The Political Legacies of Barry Goldwater and George McGovern: Shifting Party Paradigms

The Political Legacies of Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

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The Political Legacies of Barry Goldwater and George McGovern Shifting Party Paradigms Jeffrey J. Volle

THE POLITICAL LEGACIES OF BARRY GOLDWATER AND GEORGE McGOVERN

Copyright © Jeffrey J. Volle, 2010. All rights reserved. The Personal and Political Papers of Barry M. Goldwater, Arizona Historical Foundation. The George McGovern Collection, University Archives and Special Collections, Dakota Wesleyan University. File PEG 90, the George S. McGovern Collection, McGovern Library and Archives, Dakota Wesleyan University. (Photograph of Strom Thurmond, Edmund Muskie, Bob Dole, Barry Goldwater, George McGovern, and John Sparkman.) First published in 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–10003–9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Volle, Jeffrey J. The political legacies of Barry Goldwater and George McGovern : shifting party paradigms / Jeffrey J. Volle. p. cm. ISBN 978–0–230–10003–9 (alk. paper) 1. United States—Politics and government—1945–1989. 2. United States—Politics and government—1989– 3. Presidential candidates— United States—History—20th century. 4. Goldwater, Barry M. (Barry Morris), 1909–1998—Influence. 5. McGovern, George S. (George Stanley), 1922– —Influence. 6. Conservatism—United States—History—20th century. 7. Liberalism—United States—History—20th century. I. Title. E839.5.V65 2010 973.92—dc22

2010007922

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: October 2010 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

To my wife Peggy and sons Aaron and Brendan. To my Mom for all her love and support. To my late Dad who I know is looking down with pride. Also to my sisters Sue and Steph and brother Steve. And to Senator Barry Goldwater and Senator George McGovern and their millions of supporters. —Always feel proud!

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CON T E N T S

List of Illustrations

ix

Acknowledgments

xi

Introduction

1 Part I

Barry M. Goldwater

One

Change on the Horizon, 1960–64

7

Two

The Campaign for President of the United States, 1964

29

Three

The Beat Goes On, 1965–76

51

Four

The Torch Has Been Passed, 1976–80

71

Five

Redemption and the Election of Ronald Reagan

87

Six

The End of a Long Journey for Mr. Conservative

99

Seven

Conclusions Part II

113 George S. McGovern

Eight

The Most Decent Man in the Senate, 1963–66

119

Nine

Call to Duty, 1967–68

139

Ten

The Reformer, 1969–71

157

Eleven

The Campaign for President of the United States, 1972

175

Victory and Defeat, 1973–80

193

Twelve

viii

Contents

Thirteen

Redemption and the Election of Bill Clinton

213

Fourteen

Conclusions

231

Notes

235

Bibliography

247

Index

249

I L LU ST R AT ION S

1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 6.1

7.1 11.1 11.2 12.1 12.2

Attorney General Robert Kennedy Memorandum on Reuther brothers The 1964 Republican Party/Goldwater pamphlet on Vietnam The debate on Vietnam that never took place between President Lyndon Johnson and Senator Barry Goldwater during the 1964 presidential race The 1964 presidential race showing counties won by Johnson and Goldwater (in comparison to the 1968 race won by Republican Richard Nixon) The 1968 presidential race showing counties won by Republican Richard Nixon, Democrat Hubert H. Humphrey, and third party candidate George Wallace On the steps of the Capitol—senators representing the Left, Center, and Right: Strom Thurmond R-SC, Edmund Muskie D-ME, Bob Dole R-KS, Barry Goldwater R-AZ, George McGovern D-SD, and John Sparkman D-Ala Political campaign buttons of Senator Barry Goldwater and Senator George McGovern—1964 and 1972 The 1972 presidential map showing counties won by Nixon and McGovern as compared to the 1976 presidential race between Carter and Ford The 1976 presidential race with Republican Gerald R. Ford and Democrat James E. Carter The 1980 reelection campaign handout for Senator McGovern (Front side) The 1980 reelection campaign handout for Senator McGovern. This would be McGovern’s last senate campaign to represent South Dakota

16 44 45 46 47

112 116 191 192 211 212

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AC K NOW L E DGM E N T S

I would like to thank Senator George McGovern for his time and willingness to help out this first-time author. His class and dignity are an example for not only all politicians to follow, but for us as citizens as well. Farideh Koohi-Kamali, editorial director at Palgrave Macmillan, for seeing something of value in my manuscript and editorial assistant Robyn Curtis for all her knowledge and support in helping a first-time author. Linda Whitaker and Susan Irwin at the Arizona Historical Foundation for all of their assistance in finding the materials I requested on Senator Goldwater. The first section of the book would not have been possible without them. Danelle Orange and Laurie Langland at the Dakota Wesleyan University—McGovern Library for all their professionalism and wonderful assistance! Dr. Stephen Brooks at the University of Akron Political Science Department for all his mentoring during my graduate studies and since with guidance writing this book. Dr. Donald Simmons at the Dakota Wesleyan University for assisting me in contacting Senator McGovern. The staff at Seeley G. Mudd Library—the University of Princeton. Everyone involved with my visit was very kind and helpful in order that I could review the donated McGovern material. Margaret Schlankey and Ann Serrano along with the staff at the Center for American History at the University of Texas at Austin. Whitney Nichols at the RNC for her constant follow-up to my emails throughout the fall of 2009. Kevin Slodic for his assistance in formatting the photographs and computer support. And a very special thank you to my friends and neighbor growing up, the Grendell family, who inspired me at a young age to enjoy reading about history and learning about the presidents.

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Introduction

There are not too many times in American politics that losing an election can translate into a future victory. After all, politics is about power and one does not gain power without winning. Men and women have run for offices all across the United States for decades, women in the last seventy years. As candidates, thousands have attempted to change the course of their city, state, or federal government. We all remember the winners. However, as many always point out, nobody remembers who came in second place. Fortunately for the United States and our political system, millions remember who came in second in the 1964 and 1972 presidential elections. Two men who went down to defeat in historic proportions came back to prove that their loss would not be a footnote in history. Why? Because both men were leading a change—a change in the direction that their respective political parties were resisting with spirited tenacity. This is a book about two men who had the courage, honesty, and strength to lead the two major parties down an uncharted path. One was a Republican and the other a Democrat, a conservative and a liberal. These two men were Senators Barry Goldwater of Arizona and George McGovern of South Dakota. This book will not go into detail about each man’s childhood, which is not to belittle it in any way. Obviously, it was important in shaping who they are as is the case with any human being. The focus of this book is on the importance of each man’s march to political history and the factors that led to the changes in both the Republican and Democratic parties. These factors will be addressed separately for each senator including the leadership each man possessed in challenging the established structure of the two major parties. In addition, the reader will reconnect with politicians who both Senator Goldwater

2

Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

and Senator McGovern fought with, tried to cajole on an issue, and compromised to make a piece of legislation become law. For Senator Barry Goldwater, the growth of the New Deal, the fight against communism, and the moderate response of fellow Republican President Eisenhower became prime areas of concern for the conservative cause. The conservative cause became an all out revolt during the New Frontier under President John F. Kennedy and the enormous spending for President Johnson’s Great Society. The importance of Barry Goldwater to the conservative take over the Republican Party in 1964 cannot be overstated, Barry Goldwater’s political journey is a fascinating trip through three decades of hope, defeat and victory. Senator George McGovern started his political career during the Eisenhower administration as a congressman from conservative South Dakota. He took the opposing view of the conservative movement by embracing the New Deal, The New Frontier, and The Great Society. The Vietnam War would be the ultimate factor shattering the New Deal coalition of Franklin Roosevelt into pieces by the end of 1968. These pieces would be swept up and put back together again by Senator McGovern in 1972. Only this time, some of the coalition’s pieces would be left out leaving Senator McGovern to follow a long path of redemption. Both men’s political legacy would be defined within eight years of one another because of two separate presidential elections—that of 1964 and of 1972. These were two senators of different ideological beliefs leading their parties through a tumultuous decade, but with some similarities in their backgrounds that is shown throughout this book. The enormous presidential losses both Senators Goldwater and McGovern endured would have ended most political careers. However, the coalition of voters Goldwater and McGovern put together came to fruition sixteen and twenty years later with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and Bill Clinton in 1992 (we can now add Barack Obama in 2008). In addition these victories provided something both men could not gain in losses—redemption. Almost half of the American voters today were not old enough to remember either man’s attempt at the White House. George McGovern’s second attempt at the White House in 1984 gave back some of the dignity he so unwillingly gave away in 1972. Senator McGovern’s debate performance on The Phil Donahue Show with the other declared Democratic candidates in early 1984 began his redemption in the eyes of many Democratic Party faithfuls along with the mainstream press.

Introduction

3

There are numerous books that have been written on American political leaders. The campaign for president of the United States is like no other in the history of the world. The men who have run for that office over the last two hundred years are full of intrigue and mystery. Two of these men who have stood the test of time are Senators Barry Goldwater and George McGovern. Let’s be honest. The bottom line for most people when you bring up the name of Goldwater and McGovern is that they lost their presidential elections. In addition, they may say that they did not just lose, but by historic proportions. Even both men’s most ardent supporters can’t change that fact. However, the way we look at both Senator Goldwater and Senator McGovern today can be changed. Moreover, it should. Much has been said and written over the years about both men and their lopsided defeats. Many on the Left still scorn Senator Goldwater’s “no” vote on the Civil Rights bill of 1964. Many on the Right still bring up Senator McGovern when attacking Democrats for what they call being “soft on defense” (he/she is now called a McGovernite). How many times have both men’s positions been included in the last seven presidential elections when debating the issues? And these men were not even on the ballot. This is not a book to say the same old thing—that Goldwater and McGovern are losers. The story of both men and their run toward political history should be told from a different perspective. A perspective that is fair in showing how both men (if either side likes it or not) changed the American political landscape like few others have done in over 230 years of this country. These two men showed all of us that second place could be a good and honorable thing. But ultimately what these two men became were leaders—leaders to a cause that would shift both their respective parties’ ideologies to a permanent status—Goldwater to the right on social issues such as civil rights, crime, and economics and McGovern to the left mainly on foreign policy. These two separate shifting party paradigms would be steadfast in its goals and embedded in a generation of voters determined not to admit defeat. In this book, the approach to the political journeys of both Senators Goldwater and McGovern comes from a different perspective. This author did not work on the presidential campaigns of either Senator Goldwater in 1964 or Senator McGovern in 1972 or 1984. Instead, writing as a middle class voter, his is a fresh voice in a sea of books written by Washington D.C. insiders and campaign consultants. How many times have people said to each other—“all politicians are crooked.” Moreover, sometimes it is hard to argue against this type of

4

Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

thinking. But the average voter does not have the time or the interest to investigate all politicians either in the present or in the past. This book will bring to light the truly important historical roles both Barry Goldwater and George McGovern played in shaping the country we have today. Over the years, it has been gratifying to hear former senators on opposite sides of the aisle talk about their friendship with both Senators Goldwater and McGovern. Senators such as Bob Dole and Alan Simpson for McGovern and Hubert Humphrey and Henry “Scoop” Jackson for Goldwater. These men represented the best the senate had to offer. These were men who disagreed very strongly on the issues, but who were just as strong in their feelings of friendship toward one another. This seems to be a rare commodity in today’s senate. This book is a celebration and dedication to both the conservative and the liberal voter. Both ends of the political spectrum can be very proud of Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona and Senator George McGovern of South Dakota, not just for what they both gave to Republican and Democratic Parties, but also for the manner in which they honored this country. Politics is about winning, as many would say, and therefore there is no room for the second place winner(s). The minority party in Washington D.C. would agree with this statement for many men have left the House of Representatives or Senate because of being in the minority where nothing could get accomplished by a sole member. But running for president and coming in second should be thought of as an important part of political history, not an afterthought. The 1964 and 1972 elections are two very important ones that must be looked at differently because of the second place winners. Politics cannot be studied by simply glossing over a defeat; it is a package deal that one must examine to understand the coming future of another shifting paradigm. Losing anything in life is difficult and, for some, it may take years to get over it. This feeling has been best captured over the years by George McGovern when talking about his defeat in 1972 with Walter Mondale, who also lost in a landslide in 1984, but to Ronald Reagan. Vice President Mondale asked Senator McGovern “when do you get over the pain of losing?” Senator McGovern replied, “When I do I will let you know.” Let’s hope this book can ease that pain just ever so slightly.

PA RT

I

Barry M. Goldwater

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CH A P T E R

ON E

Change on the Horizon, 1960–64

The conservative movement today has a substantial following whether it is social, economical, or religious. However, prior to 1960 it never had a leader that could inspire a generation to act. There had been conservative politicians in the previous seventy years who had served as spokespersons for the conservative cause, three being presidents—Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover. However, these men fit the times in which they served and no one will brag about their dynamic personalities. The conservative movement in the early 1960s came at a time when liberalism dominated the political thinking in the Democratic Party (although southern Democrats still controlled many key positions on various committees especially in the Senate) and a majority of Americans identified themselves as liberal or liberal leaning. People have always asked the age old question, “Does history make the person or does the person make history?” To answer that one would have to look at each separate historical event and determine who were the person(s) involved. The key word in that sentence is person. The person who would make political history with his firebrand style that took no prisoners was a senator from Arizona. Barry Morris Goldwater represented Arizona as one of its two Republican senators starting in 1953 and ending in 1987 (with a brief break from 1965 to 1969). He was born on January 2, 1909, in Phoenix, Arizona, when Arizona was still a territory. Senator Goldwater worked and later ran his father’s department store in Phoenix. At the start of World War II, Senator Goldwater would become a member of the U.S. Army Air Force Reserve and would eventually became chief pilot of the “pony express run” to supply B-29 bases in India through a route

8

Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

that covered the Azores, Casablanca, and Karachi. After returning to Arizona after the war (as a lieutenant colonel), Senator Goldwater’s love for f lying would lead to him forming the Arizona Air National Guard and serve as chief of staff from 1945 to 1952. In 1949, Senator Goldwater was elected as a Phoenix city councilman, but declined a chance to run for renomination.1 When Senator Goldwater was running for the U.S. Senate in 1952, the New Deal had solidified itself in American society, it was a time of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the tail end of the Korean War, the rise of Joe McCarthy, and the election of newly declared Republican Dwight Eisenhower, the latter being very important to the future cause of the conservative movement. Goldwater’s opponent was incumbent Democratic senator Ernest W. McFarland. The biggest handicap for Barry Goldwater going into the 1952 Senate race was not being well-known. In fact, at his first campaign rally someone asked him what kind of Republican he was? Goldwater replied: “Well, I am not a me-too Republican . . . I am a Republican opposed to the superstate, and to gigantic, bureaucratic, centralized authority.”2 Barry Goldwater would go on to narrowly defeat McFarland by 6,725 votes (51.3 percent to 48.7 percent). This victory was in large part helped by Dwight Eisenhower’s landslide win over Democrat Adlai Stevenson. Eisenhower carried Arizona by over 43,000 votes. The Republican Party had nominated Dwight Eisenhower in 1952 over Mr. Republican and a conservative Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio. Eisenhower’s eventual moderate stand on issues from the Supreme Court nomination of Earl Warren to federal funding of highways and support of NATO was an alarm for the conservatives in the Republican Party. Moreover, the sudden death of Senator Taft in 1953 left a void in the conservative ranks. Senator Goldwater would pick up some of the void left by the death of Senator Taft as Senate campaign chairman for the Republican Party. Senator Goldwater toured throughout the country speaking out for Republican candidates (liberal as well as conservative). Senator Goldwater held this position until 1963 with a loss of two Senate seats, but making him one of the most sought after Republican speakers in the country especially in the South.3 In 1960, Eisenhower’s vice president, Richard Nixon, won the Republican nomination and would face the Democratic nominee Senator John F. Kennedy. The 1960 election would end up being one of the most important elections to the history of the United States and American politics. Not only did the year produce President Kennedy,

Change on the Horizon, 1960–64

9

but it also sparked the conscience of a conservative. Senator Barry Goldwater was ready to lead a generation of young believers down the path of political history. Senator Goldwater’s book Conscience of a Conservative in 1960 was the first serious attempt to challenge the New Deal and the welfare state along with the civil rights movement by a politician. This was the first serious attempt not because the conservatives who opposed Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal were half-hearted, but because this movement somehow became lost once the bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Empire of Japan brought the United States into World War II. In addition, no movement at that time could have displaced the affection most Americans felt for President Franklin Roosevelt. Conscience of a Conservative also produced a provocative challenge that may have been its overall goal. Senator Goldwater was not only challenging the liberal majority, but he was also challenging his own party to break free of moderation—he was shifting the Republican Party paradigm. However, Senator Goldwater acknowledges that the conservative movement in the twentieth century had its start in American society with philosophical thinkers such as Francis Wilson’s The Case for Conservatism in 1951, Dr. Russell Kirk and his book The Conservative Mind in 1953, and in 1955 with William F. Buckley Jr. and his magazine National Review. It is not too surprising that the conservative movement could not gain traction from a politician serving in the U.S. House of Representatives or Senate. Conservatives needed to get the word out and back in the 1950s it was very difficult for them to spread their views. Obviously, in the 1950s, there was no C-Span or MSNBC for politicians to go on and advance their message. Russell Kirk did not believe that conservatism was an ideology. For Kirk it was threefold: (1) that conservatism, unlike liberalism, offers no utopian agenda as the solution to society’s problems; (2) that conservatism is more a state of mind about life than a program for action; and (3) that change should arise out of experience, history, and tradition rather than being imposed upon society from some prescriptive rule book. The last tenet, a traditionally accepted one of conservatism, holds that change— economic, political, religious, and social—should take place gradually and within the bounds of existing custom and local institutions rather than rapidly through expanding, centralized governmental bureaucracies.4 Senator Goldwater’s introduction to political ideology had been formed first during the time of conservative administrations starting with President Warren G. Harding in 1920. After the election of

10

Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, the structure and size of the federal government would be a permanent change that is still with us today. Along with the structural changes to the federal government came a change in the American people’s mindset in what the federal government was supposed to do. The welfare state was born and liberalism gained a foothold in American politics. The shocking win by President Harry Truman in 1948 over Republican Thomas Dewey put the conservative movement on hold for another four years. Senator Joe McCarthy of Wisconsin, a Republican, shook up the liberal establishment in the early 1950s with his communist accusations. However, his reckless and unscrupulous ways ended up not just destroying him, but any legitimacy that the conservative movement may have been gathering. However, the one important legacy that Joe McCarthy did give to the conservative movement and, specifically, the Republican Party was an issue to exploit against the Democratic Party for the next thirty-five years. The anticommunist fight was now intertwined with the conservative agenda. Senator Goldwater did not back down from the allegations Senator McCarthy was vocalizing when it came to the communist inf luence among left-wing politicians especially among the Democratic Party. Here is Senator Goldwater on the f loor of the Senate in 1955 defending Vice President Nixon against Democratic Party spokesmen saying Nixon’s speeches during the 1954 elections were untruthful and just smears. The Democratic national chairman invited his Republican counterpart to read these “Chamber of Smears” that were excerpts of Vice President Nixon’s speeches:5 Why this attack on Nixon? The people conducting it claim he made statements during his campaign speaking trips which were untrue, especially the statements on the issue of Communism. He smeared the whole Democratic Party, they contend. The real reason for this attempt to make Nixon out a liar and a smearer of the whole Democratic Party is this: What the Vice President said was true and it was effective. Because it was true and effective, it hurt. Also, the Democratic spokesmen hesitate, as yet, anyway, to try to tear down President Eisenhower. So they are making Nixon their target and are aiming their fire at him with the 1956 campaign in mind. Senator Goldwater continued his diatribe against the Democratic Party including past “mudslinging” against Republican candidates

Change on the Horizon, 1960–64

11

including Abraham Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt and their “soft” stand on communism citing examples of President Harry Truman and the 1952 Democratic nominee Adlai Stevenson: You may say that anything done in 1941 is forgiveable, that desolate mistakes were made in dealing with the Communists but that, after all, we didn’t know than how sinister and threatening the Communists turned out to be. All I can say to that is that some people knew in 1943 that Communists were sinister and others, who didn’t, have had the guts since then to admit their mistake. But Mr. Stevenson has never admitted anything. What did Senator Goldwater personally think of Joe McCarthy? He did not see McCarthy as completely wrong but just as someone who had a thirst for power. One of Senator Goldwater’s votes in 1957 was “no” on the motion to censure Joe McCarthy. Senator Goldwater explained his feelings toward McCarthy in his autobiography Goldwater in 1988: I’ve never spoken this candidly about McCarthy before because it’s not part of my character to harpoon people. However, McCarthy was a very important part of our generation, good or bad. And that’s just how I felt about him—very mixed feelings. He recognized the Communist menace, as many of us did, and conservatives recognize him for that. But McCarthy went overboard in his investigations because of his inability to handle power and alcohol.6 Senator Goldwater would go on to say that alcohol and the need for power brought McCarthy down. There was a susceptible side of Senator Goldwater that is revealed when he discusses Joe McCarthy. It was not the communist chasing, manipulative bully that Goldwater saw, but a man, a human being with a drinking problem who needed help. This was one the tragedies that came from the McCarthy era; a broken man who Goldwater was hoping someone or something of a “higher being” could heal. Senator Goldwater was not about kicking a man when he was down, a quality that would endear him to his followers as well as to those who were on the opposite side. On June 8, 1957, about a month after Joseph McCarthy died at the age of forty-eight from acute hepatitis (although many today believe it

12

Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

was from alcoholism—cirrhosis of the liver), Senator Goldwater spoke to the Wisconsin Republican State Convention in tribute to his former friend:7 Joe and I became friends long before either of us entered the Senate. He was faithful, tireless and conscientious American. Joe McCarthy gave himself—his life—to the service of his God and his country. He did a job that no other man could, or would, do. He was completely self less and his single motive was the preser vation of those principles which make it possible for the Republican Party to proclaim now its fulfillment of the confidence of all Americans. Because Joe McCarthy lived, we are a safer, freer, more vigilant nation today. This fact, even though he no longer dwells among us, will never perish. And I know you will join with me in thanking God that while Joe lived he made a contribution to his countrymen that will forever redound to the credit of the people of Wisconsin and to your Republican organization. Senator Goldwater saw Richard Nixon’s nomination at the 1960 convention as a chance to openly challenge the Eastern establishment of the Republican Party. Nixon’s only real serious challenge was from the liberal governor of New York, Nelson A. Rockefeller. As told in Theodore White’s great work The Making of the President 1960 (1961), Senator Goldwater saw the moderate stance the Republican platform committee was taking on the civil rights of African Americans as too close to that of the Democrats. Many conservatives felt that if they “gave the Northern Negro vote to the Democrats, and we shall take the Old South for ourselves.”8 However, Senator Goldwater would become even more furious when he learned of a deal that Nixon and Rockefeller had made in secret. Nixon, the Republican nominee, learnt that Governor Rockefeller had issues with some of the specifics of the Republican platform that could lead to an open f loor fight. On hearing these reports, Nixon phoned Rockefeller to inquire about a meeting that eventually would be at Rockefeller’s apartment at Fifth Avenue. This deal would be known as the Fourteen Point Compact of Fifth Avenue.9 The Fourteen Point Compact agreed upon by Rockefeller and Nixon was an attempt to present a united front on foreign and economic policy at the 1960 Republican Party convention. However, not only did the pact between Rockefeller and Nixon anger the conservatives led

Change on the Horizon, 1960–64

13

by Senator Goldwater, but it also brought resentment from the de facto leader of the Republican Party President Eisenhower. The Compact seemed to be running away from what President Eisenhower felt were eight years of accomplishments. And the worst part of it all for Eisenhower was that one of the participants in this “Compact” was his vice president of eight years, Richard Nixon. The compromise between Rockefeller and Nixon was a very important contribution to the conservative movement. Senator Goldwater had felt for eight years that the Eisenhower administration used moderation and compromise with the liberals of both political parties in order to maintain power. But for Senator Goldwater, compromise did not lead and moderation would only lead to defeat. Once again, Senator Goldwater showed his class and understanding of politics after the 1960 nomination of Richard Nixon was complete. He and his followers could have left the convention, as did Governor Strom Thurmond of South Carolina in 1948 from the Democratic convention over the issue of Civil Rights being inserted in the Democrats platform. Governor Thurmond would go on to run as the State’s Rights candidate in 1948 capturing just over one million votes and thirty-nine electoral votes. In fact, Senator Goldwater told the Republican delegates at the 1960 convention that he was standing with the Republican ticket, but he did not shy away from his true feelings of discontent for the moderates of his own party: “Now you conservatives and all Republicans, I’d like you to listen to this,” he said. “We’ve had our chance, and I think the conservatives have made a splendid showing at this convention. Let’s, if we want to take this party back—let’s get to work.”10 And get to work they did. As the New Frontier of John F. Kennedy captured the imagination of the country, conservatism took a backseat once again to liberalism almost forgotten by many but the conservatives “who began to work slowly, and often secretly, toward their goal of the White House.”11 The importance of the 1960 Republican convention does get lost at times because of the nominations of Richard Nixon and his opponent John F. Kennedy along with the importance history has put on the eventual Kennedy presidency. This apathy should no longer be the norm as described by Professor Mary Brennan some eighteen years ago: Nineteen sixty proved to be a pivotal year in the conservative effort to develop an effective political movement. Building on a

14

Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

widespread but unarticulated public dissatisfaction with government and society, a resurgent intellectual movement, and a mushrooming network of grass-roots groups, conservative Republican politicians began to develop their own organization within the party . . . This trend toward unity and the emergence of Barry Goldwater are the two most important events in the early development of the conservative movement . . . Consequently, while Nixon and liberal Republicans ignored the complaints and assumed cooperation of the right wing, the conservative were left alone to start building support within the party structure and in the voting public.12 The narrow loss by Nixon to Kennedy opened the way for a new generation of Republicans to take over the party they felt was taken from underneath them by the East Coast moderates and liberals after the defeat of Herbert Hoover in 1932. Senator Goldwater was the obvious choice of this new generation. Conscience of a Conservative had become a best seller on college campuses and the call to challenge President Kennedy’s New Frontier had begun. Not since William Jennings Bryan led the populist revolt for free silver in 1896 has one man led a cause like Senator Goldwater. And this leadership is not too common if one examines the history of political leaders in the United States (excluding presidents). Leaders such as Samuel Adams and Thomas Paine in the beginning of the American Revolution; Henry Clay and Daniel Webster eloquently pleading to save the Union; Samuel Gompers and John L. Lewis and the rise of the labor unions; Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller and the inf luence of large business; Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady and the women’s movement for the right to vote; and in most recent times Martin Luther King and Medgar Evers and the civil rights of African Americans. There are others that could be named, but the point is that the United States with the millions of people who have inhabited this land have produced only a few hundred leaders that historians have written about. By the time President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas on November 22, 1963, Senator Goldwater had already decided he wanted to run against his friend. Yes, unlike in today’s cynical world of politics, senators of opposing parties actually considered the president a friend. In addition, according to Senator Goldwater, he and President Kennedy agreed to hold presidential debates with one another should Goldwater win the nomination. They would, in fact, travel with one another from campaign stop to campaign stop debating issues. For the

Change on the Horizon, 1960–64

15

first time, the American voter would have actually seen both candidates together, sharing a stage, while debating issues. Since 1960, presidential debates are held every four years (except 1964, 1968, and 1972) and monitored by a respected journalist or panel of journalist. Unfortunately, these debates have become just two hours of talking points. In addition, it does not translate into too much for the winner. Since 1984 most viewers who tuned in to watch have called every Democratic Party nominee the winner of at least the first debate, but they went on to lose the general election (most viewers felt third party candidate Ross Perot won the first debate in the 1992 presidential campaign with Democrat Bill Clinton coming in second and President George H. Bush third). Even then Attorney General Robert Kennedy acknowledged the likelihood that President Kennedy would be facing Senator Goldwater in the 1964 presidential election. Three memorandums dated October 10–25, 1963, from Attorney General Kennedy to Senator Goldwater were in response to Senator Goldwater asking him for a “rumored” document involving one of the Reuther brothers and how to deal with the “far right.” The attorney general’s final response is shown in figure 1.1:13 Senator Goldwater is one of those extraordinary people who not only led a movement in history, but who also helped propagate it. He was shifting the ideology of the Republican Party to a new paradigm. There have been many presidential elections in which a candidate would not have won no matter who the opposing candidate; most of the time it was an incumbent running for a second term. In recent times this would have been the 1984 election against Ronald Reagan. Many Democrats believe had Senator Gary Hart of Colorado been the Democratic Party’s nominee, his popular vote would have been higher than Vice President Walter Mondale’s 41 percent. It can be argued that only three times has the second place finisher in a presidential election had a message that resonated with the people who cast a vote for them and stood the test of time: William Jennings Bryan, Barry Goldwater, and George McGovern who will be discussed later on this book. Elected officials such as Senator Goldwater, who were willing to be honest with people, are in the category of politicians that can elicit a debate about issues that affect our society. This is a very unique quality that happens in only a few politicians in each decade. Senator Goldwater’s honesty has spurred discussions that have led some people to think “outside the box.” To listen to someone else’s point of view is a hard thing to do for most people. People are brought up in families with different beliefs, either political or religious, and for most of these people it is a

16

Figure 1.1

Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

Attorney General Robert Kennedy Memorandum on Reuther brothers.

Note: The Reuther brothers Senator Goldwater was referring to were: Walter, who was the head of the United Auto Workers (UAW) from 1946 to 1970 along with Victor and Roy who were also active in the UAW.

minimum of eighteen years. Individuals will then go either straight into the work force or to college where they are thrown into a society that is completely different from perhaps what they were taught. Senator Goldwater knew the steps he was taking in 1960 would elicit a strong debate within the Republican Party. Men who had controlled the Republican Party for most of his lifetime (the Eastern Establishment) were complacent in their views. To challenge them and the welfare state would take more than honest debate. Senator Goldwater knew he needed an army of volunteers. Young men and women, mixed with a few political veterans, who wanted to change the course of political history. This would lead to the Draft Goldwater Movement prior to the 1960 convention.

Change on the Horizon, 1960–64

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The excitement one feels when working on a campaign especially for a presidential candidate can be hard for some to understand. These campaign workers are very passionate about their candidate and his/her message. The disappointment when your candidate loses takes time to get over. The hurt Senator Goldwater must have felt in 1964, even if he expected it, was there. But his consolation was that his loss was setting the Republican Party up for something different, something never seen before in their party’s one-hundred-year history. It was mentioned earlier that the then-senator John F. Kennedy gave his support to the Reverend Martin Luther King during his run for president in the 1960 election. King had been arrested in Atlanta on a civil disobedience charge. Kennedy’s inf luence helped to get him freed from jail. Three years later President Kennedy became the first president in our history to call the civil rights of African Americans a “moral crisis.”14 However, President Kennedy only accelerated the feelings that white southerners had that the Democratic Party was abandoning them for the African American vote. The 1948 Democratic Party put the civil rights of African Americans on their platform, which caused the South Carolina delegates, led by Strom Thurmond, to walk out of the convention. Thurmond would run in the 1948 general election on the State’s Right ticket that garnered over one million votes. This was an ominous sign of things to come for the Democratic Party. The issue of civil rights was mentioned because by 1960, Senator Goldwater had taken a stand on civil rights and the role of the federal government in his book Conscience of a Conservative. Senator Goldwater uses education as one example to summarize his feelings on the federal government and the powers it inherited through the Constitution: It so happens I am in agreement with the objectives of the Supreme Court as stated in the Brown decision. I believe it is both wise and just for Negro children to attend the same schools as whites, and that to deny them this opportunity carries with it strong implications of inferiority. I am not prepared, however, to impose that judgment of mine on the people of Mississippi or South Carolina, or to tell them what methods should be adopted and what pace should be kept in striving toward that goal. That is their business, not mine.15 The issue of race, according to Senator Goldwater, was the reason for Richard Nixon’s loss to John F. Kennedy in 1960. Once again the importance of the Rockefeller/Nixon compact prior to the Republican

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Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

convention emerges in the history of the conservative revolt. Senator Goldwater felt if the original draft plank prepared by the Platform Committee had been adopted, which avoided any outright declaration of support for black sit-in strikes at Southern lunch counters and omitted any promise of federal intervention to secure blacks full job equality, Nixon would have taken the south giving him the 1960 election.16 It should be noted, however, that Senator Goldwater did vote for the Civil Rights Act of 1957 as a member of the Eighty-Fifth Congress and later for the Civil Rights Act of 1960 as a member of the Eighty-Sixth Congress. Senator Goldwater does mention this vote in his autobiography in 1988 in which he restates the same position on his civil rights votes as he did in 1964. The 1964 presidential campaign would brand him a racist because he did not vote for the 1964 Civil Rights bill.17 The 1957 Civil Rights Act had affirmed the right of a citizen to go to court for injunctions to protect his voting rights and empowered the federal Government, through the Attorney General, to seek injunctions against obstruction or deprivation of those rights. The Act also created a federal Civil Rights Commission with subpoena powers to investigate and report to the President and Congress on the violation of voting rights, and established a new Civil Rights Division in the Justice Department.18 It was mentioned earlier in this chapter the importance of the Eisenhower Administration to the conservative movement. These were the feelings of Senator Goldwater himself in April, 1957 when he made a speech on the senate f loor attacking the Eisenhower administrations federal spending plan of $71.8 billion: “We conservatives were determined to reverse the policies of “moderate” Republicans who were little more than “Me Too” Democrats. Eventually, frustrated because Ike and the “moderates” would not cut back their spending policies, I called the Eisenhower administration a “dime store New Deal” because of its expanding programs. My fiscal policy differences with Ike were important. This was the start of a long public debate and the eventual conservative break with party’s so-called moderate wing, which was headed by New York’s Governor Nelson Rockefeller, Senator Jacob Javits, and others.”19 Just to show a recent comparison, the previous statement made by Senator Goldwater is similar to what happened with the conservatives and their relationship with President George W. Bush. Could one only

Change on the Horizon, 1960–64

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imagine what Senator Goldwater would have thought of President Bush’s spending proposals over his eight years? Only nine senators, true “Goldwater Conservatives,” voted against expanding Medicare in 200320 and only three voted against President Bush’s education bill No Child Left Behind in 2002.21 All this as the federal deficit increased. It is becoming increasingly difficult for someone in the Republican Party to stay a true conservative. There is no doubt that this type of behavior would have outraged Senator Goldwater—giving in on principle to please a president of the same party. Most American voters know elected officials are not 100 percent honest, all the time. Senator Goldwater would have included himself in this statement. However, the era in which Senator Goldwater served enabled politicians to vote more with their conscience. In today’s society, people have become so entrenched with the idea of winning and not wanting to hear the bad news that comes with decision-making that many politicians do not vote for what is in their hearts. There are some examples an individual can state off the top of their head to refute that claim, but they are too few in number. One book that shows great examples of elected officials making votes of conscience is John F. Kennedy’s Profiles in Courage. One of the eight men in the book that Kennedy singles out is Mr. Republican, conservative senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio. Only two U.S. senators have been elected president of the United States coming directly from the Senate since 1960—John F. Kennedy and Barack Obama. Why, some may ask? Some believe that it is because U.S. senators vote almost on a weekly basis on issues that affect all Americans in one way or another. These senators have a record that the voter and the press can search through with utmost scrutiny. This is especially true for senators who have served for at least twelve years. One advantage Senator John F. Kennedy had in 1960 was that he did not have a lengthy resume of controversial votes to defend. This was especially true of the most controversial vote in his first term—the censure of Senator Joe McCarthy in 1954 (it should be noted that Senator Kennedy missed the vote because he was very ill after complications of a back surgery). This point is relevant today. Some feel this was an advantage for Senator Barack Obama (D-Illinois) who won the presidency over Senator John McCain. Senator Obama has only been in the U.S. Senate for three years. The votes cast by a senator (or any politician for that matter) gives good insight into where that person stands on social issues as well as foreign policy. There are many times it is too overstated because there are always legitimate reasons politicians can give for their vote (i.e., amendments to

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Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

the bill, certain language in the bill). The voters, at the very least, owe it to a senator, especially if he/she is not from a voter’s own state, to let him/ her explain a vote instead of letting the attack ads do it for them. Senator Goldwater was no different as he began a potential run for the presidency. He has many examples of votes he made from the heart in his first term in office (1953–59) up to his nomination for president from the Republican Party in 1964. Highlights of some of these key votes are listed here:22 Eighty-Fourth Congress: 1955–56 HR 7225. To amend the Social Security Act to extend Old Age and Survivors’ Insurance coverage. George (D Ga.) amendment to pay OASI benefits to disabled workers at age fifty, instead of sixty-five; set up a separate trust fund for disability payments and increase OASI taxes—voted “no.” Bill passed 47-45. S 2663. Depressed Areas. Established an effective program to alleviate conditions of excessive unemployment in certain economically depressed areas—voted “no.” Bill passed 60-30. Eighty-Fifth Congress: 1957–58 HR 6127. Civil Rights Act of 1957—voted “yes.” Bill passed 72-18. Eighty-Sixth Congress: 1959–60 HR 8601. Civil Rights Act of 1960. Passage of the amended bill making obstruction of all federal court orders a crime, outlawing all bombings and bomb threats, requiring preservation of voting records, providing for court registration of Negroes, and other matters—Senator Goldwater did not have a recorded vote only that he announced for it. Bill passed 71-18. HR 12580. Social Security Amendments of 1960. Anderson (D N.M.) amendment providing medical benefits for all Social Security retirees sixty-eight and over, to be financed by an increase in the Social Security payroll tax—voted “no.” Bill rejected 44-51. Eighty-Seventh Congress: 1961–62 S 1021. School Assistance Act of 1961. Passage of the bill authorizing $2,550 million in grants to the states to be used for operation, maintenance, and construction of public schools and for teachers’ salaries—voted “no.” Bill passed 49-34. Eighty-Eighth Congress: 1963–64 HR 7152. Civil Rights Act, covering voting rights, equal access to public accommodations, desegregation of public facilities, public school desegregation, extension of the Civil Rights Commission, nondiscrimination

Change on the Horizon, 1960–64

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in federally aided programs, equal employment opportunity, gathering of registration and voting statistics by race, intervention by the attorney general in pending civil rights cases, review of court orders remanding a case to state courts, establishment of a Community Relations Service, and jury trials under the Act—voted “no.” Bill passed 73-27. S 2642. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. Passage of the bill authorizing $947.2 million in fiscal 1965 for a wide variety of programs to combat poverty —voted “no.” Bill passed 61-34. Among the key votes cited here, none would be as important in Senator Goldwater’s political career than the three on civil rights matters. Although Senator Goldwater voted for two of the three civil rights bills, it was his “no” vote for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that would cost him so dearly in the 1964 general election. In his defense, Senator Goldwater released a twelve-point summary of his views prior to the actually vote on the Civil Rights Bill of 1964 called Summary of the Goldwater Views and the Goldwater Record Regarding Civil Rights.23 Here are some of his key statements: I. Discrimination against any person on the basis of color, creed, etc., is morally wrong. II. The Federal Government has a very definite responsibility in the field of civil rights. So to do the States and local communities. So do individual citizens. III. One difficulty these days stems from the attitude of some advocates of particular proposals—they seem to say if you aren’t 100% with them, then you are necessarily 100% against them! IV. The Goldwater stores, at my direction, many years ago integrated their work force. V. The Arizona National Guard, at my direction, was integrated in the 1940’s. VI. I supported (by Senate votes and public speeches) the two Eisenhower Administration civil rights bills in 1957 and 1960. VII. The 1960 civil rights act contains the Goldwater amendment making interstate f light to avoid prosecution for civil rights violence a Federal crime. IX. I have publicly supported, by speeches in all areas of the country—including the South—the proposition that court decrees in civil rights matters must be obeyed, and that the Presidential use of Federal troops, as a last resort, is an appropriate means to this end.

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Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

XI. The only portions of the pending bill to which I object are those sections dealing with private employment practices and public accommodations. These two sections are so drawn that they amount to an unconstitutional grant of power so vast and uncontrollable that as a matter of conscience I cannot vote for them in their present form. Further, these sections are so significant that they determine my vote on the entire measure. Over the years there has been much debate over Senator Goldwater’s “no” vote with some people accusing him of being a racist. This is incredibly unfair since Senator Goldwater had supported the NAACP’s challenge to segregation laws in Phoenix and he also desegregated his Air National Guard Unit before President Truman did it in 1947 on the federal level. People cannot, in good conscience, just look at his “no” vote for the 1964 Civil Rights Act and consider that an act of racism. He explains that vote in section XI given earlier, which was based on a question of constitutionality, not bigotry. However, many today still feel Senator Goldwater did in fact vote for turning back the clock on black equality when he cast a “no” vote on the 1964 Civil Rights Act. One such person is former civil rights leader, congressman, Atlanta mayor, and United Nations ambassador Andrew Young who, in November 2004, was talking about the forty-year anniversary of the passage of the Voting Rights Act and the work today for civil rights by the young hip-hop community: Barry Goldwater was the Republican presidential candidate who ran against President Lyndon Johnson in the 1964 election. As a U.S. senator from Arizona, Goldwater voted against the civil rights bill of 1964. Although the bill passed, he was a real threat to everything we did in the movement. From the sit-ins to the freedom rides, Goldwater and the Republican right promised to turn back the clock on the civil rights movement. Young continued: At the 1964 Republican National Convention, he proclaimed, “We must, and we shall, return to proven ways—not because they are old, but because they are true.” In an effort to prevent Goldwater’s election as president, we organized get-out-the-vote-drives, street rallies and marches. We preached in churches. Our message ref lected the need for everyone to exercise the right to vote. 24

Change on the Horizon, 1960–64

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Most recently, there was an attack in an article by Jon Garrido of the Arizona News on Senator Goldwater because Arizona State University is working on a plan that would preserve and showcase Senator Goldwater and his papers in a multistory library and archival building bearing his name. The new library would be located in downtown Phoenix.25 For Garrido, this act would amount to a one of racism. Garrido argues that the Republican Party during the 1960s along with many Republican candidates expressed their support for States’ Rights. Many American blacks say support of States’ Rights was a signal of opposition to federal Civil Rights legislation. Garrido feels leaders like Senator Goldwater helped perpetuate the States’ Rights movement and attitude in the South. Garrido went on to say in this article, “the best thing that ever happened to the Civil Rights movement of the 1960’s is Barry Goldwater lost his bid to become President of the United State in a landslide . . . If Goldwater had won, the United States would not have Civil Rights and equal justice for all.” And here was Roy Wilkins, executive director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, on September 8, 1963, rejecting Senator Goldwater’s stand on civil rights: “He’s written it in a book that he believes in leaving civil rights to the states, and in the Negro’s book that means leaving it to (Alabama Governor George C.) Wallace and (Mississippi Governor Ross) Barnett, and we can’t buy it, that’s all.”26 Obviously there are defenders of Senator Goldwater, one of which would not surprise many—the conservative magazine National Review. In an article titled “Conservatives Can Be Proud of Their Civil Rights Record,” John Fonte points out that the Civil Rights bill of 1964 received the support of many conservative Republicans including Everett Dirksen of Illinois, Charles Halleck of Indiana, Robert Taft Jr. of Ohio, and Roman Hruska of Nebraska. And it is a fact that a higher percentage of Republicans supported the bill than Democrats. Missing from this list was Senator Goldwater. However, Fonte points out (as mentioned earlier in this chapter) that Senator Goldwater had always been a supporter of racial equality and voted for Eisenhower’s Civil Rights bills of 1957 and 1960. Fonte also goes on to quote Lee Edwards from his book The Conservative Revolution: “As chief of staff of the Arizona National Guard he [Goldwater] had pushed for desegregation of the guard two years before President Truman desegregated the U.S. armed forces.” Goldwater stated that workforce discrimination was “morally wrong,” but worried that in the future the federal

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Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

government might “require people to discriminate on the basis of color or race or religion.” This is why Senator Goldwater opposed the 1964 Civil Rights Bill. Also weighing on Senator Goldwater’s stand on civil rights was Lee Edwards, who wrote a biography on him. Edwards participated in an interview with Ray Suarez on the PBS NewsHour dated December 24, 2002, in which the topic was about the Republican Party and race relations with African Americans mainly in the South. This was after Senator Trent Lott of Mississippi spoke at a birthday celebration for Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, a former segregationist and candidate for president as a Dixiecrat. Lott said the country would have been better off had Senator Thurmond won the 1948 election for president. This was followed by a protest from many African Americans, liberals, and even conservatives including President George W. Bush. Edwards addressed the Goldwater candidacy in 1964 by saying that Senator Goldwater voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because of Title VII and how it would lead to affirmative action and because of this he was labeled as against African Americans. When asked of Edwards that it was not only African Americans who may have misread Senator Goldwater, but whites as well since he carried four of the six states Strom Thurmond did in 1948, Edwards said that it was not a deliberate southern strategy Senator Goldwater ran in 1964 and he in fact, as mentioned earlier, agreed with President Johnson not to invoke race in the 1964 campaign.27 If one examines Senator Goldwater’s key votes listed earlier, his consistency on the issues becomes apparent. Senator Goldwater stood for a smaller federal government and less taxes. One does not have to agree with his vote, but at least one can respect his honesty. This shows why Senator Goldwater was so well respected among his colleagues in the Senate. The American voter can relate better to any politician when they tell you where they stand on the issues. However, this does not give a politician, especially a president of the United States, a green light to continue with a policy that is clearly failing. The best example to demonstrate that trait was the Vietnam War presided over mainly by Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. Both presidencies would in effect be destroyed because of this foreign policy disaster. One of the obstacles that seem to be overlooked when discussing Senator Goldwater’s lead up to the 1964 general election was the economic record of President Kennedy. Many voters don’t care if the president is a Republican or a Democrat when it comes to their pocket books as long as their pocket books are full of cash. President Kennedy had cut taxes in 1963 and was reaping the benefits of a lower unemployment

Change on the Horizon, 1960–64

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rate (5.5 percent) than when he took office (7.1 percent). The inf lation rate was also lower in 1963 than in 1961 when he took office. The issue Senator Goldwater would have to focus on was the growth of the federal government and what the conservatives saw as the decay of the American dream. President Kennedy had expanded the role of the federal government in his two and a half years in office, most notably in the area of civil rights. His biggest defeat came in his attempt to help the elderly with a new federal health program called Medicare. Overall, President Kennedy had a better legislative record than some historians give him credit for. Nevertheless, to Senator Goldwater and the Conservative Republicans it was not that the Kennedy programs passed or failed; it was the attempt by Kennedy and the liberal Democrats that scared the Conservative movement. And if Barry Goldwater was not 100 percent sure about running for president, a few thousand conservative voices were trying to cajole him to say yes on July 4, 1963, at a rally held in Washington D.C. at the National Guard Armory. Thousands showed up to hear conservative speakers, including a young senator from Texas—Republican John Tower. Here is Tower speaking: “I wish that Barry Goldwater was here tonight to see this inspiring scene. I know that if Barry could be here and see this and sense the depth of your enthusiasm there would be no question in his mind about what his decision should be.”28 If you read Senator Goldwater’s own words in With No Apologies (1979) and Goldwater there is a reoccurring, emotional theme that he speaks about—President John F. Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963. Senator Goldwater realized his hopes for the presidency were gone when a bullet ended the life of the forty-six-year-old president. The 1964 presidential election was no longer about policy, but would be switched to the bare-knuckle game of raw politics. This is where one person does whatever is necessary to win. It’s ugly and it’s coldhearted, but it makes one man president and the runner-up a footnote. The 1964 election would be different this time; one man’s defeat would bring him off the mat to reclaim his dignity in the eyes of the most important judge—history. Senator Goldwater talks about his decision to almost not run after the assassination of President Kennedy: When the Draft Goldwater movement got started and I sorta laughed at it. I said well you can go ahead and do it it’s not going any place, and these people could work off some steam. And when

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Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

it became that there was interest this was before long in October. I felt that possibly I should do it. And then President Kennedy was assassinated and I lost all interest in it. It was about four days—four or five days later that I told my wife to heck with the Presidential thing that all the anticipation all the—I don’t like to use the word fun—but all the desire left me because I couldn’t see Johnson able to draw the fine line. Johnson is a man whom I’ve known for a long time and I like him personally but I’ve watched him change just in the twelve years that I’ve known him. From a conservative Democrat to an extreme Liberal Democrat where Kennedy was a Liberal and a true Liberal and he always stayed that way. We used to argue about it. He would come over and say: “I saw you wince when I voted that time” and I would say well, why in the devil did you do it? I think your father would spank you! Well, he said, “I just feel that way.”29 When asked by an interviewer about the point at which he decided to run and who he was with during that decision: I don’t remember exactly I think I was probably sitting at my desk then in my den where I spend most of my time. I just finally said to myself—you’ve got to do it—I realize that I had a responsibility to conservatism and to the young people who had become interested in it and I felt too that if I didn’t do it that these young people who were voting, many of them for the first time, might drift away . . . I had a question in my mind all the time, all through the year whether or not this was the right time for a conservative candidate to offer himself and I felt if he were clobbered at the convention, or didn’t even reach the convention, that would be the end of conservatism in the party. Or if he were clobbered in the General Election should he be the Nominee that would write off conservatism in this country.30 The fear of a potential presidential campaign in 1964 with President Johnson that would focus on smears and innuendo would come to fruition. Unfortunately, this is not unprecedented in a U.S. presidential campaign. A more recent example of this tactic was in 1988 with the race between then vice president George H. Bush and Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis. Governor Dukakis had actually been winning in the polls leading up to both party’s conventions that summer.

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Facing the prospect of losing if the Bush campaign did not begin to go after Dukakis, Bush’s campaign leaders Roger Ailes and Lee Atwater knew they had to define Dukakis as an out-of-touch, weak on defense liberal. It was described this way in the book The Quest for the Presidency—The 1988 Campaign (1989), The last convert to the scorched-earth strategy was Bush himself. He seemed to his men to understand intellectually what he had to do, but politics, for him, had always been a grubby business, distasteful in direct relation to its degree of incivility. Dukakis was a decent man, an able man, he mused in his car one day; he was just coming at things from a different direction, and once people saw how different, the governor wasn’t gonna get a free ride anymore. What Bush seemed loath to do was rush into the ring and start swinging.31 From a speech criticizing the Eisenhower administration’ excessive budget to the draft Goldwater movement in 1960 to his vote against the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Senator Goldwater was on a course to make political history—he was the leader. The political road had been full of potholes for the conservative movement during the decades of the 1940s and 1950s. Events in the early 1960s such as the civil rights movements, proposals for new Federal health programs (Medicare), and the shocking assassination of President Kennedy were the ingredients that began to fill these holes. The road was paved for Senator Barry Goldwater and the Conservative takeover of the Republican Party.

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CH A P T E R

T WO

The Campaign for President of the United States, 1964

On January 3, 1964, in Phoenix, Arizona, Senator Barry M. Goldwater announced his candidacy for president of the United States. In his memoirs With No Apologies (1979) Senator Goldwater described his feelings as he made his historic announcement: I said I had decided to become a candidate for the Republican nomination in response to the millions of Americans who wanted a choice. I said I hoped it would be a campaign of principles, not personalities. I promised there would be a direct and decisive confrontation between two antagonistic political philosophies—the welfare state, represented by Lyndon Johnson of the Democrats, and a society of free, independent, responsible individuals, to be represented by the Republicans.1 Senator Goldwater’s appeal to a new generation of voters was that he was willing to put himself out front for a cause that by the end of the Republican convention of 1964 looked like it was all but lost. However, Senator Goldwater knew all along that he would not win the general election as he discussed in his last memoirs in 1988: “I didn’t want to run for the presidency. That’s the God’s truth. To my knowledge, no individual who has run the race has ever made such a statement. It is also true that I knew, and said privately from the start, that I would lose to President Johnson.”2 To read this for the first time really jumps out at a person. Here was a senator of the United States, who ran for the most powerful office in

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Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

the world, admitting defeat before even one vote was cast! But this was Senator Goldwater, a straight shooter, an honest politician who said what he felt and could admit he was wrong when the situation called for it. Moreover, many people, let alone politicians, feel admitting they were wrong is a sign of weakness. The most difficult part of wanting to become president of the United States, at least in the last fifty years, is winning your own party’s nomination. The importance of the New Hampshire primary and now the Iowa caucuses cannot be overstated. Senator Goldwater knew that he had to organize one of the best grassroots campaigns in the history of politics to win the Republican nomination. Senator Goldwater also knew he would be going against a formidable candidate and a chief nemesis in 1960—the liberal governor of New York, Nelson Rockefeller. The grassroots campaign for Senator Barry Goldwater, which had its origin in 1961 with F. Clifton White and the Young Republicans, will go down in political history as one of the most important and phenomenal one ever assembled by a political party. Theodore White best described the details of the Goldwater campaign in his book, The Making of the President—1964 (1965). It has already been established that Senator Goldwater never thought he would win the presidency against President Kennedy. But his goal was always to bring to the forefront the conservative agenda. In order to do this Senator Goldwater felt he had to have a respectful showing against President Kennedy. His goal was described by Theodore White thus: Goldwater had begun to talk ref lectively with his Arizona cronies about the Presidency as early as 1961—not so much as a strike for power as a strike for control of the Republican Party, and for its purification. He has then set a figure which was to be the benchmark of his inner planning—if he could come within 5 percent of Kennedy in a national contest, then he would have scored a major victory for the conservative cause. A loss by more than 5 percent, he felt, would hurt the conservative cause.3 The problem Senator Goldwater had was that he needed to win one of the major primaries to be taken seriously at the Republican convention. Former Nixon running mate in 1960 and now ambassador to Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, won the New Hampshire primary as a write-in candidate with Goldwater coming in second and Governor

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Rockefeller third. The New Hampshire primary has shown over the last 40 years that a candidate’s victory does not mean the nomination will be automatic. Henry Cabot Lodge would later been joined in political history with Democrat Edmund Muskie in 1972, Pat Buchanan in 1996, and Republican Senator John McCain in 2000. Senator Goldwater actually did not want a full-scale campaign in New Hampshire, but was talked into it by Senator Norris Cotton of New Hampshire. Senator Goldwater said:4 I found in New Hampshire that the problem was not over exposure to people. It was over-exposure to the press and having run at that level—I had no idea what it was like to have a bus load or two busloads or press people following me—again no disparity on the press, it was just their job and they were doing it but at many meetings I had more press men than I had voters. Goldwater continued: Then I was talked into doing this supermarket-side walk routine which I was against—but they convinced me I should do it and I think it was a wasted of time. While we were trapsing around shaking the hands of everybody we didn’t know whether they were a democrat or a republican or even registered to vote. In fact, Governor Rockefeller would go on to win the Oregon primary setting up the final struggle for power in the California primary. Senator Goldwater’s campaign would be at its best in the state of California by organizing thousands of voters concentrating heavily in the conservative southern part of the state. After the last vote was counted, Senator Goldwater pulled off a political upset that would change American politics for the next forty years. The primary win in California was the point at which the strength of the conservative movement was no longer a minority within the Republican Party. Senator Goldwater’s narrow win of 51.6 percent showed the intense struggle within the Republican Party between the traditional (moderate-liberal) wing of the party and Senator Goldwater’s conservative wing. But it was now on to San Francisco’s Cow Palace and the Republican convention of 1964. Between the end of the California primary and the start of the Republican convention, there was a confused, half-hearted “Stop Goldwater” movement headed by Pennsylvania governor William Scranton.

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Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

Scranton, Governor George Romney of Michigan, and Governor Jim Rhodes of Ohio tried unsuccessfully to get former president Dwight Eisenhower to speak out in support of Scranton for the nomination. In fact, appearing on the program “Face the Nation” in Cleveland, Ohio on June 7, Scranton failed to declare his candidacy or to speak out against Goldwater. It was reported that Eisenhower had called Scranton prior to the program, asking him not to join a “cabal” against Goldwater.5 When Governor Rhodes had a change of heart days before the convention by saying he would free up his delegates to vote for Goldwater (or another candidate), Scranton knew the fight to “Stop Goldwater” was over. Former president Dwight Eisenhower’s actions (or lack of ) during the spring and summer of 1964 were curious. The Republican Party was having a “civil war” amongst the party loyalists. The conservatives, who were never kind to Eisenhower during his eight years as president, were trying to take over the party Eisenhower represented (recall Senator Goldwater calling Eisenhower’s budget in 1957 a “dime store New Deal”). On May 25, 1964, former president Eisenhower released a statement describing the type of candidate he hoped would be the GOP presidential nominee as one who would “apply to our problems, both domestic and foreign” the principles of “forward-looking Republicanism” embodied in the 1956 and 1960 Republican platforms. Although President Eisenhower specifically stated that he would maintain neutrality in the presidential race, the description was interpreted to cover all major Republican candidates except Goldwater, who had opposed the 1960 platform. President Eisenhower denied the statement was directed at Senator Goldwater.6 Even John F. Kennedy as a senator in 1957 speaking in front of the Cook County Democrats in Chicago in Illinois remarked about Senator Goldwater and the inevitable collision between the moderates and conservatives in the Republican Party: In addition to problems of prosperity, the Republicans—in their recent series of conferences to determine coming issues—found that their chief concern was with questions of disloyalty and subversion, not within the Federal Government but within the Republican Party. Those Republicans in attendance at these meetings attacked the Eisenhower budget; they criticized the Eisenhower foreign aid program; they condemned the Eisenhower school bill; they expressed dissatisfaction with the Eisenhower farm program; and they attacked Modern Republicanism in general. I even understand that following Mr. Eisenhower’s address of two nights ago in defense of his foreign aid budget, the Republicans demanded

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equal television time to reply. At the close of one of those regional Republican conferences, National Chairman Alcorn declared: “It will come as no surprise that there is a difference of opinion in the Republican Party.” That statement ought to get a Pulitzer Prize for fiction as the understatement of the year! At all of these Republican meetings, the various speakers struggled manfully to define that unknown and mysterious term “Modern Republicanism.” There were already a good many definitions in existence. Republican Representative Mason of your own state says “Essentially Ike’s New Republicanism is a form of bribery, a program to buy votes with the voters’ own money.” Senator Goldwater, Chairman of the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee, says Modern Republicanism stands for “persistent indulgences of proven extravagance” and “a betrayal of the people’s trust.” Nebraska Republican A.L. Miller says a Modern Republican is a “free-wheeling free-spender.” 7 President Eisenhower did not go out of his way to campaign for Senator Goldwater during the 1964 election or when he did it was a tepid remark at best. Here is President Eisenhower at a campaign rally in Green Bay, Wisconsin, on September 18, 1964, speaking on behalf of the Republican U.S. Senate candidate Wilbur Renk. He does not mention Senator Goldwater until the last paragraph of his speech: A concluding word on my own role in this campaign. I plan to work for and to vote for Senator Barry Goldwater because he won the nomination of my party openly and forthrightly and overwhelmingly. I should be a poor American, indeed, were I so poor a Republican that I would desert the ranks because other candidates for the nomination were rejected. I hope that everyone of you, in the same spirit, will do every bit you can to help the Republican cause between now and November third; and on that day, voting yourselves, persuade every friend of good government you know to vote Republican.8 Here is former president Eisenhower again at another rally, this time in York, Pennsylvania, October 5, 1964, for the Republican Party: I am here, my friends, as a Republican—a Republican who is loyal to his party, who is respectful of the decisions made by the Republican Party, whether they are in the precinct, county, state,

34

Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

or national conventions. And I do not only respect their decisions, I go along with them because I, as an individual, had my chance, by my vote, to express my preference whether or not I was defeated or was successful. My feeling of dedication to the party of Lincoln and for the principled for which it stands are unchanged, so I shall vote for my candidates, the Republican candidates that are presented on our ticket this Fall from Senator Goldwater on down to the last precinct committeeman.9 It is worth mentioning that President Eisenhower repeatedly was talking as the loyal Republican even if Senator Goldwater was not his first choice as the Republican Party nominee for president in 1964. The speeches President Eisenhower was making on behalf of Republican candidates across the country seemed to be half-hearted when mentioning Senator Goldwater. The Republican Party as Eisenhower knew it as president was receding into the past. A new generation of Republicans was taking over thanks in large part to Senator Goldwater. There are presidential historians that believe that Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory in 1964 was a vote for President John F. Kennedy. Many voters in 1964 felt the same way—a vote for Johnson was a vote for a continuation of the Kennedy administration policies. There are few historians who felt President Kennedy was vulnerable in 1964 by pointing to his declining poll numbers just prior to his assassination. However, most of that can be attributed to his stance on civil rights. The election of 1960 showed the obvious crack in the once dominate Democratic south in part because of Kennedy’s support for Martin Luther King and his Catholicism. Obviously there were people who liked Johnson and voted for him. Lyndon Johnson was perhaps the best politician as president this country has ever seen. But any Republican, let alone Senator Goldwater, would have found it almost impossible to beat Lyndon Johnson in 1964. Senator Goldwater would carry the south in the 1964 election over the southerner Lyndon Johnson. Senator Goldwater’s near complete sweep of the south would set a precedent for the next forty years in presidential politics. No longer could the Democratic Party count on the southern vote. Senator Goldwater’s stand on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which some conservatives and Republicans such as former Republican National Committee chairman Ken Mehlman have now said was wrong, realigned the electoral base of the Republican Party. The shift that happened with the electorate between the 1960 and 1964 elections cannot be overstated. In recent elections, if the

The Campaign for President, 1964

35

Democratic Party nominee for president was not from the south (or at least a moderate) this puts approximately 122 electoral votes, before one vote is even cast, into the Republican column. Only two southern nominees, Carter and Clinton, showed strength in the south. Carter lost any strength he gained in 1976 by losing all but his home state of Georgia in the 1980 election to Ronald Reagan. Actually, if one looks at the voting data from that election, Carter loss five southern states by only 1–2 percentage points.10 (President Obama “softened” this trend somewhat by winning Virginia and North Carolina in 2008.) To show the importance of the electoral base of the south in a more recent election one only needs to say “Al Gore.” Many political pundits point to the fact that had Al Gore carried his home state of Tennessee in the 2000 election he would have won the presidency outright (without controversy). It is not completely fair to blame Gore because the state of Tennessee became more conservative over the eight years he was vice president. However, this may teach a lesson to future vice presidents with an eye on the presidency—don’t lose touch with where you started. This is something Senator Goldwater did not forget. He was proud to represent his Arizona constituents and they in turn rewarded him with over thirty years in the U.S. Senate. Al Gore was proud of his Tennessee heritage, but Senator Goldwater always had a sense of who he was and what he stood for as a person. (As a side note, many believe Al Gore was in a difficult situation in 2000. He either distanced himself from President Clinton due to his ethical problems or embraced President Clinton and the accomplishments over their eight years together. In the first scenario, he loses some of his base and in the second, he loses independent voters.) Political pundits have always been fascinated by the “what if ” scenarios in presidential elections. Many websites today on presidential elections have such computer-simulated scenarios one can play out. Obviously, this cannot be the case for the 1964 election. Senator Goldwater comes up second no matter how hard you look at the results. However, what if Senator Goldwater had not chosen Congressman William Miller of New York to be his running mate? He chose Congressman Miller because of his conservative stance on many issues such as communism and the welfare state. However, Senator Goldwater was not going to take New York, but perhaps a more “f lashy” conservative could have helped in some Midwestern or Plains states. Or how about this thought: What if Senator Goldwater had taken a moderate Republican such as either Governor Scranton or Governor Romney?

36

Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

When one does more research on this topic, he/she will come to the conclusion there were no f lashy conservatives at that time. Governor Scranton was on Senator Goldwater’s short list, but his aides took his name off because of a letter that circulated during the convention (this will be discussed later in the chapter). Names such as Senators Carl Curtis and Roman Hruska of Nebraska, and Senator John J. Williams of Delaware were the only real conservative choices to Senator Goldwater. This is not meant to disparage any of these men and their abilities. However, the fact of the matter is Senator Goldwater was very limited as to whom he could choose for his vice presidential running mate. The field of potential vice presidential running mates was, perhaps, one the weakest for any presidential nominee in our country’s history. We must also remember that there were only thirty-four Republicans in the U.S. Senate in 1964 prior to the general election. Senator Goldwater was at a great disadvantage from the start. The problem Senator Goldwater had with a limited choice for a vice presidential running mate was not the case for President Johnson. President Johnson would ask Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota to join him on the ticket only after months of speculation that Johnson might ask Attorney General Robert Kennedy. Also on the short list were fellow Minnesota senator Eugene McCarthy and Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut. Humphrey accepted Johnson’s offer after promising to be the loyal vice president in public. The choice of Humphrey showed that President Johnson was not worried about the southern vote. As some may recall, Humphrey was a staunch liberal and was a main advocate of the civil rights language being added to the 1948 Democratic platform. President Johnson shored up his liberal base and did not need to worry about losing the biggest prize of all the southern states—his home state of Texas. What did William Miller, Senator Goldwater’s running mate, think of President Johnson’s choice of Hubert Humphrey: Lyndon Johnson in nominating Hubert Humphrey on August 26 said: “This is not merely just a way to balance the ticket. This is simply the best man in America for this job . . . I want to say to you that I feel strengthened knowing that he is at my side at all times in the great work of your country and your government.” Who is this Hubert Humphrey—Johnson’s best man. Who is this man who, by just being at the side of Lyndon Johnson, gives our President such strength? For one thing, Hubert Humphrey was a founder of the Americans for Democratic Action, unquestionably

The Campaign for President, 1964

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the most inf luential organization in our nation’s capitol attempting to subvert and transform our government into a foreign socialistic totalitarianism. From 1949 to 1950 Hubert Humphrey served as chairman of the ADA. And every year since 1950 he has continued his service as Vice Chairman in the ADA, a fact which Senator Humphrey himself was proud to include in his own biography listed in Who’s Who . . . Miller continued: Today our nation confronts many grave and dangerous crises in every area of the world. Perhaps the greatest threat to peace and freedom comes today from Red China. American soldiers have already fought this threat in Korea and are fighting it today in Laos and South Vietnam. Do we want a Vice President from the Americans for Democratic Action which advocates diplomatic recognition of Red China . . . which advocated the admission of Red China to the United Nations . . . which advocates removal of the travel ban so that Chinese Communists can come travel through this country?11 The weakness in the potential vice presidential candidates that confronted Senator Goldwater does show the state the conservative movement was in at that time. Conservatism as an ideology had been around for a long time in American political thought, but liberalism became dominant for thirty-five years because of the strong leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1930s. The problem was without Barry Goldwater, the conservative movement did not have a face. This is an important point and all one has to do is look back into our American history to show the importance that one individual can make. After the war for independence from England was over, George Washington filled the first void. During Washington’s two terms as president the debate for a strong federal government versus a weaker one was led by Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. By the 1830s the abolitionist became a powerful force led by William Lloyd Garrison and his newspaper The Liberator. The movement to free slaves would continue in the 1850s with John Brown. Once the American civil war ended the Industrial Revolution began changing the way Americans would earn a living. From this came the cry from Midwesterners and farmers for the coinage of silver to help their weakened economic conditions led by one of the greatest orators this country has ever witnessed—William

38

Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

Jennings Bryan. The twentieth century would usher in the progressive era that was led by men such as Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson and Senator Robert M. Lafollette of Wisconsin. Along with these men was the leader of the movement from women’s suffrage—Susan B. Anthony—who had been preceded in the nineteenth century by Elizabeth Cady Stanton. All of these Americans were leaders; people strong enough to battle for the cause of freedom and an issue deep in their hearts that was unstoppable. Senator Goldwater also did not have “professional” campaign consultants coordinating his try at the Republican nomination. It was his close advisers from Arizona that ran his 1964 campaign—men such as Denison Kitchel, Dean Burch, and Richard Kleindienst, and Mrs. Emory Johnson, who was the director of the women’s campaign. These men and women would then be known as the Arizona Mafia.12 These were untested men in the arena of national politics. But Senator Goldwater did not care. He wanted men and women around him who would be loyal, honest, and hardworking. Almost all political scientist or political junkies, either conservative or liberal, have watched Senator Goldwater’s acceptance speech at the Republican convention in 1964. To just read the words in a textbook does not do it justice. Senator Goldwater will never be accused of being a great orator, but his acceptance speech was successful because of two reasons—he delivered it with passion and with complete honesty. Senator Goldwater was speaking to a new generation of voters, a group of people who believed in a cause and were willing to fight for it in the face of insurmountable odds. A shifting party paradigm had been initiated within the Republican Party and Barry Goldwater was its leader. For about twenty years now, right before each party’s presidential convention, C-SPAN will play past nominees’ acceptance speeches (If you get bored listening to the speech it is always interesting to watch the delegates appearance, i.e., clothes, hairstyle, etc.). The first time one watches Senator Goldwater’s acceptance speech, he/ she will be amazed by his bold and direct challenge to the delegates at San Francisco’s Cow Palace. Senator Goldwater told them that either they were for the conservative cause and believed in the new direction of the Republican Party or were against them and hence needn’t bother coming back! You don’t have to agree with Senator Goldwater and his views, but one has to admire his direct candor and honesty. There are not too many politicians since 1964 that were as passionate and honest as Senator Goldwater was at that moment of his acceptance speech.

The Campaign for President, 1964

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Senator Goldwater’s honesty in 1964 draws in comparison to some of the political figures that would lead the United States into the decade of the 1970s. The American people were very cynical by end of the 1979 mainly because of two issues: The Vietnam War along with President Richard Nixon and the Watergate scandal. There were many good and honest senators in the decade of the 1970s, but many of them were tarnished by the position they took during the Watergate scandal. Many of the Senate’s most powerful and best legislators began to retire or succumb to death by the end of the decade. This list included Richard Russell in 1971, Philip A. Hart in 1976, John L. McClellan in 1977, Lee Metcalf and Hubert H. Humphrey in 1978. The historical events of each decade shape every person’s political thought. Some voters contemplate issues by thoroughly researching them while others cast their vote based on instinct. This would be the “personality” vote. A voter does not know why, but “they just don’t like that guy.” There may not be substance to back up their claim nor do they feel they need to explain their feelings. This may have been the case for Senator Goldwater in 1964. In a campaign, defining your opponent has been around politics since the days of the Thomas Jefferson/Alexander Hamilton feud. In addition, it works! The problem Senator Goldwater faced in 1964 was not so much that he was defined by the Johnson campaign, but that his own Republican Party members defined him. One of those was the governor of Pennsylvania William Scranton. A four-page letter sent to Senator Goldwater on July 12, 1964, with a typed signature that read “Sincerely yours, William W. Scranton” would end up doing more damage to the Goldwater campaign than anything the Johnson campaign could create. Among the many things said in the letter a few stand out: “You have too often allowed the radical extremists to use you. You have too often stood for irresponsibility in the serious question of racial holocaust.” However, the one that stood out the most and the one the Johnson campaign would exploit was this: “You have too often casually prescribed nuclear war as a solution to a troubled world.” It was later found out that a staff member for Scranton had actually written the letter and that Scranton never even saw it before it was delivered to Senator Goldwater.13 The damage this letter did to Senator Goldwater once it got to the press was irreversible. Once people have a perception of a candidate, it is almost impossible to reverse it. Senator Goldwater was one of those presidential candidates where perception outweighed the truth in the

40

Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

voters’ minds. Remember, voters don’t go to the voting booth trying to define the candidate. A voter already knows what they think of choice A and choice B. It may not be correct, but it is the reality. After all the upheaval the “Scranton” letter created, Governor Scranton would actually go on to campaign for Senator Goldwater in 1964 along with some of his other rivals for the Republican nomination. There were many Republican candidates running across the country who distanced themselves from the Goldwater campaign, which was not a first even for that election. The campaign for president in 1964 could have been one of the most exciting and informative of the twentieth century. Unfortunately for the nation, President Lyndon Johnson did not need to debate the differences between him and Senator Goldwater. The 1964 campaign can be compared to an Oscar-winning movie. President Johnson would win the Best Supporting Actor award and the late President Kennedy would posthumously win the Best Actor award. What this means is that President Kennedy built a political foundation that the nation was willing to accept as long as he was the main architect. After his assassination, Vice President Johnson filled the role that made a grieving nation feel at ease. The transition was painful, but smooth. President Johnson then rode this goodwill throughout the 1964 election without having to get into a constructive, detailed debate with Senator Goldwater. Presidential campaigns have always been mudslinging events starting back with the presidential election of 1796 that included Vice President John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. Historian David McCullough described the election of 1796 in his superb work John Adams (2001). McCullough lays out the untenable position Adams was in having to succeed George Washington and facing the first presidential election in which two parties of the opposition had a face off. The voice of warning was Adams’ wife Abigail, “You know what is before you-the whips, the scorpions, the thorns without roses, the dangers, anxieties, the weight of empire.”14 John Adams went on to edge Thomas Jefferson seventy-one votes to sixty-eight, becoming the second president of the United States. Senator Goldwater would face similar obstacles in 1964 facing a popular president who succeeded an even more popular one. One could only image that Senator Goldwater’s wife of 51 years, Peggy, was thinking the same thing that Abigail Adams said some 150-plus years earlier. Senator Goldwater would be labeled everything from a warmonger to a racist in the 1964 campaign.

The Campaign for President, 1964

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One political advantage John Adams had in 1796 was that his opponents could not reach out to millions through the use of the television. Presidential campaign commercials began with the contest between Republican Dwight Eisenhower and Democrat Adlai Stevenson in 1952. Thanks to the Internet, one can watch these commercials and they are obviously very raw, but entertaining. The commercial called “Eisenhower Answers America” was somewhat amusing and, to say the least, rehearsed by Dwight Eisenhower. Adlai Stevenson does not win any awards for his campaign ad featuring a discussion about world peace with a young senator from Massachusetts—John F. Kennedy—in 1956. All political science teachers should encourage people to watch these campaign ads simply for the nostalgia as these great times are slowly fading from memory.15 The political ads in the 1964 presidential election were much better in terms of the candidate’s delivery. However, one Johnson campaign ad put the doubt in the voter’s mind that would stick with Senator Goldwater throughout the campaign. This was the famous “Girl with the Daisy” ad. A young girl is picking f lowers and counting up to ten. Then a background male voice starts counting down backward from ten as a still shot of the young girl becomes closer to the pupil in her eye. The next shot is a nuclear bomb being exploded. Obviously, the reference to Senator Goldwater as a mad man scared young and old, men and women alike. Another campaign ad called “Confessions of a Republican” was more effective in summing up what many voters were feeling in the 1964 campaign. The ad, a little over four minutes long, features a young man who says he is a Republican just like his father and that he had voted for Dwight Eisenhower his first time as a voter and had voted for Richard Nixon in 1960. He then goes on to say that he just does not know which Senator Goldwater is talking because of the inconsistencies in his statements. The gentleman in the ad goes on to say that he knows what Senator Goldwater is against, but nothing he is for, unlike President Johnson. At the end of the ad, the gentleman says that he wished he were a delegate at the 1964 Republican convention in order to fight against the takeover of his party by the conservatives. The only negative part of the ad in terms of aesthetics was when the man pulled out a cigarette and lighter and began to smoke. Obviously, this is something you would never see in an ad today (although President Obama is still trying to completely break his cigarette habit). The campaign commercial of the disgruntled Republican summed up the feelings for many of the party faithful toward the Goldwater

42

Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

nomination. Earlier in the book, it was mentioned that one of Senator Goldwater’s rivals for the nomination was Governor William Scranton. Although Governor Scranton played the loyal Republican throughout the 1964 campaign even his uneasiness with Senator Goldwater’s nomination was obvious. Here is Governor Scranton introducing Senator Goldwater at a rally at the Civic Auditorium in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on October 29, 1964, less than a week before the election: In just a few minutes I am going to get one of two things off my chest that will take me a couple of minutes. The first is this. You will remember, indeed I imagine most of America remembers, that previous to the decision in San Francisco I had my differences with our nominee, and, in some respects, I still have. And as you undoubtedly know, so do lots of other Republicans. (Boo.) . . . I do not believe in walking out on a Party. (Applause.) I do not believe in not supporting our nominee. I told everybody we would do it, and we are; and you will see on Election Day how Pennsylvania goes. (Applause.) . . . But I want to make one thing clear. Not a single Republican that I know of that went to San Francisco, or was interested in what happened there, ever thought that they would like to have Lyndon Johnson as their choice. (Applause.)16 Senator Goldwater did know that he would lose liberal and moderate Republicans in the general election because of his conservative ideology and acknowledged this in his acceptance speech. However, the campaign in 1964 had to be frustrating to both him and his followers when moderate Republicans such as Governor Scranton were making introduction speeches like the one quoted here not even a week before the election! The 1964 election held between President Lyndon Johnson and Senator Barry Goldwater has been analyzed very thoroughly over the past forty years. Senator Goldwater’s 1964 campaign can be summarized in his own words. Two days before his appearance with Governor Scranton, Senator Goldwater spoke to supporters in Cleveland, Ohio, where he laid out his beliefs—from his support of social security to being against federal busing: These are the guideposts that mark the way to progress through freedom. You may choose this way, or you may choose the other one open to you. The other is the way of the man who would be

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the Great Leader of his own “Great Society.” He opens his arms and says, “Bring your troubles to me. I will take care of them for you.” “You want peace? I’ll aid, appease, and accommodate the Communists for you.” “You want more money for the potatoes you didn’t grow? I’ll give it to you.” “You want no responsibilities? I’ll do everything for you.” “You want no worries? I’ll worry for you.” Relax and don’t worry. The Great Leader and his curious crew will do for you all those things you find unpleasant to do for yourselves. And all he asks us that you give him more and more power over your lives—more and more without end.17 Today, these very words of Senator Goldwater continue to resonate with many of the American conservative voters, mainly the view that the Federal government should not and cannot provide aid for every American family. For Senator Goldwater, the Federal government was growing out of control and the only thing that could stop it would be his being elected president of the United States. Senator Goldwater would try to take the high road with President Lyndon Johnson when he requested a meeting with him in August 1964. Senator Goldwater knew that the question of civil rights was going to be brought into the campaign, but he did not want it to be used by either candidate as political fodder because it would divide the country. Senator Goldwater also included the escalation in Vietnam. President Johnson agreed and both men shook hands.18 Can one imagine two candidates for president from opposing parties in today’s world of politics agreeing not to use a divisive issue in the campaign? Senator John Kerry would have not called President George W. Bush to request a meeting where they would both agree not to use the Iraq War to their advantage during the 2004 campaign. The meeting that took place between Senator Goldwater and President Johnson is not assigned its true importance in the annals of presidential politics. The respect Senator Goldwater showed not only to President Johnson and to the institution of presidency, but also to a country that was just beginning to feel the divisions that would engulf it within five years was noble to say the least. That said, the country would have been better served if Senator Goldwater had engaged President Johnson with tough questions as to what his administration’s true intentions in Vietnam were. In fact, the Republican National Committee broke this pledge by printing a piece of literature called “The issue is: Vietnam—War Without Victory. The Debate That Never Was” (figures 2.1).19

44

Figure 2.1

Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

The 1964 Republican Party/Goldwater pamphlet on Vietnam.

The literature cites three quotes made by President Johnson, throughout 1964, on the issue of Vietnam with responses by Senator Goldwater (figure 2.2). On November 3, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson won reelection with over 61 percent of the popular vote. President Johnson received forty-three million votes to Senator Goldwater’s twenty-seven million. The Electoral College was 486 for Johnson/Humphrey and 52 for Goldwater/Miller. The huge landslide would have been much worse had the Deep South not decisively turned to the Republican Party due in large part to the Democratic Party’s stance on civil rights. Senator Goldwater’s loss is even more astonishing when looking at the map of the counties won by Senator Goldwater as compared to President Johnson (figures 2.3 and 2.4). Senator Goldwater also came within 1 percentage point of losing his home state of Arizona. This is one embarrassment most presidential

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Figure 2.2 The debate on Vietnam that never took place between President Lyndon Johnson and Senator Barry Goldwater during the 1964 presidential race. Source: Republican National Committee 1964.

candidates fear the most. It has happened only to three candidates since 1952, all of them Democrats—Governor Adlai Stevenson (twice), Senator George McGovern, and Vice President Al Gore. There have been a few books and articles written about the landslide loss in 1964. There were mistakes made by Senator Goldwater and his staff, most of these realized by both parties involved. Senator Goldwater “shot from the lips” many times during the 1964 campaign and he paid the price with the American voters. However, throughout the 1964 campaign he never lost focus as to who he was and why he was running for president. This is an important point for readers of this book to understand. Senator Goldwater was running for a higher goal than president of the United States. He was running to reclaim, for his party, an ideology that had been taken away. He knew that his nomination was going to sacrifice his only chance to run for president and splinter the Republican Party, but he felt the humiliation that was about to be handed to him was well worth it. In as series of articles written during the Republican Convention, the Chicago Tribune had endorsed Senator Goldwater for president.

Rep Dem Ind <40% <50% >50% >60% >70% >80% >90%

© 2000 David Leip - http://www.uselectionatlas.org - All Rights Reserved

Figure 2.3 The 1964 presidential race showing counties won by Johnson and Goldwater (in comparison to the 1968 race won by Republican Richard Nixon). Source: David Leip. Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, uselectionatlas.org.

Rep Dem Ind <40% <50% >50% >60% >70% >80% >90%

© 2000 David Leip - http://www.uselectionatlas.org - All Rights Reserved

Figure 2.4 The 1968 presidential race showing counties won by Republican Richard Nixon, Democrat Hubert H. Humphrey, and third party candidate George Wallace. Source: David Leip. Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, uselectionatlas.org.

48

Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

The description of his candidacy was seen as a crusade, not as a lost opportunity: This is the first time since the era of Franklin Roosevelt that the United States has been given a chance to vote for candidate who believes in the enduring validity and inviolability of the Constitution. It is the first time in all these years that a candidate with a real respect for the balance of functions among the three coordinate branches of government and equal respect for the division of powers between the federal government and the sovereign states has been presented to the country. It is the first time in a generation that the people can exercise a choice between two diametrically different philosophies of government—total centralization under the heirs and legatees of New Deal socialism, with the inescapable diminution of the liberty and dignity of the individual, or a government which the servant of all, but the master of none.20 And finally these words speak volumes to the conservative cause in 1964: There has been no one since the advent of the New Deal who has offered the country a choice as clear as this. Mr. Eisenhower, the one President elected as a Republican in those years, acted as if he were the doctrines of his opposition. Even Richard Nixon did not make a determined fight for the Republican principles which have so firm and determined a champion in Sen.Goldwater.21 After his historic loss, Senator Goldwater sent President Johnson a telegram with the following words: Congratulations on your victory. I will help you in any way that I can toward achieving a growing and better America and a secure and dignified peace. The role of the Republican Party will remain in that temper but it also remains the Party of opposition when opposition is called for. There is much to be done with Vietnam, Cuba, the problem of law and order in this country, and a productive economy. Communism remains our number one obstacle to peace and I know that all Americans will join with you in honest solutions to these problems.22 Senator Goldwater held a press conference the next day after the election and answered many questions from the press. He reinforced

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the notion that he ran for president to push an ideology greater than one man: Also I want to express my gratitude to the more than 25 million people in this country who not necessarily voted for me but voted for a philosophy that I represent, a Republican philosophy that I believe the Republican Party must cling to and strengthen in the years ahead . . . There is a two-party system in this country, and we are going to keep it. We are going to devote our days in the years ahead to strengthening the Republican Party, to getting more people into it, and I feel that the young people coming along will provide the army that we need.23 Senator Goldwater was asked the following question by a reporter at the press conference: “Senator, shortly before you formally announced for the Presidency, you said you hoped that if you ran you would not run so bad a race that it would hurt the conservative cause. Do you think that you have hurt the conservative cause?” Goldwater answered, “ No, I don’t feel that the conservative cause has been hurt; 25 million votes is a lot votes and a lot of people dedicated to the concept of conservatism, I don’t think it has been hurt.”24 Senator Goldwater did not have to give up his Senate seat when he ran for president in 1964. He had actually announced early in June that he would still be a candidate for reelection to the Senate at least up to the deadline of Arizona’s primary on September 8. However, the announcement of Republican governor Paul Fannin on June 17 that he would seek Senator Goldwater’s seat was a sign that Senator Goldwater would not conduct dual campaigns.25 He had been overwhelmingly rejected by the American voter, but enthusiastically embraced by a new group of voters willing to go all out for their cause. Senator Goldwater had brought conservatism back as a player in the political field. Despite the view of some in the press that the Goldwater defeat was the end for the Republican Party, their lack of insight did not foresee a political movement building steam. Senator Goldwater knew that the conservative would take time to build. History would prove him right. Thomas Kuhn wrote in his monumental examination of paradigms The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962 that “paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute.”26 Senator Goldwater was more successful than his Republican competitors in defining what the Republican Party stood

50

Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

for and where it should lead into the future. A paradigm shift had occurred. Senator Goldwater was asked at the press conference if there was any single factor in the course of the campaign that he thought most substantially contributed to his defeat? He answered: No, I was thinking about that this morning, when we were talking. I can’t think of any major mistake that we made. There are always minor mistakes that you make, regardless of whether you win or lose. I think this just proves that regardless of who the candidate is it is growing increasingly difficult to upset the man who is in the White House with his tremendous base to start with of Federal employees—not that they all vote for him—the base that he starts with,oh,the power of investigation, the power of news ability to control news . . . We are not running elections any more as we used to, and I think we have to study new techniques, we have to become better versed in propaganda, we have to closer to the news, closer to you fellows who handle the news.27 The 1964 campaign took place some forty-five years ago and yet books are still being written about Senator Goldwater’s improbable and revolutionary grassroots victory. This type of grassroots victory would show the way for another improbable candidate in 1972 from the other side of the aisle—Senator George McGovern. But Senator Goldwater was the first in the modern political era to win a major party’s nomination with a swell of support from the bottom up and not from the top down. The art of door-to-door politics was taken to a new level never seen before in politics and all for one man—Senator Barry Goldwater.

CH A P T E R

T H R E E

The Beat Goes On, 1965–76

The world of Senator Goldwater and the conservatives who championed his candidacy were handed humility on November 3, 1964. The thoughts of millions of Americans were now on trying to carry out the promises started by President John F. Kennedy and reinforced by President Lyndon Johnson during the 1964 campaign. What would citizen Goldwater now do? He would have to wait until a Senate seat was open, which would be in 1968, to run again. American history is very unique in that the presidential elections have made heroes out of men who may have been mediocre at best. Mediocre in meaning that their political careers were not filled with important legislation or stirring f loor speeches. Many historians point to the legislative careers of Abraham Lincoln and John F. Kennedy. Lincoln was a one term congressman and Kennedy’s senate career was not stellar. However, it was two events that put both into the political spotlight—the Lincoln/Douglas debates in 1858 and Kennedy’s nominating speech for Estes Kefauver as the 1956 vice presidential choice. Senator Goldwater was not a mediocre politician nor would he be just a footnote in presidential trivia. He had an agenda after his defeat in 1964. He would continue to speak out on the issues that were dear to conservatives all across the country. The most important issue that would not only occupy Senator Goldwater’s time, but the citizens of the United States as well was the Vietnam War. Senator Goldwater opened up a small office in Phoenix in early 1965 with a staff of one. As he described, We were deluged with mail, especially requests for speeches. Slowly, I got back on the speaking circuit, but this time I was

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making money, more than ever in my life. The speeches covered the gamut of public issues, but audiences were primarily interested in two topics—where the Republican Party was going and how to win the War in Vietnam. For the next four years, the war became one of the driving forces of my life.1 As the Vietnam War dominated the political arena of Washington D.C. in 1965, Senator Goldwater began to speak publicly about the war. Besides making speeches across the country to fellow Republicans, Senator Goldwater began once again writing a syndicated column for the Los Angeles Times. The views of Senator Goldwater on Vietnam were summed up in various correspondences from the senator to Rex Barley, manager of The Los Angeles Times Syndicate during 1965–66. The correspondences between Senator Goldwater and Mr. Barley were once again filled with honesty and politeness as the senator spoke with Mr. Barley about his concerns regarding the content in the columns to the question of what cities across the United States the columns were being printed in. Here is part of a correspondence dated August 19, 1966:2 Dear Rex: For some months the users list of my column has not increased, in fact, I believe it has decreased a little bit. This, naturally, causes me concern, not so much from the income standpoint but, from the fact that not enough people have the availability of the column . . . When you approached me concerning the possibility of renewing the column after the election, you specifically asked that I stay clear of the philosophical line, which I formerly followed, and get into the field of what you called, newsmaking . . . Politically, the column does not just report news, it is news. In it, I speak for and to the decisive majority of the Republican Party and for the politically conservative Americans of both parties. (Emphasis added.) Senator Goldwater continued in the correspondence to speak about the accuracy of his column concerning mainly the war in Vietnam: Other areas in which the column has been impressively ahead of the news or has made news: —In January, 1965, it gave the reasons why we could step up our attacks against North Vietnam without risking Red Chinese intervention and as early as April, 1965, it called for the bombing

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of targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas. When those bombings finally took place, the Administration itself used much of the column’s reasoning to quite fears of Red Chinese intervention or retaliation. —Before any other columnist, early in 1965, I revealed in detail examples of munitions shortages in Vietnam. Later columns, running on into 1966 and continuing now, updated the charges and added new details to a story which remains a major one. —Warning of the ineffectiveness of “pauses” in our air strikes against the Vietnamese. The column has pegged each of the pauses as wrong and unproductive, and has been proven correct in its assessment each time. —Calling for intensified air strikes against North Vietnam. —Proposing a national day of honor for soldiers fighting in Vietnam. —Proposing an end to the military draft rather than an extension of it, at a time when nothing could be closer to the hearts of millions of Americans. In future columns, this issue may well develop into a major political target for the elections. The end of the correspondence is Senator Goldwater at his finest when he mentions why he is writing the column: Rex, I know this is a lengthy, probably too long a letter, and if you wish to discuss this with me, I can be reached either at the Balboa Bay Club in Newport Beach or at my home in Phoenix, and I would be glad to come to the city to visit you on this subject at any time. Keep in mind, while the money is interesting, I am more concerned with getting the message across to millions of Americans. With best personal wishes, Barry Goldwater Senator Goldwater had lost the presidential election not quite two years earlier, but his belief in the conservative movement compelled him to continue defending the values he fought so hard for in the presidential campaign against President Johnson. And when Senator Goldwater spoke to Mr. Barley concerning his pay from The Los Angeles Times column, you know he was sincere. It was never about fame and riches with Senator Goldwater, but pursuing a conviction until it was put into power.

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Senator Goldwater continued to write his column for The Los Angeles Times through 1967 making a modest commission in these years. He continued to be the leader of the Republican Party. He knew he would never be a candidate again for the highest office in the world, but he could make sure the Republican Party did not give up its voice in the issues facing the country. By 1968, Senator Goldwater would begin to mount another run for a Senate seat in Arizona, this time running for the seat being vacated by Democratic senator Carl Hayden. Senator Goldwater had not faded from the political scene as some had wanted or predicted. He kept himself visible through speeches and writings. Now he would announce once again he was ready to get back into the fight not as a Washington D.C. insider, but as an Arizona senator fighting what was wrong with Washington D.C. September 12, 1968, in Prescott, Arizona, marked the day of Senator Barry Goldwater’s triumphant return to politics. Here are excerpts from his speech:3 This morning as I drove up the Black Canyon Highway to visit with you, in a political sense, for the fourth time in my life, the green hills, the clear water in the streams, and the majesty of the Bradshaw and the Mingus Mountains caused me to think: “God has been good to us who live in this great State; God has been kind and generous and we are privileged to live in Arizona.” Standing here in the warmth of your friendship confirms that feeling . . . Sixteen years ago, when my first campaign for the Senate began here, I spoke of the danger to the individual and to his liberty because of growing bureaucracy and control in Washington. Many friends could not understand my concern then for these threats to liberty but today we Americans know that the continuing spread of federal control over our lives, our homes, our businesses and our local governments and schools is of first order in the concerns of Americans . . . Four years ago on these same steps I started a quest for the highest office in this land and, as you all know, that quest was not successful. I spoke here four years ago about the dangerous fact of crime in our streets and cities, but I was not heard. I spoke truthfully to the American people about the ugly war in Vietnam, but few listened. Yes, these are the “steps of prophecy” and from these steps I will speak honestly with you as I have always done before. I will make no promises which cannot be kept.

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One of the interesting things about Senator Goldwater’s speech was the date. In today’s world of politics, no candidate could announce his/her candidacy in the middle of September only two months away from the general election! With primaries and the amount of money that needs to be raised, today’s candidates for the U.S. Senate announce up to a year in advance of the general election if not earlier. The war in Vietnam was at a peak during the election year in 1968. The war was not only an issue in Arizona, but also in the presidential election between Democrat and Vice President Hubert Humphrey and Republican Richard Nixon. Senator Goldwater, as mentioned earlier, was a leading critic not of the war, but of the way the Johnson administration had bungled the war planning. We were not in Vietnam to win. On October 4, 1968, Senator Goldwater made a major foreign policy address to the Conference on International Education at the Arizona State University directed at the importance of the Pacific Basin that included Vietnam. The opening of Senator Goldwater’s speech underlies the seriousness he felt when speaking about the war in Vietnam: Ladies and gentlemen, before proceeding I would like to dispose of two preliminary matters: First: The foreign policy which I will present tonight is not meant to be a statement of doctrine binding upon anyone other than Barry Goldwater. Second: I hope you will forgive me tonight for presenting a speech devoid of jokes and nifty one-liners. The serious nature of the topic simply does not permit the luxury of a light-hearted, go get ‘em political speech . . . If we are to continue world leadership, I must remind you, we have responsibilities; responsibilities entail courage; courage entails strength; and strength, whether we like it or not, is what the world respects. Senator Goldwater’s speech spoke about the evils of communism all across the world and the importance of the Pacific Basin: “As to the Pacific itself, its importance to our total policy has never, in my opinion, been fully understood or appreciated by a good many Americans, including some of those in national leadership.” Senator Goldwater then said that no discussion of the Pacific can start “anywhere other than in Southeast Asia.” This, the current critical area, including Vietnam, has a most important role in this Pacific concept, not only in an economic

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sense, but in a strategic sense. This latter can be put under five points: 1. If Communism succeeds in Southeast Asia, the United States will face a Communist seaboard stretching from the Bering Sea to the Coral Sea. We will face a situation where the world’s communications will effectively be divided in two. While this barrier might not be fatal to our interests, it has an important effect on politics in the area and would certainly have a strong effect on world commerce and trade. 2. Southeast Asia is a strategic pivot point. Japan demonstrated its knowledge of this in World War II by, at the outset, attacking Saigon. Once having that city and its airbase, it was able to successfully attack Singapore and other important targets to the South. 3. Control of this land area, especially the Southeast Asian Peninsula, would bring power to relatively primitive weapons systems. Medium range missiles, outdated submarines and even relatively old aircraft could, from these bases, threaten new territories and areas. 4. This area is tremendously rich in terms of food. Other natural products, such as petroleum, tin, rubber and lumber exist in important amounts. The acquisition of these resources by the Communists would represent an enormous addition to their own economic state. 5. The most important element in Southeast Asia, however, is that it has become the arena for the practice of the doctrine of “Wars of National Liberation.” Exploiting this doctrine, Mao Tse-tung rose from chief of a ragged band hiding in the caves of Yenan in the 1920s to leader of the most populous nation on Earth. In Vietnam, this same type of warfare was originally successful against the French and, once again, is being waged successfully against the United States.4 Of the five statements Senator Goldwater made in that speech, number one never came to fruition even though South Vietnam fell to the communists of North Vietnam in 1975. However, Senator Goldwater was exactly right in his fifth statement because the United States was losing South Vietnam just the way the French had been defeated in North Vietnam in the 1950s.

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Senator Goldwater supported our reasoning for going into Vietnam, but was able to see when victory was no longer an option. Here he is again in his 1987 memoirs, I was a dissenter. I wanted out of Vietnam as much as the antiwar protester did and said so. But I would leave in a different way. The antiwar crowd wanted to cut and run. I wanted to defeat the enemy, but, since we were unwilling to do that, I finally supported a negotiated settlement of the conflict. There was no choice left. The South Vietnamese could not fight on alone, although I backed aid to them after the peace treaty was signed. It was a last grasp at honor and an attempt to give some of them a chance to decide their future.5 The 1968 presidential election ended with Richard Nixon winning with a narrow margin over Democratic candidate Hubert Humphrey and governor of Alabama George Wallace who ran as an independent. Nixon won the popular vote over Humphrey by less than five hundred thousand votes out of seventy-five million votes cast. The division within the Democratic Party was shown to the world at the Democratic convention when antiwar protesters clashed with the Chicago police. The lack of law and order would become an issue that would haunt the Democratic Party for over thirty years. Nixon played on this issue during a time when racial riots had taken place in many of the major cities across the country. He subtly played on the fears of the white, middle class and created what would become known as the “Silent Majority.” The presidential election of 1968 was not only a loss to Vice President Hubert Humphrey, but this election would be the last of the “New Deal” coalition that had carried Franklin Roosevelt to four wins, Harry Truman’s surprise win in 1948, and the victories of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. In 1969, a senior strategist for Richard Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign Kevin Phillips would speak to the issue of race and the crumbling of the “New Deal” coalition in his book The Emerging Republican Majority. Phillips writes that there was a new conservative electoral realignment taking place in the country mainly in the south. This realignment would come true over the next twenty-four years in the presidential elections, but would not be resonant to the congressional level until 1994 when the Republicans took control of Congress for the first time in over forty years. Senator Goldwater went on to win his election in 1968 over his opponent Roy Elson, a former aide to Senator Hayden, with 57 percent

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of the vote. Senator Goldwater was back in a familiar place to speak and act on issues important, not only to conservatism, but to the nation. The next seven years of Senator Goldwater’s time in the Senate went in dealing with the Vietnam War, the scandal that brought down the presidency of Richard Nixon—Watergate—and the presidential election of 1976. All three of these issues would test the strength of Senator Goldwater’s loyalty. The loyalty in question was not of his country, which was never questioned, but his loyalty to the Republican Party. From 1969 to 1971, Senator Goldwater’s voting record was consistent with the views that he had spoken about for over fifteen years. His loyalty to the Republican president Richard Nixon was evident early on in 1969. Senator Goldwater supported President Nixon’s nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth Jr. as an associate justice of the Supreme Court. Clement Haynsworth Jr. was rejected by a Senate vote of fortyfive:fifty-five. Twenty-six Republicans and nineteen Democrats supported Haynsworth, but seventeen Republicans voted “no.”6 Also in 1969, Senator Goldwater voted “yes” for HR 15090, an amendment to a Defense Appropriations bill sponsored by Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) “stating that in line with the expressed intention of the President, no funds in the bill could be used to finance the introduction of U.S. ground combat troops into Laos and Thailand.” The amendment was adopted seventy-three:seventeen with only two Republican senators voting against.7 By late 1969 it was becoming more apparent that the Democrats in the Senate along with the Liberal Republicans (yes, there was a time when there were Liberal Republicans) wanted to prevent the war in Vietnam from spreading into neighboring Asian countries. Senator Goldwater’s “yes” vote on HR 15090 did not mean that he was opposed to bombing nearby Cambodia. Senator Goldwater had always argued that the Communist supply lines coming from Cambodia needed to be bombed. Here is Senator Goldwater from his memoirs in 1988: The political decisions and objectives of Johnson and McNamara were inconsistent and contrary to our military goals. We were engaged in counterinsurgency, a war of attrition through a long process of search-and-destroy missions, to defeat the Communist guerillas. However, beginning in 1966, Vietcong and North Vietnamese regiments and divisions moved their bases into Cambodia, Laos, and the North Vietnamese panhandle north of the demilitarized zone. We did not began to attack these sanctuaries until 1970, when U.S. forces were being withdrawn. The U.S.

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embassy in Laos, claiming the war might be widened, opposed any serious American military operations against the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Senator Goldwater continued, Our counterinsurgency alone could not push Hanoi out of the war. The Communists simply retreated to sanctuaries from which they would strike again and again. It was obvious we had to hit border areas in nearby Cambodia and Laos because they were major sources of support for the war. Indeed, the North Vietnamese were able to put as many men in the field as we did because of the protection allowed them by Washington.8 Some of the United States’ greatest senators lived through the Vietnam War regardless of whether they supported the war or not. Obviously one of these great senators would have to be Senator Goldwater. His anger over the Vietnam War was not that it was wrong to go into Vietnam to fight the Communist threat, but that it was wrong how Washington was preventing a victory. As Senator Goldwater saw it, politics by the Johnson administration was tying the hands of our generals who were running the war. Senator Goldwater felt victory was never possible from the beginning and it only became worse. As a former aviator himself, Senator Goldwater even described how restrictions had been placed on U.S. pilots mainly that enemy airplanes and SAM bases must fire first. When these restrictions were ignored on one occasion, nine MIGs were destroyed in twenty-four hours. “I told Johnson our no-win policy was directly responsible for the loss of thousands of American lives.”9 Here was Senator Goldwater in 1953, his first year in the U.S. Senate, talking about an amendment he offered to Senate bill 2128 dealing with Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and the support the United States was giving France: Mr. President, for 7 long years a war has been raging in that area. The people who live there have been fighting for the same thing for which 177 years ago, the people of the American Colonies fought. The people of the Associated States of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam are fighting for freedom. Many, many times during the past 7 years France has made promises to these people that their independence will be forthcoming, that they will be allowed the opportunity to write a constitution and to become free people.10

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Senator Goldwater continued his speech and one could only sense the passion of his voice when he spoke of freedom: Yet here today, on the f loor of the United States Senate, we are proposing to support a country, France, that has colonial intentions; we are going against the wonderful second paragraph of our Declaration of Independence, which probably is the greatest collection of words that has ever been written by men in their attempts to govern themselves . . . Mr. President, the purpose of my amendment is to say to France, “If we give you this money, we expect you to do something in return for it”—because, Mr. President, as surely as day follows night, our boys will follow this $400 million. The one way to stop it is to ask France, in the decency the French possess, to grant independence and the right of freedom to these people, who have fought so long for their independence and freedom. In 1970, there was one more final push to gradually withdraw from Vietnam by putting a cap on the number of troops that would be stationed there. HR 17123 Military Procurement Authorization was sponsored by Senator George McGovern (D-S.D.) and Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.), which limited to two hundred and eighty thousand the maximum number of U.S. troops in Vietnam after April 30, 1971, and provided for complete withdrawal of troops by December 31, 1971, but authorizing the president to delay the withdrawal for a period of up to sixty days if he found the withdrawal would subject U.S. troops to clear and present danger. The bill was rejected thirty-nine:fiftyfive. Senator Goldwater voted “no” along with thirty-three other Republicans; only seven Republicans voted “yes.”11 Senator Goldwater spoke passionately about his opposition to the McGovern/Hatfield resolution to force the end of fighting in Indochina as well as his opposition to the Cooper/Church resolution prohibiting any American to fight in Cambodia on the Senate f loor on May 20, 1970. He started off by telling a story that dealt with the early days of our republic at the Constitutional Convention. One member of the convention, who was concerned about the possibility of our nation becoming to aggressive moved that “the standing army of the Republic be restricted to 5,000 men at any one time.” George Washington, who was the chairman of the

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convention and who was not allowed to offer an amendment himself whispered to another sitting member, “Please amend the motion to provide that no foreign army shall invade the United States at any time with more than 3,000 troops.”12 Senator Goldwater used this story, whether historically accurate or not, to speak of his opposition to both resolutions. Nobody in this chamber has any monopoly on a deep-seated desire for peace in Asia. I yield to no man in this regard. However, I happen to be one of those who believes that the way we attain that peace is important. I also believe that no amount of legislative desire, as incorporated in measures such as the McGovernHatfield Resolution to force an end to American fighting men in Indochina or in the so-called Cooper-Church Resolution to prohibit any Americans from fighting in Cambodia after June 30 of this year, will accomplish the job correctly.13 Senator Goldwater went on to propose his alternative to the resolutions: I certainly understand how the Father of His Country must have felt at that meeting in Philadelphia. I am moved to suggest that the McGovern-Hatfield Resolution be amended to state that no foreign power be permitted to engage Americans in military activity after July 1, 1971—the arbitrary deadline fixed in that legislative approach to military tactics. I am also moved to suggest—still following the tongue-in-cheek approach attributed to George Washington—that the Cooper-Church Resolution be amended to provide that no communist troops, either of the Viet Cong or North Vietnam, be permitted to fight in Cambodia after June 30 of this year.14 Senator Goldwater had introduced an amendment of his own to HR 17123 along with Senator Hatfield (R-Ore.) that would have increased the military salaries and recommended the creation of a volunteer army. This was rejected thirty-five:fifty-two. President Nixon opposed Senator Goldwater’s amendment. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam not only brought out the passion of young Americans to stop the war, but they also wanted to stop the military draft. Senator Goldwater addressed the issue of a voluntary

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army to the Young Americans for Freedom at the Senate auditorium on August 12, 1970: Mr. Chairman and distinguished guests, I am here today to tell you that the voluntary military proposal will definitely be brought to a vote in the Senate at this session. What is more, I am confident that it stands an excellent chance of being approved. In looking at the Senate’s timetable of debate on the military procurement bill, I would be willing to predict that by one week from today the Senate will be engaged in a deep discussion about the establishment of a completely voluntary military system. And, if I have to camp out on the Senate f loor to do it, I can assure you that the proposal will come to a vote in the Senate.15 Senator Goldwater continued with his speech: When the law is used to tell a young man how he shall spend several years of his life, this causes an invasion of the most precious and fundamental of human rights—the right of each citizen to live his own life where and how he may choose. This is why, as a Conservative, I am so strongly and emotionally committed to the voluntary military approach . . . “Not only do I believe that the draft is wrong, but I also believe it is ignorant to assume that free men have to be forced to fight for their country. I am just old fashioned enough to believe that there are still a great many Americans among us who think enough of their freedom that they are willing to fight for it.”16 It may be interesting to some to find out that Senator Goldwater was against the military draft. Senator Goldwater believed in a strong military, but not at the expense of someone’s own freedom. This view was consistent with the conservative thought Senator Goldwater held for over twenty years. Senator Goldwater also spoke often about casting his votes in the Senate saying that the love of his country came first and the Republican Party was second. Along with the Vietnam War, President Nixon was dealing with another Supreme Court nomination. The Senate rejected G. Harrold Carswell as a new associate justice by a forty-five:fifty-one vote. Senator Goldwater voted “yes” for Carswell along with forty-four other Senators. President Nixon had two nominees to the highest court in the land rejected within six months.

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By 1971, U.S. and South Vietnamese troops had invaded Cambodia and President Nixon was gearing up for his 1972 reelection bid. Daniel Ellsberg, a former employee of the Pentagon and an analyst at the RAND Corporation, leaked the Pentagon papers detailing U.S. involvement in Vietnam over a timespan of three decades. And Senator Goldwater was almost halfway through his six-year Senate term. Senator Goldwater addressed the issue of the Vietnam War in another Senate f loor speech on June 24, 1971. This time the target of Senator Goldwater’s anger was the “doves” or antiwar liberals along with President Johnson and former secretary of defense Robert McNamara: Mr. President, I think it is time to say what we think on this issue. The fact of the matter is that President Nixon, with his Vietnamization policy and troop withdrawal rate, has undone about three-quarters of the military escalation that began with President Kennedy and hit its high mark under President Lyndon B. Johnson. The fact of the matter is that our friends on the other side of the aisle would dearly like to make it appear that they have forced President Nixon to bring about an end of America’s participation in Indochina. There is no other construction that we can place on the actions of the so-called doves in this Congress. If there ever was any doubt as to how and when the military escalation began in Vietnam, it was ended with the theft, the peddling, and the subsequent publication of secret documents compiled under Defense Secretary Robert McNamara while he was in office.17 After Senator Goldwater’s diatribe against the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, he defended the record of President Nixon: And of all the Presidents involved, only one—let me repeat and underscore only one—Richard M. Nixon—did anything but escalate; did anything but increase our commitment of men, money, and machines to the war in Indochina. Only one president took it upon himself to reverse, to directly change the course of American participation in the Southeast Asian hostilities. Only one president succeeded in reducing rather than increasing the casualty rate among American fighting men. Only one president, in brief, has taken direct, deliberate and meaningful action to end the war and end the killings and end the expense of Vietnam.18

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Finally, Senator Goldwater discusses how the liberals in the Senate were trying to force President Nixon to set a timetable for withdrawing troops from Vietnam (eerily similar to the debate in 2006–2008 about U.S. troops in Iraq): I said it’s time to call the shots the way they are. And I say this whole business in the Senate right now can be put down to an exercise in political gamesmanship aimed at the 1972 presidential election. Our leftist friends, especially those who aspire to the position of Chief Executive on the Democratic ticket, are in this exercise right up to their necks. If this isn’t true, it’s about time we ask—in light of the Pentagon Papers recently published—just where were the doves when President Kennedy was sending the first contingents of troops to Indochina; where were the doves when the Johnson Administration was conducting a covert war and planning and executing a massive military escalation in Vietnam? The answer to that question and to many more cannot help but show that the majority of those bent on making President Nixon fix a date for a total withdrawal from Vietnam are using the war, the prisoners of war, and all the ramifications of that war for political purposes.19 The next three years would be some of the most painful, legally challenging, and shameful times the United States had ever faced. The Watergate scandal during the Nixon administration would put Senator Goldwater in the middle of a political storm in which there was no way out. Senator Goldwater had never been an enthusiastic Richard Nixon supporter, but he always played the role of the good Republican on issues he could support the president on, mainly Vietnam. However, Senator Goldwater summed up his feelings for President Nixon and his lack of honesty once again in his 1988 memoirs: If the War in Vietnam taught the American people and their political leaders anything, it is the truth is their strongest weapon. The Watergate scandal taught the same simple but supreme lesson. Without truth there cannot be freedom or justice, wisdom or tolerance, courage or compassion. Truth is the foundation of a stable society. Its absence was the crux of Richard Nixon’s failure.” Senator Goldwater went on to give his most blatant assessment of President Nixon’s character: “Unfortunately, despite the positive

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contributions the former president made to his country, his lies will probably be remembered longer than his legitimate labors. He is the most dishonest individual I ever met in my life.”20 Senator Goldwater’s very blunt characterization of President Richard Nixon, while he was still alive, would be unheard of today in the game of politics. Senators of the same party during the presidencies of Ronald Reagan, George H. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush criticize only at the margins. This means that senators will give the same clichés when the president of their own political party is clearly in political trouble: “mistakes were made,” “we need to wait until all the facts are out,” or on a corrupt cabinet official, “the appointment is at the President’s pleasure.” Perhaps Americans would like a little more bluntness and less partisanship from their elected officials? Senator Goldwater was loyal to the Republican Party as long as he could during Watergate, but as the evidence mounted against President Nixon, loyalty to the country came first. In fact, it was Senator Goldwater along with Senate minority leader Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania that informed President Nixon his impeachment was inevitable in the summer of 1974. One of the aftermaths of the Watergate scandal and Richard Nixon’s secret White House exploits were new laws, passed by Congress, to allow for a more open and accessible government:21 S 4016. Watergate Tapes. Passage of the bill to make the Nixon administration tapes and papers federal property, and prohibiting their destruction without explicit congressional authorization. Passed 56-7: R 18-5; D 38-2 (ND 30-0; SD 8-2). October 4, 1974. The president did not take a position on the bill. Senator Goldwater voted “yes.” HR 12471. Freedom of Information Act. Passage, over President Ford’s October 17 veto, of the bill to amend the 1966 Freedom of Information Act to guarantee broader public access to government information and documents. Passed (thus overriding the president’s veto and enacting into law) 65-27: R 18-20; D 47-7 (ND 40-0; SD 7-7), November 21, 1974. A two-thirds majority vote (sixty-two in this case) is required to override a veto. A “nay” was a vote supporting the president’s position. Senator Goldwater voted “no.” As Gerald R. Ford took the oath of office as president of the United States on August 9, 1974, not only did former president Nixon’s Watergate scandal induce a new man to lead the country, but also his lies would

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change the Republican Party. Many conservative Republicans did not like the moderate stances Gerald Ford took on social and foreign policy issues. John Robert Green in his book The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford (1995) summed up the feelings of conservatives on a Ford presidency: But the Right continued to grumble against Nixon, and in Watergate they felt they had been vindicated. Most members of the right wing had hoped that John Connally, former Texas governor and Nixon’s secretary of the treasury, would succeed Spiro Agnew. Ford, who had long been viewed by conservatives as little more than a moderate party hack, was immediately skewered as an inadequate replacement.22 The political grumbling over a Gerald Ford presidency by conservatives only grew louder when President Ford put forth the name of Nelson A. Rockefeller as vice president of the United States to replace Spiro Agnew. Agnew had resigned in October 1973 when he was convicted of tax evasion and money laundering when governor of Maryland. Conservatives across the country came out in large numbers to oppose the nomination of the Liberal Republican in Rockefeller. Once again John Robert Green: “Rockefeller’s nomination had sent the right wing of the Republican party, who remembered Rockefeller as Goldwater’s nemesis in the bloody primary battles of 1964 and who saw him in 1974 simply as the spendthrift womanizer from New York, into fits.” Green continued, “The opposition from the Right was both vehement and vocal, one reason that Rockefeller’s nomination took so long to get through the Congress.” It in fact took almost four months before Rockefeller was confirmed including eight times before the Senate Rules Committee and nine before the House Judiciary Committee.23 Senator Goldwater’s opposition to Nelson Rockefeller for vice president went back to 1972 when Agnew was nominated once again to be Richard Nixon’s running mate on the GOP ticket. Many political insiders felt that Richard Nixon and his closest advisers hung Agnew out to dry during his legal problems in 1973 to def lect the growing cancer of Watergate on the administration. Senator Goldwater spoke about what Nixon’s true desires were prior to the 1972 Republican convention: “A lot of us in the GOP knew Nixon would have preferred Rockefeller or former Texas Governor John Connally as his running mate in 1972, but conservatives would not have tolerated that. Both were still unacceptable, and if Nixon tried to replace Agnew with one of the two, we would strongly oppose it.”24

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When President Ford originally announced Rockefeller’s name, Senator Goldwater was for him. However, Senator Goldwater was one of seven senators to vote against Nelson Rockefeller for vice president in December 1974. Senator Goldwater explained his change in mind after the hearings took place in the House and Senate in which some questionable financial dealings in his past hurt Rockefeller: “It is now apparent to me that Mr. Rockefeller did in effect use his own personal money to accomplish the purchase of political power.”25 Senator Goldwater’s last ten years representing the state of Arizona had seen some of the United States’ most divided and tumultuous times in its history. The Nixon presidency would come to end with disgrace as President Nixon resignation became official on August 9, 1974. After ten long years, the Vietnam War would officially come to end with the fall of Saigon as the last Americans were pulled out on April 30, 1975. Senator Goldwater would now turn his attention to party politics as the Republican Party was facing a crisis of its own. President Nixon had won two presidential elections mainly on his views concerning the Vietnam War and crime. Conservatives in the Republican Party never trusted Nixon partly from his days as Dwight Eisenhower’s vice president. The distrust and anger over a potential Nixon presidency came forth during the Republican convention in 1960. Conservatives felt betrayed by Nixon’s spending during his term in office and were less than happy with Nixon’s choice of Gerald Ford as vice president to succeed Spiro Agnew. Now, with the nomination and confirmation of Nelson Rockefeller as President Ford’s vice president, conservatives in the Republican Party felt it was time to fight for what Senator Goldwater had gained in 1964. The conservative movement had maintained a steady but rather benign existence during the Nixon administration. The fight over the spread of communism and the breakdown of social obedience still were the underlying glue that held the conservative movement together. As President Nixon expanded welfare under the supplemental security income (SSI) and added another cabinet position with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), suspicions of conservatives such as Senator Goldwater of Nixon as a liberal spender seemed to be correct. In fact Melvin Small in his excellent book The Presidency of Richard Nixon (1999) tells us that in spite of his rhetorical tirades against the Washington bureaucracy Nixon’s record did not match what he believed. And part of this was the fact that the Democrats controlled

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both houses and they were not about to let the Great Society programs be dismantled: Whether or not Nixon believed his rhetoric, Democratic control of Congress made it impossible to do away with the Great Society, even though his administration succeeded in scaling back some programs. Nonetheless, conservative Republicans, always suspicious of Nixon’s conservative credentials, were disappointed that the president in action was not as conservative as his campaign had promised. They were horrified when Nixon proposed a guaranteed annual wage for poor people disguised as welfare reform and a variety of other social and environmental policies that placed him where they feared he had been all the time, within the confines of middle-of-the-road Eisenhower, even Rockefeller, Republicanism.26 President Ford had done his best to heal the nation after Nixon’s resignation. Many were outraged when, only after two month in office, President Ford ordered a presidential pardon for Richard Nixon. Many political pundits and diehard Ford supporters believe the pardon of Richard Nixon was the deciding factor in his narrow loss in 1976 to then-governor Jimmy Carter. Most Americans believe President Ford’s intentions in pardoning former President Nixon were honest. There were no deals made between then President Nixon and Congressman Ford when Nixon appointed him as vice president in 1973. However, President Nixon committed crimes while holding office as the most powerful man in the world. No man, even if they are the president of the United States, should be above the law. Nixon’s resignation prevented any further inquiries, at least for the time being, into how deep and sinister Nixon’s involvement was in the Watergate scandal. It should have been left to the two other branches of government, the legislative and the judicial, to decided Richard Nixon’s fate and not the head of the executive branch in President Ford. Justice should have taken its due course. That said, what were Senator Goldwater’s feelings on the pardon of Richard Nixon? Once again Senator Goldwater did not mince words after President Ford called him before announcing publicly that he was going to pardon Richard Nixon. President Ford told Senator Goldwater, “The public has the right to know that, in the eyes of the President, Nixon is clear.” Senator Goldwater was stunned by what he was hearing from

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President Ford: “This was the same man who had openly admitted that Nixon had deceived the Congress. That was most likely a criminal act—obstruction of justice. I replied, ‘He may be clear in your eyes, but he’s not clear in mine.’ ” Senator Goldwater went on to say, “Jerry Ford is a decent man, but the pardon never made sense to me and still doesn’t. It hurt him politically and indeed may have been instrumental in his loss to Jimmy Carter in 1976.”27 When the midterm elections were over in November 1974, the Republican Party was reeling in a way that had not been felt since Senator Goldwater’s own decisive defeat in 1964. The Republican Party had lost forty-eight seats in the House of Representatives and gained only Senate seat in Nevada while losing five previously held seats. The prospects also did not look good for President Ford’s own election due in large part to the Nixon pardon. There were other problems facing President Ford such as high inf lation, a stagnant economy, and an image of a clumsy, bumbling person brought famously to all American living room televisions by Chevy Chase and Saturday Night Live. Senator Goldwater had no problems winning his reelection bid in 1974 against Democrat Jonathan Marshall. His margin of victory was larger than in 1968. Senator Goldwater had captured 58 percent of the vote to Marshall’s 41 percent. Mr. Conservative had weathered one of the worst election cycles for the Republican Party since his defeat in the 1964 presidential election.

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CH A P T E R

FOU R

The Torch Has Been Passed, 1976–80

As 1976 drew nearer most political pundits had figured out who was most likely to run for president on the Democratic side, but it was the challenge to President Ford from the right that kept all eyes on the Republican race. The challenge came from a Hollywood B-movie actor and former governor of California Ronald Reagan. Ronald Reagan was someone Senator Goldwater knew very well. Reagan, a former New Deal Democrat and president of the Screen Actors Guild, had grown more conservative during the Eisenhower years and declared in 1962 that he had switched over to the Republican Party saying, “He did not leave the Democratic Party, but the Democratic Party left him.” During the 1964 Republican primaries, Reagan was one of Senator Goldwater’s biggest and enthusiastic supporters. Reagan would later give a television speech in late October 1964 during the general election campaign in support of Senator Goldwater. This speech is still considered by many political experts as one of his best. Ronald Reagan had called President Ford on November 19, 1975, to inform him that he would run against the president for the Republican nomination. “In the course of that strained conversation, Reagan argued that his challenge would not be divisive. Ford disagreed, musing in his memoirs: ‘How can you challenge an incumbent president of your own party and not be divisive?’ ”1 Reagan had been interviewed by TIME’s national correspondent Robert Ajemian about his possible running against President Ford being divisive to the Republican Party and his thoughts on Senator Goldwater not wanting him to run: Ajemian: With the withdrawal of Rockefeller, Barry Goldwater has said that you should reassess your position. Are you?

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Barry Goldwater and George McGovern Reagan: No, and Barry has never suggested to me in any way that I shouldn’t run. He knows I wouldn’t campaign in a divisive way.2

The real dilemma for Senator Goldwater was: Does he support Reagan, someone who believed in his conservative values and had stayed loyal to him throughout the tough 1964 primary and general elections, or does he stay loyal to his president and a member of his own Republican party? The decision for some may have been very difficult. It was much simpler to Senator Goldwater. Senator Goldwater did appreciate the support Ronald Reagan gave him during the 1964 campaign, but this was different. Reagan was challenging not only a fellow Republican, but the president of the United States. Senator Goldwater explained it this way in his 1987 memoirs when discussing his friendship with former Nevada senator Paul Laxalt: I knew, for example, that Ron and Nancy Reagan were upset that I supported Jerry Ford for the GOP presidential nomination in 1976. However, I still believe I never really had a choice. He was a Republican and the incumbent President. Paul, who is very close to the Reagans, went out of his way to explain my position to them: “It was never a question of liking the Reagans. It was Barry’s perception of the presidency. He took the Washington view. If a Republican President has done a good job, you support him.”3 The primaries proved to be much more difficult than President Ford had anticipated. Ford would later say himself that he underestimated Reagan. After Ford narrowly won in New Hampshire and Iowa, Reagan came back strong with wins in North Carolina, Texas, and most of the Old South. Most of Reagan’s successes in these primary wins was due to his relentless attacks on President Ford’s foreign policy. Reagan said that Ford’s negotiations on issues dealing with the Panama Canal were ultimately giving in to the leader of Panama General Omar Torrijos, who was linked to Castro. In addition, Reagan felt that Ford was too weak in terms of dealing with the communist threat across the world. Senator Goldwater saw what was happening to President Ford and his chances of winning the Republican nomination. Once again, in

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a letter to President Ford dated May 7, 1976, Senator Goldwater gave straight-shooting advice on how to deal with Reagan: Dear Mr. President: I hope this reaches you before you depart for Nebraska for I would like to reiterate a couple of things I said to you on the phone the other day. You are the President. Do not stupe to arguing with another candidate. Your speeches are a little bit too long. Get a good speech that is short and use it and use it and use it. Reagan’s trick, as you know, is to have a whole handful of cards and he shuff les out whatever comes out to be ten minutes of speaking, and I don’t think this deck has changed much over the years. Your speech writer has to be more punchy. It has to sound like you and no matter how much you have to rehearse it, do it. You are not going to get the Reagan vote. These are the same people who got me the nomination and they will never swerve, but ninety per cent of them will vote for you for President, so get after middle America. They have never had it so good. They are making more money and they are not at war and, for God’s sake, get off of Panama, but don’t let Reagan off that hook. God speed and with best wishes, Barry Goldwater 4 President Ford would go on to narrowly defeat Ronald Reagan in securing the nomination at the Republican convention in August 1976. Reagan’s strong showing and Ford’s weakness among conservatives was ref lected in the fact that Ford won 1,187 delegates to Reagan’s 1,070 during the primary/caucus season. President Ford would now take on former governor Jimmy Carter of Georgia, who came from nowhere to win the Democratic nomination. President Ford’s winning the Republican nomination was a huge personal victory for Senator Goldwater. It not only brought him admiration from many Republicans who had abandoned him during the 1964 presidential election, but it also showed his conservative base that he put the good of his party ahead of his ideology. Of course there are some who still feel Senator Goldwater did the wrong thing by backing President Ford over Ronald Reagan, but these are the same people who believed in a man in 1964 based on a slogan—“In his heart, you know he’s right.” Senator Goldwater knew he was right in backing an

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incumbent president from his own party. Time would prove him right as well. Senator Goldwater spoke at the 1976 Republican Convention held in Kansas City from August 16 to 19. The mood at the convention was one of anxiety, especially for the conservative movement, as it looked as though President Ford would be representing the Republican Party cause in 1976. Here is Senator Goldwater speaking before the apprehensive Republican crowd: Ours is a country if all the people—not of one. But I say I am afraid—let me tell you why. For a moment or two I want to discuss what the alternative to our approach means. Allow me to move Mr. Carter across the screen—slowly. Mr. Carter is the man who won a string of primary victories by ranting against Washington, promising to cut the cost of government and balance the national budget. But Mr. Carter is also the man who endorsed wholeheartedly a Democrat platform which would, if enacted, add 110–125 billion dollars to the annual cost of government . . . What Mr. Carter never seems to get around to is the fact that his own party members in the Congress are the architects and perpetuators of the things he has denounced to win votes. If the cost of government is too high—and we all know it is—then the Democrats who built the welfare state with all its expensive programs must accept the blame. Senator Goldwater would also get a dig in against his former opponent in his 1964 presidential race Lyndon Johnson: He (Carter) claims to offer the country something new and different, but let me tell you I have seen it all before. I have seen Mr. Carter’s future, and it doesn’t work. I have seen Mr. Carter’s future and it is Lyndon Johnson’s past. It is the same old left wing politics which exploits the differences among people, instead of building on the things they hold in common—the things they hold in common in which the foundation of democracy rests—the things they hold in common like freedom, and faith and lives of quiet honor.5 The 1976 presidential election would be one of the closest in American history. The former governor of Georgia Jimmy Carter narrowly defeated President Ford by a little over 1.5 million popular votes and a 297-240 margin in the Electoral College. Democrats also gained

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seven more Senate seats including one in Arizona where Democrat Dennis DeConcini took over seat vacated by Republican Paul Fannin. However, the narrow victory by Carter translated into only a gain of one House seat by the Democrats. The newly elected president Jimmy Carter would proved to be one of Senator Goldwater’s least favorite politicians in all his years serving in Washington D.C. Jimmy Carter ran for president in 1976 as a Washington D.C. outsider and this was one of the main reasons for his victory over Gerald Ford. But as president, Jimmy Carter did not want to be a politician who had to broker deals with the Congress. Jimmy Carter not only had problems with the Republicans, his main hurdles would be with his own party. Most Americans have always felt Jimmy Carter was one of the most honorable, decent men to take the oath as president of the United States. Historians and many Americans have not rated his four years in office as successful even twenty-five years after leaving office. President Carter’s problems were not that his policies were so far out of the mainstream; it was that he was not a good politician. Whether the American people like it or not, a president of the United States has to be a good politician. The success Bill Clinton had in two presidential campaigns, and in the eight years as president, was due to what he learnt from the failures of the Carter administration. President Carter started off on the wrong foot with Capital Hill when he tried to put too much on the legislative agenda. The lack of vision by the Carter administration especially rubbed the speaker of the house Thomas (“Tip”) O’Neill the wrong way: “They ran against the Tip O’Neills—the cigar-smoking, whiskey-drinking Irish politicians,” he recalled. “They were all parochial. They were incompetent. They came with a chip on their shoulder against the entrenched politicians. Washington to them was evil. They were going to change everything and didn’t understand the rudiments of it.”6 It was then Senator Goldwater’s turn to be irritated by the new president when Jimmy Carter honored his campaign promise to pardon Vietnam War draft evaders. Senator Goldwater was outraged and called Carter’s action as the “most disgraceful thing that a President has ever done.”7 There were many clashes over the four years that Jimmy Carter served as president of the United States. The first was the Panama Canal Treaty being pushed by President Carter in 1977. Here is President Carter at a press conference held on June 30, 1977, discussing the Panama Canal treaty: Q. What is the status, Mr. President, of the Panama Canal treaty? Are you likely to sign such a treaty soon?

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Barry Goldwater and George McGovern The President. I don’t know about the time schedule because it obviously takes two sides to agree to a treaty. We are putting in a lot of time on the Panama Canal treaty negotiations. And I hope that we’ll have a successful conclusion this summer. We’ve been encouraged so far. The major questions that were identified at the beginning have fairly well been concluded. One of the disagreements at this point is on the payment of portions of the tolls from the Panama Canal to Panama and the exact financial arrangement. But I hope still that we’ll have one by summer. I think that General Torrijos feels the same way, and, of course, we have been aided by the good offices of President Perez from Venezuela and others who want to have a peaceful resolution here. I can’t give you an answer because I don’t know yet. We are also trying to keep the Members of the Senate and others informed about progress as well as I’m being informed so that when we do reach a conclusion, it would be one that, with a major effort, we could have confirmed by the Congress.

Both President Carter and the Panamanian leader General Omar Torrijos Herrera eventually signed two treaties in September 1977. The first gradually would cede control of the canal to Panama by the year 2000. The second guaranteed permanent U.S. protection of the canal. The problem now was to get the U.S. Senate to pass the treaty, which also meant trying to get Senator Goldwater to vote for the treaties. Many conservatives were against the treaty. Republican Senator Strom Thurmond called the treaty a “give-away.” He went on to say: “We paid for, we built it, and it’s ours.” The biggest blow to the Carter administration was when Senator Goldwater announced he would not be supporting the treaty. Now that that he has read the text of the agreements, said Goldwater, “I would have to oppose [their] passage.”8 There were two Panama Canal treaties passed by the United States Senate, both by the vote of sixty-eight:thirty-two. The first, most commonly called the Neutrality Treaty, would give all nations access to the treaty. The second known simply as the Panama Canal Treaty gave the United States primary control over operating and defending the canal until December 31, 1999. The two treaties became effective on October 1, 1979. After the Panama Canal treaties were signed, Senator Goldwater was quoted by The New York Times on February 23,

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1978, as saying that the Panama’s corruption would ruin the canal. “I know these Latin countries. I know when it’s perfectly all right to lie. You couldn’t get away in the United States with the things we see gotten away in many other parts of the world.” Around the same time that Senator Goldwater was publicly speaking about his doubts concerning the Panamanians ability to take over the Panama Canal, Denison Kitchel, Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign manager, wrote a book called The Truth About the Panama Canal (1978). In this book, Kitchel argued there were six main points for the United States to understand: The conclusions regarding all three basic U.S. interests, foreign trade and national security, add up to these: (1) There should be a new treaty. (2) Panama’s sovereignty over the Canal Zone should be recognized. (3) Any new treaty should have a fixed term duration. (4) Panama should receive more money. (5) The United States must retain the right to control and operate the Canal for the foreseeable future. (6) The United States must retain the right to defend the Canal and maintain a military presence in Panama indefinitely.9 The main disagreement(s) opponents of the Panama Canal Treaties had was with the last two points—the right to control and operate and the right to defend the Canal. A good many senators felt that the United States must be able to control and operate the canal to make sure it was run efficiently and for profit. In addition, if there were ever a need to send troops into the Panama Canal Zone, the United States would have the right to do so. Andres Oppenheimer of the Miami Herald wrote an article dated October 27, 2006, called “A Huge Latin America Success Story.” Oppenheimer found after researching the state of the Panama Canal that people who opposed the Panama Canal Treaty such as Senator Goldwater were wrong. Oppenheimer found the following facts: ●

●

The Panama Canal’s income has soared from $769 million in 2000, the first year under Pananamanian control, to $1.4 billion in 2006, according to Panama Canal Authority figures. Traffic through the canal went up from 230 million tons in 2000 to nearly 300 million tons in 2006.

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Barry Goldwater and George McGovern The number of accidents has gone down from an average of twenty-eight per year in the late 1990s to twelve accidents in 2005. The average transit time through the canal is about thirty hours, about the same as the late 1990s. Canal expenses have increased much less than revenues over the past six years—from $427 million in 2000 to $497 million in 2006.

Today the Panama Canal seems to be running just fine except for one setback when the United States invaded Panama in 1989 to capture and remove the Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega. The successful capture of Noriega cleared the way for the eventually handing of control of the Panama Canal over to the Panamanians in 2000. The disdain Senator Goldwater had for President Carter’s foreign policy erupted in 1979. Senator Goldwater and about two dozen other members of Congress challenged President Carter’s termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan because he did not consult or secure the prior approval of the Senate. The Circuit Court agreed with the Congress, but President Carter appealed and the Court of Appeals sided with him. The case went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. A majority of the Supreme Court ordered the judgment of the Court of Appeals to be vacated and the case to be remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss the complaint. Four of the justices went on to say that this was a political issue that needed to be decided between the president and Congress. The net result was that President Carter was allowed to withdraw from the treaty. However, the U.S. Supreme Court never ruled on the merits of the case. But it also should be noted that the U.S. Supreme Court never sided with the president that he had unilateral powers to end a treaty. The Supreme Court just felt it was up to Congress to figure out the problem without court interference.10 The fight between Senator Goldwater and President Carter started mainly because President Carter wanted to “normalize” relations with China. By doing so the United States was also breaking its ties with Taiwan and agreeing with Beijing that there was only one China. President Carter recently made a visit back to Beijing, China, and he still believes he made the right decision by normalizing relations with China in 1978. Carter said the U.S. agreement to drop diplomatic recognition of Taiwan for China was conditional on Beijing’s acceptance

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that Washington would continue to offer defense to its longtime ally in Taipei. As Carter recalled, We finally reached the agreement that the United States would make public our statement, which many Chinese still don’t like, that we have an obligation to help preserve the safety of the Chinese who live on Taiwan and that we would provide them with defensive weapons only, a pledge I honored, but that we knew that the Chinese would not agree with this publicly but that they would accept it privately. President Carter also told the audience in Beijing “without normalization of relationships with the United States it would be very difficult for China to concentrate on economic development.” He said “many people never forgave me for betraying our friends from Taiwan, but he went on to say that he never regretted the decision saying the United States had treated the Taiwanese people fairly by maintaining economic relations.”11 To conservatives such as Senator Goldwater, the fight against communism was not only a policy of the United States, but it was a moral crusade of good versus evil. Taiwan had been an ally of the United States ever since Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek f led from the communist in 1949. Kai-shek’s fight against the communist leader Mao Zedong was not only capitalism versus communism, but it was a symbol of freedom to many conservatives. Abandoning Taiwan was for many conservatives another example of the weak foreign policy demonstrated by President Carter and the Democrats. Senator Goldwater had spoken early in the Carter presidency about President Carter’s announced human rights policy. For conservatives like Senator Goldwater, human rights could never be a policy toward oppressive governments ruled by Communists: Mr. President, during the recent recess for Easter it was my pleasure to have once again visited the Chinese on the island of Taiwan. I found here as I have found everywhere that I have been since President Carter’s speech on human rights a general and enthusiastic acceptance of it. I did find at the same time, however, a question as to how he can speak so eloquently of human rights while at the same time seemingly give public acceptance to the idea that even though Red China is probably the world’s worst abuser of

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human rights, it is all right for this country, the United States, to give recognition to her very existence.12 As a matter of fact, Senator Goldwater was mystified and angered over the response of some in the United States when the communist leader of China Chairman Mao Zedong died in September 1976: Mr. President, several times I have remarked on the f loor of the Senate about the unusual way that some Americans and some of our press acted when Mao died in Red China. One would have thought that one of the world’s more kindly, decent people had just gone to his rest, but, instead, he was the murderer of millions, how many we just do not know. It took a man like Ben J. Wattenberg writing about Mao’s funeral in Harper’s magazine of February to really put this whole thing in its proper stance and proper position . . . Mr. Wattenberg certainly cannot be classed as a conservative Republican but, nevertheless, his views are the views of more and more liberals who are coming to realize that things are not just like they seem in other parts of the world, particularly Red China.13 Once again Senator Goldwater was consistent in his voting record when he supported an amendment to Senate Bill 245 by Senator Charles Percy (R-Ill) to declare that hostile action against Taiwan would be a threat to the security interests of the United States. The amendment was rejected forty-two:fifty with thirty-five Republicans and only seven Democrats voting yes. Conservatism throughout Senator Goldwater’s tenure as a U.S. senator focused on three main issues: the fights against communism, the welfare state, and high taxes. The latter was always a mainstay of conservative’s agenda no matter if a candidate for office is running a local, state, or national campaign. In 1978, the California voters were presented with a ballot issue, Proposition 13, spearheaded by Howard Jarvis, which would reduce property taxes in the state. Also included in Proposition 13 was a two-thirds vote requirement for the passage of any new taxes in California.14 For conservatism, particularly Senator Goldwater, this was redemption against the liberal’s welfare state and big government spending that so many believed were growing out of control. The oppression of the American taxpayer had ended. An antitax revolt had begun.

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Senator Goldwater was not without words after California voters passed Proposition 13: Mr. President, it is perfectly clear, as a result of the overwhelming adoption of Proposition 13 in California and developments elsewhere in the Nation that the American taxpayers are in full revolt. At long last, it seems that the people who pay the freight have decided they have had enough of wasteful spending and Government extravagance in all areas of public and private life. The only surprise in that what is currently taking place has taken so long to happen.15 Senator Goldwater continued: Mr. President, I have seen this revolt coming for many years. In my travels across this country, I have heard a small rumble grow into a loud protest and finally an angry growl as governments piled more and more tax burdens on the hard working people of this Nation. In fact, as far back as my campaign for President in 1964, I began warning that the time would come that the American people, exercising their constitutional rights, would some day rebel against the liberal concepts of tax and tax; spend and spend. More and more Americans even then were beginning to question why they should work their hearts out all their lives only to find their hard earned savings disappearing down the rat hole of excessive and unfair taxation. Senator Goldwater finished his speech on the Senate f loor with fervor as he spoke of the beliefs he tried so desperately to impart in his 1964 presidential campaign: Mr. President, over the years in arguing for limited Government and fiscal responsibility, I have constantly warned that someday the chickens would come home to roost. That prophecy is being fulfilled today and irresponsible Government is finding the henhouse of waste and inefficiency being filled with the chickens of revolt. I say this is a healthy development. The adjustment may be difficult but the voters at long last have gotten the attention of the big spenders. I suspect they plan to hold that attention until some kind of sense emerges from the

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bureaucratic nightmare which has engulfed so many American taxpayers. The importance of Proposition 13 to the conservative cause cannot be underestimated. A change was coming about in the country. The American electorate was beginning to look at the Democratic Party’s liberal agenda with more scrutiny. Proposition 13 also hastened the idea that moderation in the Republican Party was beginning to die out. The crusade of Senator Goldwater that began some twenty years before against his own Republican Party for conforming too closely to the Democratic Party was coming to fruition year by year. The Republican Party was now heading on the course set by the conservative movement, with the assistance of people like Howard Jarvis. By 1979 it was clear to many political pundits that President Carter would have a very hard fight for reelection from the nominee of the Republican Party. The conservatives also believed that a candidate that was strong on defense, cutting taxes, and for less government spending was what Americans were asking for in their future president. Why were conservatives such as Senator Goldwater so excited at the prospect of running against President Carter? Besides the economic downturn that started to affect the lives of most Americans by late 1979, it was the foreign policy dictated by President Carter and the liberal Democrats in Congress that the conservatives felt they could expose for political gain. Examples such as the Panama Canal Treaties, “normalization” with China, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the budget battles over the defense spending were seen as the continuation of the 1972 Democratic platform and its nominee Senator George McGovern. By January 1970, a majority of Americans (57 percent) saw sending U.S. troops into Vietnam as a mistake; however by 1979 most Americans also did not want the United States to be seen as weak. The political situation only became worse for President Carter when Islamic fundamentalist led by the Ayatollah Khomeini over took the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iran, on November 4, 1979. Sixty-six hostages were taken prisoner leading the United States into one of its darkest periods in its young history. Although not known at the time, November 4, 1979, would mark the end of the Carter presidency. The Carter presidency from 1977 to 1981 was the best thing that had ever happened to the conservative movement. The battle to take control of the Republican Party by Senator Goldwater and his conservative followers had taken place some fifteen years earlier. The devastating

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loss in 1964 had many newspapers and political pundits writing the obituary of the Republican Party. However, the social and economic changes that took place from 1964 to 1980 along with the foreign policy of President Carter built the case for the conservative movement. Senator Goldwater was always seen as the leader of the conservative movement during this time period. Now, in 1980, another presidential election was coming up and the conservative movement was ready. Senator Goldwater was preparing to make another run for his senate seat in the upcoming 1980 elections. He formerly announced his intentions to run on January 4, 1980: During the past year, events have underscored the fact that there has been a dramatic reversal in the public’s perception of the role of government. Escalating inf lation and the energy crisis, with its devastating impact on our economy, have aroused the American people. They are calling for action. The tragic events in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet adventures around the world will inevitably bring about the necessary changes in American foreign policy and this, in turn, will put greater emphasis on our defense capability. Decisions made in Washington by the President and by the Congress will determine the future of freedom in this great land, and, in all probability, the world. The mood of the country is changing. The American people are ahead of their leaders. They are ready to face the realities of the 1980’s. They are eager to make the sacrifices—to accept the reforms so many of us have been urging over the past two decades. I believe we will have a new President in 1981. I believe a majority of the Congress will support the actions we must take to control inf lation, to adopt a common sense foreign policy, which will strengthen freedom, recognize our friends and acknowledge our enemies. During the past several months, as many of you know, I have questioned whether or not I should seek re-election to the United States Senate. I was torn between a desire to spend more time with my family, more time in Arizona and my obligation to my country, because I believe that by remaining in the Senate of the United States I can help to return this nation to the position of leadership we once held. I believe I can help to reestablish those principles of prudence and thrift and productivity, which have made us the envy of the world. I have spent thirty-seven years

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in the active reserve, National Guard and regular force. And, because I believe my experience on the Senate Armed Services Committee can help make this nation militarily strong and thus serve the cause of freedom everywhere, I have decided to seek reelection to the Senate in 1980.16 He also watched as the Republican field for president had expanded with each month in 1979. Conservatives such as Ronald Reagan, Congressman Philip Crane from Illinois, Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee, and former Democrat and governor of Texas John Connally all wanted to claim the conservative mantle held by Senator Goldwater. Moderates such as Senator Bob Dole of Kansas, former CIA director and Congressman George H. Bush, and Congressman John Anderson of Illinois were also running. Congressman John Anderson was in the race mainly to head off what he saw as the Republican Party going too far to the right. The news could not get any better for the Republicans in terms of issues by late 1979, when Senator Edward Kennedy handed them another political gift. Senator Kennedy announced in November 1979 he would challenge President Carter in the primaries for the nomination of the Democratic Party. President Carter had seen what happens when there is a challenge to an incumbent president as Ronald Reagan did to President Ford in the 1976 Republican primaries. It makes the incumbent weak and it did just that with President Ford. History shows that whenever an incumbent president is challenged in his reelection bid, it only strengthens the opposing party. Presidents William Howard Taft and George H. Bush are perfect examples of a sitting president being challenged within their own party. Taft was challenged by former president Teddy Roosevelt and Bush by political operative and writer Pat Buchanan. Both men went on to lose the general elections in 1912 and 1992, respectively. If one examines presidential history, it is fair to say that almost no president with the exception of Herbert Hoover had as many things go wrong in the last year of their presidency as did President Carter. This is in no way advocating that either man should have been reelected or that the American voter treated them unfairly; it just is an interesting fact for the political junkies out there to think about. The 1980 Republican primary season kicked off with the Iowa caucuses. Former CIA director and congressman from Texas George H. Bush would beat Ronald Reagan by a slim margin of 31 to 29 percent. Ronald Reagan would rebound with a decisive win in the New

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Hampshire primary over George H. Bush. As George H. Bush’s hopes for the presidency were beginning to fade, the conservative takeover of the Republican Party was beginning to solidify. The publisher of the inf luential Union Leader William Loeb said this on February 7, 1980: Bush is obviously the candidate of David Rockefeller and the Trilateral Commission. If Bush, who is an oil man from Texas, is able to be nominated by the Republicans, then you see David Rockefeller and the Trilateral Commission will have it . . . As this newspaper has said before, what you are seeing in New Hampshire is an attempt by the entire Eastern Establishment, the Rockefellers and all the other power interests in the East, to snow New Hampshire voters under with so much propaganda that they will fall for this phony candidate called George Bush. The last remaining faction of the Eisenhower/Rockefeller wing of the party began to disappear during the 1980 Republican primaries. The legacy of Senator Barry Goldwater started the night Reagan was declared the winner in New Hampshire. One could see the Republican Party firmly entrenched in the conservative ideology once the New Hampshire primary was decided. Ronald Reagan would go on to win all but four of the remaining primaries against George H. Bush. Moderate Congressman John B. Anderson of Illinois dropped out of the Republican primaries and would later run as an independent in the general election. Senator Goldwater would officially endorse Ronald Reagan on March 4, 1980, in this press release: Senator Barry Goldwater today announced his endorsement of former California Governor Ronald Reagan for the Republican nomination for president. The Arizona Republican said he had given long and careful consideration to the presidential contest, and decided that Governor Reagan is the man best equipped to lead the nation. “Ronald Reagan had a distinguished career leading the largest state in the nation, and has waged an excellent campaign on the issues,” the Senator said.17 On the other side of the political spectrum, the Democrats gave President Jimmy Carter a big win in the Iowa caucus over Senator Edward Kennedy and in the New Hampshire primary over both Senator Edward Kennedy and Governor Edmund G. “Jerry” Brown, Jr.

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of California. President Carter would go on to handily defeat both men for the renomination of their party. The die was cast. The 1980 general election would be a referendum on President Carter’s moral crusade to remake the U.S. foreign policy about human rights not human oppression versus Ronald Reagan’s triumvirate platform of reducing the size of the federal government, strengthening the military, and lowering taxes. For the Republicans, the torch had been passed.

CH A P T E R

F I V E

Redemption and the Election of Ronald Reagan

Sixteen years had passed since Senator Barry Goldwater changed the direction of one political party and the political ideology of millions of others. The conservative movement under Senator Goldwater, since 1964, had seen events fall in place like a puzzle that was missing some pieces—a fellow Republican Richard Nixon was twice elected as president of the United States, a war ended in Vietnam, the shame of Watergate, the ascension of Gerald Ford to the presidency, the rise of Ronald Reagan, and the election of Democrat Jimmy Carter. By 1980, a Harris poll of Americans showed that 35 percent said they considered themselves conservative up from 30 percent when Jimmy Carter took office in 1977. By 1981, Reagan’s first term in office, this number went to 38 percent and was still 38 percent in 1988—Reagan’s last full year as president. These numbers have varied slightly as of only a few years ago.1 The year 1980 must have crawled by for the Carter administration as the “year of the crises” but it brought President Carter closer to his political fate. By the time the Republican convention convened on July 14, the Carter administration was trying to heal its wounds from the aborted and fatal rescue attempt of the fifty-three American hostages who were still being held captive at the American embassy in Tehran, Iran. If the rescue mission had succeeded April 25 could have been President Carter’s most significant day in the White House. Instead, the image of mangled and burnt helicopters eerily foreshadowed what was about to happen in the upcoming November elections. More importantly, eight brave servicemen had lost their lives.

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At the time of the tragic failed rescue attempt in Iran, Senator Goldwater was a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Here was Senator Goldwater only two weeks after the tragedy making sure that the Senate, media, and the American people focus on why the helicopters crashed: Mr. Chairman: After having heard remarks made over television and radio, not to mention comments made in the press, I think it’s time that we direct and very sharply direct the focus on where these hearings should go. These hearings, in my humble opinion, are merely to find out what, if anything, went wrong with the equipment in that attempt. It is not directed at officers or enlisted men of any rank and to attempt to do so, to me, would be rank heresy. Senator Goldwater continued: The enlisted men and officers chosen for this most dangerous mission were probably among the finest men who wear the uniform of our country, and to hear them belittled by members of the press because of their junior age just isn’t getting to the point at all. I think instead of that we should be finding out why the hydraulic pumps on helicopters have a hard time working in the dusty, sandy air of southern Iran. Now let me say I know something about this. I f lew C-54S in that whole general area in World War Two and the C-54 had a 7,000 pound per square inch hydraulic pump on it that invariably went out because of the invisible dust that was constantly in the air that would be sucked into a cylinder and would grind down until it stopped working. Senator Goldwater would go further in his testimony criticizing the infamous 1973 War Powers Act that most presidents have either ignored or found to be unconstitutional: These are the things, Mr. Chairman, we should be looking at, and I decry any effort to downgrade any man of any rank in any position that he held during this rescue attempt. In fact, Mr. Chairman, as long as I have the f loor, I’m going to go a step further and remind my colleagues that I bitterly oppose the War Powers Act for the very reason that the President found it necessary to go around it just a short while ago.

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Two Presidents’ on two different occasions when rescue was needed, actually resorted to Armed Forces, and to have told the Congress one word about it would, in my opinion, have scrubbed either one of those attempts. There comes a time when a President must act in complete secrecy alone. And I can’t possibly conceive of 535 elected members of Congress being fractionally as effective as the advisors that surround the President under these conditions. We are not elected to be experts on war. We are not elected to tell the President what he should or shouldn’t do about the power that is his and his alone, the power to make ultimate military judgments. 2 If the disgrace of having sixty-six American hostages being held in Iran was not enough to make the Carter administration look weak in the eyes of the American people, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas day, 1979, reinforced the conservative’s view of a potential Soviet threat to democracies around the world. The Soviet invasion was done to keep the pro-Soviet leader Hazifullah Amin in power. Amin had tried to sweep aside Muslim tradition within the nation and he wanted a more Western slant to Afghanistan. This outraged the majority of those in Afghanistan, as a strong tradition of Muslim belief was common in the country. Thousands of Muslim leaders had been arrested and many more had f led the capital and gone to the mountains to escape Amin’s police. Amin also led a communist based government—a belief that rejects religion and this was another reason for such obvious discontent with his government.3 Thousands of Afghanistan Muslims joined the Mujahideen—a guerilla force on a holy mission for Allah. They wanted the overthrow of the Amin government. The Mujahideen declared a jihad—a holy war—on the supporters of Amin. On December 27, 1979, the Russians shot Amin and he was replaced by Babrak Kamal. His position as head of the Afghan government depended entirely on the fact that he needed Russian military support to keep him in power. Many Afghan soldiers had deserted to the Mujahedeen and the Kamal government needed eighty-five thousand Russian soldiers to keep him in power.4 President Carter’s denunciation of the invasion fell on deaf ears as the Soviet leadership under Leonid Brezhnev justified their actions as a threat to the pro-Soviet government of Amin. The United Nations had also condemned the invasion in January 1980, but the Russians had vetoed a Security Council motion calling for the withdrawal of Russian forces. President Carter’s next moves were to put a ban on the

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export of grain to Russia, end the SALT talks taking place at the time, and to boycott the summer Olympic games to be held in Moscow in 1980.5 The last move would anger many Americans especially those directly affected by this decision. Carter called for a boycott of the 1980 summer games that were to be held in Moscow. For many of the athletes, not only were four years of training wasted and dreams of competition shattered, but also the reasoning was worse. The boycott of the summer Olympics was one made based on politics. The confident conservatives of the G.O.P. marched excitedly into Detroit, Michigan, to claim a victory that was unimaginable some sixteen years before. Richard Nixon had foolishly let the Democrats back in the presidential game by allowing Watergate to grow out of control due to paranoia and stupidity. The Nixon pardon by Gerald Ford along with high inf lation brought a one term governor from Georgia into the presidency. Now, the conservatives wanted what was supposed to be theirs and Senator Goldwater’s in 1964. Conservatives wanted redemption and for them this would come in November. But for now, the convention would be a celebration of all their years of toil. The conservative agenda set out by Senator Goldwater, not just in 1964, but also since his early days in the U.S. Senate, would be solidified in the Republican Party platform. A conservative movement was taking hold on two fronts—socially and economically. Men such as Jerry Falwell were leading the social agenda with his new organization known as the Moral Majority. Issues such as antiabortion and prayer in public schools were pushed to the forefront. On the economic side, the 1978 tax revolt in California known as Proposition 78 lowered property taxes. This would become the rallying point for economic conservatives all across the country. From this point, Congressman Jack Kemp (R-NY) would begin to introduce what would be the economic blueprint of not only Ronald Reagan, but the Republican Party for the next thirty years. The theory was called supply-side economics. In basic terms, the theory goes that as taxes are cut; spending will increase because people will have more in their pocket to spend and not the federal government. This will in turn lower the federal deficit because the economy will have grown due to lower inf lation, interest rates, and unemployment. As to if this theory worked or not is an argument for another time. The main point from all of these beliefs was that going into the 1980 Republican convention, the conservative movement could put all of these beliefs into a funnel and what they had at the end was a recipe for

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victory. The American voter wants their politics given to them slowly and in simple terms. The American voter does not want to get overwhelmed with policy details—they want a simple message. A simple message cannot always be communicated articulately, but this time they had a former actor who they felt could deliver—Ronald Reagan. But before Ronald Reagan would take the stage in Detroit, the hero of all conservatives would have his moment in the sun. The Republican Party gave Senator Barry Goldwater a hero’s welcome. Senator Goldwater addressed the enthusiastic partisan crowd on July 15, 1980, the second day of the convention. Here are excerpts from his speech: My fellow Americans, I thank you for this great honor, I am particularly proud to be here with my fellow Arizonans and to be able to stand with them when all Arizonans ratify the name of our next President, Ronald Reagan. These few moments we will have together might be spent in a recital of the tragic miscalculations of President Carter and his administration—those economic decisions which have given us the highest rate of inf lation in our history, those foreign policy decisions which have cost us the respect of our enemies and destroyed the confidence of our friends throughout the world, those military decisions which have reduced us to the rank of a second-rate power. My years of dedication to the problems of national defense compel me to call history as my witness that weakness leads to war. My friends, if this country had been adequately armed and prepared, if our leaders had displayed the guts and courage America is noted for, no country in this world would have ever taken hostages from us. Senator Goldwater went on to describe the basic beliefs of the conservative cause—smaller government, less taxes, and the fight against communism: We believe in the Republican philosophy of government—limited central authority—fiscal responsibility—full value returned for each dollar taken in taxes—and an acceptable tax burden which will not destroy individual initiative. We believe these ideas offer the best hope of the future to the American people and to the free world . . . The American people are not hopelessly parochial in their world view. They recognize the relentless determination of the Soviet Union to conquer the world for communism. They

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are not cowards. They do not subscribe to the belief, “It is better to be red than dead.” They will eagerly support the rebuilding of our military capabilities. Senator Goldwater ended his speech by urging the Republican faithful to inform the American people of what needs to be done: Let us then go forth from this convention as servants of the Republic—as the bearers of truth—offering common sense remedies—resting on historical understanding. Let us study the errors of the past without alleging meanness of motive. Let us seek to unite rather than divide. Finally, as Republicans we must not fail in our goal of changing the course of this nation. We must hold sacred our traditions of loyalty and morality. We must guard against destructive, false criticism and apathy. We must not surrender to a feeling of helplessness. I truly believe Divine Providence has provided us with an opportunity to save this great country of ours and if we leave these gatherings dedicated to that purpose, our duty as Republicans will have been nobly done.6 Two days later, in his acceptance speech, Ronald Reagan echoed the words of Senator Goldwater when he spoke to the Republican delegates and millions of viewers at home watching on television that conservatism was the new political road to take. The days of big government, high spending, and weakness toward communism had taken the United States into a cesspool of malaise: First we must overcome something the present administration has cooked up: a new and altogether indigestible economic stew, one part inf lation, one part high unemployment, one part recession, one part runaway taxes, one part deficit spending, and seasoned by an energy crisis. It’s an economic stew that has turned the national stomach. It is as if Mr. Carter had set out to prove, once and for all, that economics is indeed, a “dismal science” . . . Our problems are both acute and chronic, yet all we hear from those in positions of leadership are the same tired proposals for more government tinkering, more meddling and more control—all of which led us to this state in the first place . . . I will not accept the excuse that the federal government has grown so big and powerful that it is beyond the control of any President, any Administration or Congress. We are going to put an end to the notion that the

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American taxpayer exists to fund the federal government. The federal government exists to serve the American people and to be accountable to the American people. On January 20th, we are going to re-establish that truth.7 All of these statements had to make Senator Goldwater smile because this is what he believed and fought for all his life. The less federal government one has in their life, the better off they would be. The days of pushing the federal government at people as their solution had to be replaced with people helping themselves with good paying jobs and fewer taxes. The Republican platform in 1980 ref lected what Ronald Reagan told the delegates on July 17, 1980, and what Senator Goldwater said on July 16, 1964. Here are some of the ideals the Republicans drafted into their 1980 platform: Republicans are united in a belief that America’s international humiliation and decline can be reversed only by strong presidential leadership and a consistent, far-sighted foreign policy, supported by a major upgrading of our military forces, a strengthen ing of our commitments to our allies, and a resolve that our national interests be vigorously protected. Ultimately, those who practice strength and firmness truly guard the peace . . . For too many years, the political debate in America has been conducted in terms set by the Democrats. They believe that every time new problems arise beyond the power of men and women as individuals to solve, it becomes the duty of government to solve them, as if there were never any alternative. Republicans disagree and have always taken the side of the individual, whose freedoms are threatened by the big government that Democratic idea has spawned. Our case for the individual is stronger than ever. A defense of the individual against government was never more needed. And we will continue to mount it.8 As the Republican Party came together in Detroit in July, the Democrats under President Carter were coming to New York in August as a party divided. Leading the division was Senator Edward Kennedy and the liberal wing of the party versus President Carter and the centrists. The personal disdain both men had for each other only grew throughout the primaries. Now, in the waning days of summer, President Carter had asked Democrats for unity. Senator Edward

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Kennedy would answer that call at the convention with one of the best political speeches in the history of politics. Senator Kennedy was well short of President Carter and the number needed to win the nomination. But he was not willing to give in and concede the fight to President Carter. At a TIME magazine luncheon Senator Kennedy was asked if he would support President Carter for reelection; his answer was not so favorable: “I think that Mr. Carter has created Ronald Reagan,” said Kennedy. His explanation: by bemoaning the limitations of the presidency as he sees it, Carter encouraged Americans to look for someone who proposes simplistic solutions to problems. Unless Carter changes his economic policies to support, among other things, more job stimulus programs, Kennedy is not sure at this point whether he could credibly support the president in the election, or that his help would do much good if he did.9 Senator Kennedy’s convention speech was mentioned earlier as one of the finest political speeches ever made. The reason for its greatness was that it was spoken from the Senator’s heart to his core constituents—the liberal base. Here is part of Senator Kennedy’s speech on August 12, 1980: The 1980 Republican convention was awash with crocodile tears for our economic distress, but it is by their long record and not their recent words that you shall know them. The same Republicans who are talking about the crisis of unemployment have nominated a man who once said, and I quote, “Unemployment insurance is a prepaid vacation plan for freeloaders.” And that nominee is no friend of labor. The same Republicans who are talking about the problems of the inner cities have nominated a man who said, and I quote, “I have included in my morning and evening prayers every day the prayer that the Federal Government not bail out New York.” And that nominee is no friend of this city and our great urban centers across this nation. The same Republicans who are talking about security for the elderly have nominated a man who said just four years ago that “Participation in social security should be made voluntary.: And that nominee is no friend of the senior citizens of this nation . . . And the same Republicans who are invoking Franklin Roosevelt have nominated a man who said in 1976, and these are his exact words, “Fascism was really the basis of the New Deal.” And that nominee

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whose name is Ronald Reagan has no right to quote Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The antithesis of all that Senator Goldwater and the conservatives stood and fought for in 1980 was answered in these two paragraphs from Senator Kennedy’s convention speech: The commitment I seek is not to outworn views but to old values that will never wear out. Programs may sometimes become obsolete, but the ideal of fairness always endures . . . The poor may be out of political fashion, but they are not without human needs . . . The demand of our people in 1980 is not for smaller government or bigger government but for better government.10 By the time President Carter made his nomination speech two days later on August 14, 1980, the debate had already been framed. It was Ronald Reagan and the conservatives versus President Carter and the Democratic centrist. Many of Senator Kennedy’s people would either sit out the 1980 election or vote for the independent—Republican congressman from Illinois John B. Anderson. Those Democrats that did vote for Ronald Reagan are still known today as “Reagan Democrats.” Polling data showed that 26 percent of people who identified themselves as a Democrat voted for Reagan.11 President Carter knew the strength and appeal Senator Kennedy still had with the Democratic Party. Here was his appeal to the Kennedy base of the party: I’d like to say a personal word to Senator Kennedy. Ted, you’re a tough competitor and a superb campaigner, and I can attest to that. Your speech before this convention was a magnificent statement of what the Democratic Party is and what it means to the people of this country and why a Democratic victory is so important this year. I reach out to you tonight, and I reach out to all those who supported you in your valiant and passionate campaign. Ted, your party needs and I need you. And I need your idealism and your dedication working for us. There is no doubt that even greater service lies ahead of you, and we are grateful to you and to have your strong partnership now in a larger cause to which your own life has been dedicated. What many Americans may not realize is that the 1980 election was very close going into the final weeks of the campaign. A poor

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performance by President Carter against a polished Ronald Reagan in the Cleveland debate on October 28, 1980, sealed the deal for many undecided voters. A Washington Post article in 2004 compared that presidential election race with the 1980 race: Carter remained close to Reagan in the polls during the summer and fall of 1980. Indeed, Carter ran better in horse-race polls than Bush is doing. But Reagan ultimately won an electoral landslide. Why? Because the country really wanted an alternative to Carter. Initially, many Americans were nervous about the idea of a staunchly conservative movie actor as president. A brilliantly run campaign, aimed from the beginning at reassuring voters that Reagan would be a perfectly plausible—and likable—president, laid the groundwork for the one presidential debate that year, eight days before the election. Reagan charmed the country that night. “There you go again,” he said, brushing off Carter’s attempts to depict him as an archconservative ogre. Reagan’s question to the audience—“Are you better off now than you were four years ago?”—proved devastating. Most Americans felt they were not.12 As election night neared, the conservatives were not only focused on beating President Carter, but they had their sights on the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives as well. Although taking control of the House of Representatives was a long shot, taking control of the U.S. Senate was not. Key conservative groups in selected states carried their message of change from the liberal way of running government to the people. Longtime liberal Senators and the symbol of what was wrong in America were targeted: Senator Frank Church of Idaho, Birch Bayh of Indiana, John Culver in Iowa, Warren Magnuson in Washington, Gaylord Nelson in Wisconsin, John Durkin in New Hampshire, and the biggest prize would be to defeat the liberal icon Senator George McGovern of South Dakota. Overall, the Republicans picked up thirty-three House seats (still not a majority) and twelve U.S. Senate seats, which did give them control of the Senate. All seven of the targeted Senators mentioned earlier were defeated. The conservative triumph was sealed on election night when Ronald Reagan easily defeated President Carter 43 million to 35 million votes (51 percent to 41 percent) and 489 to 49 in the Electoral College. Independent John Anderson garnered a little over 5.5 million votes (6.6 percent).

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The defeat of President Carter in the 1980 election was overwhelming. However, as noted earlier in the book, in at least seven of the southern states Carter was within 1–2 percent. This was the case as well in a few of the eastern coast states. The fact that the south was as close as it was can be attributed in large part to Jimmy Carter’s southern roots. In some of the eastern states such as Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, New York, and Maine, John Anderson being on the ballot definitely took away Carter votes. Some of these votes for Anderson were Republicans that did not like the conservative route the party was taking with Reagan, but many voted for Anderson because they did not like the alternative in Carter. In the final analysis, many voters voted against Carter not necessarily for Reagan. Conservative writer David Frum said this of Ronald Reagan’s win in 1980: Ronald Reagan owed his 1980 presidential victory to what seemed at the time to have been an inspired political stroke borrowed from a visionary young congressman named Jack Kemp. There would be no more threats to throw widows out into the snow, no more Taft-and Goldwater-style calls for self reliance, cheese-pairing, and pay-as-you-go. No more f linty frugality. Rather than fight and lose the battle over the welfare state for the hundredth time, Reagan would change the subject from spending to taxes. Later, after the tax cuts had worked their magic, there would be plenty of time to start chopping at the excesses of big government.13 As Frum would go on to write in his book, political history would show this never happened during the Reagan or his vice president George Bush Sr. years in office. The Republican Party celebrated their huge success all across the country on November 4 and no victory was more deserving in the eyes of the conservative movement than Senator Goldwater’s win over Democrat and conservative businessman Bill Schulz. Senator Goldwater’s razor thin victory (by approximately 9,400 votes out of 850,000) was partly attributed to many Arizona voters feeling Senator Goldwater had loss touch with them. Also, Democrat challenger Bill Schulz’s age, forty-nine, was definitely seen in contrast to the older Senator Goldwater at seventy-one. Although Senator Goldwater would not come out and say the Republicans’ historic win in November 1980 was redemption, many other conservatives must have felt that way. Sixteen years before the

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conservative movement was soundly defeated by Lyndon Johnson and his Great Society. Now, many of those who believed in President Kennedy’s New Frontier and President Johnson’s Great Society felt these causes were no longer practical. For many of these voters the experiment of the Federal government intervening in other’s lives had to stop. This is the attitude many voters brought to the polls in 1980. Redemption was Senator Goldwater’s whether he wanted it or not.

CH A P T E R

SI X

The End of a Long Journey for Mr. Conservative

The inauguration of Ronald Reagan as the fortieth president of the United States on January 20, 1981, was the climax of a long journey for Senator Goldwater. He had six years left in the Senate and he would continue to fight for the ideals he brought with him back in 1952. Moreover, because of the Republican majority, Senator Goldwater would become the chairman of the Armed Forces Committee. There were many important issues to address in 1981. The first priority for the new administration was getting the economy back on sound footing. This would mean dealing with inf lation, high interest rates, and high unemployment. When Ronald Reagan took office, the unemployment rate was 7.5 percent, inf lation around 13 percent, and interest rates at 15 percent for a thirty-year fixed mortgage. Reagan’s director of Office of Management and Budget David Stockman devised the economic budget that would be the cornerstone of the Reagan administration. Stockman convinced Reagan that the budget deficit, which was about sixty billion dollars (this was seen as much too high according to then candidate Ronald Reagan in his acceptance speech at the Republican convention) could be balanced even if taxes were cut and military spending was increased. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 was based off of the Kemp-Roth bill first introduced in 1977. Some may know it simply as supply-side economics. The main point of the Act was to slash the

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top marginal tax rate across the board. Here were some of the key provisions that were actually part of the bill: ●

●

●

●

An across-the-board reduction in personal income tax rates of 25%, phased in over three years. Dozens of new corporate tax breaks led by a new system of depreciation that actually produced negative effective tax rates on the profits from new investments. A reduction in the top estate tax rate and a phased-in increase in the exemption. Numerous new tax breaks for individuals with savings.1

If one will recall, Senator Goldwater said that budget deficits were caused by freewheeling spenders, mainly liberal politicians. This was one reason for his diatribe against the Eisenhower administration’s budget in 1957. Senator Goldwater wanted spending to be cut back and taxes lowered as long as the budget deficit would decrease. There would be no difference between Republicans and Democrats to the voters at the midterm elections in 1982 if the deficit increased alongside of spending. Reagan’s final budget passed both the House and Senate in 1981 thanks in large part to forty-eight Democrats in the House, mainly southerners (or, as they were known, “blue dog” Democrats) who voted for the budget. The final vote in the House was 238-195 and 89-11 in the Senate. Senator Goldwater voted for the bill as well hoping that the ways of Washington D.C. might change. Unfortunately, he would be disappointed. Along with the battle for the Reagan economic plan was another historic time for the United States. President Reagan nominated Sandra Day O’Connor for an appointment as associate justice to the U.S. Supreme Court on July 7, 1981. Sandra Day O’Connor was elected judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court, Phoenix, Arizona, and served from 1975 to 1979, after which, appointed to the Arizona Court of Appeals by Governor Bruce Babbitt, she served from 1979 to 1981.2 Senator Goldwater released this statement on July 13, 1981, concerning not only O’Connor’s credentials, but her conservative qualifications as well: In his continuing effort to bring Judge Sandra O’Connor’s record before the public, Senator Barry Goldwater said today that Judge O’Connor’s consistent stand on four broad areas of basic

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conservative philosophy mark her as exactly the type of Supreme Court Justice that Ronald Reagan and millions of Americans want on the Court. After review of her legal opinions and other articles, Senator Goldwater said that it is obvious that Judge O’Connor is a strict constructionist, she will be tough on criminals, she is a strong defender of private property rights and that is extremely respectful of state sovereignty in the judicial process. Calling these the four major conservative principles, Goldwater said that “never once can Sandra O’Connor be charged with rewriting a state law. It is clear that she is one Supreme Court Justice who will know the difference between the Court and the Congress. As a conservative, I have no fear that Sandra O’Connor will use the Court as a super-legislature.”3 Sandra Day O’Connor would go on to win confirmation from the U.S. Judiciary Committee by a vote of seventeen of eighteen committee members. One member voted “present” because O’Connor failed to condemn the 1973 Roe vs. Wade abortion decision. The full Senate confirmed her ninety-nine:zero. O’Connor was sworn in on September 26, 1981.4 In 2005, Justice O’Connor retired from the Supreme Court after serving a distinguished career. Although Senator Goldwater would still have been proud of his support of her nomination, he may have been disappointed in some of her more moderate views on abortion and states’ rights. As Arthur Hellman, a constitutional law expert at the University of Pittsburgh, said he believes O’Connor might have been partly pushed away by the fiery conservative rhetoric of Justice Antonin Scalia, whom the president has cited as the justice he most admires.5 Another important issue that confronted Senator Goldwater, the ninety-seventh Congress, and the Reagan administration was social security. Social security was reaching a point of bankruptcy within a few years unless some drastic measures were taken to deal with the crisis. Senator Goldwater released a statement on May 27, 1981, after meeting with John A. Svahn, commissioner of the social security administration, and Senator Roger Jepsen (R-Iowa) to discuss the Reagan administration’s proposals to keep the social security system from going broke: The Commissioner explained that the system will run out of money as early as September of 1982, if we do nothing. He said

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the Administration’s plan will assure that checks are paid on schedule. Senator Goldwater went on to say: I am happy President Reagan had my recommendation to lift the earnings ceiling of social security completely for workers at age 65. This will be achieved in three steps over the period from 1983–1986. The Commissioner assured me the President is firmly committed to this goal and will not compromise it. I was also pleased to hear that social security tax rates will come down under the Administration changes. Payroll taxes will actually decrease by 1990 below what they are today.6 A historic compromise deal would eventually be worked out when President Reagan appointed a commission in 1981 to save social security; this commission was headed by one of his economic advisers Alan Greenspan and included Bob Dole, Pat Moynihan, Claude Pepper, and AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland. Along with these men was the important role of the speaker of the house Tip O’Neill, who appointed former social security commissioner Robert Ball to be on the commission.7 In 1983, many of the Greenspan Commission’s recommendations would be signed into law by President Reagan, which included the following: an increase in the self-employment tax, the partial taxation of social security benefits to wealthier retirees, coverage of all federal employees, and a gradual increase of the retirement age from sixty-five to sixty-seven, starting in 2000. The bill also augmented the reserves in the social security trust funds and accelerated the scheduled increases of social security tax rates. Payroll taxes reached 11.4 percent.8 Unfortunately, the hard work of the Greenspan Commission and the likes of Senator Goldwater will be reprised by President Obama during his term. The issue of social security going bankrupt has raised its ugly head once again. In his book The Looting of Social Security (2004), Allen W. Smith, a PhD in economics from Indiana University, condemned the bipartisan work of the Greenspan commission: “The Social Security Amendments of 1983 laid the foundation of the worst fiscal fraud in the nation’s history, and that fraud is worse today than ever before.”9 Many economist scholars such as Allen Smith have been outraged for years as to how the Social Security Trust Fund was included as “on” budget by presidents and politicians for years. By adding the social security fund as on budget, the deficit was made to seem much smaller than it really was. This economic charade was finally changed in the

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1990 budget deal agreed upon by President George H. Bush and the Democratic Congress. Along with the country’s economic problems, foreign policy was also at the forefront during President Reagan’s first term. A war in the Middle East between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) erupted in 1981. The Israeli army was fighting PLO members who were hiding in neighboring Lebanon and using the country as a base to launch attacks on Israel. In June 1982, after a ten-month cease-fire in which rocket attacks by the PLO continued, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon. These bases in Lebanon were seen as a front for terrorist by the Israelis and as a base for freedom by the PLO. A multinational peacekeeping force consisting of U.S. forces as well as French and Italian ones was sent into Beirut, Lebanon, to try and stop the spread of the war while providing cover as the PLO withdrew its troops. Senator Goldwater saw the mission in Beirut as something altogether different especially after 241 Marines were blown up in their barracks by a suicide bomber: The terrorist killing of the Marines disturbed me greatly. From the beginning, I had opposed their being sent to Lebanon. It was a stupid decision for several reasons, including the central military fact that Marines are trained as assault forces, not troops who hunker down indefinitely in foxholes while getting shot at. There was also no clearly defined enemy. The truth is that those Marines were political pawns with no military mission.10 The words of Senator Goldwater on Lebanon make one think of how he would have reacted to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003? Granted the situations are different as Iraq was a U.S. led and controlled invasion militarily. In Lebanon, the U.S. military did not have control of the situation as Senator Goldwater attest to: The Marine commander calling the shots was not a leatherneck on the ground in Lebanon but an Army general sitting behind a desk in Stuttgart, West Germany. The command responsibility was that of General Bernard Rogers, NATO commander, now retired. He was isolated from Lebanon by multiple layers of command. The fault was in the Pentagon command structure.11 The fight against communism was a cornerstone of President Reagan’s first term as the invasion of Grenada as well as funding of the

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Contra fighters in Nicaragua proved. The Soviet Union was termed the “evil empire” for the first time by President Reagan in 1983. The conservatives relished the fact that, in their eyes, the fight was back on to crush the communist system once and for all. To many conservatives, this was a fight President Carter did not relish. By 1984, President Reagan was ready to run for reelection on an economy that had improved from the deep recession in 1982 (due to the recession, Democrats picked up another twenty-six House seats in the 1982 elections). Inflation and interest rates were down. Unemployment was around the same level as when Reagan took office. But mainly, Reagan ran on optimism and patriotism. These were simple terms, but President Reagan was able to sell the conservative agenda without seeming too harsh as a human being. It was not so much compassionate conservatism, but a president that was much liked personally and made the country feel good about itself regardless of problems in foreign policy and the economy. The Republicans also ran against the person who they wanted—former vice president under Jimmy Carter, Walter “Fritz” Mondale. Mondale had survived a primary that featured Senator Gary Hart and the Reverend Jesse Jackson as his main rivals. He had heavy baggage to carry into the general election when trying to defend the economy under the Carter/Mondale administration. Any hope Mondale had of winning (or at least keeping the election respectable) vanished when he announced in his acceptance speech at the Democratic convention that he would raise taxes. Senator Goldwater would address the Republican Convention in Dallas, Texas, mainly as a response to Governor Mario Cuomo’s speech to the Democratic Convention a month earlier in San Francisco: A month ago I sat in my den and watched the Democratic National Convention. Speaker after speaker promised the moon to every narrow, selfish interest group in the country. But they ignored the hopes and aspirations of the largest special interest group of all, free men and free women. So tonight I want to speak about freedom. And let me remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice.12 Senator Goldwater would go on to speak about the pride Americans felt about their country, a theme Republicans still focus and campaign on today: And let me warn those Democrats who made such a mockery out of freedom in San Francisco. Remember the millions of Americans who cheered, waved f lags, and felt joy in their hearts and tears in their eyes at the success of the American men and

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women in the recent Olympics. Don’t you Democrat leaders try to tell me that Americans don’t love and honor America. And don’t you Democrat leaders ever suggest we are not on the right path. And one more warning, quit trying to divide America. There are too many millions of Americans who just won’t take that guff. I’ve cleaned that one up. Guff. Members of the convention, we have a leader, a real leader, a great Commander in Chief: President Ronald Reagan. And in your hearts, you know he’s right.13 President Reagan would go on to soundly defeat Mondale in the general election by a 59 percent to 41 percent margin. Mondale could only carry his home state of Minnesota. And even that was by less than a 1 percent margin! In order to fight the communist menace, the United States would not only need to show strength through a military build-up, but there needed to be more efficient decision-making in the Department of Defense (DOD). This was Senator Goldwater’s last wish as a U.S. senator. He wanted to reorganize the DOD, something that had not been done in over thirty years: We proposed to transform inviolate military organizational command. Our reorganization sought to pin down a precise chain of command and the specific roles of officers in it. The chain itself was not to be altered, but it was to be much more accountable. These distinguished men were now facing the military mind’s worst nightmare: the uncertainty of change.14 Senator Goldwater probably does not get enough credit for many of his bipartisan efforts of his thirty years in the Senate. Perhaps his best example of bipartisanship was his work with Democrat Sam Nunn of Georgia. Both Senators Goldwater and Nunn felt deeply that the U.S. military could and needed to run more efficiently. In January 1985, Senator Goldwater was made the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Working with Senator Nunn, the ranking minority leader was one of honesty and sincerity. Both men spoke on the issue of the DOD reorganization with a series of speeches in 1985. A press release of October 16, 1985, on this subject is presented here. First, Senator Goldwater: It is imperative that we make organizational changes in the Department of Defense. As we face an era of declining defense

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resources and increasing threats, we must reorganize the Department of Defense to produce the most bang for the buck. This is vital to our national security and the preservation of our freedoms. Senator Nunn agreed: If we change these organizational weaknesses, we will strengthen our military. That is what this effort is all about. We owe this to the men and women in uniform and their families.15 Senators Goldwater and Nunn emphasized that the changes to the DOD must come from Congress: “If we leave it up to the Pentagon, there will be no change. The Constitution gives Congress the power—and the duty—to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and Naval forces. We must exercise that power and that duty.”16 After a long and spirited debate, the Senate, in 1986, passed the final bill officially called The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Rep. Bill Nichols was a Democrat from Alabama). The bill passed by a vote of 95-0 in the Senate. The House approved it by a vote of 383-27. President Reagan signed the bill into law on October 1, 1986. President Reagan spoke at the signing ceremony of the GoldwaterNichols Act: I have today signed H.R. 3622, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This legislation is the product of a 4-year effort led by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. It is a milestone in the evolution of defense organization since our national security establishment was created in 1947. Our thanks go to Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn, Representatives Bill Nichols, Ike Skelton, John Kasich, and Larry Hopkins, Secretary Weinberger, David Packard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and many others for their patience and perseverance in this effort. After long and intense debate, we have set a responsible course of action by taking another important step forward, building on improvements underway since 1981, and affirming the basic wisdom of those who came before us- the Forrestals, Bradleys, Radfords, and Eisenhowers—advancing their legacy in the light of our own experience.17 If one wanted sum up the final outcome of the reorganization bill it can be done in two words: efficiency and accountability. The GoldwaterNichols Act would reorganize the DOD, strengthen civilian authority in the DOD, improve the military advice provided the president, the

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National Security Council, and the secretary of defense. The act would also give commanders in the field more control over decisions.18 The reorganization of the DOD was the last crowning achievement of Senator Goldwater in his thirty-five years in the U.S. Senate. And befitting the person he was, Senator Goldwater would not take all the credit. Senator Sam Nunn said: “This law would never have been passed without Barry Goldwater.”19 Senator Goldwater responded in kind: The truth is, I never stood alone. Nunn was always by my side. He took all the f lak I did. We were a team, creating close bipartisan cooperation between a chairman and the ranking minority member to an unprecedented degree. I hope our experience will serve as a model for Republicans and Democrats in foreign policy, intelligence, and other areas.20 Unfortunately in today’s politics, it would be very difficult to say Senator Goldwater’s wishes were answered. The last few years of Senator Goldwater’s career in the United States was filled with many accolades for his years of service. One such honor came from President Ronald Reagan on May 12, 1986, when he gave Senator Goldwater the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Here were President Reagan’s remarks: The President: “Barry Morris Goldwater.” Senator Goldwater: “Thank God I made it.” (Laughter) The President: “Soldier and statesman, Barry Morris Goldwater has stood at the center of American history. Respected by both ally and adversary, Barry Goldwater’s celebrated candor and patriotism have made him an American legend. Hailed as a prophet before his time, self less in the service of his nation, Barry Goldwater has earned the unbounded affection and admiration of his countrymen and the enduring gratitude of all future generations of Americans. Here you go, Mr. Conservative.”21 Later that same year on September 9, 1986, a dinner was held to celebrate Senator Goldwater’s thirty-five years in the U.S. Senate. President Ronald Reagan called Senator Goldwater from the White House to congratulate him: The President: “Barry, I’m honored to pay tribute to you this evening and to join with many of your friends in recognizing your

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outstanding service in the United States Senate. Thirty-five years ago you brought to the Senate a dedication to the ideas which have made our country great and an ability for leadership which has rarely been matched in our lifetimes. You’ve given so much for so many—for your fellow Arizonians, for your party, for the Senate, and for all Americans—and we’re all grateful. One of your greatest achievements in the Senate is the outstanding work that you’ve done on behalf of a strong national defense, and I was moved by the many tributes from your colleagues during debate on the defense authorization bill.22 On a personal note, Barry, let me just say how much I’ll miss your friendship and guidance there in the Senate. You’ve been an inspiration to me and Nancy, and I wish you well. Nancy sends her love. And God bless you, and thank you for so many things.” Senator Goldwater: “Well, thank you, Mr. President. Bend over and give Nancy a kiss for me.” The President: “That I’ll do.” Senator Goldwater: “And if I’ve had any luck in accomplishing anything, the fellow that’s done most of the work is sitting next to me here, Sam Nunn. I wish I could have the same luck in making him a Republican that I’ve had with you-know-who.” The President: “Yes.” Senator Goldwater: Well, you have a good time. I guess you’re still up on the ranch. You sound like you’re a long ways off.” The President: “No, well, we are. I don’t know about the distances within the town. No, we’re back here at the White House now. Maybe it’s just jet lag on our part.” Senator Goldwater: “Well, just keep that old thing all together, because we’ll send somebody there to replace you. And it’s wonderful of you call, Mr. President. I do appreciate it so very, very much. And tell Nancy that my brother saw her mother just last week, and she’s wearing a hearing aid, and she still tells her dirty jokes, so—[laughter].” The President: “All right, I shall tell Nancy that.” Senator Goldwater: “Okay, Mr. President. Thank you so much.” The President: “All right. And go to work on Sam, and if there’s anything I can help in switching him, remember I once belonged to that other party, too.” Senator Goldwater: “Yes, I remember one day when you called me a black Fascist SOB—[laughter]—but you’ve gotten over that.” The President: “You bet.”

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Senator Goldwater: “Thank you so much.” The President: “You bet. Good night.”23 Along with the many accolades in Senator Goldwater’s last term also came grief and sorrow. Peggy Goldwater, Senator Goldwater’s wife of fifty-one years, passed away on December 11, 1985. No one can possibly know the importance and inf luence a spouse has on a politician. Most of them would not have climbed to the peak of their profession without their spouses and Senator Goldwater was no different: My greatest triumphs in the Senate—as chairman of the Senate Intelligence and Armed Services committees—followed the 1980 victory. These were not my conquests. The laurels belonged in great part to Peggy. The Defense Reorganization Act should not bear my name. It could just as well be the Peggy Goldwater Act. She neither claimed nor wished for public accolades. In reality, Peggy spent her life so that I might be a public figure. Her personal heights were hidden, but they were actually a lot higher than mine. I still have a long climb before I reach her.24 When Senator Goldwater’s term ended in January 1987, the Democrats had taken control of the Senate and President Reagan was beginning to be mired in the Iran-Contra affair involving arms for hostages. In addition, candidates for the 1988 Democrat and Republican presidential nomination were beginning to organize their campaigns. The list would include Vice President George H. Bush, Senator Bob Dole, and Congressman Jack Kemp on the Republican side and Senator Joe Biden, Congressman Richard Gephardt, Governor Michael Dukakis, and the Reverend Jesse Jackson on the Democratic side. Conservatism was at a crossroads as President Reagan was nearing the end of his second term and the possible candidacy of Vice President Bush was not too enduring to most conservatives. However, the sacrifice Senator Goldwater put himself through for the conservative cause was seen very clearly by the end of President Reagan’s second term. The voting electorate had gone to the right. Liberalism was now a word many Democrats were running away from during election time. Senator Goldwater was enjoying a legacy of redemption. After the election of Governor Bill Clinton in 1992 over incumbent President George H. Bush, the country was heading backing toward the middle of the political spectrum. Governor Clinton had watched three previous Democratic candidates go down badly in defeat because

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of their liberal stances on major issues. He would not let the Republican Party frame the debate in 1992 as liberal versus conservative. Every attack by the campaign of President Bush was answered immediately by the Clinton campaign. Governor Clinton demonstrated to fellow Democrats that they needed to counter-punch the Republican machine instead of taking it on the chin. President Clinton’s first year in office was a difficult adjustment for many in the Clinton administration. After continuous attacks from the Republican Party and the media mainly over the Whitewater investigation, Senator Goldwater surprised some by calling a press conference to defend the new president by saying “get off his back and let him be President.”25 One of the main issues that brought President Clinton so much scrutiny was his stand on letting gays serve in the military—the so-called don’t ask, don’t tell policy. He came under attack from the military branches, conservatives, and a few members of his own party. What did Senator Goldwater think of gays serving in the military? “The first time this came up was with the question, should there be gays in the military?” Goldwater says. Having spent 37 years of my life in the military as a reservist, and never having met a gay in all of that time, and never having even talked about it in all those years, I just thought why the hell shouldn’t they serve? They’re American citizens. As long as they’re not doing things that are harmful to anyone else . . . So I came out for it.26 Senator Goldwater does have an openly gay grandson and his brother has a granddaughter who is gay. Senator Goldwater also says that having openly gay relatives doesn’t inf luence his beliefs, which are animated by libertarian principles that government should stay out of people’s private lives.27 Many people in the conservative camp believed that Senator Goldwater was losing some of conservative beliefs by backing gay rights, a stand most often related to liberals. Senator Goldwater had a different view, one that he saw as consistent with his conservative views that government should stay out of citizens’ lives. In addition, Senator Goldwater saw the Republican Party starting to be hijacked by the religious right: The oldest philosophy in the world is conservatism, and I go clear back to the first Greeks . . . When you say “radical right” today, I think of these moneymaking ventures by fellows like Pat Robertson and others who are trying to take the Republican Party

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away from the Republican Party, and make a religious organization out of it. If that ever happens, kiss politics goodbye.28 Senator Goldwater remarried in 1992, this time to Susan Levine, a registered nurse and director of a two-hundred-employee hospice that tends to terminal cancer and AIDS patients. Susan Goldwater weighed in on the fact that Senator Goldwater was going to the left with his political views: “Barry was always a social liberal. Barry believed that people should be allowed to do whatever they wanted in their homes.” When Goldwater observed the right trying to use government to enforce private morality, he spoke up for women’s right to abortion and gay rights. His wife insisted that his convictions had remained unaltered, but that the movement for which he was the avatar had become warped. “He hated it that the rightwing zealots took over the party,” she said.29 Senator Goldwater suffered a stroke in 1996. Shortly afterward family members disclosed he was in the early stages of Alzheimer’s disease. His last days were spent at his home in Arizona with his wife Susan. Senator Goldwater passed away on May 29, 1998. One of the most inf luential U.S. senators in the history of this country, a leader of an ideological movement, was now a conservative icon.

Figure 6.1 On the steps of the Capitol—senators representing the Left, Center, and Right: Strom Thurmond R-SC, Edmund Muskie D-ME, Bob Dole R-KS, Barry Goldwater R-AZ, George McGovern D-SD, and John Sparkman D-Ala. Source: File PEG 90, The George S. McGovern Collection, McGovern Library and Archives, Dakota Wesleyan University Library 1978.

CH A P T E R

SE V E N

Conclusions

The opportunity to change the political landscape of American politics does not come along very often in history. History has presented politicians with the chance to change not only policy, but also the ideology of a generation of voters. Conservative Republicans, some who worked on Senator Goldwater’s 1964 presidential run and others who have become self-proclaimed conservatives over the past forty years, most often celebrate the political life of Senator Goldwater. However, the dignity and honesty that Senator Goldwater portrayed earned him the admiration of many Democrats and liberals who could at least respect Senator Goldwater the person, not necessarily his views. The political life of Senator Goldwater is not just fascinating to political scientists; it is important part of American history that needs to be studied by anyone interested in understanding today’s politics. Senator Goldwater never wanted all the praise that was thrown his way as the savior of conservatism. He was actually humbled by all the attention that he gained after the 1964 election loss. But deep down inside his heart he had to feel redemption and a sense of pride that particular issues he coveted were finally accepted. Senator Goldwater’s political career was in some ways very simple because he was consistent in his voting record. Not many people could (or would) say he was a f lip-f lopper and the type of nonsense that is thrown around today in Washington D.C. Senator Goldwater was against big government spending and railed against Republican administrations as well as Democratic ones. He did not care if he spoke against President Eisenhower and his budget spending, President Kennedy and his New Frontier, President Johnson and his Vietnam policy, President Nixon during the height of Watergate, President

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Carter on his recognition of China, or President Reagan and his policy in Lebanon. Senator Goldwater never took a stand where it was politically correct to do so. All the votes cast by him were based on conviction. And most of his convictions were based on the strict interpretation of the constitution. The most controversial vote of Senator Goldwater’s illustrious career was his “no” vote on the Civil Rights Act of 1964. There have been many opinions on his vote over the years from people both on the left and on the right. There are many conservatives today who will publicly admit that the Republican opposition to civil rights was a mistake. However, southern Democrats also vehemently opposed the 1964 Civil Rights bill. If Senator Goldwater’s past history had been filled with racist remarks and actions against African Americans, his vote would most likely have been seen as racist. But this is not the case with Senator Goldwater. Many southern Democrats did want to keep the south segregated because that is what they were taught and what they believed. This is not who Senator Goldwater was as a human being. Many black leaders of the 1960s did not at the time nor do they believe today that Senator Goldwater’s vote was based solely on a strict interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. Leaders such as Congressman John Lewis from Georgia marched with Dr. Martin Luther King. Lewis was beaten and jailed, but never gave in to the hatred directed toward him and his fellow marchers. For Congressman Lewis, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was earned by him and every other black man/woman who bled and died to end discrimination and for their right to vote. For Civil Rights leaders to forgive Senator Goldwater on a vote of such importance to the black population is admirable and understandable. We know Senator Goldwater’s leadership changed the face of the Republican Party. But did his conservative views get enacted into policy? The 1980s was a decade where the American people tended to lean to the right. However, the number of federal government workers was not reduced, the Department of Education and Energy were not eliminated, federal deficits became much larger, and social issues were still being hotly debated. The Reagan administration had continued the fight against communism that went back to the Truman administration. Communism did not spread under the Reagan administration, something Senator Goldwater was proud of during his last days in the Senate. The fight against communism was the one single issue that held the conservative coalition together going back to the days of the Truman

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administration. Senator Goldwater’s belief that communism had to be defeated in South Vietnam was undeterred, but the way the war was being waged mainly be the Johnson administration was appalling to him. Senator Goldwater defended the “Vietnamization” policy of the Nixon administration while blaming the deepening involvement in Vietnam of President Kennedy and President Johnson. However, the fact is that under the Nixon Administration another twenty-eight thousand soldiers were killed and thousands more wounded while the Vietnamization of South Vietnam slowly developed. The Nixon administration had also widened the war in Southeast Asia by bombing Cambodia. However, this action was seen by Senator Goldwater as necessary to stop the inf low of weapons to the Viet Cong. Social issues such as abortion and gay rights were ones that Senator Goldwater spoke out in favor for toward the last years of his life. Senator Goldwater felt his views were consistent with the conservative philosophy that the federal government should not interfere with a person’s own life decisions. This would include a women’s right to choose what she can do with her own body and a legal adult deciding who they want to be with and when. These views disturbed many conservatives who thought perhaps that Senator Goldwater was “losing it.” But for him it was the evangelical right that was wrong on their take on human rights. The life of Senator Goldwater will be examined for decades to come and should be. Forty years after the takeover of the Republican Party the conservative movement has solidified its place in the hearts and minds of millions of American voters. This was evident from the nomination of Republican senator John McCain in 2008. McCain’s nomination was a challenge to the conservatives of this country because many of them believe he has been on the wrong side of some key issues including tax cuts, campaign finance reform, and illegal immigration. What would Senator Goldwater have said about the McCain nomination? Would he have openly come out and supported him or would he have backed a more conservative candidate in the race? There are two things we can say: Senator Goldwater’s words would be taken very seriously and second, it would be straight from the heart. Ronald Reagan captured the hearts of millions of conservatives across the United States with his decisive win over Jimmy Carter in 1980 and then brought it to an iconic level with a landslide win over Walter Mondale in 1984. However, rarely has political history been so kind to an overwhelmingly defeated candidate for president. Senator

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Barry Goldwater changed the game of politics from first versus second to conservative versus liberal. The Republican Party’s paradigm shifted because of the leadership, passion, and insight of Senator Barry Goldwater, not because of a second place finish.

Figure 7.1 Political campaign buttons of Senator Barry Goldwater and Senator George McGovern—1964 and 1972. Source: Jeffrey Volle.

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CH A P T E R

EIGH T

The Most Decent Man in the Senate, 1963–66

He was a fresh face in the U.S. Senate for only ten months when the news of the assassination of President Kennedy reached him. The year was 1963 and for Senator George Stanley McGovern, like millions of others, his life would change. This soft-spoken, thoughtful, and strong intellect from the prairies of South Dakota had only the year before been appointed to the position of director of the Food for Peace by President Kennedy after his first run and subsequent defeat of an open Senate seat in South Dakota. McGovern would run again in 1962, this time defeating Republican Joe Bottum. Senator McGovern had represented the first congressional district of South Dakota for four years (1956–60) winning the seat from a popular incumbent in Republican Harold Lovre. Lovre had previously served as Republican state chairman and in 1954 he led the Republican ticket in his winning percentage.1 Not only had Senator McGovern won by a comfortable margin of eleven thousand votes, but his victory can be attributed to his work as the Democratic Party’s executive secretary from 1953 to 1955. If one wants to know what a real uphill battle Senator McGovern faced in trying to organize a viable Democratic Party in South Dakota one would have to only listen to his story of his first encounter with the state Republican Party at the state fair: After a demoralizing day of listening to the rival Republican loudspeaker herding chilled fair-goers into the tent to visit Karl Mundt

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and Bingo, the elephant, I knew that a counterattack was imperative. Providence intervened at this dark moment in the form of a loyal Democrat who appeared at my tent to inform me that he had a donkey at his gas station in Wolsey, fourteen miles away, that I could borrow. I left immediately in my old Chevy after removing the rear seat to allow room for the donkey. This was the first fateful step in a gathering, multiple disaster.2 Senator McGovern was able to get the donkey in his car, but without it first breaking a window with its hoof. After driving back to the fairgrounds and tying the donkey to the pole of the Democrat’s tent Senator McGovern describes the next unbelievable scene: To my horror, that scrawny little creature with the apparent strength of an enraged bull jerked the pole forward and the tent collapsed in the mud. With derisive Republican laughter in my ears from across the midway, I worked frantically, assisted by two humanitarian onlookers, to reconstruct the tent. While this operation was going forward, I tied the donkey to a sturdy tree. Within minutes he urinated copiously on an innocent nun who had turned her back on him. I pretended not to see this and the disciplined nun slipped away to recover her dignity.3 Senator McGovern’s nightmare of a day did not end there as he spoke through a scratchy PA system to the fair crowd to come visit the Democrat’s tent: At this point a child’s scream pierced the air and I looked in horror at the scene of a donkey’s teeth planted around the chubby hand of a ten- or eleven year-old girl. I kicked the donkey with sufficient force to jar his jaws and reached for the little girl to take her to the first-aid station. But she broke into a terrified run down the midway with me in full pursuit imagining tetanus, an amputated arm, a massive lawsuit and political disgrace. Child molestation must have crossed the minds of hundreds of spectators watching the frightened girl f leeing before a bloodied, perspiring, wild-looking male.4 The girl ended up running into her mother’s arms, who also happened to be a Democrat. No further harm was done and so ended Senator McGovern’s unbelievable day at the fair.

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Senator McGovern was born on July 19, 1922, to the son of a Wesleyan Methodist minister in Avon, South Dakota. The future senator had grown up during the Great Depression and in a Republican household. Senator McGovern’s father, Joseph, would later be a supporter of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, as would Senator McGovern. McGovern had taken f lying lessons while at college and would later enlist and then be drafted into the Army Air Force as a lieutenant pilot of a B-24 bomber named The Dakota Queen. He would f ly the required thirty-five bombing missions, which is well chronicled in Stephen Ambrose’s great work The Wild Blue.5 As with Senator Barry Goldwater’s upbringing in Arizona, Senator McGovern’s childhood in South Dakota and eventual service to his country in World War II would inf luence his ideology for the remainder of his political life. Prior to joining the Democratic Party, Senator McGovern had supported the Progressive Party nominee Henry Wallace for president in 1948 over President Harry Truman. Wallace had been secretary of agriculture under President Roosevelt and then his vice president from 1941 to 1945. Wallace would then serve one year under President Truman as secretary of commerce before leaving due to his disagreement over the Truman administration’s hard-line policy toward the Soviet Union. Senator McGovern would get his first taste of politics as a Wallace supporter as described by Robert Sam Anson in his book McGovern: The great disillusionment set in when McGovern went to Philadelphia as a member of the Illinois delegation to the Progressive Party convention. The Communist inf luence, which doubters had perceived far earlier and which the faithful, McGovern included, had always dismissed as a “smear,” came more or less into the open at the convention. McGovern was disappointed and bewildered at the “fanaticism” of some of the people closest to Wallace. Communists or not, their rigidity put him off. McGovern returned to Northwestern subdued and a little sheepish from the experience . . . There were still some, though, who voted for him, taking the trouble to write in his name on the Illinois ballot. McGovern didn’t vote at all.6 The world was much different in 1963 when Senator McGovern took his seat in the U.S. Senate than in 1948. The Korean War had ended, the Middle East was simmering with hatred between the Arabs led by Egypt’s Abdul Nasser and the newly established state of

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Israel, the Berlin Wall was erected by the Soviet Union to keep East Germans from defecting to the democratic West Germany, the Bay of Pigs fiasco marked the beginning of the Kennedy administration, the Cuban Missile crisis almost led to a nuclear war and finally the United States became more heavily involved in a little known country to most Americans at the time called Vietnam. Senator McGovern’s liberal views on foreign and domestic policy were reinforced from the very beginning of his first term as a member of the eighty-eighth Congress. Some of the key votes are listed below:7 Eighty-Eighth Congress: 1963–64 S 1. Youth Employment Act, establishing a Youth Conservation Corps and a “Home Town Youth Corps” to provide useful work experience for and increase the employability of unemployed youths. Passed 50-34: R 7-20; D 43-14 (ND 38-1; SD 5-13), April 10, 1963. Voted “yes.” HR 7152. Civil Rights Act, covering voting rights, equal access to public accommodations, desegregation of public facilities, public school desegregation, extension of the Civil Rights Commission, nondiscrimination in federally aided programs, equal employment opportunity, gathering of registration and voting statistics by race, intervention by the attorney general in pending civil rights cases review of court orders remanding a case to state courts, establishment of a Community Relations Service, and jury trials under the Act. Voted “yes.” Bill passed 73-27. S 2642. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. Passage of the bill authorizing $947.2 million in fiscal 1965 for a wide variety of programs to combat poverty. Voted “yes.” Bill passed 61-34. Exec. M, Eighty-Eighth Congress, First Session. Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Approval of the resolution of ratification. Treaty ratified 80-19: R 25-8; D 55-11 (ND 41-2; SD 14-9), September 24, 1963. Voted “yes.” Senator McGovern’s affirmative votes on the key issues of 1963–64 was in sharp contrast to the “nay” votes cast by the spokesperson of the conservative cause Republican senator Barry Goldwater. Senator McGovern believed in the Federal government intervening when injustice was being done to a group of citizens. The “Great Society” programs initiated by the Johnson administration became an extension of the liberal cause started during the Roosevelt and Wilson administrations in the early part of the twentieth century.

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The tragedy of the Great Society was that the programs designed to help impoverished Americans became a secondary issue for many of the liberals in the United States because of an undeclared war that was starting to build in Southeast Asia in a faraway land called Vietnam. Oddly enough Senator McGovern would be one of the first U.S. senator to speak of the failing policy in Vietnam that started during the Eisenhower administration. The senator’s speech in September 1963 began as an address on the overexcessive build-up of nuclear weapons by both the United States and Soviet Union. Senator McGovern ended with a summation as to where the U.S. government was headed: The current dilemma in Vietnam is a clear demonstration of the limitations of military power. There is in the jungle of Asia, our mighty nuclear arsenal—our $50 billion arms budget—our costly new “special forces”— have proved powerless to cope with a ragged band of illiterate guerillas fighting with homemade weapons. We cannot even persuade a government financed and armed by American taxpayers from tyrannizing its citizens and throwing insults at our President when he objects. Although we have spent $3 billion on the Vietnam war, lost many lives, and are continuing to spend $2 million daily, the liberties of the Vietnamese people are not expanding. Instead, we find them harassed, not only by terrorists in the countryside but also by official government troops in the cities. We find American money and arms used to suppress the very liberties we went in to defend. This is scarcely a policy of “victory”; it is not even a policy of “stalemate.” It is a policy of moral debacle and political defeat. It is a policy that demonstrates that our expenditures for more and more “special forces” are as useless and dangerous as our expenditures for more and more nuclear capability. The failure of our Vietnam policy should be a signal for every one of us in this chamber to reexamine the roots of that policy. Part of those roots are here before us today in the excessive portion of the military appropriations bill; and we stand derelict before history if we fail to make the examination. For the failure in Vietnam will not remain confined to Vietnam. The trap we have fallen into there will haunt us in every corner of this revolutionary world if we do not properly appraise its lessons.8 Senator McGovern eerily foreshadowed the quagmire that the Vietnam War would place the United States in for over ten years.

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Senator McGovern’s speech over forty-five years ago is not forgotten by many liberals today as they question the role of the U.S. commitment in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Vietnam War would also become the passion, obsession, and albatross that would drive Senator McGovern’s political life until this day. The foresight demonstrated by Senator McGovern on the f loor in the Senate in 1963 unfortunately, as would be pointed out by his critics, did not translate into him voting against the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution less than a year later. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave the green light for President Johnson to commit U.S. troops to the jungles of Vietnam after two American destroyers were attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin. Senator McGovern’s reasoning for voting for the resolution was based on a conversation he and fellow senator Gaylord Nelson (D-WI) had with Senator J. William Fulbright, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee just before voting on the resolution: I was uneasy about the request, despite private assurances that it was primarily a ploy to defuse the Vietnam issue during the Presidential campaign . . . Fulbright reiterated the plea that we had to help Johnson against Goldwater. We were just backing the President on his Tonkin response, not giving him a blank check for the war. The resolution was “harmless,” Fulbright insisted. Senator McGovern continued to explain that only two Senators, Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening, voted against the resolution. “My vote for the resolution, McGovern would say, is the one I most regret during my public career.”9 Military spending has been a focal point of political debate since the administration of Franklin Roosevelt. Liberals such as Senator McGovern have defended their stand on social spending such as the Great Society as much as they have advocated “smart” spending for the military budget. The problem for liberal senators in the 1960s is still an issue today—smaller military budgets equal a perception of weakness. Senator McGovern addressed this topic on the f loor of the U.S. Senate on December 13, 1963: Mr. President, yesterday and today news stories have appeared announcing plans by the Defense Department to phase out a number of military installations that are no longer needed for our national defense. It has been indicated that 33 installations in 14 States will be closed or reduced, affecting at least 16,000 civilian employees.

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Press reports tell of strong protests from members of Congress who represent areas where the surplus military installations are located. One highly respected Congressman is quoted as saying that he and his colleagues had a “furious session” with Defense Department officials over the proposed reduction of military plants that are no longer needed. Another able Congressman has threatened to “turn the Pentagon upside down.” Mr. President, the cry of anguish from members of Congress and from communities affected by the phaseout of surplus installations is understandable, but what a strange situation it reveals! Have we become so dependent upon military spending that we now regard the Defense Department as a grand public relief program? Senator McGovern would continue in this same speech that makes him sound in sync with a conservative: Mr. President, as long as I am in the Senate, I’m going to do everything in my power to protect and secure for my State necessary government installations and payrolls. But I do not think it would serve the interests of my State or the nation to fight for unneeded government plants that waste our resources, our taxes, and our manpower. Instead, I urge my colleagues to join in supporting legislation I introduced on October 31, “The National Economic Conversion Act” to ease the transition from military to civilian production. This nation need not fear the phaseout of unnecessary military spending, provided we act now to direct the dislocated manpower and investment into other useful tasks. Our able colleague from Michigan, Senator Hart, is the sponsor of another proposal to meet the changing requirements of our technology. This last paragraph from Senator McGovern’s f loor speech may sum up the feelings of many liberals over the last fifty years when it comes to military spending: Mr. President, I cannot believe that needless military spending serves the national interest. I cannot believe that we want to shackle our highly able Secretary of Defense in his efforts to eliminate waste from our defense budget. I cannot believe that there is any American worker who can really be satisfied in devoting his labor to unneeded tasks at the expense of his fellow citizens.10

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The death of President Kennedy and ascension of Lyndon Johnson to the presidency was very difficult for many democrats to accept. However, the Democratic Party rallied behind President Johnson in his first year in office mainly because of his policies that pleased most liberals. Senator McGovern was no different. The election of 1964 matched President Johnson, who was running on the legacy of President Kennedy and the conservative senator from Arizona Barry Goldwater. Senator Goldwater had skillfully won the Republican nomination and was taking the GOP to a new direction away from the moderate leaders that dominated since the party’s founding in the early 1850s. The Democratic Party saw Senator Goldwater as the enemy of all that the late president Kennedy and current president Lyndon Johnson were trying to achieve in redefining American society. Senator McGovern campaigned for President Johnson in the fall of 1964. He was consistent in his earlier warnings about wasted military spending. The following press release came from the office of Senator McGovern concerning his speech in Parkston, South Dakota, at a dinner on October 14, 1964: Senator George McGovern (D-S.Dak) said Wednesday night that Senator Barry Goldwater offers the nation a prescription for “colossal military waste and the weakening of civilian society.” Speaking to a public dinner meeting in Parkston, McGovern said that Goldwater “recommends billions of dollars of unnecessary military spending that would distort the overall strength of the nation both at home and abroad.” Senator McGovern continued: At a time when we already have our rivals outnumbered 4 to 1 in bombers and missiles, the GOP presidential nominee calls for a costly new round of arms increase. While we have enough nuclear power to blow up the world, he wants bigger and more expensive bombs. With humanity the world around breathing easier because the nuclear test ban has halted the pollution of the atmosphere, he regrets that the U.S. is a signatory of the test ban treaty. Eighty percent of the federal budget now serves past and present military purposes. No one quarrels with the essential portions of the defense budget. But our present preponderance of military power dictates that some of the funds previously earmarked for

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weapons can be safely diverted to such urgent national needs as job training, education and conservation. The Arizona Senator’s recommendations for expanded arms programs would result in additional federal expenditures of about $7.5 billion annually. His proposed tax cuts would come to about $9 billion the first year. Thus the Goldwater military spending increase combined with his tax cut spell a federal deficit of $16.5 billion—a new high topping the previous peacetime record of $12.5 billion in 1959. The Goldwater military and tax policies comprise a blueprint for painful inf lation and the tragic waste of funds urgently needed elsewhere in our society. Not content with costly new expenditures on arms, the GOP presidential nominee would weaken the time-honored civilian control of the military. Added together the Goldwater proposals of more and more for the military and less and less for civilian society is a formula for militarism that weakens America both at home and abroad.11 The arguments Senator McGovern was making against the GOP nominee Senator Goldwater worked in the fall of 1964. The Democratic Party was not seen as weak when it came to military issues in the election of 1964. No one could dispute the fact that three great leaders had taken the United States into war—Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Harry Truman. Now Senator McGovern was arguing for a cause that would be the crux of his political career—a reduction in military spending through prudent, smart spending not a reckless hacking of the military budget. Unfortunately for Senator McGovern, the landslide election of Lyndon Johnson over Senator Goldwater would take the military budget in a completely opposite direction. The Democratic Party would also take a different direction in the next four years, as the Johnson administration would become bogged down in a Vietnam conf lict that would also change the life of Senator McGovern due to just one of his votes. And it just so happened that Senator McGovern addressed the importance of one vote when he spoke to the National Women’s Press Club on January 9, 1963: “Elections,” Will Rogers once remarked, “are like mosquitoes—you can’t very well fight ‘em off without cussing ‘em.” As one who has

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just been through an unusually protracted electoral bout, I can tell you how very important one vote can be. For my election, believe it or not, was decided by just one-third of a vote per precinct! Mine was not the only close election this year, of course—they seem to have become the fashion—nor was it the only close one in history. It was only one vote that cost King Charles I of England his head in 1649, for his fate was determined by a court that voted 68 to 67 against him! Here in this country a single vote in the Electoral College or in Congress swayed the destiny of the United States several times. The Galloway Plan that would have turned America into a British dominion, for example, was turned down by one vote in the Continental Congress; the presidential elections of 1800, 1824, and 1876 were decided after ties or one-vote margins; and President Andrew Johnson stood convicted of high crimes and misdemeanors if one or more Senator had voted against him. Numerous Congressional elections have been decided by the narrowest of margins, in one instance in California, according to unauthenticated legend, by the toss of a coin. In this case, the story goes, the Congressman’s secretary had been too busy with office work to vote on Election Day!12 Senator McGovern’s educational background includes his PhD in American history from Northwestern University. This unique background gave him a better understanding of how American politics evolved. In some ways it may be more frustrating for someone with Senator McGovern’s background because his grasp of politics is based on historical facts. Many congressman and senators come to Capital Hill with little knowledge of our country’s political history. Senator McGovern’s passion in the Senate was foreign policy and the waste in the military budget. However, he knew that one of his main constituents in his home state of South Dakota was the farmer. For Senator McGovern there was no such thing as “farmer welfare.” The farmers were the men and women who built the United States into the country it was circa 1963. And Senator McGovern had his credibility on agricultural issues backed by his appointment as the director of the Food for Peace program under President Kennedy. Senator McGovern addressed the issue of American agriculture at the twenty-ninth Annual Convention of the Independent Bankers Association on March 26, 1963: In the early years of our national history, Thomas Jefferson observed that “the small landholder is the most precious part of

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the state.” Jefferson asserted his conviction that “those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen people . . . ” Throughout our history, most Americans have shared to varying degrees Jefferson’s lofty view of the importance of agriculture in American life. It is true that for many decades the glitter of the city has held a strong attraction for American farm youth. No one has fully answered the question: “How ya gonna keep ‘em down on the farm after they’ve seen Paree! But at least until recent years, agriculture has occupied a high place, not only in public opinion, but also in the Congress of the United States. Senator Ellender of Louisiana, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, told me that when he first came to Washington 26 years ago, Senators considered Agriculture and Appropriations the two most desirable committee assignments open to any Senator. Yet, this year I was the only member of the Senate to request assignment to the Committee on Agriculture, and five Senators presently on the committee asked to get off. Only three of them were permitted to do so! What has happened in recent years to explain this turn of events? I suspect there are several factors. First of all, agriculture has become an extremely complex industry aff licted with problems that are frustrating and difficult to solve. Second, the farm population, which embraced nine out of ten Americans in Jefferson’s day, now comprises only 8% of the American people. This inevitably spells a relative decline in the political power and public appeal of agriculture. Thirdly, there is no organization to speak for agriculture with a single voice. This is not only frustrates the friends of the farmer in Congress; it means that the farmer’s story is told poorly to the nation. Senator McGovern would go on in this speech to talk about the misconception of the politicians from the urban areas about agricultural issues: I am constantly appalled by the distorted views on agriculture of my urban friends. For example, they labor under the false impression that the farm price support program results in excessively high food prices to the American housewife. Actually, consumer food costs are $4 to $6 billion a year less than if farm prices had increased as much as prices in other parts of the economy in the last eight years.

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Senator McGovern continued: Again, urban taxpayers look askance at the $6 billion budget of the Department of Agriculture and assume that this is a gigantic subsidy to farmers. Of course, the major portion of this budget is not a farm subsidy at all. Much of it goes to finance such programs as the school lunch and special school milk program, our overseas Food for Peace Program, the consumers meat inspection program, repayable loans for rural electrification, management of our national forests, and storage fees to commercial storage companies . . . 13 Senator McGovern would also talk about the importance of the European Common Market and how this would affect U.S. agricultural imports in the future. President Kennedy tried to address this issue in 1962 by signing the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The issue of agriculture is back in the current news as the U.S. consumer has faced four-plus dollars for a gallon of gasoline. The idea of using ethanol, which uses corn as part of the ingredient, has been debated over the last year and was an issue in the 2008 presidential election. However, the decline in the percentage of Americans who farm for a living has made the plight of the farmer less of an issue for the average American. Senators such as George McGovern and Republican Bob Dole worked together to pass legislation that would help the farmer for over two decades. The election of 1964 secured Lyndon Johnson’s place in history and would begin the largest build up of social programs since the days of President Franklin Roosevelt. The next four years for every U.S. senator would be occupied with two events—the war in Vietnam and the Civil Rights movement led by the Reverend Martin Luther King. Less than 1 percent of South Dakota’s population was African American in 1965. The civil rights movement to conservative South Dakota was an inner city and southern problem. But Senator McGovern knew that the unequal treatment of black Americans was shameful. He had voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Senator McGovern spoke how civil rights were the first major issue he had to confront: I have never been a safe party man. Instead I have tried to offer forthright leadership on the great issues of war, peace and public

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priorities. Yet the first great issue to come to the Senate in my first term, the civil rights bill, was not one on which I already had deep feelings. Intellectually I had been for civil rights, but it was not until the spring of 1963 that the commitment became a matter of heart as well as head. Like many others, I was infuriated when police dogs and fire hoses were loosed on children in Birmingham. I thought, Is this happening in America? It’s like Nazi Germany. Bull Connor, the segregationist enforcer of Birmingham, was inadvertently the perfect advocate of Martin Luther King’s cause. He was right out of Hollywood casting. McGovern continued: During the filibuster over the civil rights bill, I presided over the Senate through enough long-winded pronounciamentos to compose the first draft of my book on Food for Peace, War Against Want. (One night-to-morning session I was in the chair at fourthirty when Senator Bob Byrd, then one of the filibusterers, now Senate Majority Leader, read a poem he had written in honor of my daughter Teresa’s fifteenth birthday.) The struggle, in which I played just a supporting role, left me with a new certainty that civil rights was a decisive test for America. At the political hard points, such as busing during the 1972 campaign, I have tried to keep the promise I made to myself to stand fast on civil rights. I have come to see it as more than a matter of my own conscience. The issue seemed easier, almost simple, in 1964. As it has become more intricate and difficult, pretending easy ways to evade the demands of equality only shakes the already fragile faith of people in the political system. Thus I knew it would be unpopular to say at the Democratic Issues Convention in Louisville in 1975 that busing was there to stay-that no matter what the candidates appeared to promise, they could not change that fact. I didn’t like to say it, but I thought someone had to.14 The importance of the civil rights movement to the formation of both the Democratic and Republican Parties cannot be overstated. The civil rights of African Americans had always been the Democratic Party’s “sleeping giant” that dated back to the administration of Franklin Pierce in 1853. The southern politicians would dominate the Democratic Party for close to ninety years even through the administration of Progressive Woodrow Wilson, who himself was from

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Virginia. Not until the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932 did African Americans finally put their trust in a Democratic candidate to lead the nation. The beginnings of a new coalition were under way and the shadow of the American Civil War cast over the Democratic Party began to fade at the 1948 Democratic Convention. The magnitude of the Democratic Party’s transformation in bringing African Americans into the coalition did not come about because of Senator McGovern; however, men like Senator McGovern would later help to empower African Americans through party reforms. These reforms will be examined later in the book. On August 11, 1965, in the Watts area of Los Angeles, a highway patrolman arrested a twenty-one-year-old unemployed black man suspected of drunk driving. The suspect’s mother rushed outside into the street and started shouting at the police. Soon a large crowd gathered and some began throwing rocks and other objects. By the end of the night, over five thousand blacks rioted in Watts burning and looting businesses. The rioting stopped six days later, but not until thirty-four were dead and millions lost in damages.15 This was the beginning of a succession of riots that would paralyze some of the country’s largest cities including Newark, Cleveland, Detroit, and Chicago over the next three years. This social unrest would haunt the Democratic Party and George McGovern for the next twenty years, as they were now the party that was soft on crime. As the Watts neighborhood burned, President Lyndon Johnson was dismayed that the very group he was trying to help was not going to wait for the change he was advocating. This was described by one of Johnson’s top advisers Joseph Califano Jr: what came through to me was how much Watts had depressed him. Johnson lived his presidency in a race against time. He could never get his programs to and through Congress fast enough; once they were passed, we could never get them in operation as rapidly as he ordered. On civil rights matters, he was at his most demanding. He knew it was essential to arouse the oppressed, and that, once aroused, their clock ticked impatiently. I began to grasp how acutely Johnson feared that the reforms to which he had dedicated his presidency were in mortal danger, not only from those who opposed, but from those he was trying to help.16 The Johnson administration had passed, along with the eighty-ninth Congress, an unprecedented number of social programs expanding the

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role of the Federal government that is still with the country today. Once again Joseph Califano: When the 89th Congress adjourned on October 22, 1966, President Johnson’s legislative accomplishments were already monumental. Indeed, with the President asking for 113 major measures and getting 97 passed, the second session of the 89th Congress had exceeded the output of the first, in which 87 measures were requested and 84 passed.17 Even as President Johnson and the eighty-ninth Congress’s historical run at passing legislation came to end in October of 1966, the riot in Watts, the growing number of casualties in Vietnam, and the expansion of the Federal government resulted in a Republican landslide gaining forty-seven House and three Senate seats. These gains almost offset the huge losses during the Goldwater landslide in 1964. The election of 1966 began a conservative drip outside the Democratic Party that turned into a running f low by the end of the decade. The loss of midterm congressional seats in both the House and Senate has been debated over many years among political scientist as to the factors: scandals, foreign policy, economic downturn, a president’s personal likeability, or a combination of these. Writer Kevin Phillips had coined the loss of midterm seats by the sitting party in the White House as the “six year itch” that says in summary that the voter becomes “soured” on the current administration. Stuart Rothenberg, publisher of The Rothenberg Political Report, challenged this theory and specifically points to the 1966 midterm elections: Phillips, of course, sidestepped the fact that the 1966 and 1974 midterm elections were not true second midterms in a two-term presidency, since neither Johnson nor Ford had served anything close to six years in the White House when those elections occurred. But even if I accept Phillips’ list, I have a hard time swallowing the view that four cases make a trend, particularly when various cycle-specific factors seem to explain the 1938, 1958, 1966 and 1974 results rather easily. Two of these six-year-itch elections (1938 and 1966) were rebound elections, returning the House of Representatives to “normal” partisan levels after one party had achieved abnormally large gains. In 1964, for example, Democrats made huge gains as Republicans were buried in the Goldwater landslide. Two years later, the GOP

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rallied for a big win, taking back normally Republican seats that the party had lost because of the aberrant 1964 election outcome. The 1966 results were more a reaction to 1964 than to voters “souring” on the Kennedy-Johnson administrations.18 Senator McGovern supported President Johnson on the major votes that were the foundation of the Johnson’s Great Society as a member of the eighty-ninth Congress that included: the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Social Security Act of 1965 authorizing Medicare, and Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965. These social programs are still a cornerstone of the Democratic Party today. However, President Johnson’s policy in Vietnam had become the Democratic Party’s problem and the divide among party members was beginning to show as early as 1965. Senator McGovern was becoming one of President Johnson’s strongest critics from the Left. The growing concern from President Johnson over Senator McGovern’s criticism of his Vietnam policy was evident in this conversation with his Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on June 17, 1965.19 President Johnson first reads the UPI ticker for this date: Events of this past week bear out the concern of the Viet Nam conf lict. Although prepared before the announcement, the GOP complaints were pointed out by Secretary of Defense yesterday that U.S. troops will be bolstered by 21,000. The Committee majority while recognizing the inevitable need for more funds said there was no urgency for the extra money. It says the Defense Dept has a staggering total on hand for various uses that could be diverted but generally the bill gave President Johnson about what he asked: President: “Now what do I say about this when I am asked?” Secretary McNamara: “Well first of all I have not fully read it. I just walked in the office with the foreign correspondents. I have the bill and the report which came out this morning and is on my desk. I don’t think, Mr. President, any defense bill in recent years has ever gone through the Appropriations Committee with as little change. It is absolutely fantastic.” President added: “Yes, but they say you ought to have more.” Secretary McNamara: “Well the answer is we do not need more. We do not have more men than we planned for in the Budget.

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The number of men we have is the number of men we had planned for in the Budget. We have to feed them and cloth them whether they are in South Viet Nam or the U.S.” President Johnson: “Well, they said it was the President’s decision to escalate the war.” Secretary McNamara: “Well I don’t know that you have made any decision to escalate the war. In any case, this question came up at my press conference yesterday but the question frequently comes up—do we need more in the Budget for 1966—and the answer is not now. We may later depending upon what happens in the next 13 months.” President Johnson: “McGovern says that the war has taken a very dangerous new turn with a commitment of large land forces to combat mission. He says these guerillas have lived twenty years off the country side, they have fought largely with captured weapons and their strength is they are part of the people and the terrain in which they fight and how long will it take for some people to realize that bombing Hanoi or Peking will have little or no effect on the guerilla forces fighting a thousand miles away in the jungle.” Secretary McNamara: “Well if bombing won’t have any effect and the added men are undesirable, what in the hell do we do? Get out?” President Johnson continued: “Senator McGovern said instead of continuing bombing, we should take advantage of the forthcoming Afro-Asian conference in Algiers to encourage a discussion with the Viet Cong leaders.” Secretary McNamara: “Well this is the new tact. First they said we did not say what the objective was, the strategy was, then we have stopped the bombing and had the pause, then get ready for negotiations; now the theme is we haven’t talked to the Viet Cong. This is becoming more and more the dominant theme in criticism and I think we are going to have to answer that.” While Senator McGovern was not the only Democrat for whom the Vietnam policy was a cause of consternation, a more prominent member of the Senate and a friend of Senator McGovern felt even more uneasy being critical of President Johnson—Robert F. Kennedy. Senator Robert F. Kennedy’s friendship and eventual death would impact Senator McGovern and the course of the Democratic Party in

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a way that cannot be overstated. This will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. Famous columnist Jack Newfield described the difficulty Senator Robert F. Kennedy was having trying to balance his belief that the Vietnam policy under his brother’s administration was correct in that communism must be defeated, but without the need of growing the escalation with the deployment of more U.S. combat troops and the bombing of North Vietnam: On February 17, 1965, ten days after the first air raids against North Vietnam, and while Washington was rife with rumors of a major new escalation, four Senators—Frank Church, Gaylord Nelson, George McGovern and Stephen Young of Ohio—rose to speak against escalation, in support of immediate negotiations to settle the war, and for the neutralization of Southeast Asia, which Bowles had urged in 1962. Kennedy, a freshman Senator of one month, did not speak, and on February 28, Johnson declared a policy of continuous air strikes against military targets in North Vietnam. And on July 28, the President announced he was sending 50,000 men to Vietnam.20 Newfield would continue saying that Senator Kennedy would speak about the war for the first time on May 6, 1965, during an appropriations debate for funding of the war, but he was not willing to go along with Senators Morse, Ernest Gruening, and Gaylord Nelson to vote against the subsidies. The large majority of Democrats in Congress were not yet willing to make a clean break from President Johnson’s Vietnam policy—at least not in casting a vote against him. Except for Morse, Gruening, and Nelson, only words against the Vietnam escalation would suffice. The struggles of Senator Robert F. Kennedy over President Johnson’s Vietnam policy throughout 1965–66 was impacted by the increasing inf luence of the “hawks” within the Democratic Party. The Kennedys had always worried about looking weak against communism from the Right “But it was the decision early in 1965 of the Senate colleague whose judgment he most respected, George McGovern, to break with the Administration’s policy also made an impact on him.”21 Even early on in 1966, March 1 to be exact, men like Senator McGovern had a chance to change the course of Vietnam and their previous vote for the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. But both Senators

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McGovern and Robert Kennedy voted to still support President Johnson’s Vietnam policy. This was Senate bill 2791 that said: authorize fiscal 1966 supplemental appropriations for U.S. military operations in Southeast Asia. Mansfield (D Mont.) motion to table (kill) Morse (D Ore.) amendment to repeal the 1964 “Gulf of Tonkin” resolution, authorizing “all necessary measures” to prevent aggression in the area. Tabling motion agreed to 92-5; R 32-0; D 60-5 (ND 39-4; SD 21-1). March 1, 1966. A “yea” was a vote supporting the President’s position.22 Only four members of the U.S. Senate voted with Senator Wayne Morse to try and end the military build-up in South Vietnam—all Democrats Ernest Gruening (Alaska; the only other Senator with Morse to vote against the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964), William Fulbright (Arkansas), Eugene McCarthy (Minnesota), and Stephen M. Young (Ohio). Both William Fulbright and Eugene McCarthy would also become important players in the transition of the Democratic Party’s future within two years. Senator McGovern would enter 1967 focusing more on the evergrowing number of U.S. military forces in South Vietnam. Although his votes up to 1967 did not show a rebuke of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964, his words and leadership were becoming a rallying point for those Democrats who were dissatisfied with the Party’s direction on Vietnam. The shift of the Democratic Party was starting to crystallize and Senator McGovern—named by Robert Kennedy as “the most decent man in the Senate; the only decent man in the Senate”23 —was at the forefront.

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CH A P T E R

N I N E

Call to Duty, 1967–68

President Lyndon Johnson made his fourth State of the Union address to both Houses of Congress on January 10, 1967. The Democrats held a 64 to 36 advantage in the Senate and a 247 to 187 (1 vacancy) advantage in the House. The president was still pushing for expansion of his Great Society programs: further development of the model-cities program, extension of Medicare, strengthening of the Head Start program, more oversight on consumer protection, more natural beautification and improved partnership between the federal and local governments1—all these items had solid Democratic support. However, the same could not be said of the president’s policy on Vietnam: As for Viet Nam, Johnson neither apologized for U.S. conduct of the war nor attempted to prettify the prospects. Despite heavy pressures for a sterner stance from military and congressional advisors, the President announced no new strategies and no new commitments. I wish I could report to you that the conf lict is almost over, he said somberly. This I cannot do. We face more cost, more loss and more agony.2 The ideological shift of the Democratic Party did not happen because of President Johnson’s Vietnam policy alone. As mentioned in previous chapters, the social stand of the liberals in the Democratic Party on civil rights for African Americans began in 1948 led by President Johnson’s vice president Hubert Humphrey. The once “Solid South” for the Democratic Party, dating back to the presidential election of 1880, began to show cracks in the 1960 election of John F. Kennedy. And the Southern Democrats’ dislike of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made the

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cracks become huge fissures that would take a long time in repairing. The Vietnam policy, as it was being sold by the Johnson administration in 1967, was the defining event that began an ideological shift that would redefine the Democratic Party. And there can be no doubt that one of the men leading this paradigm shift was Senator George McGovern. This shift in thinking had been noticed by President Johnson and rejected, but other members of the Democratic Party had noticed and were applauding Senator McGovern. Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota made a statement on the f loor of the U.S. Senate on February 1, 1967, describing the leadership of Senator McGovern on foreign policy from an article written by Senator McGovern a month earlier called “Foreign Policy and the Crisis Mentality”:3 Mr. President, the January issue of the Atlantic includes an article by Senator George McGovern expressing his concern about the disturbing tendency of some citizens to view foreign policy issues with a “crisis outlook.” The article also ref lects his judgment about the need for a reasonable and critical look at our foreign policy assumptions. Members of the Senate are familiar with the extensive and conscientious efforts of Senator McGovern, both in the Senate and previously as director of the food-for-peace program, to develop constructive foreign policy programs and policies. I believe his article, “Foreign Policy and the Crisis Mentality,” raises questions and contains recommendations of interest to all and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the Record. Senator McGovern was challenging not only his fellow senators, but the American people in the way they were advocating foreign policy. In this article that stands the test of time, the first part is Senator McGovern speaking about the famous writer Thomas Paine and the panic mode of the colonist during the American Revolution in Paine’s Crisis papers. Paine observed: “Tis surprising to see how rapidly a panic will sometimes run through a country.” But McGovern iterated: “Yet Paine was so fearful of the tendency of men to become indifferent or weary in time of crisis and conf lict that he believed even panics produce ‘as much good as hurt.’ ” Senator McGovern then went out to say: If he (Paine) were permitted to review our own time, he would doubtless conclude that the problem of maintaining a proper

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course between panic and complacency has taken on new dimensions in the highly dangerous nuclear age. But there is a disturbing American tendency to overreact to certain ideological and military factors while overlooking issues of vastly greater relevance to our safety and well-being. Many American, having grown impatient with the frustrations of the cold war, see each international tension as an urgent crisis calling for a direct and decisive attack on the enemy. Moreover, there must be no halfway measures: Either get in or get out! Senator McGovern described how those who suggest there may be limitations on American power are called “neo-isolationists” and those who believe the United States has a mandate to impose its will upon the world are “neo-imperialists”: For example, the neo-imperialists’ solution to the long, inconclusive struggle in Vietnam is a crushing military onslaught. They reject the outlook expressed not so long ago by General Maxwell Taylor when, as ambassador to Saigon, he said that the issue there is “very largely a political, economic, and psychological problem.” They would prefer the approach of former Senator Goldwater, who said of Vietnam: “I would turn to my Joint Chiefs of Staff and say: ‘Fellows, we made the decision to win. Now it’s your problem.’ ” Summarized here are three main reasons Senator McGovern gave for this “crisis outlook” when it came to U.S. foreign policy: 1. The United State being a rather new nation had been separated from world politics for most of the nineteenth century relying on Britain to handle crisis in faraway places. The United States was pulled into World War I, but then went back into an isolationist mode for the next two decades. Now after World War II, the United States “have frequently overreacted to incidents that an older, more mature society would have regarded as ‘business as usual.’ ” 2. The United States does not look at events from an international vantage point and is unable to understand crisis situations from European mistakes. 3. The rise of communism in the twentieth century from such countries as the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba was a threat to

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And once again Senator McGovern brings up the beginning of the involvement of the United States in Vietnam: Looking back on the Bay of Tonkin incidents of August, 1964, one wonders if a crisis was manufactured by the Administration to justify a politically popular aerial reprisal against Hanoi backed by strongly worded congressional resolution—all of this at the beginning of a national election when Administration firmness was being questioned by the political challenger. Again in February, 1965, American planes began bombing in both North and South Vietnam in response to a nighttime Viet Cong attack which killed several Americans in one of our barracks near Pleiku. Senator Goldwater had earned a “trigger-happy” label in 1964 for recommending the use of American bombers in Vietnam, but Administration spokesmen rationalized the bombing in 1965 by dramatic references to the Viet Cong’s dastardly “sneak attack” implying that enemy troops should attack only on broad daylight after a fair warning. Senator McGovern’s changing views on American foreign policy was not only a stinging attack on the Johnson administration, but an admission that Senator Goldwater was attacked unfairly for his suggestion that the United States may need to bomb Vietnam during the 1964 presidential campaign and that President Johnson turned around and actually carried out this very same policy. It has been said often that Senator George McGovern was a soft-spoken man, but this soft-spoken intellectual senator from South Dakota would soon give way to a man with a newfound determination to right a horrible wrong he himself helped to create. The war in Vietnam was to become Senator McGovern’s life crusade. Approximately three months after President Johnson’s State of the Union address, on

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April 25, 1967, Senator McGovern would deliver a memorable speech on the f loor of the United States called “the Lessons of Vietnam.” Here are some excerpts from that speech and the reactions of other senators at the time on the f loor to Senator McGovern’s speech including Senator Robert F. Kennedy: Mr. President, before delivering the prepared text of my remarks on Vietnam, which were completed several days ago, I wish to make a few comments that are prompted by recent developments. For several years, a number of Senators, including the majority leader [Mr. Mansfield], the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. Fulbright], the most senior Republican Senator from Vermont [Mr. Aiken], and other Senators have warned against our escalating troop commitment to Vietnam. These Senators, myself and others have predicted that each new escalation of forces on our part would lead to a further escalation on the other side, thus setting the stage for a larger and bloodier war on the Asian mainland. One of the difficulties in this formula is that in this kind of guerilla war, 10 additional soldiers from our side can be offset by one soldier on the other side, which gives them an enormous advantage in a war of attrition. This is the very course that most of our best generals have warned against for many years. The predictions and the warnings of our generals and the Senate critics have proved to be largely correct. The glittering military solutions of the war hawks on the other hand, have proved to be wrong. Now in their frustration, the hawks are trying to blame the failure of their policy on their critics. Senator McGovern’s reference to “hawks” is important because many of these hawks (politicians for the continuing of the war) were in his own Democratic Party. Senator McGovern along with the other senators who opposed the Johnson administration’s Vietnam policy such as Senators Morse, Gruening, Young, Nelson, and McCarthy were seen as “doves” (politicians for withdrawal). As we read more of Senator McGovern’s speech, we realize that foreign policy, a once uniting ally for a president since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, had now become a wedge within the Democratic Party. In trying to imply that it is American dissent which is causing the Vietnamese opposition to continue the war, the administration is

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only confessing the weakness of its own case by trying to silence its critics and confuse the American people ... What we have advocated is that the administration quit widening the war; that the administration quit sending more and more American boys to do the job that ought to be done by Asian boys. Knowing full well the political hazards involved in questioning the Administration’s wartime policy, I can only warn again today that the new level of escalation marked by our bombing of the North Vietnamese airfields has brought us one step closer to a major war involving legions of China and backed by the enormous firepower of Soviet Russia. Thus, I do not intend to remain silent in the face of what I regard as a policy of madness which sooner or later will envelop American youth by the millions in a war without end. Mr. President, our deepening involvement in Vietnam represents the most tragic diplomatic and moral failure in our national experience.4 One important note to remember during these first three years of the U.S. escalation of troops in Vietnam was that public opinion was firmly behind President Johnson and the Vietnam policy. And at the time of Senator McGovern’s speech on the f loor in April, 1967, 50 percent of Americans said in a Gallup poll that sending American troops into Vietnam was still the right thing to do.5 One of those who believed in the Vietnam policy of sending American troops was a southern Democrat from Louisiana Senator Russell Long. Here are Senator Long’s responses to portions of Senator McGovern’s speech: “Some of us think that there is more to fear than a bloodier war; that a Communist takeover in Southeast Asia, particularly if it led to Communist expansion elsewhere, would be a much greater disaster than a bloodier war in Vietnam.”6 Long continued: “While we deplore the cost to us of fighting this war, some of us feel that what a defeat in Vietnam would mean is a much greater price to pay for victory than our present sacrifice. We have not lost the war; we plan to win it.”7 Senator McGovern responded to Senator Long saying that the U.S. involvement in Vietnam would bring communist China into the fight against the United States and eventually unite the communist countries and not fracture them. Senator Long responded saying “May I suggest that it is somewhat unfair to develop an argument to a point of ridiculousness; I am sure

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the Senator is not going to suggest the sooner we let the Communists take over the world, the sooner they will stop killing American troops.” To this Senator McGovern replied “I am not suggesting that, I am suggesting that the policy we have followed in southeast Asia plays into the hands of the Chinese Communists, and no one is happier about our being bogged down in Vietnam than the leaders in Peking.” The importance of Senator McGovern’s speech was not lost upon the Senate’s most well-known member Robert F. Kennedy. At the time of this speech, Senator Kennedy was still not able to voice his complete condemnation about the growing escalation and number of American troops killed in Vietnam. Senator Kennedy feared that people would see his opposition to the Johnson administration’s Vietnam policy as a personal vendetta again President Johnson. This was a perception Senator Kennedy did not want to carry with him in going into 1968 if there would be a possible presidential run. Senator Kennedy did not want to look “soft” toward the communist threat especially to the conservative wing of his own party. Senator Kennedy could not have praised a speech with any more fervor than he did Senator McGovern’s: I join with some of my colleagues in commending the Senator from South Dakota on the speech he has made today. I believe it is a courageous speech. In my own analysis of the situation, and supported by the polls, the position the Senator from South Dakota is taking is not a popular position in the United States. The fact that he will run for political office in 1968, the fact that he makes this speech on the f loor of the Senate and takes on these added political problems-these facts cause me to believe that this is one of the most courageous speeches delivered in the Senate since I became a Senator.8 Senator Kennedy continued later in the same speech: I know in war a country is under strain and stress, and that once our countrymen are being shot at, it is appealing to automatically support that effort and not criticize. I think the courage of the Senator from South Dakota is to be commended. Not that he has all of the answers, because nobody has all of the answers. He has come to the f loor of the Senate and touched the conscience of this body and reminded the people of the United States that war is not always the answer, that killing people is not always the answer to

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our problems, that violence is not the answer; and that for rational men there might be some other solution.9 Many people might ask what made Senator McGovern a leader. One word that was mentioned by Senator Kennedy in his reply about Senator McGovern on the Senate f loor and that will come up again in later chapters of this book is conscience. Senator McGovern had a unique ability to make individuals look inside themselves and ask the tough question: Is my decision based on what is right or wrong or is my decision based on political expediency? In a way, Senator McGovern made some politicians feel a sense of guilt for not voting with him on whatever issue that came before them. This is not to say Senator McGovern was always right on the issues, but he felt an obligation to make people look beyond a narrow mind that can engulf many politicians. There are many reasons that could point to Senator McGovern’s gift to persuade while in the Senate: the gift of eloquence from his father Reverend Joseph, his notorious debating skills, his education in history culminating in a PhD, his wife Eleanor, his thirty bombing missions as a pilot of a B-24 during World War II, or his conscience that weighed so heavily on him when young American soldiers were dying in the jungles of Vietnam based on a vote he cast for a president he admired. In his book Ain’t my America: The Long, Noble History of Antiwar Conservatism and Middle-American Anti-Imperialism (2008), Bill Kauffman points out that there was a conservative side to Senator McGovern mainly from his small-town Midwestern Methodist background. Kauffman even suggests that had Senator McGovern played more to his grassroots upbringing perhaps he could have given incumbent President Richard Nixon a run for his money (much of it illegally donated through CREEP—Committee to Reelect the President) in the 1972 presidential race. And this is how Kauffman describes Senator McGovern after his 1972 presidential landslide loss: In the clutter and chaos of the campaign, one discerns themes that place McGovern on a whole other plane from that drab anteroom of Democratic losers, the Mondales and Dukakises and Humphreys and Kerrys. George McGovern had convictions; like Barry Goldwater in 1964, he stood for a set of ideals rooted in the American past. He spoke of open government, peace, the defense of the individual and the community against corporate power, a Congress that reasserts the power to declare war. After

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the petulant departure of his mentally ill running mate, Thomas Eagleton, McGovern chose as his veep the undervalued Sargent Shriver, founding member of the America First Committee, a pro-life Catholic who admired Dorothy Day.10 The qualities associated with Senator McGovern, described by men of such different beliefs as Robert F. Kennedy and paleoconservative writer Bill Kauffman, show some of the reasons why some are beginning to look at Senator McGovern in a different light. After his Senate speeches during the early part of 1967, the break from President Johnson and his Vietnam policy was now official. Senator McGovern had criticized the president over the past three years due to his Vietnam policy, but this speech was a shift in foreign policy thought. No longer did Senator McGovern believe that the fall of South Vietnam would be a “domino effect” that would engulf nearby Asian countries such as Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia as did his colleagues on the right such as Senator Barry Goldwater. Senator McGovern was a leading liberal voice in the Senate among a handful of senators who were not going to give their support to the president of the United States—the leader of their own party. No one could have imagined the importance that 1968 would have on the history of the American people, which includes the impact on both major political parties. Neither did Senator McGovern. It began with the Tet Offensive launched by the Viet Cong against strategic areas all over South Vietnam including the capital city of Hanoi on January 31, 1968. There were riots in many of the major cities across the United States. The great civil rights leader Martin Luther King was assassinated on April 4, 1968, and the one death that had the most effect on him personally, the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy, happened on June 5, 1968. No one could have imagined that Senator George McGovern of South Dakota would place his name into nomination at the 1968 Democratic Party convention for president of the United States; to stand in place for Senator Kennedy, to carry on the ideals he was advocating during his eighty-two-day campaign. No one could have imagined the transformation of a once dominant political party relegated to a fractured gathering trying to identify with its once reliable base. The reform that would begin after the narrow loss of Democrat Hubert Humphrey to Republican Richard Nixon and Independent candidate Governor George Wallace of Alabama on November 5, 1968, would be led by Senator George McGovern. No

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one would imagine the transformation that was about to begin for the Democratic Party. Senator McGovern had a reelection campaign of his own to be concerned about in early 1968. His stand on Vietnam opposing the Johnson administration was still not popular across the United States, let alone in conservative South Dakota. However, the events that were swallowing the Democratic Party on a national level would be fought state-to-state by individual Democratic senators. And the first test for the Democratic Party on the national level was the first primary to be held in the cold of New Hampshire. The name of Senator Eugene McCarthy, Democrat of Minnesota, was mentioned earlier in this chapter as a leading liberal opponent of President Johnson’s growing U.S. escalation in Vietnam. Senator McCarthy had announced on November 30, 1967, that he would enter at least four primaries against President Johnson with decisions on two other states, one being New Hampshire, within a few weeks’ time. Here is some of Senator McCarthy’s announcement in the Senate Caucus Room, Washington D.C.: I intend to enter the Democratic primaries in four states: Wisconsin, Oregon, California and Nebraska. The decision with reference to Massachusetts, and also New Hampshire, will be made within the next two or three weeks ... My decision to challenge the President’s position and the Administration’s position has been strengthened by recent announcements out of the Administration—the evident intention to escalate and to intensify the war in Vietnam and, on the other hand, the absence of any positive indications or suggestions for a compromise or for a negotiated political settlement. I am concerned that the Administration seems to have set no limit to the price which it is willing to pay for a military victory ... In addition, there’s a growing evidence of the deepening moral crisis in America: discontent and frustration, and a disposition to take extra-legal—if not illegal—actions to manifest protest. I am hopeful that this challenge which I am making—which I hope will be supported by other members of the Senate and other politicians—may alleviate at least in some degree of this sense of political helplessness and restore to many people a belief in the processes of American politics and of American government; that on the college campuses especially and also among adult, thoughtful Americans, it may come to the growing sense of alienation

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from politics which I think is currently ref lected in a tendency to withdraw from political action, to talk of non-participation, to become cynical and to make threats of support for third parties or fourth parties or other irregular political movements. I do not see in my move any great threat to the unity and strength of the Democratic Party—whatever that unity may be today and whenever that strength may be.11 The impact of Senator McCarthy’s announcement to the history of American politics, particularly the Democratic Party, cannot be overstated and has been discussed in a number of political books over the last three decades. Senator McCarthy was correct in that he was speaking to a segment of society that felt disfranchised and cynical about the political process and politicians in general by early 1968. What he may have misjudged or just honestly felt would not happen was the “unity and strength of the Democratic Party.” All this ties into a political shift started by men such as Senators Morse and Gruening, carried forward by Senators McGovern, Gaylord Nelson, Stephen Young, but now speeches would give way to action. And by the time the Democratic Convention would end in July of 1968 Senator McGovern would be embedded in the middle of the political fight for the Democratic Party. The surprising strong showing of Senator McCarthy on March 12, 1968, in the New Hampshire Primary was the final blow to President Lyndon Johnson. Senator McCarthy’s 42 percent shocked most political pundits and forced President Johnson to announce to the nation on March 31, 1968, that he would not run for the nomination of the Democratic Party. Both of these astonishing events pushed the antiwar Democrats to the forefront for the Democratic nomination. Senator Robert Kennedy would announce his intention to also run for the Democratic nomination on March 16, 1968, only four days after Senator McCarthy’s unexpected strong showing. Many in the Democratic Party (and outside it as well) felt that Senator Kennedy was an opportunist—waiting to see how Senator McCarthy would fare in New Hampshire against President Johnson. At his announcement in the same Senate room where John Kennedy announced his candidacy for the presidency in 1960, Senator Kennedy addressed this very question: I am announcing today my candidacy for the presidency of the United States.

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I do not run for the presidency merely to oppose any man but to propose new policies. I run because I am convinced that this country is on a perilous course and because I have such strong feelings about what must be done, and I feel that I’m obliged to do all that I can. I run to seek new policies-policies to end the bloodshed in Vietnam and in our cities, policies to close the gaps that now exist between black and white, between rich and poor, between young and old, in this country and around the rest of the world. I run for the presidency because I want the Democratic Party and the United States of America to stand for hope instead of despair, for reconciliation of men instead of the growing risk of world war ... The remarkable New Hampshire campaign of Senator Eugene McCarthy has proven how deep are the present divisions within our party and within our country. Until that was publicly clear, my presence in the race would have been seen as a clash of personalities rather than issues.12 The entry of Senator Kennedy into the race for the Democratic nomination did split the Democratic Party wider. This is not to say Senator Kennedy caused the split; it has been established that the Democratic Party was fragmenting into two camps by early 1967 because of President Johnson’s foreign policy in Vietnam. But Senator Kennedy’s joining the presidential race divided the “doves” within the Democratic Party. Senators against the Vietnam War had to choose which one of these two men, McCarthy or Kennedy, they wanted to lead the fight. And to add more problems for the Democrats were the hawks that were for the U.S. involvement in Vietnam—many of them Southern Democrats who already voted with the Republicans on some key issues such as civil rights and various other social issues. The one hawk, Hubert Humphrey, that had helped initiate the shift in the Democratic Party in 1948 on civil rights was now President Johnson’s vice president and a supporter of his Vietnam policy. Humphrey would announce his candidacy for president of the United States on April 27, 1968. So where did Senator McGovern stand with respect to the candidacies of Senators McCarthy and Kennedy during this early battle for the Democratic nomination? Senator McGovern was a good friend of Senator Kennedy and supported him once he announced for the presidency. But Senator McGovern had actually been approached by Allard Lowenstein, a reformer, future one-term Congressmen, and activist

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that was trying to recruit someone to run against President Johnson in 1967 (officially called the “Dump Johnson Movement” started with Curtis Gans) after first approaching Robert Kennedy. An account of this search for a candidate to oppose President Johnson was recalled by Jack Newfield. Newfield wrote that most candidates Lowenstein had approached did not give him a f lat out rejection, but more of “I don’t think I’m the one you want, but if no one else is willing to do it, then come back and see me.”13 Newfield went on further: One of those who had this reaction was the first Senator Lowenstein approached after Kennedy—George McGovern. McGovern’s problem was that he was up for reelection in 1968, but he was interested enough to ask Lowenstein to make a trip to his home state of South Dakota and try to evaluate the impact a primary race against the President would have on his hawkish South Dakota constituency. Lowenstein came back and told Senator McGovern that in fact a primary race would make his reelection to the Senate much more difficult. Senator McGovern never told Lowenstein no, leaving the possibility of running in the primary as an option. Newfield ended the speculation of Senator McGovern’s possible run on a sad note: Later Kennedy would tell friends that if McGovern had been the rebel’s candidate instead of McCarthy, he never would have entered the race himself. And on Robert Kennedy’s funeral train, McGovern would tell Lowenstein, “If only I had run when you asked me, none of this would have happened.”14 The death of Senator Robert F. Kennedy on June 6, 1968, left emptiness in many Americans grasping for one more shining moment in American history that was erased, including Senator McGovern who still talks about his friend today. Senator Kennedy’s last victory in California the night he was shot brought the delegate total to: Humphrey, 944; Kennedy, 524 1/2; McCarthy, 204; undecided, 872. A total of 1,312 delegates were needed for the nomination.15 The Democratic Convention was to be held in Chicago, Illinois, from August 26 to 29. After the death of Senator Kennedy in June, the momentum gained by Senator McCarthy after his win in the Oregon

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primary (immediately preceding the California primary), began to lose steam only weeks before going into the convention. Some have pointed to the decline of McCarthy’s insurgency to McCarthy himself and his lackluster attitude and inconsistent statements. In addition, the party rules for choosing of delegates to the 1968 convention made it almost impossible for anyone to have beaten Vice President Hubert Humphrey, who did not enter any Democratic primaries as pointed out by Theodore White: The Humphrey delegates were the old structured vote. Humphrey had entered no primaries, which he later regretted; but the AFL/ CIO structures had delivered to him almost all of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Michigan and Ohio; Democratic governors and mayors, who had found Humphrey the man in the Johnson administration most sensitive to their problems, could deliver hundreds more delegates from New Jersey to Washington. The one possibly unstable element in the Humphrey coalition was the South, with its 527 votes. The South would be firm in support of Johnson and the war and, by derivation, of Humphrey, the administration man; but if Humphrey yielded too much to Northern liberals either on the conduct of the war or the rules of the convention, Southern loyalties might prove shallow.16 As many pointed out at the time and still rings true for most today, the party “establishment” wanted Vice President Humphrey as their candidate—heir to Lyndon Johnson. The Democratic Party delegate rules did not favor a “dark horse” candidate or even an insurgent within the party. The question for many antiwar delegates for Kennedy was “where do we go now?” After the bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Empire of Japan in 1941, Senator McGovern answered the call of duty, like so many of his generation including Senator Barry Goldwater, by joining the Army Air Corps to fight the Axis countries determined to conquer the world. As many of the Kennedy faithful looked for direction, Senator McGovern once again answered the call to duty. He announced on August 10, 1968, two weeks before the convention, his candidacy for the Democratic nomination. Now, the final cast was set for the 1968 Democratic convention; Senators McCarthy and McGovern versus Hubert Humphrey and Lyndon Johnson. It was the new Left of the Democratic Party versus the old Left of the Democratic Party.

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Like so many conventions in previous years of both Democrats and Republicans, there would be a f loor fight to change the rules of nominating candidates in terms of delegates, challenging the credentials of pro-war delegates so they could not be seated, and the party platform. One important rule that the Humphrey forces agreed to on the Rules Committee was the unit rule. Once again Theodore White: Traditionally, small states bind all their convention delegates to vote as a unit, thus maximizing their inf luence at a national convention. For a small state to split its vote is to splinter what little strength it has. But a unit has to be controlled by a leader—thus unit rule, in the new dialogue, was synonymous with boss control. Was it now considered unpopular? Well, then, said the Humphrey people-let it be abolished.17 The real defining moment for many Democrats at the 1968 Democratic convention was the fight in the Platform Committee over the party’s stance on the Vietnam policy. The majority plank backed by the Humphrey/Johnson forces (although in his heart it was very hard for Humphrey to accept) said: “We reject as unacceptable a unilateral withdrawal ... we strongly support the Paris talks and applaud the initiative of President Johnson which brought North Vietnam to the peace table.” The plank backed by the McCarthy/Goodwin (Richard Goodwin was a speech writer for Presidents Kennedy and Johnson along with RFK, who now favored McCarthy) forces demanded “an unconditional end to all bombings in North Vietnam”; second, the negotiations of a “mutual withdrawal of all United States forces and all North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam ... over a relatively short period of time. And third “we will encourage our South Vietnamese allies to negotiate a political reconciliation with the National Liberation Front looking toward a government which is broadly representative of these and all elements in South Vietnamese society.”18 The Humphrey/ Johnson wording defeated McCarthy/Goodwin by a final tally of 1,567 3/4 to 1,041 3/4. The war in Vietnam would continue for another four years and another thirty thousand American soldiers would die. There is so much more that can be analyzed concerning the Democratic Convention in 1968—most significantly the rioting that took place outside the convention halls in the streets and parks of Chicago. The strong armed tactics and vicious attacks by the Chicago police at the direction of Mayor Richard Daley was witnessed by the millions watching on television. The image of young demonstrators

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running while being chased and then beaten was not the image Vice President Hubert Humphrey wanted to portray to the American people. The convention of 1968 was perhaps one of the last conventions with the amount of drama involved even though the nomination of Hubert Humphrey was never in doubt. A lasting memory of the extreme hatred between the establishments of the old guard of the left versus the new left was the exchange of words between Senator Abraham Ribicoff, who nominated Senator McGovern for president and Mayor Richard Daley who was sitting on the f loor of the convention. Senator Ribicoff angrily denounced the strong armed tactics of Daley’s police force against the demonstrators saying: George McGovern is a man full of goodness. He is a man without guile. He is a whole man. And because he is a whole man, he can bring a sense of wholeness to a divided nation that so desperately needs its parts put together. George McGovern is a man who has peace in his soul. And because George McGovern has peace in his soul, he can translate that peace to our cities, our states, the nation, and this world. I’ll tell you why I’m for George McGovern. George McGovern is one of the few men in public life today any place in the world who has passion in his heart and a commitment to the very depths of his soul. And what this nation lacks, lady [sic] and gentlemen, is a sense of commitment and a sense of passion for all the people of this entire nation and the entire world. George McGovern brings out of the prairies of South Dakota a new wind, a wind that will be able to lift the smog of uncertainty from throughout our great land of ours. We need unity; and we can only have unity with a new face and new ideas and new ideals. The youth of America rallied to the standards of men like George McGovern like they did to the standards of John F. Kennedy and Robert Kennedy. And with George McGovern as President of the United States we wouldn’t have to have Gestapo tactics in the streets of Chicago! With George McGovern we wouldn’t have a National Guard. You bet. You bet.19 For anyone to compare a politician in 1968 to President John F. Kennedy and his brother Senator Robert F. Kennedy was considered a great honor not bestowed upon any politician of this era. Senator

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George McGovern had now taken a place in the leadership of the Democratic Party. He also won reelection to the Senate by beating Republican opponent Archie Gubburd by a comfortable 56 percent to 43 percent. The possibility of leading a “new” Democratic Party came to fruition with the loss by Democrat Hubert Humphrey to the “revived” Republican Richard Nixon. The final popular vote was close with Nixon getting 31,783,783 (43.42 percent) to Humphrey’s 31,271,839 (42.72 percent). Third party candidate Governor George Wallace of Alabama gathered a very strong 9,901,118 (13.53 percent). The Electoral College was not as close as Nixon swept to 301, Humphrey to 191, and Wallace to 46 (all in the Deep South). The very strong showing of third party candidate George Wallace sealed the fate of the Democratic Party in the Deep South. The coalition started by Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, held together by Harry Truman and John Kennedy, widened by Texan Lyndon Johnson in 1964 had almost evaporated at the end of the 1968 general election. The Democratic Party was heading down a new road that would be filled with heartbreak and redemption over the next forty years.

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CH A P T E R

T E N

The Reformer, 1969–71

The inauguration of Republican’s Richard Nixon as president and Spiro Agnew as vice president on January 20, 1969, had to be a shock to the Democrats who must have thought some four years earlier that either Lyndon Johnson, or at the very least Hubert Humphrey as the sitting vice president, would be standing with the chief justice of the Supreme Court taking the oath as president of the United States. As reality sunk in, many Democrats (not all) believed the Democratic Party would need to reform itself to become more attentive to those who not only opposed the Vietnam War, but those young Democrats who believed the system of choosing delegates was not representative of the minority view. And to their point, it must be emphasized again that Hubert Humphrey was chosen without entering any of the thirteen primaries, received only 2 percent of the vote in those primaries compared to McCarthy’s 39 percent and Kennedy’s 31 percent.1 But many of these disenfranchised Democrats had to look no further than their own candidate at the 1968 convention—Senator George McGovern. Senator McGovern had campaigned for his friend Hubert Humphrey as the Democratic nominee against Richard Nixon in the 1968 race for president. But Humphrey and McGovern’s disagreement over the handling of the Vietnam War was too visible to ignore. Also, Senator McGovern had seen the strong-arm tactics of Mayor Daley’s police force and embedded loyalist throughout the Democratic Party silencing the voices of change at the 1968 Democratic Convention that crowned Humphrey the nominee. These two issues, the Vietnam War and reform of the Democratic Party, would now be Senator McGovern’s main focus for the next three years.

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One of the concessions that the McCarthy delegates had managed to pass at the 1968 convention was the creation of a party reform commission. The impact of this motion was not realized at the time by the Humphrey forces or by the establishment within the Democratic Party. Bruce Miroff described the choice of Senator McGovern to lead the new commission this way: Ironically in light of what would develop during the 1972 nomination season, after the 1968 election McGovern was asked to chair the reform commission as a compromise candidate. The regulars did not want a McCarthy backer to lead the reform effort, so McGovern, an insurgent who had nonetheless endorsed and campaigned for Humphrey in 1968, was the acceptable alternative. McGovern took the post “because I believed that I could bridge the gap between the Humphrey and the McCarthy-Kennedy elements of the party and ensure effective reforms and a more unified Democratic Party.”2 In the quest to further a cause leadership roles can be seized by individuals or it can be thrust upon an individual because of their past interactions with others. Senator McGovern was well known for his opposition to the Vietnam War as were a handful of other senators in the Democratic Party. It would have been very easy to overlook him as well for this new leadership position by the “establishment” within the Democratic Party. But Senator McGovern was no ordinary senator. He was a chosen leader, one who saw a chance to rebuild a Democratic Party that came out of the Chicago convention fractured. For many young and new faces in the Democratic Party reform had to be completed regardless of the short-term consequences. The leadership that Senator McGovern would provide along with a twenty-eight-member body was called the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection (1969–72) or as it is known more frequently today as the McGovern-Fraser Commission. Fraser was Congressman Donald Fraser from Minnesota who took over the Commission when Senator McGovern resigned in 1971 to run for the Democratic Party nomination. The twenty-eight-member body was appointed by chairman of the Democratic National Committee Senator Fred Harris of Oklahoma. The commission’s work has been studied by Mark Stricherz and is described in this Boston Globe article: The McGovern commission, chaired first by Senator George McGovern presidential nominees and helped create the modern

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presidential primary system. This led to a class shift in each party, as aff luent liberals gained more power in the Democratic Party while working-class conservatives won more say in the GOP. There were three major changes from the McGovern/Fraser commission. First, the commission could require state Democratic parties to comply with its wishes—the equivalent of Congress being able to do the same to each of the 50 state legislatures in the country. Second, it would require soft quotas in the selection of delegates. Women, young people, and blacks would have to be represented in numbers “in reasonable relationship” to their demographic presence. Third, there would be an end to the practice of appointing exofficio delegates (i.e., the cronies of the bosses) to the convention. Today, about 20 percent of delegates are still “super” or ex-officio delegates, interest group representatives, and union officials, the latter two appointed by party officials. The McGovern commission brought the old system to an end. No longer would party bosses have control over two-thirds to four-fifths of the delegates. Not only could they no longer appoint ex-officio delegates, but just as importantly—and against the desires of many on the commission—a number of state legislatures decided to institute new elections in order to comply with the jumble of new rules. Thus the modern presidential primary was born. In 1968, 16 states held primaries. By 1972, 28 did—and George McGovern himself became the Democratic nominee. 3 The changes brought about by the McGovern/Fraser commission have its critics in various political circles, which will be examined in more detail in the following chapter with Senator McGovern’s run for the nomination in 1972. However, it can be said that one of the most disputed parts of the McGovern/Fraser commission was in the area of delegate “quotas.” Once again Bruce Miroff: The most disputed McGovern-Fraser reforms were not these guidelines about participation, one of the chief themes of 1960s liberalism, but additional ones about another of its trademark concerns: equality for groups previously excluded from political power. African Americans were the initial target for affirmative action, but the commission quickly broadened its focus to include women and young people as well.4

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Perhaps the biggest critic of the McGovern-Fraser Commission was the largest labor union, the AFL-CIO, led by President George Meany. The inf luence of labor unions over the Democratic Party has been well documented for many years. Men such as George Meany were more conservative than the party members calling for reform. In fact, much of Hubert Humphrey’s nomination win in 1968 was due to the strong support of Meany’s AFL-CIO organization. Meany was afraid that the newly included primary systems, to start in 1972, would take away the unions’ leverage in selecting a presidential candidate to their liking. Although Meany’s AFL-CIO did not support reform, many unions did; in fact, they were represented on the twenty-eight-member McGovernFraser Commission. This includes I.W. Abel of the Steelworkers and William Dodds, the UAW political director. Other unions supporting reform were the Communications Workers of America (CWA), the International Association of Machinists (IAM), and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME).5 The twenty-eight-member commission would finish its recommendations within nine months in order that the changes take place immediately for all states as pointed out in a New York Times article on May 6, 1970: One of the essential reasons why the reform commission has issued its guidelines now for state action is to end the time lag in delegate selection. Unless changes are put into effect without delay, Democratic delegates in twenty states will be picked this year instead of in 1972. This old practice has meant rewarding the regulars and trying to decide too soon what the issues will be and which candidates can best speak for a truly representative convention. Implementation of the McGovern Commission guidelines is already under way; forty states have set up their own reform commissions. Opposition is expected in some Southern states but the commission has declared that the credentials committee at the next convention would agree in advance to unseat any delegation that was not chosen in accordance with the guidelines. The burden now shifts to the state parties.6 As Senator McGovern tried to lead the effort of reforms as to how the Democratic Party’s next presidential nominee would be chosen, his fight in the Senate against the war in Vietnam would continue, this time against the newly elected president Richard Nixon.

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In his book Nixon and Kissinger—Partners in Power, historian Robert Dallek describes the Nixon/Kissinger policy on Vietnam during President Nixon’s five years in office. One of the appeals of Richard Nixon to the voters during the 1968 presidential primary campaign season was his statement on Vietnam in New Hampshire that he would “end the war and win peace in the Pacific.”7 However, as Dallek points out about Nixon: “He refused, however, to provide any details on how he would end the conf lict, saying that if he revealed what he intended, it ‘would fatally weaken his bargaining position if he became President.’ ”8 Dallek would emphasize this point once again saying: “Although Nixon had implied during the presidential campaign that he had a plan for ending the war, it was nothing more than an election ploy. Once he was elected, however, he began trying to find a formula to end the conf lict.”9 The political life of Senator George McGovern and President Richard Nixon will always be linked, mainly from the 1972 presidential election. And these political foes, to say the least, continue their clash today through the gradual release of more Nixon White House tapes. But in early 1969, the disdain each man would have for one another had only began to surface. Senator McGovern did not waste much time in criticizing President Nixon on his initial comments concerning the Vietnam War. At a press conference on March 14, 1969, Nixon responded to a reporter’s question on troop levels saying “There is no prospect for a reduction of American forces in the foreseeable future.”10 Senator McGovern responded three days later on March 17: Although I sympathize with President Nixon as he grapples with the complexities of Vietnam and the defense of our country, I was deeply disappointed by the course chartered at his historic press conference last Friday. His statements advocating the deployment of an anti-ballistic-missile system and his f lat rejection of American troop reductions in Vietnam indicate that military considerations are dominating this administration as they came to dominate the previous one after 1964.11 For 4 years I viewed our deepening involvement in the bloody jungles of Southeast Asia with a troubled mind and a heavy heart. Now after all the political upheaval of 1968, after repeated indications that most of our citizens regret and deplore our involvement in this cruel and futile venture, I find it intolerable that we should still be pursuing the same tragic course with the same tragic results.12

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Senator McGovern went on to further criticize the corrupt government(s) that had ruled South Vietnam previously: The Saigon regime was not worth the first 20,000 American lives spent in the desperate pursuit of victory. It was not worth the 10,000 who have died since the Paris conference began. It is not worth the 360 who died last week, or the 453 who died the week before, or the hundreds who will die this week, or the hundreds who will lose their lives in the next week’s futile engagements. It is not worth one more American soldier or pilot dying next week or next month or any month in the future.13 Senator McGovern had one final plea to the new incoming president Nixon: At this important crossroads of our Nation, I would hope that America could reap the bright promise of the President’s inaugural address; and that in the spirit of that excellent speech, Mr. Nixon will reject the counsels of war and move to end the killing, and turn American energies back to the solution of our own problems and the search for a more decent world.14 Two months later Senator McGovern came to the Senate f loor to discuss how 250 college student presidents and editors from across the United States announced how they could not be “true to conscience and participate in the war ... I commend them for having the courage of their convictions and the willingness to follow their consciences no matter what the personal cost to them.”15 Of these 250 student presidents and editors, 50 had visited Senator McGovern’s office to discuss their views and also to present to him a letter they sent to President Nixon pleading for an end to the war. Senator McGovern again: “It is because of the high ideals and hopes they hold for the United States and their beliefs in the fundamental concepts of our country that they have placed their convictions and consciences above what they believe to be the mistaken course our country is following in Southeast Asia.”16 As mentioned in earlier chapters, a good word that describes Senator McGovern is a man with a “conscience” who has the highest regards for those who follow their conscience. It must be remembered in the course of any discussion concerning Senator McGovern that his life experience as a World War II bomber pilot permeated his beliefs when

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it came to the Vietnam War. Following one’s conscience to stop a war was worthy of praise of the highest order to Senator McGovern. And as the war in Vietnam raged on throughout the summer and fall of 1969, Senator McGovern’s intention to end U.S. involvement in Vietnam became stronger. Senator McGovern spoke his mind about the America he wanted to see come out of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The following excerpts are from a speech titled “The America We Seek” made by Senator McGovern at a peace parade in Washington D.C. on November 15, 1969, which included Mrs. Martin Luther King and Republican senator Charles Goodell of New York: We meet today because we love America. We love America enough to call her to a higher standard. We love America enough to call her away from the folly of war to the blessings of peace. We meet today because we cherish our f lag. We would raise the f lag out of despair and division to the higher ground of faith and love ... We meet to affirm the claims of conscience and life over the bondage of fear and hate. There is in our hearts a special sorrow for those who died in battle, for those who are scarred and wounded, for those who are held prisoners. But, in a larger sense, we are all prisoners of war. And we long to be free. We meet, not in impudence or violence, but in humility and grace.17 What is the America we seek? We seek an America with the sense of proportion that inaugurated our Constitution—“to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility ... and secure the blessings of liberty ... ” Let no American be frightened out of his constitutional rights. Let no teacher or student, no preacher or politician, no journalist or television commentator, be silenced by fear.18 What is the America we seek? We seek an America that in the spirit of 1776 permits other nations to determine their own future ... We seek an end to the draft now. We would replace the draft with the time-honored American practice of voluntarism ... We seek an America not so concerned with lowering or raising voices, as with speaking the truth. We do not make guesses about what the silent majority may be thinking.19 The “silent majority” that Senator McGovern refers to in this speech is a group President Nixon and some other political observers have credited with Nixon’s win over Senator McGovern in 1972. This

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phrase was first mentioned by President Nixon in a speech he gave to the American people on November 3, 1969, concerning Vietnam: I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism or national destiny these days, but I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion. Two hundred years ago this nation was weak and poor. But even then, America was the hope of millions in the world. Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the world, and the wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined by whether the American people have the moral stamina and the courage to meet the challenge of free-world leadership. Let historians not record that, when America was the most powerful nation in the world, we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism. So tonight, to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans, I ask for your support. I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge. The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed. For the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate at Paris. Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand—North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that.20 As 1970 approached, the die was now cast in the fight over the U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam. The liberals under the leadership of Senator McGovern were determined to see the Vietnam War end and leave South Vietnam to determine its own destiny while President Nixon would lead the new silent majority with his Republican colleagues on a road to “peace with honor.” The apex of the Vietnam War would be reached in 1970 as protest on college campuses across the United States would take an ugly turn into the history pages. The invasion of Cambodia by the Nixon administration would be challenged by more members of the Senate. And the voting age requirements would be voted on by the Senate to be reduced from twenty-one to eighteen. The announcement by President Nixon on April 30, 1970, that U.S. forces had crossed into Cambodia to attack areas known to harbor Viet

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Cong fighters would spark outrage among students on college campuses all across America. How did President Nixon respond? “Nixon responded on May 1, 1970, with a Pentagon speech attacking the campus demonstrators as ‘bums’ living a protected, sheltered life while ‘the kids’ in Vietnam ‘stand tall.’ ”21 The announcement by President Nixon of the invasion of Cambodia only furthered the distrust the people on the left had for Nixon and began to weaken some support from the moderates within the Republican Party. The entanglement of the Nixon administration’s policy in Cambodia had first been revealed by the New York Times on May 9, 1969, when they exposed the “secret” bombing war that Nixon and Henry Kissinger had designed and implemented starting in March 1969 through May 1970, codenamed Operation Menu.22 The protests on the campus of Kent State in Ohio, which had begun on May 1, culminated in one of the most tragic events in our nation’s history on May 4. The Ohio National Guard fired at the student protestors killing four and injuring nine. As protests erupted on campuses all across the country, the U.S. Senate would begin to enact legislation over a month later that would cut off funds for any further military operations in Cambodia. Democrat senator Frank Church from Idaho and Republican Senator John Sherman Cooper introduced HR 15628, Foreign Military Sales, as an amendment “barring funds for U.S. military operations in Cambodia after July 1, 1970, unless specifically authorized by Congress including the retention of U.S. combat forces, advisors and air activities in direct support of Cambodian forces.”23 This amendment was adopted on June 30, 1970, fifty-eight:thirty-seven, which included forty-two Democrats and sixteen Republicans.24 And unsurprisingly, Senator McGovern voted in favor of it. The role of Senator McGovern in the Vietnam debate throughout most of the 1960s and now into the decade of the 1970s has been discussed quite extensively to this point. However, it had been shown that a broader shift was happening between the two major parties. And for the liberals in both houses of Congress this meant regaining a slice of the foreign policy pie. No longer were liberals (and this can include a few Republicans at the time as well) going to be regulated to the sidelines listening to and rubber stamping the president’s foreign policy. But as Stanley Kutler wrote when describing the presidential years of Richard Nixon: The traditional liberal faith in a strong presidency had particularly underlined the need for broad presidential powers in foreign

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policy; Americans looked to their presidents to play the leading role for the United States in world affairs. Now, for a variety of reasons—a realization of its rightful role, a response to public pressures, a distrust of Richard Nixon—Congress began to assert itself in foreign-policy concerns after a long period of quiescence. The ingredients were all in place for fateful clashes.25 Senator McGovern had clashed with President Lyndon Johnson of his own party and now with President Nixon of the opposing party over the Vietnam policy. The challenge to the president’s sole authority to introduce troops in Vietnam began with Senators Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening voting “no” for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Senator McGovern would introduce an historical amendment of his own, cosponsored by Republican Senator Mark Hatfield, to begin the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam. The following are the remarks by Senator McGovern in Washington D.C. on May 7, 1970: The amendment I introduced with the co-sponsorship of Senator Hatfield a week ago today—Thursday, April 30—to end the war in Southeast Asia now has the co-sponsorship of 13 additional Senators. When I first conceived the idea of an amendment to the Military Procurement Bill to limit further funds for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to the amount needed to withdraw our forces safely, I did not at first think there was a chance of getting more than a handful of co-sponsors. But that was before the invasion of Cambodia and the shocking events at Kent State and other developments, which I now believe will, with hard work in the Senate, produce enough co-sponsors and votes to carry this amendment. It is the hottest and most hopeful article now sweeping the campuses, concerned churches, and peace-oriented groups in America.26 Senator McGovern then named some of the U.S. Senate’s most prestigious and inf luential members who joined on as cosponsors on May 5 after the amendment was modified. This list includes Senator’s Mondale, Inouye, Bayh, Metcalf, Cranston, and Nelson. Senator McGovern said: No longer will we just make speeches lecturing the President on what we think we should do. No longer will we ask him to bear the risk and the opportunity alone of ending or continuing the

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war. Rather, we will force the Congress to share that risk and opportunity on a broad bipartisan basis. If the President is fearful of the political recriminations of either continuing or ending the war by withdrawing our forces, this amendment is saying: “Mr. President, we are now going to share that risk with you.”27 Previously it was mentioned that the liberals in the Senate wanted Congress to reclaim some of its ability to, not control, but shape foreign policy due to the reckless policy in Vietnam for over six years. This feeling was reiterated by Senator McGovern: “But this amendment does more than that. It seeks to reclaim the Constitutional power of Congress over the issues of war and peace. It seeks to prevent the arbitrary decisions of the Executive by restoring to the Congress as elected representatives of the people the power the Constitution intended.”28 And finally Senator McGovern gives a simple overview of his amendment and the need for what was becoming America’s longest war: This is a prudent, carefully drawn amendment. It cuts off funds for military operations in Cambodia 30 days after passage. It begins the cutoff requiring withdrawal from Vietnam and Laos, effective December 31, and concluding with all forces out by June 30, 1971—unless a joint and specific declaration by the President and Congress can demonstrate the need for a specific, publicly recorded reason for an extension of time. In addition to permitting funds for the safe and systematic withdrawal of our forces, it permits funds to arrange for the exchange of prisoners and for asylum in friendly countries for Vietnamese who might feel threatened by our withdrawal.29 Let us not talk about Nixon’s war or Johnson’s war or the Pentagon’s war of the CIA’s war. Let us take hold of this war as citizens and as elected representatives and let us vote to end it.30 The historic action taken by Senator McGovern showed members of the Democratic Party and those opposed to the Democrats in general that new leadership was taking over. No longer was Senator McGovern going to hope that the policy in Vietnam would change. Speeches were over and now, as in 1964 with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Senators could show where they stood on this historical vote. Before the final was taken on September 1, 1970, Senator McGovern gave one of the most passionate and heartfelt speeches every given on

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the Senate f loor as he desperately tried to convince his Senate colleagues to vote for the McGovern-Hatfield amendment: Every senator in this chamber is partly responsible for sending 50,000 young Americans to an early grave. This chamber reeks of blood. Every Senator here is partly responsible for that human wreckage at Walter Reed and Bethesda Naval and all across our land—young men without legs, or arms, or genitals, or faces or hopes. There are not very many of these blasted and broken boys who think this war is a glorious adventure. Do not talk to them about bugging out, or national honor or courage. It does not take any courage at all for a congressman, or a senator, or a president to wrap himself in the f lag and say we are staying in Vietnam, because it is not our blood that is being shed. But we are responsible for those young men and their lives and their hopes. And if we do not end this damnable war those young men will some day curse us for our pitiful willingness to let the Executive carry the burden that the Constitution places on us. So before we vote, let us ponder the admonition of Edmund Burke, the great parliamentarian of an earlier day: “A contentious man would be cautious how he dealt in blood.”31 The final vote was taken on the McGovern-Hatfield amendment on September 1, 1970. Although the amendment failed—fifty-five voting against and thirty-nine for with seven Republicans voting in the affirmative along with thirty-two Democrats (mainly Midwestern and Northern Democrats)32—having thirty-nine senators vote for U.S. involvement in Vietnam to end was a victory in itself. Among those who voted for the McGovern-Hatfield amendment were Senators Edward Kennedy (D-Mass), William J. Fulbright (D-Ark), and the two Republican senators from New York Charles Goodell and Jacob Javits. Among those who voiced opposition to the McGovern-Hatfield amendment was Senator Robert Dole (R-KS), a friend of Senator McGovern’s. Time magazine published the anguish Senator McGovern and the other Senate “doves” were feeling with the defeat of his and Senator Hatfield’s amendment. Here is what Time wrote after the vote: A prevailing argument was voiced by Kansas Republican Robert Dole, who dismissed the measure as “a shallow appeal to the emotions and anxieties of good Americans, who are weary of seven

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years of war.” He contended that the Senate ought to express its confidence that President Nixon was moving toward “peace with honor, rather than retreat and defeat.” Some antiwar critics of the Administration cast negative votes in the belief that a withdrawal deadline would hinder rather than help peace negotiations. The defeat of the amendment cleared the way for easy Senate passage of a $19.2 billion military procurement authorization bill.33 The vote on the McGovern-Hatfield amendment showed once again the power that lay within the Democratic Party of the southern bloc of Senate Democrats. The doves in the Senate rested heavily on the Eastern and Midwestern Democrats as the south was becoming less appealing for Democrats in general because of this region’s strong support of the Vietnam War and dislike of the desegregation policies of the liberals. This sectionalism would come to fruition in ten years after the November 1980 elections. Senator McGovern’s passion to end the Vietnam War, with a still growing minority, would reach new heights in January 1971. Senator McGovern announced he was a candidate for the nomination of the Democratic Party for president of the United States. Here is Senator McGovern at Sioux Falls, South Dakota, on January 18, 1971: Today I announce my candidacy for the presidency of the United States. My wife, Eleanor and I have come home to South Dakota to make this announcement because here we shaped our basic political faith; here we were given the opportunity of public service. We are grateful to you for that opportunity and for your faith. We shall conduct this new effort to the honor of South Dakota, the nation, and ourselves. You, my fellow South Dakotans, have not always agreed with my position on public issues. That was especially true in the early 1960’s when I stood almost alone in opposition to the sending of American troops to Southeast Asia. Despite these differences, you have rewarded my willingness to state my convictions freely and honestly. I anticipate the same fair hearing from citizens across the land. Thoughtful Americans understand that the highest patriotism is not a blind acceptance of official policy, but a love of one’s country deep enough to call her to a higher standard. I seek the presidency because I believe deeply in the American promise and can no longer accept the diminishing of that promise. Our country began with a declaration of man’s rights to “life,

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liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” These liberating ideals gave such meaning and purpose to the new American nation that our forebears proclaimed, “We mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our Sacred honor.” But today, our citizens no longer feel that they can shape their own lives in concert with their fellow citizens. Beyond that is the loss of confidence in the truthfulness and common sense of our leaders. The most painful new phrase in the American political vocabulary is “credibility gap”—the gap between rhetoric and reality. Put bluntly it means that people no longer believe what their leaders tell them. Later in his speech, Senator McGovern once again remarked on the importance of pulling the United States out of Vietnam: But while our problems are great, certain steps can be taken to recover the confidence of the nation. The greatness of our nation is not confined to the past, but beckons us to the future. What other steps to future greatness? First, we must have the courage to admit that however sincere our motives, we made a dreadful mistake in trying to settle the affairs of the Vietnamese people with American troops and bombers. I have opposed that intervention from the beginning, while our President and other presidential prospects were supporting it. There is now no way to end it or to free our prisoners except to announce a definite, early date for the withdrawal of every of American soldier. I make that pledge without reservation. The tragedy of Vietnam does not mean that we are without vital interests abroad. Ironically, our obsession with Saigon has led to the neglect of such truly essential interests as the goodwill of Latin America, the survival of Israel and peace in the Middle East, and the opening of relations with China where one-third of the human race resides. We are not likely to meet our responsibilities either at home or abroad until we remove the Southeast Asia albatross from our necks. This is the first order of business.34 Although Senator McGovern had been nominated at the 1968 Democratic convention, headed the reform efforts of the Democratic Party and was admired by many Democrats, he was entering Democratic

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presidential primaries with little name recognition among many of the “establishment” Democrats. At the time of his announcement, a Gallup poll showed Senator McGovern in the single digits among registered Democrats as to their preference to be the presidential nominee. By May 1971 the Gallup poll would show the following uphill climb for Senator McGovern: Edward Kennedy at 29 percent, Senator Edmund Muskie at 21 percent, former vice president Hubert Humphrey at 18 percent, Senator George McGovern at 5 percent, mayor of New York City John Lindsay at 4 percent, and former senator Eugene McCarthy at 3 percent.35 Although Senator McGovern was very far behind in the polls, the one advantage he had was the reforms that he helped to implement within the McGovern-Fraser Commission. The delegate selection process would now be based on primary results not state “bosses” choosing their own slate of delegates for a handpicked candidate (i.e., Hubert Humphrey in 1968). Another advantage (albeit for tragic reasons) for Senator McGovern was that Senator Edward Kennedy’s presidential ambitions had been hurt by the accident at Chappaquiddick almost two years earlier that cost the life of a young former worker for Bobby Kennedy’s 1968 campaign Mary Jo Kepechne. And Hubert Humphrey was still trying to detach himself with the debacle of the 1968 Chicago convention and subsequent loss to Richard Nixon. In hindsight, as one examines Senator McGovern’s chances to receive the Democratic nomination in 1972, they were not as dire as was being predicted back in January 1971. The McGovern-Fraser Commission had opened up the Democratic Primaries to a more varied constituent that no longer was tied to the party “old guard.” In his excellent book The Liberals’ Moment (2007), Bruce Miroff discusses some of the results of McGovern’s efforts to reform the Democratic Party: Many of the McGovern-Fraser Commission guidelines that were adopted by the party for 1972 worked in the direction of an open party. They urged the elimination of fees to make it possible for low-income Democrats to serve as delegates. They banned proxy voting and the unit rule to prevent party leaders from controlling caucuses and conventions. They required that delegates be chosen in the calendar year of the national convention, that there be “adequate public notice” of meetings that picked delegates, that slate-making be done in public view, and that state parties “extend to the process of nominating delegates all guarantees of full and meaningful opportunity to participate.”36

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Miroff continued: The most disputed McGovern-Fraser reforms were not these guidelines about participation, one of the chief themes of 1960s liberalism, but additional ones about another of its trademark concerns: equality for groups previously excluded from political power. African Americans were the initial target for affirmative action, but the commission quickly broadened its focus to include women and young people as well. Compared to their proportions in the population, all three of these groups were underrepresented at the Democrats’ 1968 convention: only 6 percent of delegates that year were black, 14 percent were female, and 2 percent were under the age of thirty. Miroff then concluded: There is little question that the McGovern-Fraser reforms were essential to McGovern’s success in 1972. An insurgent like McGovern could not have won under the old rules of nomination politics in the Democratic Party. An increase in primaries and in open caucuses and conventions substantially expanded the number of rank-and-file participants for 1972.37 By August 1971, the Gallup poll showed little, if any, upward swing for Senator McGovern: Senators Edmund Muskie and Edward Kennedy were now both at 22 percent, Hubert Humphrey was still at 18 percent, Senator McGovern at 6 percent, John Lindsay at 3 percent, Senator Birch Bayh at 2 percent, and Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson at 1 percent.38 The odds were not good for Senator McGovern by the end of 1971. However, the political team he would assemble would transform him from a potential “also-ran” to a powerful player in a new age of politics that he helped to reform. The “establishment” of the Democratic Party for many years controlled numerous facets of the political system, but this would be crushed by the oncoming “McGovern Army.” A new generation of voters in the Democratic Party would now have a voice that spoke to their cause; a leader in Senator McGovern who opposed a war that many young voters had to face either through being drafted to fight, losing a close friend or relative, or just being opposed to its continuation. Senator McGovern had stepped in to replace the man so many young voters, Hispanics, and African Americans had

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loved in Robert Kennedy. Finally, Senator McGovern was the person who helped to lead reform of a party that excluded so many of the cares of these young, diverse voters. No longer would “back room” deals decide the nominee; the grassroots politics had first been used by the “Conservative Army” of Senator Barry Goldwater some eight years earlier. Now Senator McGovern would take a page from the conservative playbook and wear down the opponent with a ground game unmatched by anything seen before 1972.

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CH A P T E R

E L E V E N

The Campaign for President of the United States, 1972

There has been over thirty-five years of analysis, commentary, and ref lection on the landslide loss of Senator McGovern in the 1972 presidential race against President Nixon. Nothing anyone can say will change the outcome. Therefore, examining the leadership role Senator McGovern took on as the eventual Democratic Party nominee will be put to the forefront as well as the shift in foreign policy thinking. The shifting of the Democratic Party’s paradigm came incrementally to the movement led by Senator McGovern as did the conservative movement under Senator Goldwater in the early 1960s. These incremental steps, for both sides of the political spectrum, were due to a decade of ideological ambiguity. Some may argue that a paradigm shift in the United States will occur only when there is a catastrophic disaster such as the Great Depression or perhaps in foreign policy after the communist takeover of Eastern Europe. The paradigm shift led by Senator McGovern was due to the foreign policy in Vietnam and a war he and his liberal allies were trying to stop. The leadership role that Senator McGovern attained within the Democratic Party came from his appointment to lead the Food for Peace program under President John F. Kennedy; his opposition to the Vietnam War and a president from his own party Lyndon Johnson in 1965; his willingness to be nominated in place of the assassinated Robert Kennedy at the 1968 Democratic convention, and to his announced candidacy for president in 1971. These have all been well documented. Now, the ideological shift of the Democratic Party would enter its final

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phase as the candidates lined themselves up at a chance to run against President Richard Nixon. The list of announced candidates by the end of January 1972 besides Senator McGovern included: Governor George Wallace of Alabama, Hubert Humphrey, Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine (Humphrey’s running mate in 1968), Congresswomen Shirley Chisholm of New York (first major-party African American to run for president), Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson of Washington, former senator Eugene McCarthy, mayor of Los Angeles Sam Yorty, and mayor of New York City, and former Republican John V. Lindsay. Later candidates would put their name in selective primaries including former governor of North Carolina Terry Sanford, Arkansas Congressman Wilbur Mills, and Senator Vance Hartke of Indiana. The front-runner for the 1972 Democratic nomination was Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine, who also was the former running mate of Hubert Humphrey in 1968. With the New Hampshire primary to be held on March 7, 1972, the McGovern campaign was still f loundering in the Gallup poll in January 1972 at 3 percent as compared to Muskie’s 32 percent followed by Ted Kennedy at 27 percent, and Humphrey, almost unchanged in six months, at 17 percent.1 However, the quick demise of the Muskie candidacy in the snows of New Hampshire amid alleged tears prior to that state’s primary doomed his presidential hopes. Muskie was still able to win New Hampshire over Senator McGovern, but the 46 percent to 37 percent victory was seen as a “psychological” win for “McGovern’s Army” that had hit the snows of New Hampshire on foot and outf lanked the traditional campaign of Muskie. The campaign of Senator McGovern was not without its legion of politically savvy leaders with a blend of veterans and political newcomers destined for career longevity. The most notable veteran was Frank Mankiewicz, who was Robert Kennedy’s press secretary for his campaign in 1968 and had the unfathomable job of announcing to the world the death of Bobby Kennedy. Along with Mankiewicz was Ted Van Dyke former staff member and key speech writer for Vice President Humphrey. Perhaps the most well-known name of all the McGovern staff was Gary Hart, who was named campaign manager alongside of Mankiewicz. Gary Hart would go on to win a Senate seat in Colorado in 1974. Ironically Hart would run against Senator McGovern in 1984 for the Democratic nomination for president and then for a brief time in 1987, as the original front-runner, before dropping out (and then later back in) because of an extramarital affair.

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The grassroots organization, which some today still point to as the best ever developed, was credited to Gene Pokorny and Joe Grandmaison. Pokorny was the architect of the Wisconsin primary win and Grandmaison mobilized the all important New Hampshire “surprise.” And finally, with just as important a role in the grassroots campaign, to be known as “McGovern’s Army,” Rick Stearns was “only twenty-six at the time, but he understood the nature of the emerging electoral game in the Democratic Party better than anyone else in the country ... Stearns gave the McGovern campaign a vital edge by his mastery of the new rules.”2 And in Stearns’ own words Hubert Humphrey and Edmund Muskie were trying to play by the old party standards: “Endorsements had mattered previously because large numbers of delegates were simply being hand-selected by the very people whose endorsement political leaders sought.” But as Stearns points out 1972 was different because of the McGovern-Fraser reforms: “What you were looking at now was a selection system that was actually open and f luid.”3 For Stearns it was all about the candidate that could “turn out activists for the primaries and caucuses.” There are many others who played vital roles in Senator McGovern’s campaign in 1972 that also deserve mention including Marcia Johnston, the first director of the McGovern volunteers.4 So many men and women who had never been active in politics before had enthusiastically enlisted in the cause Senator McGovern was espousing. Men and women who had worked with previous candidates including Senator Robert Kennedy, Eugene McCarthy, and Vice President Humphrey were now following the leadership of Senator George McGovern. And to the credit of these men and women, many of these grassroots organizers came to Senator McGovern when he was only at 3–6 percent in the preference polls for the Democratic contenders. To say the 1972 Democratic field featured a very diverse group of candidates is an understatement. From the first African American and woman (Shirley Chisholm), a former Republican mayor of New York ( John Lindsay), a former vice president (Hubert Humphrey), a former vice presidential nominee (Edmund Muskie), and a segregationist governor (George Wallace). But for Senator McGovern, both political fortune and a solid campaign strategy would end up grinding down the field to the last “old style” liberal and his friend Hubert Humphrey was left standing. And his friend would end up damaging Senator McGovern in the California primary debate even more than Nixon’s CREEP (Committee to Reelect the President).

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Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

Presidential primaries can make the eventual nominee arrive at their convention strong and determined from the healthy debate between candidates or they can leave a candidate on the defensive all the way through the fall campaign against the opposing party nominee. Unfortunately, for Senator McGovern the latter was his destiny. Senator McGovern had taken the grassroots campaign to key strategic primaries and outf lanked his opponents before they even knew what happened. The Iowa caucuses on January 24, 1972, brought credibility to the McGovern campaign as Senator McGovern gathered 23 percent of the vote to Senator Edmund Muskie’s 36 percent. The New Hampshire results, as mentioned earlier, made Senator McGovern a major player for the nomination. Florida and Illinois were two primaries not strategically important for the young McGovern staff; instead Gene Pokorny had rolled out McGovern’s Army into Wisconsin making that a must win for Senator McGovern. The gamble paid off with Senator McGovern winning 30 percent of the vote to a surprise second finish with 22 percent by Governor George Wallace followed by Vice President Humphrey with 21 percent, and a disappointing fourth place finish by former front-runner Senator Muskie. By the time Muskie and Humphrey figured out that Senator McGovern’s campaign was like no other in the annals of political warfare after Wisconsin, McGovern’s Army was already set-up in Massachusetts where on April 25 Senator McGovern had his most impressive victory with 53 percent of the vote followed by nearest neighbor Senator Muskie with 21 percent. As Muskie was no longer a threat to win the nomination (although every single delegate was vital) by early May Hubert Humphrey had scored wins in Pennsylvania, Indiana, Ohio, and West Virginia. All this was leading up to an all important primary in California where 271 delegates were the cherished prize. Also, on the same day as the California primary, New Jersey, New Mexico, and South Dakota were all holding their primaries. June 6, 1972, would decide the direction of the Democratic Party. Would it be the “New Politics” as Senator McGovern envisioned or would it be the “Old Politics” represented (whether or not he liked the label) by Vice President Humphrey? Senator McGovern’s main theme throughout the primaries was his pledge to end the Vietnam War by pulling American forces out and to bring them home. This issue was still solid for McGovern, but it was not the famous “Acid, Amnesty and Abortion” that put doubts into the middle class voter’s mind; it was Welfare, Defense, and Busing. Senator McGovern was attacked on all three issues at the California

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debate by rival Hubert Humphrey. However, Humphrey went after Senator McGovern first on his biggest asset among Democrats—his pledge to end the war in Vietnam. Senator McGovern had always positioned himself as “Right from the Start” on the question of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, but this was not how Hubert Humphrey saw it: “I believe that Senator McGovern, while having a very catchy phrase ... ‘McGovern Right from the Start,’ that there are many times you will find that it was not right from the start, but wrong from the start. We were both wrong on Vietnam.”5 Humphrey would continue his verbal assault on Senator McGovern’s position on defense spending, which was vital for the economy of California: Senator McGovern says, halt the Minute Man procurement, halt the Poseidon procurement, halt the B-1 Prototype. Phase out 230 of our 530 strategic bombers. Reduce aircraft carrier force from 15 to 6. Reduce our naval air squadrons to 80 percent. Halt all naval surface shipbuilding. Reduce the number of cruisers from 230 to 130. Reduce the number of submarines by 11 ... When you ... reduce the total number of forces 66,000 below what we had pre-Pearl Harbor, you are not talking about just removing waste ... you are cutting into the very fiber and the muscle of the defense establishment.6 Finally and perhaps the most puzzling and controversial proposal of any by Senator McGovern during the 1972 campaign was the onethousand dollar “give away” to each person in the United States as a way to end welfare. Senator McGovern’s proposal was captured by Time magazine back in June 1972 this way: McGovern’s basic idea is to replace the present inefficient, bureaucratic welfare programs with direct federal “grants” for everyone, from billionaires to newborn ghetto babies. Actually, millions of people would never see the money; the grants would be only phantom figures on their tax statements. At first, the Senator set the grants at $1,000 per person per year, but only the very poor would get that much. The grants would be taxed, and taxpayers would lose their present $750 personal exemptions, with the result that most people would have at least part of their $1,000 grant eaten up by higher taxes. After this complex tax jiggling, McGovern’s initial estimates were that a family of four with an

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Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

income of $8,000 would collect $2,000 from the Government. A family with a $12,000 income would collect nothing. Families earning more than $12,000 would suffer progressively more severe tax increases.7 These “Demogrants” as they would become known would soon end as a basic part of the McGovern economic plan by August of the 1972 campaign due to the McGovern campaign’s own confusion over the cost and how the plan would be paid for: Subsequently, McGovern has hinted that the grants might be reduced. He has said that fixing on $1,000 “may have been a mistake.” The grants could not be cut too much without keeping some of the poor in poverty, but they might, for example, be lowered below $1,000 per person in large families. In any case, McGovern has yet to prove that he can devise a plan that will accomplish his goals without forcing unacceptable tax increases, especially for the middle class.8 Senator McGovern had been hit the hardest by Humphrey during the primaries as George Wallace appealed to many more moderateconservative Democrats not only in the southern states (Wallace won Florida with 41 percent of the vote), but, to the surprise of many, in northern states such as Michigan where he won and Wisconsin where he came in a strong second. The tragic assassination attempt on Wallace on May 15, 1972, in Laurel, Maryland, by Arthur Bremer left Wallace paralyzed for life and his conservative movement paralyzed as well. Wallace’s conservative message of tough on crime and anti-busing appealed to many Democrats who did not like the liberalism of Senator McGovern, but who also did not like President Nixon. The feeling of many Democrats over insecurity and violence was reinforced in a survey done for Time after the Michigan and Maryland primaries: 66% of voters interviewed at the polls said that crime and violence was one of the primary issues of the campaign—which may have been in part a ref lection of the Wallace shooting the afternoon before. The poll also disclosed that, as seemed to be the case in Maryland, there were few voters who switched to Wallace in sympathy over the shooting. Reports TIME Correspondent Gregory Wierzynski: “Interviews with Wallace voters left me

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with the impression that the man had grown into something much bigger than the regional candidate he was in Wisconsin. An impressive number of people expressed genuine admiration, almost reverence, for Wallace.”9 With Wallace effectively out of the 1972 race, many of his voters, dissatisfied with the liberal senators McGovern and Humphrey had nowhere to go but for Nixon. Is there anything Senator McGovern could have done to keep a majority of the Wallace voters in the Democratic column going into the Democratic Convention in Miami from July 10 to 13? The answer to this question is a most emphatic—probably not. The Wallace voters were conservative in their views on Vietnam, believing it was still patriotic to serve the country; they were for strict enforcement of the law and were against forced busing by the federal government. On all these issues Senator McGovern was seen as weak and on the wrong side. First on Vietnam, it was not that the Wallace voters questioned Senator McGovern’s patriotism, but his proposal to give amnesty to men who dodged the draft. Second, it was not that Wallace voters saw Senator McGovern as a lawless instigator, but it was the images of Chicago in 1968 and Senator McGovern’s followers looking like “hippies.” And finally, nowhere was forced segregation more hated than in the South. Senator McGovern’s stand for forced busing was perhaps the ultimate shove Wallace voters needed to go with President Nixon in 1972. By the time of the convention in July, there was a “Stop McGovern” movement organized mostly from Senators Humphrey, Henry “Scoop” Jackson, and Edmund Muskie along with George Wallace. As with Senator Goldwater eight years earlier, before the Republican convention, some party leaders and delegates did not want the change in direction both Senator Goldwater and now Senator McGovern were leading. The only way Senator McGovern could be stopped would be if the 271 delegates won by Senator McGovern after the California primary were divided up between McGovern and Humphrey. Here is a chronology of this important challenge to the winner-take-all process in California’s primary:10 June 6—George McGovern defeats Hubert Humphrey in the winnertake-all California Democratic primary, 44 percent to Humphrey’s 39. In the process, McGovern wins all of the state’s 271 delegates. June 29—The convention credentials committee, meeting in Washington, D.C., votes 72-66 to strip McGovern of all but 120

182

Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

of his California delegates. “Stop McGovern” forces argue that winner-take-all violates the Democrats’ new ban on the unit rule, as well as the spirit if the not the letter of new reform rules favoring proportionality in delegate selection. The McGovern campaign argues fairness—that the rules of the game should not be changed after the event has taken place. July 5—The McGovern campaign launches a legal challenge against the decision that quickly makes its way through the judicial system. McGovern wins at the appeals level but the decision is overturned by the Supreme Court, which rules that the courts should not involve themselves in a “political” matter. July 9—Convention chair Larry O’Brien (also the chairman of the Democratic National Committee) issues a list of parliamentary guidelines that he will use in officiating credentials challenges. His key decisions tend to favor the McGovern campaign. July 10—Opening night of the convention: McGovern forces win the California challenge, 1,618.28 to 1,238.22. In the process, he wins back the 151 delegates that had been stripped by the credentials committee, clearing the way for his nomination two nights later. The elation of winning the credential challenge was short-lived as Senator McGovern and his key staff members did not have much time to consider his choice to be the Democratic nominee for vice president. Unfortunately, for Senator McGovern and his staff, this would be the critical moment of the campaign. The Eagleton affair, as it would become known, would also change the way vice presidential candidates were chosen along with other cabinet members. Senator McGovern had gathered with his top advisors to discuss who would be a good choice as his running mate. Senator Ted Kennedy, whom Senator McGovern really wanted as a running mate, told Senator McGovern himself he was out of the running. Other names f loated were: Kevin White, mayor of Boston, Sargent Shriver, Senator Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut, Governor Patrick J. Lucey and Senator Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin, and Senator Thomas F. Eagleton of Missouri.11 After lengthy discussions and with time running out before the deadline to get the legal nominating petitions needed for filing, the choice of Senator Thomas Francis Eagleton was made without any real “vetting process” that is so standard in today’s politics. Senator Eagleton had been recommended by Senator Gaylord Nelson, a friend of Senator McGovern’s. Once the decision was made to go with Senator Eagleton

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the Democratic Party looked united and ready to focus on their main target—President Nixon. However, within three weeks, perceived unity led into disarray for both Senators McGovern and Eagleton. The leadership shown by Senator McGovern for more than two decades in the Democratic Party and as a bomber pilot during World War II is well documented. However, the strange events that led to Senator McGovern giving his acceptance speech to not only fellow Democrats, but to the country at 2:30 a.m. shows today how leadership cannot stop for a break. The actual nominating process for the vice presidency has become legendary and sadly, the only word to describe the process was comical. Placed in nomination were not only Thomas Eagleton but Mickey Mouse, but Archie Bunker and Mao Zedong as well. Unfortunately, lost in the open process at the 1972 convention was the most important moment of Senator McGovern’s life—the always anticipated candidate’s acceptance speech. Although Senator McGovern’s acceptance speech has not been ranked as one of the great political speeches in the history of American politics such as Senator Barry Goldwater’s in 1964, perhaps it should be examined once again. Senator McGovern attempts to capture the innocence he grew up with in the prairies of the Dakotas from the very outset of his speech: My nomination is all the more precious and that it is a gift of the most open political process in all of our political history. It is the sweet harvest of the work of tens of thousands of tireless volunteers, young and old alike, funded by literally hundreds of thousands of small contributors in every part of this nation. Those who lingered on the brink of despair only a short time ago have been brought into this campaign, heart, hand, head and soul, and I have been the beneficiary of the most remarkable political organization in the history of this country. I believe that American politics will never be quite the same again. We are entering a new period of important and hopeful change in America, a period comparable to those eras that unleashed such remarkable ferment in the period of Jefferson and Jackson and Roosevelt. Let the opposition collect their $10 million in secret money from the privileged few and let us find one million ordinary Americans who will contribute $25 each to this campaign, a Million Member Club with members who will not expect special favors for themselves but a better land for us all.

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Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

In the literature and music of our children we are told, to everything there is a season and a time to every purpose under heaven. And for America, the time has come at last. This is the time for truth, not falsehood. In a Democratic nation, no one likes to say that his inspiration came from secret arrangements by closed doors, but in the sense that is how my candidacy began. I am here as your candidate tonight in large part because during four administrations of both parties, a terrible war has been chartered behind closed doors. I want those doors opened and I want that war closed. And I make these pledges above all others: the doors of government will be opened, and that war will be closed. Truth is a habit of integrity, not a strategy of politics, and if we nurture the habit of truth in this campaign, we will continue to be truthful once we are in the White House. So join with me in this campaign. Lend Senator Eagleton and me your strength and your support, and together we will call America home to the ideals that nourished us from the beginning. From secrecy and deception in high places; come home, America. From military spending so wasteful that it weakens our nation; come home, America. From the entrenchment of special privileges in tax favoritism; from the waste of idle lands to the joy of useful labor; from the prejudice based on race and sex; from the loneliness of the aging poor and the despair of the neglected sick—come home, America. Come home to the affirmation that we have a dream. Come home to the conviction that we can move our country forward. Come home to the belief that we can seek a newer world, and let us be joyful in that homecoming, for this is your land, this land is my land—from California to New York island, from the redwood forest to the gulf stream waters—this land was made for you and me.12 The one line in Senator McGovern’s speech that can be said to be undeniably correct was that American politics would never be the same. Also, Senator McGovern’s prelude to the “10 million in secret money from the privileged few” the Nixon campaign had received was an ominous sign of what lay ahead for the country when the Watergate scandal would finally be exposed. Senator McGovern had a strong hand in changing the Democratic Party as chairman of the reform committee; his primary campaign would increase the importance of grassroots

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organization and the process of choosing a vice presidential nominee would undergo much more scrutiny (albeit the latter is the one Senator McGovern would wish was not attributed to him). Within days of his nomination speech, the McGovern campaign would take a hit like no other campaign before it. McGovern’s Army would now be in full retreat as revelations of Senator Eagleton’s depression and subsequent shock treatments would be the lead in every newspaper across the country. At first Senator McGovern backed Senator Eagleton and even went as far as to make the now famous and politically destructive comment that he backed Tom Eagleton 1,000 percent. Of course there are varying accounts of who told what to whom and when even some thirty-five years after the Eagleton affair. Here is Senator McGovern in 2008: “Today, 2008, people have a much better understanding of mental illness and especially depression than they did 36 years ago. I didn’t know much about it myself,” McGovern says. “Abraham Lincoln struggled with it most of his adult life. At one time he said, ‘I’m the most miserable man.’ Another time he talked about being ‘the saddest man on the planet.’ And so ... before we made a final decision on Sen. Eagleton, if we had known about his history of illness, we would have had time to talk to the doctors, talk to the psychiatrist, talk more to Sen. Eagleton than we did.”13 One of the ironies of the Eagleton affair was disclosed in 2007 by columnist Robert Novak on Meet the Press. Novak said that the “unnamed” Senator who talked negatively about Senator McGovern after his win in Massachusetts on April 25, 1972, was Senator Tom Eagleton: Novak quoted the following from “Senator X” in his Evans & Novak column: “The people don’t know McGovern is for amnesty, abortion and legalization of pot,’ he told us. When ‘middle America—Catholic middle America, in particular’—once they find out, ‘he’s dead.’ A lot of people said I made it up,” Novak said. “I said I’d reveal it when the person dies.” “Senator X” turns out to have been Tom Eagleton, who was at one point George McGovern’s vice presidential pick before resigning from the ticket after it was revealed that he was undergoing electro-shock treatment to treat depression. Novak labeled McGovern the Triple-A candidate—supporting amnesty, abortion, and acid.14

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Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

After Senator Eagleton withdrew his name from the McGovern ticket on August 1, 1972, a replacement had to be found and rather quickly. Senator McGovern decided on Sargent Shriver, brother-in-law to the Kennedy brothers and former director of the Peace Corps. And as good as a candidate Shriver was to Senator McGovern throughout the rest of the campaign, the Eagleton fiasco was an event the McGovern campaign never could recover. As with Senator Goldwater, would another candidate for vice president have made a difference in terms of Senator McGovern’s landslide loss? Most political experts do believe that the Eagleton choice could have helped McGovern in a few more states had Senator Eagleton not had a past of mental depression and because of his Catholic, blue collar, middle class background. One of these political experts was Democratic consultant Robert Shrum. When speaking on the same Meet the Press episode with Robert Novak where Novak revealed Senator Eagleton was the source of the infamous McGovern triple-A comment, Shrum was very candid: “Boy, do I wish he would have let you publish his name. Then he never would have been picked as vice president,” said Shrum. Because the two things, the two things that happened to George McGovern—two of the things that happened to him—were the label you put on him, number one, and number two, the Eagleton disaster. We had a messy convention, but he could have, I think in the end, carried eight or 10 states, remained politically viable. And Eagleton was one of the great train wrecks of all time.15 If Senator Gaylord Nelson from Wisconsin had accepted Senator McGovern’s offer as his choice for the second slot, this could have made a difference in his home state and neighboring Minnesota, both states Senator McGovern did fairly well in considering his numbers in most other states. The 1972 presidential election will always be remembered more for the actions of Senator McGovern than the campaign of President Nixon. The details of President Nixon’s CREEP (Committee to Reelect the President) will not be explored here, but the importance of this operation along with “All the President’s Men” cannot be overstated. And as strange as the Democratic convention may have been, the Nixon White House’s behavior against Senator McGovern and the rest of the Democratic field prior to and during the primaries was equally ridiculous and shockingly disturbing.

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The Nixon campaign would say as little as possible and always have Nixon stay “Presidential.” Robert Dallek describes the Nixon strategy: In June, White House aides Pat Buchanan and Ken Khachigian prepared an “Assault Book,” which included enough McGovern statements, positions, votes not only to defeat the South Dakota Radical—but to have him indicted by a Grand Jury ... Nixon thought that McGovern was vulnerable to attack as “fanatical, dedicated leftist extremist.” He favored “peace-at-any-price” and would be the architect of “a second-rate United States.”16 Nixon spoke to many of these talking points during his acceptance speech at the Republican Convention on August 23, 1972, at the Miami Convention Center:17 Six weeks ago our opponents at their convention rejected many of the great principles of the Democratic Party. To those millions who have been driven out of their home in the Democratic Party, we say come home. We say come home not to another party, but we say come home to the great principles we Americans believe in together. The proposal that they have made to pay $1,000 to every person in America insults the intelligence of the American voters. Because you know that every politician’s promise has a price—the taxpayer pays the bill. The American people are not going to be taken in by any scheme where Government gives money with one hand and then takes it away with the other. And finally President Nixon takes aim at Senator McGovern and his policy in Vietnam concerning “draft dodgers”: Now in discussing Vietnam, I have noted that in this election year there has been a great deal of talk about providing amnesty for those few hundred Americans who chose to desert their country rather than to serve it in Vietnam. I think it is time that we put the emphasis where it belongs. The real heroes are 2 1/2 million young Americans who chose to serve their country rather than desert it. I say to you tonight, in these times when there is so much of a tendency to run down those who have served America in the past and who serve it today, let us give those who serve in our

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Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

Armed Forces and those who have served in Vietnam the honor and the respect that they deserve and that they have earned. The charges that Senator McGovern was an out-of-touch extremist that was going to take America down a street filled with marijuana smoking, draft dodging, welfare queens took its toll. Even former president Lyndon Johnson said he could not support a McGovern presidency and told Alexander Haig that “as a lifetime Democrat, he could not vote Republican but he would not vote Democratic either.”18 Along with former president Johnson, the major unions were not endorsing a McGovern candidacy either. In fact, the Teamsters union, the longtime Democrat Party ally, endorsed President Nixon, only one of three unions to do so. After Senator McGovern chose Tom Eagleton as his running mate Democratic senator Gaylord Nelson tried to get his union friend I.W. Abel, president of the Steelworkers to endorse Senator McGovern. Senator Nelson ran into stiff opposition: Nelson called Steelworkers President I. W. Abel, whom he considered a “good, intelligent, thoughtful labor leader,” and made a pitch for a McGovern endorsement, saying, “he’s got as good a record as I do.” Abel snapped back, “Don’t demean yourself.” Abel and his AFL-CIO brethren were upset with McGovern on three counts—his early opposition to the Vietnam War, which many unions, especially the building trades, supported; a vote he had cast against the AFL-CIO six years earlier on an antiunion provision of the Taft-Hartley Act; and the fact that the reform commission he headed had replaced many union delegates to the national convention with bearded hippies, women’s libbers, and kooks, in the hard hats’ view. Nelson and other Democrats with good labor credentials could not budge the AFL-CIO, which remained neutral.19 Many of the unions decided to sit this presidential election out and not endorse either candidate—a slap in the face to Senator McGovern. A few years after the 1972 election, house speaker Thomas “Tip” O’Neill was no fan of Senator McGovern either and ref lected on his nomination: To my great disappointment, our party had just nominated George McGovern. I had gone down there as a big supporter of Senator Ed Muskie, but by then poor Ed didn’t stand a chance. Personally, I

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thought McGovern’s nomination was a disaster. I tried not to show it, but when the press asked me what had happened to Muskie, I couldn’t resist saying, “We got beat by the cast of Hair.” O’Neill continued I had known McGovern a little during his two terms in the House in the late 1950s, before he was elected to the Senate. As a member of Congress, he used to stand in the back of the House chamber, and he didn’t participate much. Frankly, I never expected him to go any further in politics, and I was absolutely shocked when the young people picked him as their champion. While I respected his strong position against the Vietnam War, I didn’t think he had much of a record to run on.20 The Acid, Amnesty, and Abortion label was another variable that Senator McGovern was not successful in def lating. Senator McGovern once again explained his position on those three issues some thirty-five years later to author Bill Kauffman: As for acid, amnesty, and abortion, McGovern’s positions now seem positively temperate: he favored decriminalizing marijuana; he argued against “the intrusion of the federal government” into the abortion law, which should be left to the states; and, as he told me, “I couldn’t favor amnesty as long as the war was in progress, but once it was over I’d grant amnesty both to those who planned the war and those who refused to participate. I think that’s a somewhat conservative position.”21 The Vietnam War was Senator McGovern’s single most important issue in the Democratic Party primaries. His honesty and integrity were his most important personal qualities going into the general election with President Nixon. As the Eagleton affair unfolded and Senator McGovern seemed very indecisive as to what he wanted to do, his credibility was hurt. President Nixon was talking “peace with honor” in Vietnam while the economy was holding steady, both issues that the middle class could accept. Today many still look to all the pre- and post-convention problems as brought on by Senator McGovern himself. In fact, the convention fight over the 271 delegates from California was brought on by members of his own party. The anti-McGovern forces of Humphrey,

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Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

Muskie, Jackson, and Wallace did as much harm to the McGovern candidacy as any miscue the McGovern organization did to itself. The weeks spent by Senator McGovern and his advisors fighting to hold on to these 271 delegates ran all the way to the last day of the convention. The time that had to be spent with the delegate fight could have been spent vetting potential vice presidential candidates, organizing the convention in order that a 2:30 a.m. convention speech would never have happened allowing Senator McGovern to come out of the convention with momentum and the look of a well-disciplined candidate. On November 7, 1972, Senator McGovern would end up losing every state to President Richard Nixon except for Massachusetts and the District of Columbia giving the Electoral College a total of 520 for President Nixon and 17 for Senator McGovern (one electorate from Virginia cast its vote for Joseph Hospers of the Libertarian party instead of for Nixon). President Richard Nixon won the popular vote in the third largest landslide in the history of presidential elections with 47,169,911 (60.7 percent) and 29,170,383 (37.5 percent) for Senator George McGovern. Even more astonishing besides the popular vote and electoral college trouncing was the number of counties won by President Nixon compared to Senator McGovern (figures 11.1 and 11.2). This is more compelling when one actually looks at the county map and compares it to 1976 presidential election with Jimmy Carter and then president Gerald Ford. Senator McGovern’s defeat was undeniably disastrous. The one lone bright spot for Senator McGovern and his Democratic Party was that they actually ended up gaining two more Senate seats while only losing twelve congressional seats. Considering the size of Senator McGovern’s loss this was truly remarkable. One of those bright spots for the Democrats is today’s vice president Joe Biden, who narrowly won his Senate seat in Delaware over incumbent Republican J. Caleb Boggs.

Rep Dem Ind <40% <50% >50% >60% >70% >80% >90%

© 2000 David Leip - http://www.uselectionatlas.org - All Rights Reserved

Figure 11.1 The 1972 presidential map showing counties won by Nixon and McGovern as compared to the 1976 presidential race between Carter and Ford. Source: David Leip, Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, uselectionatlas.org.

Rep Dem Ind <40% <50% >50% >60% >70% >80% >90%

© 2000 David Leip - http://www.uselectionatlas.org - All Rights Reserved

Figure 11.2 The 1976 presidential race with Republican Gerald R. Ford and Democrat James E. Carter. Source: David Leip, Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, uselectionatlas.org.

CH A P T E R

T W E LV E

Victory and Defeat, 1973–80

As the days passed since the November 7 landslide and 1973 was upon the country, Senator McGovern found solace in his home of South Dakota and the work for the constituents who had elected him to the Senate in 1968. Senator McGovern had to set his sights on reelection in 1974 in his home state that had rejected him to be their president. What no one could have predicted in January 1973 was a political tsunami that would make Senator McGovern’s loss seem like a ripple in a backwoods pond. Redemption is never a word a politician would use after a huge political loss especially the size of Senator McGovern’s 1972 presidential loss. However, the activities of a seedy and dark Nixon White House began coming to the forefront, a warning Senator McGovern tried to sound off about during the 1972 campaign, but to no avail. Senator McGovern would have an opportunity to challenge the Nixon administration’s policies for at least two more years as a senator unlike his friend and conservative icon Barry Goldwater, who had to give up his Senate seat after his historic 1964 loss to President Lyndon Johnson. Senator Goldwater showed his leadership by being active in his conservative pursuit of policymaking. Now Senator McGovern was at a crossroads where so many presidential second place finishers had stood in the past. Would Senator McGovern redeem himself by leading a new generation of Democratic Party activists and the belief in his brand of “New Politics” or would he quietly exit the stage of political history? The answer to this question was redemption. Senator McGovern was invited to deliver a lecture at Oxford University on January 21, 1973, the day after President Nixon’s second inauguration, titled “American

194

Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

Politics: A Personal View.” The Senator from South Dakota came out not as a man who had won only one state in the 1972 election along with the District of Columbia, but as one of the leaders inside the Democratic Party determined to set the record straight on the Nixon White House: I had hoped to be occupied elsewhere today. But the American electorate has made it possible for me to spend this time with you. Like Richard I, Richard Nixon has been celebrated for his foreign journeys, while his own land has been troubled and unattended. Like Richard II, who wasted England’s wealth in a failing war in Ireland, Richard Nixon has squandered America’s good name in a foolish venture in Indochina. And like Richard III, if we can believe the Tudor historians, Richard Nixon has usurped powers that are not his in law or tradition. You have been spared a King Richard IV. We seem to have him—for four more years.1 Only the voters of Massachusetts—the nation’s birthplace—and of Washington D.C.—the nation’s capitol—would have had it otherwise. We have established a new political dictum: “As Massachusetts goes, so goes the District of Columbia.” Just why the American electorate gave the present administration such as an overwhelming mandate in November remains something of a mystery to me. I do not expect to find a fully satisfactory answer. My supporters and I worked so incredibly hard and campaigned so vigorously and openly, that our overwhelming defeat has left us with a temporary sense of sadness and disappointment that we must learn to direct into a constructive, continuing effort to restore our hopes for America . . . I believed that any reasonable Democrat could defeat President Nixon. It now seems doubtful to me that anyone could have defeated him in 1972 unless there had been a third party effort by Governor Wallace to divert a major portion of the right wing vote from Mr. Nixon.2 Senator McGovern went further in his speech talking about the need of a shared power once more between the president and congress, not the “stronger” presidency nurtured by liberals. In fact Senator McGovern is harsh on his fellow liberals for backing down from the ideals that began under Jefferson, Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt: In modern times, when American liberals have recognized that truth, they have tended to see it in terms of the Presidency. Only a

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few years ago, liberal scholarship still celebrated the strong executive and sought to strengthen it even more. Now we have learned that the presidency, too, is a neutral instrument-that power in the White House can be abused as well as used.3 There will be plenty of time to prepare for the next campaign. But now is the time for determined effort to change, not the person in the White House, but the power of the Presidency. American liberals must reverse the forty year trend toward a stronger President and return to the two hundred year old tradition of shared power. It is time to renew the Constitution, the Bill of Rights and the Declaration of Independence.4 Senator McGovern vigorously stands up for liberalism at a time when, for many, liberalism was beginning to lose some of its luster. There were not too many politicians who were defending liberalism and the views espoused by Senator McGovern’s followers after such a resounding defeat. Senator McGovern was one of those who would not concede to the view the country was right of center: I am convinced still that the society to which America should aspire is a liberal one. To those who charge that liberalism has been tried and found wanting, I answer that the failure is not in the idea, but in the course of recent history. The New Deal was ended by World War Two. The New Frontier was closed by Berlin, Cuba and an imaginary missile gap. And the Great Society lost its greatness in the jungles of Indochina.5 The greatness of leaders is to take defeat and lead it with dignity into the arms of history. At the time, many people criticized the speech of Senator McGovern at Oxford University as antipathy after his landslide defeat to Richard Nixon. For Senator McGovern, he lost the vote of the majority of Americans, but he felt obliged to continue speaking on behalf of those twenty-nine million people who put their faith in him. Senator McGovern also furthered his leadership credentials as he took on a constitutionally confident President Nixon on the issue of impoundment. On October 17, 1972, only weeks before the presidential election, President Nixon vetoed new amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act passed overwhelmingly by both Houses of Congress only to have both Houses override his veto 247-23 in the House and 52-12 in the Senate the next day. President Nixon

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announced when he vetoed the bill that if Congress overrode his veto, he would still not spend the appropriated money.6 President Nixon was directly questioning the authority of the Congress to tell any president that he must spend appropriated money. Historian Melvin Small: After Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist gave him the constitutional go-ahead, Nixon impounded most of the funds Congress had approved in the act. Nixon claimed that he had the constitutional right not to spend money authorized by Congress if it would lead to higher prices or taxes. He was the first president to make that argument.7 However, Nixon was not the first president to use impoundment. This procedure went back to the days of President Thomas Jefferson who reported to Congress that he would not spend the fifty thousand dollars that was appropriated for Mississippi gunboats in 1803.8 President Nixon actually used impoundment more frequently than any other president when he “impounded between 17 and 20 percent of all controllable expenditures from 1969–1972.”9 As a former presidential candidate, Senator George McGovern had challenged President Nixon mainly on the front of his foreign policy in Vietnam and the breach of trust and honesty the White House was lacking under Nixon. Now, the president was challenging Congressional authority over who had the right to determine the country’s purse strings. Senator McGovern had a chance to take a leading role in this dispute when he testified before the Joint Study Committee on Budget Control on March 14, 1973. Here are some excerpts of Senator McGovern’s testimony: No claims that impoundment was invented by this Administration. But what the White House has done recently is to escalate impoundment into a form of legislation—an item veto which enables the White House to select laws it will enforce and which laws it will ignore. Presidents have requested authority of that kind from the Congress at various times in our history, and it has always been denied. Now it has simply been taken. I think members of this Committee will agree that the country should not be governed by the thesis—announced most recently by a top White House aide on the A.B.C. program “Issues and

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Answers” this weekend—that the President “knows better” than the Congress where spending priorities are concerned.10 Senator McGovern also argued that since 1921 with the passing of the Budget and Accounting Act that created the Bureau of Budget, the budget had grown and the executive branch of government was given the necessary resources to devise a budget using more people and more sophisticated means such as computers. No one disputes the right of the White House to have the necessary resources to develop its own priorities and deal effectively with the sprawling Federal bureaucracy. But certainly those resources should not exclude the Congress from what was originally its sole domain. We must restore a proper balance, and the best way to do that is to give the Congress an equal ability to develop its own budget plans and evaluate White House proposals.11 Senator McGovern ended his testimony on this note: The confrontation between Congress and the Executive serves neither branch, and it serves the public least of all. It is a route toward paralysis of the national government, with each side saying “no” to the other in growing dollar amounts, leaving neither branch able to respond positively to the needs of the American people. Unless we find a solution, each branch will continue to cancel out the efforts of the other.12 In the end, Congress passed a Budget and Impoundment Control Act by of vote of 75–0 in the Senate and 401–6 in the House. This made it very difficult for future presidents to impound funds and was opposed by President Nixon. Under the act the president had to obtain congressional approval when he planned not to use all of his budget authority, and it provided a mechanism by which Congress could release funds that the president had impounded. The act also established the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) as a counterbalance to the executive branch’s OMB. On February 18, 1975, in Train v. New York City, the Supreme Court ruled that the president did not have the inherent right to impound.13

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The constitutional battle over impoundment that Senator McGovern addressed was only the beginning of a long two years of battle with the Nixon administration. The mounting strife between the executive and legislative branches would derive from a “routine” break in on June 17, 1972, at the Watergate Complex offices of Democratic National Committee headquarters by five men eventually linked to CREEP (Committee to Re-elect the President). As more information became known about the link between CREEP and these five burglars including a money trail, an official Senate investigation began on May 17, 1973 (official name was Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities) led by Democrat Sam Ervin of North Carolina and minority leader Howard Baker Jr., a Republican from Tennessee. The committee’s two chief counsels were Sam Dash and Fred Thompson for the Democratic and Republican members, respectively. As the summer of 1973 continued with Watergate being the main issue of the country, Richard Nixon’s fortress was crumbling with each committee hearing and new revelations of deception and unlawful behavior. Also, by the end of October Vice President Spiro Agnew would resign after charges of corruption and bribery surfaced while he was governor of Maryland. Spiro Agnew’s replacement was Republican House Minority leader from Michigan Gerald R. Ford. Ford would become the first nominee to fill a vacancy in the office of the vice president under provisions of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution since its passage in 1967. Ford was confirmed by the Senate on November 27 by a vote of 92-3 and by the House on December 6 on a 387-35 vote.14 Senator McGovern voted “yes.” The Democratic Party was now poised to make major gains in the general elections of 1974. Senator McGovern went to Notre Dame University on November 15, 1973, to speak; the next day he sat down at a breakfast and spoke with the campus newspaper The Notre Dame Scholastic. The main topic was Watergate and the possible impeachment of President Nixon: Scholastic: In reiterating your stand on impeachment last night . . . Senator, do you feel there is no possibility for resignation? (Senator) McGovern: Well, I wouldn’t rule that out . . . I would prefer impeachment to resignation, because I feel it answers some of the questions which might otherwise never be answered if the President were just to resign and walk off into the night. What I really think the situation requires now is that the President be removed from office, either by resignation or impeachment.

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But I would prefer the impeachment route. I think that’s what the Constitution most clearly provides. I think that’s what the present tangled and confused situation dictates. Scholastic: Do you feel, in the vein of Senator Aiken, that we should “get in and do it or get out?” (Senator) McGovern: Yes, I think so. I think that the Congress can’t just carp away at Nixon’s misconduct and then walk off without confronting the issue. The issue now is some 22 impeachable offenses which the House Judiciary Committee is investigating. I’ve read that list, and if any two or three or four of them have validity, I think he should be impeached. Scholastic: If impeachment proceedings should be taken, how do you feel this affect the balance of power between the Executive and Legislative branches? (Senator) McGovern: Well, I would hope that there would be some restoration of Congressional inf luence and power, because I think there is an imbalance on the side of the Presidency now. I believe in a strong President, a strong activist President, and I think he ought to use all the powers the Constitution provides. But that will only work if the Congress does the same thing. If the Congress doesn’t implement its constitutional powers; if it lets the legislative initiative, for example, gradually move over to the Executive branch, if it lets the budget process be decided in the Executive branch, if it lets executive arrangements on foreign policy be made in the Executive branch, and doesn’t even have the information on which to make intelligent foreign policy or budget decisions, then that is not a proper functioning of the Constitution. On the question of the 1974 elections in South Dakota, Senator McGovern was very optimistic: “Well, I think it’s going to be a Democratic sweep. We’ve really turned that state around. I think I’m going to win that Senate reelection fight. It’s going to take some hard work, but I think it can be done.” 15 Could a turnaround of historical proportions ease the pain of Senator McGovern’s defeat only a year earlier? Could Senator McGovern find redemption one more time from the voters of South Dakota? All this would be answered on August 9, 1974, when President Richard Nixon became the first president of the United States to resign. The importance of the Watergate scandal on American political history has been written about in many books and articles over the past

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thirty-five years. The Watergate scandal truly is worth pursuing to probe the mindset of the presidency of Richard Nixon. Although the details of the hearings and the unfolding saga are not mentioned in this chapter, what can be said is that Senator McGovern was definitely hitting the right chord during the 1972 presidential campaign especially the connection between Watergate participants and their detrimental activities. And how did some of the twenty-nine million people who voted for Senator McGovern in 1972 show their outrage—bumper stickers across America’s cars would read: “Don’t blame me! I am from Massachusetts.” On November 5, 1974, the Democratic Party strengthened its number advantage in the House of Representatives with an astonishing +49 pickup and +3 in the U.S. Senate. And one of those returning to the U.S. Senate was George S. McGovern of South Dakota. Senator McGovern defeated a military hero who served in Vietnam Leo K. Thorsness, 53 percent to 47 percent. The voters of South Dakota wanted their liberal senator back to represent them and their conservative views; a testament to the qualities of his leadership—honesty, integrity, and a vision of where he wanted America to head. By 1975, the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War had taken the lives of fifty-eight thousand brave American soldiers and millions of Vietnamese and left hundreds of thousands as refugees. The end for Senator McGovern could not have come sooner. As Secretary of State Henry Kissinger declared “Peace is at Hand” back on October 26, 1972, between North and South Vietnam, complete peace in the American hearts would finally be reached on April 30, 1975, in a disheartening and tragic ending. The fall of Saigon to the North Vietnamese forces on that April day in 1975 left Americans with the image of thousands of Vietnamese trying to escape as they rushed the U.S. embassy or began jumping from the rooftop of the U.S. embassy building on to the helicopters landing feet as they took off. “After nineteen hours of crisis, at 7:46 P.M. Washington time, April 29, 1975, the last helicopter lifted off from the roof of the American embassy. Some 1,400 Americans and 5,600 Vietnamese had been evacuated . . . The next day South Vietnam surrendered, and Saigon was immediately renamed Ho Chi Minh City.”16 For many Americans, the Vietnam War was (and still is) the most tragic foreign policy mistake in their country’s history. President Ford had declared in an address to the nation after President Richard Nixon resigned and left the White House on the presidential helicopter that “My fellow Americans, our long national nightmare was now

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17

over.” The same could be said of April 30, 1975—the longest national nightmare was over along with the lives of fifty-eight thousand brave soldiers. Senator George McGovern fought with all his will and ability to end the war in Vietnam years earlier. The plight of Vietnam would not end for Senator McGovern just because Americans were no longer over there, but his leadership skills would now focus more on domestic issues; mainly feeding hungry not only in the United States but worldwide. In September 1975, the Senate passed by unanimous voice vote HR 4222, the National School Lunch and Child Nutrition Act Amendments of 1975, introduced by Senator George McGovern also the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs. An identical bill was passed 380-7 by the House on Thursday.18 The Senate action is a firm and final rejection of President Ford’s “bloc-grant” proposal, which would have reduced child nutrition funding by about six hundred million dollars or 25 percent of the entire program funding level. According to Senator McGovern: “The President’s proposal would have forced at least 3 million young children from various nutrition programs and another 5 to 10 million schoolchildren would been priced out of the lunch program due to the loss of federal support.”19 The bill would eventually be sent to President Ford for what was hoped to be his signature. Once again Senator McGovern: “The overwhelming bipartisan support shown by Congress for HR 4222 ref lects the importance of these programs to the health of our children and our country. This bill represents our best efforts towards both social and fiscal responsibility. It is vital that the President act quickly to insure that the benefits of these programs reach our nation’s children as soon as possible.”20 The belief in federal government assistance when dealing with children’s health and nutrition was a cornerstone of the Democratic Party’s ideology in 1975 and still is today. Senator McGovern’s blasted President Ford on the Senate Floor for vetoing the bill: Today’s veto of the Child Nutrition and School Lunch Bill will be overridden in less than a week. The veto is less important for what it does—which is to make Congress vote overwhelmingly one more time in favor of child nutrition—than for what it says—about the Administration’s attitude toward Congress and toward our national problems.21

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First, the veto reveals the hypocrisy of the President’s repeated pleas for legislative-executive cooperation. This is a bipartisan bill . . . Second, that veto reveals once again the misplaced priorties of the Ford Administration. This program does more for the health and well-being of American children than any other piece of legislation on the books. The White House wants to raise the military budget by billions to provide more guns for dictators, but refuses an increase in child nutrition which does not even equal current food price inf lation. Very few of the Members of Congress, whether they are Democrats or Republicans, liberal or conservative, could agree with priorities that distorted.22 The veto was overridden and the bill became law. Senator McGovern demonstrated his leadership once again by crossing party lines to benefit the country. It has been mentioned that Senator McGovern did have strong friendships across the aisle with his Republican colleagues. One of these was Senator Bob Dole, Republican from Kansas and fellow World War II veteran. In October 1975, Senators Dole and McGovern introduced a major food stamp reform bill designed to “tighten eligibility requirements in the program, improve sloppy, wasteful administration by both federal and state agencies, and reduce bureaucratic snarls which have caused delays in getting assistance to the truly needy.” The bill establishes for the first time a ceiling on the amount of income a household may have and still qualify for food stamps and bars college students who are tax dependents of ineligible families from getting stamps.23 Here is Senator Dole: Lax eligibility guidelines in the current food stamp program allow some non-needy persons to qualify for assistance, while others who need help have been forced to wait for several weeks to obtain assistance. At the same time, inept administration has resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars in wasted expenditures. Such occurrences not only run counter to the express purpose of the program but are an insult to the American taxpayer who must foot the bill.24 Senator McGovern reiterated the points described by Senator Dole: I believe this bill represents a realistic and rational approach to food stamps. It also represents a bi-partisan effort to deal with the food stamp issue on the basis facts, instead of playing politics

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with human hunger—whether that politics is Republican or Democratic, liberal or conservative. Both Senator Dole and I began with the firm belief that food stamp reform should provide help for all those who are truly in need, on the fairest and most efficient basis, in the most cost-effective manner, with as little abuse or waste as possible. This bill does that. I am convinced that when the scare charges finally die out, when there is serious and sensible food stamp debate, Congress in the end will adopt the practical, equitable kind of food stamp program which this bill offers.25 The issue of food stamp abuse by individuals has been one that is still prevalent today. Many people in 1975 would have found it hard to believe that the liberal George McGovern was sponsoring a bill to reform a system he had advocated expanding throughout his career as a senator. But as he had done some four years earlier with Republican senator Hatfield, Senator McGovern again was showing his leadership on issues that affected Americans by reaching across the aisle regardless of their ideology. The bill would pass the following April by a comfortable margin with both Republican and Democratic support. On November 16, 1975, Senator McGovern spoke at Creighton University in Omaha, Nebraska. His speech had a theme of speaking out in a country that had the freedoms that the United States created even if these views were not completely accepted by the majority. Senator McGovern spoke on the issue of no women being on the U.S. Supreme Court: For example, the time is long overdue for a woman to be named as a Justice to the United States Supreme Court. It is a national shame that in 200 years of history the barrier of sex has prevented a woman from serving on our highest court. The goddess of Justice is a female symbol, but she remains an elusive shadow without concrete expression on the court that dispenses justice.26 Senator McGovern continued with his speech criticizing former president Nixon with having four opportunities to name justices to the Supreme Court. Not only did he not appoint a woman, but two of his first nominees were rejected as unqualified: But the point is we can no longer honestly argue that the nominees to the Supreme Court have always been picked on superior

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merit alone. It is hypocrisy to pretend that the merit test excluded women for 200 years. It is prejudice that has excluded women from the court and it is prejudice that is holding up the Equal Rights Amendment. So in this Bicentennial year, Mr. Ford could offer no more fitting expression of “Liberty and Justice for All” than to name a woman to the United States Supreme Court.27 President Ford appointed John Paul Stevens to fill the spot of retiring William O. Douglas. This would be his only opportunity to appoint a Supreme Court Justice. As the country’s two-hundred-year celebration would start to take center stage in 1976, a presidential election would already be in the forefront in the winter months. Senator McGovern did not waste any time going after President Ford and his potential rival in the Republican Party Governor Ronald Reagan and even a possible Democratic candidate in George Wallace. Here is Senator McGovern: In these days the new national pastime is attacking the federal government. We are advised that to capture the public mood of political disillusionment, politicians must run against the practice of politics in general and the federal government in particular. Contrary to this prevalent view, I confess that for 23 years I have loved the art of politics and the practice of government. For 19 years I have enjoyed this capital city, its monuments, its bureaus, its political conversations, and the workings of government . . . There are some days when I even feel a tinge of affection for the national press corps.28 Senator McGovern continued by saying there were some who should serve in the public sector and those who should stay in the private sector: In this spirit, if Mr. Reagan doesn’t like the federal government, all of us should help to keep him out of it. And if Mr. Ford is too deeply troubled by the f laws of Washington residents, let us return him to the good life in Grand Rapids. As I listen to the fulminations of Ronald Reagan against the U.S. government, I get the impression he is attacking a hostile foreign power. His blasts against Washington must be the envy of the propaganda ministries in Moscow, Havana or the PLO. It is even more startling to hear the President of the United States join in the chorus

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of attacks against the federal government—especially against the Congress.29 And one other interesting note from Senator McGovern’s speech talked about individuals who make a stand against oppression and evil though they may not always defeat evil; even in losing people can make a contribution that lives on. Senator McGovern even foreshadows this author’s premise: History will leave no doubt that Adlai Stevenson did more to preserve American values in his two defeats of 1952 & 1956 than Richard Nixon did in his two victories in 1968 & 1972. And I would like to think that we will live long enough to realize the enduring impact of our 1972 effort to call America home to its founding ideals.30 As Senator Barry Goldwater’s belief in conservatism gained him icon status within the conservative movement and a grudging respect from those on the other side of the aisle, so also Senator McGovern’s unwavering belief in liberalism produced much of the same status and respect. Each man was the leader of an ideology from different ends of the spectrum. In one of his most poignant speeches on liberalism, Senator McGovern spoke with passion to the Liberal Party of Canada on June 28, 1976, in Winnipeg, Canada: First, I am personally deeply committed to the conviction that the political philosophy known as liberalism is an essential prescription for improving the human condition. On May 22, I formalized that faith by accepting the National Presidency of Americans for Democratic Action, an organization which stands more than any other for liberalism in the United States.31 Senator McGovern’s belief in liberalism not fading with the American people was premature on his part. Within four years, liberalism would take a wicked hit that many did not see coming. But the political feuds between liberals and soon-to-be president Jimmy Carter would spell the ultimate disintegration of liberalism. Once again, here is Senator McGovern: I repudiate-and the facts repudiate-the common notion that the American people have grown disillusioned with liberals and

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liberal solutions. The main evidence of this supposed disaffection with liberalism was my defeat in 1972. But it was not an issues defeat. I do not want to rehash that campaign again here. But however, it happened, the best post-election studies of the voting demonstrated that Mr. Nixon received the votes of millions of Americans whose views on the issues were much closer to mine than to his.32 Here is one prophecy Senator McGovern would be correct in seeing: It is quite possible—even likely—that liberals will have to argue with a President Carter. It is also possible that on some issues we will lose. But I would much sooner conduct those debates in circumstances where we know—if we win—that the power of the presidency will be on our side. Neither liberals nor the country can afford four full years of Ford. These premises constitute the “good news” part of my message here tonight. Liberalism lives in the United States: its fundamental premises are finding favor at the polls: if we are not yet sure that we will elect a liberal President, I consider it quite certain that we will defeat hide bound conservatism, whether it is presented in the angry variety of Governor Reagan or the more affable brand of President Ford.33 Some may see all this talk by Senator McGovern against President Ford as rhetoric as he announced on Larry King Live in 2007 after the death of former president Gerald Ford that he actually voted for Ford over the Democratic nominee Jimmy Carter in 1976. McGovern told King that he felt more comfortable with Ford and really did not know Carter. McGovern also admitted his whole family had voted for Ford. McGovern said that he voted for incumbent President Carter over Governor Ronald Reagan in 1980 although this time Carter lost to Reagan. On the second day of the 1976 Democratic Convention in New York City, Senator McGovern spoke this time as a supporter for the nominee, Governor Jimmy Carter of Georgia. And it was not lost on Senator McGovern that this time his speech would not be given at 3:00 a.m.: Well, as I was saying in Miami four years ago at three-thirty in the morning: “We are not conceding a single state.” Unfortunately, everyone was so sleepy that the only delegations that got the message were Massachusetts and the District of Columbia. In 1976,

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Massachusetts and Washington D.C. will not be so lonely because this election we are going to win.34 Senator McGovern continued: Four years ago, some Democrats had doubts about me—and we got Nixon again. To repeat that sort of folly would be unconscionable. So let us unite around our candidate and retire the Republicans from the White House. If anyone anticipates differences with Governor Carter, save them for President Carter. Governor Carter cannot put the American people back to work. But President Carter can. Governor Carter cannot reshape an obsolete foreign policy. President Carter can.35 As shown with Senator Goldwater and the rise of conservatism, the presidency of Jimmy Carter truly was a watershed to the fall of liberalism as well. The political fights moderate President Carter initiated with liberal speaker of the House Thomas “Tip” O’Neil are now legendary. The large Democratic majority in both the House and Senate, mainly liberal in their views, proved to be more of a hindrance to the agenda of President Carter than he or the American people had imagined. One of those fights was the Panama Canal treaty that began in 1977 and was opposed by almost all conservatives including Senator Goldwater and some moderate Democrats as well. Senator McGovern spoke as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations in January 1978: The issue of whether or not to ratify the Panama Canal treaties will be among the most controversial questions facing the Senate in 1978. It is so troublesome that on the basis of cloakroom conversations, I suspect that many of my colleagues would prefer to vote “no” purely for political reasons- but only if they could be certain they would be on the losing side, so they would not have to explain the consequences that will likely follow if the treaties are rejected.36 Senator McGovern also explained the impact of the treaties on his home state of South Dakota: I have felt an obligation to study these treaties with special care in part because they could have an impact on South Dakota. Along

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with its security value the Canal could affect agricultural exports which now account for fully one-fifth of net farm income in the United States. It is especially significant in connection with the $8.5 billion annual agricultural demand in Asia. If the Canal were disrupted and we had to ship grain around Cape Horn, transportation costs would double, shipping time would be extended, and the South Dakota farmer could well lose a share of that growing market.37 As with any debate, misleading statements, fabrications or f lat out lies can infiltrate the issue at hand. The Panama Canal Treaties were no different as pointed out by Senator McGovern: It is an understatement to say that these treaties are controversial. However, while there certainly are legitimate reasons for objection, I have found that a substantial amount of concern has been aroused on the basis of misleading or inaccurate portrayals of the documents themselves and the issues they ref lect. For example, one Independent national survey found that although forty-nine percent of those interviewed were opposed to the treaties, fully sixty-three percent said they would support ratification if we could retain the right to defend the Canal against attempts to close it. In fact the treaties, as expressly understood by the people who signed them, do give us that permanent right.38 The Panama Canal Treaties passed the Senate by votes of sixty-eight: thirty-two. On sad personal note, Senator McGovern paid homage to one of his fellow Senate colleagues, a friend and former vice president Hubert Humphrey who past away from cancer on January 13, 1978. Here are some of the kind words spoken by Senator McGovern and printed in the Sioux Falls Argus Leader: Hubert Humphrey’s death has silenced the most vital and eloquent voice in American public life. He was the most creative lawmaker of his generation. He was my friend and neighbor for 25 years. His passing is painful loss to me and to millions of other Americans. We loved him for own inimitable love of life. He taught us how to live and how to die . . . We both educated ourselves to become college professors. We both felt the lure of prairie politics and eventually emerged as the presidential nominee of our party—Hubert

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in 1968 and I in 1972. Although we were divided over the war in Vietnam and became presidential rivals for a brief time, the bonds of personal friendship survived that division. It was not possible to hold a grudge against Hubert. He healed the wounds of political rivalry with humor and love.39 The death of Vice President Humphrey, a liberal hero to millions, in 1978 was an unfortunate sign of bleak days ahead for the Democratic Party and specifically liberals. Proposition 13 in California, which was a ballot issue to lower the property taxes, passed overwhelmingly sparking an antigovernment movement across America (that November twelve out of sixteen anti-tax initiatives passed on state ballots). The economy started showing signs of weakness along with President Carter’s popularity. And the midterm elections were not kind to the Democrats as they lost fifteen House seats and three in the Senate (although the sitting president’s party normal loses seats in both Houses). The decision by Senator Edward Kennedy to run against President Carter in the 1980 Democratic primaries has been discussed previously in this book. However, the importance of this decision will nonetheless be mentioned again. The drifting of the Democratic Party away from what many felt were the liberal ideas the party stood for for the past seventy years was being abandoned by President Carter and now were under attack from the emerging conservative movement. Along with a deteriorating economy, the Iran hostage crisis that started in November 1979 was the foreign policy crisis that solidified President Carter’s persona as a weak president. The conservative movement had also targeted liberal senators to be defeated in the upcoming 1980 general election. One of these liberal senators was Senator George McGovern (figures 12.1 and 12.2 here). The 1980 election was a historical election because of the importance of the New Christian Right (NCR) and the leadership of Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority (founded in 1979) that began to focus solely on social issues. One of these issues was abortion. Many of these types of groups were targeting liberals such as Senator McGovern as he campaigned to hold on to his Senate seat. Here was Senator McGovern as described in a New York Times article by Steve Roberts: Senator McGovern has been accusing the evangelicals of opposing the Judeo-Christian ethic, and in a recent meeting of ministers in Huron, S.D., he made an emotional appeal for help against these fundamentalist assaults. “When they come in and say I represent a

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threat to traditional American values,” Mr. McGovern said, “that I stand outside the mainstream of American life, they’re not only threatening the values that I stand for, they’re threatening the values that you stand for. They’re threatening the humane and progressive traditions of the social gospel.”40 On November 4, 1980, Senator George McGovern went down in defeat to Republican representative James Abdnor 58 percent to 39 percent. The Democratic Party went down in f lames throughout the country. President Jimmy Carter lost to Ronald Reagan 51 percent to 41 percent with Independent John Anderson garnering almost 7 percent. The NRC had achieved almost 100 percent of their objective by defeating six out of seven targeted Democratic Senators—George McGovern, Frank Church, Birch Bayh, Gaylord Nelson, and John Culver. Only Alan Cranston of California was reelected. Even in the once solid House of Representatives, Republicans picked up thirtyfour seats. Many saw these senators’ losses as a rebuke of their liberal beliefs, but as many have pointed out at least three of these men had always represented more conservative states: Senator McGovern of South Dakota, Senator Frank Church of Idaho, and Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana. In Senator McGovern’s election many South Dakota voters had seen him as out of touch with their growing concerns of expanding government, an inept economy, and a perceived weak standing in the world. Senator McGovern’s liberal voting record had never caused him problems in past elections, but the 1980 election was a turning point where liberal voting records were seen as the cause of America’s problems. It was not necessarily that the voters of South Dakota were telling Senator McGovern we don’t like you; they were telling the Democratic Party we don’t believe in your cause anymore.

Figure 12.1

The 1980 reelection campaign handout for Senator McGovern (Front side).

Figure 12.2 The 1980 reelection campaign handout for Senator McGovern. This would be McGovern’s last senate campaign to represent South Dakota. Source: McGovern Campaign Committee 1980.

CH A P T E R

T H I RT E E N

Redemption and the Election of Bill Clinton

The 1980 general elections proved to be more disastrous for the Democratic Party than the 1972 general elections with Senator McGovern at the head of the ticket. The Democratic Party not only lost the presidency, but also the Senate for the first time since 1954. In addition, the Democratic Party also lost a net thirty-five congressional seats. With liberalism in retreat and conservative feelings on the rise, Senator McGovern would spend the next four years outside Washington D.C. for the first time in almost twenty-five years. As the recession worsened in 1981–82, Democrats’ fears of a complete Republican takeover of both Houses subsided as the midterm elections grew nearer. President Ronald Reagan had survived an assassination attempt in March 1981 and with the passage of his Economic Recovery Tax Act his popularity did get a boost. The 1982 midterm elections proved to be better than the Democrats could have imagined with a pick-up of twenty-seven House seats although the Senate remained unchanged. The presidency of Ronald Reagan, as seen by the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, was an attack on the New Deal and Great Society that so many Democrats had helped to define. One of these liberals was Senator McGovern who disagreed not only with President Reagan’s spending priorities, but also with his policy of nuclear proliferation and foreign policy with Central American countries—specifically Nicaragua. Here is part of an interview with Michael Gannon on April 7, 1983:1 McGovern believes that there is no such policy as a limited nuclear war. He states that “that there is no defense against a nuclear war.”

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He is highly critical of President Reagan raising the idea that laser beams could shoot down incoming Soviet missiles carrying nuclear warheads because there is no such defensive program that is 100 percent effective. If just one nuclear warhead got through the United State’s defense, he says, it would mean an entire city totally destroyed. He adds that the United States would have to share its missile defense systems with the Soviet Union to “assure a safe world in which neither side could be tempted to attack the other.” So, McGovern states, both sides should agree not to build such a system and thereby save $100 billion—on each side. But he stipulates that no side is going to share that kind of offensive or defensive information. He thinks both sides should say, enough is enough, that is, no more missiles: “No more nuclear-carrying submarines or bombers or other weapons of destruction of that kind.” McGovern believes that the Senate will reject the president’s current military budget. In the same interview, Senator McGovern commented on the field of Democratic candidates that had already announced to run for the Democratic nomination: Senator Alan Cranston of California would be good on arms control. He also names former governor of Florida, Reuben Askew, former vice president Walter Mondale, his former campaign manager, Gary Hart, Senator Fritz Hollings, and Senator John Glenn as possible contenders. He then focuses on the grassroots nuclear freeze movements, whose members come from diverse backgrounds but all share the same goal: wanting “to be heard on what they regard as an issue of great importance.”2 After great deliberation and discussion with others (including former president Nixon), Senator George McGovern announced on September 13, 1983, that he was again seeking the Democratic nomination for his party to be decided in 1984: I have decided to seek the Presidency of the United States. I shall make that effort on a platform of realism and common sense. Fantasy may be good entertainment on the movie screen; it is not good policy for a great nation. The new realism calls for a revival of the old common sense that has guided our greatest leaders since George Washington who gave this University its proud name.

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In the course of the campaign and I will set forth what I believe to be common sense positions on the major issues before the country, but I shall concentrate on these three propositions: PROPOSITION I: There is no longer any alternative to what president Eisenhower described as “peaceful coexistence” except no existence. PROPOSITION II: The age of intervention in the internal affairs of small countries is over. It does not work anymore. PROPOSITION III: American prosperity and power rest on faithfulness to our founding ideals including equal rights and equal opportunities for all Americans. While the nation must preserve an adequate military deterrence against attack, there is neither security nor victory in either an open-ended arms race or in the actual use of the weapons of deterrence. The only realistic, common sense course for the United States and the Soviet Union is to relentlessly pursue the discussion and settlement of disputes at the conference table. Better that old men lose their tempers at the conference table than that young men lose their lives on the battle field. Instead of increasing military spending at a pace of ten percent annually above the inf lation rate as advocated by Mr. Reagan or a five to seven percent increase as advocated by the other Democratic Presidential contenders, we should reduce military spending substantially after ratifying a verifiable arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. I would not be seeking the Presidency a second time if I did not believe with all my heart and soul that I have the God-given capacity to lead this great nation away from the abyss into the ways that make for peace. I am speaking about hard- headed negotiations with the tough-minded leaders of the Soviet Union. I am speaking about having the informed judgment to end our deepening military involvement in Central America. I am speaking about having the sense of justice and prudence to tell the warring parties of the Middle East that there will be no more American aid and no more American soldiers unless Arabs and Israelis and Palestinians get to the conference table and begin at long last serious negotiations for peace. As for our economic problems, I f latly reject Reaganomics and the Reagan budget priorities. I do not blame Mr. Reagan for all the economic problems that face the country. The economy was in trouble before the present administration came into power. But I am equally sure that Mr. Reagan’s prescription is not the cure

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for our economic illness. The Reagan supply side tax plan will cost the government an average of $125 billion annually in lost revenues with very little benefit to the average taxpayer. Nor has the tax cut achieved its announced objective of stimulating savings and investment in job of creating enterprises. Savings have declined from 5% of GNP to 3% during the last three years and the tax cuts has apparently been used more to finance corporate mergers then to create new jobs. The Reagan program of military spending is not really a program. It is not practical defense. It is a wasteful binge, and it threatens the very vitality of our economy. Until 1965, it cost less than $100 billion to run the entire United States government. Current arms spending has now pushed military outlays alone beyond $200 billion a year. The man who promised a balanced budget has combined an unworkable tax scheme with the foolishly conceived arms spending explosion to produce a $200 billion annual federal deficit. Of the total national debt accumulated since the days of George Washington, forty-one percent will have been added by the present Administration. By any test, Mr. Reagan is the most reckless deficit financer in American history. He claims to be a conservative, but these are the facts. He said in the past that I was too liberal, but if I had said in 1972 that at $200 billion annual deficit was acceptable, I wouldn’t even have carried Massachusetts! And now an exciting and what can be a victorious campaign lies before us. No candidate can protect the public reaction to his appeal. Indeed, as Emerson has written, “None but he knows what he can do, nor does he know until he has tried. “ I don’t know if I can win this campaign, but I do know that with all my heart and strength I am going to try. But let me remind you: the success of this campaign lies in your hands. Please, those of you at George Washington University and those who watch on television, if you will volunteer send your name, and if you can contribute send your dollars to the McGovern for President campaign. And let us now as Democrats and as Americans join hands around the table of common purpose and then go forward with a strong and active faith. Senator George McGovern had reentered political life with a bang. He had something to say and wanted those who believed as he did to have a voice. In the race with Senator McGovern were some well-known

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names and names not known to many outside of Washington D.C. The front-runner was former vice president Walter Mondale, Ohio senator and former astronaut John Glenn. Others in the race included Senator McGovern’s former campaign manager in 1972 Senator Gary Hart of Colorado, the Reverend Jesse Jackson, Senator Fritz Hollings of South Carolina, and former Florida Governor Reuben Askew. It has been said that some former presidents make better presidents once they leave office such as a Jimmy Carter with all his charitable work. And this is not too far from the truth as the approval ratings of these men go up higher than when they were in office. In the case of Senator McGovern it can be said that his 1984 underfinanced and understaffed campaign redeemed his standing with millions of Americans. Senator McGovern’s appeal to the left wing of the Democratic Party brought back memories of so many in the Democratic Party that believed in the leadership he provided to end the Vietnam War and on the issue of nuclear proliferation. There has been a book written about Senator McGovern’s 1984 campaign for the Democratic nomination called Vote your Conscience. The Last Campaign of George McGovern by Richard Michael Marano. The title of Marano’s book stems from one of the most memorable lines ever spoken at a presidential candidate’s debate on February 11, 1984, in Iowa. When speaking to the audience with his closing statement Senator McGovern said how many people in Iowa have come up to him during his travels and told him they agree with him on the issues, but they “don’t want to throw away their vote” on someone who can’t win. Senator McGovern turned that around and said “Don’t throw away your conscience!” The audience gave him a thunderous ovation and Senator McGovern stole the debate with this one line. Here were some of the newspapers across the country within days of Senator McGovern’s memorable line. David Broder said: George McGovern is giving the political world a classic demonstration of how to win while losing. Others in the Democratic presidential field may—and probably will—gain more votes and delegates than the 1972 presidential nominee. But no one is likely to walk away from this race with more respect and affection than George McGovern. From his introduction at the New Hampshire Democratic convention last fall, right after he belatedly entered the race, the former senator from South Dakota has been riding a wave of goodwill. The applause he received after his closing statement at last

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Saturday’s De Moines Register debate, telling Iowa Democrats, “Don’t throw away your conscience,” just would not stop.3 Here is an article on Senator McGovern while campaigning in Iowa: If there is such a critter in politics, McGovern is the Joyous Loser. Some reporters compare McGovern’s ego trip here to Johnny Bench’s or Carl Yastrzemski’s farewell tours of the ballparks last season. A baseball buff, McGovern thinks he’s more like Pete Rose, still able to leg out some last solid hits. Whatever the analogy, McGovern is the best human story in the Democrats’ drab season. Everywhere he goes, he travels in a warm rain of affectionate applause. But McGovern isn’t just a museum piece. He hammers at the issues, preaching to Iowans, “Don’t throw away your conscience.”4 And of all the accolades Senator McGovern received, none was as surprising as the congratulatory letter that was sent to his Washington D.C. office from his former rival with whom there was no love lost—former president Nixon. Senator McGovern read the letter to the press: “You have uttered the one memorable phrase, in the whole 1984 campaign,” Mr. McGovern said, quoting the letter; “Don’t throw away your conscience.” He said the letter ended: “My congratulations, Richard Nixon.” “He just apparently was struck by it,” ’ Mr. McGovern said of Mr. Nixon’s letter. “He’s a great phrase-maker himself.”5 The Iowa Caucus results were surprising in three ways: Walter Mondale’s decisive win with 49 percent, Senator John Glenn’s disastrous fifth place finish, and the man who finished in third place—Senator George McGovern with 10 percent. Senator McGovern’s surprise third place finish made it possible for his campaign to continue on to New Hampshire. However, the momentum of Iowa would not last into the New Hampshire primary. Senator McGovern finished a disappointing fifth behind surprise winner Gary Hart, Walter Mondale, John Glenn, and Jesse Jackson. Senator McGovern then made a vow that if he could not win the upcoming Massachusetts primary on March 13 or come in second he would withdraw from the race. In one of his last speeches of the 1984 campaign for president, Senator McGovern spoke these words to voters at Faneuil Hall in Boston, Massachusetts, on March 9, 1984:6 On Tuesday, I have submitted to the Massachusetts voters the responsibility for deciding whether or not my voice is needed

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any longer in this presidential election. I have no way of knowing whether the obvious affection I see in the eyes and feel in the hands of Massachusetts voters will translate in to votes. But I am personally convinced that it makes no sense to stand with leaders who leave our souls untouched and our hearts unmoved. My decision to seek the presidency was based on my belief that there were issues vital to our future that none of the other candidates were addressing. And when the choices before us embrace national solvency or national bankruptcy, justice or injustice, life or death—each of us must answer to a moral imperative that we not remain silent. I am not in this race to run interference for any of my fellow contenders. Neither am I in the race to make these others stumble. Rather I am discharging a duty, to myself and to my country, to voice my opposition to policies which are taking us astray. I still would like the chance to lead this nation into a new day, where the ideals of our founding fathers can finally be realized. And I believe with all my strength that I am prepared as never before to heed the cries of spiritual hunger heard throughout this land, by nourishing what Lincoln called “the better angels of our nature . . . So in this city that launched the great American nation with a pledge to ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,’ ” let us say a prayer for wisdom on next Tuesday and then rededicate “our lives, our fortune and our sacred honor.” Unfortunately for Senator McGovern and the millions who had followed his presidential ambitions, he placed third in the Massachusetts primary with 21 percent of the vote behind Mondale’s 26 percent and the winner Gary Hart’s 39 percent. Senator McGovern withdrew from the race after his third place finish, but the redemption he earned among Democrats, political writers, voters, and even some Republicans turned a defeat into victory. Many point to Senator McGovern’s 1984 run for the presidency as a turning point in his life as he showed his compassion on the issue facing America at that time and earned the respect of many who disavowed his 1972 presidential campaign. Senator McGovern would not be an also-ran in the lines of history. The 1984 presidential election turned out to be another decisive defeat for the Democratic nominee Walter Mondale and his running mate Geraldine Ferraro. President Reagan won 49 states with Mondale only win his home state of Minnesota (very narrowly) and the District of Columbia. Reagan won 520 electoral votes with Mondale winning 13. Reagan also pounded Mondale in the popular vote 59 percent to

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41 percent. Although Mondale was known as a liberal, he was not characterized as the far left radical Senator McGovern was in 1972. However, the results were very similar. The Democrats did pick up two seats in the Senate, but lost sixteen in the House although they still maintained a large advantage. The Democratic Party would be back to the presidential drawing board. The next years of Senator McGovern’s life would be dedicated to teaching at universities and colleges across the country on issues that affected Americans. The United States was facing challenges with fighting in the Middle East, a communist regime in Nicaragua, civil war in El Salvador, Panama dictator and former U.S. backed thug Manuel Noriega, sizing up a new leader in the Soviet Union by the name of Mikhail Gorbachev, and as always—the nuclear arms race. All these foreign policies would lead up to the 1988 presidential election with President Reagan’s vice president George Bush leading the pack. As has been mentioned throughout the political life of George McGovern was his bipartisan spirit. Once again this was shown in July 1988 in a letter to the editor of the New York Times as Senator McGovern teamed up with Senator Goldwater on the issue of Middle East peace: Former Senator Barry Goldwater and I have teamed up on a proposed declaration of peace for the Middle East. Our proposal has been signed by three other Americans: George W. Ball, former Under Secretary of State; Philip M. Klutznick, former president of the World Jewish Congress and international president of B’nai B’rith and former Secretary of Commerce, and Jerome Segal, University of Maryland research scholar and founder of the Jewish Committee for Israeli-Palestinian Peace; and by three former European government heads: Garret FitzGerald, former Prime Minister of Ireland; Anker Jorgensen, former Prime Minister of Denmark, and Bruno Kreisky, former Chancellor of Austria. We have sent the proposal to the foreign ministries of all governments with a significant interest in the Middle East. The statement is as follows: We urge immediate international attention at the highest level to foster negotiations between the state of Israel and the Palestinians based on mutual recognition of national legitimacy and the exchange of territory for peace. The bloody violence and loss of life in the disputed territory underscores the urgency of constructive negotiations. Now is the time for a declaration of peace for the Middle East.

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We support the continued independence and security of the state of Israel. We equally affirm the right of self-determination and security for the Palestinian people. We believe that mutual recognition and good-faith negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians can achieve a just settlement and that such a settlement should be guaranteed by appropriate international peacekeeping arrangements. We further believe that such a political settlement can result in a reduction of the military burden for the people of the Middle East and open the way for constructive economic, social and cultural development in the region. Negotiations must involve not only the Palestinians but also the Arab states in conf lict with Israel over substantive issues. An international conference including roles for the United States and the Soviet Union can facilitate bringing the parties together, establishing assurance of fairness and opening the way for substantive bilateral negotiations.7 Unfortunately, the First Intifada (uprising) which began in 1987 by the Palestinians against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip would not heed to pleas such as those of Senators McGovern and Goldwater. But once again the leadership both men demonstrated was an illustration of unity from two leaders of opposite ideologies. Later, in 1991, Senator McGovern would serve as president of the Middle East Policy Council until 1998. The 1988 presidential election was another loss for the Democratic Party. Governor Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts would go down to defeat to the Republican nominee Vice President George H. Bush 54 percent to 46 percent in the popular vote and 426 to 111 in the Electoral College. Although it was a decisive win for George H. Bush, Michael Dukakis did bring back some respectability to the Democrats from the previous two elections. Some point to Dukakis’s increase in the few percentage points in the campaign’s final days to his firm declaration of being a liberal. Senator McGovern met with Governor Dukakis a little over a week after his defeat and his discussion was reported this way: George McGovern, who went down to resounding defeat in the 1972 Presidential campaign, said Tuesday that Gov. Michael S. Dukakis realizes he should have done something to thwart Vice President Bush’s attacks on his liberalism, charges that “did stick.” The former South Dakota Senator, who was also derided as a liberal by Republicans in the recent campaign, met privately

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with Mr. Dukakis Tuesday and said he found the Massachusetts Governor in a good mood. “I told him he has the respect of the American people, his health and his integrity,” Mr. McGovern said. “That’s what important.” “We were comparing notes,” Mr. McGovern said. “We talked a little about the problem of negative campaigning.” Asked if he believed Mr. Dukakis should have defended the Vice President’s attacks on liberalism sooner and more forcefully in his campaign, Mr. McGovern said, “I think he recognizes now that those charges did stick.” “I suppose it’s true—if he had hit back a little sooner, it could have been different,” the former Senator said.8 The Democratic Party once again was trying to find itself and one of its new leaders was the man who gave the infamous nominating speech for Governor Michael Dukakis at the 1988 Democratic Convention—Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas. Many Democrats had seen Walter Mondale’s blow out in 1984 as a wake-up call to the Democratic Party that it was trying to lead from the left and needed to become more centrist. This leadership was a step away from what Senator McGovern had been advocating for the last fifteen years. The Democratic Leadership Council was founded in 1985 by Al From. From’s centrist thinking brought aboard men such as Bill Clinton, Chuck Robb, Richard Gephardt, and Sam Nunn. The Democratic Party was developing new leadership heading in a new direction. By 1991, Senator McGovern was once again talking as a potential presidential candidate in the upcoming 1992 presidential race. Senator McGovern had supported President Bush’s invasion of Kuwait to drive out the Iraqi Army of Saddam Hussein in January of 1991. However, he still believed the Bush administration was not handling foreign policy with diplomacy first, military action second. Here is Senator McGovern in a New York Times editorial: Perhaps because of my long opposition to the Vietnam War, I am constantly asked what a citizen does who is opposed to the war with Iraq but doesn’t want to appear unpatriotic or ineffectual in protesting the war policy. It’s a complicated question. If I were still in the Senate, I would have voted with the 47 Senators to continue the economic sanctions, with war only as a last resort. But with American forces committed to battle, with low casualties and high television coverage of the most dramatic

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aspects of aerial attack, it is not very effective to stand in front of the White House and shout, “Stop the war!” The proper course for me is not antiwar rallies, although I respect those who choose that course. Rather, I’m going to seek out a Presidential candidate who challenges the policies that set the stage for the present war and other difficulties gripping the nation. The Presidential campaign arena is the best place to focus attention on the need for new policies. The Democratic loyal opposition should be mobilizing now. It needs at least one strong Presidential contender to make clear that the 1990’s call for policies dramatically different from those applauded in the 1980’s. We need a President who recognizes that the American dream and our role in the world must be grounded in enduring values, a health economy, a just society and a government of the people. In two years, while turning away from challenges and opportunities at home, President Bush has given us two wars—a small one in Panama to seize Gen. Manuel Noriega and a larger one in the gulf to stop Saddam Hussein. George Bush and Ronald Reagan supported Saddam Hussein for years, including selling him $1.5 billion worth of equipment that he used to build chemical and nuclear war facilities. Mr. Bush, as Director of Central Intelligence had Noriega on his payroll and helped pave the way for his rise to power in Panama. I’ve told an exploratory group pressing me to announce for the Presidency to qualify me first for Federal matching funds. If we meet that goal, and first signs are encouraging, it becomes practical to launch a Presidential campaign. Both the nation and the Democratic party would profit from a candidate who looks honestly at the nation’s problems, proposes common sense solutions and raises the pride of the American people in their constitutional democracy. In my soul, I know my qualifications for the Presidency—wisdom, wit, historical perspective, toughness—are better at 68 than they were at 48. Perhaps another candidate is even now waiting in the wings to announce. If not, get ready for McGovern in ‘92.9 Throughout his life, Senator McGovern has taken stands that have not been always in step with the mainstream of Americans, but no one could deny the passion of his arguments. Senator McGovern fought in World War II as a decorated bomber pilot, a real American hero, in

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the same way Senator Goldwater had answered the call of duty during the same war. Now, almost seventy years old, Senator McGovern was contemplating another run for the White House—not for pride or power, but to change the way American foreign policy was being conducted. In the end, Senator McGovern decided not to run again mainly due to his family’s lack of support. By the end of the Democratic primaries in June 1992, Senator McGovern would get behind the eventual Democratic Party nominee Bill Clinton. Governor Bill Clinton had run Senator McGovern’s Texas presidential campaign in 1972, a state Senator McGovern lost to President Nixon 67 percent to 33 percent. Now, Governor Clinton ran as a centrist in the Democratic primaries and believed the party was veering to far left. Governor Clinton and his vice presidential pick Senator Al Gore of Tennessee would run a stellar campaign against incumbent President George H. Bush and his vice president Dan Quayle. Third party candidate Ross Perot cut into President Bush’s support, but more importantly Perot did not attack Governor Clinton as he did President Bush. Governor Clinton’s steady and personal performances in the three debates proved very beneficial as well. Governor Bill Clinton won the election in 1992 over President Bush with 43 percent of the vote to Bush’s 38 percent and Perot’s strong showing at 19 percent. The Electoral College was much more decisive with Clinton at 370 to 168 for Bush. The Democratic Party was now expected to govern from the middle of the political spectrum. Although no Democrat would come out and admit that they needed to distance themselves from past Democratic presidential nominees such as Senator McGovern, Walter Mondale, and Michael Dukakis this happened at the Democratic convention that summer. Now, the liberalism each man had professed was in jeopardy. Presidential elections are always evaluated, analyzed, and the discussed within hours of the winner being declared to years later. The elections of 1992 was no different. But the coalition of voters that Bill Clinton put together were the same coalition produced because of the very reforms Senator McGovern helped write to rule changes for the Democratic Party primaries after 1968 with the McGovern/ Fraser Commission. The participation of women, African Americans, the young, along with gays and lesbians opened the door for a centrist candidate such as Bill Clinton to win. Now this is not to say that Bill Clinton did not appeal to disillusioned Republicans and the mainstream of America because he did and very effectively.

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The breakdown of voting in 1992 is shown here by the Roper Center: Women gave their vote to Bill Clinton at 45 percent, Bush 38 percent and Perot 17 percent; African Americans went heavily for Clinton continuing to be the Democratic Party’s strongest base with 83 percent; Hispanics went to Clinton with 61 percent to 25 percent for Bush and 14 percent for Perot; eighteen–twenty-four-year-olds gave Clinton an important advantage with 46 percent to 33 percent for Bush and 21 percent for Perot, and gays and lesbians voted 72 percent to 21 percent for Clinton over Bush.10 As mentioned earlier, Bill Clinton appealed to many middle class voters as demonstrated by garnering 48 percent of their vote to George H. Bush’s 31 percent and Perot’s 21 percent. Clinton was also able to convince 18 percent of self-identified conservatives to vote for him and 18 percent went to Perot, one of the real problems for George Bush as he was unable to keep the Republican base in step. Liberals felt comfortable with the more moderate Clinton as this self-identified group gave him 68 percent of the vote. But how does this shift in the Democratic Party ideology relate to Senator McGovern? Senator McGovern once joked that after the McGovern/Fraser reforms that “I opened the doors of the Democratic Party, and 20 million people walked out.” No one can change the votes from the 1972 presidential election—Senator McGovern was overwhelmingly rejected by the voters. However, as with Senator Goldwater in 1964, the new coalition that Senator McGovern helped to solidified benefited Bill Clinton in 1992 as Goldwater’s did with Ronald Reagan in 1980. As Democratic voters look back at the reforms supported by Senator McGovern after the 1968 presidential election and the disarray at the Chicago convention that preceded it, they must feel it had to happen. Senator McGovern won himself the nomination in 1972 by giving something to voters that most take for granted and that is inclusion in the democratic process. And to strengthen this argument one only needs to look at the delegate make-up at the Democrat’s convention in 2008 with a black man as their nominee—50.1 percent of the delegates were women and 24.5 percent were African American, their largest representation ever at Democratic convention.11 In addition, Hillary Clinton came very close to be the first woman to be nominated to head a major party ticket. It should be noted that the Democratic rules for choosing delegates changed in 1979 mandating that 50 percent of the delegates had to be women.12 In addition, some will argue that demographics would naturally increase the share of woman delegates because of their larger numbers compared to the male

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population. However, it can be argued that Senator McGovern made the move to accelerate the participation of both women and African Americans years ahead of any other male in the Democratic Party. In Senator McGovern, the Democratic Party had a leader. President Bill Clinton worked on Senator McGovern’s campaign because he believed in ending the Vietnam War and, for him, Senator McGovern was the only Democrat who could stop it. In 1992, then governor Bill Clinton had moved to the center as the issues changed over the twentyyear span since Senator McGovern’s nomination. It was not that he disavowed what Senator McGovern stood for in 1972, it was not that he disavowed the reforms of the Democratic party that Senator McGovern helped to shape, it was a philosophical difference on what government should do that set them apart. For many Democrats, Bill Clinton is still a very important leader in their party and yes, partly because he won two elections. But the indelible impression Senator McGovern gave to men like President Clinton has lasted a lifetime. The friendship of Bill and Hillary Clinton with Senator McGovern has stood the test of time as we know today. Senator McGovern came out and endorsed Hillary Clinton for president during her run for the Democratic nomination in 2008. Here is Senator McGovern at Iowa City, Iowa, on October 6, 2007, talking to the sold out crowd: “She seems to have a greater feel for the problems of the country. She gets stronger all the time,” McGovern told the crowd at an Iowa City Democratic event that drew a crowd estimated at eighteen hundred people. “I think that if we can elect her president, she’ll be a greater president even than her brilliant husband.” McGovern, who had once seemed to be leaning toward Obama, praised the Illinois senator and spoke well of Edwards, but concluded, “We have an old rule of courtesy in the United States: Ladies first.”13 And this friendship has lasted even when Senator McGovern decided to endorse Senator Barack Obama in May 2008 when the nomination was virtually locked by Senator Obama. Senator McGovern’s reasoning brought back a bitter reminder of his political battle after the primaries were over in 1972 and he still was fighting party candidates for the California delegates: GEORGE MCGOVERN (D), FORMER PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE: Well, let me say, first of all, that my affection and my admiration for Hillary Clinton, Senator Clinton, and President Clinton goes on. I’ve been friends of theirs since 1972. I hope for whatever years I have left we’ll continue to be good friends.

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And I want to emphasize, it is up to Senator Clinton to make the judgment if and when she should throw her support to Senator Obama. She’s the candidate. I’m not trying to do anything to force her into a decision she’s not wanting to make . . . I think Senator Obama would make a splendid nominee. I think he’d be a great president if he’s elected. And that’s what I want to see happen. I don’t want to repeat on 1972 when the fight continued against me right down to the convention time and then out on to the convention floor. I think that played into Richard Nixon’s hands. BLITZER: And you got some personal experience knowing a bitterly divided convention what could happen. You had a conversation, I take it, with former President Clinton today. How did that go? MCGOVERN: I talked with him at some length this morning before this announcement was public and we had a good visit. There wasn’t one single angry or cross word between us. I think they appreciate that I backed Hillary before the Iowa caucuses and have stayed with her until last night when it seemed to me the results in North Carolina, which Senator Obama won handily, and almost a tie vote in Indiana, it seemed that now was the time for us to think seriously about unifying the party behind a single candidate.14 Senator McGovern emphasized the need for a unified party going into the convention and felt Senator Clinton would not do anything to jeopardize the Democratic Party’s chances in November. On this point Senator McGovern was absolutely correct. The convention speeches by Hillary and Bill Clinton brought the Hillary supporters back to the Democratic Party before dissension led to all out desertion. The scene at the 2008 Democratic Convention must have been bitter-sweet for Senator McGovern as he looked around at the eighty-four thousand delegates cheering and clapping together as a united party. Senator McGovern might have also looked around and thought to himself that the folks here reminded him of the delegate make-up in 1972, but triple in size. The winning coalition orchestrated by Barack Obama in 2008 to defeat Republican John McCain was not lost on the conservative movement. Here is an article in The American Conservative magazine, written by Daniel McCarthy, two months after Obama’s win:

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George McGovern is enjoying a renaissance. The 86-year-old exsenator best known for losing the 1972 presidential election in an avalanche—he carried only one state, Massachusetts—won new friends among libertarians last spring with two startlingly laissezfaire op-eds in the Wall Street Journal. He’ll receive further attention in January when Times Books publishes his Abraham Lincoln, the latest installment in the Sean Wilentz-edited American Presidents series. But sweetest of all for the senator from Mitchell, South Dakota, in November he finally came back to win the White House—or so you might think . . . Republicans had a hard time distinguishing Barack Obama from the Democrat Nixon trounced thirty-six years earlier. Writing at National Review Online, Victor Davis Hanson christened the Illinois senator, “the Second Coming of McGovern.” In Commentary, Joshua Muravchik warned that Obama comes to us from a background farther to the Left than any presidential nominee since McGovern, or perhaps ever . . . And not without reason: Obama’s primary base of students, blacks, and cultural leftists bore a striking resemblance to the McGovern coalition of yesteryear. But for conservative Republicans, the demographic parallels were merely lagniappe—since for them every Democratic leader, no matter how Southern, how prowar, how middle-of-the-road, is really a McGovernite. Indeed, for nearly 40 years the conservative movement has defined itself in opposition to the Democratic standard-bearer of 1972 . . . There was no way that McGovern’s coalition could beat Nixon’s silent majority in a rematch. Yet it did. In the intervening decades, the McGovern coalition had grown. And perhaps more importantly, Middle Americans faced with a choice between the semicompetent socialism of the Left and the spectacularly incompetent socialism of the Republican Right split three ways—between McCain, Obama, and staying home. Mideast war, torture, and national bankruptcy turned out to be even less popular than social liberalism.15 Senator McGovern has continued speaking out against policies over the last ten years with the main one being the war in Iraq, which he has vehemently opposed. In 2006, Senator McGovern coauthored a book with William R. Polk called Out of Iraq. One needs to go no further

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than the first sentence of the Foreword to know both men’s feelings on the war: “Events have proven that the U.S. government’s decision to invade and occupy Iraq in 2003 was a calamitous mistake.”16 Senator McGovern was also critical of his own Democrats for not being clear and definitive in their opposition of the war as shown here: The authors of this book have been disappointed in the failure of the Democratic Party—specifically its congressional members- to develop an intelligent, informed, and outspoken loyal opposition to administration policy on the bombardment, invasion, and occupation of Iraq. To be sure, twenty-two Democratic senators voted no on the war resolutions, as did 126 members of the House. Also some of the senators and representatives have spoken out forcefully against the war. But, despite individual speeches and votes, the loyal opposition, the Democratic Party, has been timid.17 It has been mentioned that Senators McGovern and Bob Dole were friends and colleagues on the opposite side of the isle, but their work on behalf of the starving people all over the world cannot be understated. In the late 1990s, McGovern and Dole worked with President Bill Clinton to establish a pilot program to provide poor children throughout Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe with school meals.18 Senator McGovern was also named UN ambassador on World Hunger in 2001. A two-year pilot program, the Global Food for Education Initiative, was established in 2000. Based on the success of the pilot, in 2002 Congress passed and President George W. Bush signed into law the George McGovern-Robert Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program (known as the McGovern-Dole Program).19 The McGovern-Dole Program has spurred increased commitments from donor countries for school feeding and has renewed support from development leaders. The G8 and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) have listed school feeding as a specific intervention in their action plans for poverty alleviation, and the UN Millennium Project included school feeding as one of its ten key recommendations for achieving the Millennium Development Goals by 2015.20 All of his life, Senator McGovern has fought for what he believed to be right and fought against what he believed to be wrong regardless of party. Since the United States entered the twenty-first century the

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liberal senator from South Dakota has been given numerous awards and recognition for his humanity work. Perhaps his most memorable award came on behalf of President Bill Clinton. On August 9, 2000, George McGovern was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom by President Bill Clinton, who once campaigned on McGovern’s behalf, in Texas. The Presidential Medal of Freedom is the nation’s highest civilian award. “George McGovern is one of the greatest humanitarians of our time,” Clinton said at that time. “He still imparts to us the power and courage of his convictions.” Clinton also appointed him as U.S. ambassador to the UN Food and Agricultural Agencies in Rome from 1998 to 2001, where McGovern continued his lifelong call to action against worldwide hunger.21 The life of Senator George McGovern has been filled with so many triumphs and tragedies in not only his political life, but in his personal life as well. His second oldest daughter Terry battled alcoholism throughout her grown life. On the night of December 12, 1994, she fell into a snow bank, while drunk, in a vacant parking lot in Madison, Wisconsin, not to be found until the next morning. She had frozen to death. This tragic event prompted Senator McGovern to talk openly about his daughter’s battle with alcoholism and to write a book in her memory—Terry, My Daughter’s Life-and-Death Struggle (1996). And just recently, his beloved wife of sixty-three years, Eleanor, passed away on January 25, 2007. But through it all he has maintained a dignity and positive outlook on life that many can only hope to possess. Senator McGovern can be called a true humanitarian.

CH A P T E R

FOU RT E E N

Conclusions

Leadership is not a word many would have used to describe the political life of Senator McGovern thirty years ago. However, the examination of his entire political life in this book should make history treat him as he is—a leader. A leader as a bomber pilot in World War II, a leader in South Dakota politics, a leader in the Democratic Party during the Vietnam War, a leader in humanitarian causes, and a leader in showing that bipartisanship is not a bad thing. George McGovern will always be remembered for his 1972 landslide loss to Richard Nixon, but this is no longer the only reason to remember the political life of this senator. Too many times political scientist, historians, opposing politicians, and political commentators have tried to bring discredit to the name of McGovern; for some it was nothing more than to gain votes. But how many of these men and woman know the full political life of this humble man from South Dakota? As shown throughout this book there are many similarities with Senator McGovern’s friend and Senate colleague Barry Goldwater. Both men served as pilots in World War II, both men married in the early twenties and stayed married until the deaths of their beloved spouses, both were family men, both had a deep religious faith, and both men’s political careers were intertwined during three decades (1950s, 1960s, and 1970s). Yet it took both men many years to find the accolades they deserved after their huge presidential losses. And, perhaps, these accolades took a little longer for Senator McGovern to achieve. The Democratic Party had built a very strong coalition under Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932. Roosevelt rode this coalition to four terms in office followed by his last vice president Harry Truman’s win in 1948. John F. Kennedy kept the coalition together enough to

232

Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

scrape out a narrow win in 1960 followed by his vice president Lyndon Johnson’s landslide win in 1964 over Barry Goldwater. But as shown in this book, the coalition began to crack with the Kennedy election in 1960 as the southern vote was becoming more conservative in part because of the increase in the African Americans’ push for civil rights and the growing acceptance among a majority of the Democratic Party. By 1964, Barry Goldwater had captured the Deep South against a southern Democrat from Texas Lyndon Johnson. This led to 1968. The turmoil of 1968 brought forth a Democratic Party that no longer could hold on to the coalition of Franklin Roosevelt. Middle class America began to relate violence, protesters, hippies, crime, and federal government interference with the Democratic Party. Unions were losing clout and conservative southern white men, former Democrats, were disillusioned with the rights given to African Americans. All these factors (along with other variables) would lead to a fractured 1968 presidential race that saw Hubert Humphrey lose many of the “solid” Democrats from years past. The interparty fight at the 1968 Democratic Convention also led to disillusionment and disgust among the “new” coalition of Democrats that were growing in numbers (i.e., women, blacks, and the young). Leadership was needed on November 6, 1968, the day after Hubert Humphrey’s election loss to Richard Nixon. Some leader wanted to look toward Senator Edward Kennedy, but he was still in deep mourning over the death of his brother Robert Kennedy in June 1968. Senator McGovern filled the void and became the leader of the Democratic Party. Reforms were agreed upon by all the presidential candidates at the Democratic convention in 1968 and now Senator McGovern was going to make sure this was fulfilled. No longer would delegates be chosen a year or two ahead of time, no longer would strong party leaders, mainly elderly white men, dictate who was to be a delegate and who was not, no longer would the process nominate a candidate who did not run in any primaries or caucuses knowing the party’s powerful men controlled the nominating process. No—the Democratic Party needed reform and Senator McGovern (and later Congressman Donald Fraser) was up to this task. Even before Senator McGovern took charge of leading the reform effort of the Democratic Party in 1968–71, he was leading a virtually nonexistent Democratic Party in South Dakota during the mid1950s to a growth never seen before in that state. Once again, Senator McGovern was leading the way for the Democratic Party. After his almost unthinkable nomination as the Democratic Party nominee

Conclusions

233

in 1972 and then subsequent defeat at the hands of Richard Nixon, Senator McGovern did not go quietly into the night. It has also been acknowledged in this book that not all members of the Democratic Party supported the reforms carried out by Senator McGovern and Congressman Donald Fraser. Many abandoned the Democratic Party in 1972 to vote for Republican Richard Nixon, brief ly returning to elect Democrat Jimmy Carter president in 1976. But even that election was much too close for a party coming off the Watergate scandal. Many of the Democratic middle class voters left again in 1980, this time to vote for Republican Ronald Reagan. But the reforms carried out by the McGovern/Fraser Commission were needed because of the policies of the very people who would end up criticizing Senator McGovern. The disastrous policy in Vietnam, in part orchestrated by the establishment of the Democratic Party, left many Democrats such as Senator McGovern skeptical and suspicious about the power held by the establishment on both sides of the aisle. The consequences were these liberals went to the left on foreign policy. Now many would say liberals such as Senator McGovern went too far to the left, but the deaths of fifty-eight thousand brave soldiers definitely weighed on their conscience and future decision-making. The issue of human malnutrition may not be one issue that affects most Americans or that most Americans think about on a daily basis, but for Senator McGovern it is his issue. Perhaps other than Vietnam there was no issue that Senator McGovern felt so deeply about. His life’s mission was to lead the effort of feeding as many in the world as possible through various programs he had been associated with his whole life. And this began as the Director for Food for Peace when appointed by President John F. Kennedy in 1961. Senator McGovern ran again for president in 1984 for the Democratic nomination twelve years after his sound loss. This presidential run could have done only two things to Senator McGovern: furthered his feeling of defeat in the minds of his fellow Democrats, or brought about redemption in the hearts of those who did not believe in his message of peace and prosperity. By the time he dropped out after the Massachusetts primary, the only state to vote for him in 1972, he was not only once again favorably in the hearts of his fellow Democrats, he was now their conscience. In 2006, McGovern Library and Center for Leadership and Public Service on the campus of Dakota Wesleyan University was created to help develop young minds in the field of public service and leadership. One of those in attendance to speak in honor of Senator McGovern

234

Barry Goldwater and George McGovern

and his wife Eleanor was President Bill Clinton: “I believe no other presidential candidate ever has had such an enduring impact in defeat,” Clinton, who directed McGovern’s presidential campaign in Texas, said. “Senator, the fires you lit then still burn in countless hearts.” Today, Senator McGovern leads an active life at eighty-seven. Still writing about the issues, still speaking to standing-room-only crowds, Senator McGovern would not let himself be a footnote in history. No longer would he just be a lovable loser that the opposing party would use as political fodder. No—Senator George S. McGovern will go down in political history as an important figure for all to study. Senator McGovern will join Senator Barry Goldwater as a leader in American politics for the ages.

NOT E S

One

Change on the Horizon, 1960–64

1. Arizona Historical Foundation, Subseries IV: Literature, Lives, Votes and Stands of the Republican Candidates, Box 5, Folder 37. “Congressional Quarterly Special Report,” Week ending July 31, 1964, 1572. 2. Ibid., 1573. 3. Ibid., 1576. 4. Charles W. Dunn and J. David Woodward, American Conservatism from Burke to Bush (Maryland: Madison Books, 1991), 29–30. 5. Arizona Historical Foundation, Series VI: Media, Speeches, Statements and Remarks, 84th Congress, Box 552, Folder 6. “Democratic Party’s Chamber of Smears,” January 17, 1955. 6. Barry M. Goldwater and Jack Casserly, Goldwater (New York: Doubleday, 1988), 159. 7. Arizona Historical Foundation, Subseries IV: Literature, Lives, Votes and Stands of the Republican Candidates, Box 5, Folder 37. “Congressional Quarterly Special Report,” Week ending July 31, 1964, 1606. 8. Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1960 (New York: Atheneum, 1961), 244. 9. Ibid., 235–238. 10. “The Conservative King.” Time August 8, 1960. http://www.time.com. 11. Mary C. Brennan, Presidential Studies Quarterly, “A Step in the ‘Right’ Direction: Conservative Republicans and the Election of 1960.” Volume XXII, Number 1, Winter 1992, 82. 12. Ibid., 82–83. 13. The National Archives, Robert F. Kennedy and Barry Goldwater Correspondence, October 10–25, 1963, ARC Identifier 193970, http://www.archives.gov/. 14. Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 522. 15. Barry M. Goldwater, The Conscience of a Conservative (New York: Manor Books Inc, 1975), 38; emphasis in the original. 16. White, The Making of the President, 244. 17. Congress and the Nation 1945–64 Congressional Quarterly Services, 1965: 69a, 81a. 18. Congress and the Nation 1965–68, Volume II, Congressional Quarterly Services, 1969: 358. 19. Goldwater, The Conscience of a Conservative, 108–109. 20. www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/11/26/politics/main58662.shtml. 21. Fredrick M. Hess and Michael J. Petrilli. www.aei.org/filter.all,pub ID.24565/pub_detail. asp. June 19, 2006.

236

Notes

22. Congress and the Nation 1945–64, 69a, 74a, 81a, 87a, 93a. 23. Arizona Historical Foundation, Subseries XIII: Speeches, Box 15, Folder 29. Civil Rights 1963–64. 24. “DMI Op-ed: I applaud hip-hop’s leap into civil rights.” November 10, 2004. Drum Major Institute For Public Policy. http://www.drummajorinstitute.org. 25. Jon Garrido, “It is Time to Demythologize Goldwater by Telling the Truth, Goldwater was a Racist.” http://www.hispanic7.com/it_is_time_to_demythologize_goldwater_by_telling_the_truth,_goldwater_was_a_racist.htm ( Jon Garrido.com). 26. Arizona Historical Foundation, Subseries IV: Literature, Lives, Votes and Stands of the Republican Candidates, Box 5, Folder 37. “Congressional Quarterly Special Report,” Week ending July 31, 1964, 1606. 27. A News Hour with Jim Lehrer Transcript, On Line Focus Race Relations, December 24, 2002. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/race_relations/july-dec02/race_12-24.html. 28. The Center for American History, The University of Texas at Austin. A Guide to the Stephen Shadegg/Barry Goldwater Collection, 1949–1965. “NBC News Special on Goldwater: “Campaign and the Candidates,” Box 3H515. 29. Ibid., 1–2. 30. Ibid., 3. 31. Peter Goldman and Tom Mathews, The Quest for the Presidency (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 299.

Two

The Campaign for President of the United States, 1964

1. Barry M. Goldwater, With No Apologies (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1979), 165. 2. Ibid., 159. 3. Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1964 (New York: Atheneum, 1965), 118. 4. The Center for American History, The University of Texas at Austin. A Guide to the Stephen Shadegg/Barry Goldwater Collection, 1949–1965. “NBC News Special on Goldwater: “Campaign and the Candidates,” Box 3H515, page 9. 5. Arizona Historical Foundation, Subseries IV: Literature, Lives, Votes and Stands of the Republican Candidates, Box 5, Folder 37. “Congressional Quarterly Special Report,” Week ending July 31, 1964, 1582. 6. Ibid., 1581. 7. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. “Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy at the Annual Dinner and Reception of the Democratic Party of Cook County in Chicago, Illinois, May 23, 1957.” http://www.jf klibrary.org/Historical+Resources/ Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/JFK+Pre-Pres/1957/002PREPRES12SPEEC HES_57MAY23.htm. 8. Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission, Eisenhower’s Speeches, Wilbur Renk Campaign, Green Bay, Wisconsin September 18, 1964: http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/speeches/19640918%20Wilbur%20Renk%20Campaign%20Green%20Bay%20 Wisconsin.htm. 9. Post Presidential Speeches, York, Pennsylvania, October 5, 1964: http://www.eisenhower. archives.gov/All_About_Ike/Speeches/Post-Presidential_speeches.pdf 10. http://uselectionatlas.org/results/index.html. 11. The Center for American History, The University of Texas at Austin. A Guide to the Stephen Shadegg/Barry Goldwater Collection, 1949–1965. “Opening Campaign Address

Notes 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25.

26. 27.

237

at Lockport, N.Y., by Rep. William E. Miller, Republican Candidate for Vice President of the United States.” Speeches August–September 10, 1964, Box 3H511. Goldwater, With No Apologies, 156. Ibid., 183–187. David McCullough, John Adams (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 459. http://livingroomcandidate.movingimage.us/election/index.php. Arizona Historical Foundation, Sub Series XIII: Speeches, Box 16, Folder 67. “Introduction by Governor William Scranton,” October 29, 1964. Arizona Historical Foundation, Sub Series XIII: Speeches, Box 16, Folder 66. Auditorium, Cleveland, Ohio October 27, 1964 Goldwater, With No Apologies, 192–193. Arizona Historical Foundation, Subseries IV: Literature, Box 5, Folder 18. “The Debate that Never Was,” 1964. Arizona Historical Foundation, Subseries IV: Literature, Box 5, Folder 63. “Why We are For Goldwater.” Chicago Tribune, 1964, 3–4. Ibid., 4. Arizona Historical Foundation, Series II, Subseries XIII: Speeches, Box 16, Folder 69. “Text of Telegram to President Johnson and Goldwater Statement on 1964 Election,” November 4, 1964. Ibid. Ibid. Arizona Historical Foundation, Subseries IV: Literature, Lives, Votes and Stands of the Republican Candidates, Box 5, Folder 37. “Congressional Quarterly Special Report,” Week ending July 31, 1964, 1582. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, second edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), 23. Arizona Historical Foundation, Series II, Subseries XIII: Speeches, Box 16, Folder 69. “Text of Telegram to President Johnson and Goldwater Statement on 1964 Election,” November 4, 1964.

Three

The Beat Goes On, 1965–76

1. Barry M. Goldwater and Jack Casserly, Goldwater (New York: Doubleday, 1988), 221. 2. Arizona Historical Foundation, Series I Personal, Box 2 Folder 7 Writings: “Goldwater Column” The Los Angeles Times (Correspondence) 1 of 13 1965–67. 3. Arizona Historical Foundation, Series I Personal Box 2 Folder 32 Senate Campaigns, “Campaign Kickoff Speech,,” September 12, 1968, Prescott, Arizona. 4. Arizona Historical Foundation, Series I Personal Box 2 Folder 32 Senate Campaigns, “Conference on International Education,” October 4, 1968, Arizona State University. 5. Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater, 247. 6. Congress and the Nation Volume III, Key Votes—1969, Chart I, 6 Haynsworth Nomination. 7. Congress and the Nation Volume III, Key Votes—1969, Chart II, 10 HR 15090. 8. Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater, 238. 9. Vaughn Davis Bornet. The Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Press Kansas, 1983), 262. 10. Arizona Historical Foundation, Series VI: Media, Subseries: Speeches, Statements, Remarks, Box 552, Folder 3. 83rd Congress. July 1, 1953. Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam (first debate on the Senate f loor). 11. Congress and the Nation Volume III, Key Votes—1970, Chart I, 10 HR 17123.

238

Notes

12. Arizona Historical Foundation, Series VI: Media, Subseries: Speeches, Statements, Remarks Box 6, Folder 27. 91st Congress. On the McGovern-Hatfield and Cooper-Church Resolutions (Senate Floor; Press Release), May 20, 1970. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Arizona Historical Foundation, Series VI: Media, Subseries: Speeches, Statements, Remarks Box 7, Folder 1. 91st Congress. “End the Draft” (before the Young Americans for Freedom, Senate auditorium), August 12, 1970. 16. Ibid. 17. Arizona Historical Foundation, Series VI: Media Subseries: Speeches, Statements, Remarks. Box 7, Folder 34. 92nd Congress. “Ending the Johnson-McNamara War (Senate Floor), June 24, 1971. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater, 255. 21. Congress and the Nation Volume IV, Key Votes—1974, 12. 22. John Robert Greene, The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford (Lawrence Kansas: University of Press Kansas, 1995), 59. 23. Ibid., 30–31. 24. Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater, 265. 25. “Drawing Up a Balance Sheet on the 93rd.” Time Magazine, December 23, 1974. http://www.time.com. 26. Melvin Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon (Lawrence Kansas: University of Press Kansas, 1999), 185. 27. Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater, 280–281.

Four

The Torch Has Been Passed, 1976–80

1. John Robert Greene, The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Press Kansas, 1995), 162. 2. Robert Ajemian, interview with Reagan, Republicans: Reagan: “I am not appeased.” Time, November 17, 1975. http://www.time.com. 3. Barry M. Goldwater and Jack Casserly, Goldwater (New York: Doubleday, 1988), 29–30. 4. Barry Goldwater’s Campaign Advice for President Ford, Letter, Barry Goldwater to Gerald Ford, May 7, 1976; folder “Marsh, 1976–77(2), “ Box 30, James Connor Files, Gerald R. Ford Library. http://fordlibrarymuseum.gov/ford_full_search.html. 5. Arizona Historical Foundation, Series VI: Media Subseries: Speeches, Statements, Remarks. Box 563, Folder 13. 94th Congress. “Before the Republican National Convention” (Kansas City, Missouri), August 16, 1976. 6. John A. Farrell, Tip O’Neill and the Democratic Century (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2001), 446. 7. Burton I. Kaufman, The Presidency of James Earl Carter Jr (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Press Kansas, 1993), 30. 8. “Now for the Hard Part.” Time, September 19, 1977. http://www.time.com. 9. Denison Kitchel, The Truth About the Panama Canal (New York: Arlington House Publishers, 1978), 202. 10. Dr. Robert M. Bowman, “The ABM Treaty: Dead or Alive.” History News Network, http://www.historynewsnetwork.org/articles/article.html?id=627. 11. “Carter Says Deng’s Private Agreement Key to Switch in Ties from Taiwan to China in 1979.” December 5, 2007, International Herald Tribune, The Associated Press.

Notes

239

12. Arizona Historical Foundation, Series VI: Media Subseries: Speeches, Statements, Remarks. Box 564, Folder 29. 95th Congress. “Jimmy Carter’s Human Rights Campaign” (Senate Floor), April 19, 1977. 13. Arizona Historical Foundation, Series VI: Media Subseries: Speeches, Statements, Remarks. Box 564, Folder 19. 95th Congress. “Mao’s Funeral,” February 24, 1977. 14. Kevin O’Leary, “The Legacy of Proposition 13.” Time, June 27, 2009. http://www.time. com. 15. Arizona Historical Foundation, Series VI: Media Subseries: Speeches, Statements, Remarks. Box 565, Folder 28. 95th Congress. “The Tax Revolt” (Senate Floor), June 19, 1978. 16. Arizona Historical Foundation, Series VI: Media Subseries: Speeches, Statements, Remarks. Box 15, Folder 29. 96th Congress. “Announcement to Seek Reelection” (press conference), January 4, 1980. 17. Arizona Historical Foundation, Series VI: Media Subseries: Speeches, Statements, Remarks. Box 15, Folder 37. 96th Congress. “Endorsement of Ronald Reagan” (press release), March 4, 1980.

Five Redemption and the Election of Ronald Reagan 1. Harris Interactive Inc. “Party Affiliation and Political Philosophy Show Little Change, According to National Harris Poll.” http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index. asp?PID=548. March 9, 2005. 2. Arizona Historical Foundation, Series VI: Media Subseries: Speeches, Statements, Remarks. Box 566, Folder 66. 96th Congress. “Iran Rescue Attempt” (Before the Armed Services Committee), May 6, 1980. 3. “Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.” http://www.guidetorussia.com/russia-afghanistan.asp. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Arizona Historical Foundation, Series II: 1964 Presidential Campaign, 1961–65, Subseries XII: Republican Party. Box 2, Folder 10 Republican National Convention, July 15,1980 (Goldwater Speech). 7. “Republican National Convention Acceptance Speech.”http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/ archives/reference/7.17.80.html. 8. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?platindex=R1980. 9. “Vowing Defiance to the End.” Time, July 21, 1980. http://www.time.com. 10. The 1980 Democratic National Convention Address Delivered August 12, 1980, New York, NY. American Rhetoric.com/speeches/tedkennedy1980dnc.htm. 11. Gallup “Election Polls—Vote By Groups, 1976–1980.” http://www.gallup.com/poll/9460/ Election-Polls-Vote-Groups-19761980.aspx. 12. Robert G. Kaiser, “For Now, Kerry Has History on His Side.” The Washington Post, July 25, 2004. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10779-2004Jul24.html, page B05. 13. David Frum, Dead Right (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 28.

Six

The End of a Long Journey for Mr. Conservative

1. “Citizens for Tax Justice,” Campaign 2000 Information Page. http://www.ctj.org/html/ taxvotes.htm. 2. USA Today. “Sandra Day O’Connor.” http://conlaw.usatoday.findlaw.com/supreme_court/ justices/oconnor.html.

240

Notes

3. Arizona Historical Foundation, Subseries XIII: Speeches, Statements, Remarks Box 16, Folder 19. 97th Congress. On Sandra Day O’Connor’s Basic Conservative Philosophy (press release), July 13, 1981. 4. http://www.supremecourthistory.org/myweb/justice/o’connor.htm. 5. USA Today. “Presidents sometimes regret justices they appoint.” http://www.usatoday. com/news/washington/2005–07-04-defiant-justices_x.htm. 6. Arizona Historical Foundation, Subseries XIII: Speeches, Statements, Remarks, Box 16, Folder 15. 97th Congress. On Keeping Social Security from Going Broke (press release), May 27, 1981. 7. John A. Farrell, Tip O’Neill and the Democratic Century (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2001), 601. 8. The Online News Hour, “Social Security Reform.” http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/ social_security/reform/timeline.html. 9. Allen W. Smith, The Looting of Social Security (New York Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2004), 2. 10. Barry M. Goldwater and Jack Casserly, Goldwater (New York: Doubleday, 1988), 348. 11. Ibid. 12. Scholastic. “Barry Goldwater Addresses the 1984 Republican Convention.” http://content. scholastic.com. 13. Ibid. 14. Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater, 336. 15. Arizona Historical Foundation, Sub Series XIII: Speeches, Statements, Remarks, Box 16, Folder 68. 99th Congress Goldwater & Nunn Speeches focus on DOD Reorganization (press release) October 16, 1985. 16. Ibid. 17. http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/pprr2.pdf. “Statement on Signing the GoldwaterNichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.” 18. Ibid. (Public Law 99-433-October 1, 1986). 19. Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater, 359. 20. Ibid. 21. “Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Presidential Medal of Freedom.” http:// www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/51286b.htm. May 12, 1986. 22. “Remarks by Telephone to Senator Barry Goldwater.” http://www.Reagan.utexas.edu/ archives/speeches/1986/090986f.htm. September 9, 1986. 23. Ibid. 24. Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater, 382–383. 25. Lloyd Grove, “Barry Goldwater’s Left Turn,” The Washington Post, July 28, 1994. http:// www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/daily/may98/goldwater072894.htm, C01. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Mathaba.net, Sidney Blumenthal, “The New Fight at the OK Corral.” http://www. mathaba.net/news/?x=38885 (February 26, 2004).

Eight The Most Decent Man in the Senate, 1963–66 1. George McGovern, Grassroots: The Autobiography of George McGovern (New York: Random House, 1977), 66. 2. Ibid., 56. 3. Ibid.

Notes

241

4. Ibid. 5. Stephen E. Ambrose, The Wild Blue (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001). 6. Robert Sam Anson, McGovern: A Biography (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), 60–61. 7. Congress and the Nation Senate Key Votes—88th Congress, 1963–64: 92a–93a. 8. Anson, McGovern, 150–151. 9. McGovern, Grassroots, 103. 10. Dakota Wesleyan University, McGovern Library, Speeches Box 11 “Military Spending Reductions: An opportunity, not a catastrophe.” Floor remarks, Dec.13, 1963 11. Dakota Wesleyan University, McGovern Library, Speeches Box 11, Parkston, South Dakota Dinner, October 14, 1964. 12. Dakota Wesleyan University, McGovern Library, Speeches Box 11, “Remarks by Mr. McGovern to National Women’s Press Club on the Importance of One Vote,” Washington D.C., January 9, 1963. 13. Dakota Wesleyan University, McGovern Library, Speeches Box 11, “American Agriculture in a Changing World,” The Independent Bankers Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, March 26, 1963. 14. McGovern, Grassroots, 92–93. 15. Joseph A. Califano Jr, The Triumph & Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 59. 16. Ibid., 62. 17. Ibid., 149. 18. The Rothenberg Political Report. Midterms Spell Trouble, But “Itch” Theory is a Real Head-Scratcher, September 15, 2005. 19. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. Citation Number 8147, WH6506.04, Program No. 12: “President Johnson’s Notes on Conversation with Secretary McNamara,” June 17, 1965, 3:25 p.m. 20. Jack Newfield, Robert Kennedy: A Memoir (New York: Plume Printing, 1969), 120. 21. Ibid., 121. 22. Congress and the Nation, Vol. II. Senate Key Votes, eighty-ninth Congress, 1966, 24a. 23. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (New York: Ballantine Books, 1978), 734.

Nine Call to Duty, 1967–68 1. “The Presidency: Cautious, Candid & Conciliatory.” Time Magazine, January 20, 1967. http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,843291,00.html. 2. Ibid. 3. Congressional Record, Vol. 113, No. 14. “Foreign Policy and the Crisis Mentality,” February 1, 1967. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, George S. McGovern Papers, Box 685, Folder 284. 4. Congressional Record—Senate, S5769-S5779, “The Lessons of Vietnam,” April 25, 1967. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, George S. McGovern Papers, Box 687. 5. USA Today/CNN Gallup poll, November 15, 2005. 6. Congressional Record—Senate, S5769-S5779, April 25, 1967. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, George S. McGovern Papers, Box 687. 7. Ibid., S5769. 8. Ibid., S5775. 9. Ibid.

242

Notes

10. Bill Kauffman, Ain’t My America: The Long, Noble History of Antiwar Conservatism and Middle-American Anti-Imperialism (New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, 2008), 139. 11. Press Conference of Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, Senate Caucus Room, Washington D.C., November 30, 1967. http://www.4president.org/speeches/mccarthy1968announcement. htm. 12. Edwin O. Guthman and C. Richard Allen, RFK Collected Speeches (New York: Viking/ Penguin Group, 1993), 320–321. 13. Jack Newfield, Robert Kennedy: A Memoir (New York: Plume Printing, 1969), 186. 14. Ibid., 186–187. 15. David C Heymann, RFK (New York: Dutton/Penguin Group, 1998), 490. 16. Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1968 (New York: Atheneum, 1969), 316. 17. Ibid., 319. 18. Ibid., 323. 19. Abraham Ribicoff, Speech Nominating George McGovern for the U.S. Presidency, delivered August 28, 1968, Democratic National Convention, Chicago, Illinois. http://www. americanrhetoric.com/speeches/abrahamribicoff1968dnc.htm.

Ten

The Reformer, 1969–71

1. Mark Blumenthal, “Some Numerical Metric,” April 26, 2008. http://www.pollster.com/ blogs/mark-blumenthal/2008/04/20-week/. 2. Bruce Miroff, The Liberals’ Moment (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Press of Kansas, 2007), 20. 3. Mark Stricherz, “Primary Colors, How a Little-Known Task Force Helped create Red State/Blue State America,” The Boston Globe, November 23, 2003. 4. Miroff, The Liberals’ Moment, 21. 5. Taylor E. Dark, The Unions and the Democrats: An Enduring Alliance (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), 84–85. 6. The New York Times. “Democratic Reform for ‘72.” May 6, 1970. http://128.91.58.209/ Articles/19700506_McGovernCommission.pdf. 7. Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger-Partners in Power (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 68. 8. Ibid., 68. 9. Ibid., 105. 10. Ibid., 117. 11. Congressional Record, Vol. 115, No. 46. “Vietnam: 1969,” March 17, 1969. Dakota Wesleyan University, McGovern Library. 12. Ibid., 3. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Congressional Record, Vol. 115, No. 71. “Problems Facing the Administration—Vietnam,” May 1, 1969. Dakota Wesleyan University, McGovern Library. 16. Ibid., 1. 17. United States Senate, No. 37, “The America We Seek,” November 1969. Dakota Wesleyan University, McGovern Library. 18. Ibid., 2. 19. Ibid. 20. Richard M. Nixon, The Great Silent Majority delivered November 3, 1969. http://www. americanrhetoric.com/speeches/richardnixongreatsilentmajority.html.

Notes

243

21. Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), 157. 22. Ibid., 119. 23. Congress and the Nation, Vol. III Key Votes—1970, Chart I, 19a. 24. Ibid. 25. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate, 155. 26. Office of Senator George McGovern South Dakota, “The McGovern-Hatfield Amendment to End the War,” May 7, 1970. Dakota Wesleyan University, McGovern Library. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid., 2. 30. Ibid. 31. Congressmen Jim McDermott, “A Vote of Conscience,” March 21, 2007. http://www. house.gov/mcdermott/sp070322.shtml. 32. Congress and the Nation, Vol. III, Key Votes—1970, Chart IV, 24a. 33. “Nation: Plight of the Doves.” Time Magazine, September 14, 1970. http://www.time. com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,902748,00.html. 34. Statement by Senator George McGovern (D-SD), Announcing Candidacy for the 1972 Democratic Presidential Nomination, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, January 18, 1971. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. http://www.4president.org/speeches/ mcgovern1972announcement.htm. 35. http://www.mrpopculture.com/files/html/may-08-1971/. 36. Bruce Miroff, The Liberals’ Moment (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Press of Kansas, 2007), 21. 37. Ibid., 22. 38. “A Campaign Chronology,” August 1–13, 1971. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, George S. McGovern Papers, Box 875.

Eleven The Campaign for President of the United States, 1972 1. Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1972 (New York: Atheneum, 1973), 78. 2. Bruce Miroff, The Liberals’ Moment (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Press of Kansas, 2007), 45. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid., 46. 5. White, The Making of the President 1972, 134. 6. Ibid., 134. 7. “What McGovern Would Mean to the Country,” Time Magazine June 26, 1972. http:// www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,906070-2,00.html. 8. Ibid. 9. “George Wallace’s Appointment in Laurel,” Time Magazine, May 29, 1972. http://quiz. cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1996/analysis/back.time/9605/29/. 10. Rhodes Cook, “The Democratic End Game: who has the right credentials?” http://www. centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/article.php?id=FRC2008041001. 11. White, The Making of the President 1972, 205–206. 12. “Acceptance Speech of Senator George McGovern Democratic National Convention,” Miami Beach, Florida, July 14, 1972. http://www.4president.org/speeches/mcgovern1972acceptance.htm.

244

Notes

13. M.E. Sprenglemeyer, “George McGovern, Miami Beach 1972,” August 12, 2008. http:// www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2008/aug/12/george-mcgovern-miami-beach-1972/. 14. Domenico Montanaro,” Novak Justifies Outing Plame & Sources,” July 19, 2007. http:// firstread.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2007/07/19/278430.aspx. 15. http://www.startlearningnow.com/articles/Thomas-Eagleton.htm. 16. Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger-Partners in Power (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 409. 17. The American Presidency Project. Richard Nixon XXXVII President of the United States: 1969–1974, 266—Remarks on Accepting the Presidential Nomination of the Republican National Convention, August 23, 1972. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index. php?pid=3537. 18. Dallek, 409. 19. UWP, Christofferson: The Man from Clear Lake, Immune to Presidential Fever, p. 318. http://www.wispolitics.com/1006/ManfromClearLakepg313_20.pdf. 20. Thomas P. O’Neill, Man of the House: The Life and Political Memoirs of Speaker Tip O’Neill (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), 356–357. 21. Bill Kauffman, Ain’t My America: The Long, Noble History of Antiwar Conservatism and Middle-American Anti-Imperialism (New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, 2008), 138–139.

Twelve Victory and Defeat, 1973–80 1. Congressional Record, Vol. 119, No. 104. “American Politics: A Personal View,” January 21, 1973. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, George S. McGovern Papers, Box 810, Folder Congressional Record 1973 Speeches. 2. Ibid., 1. 3. Ibid., 4. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid., 5. 6. Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), 135. 7. Melvin Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Press Kansas, 1999), 200. 8. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate, 133. 9. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 200. 10. “Testimony of Senator George McGovern before the Joint Study Committee on Budget Control,” March 14, 1973. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, George S. McGovern Papers, Box 810, 1973 Speeches p. 2. 11. Ibid., 4. 12. Ibid., 5. 13. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 200–201. 14. Congress and the Nation, Volume IV, Key Votes—1973, 6. 15. The Notre Dame Scholastic, Notre Dame University. “Breakfast with George McGovern,” November 16, 1973. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, George S. McGovern Papers, Box 810, 1973 Speeches, p. 5. 16. Robert John Greene, The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Press Kansas, 1995), 141. 17. Ibid., 17. 18. “McGovern Child Nutrition Bill Sent to White House,” September 20, 1975. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, George S. McGovern Papers, Box 741, Statements.

Notes

245

19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. “McGovern Blasts Ford Veto of Food For Children,” October 3, 1975. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, George S. McGovern Papers, Box 741, Statements. 22. Ibid. 23. “Dole, McGovern, Introduce Major Food Stamp Reform Legislation,” October 2, 1975. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, George S. McGovern Papers, Box 741, Statements. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. “Omaha Speech,” November 16, 1975. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, George S. McGovern Papers, Box 741, Statements, p. 4. 27. Ibid., 4–5. 28. “New Politics and Old Values,” February 23, 1976. Address at the Woman’s National Democratic Club, Washington D.C. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, George S. McGovern Papers, Box 905, Speeches 1976, p. 1. 29. Ibid., 1. 30. Ibid., 5. 31. “American Liberalism: A Perspective,” June 28, 1976. Address of Senator McGovern to the Liberal Party of Canada, Winnipeg, Canada. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, George S. McGovern Papers, Box 905, Speeches 1976, p. 1. 32. Ibid., 1. 33. Ibid., 2. 34. “Remarks by Senator George McGovern at the Democratic National Convention,” July 13, 1976. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, George S. McGovern Papers, Box 905, Speeches. 35. Ibid., 1. 36. “Statement by Senator George McGovern on the Panama Canal Treaty,” January, 1978. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, George S. McGovern Papers, Box 918, Western Hemisphere-Panama(2). 37. Ibid., 1. 38. Ibid., 2. 39. “Hubert Humphrey Eulogy,” January 24, 1978. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, George S. McGovern Papers, Box 745, Congressional Record S 344. 40. Steven Roberts, “Fears on Rise About Growing Role of Religion in Election Campaign,” New York Times, September 22, 1980. http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/specials/ elections/1980/featured_article3.html.

Thirteen Redemption and the Election of Bill Clinton 1. Michael Gannon Interview, University of Florida Department of History. April 7, 1983. http://www.history.ufl.edu/oral/collections/FP/FP63.html. 2. Ibid. 3. David Broder, “A Lesson in Winning While Losing.” Ocala Star-Banner, February 15, 1984. http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1356&dat=19840215&id=qAsTAAAAIBAJ&sji d=FwYEAAAAIBAJ&pg=7059,8195669. 4. Sandy Grady, “McGovern Not Just Nostalgia Choice.” Boca Raton News, February 20, 1984. http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1291&dat=19840220&id=AdwPAAAAIB AJ&sjid=bY0DAAAAIBAJ&pg=3742,6479813.

246

Notes

5. The New York Times, “Campaign Notes; Nixon Writes McGovern On Phrase From Debate.” February 28, 1984. http://www.nytimes.com/1984/02/28/us/campaign-notes-nixonwrites-mcgovern-on-phrase-from-debate.html 6. “Old Values and New Directions,” Faneuil Hall, Boston, Massachusetts, March 9, 1984. http:// blogs.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=blog.view&friendId=113958578&blogId= 414473997. 7. The New York Times, “Time Now For a Declaration of Mideast Peace.” July 20, 1988. http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/20/opinion/l-time-now-for-a-declaration-of-mideast-peace-222188.html. 8. The New York Times, “McGovern Compares Notes With Dukakis.” November 17, 1988. http://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/17/us/mcgovern-compares-notes-with-dukakis.html. 9. The New York Times, “I’m Ready to Run in ‘92.” February 14, 1991. http://blogs.myspace. com/index.cfm?fuseaction=blog.view&friendId=113958578&blogId=414473997. 10. U.S. Elections, How Groups Voted in 1992. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/elections/ how_groups_voted/voted_92.html. 11. “Think You Know your Democratic Convention Trivia?” CNN Politics.com, August 26, 2008. http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/08/25/dems.convention.trivia/index.html. 12. Jo Freeman, “Change and Continuity for Women at the 1996 Republican and Democratic Conventions.” Published in Off Our Backs, January 1997, pp. 14–23. http://www.jofreeman.com/conventions/1996conven.htm#footnote1. 13. John Nichols, “George McGovern Backs Clinton,” The Nation, October 8, 2007. http:// www.thenation.com/blogs/thebeat/240861. 14. The Situation Room, “George McGovern Explains new Support for Obama,” May 7, 2008. http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0805/07/sitroom.02.html. 15. Daniel McCarthy, “The American Conservative, McGovern Beats Nixon: How the South Dakota Senator Remade the Right,” January 12, 2009. http://www.amconmag.com/ article/2009/jan/12/00016/. 16. George McGovern and William R. Polk, Out of Iraq; A Practical Plan to Withdraw Now (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2006), Foreword. 17. Ibid., 15. 18. Poverty News Blog, “Two Former US Senators Receive World Food Award.” http://povertynewsblog.blogspot.com/2008/11/two-former-us-senators-receive-world.html. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. S. Clayton Moore, Airport Journals, “The Outspoken American: Aviator, Senator and Humanitarian George McGovern,” May 2006. http://www.airportjournals.com/Display. cfm?varID=0605004.

BI BLIOGR A PH Y

Ambrose, Stephen E. The Wild Blue. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. Anson, Robert Sam. McGovern, A Biography. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972. Bornet, Vaughn Davis. The Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Press Kansas, 1983. Califano A. Joseph Jr. The Triumph & Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991. Dark, Taylor E. The Unions and the Democrats: An Enduring Alliance. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999. Dunn, Charles W., and J. David Woodward. American Conservatism From Burke to Bush. Maryland: Madison Books, 1991. Edwards, Lee. Goldwater: The Man Who Made a Revolution. Washington: Regnery, 1995. ———. The Conservative Revolution. New York: The Free Press, 1999. Farrell, John A. Tip O’Neill and the Democratic Century. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2001. Frum, David. Dead Right. New York: Basic Books, 1994. Goldman, Peter, and Tom Mathews. The Quest for the Presidency. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989. Goldwater, Barry M. The Conscience of a Conservative. New York: Manor Books Inc, 1975 [1960]. ———. With No Apologies. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1979. Goldwater, Barry M., and Jack Casserly. Goldwater. New York: Doubleday, 1988. Greene, Robert John. The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Press Kansas, 1995. Guthman, Edwin O., and C. Richard Allen. RFK Collected Speeches. New York: Viking/ Penguin Group, 1993. Heymann, David C. RFK. New York: Dutton/Penguin Group, 1998. Kauffman, Bill. Ain’t My America: The Long, Noble History of Antiwar Conservatism and Middle-American Anti-Imperialism. New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, 2008. Kaufman, Burton I. The Presidency of James Earl Carter Jr. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Press Kansas, 1993. Kirk, Russell. The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot (seventh edition). Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2001. Kitchel, Denison. The Truth About the Panama Canal. New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House Publishers, 1978.

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I N DE X

Adams, Abigail, 40 Adams, John, 40–41 Agriculture, 128–130 Ambrose, Stephen, 121 Anthony, Susan B., 14, 38 Arizona, 1, 4, 7–8, 21–23, 29–30, 35, 38, 44, 49, 54–55, 67, 75, 83, 85, 91, 97, 100, 111, 121, 126–127 Arizona Air National Guard, 8 Arizona Mafia, 38 Askew, Reuben, 214, 217 Avon, South Dakota, 121 Baker, Howard Jr., 84, 198 Ball, George W., 220 Barley, Rex, 52–53 Bayh, Birch, 96, 166, 172, 210 Biden, Joe, 109, 190 Broder, David, 217 Bryan, William Jennings, 14–15, 38 Buchanan, Pat, 31, 84, 187 Buckley, William F.,Jr., 9 Bush George H., 15, 26, 65, 84–85, 103, 109, 221, 224, 225 Bush George W., 18, 24, 43, 65, 229 Califano, Joseph Jr., 132–133 California primary Democratic, 152, 177–178, 181 Republican, 31 Cambodia, 58–61, 63, 115, 147, 164–167 Carswell, Harrold G., 62

Carter, Jimmy, 68–69, 73–75, 78–79, 82–87, 89, 91, 93–97, 104, 115, 190, 205–207, 209–210, 217 Barry Goldwater criticism of, 74–75, 78–80, 91 and challenge from Edward Kennedy, 84–86, 93–95, 209 on dealing with Tawain, 78–80 and debate with Reagan in 1980, 96 defeat in 1980 of, 96–97, 115, 210 as Democratic nominee in 1976, 73–74, 206–207 election in 1976 of, 68–69, 74–75, 192, 233 George McGovern not voting in 1976 for, 206 and handling of Iran hostage crisis, 82, 87–89 and Panama Canal Treaties, 75–78, 82 and relationship with “Tip” O’Neill, 75 and relations with China, 78–79, 82 as southern candidate, 35 and the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet Union, 89–90 The Case for Conservatism, 9 Chicago Tribune, 45–46 Chisholm, Shirley, 176–177 Church, Frank, 58, 96, 136, 165, 210 Civil Rights, 3, 9, 12–14, 17–18, 21–24, 27, 34, 36, 43–44, 114, 122, 130–132, 139, 147, 150, 232 Civil Rights Act of 1957, 18, 20

250

Index

Civil Rights Act of 1960, 18, 20 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3, 21, 24, 27, 34, 114, 130, 139 Clinton, Bill, 2, 15, 65, 75, 109, 213, 215, 217, 219, 221–227, 229–230, 234 Clinton, Hillary, 225–226 Committee to Reelect the President, 146, 177, 186, 198 Communism, 2, 10–11, 35, 48, 55–56, 67, 79–80, 91–92, 103, 114–115, 136, 141–142 Connally, John, 66, 84 The Conscience of a Conservative, 9, 14, 17 Conservatism, 9, 13, 26, 37, 49, 58, 80, 92, 104, 109–110, 113, 146, 205–207 Conservative beliefs as a majority, 87 see also Polls, Public Opinion The Conservative Mind, 9 Conventions, see Democratic Conventions; Republican Conventions Cooper, John Sherman, 165 Cooper/Church resolution, 60 Crane, Phillip, 84 Cranston, Alan, 166, 210, 214 CREEP, see Committee to Reelect the President Culver, John, 96, 210 Daley, Richard, 153–154, 157 Dallek, Robert, 161, 187 Dash, Sam, 198 Democratic Conventions, 26, 153–154, 157–158, 171–172 Democratic Party congressional losses in 1980, 213 congressional gains in 1982, 213 Dixiecrats, 24 Presidential losses of the, 155, 190, 210, 219–222 reform of, 132, 147, 157–161, 170–173, 182, 184, 188, 224–226, 232–233 and riots at 1968 convention, 57, 153–154, 157

split over civil rights, 13, 17, 34–35, 44, 131–132, 150 split over Vietnam policy, 57, 127, 133–140, 143, 147–150, 153–155, 157–160, 167–170, 175, 189 and the Paradigm shift, 3, 140, 175 as too liberal, 82 Demogrants, 180 Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, 134 Dixiecrat, 24 Dole, Bob, 4, 84, 102, 112, 130, 168, 202–203, 229 Dukakis, Michael, 26–27, 109, 146, 221–222, 224 Eagleton,Thomas F., 147, 182–186, 188–189 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 2, 8, 10, 13, 18, 21, 23, 27, 32–34, 41, 48, 67–68, 71, 85, 100, 106, 113, 123, 215 Election of 1960, 14, 17, 19 Election of 1964, 44, 46, 57 Election of 1968, 47, 155 Election of 1972, 190–191 Election of 1976, 35, 74, 192 Election of 1980, 35, 97, 210 Election of 1984, 15, 105 Election of 1988, 221 Election of 1992, 224–225 Election of 2000, 35 Election of 2004, 43 Election of 2008, 227 Ellsberg, Daniel, 63 The Emerging Repbublican Majority, 57 Ervin, Sam, 198 Fall of Saigon, 67, 200 Faneuil Hall, 218 Fannin, Paul, 49, 75 Food for Peace Program, 119, 128, 130–131, 140, 175, 233 see also under McGovern, George Stanley

Index Ford, Gerald R., 65–69, 71–75, 84, 87, 90, 200–201, 204, 206 Fraser, Donald, 158–160, 171–172, 177, 224–225, 232–233 Frum, David, 97 Fulbright, J. William., 124, 137, 143, 168 Garrido, Jon, 23 Gephardt, Richard, 109 Glenn, John, 214, 217–218 Goldwater, Barry Morris anticommunism, 48, 55–56, 67, 79–80, 91–92, 114–115 birth of, 7 challenge from Nelson Rockefeller, 30–31 choosing William Miller as vice-president, 35–36 civil rights view, 3, 9, 12–14, 17–18, 20–25, 27, 34, 43–44, 114 convention speech at 1964 convention, 38 death of, 111 on Dwight Eisenhower, 2, 8, 13, 18, 27, 32, 100, 113 election to the Senate in 1952, 8 election to the Senate in 1968, 54–55, 57 endorsement of Ford in 1976, 72–74 endorsement of Reagan in 1980, 85 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization act of 1986, 106 on Jimmy Carter, 74–76, 78–79, 82–83, 91–92 on Joe McCarthy, 11–12 Leadership of, 1, 14, 27, 37–38, 114, 116, 193, 221 military service as a pilot, 7–8 opposition to the Panama Canal Treaties, 76–77 presidential campaign of 1964, 29–50 Presidential Medal of Freedom awarded from Reagan, 107–109 running against John Kennedy, 30, 40

251

speech at 1960 convention, 12–13 support of Nixon in Vietnam, 63–64 views on Lyndon Johnson, 29, 42–43 views on Vietnam, 52–62 wife Peggy, 40, 109 Grandmaison, Joe, 177 Green, John Robert, 66 Greenspan Commission, 102 Goodell, Charles, 163, 168 Gore, Al, 35, 45, 224 The Great Society, 2, 43, 68, 98, 122–124, 134, 139, 195, 213 see also Johnson, Lyndon B. Gruening, Ernest, 124, 136–137, 143, 149, 166 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 124, 136–137, 166–167 Haig, Alexander, 188 Harris, Fred, 158 Hart, Gary, 15, 104, 176, 214, 217–219 Hartke, Vance, 176 Hatfield, Mark, 60–61, 166, 168–169, 203 Hatfield/McGovern amendment, 166–169 Haynsworth, Clement F.Jr., 58 Ho Chi Minh City, 200 Hollings, Frtiz, 214, 217 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, 134 Hruska, Roman, 23, 26 Humphrey, Hubert H. as 1968 democratic nominee for president, 47, 55, 57, 147, 150–155, 157–158, 160, 232 as a candidate in 1972, 171–172, 176–181, 189 death of, 39, 208–209 as vice-presidential choice, 36–37, 44 Invasion of Kuwait, 222 Iowa, 30, 72, 84–85, 178, 217–218, 226–227

252

Index

Iraq, 43, 64, 103, 124, 222, 228–229 Israel, 103, 122, 170, 215, 220–221 Jackson, Henry “Scoop,” 4, 172, 176, 181 Jackson, Jesse, 104, 109, 217–218 Jarvis, Howard, 80–82 Johnson, Lyndon B. and 1964 election, 24, 29, 34–36, 40–45, 51, 57, 74, 98, 126–127, 130, 155, 193, 232 and The Great Society, 2, 43, 68, 98, 122–124, 134, 139, 195 and Vietnam, 24, 43–45, 48, 59, 63, 113, 115, 124, 127, 134–137, 139–145, 147–148, 150, 153 on voting for George McGovern in 1972, 188 Johnston, Marcia, 177 Kauffman, Bill, 146–147, 189 Kemp, Jack, 90, 97, 99, 109 Kennedy, Edward, 84–85, 93–95, 168, 171–172, 209 Kennedy, John F. on appointing George McGovern to run the Food for Peace Program, 119, 128, 175 assassination of, 14, 25–27, 119, 126 on civil rights, 17, 34 economic record of, 24–25 The New Frontier of, 2, 13–14, 98, 113, 195 signing Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 130 as victorious candidate for president, 30, 57, 155 Vietnam policy of, 63–64, 115 Kennedy, Robert F., 135–136, 143, 145–147, 149–151, 154 as attorney general, 15–16 as candidate for President in 1968, 149–151 Khachigian,Ken, 187 King, Martin Luther, 14, 17, 34, 114, 130–131, 147

Kirk, Russell, 9 Kirkland, Lane, 102 Kissinger, Henry, 161, 165, 200 Kitchel, Denison, 38, 77 Klutznick, Phillip M., 220 Kuhn, Thomas S., 49 Kutler, Stanley, 165 Leadership, 1, 14, 37, 55, 83, 92–93, 108, 114, 116, 130, 137, 140, 155, 158, 164, 167, 175, 177, 182, 193, 195, 200–203, 217, 221–222, 231–233 Levine, Susan, 111 Lewis, John, 114 Liberalism, 7, 9–10, 13, 37, 109, 159, 172, 180, 195, 205–207, 213, 221–222, 224, 228 Liberalism on the decline, 195, 205–207, 213, 224 Lindsay, John V., 171–172, 176–177 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 30–31 Loeb, William, 85 Long, Russell, 144 Los Angeles Times, 52–54 Lovre, Harold, 119 Lowenstein, Allard, 150–151 Lucey, Patrick J., 182 The Making of the President 1960, 12 The Making of the President 1964, 30 Mankiewicz, Frank, 176 Marano, Richard Michael, 217 Massachusetts, 26, 41, 97, 148, 178, 185, 190, 194, 200, 206–207, 216, 218–219, 221–222, 228, 233 McCain, John, 19, 31, 115, 227–228 McCarthy, Daniel, 227–228 McCarthy, Eugene, 36, 137, 140, 148, 150, 171, 176–177 McCarthy, Joe, 8, 10–12, 19 McCullough, David, 40 McGovern, George Stanley acid, amnesty, and abortion, 178, 185, 189

Index on agriculture,128–130 announcement for president in 1972, 169–170 announcement for president in 1984, 214–216 birth of, 121 California challenge at convention, 182 civil rights views of, 130–131 as congressman, 119, 189 convention speech, 183–184 on daughter Terry, 230 encouragement from Nixon in 1984, 218 as Food for Peace director, 119, 128, 130–131, 140, 175, 233 honors from Bill Clinton, 230, 233 leadership of, 1, 130, 137, 140, 155, 158, 164, 167, 175, 177, 183, 193, 195, 200–203, 217, 221, 231–233 military service as a bomber pilot, 121, 131, 146, 152, 162, 183, 223, 231 on nuclear weapons, 213–215 as potential candidate in 1968, 150–154 presidential campaign of 1972, 175–192 presidential campaign of 1984, 214–219 primary debate with Hubert Humphrey, 179–180 senatorial defeat in 1980, 210 speeches on Vietnam, 123, 142–144 on support for Hillary Clinton, 226 on supporting Panama Canal Treaties, 207–208 on vietnam withdrawal, 170 wife Eleanor, 146, 169, 230, 234 working with Bob Dole, 130, 202–203, 229 McGovern/Fraser Commission, 159, 224–225, 233 McNamara,Robert, 63, 134 Meany, George, 160 Medicare, 19, 25, 27, 134, 139 Meet the Press, 185–186 Middle East, 103, 121, 130, 170, 215, 220–221

253

Military Spending, 99, 124–127, 184, 215–216 Miller, William, 35–37, 44 Mills, Wilbur, 176 Miroff, Bruce, 158–159, 171–172 Mondale, Walter “Fritz,” 4, 15, 104–105, 115, 146, 166, 214, 217–220, 222, 224 Morse, Wayne, 124, 136–137, 143, 149, 166 Moynihan, Pat, 102 Mundt, Karl, 119 Muskie, Edmund, 31, 112, 171–172, 176–178, 181, 188–190 Mutual Defense Treaty, 78 National School Lunch and Child Nutrition Act Amendments of 1975, 201 Nelson, Gaylord, 96, 124, 136, 143, 149, 166, 182, 186, 188, 210 The New Deal, 2, 8–9, 18, 32, 48, 57, 71, 94, 195, 213 Newfield, Jack, 136, 151 The New Frontier, 2, 13–14, 98, 113, 195 see also Kennedy, John F. Nixon, Richard M. Barry Goldwater defending of, 10 on compact with Nelson Rockefeller, 12–13, 17 Gerald Ford pardon of, 68–69, 90 invasion of Cambodia by, 58–61, 63, 115, 164–167 as nominee in 1960, 12–14, 41 as nominee in 1968, 47, 55, 57, 155, 157 and the 1972 campaign for President, 180, 186–187, 189–191 as vice president, 10 Vietnam policy of, 161–169, 187–189, 196, 200 Watergate scandal for, 39, 58, 64–66, 68, 87, 90, 113, 184, 198–200, 233 Notre Dame University, 198

254

Index

Novak, Robert, 185–186 Nunn, Sam, 105–108, 222 Obama, Barack, 35, 41, 102, 226–228 O’Brien, Larry, 182 O’Connor, Sandra Day, 100–101 O’Neill, Thomas “Tip,” 75, 102, 188–189 Oppenheimer, Andres, 77 Paine, Thomas, 14, 140 Palestine Liberation Organization, 103, 215, 220–221 Panama Canal Treaty, 72–73, 75–78, 82, 207–208, 220, 223 Paradigm shift, 50, 116, 140, 175 Pepper, Claude, 102 Percy, Charles, 80 Perot, Ross, 15, 224–225 The Phil Donahue Show, 2 Phillips, Kevin, 57, 133 Phoenix, Arizona, 7–8, 22–23, 29, 51, 53, 100 P.L.O, see Palestine Liberation Organization Pokorny, Gene, 177–178 Polk, William R., 228 Polls, Public Opinion, 87, 96, 144, 171–172, 176–177, 180 Presidential maps, votes by county 1964, 46 1968, 47 1972, 191 1976, 192 Primaries Democratic, 74, 85, 104, 148–152, 159–160, 171, 176–178, 180–181, 184, 218–219, 228, 233 Republican, 30–31, 49, 66, 72–73, 84–85, 161 Reagan, Ronald acceptance speech at 1980 Republican convention, 92–93 as a candidate in 1980, 84–86 as a conservative, 87

debate with Jimmy Carter, 96 economic plan as president, 99–100 on nomination of Sandra Day O’Connor to Supreme Court, 100–101 Presidential Medal of Freedom awarded to Barry Goldwater, 107–109 on the primary challenge to President Ford, 71–73 Reagan Democrats, 95, 233 reelection in 1984, 4, 15, 104–105, 219 on sending U.S. Marines to Lebanon, 103 on social security reform, 101–102 as topic at 1980 Democratic Convention, 94–95 on winning the 1980 election, 2, 35, 96, 210 Republican Conventions, 12–13, 16, 22, 26, 29–31, 38, 41, 45 Republican Party congressional gains, 57, 69, 133, 190, 213 congressional losses in 1974, 200 and conservative takeover, 15–17, 27, 30–34, 38, 49, 66–67, 71–74, 82, 85, 90–93 as controlled by the Eastern Establishment, 12, 16, 85 Liberals in the, 14, 58 Moderates in the, 13–14, 18, 32, 84, 165 presidential losses of the, 44, 224–225, 227 and race, 17, 23–24, 57 and the paradigm shift, 9, 38, 49, 116 Rhodes, James, 32 Ribicoff, Abraham, 154, 182 Robb, Chuck, 222 Rockefeller, Nelson A., 12–14, 17–18, 30–31, 66–68, 71, 85 Sanford, Terry, 176 Schulz, Bill, 97

Index Scott, Hugh, 65 Scranton, William, 31–32, 35–36, 39–40, 42 Segal, Jerome, 220 Shriver, Sargent, 147, 182, 186 Shrum, Robert, 186 The Silent Majority, 57, 163–164, 228 Small, Melvin,67, 196 Smith, Allen W., 102 Social Security Act of 1965, 134 Southern Democrats, 7, 114, 139, 150 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 82–83, 89, 106–108, 124 Sparkman, John, 112 Stevenson, Adlai, 8, 11, 41, 45, 205 Stockman, David, 99 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 49 Taft, Robert A., 8, 19, 23, 97 Taiwan, 78–80 Taylor, Maxwell, 141 Thorsness, Leo K., 200 Thurmond, Strom, 13, 17, 24, 76, 112 Torrijos, Omar, 72, 76 Truman, Harry, 10–11, 22–23, 57, 114, 121, 127, 155, 231 U.S. Supreme Court, 17, 58, 62, 78, 100–101, 182, 197, 203–204

255

Van Dyke,Ted, 176 Vietnamization, 63, 115 Vietnam War, 2, 24, 30, 37, 39, 43–45, 48, 51–64, 67, 75, 82, 87, 113, 115, 122–124, 127, 130, 133–137, 139–148, 150, 153, 157–158, 160–170, 175, 178–179, 181, 187–189, 196, 200–201, 209, 217, 222, 226, 231, 233 Vote your Conscience. The Last Campaign of George McGovern, 217 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 22, 130 Wallace, George, 47, 57, 147, 155, 176–178, 180–181, 204 Wallace, Henry A., 121 Watergate, 39, 58, 64–66, 68, 87, 90, 113, 184, 198–200, 233 Watts Riot, 132–133 White, Kevin, 182 White, Theodore H., 12, 30, 152–153 The Wild Blue, 121 Wilkins, Roy, 23 Williams, John J., 36 Wilson, Francis, 9 Wilson, Woodrow, 38, 122, 127, 131, 194 Yorty, Sam, 176 Young, Andrew, 22 Young, Stephen M., 136–137, 149