The Rise of the Norwegian Parliament: Studies in Norwegian Parliamentary Government (Library of Legislative Studies,)

THE RISE OF THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT

THE LIBRARY OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES General Editor Philip Norton ISSN 1460–9649 A series of new and recent books exploring the role of legislature in contemporary political systems. The volumes typically draw together a team of country specialist to provide in-depth analysis. Parliaments in Contemporary Western Europe edited by Philip Norton Volume 1: Parliaments and Governments in Western Europe Volume 2: Parliaments and Pressure Groups in Western Europe Volume 3: Parliaments and Citizens in Western Europe Second Chambers edited by Nicholas D.J.Baldwin and Donald Shell Delegation and Accountability in European Integration The Nordic Parliamentary Democracies and the European Union edited by Torbjörn Bergman and Erik Damgaard The Uneasy Relationships between Parliamentary Members and Leaders edited by Lawrence D.Longley and Reuven Y.Hazan Parliaments in Asia edited by Philip Norton and Nizam Ahmed Conscience and Parliament edited by Philip Cowley The New Roles of Parliamentary Committees edited by Lawrence D.Longley and Roger H.Davidson Members of Parliament in Western Europe Roles and Behaviour edited by Wolfgang C.Miiller and Thomas Saalfeld Parliaments in Western Europe edited by Philip Norton The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe edited by David M.Olson and Philip Norton National Parliaments and the European Union edited by Philip Norton

The Rise of the Norwegian Parliament HILMAR ROMMETVEDT

LONDON • PORTLAND, OR

First published in 2003 in Great Britain by FRANK CASS AND COMPANY LIMITED Crown House, 47 Chase Side, Southgate, London N14 5BP, England and in the United States of America by FRANK CASS c/o International Specialized Book Services, Inc. 5824 N.E. Hassalo Street, Portland, Oregon 927213–3640 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Copyright © 2003 Frank Cass & Co. Ltd British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Rommetvedt, Hilmar The Rise of the Norwegian Parliament 1. Representative government and representation Norway—History 20th century—2. Norway—Politics and government—1945– I. Title 328.4′81′09045 ISBN 0-203-49770-8 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-58159-8 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0 7146 5286 5 (Print Edition) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rommetvedt, Hilmar The rise of the Norwegian parliament / Hilmar Rommetvedt. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7146-5286-5 (cloth) 1. Norway, Stortinget. 2. Representative government and representation—Norway. 3. Norway—Politics and government. I. Title. JF7543.R66 2003 328.481–dc21 2001007722 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of Frank Cass and Company Limited.

Contents

List of Figures and Tables

Chapter 1

Part l Chapter 2

Chapter 3

viii

Preface

xi

Pluralization and the Rise of Parliament: An Introduction

1

Decline and Rise of Parliament

1

Concentration and Dispersion of Power

6

Outline of the Book

11

Notes

13

Parliamentary Change From Consensual Majority Parliamentarism to Dissensual Minority Parliamentarism

17

A Party System Undergoing Change

17

Parliamentarism and the Formation of Government

22

Government Formation

29

Rising Activity in the Storting

40

Activity and Conflict

50

Conclusion

57

Notes

13

Parliamentary Committees: Performance, Structural Change and External Relations

65

Theoretical Perspectives

66

Parliamentary Committees and Parliamentary Influence in Norway

69

Rules of Procedure and Committee Reform

72

Changing Committee Relations

76

vi

Chapter 4

Part II Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Concluding Remarks

84

Notes

85

Reorganizing the Policy-Making Process: Committee Change and Environmental Politics (with Arild Aurvåg Farsund and Einar Leknes)

90

The Committee Reform

90

Theoretical Perspectives and Hypotheses

91

Empirical Results

97

Summary and Discussion

107

Notes

109

Governments, Parties, and Organized Interests Coalition Governments and the Management of Party Relations

112

The Party-Parliamentary System and the Coalition Apparatus

113

Policy Statements and Programmes

115

Decision-Making Model and Rules of the Game

117

Positions

118

Communication and Co-ordination

121

Relations between Government, Parliament and Party

124

Conclusion

127

Notes

128

From Corporatism to Lobbyism? Parliaments, Executives and Organized Interests in Denmark and Norway (with Peter Munk Christiansen)

130

Corporatism and Lobbyism

130

Corporatist Policy-Making in Norway and Denmark

132

Decline of Corporatism?

133

Parliamentary Lobbyism in Denmark and Norway

139

Explaining Institutional Change and Inertia

142

Changes in the Political Conditions for Corporatism and Lobbyism

145

vii

Chapter 7

Conclusions

148

Notes

149

The Impact of Lobbyism

154

General Assessments by MPs

154

Environmental Policy-Making: Assessments by Interest Organizations

157

Environmental Policy-Making: Three Case Studies

159

Conclusion

164

Notes

164

Part III District Representation Chapter 8

Chapter 9

The Central Assembly of the Periphery

166

Representation of the Periphery

167

Geography and Policy-Making

173

Conclusion

181

Notes

181

‘Regionoil’ Politics and Policy

184

Decisions, Conflicts and Coalitions

184

Exploratory Drilling in Northern Areas

188

Changing Expectations

194

Localization of Operations in Southern Norway

196

Conclusion

202

Notes

204

Index

205

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1.1: Relationship Between the Degree of Concentration of Private and Government Power and Types of Government Systems Figure 1.2: Concentration of Power and Government Systems Figure 2.1: Distribution of Votes in Parliamentary Elections Figure 2.2: Voter Support, Average of Various Opinion Polls Figure 2.3: Correlations between Industrial Conflicts and Parliamentary Conflicts Figure 2.4: The Development of the Norwegian Parliamentary System Figure 3.1: Parliamentary Committees Dealing With Propositions and Reports from Each of the Ministries Figure 4.1: Committee Recommendations and Attention Paid to Environmental Concerns Figure 5.1: The Norwegian Party-Parliamentary System Figure 5.2: Specialized Functions of Different Parts of the Parties Figure 6.1: Four Types of Relations between Public Authorities and Organized Interests Figure 8.1: The Norwegian Counties Figure 8.2: Residential Municipality of MPs Figure 8.3: Distribution of Seats in the Plenary Chamber of the Storting Figure 9.1: Localization of Norwegian Petroleum Activities Table 2.1: Party Composition in the Norwegian Storting Table 2.2: Norwegian Governments since June 1945 Table 2.3: Governments and Government Types in Norway Table 2.4: Months in Office for Government Types Table 2.5: Smallest Distance between Labour and the Non-Socialist Parties, and Coalition Range between the Non-Socialists: All Committees Table 2.6: Smallest Distance between Labour and the Non-Socialist Parties, and Coalition Range between the Non-Socialists: The Finance Committee Table 2.7: Private Members’ Bills and Proposals Table 2.8: Questions and Interpellations in Parliament Table 2.9: Committee Recommendations and Dissenting Remarks in Recommendations by Parliamentary Committees (Excluding Budget Recommendation) Table 2.10: Dissenting Remarks in Budget Recommendations

7 9 18 40 52 58 80 99 11 4 126 131 170 17 4 176 18 7 19 24 28 28 32 38

44 46 48 49

ix

Table 2.11: Dissenting Remarks Table 2.12: Number of MPs and Staff in the Storting Table 3.1: Committee Recommendations and Dissent (Excluding Budget Recommendations) Table 3.2: Governmental Defeats in Parliamentary Voting Table 3.3: Budget Chapters and Other Issues per Committee Table 3.4: Re-elected Members of Standing Committees Table 3.5: Budget Connections between Committees and Ministries Table 3.6: Committee and Party Group Staff Table 3.7: MPs Addressed Weekly by Different Types of Lobbyists Table 4.1: Environmentally-Related Proposals in the Committee Recommendations Table 4.2: Attention Paid to Various Issues in Relation to the Government’s Reports to the Storting on Regional Planning and Land Use Policy Table 4.3: Attention Paid to Various Issues in Relation to the Government’s Reports to the Storting on Regional and District Policy Table 5.1: Coalition Governments in Post-war Norway Table 5.2: Ministries Assumed to be Preferred by Coalition Parties Table 5.3: Distribution of Preferred Ministries in Norwegian Coalition Governments Table 5.4: Ministers and Important Government Committees in the Willoch Government Table 6.1: Number of Boards, Councils, Commissions etc. in Denmark and Norway Table 6.2: Contacts between Organizations and Different Types of Public Authorities in Denmark and Norway Table 6.3: Type of Organization and Frequency of Contacts with Different Types of Public Authorities in Denmark and Norway Table 6.4: Important Contact with Different Public Authorities in Denmark and Norway Table 6.5: Important Contacts with Different Public Authorities in Denmark and Norway and Type of Organization Table 7.1: Impact of Lobbyism on Actions Taken by MPs and the Storting Table 7.2: Dissent and Faction Remarks in Recommendations from own Committee Associated with Enquiries Made by Lobbyists Table 7.3: Amendments in Government Proposals within the Area of Jurisdiction of MP’s Own Standing Committee Associated with Enquiries made by Various Lobbyists Table 7.4: Consequences of Lobbyism

54 56 70 71 77 78 79 82 83 102 105

106

113 119 120

123 133 13 6 137

13 8 140

155 156 156 157

x

Table 7.5: Impact of Organizations’ Views on Decisions made by Various Authorities Table 7.6: The Impact of Organizational Enquiries in the Storting Table 7.7: Lobbyism and Corporatism in Different Cases and Phases Table 8.1: Valid Votes by Party and Centrality of Municipality Table 8.2: Index of Under-/Overrepresentation Table 8.3: Place of Residence of MPs and of the Population as a Whole Table 8.4: Committee Evaluation Table 8.5: Comparing the Committees

158 158 163 16 8 17 1 17 5 17 7 17 7

Preface

This book presents a collection of studies of different but inter-related aspects of parliamentary government in Norway. The studies originate from various research projects funded by the Research Council of Norway and the Joint Committee of the Nordic Social Science Research Councils (NOSS) over the last 15 years. Most of the succeeding chapters are revised and updated versions of papers previously published in journals and/or presented at international conferences. Hopefully, the reader will bear with the gaps or overlaps that still exist between some of the chapters. A great number of colleagues have contributed to the completion of this work. First and foremost, I would like to thank my co-authors Arild Aurvåg Farsund, Einar Leknes and Peter Munk Christiansen for excellent and inspiring collaboration; and John-Erik Ågotnes for providing me with a variety of data from the inexhaustible archives of the Norwegian Social Science Data Services. Thanks are also due to Lena Myklebust and Sissel Rørtvedt for their assistance with text and figures. Several others have given invaluable assistance and advise in relation to specific parts of the book. They are all acknowledged in the respective chapters. Finally, I will mention the inspiration given by the excellent milieu at my two work-places, Rogalandsforskning (Rogaland Research) in Stavanger, and LOS-senteret (the Norwegian Research Centre in Organization and Management) in Bergen. Stavanger, March 2001 Hilmar Rommetvedt

CHAPTER 1 Pluralization and the Rise of Parliament: An Introduction

Every traveller who, curious in political affairs, enquires in the countries which he visits how their legislative bodies are working, receives from the elder men the same discouraging answer. They tell him, in terms much the same everywhere, that there is less brilliant speaking than in the days of their own youth, that the tone of manners has declined, that the best citizens are less disposed to enter the chamber, that its proceedings are less fully reported and excite less interest, that a seat in it confers less social status, and that, for one reason or another, the respect felt for it has waned. Lord Bryce DECLINE AND RISE OF PARLIAMENT There is hardly any doubt that every traveller who, curious in political affairs, would visit Norway in the 1960s and 1970s and enquire how the Norwegian Parliament, the Storting, was working, would get the same answer as the one Lord Bryce predicted in 1921, in his description of The Decline of Legislatures’.1 Not only older men would say that the Storting had declined since 1884, when the principle of parliamentarism was established in Norway under the slogan ‘all power in this hall’. They would characterize the Storting as a rubberstamping institution, or what we in Norway call a sandpåstrøingsorgan, an institution doing nothing but sprinkle sand on the ink the government has used to write its proposals. The Norwegian Storting was established at the constituent assembly at Eidsvoll in 1814.2 During the Napoleonic wars, the union of Denmark-Norway sided with Napoleon, and Sweden with his adversaries. The Allies promised the successor to the Swedish throne that he would get Norway if he joined them in subduing France. After Napoleon’s defeat, the king of Denmark signed the treaty of Kiel in January 1814, ceding Norway to the king of Sweden. The Danish vice regent in Norway, Crown Prince Christian Frederik, repudiated the treaty and called together the most influential men in Norway to an assembly at Eidsvoll. The delegates to this assembly called for a liberal constitution and decided that

2 THE RISE OF THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT

the people should elect deputies to a constituent national assembly. The idea of the sovereignty of the people had prevailed. The 112 representatives to the constituent assembly at Eidsvoll represented the towns, the army and navy, and the rural districts. They included land-owning farmers, merchants, industrialists and government officials. On 17 May, the constitution was signed and sealed, and Christian Frederik was elected king of a free, sovereign and independent Norway. With this, Norway had established its constitution and founded its national assembly—the Storting. Even though Norway was forced into a union with Sweden, the Norwegians managed to retain the major elements of the constitution, including the Storting. The constitution was based on the principles of sovereignty of the people, separation of powers, and human rights. Forty-five per cent of all men above the age of 25 were given the right to vote in 1814.3 The principle of separation of powers was abandoned in 1884 when the principle of parliamentarism achieved its breakthrough after several years of conflict between the Norwegian Storting and the king in Sweden. The king lost his freedom to choose his advisors, and the parliament established authority over the executive. However, the struggle for power between the Norwegian Storting and the king in Sweden continued for several years. In 1905 the struggle came to an end. The king refused to sanction the Storting’s resolution on the establishment of separate Norwegian consulates. The Storting declared that the Swedish-Norwegian union was dissolved. Unwillingly, the Swedes accepted the situation. Norway had gained full independence. The Storting definitely proved its power vis-à-vis the king in 1884 and 1905. According to Norwegian political mythology those were the heydays of the Norwegian Parliament. There is widespread opinion that after those peaks were reached the Norwegian Parliament declined. Subsequently, the decline of parliament was followed by a rise of corporatism. The ‘formative moment’ of corporatism occurred during the economic crisis in the 1930s.4 The definitive breakthrough of corporatism in Norway came after World War II.5 During the first post-war decades the lack of power in the hall of the Storting was conspicuous. This was due to the fact that important decisions were made in the corporate channel, and that the Labour governments could control a majority of MPs. In his analysis of numerical democracy and corporate pluralism in Norway, Stein Rokkan declared that The crucial decisions on economic policy are rarely taken in the parties or in parliament: the central area is the bargaining table where the government authorities meet directly with the trade union leaders, the representatives of the farmers, the smallholders, and the fishermen, and the delegates of the Employers’ Association’.6 When Robert B. Kvavik studied interest groups in Norwegian politics, he was ‘surprised to discover the absence of “lobbyists”’ in the Norwegian Parliament.7 The responses of representatives of more than 500 organizations to a question asking them to weight ‘the most important channels for affecting implementation of group demands’, showed that ‘parliamentary institutions receive an

PLURALIZATION AND THE RISE OF PARLIAMENT 3

exceedingly weak evaluation’. They ‘expressed a number of reasons why parliament was avoided as a contact point. Most felt that little could be done on a parliamentary level. They supported the finding that legislation was shaped in the administration; once in parliament, the lines were fixed. Legislation was best influenced at an early stage of formulation… Leaders of all the interest organizations reflected their preference for the corporate channel’.8 Some years later, Gudmund Hernes summarized the findings of a major study of power relations in Norway. The first of the long-term trends in the development of the political and economic system to which he drew attention was ‘the weakening of the position of the parliament. …There is widespread agreement among power holders on how power relations have changed: away from the Storting and towards the public administration and interest organizations’.9 There is no doubt that most Norwegian scholars and political observers in the 1960s and 1970s, and even in the 1980s, would subscribe to the ‘decline of legislature’ thesis. This understanding has changed, however, and the present situation is quite different. In his analysis of organized democracy in Norway, Johan P. Olsen found that Variations in the political significance of the Storting do not follow a pattern of steady decline from a peak during the 1880s. Rather, the data suggests an ebb-and-flow perspective’. His interpretation was that ‘during the last part of the 1970s the Storting became a more rather than a less significant institution’.10 The studies presented in this volume show many examples or indicators of what we—without being too precise—may call the rise of parliament. By the end of the twentieth century the Storting was much more active than ever before. This is clearly demonstrated by the data presented in this book. A few examples may illustrate the point. In the first half of the 1960s government ministers had to answer approximately 280 questions and interpellations each year. By the end of the 1980s this figure had grown to more than 750 questions and interpellations each year.11 Question time queries and interpellations are submitted by MPs in writing and answered orally by the ministers. In 1996 the Storting set up two new arrangements for questions to ministers: (1) A socalled oral question time, where government members have to give immediate answers to questions that are put to them orally by the MPs; and (2) written questions to be answered in writing. During the 1998/99 session, ministers had to answer a total of 1,294 questions put to them by MPs, including 52 interpellations, 606 ordinary question time questions, 232 oral question time questions and 404 questions answered in writing.12 Like MPs elsewhere, Norwegian MPs have a right to table private members’ bills. For many years most MPs did not use this right. However, since 1984/85, when only 15 private members’ bills were put forward, the number has grown dramatically. In the period from 1994 to 1998 the average number of private members’ bills per year was 114, but the number dropped to 74 bills in 1998/ 99.13

4 THE RISE OF THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT

Parliamentary committees are crucial to the functioning of the Storting. Government bills and reports as well as private members’ bills are first handled by standing committees. The committees prepare recommendations to the Storting. Each recommendation may be unanimous or contain dissenting remarks and alternative proposals put forward by majority as well as minority factions. In the period from 1945 to 1973 84 per cent of the committee recommendations were unanimous. Only 16 per cent of the recommendations contained dissenting remarks. In 1985–89 and 1989–93 this proportion grew to 35 per cent and 59 per cent respectively. In 1993–96, dissenting remarks and alternative proposals occurred in 66 per cent of the committee recommendations.14 The occurrence of alternative proposals is, of course, crucial when it comes to parliamentary voting. From 1945 to 1961 the Norwegian Labour Party had an absolute majority in the Storting. In this period, the single party majority governments could rely on the support of the majority of the parliament. Since 1961, no single party has been able to command a majority of the Norwegian Parliament. With the exception of majority coalitions in 1965–71 and 1983–85, Norway has been governed by minority cabinets.15 Minority governments are more exposed to defeat in parliamentary voting. However, in 1979–81 the single party minority governments of Odvar Nordli and Gro Harlem Brundtland experienced 1.2 and 0.2 defeats in parliamentary voting per month respectively.16 Since then the number of government defeats has grown substantially. During Mrs Brundtland’s second and third governments in 1986– 89 and 1990–95 the Labour Party lost 10 and 11.4 votes per month. In most of the post-war period, the Storting made substantive changes in approximately 20 per cent of the proposals submitted by the government. According to Trond Nordby, this proportion grew to 46 per cent in 1996/97.17 The data presented here and in the rest of the book clearly indicate that the Storting of today is more active, less predictable, and more powerful than before. An important step with regard to the potential power of parliament is taken when no majority government can be established and a minority government is formed instead. In Norway the major step towards minority government was taken in 1961 when the Labour Party lost its absolute majority in the parliament. However, the potential increase in Storting power was not manifested in the 1960s. The Storting did not become more active until the second half of the 1970s. The most significant changes took place in the 1980s and 1990s.18 Why, then, did not the opposition parties in the Norwegian Parliament use the potential power they had at their disposal when the first post-war minority government was formed in 1961? An important part of the answer seems to be lack of resources. In 1971 the 150 MPs had a staff of only 174 at their disposal. Since then the staff has enlarged gradually. In 1999 the number of MPs was 165 and the staff had grown to 458.19 MPs had much better office facilities, personal computers etc. Five buildings next to the old Storting building had been bought and rebuilt for parliamentary purposes. Office space had expanded from less than 15,000 square metres in 1977 to 38,000 square metres in 1999.20 The

PLURALIZATION AND THE RISE OF PARLIAMENT 5

consequence of this development was a substantial enlargement of the political capacity of the parliament. The acquisition of resources enabled members of the Storting—or, more precisely, the opposition parties—to exert their potential power. Potential power became manifest. Gradually, political observers as well as politicians and other political actors have become more and more aware of the significance of the Storting. As we have seen, parliament was more or less avoided as a contact point due to the feeling that legislation was shaped in the administration.21 Today a substantial proportion of all nationwide interest organizations has contact with parliamentary actors.22 In 1992, 35 per cent of the Norwegian organizations had contact with the parliament, compared to 26 per cent in 1982. Even more interesting are the assessments made by organizations as regards the importance of contacts with various public authorities. A growing proportion of the organizations say that contacts with parliament are important. The assessments of the importance of contacts with government ministries and agencies, on the other hand, are quite stable. In 1995, most Norwegian MPs reported that they had frequent contacts with various types of lobbyists. Sixty-four per cent and 52 per cent respectively said that they were addressed more often than before by business organizations and trade unions.23 Sixty-eight per cent and 54 per cent of the MPs said that they were addressed weekly by business and industrial organizations and trade unions respectively.24 Similar, but somewhat weaker, trends were found with regard to other lobbyists as well. Some politicians and observers think that the strengthening of the legislature in relation to the executive has gone too far. They worry about the problems that arise when the government becomes too weak compared to the parliament. Stortingsregjereri is the disparaging phrase Norwegians use when the Storting is considered too dominant over the government’s (regjering) exertion of executive power. In 1988, the Conservative MP Kåre Willoch tabled a private member’s bill regarding constitutional amendments. With reference to the ‘problematic parliamentary situation’ he declared that ‘the intention is to strengthen the Government’s position in relation to the Storting’.25 Willoch’s proposals were based on his personal experience as Prime Minister from 1981 to 1986. He became Prime Minister and leader of a single-party minority government in 1981. In 1983, he formed a coalition government supported by the majority of the parliament. However, the coalition lost its majority after the general election in 1985, and in 1986 Willoch resigned after a defeat in the Storting. In 1990, Labour’s opposition leader at that time, Gro Harlem Brundtland, criticized Prime Minister Jan P. Syse and his minority coalition for letting the Storting ‘tidy up and clarify majority solutions of important matters’. In her view this was ‘a dangerous line that gradually may shape the impression among people that the government’s proposals are of less importance’.26 The leader of the opposition Progress Party, Carl I. Hagen, did not, however, worry about the government’s position when, five years later, he declared that ‘the government

6 THE RISE OF THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT

does whatever the Storting decides’.27 In 1999, even the President of the Storting, Kirsti Kolle Grøndahl, expressed her worries about the ‘fundamental and unfortunate shifts’ that may occur in ‘the natural interplay between the Storting and the Government’ if the Storting is too active.28 It is quite obvious that ‘something has been going on’ in Norwegian parliamentary politics over the last few decades. What is going on, and why? These are the simple questions this book intends to answer, or at least to shed some light upon. It will be argued that the rise of the Norwegian Parliament should be related to an ongoing process of pluralization. The label ‘pluralization’ adheres to the Norwegian society in general as well as to Norwegian politics in particular. This book concentrates on elements of pluralization which have direct relevance to the functioning of the political system. We may, however, illustrate the general process of pluralization in Norway with some references to the standard work, Det norske samfunn (‘Norwegian society’).29 The first edition contained an article by Johan Galtung on ‘Norway in the World Community’. He characterized Norway as ‘a highly static’, ‘a highly homogeneous’, and ‘an extremely anti-pluralistic country’.30 In 1986, a new and fully revised edition was published. The picture that was presented here was quite different from the one drawn 18 years earlier. In their preface the editors stated that ‘all chapters could have had subtitles containing the expression “social change'”. They made it clear that ‘Norway is not at all a homogenous country’.31 There are, of course, many contributing factors to this development. Some of them are related to general trends found in large sections of the world. If we are asked to point out one single country-specific factor, the answer has to be the Norwegian petroleum industry. The history of this industry is short. Exploration drilling in the Norwegian part of the North Sea started in 1966. The first large oilfield on the Norwegian continental shelf was discovered in 1969. Today, Norway is one of the largest oil exporters of the world and a major supplier of natural gas to the European continent. The impact of petroleum activities on Norwegian society, culture and economy is strong. The petroleum activities’ share of Norwegian GNP grew from two per cent in 1975 to 16 per cent in 1996. In 1996, the petroleum sector represented 23 per cent of gross investments, and 38 per cent of the export. Seventeen per cent of state revenue came from the petroleum industry.32 Stability and homogeneity are, of course, relative terms. Norway is still a stable and homogeneous society compared to many other countries. Nevertheless, by Norwegian standards the changes that have taken place within Norwegian society and politics are indeed substantial. Norway today is a much more heterogeneous and pluralist society than it was a few decades ago. CONCENTRATION AND DISPERSION OF POWER Obviously, a central aspect of the pluralization of politics is dispersion of power. The relationship between concentration of private and government power and

PLURALIZATION AND THE RISE OF PARLIAMENT 7

FIGURE 1.1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DEGREE OF CONCENTRATION OF PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT POWER AND TYPES OF GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEMS

types of governmental systems is an interesting element in the study of private interests in national policy-making published by Heinz et al.33 They emphasize that the concentration of government power varies from situation to situation, as does the power of private interests. Combining the two dimensions of public and private power concentration, they arrive at a fourfold typology of government systems (see Figure 1.1). Corporatism is characterized by high concentrations of government power as well as private power. Pluralism, on the other hand, is based on low concentrations of government and private power. A state-directed system is characterized by high concentration of government power, and low concentration of private power. And, finally, high concentration of private power and low concentration of government power condition private government. Numerous scholars have described Norway as a corporatist society. Lijphart and Crepaz have constructed a ‘composite measure of corporatism’ based on the ‘combined wisdom’ of ‘twelve neo-corporatist scholars’.34 According to their calculations, the degree of corporatism in Norway is very high, surpassed only by Austria. Phillippe Schmitter, in his well-known and stimulating works on corporatism, distinguishes between state corporatism and societal corporatism (in addition to pluralism). He characterizes Norway, together with Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Denmark, as one of the best empirical examples of societal corporatism.35 According to Schmitter, societal corporatism is found in countries with ‘singular, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered, sectorally compartmentalized, interest associations exercising representational monopolies and accepting (de jure or de facto) governmentally imposed or negotiated limitations on the type of leaders they elect and on the scope and intensity of demands they routinely make upon the state’. Such interest associations have attained a quasi-legal status and a prescriptive right to speak for their segments of the population. They influence the process of government directly, bypassing the parliament.36 He underlines,

8 THE RISE OF THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT

however, that corporatism ‘is clearly not something a polity has or does not have’.37 Practices that resemble the corporatist model are unevenly distributed across issue areas, and differences emerge and persist across countries. Schmitter’s definition of societal corporatism is based on high concentration of private and public power. As I have argued elsewhere, we may distinguish between two different types of concentration of power.38 Public as well as private power may be concentrated in a monolithic or a segmented way. The extreme version of corporatism, or state corporatism in Schmitter’s terminology, is characterized by monolithic concentration of power. Schmitter’s concept of societal corporatism, and Stein Rokkan’s concept of corporate pluralism, indicate that there is ‘something’ in between corporatism and pluralism.39 In the 1970s, Norwegian political scientists introduced the concept of a ‘segmented state’ in order to describe this intermediate category.40 A political segment has been described as ‘a set of micro linkages… characterized by related selections as regards participants, problems, and solutions’. Such segments may be found within particular economic areas, such as agriculture, fisheries and industry, or around functions like health care, communications, education and defence. Participants may come from various institutions. Thus, a segment may include representatives of interest organizations, ministries, parliamentarians, representatives of research institutions, the mass media, etc. The participants within one segment ‘are assumed to share certain basic values and perceptions, such that their models of the world coincide more with one another than with those of representatives of other segments’.41 Adjusting the axes and adding the segmented state to the typology of Heinz et al., produces five types of governmental systems, as described in Figure 1.2. Researchers within the corporatist tradition tend to ignore legislatures and focus on the relationship between organized interests and the executive. As mentioned already, in corporatist systems organized interests are supposed to influence government directly, bypassing parliament. Or, as Rokkan formulated it in his analysis of numerical democracy and corporate pluralism: votes count but resources decide.42 Kvavik observed that legislation was shaped in the administration, and that parliamentary institutions received an exceedingly weak evaluation among representatives of interest organizations.43 Using the terminology above, one may say that in corporatist systems public power is concentrated in the hands of the executive. Corporatist researchers would subscribe to the ‘decline of parliaments’ thesis. This thesis fits well with widespread opinions of executive-legislative relations in Norway and many other countries. It is interesting to notice, however, that the thesis about the segmented state does not ignore parliament. Members of parliamentary committees are included in the list of members of political segments, together with representatives of interest organizations, government ministries, etc.44 It is quite obvious that neither the state-directed nor the private government label is adequate in relation to the Norwegian governmental system. The Norwegian system is characterized by a certain balance between private and

PLURALIZATION AND THE RISE OF PARLIAMENT 9

FIGURE 1.2 CONCENTRATION OF POWER AND GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS

public power, but the concentrations of public and private power have changed over time. In an extremely simplified interpretation, we may say that Norway has changed from a corporatist system in the 1950s and 1960s, via a segmented system in the 1970s, to a pluralist system in the 1980s and 1990s. The concept of corporatism seems at least to give a relatively good description of the Norwegian system in the 1950s and 1960s, and the characterization of Norway as a segmented state was based on observations made in the 1970s.45 As we shall see, during the 1980s and 1990s Norway has developed more pluralist traits. Still, the Norwegian governmental system contains a mixture of elements of corporatism, segmentation and pluralism, and this mixture varies from one sector to another. It seems quite clear, however, that in general the centre of gravity has moved in the pluralist direction. It is interesting to notice that a certain decline of corporatism—and rise of parliament—has been observed in other governmental systems as well, including countries like Austria, Brazil and Sweden.46 Pluralization manifests itself as dispersion of private as well as public power. Most often, attention with regard to the power of private business enterprises is focused on concentration represented by large company mergers. There is, however, a dispersion of business power going on as well. According to the Norwegian Register of Business Enterprises at the governmental Brønnøysund Register Centre, 187,192 enterprises were operating in Norway by the end of 1991. Since then, the number of enterprises has increased by almost 50 per cent. By the end of September 1999 a total of 277,416 enterprises were registered in Norway. A dispersion of private power is also indicated by the fact that the number of nationwide interest organizations registered at the Norwegian Social Science Data Services has doubled since the 1970s. Almost 1,200 organizations were

10 THE RISE OF THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT

registered in 1976.47 In 1992 the figure was almost 2,400.48 The situation of Norwegian trade unions clearly illustrates the intensified competition between organizations. In 1956 approximately 45 per cent of the employed labour force were members of the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO). Ten per cent were members of independent trade unions. Two new confederations of unions were established in the 1970s, the Confederation of Academic and Professional Unions (AF) and the Confederation of Vocational Unions (YS). In 1994 only 30 per cent of the employees were members of LO. Twenty per cent (ten per cent each) were members of AF and YS, and six per cent were members of independent unions.49 AF was split in 1997 when the new Federation of Norwegian Professional Associations was established. Dispersion of public power is manifested in various ways. Naturally, single party majority governments, that is, the Norwegian Labour governments from 1945 to 1961, represent a high concentration of government power. Minority governments and government coalitions, on the other hand, have to share power with opposition parties in parliament. The strengthening of the Storting in relation to the executive represents a dispersion of public power most clearly demonstrated by the increased frequency of governmental defeat in parliamentary voting.50 Other kinds of response to the dispersion of public power are negotiations with opposition parties in order to establish parliamentary majorities, and the adaptations that governments make in their policy proposals in order to meet anticipated reactions in parliament. Successful negotiations and adaptations are less likely if the number of parties is high and the pattern of conflict and cleavages complicated. The Norwegian party system is a rather complicated one. The first parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, were established in 1884. Since then, the formation of new parties has been based on the manifestation of new cleavages. Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen have related the development of the Norwegian party system to the varying salience of six cleavages: a territorial cleavage between centre and periphery; three cultural cleavages related to language, temperance and religion; and two economic cleavages between workers and employers, and between producers and consumers of products from the primary industries.51 With the exception of 1973, five or six parties were represented in the Norwegian Parliament at the elections from 1945 to 1977. Norwegian politics was, however, dominated by the left-right cleavage and characterized by a two-bloc system—socialists versus non-socialists—in the parliament.52 By the end of the 1980s, the Norwegian party system had become more fragmented. After the resignation of the non-socialist Syse government in 1990, the two-bloc system disintegrated due to increased conflict between the nonsocialist parties. At the elections in 1989, 1993 and 1997, seven or eight parties were represented in the Storting. The level of fractionalization measured by Rae’s F, increased from 0.63 to 0.69 in 1945–61 to 0.75 to 0.77 in 1989–97.53 This development may be interpreted as an expression of pluralization and dispersion of power between the political parties. The Norwegian multi-party system has

PLURALIZATION AND THE RISE OF PARLIAMENT 11

become even more fragmented, and the formation of stable coalitions has become more complicated. Organizational changes indicate that the concentration of power within the executive is weakened as well. In 1947, the Norwegian central administration was organized in a total of 290 units like ministries, departments, bureaus, directorates etc. Fifty years later, the number of organizational units within central government was 546.54 Another aspect of the dispersion of public power is decentralization and delegation of public authority and responsibility. Local government has expanded much more than central government. In 1962, central and local government engaged 50 per cent each of the equivalent full time personnel employed by public authorities. In 1996, 73 per cent were employed by local government and only 23 per cent by central government.55 Naturally, the figures presented here do not tell the full story about concentration and dispersion of power in Norway. Nevertheless, the changes that have occurred are substantial, some would say dramatic. They do indicate that a significant dispersion of private and public power has taken place. As a consequence, we must conclude that the degree of pluralism in Norwegian politics has increased. Corporatism, on the other hand, has weakened. The number of corporatist arrangements like public councils, boards and committees with interest representation has been considerably reduced, from 1,155 in 1977 to less than 600 by the end of 1995.56 With regard to the thesis of the segmented state, we may add that the present pattern of contact between various lobbyists and MPs seems to indicate that the degree of segmentation is rather low.57 To summarize: the Storting at the turn of the millennium is more active, and Norwegian governments confront non-governmental majorities in parliamentary voting more often than they used to do. As a consequence, organized interests pay more attention to the Storting when they attempt to influence public policies. The rise of the Norwegian Parliament over the last few decades coincides with a process of pluralization of Norwegian politics. The concentration of private power has been reduced as the number of companies and nationwide organizations has grown. The rising number of interest organizations has led to more severe competition between various interests. The concentration of public power in the hands of the executive has been reduced. The Norwegian Parliament has strengthened its position vis-à-vis the government, and governments have been forced to share more of their power with the Storting. In the case of Norway at least, the pluralization of politics and the rise of parliament seem to be two sides of the same coin. OUTLINE OF THE BOOK This book presents eight studies of different, but interrelated aspects of parliamentary government in Norway. The studies originate from various research projects funded by the Research Council of Norway and the Joint Committee of the Nordic Social Science Research Councils (NOS-S) over

12 THE RISE OF THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT

the last 15 years. Most of the succeeding chapters are revised and updated versions of papers previously published in journals and/or presented at international conferences. It is hoped that the reader will bear with the gaps or overlaps that still exist between some of the chapters. Parliamentary change is the common denominator of the three studies in Part I. They deal with two core elements of government, the formation of cabinets and the organization of parliament. Chapter 2 describes the various types of governments that have been formed in Norway since World War II.58 The general election in 1961, when Labour lost its majority in parliament, was a turning point in post-war Norwegian politics. Majority government was replaced by minority government and coalition formation. In the 1970s, the Storting became more active and consensus politics crumbled. In the 1980s and 1990s, Norway experienced a significant increase in the level of conflict or dissent in parliament. In the first half of the 1990s, the increased workload together with a wish to weaken the degree of segmentation and the strong influence of specialized interests led to a reorganization of the structure of parliamentary committees. The reorganization process and some of its consequences are analyzed in Chapter 3.59 This study indicates that the intentions of the Storting were fulfilled, to a certain extent at least. Committee workload was evened out, thus enhancing the capacity of the parliament. The committee reform seems to have led to a less segmented pattern of contact with government ministries and various kinds of organized interests. In addition, the chapter questions the widespread assumption that strong committees are a prerequisite for a strong parliament. Chapter 4 (co-authored with Arild Aurvåg Farsund and Einar Leknes), examines the substantive impact of committee change, that is, the transfer of environmental matters from the former standing committee on local government and the environment to a new committee on energy and the environment.60 The analysis clearly indicates that the change had an effect with regard to environmental policy-making. Part II reviews different aspects of the Storting’s relations with Governments, Parties, and Organized Interests. Chapter 5 focuses on Coalition Governments and the Management of Party Relations.61 It looks at the complicated network of organizational elements in the partyparliamentary system and variations in the coalition apparatus set up by Norwegian coalition governments in order to manage relations between relevant party actors in a way that is suitable for the operation and preservation of the coalitions. The comparative study in Chapter 6 (co-authored with Peter Munk Christiansen), examines contacts between organized interests and various public authorities.62 The concepts of administrative and parliamentary corporatism, and administrative and parliamentary lobbyism are introduced in order to describe the changing relations between interest organizations on the one hand and the Danish and Norwegian legislatures and executives on the other. This shows that

PLURALIZATION AND THE RISE OF PARLIAMENT 13

various interest organisations pay more attention to parliamentary actors when they try to influence policy-making. The Impact of Lobbyism is analyzed in Chapter 7, which presents assessments made by MPs as well as representatives of Norwegian interest organizations with regard to the influence exerted by various lobbyists.63 These assessments and case studies related to environmental policy-making clearly indicate that lobbyists have an impact on the decisions made by the Norwegian Parliament. The discussion of coalition formation in Chapter 2 demonstrates the importance of the left-right axis in Norwegian politics. The development of the Norwegian multi-party system is, however, closely related to the manifestation of various cross-cutting cleavages.64 Part III is devoted to the role played by the centre-periphery dimension. As we have seen, the Norwegian Parliament of today plays a more central role than before. Chapter 8 shows that not only is the Storting a central assembly of Norwegian politics, it is also The Central Assembly of the Periphery’.65 The Norwegian periphery is deliberately overrepresented in the Norwegian Parliament. The most spectacular demonstrations of the explosive force of the centreperiphery dimension have been the two referendums on Norwegian EC/EU membership in 1972 and 1994. Even though most of the political elite wanted to join the European Union, a majority of Norwegian voters, especially in the periphery, said ‘no’. The EU issue is an extraordinary and exceptional case, which has been analyzed elsewhere.66 Here, we will take a closer look at the importance of the geographical dimension in ordinary politics. The study of ‘Regionoil’ Politics and Policy in Chapter 9 clearly demonstrates how parliamentary decision-making is influenced by the backgrounds of MPs.67 This study also shows how changing definitions of problems and solutions affect the salience of various conflict dimensions and thus the process of parliamentary decision-making. Johan P. Olsen raised objections against the ‘decline of parliaments’ thesis. He meant that during the last half of the 1970s the Storting became a more rather than a less significant institution, and accordingly he suggested an ‘ebb-and-flow perspective’ on the importance of the Norwegian Parliament.68 As I have pointed out elsewhere, we may add that in the 1980s and 1990s the average sea level has risen as a result of a ‘greenhouse effect’.69 The studies presented in this book exhibit various aspects of the rise of parliament that occurred in Norway during the last quarter of the twentieth century. Entering a new millennium, we would expect parliamentary ebb-and-flow to vary around a much higher average level than before. NOTES An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Norwegian Political Science Conference in Tromsø, 10–12 January 2000. I would like to thank the participants and the chairs of the workshop on comparative politics, Kaare Strøm

14 THE RISE OF THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT

and Bernt Aardal, for useful comments. I also thank Arild Farsund, Oluf Langhelle, Ståle Opedal, Vidar Rolland, Paul Roness, and William Shaffer for their advice. 1. In Lord Bryce, Modern Democracies (1921), quoted in P.Norton (ed.), Legslatures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.47. 2. See www.stortinget.no. 3. K.Eliassen, ‘Political and Public Participation’, in E.Allardt et al. (eds.), Nordic Democracy (Copenhagen: Det Danske Selskab, 1981). 4. B.Rothstein, Den korporative staten (Stockholm: Nordstedts, 1992); B.Rothstein, ‘Formative Moments vs. Rational Choice: Explaining Swedish Corporatist’, Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of APSA, Chicago, IL, 31 Aug.–3 Sept. 1995. 5. T.Nordby, Korporatisme på norsk (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1994). 6. S.Rokkan, ‘Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism’, in R.A.Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democmcies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p.107. 7. R.B.Kvavik, Interest Groups in Norwegian Politics (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1976), p.15. 8. Kvavik, Interest Groups in Norwegian Politics, pp. 118–20. 9. G.Hernes, Makt og styring (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1983), pp.300–303. 10. J.P.Olsen, Organized Democracy (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1983), pp.42, 72. 11. See Chapter 2. 12. Source: The Storting, www.stortinget.no 13. Source: The Storting, www.stortinget.no 14. See Chapters 2 and 3. 15. See Chapter 2. 16. The Storting is active from October to June. Consequently, calculations of governmental defeats per month are based on nine months per year. See Chapter 3. 17. T.Nordby, ‘Parlamentarismen i krise?’ Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, Vol.15, No.2 (1998), p.165. 18. See Chapters 2 and 3. 19. H.Rommetvedt, ‘Personellressurser, aktivitetsnivå og innflytelsesmuligheter i et Storting i vekst’, Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift, Vol.11, No. 4 (1995), p.253. 20. The newspaper Aftenposten, 14 July 1999. 21. Kvavik, Interest Groups in Norwegian Politic. 22. See Chapter 6. 23. H.Rommetvedt, ‘Næringslivets politiske påvirkning: Interesseorganisasjonene, Stortinget og forvaltningen’, in M.Malmø (ed.), Politisk årbok 1997 (Oslo: Andante, 1997), p.111. 24. See Chapter 3. 25. Letter to the Storting, dated 28 Sept. 1988. 26. The newspaper Arbeiderbladet, 20 June 1990. 27. The newspaper VG, 19 June 1995. 28. Speech at the annual dinner for Members of Parliament, hosted by the King of Norway, 21 Oct. 1999. 29. N.R.Ramsøy (ed.), Det norske samfunn (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1968); English edition: N.R. Ramsøy (ed.), Norwegian Society (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1974).

PLURALIZATION AND THE RISE OF PARLIAMENT 15

30. J.Galtung, ‘Norway in the World Community’, in N.R.Ramsøy (ed.), Norwegian Society, pp.392ff. 31. L.Alldén, N.R.Ramsøy and M.Vaa (eds.), Det norske samfunn (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1986), p.5. 32. Fakta og analyser. Særskilt vedlegg til St.meld. nr. 4 (1996–97) Langtidsprogrammet 1998–2001 (Oslo: Finans- og tolldepartementet, 1997), p.180. 33. J.P.Heinz, E.O.Laumann, R.L.Nelson and R.H.Salisbury, The Hollow Core. Private Interests in National Policy Making (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp.395f. 34. A.Lijphart and M.M.L.Crepaz, ‘Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol.21, Part 2 (1991), p.238. 35. P.C.Schmitter, ‘Still the Century of Corporatism?’ in P.C.Schmitter and G.Lehmbruch (eds.), Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979), p.21. 36. Schmitter, ‘Still the Century of Corporatism?’ p.18. 37. P.C.Schmitter, ‘Reflections on Where the Theory of Neo-Corporatism Has Gone and Where the Praxis of Neo-Corporatism May Be Going’, in G.Lehmbruch and P.C.Schmitter (eds.), Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making (London: Sage, 1982), pp.264f. 38. H.Rommetvedt, ‘Utviklingsfaser i det norske organisasjon/stat-forholdet’, in G.E.Isaksson (ed.), Inblickar i nordisk parlamentarism (Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 1997); H.Rommetvedt, ‘Private and Public Power at the National Level’, in H.Goverde, P.G.Cerny, M.Hauggard and H.H.Lentner (eds.), Political Power: Theories, Practices, Globalizations (London: Sage, forthcoming 2000). 39. Rokkan, ‘Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism’. 40. M.Egeberg, J.P.Olsen and H.Sætren, ‘Organisasjonssamfunnet og den segmenterte stat’, in J.P.Olsen (ed.), Politisk organisering (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget), 1978. 41. T.Christensen and M.Egeberg, ‘Organized Group-Government Relations in Norway’, Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol.2 (1979), p.253. The relationship with concepts like ‘policy networks’, ‘issue networks’, ‘iron triangles’ etc. is quite obvious. 42. Rokkan, ‘Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism’. 43. Kvavik, Interest Groups in Norwegian Politics. 44. Egeberg et al., ‘Organisasjonssamfunnet og den segmenterte stat’; Christensen and Egeberg, ‘Organized Group-Government Relations in Norway’. 45. One may raise the question of whether the described phases reflect the political ‘reality’ or the political scientists’ perceptions of ‘reality’. In my opinion, the strength of corporatism in the 1950s and 1960s, and of segmentation in the 1970s, has been overstated by many political scientists. ‘Reality’ was more nuanced than perceptions. I do believe, however, that the ‘real’ changes are significant enough to substantiate my characterizations. 46. M.M.L.Crepaz, ‘From Semisovereignty to Sovereignty’, Comparative Politics, Vol.27 (1994); R. Boschi, ‘The Corporatist Heritage and New Patterns of Interest Representation in Brazil’, Paper presented at the XVII IPSA World Congress, Seoul, 17–21 Aug. 1997; L. Lewin, Samhället och de organiserade intressena (Stockholm: Nordstedts, 1994).

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47. M.-A.Andersen and J.-S.Lauritsen, Organisasjonsarkivet, rapport nr. 86 (Tromsø: Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste, 1990). 48. A.Hallenstvedt and J.Trollvik (eds.), Norske organisasjoner (Oslo: Fabritius, 1993). 49. T.A.Stokke, Organisasjonsgraden på arbeidstakersiden, notat 1995:13 (Oslo: FAFO, 1995). 50. See Chapter 2. 51. S.Rokkan and H.Valen, ‘Regional Contrasts in Norwegian Politics’, in E.Allardt and Y. Littunen (eds.), Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems (Helsinki: Westermarck Society, 1964); S.Rokkan, ‘Geography, Religion and Social Class: Crosscutting Cleavages in Norwegian Politics’, in S.M.Lipset and S.Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: The Free Press, 1967). 52. See Chapter 2. 53. See Chapter 2. 54. V.Rolland, ‘Organisasjonsendring og forvaltningspolitikk: Norge’, in P.Lægreid and O.K. Pedersen (eds.), Fra opbygning til ombygning i staten (København: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 1999), p.173. 55. Sources: Statistics Norway, www-open.ssb.no; and Fakta og analyser. Særskilt vedlegg til St.meld. nr. 4 (1996–97), p.114. It should be added that local politicians criticize central government for giving them less leeway. 56. See Chapter 6. 57. See Chapter 2. 58. The original version of this chapter was published in E.Damgaard (ed.), Parliamentary Change in the Nordic Countries (Osio: Scandinavian University Press, 1992). 59. An earlier version was published in The Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol.4, No.l (1998). 60. This chapter is based on a paper presented at the Nordic Political Science Association Congress, NOPSA 99, Uppsala, 19–21 Aug. 1999. 61. An earlier version of this chapter was published in Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol.17, No.3 (1994). 62. This chapter was published in Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol.22, No.3 (1999). 63. This chapter has not been published before. 64. Rokkan and Valen, ‘Regional Contrasts in Norwegian Politics’; Rokkan, ‘Geography, Religion and Social Class: Crosscutting Cleavages in Norwegian Politics’. 65. Previously published in Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol.15, No.2 (1992). 66. A.T.Jenssen, M.Gilljam and P.Pesonen (eds.), To Join or Not to Join. Three Nordic Referendums on Membership in the European Union (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1998). 67. This chapter was published in Regional Politics & Policy (now: Regional & Federal Studies), Vol.1,No.3 (1991). 68. J.P.Olsen, Organized Democracy. 69. H.Rommetvedt, ‘Personellressurser, aktivitetsnivå og innflytelsesmuligheter i et Storting i vekst’, p.272.

CHAPTER 2 From Consensual Majority Parliamentarism to Dissensual Minority Parliamentarism

Norwegian society has undergone great changes during recent decades. Urbanization, a rising level of education, and increased employment in the service sector at the expense of industry are relevant in this context. Norway is now one of the largest oil exporters in the world, and a major supplier of natural gas to Germany, France and Great Britain. The oil activities, however, have reinforced existing development trends in society rather than created a qualitatively new direction of development. These social changes have also manifested themselves in politics. In this chapter we intend to subject political changes in Norway to a closer study. The changes affect the party system as well as government formation and parliamentary activities. In the first part of this chapter we shall study some of the main aspects of the Norwegian party system development during the post-war years. The survey shows changes in the relative strength of the various parties as well as the emergence of new ones. The second part examines changes in the type of governments formed in Norway. The relationship between majority and minority governments and between single-party and coalition governments will be clarified. The third part of this chapter will focus on changes in activity and conflict levels in the Storting as well as the possible reasons behind these changes. Lastly, we shall study some probable consequences of the changes which have taken place in the Norwegian parliamentary system. A PARTY SYSTEM UNDERGOING CHANGE During the 1940s and 1950s Norwegian politics was characterized by great stability. To a large extent, voters stuck to the party of their choice once they had made up their minds. The Labour Party, led by Einar Gerhardsen, held on to the power of government. Historian Jens Arup Seip later went so far as to describe Norway as a ‘one-party state’ during this period.1 In 1961, however, a small but significant change occurred. In the parliamentary election that year Labour suffered a drop in support of 1.5 percentage points, enough for the party to lose its majority in the Norwegian Parliament, the Storting. The recently formed

18 FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM

FIGURE 2.1 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES IN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Socialist People’s Party, with its two representatives, ended up in a pivotal position. At first, this had no consequences for the government’s situation. However, when the Socialist People’s Party two years later supported a motion of no confidence tabled by the non-socialist parties, Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen was forced to step down. The Conservative Party, the Christian People’s Party, the Centre Party and the Liberal Party formed a coalition government led by John Lyng from the Conservatives. Although his cabinet stayed in power for a mere four weeks, it provided the basis for a new coalition government, formed when the non-socialists gained a majority in the Storting after the 1965 election. This new cabinet was led by Per Borten from the Centre Party. In retrospect, the changes among the voters during the 1960s must be considered small. Far greater changes took place in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. In many respects, they started in 1972 when a referendum was held on the issue of Norwegian membership in the European Community. Despite the fact that the political establishment, with its great majority in the Storting, as well as a large proportion of the civil service and the press were in favour of membership, 53.5 per cent of the electorate voted against. The voters’ negative response in the EC referendum was an expression of disintegrating political authority and loyalties. These tendencies of dissolution had immediate effects on the political system. First, a Labour representative announced his defection to the Socialist People’s Party. Then, a socialist electoral alliance was formed by the Socialist People’s Party, the Communist Party, antiMarketeers from the Labour Party, together with independent Socialists. The Alliance was the forerunner of the Socialist Left Party.

PARTY COMPOSITION IN THE NORWEGIAN STORTING, NUMBER OF SEATS

TABLE 2.1

FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM 19

20 FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM

Changes in the party system also occurred in the non-socialist parties. The Liberal Party was divided into two when sections of the party decided to enter a new coalition government led by Lars Korvald from the Christian People’s Party. This cabinet was, to a large extent, composed of anti-marketeers. Pro-EC members of the Liberal Party refused to go along with this. Eight of the 13 Liberal MPs joined the New People’s Party, which was formally established in December 1972. The third party to be formed during the period 1972–73 had no direct connection with the EC question, though it probably was another expression of the disintegration of authority. In April 1973 Anders Lange established his own party to work ‘for a drastic cut in taxes, dues and state intervention’. The party was inspired by Glistrup’s Progress Party in Denmark, and in 1976 the Norwegian party also adopted the name ‘Progress Party’. The election in the autumn of 1973 resulted in substantial changes in the Storting. The number of parties represented increased from five to eight. The Socialist Left Party obtained 16 seats, Anders Lange’s Party 4, and the New People’s Party 1. Labour and the Liberals suffered most and lost 12 and 11 seats respectively. The oldest party in Norway, the Liberal Party, was left with only two seats. Twelve years later, in 1985, the Liberals dropped out of the Storting altogether, after 101 years of parliamentary activity. They returaed, however, in 1993. The 1973 general election marked the beginning of a period of extensive voter instability. Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1 clearly illustrate this.2 Paradoxically, the Conservative Party, one of the losers in the EC referendum, had the highest increase in support in subsequent elections. From 1973 to 1981 Conservative support increased from 17.4 per cent to 31.7 per cent. However, in the 1989 election support for the Conservatives fell to 22.2 per cent. The greatest victory was won by the Progress Party, which obtained support of 13.0 per cent. The Socialist Left Party, too, made a great leap forward in 1989 taking 10.1 per cent of the votes. The Labour Party, together with the Conservatives, was one of the principal losers. Labour obtained 34.3 per cent of the votes in 1989. During its prime, Labour had as much as 48.3 per cent (in the parliamentary election of 1957). For one thing, Labour’s decline must be attributed to reduced employment in traditional labour trades, coupled with dwindling class-consciousness among voters.3Compared with the 1985 parliamentary election, the changes in 1989 were substantial. The number of Progress Party seats increased from two to 22, and the Socialist Left now had 17 seats, as against six. The Conservatives suffered the greatest losses and lost 13 seats in the Storting, while Labour lost eight. Halfway through the electoral campaign there were indications that the changes might be even more extensive than they were. According to some opinion polls, Progress Party support was even greater than that for the Conservative Party. However, the Progress Party lost out in the final stages of the campaign. The Liberals and their breakaway faction in the Liberal People’s

FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM 21

Party reunited into one party before the election in 1989. According to opinion polls it looked as if the reunited Liberals might regain seats in the Storting. This was not to be, however. Instead, for the first time since 1918, an independent candidate was elected—Anders Aune from the Popular Movement for the Future of Finnmark, a grouping formed in order to focus on the serious problems facing the coastal areas of northern Norway. Aune was also an MP in 1969–73, when he represented Labour. He left the Labour Party in protest against the government’s policy on Finnmark. 1992 was a turning point in the Nordic countries’ relations with the European Union. The Norwegian government, together with Finland and Sweden, applied for EU membership. The Norwegian election campaign in 1993 was dominated by the debate on EU membership. The winner of the election was the anti-EU Centre Party. Centre Party support increased from 6.5 per cent of the votes in 1989 to 16.7 per cent in 1993, and the number of Centre Party MPs tripled. The Socialist Left Party was the other principal membership opponent, but they were overshadowed by the Centre Party and lost four seats in the Storting. The losers were the pro-EU Conservatives and the somewhat more diffuse Progress Party. The Progress Party lost more than half of its support and ended up with 6.3 per cent of the votes. The Conservative voter support fell to 17 per cent. The two parties lost 11 and 9 seats respectively. This time, the Labour Party, which was deeply split in 1972, successfully handled internal conflicts on the EU. The party won 36.9 per cent of the votes and gained four extra seats in the Storting. Another winner was the MarxistLeninist Red Election Alliance. They won their first seat in the Norwegian Parliament, mainly due to local corruption scandals exposed by their candidate in Oslo. Finally, the Liberals made a comeback and won a seat in the Storting after eight years out in the cold. Membership negotiations with the European Union ended in 1994. Finland, Sweden and Norway held referendums on the issue in October–November. Fiftyseven per cent of the Finns and 52 per cent of the Swedes said ‘yes’ to EU membership. The Norwegians, however, once again said ‘no’. The outcome—52. 2 per cent ‘no’ and 47.8 per cent ‘yes’—was almost identical to the result of the referendum held 22 years earlier (53.5 per cent/46.5 per cent). In 1996, Gro Harlem Brudtland, the leader of three different governments and Prime Minister for a total of ten years, decided to step down. The new Prime Minister, Thorbjørn Jagland, had a troublesome year in office. On numerous occasions the Labour government was overrun by the majority of the parliament.4 Jagland tolerated the defeats, but during the election campaign in August-September 1997 he threatened to resign if the Labour Party did not win more votes than in the previous election. The voters’ response was negative. Labour won 35 per cent of the votes only. The Christian People’s Party, on the other hand, almost doubled their voter support. The party achieved its best election result ever, mainly due to the credibility of the party’s Prime Minister candidate, Kjell Magne Bondevik. Prime

22 FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM

Minister Jagland declared that he would resign. In spite of the fact that the socalled ‘centre alternative’, that is, the Christian People’s Party, the Centre Party and the Liberal Party, won only 42 seats, Bondevik was able to form a new coalition government. The EU membership issue was no longer on the agenda, and the Centre Party lost half of its support. The Conservatives and the Socialist Left Party experienced new setbacks, and the Red Election Alliance lost their seat. The Progress Party, on the other hand, became the second largest party, mainly due to a restrictive policy towards immigrants and refugees. The Liberals won six seats in the new Storting. Once again, a representative of the northern periphery captured a seat in the Norwegian Parliament. The so-called Coastal Party was represented by the whaler Steinar Bastesen. If we are supposed to characterize the development of the Norwegian party system in the last few decades in one word, it has to be ‘fractionalization’. The number of parties represented in the Storting increased from 5–6 in 1945–69 to eight at the election in 1973. At the following election in 1977, the situation ‘normalized’ and six parties were represented in the Norwegian Parliament. Since 1989, however, there have been 7–8 parties in the Storting. In Table 2.1 we calculated the index of fractionalization constructed by Douglas W.Rae.5 At most of the elections from 1945 to 1969, the index value varied around 0.66–0.69. Since 1989 the index value has stabilized at a much higher level, 0.75–0.77. We would expect a high level of fractionalization to complicate the process of government formation, which is the subject of the next section of this chapter. PARLIAMENTARISM AND THE FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT The parliamentary system was introduced in Norway in 1884. Formally, a resolution was passed allowing cabinet ministers to be present during the meetings in the Storting. The Swedish-Norwegian King Oscar II refused to sanction this constitutional change, and the government was impeached. On 27 February, Prime Minister Selmer and his cabinet were dismissed from office. Thus the principle of parliamentarism was in effect established. In that same year the first Norwegian parties, the Liberals and the Conservative Party, were formally founded. Parliamentarism in Norway has never been confirmed in writing. The rules have been developed through practice, but there is no doubt about their relevance to the Norwegian political system. Quite contrary to the constitutional common law, Section 12 in the Constitution still grants the King the authority to choose his council from among Norwegian citizens qualified to vote. The Norwegian version of parliamentarism does not presuppose a vote of confidence in the government by the Storting. In contrast, a vote of no confidence is required to force a government to resign. If a majority votes in

FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM 23

favour of a formulation worded ‘the Government does not have the confidence of the Storting’ then the government is obliged to step down. If the Storting ‘regrets’ the course of action taken by the government in a specific case, it is considered a motion of no confidence. In other words, the definition of Norwegian parliamentarism is a negative one. The government must avoid a situation where a motion of no confidence gains a majority in the national assembly. An unusual situation may arise when two separate motions of no confidence are tabled, either of which obtains a minority of the Storting votes. If the votes in favour of the two motions together represent a Storting majority, there is a negative majority against the government. The cabinet is thereby given the option to resign, without being obliged to do so. If the government suffers defeat on a specific issue without the national assembly clearly expressing its lack of confidence, the cabinet itself must decide whether it is willing to stay on. If the issue is important enough for the government to put its continued existence at stake then it may demand a vote of confidence to be taken. If the Storting majority still opposes the government, a cabinet crisis is at hand. Changes of Government As mentioned above, the King formally appoints his cabinet members. In practice, however, the parliamentary situation in the Storting decides the composition of the government. There are no written rules governing how the formation of government shall be conducted. In practice, the following procedure is applied: (1) If one party has a majority in the Storting, this party will appoint its candidate for Prime Minister. The King follows the directions of the majority party. (2) If no single party has a majority, changes of government are carried out as follows: (a) The Prime Minister notes that the government in office does not have the required support in the Storting. This may be done formally or informally. If the government is defeated in a formal vote of no confidence or vote of confidence, it has to resign. But the Prime Minister may choose to step down if he/she finds, on a less formal basis, that a majority is in favour of a change of government. In other words, the Prime Minister does not have to risk defeat in a formal vote. (b) The Prime Minister hands in his/her resignation to the King, advising him to ask the new candidate for Prime Minister to form a government. The new Prime Minister may be the leader of the largest opposition party, or a candidate whom several parties have agreed to support. (c) If party negotiations fail to produce a new candidate for Prime Minister, the King may request the President of the Storting to make enquiries as to who can form a government which will be acceptable to the Storting.

24 FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM

TABLE 2.2 NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE JUNE 1945 (PARTY OF PRIME MINISTER LISTED FIRST)

The overview of post-war cabinets in Norway shown in Table 2.2 forms the basis for a short discussion of the various changes of government. Immediately after the liberation in 1945 Einar Gerhardsen formed a coalition government where all parties were represented. This was done --> because of the critical situation after the end of World War II. The parliamentary election in the autumn of 1945 resulted in a majority for the Labour Party. Gerhardsen then formed an all-Labour cabinet. Labour retained its parliamentary majority until 1961. The formation of government was thus, to all intents and purposes, an internal affair of concern to the Labour Party only. Gerhardsen wished to resign in 1951 and was replaced by Oscar Torp, but he returned as Prime Minister in 1955. Even though Labour lost its parliamentary majority in 1961 when the Socialist People’s Party secured two seats in the National Assembly, the Labour government stayed on. No majority could be mustered for a government coalition. However, several motions of no confidence against the Gerhardsen cabinet were tabled in the course of 1963. During the debate on a matter concerning the state-owned company Norsk Koksverk, where costs ran far beyond budget, the non-socialist parties put forward a proposition which in reality was a motion of no confidence. Simultaneously, the Socialist People’s Party tabled a motion which was unacceptable to Labour. Together, these two

FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM 25

motions were supported by a parliamentary majority. In spite of this negative majority, however, the government chose to stay in office. During the debate on the so-called Kings Bay issue, which had its origins in mining accidents at Spitsbergen, a new motion of no confidence was tabled. When the Socialist People’s Party voted in favour together with the non-socialist parties, the government had to step down. This smoothed the path for John Lyng’s four-party cabinet, which, however, chose to step down four weeks later when it faced a negative majority in the Storting during the inaugural speech debate. Labour and the Socialist People’s Party proposed separate motions of no confidence. Prior to the 1965 election the Conservatives, the Christian People’s Party, the Centre Party and the Liberals declared their intention of forming a government, provided they obtained a parliamentary majority. When this majority was secured, the last Gerhardsen cabinet stepped down. Per Borten from the Centre Party formed a new coalition government. In 1971 the Borten cabinet was replaced by a new Labour government, headed by Trygve Bratteli. In reality, internal disagreement on the question of Norwegian EC membership forced the Borten government to hand in its resignation. The President of the Storting was commissioned by the King to investigate possibilities for a new government. Kjell Bondevik of the Christian People’s Party attempted to form a new coalition government, but the negotiations failed. Consequently, the formation of government was left to the Labour Party, even though there was a non-socialist majority in the Storting. Before the 1972 EC referendum Prime Minister Bratteli made it clear that his government would resign if the results showed a majority against membership. Bratteli, in other words, demanded a vote of confidence, not from the Storting, but from the Norwegian people. In a Norwegian context, the situation was unique. The referendum resulted in a majority against membership, and thus Lars Korvald of the Christian People’s Party could form a new coalition government. In addition to the Christian People’s Party, the Centre Party and the antimarketeers of the Liberal Party participated in this minority cabinet. The main task of the Korvald cabinet was to negotiate a commercial treaty with the EC. When this assignment was completed, and the election of 1973 led to a Storting majority for the Socialists, Bratteli could return as Prime Minister. Again, however, the Labour Party had only minority support in the Storting. The government was dependent on support from the Socialist electoral alliance. When Bratteli in 1976 was replaced as Prime Minister by Odvar Nordli, it was again an internal matter for the Labour Party. The minority government stayed in power when the 1977 election gave a majority to the Socialists. However, in 1981 Nordli stepped down owing to ill health and was replaced by Gro Harlem Brundtland. Again, the Storting had no say in the change of Prime Minister. Before the 1981 election, the Conservative Party, the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party declared that the government would be replaced if the three parties together obtained a majority. The cabinet composition was to be clarified

26 FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM

after the election. The result was a new one-party government, this time under the leadership of Kåre Willoch of the Conservative Party. However, the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party formed part of the parliamentary basis of the cabinet. In 1983 a coalition government was formed, where, in addition to the Conservatives, the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party were represented. The initiative to form the coalition government was taken by the Centre Party. At the 1985 election the coalition government lost its Storting majority support. The Progress Party, with its two seats, ended up in a pivotal position but had no wish to overthrow the government. Consequently, the Willoch cabinet was able to stay on. However, it was not to enjoy the support of the Progress Party for long. In the spring of 1986 the government resigned, having demanded a vote of confidence on the question of suggested financial retrenchment measures, such as an increase in the petrol tax. Labour, the Socialist Left Party and the non-socialist Progress Party voted against, and Gro Harlem Brundtland was able to form a new Labour government, even though the non-socialists held the Storting majority. The Brundtland cabinet stayed in office even though it faced a negative majority in the early summer of 1987. The negative majority arose when the Storting debated two different issues on the same day, the agricultural settlement and the proposed revision of the National Budget. Concerning the first issue, the Conservative Party, the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party tabled a motion of no confidence, which the Progress Party voted against together with the Labour Party and the Socialist Left Party. In the second question, the Progress Party, together with the Conservative Party and the Christian People’s Party, put forward another motion of no confidence, which the Centre Party opposed. During the time following the 1986 change of government, the Labour cabinet was, to a large extent, forced to enter into compromises in the Storting with the Christian People’s Party and, in particular, with the Centre Party. After an unsuccessful attempt to form a non-socialist government in 1987, the nonsocialist parties seemed unable to present a viable government alternative prior to the 1989 election. Immediately before the start of the summer recess, however, the Conservative Party, the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party agreed on a statement to the effect that the three parties would negotiate to form a coalition government if the election results warranted such an alternative. However, very few people believed that such negotiations would lead anywhere. The election in September 1989 resulted in a joint Storting majority for the three parties and the Progress Party. After a couple of weeks of negotiations the three parties agreed to attempt the formation of a new coalition government. When the Progress Party declared its willingness to support such a cabinet, the Brundtland government handed in its resignation. Jan P.Syse of the Conservative Party was commissioned by the King to form a new government.

FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM 27

In the autumn of 1990, however, the Syse government had to resign because the parties in power could not agree on Norway’s attitude to the negotiations between the EC and the EFTA concerning a European Economic Area. The nonsocialist Centre Party recommended that a new government should be formed by Labour. At the beginning of November, therefore, Gro Harlem Brundtland became Prime Minister for the third time. The minority government of Mrs Brundtland met no serious threats in the Storting due to disagreement on the nonsocialist side. The non-socialist parties were split on a number of issues, not only the EC/EU issue. The Brundtland government had, however, to compromise and to tolerate several defeats in parliamentary voting.6 Gro Harlem Brundtland decided to resign in 1996. Once again, the Labour Party took care of the change of government without any real involvement from the Storting. The position of Prime Minister was handed over to the new leader of the Labour Party, Thorbjørn Jagland. Once in office, Jagland met serious problems in the parliament. He was loudly criticized for the way he handled an investigation of the secret services, and the majority of the Storting made extensive changes in his government’s budget proposal. Jagland tolerated a record high frequency of defeats in parliamentary votes.7 He did not demand a vote of confidence in parliament, but he did so in the election campaign in 1997. Before the election in September, Jagland declared that the parliamentary foundation of the Labour government had eroded, and consequently he would resign if the voters did not give him at least the same support as in the 1993 election, that is, 36.9 per cent. Thus, the election result— 35 per cent Labour votes—paved the way for the socalled ‘centre alternative’, a coalition of the Centre Party, Christian Peoples Party, and the Liberal Party headed by Kjell Magne Bondevik. Most observers expected the narrowly based Bondevik government to be a short-lived one. The centre coalition managed, however, to stay in office until March 2000. Then the Prime Minister lost a vote of confidence when Labour and the Conservatives decided that the construction of gasheated power plants should be permitted. The centre parties opposed this decision for environmental reasons. They turned down a Conservative invitation to form a new non-socialist coalition. Consequently, Labour could return to office, now under the premiership of Jens Stoltenberg. Types of Government The list of government changes clearly illustrates that changes can be precipitated by a variety of circumstances. The formation of government may also lead to rather different types of government, such as majority or minority governments, single-party governments or coalition governments. The different types of government are shown in Table 2.3. In Table 2.4, the number of months in office has been added up for the various governments, grouped by government type. Minority and majority governments

28 FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM

TABLE 2.3 GOVERNMENTS AND GOVERNMENT TYPES IN NORWAY (NUMBER OF MONTHS IN OFFICE IN BRACKETS)

TABLE 2.4 MONTHS IN OFFICE FOR GOVERNMENT TYPES JUNE 1945–DECEMBER 2000

have been in power for 59 per cent and 41 per cent of the time respectively. As for single-party versus coalition cabinets, single-party governments are clearly in the lead, having been in office 73 per cent of the total time. During the whole of the post-war period, single-party majority governments’ time in office has been shorter than that of single-party minority governments. On the other hand, majority coalitions have stayed in office longer than minority coalitions. However, interesting changes are hidden behind the overall figures for the entire post-war period. Table 2.4 shows how long governments stayed in office in three different periods. The table clearly illustrates the transition from majority to minority parliamentarism. The first period was dominated by single-party majority governments. As previously mentioned, the Labour Party had a Storting majority up to 1961 and formed governments on its own, except for the coalition government immediately after the war. With respect to single-party versus coalition governments, the second period was a more balanced one. Since 1986 single-party minority governments have dominate the scene (Labour and the

FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM 29

Conservatives respectively). All majority cabinets since 1961 have been coalitions. GOVERNMENT FORMATION The parliamentary system is often first and foremost associated with majority governments. The situation is relatively uncomplicated when one party has an overall majority. But in a multi-party system, where no single party holds an overall majority, there may be a variety of choices when a government is to be formed, such as a single-party minority cabinet, a coalition government representing two or more parties which together have a majority, or a coalition government which controls only a minority of the parliamentary vote. We shall now take a closer look at the reasons why one or another of these solutions is chosen. As we have seen already, minority coalitions represent a short-lived alternative. The Lyng cabinet of 1963 resigned at the very first spot of trouble. The Korvald government was formed under extraordinary circumstances after the EC referendum in 1972. The Willoch cabinet, too, turned out to be rather short-lived after it lost its majority in the 1985 election. Incidentally, Willoch’s cabinet was formed as a majority coalition, but went on as before even after losing its Storting majority in 1985. The Syse cabinet was formed as a minority coalition, and Syse had to resign after a year in office. However, the minority coalition headed by Bondevik stayed in office for a longer time than most observers predicted. In other words, the choice under ‘normal’ circumstances between a singe-party minority government and a majority coalition government in periods with no single majority party requires elucidation. Minority Governments and Party Coalitions Minority cabinets are often seen as a symptom of crisis. According to the conventional view, minority governments are formed in unstable and conflictual political systems. Such governments are seen as suboptimal and unstable solutions resorted to when all else fails. However, in a comprehensive study of government formations in a number of countries, Kaare Strøm shows that minority governments may also be the result of rational choice.8 Strøm presupposes that political parties participate in elections and seek cabinet power. The scrutiny of political positions and outcomes of elections is used as a means of influencing the formulation of policies. Policy-making may to a varying extent be influenced by the opposition parties. The active parties in government formation do not always necessarily seek a majority solution. Lastly, Strøm maintains that the parties are not preoccupied with short-term goals alone. The opportunity to influence long-term policy must also be considered.

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The advantage of government power is connected with the policy influence differential between the cabinet and the opposition. The disadvantage of government lies in the prospect of losing in later elections. Government parties have a tendency to lose votes in subsequent ballots. In a political system where the opposition exerts great influence on the formation of policy and where elections are decisive in government formation, minority rule can be a rational solution. During the post-war period Norway has not been marked by the symptoms of crisis that often characterize minority cabinets. On the contrary, Strøm’s theory seems to offer a feasible contribution towards explaining the frequency of minority cabinets. Strøm describes Norway as the most typical inclusionary system we can find.9 The opposition has considerable influence on policy formation. This influence may be brought to bear through the parliamentary or numerical democratic channel, as well as through the corporate channel where interest organizations play a central part.10 Even though minority governments may represent a rational solution, this does not mean that Norwegian politicians have not tried to establish majority alternatives by forming coalitions. On the contrary, hardly any issue has appeared more frequently on the political agenda than that of nonsocialist collaboration with the aim of depriving Labour of cabinet power. Disregarding circumstantial voting alliances in connection with specific issues, we can, in a Norwegian context, distinguish between three types of coalition: (1) Pre-election coalitions, or declarations made prior to an election to the effect that several parties will collaborate to form a government if warranted by the outcome of the election.11 (2) Government coalitions, where several parties form a government together. (3) Storting coalitions, where a government is formed on the basis of declared support from parties outside the cabinet. There are several theories on the formation of coalitions.12 Two variables are assumed to be of particular importance in this context: (1) Coalition size, that is, the number of participating parties, and the proportion of seats controlled by them. (2) Policy distance or the level of unity/disunity between the parties. Riker’s size principle forms the basis for a large part of the literature written on coalition theory. Riker maintained that participants in the political game will form coalitions which they think are just large enough to secure victory.13 Consequently, the number of people to reap the rewards will be kept at a minimum. In our context this means that the distribution of seats in the Storting decides which party coalitions are large enough to win a majority and thereby the power of government. This distribution has already been shown in Table 2.1. As long as Labour maintained an overall Storting majority, the government did not need a coalition for support. But since the 1961 election no single party

FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM 31

has held a majority. The smallest possible coalition to be able to muster a Storting majority would be Labour together with one more party. In 1961 a coalition between Labour on the one hand and either the Socialist People’s Party or one of the non-socialist parties on the other would have constituted a majority. Instead, the Gerhardsen cabinet continued as a minority government. Several times after 1965 a possible coalition between Labour and one of the non-socialist parties would have gained a Storting majority. But in Norway a centre-left coalition has never been seriously discussed.14 The examples illustrate the fact that the size factor alone cannot adequately explain why only non-socialist coalitions have been a realistic alternative in postwar Norway. Other factors must be considered in addition. Policy Distance Several coalition theoreticians use ideology or policy distance between parties as part of their explanation of which types of coalition are formed. They share the presumption that in one way or another coalitions are sought where policy distance between the participants is as small as possible. In that way the partners make sure that the policies of the coalition government are as close to the views of the participating parties as possible.15 In a study of the Swedish Parliament (the Riksdag), Søren Holmberg has used the formation of party blocs as a basis for evaluating the ‘relevance’ of various potential coalitions.16 Inside a party bloc policy distances between the parties are smaller than the distances from parties outside the bloc. The widest distance between the potential coalition partners is called ‘the coalition range’ by Michael A. Leiserson, a term which will be useful in our discussion.17 Policy distance between parties can be measured at different levels and by means of various methods.18 The following calculations of policy distances are based on the parties’ standpoints regarding issues debated in the Storting. Almost all issues to be debated in the Storting are first submitted to one of its standing committees. The committee will then present a recommendation before the issue is debated and eventually submitted to the vote. In the committees the parties flag their views, either by a unanimous committee recommendation or by means of various dissents and faction remarks not supported by all the parties. As a general rule, the views presented in committee recommendations also represent the parties’ final standpoints on the various issues.19 By recording which parties stand behind each of the majority and minority remarks in the committee recommendations, it is possible to find a measure of policy distance, or the level of unity/disunity between the parties. The following procedure has been applied. For each pair of parties two distances are measured. First, the remarks supported by party A are recorded. Then a note is taken of what percentage of these remarks are not supported by party B. A corresponding exercise is carried out on the remarks supported by B, in which case the lack of A-support is registered in percentages. These two measures of disunity may vary

32 FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM

TABLE 2.5 SMALLEST DISTANCE BETWEEN LABOUR AND THE NON-SOCIALIST PARTIES, AND COALITION RANGE (WIDEST DISTANCE) BETWEEN THE NONSOCIALISTS (% DISUNITY): ALL COMMITTEES

somewhat, they are asymmetrical. To simplify matters, we shall base our discussion on symmetrical distance. Symmetrical distance is calculated as an average of the two asymmetrical measures. To make the calculations as comparable over time as possible, we have omitted remarks supported by Labour, the Conservatives, the Christian People’s Party, the Centre Party and the Liberals together. The results of the calculations are shown in Table 2.5.20 Periodization has been applied, based on the development in non-socialist collaboration. For each period the table shows the smallest distance between Labour and a non-socialist party. In addition, the table illustrates the coalition range or the greatest distance between the non-socialist partners in a potential coalition. For the period 1945– 73 we have considered the Conservative Party, the Christian People’s Party, the Centre Party and the Liberals as possible coalition partners. In the period 1973– 89 the Liberals have been omitted, partly because the party after 1973 did not wish to take part in non-socialist collaboration efforts, and partly because it dropped out of the Storting in 1985. Perhaps the most striking feature of this picture is the relationship between Labour and the non-socialists. For many years the Conservatives, the Christian People’s Party, the Centre Party and (before 1973) the Liberal Party formed a non-socialist bloc against the Labour Party. The distances from the Labour Party

FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM 33

to each of the non-socialist parties were, in most years, far greater than the distances between the non-socialists. This explains why collaboration between the Labour Party and one or more of the non-socialist parties was out of the question. The attempts to join forces in the non-socialist bloc were initiated in 1947– 48.21 Several efforts were made to establish a non-socialist pre-election coalition, but they failed despite the fact that the non-socialists constituted a bloc against the Labour Party. However, after the resignation of the Willoch government in 1986, the non-socialist bloc dissolved. With the exception of the Syse government’s time in office in 1989–90, the coalition range between the nonsocialist parties became wider than the narrowest distance between Labour and a non-socialist party. In the 1990s, the Conservatives and the centre parties moved in quite different directions. Coalition Formation As previously mentioned, the Labour Party lost its overall Storting majority in the 1961 election. The next period started with considerable distances between the non-socialists in the Storting. However, this setback did not last very long. In 1963, the Kings Bay crisis resulted in a four-party coalition led by John Lyng. Gradually, the non-socialists in the Storting moved closer to each other, but it is worth noting that the distances between the nonsocialists were still considerable in 1962–63, a year before the crisis. The coalition formation in 1963, in other words, was not a result of a general conciliation between the non-socialists in the Storting. It was, rather, a result of the fact that the opposition (the non-socialists and the Socialist People’s Party) was of the opinion that Labour’s behaviour and lack of respect for the Storting was most unacceptable. In 1965 the distances between the Conservative Party and the parties in the political centre had narrowed considerably. The coalition range of 35 per cent disunity in 1963–65 was the smallest registered so far. The four nonsocialist parties could therefore declare that a non-socialist majority vote at the election would result in a new coalition government. The survey of party distances illustrates the fact that in most years, even before 1963–65, there were non-socialist blocs in the Storting (see Table 2.5). Consequently, the question of non-socialist pre-election coalitions was relevant. However, the attempts to establish such coalitions still failed. The formation of blocs was obviously not sufficient. It appears that party distances had to narrow still further before coalition formation could succeed. This may be connected with the fact that there has been internal disagreement on the issue of nonsocialist collaboration, especially within the centre parties. When the coalition range is very small, there is probably less risk of internal disagreement within the parties.

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While the Borten cabinet was in power, the parties divided even more distinctly into two blocs: the Labour Party on the one hand, and the nonsocialist ruling parties on the other. There was little to distinguish the nonsocialist parties from each other. Only in 1966–67, when the issue of Norwegian EC membership became topical, can a certain increase in distance be traced between the Conservative Party and the centre parties. The proximity between the four ruling parties in this period must be regarded as a result rather than a prerequisite of collaboration. The EC issue split the non-socialists in 1971, and the Borten cabinet disintegrated. After the government had resigned, it gradually became more evident that the non-socialist parties were moving in different directions. The distances between the Conservatives and the other non-socialist parties widened dramatically. Both in 1971–72 and in 1972–73 the coalition range between the non-socialists was greater than the smallest distance between Labour and a nonsocialist party. Even disunity between the centre parties grew. The distances between them do not indicate a solid foundation for a centre coalition. Still, the EC referendum did lead to such a coalition. And after the Korvald cabinet took office, a distinct rapprochement between the Christian People’s Party, the Centre Party and the Liberals took place. The Conservative Party, now in opposition, distanced itself from the centre parties. The Liberals left the non-socialist group after 1973. From 1973 the development in party distances illustrates the Liberals’ new role. Earlier, the Liberal Party was centrally situated between Labour and the Conservative Party (most often closer to the Conservatives). In the period up to 1977 the Liberals established themselves as a ‘green’ party, distancing themselves from the two ‘growth’ parties. Both Labour Party and Conservative distances from the Liberals widened. The Centre Party and, in particular, the Christian People’s Party again approached the Conservatives. In the spring of 1975, these three parties started exploring the possibility of a new nonsocialist co-operative effort. Simultaneously, there was clear conciliation between them. Prior to the 1977 election the Conservative Party, the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party were able to issue a declaration that they would co-operate if the election results gave them the basis to do so. The Liberals were left out in the cold. The coalition range between the three co-operating parties, however, was wider in 1974–77 (45 per cent disunity) than in 1963–65 (35 per cent disunity), the previous time a pre-election coalition was established. In 1949–57 and 1958– 61 (42–43 per cent disunity), when the collaboration efforts failed, the distances were slightly smaller than in 1976–77 when collaboration was successful. It is therefore somewhat surprising that an agreement was reached before the 1977 election concerning a declaration of collaboration. In the period 1977–81, too, we find relatively wide distances between the three parties. The coalition range between the non-socialists was approximately the same as in the preceding period. Again, before the 1981 election the three parties

FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM 35

reached an agreement to collaborate, although this time the uncertainties were considerable. The question of how a possible new non-socialist cabinet should be composed was left open. The reason given was disagreement between the three parties concerning the abortion issue. The Christian People’s Party wanted a more restrictive abortion law than the two other parties. The relatively wide gulfs appearing in the committee recommendations in the Storting show, however, that the three parties were in disagreement on far more issues than the abortion issue. After the 1981 non-socialist election victory the result was a compromise solution with a Storting coalition where the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party constituted part of the parliamentary foundation for an all-Conservative government. The unity was not great enough to warrant a government coalition. The Storting coalition evidently contributed to a new rapprochement between the Conservative Party, the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party. In 1982–83 the distances between these three parties had been reduced to a level comparable with those of 1964–65 and 1966–67, immediately before and some time after the formation of the Borten cabinet. This development must be said to have contributed to smoothing the path for the replacement of the Conservative cabinet by a new coalition government in 1983, after which the distances between the three governing parties narrowed. The development of the Liberal Party up to the 1985 election is interesting. Prior to this election the leaders of Labour and the Liberals, Gro Harlem Brundtland and Odd Einar Dørum respectively, were pictured in Liberal election advertisements as a newly wed couple. The Liberals’ proposition was the result of a clear warming to the Labour Party in the Storting. However, the Labour Party was not interested in collaborating with the Liberals and turned down their proposition. In the election the Liberal Party dropped out of the Storting altogether after 101 years of parliamentary activity. As already noted, the Willoch cabinet was forced to resign in the spring of 1986. From then on, the three one-time government partners became ever more estranged. In 1987–88 the distances between the Conservatives on the one hand and the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party on the other were wider than they had ever been since the war. Distances between the Christian People’s Party/Centre Party and Labour, however, seemed smaller than ever. The development seems to give a plausible explanation of why a renewed nonsocialist collaboration initiative did not succeed when attempted in the autumn of 1986 and in June 1987.22 Seen in relation to the wide distances between the Conservative Party, the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party in 1986– 87, the fact that any attempt to overthrow the government was tried at all seems all the more surprising. The development in party distances after June 1987 offers a good explanation of why the non-socialist three-party collaboration issue was no longer of any interest whatsoever. In 1987–88 the distances from the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party to Labour were narrower than the distances to the

36 FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM

Conservative Party. During this parliamentary session we also find the smallest post-war distances between the two centre parties and the Labour Party, and the widest post-war distances between the Conservatives and the centre parties. For the first time, the Labour Party, the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party constituted a bloc against the Conservative Party. In 1988–89 a degree of conciliation took place between the two centre parties and the Conservatives, while the distances to Labour widened. Compared with earlier experience, the distances were, however, far too wide to allow for any collaboration between the three parties before the election in the autumn of 1989. But, to the surprise of most people, the Conservatives, the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party agreed on a common statement just before the summer recess started. In the statement the three parties committed themselves only to negotiating the government issue after the election. Very few actually believed that the negotiations would lead to a new coalition government. When the success was secured and Jan P. Syse was able to form a government, it was, among other things, connected with the EC issue. One could say that while the EC question in 1971 led to the fall of the Borten government, it led in 1989 to the birth of the Syse cabinet. In a newspaper interview, the General Secretary of the Centre Party, John Dahle, expressed the view that Labour’s EC policy was one of the main reasons the Centre Party wanted a change of government.23 During the electoral campaign the Centre Party tried to start a debate on Norway’s and EFTA’s adaptation to the inner market of the EC. Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland did not want to divulge to the public the government’s strategy in the EFTA negotiations on EC adaptation. The Centre Party maintained that the Labour cabinet was leading the voters up the garden path, so that it could carry through an adaptation comprehensive enough to make the question of EC membership a mere formality in the end. When Gro Harlem Brundtland immediately after the election made public a series of memos on adaptation, it contributed to substantiating the criticism of the Centre Party, which saw the publication as confirmation of its suspicions of trickery. A number of manoeuvres by the Labour Party during the non-socialist government negotiations were seen as attempts at splitting up the non-socialist parties. However, this brought them even closer together. The parliamentary committee recommendations show that during the Syse government’s time in office the coalition partners managed to compromise and avoid conflict on most issues. Table 2.5 demonstrates that this was a temporary situation. After the dissolution of the Syse coalition, the non-socialist bloc in the Storting disintegrated. The Conservatives, the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party chose different paths. The non-socialist coalition range became greater than ever before (84 per cent disunity between the Conservatives and the Centre Party in 1990–96). Consequently, a broad coalition including the Conservatives was out of the question. When Prime Minister Jagland decided to

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resign after the election in 1997, the centre alternative had a chance even though its parliamentary base was very narrow. Only a quarter of the Storting seats were occupied by the three parties in the Bondevik coalition. Party Distances in the Finance Committee Until now, we have based our discussion on data from all Storting committees together. In other words, we have calculated total distances based on all issues, whatever their content and importance. In a theoretical and empirical study on coalitions in several countries, however, Budge and Herman maintain that the leftright differences constitute the determining factor in the formation of coalitions, unless the political system is being threatened.24 Lijphart, in a study on coalition formations in ten Western countries, has shown that the socioeconomic dimension predominated eight times more frequently than the religious dimension.25 In the Storting it is probably the Finance Committee which most reflects the contrasts inherent in the left-right differences. Therefore, we shall take a closer look at partial distances within the Finance Committee to find out whether they can explain the development in non-socialist collaboration efforts.26 While Table 2.5 shows the results from all Storting committees, Table 2.6 shows the results from the recommendations given by the Finance Committee. On examining the total party distances, we found that the non-socialist collaboration initiative before the 1977 election succeeded despite the fact that the coalition range was relatively wide (45 per cent disunity). In Table 2.6 we see that the coalition range within the Finance Committee was smaller (36 per cent disunity) than for all committees seen together. In 1974–77 the coalition range in the Finance Committee was at the same level as in 1963–65 (38 per cent disunity) when the foundation was laid for the successful pre-election collaboration efforts in 1965. In other words, it seems as if the proximity of the non-socialist parties to one another in the Finance Committee was decisive for successful collaboration prior to the 1977 election. The partial distances within the Finance Committee also appear to offer an explanation of the differences between 1977 and 1981. For all the committees considered as a whole, the coalition ranges in 1974–77 and 1977–81 were practically speaking identical (45–46 per cent disunity). In the Finance Committee, on the other hand, there is a distinct difference between the two periods. While the coalition range in the Finance Committee was 36 in 1974–77, it was as high as 48 in 1977–81. This may partly explain why the non-socialist pre-election collaboration statement in 1977 seemed more convincing than the one in 1981. As already mentioned, an attempt was made in June 1987 to establish a new non-socialist coalition cabinet. The fact that such an attempt was made at all may be due to a certain rapprochement in 1986–87 between the nonsocialist members of the Finance Committee. The coalition range in the Finance Committee (45 per

38 FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM

TABLE 2.6 SMALLEST DISTANCE BETWEEN LABOUR AND THE NON-SOCIALIST PARTIES, AND COALITION RANGE (WIDEST DISTANCE) BETWEEN THE NONSOCIALISTS (% DISUNITY): THE FINANCE COMMITTEE

cent disunity) was far lower than for all committees seen as a whole (60 per cent disunity). But the non-socialist members of the Finance Committee were further apart in 1986–87 than in 1965, when the Borten cabinet was formed. This may be part of the reason why the 1987 attack on the government failed. In the 1990s there was no significant difference between the coalition ranges for all committees and for the Finance Committee. In other words, the elements that somehow did not seem to correspond with our expectations in the discussion of total party distances fall into place when partial distances in the Finance Committee are considered. It appears that political distances within the Finance Committee are of the highest importance when coalitions are formed in Norway. There is, however, one piece that does not fit. The coalition formation in the autumn of 1989 came about in spite of great political disagreement between the three participating parties, even within the Finance Committee. In 1987–89 the coalition range between the non-socialist members of the Finance Committee (81 per cent disunity) was wider than it had ever been since the war. The formation of the Syse cabinet after the 1989 election thus clearly breaks with the pattern of earlier post-war years. The Syse coalition did not, however, last very long. The break with what could have been expected in relation to previous patterns was another important reason why most observers were doubtful whether Jan P.

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Syse would succeed in establishing a new coalition government. Even Prime Minister Syse himself admitted, the day after he succeeded, that he had been in doubt. An interview quotes Syse as saying: ‘I will also make a comparison with the laborious groundwork carried out for years before the formation of both the Lyng and the Willoch cabinets.—I was not sure whether the historical conditions were present, whether this could be achieved in such a short time, or whether it was in defiance of the political law of gravity.’27 The Centre Party was the party most hesitant to join a new non-socialist coalition government. The most important motivation for participating seems to have been a wish to influence the EC/EFTA negotiations concerning a European Economic Area. During the summer and autumn of 1990, however, it became clear that Norway’s demand to retain the discriminatory clauses in the legislation on industrial concessions would have to be abandoned. The Conservative Party was in favour, while the Centre Party strongly resisted. The government could not survive a conflict of this profundity, and Prime Minister Syse had to step down. When the non-socialist Centre Party recommended that a new government should be formed by the Labour Party, it caused great astonishment. The other alternative was a new non-socialist government formed by the Conservatives. However, considering the distance between the parties prior to the Sy se government, the attitude of the Centre Party was not so surprising. At this time the Centre Party tended to be in agreement with Labour more often than with the Conservative Party. The Centre Party would probably have more influence on policy-making by making parliamentary compromises with a minority Labour government than with a minority Conservative government. It is appropriate, against this background, to ask why a centre-left coalition was not seriously discussed in the 1990s. Party distances in committee recommendations give a clear answer. The coalition range in the Finance Committee for a potential coalition formed by Labour, the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party increased from 49 in 1990–91 to 82 in 1995–96 (that is, per cent disunity between Labour and the Centre Party). A viable centre-left coalition could not be based on party distances like that. A New Era? The recommendation made by the Centre Party in 1990 may be interpreted as the introduction of a new era in Norwegian politics. Developments in the 1990s confirmed the disintegration of the non-socialist bloc. It should be noted, however, that the Centre Party’s choice was the result of a development that started before 1990. A turning point came in 1986 when the Willoch government had to resign. Soon after, the former coalition partners started to move apart. The unsuccessful attempt to form a new coalition in June 1987 confirmed the problem. In retrospect, the formation of the Syse government appears to be the

40 FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM

FIGURE 2.2 VOTER SUPPORT, AVERAGE OF VARIOUS OPINION POLLS

exception that proves the rule with regard to party distance and coalition formation. At the turn of the century, Norwegian parliamentary politics has become unstable and less predictable. This fact applies to the voter level as well. The election results presented in Figure 2.1 and the monthly opinion polls presented in Figure 2.2 show that Norwegian voters have become much more volatile.28 Disintegration of party blocs seems to be an important part of the explanation of this development. RISING ACTIVITY IN THE STORTING Stability has been the most prominent feature of the formal structure of the Storting. Up until 1993, no major formal changes were made in the organization of parliament, only minor adjustments.29 The actual attention to specific matters, however, has changed character to a considerable degree. As we are about to see, the activity and conflict levels in parliament have increased considerably over the last few years. Organization The organization of the Norwegian Parliament is partly laid down in the constitution, partly in the parliamentary rules of procedure. The Storting is a combination of a one-chamber and a two-chamber system. When dealing with

FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM 41

legal issues, the Storting is divided into the Odelsting and the Lagting. All other issues are dealt with by the Storting in plenary session. The Storting convenes at the beginning of October. One-quarter (41) of the representatives are then elected to the Lagting. The remaining threequarters (124) constitute the Odelsting. The Storting as well as the Odelsting and the Lagting elects its own presidents and vice-presidents. The six presidents and vice-presidents form the Presidium of the Storting. The meetings in the Storting, Lagting and Odelsting are chaired by their presidents and vice-presidents alternately, changing each month. The standing committees represent an important element of the parliamentary organization. Immediately after the Storting has been constituted, an election committee is selected and given the formal mandate of deciding the composition of the standing committees. Chairmanship and membership of the committees are decided by negotiations between the political parties. In reality, each party decides which of its MPs are to fill the various posts. Each MP is a member of one—and only one—of 12 specialized committees. The responsibilities of the 12 standing committees largely correspond with the scope of the ministries, although the subdivision into committees does not entirely correspond with the subdivision into ministries.30 Since the introduction of parliamentarism in 1884 party groups have been central elements in the parliamentary organization. The seats in the plenary hall are grouped by constituency (county) and not by party’ as is the case in most other countries.31 Nevertheless, in most cases party membership determines the behaviour of MPs. Each party group has a parliamentary leader, a group committee and a group secretariat. The latter consists of group secretaries (political officers) and administrative personnel. The parties have regular group meetings each Wednesday afternoon as long as the Storting is in session. Parliamentary work is organized around the debating of issues and questions addressed to cabinet ministers. There are three types of issues: legal, budgetary and ordinary issues, and five types of questions to government ministers: interpellations, questions to be answered in writing, ordinary question time queries, oral question time queries, and questions asked at the end of a sitting. In most cases issues are handled on the basis of a parliamentary proposition (bill) or report (white paper) submitted by the government. Normally, the cabinet initiate the decision-making process. However, MPs may present private members’ bills or proposals, which will then be debated in parliament. Private members’ bills have been rare, but there has been a substantial increase in frequency since the 1980s. Usually, MPs present their proposals when committee recommendations on government propositions and reports are being debated. In other words, the active role of parliament is specially associated with the procedure of asking questions, whereas its reactive role to a greater extent dominates the process of decision-making.

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Decision-making All issues to be handled by parliament are first handed over to the relevant standing committee. The committee prepares a recommendation, which forms the basis of debates and voting in the Storting (or the Odelsting, on legal issues). We shall return to the procedural process in the committees at a later stage. Legal issues include all issues where decisions will be incorporated in a new act, or in alterations to existing acts. A cabinet bill is presented to the Odelsting (an Odelsting proposition). Legal issues are, as mentioned before, dealt with according to a special procedure. During the debate the Storting is divided into two chambers: the Odelsting and the Lagting. The committee recommendation is first discussed in the Odelsting. The resolution passed by the Odelsting is then handed over to the Lagting, where it is either approved or rejected. In most cases Odelsting resolutions are approved by the Lagting. The ones that are rejected are returned to the Odelsting with amendment proposals. Lagting amendment proposals are then debated in the Odelsting, which either dismisses the bill or returns it to the Lagting with or without alterations. Normally, the Lagting then approves the new resolution passed by the Odelsting, but if the Lagting is still in disagreement the issue must be handled by the Storting in plenary session. A bill debated by parliament in plenary session requires a two-thirds majority to be passed. Budgetary issues are also subject to a special procedure. During autumn sessions MPs spend most of their time dealing with next year’s budget. Proposition No. 1 concerning the Fiscal Budget, is submitted to the Storting within three days of the opening of the Storting at the beginning of October. At the same time, Report No. 1 concerning the National Budget is submitted to the Storting. The Working Procedures Committee recommends how the chapters of the budget should be grouped together in spending programmes, and how the chapters and spending programmes are to be distributed among the various standing committees. No later than 20 November, the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs presents a recommendation (budget recommendation S.I) concerning the National Budget and the Fiscal Budget, containing the proposed resolution on budget limits for appropriations in accordance with the spending programmes laid down by the Storting.32 The proposals concerning appropriations formulated in the recommendation itself or submitted by the Storting in connection with its associated consideration shall contain amounts for all spending programmes. The Storting may not vote separately on the separate parts of such a proposal. The Finance Committee submits at the same time a recommendation concerning taxes and duties and block grants to municipalities and counties. The Storting deals with these recommendations within a week following their submission. The Storting’s resolution on budget limits is binding for the subsequent consideration of the budget during the same year.

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Thereafter, the standing committees shall present recommendations concerning appropriations within the spending programmes allocated to them. Proposals concerning appropriations that are formulated in such a recommendation or are submitted in connection with its consideration by the Storting shall include all chapters and items within each separate spending programme, and may not exceed the limits set by the Storting. The Storting may not vote separately on the separate parts of such a proposal. The budget recommendations of the standing committees shall be considered by the Storting no later than 15 December. The budget resolutions made by the Storting following the consideration of these recommendations are final.33 The described procedure for the Fiscal Budget was first adopted as a trial arrangement for the parliamentary period 1997–2001. The decisions made by the Storting concerning spending programmes based on budget recommendation S.I from the Finance Committee are now binding for the standing committees. According to the old procedure, budget recommendation S.I and the budget debate in the Storting based on this recommendation provided only guidelines for the standing committees. The Storting did not make any binding decisions concerning spending programmes at this stage of the process. The new procedure was set up in order to enhance the budgetary ‘discipline’ of the standing committees and their members. As a consequence, the power and the role of the Finance Committee as a co-ordinating body in the Norwegian Parliament was strengthened. After the debate on Budget recommendation S.I the standing committees work on their respective parts of the budget. Each committee submits a budget recommendation concerning their segment of the total budget. According to the old procedure, the Storting made provisional decisions based on the recommendations from each of the standing committees. In the middle of December, the Finance Committee presented its final recommendations (budget recommendation S.II and S.III) to the Storting. Budget recommendation S.II contained statements on the National Budget, the Fiscal Budget and the National Insurance Budget; statements on and proposed changes, if any, in appropriations which were provisionally adopted; and proposals for decisions concerning appropriations which had not yet been made. Budget Recommendation S.III contained the final Fiscal Budget and National Insurance Budget proposals which were adopted by the Storting a few days before Christmas. Ordinary issues include all issues other than legal and budgetary ones, for instance, proposals for concrete resolutions presented by the government in the form of government propositions to the Storting, or more general debates on principles in various areas prepared by the government in reports to the Storting. Ordinary issues are discussed by the Storting in plenary session, also on the basis of recommendations from the relevant committees. Resolutions based on propositions to the Storting normally concern individual issues of limited extent. Neither these resolutions nor budgetary resolutions are defined as acts. Legal provisions, which are based on propositions presented to

44 FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM

TABLE 2.7 PRIVATE MEMBERS' BILLS AND PROPOSALS

the Odelsting, have a more general validity. In practice, however, whether parliamentary resolutions are carried in the form of acts or individual resolutions may be somewhat coincidental. MPs are entitled to put forward private members’ bills and proposals. For many years most MPs did not use this opportunity. Only a handful of proposals were tabled by MPs. During the 1980s and 1990s the number of private members’ bills and proposals has grown dramatically, cf. Table 2.7. Private bills and proposals are handled according to the same procedures as governmental reports and proposition. Normally, no, or only a few, concrete resolutions are made during the parliamentary debates on reports. Committee recommendations and debates, however, offer signals and guidelines for the government’s further work on specific issues. An issue which is first discussed in principle in a report will often subsequently be formulated in concrete terms in a proposition before either the Storting or the Odelsting. During the period 1945–89 a total of 24,506 committee recommendations were processed, of which 81 per cent (19,944) were discussed by the Storting in plenary session and 19 per cent (4,562) were debated first in the Odelsting and then in the Lagting. In other words, the Storting functions as a one-chamber system in four out of five instances and in one out of five as a two-chamber parliament.

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Questions The MPs may themselves make moves to put issues on the political agenda by addressing questions to one of the cabinet ministers or the Prime Minister. The various types of questions have different answering deadlines and offer varying opportunities for debating and introducing bills. Questions are asked when the Storting is in plenary session. Under the rules of procedure, interpellations must be answered as soon as possible, at the latest within one month after submission.34 When the interpellation is being answered, the interrogator and any other MPs, as well as the minister who has been called upon to answer, may speak. In connection with an interpellation, proposals may be brought in. Such proposals take the form of requests to the government to deal with certain issues. Normally, the proposals are submitted to the government before their factual aspects have been voted on. Question time is held every Wednesday. Ordinary question time was introduced in 1949 as an experiment and became permanent in 1950.35 Oral question time was established in 1996. During the oral question time, government ministers answer questions which are put to them orally by the MPs. The Prime Minister decides which members of the government will participate in oral question time each week. Each MP may ask one major question during an oral question time. After the first answer MPs may ask additional questions related to the major question. During ordinary question time, all government ministers answer questions submitted in writing by the MPs. Ordinary question time queries must be handed in by Friday at the latest and answered on the following Wednesday. Each MP with a question to ask is granted leave to speak in his or her turn, and the questions must be asked unaccompanied by supporting argument. When the question has been answered by the minister, the interrogating MP and the minister may both speak twice to offer short comments or supplementary questions. No other members may speak, and no motions may be put forward. Questions to be answered in writing were introduced in 1996. An MP who wishes to have a written answer from a government minister may submit the question via the Storting’s constitutional office. The minister should answer in writing within six working days after the question was sent from the Storting. The opportunity to ask questions during question time was limited to two questions per MP per week in 1989. In 1996, two questions to be answered in writing and in ordinary question time were set as a limit. Questions at the end of a sitting may be asked if special circumstances require immediate debate on a specific issue which cannot be raised in any other way. This type of query is used only in cases considered particularly important or critical. The significance of the issues is emphasized by the fact that the questions are often addressed by one of the parliamentary party leaders. One MP from each of the other parties is allowed to take part in the debate. No motions may be put forward in connection with questions asked at the end of a meeting.

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TABLE 2.8 QUESTIONS AND INTERPELLATIONS IN PARLIAMENT

The procedure of substantiated questions, something between interpellations and question time queries, was abolished in 1989. The average numbers of questions per year are presented in Table 2.8.36 The table includes interpellations, oral and ordinary question time queries. Questions to be answered in writing and questions at the end of a sitting are not included in the figures.37 The political importance of the questioning device is primarily based on its facility of placing issues on the political agenda. It may work as a corrective to other processes of decision-making in the Storting. The arrangements for asking questions can be seen as a parliamentary side arena, but at the same time they act as a safety valve for the procedures governing the Storting, the government and the ministries.38 As can be seen from Table 2.8, the number of questions asked in parliament increased from 2–300 questions per year in 1940s, 1950s and 1960s to approximately 750 questions per year in the 1980s. A culmination occurred in 1988–90 when MPs asked approximately 880 questions per year. During some years at the beginning of the 1990s the number of questions was less than 450. However, a new increase came with the introduction of oral question time. The highest number of questions, 931, was registered in 1997–98. This increased questioning activity may be a sign that the MPs’ need to draw attention to themselves is more important than the control function of the device of questioning. Rasch has shown that if the questioning activity is to be merely a parliamentary control function, the most rational thing would be to refrain from asking questions.39 The chances of getting favourable publicity are reduced if too many MPs table questions. However, political demonstration does not only

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benefit the individual MPs, it also puts the problem raised in the question on the political agenda. The Committees As already noted, almost all issues to be dealt with by the Storting are first submitted to the relevant standing committee. The committee appoints a spokesperson, who prepares the issue for the committee. When the committee discusses the budget, each committee member becomes a spokesperson for a number of budget areas. As a rule, committee members also function as spokespeople on other issues that relate to ‘their’ budget areas. However, when important issues are to be debated, more prominent committee members are appointed spokespeople. In such cases, there may be controversy as to who should be spokesperson. The spokesperson presents a proposal for committee recommendation. Either the committee may submit a unanimous recommendation, or there may be dissent, in which case the parties express their differing views in dissenting remarks. Recommendations on budgetary and ordinary issues will then be debated and voted on in plenary assembly, while recommendations on legal issues are first discussed in the Odelsting and then in the Lagting. When a committee debates an issue, its discussion is based either on a proposition or report presented by the government, or on proposals put forward by MPs. Normally, additional information is obtained from the ministry in question, either by written application or by oral accounts by the minister and officials from the ministry. The committees are also open to requests and information from professional and industrial bodies. In connection with debates on the budget the committees allow a number of organizations to present their views. All hearings and committee debates are carried out behind closed doors. A proposal to open committee hearings to the public, as in Sweden, for instance, was rejected by parliament in 1989. Formally, the committees represent the first stage in the parliamentary process of debating issues. However, according to Hernes, committee discussions generally represent the only phase where it is possible to influence the end result. This is where the issues are prepared thoroughly in detail, where new information can be obtained from outside parties, and where alterations or modifications can be proposed. In practice, it is therefore generally true to say that committee discussions in reality represent the last and decisive phase in the decision-making process of the Storting.40 In most cases it is possible to predict the outcome of parliamentary debates and voting on the basis of the standpoints taken by the parties in committee recommendations. We have also seen that dissenting remarks in committee recommendations can be a valuable gauge for measuring political distance between the parties.

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TABLE 2.9 COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISSENTING REMARKS IN RECOMMENDATIONS BY PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES (EXCLUDING BUDGET RECOMMENDATIONS)

Committee recommendations may indicate how the conflict level in the Storting has developed. To allow comparative studies over time we must distinguish between budgetary and other recommendations, since the Storting in 1968 simplified the budget debate procedure by reducing the number of recommendations from several hundred to approximately 20 per year. We shall return to budget recommendations later. At this point we shall look at recommendations submitted to the Storting and the Odelsting on non-budgetary issues. During the period 1945–96, the Storting debated more than 20,000 recommendations, not including budget recommendations. As can be seen from Table 2.9, significant changes developed during this period. The total number of recommendations or issues debated by the Storting reached its highest peak during the period 1973–77, when the committees submitted 2,046 recommendations. In 1989–93, the number of recommendations dropped to 1, 419. During the three years from 1993 to 1996, 976 recommendations were debated. Before 1973, dissension occurred in approximately 250 recommendations in each election period. In 1973–77 this figure rose to more than 600, after which it dropped to fewer than 400. In 1981–85 the number of recommendations with dissenting remarks rose to 585, while 542 recommendations with dissent were submitted during the period 1985–89. A new dramatic increase came in 1989–93 when dissent occurred in 843 recommendations.

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TABLE 2.10 DISSENTING REMARKS IN BUDGET RECOMMENDATIONS

To some extent, variations in conflict level can be explained by the fact that the Storting had to deal with an increasing number of issues. However, the Storting managed to keep up with the development in the number of cases, and dissent occurred in an increasing proportion of the cases. From 1945 to 1973 dissents occurred in 16 per cent of the recommendations. During the period 1973–77 the dissent frequency rose to 30 per cent, and then dropped to 21 per cent in 1977–81. In 1981–85 a new increase to 35 per cent occurred. The next steps were taken in 1989–93 and 1993–96 when there was dissent in 59 per cent and 66 per cent of the recommendations respectively. Table 2.9 also shows a definite increase in the number of dissenting remarks in the recommendations. 1973 represents a clear division, with an increase from 868 remarks during the period 1969–73 to 3,425 in 1973–77. The period 1989– 93 clearly boasts the highest number, with 11,791 dissenting remarks. Since the Storting has changed its budget procedures, there is no point in studying changes in the number of budget recommendations with and without dissent. Instead, we shall consider each budget as a whole. The total number of dissenting remarks in budget recommendations will therefore indicate the extent of budgetary dissension. The figures can be seen in Table 2.10. These figures show the same main trend as we have already seen. The number of dissenting remarks reached a temporary peak in the period 1954–57, but the most significant increase occurred from 1973 onward. Between 1969–73 and 1973–77 the number more than trebled. The rising tendency continued in 1980s, and in 1989–93 the number of dissenting remarks more than doubled compared to 1985–89. The increase continued after 1993 as well.

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ACTIVITY AND CONFLICT The surveys of the number of questions asked in parliament and of dissenting remarks in committee recommendations indicate a distinct increase in the activity level in the Storting. In addition, the number of dissenting remarks and the dissent frequency show that the conflict level, too, has risen sharply. The most significant dividing line is between the periods before and after the general election of 1973. As we have already seen, the most fundamental changes in the Norwegian party system were brought about by the 1973 election. The documentation presented in this chapter is first and foremost valid in a quantitative sense. Whether the conflict level has increased in a qualitative sense may be disputed. Whether dissension in parliamentary committee recommendations in fact reflects ‘actual’ or ‘real’ conflicts is also an open question. Dissension can be an expression of tactical party demonstrations aimed at the electorate. However, such demonstrations or manifestations of disagreement do represent a political reality. If we compare Norwegian politics of today with conditions immediately after World War I it becomes clear that political distances and conflicts have diminished in a qualitative sense. The Labour Party, for instance, has long since left behind its revolutionary socialist standpoint. On the other hand, the political conflicts of the last few years have been of a different and more fundamental character compared with the conflicts connected with the fall of ideologies in the late 1950s. Even though it is possible to make a fundamental distinction between qualitative and quantitative aspects of the conflict level in politics, the quantitative increase that we have registered may have an influence on how the conflicts are experienced in a qualitative sense. Frequent manifestations of conflict normally result in a feeling that the conflicts are profound. This is, however, an area which would benefit from a more thorough analysis. How, then, can we explain the rise in the activity and conflict levels in the Storting? Without claiming the list to be exhaustive, we can indicate at least three important circumstances. The activity and conflict levels in the Storting may (i) reflect a general increase in the conflict level in Norwegian society, (ii) be attributed to changes in the party system and the parliamentary situation, and/or (iii) be connected with the resource situation in the Storting. The Conflict Level in Norwegian Society The first edition of the standard work Det norske samfunn (‘Norwegian Society’)41 contained an article entitled ‘Norway in the World Community’ by Johan Galtung. In the article, which has become a classic in Norwegian social research, Galtung characterized Norway as ‘a highly static’, ‘a highly homogeneous’, and ‘an extremely anti-pluralist country’.42 In 1986 a new and fully revised edition of Det norske samfunn was published. In the preface, the editors wrote: ‘All

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chapters could have had subtitles containing the expression “social change”… The book has become an account of how human diversity generates motive powers for social change. Norway is not at all a homogeneous country.’43 The heterogeneity in Norwegian society can, for instance, be seen in the formation of an increasing number of groups and organizations fighting for their interests. The number of nationwide voluntary organizations rose from about 1, 000 in 1960 to around 2,200 in 1983.44 The organizations are in frequent contact with political authorities with the objective of influencing decisions.45 This increasing heterogeneity also represents a larger conflict potential in Norwegian society. We have no systematic information on the general conflict level in society, but we have some indicators showing that the conflict potential is manifested more often than before. A study contained in the Norwegian Power project on newspaper references to ad hoc campaigns in 1954 and 1974 shows that the number of such campaigns has increased. The Aftenposten newspaper reported 20 campaigns in 1954 and 108 in 1974. The increase is particularly evident in nationwide campaigns. The 1954 campaigns were dominated by regional or higher wages demands, while in 1974 the campaigns covered a wide range of topics. The study emphasizes the fact that proximity to routine politics through involvement in public decisionmaking groups, parties and organizations provides vital resources for participating in such campaigns.46 Industrial conflicts represent another indicator of the conflict level in society. These conflicts have been thoroughly documented statistically as strikes and lock-outs. Because of the close connection between economic policy and wages/ salary settlements, it seems reasonable to assume that there is a correlation between the conflict levels in industry and in the Storting. Indeed, industrial relations organizations operate in close connection with the political parties. In Figure 2.3 we have grouped information on the number of working days lost due to strikes and lockouts together with some of our data on the conflict level in the Storting.47 Industrial conflicts were widespread in the 1950s. During the fouryear period 1954–57 more than 1.2 million working days were lost. There was a subsequent decrease to well under 100,000 during the periods 1966–69 and 1970– 73, and then another increase to almost 500,000 in 1974–77. After a decrease during the following four-year period there was a renewed increase in 1982–85 and particularly in 1986–89, when more than 1.1 million working days were lost due to strikes and lock-outs. In the 1990s there was a decrease in the level of industrial conflict. In 1990–93 and 1994–97, the number of lost working days was approximately 540,000 and 700,000 respectively.48 The data show that until the middle of the 1960s there was no correlation between the conflict level in business and industry and that of the Storting. The higher degree of correlation evident around 1965 is due to a decrease in the number of industrial conflicts. The conflict level in the Storting, on the other hand, did not vary much. However, from 1965 onwards we can see that the industrial conflict level and that of the Storting are fairly parallel in variation.

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FIGURE 2.3 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL CONFLICTS AND PARLIAMENTARY CONFLICTS

The Storting seemed to have improved its ability to reflect trends in society as a whole. During the period 1985–89 the industrial conflict level rose more noticeably than the conflict level in the Storting. However, during this period developments in business and industry influenced political development in a far more dramatic way than during previous years. In April 1986 the Norwegian Employers’ Confederation declared a lockout for 100,000 employees. This was the most extensive since 1931. The lockout was also rather unusual since it was used as a ‘first-strike’ weapon by the employers. Normally, employers will not declare a lockout until after the trade unions have initiated a strike. The action drew little support from the public, and several members of the Norwegian Employers’ Confederation ignored it. As a result, the labour movement gained an advantageous position, which again influenced the relative strength of the political parties. Traditionally, the Labour Party is associated with the trade unions while the Conservative Party to a greater extent is identified with the employers. At this time, the non-socialist government had proposed financial cut-backs and expressed the view that wages settlements should have a moderate profile. When Prime Minister Kåre Willoch appealed for moderation in the tariff negotiations, the trade unions protested vehemently—as did the electorate. Support for the three parties in power at the time sank, while the Labour Party and the Socialist Left together increased their support to 50 per cent—almost four points more than in the general election in the autumn of the previous year. Labour was divided, but internal debates led to victory for the ‘hawks’. Labour therefore took the opportunity of launching a crusade against the government. Prime Minister Kåre Willoch demanded a vote of confidence, but to no avail. The government was defeated and had to step down.

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The change in the parliamentary situation which arose when the governing parties lost their majority in the Storting in the 1985 election had paved the way for a change of government. But when the change became a reality some months later, industrial conflicts represented one of the most important trigger mechanisms. In this perspective the parliamentary defeat of the government reflected the conflict situation in society. But the voters did not much appreciate the government crisis. Between April and June the opinion polls showed a decrease in support for Labour of almost four percentage points, while the Conservatives gained four points. Figure 2.3 shows that in the 1990s the frequency of dissent and dissenting remarks in parliamentary committee recommendations continued to grow despite of the fact that the number of working days lost in strikes and lockouts decreased.49 In other words, not only does the Norwegian Parliament reflect the level of conflict in the Norwegian society, in the 1990s the Storting overdoes it. The figure may indicate that the level of parliamentary conflict now exceeds the level of industrial conflict. We hasten to add that this interpretation should not be taken too literally. Nevertheless, the changing correlation between industrial conflicts and parliamentary conflicts is remarkable. The Party System and the Parliamentary Situation The Norwegian party system underwent several changes in connection with the general election of 1973. The number of parties represented at the Storting increased from five to eight. Two of the new parties, the Socialist Electoral Alliance (later called the Socialist Left Party) and Anders Lange’s Party (later called the Progress Party), were located on the left and right wings respectively. The more parties represented in parliament, and the more extreme their politics, the greater the risk of disagreement and conflicts. For this reason, one would expect the number of dissents in the parliamentary committees to increase during the period 1973–77. In order to control for the effect of the exit of old and entrance of new parties in parliament, we have calculated the number of faction remarks in the committee recommendations that occur due to disagreement between the ‘permanent’ parties of the Storting, that is, Labour, the Conservatives, the Centre Party, and the Christian People’s Party which have been represented in the Storting for the whole post-war period. The results are presented in Table 2.11. The table shows that the parties which have not been permanently represented in the Storting are responsible for a substantial portion of the dissenting remarks. However, the figures to the right show that in 1973–77 the number of remarks that occurred due to disagreement between the permanent parties grew by more than a thousand.50 In other words, we find a substantial increase in the number of dissents even though we have removed the direct effect of the entrance of new parties. In 1977, the Progress Party fell out of parliament and the number of Socialist Left MPs was reduced from 16 to two. Consequently, in 1977–81 the total

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TABLE 2.11 DISSENTING REMARKS

number of remarks was reduced. The number of dissents between Labour, Conservatives, Centre, and Christians increased, however, by almost a thousand. Disagreement between the permanent parties continued to grow in the 1980s and 1990s. The conflict potential in parliament will also depend on the parliamentary situation or the basis of the government. It seems fair to assume that the likelihood of disagreement and dissent will increase with the number of independent opposition parties represented in the Storting. When more parties join to form a coalition government, they are compelled to show a more united front in the Storting as well. The development in the number of dissents and dissenting remarks in parliamentary committee recommendations, however, shows that there is no unambiguous correlation in this respect. This hypothesis is supported by studies of the periods before and after 1965, when the Labour cabinet was replaced by a non-socialist four-party government. The dissent frequency and number of dissenting remarks decreased from 1961– 65 to 1965–69. Contrary to what might have been anticipated, a corresponding reduction during the periods before and after 1981 did not take place. It is true that the Labour government was succeeded by an all-Conservative cabinet in 1981, but the Conservatives had been given a pledge of support by the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party. In 1983, the two parties in the political centre joined the Conservatives to form a coalition government. Nevertheless, the dissension frequency and the number of dissenting remarks rose from 1977– 81 to 1981–85. Dissension frequency was also higher after the formation of the coalition government than before (33–42 per cent disagreement in recommendations excluding budgetary ones in 1983–85 and 30–31 per cent in 1981–83 respectively). Consequently, the parliamentary situation or the number

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of parties participating in the parliamentary basis of the government does not offer a complete explanation of the changes in the parliamentary level of conflict. The Resource Situation in the Storting As already mentioned, during the 1970s the Storting became better able to reflect the level of conflict in society as a whole. In the 1990s it seemed as if the level of conflict in the Norwegian Parliament exceeded the level of industrial conflicts. This development may be connected with available resources and working conditions in the Storting. Practical circumstances must be right for a conflict potential to be able to manifest itself. The fact that diverging opinions in an increasing number of cases have been expressed by the Storting over the last few years may be due to increasing political capacity in parliament. This is particularly important for opposition parties which cannot draw on administrative bodies to the same extent as the parties in power. Even though working conditions for MPs are probably worse in Norway than in the national assemblies of a number of other countries, important improvements have been introduced. Earlier, several MPs had to share offices. This obviously created problems, for example, when one of them had visitors or had to make telephone calls while the other had to plan political alternatives. Today all MPs have their own offices, which are well equipped with personal computers and other technical appliances. The personnel situation has improved considerably as well. Table 2.12 shows that the total number of people employed by the Storting and the party groups grew from 174 in 1971 to 458 in 1999. The number of MPs increased from 150 prior to the election in 1973 to 165 in 1989. The secretariat of each party group constitutes an important political support institution for the MPs. The secretariats consist of group secretaries and office staff. Table 2.12 shows the development in secretariat size. We can see that the expansion of group secretariats took place gradually, the increase in the number of employees being particularly substantial during the 1970s and 1990s. During the same period, political support organizations outside parliament were strengthened.51 The increase in staff in group secretariats and party organizations in itself contributes to improving capacity and thereby the possibility of defining a variety of political alternatives. It may also contribute to a higher conflict level, since the group and party secretaries do not participate in parliamentary committee meetings, which are important consensus-building arenas in the Storting. The parliamentary committees may promote consensus in a number of ways. Committee meetings are closed to the public, and the members try to find practical solutions and compromises that transcend party considerations.52 The spirit of consensus may even find its roots at the personal level. MPs work in close co-operation over long periods of time. If this work were continuously marked by serious conflicts, the situation could easily become intolerable.53

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TABLE 2.12 NUMBER OF MPs AND STAFF IN THE STORTING

Sources: The figures are based information given by the Storting, various editions of the internal telephone book of the Storting, and J.W.Grythe, ‘Utviklingen av sekretariatsfunksjoner i Stortinget’, unpublished paper (Oslo: Institutt for statsvitenskap, 1984). Cf. H.Rommetvedt, ‘Personellressurser, aktivitetsnivå og innflytelsesmuligheter i et Storting i vekst’.

Committee recruitment can also be consensus-forming, since the members from the start have certain common convictions. Representatives from coastal areas normally wish to sit on the fisheries committee, while people connected with industry normally prefer the committee for industrial matters. Representatives with legal backgrounds prefer the committee on justice, whereas teachers would like to sit on the committee for education, etc.54 Recruitment as well as the socializing process contribute to the formation of common frames of reference in the committees, making it easier to reach common interpretations and solutions. Party MPs are members of this ‘committee community’, from which group and party secretaries and advisers are excluded. The primary association of the secretaries and advisers is to the parties, which are normally more concerned with their distinctive character rather than with what they have in common with other parties. The expansion of the group secretariats represents a strengthening

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in numbers of what may be called the conflict-forming structure of the Storting. The increase in the number of MPs participating in the consensus-forming structure represented by the committees has been considerably more modest. In the late 1940s there were as many as 50 MPs per group secretary, but by the early 1980s this ratio had dropped to less than six. In 1999 this ratio was 3.2. Since the standing committees command a central position in the decisionmaking process it is fair to focus on the development in the institution of committee secretaries. Committee secretaries carry out a number of practical tasks for MPs, enabling the representatives to concentrate on the political aspects of case preparation and giving them more time to draw up alternative proposals. However, the committees have not always had permanent secretaries at their disposal. Table 2.12 shows the development in the number of committee secretaries. The number of committees with a permanent secretary who could assist committee members rose sharply from the early 1970s. Since 1976 all 12 standing committees have had a permanent secretary. Since 1987 and 1996 respectively, the Finance Committee and the Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs have had two secretaries each. CONCLUSION The surveys of questions and private members’ bills, as well as dissents and dissenting remarks in committee recommendations, show that during the last few years the Norwegian Parliament has become more active, and national politics more charged with conflict than before. These developments can be seen as an expression of the ongoing process of pluralization and rising level of conflict in Norwegian society. Norway has become less homogeneous and less stable than before. The Norwegian party system, too, has undergone considerable changes. The number of parties has increased, and the parties furthest to the left and right in the Storting have strengthened their positions. This has led to a weakening of the parliamentary basis of Norwegian governments, resulting in coalition and minority governments. Gregory M. Luebbert has built a typology of multi-party democracies on two variables; regime legitimacy and the role of the opposition.55 He distinguishes between regimes with widespread legitimacy and those without it; and between regimes in which the opposition plays the classic role of opposition and those in which this role is accompanied and tempered by efforts to participate in policymaking, or policy-making based on consensus-building. When the two variables are dichotomized, the result is four types of democracies: consensual democracies with widespread legitimacy and consensus-building; competitive democracies where the legitimacy of the regime is unchallenged, but which lack consensus-building; conflictual systems without legitimacy and without consensus-building; and lastly unconsolidated systems without legitimacy but with consensus-building in policy-making. According to

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FIGURE 2.4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM

Luebbert, the scholarly consensus is clearly that Norway (together with Sweden and Denmark) has the characteristics that define the consensual system. Our data from the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s can be seen as a verification of this fact. In the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, however, important changes occurred. The consensus-building mechanisms seem to be less successful, since party dissension in the Storting is far more widespread than before. Even though the regime in Norway has preserved its fundamental legitimacy, confidence in parties and politicians has weakened. If we supplement Luebbert’s typology with a fifth category, the changes in the Norwegian political system can be described as in Figure 2.4. In brief, one may say that the Norwegian parliamentary system has developed from a consensual majority parliamentarism to what we may call a dissensual minority parliamentarism. How, then, has this fact influenced the position of the Storting in Norwegian politics? As regards the influence of the Storting, the view of the Norwegian Parliament as a rubber-stamping institution has been widespread. When the parliamentary system was introduced in Norway in 1884 the slogan read ‘all power in this House’, a slogan no one believes in any more. However, the increased activity level in the Storting shows that parliament now much more than before performs other tasks than just rubber-stamping cabinet proposals. Coalition and minority governments cannot expect automatic support for their proposals in the national assembly, as a majority government by one party can count on, for instance Labour during the 1950s. The result of the decision-making process is not final until the Storting has had its say. Moreover,

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during earlier phases of the process MPs influence political decisions through widespread and increasingly active lobbying aimed at the ministries.56 The outcome of the decision-making process is not definite until the Storting has made its resolutions. However, the ability of the Storting to make decisions may be questioned. The general elections in the 1980s and 1990s have resulted in rather complicated parliamentary situations. As we have seen, for a long period the influence exerted by outside society on the parliamentary conflict level was rather inconsequential. As the Storting was given more resources in the 1970s, it gradually became more capable of reflecting variations in the conflict level in society as a whole. This may e interpreted as an expression of improved representativeness. However, Figure 2.3 seems to indicate that the parliamentary conflict level in the 1990s has surpassed the level of industrial conflicts. In other words, we may ask if the Storting, at the turn of the century, is overstating the level of conflict in the Norwegian society. During most of the post-war period there has been a distinct bloc formation in Norwegian politics. In the Storting, Labour has made up the Socialist bloc with occasional backing from the Socialist People’s Party and later the Socialist Left Party, whereas the Conservatives, the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party, intermittently supported by the Liberal Party, have constituted the nonsocialist group. Coalitions across this dividing line have never been considered. During the EC campaign at the beginning of the 1970s this bloc division was broken. The Socialist Left Party and the non-socialist parties in the political centre were opposed to EC membership, while Labour and the Conservatives were in favour. Shortly after the EC issue was decided, however, the parties found their way back to the usual bloc pattern, with the exception of the Liberal Party. In the latter half of the 1980s the non-socialist parties yet again split up. The Christian People’s Party and especially the Centre Party drew nearer to Labour, so that these three parties constituted a centre-left bloc in the Storting. Although major differences existed between the Conservatives and the two centre parties, the three parties succeeded in forming a new coalition government at the end of the 1980s, which, however, had to resign a year later owing to internal disagreement on the EC/EFTA negotiations. In the 1990s, the traditional Norwegian two-bloc system has disintegrated. The Conservatives on the one hand, and the Christian People’s Party, the Liberals and the Centre Party on the other, have chosen different directions and moved away from each other. Consequently, when the Labour government resigned in 1997, a minority coalition with a very narrow parliamentary basis was the only realistic solution. It can be argued that Norwegian politics has entered an era where the traditional division between Socialist and non-socialist parties has been replaced by varying party groupings transcending this dividing line.57

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NOTES This chapter is an updated and extended version of H.Rommetvedt, ‘Norway: From Consensual Majority Parliamentarism to Dissensual Minority Parliamentarism’, in E.Damgaard (ed.), Parliamentary Change in the Nordic Countries (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1992). I would like to thank Dag Anckar, Erik Damgaard, Arild Farsund, Gudmund Hernes, Oluf Langhelle, Anne L.K.McKenzie, Vibekke Mikkelsen, Kristine Nergaard, Bjørn Erik Rasch, Anders Sannerstedt, Mats Sjölin, Lars Svåsand, and John-Erik Ågotnes for useful comments and assistance. 1. J.A.Seip, Fra embetsmannsstat til ettpartistat og andre essays (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1963). 2. Parliamentary elections are held every four years. Norwegian governments cannot, contrary to practice in most other countries, dissolve the parliament and issue writs for a new election. The electoral system has frequently resulted in a non-proportional distribution of parliamentary seats, cf. Chapter 8, and H.Rommetvedt, ‘Politisk representasjon—fra nominasjon til iverksetting’, in B.E.Rasch and K.Midgaard (eds.), Representativt demokrati (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 1994). In 1949, for example, the Labour Party obtained only 45.7 per cent of the vote, but retained as much as 56.7 per cent of the seats. When the four non-socialist parties gained a majority in the Storting in 1965, they secured a total of 49.5 per cent of the vote and 53.3 per cent of the seats. In 1997, the Christian People’s Party got 13.7 per cent of votes and 25 seats in the Storting. The Conservatives were supported by 14. 3 per cent of the voters, but they got 23 seats only. 3. H.Valen, Valg og politikk (Oslo: NKS-Forlaget, 1981). Recent Norwegian parliamentary and local elections are analyzed in H.Valen and B.Aardal, Et valg i perspektiv (Oslo: Statistisk sentralbyrå, 1983); B.Aardal and H.Valen, Velgere, partier og politisk avstand (Oslo: Statistisk sentralbyrå, 1989); H.Valen, B.Aardal, and G.Vogt, Endring og kontinuitet (Oslo: Statistisk sentralbyrå, 1990); B.Aardal and H.Valen, Konflikt og opinion (Oslo: NKS-Forlaget 1995); B.Aardal, Velgere i 90-årene (Oslo: NKS-Forlaget, 1999); O.Listhaug, Citizens, Parties and Norwegian Electoral Politics 1957–1985 (Trondheim: Tapir, 1989); H. Rommetvedt, Lokalvalg eller riksgallup? Kommune- og fylkestingvalget 1987 (Oslo: Kommuneforlaget, 1988); and H.Rommetvedt, Vi protesterer! Stortingsvalget 1989 (Oslo: Kommuneforslaget, 1990); J.P.Gitlesen and H.Rommetvedt, Lokalvalg i møtet mellom riksog lokalpolitikk (Oslo: Kommuneforlaget 1994); and T.Bjørklund, Et lokalvalg i perspektiv (Oslo: Tano Aschehoug, 1999). 4. Cf. Chapter 3. 5. Cf. D.Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws ((New Haven, CT: Yale University Press). The index varies between 0 and 1. It is zero if all MPs belongs to one party, and 1 if all MPs represent different parties. The index values in Table 2.1 are calculated by Kaare Strøm (1945–85) and the author of this book (1989–97), cf. K.Strom, Minority Government and Majority Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.204. 6. Cf. Chapter 3.

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7. Cf. Chapter 3. 8. Cf. K. Strom, Minority Government and Majority Rule, and K. Strom, ‘Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 17 (1984). 9. Strøm, Minority Government and Majority Rule, p.189. 10. S.Rokkan, ‘Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Plurallsm’, in R.A.Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), pp.70–115. 11. R.E.Goodin, ‘Fighting Together, Falling Together. A Theory of Coalition Timing, with a Norwegian Illustration’, Paper presented to Public Choice Society Annual Meetings, New Orleans, 1978. 12. E.C.Browne and J.Dreijmanis (eds.), Government Coalitions in Western Democracies (New York, London: Longman, 1982); V.Bogdanor (ed.), Coalition Government in Western Europe (London, Heinemann, 1983); and G.Pridham (ed.), Coalition Behaviour in Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), offer surveys of such theories. 13. W.H.Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962). 14. In 1999, Labour leader Thorbjørn Jagland signalled that a coalition between centre parties and Labour could become a possibility. 15. Cf. for instance R.Axelrod, Conflict of Interest (Chicago: Markham, 1970), and A.de Swaan, Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1973). 16. S.Holmberg, Riksdagen representerer svenska folket (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1974), pp.46 ff. 17. M.A.Leiserson, Coalitions in Politics (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1966). 18. M.N.Pedersen, E.Damgaard and P.Nannestad Olsen, ‘Party Distances in the Danish Folketing 1945–1968’, Scandinavian Political Studies Yearbook, Vol.6 (1971), pp. 87–106. 19. G.Hernes, Interest, Influence and Cooperation: A Study of the Norwegian Parliament (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1971), pp.68–9. 20. Calculations are based on data from the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). The original data were collected by the author of this book. Later the data set was placed at the disposition of NSD, which is now responsible for updating the data. Cf. H.Rommetvedt, Borgerlig samarbeid (Stavanger: Universitetsforlaget, 1984); H.Rommetvedt, Partiavstand og partikoalisjoner (Stavanger: Rogalandsforskning, 1991); and H.Bjørnøy and Ø. Sivertstø1, Oppdatering av fraksjonsmerknader i stortingskomiteenes innstillinger. Notat No. 2 (Bergen: Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste, 1990). 21. O.Rovde, ‘Borgerlig samling’, in T.Bergh and Ø.Pharo (eds.), Vekst og velstand (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1977), pp.397–449; Rommetvedt, Borgerlig samarbeid: and F. Sejersted, Opposisjon og posisjon. Høyres historie bind 3. (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1984). 22. For details, cf. Rommetvedt, Partiavstand og partikoalisjoner, Chapters 8 and 9. 23. Cf. the newspaper Nationen, 6 Oct. 1989. 24. I.Budge and V.Herman, ‘Coalitions and Government Formation: An Empirically Relevant Theory’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol.8 (1978), pp.459–77.

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25. A.Lijphart, The Relative Salience of the Socio-Economic and Religious Issue Dimensions: Coalition Formation in Ten Western Democracies 1919–1979’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol.10 (1982), pp.201–11. 26. Intuitively, one could expect coalition formation to be explained by the party distances within the committees that are considered to be most important by each of the parties. One could hypothesize, for instance, that if the coalition range in the standing committee on church and education is large, then the Christian People’s Party will not participate in the coalition. Tests of this and similar hypotheses show, however, that there are no such correlations. In 1963–65, for example, the distances between the Christian People’s Party and the other nonsocialist parties were larger than ever before. Still, the party joined the Borten coalition in 1965. Cf. Rommetvedt, Borgerlig samarbeid’, and Rommetvedt, Partiavstand og particoalisjoner. 27. Cf. the newspaper Dagbladet, 5 Oct. 1989. 28. The graph in Figure 2.2 rests on the author’s own calculations based on monthly data (with the exception of July) from 3–4 different opinion pollsters from 1982 to 1997, and on calculations presented in the newspaper Stavanger Aftenblad on the basis of 5–6 different opinion pollsters from 1998 onwards. 29. A reform of the committee system was implemented in 1993, cf. Chapter 3. 30. The correspondance between committees and ministries has been weakened after the implementation of a committee reform in 1993, cf. Chapter 3. 31. Cf. Chapter 8. 32. In 1997 the chapters of the 1998 budget were distributed according to a total of 25 spending programmes. 33. A Royal Proposition concerning amendments to all the separate budgets of the individual ministries shall be submitted by 15 May during the fiscal year concerned, in connection with the submission of the Report to the Storting concerning the Revised National Budget. The Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs submits a recommendation concerning such amendments (Budget Recommendation S. II) no later than the second Friday of June. In connection with amendments to the Fiscal Budget during the fiscal year the Storting may only vote separately on the separate parts of such a proposal if no objection to this is made by the proposer. 34. Before 1989 there was no set time-limit for answering interpellations. Then it was decided that interpellations had to be answered in the course of the following session. 35. S.Kuhnle and L.G.Svåsand, ‘Spørreordningene og politiske profiler i Stortinget 1977–1981’, in O.Berg and A.Underdal (eds.), Fra valg til vedtak (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1984), p.125. 36. For the years 1945–81 the source is J.P.Olsen, Organized Democracy. Political Institutions in a Welfare State—The Case of Norway (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1983), p.46. For subsequent years the figures are based on information given by the Storting, the address given by the president of the Storting at the dissolution of the parliament, and from the register of parliamentary negotiations. Cf. H.Rommetvedt, ‘Personellressurser, aktivitetsnivå og innflytelsesmuligheter i et Storting i vekst’, Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift, Vol.11, No.4 (1995), pp.251– 76.

FROM MAJORITY TO MINORITY PARLIAMENTARISM 63

37. The number of questions answered in writing increased from 161 in 1996–97 to 297 in 1997–98, and 404 in 1998–99. Data on questions at the end of a sitting are not available. 38. L.C.Blichner and J.P.Olsen, Spørsmål i Stortinget (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1986). 39. B.E.Rasch, ‘Question Time in the Norwegian Storting’, in M.Wiberg (ed.), Parliamentary Control in the Nordic Countries (Helsinki: The Finnish Political Science Association, 1994). 40. Hernes, Interest, Influence and Cooperation: A Study of the Norwegian Parliament, pp.68–9. 41. N.R.Ramsøy (ed.), Det norske samfunn (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1968); English edition: N.R. Ramsøy (ed.), Norwegian Society (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1974). 42. J.Galtung: ‘Norway in the World Community’, in Ramsøy (ed.), Norwegian Society, pp.392ff. 43. L.Alldén, N.R.Ramsøy and M.Vaa (eds.), Det norske samfunn (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1986), p.5. 44. J.Moren et al., Norske organisasjoner (Oslo: Tanum, 1972), p.5; and NSD, Datakatalog (Bergen: Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste, 1986), p.149. 45. J.P.Olsen (ed.), Politisk organisering (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1978); M.Egeberg, Stat og organisasjoner (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1981); and K.Nergaard, ‘Stortinget og interessegruppene: forholdet mellom den korporative og den numeriske kanal til innflytelse’, Statsvetenskaplig Tidsskrift, Vol.90 (1987), pp. 273–85. 46. J.P.Olsen and H.Sætren, Aksjoner og demokrati (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), p.36 and p.236. 47. The Storting data have been subjected to periodization according to the parliamentary year, while the data on lost working days follow the calendar year. Consequently, the periodization of lost working days formally lags half a year behind the periodization in the Storting. However, since the wages negotiations mainly take place in spring, this discrepancy can be disregarded. By studying fouryear periods, incidental variations from one year to the next are avoided. 48. Source: Statistisk Sentralbyrå, ‘Historisk statistikk’, ‘Arbeidsmarkedsstatistikk’, ‘Statistisk ukehefte’, and ‘Statistisk årbok’ (Oslo: various editions). 49. Data on the number of dissenting remarks in 1993–97 are not yet available. 50. One may wonder whether some of the increase might be explained by individual MPs expressing views different from those of their fellow party members on the committees. However, the occurrence of such divergences has gradually decreased, cf. S.R. Hult, ‘lntern parlamentarisk opposisjon i Arbeiderpartiet og Høyre’, unpublished essay (Bergen: Universitetet i Bergen, 1987). 51. Sejersted, Opposisjon og posisjon; and O.J.Sæter (ed.), Kristelig Folkepartis historie 1933–1983. Samling om verdier (Oslo: Valo Forlag, 1985). 52. Hernes, Interest, Influence and Cooperation: A study of the Norwegian Parliament’, and Olsen, Organized Democracy. Political Institutions in a Welfare State—The Case of Norway. 53. Rommetvedt, Borgerlig samarbeid, cf. also W.Martinsen, Med finanskomiteen i arbeid (Oslo: Stortinget, 1988), p.31. 54. G.Hernes, Makt og styring (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1983).

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55. G.M.Luebbert, Comparative Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp.l0 f. 56. G.Hernes and K.Nergaard, Oss i mellom. Konstitusjonelle former og uformelle kontakter Storting—Regjering (Oslo: FAFO, 1989). 57. In the 1992 version of this article, the conlusion was formulated like this: ‘lt can thus be argued that Norwegian politics in the 1990s may enter an era when the traditional division between socialist and non-socialist parties will be replaced by varying party groupings transcending this dividing line’, cf. H.Rommetvedt, ‘Norway: From Consensual Majority Parliamentarism to Dissensual Minority Parliamentarism’, p.97. At the beginning of 2000 it seems fully appropriate to drop the hypothetical ‘may enter’ and ‘will be replaced by’, and to use the affirmative formulations ‘has entered’ and ‘has been replaced by’ instead.

CHAPTER 3 Parliamentary Committees: Performance, Structural Change and External Relations

The Norwegian Parliament, the Storting, has been characterized as one of the strong parliaments of Scandinavia.1 The Storting became a more significant institution during the 1970s,2 and its activity level has continued to increase during the 1980s and 1990s.3 However, parliaments are not unitary actors. The Storting has developed ‘a matrix-like organization with the party caucuses and the committees as building blocks’.4 Thus, with regard to the power of parliaments, ‘it does not make much sense to think in terms of the parliament confronting the government’.5 Parliamentary power should be related to the influence of the opposition and the role of committees. The importance of committees is underlined by Mezey: ‘Highly developed committee systems’ enable active legislatures ‘to divide the legislative labor in such a way that a degree of legislative expertise is generated in most policy areas. Such expertise is particularly important if legislators are to have an impact on policy formulation’.6 Mezey is supported by Mattson and Strøm: ‘Committees are critical to the deliberative powers of parliaments. …Strong committees, it appears, are at least a necessary condition for effective parliamentary influence in the policy-making process’.7 This study questions the assumption that strong committees are a necessary condition for parliamentary influence. With various theoretical perspectives as a point of departure, recent developments with regard to parliamentary committees in Norway will be analyzed. First, an overall assessment of the performance of standing committees and the influence of the Storting is given. Then a closer look is taken at the committee structure as described in the parliamentary Rules of Procedure, and an account given of the structural reform which was implemented in 1993. Subsequently, variations with respect to committee workload and the appointment of committee members are studied, and committee relations with other actors analysed, that is, ministries, party groups and lobbyists. Finally, some implications of the Norwegian findings are pointed out with regard to the role of parliamentary committees and parliamentary influence in general.

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THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES The development of committee systems in legislatures should be related to external as well as internal factors. Modernization has led to ‘an enlargement of the concerns of governments and a consequent need to expand capacity through differentiation’.8 Executives and legislatures have responded to the resulting structural complexity in varying degrees. In Western Europe and in the United States, ‘it became evident in the nineteenth century that enlarged agendas could not be got through unless the use of committees was extended’. The advantages of ‘devolving some of the heavy work load of a large organization onto committees, consisting of members of the organization’ are that ‘far more work can be got through in this way’, and that ‘one can make fuller use of specialized knowledge and encourage the development of it by providing avenues for its utilization’.9 Committees and Unanimity In his theory of democracy, Sartori is concerned with the importance of committees and unanimity.10 In general, he defines a committee as (1) a small, interacting, face-to-face group, (2) a durable and institutionalized group, and (3) a decision-making group confronted with a flow of decisions. According to Sartori, committee work is based on a principle, or mechanism, of ‘deferred reciprocal compensation’. Committee members engage in exchanges over time. Committees ‘hardly ever’ work on the basis of majority rule: ‘Most of the time decisions in committees are unanimous. …This is not because their members are of the same mind—they are not. Committees generally end up with unanimous agreement because each component of the group expects that what he concedes on one issue will be given back, or reciprocated, on some other issue'.11 Unanimity is enhanced by other mechanisms as well. As Shaw points out, committees in legislatures ‘provide a more informal and private setting for deliberation than is provided by the plenary chamber. Getting down to the details means not only more time and expertise, but also a “working” as opposed to a declamatory atmosphere—away very often from press and public’.12 The committee conditions not only exchanges and aggregation of pre-established preferences in ways described by exchange and rational choice theories. Committees may also provide an atmosphere for ‘open and uncoerced discussion of the issue at stake with the aim of arriving at an agreed judgement’, which is an important aspect of ‘deliberative democracy’.13 Under these circumstances, ‘the process of reaching a decision will also be a process whereby initial preferences are transformed to take account of the views of others’.14 In other words, committees may contribute to ‘ideal deliberation’ which ‘aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus—to find reasons that are persuasive to all who are committed to acting on the results of a free and reasoned assessment of alternatives by equals’.15

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In sum, we can note that decision-making based on unanimity can be attributed to committees, irrespective of which theoretical perspective we take as a starting point. Unanimity can be established through exchange and deferred reciprocal compensation, through compromises where parties meet somewhere halfway, and/or through deliberation and rationally motivated consensus. Accordingly, it is possible to endorse the following statement made by Sartori, without subscribing to his exchange perspective: from time to time even committees have showdowns, that is, have really to decide by a majority vote. However, if the recourse to the majority principle is not an exception but becomes the rule, this means that a committee no longer works. Hence, we may say that a committee ceases to be a committee. In any event, what matters is to understand why the majority principle represents the watershed between committees and noncommittees or, if you wish, between functioning and malfunctioning committees.16 As Sartori writes, the mechanism of deferred reciprocal compensation can also be described as ‘a mechanism of deferred internal payments, that is, of intragroup exchanges’. But committees are ‘inserted into a web of other committees: the committee system’. Co-ordination between committees ‘occurs via a second mechanism: side payments’: ‘side payments that occur among and across a set of committees are external payments, payments made to outer groups. …I thus define “side payment” as the concession(s) each committee has to make to other committees’.17 Sartori’s line of argument is based on the ‘unequal intensity of individual preferences’.18 This ‘intensity factor’ is reflected in the MPs’ wishes with respect to committee assignments. The committees of which MPs prefer to be members vary according to their occupational backgrounds, party affiliations, district interests, etc.19 These wishes are taken into consideration when party leaders make their decisions with respect to committee assignments. There is a clear tendency towards over-representation of farmers in the standing committees on agriculture, teachers on education committees, jurists on committees of justice, etc. Under these circumstances external payments or inter-committee exchanges are facilitated. What seems more questionable, however, is the degree to which these circumstances facilitate internal payments or intracommittee exchanges in the way Sartori presumes. Certain patterns of recruitment and the processes of socialization and deliberation may contribute to the development of committees with rather similar preferences among their members. Accordingly, we would expect unanimity to be an expression of intra-committee consensus, and not only a result of intracommittee exchanges or compromises. To a certain degree, at least, we would expect committee members to be ‘of the same mind’, even if Sartori says that ‘they are not’.20

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Triangles and Segments If we relate parliamentary committees to their extra-parliamentary context, it can be said that this line of reasoning is compatible with theories about iron triangles. According to ‘textbook triangle’ theory, ‘lnterest groups, congressional committees and subcommittees, and executive agencies are tied symbiotically together, controlling specific segments of public policy to the effective exclusion of other groups or government authorities’.21 A similar description was given by Norwegian researchers when they introduced the concept of ‘the segmented state’ in order to analyze power in Norway.22 Olsen contrasts specialized and segmented structures with anarchic or unsegmented structures on the one hand, and monolithic or hierarchical structures on the other. A segmented structure ‘with stable, nonhierarchical functional coalitions’ is the result of a ‘political-administrative division of labor’ which developed as a response to ‘problems of capacity, understanding and authority’.23 A political segment has been described as ‘a set of micro linkages ... characterized by related selection as regards participants, problems, and solutions’.24 Such segments may be found within particular economic areas such as agriculture, fisheries and industry, or around functions like health care, communications, education and defence. Participants may come from various institutions: One segment may include representatives of interest organizations, ministries, parliamentarians, representatives of research institutions, the mass media, etc. There will not necessarily be complete agreement within each segment, but the participants are assumed to share certain basic values and perceptions, such that their models of the world coincide more with one another than with those of representatives of other segments, or of those who are not part of any segment.25 Agriculture has been the most typical and frequently used example of a political segment in Norway. Traditionally, there has been a strong coalition between members of the parliamentary committee of agriculture, the Ministry of Agriculture and the farmers’ associations.26 A focal point in our discussion of parliamentary committees so far has been decision-making based on unanimity. Catchwords such as specialization and exchange, deliberation and segmentation, are used by different authors to describe the mechanisms which enhance unanimity in committees. Turning to committees in the Norwegian Storting, we can use unanimity versus dissent as an important element in the overall assessment of committee performance.

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PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES AND PARLIAMENTARY INFLUENCE IN NORWAY For several years most Norwegian politicians and observers (including this author) have agreed that the standing committees play an important, and very often decisive, role in the decision-making process in the Storting. Hernes, who interviewed Norwegian MPs in 1966 and 1969, explained why the committees are so important: they are, as a point of fact, the only stage at which issues can be scrutinized and worked over in detail; where new information can be brought to bear and where it can have an effect; where alternatives can be considered and their consequences evaluated; where outside groups can be heard and their opinions examined; and where changes in a bill or modifications in proposed appropriations can be made. … So—to exaggerate the point— one could say that not only is the committee the first stage in decisionmaking in the Parliament: for most practical purposes it is also the last.27 This picture was confirmed several years later by one of the most experienced Norwegian parliamentarians. Guttorm Hansen, Labour MP from 1961 to 1985 and President of the Norwegian Parliament from 1973 to 1981, provided the following assessment: There is no doubt about the fact that committees have become more important, as the number of issues has grown’.28 So far, so good. However, it is quite possible that the time has come for a reassessment of Norwegian parliamentary committees. Georg Apenes, Conservative MP from 1977, gave a rather pessimistic evaluation of the Storting when he retired in 1989: it is my impression…that the committee fractions’ right to act freely and independently from detailed instruction, is reduced. …Committee work is affected by the parties’ significant and increasing influence. Less and less latitude is given to the MPs; more and more has to be cleared with and coordinated by party group leaders. …Committee meetings are in the process of changing character: the long-lasting and intense discussions with a breakthrough and clarification during the meeting occur less frequently.29 Apenes, who had a reputation as a ‘freethinker’ within the Conservative Party group, was a bit frustrated when he left the Storting. It is quite possible that he expressed himself with some exaggeration. There is, however, no doubt that ‘breakthrough and clarification’ during committee meetings occurs less and less frequently. This is clearly demonstrated in Table 3.1. The table shows a dramatic change in the proportion of recommendations with dissent. From 1945 to 1973, dissents occurred in 16 per cent of the recommendations. During the 1989–93

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TABLE 3.1 COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISSENT (EXCLUDING BUDGET RECOMMENDATIONS)

and 1993–96 periods, there were dissents in 59 and 66 per cent of the recommendations respectively.30 Bearing in mind the above reference to Sartori, we may say that if we regard a recommendation with dissent as equivalent to a decision made according to the majority principle, and if dissent in committee recommendations ‘becomes the rule’, this means that the committee ‘no longer works’. In other words, unanimity or dissent in recommendations may represent ‘the watershed between committees and non-committees’, or, if we wish, ‘between functioning and malfunctioning committees’. Even if we are reluctant to accept these rather categorical formulations and prefer to regard the functioning and malfunctioning of committees as a matter of degree, we have to admit that a reduction from 84 to 34 per cent unanimity is quite dramatic. So, with respect to Sartori’s criteria, the figures clearly indicate a poorer functioning of Norwegian parliamentary committees. Earlier in this study we saw that the influence of parliament may be related to the influence of the opposition, which in its turn depends on the properties and performance of parliamentary committees. Hence, the poorer functioning of the committees in the Storting should direct us towards the conclusion that the influence of the Norwegian Parliament is declining. However, this is not the case. Due to general measuring difficulties and lack of systematic data concerning the influence of the Storting, we have to make our judgements on the basis of rather indicative data. It seems quite clear, however, that recent Norwegian governments have to accept more frequent changes in bills and proposals than most of their predecessors. This impression was confirmed by Professor Gudmund Hernes, former leader of the Norwegian Power Study and a member of the Brundtland government.31 Moreover, his opponent Carl I. Hagen, leader of

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TABLE 3.2 GOVERNMENTAL DEFEATS IN PARLIAMENTARY VOTING

Notes: a The Storting is active nine months per year (October—June). b October 1979—February 1981 c October 1997—June 1998.

the right-wing Progress Party, has stated that ‘at any time the Government does what the Storting wants, irrespective of whether the Labour Party joins the majority or not’.32 In 1996 the parliamentary leader of the Christian People’s Party, Kjell Magne Bondevik, said that Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland ‘was governing, to a high degree, on the premises of the Storting’, and that she accepted ‘defeat in parliamentary voting on important issues’.33 Even though we cannot assess the importance of the questions voted on, we can document an increase in the number of governmental defeats. The number of votes lost by the party(ies) in government is shown in Table 3.2.34 It should be noted that, with the exception of Willoch II from June 1983 to September 1985, all the listed cabinets are minority governments.35 The most striking feature of this table is the high frequency of defeat during the Jagland government. In light of the other government periods, we have to conclude that the situation in 1996–97 was exceptional. Prime Minister Thorbjørn Jagland was aware of the problems, but he did not ask for a vote of confidence in the Storting. However, before the general election in September 1997, he declared that he would resign if the Labour Party did not get more votes than in the previous election in 1993, i.e. 36.9 per cent. The resulting 35.0 per cent Labour votes paved the way for Kjell Magne Bondevik’s centre coalition. Table 3.2 shows a distinction between the Nordli and Brundtland I governments on the one hand, and subsequent governments on the other. We find the lowest numbers of defeats per month during the two governments in 1979– 81. This level of defeat is likely to be representative for earlier post-war

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governments as well. There is no linear development after 1981, but the subsequent variations in the number of defeats per month are situated on a higher level. It should be noted that the total number of defeats during the Bondevik government is not comparable with earlier figures. Due to a reform in the parliamentary budget procedures, the number of budget votes in the Storting has decreased. In order to compare the Bondevik government with earlier governments, we have to exclude votes on the budget. As we can see from the column to the right, during Bondevik’s first eight months in office the government parties lost 6.1 votes per month, compared to 5.3 votes per month during the Brundtland II and III governments (budget votes excluded). Clearly, the table indicates an increased influence of the opposition in the Norwegian Parliament since the beginning of the 1980s. However, this is only part of the story. The additional influence of the Storting, which is related to the fact that governments have to accept compromises with other parties and adjust their policies in accordance with anticipated reactions in parliament, is probably higher than the influence indicated by the figures in Table 3.2. In the light of the developments we have described in this section, we have to conclude that the assumed positive correlation between committee performance (that is, unanimity) and parliamentary influence is indeed questionable. What we have experienced in the present Norwegian case is an increasing level of parliamentary influence coinciding with a poorer functioning of parliamentary committees. In order to try to explain this coincidence, we will take a closer look at the parliamentary committees in the Storting. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND COMMITTEE REFORM According to § 10 of the Rules of Procedure of the Norwegian Parliament, every MP36 shall be assigned to one—and only one—of the following 12 standing committees: Energy and the Environment; Family, Cultural Affairs, and Government Administration; Finance and Economic Affairs; Defence; Justice; Education, Research, and Church Affairs; Local Government; Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs; Business and Industry; Transport and Communication; Health and Social Affairs; and Foreign Affairs. Using Shaw’s terminology, we can say that the purposes of the standing committees are mainly ‘legislative’ and ‘financial’.37 The Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs, is, however, mainly concerned with ‘administrative oversight’. The ‘investigative purpose’ is performed by all committees in connection with their other purposes.38 As a general rule, budget proposals, bills, reports and other matters are first submitted to the relevant standing committee for consideration. After consideration and deliberation, the committee may submit a unanimous recommendation or there may be dissent, in which case the parties express their differing views in dissenting remarks. Floor debate and voting is based on

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recommendations from the majority of the committee, and dissenting remarks and alternative proposals from committee minorities. The responsibilities of the committees are regulated by § 12 of the Rules of Procedure. The present division of labour was the result of a reform of the committee structure which was adopted by the Storting in May 1992. The reform, which was implemented after the general election in September 1993, introduced major changes in the committee structure for the first time since 1949. The 1993 reform represented a break with former principal rules governing the division of labour between committees. According to the former rules, policy areas of parliamentary committees should correspond to the jurisdictions of government ministries. Policy areas to be dealt with by each standing committee were specified with reference to the corresponding ministry. Some modification of this principle was necessary due to the fact that the number of ministries exceeded the number of committees; and due to variations in the number of ministries and the division of labour between them. In the new principal rule governing the division of labour between the standing committees, all references to ministries are omitted. Matters to be dealt with by each committee are specified with reference to policy areas and specific issues only.39 Implementation of the reform led to the following major changes in the committee structure: (1) The new Standing Committee on Energy and the Environment is now responsible for matters which were dealt with by the former Energy and Industry Committee and the former Local Government and Environment Committee. (2) The new Standing Committee on Family, Cultural Affairs and Government Administration took over matters from the former Government Administration and Consumer Affairs Committee, and some issues from the former Church and Education Committee, the former Social Affairs Committee, and the former Local Government and Environment Committee. (3) The responsibilities of the former Agriculture Committee and the former Shipping and Fisheries Committee were transferred to the new Standing Committee on Business and Industry, which also deals with industrial matters from the former Energy and Industry Committee. (4) The Committee on Scrutiny which existed before 1993 was not defined as one of the ordinary 12 standing committees. The members of this committee were elected from the members of the ordinary standing committees. The new Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs, however, is defined as an ordinary standing committee with members who are not allowed to be members of other standing committees. Constitutional affairs were transferred to the new committee from the former Foreign and Constitutional Affairs Committee.

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Main Arguments The committee reform was based on recommendations from an ad hoc committee appointed by the Presidium of the Storting to consider possible changes in rules of procedure. According to the mandate, recent changes in the division of labour between government ministries were to be the point of departure for the ad hoc committee. The Committee on Rules of Procedure was instructed to consider possible changes in committee structure in order to equalize the workload of the standing committees.40 The recommendations from the Committee on Rules of Procedure and the Presidium contained numerous dissenting remarks and alternative proposals from various minorities. Putting details aside, we can say that the main arguments were related to the following elements:41 (1) Equalization of workload between committees. (2) Parliamentary ‘emancipation’ from the structure of government ministries. (3) Desegmentation and co-ordination of policy areas. (4) Symbolic effects with respect to policy priorities. As we have already mentioned, equalization of workload was a central element in the mandate of the Committee on Rules of Procedure. The old structure and division of labour led to substantial variations in the burdens which were laid on each committee’s shoulders. An equalized workload would be fairer to committee members, and it would enhance the total capacity of the parliament. In recent decades Norway has experienced rather frequent changes of government.42 Structural changes in government and changes in the division of labour between ministries have also occurred quite often. Consequently, the Storting had to rewrite the Rules of Procedure concerning the division of labour between standing committees. By formulating a principal rule governing the division of labour between committees without any reference to ministries, the Storting could avoid this practical problem. The break from the principle of correspondence between committees and ministries allowed the Storting to give priority to its own needs. Hence, parliamentary ‘emancipation’ became a solution to the problem of equalization of committee workload. According to the Committee on Rules of Procedure, the main argument for correspondence between standing committees and ministries was of a practical nature. However, the Committee hesitated on principle to accept that the division of labour between parliamentary committees should follow directly from the structure of ministries which was adopted by the government. The Committee saw no decisive argument against two or more parliamentary committees dealing with issues from one ministry. It was argued that most emphasis should be given to the needs and requirements of the Storting itself. This principal line of argument was adopted unanimously by the members of the Committee, even though they disagreed on the division of labour and number of standing committees to be recommended.43

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According to March and Olsen, the ‘loss of national purpose and central direction’ is an important element in the criticism of politics in many countries: The political system is pictured as having surrendered to major organized interest groups ... while neglecting the national interests and the interests of less well-organized groups’.44 Norway was one of the illustrative examples given by March and Olsen.45 Their description should be linked to the fact that Olsen was one of the leaders of the Norwegian Power Study which was carried out in the 1970s and early 1980s. He was one of the originators of the thesis of a segmented state.46 At the end of the study, Olsen stated that The main tendency in Norway is toward specialization and segmentation’.47 The Power Study contributed to the widespread opinion that specialized interests dominate Norwegian politics. The 1993 reform of the committee structure in the Storting may be seen, to a certain degree at least, as a response to this type of criticism. In this connection, the most striking reform element was the abolition of the former Standing Committee on Agriculture, one of the cornerstones of the segment or iron triangle of agriculture. Arguments with respect to desegmentation and coordination were put forward in the plenary debate by, inter alia, the President of the Storting, Jo Benkow (Conservative). He stated that the establishment of a Standing Committee on Business and Industry would enhance the possibility of seeing different kinds of business and industrial interests in connection with each other: A pressure group society has developed, where different industries have tried to gain support from corresponding groups and specialized committees [in parliament]. For far too long, we have experienced a tendency towards conflicting recommendations from different standing committees. Committees are forced into the role of advocate of special interests of industrial and other sectors of society. The new committee on business and industry represents a big step in the direction of a comprehensive industrial policy where the intimate interplay between primary, secondary, and tertiary industries can get a reasonable political expression in the Storting.48 Dag Jostein Fjærvoll (Christian People’s Party) admitted that ‘a great many organizations outside this house perceive some of the committees as their own spokesmen in Parliament’. He was, however, reluctant to accept the new Committee on Business and Industry. The reason for this was the symbolic effects of the new committee structure, or the ‘political signals’ he found to be expressed by the new structure. He said that ‘the primary industries can easily become invisible within the large area of issues’ to be dealt with by the new business and industry committee.49 Fjærvoll was supported by Gudmund Restad (Centre (Agrarian) Party) who stated that his party tried to ‘avoid the weakening

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of primary industries’ which would be the consequence of the majority proposal.50 Similar arguments were also put forward with respect to environmental policy. Tora Aasland Houg (Socialist Left Party) feared that ‘environmentalist concerns would easily get run over by clearly stronger oil interests’ in the proposed Committee on Energy and the Environment.51 CHANGING COMMITTEE RELATIONS Summing up the 1993 reform, we can say that the main intentions were to even out committee workload, to reduce the influence of specialized interests, and to improve co-ordination by establishing a new committee structure. The new division of labour between committees was to be ‘liberated’ from the structure of government ministries and to be based on the Storting’s own needs. A comprehensive analysis of intentions and realities is, of course, not possible within the limited framework of this study. This section concentrates on aspects of change in committee relations with relevance, directly or indirectly, to the reform and its intentions. The following aspects will be discussed: (1) committee workload, (2) re-election of committee members, (3) committee-ministry relations, (4) committees and party groups, and (5) committee members and lobbyists. As we shall see, several of the changes are related to the degree of segmentation in Norwegian politics. Committee Workload The first question we shall address is this: Did the Storting succeed in its efforts to even out committee workload? The calculations in Table 3.3 give some indications.52 Clearly, there are substantial variations in the number of budget chapters and other issues dealt with by each committee (cf. rows c, d, i and j). In 1994–95 variations in workload, as indicated by these figures, were still substantial. However, the calculations (in rows e and f) show a reduction in variation and standard deviation. Thus, Table 3.3 clearly indicates a development in the intended direction. With regard to other issues, the figures may indicate some casual fluctuations. The main tendency is confirmed, however. The standard deviation was reduced from the two years before the committee reform to the two years after (row 1), thus indicating an equalization of committee workload. It should be emphasized that the figures in Table 3.3 are indeed crude indicators of committee workload. In particular, the figures do not show the real burdens of the Finance Committee. The Finance Committee acts as a coordinating body in the budget process. In addition to budget chapters mentioned above, the Finance Committee is also responsible for preparing a provisional recommendation concerning the National Budget, the Fiscal Budget and the National Insurance Budget. This recommendation contains guidelines for the

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TABLE 3.3 BUDGET CHAPTERS AND OTHER ISSUES PER COMMITTEE

budget process in the other committees. It should also be added that the Committee on Scrutiny is excluded from budget calculations, due to the fact that this committee has very limited responsibilities with regard to budgets. Bearing these exclusions in mind it is, however, justifiable to say that the figures are comparable and are fairly good indicators of the direction of change. A certain degree of equalization of committee workload is documented, and we would expect this development to enhance the capacity of the Storting. Re-election of Committee Members The existence of standing committees with fixed areas of work, is, of course, a prerequisite for specialization in parliament. Specialization is enhanced by recruitment of committee members with pre-established specialized knowledge about the committees’ area of jurisdiction. MPs who lack specialized knowledge can develop such knowledge through long-term service on a specific committee. The potential for specialization through long-lasting committee experience is indicated in Table 3.4. The figures in the table are based on the number of MPs who, after the general election in question, were assigned to the same committee as they were after the previous election.53 It should be noted that, due to the changes in committee structure and jurisdictions, the 1993 figures are not directly comparable with the figures for earlier years. Of course, no 1993 calculations can be given for the

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TABLE 3.4 RE-ELECTED MEMBERS OF STANDING COMMITTEES (%)

four new standing committees on Business and Industry; Energy and the Environment; Family, Culture and Government Administration; and Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs. The 1993 figures given in Table 3.4 are related to committees with relatively small changes in jurisdictions after the reform. The increased level of turnover among committee members is the main tendency revealed by our data. The total figures in the bottom row of Table 3.4 show that in 1977 one-third of the MPs were assigned to the same committee as in 1973. In 1989 the proportion of re-elected members (since 1985) was reduced to 13.9 per cent. In 1997 there was a slight increase in the proportion of re-elected committee members. 18.8 per cent of the MPs were assigned to the same committee as in 1993. However, the conclusion seems to be that the potential for the MPs to develop common preferences and to acquire specialized knowledge through long-term service on a specific committee has been reduced. Committee-Ministry Relations Undoubtedly, relations with government ministries are the most important external relations of parliamentary committees. Some of the changes in committee-ministry relations are shown in Table 3.5. Calculations are based on information about the budget process in documents from the Storting. The fiscal budget proposal from the government is divided into several budget chapters, and each ministry is responsible for a set of budget chapters related to the

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TABLE 3.5 BUDGET CONNECTIONS BETWEEN COMMITTEES AND MINISTRIES

ministry’s policy area. The proposal is taken into detailed consideration by the standing committees in the Storting. Each committee is responsible for budget chapters relevant to the committee’s policy area. A ‘budget connection’ is established when a specific committee is dealing with a budget chapter under the jurisdiction of a specific ministry. The total number of such connections between pairs of committees and ministries is given in row c. The table shows that the number of budget connections increased from 26 in 1980–81 to 39 in 1994–95 (row c). The average number of committees dealing with each ministry’s budget chapters increased from 1.73 in 1980–81 to 2.60 in 1994–95 (row d). From the opposite point of view, we can say that, on average, each committee dealt with budget chapters from 2.17 ministries in 1980–81 and 3.25 ministries in 1994–95 (row g). When variations in the number of ministries (row b) are taken into consideration, we get the ‘adjusted’ figures in rows f and i. They show the same tendency as we have already described. The increased number of budget connections, committees dealing with each ministry’s budget chapters and ministries preparing budget proposals for each committee clearly indicates that the degree of correspondence between committees and ministries has been reduced. In this respect, it is quite clear that the Storting has succeeded in ‘emancipating’ itself from the structure of government ministries. It is, however, interesting to note that this process of ‘emancipation’ started before the 1993 reform. The changes which occurred before the implementation of the reform (from 1980–81 to 1992–93) were greater than the changes after the reform (from 1992–93 to 1993–95). Hence, the effect of the reform was to strengthen an ongoing process, not to trigger the process or to change its direction. One reason to concentrate on budget proposals is the fact that we can consider the total fiscal budget of the state as one unit, or a ‘constant variable’. The number and character of other issues may change from time to time. Hence,

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FIGURE 3.1 PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES DEALING WITH PROPOSITIONS AND REPORTS FROM EACH OF THE MINISTRIES, 1994–95

changes in committee-ministry relations in connection with non-budgetary issues may be due to external circumstances. It is interesting, however, to see how the total picture looks. Such a picture (for 1994–95) is shown in Figure 3.1. Each line in the figure indicates that the committee in question dealt with at least one budget chapter, or one proposition or report concerning other issues, from the opposite ministry. The main and most frequently activated connections between committees and ministries are indicated by thick lines. Indeed, committee-ministry relations add up to a complicated web! Correspondence between Norwegian parliamentary committees and ministerial departments has been characterized as ‘total’.54 Our data and Figure 3.1 clearly demonstrate that this is no longer the case. It should be emphasized that most of

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the committees still have their main connections with specific ministries. Nevertheless, there are lots of connections with other ministries. With regard to the thesis of a segmented state, the changing committee-ministry relations clearly indicate a development toward desegmentation. The impression given is not in compliance with the thesis regarding the segmented state. Committees and Party Groups The performance of parliamentary committees should be viewed in light of the fact that members act as party representatives. As noted by Damgaard, the relative significance of parliamentary parties and permanent committees differs a great deal across legislative systems: ‘On balance, parliamentary parties seem to be the most important components of parliaments in Western Europe, given the overall constitutional arrangement of executive—legislative relations, the level and quality of staff support, the informational and technical equipment, etc.’55 Damgaard’s overall assessment of party importance in Western Europe is applicable to Norway as well. The most interesting question in this connection, however, is not the relative importance of parties and committees across legislative systems. We are concerned with the changes which occur within a specific system. As we have already seen, the level of conflict or dissent in the Storting has increased. Thus, we have registered a dramatic reduction of unanimity in committee recommendations (cf. Table 3.1). The increase in the proportion of recommendations with dissent indicates a poorer functioning of committees qua committees. Dissent in committee recommendations is, however, compatible with the functioning of parliamentary parties. Dissenting remarks and alternative proposals in committee recommendations may reflect increased party competition.56 They can demonstrate differences in party profiles to the voters. In other words, the increased level of dissent in committee recommendations may indicate that the relative significance of parties and committees is changed to the advantage of the parties. The relative importance of committees and party groups depends, among other things, on their resources. Thus, changes in staff support may contribute to the explanation of changes in the relative significance of the two ‘organizational structures’. Changes in committee and party group staff in the Storting (office staff not included) are shown in Table 3.6. Each of the 12 standing committees acquired their own secretary on a permanent basis during the 1970s.57 At present, the two committees on Finance and Scrutiny have two secretaries. In other words, the resources of Norwegian parliamentary committees have increased, even if they are still scarce compared to international standards. However, the parliamentary parties’ resources have grown substantially more than committee resources. The increased party group/ committee staff ratio of 1.67 and 3.64 in 1971 and 1999, respectively, is probably one of the factors which can explain the increased relative importance of parties as compared with committees.

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TABLE 3.6 COMMITTEE AND PARTY GROUP STAFF

It seems natural to consider the rising level of dissent in committee recommendations in connection with the fact that party group secretaries and political advisers do not participate in committee deliberations. Party secretaries are not included in the consensus-making structure which is constituted by the committees in parliament.58 Using Sartori’s wording, we may say that party secretaries are excluded from the process of exchange in committees. Committee Members and Lobbyists Parliament is a crucial link in the chain of governance.59 There are, however, alternative channels of political influence. In his analysis of ‘numerical democracy and corporate pluralism’ in Norway, Rokkan found the corporative functional channel to be more important than the territorial election channel.60 In his study of organized interest groups in Norway, Kvavik found that ‘leaders of all the interest organizations reflected their preference for the corporate channel’.61 The interviewees felt that little could be done on a parliamentary level. ‘Legislation was best influenced at an early stage of its formulation’.62 In the 1970s, relations between interest organizations and political institutions were analysed in the Norwegian Power Study. Hernes, who was one of the leaders of the study, supported Kvavik’s findings. He concluded that ‘power has moved away from the Storting towards the bureaucracy and the, interest organizations’.63 Olsen, who was the other leader of the power study, stated, however, that ‘during the last part of the 1970s the Storting became a more rather than a less significant institution’.64 His associate, Egeberg, found frequent contacts between organization representatives and MPs.65 Together with Sæetren, they developed the thesis of the segmented state, which we have already mentioned.66 It is quite possible that the symbiotic relationship between interest organizations, ministries and parliamentary committees within specific segments (or iron triangles) could be based on the premises of the parliamentarians. However, this has not been the case in Norway. Most scholars have focused on the dominance of organized interests. As we have seen, even MPs have been

MPS ADDRESSED WEEKLY BY DIFFERENT TYPES OF LOBBYISTS, 1995 (N)

TABLE 3.7

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inclined to regard at least some of the parliamentary committees as the spokesmen of special interests. In the 1960s representatives of interest organizations gave parliamentary institutions ‘an exceedingly weak evaluation’.67 Recent studies clearly indicate, however, that Norwegian interest organizations in the 1980s and 1990s pay more attention to parliament.68 Interest organizations, as well as other lobbyists, frequently contact members of the Storting. Unfortunately, we have no directly comparable data from earlier periods. However, the present situation is illustrated in Table 3.7, which is based on a survey among MPs carried out in 1995.69 A total of 120 MPs (73 per cent) responded to the questionnaire. The table shows the number of MPs who reported that they were contacted weekly (orally or in writing) by the specified types of lobbyists (business organizations, trade unions, environmental organizations, idealistic and other organizations, municipal and county representatives, private and stateowned companies and other state institutions). Figures in the sum column and the average sum per responding member of each committee show that members of the committees on Finance; Transport and Communications; Local Government; and Education, Research, and Church Affairs are most frequently contacted by lobbyists. To a certain degree, different types of lobbyists tend to concentrate on members of specific committees. It is most striking, however, that different types of lobbyists contact members of several committees. The pattern of contacts with MPs established on the initiative of lobbyists is not the one we would expect in a highly segmented state. With regard to lobbyist-committee relations, Table 3.7 seems to indicate that the degree of segmentation is rather low. This general description is appropriate to the new committees as well. Most of the members of the Business and Industry Committee are contacted weekly by business organizations. In addition, one or more members of this committee are contacted weekly by each of the other types of lobbyists. With the exception of state-owned companies and other state institutions, the same applies to the committees on Family, Culture, and Government Administration, and Energy and the Environment. The last two committees are most frequently contacted by business and idealistic/other organizations, and by business and environmental organizations, respectively. Finally, we can see that the Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs is the least ‘popular’ committee among lobbyists. Considering the special functions of this committee, we should not be surprised by this finding. CONCLUDING REMARKS As we have seen, the influence of parliament is often related to the influence of the opposition. It is assumed that the influence of the opposition depends on the properties and functioning of parliamentary committees, and that the functioning

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of committees can be assessed on the basis of the degree of unanimity versus dissent. In this study we have confronted this theoretical line of argument with some empirical evidence. What we have documented is a substantial increase in the level of dissent in the recommendations of Norwegian parliamentary committees. If we assume that the increased level of dissent indicates a poorer functioning of committees, we should draw the conclusion that the influence of the opposition, and hence the influence of the Storting itself, is declining. As we have seen, this is certainly not the case. To be sure, our data are indicative; they are not conclusive. It seems, however, to be highly probable that the Norwegian Parliament’s influence has increased simultaneously with an increasing level of dissent and hence with a poorer functioning of the standing committees in the Storting. The fact that the Norwegian government cannot control a majority in the parliament is an important, though not sufficient, condition for the increasing significance of the Storting. Current minority parliamentarism is not a new experience in Norway.70 Our findings indicate that the increased significance of, and level of activity within, parliament is related to an ongoing process of desegmentation in Norwegian politics. Although the process of desegmentation was not triggered by the 1993 committee reform, it seems to be sustained by this reform. Unanimity in parliamentary committees may be based on the specific exchange relations established in a segmented state, or on the common preferences developed within the framework of a specific segment. The common preferences shared by the members of a specific segment seem to be dominated by the interests of extra-parliamentary actors. Thus, a possible consequence of specialization based on segmentation is the co-optation of MPs. In political systems and situations where this is the case, we have to challenge the assumed connection between strong, unanimous committees and strong parliaments. One possible implication of our Norwegian findings71 could be the following recommendation. In order to increase their significance, parliaments should liberate themselves from the extra-parliamentary structure of sectorization and segmentation. As a consequence, parliaments may have to sacrifice unanimity and accept a certain degree of ‘malfunctioning’ of parliamentary committees. However, more detailed studies should be carried out before such a recommendation is implemented. NOTES This chapter is an updated version of H.Rommetvedt: ‘Norwegian Parliamentary Committees: Performance, Structural Change and External Relations’, Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol.4, No.l (1998); also published in L.D.Longley and R.H.Davidson (eds.), The New Roles of Parliamentary Committees (London: Frank Cass, 1998). I would like to thank Sandra Halverson, Lawrence Longley, Per Lægreid, Paul Roness, Nils Gunnar Songstad, and John-Erik Ågotnes for their invaluable assistance and advice.

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1. E.Damgaard, ‘The Strong Parliaments of Scandinavia’, in G.W.Copeland and S.C. Patterson (eds.), Parliaments in the Modern World (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994). 2. J.P.Olsen, Organized Democracy (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1983), p.72. 3. See Chapter 2 and H.Rommetvedt, ‘Personellressurser, aktivitetsnivå og innflytelsesmuligheter i et Storting i vekst’, Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift, Vol.11, No.4 (1995). 4. Olsen, Organized Democracy, p.64. 5. Damgaard, ‘The Strong Parliaments of Scandinavia’, p.93. 6. M.L.Mezey, Comparative Legislatures (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979), p.64. 7. I.Mattson and K.Strøm, ‘Parliamentary Committees’, in H.Döring (ed.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe (Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag/St Martin’s Press, 1995), p.250. 8. M.Shaw, ‘Conclusion’, in J.D.Lees and M.Shaw (eds.), Committees in Legislatures: A Comparative Analysis (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979), p.407. 9. Shaw, ‘Conclusion’, p.366. 10. G.Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1987), pp.214 ff. 11. Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, p.229. 12. Shaw, ‘Conclusion’, p.422. 13. Another aspect of deliberative democracy is public argument and reasoning. This criterion is not fulfilled by Norwegian parliamentary committees due to the privacy of committee deliberations. 14. D.Miller, ‘Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice’, Political Studies, Vol.40, Special Issue (1992), p 55. 15. J.Cohen, ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’, in A.Hamlin and P.Pettit (eds.), The Good Polity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p.23. 16. Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, p.230. 17. Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, p.231. 18. Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, p.225. 19. See Chapter 8 and G.Hernes, ‘lnterest, Influence and Cooperation: A Study of the Norwegian Parliament’, Ph.D. dissertation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1971). 20. Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, p.229. 21. R.H.Salisbury et al., Triangles, Networks and Hollow Cores: The Complex Geometry of Washington Interest Representation’, in M.P.Petracca (ed.), The Politics of Interests (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), p.131. 22. M.Egeberg, J.P.Olsen and H.Sætren, ‘Organisasjonssamfunnet og den segmenterte stat’, in J.P.Olsen (ed.), Politisk organisering (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1978). 23. Olsen, Organized Democracy, pp.115 ff. 24. T.Christensen and M.Egeberg, ‘Organized Group-Government Relations in Norway’, Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol.2, No.3 (1979), p.253. 25. Christensen and Egeberg, ‘Organized Group-Government Relations in Norway’, p. 253. 26. It should be noted, however, that over the last few years this coalition has been weakened. A rising level of conflict between the members of the agriculture segment may be viewed as part of a general tendency towards desegmentation. See

PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES 87

27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35.

36. 37. 38.

39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44.

A.Steen et al., ‘Maktforhold’. in Levekår, utvikling og omstilling i landbruket. Vedlegg til rapport fra forprosjektet (Oslo: Norges Forskningsråd, 1996). Hernes, ‘lnterest, Influence and Cooperation: A Study of the Norwegian Parliament’, pp.68 G.Hansen, Der er det godt a sitte… (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1984), p.l 13 (my translation). G.Apenes, Løven gjesper (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1989), pp.36 ff. (my translation). For details, see Chapter 2. Figures are based on data from the Norwegian Social Science Data Services. Budget recommendations are excluded. Cf. the newspaper Vårt Land, 9 March 1996. Cf. the newspaper VG, 19 June 1995. Cf. the newspaper Aftenposten, 25 May 1996. Bondevik was appointed Prime Minister in 1997. The votes of the individual MPs are registered electronically by the Storting. At present, data from 1979 to 1998 are made available by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services. The table utilizes the ‘Norwegian standard’ for defining a change of government: a new person is appointed prime minister or a change occurs with regard to the parties represented in the government. A general election is not considered sufficient to constitute a change of government. This definition is in contrast with the ‘international standard’ for defining a change of government based solely on the occurrence of a general election. The President and Vice-President may be excused from serving on any of the standing committees. Shaw, ‘Conclusion’, pp.370 ff. In addition to the 12 standing committees listed above, there are also three committees with ‘housekeeping’ purposes: the Credentials Committee, the Election Committee and the Working Procedures Committee. In order to cover the final two committees or committee arrangements in the Storting, we have to add a ‘consultative’ purpose to Shaw’s list. An enlarged Committee on Foreign Affairs is appointed in order to discuss important foreign policy, trade policy and national security policy issues with the government. The government’s consultations with the Storting on matters related to the European Economic Area (EEA) take place with the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, which in such matters is joined by the members of the Norwegian delegation to the EEA Joint Parliamentary Committee. It should be added, of course, that some of the committee and ministry ‘labels’ are still quite similar. Cf. recommendations from the Presidium of Parliament and the Committee on Rules of Procedure, Innst. S. nr 145 (1991–92). Innstilling fra Stortingets presidentskap om endringer i Stortingets forretningsorden, p.13. Cf. Innst. S. nr. 145 and Stortingsforhandlinger, Debatter m.v. i Stortinget (verbatim minutes from the debates in the Storting), 4 May 1992, pp.3409–40. See Chapter 2. Innst. S. nr. 145, pp.13 ff. J.G.March and J.P.Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions (New York: The Free Press, 1989), p.97.

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45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

59. 60.

61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, pp.99 ff. Egeberg et al., ‘Organisasjonssamfunnet og den segmenterte stat’. Olsen, Organized Democracy, p.116. Stortingsforhandlinger, p.3410 (my translation). Stortingsforhandlinger, pp.3418 ff. Stortingsforhandlinger, p.3420. See Chapter 4 for a follow-up to this statement. Stortingsforhandlinger, p.3416. Calculations are based on information given in documents from the Storting. Calculations are based on T.Nordby (ed.), Storting og regjering 1945–1985. Institusjoner-rekruttering (Oslo: Kunnskapsforlaget, 1985); and O.C.Torp, Stortinget i navn og tall. Høsten 1985—Våren 1989 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1986); O.C.Torp, Stortinget i navn og tall 1989–1993 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1990); O.C.Torp, Stortinget i navn og tall 1993–1997 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1994); and Stortinget, Stortinget i navn og tall 1997–2001 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1998). Some changes in committee assignments may occur during the four-year election period. However, such changes are rather few, and they should not affect the main tendencies. Mattson and Strøm, ‘Parliamentary Committees’, p.262. Their characterization is based on information from the Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1986. Damgaard, The Strong Parliaments of Scandinavia’, pp.309 ff. E.Damgaard (ed.), Parliamentary Change in the Nordic Countries (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1992), pp.196 ff. See Chapter 2. We have to admit, of course, that the increased number of party secretaries enables them to specialize in more or less delimited policy areas. However, the number of secretaries in each party group is still too small to allow them to concentrate their work to the same degree as the MPs. The secretaries of smaller parties especially have to work with a broad range of issues. Thus, the likelihood of secretaries meeting with conflicting interests is even higher than that of the MPs. Olsen, Politisk organisering, pp.22 ff. S.Rokkan, ‘Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism’, in R.A.Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966). R.B.Kvavik, Interest Groups in Norwegian Politics (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1976), p.120. Kvavik, Interest Groups in Norwegian Politics, p.119. G.Hernes, Det moderne Norge. Bind 5. Makt og styring (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1983), p. 303 (my translation). Olsen, Organized Democracy, p.72. M.Egeberg, Stat og organisasjoner (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1981). Egeberg et al., ‘Organisasjonssamfunnet og den segmenterte stat’. Kvavik, Interest Groups in Norwegian Politics, p.118. See Chapters 6 and 7, and J.E.Klausen and H.Rommetvedt (eds.), Miljøpolitikk (Oslo: Tano Aschehoug, 1997). The survey was a joint venture of researchers at the Institute for Social Research, Oslo, and the Norwegian Research Centre in Organization and Management, Bergen. Harald Espeli and the author of this book were responsible for questions concerning lobbying.

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70. Cf. Chapter 2 and K.Strøm, Minority Government and Majority Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 71. Danish findings may be interpreted in a similar way, cf. H.Jensen, Arenaer eller aktörer? En analyse af Folketingets stående udvalg (Frederiksberg: Samfundslitteratur, 1995). The standing committees in the strong Danish Parliament seem to be even weaker than the Norwegian committees.

CHAPTER 4 Reorganizing the Policy-Making Process: Committee Change and Environmental Politics ARILD AURVÅG FARSUND, EINAR LEKNES and HILMAR ROMMETVEDT

In the 1990s, Norwegian environmental policy has been developed through a close interaction between the Norwegian Parliament, the Storting, the government and civil service, environmental and ‘green’ organizations, as well as industrial and labour organizations. The parliament has become an ever more important arena for the development of Norwegian politics. Policy formulation is characterized by extensive lobbying, which is increasingly targeted towards the Storting. Since the relationship between the parliament and its surroundings in recent years has been the subject of several studies,1 this chapter will seek to shed light on the ‘life within’ the parliament. We will investigate how and in what manner decision-making with respect to environmental policy is affected by the organization of the parliamentary committee system. Our point of departure is the 1993 reform of the committee system.2 The question we pose is whether or not the reform had any effect on the attention given to environmental affairs when the Storting considers certain matters concerning the petroleum sector and regional policy. THE COMMITTEE REFORM An important element of the committee reform in 1993 was the setting up of a new Standing Committee on Energy and the Environment. The new committee took over matters that had been dealt with by the former standing committees on Energy and Industry, and on Local Government and the Environment. According to Section 12 of the parliamentary rules of procedure, the new Standing Committee on Energy and the Environment is responsible for matters related to petroleum, hydroelectric power, environmental protection, regional planning etc. The new Standing Committee on Local Government is responsible for matters related to local government administration, the labour market, regional development etc. The new division between local government and environmental policy attracted little attention. In the regulatory committee preparing the change, the Conservative member was nevertheless in favour of retaining the Local Government and Environment Committee, but he conceded that there was no majority to back this so he endorsed the establishment of an Energy and

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Environment Committee as the second best solution. The opponents of the new committee argued that environmental protection is a trans-sectoral and vital field of work that should be afforded more importance. They therefore proposed the establishment of a separate Environment Committee, detached from the Committee on Local Government.3 In the parliamentary debate on 4 May 1992, the proposed division of local government and environmental policy was not mentioned. However, the merging of environment and energy policies caused more of a stir. Commenting on the establishment of the new committee, Gunnar Berge (Labour) said: ‘ln my opinion, Parliament will by organizing its own work process in this way, improve its ability to accommodate environmental concerns compared to the situation today, with environmental and industrial issues assigned to the same committee’.4 Tora Aasland Houg (Socialist Left), however, held the opposite view: ‘I am very much afraid that, in a committee where petroleum affairs—as part of the overall energy affairs—are to be handled together with environmental affairs, the latter will be overrun by the much stronger petroleum interests’.5 This chapter will investigate whether the parliamentary reorganization of environmental policy, with the removal of the old Local Government and Environment Committee and the establishment of the new Committee on Energy and the Environment, has led to changes in the way parliament processes its affairs. We will first focus on the political consequences of what happened when energy and environment policy was amalgamated. This part of the study includes issues pertaining to the development of oil and gas fields on the Norwegian continental shelf. Subsequently we shall take a closer look at the consequences of the new split between local government and environmental policy with respect to regional development, regional planning and land use policy. It seems reasonable to assume that institutional and organizational changes in the form described here will involve consequences for the way matters are processed. The committee reform was carried out, amongst other reasons, to improve the parliamentary work situation and to enhance co-ordination between different policy areas. As previously mentioned, these objectives were achieved to a certain degree. The issue addressed in this study is whether the committee reform has had any implications for environmental policy. Has the reform had any influence on parliament’s efforts to safeguard environmental interests in the overall formulation of policy? THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES Theoretical Perspectives The theoretical point of departure of our study is a so-called generalized garbage can perspective.6 The generalized perspective combines the idea of a garbage can

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model with a neo-institutional perspective.7 In pure form, the garbage can model describes decisions as outcomes of four independent, exogenous streams: (1) a stream of choice opportunities where the organization is expected to make a choice or decision; (2) a stream of problems that may be taken under consideration, and that may find their solution in connection with the choice opportunities; (3) a stream of solutions which may represent answers to the problems that are the concern of people. Solutions may be answers looking for questions; (4) a stream of participants that bring energy and capabilities, problems and solutions into the process. Garbage can choice situations are characterized by two structures: (1) An access structure which defines the relation between problems or solutions and choice opportunities, and (2) a decision structure which relates decision-makers to choice opportunities. The access structure may allow or not allow a particular problem to be attached to a particular choice. The decision structure may allow or not allow a particular decision-maker to participate in the making of a particular choice. Garbage can processes are based on a temporal logic where the links between the streams are assumed to be determined by their arrival and departure times. The temporal logic is normally seen as quite different from the logic of appropriateness, which is attributed to institutions.8 However, a generalized garbage can perspective may open for more hierarchical and specialized decision and access structures.9 Thus, the generalized perspective becomes relevant to highly institutionalized processes like parliamentary decision-making, which is the topic of this chapter. A specialized structure is a structure in which it is possible to divide choice opportunities and decision-makers into sub-groups and match the two sets of sub-groups so that every participant has access to every choice opportunity in the matching set of choice opportunities, but to no other. In a hierarchical structure, access rights expand as a function of hierarchical rank.10 Parliaments, like the Norwegian Storting, combine hierarchical structures with specialized ones. The system of standing committees, with its detailed regulations regarding the responsibilities of the committees and their members, is characterized by highly specialized decision and access structures. Nearly all decisions made by the Storting are based on recommendations from one of the standing committees. MPs are members of one—and only one—standing committee. The committees have fixed areas of specialization. In other words, a limited set of participants with more or less firm interpretations and ideas regarding problems and solutions are responsible for the preparation of matters dealt with by the Norwegian Parliament. The committees play a crucial rule in the parliamentary decision-making process. According to Hernes, the committees are ‘the only stage at which issues can be scrutinized and worked out in detail;… and where changes in a bill or modifications in proposed appropriations can be made. …to exaggerate the point —one could say that not only is the committee the first stage in decision-making in the Parliament: for most purposes it is also the last’.11 More recent studies

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indicate that this situation is changing. The functioning of committees can be assessed on the basis of the degree of unanimity versus dissent.12 A substantial increase in the level of dissent in the recommendations of the Norwegian parliamentary committees in the 1980s and 1990s indicate a poorer functioning of the committees. The parliamentary party groups seem to have strengthened their position at the expense of the committees.13 There is little doubt, however, that the standing committees still play an important role in the Storting. Anyone studying parliamentary decision-making cannot leave out committee recommendations. Johan P.Olsen has pointed out that the organization of the four streams of participants, problems, solutions and choice opportunities, i.e. the way they are linked or kept apart, is a potentially important means of governance.14 Elected bodies may influence public policy through the creation of opportunities and arenas for decision-making by influencing the recruitment to, the agenda, the rules, and the criteria of relevance for different decision options. Such organizational means will not be the sole determinant of the outcome of future decisions, but will to a large extent influence the probabilities of such outcomes. The committee reform in 1993 represented a break with the former principal rules governing the division of work between committees and thus the links between choice opportunities, participants, problems and solutions. Various policy areas were de-coupled and re-coupled. In the former Committee on Energy and Industry, petroleum issues were coupled with industry policy. The members of this committee were responsible for matters within the scope of the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the Ministry of Industry. In the new Standing Committee on Energy and the Environment, petroleum issues are coupled with environmental affairs. The new committee is responsible for ‘Matters relating to oil, energy, watercourses, environmental protection and regional planning’. The old Committee on Local Government and the Environment was responsible for matters within the scope of the Ministry of Local Government and Labour, and the Ministry of the Environment. The new Standing Committee on Local Government is now responsible for ‘Matters relating to local government administration, the labour market and the working environment, regional development, housing conditions, rent control, building and construction, immigration policy and the Sami population’.15 An important common feature of different institutional theories is the assumption that ‘institutions matter’. There are, however, differing perceptions as to what this means in regard to institutional change, which is the subject of our study. It is often maintained that established norms, rules and routines attain an inherent value which contributes to their being able to live on in practice, despite reforms in the formal structure. This is perceived as a key feature in the institutionalization process itself. Institutional inertia is assumed to characterize highly institutionalized organizations. Even though formal changes do not always lead to real changes, this does not mean that institutions are unchangeable. Institutions can be subject to large changes by means of a process

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of several small steps or gradual adjustments.16 Such changes in the real organizational structure may also occur without corresponding changes in the formal structure. Since one tends to emphasize that decision processes are influenced by organizational structures, one would assume that decision processes will change in character if the relationship between choice opportunities, participants, problems and solutions is altered. Within an instrumental-rational perspective on reform, one would expect that new links between different matters affect the handling of these matters in the parliament. In this context one could, for example, assume that the new committee structure affected the recruitment to the new Energy and Environment Committee in such a manner that more environmentally concerned MPs were directly involved in the handling of oil and energy matters. When the parliament discussed committee reform, the MPs agreed that it would carry political consequences, but they disagreed on what these consequences would be. One side asserted that environmental concerns would be taken more into account in the new committee, whereas the other side expressed their concern about environmental interests being overrun by stronger oil interests. Main Hypotheses Administrative reform can be described as organized attention. Administrative reform processes may lead to changes in the allocation of attention.17 It seems rational to assume that the new link between energy and environmental matters brought about by the establishment of the Energy and Environment Committee in 1993 will lead to changes in the way petroleum affairs are handled. We should assume that—for reasons related to party profile and individual MPs’ committee preferences—the new committee will attract more environmentally interested members than did the old Energy and Industry Committee. Furthermore, we should assume that the committee members are influenced be the fact that they deal with matters of both oil and environmental policy. The individual committee member will see the linkages between these two fields in a far more direct way than before. This should contribute to environmental concerns being granted more attention in the treatment of petroleum affairs in the new Energy and Environment Committee compared to what was the norm in the old Energy and Industry Committee. The Environment portfolio was, as previously mentioned, taken over from the Committee on Local Government and the Environment. As a consequence, matters related to local government and regional policy were split among two committees. The traditional local and regional policy was sustained in the new Standing Committee on Local Government, whereas issues regarding land use, environment and planning were transferred to the new Energy and Environment Committee. In other words, the institutional divide already present in government administration, where the two fields are assigned to the Ministry of

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Local Government and the Ministry of the Environment respectively, was transferred to the parliament. In a far-reaching and sparsely populated country such as Norway, regional policy is of vital importance. In the former Committee on Local Government and the Environment, the conditions were initially conducive to an approach integrating both fields. The committee reform and the ensuing division of regional policy would, however, imply a weakening of the integrated approach, particularly in the new Committee on Local Government. With this in mind, it is reasonable to assume that environmental concerns are given less attention in the new Local Government Committee than in the old Local Government and Environment Committee. Since issues regarding regional planning and land use come under the jurisdiction of the new Energy and Environment Committee, we would expect environmental policy to receive the same amount of attention as before within this part of regional policy. It is reasonable to assume that the new Energy and Environment Committee to a larger degree than the former Committee on Local Government and the Environment will incorporate energy issues in the conduct of regional and land use policy. It is also plausible that traditional considerations within regional policy will no longer carry as much weight in the new committee’s deliberations in this field. The assumptions above constitute our main hypotheses regarding the consequences of the committee reform. Within an institutional perspective, one will nevertheless emphasize the development of relatively stable norms and values, rules and routines which are often sustained despite organizational reforms. Institutional inertia can, as previously mentioned, imply that one does not achieve the intended effects of the reforms. In our case, one could imagine that segments of the old structure lived on in the form of internal specialization, where some of the members in the Energy and Environment Committee concentrated upon environmental affairs, whilst others dealt with energy issues. A study by Heidi Formo shows that this is not the case, or at least only to a limited extent.18 As far as regional policy is concerned, one would imagine that the members of the Energy and Environment Committee and the Local Government Committee will take the former Local Government and Environment Committee’s handling of such affairs into account, and thereby continue the old committee’s practice to a smaller or larger degree. When organizational changes are adopted, they may in some cases merely involve a formalization of informal alterations that have already taken place. In other words, the consequences of the actual changes will have occurred prior to the formal decision. In our context, one might put forward alternative hypotheses, for example, that the actual link-up between oil and environment took place prior to the formal amalgamation following the establishment of the Energy and Environment Committee in 1993. We might assume that environmental concerns gradually became more important in the handling of petroleum affairs in the old Energy and Industry Committee as well. In that case, there is little reason to

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anticipate an additional increase in the attention attributed to environmental concerns in the new Energy and Environment Committee. One might also imagine that a division between environment and regional policy was developed prior to the committee reform in 1993, as a result of internal specialization within the old Committee on Local Government and the Environment. At first glance, changes in the environmental awareness among committee members may be perceived as an alternative explanation of a tentative increase in the environmental concern expressed in the committee recommendations. However, such changes in environmental awareness should also be viewed in the light of the committee reform. The recruitment of members to the different committees is as previously mentioned dependent upon the MPs’ own preferences as well as party decisions. These will in turn be dependent upon which fields come under which committee. Changes in the environmental awareness among committee members must therefore to a large extent be regarded as a consequence of changes in the committee structure. In other words, changes in environmental awareness form part of the main explanation that we have put forward. The MPs’ interest in environmental affairs tends to vary both according to their party affiliation and their personal inclinations. As far as party composition is concerned, it is worthwhile to note that the Socialist Left Party, which maintains a high environmental profile, was represented both in the old Local Government and Environment Committee in 1985–93 and in the Local Government Committee in 1993–97. The party was however not represented in the old Industry and Energy Committee in the period 1985–89. In 1989–93 and 1993–97 the Socialist Left Party was represented in the Energy and Industry Committee and the Energy and Environment Committee, enabling the party to promote their views in the committee recommendations in the periods before and after the reform. We do not have any complete information as to the environmental awareness amongst the members of the old energy and industry committee and the new energy and environment committee. There is however little doubt that the committee reform had clear implications for the selection of the committee chair. In 1989–93 the chairmanship of the Energy and Industry Committee was allocated to the Centre Party. Ole Gabriel Ueland, who was appointed chairman, had previously been a member of the Finance Committee. He came from the oil county Rogaland, and was first and foremost regarded as a politician of the ‘oil and industry breed’. In the autumn of 1993, the Centre Party also assumed the leadership in the new Energy and Environment Committee. The ‘party factor’ thus remained constant. The new leader was Ragnhild Q. Haarstad. She came from the former Local Government and Environment Committee and there was no doubt that she was considered more left-oriented and environmentally friendly than Ueland. Moreover, Haarstad represented Hedmark, a county that has few connections to the petroleum industry. It is unlikely that Haarstad would have become chair of the former Energy and Industry Committee if it had

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continued to exist. The consequence of committee reform and the selection of chairs was that a more environmentally friendly politician was chosen to lead the deliberations on oil affairs in parliament. Ragnhild Q. Haarstad was the only member of the Energy and Environment Committee to have come from the former Local Government and Environment Committee. Three of the members of the new committee came from the former Energy and Industry Committee. An additional two MPs had been re-elected from the previous parliament. They came from the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Agriculture Committee. The remaining eight members were newly elected MPs. The Socialist Left member and the newly elected member from the Christian People’s Party were considered ‘environmentally friendly’ politicians. In addition, the Socialist Left member of the old Energy and Industry Committee came across as a spokesman for environmental causes. Regarding the Local Government and Environment Committee/Local Government Committee, this chapter covers the periods 1989–93 and 1993–97. In 1993–97 the new Committee on Local Government comprised members from the same parties as the old Committee on Local Government and the Environment in the period 1989–93, with one exception. The Progress Party, who had a member on the old committee, was not represented in the new one. There is, however, little to be found in the party’s environmental profile that would involve any significance for our investigation. The Local Government and Environment Committee featured in the period 1989–93 politicians of a very broad background.19 Only one of those MPs who were in the committee throughout the period up to 1993 had previous experience from this committee, five MPs had experience from other committees, whereas nine were newly elected MPs.20 The Municipal Committee was in 1993–97 also characterized by the broad political experience of its members. Two MPs had experience as members of the Local Government and Environment Committee in the previous period. The composition of the two committees was in other words characterized by little continuation in the periods covered here. This might contribute to reducing institutional inertia and opening up for change. EMPIRICAL RESULTS We will examine our hypotheses with the aid of two sets of cases which the parliament and its committees handled in the periods before and after the reform was implemented in 1993. This concerns firstly the issue of the development of oil and gas fields on the Norwegian continental shelf, and secondly issues pertaining to different aspects of Norwegian regional policy. These cases have certain attributes which are important when studying the effects of committee reform in parliament: • The substance of these cases is important for Norway. The petroleum sector has a great influence on Norwegian business and economy, and it receives a

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great deal of political attention. Regional policy is seen in the context of the problematic relationship between centre and periphery. It touches up on a division that traditionally has played a major role in Norwegian politics.21 • Methodologically, the cases selected are well suited to shed light on issues raised here. This is due to their similarity in the periods before and after the committee reform. The prospect for comparison is better for these than for most other types of cases. Development of Oil and Gas Fields Norway is today one of the world’s largest exporters of crude oil. Parliament is directly involved in the conduct of petroleum affairs through (1) decisions on the opening of new fields for exploration, and (2) the approval of field development plans and transport systems. We will here focus on the development of oil and gas fields. In order to examine whether any changes have occurred in the attention given to environmental issues in the committee recommendations in parliament, we have conducted a study of the oil and gas field development plans which were handled in the old Energy and Industry Committee in 1985–89 and 1989–93, and in the new energy and environment committee in 1993–97.22 We have altogether examined 19 field developments, six in each of the two initial election periods and seven in the last period. The investigation is limited to only those developments where investments are assumed to amount to more than NOK 5, 000 million (1996 prices).23 Given the limitations mentioned, our examination includes all the developments of oil and gas fields on the Norwegian continental shelf that the parliament handled in the period 1985 to 1997. We will first consider the amount of space allocated to environmental aspects (proposals and comments) in the committee recommendations on the different field developments. Figure 4.1 shows that the new Energy and Environment Committee in the period 1993–97 emphasized environmental aspects to a much larger extent than the old Energy and Industry Committee did in the two preceding periods. (Note that the intervals increase as one moves from left to right in the figure. This means that the increase in environmental attention is larger than it might seem at first glance.) In the Energy and Environment Committee’s recommendations with regard to the six oilfield developments handled in the parliamentary period 1985–89, environmental issues were mentioned neither in the preliminary discussion of the development projects nor in the comment and proposals section. In their recommendations, the Energy and Environment Committee focused inter alia on economic issues and the location of support functions of the fields (Sleipner East, Snorre and Draugen).24 The government’s proposition regarding these field developments includes a summary of environmental consequences (regular and accidental emissions to the sea) and the consulted ministries’ comments. On average, a little less than

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FIGURE 4.1 COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS AND ATTENTION PAID TO ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS

one page of an average total of 22 is allocated to the presentation and discussion of environmental issues in the propositions. All the governmental propositions suggest that environmental concerns may be addressed further in the committee deliberations. This may involve a discussion of divergence between the environmental evaluations conducted by the operating companies on the one hand, and the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Fisheries on the other. In addition, it may incorporate the comments made by the consulted institutions regarding deficiencies in the operating companies’ evaluations, which implies an inadequate response to the evaluation requirement. The committee’s lack of reaction to this type of disagreement and inadequacy may be explained by the fact that the Ministry of Oil and Energy Affairs usually comments upon the operator’s positive environmental involvement (participation in environmental surveys etc.) in the propositions, or that the Ministry of Oil will investigate these issues further in co-operation with the Ministry of the Environment. Altogether six oil and gas field development cases in the parliamentary period 1989–93 are included in our comparative analysis. Two cases in particular had their associated environmental considerations addressed by the committee in this period. The first concerned the issue of how to handle the gas from the Heidrun

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field (re-injection and storage or leading it ashore for further processing). The greenhouse gas question was discussed in a wider policy context and became the key issue in the discussion of alternative utilization methods. The recommendation was more concerned with how Norway could meet its international obligations and less with specific CO2-abatement measures. Such issues were, however, addressed in the next case, Troll II, where the committee considered the possibility of reducing CO2 emissions by means of supplying the field with electricity generated onshore. The attention given to CO2 issues resulted from an initiative by the Christian People’s Party. In other words, in the latter half of this parliamentary period we notice an increase in the amount of attention given to the greenhouse gas question in the Energy and Environment Committee. Other environmental aspects of the oilfield developments and deficiencies in the operating companies’ own evaluations were not, however, emphasized. In the Energy and Industry Committee’s field development recommendations in this period, environmental concerns are not raised at all. In the Brage and Statfjord E/N cases, the propositions invite the committee to react upon environmental questions in the form of relatively exhaustive overviews of impacts, diverging opinions on these, and deficiencies in the impact studies. The invitation is somewhat restrained in that the Ministry of the Environment’s and the Ministry of Fisheries’ demands are met to a larger degree than in the cases put forward in the previous period. In the two last cases in the period 1989–93 environmental issues are not discussed in the proposition. The parliamentary committee is hence not invited to address the relatively forceful and extensive comments concerning regular and accidental emissions to sea and air, which the Ministry of the Environment incorporated in the Sleipner West development plan. In the period following the changes in the committee structure, i.e. the parliamentary period 1993–97, the environmental interest seems to ‘erupt’ in the recommendations from the new Committee on Energy and the Environment. This occurs as early as in the first recommendation concerning the Norne oilfield development. At least certain parts of the committee had shown a relatively strong environmental concern in the deliberations of report to the parliament no. 26 (1993–94) on challenges and perspectives for the petroleum activities. The Norne field is the northernmost field development project on the Norwegian continental shelf. The field is situated in one of the most environmentally sensitive areas ever opened for oil and gas exploration. The recommendation from the Energy and Environment Committee is appropriately enough centred on environmental aspects of the development. Both the majority group and several minority constellations within the committee noted the project’s consequences with respect to emissions to air, besides regular and accidental emissions to the sea, and any abatement measures that might be considered. Individual committee members stress—independently of each other —deficiencies in the operator’s own environmental impact assessment, and

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choose to emphasize statements from consulted parties such as the Ministry of Fisheries, the Ministry of the Environment and different pressure groups. The broad and detailed deliberation on environmental impacts found in the recommendation from the Energy and Environment Committee is new in relation to the former committee’s handling of the development cases. The new committee’s focus is to a large extent on environmental aspects. The Norne case seems to be in line with other contemporary developments, both in relation to its character and the quality of evaluation. However, the criticism from consulted parties seems to be stronger than usual. The environmental impacts were accordingly a dominant factor in the ensuing parliamentary debate. Common to all field developments in the period 1993–97 is the fact that environmental impacts, particularly emissions to air of CO2 and NOX respectively, constituted the principal theme in the committee recommendations. Approximately half the committee recommendations are dedicated to environmental issues. The above review demonstrates that environmental impacts associated with the oil and gas field developments were given far more attention in the recommendations from the new Energy and Environment Committee than what was the case in the days of the old Energy and Industry Committee. Besides the fact that environmental concern is a principal issue in the new committee’s recommendations, its qualitative character seems to differ from the old committee. We can illustrate this point with the aid of Table 4.1, which presents proposals recorded in the committee recommendations. The presentation includes proposals to reject or delay the development project, as well as other environment-related proposals. The table illustrates that there was only one party—the Socialist Left—which in the period 1989–93 actively ‘opposed’ certain field development projects, or who came up with more ‘environmentally friendly’ solutions. Both in this period and in 1985–89 the Energy and Industry Committee should be considered unaware of the information provided in the government’s propositions on the inadequate evaluation of the different environmental impacts carried out by the operator, besides the diverging opinions on these amongst the operator, the Ministry of Oil and Energy, the Ministry of Fisheries and the Ministry of the Environment respectively. The committee showed no awareness of this matter. In the period 1993–97, a lot more proposals are put forward in the Energy and Environment Committee’s recommendations. The committee members from Socialist Left, Centre and the Christian People’s Party are commonly proponents of minority group recommendations. Socialist Left is still alone with its ‘no development’ position, but the Christian People’s Party and particularly the Centre Party argue in favour of delaying developments. The Christian People’s Party is particularly active in the field of promoting environmentally-friendly technology (with respect to airborne emissions). Several proposals were recommended to the government by a united parliament.

ENVIRONMENTALLY-RELATED PROPOSALS IN THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

TABLE 4.1

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Even though most of the proposals were turned down, and therefore cannot be judged to have influenced the development plans directly, there are indications that the committee’s strong environmental focus has had an indirect influence on later projects. An official in the Ministry of Oil and Energy gives the impression that the Norne development was problematic for the ministry, particularly due to the fact that statements from the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Fisheries were used against the government’s proposition.25 This is believed to be the one of the reasons why discussions of environmental impacts, statements of consulted parties and the ensuing actions received greater attention from the government in later propositions. The committee’s focus on environmental impacts seems to have had an instructive effect on the ministry and thereafter also on the operating companies. Several minority proposals also persuaded the government to implement environmentally-friendly technology and to decide which evaluations were to be carried out. According to employees in the State Pollution Control Authority and the Directorate for Nature Management the Energy and Environment Committee’s environmental involvement has contributed to making environmental impact assessments more effective as an environmental policy instrument.26 It appears that the committee, through its general environmental commitment and specifically through its references to statements from the Ministry of Enviroment’s sub-authorities and from environmental organizations, has enhanced the authorities’ capacity to influence the operators’ development plans. Regional Policy The parliament’s decision to change the committee structure also had consequences for the regional policy-making process. The practice was established in the 1990s, where both the Ministry of Local Government and Labour (now the Ministry of Local Government and the Regions) and the Ministry of the Environment submit their own reports to the parliament about different parts of regional policy, forms the basis of our analysis of this field. The rationale behind the Ministry of the Environment’s report is parliament’s wish that the ministry should review the practical experience derived from implementing the new Planning and Construction Act (1985) once in every parliamentary period. The Ministry of Local Government and Labour produces a more general report to the parliament on regional policy instruments. While the two ministries in 1989 submitted a joint report to the parliament pertaining to both these subject areas, separate reports were submitted in both 1992–93 and 1996–97. Both the reports to the parliament from 1992–93 were processed by the Committee on Local Government and the Environment, whilst the two reports from 1996–97 were processed in separate committees, the Energy and Environment and the Local Government Committee respectively. The new Energy and Environment Committee was assigned responsibility within the areas of land use and regional planning, fields within the Ministry of the

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Environment’s jurisdiction. Important environmental dimensions within regional policy were in this way disconnected from cases pertaining to local government, then assigned to energy policy while the association with other parts of environmental policy was retained. The more comprehensive regional policy, which falls within the mandate of the Ministry of Local Government and Labour, was in turn detached from environmental policy and assigned to the new Local Government Committee. At this stage, we are concerned with the effects of an institutional gap between the comprehensive or general regional policy framework and what we might call the environmental dimension within regional policy. A review of the four reports to the parliament, the ensuing committee recommendations, and plenary debates in parliament shows that there are interesting disparities with respect to the amount of attention allocated to different topics in the processing of the two report types in the two periods. Some of the disparities can be explained in light of the contemporary political agenda. Moreover, the processing of the four reports to the parliament is characterized by the key scientific complexities within the individual policy areas. Report to the parliament no. 31 (1992–93) on regional planning and land use from the Ministry of the Environment contained 135 pages, whilst the Committee on Local Government and the Environment used 17 pages for its notes and comments.27 The ministry used 139 pages for its report no. 29 (1996– 97) on regional planning and land use policy, whilst the Energy and Environment Committee used 13 pages for its recommendation on this report.28 The plenary debates following these reports and recommendations were rather similar both years. The debates were to a great extent characterized by the fact that the members of the committee were the ones to speak. This was particularly the case in the processing of the recommendation in 1993, where only committee members took part. This report was processed immediately prior to the regional policy report from the Ministry of Local Government and Labour. A summary of the amount of attention allocated to different topics in the different stages of the decision process, i.e. in reports to the parliament, committee recommendations and plenary debates, is given in Table 4.2. Naturally, there are major differences in the lengths of the government’s reports and the committee recommendations. The length of the committee recommendation was significantly reduced in 1996–97. This might indicate that the committee was comfortable with the report, so that it found it easier to endorse the policies outlined by the Ministry of the Environment. No clear break can be observed as far as the changes in committee structure are concerned, but a few major patterns of development may be detected. Environmental policy questions comprising planning instruments and land use policy received a large share of the attention from both the reports from the Ministry of the Environment and in the parliamentary proceedings in both periods. The sole exception was the parliamentary debate in 1993, where these topics

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TABLE 4.2 ATTENTION PAID TO VARIOUS ISSUES IN RELATION TO THE GOVERNMENT'S REPORTS TO THE STORTING ON REGIONAL PLANNING AND LAND USE POLICY

Notes: Attention level: high = +++, medium = ++, low = +.

were assigned a medium level of attention. The extensive attention surrounding environmental issues corresponds well with what one might expect in view of the fact that committee recommendations to parliament were produced by committees responsible for environmental policy, i.e. the Local Government and Environment Committee and the Energy and Environment Committee. The Ministry of the Environment was not particularly concerned with problems pertaining to regional policy in 1993. In the Local Government and Environment Committee’s recommendation however, a relatively large proportion of attention was directed at regional issues. This fits well with what one would expect from a committee which - in addition to environmental affairs - also took responsibility for regional policy cases. This changed slightly in 1997 as the ministry then seemed somewhat more concerned with regional policy issues. An explanation for this might be that the problems facing rural and remote areas had been given a lot of coverage and attention in the general political debate. Nevertheless, we note that the recommendations from the new Energy and Environment Committee do not focus as much on regional affairs. This is probably because after 1993 it was the Committee on Local Government and not the Energy and Environment Committee that had the main responsibility for regional policy. Neither in 1992–93 nor in 1996–97 were energy issues touched upon in reports to the parliament. The Local Government and Environment Committee’s recommendation from 1992–93 was not concerned with such questions. This should be viewed in relation to the fact that the Committee on Energy and Industry was responsible for energy policy at the time. The 1996–97 recommendation shows that the new Energy and Environment Committee does direct a certain amount of attention to energy issues, as one would expect given this committees mandate and portfolio. A couple of other policy areas were also touched upon in the proceedings following the two reports, but then to a large degree as a result of different sectors—such as agriculture and transport—being affected by land use guidelines. In one area, private property law, there were also ideological

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TABLE 4.3 ATTENTION PAID TO VARIOUS ISSUES IN RELATION TO THE GOVERNMENT’S REPORTS TO THE STORTING ON REGIONAL AND DISTRICT POLICY

Notes: Attention level: high=+++, medium=++, low=+.

discussions during the parliamentary proceedings. Here, the split went along the old Socialist/non-Socialist lines. As previously mentioned, the more comprehensive regional policy falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Local Government and Labour. The report to parliament no. 33 (1992–93) on regional development from this ministry contained 85 pages, whereas the Committee on Local Government and the Environment used 35 pages for its amendments.29 In 1996–97 the ministry used 80 pages in report no. 31 (1996–97) on district and regional policy, whereas the new Local Government Committee used 46 pages for its recommendations.30 Quantitatively, this indicates that the new committee took a more activist stance in the deliberations on the latter report. The explanation for this might be that regional policy adapts well to the institutional identity of the new Local Government Committee. This identity is solely based upon regional issues as a consequence of the new split between policies pertaining to local government and environmental policy and the transfer of the latter to the Energy and Environment Committee. An alternative or supplementary explanation might be that in 1996–97 the problems in rural areas—i.e. related to unemployment and settlement patterns—were so extensive that additional attention was necessary in both ministry and committee. The political friction was also particularly strong, with a large and critical Centre Party attacking the Labour government’s regional policy in an election year. Table 4.3 shows the degree of attention different topics received in the different stages of the proceedings related to these reports. The table shows that regional policy dominated the scene in both 1992–93 and in 1996–97. It should be added, however, that the nature of the attention was rather different in the two reports. The first was concerned with regional policy dimensions in a national perspective, whereas the other focused more on problems in rural and/or remote areas. Both topics lie within the field assigned to the committee. As far as environmental aspects of regional policy are concerned, we note that these were more strongly emphasized in the committee recommendations than

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in the ministry’s reports. In 1992–93 this was only natural, since it was the Committee on Local Government and the Environment that handled the case. It is more surprising that the new Local Government Committee was also so preoccupied with environmental issues in 1996–97, i.e. after the environment portfolio had been transferred to another committee. We should consider, however, that the increased attention was related to what many committee members regarded as negative effects for rural districts of policies primarily directed at environmental concerns. Energy policy was not, with one exception, one of the chief issues in the reports and proceedings. At first glance, this exception is in breach of what one might expect on the basis of the 1993 committee reform. It was evidently the new local Government Committee which in 1996–97 increased focus on energy issues, as compared to the less ambitious ministerial report. This matter should, however, be regarded in the light of the committee members’ wish to focus on energy as a vital source of rural/regional income. Parliament furthermore decided that the government should see to it that the population in all parts of the country were ensured a continuous satisfactory supply of electricity, independent of their place of residence. In other words, the committee on local government regarded energy issues more as integrated elements of regional policy than as a policy area in its own right. In both cases there were also many connections with respect to sectoral policies that are important for regional policy. This is particularly true for sectors like agriculture, fisheries and transport, as well as topics that can be classified under the enterprise and industry policy heading. There is an association here between the so-called ‘small regional policy’ for which the Ministry for Local Government and Labour is responsible, and the ‘large regional policy’ which also includes those sectoral policies carrying regional implications. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION The parliamentary committee reform of autumn 1993 has been the point of departure in this chapter. We have seen that this institutional change brought about new links between participants, problems, solutions and opportunities for choice. The policy deliberations regarding energy and oil were transferred from the old Industry and Energy Committee to the new Committee on Energy and the Environment. Energy and oil issues were in other words detached from industry issues and merged with environmental issues. The committee changes also implied that environmental issues were removed from regional policy in the old Committee on Local Government and the Environment. Regional planning and land use policy were transferred to the new Energy and Environment Committee, whereas the new Local Government Committee was assigned responsibility for more general and comprehensive regional policy. A common characteristic of different forms of institutional theory is the assumption that ‘institutions matter’. There are, however, some diverging

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opinions as to what this means in relation to institutional change, which has been the theme of this chapter. On the one hand it is held that established norms, rules and routines attain an inherent value contributing to their sustenance even though the formal structure is being subjected to reform. This is perceived as being a key feature of the institutionalization process itself. Institutional inertia thus characterizes highly institutionalized organizations. On the other hand, the organizational structure’s effect on decision-making processes tends to be emphasized. This should suggest a change in the character of decision processes given that the links between opportunities for choice, participants, problems and solutions are altered. We anticipated, therefore, that the new association between environmental policy, energy issues and segments of the old regional policy would affect the handling of these matters in parliament. When the Storting discussed the committee reform, there was a consensus on the notion that the reform would affect the way in which different issues were handled, but there were diverging opinions as to exactly how this would manifest itself. On the one hand it was asserted that the new committee would ensure more consideration of environmental interests, while on the other hand there was concern that environmental interests could be overridden by the strong petroleum lobby. To shed some light on these issues, we first examined parliament’s handling of the oil and gas field developments on the Norwegian continental shelf, and subsequently the handling of two types of reports to parliament on different aspects of regional policy. All the oil and gas field development cases processed by parliament in two electoral periods prior to and one electoral period following the committee reform, demonstrate that environmental concerns received far more attention in the recommendations submitted by the new Energy and Environment Committee in the period 1993–97 than was the case for the old Local Government and Environment Committee in 1985–89 and 1989–93. The new committee also had a higher number of environment-related proposals. We have also seen that the attention surrounding some of the elements within regional policy was affected by the committee change. In the recommendations regarding the reports on regional planning and land use policy, the new Energy and Environment Committee was more preoccupied with energy issues and less with regional issues than the old Local Government and Environment Committee. In the deliberations on regional and rural policy the new Local Government Committee focused as much on environmental policy as the old Committee on Local Government and the Environment, but the new committee was primarily concerned with the negative effects environmental policy might have on regional interests. The new Local Government Committee also directed its attention towards energy issues, but it considered energy policy as a part of regional policy. In evaluating the effects of the institutional changes, it should be noted that the committee reform and the increase in the amount of attention given to certain aspects of the cases handled took place in the same period of time. The

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relationship between these two factors may, however, be more or less coincidental. There might be totally different factors that explain the development. One could for example imagine that the increased environmental attention related to the petroleum cases was associated with more significant actual environmental problems during the last parliamentary period. Our investigations suggest, however, that the opposite was the case. Strict emissions standards and improved technological solutions have gradually contributed to reduce environmental problems.31 We have also considered the linkages to other cases as a possible alternative or supplementary explanatory variable. As regards regional policy, we have seen that the committee assessments were affected by developments in the labour market and by migration from remote/rural areas. We have also seen that both the old Energy and Industry Committee and the new Energy and Environment Committee drew other environmental issues into the proceedings on oil and gas field development. These linkages seem, however, to be of a more extensive and direct nature in the new committee. The general environmental policy seems to have acquired a stronger influence on oil and gas field development cases following the establishment of the Committee on Energy and the Environment. The links also go in the reverse direction: in environmental cases, as in the report to parliament on climate policy, the petroleum sector received particular attention.32 Even though a few ‘external’ factors have to a certain extent affected the environmental attention of parliamentary committees, it seems reasonably clear that the changes in the committee structure have had an independent effect on the attention allocated to environmental aspects of petroleum and regional policy in committee recommendations. It has been interesting to observe how rapidly even such an old and distinguished institution as the Norwegian Storting can change. Some of the changes have been greater than what we had anticipated beforehand. Bearing this in mind, we should also add that the changes took place within the framework of essentially stable institutional conditions. The fundamental rules and routines of parliamentary proceedings were not altered. The committee system as such and the system regulating the proceedings and decisions of the parliament remained unchanged. The government’s propositions are still sent to standing committees which submit their recommendations to parliament before the issues are debated and voted upon in the plenary hall. What we have observed, however, is that the reorganization of the streams of choice opportunities, participants, problems, and solutions in the Norwegian Storting has indeed affected parliamentary policy-making. NOTES An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Nordic Political Science Association Congress, NOPSA 99, Uppsala, 19–21 August 1999. We would like to thank the participants in the workshop on Nordic Parliamentarism for useful

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comments, and Espen Movik, Oluf Langhelle, and Jan Einar Reiersen for their assistance and advice. The study was financed by the Research Council of Norway through the programme The Environment, Power, and Governance’. For more detailed analyses and documentation, see A.Farsund, E.Leknes and H. Rommetvedt, Stortingets miljøpolitiske reorganisering: komiteendring med konsekvenser (Stavanger: Rogalandsforskning, rapport RF-1999/095), and E.Leknes and H.Rommetvedt, ‘Miljø i olje’, Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift, Vol.15, No.2 (1999), pp. 123–54. 1. See Chapter 6, H.Espeli, Lobbyvirksomhet på Stortinget (Oslo: Tano Aschehoug, 1999), and J.E.Klausen and H.Rommetvedt (eds.), Miljøpolitikk. Organisasjonene, Stortinget og forvaltningen (Oslo: Tano Aschehoug, 1997). 2. See Chapter 3. 3. Innst. S. nr. 145 (1991–92). Innstilling fra Stortingets presidentskap om endringer i Stortingets forretningsorden, pp.15 and 18f. 4. Stortingsforhandlinger. Debatter m.v. i Stortinget. Nr. 44, 4.–5. mai, sesjonen 1991–92, p.3412. 5. Stortingsforhandlinger, p.3416. 6. M.D.Cohen, J.G.March and J.R.Olsen, ‘A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.17 (1992), pp.1–25; J.G. March and J.R.Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1976); and J.G. March and J.P.Olsen, ‘Garbage Can Models of Decision Making in Organizations’, in J.G. March and R.Weissinger-Baylon (eds.), Ambiguity and Command (Marshfield, MA: Pitman, 1986). 7. P.Lægreid and P.G.Roness, ‘Administrative Reform as Organized Attention’, in M.Egeberg and P.Lægreid (eds.), Organiiing Political Institutions. Essays for Johan P. Olsen (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1999). 8. J.G.March and J.R.Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions (New York: Free Press, 1989). 9. Lægreid and Roness, ‘Administrative Reform as Organized Attention’. 10. March and Olsen, ‘Garbage Can Models of Decision Making in Organizations’. 11. G.Hernes, ‘lnterest, Influence, and Cooperation: A Study of the Norwegian Parliament’, Ph.D. dissertation (Maryland: Johns Hopkins University, 1971), pp. 68ff. 12. G.Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1987). 13. See Chapter 3. 14. J.P.Olsen (ed.), Politisk organisering (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1978), p.90. 15. Cf. Section 12 in the Rules of Procedure of the Storting, before and after the reform in 1993. 16. Cf. March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions; N.Brunsson and J.P.Olsen, Makten att reformera (Stockholm: Carlssons, 1990); and J.P.Olsen, ‘Analyzing Institutional Dynamics’, Staatswissenshaften und Staatspraxis, Heft 2 (1992), pp. 247–71. 17. Lægreid and Roness, ‘Administrative Reform as Organized Attention’.

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18. H.Formo, Stortingets komiteer. Strukturendring, aktivisering og saksdefinering. Hovedfagsoppgave (Bergen: Institutt for administrasjon og organisasjonsvitenskap, 1998). 19. H.Formo, Stortingets komiteer, p.42. 20. A member of the committee was appointed Minister of the Environment in November 1990. 21. Cf. Chapters 8 and 9, and S.Rokkan, ‘Geography, Religion, and Social Class. Crosscutting Cleavages in Norwegian Politics’, in S.M.Lipset and S.Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1967). 22. The Storting documents are listed in Leknes and Rommetvedt, ‘Miljø i olje’, p.153. 23. The government has the authority to make the decision regarding field developments if the investments amount to less than NOK 5000 millions. 24. The Storting’s deliberations of localization issues related to Sleipner East and Snorre are analyzed in Chapter 9. 25. Interview in the Ministry of Oil and Energy, 15 Nov. 1995. 26. Interviews in the State Pollution Control Authority 13 May, and the Directorate for Nature Management 14 May 1997. 27. Innst. S. nr. 237 1992–93: Innstilling fra kommunal og miljøvernkomiteen om den regionale planlegging og arealpolitikken. 28. Innst. S. nr. 219 1996–97: Innstilling fra energi- og miljøkomiteen om regional planlegging og arealpolitikk. 29. Innst. S. nr. 231 1992–93: Innstilling fra kommunal og miljøvernkomiteen om regional utvikling (‘By og land hand i hand’). 30. Innst. S. nr. 242 1996–97: Innstilling fra kommunalkomiteen om distrikts- og regionalpolitikken. 31. Cf. MILJØSOK—oljeindustrien tar ansvar (Oslo: MILJØSOK-styringsgruppen, 1996); and Leknes and Rommetvedt, ‘Miljø i olje’. 32. St.meld. nr. 41 (1994–95): Om norsk politikk mot klimaendring og utslipp av nitrogenoksider (NOX).

CHAPTER 5 Coalition Governments and the Management of Party Relations

For a long time political scientists have been preoccupied with the study of coalition government formation. To some extent, they have also addressed the question of coalition duration and termination. Summing up several studies, Laver and Schofield describe four types of factors explaining coalition government stability:1 (1) Attributes of the overall political system, i.e. the number of parties, the ‘size’ of the party system, the presence of anti-system parties, the degree of ideological polarization, the level of policy influence open to the opposition, the salience of elections to the government formation process, and the presence of a formal investiture requirement. (2) Coalition attributes, like the cabinet’s majority or minority status, minimal winning or surplus governments, and the ideological compatibility of coalition members. (3) The bargaining environment, with a key distinction between multi-polar systems on the one hand, and bi-polar and uni-polar (centre) systems on the other, with uni-polar (off-centre) systems in an intermediate category. (4) The events approach, assuming that the fall of governments is caused by random events. As Laver and Schofield point out, analyses based on factors 1–3 are ‘deterministic’ in the sense that all the information used to predict a government’s duration is known when the government is formed.2 The events approach, on the other hand, is ‘randomistic’. The knowledge of why some events are ‘criticarl’ or ‘terminal’ is limited. A common feature of all four perspectives presented by Laver and Schofield, and of most of the literature I have read, is the lack of attention paid to the political leaders’ efforts to organize and manage relations between relevant actors in a way that is suitable for the operation and preservation of the government. The aim of this chapter is to fill in some of these blank spots. It is based on a study of five coalition governments established in post-war Norway (see Table 5.1). The Bondevik government from 1997 is not included in this study.3 In addition to using written sources like political memoirs and biographies, I have interviewed four of the five prime ministers, several ministers and state secretaries, MPs, party leaders and party secretaries.4

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TABLE 5.1 COALITION GOVERNMENTS IN POST-WAR NORWAY (PM’s PARTY LISTED FIRST)

THE PARTY-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM AND THE COALITION APPARATUS Rudy Andeweg suggests that cabinet decision-making is structured by two sources of disagreement: the departments headed by cabinet ministers, and the parties or factions these ministers represent.5 The first source of disagreement is obviously relevant to both one-party and coalition governments. Even though the second source is relevant to one-party governments, its salience is most obvious to coalition governments. The departments or ministries and the parties are certainly among the most important organizations or organizational elements in this connection. A comprehensive list of sources of disagreement needs, however, to take into account several other elements as well. The party-parliamentary system, as we may call it, is a complicated network consisting of inter- and intra-organizational relations between a number of elements. Figure 5.1 maps this system in periods with a three-party non-socialist coalition government, i.e. 1983–86 and 1989–90. It is a great challenge to the political leaders to manage these network relations and to operate this complicated system in a manner that promotes co-ordinated decision-making and action. The maintenance of the coalition and the coalition government’s ability to pursue its policy goals depend on the political leader’s ability to take care of this task of organization and co-ordination. There is no comprehensive theory describing how to fulfil this task. The aim of this chapter is not to present such a theory. It is limited to the presentation of some of the devices used to handle this challenge in the Norwegian cases. The ‘modes of executive-legislative relations’ we shall concentrate on are the inter-party and intra-party modes.6 Actually, a fruitful point of departure is still the ‘Notes Toward Theories of Coalition Behavior’ published by Sven Groennings more than 30 years ago. As Groennings points out, ‘one frequently encounters the assumption that, for analytical purposes, coalition maintenance is simply repeated coalition formation’.7 However, this assumption is not adequate. Groennings emphasizes the need to identify the maintenance variables and to theorize about the impact and relationships of these variables. He presents a model of coalition

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FIGURE 5.1 THE NORWEGIAN PARTY-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM

maintenance based on four types of variables related to each party participating in the coalition: (a) motivation and communication variables; (b) situational variables; (c) compatibility variables; and (d) strategic variables. Some of these variables are clearly related to factors mentioned in the above references to Laver and Schofield’s work. In our context, the most interesting aspect of Groennings’ model is the interaction of these variables through the coalition apparatus which is established when a governing coalition is formed. This coalition apparatus is based on some sort of initial agreement as to policies and positions, decision-making and contact structures, and rules of the game. The apparatus variables in the model are: (a) positions and the nature of leadership; (b) programmes; (c) committees;

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(d) decision-making model; and (e) rules of the game.8 In addition to apparatus variables we will include some aspects of what Groennings calls communication variables. POLICY STATEMENTS AND PROGRAMMES As Groennings points out, the coalition parties ‘normally issue an extensive statement of their lowest common denominator of purposes. ... This statement, perhaps synopsized from party programs and parliamentary committee reports, will constitute the government’s initial programmatic framework’.9 This applies to Norwegian reality as well. The coalition formation process in Norway starts with negotiations concerning the coalition’s policies. In fact, these negotiations may start long before the formation of a coalition government. In the heyday of the Norwegian Labour Party, which controlled a majority in the Norwegian Parliament from 1945 to 1961, the non-socialist parties tried to show their ability to govern by establishing pre-election coalitions or declarations to the effect that the parties would collaborate to form a coalition government if warranted by the outcome of the election. During the 1950s and at the beginning of the 1960s, they did not, however, succeed in working out any common platforms. This was due to non-socialist disagreement on policy issues in the Norwegian Parliament—the Storting. A prerequisite for the agreement on a pre-election coalition declaration seems to be a very low level of conflict or disunity between the parties in the Storting during the period before the election.10 When the Labour Party lost its majority in the Storting at the election in 1961, it was because of the new Socialist People’s Party which won a pivotal position with its two seats in parliament. In 1963 the Socialist People’s Party voted in favour of a motion of no confidence against the Labour government during the debate on the so-called King’s Bay issue, which had its origin in several mining accidents in Spitsbergen. Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen had to resign, and the Conservatives, under their leader John Lyng, formed a coalition government with the Centre Party, the Christian People’s Party and the Liberal Party. Owing to the fact that there was a socialist majority in parliament, it was quite obvious that the Lyng government would not last for long. During the inaugural speech debate, Labour and the Socialist People’s Party proposed motions of no confidence, and Lyng resigned after four weeks in office. In his memoirs, Lyng writes that, at first, he considered making a government declaration which only discussed the parliamentary principles debated in connection with the King’s Bay issue.11 These principles concerned the government’s relations with and obligations towards the parliament. Lyng, however, reached another conclusion. He wanted to use the occasion to work out a comprehensive manifesto which to some extent, though not formally, could serve as a common programme for the coalition parties. This could be of great importance before the election in 1965.

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The Lyng government’s declaration was worked out by a committee with one representative from each party. The discussions concerning the declaration helped ‘cleaning up’ disagreements between the non-socialist parties. The parties had to make compromises on some issues, but according to Lyng it was not difficult to reach such compromises. Quite a lot of disagreement, which had a historical background, was no longer relevant. Lyng’s biographer, Lars Roar Langslet, maintains that this work went quite smoothly because Lyng was willing to give substantial concessions regarding issues close to the other parties’ hearts.12 He wanted to kill old myths about the Conservative Party and to move it towards the political centre. Formally, the non-socialist parties have never prepared a common programme prior to elections. After the Lyng coalition they succeeded in establishing a coalition before the election in 1965. The declaration was limited to a statement on the non-socialist parties’ ability and willingness to form a coalition government. In reality, however, extensive common remarks in the recommendation made by the Finance Committee in the Storting, concerning the government’s long-term programme for the next four-year election period, served more or less as an election programme for the coalition parties. The coalition parties won the election, and Per Borten from the Centre Party formed a new coalition government. Coalition government formation in Norway starts with negotiations concerning policies. The distribution of ministries is negotiated after the parties have reached an agreement on policies. During negotiations concerning the coalition’s policy documents, it is the goal of each party to influence policies in accordance with their own preferences. To some extent, we may say that the distribution of ‘policy rewards’ is decided by these documents. The parties sign a protocol and issue a statement on the government’s policies. To a large extent this protocol and statement are based on and refer to the remarks in the Finance Committee’s recommendation concerning the government’s long-term programme. Together these three documents form the programme of the coalition government. A number of the formulations used in these programmatic documents seem rather vague and indistinct. The public documents do not present concise directions for action. Nevertheless, the importance of the goals presented in the documents was underlined in interviews with members of the Willoch government, especially by the Prime Minister. An important function of these documents was related to the management of party relations. The documents served as a co-ordinating device for the coalition parties. With reference to this ‘contract’, the Conservative Prime Minister Kåre Willoch could avoid or at least reduce the problems connected with the middle parties’ claims for public expenditures. It should be added that when the Willoch coalition was formed in 1983, the parties made a secret deal in addition to the official declaration and negotiation protocol.

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Policy compromises are necessary to facilitate the formation of coalitions. The participating parties need, however, to maintain their profiles concerning vital issues. Thus, the Willoch government’s declaration contained a statement saying that the parties were free to pursue their differing views on the abortion issue. Without this statement, the Christian People’s Party would not have participated in the coalition. A similar formulation was also included in the Syse government’s declaration in 1989. The Syse declaration also contained a statement on differences in the parties’ views on alcohol. Most important, however, was the so-called ‘suicidal paragraph’ in the declaration from the Syse government. The paragraph ensured the parties’ freedom of action concerning Norway’s connection with the EC. This freedom was vital to the Centre Party’s participation. Later, disagreement concerning the EC/EFTA negotiations on the European Economic Area led to the dissolution of the Syse government in 1990. DECISION-MAKING MODEL AND RULES OF THE GAME Relations between coalition parties are regulated by explicit and implicit rules. As pointed out by Groennings, dissent is bound to occur in any coalition.13 The question for coalition maintenance is how it should be handled. There are basically two decision-making models, the unanimity model and the dissent model. In the dissent model, disagreement can be handled ‘either by presenting coalition proposals with the dissent appended or announced or by allowing the dissenting party to propose, on the floor of the parliament, certain bills which it will make clear would not be a basis for cabinet proposals’. According to Groennings, it seems that ‘if the dissent model were adopted, conflict would be minimized and both durability and legislative output would be increased. However, apparently every coalition opts for the unanimity model, presumably to minimize the opposition’s opportunities to exploit differences within the coalition and to promote a spirit of consensus’.14 This view applies to Norway as well. The basic decision-making model of Norwegian coalition governments seems to be the unanimity model. Each party has a veto, ensuring that the coalition will not put forward proposals to which the party is deeply opposed. There have been, however, different views on how consistently this model should be followed in practice. We have already seen examples deviating from the unanimity principle in the pre-election and government declarations of the coalition parties. During the Borten government’s time in office, the ministers were allowed to dissent. Prime Minister Borten regarded this as a safety valve necessary to prevent the frustration which would occur if the ministers were forced to support a proposal against their will. According to Borten’s opinion, the members’ patience will corrode in a ‘streamlined’ coalition.15 Prime Minister Willoch, on the other hand, strongly opposed ministers’ dissent within his government. Willoch, who was Minister of Trade in Borten’s

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government, feared that if one party was allowed to present alternative proposals and was thus released from the common responsibility, then other parties would be tempted to make similar claims. Consequently, the coalition would risk too much disagreement to govern efficiently, and might even fall apart as the Borten government did in 1971. It is easier to avoid policy conflicts within the coalition when ministers’ dissent is ruled out of accepted practice.16 Prime Minister Willoch also underlined the importance of showing agreement between the coalition parties outside the cabinet. This view was not, however, shared by all the coalition leaders. In interviews with this author, some of the centrally positioned persons during Willoch’s time in office maintained that Willoch’s ‘strict regime’ caused frustration. After the Willoch government the pendulum swung back. At the 1985 election the coalition government lost its parliamentary majority. Prime Minister Willoch resigned in 1986 when the Progress Party voted against the government together with Labour and the Socialist Left Party. In the spring of 1987 the Conservatives, the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party tried to establish a new coalition. The three parties, however, had conflicting views on several policy issues. When I discussed the situation with the parliamentary leader of the Conservatives, Jan P.Syse, in March 1987, he maintained that the potential coalition partners should be given some latitude concerning policies. The parties should be allowed to flag the policy preferences close to their hearts.17 When Syse formed a new coalition government after the election in 1989, he thus allowed the coalition parties more voice than Prime Minister Willoch had. This points towards decentralization and self-governance as a means of managing conflict. Together with problem-solving and bargaining, selfgovernance has been a predominant policy style developed in Norway since 1945.18 As Olsen points out, The enlarged public agenda has been countered by a delegation of authority from the Cabinet to the individual minister, making him or her more independent’.19 The opinion expressed by Syse indicates that this kind of delegation may be used to manage conflicts of interest and reduce tension between coalition partners as well. It is quite possible, however, that this strategy is a ‘quasi resolution’ of conflict.20 POSITIONS So far, we have mainly been preoccupied with policy concerns. Considering the relationship between policy pursuit and office-seeking, Budge & Keman present the following possibilities: (1) office is valued for its own sake; (2) office is sought as a means of advancing policy; (3) policy is valued as a means of achieving office; and (4) policy is pursued for its own sake.21 In Norway, the second proposition is the most relevant one. Office-seeking is primarily a way to promote policy goals. In their expert survey Laver and Hunt asked whether cabinet portfolios are valued by politicians more as rewards of

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TABLE 5.2 MINISTRIES ASSUMED TO BE PREFERRED BY COALITION PARTIES

office or as the means to affect policy. The study covers 24 countries and shows that Norway is the country in which policy pay-offs appear to be most important.22 Since parties with particular preferences are likely to disagree with other parties, this circumstance represents a dilemma to the coalition. Groennings hypothesized that ‘if a party with a record of dissent in a particular policy field gains the leadership of the department centrally involved, the coalition’s stability will be threatened from the department’.23 What, then, is the Norwegian solution to this dilemma? To answer this question, we need information on the parties’ ranking of ministries. Since we have no data showing this ranking directly, we have to make some indirect assumptions. In 1977 Professor Gudmund Hernes interviewed the MPs and asked which of the standing committees in the Norwegian Storting are most important for carrying through the party programme. The responsibilities of the 12 specialized committees largely correspond to the scope of the ministries. Hence, assumptions about preferred ministries may be based on the parties’ evaluation of the standing committees in parliament.24 Table 5.2 shows the conclusions we may draw concerning the parties’ preferences of ministries. As shown in the table, the names and scope of some of the ministries have changed over the years. However, the changes have been moderate. The distribution of the preferred ministries in the Norwegian coalition governments is presented in Table 5.3, which covers a total of 32 ministerial positions. Twenty positions, almost two-thirds of all positions, were allocated to parties assumed to have a particular preference for the respective ministries, i.e. ministries distributed to the parties underlined. In other words, it looks as if the parties involved in the coalitions did not attach decisive importance to the element of risk which Groennings warned against. This conclusion does not mean that attention has not been paid to the problem raised by Groennings. On

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TABLE 5.3 DISTRIBUTION OF PREFERRED MINISTRIES IN NORWEGIAN COALITION GOVERNMENTS

the contrary, in his memoirs Prime Minister John Lyng writes that the appointment of Hans Borgen as Minister of Agriculture in 1963 caused some worries. Could Borgen, who represented the Centre (Agrarian) Party and who held leading positions within agricultural organizations, become a minister with too much power? Prime Minister Lyng, however, did not share this anxiety. In his opinion other persons within the government could redress the balance.25 Similar objections were put forward when Kjell Bondevik was appointed Minister of Church and Education in the Borten government in 1965. Bondevik represented the Christian People’s Party, which on several occasions prior to the formation of the government had made dissenting remarks in the recommendations from the Standing Committee on Church and Education, showing their disagreement with the coalition partners.26 The protests came especially from the Liberals, and even from some Conservative MPs.27 An unusual situation occurred when Kåre Willoch (Conservatives) formed a coalition government in 1983. Normally, the Christian People’s Party would have a claim to the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. However, the Christians, who disagreed with the Conservatives on the abortion issue, refrained from this claim. In 1981, when the non-socialist parties achieved a majority in parliament, the Christian People’s Party did not want to participate in the government because of this disagreement. Hence, the Conservatives formed a minority government with parliamentary support from the Centre Party and the Christian People’s Party. In 1983 the Christians joined the Conservatives and formed a coalition government together with the Centre Party. The Christian People’s Party did not, however, want to ‘administer’ an abortion law which they could not accept and which they could not persuade their coalition partners to change. The political leadership of a Norwegian ministry includes the positions of state secretary (junior minister) and political advisor (or political secretary) to the

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minister. The composition of the political staff of the ministry is hypothesized by Groennings, who expects that ‘more than one party will be represented in the highest echelons within each department’.28 An idea which immediately suggests itself is to manage party relations and coordinate policies by appointing representatives from different parties as minister, state secretary and political advisor of each ministry. Normally, this has not, however, been the case in Norway. With very few exceptions, the political staff of each ministry has been composed of politicians from one party only. Looking back on the first four years in office of the Borten government, Solstad maintains that ‘ln contrast to what has been the case with coalition governments in other countries, there has been no attempt at creating any sort of political balance by, for example, nominating a deputy minister of a different party allegiance to the cabinet minister’s’.29 During the formation of the Lyng government in 1963 there was an implicit understanding that each minister could choose a state secretary from his own party. Prime Minister Lyng himself, however, appointed a member of the Liberal Party as state secretary and press spokesman.30 In 1983, when the Willoch coalition was formed, Eivind Reiten, member of the Centre Party, was appointed one of the state secretaries in the Ministry of Finance, even though the minister, Rolf Presthus, was a Conservative. When Reiten became Minister of Fisheries in 1985, the Ministry of Finance gained a state secretary from the Christian People’s Party and a political advisor from the Centre Party. The Conservative Minister of Health and Social Affairs also had a state secretary from the Christian People’s Party. In the Syse government from 1989 to 1990, the Minister of Finance was a Conservative, while one of his state secretaries represented the Christian People’s Party. Interviewing central persons in the Willoch government I found no evidence indicating that the ‘mixed’ appointments were intended to create political balance or to improve co-ordination between parties. These appointments were made in order to solve the problems connected with the allocation of ministerial positions. A state secretary could count as something like half a minister. The solution is described as a last resort, not as a generally recommendable arrangement. The experience with the ‘mixed’ variety of political leadership, however, seems to be positive. The co-operation between Minister of Finance Rolf Presthus and State Secretary Eivind Reiten was very good. According to their own views this was mainly due to ‘personal chemistry’.31 It is possible, however, that Norwegian politicians in general underestimate the co-ordinating and consensus-building effect of mixing parties in each ministry’s political staff. COMMUNICATION AND CO-ORDINATION As we have already mentioned, committees are among the apparatus variables included in Groennings’ model of coalition maintenance. The number of cabinet committees and the formal allocation of their membership and responsibilities

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are of interest in seeing how a government co-ordinates its tasks, ensures consultation and resolves conflicts.32 The most important ‘committee’ is the full cabinet. The Willoch government may serve as an illustration in this respect. During its time in office, all the ministers met with each other three times a week. They held a government conference on Mondays, a preparatory State Council meeting on Thursdays, and the official State Council meeting at the Royal Castle on Fridays. Thus, the full government could co-ordinate the ministers’ work quite often. In addition to the formal meetings, the ministers used to have informal discussions to co-ordinate their views during the joint lunches held at these meetings. Some of the ministers also used the opportunity to consult each other during the car ride from the government building to State Council meetings at the Royal Castle. In particular, the government conferences on Mondays had an important coordinating function in the Willoch government. On these occasions the parliamentary party leaders of the coalition parties met with the ministers as well. The government used the opportunity to inform the parliamentary leaders about important issues coming up, and to receive their reactions to the ministers’ proposals. This co-ordinating ‘mechanism’ was also applied by the Borten government, but was not as effective as in the Willoch government, mainly due to Prime Minister Borten’s style of leadership. The parliamentary leader of the Christian People’s Party, Lars Korvald, felt that the government was suffering from lack of decision-making ability. Too often, discussions ended with the Prime Minister postponing decisions on complicated matters. After a while Korvald asked to be excused from the ‘endless’ meetings.33 Full government meetings are important for co-ordination of policies. Nevertheless, the size of the full cabinet (15–19 members) makes it difficult to resolve severe conflicts within the coalition. Hence, the Willoch government appointed a ‘government’s sub-committee’ to handle such problems. Officially, there is no inner cabinet in Norway. In practice, however, the sub-committee functioned as an inner cabinet or inner circle within the Willoch government. The sub-committee worked out compromises which the full cabinet normally accepted. Members of this committee were Prime Minister Kåre Willoch and Minister of Finance Rolf Presthus, Minister of Church and Education Kjell Magne Bondevik and Minister of Transport and Communication Johan J. Jakobsen. The choice of the first two members, both Conservatives, was obvious due to their positions in the government. The other two became members not due to the importance of their ministries, but due to their positions as chairmen of the party organizations of the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party respectively. In other words, the main task of the sub-committee was to make compromises between parties, not to co-ordinate ministries. As Eriksen points out, the Willoch government organized its work somewhat differently from other Norwegian governments.34 To a larger extent than before,

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TABLE 5.4 MINISTERS AND IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT COMMITTEES IN THE WILLOCH GOVERNMENT

Notes: a The Minister of Fisheries was a Conservative until 1985. After the election in 1985 a member of the Centre Party was appointed Minister of Fisheries.

policy issues were prepared by permanent and ad hoc committees with members from all three coalition parties. In addition to the sub-committee, the following committees are assessed by Berggrav as the most important: the Economy Committee, the Security Committee, the Research Committee, the Labour Committee, the Polar Committee, and the Petroleum Committee.35 The composition of these committees is presented in Table 5.4. Some of the committees were established by the Conservative one-party government led by Prime Minister Willoch from 1981 to 1983. In this period the committee members were all heads of ministries involved with their respective committee’s policy issues and therefore they represented their ministries. In 1983, when the coalition government was formed, additional members were appointed to ensure the representation of all three parties participating in the coalition. In order to represent the Centre Party, the Minister of Transport and Communication became a member of the Economy Committee, and the Minister of Environment was appointed member of the Polar Committee. The Christian People’s Party was represented by the Minister of Petroleum and Energy in the Security and Polar Committees. When the Petroleum Committee was established in 1984, the Minister of Agriculture became a member in order to represent the Centre Party.

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In earlier coalition governments the use of government committees was rather limited when compared with the Willoch government. During the Borten and Korvald governments the state secretaries played a more important role as party co-ordinators. Issues which created problems between the coalition parties were left to state secretaries to deal with. They met every Friday to discuss important issues, and state secretary committees were also appointed to take care of coordination problems and conflicts.36 R RELATIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT, PARLIAMENT AND PARTY John Lyng, who was Prime Minister in the first Norwegian coalition government, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in the second coalition, the Borten government. In his memoirs he takes up the relations between the government, the parliamentary party groups and the party organizations in a coalition. With reference to the British politician Leo Amery, Lyng describes this relationship as follows: ‘A government coalition is like a pyramid with a weak foundation. It is tightly connected at the top, i.e. within the cabinet. As one moves downwards from the top to the foundation, the ties become looser’.37 As Lyng points out, this is explained by the fact that the ministers are a relatively small group of people having almost daily contact with each other. The cabinet members have to act as a unit within the political environment. They have common responsibilities towards parliament. Hence, they develop a sense of common interests and solidarity. The co-operation within the coalition is more complicated on the parliamentary level. The number of politicians involved is larger, and they have less contact with each other. The temptation to operate on their own is greater, due to the competition between MPs and parties. The competition is even keener between the foundations of the parties, i.e. the central and local organizations. Lyng maintains that these organizations take care of the daily contact with voters. They are responsible for attracting voters’ support. Parties that are relatively close to each other, like members of a coalition, are competing for the same voters. What one party gains, another coalition member is likely to lose. Consequently, Lyng says, coalitions are rather short-lived, while parties have a natural proclivity to survive as long as possible.38 Earlier in this chapter attention was drawn to two sources of disagreement suggested by Andeweg; the ministries and the parties.39 Lyng points out a third source of disagreement, namely the functional specialization of the various parts of each party. The formation of a coalition government implies that the functional differentiation is extended. Consequently, the potential for intra-party conflict is enlarged, and the management of intra-party relations becomes more important. The main functions of the party organization are to work out the party manifesto and to organize the election campaign. The party organization is expected to emphasize its peculiar policy profile to attract voters.40 Interparty relations are

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characterized by disagreement and competition. The party’s government members, on the other hand, have to co-operate with their coalition partners. They have to build compromises and to emphasize agreement with their colleagues within the government. Difference and unity are the catchwords attached to the main functions of the party organization and the government respectively. The parliamentary party’s function is two-sided. The MPs constitute the parliamentary foundation of the coalition government. They have to ensure parliamentary support for the cabinet. Hence, they have to agree with their coalition partners on major issues. At the same time, however, the MPs have to show their parties’ ability to fulfil their promises to the voters and to implement the policies advocated in their respective election programmes. The parliamentary party has to manage both co-operation and competition. Cooperation and compromise are mainly taken care of by the parties’ members in the standing committees in parliament. Plenary debates are the arena for competition, where parties emphasize their own particular abilities. The importance of the two major functions is illustrated in Figure 5.2. The different parts of the party are ranked according to the degree of co-ordination with other parties. The potential for intra-party conflict connected with the functional specialization within parties is large. Hence, the aim of coalition leaders is to manage intra-party relations so as to reduce and avoid such conflicts. The importance of contact and communication between the various parts of the party is obvious. We have already mentioned that parliamentary leaders of the coalition parties normally attended the regular government meetings on Mondays. Thus, the parliamentary party leader plays the role of liaison officer between the party’s government members and its MPs. When the non-socialist parties have participated in pre-election and government coalitions, they have established a common coalition faction within each of the standing committees in parliament. Ministers have communicated directly with MPs at regular meetings arranged every Wednesday between the coalition faction of each committee and the relevant minister. During these meetings, the minister has discussed with the MPs matters under preparation in the ministry. Hence, the MPs have been given an opportunity to influence the government’s and ministers’ policies. In my interviews with MPs, some of them underlined the fact that the information given at these meetings represents an advantage to the coalition MPs compared with their opponents. The integrating effect of this practice is relevant to both intra-party and inter-party relations. It seems natural to expect that the parliamentary groups of the coalition parties would arrange common meetings with cabinet members. This, however, has not been the case in Norway. Common group meetings have been held on a few exceptional occasions only. Neither have individual ministers from one party met with the parliamentary groups of the other coalition parties. Traditionally, the parliamentary group is the most influential part of the nonsocialist parties in Norway. The party organization used to be a campaign

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FIGURE 5.2 SPECIALIZED FUNCTIONS OF DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE PARTIES

organization rather than a policy-making body. This has changed over the years. Lars Korvald, who was Prime Minister in the third coalition, maintains that the 1970s was the era of the party organization.41 The party organization engaged political advisors, and the central board of the party became a policy-making body to a greater extent than before. The politicization of the party organization influenced intra-party and coalition relations. Consequently, the position of the party chairman was influenced as well. When Minister of Finance Rolf Presthus was elected chairman of the Conservative party organization in 1986, it was considered whether he should leave the cabinet to concentrate on party work. However, the chairmen of the Christan People’s Party and the Centre Party protested. They feared that Presthus would be free to push interests specific to the Conservative Party in a way which they, as members of the cabinet, could not do. As a result of this discussion, Presthus remained in government. He was, however, appointed Minister of Defence in order to reduce his workload. This question was also relevant at the formation of the Syse government. The chairman of the Centre Party, Johan J. Jakobsen, was uncertain whether or not to become a cabinet member. After pressure from Prime Minister Syse, he let himself be appointed Minister of Local Government. On both occasions the coalitions chose a strategy of co-option. The co-option of party chairmen was met with some scepticism within the party organization. A kind of compensation was established in order to reduce this scepticism and to give the party chairmen the opportunity to show their parties’ ability to influence policies. As Minister of Finance during most of the

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Willoch government’s term of office, Rolf Presthus had the task of limiting public expenditures. His job was to say no when other ministers asked for more money. However, the ministers of Transport and of Church and Education, who were also chairmen of the Centre Party and the Christian People’s Party respectively, were given a little extra, a ‘chairman’s surplus’, when they asked for money. According to Presthus, this practice caused some envy among other ministers.42 CONCLUSION Coalition governments operate within a complicated network consisting of a great number of organizational elements. This network, or the partyparliamentary system as we have called it, represents a great challenge to the leaders of the coalition parties. They have to organize relations between elements with different functions, thus representing a considerable potential for conflict. Executive-legislative relations, as well as inter- and intra-party relations have to be managed by the leaders. Five Norwegian coalition governments have served as illustrative cases showing how these relations have been managed in practice. The coalition leaders’ task is two-sided. In order to ensure the coalition’s ability to govern, the coalition parties have to co-ordinate decision-making and action. At the same time, they try to influence coalition policies in accordance with their own peculiar preferences. The coalition partners are also concerned with the preservation of party profiles in order to attract voters. In short, the coalition leaders and parties have to manage unity and difference at the same time. Government coalitions establish a coalition apparatus with lines of communication intended to resolve this problem. Party leaders organizing Norwegian coalitions have chosen quite similar patterns of organization. Party chairmen are appointed as ministers, all parties participating in the coalition are represented in government committees, parliamentary party leaders meet regularly with the cabinet, etc. These are devices used to co-ordinate parties’ and politicians’ views and actions. On the other hand, ministries are allocated to parties with special preferences, and normally one party only is represented in the political leadership of each ministry. Thus, characteristic party profiles are preserved. The similarities between Norwegian government coalitions’ patterns of organization are obvious. It is, however, interesting to note variations in the management of party relations. The priority given to co-ordination and unity versus party differences has varied, especially among the prime ministers of Norwegian coalition governments. In this respect, the pendulum seems to swing back and forth, indicating a sequential attention to inconsistent goals.43 The kind of sequential attention paid to shifting goals which is involved here, seems to be connected mainly with the formation of new coalition governments learning from

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earlier experiences. What the movement of the pendulum indicates is that there is no final solution to the difference-unity dilemma. NOTES This chapter is based on H. Rommetvedt: ‘Norwegian Coalition Government and the Management of Party Relations’, Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol.17, No. 3 (1994). I would like to thank the participants at the workshop The Core Executive and the Management of Party Relations’, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Leiden, 2–8 April 1993, for useful comments. 1. M.Laver and N.Schofield, Multiparty Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990), pp. 144 ff. 2. Laver and Schofield, Multiparty Government, p.158. 3. See Chapter 2. 4. Cf. H.Rommetvedt, Partiavstand og partikoalisjoner (Stavanger: Rogaland Research, 1991). 5. R.B.Andeweg, ‘Centrifugal Forces and Collective Decision-Making: The Case of the Dutch Cabinet’, European Journal of Political Research, Vol.16 (1988), pp. 125–51. 6. A.King, ‘Modes of Executive–Legislative Relations: Great Britain, France, and West-Germany’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol.1 (1976), pp. 11–36. 7. S.Groennings, ‘Notes Toward Theories of Coalition Behavior in Multiparty Systems: Formation and Maintenance’, in S.Groennings, E.W. Kelley and M. Leiserson (eds.), The Study of Coalition Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp.460 ff. 8. Groennings, ‘Notes Toward Theories of Coalition Behavior in Multiparty Systems: Formation and Maintenance’, p.460. 9. Groennings, ‘Notes Toward Theories of Coalition Behavior in Multiparty Systems: Formation and Maintenance’, p.461. 10. See Chapter 2, and Rommetvedt, Partiavstand og partikoalisjoner. 11. J.Lyng, Vaktskifte: Erindringer 1953–1965 (Oslo: Cappelen, 1973), pp.200 ff. 12. L.R.Langslet, John Lyng: Samarbeidets arkitekt (Oslo: Cappelen, 1989), p.173. 13. Groennings, ‘Notes Toward Theories of Coalition Behavior in Multiparty Systems: Formation and Maintenance’, pp.461 ff. 14. Groennings, ‘Notes Toward Theories of Coalition Behavior in Multiparty Systems: Formation and Maintenance’, p.462. 15. Interview by author, 14 March 1987. 16. Interview by author, 1 April 1987. 17. Interviews by author, 30 March 1987, and by the newspaper Verdens Gang, 4 April 1987. 18. J.P.Olsen, Organized Democracy (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1983), p.188. 19. Olsen, Organized Democracy, p.89. 20. R.M.Cyert and J.G.March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp.117 ff.

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21. I.Budge and H.Keman, Parties and Democracy. Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp.27 ff. 22. M.Laver and W.B.Hunt, Policy and Party Competition (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp.70 ff. 23. Groennings, ‘Notes Toward Theories of Coalition Behavior in Multiparty Systems: Formation and Maintenance’, p.461. 24. Cf. Rommetvedt, Partiavstand og partikoalisjoner, p.291, and Chapter 8. 25. Lyng, Vaktskifte: Erindringer 1953–1965, pp.183 ff. 26. Rommetvedt, Partiavstand og partikoalisjoner, p. 144. 27. J.Lyng, Mellom øst og vest: Erindringer 1965–1968 (Oslo: Cappelen, 1976), p.40. 28. Groennings, ‘Notes Toward Theories of Coalition Behavior in Multiparty Systems: Formation and Maintenance’, p.461. 29. A.Solstad, ‘The Norwegian Coalition System’, Scandinavian Political Studies, Yearbook 4 (1969), p.164. 30. Lyng, Vaktskifte: Erindringer 1953–1965, p.190. 31. Interviews by author, 2 April 1987 and 3 April 1987. 32. T.T.Mackie and B.W.Hogwood, ‘Decision-making in Cabinet Government’, in T.T.Mackie and B.W.Hogwood (eds.), Unlocking the Cabinet (London: Sage, 1985), p.2. 33. L.Korvald and P.Ø. Heradstveit, Politikk og kall: Lars Korvalds memoarer i samarbeid med Per Øyvind Heradstveit (Stavanger: Rocon, 1982), pp.116 ff. 34. S.Eriksen, Herskap og tjenere (Oslo: TANO, 1988), p.45. 35. D.Berggrav, ‘Regjeringen’, in T.Nordby (ed.), Storting og regjering 1945–1985: Institusjoner—rekruttering (Oslo: Kunnskapsforlaget, 1985), p.41. 36. Eriksen, Herskap og tjenere, pp.51 ff. 37. Lyng, Mellom øst og vest: Erindringer 1965–1968, pp.326 ff. 38. Lyng, Mellom øst og vest: Erindringer 1965–1968, p.328. 39. Andeweg, ‘Centrifugal Forces and Collective Decision-Making: The Case of the Dutch Cabinet’. 40. This view ties in with the ‘directional theory’ proposed by G.Rabinowitz and S.E. Macdonald: ‘A Directional Theory of Issue Voting’, American Political Science Review, Vol.83 (1989), pp.93–121. It deviates from A.Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957). 41. Interview by author, 23 April 1987. 42. Interviews by author, 2 April 1987. 43. Cyert and March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, p.118.

CHAPTER 6 From Corporatism to Lobbyism? Parliaments, Executives and Organized Interests in Denmark and Norway PETER MUNK CHRISTIANSEN and HILMAR ROMMETVEDT

The integration of organized interests into public and administrative policymaking is core to the political structure of the Scandinavian countries. Numerous studies place the Scandinavian countries at the upper end on scales measuring the degree of integration of organized interests into public policy-making.1 In the Scandinavian countries legislation has often been prepared in boards and commissions or in other forms of close co-operation with organizations that represent the target groups of public policies. The implementation of public policies in many cases also involves organized interests as an integrated part of the implementation processes. However, significant changes in the position of organized interests in the policy-making process seem to have taken place during the last decades. It is not yet clear, however, what exactly the changes are, how they should be explained, or what their consequences are. The purpose of the article is two-fold. First we describe some of the changes that have taken place in the position of organized interests in the policy-making process in Denmark and Norway. We show that the relations between interest organizations and administrative actors are less institutionalized today compared to 20 years ago, and we show that today parliamentary actors have more intensive contacts with interest organizations than two decades ago. Secondly, departing from recent institutionalist theory, we delimit some of the explanations of the changing relations between interest organizations and parliaments. CORPORATISM AND LOBBYISM There are basically two kinds of institutions that govern the relations between organized interests and state actors, corporatism and lobbying. We define the corporatist channel of participation as an ‘incorporation of interest groups into the process of policy formation and implementation’.2 As an administrative model, corporatism covers the participation of organized interests through membership of boards, councils, committees etc., consultation, hearing, other formalized contacts, and often supported by a variety of informal contacts between bureaucrats and organized interests. Corporatism is in other words strongly institutionalized. When relations between organized interests and public authorities are mostly informal, ad hoc-based, and the degree of

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FIGURE 6.1 FOUR TYPES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND ORGANIZED INTERESTS

institutionalization is low, we talk of lobbyism. Applied to real-world phenomena, corporatism and lobbyism should be seen more as the two ends of a continuum than as discrete and distinct models. However, if we look at them as ideal types, we get the following pictures: Corporatism as an institution exactly specifies which organizations enjoy privileged access to decision-making arenas, whereas the rules for access are much more open and ambiguous under lobbyism. The corporatist structure has to be set up by the authorities, but when established the initiative for action can be taken by interest organizations as well as by public authorities. Decisions are reached through negotiations with status quo as the default rule, and the actors involved in corporatist policy-making can make de facto authoritative decisions. With lobbyism, the initiative primarily lies with interest organizations, the involvement of interest organizations in the decisionmaking process is consultation on an ad hoc basis, and the relevant interest organizations are not directly involved in authoritative decision-making. The strategies of interest organizations can be directed towards bureaucratic as well as parliamentary actors. By combining the two dimensions, institutionalization and direction, we get a fourfold typology as shown in Figure 6.1.3 Since parliamentary corporatism based on functional representation in legislature is not relevant in contemporary Scandinavia, we exclude this category from further analysis. Administrative and parliamentary lobbyism share some core characteristics. The rules governing behaviour tend to be ambiguous and the degree of institutionalization is low. However, they are also very different, because they incorporate different actors which are under very different constraints. From the perspective of control and interest maximizers in interest organizations, corporatist institutions imply strong mutual commitment between the actors involved, whereas lobbyism is less demanding. Lobbyism is a more flexible institution with a greater potential for change than corporatism.

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CORPORATIST POLICY-MAKING IN NORWAY AND DENMARK The strong integration of organized interests into political and administrative decision-making in the Scandinavian countries started in the late nineteenth century and was expanded during the first half of the twentieth century.4 The strongly increasing public regulations of the private sector following the two world wars and the economic crisis of the 1930s prepared the ground for the integration of organized interests into a large number of policy areas. By the end of World War II, corporatist structures were well established in Denmark and Norway.5 The first three decades of post-war development proved the viability of the corporatist policy-making system. Organizations came to hold a legitimate and institutionalized right to be involved in more or less all phases of political and administrative decision-making.6 Johansen and Kristensen find that issues that are ‘non-ideological, measurable, divisible, narrow and technical’ better facilitate corporatist structures compared to issues with a heavy ideological load and issues on very general questions.7 Organizations based on a functional division of labour, i.e. business organizations and labour organizations, in the private as well as the public labour market, developed the strongest ties to the administration.8 Numerous boards, committees and councils were established either on a temporary basis to come up with solutions to various problems or on a permanent basis, enabling interest organizations to become part of the administration through advisory or administrative roles. Boards and committees thus became involved on the input side of the political system as well as on the output side. Table 6.1 shows the development in the number of boards, committees, etc.9 Corporatist integration through these structures increased significantly from World War II and through the 1970s. In Sweden, interest organizations even appointed members to the governing boards of semiindependent state agencies.10 Less constraining, but still important, organizations were consulted through formal hearings in almost all proposals for legal and administrative rule-making which could be related to the interests of specific organizations. The integration of organized interests was also less formalized, but not necessarily less important. Interest organizations pursued a policy of creating and maintaining close contacts with civil servants and ministers. Some of the large industrial and labour market organizations even had daily contacts with civil servants at all levels in the central state administration.11 The development of strong corporatist structures apparently had consequences for the role of parliaments in public policy-making. In the mid-1960s, Norwegian political scientist Stein Rokkan described the two channels of representation, ‘numerical democracy’ ,and ‘corporate pluralism’. The balance between the two channels was formulated in the phrase ‘votes count, but resources decide’.12 It seemed to be a general observation that parliaments had come to play a smaller and smaller role in public policy-making. Some quotations may give an

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TABLE 6.1 NUMBER OF BOARDS, COUNCILS, COMMISSIONS ETC. IN DENMARK AND NORWAY, SELECTED YEARS 1936–95

impression of the assessment of the relative strength of the two channels of participation: Robert B. Kvavik, an American scholar who studied the role of interest organizations in Norway, was ‘surprised to discover the absence of “lobbyists"' in the Norwegian Parliament, the Storting. He observed that ‘legislation was shaped in the administration; once in parliament, the lines were fixed’.13 Having interviewed the leaders of interest organizations, Kvavik concluded that ‘parliamentary institutions receive an exceedingly weak evaluation’.14 In the conclusion on the Norwegian power study, Hernes wrote that there was agreement among the holders of power in the Norwegian society that power had been displaced ‘from the Storting towards the administration and the interest organizations’.15 The parliaments in Norway and Denmark seemed to play only a modest role in public policy-making. Apparently, these results were in close accordance with the literature on the ‘decline of legislature’ which dominated the study of policymaking in Western democracies in general and the study of parliaments in particular.16 To some extent, the observations made by students of corporatist participation on the limited role of parliaments in the Nordic countries are the result of a lack of scholarly interest in this role. When studying corporatism, one may be prone to look for signs of the strength of corporatism. However, to some extent the observed weaknesses of parliaments in the policy process also reflect a real development. DECLINE OF CORPORATISM? At the very same time as some of the above-mentioned statements on the limited role of the Nordic parliaments were published, other scholars observed that the picture might look somewhat different. In 1983 Johan P. Olsen, a colleague of Hernes in the Norwegian Power Study, claimed that ‘during the last part of the

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1970s the Storting became a more rather than less significant institution’.17 In 1981, Egeberg found that ‘not only ministries and agencies, but also the cabinet and the institutions of the Storting are core elements in the national environments of workers’ and business organizations’.18 Damgaard points to the increased activity of the Nordic parliaments in a number of respects.19 In The Strong Parliaments of Scandinavia’, he directly opposes the ‘decline of legislaturethesis’.20 Today, it is relevant to ask: Is corporatism on decline? In 1982, Johansen and Kristensen declared that ‘public committees have long since become one of the most important, if not the single most important, mode of interest mediation’.21 However, Table 6.1 shows that the use of boards, committees etc. has been reduced over recent decades. In Denmark, the number of committees peaked in 1980, as did the number of committees with members from interest organizations. In Norway the peak year for the total number of committees is registered as 1977. The decline in the number of commissions etc. during the 1980s and 1990s is significant in both countries. In Denmark, the proportion of committees with members from interest organizations rose from 1980 to 1990 (73, 77, and 84 per cent in 1980, 1985 and 1990) but fell significantly in 1995 (67 per cent). However, the absolute number, which is what counts in real-life policy-making, fell significantly. Further analysis of Danish data show that the reduction in the number of committees is much more significant for those dealing with the preparation of policy decisions than with the implementation of policies.22 In Norway the ratio of committees etc. with members from interest organizations did not change much after 1977, but the absolute number fell significantly. A parallel drop in the use of committees is also found in Sweden.23 If, as claimed by Johansen and Kristensen, boards, committees etc. are the main structural mechanism that links public bureaucracy to organized interests, it is clear that this institution has come under strong pressure.24 However, it cannot be concluded that the use of boards, committees etc. as a linking mechanism is insignificant. First, a significant number of committees still have members from interest organizations. More detailed analyses of Danish data show that the reduction in the number of committees is much less than average within ministries concerned with specific regulation, i.e. the traditional ‘corporatist’ ministries, such as Agriculture, Industry, Labour etc.25 Although a reduction is found in all types of ministries, the reduction is most significant in those responsible for public service production. This brings us to the second reservation. In Denmark and Norway, the public sector has become still more decentralized during the last two decades. More and more public sector management is taken care of at the local and regional levels. Third, the reduction in the number of committees etc. may to some extent also reflect the policies of the 1980s through which some reduction in the complexity of public sector organization was pursued. In some Danish ministries, a number of councils and committees were merged in order to reduce structural complexity without necessarily reducing the influence of interest organizations. Nordby

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correspondingly finds that many of the abolished Norwegian boards and committees were only of insignificant importance.26 Even with these reservations, we must conclude that the most institutionalized element of traditional corporatism is considerably less widespread in the 1990s than before. Representation on commissions and boards has, to some extent, been replaced by contacts with bureaucracies on a lower level of institutionalization. Table 6.2 shows that even if the number of commissions and boards has been reduced, the total frequency of contacts between interest organizations and administrative actors has increased from the beginning of the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s.27 It is interesting to observe that the least frequent type of contact (‘Yearly’) has increased more than the most frequent type of contact (‘Monthly'). In order to control for the effect of the changing population of interest organizations between the two years observed, we have separated the organizations represented both years in the two national studies so that we are able to compare the development over time for the same group of organizations. The figures for these organizations are shown in brackets in the tables. For all organizations, the increase in contacts is much larger in Denmark than in Norway. However, for the organizations represented in both years, the differences in contacts with the cabinet are of the same magnitude in the two countries, and for contacts to ministries and agencies the Danish organizations show a small drop in contacts and the Norwegian a small increase (Table 6.2, figures in parentheses). In Table 6.3, we have split the organizations into two groups. The first group— business and labour organizations—are the “traditional” partners in corporatist institutions and the other group consists of all other organizations. The table shows that the increase in administrative contacts is primarily found for ‘business and labour’ organizations. In Denmark, the group of other organizations has small increases in administrative contacts except for frequent contacts with ministries and agencies, which have dropped. In Norway, ‘other organizations’ contacts with cabinet and ministries are about the same in 1992 as in 1982, and contacts with agencies have dropped significantly, particularly the less frequent contacts. Again, the picture changes when we look at the organizations represented in both years. The Norwegian figures (in brackets) show that ‘other’ organizations have some increase in less frequent contacts with cabinet, ministries and agencies compared to Denmark where the figures for organizations represented both years are not that different from the figures for all organizations. In the Norwegian case, business and labour organizations represented both years generally have small increases in contacts with cabinet and ministries. Danish business and labour organizations represented both years have fewer contacts compared to all organizations. In Denmark there is also a significant increase in the proportion of organizations that assess contacts with administrative actors as important, cf.

Notes: 1. Includes all organizations. Contacts are defined as at least one contact per year. 2. The question was 'How often does your organization have contacts with the following types of public authorities?' 3. The question was 'Does your organization have regular contacts with the following types of public authorities?' 4. Organizations with contacts to parliament, parliamentary committees, MPs or party groups. 5. The cabinet is counted as part of the administration. 6. The Danish survey only counts contacts with parliamentary committees. 7. Does not include contacts with individual ministers. 8. Includes contacts with individual ministers. 9. Includes only ministries 10. Yearly: At least one contact per year. Monthly: At least one contact per month.

CONTACTS BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS AND DIFFERENT TYPES OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN DENMARK AND NORWAY, 1981/82 AND 1992/93' (ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTED IN BOTH YEARS IN BRACKETS) (%)

TABLE 6.2

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Notes: Organizations represented in both years in brackets. 1. The question was ‘How often does your organization have contacts with the following types of public authorities?’ 2. The question was ‘Does your organization have regular contacts with the following types of public authorities?’ 3. Yearly: At least one contact per year. Monthly: At least one contact per month. 4. Includes contacts with agencies.

TABLE 6.3 TYPE OF ORGANIZATION AND FREQUENCY OF CONTACTS WITH DIFFERENT TYPES OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN DENMARK AND NORWAY, 1981/82 AND 1992/93 (%)

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TABLE 6.4 IMPORTANT CONTACT WITH DIFFERENT PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN DENMARK AND NORWAY (%)

Notes: Includes all organizations except those that did not answer the questions on the importance of contacts. Organizations represented in both years in brackets 1. In the Danish case, the question was: ‘How do you assess the importance of contacts to the following public authorities?’ Important contacts include the answers ‘great importance’ and ‘some importance’. The other alternatives were ‘without importance’ and ‘don’t know’. In 1976 the number of cases was 1773, in 1993 the number of cases was 849. 2. In the Norwegian case, the question was: ‘With which public authorities does your organization have regular contacts? What is the importance of these contacts?’ In 1982 the alternatives were ‘great importance’, ‘minor importance’, and ‘don’t know’. In 1992 the alternatives were ‘great importance’, and ‘little importance’. It is unclear to what extent this difference has consequences for comparison between 1982 and 1992. In 1982, the number of cases varied between 944 and 997, in 1992 between 928 and 981. 3. The proportion of all organizations that had important contacts with either parliament and parliamentary committees or with MPs and party groups in parliament. 4. Includes important contacts at the agency level.

Table 6.4. (Since the Danish 1981 survey did not ask organizations to assess the importance of contacts, we have used data from 1976 in the Danish case28). In Norway there is no increase in the importance of administrative contacts. However, when we control for the change in the observed populations by looking only at organizations that are represented in both years, the two countries again converge (figures in parentheses). In Norway we find a minor increase of five per cent that find administrative contacts important. In Denmark 16 per cent is reduced to ten per cent for the organizations represented in both years. In Table 6.5 the organizations are split into business and labour organizations and other organizations. In Denmark there is a strong tendency for an increasing number of business and labour organizations to say that their administrative contacts are important. This is also the case for ‘other’ organizations in Denmark, albeit less significant. In Norway there is an increase in importance of administrative contacts for business and labour organizations, whereas ‘other’ Norwegian organizations show a small drop in the proportion that considers administrative contacts to be important. Again we find that Danish and

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Norwegian organizations converge when we look only at organizations that were represented in both years (figures in parentheses). The increase in the assessment of the importance of administrative contacts are halved in the Danish case to 13 per cent and in the case of ministries turned from a two per cent drop into an eight per cent increase in the Norwegian case. One should not push the conclusion too far: Corporatism is far from abolished, but use of the most institutionalized structure of traditional corporatism, boards, commissions, etc., is significantly lower today than 20 years ago. Although sectors with very strong corporatist structures remain, ministries are significantly less inclined to establish the traditional mediation structures when a problem needs to be solved. We must interpret the figures on the cluster of contacts as a kind of ‘compensation’ to this development. Contacts are somewhat more frequent compared to a decade ago, they are assessed as significantly more important, and in particular the organizations that were earlier involved in strong corporatist structures tend to increase contacts and to assess their increasing importance. The Danish development is more pronounced than the Norwegian. The decrease of formalized contacts through commissions and boards does not automatically imply that corporatism is replaced by lobbyism. However,traditional corporatism is under pressure, and the relative importance ofadministrative lobbyism is growing. With this conclusion we turn to therelations between interest organizations and parliamentary actors.

PARLIAMENTARY LOBBYISM IN DENMARK AND NORWAY Party groups and individual MPs have probably had contacts with interest organizations since modern parliaments were established. Some of the political parties have had and still have close relations with interest organizations. The Social Democratic parties have always had close and even formalized relations with the labour movement, although the formal ties have been weakened through the last decade. The Danish Liberal Party and the Norwegian Centre Party have had close contacts with agricultural organizations. However, these contacts have linked specific organizations and specific parties. Lobbyism is a broader phenomenon. Some elements of parliamentary lobbyism in which organizations have approached a number of parties and MPs have probably always existed in modern parliaments. If Kvavik’s observation of the absence of lobbyism in the Norwegian Parliament was correct, it is no longer true.29 Table 6.2 shows that a quite substantial proportion of all nationwide interest organizations in Denmark and Norway has contacts with parliamentary actors: 43 per cent of Danish and 35 per cent of Norwegian organizations have contacts on at least a yearly basis, whereas the corresponding figures for monthly or more frequent contacts are 17 and 15 per cent. Although the development is parallel in Denmark and Norway, the increase in contacts is much more outspoken in

Notes: Includes all organizations except those that did not answer the questions on the importance of contacts. Organizations represented in both years in brackets. 1. In the Danish case, the question was: ‘How do you assess the importance of contacts to the following public authorities?’ Important contacts include the answers ‘great importance’ and ‘some importance’. The other alternatives were ‘without importance’ and ‘don’t know’. In 1976 the number of cases was 1773, in 1993 the number of cases was 849. 2. In the Norwegian case, the question was: ‘With which public authorities does your organization have regular contacts? What is the importance of these contacts?’ In 1982 the alternatives were ‘great importance’, ‘minor importance’, and ‘don’t know’. In 1992, the alternatives were ‘great importance’, and ‘little importance’. It is unclear to what extent this difference has consequences for comparison between 1982 and 1992. In 1982, the number of cases varied between 944 and 997, in 1992 between 928 and 981. 3. The proportion of all organizations that had important contacts with either parliament and parliamentary committees or with MPs and party groups in parliament. 4. Includes important contacts at the agency level.

TABLE 6.5 IMPORTANT CONTACTS WITH DIFFERENT PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN DENMARK AND NORWAY AND TYPE OF ORGANIZATION (%)

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Denmark than in Norway. However, the difference in increases between Denmark and Norway is almost non-existent when we look only at organizations represented in bpth years in the two countries (figures in parentheses). Comparing all organizations with organizations represented both years within each country reveals that in the Danish case, the latter group has increased its contacts less than the former group, whereas it is the opposite in Norway. If again we split the organizations into the two groups, business and labour organizations versus other organizations, as in Table 6.3, we find a much stronger development for parliamentary contacts for business and labour organizations compared to the group of other organizations. In rough numbers, contacts on a yearly basis (and on a monthly basis in Denmark) doubled for business and labour organizations, whereas the development for other organizations is much more modest. Still, if we compare the group of other organizations’ contacts with parliamentary actors and the administration, these organizations appear to have increased contacts to politicians, while their contacts with the administration were almost constant. Parliamentary lobbyism is not first and foremost an activity reserved for organizations that confront problems of establishing institutionalized links with bureaucratic actors. Business organizations and labour organizations have by far the highest frequency of contacts with all types of actors. Again, we find that for all organizations the increases are much higher in Denmark than in Norway, whereas differences tend to be smaller when we compare the organizations represented in both years (figures in parentheses). The importance of contacts between parliamentary actors and interest organizations also increased. Table 6.4 lists the proportion of organizations that found the contacts with parliamentary actors important. It shows that all types of contacts with parliamentary actors are assessed as more important in 1992/93 than in 1982/76. It also appears that the importance of parliamentary contacts has grown more than the importance of contacts with administrative actors. In the Norwegian case, there is, as mentioned above, even a small drop in the proportion of organizations that assess contacts with administrative actors as important. It should be noted that even if the importance of contacts with parliamentary actors has grown significantly, more organizations still consider administrative contacts to be important than contacts with parliamentary actors. In the Danish case, the difference between the assessment of parliamentary and administrative contacts is much smaller than in the Norwegian case, and the number of organizations that consider political contacts to be important is generally twice as high in Denmark as in Norway. If again we follow the organizations which responded both years (figures in parentheses), we find a convergence between the two countries. In the Danish case these organizations consider political contacts to be more important than the group of all organizations, but the increase in the proportion considering contacts important is less for this group compared to all Danish organizations. In Norway the same tendency for repetitive organizations is found only in 1992, but not in

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1982. As a consequence, the difference in percentages between 1976/82 and 1993/92 converges. If organizations are split into the two groups also used above, we see from Table 6.5 that the proportion of business and labour organizations that find contacts with parliamentary actors important has risen significantly more than in the group of ‘other’ organizations. In the Danish case, 58 per cent of business and labour organizations find parliamentary contacts important in 1993 compared to 40 per cent of ‘other’ organizations. The corresponding figures for Norway are 32 and 18 per cent. Again, it should be noted that the score of administrative contacts is significantly higher for all groups in all years compared to parliamentary contacts. In both countries we see that differences between the assessment of political contacts by business and labour organizations on the one hand and the group of other organizations on the other hand are insignificant in 1976/82 but significant in 1993/92. A corresponding cluster in the analysis of the frequency of contacts gives another hint of a bias in the development of corporatist and lobbyist institutions in favour of the economic organizations. As in the other cases, we find a convergence between Denmark and Norway when we restrict our analysis to the organizations represented in both years (figures in parentheses). In Denmark the difference in the assessment of the importance of contacts is +34 per cent for all business and labour organizations for all contacts to parliament. The corresponding figure for Norway is +16. When we look only at repetitive organizations, the corresponding figures are +23 and +19. These also converged for the group of other organizations, with the difference that the Danish figures for repetitiye organizations are not different from the figures for all other organizations. In sum, there is clear evidence that contacts between interest organizations and parliamentary actors increased significantly from the early 1980s to the early 1990s. Contacts are also considered more important than in the early 1980s. There is still clear evidence of strong corporatist structures, but parliamentary lobbyism has increased as traditional corporatism has declined in scope and intensity. The question to be addressed relates to the second purpose of the chapter: How can these changes be explained? EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND INERTIA The increased importance of administrative and parliamentary lobbyism may be the result of several different developments, some of which are related to political and administrative institutions and some to broader social and economic changes. We restrict our investigation to the development of political and administrative institutions. Despite the vast scholarly and public interest in the relations between public authorities and organized interests, theories on these relations have not been strong in terms of explaining the changes, processes and outcomes of corporatist

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institutions. Theories on corporatism,30 policy networks,31 sectorization and segmentation32 suffer from deficiencies in their explanatory capacity.33 They tend to emphasize description in favour of explanation. In addition, and important in the context of this study, they tend to ignore the role played by parliaments.34 We cannot overcome these problems here. However, departing from recent institutionalist theory, we can throw light on some elements of the essentials and dynamics of the relations between state and organized interests. Institutional theory has progressed during the last decade, and many theoretical paths have been developed. A basic claim is that political, economic and social behaviour cannot be understood without looking at the relations between actors and the institutions of political, economic and social life. Institutions affect the outcome of social interactions. A major distinction is whether actors are considered to be primarily calculating or primarily rule-followers.35 Rational theory departs in rational choice theory and assumes that actors are selfinterested and intentionally rational—although limited by cognitive capacity and uncertainty. For real-world analysis the demands on rationality need not be very restrictive. Ostrom assumes that actors are calculating. Actors are expected to ‘compare expected benefits and costs of action prior to adopting strategies for action’.36 Institutions are defined as rules and norms that guide individual behaviour by prescribing, prohibiting or encouraging courses of action. Institutions are constraints on individual behaviour as well as simultaneously providing individuals with predictability and stability. Institutions are objects of strategic actions from self-interested actors.37 Institutions reflect the power of the actors who established them.38 Powerful actors may choose to change institutions if they have the power to do so and if they calculate change to be in their favour. Consequently, institutions are biased in favour of some actors and in the disfavour of others.39 Our choice to draw on the rational variants as a frame for understanding the inter-relations between organized interests and public authorities is based on two presumptions: First, from the outset it seems reasonable to assume that interest organizations are calculating actors.40 They have to deploy their resources in the best way in order to maximize benefits. Second, rational theories focus more explicitly on power and interests compared to the sociological variants. The interrelations between organized interests and bureaucracies and parliaments are basically about interests and power. The preferences of politicians, bureaucrats and representatives of interest organizations undoubtedly vary significantly. Yet when we restrict our considerations to the interplay between public authorities and organized interests, we might come up with a set of preferences that are not all that different among the different types of actors. First, the actors involved in institutionalized interrelations between organized interests and state actors have many and complex preferences, some of which contradict each other. In a complex world, actors may not even be able to range

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preferences fully in order to satisfy the demand for transitive preferences. As mentioned, we relax the assumptions made in neo-classic theory. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that political and bureaucratic actors and actors that represent organized interests are control and authority maximizers,41 which means that actors try to acquire knowledge about the activities and strategies of other actors, to influence the strategies of other actors, and to influence the outcomes of decisions. In strongly institutionalized settings actors will maximize long-term influence, and may thus accept short-term sub-optimal outcomes, or even losses if they calculate this to be in their long-term interest. Since institutions reduce uncertainty as regards the social behaviour of others,42 involvement in institutionalized mutual relations minimizes the complexity and uncertainty stemming from other actors. For bureaucrats, strongly institutionalized relations with interest organizations enhance the possibility of parliamentary acceptance and successful implementation of new policies. They may also be exploited when bureaucrats and ministers are in conflict with other ministries in the pursuit of institutional interests.43 Parliamentary actors may have incentives to institutionalize their relations with organized interests if they fit other interests and preferred strategies. However, it is important to notice that the institutional environments of bureaucrats and politicians may conflict with the development of strongly institutionalized relations with organized interests. This is more the case for politicians than for bureaucrats since the former are constrained by parliamentary governement and the necessity to build coalitions with other parties. As a consequence, it is less likely, compared to bureaucratic actors, that parliamentary actors will build strongly institutionalized relations with organized interests. Some of the political parties (e.g. Labour and Agrarian parties) traditionally have strong ties with labour and farmers’ unions. However, these ties seem to have loosened during the last decade, and in any case they have to be weighed against the constraints stemming from alliances with other parties. Second, for representatives of interest organizations, integration in the political and administrative decision-making process is a means to create, maintain or increase substantial benefits. Integration in public policy-making implies a privileged position which allows some actors to pursue the substantial goals of an organization. Substantial goals are many things, such as subsidies, avoiding taxation, influencing public regulation with a specific substantial position, protecting a monopoly position, etc. Institutional theory most often has problems with explaining change. However, Knight provides a sound theory of change in a rationalist institutionalist perspective.44 The premises are that calculating actors are in pursuit of distributive advantages and that institutions reflect the power of the actors who established them. Biased institutions will always confront a real or potential threat of pressure for change, but change is only likely to occur when strong actors are in favour of change and when they are able to agree with or force change on other actors.

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Knight suggests that one or both of the following two conditions are necessary for institutional change to occur: (1) the relative powers of actors change, and/or (2) institutions produce outcomes that are no longer desirable for powerful actors.45 The conditions for institutional change are restrictive, since institutional change may fail to occur when actors choose to comply with existing institutions because defection is estimated to be worse. A reluctance towards institutional change due to the uncertainty connected with the establishment of new rules also points to delays in existing institutions As control and influence maximizers, interest organizations deploy their resources where they anticipate the largest payoff in their pursuit of control and influence. As long as they get maximum control over the decision-making process through well-known corporatist institutions, they prefer to continue to do so. If, for one or another reason, the access to traditional corporatist institutions are restricted, interest organizations will exploit other channels of influence, such as administrative lobbyism. Similarly, interest organizations respond to relative shifts in power between bureaucracy and parliament by redirecting their attempts to influence policy-making towards the more powerful authority. CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS FOR CORPORATISM AND LOBBYISM For many years, the Danish Folketing and the Norwegian Storting appeared to be stable and consensual parliaments. They are both multi-party political systems, and they established stable governments in the first decades after World War II. In terms of parliamentary majority, Norway had stronger governments than Denmark which has mostly had minority governments since World War II.46 However, significant changes occurred in the 1970s. The most dramatic changes in the Danish Parliament happened in 1973, when the traditional party system, which had only changed slightly since the early 1920s, more or less broke down. The number of parties in the Folketing doubled, and during the two following decades the conditions for creating majorities in parliament significantly worsened, with frequent elections as result. During the Conservative-Liberal governments in the 1980s, parliamentary norms changed so that it became usual for governments to stay in power while accepting defeats in parliament. In a number of cases, Danish governments had to oversee policies decided upon in parliament by the opposition. As a consequence, the outcome of parliamentary decision-making processes is significantly less predictable than before 1973. Alongside this development, institutional reforms and more activity in the Folketing increased the relative power of the Folketing vis-à-vis the administration. The establishment in the early 1970s of permanent committees specialized to mirror the division of labour between ministries increased the capacity of MPs and committees to follow and control the performance of ministers.47 The activities of the committees rose sharply during

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the 1970s. Also plenary activities rose in terms of the number of interpellations and the number of questions from MPs to ministers. The Norwegian development is in many respects parallel to the Danish experiences. New parties also entered the Storting in 1973. The previously established, stable traits of parliamentary governance were weakened. The tendency for recommendations from parliamentary committees to be accepted unanimously was weakened. Before 1973, dissent only occurred in 16 per cent of the committee recommendations (budget not included) compared to 35 per cent in 1981–89, 59 per cent in 1989–93, and as high as 66 per cent in 993–96.48 Norwegian cabinets also confronted non-cabinet majorities in the Storting during the 1980s and 1990s. On average, the government lost 1.2 votes per month in 1979–81, 5.4 votes per month in 1981–83, and 3.7 in 1983–86. The corresponding figures for the two periods 1986–89 and 1990–95 were 10.0 and 11.4 votes per month respectively.49 The Storting has had standing committees for many years. However, committees and party groups in particular have experienced a significant increase in administrative resources and staff.50 The above-mentioned figures on the number of dissents point to an increase in bargaining in parliament. Private member bills are increasingly introduced. In 1984/85, 15 such bills were proposed compared with 124 at the peak in 1997–98.51 In sum, if we look at the political and administrative system from the viewpoint of interest organizations in pursuit of control and influence, the institutional conditions of success have changed significantly during the last 25 years and particularly since the early 1980s. The level of conflict and politicization in the two parliaments has increased dramatically. At the same time, the capacity of parties, parliamentary committees and MPs to control the government and the individual ministers has increased. The pre-1970 period with relatively stable governments, a relatively low level of conflict and politicization, and parliamentary acceptance of the administration as having the rights of initiative and preparation of legal regulations is long gone. The relative power of parliaments vis-à-vis ministers and administration has changed in favour of the former. The outcome of parliamentary activity has become much less predictable and the probability that governmental proposals will be changed significantly through parliamentary amendments is quite high. Under such conditions, rational actors will be more attentive to parliamentary actors in their pursuit of control and influence. They have much stronger incentives to be aware of what is going on in parliament and to let parliamentary committees, party groups and MPs know about their general and specific policy preferences. Although the institution of parliamentary lobbyism is much more ambiguous and thus difficult to act within, rational organizations have little choice but to increase their attention towards and contacts with parliamentary actors. Since it is much more difficult to control processes and outcomes through parliamentary lobbyism than through corporatism, organizations may prefer the stable and predictable environment of corporatist institutions if they can pursue

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their goals through corporatist participation. However, due to the relative power shift between parliaments and administration, a strategy directed towards administrative actors only is dangerous. In addition, lobbyism is a more flexible strategy. Lobbyism is not dependent on the willingness of political authorities to establish corporatist structures. If we change our perspective and look at corporatism versus lobbyism from the viewpoint of parties, MPs and ministers, we find that some of the advantages of lobbyism over corporatism have become more important over the last decades. The rising level of activity and conflict in the Danish and Norwegian parliaments may be related to the increased volatility of voters. Of the Norwegians who voted at both elections in 1965 and 1969, 18 per cent changed party.52 From 1993 to 1997, the corresponding figure was 33 per cent.53 Measured in terms of the average net electoral gains by the political parties, voter volatility increased from 7.1 per cent in the period 1950–69 to 13.5 per cent in 1970–95 in Denmark. The corresponding figures for Norway are 4.3 and 13.8 per cent.54 The higher voter volatility implies intensified competition between political parties. On the one hand, MPs and parties have to demonstrate their political abilities in the mass media. Critical journalists, on the other hand, demand a statement or an initiative in the continuous stream of new burning issues on the political agenda. Issues and conflicts compete for attention. The ever-increasing pace of modern politics necessitates flexibility and swift adaptation to new challenges. The demand on ministers may even be greater than on parliamentary actors. Ministers are in charge of large, professionalized ministries which possess the capacity to take action in order to solve problems. The public, as a consequence, expects minister and ministry to take due action when necessary. At the same time, ministers possess the formal authority to decide if, how and when interest organizations should be integrated into the preparation and implementation of new or revised policies. In the competition for visibility and attention, the establishment of a public committee may not be viewed as a sign of willingness to solve the problem in a foreseeable future. Ministers can hardly avoid inviting interest organizations to let their voice be heard. But they may have good reasons to prefer other types of integration than the strongly institutionalized public committees. As a consequence of this development, stability fostered by corporatist institutions becomes less important and, in some cases, even an obstacle to the pursuit of political strategies. Politicians need more leeway for their own initiatives. They are less willing to commit themselves to policies worked out by bureaucrats and representatives of interest organizations in corporatist negotiations. Politicians would also like to have a foot in different camps and to draw on the expertise of various organizations. In other words, a more flexible and less committing form of contact with organized interest, i.e., lobbyism, is conducive for the modern politician as well.

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In sum, it appears to be plausible to explain the changes in corporatist interest intermediation in Denmark and Norway at least partly by the increased power of parliaments vis-à-vis the executives and a less intense preference for the outcome of corporatist policy-making. CONCLUSIONS Institutions that integrate organized interests into political and administrative decision-making are core institutions of a democratic society. With the significantly broadened scope and intensity of political interference into a large number of societal activities, one can hardly imagine that the electoralparliamentary channel alone can cope with the demands on the political system. In Lewin’s phrase, society somehow has to solve the ‘intensity problem’ of democratic societies.55 Minorities with intense interests in a policy question risk being outvoted by the majority with less intense interests if all decisions have to go through the parliamentary channel of participation. As a consequence, political and administrative actors must intermediate the narrow interests of interest organizations with broader societal interests. According to Lewin, corporatism is the solution to the ‘intensity problem’. Recently, however, corporatism has developed a tendency to make excessive demands on the political system.56 The growing strength of post-war Scandinavian corporatism may have confirmed the worries of some observers of the 1960s and 1970s. In many policy areas it became accepted that the right to initiate, formulate and implement policies was placed in administrative and corporatist arenas. This gave interest organizations considerable influence on future policies. Strong organized interests succeeded in acquiring a large say, sometimes even a de facto veto right, in policy-making. These organizations were integrated into public policymaking through the establishment of a large number of boards, commissions, committees, etc., and close contacts with bureaucratic actors. Corporatism may be an adequate solution to the intensity problem in relatively homogenous societies. Compared to international standards, Denmark and Norway are homogenous countries. In recent years, however, considerable changes have taken place. The two countries are not as unitary as they used to be. The party systems have become more fragmented, and the number of interest organizations has increased. In most areas there are several different interest organizations with equally intense, but conflicting, interests trying to influence policy-making. In short, Denmark and Norway have become less unitary and more pluralist societies than before. As a consequence, corporatist negotiations are complicated. It is difficult to set up an adequate corporatist structure to handle problems when the number of relevant actors is high. Consequently, less formal and less institutionalized forms of participation, i.e. lobbyism, may turn out to be the alternative.

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For a number of reasons, the Danish and Norwegian parliaments increased their power vis-à-vis the administration. The tradition of stability and consensual policy-making was to some extent eroded during the 1970s and 1980s. Interest organizations could no longer be sure that the ‘normal’ way of enacting legislation was through careful and detailed preparation in corporatist structures and formal confirmation in parliament. As a consequence, rational control and influence-seeking interest organizations had to devote more attention to parliamentary activity, including the establishment of regular contacts with parliamentary committees, party groups and MPs. At the same time, the outcomes of corporatist policy-making became less attractive to ministers and top civil servants. Increasing party competition, the competition for attention in the media, the ‘public’ demand for due action to be taken in response to policy problems, and the speed of the policy-making process today are less compatible with the existence of strongly institutionalized relations with interest organizations compared to the policy-making process 20 years ago. The theoretical preconditions of change in well-established institutions are demanding. However, they are present in relation to the Danish and Norwegian parliaments, which have the prerogative to enact legislation. Even if interest organizations would prefer the stable structures of traditional corporatism to the much more unpredictable and ambiguous institution of parliamentary lobbyism, they cannot choose if and when parliament increases its power vis-à-vis the administration. Similarly, when the outcomes of strong corporatist structures are assessed to be less attractive for ministers and top civil servants they have the power, even if that power is not unrestricted, to force upon interest organizations new ways of integrating into the decision-making process. The comparative approach pursued in this study has focused on parallel developments in Denmark and Norway as regards the relations between state actors and interest organizations. The fact that these relations have developed so similarly in the two countries proves that they are not only to be explained by idiosyncratic attributes of the two countries, but that we are dealing with phenomena shared with other political systems comparable to those of Denmark and Norway. Actually, we have found similar changes in as different countries as Brazil and Austria.57 More detailed studies of policy sectors would probably highlight significant differences between the two countries in the way organized interests are integrated into the political and administrative decision-making processes. However, knowledge of the general development in the relations between state and organized interests in the two countries would also be of significant value for sectoral studies. NOTES This chapter was first published in Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol.22, No.3 (1999). We would like to thank Endre Holmefjord and Kirsten Nielsen for their assistance.

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1. E.g. A.Lijphart and M.M.L.Crepaz, ‘Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol.21 (1991), pp.235–56. 2. ,Lijphart and Crepaz, ‘Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages’, p.235. 3. Cf.H.Rommetvedt and S.Opedal, ‘Miljølobbyisme og næringskorporatisme?’, Nordisk administrativt Tidsskrift, Vol.76 (1995), pp.279–302. 4. A.S.Nørgaard, The Politics of Institutional Control Corporatism in Danish Occupational Safety and Health Regulation and Unemployment Insurance, 1870– 1995 (Aarhus: Politica, 1997). 5. L.N.Johansen and O.P.Kristensen, ‘Corporatist Traits in Denmark, 1946–1976’, in G. Lehmbruch and P.Schmitter (eds.), Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982); T.Nordby, Korporatisme på norsk 1920–1990 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1994). 6. J.P.Olsen, Organized Democracy. Political Institutions in a Welfare State—The Case of Norway (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1983), pp.166ff. 7. Johansen and Kristensen, ‘Corporatist Traits in Denmark, 1946–1976’, p.197. 8. M.Egeberg, Stat og organisasjoner (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1981); Johansen and Kristensen, ‘Corporatist Traits in Denmark, 1946–1976’; Olsen, Organized Democracy; Nordby, Korporatisme på norsk. 9. Norwegian data on boards, councils, commissions etc. are collected by Planleggingog Samordningsdepartementet and available from Norwegian Social Science Data Services. Data are published every fourth year in Stortingsmelding nr. 7 and in Oversikt over statlege utval, styre og råd m.v, (Oslo: Planleggings- og samordningsdepartementet/Arbeids-og administrasjonsdepartementet). Data have been made available by John-Erik Ågotnes, Norwegian Social Science Data Services. In contrast to Norway, Denmark has no official register of public boards, commissions, etc. Data have been collected by different scholars through the last two decades from a large number of sources. The period 1946–75 is documented in O.P.Kristensen, ‘Centraladministrationen og de særlige forvaltningsorganer i Danmark efter 1945’, Nordisk Administrativt Tidsskrift, No.l (1979), pp.69–98. Data from the period 1980 through 1990 have been published in J.G.Christensen and P.M.Christiansen, Forvaltning og omgivelser (Herning: Systime, 1992), pp. 66ff. Data for 1995 have recently been collected at the Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus. Documentation for data 1980–95 is available in J.G.Christensen and P.M.Christiansen, Kodebogfor udvalgsdatabase (Aarhus: Department of Political Science). It should be noted that data on boards, councils, and commissions are not counted in exactly the same way in Norway and Denmark. As a consequence, it may be a problem to compare the absolute numbers of councils, committees etc. between the two countries. However, data are comparable over time in each country, except that there are some problems of comparison of the Norwegian figures before and after 1977. The Norwegian figure for boards etc. existing by the end of 1995 was 585. 10. Olsen, Organized Democracy, p.167. 11. J.Buksti, Organisationernes folk (Aarhus: Forlaget Politica, 1995); Johansen and Kristensen, ‘Corporatist Traits in Denmark, 1946–1976’; Olsen, Organized Democracy.

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12. S.Rokkan, ‘Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism’, in R.A. Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p.105. 13. R.B.Kvavik, Interest Groups in Norwegian Politics (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1976), pp.15, 120. 14. Kvavik, Interest Groups in Norwegian Politics, p.118. 15. G.Hernes, Det moderne Norge. Bind 5: Makt og styring (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1983), p. 303. 16. E.Damgaard, ‘Nordic Parliamentary Goverament’, in E.Damgaard (ed.), Parliamentary Change in the Nordic Countries (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1992). 17. Olsen, Organized Democracy, p.72. 18. Egeberg, Stat og organisasjoner, p.143. 19. Damgaard, ‘Nordic Parliamentary Government’. 20. E.Damgaard, ‘The Strong Parliaments of Scandinavia’, in G.W.Copeland and S.C. Patterson (eds.), Parliaments in the Modern World (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994). 21. Johansen and Kristensen, ‘Corporatist Traits in Denmark, 1946–1976’, p.196. 22. P.M.Christiansen, ‘lnteresseorganisationer, centraladministration og udviklingen af nye indflydelsesstrategier’, in K.Ronit (ed.), Interesseorganisationer i dansk politik (Copenhagen: Jurist-og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 1998), pp. 119–54. 23. SOU, Statens offentliga utredningar. Demokrati och makt i Sverige. Maktutredningens huvudrapport (Stockholm, 1990). 24. Johansen and Kristensen, ‘Corporatist Traits in Denmark, 1946–1976’. 25. P.M.Christiansen, ‘Organisationernes rolle: Det gode samfund eller organiseret tyranni?’, in M.Ibsen, P.L.Nielsen and B.Schou (eds.), Folkestyre og Forvaltning (Copenhagen: Jurist-og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 1994). 26. Nordby, Korporatisme på norsk 1920–1990. 27. The table is based on survey data on contacts between interest organizations and public authorities. The Danish data have been collected through three questionnaire surveys of all national Danish interest organizations by scholars at the Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus. The 1976 data are available from DDA-0053, Interesseorganisationer i Danmark 1976 (Odense: Danish Data Archives, 1976) and 1981 data from DDA-0510, Interesseorganisationer i Danmark 1981 (Odense: Danish Data Archives, 1981). 1993 data are from the project Interesseorganisationernes ressourcer, struktur, opgaver og kontakt til myndigheder, 1993. The survey was carried out by Jørgen Grønnegård Christensen, Peter Munk Christiansen and Niels Chr. Sidenius, Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus. The population was delimited in the same way as in the previous surveys. The population is delimited from a large number of sources. As a consequence, it is difficult to precisely define the total population. The theoretical criterion is all national Danish interest organizations, excluding pure hobby or leisure organizations. The delimited population was 2,050 organizations, and 1,316 organizations responded. The only known bias in the responses is that a number of industrial organizations have not responded. The Danish Manufacturing Employers Association did not want to participate in the survey on behalf of the organizations for which the organization provides

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28.

29. 30. 31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39.

secretarial assistance. Nevertheless, answers were given by a number of these organizations. The Norwegian survey data on contacts between interest organizations and public authorities have been collected through questionnaire surveys of all national Norwegian interest organizations by the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo and by the University of Tromsø. Data for the years 1964, 1967, 1971, 1976, 1983 and 1992 are available at the Norwegian Social Science Data Services. The population of organizations is delimited in a way quite similar to the Danish surveys, although there may be some differences in the selection procedures. Since the population is delimited from a large number of sources, it is difficult to precisely define the total population. The Norwegian surveys are documented in M.-A.Andersen and J.-S.Lauritsen, Organisationsarkivet. Ei brukarrettleiing, NSD Report No. 86 (Tromsø: The Norwegian Social Science Data Services, 1990) and in A.Hallenstvedt and J.Trollvik (eds.), Norske organisasjoner (Oslo: Fabritius, 1993). Data have been analyzed and made available to us by Endre Holmefjord, cf. E. Holmefjord, Organisasjonene, forvaltningen og de folkevalgte, Report R9808 (Bergen: LOS-senteret, 1998). Due to differences in the alternatives the respondents were presented with, crosscountry comparisons of the importance of contacts should be done carefully, cf. notes for Table 6.4 and 6.5. Kvavik, Interest Groups in Norwegian Politics. P.C.Schmitter, ‘Still the Century of Corporatism?’, Review of Politics, Vol.36 (1974), pp.85–131. R.A.W.Rhodes and D.Marsh, ‘Policy Networks in British Politics. A Critique of Existing Approaches’ and ‘Policy Communities and Issue Networks. Beyond Typologi’, in D.Marsh and R.A.W.Rhodes (eds.), Policy Networks in British Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). M.Egeberg, J.P.Olsen and H.Sætren, ‘Organisasjonssamfunnet og den segmenterte stat’, in J.P.Olsen (ed.), Politisk organisering (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1978). M.O.Heisler, ‘Corporate Pluralism Revisited: Where is the Theory?’, Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol.2 (1979), pp.277–97. Egeberg et al., ‘Organisasjonssamfunnet og den segmenterte stat’, include members of parliamentary committees in their description of political segments. J.G.March and J.P.Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1989). E.Ostrom, ‘Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Toward Complementarity’, American Political Science Review, Vol.85 (1991), p.243. E.Ostrom, ‘An Agenda for the Study of Institutions’, Public Choice, Vol.48 (1986), pp.3–25; Ostrom, ‘Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Toward Complementarity’; K.A.Shepsle, ‘Studying Institutions. Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol.1 (1989), pp. 131–47; and D.C.North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance; J.Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict, passim; North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, p.48.

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40. Rational institutional theory adheres to the principle of methodological individualism which means that the unit of analysis is, in principle, individuals and that aggregate actors in principle be dissolved to the level of individual actors. Organized interests are, per definition, collective actors. As a consequence, we must assume that we can treat interest organizations as unitary actors. According to Scharpf, this is not a prohibitive assumption. He concludes that ‘the prevailing practice of treating a plurality of actors as a single player in game-theoretical applications is often fully justified’ (F.W.Scharpf, ‘Games Real Actors Could Play: The Challenge of Complexity’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol.3 (1991), p. 291). In empirical analysis it is from time to time clear that the assumption is not justified. In such cases, we must deal explicitly with the problem and try to disaggregate collective actors. 41. P.M.Christiansen, ‘Why are Corporatist Arrangements so Attractive? State and Organized Interests in a Rationalist Institutionalist Perspective’ (Aarhus: Department of Political Science, 1996); Nørgaard, The Politics of Institutional Control, p.14. 42. Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict. 43. Christiansen, ‘Why are Corporatist Arrangements so Attractive?’. 44. Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict. 45. Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict, pp.145ff, 171ff. 46. Cf. Chapter 2 and E. Damgaard, ‘Parliamentary Change in the Nordic Countries’, in E. Damgaard (ed.), Parliamentary Change in the Nordic Countries (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1992). 47. E.Damgaard, Folketinget under forandring (Copenhagen: Samfundsvidenskabeligt Forlag, 1977). 48. Cf. Chapter 2. 49. Cf. Chapter 3. Calculations are based on the active months in the Storting, i.e. nine months per year (October–June). In 1996–97, the Jagland goverament lost 35.8 votes per month, but the situation during Jagland’s year in office was exceptional. 50. Cf. Chapter 2 and H. Rommetvedt, ‘Personellressurser, aktivitetsnivå og innflytelsesmuligheter i et Storting i vekst’, Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift, Vol.11 (1995), pp.251–76. 51. Cf. Chapter 2. 52. H.Valen, Valg og politikk (Oslo: NKS-Forlaget, 1981), p.335. 53. Statistisk sentralbyrå, ‘Valgundersøkelsen, 1997’, Ukens statistikk, No.6 (1998). 54. J.G.Andersen and J. Hoff, ‘Democratic Citizenship in the Scandinavian Welfare States’ (unpublished ms, Aalborg University, 1998). In the case of Norway, the increased voter volatility is even better illustrated by Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2. 55. L.Lewin, Samhället och de organiserade intressena (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1992). 56. Lewin, Samhället och de organiserade intressena, pp.128ff. 57. R.Boschi, The Corporatist Heritage and New Patterns of Interest Representation in Brazil’, Paper presented at the XVII IPSA World Congress, Seoul, 17–21 Aug. 1997; M.M.L. Crepaz, ‘From Semisovereignty to Soverereignty. The Decline of Corporatism and Rise of Parliament in Austria’, Comparative Politics, Vol.27 (1994), pp.45–65.

CHAPTER 7 The Impact of Lobbyism

The previous chapters have shown that various organized interests are active lobbyists in the Norwegian Parliament. The questions to be illuminated in this chapter pertain to the impact of lobbyism. Does lobbyism really matter? What kinds of impact do lobbyist have? The present chapter concentrates on two aspects: (1) the impact of lobbyism on the work and functioning of the Storting, and (2) the influence on policymaking achieved by various lobbyists. The first section presents some general assessments by members of the Norwegian Parliament. It is based on a survey among MPs that was carried out in 1995. The second section presents assessments of the influence exerted in relation to environmental policy-making. This section is based on a survey among representatives of environmental and industrial organizations. The third section is devoted to some major findings from three case studies related to environmental policy-making. GENERAL ASSESSMENTS BY MPs In the survey among Norwegian MPs lobbyism was defined as written and oral enquiries made by external groups/interests who seek to put matters on the agenda of the Storting or who try to influence MPs’ views on matters that are handled by the Storting. Direct personal contacts as well as enquiries passed on by the party secretariat or standing committees were included, but mass correspondence was not. The communication could contain information, arguments and specific proposals.1 The frequency of this kind of lobbyism is high: 68 per cent of the MPs said that they were addressed weekly by business organizations; 54 per cent and 52 per cent got weekly enquiries from trade unions/vocational organizations and municipal/county representatives respectively. Environmental organizations and ideal/other organizations made weekly enquiries to 38 per cent and 40 per cent of the MPs respectively; 29 per cent of the MPs were addressed weekly by private companies, 11 per cent by state-owned companies, and 12 per cent by governmental institutions outside the ministries.

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TABLE 7.1 IMPACT OF LOBBYISM ON ACTIONS TAKEN BY MPs AND THE STORTING, PERCENTAGE OF MPs (N=116–18)

MPs were asked to consider how often the enquiries made by various lobbyists were a contributing factor when various actions were taken by MPs or by the Storting. The answers are presented in Table 7.1. As we can see, most of the MPs said that lobbyism is ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ a contributing factor when parliamentary committees ask ministries for additional information (59 per cent ‘often’+37 per cent ‘sometimes'), and when dissenting remarks and proposals are formulated in committee recommendations (44 per cent+47 per cent). Minor amendments made in government proposals, MPs’ interpellations and questions and private members’ bills are ‘sometimes’ (60 per cent, 42 per cent, and 46 per cent respectively) or ‘often’ (28 per cent, 33 per cent, and 24 per cent) related to lobbyists’ enquiries. Most of the MPs said that major amendments in government proposals are ‘seldom’ or ‘never’ related to lobbyism (57 per cent), but ‘sometimes’ (40 per cent) such amendments are related to enquiries made by lobbyists. In addition to these general statements, MPs were asked to assess the impact of lobbyism in relation to the policy areas they were assumed to know best, i.e. the area of jurisdiction of the standing committee they were members of. First, MPs were asked how often dissent and faction remarks in recommendations from the standing committee they were members of were related to enquiries made by various lobbyists. The answers are presented in Table 7.2. Of the MPs, 25–29 per cent said that dissent and faction remarks in the recommendations of their own standing committees are ‘very’ or ‘fairly often’ associated with enquiries from municipal/county representatives, trade unions and business organizations, while 7–17 per cent said that dissent is ‘often’ related to enquiries made by other types of lobbyists. In addition, approximately half of the MPs mentioned that dissent and remarks are ‘sometimes’ related to enquiries from various interest organizations.

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TABLE 7.2 DISSENT AND FACTION REMARKS IN RECOMMENDATIONS FROM OWN COMMITTEE ASSOCIATED WITH ENQUIRIES MADE BY LOBBYISTS, PERCENTAGE OF MPs (N=114–18)

TABLE 7.3 AMENDMENTS IN GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS WITHIN THE AREA OF JURISDICTION OF MP’s OWN STANDING COMMITTEE ASSOCIATED WITH ENQUIRIES MADE BY VARIOUS LOBBYISTS, PERCENTAGE OF MPs (N=1 12– 16)

The next question referred to amendments made by the Storting in governments’ proposals and guidelines within the policy area of the MP’s own committee. As we can se from Table 7.3, one of five MPs each said that such changes in government proposals are ‘often’ associated with enquiries made by business organizations, trade unions and municipal and county representatives. Four of ten MPs each said that amendments are ‘sometimes’ related to enquiries from such lobbyists. The impact of lobbyism may also be related to other aspect of the parliamentary process, functional as well as dysfunctional. The MPs were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the various statements about the consequences of lobbyism presented in Table 7.4. Most of the MPs agreed that they get better access to alternative information, and that the Storting gains more control over the government through contacts with various lobbyists. On the other side, most of the MPs agreed that well-

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TABLE 7.4 CONSEQUENCES OF LOBBYISM, PERCENTAGE OF MPs WHO AGREE/ DISAGREE WITH THE VARIOUS STATEMENTS (N=114–19)

organized interests become too influential in relation to weakly organized interests. MPs are split, however, with regard to whether specialized interests become too influential at the expense of a more comprehensive policy. The frequency of contacts with various lobbyists reported earlier clearly indicate that lobbyism takes a lot of the time that MPs have at their disposal. Most MPs disagreed, however, that enquiries made by lobbyists take too much time. Finally, the MPs were asked to make an overall assessment of the positive and negative aspects of the lobbying activities in the Storting. A vast majority of the MPs, 86 per cent, said that lobbyism has more positive than negative sides. Only 14 per cent gave a negative overall evaluation of lobbyism in the Norwegian Parliament. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY-MAKING: ASSESSMENTS BY INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS Our next step is to have a look at the impact of lobbyism from the perspective of the lobbyists. The data we utilize stem from two surveys among board members and administrative leaders of the most important Norwegian environmental organizations and industrial organizations within transport and agriculture. The administrative leaders of 31 organizations and 144 board members participated in the survey.2 Board members were asked to make a statement about the impact of the organizations’ views on the outcome of decisions made by various political authorities. The number of board members and respondents varies from one organization to another. In order to compensate for this, the answers are weighted in such a way that each organization counts as one unit, and not each board member. Table 7.5 shows weighted percentages of board members

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TABLE 7.5 IMPACT OF ORGANIZATIONS' VIEWS ON DECISIONS MADE BY VARIOUS AUTHORITIES, WEIGHTED PERCENTAGES OF ORGANIZATIONS' BOARD MEMBERS THAT SAID THEY HAVE ‘CONSIDERABLE' OR ‘SOME’ INFLUENCE ON DECISIONS

TABLE 7.6 THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZATIONAL ENQUIRIES IN THE STORTING, AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF BOARD MEMBERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LEADERS

responding that the organization had exerted a ‘considerable’ or ‘some’ degree of influence on the decisions made by the respective authorities. Table 7.5 demonstrates that most of the environmental organizations believe they have ‘considerable’ or ‘some’ impact on decisions made by directorates and public agencies. Half of the industrial organizations believe that they have an impact on decisions made by ministries and directorates. Both the environmental and the industrial organizations express difficulties in advancing their views in the government. Influence on decisions made by the Storting comes somewhere between the government and the public administration. In general, industrial organizations are regarded as powerful participants in the political arena. However, Table 7.5 shows that the board members of environmental organizations feel to a greater extent that their opinions are taken into consideration. This is the case for all instances of authority, with the exception of ministries where the difference between the environmental and industrial organizations is insignificant. The most distinct difference between the two types of organization lies in their relationship with directorates, where the environmental organizations feel that they play a more influential role. A slightly

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larger section of the environmental than of the industrial organizations say that they have an impact on decisions made by the Norwegian Parliament. Both the administrative leaders and the board members of the organizations were asked to specify the influence they exert on the Storting. The figures in Table 7.6 are average frequencies for administrative leaders and board members. The first impression from this table is that a considerable portion of the administrative leaders and board members believe that the lobbying efforts made by the organizations do have an impact on the work of the Storting. The enquiries are ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ a contributory factor when the parliament makes minor amendments to government proposals, and when MPs make dissenting remarks to the recommendations from parliamentary committees. To some extent these enquiries are also a contributory factor when MPs ask questions directed to ministers in parliament. When more comprehensive amendments are made to government proposals or when private members’ bills are tabled in the Storting, this is less often because of organizational enquiries. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY-MAKING: THREE CASE STUDIES The surveys among MPs and representatives of environmental and industrial organizations clearly indicate that lobbying may have a significant influence on the work of and decisions made by the Storting and other political authorities. In order to get a more concrete impression of the influence exerted by various organized interests, we will have a look at some major findings from three case studies. All three cases are related to environmental policy-making: taxes on disposable packaging, climate change policy and protection of conifer forests. The cases were chosen partly because they represent various kinds of environmental problems, and partly because they affect various parts of society and of the political system. The concepts of parliamentary lobbyism and administrative lobbyism and corporatism that were introduced in Chapter 6 were also used in the case studies.3 The study of new taxes on disposable packaging covered the period from 1992 to 1995. There are two decisions in particular that call for attention. The first of these is the decision to introduce a basic lump-sum fee on packaging. Even though none of the pressure groups involved achieved their primary aims, it may be argued that the most influential groups were the environmental organizations and the brewery workers’ organizations. The resolution of the Storting was in accordance with these groups’ secondary preferences. Parliamentary lobbyism was the most important channel of influence for these organizations. The trade and industry organizations, which largely based their efforts on lobbying the civil service, were not equally successful in getting their views across. The other decision in this case was aimed at solving the waste problem by means of voluntary agreements with the business community, without the introduction of further fees. In this case it particularly seems as if it were the

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lobbying efforts of PLM Moss Glassverk (a major glass producer) towards the Storting that contributed to alter the Labour Party’s stance on the lump-sum fee. The agreement seems to be a result of parliamentary as well as administrative lobbyism on the part of these organizations. The study of Norwegian climate policy covered the period from 1989 to 1996. In this case there are three major ‘milestones’ to consider. The first is the Storting’s 1989 decision to stabilize emissions of climate gases at a 1989 level in the year 2000. Here, it seems as if the Norwegian environmental organizations’ lobbying efforts towards the parliament contributed to ensure that the climate gas objective was established. In addition, the international proceedings and the warnings put forward by respected research institutes were important for both the Storting and the government at this time. The industrial organizations were less active in this period and utilized their potential influence through lobbyism and corporatism to a lesser degree. The other ‘milestone’ concerns the decision to introduce a charge on CO2 emissions in the period 1990–93. Even though the environmental and industrial organizations did not accomplish their primary objectives, they had success with some of their proposals. The introduction of the charge can to some extent be regarded as a victory for the environmental organizations, since instruments were implemented to ensure that the emissions target level would be reached. In 1992– 93 we could observe that the ‘wind’ changed direction in climate policy in favour of business interests who managed to exempt 40 per cent of the emissions from charges. Both parliamentary and administrative lobbyism were significant in the organizations’ work in this period. The third ‘milestone’ relates to the work associated with a governmental report to the Storting on climate policy. When the government prepared the report, it was to a large extent influenced by business interests through administrative corporatism and lobbyism. Major victories for these organizations comprised the decision to withdraw from a heavily enforced implementation of climate policy, and the voluntary agreements on CO2 abatement were introduced. This was somewhat levelled out in the proceedings in the parliament’s Standing Committee on Energy and the Environment. In the committee’s recommendations there are statements that reflect suggestions from various interest groups. The views of environmental organizations on economizing on energy, bio-energy and electrification of the oil and gas industry were influential. On the other hand, industrial interests were served in that the main guidelines for climate policy would stay until international developments made it feasible to change them. The most important channel of influence for both parties was parliamentary lobbyism. The study of conifer forest protection covers the period from 1986 to 1996 and concentrates on a decision made by the Syse government in 1990, an escalation proposal put forward by the Brundtland government in 1995, and a decision by the Storting in 1996 to expand the conservation programme. The result of the first decision was a protection level at less than a minimum proposal put forward

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by a government committee on conifer protection. The committee members were civil servants and representatives from the forestry and environmental organizations. However, the forestry organizations took the case off the committee’s agenda. Instead, they focused on parliamentary and administrative lobbyism. Administrative lobbyism was particularly directed at the ministries’ political leadership. The Brundtland government’s proposal to expand the protection programme can be understood in light of reactions to the previous stages of the decision process. The Syse government’s decision led to a strong mobilization of environmental organizations and biologists. This pressure was to a great extent channelled through parliamentary and administrative lobbyism, especially at the political level of the ministries. The Storting’s decision to escalate was largely in line with the government’s recommendation. The principles for protection had been established earlier. For the industrial organizations, the paramount objective was to ensure improved economic frameworks for the forest owners affected by the policy. For the environmental groups, it was vital that larger areas should be conserved. In this context, the decision to increase the conserved area by 120 km2 can be regarded as a compromise between the two interest groups. The environmental organizations achieved a certain expansion of the protected area, whilst the forest owners and other business interests secured improved compensation schemes. In this part of the proceedings, administrative lobbyism and corporatism as well as parliamentary lobbyism played a part in determining the outcome of the case. We may also relate attempts at influencing public policies to the various phases of the policy-making process. Various authorities play different roles in different phases of the decision process. In the original analyses of the three environment cases the processes were separated into four different stages: First an initiating phase when environmental problems are put on the political agenda; second a clarification phase when goals and different solutions are taken under consideration; third a decision-making phase when the actual solution is chosen; and finally an implementation phase when the chosen policy is carried into effect.4 According to conventional wisdom, public administration and the government are responsible for the initiating and clarifying phases. The parliament should play its role at stage three, i.e. in the decision-making phase. Finally, implementation of the decisions made by the parliament should be left to the executive. Table 7.7 shows that the organizations’ ways of influencing policy-making varies between different issues, phases and actors in the decision-making processes. The table gives a summary of how relevant interest groups tried to influence the decisions through administrative corporatism, administrative lobbyism and parliamentary lobbyism respectively. The ‘points’ given in the table are based on a tentative assessment of the level of activity of different

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actors. Two points indicate a high level of activity, one point a medium level, and zero points a low level of activity. Let us start with the different ways of influencing political authorities. The total sums at the bottom right-hand show that when we view all the cases, periods and interest groups together, parliamentary lobbyism is the most frequent way of exerting influence (30 points). In second place comes administrative lobbyism (26 points) and third is administrative corporatism (19 points). When we have a closer look at the different interest groups, we can observe that both environmental and industrial organizations participated in all the three cases. In the disposable packaging case local interest groups participated as well, and in the climate policy case we also observed that companies producing new technology were involved. If we exclude these two last groups and sum up the points for environmental and industrial organizations we get the following result. For industrial organizations we get 10 points on administrative corporatism, 14 points on administrative lobbyism and 13 points on parliamentary lobbyism. For environmental organizations the corresponding figures are 8, 9 and 12. This indicates only minor differences between the two types of organizations concerning ways of influencing policy-making. However, industrial organizations are a bit more active than the environmental organizations. In the column ‘sum all phases’ we may observe the major differences between the three issues we have studied. Some of the differences are considerable. The conifer forest case is marked by the high use of administrative corporatism (12 points). In the climate policy case and in the disposable packing case the use of administrative corporatism was rather limited (3–4 points). Parliamentary lobbyism was the most important way of exerting influence in these two cases (climate 12 points, and packing 11 points). These results should be related to the relatively high degree of corporatism that we still find in the Norwegian agrarian sector. Our final theme is the connection between the form of influence and stages in the decision-making processes. The three case studies indicate that lobbyists do not follow the assumed executive-legislative division of work in their attempts at influencing policy-making. The bottom row (‘sum all cases’) shows that organized interests exert influence through parliamentary lobbyism as well as administrative lobbyism and corporatism in all the four phases. But we can observe that administrative corporatism and administrative lobbyism are most common in the two earliest phases. Administrative corporatism receives 7 points in the initiating phase and 5 points in the clarification phase. Administrative lobbyism receives 7 points in the initiating phase and 9 points in the clarification phase. Parliamentary lobbyism increases from 3 points in the initiating phase to 16 points in the implementation phase. The most surprising result is the high level of lobbyism in the implementation phase. At this stage of the process responsibilities are assumed to be taken over by the executive. However, in the cases we have analysed, we could observe that what was supposed to be a phase of implementation of decisions made by the

Note: AC=Adminstrative corporatism AL=Administrative lobbyism; PL=Parliamentary lobbyism

LOBBYISM AND CORPORATISM IN DIFFERENT CASES AND PHASES

TABLE 7.7

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Storting quite often became a replay and a new opportunity for lobbyists and politicians to promote and discuss alternative solutions. In sum, the three environmental policy-making cases show that attempts at influencing the decision-making processes may be channelled through corporatist bodies as well as lobbyism. It is quite clear that organized interests have an impact on the outcomes. It is, however, also clear that no single interest group can dictate decision-makers. Different interests compete with one another, and the influence achieved by various interest organizations varies over time. Concerning lobbyism versus corporatism, the overall impression is that parliamentary and administrative lobbyism are not only the most frequently applied strategies, but also the most successful ones. CONCLUSION The frequency of Norwegian parliamentary lobbying is increasing and the general assessments made by Norwegian MPs clearly indicate that lobbyism has an impact on the work of the Storting. Various activities performed by MPs are affected by enquiries made by lobbyists. Some of the amendments made by the Storting in government proposals are associated with enquiries made by interest organizations, representatives of local government, and other lobbyists. In general MPs have a positive view of lobbyism. Contacts with lobbyists give MPs better access to alternative information and better possibilities to control the government. Assessments made by representatives of industrial and environmental organizations and the case studies of environmental policy-making processes confirm the impression that lobbyists do have an impact on decisions made by the Storting. No single interest organization can dictate the outcome of the decision-making process. Lobbyists have to compete with ‘counter-lobbyists’ and the influence achieved by the competing interest groups varies over time. MPs do worry, however, about the lack of balance between strong and weakly organized interests. NOTES 1. The survey was carried through by researchers at the Institute for Social Research, Oslo, and the Norwegian Research Centre in Organization and Management, Bergen. Harald Espeli and the author of this book were responsible for questions concerning lobbyism. See Harald Espeli, Lobbyvirksomhet på Storting (Oslo: Tano Aschehoug, 1999). 2. See J.E.Klausen and H.Rommetvedt (eds.), Miljøpolitikk. Organisasjonene, Stortinget og forvaltningen (Oslo: Tano Aschehoug, 1997); and H.Rommetvedt, A.A.Farsund and K. Melberg, ‘Corporatism and Lobbyism in Norwegian Environmental Policy-Making’, in S. Nagel (ed.), Handbook of Global Technology Policy (New York: Marcel Dekker, 2001).

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3. See S.Opedal and A.A.Farsund, ’Miljøhensyn og lokal sysselsetting. Avgiften på engangsemballasje’; A.A.Farsund, ’Den globale utfordring. CO2-målsettingen og klimapolitikken’; and S.Opedal and A.A.Farsund, ‘Klassisk naturvern. Bevaring av barskog’, in Klausen and Rommetvedt (eds.), Miljøpolitikk. 4. See A.A.Farsund and H.Rommetvedt, ’Miljøpolitikk i møtet mellom organisasjonene, Stortinget og forvaltningen’, in Klausen and Rommetvedt (eds.), Miljøpolitikk.

CHAPTER 8 The Central Assembly of the Periphery

In their classic analysis of cleavage structure, party systems and voter alignments, Lipset and Rokkan suggest that the crucial cleavages and their political expressions can be ordered within a two-dimensional space constituted by a territorial dimension, or centre-periphery axis, and a functional dimension, or cross-local axis.1 This chapter concentrates on the first of these two dimensions. Thus, its main focus is the relationship between centre and periphery in Norwegian politics. Centres can be defined as the privileged locations within a territory where key resource-holders most frequently meet. A centre controls the bulk of transactions among resource-holders across territorial boundaries, and it is able to dominate the communication flow through a standard language and a set of institutions for regular consultation and representation. A periphery, by contrast, is dependent, controlling only its own resources at best, and it is isolated from all other regions except the central one.2 In other words, centres are powerful, rich and influential; peripheries are powerless, poor and easily influenced.3 In their analysis of centres and peripheries in Western Europe, Rokkan and Urwin developed a typology of nation-building and state-building processes based on space identity and strategies of unification.4 Political movements tend to identify with both a territory and a group. Hence, according to Rokkan and Urwin, we have to deal with two inter-related spatial dimensions -‘membership space’ which means membership of a group that possesses some common sociocultural stigmata, and ‘territorial space’ which means identification with and occupation of a specific geographical area. Nation-building is thus considered as a continuum which may be divided into four categories: (1) territorial space predominant; (2) territorial space dominant, but with strong membership space characteristics; (3) membership space dominant, but with strong territorial space characteristics; and (4) membership space predominant. Unification or statebuilding may be based on centralizing strategies or federalizing accommodation. Both strategies can be dichotomized, giving a fourfold classification: the unitary state, the union state, mechanical federalism, and organic federalism. According to Rokkan and Urwin, Norway is placed at one extreme of both dimensions. Territorial space is predominant. There is an unambiguous central point of control with only weak or no regional institutions. Where political

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protest does arise, it tends not to have any strong positive regionalist or peripheral perspective, since there is little or no distinctive identity other than with the state. Norway is also a unitary state with one unambiguous political centre, which enjoys economic dominance and pursues a policy of administrative standardization. All institutions are under direct control of the centre. Why, then, has Norway not experienced serious regional unrest? The question is raised by Aarebrot who has analyzed the Norwegian case in Rokkan and Urwin’s book.5 He offers three explanations: (1) the regional level has very little institutional infrastructure; (2) cultural identities and aims are not tied to specific regions; and (3) the basis for economic development has emphasized the local rather than regional establishment of industries. In other words, a ‘missing regional link’ is the reason why ‘fully-fledged regional political problems’ have not emerged in Norway. The overall impression of Norway given by Aarebrot, Rokkan and Urwin, in short, is characterized by the domination of a strong centre over weak peripheries. In a comparative perspective this is the most conspicuous tendency. However, this ‘centralistic’ picture of Norway needs modification. It may be argued that local and regional identities do exist, and the influence of the Norwegian periphery is quite substantial. The regional link is not really missing. It is probably more adequate to say that the interests of the Norwegian periphery are integrated into the institutional infrastructure of the unitary state. It is, of course, not possible to give a comprehensive analysis of this question within a short chapter. The aim here, therefore, is to provide some empirical illustrations that may contribute to a more nuanced picture of centre-periphery relations in Norwegian politics. The first section of this chapter will examine the representation of the periphery in the Norwegian Parliament, the Storting, at two levels—the county level and the municipal level respectively. In the second section we will take a closer look at how district interests influence committee evaluations, decision-making and questions in parliament, and the MPs’ contact with the administration. As we shall see, representation of the periphery in the Storting is strong, and district interests have a substantial impact on policymaking and other activities of the Norwegian Parliament.6 REPRESENTATION OF THE PERIPHERY The first political parties in Norway, the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, were established in 1884. They adopted the Norwegian names ‘Venstre’ and ‘Høyre’, which literally mean left and right. But to a large extent the two parties also represented the periphery and the central areas respectively. Roughly speaking, there are two peripheries in Norway, one in the southern and western parts of the country, and one in northern Norway.7 Traditionally, the Labour Party had a stronghold in the northern periphery, while the so-called middle parties, the Agrarian Party (later called the Centre Party), the Christian People’s Party and the Liberal Party had their strongholds in the southern and western

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TABLE 8.1 VALID VOTES BY PARTY AND CENTRALITY OF MUNICIPALITY (PERCENTAGES), 1989 AND 1997

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics. Centrality of municipality is defined as follows: Central = The five (1989)/six (1997) largest cities and their surrounding regions. Fairly central = Municipalities within working distance of urban settlements with 10,000/15,000 to 50,000 inhabitants. Less outlying=Municipalities within working distance of urban settlements with 5,000 to 10,000/15,000 inhabitants. Outlying=Municipalities further than working distance away from urban settlement with at least 5,000 inhabitants.

periphery. The Conservative Party had its strongest support in the central parts of eastern Norway, especially in the capital, Oslo. To a certain degree, this is still the case. We can also see the impact of the centre-periphery dimension on party support at the municipal level. As shown in Table 8.1, support for the Centre Party and the Christian People’s Party decreases as one moves from outlying to central municipalities, while support for the Conservatives and the Progress Party increases. The County Level The Norwegian constitution of 1814 established two kinds of constituencies— cities and rural districts—within each county. As Rokkan has pointed out, provisions of the constitution ensured urban over-representation.8 The peasantry was enfranchised but kept within bounds: one vote in the cities weighed as much

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as five votes in the countryside. An increase in the number of registered citizens in a constituency resulted in a proportional increase in its number of representatives. However, the constitution stated that the ratios were to be changed if the number of city representatives exceeded one-half of the number of rural representatives. This provision was not taken very seriously in the first decades after 1814. The gradual increase in the population of the cities produced a more and more marked over-representation of their electorates, but action against this injustice was not taken until the peasants begun to mobilize their forces in opposition to the dominance of the cities. A slow process of rural mobilization started in the 1830s. By 1859 the number of representatives from the cities went far beyond the original 1:2 ratio and the peasants finally took action to defend their rights, seeing to it that the 1:2 urban-rural ratio was strictly enforced. Originally, the 1:2 ratio served to ensure urban over-representation. But after 1859 the ‘peasant clause’, as the rule came to be called, had the effect of defending the rural interests in an increasingly urban society. Yet even in 1885 the cities, with the exception of the capital, were still markedly overrepresented.9 Only in 1952, when the urban and rural parts of each county were merged into one constituency, was the 1:2 rule abandoned. At present, constituencies for Storting elections are identical with the 19 Norwegian counties (see Figure 8.1). The number of representatives from each county roughly corresponds to the number of inhabitants. But the distribution of seats among the counties is still by no means strictly proportional. Compared with the number of citizens, central counties are now under-represented, while sparsely populated and peripheral counties are over-represented in the Storting. In the 1969 election, for example, there was an average of 14,391 valid votes cast per representative on the national level. In the two centrally located counties of Akershus and Oslo, however, the number of votes cast per representative amounted to 24,958 and 23,798 respectively. In Finnmark and Nordland in the northern periphery, by comparison, there were only 9,096 and 9,996 votes cast per representative. If we say that the average voter on the national level has one vote, it means that each Finnmark voter had 1.6 votes, whereas each Akershus voter had 0.6 votes. Most Norwegian politicians have accepted the principle that long distances to the political centre in the Norwegian capital Oslo should be compensated by a certain over-representation of the periphery. But over time, due to population growth in the central areas, the degree of under-representation of the centres became unacceptable. Thus, in 1973 the total number of seats in parliament was increased from 150 to 155, providing Akershus and Oslo with three and two new mandates respectively. Because of continuing population growth, Akershus was subsequently granted two more seats in the 1985 election. At this point there was an average of 16,572 valid votes cast per representative on the national level. In Akershus, however, there were 20,669 votes per representative, while the corresponding number in

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FIGURE 8.1 THE NORWEGIAN COUNTIES

Finnmark was 10,578. In view of this situation, we may say that each Akershus voter had 0.8 votes in this election, while each voter from Finnmark still had 1.6 votes. Regional differences between the parties further contribute to the unproportional distribution of mandates between the counties. To make the distribution between the parties somewhat more proportional, it was decided that

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TABLE 8.2 INDEX OF UNDER-/OVERREPRESENTATION, 1989

for the 1989 election eight additional seats should be elected on a nationwide basis. Since the parties entitled to the additional seats tended to gain most of their ‘extra’ votes in densely populated counties, this arrangement also had an impact on the geographical distribution of the mandates. In 1989 Akershus won three of the at-large seats, Rogaland 2, Oslo 1, Østfold 1 and Hordaland 1. The effect is shown in Table 8.2. In the first column we find the actual number of votes per representative in each county. In the second column we have estimates based on the hypothetical situation where no additional at-large seats were elected, and the third column provides an index of under-/overrepresentation for individual districts based on the situation with additional seats.10 As we can see, the national average in 1989 was 16,046 votes per representative. Given the arrangement with additional seats, 17,569 votes were cast per representative from Akershus in 1989, whereas had there been no additional seats, the number of votes per representative from Akershus would have been 21,961. In Finnmark, by comparison, which did not get any additional seats, the number of votes per representative was 10,261. Thus, each voter from Akershus counted for only 0.9 votes, while the voters in Finnmark had 1.6 votes each. It should be noted, however, that in the 1989 election Buskerud, a county

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to the southwest of Oslo in which Drammen, Norway’s sixth largest city is located, was the most under-represented county, since each vote there counted for only 0.8 of a vote (20,514 votes per representative) as compared to the national average. Clearly, the distribution of the additional seats has an impact on the geographical distribution of the mandates in the Storting. But the additional seats are only distributed to parties which, after the distribution of the county seats, are under-represented in view of their overall support on the national level. Consequently, the geographical effect will vary from one election to another. Moreover, even though the under-representation of the central counties has been reduced over the years, peripheral counties are still over-represented. All of the seven counties at the bottom of the list in Table 8.2 (i.e. those which are most over-represented) were the most peripheral counties in southern, western and northern Norway. At the election in 1997, Finnmark (9,789/1.60) and Nordland (11,267/1.39) were still the most over-represented counties. Buskerud (19,860/0. 79) and Akershus (19,332/0.81) were the most under-represented counties in 1997. (The national average was 15,662 votes per MP, seats at large included.) In the 1989 election the periphery was not only over-represented in relation to the size of the population, the utmost periphery was also represented directly. In this election, for the first time since 1918, a non-partisan candidate, Anders Aune, was elected to the Storting. Aune represented the ‘Popular Movement for the Future of Finnmark’, a constellation formed in order to draw attention to the serious problems facing the coastal areas of northern Norway. Anders Aune was also an MP in 1969–73, representing the Labour Party, but he subsequently left the party in protest against government policy regarding Finnmark. The Municipal Level The Norwegian constitution originally stated that candidates for parliamentary elections had to be residents of the constituency in which they were nominated. This requirement was abolished in 1952, but still most candidates have their residence in the county they represent. In 1985 only one per cent of the candidates lived outside the county in which they were nominated.11 In 1989 the strong tradition for nominating candidates who live within the district even caused problems for a national party leader. Erik Solheim, the leader of the Socialist Left Party, lived in Oslo. But a former party leader already occupied the party’s ‘secure’ Oslo seat. Hence, Solheim ran for nomination in Sør-Trøndelag. He succeeded, but many of the local politicians protested strongly. The peripheral component in Norwegian politics is also evident in the nomination process, which, in the Norwegian parties, is highly decentralized. National party leaders are very reluctant to interfere with this process. Several criteria for group representation are involved. Among the most important ones are district representation, representation of women, of youth and of different occupations.12 Probably the most important one when the parties compose their

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lists of candidates, however, is geographical balance. Most often the top candidates of a party live in different municipalities within the county. Even so, the concentration of voters in county centres tends to contribute to the nomination of at least one candidate from the central areas of the county on each party list. Since some of the smaller parties will win only one seat in the election, over-representation of the central municipalities could quite naturally be the result. The map in Figure 8.2 shows the actual distribution of MPs according to the municipality in which they lived at the time of the 1989 election. Three or more MPs were resident in the municipalities with the darkest colour. No MPs lived in the municipalities shown in white. With a total of only 165 MPs and 448 municipalities, it was obviously impossible for all municipalities to be represented in the Storting. But, as we can see, municipalities with one or two representatives were scattered all over the country. And insofar as there were municipalities with three or more representatives, these were indeed most often the largest towns in each county. Yet this situation does not automatically imply an over-representation of the centre. The distribution of representatives and population according to the centrality of the municipality is shown in Table 8.3. As we see from the table, the suggested over-representation of the centrally located municipalities is by no means confirmed. On the contrary, the most centrally located municipalities were the ones most likely to be under-represented. The main conclusion to be drawn, however, is that the distribution of MPs and that of the population as a whole were almost identical. The situation in 1989, we may add, was no coincidence. Hellevik found the same pattern when analyzing the period from 1945 to 1969.13 GEOGRAPHY AND POLICY-MAKING As we have seen, the geographical background of the candidates plays an important role in the nomination process. The reason, of course, is the supposed effect it has on policy-making. Candidates are expected to promote the interests of their own districts. Experience from local politics is probably one of the factors strengthening the connection between geographical background and policy-making. Most of the elected representatives in the Norwegian Storting have experience from local politics. Of the MPs elected in 1989, 23 per cent had been either mayor or vice-mayor in their own municipality or county. A total of 85 per cent had served in some kind of local office.14 These figures are quite representative for the post-war period as a whole, even though the extent of local political experience has been slightly reduced. According to Eliassen, only 12 per cent of all MPs elected during the period 1945–85 had no experience from local offices.15 Of these MPs 30 per cent had been mayors in their own municipality, and an additional 58 per cent had been members of the municipal council, while 25 per cent had been members of the county council.

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FIGURE 8.2 RESIDENTIAL MUNICIPALITY OF MPs, 1989

Source: Norwegian Social Science Data Services.

The importance of the geographical background of Norwegian MPs has its symbolic expression in the plenary meeting room in the Storting. Goodsell has argued that parliamentary buildings preserve the cultural values of the polity, articulate contemporaneous political attitudes, and contribute to the formation of political culture.16 He quotes Winston Churchill: ‘We shape our buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape us’, and points out that the Westminster-style opposition seating, across two sword-lines woven into the carpet of the floor of

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TABLE 8.3 PLACE OF RESIDENCE OF MPs AND OF THE POPULATION AS A WHOLE, BY CENTRALITY OF MUNICIPALITY, 1989

Note: a See note on Table 8.1. In Table 8.3 each of the last three categories in Table 8.1 has been split into two new categories, depending on the distance to the five largest cities.

the House of Commons, must invite an atmosphere of confrontation between government and opposition. An alternative semi-circular arrangement can also facilitate ideological debate, provided that seats are ordered in a partisan array. None of these arrangements are found in the Norwegian Parliament. The geography of the plenary chamber of the Storting corresponds to the geography of the country. MPs take their seats on county benches, on which they are seated according to the distribution of party mandates. As a result, in 1989–93 one could find political opponents from the Labour Party and the Conservative Party sitting together on the Akershus bench. Likewise, on the bench for Troms in northern Norway, the right-wing MP from the Progress Party sat next to the MP from the Socialist Left Party (see Figure 8.3). The importance of the geographical background of the MPs is also illustrated by the distribution of the additional seats in the plenary chamber. This distribution caused some problems in the Storting. MPs holding the additional seats are primarily supposed to represent their parties, not the county. The logical, and most convenient, solution would have been to place the additional seats on a bench separate from the county benches. However, parliament chose to place the MPs holding one of the additional seats on the benches of the counties they come from. This is done in spite of the inconveniences it causes. Since the geographical distribution of the additional seats will vary from one election to the next, signs on the chairs showing the number and county of each representative must according to this rule be moved around after each election. It is quite possible that the seating arrangement in the Norwegian Storting contributed to the widespread consensus which characterized Norwegian politics in the first decades of the post-war period.17 When political opponents share a twoseated chair during debates, they have considerable time for informal communication, reducing the political tension between them. This communication may reduce the conflicts between the parties, and strengthen the co-operation between county representatives across party cleavages. The combined effect of this, and of the heavy emphasis placed on the candidates’

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FIGURE 8.3 DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN THE PLENARY CHAMBER OF THE STORTING

Notes: Map: Norwegien party abbreviations and names in English: AP=Labour Party; Aune= Popular Movement for the Future of Finmark; FRP=Process Party; H=Conservative Party; KRF=Christian People’s; SP=Centre Party (Agrarian); SV=Socialist Left arty.

experience from local politics in the nomination process, may represent a strengthening of the political impact inherent in the geographical background of the MPs. Standing Committees Standing committees play an important role in the policy-making process in the Norwegian Parliament.18 All issues to be decided by the Storting are first submitted to the relevant standing committee. The committee makes a recommendation on which the debate in the plenary assembly is based. On several occasions, Gudmund Hernes has asked the MPs to evaluate the different committees.19 Three questions are of special interest in this context: (1) Of which committees do they prefer to be a member? (2) Which committees are most important for carrying through the party programme? and (3) Which are most important for the promotion of district interests? Each MP was asked to name three committees on each question. The results from 1977 are presented in Table 8.4.

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TABLE 8.4 COMMITTEE EVALUATION 1977 (%)a

Notes: a Percentage of MPs naming the committee as one of the three most important ones for carrying through their party programme and promoting their district interests, and those that prefer to be members of the committee. Source: The table is based on data made available by Professor Gudmund Hernes. TABLE 8.5 COMPARING THE COMMITTEES

Not surprisingly, the Standing Committee on Transport gets the highest ranking on the question concerning district interests. It is, by contrast, ranked as number seven concerning the importance for the fulfilment of the party programme. The Committee on Local Government and the Environment is ranked second on district importance and third on party programme importance, while the Committee on Industrial Affairs has the opposite ranking. Most important for carrying through the party programme is the Finance Committee. On the district issue, the Finance Committee is ranked in the fifth place only. Committee ranking according to which one the MPs prefer to be a member of seems to lie somewhere in between the district and party programme rankings. The committees on Local Government and on Industrial Affairs are most preferred, followed by the Committee on Transport and the Finance Committee. Table 8.5 compares the different committee rankings. The table shows the rank correlations, rho and the average differences between the percentages. The correlations between preferred membership and importance to party programme and district interests respectively are practically identical. This suggests that

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party programme and district interests have approximately the same impact on the MPs’ preferences as to committee membership. If we have to distinguish between the two, however, district interests seem to be somewhat more important to membership preference than party programmes, as indicated by the average percentage differences. Voting Usually it is possible to predict the outcome of parliamentary debates and voting on the basis of the standpoints taken by the parties in committee recommendations. Normally, the parties act very cohesively when voting in the Storting. Votes in the Norwegian Parliament have not been thoroughly analyzed. However, Shaffer’s data from 1985–86 are probably quite representative. On 84 per cent of the votes in this period every single representative voted with his or her party.20 If a party’s vote is split in the Storting, the issue is likely to contain some kind of geographical conflict. If the cabinet’s survival is not at stake, the MPs will normally be free to vote according to the interests of their constituencies, irrespective of their party’s official standpoint. And even if the survival of the cabinet or a single minister is threatened, it is not always easy to get every MP to vote together with the rest of his party if important district interests are involved. This fact may be illustrated by two noteworthy examples. In 1970, the non-socialist coalition government under the premiership of Per Borten proposed a rise in the kilometre-based taxation on transport. A Conservative MP from the county Sogn og Fjordane and a Centre Party representative from Hordaland declared that they would vote against the proposal made by their own government. The cabinet would not survive a defeat, but the two MPs represented counties with very long transportation distances. Important district interests were involved, and the two MPs did not give in until, after the debate had started, they had been assured that the interests of the periphery would be taken care of in other ways. In 1988, the Labour government headed by Gro Harlem Brundtland faced severe problems when the Storting was to decide the localization of a new main airport in the Oslo region. This had been a difficult issue for decades. The government’s choice was Gardermoen in Akershus county. The other alternative was Hurum in Buskerud county. Gardermoen is located to the northeast of Oslo and Hurum to the southwest. Several parties split their votes. A majority of 81 MPs voted for Hurum, while 76 supported the Gardermoen alternative proposed by the government. Fourteen Labour MPs voted for Hurum and thus became responsible for their own government’s defeat. They represented the counties Buskerud, Vestfold, Østfold and Telemark, all of which are located to the south and west of Oslo. (Later this decision was changed, but that is another story.) The political consequences of this outcome for the government were severe. The Minister of Transport had to resign. As one of the cabinet’s ‘heavy-

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weights’, however, he was appointed as new Minister of Local Government. Several other changes in the cabinet, which were planned to take place somewhat later, were effected at the same time. Afterwards, some of the Labour MPs who voted against the government proposal said they did not know that the proposal was of such great importance to the government. They thought they had their ‘normal’ freedom to vote in favour of their district’s interests. The Prime Minister had not explicitly declared the consequences of a defeat. Other Labour MPs claimed that everybody ought to have known. However, the fact that the Prime Minister and the parliamentary group of the Labour Party did not ‘order’ the MPs to vote in favour of the cabinet’s proposal illustrates the importance of the district interests. Even when district interests clash with party interests, the party leaders are very reluctant to instruct their MPs to vote against the interests of their constituency. As we have seen, the Parliamentary Committee on Industrial Affairs was also one of the most important for promoting district interests. Since Hernes interviewed the MPs in 1977, this committee has become even more important. Norway has become a major oil and gas producer, and is now among the largest oil exporters in the world, and a major supplier of natural gas to Great Britain, Germany and France.21 As a result of these developments, the name of the committee, which was also responsible for petroleum policy issues, was changed to the Standing Committee on Energy and Industry. Otterå has examined cleavages in Norwegian petroleum politics from 1973 to 1985.22 As the basis of his analysis, Otterå used dissenting remarks in petroleumrelated recommendations from various parliamentary committees. It is a declared aim of Norwegian petroleum policy to let the whole country benefit from petroleum resources. Otterå found geographical conflicts between centre and periphery, as well as conflicts concerning localization of the petroleum activities, in 15 to 20 per cent of the dissenting remarks. The left-right conflict between public and private engagement, by comparison, was manifested in 31–41 per cent of the dissenting remarks. As Schattschneider has pointed out, conflicts compete with each other.23 One kind of conflict can become dominant only if another one is subordinated. People must, in short, choose among conflicts. Under normal circumstances, the leftright conflict is the dominant one in Norwegian politics. When this conflict is subordinated, however, some kind of centre -periphery conflict is likely to be involved. An example from petroleum politics is illustrative in this respect. When the Norwegian state-owned oil company Statoil was established in 1972, there was a potential for both kinds of conflict. State ownership in industry has been a conflictual issue in Norwegian politics for many years. In this case, however, there were no protests against the establishment of a new state-owned company. The only dissenting remarks in the recommendation made by the Committee on Industrial Affairs concerned the geographical location of the oil company and the new Petroleum Directorate which was also established at that time. Three cities were proposed: Oslo, Stavanger and Trondheim. Several parties

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experienced a split vote when the majority decided that Stavanger, which is located nearest to the oil fields in the North Sea, was to be the ‘oil capital’ of Norway. The left-right conflict, in other words, was suppressed by the geographical conflict. In more recent years, geographical conflicts have been most conspicuous when the Storting made its decisions on the location of supply bases and operational organizations for the different oil and gas fields. On several occasions the MPs have voted according to their geographical background, and not according to their party affiliation.24 Questions and Contact with the Administration Normally, the cabinet initiates decision-making processes in the Norwegian Parliament. In most cases the Storting and its committees respond to bills and reports submitted by the government. However, MPs may also play a more active role, especially in addressing questions to cabinet ministers.25 Kuhnle and Svåsand have examined the questions addressed to some of the ministers during the period 1977–81.26 Even though they found that the number of districtoriented questions was somewhat smaller than expected, quite a substantial number were focused on district-related problems. More than 56 per cent of the questions addressed to the Minister of Transport were related to the districts. Almost 33 per cent of the questions to the Minister of Local Government and Employment concerned district interests, while 30 and 26 per cent of the questions to the Ministers of Education and Social Affairs, respectively, were district-oriented. Blichner and Olsen have similarly analyzed petroleum-related questions asked in the Storting from 1960 until 1985.27 They found that most of the questions on petroleum policy were raised by MPs living in the coastal counties near the offshore oil and gas fields. Forty per cent of the petroleum-related questions concerned problems in a specific county or district. This share has increased since 1973. In 1981–85 more than half of the petroleum-related questions were district-oriented. Eighty-seven per cent of the questions concerning the development of petroleum fields, 70 per cent of the questions concerning delivery of goods and services and 40 per cent of the questions on education and research were related to a specific district. The proportion of questions referring to a specific constituency or county has risen considerably. In a parliamentary system like the Norwegian one, contact between the Storting and the ministries is supposed to be taken care of by the ministers. Nevertheless, a considerable amount of informal contact between individual MPs and civil servants in the ministries has been registered. When Hernes interviewed MPs in 1977, they were asked what were the most important and second most important reasons for their contacts with the ministries. Seventy-two per cent of the MPs referred to committee work, while 69 per cent said that contact was made on initiatives from their constituency. Only 23 per cent said that personal

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interest in the issue was among the most important reasons for contact with the ministry.28 The MPs were also asked how they could best promote the interests of their districts. Seventy-two per cent of the representatives said that their contact with the ministries was the most important, or second most important consideration. Next came committee work, which was mentioned by 30 per cent of the MPs. Twenty-three per cent of the MPs said that cooperation with MPs from their own constituency representing other parties was the most important or second most important factor for the promotion of district interests. CONCLUSION This chapter has examined the representation of the periphery in the Norwegian Parliament and the impact of district interests on policy-making in the Storting. It has tried to give a more nuanced picture than the ‘centralistic’ impression given by Rokkan and Urwin in their comparative typology of state-building and nation-building processes.29 At the constituency or county level, it is evident that the periphery has been over-represented in the Norwegian Storting, even though the underrepresentation of the central counties has been somewhat reduced over the years. At the municipal level, we have seen an almost identical percentage distribution of population and of representatives, depending on how central the residential municipality is. Yet, to be more specific, even using this measure the most centrally located municipalities are slightly underrepresented. Policy-making in the Norwegian Parliament is marked by conflicts between political parties. The left-right dimension is the dominant one in Norwegian politics and policy-making. We have, however, seen several examples where the left-right cleavage has been suppressed by other conflicts. When party votes are split, the issue is likely to contain a conflict between different geographical areas. Even the survival of the cabinet or of a single minister may be in danger if centre-periphery conflicts occur. And MPs expend a considerable amount of energy on the promotion of district interests. The Norwegian Parliament first and foremost constitutes an important part of the political centre of Norway. As we have seen, however, regional and district interests are well integrated into the Storting. To a certain degree, we may say that the Storting constitutes a regional link, a link that is missing according to Aarebrot.30 Hence, the Storting is not only the political centre of a unitary state; it is also the central assembly of the Norwegian periphery. NOTES This chapter is based on H. Rommetvedt: The Norwegian Storting: The Central Assembly of the Periphery’, Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol.15, No.2 (1992). The data were made available by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services,

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the Central Bureau of Statistics of Norway, and by Professor Gudmund Hernes. I also thank Anne Liv K. McKenzie for her assistance, and the anonymous reviewers of Scandinavian Political Studies for their comments. 1. S.M.Lipset and S.Rokkan, ‘Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction’, in S.M.Lipset and S.Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: The Free Press, 1967). 2. S.Rokkan and D.W.Urwin, ‘lntroduction: Centres and Peripheries in Western Europe’, in S. Rokkan and D.W.Urwin (eds.), The Politics of Territorial Identity (London: Sage, 1982). 3. D.Anckar, ‘Parliaments, Centers, Peripheries’, Paper presented at the XVth World Congress of the international Political Science Association (Buenos Aires, 21–25 July 1991). 4. Rokkan and Urwin, ‘lntroduction: Centres and Peripheries in Western Europe’. 5. F.Aarebrot, ‘Norway: Centre and Periphery in a Peripheral State’, in Rokkan and Urwin (eds.), The Politics of Territorial Identity. 6. Also see Chapter 9. 7. S.Rokkan, ‘Geography, Religion and Social Class: Crosscutting Cleavages in Norwegian Politics’, in Lipset and Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments. 8. Rokkan, ‘Geography, Religion and Social Class: Crosscutting Cleavages in Norwegian Politics’. 9. Rokkan, ‘Geography, Religion and Social Class: Crosscutting Cleavages in Norwegian Politics’. 10. Calculations are based on data from the Central Bureau of Statistics. 11. H.Valen, ‘Norway: Decentralization and Group Representation’, in M.Gallagher and M. Marsh (eds.), Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective (London: Sage, 1988). 12. Valen, ‘Norway: Decentralization and Group Representation’. 13. O.Hellevik, Stortinget—en sosial elite? (Oslo: Pax, 1969). 14. Kommunal Rapport, no.15 (l989). 15. K.A.Eliassen, ‘Rekrutteringen til Stortinget og regjeringen 1945–1985’, in T. Nordby (ed.), Storting og regjering 1945–1985. Institusjoner—rekruttering (Oslo: Kunnskapsforlaget, 1985). 16. C.T.Goodsell, ‘The Architecture of Parliaments: Legislative Houses and Political Culture’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol.18 (1988), pp.287–302. 17. See Chapter2. 18. See Chapters 3 and 4. 19. Cf. G.Hernes, Interest, Influence, and Cooperation: A Study of the Nonvegian Parliament (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1971). 20. W.R.Schaffer, ‘lnter-Party Spatial Relationships in Norwegian Storting Roll Call Votes’, Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol.14 (1991), pp.59–83. 21. H.O.Bergesen and A.K.Sydnes (eds.), Naive Newcomer or Shrewd Salesman? Norway—A Major Oil and Gas Exporter (Lysaker: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 1990). 22. M.Otterå Petroleumsvirksomhet og konfliktlinjer (Bergen: Institutt for administrasjon og organisasjonsvitenskap, 1985).

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23. E.E.Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People (Hinsdale, IL: The Dryden Press, 1975). 24. See Chapter 9. 25. See Chapter 2. 26. S.Kuhnle and L.Svåsand, ‘Spørreordningene og politiske profiler i Stortinget 1977– 1981’, in O.Berg and A.Underdal (eds.), Fra valg til vedtak (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1984). 27. L.Chr.Blichner and J.P.Olsen, Spørsmål i Stortinget (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1986). 28. G.Hernes and K.Nergaard, Oss i mellom. Konstitusjonelle former og uformelle kontakter Storting—Regjering (Oslo: FAFO, 1989). 29. Rokkan and Urwin, ‘lntroduction: Centres and Peripheries in Western Europe’. 30. Aarebrot, ‘Norway: Centre and Periphery in a Peripheral State’.

CHAPTER 9 ‘Regionoil’ Politics and Policy

There is a well-established tradition in Norwegian politics of looking after the interests of provincial areas and a strong wish to preserve the pattern of scattered settlement in the country. Consequently, there is great emphasis on regional politics and policy.1 Since 1969 when the first large oilfield was discovered in the Norwegian part of the North Sea, Norway has become an important oilproducing country. This fact has influenced Norway’s position in international society as well as having had an impact on the relationship between central and peripheral areas within the country. This chapter will focus on the intersection between regional and oil-related politics, or what we might call the ‘regionoil’ politics and policy of Norway. Our objective is to show how changes in the way problems are defined influence oilrelated political decisions which have regional effects. This will help to illuminate general characteristics of the functioning of the political system, and to explain why specific issues turn out as they do. We are going to combine elements from organization theory and party theory, that is, the garbage-can model and a conflict dimensions perspective respectively. The following issues will be examined: (1) the initiation of exploration activities north of the 62nd parallel; (2) decisions concerning the localization of operations organizations for the Sleipner and Snorre oil and gas fields. DECISIONS, CONFLICTS AND COALITIONS Within the garbage-can perspective, oil-related political decisions, like political decisions in other areas, can be seen as results or interpretations of several relatively independent streams within an organization: a stream of choice opportunities where the political-administrative system must choose between different alternatives; a stream of problems; a stream of solutions; and a stream of participants.2 The four streams are connected or kept apart by means of organization. The decision-making process depends on two closely linked processes: the activating process determines which participants will be activated, how stable the participant pattern will be, and how the participants organize their mutual relationships. The defining process determines which contents of

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meaning will be incorporated in the decision to be made, which objectives and means-objective correlations will be tied to the process, and definition stability. The selected problem definitions decide which alternative solutions will be considered appropriate, and which participants are relevant in the decisionmaking situation, and vice versa. In the stream of information concerning all potential conflicts there is a process of selection where opinions and interpretations are determined.3 What happens in politics depends on the way in which people are divided into factions, parties, groups, and so on.4 The outcome of the game of politics depends on which of a multitude of possible conflicts gains the dominant position. Since it is impossible to handle all kinds of conflicts at the same time, people have to choose among conflicts. There are billions of potential conflicts, but only a few become significant. In this selection and interpretation process, information is related to the categories and patterns already familiar to the participants. In political decisions involving parliament and government the political parties are central participants. Political parties are established to take care of a number of values and interests associated with various cleavages or dimensions of conflict, which again form more or less stable patterns to which new political issues are related through the processes of activation and definition.5 The relevance and concrete value of the various cleavages or conflict dimensions may vary over time. Now and then new dimensions appear. In our ‘regionoil’ context the following dimensions of conflict seem particularly relevant: (1) the left-right dimension, focusing on the relationship between public and private involvement, or between economic profitability and redistribution; (2) the centre-periphery dimension, focusing on local areas and regional politics; (3) the growth-conservation dimension, focusing on the balance between economic growth and environmental protection. Political parties in Norway take different positions along the various conflict dimensions. The Socialist Left and the Labour Party give high priority to public involvement and distribution of wealth, thereby taking a position on the political left. The Conservatives and the Progress Party, on the other hand, place themselves on the right by giving high priority to private initiative and profitability. The Liberal Party, the Christian People’s Party and the Centre (Agrarian) Party occupy midpoint positions on the left-right axis. In the centreperiphery dimension the centrist parties and the Socialist Left are normally most supportive of peripheral districts, while the Progress Party, the Conservative Party and Labour are considered to be spokesmen for central areas. Corresponding constellations can be seen along the growth-conservation dimension, where the Socialist Left, the Liberals, the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party present themselves as conservationists, while the Progress Party, the Conservatives and Labour are seen as parties favouring growth.

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The positions of the various parties in the conflict dimensions decide which coalitions will be feasible. When government coalitions are formed, the political distances along the left-right dimension seem to be decisive.6 However, when specific issues are at hand, the coalition potentials will vary depending on which conflict dimensions are relevant. In short, then, the decision-making process can be said to develop as follows: when a new issue develops or a new decision-making situation occurs, the political parties will, consciously or not, interpret the issue in relation to familiar patterns—i.e., conflict lines relevant to Norwegian politics. In the interpretation process the issue becomes ‘meaningful’—the problem is defined, which also involves a selection of the conflict(s) to be focused on. Since different parties and other participants are interested in different values and aspects of the issue at hand, the result of the defining process will depend on who the participants are. This will also have an impact on which solutions are suggested or considered relevant. Problem definition and suggested solutions will then decide which participants can form coalitions, and thus the outcome of the decision-making process is determined. Norwegian Oil Activities and Oil-Related Politics Norway’s sovereignty over the Norwegian Continental Shelf was pro claimed in 1963. Agreements between Norway and the UK and Denmark on delimitation of the Continental Shelf south of the 62nd parallel were signed in 1965. In the summer of 1966, the first exploration well on the Norwegian Continental Shelf was drilled. In December 1969, the Ekofisk field was proven. The Norwegian oil production began in 1971. In 1985, the gross production value within the petroleum production and pipeline transportation sectors represented about 19 per cent of the gross national product. When prices dropped in 1986, this share was reduced. In 1989 gross production was about 11 per cent of the GNP. The export of petroleum represented about 29 per cent of total Norwegian exports in 1989.7 The development of Norwegian oil politics has gone through several phases.8 Up to around 1970 oil-related politics was characterized by few participants, few issues and a high degree of harmony. In the 1970s, a mobilization process took place involving a number of different participants and interests. The conflicts and problem definitions changed focus. Oil politics does not constitute an independent conflict dimension in Norwegian politics, but oil-related political issues illustrate the relevance of the general conflict dimensions already discussed.9 The definition of problems or the interpretation of the concrete subject matter of specific issues depends on which dimensions become relevant, and vice versa. During the 1980s, oil politics entered a consolidation phase. The number of participants decreased. Olsen, however, argues that the petroleum sector seems to have difficulties in settling down and finding a permanent balance between different interests.10 The issue constellations which we shall examine in this article

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FIGURE 9.1 LOCALIZATION OF NORWEGIAN PETROLEUM ACTIVITIES

illustrate this. We shall see how problem interpretation and participation in important oil-related political issues have changed over time and influenced the outcome or solution of the issues. Special attention will be drawn to regionalpolitical aspects of these issues.

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EXPLORATORY DRILLING IN NORTHERN AREAS The issue of oil exploration activities north of the 62nd parallel was raised by the non-socialist coalition government led by Prime Minister Per Borten. A Report to the Norwegian Parliament, the Storting, stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Oil Council and all Norwegian and foreign oil companies were in favour of opening up this part of the Continental Shelf. The Ministry of Industry, which at the time was responsible for oil-related affairs, wanted surveying of the resources to be started in the summer of 1971.11 Considering the debates of later years, it is interesting to note that this question was not connected with nature conservation and environment protection—or even with the fishing industry, which is the most important livelihood in northern Norway. The problem was defined as a practical, technical and rather non-political question. None of the potential conflict dimensions were activated by the participants involved at this stage. During the spring of 1971 the Borten government resigned because of internal disagreement on Norway’s relationship with the EEC. The Labour government which took its place was led by Trygve Bratteli, and it raised the question of oil activities in northern waters in a new report to parliament. The views contained in this report were not divergent from those of the Borten government. However, it contained a chapter on environment protection, nature conservation and pollution-related problems. The Bratteli cabinet resigned in 1972 when its recommendation to join the EEC was defeated in a referendum. The parties opposing Norwegian membership, the Christian People’s Party, the Centre Party and the Liberals, formed a coalition government led by Lars Korvald. In its long-term programme for 1974–77 the new government professed its intention to step up efforts to explore the Continental Shelf north of the 62nd parallel. According to the programme, the activities would probably enter the drilling phase before the end of the period. The Parliamentary Committee on Local Government and the Environment expressed no significant reservations when presenting its views on the long-term programme. After the parliamentary election in the autumn of 1973, Mr Bratteli formed a new government, which in a new parliamentary report promised to stick to its position that the opening up of areas north of the 62nd parallel should start offshore northern Norway. The government planned for drilling activities to start in 1975–76. In summary, during this period, Norway had four different governments formed by various party constellations: the Borten government, 1965–71 (Centre Party, Conservatives, Christian People’s Party, Liberals); the Bratteli I government, 1971–72 (Labour Party); the Korvald government, 1972–73 (Christian People’s Party, Centre Party, Liberals); the Bratteli II government, 1973–76 (Labour Party)

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The government changes of this period were induced by the EEC struggle, which in many ways reflected the conflicts between centre and periphery in Norwegian society. The fact that the majority voted against membership in the referendum was interpreted as a wish for a new policy with less emphasis on economic growth and more on ‘green’ values. It would be reasonable to expect this view to manifest itself in the various governments’ view on oil exploration north of the 62nd parallel, too. However, there is no such manifestation. The stability of the government’s standpoint is particularly conspicuous in the Korvald cabinet, which represented the EEC membership opponents. The government was formed by parties close to the political centre which have since adopted a pro-conservationist standpoint on issues concerning environmental protection. In other words, we find a high level of standpoint consistency in the various governments. The positions seem to be independent of which parties are involved in government, which may be due to the fact that issues are prepared by departmental bureaucracies which do not change even though governments come and go. However, this is an insufficient explanation of the consistency in government views. When different governments and parties take the same general position on an issue, it may be because it has not been politicized. The decisive argument for opening up the Continental Shelf north of the 62nd parallel seems to have been a wish to survey the resources combined with a belief in the positive effects oil activities would have on the regional development in the periphery. Possible effects on the fishing industry, for instance, were not even debated—if there was a debate at all. Even environmental considerations were hardly touched upon in the parliamentary reports, at least not in connection with opening up the Continental Shelf north of the 62nd parallel. Consequently, there was hardly any discussion at all during the period examined above concerning the opening up of the northern part of the Continental Shelf. Even the starting date was more or less decided on: as soon as possible. It was an exclusively technical problem. Politically, oil activities in northern areas represented no problem. On the contrary, drilling offshore was seen as a potential contribution to solving the regional problems facing peripheral areas in northern Norway. The participants involved in the decision-making process shared this view. A New Phase in Norwegian Oil Politics When the Bratteli government, in February 1974, presented its parliamentary report no. 25 (1973–74) concerning the role played by petroleum-related activities in Norwegian society, it indicated in several ways the transition to a new era in Norwegian oil politics. While previous parliamentary reports had been rather technical in character, evaluating petroleum-related activities as an

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isolated sector or as a possible incentive in regional policy, parliamentary report no. 25 examined oil activities in a broader social context. Earlier reports had been prepared by the Ministry of Industry, by and large the only ministry involved. Parliamentary report no. 25, on the other hand, was drawn up by the Ministry of Finance in co-operation with the Ministries of Industry, Fisheries, Environment, Health and Social Affairs, Education, Local Government Affairs, Defence, Trade, and Foreign Affairs. The number of participants was, in other words, greatly increased. In many respects, the Ministry of Finance functions as a ‘co-ordinating ministry’ for the government. It therefore has a wider perspective of the oil activities than the more specialized Ministry of Industry. The fact that the government at this stage initiated work on parliamentary report no. 25 shows that the definition of problems connected with the oil industry was in the process of changing. When the report was presented, this process of change gained force. The issue of petroleum-related activities as a whole was now much more problem-oriented and to a certain degree politicized. It is important to note that potential problems to the fishing industry and the natural environment posed by drilling activities north of the 62nd parallel were examined in the report. But the conclusions were still concurrent with those promoted by previous governments. According to the report, the government had made an overall evaluation based on commercial as well as population- and employment-related factors in a regional context and arrived at the conclusion that areas north of the 62nd parallel should be opened up to exploration activities and that drilling operations should start offshore northern Norway. One month after parliamentary report no. 25 had been presented, the Ministry of Industry issued parliamentary report no. 30 (1973–74) concerning activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. This report declared that the government would promote oil production at a ‘moderate’ pace, due to the extensive impact it would have on Norwegian society. The report also quoted the Oil Council, saying that district-related political considerations would favour a shift in oil activities northwards. It was maintained that if activities were concentrated in the south at the expense of northern Norway, labour and capital would be drained from the northern regions. Even the Ministry of Industry presumed that regional considerations would favour the initiation of exploratory drilling offshore northern Norway. The ministry was in favour of opening up a limited area for exploratory drilling relatively near the coast of northern Norway in 1975–76. If conditions would allow, a smaller area offshore mid-Norway would be opened up at the same time or shortly afterwards. However, drilling activities north of the 62nd parallel would only be permitted as long as they caused no significant inconvenience to the fishing industry. As we can see, several potential problems were evaluated without a change in conclusion. One important reservation was made, however: the activities must not cause significant inconvenience to the fishing industry. The definition of

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inconvenience significant enough to hinder oil activities was not clear, though. But the government’s plans for exploration activities were more limited than at first envisaged. The potential conflicts indicated in the two reports were manifested in the public debate, for instance in statements from the Oil Council of Northern Norway and the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association. The Oil Council of Northern Norway recommended exploratory drilling in 1975–76, with certain reservations with regard to the fishing industry. The Norwegian Fishermen’s Association, on the other hand, insisted that no drilling should be allowed in northern areas in the near future. Within the political parties doubts began to spread. The Labour Party announced its conclusion that it would be unwise to appoint a definite year as the starting date for exploratory drilling north of the 62nd parallel. The party wished to step up its efforts to examine the interests of the fishing industry. The Conservative Party supported commencement of exploration activities, provided a research project was initiated first to safeguard against pollution which might be harmful to the fishing industry. The Centre Party, the Liberal Party and the Christian People’s Party were of the opinion that commercial exploitation of potential petroleum resources north of the 62nd parallel should be postponed for the time being. Instead, the Norwegian state-owned oil company Statoil should carry out extensive survey and exploration activities to get a picture of the petroleum resources north of the 62nd parallel. The survey of any discoveries was to be extensive enough to establish whether the resources were commercially profitable. The Liberal Party representative added that commercial utilization of petroleum resources north of the 62nd parallel should be postponed for ten years. As we have seen, the original target was to commence exploration activities in northern areas as early as in the summer of 1971. The fact that this proved impossible and the starting date was repeatedly postponed was due to capacity problems in the oil companies and the time needed by the civil service to prepare the case, rather than to political decisions. In any case, this enabled more participants to enter the field with their own interpretations and definitions of the problems. The conflict between economic growth and environmental protection was revealed. Consequently, new proposals for conclusions or solutions to the question of drilling in northern areas were introduced. The ‘growth parties’ still wanted to go ahead in the north, while the ‘conservationist parties’ called for a halt. During the spring of 1975, the Ministry of Industry tabled a new parliamentary report with summer 1977 as the recommended starting date for drilling operations in northern areas. The Conservative Party, the Christian People’s Party, the Centre Party and the Liberal Party all warned against a progression that was too fast to enable ecological and environmental consequences of the oil activities to be examined properly. The Conservatives and Labour, however, emphasized the fact that exploratory drilling should start before the end of 1977, provided that it

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was sufficiently certain that there would be no risk of pollution and that the fishing industry would suffer no damaging effects. The pollution issue, however, made the commencement of drilling operations north of the 62nd parallel unacceptable to the Socialist Left Party. Safety-related aspects were at the core of a parliamentary report presented by the Ministry of Industry in spring 1976. The Parliamentary Committee on Industrial Affairs did not present its view until February 1977. In its recommendation the Labour Party supported initiation of drilling operations in 1978, while the Conservative Party, now co-operating with the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party, in preparation for the parliamentary election in September 1977, could not at that time justify making a decision on the commencement date for drilling in northern areas. The centrist parties were still showing scepticism about starting up drilling activities offshore northern Norway. In the meantime, local resistance to oil drilling in northern areas had been building up. The so-called Oil Campaign in Northern Norway had been founded in November 1976 by representatives of, among others, local fishing associations, nature conservationists and several local parties.12 Blow-out In April 1977, a blow-out was reported on the Bravo platform at the Ekofisk field. Approximately 22,500 metric tons of oil and approximately 1.7 million cubic metres of gas escaped before the blow-out had been stopped and the well brought under control one week later. The blow-out resulted in a temporary halt to the plans of drilling in northern areas. Based on a parliamentary report on exploration for petroleum north of the 62nd parallel the Committee for Industrial Affairs submitted a recommendation where the Labour Party and the Conservatives pointed out that plans for petroleum activities north of the 62nd parallel had been suggested on several occasions and had been postponed each time. The postponements were mainly due to all the practical and technical preparations needed to ensure adequate safety, as well as the establishment of appropriate contingency plans. With reference to district-political consequences for northern Norway as well as the desire to gain as much information about the petroleum resources as possible, the Labour Party and the Conservative Party maintained that exploratory drilling for oil and gas should commence as soon as all practical problems had been solved and acceptable safety measures had been established. The two parties declared that drilling operations offshore northern- and mid-Norway could be initiated before the end of 1980. The Christian People’s Party stressed the need to survey the resources and emphasized the political impact on peripheral areas that could be caused by potential oil activities. The party wanted to start exploratory drilling outside midNorway in 1981. The Christian People’s Party would make a resolution on the

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issue of exploratory drilling offshore northern Norway when experience had been gained from drilling activities offshore mid-Norway. The committee members representing the Centre Party and the Liberal Party declared that an overall evaluation of possible effects on the fishing industry and resources, employment, safety and contingency, as well as the need to survey resources and control the oil activities, had led to the conclusion that it was still too early to commence oil operations north of the 62nd parallel. Accordingly, the Storting majority was in favour of initiating drilling activities during the summer of 1980. A few days later, however, a new postponement was proposed because of an uncontrolled blow-out in the Gulf of Mexico in June 1979. But the licence round went ahead, and in January 1980 the first three contracts were awarded. The three Norwegian oil companies (Statoil, Hydro and Saga) were designated operators. Simultaneously, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy presented an up-to-date report on oil drilling north of the 62nd parallel. The parliamentary parties took more or less the same standpoints as before, and in March 1980 the Storting turned down a proposal to postpone exploratory drilling north of the 62nd parallel by 76 votes to 26. Two weeks later the most disastrous accident up to that point on the Norwegian Continental Shelf occurred. The hotel platform ‘Alexander L. Kielland’ capsized and 123 people were killed. A proposal by the Christian People’s Party, the Centre Party and the Socialist Left Party to postpone drilling activities in northern areas, however, was rejected by 97 votes to 34 when the issue was debated in the Storting in May. On 1 July 1980, exploration drilling offshore northern Norway was commenced using the drilling platform Treasure Seeker’. Omdahl points out that a number of circumstances prevented the start of drilling operations in northern areas from being postponed yet again. The decision-making process had taken 15 years. Deadlines had been deferred, causing uncertainty in business and industry in northern Norway. Another postponement might even harm the political system by reinforcing the impression of paralysis. And, finally, contracts had already been allocated.13 The anticipated effects from an oil industry in northern Norway did not happen, however, but that is another story.14 Problem Definitions, Conflicts and Coalitions As we have seen, the decision-making process concerning oil operations north of the 62nd parallel went through several stages with rather different problem definitions, participants and solutions. Problem definitions prevalent in the 1970s can be interpreted in relation to the more general conflict pattern in Norwegian politics. Two conflict dimensions seem to be particularly relevant: the centreperiphery dimension and the growth-conservation dimension. In the first phase, the issue of drilling activities in northern areas was considered mainly a practical and technical problem. Politically, it was seen as a

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means of solving district-related problems in northern Norway rather than as a problem in itself. Generally, the oil industry was seen as a stimulus for growth in business and industry. Drilling for oil in northern areas was seen as a contribution to solving problems in peripheral areas, while at the same time contributing to the promotion of economic growth in general. This problem definition was also important with regard to potential coalition formations. During the first phase, all parties were able to agree on an early opening-up of the Continental Shelf north of the 62nd parallel. With a slight exaggeration, one may say that the growth-related aims of the Labour Party and the Conservatives were taken care of, as were the district-related issues of the centrist parties and the Socialist Left. Thus, the way the problem was interpreted formed the basis for a broad consensus among the parties involved. Parliamentary report no. 25, presented in February 1974, represented a widening of the perspectives on Norwegian oil activities. In this phase new participants brought new problem definitions and solutions into the decisionmaking process. Still, drilling activities in northern areas could be seen as a stimulus to economic growth. However, they were no longer seen as an unambiguous solution to district-related problems. Rather to the contrary, drilling activities could create new problems for the districts because of the risk of pollution and the problems this might bring to the fishing industry. This new problem definition contributed to the fact that the political parties now parted in their views on oil drilling in northern areas. The Labour Party and the Conservatives still advocated the exploitation of oil as an impulse for growth, while the centrist parties and the Socialist Left Party now considered drilling operations a danger to the natural environment and business and industry in local areas. Consequently, the latter group of parties changed their views and were now in opposition against drilling operations in northern areas. CHANGING EXPECTATIONS Even though parliamentary report no. 25 questioned several aspects of the oil activities, it also contained statements which created expectations of great revenues and positive regional effects in the periphery. In a separate addendum on localization policy and planning, attention was drawn to negative aspects of the trend in the national settlement pattern. It was claimed that the petroleum industry might aggravate this trend. The development would obstruct accepted aims in regional and local area policy. If a more decentralized development pattern was chosen, however, the development would be more consistent with the targets set by political authorities with regard to settlement pattern. To attain this might require a subdivision of petroleum-related activities into smaller units than would be called for from a purely microeconomic point of view. Furthermore, the report claimed that in a balanced development adapted to national resources and political objectives for business and industry, petroleum-

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related activities could be applied as an operative instrument in district and regional policy. In a review of relevant planning initiatives the report stressed, among other things, the importance of local authorities including anticipated effects from petroleum-related activities into their municipality plans. Although the report stated that increased employment in oil-related activities for all local areas would be impossible, it is a fact that it contributed to great expectations developing in a large number of local areas along the coast. How to avoid the detrimental consequences of pouring too much money from the oil industry into Norway’s economy was one of the main topics in the report. However, a number of local politicians saw oil revenue as an asset rather than a liability. Based on interviews with district council chairmen in northern Norway, Kamfjord maintains that there were considerable unrealistic expectations as to how much and in which ways oil-related activities might benefit the northern region.15 Later developments were to show that expectations had indeed been exaggerated. Many local areas waited in vain for their turn to participate in the oil activities.16 In 1981, when the new Labour government led by Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland presented its long-term programme for the period 1982–85, the situation as well as attitudes towards the oil activities were in a process of change. The cabinet declared that the oil industry already established would constitute the main structure in the future pattern. Because of limited technical and financial opportunities to expand activities, relatively few new areas would gain direct benefit from the oil industry during the long-term programme. The government also claimed that inflated ideas of the impact of oil revenues might lead to demands too excessive to be met by available resources. The 1981 parliamentary election led to a non-socialist majority in the Storting. Kåre Willoch formed a Conservative government, which in 1983 was converted into a centre-right coalition consisting of the Conservative Party, the Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party. In its long-term programme for 1986–89, the coalition government warned that the risk of falling oil prices or worsening US$ exchange rate illustrated the great uncertainties facing the development in petroleum revenue. This warning turned out to be most timely. After the spot price of North Sea oil had risen to more than US$30 per barrel at the end of 1985, it plummeted to US$9 during the spring of 1986. The consequences to the Norwegian state were monumental. Accrued taxes and royalties from oil-related activities sank from NOK50.5 billion in 1985 to NOK17.1 billion in 1986 and to NOK14.4 billion in 1987. Net cash flow to the state (revenue less costs) was reduced from NOK39.0 billion in 1985 to NOK25.0 billion in 1986 and to NOK8.3 billion in 1987.17 Simultaneous with the plunge in the state’s oil revenue came reports that the cost estimates of Statoil’s extension of the Mongstad refinery and crude oil terminal would be grossly overstepped—by billions of NOK according to the first signals in September 1987. In the aftermath of the ensuing scandal Statoil’s Managing Director, Arve Johnsen, had to resign in January 1988.

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LOCALIZATION OF OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN NORWAY While activities in northern Norway were concentrated around oil and gas exploration, activities in southern Norway during the last part of the 1980s were concentrated around the development and operation of established oil and gas fields. The choice of sites for the various fields was a central issue in regional oil politics in this part of the country. Normally, we may view the political parties in Norway as unitary actors in the way we have done so far. Normally, the parties act very cohesively when voting in the Norwegian Storting. However, when parliament is to decide where to situate an institution, a split of votes is likely to occur in several parties. As we saw in Chapter 8, the establishment of the Norwegian state-owned oil company Statoil in 1972 may serve as an illustration. When Statoil was established, there was a potential for left-right conflict between public and private involvement as well as geographical conflict between the localization alternatives. State ownership in industry has been a controversial issue in Norwegian politics. In this case, however, there were no protests against the establishment of a new state-owned company. The only dissenting remarks in the recommendation made by the industry committee in the Storting concerned the localization of the oil company and the new Petroleum Directorate, which was also established at that time. Several parties were divided when the majority decided that Stavanger was to be the ‘oil capital’ of Norway. In other words, the left-right conflict was suppressed by the geographical conflict. The priority given to the geographical interests in this case reflects an important element of Norwegian political culture. If the cabinet’s survival is not at stake, the MPs will normally be free to vote according to the interests of their constituencies, irrespective of their party’s official standpoint.18 Consequently, when the question of specific sites of localization is involved in the decisionmaking process, the MPs will often participate primarily as county representatives, not as party members. This is an important factor to take into consideration when we study the choice of operations sites for the Sleipner and Snorre fields. The Sleipner East Field Sleipner East is an oil and gas field in the North Sea west of Stavanger. Recoverable reserves have been estimated at 19 million Sm3 oil, 51 billion Sm3 gas, and 10 million tons of condensate.19 The Norwegian state-owned oil company Statoil is the operator. The choice of site for Sleipner East operations and supply activities was presented to the Storting in the spring of 1987. Statoil proposed integrating the new assignments into the company’s existing operations in Stavanger, using supply bases in the region. The majority of the Localization Policy Committee

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(advisory committee to the Ministry of Local Government and Labour), on the other hand, recommended that Statoil should establish operations in the Kristiansand area in the southernmost part of Norway. The Ministry of Petroleum maintained that there were two main alternatives: either concentrating all activities in Stavanger, or running operations activities in Kristiansand and supply activities from a base in Mandal. Evaluations of the two alternatives led the cabinet to support both operations units and supply base for Sleipner in the Stavanger area. Evaluations were based on Statoil’s calculation of how much more it would cost to locate the operation in Kristiansand. Independent evaluations carried out by a research institute on behalf of the Kristiansand local council concluded that the extra cost was considerably exaggerated.20 An inter-departmental working group with members from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Local Government and Labour and the Ministry of Petroleum evaluated the calculations made by Statoil and the research institute respectively and concluded that the discrepancy was partly due to different calculation principles and partly to different interpretations of the actual extra cost factors. The working group as well as the Ministry of Petroleum in principle accepted the extra cost calculations made by Statoil, estimated at NOK1.23 billion if the operation was located in Kristiansand, and NOK435 million if the supply base was established in Mandal. The macroeconomic current value of the whole project would be reduced by 36 per cent. In its economic evaluation of the regional aspects, the report maintained that even if Kristiansand in 1986 had a higher unemployment rate and lower rate of work participation than Stavanger, the need for new jobs would be considerably greater in Stavanger than Kristiansand towards the turn of the century. Several of the oil and gas fields operating from the Stavanger area were expected to be phased out during the 1990s. If Stavanger did not get new operations assignments, onshore employment would be greatly reduced up to the year 2010. The largest reduction was expected to occur during the period 1990–95. The ministry claimed that Stavanger to a greater extent than Kristiansand would be able to provide personnel relevant to the Sleipner organization and its demand for goods and services. According to the inter-departmental working group, the relative importance to local business and industry would be greatest in the Kristiansand area, whereas volume-wise the local impact would probably be greater in the Stavanger region. All in all, the ministry found it difficult to draw unambiguous conclusions as to which region would benefit most from being host to the Sleipner activities. The report also pointed out that there was reason to expect the basis for establishing new independent operations for North Sea fields to gradually disappear as an increasing number of operators established their onshore organizations and as the fields, step-by-step, entered the operations phase. This was, according to the report, first and foremost valid for onshore functions

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serving the North Sea activities. Operations further north would require operations to be established in mid and northern Norway. When the issue was debated in the Storting in 1987, the standpoints followed geographical rather than party lines. Thirty-one MPs voted in favour of Kristiansand/Mandal, whereas 87 were in favour of Stavanger. All MPs from the two counties nearest to Kristiansand voted in favour of Kristiansand/Mandal. The Socialist Left Party was the only party which voted unanimously in favour of Kristiansand/Mandal, while the Progress Party and the Centre Party were unified in their support of Stavanger. The Labour Party, the Conservatives and the Christian People’s Party were divided, but the two former parties had a clear majority in favour of Stavanger. The Snorre Field The Snorre field is situated in the northern part of the North Sea and contains, according to estimates made by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 106 million Sm3 oil, 5.8 billion Sm3 gas and 2.7 million tons of condensate.21 The privately owned Norwegian oil company, Saga, was operator, with Esso as its technical adviser. The site alternatives for the Snorre operations were presented in a cabinet proposition to the Storting in January 1988. However, the first part of this concentrated around a more general issue: the phasing in of field developments in the years to come. The economic situation in general and the conditions in the oil industry in particular demanded, in the cabinet’s view, a ‘queue’ arrangement for the development of oil and gas fields. The Snorre field was placed at the head of the queue. The operator Saga proposed that the operations organization should be situated in Stavanger and an extended supply base built in Florø. The Ministry of Petroleum shared this view. The cabinet proposition maintained that Saga would face great challenges of technical as well as organizational character in the operation of the Snorre field. In order not to complicate the handling of these responsibilities, the ministry considered it important that the small and relatively inexperienced oil company Saga should be in close proximity to established oil expertise in Stavanger. The importance of keeping in close contact with the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) as well as with Esso (as technical adviser) was emphasized. Both are situated in Stavanger. Ålesund also entered the contest for the Snorre operation. The ministry, however, shared Saga’s view that if the operation were to be situated in Ålesund it would mean an extra cost of approximately 900 million 1986 NOK over the lifetime of the field. Furthermore, the ministry pointed out that the benefits of locating exploration and production drilling in the same place would be considerable. Saga’s drilling department was located in Stavanger. The proposition claimed that the authorities found Saga’s plans for setting up Florø most interesting. If the operation were located in Ålesund, several of the

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professional reasons for establishing extensive functions in Florø would no longer be legitimate. Neither could the accommodating attitude shown by Saga to establishing additional functions in Florø be expected to be maintained if extra costs were imposed on the company by ordering the operation to be situated outside Stavanger. In this case, the ministry juxtaposed the interests of Florø with those of Ålesund. If the operation were situated in Ålesund, it could be used as an argument to establish the base functions in the same place, in which case Florø would be out of the competition. Bergen also entered the contest, but the ministry claimed that it lacked some of the advantages Stavanger could offer Saga, such as proximity to a wide range of services and to the partners, and the possibilities for coordination with the company’s drilling department. Summing up the regional and macro-economic circumstances, parliamentary report no. 25 concluded that redistribution policy aspects also had to be considered. Significantly, if the licensee was requested to choose a microeconomically more expensive solution, the main brunt of the extra cost would be carried by the state in the form of reduced tax revenue. The government also referred to the importance of making use of existing operations and base facilities to secure work there in the long run. In the petroleum sector, existing operations should be used for future assignments. Gradually, more fields would enter existing operations, and these subsequently phased out, releasing capacity for the operation of new fields. A central point in the Snorre development evaluation was the uncertainty in overall field economy. The parliamentary report maintained, among other things, that the Snorre project might yield considerable revenue if the actual trend in the real price of oil corresponded with the expected trend. However, seen in relation to the size of the project, profitability was not altogether satisfactory. A high break-even oil price, great reservoir uncertainty and high costs could make for considerable potential losses. The Parliamentary Committee on Energy and Industry unanimously concluded in its recommendation that there was a considerable risk connected with the Snorre project. Still, the committee was in favour of the ministry’s proposal to approve the project, emphasizing the fact that all ten participating oil companies had found the field to be commercially viable. The issue was debated in the Storting in May 1988. A proposal by the Socialist Left Party to postpone the field development was supported by six votes only. Subsequently, six MPs from Hordaland county, where Bergen is located, voted in favour of locating the operations organization in Bergen, a proposal opposed by the two Hordaland MPs from the Progress Party and the Socialist Left. In the final vote, Stavanger gained 82 votes and Ålesund 28. All MPs from the county Møre and Romsdal, where Ålesund is situated, voted in favour of Ålesund. The MPs from the county Rogaland, where Stavanger is located, were unanimously in favour of Stavanger. The Progress Party and the Socialist Left

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were also united in their support of Stavanger, while the other parties’ votes were split. A large majority in both the Labour Party and in the Conservative Party supported Stavanger. Problem Definitions, Conflicts and Coalitions As we have seen, the period before the Sleipner East and Snorre operations phase locations were decided on was marked by fundamental changes in the economic conditions for the petroleum activities. When parliamentary report no. 25 was presented in 1974, the economic aspect was almost defined as a problem of flooding. Norwegian society had to be protected against the flow of petroleumgenerated money. As far as the oil-generated money could be absorbed by the Norwegian economy, it would be distributed as much as possible in order to avoid detrimental effects. In other words, it was also a question of distribution. During the following years the development moved in a direction different from the one anticipated. When the oil price fell dramatically in the middle of the 1980s, the value of the petroleum resources decreased. State revenue dwindled, leading to a redefinition of the political issues pertaining to the oil activities. Now the oil-related part of the economy became a question of profitability—or, at worst, a question of deficit. As long as the oil price was high and on the increase, micro and macroeconomic interests were in harmony. Oil and gas production yielded substantial profits to the companies as well as to the state, so that attention could be concentrated on the distribution of the oil activities and the oil-generated wealth. When the oil price fell and profits waned, however, there was less money available for distribution. More focus had to be given to the issue of making field operations profitable, thereby making the extra cost issue connected with alternative sites decisive for the conclusions reached by the Storting. The extent of extra cost connected with different site alternatives is, among other things, dependent on the infrastructure already established in the area. The Stavanger area had the best infrastructure for the oil industry, giving Stavanger an edge in the competition between various site alternatives for the Sleipner and Snorre fields. In a situation where profitability was of great importance, this advantage was extremely significant. In 1974, it was important to divide activities into smaller elements than would be necessary seen from a microeconomic point of view, while in 1987 (Sleipner) and 1988 (Snorre) the benefit of co-ordinated sites was emphasized.22 As we have seen, these lines of conflict are correlated with geography more than with political parties. Even so, there is reason to draw attention to the fact that the great majority of both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party supported the Stavanger alternative. According to their positions on the left-right axis, these two parties are most often seen as the main antagonists in Norwegian politics. In connection with the Snorre development, this fact materialized in the question of state ownership. The Conservatives wanted to sell the state-owned

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shares, which Labour opposed. The Christian People’s Party and the Centre Party advocated a compromise solution. The Labour Party and the Conservative Party are also normally considered opponents on the issues of profitability and redistribution. Labour tends to emphasize the redistribution aspect, while the Conservatives accentuate the importance of profitability. The reason why the majority of the two parties joined forces on the Sleipner and Snorre issues may be related to a feature more prominent in the oil industry than elsewhere; due to tax legislation the profit interests of the oil companies and the state revenue from oil-related activities have a high degree of concurrence. If there is no profit to be made, the companies lose money and the state receives no tax revenue. This is an approach which forms a favourable basis for coalitions between Labour and the Conservatives. Coalitions may also be formed across party lines. In connection with Sleipner East and Snorre, there was a geographical conflict between the Stavanger area on one hand and the regional challengers in the periphery on the other. As was pointed out earlier, the MPs often participate primarily as district representatives and not as party members when it comes to localized decisions. It seems obvious that this could have formed the basis for a coalition between Kristiansand/Mandal and Ålesund. The MPs supporting Ålesund could have voted for the Kristiansand/Mandal alternative during the Sleipner debate and the MPs supporting Kristiansand/Mandal could have voted for Ålesund when Snorre was debated. Transcripts of the parliamentary votes can tell us whether such a coalition took place, implicitly or by explicit agreement between MPs. However, there is no evidence that this was the case. A total of 52 MPs voted in favour of Kristiansand/Mandal and/or Ålesund, but only seven MPs favoured both alternatives. Twenty-four MPs voted for Kristiansand/Mandal and against Ålesund, while 21 MPs voted against Kristiansand/Mandal and in favour of Ålesund (or were absent when one of the votes was taken). Why, then, was the opportunity to form a geographical coalition not seized? The time factor may be one reason. There was almost exactly one year between the debates on the two issues, making an association between the two difficult. In addition, the following points were important. As we have indicated, the economic interests of the oil companies and of the state tend to correlate when profit margins are narrow in the oil industry. Economic interests related to local areas, on the other hand, may increase in controversy. In the case of Stavanger, all these interests were united: micro- and macro-economic interests as well as the local area aspect concurred in the Stavanger alternative. The situation was different for Kristiansand and Ålesund. If Kristian-sand/ Mandal had been chosen for Sleipner or Ålesund for Snorre, state revenue from these two fields would decrease and there would be less money available for distribution to peripheral areas. Consequently, Stavanger was preferable to the

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Ålesund area as the site for Sleipner—and, correspondingly, to the Kristiansand/ Mandal area as the site for Snorre. Thus, the probability of a coalition between the two areas was slim. CONCLUSION This chapter has examined a number of oil-related political decisions relevant to regional policy by combining the garbage-can perspective from organization theory with a conflict-dimensions perspective from party theory. We have considered the decision-making process as a result of the connection between choice opportunities, problems, solutions and participants. The dominating problem definitions and solutions have been related to some of the general cleavages or conflict dimensions in Norwegian politics. These conflict dimensions form different foundations for coalition formation, and thus for the outcome of the decision-making process. The first part showed how changes in the problem definitions changed the parties’ standpoints regarding exploratory drilling north of the 62nd parallel. During its early days, oil-related politics was considered to be rather segmented. Certain participants with certain problem definitions and solutions were linked together in the decision-making process. ‘Outsiders’ were excluded. Drilling in the north was hardly politicized at all. The issue was defined as a technical problem and as a possible solution to the regional problems in the periphery. This problem definition formed the basis for a broad consensus among all political parties. However, parliamentary report no. 25 (1973–74) represented a new attitude, demonstrating that oil politics had been opened up to a number of new participants and interests. New problem definitions and new solutions were involved in the decision-making process. Consequently, drilling in the north became a highly politicized question, and the broad consensus was broken. Different links between state and private interests on one hand and geographical interests on the other will influence the probability of coalitions between parties. Under otherwise identical circumstances private, decentralized solutions will be expedient for coalitions between the Conservatives and the centre parties, while coalitions between Labour and the centrist parties may develop when state solutions are combined with peripheral locations. Generally, the centrist parties are most concerned with regional policy and tend to choose decentralized solutions. However, they also concern themselves with the interests of the primary industries and environmental issues. If the oil activities conflict with these interests, these parties may become obstructive to the distribution of oil activities, as we saw in the issue of exploratory drilling in northern areas. When the growth-conservationist conflict is activated, there is a possibility of a coalition between Labour and the Conservatives on the growth side of this dimension.

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Norwegian politics is characterized by a high degree of loyalty among the representatives of each party. In most cases, therefore, the conflict lines between the parties determine their standpoints. In other words, the MPs participate as party representatives in the decision-making process. However, in issues of localization MPs are often free to look after the interests of their own constituencies. The Storting is not only Norway’s national and political party assembly; it is also very much the central assembly of the periphery.23 On specific issues like the choice of sites for operations the MPs participate primarily as district representatives. MPs from one particular county often vote unanimously irrespective of party affiliation. This liberty to take care of the interests of their own constituencies may create a foundation for geographical coalitions across party lines. The probability of geographical coalitions is weakened, however, by the fact that regional economic interests easily become contradictory when profit margins dwindle. Each district is naturally interested in attracting oil activities. In cases where this is not possible, each local area will benefit most from low-cost locations giving high state revenue to be distributed in other connections. Thus, different areas can be played off against each other, so that party lines become more decisive than the geographical ones. The latter possibility will, however, depend on whether it is feasible to connect different decisions on choice of site. Here, the time factor is an important element. It will be easier for MPs from different areas to see two issues in relation to each other and negotiate an exchange of favours if the decisions are to be made almost simultaneously. The organization of the oilrelated political agenda may therefore have an impact on the outcome of oilrelated issues with consequences for regional policy. It is natural to ask whether it is not in everybody’s interest to minimize extra costs in the choice of sites, so that the profit yielded by the activities will be as high as possible. Then, of course, the size of the pie will increase with larger bits for everyone. This must be obvious—even to ‘irrational’ regional politicians. Undoubtedly, this argument is appealing from a national point of view. But the harmonious pie model is based on the condition that there are universal definitions of cost and income. In our context this condition does not hold. What is seen as extra cost for a specific site alternative from a company’s or the state’s point of view is extra income for the local region. Consequently, the different foundations for rationality become incompatible. Decisions on choice of site, as discussed above, will have an impact beyond the direct profit yielded in the local region. The investments represent an infrastructure which may be of importance to future site alternatives and income. This was clearly expressed in connection with the choice of site for the Sleipner and Snorre operations. The benefits of coordinated sites and the utilization of the existing infrastructure in the Stavanger area were strongly emphasized. The Stavanger region still reaps benefits from the fact that important parts of the oil industry were established there some decades ago. Other regions have learnt from

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Stavanger, which is why the various areas in Norway will continue to fight for their share in the oil activities. NOTES This chapter is based on H.Rommetvedt, ‘“Regionoil” Politics and Policy in Norway’, Regional Politics & Policy (now Regional & Federal Studies), Vol.1, No.3 (1991). 1. See Chapter 8. 2. M.D.Cohen, J.G.March and J.P.Olsen, ‘A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.17 (1972), pp.1–25, and J.G.March and J.P.Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1976). 3. K.E.Weick, The Social Psychology of Organizing (New York: Random House, 1979). 4. E.E.Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People (Hinsdale, IL: The Dryden Press, 1975). 5. S.M.Lipset and S.Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: CrossNational Perspectives (New York: The Free Press, 1967). 6. See Chapter 2. 7. Fact Sheet. The Norwegian Continental Shelf (Oslo: The Royal Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 1990), pp.7 ff. 8. J.P.Olsen, Petroleum og politikk (Oslo: TANO, 1989). 9. M.Otterå, ‘Petroleumsvirksomhet og konfliktlinjer’ (unpublished thesis, Institutt for administrasjon og organisasjonsvitenskap, Bergen, 1985). 10. J.P.Olsen, Petroleum og polilikk. 11. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy was established in 1977. 12. H.O.Larsen and N.Aarsæther, ‘Oljeaksjonen i Nord’, Syn og Segn, No.6 (1977). 13. A.Omdahl, ‘Oljeboring nord for 62. Breddegrad’ (unpublished thesis, Institutt for administrasjon og organisasjonsvitenskap, Bergen, 1987). 14. Cf. A.Mariussen, ‘Oljebyen i nord—visjon og virkelighet’, in O.E.Olsen and J.E.Reiersen (eds.), Svart gull på alles fat? Oljevirksomhetens regionale fordeling (Oslo: Kommuneforlaget, 1991), pp.117 ff. 15. G.Kamfjord (ed.), Nord-Norge og oljen (Oslo: Tiden, 1982). 16. Olsen and Reiersen (eds.), Svart gull på alles fat? 17. Parliamentary Report No.2 (1988–89), p.43. 18. Even if the cabinet’s or a single minister’s survival is threatened, it is not always easy to get every MP to vote together with the rest of his party if important district interests are involved, cf. Chapter 8. 19. Fact Sheet. The Norwegian Continental Shelf, p.60. 20. R.Helland-Olsen et al, Driftsorganisasjon for Sleipner: Rogaland eller Sørlandet? (Kristiansand: Agderforskning, 1986). 21. Fact Sheet. The Norwegian Continental Shelf, p.54. 22. Cf. Parliamentary Report No.25 (1973–74). 23. See Chapter 2.

Index

Aarebrot, R, 166, 181 abortion, 34, 116, 120 access, 91, 130, 144, 155–2, 162 activating, 183–90 active role, 41, 180 activity, 6, 16, 18, 34, 39, 46, 50, 58, 64, 70, 84, 89, 100, 133, 141, 144–54, 156, 161, 162, 166, 179, 183, 186–197, 200– 7, 202–10 actors, 4, 11–12, 64, 84, 111, 129–6, 134, 135, 139–148, 161–8, 195 administrative, 2, 4, 8, 11, 12, 41, 54, 67, 72, 90, 93–7, 129–7, 134, 135–3, 139–7, 144–55, 156–7, 162, 166, 183 advisers, 2, 55, 81, 126 agencies, 4, 67, 131, 133–9, 135, 157 agenda, 21, 30, 44, 46, 92, 103, 117, 146, 153, 160, 202 Agrarian Party, 119, 144, 167, 185 agriculture, 8, 26, 66–67, 73, 75, 76, 96, 105–10, 119, 123, 134, 139, 156, 175 amendments, 5, 105, 155–61, 157–4, 162 Amery, L., 124 Anders Lange’s Party, 18, 52 Andeweg, R., 112, 124 anticipated reactions, 10, 71 Apenes, G., 68 attention, 2, 9, 11, 12, 46, 82, 89–3, 93–8, 97–101, 101–10, 108–13, 111, 118, 124, 127, 146, 148, 158, 171, 186, 194, 200 Aune, A., 18, 20, 171 Austria, 6, 9, 149 authorities, 2, 4, 11, 12, 51, 67, 101, 130, 142, 143, 146, 156–4, 160–7, 194, 198

bargaining, see negotiations Bastesen, S., 21 Benkow, J., 75 Berge, G., 90 bills, 3, 5, 41–7, 57, 68, 70, 72, 92, 116, 145, 155, 157–4, 180, 195–2, 198 Blichner, L.Chr., 180 blocs, 31, 32–6, 35, 39, 59 board members, 156–4 boards, 11, 129–6, 133–9, 135, 147 Bondevik, K., 24, 119 Bondevik, K.M., 21, 23, 27, 70–4, 122 Borten, P, 17, 23–6, 27, 33–8, 37, 112, 115, 117, 119–4, 122–7, 178, 186–4 Bratteli, T., 23–7, 27, 186–5 Brazil, 9, 149 Britain, 16, 179, 185 Brundtland, G.H., 3, 5, 23, 25–9, 34–9, 70– 4, 160, 178, 195 Bryce, Lord, xi Budge, L, 36, 118 budget, 24, 26–9, 41–6, 47–49, 54, 70–5, 76–79, 145 bureaucracy, 81, 134, 144 bureaucrats, 130, 143–9, 147 business, 4, 9, 51, 72–6, 75, 76–77, 82–7, 96, 97, 131, 133, 135–3, 139–7, 153–61, 159–6, 193, 194, 197 cabinet, see government campaign, 20–3, 27, 35, 51, 59, 124, 126 candidate, 20–5, 171–8, 175 capacity, 4, 11, 54–9, 65, 67, 74, 76, 101, 142–8, 145–2, 190, 199

205

206 THE RISE OF THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT

centre, 9–10, 12, 21, 27, 31, 32–6, 35–9, 39, 54, 59, 71, 97, 111, 115, 165–5, 172, 179, 181, 185, 188, 193, 195, 201 centre parties, 27, 32–6, 35, 59, 201 Centre Party, 9, 17–18, 20–3, 23–9, 31–9, 37–2, 53–8, 59, 75, 96, 101–5, 105, 112, 114–21, 119–4, 122–7, 126, 167, 174, 178, 185–91, 186–4, 190–8, 195, 198, 200 centre-periphery, 12, 165–3, 179, 181, 185, 193 chairmen, 13, 96, 122, 126–31, 175, 194 choice, 16, 29, 39, 65, 91–6, 107, 109, 122, 143, 146, 178, 183, 195–2, 201–10 Christian Frederik, xi, 2 Christian People’s Party, 17–18, 21, 23–8, 31–9, 39, 53–8, 59, 70, 75, 96, 99, 101– 5, 112, 114, 120, 186–4, 190–8, 195, 198, 200 church, 72–6, 76, 82–7, 119, 122–7, 126, 175 Churchill, W., 174 civil service, 17, 89, 159 clarification, 68–2, 160, 162 cleavages, 10, 12, 165, 175, 179, 181, 185, 201 climate, 108, 158–7 coalition, 3, 5, 10, 11–12, 16–17, 18, 21, 23–39, 53–8, 57, 59, 67, 71, 111–22, 120–31, 144, 178, 185, 186, 193, 195, 200–9 coalition apparatus, 11, 113–18, 127 coalition formation, 11, 12, 32, 36, 37–2, 112, 114, 118, 193, 201 coalition maintenance, 112–77, 116, 121 coalition range, 31–7, 36–39 Coastal Party, 18, 21 commissions, 129, 133–9, 135, 147 committees, 3, 9, 11–11, 31, 34, 36–44, 46–50, 52–7, 55–57, 64–69, 71–81, 82– 8, 89–101, 101–13, 114–19, 118, 121–7, 125, 127, 130–6, 133–9, 145–4, 153–66, 166, 175–3, 179–7, 186, 191–8, 196, 199 committee reform, 11, 73, 76, 84, 89–3, 92–97, 106–12 committee secretaries, 55

committee-ministry relations, 76, 77, 79, 80 communication, 76, 113–18, 125, 127, 153, 165, 175 competitive, 57 compromise, 26, 34, 36, 39, 55, 66–67, 71, 115–20, 122, 124–9, 160, 200 confidence, 17, 22–9, 52, 57, 71, 114 conflict, 2, 10, 11–12, 16, 20, 29, 36, 37–2, 47–48, 50–59, 81, 114, 116–22, 121–9, 127, 144, 145–2, 175, 178–7, 183–94, 190–7, 193, 196, 200, 200, 201, 202 conifer, 158, 160–7 connection, 18, 30, 42, 44–8, 47, 51, 52, 72, 75, 77–5, 84, 91, 96, 106, 112, 115– 20, 162, 174, 188, 200–10 consensus, 11, 55–57, 59, 66–67, 81, 107, 116, 121, 144, 148, 175, 193, 201 Conservative Party, 5, 10, 17–27, 31–9, 37– 2, 51–8, 59, 68, 75, 90, 101, 112, 114– 21, 119–6, 126, 144, 166–3, 175, 185– 91, 188, 190–195, 198–9 constitution, xi, 5, 2, 21–4, 40, 45, 55, 72– 6, 76–77, 81, 82, 168, 171 contact, 2, 4, 11–4, 51, 81, 82, 114, 124–9, 129–5, 132, 134, 135–3, 139–7, 146–4, 153, 155–2, 166, 180–7, 198 control, 2, 46, 52, 84, 93, 131, 134, 135, 143, 144–54, 155–2, 162, 166, 191–8 co-ordination, 73, 75, 76, 90 corporate pluralism, 2, 7–8, 81, 132 corporatism, 2, 6–9, 11, 12, 129–9, 135–3, 139, 142, 144, 146–4, 158–7, 162 correspondance, 37, 40, 72, 118 councils, 11, 130–6, 134 county, 41–5, 82, 96, 153–61, 166, 168, 169–8, 174–82, 178, 180–7, 196–3, 199, 202 Crepaz, M.M.L., 6 culture, 6, 10, 72–6, 76–77, 82, 119, 123, 165–2, 174, 196 Dahle, J., 35 Damgaard, E., 59, 81, 133 debate, 20, 24, 35, 41, 43–8, 47, 52, 72, 75, 90, 101, 103–8, 106, 114, 125, 174, 175– 4, 186–4, 190, 200

INDEX 207

decision-making, 12, 41, 46–47, 55, 58, 65, 68, 89, 92, 107, 112, 114, 116, 122, 127, 130, 148–5, 160–70, 166, 180, 183– 91, 188, 193, 196, 201–9 declarations, 33, 34, 114, 115, 116 decline of legislature/parliament, 2–2, 8, 12, 133 defeat, xi, 3, 5, 10, 22–5, 52, 70–4, 178 defence, 8, 67, 72, 76, 82, 123, 126, 175, 189 definition, 7, 12, 22, 55, 183–92, 189–7, 193–194, 201–9 deliberative democracy, 65 Denmark, xi, 7, 12, 18, 57, 129, 131–9, 135–3, 139–7, 144–55, 185 desegmentation, 75, 80, 84 difference, 7, 36–37, 59, 81, 103, 116, 127, 134, 139–7, 149, 157, 161, 169, 176 differentiation, 65, 124 dissent, 3, 11, 31, 47–50, 52–8, 57, 59, 68– 2, 72–6, 81–5, 84, 92, 116–23, 145, 155, 158, 179, 196 distance, 30–39, 47, 50, 168, 178, 185 district, 2, 12, 66, 105–10, 166, 168, 169, 172, 174, 176–7, 185, 192–194, 200, 202 disunity, 30–7, 36–39, 114 division of labour, 72–8, 131, 145 Dørum, O.E., 34 ebb-and-flow, 2, 12–13 economic, 2–2, 6, 8, 10, 51, 67, 97, 99, 122, 131, 142–8, 160, 166, 185, 186–4, 191, 193–194, 197–7, 202 education, 8, 16, 55, 66–67, 72–6, 76, 82, 119–4, 122, 126, 175, 180, 189 Egeberg, M., 81, 133 elections, 5, 10, 11, 16–17, 18–3, 24–9, 29– 2, 32–40, 48, 50, 52, 55, 58, 71–5, 76– 77, 81, 98, 105, 111, 114–19, 117, 124– 9, 144, 146, 168–8, 175, 186, 191, 195 Eliassen, K., 174 employees, 10, 51, 55, 101 employers, 2, 10, 51 energy, 11, 72–6, 75, 76–77, 82–7, 89–9, 98–4, 101–12, 123, 159, 179, 181, 192, 199

environment, 11–12, 27, 72–6, 75, 76–77, 82, 89–109, 111, 122–8, 146, 153, 155– 7, 162–70, 175–3, 185, 186–5, 191, 194, 202 Eriksen, S., 122 European Community, 12, 17, 18, 24–8, 29, 33, 35–9, 37, 59, 116 European Economic Area, 26, 37, 116 European Union, 12, 20–21, 26 exchange, 65–67, 81, 84, 195, 202 executive-legislative relations, 8, 81, 112 factions, 3, 20, 31, 52, 112, 125, 155–61, 157, 185 family, 72–6, 76–77, 82 farmers, 2, 66–67, 144 finance, 25, 36–39, 42–6, 51, 55, 72, 76, 81–7, 96, 115, 119–7, 126, 175–3, 189, 195, 197 Finland, 20 Finnmark, 18, 20, 168, 169–7 fisheries, 2, 8, 55, 67, 73, 76, 99–4, 101, 106, 120, 123, 175, 186–8, 194 Fjærvoll, D.J., 75 foreign affairs, 72, 76, 96, 123, 186, 189 Formo, H., 95 fractionalization, 10, 21 France, xi, 16, 179 function, 46–47, 67, 81, 91, 116, 121, 124– 9, 130–6, 155, 165 Future for Finnmark, 18, 20, 171 Galtung, J., 5, 50 garbage can, 91, 183, 201 gas, 6, 16, 27, 90, 97–101, 107–12, 159–6, 179–6, 183, 191–8, 195–4, 200 geographical, 12, 165, 169–8, 174–2, 178– 7, 196–3, 200–9 Gerhardsen, E., 16–9, 23–6, 27, 31, 114 Germany, 16, 179 Glistrup, M, 18 goal, 29, 112, 115, 118, 127, 144, 146, 160 Goodsell, C.T., 174 government, xi–11, 16–9, 18–31, 32–39, 41, 43–47, 51–8, 57–3, 64–8, 67, 70–8, 77–2, 89–3, 93–97, 99, 101–13, 111–16, 114–31, 133–9, 135–3, 144–51, 155–63,

208 THE RISE OF THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT

159–7, 162, 171, 174, 175–7, 180, 185– 91, 186–6, 195–2, 198–5 government administration, 72–6, 77, 82, 93–7 government committees, 94, 96, 103, 105– 12, 121, 123, 127 government formation, 16, 21, 29, 111, 115 governmental systems, 6, 8, 9 Groennings, S., 112–18, 116, 118–5 growth-conservation, 185–91, 193, 202 Grøndahl, K.K., 5 Hagen, C.I, 5, 70 Hansen, G., 68 health, 8, 25, 67, 72, 76, 82, 119–5, 189 Heinz, J.P., 6, 8 Hellevik, O., 172 Herman, V., 36 Hernes, G., 2, 59, 68, 70, 81, 92, 118, 132– 8, 175, 179–6 hierarchical, 67, 91 Holmberg, S., 31 homogeneous, 5–6, 50–4, 57 Houg, T., 75, 90 Hunt, W.B., 118 Haarstad, R.Q., 96 impact, 6, 11–12, 64, 100, 101, 113, 153– 64, 162–70, 166–3, 169–7, 175–3, 181, 183, 185, 189, 192, 195, 197, 202–10 implementation, 2, 79, 129–5, 133, 144, 146, 159, 161, 162 independence, 2 industrial conflicts, 51–6, 54, 59 industry, 6, 8, 10, 16, 51–5, 55, 67, 72–6, 75, 76–77, 82, 89, 92, 94–9, 98, 100–4, 105–12, 123, 134, 159–6, 166, 179, 186– 203 inertia, 93, 95, 97, 107 influence, 7–8, 11–12, 29–2, 37–2, 47, 50, 57–2, 64, 68–4, 75, 81, 84, 91–5, 97, 101, 108, 111, 115, 125–31, 134, 144– 51, 147–4, 153, 157–7, 162–70, 166, 183, 201 information, 47, 51, 68, 77, 96, 101, 111, 118, 126, 153–62, 162, 185, 192

initiate, 41, 147, 160–7, 162, 192 institutional, 2, 8, 67, 81, 82, 90–4, 93–7, 97, 99, 103, 105, 107–3, 129–9, 135, 142–54, 153, 155, 165–2 interest organizations, 2, 4, 8–9, 11–12, 30, 67, 100, 129–9, 139–55, 153, 156, 158, 162–70 interpellations, 2, 3, 9, 41, 44–8, 52, 145, 155, 157, 185–93 interpretations, 55, 92, 183–90, 191, 197 intra-party, 112, 124–30 issues, 7, 12, 17, 20–4, 24, 26, 30–3, 33–9, 40–48, 59, 65, 68, 70, 72–9, 79, 90, 92, 94–8, 97–101, 104–13, 114–21, 120–8, 131, 146, 161, 175–7, 183–95, 191–9, 195–9 Jagland, T., 21, 23, 26–9, 36, 70–4 Jakobsen, J.J., 122, 126 Johansen, L.N., 131, 133–9 Johnsen, A., 195 jurisdiction, 72, 77, 94, 103, 105, 155 justice, 55, 66, 72, 76, 82, 123, 175 Kamfjord, G., 194 Keman, H., 118 King, the, xi, 2, 21–6, 26, 114–19 Knight, J., 144–50 Korvald, L., 18, 23, 25, 27, 29, 33, 112, 119, 122–7, 126, 186–4 Kristensen, O.R, 131, 133–9 Kuhnle, S., 180 Kvavik, R.B., 2, 8, 81, 132, 139 labour, 9, 18, 31, 51, 72, 74, 89–3, 93, 108, 122, 131–7, 135–3, 139–7, 144, 189 Labour Party, 2, 3–5, 10, 11, 16–21, 23– 27, 30–39, 50, 51–8, 58–3, 68, 70–4, 90, 93, 101–7, 105–10, 114, 117, 119, 123, 134, 144, 159, 167, 171, 175, 178–5, 185–91, 186, 190–202 Lagting, 40–5, 44, 47 land use, 90, 94, 103–9, 107–12 Lange, A., 18, 52 Langslet, L.R., 115 Laver, M, 111, 113, 118 legal, 7, 40–4, 43, 47, 55, 132, 145

INDEX 209

legislation, 2, 4, 8, 37, 129, 132, 148, 200 legitimacy, 57, 131, 198 Leiserson, M.A., 31 Lewin, L., 147 Liberal Party, 10, 17–25, 27, 31–7, 59, 112, 114, 119–4, 139, 144, 166–3, 185– 91, 186–4, 190–8 Lijphart, A., 6, 36 Lipset, S.M., 165 lobbyism, 2, 4, 11, 12, 58, 64, 76, 82, 89, 107, 129–7, 139–7, 144, 146–4, 153–62, 158–7, 162–70 local, 11–3, 20, 90, 93–97, 101–12, 124, 134, 161, 162, 165–2, 172, 174, 175–3, 185, 191, 194, 197, 200, 202–10 local government, 11–3, 72–6, 76, 82, 89– 3, 93–97, 101–12, 119, 126, 162, 176–4, 180, 186, 189, 196–3 localization, 178–5, 183, 194, 196, 200, 202 lockouts, 51, 52 Luebbert, G.M., 57 Lyng, J., 17, 23–6, 27, 29, 32, 37, 112, 114– 19, 119–4, 123–8 March, J.G., 27, 74, 117, 192 matters, 5, 11, 31, 39, 55, 66, 72–6, 89–3, 92–6, 94, 107, 122, 153 Mattson, L, 64 members, 2, 9–10, 12, 17, 18–4, 24–7, 33, 36, 37, 41, 43–8, 47, 51, 55–57, 59, 65– 67, 73–7, 76, 77, 81, 82–8, 91–5, 94–97, 103, 111, 116–21, 121–6, 124–30, 130– 6, 133–9, 153–60, 156–4, 165, 174, 176, 188, 196–3, 200 Mezey, M.L., 64 ministers, 2, 5, 21–8, 41, 44–8, 47, 52, 111– 16, 116–21, 119–31, 132, 144, 145–2, 148, 158, 178, 180–7 ministries, 4, 8–9, 11–11, 40, 46–47, 58, 64, 67, 72–9, 77–3, 92–7, 81, 99–4, 101– 10, 112, 115, 118–6, 124–9, 127, 133–9, 135–3, 144, 145–2, 153–63, 160, 180–7, 186, 189–8, 196–5 MPs, 2–5, 11, 12, 18–2, 40–47, 53–55, 58, 68, 72, 76–77, 81–8, 92–97, 118, 120, 124–30, 139, 145–2, 148, 153–64, 162–

70, 166, 171–8, 174–87, 196–3, 199, 200, 202 municipal, 82, 97, 153–61, 166–3, 172, 174, 181, 194 Napoleon, xi nation-building, 165, 181 negotiations, 2, 10, 20, 23–8, 35–9, 37, 40, 52, 59, 111, 114–21, 130, 145, 147–4, 202 Netherlands, 7 network, 11, 112, 127, 142 New People’s Party, 18 no confidence, 17, 22–6, 26, 114 non-socialist, 10, 17, 18, 24–9, 30–39, 51, 54, 59, 105, 112, 114–19, 120, 125–30, 178, 186, 195 Nordby, T., 3, 134 Nordli, O., 3, 23, 25, 27, 70–4 numerical democracy, 2, 8, 81, 132 Odelsting, 40–7, 47–48 office, 4, 21–29, 32–6, 36, 45, 55, 70–4, 81, 114, 117–2, 120–5, 126, 174 office-seeking, 118 oil, 6, 16, 75, 90, 92–101, 107–12, 160, 179–6, 183, 185–203 Olsen, J.P., 2, 12, 67, 74, 81, 92, 117, 133, 180, 186 Omdahl, A., 193 opposition, 4, 5, 10, 23, 29–2, 32–6, 53–8, 57, 64, 69, 71, 84, 111, 116, 144, 168, 174, 194 ordinary issues, 41, 47 organizations, 2, 4, 8–9, 11, 12, 30, 47, 51, 55, 67, 75, 89, 93, 101, 107, 112, 119, 122, 124, 126, 129–9, 135–3, 139–54, 153–67, 162–70, 180, 183, 197 organized interests, see interest organizations Ostrom, E., 143 Otterå, M., 179 oversight, see scrutiny packaging, 158, 161–8 parliamentarism, xi, 2, 4, 11, 22, 27, 41, 57, 59, 84, 109, 144

210 THE RISE OF THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT

parliamentary groups/parties, 45, 81–5, 92, 121, 123–31, 179, 192 parliamentary leaders, 41, 70, 117, 121–6, 125 parliamentary situation, 5, 22, 50, 52–8, 58 participants, 8, 13, 30–3, 67, 91–6, 107, 109, 128, 157, 183, 185–95, 191, 193, 201 parties, 2, 4, 10, 16–17, 18–31, 32–41, 45, 47, 51–8, 55–57, 59, 66, 68, 70–5, 81–5, 97, 100–4, 101, 111–16, 114–22, 120– 31, 139, 144–52, 160, 166, 169–8, 175– 5, 181, 185–91, 186–4, 190–196, 198–9 party distance, 31, 32, 33, 35–9, 37–2 party groups, 41, 55, 59, 64, 68, 76, 81–5, 92, 123, 145–2, 148 party organization, 55, 122, 124, 126 party relations, 116, 120, 124–31 party secretaries, 55–55, 81, 111, 153 party system, 10, 16, 18, 21, 50, 52, 57, 111, 144, 148, 165 party-parliamentary system, 11, 112, 127 periphery, 10, 12, 21, 97, 165–4, 171, 178– 5, 181, 185, 188, 193–194, 200–9 petroleum, 6, 89–3, 92, 94–97, 100, 107– 13, 122–7, 179–6, 185–2, 189–8, 194– 200 planning, 89–3, 92, 94, 103–8, 107–12, 194 plenary, 40–7, 47, 65, 75, 103–8, 106, 109, 125, 145, 174–82 pluralism, 2, 5, 7–9, 11, 81, 132 pluralization, 5–6, 10–11, 57 polar, 122–7 policy, 2, 6, 10–12, 20–3, 29–3, 35, 39, 51, 57, 64, 67, 71–6, 75, 77, 89–8, 97, 99, 101–13, 111–16, 114–19, 117–2, 120, 122, 124–31, 129–9, 142, 144–50, 146– 5, 153–62, 158–70, 166, 171, 174, 175– 3, 179–7, 183, 188–5, 194, 199, 201–9 policy pursuit, 118 policy-making, 6, 11–12, 39, 57, 64, 101, 109, 126, 129–5, 144, 147–4, 153, 158, 160–7, 162–70, 166, 174, 175, 181 positions, 2, 5, 11, 17, 25–8, 29, 51, 55–57, 92, 101, 114, 118–6, 126, 129, 144, 147, 157, 183–91, 186–4, 200

power, xi–11, 16–9, 25–30, 33, 43, 52, 54, 58, 64, 67, 81, 89, 119, 132–8, 143–54 pre-election coalitions, 32–6, 37, 114–19, 117, 125 preferences, 65–9, 77, 84, 94–8, 115, 117– 2, 127, 143, 146, 158, 176 presidents, 5, 23, 24, 40, 68, 73, 75 pressure groups, see interest organizations Presthus, R., 120–6, 126 prime ministers, 5, 17, 20–9, 35–9, 37, 44– 8, 52, 70–4, 111–6, 114–21, 119–4, 122– 7, 126–31, 178–5, 186, 195 private government, 6, 9 private members’ bills, 3, 41, 43–7, 57, 155, 157–4 problems, 4, 8, 12, 20, 26, 39, 54, 67, 71, 91–6, 104–9, 107–13, 116, 121–7, 131, 141–7, 144, 146, 148, 158, 160, 166, 171–8, 175, 178, 180, 183, 186 –194, 201 procedure, 22, 31, 41–6, 45–47, 49, 71 programme, 114–19, 118, 125, 175–3, 186, 195 Progress Party, 5, 18–21, 25–8, 52–7, 70, 97, 117, 167, 175, 185–91, 198–5 proposals, xi, 3, 5, 10, 27, 41–8, 47, 55, 58, 70, 72–6, 75–9, 77–2, 81, 98–2, 101–6, 108, 116–21, 121, 131–7, 145, 153, 155– 61, 157–6, 162, 178–5, 191–8, 199 propositions, 24, 34, 41–7, 47, 79, 99–4, 101, 109, 118, 125, 198 public, 2, 4, 6–11, 12, 35–9, 47, 51–5, 55, 65, 67, 92, 115–21, 126, 129–9, 142–9, 146–4, 156–3, 160–7, 179, 185, 190, 196 public administration, 2, 156–3, 161 questions, 2–3, 5, 11, 18, 24–8, 32, 34–9, 41, 44–47, 49–3, 57, 64, 70, 76, 77–2, 81, 89, 91, 99–3, 104–9, 111, 116, 118, 126, 131, 133, 142, 145, 147, 153–61, 157–4, 166, 175–3, 180, 186, 191, 196, 200–8 Rae’s F, 10, 18, 21 Rasch, B.E., 46, 59 rational, 29–2, 46, 65, 93, 143, 145–2, 148

INDEX 211

reactive role, 41 recommendations, 3, 31, 34, 36, 39, 41–7, 47–50, 52–8, 57, 69, 72–6, 75, 76, 81–5, 84, 92, 95–9, 98–4, 103–10, 108–13, 115, 119, 145, 155, 157–6, 175–3, 179, 186, 191, 192, 196, 199 recruitment, 55, 66, 77, 92–6, 95 Red Election Alliance, 18, 20–3 re-election, 32, 37, 76 referendum, 12, 17, 18–2, 24–7, 29, 33, 186–4 reform, 11, 64, 71–79, 84, 89–97, 106–13 regime, 57, 117 regional, 51, 89–3, 92–8, 97, 101–13, 134, 165–2, 178, 181, 183, 185, 186–6, 194– 197, 199, 200–10 Reiten, E., 120–5 remarks, 3, 31–4, 47–50, 52–8, 57, 72–6, 81, 98, 115, 119, 155–61, 157–4, 179, 196 reorganization, see reform reports, 3, 41–7, 47, 72, 79, 100, 101–12, 114, 159, 180, 186–5, 191–195, 197, 199–6, 201 representation, 2–2, 8–9, 11, 12, 17, 21, 40, 55, 58, 66–67, 71, 81–5, 82, 115, 120, 122, 130, 132, 143–9, 147, 153–61, 158, 160, 162–72, 168, 169–8, 174, 175, 178, 181, 190–7, 196, 200, 202 research, 8, 11, 50, 67, 72, 82, 109, 119, 122–7, 159, 180, 190, 197 resources, 4, 8, 51, 54, 58, 81–5, 132, 143, 144–51, 165, 179, 186–4, 190, 192, 194– 195, 200 Restad, G., 75 Riker, W.H., 30 rise of parliament, 2, 9, 11, 13 Rokkan, S., 2, 7–8, 10, 81, 132, 165–2, 168, 181 rubber-stamping, xi, 58 rules, 22, 72–6, 92–6, 95, 107, 109, 114, 116, 130–6, 143, 144 Rules of Procedure, 40, 44, 64, 72–7, 89 rural, 2, 104–10, 108, 168 Sartori, G., 65–67, 69, 81 Scandinavia, 59, 64, 128, 129–6, 133, 147

Schattschneider, E.E., 179 Schmitter, P.C., 6, 7 Schofield, N., 111, 113 scrutiny, 29, 55, 72–6, 76–77, 81–7 seats, 18–3, 24–7, 30, 36, 41, 114, 168–7, 174–82 secretaries, 41, 55–55, 81, 111, 120–5, 123 security, 122–7 segmentation, 7–9, 11–3, 43, 67, 74–9, 80, 81, 82–8, 142, 201 segmented state, 7–9, 11, 67, 74, 80, 81, 82, Seip, J.A., 16 selection, 67, 96, 185–91 Selmer, C.A., 21 separation of powers, 2 Shaffer, W.R.,15, 178 Shaw, M., 65, 72 size, 30–3, 55, 111, 122, 171, 199, 202 social affairs, 72–6, 119–5, 180, 189 Social Democratic, 139 socialist, 10, 17, 18, 24–9, 30–39, 50, 51, 54, 59, 105, 112, 114–19, 120, 125–30, 178, 186, 195 Socialist Left, 18–21, 25–8, 52–7, 59, 75, 90, 96, 101–5, 117, 167, 172, 175, 185– 91, 191–194, 197, 199 Socialist People’s Party, 17, 18, 24, 31, 32, 59, 114 society, 5–6, 16, 50 54, 57–3, 75, 132, 147, 158, 168, 183, 188–5, 200 Solheim, E., 172 Solstad, A., 120 solutions, 5, 8, 12, 29, 55, 67, 91–6, 101, 107–13, 131, 160, 162, 183–91, 191, 193, 201 space, 4, 98, 165 specialization, 11, 40, 65, 74–8, 91–5, 118, 124–9, 145, 156, 189 split, 10, 20, 26, 33, 59, 90, 94, 105, 135– 3, 139–6, 156, 178–5, 181, 195, 199 spokesperson, 47 staff, 4, 55, 81–5, 120–5, 145 State Council, 121 state secretary, 111, 120, 121, 123 state-directed, 6, 9 Stoltenberg, J., 23, 27

212 THE RISE OF THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT

strategy, 35, 118, 126, 130, 143–9, 146–3, 162, 165 strikes, 51, 52 Strøm, K., 13, 29–2, 64 Svåsand, L., 59, 180 Sweden, xi–2, 7, 9, 20–3, 31, 47, 57, 131, 133 Switzerland, 7 Syse, J.P, 5, 10, 23, 26–9, 29, 32, 35–9, 37– 2, 70, 112, 116–23, 121, 126, 160 Sætren, H., 81 tax, 18, 25, 42, 158, 195, 199, 200 territorial, 10, 81, 165 Torp, O., 23–6, 27 trade unions, 4, 9, 51–6, 82, 153–61 transport, 72, 82, 98, 105–10, 119, 122–7, 126, 156, 175–4, 180 triangles, 67, 75, 81 Ueland, O.G., 96 UK, see Britain unanimity, 3, 31, 47, 65–72, 81, 84, 92, 116, 117 unconsolidated systems, 57 union, xi, 2, 165 United States, 65 unity, 30–3, 34, 124, 127 urban, 168 Urwin, D.W., 165–2, 181 Valen, H., 10 veto, 117, 147 voters, 12, 16, 17, 18, 21, 27, 35, 39, 52, 81, 124, 125, 127, 146, 171, 172 voting, 2, 3, 8, 10–11, 17, 18–5, 25–9, 29– 3, 32, 41–5, 47, 52, 66, 70–5, 132, 145, 168, 169–7, 176–5, 181, 192, 195–2, 199, 200, 202 white paper, see reports Willoch, K., 5, 23, 25, 27, 29, 32, 34, 37– 2, 52, 70, 112, 116–21, 119–7, 126, 195 workload, 11, 64–8, 73, 74, 75, 76, 76, 126 World War, 2, 11, 24, 50, 131, 144