The Religious Philosophy of Liang Shuming: The Hidden Buddhist

The Religious Philosophy of Liang Shuming

Modern Chinese Philosophy Edited by

John Makeham, Australian National University

VOLUME 3

The Religious Philosophy of Liang Shuming The Hidden Buddhist

By

Thierry Meynard

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2011

This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Meynard, Thierry. The religious philosophy of Liang Shuming : the hidden Buddhist / by Thierry Meynard. p. cm. — (Modern Chinese philosophy ; 3) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-17151-0 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Liang, Shuming, 1893-1988. 2. Liang, Shuming, 1893–1988—Religion. 3. Liang, Shuming, 1893–1988— Criticism and interpretation. 4. Philosophers—China—Biography. 5. Buddhism— Influence. I. Title. II. Series. B5234.L524M49 2010 181’.112—dc22 2010033347

ISSN 1875-9386 ISBN 978 90 04 17151 0 Copyright 2011 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

CONTENTS Foreword by Guy Alitto ............................................................. Preface ......................................................................................... Acknowledgments .......................................................................

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Chapter One The Shaping of the Concept of Religion in China ...................................................................

1

Chapter Two

A Philosophy and Typology of Religion ........

21

Chapter Three

Christianity as a Social Religion ...................

47

Chapter Four

Buddhism as the True Religion .......................

61

Chapter Five Buddhist Practice and Yogācāra Epistemology ...........................................................................

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Chapter Six

Buddhist Ontology ..............................................

105

Chapter Seven

Opposition to Humanistic Buddhism ............

127

Chapter Eight Religion

Confucian Morality as a Substitute for ...........................................................................

147

Chapter Nine Religious Aspects of Liang’s Public and Private Lives ...........................................................................

165

Conclusion Broadening the Concept of Religion for Today ..... 201 Bibliography ................................................................................ 215 Index ........................................................................................... 223

FOREWORD I was delighted when Professor Meynard asked me to write a foreword to his book. Upon reading the volume, I found it fascinating to observe his mind, highly attuned to philosophical nuance, examining those writings of Liang’s that I myself had read long ago, but from a perspective quite different from the one with which I had read them. He makes a clear and cogent case for Liang being primarily a religionist. In the process he reviews in a sophisticated and balanced fashion the hoary questions of what is “religion,” and of how Buddhism, Confucianism, folk Daoism, and Christianity relate to it. It is one of the most coherent and compelling discussion on the subject that I have read. It is worthy of his Jesuit intellectual forebearers who created this discourse centuries ago. Professor Meynard’s subtitle “The Hidden Buddhist,” suggests a correspondence to my Liang biography title, “The Last Confucian.” Thus, I feel compelled to write a few words on the relationship between our two distinctly different approaches to our common subject. As I am sure most are aware, the title “The Last Confucian” was never meant to be taken literally. One of the most dramatic events in Liang’s life was his public defiance of Mao in 1953; in it he exemplified certain traditions of moral and political autonomy in what people have generally considered Confucian. Especially from the vantage point of the mid-1970s, it did appear that he would be the last Chinese intellectual to perform the role of moral remonstrator of the highest political authority. It was, after all, criticism of Wu Han’s historical play “The Dismissal of Hai Rui” that was the harbinger of the Cultural Revolution, which was still going on when I was researching and writing the book. I began my biography with this scene, precisely because of its dramatic quality and the “Confucianness” of the act. Buddhist monks, on the other hand, did not see speaking truth to power as their role or purpose. The words “Last Confucian” also have a certain romantic quality evocative of the anti-Confucian attacks of the preceding sixty years. Of course, such a title also went well with Liang’s well-known self-proclaimed “Confucianness.”

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In my book, I did not make more of Liang’s Buddhism for various reasons. Most important was the fact that after 1921, Liang did not champion Buddhism publicly, nor did he praise it. He did announce in 1921 that he still believed ultimately in the Buddhist ideal of enlightenment, but seldom brought up the subject again, publicly or in writing, until over half a century had passed. It was not until during our talks in 1980 that he announced unequivocally that he had always wanted to be a monk. Thus, at the time I wrote the book, Liang’s Buddhism seemed too peripheral to the other major aspects of his thought and activities to warrant much space and discussion. In addition, I admittedly lacked the mastery of the texts, terminology and scholarship of Weishi Buddhism necessary to do justice to such a discussion. Professor Meynard, on the other hand, has taken up and met this latter challenge quite successfully. His understanding of and empathy with Buddhism, as well as his extraordinary philosophical perceptiveness, are testimony to both his special sensitivity to the religious as well as to the profundity of his scholarship. His work benefited from material that shed more light on Liang’s deep and abiding Buddhist commitment, such as his diary and statements of the early 1980s and the scholarship on Liang from 1980 to the present. I should also point out that Professor Meynard’s work is a true intellectual biography. In comparison, perhaps because it was the first academic work in any language to take up Liang as a serious historical subject, my volume was an attempt relate and analyze Liang’s total response to his historical situation. It stressed the interface between thought and action as constituting a whole. During my conversations with Liang in 1980, he announced unequivocally that he had always been a Buddhist. We should all be aware, however, that during our talks he also implied that he was a Marxist, and that he accepted the validity of “Scientific Socialism.” He was aware of the tension between Marxism and religion, which is why he had such high regard for Kawakami Hajime, a Marxist champion of religion. He was also highly interested in Pavlovian psychology, and had hoped to go to the USSR to study it in depth. At the same time, he also expressed great respect toward Daoism, both philosophical and “religious” or folk Daoism, pointing out that the Chinese medical traditions stem primarily from the latter. He admired George Marshall as a highly moral, “good” man, qualities he thought Marshall possessed because he was a pious Christian. Liang also said that he thought that the lives of most people were

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determined by larger forces and fate. He also expressed a “faith” in the accuracy of fortune telling. Of course he also accepted the title of “Confucian” as well. Professor Meynard’s tack in studying Liang might also be seen as bringing to the fore the appropriateness of the suffixes “ist,” “ism” and “ian” in older Chinese historical contexts. At one point, I asked Liang at one point whether, looking back on his past writing, he saw any errors. He thought a bit and then said that, early in his career, he has misunderstood the nature of “instinct” as a concept and term. That is to say, otherwise he saw no contradictions among his various commitments to and respect for ideologies that would appear to be in direct conflict with one another. As Meynard points out, both Zhang Taiyan and Liang Qichao (together with many of their generation of intellectuals) were fervent Buddhists while they were perhaps more noted in history for other commitments. Marxist-Leninist Li Dazhao, co-founder of the Chinese Communist Party and a friend and colleague of Liang’s, managed to be a great admirer of French Vitalist Henri Bergson and an ardent nationalist (at a time when the Party was committed to internationalism). In that period, intellectuals often changed their philosophical or spiritual allegiances radically. Some early Chinese Anarchists such as Liu Shipei ended up as a monarchist and cultural conservative. Yan Fu, famed critic of Chinese civilization, champion of Western thought and institutions, and radical reformer, ended up a monarchist critic of the West. All of this is simply to observe that Liang was representative of Chinese scholars of his generation in his pronounced eclectic penchant. Although Liang accepted, as Professor Meynard points out, the modern Western concept of religion, I don’t think he accepted the binary logic and consequent exclusivity associated with this concept. In monotheistic religious traditions, at least, one cannot fully subscribe to two or more religions simultaneously. Speaking a bit simplistically, this is fully consonant with the Aristotelian Laws of Contradiction and of the Excluded Middle, (that the two propositions A is B and A is not B are mutually exclusive, or that something cannot exist and not exist simultaneously, and such-like expressions). The cosmological assumption that all pre-Qin texts seem to share (and is explicit in the Book of Changes), however, is that the universe, in perpetual flux, is an organic whole made up interdependent, interpenetrating, and complementary parts. Yin cannot exist without Yang, and visa-versa. Therefore, one

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might say that absolute bifurcation in such a cosmology is impossible. Professor Meynard skillfully argues, in effect, that Liang hierarchized the values to which he was committed, so that Buddhism was his ultimate commitment. In sum, Professor Meynard has provided us with a spiritual portrait of Liang that is both broader and deeper than those that have preceded it. It is distinguished especially by his remarkable subtlety and acuity in treating the religious dimension of human existence and his profound grasp of the philosophy and religion of Buddhism. Guy Alitto

PREFACE Although his name may be unfamiliar in the West, Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893–1988) was one of the most influential intellectuals in twentieth-century China. Today, the life and thought of Liang Shuming still draw a strong and continuous interest from both academics and the general public. Each year, his works are reprinted and new biographies come out. The number of academic papers about various aspects of his life and thought is impressive. During his long life, Liang Shuming was an important witness to, and actor in, the main events of the country—from the May-Fourth Movement in 1919 to the aftermath of Mao Zedong 毛澤東’s death in 1976. He remains greatly admired for his courage in undertaking difficult experiments in rural areas. He gained the highest respect for his intellectual honesty; while nearly all Chinese intellectuals bowed to Mao, he was one among a very few who dared to express his true convictions. In 1953, he publicly opposed Mao’s industrialization policy, which Liang considered a betrayal of the peasants. In 1974, while being asked to criticize Confucius during the political campaign against Lin Biao 林彪 (1907–1971), Liang did not yield to pressure, but on the contrary, dared to publicly praise Confucius. At the time, when most academics were writing papers and articles on the basis of Marxist thought, he secretly continued his own intellectual work. For many people in China, Liang has become an icon of intellectual freedom, representative of China’s conscience. Liang is best known as a Confucian, and even as the “last Confucian,” in the words of Guy Alitto, the American scholar who wrote the first comprehensive study on him thirty years ago. Similarly, in the last twenty years, many studies in Mainland China have analyzed Liang’s thought from the standpoint of Confucianism, considering him to be the forerunner of today’s Contemporary New Confucianism—a movement which attempts to provide a modern interpretation of the Confucian tradition. Those studies acknowledge a Buddhist period in Liang’s life, but they usually reject the Buddhist writings of his youth and concentrate on selected texts which were written later, considering the core of Liang’s mature thought to be Confucian.

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This segmentation of Liang’s intellectual biography tends to reflect the fragmentation of academia, with people specializing in Confucianism and unable to appreciate the Buddhist dimension. A careful reading of the texts shows that it is too convenient to distinguish between a Buddhist period and a Confucian period, since the relation between Buddhism and Confucianism in Liang’s thought is more complex than a chronological substitution of one for the other, or a choice of either/ or. In the texts of the so-called Buddhist period, we can see many Confucian elements, while the texts of the so-called Confucian period drew a lot from Buddhism. Liang at the end of his life declared that he had remained a Buddhist. For a while, these declarations had puzzled the academic world in China, but they were not taken seriously, and scholars prefered keeping the convenient category of having Liang as a Confucian. Until now, research thus encounters great difficulties when trying to reconcile the Confucian and Buddhist elements in Liang’s thought. As an example of the aporia of the research on Liang Shuming, I would like to take the case of Chen Lai 陳來, former professor in the department of philosophy at Peking University, and now the director of the Institute of National Studies at Tsinghua University, also in Beijing. Over the last few years Chen Lai has taken a more comprehensive approach to the study of Chinese philosophy. The broadening of the concept of philosophy to the practices of self-cultivation has allowed him to reclaim indigenous traditions and also to contest the current domination of Western philosophy over Chinese thought.1 In his research on Liang Shuming, Chen has moved precisely into that direction. Whereas his previous studies focussed unilaterally on Liang’s theoretical texts, and only from the perspective of Confucianism, he has recently written an engaging article in which he analyses, for the first time, Liang’s Buddhist practice.2 This new focus of Chen Lai on Liang’s Buddhism and on practices of self-cultivation reveals an understanding of Liang’s life and thought which is more accurate and comprehensive than before. For example, Chen Lai recognizes 1 See: Chen Lai, “Studying Chinese Philosophy: Turn-of-the-Century’s Challenges,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie,” 2 (2005): 181–198. Also available on line (accessed on 28 March 2010): http://www.institutricci.org/A6_documents/data_doc/ Doc/Chen_Lai_Chinese_Philosophy.html 2 Chen Lai 陳來, “Liang Shuming yu Mizong 梁漱溟與密宗 [Liang Shuming and Tantric Buddhism],” Hebei xuekan 河北學刊 [Hebei Academic Journal] 29/6 (2009): 30–38.

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that Liang’s “ultimate concern” is Buddhism. And yet, despite such advances in the correct understanding of Liang, Chen Lai’s study, as with many others, does not succeed in making a real breakthrough because it still keeps attached to the misrepresentation of Liang as a representative of modern New Confucianism. This labeling of Liang as a Confucian or as a New Confucian prevents a comprehensive understanding of his thought and life that would articulate, in a meaningful way, both Confucianism and Buddhism. This study proposes that Liang’s thought should be understood as centered on the notion of religion. While Liang never attempted to develop a complete philosophy of religion as such, he wrote extensively about it, analyzing religion from the perspectives of the social sciences (including psychology, sociology, and politics), and most important for our topic, as being a product of the mind. Through these discussions, Liang articulated a theory concerning three cultures and their religions: China (Confucianism), India (Buddhism) and the West (Christianity). This study is divided into nine chapters. The first chapter examines how the modern concept of religion was shaped by cultural interaction between the West and China. It is important to grasp the archaeology of the concept of religion in order to uncover the presuppositions made both by Western and Chinese intellectuals in constructing this new category. Though the ideas exposed in this chapter do not deal directly with Liang Shuming, yet they are important since they set the context for much of the debate in the book as a whole. The second chapter analyzes Liang’s creative reception of religion. While fully embracing the modern category of religion, he gave it a new and original definition based on the Buddhist idea of renouncing the world. Through this normative definition of religion, Liang established a typology of Indian, Chinese and Western cultures distinguished by their different religious attitudes toward the world. The third chapter shows how Liang understood Christianity to be an earthly religion able to provide the West with powerful social institutions. Despite this, he held that Christianity fell short of what he considered to be the core of religion. Chapters Four to Eight constitute the core of the book, dealing first with Liang views on Buddhism, and then on Confucianism. Since Buddhism provided Liang with the basic methods and insights that guided his investigations into religion, four chapters deal with this topic. We shall see in Chapter Four why Liang considered Buddhism to be the true religion of absolute transcendence. For

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Liang, Buddhism met the criteria laid down by modern standards of rationality. Chapter Five therefore discusses Liang’s use of the sophisticated tools of Yogācāra epistemology to demonstrate this, and how the Buddhist deconstruction of human experience pointed toward a radical transcendence. The controversial question of Buddhist ontology, and its relation to the history of Chinese Buddhism, will be analyzed in Chapter Six. Another contentious area was Liang’s opposition to humanistic Buddhism—a movement which has defined the history of modern Chinese Buddhism. In Chapter Seven, we shall attempt to understand and evaluate Liang’s rationale for preserving a Buddhism that was removed from political and social forms of engagement. Because Liang wanted to preserve Buddhism as a religion of pure transcendence, he assigned the social and psychological functions of religion to Confucianism. Chapter Eight therefore describes how Liang understood Confucianism to function as a substitute for religion. Leaving theoretical problems behind, the final chapter illustrates how Liang attempted to live his religious quest both privately and publicly.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This study is a development of my doctoral dissertation, which I defended in 2003 in the Philosophy Department at Peking University, under the direction of Professor Lou Yulie 樓宇烈. I am very grateful to Professor Lou for introducing me to the history of Confucianism and Buddhism, and their interactions with one another. I benefited greatly from his inspiring seminars. I would like to acknowledge that I have re-worked some previous publications in English in writing this volume. The first chapter is an expansion and a re-articulation of ideas I wrote in “Religion and Its Modern Fate: The Shaping of the Concept between the West and China” (International Philosophical Quarterly, 2005). Parts of the second chapter are taken from a chapter entitled “Introducing Buddhism as Philosophy: The Cases of Liang Shuming, Xiong Shili and Tang Yongtong,” (Transforming Hundun: The Genesis of Chinese Philosophy as an Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China, edited by John Makeham, forthcoming). I have also drawn from an article in English, “Is Liang Shuming Ultimately a Confucian or Buddhist?” (DAO: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, 2007), which provides an overview of the general argument in my Chinese doctoral dissertation. Finally, some references to and translations of Liang’s quotations are taken from a volume that I have edited: Liang Shuming’s Thought and Its Reception (Contemporary Chinese Thought: M. E. Sharpe, 2009). I am very grateful to Scott Pacey for having polished the style and providing constructive feedback. At Brill, Matt Kawecki and Mark Monfasani did a very professional job. I am also very grateful to the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange and to the Australian Research Council for grants which, in part, have supported this research through the collaborative project I am involved in, “The Indian Roots of Modern Chinese Thought.” Finally, I would like to express my sincere thanks to Professor John Makeham, from the Australian National University, for including this volume in the series Modern Chinese Philosophy, and for his support over the past years.

CHAPTER ONE

THE SHAPING OF THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION IN CHINA In our modern age, religion is often conceived of as a distinct sphere, in which individuals and groups seek answers to matters of “ultimate concern.” This religious sphere is deemed to be completely independent from the secular sphere and as following its own peculiar rationality, distinct from objective reason and common sense. At the sociological level, religion is seen as operating with its own social patterns, distinct from the common fabric. It operates at the margins of normal society and always threatens its normal functioning. However, the legitimacy of this apparently self-evident division between the religious and the secular must be questioned. Indeed, our modern conception of religion has been shaped by a history which not only involves Western intellectual developments, but also the West’s intellectual encounter with Asia, and especially China. Therefore, in this preliminary chapter we trace the archaeology (in the Foucaldian sense) of this concept, and trace its diachronic and synchronic unfolding. In its diachronic aspect, the concept of religion is seen as having changed throughout the course of history, taking on new meanings at each period. Interestingly, the definition of the concept of religion in the West appeared precisely when religion itself became problematic.1 In a traditional setting, either in the West or elsewhere, religion was lived out as a non-conceptualized reality with a much broader meaning and scope than it has today. Religion was a generic reality encompassing all aspects of social and individual life. Its spatial aspect incorporated temples and churches, while its temporal aspect incorporated rituals and festivals. Even though there may have been an awareness of the distinction between the sacred and the profane, the two domains were never mutually exclusive, but on the contrary, were intimately intertwined. For example, in the Roman Empire, the Latin word pro-fanum referred to the space in front of the temple where financial activities 1 For a discussion on the meanings of the classical notion of religio, see Benson Saler, “Religio and the Definition of Religion,” Cultural Anthropology 3 (1987): 395–399.

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took place, especially on feast days. Though outside the temple, those activities were still inside the religious sphere. In traditional society, the profane was understood primarily as a sense of impurity felt by the sinner in front of the God. Therefore, “the sacred” and “the profane” did not constitute distinct domains. The two categories differed only in degree, and essentially belonged to the same unity. While there was no distinction between “the religious” and “the secular,” there was a difference between “true religion” and “false religions,” the latter being understood as idolatries. For example, in Christianity, Saint Augustine (354–430) saw religio as the worship of the true God. He held to the principle “extra ecclesiam nullus salus” (no salvation outside the Church).2 Also, in his De Vera Religione, he distinguished Christianity, as the vera religio, from the falsa religio.3 This vision of a “true religion” opposed to idolatry would be prevalent in the Christian world for more than a thousand years. Similarly, in traditional Chinese culture and society, the term jiao 教 referred to a generic sphere which encompassed both doctrine and practice. In Chinese, as in Christianity, correct teachings (zhengjiao 正教) were opposed to false teachings (xiejiao 邪教). But once again, we do not find a modern distinction between religious and secular spheres. Although the “correct teachings” were mostly represented by Confucianism, it was never exclusive from the other traditions. Certainly Confucianism was the political and cultural norm by which other traditions were judged, but it also accommodated other teachings into its system in a Ptolemaic fashion, with Confucianism standing at the center and other traditions such as Daoism and Buddhism orbiting around it.4 Therefore, religion in traditional societies, either in China or in the West, did not entail a modern opposition between the religious and

This principle was forged in the early Church by Origen and Cyprian, and restated by Saint Augustine: “A man cannot have salvation, except in the Catholic Church. Outside the Catholic Church he can have everything except salvation.” Saint Augustine of Hippo, Discourse to the People of the Church at Caesarea (Chapter VI). This idea was not firstly intended for non-Christians, but for some Christians who had been baptized and who subsequently left the Catholic Church. 3 For example, Saint Augustine, in the epilogue of De Vera Religione, refers explicitly to the Catholic Church as the Vera Religio and the Manichean Church as the Falsa Religio. See Augustine of Hippo, On the True Religion: “Epilogus exhortans ad veram religionem, et a falsa deterrens” (Chapter LV). 4 See Chen Hsi-yuan, Confucianism Encounters Religion (Cambridge: Harvard University Thesis, 1999), 52. 2

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secular spheres. In fact, before the European Enlightenment and its introduction to China in the second-half of the nineteenth century, there was neither in Europe nor in China a concept of religion that delineated the two opposite domains of the religious (or the teaching) and the non-religious. With the onset of modernity, a great change occurred. While in a traditional culture, religion was fully integrated into an all-encompassing symbolic system, modern religion needed to be argued for and accounted for. In the seventeenth century, this gave shape to the modern concept of religion and, in the nineteenth century, to a new discipline: Religious Studies. As Talal Asad has shown, the very project of defining religion entails circumscribing it within precise limits.5 According to this view, religion usually refers to a common experience of humanity in its infancy, which fades away with the rise of rationality. Being purified from its superstitions, religion would totally disappear in a modern secular society. Yet, modern studies of religion did not fail to acknowledge the diversity of religious conceptions and practices throughout the world. The sociology of religion, founded by Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) and Max Weber (1864–1920), acknowledges the paradigm of tradition-modernity, and incorporates a comparative approach to the study of religions. Although the new-born field of religious studies strove to find a common denominator for all religions which would go beyond the Christian notion of a personal God, the field largely stayed within the boundaries of Christianity’s conceptual framework. As the main religion in the West, Christianity was the common reference point for understanding and evaluating religions in other parts of the world. More importantly, the modern concept of religion was applied to other traditions in an uncritical way, with all civilizations being analyzed from this universalistic standpoint. This universalism did encounter some resistance, as China revealed itself to be an aporia—as lacking any religion at all. Subsequently, religion was understood as a dividing line: Western civilization, as with many others, was shaped by religions, but China was a civilization lacking religions in name or form, or at least with a religion so unique that an equivalent could not be found elsewhere. As we shall see, Liang Shuming developed

5 Talad Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).

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a most articulate discussion of religion as the line dividing the West and China. This aporia was possible only because the West had applied a universalistic model of religion to the Chinese situation. This synchronic approach to religion failed to appreciate how the modern concept of religion was itself a product of the cultural encounter between the West and Asia, most notably China. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the modern concept of religion by articulating a twofold evolution, both diachronic and synchronic, in which the historical evolution from tradition to modernity interplays with a cross-cultural dialogue.6 To understand the genesis of the modern concept of religion, we must pay attention to these two dimensions. The fundamental point is the encounter between Christianity and other religions and cultures, especially the encounter with China at the end of the Ming dynasty, in the sixteenth century. The modern concept of religion, used today in the West and in China, is partially the result of cultural interactions, interpretations, and misinterpretations between them. In this cultural exchange, each has constituted the other as an ideal of what it was looking for, or as a counter-model it strove to dissociate itself from. This cultural exchange can be described as a “drama” comprised of three acts. In the first act, in the sixteenth century, Western missionaries in China found a concrete example of a “natural religion,” and subsequently invented the concept of “civil religion.” In the second act, the concept took its modern form and was adopted by the European Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, resulting in the religious and the secular becoming dissociated from one another. Finally, in the third act, the concept of religion was re-introduced to China. The drama ends with the de-religionization of China in the twentieth century. We shall now sketch out these three acts. Act One: The Invention of “Natural” and “Civil” Religion According to scholastic theology, human beings can attain, through reason, a natural knowledge of God. “Natural” here means “of the same nature”, that is, a common human nature inherited at Creation and before the Fall. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) grounded a theoretical 6 The action of the West upon other cultures has been largely acknowledged, but the reaction that was exercised back to the West has generally been underestimated.

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basis for moral life in human reason, which was accessible to individuals and independent from Revelation. However, for Aquinas, even though pagans could be virtuous through the use of reason, they could only be saved through the historical Revelation embodied by the Church as sacrament of God. According to this view, the natural is hierarchically subordinate to the supernatural, yet intrinsically linked to it: human nature and human reason are of necessity oriented toward God, who is also their ultimate foundation. In the fourteenth century, the Franciscan William of Ockham (1288–c.1348) developed the notion of natural religion one step further. Criticizing the moral determinism of Aquinas, which restricts both divine and human freedom, Ockham extended the power of God to reformulate all moral laws. The present order of nature and salvation was not a necessity, but had been freely established by God, who could also have established a different order. Consequently, God is free to command and reward acts such as theft, murder and adultery as he wishes.7 The foundation of the moral order and of the distinction between good and evil ultimately laid in the will of God. Not only could the pagan be virtuous outside the historical Revelation embodied by the Catholic Church, as Aquinas conceded, but more importantly, the pagan could also gain salvation. In other words, God’s saving grace was not limited to the confines of the Church. What was recognized then at the level of the individual was opened a few hundred years later to the possibility of recognizing, in some non-Christian cultures, true elements of a “natural religion.” This made a secular encounter between Christians and non-Christians, directed towards God, possible on the basis of reason. Although Christian Europe had already encountered Islam, it was the Renaissance and the Age of Exploration, and the subsequent awareness of cultural and religious diversity, which led to a theological and anthropological rethinking.8 The civilizations that had been newly “discovered” were not put on an equal footing. In the sixteenth century, the Spanish Jesuit José De Acosta (1539–1600) classified them

7 William of Ockham, Opera Theologica (New York: St. Bonaventure University, 1967–1986), Volume V, 352–353. 8 In the first centuries of Christianity, the awareness of cultural and religious diversity was very strong and the Church Fathers dealt abundantly with the Wisdom contained in the pagan classics. However, in the Middle Ages, Christian Europe defined itself as the ultimate and exclusive norm.

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according to two criteria, which reflected the value system of the Renaissance. The first was the existence or absence of scriptures, and the second was the degree of political organization.9 Accordingly, De Acosta set up three levels of culture: the barbarians, without writings and without political society, as in Africa, and for which the imposition of the Western system by force was legitimate; the civilized, without writings but with a political society, such as those found in modern-day Peru and Mexico, and for which a certain degree of military coercion was still legitimate; and lastly, the civilized, with their own classical writings and political society, such as those of India, China, and Japan, for which the West could only peacefully propose its own scriptures and political system. Among the “civilized” cultures, China would rapidly gain preeminence as the “other” model of civilization by which Europe measured itself. China was seen as culturally closest to the West; the Chinese had scriptures and a political system, as Westerners did. The otherness of Chinese civilization was reduced to the level of—as the French philosopher Paul Ricœur (1913–2005) would say—sameness.10 The concept of natural religion was introduced to express, at the theological level, the level of identity between Westerners and Chinese. Even though the Chinese had not yet been exposed to Christian Revelation, by nature, they partook of the goodness of human nature and had a natural knowledge of God.11 And so, when missionaries went to China, they encountered a dilemma. They could not categorize the sophisticated Chinese system of classical writings and beliefs, especially Confucianism, as idolatrous. Neither could they make Chinese beliefs the equivalent of the absolute truth of Christian religion. The Jesuits therefore adopted the Ockhamian concept of natural religion. Although the Chinese had not embraced true religion, human reason had ensured there was nothing intrinsically wicked in their nature. This suggested that God had planned two independent and separate paths to salvation: one through See José De Acosta, De Procuranda Indorum Salute (Madrid, 1588). For the distinction between the two concepts of ipseity (ipséité) and sameness (mêmeté), see Paul Ricœur, Oneself as Another (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 2–3. 11 The Spanish Augustin Juan González de Mendoza even wrote: “There is so much morality in that Kingdom of China, which is in conformity with our Christian religion, that we can easily consider this nation to be naturally good.” Historia de las Cosas mas Notables, Ritos y Costumbres del Gran Reyno de la China (Roma, 1585). 9

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Revelation, and one through reason alone. The Jesuits affirmed the high point of Chinese rationality: Confucianism. Since reason ultimately came from God and was integrated into the economy of salvation, the Jesuits strove to demonstrate that God, independent of historical Revelation, was already present in this “natural religion” which eventually reached its fullness in Christianity.12 Although an historical Christian Revelation had not yet occurred in China, the missionaries had encountered an exemplary “natural religion.” They even suggested that in some ways, China had surpassed Europe. Therefore, the Jesuits were compelled to break with the traditional Thomistic view which closely associated religion with reason, and acknowledge a reason that was autonomous from historical religion. We can clearly see this at work in the scientific endeavors of the Jesuits in China, where they had to recognize the divide between religion and science. While both Chinese and Western traditions maintained a close correspondence between the natural world of science and the heavenly truths of religion,13 when the two traditions came into contact, there was a logical dissociation. For example, the Chinese accepted the results of the Jesuits’ astronomical predictions as more precise than their own, but remained attached to their own religious vision of the world. The scientific Jesuits working in the court, such as Adam Schall von Bell (1591–1666) and Ferdinand Verbiest (1623–1688), were therefore obliged to recognize that Western science could work for the Chinese independent of its theological framework, sundering the unity between science and religion. However, most of the Dominican and Franciscan Friars in China, as well as the intellectuals in Europe influenced by Saint Augustine, vehemently opposed this theology of nature, instead upholding a theology of grace. For them, the notion that something non-Christian could be good, moral, and acceptable was scandalous. Strangely enough, the Dominicans also abandoned their Thomistic principles and moved towards an extreme version of the Augustinian position on grace. Meeting such an opposition, the Jesuit line of argumentation

12 For this reason, Matteo Ricci was very cautious not to use the term of “atheism” or “pantheism” describing Confucianism. See Paul Rule, K’ung-tzu or Confucius? (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 39. 13 For example, Johannes Kepler (1571–1630) was both an astronomer and an astrologer in the West, and in China, Li Shizhen (1518–1593) was both a pharmacist and an alchemist.

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was forced away from the concept of natural religion to a more secular account of Chinese society.14 They abandoned their theological interpretation of Chinese reality in the face of “Augustinians” who believed that aside from “true” religion, there was only “false” religion. Instead of maintaining there was a kind of progression between Chinese natural religion and the Christian true religion, the Jesuits defined a new social domain which was devoid of transcendence: the literatorum secta (school of the literati), or what would be called Confucianism. They abandoned any understanding of Chinese tradition as religious, instead moving to discuss a sphere that was religiously neutral. By approaching the issue on purely political and social grounds, the Jesuits hoped to avoid charges of heresy. Accordingly, not only did the Confucian Chinese not worship any god, they did not believe in a religion either. The rites they performed for their ancestors, Confucius or the emperor, played only social, cultural and political functions, without the religious meaning or notions of transcendence a natural religion would imply. For example, the Flemish Jesuit Philippe Couplet (1623– 1693) described Chinese rites as purely “civil” or “political.”15 The missionaries considered Confucianism to be the essence of Chinese culture, and as a philosophy rather than a religion. Confucius was not seen as a religious figure, but, as the title of Couplet’s book claimed, the “philosopher of the Chinese people.” The mere fact was in front of their eyes: the Chinese could be perfectly moral, and yet without any religious belief. Western Christian civilization was rediscovering the fact that a “quasi-truth” could exist independently of their civilization, 14 The first generation of Jesuit missionaries, like Ricci, still had no problem acknowledging some measure of religious transcendence in Chinese culture, especially in its rituals, and therefore did not use the notion of civil religion. They saw Chinese rituals as religious, i.e. naturally religious. It was the Franciscan and Dominican Friars in the 1630s who forced the religious/civil distinction on the Jesuits by insisting that if a ritual was religious and not Christian it was therefore false, and this drove the Jesuits to develop the theory of a civil religion. I am indebted to Paul Rule for this analysis. 15 Philippe Couplet and Prospero Intorcetta, Confucius, Sinarum Philosophus (Paris, 1687), cxvii. Similarly, the French Jesuit Louis Le Comte characterized the rites as “honneurs purement civils,” in Eclaircissement Donné à Monseigneur le Duc de Maine sur les Honneurs que les Chinois Rendent à Confucius et aux Morts (Paris, 1700). We should be careful to avoid confusing the notion of civil religion coined by the Jesuits at that time with the one held by the American sociologist Robert Bellah (1927–) for example. The Jesuits, coherently, tried to deny any transcendence in the Chinese rituals, which they believed were directed to purely human ends like remembrance and imitation of the ancestors. They took religion only in the sense of a social force. This model stands very differently from the notion of civil religion in America where the public sphere is, on the contrary, made sacred.

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and that this quasi-truth might not contain a concept of religious transcendence. The Jesuits therefore invented categories that went beyond religious notions of “true religion” and “idolatry.” They created a new space, devoid of religiosity and transcendence, which they referred to as “civil,” and which later became the secular.16 The search for an autonomous space inside an overtly European society had already been ongoing for some time, but it was only when “secular” China was encountered that it received its most authoritative support. As Andrew Kipnis has remarked, The “Rites Controversy” of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was perhaps one of the first attempts to use Western categories that approach the modern notions of “religious” and “secular” in categorizing Chinese doctrine. Jesuit missionaries argued over what in Chinese thought contradicted Christianity and was thus “idolatry,” and what was simply “civil.”17

However Kipnis seems to imply that the Western categories of “religious” and “secular” existed prior to the encounter with China, and that the Jesuit missionaries simply applied them to a new found reality. It should be emphasized that the missionaries in China met with a new set of circumstances which moved them to shape a completely new framework of understanding. The refusal of the Dominican and Franciscan Friars to recognize in Chinese culture anything worthy of being called religious or transcendent also played a major role, since this ultimately pushed the Jesuits to define Chinese culture in purely secular terms. The Jesuits’ revolutionary approach was motivated by their interpretation of Chinese culture and society, which they esteemed as deserving of praise and study. Some strategic considerations may have been taken into account, such as the impossibility of military coercion.

In his review of Lionel M. Jensen’s Manufacturing Confucianism (Duke University Press, 1997), Nicolas Standaert stresses that the true invention of the Jesuits was the idea of a civil sphere independent from religion. Talking about the Confucian school (ru), he said: “ru was a non-religious group in the modern sense of the word, and the Jesuits even insisted that its ritual practices were political and civil…” Nicolas Standaert, “The Jesuits Did Not Manufacture Confucianism,” in East Asian Science, Technology, and Medicine 16 (1999): 129. Of course, we should be reminded that, even though this “civil” society had reached a high degree of morality and political organization, it was still imperfect, in the eyes of the missionaries, and needed the Christian revelation and baptism in order to be saved. 17 Andrew B. Kipnis, “The Flourishing of Religion in Post-Mao China and the Anthropological Category of Religion,” in Australian Journal of Anthropology 12 (2001): 34. 16

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More decisively, however, it was the Jesuits’ humanistic education which made them capable of this revolutionary innovation.18 The “Rites’ Controversy” ended with Rome condemning the Chinese rites in 1704. However, in retrospect, the Jesuits could have found another solution. Had they recognized Confucianism as a true religion, rather than just a “natural” one, and as having received an historical revelation, they could have engaged in an open inter-religious dialogue. However, Christianity at that time was not yet ready to entertain this possibility.19 Despite condemning the Chinese rites, the Jesuits’ interpretation, or should we say misinterpretation, of China as being without religion and notions of transcendence became very influential in Europe, first shaping modernity there, and later in China. This debate on Chinese religion was intelligible only in the frame of Western concepts, and was therefore circumscribed to Westerners. For the Chinese at that time, Christianity was a foreign teaching (waijiao 外教) and the question was whether it complied with Confucian orthodoxy or not. As Wilfred Cantwell Smith has correctly remarked, “the question ‘Is Confucianism a religion?’ is one that the West has never been able to answer, and China never able to ask.”20 Act Two: The Division of the Religious and the Secular What Ockham had proposed for the individual in the fourteenth century took form, four centuries later in China, at the social level. Through the reports of missionaries, European intellectuals discovered

18 Some scholars like Jacques Gernet have suggested that the Jesuits deliberately created an inaccuracy concerning the nature of Chinese rites to fit their missionary purpose. See Jacques Gernet, China and the Christian Impact (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 15–57. 19 Today, many theologians, such as Robert C. Neville of Boston University’s theology department, emphasize the deep religiosity and transcendence of Confucianism, and from that perspective promote an inter-religious dialogue between Christianity and Confucianism. However, the Jesuit view of the absence of revealed religion inside the living culture of Chinese people led the Jesuit Figurists into their speculative theories of a primitive revelation being transmitted to China by descendents of Noah and coded in the Chinese classics. As the notion of natural religion faded away, they felt compelled to defend the religious nature of Chinese civilization on grounds of a common revelation hidden in canonical texts. The idea of revelation they held was too naïve and simple to engage into a fruitful inter-religious dialogue with the Chinese. 20 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 1–19.

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the possibility of a secular society ruled by reason, independent of divine revelation and its interpretation by the Church. As we know, to obtain support for their mission in China, the Jesuits had to produce an abundant literature expressing their views. Even though the higher authorities of the Catholic Church finally opposed the Jesuit representation of Confucianism, liberal intellectuals adopted their view, making China a nation without religion, or at least a nation with only a civil religion. This interpretation in the hands of the liberal intellectuals went beyond the Jesuits’ original intentions.21 For the Jesuits, Confucian China was free of superstitions but still needed to embrace Christianity. However, for Enlightenment thinkers like Voltaire (1694–1778), China provided the social model they were searching for: a society without a revealed religion and without a Church. Historically revealed religion was thought to oppress human reason and divide society. In China, however, they found an example of a society without it; Confucius’s deist faith was sufficient to foster morality among the people, without the need of historical revelation or a religious organization. On the basis of this Chinese example, European society could abandon revealed faith and its theocracy, and find salvation in the natural law given by God. Very early on, thinkers such as Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) not only claimed that it would be better to consider the natural religion of the Chinese atheistic. They also rejected the idea of a metaphysical God, and even promoted atheism as the best choice for Europe.22 The a-religious, or even anti-religious, China became the mirror in front of which Europe searched for itself. Since then, the concept

21 Paul Rule correctly points out the naïveté of the Jesuits concerning the use of their revolutionary ideas in European theology by the enemies of the Jesuits and the Church: “The Jesuits do not seem to have seen the potential effect of their presentation of China on the European debate about revealed religion. What the Jesuits’ interpretation of Confucianism was doing was nothing less than questioning the uniqueness of the Judaeo-Christian revelation.” Rule, K’ung-tzu or Confucius?, 134. 22 See Virgile Pinot, La Chine et la Formation de l’Esprit Philosophique en France (1640– 1740), (Paris, 1932; Genève : Slatkine Reprints, 1970), 281–313. See also, J. J. Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment, The Encounter between Asia and Western Thought (London: Routledge, 1997), 37–53. Contrary to the majority of the Enlightnement thinkers, Leibniz did not hold the Chinese to be atheistic, but moved in another direction, trying to shape a new conception of a metaphysical God in the line of Chinese organism; see Yu Liu, “From Christian Platonism to Organism: The Two Chinas of Leibniz,” International Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2001): 439–451.

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of religion changed dramatically, drawing a strict boundary between religion and the secular. As argued by Joël Thoraval, China’s secular culture made an important contribution to shaping the modern concept of religion, to the extent that, without China’s example of a society that was both a-religious and virtuous, Enlightenment thinkers would not have imagined such a society as being possible.23 In the nineteenth century, the schism between religion and reason became more radical: religion was pushed away from the realm of reason, and became identified with pure irrationality. Science and religion were now in conflict: while science was seen by many as representing knowledge that was objective and reliable, and which positively contributed to social development, religious beliefs and their moral tenets became groundless. Even though religion could still provide spiritual solace for the individual, its imaginary worldview could also be dangerous not only for the individual, but also society at large. Scientism became the definitive truth, and religion the great illusion. In this context, the religious sciences, or religious studies, were created. In the nineteenth century the “neutral” sciences appeared to understand the phenomenon of religion objectively. The Holy (or sacred) became the central idea for understanding religion, establishing a strict opposition between two heterogeneous domains, the sacred and the profane, which traditionally had been inseparable. The concept of sacredness was first applied in the disciplines of comparative religions or the history of religions, replacing the concept of the Christian God, which after the encounter with religions like Buddhism and Hinduism, could no longer serve as the common denominator of religions. In the field of the sociology of religion, Durkheim, in the introduction to Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, adopted the same opposition: all known religious beliefs “always suppose a bipartite division of the whole universe, known and knowable, into two classes which embrace all that exists, but which radically exclude each other.”24 Out of this opposition, Durkheim developed a definition of religion: “religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred

23 Joël Thoraval 杜瑞樂 “Sixiangshi shiyuzhong de rujiao zhizheng 思想史視域 中的儒教之爭 [The Controversy about Confucian Religion in the Context of Intellectual History],” Zhongguo zhexueshi 中國哲學史 [History of Chinese Philosophy] 21 (2002); see also Rule, K’ung-tzu or Confucius?, xiii. 24 Emile Durkheim, Formes Elémentaires de la Vie Religieuse (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1912), 56.

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things, i.e. things set apart and forbidden, beliefs and practices which unite all those who adhere to them into one moral community, called Church.”25 Mircea Eliade (1907–1986), in his Traité d’Histoire des Religions (1949), defined religion similarly as the “morphology of the sacred,” opposing the sacred with the profane.26 Western Sinologists were perfectly at ease with the delineations of the new field of religious studies since it was Sinology which had for the most part shaped it. Not surprisingly, Sinologists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries would generally consider the Confucian tradition agnostic. For example, in the introduction to his translation of the Book of Rites (Liji ), James Legge (1815–1897) comments that there is no profound theological meaning to be found in it, and that its value lay mostly in the rationality of its ethics.27 As shown above, this opposition between the religious and the profane did not exist in traditional societies, but rather came about through contact with modern secular society, establishing a rigid opposition between two heterogeneous, discontinuous, exclusive realms. The wonder today is that those categories were universalized, applied to all cultures and to all times, and delineated along fixed boundaries. At the same time it was overlooked that this process of universalization first occurred during an historical encounter between different cultures trying to overcome their differences. Act Three: Re-Introduction of the Concept of Religion in China As described above, Westerners found in China a reality which compelled them to define two distinct concepts: the religious and the secular. This new vision of establishing a secular realm autonomous from religious institutions stimulated the material progress and military conquests by the Western world. These conquests were above all ideological; the aim was to subdue all cultures in the world.

Ibidem, 65. Paradoxically, modern sociology of religion by defining religion in opposition to the secular, and thus circumscribing and limiting it, often held a functional description of religion that sees it at all pervading and essential to any functional society. 27 James Legge translator, The Lî Kî (Oxford: Sacred Books of the East, Volume 27, 1885), Introduction, Chapter II. 25 26

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Since Chinese intellectuals considered the conquering West shaped by Christian religion, religion remained a very important concept for the Chinese to understand themselves relative to the West. Chinese intellectuals asked themselves the following questions: did China have a religion? Should it have a religion? If China needs religion and does not have one, which one should it adopt? Three main positions were elaborated. First, some held that China did not have a religion, but that it still needed one. This position was held by a minority, among whom we find the Chinese Christians. They held that Confucianism was not a religion and that no religiosity whatsoever could be found in it. In order to address the need for spirituality, they argued that conversion to Christianity was necessary. Second, others held that China did have a religion, but in the present age it needed to be more clearly defined. The reformist Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858–1927) exemplifies this position. Considering Western civilization to have been empowered by Christian religion, he held that the only way for China to resist cultural, religious and military invasion was to embrace a religion as strong as Christianity, thereby unifying society. Kang therefore devoted himself to reshaping Confucianism as the “Church of Confucius” (Kongjiaohui 孔教會). He departed from orthodoxy by promoting Confucius as a god to be worshipped. Moreover, he wanted to establish Confucianism as a state religion. Many intellectuals opposed this project not only because by deifying Confucius it departed from orthodox tradition, but also because the establishment of a state religion would violate the principle of religious freedom.28 In fact, as it is remarked: His blueprint for Confucian religion was an accommodation to the break-up of the imperial Confucian synthesis and the accompanying scholar-official rule. Nonetheless, it was only a social accommodation to China’s contemporary needs, not a strategy conceived out of the conviction that Confucian truth required such forms of expression.29

28 In 1913, Yuan Shikai attempt’s to make Confucianism a state religion failed. In 1916, another attempt by Kang Youwei through the president Li Yuanhong failed again. The movement for the Confucian religion ended there. The failure of the movement lay in its weak foundation of utilitarianism, looking at religion only as a social structure for the country, and unable to express at the individual level a deeper meaning. 29 Merle Goldman, ed., An Intellectual History of Modern China (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 57.

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Despite its nationalistic agenda, this attempt at transforming Confucianism along the lines of Christianity went against the national culture and was finally defeated. Besides the movement for a Confucian religion, Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929) and Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 (1868–1936) promoted the revival of Buddhism. Despite its foreign origin, Buddhism was thought to have been Sinicized for more than a thousand years, and was even considered a national religion. Liang and Zhang hoped to reform society and culture through Buddhism. For Zhang Taiyan, Buddhist teachings about the illusory world would lead people to give up their lives for the sake of national revolution.30 But, as with Kang Youwei, Zhang Taiyan confined religion to its political dimension, leaving aside its transcendent meaning for the individual to discover. It was a third opinion which finally prevailed: regardless of whether China had a religion or not, it was not needed, neither then nor in the future. Hu Shi 胡適 (1891–1962), Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀 (1879–1942) and Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培 (1867–1941) represented the atheistic position of the New Culture Movement (Xin wenhua yundong 新文化運動). This became the most influential view, gaining prevalence in the twentieth century. Thinkers associated with the movement agreed that scientific progress was making religion obsolete, and that religion would—or should—not exist in modern China. At a conference at Peking University in 1917, Cai Yuanpei claimed that religion obstructed the progress of humanity and could be replaced by an aesthetic education which addressed the affective needs of the people. In 1920, Chen Duxiu, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, declared that religion belonged to the past and that it would play no role in China’s future. For Chen, all religions should be discarded since they obstructed individual rationality and national progress.31 The New Culture Movement looked at Buddhism as a religion in decay; the monks’ relatively low level of education and the attitude of escaping society inspired in the Movement’s protagonists nothing but disdain. On the contrary, Christianity was thought to be a real danger and became the major target of the movement. On September 1920, the committee of the magazine Young China (Shaonian Zhongguo 少年中國) Sin-wai Chan, Buddhism in Late Ch’ing Political Thought (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1985), 45–46. 31 See Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀, “Jidujiao yu zhongguoren 基督教與中國人 [Christianity and Chinese People],” Xin qingnian 新青年 [New Youth] 7/3 (1921). 30

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asked all Christian believers to voluntarily leave the organization. In the name of religious freedom, some declined to do so. Therefore, the magazine invited scholars, including Zhou Zuoren 周作人 (1885– 1967), Cai Yuanpei and Liang Shuming to express their views. From February 1921 to April 1924, some thirty-one articles were published in the magazine.32 Most reflected the anti-religious atmosphere of the time. Moreover, in the spring of 1922, the World Federation of Christian Students met in Beijing at Tsinghua University 清華大學. In reaction, the Anti-Christian Student Federation was created (Fei jiduzongjiao xueshengtongmeng 非基督宗教學生同盟), which later became the Anti-Religion Federation (Fei zongjiao datongmeng 非宗教大同盟).33 The New Culture Movement also targeted Confucianism. Chen Duxiu considered it to be deprived of any religiosity, but since the country was filled with temples dedicated to Confucius, he advocated their destruction, or their conversion into stadiums or schools, in order to correct any misunderstanding.34 The traditional term for teaching (jiao) was deemed too closely related to the new concept of religion (zongjiao) and therefore became depreciative. It became proper to talk about Confucianism only as a school of thought (rujia) and no longer as a teaching (rujiao) which could be mistaken for a religion.35 Therefore, many intellectuals adopted the conceptual framework of the West and embraced the values of “science” and “democracy.” They accepted this modern concept of religion as a distinctive feature of Western civilization, mostly of its past, and they understood Chinese culture to be incompatible with it. The separation between the religious and the secular became one of the most unifying values of the New Culture Movement. Religion was conceptualized only—in 32 See Wing-tsit Chan, Religious Trends in Modern China (NY: Columbia University Press, 1953), 222–228. 33 Cai Yuanpei’s rejection of religion was considerably milder since he still emphasized the positive contribution made by religion in the development of humanity, especially in its affective life. But, for him, the affective life should now progressively escape from the control of religion and be replaced by the aesthetic education. Cai denied any religiosity in Confucianism, considering it to be a philosophy. In the education system, he advocated that the Classics should be introduced to students as purely secular texts devoid of any religious authority. 34 Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀, “Zailun kongjiao wenti 再論孔教問題 [Another Discussion about the Question of Confucianism as a Religion], ” Xin qingnian 新青年 [New Youth] 2/5 (1917). 35 Chen Hsi-yuan remarks that all the books published on Confucianism in the 1920s and 1930s in China all mentioned rujia and not rujiao. See Confucianism Encounters Religion, 239.

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the same gesture—to be pushed outside and marginalized into various dedicated places of the past (temples and churches) that were soon to be demolished. With the rise of human reason, Chinese intellectuals shared the belief of many in the West that religion would completely disappear in modern times. Most of them envisioned the future of humanity as being without religion at all. In the 1920s, the modern concept of religion enjoyed broad acceptance in China. At that time, the British philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) was invited to give lectures there. He congratulated the Chinese for not having a religion, and for therefore having avoided the oppression of the Church and religious wars.36 Russell had a large crowd of followers who were very satisfied to hear his compliments. However, we could think that Russell was here very condescending towards the Chinese, since it was still Russell the Westerner who could, from his position of authority, congratulate the Chinese on something they had ignored. In fact, Russell and his Chinese counterparts were all party to the uncritical acceptance of this modern concept of religion. The acceptance of the Western conceptual framework was used as an ideological tool to prove the superiority of Chinese culture, since China was held to have achieved secularity centuries before the West. Feeling that they had no choice but to accept Western concepts, Chinese intellectuals believed that they could still use them to fight back. This cultural and historical reconstruction of the concept of religion shows that the concept was a product of a secular modernity. It came as an attempt to delineate a religious sphere that could become the object of rational discourse. This conceptualization of religion has imposed itself on the modern mind—we cannot avoid thinking with a category that has helped to define modernity. It would be futile to eradicate the concept completely and return to pre-modern thinking. Chinese intellectuals in Republican China were already thinking within the parameters of modernity, and therefore could not avoid addressing the question of religion. For them, the question was not limited to cultural differences between the West and China. It became

36 See Bertrand Russell, “The Essence and Effect of Religion,” in Russell on Religion, edited by Stefan Andersson and Louis Greenspan (London: Routledge, 1999), 70–76. Russell could not foresee that a few decades later China would experience a fierce civil war and a cruel Cultural Revolution which easily match the atrocities of the Wars of Religion in Europe. Liang quotes Russsell’s analysis of China as being without religion in Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 16.

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a question with relevance for Chinese culture itself—a question about modernity versus tradition. This short history of cultural exchanges, which to the historian may appear rather schematic, can help us to grasp the core issue at stake. The concept of religion, which had such a tremendous impact in twentieth century China, indeed came from the West, but it was in fact a Western response to a Chinese reality. Originally the fruit of a cultural encounter between the West and China in the seventeenth century, it was overwhelmingly accepted by the Chinese some three hundred years later. However, the cross-cultural origin of the concept was not recognized, and it was mistakenly considered by Westerners, and Chinese, to be a product of the Western Enlightenment. The modern concept of religion we hold now, with all its universality and abstraction, was in fact very much linked to the specific context of the historical encounter with China. Perhaps the retelling of this story may somehow make the concept of religion more acceptable to some Chinese. It has been shown that it is not a foreign concept, but is rooted in an ongoing dialogue between the West and China, even though its participants were not completely aware of all the presuppositions held by both sides. We should consider the concept of religion to be part of Chinese culture, since its translation and explanation into the Chinese language indicates a mutual interpretation, between the West and China, at work for more than four hundred years. Similarly, the Jesuits’ description of China as a-religious was also the result of an encounter between two cultures. The dialogue was cut short, however, and did not penetrate matters with sufficient depth. In conclusion to this preliminary chapter, and as a way of introducing the issues at stake in this study, I would like to say that the foregoing historical reconstruction shows that the concept of religion should not be thought of as immutable, but on the contrary, as one that has been creatively shaped by the human mind. Although Chinese intellectuals lacked Western historical perspective regarding the evolution of the concept, they were not completely passive in receiving modernity from the West. On the contrary, they were able to create new ideas about religion. As we are going to see in the next chapter, Liang Shuming was one among the few of his time to have accepted the concept in a positive way, defending religion, even to the point of claiming that the

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final stage of humanity will be religious. Because of his positive attitude toward religion, Liang enriched the concept and transformed it into something very different. In the following chapter, we shall analyze Liang’s anthropological and cultural philosophy, upon which he created a new typology of religions.

CHAPTER TWO

A PHILOSOPHY AND TYPOLOGY OF RELIGION While many Chinese intellectuals during the early Republican era defined religion in relation to Christianity and the West, Liang came from a Buddhist background and considered Christianity to be an inferior form of religion. He therefore applied his understanding of Buddhism to the concept of religion. We shall first examine the circumstances which led Liang to engage with the academic world and teach at Peking University. Under the influence of pragmatist philosophy, in 1920–1921 he decided to articulate religion using the “scientific” discourse of philosophy. Although Liang adopted this new category of philosophy, he did not remain caught in a rationalistic philosophical discourse. With the publication of his major work in 1921, he became the first in China to establish a cultural and anthropological philosophy. Then, we shall spend some time describing the framework of his cultural and anthropological philosophy, as well as his typology of the three cultures of India, China and the West. We shall see that within this basic framework, the position and role of religion is at the heart of the human will, as well as culture and society. This will lead us to a religious typology which includes Buddhism, Confucianism and Christianity. Finally, the central position assigned by Liang to religion will be analyzed as a double critique of philosophy: religion precedes philosophy in the sense that the concrete questions raised by religion always come first, and philosophy intervenes only as an intellectual tool in order to eliminate wrong ideas and perceptions. This negative philosophical method also points to something beyond philosophy, toward the religious realm of the transcendence in which rationality itself is overcome. Liang’s Entry into the Academic World Buddhism became an object of academic study in China in the early twentieth century, and was studied mostly in the philosophy departments of newly-founded universities. This new academic discourse on Buddhism came to challenge a traditional discourse considered by

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many intellectuals as backward. As Buddhist studies entered academia, Buddhist monks such as Taixu 太虛 (1890–1947) and Buddhist laymen like Ouyang Jingwu 歐陽竟無 (1871–1943) developed a modern approach to their own intellectual tradition.1 Under the pressure of Western-style academic institutions, including Christian Universities and seminaries, Buddhist training centers began to open. These included the Wuchang Buddhist Institute (Wuchang foxueyuan 武昌佛 學院), the Minnan Buddhist Institute (Minnan foxueyuan 閩南佛學院) and the Sino-Tibetan Teaching Institute (Hanzang jiaoli yuan 漢藏教理 院), all three founded by Taixu repectively in 1922, 1925 and 1930, as well as the Institute of Inner Learning 支那內學院 (1922–1952), which was founded and directed by Ouyang in Nanjing.2 Liang entered philosophical circles in the context of this Buddhist revival. But before, we should give some information about Liang’s family background and his youth, which stirred up his interest in Buddhism. Liang belongs to an ancient family of literati who had served the imperial bureaucracy for centuries. The family originated from the Guangxi province but had been installed in Beijing for three generations, at the service of the court. Liang’s father was quite progressive since he gave his son a modern education in one of those few schools who had adopted their methods and teaching from the West. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the family came across the huge political changes in the country: revolutionary activities to overthrow the Qing dynasty, Boxer Rebellion (1901), abolition of the Imperial Examination (1905), Constitutionalism Campaign (1906). Liang’s father started to grow worried about the turn of the events, and as we shall see, he decided to take his life a few years later. In the year 1911, Liang Shuming was eighteen years old and quite enthusiastic about the new direction of the country. He had discontinued formal education in order to engage himself into journalism and politics. Yet, at the peak of this intense activism, Liang entered into a deep depression.

1 Jing Haifeng distinguishes between five different kinds of Buddhist studies: traditional studies by the Buddhist community, modern Buddhist studies by monks, modern Buddhist studies by lay Buddhists, academic Buddhism by historians, and creative Buddhism by philosophers. Jing Haifeng 景海峰, Xinrujia yu ershishiji zhongguo sixiang 新儒學與二十世紀中國思想 [New Confucianism and Twentieth Century Chinese Thought], (Zhengzhou 鄭州: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe 中州古籍出版社, 2005), 125–128. 2 See Chen Bing 陳兵 and Deng Zimei 鄧子美, Ershishiji Zhongguofojiao 二十世紀 中國佛教 [Chinese Buddhism in the Twentieth Century] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2000), 101–102.

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Just after the Xinghai Revolution blew out in October 1911, he attempted suicide twice. After the enthusiasm which had carried him for a few years, he was now at loss. Liang found a way out of this familial, political and personal crisis through religious conversion.3 In a kind of quasi-retreat, he intensively read both Buddhist sūtras and Western philosophical works. In 1916, he published in Eastern Miscellanies (Dongfang zazhi 東方雜誌) his first philosophical essay, entitled Treatise on Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt ( Jiuyuan jueyilun 究元決疑論, 1916). This essay can be considered a philosophical reflection on cosmology and human life. Besides the Buddhist references, Liang mentioned the names of some Western philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) and Henri Bergson (1859–1941). Yet, in writing this article, Liang was most probably unaware that he was doing philosophy as such. Or at least, we may say that it was not his love of knowledge or speculation which first motivated him, but his attempt to solve an intellectual and moral crisis. Many years later, in the preface to Substance of Chinese Culture (Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi 中國文 化要義, 1949), Liang reflected on his scholastic life and stated that he did not enter academia for its own sake, but rather that he was forced to do so in order to solve personal issues.4 Indeed, Liang did not consider philosophy to be a luxury reserved for an elite contemplating eternal truths. For him, it was a matter of exigency and urgency. He felt the need to engage in philosophical discourses in order to articulate his own understanding of life, which was permeated by his Buddhist faith. Regardless of Liang’s ultimate motivation, Cai Yuanpei discovered the 1916 article and recognized it as a work of philosophy. When Cai became the chancellor of Peking University the following year, he recognized that Liang could be a philosophy teacher, and invited him to teach a class on Indian Philosophy. Liang was very much aware of his lack of credentials, stating: Concerning my qualifications, first, I did not go to university, and second, I did not study abroad. Concerning my specialization, I had

We shall analyze in more details this experience of conversion in Chapter Nine. Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works of Liang Shuming, Vol. 3, 5. Liang’s quotes are taken from Liang Shuming quanji 梁漱溟全集 [Complete Works of Liang Shuming] ( Jinan 濟南: Shandong renmin chubanshe 山東人民出版社), 8 volumes. 3 4

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chapter two diligently studied by myself only a few disciplines and acquired a smattering of knowledge.5

Therefore, at the very beginning, Liang was neither consciously doing “philosophy” nor consciously writing “philosophical books.” This label was given to him by a young academic institution eager to attract bright minds. Without Cai’s discovery, Liang would most probably have never started his career as a philosopher. Here, we face an important historical issue: after the abrogation of the imperial examination system in 1905, what careers were offered to young intellectuals? With the split between the intellectual and political elites, could intellectuals satisfy themselves with a prestigious position in teaching and research, yet be cut from their traditional involvement in public administration? Going beyond the historical context of the time, we can ask what the role of a philosopher is in society, whether a philosopher can exist outside philosophy departments or research institutes, and what price a philosopher should accept to pay for the support he/she receives from an academic institution. Philosophy as the Locus of a Scientific Discourse Once Liang had joined a philosophical institution, he embraced the neologism of “philosophy.” He followed the trends of Anglo-Saxon empiricism and pragmatism which were prevalent at Peking University at the time, especially in the period after the lectures given by John Dewey (1859–1952) and Bertrand Russell between the years 1919–1921. Following in their footsteps, Liang promoted a “scientific” philosophy. He accepted the double challenge posed by the introduction of Western culture into China—“Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy,” in the words of Chen Duxiu. In all his works, Liang would attempt to tie his own philosophical discourse to the world of science, such as particle physics in the Treatise on Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt, the social sciences in Substance of Chinese Culture, and the biological sciences in Human Mind and Human Life (Renxin yu rensheng 人心與人生, 1984).

5 Li Yuanting 李淵庭 and Yan Binghua 閻秉華, eds., Liang shuming xiansheng nianpu 梁漱溟先生年譜 [Chronicle of the Life of Liang Shuming] (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 1991), 31.

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For Liang, however, science was not limited to understanding nature and society. Science referred mostly to a type of spirit, and a method of rigorous analysis. It was in this sense that Liang recognized Western philosophy had made, in modern times, tremendous progress and, as he stated in his Eastern and Western Cultures and their Philosophies (Dongxi wenhua jiqizhixue 東西文化及其哲學, 1921), that it could truly be called a “scientific philosophy” (kexue de zhexue 科學的哲學).6 Liang’s own definition of the term “philosophy” reflected this appreciation of science: “what we call philosophy is thought systematized into a doctrine.”7 As this definition implies, thought came first, and was then ordered into a coherent system in the form of a doctrine. Zbigniew Wesołowski has stated Liang’s definition to mean “the conceptual effort of the mind by an individual”: For Liang, philosophical thought was conflictual. Based on fundamental concepts of the thinking process, it continuously creates concepts, which are linked with each other, without contradiction.8

Besides this formal aspect of scientific philosophy as a systematic exposition of a doctrine, Liang was very much influenced by the methods of the empirical sciences, which he also borrowed from the West. For Liang, “theories” were not necessarily scientific. What ultimately mattered was an agreement with facts, or as Liang said, “a credible theory has to be proven in practice.”9 In this sense, philosophical rationality implies a continuous process of interaction between theory and its confirmation by practice. Applying this standard definition of philosophy to China, Liang could not help but acknowledge the great difference between it and a Chinese philosophy that he considered to be mostly “unscientific,” in the sense that its theory of knowledge lacked a sound foundation. Because the New Culture Movement focused its attacks on destroying the intellectual foundations of Confucianism, there was no systematic attack against Buddhism. On the contrary, as has been mentioned, some intellectuals such as Zhang Taiyan and Liang Qichao considered there was a philosophical core in Buddhism that was worth investigating. Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 350. Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 395. 8 Zbigniew Wesołowski 魏思齊, Liangshuming (1893–1988) de wenhuaguan 梁漱溟 (1893–1988) 的文化觀 [The View on Culture of Liang Shuming] (Taipei: Fujen daxuechubanshe 輔仁大學出版社, 2003), 107. 9 Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 363. 6 7

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Buddhist thinkers themselves, like Taixu and Ouyang Jingwu, attempted to make Buddhism relevant to the modern world, presenting its most rational face, namely the Yogācāra School. The intellectual revival of Buddhism during this time explains why Liang could easily associate Buddhism with philosophy. Yet, Liang, like other intellectuals sympathetic to Buddhism, strove to differentiate himself from popular forms of Buddhism that he himself considered irrational and superstitious, such as the prayers and rituals for souls in hell and the Chinese Buddhist Festival of Yulanpan 盂蘭盆節.10 Like Liang Qichao, Zhang Taiyan, Taixu and Ouyang Jingwu, Liang saw Yogācāra as the only “Eastern” theory of knowledge able to compete with Western epistemology. In his Outline of Yogācāra (Weishi shuyi 唯識述義, 1920), Liang claimed Yogācāra’s theory of knowledge was scientifically sound.11 He even claimed that “Yogācāra is representative of all the Buddhist doctrines,”12 and later stated that Yogācāra was superior to Western epistemology. Therefore, in emphasizing empirical reason, Liang’s conception of philosophy was very much shaped by Western empiricism. He strove to purify Buddhism of its so-called irrational elements and establish it on a scientific basis. In all of his later works, Liang would strive to establish a philosophical discourse which conformed with the most recent scientific discoveries, as well as to methods of logical argumentation. A New Approach: Cultural Philosophy As seen above, Liang adopted standards of philosophy which came from Western empiricism. The broad scope of Dewey’s pragmatism opened wide horizons for Liang. As we know, Dewey’s empirical method was not narrowly limited to the individual’s immediate sensations, but also 10 However, Liang maintained all his life a kind of faith in “supernatural power” or shentong. See Thierry Meynard, “Intellectuels chinois contemporains en débat avec les esprits: le cas de Liang Shuming (1893–1988),” in De l’Esprit aux Esprits, Enquête sur la notion de Shen, edited by Romain Graziani and Robert Sterckx (Paris: Presses Universitaires de Vincennes, 2007), 55–68. 11 Outline of Yogācāra, 271. I do not distinguish between the Indian term of Yogācāra for the Buddhist school and the Chinese term of Weishi (or Vijñānavāda in Sanskrit) for the theory of consciousness-only. Weishi was the core teaching of the Yogācāra School and came to indicate the school in China. 12 Outline of Yogācāra, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 269.

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considered the collective life as an object of enquiry. Also, experience did not only include raw data from the senses, but also meanings and beliefs. Such a broad philosophical enquiry encouraged Liang when developing his philosophical discourse on cultures. At that time, some intellectuals, including Liang Qichao, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao 李大釗 (1888–1927) had already paid some attention to cultural differences.13 But, their analyses of cultural differences and philosophies were quite rudimentary. Liang was the first to elaborate in the Chinese language what we may call a true “cultural philosophy.” His project appears clearly in his Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies. Setting aside the introduction (Chapter One) and the conclusion (Chapter Five), the book’s title reflects the two major parts of the work. In the first part (Chapters Two and Three), Liang stated the issues tackled by the three cultures of China, India and the West, were determined by three fundamental attitudes toward the human will ( yiyu 意欲). The world was made by the projections of our individual and collective wills, desires and quests. While Western culture affirmed human will by fulfilling desires, Chinese culture controlled the will by moderating desires. Finally, Buddhism went beyond the will by rejecting all desires. Once the three cultural orientations had been described, Liang showed, in the second part of the book (Chapter Four), how they were themselves supported by three different philosophies. These were Confucianism, Yogācāra and Western philosophy respectively. Therefore, the two parts of the book drew clear associations between each culture and its philosophy, constituting what Liang would recognize later as a “cultural philosophy.” He defined culture as a synthetic concept which could be applied to one nation and encompassed three aspects: spiritual life ( jingshen shenghuo 精神生活), including religion, philosophy, science, and the arts; social life (shehui shenghuo 社會生活); and material life (wuzhi shenghuo 物質生活).14 Though Liang did not explicitly mention the term “cultural philosophy” in Eastern and Western Cultures and their Philosophies, later, in the preface to Substance of Chinese Culture, he made an explicit reference to it. He admitted that he did not create this term at that time, since his main concern was

13 See Guy Alitto, The Last Confucian (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 75–78. 14 Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 339.

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not to define new terminology, but to find intellectual resources with which he could address and solve problems.15 How did Liang arrive at this notion of “cultural philosophy”? In fact, we may regard it as an attempt to move away from the universalistic and formalist features of the “scientific philosophy” which he advocated at first. The latter indeed displays a rational discourse, but tended to be completely detached from real contexts and therefore became irrelevant. The “scientific philosophy” also tended to deny that particular cultures and philosophies had any value, precisely because they lacked universality. On the contrary, Liang affirmed their different values. These could not be denied from outside since they corresponded to different internal issues and logics. Liang claimed that each of the three cultures had different views on human existence, and different issues to address, and therefore had different strategies to deal with them. The term “cultural philosophy” meant that philosophical discourses were always embedded in particular cultures. Philosophy addresses issues that are first encountered inside a particular culture, and attempts to comprehend, through a rational discourse, the meaning of individual and collective life within that culture in a philosophical sense. Philosophy thus helps to conceptually clarify a culture’s essential features, values and orientations. Anthropological Philosophy Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies included many analyses of Indian, Western and Chinese societies that were borrowed from the social sciences. In this work, as in other works during his life, especially during his involvement in rural reconstruction in the nineteen-twenties and thirties, Liang set up theoretical frameworks for understanding Chinese society. His anthropology borrowed heavily from economics and political science. Yet, Liang did not strive to engage in sociology or social science as such, because for him culture, and not society, was at the center of human experience. By insisting on using the term “culture,” Liang distinguished himself from the social determinism of Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) and from Karl Marx’s historical materialism.16 From the perspective of teachings on the Buddhist law of 15 16

Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 4. See Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 371.

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universal causation, Liang believed that social analysis described only the chain of causes linking different phenomena ( yuan 原), and was therefore unable to identify root-causes ( yin 因).17 Liang affirmed, from the perspective of his cultural philosophy, the freedom of the human mind as the ultimate transcendent cause. Faced with a complex bundle of different problems and issues, the human spirit was free to make decisions that were not completely dictated by the laws of necessity as described in the social sciences. Indeed, though Liang recognized the power of science in describing the laws at work in society, this kind of knowledge was purely passive, affecting only our human awareness ( yishi 意識). On the contrary, the human spirit ( jingshen 精 神) was active and dynamic, and able to provide life with new meanings. Liang clearly held a very idealistic stance, even affirming that the spirit could exist independent of awareness. Distancing itself from the social sciences, Liang’s cultural philosophy was a form of anthropological philosophy at heart, taking the human being as the center of its analysis. Though Liang’s anthropological method borrowed greatly from social science’s descriptive methods, he went one step further, pointing out philosophical meanings and values. For example, his analysis of the three culture’s fundamental orientations was supported and illustrated by many examples drawn from individual and social psychology. In this sense, Liang was doing cultural anthropology. Yet, he articulated the meaning and value of these cultures in a systematic way, so that each became a universal paradigm relevant for the other two, and indeed for every human being. The reader, even though he or she may not exist in one of the three cultural areas mentioned by Liang, may still be interested in what he says about China, India, or the West, because his analysis centers on fundamental questions concerning the ultimate meaning of life, culture and society. In this sense, Liang was not doing cultural anthropology, but philosophical anthropology. This implies that we should not narrowly understand the three cultural orientations described by Liang only as a form of empirical data, but as philosophical paradigms. Such a philosophical method cannot avoid simplifying social and human reality—a simplification which may at times annoy the reader. For example, Liang reduced Chinese culture to “the philosophy of Confucius” (Kongzi zhexue 孔子哲學). He thus put aside Daoism and

17

Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 372.

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Chinese Buddhism. This over-simplification allowed Liang to describe a kind of fundamental orientation which may be present in other cultures, but which was exemplified in Chinese culture. The same could be said about Indian and Western cultures. Comparative Cultural Philosophy: From Bi-Polarization to Tri-Polarization Once Liang had established the basis of his cultural philosophy, and had grasped the internal logic of each of the three cultures, he could then advance into the field of comparative philosophy. Liang set about systematically investigating the specific features of each culture and philosophy. Only then could a sound comparison between the two be made. Liang explained that cultural differences did not happen by chance, and were not determined purely by external factors, but reflected deeper fundamental orientations. This comparative approach tended to contrast the differences between cultures more forcefully. Interestingly, it also tended to make value judgments irrelevant. If the three cultures were such by nature, there was no real point in deciding which one was superior when compared to the other two. Comparison here therefore loses its meaning. For example, though Chinese culture may have some limitations, it cannot change without renouncing that which makes it Chinese. One may ask how someone could enter so deeply into the problems and internal logic of a thought system to which one did not belong. Liang acknowledged the difficulties inherent in understanding another culture and philosophy, because the questions it addressed were different. For example, Chinese and Westerners have difficulty in understanding Indian philosophy because they do not face the question of renouncing the world with the same intensity as Indians do.18 Yet this was the task Liang undertook. By doing so, he showed that the task was not entirely impossible. The title Eastern and Western Cultures and their Philosophies can be misleading, since the book did not discuss a bipolar arrangement consisting of the East and the West, but rather a tripolar configuration which included China, India and the West. While the philosophical scene in twentieth-century China did indeed focus on the former bipolar

18

Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 440.

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relationship, Liang was a remarkable exception. His intellectual background in Buddhism, his Confucian way of engaging with the world and his greater familiarity with Western philosophy at Peking University nurtured in him a real appreciation for the specific features of each of the three cultures. His cultural philosophy was therefore not based on two cultures, but three. Moreover, Liang held that a closer affinity existed between the West and China than between China and India. While Western and Chinese cultures represented two different ways of being in the world, India took a more radical stance, with its ideal of leaving or renouncing the world. By doing this, Liang challenged the myth of a so-called Oriental culture that placed China at the centre and India on the periphery, as Hu Shi thought.19 Also, while Liang Qichao, Chen Duxiu, and Hu Shi optimistically envisioned a blending of Chinese and Western culture, Liang attempted to show the fundamental differences and incompatibilities between cultures. Therefore, the bipolar nature of the title Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies did not reflect the tripolarity of his theory. We recognize in this tripolar arrangement one of Liang’s great achievements. This was to show that real dialogue was difficult between only two participants, as it constantly risked falling into a sterile polarization of contradictory positions. On the contrary, with a third pole, none of the participants could make its position absolute and a real exchange could happen. The Three Orientations of the Will Liang’s classification of religions was grounded in his anthropology and cultural philosophy, as expounded in his famous 1921 work, Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies. His anthropology centered on the notion of will ( yiyu 意欲), a concept which he had borrowed from Western philosophy. Indeed, Liang claimed: Life is an inexhaustible ‘will’, in the sense of Schopenhauer, within the uninterrupted course of satisfactions and dissatisfactions.20

19 See introduction of Hu Shi, Zhongguo zhexue dagang 中國哲學史大綱 [Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy] (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書館, 1919). 20 Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 352.

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Schopenhauer’s idea of the will was introduced into China by Wang Guowei 王國維 in Human Words and Language (Renjian cihua 人間詞話, 1910).21 Liang adopted Schopenhauer’s idea of the entire world as the representation of a single will, and that our individual wills were examples of phenomena which stemmed from this. This representation of the world accorded with Liang’s view that the mind and the world were fundamentally unified—a view that he inherited from the Neo-Confucian School of the Mind. Yet, it was Yogācāra that would allow Liang to articulate volitions of the individual mind with the mind of the world or the cosmos. Liang believed that the cosmos was “living” and that the life of the cosmos was a “continuum” (xiangxu 相續). Since this life and living things form a unity, they could be said to form a “continuum.” The cosmos was a creation that was continually expanding, full of vitality, irresistibly encompassing everything within it. Human beings were included in this flow of cosmic transformation. Though human life had to rely on the material and artificial worlds, there was no separation between human beings and the cosmos, and they communicated with each other, forming one entity.22 Yet the individual will was not completely passive in this flow of cosmic transformation. Drawing from Yogācāra, Liang saw life as comprised of a succession of discrete moments. He stated that the cosmos is a great living body, and to live means there is a continuum between events. What are events? For me, events are made of questions and answers, or according to the Yogācāra School, they are made of a subjective aspect ( jianfen 見分) and an objective aspect (xiangfen 相分). One event succeeds another. Their unceasing flow is called a continuum. Why is there this unceasing flow, which creates a continuum? Because we never stop asking, never stop searching. Once there are questions, there are also corresponding answers to each. As a result, to this unceasing questioning there is an unceasing answering, which constitutes this endless flow of events. Life therefore becomes this indefinite continuum.23

21 While Wang Guowei translated it from English as yizhi 意志, Liang Shuming adopted yiyu. 22 See Lin Anwu, “Liang Shuming jiqi wenhua sanqi chongxianshuo 梁漱溟及其 文化三期重量說 [Liang Shuming and His Theory of the Reappearance of Three Cultural Periods: Analysis and Evaluation of Liang Shuming’s Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies],” in Dangdai xinrujia zhexue shilun 當代新儒家哲學史輪 [History of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy] (Taipei: Mingwen Shuju 明文書局, 1996), 110. 23 Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 376–377.

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This conflict never ceases and explains the ongoing and constant transformation of the self. Therefore, behind all these moments of the “actual self,” there exists a kind of inexhaustible “hyper-will” permanently at work. Because of this, the endless continuum of life is entirely pushed by this inexhaustible will. Liang explained that, This questioning or search uses six tools: the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, the body and one’s intelligence. Every sensation or idea is, at any instant, an event made of one question and one answer. Behind these tools, there is a force producing and directing them. We can call this the great hidden force (daqianli 大潛力), the hyper-desire (dayaoqiu 大要求), the hyper-will (dayiyu 大意欲) or the exhaustible will (meijin de yiyu 沒盡意欲).24

Liang used Yogācāra categories to distinguish between two moments: the “previous self ” (qianci de wo 前此的我) and an “actual self ” (xianzai de wo 現在的我). The “previous self,” also called the “self already made” ( yicheng de wo 已成的我), corresponds to the karmic result of our previous selves. It constitutes the world which has been known up to now through the senses (the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, and intelligence) and through deeds and actions. Many material, cultural, social and psychological elements constitute this “previous self.” But the self is not completely determined by its past, since at each moment an “actual self ” arises, affirming itself through the actual will, which is commonly called “mind” (xin 心) or “spirit” ( jingshen 精神). It is an instantaneous activity which projects itself ahead, in opposition to the “self already made.” Therefore, Liang defined life as the “actual self ’s’ conflict against the previous self.” In turn, the newly constituted “actual self ” will become a “previous self ” against which the will shall struggle. Carried onwards by this constant conflict, the will could make three basic choices, which were not always conscious. The first choice, taken by the West, was to embrace the struggle, always projecting itself ahead in order to change and improve the external conditions of life. For Liang, the self fights in order to overcome material obstacles, but more importantly in order to overcome intellectual ones. The self engages in a struggle of ideas and opinions. Therefore, for Liang, the real battlefield was not limited to the dimension of the material world, but also unfolded into society and politics. In the second option, which

24

Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 377.

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had been taken by China, the will decided to adapt itself to the previous external conditions. The will did not turn outward as in the first option, but turned inward, transforming itself. Finally, the third choice corresponded to the Indian position in which the “actual will” negates the “previous self ” in a radical way, since it withdraws from the fight altogether, choosing not to constitute a new “actual will.” What is negated here was not life itself, but the “continuum of life” made of temporary moments. In this sense, it would be wrong to read this as a kind of nihilism. What the mind discovered was that the true life was not made of this succession of temporary and unstable stages, but rather a tranquil and permanent reality, accessible to the one who discards the wrong idea of a permanent and independent self. For Liang, these three orientations of the will were not on the same level, since he granted to the life of the cosmos a value which was superior to the continuum of events in life. In one respect, the individual self was an immanent reality—the foundation and source of human action and intention. But the individual self was also a transcendent reality which could communicate with the great self of the cosmos. Therefore, the full process of transformation for the will was to abandon the fight for the small self ’s affirmation, turning instead to an inward transformation that would ultimately lead to a radical selfnegation and open communication with the great self of the cosmos. The Three Cultures While many intellectuals, both in the West and in China, stressed the historical discontinuity between tradition and modernity, Liang, on the contrary, emphasized the basic differences between cultures. He established a comparative cultural framework in which the three cultures of the West, India and China followed their own specific paths, according to the three orientations of the will. Therefore, the manner in which the will related to life gave a culture its fundamental orientation. Accordingly, Western culture was sustained by the will to conquer and control life and the environment in order to satisfy individual and collective desires. Chinese culture was sustained by the will to balance the desires. Indian, or Buddhist, culture sought a total suppression of the self and its desires. Liang used a metaphor in which three people, a Westerner, a Chinese and an Indian, lived inside the same house. He explained:

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The first orientation is a need to project, or a conflictual attitude. When a person encounters difficulty, he deals with the future’s possibilities. Through his actions, he can transform the situation in such a way that his needs are fulfilled. The second orientation consists of modifying and adjusting one’s desires. When encountering difficulties, he does not attempt to solve and transform the situation, but finds satisfaction amid the present circumstances. For example, if he lives in a dilapidated house, according to the first orientation, he would surely move to another house. But, when the same problem is met by those with the second orientation, he does not need to move house, but finds satisfaction by changing his way of looking at it and seeing that this way is equally good. In this case, the person does not deal with a possibility, and does not look ahead, but looks around. He does not want to fight to change the situation, but he accepts it as it is. The third orientation consists of turning around and looking back. Unlike the first orientation, the person does not want to change the situation. Unlike the second, he does not want to change his own way of looking at things, but wants to radically eliminate the question. This is one way to confront the difficulty, but it completely contradicts the nature of life, because the nature of life is to go ahead. All people who maintain this attitude of suppressing their desires walk along this path.25

This cultural typology has received many critiques. For example, the Taiwanese scholar Lin Anwu has pointed out the difficulty in reducing all human cultures to just three.26 Indeed, today we are much more knowledgeable about, and aware of, the cultural diversity of our world than Liang was one hundred years ago. However, Liang’s theory seems more advanced than what we see today in a Chinese academic discourse dominated by a dualistic vision consisting only of China and the West. The Republican era was characterized by greater cultural openness than today, since India and Japan were regarded as serious intellectual partners. To this cultural typology, Liang added a dynamic of historical evolution in which the human will or spirit was the determining factor. This spiritual vision of history went against the materialist view which has prevailed since the nineteen-twenties in China. Liang stated: Materialist history considers consciousness to be determined. It is unable to determine anything itself. I accept this point, but spirit cannot be compared with consciousness. Materialist history is wrong to use the two

25 26

Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 380. Lin Anwu, 116.

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chapter two words in an undifferentiated sense . . . I see the human spirit as able to determine economic reality, but consciousness cannot.27

Liang therefore distinguished between consciousness, which was momentary and individual, and spirit, which was permanent and collective. In that sense, spirit was both a transcendent reality and an immanent reality—a continual activity which was eternal and without rest. Spirit had a cosmic meaning, as it gave birth to the cosmos and allowed history to develop. It also had an ontological meaning, since it was the basis of all that exists. As Lin Anwu has remarked, The human being, who is filled with this spirit, can consider himself to be his own master, as well as of the world and of history.28

While in the past, the three cultures of the West, India and China have taken their own independent paths, they have come into closer contact in modern times. Because of the influence of economics and politics, cultures come into conflict with one another. Western culture invades and attacks cultures which have taken the second and third paths. However, Western culture faces the question of “alienation” ( yihua 異化), which is created by an excessive concern with forward and external projection and by its desire for conquest and competition. Always projecting itself ahead, Western culture cannot solve its problems by itself. Therefore, in the near future, Western culture shall reorient itself along the line of Chinese culture. The West will not need to completely abandon the fundamental products of modernity, such as science, democracy, and so on, but it will abandon its onward thrust toward progress and adopt a more conciliatory approach to life. Then, China will become the model for world culture. However, at present China needs to successfully, and sufficiently, appropriate and integrate elements of the first path in order to fully develop its traditional, harmonious spirit. This was a subtle balance that China needed to get right; it could not take too much from the first path, which would run against its own spirit, but it needed enough to provide a sufficiently comprehensive material and social basis for the moral principles of Confucianism to fully develop. In a more remote future, however, humanity would shift to the third path. After having successfully resolved the questions of inter-personal relationships and

27 28

Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 375. Lin Anwu, 115.

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personal cultivation thanks to Confucianism, humanity could then face the radical question of the meaning of life. Then, the Indian, Buddhist path would impose itself on the whole of humanity. After the affirmation and harmonization of the human will, the will would itself be negated. Liang’s evolutionary scheme should not be considered deterministic. It contains no law of necessity, since the encounter between the three types of culture was accidental. Without such an encounter, the three cultures would have followed their own specific paths indefinitely. Liang therefore later claimed that Chinese culture had not made any progress for the last two thousand years and, had it not encountered Western culture, would have followed its own trajectory indefinitely, never giving rise to science or democracy.29 Religion at the Heart of Culture The above section has provided a brief sketch of Liang’s cultural and anthropological philosophy. It remains for us to see how the question of religion emerges within this framework. We have quoted Liang’s definition of philosophy. Now we complete it with his definition of religion. On this question, Liang stated that “what we call religion is thought, that has a special attitude, and which leads to a certain behavior.”30 This special attitude refers to how a culture or an individual relates to the world and to life. For Liang, there were three kinds of attitude: an attitude of engagement with the world, an attitude of harmonizing with the world, and an attitude of renouncing the world. These three attitudes were expressed in three kinds of religion: Christianity, Confucianism and Buddhism. In other words, religion was at the heart of the three orientations of the will, and at the heart of the three cultures. The question of religion also accompanied the evolution of humanity through its three different stages. His culturalist approach led Liang to assign religion the central role within his three cultures: the social religion of Christianity in the West, the psychological and moral religion of Confucianism in China, and the transcendent religion in India. This allowed Liang to see religion, and not philosophy, as the most pervasive cultural influence. 29 30

See Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 151. Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 395.

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For example, in the case of India, Liang affirmed that “India has no individual philosophers, but only religious schools.”31 Indeed, while a philosophy may reflect only one individual’s thinking, sometimes with only a limited influence, only religion could transform individuals and society in concrete ways. Real competition did not occur between philosophical systems. Among philosophers, there was no real need to oppose one another in order to establish oneself. In fact, the real conflict occurred between groups competing for members.32 This was one of the reasons Liang left Peking University to focus on rural reconstruction in the 1920s and 1930s. Through his academic experience, Liang had the opportunity to develop clearer ideas about himself, society and the world. He realized the limitations of institutions of higher learning in bringing about deep changes in people and society. His passage to more direct forms of engagement reveals that Liang felt quite constrained within the narrow limits of academia. Therefore, Liang began from religious questions which were encountered in “culture,” clarified and mediated them through philosophical enquiry, and then, in the third stage, went back to the issue of culture generally, as well as issues of practice and its relation to attitude and concrete forms of action. In this scheme, philosophy worked mostly as an intellectual tool for dealing with practical issues. This led Liang to judge particular philosophies according to the degree to which they were connected with culture. He therefore judged Western philosophy to be, for the most part, an intellectual activity that could produce results in the empirical world efficiently, but which remained distant from the question of meaning. Liang’s judgment may seem severe, such as when he wrote: Philosophies of life in the West are not deserving of the name “philosophy.” From ancient times until now, almost all of them have the same style. What style? In short, an emphasis on intellect. Either it focuses on efficiency, and then it is a matter of intellectual computation; or it focuses on knowledge, and then it is a matter of intellectual enterprise; or it focuses on the absolute, and even then it is a problem of rationality.33

31 32 33

Introduction to Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 58. Introduction to Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 61. Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 482.

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Because he embraced empirical methods, Liang always advocated starting with concrete questions that were encountered in life. He discarded philosophical speculation for its own sake. In this sense, he considered religion to be a practice that was much more anchored in the present world than philosophy was. Typically, Liang considered Indian Buddhism to be much more than an intellectual activity. He saw it as a true mode of life. He also understood Confucianism not as a theory, but as grounded in concrete methods of self-cultivation. He refused to consider his own thinking as a purely theoretical activity, limited to the arena of academic thought. For him, ultimate reality could not be grasped through philosophical reasoning. The mistake of modern scholars, both Western and Chinese, was to try to solve through philosophy questions that lay outside its scope. Liang invited these scholars to look in the direction of practice, both individual and communitarian. Besides the generic definition of religion we have seen above—religion as a type of thought associated with a certain behavior—Liang developed a more precise definition of religion. This appeared in similar forms in Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Substance of Chinese Culture, as well as in his later work Human Mind and Human Life. Liang stated that religion had two unique features: First, at the level of human reason, religion has a constant tendency to go against reason, which means leaning toward mystery and radical transcendence. Religion always establishes proofs that go beyond reason and against reason. Second, at the level of human emotion, religion constantly consoles and gives encouragement. When human emotions are shaken, and the will is weakened, religion reinvigorates, allowing life to continue. This is called peace of mind and the stability of life.34

Liang therefore claimed that all religions inevitably had two fundamental characteristics: they went beyond reason and provided psychological consolation. Because the relative importance of these two elements varied in each religion, Liang set up a typology which contained three religions as model types.

34 Human Mind and Human Life, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 693. For other expressions, see Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, 418; and Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 98.

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chapter two The Three Types of Religion

Since the three cultural periods correspond to the three orientations of the will, there were also three types of religion accompanying human history. At the most basic level, religion worked as a religious organization which enabled society to develop, filling the social need for efficient cooperation. For Liang, Christianity represented the apex of this level. On the second level, which was exemplified by Confucianism, religion provided consolation for the individual faced with existential questions, and fostered a spiritual harmony within both the individual and the group. Finally, in its most advanced form, religion addressed the transcendent quest through a radical renunciation of the world. This transcendence was best expressed by Buddhism. The three functions of religion—social, psychological and transcendent—represented cultural models found in three different parts of the world—the West, China and India. When Liang described the functions of Christianity, Confucianism and Buddhism, he did not put them on the same level. In fact, the three religions corresponded to three different stages in the development of humanity, as it faced facing specific problems. While Western religion met the basic needs of collective life, and the Confucian “quasi-religion” dealt with the more sophisticated needs of moral life, in the true sense of the word, only Buddhism was a true religion, since it dealt with the question of transcendence. More specifically, Christianity first helps to solve the question of collective survival by organizing society under one God and one Church. Confucianism found a spiritual balance between the individual and the group, allowing the individual greater freedom. Finally, Buddhism helped to solve the ultimate question of life’s meaning by asserting a radical transcendence. In this sense, Liang held that Confucianism was the religion or form of spirituality for the present, and that Buddhism was the religion for the future. Therefore, in these three types of culture, the central position was occupied by religion, even though in each case the meaning of religion changed dramatically. Indeed, we may wonder what Liang regarded Christianity, Confucianism, and Buddhism as sharing in common, since each of them had a very specific role, and was distinct from the other two. Nevertheless, Liang recognized that in each culture religion performed the most important function, encapsulating the entire culture and society’s orientation, as based on the attitude of the will toward the world.

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These three religions served mostly to illustrate three different stages or types of culture, and should not be understood in their narrow sense as concrete historical religions. Liang was acutely aware of their historical complexity. Even though his approach may appear quite reductionist, and as failing to adequately recognize social and cultural diversity, Liang was mainly interested in capturing the fundamental “spirit” of each. His approach to religion included many elements drawn from the sociology of religion, and yet for the most part he thought as a philosopher of religion who was trying to delineate different philosophical approaches to the meaning of life. It may seem that Liang’s own approach to religion was functionalist. Indeed, his views can be understood within the anthropological framework that we have described. He did not begin with questions on religious beliefs as such but rather with the dynamics of fundamental human desires and how religion could address them. Yet, it would be wrong to state that Liang was only concerned with the functionality of religion. As we shall see, Liang had his own strong religious beliefs that he would express in the form of Confucianism and Buddhism. Although the theory of evolution was new in China at that time, if there was one single idea which impacted on the Chinese mind more than any other, it was this. Theories of biological and social evolution became extremely popular. One of these was the theory of Auguste Comte (1798–1857). According to this, humanity went through three different stages. These were the “religious stage,” in which people accepted religious explanations about unsolved issues; the “philosophical age,” in which people accepted only rational investigations, but without solid evidence; and finally, “the positivistic age,” in which people perfectly understood all the laws operating in the natural and social worlds and came to create a new society.35 Liang knew about Comte’s theories, and he mentioned them explicitly in Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies.36 He fully accepted the idea of evolution, which he applied to the realm of culture in this book, and to the realm of the biological and spiritual life in Human Mind and Human Life. Liang even accepted Comte’s three stages, but he completely reversed their order. Whereas Comte placed religion at the

35 Auguste Comte, Cours de philosophie positive, vol. I (Paris: La Société positiviste, 1893), 243. 36 Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 392.

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lowest stage and science at the highest, Liang did exactly the reverse, opposing the positivism which prevailed at that time both in the West and in China. Although rationalist theories recognized the importance of religion during humanity’s infancy, Liang insisted not only on the central role of religion in the genesis of society, but also its relevance to the moral life in the present age, and even more importantly, for the question of transcendence in the future. Besides Auguste Comte, Liang’s vision of the coming of a Buddhist age was also deeply influenced by Zhang Taiyan. Liang Shuming had read Zhang Taiyan’s Establishing a Religion ( Jianli zongjiao lun 建立宗教論) which he quoted in his first essay in 1916. Zhang announced that the near future would be Buddhist because it provided a concrete method for the individual to witness reality fully.37 Unlike Liang, Zhang did not consider Buddhism to be a transcendent religion; rather he saw it as an embodied wisdom. Despite this difference on the question of transcendence, we cannot doubt that Liang was deeply impressed by Zhang’s vision of a Buddhist age. Religion Transcending Philosophy Although philosophy occupied an important position in Liang’s thought, he also placed limits on its application. We have already seen that Liang held philosophy to be an intellectual tool in service of practical forms of life. Furthermore, he came to view religion as surpassing philosophy. Not only did Liang suggest something that transcended philosophy—a non-conceptual reality in which there was no difference between the thinking subject and the object of thought—he also suggested a method to reach this through a philosophy that negated itself. Through the dialectic method of negation, conceptual knowledge and reason itself were negated. Liang could then say: The philosophy of Buddha is not for accomplishing philosophy, but its only advantage is to express the nirvāna.38

See John Makeham, “Zhang Taiyan, Yogācāra and Chinese Philosophy,” in Transforming Hundun: The Genesis of Chinese Philosophy as an Academic Discipline in TwentiethCentury China, edited by John Makeham, forthcoming. 38 Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 73. 37

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In Outline of Indian philosophy (Yindu zhexue gailun 印度哲學概論, 1919), Liang analyzed the Indian schools as “philosophical religions” (zhexue de zongjiao 哲學的宗教).39 He maintained that these sought a transcendent and cosmic reality, reached through the dialectical method of negation. Therefore, Indian schools were to be understood as religions, with the religious quest coming first. Within this fundamental religious framework, Liang could say that Indian schools were philosophical in their method. Their philosophies did not depart from their religious framework and were therefore “religious philosophies” (zongjiao de zhexue 宗教的哲學). In this sense, Indian philosophies borrowed their questions (such as the question of transcendence), and their methods (for example, meditative techniques as a way of gradually purifying the mind) from religion. Clearly, Liang considered all Indian philosophies, including Buddhist philosophy, to be subservient to the religious quest. Liang moved one step further: Indian philosophy, and most especially, Buddhist philosophy, turned to be “anti-philosophies.” Ordinary philosophy developed knowledge about the reality of this world. As Liang said in Outline of Indian Philosophy, “the nature of philosophy is to develop knowledge from ignorance.” Philosophy was characterized by its project of acquiring knowledge through rationality. In contrast, Buddhist philosophy destroyed philosophy itself in order to achieve a higher reality—a wisdom which went beyond Western rationality and Confucian moral intuition.40 Liang concisely described the Buddhist method as “canceling understanding through understanding” ( yi lijie quxiao lijie 以理解取消理解).41 The mind could access ultimate reality only when reason had systematically destroyed all conceptual attachments that reason had itself created. Then, the mind would identify completely with ultimate reality, without any distinction between the inner and outer worlds. In the mind, there could not be any selfreflective activity, or a space for self-awareness, but only pure and spontaneous activity.

Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 60. I do not detail here the anti-intellectualism of Liang’s understanding of Confucianism. He opposed the abstract and utilitarian rationality of the West to the moral intuitionalism of Confucianism. See Fang Keli 方克立, “Liangshuming de feilixing zhuyi 梁漱溟的非理性主義 [The Anti-Intellectualism of Liang Shuming],” Zhongguo Luntan 中國論壇 7/10 (1988): 54–63; 7/25 (1988): 60–68. 41 Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 158. 39 40

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Therefore, Liang regarded Buddhist philosophy as the death of philosophy itself. He explained that, By making Buddhism an object of study and research, it loses its meaning. The original intention of Buddhism was not to practice philosophy. In fact, it leads to the death of philosophy.42

Indians had adopted the proper attitude, which enabled them to understand ontological reality.43 Yet, their understanding did not remain at the level of the individual. By destroying the mind’s conceptual constructions concerning the absolute, Indians had successfully united with it. By exploring the boundaries of the concept of philosophy, Liang showed its importance and also its limits. We might understand Liang’s ambivalent attitude to philosophy as a kind of creative cultural resistance. Liang insisted on the relevance of this category for his time, and yet, he also showed that this category, which was culturally determined by Western rationality, pointed beyond its own borders, toward a non-conceptual and practical form of life that was beyond reason and consciousness. By exploring philosophy’s boundaries, Liang displaced philosophy from the center it was supposed to occupy. The Transformation of Concepts Many scholars maintain that intellectual and academic life in modern China has been shaped by a continual process of Western colonization. This process has been analyzed from the perspectives of influential theories such as Orientalism, colonialism, and cultural imperialism. Studies which employ these theories typically depict an ideological struggle for power between two actors. On one side, there is the West’s universalistic culture with its dominating episteme, and on the other, the local culture, which resists it through either rejecting the foreign influence or affirming the local tradition. Intellectuals or institutions reacting against Western academic influence and attempting to preserve the quintessence of Chinese tradition are conveniently analyzed within this framework—as representations of a local culture reacting

Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 72. See Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 415–416. 42 43

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to a foreign force. This is the impact-response paradigm. In the end, most such studies conclude that foreign forces are more powerful and finally crush any Chinese resistance.44 However, we may wonder if such a model is not too simplistic. Such a dualistic vision may overlook more subtle strategies. While the local culture may seem fully to adopt a foreign episteme, in fact it may transform imported categories from within, along the lines of its own traditional episteme. For example, in the 1920s, under the influence of the New Culture Movement, all academic disciplines accepted “science” as a definitive criterion and harshly criticized the traditional forms of knowledge as “unscientific.” If we look only at the specialized terminologies and the professed methodologies borrowed from the West and adopted by the intellectuals at that time, we can easily gain the impression of a radical rupture with the past and the full embrace of Western categories. However, this apparently universal adoption of Western episteme was only one part of the story, and perhaps a misleading one. In fact, in all of these disciplines, new knowledge did not entail the abandonment of tradition, but rather its recovery in new forms. Under the guise of new names, traditional Chinese patterns were kept very much alive. Although academics used new terms borrowed from the West, they reshaped them along the lines of traditional knowledge, sometimes even unconsciously. Bearing this in mind, we can measure the course of Liang’s intellectual engagement with the new concepts of “philosophy” and “religion,” which were introduced from the West. He did not dismiss them as irrelevant for China. Although he maintained that Christian religion was at odds with Eastern culture, he also endorsed the universal validity of the religious quest, that is, the desire for transcendence, for something beyond the world as commonly experienced. Of all the world religions, he maintained that only Buddhism conformed to this definition of religion, therefore implying that other religions, like Christianity, were inferior, or not religions at all. In doing so, Liang reshaped the Western category of religion. Something similar happened concerning philosophy. The modern discipline of philosophy was shaped in the West around a very narrow conception of rationality (lixing 理性), inherited both from German

44 See Thierry Meynard, “The (Re-)shaping of Academic Disciplines in China” Cross Currents 5/4 (October 2008):123–128.

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idealism and Anglo-American pragmatism. This dominated philosophical reflection in China, pushing aside the traditional locus centered on self-cultivation (xiuyang 修養). Almost all philosophers adopted this new episteme from the West, and Liang was no exception. For example, in Substance of Chinese Culture, he presented lixing as Chinese culture’s central concept. On a superficial level, it seems that he completely adopted the Western philosophical model. Yet, a closer reading shows that the concept was completely reworked and transformed so as to express the moral capacity of the subject along the lines of the Neo-Confucian school of the mind of Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529). By doing this, Liang was able to recover the traditional Confucian discourse on the cultivation of the self. This traditional Chinese theme virtually disappeared in face of the new Western categories of logic, metaphysics, and ontology, but Liang enabled it to regain its central position in his philosophical discourse. The above examples show that although Liang fully adopted Western concepts, he nevertheless transformed them in accordance with traditional Chinese knowledge. This was typical of many other Chinese intellectuals at that time who were attempting to speak in their own terms. Therefore, the process of interaction should not be seen as an ideological power struggle between a dominating West and a dominated China. It is better described as a creative reinterpretation of the local tradition through concepts borrowed from outside.

CHAPTER THREE

CHRISTIANITY AS A SOCIAL RELIGION In our analysis of Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies in the previous chapter, we saw that religion manifested itself as an orientation of the individual will, and that it gave a general orientation to a particular culture. In setting up this anthropological and cultural framework, Liang was interested not only in describing different types of religions, but more importantly, in establishing Buddhism as the religious norm—as the true religion. Liang evaluated Christianity and Confucianism as temporary substitutes from this Buddhist standpoint. In his second major book, Substance of Chinese Culture, Liang analyzed religions as social institutions supporting particular cultures. Compared to his previous work, his analysis of religions in this book tends to be more descriptive than normative. Liang described three social models of religion: a socially engaged but unbalanced Christianity, a socially engaged yet balanced Confucianism, and finally a socially disconnected Buddhism. In this chapter, we shall deal with Liang’s Christian social model. We shall briefly discuss his knowledge of Christianity and state the sources that he used. Liang especially emphasized the social and political influence of Christianity in shaping European society. Then, we shall list five positive factors which can be derived from Liang’s analysis. However, Liang’s analysis also revealed three main social drawbacks associated with Christianity. Although Liang underlined the strength of religious organizations in the social life of the West, he also saw them as highly problematic and held that Western social religion did not fit the Chinese ethos. Liang’s Insights into Christianity We should first acknowledge that Liang Shuming was not very knowledgeable about Christian thought or theology. Under the influence of the anti-Christian philosophers of the nineteenth century, he dismissed theology completely as founded on irrational beliefs, stating that Christianity “is a very stupid religion; to believe in an anthropomorphic

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God is untenable.”1 Through such a harsh judgment, Liang clearly recognized that the traditional affirmations of the Christian faith had been challenged by modern science. He followed the liberal intellectuals of the New Culture Movement in regarding Christianity’s decline as certain. Yet, when in 1921 Liang was invited by Young China to speak on the question of religion, he showed that he was an independent thinker. Liang first questioned Li Dazhao and Zhang Shenfu 張申甫 (1893–1989) about Young China’s decision to forbid people with religious faith to speak. In the first part of his talk, he lectured Young China members on the necessity of open dialogue.2 In addition, in opposition to the anti-religious atmosphere of the time, Liang remarked that religion and science functioned at different levels. Though religion should not contradict human reason and scientific truth, it reflected different human motivations. He stated that, Science is about knowledge, but religion is about behavior. Knowledge cannot change our behavior since the latter arises from our motivations. It is the satisfaction and the contentment coming from scientific progress that has toppled religion, not science as such.3

Indeed, Liang was ready to concede that human reason and scientific progress could emancipate people from certain religious beliefs. The religions of old, which consisted of irrational dogmas, had to perish. Yet he held that there was a more fundamental quest which could not be addressed by scientific progress. As we saw above, Liang held that religion did not represent the past of humanity, but its future. Though Liang was dismissive of Christian theology, he became very interested in how the spirit of Christianity had shaped Western culture and society. Liang considered religion to be the most influential driver of human history. In the middle of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), he wrote that “as the world’s history shows, it [religion] is the most powerful activity in social life.”4 For him, the social impact of religion could be best observed in Western, Christian society. Liang acknowledged that in modern times, Christianity had lost most of its

Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 361. Liang Shuming, “Zongjiao wenti jiangyan 宗教問題講演 [Lecture on the religious question],” in Complete Works, Vol. IV, 630; about Youth China and the debate on religion, see above in Chapter One, section Re-Introduction of the Concept of Religion in China. 3 Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 422–423. 4 Treatise on Differences and Similarities between Confucianism and Buddhism, in Complete Works, Vol. 7, 162. 1 2

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hold on society, yet the modern West had nevertheless inherited the cultural and sociological patterns of Christianity. After devoting himself to rural reconstruction, Liang strove to understand the fundamental differences between Chinese and Western society, stating that “the religious question is the line which divides China and the West.”5 Liang analyzed China from the vantage point of the experiences gained during his rural reconstruction efforts. He read the works of major historians of Western civilization, such as the French historian Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges (1830–1889), who emphasized the role of Christianity in the constitution of European political identity.6 He also read the Belgian historian Jean Pirenne’s (1962–1935) study of the economic role played by guilds, which were religious and political organizations, in the Middle Ages.7 Liang also learnt from Lynn Thorndike (1882–1965) about the collectivism of the Spartans, in which family life did not play an important role.8 Besides these historical analyses of Western society, Liang was also influenced by social thinkers such as Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, who borrowed their methods from biology and understood human society as a biological organism,9 with individuals integrated into an organic and collective life. This form of social thought went against Greek and Christian metaphysics, which held that there were fundamental differences between human beings, animals and plants. However, it was more congenial to Chinese thought. This social theory

Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 52. La Cité Antique (1884) was translated into Chinese by Li Xuanbo 李玄伯 and published in Beijing, in 1938, by Shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書館, under the title Xila luoma gudaishehui yanjiu 希臘羅馬古代社會研究 [Research on the Society in Ancient Greece and Rome]. Liang Shuming explicitly quoted this work in Substance of Chinese Culture, 53–57. 7 Pirenne’s book, Histoire Economique et Sociale du Moyen Age, which appeared in English translation in 1933, was translated into Chinese by Hu Yimo 胡伊默 with the title Zhonggu ouzhou shehuijingjishi 中古歐洲社會經濟史 [Socio-Economical History of the Middle Ages], and published by Shangwu yinshuguan in Shanghai in 1940. Liang quoted also this work. See Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 60–66. 8 In Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 55, Liang quoted from the Chinese edition of Lynn Thorndike, Short History of Civilization (New York: Crofts, 1936). Two Chinese editions of the book were then available: Lynn Thorndike林恩·桑戴克, Shijjie wenhuashi 世界文化史 [The History of World Cultures], translated into Chinese by Chen Tingfan 陳廷璠 (Chongqing 重慶: Chongqing shudian 重慶書店, 1930); 桑戴 克, Shijjie wenhuashi 世界文化史 [The History of World Cultures], translated into Chinese by Feng Xiong 馮雄 (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan as Shijie wenhuashi, 1934). 9 See Herbert Spencer, Principles of Sociology (London: Williams and Norgate, 1862), Part II. 5 6

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was based upon functionalism and held a great attraction for Chinese intellectuals, since it emphasized the continuity between human beings and other forms of life, as well as with the cosmos at large. However, it seems that Liang did not read works by the founders of sociology, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, who also established theoretical bases for the sociology of religions. We may recall here a contemporary definition of the sociology of religion, which states that, The sociology of religion can be said to consist of two main themes or central questions, namely, why have religious beliefs and practices been so central a feature of culture and society and why they have taken such diverse forms? The sociology of religion poses the question of the role and the significance of religion in general, in human society, as well as that of understanding the particular beliefs and practices of particular groups and societies.10

As we shall see, Liang attempted to answer these two sets of questions. However, his sociological analysis lacked a proper disciplinary methodology. Yet, we should not forget that Liang’s analysis of Christianity as a social religion served only as an analytical tool for him to explore the “substance of Chinese culture.” Christianity as a Social Religion In Substance of Chinese Culture, Liang argued that the strengths of Western culture and society were founded on Christianity. Under the influence of Western ideas, he came to reflect on the genesis of society and the role played by religion in it. Yet, what interested Liang most of all were not theoretical questions about the origins of society and religion as such, but what religion’s social roles and functions were. Liang especially emphasized the strength of Christianity in building society. It did this in five ways: by fostering social cohesiveness, social dynamism, and universality; by exerting a civilizing influence, and by promoting public morality. Liang, like Hobbes, first claimed that society was originally made of dispersed individuals or clans. When scattered people came into contact, they were driven by primitive motivations such as fear and

10

Malcolm B. Hamilton, The Sociology of Religion (London: Routledge, 1995), 1.

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competition to survive. Lacking reason and morality, they engaged in warfare. For Hobbes, peace was only possible through fearful submission to an authoritative political order. In contrast, Liang considered a common religious faith more efficient than sheer violence. Unlike violence, religion “tamed” (xunfu 馴服). In this sense, the social function of religion was “to gather and to agglomerate” (tongshe ningju 統攝凝聚).11 Morality, customs, rites, laws and regulations, all contributed to the implementation of a unity which was first brought about by this common religion. In his last work, Human Mind and Human Life, Liang would return to the same idea when he asserted that “only by establishing faith and worship inside a unified group can the life of the group become stable and progress.”12 In Western society, Liang recognized that the Christian idea of an absolute and unique God was a decisive victory over previous polytheistic beliefs; as there was only one God ruling the universe, there was also one ruler governing human society. At the extreme ends of society were the individual and the institution. While Christianity in the Middle Ages succeeded in drawing each individual into the Church through a complex and sophisticated network of institutions, including schools, hospitals and tribunals, this social structure created a dynamic tension between the individual and the church. Sometimes, individual members favored entrusting more power to the church, which resulted in a kind of collectivism. At other times, they requested more autonomy from the church, up to the point of anarchy. However, each member considered his relation to the overall structure to be an essential component of his or her identity. This relation between the individual and the church lent society great cohesion. Religion’s second strength was a social dynamism sustained by regulated conflicts. While religion strove to unite humanity spiritually, it still imposed doctrinal boundaries. In the case of Christianity, there was a clear consciousness concerning orthodoxy, working not only ad extra but also ad intra. Liang explained that,

11 12

Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 97–98. Human Mind and Human Life, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 696.

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chapter three Christianity does not erect an altar by itself. It needs to destroy the altar of heresy . . . A community needs an opponent or competitor to invigorate itself and lend cohesion to its organization.13

In other words, Christians busy themselves with questions of orthodox interpretations, correct behavior and appropriate ways of thinking. This internalization of the struggle against heresy within the church and within each individual did not lead to a weakening of the organization. On the contrary, it energized Christianity and empowered it with a strong social unity. Liang stated that, More than a thousand years of frequent and fierce conflict have contributed to the cultivation and shaping of the foundations of the collective life of Westerners in a particularly important way.14

Since monotheistic religions like Christianity hold that truth is immutable, the tribunals in which the truth is argued, disputed and validated, contribute to the establishment of strong social organizations. This necessity of internal conflict for stimulating social progress was an idea shared by many Chinese intellectuals at that time, including Yan Fu 嚴複 (1854–1921), Zhang Dongsun 張東蓀 (1886–1973), and of course, by Chinese Marxists like Li Dazhao.15 Liang Shuming’s contribution was to recognize this as an internal principle of monotheistic religions, such as Christianity. Monotheistic religions did not suppress conflict, but on the contrary, constantly engaged it. It might be expected that reason would be suppressed by this power struggle. Yet Liang maintained that, paradoxically, rationality was progressively fostered by these struggles and that true reason would ultimately emerge. Liang pointed out a third social strength of religion. This was its effectiveness as a universalizing force. Liang recognized the success of the great monotheistic religions in transcending national boundaries. He stated that, For a great collectivity which is no longer centered on the family, we had to wait for religions like Christianity and Islam to be constituted.16

Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 57–58. Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 58. 15 Liang Shuming explicitly recognizes his debt to a work: Zhang Dongsun 張東蓀, Lixing yu minzhu 理性與民主 [Reason and Democracy] (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書館, 1946); see Substance of Chinese Culture, 215. 16 Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 55. 13 14

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Religious faith could overcome the divisions established by families, clans, races, nations and states. Religion worked as a unifying force which was more powerful than these boundaries. Liang therefore acknowledged the importance of Christian monotheism, especially in the Middle Ages, for the creation of a common identity in Europe. During Liang’s time, Confucianism, Daoism, Hinduism, and even Buddhism, were regarded as local or regional religions. Christianity appeared as a religion which was truly international, with believers present on the five continents. Fourth, religion, as exemplified by Christianity, had enabled social progress by fostering science, democracy and capitalism. These were all rooted in religion. Science was made possible because of the metaphysical and epistemological dualism of the Greeks, which were inherited by Christianity—just as humanity relied on God, nature followed the principles which had been decreed by Him. Therefore, to understand the laws of nature is to indirectly know God. For Liang, this explained why Christianity supported, financially and institutionally, the works of scientist-priests or scientist-monks—people who could detach themselves from other concerns and dedicate themselves entirely to the theoria of the universe, continuing the work of Greek philosophers.17 In support of his view, Liang referred to the scientific contributions made by the Jesuits in China at the end of the Ming dynasty and beginning of the Qing in the fields of astronomy, mathematics, physics, geography, and medicine. Again, in holding this view, Liang was in direct opposition to those held by the liberal thinkers of the New Culture Movement. Though Liang considered some Christian dogmas to contradict human reason and scientific truth, he did not see an absolute incompatibility between religion and science. Regarding democracy, Liang recognized that there had been an historical conflict between the emergence of democratic states and Christian thought, with the latter leaning traditionally toward monarchy. Yet, as in the case of science, Christianity had made a great theoretical contribution—democracy had been made possible by the notion that humans were equal before God. Liang explained that, While men and women have different positions in the religious structure, they are all equal in front of God, and nobody is greater than anyone

17

See Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 276.

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chapter three else. In this context, [the rationale underlying the notion of] majority rule becomes obvious.18

Regarding capitalism, Liang maintained, in a very Weberian fashion,19 that Christian ethics made capitalism possible because of its emphasis on collective life, which enabled the building of an urban society, the concentration of manpower, capital, and learning—conditions necessary for the industrial revolution. Liang was therefore opposed to Karl Marx when he stated: “I consider that human spirit can determine economic phenomena.”20 Liang clearly recognized that religion had made important contributions in the areas of science, democracy and capitalism. Unlike many modern thinkers, he did not see religion as consisting only of rites, instead taking a broader perspective and regarding it in a more nuanced manner. Considering religion to be a creation of the human mind, Liang affirmed that it was not completely determined by external factors, but on the contrary, could lend culture and society direction. Finally, religion contributed to a group psychology which was oriented toward the public good. During times of anxiety, religion provided society with consolation and peace. A common faith could also, in the long term, provide spiritual bearing and sustain strong social movements. Religion contributed to the shaping of public virtues by distinguishing good from evil. For Liang, some public virtues were especially relevant: public concern, discipline, organizational capacity and a spirit of justice. Without the support of a religion, these were hard to maintain, especially for the common people. Liang contrasted the Han Chinese, who became addicted to opium, with the Chinese Muslims who never smoked because it was prohibited by their religion.21 Liang also referred to the religious spirit of asceticism and sacrifice as important elements in building public morality.22 Believers were trained in a moral life by their religious communities and could then extend these values to the whole of society. Liang therefore recognized the importance of religion in shaping public morality. At this level, religion worked within the people as a kind of collective consciousness, providing every individual with a common meaning and values. 18 19 20 21 22

Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 252. See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904–1905). Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 375. See Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 109. See Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 88.

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These five features explained why Christianity was a progressive force in shaping the West into a strongly structured society. Religion certainly led to divisions, and entailed tensions between the world and God, orthodoxy and heresy, body and spirit, as well as instinct and reason. However, it was through these divisions and tensions that a densely complex and unified social body was constantly being shaped. On the other hand, Liang asserted that China, at a very early stage, had moral reasons and insights. But it had always lacked the social structure to sustain them, causing it to stop short in its social and moral progress. The Drawbacks of Social Religion While Liang recognized the positive effects of Christianity in terms of social development, he also regarded it as having some basic flaws when compared to the two other models of religion—the moral religion of Confucianism and the transcendent religion of Buddhism. Especially in comparison with Confucianism, the price it paid for its social advantages was very high. Liang recognized that there was a degree of ambiguity in any religion: Religion is a strange thing. On one hand, part of it consists of moral reasoning. On the other hand, it obscures moral reasoning. It enables people to establish mutual relationships. Yet, at the same time, it drives people apart.23

The major criticisms Liang had of social religion were: a mechanical collective life, an exaggerated level of exclusivity, and a lack of true introspection. First, Liang stated that the framework of religious institutions, which were made up of dogmas, rites and organizational structures, could inhibit the development of a reflexive morality. He wrote that, The psychology of the gathered masses entails a great mechanicalness, blindness, and impulsiveness, and makes reflection difficult.24

Religion, as an enduring social body, upheld rigid and immutable truths that were forced upon the lives of individuals. However, life

23 24

Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 302. Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 200.

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itself, especially moral life, was a continuous process which was comprised of changes. Rigid truths were irrelevant for this. By holding onto these sedimentary truths, people could set themselves apart from the ever changing reality of life. People created attachments to false ideologies, preventing themselves from developing a true morality. In this sense, Liang criticized the West for its formalism, stating that Christianity’s “collective community interferes too much [with the individual].”25 This is quite similar to the notion of mechanical solidarity developed by Durkheim in his first major work, The Division of Labor in Society (1893). According to this, social cohesion was based on likenesses and similarities between individuals, and was largely dependent on common rituals and routines. Mechanical solidarity resulted when all members of a society performed the same, or nearly the same, tasks. If a person were to die and not be replaced, society would not change, because the remaining members would continue to do the exact same things as the deceased member. All members of a mechanical society shared an identical collective consciousness. Bonds were derived not from a dependence on other individuals, but from a dependence on the total social system. Durkheim attributed mechanical solidarity to pre-industrial societies, however, and stated it became less predominant with modernization. In contrast, Liang tended to see mechanical solidarity as a permanent feature of Western society. The second major defect of religion was its exaggerated exclusivity. Although the spirit of religion is oriented toward universality, believers unconsciously develop “feelings of stupidity and stubbornness” (yubi pianzhi zhi qing 愚蔽偏執之情). This makes them accept dogmas uncritically, as well as making it impossible to examine them rationally or discuss them with outsiders. This turns into “a spirit of violence and impulse” (qiangbao chongdong zhi qi 強暴衝動之氣) which is enacted against outsiders.26 This spirit of intolerance tears human relationships apart and threatens social harmony. Liang contrasted Christian intolerance with Chinese tolerance. Liang’s contrast is much to the point, since in traditional China, besides the elite class and some monks, it was rare for commoners to have a sense of belonging exclusively to one religious community, or of worshipping only one deity. Most people could easily worship the Buddha, Laozi or other local gods.

25 26

Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 249. Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 111.

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On the contrary, Christians could belong only to the Church. One is reminded that new converts to Christianity in China were often required to destroy the statues or images of other gods as an expression of their conversion, and of belonging exclusively to the Church. Third, Liang criticized Christianity’s lack of true introspection. The faithful checked their moral lives against external standards, which were decreed by God, and which prevented them from developing a true morality themselves. Moral judgment ultimately came from outside, from God. For Liang, the externality of Christian morality had, in the modern West, developed into another kind of externality. This was a morality based on external profits or advantages, as exemplified in utilitarian traditions in which the standard of what was good was measured quantitatively, mostly in material terms. According to Liang, What has changed is that the [standards of ] profit and loss have replaced the [standard of] sin and beatitude, and the law has replaced the religious commandments. But, the conception of profit and loss and the conception of sin and beatitude have the same origins. They have changed without having really changed.27

For Liang, the problem was the external standard, be it divine, political or economic. Because of this externalization, Christianity could not fully develop humanity’s inner essence, since it failed to understand its inner heart. With these three critiques of the social aspects of Christianity, Liang claimed that it was ultimately unable to resolve an individual’s quest for meaning, or provide people with peace of mind. Religion presented itself to the individual as embodying absolute and objective aims, with an ultimate standard of meaning. Liang warned, however, that this aim unavoidably ended up being questioned, which created more doubt and frustration for the disillusioned follower. As we shall see in connection with Buddhism, for Liang, true religions should not establish any such aim or meaning, but rather, completely overcome questions of meaning. Liang therefore recognized the advantages a social religion like Christianity could have. He also held that China lacked such a religion for disciplining the people. However, China’s unique culture and society precluded a complete adoption of the Western religious model. 27

Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 278.

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China was therefore bound to continue on its own way, since the two societies were on different paths and had different structures; Liang believed that while Western society could be understood as a Church, Chinese society was like a family. In his rural reconstruction program, Liang tried to incorporate some organizational elements from the West as a way of rejuvenating his ideal of a close-knitted and self-dependent community. Yet he maintained that Chinese society should incorporate Western elements as adjuvants only, and that it should be built on the basis of its own specific features.28 In the end, Liang would come to a surprising conclusion, in which we can read a “trick of history.” While China had unearthed moral reason early on, it never found an adequate social structure which would allow the social body to grow. China had therefore not made any progress during the last two thousand years. Conversely, the West had ignored moral reasoning and instead built a strong organizational structure. The trick of history was that, despite its shortcomings, the West had finally succeeded in begetting moral reason.29 It had been partially successful in overcoming its initial mechanicalness and fostered a culture which had evolved into something more humane. Liang would even admit that “in some aspects, the moral reasoning of the Chinese is inferior to that of Westerners.”30 Local Religion versus Centralized Religion The identification of religion with Christianity was so strong in the early Republican era that Christianity had became the social pattern or standard form against which other religions were measured. Religion was therefore understood as entailing a centrally organized structure, with branches at the local level. As Vincent Goossaert has recently shown, this concept of religion, imported from the West, was quickly appropriated by the Chinese state.31 Seeking to restructure Chinese religion along the lines of a modern version of Christianity, beginning in the early twentieth century the Chinese government See below Chapter Eight on Confucianism. See Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 186. 30 Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 309. 31 See Vincent Gossaert, “L’invention des Religions en Chine,” in La Pensée en Chine Aujourd’hui [Chinese Thought Today], edited by Anne Cheng (Paris: Gallimard, 2007), 185–213. 28 29

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sought to eradicate local religious organizations, which were perceived as a threat to the central authority. Instead, the Chinese state recognized five religions (Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, Buddhism and Daoism), constraining all religious activities within the framework of Western-style religious organizations over which it could enforce strict control. Some modernist religious leaders, such as the Buddhist monk Taixu, internalized this conception of religious organizations which came from the West and was enforced by the Chinese state. While national religious organizations were granted greater social visibility than the previously scattered religious groups, it came at the great cost of abandoning many local practices. The criticism made by Liang against Christianity should be understood, in fact, as a criticism against this model of modern religious organization. For Liang, the Western concept of religion could not be applied to Confucianism, since this one did not postulate the formation of a state, but was centered on families and local communities. Nor could the modern concept of religion be applied to Buddhism, since its aims were entirely other-worldly. Consequently, Liang opposed any attempt to transform Confucianism or Buddhism into a Church, or a centralized organization. This suggests that while Liang recognized the social import of the Western model of religion, he still held that Chinese and Indian cultures could not accommodate such a model. As we have seen in this chapter, Liang arrived at quite a refined understanding of the social role of religion. As he said, “every great civilization relies on a great religion.”32 Liang endeavored to understand the religion behind the West’s success. During the first half of the twentieth century, at a time when China was experiencing political instability and social unrest, Western societies appeared to be models of political uncertainty and social stability. Many Chinese intellectuals therefore attempted to locate the intellectual foundations of Western society. Among them, Liang was notable for his identification of the positive cultural and social roles played by Christianity. He described the Christian values and attitudes which had so strongly shaped social life in the West, and came to have a deep appreciation of Christianity as a social religion. Yet he also pointed out its drawbacks and failures. More importantly, he contended that this model was inappropriate for China. In our analysis of Liang’s understanding of Buddhism below,

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we shall see how he came to regard it as a transcendent religion. For Liang, Buddhism had to be completely detached from society for it to function effectively as a critique of all social constructions, including the Buddhist sangha. In Chapter Eight of this study, we shall see how Liang came to advocate a Confucian model for Chinese society, in which Confucianism played the role of a substitute for religion. As we can see, the crux of this question hinged upon the relationship between a religious spirituality and a religious organization. Liang understood this relation to be very important, and yet highly problematic.

CHAPTER FOUR

BUDDHISM AS THE TRUE RELIGION Having discussed the basic principles of Liang’s religious typology in Chapter Two, and his understanding of Christianity as a social religion in Chapter Three, in this chapter, and in the next three, we shall deal with Liang’s understanding of Buddhism as a religion of pure transcendence. In the present chapter, we will first see how the religious drive for renouncing the world sprang from the fundamental experience of human suffering. Liang did not describe this experience entirely in Buddhist terms, but also in Confucian ones. However, the decision to renounce the world was entirely Buddhist and arose from a quest for radical transcendence. This is significant not only for the individual, but also for the whole history of humanity. In the second section of this chapter, we shall see how Liang moved away from an emotional understanding of religion towards the pursuit of academic research on the history of Indian Buddhism. We will also examine the more rational understanding of Buddhism he developed when he made an intellectual shift to Yogācāra. Liang’s Buddhist Background Liang was a self-taught Buddhist. He began reading sūtras in 1909, at the age of sixteen. From 1911, during his period of seclusion, he read them with increased intensity. He was also reading the monthly publication Buddhist Miscellanies (Foxue congbao 佛學叢報),1 as well as the Buddhist sūtras published by the Jinling Sūtra-Publishing House ( Jinling kejingchu 金陵刻經處) in Nanjing. Liang was heavily influenced by the Buddhist writings of Zhang Taiyan. Zhang’s influence can be felt in Liang’s first essay, Treatise on Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt, especially in the idea of

1 This Buddhist monthly review started on October 1912 and lasted until June 1914, with a total of 12 issues. It was published by Youzhengshuju Press 有正書局出版社 in Shanghai.

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the concomitant increase of joy and pain in the modern age.2 Liang also inherited from Zhang the idea that Yogācāra epistemology could compete with Western theories.3 Liang was also influenced by Zhang’s idea that Buddhism could have a positive role as a religion for modern times, as we have mentioned above.4 However, Liang expressed his disapproval of Zhang’s Qiwulunshi 齊物論釋, in which he used Yogācāra to interpret Chinese philosophy.5 Later on, Liang would consider Zhang to be an outsider (waihang 外行) to Buddhism, and distanced himself from his thinking.6 Self-trained in Buddhism and without any proper academic supervision, Liang recognized that he was at loss when confronted by so many schools and theories.7 Yet his seminal essay, Treatise on Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt, was noticed by Cai Yuanpei. This essay launched Liang into the academic world, beginning his career teaching Indian philosophy. In this essay, Liang began by expounding the first Noble Truth— that of suffering—in its existential dimension. He explained there were two aspects to impermanence. These were life itself, and human will. The impermanence of life caused suffering because human beings must leave that which they are attached to, and because they are unable to find a state of permanency. At the level of human will, individuals were constantly switching to new desires and purposes, which were ultimately revealed to be empty, creating more anxiety and frustration. Most people were unable to retain set goals throughout their lives. Liang described the human condition as being comprised of exhausting “oscillations” ( panghuang 彷徨). The first existential reality Buddhism dealt with was this continual feeling of frustration due to our own finitude and our will’s constant search for new aims. The solution, therefore, was not to find new purposes, but to go beyond purposes

See Zhang Taiyan 章太炎, “Jufen jinhua lun 俱分進化論 [Theory of Evolution in Two Ways],” in Minbao 民報 7 (1906); Zhang Taiyan quanji 章太炎全集 [Complete Works of Zhang Taiyan], vol. 4 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, 1985). 3 Treatise on Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 16. 4 Zhang Taiyan 章太炎, “Jianli zongjiao lun 建立宗教論 [On Founding a Religion],” Minbao 民報 9 (1906); Zhang Taiyan quanji, vol. 4. See Liang’s Treatise on Differences and Similarities, in Complete Works, Vol. 7, 159. 5 Outline of Yogācāra, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 253. 6 See Wodezixue xiaoshi 我的自學小史 [Short Story of My Self-Learning], in Complete Works, Vol. 2, 695. 7 Short Story of My Self-Learning, in Complete Works, Vol. 2, 692. 2

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altogether. A life free from definite purposes, and free from concrete aims, would be a pure freedom which corresponded to the Chinese concept of “non-action” (wuwei 無爲). Liang explained that, Actions without purpose are usually considered unconscious movements, without any value. But in fact, they should be called the highest, and the freest, in thousands of years.8

At this point, we may correct a misunderstanding. Liang did not advocate easy escapism or a form of nihilism. He especially did not claim that life was meaningless. Rather, he invited us to discard all the “meanings” we ascribe to it, even the religious ones. By remaining in this vacuity, we could find the true meaning of life, as a reality already present and yet always escaping us. Feelings of Shame and Compassion While the first set of feelings was due to our own mistaken way of relating to ourselves, moral feelings arose in relation to others. Liang explained there was an unavoidable, mutual cruelty among living beings in this world. The resulting feeling of human misery and impotence was even more overwhelming than the feeling of impermanence. We recognize that our own survival is necessarily at the expense of other living beings (both plants and animals). The suffering inherent in life made it impossible and unbearable. Liang asserted that In life, one can never avoid hurting other things. How can the instincts of birds, insects and animals be changed? Therefore, the Buddha could not bear to live one more day in this world. This life cannot continue as it is. He has only one requirement concerning life and concerning the world: to renounce it.9

Since living entails the negation of other people’s livelihoods and happiness, a person with a high moral sensibility would choose to renounce the world, thereby creating a moral sphere in which unity was restored. We can clearly see that behind this attitude lay a deep moral feeling of shame, impotence, and culpability, which may find

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an echo today in the ethical philosophy of the French philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas (1906–1995).10 While the structural cruelty of the world made life unbearable, the death of the other provided a decisive occasion to leave the world. True suffering was never primarily physical, but moral. Biological death should not cause anyone grief, since death was only one link in the cycle of reincarnations. True suffering is ethical, and in relation to others: one witnesses the fear of others—a family member, a friend, or a stranger—facing death and feels a deep anxiety at the idea of leaving this world. The psychological and spiritual anguish of the other at the decisive moment of death presented an ethical problem to the sensitive person. How could one respond to this crisis in a way that helped others overcome their own? At this point, Liang held that a sensitive person would feel a deep concern and compassion for one facing death with fear. This was because they revealed themselves to be prisoners of sa sāra, and as unable to make a radical departure from it at the decisive moment of biological death. Liang assumed the following was the correct way to understand death, and that it enabled liberation: It is the fear of not dying completely—of dying, and yet not being finished. To die is not so easy. It requires cutting oneself off from what life produces, and obtaining that which is offered by death. Therefore, through a lengthy and painstaking process, one looks forward to renouncing the world. This means one looks forward one’s own death. It is not that one fears death, but rather that one fears life.11

The one who has severed every attachment to this worldly life, and renounced any desire for an afterlife, could in a real sense “die”, leaving this world and gaining final liberation. Therefore, for Liang, when the sensitive person, filled with a compassionate heart, witnessed the psychological suffering of another who was dealing with death, he or she gave rise to a “true and real feeling” (zhenqing shigan 真情實感), and an “affective requirement” (qinggan yaoqiu 情感要求). Sensitive people made the suffering of others their own suffering. Even if they knew the anxiety of the other to be ill-founded, unnecessary, and ultimately empty, the sensitive person would still feel Lévinas has developed his philosophy on the experience of the alterity, by which the other is calling each of us to an irreductible responsibility toward him. See Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969). 11 Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 431. 10

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the pain of the other to be very real, and would be overwhelmed by it. The sensitive person would then be compelled by their inner feelings to immediately renounce the world. Only this extreme decision, this honesty toward one’s own feelings of compassion, and this attitude of self-sacrifice, could awaken the other in their final hour, allowing the sensitive person and the dying person to communicate with one another at the deepest level of reality, beyond both life and death. A Buddhist Liberation Spurred Onwards by Confucian Moral Feelings Therefore, for Liang, the root of the Buddha’s decision to renounce the world was not his knowledge of its impermanence, but his inner feelings of compassion. The Buddha had decided to renounce the world because he was unable to bear the psychological and moral suffering of a dying person. Liang therefore gave the Four Noble Truths a new order. While in the classical teachings, the decision to renounce the world came third (the extinction of suffering) or fourth (the way leading to the extinction of suffering), Liang here expedited the process and brought it to the beginning, making it the First Noble Truth (the nature of suffering). It was therefore an immediate decision which sprang from the experience of witnessing the suffering of others. This kind of ethical intuitionism can be traced back to Mencius’s “mind which cannot bear the suffering of others” (buren zhixin 不忍之心), and the famous example of the true feelings of compassion which would be experienced by anyone who saw a child fall into a well. At a more theoretical level, Liang interpreted this ability to feel compassion in Neo-Confucian terms. He stated our mind had an “original moral intuition” (zhijue 直覺), unobstructed by the calculative mind which always pursued self-interest. Our mind could therefore transcend the individual self. In a very Confucian way, Liang wanted to show that the decision to renounce the world was rooted in immediate moral feelings. There was no need to go through the rational analysis required to realize the Second Noble Truth (the cause of suffering). This meant that Buddhist illumination could be explained in Confucian terms. It was not primarily the person of wisdom, but the sensitive person, who could attain liberation. Instead of rationally enquiring about the nature and workings of human cravings and attachments, Liang wanted to show that, inside this excess of moral feelings, there was already a way to realize the final awakening—instantly.

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One may therefore speak of a “Confucianization” of the First Noble Truth. Even though suffering was itself empty, the feeling of compassion which arose from it was real and of the highest moral value. It expressed the real nature of humanity and the cosmos. The First Noble Truth did not lead to a rational enquiry of the world’s emptiness, but remained at the level of human, moral feelings. Renunciation would be felt to be the only solution to the dilemma that moral feelings raise. It was true that Mahāyāna Buddhism put a strong emphasis on compassion, which was accorded the same level of importance as wisdom. But the bodhisattva’s compassion in Mahāyāna was still a logical deduction from the negation of a permanent self. For Liang, however, compassion was the consequence of a direct experience with suffering. It was an a priori experience, anterior to wisdom. Nonetheless, Liang acknowledged that the treatment of the feelings themselves went beyond Confucianism. While Confucians tried to harmonize feelings and keep them in check, the compassionate heart led to “feelings going to their extreme” (zou jiduan de ganqing 走極端的感情).12 Only by going to the extreme could one bring about the definitive decision to renounce the world. Strong tendencies toward subjectivity and sentimentality may be seen here. Liang was himself aware of these risks and he would, later on, try to give this decision to renounce the world a more rational and objective grounding. Buddhism as the Religion of Radical Transcendence When faced with suffering, many people made recourse to religious beliefs, betraying their fear for their existence. Their faith made them believe they could influence events for their advantage, or find a realm of happiness and bliss after death, imagined in terms that were analogous with this world. By doing so, however, they exerted pressure on their human nature, consigning their existence to a narrow egoistical sphere. For Liang, only the Indians, and especially Indian Buddhists, had found the correct attitude for facing the question of suffering. They were not concerned with their own lives, nor were they confined within their own experiences of suffering. Instead, they displayed the highest courage. Liang stated that “in other regions, most people are

12

Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 429.

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cowardly and necessarily deform their nature. But most Indians do not seek help in preserving their lives. They usually, normally, seek to leave the world—they call it nirvāna.”13 Liang used the Chinese word chaojue (超絕) to mean “radical transcendence”—a term which meant “to surpass” (chao 超) by “cutting through” ( jue 絕).14 This is a concept which differs from chaoyue (超越), which means “to surpass” (chao 超) by “going beyond” (yue 越). This second kind of transcendence is understood in terms of a continuity and prolongation of the world, which signifies an existence as prisoner of sa sāra. A religion resting on this kind of transcendence could not enable final liberation. Liang explained that, Though this religion leaves this world, it also affirms the world. It is thus unable to be a religion which truly attempts to leave the world.15

While Liang acknowledged that all historical religions dealt with transcendence or the supernatural, most of them, however, remained attached to the world. Believers in popular religions expected to gain concrete benefits in this worldly life from the supernatural. Even more elaborate religions, such as Christianity, established an ultimate reality or an after-life which was modeled on the world; God was thought of analogically, as a being, a person, a will, and so on. Paradise was thought of as a concrete space. Also, as we saw in the previous chapter, Christianity engaged with the world with the hope of transforming it and making it a better place, thereby creating more attachments to it. And so, at the normative level, only Buddhism could be called a true religion, since its essential aim was “to leave this world” (chushi 出世). As was stated in Chapter Two, Liang’s understanding of Buddhism provided him with this normative definition of religion. Liang looked at this, via negativa, as the only solution. He stated that, Indians fundamentally reject worldly life. Therefore, their renunciation is not only concerned with this life—they consider the entirety of life and reject it all. This is what it means “to sever and extinguish.”16

While Liang recognized that all religions were characterized by the quest for transcendence and the quest for spiritual consolation, what

13 14 15 16

Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 437. Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 419. Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 60. Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 60.

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really differentiated them from one another was whether or not they could enable true transcendence to be realized—the first of these two features. For Liang, even though many Indian schools had come close to this realization, Indian Buddhism had done so to the greatest extent.17 However, the Buddhist quest for radical transcendence did not stem primarily from a theoretical enquiry into metaphysical reality, but from true feelings, feelings of frustration, and moral feelings of shame and compassion. Buddhist Awakening and Waiting for the End of History Liang acknowledged that during his time, not everyone was ready for this radical solution of renouncing the world, as he himself was. In fact, most people were still insensitive to the suffering in the world, and ignorant about the true state of the world’s emptiness. Therefore, awakened people, due to their compassion, decided to stay in the world, like a bodhisattva, and lead people towards final liberation. At this point, Liang arrived at a very novel and surprising conclusion: he decided not to teach Buddhism, but Confucianism. Already in his earliest publication, Treatise on Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt, Liang had envisioned two ways to become awakened: immediately renouncing the world, and patiently remaining in the world. All his subsequent works aimed at developing the second way: Liang considered Confucianism the way to bring about humanity’s Buddhist awakening, and regarded Buddhism as unsuited to the needs of the present age, since escapism would only lead to a passive attitude towards the world and society. Liang, as a good Mahayanist, considered any “skillful” means (upāya, or fangbian 方便) conducive to promoting the goal of enlightenment to be legitimate. In the present age, Confucianism was that expedient means, and was able to prepare the path towards Buddhist awakening. Of course, Liang’s position was attacked by institutional Buddhists, represented by monk Taixu, as we shall see in Chapter Seven. Liang’s Buddhism was original in another very significant way: he incorporated the concept of evolution into the Buddhist notion of mind. Many Chinese intellectuals were much impressed by the theory

17

See Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 33–45.

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of evolution, which was introduced to China by Yan Fu at the end of the nineteenth century. Liang adhered to the theory of the Australian scholar Edward Jenks (1861–1939), for whom human society advanced by stages. These consisted of the totemic, patriarchal, military and the socialist.18 Yet, contrary to the naïve optimism of sociologists, scientists and Marxists in their quest for the betterment of the world, Liang leaned toward an eschatology in which a transcendent realm would emerge at the end of history. Already before Liang, this naïvely optimistic belief in a happy future had been contested by Zhang Taiyan with his theory of “the simultaneous progression of suffering and happiness” (kule pianjin 苦樂駢進). According to this view, although happiness increased due to the progress of civilization and knowledge, suffering also increased at the same rate, leading to further frustration.19 Liang sided with Zhang in having this realistic conception of progress. He stated that “the more intelligence advances, the more excessive desires become.”20 Though the range and of options available to people in modern society was greater, they were still limited in what they could realize, thus generating acute frustrations. These frustrations would offset what had been gained, which deepened people’s consciousness of failure. For Liang, some very sensitive people had already experienced this misery and fallen into despair, including some who had committed suicide.21 Therefore, the progress of civilization was not unambiguously good. It brought with it extreme forms of both liberation and alienation. But here Liang brought something new, compared to Zhang, to the discussion. For Liang, the unfolding of history was not open-ended. Progress and suffering would continue until their maximum point, when there would then be a final collapse. According to Liang, When the intelligence of humanity reaches its peak, suffering will also reach its extreme. After all methods of liberation from suffering have been exhausted, the great law of the Buddha will then arise.22

18 Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 17. Jenks’s History of Politics (1900) was loosely translated by Yan Fu and published in 1904 with the title General Interpretation of Society, Shehui tongquan 社會通詮. 19 Zhang Taiyan, “Jufen jinhua lun,” in Zhang Taiyan quanji, vol. 4, 386. 20 Treatise on Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 18. 21 In 1911 and 1912, Liang himself tried twice to commit suicide, as mentioned in Chapter Two. 22 Treatise on Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 19–20.

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In other words, it was only after all other solutions had failed, and that everything had collapsed, that the liberation of humanity could happen. It would thus seem that suffering had a purificatory function, and that it prepared the world for its final liberation. The world needed to be caught in this form of extreme violence so that the solution of renouncing the world would become self-evident. Interestingly, Liang cited the example of the renewal of interest in Buddhism in Europe during the First World War as a way of proving his point; Buddhism could only emerge as the solution amid the worst tragedies of history. Here we find in Liang’s thought a conjunction between the eschatological and the apocalyptic—a conjunction more familiar to Western Christian, than Asian, thought. Therefore, Liang drew a very important conclusion. Since the final outcome of human history—Buddhist awakening—was certain, everything that could hasten its progress was welcome. The solution for the present age was not to withdraw from the world, but on the contrary, to engage with it. He wrote that, To be engaged with the world today will accelerate progress and therefore push us toward the successful apprehension of Buddhism.23

Worldliness would therefore not hinder the coming final liberation. Rather, to be actively involved in spurring civilizational progress onward would help, little by little, in bringing about the final moment where the Buddhist solution of total renunciation would become apparent. A new reality would rise from the ruins of the old. For Liang, the end of the world was not frightening in itself, since it would bring about a universal Buddhist awakening. Renunciation would not put an end to biological life, but cut all attachments to life and to the world, and even to ideological constructions of the mind concerning nirvāna. Through this process of abandonment, an intuitive experience of reality, which could not be expressed in terms of analytic thinking, could be achieved. For Liang, compassionate feelings toward the suffering of humanity would provide the best way to realize final enlightenment. Those feelings would not only induce a negation of the self’s egocentric orientation, but more importantly, it would lead to a postponement of one’s own enlightenment for the sake of others. In that sense, the commitment to first serve

23

Treatise on Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 20.

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the worldly needs of humanity through Confucianism had two functions. First, it reminded us that self-centeredness in the quest for one’s own enlightenment must be overcome by actively benefiting others. Second, worldly engagement itself would lead to the overcoming and abandonment of such self-centeredness, and show the fundamental limitations of fulfilling only people’s psychological and social needs. In doing so, it would prepare humankind to face the necessary next step of ultimate Buddhist liberation. Liang’s Understanding of Indian Buddhism As we saw above, Liang had a very deep insight into Buddhism’s soteriological program. This was gathered from his own personal experiences and studies of Buddhism, which he began only when he joined Peking University. In 1917, he offered a class on Indian Philosophy there. The corresponding book was published in 1919 as Outline of Indian Philosophy. A revised and expanded version appeared in 1922.24 As mentioned in the preface to the 1922 edition, Liang inherited notes from the Buddhist layman Xu Jishang 許季上 (1891–1953), who had taught the class before him.25 According to Liang, Xu’s notes came from “three or four Japanese books, and two or three English books.”26 Over several years, Liang completely rearranged Xu’s manual and expanded its content, drawing especially from Japanese books obtained through a colleague, Wu Chengshi 吳承仕 (1884–1939). Liang’s teaching manual could not make use of the History of Indian Philosophy, in five volumes, by Surendranath Dasgupta (1887–1952), since the first volume was published only in 1922, by Cambridge University Press. The first volume of Indian Philosophy, by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888–1975), could also not have been one of Liang’s

24 Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 26. In this study, we are using the 1922 edition as found in the Complete Works, Vol. 1. Similar works on Indian Philosophy or Indian Buddhism in that period include: Lü Cheng, Yindu fojiao shilue 印度佛教史略 [Short History of Indian Buddhism] (1933); Tang Yongtong, Yindu zhexue shilue 印度哲學史略 [Short History of Indian Philosophy] (1945). 25 Xu Jishang was only a few years older than Liang. He became a lecturer at Peking University in 1913 and taught Indian Buddhism there. Because of health problems, he had to leave his teaching position in 1917. 26 See the preface to the third edition, Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 26. The notes left by Xu Jishang were entitled Yindu zhexue jiangyi 印度哲學講義 [Lectures on Indian Buddhism].

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sources, since it was published only in 1923. Nor could Liang use the English translations of the Pali canon by Thomas William Rhys Davids (1843–1922), which were published between 1921 and 1925. Among the resources available, besides the Japanese manuals, there was the Sacred Books of the East series, which was issued by the Oxford University Press between 1879 and 1910. Among the 49 volumes are 19 volumes of Indian sacred texts and 7 volumes of Indian Buddhist sūtras.27 In fact, Liang had learned about Indian Buddhism mostly through Chinese Buddhist sources. As he himself was aware, these texts were biased against some Indian schools, analyzing them from the point of view of Chinese Buddhism. Lacking the ability to read the original texts, Liang could only partially disengage himself from the prejudices and inaccuracies of the Chinese sources. In other words, Liang’s Outline of Indian Philosophy antecedes both the modern research on Indian philosophy, and the modern editions of Indian texts. Therefore, we cannot expect Liang’s research to meet modern standards of scholarship. As we saw in Chapter Two, Liang understood and analyzed the Indian schools within a religious framework. Even though the title of his manual contained the word “philosophy,” Liang went beyond Western dichotomous notions of philosophy and religion. He rightly analyzed the Indian schools as being fundamentally driven by a religious quest. In the first chapter of the manual, Liang provided an overview of the histories of the six orthodox and six heterodox schools, including Buddhism. The rest of the book was structured according to modern Western philosophical categories, with the second chapter discussing ontology (bentilun 本體論) and the third chapter discussing epistemology (renshilun 認識論). Though recourse to Western concepts was already very common in the Chinese academic world at that time, such heavy reliance on these terms was quite problematic.28 The fourth and last chapter analyzed Indian anthropology and practical morality

27 Another book available was Archibald Edward Gough (1845–1915), The Philosophy of the Upanishads and Ancient Indian Metaphysics (London: Trübner, 1882). 28 When Tang Yongtong wrote in 1929 his own Short History of Indian Philosophy (published only in 1949), he criticized heavy dependence on Western terminology, with probably Liang Shuming in mind, but without mentioning explicitly his name: “Every time a Western category is used, it is a wrong comparison which makes things more confused and the truth more distorted.” Short History of Indian Philosophy, 5.

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under the Buddhist heading “On the mundane world” (shijianlun 世間論). In Outline of Indian Philosophy, Buddhism was correctly understood as having been one school among many in India. For each of the four thematic chapters, the manual first systematically presented the position of the six orthodox schools, and then the position of Buddhism.29 Through this unique method, Liang could stress the continuities and discontinuities that existed between the Indian schools and Buddhism. However, the book was mostly written from a Buddhist perspective. The Indian schools were not studied for their own sake, but rather in order to understand how Buddhism had either inherited or distinguished itself from them. While the manual discussed the Indian schools with reference to their own classical literature, most of the time, however, the references were borrowed from Buddhist texts. The Indian schools were therefore referred to from the Buddhist perspective—as “heretical paths” (waidao 外道). Clearly, this sectarian and uncritical use of Buddhist texts carried along with it a strong bias against the six Indian schools. Liang’s Early Prejudice against Yogācāra In his Treatise on Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt, Liang had quite a negative view of Yogācāra. He adopted the usual way of classifying Chinese Buddhism according to two main schools, the “dharma-character school” (xiangzong 相宗) and the “school of nature” (xingzong 性宗). Accordingly, the School of Yoga Practice (Yogācāra, yuqie xingpai 瑜伽行派) was considered to belong to the “dharma-character school.” It limited itself by taking only the “dharma-character,” or the constantly changing nature of phenomena, as its object of analysis. In contrast, the “school of nature” was considered superior since it allowed the mind to fully grasp the true nature of reality as Buddhahood. Therefore, when Liang spoke about Yogācāra in his first treatise as the “dharma-character school,” this term was not neutral but already implied a negative value judgment. In his Treatise on Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt, Liang first presented his understanding of the “school of nature.” He found 29 The six Indian schools are: Puarra Mimamsa, Vedanta, Samkhya, Yoga, Vaisesika and Nyaya.

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in modern science a confirmation of the Buddhist teaching about the existence of an essential nature. He referred to the theory of ether, or yitai 乙太. Ether was then believed by many scientists to be the basic constituent of the universe. A French amateur physicist, Gustave Le Bon (1841–1931), held that the whole universe was made of dematerialized ether—a substance without mass. Matter was simply a condensation of the ether. Le Bon stated that, If we know very little about the ether, we must, however, consider it certain that most of the phenomena in the universe result from the manifestations of ether. Ether is without doubt the first source and the ultimate end of things, the substratum of the worlds and of all beings moving on their surface.30

Le Bon’s conclusion clearly went beyond physics, but Liang Shuming accepted this ontological vision of the cosmos, identifying ether with the Buddhist mind. In this sense, Western science confirmed what the Buddhist “school of nature” had already affirmed long ago— that the Buddha mind is the substratum of all that exists. Like the ether, the Buddha mind is “without causes, without spontaneity, purely at rest, embracing the whole universe of dharmas.”31 From this, we can see that Liang upheld, from very early on, an ontological version of Buddhism. Like most Chinese Buddhists, he regarded the “school of nature” as superior to the “dharma-character school” because the latter had failed to grasp Buddhahood. The Yogācāra Revival in China Despite his initial prejudices, Liang’s views on Yogācāra quickly changed; he believed he could reconcile it with ontology. Another circumstantial reason explains this shift: the revival of this school at that time in China. Indeed, in the first half of the twentieth century, Yogācāra became very popular among Chinese intellectuals.

30 Gustave Le Bon, The Evolution of Matter (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1907), 52–53; original edition in French, L’Evolution de la Matière (Paris: Flammarion, 1905). 31 These terms come from the Sūtra on (the Buddha’s) Entering (the Country of ) Lanka, or the Lankāvatāra sūtra, in Chinese Lengqie jing 楞伽經. This sūtra was translated from Sanskrit into English by D. T. Suzuki: Lankavatara Sutra (Boulder, Colorado: Prajna Press, 1978).

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This Buddhist school was first introduced into China during the sixth century, when it became known as the Weishi School 唯識宗, or the school of Consciousness-Only. The school flourished for a while. However, beginning in the Song dynasty, Yogācāra disappeared as an independent school in China and came to be held in low esteem because of its failure to grasp Buddhahood. Nevertheless, Yogācāra’s theory of cognition still influenced Chinese Buddhist schools such as Tiantai 天臺, Huayan 華嚴 and even Chan 禪 (or Zen). Yogācāra also exerted an influence on some Confucian thinkers during the Qing dynasty, such as Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619–1692). It was not until the early twentieth century that the Yogācāra School experienced a revival in China. This was for two main reasons. First, there was a circumstantial reason: the lay Buddhist Yang Wenhui 楊文會 (1837–1911) met with the Japanese Buddhist scholar Nanjō Bunyū (1849–1927).32 Subsequently, from 1892 to 1896, Nanjō sent to Yang Wenhui some two hundred texts which had not been transmitted in China for centuries. Among these were thirty Yogācāra texts.33 Yang Wenhui edited and published some of these. Their availability threw new light onto this school for Buddhists in China. Second, for many Japanese and Chinese, Yogācāra appeared to be a legitimate intellectual resource due to its logical methods of analysis, which they saw as meeting Western standards. This school appeared then, both in Japan and in China, as an Asian alternative to the Western discourse of science. Yet it was typically Asian by virtue of its focus on the mind rather than matter. Three different groups contributed to the revival of the Yogācāra School in China. First, there was the group of the Buddhist laymen: Yang Wenhui, Ouyang Jingwu and Lü Cheng 呂瀓 (1896–1989).34 This group was closely identified with the Chinese Institute of Inner Learning, which we have mentioned above. Since its members focused almost exclusively on editing and interpreting the original Yogācāra

32 Yang Wenhui is also called Yang Renshan 楊仁山 or the venerable monk from Shidai in Anhui province (Shidai zhanglao 石埭長老). 33 Sin-wai Chan, Buddhism in Late Ch’ing Political Thought, 21. Besides the text originating from China, there were also a few texts originally written by Japanese Buddhist monks. 34 About Yang Wenhui, see Gabriele Goldfuss, Vers un bouddhisme du XX e siècle (Paris: Collège de France, Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises, 2001); see also Sinwai Chan, Buddhism in Late Ch’ing Political Thought, 16–27; Yang Wenhui 楊文會, Yang Renshan quanji 楊仁山全集 [Complete Works of Yang Renshan] (Hefei: Huangshan shushe 黃山書社, 2000).

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texts, their understanding of the entirety of Buddhist doctrine was limited.35 The second group focusing on Yogācāra texts came from institutional Buddhist circles, and was led by the monk Taixu. For Taixu and his followers, the Yogācāra School was important for distinguishing Buddhism from popular forms of religion, which they considered irrational and superstitious. They envisioned Yogācāra as the intellectual foundation on which a modernized Buddhism could be rebuilt. Unlike the laymen of the Chinese Institute of Inner Learning, these representatives of institutional Buddhism were not only interested in discussing theoretical issues in Buddhist doctrine, but more importantly, in making Chinese Buddhism compatible with modern society. Finally, the third group came from academic and intellectual circles. They were not Buddhist laymen, striving to return to an original Buddhism, nor did they belong to institutional Buddhism. They were independent thinkers, and were quite eclectic in their approach. Zhang Taiyan was the first to systematically apply Yogācāra categories to the interpretation of Chinese Classics. Liang Shuming, himself a lay Buddhist lacking any formal association with the sangha, inherited from Zhang many of his ideas and methods, and embraced this school.36 Following the lead by Zhang Taiyan and Liang Shuming, other academics and intellectuals used Yogācāra, which became an important resource for contemporary New Confucian thinkers such as Xiong Shili (1885–1968) and Mou Zongsan (1909–1995), who adopted many of its concepts and methods. Also, Tang Yongtong 湯用彤 (1893– 1964), an historian of Buddhism, succeeded Liang Shuming and Xiong Shili in teaching the Yogācāra class at Peking University. As we shall see in more detail, because the three groups had different motivations, their approaches to Yogācāra resulted in divergent and conflicting interpretations.

35 Another group, called the Three Periods Study Group (Sanshixuehui 三時學會) was founded in Beijing in 1927. Much less influential than the Institute of Inner Learning, it was directed by the lay Buddhist Han Qingjing 韓清淨 (1884–1949). 36 See Makeham, “Zhang Taiyan, Yogācāra and Chinese Philosophy,” in John Makeham, ed., Transforming Hundun (forthcoming).

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Liang’s New Understanding of Yogācāra Within the context of this revival, Liang abandoned his early prejudices, and was subsequently greatly influenced by Yogācāra. After joining Peking University, he engaged in in-depth studies of Yogācāra so that he could teach it. He read the Yogācāra texts in Chinese translation, including the fundamental text of the school: the Discourse on the Stages of Concentration Practice (Yogācāra-bhumi āśstra, or Yuqie shidi lun 瑜伽師地論) by Asa ga 無著 (c. 315–390).37 He read also the Gate to Logic (Nyāyamukha or Yinming zhengli menlun 因明正理門論) by Dignāga 陳那 (c. 480–540),38 as well as the Introduction to Logic (Nyāyapraveśa āśstra or Yinming ruzhengli lun 因明入正理論) by Dignāga’s disciple, Śa karasvāmin 商羯羅主 (end of sixth century).39 Of course, he also read the authoritative commentaries written by the two famous Chinese monks: the Chengweishilun 成唯識論 by Xuanzang (602–664) and the Chengweishilun shuji 成唯識論述記 by Xuanzang’s disciple, Kuiji 窺基 (632–682). These two last texts presented the teachings of this school in a systematic and comprehensive way—the first time it had been done in China. In his Outline of Indian Philosophy, Liang devoted one short chapter to discussing Yogācāra, and the debates by proponents of “emptiness” (kong 空) and “existence” (you 有). In some ways this duplicated the debates between the “nature school” and the “dharma-character school.”40 In 1920, one year after the first edition of his Outline of Indian Philosophy, Liang published his Outline of Yogācāra, a book devoted especially to this school. In this, Liang showed himself to be a staunch supporter of the Yogācāra School, even going so far as to state that “Yogācāra represents the entirety of the Buddhist teachings.”41 At a personal level, Yogācāra allowed Liang to explicate, in a rational way,

The text comprises one hundred fascicles, composed in India between 300 and 350 A.D. and translated into Chinese by Xuanzang from 646 to 648 at Hongfu and Ci’en Monasteries. The Tibetan tradition considers the text to have been composed by Asa ga. 38 This text was translated from Sanskrit into Chinese by Xuanzang. The Japanese scholar monk Kirara Koyo (1824–1910) published an annoted edition of this text in 1881. Kirara stressed the practical use of Buddhist logic, especially in the public debates of the courts and of the national assembly. 39 This text was also translated by Xuanzang. Many faxiang scholars commented on this text, the most influential being Ci’en Ji. 40 Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 123–143. 41 Outline of Yogācāra, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 269. 37

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on his previous spiritual views. As we have seen above, these were more affective than intellectual. The Adoption of Modern Methods of Criticism We saw in the beginning of this chapter that Liang’s academic understanding of Buddhism was quite limited, especially since he lacked access to original texts and modern secondary literature. A thinker by nature, Liang still made efforts to adopt modern methods of criticism in his research. During the Republican era, many scholars emphasized the use of new methods of critical scholarship when dating and establishing the authorship of works. Also, modern approaches to the history of Buddhism allowed scholars to establish the intellectual influences on writers and schools. Liang Shuming used these methods to reassess the Buddhist tradition. For example, in China, Yogācāra was thought to have been established by Maitreya (or Maitreyanātha, Mile 彌勒), who would have lived between 270 and 350 A.D. and would have written the school’s fundamental treatise, this Discourse on the Stages of Concentration Practice that we just mentioned above. In the first pages of his Outline of Yogācāra, Liang established that since Maitreya had dictated these teachings to his student Asa ga, we should consider this one to be the proper “writer” rather than Maitreya, especially if we take into consideration the fact that Asa ga himself wrote Verses on the Great Vehicle (Mahāyāna-samgraha, Shedashengsong 攝大乘頌). Liang concluded that “it is better to say that the Yogācāra School goes back to Maitreya rather than to say it goes back to Śākyamuni Buddha; but it is even better to say that it goes back to Asa ga rather than to say it goes back to Maitreya.”42 Through his focus on the question of authorship, Liang’s conclusion was, at that time, an important contribution to the academic field.43 As we shall see below, Liang would immediately accept the conclusions of Japanese scholars and Ouyang Jingwu, who established that

Outline of Yogācāra, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 267. See Zhang Wenru, “Liang Shuming and Buddhist Studies,” translated by Jarosław Duraj, in Thierry Meynard, ed., Liang Shuming’s Thought and Its Reception (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 80. In fact, Liang did not have access at that time to Sanskrit and Tibetan texts by Maitreya. Recently, Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti have regarded Maitreya as the founder of Yogācāra. See Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti, Being as Consciousness (New Delhi: Motilal Barnasdass, 2004), xv. 42 43

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the Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna (Dasheng qixinlun 大乘起信論) did not reflect Indian, but Chinese Buddhism. Even though this conclusion went against his understanding of Buddhism and indeed may have shaken the foundations of his Buddhist thought, Liang bowed to the results of textual research. In Outline of Yogācāra, Liang expressed his concern for preserving the original Buddhist doctrines. While he made major changes to Yogācāra epistemology himself in Eastern and Western Cultures and their Philosophies, as we shall see in the next chapter, he criticized Ma Yichu 馬夷初 (1885–1970) and Zhang Taiyan for distorting Yogācāra when using it as a tool to interpret Chinese philosophy.44 In fact, for Liang, when interpreting Buddhism in general, or Yogācāra in particular, preserving the transcendent nature of its theoretical basis was of prime importance. In this chapter we have analyzed the early Buddhist thought of Liang Shuming as found in three of his early works: Treatise on Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt, Outline of Indian Philosophy and Outline of Yogācāra. Despite his lack of a formal training in Buddhist studies, Liang Shuming displayed in these books the depth of his Buddhist insight into ultimate liberation. This allowed him to think of Buddhism as a religion of pure transcendence, and therefore as fulfilling the requirements of what he claimed a normative religion should be. Yet, his ideas on Buddhist transcendence had an affective tendency, and lacked a rational basis. Because of the deficiency of a rational basis in his Buddhist faith, and also because of the revival of a rationalized form of Buddhism, under the form of Yogācāra, Liang therefore started turning his attention toward this school. We shall present in the next chapter how the adoption of Yogācāra epistemology allowed Liang to build a more rational foundation on which to base his ideas concerning Buddhist transcendence.

44 See Outline of Yogācāra, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 253. Zhang Taiyan wrote Qiwulunshi 齊物論釋 (1914) and Ma Yichu, Zhuangzi zaji 莊子劄記 (1919).

CHAPTER FIVE

BUDDHIST PRACTICE AND YOGĀCĀRA EPISTEMOLOGY In this, more technical, chapter, we shall take a closer look at Liang’s use of Yogācāra. First, we shall present Liang’s claim of Yogācāra being a remedy against the shortcomings of Western epistemology. Next, we shall briefly present the main ideas of the school and, more importantly, the important changes Liang introduced, on purpose. These changes will then be evaluated against the background of Liang’s overall project as presented in the previous chapters. Criticisms of Western Epistemology For Liang, Western epistemology fell into two traps: dogmatism (duduan 獨斷) and skepticism (huaiyi 懷疑). According to his definition of dogmatic views, everything could be known, and knowledge was therefore boundless. For example, Liang claimed that the categories of “liberty” or “providence”, which were philosophical postulates, or the category of an “end,” which was a scientific postulate, were all dogmatic since they lacked evidence.1 When looking at the history of Western thought, Liang held that epistemology had been contaminated by a metaphysics founded on false assumptions. For example, metaphysics first postulated the notion of a universe and then, through an epistemic enquiry, deduced the possibility of knowing the universe rationally and being able to describe all of its proprieties. Liang characterized this view as entailing the belief that, The essence of the universe is such and such; its foundation is like this or like that; it is one, two or many; it is material or spiritual; it is true, good or divine; it is eternal, all-encompassing, unmovable, very different from phenomena, and other strange things—they know it all.2

In such a way, reason exceeded its own capacity. Liang felt this tradition of dogmatism ran very deep in Western thought. Liang therefore 1 2

See Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 166. Outline of Yogācāra, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 272.

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praised the rise of modern epistemology in the West, and its abandonment of the dogmatic tradition. Modern epistemology flourished in the West with empiricism and philosophers such as Francis Bacon (1561–1626), David Hume (1711–1776), William James (1842–1910), Karl Pearson (1857–1936), John Dewey and Bertrand Russell. For Liang, these philosophers had successfully disengaged themselves from dogmatism by returning to experience. Liang praised such efforts since, in principle, they agreed with Buddhism, which also emphasized experience. However, Western empiricism only went half-way, and often went to another extreme: skepticism. For Liang, empiricism only made a limited use of reason—its calculative aspect—and therefore could not build a sound metaphysics. This was Liang’s main point of contention with Western empiricism and the Chinese rationalists of the New Culture Movement. Liang spent his life attempting to build a metaphysics which would be non-dogmatic. Thus, he went against the rationalism of his time which was confining reason within narrow boundaries. He explained that, You have to acknowledge that the universe cannot be known. It can only be said to be mysterious, and similar to this or to that. There are people who say that the universe follows reason; other people say that the universe follows sincerity. In fact, what cannot be known is unknown. This is the limit of the cosmos [for us].3

Indeed, throughout his work, and contrary to the spirit of the rationalists, Liang faced the mysteries of life, the cosmos, and humanity itself with humility. Therefore, among the many Western authors he read, one of them especially caught his attention—Bergson. Like the empiricists, Bergson started from human experience, but unlike them, however, he did not reject metaphysics. For Liang, Bergson could do this because he did not limit human reason to its empirical dimension; he was therefore able to accommodate extra-rational perception, or intuition (zhijue 直覺). Liang stated that, The whole universe is an absolute. As we have said, sensation is made of something perceived and of someone perceiving. It is, of course, impossible to sense the whole universe. When Bergson discusses his concept of

3

Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 166.

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“perception,” he is clearly saying that the subject, as the perceiver, has to get inside the object which is perceived instead of remaining outside.4

There is thus the possibility of knowledge which is neither external to the object nor to the world, and which transcends the barrier between subject and object. Liang therefore upheld the important Bergsonian idea of “integral experience” (quanzheng de jingyan 全整的經驗).5 Faced with the empiricism and scientism which dominated his intellectual landscape, Bergson rehabilitated the idea that an epistemology based on experience could move in the direction of metaphysics. Though Liang recognized the merit of Bergson’s ideas, he regarded Bergson’s method as unable to establish a true metaphysics. Nevertheless, Liang’s Bergsonian moment was crucial for the development of his own thought, since it helped him to understand how a sound Buddhist epistemology could lead to a correct Buddhist metaphysics. A Buddhist Epistemology Based on Meditative Practice Liang affirmed that Buddhism was an entirely rational philosophy that was free of dogmatism. Though Buddhism went beyond empirical forms of reasoning, the path it took to do so was entirely rational. Yogācāra explained how consciousness worked, how we perceived the world and the self, and went into great detail when explaining the functioning of the different stages of consciousness. Yogācāra theory provided an explanation of how perception was constructed by the mind. This epistemology, however, was part of a larger soteriological project in which consciousness played an ambivalent role; consciousness was not only the medium through which humans could be liberated, but it was also the last obstacle. Only by negating the consciousness could the mind free itself. Therefore, Yogācāra epistemology was constructive in the sense that it explained the workings of consciousness positively. However, in the final analysis, it was deconstructive, since liberation could be obtained only by bringing an end to the ongoing production of consciousness. Liberation was obtained by negating the different elements of perception since they were ultimately

Outline of Yogācāra, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 276. Henri Bergson, “Introduction à la métaphysique,” in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 11/1 (1903): 1–29; An Introduction to Metaphysics, translated by T. E. Hulme (London: Macmillan, 1913). 4 5

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false and illusory. The process was therefore purely rational. Liang characterized it as an effort “to cancel understanding through understanding” ( yi lijie quxiao lijie 以理解取消理解) . It was this negative philosophy which lent legitimacy to the Buddhist aim of “leaving the world.” Like Western empiricists, Liang advocated a return to experience. However, for him, this did not entail a focus on the examination of the external, material world. Instead, it meant a focus on that which constituted the core of human experience: our psychological lives. Liang used the term “religion” in a broad sense, referring to any personal practice in which the human mind sought to know itself. Religion therefore represented a spiritual method for knowing oneself. In Confucian terms, it was a form of self-cultivation (xiuyang). The Yogācāra School held a special significance for Liang because of its emphasis on concrete meditational techniques. This is already implied by the meaning of Yogācāra (the practice of yoga). Practice centered on “stabilizing meditation” (in Sanskrit śamatha 奢摩他 or samadhi 三摩提). This began with meditation on a mental object, and then involved leading the mind through different stages, until in the end it became stable and undisturbed. When discussing the meditative methods of the Yogācāra School, Liang referred mainly to those described in the Lengyan jing 楞嚴經.6 According to tradition, this sūtra would have been the translation of an Indian text, entitled the Śūrangama Sūtra. The translation would have been done in Canton (Guangzhou 廣州) in the year 705 by Śramana Pāramiti 般刺蜜帝, who came from central India. Liang included a very extensive quotation from the Lengyan jing in Outline of Indian Philosophy.7 The practice of Yoga is aimed at stabilizing the mind. When the mind is at rest, the flow of consciousness is seen to be an illusion. The sūtra, which Liang quoted from, states:

6 This sūtra was translated from Chinese into English: The Shurangama Sutra: sutra text and supplements, with commentary by Hsuan Hua, English translation by the Buddhist Text Translation Society (Burlingame, CA: Buddhist Text Translation Society, 2003). Another translation is: The Śūrangama sūtra, translated by Charles Luk, (London: Rider, 1966). I have used here the translation by the Buddhist Text Translation Society. It is quite significant to notice that the translators have maintained the Sanskrit name in the title, perpetuating the myth of an Indian origin of this text. I myself prefer reffering to the Lengyan jing instead. 7 Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 67–70.

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Ananda, you should know that when the good person has obtained proper knowledge in his practice of shamatha [śamatha], his mind is unmoving, clear, and proper, and it cannot be disturbed by the ten kinds of demons from the heavens. He is now able to intently and thoroughly investigate the origin of all the categories of beings. As the origin of each category becomes apparent, he can contemplate the source of the hidden, fleeting and pervasive fluctuation.8

The sūtra then explains how to reach this stage, which entails negating, one by one, incorrect ideas which arise in the mind. For example, the sūtra explains how to overcome the first incorrect idea that there would be no cause for the origin of life and no cause for the end of life: If he [the good person] begins to speculate on that pervasive source, he could fall into error with two theories of the absence of cause. First perhaps this person sees no cause for the origin of life. Why? Since he has completely destroyed the mechanism of production, he can, by means of the eight hundred merits of the eye organ, see all beings in the swirling flow of karma during eighty thousand eons, dying in one place and being reborn in another as they undergo transmigration. But he cannot see beyond eighty thousand eons. Therefore, he concludes that for the last eighty thousand eons living beings in the ten directions of this and other worlds have come into being without any cause. Because of this speculation, he will lose proper and pervasive knowledge, fall into externalism, and become confused about the Bodhi nature. Second, perhaps this person sees no cause for the end of life. And why? Since he perceives the origin of life, he believes that people are always born as people and birds are always born as birds; that crows have always been black and swans have always been white; that humans and gods have always stood upright and animals have always walked on four legs; that whiteness does not come from being washed and blackness does not come from being dyed; and that there have never been nor will there be any changes for eighty thousand eons. He says, “As I now examine to the end of this life, I find the same holds true. In fact, I have never seen Bodhi, so how can there be such a thing as the attainment of Bodhi?” You should now realize that there is no cause for the existence of any phenomena. Because of this speculation, he will lose proper and pervasive knowledge, fall into externalism, and become confused about the Bodhi nature. This is the first external teaching, which postulates the absence of cause.9

Śūrangama sūtra, Da foding rulai miyin xiuzheng liaoyi zhupusa wanxing shoulengyan jing 大佛頂如來密因修證了義諸菩薩萬行首楞嚴經, N. 945, Vol. 10, T19; quoted in Outline of Indian Philosophy, 67. English translation: The Shurangama Sutra, 269. 9 English translation: The Shurangama Sutra, 270. 8

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This is the first of a total of ten teachings on the erroneous ideas which arise in the mind. Some of these teachings concern extreme views which need to be rejected.10 Though Buddhist practitioners know that the five aggregates or skandhas (matter, sensation, perception, volition and consciousness) are empty, their minds generate various ideas which then become seeds. These produce unwanted results. The sermon continues as follows: Ananda, you should know that the good person has thoroughly seen the skandhas as empty, and he must return consciousness to the source. He has ended production and destruction, but he has not yet perfected the subtle wonder of ultimate serenity. He can cause the individual sense faculties of his body to unite and open. He also has a pervasive awareness of all the categories of beings in the ten directions. Since his awareness is pervasive, he can enter the perfect source. But if he regards what he is returning to as the cause of true permanence and interprets this as a supreme state, he will fall into the error of holding to that cause. Kapila the Sankhyan, with his theory of returning to the Truth of the Unmanifest, will become his companion. Confused about the Bodhi of the Buddhas, he will lose his knowledge and understanding. This is the first state, in which he concludes that there is a place to which to return, based on the idea that there is something to attain. He strays far from perfect penetration and turns his back on the City of nirvāna, thus sowing the seeds of externalism.11

Not all erroneous ideas are stated to be heresies to avoid. On the contrary, they indicate a mental path which must be experienced by the individual. The distance run by the mind is very relevant here. Through concrete meditation, the mind stays for a while with these ideas, measures them, experiences them, and then finally rejects them. Liang expressed this by using the modern philosophical category of “reason.” He regarded this meditative practice as the elimination of incorrect ideas through reason, or “canceling understanding through understanding.” Yet in the end, consciousness itself had to be destroyed in order to enter into the “profound truth” (mingdi 冥諦) which is nonconceptual, and in which the mind is “at rest and stabilized” (wuwei 10 The seven inversions are: (1) taking impermanence as permanence; (2) taking misery as happiness; (3) taking defilement as purity; (4) taking no-self as self; (5) inverted perception, which refers to the inverted differentiations in the first four inversions; (6) inverted view, which refers to the establishment of, attachment to, and delight in the first four inversions; and (7) inverted mind, which refers to afflictions arising from the first four inversions. See Fo Guang Da Ci Dian. 11 English translation (that I modified a little): The Shurangama Sutra, 279–280.

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zhengding 無為正定), and therefore able to know the cosmic Being.12 Liang’s interpretation of these ancient Buddhist texts through the modern concept of reason was intended to show that the Yogācāra School was entirely rational, making it acceptable for modern people, and yet going beyond reason, shaking the rationalistic belief and pointing toward another dimension of reality. Besides the Lengyan jing, Liang also referred to a more ancient Indian text: the Discourse on the Stages of Concentration Practice. In the first stage of meditation, the five hindrances completely disappear and one can experience an intense, unified bliss. The ability to form unwholesome intentions ceases. Yet subtle mental movements remain, and therefore this samadhi is called “searching and watching” (vitarka, you xun 有尋; vicāra, you si 有伺).13 This means that conceptualization and reflection still occur at a preliminary level. For Liang, this proved that philosophical thought and meditative practice were complementary. He explained a process which went, First, from thought to meditative practice, and then, from meditative practice to thought. Continuing onwards, the depth of thought depends on meditation, and the degree of meditation depends on thought.14

Liang therefore understood Buddhism, like Bergson, as aiming at an “integral experience.” In its fundamental intent, the Buddhist “realization” (zhenghui 證會) was therefore similar to Bergsonian perception. This integral experience was accessed both through meditation and philosophy. The two were indispensable. Without meditative practice, ideas could appear in the mind, but they were not really experienced, in the end bringing no result except a catalogue of different opinions. Without philosophical reasoning, experience was fundamentally blind. For Liang, the Buddhist method made use of both religious practice and philosophical enquiry. Here, reason worked as a tool for discarding erroneous ideas (pi 辟).15 This via negativa worked as a kind of mental purification, preparing one to leave the world. Meditative practice led to transcendent wisdom. Liang said that in this sense, Buddhism was a religion, not only in terms of its method, but also its aim—to

Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 67. See The Discourse on the Stages of Concentration Practice, quoted in Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 70. 14 Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 70. 15 Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 70. 12 13

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leave the world and access the reality which lay beyond.16 This transcendent reality is expressed positively as the Buddha nature, as the excerpts above from the Lengyan jing show. The Eight Consciousnesses Originally, Buddhism held that there were only five kinds of consciousness. These were attached to the five sense organs, and consisted of: visual consciousness (which was attached to the eyes), hearing consciousness (the ears), olfactory consciousness (the nose), gustatory consciousness (the tongue), and tactile consciousness (the skin). Originally, these five consciousnesses had independent mental functions. Later, they were understood as being controlled by a sixth consciousness— the mind-consciousness, called manas in Sanskrit—which was responsible for creating concepts. When the five consciousnesses together were directed toward a particular object, ideas concerning it were formed. This Buddhist theory was sufficient for explaining and analyzing discrete, momentary perceptions. However, the theory encountered difficulties when explaining how past experiences informed present ones, and how it could play a positive role in the progression to Buddhist liberation. In order to explain karmic trajectories and the possibility for people to influence them, Yogācāra theorists developed a very elaborate theory which added two further layers of consciousness: the seventh and the eighth consciousnesses. The seventh consciousness (which in Sanskrit is called the manas-vijñāna and in Chinese the monashi 末那識) is the basis for the six consciousnesses. While the sixth consciousness was in a sense neutral, the seventh consciousness was responsible for the misuse of both the fifth and eight consciousnesses, therefore creating attachments to the world and to the self. This level of consciousness is therefore the main responsible for the sa sāra, since it creates the wrong idea of an independent and permanent self. The eighth consciousness, or “storehouse consciousness” (which in Sanskrit is called the ālāyavijñāna, and in Chinese the alayeshi 阿賴耶識), was the basis for the other seven consciousnesses. It is called a “storehouse” because it accumulates the mental seeds created by past actions and

16

See Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 66.

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thoughts, until the point where they bear karmic fruits. It therefore administers, and leads to, the process of rebirth. Deconstructing Experience According to Yogācāra, the basic problem lays in our attachments to the self and to the world. These are the result of an epistemic mistake—the creation of dualistic views consisting of the self and the world, the subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge, and the subject as a “grasper” (nengqu 能取) and the object as something that is “graspable” (suoqu 所取). Once we have built up this mistaken conception of existence, we think and act as graspers, striving to grasp the world in order to gain knowledge and fulfill desires. However, there is in fact no distinction between the self and the world, and therefore nothing to know, and nothing to grasp. Yogācāra develops a very refined analysis of cognition, in order to liberate us from the cravings created by erroneous thoughts and desires. Accordingly, Yogācāra therefore holds that there are “three natures” (tri-svabhāva, sanxing 三性) of cognition. The first is the imagined nature, or the “nature of existence according to the discriminating mind” (parikalpita-svabhāva, bianji suoyixing 編計所執性). This is the nature of existence, in which the individual is seen as a subject or object of experience. It includes all subjective forms of living and non-living beings, the self, and representations of consciousness. These forms are not the things themselves, but are the mental constructions, conscious or not, which we project onto them. They are seen by some people as an object of knowledge, and by others as an object of enjoyment. The difference between forms is a result of differences between individual minds. Thus, these experiences are described as imaginary, without extra-mental foundations. The mind mistakenly assigns a real essence to things that in fact have no true reality, leading us to become attached to those false realities. The mind must therefore overcome this first cognitive obstacle—the imagined nature. The second nature is the other-dependent nature, or the “nature of existence as dependently arisen” (paratantra-svabhāva, yitaqixing 依他 起性). This refers to the nature of existence, in which the individual sees things as differentiated into subjects and objects. The major activity of the mind is therefore to discriminate between the grasper and the graspable. The individual believes he or she is a subject that can

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enjoy objects of experience. While in the imagined nature, illusions are created by the defilements of the mind in the present moment, the illusions here come from the deep-rooted conditioning of one’s own past deeds, habits and previous lives. This nature of cognition is therefore called other-dependent nature. The other-dependent nature is also the key level of consciousness, since it is the source of sa sāra, and “becomes the battleground in which our dispositions create either a substructure in the form of a real and permanent subject or object, or a superstructure in the form of an ideal.”17 While it may be relatively easy to overcome the first hindrance—the imagined nature—by training the discriminating mind to return to a stage in which differentiations do not arise, it is more difficult to overcome the unconscious structure of the other-dependent nature, since it constitutes the foundation of the physical and mental world. The third nature, or the perfected nature ( parinispanna-svabhāva, yuanchengshixing 圓成實性), is the highest state of existence. Here, the individual is characterized neither as a subject nor as an object, but reality as such. One can reach this state by neutralizing the discriminating activity of the mind, in which it differentiates between the grasper and the graspable. Such a state consists of the thing in itself, or suchness. The crux of the matter is the other-dependent nature. When this is contaminated by the act of discrimination, the nature of cognition is the imagined nature. When the other-dependent nature is not contaminated by acts of discrimination, the nature of cognition is the perfected nature. Therefore, the perfected nature is the other-dependent nature when it is cleansed of discrimination. The other-dependent nature can be seen as a pivotal point, since it leads to either transmigration or nirvāna. The Four Forms of Attachment There are two kinds of attachments to the self: the innate attachment ( jusheng 倶生) and the attachment due to discrimination ( fenbie 分別). An attachment is said to be innate because it arises simultaneously with the mind. Beginningless, it is carried over from previous lifetimes. 17 David Kalupahana, Principles of Buddhist Psychology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 131.

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Such attachments are therefore deeply embedded and difficult to overcome. They occur in the seventh consciousness as well as the sixth consciousness. The second kind of attachment, due to discrimination, results from the power of external conditions and the imagination, which is false. Since discrimination is the function of the sixth consciousness, the hindrances of discrimination arise from that consciousness. They arise from following a deluded teacher, deluded teachings, or one’s deluded thoughts. Therefore, the attachment due to discrimination is easier to overcome than innate attachment. These two attachments may be subdivided according to their object—either an attachment to the self (wozhi 我執) or to the world ( fazhi 法執). This therefore makes a total of four forms of attachment. Let us look at each of the four types of attachment in more detail. The first attachment is the innate attachment to the self ( jushengwozhi 俱生我執). This is an attachment due to a discrimination of the self through thought. It is therefore constantly present. Even when one tries to not give rise to such thoughts and to suppress this view of the self, an attachment to the self will still arise. This is called “arising together with the mind.” The attachment is either constant and continuous, or intermittent. When it is constant and continuous, attachment occurs spontaneously and resides in the seventh consciousness, taking the eighth as an object and clinging to it, thereby forming the idea of the self. When it is intermittent, the attachment resides in the sixth consciousness and takes the images of the five aggregates as objects and clings to them, also forming the idea of the self.18 The seeds produced by these hindrances are different to those produced as a result of “discriminated arising.” The discriminated arising hindrance is cut off when one awakens to the principle of dependent origination. However, one becomes habituated to the hindrance of simultaneous arising. Even if one understands the principle of the Way, this hindrance will still arise. One must repeatedly practice contemplation of dependent origination in order to cut off the habituated nature. Here, attachment to the self does not come only from our mistaken understanding, but more importantly, from a structural flaw. The second attachment is the attachment to the self due to discrimination ( fenbiewozhi 分別我執). This attachment results from the

18 See Hsüan-tsang, Chengweishilun, in Three Texts on Consciousness Only, translated by Francis Cook (Berkeley: Numata Center, 1999), 13.

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power of external conditions, and is a product of the false workings of the imagination, or discriminations arising in the sixth consciousness.19 They exist in two forms. Either the sixth consciousness takes images of the aggregates as objects and clings to them, forming the idea of the self, or the sixth consciousness takes as objects the images of the self as objects and clings to them, also forming the idea of the self. The third is the innate attachment to the world ( jushengwozhi 俱 生法執). This arises in the seventh and sixth consciousnesses. This attachment occurs in two forms: either constant and continuous, or intermittent. When occurring spontaneously, this attachment resides in the seventh consciousness. It takes the eighth consciousness as an object and clings to it, forming the idea of dharmas. When intermittent, the attachment resides in the sixth consciousness, takes the images of the five aggregates as objects, and clings to them, also forming the idea of dharmas. As in the case of the innate attachment to the self, these hindrances are difficult to overcome. Finally, the fourth attachment is the attachment to the world due to discrimination ( fenbiefazhi 分別法執). It results from the power of external conditions, and derives from the workings of the false imagination, or discrimination arising in the sixth consciousness. These attachments exist in two forms. Either the sixth consciousness takes images of the aggregates as objects and clings to them, forming the idea of dharmas, or the sixth consciousness takes images of the self as objects and clings to them, also forming the idea of dharmas. The psychological continuity of human actions and mental activities (including recollection, perception, repetition, volition, and anger) does not necessitate the theory of a permanent self. In fact, this continuity comes from the eighth consciousness (ālāyavijñāna), which is a permanent, but always changing, structure.20 There is no self—only different states of consciousness.21 Yogācāra texts teach that practitioners of the two vehicles are capable of eliminating attachments to the notion of an inherent self, but are not aware of their unconscious attachment to the reality of elemental constructs. Therefore, from among the four attachments above, the innate attachment to dharmas is the strongest and the final one to

19 20 21

See Chengweishilun, translated by Cook, 14. See Chengweishilun, translated by Cook, 14–15. See Chengweishilun, translated by Cook, 15–16.

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be overcome. Bodhisattvas, seeing elemental constructs to be empty of an enduring nature, eliminate all noetic hindrances. These include not only the incorrect belief in the existence of a permanent self, but also the belief in the existence of an external world. Despite negating the reality of the self and the external world, Yogācāra does not fall into solipsism. It does not deny that there is a reality outside the mind, since this would enclose the mind in its illusions. Indeed, as is stated in the Chengweishilun, “objects of consciousness are only the manifestations of consciousness and are dependent upon other dharmas for their appearance, like illusions.”22 The Two Modes of Cognition in Yogācāra All schools of Indian philosophy recognize several modes of cognition (pramāna, liang 量), with some schools having up to six. Almost all of them recognize the epistemology which is founded on the sacred scriptures of Buddhism (āgama-pramāna, shengjiaoliang 聖教量). Liang, however, follows Dignāga in claiming that it is better to exclude the scriptural mode and retain only the other two.23 We again see evidence of Liang’s modern stance, as he attempts to establish Buddhism on purely rational grounds and thus make it acceptable to those beyond the Buddhist communities who recognize the authority of the scriptures. According to Dignāga, the mind-consciousness, or the sixth consciousness, constructs knowledge through two cognitive functions: “direct perception” ( prayaksa-pramāna, xianliang 現量) and “intellection” (anumāna-pramāna, biliang 比量). Direct perception is the pure cognition of objective sense data, such as colors, sounds, and smells, without the interference of conceptualization. This consists only of a perceptive knowledge of the object, without any reflexivity. There is no awareness of knowledge, nor is there any meaning attached to it. This perception is discrete, enclosed in the moment and the context of its occurrence. It is different from the common form of perception, in which information obtained by the five senses is aggregated and mistakenly synthesized

Chengweishilun, translated by Cook, 40. Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 146–147. As we shall see, Liang would later recognize three modes, splitting xianliang into an “other-worldly” xianliang and a “worldly” xianliang. 22 23

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into false knowledge. For example, when we look at or touch a bottle, we construct an experience of it, mistakenly thinking that this synthetic perception gives us satisfactory knowledge of it. In fact, we have no direct perception of the bottle, but see only its whiteness, feel its hardness, and so on.24 Therefore, common perception is flawed, since it is based on hypotheses which are not grounded in direct sensory experience. Direct perception alone is correct, since it is a form of perception which is really a direct “sensation” (ganjue 感覺). Also, when direct perception is focused on an individual object, through one sense organ, and at one moment, the fullness of experience is then achieved. With this atomistic form of perception, a higher knowledge is attained which transcends all distinctions. No longer is there an individual object which is perceived, or an individual who perceives it. The perception of the object itself is beyond categorization—it is “perceived as white and yet without an awareness of its whiteness.”25 For example, when my taste-buds come into contact with some tea, its taste is perceived directly, without any image, language or idea. Such knowledge is ultimately beyond language and self-awareness. The second cognitive function—intellection—consists of knowledge that is built on concepts, and which is constructed through an abstract process of comparison and classification on the basis of past experiences of direct perception. Following on from the above example, my previous experiences of drinking tea allow me to construct a concept of tea, in which, for example, it is different from wine.26 These two cognitive functions—direct perception and intellection—when working correctly, can apprehend reality as it is. Erroneous perceptions and intellections occur, but it is the aim of Buddhism to make us aware of the correct working of our cognitive functions, so we will not continue to be mistaken. The mind therefore has to purify itself of all misconceptions, and see reality as it is, without adding or eliminating anything. Correct knowledge should therefore be an apprehension of the true form of reality. Awakening does not change reality itself. Reality will remain the same, however it will be captured in a radically different way, without any errors. See Outline of Yogācāra, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 284–285. Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 153. 26 These examples are taken from Liang’s Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 397–398. 24 25

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The two modes of cognition—direct perception and intellection— are not valued equally. Direct perception is closer to raw experience and is therefore valued much more highly than intellection, which tends to build concepts that are remote from experience. Intellection also leads to conceptualization, which tends to reify our knowledge of reality and establish judgmental patterns. The mind-consciousness perceives objects which really exist, and these objects of consciousness belong to the “domain with substratum” (daizhijing 帶質境). Yet the mind-consciousness does not perceive objects as they really are, and misrepresents them. Cognition can thus lead one further astray, with the result that one will be cut off from the reality of the external world. Mind-consciousness then forms purely subjective ideas, without any underlying substratum. For example, in my mind I can form the idea of tea, even though I do not presently perceive it. Such objects of consciousness belong to the “domain of pure illusions” (duyingjing 獨影境) and should be rejected, as they only create more attachments. On the other hand, the direct perception of a single object, at a single moment, and through a single sense organ, allows for a valid cognition of it in its individuality (svalak a a, zixiang 自相), instead of as a misconstrued generality (sāmānya, gongxiang 共相). Unlike objects of the consciousness, which are apprehended on the basis of intellection and which belong to the “domain with substratum” and the “domain of pure illusions,” the objects of consciousness apprehended by direct perception belong to the “domain of essence” (xingjing 性境). Therefore, objective reality can be apprehended through direct perception, which reduces objects into discrete elements, and which leads to a transcendent experience that is beyond concepts, language and self-awareness. Ultimately, no one exists to be aware of experiences at all, and there is no distinction between external reality and the mind. Discrete objects would no longer be experienced. One would instead perceive a transcendent reality which encompasses everything. Liang Shuming saw the Yogācāra method as sound because it began, like Western epistemology, from the concrete experience of the outside world—the world which is apprehended through the senses. Sensory experiences were the only basis for human knowledge.27 In this sense, Liang explained that the modern discourse of science made Yogācāra epistemology understandable. Only after the theory of evolution had

27

See Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 410.

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produced and influenced modern sciences such as biology, psychology, and so on, could a pragmatic philosophy and epistemology be possible.28 In other words, Yogācāra epistemology came too early in India and China. Because they lacked a scientific culture, Yogācāra could not complete its development. Liang believed that, in the scientific age, Yogācāra would become the basis for modern philosophy. This method would be fully accepted, since it was free of dogmatic beliefs. Yogācāra epistemology thoroughly deconstructs the different levels of cognition, or as Liang said, “the bottle, its whiteness, the meaning of whiteness—all these three levels are denied one after the other.”29 Yet, only reason is used in this process of negation. Sensory experience of the world therefore provided a sound basis for epistemology, leading to the “integral experience” of transcendent reality. Liang’s Modified Yogācāra: Intuition as the Third Mode of Cognition As we have seen above, there are two modes of cognition in Yogācāra epistemology: biliang and xianliang. In Outline of Indian Philosophy and Outline of Yogācāra, Liang faithfully presented Dignāga’s doctrines in the standard way. However, in Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, Liang stated that he was not entirely satisfied with this doctrine on two grounds. One was theoretical, and the other was moral. On the theoretical level, Liang argued that since direct perceptions were discrete and encapsulated in distinct moments of consciousness, they had no duration and therefore could not be used in processes of intellection to construct concepts by comparing them over longer periods of time. He explained this with an example, stating that, If through the first experience of darkness one obtains nothing, one will obtain nothing in other successive experiences. How can intellection perform its analytic and synthetic functions in this process?30

On the moral level, direct perception and intellection ideally functioned in a purely corrective and somewhat passive mode. The mind strove to correct its cognitive errors, but it should add nothing to reality. Mental functions were therefore reduced to cognitive and mechanical

28 29 30

See Outline of Yogācāra, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 279–280. Outline of Yogācāra, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 286. Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 399.

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processes, cut from the moral realm of meaning and value so important in the Confucian tradition. Therefore, besides direct perception, which allowed for the correct experiences of discrete sensations (xianliang), and intellection, which formed conceptual thoughts (biliang), Liang saw the necessity of including intuition (zhijue 直覺) as another valid mode of cognition. For Liang, this third cognition was associated with the two mental functions of feeling and discerning. He asserted that, Between direct perception and intellection, we should insert the two mental functions (xinsuo 心所) of feeling (shou 受 [vedanā]) and discerning (xiang 想 [samjñā]), which are attached to perception and rule over consciousness.31

In the Yogācāra theory, these two mental functions belong to a list of five. These are called universal, or omnipresent, because like the eight consciousnesses, they are always active in the mind. The five mental functions are: attention, contact, feeling, discernment and volition.32 To the special cognition of intuition, Liang assigned the mental functions of feeling and discerning. “Feeling” referred to the fact that perception was not only limited to one moment, but could be experienced as a continuum. “Discerning” referred to the possibility of making moral and aesthetic judgments, which were expressive of the deepest human motivations. Liang provided the example of a sound. A sound is an objective reality which can be known through direct perception, and can also be conceptualized by the intellect. However, intuition could also understand a sound as being something harmonious. While direct perception added nothing to reality, and intellection added something essentially negative, intuition added something positive: the moral meaning the subject brought to objective reality. This meaning was pre-conceptual, and was the basis for the intellection’s conceptual constructions. This cognition was not entirely objective, like direct perception, nor was it entirely subjective, like intellection. Instead, it was both objective and subjective. It was objective because it referred to an existent reality

31 Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 399. These two mental functions should not be confused with the two aggregates, or skandhas, part of the five aggregates (wuyun 五蘊): form, feeling, perception, mental constituents, and consciousness. 32 Kogen Mizuno, Essentials of Buddhism (Tokyo: Kosei Publishing, 1996), 100–101.

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and belonged to the “domain with an underlying substratum,” unlike pure intellection (since there was a real sound to be heard and not an illusion of sound). Yet, intuition was also subjective because it led to an aesthetic or moral judgment, as in the statement “this is a harmonious sound.”33 Liang Shuming was acutely aware that he was changing Yogācāra doctrine. Taixu criticized him harshly for departing from the “orthodox” teachings, stating that his “explanation of the two mental functions of feeling and discerning was a complete mistake.”34 As I see it, Liang’s theoretical justification was quite weak. He argued that the two cognitions in standard Yogācāra theory, direct perception and intellection, could not explain the continuum of experience. Yet, in Yogācāra theory, it is the eighth consciousness, the storehouse consciousness, which registers the seeds produced by the perceptions occurring in the sixth consciousness (or mind-consciousness), and which explains the continuity of the stream of consciousness. The crux of Liang’s argument for introducing intuition as a third mode of cognition lies elsewhere. Liang held that there should be a special cognition, not entirely passive like direct perception, nor essentially flawed like intellection. Though Yogācāra’s epistemology explained the functioning of the mind, it ultimately regarded the mind as a problem and an obstacle to be overcome. By deconstructing mental operations we succeed in neutralizing them and not allowing them to work, thereby liberating ourselves from them. While Liang would continue to uphold these aims, he also sought to accommodate within the scope of these mental operations a space for moral and aesthetic judgments, which could have positive meanings. Here, we touch upon a long-standing tension which has existed between Buddhism and Chinese culture, especially Confucianism. Buddhism has always been suspected of not sufficiently affirming the value of one’s present life by considering it illusory. While Liang remained fundamentally a Buddhist, he believed that traditional Buddhist teachings did not give enough weight to the positive appreciation of human life. He therefore attempted to establish a Confucian morality that

Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 400. Taixu 太虛, Renshengguan de kexue 人生觀的科學 [Science of Human View], in Taixudashi quanshu 太虛大師全書 (Tapei: Taixudashi quanshu chuban weiyuanhui 太虛大 師全書出版委員會, 1959), Vol. 46, 57; original edition: (Shanghai: Taidong Tushuju 泰東圖書局, 1929). 33 34

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would value the present, while preparing for the Buddhist liberation of tomorrow. Morality played an important role in traditional Buddhist teachings. However, it was essentially a negative morality, concerned with avoiding attachments to the self and to others. Buddhism did not allow any room for moral judgments in the cognitive act, since they were additions to reality and were therefore errors (wang 妄). Liang did not regard his third mode of cognition, intuition, to be a “mistaken cognition” (apramāna, feiliang 非量), due to the negative connotations of the term.35 For Liang, even if the aim of life was to finally experience ultimate liberation, it would be wrong to live with the sole intention of ridding ourselves of our mistaken cognitions, and avoiding the attachments created by them. Life itself should be invested with a positive meaning. An “attachment” to some moral values, to some good people, or to life itself, was therefore legitimate. In my view, it was precisely because Liang understood Buddhism as a religion advocating renunciation and the transcendence of mundane reality, that he had difficulty finding a positive valuation of the world in it. Liang understood Buddhist transcendence in a radical way. Yet he also had to locate a temporary morality for the present world. He found this outside of Buddhism, that is, in Confucianism. For Liang, intuition belonged to the realm of true morality. As in Confucianism, intuition was comprised of moral intentions ( yi 意) which gave “meaning” ( yiwei 意味) to the world. From around 1937, Liang began to develop this concept of intuition as a special mode of cognition. However, he dropped the term “intuition” and decided to instead call it lixing (理性), a term which can be best translated as “moral reason.”36 This change of terminology, from intuition to moral reason, is demonstrative of Liang’s switch from epistemological problems to ethical issues, and his application of Buddhist epistemology to Confucian ethics. As we shall see later, Liang applied the theory of the three natures of cognition to the three stages of culture. He would state that Confucian intuition was perfectly able to solve the problem of the first cognitive hindrance, which was created by the discriminating

Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 401. See An Yanming, “Liang Shuming and Henri Bergson on Intuition: Cultural Context and the Evolution of Terms,” Philosophy East & West 47 (1997): 337–362; see also John Hanafin, The “Last Buddhist,” in New Confucianism, edited by John Makeham (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 202. 35 36

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mind. However, throughout his life, Liang would maintain the view that only Buddhism could sever the final attachments to the self and to the world, allowing the attainment of perfect cognition and thereby realizing total freedom. Dualistic Epistemology Liang correctly understood that Yogācāra was not a pure epistemology. It was at the service of the Buddhist soteriological project of cutting off wrongs views and attachments in order to attain complete freedom. Moreover, following Chinese Buddhism, Liang interpreted this radical freedom in terms of an ontological metaphysics. For Liang, this metaphysics was not an addition from the outside, and instead flowed from epistemological enquiry. Liang was adamant that, unlike Western or other metaphysics, Yogācāra did not introduce any undue presuppositions, such as the idea of the cosmos ( yuzhou 宇宙), but that its metaphysical notion of the cosmos was drawn entirely from its rational analysis of cognition. For Liang, Yogācāra was a valid path which allowed one to know “the essence of the cosmos” ( yuzhou benti 宇宙本體). In this sense, Buddhist metaphysics was perfectly acceptable. As we have seen, besides intellection and direct perception, Liang recognized another mode of cognition: intuition. In Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, he associated intellection with the West, direct perception with India (specifically to Buddhism), and intuition with China (Confucianism). Liang attempted to show that Buddhist direct perception and Confucian intuition shared the common aim of perceiving reality without any attachments. Confucian intuition had taken the first step by showing how reality could be perceived without being soiled by the idea of the self. It added a moral and aesthetic meaning to reality, but without any egocentric attachments. In the second step, which Buddhism had realized, the true essence of reality was perceived without any such additions. Therefore, for Liang, Confucianism and Buddhism formed a continuum. Liang regarded Confucian intuition as the “first step in direct perception” (touyibu xianliang 頭一步現量), while Buddhist direct perception was the “next step in direct perception” (ciyibu xianliang 次一步現量).37

37

Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 410–411.

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Liang’s emphasis on Buddhism as a religion of transcending the mundane world (chushi 出世) led him to distinguish between two levels of “direct perception.” They were directed toward two different realms. Confucian intuition was directed toward the moral world, while Buddhist direct perception was directed toward transcendent reality. At the first level—Confucian intuition—reality was perceived without the creation of any misconceptions or attachments. Instead of perceiving the reality of this or that object, things were perceived as a whole which encompassed everything that exists. At the second level, even the view that there is a world disappears. As Liang said, at this level: The mountains, the rivers and the earth have all disappeared from in front of the eyes. Nothing is seen, and then the ontological reality (benti 本體) appears. As the Yogacarins say, fundamental wisdom (mūla-jñāna genbenzhi 根本智) enables one to witnesses suchness (zhenru 真如).38

Here, Liang made an implicit reference to some passages of the Chengweishilun where Xuanzang mention the concept of suchness. Liang believed that Yogācāra offered a metaphysics which enabled one to know the “ultimate ontological reality.”39 He held that the higher level of cognition was therefore this “second step in direct perception,” which was also called “extraordinary direct perception” (teshu xianliang 特殊現量),40 or “Buddhahood direct perception,” and which is considered specific to Buddhist teachings. The Replacement of “Subsequently Attained Wisdom” with Confucian Intuition In the Chengweishilun, Xuanzang distinguished between two kinds of wisdom. One was a fundamental wisdom (mūlajñāna, genbenzhi 根本智), which was used to understand the true nature of reality. Once this wisdom had been acquired, bodhisattvas gave rise to another wisdom used to liberate other sentient beings called the subsequently attained wisdom ( prstha-labdha-jñāna, houdezhi 後得智). This wisdom was discriminating, but did not create incorrect ideas about the self or

38 39 40

Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 411. Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 412. Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 398.

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external reality.41 Through this wisdom, the bodhisattvas were able to use conventional knowledge to help other sentient beings in concrete ways. But they did not create attachments to this knowledge, since they know it is only intermediary, unlike fundamental wisdom. Liang fully accepted the attainment of “fundamental wisdom” to be the ultimate aim. However, he did not support the idea of a “subsequently obtained wisdom,” and did not believe this wisdom took human affairs seriously. Indeed, from the point of view of fundamental wisdom, both our conventional knowledge and the world itself lack substance and are illusory. Though bodhisattvas may indeed help sentient beings attain final liberation, they are not really interested in making this world a better place. “Subsequently obtained wisdom” is legitimate only because it aims at final liberation. Yet it fails to give one’s present life, and this present world, any positive meaning. Buddhism is founded on the premise that the world is an illusion. Faced with this false world, knowing or perceiving it is not, as far as human beings are concerned, very meaningful. The aforementioned problems could thus be eliminated. Liang rejected Buddhism as a practical path for the world for several reasons. First, in the world’s evolution through the three stages, Liang assigned Buddhism the role of religious transcendence, and Confucianism the role of dealing with the conventional world. Liang replaced the Buddhist subsequently obtained wisdom with Confucian intuition, which, he believed, was better suited to an active engagement with the world. Also, subsequently obtained wisdom was reserved for bodhisattvas, and Liang therefore considered it very difficult to obtain.42 On the contrary, Confucian intuition was accessible to everyone, and did not require enlightenment as a precondition. Another explanation for Liang’s rejection of the subsequently obtained wisdom can be found in his understanding of religion. Liang’s radical religious quest led him to establish a realm of absolute transcendence, thus creating a strong dualism between the other-worldly reality and the present world. For Liang, Buddhism represented a radical method for destroying the

41 In Outline of Indian Philosophy, the subsequently obtained wisdom is associated with the notion of worldly direct perception (shijian xianliang 世間現量). See Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 163–164. Indeed, Liang’s concept of intuition is identical to worldly direct perception, with the difference that intuition provides a positive meaning to the present existence and the present world as it is. 42 Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 163.

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attachments and wrong ideas of the present world. It was a pure via negativa, directed toward a transcendent ontology. Therefore, in order to fill the gap that Liang had himself created between this world and the other-world, he needed to find a concrete bridge to relate the two. He found it in Confucianism. For Liang, Buddhism and Confucianism complemented one another. Through Buddhism, the ultimate and ontological reality could be known, but only Confucianism could provide one’s present existence, and the present world, any positive meaning. Liang’s vision was deeply rooted in his own personal experience. He personally sought after an other-worldly reality. However, he saw the suffering of his time and attempted to find a concrete way to alleviate it. He actively engaged in social and cultural reforms; these stemmed not only from his Buddhist compassion, but from his belief that he could give the world a positive meaning by doing so. Liang thus established Confucian morality as a link in his fundamentally Buddhist vision. In conclusion, we can summarize Liang’s project in the following way. He attempted to find a pure form of Buddhism that could encapsulate the essence of the doctrinal teachings, but which was cleansed of all dogmatism and superstition. Yogācāra was the intellectual tool he needed. There was probably a kind of naïveté in his assumption that he could find a pure epistemology, free from any metaphysical suppositions. His method also seems to have been sullied by its own kind of dogmatism, since he postulated metaphysical realities and then found an epistemology to prove them. Nonetheless, Liang’s use of Yogācāra to build a Buddhist metaphysics is exemplary for its creativity and originality. His attempt to accommodate Confucianism within his overall Buddhist project was unique, even if it was understood by only a few.

CHAPTER SIX

BUDDHIST ONTOLOGY As shown in the previous chapter, Liang adopted Yogācāra as a response to the challenge from the West about what true knowedge and true reality are. Yet his metaphysical quest did not make him discard moral issues and he felt compelled to modify, on purpose, the Yogācāra teaching, so that it could give a positive meaning to human life and to the world. However, the Yogācāra with which Liang was thinking was, in fact, the result of a lengthy process by which Indian Buddhism had been transformed into Chinese Yogācāra. In other words, we have to take into account, not only the conscious changes that Liang made about Yogācāra, but also some changes that were introduced much before him and about which he was largely unaware. Indeed, Liang based his interpretation of the Dharma and the Yogācāra School for most part on Chinese Buddhism. Though he had done research on Indian Buddhism while teaching at Peking University, his understanding of Indian Buddhist history was limited. He could rely only on traditional Buddhist literature in Chinese, and on modern Japanese and English literature, which was quite scarce at that time. One of the main differences between Indian Buddhism and Chinese Buddhism is related to the question of ontology. It is only in the nineteen-twenties that the question of Buddhist ontology became very controversial in China, as it still is today. But, for Liang, his understanding of Buddhism had already been shaped and he could not discard it. We shall therefore first examine the doctrinal debates surrounding the interpretation of the Awakening of Faith. Then, on the question of ontology, we shall examine the position of Indian Yogācāra and its subsequent development in China until modern times. This will allow us to further examine Liang’s understanding of Buddhist ontology, and finally to evaluate it. The Doctrinal Debate on the Awakening of Faith The debate about the orthodoxy of the Awakening started very early in Japan. In 1906, Issai Funabashi 舟橋水哉 (1874–1945) first developed the hypothesis that it was written in China. In 1919, Mochizuki

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Shinko 望月信亨 (1869–1948) wrote an article in which he asserted that it was a Chinese product. In 1922, Liang Qichao wrote an article in Eastern Miscellanies in which he conceded that the Awakening did not belong to Indian Buddhism, but instead of seeing this as a problem, he boosted, as a nationalistic reaction, that Chinese people should take pride in having created, by themselves, such a profound text.1 From 1922 onward, Ouyang Jingwu offered classes on Yogācāra texts at the Chinese Institute of Inner Learning. His textual research on the newly rediscovered Yogācāra classics uncovered the original teachings of Indian Yogācāra. At the same time, this shed new light on the important texts of the Chinese Tripitaka, such as the Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna. This text is traditionally considered an important śāstra in Chinese Buddhism, especially for the Huayan and Chan Schools. It was believed to have been written in Sanskrit by Aśvaghosa 馬鳴 (c. 80–c. 150) and translated into Chinese in 550 A.D. by Paramārtha 真諦 (499–569), a famous Indian translator of Buddhist texts.2 However, the original Sanskrit text has never been found. And so, Ouyang Jingwu’s lectures shocked the Chinese Buddhist world.3 Ouyang Jingwu held that the Awakening should be rejected because its doctrinal content departed from orthodox Buddhism. Though the Awakening inherited categories from Yogācāra, it departed from it by constructing a fundamental ontology and by introducing concepts which were not found in earlier texts. Ouyang recognized that the concept of suchness, or zhenru, appeared occasionally in texts such as the Chengweishilun, but in those places it should be understood as a perfect cognitive state, underlying the mind’s constant and ever

1 In 1924, Liang Qichao published Dasheng qixinlun kaozheng 大乘起信論考證 [Textual Critique on the Awakening] (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1924). 2 See Yoshito S. Hakeda, in the “Introduction” of The Awakening of Faith, translated with commentary by Yoshito S. Hakeda (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 1. Paramārtha 眞諦 came to Guangzhou by sea route in 546. In response to the request of the emperor Wu of Liang 梁武帝 (r. 502–549), he undertook the translation of Buddhist texts. Among the 64 works in the 278 fascicles that he translated, were such influential scriptural texts as the Suvarna-prabhāsa-(uttama)-sūtra 金光明經, the Mahāyāna-samgraha 攝大乘論 and the Madhyānta-vibhāga 中邊分別論. About the life Paramārtha, see Diana Paul, Philosophy of Mind in Sixth Century China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), 11–37. 3 The lectures were published later on: Ouyang Jingwu 歐陽竟無, “Weishi jueze tan 唯識抉擇談 [Decisive Talks on the Consciousness-Only School],” (Nanjing: Chinese Institute of Inner Learning 支那內學院, 1928).

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changing flow of cognitions.4 Therefore, suchness should no longer be referred to as consciousness or mind. Ouyang pointed out that the concept of suchness came to be used in a completely different way in the Awakening, and no longer meant a cognitive state, but an ontological reality. Suchness came to be understood as the fundamental mind—completely tranquil, with nothing arising or ceasing. Chinese Buddhism departed from Indian Yogācāra, precisely in seeing ultimate reality as an absolute mind. Indeed, the Awakening states this very clearly: The Mind in terms of the Absolute is the one World of Reality and the essence of all phases of existence in their totality. That which is called ‘the essential nature of the Mind’ is unborn and is imperishable. If one is freed from illusions, then to him there will be no appearances of objects; therefore all things from the beginning transcend all forms of verbalization, description, and conceptualization and are, in the final analysis, undifferentiated, free from alteration, and indestructible. They are only of the One Mind; hence the name suchness.5

In other words, the text postulates that, behind the cognitions of the mind, suchness is an eternal and tranquil substance—the origin and producer of all dharmas. The idea of this eternal and tranquil substance has been understood by the Chinese tradition as the core message of Buddhism. For example, in a recent manual on Buddhism, Fang Litian 方立天, an eminent professor at People’s University in Beijing, could sum up the meaning of suchness in the Awakening as follows: Suchness in the Awakening is a substance embracing all the virtues of Buddhism; it is the highest realm. Suchness is the quintessence of Buddhist morality and wisdom, the origin and ontological foundation of the cosmos. Suchness is not God, not the creator, not the absolute spirit in the Hegelian sense, but the spiritual essence shared by all sentient beings, uniting morality and wisdom. It is a special and mysterious essence.6

4 Xuanzang mentioned the notion of suchness some one hundred times in the Chengweishilun. For example, Chengweishilun, T31.1585–0045c14. 5 The Awakening of Faith, translated by Yoshito S. Hakeda, 38. 6 Fang Litian 方立天, Fojiao zhexue 佛教哲學 [Buddhist Philosophy] (Beijing: Zhongguo renmindaxue chubanshe 中國人民大學出版社, 1991), 243.

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Unlike Fang Litian, Ouyang Jingwu had considered this innovation, and others in the Awakening, to be “erroneous” (miu 謬).7 Taking the original doctrines of Yogācāra as the standard, Ouyang considered the Awakening and the whole of Chinese Buddhism to be unorthodox and even non-Buddhist. He rejected the Awakening purely on doctrinal grounds. He was aware of the debates concerning the text’s authorship. However, this question was not important for him and he continued to maintain that the Awakening was originally a text written in Sanskrit by Aśvaghosa. Based on textual criticisms, two disciples of Ouyang, Lü Cheng and Wang Enyang 王恩洋 (1897–1964), would radicalize the stance of their master. They held that the Awakening was not written by Aśvaghosa as stated, but that it was a much later production, and concluded that the text was a forgery.8 In 1922, the same year that Ouyang launched his attack on the Awakening, Taixu wrote a short response entitled “A discussion on choosing from among the entirety of the Buddhadharma” (Fofa zongjueze tan 佛法總抉擇談).9 Like Ouyang Jingwu and Liang Shuming, Taixu held that only Yogācāra could save Buddhism. However, he believed practitioners should not follow the Yogācāra School exclusively, and as the title of his article suggests, should instead have a broader approach. Taixu argued that it was inappropriate to judge the Awakening only from the point of view of one school—Yogācāra—and that it should

7 Besides rejecting the wrong understanding of suchness, Ouyang criticized also the wrong understanding of the function of perfuming. See Li Guangliang 李廣良, Xinshi de liliang 心識的力量 [The Power of Consciousness] (Shanghai: Huandong shifan daxue chubanshe 華東師範大學出版社), 115. 8 See Lü Cheng 呂瀓, “Dasheng qixinlun kaozheng 大乘起信論考證 [Textual research on the Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna],” in Lü Cheng foxue lunzhu xuanji 呂瀓 佛學論著選集 ( Ji’nan: Qilu shushe 齊魯書社, 1991), vol. 1. See also Li Guangliang, Xinshi de liliang, 114. Today many scholars believe that a preliminary Indian work may have existed, composed by an Indian or Central Asian Buddhist, which was used by the author(s) of the Awakening in creating a text particularly appealing to Buddhist thinkers in China in the sixth-century. See Ryuichi Abé, in the “Introduction to the Reprint Edition” of The Awakening of Faith, translated with commentary by Yoshito S. Hakeda (Columbia University Press, 2006), 25. Later on, Lü Cheng made a thourough critique of the notion of “original illumination” (benjue 本覺) in Chinese Buddhism, especially the idea, wrong for him, of a mind “originally enlightened” (xingjue 性覺). See Lü Cheng, “Shilun zhongguo foxue youguan xin xing de jiben sixiang 試論中 國佛學有關心性的基本思想 [Considerations on Mind and Nature in Chinese Buddhism],” in Guangming ribao, June 6, 1962. 9 The short answer by Taixu was published in 1938: Faxiang weishixue 法相唯 識學 (Shangwu yinshuguan, 1938); for a more recent reprint: Faxiang weishixue (Shangwu yinshuguan, 2004), 385–392.

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be evaluated against the entire Buddhist tradition. Based on this perspective, Taixu held that the Chengweishilun and the Awakening of Faith belonged to two different Buddhist schools, and that these were not fundamentally incompatible but rather complementary. Liang’s Stance on the Debate Liang could not ignore the debate between Ouyang Jingwu and Taixu. Like many of his contemporaries, Liang had believed the Chinese tradition which attributed many texts to Indian authors. He finally acknowledged the conclusion of the scholars about the dubious origins of texts he had previously treated as Indian. In 1923, in the preface to the third edition of Outline of Indian Philosophy, he accepted the conclusions of the Japanese scholars and of Ouyang that both the Lengyan jing and the Awakening of Faith were dubious texts.10 As we have seen in the previous chapter, Liang had made an extensive use of the Lenyan jing as representative of Indian philosophy. Same as for the Awakening, no Sanskrit version of the Lengyan jing has ever been found, because the text was most probably first written in Chinese, being considered today not as representative of Indian Yogācāra, but of Chinese Buddhism.11 Of course, this was quite a painful recognition for Liang at that time since he had made such a use of the Lenyan jing, believing that it was an Indian text, but he had now to recognize his mistake. Although Liang accepted these conclusions concerning the authorship and dating of the sūtras, he remained silent on the orthodoxy of the thought contained in them. He had read all the Yogācāra texts with the presupposition of suchness as the ontological basis for the whole system. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Liang felt that he had with him the authority of Xuanzang himself who made mention of the concept of suchness. Ouyang Jingwu was then showing that the term had a different meaning than thought. It was impossible to deduce from its use in the Chengweishilun that Xuanzang had in mind the construction of a Buddhist ontology as found later in the 10 Outline of Indian Philosophy, preface, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 28. Yet, Liang was not completely unaware of the doubts about the origin of the Lenyan jing, but this did not prevent him from still including this text within the framework of Indian philosophy. Liang expressed that, despite the doubts abouth this text, he was still fond of it. See Outline of Indian Philosophy, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 196. 11 See Mizuno, Essentials of Buddhism, 45.

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Awakening. Therefore, the validity of Liang’s ontological interpretation of the Chengweishilun was debatable. Since Liang’s understanding of Buddhism was based on the Chinese Buddha-nature tradition, it would have been very difficult for him to renounce it. In this sense, Liang silently sided with the traditional Chinese interpretation, defended so vehemently by Taixu, a tradition which affirmed the legitimacy of the fundamental Buddhist ontology and metaphysics. Liang had previously considered Yogācāra’s theory of knowledge to be the philosophical basis on which a new metaphysics could be built.12 Unlike Ouyang Jingwu and some Japanese scholars, Liang was not ready to alter his metaphysical understanding of Buddhism, since his philosophical thought rested upon it. Therefore, he maintained his ontological understanding of the Buddhist concept of suchness. Another factor may help explain why Liang continued to hold onto Chinese Buddhism. The controversy which existed between Chinese Buddhism and Indian Buddhism, and between metaphysics and antimetaphysics, developed mostly in the nineteen-twenties and thirties. At that time, Liang had already shaped his understanding of Buddhism. He was not so interested in the academic debates on Buddhist history, and he clearly recognized his lack of expertise in this field. Liang went to Buddhism not for its own sake, but for a tool with which to solve existential questions. Also, when the debate erupted between Ouyang Jingwu and Taixu, Liang’s interest had already shifted to rural reconstruction. It was therefore difficult for him to participate in the intellectual and academic discussions on Buddhism at that time. However, we may suppose that if Ouyang’s thesis on the incompatibility between Yogācāra epistemology and metaphysics had appeared ten years earlier, it would have seriously undermined Liang’s project to establish an ontological metaphysics on the former’s basis. The Non-Ontological Approach of Indian Buddhism and Yogācāra Before examining Liang’s Buddhist ontology further, we shall first discuss the question of ontology in Indian and Chinese Buddhism. Although Chinese Buddhism evolved from Indian Buddhism, in the

12

See Outline of Yogācāra, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 271.

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process of acculturation, all the Chinese schools shifted toward ontology. For example, in India, the Middle Way School (Mādhyamika, Zhongguanzong 中觀宗), as expounded by Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250), rejected the two extreme views of eternalism and nihilism. However, the two schools of Chinese Buddhism which developed from the Indian Middle Way School, the Tiantai 天臺 and the Three Treatises School (Sanlunzong 三論宗), both added new layers of interpretation. Tiantai came to introduce concepts such as the Middle Way Buddha Nature (zhongdao foxing 中道佛性) and the One Mind ( yixin 一心). While in Indian Buddhism there was a tension between existence and nonexistence, Tiantai solved this by creating an onto-metaphysical synthesis based on the One Mind. Similarly, the Three Treatises School considered the Middle Way to represent true reality (shixiang 實相).13 An examination of the classic Yogācāra texts for themselves reveals that Indian Yogācāra had developed a transcendent approach without ontology. It was transcendent because although the entire thinking process was analyzed in great detail, it was ultimately to be discarded, thereby opening into an extra-conceptual experience beyond the notions of self and the world. Even though nothing existed outside the consciousness, Yogācāra did not claim the world was created by the mind. Rather, it maintained that we mistakenly identify our projective interpretations with the real world. Correct cognition required a removal of the obstacles preventing us from seeing the true manner of dependent, causal conditions. These conditions are cognitive, not metaphysical. This approach was the most widespread in Indian Buddhism, even though ontological claims about an ultimate being could still be found here and there. Also, in China, Xuanzang’s interpretation of Yogācāra attempted to avoid ontologization and stay at the pragmatic level of a radical critique of cognitive conception. Therefore, Indian Yogācāra and the orthodox interpretation by Xuanzang in China avoided any transcendence that would hypostatize reality into an ultimate reality of the cosmos. They consciously avoided movement towards a substantial ontology. Their radical transcendence was only a movement outwards, an action of leaving behind, or of reaching beyond.

13 See Ran Yunhua 冉雲華, Cong yindu fojiao dao zhongguo fojiao 從印度佛教到中國 佛教 [From Indian Buddhism to Chinese Buddhism] (Taipei: Dongda Faxing, 1995), 9–11.

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The previous chapter presented the theory of the three natures of cognition. These natures should not be understood as ontological substances, but as psychological functions, or as three different levels of consciousness. Each involves the subject-object duality. Even the notion of perfected nature is not an absolute category, and makes sense only in the context of the dependent nature. The nature of cognition becomes perfect because it is liberated from other-dependent nature. Therefore, the perfected nature is not different from the dependent nature, yet neither is it the same. They are two sides of the same coin; the dependent-nature is infatuated with the subject-object misconception, while the perfected nature is eternally and absolutely free from it.14 Xuanzang made clear that the three natures were not separate from the mind. Even the perfected nature was not something outside of or above the mind, but rather the mind purified from all forms of imagination and discrimination.15 While developing the theory of the three natures, the Yogācāra School realized the danger of misconstruing the three natures of cognition as metaphysical entities. There was a distinct danger of turning the perfected nature of cognition into an ontological foundation. This would run against Yogācāra’s fundamental aim, which was to analyze consciousness in order to deconstruct it. Yogācāra was fundamentally opposed to establishing a transcendent and ontological Mind. In order to avoid such a misconception, Yogācāra developed the theory of the three non-natures at a very early stage.16 In contrast to the three natures, these three non-natures were established on the basis of teachings concerning emptiness. Non-nature meant that even though all things could be categorized as one of the three forms of existence, as described above, each of the three were in fact without nature. The first non-nature was the naturelessness of characteristics (xiangwuxing 相無性). This signified that phenomena only had an imaginary existence. The characteristics and definitions assigned to experience were ultimately illusory, without defining characteristics of their own. The second non-nature was the naturelessness of self-existence (shengwuxing 生無性). This referred to the dependent nature of phenomena, which lacked the power of self-origin or self-birth. Although things appeared See verse 22 of Vasubandhu, Chengweishilun, translated by Cook, 281 Chengweishilun, translated by Cook, 286–287. 16 The concepts of the three-natures and three non-natures are explained in the Discourse on the Stages of Concentration Practice. 14 15

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to exist, they were dependent on causes and conditions, and their existence was therefore provisional. The third non-nature was the naturelessness of ultimate reality (shengyiwuxing 勝義無性). This referred to the perfected nature, which is, by definition, already devoid of any misconceptions.17 The three non-natures were therefore an attempt to bracket any ontologization. In other words, Yogācāra worked on two different levels. On the first level, it claimed that we cannot know external objects as such; we only know that which appears in our consciousness. We therefore experience only consciousness since nothing exists outside of it. The mind encloses the human horizon. At the second level, Yogācāra claimed that consciousness itself could be overcome. Consciousness is not the ultimate reality but the root problem. Yogācāra described at length the structure of consciousness with the intention of overturning it. This overturning transformed the basic mode of cognition from “consciousness” (shi 識) into “direct knowing” (zhi 智). This direct knowing was defined as non-conceptual, or devoid of interpretive overlay. This affirmative moment set up a mode of experience beyond cognition and consciousness. What then, is the ultimate truth of Yogācāra theory? Only that subject-object designations are merely representations of our consciousness and that those representations do not belong at all to the perfected nature. This truth can be understood as transcendent, but only in the paradoxical sense of the “ultimate referent.” The ultimate referent is beyond any referentiality—it is beyond linguistic expression. Accessing the ultimate truth requires us to break free from our experiences and language, rather than grasp onto an “outside” reality. There is no other shore. Ontologization of Yogācāra in Chinese Buddhism However, Chinese Buddhism went in a different direction and regarded the perfected nature as the ultimate, substantial, transcendent reality, divorced from experience itself. There were already seeds of this idea in India. For example, in the sixth century A.D., the Indian monk Paramārtha is credited with having introduced the idea of an

17

See Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, Three Non-Natures.

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additional consciousness. He stated that the eighth consciousness, the alaya-vijñāna, was defiled and must be eliminated in order to reveal the pure, eternal and resplendent ninth consciousness (amala-vijñāna, amoluoshi 阿摩羅識). This ninth consciousness was only accessible to enlightened beings.18 Concerning the theory of the three-natures, Paramārtha did not concede that the perfected nature was without nature, but instead claimed that it “neither has nor does not have a nature.”19 The idea of a ninth consciousness was also associated with the tathāgatagarbha, or “womb of the tathāgata” (rulaicang 如來藏), which was already marginally present in Indian texts such as the Tathāgatagarbha sūtra (Dafangguang rulaizangjing 大方廣如來藏經),20 the Śrīmālā sūtra (Shengman jing 勝鬘經),21 and the Mahā-parinirvāna sūtra (Daban niepan jing 大般涅槃經),22 the Ratnagotravibhāga-mahāyānanottaratantra ( Jiujing yisheng baoxing lun 究竟一乘寶性論), the Madhyānta-vibhāga (Bian zhongbian lun 辨中邊論), the Mahāyānasūtra-alamkāra (Dasheng zhuangyanjing lun 大乘 莊嚴經論) and the Buddhahood śāstra (Foxing lun 佛性論). Recently, a young Chinese scholar, Zhou Guihua 周貴華, has attempted to show, in his work Yogācāra and Perception (Weixin yu liaobie 唯心與了別), that Indian Yogācāra was not as monolythic as Ouyang Jingwu had claimed.23 Zhou Guihua contends that it existed two branches, the major branch based on the Discourse on the Stages of Concentration Practice, and a minor branch, with the texts mentioned just above and containing ontological thought. Even if the major branch developed first, Zhou maintains that the minor branch was almost as ancient and was considered as orthodox for sometime within Indian Yogācāra. However, because the main current saw a danger of “brahmanization” ( fanhua 梵化) in it, with a proclivity towards the atman

18 For a discussion on the textual evidences about the ninth consciousness, see Diana Paul, Philosophy of Mind in Sixth Century China, 139–140. 19 Dan Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenomenology (NY: Routledge Curzon, 2002), 340. In fact, it was in part for rejecting these theories that Xuanzang wrote the Chengweishilun. 20 Trans. Bukong 不空; T 667.16.460b–468a. 21 T 353.12.217a–223b. 22 There are two Chinese versions, the northern in 40 juan, translated by Dharmaksema 曇無讖 (T 374.12.365c–603c), and the southern, a revision of the northern version in 36 juan, translated by Huiyan 慧嚴. 23 Zhou Guihua, Weixin yu liaobie 唯心與了別 (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 北京中國社會科學出版社, 2004). This book was also published the same year in Taiwan (Taiwan Foguangshan wenjiao jijinhui 臺灣佛光山文教基金會, 2004).

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of Hinduism, this ontological thought came under suspiscion and maintained itself only at the margins, without completely dying out. Therefore, Zhou Guihua criticizes Xuanzang for having given in his Chengweishilun a partial view of Indian Yogācāra, and deliberately dismissing the ontological current. According to Zhou, this current never disappeared in India and reappeared, later on, in China with texts like the Lankāvatāra 楞伽經 and the Miyan 密嚴經. Finally, the Awakening and the Record of the Mirror of Orthodoxy (Zongjing lu 宗鏡錄) would mark the theoretical formulation of mature thought. In his second book, Yogācāra, Nature of the Mind and Tathāgatagarbha (Weishi, xinxing yu rulaizang 唯識、心性與如來藏), Zhou restates the traditional stance of Chinese Buddhism, somewhat similar to that espoused by Fang Litian above, that the notion of tathāgatagarbha represents in summary form the whole of Buddhism.24 Indeed, the history of the transmission and transformation of Indian Yogācāra in China is very complex. Much scholarly progress has been made since the time of Ouyang Jingwu. It is important to accept the principle of a genetic development of the teaching. In this regard, the conclusions of scholars like Fang Litian or Zhou Guihua do not seem to respect this historical development, projecting on early Yogācāra and Buddhism in general some normative ideas which came to be developed much later. It is as if a Thomist would argue that the notion of God as a self-subsistent essence, perfect in itself, could be found as such in early Christianity and could reprsesent in summary form the whole of Christianity. In fact, following the path laid down by the Awakening, Chinese Buddhism, especially the Huayan and Tiantai Schools, developed in quite a different direction from Indian Yogācāra. These schools claimed the existence of a positive, ultimate essence, named and described as the Tathāgatagarbha, “Buddhahood” ( foxing 佛性), or the “mind of the cosmos” ( yuzhouzhixin 宇宙之心). This ultimate reality therefore tended to be interpreted as present in two modes: the actual and the potential. In the actual mode, it was absolutely transcendent and independent from the world. In the potential mode, it was present everywhere in the phenomenal world.

24 Zhou Guihua, Weishi, xinxing yu rulaizang 唯識、心性與如來藏 (Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe 北京宗教文化出版社, 2006).

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In fact, ontologization was the result of an interaction between Chinese culture and Buddhism. On one hand, the pragmatic mind of the Chinese was interested in affirming the ultimate reality of the world. The dharmas could be illusory, but behind this there was the certitude of an underlying reality holding the world together and giving it meaning and direction. On the other hand, Buddhism and Yogācāra provided conceptual tools which had not existed previously. China thus gained a new fundamental ontology. This led to two outgrowths: the metaphysical system of Chinese Buddhism, and the metaphysical system of Neo-Confucianism, which itself owes much to Buddhism. The Metaphysical Reading in the Twentieth Century When Chinese scholars commenced their academic studies of the Yogācāra texts in the first half of the twentieth century, they relied mostly on Chinese and Japanese commentaries. Their understanding was therefore heavily influenced by the ontological reading which had prevailed in East Asia for a thousand years. Despite the initial effort of Ouyang Jingwu and his disciples to return to the original meaning of the texts, Yogācāra was not revived as an independent Buddhist school. Instead, Taixu’s interpretation prevailed and Yogācāra remained integrated within the metaphysical system of East Asian Buddhism. Yogācāra was studied only for its theoretical contribution to Chinese Buddhism. In addition, the more philosophically-minded scholars, such as Liang Shuming, Xiong Shili and Mou Zongsan, all followed this metaphysical use of Yogācāra, integrating it into their own metaphysical systems.25 Western scholars of Yogācāra were also influenced by their own ontological traditions. Sylvain Lévi (1863–1935), during a trip to Nepal in 1922, found two fundamental texts in Sanskrit by Vasubandhu 世親 (c.316–c.396): The Twenty Verses or Vimśatikā, and the Thirty Verses or Trimsikā, which he published with translations in 1925.26 A few years later, Lévi’s student, Louis de la Vallée Poussin (1869–1938), translated 25 Their metaphysical system bears great differences. For example, Liang held that, beyond the great flow of change and transformation, there was a separate and unchanging reality. On the contrary, Xiong drew from the Yijing and held that the great flow of change and transformation is the ultimate and ontological reality. 26 Sylvain Lévi, Matériaux pour l’Etude du Système Vijnaptimâtra (Paris: Bibliothèque de l’École des Hautes Études, 1925).

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the Chengweishilun from Chinese into French.27 He offered an idealist reading of Yogācāra in which consciousness alone created the world, despite the fact that the Chengweishilun constantly refrains from making such an argument.28 Subsequently, other Western scholars, such as the Russian scholar Fyodor Ippolitovich Stcherbatsky (1866–1942), followed the idealistic reading of La Vallée Poussin. This idealistic reading of the Yogācāra was also prevalent in modern India, with scholars like A. K. Chatterjee, C. D. Sharma, P. T. Raju and S. N. Dasgupta.29 In modern times, Yogācāra was therefore understood mostly as a form of metaphysics. This reflects the fact that both Asian and Western philosophy have approached Yogācāra within a common philosophical framework, structured by a fundamental ontology. This may come as a surprise, since metaphysics and ontology were challenged in the West and, in modern times, in East Asia as well. Yet, what attracted modern minds to Yogācāra was not so much its deconstructive project, but how this deconstruction could serve to establish a scientifically sound metaphysical system. Modern interest in Yogācāra came from the idea of using it to build a rational metaphysics, stripped of any dogmatism. Yogācāra epistemology was not considered for itself; it was instead integrated into an overall ontological project, in which it became an important tool for building a purified metaphysics. Only during the relatively short time where Yogācāra was an independent Buddhist school in India could it preserve an epistemology that was relatively free from metaphysics. In the last twenty-five years, non-metaphysical readings have also been proposed. The first author to go against the idealistic reading of Yogācāra was the Indian scholar Thomas A. Kochumutton.30 After Kochumutton’s “new” interpretation, which attempted to unearth the original meaning of the classical Yogācāra texts, other scholars followed. More recently, Dan Lusthaus has understood Yogācāra as similar to the Western school of phenomenology, and especially to the

27 Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1928–1929). 28 See Dan Lusthaus, A Brief Retrospective of Western Yogācāra Scholarship in the 20th Century, http://www.acmuller.net/Yogācāra/articles/ISCP_99_Yogācāra_retro2.html 29 See Thomas A. Kochumutton, A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982), 198–200. 30 See Thomas A. Kochumutton, A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience.

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thought of Husserl.31 Alex Wayman has also adopted a similar nonontological reading.32 Liang’s Buddhist Ontology Liang began dealing with Yogācāra texts in the Treatise on Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt. In this seminal essay, he established two kinds of Buddhist ontology: one founded in the school of nature, and the other founded in the dharma-character school. At that time, Liang promoted the former over the latter. He used scientific theories, such as the theory of ether, to support the belief in a fundamental substance that would, according to the Awakening, “combine the perishable and the imperishable.”33 Yet, in the Treatise on Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt, Liang also envisioned the dharma-character school as comprising an alternative type, which he considered, at that time, to be inferior to the school of nature. It was therefore in the section on the dharma-character school that Liang explicitly referred to Yogācāra. It seems that at that time Liang had not yet read the Chengweishilun. The only two Yogācāra texts mentioned were the Treatise on the Three Non-Natures (Sanwuxing lun 三無性論) and the Treatise on the Buddha Nature (Foxing lun 佛性論); two treatises that were translated by Paramārtha and which displayed a strong ontology. Liang wrote that, All the dharmas are identical to non-nature, and therefore, the complete and perfect reality ( yuancheng shixing 圓成實性) is a non-nature nature.34

Liang concluded that “what is called the foundation is non-nature, and only this is the true self-nature.”35 The three non-natures theory was originally written from the perspective of teachings on emptiness— and was against any ontologization—in order to destroy the illusion that the three-natures were something substantial. However, Liang followed Paramārtha’s ontologized interpretation. Accordingly, Liang See Dan Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenomenology. Alex Wayman, “A Defense of Yogācāra Buddhism,” in Philosophy East and West 46/4 (1996): 447–476. 33 Treatise on Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 6; see Awakening, T1666, 576a24. 34 Treatise on Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 8; Treatise on the Three Non-natures, T1617, 867c13. 35 Treatise on Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 9. 31 32

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regarded the foundation of the myriad of dharmas to be a substance or suchness. While Yogācāra originally considered the “complete and perfect reality” to be the only correct perspective on reality, it later gained ontological status. In his Outline of Yogācāra, Liang developed the idea of an ultimate reality as hyper-consciousness, or that “everything can be discarded (po 破) except one thing; this is perception. There is nothing else but the consciousness of Yogācāra.”36 In other words, for Liang, consciousness was not a mere epistemological tool for destroying illusions, but the ultimate reality and its ontological foundation. Liang raised consciousness to the level of a transcendent Mind along the lines of Chinese Buddhism and Confucianism. Liang summed up his interpretation of Yogācāra, with regard to consciousness, in two sentences, contrasting the Yogācāra definition of mind with its common meaning: That which people usually call the mind is merely half of it—that which Yogācāra calls the mind is complete. That which people usually call the mind is merely a function, but that which Yogācāra calls mind is a thing.37

In the first sentence, Liang states that people generally consider the mind a tool for cognizing objects. Yet, this kind of knowledge was purely external. Yogācāra alone allowed one to go beyond the cognition of a particular object and grasp the metaphysical reality, seeing the object and yet not knowing there was an object. In the second sentence, Liang warned against any psychologism that merely analyzed the different functions of the mind and then stopped. This was indeed the danger of modern science. Only Yogācāra could go beyond this to consider the mind as something real and substantial. The understanding of the mind against which Liang warned was in fact the modern and scientific view, which had already prevailed in China. In Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, Liang’s ontological interpretation of the Chengweishilun became even more explicit. He explained that:

36 37

Outline of Yogācāra, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 286. Outline of Yogācāra, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 288.

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chapter six Direct perception (xianliang) witnesses suchness (zhenru) that is being (benti). This is what Yogācāra means by “wisdom and suchness are perfectly equal” or “non-conceptualizing wisdom does not change.” Then, we turn to the subsequently attained wisdom and differentiate between the intrinsic and general attributes of dharmas. What the non-conceptualizing wisdom, also called the fundamental wisdom, witnesses for us is metaphysics.38

When Xuanzang was talking about the equality between wisdom and suchness, this did not necessarily imply identity. He meant that wisdom and suchness were at the same level. But Liang understood fundamental wisdom and suchness to be identical. For him, suchness was the ontological Mind, the foundation of human consciousness and of the cosmic reality, which “witnesses itself ” (xinziweizheng 心自 為證).39 Liang here displaced the aim of Yogācāra’s epistemology from an analysis of concrete perceptions to an experience of an ultimate reality which existed prior to, and somehow independently from, perception. Interestingly, for Liang, Being (benti 本體) was not to be conquered but revealed. Liang used the metaphor of a “heavy curtain” (zhongmu 重幕) to express this manifestation of Being: The cosmos is called absolute because it cannot be apprehended by our perception or our thought. When those functions are active, then there is an oppositional movement between the inner and the outer, as well as many other obstacles. In order to open the heavy curtain and experience the absolute Being, you must be free from the two attachments to the self and to dharmas, finding rest in oneself. Then, the heavy curtain will fall by itself and you will witness the ontological reality.40

Here, Liang underlines the fact that the epistemological apparatus put in place by the Yogācāra School could not, by itself, conquer absolute Being. On the contrary, it was only through the pacification of the mind that the absolute Being could manifest itself. Since the ultimate reality was itself tranquil, only a pacified mind could be united with it. As Ernst Steinkellner has said in reference to Yogācāra:

Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 413; Chengweishilun, T1585,49c18. 39 Outline of Yogācāra, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 287 40 Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 412. 38

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the school presented discursive thought as the medium of intellectual life, meaning not as an end in itself, but as progressing toward a goal that transcends it and confers on it its meaning.41

As can be seen, Liang read Yogācāra texts in the context of Chinese Buddhism, where ontological, rather than epistemological concerns, were foremost. This was more congenial to Chinese culture. The epistemology of Yogācāra, in which the process of negation had been pushed to its extreme, opened to the ultimate stage of nirvāna, which was not defined purely in negative terms, but as a positive reality. Liang’s thought was unusual in the sense that he combined the radical transcendence of leaving the world, typical of Indian Buddhism, with an ontological framework, typical of Chinese Buddhism. Yet, Liang’s ontology was clearly dualistic; suchness existed above and independently from the mundane reality. Though Liang never fully understood the historical process of ontologization in Chinese Buddhism, he clearly saw the difference between the two kinds of ontology. In Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, he stated that: Chinese metaphysics differs completely from Western and Indian metaphysics. Its problems are different. The problems discussed in the West and in India did not appear in China. While the problems in the West and in India were different, regarding the search for the essence of the cosmos, they were the same. This is precisely the point at which China departed from them. Where have you heard of Chinese philosophers debating monism, dualism, pluralism, idealism, or materialism? The Chinese do not discuss rigid problems of a tranquil essence. All the metaphysics handed down from greatest antiquity in China, constituting the fundamental concepts of learning, is completely devoted to changes, and not at all to a tranquil essence.42

Liang saw a fundamental difference between the metaphysics of India and the West, and China. Here, though Liang seems to have been reluctant to refer to ontology when discussing Chinese philosophy, we can explain the issue in terms of different views on the ultimate essence of the cosmos. While Chinese philosophy has functioned within the parameters of a dynamic ontology, in which the essence of the cosmos is always changing and immanent, Indian and Western ontologies 41 Ernst Steinkellner, “Buddhist Logic: The Search for Certainty,” in Buddhist Spirituality, edited by Yoshinori Takeuchi (New York: Crossroad, 1993), 215. 42 Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 442.

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have adopted a view of the essence of the cosmos as static. Liang rightly considered Buddhism to be a part of Indian philosophy, but he completely neglected the fact that Buddhism represented a great departure from the orthodox Indian schools. Not only did Indian Buddhism reject the Vedas and Upanishads, it also rejected any form of metaphysics or ontology. From the point of view of a dynamic essence of the cosmos, Indian Buddhism, and especially Yogācāra, was closer to Chinese philosophy than Liang admitted. This lack of a thorough knowledge of Buddhist history explains why Liang went on to oppose the Chinese view of a dynamic essence of the cosmos on the basis of the Indian view of a static essence. In Human Mind and Human Life, Liang developed his understanding of the “mundane” (shijian 世間) and the “supramundane” (chushijian 出世間) further. He clearly spoke of the supramundane in ontological terms, for example when he stated that “the mundane and the supramundane are what the philosophers call the phenomena (xianxiang 現象) and the Being (benti 本體).”43 The supramundane was the permanent ontological foundation of the physical and mental world, which was in constant flux and always changing. In other words, while primitive Buddhism interpreted the mutual interaction between sa sāra and nirvāna in terms of an epistemic difference (delusion-enlightenment), Liang interpreted it in terms of an ontological difference (potentialityactuality). The epistemic difference between sa sāra and nirvāna in classical Yogācāra was transformed here into an ontological difference—a difference in the degree of being. As Liang said, “if we acknowledge that sa sāra is real, then nirvāna is even more real.”44 Undoubtedly, this line of reasoning progresses in an ontological direction, in which phenomena are considered to be reflections of a higher reality. Liang went to describe ultimate reality using a Neo-Confucian term: the “mind of the cosmos” ( yuzhou zhixin 宇宙之心). Liang fully understood that the purpose of Yogācāra was to deny ultimate reality to concrete human consciousness, but his notion of the “cosmic mind” still tended to raise the concrete human mind to the level of a supreme and absolute reality. However, Liang never fell into the trap of reducing the tension between the mundane and the supramundane so they became fused

43 44

Human Mind and Human Life, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 705. Human Mind and Human Life, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 706.

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into one metaphysical entity. He stated that “sa sāra and nirvāna are neither identical, nor distinct.”45 Liang’s quest for a radical transcendence also prevented him from succumbing to the temptation of pantheism. Even though “sa sāra is the basis of nirvāna,”46 there was still a real dissymmetry between the two. Only nirvāna was the transcendent reality which encompassed all of reality, human and physic, and which was eternally tranquil.47 Evaluation of Liang’s Buddhist Onto-Metaphysics While Indian Yogācāra involved a radical deconstruction of cognition in order to free the mind from all attachments to both itself and the world, modern thinkers in twentieth-century China developed a modernized version of Yogācāra as a way of re-building Buddhist or NeoConfucian metaphysics. It was important for these metaphysicians to retrieve Yogācāra’s epistemological method in its purity. This method did not presuppose that which it sought to establish—a foundation for the mind and for the world. These metaphysicians could not use the Yogācāra which had already been incorporated into metaphysical systems such as Huayan, since in those, epistemology served to illustrate metaphysical truths. This modernized and scientific brand of Yogācāra shared with Indian Yogācāra the conviction that all metaphysical assumptions should be avoided in the first instance. Unlike Indian Yogācāra, however, it attempted to build an ontology of the Mind as the ultimate reality. In addition to Liang Shuming, philosophers such as Xiong Shili and Mou Zongsan valued Yogācāra because they could derive a purely rational metaphysics from it. They worked back to a pure epistemology and then progressed step by step toward metaphysics. By way of concluding this chapter, I propose to evaluate Liang’s ontology from four different perspectives. First, from the perspective of Yogācāra, Liang clearly understood the school’s epistemological project as avoiding any undue metaphysical constructions. Liang appreciated Yogācāra precisely for its scientific method. However, he Human Mind and Human Life, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 705. Treatise on Differences and Similarities between Confucianism and Buddhism, in Complete Works, Vol. 7, 157. 47 At this point, some may wonder what distinguishes it from the concepts of atman in Hinduism or God in Christianity. 45 46

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always considered that Buddhist metaphysics could be deduced from Yogācāra epistemology. Though Liang emphasized starting from epistemology, he had therefore already presupposed a metaphysical frame. This shows that he never considered Yogācāra for what it was originally. His academic presentation of Indian philosophy and Yogācāra, as reflected in the two manuals he wrote for students at Peking University, showed that he understood Yogācāra both as a form of epistemology and as a form of metaphysics.48 Thus, from an academic perspective, we should recognize that Liang’s understanding of Yogācāra was limited. Second, from the perspective of intellectual history, it is true that Buddhism, from the very beginning, avoided metaphysics. It was not so much that the Buddha was against metaphysics, but that he was worried about its perverse use, and its getting in the way of the liberation project. In this sense, Indian Yogācāra was faithful to early Buddhism, analyzing the workings of the mind not in order to reify them but to deny them absolute reality and truth. The subsequent metaphysical trajectory was a departure from the core Buddhist teachings. Yet, we have to acknowledge the historical fact that the Yogācāra School flourished for several centuries, and then almost completely disappeared as an independent school. Yogācāra ideas were ultimately very fruitful and were incorporated into the metaphysical systems of East Asian Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism. Though Yogācāra was revived in modern China, it failed to foster an independent movement. Instead, Yogācāra once more became an important intellectual resource both for modern Buddhist thinkers (Liang Shuming, Taixu and the advocates of Humanistic Buddhism) and for the New Confucians (Xiong Shili and Mou Zongsan). Each of these modern thinkers used Yogācāra as an important device which was at the service of metaphysics. Therefore, from the perspective of intellectual history, we have on one hand a pure Yogācāra which existed only for a short time, in a limited geographical area, and which is now dead, and on the other, a metaphysical brand of Yogācāra which has lasted for a thousand years until the present day and which continues to influence East Asian thought. Therefore, this ontologized version of Yogācāra, which has nourished the lives and thought of so many people, should not be discarded lightly. From this perspective, Liang’s interpretation

48

Outline of Yogācāra, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 269.

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of Yogācāra is completely consonant with mainstream East Asian thought. Third, from the perspective of philosophy, we must question the claim that Yogācāra is free of metaphysical suppositions. In fact, it is doubtful that it is even possible to have an epistemology that is completely free of metaphysical presuppositions. Even scientific theories are built on the metaphysical concepts of time, space, continuity and so on. In fact, it may be quite naïve to believe in the possibility of a non metaphysical discourse. Though the Buddha himself refused to answer the “fourteen difficult questions,” he did not directly deny metaphysical realities.49 On the contrary, mature thought should be able to recognize its metaphysical suppositions and evaluate them critically. It is probably the case that a refusal to consider the metaphysical dimensions of a discourse leads to more difficulties than otherwise. Furthermore, comprehensive thought cannot fail to deal with metaphysical questions.50 In this sense, Liang’s notion of a cosmic mind was in some ways similar to the concept of brahman in Indian philosophy, and the concept of God in Western philosophy. Indeed, Liang claimed to have developed a complete discourse which combined both epistemology and metaphysics. Liang’s attempt to do this was in part strategic, and was motivated by the challenges brought about by Western philosophy. But there were also deep philosophical considerations which led him to believe that an epistemological discourse, cut off from metaphysics, was insufficient. The Buddhism that Liang professed was an integral system of thought which had to include metaphysics. Fourth, from the point of view of the individual, it may seem that religious practice does not require the supposition of an ontology, which in fact may hinder one’s liberation. Yet, in Yogācāra epistemology,

49 The fourteen difficult questions (catur-daśa-avyākrta-vastūni, shisi wuji 十四無記) are: all is permanent 世間常; all is impermanent 世間無常; it is both permanent and impermanent 世間亦常亦無常; it is neither permanent or impermanent 間非常非 常; there is finitude 世間有邊; there is infinity 世間無邊; there are both finitude and infinity 世間亦有邊亦無邊; there are neither finitude or infinity 世間非有邊非無邊; the tathāgata exists after death 如來死後有; it does not exist after death 如來死後無; it both exists and does not exist 如來死後亦有亦非有; neither it exists nor it does not exist 如來死後非有非非有; after death we have the same body (or personality) and spirit 命身一; after death, body and spirit are different 命身異. See Digital Dictionary of Buddhism. 50 In fact, it would be worthwhile to investigate whether this non-metaphysical version of Yogācāra which has been advocated recently by scholars like Dan Lusthaus does not correspond in fact to an intellectual agenda of modern Western philosophy.

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both the self and volition have no ontological foundation, and therefore lack intellectual and practical strength. Subsequent ontological developments addressed precisely this need, giving Buddhist practitioners a firm basis for their practice to stand on. In conclusion, we may state that Liang had an ontological faith, in the sense that he believed there was an ontological foundation both to human experience and the world. Yet, in the other end, he started with existential questions about human suffering and impermanence. He adopted the Yogācāra method in order to deconstruct the elements of experience. Finally, he completed the circle, affirming that, beyond the illusory elements of experience, an ontological reality—or suchness—could be found. It can be said that Liang had a real faith in suchness, something that was beyond words and intelligence, but which was something one could truly experience.

CHAPTER SEVEN

OPPOSITION TO HUMANISTIC BUDDHISM How does religion relate to society? Are they in opposition or in harmony? This question became very important in modern times, and formed a line which divided religious traditionalists from religious reformers. In this chapter, we shall first examine the traditionalist stance of Liang Shuming, who upheld a clear separation between Buddhism and society, thereby preserving its function as a vehicle of radical criticism. We shall also examine the agenda put forth by Taixu, the most important Buddhist reformer of the first-half of the twentieth century in China. We shall then examine the debate which arose between Liang on one side, and Taixu, Yinshun and the sangha on the other. Since Liang regarded Buddhism to be a religion of pure transcendence, he opposed using it to tackle social problems. Liang instead advocated Confucianism, as a form of upāya, which could more effectively lead towards the ultimate Buddhist goal of renouncing to the world. Liang’s Opposition to the Buddhist Revival Liang’s position vis-à-vis Buddhism was ambivalent. On one hand, he considered it to be the perfect religion, leading to the supra-mundane reality. However, in order to preserve its transcendent function, Liang considered that Buddhism should not compromise at all with the mundane world. Liang’s theory of the three cultural stages makes this clear. In this, social and moral issues were addressed in the first and second stages, while religious issues were reserved for the future. Therefore, not unlike the New Culture Movement, Liang opposed the revival of Buddhism for the present age, since this would lead to social escapism and weaken efforts toward national salvation. Liang thought that calls for a Buddhist revival would be irresponsible given China’s precarious situation. He stated:

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chapter seven It is too early to uphold the third attitude. This is very obvious. If someone wishes to walk the Buddhist path for himself, I can accept that. But if he promotes it for society, then I am forced to oppose it.1

With China facing the collapse of its national institutions, as well as civil unrest and encroachments on its national sovereignty, Liang asserted that the Chinese people should adopt the proactive attitude of the West in order to defend “their rights to life, to property and other individual rights” and, at the same time, promote the Confucian way of harmonizing conflicts.2 In other words, according to Liang, while the nation was engaged in a fight for survival, it would be suicidal to promote the Buddhist goal of renouncing the world. Liang clearly understood that, by engaging in conflict, many wrong ideas and imperfect attitudes may arise, but he thought that the survival of the Chinese nation and culture was the priority. He stated: It is not because I believe life to be so good that I want the Chinese to live it, or that human culture has such a high value that I want the Chinese to realize it. I am merely cognizant of what the world is today for the Chinese.3

Liang’s pragmatic attitude led him to understand that Buddhist transcendence was not the most important matter at that time. But if the time for the religious question had indeed not yet come, could some resources be drawn from Buddhism to address the social and moral issues of the present age? In other words, could Buddhism be reformed so that it addressed mundane issues? In fact, Liang held, first, that Buddhism could not be changed, and second, that even if it could, it should not be changed. His first assertion was related to the practical situation of Buddhism in China, and the second, with Buddhist theory. Concerning the first, Liang regarded popular Buddhism to be replete with superstitions. Most of the people going to temples were not really seeking nirvāna, but rather a better reincarnation in the next life, either for themselves or their relatives. Liang considered such popular views to be contrary to authentic Buddhism. Yet, he judged popular Buddhism to be so engrained in the minds of Chinese people that it would be impossible to eradicate it.

1 2 3

Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 533–534. Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 534. Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 535.

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At the same time, other Chinese intellectuals were influenced by Buddhism, while Buddhists themselves came up with new interpretations they hoped could meet the challenges of modern times. In Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, Liang mentioned that he had discussed the possible adaptation of Buddhism to modernity with leading intellectuals such as Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan.4 While Liang Qichao considered Chan Buddhism to be a possible resource, Liang Shuming considered Chan to be an inarticulate discourse, unsuited to people’s present needs. Zhang Taiyan agreed with Liang Shuming that true Buddhism was, in the present circumstances, reserved to just a few elites and was essentially out of reach for the common people. Not only did Liang believe that Buddhism could not be reformed, he also stated that it should not be reformed. Even if Buddhism could be reformed by adapting itself to modern times and to the level of the common people, this would be detrimental in the long run. Therefore, not only was reforming Buddhism impossible, it more importantly was undesirable. As Liang stated concerning this Buddhist reform effort, “if this succeeds, it would not be Buddhist anymore.”5 Here, Liang’s stance was connected to his theoretical understanding of Buddhism as a religion of ultimate transcendence. Considering the reform efforts from his position grounded in the fundamental teachings of Buddhism, Liang believed they should not be made because they would dilute its core message and emphasize worldly considerations, such as politics, education and morality. Liang thus opposed any changes that would denature Buddhism. From his perspective, Buddhism should be kept intact, and held in reserve for eschatological times. Both Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan were intellectuals who had been influenced by aspects of Buddhist history, culture or history. Yet, neither of them were true believers in Buddhism. Rather, they looked at Buddhism as one of many resources available to address the national crisis. Their choice of Buddhism was dictated mostly by strategic considerations. Unlike Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan, Liang Shuming had a more complex relationship with Buddhism. He valued the transcendent message of Buddhism and, throughout his life, he believed in it. Yet, his understanding of Buddhism as a pathway to transcendence led him to downplay institutional Buddhism, which

4 5

Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 536–537. Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 536.

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he saw as secondary, or even as an obstacle. So, when Liang’s views were confronted with the reformist ideas of Taixu, the debate about the role of Buddhism in society became intense. We shall first present the basic ideas of Taixu. Taixu’s Program to Reform Buddhism The primary aim of the New Culture Movement was to demolish Confucianism. It also discarded Buddhism as a superstitious tradition, to be eliminated in order to modernize national culture. Buddhism was also a victim of the anti-religious movement affecting society at that time. When establishing a tight system of religious control, the Guomindang implemented an anti-Buddhist program, turning many Buddhist temples into schools. Some Buddhist laymen like Yang Wenhui had previously understood the growing divide between modern Chinese society and Buddhism. Yet, a thorough reform of Buddhism could not avoid reforming the sangha—something difficult for a layman to do. Any institutional reforms of Buddhism had to be made by a monk. The monk Taixu was indeed the most important reformer of Buddhism. After having taken part in revolutionary activities directed at overthrowing the imperial system,6 he applied himself to the reformation of Buddhism. Like Liang Shuming, Taixu was deeply influenced by Western humanism. Yet, as Don Pittman says, “although external influences must be acknowledged, the sources of Taixu’s position were profoundly Buddhist.”7 Taixu drew much from the schools of Chinese Buddhism, such as Chan and Tiantai. Pitman qualifies Taixu as an “ethical pietist” who wanted to realize “a communal utopia on earth.”8 From 1920, he edited the Buddhist periodical Sound of the Sea Tide (Haichaoyin 海潮音)—the sea tide being a metaphor for Buddhism. This served as a forum for Taixu to promote his reformist ideas. These included advocating three Buddhist revolutions: revolutions of doctrine, of the sangha and of temple management. The two last revolutions would indeed entail significant changes for Buddhist monks and 6 See Edward S. Krebs, Shifu: Soul of Chinese Anarchism (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 85–88. 7 Don A. Pittman, Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism, Taixu’s Reform (University of Hawaï Press, 2001), 169. 8 Ibidem, 169.

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devotees. Like Liang Shuming, Taixu was dissatisfied with the central position Buddhist rituals for the dead had attained in China. Yet, for Taixu, the problem was not so much that people had forgotten that the Buddhist ideal was to reach nirvāna, but rather that they relied on magical rituals instead of focusing on their Buddhist practice in order to progress on the path to enlightenment in the here and now. Therefore, Taixu proposed a sweeping reform—getting rid of the Buddhist ceremonies for the dead, which was also one of the main sources of income for monks. Instead, Taixu encouraged them to work for themselves.9 As we can imagine, this was an explosive proposal within Buddhist monasteries and communities. However, Taixu considered doctrinal reforms, without which the other two could not succeed, to be the most important. For him, Chinese Buddhists were too concerned with their next reincarnation and largely ignored the human world as the necessary basis for enlightenment. Therefore, Taixu put his theoretical emphasis on the two vehicles, the vehicle of human beings and the vehicle of devas. A vehicle ( yāna, sheng 乘) is a way of carrying beings across the sea of suffering. According to the Mahāyāna tradition, there were five vehicles. The human vehicle (rensheng 人乘) was intended for human beings. It consisted of following the five precepts of Buddhism. The deva vehicle (tiansheng 天乘) was intended for gods, who were to perform the ten forms of good action. The śrāvaka vehicle (shengwensheng 聲聞乘), or the vehicle of the hearers, consisted of adhering to the four Noble Truths. The pratyekabuddha vehicle ( yuanjuesheng 緣覺乘), or the vehicle of the solitary Buddha, involved contemplating twelve-fold dependent arising. Finally, the bodhisattva path was for bodhisattvas, who could leave the world but have decided to stay to help sentient beings. Mahāyāna Buddhism stressed the importance of concrete forms of practice and universal liberation, and has therefore regarded the bodhisattva path as the ideal. Also, Mahāyāna broadened the notion of the bodhisattva to include anyone who aspired to enlightenment for himself and all sentient beings, and actively engaged in the six perfections (pāramitās, boluomi 波羅蜜).10 Taixu did not deny the existence of the other three vehicles, but he considered that only two vehicles—the vehicle of See “Zhengli sengqie zhidulun 整理僧伽制度論 [Reorganization of the Sangha Community],” in Complete Works of Taixu, Taixu quanji 太虛全書, Vol. 17. 10 The six perfections are donation, morality, forbearance, effort, meditation and wisdom. See Mizuno, Essentials of Buddhism, 26–28. 9

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human beings and the vehicle of devas—could provide a solid platform for enlightenment in the modern age. Liang and Taixu’s Common Rejection of Popular Buddhism Though Liang Shuming and Taixu’s understandings of Buddhism were quite different, they both accepted modern science and sought scientific proofs as a way of confirming Buddhist beliefs. Yet, they rejected any scientism that would reduce the reality of life and of the world to the narrow limits of what modern science already knew. They held that, besides the forms of life recognized by modern science, there were others that we may not fully know about, such as spirits or ghosts. Life, and the world, were still mysteries, and they believed that one day science may explain rationally phenomena such as shentong 神通 and miracles.11 They did not see these things as completely superstitious, although they believed that paying too much attention to them was problematic. Both Liang Shuming and Taixu recognized that popular Buddhism had laid too much emphasis on spirits and ghosts. They therefore deemphasized the importance of the extra-human forms of life so as to not encourage attachments to them. Yet, they also had more specific motivations for opposing popular Buddhism. Liang judged popular Buddhism from the perspective of the Buddhist teachings on radical transcendence. He saw the common people not as searching for nirvāna, but as trying to secure a better place for themselves in sa sāra. Taixu, from a more practical stance, felt that due to popular Buddhism’s focus on future reincarnations, people were not actively engaging with the present world. It may seem as if Taixu attached more importance to the concrete, present world than Liang. Indeed, Liang criticized Buddhists for not aiming at a sufficiently radical transcendence, while Taixu criticized them for not paying enough attention to the present world. In fact, both of them did pay attention to the more germane issues of human life, but in different ways. For Taixu, only a Buddhist engagement with the world could offer a platform for reaching nirvāna, while for Liang, only a Confucian engagement could solve the world’s problems and prepare the way to Buddhism. Liang did not belittle Buddhism, but

11

In Chapter Nine of this study, we shall deal with Liang’s belief in shentong.

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on the contrary, he respected Buddhism for what he thought was its core message. The First Phase of the Debate on Buddhism for Human Life: 1921–1928 In Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, Liang mentioned briefly that he had read in the Sound of the Sea Tide an article by Taixu in which he promoted the idea of the two vehicles. Liang criticized Taixu’s view, stating that such an idea ran against the fundamental spirit of Buddhism, which, for Liang, “only talks about things outside of the present life.”12 Liang’s position is easily misunderstood and it is therefore important to analyze it carefully. Liang did not deny that Buddhism was connected with the practical world. As we have seen above, Liang understood perfectly that Buddhism essentially consisted of concrete forms of practice directed at correcting our misconceptions, and alleviating the undue suffering attached to them. Such practice would necessarily involve all the elements of human existence, including its moral, social and political dimensions. In other words, Liang was not opposed to the Buddhist reform effort because he believed that Buddhist teachings should remain separate from social realities. In fact, Liang stressed that Buddhism’s purpose was not to talk about this world as a permanent and absolute reality, since it aimed at something which was beyond the world. In other words, the goal of Buddhism was not to make the world a better place, much less save the world, but to transcend it. If people forgot about Buddhism’s transcendent orientation, they would completely denature the Buddha’s message. On the tenth of October 1921, Taixu took the night train from Beijing to Hangzhou. During the ride, he read Liang’s Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies from beginning to the end. Shortly after, he wrote a short review of the book, which was published in the November issue of Sound of the Sea Tide.13 Taixu had previously read Liang’s Outline of Yogācāra, which had been published one year before. He had praised Liang’s efforts in explaining Yogācāra theory in the Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 536. Taixu, “Lun Liangshuming dongxiwenhua jiqi zhexue 論梁漱溟東西文化及 其哲學 [About Liang Shuming’s Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies],” in Sound of the Sea Tide, 1/11 (1921). Reproduced in Taixudashi quanshu 太虛 大師全書 [Complete Works of Master Taixu] (Taipei: Shandaosi 臺北善導寺版, 1946), vol. 25, 302–304. 12 13

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language of Western philosophy. Therefore, when Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies was published, and when Taixu read that the young teacher of Indian philosophy at Peking University had apparently shifted to Confucianism, and advocated putting Buddhism in reserve for the future, he and others in Buddhist circles were very surprised. In his review, Taixu first discussed Liang’s theory of the three stages of culture, as well as its underlying epistemology. Taixu was deeply impressed by the importance Liang Shuming gave to the religious quest, and indeed he called Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies “the best book of the recent New Culture Movement.”14 Then, Taixu launched two critiques against Liang. First, he criticized Liang for his aristocratic (guizu 貴族) understanding of Buddhism. He wrote that “if Liang Shuming can understand that Buddhism is the only truth, then, the common people can also understand this.” Taixu could not accept Liang’s elitism since it went against his efforts to present a modern form of Buddhism that was accessible to the masses. Yet, Taixu’s critique was in a sense flawed. Liang did not state that people were unable to understand authentic Buddhism because they were intellectually limited. Nor did he claim that Buddhism was, ultimately, out of reach for most people. Rather, he stated that Buddhism did not answer the questions that most people were facing at that time. Taixu probably understood the weakness of his first critique, because he then moved to present a second one aimed at Liang’s claims concerning the inadequacy of Buddhism for the present time. In Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, Liang expressed his fear that promoting Buddhism would create even more chaos and confusion. Taixu rejected Liang’s opinion and countered that Buddhism was in fact the best remedy for the problems of their era. There were two parts in Taixu’s argument. First, Buddhism could directly address the question of suffering, which was universal and acute at that time. Second, Buddhism offered a viable alternative to Westernization, and was superior to the “inarticulate discourses” of Confucianism, Neo-Confucianism and Daoism. Like Liang, Taixu recognized that there was a deep need to first address “the peace and happiness of the people in this world” (renshi zhi anle 人世之安樂). In this sense, both of them shared the same awareness of the present challenges. They did not seek to escape into a

14

Taixu, “Lun Liangshuming dongxiwenhua jiqi zhexue,” 304.

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transcendent realm beyond the present world, but work for a series of moral, social, political and cultural goals that would decrease the level of suffering in their individual lives and in the world in general. While Liang felt that Confucianism was better equipped than Buddhism to alleviate worldly suffering, Taixu believed that Buddhism could create an earthly “Pure Land.” Taixu thus rejected the first of Liang’s critiques, about the possibility of reforming Buddhism and adapting it to the needs of the modern age. But, as Cheng Gongrang 程恭讓 has recently remarked, Taixu failed in this hasty response to answer the second, and more important, of Liang’s questions—the question of the theoretical legitimacy of the reform effort. This was because Liang considered that such reforms would constitute the abandonment of original Buddhism, and therefore should not be made.15 Clearly, Taixu’s “two vehicles” theory did not provide a sound theoretical basis on which to address Liang’s question. In 1923, partly as a reaction to Liang’s advocacy of the Neo-Confucian school of the mind, Taixu wrote an article arguing against Wang Yangming’s philosophy. In it, Taixu criticized Liang’s theory of the three stages. He wrote: Liang Shuming has devoted a long time to Buddhist studies. He first caught a glimpse of Confucianism and Buddhism. He then taught about the experience of the true meaning of human life. In fact, it is necessary to first promote Buddhism. Putting Buddhism at the end is like wishing a branch to flourish and yet cutting its roots, or wishing a river to flow far and yet drying its source.16

Taixu emphasized here the continuity between the present and the future stages, a continuity that should be grounded in Buddhism. However, at this stage Taixu had not yet found a common theoretical foundation that would unite a Buddhist engagement with the world and the Buddhist supra-mundane reality. In 1924, Taixu engaged in the famous metaphysics-versus-science debate, which had enlivened China’s intellectual world. Taixu then

15 Cheng Gongrang 程恭讓, “Cong Taixu yu Liang Shuming de yichangzhengbian kan renshengfojiao de lilunnanti 從太虛與梁漱溟的一場爭辯看人生佛教的理 論難題 [Theoretical Issues with Humanistic Buddhism Examined from the Debate between Taixu and Liang Shuming],” in Zhexue yanjiu 哲學研究 [Philosophical Investigations] 5 (2002): 74. 16 Taixu, “Lun Wang Yangming 論王陽明 [On Wang Yangming],” in Taixudashi quanshu, vol. 21, 509–510.

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wrote Science of Human Life, which was published in 1929.17 In this book, he reiterated his rejection of Liang’s theory of the three cultures. He stated that Buddhism should not be reserved only for the third stage, but that it should be used in each of the three stages. While Liang had distinguished between cultures on the basis of the different issues they addressed, Taixu considered Buddhism to be a comprehensive system that could provide for all human needs. Compared to his two previous articles, Taixu this time provided more systematic answers to Liang’s ideas. He addressed, for the first time, Liang’s accusations regarding the modification ( gaizao 改造) of Buddhism. Taixu argued that his own interpretation of Buddhism, which aimed at perfecting and completing human life, in fact represented true Buddhism. He held that the human vehicle was “the main base” from which one could reach Buddhahood, without going through the other intermediary vehicles.18 As we have seen above, Mahāyāna Buddhism differentiated between five vehicles. It was believed that sentient beings would have to climb slowly upwards from the human vehicle to the bodhisattva vehicle. Only through a long process, requiring eons, could sentient beings finally reach Buddhahood. Now, Taixu was arguing that by practicing the human vehicle, one could attain Buddhahood during their own lifetime, without going through the other vehicles. In fact, Taixu combined the human and bodhisattva vehicles together. The basis of the human vehicle was to make the bodhisattva vow of universal liberation. The bodhisattva vehicle therefore became the theoretical basis bridging human existence and Buddhahood. A human being committed to the bodhisattva path could reach Buddahood directly, without needing to first progress through other forms of existence. Taixu claimed that the bodhisattva path was the foundation of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and that the human vehicle, based on the bodhisattva path, represented authentic Buddhism. According to Cheng Gongrang, this “was a decisive step in the elaboration of Buddhism for human life.”19 Indeed, human life was then endowed with the capacity to attain Buddhahood. But what was the concrete expression of the bodhisattva path in human life? It was mostly to perform

17 Taixu, Renshengguan de kexue 人生觀的科學 (Shanghai: Taidong Tushuju 泰東 圖書局, 1929). 18 See Taixu, “Fojiao zhijie fosheng de zhuyao jichu” 佛教直接佛乘的主要基礎 [“The Main Basis for Direct Access to Buddhahood”], in Taixudashi quanshu, vol. 46, 40. 19 Cheng Gongrang, “Cong Taixu yu Liang Shuming de yichangzhengbian,” 74.

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moral duties and engage in social reform for the benefit of all. There was no need for the intercession of superhuman powers. Everything was within reach of the ordinary human being. By working to make this world a better place for oneself and for others, one could reach Buddhahood. Taixu could thus answer Liang’s accusation that he was distorting Buddhism; his ethical form of Buddhism was in complete accordance with the true intent of Śākyamuni, which was to help all human beings gain ultimate liberation. Like Liang, Taixu had rejected popular forms of Buddhism which focused on obtaining benefits in the next life. However, in Science of Human Life, Taixu went further, condemning also “mystics who gain special experiences from their meditative practice.”20 This seems to be a reference to Liang, whose method for reaching nirvāna tended to transcend concrete human life by emptying it of any ultimate value. In other words, while Liang understood Buddhism to entail renouncing human nature, Taixu understood Buddhism as completing it. As can be seen, Liang’s stance, and that of some of the other intellectuals who were against Buddhist social engagement, convinced Taixu that he needed to develop a more comprehensive theory concerning his modernized version of Buddhism. We can therefore say that Liang indirectly influenced Taixu. A few years later, in 1928, Taixu developed his concept of “Buddhism of Human Life” (Rensheng Fojiao 人生佛教), which was a theoretical clarification of his “two vehicles” theory.21 Taixu narrowed the focus from two vehicles—those of human beings and devas—to only one: the vehicle of human beings. Though he never denied the existence of other realms besides the human one, he stated that, in the current age, the human vehicle alone should be practiced. When it came to practical matters, the other vehicles should be disregarded. By focusing on Buddhism for human life, Taixu directly denied Liang’s affirmation that Buddhism was unfit for solving the challenges of human life and society. Taixu affirmed that, on the contrary, modern Buddhism should focus exclusively on the present, as in Confucianism or Western culture. Furthermore, this humanistic Buddhism was, for

Taixu, Renshengguan de kexue, in Taixudashi quanshu, vol. 23, 42. See “Duiyu Zhongguo fojiao geming seng de xunci 對於中國佛教革命僧的訓 詞 [Exhortation about the Revolution of the Chinese Sangha],” in Taixudashi nianpu 太虛大師年譜 [Chronicle of the Life of the Great Master Taixu], edited by Yinshun 印順 (Taipei: Zhengwen chubanshe 正聞出版社, 1985), 256–257. 20 21

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him, more suitable than either Confucianism or Western culture in meeting the challenges posed by the moral and political crises facing the country. The Second Phase of the Debate on Buddhism for Human Life: 1940–1942 After the Japanese invasion and the termination of the reconstruction program in 1937, Liang Shuming left Shandong and went for a series of discussions with Mao Zedong in Yan’an in 1938. Afterwards, he settled in Chongqing, which was the seat of the Guomindang government. Nanjing was subsequently taken by the Japanese. In January 1940, Liang visited the Sino-Tibetan Teaching Institute. The talk Liang gave to the monks was recorded and published that same year in the Sound of the Sea Tide.22 In this, Liang first acknowledged that he had long wished to visit this institute, which Taixu had founded in 1930.23 Liang openly admitted that in his youth, he had shifted from Buddhism to Confucianism. However, he also emphasized that his belief in Buddhism, in “transmigration,” and the “three worlds” remained unchanged.24 Interestingly, in his talk Liang emphasized not the transcendent path of Buddhism, but ethical engagement. He was convinced that Confucianism was the best vehicle for ethical engagement in the present world. Yet he perfectly respected the choice of Buddhist monks to engage with the world. Liang admonished them, stating that “human life is a rare opportunity,” that “time does matter,” and that time should not be wasted. If one only says prayers and spends all his time dawdling, then even though he may have renounced the world, such a person would be as senseless as worldly people are.25 In other words, Liang exhorted the monks to engage with the world from the perspective of their lives as Buddhist monastics. Here, Liang adopted a very ecumenical approach, developing his conception of engagement with the world around concepts which could be considered both Buddhist and Confucian, such as “self-reflection” ( fanxing 反省) and “love for 22 This talk was first published in 1940 at Chongqing by The Sound of the Sea Tide. It is reproduced as “Wo de guoqu 我的過去 [My Past Life],” in Complete Works, vol. 6, 68–73. 23 It was closed down by the new regime in 1950. 24 Liang Shuming, “My Past Life,” in Complete Works, vol. 6, 71–72. 25 Liang Shuming, “My Past Life,” in Complete Works, vol. 6, 72.

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others” (airen 愛人).26 Liang therefore did not argue from a doctrinal perspective in his speech to the monks. Though he did not advocate using Buddhism as the main force for social reformation, he welcomed the contribution Buddhism could make, since he understood that Confucianism and Buddhism shared common values. Liang also suggested, however, that he was using Confucianism as a tool to further the Buddhist goal of ultimate liberation, stating that all his efforts were intended to help “ferry the living across the sea of sa sāra to the shore of nirvāna.” In other words, Liang was dedicated to the bodhisattva path, which he pursued using the unorthodox means of promoting Confucianism. However, some Buddhist monks were more doctrinal, and had difficulty accepting Liang’s ecumenical approach. They asked him why he had stopped advocating Buddhism. Liang replied laconically that it was because of “this time, this place, this life” (cishi, cidi, ciren 此 時、此地、此人).27 By “this time,” Liang meant that Buddhism was overtly focused on the two worlds of the past and of the future, but Liang was more concerned with the world of the present. Also, Buddhism considers the earthly realm to be one of ten places or directions. Liang, however, had more concrete concerns about the present time and world. Finally, Buddhism also considered human life to be one of the six forms of existence. However Liang, again, had explicit concerns about the current state of humanity.28 We should understand Liang’s answer in the context of his background, which involved ten years in rural reconstruction. During this time, he advocated Confucianism as the practical solution to the problems of Chinese society hic et nunc. In other words, for Liang, Buddhism’s temporal and spatial expansiveness precluded it from taking human life seriously. Though his Confucian program in Shandong had collapsed due to the war, Liang still held Confucianism to be a better response than Buddhism Liang Shuming, “My Past Life,” in Complete Works, vol. 6, 73. Yinshun, Yindu zhi fojiao 印度之佛教 [Indian Buddhism] (Taipei: Zhengwen Chubanshi 正聞出版社, 1985), 1–2. Yet it is quite strange that when the Sound of the Sea Tide published Liang’s speech, the words “this time, this place, this life” did not appear. We may conjuncture that these words were not part of Liang’s formal speech but answers to a question. Another hypothesis is that they were judged at that time by the editor of the Sound of the Sea Tide too dismissive of Buddhism and may have been deleted. 28 While the three worlds refer to past, present, future, the ten directions refer to to East, West, North, South, the four points between these, and up and down. The six realms of existence are hell, ghost, beast, demon, human and heavenly being. 26 27

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to the present national crisis. For Liang, the efforts of Buddhism, while worthy, could not deal with such an acute disaster. Therefore, Liang’s objection to the Buddhist revival did not only have a doctrinal basis. He knew the intellectual efforts Taixu had made to provide Buddhism for human life with its theoretical foundation. Liang may even have accepted some of Taixu’s conclusions. In a context in which the country was under a fully-fledged invasion, Liang welcomed the efforts of the Buddhist sangha in reconstructing society. Yet he had serious doubts about the effectiveness of these efforts. The monk Yinshun (印順, 1906–2005), a young disciple of Taixu who later became a very famous Buddhist scholar and leader in Taiwan, was present during Liang’s lecture. He was so deeply impressed and challenged by Liang’s words that he reported on them in the preface to his book Indian Buddhism (Yindu zhi Fojiao 印度之佛教, 1942).29 Taixu himself did not attend the talk given by Liang in January 1940 at the Sino-Tibetan Teaching Institute since he was in India. However, after his return to Chongqing, Taixu came to know the content of Liang’s lecture, which appeared in Sound of the Sea Tide. Taixu would therefore certainly have heard about Liang’s famous six words—“this time, this place, this life.” On the 17th of June that same year, Taixu gave a lecture during a celebration at the Institute. The lecture was entitled “On the Bodhisattva path in the present-day from the perspective of Buddhist teachings in the Pali language” (Cong baliyuxi Fojiao shuodao jinpusaxing 從巴厘語系佛教說到今菩薩行). In this lecture Taixu presented some of his thoughts from his overseas trip, however he also directly responded to Liang Shuming’s critique that Buddhism was too aloof from practical concerns to deal with human realities. Taixu again called for the reform and modernization of Chinese Buddhism. He stated the implementation of Mahāyāna theory is what I call the new Bodhisattva path. And this Bodhisattva path must adapt to the concrete needs of the present time, the present place and the present life.30

29 In the preface of Indian Buddhism, Yinshun dated Liang’s visit to the Han and Tibetan Buddhist Institute in the winter of 1938. However, this seems a mistake since the Complete Works of Liang Shuming dates the visit to early 1940. Also, Liang said in his speech, later published by the Sound of the Sea Tide and inserted in the Complete Works, that he was coming then for the first time to the Han and Tibetan Buddhist Institute. 30 Taixu, Taixudashi quanshu, vol. 35, 30.

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The last words are clearly a response to Liang. Here, Taixu expressed his opinion that Buddhism could constitute a clear path for the modern world. He had therefore developed a new interpretation of the bodhisattva path, stating that it needed to provide germane solutions to the problems which were affecting people at that time. Taixu emphasized that Buddhahood was reached, not in spite of human suffering, but on the contrary, only through a direct engagement with it. Crises should not be feared, but welcomed. Liberation was reached not by cutting oneself off from suffering, but by transforming suffering from the inside, thereby progressing towards Buddahood. Buddhahood could therefore be reached not only by monks, but by Buddhist laypeople, because each of them had decided to remain in this world and tackle the problems of humanity. Taixu’s best answer to Liang’s doubts about the effectiveness of Buddhist engagement was simply to implement the program and then check its level of effectiveness by assessing its tangible results. Taixu still wanted to preserve the transcendent aspect of Buddhism. Engagement with the world was the basis for enlightenment, but it could not be an end in itself. Therefore, although monks would pursue an engagement with the world, they nevertheless had to remain committed to the sangha’s ideals and requirements, which would express this transcendence both to themselves and to laypeople. And so, Taixu differentiated between monks who would participate in culture, education and charity, and laypeople who would participate in politics, military, business, finance and labor, so that the country, society and the common people could benefit from Buddhism. As was stated above, Yinshun was among the monks who listened to Liang’s speech at the Sino-Tibetan Teaching Institute in 1940. Liang’s words had a strong impact on Yinshun, who then experienced a religious crisis, leading to him “having doubts and feeling extremely unsettled” (wuxin yishen shubu’an 吾心疑甚，殊不安).31 Sometime later, while studying Yogācāra and the Agama sūtras 阿含經, Yinshun came across the sentence “all Buddhas come from the human realm; ultimately they do not become Buddhas in heavens” (zhufo jie chu renjian zhongbuzaitianshang chengfoye 諸佛皆出人間，終不在天上成佛也). In other words, although there were ten directions and three worlds, the Buddhas accorded the earth with the highest level of importance and focused on human beings in the present. According to Yinshun’s own

31

Yinshun, Indian Buddhism, 1.

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account, when he understood the meaning of this sentence, he shed tears of joy. As we can see, Yinshun’s compassion was as strong as Liang’s. On the basis of Taixu’s Buddhism for Human Life, Yinshun came to develop his own notion: Buddhism for the human realm (renjian fojiao 人間佛教). In some ways, Yinshun’s concept was even more radical than Taixu’s. While Taixu emphasized the suitability of the human vehicle for modern times, he had not yet denied the existence of the other vehicles and even paid respect to them. In contrast, Yinshun came to believe that the human vehicle alone was the basis for obtaining Buddhahood. As Marcus Bingenheimer has stated, Taixu is much more inclusivistic regarding Buddhist deities, heavens, hells and devotional practices. Yinshun tends to qualify them at best as upāya, at worst as defiling true Buddhism by assimilating theistic concepts and practices.32

As we can see, Yinshun pushed modern Buddhism’s anthropocentric trend to a new level. Yinshun reduced Buddhism’s six traditional realms of existence to only one. Yinshun’s new brand of Buddhism may be understood to be a rationalist purification of the Buddhist discourse. Yet, unlike Yinshun, both Taixu and Liang Shuming resisted going in this direction, because they did not want to renounce to the richness of Buddhist cosmology which was, after all, a traditional means of expressing religious transcendence. Buddhism as Spirit or as Religion? Facing the challenge of Christianity and the marginalization of Buddhism in twentieth century China, Taixu envisioned constituting Buddhism as a modern organization which could implement an ethical and social program. While the center of Buddhist life has traditionally been local temples which are largely independent from each other, Taixu decided to set up Buddhist organizations that were centralized at the national level. These included the Association for the Advancement of Buddhism (Fojiao xiejinhui 佛教協進會) in 1912; the Buddhist Society of the Great Vow (Fojiao hongshihui 佛教弘誓會) in 1913; and Marcus Bingenheimer, “Some Remarks on the Usage of Renjian Fojiao,” in Development and Practice of Humanitarian Buddhism, Interdisciplinary Perspectives, edited by Hsu Mutsu, Chen Jinhua, and Lori Meeks (Hua-lien: Tzuchi University Press, 2007), 147. 32

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the League for the Support of Buddhism, (Weichi fojiao tongmenhui 維持 佛教同盟會), also in 1913.33 He envisioned the establishment of Buddhism in a form akin to the Christian Church, with an international network, so it could be an effective force in the globalizing world. In 1928, Taixu founded the World Buddhist Institute (Shijie foxueyuan 世 界佛學院) in Paris.34 He closely collaborated with the Guomindang regime in the establishment of Buddhism as a unified organization. During the war, he even placed patriotism at the foundation of Buddhist practice. In 1939 he toured East Asia on behalf of the Chinese government to gain support for the war effort from Buddhist communities in Burma, India, Ceylon and Malaysia.35 However, Taixu met strong resistance from these local Buddhist communities and he ultimately failed to realize his dream of a unified Buddhist organization. While the establishment of Buddhism as a modern religion made it more effective in social reform efforts, this came at a great cost, with many local traditions and practices being undermined and abandoned. As we saw in Chapter Three, Liang fully understood that the Western model of a centrally organized religious organization was not suitable for either Chinese society or for a religion of radical transcendence like Buddhism. Also, Liang opposed any control of religion by the state. In the case of Buddhism, Liang even rejected efforts at proselytization. For him, the religious question could be addressed by people only when they faced it. At times of national crisis, people were concerned with their own individual survival, with the survival of their family and friends, or with the survival of the country and the national culture. Most people had not yet developed the sensibility for suffering that could lead to renouncing the world, and so the Buddhist path was impossible for most individuals and for society at large. Still, Liang held that some individuals were more precocious than others, and could address religious questions for themselves. Consequently, there was no need to impress one’s own religious experience upon others, since in the end this would be ineffective. Buddhism entailed affective and moral experiences which could not be taught to anyone else. Liang believed that people generally lived in their own mental worlds and, even though they were interrelated, they could not truly communicate Pittman, Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism, 51, 77–76. Pittman, Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism, 120–122. 35 This is why Taixu was not present at the Han and Tibetan Buddhist Institute, his usual residence at that time, when Liang came to visit and give his talk. 33 34

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with one another. In this sense, there was no need to teach someone Buddhism. If an attempt was made to do so, it would only lead to confusion by making Buddhism appear to be just another ideology. Consequently, Liang refused to understand Buddhism as an organized religion in charge of disseminating a belief. He saw Buddhism, for the most part, as a religious spirit. In this sense, Liang’s view of religion was very individualistic. In many ways, he was like people today who affirm that they are spiritual but not religious, having personal experiences with transcendence but yet refusing any association with a religious group or Church. Liang’s religious spirit and Taixu’s collective form of religious piety therefore stand as two extremes. Liang’s Confucian Path of the Bodhisattva Taixu had a comprehensive approach to Buddhism, and maintained that it could be the main force which could drive modern society. Buddhism could resolve all the issues facing humanity, including material, social, moral and transcendent. For Taixu, none of these things were foreign to Buddhism, and instead represented a concrete path for reaching Buddhahood in the present age. By establishing a Buddhist society on earth, the human realm could become a Pure Land. In addition, Taixu represented institutional Buddhism and was committed to reforming Buddhism not only as a philosophical idea, but also as a social institution. In fact, Liang Shuming was not opposed to the discourse surrounding the modernization of Buddhism. He regarded Buddhism as compatible with modern science, and he himself used recent scientific theories to discuss it (for example, as it related to ether, relativity, and Darwinism). Liang also contributed to the installation of Buddhism into academic discourses. Yet, he maintained that Buddhism should not become involved in social or political activities, and was therefore opposed to humanistic Buddhism. Liang and Taixu came to oppose each other because of their different perspectives and social positions. As a philosopher, Liang had a specialized approach to Buddhism; he emphasized Buddhist transcendence and was concerned about diluting Buddhism’s religious message, and turning it into a form of worldly activism. Yet, it was to Liang’s credit that he did not descend into a kind of Gnosticism, and thereby congratulate himself on being one of the happy few who could attain liberation. He did not disregard the

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social reality, but instead came to advocate Confucianism as the social and cultural form which gave flesh and body to his faith, as we are going to see in the next chapter. While Taixu focused on institutional reforms, Liang was more interested in Buddhism’s spiritual message, and for him, preserving or strengthening Buddhist institutions was secondary. As we saw in Chapter Three, Liang considered a religion like Christianity to play an important role in social life. Therefore, why could Buddhism not play the same role? This is because Buddhism was, for Liang, a religion of transcendence. It was therefore essential to preserve Buddhism’s purity for eschatological times. It was vital for Liang to preserve Buddhism from secularization. Only after humanity had exhausted all the questions of this present life would it turn to face the painful question of its meaning. What, in the end, were all their struggles for? People will not find any answer. Then, realizing the inanity of these struggles, humanity will enter nirvāna. However, the period of eschatology would not necessarily take place at the end of history. In fact, this eschatological age was present throughout history, meaning it judges each moment. In this sense, each moment can be eschatological. Liang stood as a prophet who fully understood the course that humanity, of necessity, would run. He realized that the eschatological question was always present. At each moment in his social and political activism, Liang knew he would have to leave the world in order to open himself to the transcendent realm of Buddhahood. Yet, Liang believed that, at present, most people could not adopt such a view. He therefore decided to help them— not by introducing them to Buddhist transcendence—but by introducing them to the Confucian way of engaging with the world. As can be seen, Liang’s decision was historically situated and dictated by the struggle for national survival. However, under different circumstances, Liang may have made another choice. Had the nation already appropriated the spirit of renunciation that Liang stated was characteristic of India, then cultural and national survival would have not been an absolute necessity. In such a situation, people may have decided not to fight, pursuing instead the Buddhist path of renunciation. Having reached the end of this chapter, we can ponder the failure of Taixu’s Buddhist reforms. For Liang, such a failure was intrinsic to Buddhism. Yet, we could also argue that external causes played also an important role, since Taixu’s attempt to change the course of

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Chinese society was terminated with the onset of war and the rise of Communism. Under the Marxist regime, Buddhism was banned. Yet, the recent Buddhist revival, since the nineteen-eighties, could prove Liang wrong, since it seems that Buddhism can now, in a more peaceful and stable environment, contribute to social life and tackle the question of the relationship between society and religion anew. Yet, it is Liang’s great credit to remind that the religious quest should not be confused with worldly activism.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONFUCIAN MORALITY AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR RELIGION So far we have seen that Liang developed an original discourse centered on two kinds of religion: a Christian-type that was oriented toward society, and a Buddhist-type that was oriented toward radical transcendence. But what was Liang’s stance on the question of whether China had a religion? If religion was indeed a universal quest, how could China be without religion? For many scholars, China seemed unique, having either too many religions or none at all. In this chapter, we shall see that Liang developed his own understanding of China’s religions. He recognized the presence of popular religions in China. He compared them to the transcendent religion of Buddhism, to the social efficacy of Christianity and to the moral life of Confucianism. Compared to these three acceptable forms of religion, Liang judged Chinese popular religions to represent the lowest form, and that in fact, they should be discarded. Having pushed aside popular religion, Liang came to see Confucianism as its substitute. It was not quite a true religion, and yet it performed many of a religion’s functions. Liang showed his creativity and originality by developing Confucianism as this third type of religion, or quasi-religion, placing it at the mid-point between a Christian engagement with the world and the Buddhist drive to escape from it. The Dismissal of Chinese Popular Religions Because of his long involvement in rural China, it could not escape Liang that the country was replete with popular religions. The majority of Chinese people at that time practiced various forms of popular religion. Liang, like most intellectuals, harshly criticized and rejected these. Liang’s criticisms were of three kinds. The first category consisted of his scientific and rational critiques. Liang considered Chinese popular religion to be absurd and completely irrational from this perspective. His social criticisms comprised the second category. He felt that popular religions remained at a primitive level and were unable to

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reach a high state of socialization, as in Christianity. More specifically, Liang pointed out that popular religions resulted in a spirit of passivity, in which people petitioned the gods and waited for the results. When disasters occurred, they saw it as their destiny (tianyi 天意).1 This fatalism was not conducive to the reform of social structures. For Liang, local religious practices were unable to provide society with a wellstructured organization, and were significant factors contributing to the conservatism which hindered rural China’s social transformation. Yet for Liang, it was the third category of criticisms which were most important: popular religions developed low moral standards, especially selfishness. Liang expressed this view when he said that, Despite the progress of Chinese culture, the origin of its religion is in low motivations, such as praying to Wenchang 文昌 and Lü Dongbin 呂洞賓 for wealth, longevity and immortality.2

Since they were essentially concerned with earthly results, popular religions enclosed people in the small world of their immediate and personal interests, cutting them off from the moral realm in which one communicated with others and with the cosmic life. Liang explicitly criticized the Daoist priests ( fangshi 方士) who contributed, through their theories and practices, to the building up of these selfish attitudes.3 By worshiping different deities according to their needs, people did not develop a permanent bond of faithfulness to any of them, but instead used the gods as they wished. In brief, Liang criticized Chinese popular religions from the three normative elements of reason, moral life and social efficacy, and he finally considered them to be the lowest form of religion. Liang’s judgment reflected the opinion of contemporary elites. Though some Chinese intellectuals were able to cope with Christianity and Buddhism, they unanimously rejected popular religions. Since Liang’s time, our understanding of popular religions has changed significantly, and our judgments today are more balanced. Let us evaluate the three criticisms Liang addressed towards popular religion. First, on the question of reason, we could say that, from the point of view of structural anthropology, all “primitive” religions have their own internal logic and rationality, enabling individuals to insert themselves

1 2 3

Eastern and Western Culture and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 361. Eastern and Western Culture and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 423. Eastern and Western Culture and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 430.

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symbolically into a web of relationships. This kind of logic cannot be fully apprehended by the empirical sciences, yet it is not purely arbitrary, and it obeys certain rules. Second, from the perspective of the sociology of behavior, Liang judged popular traditions from the vantage-point of his idealized society in which the actions of individuals were directed toward benefiting society as a whole. However, when we realize that most social interactions at the local level were occurring by, and through, local religious associations, temples and confraternities, we cannot but feel that their disappearance in modern China was a great loss for society. Third, regarding morality, Liang overlooked the unconscious motivations of people praying for their own wealth or for longevity. If questioned further, worshippers may realize that they are praying not only for themselves but also for their family or for a larger group. The relationship they established with deities, such as Wenchang or Lü Dongbin, should not be considered purely mercantile, but as involving an affective dimension, such as feelings of respect and faithfulness to the deity, even if the petitions have not produced immediate results. Liang’s dismissal of Chinese popular religion therefore reflected the limited understanding of intellectuals. Indeed, Confucian orthodoxy usually looked down on religious polymorphism as difficult to understand and control. In the twentieth century, under the influence of Western rationalism, the dismissal of popular religions went one step further. Chinese intellectuals often functioned within the parameters of the Western religious paradigm. From this perspective, they regarded Chinese popular religions as a lower form of religion which should be eliminated. Confucian orthodoxy in Imperial China was able to tolerate popular religions, but Chinese intellectuals in the twentieth century, and in the modern Chinese state, decided to wipe them out. The state officially recognized five religions, and Chinese popular religions could not fit within this scheme. They were therefore simply banned. Today, the temples and activities of popular religions can exist only by being attached to one of the five official religions, and therefore their vitality is largely inhibited. China without Religion Despite the ubiquitous presence of popular religions in rural China, Liang sought to eliminate them from the picture because they did not match his criteria of what a religion should be. In this sense, Liang

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could say that China had no religion. In Substance of Chinese Culture, Liang listed fourteen characteristics of Chinese culture, and he boldly affirmed that “the absence of religion in Chinese culture” was one of them.4 In his book on social philosophy, religion was understood mostly as a religious organization modeled after Christianity. By affirming that China had no religion, Liang was saying that China lacked a religious organization like Christianity. As we have said in the first chapter, such an idea first originated in the minds of Jesuit missionaries in the seventeenth century, and was later accepted by thinkers of the European Enlightenment. At the turn of the twentieth century, Chinese intellectuals adopted this idea as a convenient way of demarcating themselves from the West. Clearly, both Westerners and Chinese, like Liang, were unaware of this intellectual history. With their rationalist and functionalist approach to religions, they concluded that China had none. Liang therefore saw the question of religion as a watershed issue between the West and China. He believed that although religion had been a part of human culture from the beginning, China had evolved in a completely different direction. Liang claimed that while Confucianism’s foremost concern was family life, in the West the Church was placed above the family, which made its inner structure very strong. As we saw in Chapter Three, Liang argued that internal and external religious conflicts had contributed to the shaping of a unified spirit, self-discipline and nationalism in Western society. Liang recognized that the West and India had developed two great religions, and he thought that a great culture like China should not be completely lacking in one. Therefore, with the aim of enhancing Chinese culture, he developed Confucianism as a substitute for religion. This was because he regarded it as performing the functions of a religion, yet also as having a fundamentally different nature, and as even being opposed to religion. The idea of a Chinese substitute for religion was first proposed by Cai Yuanpei in a famous lecture given at Peking University in 1917. In this, Cai stated that in China, aesthetics could and should take the place and function of religion. Liang was also influenced by Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 (1895–1990) who, as an historian of philosophy, expressed the idea that Confucianism had transformed ancient worship into “poetry” (shi 詩) and “art” ( yishu

4

Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 15.

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藝術).5 In 1918, Hu Shi developed the idea of Confucianism as a moral religion.6 In Substance of Chinese Culture, Liang combined these different approaches to form his own idea—that of Confucian morality as a substitute for religion. This was an important step in Liang’s views on religion. Liang had previously developed his understanding of the West as possessing a social religion, and of India having a transcendent religion. In 1949, he completed his trilogy on religion, establishing Confucianism as a substitute for it. Confucius’s Opposition to Traditional Worship Liang recognized that primitive culture in China, as elsewhere, was centered on religion.7 This kind of religion belonged to the infancy of humanity, since it was irrational and based on self-interest. However, Confucianism gave Chinese culture an orientation that was completely different to that of all other civilizations. This shift was related to the question of religion. In his Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, Liang had already argued that Confucianism could not be a religion since Confucius himself was opposed to it.8 In Substance of Chinese Culture, Liang elaborated further and expressed Confucius’s view of religion in a more systematic way. He began by quoting the American historian Lynn Thorndike, who affirmed that Confucius did not worship any deities.9 Liang reproduced quotes from the Analects that Thorndike had provided to support his claim. Interestingly, while discussing and presenting to the Chinese readership Confucius’s ideas on religion, Liang felt the need to refer to a Western scholar, implicitly recognizing him as an authority on the matter. This clearly shows that the debate on religion was dictated by a form of thought quite alien to China. With this evidence, Liang could thus repeat the conclusion he had already drawn in Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies: “Confucius was opposed to religion.”10

5 Liang quoted the History of Chinese Philosophy (1930–1934) by Feng Youlan. See Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 112–113. 6 See Hu Shi, Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy. 7 Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 97. 8 Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 469. 9 See Thorndike, Short History of Civilization. 10 Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 106.

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For Liang, religion was very much concerned with the supernatural, but Confucius never discussed “strange phenomena, physical exploits, disorder or spirits.”11 Liang therefore concluded that Confucius was opposed to religion. As I see it, Liang’s understanding of Confucius as “opposed” to religion is problematic. Indeed, it is difficult to deduct from Confucius’s silence that he was opposed to religion, or that he did not believe in the existence of spirits and ghosts. Scholars who paint Confucius as a secular thinker or an atheist are only imposing later categories which have nothing to do with Confucius. From the Analects, we can only gather that religion was not at the heart of his message. In Substance of Chinese Culture, Liang stated that, for Confucius, the root problem of religion was not its irrationality, but its immorality. Religion was spurred onwards by self-interest. Those consumed by self-interest discarded their moral cultivation and neglected their relations with others. Such people were unable to face their own moral duties, becoming distant and cold towards others. What they should have searched for within human relations, they now searched for outside. They pinned their hopes on the intervention of external powers, expecting supernatural help from deities. Cut from correct human relationships, worshipers of deities looked to their own immediate advantage and lived in a world of fantasies. Finally, the worshipper ended up building irrational beliefs. Interestingly, Liang believed that the major problem with the worship of deities was of a moral, rather than rational, nature. The worship of deities destroyed Confucian benevolence (ren 仁). Because people deserted ren and craved external things, they wrongly believed in the existence of deities who could fulfill their requests. In other words, though their worship was irrational, the root problem was not intellectual but moral. People first deviated from correct moral attitudes and then developed wrong ideas, rather than the reverse. This analysis was purely Confucian and differed from the epistemological stance of Buddhism, which held that people suffered because in their minds they first construed the existence of a real self, and a real world.12

Confucius, Analects, 7.20. As we have seen in chapter 4, Liang held that the search for Buddhist enlightenment started with an existential and moral crisis. 11 12

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Confucianism as a Substitute for Religion In China, after the Duke of Zhou and Confucius, the center of culture shifted to non-religious education. The previous worship of heaven and ancestors, as well as other forms of religion, became only one aspect of education. In the new setting, attention shifted to the family, rather than the temple. Liang therefore contrasted the communitycentered life of Christianity in the West with the family-centered life of China. This created two different cultures—one of religion and one of non-religion. Liang held that Confucianism had a spirit that religion could not have: the conviction that everyone had moral reason, a “sense of what is right and wrong” (shifei zhixin 是非之心).13 Therefore, while religion called for all believers to observe certain religious tenets, Confucianism emphasized self-examination and did not set a universal standard. Liang explained: Moral reasoning is about morality, and it exists in the self-consciousness and self-discipline of every human being. But religion is about faith. This is manifested in a strict observance of the religious rules which are placed on the believer, and in the respect towards religious disciplines.14

Liang then resoundingly praised Confucius: What a high spirit this is! Even if humanity were to progress 10,000 years, I’m afraid it could not go beyond this.15

As mentioned above, when faced with the question of worship, Confucius did not argue about whether deities existed or not, but instead chose to keep silent, inviting reflection. By returning to moral reason, people could experience a fundamental unity with the moral life of the cosmos, and obtain consolation and peace from this. What people were previously tempted to obtain from the outside, they now realized was within themselves. In this way, Confucian morality could perform the psychological function of providing consolation, which Liang had assigned to religion. Confucianism could thus be understood as a religion, since it granted individuals a deep sense of consolation through an active participation in the life of the cosmos. Yet Liang held that

13 14 15

See Mencius, Gaozi, A. Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 108. Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 107.

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Confucianism was not a religion in the ordinary sense of the term, since it was not established on the basis of irrational beliefs. In this sense, Liang could affirm that Confucianism “was like a religion, but was not religion.”16 In Substance of Chinese Culture, Liang forcefully expressed the view that the Confucian path made traditional religions obsolete, or as he stated, that “morality replaced religion” ( yi daode dai zongjiao 以道德代宗教).17 For Liang, Confucianism did not require one to believe in a creed or deity, but to turn inward and reflect upon oneself. This path was quite demanding, and some may prefer to follow the external regulations, stable beliefs and mechanical rituals of traditional religions. Yet it was only by turning inward that people could develop their moral reason. Liang mentioned in his last work that “religion is a method of helping people uplift their own ethos, but morality requires people to express their ethos directly.”18 Clearly, Liang understood religion to be a tool for uplifting one’s moral life, and that Confucianism had no need for such a tool. Confucius’s Method in Transforming Traditional Worship into Morality For Liang, the “genius” of Confucius was to turn religion into morality. In a sense, Confucius reformed religion, or even subverted it. Rather than speak against religion and appear as a declared opponent of religious practices that he may have judged defective, instead, Confucius pointed to the necessity of cultivating the self. However, it was not enough to say that Confucius shifted Chinese culture from traditional worship to ethics. It is more important to show how this shift could have happened. And here, Liang’s views were quite penetrating. First, Liang showed the new meaning that Confucius had given to rituals, and second, he envisioned these changes as part of a long historical process, which had started much earlier than Confucius. First, Liang explained how the transformation from religion to morality had occurred within the traditional religious rites. In these, the worshipper and the object of worship stood in clear and distant opposition. On the contrary, Confucian rituals allowed this gap to be

16 17 18

Eastern and Western cultures and Their philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 417. Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 95. Human Mind and Human Life, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 704.

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bridged, and for the worshipper to be introduced to the fundamental harmony in oneself and in the cosmos. In Confucian rituals, human beings could fully participate in the cosmic life, becoming united with heaven and earth. Some solemn rituals at temples could realize this, but for Liang, the whole of human life was to be ritualized, becoming a great liturgy. This included one’s familial relations with one’s parents and siblings, and at school between teachers and students. Most importantly, rites should not express division, but rather a harmony which embraced the self and the cosmos, so that eventually the ideals of “rituals without rituals” (wuli zhi li 無禮之禮) and “music without sound” (wusheng zhi yue 無聲之樂) were realized.19 Liang’s explanation of the Confucian rites was influenced by the cosmological language of Neo-Confucianism, and yet it perfectly reflected Confucius’ understanding of rituals, not as religious sacrifices paid to some deities or to some supernatural forces, but as the moral and esthetical expression of a fundamental harmony among human beings.20 Thus, Liang’s philosophical contribution was to explain how the transformation from worship to morality occurred within the rituals themselves. Besides this shift in the meaning and function of rites, Liang stressed a second element which is quite helpful for understanding the passage from religion to ethics—the long historical process which started before Confucius. In Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, Liang had already stated that Chinese culture had taken the path of inner morality at an early stage. He even considered this to have been “too early,” since at that time China had not developed a strong material basis for society. Liang referred to this as the “precocity” (zaoshu 早熟) of Chinese culture.21 In Substance of Chinese Culture, Liang proposed a more detailed historical explanation of the shift from ritual worship to morality. He stated that, The transformation of the ancient religion into rituals obviously went through a process, and people before [Confucius] had probably made significant contributions to it.22

Liang stressed the importance of the Duke of Zhou, and associated him with Confucius, and therefore talked about the “rites of the Duke

19 20 21 22

Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 131. See Anne Cheng, Histoire de la Pensée Chinoise (Paris, Seuil, 1997), 68–71. Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 526. Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 115.

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of Zhou and Confucius” (Zhoukong zhi li 周孔之禮). In other words, the transformation of traditional rites had undergone a long educational process. People continued to practice the ancient rituals toward heaven and the ancestors, but they progressively gave them new meanings. Liang’s hypothesis about the slow transformation of rituals has been confirmed by recent discoveries and modern research. In Ancient Religion and Morality, Professor Chen Lai distinguishes between two historical transformations in ancient China: first, a change from the Xia dynasty’s culture of witchcraft to the sacrificial culture of the Shang dynasty, and then a second change to the ritualistic culture of the Zhou dynasty. Regarding this lengthy transformational process, Chen has written: The ritualistic culture of the Western Zhou constitutes the soil of Confucianism. The thought of the Western Zhou provided Confucius and the early Confucians with an important basis for their worldview, political philosophy and morality. In this sense, there was Confucian thought before Confucius. At the same time, Western Zhou culture was the result of a long evolutionary [process extending back] through three [previous] dynastic cultures. [It] had passed through a culture of witchcraft, a sacrificial culture, and then developed into a ritualistic culture. From a primitive religion, it became a religion of nature and then developed into a moral religion, creating a thick layer [of fertile ground] for Confucius and the early Confucians.23

As we can see, Chen Lai agrees with Liang Shuming. Confucius did not give a new and radical meaning to the ancient rituals all at once. His contribution was to express a cultural change which had started before him, but which was not fully accepted by all. Confucius inherited the meanings of the rituals. For Liang, Confucius’s specific contribution was not his interpretation of the rites, but his teaching on social positions (lunli mingfen 倫理名分).24 Liang also stated that Xunzi had expressed the nature of the Confucian rituals most clearly: the common people were mistaken when they thought that rituals were addressed to deities, but the noble man ( junzi 君子) understood that rituals were like ornaments (wen 文)—that is, the refined expressions

Chen Lai 陳來, Gudai zongjiao yu lunli 古代宗教與倫理 [Ancient Religion and Morality] (Beijing: Sanlian shudian 三聯書店, 1996), 16. For a brief presentation of Chen Lai’s ideas, see John Makeham, Lost Soul, 286–287. 24 Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 115. 23

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of an inner attitude of respect.25 Therefore, the rites did not stress the objective presence of a divinity, but the state of mind of the sacrificer.26 Since he perceived Confucianism to be a form of moralism, Liang understood the whole of Chinese antiquity to be agnostic. He regarded Laozi and Zhuangzi’s philosophical Daoism to be a combination of atheism and materialism.27 He also expressed his agreement with Wang Zhixin 王治心 (1881–1968), a scholar in religious studies who recognized that Mohism had a strong religious dimension, but that it disappeared as an orthodox school during the Han dynasty, while the popular worship of heaven persevered only in the lower social classes.28 Like many intellectuals at this time, Liang considered the terms “religion” and “morality” to be mutually exclusive and in opposition. Yet we can clearly see that Liang’s notion of morality was permeated by a strong religiosity. We shall evaluate Liang’s dichotomy between religion and morality below. Let us first see, however, how he inserted a Confucian morality into a Buddhist soteriology. Confucian Ethics Justified by a Buddhist Soteriology Yogācāra recognizes two modes of cognition: biliang and xianliang. In order to align Yogācāra epistemology with his theory of the three cultures, Liang had to introduce a third mode of cognition, which he first called intuition (zhijue), and then moral reason (lixing). This enabled Liang to adapt the Yogācāra theory of the three natures of cognition into a soteriological scheme with three specific stages: a Western stage, a Confucian stage and a Buddhist stage. Let us recall here what the three natures are. Yogācāra recognizes three natures of cognition which are based on their different modes. The first two natures correspond to the two kinds of hindrance that the mind needs to overcome: the nature of existence according to the

25 Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 113; Xunzi, “Tianlunpian 天論篇 [Chapter on Heaven]”: “故君子以為文，而百姓以為神.” 26 Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 113; Xunzi, “Lilunpian 禮論篇 [Chapter on Rite]”: “祭者，志意思慕之情也.” 27 Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 106. 28 Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 106; see Wang Zhixin 王治心, Zhongguo zongjiao sixiang dagang 中國宗教思想大綱 [Outline of Chinese Religious Thought] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1933).

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discriminating mind, and the nature of existence as dependently arisen. The third nature, the nature of existence being perfectly accomplished, corresponds to the perfection of cognition. According to Liang, the fundamental basis of Western culture was biliang. This contributed to the strengthening of the first hindrance, which was itself created by the discriminating mind. Liang developed the idea that the Confucian intuition, or moral reason, could effectively neutralize the first hindrance. As such, the moral mind would still operate in the world, but without any attachment to it. In fact, we can easily trace Liang’s idea back to Zhang Taiyan. In his first essay, Treatise on Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt, Liang had already emphasized the necessity of overcoming the first hindrance. He quoted from Zhang Taiyan’s Establishing a Religion, which stated that the mind should overcome “existence and nothingness, self and other, subject and object, essence and function, one and two, presence and absence, birth and death, discontinuity and continuity, coming and leaving, cause and effect, and all other illusory differences.”29 In his following works, Liang specifically assigned such a task to Confucianism. At this stage, the perceived reality, especially human reality, was still structured according to differences, but these were morally neutralized by Confucian intuition. The discriminating mind continued to establish legitimate distinctions between the noble man and the petty man, or between the five basic ethical relationships (father-son, ruler-minister, and so on). However, the moral mind, through Confucian intuition, recognized these distinctions for what they were, and refrained from creating divisions. On the contrary, it established a basic relational unity. Being perfectly free from attachments, the mind could communicate beyond distinctions and realize unity, or as Liang stated, Human beings follow forms and cannot avoid making distinctions between this and that, but the mind can become an entity that is one with everything, allowing the cosmos to communicate without separation, despite its vastness.30

Liang’s idea reflects the moral metaphysics of Neo-Confucianism, according to which one can go beyond the distinctions made between oneself and the world. This metaphysics finds its roots in the thought

29 Treatise on Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 9. About Establishing a Religion, see chapter 2 of this volume. 30 Treatise on Differences and Similarities, in Complete Works, Vol. 7, 159.

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of Confucius, about whom it is reported: “there were four things from which the Master was entirely free. He had no foregone conclusions, no arbitrary predeterminations, no obstinacy, and no egoism.”31 Precisely because Confucius realized the ontological unity between the human mind and the cosmos, he could overcome the mundane distinctions arising from self-centeredness and egoism. Though Liang held that Confucianism could solve the hindrance created by the discriminating mind, he acknowledged that Confucianism was unable to solve the second obstacle. Indeed, the moral mind was still supported by the physical and mental world. Even though the mind did not create further attachments to the world or to itself, it became aware of itself through the world. In other words, the mind still needed the objectivity of the world in order to rise to the level of consciousness. Though the moral dichotomy between the self and the world has been overcome, the ontological dichotomy is still present and needs to be overcome. It was at this level that Buddhism made its contribution: cutting through the nature of existence as dependently arisen, and reaching the ultimate nature of existence. As we can see, Liang used the epistemological framework of Buddhism, but differentiated between a moral function of the mind which was best performed by Confucianism, and a transcendent function, which could only be performed by Buddhism. I would like to underline the fact that the whole process was based on the moral life of the mind. In the first stage, the root problem was essentially experienced as a moral one. The hindrance caused by the differentiating mind was not so much epistemological but moral. Therefore, the solution was not so much for the mind to know, in an intellectual sense, that the differences it had established were illusory, but rather to directly experience its fundamental moral nature, without recourse to intellectual analysis. Concerning the second stage, as we saw in Chapter Four, the decision to pursue Buddhist liberation was stimulated by feelings of compassion which were clearly Confucian. It was not the direct experience of one’s own suffering, but the moral experience of witnessing the suffering of others that ultimately led to the pillars of existence itself being toppled. The resolution of this moral crisis allowed one to enter into a fundamental unity with others and with the cosmos as a whole,

31

Confucius, Analects, 9.4.

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in which all divisions were utterly abolished. Therefore, for Liang, Buddhist epistemology was driven by Confucian morality, and by the moral unity of all beings. An exacerbation of Confucian feelings led one to search for a transcendent reality outside the present world. Attachment to the Self as a Form of Creativity For Liang, the attachment to the self (zhiwo 執我) was not totally negative and he regarded it somewhat ambivalently, unlike in Buddhism. On one hand, as in Buddhism, attachment to the self hindered one’s final awakening, since it created the illusion of a permanent self and left one a prisoner of sa sāra. But on the other hand, Liang understood attachment to the self as a form of creativity that shaped the world. He asserted that “the attachment to the self is the source of all life’s activities.”32 Such a statement was not at all aligned with Buddhism. Yet Liang saw the apparition of the self as playing a positive role in the life of the world: “from the origin of life up to the appearance of human beings, there is nothing which has appeared that was not a development of the self.”33 Therefore, Liang opened up a space in which the self could undergo a process of creative development. This was not the material world fabricated by humans, but the moral realm where human beings expressed their inner nature, along the lines of Wang Yangming’s philosophy of the mind. The moral mind had an innate ability to know good and evil, without having to think about it. At the ontological level, the mind was established as a metaphysical reality encompassing the whole universe, both natural and human. For Liang, Confucianism did not seek to break off the supports of life, of the world or of the mind itself. Instead, the human mind could, at any time, develop itself as an ever new creative force, without producing any attachment. In claiming that consciousness, as intuition, was not necessarily flawed, Liang departed from Buddhism in general and Yogācāra in particular. He interpreted intuition as a positive moral force involved in creating the world, stating that “the mind comprises the entire entity of life, and all of life’s activities come entirely from moral intentions.”34

32 33 34

Human Mind and Human Life, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 709. Human Mind and Human Life, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 712. Human Mind and Human Life, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 709.

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Therefore, when the self opened up to the principle of creativity at work in the cosmos, it had already vanquished its fundamental egoism. Confucianism as the Quasi-Religion Needed in the Present Time For Liang, Confucianism was not a religion like Christianity since it lacked a strong social cohesiveness, nor a religion like Buddhism since it did not address the ultimate question. Yet Liang considered Confucianism to be like a religion since it performed psychological and moral functions for the individual and for the community. Here, Liang drew mostly from the Song and Ming Neo-Confucians for whom the personal inner heart could be enlarged to the dimensions of the moral cosmos, enabling humans to achieve real freedom within the world. Through moral reasoning, individuals could apprehend the movements of the cosmic life, and could embrace its flux. By balancing their inner moral feelings with reason, they could be associated with the pace of the cosmos. Therefore, Liang once more distinguished between the specific roles of Buddhism and Confucianism, explaining: We cannot but distinguish between two aspects: the essence of the cosmic life in its state of flux, and its essence in the state of tranquility and unconditionality, neither arising nor ceasing. These two aspects are neither identical not distinct. [They are] two but still one, one but still two. The Confucian way deals mainly with the first [i.e., essence in the state of flux] and Buddhism with the second [i.e., essence in the state of tranquility and unconditionality].35

In other words, transcendence and immanence constituted one reality, yet this unique reality could be cognized in its two dimensions. Buddhism was best at dealing with the transcendent dimension, in states of tranquility and unconditionality, which Liang considered to be ultimate and absolute. Yet, Liang acknowledged that the life of the cosmos and of human society was in state of flux, and that this dimension was best addressed, not by Buddhism, but by Confucianism. Here, Liang showed that he took the patient workings of time and human history seriously. Even though the final awakening was always

35

Human Mind and Human Life, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 660.

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potentially present at each moment in the process, it was only by dealing with history that the final awakening could be reached. Confucianism could not overcome inborn attachments because it was grounded in the present world, and the moral mind should not cut off the support on which it relied to develop. Confucianism did, however, enable humans to find spiritual harmony in the world. And so, Liang held that it was Confucianism which was the best way to prepare for the question of transcendence. First, Confucianism overcame the fundamental egoism of the self by establishing an avenue of communication with the cosmos. Second, it overcame the discriminating mind’s attachment to the mistaken ideas of the self and the world, reestablishing a basic unity between the mind and its experiences. For Liang, Confucius had laid down a middle path between Christianity and Buddhism. Only Confucianism could truly know the inner heart. The Confucian project here pursued a line and depth of questioning similar to religions, providing intellectual and affective answers. But it was not a religion in the sense that it did not postulate external revelations or otherworldly realms (unlike Christianity), nor did it lead to a radical transcendence from within (unlike Buddhism). Liang therefore saw Confucianism as a quasi-religion—something that was “not a religion, but yet [was] like a religion.”36 As we can see, Confucian morality did not consist of performing good actions, or of getting nice feelings about doing so. As in NeoConfucianism, morality was a deep part of human nature and introduced us to what we may call a spiritual, or even religious, experience. Though Liang established morality as a substitute for religion, we cannot help but think this morality was indeed deeply religious and capable of leading to a kind of transcendence. Of course, this was not the Buddhist transcendence which reached the essence of the cosmic life in a state of tranquility through a radical renunciation of the world. It was an immanent transcendence, in which one became united to the cosmic life in its state of flux. Therefore, for Liang, Confucianism was relevant in two ways. First, it provided the modern age with an alternative to conventional religion, by developing self-reflection, introspection and the inner life. Although the individual was always in danger of being swallowed by the artificiality and superficiality of modern society, in Confucianism

36

Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 417.

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one could find a moral quest, and an ethical practice, which gave one inspiration and direction. By fulfilling our moral duties towards one another, one penetrated further into the true meaning of life. Not only did individuals thus uplift their moral lives, they also entered into an aesthetic and spiritual experience. Second, Confucianism was relevant in the sense that it directly prepared one’s mind to turn inward, and prepare for a final enlightenment that would require even more lucidity and courage. As we have seen in this chapter, for Liang, humanity began with primitive religion. The three civilizations of the West, China and India, however, subsequently took divergent paths. These were dictated by their different religious attitudes. The West built upon primitive religion to develop Christianity, which was a powerful tool for shaping and controlling society. In contrast, China discarded the externalities of religion at an early stage, and went on to develop, in Confucianism, a form of education centered on ritual. Finally, India focused on radical transcendence, and developed in Buddhism a religion of renunciation. Liang advocated Confucianism for the modern world, where the above three cultures were coming into close contact for the first time, because he believed that during this stage, humanity should rely on Confucian moral reasoning. Therefore, Liang envisioned the modern age not as shaped by religion (neither the religion of the West nor the religion of India), but as being shaped by morality. For him, humanity was entering into the ethical age. Although Liang’s language was somewhat constrained by a narrow conception of religion, his moral ideas were imbued with a deep spirituality and a strong religious dimension. Liang was very much aware that the moral life could not be reduced to the performance of good deeds, but rather was unbounded, like the moral life of the cosmos itself. We should not forget, however, that when this moral reason had developed to a certain stage, an answer to the question of the ultimate meaning of life would be found only through Buddhist renunciation.

CHAPTER NINE

RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF LIANG’S PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIVES The previous chapters have presented Liang’s views on religion. His ideas can stand for themselves, quite independently from Liang the man. They form a system of religious thought which includes elements of anthropology, philosophy and sociology of religion. By virtue of the universality of the problems he tackled, Liang’s religious thought transcended the circumstances in which he wrote about them, and have a significance which extends beyond twentieth-century China. Yet, for Liang, the act of thinking was never disconnected from one’s life in the world. Questions emerged as a result of the difficulties one encountered in life—difficulties which needed to be addressed at the intellectual level. And so religion was for him not an abstract idea. At the personal level, he was moved by a strong religious quest, which arose in his early twenties when he came to understand the suffering and impermanence of the world. His thirst for personal liberation ( jietuo 解脫) was intimately associated with his hopes regarding the liberation of the whole of humanity. He engaged in academic teaching and research, and through this developed a moral and religious ideal based on Buddhism and Confucianism. Never separating theory from practice, Liang implemented his ideals in his life and actions. In this final chapter, we will look first at Liang’s personal religious practice, and then consider his rural reconstruction efforts as a religious movement. In order to understand his personal and public lives, we shall make use of a wealth of material, including his autobiographies, interviews, his morning talks to students (chaohua) and his personal diary. In these documents, Liang spoke about himself, reflected upon the evolution of his life, and explained the meaning of his decisions and actions. For obvious reasons, I will begin from the most inner dimensions of Liang. First, I shall attempt to grasp the calling or vocation that Liang received in his early age. Liang himself attempted to clarify for himself and for others the direction of his life and we shall look therefore at his motivation in narrating his life so frequently. Within his self-narratives, the stories of his different conversions deserve special attention. We

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shall see the roles played by the Buddhist and Confucian scriptures and by the Tantric rituals in his religious practice. We shall also briefly touch upon Liang’s family life, diet and belief in reincarnation. The second part of this chapter will explain how Liang could grow, out of this personal practice, a very distinctive attitude in his engagement within the world of politics and social work. Liang’s Calling None of Liang’s biographers have failed to notice his strong personality. Further information on his personality can be gleaned from his writings, speeches, and interviews. In middle school, he did not often fraternize with his classmates, and always maintained his independence. He felt set apart from others, and that he had a special destiny.1 This character trait manifested itself during his education. Although Liang attended school, he preferred self-study, and to choose his own books and magazines.2 He was not easily influenced by his teachers or the education system. Throughout his life, Liang never gave up this independence of thought. He absorbed many ideas from others, but he submitted them to critique and developed his own views. Liang’s independent character did not mean that he was aloof from others. On the contrary, Liang was sensitive to those around him. He could not stand the suffering caused by violence or social injustice, and therefore embraced the ideals of a society without private ownership.3 He attempted to solve the problems of human suffering, social injustice and cultural survival. This combination of an independent personality and an acute sense of responsibility toward others underlay Liang’s belief that he had been imparted with a unique salvific mission, and that he alone could save the country. During his rural reconstruction project, he stated: China needs someone who can point out, through his words, a direction for us all, and whose heart and actions can be trusted by everyone.4

1 Ma Yong 馬勇, Liang Shuming sixiang qiren 梁漱溟思想奇人 [Liang Shuming, an Extraordinary Thinker] (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2008), 14. 2 Ibidem, 15. 3 See the text of a conference in Shandong in 1923, in Complete Works, vol. 4, 734–739. 4 Chaohua 朝話 [Morning Talks], in Complete Works, Vol. 2, 47.

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Liang believed himself to be such a person. He even said: My [own] self-confidence can easily become the collective confidence of everyone [else], and my courage can transform everyone’s discouragement.5

When Japan invaded Hong Kong, Liang had to flee on a small boat to mainland China. Regarding this dangerous situation, he remarked with some humor: I believe that my safety depends on my destiny (tianming 天命). I cannot die, because if I die, Heaven and Earth will change color, and history will alter its direction. In order for the Chinese nation to be revived, I have to write my third book [i.e. Substance of Chinese Culture]. I have not yet finished writing it, and so I surely cannot die now.6

Liang’s Multiple Self-Narratives Liang began to write about himself from an early age, and he continued this practice for the remainder of his life. In fact, Liang started his first family biography in 1925 at the age of 32, when he edited and published the notes that his father, Liang Ji 梁濟, had written before his suicide in 1918. In the preface to this work, Liang expressed a deep sense of remorse concerning his father, and the feeling that he had not been filial.7 Liang dealt with his guilt by editing his father’s notes. Clearly, the suicide of his father had a strong impact on Liang’s psyche. We have self-narratives from four periods of Liang’s life: the years between 1932 and 1935, during the rural reconstruction program; the years between 1940 and 1942, during the war; the years between 1969 and 1979, during the Cultural Revolution; and finally, the years between 1980 and 1988, during China’s opening-up. Let us briefly review the documents that are available from each of these four periods. When Liang was just over forty years old, he gave a series of four talks about himself (between January 3 and January 6, 1934) to his

Ibidem. Website of the Research Center on Historical Figures, of Peking University http://www.renwu.org/dnews.jsp?id=315, consulted on April 1, 2010. 7 Guilin Liang xiansheng yishu 桂林梁先生遺書 [The Testament of Mr. Liang of Guilin], in Complete works, Vol. 1, 593–596. 5 6

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associates in the rural reconstruction program. The talks were published the same year with the title Autobiography (Zishu 自述), as an appendix to the Collected Papers on Rural Reconstruction (Xiangcun jianshe lunwenji 鄉村建設論文集).8 In these, Liang demonstrated that he had a clear vision of the history of his intellectual development. He distinguished between three periods: the “period of utilitarianism” (from the ages of 14 to 19), the “Buddhist period” (from the ages of 20 to 29) and a “Confucian period” (from the age of 29 onwards).9 Besides these four presentations between 1932 and 1935, Liang gave informal talks to his students almost every day at dawn, in a religious atmosphere. These talks, which were published for the first time in 1937 under the name Morning Talks (Chaohua 朝話), contain many of Liang’s reflections on his life.10 During the war, Liang also gave various accounts of his life. As mentioned in Chapter Seven, in 1940 he gave a short speech to the Buddhist monks at the Sino-Tibetan Teaching Institute in Chongqing. This speech was published that same year in the Sound of the Sea Tide, entitled My Past (Wo de guoqu 我的過去).11 In 1942, at the age of 49, Liang wrote his first autobiography, Short Story of My Self-learning.12 As in his earlier Autobiography, this covered the period of his youth up to 1921, when he turned 28 and when Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies was published. This autobiography added some details which had not been mentioned previously. In 1969, at the age of 76, Liang wrote, apparently for himself, an intellectual biography of his youth: Self-Narrative about the Two Transformations and Changes in My Early Thought.13 At this time, Liang was working on the seventh chapter of Human Mind and Human Life, and he needed to clarify for himself his positions on Western thought, Buddhism and Confucianism. He adopted a chronology similar to that used in Morning Talks, dividing his intellectual progress into three periods. This piece contains many biographical elements, as well as accounts of more academic developments. Ten years later, Liang added an Autobiography, in Complete works, Vol. 2, 1–34. Autobiography, in Complete Works, Vol. 2, 9. 10 Morning Talks, in Complete Works, Vol. 2, 36–140. 11 Wo de guoqu 我的過去 [My Past], in Complete works, Vol. 6, 68–73. 12 Liang, Wodezixue xiaoshi 我的自學小史 [Short Story of My Self-Learning], in Complete Works, Vol. 2, 661–699. 13 Liang, Zishu zaoniansisiang zhi zaizhuan zaibian 自述早年思想之再轉再變 [SelfNarration about the Two Transformations and Changes in My Early Thought], in Complete Works, Vol. 7, 177–184. 8 9

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appendix to this, which was entitled: “A key element in the evolution of my early thought” (“Wo zaonian sixiang yanbian de yida guanjian” 我早年思想演變的一大關鍵).14 In this, Liang explained that his father had providentially not required him read the Chinese classics. Liang’s ignorance regarding the Confucian classics later allowed him to discover Confucianism’s true essence, because he could then compare it to Western and Buddhist thought. Finally, at the end of his life Liang gave a series of interviews, which were later published, and are important for understanding the evolution of his thought. Guy Alitto, after completing and then publishing his doctoral thesis on Liang, went to China and completed two rounds of interviews with him in 1980 and in 1984. He met with Liang more than ten times and recorded the interviews on 30 cassette tapes. These tapes were later transcribed, and some excerpts were published in 1993, after Liang’s death.15 An important interview was also conducted in 1986 by Wang Zongyu 王宗昱, a professor of philosophy at Peking University, and published that same year.16 Another, more extensive interview, was conducted by the journalist Wang Donglin 汪東林 and published in 1988, the year of Liang’s death.17 In each instance, Liang spoke or wrote about himself at the invitation of collaborators, friends, fellow teachers and journalists. He accepted these invitations, not because he sought the limelight, but because he wanted to provide people with a model to emulate. In fact, one is struck by how often Liang engaged in deep reflection on his life. He was able to identify some important and decisive moments, such as his experiences of religious conversion, which gave his life new meaning. 14 Liang, Self-Narration about the Two Transformations and Changes in My Early Thought, in Complete Works, Vol. 7, 184–185. 15 Meiguo xuezhe Aikai xiansheng Fangtanjilu Tiyao 美國學者艾凱先生訪談記錄提要 [Excerpts of the Recorded Interview with the American Scholar Alitto], in Complete Works, Vol. 8, 1137–1178; hereafter: Interview with Alitto. The interview was published as an independent volume under the title: Zhege shijie hui hao ma 這個世界會好嗎 [Is This World Becoming Better?], (Donfang chubanshe 東方出版社, 2006). 16 Wang Zongyu 王宗昱: “Shi rujia, haishi fojia—lun Liang Shuming xiansheng 是儒家，還是佛家？——訪梁漱溟先生 [Buddhism or Confucianism, Interview with Liang Shuming],” Zhongguo wenhua yu Zhongguo zhexue 中國文化與中國哲學 [Chinese Culture and Chinese Philosophy] 1 (1986): 560–565. 17 Liang Shuming wenda lu 梁漱溟問答錄 [Records of Questions and Answers of Liang Shuming] (Hunan Chubanshe 湖南出版社, 1988). The book was published the same year in Hong Kong by Sanlian Shudian 三聯書店. In mainland China, the book was reprinted in 1991 by Hunan Chubanshe and, in 2004, by Hubei Chubanshe 湖北 出版社.

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We also have Liang’s diary, which covers a span of almost 50 years, from 1932 to 1981. Between 1932 and 1939, his notes are very brief, and only mention his movements. From 1939 onwards, he wrote quite detailed daily records.18 Having reviewed this documentation, let us now examine what it reveals about Liang’s religious life in more detail. Narrating His Conversion to Buddhism Liang’s conversion to Buddhism was progressive. He described it as having taken place in stages: Around the age of sixteen [in the year 1909], I shifted from a utilitarian analysis and vision to a reflection on ‘suffering’ and ‘happiness.’ I concluded that [to have a] human life was to understand suffering, and I was therefore progressively leaning toward the other-worldly thinking of India. At the age of seventeen, I rejected the marriage arrangement my mother had prepared for me. At the age of twenty, I started to eat vegetarian food, and was looking for Buddhist sūtras to read.19

Liang’s interest in Buddhism was therefore, from the beginning, very personal. His own experiences were his starting point, and he found in Buddhism something he could use to explain them. One unique feature of Liang’s Buddhist development was that he first committed himself to a Buddhist way of life (by embracing celibacy and vegetarianism), and then started learning about Buddhism in a more systematic way by reading Buddhist classics (Fodian 佛典). While he cultivated his interest in Buddhism, between the ages of sixteen (1909) and twenty (1912), he became engaged in political activism with the aim of “saving the country.” Political idealism led him to become a journalist after completing secondary school at the age of 19. He subsequently joined revolutionary organizations which aimed at overthrowing the imperial regime. For three years, Liang was split between worldly political activism, and the Buddhist search for ultimate truth, which necessitated renouncing the world. Liang could not reconcile the two paths, creating an inner tension.20

Diary, in Complete Works, Vol. 8, 389–1136. Short Story of My Self-Learning, in Complete Works, Vol. 2, 691. 20 Some, like Taixu, could perfectly hold together their Buddhist faith and practice with revolutionary activities. 18 19

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At the height of his revolutionary fever, around the time of the 1911 revolution, Liang Shuming went into a deep depression. He attempted to commit suicide twice. The first time was at the end of 1911, and the second time was at the end of 1912, shortly after the death of his mother. Liang could only begin to discuss his suicide attempts twentyfive years later.21 It was then that he wrote about what had motivated these attempts at suicide, and when he mentioned a deep aversion for the suffering of others. He recalled having seen an old man pulling a rickshaw in a Beijing street and who was forced by the passengers to speed up. Liang also recalled seeing someone being beaten by the police. Liang could not stand these situations. He wept and, in his own words, “nearly lost his mind” ( jihu fafeng 幾乎發瘋).22 Liang’s experiences accorded with the Buddhist notion of suffering, and were akin to Gautama Buddha stepping out of his palace and encountering an old person, a sick person and a decaying corpse. However, Liang, at this stage, did not embrace Buddhism as a way of alleviating his trauma. His true conversion to Buddhism occurred later, between the years of 1913 and 1916, during a process of spiritual and psychological reconstruction. He almost completely withdrew from society and stayed at home to read and meditate on Buddhist sūtras and books on philosophy. He finally regained some kind of psychological balance that would last until the end of his long life. In 1916, Liang ended his period of seclusion and sent his first important essay, Treatise on Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt, to the magazine Eastern Miscellanies for publication. According to Alitto, Liang’s crisis was fundamental in the sense that it helped shape what may be called his mission or vocation. Alito wrote: Liang was a “religionist” of sorts, and that his crisis was a “religious experience” is certain; for the rest of his life he would be, in Western terms, a “messianic” personality. Prophets, saints, and messiahs, however, are sages and worthies in China. Chinese sagehood of all varieties (Confucian, Buddhist, Taoist) involves a merging of the transcendent eternal with the particular temporal. The sage rises to the sublimity of the universal trans-historical tao and then returns to the common world to teach how the ultimate reality relates to the mundane problems of people. He succeeds in synthesizing in himself the contradictions

21 22

Morning Talks, in Complete Works, Vol. 2, 42. Li Yuanting and Yan Binghua, Chronicle of the Life of Liang Shuming, 23–24.

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Indeed, Liang believed that overcoming his own personal crisis would be important for Chinese society and humanity in general. He invested himself with the mission to rescue people from their suffering and help them reach nirvāna. Narrating His Conversion to Confucianism We saw in the previous chapter that Liang’s conversion to Confucianism was a tactical necessity. He understood that Buddhism was out of reach for most people, and therefore advocated Confucianism, considering it suitable for the present age. Many people wrongly believed that, by promoting Confucianism, Liang was denying his Buddhist faith. In fact, Liang maintained that Confucianism was fundamentally compatible with Buddhism. He saw Confucianism as a necessary step that would ultimately lead to Buddhist enlightenment. Yet there were other, more personal reasons which explain Liang’s conversion to Confucianism. Many scholars have attached importance to the suicide of his father, Liang Ji, in 1918. This occurred just a few days before Liang Ji’s sixtieth birthday, for which the family was actively preparing. He had been secretly planning his suicide, and writing his last will, Warning to the World (Jinggao shiren shu 敬告世 人書), for years. His act was not only an expression of loyalty to the Qing dynasty, but more deeply, an expression of his ideal of public duty and private rectitude.24 His father’s death was indeed an important factor in Liang’s conversion to Confucianism. More fundamentally, however, Liang was looking for a way to bring people to Buddhist enlightenment. He considered his own experiences of enlightenment to be too peculiar and demanding. After all, there were not many people who are ready to face such despair. Liang therefore arrived at the view that Confucianism could serve as a vehicle to bring people to Buddhism in the present age. Since Liang understood Buddhist enlightenment to be an experience of radical transcendence that was in opposition to the world, he

23 24

Alitto, The Last Confucian, 59–60. See Alitto, The Last Confucian, 66.

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did not consider some of the more conciliatory approaches to worldly engagement, such as are found in Mahāyāna Buddhism. As we saw in Chapter Seven, he was opposed to a modernized and secularized version of Buddhism, considering this an unacceptable, worldly compromise. His lack of familiarity with institutional Buddhism did not help him see the possible bridges that may have existed between Buddhism and society at large. Therefore, in his vision of a humanity progressing toward radical Buddhist enlightenment, Liang looked for channels outside of Buddhism. He was convinced that this channel should not be a theory, but rather, a practical way of life that could shape the thoughts and actions of the people. From this perspective, it was natural for Liang to turn toward Confucianism. Though he did not receive a traditional training in the Confucian Classics in his youth, and despite the antagonism directed against Confucianism in the New Culture Movement, Liang considered Confucianism to constitute a practical form of life that was able to prepare the way for the Buddhist awakening. More specifically, Liang understood that, short of this final awakening, Confucianism could bring the peace of mind so urgently needed amidst the chaos of China at that time. In 1921, Liang explained this great discovery, writing: My book Eastern and Western Cultures and their Philosophies adopts a vision of life [centered on] Chinese Confucianism, and points out that Chinese culture will be revived very soon. This is a great shift from my thinking when I was a youth. I originally cherished Buddhism, and therefore determined that human life is about suffering (ku 苦). Then I paid attention to the beginning of the Analects where it is said: “to learn and at due times to practice what has been learned, is that not after all a pleasure?” I looked throughout the whole book; I could not find the word “suffering,” but the word “pleasure” (le 樂) was repeated over and over. This could not but greatly attract my attention. In the Analects, the word “pleasure” is contrasted with the word “worry” ( you 憂). Therefore it is said that: “The man of ren 仁 does not worry.” Confucius himself talked about “forgetting worries through pleasure.” It is very clear that this is full of optimism. What does this mean? After having very carefully pondered and reflected on this, I corrected my unilateral and partial view. This is the reason I wrote Eastern and Western Cultures and their Philosophies. I discarded my idea of becoming a monk and I decided to re-enter the world.25

25

Short Story of My Self-Learning, in Complete Works, Vol. 2, 698.

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While many were criticizing Confucianism for being too conservative in the realms of ethics and politics, Liang apprehended its spiritual value. In Confucianism, he found a way to solve his anxiety and to find some peace in this world. He believed that many others would also be able to have the same experience. During the years 1919 and 1920, Liang gradually discovered a Confucian spirituality. This may be considered a conversion experience, since he related it as a specific event in his life which provoked a radical change, as we shall see below. Liang retained his ideal of radical Buddhist enlightenment for his whole life, however he combined it with a Confucian spirituality and morality that was suited to the circumstances of his era. Professor Zhang Wenru 張文儒 similarly interprets Liang’s Confucian shift along Buddhist lines, stating: It is very clear that Liang Shuming decided to abandon Buddhism and embrace Confucianism. But what he abandoned was only the monastic form of renouncing the world. At the same time, he did not abandon the Buddhist essence of universal liberation for all living beings. In reality, even after his conversion to Confucianism, the spirit of liberating the world and the feelings of compassion in the Mahāyāna path of the bodhisattva still penetrated each one of his words and each one of his actions. This motive became the fundamental force carrying him throughout life.26

Zhang Wenru has argued that Liang’s Confucian conversion paralleled Buddhism’s historical development from Theravāda to Mahāyāna. These two major schools pursue a goal which is not entirely identical. Theravāda seeks the self-fulfillment which comes from calmness and extinction, while Mahāyāna postpones entrance into nirvāna in order to help other beings attain enlightenment. According to Zhang, Liang had obviously chosen the latter. As a result, he abandoned his intention of becoming a Buddhist monk, yet retained the Buddhist goal of ultimate liberation. For Liang, the Mahāyāna ideal of helping other beings to gain enlightenment found expression in Confucianism’s spirit of sacrifice.

26

Zhang Wenru, “Liang Shuming and Buddhist Studies,” 86–87.

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Personal Awakening and the Mediation of Scriptures When he was deeply engaged in the rural reconstruction program, Liang had an awakening. He had some doubts about the future of the movement. He knew that the Chinese countryside was experiencing irreversible transformations, and he therefore came to doubt that the Confucian tradition could be preserved amid these deep social and cultural changes. In 1927, he experienced what he called an “enlightenment” (kaiwu 開悟), in which he recognized that a new form of Confucianism was still possible. He subsequently arrived at the conviction and even the “belief ” (xiangxin 相信) that Confucianism had a future.27 After this, Liang would carry out his rural reconstruction work with an even firmer resolve, since he now believed it was a practical way to build this new form of Confucianism, which was oriented towards the future. Liang therefore described his personal experience using the words “enlightenment” and “belief ”—a religious vocabulary. Yet, he also saw the possibility of such an awakening at the level of the nation. For Liang, a nation could have collective experiences or insights that would completely change the culture or vision of that country. Liang even called one of his books The Final Awakening of the Chinese People’s Self-salvation Movement (Zhongguo minzu zijiu yundong zhi zuihou juewu 中國 民族自救運動之最後覺悟). This “final awakening” was Confucian in nature, and consisted of a moral responsibility toward the country. But “final awakening,” in the term’s true sense, meant the Buddhist decision to renounce the world—a decision that could be made by only a few individuals in the present age. While Buddhist awakening would happen in the third and last stage of development of world culture, there was room in the present age for a Confucian awakening. As we can see, Liang had several spiritual experiences that he described using religious terminology. Yet, his spiritual life was not purely subjective and he liked returning to Buddhist scriptures or Confucian texts, which had great bearing for him. His reading of these texts was never purely academic, but also deeply religious and spiritual. Liang found in them guidelines and inspiration concerning his

27 Liang narrated the experience in a text published in 1930. See “Zhubian benkan cunzhi zhi zibai 主編本刊《村治》之自白 [The Confession of the Editor of Rural Management],” in Complete Works, Vol. 5, 13.

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personal life. At this point, I would like to mention two examples—the first concerns Buddhist scriptures, and the second Confucian ones. Liang took the commandments and precepts of the Buddhist scriptures very seriously. He had considered becoming a monk at the age of eighteen, but harbored some doubts about the prospect of a secluded life in a monastery. He did not wish to become a monk in a monastery, but rather a monk with some kind of engagement with the world. While reading the Diamond Sūtra (Jin’gangjing 金剛經), he pondered the Buddha’s precepts, and the request “to enter the city and beg for food.” Since Liang had not joined the Buddhist sangha and would not be recognized as a Buddhist monk, he could not fulfill this request. As a substitute, he decided to become a medical doctor who could benefit the people. In doing so, he would earn his food. His first, preparatory step was therefore to study medicine.28 However, Liang did not enroll in a medical school, and instead studied Western and Chinese medicine by himself for a number of years. When Liang dropped his plans to become a monk, he also dropped his medical studies.29 This example shows the great respect Liang had for Buddhist scriptures, in which he found rules for living and acting. He earnestly strove to put them into practice. Another instance, in which Liang read a Confucian text, which he regarded very highly, had a decisive impact on his eventual conversion to Confucianism. He recalled: In the spring of 1920, having accepted an invitation from the magazine Young China to give a talk on the issue of religion, I was at home completing my speech. It should have been quite easy, but unexpectedly I had difficulties taking to my pen, and only wrote a few lines with plenty of corrections. My ideas were unclear and my mind confused . . . I rested my mind for a while, and then I took a book that was at hand, the Records of Ming Scholars (Mingru xue’an 明儒學案), reading some parts here and there. In the book, I was quite familiar with the Taizhou school of Wang Gen 王艮. This time I suddenly saw in the Recorded words of Dongya the eight characters “one hundred worries enmesh and snare; my vital spirit finds no peace” (bailüwengu xueqimoning 百慮交錮，血氣 靡寧). Were these words not addressed to me? Did they not point out my present situation? Immediately, my hairs stood up and I was sweating. I reflected silently. Slowly I came to a decision to drop my plans to become a monk. In the summer of that year, I was invited to Ji’nan to give Eastern and Western Cultures and their Philosophies. When I came back

28 29

See Short Story of My Self-Learning, in Complete Works, Vol. 2, 692. See Short Story of My Self-Learning, in Complete Works, Vol. 2, 693.

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to Beijing, I edited and published the book. By the end of November I was married.30

Faced with the frustrations of being unable to write an article, and more generally with his personal difficulties in bridging the gap between his Buddhist ideals and his daily life, Liang picked up the Records of Ming Scholars by Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (1610–1695), perhaps as a result of unconscious motivations, and then had a kind of revelation. His reading was not academic, but spiritual. He truly believed that the meaning of this passage was addressed to him. Just as Saint Augustine heard a voice asking him to “take up and read” (tolle, lege) a random passage in the Bible, Liang found in these eight characters a call to discard excessive worries and embrace peace. The illumination that Liang received in this spiritual experience was so powerful that he was compelled to change his life style and thus abandon his plans to become a Buddhist monk. In Chapter Five, we saw that Liang rejected cognition that was based on the sacred scriptures. Yet, Liang’s experiences of enlightenment were often induced by an initial contact with scriptures, as can be seen from the two examples above. Though scriptural authority was not sufficient, it provided privileged occasions for Liang to draw important conclusions which had meaning and relevance for his life. As attested by his diary, especially at the end of his life, Liang recited Buddhist sūtras daily. When his second wife died in August 1978, he recited the Earth Sūtra, or Dizangjing 地藏經, for several days. Liang’s Practice of Tantric Buddhism In Liang’s spiritual journey, his practice of Tantric Buddhism is very revealing, but has been overlooked by his biographers.31 During the civil war, between 1945 and 1949, Liang resided mostly in Sichuan. He served as a teacher and adviser at a private school, the Mianren Literary Institute (Mianren wenxueyuan 勉仁文學院), in Chongqing. He was still involved in politics and made vain calls for peace between the Communists and the Nationalists. Because of the war, his work in rural reconstruction was completely stopped and he found himself Short Story of My Self-Learning, in Complete Works, Vol. 2, 699. For example, in his Chronicle of the Life of Liang Shuming, Li Yuanting says nothing about it. 30 31

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reflecting on his experience in rural China, writing his second most important book, Substance of Chinese Culture. During these years, Liang’s location in Sichuan allowed him to get into contact with Tantric Buddhism, a brand of Buddhism which has been generally dismissed by Han Chinese Buddhists. In 1947, he came to visit Nenghai 能海 (1886–1966). Alhough Nenghai was a Han cleric, he had gone to Tibet to be initiated to Tantric Buddhism, and was then teaching it in Jialing 嘉陵. From the records of Liang’s diary, it seems that Nenghai received him quite coldly, only asking about his age. Liang answered that he was 55 years old. The monk then told him to “practice quietness” (xijing 習靜) for one hour a day. When Liang enquired about the method, the monk told him that any method will be fine.32 Probably, Nenghai considered that Liang was a busy man, being engaged in education, politics and social movements, and so he could not easily settle in one single practice.33 Liang was not discouraged by Nenghai’s answer and he quickly found a certain Jiang Zizhai 江子齋, who had a thirty-year-long experience in practicing quietness. Following Jiang’s instruction, Liang was waking up in the second half of the night in order to practice meditation. However, after one week or so, he realized that he could not pacify his mind. He reflected that his desire was not pure, or as he wrote: Searching for peace of mind cannot procure peace; striving to discard illusions cannot discard illusions.34

After another ten days of unsuccessful efforts, it seems that Liang ended the experience, noting in his diary a new realization: All the Buddhas are already present, without any distance from me. Not to deceive myself, this is the way to get it; there is no other true peace than not deceiving myself.35

In other words, facing his failure in Tantric meditation, Liang understood, from the point of view of his Buddhist faith, that the Buddhas are already present to him. There was no absolute necessity in engaging in meditative practice, as if the Buddhas were only present there and not present right now, at any moment of his life. Therefore, Liang

32 33 34 35

Entry of March 3, 1947 of the Diary, in Complete Works, Vol. 8, 420. Liang met Nenghui again in 1956. See Diary, in Complete Works, Vol. 8, 584. Entry of March 8, 1947, Diary, in Complete Works, Vol. 8, 421. Ibidem.

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came back to the familiar method of “not deceiving himself.” By doing so, Liang was adopting Confucianism as upāya. Liang could perform the Neo-Confucian practice of the sincerity of the will in his daily activities, at any moment, and find peace this way. Yet, two years after his first foray into Tantric Buddhism, another opportunity presented itself. Tantric meditative practice is very different from Confucianism and Yogācāra on a crucial point, i.e. the role of a guru. Even if teachers and masters play an important role in Confucianism and Yogācāra, their mediation is not absolutely necessary. Liang is himself a good example of this, since he learnt both by himself, through books. Further, both in Confucianism and in Yogācāra, the practioner relies on his/her own efforts in order to achieve peace or stability of mind. On the contrary, in Tantric meditation, the esoteric transmission of a guru, or a more experienced teacher who has gone through the different meditative stages, is fundamental. Also, Tantric practice is based on the belief that the spiritual power of the guru is transferred into the body and mind of the disciple. It can be said that the guru assumes the role of the Buddha. This was something completely new for Liang. In June 1949, Liang had just finished the first draft of Substance of Chinese Culture and he went to look for Gonggar 貢噶呼圖克圖 (1893– 1957), who accepted him as student. Gonggar was believed to be a living Buddha, the ninth reincarnation of a thirteenth-century Tibetan monk. He belonged to the Kagyu 噶舉 School. Liang received from Gonggar the Abhi eka, or Sprinkling of Water on the Head (Guanding 灌頂). Liang wrote about it: “Immediately, I realized the truth as never before.”36 Not only did this ritual authenticate Liang’s practice but it also empowered him at the start of his practice. Liang could therefore use the Tantric texts used by Gonggar, and more importantly he could receive from him the private and oral teaching on how to use these texts. For someone of such an independent character as Liang, it was really a big step to accept the Abhi eka. From August 4th to September 11th, Liang commenced a retreat of 40 days, with a few friends, at a Buddhist holy site, the Jinyun Mountain 縉雲山, near Chongqing. This type of retreat was not the first for Liang, since he had stayed 40 days in the Temple of Supreme

This episode itself is not mentioned in the diary, but narrated by Liang in a letter, written much later, in 1984. Letters, Vol. 8, in Complete Works, 307–308. 36

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Bliss ( Jile si 極樂寺) in Beijing when he was a teacher at Peking University.37 Fortunately for us, Liang kept the habit of recording almost every day what he did and experienced. He started a practice which was very different in content from meditation in Yogācāra. As we have seen above, Yogācāra is very rationalistic in its method, using reason to deconstruct the workings of reason, and leading ultimately to a realm beyond reason. This practice bears many similarities with the suspension of judgment as it was practiced by the Stoics during GrecoRoman antiquity. As with other Buddhist schools, Yogācāra practice includes also rituals, but they are not central to the practice. On the contrary, Tantric practice is not primarily based on mental exercises, but on rituals. Before entering into the core experience, some “preliminary practices” (sijiaxing 四加行) are necessary. These practices are designed to remove the hindrances of past karma and to purify the mind. First, one should recite formulae for placing faith in the three jewels of Buddhism and in the guru—Gonggar in Liang’s case. Second, one should recite some mantras. As recorded in his diary, Liang used the Understanding One Hundred Syllables (Baiziming 白字明), consisting of one hundred syllables, such as O ma ipadme hū .38 It is believed that words themselves have an inherent power and can achieve the purification of the mind. During the recitation, one should attempt to visualize the guru and enter into spiritual communion with him. These exercises are in fact a preparation for the core meditation, the Mahāmudrā, or the Great Seal (dashouyin 大手印), a method to realize mind’s innate purity, clarity and perfection. Through this exercise, the practitioner is united with the deity and finally released from the cycle of birth and death. As Tibetan scholars explain, The basic pattern of the ritual consist[s] of an offering, to arouse the deity’s heart, and an evocation, in which one use[s] the deity’s mantra to coerce the impersonal power set in motion by the deity’s original vow or pledge to become a deity or to protect Buddhism in the first place.39

37 See Wang Zongyu 王宗昱, “Liang Shuming de fojiao xiuxing 梁漱溟的佛教 修行 [The Buddhist Practice of Liang Shuming],” in Ehu yuekan 鵝湖月刊 [Goose Lake Monthly], 29/6 (2003): 30. 38 The full Chinese title of the Baiziming is: Jingang saduo baiziming zhou 金剛薩埵白字 明咒. Another mantra mentioned in the Diairy is: Hufa 護法 [Protecting the Dharma]. 39 Richard Robinson, Willard Johnson and Thanissaro Bikkhu, eds., Buddhist Religion: A Historical Introduction (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2005), 289.

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Following the method set by Gonggar to enter into the Great Seal, Liang meditated by visualizing the mandala of Vajravarahi ( jin’ganghaimu 金剛亥母). Through the fierce picture of this goddess, Liang could visualize her in his mind, enabling her to destroy all his attachments and remove his mental confusion. Liang made a few attempts of entering into the Great Seal by visualizing the mandala of Vajravarahi, but in his diarly he expressed repeated failure. He recognized that, unlike the preparatory exercises, one cannot enter forcefully into this mental state. Therefore, Liang decided to spend more energy on preparatory exercises. In the following days, Liang continued to do the preparatory exercises and made regular attempts to enter into the Great Seal. On August 17, he came to a realization about the origin of his difficulty: Today it seems that it is going to rain, but yet there is no rain. Tonight, my dreams were more peaceful, like a tour on the West Lake or like watching theater. As soon as I am sleeping, I have dreams and I cannot be quiet. The ones who practice Buddhism always use the metaphor of a baby, but with a baby there is no knowledge, no brain. Life is only amid immediate feelings. Everything replaces everything else. Most of the life is direct perception (xianliang). This is the gate for entering. First, no attachment due to discrimination ( fenbiewozhi), and next, cutting attachment to the world ( jushengwozhi). While I was reading aloud in the preparatory exercises that “the great compassion in the present life leads to reincarnation,” I suddenly realized that [on the contrary] Tantric Buddhism is about becoming a Buddha in this life. Although I myself believe [in becoming a Buddha], yet I do not have the desire to become a Buddha during this lifetime. I practice only for harmonizing, nourishing, and clarifying the mind. Even though becoming a Buddha and clarifying the mind are connected, since I did not make the resolution of becoming a Buddha, my [Tantric] practice cannot easily gain strength.40

Liang Shuming saw here a contradiction between his ideal of being a bodhisattva in this world and what he perceives as the focus of Tantric Buddhism, leaving the world and becoming a Buddha. Liang was practicing Tantric meditation, in the first place, only in order to cut attachments due to the discriminating mind and to find peace of mind. He then realized that, lacking the resolution of cutting attachment to the world and to life itself, his practice could not be successful. Much later, Liang expressed his dilemma as follows: “I do not pray to Buddha, 40

Diary, Vol. 8, in Complete Works, 423–424.

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but to Guanyin,” meaning that he did not want to become a Buddha, but rather wanted to stay in the world caring for all living beings.41 Yet, Liang’s concern for the world turned into anxiety, which in turn became obsessive. The passage above, as well as many other records of his diary during his life, show that Liang was suffering insomnia and was awakened by nightmares.42 In other words, Liang wanted to use Tantric practice as a therapy to pacify his mind, but he did not want to run the full course of the process and leave the world, since he was committed to help all living beings in this world. Of course, a Tibetan monk may have not seen any practical contradiction between the pacifying of the mind and the practice to reach ultimate liberation. Also, on a theoretical level, there is no contradiction between one’s bodhisattva vow and one’s attempt to reach ultimate liberation, but precisely because Liang had defined ultimate liberation as leaving the world, he could not resolve the contradiction. In a diary entry of August 19, Liang expressed attachment to the world as a responsibility for the “establishment of the nation” and for “change in world culture.” Liang’s resolution was therefore a response to a global crisis in the nation and in the world, a crisis that he had first felt in his youth and which became particularly strong in the summer 1949. This explains why Liang’s retreat was not very strict: he kept receiving and answering letters; he was hoisting guests, such as family members, friends, teachers and staff of the Mianren Literary Institute, politicians, and even American diplomats. He was also busy checking the proofs of Substance of Chinese Culture. Probably, Liang never intended to isolate himself completely, since he was very much worried about the situation of the country and he felt that he had to keep involved. For example, on September 2 and 3, he recorded in his diary the bombing of Chongqing by the Communists, and the heavy casualties resulting from it. Some ten days later, he went down from the mountain and returned to a world that he had never completely left. If China had been at peace then, Liang would perhaps have not felt so strongly the urgency of getting involved and he may have taken the step of leaving the world. However, we can gather from his diary that other elements played a great role. For example, Liang’s own character may not have disposed him to enter into the Great Seal. Even

41 42

Letters, Vol. 8, in Complete Works, 307–308. See the entry of August the Eight, 422.

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though he understood that Tantric meditation does not rely on ratiocination as in Yogācāra, however, the diary shows that he was in fact reflecting too much. He was more of an intellectual than contemplative. Intellectual activities came to occupy his mind: he was busy reading the Buddhist works of Nāgārjuna and other sūtras, not as a way to clear the mind from illusions, but because of intellectual interests. Also, the keeping of a diary may not have been instructed by Gonggar, and probably played a negative role in Liang’s meditative practice. Although Liang could not fully enter into the core of Tantric meditation, evidence from the diary suggests that the meditation succeeded somehow in tranquilizing his mind, since he continued the practice for a long time. For example, in 1956, records show that he practiced Tantric meditation for half-a-year, staying at a Buddhist sacred site in Beijing, Badachu 八大處, for almost two months, from August 8 to September 30.43 During that period, on several occasions Liang met the monk Nenghai, the master of Tantric Buddhism whom he had known since 1947. Another proof of Liang’s Tantric practice is a book in which he copied Buddhist texts for his personal practice. According to Professor Wang Zongyu, most of the texts in it belong to Tantrism, showing the centrality of this practice for him.44 Yet, Tantrism was far from being his exclusive form of practice. Although Liang had little knowledge about Daoism, his diary shows that he was practicing Daoism, such as Taijiquan 太極拳 and Qigong 氣功. In that sense, the monk Nenghai was correct in his understanding of Liang: Liang could not follow one particular method but kept drawing from the three traditions of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism. Liang’s Attitude toward Family Life In his own personal life, Liang attempted to combine his personal identity as a Buddhist with the Confucian way of life he publicly promoted. He therefore combined Buddhist and Confucian practices together. We shall see here how Liang made this combination in five areas: his family life, his diet, his belief in his previous life, his belief in spirits, and finally, his attitude as a public intellectual.

43 44

Diary, Vol. 8, 583–595. Wang Zongyu, “The Buddhist Practice of Liang Shuming,” 31–32.

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At the age of seventeen, in 1910, Liang refused a marriage which had been arranged for him by his mother. He had resolved to become a Buddhist monk, and his parents were set aback by his refusal. They were now facing the prospect of not having any male descendants, since after ten years of marriage Liang’s elder brother did not have a son. After the suicide of Liang’s father in 1918, Liang, already 26 years old, remained celibate and continued to consider becoming a monk. However, with both parents dead and the guilt of not having married earlier, Liang felt a moral obligation to marry. After hesitating for three years, Liang finally discarded his plans for a monastic life. He accepted the bride presented to him and married her in the winter of 1921 at the age of 29—an advanced age to get married at that time. As he explained, he decided to marry only to obey the wish of his dead father, and to fulfill his duty as a filial son.45 Despite being married, Liang lived a celibate life most of the time. His wife Huang Jingxian 黃靖賢 died very young—in 1935—fourteen years after their wedding. She bore him two children. Yet, most of the time, Liang was not with his family because of his involvement in the rural reconstruction project. When his wife died, Liang stated they were like strangers to each other. What he regretted most was that he had not helped her with her personal cultivation. After her death, Liang wrote a poem in remembrance of his wife: We were married for ten years, I did not know her and she did not know me. Because I did not know her and she did not know me, I had more time to think. More time to work. Now she has gone, and this is better, Better than to live in this country, Better than to live in this society. She has gone and she has left me more time to think, More time to work.46

After the death of his wife, Liang entrusted his two children to his uncles and aunts so they could follow a normal education while he busied himself with rural reconstruction. Though Liang promoted his idea of China as family-centered society, he himself had sacrificed his family life for the sake of his mission. Short Story of My Self-Learning, in Complete Works, Vol. 2, 691–694. See “Daowang shi Huang Jingxian furen 悼亡室黃靖賢夫人 [Mourning My Wife Huang Jingxian],” in Complete Works, Vol. 5, 750–755. 45 46

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After Huang’s death, Liang decided not to remarry, and indeed remained a widower for eight years. However, he felt that he was growing old and needed someone to take care of him. In 1944, at the age of fifty, he married Chen Shufen 陳樹芬, who was three years younger than him. This second wedding was not a marriage of love, but of convenience.47 After the end of the Second World War and the civil war, Liang had a stable family life for the first time, living in Beijing with his second wife and two children from his first marriage. We may say that this was the first time Liang had a proper family life. Chen Shufen died before Liang, when he was eighty-six. Yet, at the end of his life, Liang considered this second marriage to have been a mistake. All this shows that family life was not very important to Liang. He always put his mission of liberating the people first, and it was only when this mission could not actively be carried out, under the new Communist regime, that he settled into family life. If circumstances had allowed, Liang probably would have continued his itinerant lifestyle, preaching to diverse communities. His decision to pursue family life was, in a sense, imposed on him by circumstance. In his heart, he felt he was a person who “had left his family” (chujiaren 出家人). In 1981, at the advanced age of 89, he recognized that his desire to become a Buddhist monk was still alive: Buddhism is all-embracing, and too deep to fathom; (. . .) if I have desired to renounce the world and become a Buddhist monk since I was sixteen or seventeen years old, refusing the arrangement of my marriage by my mother, of course today, at the age of 89, I still have this inclination. I admit unequivocally that I am a Buddhist.48

Liang’s Strict Diet Besides Liang’s quasi celibacy and little focus on family life, another element which was noticed by those around him was his strict diet. Since 1913, he had abstained from eating meat and fish.49 He also

See Alitto, The Last Confucian, epilogue (1986), 339. “Interview with Alitto,” in Complete Works, Vol. 8, 1147. 49 According to Professor Wang Zongyu, Liang started eating vegetarian in 1913, during his brief stay in Xi’an. See Wang Zongyu, “The Buddhist Practice of Liang Shuming,” 30. 47 48

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never drank alcohol or smoked.50 In fact, anyone who has lived in China knows the social pressure put on individuals to eat meat, drink alcohol and smoke cigarettes. Smoking and drinking alcohol play an important role in male interpersonal relationships; rejecting an offer to smoke or drink can be seen as rejecting a personal relationship. Yet, even in front of Mao, Liang would do none of these things. Guy Alitto considered Liang’s abstentions to simply have been “exercises in self-mastery, and lacking in religious nature.”51 Alitto’s view is premised in a misunderstanding—that Liang completely discarded Buddhism after 1920. In fact, if we take Liang’s claims that he remained a Buddhist throughout his life seriously, it would have made perfect sense for him to uphold these abstentions in a religious way, as an expression of his commitment to Buddhism. His Belief of Being the Reincarnation of a Monk As we can see, Liang considered himself to have been a Buddhist with a monastic vocation. At the end of his life, Liang understood his Buddhist vocation to have in fact been the result of his previous life as a Chan monk. He wrote in a letter to a friend: Since my childhood, I have always thought about renouncing the world and becoming a Buddhist monk. All my life I have admired, wholeheartedly, the Buddhist doctrine and I have shifted from Theravāda to Mahāyāna. The Mahāyāna bodhisattva does not abandon living beings, and does not dwell in nirvāna. He follows the otherworldly way and yet does not leave the world. To me, it seems as though I had been a Chan master in my previous life.52

Here, by “following the otherworldly way and yet not leaving the world,” Liang meant he was entering into the affairs of the world with the spirit of renouncing it, as in Mahāyāna Buddhism. Liang understood his vocation to be something so strong that it could only have come from a previous life. Previously, there had been a Chan master who could have reached nirvāna, but instead decided to stay in

I rely here on the oral testimony of professor Wang Shouchang 王守常, at Peking University. 51 Alitto, The Last Confucian, 54. 52 “Interview with Alitto,” in Complete Works, Vol. 8. 50

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the world and reincarnate as Liang Shuming, bringing his message of liberation to the world. In 1987, one year before his death, Liang reiterated this belief—this time publicly. At the ceremony of the founding of the Chinese Buddhist Cultural Institute (Zhongguo fojiao wenhua yanjiusuo 中國佛教文化 研究所), Liang was the first speaker. He stated: Today I wish to tell everybody that I am a Buddhist. I haven’t told anyone before because I was afraid of jokes. Now I want to say: everybody has a previous life, a present life and a future life. In my former life I was a monk, a Chan monk.53

We might not accept the literal truth of Liang’s statement, but it clearly demonstrates that he understood his fundamental identity to involve promoting Buddhist liberation for everybody. Liang’s Belief in Spirits and in Shentong As we all know from Hong Kong movies, a belief in spirits is part of Chinese culture. One of the first books of “philosophy” introduced from Japan was a translation by Cai Yuanpei of Lectures on Demons by the founder of the Institute of Philosophy in Japan, the Buddhist Inoue Enryo 井上圓了. Sometime later, in 1939, Feng Youlan himself devoted one chapter of New Confucianism to spirits.54 As we have seen above, Liang had no definitive proof of the existence of spirits, but he still held that there were many signs which indicated their existence. He also believed that some people could obtain supernatural knowledge about the past, the present and the future. At the end of his life, Liang himself knew that he was the reincarnation of a Chan monk. Also, in his first essay, written in 1916, Liang referred This is reported by Zhao Puchu 趙朴初 who was present at the meeting. See Fayin 法音, 111/11 (1993). See also: Zhao Puchu 趙樸初: “Liang Shuming xiansheng shi yiwei fojiaotu 梁漱溟先生是一位佛教徒 [Liang Shuming is a Buddhist],” in Ma Yong 馬勇, ed., Modai shuoru 末代碩儒 [The Great Confucian of the Latter Period] (Shanghai: Dongfang chubanshe zhongxin 東方出版中心, 1998), 33. See also Zhao Puchu 趙樸初, “Cangshen renhai zuihoulu yilin 藏身人海最後露一鱗 [The Last Disclosure of a Buddhist Hiding Himself among the People],” in Liang Shuming xiansheng jinian wenji 梁漱溟先生紀念文集, edited by Liang Peikuan 梁培寬 (Beijing: Zhongguo gongren chubanshe 中國工人出版社, 1993), 327. 54 Inoue Enryo 井上圖了, Yaoguaixue jiangyi 妖怪學講義 [Lectures on the Demons] (1895), translated by Cai Yuanpei (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1906); Feng Youlan 馮友蘭, Xinlixue 新理學 [New Confucianism] (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1939). 53

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to the example of a certain elder, named Shidai 石埭, who had predicted, just before his death, the revolution and the fall of the Chinese empire. Who was this elder Shidai? Nobody else but the lay Buddhist Yang Wenhui, from Shidai in Anhui province.55 For Liang, the human mind, when liberated from worldly illusions, could communicate freely with the deepest level of reality, up to the point of knowing events in the past and future, as in the case of Yang Wenhui. For Liang, these phenomena were not irrational, and he believed that a science of the mind would one day explain them. Though Liang opposed superstition on moral grounds, since he considered it a manipulation of the spirits for private interests, he did not accept limiting his worldview to include only that which was known by the science of his day. Liang did not criticize a belief in spirits as such, but rather the immoral aspects of this belief. He held that the spirits (guishen 鬼神) were an objective and rational reality. In Human Mind and Human Life, he declared: Of course the spirits exist, but they are difficult to know. In the future, with the progress of knowledge, we shall know more about them little by little.56

Liang’s belief in the spirits was peculiar. It was not founded on the traditional Chinese conception of spirits, but rather on a modern blend of Buddhism and Confucianism. Formerly in China, human beings were considered to be temporary blends of vital forces. At death, these vital forces were unbound, but they reconstituted themselves in new forms. Buddhism introduced the idea of reincarnation into China. In both cases, death was not seen as an ultimate end, but as a passage or a transformation into a new reality. Also, both ancient Chinese thought, and Buddhism, considered this new reality to have a strong relationship with the world of the living. Buddhism furthermore holds that reincarnation does not immediately follow death. Between two lives, there is an intermediate existence as spirits. These still have a bodily dimension, and can be perceived by human beings. Liang referred to these spirits as “the intermediary yin body” (zhong yin shen 中陰身). These spirits had the ability, unlike human beings, to move freely. Such a freedom of movement

55 56

Treatise on Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt, in Complete Works, Vol. 1, 15. Human Mind and Human Life, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 698.

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was one of their so-called “supernormal abilities (shentong 神通).”57 This intermediary stage between two lives was therefore characterized by a greater communication with other forms of life. Here, one may accuse Liang of having gone beyond the limits of reason. However, this view concerning the continuity of states of existence beyond death is in fact more rational than the modern, so called scientific conception of death. Indeed, the affirmation that death is the irreversible and definitive end of life is founded only on a few pieces of evidence, such as the cessation of the heart or brain’s functions. The annihilation of life is unduly affirmed from these clinical observations. The modern view that death is the entry into an eternal vacuum or sleep, without any sensation of pain or memory, is an irrational supposition which lacks sufficient proof.58 According to Robert Thurman, professor of Tibetan Buddhism at Columbia University, we can see in this modern representation of death a reflection of the nihilism of our times. More importantly, it is a conception that is open to criticism. For Liang, the existence of spirits was explained by his conception of life. Life was comprised of a physical aspect (shenti 身體) and a psychological aspect (xin 心). These two elements were necessary for life. It was wrong to think that the physical element was destroyed at death and that only the psychological element remained. Liang refused to consider spirits only as immaterial and subjective things; he maintained their objective reality in the physical world.59 The supernormal abilities of spirits after death and before the next reincarnation granted them a higher degree of freedom, but were still determined by their previous lives. Liang mentioned three determining factors: retribution (bao 報) due to past lives, practice (xiu 修) in former lives, and the manifestation (zheng 證) of the fruits of Buddhahood. First, the spirits’ supernormal abilities were the result of the spiritual fruits they had gained during their past lives. For Liang, however, this influence was quite limited. The freedom these abilities granted resulted mostly from individual practice in the most recent life. Liang recognized a plurality of practices, such as Daoist, Buddhist and Hindu. Each of these produced different results. Freedom was

Ibidem. See Robert Thurman, The Tibetan Book of the Dead (New York: Bantam Books, 1994), 1–35. Thurman points out that the experiences of quasi-death among Tibetans tend to prove the existence of physico-psycho states beyond death. 59 See Human Mind and Human Life, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 698. 57 58

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accumulated during one’s life time, however it was released only at the moment of death, as a manifestation of the fruits of Buddhahood ( foguo 佛果). On the basis of information contained in the Buddhist sūtras, Liang delineated the different aspects of the spirits’ supernormal abilities which pertained to their communicative capacities. Their communication could be visual or oral, enabling them to see or hear things which were not seen or heard anywhere else. Mental communication allowed them to know the thoughts of others. Finally, trans-sensorial communication allowed the five senses to communicate with one another, so that each sense knew what the five senses knew as a whole.60 Thus, one who had the fruits of Buddhahood could access absolute freedom in which all barriers between oneself and the external world had been vanquished. For Liang, Yang Wenhui had obtained this mental power just before his death. This had allowed him to know about the coming revolution. The Buddhist shentong did not function in nirvāna, but within sa sāra, and so Liang applied it to the moral realm of Confucian metaphysics. Drawing from the vitalism of Bergson, Liang concluded that life was an ever-expanding reality which overcame the obstacles met through an unceasing creativity. This vitalism allowed Liang to affirm his belief in the existence of spirits, especially in their ability to communicate. He explained that, The essence of life, demanding communication and unification, goes forward progressively, expands everywhere, and increases its capacity for action.61

This élan vital should not be understood as external to life, but interior to the movement of life itself, taking energy from within the obstacles. It comes from across the physical, psychological or moral realities at work in the cosmos. For Liang, the human spirit, even though it went beyond biological life, still rested on a physiological basis. Also, in Human Mind and Human Life, Liang interpreted the stages of the evolution of life in philosophical terms. The instinct (benneng 本能) constituted a decisive stage, in the sense that it allowed the specialization of innate functions for the survival of the individual, and of the species. However, the development 60 61

Human Mind and Human Life, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 699. Human Mind and Human Life, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 698.

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of instincts also enclosed the species within a mechanical existence, which was repetitive, and finally within a relatively confined environment. This resulted in the end of evolution, bringing about the end of the species through its inability to adapt to external changes. This fatal impasse could be considered a reason of error and a moral mistake. Therefore, instinct’s logic was opposed to shentong. Through this Buddhist notion, Liang expressed his Confucian belief in the human mind’s moral communication with the cosmos. Liang’s Personal Courage and Its Religious Roots Very early in his life, Liang became a famous public intellectual. He gained the reputation of a man who could freely express his opinions. Later on, under the Communist regime, Liang wrote some pieces to justify his thought and action in front of the new regime, for example his previous involvement in the rural reconstruction program in the nineteen-twenties and thirties, his actions during the war against Japan, his position toward the Communist and Nationalist Parties, and so on. But even in these writings, Liang expressed his own convictions very honestly, without bowing to the official ideology. More specifically, Liang showed his bravery on three occasions. First, in 1953, the first Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi 中國人民政治協商會議) opened. On September 11, 1953, Liang, as a delegate, openly criticized Mao’s economic development plan, which had been inspired by policies in the Soviet Union.62 For Liang, the allocation of the majority of resources to the industrialization effort amounted to a betrayal of the peasants. Liang expressed his opposition to a reform which would widen the gap between the cities and villages. On September 18, Mao Zedong publicly criticized Liang for being a conservative who did not understand or represent the people: Everybody says that you are a good man, but I myself think that you are a hypocrite (weijunzi 偽君子). To tell the truth, while Chiang Kai-shek killed people with weapons, Liang Shuming killed them with his pen. There are two ways to kill people, using weapons or using a pen. Using

62

See Complete Works, Vol. 7, 3–6.

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chapter nine a pen is surely more sophisticated, and without bloodshed. You (Liang Shuming) are this kind of criminal.63

Liang asked the president of the session to allow him to speak but he was denied this right. This public disavowal from Mao was a very serious matter indeed, and put Liang in an extremely dangerous position. Yet, Liang did not change his stance, nor retract anything he had said, instead remaining entrenched in his position. He claimed that neither Mao Zedong nor Zhou Enlai 周恩來 had understood him, and he wrote to them to clarify his position. Mao kept Liang in his position as a delegate, but two years later, in 1955, a major campaign against him was launched in the newspapers. There were hundreds of articles attacking his ideas or him personally. These sometimes came from former colleagues or collaborators.64 In 1956, the Sanlian Bookstore (Sanlian shudian 三聯書店) in Shanghai collected and published, in three volumes, these articles under the title: Criticizing Liang Shuming’s Thought (Liang Shuming sixiang pipan 梁漱溟思想批判). The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, under the leadership of its director, Guo Moruo 郭 沫若 (1892–1978), also held sessions for criticizing Liang’s views. Despite the campaign orchestrated against him and other prominent intellectuals, Liang never deviated from his ideas. Also, he never shirked the political obligations attached to his position. In 1958, he took the opportunity to address, three times, a sub-committee of the People’s Political Consultative Conference to express his views. In the third address, Liang even reaffirmed his Buddhist stance, stating: My views on human life are based on the Buddhist idea of renouncing the world. Because there is a world, there is therefore also the renouncement of the world. There are two aspects: positive and negative. There is nothing strange there. What Marxism-Leninism says about the world is completely true. I completely adhere to this without hesitation. However, Marxist-Leninism does not acknowledge that there is something akin to renouncing the world. Therefore, I often tell my friends: I recognize Marxism-Leninism, but Marxism-Leninism does not recognize me.65

The second time Liang showed his resilience was during the Cultural Revolution. The Red Guards went to his house on August 24, 1966, 63 Ma Yong, Liang Shuming, an Extraordinary Thinker, 250. Mao’s words were published in 1977, in the fifth volume of Selected Works of Mao Zedong. See also Chow Chingwen, Ten Years of Storm (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), 252–257. 64 See Alitto, The Last Confucian, 328. 65 See Complete Works, Vol. 7, 55.

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and burnt his books, including his draft of Human Mind and Human Life.66 They came back on August 29, beating his wife quite seriously. They continued to harass him over the following days, on at least four occasions: September 1, 3, 5, and 7. Each day, Liang and his wife were worried that the Red Guards would come. During this climactic, anxious time, Liang found peace by taking refuge in the name of the Buddha. On the night of September 24, he awoke, calling out the name of the Buddha. He then wrote in his diary: At the sound of the Bodhisattva Guanyin’s name I awoke to my mind Mind as Buddha, Buddha as mind . . . Pure mind as emptiness Eternally leaving all that exists Tirelessly progressing in Buddhist practice . . .67

Clearly, Liang did not bow to violence, but found spiritual comfort and resolution in his Buddhist faith. He was indeed taking some risks by writing in his diary, because it may have led to more problems had the Red Guards discovered it. Probably because of his personal relationship with Mao, Liang was never physically abused. The third time Liang showed his bravery was between the years 1973 and 1974, during the “Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius” (pilin pikong 批林批孔) campaign. At a session of his study group, when everyone had already announced their support for the campaign, Liang was invited to speak, but he kept silent. He maintained his ambiguous silence for more than a month. Under pressure, he finally expressed his opinion that there was no connection between Lin Biao and Confucius, and that there was no need to criticize Confucius. To make his stance even clearer, Liang quoted Confucius himself: You can carry off the commander of the armed forces of a large state, but you cannot change the will of the humblest person (Sanjun keyi duo shuai, pifu buke duo zhi 三軍可以奪帥, 匹夫不可奪志).68

Liang’s courageous attitude can be interpreted as an expression of his devotion to freedom of thought. Yet, I would suggest it also had religious roots. Liang was convinced there was an absolute, transcendent truth—in Buddhist terms this is called suchness, or zhenru. He 66 67 68

See Diary, in Complete works, Vol. 8, 724. Dairies, in Complete Works, Vol. 8, 728. Confucius, Analects, 9.26.

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was committed to this, and regarded other realities, including his own existence, as secondary. He was therefore ready to die for this truth. By renouncing his own life, and by cutting off all attachments to his earthly existence, Liang could unite with a higher realm of existence. At the same time, Liang’s self-sacrifice would become for others, including his persecutors, a testimony to this higher reality. Liang’s profession of his faith in Buddhism may be found on the first page of a personal notebook. This was probably written in the nineteen-sixties, and is entitled “Vows to the Buddha” (Fayuan wen 發源文): Today I bow in front of the Buddha; sincere and single-minded, I repent, Without beginning, I am greedy, angry and foolish. I realize the meaning of the mistakes due to past karma and I feel ashamed. Before, I was concealing them, but today I feel ashamed of all of them. I pray that the Buddha illuminates me, and I resolutely pledge to sin no more. I pray that the Buddha comes to me, a clear mind purifying the three karmas. I make the vow to realize the supreme path of the Buddha. I make the vow to cut off the inexhaustible vexations. I make the vow to study the innumerable doors to enlightenment. I make the vow to help all sentient beings reach liberation. The Buddha and the sentient beings are all one. In a fraction of a moment, self-nature is manifested.69

In Liang’s mind, his “vow to help all sentient beings to reach liberation” included sacrificing his own life, if needed. We can see here the religious roots of the courage that he showed throughout his life. Also, despite the social and mental pressure he was under, Liang continued to actively engage in creative thought. At times, the numerous political sessions to which he was subjected greatly impeded his ability to carry out his personal intellectual work, yet he always continued with it. After the red guards burnt his draft of Human Mind and Human Life, he started all over again and was able to finish the manuscript in 1975. He had the book published in 1984, four years before his death. This work, which Liang considered his most important, and which was written during the regime’s most oppressive period, was indeed 69 Fayuan wen 發願文 [Vows to Buddha], in Complete Works, Vol. 7, 227. A fac-simile in Liang’s handwriting can be found in Ma Yong, Liang Shuming, an Extraordinary Thinker, 33.

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a kind of miracle. It bears testimony to the resilience of the human mind, as Liang attempted to disentangle himself from ideology and to create a new space for thought. Compared to other works from this period, which were subservient to the ideology of the time, Liang’s book stands almost alone. We cannot doubt that it was Liang’s Buddhist faith which gave him the resolve to carry out his work. Faith-Based Communities Besides Liang’s personal religious practice, there were many religious elements in his public life as well. Liang advocated autonomous villages and communities that would be their own agents of development. The focus was therefore not on bureaucracy or administration. Nor did Liang see the rural reconstruction as a political movement akin to the political tutelage and the constitutional government promoted by Sun Yat-sen. Liang envisioned a contract of mutual assistance between peasants, rooted in the historical “village compact” (xiangyue 鄉約) of the Song dynasty. This Confucian form of community life was to be a new creation, integrating responses to the challenge of modernity. Accordingly, the “village compact” was not limited to the traditional mutual assistance which occasionally emerged during times of danger and difficulty, but was expanded to tackle long-term issues such as structural poverty. The scope of the new compact was not limited to matters of rural development or self-defense against banditry, but was extended to all aspects of rural life. The educational program was not centered on abstract social goals, but on people. Liang envisioned the complete transformation of the individual in areas such as intellect, knowledge, technical ability, culture and ethics. Teaching would not be limited to schools, and academic results would not be the primary objective. The project aimed at a general transformation of the entire rural culture and society. The whole village would constitute the “school,” and all the villagers would be “students.” In order to develop strong bonds between teachers and students, meals would be taken together. In addition, every year teachers would go to different villages and view the work of former students, advising them on any difficulties they were encountering. Mao and Liang shared similar goals, in the sense that they envisioned a society without class. Yet their methods differed greatly. While Mao relied on class struggle to arouse the political consciousness of

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the peasants, Liang promoted their spiritual and moral transformation through personal reflection, emphasizing the moral ideals of personal awareness and responsibility toward others. Students were encouraged to frequently engage in self-reflection, for example by writing in their diaries in order to clarify their emotions and order their ideas.70 Students were to be self-disciplined, instead of being coerced and disciplined by others.71 Liang pushed this idea of self-responsibility quite far, up to such a point that sometimes the ideal became impractical and had to be discarded. For example, in a school in Caozhou 曹州, students paid tuition each month on a voluntary basis according to how much they could afford; wealthy students were encouraged to pay more, while poor students could study for free. However, the scheme was cancelled after three months because only a few students were participating fairly.72 The rural reconstruction program also advocated changes to customs and habits. People were encouraged to give up smoking drugs and gambling with money. The practice of foot-binding was discouraged, as were arranged marriages at an early age.73 Instead of relying on the police, educational programs were offered to the peasants so they could change these undesirable customs by themselves. In Caozhou, Liang would give informal speeches under a tree, always linking his talks to personal experiences. He once told about how the previous day, he had met an old man and a three year old child who were begging. While relating this experience, and reflecting on the social gap which existed between destitute people and himself, Liang started to cry in front of his pupils.74 Each day at dawn, Liang would also give a speech to his students.75 Even in the cold winter of Shandong province, Liang would meet with them daily. Sunrise was very important to Liang, since at that time it was possible to experience a communion with nature and with the cosmos, and to reflect more deeply on oneself.76 Liang also insisted on the moral dimension See Morning Talks, in Complete Works, Vol. 2, 51. Ma Yong, Liang Shuming, an Extraordinary Thinker, 119. 72 Wang Ling 汪淩, Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (Zhengzhou: Daxiang chubanshe 大象 出版社, 2008), 8. 73 Ma Yong, Liang Shuming, an Extraordinary Thinker, 127–128. 74 Wang Ling, Liang Shuming, 8. 75 Morning Talks, Complete works, Vol. 2, 36–140. 76 Morning Talks, in Complete Works, Vol. 2, 41. 70

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of this experience, stating that “while everybody is still asleep, I alone am awake—I feel a great responsibility.”77 Liang would observe a long period of silence, then talk about moral progress and reflect on the meaning of life. Sometimes, he would answer questions from the students. Liang saw this moment as a spiritual preparation for the day to come. During these times, he would admit to his mistakes and repent (chanhui 懺悔). He would contemplate how much of human life is pitiable, and the extent to which human beings were controlled by their passions and were unable to be their own masters. Then, Liang would renew his trust in the energy within him, and in the cosmos. He would feel self-renewed (zixin 自新), and find direction for the day ahead.78 The instructions Liang gave to his students were grounded in a spiritual communion which existed between himself and the moral forces of the universe. Through these daily rituals, Liang and his disciples could obtain clarity (qingming 清明), overcome their selfishness, become settled and at peace (anhe 安和), and finally re-establish spiritual communion between themselves and the universe.79 Through the internalization of these rituals, they could open themselves up to the moral life of the universe, as described in the previous chapter. From there, they could effectively engage themselves in creating new social forms which would re-create the original form of communication that had been lost. The affective dimension played an important role in these rituals, but it was no longer a sentimental prisoner of the illusion of selfhood. More deeply, it was a moral feeling of empathy and responsibility, characteristic of a spontaneous openness to the other, as in the Mencian tradition. Liang did not regard his “repentance” and “self-renewal” as specifically religious, probably because he wanted to point out that these experiences did not presuppose the belief in a transcendent god.80 Yet, these experiences can be understood as religious in the broad sense of the term. In fact, we may find many similarities between the self-sustaining communities envisioned by Liang and other experiments in the twentieth century, such as the ashrams founded by Gandhi in India or

77 78 79 80

Morning Talks, in Complete Works, Vol. 2, 40. Morning Talks, in Complete Works, Vol. 2, 42–44. Substance of Chinese Culture, in Complete Works, Vol. 3, 111. Morning Talks, in Complete Works, Vol. 2, 42.

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the kibbutzim in Israel.81 These experiments were inspired by socialist political projects, strong ethical values and a religious fervor. Similarly, Liang envisioned a renewal which combined religion, culture and nationality. The Religious Spirit Underlying Social Work In 1933, Liang gave a talk at Zouping 鄒平 in Shandong Province, which was entitled “Engaging in rural work with the spirit of renouncing the world” (Yi chushi de jingshen zuo xiangcun de gongzuo 以出 世的精神做鄉村工作). In this, Liang made the religious dimensions of social work explicit to the social workers. He stated: A genuine Buddhist monk forsakes the world. The great matter of life and death has touched his conscience and has influenced his life. Watching all the living creatures pitifully sinking in the cycle of life and death, he decides to solve the problem of life and death by detaching himself from life and death, by forsaking everything and by disregarding everything . . . This kind of spirit, of not forgetting about living beings, and of caring for them, should be imitated by the people who are performing rural campaigns.82

In other words, for Liang, social work did not aim only at improving the world or reducing the level of suffering in it. Although social activism was necessary, it was ultimately not sufficient. For Liang, a solution to the problem of suffering could only come from a personal decision to renounce the world. From this perspective, social work was an existential transformation of the social worker in which he or she manifested their renouncement of the world, and by which they invited others to do the same. This extreme form of self-sacrifice has already gone beyond common Confucian ethical boundaries and essentially become religious. Speaking about his personal motivations for engaging in the rural movement, Liang explained further:

81 For a comparison with the kibbutz, see Gu Hongliang 顧紅亮, Rujia shenghuo shijie 儒家生活世界 [The Confucian Lifeworld] (Shanghai: Shangghai Renmin Chubanshe 上海人民出版社, 2008). 82 “Yi chushi de jingshen zuo xiangcun de gongzuo 以出世的精神做鄉村工作 [To Engage Rural Work with the Spirit of Renouncing the World],” in Complete Works, Vol. 5, 425.

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I am like a Buddhist monk renouncing the world (. . .) who has been simultaneously influenced and challenged by big questions. To arrive at this state, I have left friends and abandoned relatives. I resemble a Buddhist monk entering a monastery.83

Liang’s renunciation of the world was not through the conventional means of Mahāyāna Buddhism, but was rather an authentic expression of its spirit. For him, the monastery was not an isolated place cut off from the world. He instead saw the world as a large monastery in which he could put the spirit of renunciation into practice, and invite others to do so as well. With such a spiritual understanding of what it was to be a monk, Liang warned the Buddhist sangha against worldliness. As we have mentioned in Chapter Seven, when Liang came to give a speech to the Sino-Tibetan Teaching Institute, he explained that he had experienced an early shift from Buddhism to Confucianism, but that his belief in the Buddhist doctrine had not changed, and that he still believed in reincarnation and in the three worlds of the past, present and future.84 He was willing to make efforts to “ferry the living across the sea of sa sāra to the shore of nirvāna.” He thus exhorted and admonished the monks and others who had renounced the world, telling them that “human life is a rare opportunity,” that “time does matter,” and that it should not be wasted. Once more, we encounter Liang’s criticism of institutional Buddhism. For Liang, Buddhism should not be identified with a specific organization, the clergy or the temples. Buddhism entailed, first and foremost, a spirit of renouncing the world while remaining in the world. Since it was opposed to monks living a contemplative life cut from society, Liang may have felt more sympathy toward Taixu’s Humanistic Buddhism. Were not the Buddhist monks of this movement actively engaged with the world? Yet, as we saw also in Chapter Seven, Liang was opposed to it because he considered its theoretical basis to be flawed, and that it gave the incorrect impression that Buddhism aimed at improving society or creating a Pure Land in this world. Liang could avoid promoting this misunderstanding, since most of the time he kept silent about his ultimate religious motivation, with the exception of the 1933 talk to the social workers and the 1940 talk to the

83 84

Ibidem. “My Past,” in Complete Works, Vol. 6, 72

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monks.85 Liang always addressed the peasants at the level of Confucian morality. Yet, when he spoke to the social workers and the Buddhist monks, he thought they were ready for the religious message which underlay his actions. Liang’s quest for transcendence led him to be committed to his personal religious practices and social engagement. It was precisely because of the radicalism of his transcendent quest that he was able to become such a powerful and influential social activist and politician. His participation in the rural re-construction movement and in politics, in the garb of Confucianism, should be rightly understood as an expression of his Buddhist faith. However, unlike Mao, Liang did not succeed in energizing the peasants because he could not fully understand their wants and needs. Liang himself admitted that the peasants were somewhat apathetic towards his rural reconstruction program. Liang had probably demanded too much from them, and the road to revolution may have seemed much easier than patient social transformation through spiritual and moral self-cultivation.

Most probably, Liang did not intend to have the talk ever made public, since the talk was published without him reading it before. See note of the editor, Liang Shuming, “To Engage Rural Work with the Spirit of Renouncing the World,” in Complete Works, Vol. 5, 425. 85

CONCLUSION

BROADENING THE CONCEPT OF RELIGION FOR TODAY Bridging the Profane and the Transcendent We can now pull together the different aspects of Liang’s religious thought that we have analyzed in this study. In the first chapter, we saw how the modern concept of religion was shaped. Today, we inherit this history, which comprises both interpretations and misinterpretations. We recognize that the modern distinction between the religious and secular spheres has some legitimacy, and that we cannot, and should not, return to the pre-modern era. However, we should also be aware that there is no fixed and absolute boundary between the religious and the secular. We should recognize that the boundary between the religious and secular worlds is not as rigid or absolute as we might have thought. Instead, it is a reality that has changed throughout human history. Also, there is no objective principle inherent in things that authorizes us to split them into religious or secular categories, into the sacred and the profane. The French theologian Henri Bouillard (1908–1981) can help us to overcome this binary opposition between the religious and the secular through his provision of a third term—the holy—which represents an intermediate position between human beings and the divine. As Bouillard argued, The holy is an element of the profane, where the religious human being recognizes the echo of the divine, and by which he expresses his personal relation, as well as the relation of the whole of profanity, to the Divine.1

Only when the holy is absolutized and identified with the Divine is the profane not appreciated. Eventually, the holy appears to pose a threat to human freedom. Most importantly, religion should be acknowledged not primarily as a theoretical belief in dogmas, but as a life experience

1 Henri Bouillard, “La Catégorie de Sacré dans la Science des Religions,” in Enrico Castelli, ed., Le Sacré, (Paris: Aubier-Éditions Montaigne, 1974), 50.

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in which the divine makes itself manifest. The religious experience, while necessarily circumscribed to one portion of profane life, has the potential to give religious meaning to the whole of it. Liang’s ideas were, in a way, constrained by the language of his time. He considered Buddhism to represent the future of humanity, yet he often used the term religion in a narrow sense which implied that one of its defining features was indoctrination by an external authority. In this sense, Liang was influenced by the terminology of the New Culture Movement, and under its influence he came to adopt the view that Confucianism was not a religion. This led Liang to construct, quite artificially, a dichotomy between a religion of pure externality (exemplified by Christianity) and a substitute that was inward-focusing and reflexive (Confucianism). Despite the limitation of the language and of the concepts, Liang’s idea of religion avoided the pitfalls of a binary opposition between the profane world (Western materialism) and absolute transcendence or the Divine (Buddhism). Instead, it bridged them with Confucianism. If we go beyond Liang’s terminology, we will find that his conception of morality is very broad and encompasses what many people today include under the labels of spirituality and religion. Liang’s novel contribution was to develop Confucianism as an expediency, adapted to modern times, which would ultimately lead to absolute transcendence. The Religious Dimension of Confucianism After Liang Shuming, many Chinese scholars were able to go beyond the narrow concepts of the New Culture Movement and to reclaim the true religious bearings of Confucianism. Liang’s ideas concerning religion have greatly influenced contemporary New Confucian philosophers, helping them to reclaim Confucianism’s spiritual tradition.2 In the past fifty years, the philosophers belonging to this movement have reassessed the question of religion with greater openness, when compared with the outright rejection of the New Culture Movement. Indeed, among Liang’s many ideas that have deeply influenced Contemporary New Confucianism, was his view that Confucianism was

2

Umberto Bresciani, Reinventing Confucianism (Taipei: Ricci Institute, 2001), 83.

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not a religion in the conventional sense, and yet was deeply spiritual. Umberto Bresciani stresses the contribution of Liang in this matter as follows: Liang Shuming was the first to stress the religious import of Confucianism. More broadly, he was referring to Chinese culture in general, because in his thinking the whole of Chinese culture possessed a deeply spiritual bent, whether Daoism or Buddhism, as well as the mainstream doctrine of the Chinese, Confucianism.3

Liang’s analysis of Chinese culture as being without religion, and where moral reason replaced both faith in God and obedience to a Church, has been largely accepted by Contemporary New Confucians. Liang’s influence can be felt in the “Declaration on Behalf of Chinese Culture Respectfully Announced to the People of the World,” written by Zhang Junmai 張君勱 (1886–1969), Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–1978), Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan 徐複觀 (1903–1982), and proclaimed on January 1, 1958. The four authors emphasized that Confucianism was not a purely intellectual theory, but a life commitment which held that the supreme ideal of sagehood was to be in communion with Heaven. Though Confucianism did not develop into an organized religion, it still contained a deep religiosity. The four authors were able to go beyond the artificial dichotomy established by Liang between religion and morality, stating that, for Confucianism, “human existence is simultaneously moral and religious.”4 The authors did not shy away from using the term “religion,” and qualified Confucianism as a “humanist religion” (renwen zongjiao 人文宗教) or an “ethical religion” (daode de zongjiao 道德的宗教).5 More recently, Tu Weiming 杜維明 (1940–) has developed the concept of “Confucian spirituality” as an encompassing way of life. Some scholars have also attempted to go beyond the misrepresentation of Chinese culture as one of immanence, and as opposed to a Western culture of transcendence. Yu Yingshi 余英時 (1930–) and Tang Yijie 湯一介 (1927–) began developing the idea of an “immanent transcendence” (neizai chaoyue 內在 超越) in Chinese culture or Confucianism.6 Bresciani, Reinventing Confucianism, 83. Manifesto, quoted by Bresciani, Reinventing Confucianism, 54. 5 Tu Weiming and Mary Evelyn Tucker, eds., Confucian Spirituality (New York: Crossroads, 2003–2004), 2 vols. 6 Yu Yingshi 余英時, Cong jiazhixitong kan Zhongguo wenhua de xiandai yiyi 從價值系統 看中國文化的現代意義 [Looking at the Modern Meaning of Chinese Tradition from the System 3 4

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And yet, despite the respect of the Confucian scholars for Liang’s broad religious vision, most of them went into a completely different direction. For example, Mou Zongsan, following the steps of his master Xiong Shili, oriented the transcendent mind toward a very rationalistic system, far removed from practical life and the social structure (community and rituals) which could support it. This hyper-rationalization is certainly due to the challenge brought about by Western philosophy. Contrary to those scholars, Liang had always refused to consider his thinking as a purely theoretical activity, limited to the academic arena. For him, ultimate reality could not be grasped through philosophical reasoning alone. As we can see, the mistake of the modern New Confucian scholars is still to try to solve, through philosophical means, questions that were outside its scope. The hyper-rationalization of the movement leads Confucianism to be defined as a religiosity without religion, thereby divorcing the religious quest from its concrete social forms. In my opinion, this idea of religion still follows the narrow concept inherited from the Enlightenment, which finally lead the New Confucians to consider religion a marginalized social reality. Their definition of Confucianism as a religiosity without religion ultimately leaves it very weak, both intellectually and socially. In contrast, Liang invited his contemporaries to look towards necessary practices, both individual and communitarian, which recognized their own limitations yet opened up to a radical transcendence from within. Liang’s quest for transcendence implied both a strong personal commitment and a social engagement. Only at the level of practical engaging with the world could a true religious experience be fostered. Through this concrete form of practice, people could experience, at the individual and collective levels, something truly religious, described in Confucian terms, and which was a moral and esthetic union with the cosmos. Outside Contemporary New Confucianism, Liang’s idea on religion have even more difficulties to be full understood, since many intellectuals today remain attached to the dichotomy between religion and morality. For example, professors Lu Weiming 陸衛明 and Zhao of Values] (Taipei: Shibao wenhua chubangongsi 時報文化出版公司, 1984); Tang Yijie 湯一介, Rudaoshi yu neizaichaoyue wenti 儒道釋與內在超越問題 [Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism and the Question of Immanent Transcendence] (Nanchang 南昌: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe 江西人民出版社, 1991).

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Xiaoyu 趙曉宇 have recently summarized Liang’s analysis in the following way: Beginning with Confucius, China has walked a path of morality that has replaced religion. This is exactly the opposite of religion, which tells people to abandon self-belief and self-reliance, and [instead] rely on external forces. Chinese people know right from wrong without the religious concept of sin. Liang is certain that regardless of whether it is selfconsciousness and self-discipline, or obedience to a religious discipline, all can lead to a good and orderly society. Indeed, religion has rapid and strong effects which are not easily discarded. In this sense, morality cannot compare [with it]. [The question of] religion versus non-religion is certainly a watershed issue between Chinese and Western culture. Liang’s grasp of these differences is extremely insightful, and his useful comments demonstrate a clear and penetrating knowledge of the various effects they produce.7

Here, the two authors praise Liang for replacing religion by morality. In fact, this schematic reading is too simple and I hope to have shown that a careful reading of Liang’s work suggests something quite different. But the reading of our two authors here is reflective of the endurance of the anti-religious sentiment in China in the twenty-century, starting from the New Culture Movement to the Marxist ideology which is still very present. The Question of the Pluralistic Meanings of Rituals As we can see, Liang attempted to reclaim the spiritual heritage of Confucianism. However, Liang’s emphasis on ritualism is still largely overlooked. One obvious reason for this is that Chinese customs and rituals were still practiced during the Republican era, especially in the countryside where Liang attempted to implement his rural reforms. With the rise of Communism and the Cultural Revolution, most of

7 Lu Weiming 陸衛明 and Zhao Xiaoyu 趙曉宇, “Cong ‘Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi’ kan Liang Shuming de Zhong xi wenhua guan 從《中國文化要義》看梁漱溟的中 西文化觀 [Liang Shuming’s Viewpoint of Chinese and Western Cultures in Substance of Chinese Culture],” in Zhongguo shehuikexueyuan yanjiushengyuan xuebao 中國社 會科學院研究生院學報 [Academic Journal of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Graduate School] 1262 (November 2007): 43–48; “Liang Shuming’s Viewpoint of Chinese and Western Cultures in Substance of Chinese Culture,” translated by Michael Chang, in Liang Shuming’s Thought and Its Reception, edited by Thierry Meynard (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 61–62.

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these customs, rituals and festivals have today disappeared. Here, Liang reminds us that Confucianism can be a truly living tradition only if it nourishes one’s spiritual life through an ethical involvement in the family, schools, companies and the government. If Confucianism remained only a literary resource from the past, its spiritual role would be limited to a tiny elite. The revitalization of ancient rituals through their modernization is not an automatic guarantee that one will lead a moral life. As Confucius envisioned, rituals have to be performed alongside others, thereby inviting people to reflect upon their own morality. Here, I would like to emphasize the polysemy of rites in a pluralistic society. Indeed, Liang may have overlooked this dimension, as did many Chinese intellectuals during the twentieth century, whose understanding of the rites was too dogmatic. As I see it, there are different ways to experience rituals. Some indeed remain at the level of only what one can see and hear. Others may use them to enter into a deeper transformation of the self, through which they become united with Heaven. However, I do not see the need to judge, using a Confucian scale, which experience is better, as Liang Shuming and others did when they rejected popular methods of performing the rituals. Their rejection of popular forms of religiosity was symptomatic of their elitism. They could not accept the fact that people performed rituals without engaging in a strictly orthodox Confucian self-transformation. Instead, they tended to reduce the rituals to these more narrow interpretations. People were not only expected to participate in the rites—their interpretations of them were to remain confined to such orthodox meanings. However, before modern times, traditional Confucianism did not attempt to enforce such rigid interpretations. Although people were invited to uphold a strict orthopraxis, there was no authority to check whether or not they did so. This peculiarity of Confucianism astonished the Jesuit missionaries when they went to China in the seventeenth century. The rituals they performed for their ancestors, Confucius or the emperor could take on as many meanings as there were performers. Some literati understood the rituals in a purely ethical or spiritual fashion, while common people attached supernatural forces to them. Coming from the perspective of Christianity, which not only defined a strict orthopraxis in sacramental life but also stipulated a correct interpretation of it, the missionaries had difficulty understanding the different and contradictory interpretations given to the Confucian rituals in

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China. This lack of orthodoxy shocked them. The treatise written by the Italian Jesuit Niccolò Longobardo (1565–1655), who succeeded Matteo Ricci as leader of the Jesuits’ mission in China, had much to say about this.8 Longobardo and other missionaries suspected the literati of hypocrisy because they accepted that the common people performed rituals while harboring an interpretation of them that was different to their canonical meanings. The Jesuits thus saw the literati as “atheo-political”; they were “atheists” since they supposedly did not believe in any objective reality outside the sensible world, and they were “political” because they used religious rites as tools for controlling the country.9 In fact, the literati of Ming or Qing dynasties were not hypocritical at all, but, like Confucius, they trusted in each individual’s capacity to discover the meaning of the rituals for themselves. As Liang recognized, Confucius did not directly oppose the ancient forms of worship. Yet, on this point, Liang, like most intellectuals in the twentieth century, was not as tolerant as Confucius. Liang rejected and advocated the eradication of popular religions, and considered them a lower form of religion which did not meet either the higher standards of the Western social religion (Christianity), the Chinese moral religion (Confucianism), or the Indian transcendent religion (Buddhism). Under the influence of the New Culture Movement, Liang construed an idealized, puritan form of Confucianism and relegated the matrix of Chinese popular culture to oblivion. This limitation may serve to remind us of how Confucianism worked in pre-modern China. Before modern times, Confucianism traditionally worked within the context of a pluralistic Chinese society. Therefore, Contemporary New Confucianism should renounce the image it has constructed of itself, as in complete isolation from other cultural and social currents. It should instead engage in a dialogue with other traditions. Liang Shuming had already made great progress in this direction, envisioning a society in which the three elements of Western thought, Confucianism and Buddhism could co-exist. Yet, his dismissal of popular culture and religion should be seen as a mistake. Confucianism can only regain its central position in Chinese culture,

8 See Niccolò Longobardo, Traité sur quelques Points de la Religion des Chinois (Paris, 1701). 9 See Philippe Couplet and Prospero Intorcetta, Confucius Sinarum Philosophus.

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not by placing itself above other traditions, but by existing in symbiosis with them. Confucian rites have many symbolic resources which may be meaningfully interpreted by other traditions, including Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Christianity, and so on. Liang as a Crypto-Buddhist For most of his life, Liang advocated the revival of Confucianism. However, he retained the conviction that Confucianism could not address ultimate questions of meaning for the individual and for the world. The academic community has begun to understand Liang’s complex relationship with Buddhism only recently, especially by taking into account some of Liang’s interviews. In these, he revealed that he had remained a Buddhist throughout his life. The academic community’s misperception of Liang’s true religious identity is understandable. Believing that humanity was not yet ready to enter into the Buddhist period, Liang instead promoted Confucian morality as a necessary step for fostering self-reflection and personal cultivation, which he believed would prepare the ground for eventual Buddhist enlightenment. We can gather that Liang kept silent about his Buddhist faith because he wanted people to concentrate on the issues they were presently facing, and not be distracted with issues for which they were not yet ripe. From this perspective, the intellectual itinerary of this crypto-Buddhist becomes quite clear. In his twenties, Liang went to Buddhism in order to solve existential issues, such as the question of suffering and death. During this period, he had the conviction that he should engage in self-cultivation while seeking to “leave this world” (chushi). Later, he felt the need to find a more rational foundation for his Buddhist faith. He then adopted Yogācāra. This provided him with a rational discourse which, when pushed to its extremes, was self-negating and opened into the extra-rational realm of Buddhahood. This kind of “negative philosophy,” in which reason annihilated itself, and which has some nihilistic tendencies, indeed plays an important role in all of Liang’s works. As we have seen, Liang’s interpretation of Buddhism was judged to be unorthodox. His emphasis on radical transcendence, and on renouncing the world, was in complete opposition to the movement led by Taixu, who attempted to transform Chinese Buddhism into a

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social movement. However, by advocating Confucianism during the present age, Liang remained faithful to the Mahāyāna conception of skillful means. According to this, everything that leads toward enlightenment can be called Buddhist. At a personal level, Liang always remained a devout Buddhist, believing that Buddhist enlightenment represented ultimate reality. Even though he remained distant from institutional Buddhism, he was committed to his religious practice. It can be said that his ascetic way of life, his commitment to transmitting the Way, and his readiness to become a martyr of the Way during the Cultural Revolution, are all indicative of the religious dimension to his personal life. For most of his life, Liang kept his Buddhist faith secret, with the result that he has been believed to be a Confucian, and even “the last Confucian.” Liang did not deny being Confucian, since he considered Confucianism the most appropriate path for humanity’s present stage, and that it could ultimately lead to Buddhist enlightenment. Liang’s best kept secret was finally revealed at the end of his life. On August 1980, Guy Alitto went to interview him in Beijing and asked him about his views on Buddhism, to which Liang replied: I consider myself a Buddhist. But from the standpoint of society, it is better to say that I am a Confucian. I admit this point.10

Several years later, in the spring of 1985, Liang made a similar declaration to Professor Wang Zongyu when he said: I converted to Confucianism because Buddhism is an other-worldly religion, and does not coincide with the human world. But I have still kept Buddhism in my heart. I have never changed on this.11

While Liang was promoting a Confucian program for improving society and bringing psychological peace to individuals, he was in fact looking beyond the material and social world, and even beyond the mental world. For him, ultimate liberation could come only from Buddhism, and from completely renouncing all corporeal and mental attachments. His silence regarding his ultimate commitment and faith led people to mistakenly believe that he was a Confucian. Liang, on purpose, did not correct this misperception.

Interview with Alitto, in Complete Works, Vol. 8, 1178. Treatise on Differences and Similarities between Confucianism and Buddhism, in Complete Works, Vol. 7, 67. 10 11

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This tension between the two distinct poles of chushi and rushi can be found everywhere in Liang’s thought. They are complementary, however, despite their opposition. Those who do not understand the need to renounce the world are finally unable to engage with it, and those who do not understand the need for engaging with the world are unable to renounce it. As a Buddhist, Liang recognized in his own personal life, as well as in the life of humanity and of the cosmos, a “beyond” which radically transcended human experience and the world. This beyond did not provide any positive meaning to human existence, but emptied it of all meaning and revealed the pure and transcendent. Liang’s idea of radical transcendence is significant for our secular world. With the coming of modernity, both in the West and other parts of the globe, religions have undergone profound transformations. Human reason has become more autonomous, less bound by tradition, and more certain of its own power. Focus has shifted from other-worldly to this-worldly realities. In the West, Christianity has concentrated its efforts on establishing the kingdom of God on earth. The Protestant Social Gospel and Catholic Liberation Theology are examples of such a shift. Many secular movements have also grown out of Christianity, the most influential being Marxism. Similarly, Chinese religions have been deeply transformed by modernity. The humanistic Buddhism advocated by Taixu has today been accepted by the government-controlled Buddhist Association of China (Zhongguo fojiao xiehui 中國佛教協會) because of its contribution to an “harmonious society” under the leadership of the Communist Party. Also, Engaged Buddhism has become an important movement in South and East Asia, including in Taiwan, Vietnam, Thailand and South Korea.12 The engagement of religious organizations in social reform programs has certainly produced benefits. Society has gained from this trend, since religions have been able to foster new energies which have complemented state efforts. Religions have also gained from it a platform

12 The term Engaged Buddhism was coined by the Vietnamese Buddhist Thich Nhat Hanh (1926–). During the Vietnam War, he and his sangha made efforts to respond to the suffering they saw around them. They saw this work as part of their meditation and mindfulness practice.

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to participate in social realities, and an opportunity to articulate a new discourse—one which can reach out to people in concrete ways. Yet despite all this, Liang Shuming reminds us that religion should not be confused with an ethical, social or political program for changing the world, because religion in its essence aims at a transcendent reality. In a world which is increasingly secularized, religion should resist the tendency to be transformed into a secular movement or a form of social activism. Religion should especially avoid the temptation to become reduced to ethics. On the contrary, it should be a reservoir of true transcendence, and function to offer criticisms of the world in its present state. If we understand the true intent of Liang in his rejection of social religion, it will be possible to give more elasticity to the concept of religion, which as a cultural reality can have many aspects and functions. Once the core of religion as pure transcendence has been secured, it will be possible for religion to reclaim a kind of social engagement. A Personal Synthesis Liang’s ideas were highly original, and he was rarely fully understood. If partially understood, his ideas were often opposed, either by Buddhists or by Confucians. Others may feel Liang’s life and thought was too eclectic. However, despite appearances, he was not an eclectic, nor a syncretist, but someone who had reached a remarkable degree of synthesis between his life and thought. Even if some of his contradictions remain unresolved, he showed an impressive coherence in his understanding of a Buddhist-type of religious transcendence, which unfolded into a Confucian-type of mental life, and the Christian-type of social life. For Liang, these three types of religions were needed to bring the final awakening to fruition. Liang held an elitist view of Buddhism; he considered common people to be unprepared for Buddhist enlightenment. However, he attempted to map a path toward final liberation for all, by integrating positive Christian and Confucian elements that could effectively prepare society and culture for it. This theory of stages should not strike us as unfamiliar. After all, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many in the West, like Kierkegaard and Freud, produced similar theories. But we touch here the most problematic aspect of Liang’s thought. His theory of stages went against the more holistic approach

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we are now familiar with, which emphasizes the interconnectedness between religion’s economical, political, social, cultural and spiritual facets. Each of these different elements needs to be addressed simultaneously for results to be maximized, rather than proceeding through different stages as Liang envisaged. Despite these limitations, Liang’s religious thought was remarkable by virtue of its breadth and depth. It may stimulate new ways of understanding the ever-strengthening trend of cross-fertilization, at work in a globalized world, between different cultural and spiritual traditions. Relevance of Liang’s Individual Practice Finally, Liang’s individual practice is particularly relevant in our modern or post-modern context. Three decades ago, Michel Foucault showed us the post-modern crisis at the level of the self. His project was precisely to re-imagine new modes of subjectivism, new modes by which the subject could understand and shape his own identity. For this, Foucault drew a lot from the study of Greco-Roman Antiquity, and especially of the Roman Empire. At a time where freedom in the public forum was narrowing, people were looking for new forms of individual practices, dealing with diet, sexuality and ethical relationships. By developing these techniques of the self, they were able to reclaim for themselves a certain degree of personal freedom. In a very different context, Liang attempted something quite similar in the second part of this life. Although he was denied political action in the fields of education and social work, he developed for himself an array of practices which keep him spiritually alive. And although much is to be learned in the collective practices that he attempted before 1949, his individual practice may prove to be even more relevant. He understood that a direct resistance and opposition to the regime was not the real issue, but he went on developing different techniques of the self, drawn mostly from Buddhism, but also from Confucianism, and even from Daoism. This is perhaps Liang’s deepest secret. His freedom of thought would have been impossible without the spiritual freedom which was nourished by those techniques. In this respect, Liang may not appear so unique and so out-ofreach, since we can suppose that even under the Maoist dictatorship many people could privately engage in similar practices. The question of spiritual freedom should be able to be addressed at anytime, and

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not reserved only for the times of dictatorship. Although many people in the West enjoy today the benefits of political participation, the high degree of sophistication of our societies deprive the individual of his/ her true identity and call for new techniques in nurturing the true self and regaining freedom. Here also Liang Shuming can be a master for us.

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INDEX Alitto, Guy, vii–x, 11, 169, 171, 185, 186, 209 Aquinas, Thomas, 4, 5 Asad, Talad, 3 Asa ga 無著, 77, 78 Aśvaghosa 馬鳴, 106, 108 Atheism, 11, 157 Attachments, 43, 56, 65, 67, 90–93, 95, 99, 100, 132, 158, 159, 194 – due to discrimination, 91, 181 – to the self, 88, 89, 99, 120, 160, 161 – to the world, 64, 70, 88, 89, 99, 120, 182 Innate—, 90, 162, 181 Augustine of Hippo, 2, 7, 177 Awakening of Faith, 79, 105–110, 115, 118 Bayle, Pierre, 11 Bergson, Henri, ix, 23, 82, 83, 87, 190, 193 Bingenheimer, Marcus, 142 Bodhisattva, 66, 68, 93, 101, 102, 174, 181 Vow of—, 182 – path, 131, 136, 139, 141 Book of Rites, 13 Bouillard, Henri, 201 Buddha(s), 42, 56, 63, 65, 69, 74, 78, 86, 124–133, 141, 171, 176–182, 193, 194 Buddha nature, 88, 110, 111, 118 Buddhahood, 73–75, 101, 115, 136, 137, 141, 142, 145, 189, 190, 208 Buddhism, vii, xii, 2, 12, 15, 21–27, 37–47, 53–60, 159, 170–172, 193–194, 208–209 Chinese—, xiv, 30, 72, 76, 79, 100, 105–110, 113–116, 119, 121 Indian—, 39, 61, 68, 71–73, 105, 106, 110–113, 122 Institutional—, 76, 129, 144, 173, 209 Humanistic—, xiv, 124, 127–144, 199, 209, 210 Liang’s—, viii, xii, 68, 102, 103, 110 Popular—, 128, 132, 133

Mahāyāna—, 66, 131, 136, 173, 186 Tantric—, 177–183, 189 Bresciani, Umberto, 203 Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培, 15, 16, 23, 62, 150, 187 Chan, 75, 106, 129, 130, 186, 187 Chatterjee, A. K., 117 Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀, 15, 16, 24, 27, 31 Chen Lai 陳來, xii, xiii, 156 Chen Shufen 陳樹芬, 185 Cheng Gongrang 程恭讓, 135, 136 Chengweishilun, 77, 93, 101, 106, 109, 110, 115–119 Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石, 191 Christianity, vii, xiii, 2–16, 21, 37, 40, 45–61, 67, 142–153, 161–163, 202, 206–211 Compassion, 63–66, 68, 70, 103, 142, 159, 174, 181 Comte, Auguste, 41, 42, 49 Confucius, xi, 8, 14, 16, 29, 151–156, 159, 162, 173, 193, 205–207 Confucianism, vii, 6–15, 36–41, 66–71, 98–103, 134–139, 147–163, 172–174, 202–212 Contemporary New—, xi, xiii, 76, 202 Neo—, 32, 46, 65, 116, 122–124, 134, 155–162, 179 Consciousness, 35, 44, 54, 56, 69, 83–98, 107, 112–122, 153, 159, 195, 205 Couplet, Philippe, 8 Cultural Revolution, vii, 48, 167, 192, 205, 209 Daoism, vii, viii, 2, 29, 53, 59, 134, 148, 157, 183, 189, 203, 208, 212 Darwinism, 144 Dasgupta, S.N., 71, 117 De Acosta, José, 5, 6 De La Vallée Poussin, Louis, 116, 117 Dewey, John, 24, 26, 82 Dharma-character school, 73–77, 118 Diary, viii, 165, 170, 177–183, 193, 196 Dignāga 陳那, 77, 93, 96,

224

INDEX

Direct perception (or xianliang), 93–102, 120, 181 Discourse on the Stages of Concentration Practice, 77, 78, 87, 114 Duke of Zhou, 153–156 Durkheim, Emile, 3, 12, 50, 56 Eliade, Mircea, 13 Empiricism, 24–26, 82, 84 Epistemology, xiv, 26, 53, 62, 72, 79, 81–103, 110, 117–125, 134, 157–160 Evolution, 4, 18, 35, 37, 41, 68, 69, 95, 102, 156, 190–191 Fang Litian 方立天, 107, 108, 115 Feng Youlan 馮友蘭, 150, 187 Finding the Foundation and Resolving the Doubt, 23, 61, 68, 73, 79, 118, 158, 171 Foucault, Michel, 212 Freud, Sigmund, 211 Funabashi, Issai, 105 Fustel de Coulanges, Numa Denis, 49 Gandhi, 197 Gonggar 貢噶呼圖克圖, 179–183 Guo Moruo 郭沫若, 192 Hinduism, 12, 53, 115, 189 Hobbes, Thomas, 50, 51 Hu Shi 胡適, 15, 31, 151 Huang Jingxian 黃靖賢, 184 Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲, 177 Human Mind and Human Life, 190–194 Hume, David, 82 Husserl, Edmund, 118 Imagined nature, 89, 90 Inoue Enryo, 187 Integral experience, 83, 87, 96 Intellection (or biliang), 93–98 James, William, 82 Jiang Zizhai 江子齋, 178 Kant, Immanuel, 23 Kang Youwei 康有為, 14, 15 Kierkegaard, Søren, 211 Kochumutton, Thomas, 117 Kuiji 窺基, 77 Le Bon, Gustave, 74 Legge, James, 13 Lévi, Sylvain, 116 Lévinas, Emmanuel, 64

Lin Anwu 林安梧, 35, 36 Lin Biao 林彪, xi, 193 Liang Ji 梁濟, 167, 172 Liang Qichao 梁啟超, ix, 15, 25–27, 31, 106, 129 Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (his life), xi, 21–23, 165–200 Longobardo, Niccolò, 207 Lu Weiming 陸衛明, 204 Lusthaus, Dan, 117 Lü Cheng 呂瀓, 75, 108 Lü Dongbin 呂洞賓, 148, 149 Maitreya 彌勒, 78 Marx, Karl, 28, 54 Marxism, viii–xi, 52, 69, 146, 192, 205, 210 May Fourth Movement, xi Mao Zedong 毛澤東, vii, xi, 138, 186, 191–195, 200, 212 Mencius 孟子, 65 Metaphysics, 11, 46, 49, 53, 68, 81–83, 100–103, 105–126 Moral Reason (or lixing), 55, 58, 99, 153–158, 161, 163, 203 Morality, 11, 51, 55–57, 72, 98–103, 107, 129, 147–164, 174, 200–208 Public—, 50, 54, – replacing religion, 154 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, 76, 116, 123, 124, 203, 204 Nāgārjuna 龍樹, 111, 183 Nanjō Bunyū, 75 Nenghai 能海, 178, 183 New Culture Movement, 15, 25, 45, 48, 53, 82, 127, 130, 134, 173, 202, 205, 207 Noble Truth(s), 62, 65, 66, 131 Objective aspect, 32 Ockham, William of, 5, 6, 10 Ontology, xiv, 36, 44, 46, 72, 74, 100–103, 105–126 Other-dependent nature, 89, 90, 112 Outline of Indian Philosophy, 42, 43, 71–79, 84, 96 Outline of Yogācāra, 26, 77–79, 96, 119, 133 Ouyang Jingwu 歐陽竟無, 22, 26, 75, 78, 106–110, 114–116 Paramārtha 眞諦, 106, 113, 114, 118 Pearson, Karl, 82

INDEX

Peking University, xii, xv, 15, 21–24, 31, 38, 71, 76, 77, 105, 124, 134, 150, 169, 180 Perfected nature, 90, 112–114 Philosophy, x, 8, 19, 21–46 Anthropological—, 28–30, 37 Cultural—, 19, 26–28, 30–31 Death of—, 43–44 Definition of—, 25, 37 Indian—, 23, Scientific—, 24, 25, 28 – of Confucius, 29 – of Religion, xiii Pirenne, Jean, 49 Pure Land, 135, 144, 199 Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli, 71 Raju, P. T., 117 Religion, Category of—, xiii, 45 Concept of—, 201–214 Definition of—, xiii, 12, 37, 39, 45, 67 Moral—, 37, 55, 151, 156, 207 Natural—, 4–11 Philosophy of—, xiii Social—, 37, 47–61, 151, 207, 211 Substitute for—, xiv, 60, 147–164, 202 True—, 6–10, 40, 47, 57, 61–80, 147 Typology of—, 19, 21–46 Rhys Davids, Thomas William, 72 Ricci, Matteo, 207 Ricœur, Paul, 6 Russell, Bertrand, 17, 24, 82 Śa karasvāmin 商羯羅主, 77 Schall von Bell, Adam, 7 School of nature, 73, 74, 118 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 23, 31, 32 Scientism, 12, 83, 132 Secular, 1–5, 8–17, 145, 152, 173, 201, 210, 211 Self Actual—, 33 Great—, 34 No—, 92 Previous—, 33, 34 Small—, 34 Self-cultivation, xii, 39, 46, 84, 200, 208 Sharma, C. D., 117 Shentong, 132, 187–191

225

Shinko, Mochizuki, 106 Smith, Wilfred Cantwell, 10 Spencer, Herbert, 28, 49 Śramana Pāramiti, 84 Steinkellner, Ernst, 120 Stcherbatsky, Fyodor Ippolitovich, 117 Subjective aspect, 32 Substance of Chinese Culture, 23, 24, 27, 39, 46, 47, 50, 150–157, 167, 178–182 Suchness, 90, 101, 106–110, 119–121, 126, 193 Supra-mondane (or chushijian), 122, 127, 235 Taixu 太虛, 22, 26, 59, 68, 76, 98, 108–110, 116, 124, 127–146, 199, 208, 210 Tang Junyi 唐君毅, 203 Tang Yijie 湯一介, 203 Tang Yongtong 湯用彤, xv, 76 Thorndike, Lynn, 49, 151 Three natures, 89, 99, 112, 114, 118, 157 Thurman, Robert, 189 Transcendence, 8–10, 21, 40–45, 128, 129, 141–145, 161, 200, 203, 211 Absolute—, xiii, 102, 115, 193, 202 Pure—, xiv, 61, 79, 127, 211 Radical—, xiv, 12, 39, 61, 66–68, 111, 121, 132, 143, 147, 162, 172, 204, 208–211 Transcendent reality, 34, 36, 88, 95, 96, 101, 113, 123, 160, 211 Transcendent religion, 37, 42, 55, 60, 147, 207 Tu Weiming, 203 Vasubandhu 世親, 116 Verbiest, Ferdinand, 7 Voltaire, François-Marie, 11 Wang Enyang 王恩洋, 108 Wang Fuzhi 王夫之, 75 Wang Gen 王艮, 176 Wang Guowei 王國維, 32 Wang Yangming 王陽明, 46, 135, 160 Wang Zhixin 王治心, 157 Wang Zongyu 王宗昱, 169, 183 Wayman, Alex, 118 Weber, Max, 3, 50, 54 Wenchang 文昌, 148, 149 Wesołowski, Zbigniew, 25 Will, 5, 21, 27, 35, 47, 62, 179, 193

226

INDEX

Hyper—, 33 Orientations of the—, 31–34, 37, 39 Wisdom, 42, 43, 65, 66, 87, 107 Fundamental—, 101, 120 Subsequently obtained—, 101–103, 120 Womb of the tathāgata (or tathāgatagarbha), 114, 115 Wu Chengshi 吳承仕, 71 Xiong Shili 熊十力, 116, 123, 124, 204 Xu Fuguan 徐複觀, 203 Xu Jishang 許季上, 71 Xuanzang 玄奘, 77, 101, 109, 111, 112, 115, 120 Yan Fu 嚴複, ix, 69 Yang Wenhui 楊文會, 75, 130, 188, 190

Yinshun 印順, 127, 140–142 Yogācāra, 26–33, 73–78 Indian—, 105–113, 123, 124 Chinese—, 75, 105, 113–116 – Epistemology, xiv, 79, 81–103, 110, 117, 124, 125, 157 Yu Yingshi 余英時, 203 Zhang Dongsun 張東蓀, 52 Zhang Junmai 張君勱, 203 Zhang Shenfu 張申甫, 48 Zhang Taiyan 章太炎, ix, 15, 25, 26, 42, 61, 69, 76, 79, 129, 158 Zhang Wenru 張文儒, 174 Zhao Xiaoyu 趙曉宇, 205 Zhou Enlai 周恩來, 192 Zhou Guihua 周貴華, 114, 115 Zhou Zuoren 周作人, 16