The Problem of Representation in Deleuze's Reading of Leibniz: To forget the Transcendental

UNIVERSITY OF SUNDERLAND

LIBRARY UNIVERSITY 1 The Problem of Representation

in Deleuze's

Reading of Leibniz:

To forget the Transcendental

Phillip Gillham

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the

requirements of the University of Sunderland for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

September 2005

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Abstract

The critique of representation and the project to think difference in a nonrepresentational fashion has been one of the defining factors of modem continental philosophy. And yet how a thought of pure difference can be used in a practical or interventionist sense is also one of its most obscure aspects. We shall examine this through an exploration of one of the main figures of modem continental philosophy, Gilles Deleuze, with reference to his use of the seventeenth century philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The importance of Leibniz to Deleuze lies in two main features: the infinitesimal calculus and his logic of events. While the infinitesimal calculus remains indispensable to Deleuze's use of transcendental principles he will take issue with Leibniz's logic of the event in order to produce his own theory (most specifically in the 1969 text The Logic of Sense). Deleuze's criticism of Leibniz is first set forth in Difference and Repetition (1968) where he argues that Leibniz limits his theory of the event to the extent that it is based on the belief of a God who produces the best of all possible worlds. As such although difference is taken to the infinite through the infinitesimal calculus Deleuze concludes that we remain within the realms of representation through the convergence of events in the ultimate identity of God. To express a non-representational form of difference Deleuze's is to construct a divergent theory of the event. Although this approach solution remains constant throughout all his works when we turn to The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (1988) the accusation of representation is withdrawn leaving simply the criticism of convergence. The reason for this is that Deleuze will find an entirely different form of logic at work in Leibniz's deduction of the individual or monad. It is the contention of this thesis that this alternative logic also undermines Deleuze's own theory of the event. We investigate this by tracing Leibniz's logic of the event back to its roots in scholastic philosophy. Here we propose that for Leibniz, in opposition to Deleuze, an event is constituted by the individual or monad itself. We also draw on the fact that Leibniz stated that the infinitesimal calculus was only the first step in his mathematical logic and that he always envisioned a geometric calculus, a calculus that would position individuals in relation to God. In order to access the logic behind such a calculus we turn to the ancient Greek term of tolma or audacity in neo-Platonism and gnosticism. This is a logic that has recently been revived by Frangois Laruelle. Through the construction of a tolma logic we argue that thinking difference in itself is an irresolvable abstraction and finally turn to Jorge Luis Borges to present a solution in terms of a geometry of place and a theory of proximate individuals. The originality of this thesis lies in that this research provides the first defence of Leibniz against Deleuze's interpretation to be found in contemporary studies. I also formulate a reading of Leibniz's philosophy that provides a unique position on debates in philosophy today.

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Acknowledgements

The original ideas for this project first came together nearly ten years ago. There are a lot of people who have provided help over this time. First I would like to thank the people without whom this thesis would not be finished: Dad, Hazel, Janet, David, Alan, and my late granddad who will be much missed. I would also like to thank Stuart Sim, my second director of studies for taking on the project at such a late stage. For encouragement throughout the project I would like to thank Malcolm, John, David, Paul, Bella and Tony. Finally I would like to thank John Mullarkey, my first director of studies for giving me the opportunity to begin this thesis.

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Contents

Introduction

6

1. Simulacra: A Study in the Platonic Dialectic

15

2. The Logic of the Event

45

3. The Art of Leibniz

103

4. The Position of Philosophy

167

Conclusion

210

Bibliography

212

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`So, my friend, after the example of the Phoenicians,you chartedyour courseby the journeyed. T ' ' 'No, Menippus, I `it themselves the said stars? stars was among Baudrillard

Introduction

7 PhilosoiDhv.Contemporary Philosophy...

Philosophy as science,as serious,rigorous, indeed apodictically rigorous ' dream is the scienceover. What place does philosophy have in the world today? Where once it was the cornerstoneof all knowledge it has now become sidelined by empirical science. If one wants to seek knowledge then one becomesa scientist rather than a philosopher etc.... Metaphysicsis left to quantum physics. How strangeto think that sciencewas once an occult practice; now it is the norm and is invoked should any discussion of `supernatural' phenomena ever threaten to be taken seriously. Even worse, investigation left demoted `psychological' this to and are of nature phenomena are floundering before the monolithic questions `Is it real?' and `Can we measureit? ' One only needsto turn to Albert Einstein's rebuttal to Henri Bergsonto confirm this: differs is `There is that time time; there a psychological no philosopher's only ... from the time of the physicist.'2 This is a pathology of the real. At what point did become the scienceof the obvious or the self-evident, this conflation of empiricism is, That the the touch: the the senses? conformation of sight and confirmation and science of the convenient; not only can I touch the world out there but I can see myself touching it, ergo, it must be real. On the other hand, if we turn to the work of the neuroscientistKarl Pribram or the physicist David Bohm their ideas fundamentally question our notion of `reality.' Pribram will argue that the brain functions holographically, that is, it expressesnon-localised energy waves in so called `space-time' co-ordinates? Bohm " itself. Such the world will use quantum physicsto extend this notion to the natureof theories challenge our notions of reality rather than take it as given. Suffice to say science has always had its dogmas in the same way as they are to be found in

' EdmundHusserl(1970) The Crisis of European Scienceand TranscendentalPhilosophy, trans. D. Carr. Illinois: NorthwesternUniversity Press,p. 389, quoted by Robin Durie (2002) "Does rhenomenologyhave a future?" Radical Philosophy, 113,p. 37 Henri Bergson(1999, orig. 1922) Duration and Simultaneity: Bergsonand the Einsteinian Universe, edited and with an introduction by Robin Durie, trans.L. Jacobson,trans.of supplementarymaterial M. Lewis and IL Durie. Manchester:Clinamen Press,p. 159 3 Daniel Goleman(1979) "Holographic Memory: Karl Pribram interviewed by Daniel Goleman," PsychologyToday, 12: 9, pp. 71-76 4 David Bohm (1980) Wholeness and the Implicate Order. London: Routledge

8 in Of thrives a technophilosophy. course empirical scientific rationalism very well capitalist `democracy.' It is all the more ironic that at the dark heart of empiricism we find the doctrine of scepticism. The doctrine of scepticism can really only be taken as a matter of degreesof scepticism -a complete sceptic would believe in nothing and as such would not even have the means to assert such a position. In this sense scepticism is the first moment of all philosophy, one must put one's assumptions to one side. In this, philosophy has changed very little down the ages, from Plato's dialectic to Nietzsche's total critique. However, the nature of scepticism has changed. The main protagonist of our thesis, the French philosopher

Gilles Deleuze, provides us with the following

brief

delineation of scepticism:

In opposition to ancient scepticism which rests on the variability of sensible appearanceand on the errors of the senses,modem scepticism rests on the status of relations and on their exteriority. The first act of modem scepticism was the discovery of belief in the foundations of knowledge, that is, the naturalization of belief (positivism). Starting from this point, its secondact was the denunciationof illegitimate beliefs, that is, of beliefs which do not obey the rules which result in effective knowledge (probabilism, calculus of probabilities).-' With modern scepticism a move is made from the sensibleto the cognitive. It is no longer the casethat the world out there may not be what it seemsbut a matter of how we constitute the world through mental associations.From the position of modem scepticism we may take two possible directions. First, we may construct practical knowledge from the world we do experience (science). Or second, we may investigatehow we constitute the world. And as ConstantinBoundaswill write in his translator's introduction to Deleuze's book on Hume, the world as a construct of the mind is effectively little more than a fiction: The world abides as a fiction of the imagination, and also fiction

s Gilles Deleuze(1991, orig. 1953)Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essayon Hume's theory of Human Nature, trans. ConstantinBoundas.New York: Columbia, p. 19, hereafterdenotedas Hume. This passageis taken from Boundas' introduction, `Deleuze,Empiricism, and the struggle for Subjectivity,' taken from Gilles Deleuze, `Hume,' chapterin F. Chateletet at. (eds.X 1979)La Philosophie. Verviers: Marabout, Vol. 2, p. 232, translation Boundas.

9 becomesa principle of human nature; the world never turns into an object of the understanding. It remains as an idea, but the idea is not 6 it fiction. constitutive; constitutesa With the Humean `turn' it is not just the casethat our perception of the world is a representation but that the representation is itself arbitrary. Neither can it be maintained that science is simply a neutral phenomenon- science, like any other knowledge, is a production. Jean Baudrillard alerts us to the original meaning of this term, production (pro-ducere]: to make visible.7 What is, and what is not visible is never a disinterestedphenomenon.This type of scepticism has also taken a further turn over the past century, which Stuart Sim has recently called `super-scepticism.'8 The linguistic turn in philosophy and the developmentsof structuralism and poststructuralismprovide further meansof taking our conceptionsapart. Theory. Postmodern Theory...

Say: This is real, the world is real, the real exists (I have met it) - no one laughs. Say: this is a simulacrum, you are merely a simulacrum, this war is a simulacrum - everyone bursts out laughing. With forced, condescendinglaughter, or uncontrollable mirth, as though at a childish joke or an obsceneproposition. Everything to do with the simulacrum is taboo or obscene,as is everything relating to sex or death. Yet it is much rather reality and obviousnesswhich are obscene.It is the truth we should laugh at.9 As a construct theory can no longer lay claim to an external referent. The world can no longer be used as justification, foundation or guarantor and conceptually is little more than an illusion, a phantasm,or better yet, an enchantment.We can no longer de-cipher,only cipher the world. This has lead to severalrelated common concernsin post-structuralist theory. The first is that of immanence- this directly follows as a consequenceof there being no external referent, for if there can be no claim to an

6 `Deleuze,Empiricism, and the struggle for Subjectivity,' p. 18 7 JeanBaudrillard (1987, orig. 1978) Forget Foucault, trans.N. Dufresne.New York: Semiotext(e), 21 Stuart Sim (2000) ContemporaryContinental Philosophy: TheNew Scepticism.Aldershot: Ashgate, 1-2 gJean Baudrillard (1996, orig. 1995) ThePerfect Crime, trans.C. Turner. London: Verso, pp. 95-6

10 outside then theory must justify itself from within, or immanently. A secondconcern is that of difference (or identity) - defining something in itself in terms of what it is not (a referenceto an outside) would re-introduce transcendenceinto the system.As such to maintain immanenceany `identity' must be constituted differentially within the system itself. A third concern is a thorough critique of representation.Identity is not the only way in which a thought of difference may be compromised. That is, in order to think difference in itself it must not be mediatedthrough anything else. Of course it may be argued,as does Baudrillard, that defining the rules of the simulacrum does not in any way help one to escapethe reality principle: `What are we to do then? ... When everything conforms, beyondeven our wildest hopes,to the ironic, critical, alternative, catastrophic model?"° Deleuze's responseto problems such as thesehas consistently beento pre-configurethe rules of the gamethrough the history of philosophy, as we have already seenin Deleuze's presentationof Hume's scepticism.Likewise, Deleuzewill elaboratea theory of difference in his early works on Hume, Bergson and Nietzsche that essentially bypasses so-called 'postfrom following in ' It is Boundas the this that quotation structuralism. will use sense Derrida in relation to Deleuze's project: It is the dream of a purely heterological thought at its source. A pure thought of pure difference. Empiricism is its philosophical name, its metaphysical pretention or modesty. We say the dream because it must vanish at daybreak, as soon as language awakens. But then perhaps one will object that it is language which is sleeping. Doubtless, but then one must, in a certain way, become classical once more, and again find other " for divorce between thought. the grounds speech and

Unlike many of his contemporarieswho were working from the phenomenologicalexistential tradition Deleuzewill trace a different philosophical lineage.

'° ThePerfect Crime, pp. 101-2 " JacquesDerrida (1978) Writing in 151, Difference, Routledge, A Bass. London: trans. quoted p. and Hume,p. 3. Dcrrida originally madetheseremarksin relation to Levinas.

11 Deleuze's Trajectory

The themes of immanence, difference, and the critique of representation will all be locked into place at an early stage in Deleuze's philosophy:

1) On immanence

Deleuze will first turn to Lucretius and Nietzsche and then find its ultimate form in Spinoza. The tone of this is set in the essay `Lucretius and Naturalism: ' `The first philosopher is a naturalist: he speaks about nature, rather than speaking about the gods. His condition is that his discourse shall not introduce into philosophy new myths.... 912That is, philosophy must not turn to a higher law for explanation but to the things themselves. 2) On difference Deleuze will turn to Bergson and Leibniz. As Deleuze will

say in the essay 'Bergson's

conception of difference: ' `... to do

philosophy is precisely to start with difference [... ] It is difference which explicates the thing and not its causes.'13 Essential to this notion of difference is Leibniz's differential calculus. The calculus provides a way to conceive of difference as a differential - something different in itself. 3) On the critique of representation Deleuze will write his own book on the matter, Difference and Repetition, which brings together all the themes of his earlier studies. Here Deleuze sets forth his own critique of representation:

Representationis a site of transcendentalillusion. This illusion comes in several forms, four interrelated forms which correspond particularly to thought, sensibility, the Idea and being. [The first illusion] consists of ... representing difference through the identity of the concept and the thinking subject. The second illusion concerns the subordination of difference to resemblance[... ] The third illusion concernsthe negative and the manner in which it subordinatesdifference to itself, in the form of both limitation and opposition [... ] Finally, the fourth illusion concernsthe subordinationof difference to the analogyof judgement.14

12Gilles Deleuze(1961) 'Lucnce Etude la et naturalisme' philosophiques, 1, translatedas `Lucretius and Naturalism,' in Gilles Deleuze(1990 orig. 1969) TheLogic of Sense,trans. M. Lester with C. Stivale. London: Athlone, p. 278 13Gilles Deleuze(1956) `La conceptionde la difference chez Bergson' Les EtudesBergsoniennes,IV, trans. M. Mcmahon as 'Bergson's Conceptionof Difference' in J. Mullarkey (ed.)(1999) TheNew Bergsonism.Manchester:University Press,p. 62 14Gilles Deleuze(1994, orig. 1968) Difference and Repetition, trans. P. Patton. London: Athlone, pp. 265-69

12 The Problem

However, while Leibniz's differential calculus is fundamentalto Deleuze's study he will arguethat Leibniz's metaphysicsdoesnot escapethe hold of representation: infinite representation does not free itself from the principle of identity ... as presupposition of representation.... Infinite representation invokes a foundation. While this foundation is not the identical itself, it is nevertheless a way of taking the principle of representation particularly seriously, giving it an infinite value and rendering it coextensive with the '-5 in it itself. this to reign over existence whole, and manner allowing

That is, although Leibniz takes the notion of difference into the infinitely small through the calculus he will still use this as a limit to difference. On the other hand when we turn to Deleuze's later work The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, we find the following statement:

Leibniz draws identity into infinity: the Identical is an auto-position of the infinite, without which identity would remain hypothetical.... The principle of identity - or rather, of contradiction - is only the cry of the Identicals.It cannot be an abstraction.It is a Signal16 . In fact in The Fold there will be no reference to Deleuze's earlier criticism of Leibniz. There are two possible ways to interpret this. Either Deleuzerecognisesthat his original criticism was invalid or perhapsDeleuzenow holds the view that there is a use for representation.If the former caseis correct then in what way do identity and contradiction play a part in difference or if the latter case is correct then would this compromiseDeleuze's approachto difference.

's Gilles Deleuze,Difference and Repetition, p. 49 16Gilles Deleuze(1993, orig. 1988) TheFold.- Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. T. Conley. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 43-44 p.

13 The Thesis

In this thesis we will be exploring this discrepancy between Deleuze's early and late works on Leibniz. The thesis we will present is that in Deleuze's later reading he does recognise a deeper logic in Leibniz that invalidates his earlier reading. However, we will also present the view that Deleuze does not appreciate the full consequences that this new logic has in terms of his own philosophy. In order to do this we shall first explore the logic and method Deleuze develops in producing his theory of difference in his early philosophy. To this effect in Chapter One we will explicate and analyse how Deleuze uses the idea of the simulacrum to provide a space for a philosophy of pure difference. In Chapter Two we shall see how the philosophy of difference is realised in Deleuze's theory of the event. Having elaborated the basic structure of Deleuze's early philosophy we will then be able to turn to Deleuze's later reading of Leibniz. This will be done in Chapter Three where we shall also identify a logic in Leibniz that requires us to re-evaluate Deleuze's philosophy. Finally Chapter Four will be concerned with a construction of this logic and the consequences this has for the overall position of Deleuze's philosophy.

14 Some short notes on three tvnes of infinite logic Throughout this thesis we shall make use of and discuss many different types of infinite logic. It will therefore be useful to outline the three most common forms thesewill take: 1) Infinity Logic. Essentially based on a logic of spatiality. Takes the form that in order for something to be everything it must be nothing. An essential component of Baudrillard's

theories, for example, simulation is everywhere because it has no

it i. reality, e. doesn't exist. Also used by the Kabbalists in their ideas of God but they modify the logic to say that God is no-thing rather than nothing.

2) Transcendentalor Differential Logic. Made possible by Leibniz's invention of the mathematical calculus. Has scientific as well as philosophical uses, e.g. use of the Fourier transform in holography. Takes a similar form to infinity logic except now the nothing part of the logic is treated as a limit. This important modification allows two different orders to be related in the form of one being an immanent condition of the other without re-introducing transcendence.Plays an important role in Deleuze's philosophy. 3) Unilateral Duality Logic. Recently single-handedlyre-introduced into philosophy by FrancoisLaruelle, he describesit as the only methodologicalway to think without presuppositions. Arguably first used in neo-platonic, Gnostic and perhaps even Kabbalistic thought. It is similar in form to differential logic: A is an immanent condition of B, but unlike transcendentallogic where A and B are co-conditions of each other so that conditioning takes place in both directions, in unilateral duality logic A conditions B but B has no effect on A. To provide an example from neoPlatonism the world is an expressionor outpouring of God but has no effect on God at all. The interesting result of this logic is that one can only think from the side of the conditioned, the world - one cannot passover the abyssto the other side. As such the condition (God) is totally indifferent to the conditioned.

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Chapter 1

Simulacra: A Study in the Platonic Dialectic

16 Introduction

We shall begin our study of Deleuze's early philosophy by exploring how Deleuze develops the notion of the simulacrum via the critique of Platonism. This will be f The in the this secondsection of this chapter will out rst chapter. section of carried developa responseto Deleuze's critique which is already to befound in the Platonic Dialogues.

It is perhaps not a coincidence that the concept of the simulacrum has been developed in contemporary continental philosophy at the same time as science and science fiction has grappled with the idea of virtual reality. Of course, the notion that the Eastern Greek is just back be thought to traced and ancient an appearance can world (and many other traditions). However, the modern conception of the simulacrum is is just between the as generally and appearance reality concerned with not opposition thought to be found in Parmenides, Plato and Lucretius but when the reference to a notion of reality is also dissolved. To this extent the modern conception of the his be back Nietzsche traced to project to overturn the and may simulacrum Deleuze As divide in will terms the sense or value. concept of essence/appearance of form in itself is the less this of an antiproject note no an overturning of philosophy Platonism. " However overturning Platonism is not simply `the abolition of the world dissolution but the the of the also of essences and of world of appearances' 8 ' division. constituting thought that sets up this

In contemporary continental philosophy the simulacrum is associatedwith two theorists in particular: Jean Baudrillard and Gilles Deleuze. Certainly the simulacrum is not solely exclusive to these two theorist as the simulacrum foreshadowsall `postmodern' theory to someextent but what they do presentus with is two very different approachesone may take to the simulacrum.For Baudrillard the is simulacrum the avatar of the complete loss of referenceto a real world. More than

17 `... the task of modem philosophy has beendefined: to overturn Platonism,' Gilles Deleuze(1994, orig. 1968)Difference and Repetition, trans. P. Patton. London: Athlone, p. 59 " Gilles Deleuze `Plato and the Simulacrum,' originally `ReversingPlatonism,' Revuede Metaphyisiqueset de Morale, 1967,reproducedin Gilles Deleuze(1990 orig. 1969) TheLogic of Sense,trans. M. Lester with C. Stivale. London: Athlone, p. 253

17 his In is like black hole study escape. this simulation a with no possibility of Baudrillard and Signs: Signification Ablaze, Gary Genosko will trace the lineage of Baudrillard's conception of the simulacrum via Michel Foucault, Pierre Klossowski, demon the idea back Georges Bataille Descartes' world producing to evil an of and 19 back be to gnostic traced deception. is idea This that can ultimately an as a Manicheism: `A Manichee thinks in radically dualistic terms and posits the cois Evil ). The Evil... irreconcilable (Good of two source and principles existenceof demon Good, but For Baudrillard Demon. '20 the the was triumphant evil not rather, a in his Deleuze in is work. this the treated negative purely as sense simulacrum and be in but loss the seenas a prototreats may what also simulacrum as a of reference Derridean manoeuvrehe posits that there was really no true referenceto begin with. For Deleuze reality has always been a simulacrum, a virtual reality, and the real is different lineage is Deleuze's is In very this endeavour what constructedor selected. from Baudrillard as notions of this type of virtuality are already to be found in Bergsonand Leibniz. Again, contra Baudrillard, Deleuze finds the simulacrum to be a positive notion in that it allows the possibility to produce an anti-Platonic We identity difference the shall now that than of essence. affirms philosophy rather turn to an in-depth study of Deleuze's anti-Platonism and his notion of the difference. his to pure of to simulacrum explore project producea philosophy

19Gary Genosko(1994) Baudrillard 29-34 Routledge, London: Ablaze. Signification Signs: pp. and 20ibid.

18 1. Deleuze's anti-Platonism Paul in Deleuze's is determine First we must anti-Platonism. entailed what exactly fact the that draws the to ' Art, `Anti-Platonism Patton's essay, attention our and 21 is his French Deleuze renverser. term to that anti-Platonism express uses precise This term can have the meaning of reversing, overturning, or overthrowing. Patton inverting by is `overcoming that Deleuze's certain proceeds strategy an proposes that Brusseau: by James is taken '22 Platonism. A up also similar stance aspects of `Reversed Platonism is not the opposite of Platonism, and it is not another version of 23 Deleuze's own Platonism. Platonism. It is a different philosophy that twists out of he Simulacrum' in `Plato for the and example position would seem quite clear, '24 Platonism. destruction destructions, innocent the `the of most of all speaks of However, Deleuze's position has come under scrutiny in recent scholarship on the philosophy of the event. For instance, Alain

Badiou argues that Deleuze has

produceda re-accentuatedPlatonism: "Platonism" is the great fallacious construction of modernity and postit It only exists prop: type negative of general modernity alike. serves as a to legitimate the "new" under the heading of an anti-Platonism. Certainly, the anti-Platonism proposed by Deleuze is the most generous and the destining the least inclined agency and to the a evoke most progressive, lacked Deleuze to All that was to most open contemporary creations. finish with anti-Platonism itself. 25

Another French philosopher, Francois Laruelle states:`Nietzscheand Deleuze empty Platonismof its intermediary hybrids and identify the extremes.'26The point we must investigateis whether Deleuze actually succeedsin his project to overturn Platonism

21Paul Patton (1994) `Anti-Platonism and Art, ' chapterin C. Boundasand D. Olkowski (eds.) Gilles Deleuzeand the Theatreof Philosophy. London: Routledge,p. 143,Cf. `the task of modem Vhilosophyhas beendefined: to overturn [renverser]Platonism,' Difference and Repetition, p. 59 Paul Patton(1994) `Anti-Platonism and Art, ' p. 143 23JamesBrusseau(1998) Isolated Experiences:Gilles Deleure and the Solitudesof Reversed Platonism. New York: SUNY Press,p. 3 u 'Plato and the Simulacrum,' p. 266 's Alain Badiou (2000, orig. 1997) Deleuze: TheClamor of Being, trans. L. Burchill. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,p. 101 '6 FrancoisLaruelle (1999) `Identity and Event,' trans. R. Brassier,transcript of paper presentedat Thinking the Event conference,Coventry: Warwick University, June,p. 3

19 first determine Plato's do Platonic To this elements still must whether remain. we or doctrinesand then explore how Deleuzedevelopshis own philosophy through them. The Trial of Socrates' Witness

Determining Plato's philosophy is a complex issue. As John Sallis points out `Plato himself wrote no treatises expounding "his philosophy. "'27 On the whole, Plato's forward, form in dialogues. is Points the arguments put of are of view writing Although for their certain refutation reached. and provisional positions proffered theories are consistently argued throughout the dialogues, as we shall see later, not it doctrine Platonic Forms is the the seems. All of this as of as straight-forward even is presented as being under the aegis of Plato's master, Socrates. Plato does not `speak' in the dialogues at all. 28Furthermore Plato's comments in the seventh letter has he further. he Here that to tells written no work on confuse matters only us seem intends do to or so (341c), after which he continues: philosophy

I know, that if there were to be a treatise or a lecture on this subject, I could do it best. I am also sure for that matter that I should be very sorry to see such a treatise poorly written. If I thought it possible to deal adequately with the subject in a treatise or in a lecture for the general life finer in been have than to there my what achievement public, would write a work of great benefit to mankind and to bring the nature of things to light for all men? I do not, however, think the attempt to tell mankind of these matters a good thing, except in the case of some few who are 29 discovering little for the truth themselves with a guidance. capable of

One may wonder whether any relevant conclusions could be drawn about the Dialogues in respect of the seventh letter. At one extreme one could posit that the Dialogues are simply a record of the teachingsof Socrateswhile at the other extreme one could paint the picture of Plato as the wily philosopher who admits to nothing and bequeathsit to a `few people' to find their own path to the `higher philosophy.'

27John Sallis (1996, orig. 1975) Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,p. 1 28Plato plays the part of a witness in the Phaedo 29Plato, Letter VI1,341d-e,p. 1589.All referencesto Plato Collected The (1961) from Plato are Dialogues of Plato including the Letters, edited by E. Hamilton and H. Cairns.New York: Pantheon

20 Investigations generally divide the Dialogues into three not necessarily exclusive topics. First there is the role played by Socrates,and to what extent the dialoguesare an accuraterendering of Socratesand his teaching. Second,there is the in dialogues, Plato, intentions he had himself, in the the and writing mind author including whether or not he intended to be critical of Socrates.Finally, there is the interpretation of the dialoguesthrough history: Platonism. In Deleuze's early writings he is specifically critical of Socratesand Platonism while finding inspiration in an `original' Plato. For instance,in Proust and Signs Deleuzestates: Proust is a Platonist, but not in the vague sense,not becausehe invokes essencesor ideas....Plato offers us an image of thought under the sign of 523b-525b], [VU, In Republic the and violences. encounters a passageof Plato distinguishestwo kinds of things in the world: those which leave the mind inactive, or give it only the pretext of an appearanceof activity; lead [ ] But the it force those to think to think, which and which us ... Socratic demon, irony, consists in anticipating the encounters. In Socrates,the intelligence still comes before the encounters;it provokes them, it instigates and organizes them. Proust's humor is of another nature: Jewish humor as opposedto Greek irony. One must be endowed for the signs, ready to encounter them, one must open oneself to their violence. The intelligence always comes after, it is good when it comes after, it is good only when it comes after. We have seen how this difference from Platonism involved many more.30 In his early writings Deleuze will identify Plato with those positive aspectsof the Platonic dialogues which he wishes to utilise for his own philosophy and against Platonism. However, in his later writings the figure of Plato will also come under suspicionand is similarly accusedof the original offence: Plato teaches the opposite of what he does: he createsconcepts but ... needsto set them up as representingthe uncreatedthat precedesthem.... Thus, on the Platonic plane, truth is posed as presupposition,as already there. This is the Idea. In the Platonic conceptof the Idea,first takes on a 31 precisesense.

30Gilles Deleuze(1972, orig. 1964) Proust and Signs,trans. R. Howard. New York: GeorgeBraziller, pp. 165-7 31Gilles Deleuze& Felix Guattari (1994, orig. 1991) What is Philosophy?,trans. G. Burchell and H. Tomlinson. London: Verso, p. 29

21 So we may seethat Deleuze's main target in the Platonic Dialogues is the theory of Ideas or Forms whether this is attributed to Socrates,Plato, or Platonism. We shall next turn to an elaborationof this doctrine.

What is Platonism?

`Platonism' comprises both a theory and a method, namely the theory of Forms or Ideasand the `Socratic method' or `dialectic.' The basic metaphysicsof the theory of Ideasis most clearly alluded to by Timaeus in the dialogue of the samename:

First then, in my judgement, we must make a distinction and ask, what is that which always is and has no becoming, and what is that which is always becoming and never is? That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state, but that which is by is help the opinion reason conceived with of sensationand without 32 is.... in becoming always a processof and perishing and never really Here Timaeus distinguishesbetween a sensibleworld which is always in flux and a is This through the extended account which we comprehend world. realm of reason to knowledge by Socratesin the Cratylus: `Nor can we reasonablysay, Cratylus, that there is knowledge at all, if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding. For knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge unless continuing always to abide and exist.'33The mental realm encompassesboth reasonand opinion but as we are told in the Timaeus for true knowledge to exist it must find its foundation in an `extra-mental' reality, that is it cannot be a sensible construct (opinion) otherwise it would not be eternal.34This extra-mental reality acts as a 35 from is derived the which model physical world as a copy. So the aim of reasonis to attain theseForms. The Socratic method is harder to define as it is drawn from the very form of the Platonic Dialogues. As a tool of instruction we also need to take into account how the Dialogues are utilised as a method of teaching.Consequently,readingsrange

32Plato, Timaeus,27d-28a,p. 1161 33Plato, Cratylus, 44th b, p. 473 34Plato, Timaeus,29a, p. 1162 35ibid. 30c-31b, p. 1163

22 from the `generous' to the `narrow.' An example of a generousreading is provided but rather a by David Burrell: `Dialectic is not a direct knowing of a higher sort ... critical reflection on the accounts we do give. Such a reflection remarks the inadequaciesof eachaccount, yet recognisesthat the deficienciesof one may well be is by '36 `accounts' From this the of another. criticism complemented viewpoint fundamentalto Socratic method and is part of what Burrell calls the `journey plotted by both "teacher" and "student," by appropriate disagreement.' 37On the other hand higher Socratic ' do it be `knowing the take to of method of readings a sort. some a For instance the following account is given by Richard Robinson in The Concise Encyclopaediaof WesternPhilosophy and Philosophers: His [Socrates] conversation takes the form of putting questions to a for definition, first The being a question, a request respondent. single does not admit the answers yes and no and is a matter of doubt. The Having however, demand the no. questions, or subsequent answer yes obtained a number of apparently disconnected answers in this way, Socrates "syllogizes" them, as Aristotle says, and shows that they refute his respondent's answer to the first question. He then asks the respondent to find another answer to the first question, and treats that in the same himself, is The is to that the and effect show way. answerer contradicting does not know what he thought he knew. Socrates does not, however, claim to understand the matter himself. On the contrary, he denies all knowledge of it. He even denies that he intended to convict his answerer of ignorance [... ] He says that his questions might for all he knew beforehand, have led to the establishment instead of the refutation of the answer given. This latter denial is, however, impossible to believe. Hence his victims tend to call him "sly", as pretending that he knows less than they do when actually he knows more. The Greek for slyness is " ny».... 38

The difference between these two types of reading can be located in the relation between the theory of Forms and the Socratic method assumed in each. In the generousreading the Socratic method is given in its own right, independentof the Forms. However, this is not the case in the narrow reading. Here the method is in aim with a prior mind. We have already seenhow Deleuzeholds this latter applied

36David Burrell (1973) Analogy and Philosophical Language.London: Yale University Press,p. 66 " ibid. p. 38 38R. Robinson `Socrates,' entry in J. Urnison and J. Ree(eds.X1989) The ConciseEncyclopaediaof WesternPhilosophy and Philosophers.London: Routledge,p. 299

23 in Socrates, demonstrated ('In from Signs Proust the the above quotation as and view intelligence still comes before the encounters.... Prousts humor is of another nature: Jewish humor as opposed to Greek irony. ') as is also in evidence in Deleuze's later in detail. Plato. Let look Platonism Deleuze's to more us now of at critique approach

Deleuze's critique of Platonism One of the fundamentaltenetsof Platonism is that the sensibleworld is producedas a Sophist. Forms. Deleuze In the the the this through criticises of an analysis copy of Sophist two different types of entity are distinguished in relation to the Forms: good 39 bad ). This is also in ('images') 'simulacra' and copies ('semblances' or copies 40 in definition imitator The Republic. in of the user,the producerand the evidence the The user is that which has the Idea (or Form) of an object. The producerproducesthe object according to this Idea. The imitator however does not have the Idea of the object and hencecan only produce it according to external resemblancesor through external instruction. Here we may seethat the processof production occurs according to an internal relation to the Idea or as Genosko obversely notes `[t]he art of the imitator is thrice removedfrom true knowledge.'41 Deleuze criticises the Forms from two different angles.Firstly, it is stated in The Republic that only the user is able to judge betweengood and bad copies.It is for this reasonthat Deleuzemakesthe point that Platonic Ideasare a way to evaluateand foundation, is in fact, ideal Form: `What to the pretenders needsa select claimants or alwaysa pretensionor a claim. It is the pretenderwho appealsto a foundation, whose claim may be judged well-founded, ill-founded, or unfounded.'42 But what is the criterion upon which pretenders are judged? Deleuze argues that this criterion is basedupon samenessand similitude as opposedto difference: The Platonic model is the Same,in the sensethat Plato saysthat Justiceis just, Couragenothing other than courageous,etc. the than more nothing -

39Plato, Sophist,236a-b, pp. 978-9 40Plato, The Republic, Book X, 601d-602c, pp. 826-827 41Genosko,Baudrlllard and Signs,p. 29

42De1euae, `Platoandthe Simulacrum, ' p. 255

24 in determination foundation the that of abstract which possesses a as primary way. The Platonic copy is the Similar: the pretender who possessesin a secondary way. To the pure identity of the model or 43 there correspondsan exemplary similitude.... original Deleuze tells us that to this extent Platonism presentsus with a particular `moral vision of the world, ' a vision basedon identity rather than difference: importance Plato, decision the a philosophical was with utmost of ... taken: that of subordinatingdifference to the supposedlyinitial powers of the Same and the Similar, that of declaring difference unthinkable in itself and sending it, along with the simulacra, back to the bottomless 44 ocean. The second issue Deleuze takes up is the difference between copies and simulacra. He states: `If we say of the simulacrum that it is a copy of a copy, an infinitely degraded icon, an infinitely loose resemblance, we then miss the essential, that is, the difference in nature between simulacrum and copy.... '45 Whereas Deleuze identifies Ideas as being based on sameness, simulacra are based on `pure becoming' and he becoming, further `[p]ure that the unlimited, is the matter of the simulacrum argues insofar as it eludes the action of the Idea and insofar as it contests both model and copy at once. '46 To demonstrate this Deleuze points to how the simulacrum is described in the Sophist in relation to the image. The dialogue proceeds as follows:

Stranger: The perfect example of this [the making of images] consists ... in creating a copy that conforms to the proportions of the original in all three dimensions....

Theaetetus:Why, is not that what all imitators try to do? Stranger: Not those sculptors or painters whose works are of colossal size. If they were to reproducethe true proportions of a well-made figure, as you know, the upper parts would look too small, and the lower too large, becausewe seethe one at a distance,the other close at hand [...] So artists, leaving the truth to take care of itself do in fact put into the images they make, not the real proportions...4'

43ibid. p. 259 44Deleuze,Difference and Repetition, p. 127 '3 Deleuze,`Plato and the Simulacrum,' p. 257 46Deleuze,TheLogic of Sense,p. 2 47Plato, Sophist, 235d-236a,p. 978

25 Deleuzeprovides the following commentson this issue: implies huge dimensions,depths,and distancesthat the the simulacrum ... observercannot master.It is precisely becausehe cannotmasterthem that he experiencesan impression of resemblance.This simulacrum includes the differential point of view; and the observer becomes a part of the his itself, by is deformed transformed point of which simulacrum and becoming is in becoming-mad, In there the or a simulacrum a view. short, 48 unlimited.... While imagesare producedaccording to an internal relation of similarity to the Idea, Deleuze proposesthat the simulacrum is producedentirely by external forces (in the Nietzscheansense),that is, the becoming of the world. It is for this reasonthat the for Idea the that matter any model model evades and of copy and simulacrum Other, invoke As Deleuze is `It the to model a of says: not even enough whatsoever. for no model can resist the vertigo of the simulacrum.'49Basically, the simulacrum is `... different form identity from `order' the to this viewpoint switched any and of an of identity of the model and the resemblanceof the copy becomeerrors, the same and the similar no more than the illusions born of the functioning of simulacra.... "`to reverse Simulacra function by themselves....' S0 So, Deleuze argues that ... Platonism" meansto make the simulacra rise and to affirm their rights among icons To Sophist? does how justify '5' But Deleuze in the this the this of context and copies. final description draws in Deleuze Sophist the the the of the ending on of where end in Eleatic he `... tells the that private and stranger arguments sophist us uses short forces others to contradict themselvesin conversation.' 52From this Deleuze deduces that:

it may be that the end of the Sophist contains the most extraordinary ... adventureof Platonism: as a consequenceof searchingin the direction of the simulacrum and of leaning over its abyss,Plato discovers,in the flash of an instant, that the simulacrum is not simply a false copy, but that it places in question the very notations of copy and model. The final

Deleuze,`Plato and the Simulacrum,' p. 258 ibid. p. 262 S0Deleuze,Difference and Repetition, p. 128 s' Deleuze,`Plato and the Simulacrum,' p. 262 52Plato, Sophist,268b, p. 1016

26 definition of the sophist leads us to the point where we can no longer distinguish him from Socrateshimself - the ironist working in private by 53 brief arguments. meansof Analysis of Deleuze's critique The description of the sophist at the end of the Sophist does indeed sound like Socrates,and Deleuze is not the only commentator to point this out.54However, is there recoursein the Sophist to deflect this position? We may recall that the aim of the Sophist is to distinguish betweenthe true philosopher and the false philosopher or in Such if be the question acted a would sophist a way not relevant sophist. in different from is because It the the acts sophist a way philosopher. significantly in first The distinguishing the the that to the two place. philosopher need similar Sophist suggeststhat the sophist can be identified becausehis argumentsonly appear true from a perspectivethat distorts the real dimensionsof the true. The philosopher latter be This hand dimensions. the to these true argument other would able on reveal is basedon the definition of good and bad copies as different by degree.Deleuze's definition of the simulacrum however does not let such a distinction stand. As we have seen,the basis of Deleuze's argumentlies in the notion that there is a difference in kind betweenIdeasand simulacra.He tells us what this difference entails: Let us considerthe two formulas: "only that which resemblesdiffers" and "only differences can resemble each other." These are two distinct readings of the world: one invites us to think difference from the standpoint of a previous similitude or identity; whereasthe other invites us to think similitude and even identity as the product of a deepdisparity. The first reading precisely defines the world of copies or representations....The second,contrary to the first, defines the world of 55 simulacra.... Deleuze's strategyhas beento show how the order of Ideas,basedon the principle of identity does not take into account how it is constituted by difference. As such it into the order of difference. However, if Ideas and simulacra really are collapses

53Deleuze,`Plato and the Simulacrum,' p. 256 '4 For example,Sallis, Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues, p. 532 53Deleuze,`Plato and the Simulacrum,' pp. 261-2

27 different in kind then how can either one be reducedto the other? On the other hand, if the order of Ideas is constituted by difference then how can it be maintained that there is a difference in kind between ideas and simulacra? From this standpoint we in identity Idea. Deleuze has the the whether of ask order also really confronted must In this we assumethat for there to be a real difference in kind between Ideas and be We two terms the must shall now explore whether mutually exclusive. simulacra this is really the level on which Deleuze's argumentrests.

Zealous Orders

Brusseau notes that the order of simulacra is based on the demonstration of a `counter-example,' an example of an experiencethat lies beyond the remit of the He for his Ideas. basis to this own arguments: goes on of use model order as a When Deleuze wrote that the task of contemporary philosophy was to reverse Platonism, he gave himself and his students one central charge: find experiences beyond the pervasive resemblance undergirding Socrates' metaphysics. The demand is simple: locate an example. In the Nietzsche Deleuze's in his keystone texts, and project, as set up end, Philosophy, Difference and Repetition, The Logic of Sense, stands or falls on the basis of an example, actually a counter-example, a single counterleast [... ] I to there one that at exists need example convince you substantial case.... If I succeed, then we can claim that Platonism has been again reversed.56

As a first remark we may notice a certain similarity betweenhow Brusseauusesthe 57 `single falsification. The Karl Poppers theory counter-example' and notion of a of basis of this is that a theory will be invalidated if just a single piece of data is shown to be beyond a theories remit. But we should note that Popperuses this criterion as the definition of a scientific theory. How appropriateis it to apply this to Deleuze's theories?It is perhapssurprising that Brusseaushould frame his study in such a way. Brusseau will specifically use the writings of Isabelle Eberhardt to provide an

' Btusseau,Isolated Experiences,pp. 179-80 57Karl Popper(1959, orig. 1934) TheLogic ofScient(c Discovery. London: Hutchinson

28 58 he sees as the completely alien nature of the simulacrum. example of what However, Brusseau'suse of Eberhardtseemsless a counter-examplethan a changeof paradigmin the first place: Eberhardt wallows in the solitude of difference...: "I sit here all by myself, looking at the grey expanseof murmuring sea ... I am utterly alone on earth, and always will be in this Universe.... "59 Above all, Eberhardt's solitude is not a loss, it is not a condition of being denied a real love or real other. True, sometimesshe had no real love or her in but facts her. Because those to of origin real other, made no sense difference, Eberhardt recognised no state of existence and no existence beyondher own self-imposed limits. 60 Perhapsframing Deleuze's logic of the simulacrum in terms of a Kuhnian paradigm shift is a more proximate way of understandingDeleuze's argument,as for instance we could comparethe way in which Newtonian physics becamean inaccuratesubset of Einstein's theory of relativity with how Deleuze envisions identity as being an illusion of the simulacrum. This is to say that Deleuze'stheory of the simulacrum is a higher order argument. That is, Deleuze proposesthat the order of the simulacrum Whether higher be level But how to this verified? a of analysis. provides us with can counter-exampleor paradigm shift this is still operating within a scientific frame of reference. With a scientific theory we can compare it to how well it predicts the physical world. Philosophical theories do not have the samecriterion. Indeed,Popper 61 However, he posits irrefutable. that theories philosophical argues are essentially that theories can be criticised in terms of how adequate they are in providing 62 to the they philosophical problems solutions pose. The main criterion of any theory is parsimony.It is common in the history of philosophy for a `higher-order' theory to be put forward that provides an explanation of previous disparate theories. Can

39[sabelleEberhardtlived asa nomad in North Africa and died at the age of 27 in 1904.Our purpose here is not to examineBrusseau'sreading of Eberhardtbut the context he puts this interpretationin teens of Deleuze's simulacrum. 19Beisseau,Isolated Experiences,p. 191 60ibid. p. 194 61Karl Popper(1985) `Metaphysicsand Criticisibility, ' in Popper Selections, D. Miller. New ed. Jersey:PrincetonUniversity Press I ibid. p. 217, later in Chapter2 we shall seehow Deleuzehashis own theory of problems and solutions.

29 Deleuze's theory of simulacra be entirely characterisedin this manner? Is it simply the casethat the theory of Forms excludespure difference from which a position can be derived to re-include it? Here we can turn back to our treatment of Brusseau's be To `counter-experience'be to the said of problem. what extent can a presentation determining Ideas? in We the a the of of realm remit are once again outside difference in kind. Yet, to be sure,Brusseautakes his lead from Deleuzehimself who has made a point of using `counter-experiences'such as nomadism, schizophrenia 63 how Deleuze in his We drug to turn new now as rhythms use philosophy. shall and higher-order his argument. produces

The Transcendental

Deleuze's order of simulacra makes use of differential or transcendentallogic. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze will describe this project as producing a `transcendentalempiricism:'

Empiricism truly becomes transcendental only when we apprehend ... directly in the sensiblethat which can only be sensed,the very being of the sensible:difference, potential difference and difference in intensity as the reasonbehind qualitative diversity. It is in difference that movement is producedas an `effect', that phenomenaflash their meaning like signs [simulacra]. The intense world of differences, in which we find the is behind being the the reason qualities and sensible, precisely the of " object of a superior empiricism. The first facet of a transcendentalempiricism is derived from Deleuze's study of Kant. Deleuzetells us: `Kant: of all philosophers,Kant is the one who discoversthe

domain doctrine Kant's '65 the In transcendental. terms of of of the prodigious

63`... transversalrelations ensurethat any effects producedin someparticular way (through ... homosexuality,drugs, and so on) can always be produced by other means,' 'Letter to a Harsh Critic, ' in Gilles Deleuu (1995 orig. 1990) Negotiations, trans. M. Joughin.New York: Columbia University Press,p. I1 ' Deleuze,Di8erence and Repetition, pp. 56-7 63Before his critical turn Kant expoundeda Leibnizian philosophy, suchas in Kant (1756) Metaphysicaecum geometrica iunctae Ususin philosophia natural I, cuius specimenI, continet monadologiamphysicanr. Kant's transcendentallogic, while still a derivation of Leibniz's differential logic, sets limits on the metaphysicalvalidity of Leibniz's calculus in terms of the limits of the faculties, seeIvor Leclerc (1972) TheNature of Physical Existence.London: GeorgeAllen & Unwin

30 faculties the role of the transcendentalis given in terms of a method to determinethe internal or immanent conditions of the respective faculty. The transcendentalis in turn contrastedto the transcendent.The transcendententails the external relations to the faculty. Why are the transcendentalinternal relations essentialfor Deleuze while the transcendentexternal relations erroneous?The first reason is to be found in Kant's own critical project: `In what he called the Critical revolution. Kant set out to discover criteria that were immanent to knowledge so as to distinguish a legitimate '66That is a use of a concept and illegitimate use of the synthesesof consciousness. would only be legitimate in terms of its own faculty, for example, a concept of the faculty of understandingwould not be applicable in relation to the faculty of desire.67 A second reason is to be found in that, as Michael Hardt suggests,Deleuze is distinction to be found in Scholasticism: an ontological utilising For being to be necessary,the fundamental ontological cause must be internal to its effect. This internal cause is the efficient causethat plays the central role in Scholastic ontological foundations. Furthermore, it is only the efficient cause,precisely becauseof its internal nature, that can " being sustain as substance,as causasui. This is to say that an external causeis essentially seenas an accident, peripheral to being, and hence being would not be necessary.This secondreasonis important to Deleuze as it precludes the Hegelian dialectic that finds a purpose for the 69 difference. function in form terms of a negativeand limitative transcendent of The second facet of Deleuze's transcendental empiricism is developed through Bergsonand the method of intuition: intuition presentsitself as a method of difference or division.... This ... method is somethingother than a spatial analysis,more than a description

Ltd, pp. 276-295

66Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari (1972) Capitalisme et Scizophrenie Tome 1. L'Anti-Oedipus. Paris: Minuit, translation from Ray Brassier (2001) Alien Theory The Decline of Materialism in the Name of Matter, PhD thesis, University of Warwick, p. 54

67Gilles Deleuze(1984, orig. 1963) Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine the Faculties, trans. of H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam.London: Athlone, especiallychapter 1, pp. 1-10, hereafterdenoted Kant 6" Michael Hardt (1993) Gilles Deleuze:An Apprenticeship in Philosophy. London: UCL Press,p. 5 69ibid. pp. 1-25

31 [... ] less (in than transcendental analysis and of experience appearance) a We must not raise ourselvesto the level of conditions as conditions of all possible experience,but as conditions of real experience ... they are no broader than the conditioned, becausethe concept they form is identical 70 its to object. For Deleuze a transcendentalcondition must have the same `reality' as that which it conditions and as such it is not a `possible' which has potentially more reality than the thing in which it is finally manifested but a `virtual. ' From this perspective Bergson's With introduces into transcendence the transcendental. method possibility in kind. difference ' A intuition `difference to the we also come precise meaning of of in kind is not only a distinction between two phenomena, such as Ideas and is designates distinction but itself: `Difference the of nature one side of simulacra, ... is itself difference longer between two things two tendencies, of nature a or rather no "That is different in kind itself tendency the thing, one to opposing which other. differs in itself qualitatively. From this perspective our notion of a higher-order between is the two orders at this stage. aimed solely argument

More Transcendence

In the essay `Deleuze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality, ' Daniel Smith provides us with three further differences between Deleuze's and Kant's transcendentalism:

be found in the sign [simulacrum], and the elements of sensation must ... not the qualities of a recognizable object; the sign [simulacrum] is the limit-object of the faculty of sensibility, beyond the postulates of recognition and common sense;the Idea of sensibility is constituted by differential relations and differencesin intensity.... 72 We are told the problem with Kant is that he relatesthe faculty of sensibility to an

'ÖGilles Deleuze,G. (1956) `La conception de la diffb'rence Etudes in Bergsoniennes, Bergson chez IV, pp. 77-112, trans. M. Mcmahon as 'Bergson's Conceptionof Difference' in John Mullarkey (1999) TheNew Bergsonism.Manchester:University Press,p. 46 " ibid. p. 48 n Daniel Smith (1996) `Deleuze's Theory Sensation:Overcomingthe Kantian Duality, ' in Patton, of P. (ed.) Deleuze:A Critical Reader.Oxford: Blackwell, p. 39

32 external object that is already pre-constituted in thought as a `common sense' or `recognition.' As such, Deleuze accusesKant of psychologism.73Instead, Deleuze locates the simulacrum as a limit-object (or differential) within thought. What we have previously called `counter-experiences'(and Brusseaucounter-examples)are in is, but it. That Deleuze's implicit immanent to thought, to no senseexternal are or higher-order argument is posited as internal to the order it criticises. However, what distinctions is Deleuzeusing here in relation to what he calls a `common sense'? In The Logic of SenseDeleuze tells us that common senseis the `assignation of fixed identities.'74Deleuzeexplains further in Difference and Repetition: thought has as its implicit presupposition a pre-philosophical and ... natural Image of thought, borrowed from the pure element of common sense.According to this image, thought has an affinity with the true; it formally possessesthe true and materially wants the true.75 The notion of common senseis basedon the model-copy distinction. Common sense is Which the true truth to the that provides us with a model of extent we can ask: is difference in is false Which In the there the a recognition? recognition? sameway identity difference between and order we find in Deleuze's transcendentalempiricism (or in between difference (or the transcendental the transcendent order and a external) internal). There is anotherparallel in how the sameway Deleuzeposits identity to be the effect of difference, the transcendent is an effect of the transcendental.For Deleuze,the problem with common senseis again that it introducesthe transcendent into the transcendental.Here however we can apply the sameargumentas developed earlier: if common sense is already a compromised notion then there cannot be a difference in order distinction operating here. Is there recourseto solve this problem in terms of the structure of a higherorder argument?If we simply consider the two argumentsin relation to each other then there does seemto be a difference in order: the two argumentseach have their own frame of reference or `paradigm.' However, in the sensethat the lower-order is argument already compromised there is also an overlap with the higher-order

73Deleuze,Difference and Repetition,pp. 135-7 74Deleuze,TheLogic of Sense,p. 3 71Deleuze,Difference and Repetition,p. 131

33 argument.This points to the idea that there is a point of commonality betweenthem. As Kant will himself tell us: `Now it is quite clear that there must be some third thing, which on the one hand is homogeneouswith the category, and with the appearanceon the other, and so makes the application of the former to the latter possible.'76Deleuze places his version of the transcendentalargument solely on one side of the original schema.We shall now examine how this plays out with further analysisof Plato's theory of Forms. Perhapswhat is surprising is the prescientway in which theseissuesare actually treatedin Plato's Sophist.

76ImmanuelKant (1993, orig. 1934) Critique Pure Reason, trans. JMD Meiklejohn, ed. V. Politfis. of London: Everyman,p. 143

34 2. Return to the Forms

In this section we will discuss identity and difference through the problematic of the theory of the Forms. The Plato scholar Francis Pelletier distinguishes between an in Platonic Forms later `Kinds' Forms the theory theory of and a of or early 77 Dialogues. As Pelletier notes this later development is characterised by an intriguing remark by the Eleatic strangerin the Sophist: `Any discoursewe can have '78 First interweaving its forms to the the we shall another. existence of one with owes turn to the context in which this later theory is set forth. The task set up in the Sophist is to distinguish betweenthe philosopher and the sophist. How can the true friend of knowledge be told apart from the imitator? In Eleatic do falsehood but is the this to stranger states, a notion of as order required, this is itself problematic: `It is extremely hard, Theaetetus,to find correct terms in which one may say or think that falsehoods have a real existence, without being Here '79 in by the we are once mere utteranceof such words. caught a contradiction knowledge has been `... in Cratylus: too cannot the what of reminded said again is ' Truth knowledge be to to exist. abide and unless continuing always continue BO is distinction Sophist falsity flux. In this the associatedwith permanenceand with flux, falsity how is if is is, in Parmenides, terms that to a problem up of attributed set 8' false? know It identify do false it even possibleto the the not since by definition we is this `unknowable' position that the Eleatic stranger identifies with the sophist: `... the Sophist had denied the very existenceof falsity; no one could either think ... is `what not,' becausewhat is not never has any sort of being.'g2 In order to or say flux Eleatic instigates the through the problematic stranger of work and permanence, between debate `Gods' (or `friends of the forms') and `Giants' (or `sons of the a earth'). The solution to `Parmenidesproblem' is provided by the friends of the forms deal with this side of the debatefirst. we shall so

" FrancisJ. Pelletier (1990) Parmenides,Plato, and the semanticsof not-being. Chicago: University Press,p. 31 n Plato,Sophist,260a, p. 1007,Pelletier's (1990) translation, 8 p. 79Plato, Sophist,237a, p. 979 '0 Plato, Cratylus, 440a-b, p. 474 Cf. Sophist, 237a; 241d; 242c; 258c `ý Plato, Sophist, 260d, p. 1007

35 Friends of the Forms The Eleatic strangerbegins by introducing three Forms or Kinds: motion, rest, and existence.From 250a to 250d in the Sophist the strangerascertainsthat motion and rest must be two separatethings (if something is in motion then obviously it is not at if However, we take motion and rest to be two real aspectsof existence then rest). what are their relation to existence? Neither motion nor rest can be the same as existenceas this would mean that existencewould be both in motion and rest at the sametime, which is impossible. Hence existencemust be a third Kind separatefrom but in in to them; and rest sometimes some motion, way motion connected sometimes at rest. Having determined this the Eleatic stranger then applies the possible viewpoints of the friends of the forms to seehow they deal with thesethree entities: Are we not to attach existence to motion and rest, nor anything else to anything else, but rather to treat them in our discourseas incapableof any blending or participation in one another? Or are we to lump them all together as capableof associationwith one another?Or shall we say that this is true of someand not of others?83 As Pelletier notes,there are three viewpoints to be distinguishedhere: (1) the view that allows no "mixing" or "blending" or "communion" among any of their forms; (2) the view which insists that every one of their forms "blends," "mixes," et cetera with every other form; and (3) the view which holds that some forms "blend," "mix, " et cetera, with some other forms, and some forms do not "blend," "mix, " et ceterawith someother forms. The Eleatic stranger dismisses the first viewpoint because if `... nothing has the capacity for combination with anything else for any purpose. Then movement and have in no part existence.'" The stranger similarly dismisses the second rest will because `... then movement itself would come to a complete standstill, and viewpoint

13ibid. 251d-e, 996-7 Pelletier (1990), p. 35 Plato, Sophist,252a, p. 997

36 again rest itself would be in movement, if each were to superveneupon the other.'86 This leavesus with the third viewpoint - some forms blend, others do not. To solve the relation between motion, rest, and existence, the stranger introduces two new in for 254d 255e From difference. the to consideration: samenessand aspects Sophist, the Eleatic stranger first arguesthat motion, rest, and existencemust be the in same themselves,but they cannot be the sameas one anotherotherwise this would lead to contradiction. Consequently, samenessin itself is posited as a fourth kind. Secondly, it is argued that motion, rest, and existence must be different from one but they cannot be different in themselvesotherwise this would again lead to another Therefore, difference, as in different from somethingelse, is posited as contradiction. a fifth kind. We are now able to determine the `hierarchy' of blending betweenthe kinds: samenessand difference blend with all the forms; existenceblends with motion and rest; motion and rest however, do not blend. With this in mind the strangergoeson to offer a solution to `Parmenidesproblem:' When we speak of `that which is not, ' it seems that we do not mean something contrary to what exists but only something that is different [... ] In the same way that when for example, we speak of something as `not tall, ' we may just as well mean by that phrase `what is equal' as `what is short' [... ] So, when it is asserted that a negative signifies a contrary, we shall not agree, but admit no more than this - that the prefix 87 `not' indicates different from that follow....

something

the words

Hence a notion of falsity is obtained through the notion that something is different from something else, that is, to say that something is not-A is really saying that it is somethingelse, e.g. B. So far this theory of the blending of the Forms is still open to Deleuze's criticism that difference is being thought of in the image of identity, since firstly, difference is different from something-else(model of the same)and secondly difference itself is exactly treated as a Form. However we have yet to come to Plato's own solution to Parmenides problem and perhaps more importantly, how Plato actually setsup `Parmenides'problem.'

" ibid. 252d, p. 997-8 87ibid. 257b, 1003-4

37 `Parmenides' problem' It is important to note that what has been termed `Parmenides'problem' is exactly a problem that has been set up in the Platonic dialogues. The problem is situated between two `opposing' doctrines. Socrates tells us of these two doctrines in the Theaetetus.The first doctrine is one of flux: It declaresthat nothing is one thing just by itself.... All the things are ... in process of becoming, as a result of movement and change and of blending one with another.... In this matter let us take it that the whole ... 89 seriesof philosophersagree- Protagoras,Heraclitus, Empedocles. The seconddoctrine is one of permanence: [it] teachesjust the opposite that reality "is one, immovable, being is ... the name of the all, " and much else that men like Mellissus and Parmenides maintain in opposition to all those people, telling us that all things are a unity which stays still within itself, having no room to move in 89

However, a line of modern scholarship completely disagrees with this polarised forth is Plato Heraclitus Parmenides. The that put and account of main argument 90 differences Parmenides. between As Martin Heraclitus and overemphasisedthe Heideggerwill tell us: Even if we could supposewe were instructed about the essenceof truth as the Greeksthought it by taking the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle as a norm, we would already be on a false track that will never, on its own, lead back to what the early thinkers experiencedwhen they gave a name to that which we signify by "truth. 1191

" Plato, Theaetatus,152d,p. 857 "9 ibid. 180d-e,p. 885 90SeeR. A. Prier (1976) Archaic Logic: Symbol and Structure in Heraclitus, Parmenidesand Empedocles.The Hague:Mouton, pp. 90-95, for a review of the literature. Heideggerhasalso had a major influence on studiesof the pre-Socratics,seeK. Maly and P. Emad (eds.X 1986)Heidegger on Heraclitus: a new reading. New York: Edwin Mellen Press 91Martin Heidegger(1992, orig. 1982) Parmenides, trans. A. Schuwerand R. Itojcewicz. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,p. 10

38 So how exact is `Parmenides' problem' in relation to Parmenides' own writings? Parmenides' poem is his only extant work and charts the path to a true way of 92 by figure the enquiry guided of a goddess. The goddess says that there are two possible routes to take. Either through what `is' (being, the immutable, the one) or through what `is not' (becoming). She identifies the former way as the true way. This may seema simple determinationbut as the pre-Socraticscholar P. A. Meijer tells us, this causesa number of interpretational problems: Even if... one could fathom what Being was for Parmenides,then how is the relation of this Being to what is the not-being? Is not-being the socalled Doxa [opinion], Parmenides' description of the world around us? What is the value of the "Doxa", is it a faithful description of this world? Or is it, as not-being, but a detector of lies, a model of error, a scale by meansof which one is able to determine immediately the basic error of 93 every systemwhich may explain our world? This raises the question of whether there can be a certain `use' of opinion or simulacra, an approach exemplified by Parmenidesuse of divine and cosmological imagery in his poem. Meijer goes on to arguethat Plato has essentiallymisinterpreted Parmenidesby associatingParmenideanBeing with the copula: As soon as I recognized that existence is not the focus of Parmenides interest, I was able to keep the Doxa free from the idea of non-existence. For what is not in the absolutesense- and the Doxa is not in the absolute sense- may neverthelessexist if existenceis not the basic meaning of is. It is amazing to discover that unlike for Plato, who connectedBeing and Doxa by meansof the participation of the particulars of our world in the Ideas, absolute Being for Parmenidesseemsto have nothing to do with 94 our world. Neither does Meijer stand alone in this interpretation. For example, another ancient Greek scholarJeanBeaufret tells us: `...the doxa of Parmenideshas a totally different quality from that of Plato. This doxa can actually pursuethe illusion in the midst of a

92A. H. Coxon 0 986) The Fragments of Parmenides, a critical text with introduction, translation,the ancienttestimoniaand a commentary.Assen/Maastricht:Van Gorcum '3 P. A. Meijer (1997) Parmenidesbeyond the Gates: TheDivine Revelation Being Thinking and on the Doxa. Amsterdam:J. C. Gieben,p. 1 94ibid. p. 2

39 95 is in itself illusion.... ' What this entails for Plato's `solution' clearing which not an to his own rendering of `Parmenides' problem' is that in terms of Parmenidean Being he has collapsed being and not-being on the plane of existence (that is, being as The have Deleuze is this that argued associates significance of we existence). Platonism with pure identity, but to what extent are Forms already compromised or contaminated with existence? In order to explore this we can set up what a theory of Forms based on pure identity might look like.

The Proximate Bornes

In Jorge Luis Borges short story `Funs the Memorious' he presents us with the 6 This story tells the tale of a identity. nightmare of a world perceived through pure young man, Ireneo Funes,who can only experiencelife through particularity: He was, let us not forget, almost incapableof Ideasof a general,Platonic sort. Not only was it difficult for him to comprehendthat the generic symbol dog embraces so many unlike individuals of diverse size and form; it bothered him that the dog at three fourteen (seenfrom the side) should have the same name as the dog at three fifteen (seen from the f-ont).97 We should first note that this example is perhapsin fact not one of pure identity but is different infinite difference. Funes For the and opposite: everything exactly identities has its identity. But these are totally own subsequently while heterogeneous,the differences he experiencesare completely homogeneous.That is, the difference betweenfor example,a cat and a dog, would be exactly the sameas the difference between say soup and fish, or for that matter any other conceivable difference. What we have here is difference treated as a pure identical Form, pure metonymy. In contrast, if we now turn to the `structure' of the Forms then we may seethat a heterogeneousrather than homogenousdifference is being implicitly used. That is, the difference between a dog and a cat is not the same difference as that

J. Beaufret, `Heraclitus and Parmenides,' in Maly and Emad (1986), p. 81 JorgeLuis Borges(1970) `Funs the Memorious,' in Labyrinths, eds.D. A. Yatesand J. E. Irby. London: Penguin 97ibid. pp. 93-4

40 betweensoup and fish. We have already seenhow Deleuzetells us that difference is subordinatedto identity in the Forms but this is precisely a conceptualdifference. He does not consider to what extent difference is already implicit in the system of Forms. But is not Deleuze's strategyto show that difference is already implied in the system? Indeed, but he already also assumesthat the Forms are based on pure identity. From this position the demonstrationof implicit difference suits his purpose that identity is just an effect of difference. However, our argument is that implicit difference shows that the Ideas are not based on pure identity and as such there cannot be a pure difference in order betweenIdeas and simulacra. More than this, the compromisedstateof the Forms is already to be found in the Sophist.

The sons of the earth We shall now come back to the debatebetweenthe friends of the Forms and the sons of the earth in the Sophist. Turning to the position upheld by the sonsof the earth the Eleatic strangertells us:

[they] drag everything down to earth out of heaven and the unseen, ... literally grasping rocks and trees in their hands, for they lay hold upon belongs that existence real every stock and stone and strenuously affirm only to that which can be handled and offers resistance to touch. They define reality as the same thing as body.... "'

He identifies them as `sensualists'in the very strong senseof the word: they refuseto justify their position through rational discourse(246c-d). However, in order to assess their position the Eleatic strangerconstructsa `reformed' version in order to compare them with the friends of the Forms. To do this the Eleatic strangeridentifies a `mark' of reality: has being that is so constituted as to possessany sort of real anything ... power either to affect anything else or to be affected, in however small a degree, by the most insignificant agent, though it only be once. I am proposing as a mark to distinguish real things that they are nothing but

" Plato, Sophist,246a-b, p. 990

41 power. By using this idea of a mark of reality the Eleatic strangerexploit's a weaknessin the position of the friends of the Forms for whom power is not a mark of reality but a becoming: of mark [the friends of the forms] reply that a power of acting and being they ... acted upon belongs to becoming, but neither of these powers is compatible with real being [...] Do they acknowledgefurther that the soul knows and real being is known? [...] They would have to say this. If knowing is to be acting on something, it follows that what is known must be acted upon by it, and so, on this showing, reality when it is being known by the act of knowledge must, in so far as it is known, be changed owing to be so acted upon - and that, we say, cannot happen to the changeless[...] if all things are unchangeable,no intelligence can really 1°° in in exist anywhere anything regardto any object. The consequenceof this argument is that it can no longer be maintained that the Forms are immutable and will lead to the ending of the Sophist where the indistinguishable is how from have We Deleuze the seen already philosopher sophist. will interpret this as meaning that the order of Ideas collapses into the order of simulacra,however, there also seemsto be another way to interpret this: to accept it as an alreadycompromisedposition. Proposition: The method of compromisedposition does not take a phenomenonand then show how it is compromisedby anotherprinciple but startsfrom the supposition that thephenomenonis already compromised.

It is not the case that the Forms were `pure' in the first place as if a drop of black paint will forever turn white paint into a shade of grey. More precisely the contaminationoperatesin both directions. If the philosopher cannot be distinguished from the sophist then neither can the sophist be distinguished from the philosopher. Moreover, the ancient Greek scholar JacquesBrunschwig points to the fact that Plato was precisely aware that in order to reach a position where the argumentsof the

" ibid. P. 247d-e, p. 992 100ibid. 248c-249b, pp. 993-4

42 friends of the Forms and the sons of the earth can be comparedhe was working with a reformed or compromisedposition:

the the point of cost or synthesis of proposing only was reached at ... imposing a number of corrections for the antithetical doctrines, correctionsto which Plato himself draws attention with an opennessand honestynot always detectablein philosophical operationsof this kind. 101

101JacquesBrunschwig (1994) 'The Stoic Theory the SupremeGenus in ' Ontology, Platonic of and Papers in Hellenistic philosophy, trans. J. Lloyd. Cambridge:University Press,p. 119

43 Conclusions

In this chapterwe have seenhow Deleuze claims to overturn the order of the Idea in favour of the order of the simulacrum. This procedurewould not be problematic were it not for the fact that Deleuze claims there is a difference in order betweenIdeasand simulacra. We have argued that the order of Ideas is always already of the order of difference. From this perspective we may concur with the comments of Badiou and Laruelle that Deleuzehas produceda `re-accentuated'or `extreme' Platonism. On the other hand we could say that the simulacrum presentsus with the `pure' order of difference whereas the Idea does not. To the extent that we could still pose pure identity to Deleuze's pure difference (being to not-being) perhaps we may say that what Deleuze has produced is in fact a Parmenideism. The original target of Deleuze's studies is the order of pure identity of the Ideas but we may question it has been has been Or this order precisely, not addressed more at all. whether in Parmenidean because distorted Plato Ideas the the the context original of addressed first has in Deleuze From that the this agree may place. we problem obverseposition to some extent `overturned' Platonism by dint of the fact he never confronted Platonism but insteadthe original Parmenideanproblem of the relation betweennotbeing and not-existence. This will in fact be the same subject on which the Stoics 102 in Chapter 2 Shortly their we shall own anti-Platonic will present philosophy. how Deleuze develops the notion of the simulacrum through the concept of examine Event by drawing on the Stoics. How does this effect Deleuze's overall project to produce a philosophy of difference?Todd May, in his essay"Difference and Unity in Gilles Deleuze," claims 103 deconstruction Deleuze's do to of a philosophy. He tells us: `There can be no thought that takesdifference seriously - and indeedwe live in an age that desperately needsa thought that does so - that can avoid the unity that attachesitself to such a project of thought. Difference, in short, must be thought alongside unity, or not at

102`Stoicism succeededin toppling Platonism it is than more usually subtly and more completely ... credited with doing.... ' Brunschwig (1994) p. 119 103Todd May `Difference and Unity in Gilles Deleuze,' (1994) Olkowski in Boundas p. and chapter 34. This chapteris expandedin Todd May (1997) ReconsideringDifference: Nancy, Derrlda, Levinas, and Deleuze.Pennsylvania:University Press,pp. 182-3

44 104 However, May does not seem to go far enough. For, to turn one of Deleuze's ' all. arguments on its head, we have only ever thought in the image of identity and hence we require a thought that not only takes difference seriously, but also identity, or how from borrow Alfred North To these terms precisely, a phrase more are used. Whitehead, identity and difference are exactly `ideal opposites, ' and ideals cannot be used as presuppositions but must themselves be explained. It is interesting to note Whitehead's comments on how these two notions have been used in metaphysics:

full find in first lines hymn famous the two the expression we a of of a ... union of the two notions in one integral experience: Abide with me; Fast falls the eventide. Here the first line expressesthe permanences,`abide,' `me' and the `Being' addressed;and the secondline setsthese permanencesamid the inescapableflux. Here at length we find formulated the completeproblem first line have Those the of metaphysics. philosophers who start with given us the metaphysics of `substance'; and those who start with the in have line `flux. ' But, developed truth, the the second metaphysicsof two lines cannot be torn apart in this way; and we find that a wavering balance between the two is characteristic of the greater number of 105 philosophers. Identity and difference are part of an irresolvable antinomy. What is required is a counter-point from which both the terms can be laid out on the sameplane prior to the actual manifestation of thesephenomena.In this chapter we have tried to enact a destabilisationof Deleuze's philosophy of difference by analysing the compromised nature of his concepts.In some sensethis could be termed a deconstruction but it be would perhaps more correct to say that this is simply an extension of the method of Platonic dialectic.

10'ibid. P. 47; p. 201 103Alfred North Whitehead(1978, orig. 1929)Process New Cosmology. in Essay An Reality: and York: Free Press,p. 209

45

Chapter 2

The Logic of the Event

46 Introduction

In this chapter we shall explore how Deleuzedevelopsthe notion of the simulacrum into the theory of the event through the Stoic reaction to Platonism. This chapter will be divided in thefollowing way: part 1 will elaborate the Stoic background,parts 2 focus 3 on Deleuze's text The Logic of Sense,looking at the theories of and will senseand nonsenserespectively,part 4 will analysethe structure of the event. Deleuze first deploys the concept of event in a systematicfashion in The Logic of Sense.The Logic of Senseis itself an extension of many of the issuesplayed out in Difference and Repetition. These two works are, amongst other things, Deleuze's responseto the pervasive hold of the phenomenologyof his time; Difference and Repetition is a study of difference and time through a neo-Kantian reclamation of Nietzsche,contra Heidegger;106the Logic of Senseis a study of sensethrough Lewis Carroll and the Stoics, contra Husserl.107The method common to both of thesebooks is Deleuze's use of Leibnizian differential logic and adherence to Lacanian in be This Antito swept aside structuralism. adherence structuralist method will Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, written in collaboration with Felix Guattari.108On the other hand, as Deleuze will note in the prefaceto Difference and Repetition written in 1994, all the other themescoveredin thesetwo books remain a constant force throughout all his works. Yet, as we shall see, it is Deleuze's use of structuralism and most especially its relation to Stoic philosophy that is one of the most interestingaspectsof the Logic of Sense. i) Senseand Simulacra

In the prefaceof the Logic of SenseDeleuzeoutlines the reasonsbehind his approach to his study of sense:

1°6Deleuze,Dgerence and Repetition, seepp. 64{( 107Deleuze,TheLogic of Sense,seepp. 101-3 'a$Gilles Deleuu & Felix Guattari (19$4, orig. 1972)Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. R. Hurley, M. Seemand H. Lane. London: Athlone

47 The privileged place assigned to Lewis Carroll is due to his having provided the first great account, the first great raise en scene of the paradoxes of sense - sometimes collecting, sometimes renewing, sometimes inventing, and sometimes preparing them. The privileged place assignedto the Stoics is due to their having been the initiators of a new image of the philosopher which broke away from the pre-Socratics, Socratic philosophy and Platonism. This new image is already closely linked to the paradoxical constitution of the theory of sense.109 The relevanceof Lewis Carroll may be seen in that throughout Alice's adventures, growing smaller/larger for example, there is a certain operation taking place that is without measure. Deleuze's purpose will be to use this operation to link the simulacrum to sense. In terms of the Stoics in relation to sense, Jean-Jacques Lecercle will note that `[w]hat Deleuze is doing is, in fact, by-passing centuries of reflection on meaning, and going back to the very beginning, exploring a long 10 Stoics. dead-end, logic ' From this one the neglected and theory of meaning of the may conclude that there is almost a conventional history of philosophy argument being made here. On the other hand, Deleuze puts the Stoics in line with the Nietzscheanproject of overturning Platonism and Deleuze's interpretation of sense it in has decidedly Nietzschean to terms of the aroma as an effect of physical causes a Nietzschean concept of value. This `wilful re-organisation' of the history of his in Deleuze's is fundamental thought the aspects of philosophy, philosophy one of as he tells us in Difference and Repetition: The time is coming when it will hardly be possible to write a book of philosophy as it has been done for so long: `Ah! The old style... ' ... In the history of philosophy a commentaryshould act as a veritable double ' 11 bear double. the to and maximal modification appropriate a To this effect he draws on Borges's short story `Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote.' In this story the characterof the title, Menard sets himself the task of 'reQuixote. Cervantes' But this is not the caseof writing a new version, but of writing' it if Quixote had the as writing never existed before. Borges tells us that Menard

109ibid pp. xiii-xiv "o JeanJacques Lecercle(1985) Philosophy through the looking-glass. Tiptree: Open Court, p. 92 111Deleuze,Difference and Repetition, p. xxi

48 in succeeded writing several fragments and comparesthem to Cervantes' original text. For example,the original reads: is history, rival of time, depository of deeds, truth, whose mother ... witness of the past, exemplar and advisor to the present,and the future's ' 12 counsellor. Instead,Menard's version reads:

is history, rival of time, depository of deeds, truth, whose mother ... witness of the past, exemplar and advisor to the present,and the future's ' 13 counsellor. Borges commentsthat `the Cervantestext and the Menard text are verbally identical, but the second is almost infinitely richer.'"4 This argument is based on the Heracliteannotion that no two momentscan ever be the same.Therefore the chances that two disparate moments can produce something completely identical are has infinite. Deleuze interprets `the this most repetition strict practically as meaning as its correlate the maximum of difference.'"

Deleuze will carry this idea into the

very form that the Logic of Senseis written by structuring it in terms of seriesrather than chapters.This use of `series' is at once both mathematical and structuralist in nature and belies an organisational principle of the event: `As on a pure surface, certain points of one figure in a seriesrefer to the points of another figure: an entire 116 "' "convoluted galaxy of problems ... a complex place; a story. ii) Senseand Event

The Logic of Sensecombines its study of sensewith the elaboration of the event to the extent that Deleuze seesa fundamentallink betweenthem: `Senseand the event

I" Jorge Luis Borges (1999) `Pierre Menard, Author the Quixote,' in Collected Fictions, trans. A of Hurley. London: Penguin,p. 94 113 ibid.

ibid. "s Deleuze,Difference and Repetition, p. xxii 116Delouze,TheLogic of Sense,p. xiv

49 17 't One aspectthat links senseand the event is the impossibility thing... are the same of speakingof either without entering into an infinite regress.If we first take the case of the event Deleuze will first define the event in the essay `Lucretius and Naturalism:' `the event expresses what is happening,without destroying the nature ... of the thing.'"g Here we can distinguish two relations: i) the relation of the event to the `happening' of the world, ii) the relation of the event to the languagein which we is To language in the the the that the of event. extent we of speak which speak event itself a `happening' we are using an event to speak of an event. To speak of this overall event would then constitute another event, and so on. Speaking of sense presentsus with similar problems. One is not able to speakof sensewithout adding a further sensein how we speak about it. In many ways we may consider senseas primary to the event to the extent that the word `event' is part of a languagethat has for is deny This dualism. It to the not us. provides sense us with a strange problematic of the event of sensebut presentsus with a method of accessvia the Deleuze direction is It that this the the through method of sense opposite event. of will navigatea path through the Logic of Sense.

"' ibid. p. 165 "' Doleuze,`Lucrti:tius and Naturalism,' ibid, 277 p.

50 1. The Stoic Heritage

Before we consider how Deleuze utilizes the Stoics it will be useful to elaborate some basic points of their philosophical system. The Stoic scholar Jacques Brunschwig tells us that the Stoics acceptedthe following four theses: 1 Somethingis an existent if and only if it is a body. By the sametoken, somethingis a `non-existent' if and only if it is not a body. 2 The term incorporeal applies, not to any and every nameable item which is not a body, but only to a limited and determinedgroup of such items, namely the void, place, time and the lekta... [hereafter I shall follow Brunschwig's nomenclature and refer to these as the `canonical incorporeals']. 3 Only bodies and canonical incorporealsmay be called something. 4 The term not somethingdenotesthe ontological statusof concepts.' 19 The Stoics distinguish betweentwo different sorts of things: bodies and `non-bodily' or `incorporeal' entities. For the Stoics only bodies are existent. Another scholar David Hahm provides us with a possible syllogism for this: `Whatever exists either is Nothing body. Therefore, be upon. without only acted upon or can act or acted acts bodies exist.' 120We may recall from Chapter 1 that Brunschwig traces this mark of reality back to Plato's Sophist: `... anything has real being that is so constituted as to be to to sort of power or affected ... I am either affect anything else possessany 12' distinguish but ' to they that are nothing power. real things proposing as a mark Bodies are themselvescomposedof mixtures. In the first place they are a mixture of is, (that the archetypal elementsof fire, air, water and earth) and seconda elements mixture of bodies themselves. To be sure the Stoics espouseda materialism that for body be today they to the unwieldy seem a as well as qualities of would saw soul the soul such as knowledge, virtues and vices. Basically, anything that has the power to affect is a body. The Stoics propose that these mixtures of bodies with their actions and passions have a particular relation to each other. The ancient Greek commentator

119Bnmschwig (1994), p. 92, paraphrased '20David Hahm (1977) TheOrigins of Stoic Cosmology.Ohio: Ohio StateUniversity Press, 1Z p. 121Plato, Sophist,247d-e,p. 992

51 SextusEmpiricus statesthat `[e]very causeis a body which is the causeto a body of somethinghappeningto it. '122Deleuze elaboratesthis further in saying: `There are no causesand effects among bodies. Rather, all bodies are causes- causesin relation to 123 for ' The important phrasehere is that a causeis a cause each other. each other and in relation to another cause.The Stoics proposedthat the cosmos was itself a body and so all bodies exist in relation to this limit-body. Only the cosmos could be independent true as a considered causewhile bodies always involve a multiplicity of relative causes.As Deleuze states:

They refer causesto causesand place a bond of causesbetweenthem.... They refer effects to effects and pose certain bonds of effects between them. But thesetwo operationsare not accomplishedin the samemanner. Incorporeal effects are never themselvescausesin relation to each other; rather, they are only "quasi-causes" following laws which perhaps in express eachcasethe relative unity or mixture of bodies on which they dependfor their real causes.' 24 For a better comprehensionof this idea we may note that the Stoic conception of in has remarkable resonances with notions of causality quantum physics. For causes instance,the physicist David Bohm in explaining his own interpretation of quantum '25 fish imagine is The fish to through us an aquarium. a moving physics asks by from independent from head-on two the side, observers and observed sources, who do not know what they are observing. The observers,not knowing that they are in fact looking at the same thing would conclude that there was some form of relationship between their observations. In the Stoic context the fish and the form would always aquarium an aggregateof bodies. The two observationalsources would record the motions or effects of this aggregate.These two effects would behave in what would appear to be a causal manner when they were really just exhibiting a quasi-causaleffect of the situation. But in this situation what is left of effects? On the relation between the Stoic conception of causeand effect Deleuze tells

122Quoted in S. Sambursky(1959) Physicsof the Stoics. London: Hutchinson, 53 p. 123Deleuze,TheLogic of Sense,p. 4 '2' ibid, p. 6 '" David Bohm (1987) `Hidden Variables and the Implicate Order,' in B. Hiley and F. Peat.(eds.) QuantumImplications. London: Routledge,p. 38

52 in `[t]hey the processof bringing about, first, an entirely new cleavageof the are us causalrelation. They dismemberthis relation, even at the risk of recreatinga unity on "26 Another recent Stoic commentatorS. Sambursky,elaboratesfurther: eachside. Here we have a radically new approachto causality as against Aristotle and all the precursorsof the Stoics. Insteadof the vagueformulation "A is the causeof B" (in the languageof today), the Stoic definition elaborates thus: A is the causeof the effect E being wrought on B. According to this statementthe Stoics saw an effect as a processoriginating in a body A "7 leading in body B. to and a change a If we go back to the original Stoic theseswe find that effects are not bodies, they are incorporeal, and for the Stoics they are not existent. However, neither are they Stoics bodies designate `something' the the term to and incorporeals and use nothing alike. As Brunschwig notes, `something' is the supreme genus of Stoic 128 metaphysics. In speaking of these incorporeals Sextus Empiricus gives us flesh from `being ' Deleuze burnt. `being the Stoic quotes examplesof cut' and wood scholar Emile Brehier on this point: When the scalpel cuts through the flesh, the first body producesupon the second not a new property but a new attribute, that of being cut. The is, it does designate to the contrary, not attribute ... any real quality..., is being, but it by that the not a a always expressed verb, which means limit, being.... This being itself the finds at at of somehow way way of the surface of being, the nature of which it is not able to change:it is, in fact neither active nor passive, for passivity would presuppose a corporeal nature which undergoesan action. It is purely and simply a 129 beings.... is be to result, or an effect which not classified among To provide an example of this `way of being' Josiah Gould draws on Chrysippus' discussion of time. Chrysippus tells us that time `subsists' in bodies `just as predicatesexist only when the acts (named by them) are taking place; for example, for me when I am walking, but does not exist when I am lying down exists walking

Deleuze,TheLogic of Sense,p. 6 Sambursky(1959), p. 53 Btunschwig (1994) Deleuze,TheLogic of Sense,p. 5, quotation taken from Emile Brehier (1957) La Morie des Incorporels dannL'ancien Stoicisme.Paris: Vrin

53 30 '' or seated.

The Qualification of 'not-something' The Stoic conceptionof causesand effects also provides us with a better appreciation of how the Stoics criticised the Platonic Ideas.Deleuzetells us: if bodies with their states, qualities, and quantities, assume all the ... characteristicsof substanceand cause, conversely, the characteristicsof the Idea are relegated to the other side, that is to this impassive extraBeing which is sterile, inefficacious, and on the surface of things: the ideational or the incorporeal can no longer be anything other than an "effect."031 Gould notes that `Chrysippus' affirmation of the corporeal nature of causesis a flat 1 32 incorporeal But, as Brunschwig tells ' Plato Ideas). (the the causesof rejection of 133 irreality Ideas ' does `... Plato's to the of statements absurdity.... us not condemn For indeed the Stoics make use of effects themselvesin the form of the canonical incorporeals.A different criterion is required. The Stoics find this criterion through a test of particularity (or more precisely, individual particularity). This is elaboratedin a paradox brought to us by Simplicius (another ancient Greek commentator on the Stoics): `if someoneis in Athens, he is not in Megara; now man is presentin Athens; 134 is in Megare. ' The point of this paradox is that the term not present so man `someone'cannot be substitutedby a universal term without creating a contradiction. This statementdoeswork for particular things though. For example,Brunschwig uses 35 ' Socrates: if Socrates in is Megare. is in he However, as Athens, the example of not Brunschwig points out, this paradox is not a test of corporeality but a determination of something from not something. Brunschwig uses two special examples to demonstratethis. Firstly, he uses the `mass-term' water (a mass-termis a term that

10 Quoted in JosiahGould (1970) The Philosophy Chrysippus.Albany: StateUniversity New of of York, p. 108 13'Deleuze,TheLogic of Sense,p. 7 132Gould (1970), p. 108 '" Brunschwig(1994), p. 127 134ibid, p. 131 135ibid.

54 applies equally to the whole as to its parts). Water is corporeal but if water is in Athens it doesn't necessarily mean it isn't in Magary Secondly, he uses the incorporeal of the place of Socrates.Now this does satisfy the test: if the place of Socratesis in Athens then it cannot be in Megara. So, this paradox allows the Stoics to distinguish two ontological categories under non-existence. First, there is that is both not existent and not something. This applies to universal notions such which as 'man' which is the category that they locate Platonic Ideas. Texts attributed to Zeno tell us that he considered Platonic Ideas to be no more than `figments of " 36 ' `empty imagination. Second,there is that which is thought, or movementsof the is but something,the categoryof the canonical incorporeals. not existent In the first instance the Stoic's choice of the canonical incorporeals - void, place, time and lekta (the sayable) seemssomewhat arbitrary. This category would be do fit to than that terms more not nothing neatly within Stoic seem a repository of be in On hand Stoics the to the general. other seem enacting through the physics what categoryof the incorporeals is some form of originary epoche.It is not as severeas the Husserlian phenomenological epoche which brackets phenomenaso as to rule metaphysicalconsiderationsout of court; what it does do is provide a space where diverse phenomenahave the sameontological (if not logical) value. For example,the is conceptof void ubiquitous throughout ancient Greek cosmologies(and many other traditions). By giving it the same ontological status as the other incorporeals this forms had for between hitherto not been them of new relations which allows conceived. From this viewpoint the diversity of the canonical incorporeals is not a but weakness a strength. Deleuzian interventions.

In the Logic of SenseDeleuze's overt interest lies in the incorporeals of time and lekta. We shall now investigate how Deleuze's interpretation of these incorporeals diverge from that of the Stoics. Let us first turn to how Deleuze interprets the Stoic theory of time, he tells us:

16 ibid, p. 147

55

time must be grasped twice, in two complementary though mutually ... exclusive fashions. First, it must be graspedentirely as the living present in bodies which act and are acted upon. Second, it must be grasped entirely as an entity infinitely divisible into past and future, and into the incorporeal effects which results from bodies, their actions and their Only the present exists in time and gatherstogether or absorbs passions. the past and future. But only the past and future inhere in time and divide infinitely. These are not three successivedimensions, but present each two simultaneousreadings.' 37 First there is the time of the present, Chronos, and second there is the time of becoming, Aion. In examining Deleuze's reading of Stoic time we shall turn to two important considerations:i) Deleuze's own theory of time as presentedin Difference ii) Deleuze's Repetition, and and use of the work of the modem Stoic scholar Victor Goldschmidt and the subsequentreception of his ideasin recent Stoic debate. i) The eternalreturn.

When considering the Stoic theory of time in relation to Deleuze's theory of time in Difference and Repetition it is difficult not to draw a direct comparison between them. The Stoic theory of time is most succinctly put forward by Chrysippus, he defines time as `interval of movement in the sensein which it is sometimescalled measureof swiftness and slowness, or the interval proper to the movement of the 38 1 is in it Time ' In this passagewe that everything moves and exists. cosmos, and may discern three distinct moments. The first moment is the definition of time as a measureof movement. This is so far what we have commonly called the present. However the Stoics also attribute this measure of movement to the cosmos as a from its originary contraction to eventual conflagration. As Deleuzestates:`At whole the limit, there is a unity of all bodies in virtue of a primordial fire into which they becomeabsorbedand from which they develop accordingto their respectivetensions 139 ' This is the secondmoment of the embraces present a cosmic entire universe. ...

"' Dcleuze, TheLogic of Senfe, P. 5 '31Quoted from Brunschwig (1994), p. 145 '" Deleuze,TheLogic of Sense,p. 4

56 the Stoic theory of time. Both of these two moments fit within a reading of time as Chronos.The third moment occurs in what almost seemsto be an afterthought: `and it is in Time that everything exists.' Is this phrasesimply a qualification of a cosmic present as in everything happens within the cosmic present?On the other hand, if everything happens within Time then time would no longer be a measure of but constitutive of it. It is in this way that Deleuze would define this third movement moment as Aion, or as he often repeats- time out of joint.

If we now turn to Deleuze'stheoryof time in Differenceand Repetitionwe is that this see also composed of three moments or what Deleuze will call, may following Kant, 'syntheses.' 140However, on the contrary, it is not Kant who Deleuze first turns to for his exposition on time but Hume. Fundamental to the empirical is factor the of repetition - associationsin the mind occur through orderly approach in But what form does repetition itself exist? Deleuze states: `Repetition repetition. changesnothing in the object repeated,but doeschangesomethingin the mind which 141 it., The point to be made here is not that repetition is purely contemplates subjective but that a principle of repetition cannot be drawn from a ready given object: In considering repetition in the object, we remain within the conditions which make possible an idea of repetition. But in considering the change in the subject, we are already beyond these conditions, confronting the 142 form difference. of general by virtue of the changeor difference can one speak of repetition only ... that it introducesinto the mind which contemplatesit.... 143 In order to understandthe idea behind this we shall first turn to repetition in the object. Let us consider a seriesof casesof the form A, A, A, A, ..., where each case is taken to be an object of the understanding.If we consider the first two casesthen we may say that the second case of A is a repetition of the first case. Here the

10 Kant defines synthesisas `the processof joining different representationsto eachother, and of comprehendingtheir multiplicity in one act of knowledge,' Kant (1993, orig. 1934),p. 84 14'Deleuu, Di9"erenceand Repetition, p.70 142ibld, p. 71 143ibid, p. 70

57 criterion of repetition is similarity. However, this leads to a paradox in that when we consider the two cases in relation to each other we no longer have two separate instancesof A but a single instanceof the form (A A) but as such there is no longer judge to the repetition. We could then introduce a third caseof with which criterion a A, but in relation to the other two casesthis would then form an instanceof the type (A -AA) and so on to infinity. Effectively a criterion of repetition can only be found within the general form of repetition itself. Deleuze demonstratesthis by 14° Hume's AB, AB, The point of this is to AB, A.... turning example of the series that when one seesthe caseA one expects the case B to follow. From this Deleuze draws the conclusion that the first principle of repetition is contraction. Essentially, an associationis a contraction of casesor instants. For Deleuze, this also forms the first synthesisof time where, in simple terms, the caseA could be substitutedfor the past and the caseB could be substitutedfor the future in the latter series: Time is constituted only in the originary synthesiswhich operateson the repetition of instants,This synthesiscontractsthe successiveindependent instants into one another, thereby constituting the lived, or living, present... The past and the future do not designateinstantsdistinct from a supposedpresent instant, but rather the dimensions of the present in so far as it is a contraction of instants. The present does not have to go 145 itself in from future. outside order to pass pastto The first synthesisof time is that of habit, a habit of the mind. It is passive to the "46 is `it by However, but in that the the not carried out extent mind.... mind, occurs time constituted as the present is only a first step. It provides us with an internal criterion of repetition but does not show how the repetition between instants or is presents constituted,that is, of the type (A - B)(A - B). WhereasDeleuzeturned to Hume for the first synthesisof time for the secondsynthesishe will turn to Bergson. The paradox of the presentis that it passes,or more precisely, it is not able to constitute the principle of its passing, or as Deleuze states `to constitute time while 147 in ' time This leads to the conclusion `that there must be the constituted. passing

"4 ibid. 143ibid, pp. 70-71 146ibid, p. 71 147ibid, p. 79

58 148 first in ' In the sameway that a the another time which synthesisof time can occur. principle of repetition cannot be derived from ready given objects neither can a principle of passing be derived from ready given presents.The principle of passing involves three main elements: contemporaneity,coexistenceand pre-existence.First, a principle of passing must be contemporaneouswith each present otherwise `no 149 it it is ' "at time" the same present would ever pass were not past as present. Second,to the extent that the past is contemporaneouswith each present,that is each is present already past, the whole of the past co-exists with each present. Third, contemporaneityand coexistenceposesthe past as presuppositionof the presentand in this senseit pre-existsthe present: the past, far from being a dimension of time, is the synthesisof all time ... of which the present and the future are only dimensions. We cannot say that it was. It no longer exists, it doesnot exist, but it insists, it consists,it It is the in-itself of time as the final ground of the passageof time. is ... In this senseit forms a pure, general,a priori elementof all time. ' 50 The secondsynthesisof time is that of memory. Like habit it is basedon contraction but in this casethe material that is contractedis the past. Whereashabit contracteda finite number of instants into the present, memory contracts the totality of instants. From this viewpoint contraction in itself is not enough to distinguish one present from another as the present - all presents are equally present to the past. For this purpose Bergson poses that there cannot be contraction without the complementary principle of relaxation, or more precisely, degree of contraction (which is inversely '51 degree to of relaxation). The living presentwill now be constituted as the related past in its most contractedstate.For Deleuze,memory, like habit, is part of a passive synthesis.We may seethat passivesynthesishas anothermeaningrather than just the intuitive idea that habit and memory are involuntary processesof the mind, that is, in terms of a principle of repetition a certain preconceivedidea of repetition is still in operation in terms of how passive synthesis does not go beyond its original

14*ibid. 149ibid, p. 81 10 ibid, p. 82 151Henri Bergson(1988 orig. 1896) Matter and Memory, trans.N. M. Paul & W. S. Palmer. London: Zone, p. 105-6

59 Deleuze as states: conditions, The shortcoming of the ground is to remain relative to what it grounds,to borrow the characteristicsof what it grounds, and to be proved by these the secondsynthesisof time points beyond itself in the direction of so ... a third which denouncesthe illusion of the in-itself as still a correlate of representation.The in-itself of the past ... constitute[s] a kind of `effect,' 152 like an optical effect itself. of memory ... That is, the general form or `in-itself of time (it passes)or repetition (it repeats)is This leads to to the conclusion provide sufficient us with a not constitutive principle. that there is a third moment of time. For this purposeDeleuzeturns to Nietzsche.The third synthesisof time is that of the eternal return. Deleuze interprets Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal return as an expression of becoming or difference. In this sense that which returns or repeats cannot be thought of in terms of the identical or the same. It is a case of the `being of becoming' rather than the `becomingof being:' It is The eternal return is the to passage... of not problem an answer ... being that returns but rather the returning itself that constitutes being insofar as it is affirmed of becoming and of that which passes... In other words, identity in the eternal return does not describe the nature of that for but, fact that which the the returns on returning which contrary, of differs. This is why the eternal return must be thought of as a synthesis;a 153 its dimensions.... time and synthesisof Time as eternal return overturns the original conditions of the first two synthesesof time. First, it unhinges the notion of time as a repetition of instants. Deleuze describesthe eternal return as an `empty form of time' in the sensethat time is no longer subordinatedto the measurementof movement.That is, time as eternal return unfolds and constitutes the ordering of instants as opposedto the other way round. Second, it unhinges the contemplating mind which contracts these instants. In the first two synthesesof time the mind contracts instants into a unity but the operation of the eternal return shattersthe possibility of unity. In this way Deleuze describes

152Deleuze,Difference and Repetition, p. 88 1$3Gilles Dekan (1483 orig. 1962) Nietzsche and philosophy, trans. H. Tomlinson. London: Athlone, p. 48

60 the mind as a `fractured I; ' time is experiencedas the differential createdthrough this fracture. Deleuzewill sum thesepoints up: Eternal return affects only the new it causes neither the condition nor ... the agent to return: on the contrary it repudiates these and expels them its all centrifugal force.... It is repetition by excess which leaves with nothing of the default or the becoming-equal. It is itself the new, complete novelty.... It allows only the plebian to return, the man without 1 54 a name.

Obviously there are both similarities and differences between the Deleuzian and Stoic conceptions of time. The most pertinent factor is where the third moment of Stoic time fits within the Deleuzian syntheses.On the one hand incorporeal time could be associatedwith the second synthesis to the extent that it subsists in the field. bodies On the other hand, transcendental and acts effectively as a present of incorporeal time, by dint of being incorporeal is by definition an empty form and issue be However, the that the therefore the third associated could with synthesis. latter possibility raises is how can an incorporeal, which is an effect, act as an active constitutive principle? ii) The empty form of time. Deleuze's interpretation of the Stoic theory of time as Chronos and Aion draws heavily upon the work of Victor Goldschmidt, as Deleuzewill himself state in one of the footnotes of the Logic of Sense: `Among the commentators of Stoic thought, Victor Goldschmidt in particular has analysed the coexistence of these two conceptions of time: the first of variable presents; the second, of unlimited "55 into future. However, Goldschmidt's work has come under past and subdivision scrutiny in terms of how his interpretation of time draws on a feature of the other incorporealsof void and place: in the temporal domain, there exists no concept or at least no term ..,

Deteuze,Dfference and Repetition, pp. 90-91 issDeleuze,TheLogic of Sense,p. 340n. 3

61 which standsin the same relation to total and infinite time as place does to the void. It is true that one can try to re-establishthe symmetry, as Goldschmidt does, by appealing to the following analogy: what the infinite void is to a place limited by the body which occupiesit, total and infinite time is to time limited by the action which occupies it, that is ... to say the present. But this analogy seemsto me to be flawed by several differences: in the first place, the limited parts of time are not necessarily determined by an action in the present ('last year'; `the day after tomorrow'); and secondly,there is no suchthing as `empty' time which is beyondthe limits of the time occupied by the movementsof the world. 156 What is this relation of place to the void? As Brunschwig points out, the void could be called `the incorporeal' par excellencein that it is by definition `a desertdevoid of bodies.' Incorporeals do not `exist' and hence are necessarily`empty' by nature.I57 But how could such a term even be called something?The Stoics believed that the finite and required something in order to accommodate its periodic cosmos was conflagrations and contractions: the infinite void. From this perspectivethe void is indeed a definite place, but this ability to accommodatethe cosmos is its only defining feature.As a definite place the void can indeed be consideredas something. This is qualified in that the void can in no sensebe consideredto be in the cosmos. For the place in the void that the cosmos occupies is no longer void but body. As Brunschwig puts it, the cosmos `... limits it [the void] internally just as a hole limits "58 Gruyere the continuity of a cheese. If we now turn to Bnuischwig's criticisms of Goldschmidt's interpretation of Stoic time we may agreewith the idea that there is in no sensewhat could be called a `place' of time, that is, there is no `outside' of time in the sameway as the void is bodies. However, the cases Brunshwig uses to support this are not well outside Firstly, limited be the although present as a part of time this is not to chosen. can seen isn't it that also variable according to the extension of the acting body. say Brunschwig's examplesof `last year' and the `day after tomorrow' could effectively be defined as bodies if they were exerting power on the present.The ancient Greek commentatorPlutarch would even state:

156 B 's' ibid,

(1994), 140-1 pp. wig p. 138

'-" ibid, p. 139

62 The Stoics do not admit the existence of a shortest element of time, nor do they concede that the `now' is indivisible, but that which someone might assumeand think of as present is according to them partly future and partly past. Thus nothing remains of the Now, nor is there left any part of the present, but what is said to exist is partly spread over the future and partly over the past.1'9 Second,Brunschwig's objection that there is no such thing as `empty' time needs for it can be argued that time as an incorporeal is precisely empty. More qualifying exactly, this qualification is also required for the `outside' argumentused to describe the void as strictly speaking the void as an incorporeal does not exist outside of bodies any more than time can. What we may see taking place here in terms of time different logical two types are void argument - incorporeal time is related of and differentially or transcendentally to bodies while the incorporeal void is related bodies. to unilaterally Deleuze's second main interest in the Stoic incorporeals is that of lei to and the

basic has Lecercle `predicates. ' to this tells theory: this us about verbs or relation On most accounts,Stoic logic makes a threefold distinction between the sign (which signifies), the referent (which exists) and the significate (which is signified). Both the referent and the sign (the word as sound) are bodies ... but the significate is incorporeal. It is not a thought, however, but rather `the actual entity indicated or revealedby the sound, which we apprehendas subsisting together with our thought' [... ] the lekton is the predicate in a proposition: the incorporeal predicate incorporeal is individual It (a the equally neither an expresses event. 160 (a but (a an attribute verb). noun) nor a concept noun or adjective) In this way we may see how Deleuze links lekta directly with a language of becoming

Mixtures in general determine the quantitative and qualitative states of affairs: the dimensions of an ensemble- the red of iron, the green of a tree. But what we meanby "to grow," "to diminish," "to becomered," "to become green," "to cut," and "to be cut," etc., is something entirely

'"Quoted in Btunschwig (1994), P. 145 160L,ecercle(1985), p. 99

63 different. These are no longer states of affairs deep inside mixtures bodies - but incorporeal events at the surface which are the results of 16' The , tree mixtures. greens,,, ....

However, as Brunschwig notes, for the Stoics the position of lekta is not so clear cut. A predicate without a subject such as `... walks' is termed an incomplete lekton by 162 When this subject is filled such as `Socrateswalks' or `Plato walks' Stoics. the these are known as complete lekta. This is an important nuance. Deleuze's method has beento interpret the incorporeals as an order of becoming, but for the Stoics this is only true to the extent that an incorporeal is first qualified as a `something' as opposedto a `not-something' (as we saw in Simplicius' paradox). However, as we noted earlier at the beginning of the chapter it is not Deleuze's purposeto produce a strict interpretation of the Stoics but a repetition. On the other hand, evaluating Deleuze's interpretation in terms of the original Stoic theseswould seemto be a valid Stoics if interpretation fall foul Deleuze's the to were criticising what point were of in the first place. To explore this further let us turn to Deleuze's theory of sense.

161Deleuu, TheLogic of Sense,pp. 5.6 162Bnmschwig (1994), p. 135

64 2. The Theory of Sense From Simulacra to Events

Deleuze begins the Logic of Sense with the sentence: `Alice and Through the Looking-Glass involve a category of very special things: events, pure events.' 163 Deleuze introduces us to one of the fundamental aspectsof the event through the themeof becoming and usesthis to show how it disrupts our notion of sense,or more it disrupts how what Deleuze classifies as a `good' senseand a `common' precisely, first Deleuze turns to the disruption of good sense: sense. When I say "Alice becomeslarger," I mean that she becomeslarger than By is becomes however, the than token, she was. smaller she same she now. Certainly, she is not bigger and smaller at the same time. She is larger now; she was smaller before. But it is at the samemoment that one becomeslarger than one was and smaller than one becomes.This is the '' is becoming the present. simultaneity of a whosecharacteristic to elude For Deleuze good senseis rooted in a thought of the present and a distribution of time that moves from past to future in accordancewith the present. For example, a glassof hot water is commonly seento cool over time, that is, its difference from the norm is cancelledout or homogenized.But this is a presentationof the presentor the `now:' now it is hot, now it is cool. From the viewpoint of becoming the situation is very different, as Deleuzewill quote from Plato: "`hotter"' never stopswhere it is but `but they can is always going a point further, and the same applies to "colder" ... never finally becomeso; if they did they would no longer be becoming, but would be 165 is becoming ' Pure too quick for the presentand as such removesthe criterion so that enablesus to judge whether time is moving forwards or backwards.This is the paradoxbecomingproducesin relation to good sense. To be sure we have not yet come to events themselvesyet but are still in the realm of simulacrafor it is the simulacrum which is `without measure.' To this extent

163ibid, p. 1 "µ ibid. 165ibid, p. 2

65 Deleuzetakesus back to the organisation of the simulacrum: Plato invites us to distinguish between two dimensions: (1) that of limited and measured things, of fixed qualities, permanent or temporary which always presuppose pauses and rests, the fixing of presents and the assignation of subjects (for example, a particular subject having a largeness particular or a particular smallness at a particular moment); and (2) a pure becoming without measure, a veritable becoming-mad, which 1 66 never rests.

`Becoming-mad' is the matter of the simulacrum but for Deleuzethis doesnot form a dualism in simple opposition to Platonic ideasbut occurs within things themselves: It is not at all the dualism of the intelligible and the sensible,of Idea and matter, or of Ideas and bodies. It is a more profound and secretdualism hidden in sensible and material bodies themselves.It is a subterranean dualism betweenthat which receivesthe action of the Idea and that which eludes the action ... Limited things lie beneath the Ideas; but even beneath things, is there not still this mad element which subsists and occurs on the other side of the order that Ideas impose and things 167 receive? The simulacrum occurs on the sensible side of things and functions in a similar 168 faculties. Having Kantian it limit the point of sublime - occurs at the manner to a delved to the bottom of things to find the simulacrum as the unlimited Deleuze will now reversehis approachto seehow the unlimited affects our perceptionand thought of the limited by turning to language: SometimesPlato wonders whether this pure becoming might not have a very peculiar relation to language [...] Could this relation be, perhaps, essential to language, as in the case of a "flow" of speech,or a wild discourse which would incessantly slide over its referent, without ever stopping?Or might there not be two languagesand two sorts of "names," one designatingthe pausesand rests which receive the action of the Idea, the other expressingthe movementsor rebel becomings?Or further still, is it not possible that there are two distinct dimensions internal to

'" ibid, pp. 1-2 167ibid, p. 2 '" Gilles Deleuze(1984, orig. 1963) Kants Critical Philosophy: TheDoctrine the Faculties, U=. of H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam.London: Athlone, p. xi

66 languagein general - one always concealedby the other, yet continuously 169 to the aid of, or subsisting under, the other? coming We have already seen that the language of good senseis rooted in the `now' and consequently constitutes a very specific way of thinking - one of linear homogenisation.On the other hand, through the concept of becoming, it is at least possible to conceive of a languageor substantially, a way of thinking, that could be Of in different. find it that course names could one may some way very paradoxical designatebecomings,but here Deleuze is alluding to the difference betweennouns or adjectives,and verbs. Verbs expressactions and happeningsand so for Deleuze have a relation to becoming: `... the namesof pauseand rest are carried away by the verbs 170 becoming.... ' Neither is Deleuze the first to postulatesuch a language,for of pure example, Borges, in his short story `Tlon, Uqbar, Orbius Tertius,' creates an imaginary languagewhere a sentencesuch as `the moon rose above the river' would be approximately translated as `upward, behind the onstreaming it Mooned.,171In such a language `there are no nouns...: there are impersonal verbs, modified by 72 " is It Deleuze's (or functioning suffixes adverbs. prefixes) as now mono-syllabic by bringing fixed identities the to turn to transformation together of nouns or purpose the becomingwithin good sensewith the becomingwithin language: becoming, with its capacity to elude the present, The paradox of pure ... is the paradox of infinite identity.... It is languagewhich fixes the limits (the moment, for example, at which the excessbegins), but it is language as well which transcends the limits and restores them to the infinite ' 73 becoming.... equivalenceof an unlimited For Deleuze this is the paradox that becoming produces in relation to common sense. Deleuze defines common senseas ... the norm of identity from the point of Self the pure and the form of the unspecified object which correspondsto view of it., 174From the point of view of languageit is expressedin nouns and adjectives as

"" ibid. 170ibid, p. 3 Borges, `Tlon, Ugber, Orbius Tertius,' in Collected Writings, p. 73 m ibid. "' Deleu=e,TheLogic of Sense,Pp. 2-3 " Deleuze,Difference and Repetition, p. 133

67 the `assignationof fixed identities.' 15 The paradox comes about as a result of the destruction of good senseand the disruption of the `now.' Without a now to order thought the before and after are equally affirmed in becomingand produce an infinite identity of both senses(or directions) at the sametime, as Deleuze draws on Lewis Carroll:

"which way, which way?" asks Alice, sensing that it is always in both directions at the sametime, so that for once she stays,through an optical illusion; the reversal of the day before and the day after, the present always being eluded - "jam tomorrow andjam yesterday- but neverjam to-day.9476 What happensto nouns and adjectives in this situation? For Deleuze, through the paradoxof common sensewe now arrive at the realm of events: When the namesof pauseand rest are carried away by the verbs of pure becoming and slide into the language of events, all identity disappears from the self, the world, and God. This is the test of savoir.... It is as if events enjoyed an irreality which is communicatedthrough language to the savoir and to persons.For personaluncertainty is not a doubt foreign to what is happening,but rather an objective structureof the event itself, insofar as it moves in two directions at once, and insofar as it fragments the subject following this double direction."? The event splits the very notion of there being a conceptionof identity or the self. We are perhapsnow in a better position to determinewhy Deleuzeturns to Lewis Carroll is a cipher of the event: `All these reversalsas they appear in Alice for Deleuze, infinite identity have one consequence:the contestingof Alice's personalidentity and the loss of her proper name. The loss of the proper name is the adventure that is repeatedthroughout all of Alice's adventure's.9178

173Deleuu, TheLogic of Sense,p. 3 16 ibid. 'n ibid. 178ibid.

68 The Proposition

Deleuze states: `It is the characteristic of events to be expressed or expressible, 179 in ' least that uttered or utterable, propositions are at possible. In the third seriesof TheLogic of SenseDeleuzedeterminesthe relation of his notion of the event to sense and language.He does this by first setting out a certain model of the proposition. Deleuze begins by specifying three distinct relations within the proposition: denotation,manifestationand signification. i) Denotation. Deleuze statesthat denotation:

is the relation of the proposition to an external stateof affairs (datum). ... The stateof affairs is individuated; it includes particular bodies, mixtures of bodies, qualities, quantities, and relations. Denotation functions through the association of the words themselveswith particular images "* "represent" to the which ought stateof affairs. The operation of denotation is the `naming' of statesof affairs. To construct this in Stoic terms this would be the relation between the body that is the word (the body Deleuze it the the tells us that and of state affairs represents. of which utterance) denotation provides us with the logical criterion of true and false: "`True" signifies that a denotation is effectively filled by the state of affairs.... "False" signifies that the denotation is not filled, either as an result of a defect in the selectedimagesor as impossibility be image the radical which can of an associated a result of producing with the words-'181This criterion fits in with the basic Stoic definition of the find it in Diogenes Laertius: `A proposition is that which is true or as proposition we false, or a complete state of affairs which, as far as itself is concerned, can be 182 in his Chrysippus definitions. Dialectical ' says asserted,as ii) Manifestation. This is `the relation of the proposition to the person who

179ibid, p. 12 180ibid. "ibid. p. 13

'82DiogenesLaertius, 7.65, in A. Long and D. Sedley(1987) TheHellenistic Philosophers, Vol. 1: Translationsof the principal sources,with philosophical commentary.Cambridge:University Press, p. 202

69 183 himself. is ' It the relation of the speakerto the external state and expresses speaks of affairs. This relation is of a different kind to a strict denotation. Deleuze says: is presentedas a statementof desiresand beliefs which Manifestation ... correspondto the proposition. Desires and beliefs are causal inferences, not associations.Desire is the internal causality of an image with respect to the existence of the object or the correspondingstate of affairs [... ] Hume had seen this clearly: in the associationof cause and effect, it is "inference accordingto the relation" which precedesthe relation itself. 184 In the Stoic context this would be the relation of the soul (the 'commanding-faculty') to the external world. What is the relation of manifestation to denotation? Deleuze 85 form derive. '' It is the `inferences from a systematicunity says which associations speaking person who makes denotations according to the prior relation of manifestation. Moving from denotation to manifestation we likewise have a change in logical principle, it is `no longer the true and the false, but veracity and illusion. " 86 The possibility of true and false is groundedin ajudgement.

iii) Signification.This has a complex relation in the propositionin that it doesn't conform to the strict distinction betweenthe proposition and an external state of affairs. Deleuzetells us that signification: is a question of the word to universal or general concepts, and of ... syntactical connections to the implications of the concept. From the standpoint of signification, we always consider the elements of the proposition as "signifying" conceptual implications capable of referring to other propositions, which serveas premisesof the first. Signification is defined by this order of conceptual implication where the proposition under consideration intervenesonly as an element of a "demonstration," in the most general sense of the word, that is, either as premise or as conclusion. Thus, "implies" and "therefore" are essentially linguistic signifiers. "Implication" is the sign which defines the relation between premises and conclusion; "therefore" is the sign of assertion, which defines the possibility of affirming the conclusion itself as the outcome of implications.187

113Deleuze,TheLogic of Seise, p. 13 184ibid. '15ibid. 16 ibid, p. 14 1" ibid.

70 Theseideasare more intelligible through the useof examples.Deleuzedraws on two distinctions that Descartes made: a) the determination of the Cogito, and b) the definition of man as a rational animal.' 88 Here we have the two `types' of signification. In the first case,whenever `I' speak,the Cogito, the `I' think, is always implicit in the I (as a hypothesis at least). In the secondcase,`man therefore rational is denotation. is It requires an in true the an assertion and sense as a animal' not same for it demonstration be is, to true, that actual a man acting as a rational animal. From this we would require a further demonstration of rational and animal, and so on. Thesedeterminationsalso have resonancein Stoic thought, as Benson Mates states: According to Sextus, the term "signal" has two senses,a common sense and a special sense. In its common usage the word refers to anything it has "reveal" to as serves which were, else previously something which, been observed in conjunction with it. In the special senseit means that 189 is indicative [for of somethingnon evident example,the soul]. which With signification we have another change in logical form. Deleuze argues that the logical criterion of signification is `the condition of the true, the aggregate of Deleuze further: ' be" "would the true. elaborates which proposition under conditions The conditioned or concluded proposition may be false, insofar as it actually denotesa nonexisting state of affairs or is not directly verified. Signification does not establish the truth without also establishing the possibility of error. For this reason,the condition of truth is not opposed to the false, but to the absurd: that which is without signification or that 190 be false. true nor which may neither This is to say that signification forms a 'model of truth' upon which truth can be judged.

What is the relation of signification to manifestation and denotation? We have

ibid. I$9BensonMates (1973) Stoic Logic. Berkeley: University California Press, 13 p. of 190Deleuze,TheLogic of Sense,pp. 14-15

71 is denotation. Deleuze `prior' that to posits that seen manifestation already is is from but the to this also a certain prior only case manifestation signification point of view: `... from the standpoint of speech(parole) ... the I is primary, not only in relation to all possible denotations which are founded upon it, but also in relation 19' it ' However, this viewpoint has specific the to signification which envelops. implications for the notion of signification and Deleuzecontinues: `... precisely from this standpoint, conceptual significations are neither valid nor deployed for themselves:they are only implied (though not expressed)by the I, presentingitself as having signification which is immediately understood and identical to its own "92 manifestation. And as we are told by Galen: Chrysippus wrote about the word ego ("P') in the first of his books On ... the soul, in a discussion of the commanding-faculty.... We say ego ... in this way, pointing to ourselves at the place in which we declare thought to be, since the demonstrative reference is conveyedthere naturally and 1 93 appropriately. From this Deleuze infers that the `I' of manifestation is based on a conceptual in He is domain there asks a which conceptual significations are signification. developedfor themselves?He posits that this domain is that of language(langue). It is in languagethat `a proposition is able to appearonly as premise or a conclusion, before before denoting concepts manifesting even or a state of a subject, signifying We drawing here how is ''94 Deleuze should note on structuralism to ground affairs. this assertion: Benvenistehas shown that the relation betweenthe word (or rather its ... image) and the concept was alone necessary,and not own acoustic Only the relation between the word and the concept enjoys a arbitrary. necessitywhich the other relations [denotation and manifestation] do not have. The latter remain arbitrary insofar as we consider them directly and escapethe arbitrary only insofar as we connect them to this primary relation. Thus, the possibility of causing particular images associated with the word to vary, of substituting one image for another in the form

19'ibid, p. 15 92ibid. Galen, ORHippocrates' and Plato's doctrines, 2.2.9-11, in Long 204-5 (1987), Sedley p. and 'ý' Deleuze,TheLogic of Sense,p. 15

72 "this is not that, it's that," can be explained only by the constancyof the 9S signified concept. There is perhapsan intuitive link betweenstructuralism and the Stoics in the way that the word (the acoustic image) is treated as a material determination in structuralism. However, the position and role of language in Stoic thought is complex and Laertius Diogenes to tells us: `Utterance and speech are re-construct. problematic different, becausevocal sound is also an utterancebut only articulated in speech.And speechis different from language,becauselanguageis always significant, but speech "96 lack is We have blituri, language signification, e.g. not so at all. can whereas bodies that the the of affairs are seen utterance and state while the external already is Gould `complete incorporeal. `the is As says: or sayable' proposition proposition, identical neither with the words which express it nor with the fact which it 197 be Where To language ' does language fit into does this sure schema? expresses. is fit into in for this the a particular and as schema at schema all each element not Deleuze has himself pointed out, signification involves a relation to universal or However, despite the Stoic critique of Platonic Ideas as universals generalconcepts. this does not rule out the use of universals per se. Stobaeus states `[t]he Stoic in' is `participate Ideas, that there the that say we are what no and philosophers "98 concepts. Conceptsare universals but as Long and Sedley point out `if it is asked what makes someone'scommon quality count as `man,' not `horse,' the answer will it be doubt that matchesthe universal concept called `man' ... But any resultant no metaphysical problems are problems for concepts, not for common qualities " themselves. For the Stoics, concepts and what the structuralists call langue (the rules of language)are what they would term `not-somethings.' As such they do not but role an perhapsa practical one - one accordingto association. ontological play Let us now summarise the relationships between the dimensions of the From the viewpoint of language signification is the primary relation. proposition. However, Deleuze identifies that this is itself problematic. For signification only

'" ibid, pp. 15-16 '% DiogenesL,eaertius, 7.57, in Long and Sedley(1987), p. 33 Gould (1970), p. 70 Stobaeus,1.136,21-137,6, in Long and Sedley(1987), p. 179 Long and Sedley(1987), p. 183

73 provides us with the condition of the true, not a particular truth. That is, signification lacks a referent or more precisely, it lacks denotation: `implication never succeedsin grounding denotation except by giving itself a ready-madedenotation, once in the premisesand again in the conclusion.'200In the proposition signification is reliant on denotation,but we have already seenthat denotationis itself reliant on manifestation, which is where we started in the first place. Problematic of the Proposition

Having now set up the problematic of the proposition Deleuzeasks whether it would be pertinent to posit senseas a fourth dimension of the proposition in order to resolve this problematic. Deleuze tackles this possibility from two different angles: as a question of fact and a question dejure. The question of fact is one of whether sense can already be found in one of the dimensionsof the proposition. Of the question de jure Deleuzestates:

It is not that we must construct an a posteriori model corresponding to dimensions, have but itself the aptitude to the must previous rather model function a priori from within, were it forced to introduce a supplementary dimension which, because of its evanescence,could not have been 201 in from recognized experience outside As a question of fact Deleuzetells us that sensecannot be found in denotation in that be founded false in false: both have a is true that true and cannot or which sense senseof their own. Manifestation provides us with a more intuitive possibility in terms of how the I makes senseof the world. But, in Deleuze's structuralist model of the proposition the I is itself a signification and hence cannot be the ultimate foundation. Likewise signification cannot act as the ultimate dimension of senseas it presupposesan `irreducible denotation.'202Signification always fails because`there is a circularity between ground and grounded.'203NeverthelessDeleuze posits that

200Deleu=e,TheLogic of Sense,p. 16 m' ibid, p. 17 202ibid, p. 18 203ibid.

74 this provides us with a certain model for the understandingof sense in how this circularity is basedin the logical criterion of signification. Deleuzestates: In discussing the conditions of truth, we raise ourselves above the true and the false, since a false proposition also has a senseor signification. But at the same time, we define this superior condition solely as the possibility for the proposition to be true. This possibility is nothing other than the form of possibility of the proposition itself [... ] Here [in signification] one rises to a foundation, but that which is founded remains what it was, independently of the operation which founded it and 204 by it. unaffected In this way, with signification, the conditioned is itself usedto form the condition of possibility producing the circularity we have seen. At this point we come to the questionof sensedejure. Deleuze arguesthat the condition of truth: to have something unconditioned capable of assuring a real ought ... genesis of denotation and of the other dimensions of the proposition. Thus the condition of truth would be defined no longer as the form of conceptualpossibility, but rather as ideational material or "stratum," that 2os longer but is to say,no as signification, rather as sense. Now, how does sense operate in the proposition? Sense `... does not exist is it; the which proposition expresses what expresseddoes not exist outside outside its expression.This is why we cannot say that senseexists, but rather that it inheres or subsists.'206However, `[w]hat is expressedhas no resemblancewhatsoeverto the Sense is is '207 but `rather the attribute the the not attribute proposition expression. of of the thing or state of affairs.'208 Nevertheless, the proposition does have an is which predicate a attributed to the subject. At the sametime `the attribute attribute, of the thing ... the verb: to green, for example, or rather the event expressedby the verb ... is attributed to the thing denoted by the subject, or to the state of affairs denotedby the entire proposition.' 209However, `[t]his attribute doesnot exist outside

204

ibid. msibid, p. 19 ibid, p. 21 207ibid. 20Sibid. 209ibid.

75 of the proposition which expressesit in denoting the thing. Here we return to our 2 10 departure: does The the sense point of not exist outside of proposition. ..., dimension of sensewould appear to have a circularity all of its own but this is not necessarilythe case.Deleuzetells us: Senseis both the expressibleor the expressedof the proposition, and the attribute of the state of affairs. It turns one side towards things and one side towards propositions. But it does not merge with the proposition which expressesit any more than with the state of affairs or the quality which the proposition denotes. It is exactly the boundary between 1 things. propositions and The Stoics also determine a `realm' of sense.We may seethis in the famous paradox of Chrysippus: `If you say something, it passesthrough your lips; so, if you say "chariot," a chariot passesthrough your lips. '212The utterance`chariot' and the thing, chariot, are both bodies, but to avoid the paradox the `sayable' chariot must have a sensewhich merges with neither of these bodies. Nevertheless,the sayable is the is bodies these two the sayable a particular, a particular and moreover, relation of `something.' This is where Deleuze's reading of sense deviates from the Stoics. Deleuzetells us `[w]e will not ask therefore what is the senseof the event: the event is sense itself. The event belongs essentially to language; it has an essential We relationship to language[where the event is expressedby the infinitive verb]. 9213 language based to the of what extent sense,as condition must explore on partakesin the universality of signification. The point is to what extent sensepartakes in the economy of that which it engenders,that is, of languageas a not-something. This is the problem of transcendentalconditions in general. From this perspectivewe must consider Deleuze's conjunction of sensewith the event and determine to what extent these are logical rather than ontological notions. In order to explore these problems we must first examine how Deleuzequalifies his notion of sense.

210 ibid.

211ibid, p. 22 212ibid, p. 8 2º3ibid, p. 22

76 3. The Theory of Nonsense Deleuze's strategy in his theory of senseso far has been to elaborate a number of dualities. The first duality, and perhapsthe most fundamental,is the Stoic distinction between causesand effects, corporeal `things' and incorporeal `events.' Deleuze's consideration of the proposition leads to the next duality. He states `... insofar as events-effectsdo not exist outside the propositions which expressthem, this duality is prolonged in the duality of things and propositions, of bodies and language.'214 With Deleuze's elaboration of the notion of sensewe arrive at a third set of dualities. Although senseis describedas a dimension of the proposition and `... does not exist outside of the proposition which expressesit, it is neverthelessthe attribute of states of affairs and not the attribute of the proposition. The event subsistsin language,but it happensto things.'215Subsequently,a duality is to be found in both things and propositions: On the side of the thing, there are physical qualities and real relations which constitute the state of affairs; there are also ideational logical attributes which indicate incorporeal events. And on the side of the denote there the state of which proposition, are names and adjectives affairs; and also there are verbs which express events or logical 216 attributes. The relation betweendenotation and expressionin the proposition is not simply one between `names of stasis and names of becoming; rather, it is between two dimensions of the proposition.... i217Moving from denotation to expression is to move from the conditioned to the condition. But Deleuze arguesthat this condition in be the `image' of the conditioned and is of an entirely different nature; it is cannot an `unconditioned' element. Just as in Through the Looking-Glass Deleuze states`it is like the two sides of a mirror, only what is on one side has no resemblanceto the 8 is But 'Z' the precise nature of this relation? Deleuze sketchesout a what other....

2'4ibid, p. 23 25 ibid, p. 24 X16ibid. 217ibid, p. 25 218 ibid.

77 first explanation of their connection through an episode from Alice's Adventures in Wonderlandwhere the Mouse tells his story: "... the patriotic archbishop of Canterbury found it advisable," "Found what?" askedthe Duck. "Found it, " the Mouse replied rather crossly: "of courseyou know what `it' means." "I know what `It' meanswell enough, when I find a thing," said the Duck: "it's generally a frog, or a worm. The 219 is, did fmd?: the archbishop question what Deleuze interprets this passagein the following way: the duck understandsthe word `it' as a generalterm of denotation; for the mousehowever, `it' refers to the senseof a previous proposition. Deleuze states `[t]he equivocation of "it" is therefore distributed in accordancewith the duality of denotation and expression. The two dimensions of the proposition are organized in two series which converge in asymptotically, a term as ambiguous as "it, " since they meet one another only at the frontier which they continually stretch.'220However, Deleuze wants to use it in a [denotation He dimensions `[t]hese tells two and expression] way. us very specific u' in [something] in The an esoteric word, a non-identifiable aliquid converge only in first Lewis The Carroll is `esoteric' turn to words we shall shortly. of a subject use thing we must determineis how senseoperatesin thesedualities. The dual nature of Sense At the beginning of the fifth seriesDeleuze states: Senseis never only one of the two terms of the duality which contrasts things and propositions, substantives and verbs, denotations and expressions;it is also the frontier, the cutting edge,or the articulation of the difference between the two terms, since it has at its disposal an impenetrability which is its own and within which it is reflected. For thesereasons,sensemust be develord for its own sakein a new seriesof 2 2 internal. paradoxes,which are now

219Lewis Carroll (1994, orig. 1865)Alice's Adventuresin Wonderland.London: Penguin, 32 p. 22"Deleuze,Logic of Sense,p. 26 22'ibid. "2 ibid, p. 28

78 Deleuzedevelopshis notion of sensethrough four basic paradoxes. 1) The paradox of regress. This paradox concerns the impossibility

of saying

the sense of that which is said. In order to speak of this sense we must produce likewise its Deleuze does says: `... I never which not say own sense. another sentence But hand, I I the the of what am saying. on other can always take the sense sense state in I the turn, I cannot state. as of object another proposition sense, say whose of what I thus enter into the infinite regress of that which is presupposed.'223In this way `one is established "from the outset" within sense' in the things we say. Deleuze notes that this is Frege's paradox. If a proposition is denoted by a name (ni), the sense of this by is (n2), denoted by a is denoted the the second second a name name sense of name third name (n3), and so on to infinity. This paradox is also to be found in Lewis Carroll in many different forms. Deleuze is most interested by the form presented in the announcement of the title of the Knight's song in Through the Looking Glass:

"The name of the song is called `Haddock's Eyes' " "Oh, that's the name "No, is it? feel interested. " Alice trying to the you don't song, said, of looking "That's " Knight little the said, a vexed. what the understand, is is The `The Aged Aged Man. ' " the song called. of name really name "Then I ought to have said `That's what the song is called'? " Alice herself. "No, you oughtn't: that's quite another thing! The song corrected is called `Ways and Means': but that's only what it's called, you know! " "Well, what is the song then?" said Alice, who was by this time bewildered. "I was coming to that, " the Knight said. "The completely `A-sitting is really on a Gate!... "224 song This passagepresents us with four names:

is The `A-sitting song on a gate.' nI: is The called `Ways and Means.' song n2: n3: The name of the song is `The Aged Aged Man. ' n4: The name of the song is called `Haddock's Eyes.'

Deleuzetells of the developmentin this regressof naming:

223

ibid. 224Lewis Carroll (1994, orig. 1872) Through the Looking Glass. London: Penguin,pp. 137-8

79 there is the name of what the song really is [n1]; the name denoting this ...

is denotes the thus the what song called song or represents reality, which [n2]; the sense of this name, which forms a new name or a new reality

[n3]; and the name which denotes this reality, which thus denotes the

is the the the song called what song, or represents name of sense of [n4], 225

Deleuze notes two things here. Firstly, although Carroll presents us with only a finite (the be because is this carried name of this on could regress perhaps arbitrary regress in from different is ). Secondly, the strict this the nature the name of regress song, etc. ' In `couplets. in Carroll that of progression a with presents us n1, n2, ..., nfl paradox (the denotation (the the name of the sense of na and of song) the strict sense only n2 form Deleuze that denotation) to the and n3 part of a n, argues that conform paradox. different series in that with n, we have the song (the thing itself) as a name and n3 226 forms `Carroll itself. Deleuze therefore thing continues: takes the second name as a is infinitum. That displaced four to ad the regress with nominal entities which are it from draw in it, freezes decomposes to he a order each couplet and say, in further is developed `freezing' j227 This strategy of supplementary couplet. Deleuze's second paradox of sense.

2) The paradox of sterile division. Deleuze states`[t]here is indeed a way of it, just long immobilize infinite is fix It to to the this regress. proposition, avoiding limit film from it its the thin the to of things and at sense extract enough Deleuze's is This theory of sense. '228 to theoretical operation central perhaps words. He describes this process as akin to the breaking open of a Moebius strip to reveal the dimension of sense within.

In this `unfolded'

state sense, like the Stoic

incorporeals is sterile; it neither acts nor is acted upon. For Deleuze sense as is denotation has It by from the truth. to simply expressed no relation extracted infinitive verb. This leads to the third paradox.

3) The paradox of neutrality. Deleuze specifiesthat `if senseas the double of the proposition is indifferent to affirmation and negation,if it is no more passivethan

"s Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 30 226That is, the form of each couplet is [thing sense] or more precisely [thing (sense) sense (thing)]. 221Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 30

2n ibid, p. 31

80 it. '229 Deleuze's is to of the notion affect then able proposition mode of no active, `God From is the as statements such contrary point of view of quality sense neutral. is' or `God is not' have the same sense in that sense has nothing to do with actual in how have We terms (denotation). neutrality operates encountered already existence larger that becoming the axis produces a same operates along or smaller of relations: double sense at the same time. Or as Deleuze tells us: `five nights are five times hotter than a single one, "but they must be five times as cold for the same reason.9t9230 But if sense has no relation to existence then what is its relation to modality in have for its the `[t]he Deleuze and same one must part, event, states: general? divides it its in future line both in presence ad which with and past, modality, infinitum. If the event is possible in the future and real in the past, it is necessary that it be both at once.... '231The question here is one of whether sense or the event is hypothesis the `[t]he Deleuze But on rests of necessity out as points necessary. ... application of the principle of contradiction to the proposition which announces a future. '232He continues: `... the principle of contradiction concerns the impossibility '233 denotation the of signification. condition minimal and, also, of the realization of That is, this involves a condition of possibility which Deleuze has already attributed is He the that event of another order: or sense to the operation of signification. posits `... neither possible, nor real, nor necessary.'234This idea becomes clearer when we turn to the fourth paradox of sense.

4) The paradox of the absurd,or of impossible objects. The paradox we face here is that `the propositions which designate contradictory objects themselves have a This 9235 concerns contradictory notions such as square circles or matter sense. denotation find `[t]heir With these things that cannot at all we without extension. ... be fulfilled; nor do they have a signification, which would define the type of fulfilment. is in for '236 It these that this way notions are absurd a such possibility in In defining do have that they this sense they not nonsense a sense. are although

229ibid, p. 32 o ibid, p. 3 231bid, p. 33 232bid.

733ibid, p. 34 234 ibid. 235ibid, p. 35 236ibid.

81 Deleuzestates: If we distinguish two sorts of beings, the being of the real as the matter of denotation and the being of the possible as the form of significations, we must yet add this extra-being which defines a minimum common to the is For impossible. the the the of contradiction principle possible and real, 237 impossible. but not to the applied to the possible and to the real,

To say that senseor the event is in some way impossible means for Deleuze that be in is `unable is `excess' to the that realized there an a state of of senseor event 239 later is Deleuze call the eventum tantum. will affairs.'238This phenomenon what The notion of an `excess'is developedfurther in the sixth series. For Deleuze's method the paradox of infinite regress, or more precisely, Carroll's derivation of it is the most important. The series of regress that is provided by the `straight' paradox gives us a homogeneous series of terms (nj, n2, n3, ..., nn). Here we have a synthesis of the homogeneous in that each successive term is superior to the derivation it. However, Carroll's provides us with a supersedes and one previous different form of series. In this case two heterogeneous series are produced in that an in its is itself This is then taken taken as an object. sense gives us two which object ), (n2, (n1, terms: sense of object of n3, n5, n4, series object of sense simultaneous ... is is `it in Deleuze ). In this twice, sense says: presented way presented once as n6, ... the proposition in which it subsists, and again in the state of affairs where it crops up This brings duality. 9240 back We have to the the of us paradoxes surface. already at between duality things and propositions, states of affairs and events, that exists a seen denotations and expressions. The question that Deleuze now poses is what is the forms heterogeneous homogeneous between From the the of series? and one relation homogeneous form heterogeneous the two the subsumes of view series under it. point However, if we take two homogenous series (such as two series of events or things or do have ) heterogeneous form they to the etc. a relation expressions, or are they

23'ibid. 238ibid. 239ibid, p. 151 20 ibid, p. 34

82 simply arbitrary? To tackle this Deleuze draws a distinction

from the original

dualities and defines two new terms:

The law governing two simultaneous series is that they are never equal. One represents the signifier, the other the signified [... ] We call "signifier" any sign which presents in itself an aspect of sense; we call "signified, " on the contrary, that which serves as the correlative to this aspect of sense, that is, that which is defined in a duality relative to this aspect. What is signified therefore is never sense itself [... ] Thus, the signifier is primarily the event as the ideal logical attribute of a state of affairs, and the signified is the state of affairs together with its qualities 24' and real relations. Here we see the influence of Jacques Lacan on Deleuze's thought for he is utilizing the Lacanian idea that the signified is an essential lack (in this case, of sense) while the signifier is the excess to cover this lack. However, as we shall soon see, Deleuze uses this idea in a novel fashion. Deleuze's present strategy is to apply the signifier/signified distinction to the homogeneous form of series. In this task Deleuze draws our attention to Edgar Allan Poe's short story The Purloined Letter. 242This story presents us with two series which Deleuze summarizes as follows:

First series: the king who does not see the compromising letter received by his wife; the queen who is relieved to have hidden it so cleverly by leaving it out in the open; the minister who sees everything and takes possession of the letter. Second series: the police who find nothing at the minister's hotel; the minister who thought of leaving the letter in the open in order better to hide it; Dupin who sees everything and takes back 243 letter. the possession of

With reference to this story Deleuze identifies three basic characteristics of the homogeneousform of series. First, there is a displacementbetween the two series: the minister who steals the letter in the first serieshas the letter stolen from him in the secondseries;the minister realizes the obfuscation in the first serieswhile Dupin does so in the second,etc. In this Deleuze says there is `... double a sliding of one seriesover or under the other, which constitutes both, in a perpetual disequilibrium

" ibid, pp. 37-38 242Edgar Allan Poe (1994) SelectedTales.London: Penguin, 337-356 pp. 243Deleuze,TheLogic of Sense,p. 38

83 vis-ä-vis each other. '244Secondly, Deleuze argues that `this disequilibrium must itself be oriented. '245 This orientation is provided by the signifier/signified

relationship.

The signifying series presents us with an excess of meaning over the signified series. In the story the second series is the signifying series in that it is Dupin who resolves the puzzle of the purloined letter and gives meaning to the story. Through this Deleuze argues that two seemingly homogeneous series are in fact determined as heterogeneous through the signifier/signified

relation. The third and most important

characteristic of series is what Deleuze calls the `paradoxical entity. ' This entity `... ensures the relative displacement of the two series, the excess of one over the being without reducible to any of the terms of the series or any relation other, between these terms. 1,246 In Poe's story this role is played by the letter. It positions all the characters in

both

series and orders their

respective signifier/signified

relationship. In this task the paradoxical entity has particular characteristics of its own: `It circulates without end in both series and, for this reason, assures their is It a two-sided entity, equally present in the signifying and the communication. signified series. It is the mirror. Thus, it is at once word and thing, name and object, denotatum, expression and designation, etc. '247In order for the paradoxical and sense entity to circulate in the two series `it behooves it ... to be in excess in the one series it constitutes as signifying, and lacking in the other which it constitutes as which signified: split apart, incomplete by nature or in relation to itself. Its excess always refers to its own lack, and conversely, its lack always refers to its excess.5248For Deleuze, this relation of excess/lack operates in an almost contradictory fashion. He finds its principle in an episode from Through the Looking Glass when Alice is in the Sheep's shop. Here, when Alice looks at any shelf it always seems to be empty while all the other shelves are as full as possible. Deleuze tells us `... that which is in excess in one case is nothing but an extremely mobile emptyplace; and that which is lacking in another case is a rapidly moving object, an occupant without a place always

Z" ibid, p. 40 245ibid. 2A6ibid. 247ibid.

248ibid, p. 40

84 displaced-'249 When and supernumerary

we apply this

paradoxical entity to the signifying/signified

find in that the what circulates series we

characteristic

of

the

in is `empty the signified series we while series an place without a word' signifying have an `object without a place. ' The notion of an `object without a place' is perhaps but letter form it in letter; Poe's the to as a place, we see a without understand of easy `place Deleuze `blank is the correlative calls word'? a without word' or what what We find that this blank word is denoted by `esoteric' words. Deleuze elaborates Carroll's use of esoteric words in the seventh series of The Logic of Sense.

The esoteric word

Carroll uses esoteric words and paradoxical entities in general to construct a number kind kinds identifies different Deleuze of series as `two series of of series. one of (or rather ... one series of pure expressions and one series of propositions by means of an esoteric Word.9250Deleuze tells us here we denotations) regulated ... find the esoteric word falls into two different types. First, there are `contracting' for ' `your Highness. in `y'reince' Sylvie Bruno royal which stands and words such as Deleuze states `[t]his contraction aims at the extraction of the global sense of the in order to name it with a single syllable - or an "Unpronounceable entire proposition Monosyllable, "'251 We should note that this operation only comes to bear on the is denotation `y'reince' The the the of paradoxical series of entity. word signifying the blank word. These words `perform a synthesis of succession over a single series' and Deleuze calls this operation 'connection. '252 Second, there are `circulating' described These to the approximate closest entity previously. We words. paradoxical find them in words such as `Snark' (from The Hunting of the Shark), `Phlizz' (from Sylvie and Bruno) or the Mouse's `it. ' These words denote the blank word in the signifying series while are absent objects in the signified series - the Snark is an invisible animal, the Phlizz is a fruit without taste, and for the duck `it' is a term without

denotation.

249ibid. u0 ibid, p. 43 251ibid. 252ibid, p. 47

These words

`perform

a synthesis of

coexistence and

85 between heterogeneous Deleuze two coordination series' and calls this operation `conjunction. ' 253 Another formation of series to be found in Lewis Carroll concerns `... greatly being regulated by portmanteau words.... '2M Portmanteau words are ramified series esoteric words of a third kind. They denote the `disjunction' of series. Examples of this operation are provided in the preface of Carroll's The Hunting of the Shark:

Supposingthat, when Pistol uttered the well-known words "under which king, Bezonian? Speak or die!" Justice Shallow had felt certain that it was either William or Richard, but had not been able to settle which, so that he could not possibly say either name before the other, can it be doubtedthat, rather than die, he would have gaspedout "Rilchiam! "255 The name `Rilchiam' is the contraction of Richard and William and as such denotes the two series in a portmanteau word (unlike connecting words which just contract a single series). However, the situation is more complex than this when we consider a portmanteau word such as `frumious' (fuming and furious). Carroll states: `If your thoughts incline ever so little towards `fuming, ' you will say `fuming-furious; if they turn, even by a hair's breadth, towards `furious, ' you will say `furious-fuming';

but if

you have that rarest of gifts, a perfectly balanced mind, you will say `frumious. "256 And Deleuze comments `... the necessary disjunction is not between fuming and furious, for one may indeed be both at once; rather, it is between fuming-and-furious furious-and-fuming on one and on the other. '257In principle the ramification of series occurs from within the series itself and the disjunctive word co-ordinates this divergence. Deleuze tells us that with disjunctive words we come to a different order This is because words. esoteric of while connecting and conjunctive words denote aspects of the paradoxical entity (blank word/invisible object), the portmanteau word denotes the esoteric word itself: it names the divergence of series in a new use of connection and conjunction.

233 ibid.

u4 ibid, p. 44

255Lewis Carroll (1939) The Complete Works Lewis Carroll. London: Nonesuch Press, p. 678 of Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 46

237ibid.

86 The Theory

We have reacheda point where we may turn to the elaboration of Deleuze's theory of disjunctive Conjunctive words and words presentus with two special cases. sense. 1) Conjunctive words. In the paradoxical entity the blank word denotes the

blank is denoted by itself this and place word a conjunctive word. without object Deleuzestates: both the blank word denoting it [the object without place] and the ... denoting function blank have to expressthe the the word word esoteric thing. It is a word that denotes exactly what it expressesand expresses what it denotes.It expressesits denotatum and designatesits own sense. It sayssomething,but at the sametime it saysthe senseof what it says:it is its It therefore completely abnormal [... ] The name own sense. says 258 its be (N). nonsense saying own sensecan only We may find this principle of nonsense in the mouse's `it. ' Deleuze has previously it is because has lacks denotation. `it' `it' However, this that precisely no specified denotation that it is capable of engendering all possible denotation. In the paradox of infinite regress the sense of each term is denoted by another term but a term that designates its own denotation `says its own sense.' In this way the term effectively ' We for `non-sense. Deleuze. this shall word entails a see shortly what expresses 2) Disjunctive words. The portmanteau word presents us with two alternate terms such as fuming-furious

or furious-fuming.

However, under the form of the

in (frumious) is is term that the same as that word one which expressed portmanteau denoted by That is, is its the the other. word also expresses portmanteau own which has hence So `... is `non-sense. ' `non-sense' that two sides, one also we see sense and disjunctive the to the to the regressive synthesis, other synthesis. '259 corresponding

Deleuze's notion of sense is essentially a structuralist notion and our description of

the Mouse's `it' requiresclarification from this perspective.As Deleuzesays:

258ibid, p. 67 259ibid.

87 The play on words would be to say that nonsense has a sense, the sense being precisely that it hasn't any. This is not our hypothesis at all. When indicate, its to that on the says own sense, we wish nonsense we assume contrary, that sense and nonsense have a specific relation which can not be false, is, that that the true not conceived simply can of and which copy logic is ] The basis [... the of sense a relation of exclusion of on necessarily determined to posit between sense and nonsense an original 260 intrinsic type of relation, a mode of co-presence

Deleuze's hypothesis is that `... nonsensedoes not have any particular sense,but is it in 1261 that than the to to the produces excess. of sense rather sense absence opposed From this point of view nonsensehas a certain value within a structure even if this `phoneme Deleuze Jakobson's is to zero' which compares nonsense zero value 262 from determines phonetic value a zero point within the structure. In effect, has blank is the and as such series a special empty place or word within nonsense function within a structure: Inside the series, each term has sense only by virtue of its position itself depends But to term. this position on relative every other relative the absolute position of each term relative to the instance=x [paradoxical entity]. The latter is determined as nonsense and circulates endlessly throughout the series. Sense is actually produced by this circulation as sense which affects both the signifier and the signified. In short, sense is 263 always an effect. This is to say that sense is the effect of a structure, as Deleuze tells us `[s]tructure is M for '2 incorporeal fact in the production of sense.... a machine

Now how are we to evaluate Deleuze's notion of sense?We have already drawn out the distinction between the Stoic `something' and `not something. ' A is is a always particular a not-something something while simply a something have is We Deleuze's that seen of sense neutral or sterile in notion conception. is indifferent `It the to to the universal and to the singular, to the proposition: relation general and to the particular, to the personal and to the collective; it is also indifferent

7b0ibid, p. 68 261ibid, p. 71 262 ibid.

263ibid, p. 70 2" ibid, p. 71

88 to affirmation and negation, etc. In short, it is indifferent to all opposites. '265From this perspective Deleuzian sense would appear to have the value of a not-something. In describing the neutrality of sense Deleuze quotes from Husserl's Ideas 1: `the its from fact it this the that expression and apart constitutes peculiarity of stratum lends expression to all other intentionalities, is not productive. Or if one prefers: its productivity,

its noematic service, exhausts itself in expressing. 9266However does

this mean that it completely disappears or that it is left as a dead matter on the transcendental

field,

extraneous to

its

purpose? As

Baudrillard

will

say:

`Disappearance is something completely different from death. Dying doesn't do any 267 have disappear., investigate To You to this we will turn in the final still good. Deleuze's to use of structure. section

2 ibid, p. 35 266Quoted in Deleuze,ibid, p. 152 267Baudri11ard, Forget Foucault, p. 21

89 4. The Structure of the Event

Our use of the term `structure' in understanding Deleuze's theory of sense or the into First, is in falls there two the not necessarily categories. structure exclusive event terms of Deleuze's use of structuralism. Although Deleuze will

later reject the

find features of this event Logic Sense the elements still of of we explicit structuralist (the excess of the event, the eventum tantum) present in his later work. Although these concepts have been reworked we still find the common element of the transcendental field, that is the moment of anti-production.

What is this second

field? Structure is by the transcendental structure presupposed perhaps of meaning the wrong term here for what is at stake is a certain order or ordering. The way in Deleuze's in field determined is theory through the transcendental of sense not which insignificant.

Our critique of Deleuze's theory of sense has relied on the Stoic

distinction of something (bodies and incorporeals) from not-something. Deleuze he from then sets up as the the the stratum of sense proposition which extracts transcendental field of bodies/incorporeals. We have argued that this notion of sense is a not-something and fu thermore, as a production, it does not lead us back to bodies/incorporeals but creates its own production of them. That is, Deleuze has investigate To 'not-something' bodies/incorporeals. this we will theory of a produced Deleuze's Deleuze's Stoic inspired topics: three related structuralism, explicit analyse development of structuralism, and the order of the transcendental field.

Deleuze's essay`How do we recognizestructuralism?' originally published in 1967 is both a historically interesting and complex piece.268Written at a time before the term `structuralism' becamea defined movement Deleuze provides us with what Charles Stivale (the translator of this essay into English) calls `an idiosyncratic "structuralism. "'269 in interest Our this essay lies in that in of conceptualisation Deleuze's version of structuralism we find the initial roots of what will become his `transcendentalempiricism' of Difference and Repetition and the theory of the event in TheLogic of Sense.Let us consider the following passage:

2" Gilles Deleuze(1998, orig. 1967) `How do we recogniseStructuralism?' trans. in CharlesStivale, The two-fold thought of Deleuzeand Guattari: intersectionsand animations.New York: Guildford Press,pp. 258-82 269Stivale (1998), p. 251

90

The elements of a structure have neither extrinsic designation nor intrinsic signification. Then what is left? As Levi-Strauss recalls rigorously, they have nothing other than a sense: a sense that is necessarily and uniquely "positional. " It is not a matter of a location in a real spatial expanse, nor of sites in imaginary extensions, but rather of places and sites in a properly structural space, that is, a topological space. Space is what is structural, but an unextended, preextensive space, pure spatium constituted bit by bit as an order of proximity, in which the notion of proximity first of all has precisely an ordinal sense and not a 27° in signification extension. We have already seen in our study of the Logic of Sense how sense is treated as an effect. In `How do we recognize structuralism? ' Deleuze tells us `... sense is always a result, an effect: not merely an effect like a product, but an optical effect, a language effect, a positional effect. 1271And this notion of sense is reiterated in The Logic of Sense: '... [sense is] a surface effect, a position effect and a language effect. 9272 Through the development of the Logic of Sense we find that sense is primarily the effect of bodies and secondly the effect of the paradoxical entity (nonsense). However, the paradoxical entity is not a cause in itself in that it is part of the signifier/signified

system; it is a quasi-cause in relation to the system. In this way

sense is itself a quasi-effect or quasi-product. As a preliminary remark we must note that a certain physics is at work here, as Deleuze himself says:

double causality is manifest, even from the point the requirement of a ... of view of a pure physics of surfaces.The eventsof a liquid surfacerefer to the inter-molecular modifications on which they depend as their real cause, but also to the variations of a surface tension on which they 273 dependas their (ideational or "fictive") quasi-cause. Further on Deleuzestates:

to the physics of surfaces a metaphysical surface necessarily ... corresponds.Metaphysical surface(transcendentalfield) is the name that

270De1euze,`How do we recogniseStructuralism?, 262 p. 271ibid, p. 263 272Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 70 273ibid, pp. 94-5

91 between be frontier hand, bodies to the given established, on one will taken together as a whole and inside the limits which envelop them, and 274 in on the other, propositions general. What is the demarcation between physics and metaphysics at work here? To some extent Michel

Foucault seems to capture this point. In Foucault's

`Theatrum

Philosophicum, ' a commentary on Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense, he states:

The Logic of Senseshould be read as the boldest and most insolent of ... metaphysicaltreatises- on the basic condition that insteadof denouncing metaphysicsas the neglect of being, we force it to speakof extra-being. Physics: discourse dealing with the ideal structure of bodies, mixtures, reactions, internal and external mechanisms; metaphysics: discourse dealing with the materiality of incorporeal things - phantasms,idols, and simulacra. [... ] Physics concerns causes,but events, which arise as its effects, no longer belong to it. Let us imagine a stitched causality: as bodies collide, mingle, and suffer, they create events on their surfaces, events that are without thickness, mixture, or passion; for this reason, they can no longer be causes.They form, amongthemselves,anotherkind incorporeals links derive from of of successionwhose a quasi-physics in short, from metaphysics.275 This is a peculiar situation. Deleuze's distinctions are basedon Stoic physics but this is itself not devoid of metaphysicalnotions, that is, of causeand effect. Here physics is define but different there two may and effect still a primary causality cause orders that constitutes the `surface' of effects ('there is an entire physics of surfaces as ... 276 deep the effect of mixtures'). Moreover, if our senseof the world is derived from the paradoxical entity, that is, the quasi-cause,and let us rememberthis brings about `the reversalof causeand effect,' then would not such a notion problematisethe very idea of cause and effect? Here we find a central tension in The Logic of Sense: defines the transcendental field of a physics of surfaces but the metaphysics transcendentalfield itself requires a general physics. The question remains of how this structural or topological spaceis determinedin the first place. We shall soon see

274ibid, p. 125 275Michel Foucault (1977) `TheatrumPhilosophicum,' chapter in Language,Counter-Memory, Practice: SelectedEssaysand Interviews, trans D. F. Bouchard.Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 172-3 276Deleuze,TheLogic of Sense,p. 125 ýý

92 that Deleuze's answer to this lies in his reading of the Stoic incorporeals. Before we can move onto this we need to determine the general organization

of the

transcendental field. Let us first turn to Deleuze's definition of a structure in The Logic of Sense. First, there must be two heterogeneous series one of which is signifying and the other have is by As the the we series seen characterized previously signifying signified. excess of a place without object while the signified series is characterized by the lack for disjunction (here is Deleuze the an of void and place). object using of a place Second, each series consists of terms which are related differentially to each other. In `How do we recognize structuralism? ' and Difference and Repetition Deleuze former in In differential the this terms text we are told explicitly of calculus. explains this relationship

is established between elements that have no determined value ... themselves, and that nevertheless determine each other reciprocally in the relation: thus yd. + xdx = 0, or dy/dx = -x/y. Such relationships are symbolic, and the corresponding elements are held in a differential relationship. Dy is totally undetermined in relation to y, dc is totally undetermined in relation to x: each one has neither existence, nor value, determined, is And dy/dx the two totally the signification. nor yet relation 277 determine in the relation. elements each other reciprocally This differential nature leads Deleuze to a correlative feature of the structure. He posits that corresponding to these differentials

are very particular

events or

`singularities. ' Again Deleuze alludes to differential calculus to explain this and once is this reference most explicit in `How do we recognize structuralism? ' again

Corresponding to the determination of differential relations are singularities, distributions of singular points that characterizecurves or figures (a triangle, for example, has three singular points) [... ] Every structure presents the following two aspects: a system of differential relations accordingto which the symbolic elementsdeterminethemselves reciprocally, and a system of singularities corresponding to these relations and tracing the spaceof the structure.

277Jleuze, `How do we recogniseStructuralism?' 265 p.

93 In a footnote in The Logic of Sense Deleuze reminds us that to begin with he defined sense and the event as neutral to all modes of the proposition. But now he states that the event is singular to the extent that it is `punctual. ' That is, events are defined as 278 This involves a certain temporal formation of the positional within a structure. topological surface. We have already encountered this notion of time earlier in the form of a pure becoming where `each present is divided into past and future, ad infinitum. '279Here we find Deleuze's employment of the Stoic incorporeals. On the surface organization of events Deleuze tells us:

Each event is the smallest time, smaller than the minimum of continuous thinkable time, because it is divided into proximate past and imminent future [Chronos]. But it is also the longest time, longer than the maximum of continuous thinkable time, because it is endlessly subdivided by the Aion which renders it equal to its own unlimited line [... ] This is the secret of the event: it exists on the line of Aion, and yet it does not fill it. How could an incorporeal fill up the incorporeal ?280 ... But which incorporeals are being used here? Deleuze states that `the event is the identity of form and void. 281Events `communicate in the void which constitutes their substance.'282 The event is the place of a temporal becoming in the void. However, this is a conflation of a differential and unidirectional

unilateral logic.

That is to say a unilateral operation is being made on the transcendental field itself. The transcendental field of singularities can but be a not-something. But what is left of its organizing principle? For this purpose we must turn back to the nature of singularity.

What is a Sinaularity?

Deleuze tells us that they are special or `sensitive' points: `Singularities are turning points and points of inflection; bottlenecks, knots, foyers, and centers; points of fusion, condensation,and boiling; points of tears and joy, sicknessand health, hope 279De1euze, The Logic of Sense, p. 339n. 1 279ibid, p. 62

2ß0ibid, pp. 63-4 281ibid. p. 136 282ibid, paraphrased

94 is in `[t]he distinction '283 They ideal to the are relation world: and anxiety.... ... between the event, which is ideal by nature, and its spatio-temporal realization in a state of affairs ."284To provide an example we may consider Poe's `The Purloined Letter' once again. Here we find three singularities: concealing a letter, not discovering the letter, and finding the letter. These singularities are in turn expressed through the characters which may be considered the differential

points of the

structure; in the first series queen-king-minister and in the second series, ministeris have in As terms this structure organized we seen previously, whole police-Dupin. is (in letter). The the third this the the entity paradoxical entity case, paradoxical of in both is in is `object=x' It structure which mobile of a general. an characteristic in `distance' but fixes both the time the an absolute same series at elements of series from itself. That is, it is their `differentiator. ' However, this is just one aspect of its role. When the paradoxical entity is considered from the point of view of the quasicause it has a productive role in terms of the `actualisation' or `realization'

of

Deleuze Simondon draws Gilbert to argue that the singularities. on psycho-biologist singularities have a potential energy in relation to the quasi-cause whereupon they are held in a metastable state.285As Deleuze tells us about this surface topology: `Being a pure effect, it is nevertheless the locus of a quasi-cause, since a surface energy, being of the surface, is due to every surface formation; and from it a without even fictitious

surface tension arises as a force exerting itself on the plane of the

'286 Accordingly, singularities are actualised in a state of affairs in a process surface. based on integral calculus. As we are told in `How do we recognize structuralism? ':

distinguish between the total structure of a domain as an We must ... ensembleof virtual coexistence,and the substructuresthat correspondto diverse actualisation in the domain. Of the structure as virtuality, we it is still undifferenciated, even though it is totally and that say must differentiated. Of structuresthat are embodied in a particular completely actual form (present or past), we must say that they are differenciated, for them to be actualised is precisely to be differenciated. The that and structureis inseparablefrom this double aspect,or from this complex that

283ibid, p. 52 'B4ibid, p. 53 295ibid, p. 103 286ibid, pp. 124-5

95 287 designate different/ciation.... one can under the name Differenciation involves a localized integration of the structure, that is, an integration limits. In this phenomenon we encounter the definitions of problems and within solutions. How are we to determine the limits within which something is integrated? To the extent that mathematical problems provide certain conditions for the finding of solutions Deleuze considers this an essential part for the understanding of the transcendental field.

Problems and Solutions

Deleuze's theory of problems and solutions is derived from Henri Bergson and Albert Lautman. In Bergsonism Deleuze takes the following quotation from Bergson's The Creative Mind:

The truth is that in philosophy and even elsewhere it is a question of finding the problem and consequently of positing it, even more than of solving it. For a speculative problem is solved as soon as it is properly stated [... ] Already in mathematics, and still more in metaphysics, the invention of effort consists most often in raising the problem, in creating the terms in which it will be stated. The stating and solving of the problem are here very close to being equivalent: The truly great problems are set forth only when they are solved. 288 Commenting on this Deleuze says `... the problem always has the solution it deserves, in terms of the way in which it is stated (i. e., the conditions under which it is determined as a problem).... '289In The Logic of Sense Deleuze applies this notion

to the event: `The mode of the event is the problematic. One must not say that there are problematic events, but that events bear exclusively upon problems and define their conditions.1290Here Deleuze draws on Lautman to argue that a problem is determinedby a set of singular points or eventswhich provide us with the conditions

287Deleuze, `How do we recognise Structuralism? ' p. 268 ZagGilles Deleuze (1988 orig. 1966) Bergsonism, trans. H. Tomlinson & B. Habberjam. New York: Zone Books, p.p. 15-16, quotation of Henri Bergson (1946 orig. 1941) The Creative Mind, trans M. L. Adison. New Jersey: Citadel Press, pp. 58-9

Z" Deleuze,Bergsonism,p. 16

290Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 54

96 Deleuze the problem. continues of

`... singularities preside over the genesis of the

solutions of the equation. Nonetheless, it is still the case, as Lautman said, that the instance-problem and the instance-solution differ in nature they as represent 291 ideal its ' the Now we must turn event and spatio-temporal realization. respectively to the issue of how that which is actualised is determined to do so. For Deleuze this process is regulated by the paradoxical entity. The paradoxical entity defines `the locus of a question' in which the field of problems is distributed. 292As such all in communicate a single Event that is the question-event. For Deleuze the events paradoxical entity takes on the form of an `aleatory' point. He explains this through the use of the notion of an `ideal game' in the tenth series of The Logic of Sense.

The Game

In order to elaborate the principles of the ideal game we must first turn to the principles of what we normally consider to be games in general (for example, cricket, chess, poker, Russian roulette, etc.). Deleuze tells us that games have four basic 293 1) Rules characteristics. pre-exist the game and provide the `conditions' for the Hypotheses 2) are derived from these rules in accord with which chance is game. distributed in the game. 3) These hypotheses arrange the game into a number of turns or `plurality of throws, which are really and numerically distinct. '2944) The objective is the game to win rather than lose. Deleuze argues that games such as these are of really only partial games in two respects. First, these games naturally limit the activity at hand. Second, chance only occurs at certain defined points in the game.295 In contrast to these types of game Deleuze searches for a `pure' game which he finds in Borges' description of the Babylonian lottery:

if the lottery is an intensification of chance, a periodic infusion of ... chaos into the cosmos, would it not be desirable for chanceto intervene at all stages of the lottery and not merely in the drawing? Is it not

2" ibid. 292ibid.

293seeibid, pp. 58-65 294ibid, pp. 58-9 295ibid, p. 59

97 for chance to dictate the death of someone while the ridiculous circumstances of his death - its silent reserve or publicity, the time limit of one hour or one century - should remain immune to hazard? [... ] In reality, The number of drawings is infinite. No decision is final, all diverge into others. The ignorant suppose that an infinite number of drawings requires an infinite amount of time; in reality, it suffices that time be infinitely divisible, as is the case in the famous parable of the Tortoise and the Hare. 96 In such a game Deleuze determines four alternate principles. 1) There are no rules that pre-exist the game. The game is its own rule. 2) Chance is affirmed at every `point' in the game. 3) To the extent that the turns or throws are infinite (endlessly forms `... distinct, but they the are qualitatively qualitative of a single are ramified) is ontologically cast which

one. '297 That is, each turn or throw corresponds to a

distribution in `... of successive singularities relation to one which are problematic in [the to this simultaneous paradoxical entity or aleatory relation yet point another, point] which always changes the rule, or coordinates and ramifies the corresponding insinuates '298 4) Such it length the chance each series. a game over of entire as series has neither winners or losers. At this point Deleuze reaches the game as `nonsense.' be thought as nonsense. But precisely for this He states: `The ideal game can only ... is it itself ] [... For the thought thought the reality of of pure and unconscious reason, finds it thought possible to affirm all chance and to make chance into an object only 299However, from this is perspective chance effectively being treated of affirmation. as a `zero point' thereby transforming it into a physical principle. As Baudrillard in idea The Logic `The Sense: that games can be comments some on very of notes intensified by the acceleration of chance (as though one were speaking of the acidic becoming idea the that a chemical solution), can thereby be extended of content into turns chance an energizing function.... But this is not chance.'300 exponentially, Moreover at the zero-point of chance, wouldn't

this point be paradoxically

an

from infinite divergence from? convergence which springs originary

I ibid, p. 61, quotation from Borges, Labyrinths, p. 59 297ibid, p. 59 1 ibid. 2" ibid, p.60 300JeanBaudrillard (1990, orig. 1979) Seduction,trans, B. Singer.New York: St Martins Press,p. 145

98 Conclusion

Deleuze's conception of singularities and events are in a precarious position. As a They the they are precisely part physics. of an unresolved exist at whim metaphysics determination Deleuze's ' If the `quasi-physics. turn to of of general method we of a the transcendental field then we notice that, as we saw in chapter 1, a higher-order logic is involved. Deleuze derives this method from Bergson. Indeed, one can but is in Aion the how the the quantitative actualised continuity of qualitative notice discontinuity

Bergson's f. duration Chronos (c. Bergson's general space). and of

in degree different is they treated that when as phenomena are philosophy of critique is determine kind. in Consequently true to different method of stage one are really difference in kind, for example, duration and space. This provides us with certain dualisms. But, as Deleuze tells us in his description of the Bergsonian method in Bergsonism, the next stage of method is to put the dualism `back together again: ' '30' lead the to of a monism. re-formation a moment, must only which ... difference `lines' the is two A the is traced of How this performed? whereupon plane `Dualism is

in kind intersect in a point. Deleuze describes this process thus:

beyond in "lines" have followed the turn the we each of when ... intersect they the at which point experience, we must also rediscover in differ directions that the tendencies the cross and where again, where kind link together again to give rise to the thing as we know it. It might be thought that nothing is easier, and that experience itself has already have followed it is After But that. this we point. as us not as simple given the lines of divergence beyond the turn, these lines must intersect again, but the rather at a virtual point, at a point at which we started, at not is itself located beyond departure, image the the of point of which virtual 302 in turn experience....

We can now locate the source of the higher-order logic. It is to be found in the transcendental field of the virtual (which provides the conditions of actual is This lies. For the the virtual point (or paradoxical where problem experience). located field from is the transcendental on also which it derives its principle. entity)

301Deleuze,Bergsonisni,p. 29 302ibid, p. 28

99 That is, the paradoxical entity is itself treated as part of the higher order logic and indeed, constitutes it. Could a method be constructed that doesn't make this error?

There is one aspect of the Bergsonian method that requires further explication: in by begin Let this example as aid an will us providing us problems and solutions. 303 light. is Bergson tells us that the eye the solution to the problem of our discussion. The solution-problem has its own limits or flame. for example, the speed of light, its limits However, insect. this different in within or such as mammalian species eyes both the the that to problem and solution are extent seems perfect solution-problem but be How the the the anything solution of eye could same plane. on organised light? However, the problem remains of how problems themselves are organised in ideal in locates Deleuze the have terms they We that of game; problems seen general. Let by in turn the terms the entity. us paradoxical posed of question are organised ideal Baudrillard's the to game: critique of once more

They are Games are not to be confused with "becoming".... by to their capacity reproduce of chance, even when games characterised, indefinite in terms the number of an same a given arbitrary constellation times. Their true form is cyclical or recurrent. And as such they, and they its by definite the to principle not causality and stop alone, put a in dispersal introduction (which the only results series of random massive its its fragments, to not overcoming) and reduction scattered of causality, by the potential return (the eternal return if one will) to an orderly, but form [... ] it is [... ] the the ritual a of eternal return conventional situation in as games, of an arbitrary and non-causal recurrence, willed the next relentlessly, as out of signs, where each sign seeks configuration in the course of a ceremonial. 3°4

Baudrillard's main point is that he views gamesas being of a ritual form as opposed here. In Difference and issues form. There stake Deleuze's at are many to aleatory Repetition Deleuze defined the true eternal return as the return of the different, or He being becoming. is the tells that as us repetition of what essential precisely, more

"3 Henri Bergson (1983 orig. 1911) Creative Evolution, trans. A. Mitchell. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, see pp. 53-62

304JeanBaudrillard (1990, orig. 1979) Seduction,trans, B. Singer. New York: St Martins Press,pp. 146-7.Does the ritual form entail someform of mysticism? It is perhapstrue that in mystical in form is does but the encountered a particularly not constitute ritual pure state mysticism experience the ritual form. It is simply the casethat mysticism is already basedaroundritual (a ceremonial).

100 to heterogeneous series is not the repetition of samenessor identity but of differences whether small or large. In the preface of Difference and Repetition Deleuze found it's exemplary form in Borges' short story Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote. Let us return to this story once more. In this story we are told that the character Menard sets himself the task of writing the Quixote. But this is not a case of re-writing Cervantes' Quixote in the context of the twentieth century but of actually writing The Quixote. Menard succeeds in writing several fragments. To make a comparison between them Cervantes' original text reads:

truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository of deeds, ... witness of the past, exemplar and advisor to the present, and the future's 305 counsellor.

Instead,Menard's version reads:

is history, rival of time, depository of deeds, truth, whose mother ... witness of the past, exemplar and advisor to the present,and the future's 306 counsellor. The narrator tells us that when he read these fragments, although they were exactly the same as Cervantes' text, their meaning seemed infinitely different and `richer. ' Deleuze takes this to mean that repetition presents us with a `maximum

of

difference. ' But Deleuze seems to have missed another possible explanation here. The reason a difference is perceived in the two books is because both Quixote's are original compositions. To understand this we must turn to how Menard composes his work. He first decides to `become' Cervantes: `Know Spanish well, recover the Catholic faith, fight against the Moors or the Turk, forget the history of Europe between the years 1602 and 1918.... '307But this method proves unsatisfactory, it is not a case of actualising the `singularities' of Cervantes. Instead he turns to a strange ritual method: `He multiplied draft upon draft, revised tenaciously and tore up

305Jorge Luis Borges (1999) `Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote, ' in Collected Fictions, trans. A Hurley. London: Penguin, p. 94

306 ibid.

307Borges,Labyrinths, p. 66

101 thousands of manuscript pages.'308 Through this method he produces several fragments of the Quixote. This process is very similar in nature to Bergson's example developing the eye as a solution to the problem of light although following very of different evolutionary paths. The same unique solution exists for the same unique problem. This could be called a `ritual series.'

Definition:

Singularity is the repetition of the same unique solution for the same

uniqueproblem How does this definition

of singularity relate to Deleuze's notion? For after all

Deleuzian singularity is also a composition of uniqueness. However when we turn to problems and solutions in Deleuze we find they are regulated by the paradoxical in However, our definition above there is no need for any mediation because entity. the two are in parallel. In fact any form of constituting factor between them would simply add something extraneous to the process.

Perhaps the most fundamental problem-solution involves the thematic of individuation:

the individual

is the problem of the world. We find that on the

contrary in The Logic of Sense, Deleuze defines the individual as the actualisation of a specific set of singularities. From this he derives a theatre of the individual. The individual may will their singularities well or badly. Here Deleuze's own theory of disappearance (or becoming imperceptible) comes into play. The person who wills their singularities

in such a way as to embody them performs a `counter-

actualisation. ' They will their own destiny: amorfati.

But it seems that this has still

not reached the eternal return of the ritual form. All ritual is theatre but not all theatre is ritual. From the point of view of the ritual form it matters neither way whether one badly (psychological types), it is all part of the ritual. This involves well or acts a critique of Deleuze's conception of singularity. As soon as one submits singularities to a theory of energetics, the ritual form of singularity is lost. Moreover, is not the type of organisation required not already hinted at by Simplicius' paradox the unilateral organisational principle of place is abolished in the determination of an

308ibid. p. 70

102 individual as something rather than not-something. Of course the next philosopher who will define singularity as individual uniqueness and in terms of position will be Leibniz.

103

Chapter 3

The Art of Leibniz

104 Introduction

The Thesis

In this chapter we will argue that due to his commitment to materialism Deleuze fails to grasp the theory of singularity in Leibniz's fundamental concept of the monad. In this we oppose Deleuze's association of matter with a physical principle to a ritual theatre of matter. However this task is made all the more difficult in that we will also argue that Deleuze's reading of Leibniz in The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque is one of the most contemporary and inclusive to date that re-establishes the scope of Leibniz's work as The Renaissance philosopher. As Deleuze will state at the end of his study: `we all remain Leibnizian.... '309 To attempt this task it will first be beneficial to gain an orientation on Deleuze's study within the context of his own philosophy and then within the context of current Leibniz research.

The Problem

In the first instanceDeleuze's later work on Leibniz seemsto be a capitulation on his project of a philosophy of difference. For in Difference and Repetition Deleuze will criticise Leibniz for drawing representation into the infinite:

infinite representation does not free itself from the principle of identity ... as presupposition of representation.... Infinite representation invokes a foundation. While this foundation is not the identical itself, it is nevertheless a way of taking the principle of representation particularly seriously, giving it an infinite value and rendering it coextensive with the 310 in it itself. this and to whole, manner allowing reign over existence

However, in The Fold this criticism is not to be found and insteadDeleuze statesthe following:

Leibniz draws identity into infinity: the Identical is an auto-position of

309Deleuze,TheFold." Leibniz and the Baroque, 137 p. 310Deleuze,Difference and Repetition, p. 49

105 the infinite, without which identity would remain hypothetical.... The principle of identity - or rather, of contradiction - is only the cry of the Identicals. It cannot be an abstraction. It is a signal. Identicals are undefinables in themselves and exist perhaps beyond our ken; they have, 31 less, here. that the principle makes us aware of or able to no a criterion Has there been a re-evaluation in Deleuze's position on Leibniz? In Lang Baker's recent study `The Cry of the Identicals: The problem of inclusion in Deleuze's Leibniz, ' he argues this in the negative in that the original criticism has not of reading been withdrawn but has been tackled in a new way. 312However, while we agree with Baker's basic approach there also seems to be another difference in Deleuze's later work: if the criticism of representation against Leibniz's philosophy of difference is withdrawn it is because Deleuze has himself found a new use for the concept of representation, or just as importantly, representation never functioned in Leibniz's philosophy as was originally portrayed in Difference and Repetition. We shall argue that the reason behind Deleuze's later approach is not wholly based on a developed notion of inclusion in the monad, as Baker presents the issue, but is based on the more fundamental idea that Deleuze is no longer treating Leibniz's philosophy as a but as an art. Our perspective on this issue, while not specifically metaphysics, addressed in recent Deleuze scholarship is perhaps not as contentious as it first seems when we consider the actual title of Deleuze's work: The Fold. - Leibniz and the Baroque. Of course this also leads to one of the main problems of reading The Fold: while some of its statements may be in the register of an art, other statements may well be in the register of a philosophy. In this way what Deleuze will say of Leibniz in one of his lectures at Vincennes can also be applied to his own text:

I'd say that his system is rather like a pyramid. Leibniz's great system has several levels. None of these levels is false, these levels symbolise each other, and Leibniz is the first great philosopher to conceive of activity and thought as a vast symbolisation. Thus all these levels symbolise, but they are more or less close to what we could provisionally call the absolute [... ] It's complicated because, in my opinion, one can never rely on a Leibniz text if one has not first discerned the system level to which

311Deleuze,TheFold, pp. 43-44 312Lang Baker (1995) `The Cry of the Identicals: The problem of inclusion in Deleuze's reading of Leibniz,' Philosophy Today, Summer,p. 199

106 this text corresponds, 313

Let us now turn to how the position of an art is developedin Deleuze in more detail. The Art of Deleuze To be sure a re-evaluation of representation is already to be found in The Logic of Sense:

There is

"use" of representation, without which representation would a ... remain lifeless and senseless [... ] such use is not defined through a function of representation in relation to the represented, nor even through representativeness as the form of possibility [... ] use is in the relation between representation and something extra-representative, a non314 represented and merely expressed entity. The idea of a `use' of representation has certain echoes with the Parmenidean doxa which can follow the path of not-being (which we touched on in Chapter 1). Deleuze will himself see this as a link between representation and the event, that is, there can be a representation or symbolisation of the event although this will ultimately be part of a unifying logic. In this sense Deleuze will describe Leibniz as being `[t]he first theoretician of alogical incompatibilities,

and for this reason the first important

of the event.... '315 The logics of such systems is akin to the 316 correspondences of astrology.

theoretician

However these ideas do not in themselves signify a shift in Deleuze's association of representation with identity. The place where we do find a fundamentalchangein his ontological position is in his re-working of the processof realisation into the theory of expression:`The world is a virtuality that is actualisedin but souls, or also a possibility that must be realisedin matter or in bodies.'317 monads In contrast we may look at the position originally presented in Difference and 313Gilles Deleuze(1980) `Leibniz Lecture 1,' trans. C. J. Stivale, 4, p. available from www.webdeleuze.com 314Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 146 315ibid. p. 171

316ibid., we may also add the correspondence systemsof the Hermetics,RaymonLull and the Kabbaliststo this list, which we will be coming to shortly. 317Deleuze,TheFold, p. 107

107 Repetition:

to the extent that the possible is open to `realisation, ' it is understood ... is image the the supposed to resemble the real, while real of as an possible.... Any hesitation between the virtual and the possible ... is disastrous, since it abolishes the reality of the virtual [... ] This hesitation between the possible and the virtual explains why no one has gone further than Leibniz in the exploration of sufficient reason, and why, nevertheless, no one has maintained the illusion of a subordination of that 318 identical. sufficient reason to the

Perhapsa casemay be made that Deleuze is just expressingLeibniz's views and not his own in the former quotation from The Fold. However what we do find in Deleuze's work from the time of Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation via the Cinema books up to What is Philosophy? is a an approachto art that precisely relies 319 find in What We this theory this explication of an notion of possibility. revised on is Philosophy? where Deleuze and Guattari propose that thought confronts the infinite in three different ways: i) in philosophy through the concept, ii) in science through the function, and iii) in art through the percept. We shall turn to the concept but in let function the the next chapter us now examinethe percept. and What is a Percent? For Deleuzeand Guattari the percept is connectedto the work of art: What is preserved- the thing or the work of art - is a bloc of sensations, that is to say, a compoundof percepts and affects. Perceptsare no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who experience them. Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strengthof those who undergothem. Sensations,percepts,and affects are beings whose validity lies in themselvesand exceedsany lived [... ] The

318Deleuze,Difference and Repetition, pp. 212-3

31 Gilles Deleuze (2001 orig. 1981) Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, translated with an introduction by Daniel W. Smith Minneapolis: University if Minnesota Press; Gilles Deleuze (1992 orig. 1983) Cinema 1: The Movement Image, trans. H. Tomlinson & B. Habberjam. London: Athlone; Gilles Deleuze (1989 orig. 1985) Cinema H: The Time Image, trans. H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta. London: Athlone; Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari (1994, orig. 1991) What is Philosophy?, trans. G. Burchell and H. Tomlinson. London: Verso

108 320 it itself. in is being of sensationand nothing else; exists work of art a From a materialist perspective the work of an has the same being as any other thing, 32' in inorganic: be ' `They the absence of man.... could said to exist organic or However this gives art a very special characteristic: possibility. In the sense that the is `dormant' it is not a virtuality work of art

that has the same reality in its

but is open to realisation: actualisation

These universes are neither virtual or actual; they are possible, the possible as aesthetic category..., the existence of the possible, whereas eventsare the reality of the virtual, forms of a thought-Naturethat survey 322 in its possible universe.... every possible universe ... a sensationexists How does one create a possible universe? It is a wresting of the percept `from in framing the the the subject' resulting of objects and state of perceiving perceptions 324 323 idea ' The landscapes bloc Percepts `nonhuman of sensation. of nature. are of a Guattari in important flaming for Deleuze terms takes and not only on an meaning of in but `frame' terms of a constructive process. the the of work of art also of Sensations are pure becomings that are framed in the work of art in the sense of a framework or house. The framework or house is itself a construction on a plane of 325 it back becoming In this way that the to the relates of universe. composition Deleuze and Guattari propose that `[a]rt begins the house. That is why with ... 326 is first On the method of construction of the frame the the of arts. architecture Deleuze and Guattari tell us:

The artist creates blocs of percepts and affects, but the only law of is its that the on compound must stand up own. The artist's creation difficulty is to make it stand up on its own. Sometimes this greatest is, from the viewpoint of an implicit model, from the what requires lived of viewpoint perceptions and affections, great geometrical

320Deleuze& Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 164 321 ibid.

322ibid. p. 177-8 " ibid. p. 167 324ibid. p. 169

'u ibid. pp. 179-180 326ibid. p. 186

109 improbability, physical imperfection, and organic abnormality.327 In its extraction from perception the work of art must be built in an entirely contrary existence. In order for it to be enduring 328 it is literal 'monument. Another takes component a sense: a on very construction

fashion in order to give it individual

house in is (even the this expressionism where abstract resemblance construction of becomes landscape) although it is not an imitation, an analogy or an identification, but

instead a `produced resemblance'329 or

monumental

resemblance. The

becomings it but functions between the the extracts not art and work of resemblance between the house and the universe and in this sense the work of art may be likewise Leibniz's be Deleuze to the of will a symbol say of or as world considered `... Leibniz's be philosophy must conceived as the allegory of the world, philosophy: We shall now explore how Deleuze's approach to the signature of the world.... 1,330 Leibniz fits in with current Leibniz studies.

The Leibniz Literature

The General Science is simply the science of what is universally thinkable in so far as it is such. This includes not only what has hitherto been regarded as logic, but also the art of discovery, together with method or the means of arrangement, synthesis and analysis, didactics, or the science of teaching, Gnostologica (the so-called Noologia), the art of reminiscence or mnemonics, the art of characters or of symbols, The Art of Combination, the Art of Subtlety, and philosophical grammar; the Art of Lull, the Cabbala of the wise, and natural magic. Perhaps it also 331 includesontology....

During the twentieth century there was a picture painted of Leibniz in which his logic. his direct This enduring image was seen was as a consequenceof metaphysics first set forth in the influential studies of Bertrand Russell and Louis Couturat.332

327ibid. p. 164 328ibid. 329ibid. p. 173 330Deleuze,TheFold, p. 127 331Leibniz (1679) An Introduction to a SecretEncyclopaedia,in Leibniz, G. W. (1995, orig. 1934) Philosophical Writings, ed. G. H. R. Parkinson,trans. M. Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson.London: Everyman,p. 5, hereafterdenotedas Philosophical Writings. 332Bertrand Russell(1992, orig. 1900)A Critical Exposition the Philosophy of Leibniz, with an of

110 However as the Leibniz archives at Leipzig have been progressively catalogued and made available this point of view has been progressively challenged. Or more precise, Leibniz's metaphysics may be based on his logic but this logic is certainly not of the sterile analytic interpretation often associated with Aristotelian 'subjectpredicate' logic. One of the first studies to directly challenge this view is Frances Yates' study The Art of Memory. 333Yates places Leibniz at the end of a lineage that transmitted the `art of memory' from the mediaevalist Raymon Lull (a contemporary of Aquinas) by way of the Renaissance heretic Giordano Bruno. 334The art of memory originates in pre-Socratic Greece with the poet Simonides of Ceos who is reported to remember the places of the guests at a banquet whom are crushed when the roof falls in. 335It is the technique of using places (such as a house or a theatre) and images (mnemonics) to aid memory. As David Stevenson sums up this practice:

In its most common forms, the art of memory had an architectural framework. To memorise a speech,the practitioner createdin his mind a complex building with many rooms, furnished with imagesor symbols in set locations. He then moved mentally through this building on a fixed route, assigningeachidea in his speechin turn to one of the images..."336 This technique was transformed by Raymon Lull when he used it as the basis of a 337 for God. The occult Renaissance Names the neo-Platonic combinatory system of brought finally fruition by Giordano Bruno who combined Lullism with to was Hermeticism338:

appendixof leading passages.London: Routledge,p. ix; Louis Couturat (1994, orig. 1902) `On Leibniz's Metaphysics,' in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Critical Assessments, ed, R. S. Woolhouse. London: Routledge,Vol. I, p. 1, translation of `Sur la m8taphysiquede Leibniz, ' Revuede metaphysiqueet de morale, 1902,10 333FrancisYates (1966) TheArt of Memory. London: Routledgeand Kegan Paul 334ibid. pp. 379-89 33sibid. pp. 1-2

336D. Stevenson (1988) The First Freemasons: Scotland's Early Lodges and Their Members. Aberdeen: University Press, p. 291

"' Yates(1966) pp. 173-198 338The Hermetic writings are Platonic mystico-religious texts usually datedaround 200AD, originating in Egypt, and attributed to the God HermesTrismegistus.Plotinus' teacherAmmonius Saccasis reportedto have taught Hermeticism, seeWalter Scott (a and trans.X1993) Hermetica. Boston: Shambhala,pp. 1-16

111 Mediaeval man was allowed to use his low faculty of imagination to form his it help his to to a concession was memory; corporeal similitudes he has divine believes Hermetic Renaissance that powers; man weakness. he can form a magic memory through which he grasps the world, 339 divine his in divine the microcosm of mens. macrocosm reflecting the Recent scholarship has questioned whether there is a direct link between Leibniz and 340 Nevertheless, what is certain is that Yates brought attention to the fact that Bruno. Leibniz's philosophy attempted a synthesis of many different streams of thought his in his find if be the tried to motivation of system missed one simply which would logic. Subsequently there have been many different studies over the past twenty years his in historical have the philosophy was produced: which context that examined Laurence McCullough, J. A. Cover, and John O'Leary-Hawthorne

have studied the

influence of the Scholastics on Leibniz's university dissertation thesis Disputatio Metaphysica

de Principio

Individui

in his later its presence continued and

341Christia Mercer has examined the influence of a Christian-orientated philosophy; 342 Leipzig; Catherine during Leibniz's at Platonism pervasive years university Wilson has explored the associations between Leibniz and the pansophics J. H. Alsted and John Bisterfield

who expounded Lullism

and also the Cambridge

Platonists Henry More, Ralph Cudworth and Anne Conway, for whom all had a 343 Coudert have Allison in Stuart Brown similarly and common; theory of monads Kabbalists Francis Mercury Christian Leibniz's the associations van with studied 3'" be We Christian Knorr Rosenroth. Helmont and shall utilising the ideas of von many of these scholars throughout this chapter.

However, while the aim all these studies is to restore a `true' picture of the historical Leibniz there is a certain sense in which the relevance of Leibniz's

339Yates (1966), p. 172 30 Allison Coudert (1998) `Leibniz and the Kabbalah, ' in Leibniz, Mysticism and Religion, eds. A. Coudert, R. Popkin and G. Weiner. London: Kluwer, p. 72 341Lawrence McCullough (1996) Leibniz on Individuals and Individuation. London: Kluwer Academic Publishers; J. A. Cover and J. O'Leary-Hawthorne (1999) Substance and Individuation in Leibniz. Cambridge: University Press 342Christia Mercer (2001) Leibniz's Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development. Cambridge: University Press

343CatherineWilson (1989) Leibniz's Metaphysics:A historical and comparativestudy. Manchester: University Press 344StuartBrown (1998) `SomeOccult Influenceson Leibniz's Monadology,' in Leibniz, Mysticism Kluwer Coudert, A. P. (1995) London: Academic Leibniz Kabbalah. 1-21; the Religion, and pp. and Publishers

112 is still rooted in the past. As Russell stated: `I felt - as many others have philosophy felt - that the Monadology was a kind of fantastic fairy tale, coherent perhaps, but wholly arbitrary. '345In fact perhaps the only recent philosophical advocate of Leibniz in the English speaking world is Alfred North Whitehead whose work is probably even less well known than that of Leibniz. This situation however is very different in French philosophy in the twentieth century where Leibniz's ideas played a prominent role in the pan-psychic and bio-philosophical approach of Raymond Ruyer and more recently in the mathematical and scientific writings of Michel Serres.3' It is these authors who provide precedence for Deleuze's The Fold.

The Great Experiment

One may only hint at the relish in which Deleuze tackles the philosophy of Leibniz in The Fold, his last monograph on a figure in the `history of philosophy. ' In Deleuze's Leibniz lecture series at Vincennes in 1980 he will state: `I want to present this Or at the end of The Fold Deleuze will author [Leibniz] and have you love him.... 9347 finish with the sentence `... we all remain Leibnizian because what always matters is folding, unfolding, refolding. '348Deleuze may call Spinoza the `prince' or `Christ' of philosophers but Leibniz is the great experimenter. It was perhaps only in the Renaissance mind of Leibniz where art, philosophy, science, logic and mathematics could all come together in equal measures. As such The Fold could be seen as an experiment in Deleuze's philosophy preceding the concatenation of art, philosophy, science and logic in What is Philosophy?. The key to Deleuze's experiment is the notion of the fold. The fold is itself presented as a key to explore the notion of the Baroque. The Baroque is in turn the figure of the labyrinth where thought confronts the infinite. As we have been arguing the way in which we must approach The Fold is not in terms of the concept but in terms of the percept. The fold is the fundamental percept of the Baroque. In this our approach is somewhat different to another recent

345Russell(1992) p. xvii

346Cf. R. Ruyer (1950) La conscience et le corps. Paris: PUF; R. Ruyer (1952) Neofinalisme. Paris: PUF; R. Ruyer (1958) La genese desformes vivante. Paris: Flammarion; and M. Serres (1982) Le Systeme de Leibniz et ses Modeles Mathematiques. Paris: PUF

34'Deleuze,`Leibniz Lecture 1,' p. 1 343Deleuze,TheFold, p. 137

113 study of The Fold: Alain Badiou's `Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. '349 Badiou will

take Deleuze's approach to the fold and apply it to

Deleuze's philosophy itself:

Deleuze wants and creates a philosophy "of' nature, or rather a philosophy as nature. This can be understood as a description in thought of the life of the world, such that the life thus described might include, as one of its living gestures, the description itself. I do not use lightly the word life. The concepts of flux, desire, fold, are captors of life, descriptive traps that thought sets for the living world and the present 350 world.

Badiou's interpretation seemsnothing less than a confusion betweenthe percept and the concept. The percept as a resemblanceor symbol of the world certainly has the descriptive ability that Badiou suggestsbut the concept is not a possibility open to realisation and has no properties of resemblanceas Deleuze will define it. One may question whether Deleuze actually achievesthis but this is not a fault of his method per se. On the other hand the criticism we may follow up is whether the percept undermineshis philosophy. That is, does the re-introduction of possibility alert us to an originary disequilibrium in Deleuze's system?Have all the faults of representation that were unceremoniouslyjettisoned in Difference in Repetition beenre-concededin an innocuousform? Or will the simulacrum return, rise up and take its revenge?

349Alain Badiou (1994) 'Gilles Deleuze, TheFold. Leibniz " and the Baroque,' trans. T. Sowley, in C. Boundasand D. Olkowski (eds.) Gilles Deleuzeand the Theatre Philosophy. London: Routiedge, of pp. 51-69

iSo ibid. p. 63

114

1. Three Great Points

This section is divided into two parts. In the first part we shall follow Deleuze's progression to Leibniz 's concept of the monad. In the second part we shall explore

the constitution of the monad in more detail. The New Ate

The Baroque refers not to an essencebut rather to an operative function, to a trait. It endlessly produces folds. It does not invent things: there are all kinds of folds coming from the East, Greek, Roman, Romanesque, Gothic, Classical folds.... Yet the Baroquetrait twists and turns its folds, pushing them to infinity, fold over fold, one upon the other. The Baroque fold unfurls all the way to infinity. 35' For Deleuze the Baroque fold is the alliance of art and mathematics. It comes about through two new innovations: a new model of perception and the mathematical calculus. Firstly the Baroque notion of perception rejects the standard Platonic or Cartesian idea that truth and objects are perceived through illumination, by shining light on the matter: `Contrary to Descartes, Leibniz begins in darkness.'352Instead of the light of the sun the Baroque begins with a dark seething mass from which forms and objects are abstracted or projected. Deleuze will liken this process to film noir figures emerging from the shadows an art that can be seen in recent times in the films of David Lynch. 353The Baroque model of perception leads to an obvious but quite startling conclusion: `Every perception is hallucinatory because perception has '354 Perception is very much a construction and a habituation. Secondly, the object. no Leibnizian calculus provides the Baroque understanding with a new conception of the infinite. The first thing to understand about the infinite is that spatially speaking it not only applies to that which is larger than is conceivable but equally applies to that which is also smaller than is conceivable. These two aspects of the infinite can be

331Deleuze,TheFo14 p. 3 352ibid, p. 90 35'Especially in the film Lost Highway where the first segmentplays out in either shifting near darknessor under the surveillance of light. The highway sequencesare also strongly reminiscentof Deleuze'stheoriesin TheFold: `the sealedcar speedingdown the dark highway,' p. 137 354ibid, p. 93

115 seen in the thought of Nicholas of Cusa and Zeno's paradoxes respectively. Nicholas idea infinitely Cusa the use will of an expanded circle to demonstrate the nature of of God. If the radius of a circle were expanded infinitely then the curvature of the circle would flatten out to the limit point of a straight line. In this way Nicholas of Cusa will argue that everything is enfolded within the straight line of God. In contrast Zeno's infamous paradox of Achilles and the tortoise will show the effect of an infinitely divisible matter. If the tortoise starts the race at point A ahead of Achilles, then for Achilles to catch up with the tortoise he must first reach point A, but by this time the tortoise will have moved to point B, by the time Achilles has reached point B the tortoise will have reached point C. In fact Achilles will never be able to catch up with the tortoise and the tortoise acts as a limit point which Achilles will draw closer and closer to but never reach. For the first time the calculus provided a concrete way to conceive of the infinite as a limit in the form of a tangent or rate of change (the relation of two objects whose velocities are uniformly variable). Deleuze will utilise these new conceptions to explore the percept of the fold. The fold is itself framed by the notion of a Baroque house.

The Baroque House

The basis of the Baroque houseis to be found in the differentiation betweenbuilding and landscapewhich is embodied in the structure of the Baroque house itself. The Baroquehouseis composedof two floors. The top floor is an enclosedchamberfilled with the `folds of the soul' and approximatesmost closely with Leibniz's idea of the monad - without windows. The ground floor however is more mysterious still, it consistsof rooms with windows but the windows do not provide an opening from the inside to the outside but from an exterior onto another exterior. These are the pleats of matter. Matter and soul form two very different types of labyrinth. For Leibniz matter has the characteristicof infinite divisibility: Every portion of matter can be thought of as a gardenfull of plants, or as a pond full of fish. But every branch of the plant, every part of the animal, and every drop of its vital fluids, is another such garden, or another such pond. And although the earth and the air in between the plants in the garden,and the water in betweenthe fish in the pond, are not

116 themselves plants or fish, they do neverthelesscontain others, though 355 be imperceptible to us. usually they are so tiny as to The unit of division is the fold. As we may see in the above quotation, matter is like From a series of caverns, cavern within cavern. a perceptual viewpoint enfolded it is as if at the hypothetical last cavern one may found a `quale' of colour itself. Leibniz will say that matter is organised through two forces. In the first instance logic fold. is, is infinitely That divisible is to the this a of matter according although it cannot be infinitely divisible in itself or by the atom as it would have no cohesion or continuity:

initially fluid, is full think which should matter we space as of of ... capable of every sort of division and indeed actually divided and it is how divisible infinity; difference, but that to this and subdivided with divided varies from place to place, becauseof variations in the extent to which the movements in it are more or less harmonious. That is what brings it about that matter has everywheresomedegreeof rigidity as well as fluidity, and that no body is either hard or fluid in the ultimate degreewe find in it no invincibly hard atoms and no massthat can be divided as 356 in in easily any manneras any other. Neither fluid nor rigid the first principle of the fold is `elasticity' and in this way both the problems of cohesion and continuity are solved. In the second instance although for Leibniz the elastic force of matter furnishes us with the mechanical laws of nature it is not itself enough to explain the organisation of organic matter: `... the laws of mechanism by themselves could not form an animal where there is nothing already organised.'357Here Leibniz is dealing with a common debate in seventeenth century His between body. the relation position on this debate is soul and philosophy: immediately against the Cartesians for whom matter is simply mechanical. 358

1s5Leibniz (1714), Monadology, §67-68, in G. W. Leibniz (1998) Philosophical Texts,trans. and ed. R. S. Woolhouseand R. Francks.Oxford: University Press,p. 277, hereafterdenotedas Philosophical Texts. 356G. W. Leibniz (1996, orig. 1704) New Essayson Human Understanding, eds. P. Remnantand J. Bennett.Cambridge:University Press,p. 59-60 33'Leibniz (1969, orig. 1705) Considerations vital Principles on and Plastic Natures, by the author of the SystemofPre-established Harmony, in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1969) Philosophical Papers and Letters, a selectiontrans. and ed., with an Introduction by L. E. Loemker. Dordrecht: Reidel, p. 589, hereafterdenotedas Philosophical Papers 358Seeespeciallythe article Nature Itself, " or, TheInherent Force and Activity of Created Things-

117 However, as Deleuze points out Leibniz's problem with the Cartesians is not for for but mechanism not being mechanical enough: espousing

it is not because living matter exceeds mechanical processes, but ... because mechanisms are not sufficient to be machines. A mechanism is faulty not for being too artificial to account for living matter, but for not being mechanical enough, for not being adequately machined. Our mechanisms are in fact organised into parts that are not in themselves machines, while the organism is infinitely machined, a machine whose 359 is every part or piece a machine ....

Leibniz expressesthe idea that organisms are organised according to a second principle of the fold: plasticity. It is important to distinguish here betweenLeibniz's his More, in the those natures contemporaries of plastic work of use and presented Cudworth, and von Helmont who used plastic naturesas an immaterial principle 360 For Leibniz, the immaterial, that is, the monad, can have no affect on or be affected by matter and henceplastic forces are solely a material phenomenon: if matter is arranged by divine wisdom, it must be essentially organised ... throughout and that there must be machines in the parts of the natural machine into infinity, so many enveloping structures and so many organic bodies enveloped, one within the other, that one can never produce any organic body entirely anew and without any preformation, nor any more destroy entirely an animal which already exists this preformation and ... this infinitely complex organism provide me with material plastic 361

natures....

The organism always exists in some form whether this be a seed or egg which 362 in life in death To be sure Leibniz's approachto matter and enfolds again unfolds is preset by his responseto the soul/body debate in the form of his theory of preharmony as set out in the New Systemof the Nature of Substancesand established their Communication,and of the Union which Exists betweenthe Soul and Body.363

Confirming and Illustrating the Author's Dynamics, in Philosophical Texts,pp. 209-222 's9 Deleuze,TheFold, p. 8 360SeeWilson (1989), especially Chapter 5, pp. 159-202 36'Leibniz (1705) Considerationson Vital Principles and Plastic Natures, in Philosophical Papers, p. 589 It is tempting to useDNA as a limited exampleof suchan idea. 363Leibniz (1694) in Philosophical Texts, pp. 143-152

118 That is, Leibniz sees soul and body as being completely separate but they both progress in harmony as if governed by the same clock. However, if soul and body are completely separate then how does one progress from the labyrinth of matter to the labyrinth of the soul? Leibniz will say that due to the `infinite' nature of God he can but choose and create the best possible world, that is continuity in the folds of matter that fills up the most space without gaps and absolute freedom in the folds of the soul. To move from one to the other we shall require a further explication of the notion of a limit and the mathematics of the fold.

Calculus of the Fold Martial Gueroult tells us in his study `Space, Point, and Void in Leibniz's Philosophy' that Leibniz distinguishesbetweenthree different kinds of points.364He summarisestheseas follows:

(i) the metaphysicalpoint, which is unextendedsubstance;it is exact and real; (ii) the mathematical point, which is the point of view from which each substanceexpressesthe universe; it is exact, but unreal - it is a modality or an aspectof real terms; and (iii) the physical point, which is the restriction of the parts of corporeal substancessuch that they appear as a point - this latter is not rigorously a point, but an infinitely small extension;it is real, but inexact.365 In The Fold Deleuze will use the same distinctions as Gueroult. The physical point is the elastic or plastic point fold which is inexact or perhaps `non-local' as it can be infinitely divided. The mathematical point is exact to the extent that it acts as a limit (as in the extremum of a line) and defines position or point of view but is

ideal determination of a body. The metaphysicalpoint is that which an nevertheless occupiespoint of view. Deleuze will term these `thepoint of inflection, the point of 366 the inclusion' point of position, and respectively. It is the mathematicsof the fold that links thesepoints together.

164M. Gueroult (1982, orig. 1946) `Space, Point, and Void in Leibniz's Philosophy' in Hooker, M. Leibniz: Critical and Interpretive essays. Manchester: University Press, pp. 284-301

365ibid, p. 290 366Deleuze,TheFold, p. 23

119 Deleuze begins with the physical point of inflection: `Inflection is the ideal is fold. Inflection the the the atom, authentic curve or of variable element genetic lead back is inflection? ' So Here to the notion of are we what an elastic point. form in its find `purest' the theory as of singularity singularity and perhaps where we Deleuze will present it in his Leibniz lectures:

longer is is discovery [The] that singularity no great mathematical ... thought in relation to the universal, but is thought rather in relation to the is The to the or regular. singular what exceeds the ordinary and ordinary the regular. And saying that already takes us a great distance since saying it indicates that, henceforth, we wish to make singularity into a 367 philosophical concept.

To demonstratethe idea of singularity Deleuzeprovides the example of a square.The four (its has singular comers or vertices) as opposed to the regular points square is However, imagine its the really a square compose sides. points which we could figure for is figure. its The The ' `extreme. a rectilinear square vertices are continuous determining But identify its the it is to singularities. or easy extrema which differential is difficult. For to this need make use of we of curves more singularities Let us consider a simple curve: calculus.

ýý The singularity or extremum of this figure will be the point A- the unique point of the curve where dy/dx or the rate of changechangessign. That is, this is where the ' In Leibniz following lectures `inflects. formula for Deleuze the the provides curve mathematicalsingularity: is a distinct or determinedpoint on a curve, it's a point in a singularity ... the neighbourhoodof which the differential relation changesits sign, and

36' Gilles Deleuze(1980) `Leibniz Lecture 2, ' trans. C. J. Stivale, p. 5, availablefrom www.webdeleuze.com

120 the singular point's characteristic is to extend [prolonger] itself into the whole series of ordinary points that depend on it all the way to the neighbourhood of subsequent singularities. So I maintain that the theory of singularities is inseparable from a theory of an activity of extension [prolongemont]. 368 In The Fold Deleuze draws on the mathematician Bernard Cache to describe three 369 Tie fold: transformations the and projective variable. of vectorial, mathematical first transformation changes the `direction' of the inflected line producing at two possible extremes symmetrical

folds. The second transformation

projects the

inflection onto a plane thereby producing `exterior' folds from the now original interior folds. The third transformation submits the inflected line to the form of an infinitely multiplying

variable curve (most famously known through Mandelbrot's

fractals)

levels into a vortical form. At this point the inflection is no longer

fluctuated. In Deleuze but is infinitely this way will or projective or vectorial variable define the inflection as infinite variation.

How do modern ideas about inflection relate to Leibniz's conception?It was Nicholas of Cusa who first introduced the idea that if the radius of a circle was extended to infinity then it would be a straight line. That is, the `reason' of the curve is to be found in the straight line of God. Both Leibniz and Deleuze dispute the mathematical validity of this idea in that a straight line has a uniform variability. The situation is different when we consider irrational numbers (such as n) or the differential quotient. As Deleuze states: `The irrational number is the common limit between the two convergent series, of which one has no maximum and the relation of other no minimum. The differential

quotient is the common limit of the relation

between two quantities that are vanishing. '370In both these cases a straight line, the does limit the tangent, and not give the reason of the acts a simple and asymptote line. is, it That does Michel Serres not explain curved variability. suggests Leibniz following the solution: provides

Instead of seeking the unique straight tangent in a unique point for a

M ibid, p. 50 369Deleuze,TheFold, pp. 15-17 370ibid, p. 17

121 in tangent the curve an infinity of curve, we can go about seeking given points with an infinity of curves; the curve is not touched, it is touching, the tangent no longer either straight, unique, or touching, but now being 371 infinite, family. touched curvilinear, an Such a `curvilinear tangent' of the world would have a `single and unique variability' which provides the reason for the fold. The fold presents us with a new conception of 372 With Deleuze it ' `objectile, terms the object, or as as a modulation of matter. an the transformation of the object there is also a transformation of the subject as a point of view on variation:

We move from inflection or from variable curvature to vectors of curvature that go in the direction of concavity. Moving from a branching of inflection, we distinguish a point that is no longer what runs along inflection, nor is it the point of inflection itself; it is the one in which lines perpendicular to tangents meet in a state of variation. It is not exactly a point but a place.. 373 To describethis diagrammatically:

0

A

Pout of view

On any concave curve there are a potentially infinite number of points of view. It is perhaps only with the mathematical point that Deleuze's interpretation of Leibniz from distinctions differ the set up by Gueroult. In Gueroult's distinctions the will is point exact and unreal, that is, it is exact in ideal mathematical terms. mathematical

However for Deleuze the mathematicalpoint losesexactitude in becoming a place or differential viewpoint. The point of view does become exact in the special a site of but in this special casewe are no longer dealing with curve a closed or circle of case

"' ibid, pp. 18-19, Serres(1982), p. 197 3n ibid, p. 19 373ibid.

122 the mathematicalpoint but that which takes up point of view - the metaphysicalpoint or monad. On the level of the monad we find a `condition of closure' whereupon the is locus the of a convergent series.Deleuze's trajectory of the calculus of the monad fold has taken us `from inflection to inclusion.'374

Deleuze's Thesis

Having elaboratedthe mathematicsof the fold Deleuze will first raise his materialist thesis on Leibniz. This is posedin terms of where the principle of the fold is located: God producesthe world "before" creating souls since he createsthem for this world that he invests in them. In this way the law of infinite seriality, the "law of curvatures," no longer resides in the soul, although seriality 375 be it. be the may soul, and although curvaturesmay The point at stake is that if the monad can be deduced from a mathematical materialism then can it be maintained that it is fore-closed to the outside when it is from the outside we find the origin of its principle. To explore this further we will next turn to Deleuze's elaboration of the metaphysicalconstitution of the monad. Metaphysics of the Monad

So far we have seen the physical and mathematical application of the fold but the question now arises of how this relates to the folds in the soul, that is, the monad. Leibniz's own formulation of this is well known: `... the nature of an individual substanceor of a complete being is to have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to include, and to allow the deduction of, all the predicatesof the subject to which that notion is attributed.'376The logical form of this principle is that the predicate is included in the subject. We have already seen how Deleuze's calculus of the fold leadsfrom inflection to inclusion and Deleuzewill now apply this to the metaphysics of the fold:

374Deleuze,TheFold, p. 22 375ibid, p. 25 376Leibniz (1686) Discourse on Metaphysics, §8, in Philosophical Texts, 60 p.

123

Inflection is the event that happens to the line or to the point. Inclusion is line in inflection the the the that of or concept the predication places We be in is, that go this metaphysical. called that will other point point, from inflection to inclusion just as we move from the event of the thing " What "reading. from "seeing" to we see the to the predicate of notion, or is [... ] Sufficient in its reason concept or notion on the thing we read inclusion; in other words, the identity of the event and the predicate. Sufficient reason proclaims, "Everything has a concept! "37 is `nothing is there that the Leibniz For philosophical principle sufficient reason be the concept notion complete with as correlative and can seen a reason' without influx by be it be individual or to affected for an can neither complete substance level On its the have metaphysical predicates pre-established. accidents and already is fold: `If the called the an event Deleuze will use sufficient reason as principle of it be it happen, it the can event or makes what happens to a thing, whether undergoes its the is includes the predicates: as one of event that what reason sufficient said '378 Shortly on an analysis of embark the shall thing, the we or notion. of concept first be however it deduction through will the reason Deleuze's sufficient monad of Deleuze's this studies on other recent within to matter on approach set useful Leibniz.

Reason and Harmony

We may already seethat Deleuzetakes subject-predicatelogic to be an important part his falls this Leibniz. In that interpretation his this study part of very of we may see of (although Leibniz Couturat-Russell this tradition studies the setting of within much deeper level for fold the a of analysis). will provide within the elaboration of However, as we outlined in the introduction to this chapter the Couturat-Russell in increasingly been has coming under attack the Leibniz literature. Two tradition Mercer here by Wilson. Mercer those and studies are pertinent argues particularly is Leibniz's the philosophy to be found in a neo-Platonic that main motivation of

377Deleuze,TheFold, p. 41 373ibid, p. 42

124 379 From this perspective the subject-predicate logic is operating theory of emanation. from the position of a re-Platonised Aristotle. Wilson focuses on the fact that the is hence logic is from Leibniz's writings and erroneous mid-period subject-predicate to apply it to his later writings which operate according to `an ontology of individuals `an than of as a collection' ontology of events conceived of as a rather conceived 380 We shall now investigate these matters further by turning to Louis ' series. Couturat's central thesis on sufficient reason.

In the 1902 essay`On Leibniz's Metaphysics' Couturat draws support for his thesis that sufficient reason is derived from the subject-predicate logic by using the then recently discovered Leibnizian document which has come to be called First Truths. 381In this document Leibniz proceeds to the principle of sufficient reason in the following manner. He begins by defining truth in terms of a principle of identity: `First truths are those which predicate something of itself or deny the opposite of its 082 Leibniz For is is A A, A then goes on to say: example, or not non-A.... opposite. `All other truths are reduced to first truths with the aid of definitions or by the 9383 That `derived' in this all or is, priori.... a consists proof analysis of concepts; `secondary' truths can be reduced through analysis into their component parts or identities. From this procedure Leibniz concludes: `The predicate or consequent therefore inheres in the subject or antecedent [... ] In identities this connection and the inclusion of the predicate in the subject are explicit; in all other propositions they 384 This is in turn implied be and must revealed through the analysis of concepts. are a principle of sufficient reason:

These matters have not been adequatelyconsideredbecausethey are too easy, but there follow from them many things of great importance. At once they give rise to the acceptedaxiom that there is nothing without a reason, or no effect without a cause. Otherwise there would be no truth be could proved a priori or resolved into identities - contrary to the which

379Mercer (2001), especially Chapter 5, pp. 173-205 380Wilson (1989), p. 70 381An undatedpiece namedafter the opening words primae veratates,generally consideredto be written circa 1680-84,Philosophical Papers, pp. 267-271; Philosophical Writings, pp. 87-92 382Philosophical Papers, p. 267 383ibid.

384ibid, pp. 267-8

125 385 is implicitly identical. truth, nature of which always either expresslyor Couturat comments on these matters: `The principle of identity states: every identity (analytic) proposition is true. The principle of reason affirms, on the contrary, every true proposition is an identity (analytic). Its effect is to subordinate all truths to the identity. '386 While the material in First Truths does seem to affirm of principle Couturat's thesis, two qualifications

need to be taken into account. First, as the

translator Leroy Loemker notes `the paper moves by means of definitions from an abstract principle

of identity

to more complete concepts and more concrete

principles. Many of these definitions are basically metaphysical in character. '387That is, truth and the principle of identity are themselves not devoid of metaphysical content. The second qualification is somewhat paradoxical to the first. To the extent that truth is treated as a logical determination can the case be made that sufficient reason is essentially tautological? The tautological character of sufficient reason is most clearly to be seen in Leibniz's writings of the 1670's. Recent studies by Wilson and another modem Leibniz scholar Robert Merrihew Adams remark that these early further provide a writings problem for Couturat's thesis in that Leibniz discusses 388 logic. In these early sufficient reason without recourse to the subject-predicate writings sufficient reason is discussed in terms of two different but not exclusive ways: logic and the harmony of God. In the work Demonstratio Propositionum Primarum from the early 1670's (dated 1671-2) Leibniz devised a proof for the principle of sufficient reason which proceeds as follows:

385ibid. 268 386Coururat (1994), p. 2 387Philosophical Papers, p. 267 388Wilson (1989), p. 70; Adams, R. M. (1994) Leibniz: Determinist, Theist,Idealist. Oxford: University Press,pp. 67-71

126 Proposition: Nothing is without a reason, or whatever is has a sufficient reason. Definition 1. A sufficient reasonis that which is such that if it is posited the thing is. Definition 2. A requirement is that which is such that if it is not posited the thing is not. Demonstration:

Whatever is, has all [its] requirements. For if one [of them] is not posited the thing is not by def. 2. If all [its] requirementsare posited, the thing is. For if it is not, it will be kept from being by the lack of something,that is, a requirement. Thereforeall the Requirementsare a sufficient reasonby def. 1. Thereforewhatever is has a sufficient reason.Q.E.D.389 In the contemporary literature R. C. Sleigh's study `Leibniz on the Two Great Principles of all our Reasonings' seems to have been the first to discuss this proof. 39' Sleigh states: `A difficulty

in face. Note that the the the one with argument stares

for i. the the thing the of all second requisites of a given collection step e., reason constitutes a sufficient condition of it - is not a consequence of either definition [... ] the aroma of question begging fills the air. s391However, Adams does not seem to consider this a problem when he says: `The crucial premise of the proof is that fail for (i. lack to can exist except nothing of a requirement e., a necessary condition) '392 important its The existence. of point here is the interpretation of a `requirement. ' How does Leibniz define this concept? In the Letter to Magnus Wedderhopf (May, 1671) Leibniz will

discuss sufficient

reason in terms of God's harmony and

393In the letter Leibniz is God `Since it is the most perfect mind states: perfection. ... impossible for him not to be affected by the most perfect harmony. '394By 1676 the God's of perfection will notion

be posited in a more extant form as an `ens

I" Adams (1994), p. 68, trans. Adams 390R. C. Sleigh (1983) `Leibniz on the Two Great principles of all our Reasonings,' reprinted in Woolhouse(1994), pp. 31-57 391ibid, p. 43 392Adams (1994), p. 68 393Leibniz (1671) Letter to Magnus Wedderhopf in philosophical papers, pp. 146-7 394ibid, p. 146

127 being' is ' `most An `subject perfect or a of all ens perfectisimum perfectissimum. perfections' where a perfection is `every simple quality which is positive and "" it limits. In turn Leibniz absolute or which expresses whatever expresses without 396 divine "`first These matters perfections the requirements" of things. calls the

becomeclearerwhen we considerthe following passage: it seemsto be proved, further, that a Being of this sort, which is now ... it is it be For perfect, most necessary. cannot unless has a reason for existing from itself or from something else. It cannot have it from something else, becauseeverything that can be understood in something be already understood in it - that is, because we conceive it else can 397 itself. itself, because it has through or no requirementsoutside Given the qualification that a requirement is a perfection conceived through God, Sleigh's objection is perhaps unjustified: Leibniz could have simply fashioned his proof better through the elaboration of more definitions.

At this point we may seethat Leibniz's early notion of sufficient reason is a mixture of inclusion (God is the subject of all perfections) and a certain causal has Spinozistic flavour. Here we may bring to mind the first and a which principle third definitions of Spinoza's Ethics: `By cause of itself I understand that whose essenceinvolves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as I `By substance understandthat which is in itself and conceivedthrough and existing' itself. '398On this point Adams raises a more pertinent objection to Leibniz's proof of sufficient reason: denies the Principle of Sufficient Reasonwill supposethat who anyone ... when all the necessaryconditions of a thing's existence are given, there both a possibility of its existing and a possibility of its might still remain not existing - unless trivially necessaryconditions (such as a thing's included 3ý itself) here its are existence among requirements....

395Leibniz (1676) Two Notations for Discussion with Spinoza, in Philosophical Papers, p. 167 396Adams (1994), p. 117 "' Leibniz (1676) Paris Notes, trans. Adams (1994), 151 p. 38 B. de Spinoza (1994) A Spinoza Reader. The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and trans. E. Curley. Princeton: University Press, p. 85

399Adams (1994), p. 68

128 That is, if existencewere included in essencethen the principle of sufficient reason individuals lead Spinozism: be to would nothing more than modalities of the would infinite substanceof God. To be sure Leibniz also recognisedthis point and he tells On Freedom: in the paper us For my part, I used to consider that nothing happens by chance or by accident, except with respectto certain particular substances... and that its individual from that exists unless are given, and all nothing requisites thesetaken together it follows that the thing exists. So I was not far from the view of those who think that all things are absolutely necessary[a referenceto Spinoza][... ] But I was draggedback from this precipice by a consideration of those possibles which neither do exist, nor will exist, 400 have existed. nor Towards the end of his life Leibniz will famously say Spinoza `would be right if there were no monads.'401How does this affect Leibniz's version of the principle of In have Leibniz the that reason? early reason we seen version of sufficient sufficient his logical it in to notion of God. In the principle even relation applied as a strong Letter to Magnus Wedderhopfhe states: it is necessary to refer everything to some reason, and we cannot stop ... have arrived at a first cause - or it must be admitted that we until something can exist without a sufficient reason for its existence, and this destroys the demonstration of the existence of God and of admission many philosophical theorems [... J What then is the reason for the divine intellect? The harmony of things. What the reason for the harmony of 402 Nothing. things?

Here we find that the first causeis the harmony of things which cannot be analysed further. The harmony of things is synonymouswith the most perfect being but the God In Leibniz's derived later themselves through of are analysis. views perfections he will specifically deny this final point. This is most clearly seen in Leibniz's Spinoza. Adams notes: of rebuttal

400Leibniz (1689) On Freedom, in Philosophical writings, p. 106

411Leibniz (1714) Letter to Louis Bourguet, in Philosophical Papers, p. 663

402Leibniz (1671) Letter to Magnus Wedderhopf in Philosophical Papers, p. 146

129 15 April 1676 he [Leibniz] wrote that ' God is whereas on ... ... everything. Creatures are somethings, ' he wrote to Eckhard on the 28`hof the following April that 'it seems to be impossible for there to be a Being that is everything; for it could be said of such a Being that it is you and it is also me.... °3 Likewise, later in 1678 Leibniz objects to the third definition of the Ethics ('By substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself):

`... on

the contrary, it seems rather that there are some things that are in themselves even if they are not conceived through themselves. And that is how people commonly conceive of substance.'404 To make this distinction clearer Leibniz will state in the paper On the Abstract and the Concrete: `... the reality of creatures is not that very in God is absolute, but a limited reality, for that is of the essence of a that reality creature. '405 Adams remarks on this quotation: `... the limited and the absolute or incompatible, different, indeed unlimited reality are attributes and hence are not ' in This is to say that the requirements of God are not the the same subject. present same as the requirements of limited substances. Leibniz will now call these `limited' requirements `constituents. '407So we find that the strong logical form of the principle of sufficient reason can no longer be applied to the requirements of God. In this we find a certain theory of truth which Leibniz elaborates in An Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia:

An analysis of concepts by which we are enabled to arrive at primitive notions, i. e. at those which are conceived through themselves, does not seem to be in the power of man. But the analysis of truths is more in human power, for we can demonstrate many truths absolutely and reduce 408 them to primitive indemonstrable truth ....

The important point to note is that there are two different versions of sufficient We may seethat one of theseversions is derived from subject-predicatelogic reason. directly is connectedto Leibniz's theory of truth. However, there is also a second and 403Adams (1994), pp. 130-1 404Leibniz (1678) On the Ethics of Benedict de Spinoza,trans. Adams (1994), 131; Philosophical p. Papers, 196 405Leibniz (1688) On the Abstract and the Concrete,trans. Adams (1994), 133 p. 406Adams (1994), p. 133 407 ibid.

40SLeibniz (1679) An Introduction to a SecretEncyclopaedia,in Philosophical Writings, 8 p.

130 harmony God's from the that of pre-established results version of sufficient reason Deleuze is in drawing We how these two effective shall now examine perfection. variations togetherin his deduction of the monad.

Preliminaries

As a preliminary to his analysis Deleuze raises the problem of whether the concept (or individual notion) as defined by predicates-as-eventsholds for every inclusion. Here Deleuze is taking his lead from §8 of the Discourse on Metaphysics where Leibniz states: `It is certainly true that when severalpredicatesare attributed to the same it is is to this other, called an any subject not attributed subject, and individual substance.But that is not enough, and such an explanation is is it be is It to truly therefore, to what nominal. consider necessary, only attributed to a certain subject.'` In responseto this demand Deleuze introduces the Leibnizian distinction between (of (of truths truths existence): essence) and contingent necessary inclusion distinction types the two of or analysis, encounter of great we ... analysis being the operation that discovers a predicate in a notion taken as a subject, or a subject for an event taken as a predicate. Leibniz seems to be saying that in the case of necessary propositions or truths of essence ("2 plus 2 equals 4"), the predicate is expressly included in the notion, while, for contingent existences ("Adam sins," "Caesar crosses the Rubicon"), inclusion is only implicit or virtual. 410

In terms of this designation Deleuze asks whether we are to understandthat analysis is finite in the caseof necessarytruths and indefinite in the caseof contingent truths. For if this were so then finite analysis would be contrary to the infinite nature of God's essence,and similarly, indefinite analysis would be contrary to the infinite in God's To is the this world of understanding. see existence not the case Deleuze turns to the nature of definition itself. Deleuze states:`A definition posits the identity

I Leibniz (1686) Discourse on Metaphysics,in Philosophical Texts,p. 59 410Deleuze,TheFold, p. 42

131 4" Here (definers least defined) (the terms two or reasons). other with at of one term An its definers. defined between is the there and a reciprocal relation we may see four 2 Deleuze by 1. defined is is 3 Deleuze makes that and provides example determine definitions the First, possibility this and are genetic operation. remarks on is; 2 define 1) define 3 (2 is, before That defined. what we must and we can of the before we can define 2 we must define what 1 is, etc. Second, definitions are purely functional, as Deleuze says: `definitions of this kind never operate by genre and difference. They solicit neither the comprehension, the extension of a concept, '412 definitions. back to nominal abstraction, nor generality that would, moreover, go function defined back of as a Or to go to the mathematical analogy all numbers are the number 1. Third, analysis provides us with a chain or series of reciprocal inclusions, as we see in the definition of 3 as 2 and 1 above. Fourth, the definers of a definition precede the definition as the condition of possibility for the defined.

If we now return to the matter of the nature of analysis we may see that the if because is to finite be continue we were to truths of essence seem would reason definitions we can posit that we would eventually arrive at original along a chain of definers. That is, reasons that have no other definers and would consequently be `undefinable.' However this positing is a matter of setting an artificial limit to hand On definer. definition the define other the to as a chain a analysisand stopping indefinite be to as one would never an analysisof contingent existencieswould seem be able to find an appropriateplace to stop in the chain (e.g. in the infinite seriesof in lead Caesar But Rubicon). this case unless one was to to the that cross causes in infinite the the any situation one would end up series of causes world of consider 413 definitions anyway. with only nominal rather than real The purpose behind Deleuze's preliminary discussion on the nature of deduction in determining is the the to of monad. of start a matter where analysis Obviously, in order to provide a genetic account of the monad one must first start least definition. We have definitions that theoretically at any chain of seen a real with definers with or undefinable must start

411ibid, p. 43 412ibid. 413seeibid, pp. 51-2

notions. Although it may not be possible to

132 know what theseare it is possibleto infer their nature: These undefinables are obviously not reciprocal inclusions, like definitions, but they are auto-inclusions: they are Identicals in the pure state, each of which includes itself and includes only itself, each only capable of being identical to itself. Leibniz draws identity into infinity: the Identical is an auto-position of the infinite, without which identity would remain hypothetical (if A is, then A is A... ) [... ] The principle of identity or, rather, the principle of contradiction become makes us ... aware of a class of beings, that of the Identicals, which are complete beings. The principle of identity is the or of contradiction rather, only cry of the Identicals. It cannot be an abstraction. It is a signal. Identicals are undefinables in themselves and exist perhaps beyond our ken; they have no less, a criterion that the principle makes us aware of or able to hear.414

Having gained the starting point for a real definition Deleuze will now turn to the deductionof the monad itself.

Deduction of the Monad

Deleuzeprogressesthrough the deduction of the monad through four different stages. Each of these stagesis defined by a specific ordering of infinity: `the infinite sum of primitive forms (= God); infinite series without limits; infinite series with intrinsic limits; infinite series with extrinsic limits that restore an infinite whole (= World). '415 Deleuze has already given us the beginning of the deduction in the form of the Identicals. These are the infinite perfections of God, the Alphabet, or what the Kabbalists would call the Names of God, from which everything else is composed. In themselves they form the infinite sum of God. God is a sum because His perfections

are absolutein themselves: Each one, being included in itself and including only itself, not being a whole and having no parts, has strictly no relation with an other. These are pure "disparities," diverse absolutesthat cannot be contradicted since no element exists that one can affirm or the other can deny. They are, as Blanchot would say, in a "nonrelation." And this is just what the 414ibid, pp. 43-44 415ibid, p. 51

133 distinct Identicals it two that since of contradiction states: states principle i6 form be by they surely a categorya cannot contradicted eachother, However, if Identicals are purely disparate how is it possible for them to become the definers of other things? This is because the `infinite infinite' is itself the limit of a infinity. is infinite. This Unlike His ' God `whole the type of gives perfections second way to a derived form of the infinite in terms of an infinite series that does not form a whole in itself although its constituents form a reciprocal relation of wholes and parts within the series:

They enter into relations that define wholes and parts to infinity, and are themselvesin reciprocal inclusion with the definers, in accord with the double antecedence.Here we have entered into "sufficient reason," instance because in definers in the the their each simply relation are reasonof the defined. Were a relation to be defined, we would say that it is the unity of the nonrelation with mattersof wholes-and-parts.1 With this derived infinity we have reached the Combinatory order of reality although it must be specified that it is God who combines the Alphabet and this is no simple combination but the `unity of a nonrelation. ' Logically speaking we may see that Identicals shape the derived infinity as a lateral condition without entering into the series, however this does not explain how a relation can be born out of a non-relation. In the first instance this can be alleviated by the idea that God must be able to conceive of all possible series or worlds before being able to choose the best possible series. Hence Deleuze will associate the derivation out of a non-relation in terms of 418 for he this to turns the and realisation and possibility notion of a vinculum purpose In his later writings Leibniz will use the idea of a vinculum or substantial bond to 419 in Here Deleuze will use it to the organisation of monads realised matter. explain show the combination of Identicals. The vinculum has the dual purpose of acting like a wall or partition between Identicals while at the same time forming substantial bonds between them forming them into a chain. As such Identicals become the definers of definitions in the derived infinity.

416ibid, p. 44 a" ibid, p. 46 41$A `vinculum' is literally a connective `bond.' 419seeLeibniz (1709-15) Correspondencewith Des Bosses,in Philosophical Papers,pp. 601-7

134 With the derived infinity we may also seethat it forms the basis of Leibniz's is, it has that of matter, parts which are themselves wholes but contain further notion parts, ad infinitum. But what of qualities that fill matter? Here we move to the third infinite: the of ordering

infinite

series that `are convergent and tend toward a

limit. '420In this case the limit is meant as an internal limit, it is that which is different in itself: the differential (dy/dx). We are no longer dealing with wholes and parts but that which happens across parts that act as localisable limits, that is, intensities and At this stage the nature of definition changes as the third type of characteristics. infinity constitutes what could be called unilateral inclusion. That is characteristics by not wholes and parts but by degrees of intensity and so are not able to act operate in definers a reciprocal definition. as

As Deleuze notes, sufficient reason now

becomes a true principle. 421Whereas we found the initial starting point of sufficient in reason the undefinables we find its `upper' limit in the third type of infinity which be Characteristic. the called will

Finally we come to the fourth type of infinity and the constitution of the itself. To the extent that the monad includes the world it includes both monad extension and characters, that is it forms a further convergent series of both wholes degrees intensity. This time the limit of the convergent series is not and of and parts internal but conforms to the original infinity of God Himself. However, being an envelopment of the infinite it is related to God reciprocally. As Deleuze puts it, if the formula for God could be considered to be oo/l then the formula for the monad would be 1/00422So now the limit of the infinite series is to be found external to the monad in the form of the totality of monads. As such inclusion in the monad is again of the but limit is type the the since of series outside the monad inclusion is not unilateral localised as it was with intensions, that is, the monad can only express a portion of the infinite series.

420TheFold, p. 47 421ibid. 422ibid. p. 149

135 Analysis of the Deduction We are perhaps now in a position to see how Deleuze constructs his Baroque house. The monad is the house itself. On the lower floor the Combinatory defines the layout of its labyrinthine rooms. The Characteristic provides doors and windows that give the illusion of an outside when really it is the lower floor that is outside. On its walls are indecipherable markings that signal the Alphabet. One thing we may notice in Deleuze's deduction is that it is almost as if everything takes place or is derived from the lower floor. Even when he moves from the Perfections of God to matter as wholes and parts this is done through the logical invocation of the vinculum.

However, there is a long line of Leibniz scholarshipthat questions if Leibniz 423 held in first the notion of the vinculum the place. For the most part Leibniz's ever discussion of the vinculum is only to be found in his correspondence with the Jesuit teacher of theology Bartholomew Des Bosses, and this only occurs towards the very end of his life when he already had his primary principles of philosophy in place 424 before. Russell concludes the following interpretation from this: `He many years heresy, believe Catholics to they that anxious might, without extremely persuade was in his doctrine of monads. Thus the vinculum substantiale is rather the concession of a diplomatist than the creed of a philosopher. '425More recently Wilson argues that the theory of the vinculum was introduced into his philosophy as a response to the criticism that his philosophy resulted in phenomenalism, a theory that he finally 426 detriment his bodies. However it is to the to rejects explanation of corporeal doubtful that Leibniz saw phenomenalism as a serious threat to his system as for Leibniz the world is simply phenomenal God produces the best possible although is, the one that is the most full (without gaps), well-founded, and the most that world, manifest. This will

place Leibniz strongly within the neo-Platonic and Gnostic

traditions, a fact that he never disputes. Perhaps the most considered viewpoint on this matter is put forward by Adams who postulates that Leibniz did indeed entertain the notion of a vinculum. For the idea of a substantial bond in matter does not

`' SeeAdams (1994), pp. 299-307 for a review of this literature. 424Leibniz died 14/11/1716,aged 70, the correspondencetook place 1709-1715. au Russell(1992), p. 152 426Wilson (1989), pp. 192-3

136 but his the true only as substance of monads would notion necessarily compromise correspond to God's organisation of the monads as a totality and would in this sense be a further extension of pre-established harmony. However Adams also points out that these deliberations only arose in the theological context of Leibniz discussing his in Eucharist incarnation terms the the the transubstantiation of of and of philosophy God in the Christ. In this sense Leibniz only introduced the notion of the vinculum to in his for Hence `supernatural' terms these of occurrences monadology. explain Adams argues it would be fair to conclude that while the notion of the vinculum is in importance it Leibniz's a role place played of central of never philosophy out not in the formation of his philosophy. 427 This is most clearly seen in the following from Des Bosses: the correspondence with passage

to the monads, which substantial chain a or a substantial addition ... formally constitutes the compound substanceand reifies the phenomena, be changedwhile the monads themselvesremain, becauseas I have can said, the soul of the little worm is not of the substanceof the body which containsthe worm.... A substantialchain superaddedto the monadsis in independent be it of my opinion something absolute ... can nevertheless the monads in a supernaturalsenseand can be removed and adaptedto 428 its former other monadswhile monadsremain. It is perhaps ironic (but entirely consistent with his point of view) that Leibniz idea be the to of a real substantial a supernatural phenomenon. And matter considers it is in this sense that the vinculum comes into play. Leibniz poses a correspondence between the monad and the superadded vinculum

but whereas the monad is

immutable the vinculum is not, that is, the vinculum is a substantial Accident. In fact it is only when matter is considered in itself and for itself, independent of substance, that the vinculum is required at all - the monad cannot be deducted from it. In what leave does Deleuze's this analysis? position

The first thing we may note is that for Leibniz the vinculum was never meant to show the link betweenthe perfections of God and his creationsas this was already dealt with by his theory of pre-established harmony. As Mercer identifies, pre-

427SeeAdams (1994), pp, 303-7 for thesearguments. 428Leibniz (1709-15) Correspondencewith Des Bosses,in Philosophical Papers,p. 608

137 429 is harmony functions in First harmony there two ways an emanative established that exists between God and the totality of monads that He creates. Second there is a reflective harmony which also operates in two different ways: i) between the monads themselves, and ii) between the monad and the world. In this way both the world and the totality of all monads is reflected in a single monad. In The Fold we will find that Deleuze will specifically criticise Leibniz's

ideas on pre-established harmony. So

could an independent case be made for the vinculum after all? Let us first turn to the Deleuze's critique. of nature

Deleuze leadsup to his criticism by first focusing on the convergentseriesof the Characteristic. To the extent that the same world is expressed in every monad they form a common nature of the monads in terms of how the same characters are 430 Here Leibniz's notion of compossibility throughout the all monads prolonged comes into play. God could have chosen to create from any number of possible worlds (such as the world where Adam doesn't sin or where Caesar doesn't cross the Rubicon) but the world he does create is com-possible with all monads. It is conceivable that Adam didn't sin or that Caesar never crossed the Rubicon but these incompossible draws Deleuze From this the notion of an are with our own. worlds antecedence to the world. God did not create Adam the sinner but the world in which Adam Sins.431Here Deleuze draws a parallel with the fourth stage of the monadic deduction - although the monad includes the world it does not contain the law of its nature432 Of course if one where to change this law then the nature of the monad would also change and this is what Deleuze will do. For the infinite perfection of God Deleuze will substitute matter and the Nietzschean dice-throw. The dice-throw longer affirm convergence but the divergence of series: no will

the monad is in tune with divergent series that belong to when ... incompossiblemonads it could be said that the monad, astraddleover ... several worlds, is kept half open as if by pliers. To the degree that the world is now made up of divergent series (the chaosmos), or that crapshootingreplacesthe game of Plenitude,the monad is now unable to

429SeeMercer (2001), pp. 184-196 43°Deleuze,TheFold, p. 50 431 ibid,

p. 60

432ibid, p. 50

138 contain the entire world...

433

However, Deleuze's manoeuvre does not seem entirely convincing as a criticism of Leibniz as it seems to be little more than an isomorphism of Leibniz's system, which is what one would expect if one started from the viewpoint of matter rather than individual substance. What is more Deleuze's criticisms seem to be entirely focused on the reflective aspect of pre-established harmony and does not engage with the harmony. Of course, one way that Deleuze does engage with of emanative aspect is harmony in the form of the vinculum. As we shall see later434Deleuze emanative certainly seems to formulate emanative harmony in the correct way as a `relation of a nonrelation'435 That is, in terms of an object of knowledge it is the relation of two terms that are fundamentally incomprehensible. However, the true emanative relation seems to be not between the unknowable undefinables of God but between God and that which he creates, which by definition would be as incomprehensible as He is. As Leibniz tells us:

Would that the attribute of incomprehensibility did belong to God alone; our hope of knowing nature would then be greater. But it is all too true that there is no part of nature which we can understandperfectly; the very interdependenceof things proves this. No creature, however excellent, can at once distinctly perceive or comprehend the infinite; on the contrary, indeed, whoever were to understand a single part of matter 436 the would understand whole universe... Deleuze's solution to this problem in the form of the vinculum seemsto be simply a Deleuze's solution also presents us with a more pressing problem. As shortcut. outlined previously, Leibniz's adherence to a monadology left him open to accusationsof phenomenalismeven if these were not well-founded. Since Deleuze adheresto the vinculum and the substantialaccidentthen would he not be open to the inverse criticism, that is, he has no principle of individuation unless something is `superadded'to it. We shall analysethis possibility in the next part of this chapter.

433ibid, p. 137 434seeChapter4. 435Deleuze,TheFold, p. 44 "' Leibniz (1709-15) Correspondencewith Des Bosses,in Philosophical Papers, 599 p.

139 2. Individual Substance in Leibniz

In this part of the chapter we shall argue that the position Leibniz holds in his first Deleuze's This Disputatio, the explicitly will wort; criticises position. philosophical proceed in three parts, first we will present a detailed study of the Disputatio, second we shall present how these ideas shape Leibniz's later philosophy and third, we will explore how this produces a critique of Deleuze's position.

Introduction

The fact that a detailed study of Leibniz's first philosophical work, his baccalaureate thesis Disputatio Metaphysica de Principio Individui of 1661, has only been published as recently as 1996 (in McCullough's Leibniz on Individuals and Individuation) could be considered to be something of an oversight by Leibnizian 437 scholars. For the most interesting feature of the Disputatio is that Leibniz defends 438 its This has obvious is individuated by `individual the thesis that an whole entity. Leibniz's later To individual take one pertinent substance. with concept of resonance in Leibniz his Amauld: will say with correspondence example I maintain as axiomatic identical proposition, this whose ... differentiation can only be marked by the accentuation - namely, that that is not truly one entity is not truly one entity either. It has always which been held that unity and entity are reciprocal things. An entity is one thing, entities are quite another thing: but the plural presupposes the 439 is less there there singular, and where no entity still are several entities

That is for an entity to truly be an entity it must be a complete entity. Given such an important connection why has the Disputatio been ignored to such an extent? Perhapsone may attribute it to the pervasiveopinion of Leibniz scholarsthat Leibniz

437Leibniz (1661) Disputatio Metaphysica de Principio Individui, trans. McCullough (1996), hereafter denotedasDisputatio. McCullough spreadsthe translationthroughout the chaptersof his book and presentsthe philosophical backgroundto Leibniz's argumentsas well as critical comment. 438ibid. section4, p. 100 439Leibniz (1686-7) Correspondencewith Arnauld, in Philosophical Writings, p. 67

140 440 in Or perhaps one the only arrives at a coherent metaphysical system mid-1680's. may consider the Disputatio, written when Leibniz was only 17, to be little more than a youthful essay influenced by the reformed Aristotelianism of his teacher and thesis 44 ' Jacob Thomasius hence biographical supervisor and only worthy of significance. Leibniz has himself provoked much speculation and debate over his own account of his intellectual development in his letter to Nicholas Remond of 1714:

I discoveredAristotle as a lad, and even then the Scholasticsdid not repel me; even now I do not regret this. But then Plato too, and Plotinus, gave me some satisfaction, not to mention other ancient thinkers whom I consulted later. After having finished the trivial schools, I fell upon the modems,and I recall walking in a grove on the outskirts of Leipzig called the Rosental, at the age of fifteen, and deliberating whether to preserve substantialforms or not. Mechanism finally prevailed and led me to apply myself to mathematics[... ] But when I looked for the ultimate reasonfor mechanism,and even the laws of motion, I was greatly surprised to see that they could not be found in mathematics but that I should have to 442 to return metaphysics The most important factor to recognise is that even as Russell admits `Leibniz was in the scholastic tradition. ''" educated

On the general coherence of Leibniz's life-

work, Benson Mates tells us: `... talk of "question begging" and "vicious circles" in proofs and definitions has no clear application to Leibnizian philosophy, since those terms acquire sense only in relation to some deductive system explicitly or implicitly indicated. '`

That is, it is on the grounds of the implicit assumptions of Leibniz's

later notion of individual substance that we may find these assumptions in a more explicit form in his early work. Putting across this point more forcefully Cover and 0' Leary-Hawthorne state: `... consider the question "what is it for something to be the very individual it is?" The question is too easily answered if one suspects, as many (in the grip of the Discourse on Metaphysics) wrongly have, that given Leibniz's complete-concept doctrine, a substance is individuated by a complete list of

Suchis the viewpoint taken up by Russell (1992), p. 7 "' Of courseMercer (2001) will argueit is precisely this version of PlatonisedAristotelianism that will shapethe courseof his philosophy. 442Leibniz (1714 -1715) Letters to Nicolas Remond,in Philosophical Papers, pp. 654-5 443Russell(1992), p. 6

4" Benson Mates (1986) The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language. Oxford: University Press, p. 4

141 445 individuation be is, That Leibniz's its theory of simply cannot early properties. all first implicit his later the theories through an appreciation obtaining of without read scholastic context. The Disputatio

is relevant to our own study of Deleuze's

interpretation of Leibniz in two ways: 1) in terms of the scholastic assumptions Leibniz uses in his definition of the individual and 2) in terms of the theories of the individual which Leibniz rejects. Before we turn to an analysis of the salient points of the Disputatio, some background information is required on the basic features of individual. the theories of scholastic

The Individual in the Disnutatio

Preliminaries

The first place to start for an understandingof the notions of individuation and the 446 distinguished Aristotle in Scholastic is logic Aristotle. individual the philosophy of between two different aspectsof being, substancesand accidents. Each of these is further distinguished into universals (speciesand genera) and individuals. This can be summarisedas follows: Substance

Accident

Individual Substance

Individual Accident

Specific Substance

Specific Accident

General Substance

General Accident

Amongst these classes two types of predication operate. The first type, essential This functions respectively. operates within substances accidents and predication, from generato speciesand from speciesto individuals. As McCullough explains: Something is said as a predicate of a subject if and only if the subject falls under the predicate becauseit is determined,made the thing it is, by

«5 J. Cover, and J. O'Leary-Hawthorne (1999), p. 4 "6 seeAristotle, Categories, 1-5, sourceused Aristotle (1995) Selections,Trans. with Introduction, Notes and Glossary,by T. Irwin and G. Fine. Cambridge:Hackett

142 the former. Thus, `animal' is said of `man', because man is of the kind, is kind, Plato because is `Plato' `man' the of man. said of animal, and `Colour' is said of `white', because white is of the kind, colour, and `white' is said of `this white', because this white in Plato is of the kind, 47 white From this we may see that individual

substances and accidents are privileged

logically in that they cannot be `said of anything but themselves. The second type of is is in known an where accident present a predication, as accidental predication, is in `this in is An that the this white' quotation above also example of substance. in (a be in Plato. An something substance). else present accident can only present Here we may determine that individual substance holds the most important position in that unlike an individual accident it cannot be predicated of anything else. As Aristotle states in the Categories: `What is called substance most fully, primarily, in '448 is is nor any subject.... and most of all, what neither said of any subject

Theseideas form the basis of Scholastictheories of the individual. However, the different thought really constitutes nature what sprang up about schools of many background To it individual the exists. give a the even on point of whether actually of to the context that Leibniz was working in, McCullough points to Jorge Gracia's 449 Early Middle Ages. In Problem in Individuation Introduction the to the of study this book Gracia provides a classification of the various schemas of scholastic individuals. Theseare set out on the next page.

«7 McCullough (1996), p. 25 4" Aristotle (1995), 2a, p. 4 °49JorgeGracia (1988) Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages. Munchen:PhilosophiaVerlag

143 Classification of Scholastic Individuals

1)

Intension:

indivisibility distinction Extension:

2)

no existentsindividual, or all existentsindividual, or individual but all existents existents not some 3)

Ontological Status:

the individual and its nature are the same,or the individual and its nature are different, Basedon: distinction, or real mental distinction, or other distinction The general thematic of scholastic theories of the individual is concernedwith the `nature' of the individual, that is, its individual character or individuality. Three important aspects of the nature of individuals that Gracia identifies are 1) the intension of the individual, 2) the extension of the individual, and 3) the ontological 450 individuality in individual individual's its the the to and relation statusof nature On the first feature of intension Gracia will tell us that it `is what individual individual. To ask, therefore, about the intension of an as characterizes individuality is to ask about what it is to be an individual as opposedto something intensional is by The itself '45' factors. One of aspect a number characterised of else. these is indivisibility. McCullough states that this is `the impossibility of an individual being divided or somehow broken up into individuals of the samespecies individual. '432 For human the original example, a cannot be divided up into further as

450Gracia (1988), p.21 451bid, p. 22 452McCullough (1996), p. 28

144 humans. A second intensional characteristic is distinction.

As Gracia puts it:

Socrates may move, `Socrates is a distinct being apart from the dog he owns ... die become and even and nothing of the kind may happen to senile change position, his dog. '453 An important term used for this purpose is `numerical difference. ' Numerical difference is used to describe two distinct individuals

where there is

`some feature or features [but not all] in which they differ. 'asa Th e second feature of Obviously individuals hold the view really exist. one can concerns whether extension in the affirmative either

or to the negative (for example everything involves

feature On third these the of the ontological status mixture of or a views. accidents) following identifies it involving issues: Gracia `(a) whether it individuality the as of is the case for all natural beings that an individual,

considered as individual,

is

distinguished by some feature or features from its nature; (b) the nature of this distinction, that is, whether it is real, conceptual, or otherwise. '455That is, whether there is a difference between the individual and the nature (or substance) through is based is individuated it to this the provided problem and whether solution which on real, mental or other distinctions. individuality

As Gracia notes these three aspects of

are not necessarily independent and can produce many complex and

seemingly contradictory configurations depending on ones viewpoint. We shall turn to Leibniz's Disputatio to see how he navigates these matters.

The Disoutatio

The Disputatio is an ambitious attempt by the young Leibniz to defend his own theory of the individual against the prominent scholastic theories of his day. In the secondsection of the Disputatio Leibniz setsforth the `stateof the question' and his hand: to the subject matter at approach own We are, then, to treat of the principle of the individual. Now, both `principle' and `individual' are understood in various ways we note ... that `individual' may mean "according to the thing" (in re), or "according

453Gracia (1988), p. 26 434ibid. 455ibid, p.34

145 to the concept" (in conceptu), or as some say, respectively, "fundamentally" or "formally" [... ] Too, `principle' is used to mean the Wherefore, knowing being [... ] to summarise the and of principle of foregoing, we treat of something real and what is called a "physical for foundation formal in " the the serve as notion principle, which would the mind of `individual, ' understood either as individuation or numerical difference. 456

The principle of the individual may be understoodeither ontologically - according to the fundamentalthing - as a principle of being, or epistemologically - according to the formal concept- as a principle of knowing. Leibniz tells us that his approachwill be ontological. His first concern is with a `physical principle, ' that is, a principle form find independent Here Leibniz's to the adherence of mind. we a of or outside in Preface Leibniz the to an edition ofNizolius: tells this what us entails nominalism. `Nominalists are those who believe that all things except individual substancesare deny they therefore the reality of abstract terms and universals mere names; forthright. '457That is, nominalists reject any type of conceptual category and accept that only real things can be individuals. We shall seethe position that Leibniz takes Disputatio. discussion Leibniz doctrine the through of this we our next as progress on individual: for individuating the the the principle of possible candidates outlines individuation is taken to be either the whole entity (1), or is Less-than-whole entity expressed either by entity. by something positive. Concerning the positive sense of entity, one may take one of two views: (3) there is a physical part of the individual that terminates its essence, existence; or (4) 459 haecceity. a metaphysical part that terminates species,

The principle of not the whole (2), or negation less-than-whole

Of course Leibniz will take up the first point of view, however it will be useful to his he in highlight the theories to own position. rejects order elaborate The first principle of individuation that Leibniz rejects is negation. Leibniz describesthe principle thus:

From the summum genus through differences determined by the

4 Disputatio, section2, McCullough (1996), pp. 22-3 aspLeery (1670) Preface to an edition ofNizolius, in Philosophical Papers, p. 128 458Disputatio, section 3, McCullough (1996), p. 23

146 But descend infima there to the species. you cannot should one subaltern, [descend] further and the negation of further descent would be the formal, intrinsic [principle] of the individual [... ] The first negation, that individual. [principle] it But is, division, the the a general of as were, of individual identity this that would make with another, of negation, other 459 from distinct truly another. The main focus of a negation theory is on the intensional features of the individual in for individual be First, for to two this order an negations. reason requires and individual and not be divided further it must involve a negation of division. The least (the determination from is divided being the genus of summum up nature of being after being itself which is not a genus) to the infima species (the greatest determination of being before individuals) that is common to `individuals. ' As such For individual individual be determine though. the the to is to this not enough distinct, for its nature to be a `this,' a secondnegation is required - the negation of identity with another (that is, indistinction). Leibniz presentsthe following argument againstthis viewpoint: the individual is constituted by negations, either outside the mind or in ... the mind. If the latter, their answer has nothing to do with the issue in be by former, being how If the constituted negative can positive question. being? {... ] let there be two individuals - Socrates and Plato. Then the Plato Socrates be the and the principle of of negation will principle of Plato will be the negation of Socrates. In either case there will be 46° something positive on which you can stand. Leibniz's

argument against the negative principle

is that it is not capable of

it distinguishes individual is, from that the one way positive, anything establishing individuality for does the specific provide not another

of an individual.

Or as

McCullough explains: `... double negation is the same in each individual. It cannot therefore, make a particular substance "this" rather than "that" individual. Negation as the principle

of

individuation

fails

to establish the ground

in

re for

distinction.... 9461

The second principle of individuation that Leibniz rejects is existence. The

459ibid, section 11, p. 37 460ibid, section2, pp. 37-8 461McCullough (1996), p. 41

147 between For distinction is based for the existence and essence. on argument existence but it does have imaginary not necessarilyexist. may an essence animal example,an Some scholasticsargued that the `actualisation' of essencewas accountedfor by an is individuated. individual McCullough it is God that the this through act and act of draws on the scholasticPaulusSoncinasto summarisethis viewpoint: Any essencehas two respects[relations] to the first cause [God]. One is the respectof a copy to examplar [or model].... The other respect is the indeed its things to respect which producing cause, relation of an effect do not have before they exist but only after they are produced. But the terminus [of the producing agent], the esse[of existence], signifies nature it does is inasmuch Therefore, thing, the that as not exist, respect. with indeed called `essence'but it is not said `to be,' becauseit does not [yet] havethis [second] respect.462 On one hand the argumentfor existenceis external to individual substancesince it is basedon an act of God, but on the other hand, this is an intrinsic principle because difference but is does determining (or to the essence extra) a a not add existence `perfection' of it. As McCullough notes, here `perfection' is used `in the sensethat "to be" is more perfect than "not to be."'463In this senseindividual essenceis lessthan-whole entity and the act of existenceproducesthe whole entity. Leibniz begins his discussion of this principle by detailing how essence and existence are distinguished:

this [position] can be taken in two ways. In one way, existence might ... be some real mode, intrinsically individuating the thing and distinct a from its it is If the this case, can by no means be essence. parte rei defended.... But, if [existence] differs only mentally from essence, [this 464 position] agrees uncommonly well with us.

Leibniz tells us that if essenceand existenceare only mentally distinct, that is they inseparable, it then would be similar to his own viewpoint. That is, this are really would not conflict with Leibniz's whole entity principle because existence and

"2 PaulusSoncinas(1967) QuaestionesMetaphysicalesAcutissimae.Frankfurt: Minerva, p. 20b translationby McCullough (1996), pp. 44-5 40 McCullough (1996), p.45 4" Disputatio, section 14, p. 46

148 So distinguished be the entity. same whole aspects of mentally essence would only Leibniz's refutation is only focussed on really distinct existence. He argues this as follows: `If essence and existence are the same a parte rei, then it follows that differ ] Whatever individuation [... is things the really of not principle existence ... be '465 be But by turns, separated. cannot existence and essence separated. can, Leibniz's reasoning for this is outlined in the next section of the Disputatio where he if the essenceand existence were really separable: consequences considers

Essence, once existence is taken away, is either a real thing or nothing. If it is in it or was not absurd; creatures, which was not nothing: either distinct from existence, which is what I maintain. If, on the other hand, [essence] is a real being, it is either purely potential or actual being. Without doubt [it must be] the former, for it cannot be actual except through existence which, however, we have supposed to be separated. If, therefore, essence is purely potential, all essences are prime matter [... ] If, therefore, essencesare not different from matter, it follows that matter ' differ by do be the essential part and things species.... not alone would In the first instance if creatures had no essence they would be merely accidents or from different if in instance the matter was not essence second automatons while there would be no need for it anyway. The third and final principle that Leibniz refutes is haecceity. This principle first identify We formulated by John Duns Scotus. the nature of shall was originally 467 is individual For Scotus thing a composite of `common this concept. an existing individual The individuates `haecceity' matter. existing primary which nature' and has numerical unity, that is, it is numerically one, however Scotus makes a specific R. As Kilcullen in this the constitution. states: of process use of non-numerical unity `he orders unities from individual, to specific, to generic, to categorical. 468 The individual has perfect unity while the following classes have a progressively lesser degree of unity. Further, each class has actuality in relation to the class it immediately has is determinable in relation it. For conversely which a potential or precedes

4" ibid, p. 47

"" ibid, section 15, p. 47 '167 Scotus' ideasare to be found in John Duns Scotus(1996) Ordinatio, II, dist. 3, pars 1,168-211, trans. by R Kilcu11en,available at www.humanities.mq.edu.au/Ockham/mjds. html '" R. Kilcullen (1996) Scotuson Universals,Lecture 6, available at www.humanities.mq.edu.au/Ockham/z3606.htm1,p. 9

149 is in has through to the the and species actualised relation potentiality genus example, individual is So, difference the actualised on. actual species, and so as an specific through a series of determining diffferences. However, there are two types of determining differences. The first type determines being up to the species. This is the Aristotelian In terminology the traditional the thing. common of nature common For Scotus form, the thing. the to the of or quiddity essence nature corresponds less has it individuate is than to thing numerical unity. and enough a not of nature Numerical unity is conferred on the thing through the individuating

difference or

haecceity which actualises the thing as an existing individual. Scotus proposes that distinctions within this theory, between classes themselves and between classes and distinction. We formal determining through may recall that a their entities, are made the Scholastics distinguished

between two

fundamental distinctions,

the real

distinction - between really separable things, and the mental distinction - between To Scotus this that adds the are not really separable. mentally separable concepts formal distinction.

This is a distinction

between things that are metaphysically

foundation for do but distinct, but mental act as a are not really separable distinctions. To summarise, for Scotus the numerical individual is a combination of distinct have less formally haecceity than and each nature and are which common following begins Scotus Leibniz's the passage: with own analysis of numerical unity.

Now, it was known that Scotus was an extreme realist, becausehe held that universalshave true reality outside the mind.... But so that he would not adopt the view attributed by Aristotle to Plato, he contrived the "formal distinction" to hide his error. Indeed,this distinction is supposed to obtain before the operation of the intellect and yet he saysthat it holds he be intellect.... [B]ecause to to the supposed universals respect with from it that singulars originate real was necessary a something ... 469 universal with somethingadded. The first thing to note in this passageis the position attributed to Plato. Kilcullen tells Scholastics Plato because be he held that the that to considered realist an extreme us 470 had Forms the the reality outside mind. Likewise, Leibniz attributes this position to

469Disputatio, section 17, p. 56 40 R. Kilcullen (1996) Ockhamon Universals, Lecture 8, available at www.humanities.mq.edu.au/Ockham/z3608.html, p. 7

150 Scotus for holding that universals exist outside the mind. Technically speaking, as McCullough points out, Scotist common nature isn't a universal but specific to an individual. 47 However, Leibniz's views on Scotus are also based on a critique of the Scotist formal distinction and as he tells us: `If there is no formal distinction, haecceity falls. '472If the formal distinction was shown to be no more than a mental distinction then the common nature/haecceity composite would be a mental or universal concept. Leibniz continues:

for the formal concept is founded properly in the objective concept. If, ... therefore,the objective concept [is also founded] in the formal, there will be a circle and, while each [does the founding], neither is founded and each would vanish [... ] Therefore, nothing could still exist for the distinction aparte rei.473 The argument that Leibniz articulates here is originally to be found in William of Ockham. Kilcullen summarises this argument as follows: `If a quasi-real distinction between inseparable formalities is admitted, then there will be no way of establishing any fuller distinction. No real distinction will be any more than formal, or (vice formal distinction will be as real as any distinction ever is. '474The point versa) every here is that if there is a formal distinction before the operation of the intellect then it would not be possible for the mind to distinguish it from the real distinction which is also before the operation of the intellect. As such the formal distinction is either a distinction with real parts or it is simply a mental distinction. Leibniz rejects the former option because the formal distinction is supposed to pertain prior to the operation of the intellect. Moreover, if haecceity is mentally distinct it cannot supply us with an ontological principle of individuation. principle of individuation that Leibniz proposes.

471McCullough (1996), p. 56-57 472Disputatio, section24, p. 65 473ibid, section25, p. 66 1

KilcuIIen,

OCkliam

on Universals,

p. 3

We shall now move onto the

151 Leibniz's Principle

In the Disputatio Leibniz defendsthe thesis that an `individual is individuated by its (its between be distinction ' Here the the thing nature of can made a whole entity. be What individual. how individuates this the this seen can entails whole entity) and 475 Ockham. Ockham by held William took this theory that of compare with we when the extremeview that the individual is already individuated. As such the nature of the individual and the individual itself are synonymous, and the principle of individuation is the individual itself. The problem that Ockham now faced was that if individual natures are not distinguishable from the individual then how can these individual known by Ockham be that the naturesare concepts will say mind. natures distinct. is, We intellect, they that the the are mentally result of an act of which are in First, differs from Leibniz's the nature of the two this that ways. position may see individual is not the same as the individual, and second,the nature of the individual is more than just a mental phenomenon. McCullough notes that Leibniz follows 76 fundamental Suarez. The Francis in thinker these matters: another scholastic doctrine that Leibniz will take from Suarez is that there are two different kinds of following in Suarez distinctions distinction. defines the these way: mental One, which has no foundation in reality, is called a distinction of the it (distinctio since arises entirely reasoning reason rationis ratiocinantis), from the reflection and activity of the intellect. The other, which has a foundation in reality, is called by many a distinction of the reasoned reason (distinctio rationis ratiocinatae). This kind of mental distinction can be understood as pre-existing in reality, before the discriminating intellect intellect, to recognise it, the the and only requires operation of but not to constitute it... [I]t does not arise entirely from the mere operation of the intellect, but rather from the occasion offered by the 4n itself, is thing on which the mind reflecting.

The distinction of the reasoning reason is the traditional mental distinction in On distinction hand the the philosophy. of the reasoned reason other scholastic

assWilliam of Ockham's ideas are to be found in William of Ockham(1996) Ordinatio, I, dist. 2, q. 6, trans.by R. Kilcullen, available at www.humanities.mq.edu.au/wockord.html 476McCullough (1996), p. 91 477FrancisSuarez(1947) On the Various Kinds of Distinction, trans. C. Vollert. Milwaukee: MarquetteUniversity Press,p. 18

152 foundation distinctions to the to according a mind make correct metaphysical allows in reality. If this is the case then could the Scotist formal distinction be considered to be a distinction of the reasoned reason? This is not the case because a distinction of the reasoned reason is a `well-founded' mental distinction and is not based on a prior 478 is does in distinction Of the the question what exactly course reality. metaphysical On in this point McCullough tells reality. reason recognise as pre-existing reasoned us:

in individual the reasoned the an mind, act of of aspects an can move ... individual. distinguish different to the that to pertain concepts reason, Individuated nature moves the mind to recognise,not createde novo, the in is individuals that the reality are at most of what same among concept de Individuated to the not create recognise, mind nature moves similar.... indivisibility, basic intentional individuality, the and to aspectsof novo, derive from it the proprium of individuality, distinction.479 These ideas can again be understood more clearly in comparison with Ockham. Ockham's position is that the mind recognises universal concepts according to distinction individuals. between In Ockham's the truth version of mental similarities is more akin to an act of the reasonedreason,for the Ockhamite mental distinction is known. but is formed 9480 As `in the arbitrary as object such the only simply mind not objection that Ockham would have with the above passageis that it is not through individuated nature (either emphasis) that something is recognisedbut through the individual itself. So whereasOckham would hold that the individual individuates its Leibniz it is individual `whole the that will argue nature or nature, entity' that own individuatesthe individual. This is the main line of argumentin the Disputatio:

That by means of which something is, by means of it that something is one in number. But any thing is by means of its entity. Therefore, [any thing is one in number by reasonof its entity]. The major is proved in that 48' beyond being. one addsnothing real

478McCullough (1996), pp. 96-7 479ibid, p. 96

480R Kilcullen (1996) Ockham on Universals, Lecture 8, available at www. humanities. mq. edu.au/Ockham/z3608. htm1 4t Disputatio, section 5, p. 101

153 The crucial point in this principle of individuation is the final line `one adds nothing is `added' being. ' This to the whole entity or nature beyond matter concerns what real is here Leibniz it individual. What that numerical unity adds nothing to make means individuated to real

individual's the precisely, nature, or more

entity and the

To distinct by the individual this the clearly put more reason. are reasoned numerical it is As is to that thing. thing to any such not common particular of a nature or entity indivisibility intensional individual In `becoming' the aspects of other thing.

and

distinction are conferred or `added' to the whole entity. As McCullough tells us:

be distinguishable individuality, the must of real, principle -something from nature or else Leibniz could not meaningfully hold that there is such individuated in the sense of that aspect of an nature, as an entity individual that accounts for the operation of the reasoned reason that from individuals that similarity abstracts and recognises similarity among is in mente only, common to them or the the that of nature a concept 482 in them. same To make sense of this let us recall that Leibniz's purpose in the Disputatio is to individual One individuation internal thing. the to provide an ontological principle of be for the to the would seem enterprise promising an most candidates such of is individual by individual by William Ockham held of virtue of every real position itself. However, the consequence of this position is that the individual has no internal individual is determined for know Indeed, Ockham an of content. we or what nature does As this not even count as a candidate an external principle position externally. for consideration in the Disputatio.

Instead Leibniz proposes the whole entity

doctrine - an individual is individuated by its whole nature. In the next section we Leibniz's in into doctrine look the the this of context metaphysics relevance of shall in turn will enable us to make a comparison with Deleuze's the which monad, of interpretation of Leibniz.

McCullough (1996), p. 117

154 Leibniz's later metanhvsics

be later Leibniz's that Disputatio between can disparity philosophy the One and immaterial both he is highlighted talk and physical that of immediately will 483 Leibniz's in Disputatio individuals the own philosophical substances as development will take a detour when in the mid 1660's he rejects the obscure Scholastics turns to the mechanism: and of arguments After having finished the trivial schools, I fell upon the modems, and I Rosental, Leipzig the in the called of outskirts a grove on recall walking deliberating to fifteen, preserve substantial whether the and age of at forms or not. Mechanism finally prevailed and led me to apply myself to 484 mathematics. However, even during these years Leibniz was still concerned with the subject of Leibniz's 1672 Philosophi in Confessio be This the where of individuation. can seen dialogue in tells us: the spokesperson There you have it, what amazes you, the principle of individuation, be difference itself. For these can eggs no among outside the thing by God (given have by I to the say, audacity an angel or, assigned either the hypothesis of the greatest similarity possible) other than that at the I [... ] B is A, the or as this souls, time place at other one at place present it become individuated, them, to or, as were, call minds are also prefer 485 by these, place and time.

NeverthelessLeibniz will return to a metaphysicaltheory of individuation from the late 1670's resulting in his reacceptanceof substantialforms in a Platonisedfashion. 486 his Here be divinity. his concern This is what Mercer will call will metaphysicsof development In the immaterial the themes of of substances solely. elaborating with focus Disputatio there three we can areas are main on: 1) only the perhaps

U3Disputatio, section 2, p. 22-23 4" Leibniz (1714-15) Letters to Nicolas Remond,in Philosophical Papers, p. 655, seeChristia Mercer (1997) `MechanisingAristotle: Leibniz and Reformed Philosophy,' in M. A. Stewart,Studiesin Philosophy. Oxford: ClarendenPress,pp. 117-152for the debateaboutthe year Seventeenth-Century when Leibniz's walk took place. 40 Leibniz (1672) ConfessioPhilosophi, quoted in Cover, J. A. and O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. (1999), P. 60-1 6 Mercer (2001), chapter5

155 individuals are real and exist, 2) there is no common nature between substances,and 3) substances are individuated by their whole entity.

The idea that only individuals are real is common to both the Disputatio in Monadology: `monads he the As later the tells Leibniz's are us philosophy. and true atoms of nature; in a word, the elementsof things.'487A more precise statement is to be found in the New System of the Nature of Substances and their Communication: `It is only metaphysical or substantial points (constituted by forms be both indivisible them there would without and and real, or souls) which are latter '488 In be the there true multiplicity. no would unities nothing real, since without individual: intensional back brought the to the aspects of quotation we are also indivisibility and numerical distinction. These aspectsare to be found in exactly the later in form the philosophy: same 1) the monad is indivisible, as Leibniz will tells us in the Monadology: `The monad, of which we will be speakinghere, is nothing but a simple substance, has that into parts which no composites; simple, meaning without which enters ... is '489 divisibility possible. parts,neither extension,nor shape,nor 2) the monad is numerically distinct, as Leibniz tells us in the New Essays:

In addition to the difference of time and place [an external principle] there must always be an internal principle of distinction [... ] The `principle of individuation' reduces, in the case of individuals, to the been just distinction have If I two speaking. of of which principle individuals were perfectly similar and equal, in short, indistinguishable in themselves, there would be no principle of individuation. I would even be individual in there to that would no such a case say venture distinctness, no separate individuals. 490

With the intensional aspects of individual substance we may also discern why Leibniz rejects material substancesin favour of immaterial substances.That is, furnish divisible things are physically cannot and so a principle of unity. material

"' Leibniz (1714) Monadology, section 3, in Philosophical Texts,p. 19 `" Leibniz (1695) New Systemof the Nature of Substancesand their Communication,section 11, in Philosophical Texts,p. 149 4" Leibniz (1714) Monadology, sections 1 and 3, in Philosophical Texts,p. 19 1 Leibniz, New Essays,pp. 229-30

156 found in be is fundamental to argument also However, a secondand perhapsmore Leibniz's later writings. As Coudert notes this will be based in the neo-Platonic and limitation but is in is idea a privation or of that matter some sense not real gnostic `spirit. -)491Leibniz himself draws attention to this in the Refutation of Spinoza of 1708:

The cabalists seem to say that matter, on account of the vileness of its is hence, there that be exist; can created nor essence, can neither Henry More that maintains as matter, and spirit absolutely no matter, or in his cabalistic theses, are one and the same thing [... ] There is some [... ] it is but I in think understood these sufficiently not truth words, Merely passive matter is something very low, that is, wanting in all force, 192 in incomplete in the but such a thing consists only abstraction. or

Leibniz will say that `actions and passionsproperly belong to individual substances' 493 discussion is Leibniz's this Metaphysics. Discourse of principle the on as early as 1695: Dynamicum in Specimen the of most prominent Active force (which some not unreasonably call power) is of two kinds. There is primitive active force, which is inherent in all corporeal [passive] force, derivative is there which active substance as such ... and is as it were the limitation of primitive force brought about by the force is Primitive bodies which none with each other.... collision of first the to the soul or substantial than entelechy corresponds other form; but for that very reason it relates only to general causes, which are force is Passive [... ] to similarly of two explain phenomena not enough kinds, primitive and derivative. The primitive force of being acted upon Scholastics if the understood, properly constitutes what, of resistance or interpenetrate, bodies is It cannot why what explains call primary matter. but present an obstacle to one another.... The derivative force of being in itself in therefore secondary matter various ways shows acted upon [that is, composites] 494

Here we seethat active force is the entelechy associatedwith the soul or substantial form of individual substancewhereas passive or derived force is associatedwith in be inconsistencies However First, this there to two seem account. primitive matter.

491Allison Coudert (1995), pp. 87-94 492Leibniz (1708) Refutation of Spinoza, in Philosophical Papers, pp. 486-7 493Leibniz (1686) Discourse on Metaphysics,section 8, in Philosophical Texts,p. 59 494Leibniz (1695) SpecimenDynamicum, sections6-7, in Philosophical Tarts, pp. 155-6

157 is, bodies. is force that substance, material associated corporeal also with active Second, this description would seem to fit into the traditional Aristotelian account of individual substance where a substantial form actualises the potential of primary determine is for To the exact relation this must either case we see not correct matter. between active and passive force. In the Specimen Dynamicum a distinction is made between a metaphysics of active force and a physics of passive force or primary found in letters be is Leibniz's information de More to to this subject on matter. Voider and Bernoulli:

I distinguish

(1) the primitive ...

Entelechy or Soul, (2) Matter, i. e.

Monad by (3) the completed power, or passive matter, primitive primary 495

these

two...

When I say that primary matter is that which is merely passive and for it be from forms, I twice, thing the would souls or said same separated the same if I had said that it is merely passive and separate from all activity. Forms are for me nothing but activities or entelechies, and have I forms the preferred to say that primary entelechies. are substantial the active is incomplete without the passive, and the passive without the form form than to and without without rather of matter speak active, 496 matter... We saw in the passage from the Refutation of Spinoza above that Leibniz termed in We incomplete this the quotations also as see or an abstraction. passive matter force is find here but the that the of monad we also active also termed as above incomplete. What this seems to point to is that speaking of the monad as either i. i. is e. e. active, spirit, passive, as or matter, completely an abstraction. completely Leibniz tells us the reason he uses these terms is so as not to be confused with an Aristotelian distinction. The way in which Leibniz is using this terminology can be Reflections Universal Spirit: Doctrine Single in the the on of a seen

known that there are degreesin all things. There is an infinity of It is ... degreesbetweenmotions of any kind whatever and perfect rest, between hardness and perfect fluidity without resistance, between God and nothing. Thus there is likewise an infinity of degreesbetween an active

4" Leibniz (1699-1706)Correspondencewith de Voider, in Philosophical Papers,p. 530 496Leibniz (1698-9) Correspondencewith Bernoulli, in Philosophical Papers,pp. 511-2

158 being as great as it can be and pure passivity. It is unreasonable, therefore, to recognise only a single active being, that is, a universal 497 is spirit, and a single passive one, that matter.

Here we see that the relation between pure activity and pure passivity is one of degreerather than of kind - there is an infinite order of limitations between activity and passivity. However there are two axes along which limitations occur: first, between God and created things, and second, on the level of created things. What Leibniz seemsto be arguing here is that there are both degrees of perfection and degreesof imperfection, as he statesin the Monadology: `... createdthings have their from influence have imperfections God, but from their the their they of perfections is bounded. '498 That this which are necessarily is, part of an emanative own natures, relation where God confers his perfections on created things, but at the level of degree things their of perfection is not a relation to God, but amongst other created idea In Leibniz the that individual souls are things. this that way argues created 499 is from `world-soul' erroneoUS. Universal spirit is an a universal spirit or produced being formed level than the things on rather a relation to God. of created abstraction So far in our discussionwe have seenhow someof the basic ideasused in the Disputatio inform Leibniz's later metaphysics of the monad. We may also see that the way in which they are developed further is through a theory of emanation. This is further confirmed with the theme that there is no common nature between substances. This notion occurs in the later Leibniz in its most famous form in the Monadology formula that monads have `no windows' through which `anything could the with in or go out ... neither substance nor accident can come into a monad from come is found in a more complex context in the earlier work A Specimen of '-'w It outside. Discoveries of 1686:

From the notion of an individual substanceit follows in metaphysical ... rigour that all the operationsof substances,both actions and passions,are spontaneous,and that with the exception of the dependenceof creatures

497Leibniz (1702) Reflections on the Doctrine of Single Universal Spirit, in Philosophical Papers, a p. 559

`99Leibniz (1714) Monadology, section42, in Philosophical Texts,p. 273 499ibid, p. 555 500Leibniz (1714) Monadology, section 7, in Philosophical Texts, 269 p.

159 intelligible. is For whatever influx from God, to the other one no real on happensto each one of them would flow from its nature and its notion 50' be if the to rest were supposed absent. even That is every monad has its own unique nature and has no influence on the nature of further develops idea in his later in Leibniz The this way which monad. any other harmony. is, That God is through the notion of pre-established prephilosophy it's harmony) (emanative that the the so actions and nature of monad establishes but in harmony monads also with the physical with all other passionsare not only harmony). (reflective world Further confirmation of Leibniz's use of emanationis provided when we turn its by individuated is theme that third the whole entity. To give an to substance in later Leibniz's is how the theory philosophy we manifest of whole entity example may turn to the Discourse on Metaphysics: The nature of an individual substance or of a complete being is to have a it is that complete sufficient to contain and to allow us to so notion deduce from it all the predicates of the subject to which the notion is haecceity [... ] God, individual the notion or sees attributed who sees ... in it at the same time the foundation and the reason for all the predicates 502 be belong it.... truly to to said which can Here we may see the whole entity theory in its `pure' form as `a notion so complete' it is in the to terms of the complete-concept theory of the monad. uses put also and We may also see that there are in fact two different approaches to the completeby doctrine. First, it is commentators, the complete as commonly accepted concept its individual is defined predicates. Leibniz will say all an as containing concept of 503 in in-esse the that predicates are contained concept of substance. As we or virtually have seen this is the basis of the Couturat-Russell `inclusion'

interpretation of

Leibniz commentary and takes up a fundamental role in Deleuze's deduction of the However the passage above also suggests a second path in terms of the monad. being in in God the that: `... God's understanding is the concept mind of complete

so'Leibniz (1686) A Specimenof Discoveries, in philosophical Writings, p. 79 302Leibniz (1686) Discourse on Metaphysics,section 8, in Philosophical Texts,p. 60 503ibid, p. 59

160 depend 'S04 In ideas they this the the truths, sense on which or of of eternal realm .... inclusion, for in God is than rather one of a relation of compossibility with monad God choosesthe best possible world. Here we find a theory of emanation that is comparableto Plotinus: determined life is Intellectual-Principle the Life in the Supreme was ... ... There taking the was the potentiality of place vision collectivity of power; is Intellectual-Principle, thus manifested as this universe of arising, all; Being. It stands over the Beings not as itself requiring base but that it may serve them as base through its vision of that Form of the Firsts, the becomes the Intellectual-Principle Formless Form whenever ... determinant of soul it shapes it into Reasoning soul, by communicating a 505 itself has trace of what come to possess.

So in accordancewith the two approachesto the complete concept doctrine we may identify two different logics - the sufficient reason of inclusion and the sufficient is latter harmony it is the which ontologically prior, as and reason of emanative Leibniz statesin the Monadology: in generalare living mirrors or imagesof the universe of created souls ... things, but minds are also images of the divinity itself, or of the very creator of nature. They are capable of knowing the system of the universe, and of imitating it in part through their own samples of architectonic endeavour,each soul being like a little divinity within its own sphere. At this point we have elaboratedthe main factors in Leibniz's theory of individuation so let us now return to how theserelate to Deleuze's interpretation.

Deleuzian Critique

Leibniz makesa most pertinent comment in the Disputatio when he describesScotus as an `extremerealist' in that, as we shall soon see,such an accusationcould also be

S04 Leibniz (1714) Monadology, section 43, in Philosophical Texts,p. 273 505Plotinus (1991) TheEnneads,trans. S. MacKenna, abridgedwith an introduction and notes,J. Dillon. London: Penguin,VI, 7,17, pp.487-8 Leibniz (1714) Monadology, section 83, in Philosophical Texts,p. 280

161 levelled against Deleuze's position. In order to see how this applies we shall first provide a summary of this argument. This will then allow us to make a comparison Leibniz. interpretation Deleuze's of with

By describing Scotus as being an extreme realist Leibniz is effectively have him Platonism existence outside the of a certain whereupon universals accusing intention beyond Scotus' for he Certainly determination this own argues goes mind. that the individual is composed of formally distinct parts which do not really exist based is Scotus' individual. However, Leibniz's the of on a critique assertion outside in To have the chapter. reiterate the main which we outlined previously assumptions line of this critique, Leibniz sees the most problematic aspect of Scotus' theory of individuation as being Scotus' formulation of the formal distinction. Let us recall that the Scholastics utilised two common distinctions:

the real distinction

between

separable things, and a distinction of reason between mental concepts created by an interested in However, Scholastics the problem of the the were also mind. activity of how a distinction of reason could have a foundation in reality and so provide a basis for epistemology. Scotus' solution to this problem is the formal distinction -a distinction within reality which the mind is able to recognise. Leibniz outlines two is Ockham's if first in Disputatio. The the that this the argument against arguments formal distinction is accepted then there is no way in which to determine a `fuller' real distinction. The second argument is via a more nuanced criticism by Suarez. Suarez accepts the idea of a well-founded distinction of reason, which he calls the but is be found in the constitution distinction to that reason, argues such a reasoned of the intellect rather than the constitution of the individual. implications

for the ontological

constitution

This has important

of the individual.

For Scotus the

individual is constituted by its quiddity or formal specific difference, which has less than numerical unity, which is then actualised as a numerically singular individual by its haecceity or formal individuating difference. In this sense something `real' has to be added to quiddity in order to make a real numerically singular individual. On the for Suarez and Leibniz the individuating entity is already numerically hand, other singular. If we now return to Leibniz's labelling of Scotus as an extreme realist we his is based on the idea that the formal distinction does not that reasoning may see have any foundation in reality and as such formalities are simply mental abstractions

162 or universals. From Leibniz's perspective Deleuze's position would appear to be even more

defence formal distinction it Deleuze takes the the and redeploys of at a up extreme. description first Deleuze's in his Let turn to of the own philosophy. us pivotal point formal distinction. In Expressionism and Philosophy: Spinoza, Deleuze states:

Formal distinction is definitely a real distinction, expressingas it doesthe different layers of reality that form or constitute a being. Thus it is called formalis a parte rei or actualis ex nature rel. But it is a minimally real distinction because the two really distinct quiddities are coordinate, together making a single being. Real and yet not numerical, such is the 507 formal distinction. statusof Here Deleuze stays relatively close to Scotus. The formal distinction is a `real' distinction but this is not a distinction between separable things. As mentioned is it in `minimally distinction is it that the the sense real' real so a within previously, in Being. Deleuze presentshis own distinctions internal it the true that would specify Repetition: in Difference further and position We can conceive that names or propositions do not have the same sense even while they designate exactly the same thing (as in the case of the Israel Jacob, star, star plan examples: morning evening celebrated blanc). The distinction between these senses is indeed a real distinction, but there is nothing numerical - much less ontological - about it: it is a formal, qualitative or semiological distinction. 508

In this passageDeleuze's relation to Scotus concerningthe ontological status of the formal distinction is more complex. For Scotus the formal distinction is in the first God is distinguish God. formally diverse but to the attributes of place a way distinction between In is God's this there one. respect ontological no ontologically attributes. On the other hand the formal distinction does seemto have an ontological individual. individual in For Scotus is the the the constitution of role composed of different degreesof formal unity. In the final instancefor the individual to becomea real individual something real has to be addedto formal unity in order to produce a

'107 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 64 30"Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 35

163 Deleuze the individual. However, that ontological argue will singular numerically factor at work here is not the formal distinction but Scotus' use of another important the formulated Scotus the negative against of univocity concept univocity. concept: is, is he known that be God through not, that what could only theologians who argued God Scotus Instead, that foundation. has God knowledge proposed of a negative our is, in known is that He because the known be sense, same positively could Deleuze Nevertheless that tells in both His Himself us creations. and univocally, Scotus did not draw on the full consequences of univocity (which would be immanence) and only uses it in an analogical manner as can be seen in the analogical levels of reality in the individual. For this reason Deleuze states that Scotus only ever from this is interesting (it that to perspective note abstractly of univocity conceived formalities Scotus' be Scotus to Deleuze also effectively posits an extreme realist: it Deleuze that full draw To say will the consequences of univocity are abstractions). is haecceity or singularity that is formally distinct and forms true non-numerical individuals.

From Leibniz's position we may see Deleuze is even `more' of an extreme formal distinction to Scotus the Scotus For composea than used was. whereas realist is does individual Deleuze there such a thing: even accept numerical The notion of unity appears only when there is a power takeover in the by the signifier or a corresponding subjectification multiplicity dimension in Unity an empty always operates proceeding.... is The (overcoding). point to that the of system considered supplementary that a rhizome or multiplicity never allows itself to be overcoded, never has available a supplementary dimension over and above its number of 509 lines ....

To counter Deleuze's philosophy Leibniz has three criticisms at his disposal. First, the formal distinction only constitutes an abstraction, second he has no theory of individuation to account for numerical individuals, and third, whatever theory of individuals this system does propose would have a common nature in terms of how they are constituted by a principle outside of themselves.We shall now turn to how Deleuzedoestreats thesepotential criticisms.

51 Deleuze& Guattari, A ThousandPlateaus, pp. 8-9

164 Deleuzian Manoeuvres

but is these fmd in Deleuze's a of criticisms What we system not a refutation if Ockham instance that first In is based we the argue will them. that on philosophy distinction further in is formal distinction there a real then which no way acceptthe Due distinction. to is however thing For Deleuze there be as a real such no can made. his adherenceto immanencethere can only be formal distinctions as a real distinction it. In hence the immanence from be compromise and something separate would fact is in it the Deleuze instance that advocacyof real numerically argue will second distinct individuals that consignsphilosophy to abstraction: What is common to metaphysics and transcendental philosophy is, above impose both they on us: either an this alternative which all, formless nonbeing, or an abyss a groundlessness, undifferentiated ground, individuated differences a supremely or and without properties, without Being and an intensely personalised Form. Without Being or this Form In [... ] have other words, metaphysics and chaos only you will transcendental philosophy reach an agreement to think about those determinable singularities only which are already imprisoned inside a supreme Self or a superior L51°

From this perspective the constitution of individual selves is not an ontological logically is Sense the in Logic be The This where self of can seen phenomenon. 5 1 becomes What this incompossible clear deducedas a seriesof entails singularities. The the later Deleuze's to as realisation turn comes about self philosophy. we when is is, the the that the a matter of percept rather self of constitution possibility, a of its be In to Like the the able stand up on own. must the of self than work art, concept. is idea the instance that the a common nature of self of third the we may see fundamental to the percept. The self as the incompossibility of divergent series of freedom. There is is its the thing that the an art of the gives absolute self singularities dice-throw. So infinite in Nietzschean the that chance we may see that wills self Deleuze's interpretation meets the Scholastic demandsof Leibniz's philosophy by a inverse is if he It if Deleuze Leibniz route. gives us almost a vision as of somewhat

"0 Deie TheLogic of Sense,pp. 105-6 , s11ibid, pp. 118-126

165 had chosen to stay on the path of mechanism rather than the metaphysics he eventually chose. But how are we to choose between these two philosophies except for ones own predilection for either numerical or non-numerical singularity?

However, we may identify two possible inconsistencies in Deleuze's interpretation. The first inconsistency involves Deleuze's own determination of the is, if is how the to then that possibility and according realisation self constituted self, from in his be To immanence the point of view philosophise system. maintained can immanence. The to the second entail an external relation self would already of inconsistency is to be found in Deleuze's criticism of pre-established harmony. Deleuzewill replacethe convergenceof pre-establishedharmony with the divergence diverge it if dice-throw. However, Nietzschean then two the series would mean of that they have come from a previous convergence.Moreover, to the extent that Deleuze's philosophy is basedon divergenceand hencea previous convergencethen his in how real sense work assumesthis originary connection. In this we see a very dice-throw but in form have the the this the and vinculum seen of one chapter we habituation in Hume, determine as such concepts and many other similar also may lines is if in fact in Bergson. In two the which will never cross only way contraction they are in parallel. There are two points to raise here. First, on a metaphysicallevel, because the monad, the world and the totality of all monads are in complete but it indeed in parallel. that they would mean not convergent are are correspondence Second,we have seenhow Deleuze usesLeibniz's differential calculus to show how the mathematical deduction of the monad moves from inflection to inclusion. However, four years after Leibniz invented the differential calculus he expressesthe idea that there is actually a more fundamentalcalculus:

The ancientshad another kind of analysis, different from algebra, which was concernedrather with considering situation. It deals with data and with the positions of unknown entities or their loci [... ] The true analysis is therefore still to be supplied [... ] Furthermore,this point of situation of view, which offers such facility in demonstratingtruths which have been proved only with difficulty by other methods,also opensup a new type of calculus to us which is far different from the algebraic calculus and is new both in its symbols and in the application it makes of them or in its operations. I like to call it Analysis Situs, becauseit explains situation directly and immediately, so that, even if the figures are not drawn, they

166 512 are portrayedto the mind through symbols.... Deleuze will link `analysis situs' with the projected point of view in the body but Loemker will also link it to pieces such as the On the True Theologia Mystica where 513 into We his terms. Leibniz will translate theological may also see this philosophy in the Refutation of Spinoza where Leibniz links God and His creaturesthrough an idea of position: I think that everything is in God, not as the part in the whole, nor as an accident in a subject, but as place, yet a place spiritual and enduring and just is divided, is in that placed, namely, as which not one measuredor God is immenseor everywhere;the world is presentto him.514 Here we are taken back to the idea we expressedat the end of part 1 of this chapter that the monad needsto be understoodin terms of a theory of emanation.Theories of in We is the to the themes turn next chapter. shall also one of will we emanation investigatethe effects theseideashave for Deleuze's philosophy.

512Leibniz (1679) Two Studies in the Logical Calculus, in Philosophical Papers, pp. 254-257 s" ibid, p. 247 s" Leibniz (1708) Refutation of Spinoza, in P. Wiener (ed.X1951) Selections.New York: Charles Scribner,p. 489

167

Chapter 4

The Position of Philosophy

168 The Philosophy of Shock

`What gives you a hard-on theoreticians is the coldness of the clear and distinct.' Lyotard

How is it possible for philosophy

to be anything other than mere mental

masturbation? Or more precisely, how is it possible for a philosophical `discourse' to create or affect something `real'? Or more precise still, how can a philosophical discourse not fail to affect something, although its affections may be ineffectual and unaffected? How one thinks would seem to be fundamental to how one lives yet philosophy rarely ventures out of the academy indulging instead in noodling515 and petty squalling. Perhaps the diminishing

of philosophy may be attributed to its 516 lapse into At what point did thought, like to tendency stultifying scholasticism. Baudrillard's God become too tired to intervene in the world? 5'7

Deleuze will

specifically portray his philosophy as `creative' or

`revolutionary' in the sense that a philosophy of the event is designed to produce a shock to thought; a bolt of lightning to shock thought into thinking. To this effect Deleuze draws on Heidegger and quotes from him the following passage: `Man can think in the sense that he possesses the possibility to do so. This possibility alone however, is no guarantee to us that we are capable of thinking. '518To what extent can it be said that Deleuze has taught us to think again? Certainly two of Deleuze's most prominent contemporaries, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida attest to this aspect of his work. In this respect Foucault will write: `... a lightning storm was produced which will, one day, be given the name of Deleuze: new thought is possible: thought is again possible. '519For Foucault, Deleuze has fined a thought of difference from its

515Noodling is the pastimeof catching fish with your hands.

516l)eleuze will likewise describe his thought as originating in a similar environment: `I belong to a generation, one of the last generations, that was more or less bludgeoned to death with the history of philosophy. ' M. Cressole (1973) `Letter to a Harsh Critic' in Gilles Deleuze (1995 orig. 1990) Negotiations, trans. M. Joughin. New York: Columbia University Press, 5. p. 517Baudrillard, Fatal Strategies, pp. 144-164. Baudrillard makes the point that God has grown too tired to intervene in the destiny of the world in response to a theologian who said God had grown tired of gambling which Baudrillard takes to mean God has grown tired of chance.

sagDeleuze,CinemaII: The Time Image, 56. p. 511Foucault, M. (1977), p. 196.

169 philosophical presuppositions:

The conditions for thinking of difference and repetition, as we have seen, have undergone a progressive expansion. First, it was necessary, along with Aristotle, to abandon the identity of the concept, to reject resemblance within representation, and simultaneously to free ourselves from the philosophy of representation; and finally, it was necessary to free ourselves from Hegel - from the opposition of predicates, from contradiction and negation, from all off dialectics. But there is yet a fourth condition and it is even more formidable than the others.... Difference can only be liberated through the invention of an acategorical 52o thought. As Deleuze will himself say: `Life will no longer be made to appear before the categories of thought; thought will be thrown into the categories of life. 'S2' It is in this sense that Foucault remarks `perhaps one day, this century will be known as Deleuzian. '522For his part Deleuze takes this to mean that of his generation it is he 523 has He the worked most concepts of philosophy. closely with pure who also recognizes

that

staying

precisely

within

the remit

of

thinking

difference

philosophically is perhaps not in itself enough to induce thinking: `Everyone knows that, if an art necessarily imposed the shock or vibration, the world would have 524 long for long have been ' Derrida thinking time. ago, and men would a changed carries these issues further forward in his eulogy to Deleuze: `Deleuze the thinker is have been for the thinker of the event.... From the very beginning, all of his books ... me ... strong provocations to think.... 9525and adds the following qualification:

Yes, we will have all loved philosophy, who can deny it? But, it is true he said it - Deleuze was the one among all of this "generation" who "was doing" philosophy the most gaily, the most innocently. I don't think he have liked would me using the word "thinker" earlier. He would have preferred "philosopher." In this regard he was making himself out to be "the most innocent" (the least guilty) "of doing philosophy."

52°ibid. p. 186

521Cinema II, p. 189

522Foucault (1977), p. 165 523Deleuze,Negotiations, pp. 88-89. su Deleuze,CinemaII, p. 157 su JacquesDerrida (1998) `I'm going to have to wander all alone,' trans. L. Lawlor, Philosophy Today,Spring 1998,p. 3.

170 Undoubtedly, this was the necessary condition in order to leave on the deep incomparably the this mark that will always of century philosophy 526 be his. The mark of a great philosopher and a great professor. So what is the difference between a "thinker"

and a "philosopher"?

Certainly a

in distributes thinking template a or assemblage which philosopher will create a leads but is to this that thought the or experience originary mode of what certain way in the first place? This chapter will be concerned with the place of thought within Deleuze's philosophy. In the first part of this chapter we will trace the position of development. Deleuze's historical in the trajectory terms philosophical thought of of The second part of this chapter will explore the consequences that this position of thought has for his philosophy.

526bid, p. 4

171 What is left of thinking?

The role of thought in Deleuze's philosophy is inextricably linked to his own basic First outline of this position through provide a position. we will philosophical his early work on Hume, Bergson and Nietzsche. This in turn provides the basis of Deleuze's approach to a theory of expression. Second we shall analyse Deleuze's theory of expression in his early and late works. Finally we shall turn to the organisation of a logic of expression. Eariv Develoi meat The first figure of major philosophical import to Deleuze is Hume. As we outlined in the Introduction the first and perhapsforemost factor in Deleuze's philosophy is that thought and philosophy are constructions. The question then is with what they are constructed.Deleuze explicitly turns to this matter in the preface he wrote for the English edition of Dialogues: `I have always felt that I am an empiricist, that is, a pluralist.'527 For Deleuze experience can't be understood through ready-made conceptsbut must first be taken as it is, in its undiluted multiplicity: Empiricism starts with things, in such a way that of analysing states ... non-pre-existent concepts can be extracted from them. States of things are neither unities nor totalities, but multiplicities.... The essential thing, from the point of view of empiricism, is the noun multiplicity.... In a multiplicity what counts are not the terms or elements, but what there is `between, ' the between, a set of relations which are not separable from 529 each other.

Deleuze's use of the `between,' like multiplicity, is to be understood as a noun. Objects,like concepts,are also not ready madebut are part of a differential field. But how are we to make senseof the `multiplicity' of the `differential field? ' For this purposeDeleuzeturns to Bergson. In Bergson we find some very precise answers to these points. Firstly, in

527Gilles Deleuze& Clare Parnet(1987 orig. 1977) Dialogues, trans. H. Tomlinson & B. Habberjam. London: Athlone, p. vii 523bid, pp. vii-viii

172 in think terms of a multiplicity to order

requires an open as opposed to a closed

is based Here thought thought. the on the notion that a concept of an open system of

in Deleuze Cinema 1: is tells totality, as us not a completed or whole multiplicity According to Bergson the whole is neither given nor giveable.... Many philosophers had already said that the whole was neither given nor giveable: they simply concluded from this that the whole was a different: is if the whole Bergson's very conclusion meaninglessnotion. is not giveable it is becauseit is the Open, and becauseits nature is to 529 in changeconstantly,or to give rise to somethingnew, short, to endure. This gives rise to a new possibility for thought, for an open thought would itself encapsulate the movement of multiplicity:

`... one must be capable of thinking the

is is, the this the that the singular complete a and of new, remarkable production ... describe '530 Bergson the process of this new way of of philosophy. will conversion thinking in The Creative Mind:

It [our mind] can be installed in the mobile reality, adopt its ceaselessly do it do But direction, in it intuitively. to that, must grasp changing short, itself violence, reverse the direction of the operation by which it ordinarily thinks, continually upsetting its categories, or rather, recasting them. In so doing it will arrive at fluid concepts, capable of following reality in all its windings and of adopting the very movement of the inner life of things [... ] To philosophise means to reverse the normal direction 531 of the workings of thought.

There are two points to be drawn from this passage.The first point is that as Deleuze notes in Bergsonismthe idea of intuition is not an ill-defined concept but forms the 532 intuition is Bergson's It discern through that of philosophy. method we very differencesin kind (duration or qualitative multiplicity) as opposedto differences in degree(spaceor quantitative multiplicity). The secondpoint is that if in order `think' in terms of qualitative multiplicity one must `reversethe natural direction of thought'

I" Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement Image, p. 9 530ibid. p. 7

531Henri Bergson(1946 orig. 1941) The Creative Mind, trans M. L. Adison. New Jersey:Citadel Press,p. 190 532Gilles Deleuze(1988 orig. 1966) Bergsonism,trans. H. Tomlinson & B. Habbeijam. New York: Zone Books, pp. 13-35

173 further turn To this does to thought. we shall this examine ascribe then what position to Bergson's Matter and Memory.

In Matter and Memory Bergson starts from the supposition that we images idea the ' The `images. only not through concerns of the world experience in image is the body but `out the as another considered there' which also world it is is that body to the However not only the extent provided a special status world. 533 Bergson from `within' but through affections. also experiencedthrough perception in the faculty is world: that that actions our presents a perception argues My body, an object destined to move other objects, is ... a centre of [... ] I birth it to call matter the representation a cannot give action; images these images, same matter and perception of aggregate of 534 body. image, my to the particular one of action eventual referred The fundamental image in this schema is the brain: `... the brain appears to us to be instrument in instrument of to the an movement received and regard of analysis an has both brain The '535 thought a in or regard to the movement executed. selection forms `zone it in that is the It of a sense passive an active aspect. and passive 536 In this way thought indetermination' as not all thoughts are executed as actions. On '137 `virtual the Bergson form delayed in call action. time will which of a exists Bergson As brought is to how it is in hand real action. this virtuality active other but by taking is done by the to away action virtual this adding something not notes in find We the interest it. this do of a comparison those aspect which not consideration of the active perception of an object:

To obtain this conversion from the virtual to the actual, it would be but, light the to throw on the contrary, to object, on more necessary,not itself, by it its diminish the to greater part of so aspects, obscuresome of that the remainder, instead of being encasedin its surroundings as a 538 itself detach thing, should as a picture.

533Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 17 " ibid. pp. 20-22

533ibid. p. 30 s ibid. p. 32 537ibid. p. 50 538ibid. p. 36

174 As such the brain is an organ of attention to life and selects or contracts actions but is its interests. So to that thought passive essentially according we may see becomes active through selection. With this formulation we have already come to some of the main points that Deleuze will further develop through Nietzsche.

With Nietzsche it would appearthat Deleuze's early studies reach a state of Nietzschean Deleuze duration Instead Bergson's duree turns to the completion. of or eternal return which affirms the being of becoming; instead of the elan vital or is instead is force there the to there the of contraction effort power; creative and will dice throw which affirms all chance in its selection of multiplicity. In terms of Nietzsche's approachto multiplicity he is not concernedwith questions of the sort `what is it? ' but of the type `which one is it? ': According to Nietzsche the question "which one?" means this: what are the forces which take hold of a thing, what is the will that possesses it? Which one is expressed, manifested and even hidden in it? We are led to essence only by the question: which one? For essence is merely the sense is "what the Moreover, the thing.... ask question when we and value of it? " we not only fall into the worst metaphysics but in fact we merely ask the question "which one?" in a blind, unconscious and confused way. The question "what is it? " is a way of establishing a sense seen from another point of view. Essence, being, is a perspectival reality and 539 presupposes a plurality.

In a similar way as we saw in Bergson's method of intuition earlier Nietzsche's method of `which one' (genealogy) essentially constitutes a typology and form of distribution. This is anchoredin a metaphysicsof force: We will never find the senseof something (of a human, a biological or even a physical phenomenon) if we do not know the force which appropriatesthe thing, which exploits it, which takes possessionof it or is expressed in it. A phenomenon is not an appearanceor even an apparition but a sign, a symptom which finds its meaning in an existing force. The whole of philosophy is a symptomatology,and a semeiology [... ] All force is appropriation, domination, exploitation of a quantity of 540 reality.

539Deleuze,Nietzscheand Philosophy, pp. 76-77 xo ibid. p. 3

175 Nietzsche's basic metaphysicalapproachis not dissimilar to that of the Stoics except instead of mixtures it is force that plays the primary role and effects are entirely it. following This to the position to consciousness and thought: accords subjugated

To remind consciousness of its necessary modesty is to take it for what it is: a symptom; nothing but the symptom of a deeper transformation of in factor is body forces. "Perhaps the the all only entirely non-spiritual spiritual development" [... ] the servility of consciousness ... merely testifies to the "formation of a superior body. )9541

It is only through the Nietzscheandice-throw and the will to power that thought frees itself from this subjugation. Or as we have already quoted from Deleuze's idea of the ideal gamein Chapter2: `... only thought finds it possible to affirm all chanceand to is in it And 'S42 this sensethat we may see into make chance an object of affrmation. why Deleuze considers his work as a work of philosophy rather than a work of thought: a non-subjugated thought is no longer thought as such but a map of 2, Deleuze's However, in Chapter affirmation of chance singularities. as we argued introduces an unresolved physical principle into his philosophy. We shall now in how his in this theories examine of expression general. plays out What is a Logic of Expression? In its most general sense a logic of expression is a metaphysical distinction of different orders of `reality' where one order is manifested or expressedin another back Parmenides One trace the to this type thought may way and Plato order. all of where the world of forms is expressedin the world of appearances.For Deleuze however expression finds its most rigorous formulation in the work of Spinoza.543 Spinoza's philosophy is characterized by two main factors: immanence and First God is immanent to that which he produceswhich is to say that God univocity. is equally expressedin himself as he is in that which he expresses.Second God is expressedunivocally in his expressionswhich is to say that all expressionshave the

54'ibid. p. 39 342Delenze,The Logic of Sense, 60 p. 543Deleuze,Expressionismin Philosophy. Spinoza, pp. 13-22

176 his from deduces theory God. Spinoza in these to points relation same sense or value it be infinite be infinite infinite. For there to truly and the nothing outside the can of his internal in is implicated infinite the God of production as the absolute so been idea had A in God. is is, the world previously similar enfolded expressions, that be figure finite by Cusa that Nicholas the can any taken up metaphor of who used is The God. infinite line from, deduced pursue the shall to, question we of or reduced how a theory of immanence operates in Deleuze's philosophy and the distribution of issues identify First the this of that some thought and metaphysics we shall produces. investigate this matter. to to consider we need

In Deleuze's formative work we may already see a logic of expression developing in terms of the metaphysics already present in Bergson and Nietzsche. Returning to a previous quotation Bergson will state that `to philosophise means to 544 `natural' As the direction thought. such the the of workings of normal reverse direction of thought is from the virtual to the actual (from virtual action to real direction in is the to For Bergson opposite the aim of philosophy move actualisation). from the actual to the virtual in order to elaborate the `reality' from which thought by itself influenced is is Bergson's one of the approach constituted. and the world infinitesimal Leibniz's thought, greatest advances of modem

calculus: `The most

infinitesimal known investigation the to mind, powerful method of born of that very reversal. '-545Leibniz's

calculus, was

invention of the infinitesimal

calculus

provides an apparently concrete way in which to conceive the world as a process of integration differentiation The themselves and mathematical of processes expression. between limits determining the to tangent the the and area a curve operations of are fundamental but in itself This calculus stands may not seem particularly on a curve. Newtonian-Einsteinian the the precisely, more cornerstone of modem physics, or as derivation of modem physics. An innovation with more philosophical implications is Dennis Gabor's invention of the hologram which utilized calculus in the form of Fourier's mathematical theorem:

The Fourier theorem states that any pattern of organisation can be

54'Bergson,The Creative Mind, p. 190 545ibid.

177 analysed into, and represented by, a series of regular waveforms of different amplitudes and frequencies. These regular waveforms can in turn be superimposed,convolved, with one another and, by way of the inverse Fourier procedure, can be retransformed to obtain the original space-time configuration [... ] Dennis Gabor ... the inventor of the hologram, basedhis discovery on the fact that one can store interference patterns of waveforms produced by the reflection or refraction of light from an object on a photographic film and reconstruct from such a film the image of the object. The description of the enfolded organisation of the stored potential for reconstruction is related to the unfolded spacetime description of the object by a Fourier transform.... The idea of an enfolded and an unfolded organisation of reality leads to the simple intuition that the world we inhabit is an integration of a `deeper' reality and that we can accessthis order through its inverse process of differentiation. However, this intuition does simple not resolve the metaphysicsof the calculus and posesa number of problems of its own. The first problem is that there is always a tendencyto reify differential and integral orders. That is, do differentiation and integration lead to differential and integral orders of reality or should they be conceived as completely processual?The distinction being made here is whether there are end products of differentiation and integration or whether differential and integral orders occur in process. The second problem is that whether these orders are static or processual there is still the question of the `matter' of that which is differentiated/differentiating and its relation to a originary principle of differentiation. The third problem is the general organisational structure of the theory of expression or schemaof calculus. That is how it is conceived as either immanent or transcendentand the number of transformations used to constitute reality. Of course, these three issues are not entirely exclusive of each other. With these points in mind we shall now turn to Deleuze'stheoriesof expression.

Delenze's early expression Deleuze's first complete theory of expression is to be found in Difference and Repetition. However the form this will take is already present in Nietzsche and 546Karl Pribram (1986) "'Rte Cognitive Revolution and Mind/Brain Issues," American Psychologist, May, p. 515

178 Philosophy where he will

interpret Nietzsche's philosophy as essentially a

differential philosophy:

The will to power is to force as the differential and genetic added ... it [... ] More internal its the precisely, production element, as element of is added to force as the internal principle of the determination of its quality in a relation (x+dx) and as the internal principle of the itself (dy/dx). The determination this will to relation quantitative of power must be described as the genealogical element of force and of forces. 547

This approachculminates in Difference and Repetition where Deleuze resituateshis is, differential Ideas, Nietzsche that theory of Kantian theory a of reading of within a Ideas:

Ideas presentthree moments:undeterminedwith regardto their object, ... determinablewith regardsto objects of experience,and bearing the ideal of an infinite determination with regards concepts of the understanding [... ] The principle of a generaldifferential philosophy must be the object dx The appears as simultaneously of a rigorous exposition... symbol undetermined, determinable and determination. Three principles which together form a sufficient reason correspond to these three aspects: a principle of determinability correspondsto the undeterminedas such (dx, dy); a principle of reciprocal determination corresponds to the really determinable(dy/dx); a principle of complete determination corresponds to the effectively determined (values of dy/dx). In short, dx is the Idea....54s In order to understandthis we must return to the Nietzscheanthematic of a field of forces. The first phase of the Idea is as a determinable force which has `some' but force forces. is in The this to other undetermined relation secondphase quantity idea is determination differential forces the the relation which provides us of via a of with the quality of reciprocal forces. The final phase involves the complete determinationof force as singular values. Here Deleuzeis providing us with a genetic differentiation of which results in the complete determination of a field of account This processis also a determinationof force and as such the differential singularities.

347Deleuze,Nietzscheand Philosophy, p. 51

I" Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 169-71

179 field is associated with a potential or intensity which precipitates Deleuze's account

for field differential integration. The the the provides conditions potential of of intensity: difference `cancel' their to of singularities Intensity is the uncancellablein difference of quantity, but this difference being is by precisely the cancelled extension, extension of quantity inside distributed is intensive difference by turned out and process which in such a way as to be dispelled, compensated,equalised and suppressed in the extensity which it creates.M9 For Deleuze, this constitutes the process of integration (which he will also term actualisation or `differentiation').

Integration occurs as a depotentialisation across

the intensive gradients of singularities akin to lightning flashes. As such singularities or events are actualised to form extension.

Let us now turn to the composition of this theory of expression. The differential field is transcendental to extension but what is the constitution of the differential field itself? For this purpose Deleuze turns to a static ontological genesis in terms of the will to power (we have already seen in Chapter 2 that the aleatory The Sense). in The Logic the will to power constitutes the same role of point plays differential

order from the pure becoming of forces which Deleuze will term a

`groundless ground. ' or `dark precursor. '55° This is, as it were, the `medium' of the differential field. In this schema one may see that the order of the actual is most definitely a processual order in that it occurs between singular intensities. However, the position of the virtual is not so clear. The formation of singularities across the medium of a pure becoming would certainly point towards a processual order but the added organisational factor of the will

to power provides for a much more

in The two the to univocal composition: combines moments power will complicated form of the Nietzschean dice throw. 55' The first moment is the affirmation of chance in the throw of the dice to which Deleuze attributes the power of differentiation. The is the affirmation of the eternal return as the return of the different in moment second the combination which the dice produces, to which Deleuze attributes the power of

-`9ibid. p. 233

33°Deleuze,Difference and Repetition, p. 227

551Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 25-29

180 differenciation.

In this sense Deleuze's interpretation of the will to power is a

is in first in is becoming. It that the to the place process, power will mediation of pure that which happens `between, ' and produces the differential field as a `static' order. Is the will to power perhaps an extraneous principle to the extent that it is a process his himself becoming)? Deleuze (of that theories recognise of will pure process a of his by Lacanian influenced structuralism where are expression pre-Anti-Oedipus theory of the will to power in Difference and Repetition and the `object=x' of the be in The Sense Logic seen to play the part of a primary may of aleatory point into introducing later Deleuze transcendence this an element of will see as signifier. the theory of expression: `Is there a "best" plane that would not hand over immanence

to

Something=x

and

that

would

no

longer

mimic

anything

transcendent?'552We shall now explore this through Deleuze's theory of expression in his later work.

Deleuze's late expression `We requirejust a little order to protect us from chaos.'553 The main difference between Deleuze's early and late theories of expressionis that differentiation being in find the theories produced of order early a static we whereas by a secondary principle of movement it will now be movement that plays the primary principle of the system. To explore this we will turn to Deleuze's final in found be theory to what also turned out to be his final of expression statementon a book with Felix Guattari: What is Philosophy? In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari begin their theory of expression infinite flux the of movement: notion of a virtual chaos,a chaotic with Chaosis defined not so much by its disorder as by the infinite speedwith which every form taking shape in it vanishes.It is a void that is not a nothingnessbut a virtual, containing all possible particles and drawing forms, possible all out which spring up only to disappearimmediately,

552De1euze& Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 59 sssibid. p. 201

181 Chaos is consequence. an without consistency or reference, without s-14 infinite speedof birth and disappearance. The virtual chaos produces a state of affairs through what is described as a process of `slowing down. ' The basic intuition of a slowing down of the infinite would seem to lead to the notion that a form of differentiation is taking place here, that is, a loss of (mathematical) power. However this seems less clear cut to the extent that Deleuze in is Deleuze that the a state of affairs. actualised specifically virtual chaos posits function to this a operation attributes

of science as opposed to a concept of

philosophy:

by relinquishing the infinite, science gives a reference to the virtual, ... is fantastic down, [... ] It it functions through a slowing actualises which and it is by slowing down that matter, as well as the scientific thought function is is A it to actualised. a Slowpenetrate prepositions, able with in limit down is ] [... To to chaos to which all speeds set a slow motion determined form they that as abscissa,at the a variable are subject, so be forms limit that time the constant cannot gone a universal as same beyond 555 .... A state of affairs `sections' the virtual chaos via a plane of reference that acts as a lateral or transcendental condition.

Here we may see that actualisation is not

in in integration. is drop It the form of a plane of potential a synonymous with reference (limit) that gives actualisation the power to proceed:

depotentialization has been carried out that makes operation of an ... from distinct the starting comparisonof powers which a thing or possible In develop body (integration). general, a state of affairs does may well a from it taking a potential that is not actualise a chaotic virtual without distributed in the systemof ordinates.5g The state of affairs is a mixture or mass of independentvariables.557To the extent that it is potentialised from the virtual chaos it is already in relation to a differential but determination independent the of of relations gradient variables in turn

s4 ibid. p. 118 553ibid. s56ibid. p. 122 557ibid. p. 153

182 distinguish singularities in the differential gradient. However this movement in the `opposite' direction from the actual to the virtual is no longer according to a its in finds The function, but the to concept place concept. a philosophical scientific

virtual rather than the actual: The concept is an incorporeal, even though it is incarnated or effectuated in bodies. But, in fact, it is not mixed up with the state of affairs in which it is effectuated. It does not have spatiotemporal coordinates, only intensive ordinates. It has no energy, only intensities; it is anenergetic.... The concept speaks the event, not the essence or the thing - pure Event, a hecceity, an entity.... 558

However, if the concept is virtual then what relation does it have with the virtual Deleuze it tells us on this point: is How to the reach concept? possible chaos? if we go back up in the opposite direction, from states of affairs to the ... The it is because is line the the the not same virtual... same not virtual, has but is longer that the rather virtuality chaotic virtual no virtual become consistent, that has become an entity formed on a plane of immanence that sections the chaos. This is what we call the Event, or the The happens. in its that that everything own eludes actualisation part Event is not the state of affairs. It is actualised in a state of affairs, in a body, in a lived, but it has a shadowy and secret part that is continually in from its to contrast with the state of or added actualisation: subtracted kept infinite has but it begins the gained or neither nor ends affairs, 559 it movement to which gives consistency.

Unlike the function which operates according to a plane of reference, the immanence. is The to of concept/event operates a plane according concept/event defined not by the process of `slowing down' whereby the function is actualised is, That it has limit but the to to of virtual chaos. configuring a according a according it Thereby instead becoming the maintains pure of exo-consistency. endo-consistency form but finds its finitude in the the chaos relative of the consistentplane it virtual of forms:

0

The concept is both absolute and relative: it is relative to its own ... 538ibid. p. 22 559ibid. p. 156

183 it is defined, to to the which on and to plane components, other concepts, the problems it is supposedto resolve; but it is absolute through the condensation it carries out, the site it occupies on the plane, and the it is but insofar it As to the whole absolute, assigns problem. conditions as it is fragmentary it is relative. It is infinite through its survey or its speed but finite through its movement that traces the contour of its 5° components. In terms of the overall structure of this theory of expression Deleuze will state: `Concepts and functions two types of multiplicities or varieties whose appear as ... both different. '-561 From the actual and the consistent this view of point are natures far both `between. ' So have they are we provided as occur processual orders; virtual in his late Deleuze's brief theories early and of expression work, shortly outline of a `expressional deeper the the to turn organisation general of of a exploration we shall schema.'

First

however,

we

shall

examine

the

nature

of

that

which

is

differentiated/integrated.

The transcendental

In both Deleuze's early and late theories of expression we find the idea that the is by Deleuze transcendental which governed a energy will term `intensity. ' virtual As we have seen Deleuze stresses how this transcendental energy is different in kind to what is commonly considered to be physical energy. Intensity is of the form of the unequal which gives way to a equalising process in the form of an extensity or state for However, a condition to be truly transcendental can its nature have any affairs. of it himself Deleuze to that will which produces at all? state in The Logic of relation Sense:

We seek to determine an impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field, which does not resemble the corresponding empirical fields, and which neverthelessis not confusedwith an undifferentiated depth.-562 In defining a transcendentalfield it cannot borrow the characteristicsof that which it

360bid. p. 21 '6' ibid. p. 127

W The Logic of Sense, p. 102

184 is happening Deleuze be however This to speaks of the when what seems constitutes. in `potential. ' More in in terms terms the of a precisely, of unequal or virtual designating an intensity of the virtual Deleuze is speaking of the virtual from an in itself does This not necessarily pose a problem unless the perspective. exterior descriptive is then used as a principle of the virtual itself. However Deleuze does fundamental becoming (the the the as principle of the of essence unequal) posit is in in We the the this event a state of actualised whereby process earlier saw virtual. immune In is to this that the there actualisation. remains of event a part affairs where is function it being is the the there part of which of event of an excess or reserve way defined as the unequal in itself. As such it would seem that Deleuze's theories of inherently is, is being idealism, form that transcendental a realism of expression are a in by We this transcendental. to the assertion more context place now shall ascribed turning to an analysis of the schema of expression that Deleuze utilises.

Schemasof Expression In terms of a theory of calculus one of the simplest forms that a schemaof expression following: is the take can

Primary medium -+ Differentiation -+ Integration

We shall term this the classical schema.In our explication of Deleuze's theories of expressionwe may see that the schemain Difference and Repetition is a variant of this form:

(Dark Precursor-*Da`0f)

Differential field ->o'

'a`O' Actualisation

The main difference being that the dark precursor is transcendentallydeducedfrom the differential field rather than being posited from the outset. However in terms of form is there that its organisationcan take: schemas another equally simple general Differentiation F-- Primary Medium -+ Integration

185 We shall term this the split-schema of expression. Obviously whereas the classical schemais uni-directional the split schemais bi-directional. We have already seenthat Deleuze's theory of expressionin What is philosophy? has a bi-directional character: Virtual Chaos

ConsistentVirtual'-

I

-->""

Stateof Affairs

So can it be said that the type of expression operating here is of the split-schema variety? In Deleuze's early theory of expression the differential field always mediates between primary chaos and actualisation but here there is a direct connection from the chaotic virtual to the state of affairs. So has the actual organisation of the theory been instance last In the this would appear not to be the of expression re-evaluated? case as even though actualisation operates directly from the chaotic virtual to the actual this is still accompanied by a drop in potential even though this may not be directly accessible by the concept. In this way Deleuze's later schema continues along a uni-directional theme:

-> Chaotic Virtual -+

Planeof Reference

(ConsistentVirtual

I

Stateof Affairs)

Planeof Immanence 4--

By placing the primary principle `at the end of the line' (functional) differentiation continues to play a mediating factor of the primary principle in the overall schema. We have arguedthat Deleuze's theoriesof expressionare organised according to the classical schemabut is there any reason why the split-schema of expression should automatically be rejected? Working from an entirely different (infinite) logic

186 Spinoza first the the whom split-schema was of expression perhaps philosopher of Deleuze

called

the

`prince

of

philosophers'

because of

his adherence to

immanence. 563Although strictly speaking Spinoza proposed a multi-schema rather than a split-schema of expression because God as the absolute infinite produces infinite attributes. However, only two of these attributes are known, thought and extension:

Thought E- God or primary substance -+ Extension

As such thought and extension develop in parallel or in correspondencewith each interested in `What he Deleuze's In Spinoza me most state: will own study of other. Spinoza wasn't his Substance,but the composition of finite modes [... ] That is: the hope of making substanceturn on finite modes.'

For Spinozathe attributes of God

in turn produce infinite modes - particular thoughts and objects. Unlike Spinoza though who started with the absolute infinite idea of God, Deleuze's derivation is to is But deduction. the back the through a materialist modes and work start with Another for the philosopher split-schema? of a primary positing substancenecessary is Frangois different in the manner completely who makes use of a split-schema Laruelle. Laruelle utilises the split-schema as an analytic to subvert the practice of functions itself. He that according to a selfphilosophy posits all philosophy legitimising presupposition.He terms this presuppositionthe `Principle of Sufficient Philosophy' and this is based on a fundamental philosophical `Decision.' In Ray Brassiers' PhD thesis on Laruelle he explains the natureof Decision as follows:

All philosophising, Lamelle insists, begins with a Decision, with a division traced between an empirical (but not necessarily perceptual) datum and an a priori (but not necessarilyrational) faktum, both of which are posited as given in and through a synthetic unity wherein empirical and a priori, datum and faktum, are conjoined. Thus, the philosopher posits a structure of articulation which is simultaneouslyepistemological and ontological, one which immediately binds and distinguishes a given

' Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 11 564ibid.

187 empirical datum, whether it be perceptual, phenomenological, linguistic, social, or historical; and an a priori intelligible faktum through which that datum is given: e.g. Sensibility, Subjectivity, Language, Society, or History. 565

From a philosophical point of view Laruelle's project may be seenas a radicalisation or total critique of Kant's own designation of the transcendentaldoctrine. Kant will define the transcendentaldoctrine in the following manner:

In all subsumptions of an object under a concept, the representation of the object must be homogeneous with the concept.... But our objects of the intuitions, or even with understanding, when compared with empirical sensible intuitions in general, are quite heterogeneous, and can never be discovered in any intuition. How then is the subsumption of the latter under the former, and consequently the application of the categories to appearances, possible? [... ] Now it is quite clear that there must be some third thing, which on the one hand is homogeneous with the category, and with appearance on the other, and so makes the application of the former to the latter possible. This mediating representation must be pure (without empirical content), and yet must on the one hand be intellectual, is Such the transcendental the on other sensible. a representation schema.w For Laruelle the true transcendental cannot be contaminated with the vestiges of the sensible or the intelligible,

that is, the mode in which it is given cannot be

predetermined. As such the true transcendental cannot be designated through a philosophical determination at all. In turn Lamelle deduces a non-substantial, nonontological, that is to say, non-philosophical notion of the transcendental which he terms the `One' and posits this as `Real' presupposition of philosophy:

What do we mean by a `transcendentalfunction' if the former is not to be understood in a Kantian sense?The Real or One is given without an operation of givenness,manifestedwithout an operation of manifestation. It is not split in two, divided and representedby itself, posited by itself, cause of itself or passive effect of itself. This suffices to ensure its universality, that is to say, to ensurethat it allows philosophy itself to be given also, and to give it according to its own mode which is that of the

I Ray Brassier(2001) Alien Theory: TheDecline Materialism in the Name Matter, PhD thesis, of of Coventry. University of Warwick, p. 114 "I Kant (1993), pp. 143-144

188 `without-givenness. ' There is a givenness of philosophy, but it is a selfgivenness which has no effect on that being-given which the Real as such is. On the other hand the Real gives according to its own mode of beingbrings forth inasmuch Real Yet, the as given philosophy's self-givenness. it but brings its own beingthat nothing, and particularly not philosophy, better forth latter, brings (without-givenness) to the or still, given philosophy according to the mode of this being-given, where the former its to own mode, then the Real would otherwise remain given according immediately fulfils a transcendental function vis a vis philosophy as 567 such. Essentially

Laruelle's

non-philosophy

operates according

to a non-relational

duality). logic The One Real (which Laruelle the or unilateral calls unilateral inverse in is but Philosophical Decision to there the the no operation go conditions be directly direction. is foreclosed One The to philosophy and cannot opposite accessed.As such one cannot think the One but only according to it. It is thought as a henotypology. The material on which this type of `thinking' operates is philosophy itself enlarging the possibilities for thought where philosophical presuppositions had fulfilled been. So has Laruelle the prophecy of a split-schema thought? previously We shall explore this by taking a closer look at the nature of the philosophical Decision. In the article `Axiomatic heresy: The non-philosophy of Francois Laruelle' Brassier will define the structure of the philosophical Decision in the following manner:

It is basically a fractional structure comprising two differentiated terms and their difference as a third term that is simultaneously intrinsic and extrinsic, immanent and transcendentto those two terms. Thus, for any philosophical distinction or dyad, such as transcendental/empirical, subject/substance,being/beings, diff6rance/presence,the distinction is simultaneously intrinsic and immanent to the distinguished terms and extrinsic and transcendent in so far as it is supposed to remain constitutive of the difference between the terms themselves. For the division is inseparable from a moment of immanent indivision 56s dyadic the the guaranteeing unity-in-differentiation of coupling.

567FrancoisLaruelle (2000) `Identity and Event,' conferencetranscript, trans. R Brassier, Thinking the Event, Coventry: Warwick, p. 9, reproduced in Pli: The WarwickJournal of Philosophy, Vol. 9. ' Ray Brassier(2003) `Axiomatic heresy:The non-philosophyof FrancoiseLaruelle,' Radical Philosophy, 121: p. 26

189 How does this relate to the general form of the split-schema elaborated above? To provide an example, if we posit that thought operates on the differentiating side of the schema and perception operates on the integrating side of the schema and examine this in terms of the philosophical Decision then we may see that thought not only conditions what we perceive but also regulates the difference between the two. In some ways it would seem that thought has not even reached its target and subsumes both perception and its mediation within the differentiating

side of the

schema. Does this mean that the differential split-schema is already compromised as an analytic? This does not necessarily need to be the case if both the differentiating and integrating sides are mediated by a non-relation in the first place. On the other hand to the extent that Laruelle places the philosophical Decision firmly in the differentiating side of the schema is he not proceeding from a position that is in some sense already precisely compromised? Is not the content of thought being reduced to an invariant form of thought? Of course the philosophical Decision cannot affect the One in any way which is without determination but it will influence how the One is positioned in relation to how it is posited we think according to the One. There is no injunction against thinking the `other side' so long as one knows from where one thinks and perhaps determining the position of thought would provide its own absolute presupposition:

Someone proposed a regressive method: To locate book A, consult first a book B which indicates A's position; to locate book B, consult first a book C, and so on to infinity.... In adventures such as these, I have squandered and wasted my years. It does not seem unlikely to me that there is a total book on some shelf of the universe. 569

To explore this further we shall now turn to the natureof philosophy itself.

369Borges, `The Library of Babel,' Labyrinths, 94 p.

190 What is left of Philosophy?

`... it makes no sense to `take the side' of becoming, assuming it exists no more than that of chance, or desire. For one has no choice: "To take the side of the primary process is still a consequence of secondary processes."'

Baudrillard57°

Return to Plato

In Deleuze and Guattari's account of the birth of philosophy in ancient Greecethey proposethat this was madepossiblethrough three conditions:

immanence, the "intrinsic nature of a pure sociability as milieu of ... association," which is opposed to imperial sovereignty and implies no prior interest because,on the contrary, competing interestspresupposeit; a certain pleasure in forming associations,which constitute friendship, but also a pleasure in breaking up the association, which constitutes rivalry...; and a taste for opinion inconceivable in an empire, a taste for the exchangeof views, for conversation.571 For Deleuze and Guattari, `immanence,friendship, opinion' are the conditions of the sn Greek territory of philosophy. And philosophy remains Greek to the specifically extent that they were precursors to a plane of immanence and the philosophical concept: be sought in the relation the originality of the Greeks should ... ... betweenthe relative and the absolute.When relative deterritorialisation is itself horizontal, or immanent, it combines with the absolute deterritorialisation of the plane of immanencethat carriesthe movements of relative deterritorialisation to infinity, pushesthem to the absolute,by transforming them (milieu, friend, opinion). Immanence is redoubled. This is where one thinks no longer with figures but with concepts. It is the conceptthat comesto populatethe plane of immanence.573

570Baudrillard, Seduction,p. 145 s" Deleuze& Guattari, What is Philosophy?, pp. 87-8 sn ibid. 573bid. p. 90

191 From Deleuze and Guattari's point of view the essential factor is that the Greeks divorced thought from a wisdom-thought or religious way of thinking. They argue that religion thinks in terms of `figures' which project transcendenceonto the plane discover immanence. innovation The Greek to a `Being-thought' or 'Naturewas of thought' which took thought for itself. 574This new way of thinking installs the friend the as philosopher of wisdom as opposedto the sage,the possessorof wisdom. Nevertheless, for Deleuze and Guattari the Greeks only achieved a relative deterritorialisation which manifests itself in their milieu in terms of rival opinions Deleuze Guattari's friend In lay be to the contrast, and claim of wisdom. which philosophy lays claim to an absolute deterritorialisation where the philosopher is the have for (nomads), friends time who no opinion creator of concepts,sharedamongst for is than taste ones opinion. rather or conversation;philosophy what one enacts However, even if we accept the general form of Deleuze and Guattari's version of Greek thought their account is not entirely satisfactory. For instance, are the Platonic discussionsof the Good in the Republic and the One in the Parmenides figure-thought? What a of religious of philosophical concepts or evidence signs still is certain is that the Neoplatonists interpreted the Platonic dialogues in terms of the latter - as part of a perennial philosophy or wisdom-knowledge. In her recent study Reading Neoplatonism, Sara Rappe tells us that the Neoplatonist Proclus distinguished between four different types of mystico-religious texts: `... the great theologians fall into four distinct types: Orpheus uses images, Pythagorasemploys symbols, the Chaldean are inspired, and Plato is scientific. '575 While Proclus primarily views the Platonic dialogues as scientific or dialectical in nature he also identifies imaginative, symbolic and inspired aspects in them as well. 576Such a reading of Plato would not appear at first impression to challenge Deleuze and Guattari's accountof the beginningsof philosophy in that the Neoplatonistsprecisely held on to a religious figure-thought which would preclude them from the philosophical concept. However, to the extent that Deleuze specifically develops his notion of immanencein opposition to Neoplatonism in Expressionismin Philosophy:

574ibid. p. 88 sn SeraKappe(2000) ReadingNeoplatonism.Cambridge:University Press, 159 p. 576ibid.

192 Spinozawe shall now examinethis feature further. Immanence and Emanence In Expressionismin Philosophy: Spinoza Deleuze sets up an encounterbetween the 577 Neoplatonists. Deleuze immanent causeof Spinoza and the emanentcauseof the between differences both these two notions of there that are similarities and states Spinozist One Neoplatonic being the The the that and main similarity causality. Absolute do not diminish as they produce, that is, the causeremains in itself. On the Spinozist its Absolute is hand, difference the the that produces whereas main other its One Neoplatonic inside itself immanently, the produces effects outside of effects One. In diminishing its the itself that of accordancewith a are effects emanentlyso of Deleuze's notion of difference Neoplatonic metaphysicsfalls short of a pure concept into in form Being because it introduces difference the transcendence of a negative of 578 it is diminished (its by nature). not theology where the One is determined what However, recent scholarship in Neoplatonism has raised the issue that the label of `negativetheology' is a very poor approximation of what is at work in Neoplatonic metaphysics.For example, studies by Sara Rappe and Michael Sells point out the provisional nature of Neoplatonic metaphysics and the critique of philosophical languagethat this implies.579With Plotinus `negative theology' is not simply a way both it is it but One it is defining the through negating of what not and what what of is not.580This involves a critique of predication itself: But given that we must incorrectly employ predications for the sake of enquiry, then let it be said once again that they are not being spoken for be duality the sake of not even must never posited, correctly, since a for We the sake of persuasion these notion. now obtaining a use names 581 in doing depart from so we and strict accuracy. This method peculiar to Neoplatonism reachedits highest level of sophistication in

sn Deleuze,Expressionismin Philosophy: Spinoza,pp. 169-186 578ibid. pp. 172-3 "' S. Rappe(2000); M. Sells (1994) Mystical Languagesof Unsaying.Chicago: University Press s"0Sells, Mystical Languages,p. 20: `it is neither X nor not X' 581Plotinus TheEnneads,6.8.13 1-9, trans. M. Sells, Mystical Languages, 24 p.

193 the final scholarch of the Neoplatonic school, Damascius, who gives a more precise description of this method of `apophasis: '

In one way, "The Ineffable" is apophatic. By this I do not mean that the term designates anything positive at all, but that this term is not even a negation: it is complete removal. It is not merely not-a-thing (since what is not-a-thing is still something) but it absolutely has no reality. So we define this term, "ineffable, " in such a way that it is not even a term. S82 For Damascius the method of

apophasis involves

a complete

`reversal of

thscourse 9583In this respect negations do not `lead us closer' to the Ineffable but only serve to delimit our discourse. We may note in this passage that Damascius uses the term `Ineffable' as opposed to the `One. ' The reason for this is that Damascius identified a fundamental contradiction in Neoplatonic metaphysics involving

how

anything can be produced by the One. That is, Damascius wished to criticise the accuracy of this metaphysic. Rappe states the basic contradiction of the One thus: `If is from then the things the absolute a principle or a cause of other absolute, come all things. But if the absolute is a cause, it is no longer the absolute, since it then exists in relation to others. SM That is, most pertinently for our investigation, Damascius provides a critique of the emanative cause. Damascius begins his Doubts and Solutions Concerning First Principles by posing the question: `is that which is designated as the one principle of all things beyond all things or is it one among all things, the summit of everything that proceeds from it? '585 He then goes on to dispute both possibilities. In terms of the first hypothesis he states:

The term "all things" [refers] in the strict sense to that from which nothing is absent. But [now we are supposing] the principle itself is missing. Therefore that which comes after the first principle is not in the strict senseall things, but rather all things except the first principle.586

m Damascius (1986-91) Doubts and Solutions Concerning First Principles, 3 Volumes, eds. J. Combes and L. G. Westerink. Paris, I, chap. 42, quoted in Reading Neoplatonism, p. 209

m ReadingNeoplatonism,p. 200 584ibid. s05Damascius,Doubts and Solutions, 1.1,quoted in ReadingNeoplatonism, 204 p.

m Damascius, Doubts and Solutions, I1.1-5, quoted in Reading Neoplatonism, p. 206

194 If the first principle is outside all things then we are no longer dealing with `all things.' Hence the principle of all things cannot be beyond all things. On the other hand if the principle of all things is amongstall things then the `causemust be ranked "" Damascius hypothesis In this terms the states: of effects. among if all things are together with the first principle, there cannot be a ... principle for all things, since on the supposition that the principle can be beginning, be [i. by things, there principle e. no no no would all subsumed [let for Therefore things. us say that] the single coordinated all cause] disposition of all things (which we designate by the term `all things') is [continue lest first the search] ad we principle and uncaused, without a 588 infinitum.

If a causewere to be found amongst its effects then the first principle would have to first As itself both its the effect an principle would effects and as an effect. produce then no longer be a first principle. However, as John Dillon tells us in his essay `Damasciuson the Ineffable,' Damascius' intention here is not to deny that there is a `first principle' but to dispute that it can be accountedfor in a dogmatic metaphysics 589 first be Within the this principle can neither completely context of causation. transcendentor immanent. From this perspective Deleuze's interpretation of Neoplatonism seems to be

based on a common misconception of Neoplatonic emanence. His position on Neoplatonism is that: `emanation, in its pure form, always involves a systemof the One-above-being; the first

hypothesis of

the Parmenides dominates all

Neoplatonism.'590First we may question whether there is such a thing as a `pure form' of emanencein Neoplatonism in a strictly philosophical sense,and second, Damasciusbrings to bear the full force of the negative hypotheses(if there is not a One...) of Plato's Parmenides on Neoplatonic metaphysics. The issue at hand however is in what sense Damascius' critique of the emanative cause applies to Deleuze's philosophy. Damscius' specific target is the Plotinian doctrine of how an effect differs from its cause. As Rappe summarisesthis doctrine: `Plotinus argued 587

ibid. sN Damascius,Doubts and Solutions, 12.9-12,ibid. 5" J. Dillon (1997) `Damasciusand the Ineffable,' article in The Great Tradition: Further Studiesin the Developmentof Platonism and Early Christianity. Aldershot: Ashgate,XX1, p. 125 30 Deleuze,Expressionismin Philosophy, 172 p.

195 that the full nature of the cause was available for transmission to the effect. It was only the inferior capacity of the effect to express the qualities of the cause that introduced the difference between cause and effect. 591 This appears to be very different terrain from Deleuze who argues, following

the Stoics, that an `effect'

subsists in its cause. Or more precisely, as we find in Nietzsche and Philosophy, `cause' and `effect' are really two moments of the same univocal expression. 592How are these two moments to be distinguished? For this purpose Deleuze will turn in Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza to the Scotist formal distinction distinction -a last In `outside' the the that the real mind. within occurs chapter we have already seen a critique of the formal distinction

via Suarez and Leibniz, but now with

Damascius we may approach this from a completely new angle. In Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza Deleuze emphasises how Scotus devised the formal distinction be defined how God formally by His positive theology of may as part a positive of 593 he is However, from to the theology attributes as opposed of what negative not. Damascius' point of view neither a positive nor a negative rendering of the Absolute is sufficient, and at best provides a provisional position to be corrected or at worst a reified dogmatic metaphysics. Nevertheless, even if Damascius' position undermines Deleuze's philosophy do we face the same situation as earlier with a mysticoreligious thought ultimately diametrically

opposed to Deleuze? A philosophy of

Being and the One (a philosophy of predication) as opposed to a philosophy of becoming (or a philosophy as becoming)? To finally escape this aporia we shall turn to another recent study on Neoplatonism, N. Joseph Torcia's Plotinus, Tolma, and 594 Descent Being. the of

Tolm Lanauaae

Torchia's study provides us with an opening to considerthe beginnings of philosophy from a new perspective through an examination of `tolma language' in Classical

Reading Neoplatonism, p. 207 Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 25

593Expressionismin Philosophy: Spinoza, pp. 63-4 5` N. J. Torchia (1993) Plotinus, Tohga, and the Descentof Being: An Exposition and Analysis. New York: Peter Lang

196 literature. The translation of the Greek word tolma is audacity.595Torchia notes that in early Greek writings this term had both positive and negative connotations.On the one hand Homer emphasisedaudacity in the form of brave and heroic acts in the face of insurmountable odds. On the other hand Greek tragedy saw any attempt to rise above one's station as reckless and arrogant and an impiety against the 596 Gods. In philosophy one of the first direct usesof this type commandmentsof the of thought is to be found in Plato. For example,in the Theaetatuswe read: Socrates: doesn't it strike you as shamelessto explain what knowing is ... like, when we don't know what knowledge is? [... ] Theaetatus:Well, but how are you going to carry on a discussion...? Socrates:I cannot, being the man I am, though I might if I were an expert in debate [... ] As we are such bunglers, then, shall I be so bold as to describewhat knowing is like?597 Here we see both the characterisation to speak of what one does not know as shameless and a boldness to actually attempt the task. In the centuries after Plato tolma language played a pivotal role in the cosmogonies of the Neopythagorean, Alexandrian, Hermetic and Gnostic traditions. 598More precisely, tolma is the pivot around which this traditions

hang. For example, in the Gnostic Sophia myth

especially prevalent in Valentinian gnosticism, Sophia, the youngest of the aeons that constitute the spiritual pleroma had an audacious will to understand the divine nature. In so doing she goes 'beyond' the divine and `falls, ' thereby producing the realm of 599 Although Plotinus criticises the Gnostics for their `undisciplined matter. multiplication

of spiritual entities'600 (the aeons), tolma language plays a similarly

fundamental role in Neoplatonism. Plotinus will say that due to the nature of the one (its `goodness') it necessarily diffuses this nature through an `overflowing'

or

`radiation. '601 This is also the beginning of the second hypostasis of Nous. The outpouring forms an indefinite dyad which contemplates the One and in so doing

595ibid. p. 12 596ibid.

"' Plato, Theaetatus,196d-197a, 903 p. 5" Plotinus, Tolma, and the Descent Being, 11 of p. As reported by Irenaeus,in Plotinus, (1991) TheEnneads,trans. S. MacKenna, abridged with an introduction and notes,J. Dillon. London: Penguin, 121 p. 600Plotinus, Enneads,11.9, pp. 108-132 601ibid, VI. 7,18, pp. 488; V. 1,7, 355 p. y

197 forms Nous.602However, this process involves a separation from the One and comes One. Torchia diffusion As for in from desire the the states, of otherness a about in is One diffusion tension treated the the purely positive, arises as a of although Plotinus' account when he describes Nous as desiring an independent existence as 603 is it is Torchia's that thesis an act of tolma that part of a choice or volition. 604 hypostasis, from Nous). To Soul, from One (and Nous third the the also separates Neoplatonic investigation how the tolma of emanation we assists our concept of see look how this concept operates. take at a closer must

The first thing we may notice is that tolma does not operate from the from descended One. is And from the but One that the already which perspectiveof is (inversely) diffusion One's `positive' the correlative to the the nature of yet be in Plotinus' its Certainly positive system a audacity cannot products. separationof descendence but One is lacks the the One of to the nothing, which attributed One. What `outside' is dependent the `overflowing' this to that points on an precisely from `outside' first is from in the the place already the position which one speaks One. To say that the One produces something outside of itself is only a figurative Nous. From from the (a the of view point of view of point ciphering) speaking of way be One One `outside' `inside' the terms the completely would meaningless. and of limit from if is One the position of that the point absolute posited as an may object thought then this would seem to completely relativise metaphysics and reveal its if is However, this only valid one takesmetaphysics natureas essentiallyprovisional. look Plotinus' its If take at closer processionof the a object. we as a reification of One (One - Nous - Soul) we may seethat all theseterms are regulatedby place: Nous has a place in relation to the One, and Soul has a place in relation to Nous. Place is is Nous `outside' of by language. In that terms tolma may say we place of regulated the One but this doesnot prevent its connectionto it. The conceptof place opensup a way of thinking where both the One and thought can be related on the same plane. Thought and the One are not immanent but neither are they transcendent.More precisely,to think the conceptof place is to think on a plane of uncommon natures.

02 ibid. V. 2,1, pp. 361-2 603Plotinus, Tolma, and the Descentof Being, p.41 6" ibid. p. 52

198 The audacity of youth

Interestingly, in Deleuze's preface to Difference and Repetition he will himself align his book in terms of a form of audacity: A book of philosophy should be in part a very particular species of detective novel, in part a kind of science fiction. By detective novel we intervene to that their presence, should concepts, with zones of mean have local [... ] They a coherence among must resolve situations themselves, but that coherence must not come from themselves. They is This from the secret of their elsewhere. must receive coherence empiricism. Empiricism is by no means a reaction against concepts, nor a simple appeal to lived experience. On the contrary, it undertakes the most insane creation of concepts ever seen or heard. Empiricism is a mysticism fiction in Science yet another sense, and a mathematicism of concepts.... How in become the else can one write manifest. one which weaknesses but of those things which one doesn't know, or knows badly? It is precisely there that we imagine having something to say. We write only 605 frontiers knowledge.... at the of our How are we to interpret this early statement of Deleuze's position on philosophy Philosophy?: is in What `Philosophy is following to the a when compared statement constructivism, and constructivism has two qualitatively different complementary ' immanence]. In [of laying out of a plane aspects: the creation of concepts and the contrast Deleuze and Guattari will consider What is Philosophy? to be a sober work 607 of old age. One may certainly identify a tension in Deleuze's early writings in the form of the turn from Bergson to Nietzsche. Deleuze's text on Bergson, Bergsonism, was published in 1966. However,

it Nietzsche, Nietzsche his on and Philosophy although was published after work (1962), it is widely seenas the completion of Deleuze's earlier studies on Bergson, such as the essay 'Bergson's conception of Difference' written in 1956.608In Bergsonismwe fmd a passagethat is somewhatat odds with Deleuze's philosophical perspective:

60 De1euze,Difference and Repetition, pp. xx-xxi ' De1euze& Guattari, What is Philosophy?, pp. 35-36. 607ibid. pp. 1-2 "I Hardt (1993), pp. 124-5, n. 5

199

the great souls - to a greater extent than philosophers - are those of ... artists and mystics (at least those of a Christian mysticism that Bergson describes as being completely superabundant activity, action, creation). At the limit, it is the mystic who plays with the whole of creation, who invents an expression of it whose adequacy increases with its dynamism. Servant of an open and finite God (such are the characteristics of the Elan Vital), the mystical soul actively plays the whole of the universe, and is in Whole there the nothing to see or to which opening of a reproduces 609 contemplate. This passage is not entirely disparate from the one previously quoted from Difference and Repetition in that an empiricism

its limits to pushed

is not necessarily

incommensurable with mysticism. We also find in the later Deleuze a return to Bergson and the notion of the `open whole. ' However, in Deleuze's turn to Nietzsche there is a definite movement in Deleuze's approach from that of `spirit' to that of `matter':

To remind consciousnessof its necessarymodesty is to take it for what it is: a symptom; nothing but the symptom of a deeper transformation of is factor in body forces. "Perhaps the the all only entirely non-spiritual spiritual development" [... ] the servility of consciousness ... merely testifies to the "formation of a superior body.9-61° This turn constitutes a move from a Bergsonianto a Nietzschean form of audacity. Undoubtedly, Deleuze could not be content with Bergson's notion that it is the mystic soul which connects with a `... Being Who transcendstangible reality as He transcends human consciousness.... '611 Nor could Deleuze be content with the downplaying of philosophy this implies: `In philosophy itself, there is still too much intelligence if imbued Everything happens as were already contemplation: alleged for in intuition, but thus creating so emotion, with not conformity to this with '612 Bergsonism in form the constitutes of the mystic soul that emotion. an audacity acts in accordance to the One through creative emotion, however, Nietzschean

6' De1euze,Bergsonism,p. 112 610De1euze,Nietzscheand Philosophy, p. 39 611Henri Bergson(1977) The Two Sources Morality and Religion, trans. R A. Audra of and C. Brereton with assistancefrom W. Horsfall Carter. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press,p. 262 612Deleuze,Bergsonism,p. 112

200 philosophy is perhaps a greater audacity yet in that the most audacious act is not to from the viewpoint of the One, but from exactly where one is. Deleuze's speak position on the `mystical' Bergson is perhaps most forcefully put in the `Afterword' to Bergsonism, written in 1988, where he states the Bergsonian method of intuition must not be seen as `an appeal to the ineffable. '613

Becoming or the One?

Nevertheless Bergson played a profound influence on Deleuze's work and his interpretation of Bergson is an extrapolation of the materialist aspectsof Bergson's philosophy. Indeed Deleuze's own turn to a Nietzscheanphilosophy of becoming is in some sensealready precipitated by Bergson: `... philosophy is not only the turning of the mind homeward, the coincidence of human consciousnesswith the living principle whence it emanates,a contact with the creative effort: it is the study of becoming in general....9614 There is also the prospectof Deleuze's return to Bergson in his later work. However, Bergson accommodatedboth the One and becoming in his philosophy. On the other hand Deleuze seesany capitulation to the One as the introduction of transcendence.However, Alain Badiou in his recent book Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, arguesthat despite Deleuze's claims to the contrary he has in fact produced a philosophy of the One.615This argument would seem somewhat contentiousin terms of the vehemencein which Deleuze and Guattari reject the One or any form of unifying principle: `We do not have units of measure, only multiplicities or varieties of measurement.The notion of unity appearsonly when there is a power takeover in the Multiplicity .... 9616Deleuze gives a different formulation of this idea in TheFold: Leibniz and the Baroque: Events are produced in a chaos, in a chaotic multiplicity, but only under the condition that a sort of screenintervenes.Chaos does not exist; it is an abstraction because it is inseparable from a screen that makes something- somethingrather than nothing - emergefrom it. Chaoswould

613ibid. p. 115 6'4Bergson,Creative Evolution, pp. 369-370 61sBadiou (2000), p. 17 616De1e= & Guattari, A ThousandPlateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,p. 8

201 be a pure Many, a purely disjunctive diversity, while the something is a One, not a pregiven unit, but instead the indefinite article that designates 617 a certain singularity. The indefinite event or singularity is formed on a plane of consistency in relation to the plane of immanence. As we saw earlier with the concept, consistency carries the finite `something' it is but the as a also relative to chaotic virtual speed of absolute the plane of immanence. What is the nature of this relation? Of THE plane of immanence Deleuze and Guattari tell us:

Is there a `best' plane that would not hand over immanence to Something=x and that would no longer mimic anything transcendent? We will say that THE plane of immanence is, at the same time, that is be It be the thought. that thought cannot which and which must immanent base is It to every the thought. of all planes, nonthought within thinkable plane that does not succeed in thinking it [... ] Perhaps this is the supreme act of philosophy: not so much to think THE plane of immanence as to show that it is there.618

Here we seeDeleuze and Guattari treating THE plane of immanencein the form of a `Philosophy to to a non-philosophy: or non-thought needsa non-relation, a relation a do Deleuze '619 But Guattari it.... that what and comprehends mean by nonphilosophy is be do The first that they thing certain may not mean that we nonphilosophy? nonphilosophy is to be understood from an aesthetic or scientific perspective - in What is Philosophy? they set up philosophy, art and science as three independent 620 in is And in thought the which virtual chaos confronted each of these ways ways finds its form) in limit (or `non' this confrontation so that they are not thinking of `.. complementary: just as art needs nonart and science needs nonscience.i62' Instead, can Deleuze and Guattari's nonphilosophy be considered to be influenced by Laruelle? During the 1980's the proposition of Laruelle's own specific non-philosophywas coming to full fruition and often this was in direct confrontation

617Deleuze, TheFold: Leibniz and the Baroque, p. 76 618Deleuze& Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 59 6'9ibid. p. 218 62" ibid. p. 208 621ibid. p. 218

202 622 ideas. Guattari's Although Laruelle is not mentioned in the main Deleuze to and 623 is in What Philosophy? he is the notes. Perhaps it may be posited text of referred to that Deleuze and Guattari's use of the term `nonphilosophy' is in some sense a reappropriation

of philosophical

ground even if

the Laruellian

critique

is not

considered to be a major threat. For of course Deleuze and Guattari pose a nonontological becoming as opposed to a non-ontological

One as the basis of their

nonphilosophy. However this being the case there seems to be a certain similarity between Laruelle's and Deleuze and Guattari's overall philosophical organisation around the transcendental function. For ultimately multiplicity THE plane of immanence. Effectively

is circumscribed by

THE plane of immanence acts as the limit

point of a One-All within which multiplicity

is thought. In this sense Laruelle's and

Deleuze and Guattari's thought seem to be asymmetric - whereas Laruelle places the One on the other side of the transcendental, Deleuze and Guattari place it on this side where thought already operates. More interestingly this overall schema seems to be directly related to the project to think the absolute.

The Real

In respect of Deleuze and Laruelle we have seen that the consequences of thinking the absolute produces both a One and a non-relational residue. Of course both Deleuze and Laruelle use this to their advantage. It is due to a residue that for Laruelle philosophy can be thought according to the One `in the last instance' or for Deleuze the Event will be a pure reserve for the creation of concepts. It should not be downplayed that both of these philosophers have created completely new registers for thinking philosophically. In many ways Laruelle seems the most `traditional' of 62A in how he lays On the two philosophers claim to a real presupposition of thought the other hand for Deleuze the real is that which is constructed rather than that which is given. As Jean-Luc Nancy states:

622Alien Theory, pp. 53-95 623Latuelle is mentionedtwice, p. 220, n. 5; p. 234, n. 16 624`I lay claim to the abstract the Real or the One rather than to abstraction,, 'Identity and Event,' P. 11

203 Deleuze doesnot attempt to speakabout the real as an exterior referent ... (the thing, man, history, what is). He effectuates a philosophical real. Philosophical activity is this effectuation. For him, to create a concept is not to draw the empirical under a category: but to construct a universe of its own, an autonomous universe, an ordo et connexio which does not imitate the other, which does not represent it or signify it, but which 625 it in its effectuates own way. From this perspective we must admit that our critique of the content of Deleuze's `doctrines' is somewhatphilosophically `average'to the extent that what Deleuze has in but is in the register of para-physics626 the metaphysics register of produced not the constructedreal. In a similar fashion Laruelle writes in the register of henology the scienceof the One. From a purely metaphysicalperspectivewe have arguedthat a thinking of the Absolute producesa structureof the One and a residue which is to say that a pure thought of the Absolute is not possible as it will always be compromised. Of courseone can always argue from the position of the Absolute as if it were real or even a constructedreal but there is also anotheroption: to take the notion as precisely compromised. However, what effect does this have on the notion of place we were developing earlier? If the idea of the absolute cannot be relied upon then this would seem to take the tolma relation out of position. To investigate further let us return in introduced by Bergson Matter and Memory. Bergson to the again schema once argues that perception cannot be a representation. For if we consider the world composed of by `images' there is nothing the image can be represented to as the individual

is just another image amongst images. This formulation

has some

interesting consequences. First perception is an action but cannot be located `in' the individual, that is, it is as much in `things' themselves as it is in the individual. Of course within this schema the image of the brain has a special position or locus point in terms of which all other images are located. Thought is portrayed as being a `virtual action' for the selection of images. For Bergson the virtual plays a fundamental role in his distinction between matter and spirit. Matter or perception (the actual) is the most contracted state of spirit or pure memory (the virtual). It is a

625Nancy, J-L. `T'heDeleuzian Fold of Thought,' chapter in Patton, P. (ed.X1996) Deleuze:A Critical Reader.Oxford: Blackwell, p. 110 616Paraphysics perhapsa more formal version of Alfred Jarry's pataphysics. -

204 fundamental part of Bergson's metaphysics that he defines perception and memory as being different in kind: `... memory is something other than a /unction of the brain, . kind, between but difference degree, in is there of perception and not merely a and 627How does position operate within Bergson's philosophy? In regards ' recollection. to perception there is a non-dualysing use of place but this is set within a dualysing from dualysing `relative If this to a aspect collapse we were metaphysics overall. but be then as such provide a map of actual not perception would position' aspect in fact be different function ' This `memory. than no would virtual positions within the role that thought plays. This is the dream of a world of indivision.

Taking this a step further we may arguethat from the aspectof thought, it too is as much in things themselves as it is in the individual. It is perhaps Baudrillard it is innocent, furthest: `The has hypothesis taken this the exists and never object who takes revenge. '628For Baudrillard the world is reversible and fatal (fateful). Due to the nature of the object as totally alien/other it completely submits to rational analysis (only too well) while at the same time following its own inconvertible destiny:

Consider the story of the soldier who meets Death at a crossing in the marketplace, and believes he saw him make a menacing gesture in his direction. He rushes to the king's palace and asks the king for his best horse in order that he might flee during the night far from Death, as far as Samarkand. Upon which the king summons Death to the palace and reproaches him for having frightened one of his best servants. But Death, him. just I frighten It didn't "I that to was was astonished, replies: mean surprised to see this soldier here, when we had a rendez-vous tomorrow in Samarkand. 9629

This is the object's principle of seduction. Is it possible to `think' as an object? Baudrillard will somewhatcontroversially posit that there was once an absolutebond between thought and object in `savage' societies but this has been irrevocably lost with the advent of the subject and resultant loss of reference in thought: `The absoluterule of thought is to return the world as we received it: unintelligible. And if

627Bergson,Matter and Memory, p. 136 628JeanBaudrillard (1990, orig. 1983) Fatal Strategies.London: Semiotext(e), 93 p. 6" Baudrillard, Seduction,p. 72

205 630 little bit A The it bit is it possible, to return a more enigmatic. more unintelligible. began. Baudrillard's is division the the of world own project question at stake where is built upon the acceptance of the subject/object divide and the full consequences this implies. Is there a way of thinking indivision without turning to a metaphysics of the absolute? Or perhaps more precisely is it possible to think an absolute without residue? With this in mind we turn once again to Bergson and the idea of an incomplete whole.

Mirror Repair

On the issueof the relation betweenthe individual and the world in Bergson,Deleuze following the state will It is widely known that Bergson initially discovered duration as identical to consciousness. But further study of consciousness led him to demonstrate that it only existed in so far as it opened itself upon a whole, if the living being is a by coinciding with the opening up of a whole ... whole and, therefore, comparable to the whole of the universe, this is not because it is a microcosm as closed as the whole is assumed to be, but on the contrary, because it is open upon a world, and the world, the universe, is itself the Open.63' For Deleuze an open world creates the possibility of open individuals. However this is first interpreted in different be The that the aim of philosophy is two way ways. can to trace the movement of thought back from the individual through its immanent opening on the world to the open world itself. This is the option Deleuze and Guattari immanence take to to they trace a plane when of everything or chaotic appear if The interpretation is that second even we conceive an open world as virtuality. individuals individuals does this that open creating not mean are reducible to the world. Contrary to their intentions it would appear that Deleuze and Guattari are posing that the world is coextensive to the individual.

That is the individual

is

reducible to a common nature of becomings and singularities. For Bergson on the other hand, duration provides a point or pivot between world and individual rather

6'0Baudrillard, ThePerfect Crime, p. 105 631Deleuze,Cinema1, pp. 9-10

206 than a plane. This is perhaps key to how Bergson practices philosophy:

Now there is another method of composition, more ambitious, less certain, which cannot tell when it will succeed or even if it will succeed at all. It consists in working back from the intellectual and social plane to a point in the soul from which there springs an imperative demand for creation. The soul within which this demand dwells may indeed have felt it fully only once in its lifetime, but it is always there, a unique emotion, an impulse, an impetus received from the very depths of things. To obey it completely new words would have to be coined, new ideas would have to be created, but this would no longer be communicating something, it 632 be would not writing.

To the extent that the individual cannot be reduced to the world the two can be consideredas two uncommon naturesrelated in the opening of an incomplete whole, this may perhapsbe representedthus:

individual `X

world

To think from the uncommon nature of the individual to the uncommon nature of the world is a tolma relation but the notion of an incomplete whole would seem to be anathema to how tolma operates - between an absolute and its residue. However, it would be conceivable to think the opening of an incomplete whole if first one works from the perspective that the Absolute is precisely compromised and second if one posits not one but two Absolutes, one on `either side' of the open. Likewise there be two residues. If the two residues cancelled themselves out we would also would then be left with the coincidence of two incomplete wholes thinkable on the same We shall term this the inverse tolma relation. However, for this to work the plane. two absolutes would need to be complete mirrors of each other in order to have inverse residues. How can such a positioning of thought be achieved? We may hypothesise that it would function as a type of mirror thought, that is, to think any object one must at the same time locate its mirror. Of course one could posit any number

of

correspondences

between

uncommon

632Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, p. 254

natures

(individual/world,

207 individuals/stellar problems/solutions,

living left the right sides of and phenomena,

is However, ). the strange phenomenon that one there etc... male/female, creatures, been brought into had know that two equilibrium until uncommon natures would not one actually achieves this, that is, it is only at this point that they would actually bring further function. To together this to shall explore we a mirror operate according the theories we have developed earlier in the thesis.

Proximity Theory

In Chapter One we presented the proposition of compromised position which be that takes will already compromised. any position one on philosophy postulates This was transformed into the idea in Chapter Three of a relation of a non-relation. That is, the prospect of determining the relation between two unknown things. Finally in this chapter we presented a solution to this in terms of the inverse tolma `absolute' The inverse tolma solution to this problem us an gives relation relation. but how realistic or practical is it? To investigate this we shall turn to Borges' short story `The Approach to

This work is perhaps Leibnizian

in

book It Bombay tells the who writes attorney a about an character. story of a faith. finds Muslim The himself law his has man student who renounced unnamed killed Hindu). in has (a he He consequently he thinks a man a riot where caught up flees the marauding hordes whereupon his journey starts. Borges will summarise the main plot:

A man (the unbelieving, fleeing law student we have met) falls among people of the lowest, vilest sort and accommodates himself to them, in a kind of test of iniquity. Suddenly - with the miraculous shock of Crusoe when he sees that human footprint in the sand - the law student perceives some mitigation of the evil: a moment of tenderness, of exaltation, of silence, in one of the abominable men. "It was as though a more complex interlocutor had spoken." He knows that the wretch with whom he is conversing is incapable of that momentary decency; thus the law student hypothesises that the vile man before him has reflected a friend, or the friend of a friend. Rethinking the problem, he comes to a mysterious conclusion: Somewhere in the world there is a man from whom this

633Borges, Collected Fictions, pp. 82-87

208 brightness in the world there is a man this clarity, emanates; somewhere

devote life law his brightness. The to to to this resolves student equal 634 searching

out this

man.

The man proceeds The insatiable search for a soul by means of the delicate glimmerings or faint first, in has left the trace of a smile or this others - at reflections soul last, the varied and growing splendours of the toward a word; intelligence, and goodness. The more closely the men interrogated by the law student have known Al-Mu'tasim, the greater is their portion of divinity, but the reader knows that they themselves are but mirrors ... The person immediately preceding Al-Mu'tasim is a Persian bookseller of great courtesy and felicity; the man preceding the bookseller is a 635 Sälnt. The narrator Borges will complain that he only has a later edition of the book where the man's journey has been turned into allegory:

(the name of that eighth The etymological meaning of "Al-Mu'tasim" Abbasid king who won eight battles, engendered eight sons and eight daughters, left eight thousand slaves, and reigned for a period of eight years, eight moons and eight days) is "He who goes in quest of aid. " In the 1932 version of the novel, the fact that the object of the pilgrimage was himself a pilgrim cleverly justifies the difficulty of finding AlMu'tasim; in the 1934 edition, that fact leads to the extravagant theology I have described 636 It can clearly be seen in this story that Leibniz's idea of the monads that mirror all other monads is present in the story. However, the important point we wish to raise is the nature of the journey or series itself - it starts from an unsure beginning and moves towards an uncertain end via proximate individuals. Here we may also bring in our definition of singularity from Chapter 2. The idea of a perfect singularly unique individual is perhaps as absolute an idea as inverse tolma. For a perfectly unique individual

would exactly mirror the world and would be analogous to

Leibniz's idea of God. However, if the inverse tolma relation is less than absolute

'1' ibid, p. 84 635bid, p. 85 636ibid, p. 85-6

209 individual is not perfectly singular then one would have a monad that is the and passiveas well as active and a world that would not perfectly mirror the monad but would refract it infinitely. Hence we may seehow the theories we have developed in this chapter give a greater understandingto Leibniz's philosophy from the point of view of emanation.However there is also another factor which we need to consider next.

Positional Theory

If the inverse tolma relation operates in one direction to proximate or position the individual in relation to perfect singularity then the obverse side of this, that is the original tolma relation will operate in the opposite direction to position the activity of monads in the world. Corresponding to this is a theory of knowledge in terms of an art of memory based on the `external' positions of the monad. And it should be said

that to exist is an act of tolma; it is an act of audacity.

210

Conclusion

211 The End of Immanence

The purpose of this thesis was to explore the problematic notion of representation in Deleuze's reading of Leibniz in his early and late works. In Chapter One we identified how the critique of representation through difference leads to its own form of idealism. In Chapter Two we extended this line of enquiry to show how Deleuze's transcendental method required an added organisational principle. These ideas lead up to the work in Chapter Three. Here we presented the thesis that Deleuze's later approach to Leibniz would indeed invalidate his early accusations on Leibniz for subordinating difference to representation. For the themes Deleuze criticised Leibniz on in Difference and Repetition:

Any hesitation betweenthe virtual and the possible, the order of the Idea and the order of the concept,is disastrous,since it abolishesthe reality of the virtual [... ] This hesitation between the possible and the virtual in Leibniz further has the exploration of than explains why no one gone has better one no maintainedthe sufficient reason,and why, nevertheless, illusion of a subordinationof that sufficient reasonto the identical 637 Theses themes now not only form Deleuze's main exposition of Leibniz, for example, on the matter of the Identicals, but are also part of his own ideas, such as the notion of possibility he uses in his ideas on art. However, we also argue that Deleuze fails to engage with the fundamental logic in Leibniz's work and this in turn highlights discrepancies in his own philosophical system. In both Deleuze's early essay on Lucretius and his final work with Guattari, What is Philosophy? he will bring up the idea that we must think at infinite speeds in order to think the event. We have agued in this thesis that the infinite is only a limit or the immanent condition of a transcendental. Tolma or audacity requires us to think faster than the infinite: the instant. The originality of this thesis is to be found in not only the interpretations we give of Deleuze and Leibniz but also the relevance we find in ancient philosophies for the philosophical problems of today.

637Deteuze,Difference and Repetition, p. 212-3

212

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