authorise stationing of fleet in half-crew condition in Toulon and North African ports. I have firm hope that German Government, whose reply is awaited, will agree to same. Etc.’14 If this hypothesis is correct, then the question must be asked as to why the Prime Minister did not pause to await the other Axis member’s decision – would the German government accept the demilitarisation of ships in North and West Africa? – or, to simplify Force ‘H’’s task , to wait until the agreed crew reductions had rendered the Force de Raid a ‘softer’ target. Whatever the exact state of knowledge, interpretation, intuition or reasoning, but without discussion in Cabinet, the signal15 despatched to Somerville 6 hours later answered without ambiguity his request for clarification as to the final sanction16 and very curtly dismissed his lengthy alternative proposals: ‘It is the firm intention of His Majesty’s Government that if French will not accept any of the alternatives which are being sent to you, their ships must be destroyed. The proposals in your 1220/1 are therefore not acceptable.’ Almost as soon as it had become effective, the new and unimpeachable source of intelligence was cut off. During the forenoon of 1 July, the Foreign Office informed the French Embassy in London that the three Service Missions were to discontinue the use of encrypted communications; henceforward, Vice-amiral Odend’hal passed his secure traffic to the Ministry of Marine through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Also, the admiral was requested to vacate the office which had been placed at his disposal in the Old Admiralty Building and to move to an office in the Embassy. The Attaché called on Vice-Admiral Phillips twice during the day. During the morning, he was sent by Cambon, who had been acting as Ambassador since 26 June, to query the Foreign Office Note of 167

THE ROAD TO ORAN

30 June stating the British government’s refusal to permit the departure of the Alexandria squadron. The VCNS had no previous knowledge of the Note but on reading it commented that it hardly differed from the sense of the First Sea Lord’s strong warning in conversation on 27 June; it did not appear to indicate a new development, but he would raise the matter with the Foreign Secretary at a meeting scheduled that evening.17 In the meantime, he asked that it should not be passed to France. Odend’hal again insisted on awaiting the outcome of the Armistice Commission’s renewed meeting. He referred to the Amirauté’s telegram 5202, admitting that he had not been able to draw a clear message from it. Phillips, who by now had probably seen the uncorrupted intercepted text, restated the British objection to Toulon – it was impossible to regard ships stationed in metropolitan ports as being out of reach of seizure by the Germans or Italians. Odend’hal’s second meeting with Phillips was provoked by a visit from Vice-Admiral Chalmers, the Admiralty Liaison Officer with the Allied Naval Missions in London. The latter had been instructed by the Director of Naval Intelligence to inform the French Naval Mission that no records were to be removed from the Admiralty and to offer to take them into custody under the Admiralty seal. Odend’hal declined the offer and went immediately to the VCNS’ office to protest against this move, telling Phillips that, whether the British liked it or not, he would remove his cypher material and signals logs; all Royal Navy material had been either handed back or destroyed by burning. Phillips replied that he had not known of Godfrey’s order and that Odend’hal had been right to come to him; knowing how loyal an ally the Vice-amiral had proved, he could take away whatever he wished. VCNS added his regrets that Odend’hal was leaving the building and stated that the accommodation would remain available for his use. The War Cabinet held its first meeting of 1 July at 1130. This was very full, with no fewer than 20 individuals, ministers, senior officials and secretariat, present when the topic of the French fleet was raised, as the final item. As Vice-Admiral Phillips was aware, the main meeting on the subject was to take place in the evening and discussion at the first meeting was very brief and its nature went unrecorded. Only nine individuals attended the day’s second meeting of the War Cabinet, at 1800.18 Besides the Prime Minister and four full members of the Cabinet – Lord Halifax and Messrs Chamberlain, Attlee and A. Greenwood19 – only Mr Alexander, Pound, Phillips and Sir Edward Bridges, the Secretary of the Cabinet, were present. They had before them the Chiefs of Staff paper recommending early action against the French fleet, draft instructions to Somerville and Cunningham prepared by the Admiralty, an Admiralty draft of the 168

1 JULY

options to be presented to the French commander at Mers-el-Kébir, and a draft personal message to the latter by the Prime Minister. Vice-Admiral Phillips reported his conversation with Odend’hal early that day and passed on the latter’s request that final judgement should be reserved until the details of the armistice conditions, actually being discussed by the Franco-German Commission at Wiesbaden that day, became known. Churchill, who almost certainly knew that the French Navy had wrung a major concession from the Italians and hoped to do so from the Germans, was dismissive: ‘discussions as to the armistice conditions could not affect the real facts of the situation.’ If he was not intent on deceiving his political colleagues, then it is difficult to follow his reasoning. The easing of the conditions agreed in Article 12 of the Franco-Italian armistice did alter the situation, for no longer were the most important operational units of the French fleet to be brought within easy reach of the enemy; if the German Commission accepted a parallel modification to the Franco-German agreement then the Prime Minister’s concern about the two modern, but incomplete, battleships in West Africa should have been lessened. Churchill next queried whether demilitarisation should be included among the options offered to Gensoul – Force ‘H’ had to act quickly and any action taken to demilitarise or immobilise the French ships in a short time could probably be repaired in a relatively short time. The First Sea Lord took the view that demilitarisation was the measure most likely to appeal to the French Navy, who would thus retain possession of the ships and hope to be able to put them back into service at the end of the war; it would be possible to wreck the steam turbines in about 30 minutes or to put guns out of action by oxyacetylene cutting in a rather longer period. The general view of the Cabinet was that demilitarisation should not be offered but that, if the other alternatives were declined, Somerville should be authorised to accept it in order to avoid bloodshed. One of the ministers suggested that the French should be invited to hand over their ships unmanned: this, it was pointed out, was impractical, for it would mean providing crews from Force ‘H’, to the operational detriment of the British ships. The instructions to Somerville were revised and approved, leaving only a few points of detail to be amended, and it was agreed that the final version of the message to be handed to Amiral Gensoul should be written by the Prime Minister and First Lord later that evening. They would also draw up supplementary instructions for Somerville, outlining ‘staff answers’ to possible arguments which the French might present in the course of discussion of the options. Cunningham’s instructions were approved with only one very minor amendment before the Cabinet turned to the matter of the seizure of the French ships at Plymouth and Portsmouth. All were now 169

THE ROAD TO ORAN

in harbour and many were tied up alongside; at that time, the French crews appeared to be ‘reasonably content’ apart from a fear of internment. Arrangements had been made for strong forces to board the ships early on the morning of 3 July. After some discussion, it was decided that detailed arrangements and instructions for the seizure should be left to the Admiralty. The First Sea Lord introduced the matter of the cruiser Emile Bertin, still lying under the guns of Martinique. HMS Fiji, the modern cruiser which was ‘marking’ it, was required for another operational task and it was considered that the older Dunedin would experience great difficulty in attempting to seize the French ship. The War Cabinet agreed with Admiral Pound’s suggestion that, as long as the French continued to unload the cargo of gold, no action should be taken. NOTES: 1. The difference was 1,100lb (508kg): 24 15in (380mm) guns in Hood, Valiant and Resolution firing 20,968kg, and 20 13.4in (340mm) guns in Bretagne and Provence with 16 13in (330mm) guns in Dunkerque and Strasbourg firing 20, 460kg. 2. Admiralty signal, 0225, 1 July 1940. 3. PRO ADM 199/391. Somerville’s Report of Proceedings; the withdrawal of the patrol to the west of Oran was not approved (Admiralty signal, 2359, 1 July). 4. Ibid.; FO Force ‘H’ signal, 0942, 1 July 1940. 5. Lately BNLO, Force de Raid and BNLO, Bizerta Submarine Command, respectively. 6. Admiral North, recalled in letter to Commander George Stitt, 2 August 1950 (NHB). 7. Davies letter to Stitt, 14 June 1950. 8. Ibid. 9. FO Force ‘H’ signal, 1220, 1 July 1940. 10. North to Stitt. 11. PRO ADM199/391. 12. Ibid. 13. Originated at 1430, 30 June (see p. 160). 14. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, Vol. I, p. 152; Gras, L’Armistice de juin 1940, p. 116. 15. 1SL’s signal, 1820, 1 July 1940. 16. See p. 164. 17. That is, the War Cabinet’s second meeting of the day. 18. WM(40)190, Confidential Annex. 19. Minister without Portfolio.

170

20

Orders for Operation ‘Catapult’, 2 July

The Prime Minister and the First Lord met in the Admiralty at 2200 on 1 July to begin the final drafting of the instructions for Force ‘H’ and the Mediterranean Fleet. Just over 3 hours later, the first of four long signals went out to Vice-Admiral Somerville:1 His Majesty’s Government have decided that the course to be adopted is as follows: (a) French [Fleet] at [Oran] and Mers-el-kabir [sic] is to be given four alternatives:– i. To sail their ships to British harbours and to continue to fight with us. ii. To sail their ships with reduced crews to a British port from which their crews would be repatriated whenever desired [or] in the case of alternative (i) or (ii) being adopted, the ships would be restored to France at the conclusion of the war or full compensation would be paid if they are damaged meanwhile. If the French Admiral accepts alternative (ii), but asks that their ships should not repetition not be used by [British] during war, say we accept this condition for so long as Germany and Italy observe the armistice terms but we particularly do not repetition not wish to raise point ourselves. iii. To sail their ships with reduced crews to some French port in West Indies such as Martinique. After arrival at this [port] they would either be demilitarised, to our satisfaction, if so desired, or be entrusted to the USA jurisdiction for the duration of the war. The crews would be repatriated. iv. To sink repetition sink their ships. (b) Should French Admiral refuse to accept all above alternatives and should he suggest he should demilitarise his ships to our satisfaction at their present berths, you are authorised to accept this further alternative provided you are satisfied that measures taken for demilitarisation can be carried out under your supervision within six hours and prevent ships being brought into [service] for at least one year, even at a fully [equipped] dockyard port.

171

THE ROAD TO ORAN

(c) If none of these alternatives are accepted by the French you are to endeavour to destroy repetition destroy ships in Mers-el-kabir [particularly] Dunkerque and Strasbourg using all means at your disposal. Ships at Oran should also be destroyed if this will not repetition not entail any considerable loss of civilian life. (d) Communication to the French Admiral follows. (e) It is most undesirable that you should have to deal with the French Fleet at sea and consequently about twelve hours warning, as suggested in your 0812 of 1st July is not repetition not acceptable. Hence, you should arrive in the vicinity of Oran with your force at whatever time you select, and send your emissary ashore, subsequently taking such action you consider fit with your force in period before time limit given expires. (f) If first alternative is accepted ships should proceed to United Kingdom ports rather than Gibraltar. If second alternative is accepted ships should proceed to a United Kingdom port unless French prefer Gibraltar. (g) In view of strength of defences at Algiers and impossibility of avoiding destruction of town, it is not repetition not considered justifiable to carry out an operation against that place. (h) These are your final instructions in case you find the French fleet in harbour which were decided upon after receipt of your 1220 of 1st July. (i) Further instructions follow as regards the action to be taken if French Fleet is not at sea.

As the curiously worded paragraph (h) of the signal indicated, Somerville’s counter-proposals had not fallen entirely on stony ground, but neither had they been adopted. The one wholly new element was the third option, which had not featured even in the draft laid before the War Cabinet on the evening of 1 July. The offer of sanctuary in the West Indies and, specifically, a role for the United States, first appears in a heavily annotated draft,2 on 10 Downing Street notepaper, which was ‘married’ by the Naval Staff to the Admiralty’s last draft to provide a working draft for the First Lord before his meeting with the Prime Minister. As there is no record (or published reminiscence) of the discussion or reasoning, it cannot be known for certain why this was added, but a possible answer can be suggested from circumstantial evidence. As long ago as 24 June, Amiral Darlan had signalled orders in an ‘Xavier 377’3 to his senior commanders, instructing them to take secret measures to ensure sabotage to prevent ‘ennemi ou étranger’ from making use of any ship seized by force. The sense of this order had been passed to the British authorities but not that of a third paragraph: 172

ORDERS FOR OPERATION ‘CATAPULT’, 2 JULY

If Armistice Commission charged with interpreting the terms decides other than that [Fleet must remain French, under the French flag, etc.] at the moment that this new decision comes into effect, warships are, without further orders, to be taken to the United States or scuttled if there is no other way of withholding them from the enemy.

This was one of the last enciphered signals to be despatched before the general ban on French wireless communications came into effect with the cease-fire. It is likely that it had been intercepted by the British monitoring service and inherently probable that the cryptanalysts would have worked backwards through the accumulated signals once they had obtained the keys (via the Narval), reading the most recent items first. If this was the case, then the importance of this signal would have been readily apparent to the Director of Naval Intelligence, who would have ensured that Pound and Phillips, and, thereby, Churchill, saw it without delay on 1 July. Of those present at the 1800 Cabinet meeting, only these three and Alexander had access to ‘Special Intelligence’ based on decryption, so that the possibility of grasping a lifeline provided by Darlan himself could not be discussed, hence the need for a further meeting to draft a final list of options which included United States involvement. Somerville received the 0103 signal at 0426. The follow-up referred to in paragraph (d)4 arrived at 0604: Following is the communication to be made to the French Admiral at Algiers5 referred to in my 0103/2nd July. 1. HM Government have sent me to inform you as follows:– 2. They agreed to French Government approaching the German Government only on conditions [that before] armistice was concluded the French Fleet should be sent to British ports to prevent it falling into hands of the enemy. The Council of Ministers declared on 18th June that before guilty of6 capitulation on land the French Fleet would join up with British Force or sink (repetition) sink itself. 3. Whilst the present French may consider terms of their armistice with Germany and Italy are reconcilable with these undertakings, HM Government finds it impossible from our previous experience to believe Germany and Italy will not (repetition) not at any moment which suits them seize French warships and use them against Britain and allies. Italian armistice prescribes that French ships should return to metropolitan ports and under armistice terms is required to yield up units for coast defence and minesweeping. 4. It is impossible for us, your comrades up till now, to allow your fine ships to fall into power of German or Italian enemy. We are determined to fight on till the end and if we win, as we think we

173

THE ROAD TO ORAN

5.

5. 5.

5.

6.

shall, we shall never forget that France was our ally, that our interests are the same as hers, and that our common enemy is Germany. Should we conquer we solemnly declare we shall restore the greatness and territory of France. For this purpose we must be sure that the best ships of the French Navy will also not (repetition) not be used against us by the common foe. In these circumstances HM Government have instructed me to demand that French Fleet now at Mers el-Kebir and Oran, shall act in accordance with one of the following alternatives:a) Sail with us and continue to fight for victory against the Germans and Italians b) Sail with reduced crews under our control to a British port. The reduced crews will be repatriated at earliest moment. If either of these courses is adopted by you we will restore your ships to France at the conclusion of war, or pay full compensation if they are damaged meanwhile. c) Alternatively, if you feel bound to stipulate that your ships should not (repetition) not be used against Germans or Italians, for which these7 break the armistice, then sail them with us with reduced crews to some French port in the West Indies, Martinique for instance, where they can be demilitarised to our satisfaction, or be perhaps entrusted to the USA, and remain safely until end of war, the crew being repatriated. If you refuse these fair offers, I must with profound regret require you to sink your ships within six hours. Finally, failing the above I have the orders of HM Government to use whatever force may be necessary to prevent your ships from falling into German or Italian hands.

The preamble in paragraph 2 of this message was inaccurate. Sir Ronald Campbell had first reported on 18 June that the Council of Ministers was expected to ratify the decision to send the French fleet to a place of safety but he had followed this up with the news that this had not occurred. The Council had decided instead that, if the German armistice terms demanded the surrender of the fleet, they would be rejected and that, after fighting on as long as possible, and before the army finally surrendered, the ships would join up with the Royal Navy or, if that were not possible, would be scuttled. In the event, of course, the surrender of the fleet had not been demanded and the government and the navy considered that adequate precautions had been taken to ensure that it would not fall intact into enemy hands. The addition of the word ‘guilty’ to the form of words which Somerville was to present to Gensoul is unaccountable; it appears in none of the four preliminary drafts, nor is it in the Admiralty copies 174

ORDERS FOR OPERATION ‘CATAPULT’, 2 JULY

of the signal,8 and it was fortunately omitted from the text to be handed to the French admiral, for it introduced an emotive element, implying a recrimination which had previously been studiously avoided by the British government. The supplementary instructions to Somerville took the form of ‘suggestions’ covering possible queries or arguments which might be put to his emissary by the French.9 These covered some familiar ground – Darlan’s promise that the fleet would never be delivered intact to the enemy, the impossibility of ensuring the safety of warships in metropolitan ports, the promise of British rates of pay to those who volunteered to fight on and the offer of force majeure – ‘the blame will fall on us and not on your ships’ companies’ – as an inducement to agreement. Recent successes against the Italian Navy were quoted as examples of what could be done if the two navies continued to fight together. The one fresh point which was made was wholly valid but, in spite of the evidence offered, in July 1940 it could be seen as crystal-ball gazing: It is a delusion to believe that France can be restored by cooperation with Axis. Armistice terms are not peace terms and ‘Mein Kampf ’ shows what treatment Hitler has in store for France. Whatever is left to France, if anything, will only be held on sufferance until Germany is defeated. How much better therefore to fight on with us for restoration of French Empire.

The fourth and last signal in the series provided for an encounter between Force ‘H’ and the French Fleet at sea:12 What we particularly require is that Dunkerque and Strasbourg should not get into enemy control. Other modern units are important but less so. If the French Fleet is either in visual signal distance or in sight of your aircraft some means must be found to order them to stop and if they fail to do so action must be taken to force them to do so either by gunfire or air striking force. Once they have stopped, action must be taken as if they were in harbour except that should they suggest demilitarisation you should only accept on condition they return to Oran.

Further instructions, giving details of the measures to be taken, such as employing demolition charges, to immobilise or otherwise render unserviceable the French ships within the set working period of 6 hours, were received by Force ‘H’ during the forenoon of 2 July. The instructions for the Mediterranean Fleet had been settled in Cabinet the previous evening and were transmitted to Admiral Cunningham before the final drafting session began on 1 July: 175

THE ROAD TO ORAN

A. We should like to obtain the French ships at Alexandria for our own use if this can be done without bloodshed. In this case men who desired to remain would be accepted for service under RN conditions. B. If we cannot obtain the ships for our own use they must be dealt with in one of the following ways, which are in order of merit from our point of view:– 1. Retained at Alexandria with a skeleton crew, but immediately put in a non-sea-going condition, on the understanding that we would only use them if the Germans or Italians broke the terms of the Armistice. Responsibility for the pay and maintenance of the personnel and ships would be undertaken by HM Government. Should Admiral Godfroy insist that ships must be demilitarised before he leaves them you may accept this. 2. Sunk at sea. C. As action at Oran will be taken early on Wednesday, 3rd, you should, unless you hear to the contrary, put A, and if this fails then the other alternatives in turn to Admiral Godfroy at 0700 on Wednesday, 3rd.

The difference in tone between this personal signal from Admiral Pound to Admiral Cunningham and those sent during the previous two days to Vice-Admiral Somerville is most marked. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, had continued to voice his disapproval of the entire scheme for the seizure or destruction of the French fleet and to proffer unsolicited advice which ran counter to the War Cabinet’s – and specifically the Prime Minister’s – intentions but he was too powerful to be ‘slapped down’, or by-passed as Sir Dudley North had been by the appointment of an admiral directly responsible to Whitehall. Besides the personal and professional respect he commanded, Cunningham was, for immediate purposes, irreplaceable and the most that the Admiralty could do was to provide him with a desired framework, omitting any reference to direct action against Force ‘X’. During the night (1/2 July), Vice-Admiral Phillips’s staff had telephoned the French Embassy, requesting a member of the Naval Mission to withdraw the Foreign Office Note of 30 June and asking Viceamiral Odend’hal to meet the VCNS. The meeting took place at 1000 and lasted for 20 minutes. Phillips explained that he had spoken with Lord Halifax and established that the Note was a product of the slow movement of the machinery; the British government still wanted the details of the decisions of the Armistice Commissions, as soon as Odend’hal learned them. From this the Vice-amiral gathered the firm impression that the Admiralty had not yet taken any definitive decision as to the French ships. Phillips went on to express his regrets that the French Navy had ceased fighting, for, otherwise, Italy would have been quickly brought 176

ORDERS FOR OPERATION ‘CATAPULT’, 2 JULY

down. Odend’hal replied that Weygand and Darlan had considered that prolonged resistance in North Africa was impractical and that, without knowledge of all the facts which had been available to influence them, he had to support the decision. The VCNS brought what had been a very cordial meeting to a close by inviting Odend’hal to ‘come and see me at any time’.11 The War Cabinet, meeting at noon, noted the contents and despatch of the signals to Gibraltar and Alexandria but there was no discussion of the contents, or of the impending operation.12 At Gibraltar, Vice-Admiral Somerville held a forenoon meeting of flag and commanding officers to explain and discuss the orders13 which his staff had drawn up for Operation ‘Catapult’: 10. My intention is to prevent the French warships at ORAN from falling into the hands of the enemy. 11. To carry out this intention, the following procedure will be adopted:– a. Phase I Using persuasion and threats as may be found expedient, to inform the French that they must either:– i. Bring their ships to British harbours and fight with us [i.e. adopt HM Government’s first option] or ii. Steam their ships with reduced crews to a British port or to the West Indies from which their crews would be repatriated if desired [i.e. HMG’s second or third option] or iii. De-militarise their ships immediately to our satisfaction or iv. Sink their ships [HMG’s fourth option]. b. Should the French be unwilling to adopt any of the above measures, it will then be necessary to proceed to:– Phase II i. Show that we are in earnest by offensive action without endangering French ships. ii. Destroy the French ships by our own action.

Paragraph 11(a)iii did not reflect the Prime Minister’s instructions, which were that the offer to demilitarise in situ was to be made by the French and was to be accepted by Flag Officer, Force ‘H’ only if all the other options were declined. Paragraph 11(b)i was a completely new idea, added by Somerville to forestall resistance by convincing the French of the serious intent of Force ‘H’, in the hope that they would accept the principle of force majeure. The emissary was to be Captain Holland, who would arrive off Mers-el-Kébir in the destroyer Foxhound at about 0700, followed some 2 hours later by the remainder of Force ‘H’; if it was learned that the French fleet had sailed during the night (i.e. of 2/3 July), the 177

THE ROAD TO ORAN

carrier Ark Royal’s aircraft were to endeavour to locate and shadow them. If the fleet was present then, acting in accordance with ‘special instructions’, Holland would present the French with the options in Paragraph 11(a), informing them that scuttling could be carried out inside or outside of the harbour; if no progress was being made by about 1400, he was to warn them that Force ‘H’ would proceed to take the necessary action, and that if that became necessary then the Royal Navy could not hold itself responsible for any loss of life in the ships in harbour or ashore close to the harbour. Holland was, if possible, to report progress via the Foxhound but the destroyer was authorised to withdraw at discretion ‘in the interests of her own security’, leaving the negotiating party behind if need be. The orders for ‘Phase II’ were deliberately general, in order to permit flexibility in the application of force. Stage I 18. Is that in which we show the French that we are in earnest by the firing of a few rounds or by the dropping of bombs close to, but not actually hitting, French ships. 19. HOOD is to be prepared to fire a few salvoes just clear of MERS EL KEBIR harbour. 20. ARK ROYAL is to be prepared to carry out a bombing attack on MERS EL-KEBIR harbour, taking care to avoid hitting the ships. Stage II 21. Is that in which it becomes necessary to undertake the destruction or sinking of French ships. 22. The priority (in order of importance, though not necessarily in order of sequence) in regard to the destruction of the French Fleet is to be:– 22. a. STRASBOURG and DUNKERQUE 22. b. BRETAGNE and PROVENCE 22. c. OTHER fighting units in order of size. 23. The methods of destruction to be employed … will largely depend upon circumstances which cannot be foreseen, such as weather, smoke, French reaction, etc. 24. If the French offer organised and spirited resistance it may be necessary to develop a full offensive with all the means at our disposal on French ships, shore batteries, etc. 25. In this case the code word ‘ANVIL’ will be signalled to all our forces.14 Senior officers are then to take all necessary action to crush the resistance, ceasing fire as soon as it becomes apparent that the French have ceased to resist. Screening destroyers are not to leave the screen unless so directed.

178

ORDERS FOR OPERATION ‘CATAPULT’, 2 JULY

26. If, on the other hand, no organised French resistance is encountered, the destruction of French ships will be undertaken with more deliberation and greater economy of ammunition and torpedoes, available reserves of which are at present very limited.

Paragraph 26 reflected Somerville’s own ‘worst case’ expectation. He had been given to understand, or had gained the impression, that, in the last resort, the French would not make a determined resistance. His orders for the destruction of the ships under these circumstances combined both ancient and modern methods, with air-launched torpedoes and boarding parties to be employed: 28. MERS EL KEBIR 22. a) Long range gunfire with main armament of Capital ships, with aircraft spotting, in order to destroy morale, damage A/A equipment and induce French crews to abandon their ships. 22. b) Bombing by aircraft from ARK ROYAL for the same purpose. 22. c) T/B [i.e. torpedo-bombing] attack … (if necessary protected by fighters) from ARK ROYAL, in order to sink or cripple those ships exposed to torpedo fire. 22. d) Sinking of those ships still afloat by special demolition parties from two destroyers of the 13th Destroyer Flotilla. Instructions to be issued by Captain D.13 and names of ships detailed reported. 22. e) Cruisers are to be prepared to engage light craft or shore batteries as ordered.

Long-range gunfire (18,000 yards=16.5km) was to be used for three reasons, of which remaining at a safe distance from the French coastal batteries was probably the least significant. The 10-metreshigh breakwater protected much of the ships’ sides from low-trajectory fire, limiting the serious internal damage which could be inflicted; at long range, the plunging trajectory of the shells would clear the breakwater and penetrate deep into the hulls of the targets. The other consideration was humanitarian – ‘overs’ fired on a flat trajectory would be more likely to hit the shore and inflict civilian casualties; largely for the same reason, it was ordered that fire would be opened from the north to north-east of Mers-el-Kébir, so as not to endanger the built-up area of the town of Oran. The use of spotting aircraft – initially the capital ships’ own floatplanes – would, of course, improve the accuracy of the bombardment, but even so precision was not demanded, even in the case of ‘spirited and determined resistance’: 179

THE ROAD TO ORAN

Appendix IV

GUNFIRE BY MAIN ARMAMENT OF CAPITAL SHIPS

5: … No particular attempt is to be made for the fire to be concentrated on one particular ship, but spotting aircraft are to correct the fall of shot to bring them into the area occupied by the Capital ships.

Deliberate, aimed fire would be employed if the intention was to break French morale. In this case one capital ship (‘probably HOOD’) would be employed, although the other two might be called upon to fire. Finally, Somerville was prepared to deal with Italian interference: ‘36. In the event of important surface units of the Italian Fleet being encountered, it is my intention to engage them, if necessary deferring operations with the French Fleet.’ What the French fleet was expected to do when this relief appeared over the horizon was not stated. Somerville can scarcely have believed that it would remain passive, awaiting the return of Force ‘H’ and its own destruction. Indeed, it was a weakness of Somerville’s orders, acknowledged in his Report of Proceedings, that nowhere was a possible sortie by the Force de Raid, as a whole or by individual units, considered. While the ordered bombardment area, to the north and north-east of Mers-el-Kébir, gave positional security against a break-out, should the ships move from this, or the visibility become obscured, the advantage could be lost. The tactical use of the magnetic mines which the Ark Royal’s aircraft could now lay was discussed with Vice-Admiral Wells. Informed that the aircraft could be quickly armed with these weapons, Somerville decided not to lay them ‘except as a last resort, since this would have prevented the French from accepting the first or second alternatives and it would also have prevented the entrance of our destroyers with demolition parties’.15 There was therefore no reference in the operation orders to their use. Force ‘H’ sailed amid some confusion. In the signal informing the Admiralty of Somerville’s intention to sail at 1500, one of his staff officers omitted the Ark Royal.16 In the event, Force ‘H’ was clear of the harbour by 1700 (although the Port Admiral reported the time as 1730). Meanwhile, the omission had been noted in London and at 1810, the First Sea Lord himself signalled to Force ‘H’, querying the absence of the all-important aircraft carrier. Although, as Somerville stated in his Report of Proceedings, the ship had left with the others, he nevertheless considered it necessary to signal at 1945: ‘If in harbour, Ark Royal raise steam for full speed. Collect destroyers to screen her.’ It was hardly an auspicious beginning to an intricate and important operation.17 According to Churchill’s memoirs, a signal was despatched, at his request, at 2255 to Somerville by the Admiralty: ‘You are charged 180

ORDERS FOR OPERATION ‘CATAPULT’, 2 JULY

with one of the most disagreeable and difficult tasks that a British Admiral has ever been faced with, but we have complete confidence in you and rely on you to carry it out relentlessly.’18 Somerville did not comment on the receipt of such a signal either in his Report of Proceedings or in his personal diary. NOTES 1. PRO ADM199/391, Admiralty signal, 0103, 2 July 1940; the form given is that in which it was received by the Hood, varying slightly (mainly in the emphases and omissions) from that which is usually quoted. 2. In ADM1/10321, ‘French Warships at Oran & Alexandria on the Fall of France’. 3. No. 5144, originated at 1250. 4. PRO ADM199/391, Admiralty signal, 0108, 2 July 1940 (again in the form received). 5. Ibid., clearly a coder’s error – ‘Oran’ appears in all other contemporary records. 6. The two words in italic are not included in any other version. 7. Italicised words translated in manuscript in PRO ADM199/391 as ‘since this would’, but intended meaning was ‘unless these’. 8. PRO ADM1/10321 and Admiralty War Diary, 1 July 1940, p. 21C. 9. CAB65/8, Admiralty signal, 0113, 2 July 1940. 10. Ibid.; Admiralty signal, 0228, 2 July 1940. 11. Odend’hal. 12. WM(40)191. 13. PRO ADM199/391, Annex to Somerville’s Report of Proceedings. 14. Some commentators have deduced from this instruction that the Mers-el-Kébir operation bore the code-name ‘Anvil’, whereas the word was simply an executive command. 15. PRO ADM 199/391. 16. Force ‘H’ signal, 1426, 2 July 1940. 17. It had, however, an historical precedent: on 30 May 1916, the Grand Fleet sailed from Scapa Flow without its seaplane carrier, the Campania, because the ship had been omitted from the sailing plan by an error that was never rectified. 18. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. II, p. 209; this signal has not been sighted in official records, nor was it traced by Commander G.W. Stitt or those redoubtable authorities Professor A.J. Marder and Captain D.G.F.W. Macintyre during their research into this episode.

181

21

Mers-el-Kébir: The Parley, 3 July

The events of 3 July 1940 at Mers-el-Kébir, the negotiations and the brief bombardment which brought the day to a tragic close, are a rich field for hindsight and hunters of missed opportunities. Once set in train, the offensive phase of ‘Catapult’ could only be stopped by the rival sets of decision-making machinery, respectively concentrated in Whitehall and scattered through the Lot and Auvergne. At the ‘controls’ of each were the single figures, Winston Churchill and François Darlan, both answerable to high-level political councils but, in practice, neither consulting colleagues before making decisions. For once in this account, poor communications could not be blamed: both men had an opportunity during the day to bring about a solution which would have avoided the loss of life and of ships and, deliberately, neither took it. The authorities in France could have done nothing to stop the first move of the day, which was to secure the French warships lying in British harbours. At between 0430 and 0445 – as HMS Foxhound was approaching Mers-el-Kébir – parties of armed marines, sailors and soldiers went aboard every ship lying at Portsmouth, Plymouth, Southampton, Falmouth and five other ports in Britain and four in Canada. Surprise was complete and, although sabotage was accomplished in a few ships, only aboard the submarine Surcouf was there a serious incident, in which two Royal Navy officers and a French warrant officer were mortally wounded and a British leading seaman shot dead, the latter by the submarine’s doctor. At the two principal naval ports, the senior French commanders, Contre-amiral de Villaine at Portsmouth and Vice-amiral Cayol at Plymouth, protested most strongly at the action, but whereas the latter was not permitted to contact the French Embassy, de Villaine was allowed to telephone Odend’hal at 0645 to inform him of the seizure. The French ensign was raised on all ships at 0800 although the ships were wholly under British control and their crews had been landed and interned; exceptionally, at Dundee, the senior British naval officer offered the commanding officer of the submarine Rubis the opportunity to scuttle his vessel if the latter considered it to be his duty.1 182

THE PARLEY, 3 JULY

Vice-amiral Odend’hal, on learning of the operation, sought an immediate interview with the First Sea Lord. This was fixed for 1630, but at that time Admiral Pound was not available and thus Odend’hal did not see either him or Phillips until after he had learned of the Mers-el-Kébir operation. At Mers-el-Kébir, the negotiations took place with neither party aware of the morning’s action in the United Kingdom. The Foxhound arrived off Cap Falcon, to the north-west of Mersel-Kébir at 05452 and established contact with the Port War Wireless Station. A request made to the wireless station at 0558 to enter harbour was repeated to the Port Admiral’s signal station at 0620, together with a signal to be handed to Amiral Gensoul: ‘L’Amirauté Britannique envoie le commandant Holland conférer avec vous. Permission de entrer.’3 Permission was received at 0724, but in the meantime, at 0709, the Foxhound signalled by light to the Dunkerque and the Port Admiral’s signal station. The opening sentence was identical to that sent at 0620, but the message continued, in plain language: La Marine Royale espère que les propositions vont vous permettre, la Marine Nationale Française vaillante et glorieuse, de se ranger a nos côtés. En ce cas vos bâtiments resteraient toujours les votres et personne n’aurait pas besoin d’aucun anxiété dans l’avenir. La Flotte Britannique est au large d’Oran pour vous accueillir.

The stated intention of this manner of announcing the purpose of his arrival, Holland wrote in his subsequent report,4 was for the purpose of disseminating the reason of our arrival, and giving some indications as to the proposals so that the Lower Deck [i.e. the ships’ companies] should get to know of them since it was thought that Admiral Gensoul might otherwise keep the matter secret.

The idea had been Holland’s and it was, by any standards, a singularly misguided beginning. If the French admiral was to be won over to disobey his government and, more particularly, Amiral Darlan, when the terms of the armistices were widely known throughout his fleet,5 then it was essential that his trust had to be earned. The former BNLOs had emphasised to Vice-Admiral Somerville the undesirability of attempting to force a swift decision from a French flag officer and while they had suggested that ‘more junior officers’ than those in his immediate staff should be aware of the purpose of the presence of Force ‘H’,6 they had not proposed an unlimited audience. An open appeal to all and sundry in his fleet and ashore, couched in ungrammatical, 183

THE ROAD TO ORAN

schoolboy French, met none of the requirements. Amiral Gensoul much resented the public manner of this appeal, the implicit threat posed by Force ‘H’ and, reputedly, was offended that a mere captain should have been sent as the emissary.7 The Foxhound was offered a berth close to the Dunkerque but declined to enter the harbour and anchored 3,200 yards (2,900m) off the end of the breakwater, outside the anti-submarine boom. This was a precaution against it being prevented from sailing but it had the most unfortunate effect of delaying physical exchanges of written messages and face-to-face contact. Time was not yet pressing, but the Admiralty had instructed Somerville that the operation was to be concluded during daylight.8 Gensoul sent his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant de vaisseau Dufay, to the Foxhound to explain that the admiral was too busy to receive Holland personally; the Chief of Staff would be sent. To this, Holland replied that the matter could only be put to Gensoul himself. While awaiting a reply, the British destroyer was politely ordered to leave, immediately. Holland, accompanied by Spearman and Davies, transferred to its motor boat at 0905 and it weighed anchor but did not move far off. Soon afterwards, the capital ships and two of the cruisers of Force ‘H’, training their powerful signal projectors on the French capital ships, flashed a repetition of the 0709 message and its open appeal. The party in the boat, now cut off from direct communication with Somerville, began to head for the harbour but were met outside the breakwater by Lieutenant Dufay, who confirmed that Gensoul would not receive Holland but who agreed to hand Somerville’s personal message9 to the Admiral himself. Holland, waiting off the breakwater, estimated that Gensoul would have received the sealed envelope at about 0935. In fact, Dufay arrived on board the Dunkerque at 0925 and the message was handed over only a few minutes later. Again, offence was caused, for Gensoul was quick to note that what purported to be a personal démarche from the English Admiral was unsigned. So far, Force ‘H’ had been able to report to London only that the Force de Raid was still present and that Holland had gone inshore. As Holland and Dufay conferred for the second time, the Ark Royal’s aircraft noted (as did Holland) and reported that the French capital ships were taking in their awnings and raising steam. Somerville interpreted this as a sign that they were preparing for sea and reported the movement to the Admiralty.10 At much the same time, Admiral Cunningham, at Alexandria, reported that Vice-amiral Godfroy, whom he had met at 0700, appeared to be likely to accept the condition of demobilisation at Alexandria.11 184

THE PARLEY, 3 JULY

The Admiralty received these signals at about 1045, in advance of an earlier report by Somerville that Gensoul was avoiding Holland.12 The appropriate conclusions were drawn and at 1056 the First Sea Lord replied to Somerville: ‘Consider laying of magnetic mines to prevent the French Fleet sailing.’ Somewhat alarmed by the French preparations, the latter had already signalled to the Foxhound, at 1046: ‘Imperative French should know I will not repetition not allow them to leave harbour unless terms accepted.’ Twenty minutes later, at 1105, Somerville ordered the Ark Royal to load mines on to some aircraft, in preparation for laying them off the entrance to Mers-el-Kébir. Captain Holland was at this stage out of touch with the Foxhound. Lieutenant Dufay had returned to Holland’s boat at 1000 with a handwritten note from Amiral Gensoul:13 1. The assurances given by Admiral Gensoul to Admiral Sir Dudley North remain unchanged. In all circumstance [en aucun cas] French warships will not fall intact into either German or Italian hands. 2. Given the substance and form of the veritable ultimatum sent to Admiral Gensoul, French warships will defend themselves by force.

Holland, who was aware of the meeting between Gensoul and North on 24 June, did not pass this reply back to Somerville but reasoned with Dufay, asking when the Force de Raid had last received a personal signal from Amiral Darlan and letting it be known that the Royal Navy was aware of the existence of a special authenticating code word. The fact that Darlan was actually prohibited from sending enciphered messages appears to have escaped Dufay who, according to Holland’s account, was sufficiently impressed to agree to return to his Admiral with the typescript of a paper which the emissary had intended to keep as an aide-mémoire: The British Government have had suspicions for some days that the Germans and Italians were intending to break the Armistice terms as regards the Navy as soon as a favourable opportunity occurred. The day before yesterday this was confirmed beyond doubt.14 Admiral Somerville who is commanding the British Naval Forces at Gibraltar, who had many weeks of close cooperation with your ships during the Spanish Civil War has therefore been ordered to present certain proposals to you and has sent me for this purpose. This intended action is a dastardly trick which reflects as much against us as it does against you.15 I have told you here more than I have been ordered to do, but having had the honour of serving with the French Navy and under the orders of its Chief who trusted me and gave me his friendship, I feel I wish to

185

THE ROAD TO ORAN

help you in every way I can. Because of my close association with you, I perhaps realise and feel more acutely the circumstances from your point of view. But I must also try and put our point of view, if I am permitted to do so.

Holland’s note continued by repeating the trust which the Royal Navy (and he personally) placed in the assurances given by Darlan, de Laborde, Esteva, Ollive and Gensoul himself, but repeated the total mistrust of Axis intentions. The options laid down by the British government were then spelled out once more, with the final warnings that scuttling and, in the last resort, the use of force were the only remaining alternatives.16 Dufay left Holland at 1050. The aide-de-camp was back 40 minutes later with Gensoul’s Chief of Staff, Capitaine de vaisseau Danbé; such a rapid turn-round suggests that Holland’s aide-mémoire had received but scant attention, which in view of the unsubstantiated allegation of impending Axis treachery and the ambiguity as to the author of the imminent dastardly action was probably fortunate. Danbé brought another hand-written note,17 in which the French Admiral forecast the situation which many Royal Navy officers had predicted as a likely outcome: 1. Admiral Gensoul can only confirm the reply already delivered by Lieutenant de vaisseau Dufay. 2. Admiral Gensoul is determined to defend himself by all means at his disposal. 3. Admiral Gensoul draws to the attention of Admiral Somerville the fact that the first shot fired against us would have the practical effect of immediately setting the whole French Fleet against Great Britain, [an effect] which would be diametrically opposite to that sought by His Britannic Majesty’s Government.18

Holland had apparently queried the exact meaning to be understood from the phrase ‘en aucun cas’ which had appeared in Gensoul’s previous message, relating to the assurance that the French ships would not fall intact into enemy hands. This was spelled out, in writing and without ambiguity: ‘En aucun cas = anytime, anywhere, anyway and without further orders from French Admiralty.’ Holland stated in his report that he decided not to go over the same ground again with the Chief of Staff and returned to the Foxhound, to communicate direct with Somerville. Before leaving Danbé, he agreed that he would signal to the Dunkerque and send in the motorboat to meet a member of Gensoul’s staff with a message. He concluded this short meeting by remarking to the French Captain: ‘Allow me to 186

THE PARLEY, 3 JULY

tell you, officer to officer, that in your position my reply would have been no different.’19 Aboard the Foxhound, which moved to a position just outside the outer boom, the message from Somerville warning the French not to leave harbour was awaiting Holland. Lieutenant-Commander Spearman was immediately sent inshore in the motor boat with this message and simultaneously, at 1140, it was passed by light to the Dunkerque. Holland had also learned that matters appeared to be proceeding well at Alexandria and followed up with a further message to Amiral Gensoul: ‘Suis informé que l’Amiral Godfroy demilitarise ses bâtiments maintenant à Alexandrie avec l’équipage réduit.’* This was, again, not quite accurate, although it reflected Holland’s understanding. Admiral Cunningham had so far reported only that the French were ‘likely’ to accept demobilisation.20 Designed to encourage Gensoul to follow suit, the manner of transmission was once again too public a means of pursuing delicate negotiations. Holland now summarised for Somerville the French response to date: Gensoul had confirmed previous assurances, he would fight if force was used and he had pointed out that the first shot fired would alienate the entire French Navy, which would be exactly the opposite effect to that desired.21 To Somerville, the essential point was the intention of the French to resist – not only did he have Holland’s brief report but he also had the first-hand reports of the aircraft, one of which had estimated that the ships would be ready to sail at 1230,22 and this he reported to the Admiralty at 1151. The British War Cabinet was in session. Immediately before the 1130 meeting had begun, and as a result of the earliest reports from Force ‘H’, Admiral Pound drafted a signal authorising Somerville to offer the option of immediate demilitarisation at ‘Oran’; this was not sent but was taken to the Cabinet. After an optimistic (but inaccurately recorded) outline of the events in British ports, Pound reported what he knew of the situation at Mers-el-Kébir and presented his draft message offering demilitarisation: The War Cabinet was reminded that the instructions issued had been that demilitarisation should not be among the alternatives offered but might be accepted, subject to certain conditions, if volunteered by the French. The question arose whether a signal should now be sent instructing our representative to include among the alternatives offered demilitarisation of the ships to our satisfaction.

* ‘Am informed that Admiral Godfroy is demobilising his warships at Alexandria with reduced crews.’

187

THE ROAD TO ORAN

This proposal was rejected after brief discussion – ‘demilitarisation not having been included in the alternatives first offered, we should not offer it now, as this would look like weakening’.23 The First Sea Lord had proposed what had appeared to the Naval Staff to be the only remaining course of action which offered a possibly acceptable and achievable solution: the British government’s stated objective was to prevent the French fleet falling into the hands of the Axis powers and the French government wished to abide by the armistice terms while retaining their fleet – the disarmament of the Force de Raid in the face of odds should have satisfied all parties. The remainder of the Cabinet discussion, which gave de post facto authorisation to Somerville to threaten to open fire if the French fleet attempted to leave harbour and which heard further messages of United States moral support, was of academic interest only. At 1215, Admiral Pound telephoned to inform the VCNS that his draft had not been approved. The Cabinet authorisation to warn the French was passed to Force ‘H’ at 1232 and 30 minutes later the Admiralty learned that Somerville was prepared to open fire at 1330. What was not known in London or even in Force ‘H’ was that Holland had already given Gensoul’s Chief of Staff to understand that demilitarisation at Mers-el-Kébir could provide the basis of an arrangement. That he had so far exceeded his authority did not appear in Holland’s report but it was reported at 1330 by Gensoul to the French Admiralty operations headquarters at Nérac, in a signal giving abbreviated details of the British ultimatum and of his response. This was only the second signal to be sent from Mers-el-Kébir since the arrival of the British. Gensoul had not made his first signal until as late as 0945, when he had simply reported the arrival and composition of Force ‘H’ and had been economical with the details of the ultimatum, reducing the options to two: ‘Sink your ships within six hours or we will oblige you to do so by force. [My] reply French ships will respond with force.’24 This was received at Nérac at 1156 by the Vice-Chief of the French Naval Staff, Vice-amiral M.A. Le Luc. Amiral Darlan was at Clermont-Ferrand with Capitaine de vaisseau Négadelle and Contre-amiral Auphan was on the road to Vichy.25 Le Luc, acting on his own initiative, prepared orders for the cruisers at Toulon and Algiers to sail for Oran to support the Force de Raid and Force ‘X’ to break out of Alexandria, using force if necessary. These measures were fully approved by Négadelle, on behalf of Darlan, when telephone contact was made with ClermontFerrand at about 1255 and on the instruction of the Assistant-Chief a general broadcast was transmitted from Nérac at 1345 to all warships in British ports, ordering them to sail for Brest – an enemyheld port! 188

THE PARLEY, 3 JULY

Telephone contact with Darlan himself was finally achieved at about 1330 and he was still on the line at 1400 when Gensoul’s 1330 revelation was received, that demilitarisation at Mers-el-Kébir was a probable additional option:26 Initial English ultimatum was to either join the English Fleet or else destroy ships within six hours to avoid their falling into German [or] Italian hands. Have replied: First: The latter hypothesis was not for consideration. Second: Will defend myself by force. Third: First shot would have practical result of setting whole French Fleet against Great Britain, [the] result diametrically opposed to that sought by British government. English response: If you get under way without accepting British proposals which are reasonable and favourable, I would regretfully open fire. Captain Holland, who has acted as intermediary, has hinted that disarmament of Force de Raid at Mers-el-Kébir could provide the basis for an arrangement. The latter comes under reservations.

The hint of an alternative solution did not influence Darlan in the least. His response, relayed by Le Luc at 1405, was uncompromising and en clair: You will make it known to the British intermediary that the Admiral of the Fleet has ordered all French naval forces in the Mediterranean to join you ready for action immediately. You should, then, give your orders to these forces. You will reply to force with force. Summon submarines and aviation if necessary.27

The British Naval Staff had been incorrect in their assessment. Darlan had been unable to accept the compromise. His staff informed other ministers while he himself set off from Clermont-Ferrand for Vichy, 2 hours distant by road, to attend a meeting of the Council of Ministers. Thus did the Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy take the final political decision on either side in some haste, without reference to political colleagues, and thereafter cut himself off from personal control, and even up-to-date news, of the fate of ‘his’ fleet. Meanwhile, at Mers-el-Kébir, events had been following their own momentum. Shortly after noon, Holland signalled to Somerville: ‘From activity in ships apparent intention is to put to sea and fight.’ This signal was received in the Hood at 1227 and Somerville now took the decision to order ‘Anvil’ – the ‘full offensive with all the means at our disposal’ – and informed the Admiralty that he was preparing to open fire at 1330.28 But he was not prepared to do so 189

THE ROAD TO ORAN

until he was certain that negotiation offered no hope of a peaceful solution. At 1236 he queried of Holland: ‘Presume there is now no alternative ANVIL’, and only 6 minutes later received the pessimistic reply: ‘Your 1236 am afraid not. Am awaiting in V/S [visual signalling] touch in case acceptance before expiration time. Proposals received 0935.’ This, and an aircraft report that the Mers-el-Kébir inner boom gate was open, as if to permit the French ships to leave harbour, decided him to order the first offensive move, the Ark Royal receiving instructions at 1252 to fly off minelaying aircraft in order to mine the entrance at 1330. While the aircraft were taking off, Admiral Somerville had second thoughts about Holland’s latest message: the reference to ‘expiration time’ had left him uncertain whether the intermediary had, in fact, given Amiral Gensoul a deadline. The ‘personal communication’ had required Gensoul to scuttle his ships within 6 hours if he would not accept the first three options, but Somerville was unsure as to the ‘start time’ of these 6 hours. These doubts as to whether Gensoul had been given a defined period of immunity were sufficiently strong to make him signal at 1315 to Holland: ‘Does anything you have said [i.e. to the French] prevent me opening fire?’ Holland’s response, at 1332, counselled a brief stay of execution, if not a reprieve: Nothing I have said, since terms were not discussed, only handed and reply received. But I would suggest there might be a chance of avoiding ANVIL if Foxhound went in to V/S touch and asked if there was a further message before force employed.

This was based upon his own appreciation of the French character that an initial refusal will often gradually come around to an acquiescence. I had felt most strongly all along that the use of force, even as a last resource [sic], was fatal to the attainment of our object, and I was thus using every endeavour to bring about a peaceful solution. I therefore take full responsibility for any delay I may have tried to enforce.29

The signal from Foxhound was not the factor which stayed Somerville’s hand at this point, for it was transmitted after the intended hour of opening fire. The critical input was an aircraft report, received in the Ark Royal at 1324, that the boom gate had been closed and that the French ships still had their boats in the water alongside them – a clear indication that they were not as yet ready for sea. Somerville decided to postpone ‘Anvil’ until 1500, to permit the French to come to a decision. But although the British battleships did not open fire, 190

THE PARLEY, 3 JULY

it was too late to stop the minelaying and, on time, at 1330, the five Swordfish each laid a single magnetic mine in the vicinity of the gap in the outer boom. Half an hour later, during which concern was caused by the movement of submarines within the harbour but little else occurred, Somerville instructed the Foxhound to relay a message to Amiral Gensoul: ‘If you accept the terms hoist a large square flag at masthead otherwise I must open fire at 1500.’ This should have given the French Admiral an hour’s grace in which to come to a decision. According to Holland’s report the signal was not received in the Foxhound until 1419 and another 23 minutes elapsed before it was passed on, in French, to the Dunkerque; the official French account30 states that Somerville’s warning was received much earlier, at 1410. The latter version is supported by observed events, for as a prudent measure Gensoul ordered his ships to go to action stations and then, at 1415, replied: ‘Je n’ai pas l’intention d’appareiller. J’ai télégraphié à mon gouvernement dont j’attends la réponse. Ne créez pas irréparable.’ (‘I have no intention of getting under way. I have telegraphed to my government whose reply I am awaiting. Do not create [an] irreparable [situation].’) This message, which can be read as indicating a belief on Gensoul’s part that an acceptable solution could be reached, does not appear to have been received by the Foxhound, to whom it was transmitted. The preparations for action were noticed by the attentive Swordfish spotter aircraft, which reported at 1429 that the turrets of the Dunkerque and Strasbourg were trained on Force ‘H’, as was one turret of the Bretagne, and tugs were pushing the battlecruisers’ sterns around, to improve the ships’ arcs of fire; the Provence’s turrets were still trained fore and aft. Faced with these preparations, Somerville signalled to the Foxhound: ‘Pass to Gensoul. Accept our terms or abandon your ships, as I mean to destroy them at 1530.’ This message, received at 1450, was not passed on, for, 10 minutes earlier, a signal had been received from Gensoul, addressed to Somerville: ‘Suis prêt à recevoir personellement votre délégué pour discussion honorable.’31 Holland repeated this to Somerville and at 1500 was instructed to go inshore to obtain an immediate answer. The Admiralty was informed of this development, Somerville’s signal32 closing with the first optimistic note of the day: ‘Am postponing action and I think they are weakening.’ The Foxhound had been gradually moving away from the entrance to the harbour since 1130 and was now some 6 miles north-north-west of the French flagship. Taking with him Lieutenant Commander Davies, Holland left the destroyer at 1510 in the motor-boat and after transferring to one of the flagship’s boats for the final stage, the two Royal Navy officers arrived on board the Dunkerque at 1615; 8 hours had now elapsed since Holland 191

THE ROAD TO ORAN

had first spoken to Lieutenant Dufay and barely 4 hours of daylight remained. As the British emissaries were drawing alongside the French battlecruiser, the Director of Naval Intelligence was signalling to Force ‘H’ the contents of the 1430 plain language signal sent by Le Luc to Gensoul on Darlan’s orders and which had been intercepted by British monitoring stations: You will inform the British Representative that the C-in-C has given orders to all French naval forces in the Mediterranean to join you immediately in fighting order. You are empowered to give orders to these forces. You are to answer force with force. Call in the submarines and aircraft if necessary.33

This was followed by a hastener originated by the First Sea Lord: ‘Settle the matter quickly or you may have French reinforcements to deal with’,34 which was received by Somerville at 1646, after he had reported: ‘Am awaiting return of delegate whose entry and return delayed by minefield.’35 The Admiralty in London was also facing what it regarded as difficulties over the French squadron at Alexandria. At 1510, a signal had been received from Admiral Cunningham,36 stating that Viceamiral Godfroy had elected to scuttle his ships if he could not seek instructions from the French Admiralty; if this was permitted, then he would recommend to his authorities demilitarisation at Alexandria. Godfroy had also requested 48 hours to make arrangements for the landing and accommodation ashore of his 4,000 men. Cunningham reported that he was formally accepting the decision to scuttle, while trying to persuade the French admiral to defuel his ships and take steps to disarm the ships. Very soon afterwards, at 1520, two more signals37 were received from Alexandria, the first stating, presumably on the advice of the Ambassador in Cairo, that the risk could not be taken of landing French sailors from sunken ships in Egypt. The next reported that Godfroy had been persuaded to discharge fuel and remove warheads but that he would not reduce to skeleton crews without the consent of the French government. Admiral Cunningham personally considered this to be a substantial gesture of good faith, demonstrating that Force ‘X’ was incapable of proceeding to sea and was, to all intents and purposes, disarmed. Like North and Somerville at Gibraltar, he may have believed that contact was being maintained by Whitehall with French officials – he certainly believed that the matter should not be settled by force of arms and concluded his signal: ‘Urge most strongly that matter should be settled by negotiation between Admiralties if 192

THE PARLEY, 3 JULY

this is possible.’ The Admiralty did not reply for over an hour and then the task was delegated to the Director of the Operations Division (Foreign), who signalled at 1628: ‘Your 1429/3. Negotiation between Admiralties is quite impossible.’ At this stage, it was, indeed, impossible. But it had not been attempted on the British side since the British Ambassador and Naval Attaché had left Bordeaux, 11 days earlier. Aboard the Dunkerque, at 1615, Holland and Davies were greeted very formally by an extremely indignant Amiral Gensoul. He reiterated his statement that the first shot would be tantamount to a declaration of war between France and Great Britain and that force was not the best means of ensuring that the French fleet would not be used against the latter. He was particularly angry at the manner of the presentation of the terms, which amounted to an ultimatum, and at the minelaying of the entrance to the harbours (Oran had been mined as the Foxhound’s boat was proceeding inshore). If nothing else, the minefield prevented him from sailing to comply with the first three options offered. The fourth, that of scuttling his ships, he rejected out of hand and he concluded by repeating the assurance which he had given to Admiral North. Captain Holland explained once again the British government’s views but Gensoul remained confident that his own preparations for scuttling and sabotage in the event of an Axis breach of the armistice terms were adequate. Force majeure was not an attractive excuse for sinking his own ships – as long as the armistice terms were observed by all sides the French fleet would remain French and he would not be the first to break them. Gensoul only now began to believe that the Royal Navy was in earnest about the use of force, when Holland explained that the orders behind the messages given to him that morning were those which Vice-Admiral Somerville was following, and that the latter ‘had on his own responsibility disobeyed those orders by not taking action within the time laid down, thus showing his desire to avoid the use of force if this were possible’. The French admiral produced the last cipher ‘Xavier 377’ received, asking Holland for assurances that the contents would not be divulged. This was the signal of 24 June in which Darlan had given instructions that if the Armistice Commission agreed to conditions other than those of French ownership and actual possession of the fleet in French ports, ships should proceed to the United States or be scuttled.38 To Holland, this seemed to be so close to the third British option that there might be a chance of persuading Gensoul to accept the latter. The admiral remained ‘stubborn’, for the Armistice Commission had recommended nothing that was unacceptable. The only further concession he made was to inform Holland that the reduction of his 193

THE ROAD TO ORAN

ships’ crews had already begun that morning with the demobilisation of reservists from North Africa. No mention was made of Le Luc’s instructions to tell the British that naval reinforcements had been ordered to concentrate to support the Force de Raid and it must be presumed that this signal had not yet reached Gensoul. The meeting was drawing to a close, with Gensoul drafting a statement of his final position,39 when, at 1715, an urgent message from Admiral Somerville was delivered to Amiral Gensoul. The former had waited only 10 minutes after the First Sea Lord’s order to ‘settle matter quickly’ before transmitting directly to the French War Signal Station: ‘Si un des propositions britanniques ne sont pas accepté par 1730 BST, je dis 1730 BST, il faut que je coule vos batiments.’40 The delay in relaying the signal41 to the Dunkerque, which received it at 1712, cut by more than half the last period of grace. Before leaving the French ship Holland had just time to draft, with Gensoul, one more message: ‘Admiral Gensoul says crew being reduced and if threatened by enemy would go to Martinique or USA but this is not quite our proposition. Can get no nearer.’42 Holland and Davies re-entered the admiral’s barge at 1725 as this signal was being flashed to the Foxhound. The Dunkerque was going to action stations as they left, but they were politely saluted by the Bretagne as they passed on their way to the boom, where they transferred to the destroyer’s motor-boat at 1735.43 Somerville received Holland’s final communication at 1729. The Admiralty’s instructions left him no alternative but to implement his plans for ‘Anvil’, having delayed this final step for 4 hours. The Ark Royal was ordered to fly off aircraft armed with bombs and the capital ships stood in towards the coast. Contrary to the orders, the chosen bombardment station was not to the north and north-east, but to the north-west: personal observation had led Somerville to choose this direction partly because it masked the fire of coast-defence batteries but also to reduce the danger to French crews abandoning their ships towards the nearest shore. This opened the way for the escape of ships to the eastward, but it was considered that the magnetic mines laid in the entrance would guard against such an attempt. At 1754, at the maximum visibility distance of 17,500 yards, HMS Hood opened fire on the French warships in the harbour of Mers-el-Kébir. NOTES 1. Cras, L’Armistice de juin 1940, p. 177. 2. All times in this passage are Zone-1 (‘A’).

194

THE PARLEY, 3 JULY 3. ‘The British Admiralty sends Captain Holland to confer with you. [Request] permission to enter [port].’ PRO ADM199/391; this signal and those which follow are taken verbatim from Holland’s Report, annexed to Somerville’s RoP. 4. ‘The Royal Navy hopes that the proposals are going to allow you, the valiant and glorious French Navy, to fall in at our side. In this case your ships would always remain yours and no one would need to have any anxiety as to the future. The British Fleet is off Oran to welcome you’, ibid. 5. Somerville had reported to the Admiralty on the night of 1 July that the armistice terms had been published in the North African papers (Force ‘H’ signal, 2030, 1 July 1940). 6. See p. 171. 7. Antier, Le drame, p. 105. 8. PRO ADM199/291, Admiralty signal received 0135, 3 July 1940; Sunset was at 2020. 9. That is, the Admiralty signal originated at 0108 on 2 July (see p. 173). 10. Force ‘H’ signals 0929 and 0958. 11. C-in-C Mediterranean’s signal 0935; see p. 1102, para. B.1 of options. 12. Force ‘H’ signal 0937; chronologies of these signals are to be found in PRO ADM1/103231, and in the Admiralty War Diary, Vol. XVIII, pp. 44–6. 13. 1. Les assurances données par l’Amiral Gensoul à l’Amiral Sir Dudley North demeurent entières. En aucun cas, les bâtiments français ne tomberont intacts aux mains des Allemands ni des Italiens. 2. Etant donné le fond et la forme du véritable ultimatum qui a été remis à l’Amiral Gensoul, les bâtiments français se défenderont par la force.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

The copy preserved in PRO ADM199/391 was written by Dufay, at Holland’s request, on a standard Royal Navy ‘Message Form’, Caroff, Le Théâtre Méditerranéen, Vol. II, p. 144. That is, 1 July, though to what this referred is not at all obvious. The ‘dastardly action’ was the prophesied Axis seizure, not the mission of Force ‘H’’s mission – the juxtaposition and resulting ambiguity was a hostage to fortune that was not exploited by the French. PRO ADM199/391. Ibid., the message was scribbled, this time, on a French message form. Ibid. 1. Amiral Gensoul ne peut que confirmer la réponse déja apportée par le Lieutenant de vaisseau Dufay. 2. Amiral Gensoul est décidé à se défendre par tous les moyens dont il dispose. 3. Amiral Gensoul attire attention de l’Amiral Somerville sur le fait que le premier coup de canon tiré contre nous aurait pour résultat pratique de metter immédiatement toute la Flotte Française contre le Grande Bretagne, résultat qui serait diamétralement opposé à celui que recherche le Gouvernement de SM [Sa Majesté] Britannique. In the original, ‘à que recherche’ was followed by ‘l’Amiral Somerville’; this was scored out, Gensoul appreciating that the British Admiral was the agent, not the initiator. Caroff, Le Théâtre Méditerranéen, Vol. II, p. 145. See p. 156. PRO ADM199/391; Foxhound signal, 1146, 3 July 1940. Ibid.; VA (Air)’s Report of Proceedings. WM(40)192, Confidential Annex.

195

THE ROAD TO ORAN 24. ‘Coulez vos bâteaux délai six heures ou nous vous y containdrons par la force. Réponse bâtiments français répondront par la force.’ Amiral Atlantique’s signal No. 2607, 0945, 3 July 1940, Caroff, Le Théâtre Méditerranéen, Vol. II, p. 150. 25. Le Luc’s account, used by Coutau-Bégarie and Huan, Darlan, p. 279, varies from that in Caroff, Le Théâtre Méditerranéen, Vol. II, p. 150. The Vice-Chief stated that Négadelle was in Vichy, but this is clearly an error. 26. Ultimatum initial anglais était ou bien rallier flotte anglaise ou bien détruire bâtiments dans les six heures pour éviter qu’ils tombent mains Allemagne Italie. Ai répondu: Primo: Cette dernière hypothèse n’était pas à envisager. Secundo: Me défendrai par la force. Tertio: Premier coup de canon aurait résultat pratique mettre toute flotte française contre Grande-Bretagne, résultat diamétralement opposé à celui que recherche gouvernement britannique. Réponse anglaise: Si vous appareillez sans accepter propositions britanniques, lesquelles sont raisonnables et favorables, j’aurai regret ouvrir le feu. Commandant Holland qui a servi intermédiaire a insinué que désarmament Force de Raid à Mers-el-Kébir serait susceptible donner base à un arrangement. Ceci sous toutes réserves. Amiral Atlantique’s signal No. 1860, 1230 (Zone-2), 3 July (cited in Caroff, Le Théâtre Méditerranéen, Vol. II, p. 150). Much has been made of Gensoul’s omission, from this signal, of the option of proceeding to the West Indies. Such an action would have been as much in violation of the armistice terms as that of sailing for British ports and this was the view taken by the Vichy government when the full text of the British communications became known. Amiral Gensoul, appearing before a parliamentary inquiry in 1949, did, however, apologise for the omission [Figaro, 28 December 1951]. 27. Amirauté telegram No. 3303, originated at 1405 and transmitted at 1430, 3 July 1940:

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

Vous ferez savoir à l’intermédiaire britannique que Amiral de la flotte a donné ordre à toute force navale française en Méditerranée de vous rallier en tenue de combat immédiatement. Vous avez donc à donner vos ordres à ces forces. Vous répondrez à la force par la force. Appelez sous-marins et aviation si nécessaire. Force ‘H’ signal, 1231, 3 July 1940 (PRO ADM1/10321 and War Diary, Vol. XVIII, p. 44). PRO ADM199/391: Holland’s Report. Caroff, Le Théâtre Méditerranéen, Vol. II, pp. 146–8; all British signals are quoted from PRO ADM199/391. ‘Am ready to receive personally your delegate for honourable discussion.’ Force ‘H’ signal, 1459, 3 July 1940 (War Diary, Vol. XVIII, p. 45). Ibid., Admiralty signal, 1613, 3 July, reporting Amirauté signal No. 3309, 1305 (Z-2). Ibid., 1SL’s signal, 1614, 3 July 1940. Ibid., Force ‘H’ signal, 1637, 3 July 1940; this was not received in London until 1740. C-in-C Mediterranean’s signal, 1259, 3 July 1940 (War Diary, Vol. XVIII, p. 48). C-in-C Mediterranean’s signals, 1407 and 1429, 3 July 1940 (ibid.). See p. 172.

196

THE PARLEY, 3 JULY 39. Holograph, timed at 1720, enclosed in PRO ADM199/391. The message, hastily written on the Dunkerque’s stationery, is possibly incomplete, for it gives no fresh information, other than to confirm that partial demobilisation had commenced on 2 July. 40. ‘If one of the British proposals are [sic] not accepted by 1730 BST [i.e. Z-1], I say 1730 BST, I must sink your ships.’ 41. Force ‘H’ signal, 1655, 3 July 1940 (Holland’s report, PRO ADM199/391). 42. Holland’s report, PRO ADM/199/391. 43. The boat was sighted at about 1915, when 15 miles north of Mers-el-Kébir, by Force ‘H’ and the officers and crew taken off by HMS Forester; despite being only 1 mile from the end of the breakwater when the action started, no fire was directed at the boat.

197

22

The Bombardment of Mers-el-Kébir, 3 July

At 1754 on 3 July 1940, at the maximum visibility distance of 17,500 yards, HMS Hood, followed by HMS Valiant and Resolution, opened fire on the French warships in the harbour of Mers-el-Kébir. During the next 10 minutes, the three capital ships fired 12 salvoes apiece, amounting to 144 15in (380mm) rounds. Force ‘H’, besides the three capital ships, consisted of the light cruisers Arethusa and Enterprise, which were tasked with replying to shore batteries, and the destroyers Faulknor, Foxhound, Forester, Keppel, Active and Vidette, screening against submarine or destroyer attack. The first salvo fell short but the next hit the breakwater, showering the French battleships with fragments of concrete. The third scored a direct hit at 1757 on the old, but modernised battleship Bretagne, causing a major explosion amidships; its commanding officer initially attempted to beach the ship but quickly appreciated that the situation was beyond hope and ordered it to be abandoned. A minute before this first hit, the Bretagne’s sister-ship, the Provence, had begun to return the British fire, simultaneously cutting the wires which secured it to the breakwater and slipping the cable forward. The first French capital ship to get under way was the Strasbourg, whose commanding officer did not bother to cut his stern wires until after he had pulled out the bollards to which they were secured. As the ship came clear of its berth, at 1759, a salvo of shells landed where it had been lying a minute previously; thereafter, the Strasbourg was repeatedly straddled as it made its way down the harbour, but it was not hit. As the Provence began to move clear, at 1800, Vice-amiral Gensoul’s flagship, the battlecruiser Dunkerque, opened fire on Force ‘H’. Just as it finished casting off, however, it was hit first by a 15in shell which passed through the aircraft hangar aft without causing serious damage and then, as the commanding officer ‘rang down’ for 12 knots, by three more heavy shells from a single salvo. Of these, one ricocheted off the upper 13in (330mm) turret, another penetrated the side armour and exploded inboard, causing severe damage and fires, the smoke from which caused the abandonment of the starboard engine-room; 198

THE BOMBARDMENT, 3 JULY

the third shell hit on the waterline amidships, penetrating the armoured belt, two anti-torpedo bulkheads and the lower armoured deck, and causing fires, oil fuel flooding and severe damage to the electrical distribution system in its wake. Despite the damage, the Dunkerque continued to fire six of her eight guns until all electrical power failed, at 1808, and 5 minutes later it was anchored in the harbour. The ships’ return fire was at first very short, but accuracy improved and although no hits were obtained, the British ships were near-missed and in some instances bracketed by French salvoes, the Hood sustaining minor damage from splinters which wounded two men. The bombarding squadron maintained an easterly heading until 1801, when the increasingly accurate fire of the shore batteries resulted in the British ships turning away to reverse track to the westwards, Somerville ordering them to make smoke to obscure the view from the forts. By 1801, the Provence had steamed about 500 yards from its berth when it, too, was hit by a 15in shell. This caused a very serious fire aft and the after portion of the ship was flooded as the result of a section of armour plate being detached by shock. Like the Dunkerque, it came to anchor in the harbour. The Bretagne, badly on fire, took more hits and capsized at 1807 with the loss of 907 officers and men. Six contre-torpilleurs, large destroyers armed with cruiser-calibre guns, were either under way or preparing to un-moor when the first salvo was fired by Force ‘H’. The closest to the harbour entrance was the Mogador and it was hit at the same time as the Bretagne (1757); struck aft by a 15in shell which detonated 16 depth-charges, it lost its stern, its hull was wrecked as far forward as the machinery spaces and, reduced to a hulk, was abandoned at 1802 by all but its fire-fighting parties. Only two of the other large destroyers sustained any damage while escaping from the harbour, the Volta1 being showered with concrete fragments from a hit on the breakwater and the Lynx being holed by splinters from a near-miss shell; neither sustained any personnel casualties. Two tugs were also hit by splinters, but the seaplane-carrier Commandant Teste, one of the largest targets, was untouched, even though it remained at its mooring at the end of the line of capital ships throughout the bombardment. The shooting had been very accurate, for only six heavy shells had been strays, five landing in the hinterland and another decapitating the Mers-el-Kébir lighthouse. Force ‘H’ ceased fire at 1804, as soon as it had become apparent that the French ships were no longer replying. The gunnery of the coast-defence batteries had become increasingly accurate and this forced Vice-Admiral Somerville to turn away and head westwards under a smoke-screen. Already far to the north-west of the entrance 199

THE ROAD TO ORAN

to Mers-el-Kébir, this turn took him away from the Strasbourg, which passed through the gap in the outer boom at 1807, clear of the five mines laid by the Ark Royal’s aircraft. She made good her escape to the east, in company with the five contre-torpilleurs. At 1813, Amiral Gensoul ordered a large square sail to be raised by the Dunkerque and passed a message to the wireless station to be forwarded to Force ‘H’: ‘Vous demande de cesser le feu.’ This was also passed by light and wireless by several ships and shore stations but Somerville, who had already ceased fire, did not reply until 1835, when he signalled: ‘Unless I see your ships sinking, I shall open fire again.’ It was, indeed, impossible to see anything in Mers-el-Kébir harbour from Force ‘H’ and even the spotter aircraft were having difficulty because of the palls of smoke from the burning ships and the late-afternoon haze. But, by this time, Somerville had a further problem, which was to spare Mers-el-Kébir a further bombardment. As early as 1804, an aircraft reported that the Strasbourg was under way in the harbour. At 1813, three destroyers were seen to be heading east and 5 minutes later the aircraft reported that a battle cruiser was also clear and making to the east. Somerville was disinclined to believe this last report: In view of other reports of movements which had subsequently been cancelled, the difficulty of observation due to smoke and the certainty I entertained that the French would abandon their ships, I did not attach sufficient weight to this report.

Tactically, he had been completely ‘wrong-footed’, primarily because, contrary to his own orders, he was in completely the wrong position to cut off any attempted break-out. The cause of his disbelief in airborne observation, he explained, was the earlier sequence of reports of confused boat traffic and the movement of submarines (the purpose of which had been quickly and accurately surmised by the airborne observers), but once the action had started there was little justification for doubting the aircraft reports. The worst possible outcome of Operation ‘Catapult’ was an escape by French capital ships, but Somerville still believed what he had been told a week previously about French naval morale and he had not made adequate provision on the day. Twelve minutes elapsed, while Force ‘H’ steered north-west at 18 knots and the Strasbourg headed north-east at 28 knots, before another aircraft report convinced him, at 1830, that a major break-out had occurred; by the time that he actually turned Force ‘H’ to the east, eight minutes later, the French ships were some 25 miles ahead. 200

THE BOMBARDMENT, 3 JULY

The Ark Royal had meanwhile received somewhat of a fright. She had been operating independently2 of the capital ships throughout the day and, screened by three destroyers, she was some 18 miles to the north of Oran when an aircraft report was received at 1835 that the Strasbourg was within easy gun range of the carrier, should the visibility improve. Immediately after the receipt of the report, the bowwaves of two of the French destroyers3 were sighted from the Ark Royal’s bridge. The carrier was immediately turned away and headed north-west at 30 knots, to avoid contact and to seek support from Force ‘H’. Not only had Somerville failed to prevent the escape of the Strasbourg – he had come perilously close to losing his own carrier! The Ark Royal had just completed launching six Swordfish and three Skua fighters as escorts when this near contact occurred. These aircraft were a belated contribution to the ‘Anvil’ phase and were armed with 250lb and 20lb bombs ‘to destroy morale, damage A/A equipment and induce French crews to abandon ships’.4 Vice-Admiral Wells subsequently reported that at 1840, ‘as it appeared that the enemy battle-cruiser outside the harbour might escape Eastwards, bomber striking force was ordered by W/T to attack this ship’. This was a curious statement, for by that time it was patently obvious that the Strasbourg was escaping and subsequent commentators have observed that little could have been hoped for in the way of substantial damage to a modern capital ship from such light bombs. The timing of the order suggests that the more likely reason for the order to attack was to create a diversion to permit the Ark Royal to get clear of the French ships. If, as is likely, this was indeed the case, the aircraft did not contribute to the Ark Royal’s escape, neither did they hinder the Strasbourg’s: not until an hour later did the Swordfish deliver their strike, having first staggered up to 11,000 feet to begin their divebombing run. All bombs missed and two aircraft were shot down, although their crews were rescued. Admiral Somerville meanwhile was in pursuit of the Strasbourg, which had been joined by three destroyers from Oran. His two slow battleships were gradually left behind without escort as the Hood, two cruisers and all available destroyers worked up to full speed, but the Valiant was to fire the last British salvoes of the day, engaging a destroyer inshore.5 The Ark Royal flew off a torpedo-strike at 1950, in the hope of slowing down the Strasbourg but 30 minutes later, long before the aircraft could close the French ships, Somerville abandoned the chase: he was not gaining on the quarry, which was reported as being 25 miles ahead, and he estimated that the Strasbourg would rendezvous with the Algiers squadron’s cruisers and destroyers at about 2100. The torpedo attack was delivered between 2055 and 2112, in the late twilight. In the poor light and thick haze, the Swordfish pilots 201

THE ROAD TO ORAN

had difficulty in estimating the speed of the Strasbourg and their range at the point of dropping. None was fired at before releasing torpedoes but, despite achieving surprise, no hits were scored. Somerville’s fast ships withdrew to the west, to concentrate Force ‘H’ once again. At the beginning of the day he had instructed the submarine Proteus to remain clear, to the north of Oran, but at 2150 it was ordered to close the coast again; it was to attack any French ships encountered, as was the Pandora, off Algiers, where, the latter was informed by Force ‘H’ at 2205,6 the Strasbourg might arrive after 2300. His own intentions were to launch a dawn air-strike on Mers-el-Kébir. This was, in the event, thwarted by fog and at 0630 on 4 July Somerville abandoned further operations and headed back to Gibraltar, where all ships had arrived by 1900. Total Royal Navy losses on 3 July amounted to two aircrew missing, five aircraft and the Foxhound’s motor-boat. After the Admiralty received Somerville’s 1637 signal that he was waiting Holland’s return, nothing further was heard from Force ‘H’ until 1940, when a report timed at 17537 was received: ‘Have opened fire on French ships.’ With communications lagging so far behind the action, those in Whitehall were powerless to do anything to affect the operations at Mers-el-Kébir, other than despatch orders which became increasingly irrelevant. The same was true of their influence on Alexandria, where the recalcitrant Cunningham was handling the cooperative Godfroy with great care, but the impatient Prime Minister’s attempted longrange micro-management here resulted in what was undoubtedly the most ridiculous signal of the day. At 1727, Cunningham had reported that the French cruisers had started to discharge their fuel oil and that the destroyers were about to commence. This was received quite quickly by the Admiralty whence, at 1824, a further order was despatched:8 ‘Admiralty note French ships discharging oil but crews should commence being reduced by landing or transfer to Merchant Ships especially key ratings before dark tonight. Don’t fail.’ The lack of sense of timing, as well as the final injunction, betrays the authorship of this useless order – the sun had already set in Alexandria, far to the east of Whitehall, when it had been originated; by the time that the signal reached Admiral Cunningham, nearly two hours later, it had long been dark. He simply ignored it and went on to deal with the deterioration of relations which had resulted from Godfroy’s learning of the action at Mers-el-Kébir. In this he was ultimately successful, securing the peaceful demilitarisation of Force ‘X’ on 4 July while retaining the personal goodwill of Vice-amiral Godfroy. At Mers-el-Kébir, the damaged Dunkerque and Provence had had to be beached and abandoned. The fires on board these ships and the 202

THE BOMBARDMENT, 3 JULY

Mogador anchored in the harbour were fought by parties who remained, assisted by the tugs, but not for several hours were they brought under control. At 2130, Amiral Gensoul signalled to Somerville ‘Bâtiments de combat à Mers-el-Kébir hors de combat. Je fais évacuer les bâtiments par leur personnel.’9 Although this omitted the fact that a number of warships, including the undamaged Strasbourg, had got clean away, it was a clear admission that Force ‘H’ had fulfilled its orders as far as the ships which remained were concerned. The message was received by the British admiral, although the time of receipt is not known, and the latter reported that it contributed to his decision to return to Gibraltar on 4 July. The signal was also received by the Amirauté. The normally selfcontrolled Darlan was by now beside himself with rage against Churchill, Pound and the entire Royal Navy10 and he approved Le Luc’s very swift response, originated at 2153, which gave Gensoul absolutely no freedom to save his fleet: ‘Cessez de parlementer avec l’ennemi. Référence votre 2030/3–7 [i.e. 2130 Z-1] s’il est authentique.’ During the evening, Le Luc sent from Nérac, on Darlan’s authority, a series of urgent signalled instructions to ships and commanders. Had these orders been implemented before cooler heads in the Council of Ministers prevailed, the French Navy would have been in an immediate state of war with Britain; fortunately, Darlan and Laval, who sided with the admiral, were overruled by Pétain and Baudouin and they continued to be thus restrained even after the reattack on Mers-el-Kébir on 6 July. The most that Pétain would agree to as an immediate measure was a 20-mile exclusion zone around French possessions. The fog on 4 July possibly saved one French ship: during the early afternoon the submarine Proteus sighted the seaplane-carrier Commandant Teste off Oran at 1447 but lost it in the poor visibility. The aviso Rigault de Genouilly was near-simultaneously (1458) sighted off Algiers by the Pandora, which was able to make an attack. Two torpedoes hit the big sloop, which sank with heavy loss of life an hour and a half later. The British government apologised to the French Embassy for this tragic incident and that evening the Admiralty instructed all Commanders-in-Chief that ships and submarines were to be ready for attack but were not to fire the first shot at French vessels.11 A second attack on Mers-el-Kébir was ordered by Churchill, between meetings of the War Cabinet. Somerville, although he knew for a certainty that the Dunkerque had been damaged and beached, was not able to give the categorical assurance, demanded by the First Sea Lord on behalf of the Cabinet on 5 July, that it she could not be repaired within a year. Whether any French naval architect could have given an estimate at that point is debatable and it was such an unreasonable 203

THE ROAD TO ORAN

demand to place on Admiral Somerville that it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Churchill was determined upon further warlike action. No gunfire was used on 6 July as the Dunkerque’s position was suitable for air torpedo attack. Further damage was inflicted by freakish means: a torpedo struck and sank a patrol craft (the Terre Neuve) alongside the battlecruiser and the depth-charges aboard the small vessel exploded, causing massive flooding in the Dunkerque. One tug was also hit and sunk. The French personnel losses in the second attack were not counted separately: altogether, 47 officers and 1,238 ratings were killed and 351 wounded on 3 and 6 July. Of these, 210 were lost aboard the Dunkerque and 38 aboard the Mogador, but the vast majority – 36 officers and 976 ratings – were lost with the Bretagne. The Dunkerque’s temporary repairs – refloating and making her fit for passage to Toulon – were not completed until February 1942. She had long been preceded by the Mogador and the Provence which left Mers-el-Kébir, the former under tow, in November 1940. The affair stirred deep emotions, while it was in train and for 50 years after. It is therefore difficult to obtain an unclouded perspective when all participants and witnesses, writing concurrently with the events or retrospectively in their memoirs, were affected to a greater or lesser degree. But what does emerge from examination of the tragic history is the victory on the British side of perceived political necessity over military reality. From the outset, the senior British professional – the First Sea Lord – never really believed that the French Navy would voluntarily evacuate its ships to British ports: in the event of the capitulation of France, it would prefer to scuttle in its own bases. This opinion did not deter him from attempting to persuade his opposite number, Amiral Darlan, to send his most modern ships to continue to fight alongside the Royal Navy. The immediate consequences of the action – Amiral Darlan’s enmity aside – were the relaxation of the Axis armistice terms relating to the French fleet, which was encouraged to remain under arms to counter future British attack. Within the French Navy, the one-sided action at Mers-el-Kébir polarised attitudes: most of the long-service personnel who had been wavering in their attitude to the Vichy government were persuaded to give their full obedience but there were also ships and submarines which mutinied during the days which followed. The same applied among the ‘Free French’ who were being recruited by General de Gaulle and Amiral Muselier – many of those who had agreed to fight on now applied for repatriation. Abroad, to judge by the response of the neutral Press, Operation ‘Catapult’ was generally approved (and in several instances applauded) 204

THE BOMBARDMENT, 3 JULY

– the demonstration of Britain’s determination, which, it was alleged, had been Churchill’s intention throughout, had therefore succeeded. NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

This ship, it will be recalled, had brought Darlan to Portsmouth in August 1939. Commanded by the Executive Officer in the absence of Captain Holland. Probably the Volta and Le Terrible. See p. 179. Probably the Kersaint, which could not exceed 20 knots on its one serviceable set of machinery. PRO ADM199/2208, Admiralty War Diary, 3 July 1940, p. 50. Force ‘H’ signal, 1753, 3 July 1940 (PRO ADM199/2208, Admiralty War Diary, 3 July 1940, p. 45); the timing, of course, clashes with Somerville’s statement, in his Report, that he opened fire at 1754. PRO ADM199/2208, Admiralty War Diary, Vol. XVIII, p. 49. ‘Warships at Mers-el-Kébir out of action. I am evacuating the ships’ personnel.’ Coutau-Bégarie and Huan, Mers-el-Kébir, pp. 283–4. PRO ADM 186/797, ‘Selected Bombardments (Mediterranean) 1940–41’ (Naval Staff History, Admiralty, London, 1954), pp. 13–14.

205

Bibliography

PRIMARY SOURCES

Admiralty and Cabinet Office papers, Public Record Office, Kew ADM 1/9786: British Naval Liaison Organisation in Paris in event of war: Policy 1939 ADM 1/10311: Transfer of Asdic Trawlers to French Government: conversion of eight trawlers ADM 1/10321: French Warships at Oran and Alexandria on surrender of France 1940 ADM 1/10563: Immobilisation of harbours and rivers in UK: requisitioning taking up of various vessels as blockships ADM 1/10568: British and French Naval Operations in event of German invasion of Holland Belgium 1940. ADM 116/5458: Naval Liaison with France: exchange of information and contingency plans 1939–40. ADM 186/797: Naval Staff History: Selected Bombardments (Mediterranean) 1940–41. ADM 186/806: Naval Staff History: Mediterranean, Volume I (see also Secondary Sources, David Brown). ADM 199/291: Co-operation with the Allies: France and Yugoslavia, 1939–45 ADM 199/391: Force ‘H’ War Diaries ADM 199/2201: Admiralty War Diary, 17–31 March 1940 ADM 199/2204: Admiralty War Diary, 1–15 May 1940 ADM 199/2207: Admiralty War Diary, 17–30 June 1940 ADM 199/2208: Admiralty War Diary, 1–16 July 1940 ADM 205/2: First Lord’s minutes and accompanying papers: Scandinavian matters. Naval policy, war strategy September– December 1939 ADM 205/3: First Sea Lord’s private correspondence: Admiral Sir Roger Blockhouse and Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, etc., 1938-1939 ADM 205/4: Minutes of First Lord’s Meetings. Plan ‘Catherine’. Enemy commerce raiders etc. 206

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ADM 234/372: Naval Staff History: Home Waters and the Atlantic, Volume II, 9 April 1940–6 December 1941 CAB 79/5: Minutes of Meetings, 11 June–6 August 1940 CAB 80/14: Memoranda, 28 June–15 July 1940 Seekriegsleitung (SKL) Kriegstagebuch, Militärarchiv, Freiburg-im-Breisgau.

German

Bundesarchiv-

SECONDARY SOURCES

Books Antier, Jean-Jacques, Le Drame de Mers el-Kébir, Paris, Presses de la Cité, 1990. Auphan, Paul, L’Honneur de servir, Paris, France-Empire, 1978. Auphan, Paul, and Mordal, Jacques, The French Navy in World War II, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1959. Beesly, Patrick, Very Special Admiral: The Life of Admiral J. H. Godfrey, CB, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1980. Beniost-Méchin, J., Sixty Days that Shook the West: The Fall of France, 1940, London, Putnam, 1963. Brown, David (ed.), The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean, Volume I: September 1939–October 1940, London, Frank Cass, 2002. Caroff, Capitaine de frégate, Les Forces Maritimes de l’Ouest, Vincennes, Service Historique de la Marine, 1954. Caroff, Capitaine de frégate, Le Théatre Atlantique: Volume II, Le Théatre Atlantique après le 25 juin 1940, Vincennes, Service Historique de la Marine, 1959. Caroff, Capitaine de frégate, Le Théatre Mediteranéen: Volume I, du 2 septembre 1939 au 25 juin 1940, Vincennes, Service Historique de la Marine, 1960. Churchill, Winston S., The Gathering Storm, London, Cassell, 1949. Colville, John, The Fringes of Power: Sir John Colville’s Downing Street Diaries, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1985. Coutau-Bérgarie, Hervé, and Huan, Claude, Darlan, Paris, 1989. Coutau-Bérgarie, Hervé, and Huan, Claude, Lettres et notes de l’Amiral Darlan, Paris, Economica, 1992. Coutau-Bérgarie, Hervé, and Huan, Claude, Mers-el-Kébir (1940): La rupture franco-britannique, Paris, Economica, 1994. Cras, Hervé, Medecin en chef de 1ère classe, L’Armistice de juin 1940, Vincennes, Service Historique de la Marine, 1959. 207

THE ROAD TO ORAN

Cunningham, Andrew Browne, Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, A Sailor’s Odyssey, London, Hutchinson, 1951. Hinsley, F. H. et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War, London, HMSO, 1979. Kowark, Hannsjörg, Hitler et la flotte française, Nantes, Marines Editions, 1998. Mallett, Robert, The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism, 1935–1940, London, Frank Cass, 1998. Marder, A., From the Dardanelles to Oran: Studies of the Royal Navy in War and Peace, 1915–1940, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1974. Martienssen, Anthony (ed.), Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, London, Brassey’s, 1948. Reussner, M. A., Les conversations franco-britanniques d’Etat-Major (1935–39), Vincennes, Service Historique de la Marine, 1969. Rochas, Capitaine Yves, 1940, Churchill et les Français. Un été fertile en légendes, Paris, NEL, 1998. Varillon, Pierre, Mers-el-Kébir, Paris, Amiot Dumont, 1949. Winser, John de S., B.E.F.: Ships Before, At and After Dunkirk, Kendal, World Ship Society, 1999. Woodward, Sir Llewellyn, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Volume I, London, HMSO, 1970.

Articles Auphan, Paul, ‘The French Navy Enters World War II’, Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press (June 1956). Weichold, E., ‘German Surface Ships – Policy and Operations in the Second World War’, unpublished study, London, Admiralty, 1949.

208

Index

Abrial, Amiral d’escadre JeanMarie, 3, 4, 11, 17 Abyssinian crisis, 1 Acasta, HMS, 72 Admiral Hipper, the, 73 Admiral Scheer, the, 32(n1) Admiralty, the, 8, 18(n3), 36; and the Mediterranean, 20, 22; and the negotiations at Mers-el-Kébir, 192–3; options offered to Gensoul, 163 Albatross, HMS, 119, 121, 129 Alexander, Albert, 52–3, 54, 59, 60–1, 105 Alexandria, xxvii, 19, 20, 21, 29–30, 85, 94, 151, 156, 184, 187, 192, 202 Algeria, 56, 59–60, 101, 115, 132 Algiers, xxvii, 23 Allied Supreme Council, 20 Amirauté, the, 8, 8–9, 26, 28, 149; and the Mediterranean, 20, 22, 23; and merchant shipping, 55–6, 65–6; orders ships out of British territory, 69 Amirauté signal No. 5202, 159–60, 167, 168 Anglo-French naval cooperation, xiii Arethusa, HMS, 58 Ark Royal, HMS, xxi, 77(n10), 120, 138, 178, 180, 184, 185, 190, 194, 200–1, 204(n2) Armée de l’Air, 8, 15, 23, 139 Armistice, the, ix, xiii, xxii, 66, 83–7, 97, 110–17, 150, 204; British response, 81–2, 82–4, 85,

88–90, 103–4; British response to French request for, 43, 47; French counter-proposals, 79–81; French delegation, 58–9; French request for, 41; German discussion of terms, 72–3; terms, 78–9, 80, 85, 93, 117(n3), 174 Asdic, 2 Atlee, Clement, 107 Auboyneau, Capitaine de vaisseau P.M., 128(n10) Augusta, 20 Auphan, Capitaine de vaisseau A.J.P., 9, 18(n18), 28, 29, 31, 46–7, 54, 58–9, 67, 188 Backhouse, Sir Roger, 1, 4 Bardia, bombardment of, 66 Barnouin, Contre-amiral, 67 Baudouin, Paul, 41, 47, 68, 79–80, 203 Beagle, HMS, 65, 85, 88, 92 Béarn, the, 69, 146 Bergeret, Armée de l’Air BrigadierGeneral, 59 Berkeley, HMS, 39, 48, 58, 65 Bismarck, the, 32(n1), 33(n20), 82 Bissett, Captain A.W. La T., RN, 44, 50, 86, 93, 94–5, 100, 123, 124–5 Bizerta, 11, 20, 23, 85, 93, 97 Blake, Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey, 26, 152 Bordeaux, 31, 47–8, 52–4, 65, 83, 149; air raids, 63; British official evacuated, 58; demolition cancelled, 88

209

THE ROAD TO ORAN

Bos, Capitaine de frégate, 45, 149–50 Boulogne, 16 Bourragué, Contre-amiral, 2 Brest, 11, 23, 48, 50, 53 Bretagne, the, xx, 23, 163m 179(n1), 191, 194, 198, 199, 204 Briare, 27 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 110–11, 146 British Expeditionary Force (BEF), 16–17 British Naval Liaison Officers, 7, 86, 97, 147(n10); joint report, 139–40 de Bryas, Capitaine de frégate, 55 Burges Watson, Rear-Admiral F., 65 Cambon, R., 101–2 Campbell, Sir Ronald, 26, 28, 30, 31–2, 35, 92; and the Armistice, 66, 79, 80–1; and the Foreign Office telegrams, 38, 39, 47; and the French fleet, 112; and French Government intentions, 68; leaves France, 84–5; meeting with Pétain, 44, 59; and the Pétain administration, 41, 43, 51–2, 111–12; and Pound’s visit to Bordeaux, 52, 54; return to London, 111–12 Campinchi, César, 10 Canada, 53, 182 Carpentier, Contre-amiral, 94 Casablanca, 11, 46, 86, 93, 94–5, 100, 110, 120, 124–5 Castex, Amiral Raoul, 11, 18(n12) casualties, ix, xx, xxi, 182, 199, 201, 203–4 Cayol, Vice-amiral Lucien M., 95, 182 Chalmers, Vice-Admiral W.S., 27, 168 Chamberlain, Neville, 5, 37, 107, 123, 152 Charles-Roux, François, 47, 56 Chautemps, Camille, 39, 47

Cherbourg, 48 Chiefs of Staff, 157–9, 161(n4) Churchill, Winston, xxvi–xxvii, 20, 32(n8), 68–9, 85, 103, 106–7, 116; access to information, 167; and the bombardment of Mersel-Kébir, 203; and de Gaulle, 91; and the decision to take action against French fleet, 169; and the disposition of the French fleet, 99–100; and the Force de Raid, 36; French attitude to, 102; and French broadcasting stations, 55; and the French Naval building programme, 9–10; and HMS Nelson, 160; and Léger, 146–7; meeting with Darlan, 9–10; message to Pétain, 51; and the neutralisation of the French fleet, 130, 131–2; and Operation ‘Catapult’, 182; repatriates French personnel, 143; and Reynaud’s message, 36; and the Richelieu and Jean Bart, 82–3; signal to Somerville, 18(n20), 180–1; union proposal, 37–9; visits France, 27 Clermont-Ferrand, 149 Clyde, HMS, 73 Collett, Commander, RN, 111, 141–2, 148(n23) Comité d’études militaires (CEM), 6 Comité National Français, 91–2 Commandant Teste, the, 199, 203 convoys, 2 Corbin, Charles, 68–9, 91, 92, 101 Council of Ministers, 32, 34–5, 38, 39, 59–60, 63; and the Armistice terms, 174; and the disposition of the French fleet, 51–2 Courbet, the, 57(n12) Cunningham, Admiral Sir Andrew, xxvi, 4, 21, 22, 29–30, 35, 94, 110, 131, 133, 138, 151, 184, 187, 192–3, 202; instructions, 170, 175–6; and the seizure of French ships, 156–7; situation

210

INDEX

report (20 June), 61; situation report (28 June), 140–1; situation report (29 June), 153–4 Dakar, xxi, xxiv, 10, 50, 67, 95, 121, 138–9, 153; the Richelieu leaves, 119; Royal Navy presence, 125–6 Daladier, Edouard, 68 Danbé, Capitaine de vaisseau, 186–7 Danckwerts, Captain V.M., 1–2 Daniel, Captain C.S., 149, 151 Darlan, Amiral de la Flotte Jean Louis Xavier François, xxiii, xxvii, 9, 20–1, 23, 42, 48, 88, 128(n10), 142, 177, 182; appointed Minister of Marine, 41; and the bombardment of Mers-el-Kébir, 203; and the British ultimatum, xxvi; command control, 3–4, 11; contempt of politicians, 70(n6); and the cruise of the Richelieu, 122; and the disposition of the French fleet, xxii–xxiii, 27, 32(n8), 52–3, 61–2; and Force ‘X’, 21, 22, 134–5; and Godfroy, 153; meeting with Churchill, 9–10; meetings with Pound, 5, 11–12, 52–4; move to Nérac, 149; and the negotiations at Mers-el-Kébir, 188, 189; orders fleet to North Africa, xxiv–xxv; and the Supreme Allied Council, 5–6; visits Portsmouth, 4–6; ‘Xavier 377’ signals, 61–2, 64–5, 70(n24), 99, 114–15, 117–18(n14), 122, 172–3 Davies, Lieutenant Commander G.P.S., 82, 164, 164–5, 184, 191, 193 Devonshire, HMS, 69, 72, 81 Dickens, Admiral Sir Gerald, 149 Dill, General Sir John, 27 Dorsetshire, HMS, 119–20, 121, 122–3, 124, 129–30, 135(n2), 138, 139

Drogou, Lieutenant de vaisseau François, 126–7 Dufay, Lieutenant de vaisseau, 184, 185, 186 Duff-Cooper, Alfred, 108, 125 Dunbar-Naismith, Admiral Sir Martin, 44, 95 Dunedin, HMS, 116, 170 Dunkerque, the, xx, xxi, 19, 30, 35, 83, 106, 170(n), 175; at Mers-el-Kébir, 187, 191, 194, 198–9, 202, 203 Dunkirk, 11, 203–4; evacuation from, 17, 25, 133 Duplat, Vice-amiral, 10 Duquesne, the, 24(n8) Eagle, HMS, 22 Eden, Anthony, 27, 116 Edward-Collins, Vice-Admiral, 74, 75, 77(n8) Edwards, Captain Ralph, 36 Emile Bertin, the, 69, 81, 116, 126, 129, 131, 146, 170 Esteva, Amiral Jean-Pierre, 9, 22, 56, 60, 83, 93, 96(n15), 99, 141 Falmouth, 182 Fiji, HMS, 126, 170 Finland, Allied intervention plan, 12–13 First Sea Lord, role, 4 Fleuret, the, 119, 121 Florida, the, 60, 63 Forbes, Admiral Sir Charles, 75 Forbin, the, 24(n8) Force ‘H’, xx–xxi, 46, 54, 132–3, 163, 184; purpose, 144–5; sails, 180 Force ‘X’, 21–3, 24(n8), 29, 66, 131, 134–5, 156, 188, 192–3, 202 Force ‘Y’, 10 Ford, Vice-Admiral Sir Wilbraham, 126–7 Foreign Office telegram No. 368, 36–7, 38, 39, 42–3, 47

211

THE ROAD TO ORAN

Foreign Office telegram No. 369, 37, 39, 42–3, 47 Foxhound, HMS, 177, 178, 183, 184, 185, 187, 191, 194, 198 Le Franc-Guyader, Capitaine de vaisseau, 62 France, Battle for, xiii, 16–17, 25; Franco-British relations, effect on, xxi Franco-Italian armistice, 105, 110–11, 117(n3), 143–4, 147–8(n19), 150, 154 Franco-Italian crisis, 1 Franco y Bahamonde, Generalissimo Francisco, 46 Fraser, HMCS, 92 ‘Free French’, 204 French Army, 5, 8, 23, 43–4, 139 French broadcasting stations, German control of, 55 French Morocco, 46 French Navy, xxiv–xxv, 2, 3, 11, 20, 69, 133–4; 2ième division de ligne (2nd Battle Squadron), 20, 21, 24(n4); 3ième division de croiseurs, 20–1; and the Armistice, 98; assurances about disposition, 41–2; and the bombardment of Mers-el-Kébir, 204; building programme, 9–10; command control, 3–4; Darlan’s orders to, 64; decommissioning preparations, 100; decommissioning proposals, 80–1; demobilisation of, xxii–xxiii, xxiv–xxvi, 144; disarmament at Mers-el-Kebir offered, 187–9; disposition of, 25–32, 98–102, 103–5, 105–8, 146–7, 150–2; Flotte de Haute Mer, 4; Force de Raid, 3, 19, 20, 23, 30, 35–6, 104, 131, 188; importance of, 43; morale, 85–6, 98, 132–3, 139–40; options offered, 163, 171–2; political importance of, xxiii; seizure plans, 156–7, 182 French ports, clearance of, 44–5

French Somaliland, 56 French West Africa, 90 Galatea, HMS, 65, 92 Gamelin, General Maurice, 5, 6 de Gaulle, Brigadier-General Charles, xxi, xxv, 37, 91–2, 101, 146 Gensoul, Vice-amiral d’Escadre Marcel B., xx, xxvi, 98, 111, 141, 153; and the bombardment of Mers-el-Kébir, 199, 202; negotiations at Mers-el-Kébir, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188–9, 191, 193–4, 195(n18), 196(n26) Georges Leygues, the, 24(n2) German navy, 72, 75–6, 76(n1) Germany, xxii, 2, 72–3 Gibraltar, 9, 23, 24(n3), 54, 160–1; threat to, 45–6 Gloire, the, 24(n2) Glorious, HMS, 25, 72, 77(n10) Gneisenau, the, 25, 72, 73–5 Godfroy, Vice-amiral René Emile, 29, 48, 50, 94, 110, 115, 129, 133–4, 140–1, 151, 153–4, 184, 192, 202 Gort, General Lord (Viscount), 108, 125 Graf Spee, the, 10 Great Britain, xiii, xx, 73, 78; and the disposition of the French Fleet, xxii, xxiv, 25–6, 27–8, 36–7; threat of French fleet, xxiii, 30, 158–9 Greece, 20 Halifax, Lord (Viscount), 50, 85, 123, 143; and de Gaulle, 91, 92 Hankey, Lord (Baron), 25–6 Hermes, HMS, xxiv, 10, 95, 98–9, 129–30; and the cruise of the Richelieu, 119, 120, 124 Herriot, Edouard, 68 Hillgarth, Captain Alan H., RN, 45 Hitler, Adolf, 43, 72–3 Holland, Captain C.S., RN, xx, xxv, xxvi, 1, 6–7, 100, 120,

212

INDEX

148(n23); assessment of French officers, 141; assessment of Darlan, 142; awarded Légion d’honneur, 16; criticism of French Admiralty, 13; and the French naval building programme, 9; naval liason responsibilities, 7; negotiations at Mers-el-Kébir, 183–4, 185–7, 188, 189–90, 191–2, 193–4, 195(n3); nominated as emissary, 164; opposition to use of force, 161; role as emissary, 177–8 Hood, HMS, xx, xxi, 120, 138, 170(n), 189, 194, 198, 199, 201 Huntziger, General Charles, 5, 59 Iceland, 73, 76–7(n6) Indo-China, 105 Italian Navy, 19, 20 Italy, xxii, 8, 19, 19–20, 26–7, 72 James, Admiral Sir William, 98 Jean Bart, the, ix, 9, 28, 30, 31, 33(n20), 45, 53, 82–3, 95, 107, 120, 122, 124–5, 131; escape from St Nazaire, 58, 67 Jeanne D’Arc, the, 69, 146 Jeanneney, Jules, 38 Joint Planning Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, 152 Kennedy-Purvis, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles E., 69, 126, 129, 146 Kersaint, the, xxi, 204(n5) L’Audacieuse, 24(n2) L’Indomptable, 24(n2) La Pallice, 48 La Spezia, 23 de Laborde, Amiral, xxvii, 45, 99, 128(n22), 141 Lambe, Captain C.E., 116–17, 126, 129, 145, 146 Lancastria, SS, 48 Le Fantasque, 24(n2) Le Luc, Contre-amiral Maurice A., 58–9, 188, 189, 203

Le Malin, 24(n2) Le Terrible, 24(n2) Le Triomphant, 24(n2) Lebrun, Albert, 102–3 Léger, Alexis, 91, 146–7 Lelong, Général, 47 Little, Admiral Sir Charles, 149 Lloyd, Lord (Baron), 54, 60, 64–5, 142–3 London, staff talks, 1–3 Lorraine, the, 66 Lothian, Lord (Baron), 50–1 Low Countries, German invasion of, 15–16, 22 Lütjens, Vize-admiral Guenther, 73 Lützow, the, 32(n1) Lynx, the, 24(n8), 199 Lyon, Vice-Admiral Sir Guy d’Oyly, 10, 11, 111, 125–6, 129–30, 153; and the cruise of the Richelieu, 119, 120, 124; situation report (28 June), 138–9 Lyster, Rear-Admiral A.L., 11 Malaya, HMS, 20–1 Malta, 4, 22, 23 Mandel, Georges, 28, 68 Marceau, 8, 9–10 Marseilles, xxiii Martinique, xxvi, 85, 116–17, 126, 129, 145–6 Marzin, Capitaine de vaisseau, xxiv, 121, 122–3, 128(n10) Massilia, the, 60, 68 merchant shipping, 2, 55–6, 65, 67, 94, 129; the War Cabinet and, 66, 68–9, 81–2, 92–3, 105 Mers-el-Kébir, 2, 19, 20, 104, 109(n19); bombardment of, xx–xxi, 194, 198–205; bombardment plans, 161, 179–80; negotiations, xxv–xxvi, 183–97 Mittelhauser, Général Eugène D., 90, 108, 116, 132 Mogador, the, xx, 24(n2), 199, 202, 204 Montbazon, 28–9

213

THE ROAD TO ORAN

Montcalm, the, 24(n2) Morocco, 5, 115 Muselier, Contre-amiral, 141, 147(n14) Mussolini, Benito, 72, 73 Nantes, 48 Narval, the, 126–7, 131 Naval Control of Shipping Officer (NCSO), Lisbon, 45 naval defences, 2–3 naval liason provision, 1, 6–7 Négadelle, Capitaine de vaisseau J.L., 31, 63–4, 188 Nelson, HMS, 160, 163 Nérac, 149 Nöel, Léon, 59 Noguès, Général Auguste, 60, 101, 116, 132 North, Admiral Sir Dudley, 9, 93–4, 98, 100, 111, 122, 133, 141, 176; opposition to use of force, 160–1, 164 Norwegian campaign, 13–15, 23, 25 Odend’hal, Vice-amiral Jean E., 3, 6, 8, 27–8, 29, 47, 55–6, 86, 95, 129, 159–60; meetings with Phillips, 154–5, 168, 176–7; meetings with Pound, 114–15, 134–5; moved to the Embassy, 167–8; and the seizure of ships in British ports, 182–3 Ollive, Vice-amiral d’escadre Emmanuel, 4, 46, 100, 141 Onslow, Captain R.F.J., RN, 95, 121 Operation ‘Aerial’, 48–9 Operation ‘Catapult’, 158–9, 163–4, 182, 204; alternative proposals, 164–6; destruction priority, 178; orders for, 171–81 Operation ‘Catherine’, 12 Operation ‘Dynamo’, 17, 25 Operation ‘FA’, 16 Operation ‘Royal Marine’, 12 Operation ‘Torch’, xxvii

Oran, xxii, 23, 153, 162(n8), 193; attack plans, 106–7, 161 Oronsay, SS, 48 Pandora, HMS, 201 Paris, the, 57(n12) Paris, staff talks, 3 Parisot, Lieutenant-General, 59 Pétain, Maréchal H Phillipe, 27, 39, 43, 51, 60, 203; and the Armistice terms, 80; and the French fleet, xxii–xxiii, 44, 60 Petsamo, 12 Phillips, Rear-admiral T.S.V., 9, 29, 159–60; meetings with Odend’hal, 154–5, 168, 176–7 Plançon, Contre-Amiral, 50, 95, 121, 124, 125–6, 147(n5) Pleydell-Bouverie, Captain the Hon. E., RN, 13, 16–17, 28–9, 30, 31, 35–6, 46–7; and the Armistice terms, 78, 79–80; disenchantment, 66–8; and the evacuation of Bordeaux, 58; and the French fleet, 112–14; leaves France, 85; meeting with Négadelle, 63; meeting with Darlan, 42; and Pound’s visit to Bordeaux, 52; report, 112–13; report on the French colonies, 132 Plymouth, xxvii, 149–50, 170, 182 Portsmouth, xxvii, 4–6, 98, 170, 182 Pound, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley R.P., xxvi–xxvii, 3, 9, 18(n4), 26, 83, 111, 127, 204; appeal to Darlan, 88; appointed First Sea Lord, 4; appoints Somerville to command Force ‘H’, 132–3; and the cruise of the Richelieu, 120–1, 121–2; and the decision to take action against French fleet, 169; and the Emile Bertin, 170; and Force ‘X’, 134–5; meeting of 29 June, 149–51; meetings with Darlan,

214

INDEX

5, 11–12; message to Esteva, 88–9; and the negotiations at Mers-el-Kébir, 187–8, 192; and the neutralisation of the French fleet, 130, 131; and Operation ‘Catherine’, 12; situation report (27 June), 137–8; visit to Bordeaux, 47–8, 52–5, 59 Power, Rear-Admiral A.J., 149, 150, 155(n4) Proteus, HMS, 153, 201, 203 Provana, the, 57(n16) Provence, the, xx, 23, 163, 170(n1), 191, 198, 199, 202 radar, 2–3 Raeder, Admiral Erich, 73 Ramillies, HMS, 22 Ramsay, Vice-Admiral Sir Bertram, 16, 133 Renown, HMS, 74, 77(n8) Repulse, HMS, 74, 77(n8) Resolution, HMS, 35, 120, 170(n1), 122, 198 Reynaud, Paul, 13, 27, 31, 39; and the demobilisation of the French Navy, xxii–xxiii; message to Churchill, 34–5, 36 Richelieu, the, xxiv, 9, 28, 31, 45, 50, 53, 147(n10); cruise of, 119–27, 129–30, 138; escape of, 67, 95, 131; threat of, 30, 82–3, 107 Robert, Amiral Georges A., 69, 116–17, 126, 129 Romania, 5 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 27, 31, 34, 51 Royal Air Force, 45, 130 Royal Navy, xxii, 17, 35; command control, 4; command responsibilities, 133; losses, 202; Mediterranean Fleet, 8, 19, 20, 22; presence at Dakar, 125–6 Royal Sovereign, HMS, 20–1 Rubis, the, 182 Rushbrooke, Commander J., RN, 130

Salonika, 5 Sanson, Capitaine de frégate, 29, 31 Sardinia, 23 Scharnhorst, the, 25, 72, 73–5, 76, 77(n10), 159 Sfax, 156, 157 Somerville, Vice-Admiral Sir James, xxv, xxvi, 132–3, 144, 195(n5); alternative proposals, 164–6; arrives in Gibraltar, 160–1; and the bombardment of Mers-elKébir, xx–xxi, 199, 199–200, 201–2, 203; Churchill’s signal to, 18(n20), 180–1; instructions, 169–70, 171–2, 173–5, 185; at Mers-el-Kébir, 184, 185, 187, 189–92, 193, 194; and Operation ‘Catapult’, 163–4; orders, 177–81 Southampton, 182 Spain, 5 Spanish Civil War, 1 Spearman, Lieutenant-Commander A.Y., RN, 139, 164, 184, 187 Spears, Lieutenant-General Sir Edward, 38, 40(n8) St Malo, 48 St Nazaire, evacuation of, 48–9 Stitt, Commander George, RN, xiv Strasbourg, the, xxi, 10, 19, 30, 35, 83, 106, 170(n1), 175; escape from Mers-el-Kébir, 199–201; at Mers-el-Kebir, 191, 198 strategic plans, 12–13 Supreme Allied Council, 5–6 Supreme War Council, 12–13, 14, 27 Surcouf, the, 182 Syria, 56, 90, 94, 116, 132 Tait, Rear-Admiral W.E.C., 149, 150 Tigre, the, 24(n8) Tirpitz, the, 32(n1), 33(n20) de Torcy, Capitaine de corvette, 121 Toulon, xxi, xxiii, xxvii, 11, 23, 168

215

THE ROAD TO ORAN

Tours, 27 Tourville, the, 24(n8) Tunisia, 56 Turkey, 5 Vaillac, Capitaine d’Antin de, 17–18(n1) Valiant, HMS, 170(n1), 198, 201 Vansittart, Sir Robert, 51, 57(n6), 91 Vichy, 155(n1) de Villaine, Contre-amiral, 182 Volta, the, 4, 24(n2), 199, 204(n1) Walcheren, 12, 15 Walton, Petty Officer R.W., RN, 67–8, 70(n33), 85 War Cabinet, the, 36–8, 42–3, 59, 115–16, 142–3; agrees to action, 160; and the cruise of the Richelieu, 123–4; decision to take action against French fleet, 168–70; and the disposition of the French fleet, 103–5, 105–8, 152; lack of real-time information, 68; and merchant

shipping, 66, 68–9, 81–2, 92–3, 105; and the negotiations at Mers-el-Kébir, 187–8; and the neutralisation of the French fleet, 130–2; orders capture of the Richelieu, 119–20; plans to attack French fleet, 106–7; response to the Armistice, 81–2, 82–4, 85, 89–90, 103–4 Warspite, HMS, 22 Watchman, HMS, 94, 110, 120 Watson, Rear-Admiral Burges, 67, 85 Wavell, General Sir Archibald, 94 Welles, Sumner, 152 Wells, Vice-Admiral Lionel V., 122, 133, 153, 201; opposition to use of force, 161 Weygand, General Maxime, 17, 20, 27, 51, 59, 85, 177 Wodehouse, Rear-Admiral N.A., 9 ‘Xavier 377’ signals, 61–2, 64–5, 70(n24), 82, 99, 114–15, 117–18(n14), 122, 126–7, 145, 147(n5), 172–3, 193

216