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Literary personification has long been taken for granted as an important aspect of Western narrative; Paul de Man has given it still greater prominence as 'the master trope of poetic discourse.' James Paxson here offers a much-needed critical and theoretical appraisal of personification in the light of poststructuralist thought and theory. The poetics of personification provides a historical reassessment of early theories, together with a sustained account of how literary personification works through an examination of narratological and semiotic codes and structures in the allegorical texts of Prudentius, Chaucer, Langland and Spenser. The device turns out to be anything but an aberration, oddity, or barbarism, from ancient, medieval, or early modern literature. Rather, it works as a complex artistic tool for revealing and advertizing the problems and limits inherent in narration in particular and poetic or verbal creation in general.
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The poetics of personification
Literature, Culture, Theory
General editors RICHARD MACKSEY, The Johns Hopkins University and MICHAEL SPRINKER, State University of New York at Stony Brook
The Cambridge Literature, Culture, Theory series is dedicated to theoretical studies in the human sciences that have literature and culture as their object of enquiry. Acknowledging the contemporary expansion of cultural studies and the redefinitions of literature that this has entailed, the series includes not only original works of literature theory but also monographs and essay collections on topics and seminal figures from the long history of theoretical speculation on the arts and human communication generally. The concept of theory embraced in the series is broad, including not only the classical disciplines of poetics and rhetoric, but also those of aesthetics, linguistics, psychoanalysis, semiotics, and other cognate sciences that have inflected the systematic study of literature during the past half century. Titles published Return to Freud: Jacques Lacan's dislocation of psychoanalysis SAMUEL WEBER
(translated from the German by Michael Levine) Wordsworth, dialogics, and the practice of criticism DON H. BIALOSTOSKY
The subject of modernity ANTHONY J. CASCARDI
Onomatopoetics: theory of language and literature JOSEPH GRAHAM
Parody: ancient, modern, and post-modern MARGARET ROSE
The poetics of personification JAMES PAXSON
Possible worlds in literary theory RUTH RONEN
The poetics of personification JAMES J. PAXSON Iona College, New Rochelle
| CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo, Delhi Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521106313 © Cambridge University Press 1994 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1994 This digitally printed version 2009 A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Paxson, James J. The poetics of personification/James J. Paxson. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-521-44539-6 1. Personification in literature. 2. Literature, Medieval — History and criticism. 3. Rhetoric, Medieval. 4. Allegory. I. Title. PN56.P38P39 1994 809'.915-dc20 93-15561 CIP ISBN 978-0-521-44539-9 hardback ISBN 978-0-521-10631-3 paperback
For my parents, Marge and Bud Paxson
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Introduction
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A history of personification theory
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Narrative level, personification, and character ontology in Prudentius' Psychomachia
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A phenomenology of personification
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Personification, dreams, and narrative structures in P/ers Plowman B
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Conclusion: Taxonomy II and future directions in personification theory
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Preface
As I completed the final revisions of The Poetics of Personification, I saw more and more the need to continue work on this strange device in a range of purviews only touched on in this study. I especially care to persist in examining the cultural and public constructions of personification or rhetorical embodiment in our own political and popular culture. Although I argue in this book that we have moved past a historical era when personificational literature was powerful and esteemed, I have looked suspiciously and curiously at governmental rhetoric of late: no one could miss the significance of President George Bush's charges against the One Evil Man, Saddam Hussein, who personified all the miseries of the 1990 Persian Gulf War and all the ills of contemporary Iraq. I therefore hope that this specialized book, which largely addresses a readership interested in literary theory (and in the stakes of deconstruction, in particular) and medieval allegorical literature, will prompt further interest in the continuing global implications of figural language and thought in a decisively postmodern era. The essential frame of this book began as my doctoral dissertation which I completed while holding a State University of New York Dissertation Fellowship during 1988-89. I thank, first and foremost, my wife Tammy for helping me find the time to read, write, and revise during that year and over the subsequent three years, while we were more than busy — both working and trying to raise our two babies, Maggie and John. I give special thanks to Rose A. Zimbardo, Martin Stevens, Michael Sprinker, and Thomas E. Maresca for reading and commenting on the three or so drafts that this thing has been through. I am indebted to Tom Maresca for our numerous discussions on allegory and personification; indeed, he prompted my strong interest in allegory theory in general. To my friend Jeffrey Williams I also give a special thank you. Jeff and I have had many talks - often long distance - on the current state of theory and the profession, on
Preface narratology, and on deconstruction. I wish also to extend thanks to an informal - and sempiternal, so it seems - study group I join regularly at Columbia University: Christopher Baswell, Sealy Gilles, Joan Haahr, Robert W. Hanning, Sandra Pierson Prior, Nancy Reale, Anne Schotter, Robert Stein, and Sylvia Tomasch. These generous and supportive persons have heard and read bits and pieces of this project as it came together. I am likewise grateful to my colleague at Iona College, Thomas Pendleton, with whom I endlessly discuss the problems of personification in Shakespeare — a peculiar critical problem that will warrant its own study as fast as I can get into it! Like the shimmering Body Politic of medieval political theory, this study offers a Face for the help from a legion of friends, colleagues, and teachers.
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Personification, or prosopopeia, has enjoyed serious attention only in recent critical and literary theory. The readily spotted figure — through which a human identity or " face" is given to something not human-was for years automatically equated with "allegory." 1 Moreover, personificational allegory was thought of as wooden, tedious, obvious, simple, and juvenile.2 But a recrudescence in allegory theory, founded largely on more incisive readings of the classical rhetoricians and the Church Fathers, rehabilitated the mysterious narrative mode called allegory and in turn removed personification from its purview.3 Next, poststructuralist thinkers re-evaluated, along with allegory, the highly complex nature and key value of personification in literary discourse. Of late, prosopopeia has even come to enjoy theoretical primacy over irony and metaphor. Paul de Man has proclaimed it "the master trope of poetic discourse" (Resistance 48). The present book aims to extend and enrich the current theoretical rehabilitation of personification begun by de Man, J. Hillis Miller, and others. Granted, the deconstructive theory of personification (like the deconstructive theory of "allegory") seems to expand to the point where it encompasses all narrative or lyric. This book tries to reach a theoretical line of mediation between the poststructural posture wherein all kinds of poetic knowledge register an "allegorical" and "prosopopoetic" cognition, and the traditional critical posture that attends to canonically received (and for the most part pre-modern) allegorical texts. The first step in such a rethinking of personification must thus be a careful investigation of its formal nature, for tropological poetics is certainly the methodological common ground shared by poststructural deconstruction and traditional grammatical or rhetorical theory and praxis. I contend that the trope, especially in the works of certain major authors, is sufficiently complex — as are irony, metaphor, metonymy, or catachresis — to warrant minute structural description. Such a description should provide the ar-
The poetics of personification ticulation of a formal system or a set of laws that govern the creation and functions of personified characters - in short, a "poetics" of personification. Ideally, this projected poetics should entail treating examples of literary personification from many different periods and national traditions, including an analysis of the historical fountainhead of Western literary personification: the personified abstractions seen on Achilles' shield in the Iliad or those that people Hesiod's imaginative genealogies in his Theogony. In this line of works stand Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound, Book vi of Vergil's Aeneid, the works of Martianus Capella, Boethius, Allan of Lille, Bernardus Silvestris, Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun, and so on. For practical purposes it should suffice to establish the preliminary grounds for such a poetics upon the detailed examination of four canonically major authors who use a variety of methods in the invention of personification characters. The texts under study are Prudentius' Psychomachia, two of Chaucer's long allegorical dream poems as well as The Nuns Priest's Tale, Langland's Piers Plowman, and Spenser's The Faerie Queene. The selection of texts and authors is not intended to posit a chronologically chartable, genetic line of evolution. Nor does it imply that the works of the four authors under discussion are, by necessity, superior to other examples from the allegorical tradition in a formally qualitative sense. That is, canonically " great" authors do not always employ tropes in cleverer, more profound ways. Texts of minor authors, works of popular culture (like modern cinematic cartoons), or bits of everyday speech for that matter, can contain personification figures of a complex nature. The texts in this book's selection reveal paradigmatic employments of personification that best dramatize the formal codes which constitute the trope and that in turn advertise the limits of tropological formalization. The first chapter of this study isolates the theoretical problem in terms of an historical survey of ideas about personification. Here, I consider the opinions of Aristotle and the classical rhetoricians Demetrius, Cicero, the Rhetorica Ad Herennium author, and Quintilian. I mention the work of major medieval writers on the subject, such as Bede and Geoffrey of Vinsauf. And I include theories offered by certain Renaissance thinkers, such as Erasmus, Henry Peacham, George Puttenham, or Richard Sherry. I also treat Enlightenment and Romantic theorists like Fontanier, Lord Kames, and Coleridge. The considerations of personification by twentieth-century theorists caps the
Introduction
historical survey in chapter 1 but also punctuates the whole study. My intention here is to trace and compare the ways in which ideas about personification evolve through time, and to highlight theoretical treatments that do handle personification as a complex device. As a sideline, this comparative program supplies brief etymological points regarding the successive connotations of terms like "prosopopeia," "conformatio," or "personification." In line with the spirit of the diachronic sketch in chapter 1, the second chapter of the book reassesses the conventional terminology associated with personification. The subject cries out for rigorous taxonomy. Many literary characters who appear in personification narratives are automatically and decisively labeled "personifications." Such a general type-label makes no distinction among the textual and ontological statuses of what might be radically different fictional entities. For example, the mute and blank characters whom Aeneas encounters at the gate of the underworld in Book Six of Vergil's epic are poetically or formally different from the outspoken and minutely described figures who converse with and instruct the dreamer in Piers Plowman. Yet, conventional criticism treats these quite different categories of figural character invention as though they were the same. As the example shows, the speaking aspect of a prosopopeia is essential in describing a personification character's essential status. Thus, a primary taxonomic point must be the presence, absence, or varieties of speech produced by such characters. Another primary point has to do with labels or names of personification figures: are they named? How fully? In what languages? Taxonomy is crucial to any effective formal poetics. The taxonomic tactic in this chapter centers, of course, on the structural distinction of personification used as a component of narrative discourse and as a component of narrative story or fabular, material event. This distinction, in turn, shapes much of the book's theoretical framework, which in some way addresses the thematization of or focalization on the coded structures of personification evinced in the works of four principal authors. Chapter 3 deals with the Psychomachia, and centers upon a narratological program analyzing "layers" or levels of diegesis in Prudentius' narrative. This program of analysis also tries to account for the relationship, from the Apologetic and Patristic periods on, between personification and the traditional medieval four-level paradigm of literal and extra-literal signification. From the topic of diegetic structuration in Prudentius' poem, I move
The poetics of personification in chapter 4 to the sketch of a phenomenological model that explains the textual " generation" of personification figures. (Rather than an apology for phenomenology as an epistemological mode, the chapter provides the framework for showing how personificational thinking in medieval literature presages modern philosophical or critical phenomenology.) Such characters, I will show, are figural indices of a psychically or spiritually diminished narrator. This argument involves a brief excursus into medieval notions of psychology and sin. I also show its application to problems of narrative structure and the thematic foregrounding, specifically in The House of Fame and The Parliament of Fowls, of images and ideas of pictorial art. Via a consequent discussion of narratorial " diminution " and a review of the philosophical notion of acedia or " sloth," I take up a discussion of personification in chapter 5 of Langland's Piers Plowman. In this chapter, I shall argue that the embedded dreams of this peculiar and complex Middle English poem correspond to layered diegetic registers. Taking the cue from the second chapter of my study, I also map out the variety of denominational methods Langland employs for naming the species of his figural characters. The chapter focuses on the uncovering and articulation of a precise proairetic code that programs the means by which Langland's narrator, Will, recognizes, names, and interacts with various personification figures. This code is determined, of course, by the poem's complex narratological structure. Chapter 6 devotes itself to what tradition has undoubtedly cast as the grandest of personification narratives in English letters - The Faerie Queene. Clearly the fields of personification theory and Renaissance studies require a multi-volume study of the personification figures, their variety and variability, in Spenser's poem. No doubt, my confined look at personification in two or so Books of The Faerie Queene will feel too brief given the vast scale of the poem. But my focal interest in this chapter falls upon several sites in the poem where Spenser, like his two innovative predecessors, self-consciously plays with and foregrounds the features of personification understood as an artificial, complex, literary trope. I first examine the final cantos of Book 11, where Sir Guyon encounters such figures as Eumnestes ("Memory") in Alma's House of Temperance. In this section of his poem, Spenser constantly foregrounds and examines ideas and images of language, writing, texts, and textualized entities to which he gives human or other substantial form. I also examine cantos 11 and 12 of Book iv, in which we meet the peculiar pageant-procession of the
Introduction
personified Rivers. This site in Spenser's poem offers a sustained examination of types of figural character invention and the problem of narrative temporality. I demonstrate the process by which Spenser's passages on the personified Rivers of the world deconstruct traditional formal notions of literary character, description, and narration. In addition, my discussions of characters including Error, Duessa, Orgoglio, Malbecco (Jealousy) and Death disclose how Spenser's text narrates the literalized moment of the "making" or "unmaking" of a personification figure. By these examinations of Prudentius, Chaucer, Langland, and Spenser, I seek to show how these texts embody art that is far more sophisticated than the simple visual or functional verbal personification that had nearly turned serious critical inspection away from the face of the trope.4 Indeed, fewer and fewer thinkers today believe in the old "axiomatic association" between personification and allegory. But even misdirected wisdom finds its basis in some truth. Is there a direct and sometimes necessary connection between personification and allegory? Basing my conception of allegory on the most current, complex, insightful, and convincing theoretical models of this mysterious narrative mode, I attempt in my Conclusion to show how and why the use of personification figuration by Prudentius, Chaucer, Langland, and Spenser might well operate as the basis of narrative allegory. Because these authors handle the trope in elaborately selfreflexive and metafictional ways, their creative methods are crucial to the kind of genuine allegory described in current literary theory.5 Although the object of this study is to establish a formal poetics of personification based in part on the readings of four canonical Western authors, I end with a sketch of plausible theoretical models, not yet established, of the essential or ontological status of the trope as a master or key trope, a "metafigure." In this sketch, I consider personification as the trope or figure of several principles — from narration to characterization, from figuration itself to Derrida's concept of relever as a possible concomitant of the process he calls "metaphorization." Many of these ideas I develop as proposals or prospectuses for future directions in a total theory of personification. Chief among these proposals is the potential historical materialist implication of a long-range historical survey of literary personification. Such a historical program could explore how, when, and why, certain of the major features of personification figuration and fabulation arise when they do. For instance, what characteristics of the ideological
The poetics of personification superstructure of late Rome inform the advent of literary paysage moralise or the helium intestinuml What characteristics of medieval ideology inform the debate or the pageant-procession topos? What, aside from grammatical gender, was responsible for the fact that all personification figures prior to the sixth century A.D. were exclusively and necessarily female? The primary aim of these concluding propositions is to show that a formal poetics is still far from being exhaustively descriptive of the nature of literary personification, one of the most curious and compelling effects in Western art and literature. One more foundational assumption that underlies the interests of this study needs clarification at the outset. In examining personification figures that appear in Prudentius, Chaucer, Langland, and Spenser, I shall avoid those fantastic characters who are termed "gods." The Olympian deities of Homer's Iliad or Hesiod's Theogony indeed seem to be embodied abstract concepts named in Greek that were adopted as the objects of ancient Achaean veneration. However, describing the historical origin of the gods who constitute an animistic or totemistic pantheon is an anthropological problem, not a literary or poetic one. At the close of his brilliant study of allegory and personification, Jon Whitman aptly identifies this special scholarly project: In short, it is necessary to distinguish two meanings of the term " personification." One refers to the practice of giving an actual personality to an abstraction. This practice has its origins in animism and ancient religion, and is called "personification" by modern theorists of religion and anthropology. U71) For instance, when Joseph Campbell, in any one of his popular books on mythology, calls Isis a "personification" of procreative energy, he invokes this anthropological understanding of the term.6 Whitman goes on to distinguish this understanding from its more proper and familiar literary and rhetorical use: The other meaning of "personification," the one used throughout this study, is the historical sense of prosopopoeia. This refers to the practice of giving a consciouslyfictionalpersonality to an abstraction, "impersonating" it. This rhetorical practice requires a separation between the literary pretense of a personality, and the actual state of affairs. Thus, we cannot properly speak of literary "personification" when Homer calls "fire" by the name of "Hephaestus" ... who is also described as a personal god. (271-72) Even with this formal distinction in mind, Whitman still attends (14—20) to the appearance of deific, embodied abstractions in the Iliad,
Introduction
perhaps because his study is structured as a historical genealogy of personification allegories that must have a chronological starting place. The present study closely adheres at least to Whitman's theoretical distinction. The move forecloses the need to look at preChristian literary texts that contain fantastic characters and embodiments that are most likely animistic entities. (Consequently, chapter 1 of this book bypasses theoretical discussions like Vico's analysis in The New Science [120 ff.] of the animistic and "personificational" origins of the gods.) It also forecloses the need to become absorbed in the gods or other mythical characters who frequently inhabit the works of Chaucer or Spenser. This is not to say that the study ignores a character like Venus in Chaucer's The House of Fame. Rather, she is examined only in structural relation to genuine personification characters - to those "embodied abstractions'' which, as Whitman notes, had only a "fictional" and never an "actual" basis in reality. Characters designated as "gods," incidentally, might be more properly considered "numinous" figures. These constitute a category which I attempt, in chapter 2, to define in comparison to true personifications. Still, the distinctions among gods, ghosts, genii, fantastic creatures, and personification characters were not always clear even to the principal theorists of classical, medieval, or Renaissance rhetoric. The historical discussion that follows will bear this out. It will also provide this study with a minimum currency of taxonomic insights and methodological departure points.
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I The sensible starting place for a theoretical investigation into personification would be a comprehensive historical survey of writings that discuss the trope. The modern critical voices placed in the Introduction of. this study are, for the most part, theoretical devaluations of personification. These voices also represent the major positions in a critical dialogue that has emerged mainly in the service of the theoretical "rescue" of allegory as a privileged, superior, mysterious narrative mode. But a coordinate critical dialogue that treats personification as a valuable and sophisticated commodity must also be articulated as a history. This dialogue also has its inception in the rhetorical treatises of antiquity, and culminates in a collection of occasionally offbeat documents produced by a handful of contemporary literary and rhetorical theorists. Ideally, mapping this second dialogue would entail treating every recorded mention of the trope personification, however brief or matter-of-fact, from the era of Aristotle's Rhetoric and forward through the history of Western grammatical and. rhetorical theory. But such a compendious historical survey would not really serve to elucidate the true nature of personification; it might, on the contrary, support the theoretical camps that devalue the trope. This is because we would be faced with a mountain of summary, formulaic, aphoristic utterances about prosopopeia and its relatives. The uniformity and sheer mass of these utterances would defuse the ostensibly delicate and powerful virtue of the trope. Most "histories" of what is commonly conceived of as "rhetoric" themselves suffer from just such an obsession with the pathology of the compendium. The conception of rhetoric as a mountain of data that involves the sheer naming and identification of all conceivable tropes, schemes, figures, and topics of invention is the degenerative legacy of classical
History of personification theory
logic and rhetoric in the Middle Ages and after. As Richard McKeon explains: The history of rhetoric as it has been written since the Renaissance is ... in part the distressing record of the obtuseness of writers who failed to study the classics and to apply rhetoric to literature, and in part the monotonous enumeration of doctrines, or preferably sentences, repeated from Cicero or commentators on Cicero. (260) In the Middle Ages, rhetoric failed to hold as its primary interest the discovery, invention, and implication of topics and arguments; rather, it pursued the taxonomic obsession best suited to the compilatio or the scholia formats of treatise composition. Medieval, Renaissance, and Neoclassical rhetorics provided collections of sentences and terse passages that named any conceivable number of tropes and figures. These collections were supplemented with literary examples originally conceived by Cicero or Quintilian. The two great Roman rhetoricians, in fact, are the seminal sources for medieval rhetoricians. McKeon continues: Scholarly labors have reconstructed only a brief and equivocal history for rhetoric during the Middle Ages. The development consists of slight and original increments of erudition in the compendia composed from the fourth to the ninth century - derived largely from the De Inventione of Cicero and the Ad Herennium — and in later commentaries and treatises to the elaboration of coherent and complex doctrines in the twelfth century based on Quintilian and the later rhetorical works of Cicero, the Orator, the De oratore, and the Topica.
(260)
Most of the entries, then, in a tentative history of the trope personification would repeat the original musings of Demetrius, Cicero, the Rhetorica ad Herennium author, and Quintilian. Only after " rhetoric disappears when knowledge of it is at a maximum " (McKeon 260), would we find the possibility of entirely fresh and original theoretical considerations of personification. Historically, this point of maximization is located by Paul Ricoeur and Tzvetan Todorov in the writings of the "last rhetorician in Europe," Pierre Fontanier (Rule 4; Symbol 69-70). The rigorously formal and aesthetic appraisal of tropes and figures is coterminous only with the rise of modern literary criticism. (Earlier, of course, the description and appraisal of tropes was often deferred from rhetoric to grammar; see Copeland 13-17.) Nonetheless, a selective historical survey of theories and ideas about
The poetics of personification personification should prove illuminating. The project, however, requires acknowledgement of some problems involved in writing any kind of history, whether of forms, ideas, topoi, or texts. Writing a history of the trope personification might automatically assume the tactic of literary history as it has been conceived during much of the twentieth century. Tropes and figures, as discreet formal entities, can be likened to texts. The temptation to see them as precursors or successors in a lengthy chronological chain is always present. We could fall prey to the impulse of seeing the history of a given trope as a genetic order in which earlier, literary implementations or theoretical conceptions of the trope evolve into richer, more complex and mature, later versions — versions made possible by the more highly evolved temperaments of creative men and women in chronologically later periods. A genetic history of tropes would parallel the genetic or organic history of literary texts of the kind criticized by R. S. Crane {History 32—33). Yet, in abandoning the organic models of literary history offered by, say, Taine or Cazamian, Crane inadvertently articulates the design of a history of figures which valorizes the function of the formally internal properties of texts. He indeed understands an evolution, through history, of modes, genres, forms, and by extension, formal figures and tropes (Sprinker 126—33, 145). In fact, Crane specifically mentions the chronological evolution of figures: "We may thus say theoretically ... that there is a tendency in the literary arts to move from ... simple metaphors to complex and difficult ones" {History 33). Even though Crane admits that "in any given situation in history the [evolutionary] order may be reversed," he has programmed his history of forms and figures as a genealogy. Crane's genealogy, directed to a perfective telos and self-generating, is not unlike the pervasive phylogenetic image of history identified by de Man, in "Literary History and Literary Modernity," as a "temporal hierarchy that resembles a parental structure" {Blindness 164). But the advents and implementations of tropes like personification, through history, hardly conform to a phylogenetic model. Not only are individual figures resistant to an evolutionary model, so are any historically successive conceptions of figuration in general. The successive and historically determined statuses of figuration or tropology are impossible to calculate according to a linear calendar of Western intellectual history. That is, the ethical and axiological valorization of figures that are conceived either as poetic forms or as affective vehicles cannot be made parallel to sequentially successive
History of personification theory
chronological periods. It is common knowledge that figuration, as a constituent part of literary discourse, was appreciated as a positive, ornamental, and pleasing commodity in the Horatian tradition.1 The sentiment is upheld by Sidney in his A Defense of Poetry (28—29) and echoed by his Renaissance contemporaries. According to Henry Peacham, the notorious figure allegory " serveth most likely to ingrave the lively images of things" on the human mind, "wherein wit and iudgement take pleasure'' (29). But paradoxically, the figure allegory as it was described by Demetrius eighteen centuries earlier was seen to cause unease, fear, and displeasure in readers (11.100). A widespread notion in the Middle Ages, most emphatically voiced by the rhetorician and dogmatist John Balbus of Genoa, held that all figuration was a negative and evil commodity (Murphy 186).2 How can we systematically account for the rise and fall in value of figuration throughout history? We can attempt to map the prevailing social, religious, economic, and political climates of each successive period in Western history, and this will show at best that there is no evolutionary and genetic pattern to the chronologically changing status of figuration in general and of individual tropes, schemes, and figures in particular. To return momentarily to the metaphor of phylogeny, we realize that a popular logical fallacy in the metaphorics of history writing is confounding phylogenesis with ontogenesis confounding the maturation of the species with the maturation of an individual of that species. Just as there can be no teleologically ordered model of rhetoric (as collective species) through the ages, so there can be no teleologically ordered model of a given trope through time.
II Although Aristotle's Rhetoric might seem to be the chronological starting place to look for pronouncements on the trope personification or prosopopeia, we find in it few identifications of individual tropes, figures, or schemes by name. Aristotle's primary interest in the Rhetoric is to discover and arrange arguments. Consequently, the " unitary quantity" of interest is not the figure, as it is in all subsequent rhetorical treatises, but the enthymeme (Rhetoric 1396a—1400b). In his theoretical excursion into style, Aristotle at most names and describes "metaphor" and "simile," and provides numerous examples of the varieties of each. In his subordinate discussion on "proportional
The poetics of personification metaphors/' Aristotle does indeed describe " Homer's common practice of giving metaphorical life to lifeless things" (i4iib.25-35). 3 The virtue of this variety of metaphor is the vivid sense of " activity " it imparts to a passage. Yet, Aristotle does not employ the term "prosopopeia" to name this metaphorical effect. I suggest that the unor post-Aristotelian fashion, in rhetorical theory, of naming and taxonomizing tropes is at the root of the compendium tradition in medieval rhetoric. A proclivity towards the rhetorical compendium is already apparent in Demetrius of Phalerum's third-century B.C. treatise On Style (Peri Ermeneias). It is here that we find the first description in Western rhetorical theory of the trope personification as it is definitively indicated by the term "prosopopeia." Demetrius' definition is concise yet inclusive of potential varieties of the trope. He writes: "Another figure of thought - the so-called 'prosopopoeia' - may be employed to produce energy of style, as in the words: 'Imagine that your ancestors, or Hellas, or your native land, assuming a woman's form, should address such and such reproaches to you'" (461, 63). Evidently, the term "prosopopeia" represents several subordinate figural conceptions that we will see variously described in later rhetorical treatises. For Demetrius, prosopopeia can be the apostrophic "making present" of a dead ancestor as well as the anthropomorphizing and lending of speech to a conceptually abstract, geopolitical entity. A syntactical ambiguity in W. Rhys Roberts' translation, however, designates that the "ancestors" are assuming the prosopoetic form of the woman. The summoning of ancestors is an elementary kind of "apostrophic" pfosopopeia, and it requires no actual "invention" or materialization of a character which has never before possessed a human form. Unlike an abstraction or a piece of land, the ancestor has indeed enjoyed human form. He is only currently "removed" in a temporal sense, not an ontological sense. The syntax of the sentence, therefore, inappropriately suggests that the ancestor can be assigned to " a woman's form " (gynaikos schema). It should be clear that as early as Demetrius' entry on personification, the theoretical distinction among potential kinds of prosopopeia is already tainted by confusion in expository discourse. Shortly, we will see how the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium handles the idea of trans-temporal, apostrophic personification in conjunction with the idea of lending human form and speech to a geographical locus. Before proceeding with this survey, we should note that the general 12
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notion of prosopopeia as a method of character invention has an allied source in Greek drama and the philosophical dialogue. At the openings of Plato's dialogues or of the plays of Euripides, we often find a rubric called prosopa ("faces'' or "masks"), meaning dramatis personae. As the entry for "prosopopeia" in Liddell and Scott's Greek Dictionary indicates, the term denotes the creation of any kind of dramatic character in a mimetic text (Haworth 45—46). The character or prosopon need not be an abstraction given human form. It could be any historical or mythical human personage re-presented in the text. It could be Socrates or Gorgias in a Platonic dialogue; or it could be Admetus and Alcestis - and not necessarily Thanatos ("Death") - in Euripides' Alcestis. The word "prosopopeia" seems to have indicated a means of mimetic character invention before it described a mode of rhetorical ornamentation.4 The next major treatment of the trope personification comes in the anonymous Rhetorica Ad Herennium. Among the two or three most popular and influential rhetorical treatises in the ancient world, the book was attributed after the time of St. Jerome to Cicero, and later, to someone named Cornificius (Herennium viii-ix). The most original and striking feature of the plan of the Rhetorica as a whole is the author's election to use translative Latin names for the tropes and figures rather than the original Greek ones. (Quintilian is counted among the Roman rhetoricians who, in the learned convention of their day, directly imported the Greek names of the figures by writing them in Greek lettering.) Thus, the Rhetorica author names the trope which we call "personification" by the label conformatio. In Book iv's discussion of "figures of thought," we find a succinct paragraph headed by the definition of conformatio, followed by numerous examples from contemporaneous political discourse. Like Demetrius, the Rhetorica author's definition begins with a statement about what I have called the "apostrophic" variety of personification, and proceeds to a more inclusive description: Conformatio est cum aliqua quae non adest persona confingitur quasi adsit, aut cum res muta aut informis fit eloquens, et forma ei et oratio adtribuitur ad dignitatem adcommodata aut actio quaedam... Haec conformatio licet in plures res, in mutas atque inanimas transferatur. Proficit plurimum in amplificationis partibus et commiseratione. (Personification consists in representing an absent person as present, or in making a mute thing or one lacking form articulate, and attributing to it a definite form and a language of certain behavior appropriate to its character
The poetics of personification ... Personification may be applied to a variety of things, mute and inanimate. It is most useful in the divisions under Amplification and in Appeal to Pity.) (iv.66) Let us dwell upon this rich passage, for it provides, albeit in fustian style, most of the connotations and subordinate varieties of personification to which rhetoricians after the Latin Golden Age attend. The first stated condition, the figure's power to "make present" a person who is absent, is a generalized description of personification as a device for transcending spatiality: he or she who is physically or spatially remote is brought into the proximity of the speaker. This invokes a specific figural seme — which we can call " the annihilation of space " — that is translated, in the author's example of the great Lucius Brutus "come to life again" (revivescat), into its corollary seme, "the annihilation of time." This is so because, like Demetrius' foremost example of the trope, personification often involves the figural "reviving" of a person or persons (for Demetrius, progonous, " ancestors ") who are long dead, persons who are temporally removed from the speaker. True, none of the classical rhetoricians "read" the trope personification as a figural mechanism for manipulating time and space (cf. the tropes anachronism and anachorism). But the programmatic moves wherein Demetrius and the Rhetorica ad Herennium author begin their definitions of personification with images of restoring, spatially or temporally, a non-present human being further underscores the role of the trope as (A) a variation on apostrophe, and (B) a means of dramatic character invention or presentation. This underscoring on the part of the Rhetorica author overrides the secondary value of personification, which is its role as a device for making articulate (fit eloquens) that which is mute. Here, however, the Rhetorica collapses two subordinate (or really, coordinate) tropes of personification. Lending speech to mute things (animals or objects) can be seen as a figural maneuver distinct from lending "a definite form" to something without physical contour, something insubstantial (say, an ideational abstraction; in chapter 2 of this study, I will undertake a modern taxonomy based in part on the terms of these translative effects). But the Rhetorica author's initial sentence involves syntactical confusion which blocks ready discernment of the potentially subordinate varieties of personification. Returning to the second and third clauses of the sentence, we see that the writer's regular use of the conjunction aut ("or") confounds a clear and ready lining up of direct objects and their indirect objects. Does
History of personification theory
the "attributing" (adtribuitur) of "definite form" (forma) and "a language" (oratio) in clause three apply to the "mute thing" (res muta) or to the thing "lacking form" (res... informis), both in clause two? Furthermore, does the "certain behavior" (actio) that should be "appropriate to its [italics mine] character" (ad dignitatem adcommodata) refer to the mute thing or to the formless thing? For a treatise so concerned with the correct and clear creation of syntax and grammar, the Rhetorica at this point provides tangled syntax. It therefore confronts us with an anomaly. The compendium or scholium format of Book iv seems explicitly designed to make immediately evident the natures, along with exemplary implementations, of the major figures of thought and diction. (A perusal of the entries relegated to the remaining figures in Book iv bears this out.)5 The economy of the compendium is subverted by this brief but oblique discourse on personification. In the history of Western rhetorical treatises, the Book iv personification passage inaugurates discursive confusion about what should be an easily definable figure of thought. As early as the Rhetorica ad Herennium, we see a theoretical difficulty in talking about personification and its subordinate or coordinate tropes. If the modern devaluers of personification (whom I addressed in the Introduction to this study) believe that a definitive and simplistic explanation of the trope is adducible from an inaugural text like the Rhetorica, they are clearly mistaken. If Demetrius' On Style and the Rhetorica ad Herennium initiate a less than clear cut understanding of personification, the writings of Cicero provide a straightforward and unconfused conception of the trope. It is possible, for that matter, that the devaluation and demystification of personification is traceable to the De oratore, the De inventione, and the Orator — the written manifestos of the greatest voice in the Roman traditions of rhetoric and legal advocacy. Cicero does not even mention prosopopeia or conformatio in the De inventione, and his treatments of the trope in the other two treatises are made mainly in passing. Cicero describes, but like Aristotle does not name, the figure prosopopeia in the De oratore: Quo item in genere et virtutes et vitia pro ipsis in quibus ilia sunt appellantur: "Luxuries quam in domum irrupit," et "quo avaritia penetravit," aut "fides valuit," "iusticia confecit/' (And also in the same class is the use of the names of the virtues and vices to stand for the people who possess them-"The dwelling whereinto Ex-
The poetics of personification travagance / Hath forced an entry" - and "where avarice has found its way," or "loyalty has prevailed," "justice has achieved.") (3.42.168) The "same class" Cicero speaks of is "substitution or metonymy" {tradudio atque immutatio, 3.42.167), the figural superset of personification. Later in the De oratore (3.53.205), Cicero includes in a long list of oratorical ornaments a device through which the speaker effects personarumfictainductio, the "impersonation of people." But the terse mention of this effect at this point does not link it definitively to personification; "personation" could simply be the representation of regular human characters, a discursive method not necessarily motivated by a figural operator. In the Orator, Cicero mentions the process of personification (again leaving the trope unnamed) as a figure of speech to be used sparingly or avoided altogether as a means of enlivening discourse. Among a litany of devices a speaker may use to "brighten his style" (ilia sententiarum lumina), Cicero advises "Nonfaciet rem publicam loauentem nee ab infernis mortuos excitabit..." ("He will not represent the State as speaking or call the dead from the lower world..."). The themes of prosopopeia mentioned in this caveat were first conceived, we saw above, by Demetrius: giving speech to a geopolitical entity, and annihilating or eliding time by the "making present" a dead person. Both the De oratore and the Orator treatments of the trope are highly paraphrastic. Like Aristotle, Cicero is interested in the discovery of logical tactics and topical bases. He is not a compiler and namer of figures. Cicero, thus, does not fit into the pedigree of taxonomyobsessed rhetoricians. Yet his primary authority through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance was indisputable. Next in this history of personification theory comes Quintilian. The Institutio Oratoria clearly did not enjoy the popularity of Cicero's treatises in the Middle Ages. Yet its form and its drift place it squarely in the tradition of the rhetorical compendium. Quintilian's treatise was a rhetorical opus magnum in which the author attempted a scope far greater than that of any of his predecessors. Its expanded format of twelve books allowed the author to indulge in an extensive taxonomy of tropes. His description of personification, therefore, is the most thorough and complete up to the middle of the first century A. D. Quintilian's understanding of the trope, in fact, goes beyond the conventional notion of an abstraction given voice. Taking the cue from Cicero's passing comment on character "personation," Quintilian 16
History of personification theory
places under the rubric of prosopopeia (which he names at the outset in Greek, 9.2.29) the invention of a hypothetical voice for a client in a court of law. The examples Quintilian provides regarding this mode of personation demonstrate that he conceives of prosopopeia specifically as a means in legal and juridical discourse, rather than as a general-purpose way of enlivening or varying any kind of public speech. Quintilian's method of discussing the trope is more sophisticated than that of his predecessors for two main reasons. First, he takes into account other theoretical positions on the matter of prosopopeia: Ac sunt quidam, qui has demum prosopopoiias dicant, in quibus et corpora et verba fingimus; sermones hominum adsimulatos dicere dialogous malunt, quod Latinorum quidam dixerunt sermocinationem. (9.2.31) (There are some authorities who restrict the term impersonation to cases where both persons and words are fictitious, and prefer to call imaginary conversations between men by the Greek name of dialogue, which some translate by the Latin sermocinatio.) Second, he explores the possibility of the trope's formal relationship to other tropes in bold ways. That is, whereas Cicero at best saw personification as a variety of metonymy, Quintilian proposes the trope's contingent and periodic similarity to many figural relatives. As we saw, he (1) likens prosopopeia to dialogue-, but also, (2) he sees it as a kind of parode ("parody," 9.2.35); (3) he understands it in the conventional way as the substantialization of an abstraction (formas quoque fingimus saepe, Q.2.36); (4) it is also the speaker's or writer's introduction of "some imaginary person" without a nominational identification into his discourse (Est et incertae personae ficta oratio, 36); (5) it can also be a hybrid figure coupled with "ellipse" (9.2.37); and (6) it can be a narrative method of creating oblique adlocutiones ("indirect speeches," 37). Speaking of obliquity, Quintilian's battery of formal variations compiled from fits 35 through 37 promotes its own conceptual confusion. One has the sense that this tally of variations on prosopopeia, even though it is the lengthiest of its kind when compared to other discussions of the trope up to the first century, could go on still further. Quintilian's theoretical assimilations of prosopopeia to other tropes, along with his selection of exemplary instances of the trope in literature and history writing (he uses sources ranging from Vergil to Xenophon), are experimental and cautious at best. He seems overwhelmed by the discursive possibilities that prosopopeia allows. 17
The poetics of personification
This feature of the Institutio separates it cleanly from Cicero's treatises. For the author of the De oratore, personification is a trope of questionable value best approached with trepidation and suspicion; for the author of the Institutio, personification cannot always be clearly and apodictically defined, but is a fertile means of discursive invention. At times it resembles other tropes, and it can be regularly combined with them as a mode of narrative invention. Yet, it can also be a mechanism of strictly juridical discourse, a fact that should promise a theoretically apodictic handling in the Institutio but which in fact creates a striking semiotic ambiguity regarding the " directionality " of a standard juridical prosopopeia: ... prosopopoeiae, id est fictae alienarum personarum orationes, quales litigatorum ore dicit patronus ... Non enim audire iudex videtur aliena mala deflentis, sed sensum ac vocem auribus accipere miserorum, quorum etiam mutus aspectus lacrimas movet. (6.1.25-26) (... by impersonations I mean fictitious speeches supposed to be uttered, such as an advocate puts into the mouth of his client... then the judge seems no longer to be listening to a voice bewailing another's ills, but to hear the voice and feelings of the unhappy victims, men whose appearance alone would call forth tears even though they uttered never a word.) Given the dual sense of the term itself (prosopopeia = prosopon -\-poein, "to make a face"), Quintilian's example leaves us uncertain about who the prosopon is. Is the prosopon the advocate who speaks "in behalf" of his client — saying what the client would say if the latter could think and speak like a skilled advocate? (In modern American slang, a lawyer is called a "mouthpiece," a "locutionary prosthesis," a "mask.") Or is the prosopon the legal client — the passive, shell-like creature who sits like a dummy (mutus) while the advocate sends a verbal message through him? In Jakobson's terms, the "addresser" or source of the message is confused with the "code" or formal means of the message (Hawkes 83). Put another way, Quintilian's juridical passage implicitly proposes the semiotic question, "In a personification figure, exactly what gets converted into or personifed as whom"? Quintilian's final pronouncement on personification in the Institutio displays this semiotic crux in terms more sociologically loaded for poetics in the 1990s: Denique non modo quot in causa totidem in prosopopeia sunt varietates, sed hoc etiam plures, quod in his puerorum, feminarum, populorum, mutarum 18
History of personification theory etiam rerum assimulamus adfectus, quibus omnibus debetur suus decor. (11.1.41)
(Further, it is not merely true that the variety required in impersonation will be in proportion to the variety presented by the case, for impersonation demands even greater variety, since it involves the portrayal of the emotions of children, women, nations, and even of voiceless things, all of which require to be represented in character.) If women and children are already persons, why must they be given speech according to the same fictional and figural mechanism that governs the " impersonation," or personification, of a nation or of inanimate and voiceless objects? I will explore the semiotic conditions of this formulation in the next chapter. For now, it is important that we fully appreciate Quintilian's unsurpassed but problematic formalization of the trope's complexity and his expanded understanding of its utility. Not until after the Renaissance would the tradition of European rhetoric boast so rich a theoretical treatment of personification. Many rhetoricians and grammarians in the later Roman periods present the trope with Ciceronian brevity. Chirius Fortunatianus, the famous fifthcentury author of Artis rhetoricae libris tres, gives prosopopeia and apostrophe a one-sentence description in which he asks how the trope might be used in narration (Halm 112). Julius Ruh'nus, also of the fifth century, provides only two brief lines on personification.6 However, as the format of his compendium dictates, he provides curious Latin translations for the Greek word: in this case, he eschews the traditional term conformatio, and instead translates "prosopopeia" as deformatio and effiguratio. Equally curious is the schematic treatment of personification offered by Rufinus' contemporary, Emporius the Great. Emporius devotes an entire treatise to what Joseph M. Miller translates as "impersonation"-naming it De ethopoeia. The fifth-century rhetorician parrots more Ciceronian pronouncements (Miller, Prosser, Benson 35), and he subordinates prosopopeia as a fourth variety of ethopoeia, the "making of a character." He thus repeats a taxonomic move made by his fourth-century predecessor Aphthonius of Antioch, who also delineated prosopopeia as one of fourteen practical "exercises" for schoolboys in his Progymnasma (Kennedy 64). The grammarian Priscian devotes a full page to "impersonation," contrasting "prosopopeia," which is exemplified when "Cicero gives speech to the fatherland," with the concept "eidolopeia," which involves all modes of narrative character invention (Miller, Prosser,
The poetics of personification Benson 64). A century later, Isidore's treatment of personification in the Etymologiae is confined to a scant two lines which, again, invoke Cicero, this time by making reference directly to the oration In Catillinam (Miller, Prosser, Benson 94). We could readily extend this tally of Latin rhetoricians who treat personification by including well-known writers as varied as Rutilius Lupus or Aelius Donatus.7 It is more practical, however, to draw at least two conclusions regarding their theoretical treatments of prosopopeia. First, as I have suggested all along, a Ciceronian brevity along with actual Ciceronian examples (the fatherland or a dead ancestor speaking) characterize the style and content of all major discussions of personification. Second, many rhetoricians - either through peculiar tendencies in translation, or in methods of taxonomic subordination — have indeed glimpsed in their writings the complexities inherent in formalizing so unusual, but at first seemingly transparent, a trope as personification. This general condition seems to maintain itself through the sixth century A.D. AS an exception, Bede's De schematibus et tropis tries to restake a semiotic reformulation of the conceptual terms that inhabit the structures of specific tropes and figures (Irvine). Like Aristotle in The Rhetoric, Bede does not name "prosopopeia" or "conformatio" as a specific and independent trope. Rather, he begins his section "De Tropis" with a logical decomposition, reminiscent of a similar table written by Quinfilian (8.6.0-13), of the translative terms that constitute the trope metafora: Metafora est rerum verborumque translatio. Haec fit modis quattor: ab animali ad animali, ab inanimale ad inanimale, ab animale ad inanimale, ab inanimale ad animale. (Halm 611) (Metaphor is a translation among things and words, accomplished four ways: from a living creature to another living creature; from a non-living thing to another non-living thing; from a living creature to a non-living thing; from a non-living thing to a living creature.) Following this concise logical scheme are more than a dozen examples, mainly from scripture, that demonstrate each translational or transformational equation. Through a precise set of structural relations governed by the semes "living" and "non-living," Bede's grid exhausts the entire set of transformations that had been unsystematically addressed through the sets of examples employed by preceding rhetoricians to describe "varieties" of prosopopeia: Demetrius' dead 20
History of personification theory
ancestor made to speak (transformation 2), Quintilian's hypothetical client mouthing the words of his advocate (transformation 1), and so on. Moreover, the grid describes the sets of transformations that constitute many other tropes. The whole operation, of course, is taken from the Institutio Oratoria which, in fact, ramified it further: the four transformational axes divide among the translation of "rational" and "irrational" beings (8.6.13). But in an era less than familiar with Quintilian, Bede's appropriation of such a structural system founded on the binary logic of categorical opposition reaffirmed that prosopopeia, as a suspiciously unnamed structural subordinate of metaphor, revealed its dialectically complex nature as well as its key, privileged role as a figure always telling something about figuration itself. Although the major theorists of medieval rhetoric following Bede describe personification in no more detail than the terse entries characteristic of the late antique compendia,8 the sense of the trope as a latent but powerful force - as a figure telling something about figuration — does unconsciously creep into theoretical poetics. That is, putatively apodictic, instructional treatises on poetic tropology contain descriptions of grammatical values and relations, figures, and tropes figured as prosopopeias. For example, Geoffrey of Vinsaufs influential Poetria Nova provides no more than a single, scholium-styled line on conformatio as an "easy" ornament of style: "Conformatio. Again, adorning the subject with a different kind of freshness, at one time I fashion a new person by giving the power of speech where nature has denied it" (Preminger, Hardison, and Kerrane 400). The sentence is finished with a personification of nature that is syntactically and epistemologically balanced and on par with the referential claim made by the speaking " I " who has deliberately "fashioned" an artificial character. Furthermore, Nature in this phrase is rhetorically characterized as a "denier" of speech in the "new person." A figural reciprocity exists between the self-important speaker who creates characters and the inadvertently personified Nature who has the power to deny, and by implication, give speech; she is a personification capable of personifying. The passage provides a brief staging of some of the semiotic properties contained in personification that surface unexpectedly in an expectedly non-literary and rational discourse. The lexicon-like forms of Geoffrey's entries on tropes, figures, and means of invention mark the Poetria Nova as a prime representative of the condition Richard McKeon ascribes to the exhausted medieval
The poetics of personification rhetorical tradition. Yet, Geoffrey's scholia function as poetically charged micronarratives. And even when other tropes are the subjects of discussion, these micronarratives contain personification as a latent matrix. In general terms, Alexandre Leupin calls this quality a "discursive blending of theory with its corroborative examples" (124) - a tactic Geoffrey employs, often humorously, for dozens of trope definitions. In a discussion of the thematic " specularity " of Geoffrey's declarations, Leupin matter-of-factly cites a passage on transsumptio (metalepsis) and its subordinate collatio (comparison): No such telltale signs occur in the covert Comparison, which does not show its own face but wears a mask, as if no Comparison were actually taking place there but rather a sort of new changeover, marvelously engrafted. (PN 247-50, qtd. in Leupin 139) The sentence is perhaps the most striking definition in the Poetria that figures a trope ("comparison") as a prosopopeia - in fact, as the prosopopeia of a prosopopeia, for the real "face" is as figurally invented a "facade" as the adopted "mask." There may be an overt source for this kind of metafigural, personificational pervasion. Geoffrey had, of course, employed the vague medieval topos about how grammatical structuration and syntactical arrangement amount to an essential, formal act that gives "forms" and "faces" to individually isolatable words. By themselves, words (lexical or semantic "units") are like the hyle or "prime matter" of chaos that do not yet have real meaning (Nims 215). In arguing that words take on significational form only in precise structural relation to other words (the formulation looks forward to the modern, structural-linguistic valorization of syntactical syntagm over semantic paradigm), Geoffrey invokes the classical, form/substance, container/content topos called holomorphism, or hylozoism. Furthermore, Geoffrey even distinguishes between the "minds" of words, that is, their semantic signifieds, and their "faces" or audial, phenomenal natures (PN 739-40; cited in Nims 215). In the Poetria, words themselves have the potential as independent personification figures when they are part of a "community" of other words. Geoffrey's latent narratives of prosopopeia find similar expression not until much later in Western rhetorical theory; the work of Bernard Lamy in the late seventeenth century, for instance, presents a similar metafigural effect in supposedly "theoretical" discourse. The Renaissance, however, provides little relief from the economical tendency in rhetorical compilation that had marked the Middle Ages.
History of personification theory
The most exemplary treatise of the late fifteenth century, Erasmus' De ultraque verborum ac rerum copia, is in large measure a rewriting of the exemplary sentences found in Quintilian, Cicero, and the Rhetorica ad Herennium (W. Crane 99). In the De copia, Erasmus confines his definition of prosopopeia to the "description of persons/' He admits that the trope is very similar to, and at times conceptually interchangeable with, prosopographia - the figure whereby the physical characteristics of a human personage are delineated (Erasmus 50-51). Compared with all the rhetorical treatises that had preceded it, however, the De copia is the first to provide an extended tally, occupying several lines, of personified abstract virtues which appear in the works of Lucian, Ausonius, Horace, Moschus, Aristophanes, Chrysippus, and Boethius. Furthermore, Erasmus assimilates mythical beings — vampires, sphinxes, furies, and graces — to the ontic domain of the personification figure (51). Along with Petrus Mosellanus' Tabulae de schematibus et tropis, Erasmus' De copia became the seminal study of tropes and figures throughout Europe in the sixteenth century. Slavish imitation of these two Northern masters is evident in the rhetorical tradition of Elizabethan England. Wholesale copying of figure and trope tables is apparent even to the casual reader of the major texts in the English tradition - Leonard Cox's The Arte and Crafte of Rhetoryke, Thomas Wilson's The Arte of Rhetorique, Abraham Fraunce's The Arkadian Rhetorique, George Puttenham's The Arte of English Poesie, and so forth.9 A review of two of the major texts in this Elizabethan tradition will demonstrate its spareness and its dependence upon the work of the earlier Dutch theorists. Richard Sherry's A Treatise of Schemes and Tropes (1550), the first widely read English rhetorical treatise, was no more than an encyclopedia of tropes accompanied by a sparse tally of examples. Precisely like Erasmus, Sherry indiscriminately combines mythical creatures with instances of true personification figuration. Concerning "prosopopey," he declares that it is that forme ... wherein we fayne perso[ns], communicacions, or affects of a man or of a beast, to a dumme thynge, or that hath no bodye, or to a dead man: as to the harpies, furies, devils, slepe, hunger, envie, fame, vertue, iustice, and such lyke. (67) Sherry's entry on prosopopeia is indeed terse. It is virtually a direct plagiarism of Erasmus' version, although the Dutch thinker had considered the trope to be a subspecies of "amplification," while
The poetics of personification Sherry subordinated it as the fifth variety of energeia. But it returns us to the syntactical confusion that characterized Demetrius' declarations: the feigning of the "affects of a man" to a "dumme thynge" or to that which "hath no bodye" is indeed personification. But what of the attribution of the "affects" of a beast to a "dumme thynge"? In his drive to be concise, Sherry confounds a number of figural transformations - all of which can be accounted for in Bede's grid of translational relations, and all of which could be further identified and named with a specific example from a fictional text.10 Sherry's definition of prosopopeia begs for a far more complete formalization of the trope. The second exemplary rhetorical treatise from the English Renaissance is the better-known The Garden of Eloquence by Henry Peacham. This text, first published in 1577 and expanded in 1593, provides an apodictic definition of prosopopeia that is as brief as Sherry's entry, but completely devoid of the conceptual confusion. (Instead, Peacham supplies a battery of hypothetical literary examples excluded by Sherry.) Peacham prescribes only one "direction" of figural transformation: " . . . hence it is that poets and orators do attribute to things which are without life, not only life, but also reason and affection, and sometime speech" (136). There is only one direction of transformation because Peacham posits the ameliorative transformation (which moves "up" the ontic scale) of a lifeless thing first into a living thing, then into a sentient creature, then into a speaking human being. Sherry's jumbled set of terms includes the ontic status of formless, or nonsubstantial things as well as lifeless and living things; his terms mark transformational movement in a reverse direction as well as a forward one. The attribution of the affects of a beast to a dead man - as the syntax of the line dictates — is figurally different from animizing an abstract idea in the form of a beast. Terse as these discussions of the trope personification are, they are part of a trend in rhetorical theory that reveals conceptual slippage along with richness, a slippage that theorists of tropes and figures in the precision-oriented works of the eighteenth century tried to avoid. Between the Renaissance and the eighteenth century, many texts attempt conceptual precision by avoiding the formal problem of tropes, and by attending to the expressive and psychological grounds that led to the authors' employment of such tropes. An example of such an interim text is Bernard Lamy's De 11 Art de Parler (1675). In this manual for orators and poets, the author tries for 24
History of personification theory
greater completeness regarding a model of personification, but because of his elaborate definition of what a "figure" is, he engages in a specular display of the latent powers of the trope. Regarding prosopopeia by itself, Lamy writes: When a passion is violent, it renders them mad in some measure that are possess'd with it. In that case, we entertain our selves with Rocks, and with dead Men, as if they were living, and make them speak as if they had Souls. (-234) Lamy follows with a lengthy example about a "Carkass" that is asked to speak. In the definition, Lamy ignores the notion of prosopopeia as a means for animating abstract and insubstantial concepts. He also locates the power and structure of the trope in an interior, psychological motion of the speaker's mind - a standard idea in theories of the creation of art that began to gain momentum, according to M. H. Abrams's famous argument, around the end of the seventeenth century (21-26, 47-99). Lamy, of course, had laid out this expressive theory of figural production at the outset of his discussion of figures. In short, the "peculiar language" of the passions are the figures. Curiously, the analogy Lamy uses to explain the structural relationship between passions and figures is the programmatic image of the mind/face, specifically the mind of a person who is disturbed or passionate: "So our words answer to our thoughts ... as the Face of a Man ... when he is angry, [or] his Face when he is quiet and serene" (224). For Lamy, then, figuration is encompassed by the concept of prosopopeia (the "making of faces"), a putative subset of figuration. This peculiar and ironic feature of Lamy's discussion looks forward to similar identifications that will be made by the French structuralists concerning models of figuration. Nevertheless, it is inevitable that a conceptual discourse of any kind should adopt the semiotic vocabulary of faces and minds, bodies and souls, insides and outsides, once that discourse positions itself as a fundamentally expressive or expressionistic one. This fundamental position in fact dominates much of European rhetorical theory during the whole eighteenth century. Returning to England for a moment, we come across the major theorist of figures and tropes of the century. 11 Henry Home, Lord Kames, composed his Elements of Criticism as a manual for both critical readers (that is, aesthetic evaluators) and writers of literary texts. Kames devotes thirteen pages to a discussion of personification, taking
The poetics of personification it up in chapter xx of his book as the first of the "figures" of literary discourse. As it had been for Lamy, the important feature of the figure is its genesis in the mind of the speaker or writer: highly passionate feelings move the speaker to personify things (347). The greater percentage of Kames's discussion of the trope is a tally of examples culled from the plays of Shakespeare or Vergil. Kames's major contribution, however, to a theory of the trope is his division of it into two types. "Passionate" personification involves the invention of characters in a discourse; it is "superior" because it arises out of genuine and sincere, agitated passions. "Descriptive" personification is mere rhetorical ornament; it is almost universally inappropriate in poetic discourse. Kames's overall position on personification of either variety is stern. He advises against allowing the figure, with its generally "ridiculous appearance" (359), to command too much space in speech or writing. No doubt, the Elements of Criticism was one of the major early theoretical texts in English that brought about the demotion of personification as something crude, silly, and, to use Kames's evaluative adjective regarding Vergil's frequent use of the trope, "insufferable" (359). If the English rhetorical tradition is best exemplified in Kames's expressivist project, the French tradition - characterized by far more formal rigor in the work of thinkers ranging from Condillac to Du Marsais - is best exemplified by one who is perhaps its final and greatest spokesman: Pierre Fontanier. Fontanier's Les Figures du Discours provided the most systematic taxonomy of tropes and figures of all similar projects through the close of the eighteenth century, and his taxonomic distinctions concerning personification are no exception.12 Fontanier's treatment of the trope involves a completely novel distinction: what Fontanier calls personnification is a "trope" completely different from the figure de pensee he calls prosopopee. The former is the trope for substantializing and lending speech to abstract entities; the latter is a device used to give voice to the dead - the device, as we have seen, that attracted far more theoretical consideration throughout the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Thus, Fontanier's concise definition of personification: La personnification consiste a faire d'un etre inanime, insensible, ou d'un etre abstrait et purement ideal, une espece d'etre reel et physique, doue de sentiment et de vie, enfin ce qu'on appelle une personne; et cela, par simple faqon de parler, ou par une fiction toute verbale, s'il faut le dire. Elle a lieu par metonymie, par synecdoque, ou par metaphore. (111) 26
History of personification theory
With this brief set of formulations, Fontanier has exhausted all the ontic categories whose members can be figurally transferred among each category: life or non-life, sentience, abstract formlessness, substantial form, the power of speech, etc. Another major achievement of Fontanier was the structural subordination of all tropes to three tropological supersets: metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche. Personification could operate as a "variant" of any three of these major operators. Fontanier fills the next four pages of his discussion of the trope with literary examples that show how personification varies according to the programs of the three super-tropes. For example, addressing the citizens of Sparta as a single entity "Sparta" is personification "through metonymy"; calling a man who is "humble and virtuous" the "Virtue Humbleness" is personification "through synecdoche"; and attributing human feelings to mountains, oceans, rivers, and so forth, is personification "through metaphor." Fontanier takes up prosopopee much later in his treatise, and he begins by insisting on its theoretical division from personification and apostrophe, its two very close relatives: La Prosopopee, qu'il ne faut confondre ni avec la Personnification, ni avec TApostrophe, ni le Dialogisme, qui l'accompagnent presque toujours, consiste a mettre en quelque sorte en scene, les absens, les morts, les etres surnaturels, ou meme les etres inanimes; a les faire agir, parler, repondre, ainsi qu'on 1'entend; ou tout au moins a les prendre pour confidens, pour temoins, pour garans, pour accusateurs, por vengeurs, pour juges, etc.; et cela, ou par feinte, ou serieusement, suivant qu'on est ou qu'on n'est pas le maitre de son imagination. (404) In sum, prosopopee — the figure whereby the dead, the absent, supernatural beings, the non-living, etc, can be given form, life, and speech - might at first seem identical to any of the three modes of personnification. But the examples cited by Fontanier reveal that it is, like Kames's notion of the trope, a product of extreme internal passion in a speaker. Moreover, it is a device for inventing and "placing characters in some sort of scene," rather than the disposition of local rhetorical ornament. We might also add that Fontanier's division of personnification /prosopopee is approximately equivalent to Kames's division between passionate/descriptive personification. The primary difference between the two, however, rests on Fontanier's constant obsession with defining figures and tropes in relation to other figures
The poetics of personification and tropes. In conjunction with his examples of prosopopee, the French rhetorician provides contrastive descriptions of I'apostrophe and dialogisme (what rhetoricians of antiquity at times called sermocinatio); that is, he defines prosopopee by what it is not. Certainly unlike Kames, Fontanier describes tropes as relative quantities. Each trope exists as a variant, a relative, or an inversion of every other trope. It is therefore no coincidence that Fontanier became such a favorite of the French structuralists — specifically Todorov, Genette, Ricoeur, DuBois and the Group Mu — in their own theoretical discussions of figuration and rhetoric. Fontanier's project is indeed the first"modern" and genuinely scientific taxonomy of tropes in the history of Western rhetoric and poetics. If we agree with Todorov and Ricoeur that Fontanier was the last rhetorician in Europe, we would expect a lull in the theoretical activity concerning tropes and figures. On the whole, the nineteenth century sees the expansion of the expressivist model of figuration; it is, after all, the foundation of one of the most powerful strands in the theory of Romantic poetics. Personification comes under fire, as it had at the hands of Lord Kames, as an aesthetically weak and inappropriate form. Coleridge, of course, paid the greatest theoretical attention to the poetic problems of personification tabulation. His disapproval of the trope has been amply discussed (Knapp 7-50; and passim). However, it is sufficient for us to recognize one formal contribution on his part - t h e distinction between "narrative allegory," as he called it, and "unmixed" allegory that was equivalent, at times, to the simple "poetic diction" of local rhetorical ornament (Knapp 12). After Coleridge, few English theorists addressed the problem of personification. One interesting approach to the trope can be found in the aesthetic inquiries of John Ruskin. But like others before him - no less than Aristotle and Bede - Ruskin avoids using the words "prosopopeia" or "personification" to describe the substantializing, animation, and endowing with sentience and speech of a non-human entity. Ruskin uses two terms, "grotesque idealism" and the "pathetic fallacy," to convey this concept. Both terms are elaborately deployed in Modern Painters, Ruskin's aesthetic opus magnum. In his thorough discussion of the significational richness abounding in the Envy episode of The Faerie Queene i.iv.30, Ruskin discloses the literally "grotesque" or serpentine complexity of which personification figuration is capable (Ruskin 60—61). The "pathetic fallacy" is so named in order to reveal Ruskin's conceptual basis for the device: 28
History of personification theory
The temperament which admits the pathetic fallacy is ... that of a mind and body in some sort too weak to deal fully with what is before them or upon them; borne away, or over-clouded, or over-dazzled by emotion; and it is a more or less noble state, according to the emotion that has induced it. (66) The idea is familiar. Like the Romantics, and like Lord Kames and Bernard Lamy, Ruskin sees the trope as a verbal extemalization of an intensified interior state. Indeed, most of his literary examples of it reveal a fictional speaker whose "reason is unhinged by grief" (63). Later in Modern Painters, however, Ruskin extends the conceptual field of pathetic fallacy to the fictional creation of moralized landscapes (Ruskin 77-78), a prime but problematical move in Romantic poetics (de Man, Blindness, 206). This critical development helped establish one of the central topoi in theoretical discussions of Romantic literature. (In fact, in the popular lexicon of today, "pathetic fallacy" is often thought of solely as the fictional extemalization of a poetic speaker's interior atmosphere - like the condition of Keats's forlorn lover in "La Belle Dame Sans Merci.") But the critical term "pathetic fallacy," I believe, is also a symptom of the nineteenth-century dislike for the terms personification and prosopopeia. During the mid-1800s, as I pointed out in the Introduction to this study, the word "allegory" also takes over as the exclusive nominational title for personification fabulation. And correspondingly, a critical absorption in the Viconian model of primitive anthropomorphism occurs; such is the case regarding Walter Pater's writings on the animistic provenance of the classical gods. After Ruskin, however, direct theoretical interest in personification wanes and is not truly revived until after World War II. Ill Personification theory in the twentieth century presents us with a special problem. Most critical observations on the trope, especially those before mid-century, have been made by scholars in the fields of art history and philology. Two of the greatest figures in the former field, Rudolf Wittkower and Erwin Panofsky, along with two of the greatest practitioners of the latter, E. R. Curtius and Erich Auerbach, follow the general nineteenth-century trend by using the term "allegory" to indicate works of art or literature that contain personification figures. The four great German scholars show that personification can indeed operate in the service of polysemy and mystical significance (Wittkower gS-106; Curtius 101-02; Auerbach, 29
The poetics of personification Scenes, 94—98); but, as I noted above in my Introduction, they also indiscriminately refer to any moment of personification in a visual or verbal text, however simple, as an instance of allegory.13 It is therefore theoretically necessary that we pick up the thread of personification theory with those literary critics who maintain that there is a difference between sheer, simple personification and genuine allegory. 14 Such critics, fully aware of the abuses of allegorical interpretation as well as the potential powers of religious symbolism and allegory in scripture and in secular medieval literature, are the first to engage in scrupulous formal investigations of the trope personification. Morton W. Bloomfield was one of the first modern literary critics to attempt a coherent formalization of personification. His essay, "A Grammatical Approach to Personification Allegory," begins with an attempt at taxonomic differentiation. Bloomfield differentiates " shorthand" named characters (Fondlove or Thwackum) from "formal personification," or "emblematic" figures (the Slough of Despond) from genuine personification (164). Bloomfield's division follows the earlier distinction between personification as local, rhetorical ornament and personification as a mode of character invention. The former he calls the "animation of proper nouns," or the "animate metaphor" (Bloomfield would later call such formal effects "personification metaphors"). Bloomfield's system of formalization is purely grammatical : it accounts for personification as a violation of grammatical rules which, especially in English, suggest the animation of a noun that is abstract. This can be accomplished, in a very elementary way, through the elision of a definite article. Changing "the truth" to "Truth" involves what Bloomfield calls the "deictification" of the term — changing the word from a source noun to a proper noun (164-65). A summary definition of Bloomfield's grammatical system runs as follows: Personification allegory combines the non-metaphoric subject with metaphoric predicate and yokes together the concrete and the metaphoric in the presentation of generality. It attempts to gain the advantages of both the general and the concrete at the same time without sacrificing one for the other. (169) Although Bloomfield is concerned with personification as a mode of character invention, his system is better suited to the description of localized, animate metaphors, or of characterological personification in
History of personification theory
which little action occurs. (It is no wonder that he concludes his essay mainly with a discussion of personification in painting and sculpture.) The grammatical system fails to account for the complexities that arise when personification figures are combined with other kinds of fictional characters — historical human beings, mythological beings, and so forth. Nevertheless, Bloomfield's is among the first of palpable formal systems concerning the trope, and it promoted at least two strong theoretical legacies. First, Bloomfield's position continues in the work of the American transformational grammarians. Dorothy Mack, in accounting for the deep-structural transformations that are at work in metaphor, abandons the familiar terms for tropes of substantialization handed down in rhetorical theory. She renames personification as agent promotion and reification or "objectification" as predicate incorporation (78). Second, the formal rigor of Bloomfield's grammatical method invites further speculation along the lines of the aesthetic or phenomenological domain of predicative metaphorical nouns in discourse. This phenomenological approach to the grammatical aspect of personification anchors Samuel R. Levin's original contribution to a formal poetics of the trope. For Levin, personification involves the attribution of species-specific predicates to the members of a different species. "The rock was merry," Levin demonstrates, involves the attribution of a human affective state to an entity that may possess other states. The rock is personified. However, reading the predicate as an approximation in rocks of the human state called "merriness" effects what Levin calls a "dispersonification" of the utterance ("Allegorical" 29—30). The conceptual shift wherein we try to imagine what merriness is like for rocks amounts to what Levin calls "radical dispersonification." Levin connects this concept to Wordsworth's notion of "seeing into the life of things" ("Allegorical" 31), a process which no doubt involves a peculiar variety of phenomenological mysticism. Levin's project, which finds its fullest expression in his Metaphoric Worlds, has its basis in a number of formal and aesthetic ideals that confront both the creator of personification figures and the reader of them in literary texts. Always built into a moment of personification is an aesthetic modulation present between text and reader. Although the formal rigor of the grammatical approaches applied by Bloomfield and Levin reveal a great deal about the operation of
The poetics of personification personification, the majority of investigations into the trope's functional or operational nature in the past two decades have followed a thematic model. Like Thomas Maresca, John Steadman argued insistently for the division of allegory from prosopopeia {75). Yet, his study takes up the thematic complexities possible, mainly in Spenser's poetry, through the bold manipulation of personification figures (71-105). Carolynn Van Dyke's brilliant The Fiction of Truth similarly accounts for the philosophical and theological values of the personified characters in Prudentius, Langland, the Middle English morality plays, and in Spenser. The thematic appraisal of the "meanings" of individual personification figures is undoubtedly an inexhaustible avenue of inquiry in the field of medieval allegory studies. In Allegories of History, Allegories of Love, Stephen Barney provides an incisive study of the doctrinal and ideological dimensions of the personified characters in Prudentius, Langland, and Spenser, but he also offers some astute and highly useful formal distinctions among the varieties of allegory. Although Barney is cognizant of the classical distinction between prosopopeia and allegoria, he opens his study by claiming that personification "is the most trustworthy signal of allegory." That is, Barney is interested in the narrative implications of the "labeling of a figure with an abstract name... and not the attribution of human qualities to an object" (20). Personification, considered strictly as a mode of character invention and coupled with emblematic or typological characterization, is the foundation for allegory. Furthermore, Barney distinguishes between the two basic tropes that constitute the mode allegory: "typological allegory" and "reification allegory" (30). Barney uses the term "reification" to denote the most fundamental figural maneuver entailed in the personification of an abstract concept: first, the non-substantial essence must take on substance; thus, the employment of the neo-latin word that describes the making of a res, of "matter" or a "thing." In formalizing the properties of reification allegory, Barney begins not with passages from Prudentius or Langland, but with a character from the popular American cinema-Walt Disney's Pinocchio.15 The curious, though entertaining, explanation of the cartoon character shows how the figural scheme of ideas-turned-to-substance can be rich and complex. Overall, Barney is one of the few theorists of personification to attend to the translative or transformational "directions" among personified or dispersonified entities in the medieval, Renaissance, and modern literary works he scrutinizes. The
History of personification theory
entire first chapter of his book stands by itself as an autonomous, resilient and powerful theoretical treatise on the poetics of personification. If Stephen Barney's interest in personification theory rests in the formal description of figurally invented characters who can exist in a narrative, the majority of contemporary poststructuralist formalizations of the trope are concerned with rigorous analyses of what many of the critics in this survey have been recognizing as localized, rhetorical personification — that is, the " animate metaphors" of Bloomfield's studies. The most intriguing formal descriptions of personification, particularly those offered by Paul de Man and his various critics, seem to arise out of literary studies conducted on postEnlightenment texts. Barney and Bloomfield are students of medieval and Renaissance allegorical literature; it is necessary that they confront the problem of the ubiquitous personified abstraction. De Man handles Romantic, early modern, and symbolist poems, in which much of the "personification" is of the localized, rhetorical variety. For de Man, the theorization of prosopopeia involves the ever-active bridging between localized animate metaphors and the cognitive generalization that all linguistic activity involves diffusive and latent personification. Still, de Man's observations prove invaluable in the formalization of genuine character personification. De Man's primary contributions to a formal theory of personification can be found in four important essays. " Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric" attempts a distinct definition of the general term "anthropomorphism" as something like a trope. It is a special figural device - more fundamental than prosopopeia. De Man writes: But "anthropomorphism" is not just a trope but an identification on the level of substance. It takes one entity for another and thus implies the constitution of specific entities prior to their confusion, the taking of something for something else that can then be assumed to be given. Anthropomorphism freezes the infinite chain of tropological transformations and propositions into one single assertion or essence which, as such, excludes all others. {Rhetoric 241)
This provocative set of statements — which has become one of the many classic de Manian " formulas " — uncovers a cognitive operation that necessarily precedes all figural translations that involve character invention while calling them into question.16 "Hypogram and Inscription," "Reading and History," and "Autobiography as De-Facement," each provide a careful reflection on the 33
The poetics of personification figural relationship between literalized imagery of "faces" {prosopa) and the semiotic capacity of the trope prosopopeia. In each essay, de Man demonstrates how various poets - Wordsworth, Hugo, Baudelaire, Mallarme - construct a symbolic narrative of the interdependent, cognitive relationship between the perceiving, poetic ego and the external, phenomenal world.17 I shall reserve particular resummary and application of the fundamentals provided in these three articles for later on. For now, suffice it to say that de Man's explication of prosopopeia — the "master trope of poetic discourse" (Resistance 48) - is unexcelled to date as a formalization of the trope. The preceding three major projects reviewed in this survey - de Man's, Barney's, and Bloomfield's - demonstrate the drive for finer taxonomic distinction regarding varieties of personification. The task is needed not only as a preliminary operation in the ongoing project of defining "allegory," but also as a project of discovery in its own right. Conversely, J. Hillis Miller's recent book, titled Versions of Pygmalion, eschews fine taxonomic distinction and in a sense repeats the pre-Hellenic move to call any kind of narratorial character invention "prosopopeia" or "personification." Indeed, Hillis Miller's various essay-length studies on prosopopeia in authors ranging from Thomas Hardy to Wallace Stevens follow the expansive conception of the trope endemic to deconstruction. On the level of personification as local ornament, Hillis Miller often reads certain lyrical passages as showcases for what I would be inclined to call a kind of "pseudopersonification. " That is, he uncovers and explicates occluded figures of prosopopeia.18 Moreover, Hillis Miller addresses the temporal quality latent in prosopopeia: all prosopopeias somehow evoke a melancholy of loss, thereby trying to figurally bridge a temporal gap. This figural act, though, always advertizes the failure of the figure to reunify the long past or the disparate present (Pygmalion 47—48, 214—15, 238). Hillis Miller's final observations on the trope, in turn, provide a thoroughgoing semiotic analysis of the programmatic imagery of temporal passage, absence and presence, dismemberment, and effacement — conceptual elements that will operate as descriptive topoi in later chapters of this book. Along with such contemporary analytical strategy, however, the general (and ancient) problems of trope distinction and logical categorization so far charted form the basis for the taxonomies that follow.
34
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Towards a taxonomy of tropes ^X^ •
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From the survey of theories about personification presented in the last chapter, we can readily see the need for a more inclusive and extensive taxonomy of personification and its coordinate tropes. The classification of figural characters, especially those in complex works such as P/ers Plowman, is very difficult, as Lavinia Griffiths remarks, because contemporary theory has not yet been able to settle on a universal, working definition of the figure (4).1 Critics still labor under the legacy of at least two kinds of personification, both of which had been identified and studied, as chapter 1 revealed, by Morton Bloomfield, Coleridge, Lord Kames, and Fontanier. The distinction between a figure that exists strictly in speech and a figure that gets extended into an actual story probably shared origins with the allegoria in verbis/in facto commonplace first proposed by Augustine and later promoted by Bede. Since this study takes as a focal interest the formal role of narrative in a theory of personification, the terms "personification figure'' and "personification character" provide a handy taxonomical minimum with which to begin. Personification figures constitute a set that includes but is not exhausted by the subset of personification characters. The former set comprises all implementings of the trope personification in narrative, in the short lyric, in drama, in non-verbal arts, in rhetorically ornamental fictional dialogue, or in everyday speech. A personification figure, in simplest terms, must at least be a local rhetorical ornament. Personification characterization refers specifically to employment of the trope in the narratorial invention of actual characters, objects, or places that occupy the material space-time of the fabular, or " story " level of a narrative text. To paraphrase Hillis Miller ("The Two Allegories" 355), there are two personifications. The first is for the most part self-contained in a phrase or line. The second is an extension of the first into a complete narrative world. According to a strong critical tradition, incidentally, personification projected into a 35
The poetics of personification
narrative dimension has been understood as a constitutive component feature of " allegory" (Dawson 6). This is not simply to say that a personification figure which has been " extended" from one local site in a text entails fabular characterization. A memorable example of elementary personification figuration that occupies more textual space than one local site but is not necessarily fabular is found in the Old Testament meditation upon the female figure Wisdom: Therefore I prayed, and prudence was given me; I pleaded and the spirit of Wisdom came to me. For in her is a spirit intelligent holy, unique, Manifold, subtle, agile, clear, unstained, certain, Not baneful, loving the good, keen, unhampered, beneficent, kindly ...
(Wisdom 7.7,22-24)
Apart from the initially localized "coming" of Wisdom, this passage presents sheer notaiio, or the delineation of abstract behavioral tendency in Wisdom's character. Collections of aphoristic phrases in this vein continue through Wisdom 8, in which the speaker adds further descriptions of how he worked to acquire Wisdom's favors. He also provides a litany of narrative summaries that recount, in a generalized manner, her divine actions: She preserved the first-formed father of the world when he alone had been created; And she raised him up from his fall, and gave him power to rule all things. But when the unjust man withdrew from her in anger, he perished through his fratricidal wrath. When on his account the earth was flooded, Wisdom again saved it, piloting the just man on frailest wood. (Wisdom 10.1-4)
This passage is a paraphrastic summary of the Genesis narrative that deals with Adam, Cain, and Noah. (The summary continues through Abraham, Moses, and up to the Prophets — characters all typologically 36
Towards a taxonomy of tropes
linked to wisdom.) As a personification character, Wisdom is central to the action in each summarized episode. She determines the outcomes of each capsulized Old Testament story. Her actantial role, however, is narratologically different from, say, the roles of the personification characters in the Psychomachia. In that poem, we see a moment-by-moment mimetic reconstruction of the characters' actions and utterances on the battlefield. The formal difference between the narrative presentation of the Old Testament figure Wisdom and that of Prudentius' figures Faith or Avarice is one of " narrative speed/' According to Gerard Genette, narrative speed is the relationship between narrated time and the time of narration.2 Narrative speed divides into four "tempos": ellipsis, summary, scene, and pause. "Scene" is the tempo in which narrated time is equivalent to the time of narration. "Ellipsis" and "summary" are tempos in which narrated time is greater than time of narration; "pause" is a tempo in which narrated time is less than narration time. The sites in Wisdom 8-10 that present us with the divine figure's generalized actions are governed by the narrative speed called "summary." The formal effect of all narrative sequences governed by ellipsis and summary is that of pseudo-narrative: the narrator of the Wisdom text falls short of mimetic fabular invention of the kind intrinsic to traditional personification narratives. That is, he creates a text more closely akin to description or illustration - the discursive modes that bring the narrative "to a temporary halt" while arraying a sequence of semantically and thematically "predictable" ideas (Hamon 170). It is true that the tempo called narrative "pause" is most appropriate to description — but description concomitant with the sensory representation of a character's phenomenal appearance (what classical rhetoricians called effidio). Instead, description in Wisdom 7 involves the more abstract concept notatio, the concept of the portrayal of actantial tendencies rather than mimetically realized actional engagements. (This is why summary usually requires employment of the perfect, imperfect, and pluperfect verbal tenses.) Narratives governed exclusively by speeds other than "scene" cannot constitute an adequately mimetic text. They cannot "set before us" characters by having them speak (as in dialogue), move about, produce gestures, or physically act upon the actantial "objects" of the narrative worlds that contain them.3 In sum, personification that remains sheerly descriptive or paraphrastic is not mimetic or fabular. The subordination of tabulation to 37
The poetics of personification figuration, and the concomitant distinctions among descriptive personification, paraphrastic narrative personification, and fabular narrative personification, underline the importance of narrative duration and character activity in a formal taxonomy of figural character invention. This aspect of the trope's potential will come into play later, when we begin to consider how personification figures and coordinate figural effects can be classified according to genera and species. The concepts of "genera" and "species" seem naturally applicable when we consider characterological types in personification narratives. In the realm of rhetoric and poetics, however, the metaphorical terms "species" and "genera" pose further problems that need preliminary clarification. Regarding the relation between "allegory" and "personification, " I sketched a critical attitude that held the two tropes to be absolutely distinct and, probably, mutually exclusive. One reason for this surgical division among figures or tropes is an epistemically natured conception of the human act of classification. Kenneth Haworth's declaration that "there is no necessary connection between the rhetorical figure personification and allegory" (51) is prompted by a species-specific comparison of one trope with the other. Allegory, irony, personification, metaphor, metonymy, and so on, are each different " species" of figure. Specific instances of each figure are like different living creatures, often morphologically similar, but genetically distinct. The institution of this global episteme is traceable to the Linnaean paradigm of organism taxonomy based on the Swedish botanist's principle of binomial nomenclature. In The Order of Things (125—65) and The Archaeology of Knowledge (56—63), Michel Foucault
deftly elaborates the epistemic hegemony of Linnaeus' intellectual model of classification. It is no coincidence that Gerard Genette called Fontanier "the Linnaeus of rhetoric" (Intro. Fontanier 13) for the intellectual arenas of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were dominated by a conception of taxonomy that was founded upon the paradigm of genera and their respective subordinate species. Rhetoric was not excluded from these arenas. Fontanier, as chapter 1 of this study shows, was the first to classify tropes and figures with a "scientific" rigor. The legacy of his project can be seen in modern rhetorical or poetic taxonomy programs as varied as that of Roman Jakobson, who considers metaphor and metonymy as the superordinate genera for all figures (Hawkes 77-80), or those of the French Mu Group. (More rigorously and extensively than in poetics or
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rhetoric, the institution of the Linnaean episteme of taxonomy has signaled the birth of modern historical linguistics: the current classificational system of Indo-European languages devised by Bopp, Grimm, Schleicher, and others in the early nineteenth century is a monumental example.)4 In comparison to such taxonomic attention, ancient and medieval rhetoricians worked with a more comfortable scale of figure differentiation. They operated under the perhaps unconscious assumption that taxonomic rigor could go only so far. Then, a conception of figures that fitted loosely into a network of sliding scales seemed more reasonable. In the remainder of this chapter, I will try to fit the personification figure and its coordinate tropes into logically determined classificational scales that may at times appear to slide, even while they approach a rigor of superordination and subordination. I will also attempt to articulate the formal limits of these scales — scales and paradigms founded upon the structural logics of genera-species categorization, the binary opposition, and the structural relationships of actants and objects. In explaining the unavoidable historical confusion of allegory with personification, Jon Whitman takes recourse to the lexical values of "prosopopeia" and the conceptual precursor of the term "allegory/ 7 called hyponoia. Whitman writes: The sense of a front or a facade affects the whole history of the word [prosopopeia] and its derivatives, and accounts in part for the rhetorical consensus that "personification" is a verbal front, a literary facade masking something else underneath. (269) The term hyponoia was probably confused with prosopopeia because the two terms invoke the same structure of semes. The prosopon ("face" or "mask") is a surface, an external set of material contours. Under it lies the true entity or essense. The Greek preposition hypo("under") denotes a substrate, an internal substance or essence. The two Hellenic concepts are ordered according to one of the classic and ubiquitous binary oppositions: substrate/surface, inside/outside, contained/container. The identical opposition hypo/prosopon, then, makes hyponoia and prosopopeia into versions of each other. Both figures are identically dichotomous semic compounds. The personification figure is the material translation of one quantity (often ideational or abstract) into another (usually a person). But the abstract ontological status of "translation" is figured in terms of a strong material metaphor: containment. Given this conception, we can see that the hierarchical inner/outer form of the personification 39
The poetics of personification figure resembles that of the sign understood by structuralists. For, say, Saussure or Jakobson, the sign consists of two components, the signifier and the signified. The former is the material (phonic or graphic) agent by which the latter (conceptual) is given expression or contained. When schematically represented, the personification figure has the same structure: personification "figure" =
personifier personified As we will see later, the " personifier" conforms to a standardized narrative actant: s/he is a mobile and active human being, endowed with speech, and representative of a specific psychological, physiological, and ideological constitution. The "personified" can be found among a range of abstract essences, inanimate objects, animals, etc. (This point will be made clearer during our discussion of the apologue.) It is figurally translated into the personifier. The personification figure is thus a compound entity. It originated in an era of human history when everything was thought to be contrived of forms and their essences, containers and their contents. But the compound or duplex nature of personification is more evident when we consider the semiotic structure of the fabular personification character. The "second personification" is really a figural modification of the first. For example, the expression "Poverty walked in, and Love flew out the window" is an aphoristic, localized, rhetorical figure. Such utterances occur in everyday language, and in the spoken discourses of an endless tally of dramatic or fictional characters in Western literature. To materialize the concepts of love and poverty as characters in a narrative world (making them walk and fly through actual doors and windows) means to literalize what is already rhetorical figure. Since such literalization (really a synonym for "substantialization," or "materialization") is itself a figure, the invention of a personified character as an agent in a narrative world involves the figure of a figure. Literalization, however, passes itself off as an act of " defiguralization." But this act is emblematically figural because it tacitly stages the tension between the putatively exclusive, oppositional domains "figural" and non-figural or "referential." Such figuring of figure, in turn, involves Lessing's understanding of a cofigural "metalepsis" in Laocoon. Although Lessing does not use the classical term,5 he describes the process as the fundamental figural maneuver essential to the creation of what he calls " allegory." In the 40
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classical rhetorical tradition, a metalepsis, or transsumptio, is the adding, combining, or compounding of two different rhetorical figures.6 Such metaleptical allegory consists, Lessing notes, in the literalizing or substantializing of a metaphor. An oxymoron underwrites Lessing's example: contemporary painters create an allegory when they try to visualize (that is, substantialize) as a dense cloud or nimbus Homer's representation of invisibility in The Iliad. This /y invisibility," however, is already a Homeric metaphor of the supersensible velocity with which gods or goddesses depart from the Phrygian battlefields (67-69). The "second personification'' is just such a bold but naive attempt to pictorialize the supersensible or abstract. Moreover, Lessing's combinatorial allegory that keys on cofigural metalepsis performs a curious resuscitation of the old axiomatic association between allegory and personification: the trope metalepsis amounts to a rhetorical algebra that organizes both Lessing's scheme for allegory and my scheme, laid out in the preceding paragraph, for the two personifications. The appropriation of the classical term metalepsis, however, presents defiguralization as a resolutely willed act. But figure can be construed as "error," as James Murphy (186), E. R. Curtius (44) or Paul Ricoeur (Rule 20) have shown. Error itself, in this case, might signify anything from forgetting to ontological blundering - two plausible performances made when the narratorial inventor of a character treats that character as viable and literal when its basis is merely rhetorical. The errors of forgetting (that something was part of rhetorical discourse) or blunder (about the ontological statuses of the "real" and the "imaginary") involve not just an isolated figure here or there compounded by another. Rather, they apply to whole domains of textuality. That is, they are errors made in distinguishing what narratologists term discourse and story. Discourse, the narratorial level that is the verbal stuff constituting the whole text, and story, the narrated level of phenomenal events within the text, make up another traditional hierarchically structured duplex. Most contemporary narratologists maintain in some form the old " two-level," sjuzet/fabula or "plot"/"story" paradigm of the Russian Formalists (Chatman 15—42; Genette, Narrative, 25—32; Bal, Narratology, 3—10). When the components of this duplex are confused, error of a curiously inventive nature arises. A fabular personification character, therefore, not only exists as an erroneous story-level misplacement of a discourse-level entity, it signifies the epistemological imperfection itself that is
The poetics of personification represented by the erroneous confusion of narratorial discourse with narrated story. It functions as a (meta)sign for the potential selfdissolution of narratological formalization. Returning to the more preliminary task of trope grouping, the previous description of literalization invites us to subordinate personification under the figural genus known as "substantialization" - the more inclusive trope whereby any non-substantial quantity (including figuration, or more generally, human language) is given a material form. This definition recalls the old theological concept of "hypostasization" which should in turn bring to mind the standard rhetorical conception of another coordinate trope of personification "reification." The term reification is a nineteenth-century neolatinism (made popular by Marxist discourse in the form of its German equivalents: Versachlichung or Verdinglichung) that did not exist in antiquity or in the Renaissance. But its principle was expressed, as we saw in chapter 1, through the rhetorical term pragmapeia, that is, the "making of a thing.'' 7 Substantialization subsumes all figural maneuvers wherein a literary text presents the translation of incorporeal abstractions into the corporeal members of several ontological categories: sentient human beings, geographical places, inanimate objects, deities, or animals. It leaves unanswered, however, the question about the translation of members among the categories of ontological status I have enumerated in the preceding sentence. This foregrounds the problem I introduced with the duplex structural division of the personification figure into personifier/ personified: in fabular "personification" characterization, exactly what is figurally converted or translated into what? I prefer to use the term "translate" because not all the figural metamorphoses we can identify involve making a person. Metamorphic translation, in fact, can occur among all categories. A generalized glossary of tropes that constitute these figural translations exhausts the relationships possible among ontological categories: — substantialization, materialization, hypostasization, or the figural translation of any non-corporeal quantity into a physical, corporeal one. — anthropomorphism, or the figural translation of any non-human quantity into a character that has human form. — personification (prosopopeia), or the translation of any non-human quantity into a sentient human capable of thought and language, possessing voice and face. 42
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These definitions themselves break down into subsets that can operate separately or combine as figural hybrids: — animification, or the figural translation of (1) a human agent into an animal, or of (2) an abstraction or inanimate object into an animal. (The basis of the animal apologue or beast fable.) — reification (pragmapeia), or, if you will, "dispersonification" — the translation of a human agent into an inanimate thing. (Donne's famous lovers presented as compass needles are a fine example.) Thematically, these two tropes are related to: — ideation, or the translation of a thing or human agent into an abstract idea, essence, spirit, or rarefied form. (" Rarefication," in fact, often fits as a good synonym.) — topification, or the translation of an abstraction into a geographical locus. This tally of definitions still does not exhaust the grid of relationships possible among the major ontological categories. These categories comprise the potential sum of actants and objects in any given narrative world. All actants and objects can be categorized according to the six ontological domains I have enumerated: human, non-human life form (plant or animal), inanimate object, place, abstract idea, deity. (The cue for this categorical framework comes, of course, from Quintilian 8.6.9-13.) A member of any one of these six categories can be figurally translated into a member of any other. The seven tropes of substantialization defined here account for a great variety of figural-narrative techniques. Paysage moralise, or " moralized landscape," has as its figural operator the trope topification. The figure of the Body Politic (ubiquitous in political propaganda and nicely represented by Menenius Agrippa's vision of Rome in Coriolanus i.i) involves the personification of an abstract idea (" society ") as a human individual. Conversely, the figuration of a human body as a geography of districts or landscapes (as in the Syracusan Dromio's description of his enormous lover Nell in A Comedy of Errors 111.ii.116—44) involves not only topification, but reification. The genre we call the " apologue " is constituted by talking animals; it therefore involves personification. The whole range of antique fictional techniques that I have only begun to list here is made possible by the pre-modern notion of a Great Chain of Being. The ontological categories of the divine, human, animal, inanimate, and so on, are expressed in the logic of medieval Scholastic method. The great Neoplatonist John the Scot Eriugena, in fact, employs a Logic Square based upon the conditions of (A) created 43
The poetics of personification status and (B) creative potential to exhaust the categorizing possibilities for all conceivable life-forms.8 His categories coincide with the divine, the human, the animal or inanimate, and the abstract or materially nonexistent. The so-named figurational enactments of these categories, however, provide an approximate minimum from which to begin the thinking needed for a formal taxonomy. On closer inspection, they can be seen to override each other's boundaries. The "rarefication" characteristic of literary ideation involves a sort of dehumanization and thus reification or pragmapeia. The trope topification likewise can blur into ideation in the guise of the Body Politic figure, especially when the Body Politic is conceived as the state personified as a single monarch. As Ernst Kantorowicz has shown, the "Body Politic" of the medieval or Renaissance king - the second of "two bodies" he possessesexists coevally with the ideally everlasting geopolitical entity he reigns over (7-S). He thus exists in an ideated or angelified way; as a figural entity or persona ficta he is human, "noetic" (rationally or ideationally invented), transhuman (pseudo-deific or angelic), and "geomorphic." The problem of blurring is accompanied by the problem of discovering names or labels for figurational categories. Even though we can readily find generic labels for antique fictional techniques like the apologue,, certain antique techniques founded upon figural invention lacked any nominational identity at all. Like Aristotle facing prosopopeia, many medieval rhetoricians never thought to label curious devices or figural effects. Rather, they named them incorrectly, given even their own often fanatical propensity for logical decomposition and categorization. To repeat, the faculty of human intelligence coupled with the power of speech indicates that we have a real personification character. The substantialized abstractions Vergil places at the mouth of the Underworld in Book vi of The Aeneid are often treated (as in the Introduction to this book and by conventional criticism) as seminal models of formal personification. But they are utterly mute, and produce no physical actions. There is no sense of them as parts of a social aggregate: Vestibulum ante ipsum primisque in faucibus Orci Luctus et ultrices posuere cubilia Curae; Pallentesque habitant Morbi, tristisque Senectus, Et Metus, et malesuada Fames, ac turpis Egestas, Terribiles visu formae, Letumque Labosque; 44
Towards a taxonomy of tropes Turn consanguineus Leti Sopor, et mala mentis Gaudia, mortiferumque adverso in limine Bellum, Ferreique Eumenidum thalami, et Discordia demens, Vipereum crinem vittis innexa cruentis. (Before the entrance, at the jaws of Orcus, both Grief and goading Care have set their couches; there Pale Diseases dwell, and sad Old Age, and Fear and Hunger, that worst counselor, and ugly Poverty - shapes terrible to see - and Death and Trials; Death's brother Sleep, and all the evil Pleasures of the mind; And War, whose fruits are death; and facing these, the Furies' iron chambers; and mad Strife, her serpent hair bound up with bloody garlands.)
(273-81)
The germinal site in The Aeneid affords no prosopopeia because the figures possess no human voices, and therefore, no prosopa or " faces/' The entities are enumerated and described. The textual effect closely resembles that of the passage in Wisdom 7, demonstrating that the figural operator is anthropomorphism. In the terms of the list of categories above, the anthropomorphism is " ontogenetically prior" to the personification character. That is, in classical and medieval physics, substance precedes form (or "accident") which in turn precedes viability and sentience. Put schematically: substantialization -> anthropomorphism —• personification. The ontogenetic progression, once again, equates to a hierarchy because each trope is "founded" on or made possible by a prior trope. The medieval philosophical analogue for this logical progression was probably the renowned "Tree of Porphyry" articulated and analyzed especially by Duns Scotus. As Constantino Marmo notes, the Tree, which charts two tandem classificational hierarchies (substantia /'corporeitas / animalitas and corporalitas/sensibilitas/rationalitas),
illustrates the per-
fective and additive (or cumulative) progressions of "ontological density" (155) - a conceptual scheme central to medieval scholastic thought. This hierarchy, however, undoes itself when overwritten by logics aside from the purely additive one of ontogenesis. Paul de Man, for example, takes recourse to a phenomenological ground when he conflates substantialization and "anthropomorphism," meanwhile proclaiming that the latter is not a trope "but an identification on the level of substance" (Rhetoric 244). For de Man, anthropomorphism is 45
The poetics of personification more like the "second personification" described in this study. It is a cognitive commodity that tries to escape figuration, a self-priorizing function that "freezes the infinite chain of tropological transformations and propositions into one single assertion or essence which, as such, excludes all others" (Rhetoric 244). Strangely, such "non-tropological realness" does seem to accompany other literary appearances of anthropomorphism characters or mute personifications. Through a theological reading of Dante's Poverty in the Paradiso, Erich Auerbach reached a similar conclusion (Scenes 94—95). Anthropomorphism might at first seem mechanical, but it is a complex coordinate trope of personification that looks at the same time simpler (anthropomorphisms seem to be little more than animated words) and more uncanny (its seeming power to "freeze" or escape tropology). Another example of a seemingly simple but provocative trope that went unlabeled by medieval rhetoricians determines the title of and organizes the great Middle English morality play Everyman. The trope looks like standard personification characterization but carries shifted structural axes. Because the collection of human beings called "humanity" is really an abstraction, the character Everyman is of course the personifier that represents the abstract personified known as humanity.9 Yet, Everyman is ontologically identical to any single member of the collective group humanity. Unlike a genuinely abstract personified (an emotion, faculty, vice or virtue) that is qualitatively different from its personifier, humanity is only quantitatively different from its personifier, "Everyman." At first glance, the figural operator in Everyman would seem to be synecdoche. The figure synecdoche (the mechanism whereby a text assigns "parts for wholes, and wholes for parts"), however, really involves the translation between fragments and the physically connective whole of which they are components, rather than the translation between members and the conceptually collective whole to which they belong. Everyman is not an organ in a Body Politic. He is the representative of a greater number of entities ontologically identical to himself. The same can be said for the hero of another memorable Middle English morality, Mankind. In the discipline of modern statistics, this method of symbolic representation is called "isotyping." An isotype is a convenient shorthand figure for a quantity difficult to grasp, in a comparative context, with the senses. In a pictorial display, a historian may represent two thousand casualties from one army in a battle as two human figures, while she represents the ten thousand killed from the 46
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opposing army as ten figures. The method possesses iconographic power and simplicity. Yet it is structurally different from both personification and synecdoche. A formal articulation of the isotype could promise, in fact, to be a powerful tool for describing the figural character invention at work in many traditional medieval and Renaissance allegories. The personification figure Death could indeed be an isotype of all dead persons, since his physical features are not always those of a cosmetically idealized abstract personifier (say, a figure shrouded in black or perhaps black and amorphous - like Milton's Death in Paradise Lost or Spenser's Death in the Mutabilitie Cantos), but of a realistic corpse or skeleton (Holbein's Death in the Totentanz woodcuts). Death is a unique personification character in that, as a sign, he does not always point clearly to an incontestable personified. Does he signify the dead or the process of dying? Once again, we are brought back to the problematic structural relation between the personifier and the personified. This relation is often complicated by the engagement of the trope personification in certain conventional antique genres and sub-genres. Earlier, I mentioned the apologue. In the form of the beast fable, the apologue seems to prescribe a simple relationship between the personifiers (intelligent entities that speak — these are the prosopa) and the personifieds (the naturally aphasic and non-intelligent animals). The anonymous Dialogues of the Creatures Moralised, discussed by Rosemond Tuve (Allegorical 4-25), is a pedestrian example. The creatures of Aesop's Fables exist according to a similarly simple relation of personifier and personified in the trope personification. Often, animal apologues will present an entire society, identical to that of humans, but comprised of animals as the individual members. These societies may have commerce, education, and, like the birds in Chaucer's Parliament of Fowls or the pigs in Orwell's Animal Farm, government. Their societies are often specular images of Western human civilization, a point that has always made the animal apologue an especially appropriate vehicle for satire. Animals are ontologically different from humans, so the figural translation that operates as the motor of such apologue fabulation is strikingly visible. But what of apological fictions in which the "personifiers" are more than animals or objects who occupy societal domains approximate to, but somehow inversional of, our own? What are we to make of the narrative world in which the totality of individuals in the fictional society is composed of members from one class or variety of human 47
The poetics of personification individuals (one social level, profession, sex, age, race, etc.) from our own real society? Sebastian Brandt's Das Narrenschiff portrays the medieval tradition of the ship-of-state apologue about a "society" comprised entirely of fools. (The ship-of-state topos is itself a sign of apologue: in John Skelton's The Bowge of Court, all the voyagers on the ship of court are personified abstractions; even the first-person narrator is, strangely, a personification.) Conversely, Part m of Gullivers Travels gives us the society of Laputa, a place exclusively made up of absent-minded scholars. Much earlier, classical historians and fabulists (Diodorus and Hyginus are prime examples) depicted Amazonian societies composed solely of women (Lempriere 36-37). The fictional enterprise of the all-female society had its greatest literary expressions in Christine de Pisan's medieval allegory The Book of the City of Ladies, and in Margaret Cavendish's seventeenth-century romance, The Academy for Women. For Cavendish, the "males" in her Blazing World are actual beasts who occupy the forests outside the cosmopolitan Academy. More timely and comprehensible as examples of the kind of apologue I am describing are several entries from modern popular culture. Alan Parker's 1976 film, Bugsy Malone, presents an entire culture — specifically America of the Roaring Twenties — inhabited only by children. (A more extreme form of the idea organizes a recent diaper commercial for television that portrays infants as the sole inhabitants of an entire downtown American city.) Marc Connelly's 1939 film version of the Bible, The Green Pastures (based on his 1929 play of this title), cast all the characters of the Old Testament as jazzage, African-American men and women. A short-lived television situation comedy created by Norman Lear in the late 1970s, called All That Glitters, revived the Amazon topos, presenting a modern America in which the social and occupational roles of men and women were entirely reversed. Each of these modern examples contrives a fictional world in which our modern society is somehow the template of an apologic narrative. The characters who fill these worlds are "not quite" the correct constituent members of the true, template world. The children in Bugsy Malone are "personified" as American adults according to the same figural mechanism that governs the traditional animal fable. Yet, the children are humans. They are sentient, intelligent, capable of speech. Is "personification" — or some as yet unnamed figural operator akin to it - the correct term to apply to so global a figural effect in that film? The fictional or figural translation of 48
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the standard roles of women and children into the standard roles of adult men resembles a feature of prosopopeia recognized, as I noted in the last chapter, by Quintilian: Further, it is not merely true that the variety required in impersonation will be in proportion to the variety presented by the case, for impersonation demands even greater variety, since it involves the portrayal of the emotions of children, women, nations, and even of voiceless things, all of which require to be represented in character. (11.1.41) Clearly the sense of Quintilian's sentence assimilates women, children, and "voiceless things'' into one ontic category - a category apart from that of adult males who can be represented in a fictional text according to other means of characterization (ethopeia or adlocutio). Roman legal theory, in fact, designated any being — corporate or individual — that was not a " sane, adult, and natural person," as part of a category in need of "curatorial" representation (Kantorowicz 374). Thus, children, mad persons, and cities required figurational processing in order to enjoy legal voice or social presence. This avenue of inquiry reveals one pitfall of designating personification or its related tropes as prime figural operators in imaginative works of literature or popular culture. The cinematic examples cited above, along with Quintilian's statement, demonstrate that part of the formal nature of the trope personification rests in a social continuum of which the personified, or apologic, character(s) might be part. A parliament of birds is clearly personificational, as is a single owl speaking to a single nightingale. A complete society of infants or small children is plausible only through literary apologue. But two small children, dressed in tuxedos and speaking to one another, does not necessarily indicate the inception of any figural modus operandi. As Bakhtin demonstrated sixty years ago, verbal utterances produced at a given time and place must be considered as shaped by an overriding, though often not immediately discernible social or sociological " context." Like verbal utterances, characters in apologues are figurally invented entities; they are fabricated counters of rhetorical or poetic self-reference. In the apologue, we seem to have a literalized version of Bakhtin's early concept of socialized discourse, because the apologue characters' ontological statuses are determined by a social or societal framework. This brief tally of apologue and personification narratives prompts a lateral extension among the number of terms associated with the 49
The poetics of personification concept of the "personified" in the initial structural division schematized at the outset of this chapter. Along with abstractions, animals, and objects that can be translated into a personifier, we find suppressed in the domain of the personified all categories of Otherness: infants and children, women, the aged, the feeble-minded, insane, or infirm, and members of ethnic, religious, occupational, or racial minorities. In pursuing this line of inquiry, this investigation is being diverted from its promise of a formal or poetic description of personification and its related tropes and fictional effects. But a sociocritical tactic at this moment narrows a semiotic concept of the personifier while it extends a concept of the personified. Implicit in the concept of the personifier are capacities not only of human physiology, sentience, intelligence, and language in general, but also maleness, adulthood (but not old age), bourgeois financial and social standing (including standard bourgeois-level education), membership in the white race — in short, all the properties that constitute the valorized facets of the ideological superstructure of the complete "society" depicted in the Western personification apologue of the modern Christian era. The apologue engenders, in its semiotic structure, a hidden critique of the structure of Western culture. This detour from the project of a formal poetics of personification is necessary because it demonstrates, once again, how seemingly symmetrical and sharply defined taxonomies experience slippage once we have articulated the layers of hidden and suppressed values that underlie their terms. Even the most basic assumptions of taxonomic trope relationship, according to which we have been proceeding, avoid simple formulation. The short glossary of terms and definitions I sketched above suggests a number of fundamental, logical principles of relationship among the substantialistic tropes. Because personification is the " figural translation of a non-human quantity into a human being," and reification is " the figural translation of a human agent into a non-human one," we might be compelled to designate the two complementary tropes as binary oppositions. But in true poststructuralist fashion, each of the two complementary tropes is seen to be contained in the other's structure, especially when they are reinscribed in a third and coordinate generic scheme, the Body Politic. The Body Politic topos involves, as noted above, the frequent personification of the land and society as the sublime "body" of the king. When over-literalized, this "non-personal" body or person takes on particularized features: subordinate "organs," "limbs," "faculties."
Towards a taxonomy of tropes
This is the case in Elizabethan juridical theory where the "mystical'' or "politic" body of the monarch undergoes allegorical anatomization: the "natural" body of the king as individual becomes the "head" of the Body Politic; the king's subjects become "members" (Kantorowicz 13-14). As such, the Body Politic idea has instigated the rhetorical and ideological opportunity for great mischief throughout history. From the political propaganda issued by Menenius Agrippa in prerepublican Rome, to the lies of the Nazis, the Body Politic has keyed on the synecdochal relationship between parts (which are either rightly functioning or ill-functioning) and a whole that is directed by a single, righteous "heart" or "mind." The function of the personification/reification opposition takes on great ethical significance when we review the classic German social principle of the Volkskorper as it worked in the rhetoric of the Nazis. In his study of experimental German medicine in the early 1940s, The Nazi Doctors, Robert Jay Lifton uses the testimony of Dr. Fritz Klein, a low level SS physician, as exemplary of the Nazi sensibility regarding the conceptual relationships among human society, the Jews, and a physician's role as an upholder of the Hippocratic Oath. Klein says, "Of course I am a doctor and I want to preserve life. And out of respect for human life, I would remove a gangrenous appendix from a diseased body. The Jew is the gangrenous appendix in the body of mankind" (16).10 The statement is a numbing reminder of how verbal figuration can turn to poison when it is put in the service of misdirected patriotism. But more to our point, the statement reveals the structural interdependence of the tropes reification and personification as they are circumscribed by the scheme of the Body Politic. In translating society, a conceptual abstraction, into a living human body, the discursive field of the statement automatically dispersonifies the concrete and living components that make up that conceptual abstraction. The human individuals who constitute society are reified into organs, limbs, tissues. We see the propagandistic value of the Body Politic figure at this point, for only when human beings have been rhetorically made into objects and things can they be conceptually treated like things — they can be "removed" or excised, rather than murdered. Putting the (needed) ethical aspect of this discussion aside for the moment, we see that a ready formalization of the coordinate tropes personification and reification into binary opposites dismantles itself, because each trope constitutes the latent structure of the other.
The poetics of personification The mutual and latent image of personification and reification in one another compels more complete charting in an exhaustive semiotic grid containing tropological relatives. De Man has observed, for example, that a rhetorical apostrophe engenders a prosopopeia because the linguistic structure of the apostrophic utterance assumes or predicates a responsive human consciousness in inanimate objects (Rhetoric 75-76). Hillis Miller declares that "A prosopopeia is usually at least implicitly an apostrophe, an invocation, an attempt to bring back something that was presumably present but no longer is present" (Pygmalion 238). Yet apostrophe is intimately linked to reification, for the phenomenological stakes of addressing speech towards that which is non-human presumes an imaginary, ontically different state of affairs in which non-human things could have "language," however alien. (Such thinking follows Samuel Levin's logic of "radical dispersonification"; see below, chapter 4.) The move thus assimilates the apostrophizer to the apostrophized, engendering the reification of the human speaker as well as the personification of the apostrophized thing. This explanation clarifies de Man's cryptic pronouncement that prosopopoetic apostrophe "strikes dumb" the speaker (Rhetoric 78). As Cynthia Chase explains, "Prosopopeia, or the giving of face, is defacement ... insofar as if face is given by an act of language it is 'only' figure" ($5). Embedded in a Greimas Square, the three tropes reveal a neat geometry of relations. Prosopopeia and reification are contraries which frame an axis of diminishing as well as increasing figural speech inception. Apostrophe is the contradictory of prosopopeia. In the logic of the Greimas Square, apostrophe is corollary to but not an inversion of prosopopeia. Moreover, it signifies the essence of the axis plotted by prosopopeia/reification - that is, the essence of the potential range of "voicedness," the gamut from figural voice to figural voicelessness. Put another way, apostrophe is both prosopopeia and reification. Its homograph, or iconic physical sign, is the telltale " O " that initiates the syntagms of all apostrophic utterances. As Jonathan Culler has shown, the " O " is the sign of voice itself (Pursuit 142). A synecdoche of an apostrophe, the " O " is the figure of voicedness, the axial range of the tropes prosopopeia and reification. The triplex scheme prosopopeia/reification/apostrophe, however, leaves empty a fourth potential vertex in the Square. Logically, the fourth trope would be the subcontrary of apostrophe and the complementary of prosopopeia. It would, in effect, appear as a non-
Towards a taxonomy of tropes
trope - as a value outside of the system comprising poles of voice figuration. This "figure," called dialogism or sermocinatio ("dialogue"), is amply treated in the rhetorics and is the fictional motor of direct speech between two human characters. The grid exhausts two oppositions plotted by ontic categories and directionality of message -human/non-human and speaker/listener or addresser/addressee: PROSOPOPEIA <
• REIFICATION
SERMOCINATIO «
> APOSTROPHE
The idealized set of relations in this Greimas Square, however, functions minimally when the "prosopopeia" that anchors and powers up the grid is the "first personification" — the prosopopeia of local, rhetorical ornament. (The Conclusion of this book rewrites this square as a syntactical hierarchy of modified "meta-personifications," each representable by schematic calculi.) It is curious that contemporary poetic investigations into medieval characterization often use "voice," the phenomenal core of all fictional or figural character invention, as the phenomenal node for sermocinatio alone. For instance, Leonard Michael Koff argues that The Pardoners Tale and The Knight's Tale respectively exemplify a strictly binarized set of alternatives. There is: a storytelling continuum in Chaucer that includes tales usually seen as pure voiced performances (as species of drama, with varying degrees of deep or rounded characterization) and tales usually seen as purely voiceless juxtapositions of style or idiom (as species of narrative, with allegorical or emblematic, flat or idealized characters). (156; italics mine) In other words, figurally voiced character is figured as unvoiced; mimetic and "real" fictional character is figured as voiced. The old round/flat, dramatic/narrative valorizational dichotomy at the heart of this declaration commands an ontic distribution among characterizational sermocinatio, ethopeia, eidolopeia, and prosopopeia that markedly differs from the distribution used in this book. What one critic identifies as figural and emblematic, another identifies as authentic, human, and real. Apart from the aesthetic or ideological strands running through this evaluational division, sheer structural identification of personification 53
The poetics of personification and reiflcation in ready and quick terms can sometimes be difficult — a truth that threatens to shut down the preliminary (and admittedly) positivistic maneuvers needed in a formalization of tropes. The preceding semiotic analysis of four coordinate tropes represents an idealized set of relations permitted by abstracting the tropes out of a literary text. Ready identification of personification or reiflcation is especially problematic when we are confronted with figural character invention that is patterned by a unique diegetic structure in which the invention takes part. (I will discuss diegetic registers and personification more thoroughly in chapters 3 and 4.) An elementary example of the dilemma of identifying a driving inventional trope arises during the play-within-a-play "Pyramus and Thisbe," put on by the mechanicals in A Midsummer Night's Dream. In the domain of the mimetic line of plot that constitutes the circumscribing action of Shakespeare's whole play, the characters Flute, Snout, and Starveling are figurally transformed into non-human entities. Flute is animified as a Lion, while Snout and Starveling are reified as a Wall and Moonshine, respectively. These figural translations are executed through dramatic role-playing by figures who are already characters in the dramatic text A Midsummer Night's Dream. In the encapsulated or embedded domain of the inner play " Pyramus and Thisbe/' however, the non-human entities Lion, Wall, and Moonshine are personified as sentient, speaking beings. On the mimetic level of Shakespeare's play, the figural operator is reification; in the encapsulated level of play-withina-play, the operator is personification. As we saw above, these two tropes should be mutually exclusive. The narrative structure of Shakespeare's text prohibits binary opposition between personification and reification. It defers opportunity to readily name the tropes via the standard Saussurean tactic of definition by negative affirmation. A particularized narrative structure (like the play-within-a-play) can generate identificational confusion not only between personification and its figural binary opposite, but between personification as a figural means of characterization in general, and the descriptive presentation of something fictional but not personificational. Spenser's River catalogue in The Faerie Queene iv.xi involves such a confusion between trope and non-trope, between a narratorially presented personifier (the figurally invented character we see in narrative) and a descriptively presented personified (the actual, non-human thing in real life). Throughout the canto, certain programmatic words indicate that the narrator is recounting a pageant-procession (a discrete, embedded, 54
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performative genre or form) of humanoid figures. Stanza 11 begins, "First came great Neptune..." The "first came/next came" formula continues through the next forty stanzas, and the entities that move in the procession appear in order according to ontological categorization : first gods (iv.xi.o), then semi-divine or heroic humans (stanza 13), then the personified rivers (20), and finally aquatic nymphs (48). (The categorical segregation gauged by the segmenting of the linear procession resembles a variety of "diegetic quarantining" of figural characters that will receive further attention in chapter 3.) Catalogues of any sort, like the tally of trees in the first canto of Book 1, often signal Spenser's devotion to epic convention for its own sake (Braden 26). But Spenser's River catalogue presents a narratorial opportunity for the critique of the procession and of the "literary list." According to Stephen Barney, the latter is another discrete, embedded generic form which, somewhat like the procession, is (metaphorically) ordered by an image of linear motion and is controlled by adverbial markers like the "first/next" formula ("Lists" 205-06). The procession of iv.xi, because it is constituted by "personified" rivers, involves narrative language promoting formal confusion between procession and list. This is because every stanza begins with a "next came" or "there came" formula, while the descriptions of the individual rivers focus on the velocities of their currents: There was the speedy Tamar, which devides The Cornish and the Devonish.confines; Through both whose borders swiftly downe it glides, And, meeting Plim, to Plimmouth thence declines: And Dart, nigh chockt with sands of tinny mines, But Avon marched in more stately path, Proud of his Adamants with which he shines And glisters wide, as als of wondrous Bath, And Bristow faire, which on his waves he builded hath. (1v.xi.31) In addition, programmatic verbs like "marched" or "went" maintain that the passage is the narrative recounting of a train of human figures walking in linear sequence - in a ritualized procession. Because "marching" can also be a metaphor for "flowing," thus making it impossible for us to adjudicate between the two senses of the verb in context, we cannot decisively tell rivers from Rivers. The phrase "First came marching..." can mean, "First in my static description of actual, geographically locatable rivers in Britain, river x flows along speedily." The phrase can also mean, "Appearing at the 55
The poetics of personification head of the procession presented in my dynamic narrative tally of personification characters, River x walks speedily forward." This systematic ambiguity is by no means confined to stanza 31; it marks nearly every stanza in which the text introduces new rivers/Rivers in the catalogue. Such ambiguity of dual-reference incorporates other actional verbs apart from those of forward motion: But Thame was stronger, and of better stay; Yet seem'd full aged by his outward sight, With head all hoary, and his beard all gray, Deawed with silver drops that trickled downe alway. And eke he somwhat seem'd to stoupe afore With bowed backe, by reason of the lode And ancient heavy burden which he bore Of that faire City, wherein make abode So many learned impes, that shoot abrode, And with their braunches spread all Britany, No lesse then do her elder sisters broods. Joy to you both, ye double noursery Of Arts! But, Oxford, thine doth Thames most glorify. (iv.xi.35-36) The dewy, gray beard is a stock iconographic image of personified Rivers in Renaissance pictorial tradition. (One recalls the "crisp head" of the personified River Severn that appears in a speech by Hotspur, 1 Henry 4, i.iii. 104-06.) But the fact that Thames stoops, "With bowed backe, by reason of the lode / And auncient heavy burden" which he bears, promotes further ambiguity concerning the speaker's descriptive discourse about big river towns and his simultaneous narratorial attention to another stock iconographic trait: the heavy urns personified Rivers are often seen, in pictorial art, bearing on their backs (Hall 316). It is curious, though, that River Thames's physically heavy load is a literalization of the metaphorical "burden" of reputation the river Thames carries for the two university towns. The Thames segment of the catalogue expresses less effectively the force personification narrative can exert to distort the conventional structural boundaries between the two forms we call description and narration. But on the whole, the River episode presents not only the identificational difficulty of distinguishing tropological characters from real, nontropological things, it also deconstructs the figural/literal rhetoric of 56
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temporality that makes possible the distinction, charted by Phillipe Hamon (147-48, 162-70), between narrative and description. This textual effect, I contend, represents another codifiable, poetic feature of personification once the trope is combined with a range of generic forms or topoi. Spenser's Rivers, nonetheless, are anthropomorphisms like Vergil's creatures at the gate of the Underworld. But prosopopoetic characters still stand at the heart of this taxonomic chapter. The category of those anthropomorphic beings who enjoy the power of speech further divides into a variety of subsets. Evidently, the kinds of speech produced by prosopopoetic or personification characters bears structural and thematic significance for the text in which the being appears. Prosopopoetic characters in medieval allegory, for instance, often produce only one kind of discourse. Stephen Hawes's tutelary personifications Grammar (lines 519-609), Rhetoric (652-959), and Logic (610-51), in The Pastime of Pleasure, for instance, open their mouths to produce nothing more than dry, textbook jargon taken from the disciplines of Aristotelian rhetoric and logic. Tutelary personifications in medieval allegory are often mere mouthpieces for technical or doctrinal information. They function as prosopa for their real and opinionated author as much as they do for abstract concepts in the text. Many of the tutelary personifications in Piers Plowman provide a more extensive example. In fact, criticism has long recognized the uniform nature of the continuum of doctrinal discourse poured out on Will the dreamer each time he converses with a newly met figure of instruction (Study, Learning, Nature, the Graces, etc.). Many critics have even been amused that Will never really assimilates and learns from the pure doctrine he has been receiving throughout Langland's poem. All of the long educative speeches in Piers Plowman are comprised of highly orthodox theological and philosophical reflections, formulations, doxologies, and proof-texts from scripture. We need not delve into the contents of such speeches at the moment (reserving commentary for chapter 5); we need only to recognize their discursive structures here. Overall, the tutelary speeches tendered upon Will all have the same discursive structure. Like the utterances of Hawes's Logic and Rhetoric, Langland's tutelary personifications produce a uniform discourse that is devoid of narrative moments (with the possible exception of the highly summarized scriptural prooftexts) or rhetorically colorful figuration. They produce largely what 57
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Locke would have considered "pure" discursive language, language that avoids or reduces figural play, as well as any propensity towards fictional or fabular motion (146). The discourse of Langland's tutelary figures can be described as "monological," in the way that Bakhtin uses the term in The Dialogic Imagination (246). Indeed, the discursive "voice" of all the tutelary personifications in Piers Plowman conforms to one monological mode. The potential dialogical nature of Langland's whole work arises out of the communication between this doctrinally thematic, monological stratum and other strata coextending within the narrative dimensions of the poem. Narration is, quite clearly, a discursive mode formally distinct from other modes of discourse, i.e., exposition, description, or persuasion. Narration comprises yet another category of speech that is possible among prosopopoetic characters. The figural invention of a character who can produce her own narrations operates as a reflexive move on the part of the circumscribing poetic text. An author such as Prudentius has made a text in which purely figural characters have the power to make their own texts — their own narratives. (In the following chapter, we will see the significance of this effect for personification theory.) Therefore, a figural subset of prosopopeia is a tangential trope through which the narrative text figurally makes further makers of narrative texts. Another taxonomic point regarding the identification of personification characters concerns what might at first seem to be the simplest question of all: the topic of names they bear. In defining the scope of this study, I at first chose to avoid figural characters who bore names, or lexical labels, that did not denote a readily and commonly identifiable abstract concept — a faculty of the mind, a human institution or agency, a natural force or essence. Quantities such as justice, mercy, the holy church, mankind, pride, or rhetoric are all readily and commonly identifiable abstract concepts. Presented in a literary text, and named or labeled using the proper language of the author of the text — say, a medieval English author — they can become the personification characters Justice, Mercy, Holy Church, Mankind, and so on. A plausible but highly restrictive taxonomic foundation for personification based on names written in the proper language of the author would exclude characters bearing foreign names, neologistic names, nonce-word names, or idioglossic names. A text such as Prudentius' Psychomachia provides only this kind of elementarily labeled personification character. But clearly other great works of 58
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personification tabulation, such as Piers Plowman or The Faerie Queene, are heavily populated with characters named according to nonelementary principles. Spenser's personification figures grow into their names after complex symbolic trials; or, their names ironically or multivalently fit their characters. For personification theory, the topic of naming broaches what I call "the dilemma of nomination/' Again, a brief glossary of nominational varieties will be of service: 1 Personifications bearing single-word names formed in the language of the text's author (Langland's "Kynde" or "Conscience" in Piers Plowman; Milton's Sin and Death in Paradise Lost). 2 Personifications bearing compound or multi-word names formed in the author's language (Messers "Save-All," "Money-Love," and "By-Ends" in Bunyan's The Pilgrims Progress; Prudentius' Vice "Fidem Veterum Cultura Deorum." I will elaborate upon the semiotic value of this category for Piers Plowman in chapter 5.) 3 Personifications bearing either single or compound word names in a language foreign to the author's proper vernacular (Langland's "Anima" or "Activa Vita"; Spenser's "Orgoglio" in The Faerie Queene). The articulation of category three for Piers Plowman is crucial, since Langland creates so many personifications named in Latin, and because there is a regular frequency of Latin that punctuates, at times in something like macaronic fashion, the conventional Middle English language stock of the poem's entire discourse. But the taxonomic distinction between category one and category three, a distinction based on the slippery concept of the author's "vernacular," runs into problems when the entire text of a personification narrative is written by a vernacular author in a non-vernacular, hieratic language like Latin. Milton's early mini-epic, In auintum Novembris, Anno aetatis 17 ("On the Fifth of November, at Age Seventeen"), is an imaginative personification fable peopled with figures, all naturally named in Latin, such as Fama, Discordia, Calumnia, Timor, and Horror. But among his demonic pantheon of evils and vices (lines 130-54) which follows the tradition of Aeneid vi.2 73-81, Milton also includes a figure named Phonos, which Douglas Bush and Merritt Hughes both translate, quite accurately, as "Murder." It is peculiar that Milton, writing his little epic in the hieratic Latin, names this character in Greek. Why does he not name the concept "murder" by employing the proper Latin labels, say, Caedes, Nex, or Homicidiuml I do not intend to fully articulate the aesthetic reasons for Milton's nominational tactic. There is a need 59
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mainly to point out that the question of foreign/vernacular language nomination is central to the categorization of figural beings because medieval and Renaissance thinking held that there was a hierarchy of created things that had to be named. There was also a hierarchy of languages. The pervasive translatio imperii topos, for example, ranked Greek, Latin, and English in a valuational order: the more chronologically prior the language, the more hieratic its status. Thus, Milton's Phonos may be so named to indicate the concept's originary status as a crime or sin (the biblical idea of murder, first committed by Cain, as an originary sin was a conventional enough one) - a crime or sin prior to "discord," "fear," or "horror." In a continuing tentative glossary of nominational tactics, domains of character invention that are not based upon personification proper come into focus. Completing the three categories listed above is a further tally of nominational modes that begin to fall outside of this study's purview: 4 The " ticket-name " or " tag-name " character. This numerous class includes medieval examples (Dante's Malebranche devils "Ciriato," "Barbariccia," "Cagnazzo"), many English Renaissance, Restoration, and Georgian examples (Shakespeare's Bottom the Weaver; Marlowe's Lightborne in Edward II; Wycherley's Pinchwife, Horner, or Fidget in The Country Wife; Sheridan's Surface or Snake in A School for Scandal), and numerous examples from modern literature (Beckett's Clov and Hamm in Endgame; Thomas Pynchon's Benny Profane in V and Oedipa Maas in The Crying of Lot 49). 5 The nonce-word character. These figural characters' names are contrived from the vocabulary of an author's vernacular language, as well as from the vocabulary of a language foreign to the author. Like ticket-named characters, these are far too numerous in allegorical literature to represent here in a fair and full light. (Spenser's characters "Amoret," "Scudamour," and "Belamour" are all obvious lexical regenerations of the Latin amor, or of the French I'amour. The orthographic cast Spenser gives any figural name always possesses centrifugal thematic value.)11 6 Another major category of personification-like figural character nomination, traditionally termed " typification," has been long recognized as distinct by theorists of medieval allegory, particularly by Robert Worth Frank (245). I call this the category of "exemplary property characters," and structurally the mechanism of their figural invention is really a variation on isotyping. These are characters in 60
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whom an abstract quality is not necessarily personified. Rather, they are characters who exemplify the abstract qualities reflected in their names. Grammatically, their names are not abstract nouns or mass nouns, but adjectives and count nouns. (Bunyan's "Hopeful" and "Faithful/' and Jean de Meun's Ami or "Friend," are among the most notable examples.) These figures are a variety of isotype because exemplification makes them individual representatives of classes of human beings who are hopeful, faithful, friendly, etc. In the terminology of conventional art history, these characters are at times called exempla. 7 The final category of figural character nomination, which quite properly belongs outside the domain of pure personification, is that class of figural-looking beings who remain unnamed in a literary text. Often, this nominational tactic will take the form of a figure who bears specific iconographic attributes, or who seems to fit as part of a larger, apologic group, but does not bear a name or lexical label. Examples include the "sevene grete geaunts" who assail the building Unity at the close of Piers Plowman (B.xx.215), or the second, unnamed old man in a triad with Eumnestes and Phantastes, in The Faerie Queene (ii.ix.53-54). If we entertain the idea that Chaucer's House of Fame is deliberately unfinished, perhaps we can see the " man of gret auctorite " who appears at the end of the poem (lines 2155—58) as an unnamed figural character. This is structurally possible because of the characterological design of the poem: except for the dreamer Geffrey, the companies of beings that fill Fame's temple and the House of Rumor are really personified verbal utterances (rumors, complaints, petitions, praises). They have ascended from the earth below. The hierarchically elevated and central characters in the House of Fame are Fame and Aeolus; they too are personification figures. It is possible, therefore, that the Man of Authority whom the Dreamer sees is similarly elevated above the lesser, personified rumors who fill the wicker building. As a character of superior status in the House of Rumor, he structurally complements the other two chief personification figures we see: Fame and Aeolus. Perhaps he is the figure Rumor. In the end, however, this speculation is vain because of the unfinished condition of the poem, and because Chaucer does not name him. It is possible for us to think of Langland's seven giants, the second sage in Alma's House of Temperance, and the Man of Authority in Chaucer's poem, as "personification figures" because of the semiotic and structural matrices that contain them, but we still cannot make 61
The poetics of personification final nominational conclusions regarding them. The seven giants may seem to be, axiomatically and without doubt, the Seven Deadly Sins. Here, we have only a numerological value to go on. But the case of the sage is more problematic: what complementary property — to Memory and Imagination - of mind does he personify? Nor is ready structural equation and conceptual appreciation plausible in regard to the Man of Authority. The effect of this kind of non-naming, in fact, creates an open space in the literary text which may initiate the aporia of allegory as de Man described it in Allegories of Reading. In the pages that follow, we will see how the thematic, structural, semiotic, and narratological matrices in the Psychomachia, Piers Plowman, and The Faerie Queene program personification characters who are named in a variety of ways. The taxonomy charted in this chapter can effectively describe figural characterization in the majority of ancient, medieval, Renaissance, and modern literary works. Yet it may be modified or disrupted as it is more extensively applied in the three works the remainder of this study seeks to account for. The taxonomy provides a foundational model or a map from which the textual realization of its categories will necessarily diverge, producing at times further moments of conceptual and terminological slippage.
62
Narrative level, personification, and character ontology in Prudentius' Psychomachia As the first major work in the history of Western personification literature, the Psychomachia of Prudentius has had a paradoxical status. In the modern critical arena, it is recognized as the most influential source for later medieval allegories that are built upon the central notion of spiritual conflict. At the same time it is considered something of an embarrassment, because of its simple plot structure, the seeming lack of literary grace in its language, and its frequently artless purveying of doctrine. It works more like a piece of theological propaganda than a poem in the epic tradition. More precisely, the Psychomachia has been traditionally appraised as a poetic or formal failure but as a thematic staple in Western thought. The first modern critic to pay close attention to the Psychomachia was C. S. Lewis, who relegated it to the great heap of zealous, popular doctrinal staples of the late Patristic period. For Lewis, "an anticlimax has to be faced when we reach... the Psychomachia of Prudentius. It is unworthy of the great utterances which lead up to it and explain its existence" (66). Lewis appreciates the poem from the perspective of genetic literary history: the primary value of the Psychomachia is its location as the first entry in a vertically ascending scale of allegorical works that reaches, through time, toward greater and greater aesthetic perfection. H. R. Jauss more thoroughly examined the poem's germinal influence on the new psychological apparatus of the great twelfth-century allegorical and humanistic renaissance ("Form")/ while Maurice Lavarenne saw the Psychomachia as the symbolic expression of the crucial historical moments when paganism gave way to Christianity (9-10). In canonical critical accounts of the poem, the trope personification is understood as unsophisticated or banal. This view is no doubt promoted by the poem's simple structure of binarily organized 63
The poetics of personification combats between readily named, definable Virtues and Vices. There seems to be no mystery to the identities of the combative figures, and the staging of the fights is seen as altogether routine. In fact, Prudentius' structure is so predictably methodical, it amounts to a mechanical expression of the concept of plot "conflict" itself: six Virtues slay, in choreographic sequence, six respectively oppositional Vices. Jean Batany's summary of the structure of the Psychomachia as a routine and predictable battle "in which certain individual combats receive particular notice" (32) accurately conveys what seems to be a striking actantial simplicity. Indeed, the economical structure of the Psychomachia constitutes what Viktor Shklovskij might have called an "algebrized" narrative design (11-12), because the predictably sequential pageant of combats parallels and underscores the temporally sequential procession of events in everyday life, rather than the reconfigured and "defamiliarized" collection of events that belong to the genuine "poetic" text. The plot of the Psychomachia exemplifies insured lectorial expectation. In sum, the Psychomachia, because of its algebraic character, seems allied to the simple and "equational" moralization Tuve assigns to "bad allegorization." Its structure also evokes the cumulative character of the equational litanies that punctuate Fulgentius' Continentia Vergiliana, another seminal early medieval allegorical text in which the narrator learns from his magister, the spirit of Vergil, the formulaically derivable "meanings" of all the characters, incidents, and places included in The Aeneia1.1 This algebraic character of the Psychomachia has also furthered the general critical conception of personification the most outstanding formal feature of Prudentius' poem — as a simplistic, algebraic, and inelastic poetic device. Prudentius' personification of virtues and vices, along with his routine deployment of the battle topos, have resulted in a generally unfavorable reception of the poem as an aesthetic entity. More damaging to this already devalued estimation of personification in the poem is the alternative critical opinion that Prudentius does not employ real personification at all The chief recent exponent of this position in Prudentius criticism is Kenneth R. Haworth, in Deified Virtues, Demonic Vices, and Descriptive Allegory in Prudentius
"Psychomachia".2 According to Haworth, the Vices and Virtues in the poem are not personified faculties of the human mind or tendencies of the human spirit. The Vices are "nether spirits," and the Virtues are something akin to angels or minor heavenly deities. This conception 64
Prudentius Psychomachia is approximately conveyed in E. H. Gombrich's description of the urban tyche, the local genii once believed to preside over Roman cities, as actual divine spirits (Symbolic 128). Haworth's project, then, considers the poem as a mimetic narrative that recounts "battles" between good and evil spirits for the human soul. It does not consider the poem primarily as a text that is heavily invested in its own figurality. The argument of Haworth's book is often convincing, mainly because of his keen observations on late Roman religion. But in effect, the foundation of his critical method can be construed as a modified version of the old anthropological approach. This is because Haworth concludes that the divinities and nether spirits of Prudentius' poetic war are vestigial images of gods and goddesses worshiped by the Latin peoples in prehistoric Italy. This general thesis is contradicted by the fact that the first combat described in Prudentius' narrative is between Fides ("Faith") and Fidem Veterum Cultura Deorum ("Faith-inthe-gods-of-antiquity"). The latter might more easily be translated as "Paganism." This necessarily creates a paradox in Prudentius' text, because if all the characters are vestigial, "faded deities" from the religion of pre-Christian, prehistoric Italy, an initial combat in which the paragon of faded deities is destroyed becomes absurd. It is unlikely that Prudentius' Virtues and Vices are vestigial gods and goddesses. Moreover, as we will see, there is strong formal evidence in the Psychomachia which proves that personification is a self-reflexively developed property of the poem. Despite the general devaluing of mimetic narrative structure in the Psychomachia, recent criticism has elaborated Prudentius' sophisticated handling of thematic and theological subjects. Stephen Barney has examined the role of biblical typology in the poem, concluding that Prudentius deftly situates exemplary moments from the Old Testament in regard to the allegorical "outer space" of the battlefield and a psychological "inner space" of the human mind (Allegories 67-68). Carolynn Van Dyke has provided a highly detailed and sensitive investigation into the lexical and thematic properties of all the Virtues' and Vices' names in relation to surrounding narrative contexts. Often, Van Dyke takes to task the problem of translating the Latin words for the Virtues and Vices into English. For example, " Operatio," in the narrative context of her combat with Avaritia, implies a range of theological and social concepts that are restricted by H. J. Thomson's phrase "Good Works" (Van Dyke, Fiction, 56). This critical tactic, also 65
The poetics of personification strongly represented by S. Georgia Nugent's concurrent book on the Psychomachia, attends to the "personifieds" that make up part of the personification figure. However, Van Dyke also elaborates the poem's systematic but significant confusion between typology proper and primary allegorical action. For example, she understands the claim of Pudicitia ("Chastity") - that the Virtues were "prefigured" by Judith — not as a flaw in the distinction between modes of discourse (the typological and the personificational) on Prudentius' part, but as a reflexive manipulation of narrative codes. Prudentius' text selfconsciously mixes the then current conceptions of what Van Dyke calls conventional "literary allegory," or "the set of genres based on the synthesis of... generic codes," and "pure allegory," or "Realistic narrative ... whose agents are universals" (39-41). The actants of Prudentius' poem are, for Van Dyke, abstract universals contained in a narrative continuum. The allegorical power of the poem lies in its lexical and thematic fissures along with larger generic confusions, rather than in any basic assumptions the poem makes about the trope personification itself. For Van Dyke, personification is one of the stable givens of the Psychomachia from which we proceed to more complex formal matters. This at first seems to be an appropriate critical response, because the Psychomachia provides, as I noted in chapter 2, characters that are labeled in the poet's proper language with words that indicate comprehensible, albeit abstract conceptions: faith, greed, discord, lust, and so on. Van Dyke and Barney, like all commentators on Prudentius' poem, make little of the concrete, physical action of the battle that constitutes the poem's primary and mimetic narrative moments. This is disappointing, because the most memorable details of Prudentius' descriptive discourse are the moments of graphic demolition that befall the Vices at the hands of their conquerors. The grisly descriptions of bloody decapitation, dismemberment, and the mutilation of faces have been decisively traced to the Vergilian descriptive tradition of epic battle. Sister M. Clement Eagan associates the gory aspects of the Psychomachia with key sites in The Aeneid (82)? More recently, Martha Malamud has discussed the martyrological common ground of Prudentius' Peristephanon and the Psychomachia; quite importantly, her reading of Claudian's In Rufinum explores the topos of dismemberment in the arena (48—54). But even as versions of Vergilian battle topoi or martyrological parody, the grisly sites in Prudentius' poem seem awkwardly excessive. After all, they conflict 66
Prudentius Psychomachia with the "ideational" properties of characters that are supposedly abstract universals. Macklin Smith explains that Prudentius' engagement of Vergilian themes and battle topoi is strictly ironic: Prudentius contrasts noble pagan action in battle with that of ideal Christian action in battle (144). The excessive quality of the fleshy demolition of Vices could be an ironic commentary on a traditional battle ethos. Carolynn Van Dyke agrees with the general idea that Prudentius employs, either ironically or straightforwardly, epic battle conventions. Concerning Prudentius' graphic details, she writes: We can safely conclude that these details are 'epic convention' and declare that no allegorical image can correspond perfectly to thematic meanings. Still, we may wish that the image had been more appropriate or more sensitively handled. (32) I have been dwelling upon the topic of the graphic gore in the Psychomachia because it is the only expressly physical detail with which Prudentius invests his personification characters. True, he provides general descriptions of the warriors' clothing and hair, but nothing on the order of the iconographic elaboration that characterizes the figures who inhabit later medieval allegories. In the handful of critical perspectives just reviewed, the graphic gore is appreciated as a physically "realistic" element in Prudentius' poem about non-corporeal conceptual or ideational quantities. Yet, certain of the descriptions part from realistic representation, and attain a greatly exaggerated quality - a kind of "visual hyperbole." An example is the death of Fidem Veterum Cultura Deorum, which concludes the poem's first combat. Here, Faith hostile caput phalerataque tempora vitiis altior insurgens labefactat, et ora cruore de pecudum satiata solo adplicat et pede calcat elisos in morte oculos, animamque malignam fracta intercepti commercia gutturis artant, difficilemque obitum suspiria longa fatigant. (rising higher, smites her foe's head down, with its fillet-decked brows, lays in the dust that mouth that was sated with the blood of beasts, and tramples the eyes under foot, squeezing them out in death. The throat is choked and the scant breath confined by the stopping of its passage, and long gasps make a hard and agonising death.) (30-35) Van Dyke maintains that to "allegorize in detail" such a graphic passage would "betray the absurdity of the procedure" (32). True, the search for the symbolic value of eyes, mouth, and breath in an iconographic system outside of the text could become exegetically 67
The poetics of personification strained and cumbersome. But the precise details Prudentius provides in this passage - the destruction of eyes, mouth, and throat - are repeated again and again in the Psychomachia. Witness the destruction of Luxuria (" Indulgence") at the hands of her opponent Sobrietas ("Soberness"), who smashes a stone into the Vice's mouth: casus agit saxum, medii spiramen ut oris frangeret, et recavo misceret labra palato. dentibus introrsum resolutis lingua resectam dilaniata gulam frustis cum sanguinis inplet. insolitis dapibus crudescit guttur, et ossa conliquefacta vorans re vomit quas hauserat off as. (chance drives the stone to smash the breath-passage in the midst of the face and beat the lips into the arched mouth. The teeth within are loosened the gullet cut, and the mangled tongue fills it with bloody fragments. Her gorge rises at the strange meal; gulping down the pulped bones she spews up again (421—26) the lumps she swallowed.) Earlier in the poem, Pudicitia inflicts a similar, fatal laryngeal wound on Libido ("Lust"): tune exarmatae iugulum meretricis adacto transfigit gladio; calidos vomit ilia vapores sanguine concretos caenoso; spiritus inde sordidus exhalans vicinas polluit auras. (Then with a sword-thrust she pierces the disarmed harlot's throat, and she spews out hot fumes with clots of foul blood, and the unclean breath defiles (40-52) the air near by.) And again, after the conclusion of the "war proper/' when DiscordiaHeresis enters the camp of the Virtues, we have nearly the same image: non tulit ulterius capti blasphemia monstri Virtutum regina Fides, sed verba loquentis inpedit et vocis claudit spiramina pilo, pollutam rigida transfigens cuspide linguam. (No further did Faith, the Virtues' queen, bear with the outrageous prisoner's blasphemies, but stopped the passage of her voice with a javelin, driving its hard point through the foul tongue.) (715-18) Each of these passages no doubt has an analogue in Homeric or Vergilian battle convention; mouths and faces are commonly smashed in the epic battle. But here, Prudentius' lingering on the precise demolition of oculi, and of dentis and linguae seems to bear crucial semiotic force. Teeth and the tongue are the internal bodily components for making speech. They constitute, along with the lips (labii — the external components for making speech), the mouth. The mouth (along with the larynx which modulates the breath) is the seat 68
Prudentius Psychomachia of the power of language. As organs, the mouth and the eyes constitute a sign of the face. And the face (prosopon) thematized is the signature of prosopopeia. Paul de Man understands the semiotic engagement of eyes, mouth (voice-speech), and the face as the central chain of figural images in Wordsworth's Essays Upon Epitaphs: We can identify the figure ... of prosopopeia, the fiction of an apostrophe to an absent, deceased,, or voiceless entity, which posits the possibility of the latter's reply and confers upon it the power of speech. Voice assumes mouth, eye, and finally face, a chain that is manifest in the etymology of the trope's name, prosopon poein, to confer a mask or a face (prosopon).
(Rhetoric j6)
Prudentius' focus upon the imagery of the destruction of the face, therefore, is a literalized reverse of prosopopeia. It is the symbolic dismantling of the trope by which the text invents the figural characters who inhabit its actantial narrative. Prosopopeia is selfreflexively thematized as a central topical ground in the Psychomachia. The final dismemberment of Discordia furthers the significance of this structure. At this moment, Prudentius thematizes the coordinate trope anthropomorphism by instantiating its literalized inversion: carpitur innumeris feralis bestia dextris... discissum foedis animalibus omne cadaver dividitur (Countless hands tear the deadly beast in pieces... The whole corpse is torn asunder and parcelled out to unclean creatures.) (7*9/ The graphic rending of limbs from trunk and part from part no doubt ironically reveals Discord's symbolic condition in life. But the image is also a potent figural reversal of the trope wherein the human form (arms, legs, head, trunk) is poetically and figurally "assembled" as a characterological entity. The graphic demolition of the Vices at the hands of the Virtues has created a critical dilemma regarding the ostensible ethics of "Virtues" (Clifford; Nuttall). We must remember, however, that the Virtues in Prudentius' poem are reflexively realized figural entities. At times, their main semiotic function (as opposed to their obvious thematic role) is to reflect not the ethically abstract offices of virtuehood, but rather the self-reflexive figural armature of the entire Psychomachia. This "armature" is the self-conscious omnipresence of the text's foundational figural operator, personification. The argument I have outlined here therefore pushes back, beyond the advent of the allegorical poetry of the High Middle Ages (The Romance of the Rose, Piers Plowman), the inception of self-reflexive personification fabu69
The poetics of personification lation. Through what at first seems to be the pedestrian implementation of hackneyed conventions, the Psychomachia provides a critique of the primary subordinate tropes of substantialization — prosopopeia and anthropomorphism. The simple structure and cliche actions of the poem bespeak a sophisticated process of reader involvement: we expect an inelastic, embarrassingly naive and predictable apologue; but we get an implicit theoretical document on the modes and problems of figural character invention. Even if we insist that dismemberment and defacement in the Psychomachia can be best explained in terms of martyrological or epic sources, the aforementioned semiotic state of affairs can be seen to inform even those sources. Martha Malamud's excellent examination of the connections between Claudian's In Rufinum and Prudentius' Psychomachia reveal the programmatic figural imagery of encasement, defacement, and dismemberment. The tearing apart of Rufinus in the arena involves a kind of "metamorphosis/ 7 a figurative depiction of the bestially attacking soldiers encased in "statue-like," non-human looking shells (in lamina —a semiotic "oxymoron" that both dehumanizes the soldiers, as Malamud notes in the boustrophedon of the word, animal, while depicting them as metal prosopa) that strangely "breathe" while rending Rufinus into pieces (51-53). As a literary source, the Claudianic text presages the latent mimesis of the tropes prosopopeia and pragmapeia that characterizes Prudentius' text. So far, we have dealt exclusively with the physical details of mimetic action that involve the actants of Prudentius' text. We have not, though, addressed the verbal discourse produced by these actants. We have seen how Prudentius, in general, thematizes prosopopeia. But he also provides a reflexive figural examination of that hypothetical subset of prosopopeia mentioned above in chapter 2: the Psychomachia presents poetically crafted figural characters who make their own poetic texts. In light of the earlier, reductive tradition of figural characterization in Aeneid vi, Prudentius' creation of personification figures who speak and narrate is an inaugural moment in Western letters. Before fully articulating this concept, however, we must pursue the "kinds" of allegorical operation evident in the Psychomachia. This question has been broached by Stephen Barney, who, as we saw in chapter 1, understands two varieties of allegory at work in Prudentius' poem: "reification allegory" and "typological allegory." The distinction arises out of the thematic and semiotic tension generated between the "historical," biblical matters spoken of
Prudentius Psychomachia by the Virtues and Vices, and the encapsulating continuum of the battle action (Barney, Allegories, 63; Van Dyke, Fiction, 34-35). Exactly what is the structural relationship between the biblical or typological dimension of the poem, and the actantial or personificational one? A theoretical review of typology, personification, and their significance in the province of traditional medieval allegoresis frames this question. In most discussions of allegory theory since the 1950s, the four-fold method of medieval allegorical exegesis has come under strong attack. Morton Bloomfield was the first critic to point out that, along with what is called the "literal" level, "typological" (often called "allegorical"), "tropological," and "anagogical" valences of meaning arise, at best, only out of successive and different moments of a literary narrative. Rarely do all four senses apply to a single, isolable site (either in scripture or in secular literature), except in the case of "a few hackneyed phrases like Jerusalem" ("Symbolism" 76). The popular understanding that four senses or levels of meaning are engendered in every phrase, image, or episode of an allegorical text is traceable to Dante's " Letter to Can Grande," in which the poet offers as exemplary of the four-fold exegetical paradigm an analysis of the famous passage from Psalm 114, 1-2 (Adams 122). Looking from Dante to Bloomfield, we might say that there is little or no current interest in the four-fold scheme as a serious and useful topic of inquiry in modern allegory theory. It is perhaps instructive that modern allegory theorists generally pay no attention to the scheme, while some medievalists, like V. A. Kolve, still see it as a viable hermeneutic tool in decoding complex works like Chaucer's Man of Laws Tale (297-358). A formal redefinition of the four levels that tries to account for the genuine function of the trope personification, however, could provide foundation for a new argument. I would like to propose that a narratological program — that is, a descriptive taxonomy that accounts for the formal operation of narrative levels and codes in a literary text - could revive the notion of significational senses or "levels" in texts that are traditionally accepted as "allegorical." By seeing how personification relates to the four levels and then examining the levels in terms of narrative or diegetic patterns as they are arranged in the Psychomachia, we can better understand the widespread medieval conception of literary texts that are significationally " layered." And we will further see how Prudentius foregrounds and examines the semiotic value of the trope personification. Our first task is to see how personification, as a narrative trope of
The poetics of personification character invention, is related in its essence to the four levels of literal and extra-literal significance. When we trace the four-fold scheme backward from Dante (ignoring for the moment other major exponents of it, such as Isidore of Seville) we come first to Augustine, who expounded a similar four-level significational configuration in scripture. Augustine's " senses," however, do not correspond precisely to Dante's. They are the "historical," the "etiological," the "anagogical," and the "allegorical" levels of meaning (Rogers and McKim 32). Nearer to the elements of Dante's scheme are the three levels prescribed by Origen. His "literal," "moral," and "anagogical" levels prefigure Dante's senses, and they reflect, approximately, the soma, psyche, and pneuma of a human being (Rogers and McKim 15). Going back still further, we come to Philo of Alexandria, whose still more compact two-fold paradigm of signification was the first to account for registers of scriptural polysemy (Grant 58). For Philo, scripture engendered a "physical" level and an "ethical" level of understanding. If we rewrite the popular four-fold scheme in the terms of Philo's paradigm, we are left with only two levels of significance. The eschatological-anagogical sense chronologically involves the final moments of real human history - the "end-time," or parousia of the "literal," temporal sequence of human history. This sequence is represented concretely in the narration of actual events and living persons that constitute the subjects of the Bible - the record, for orthodox medieval Christians, of divinely guided salvation-history. What are traditionally the first and the fourth levels of the four-fold paradigm — the literal and the eschatological — therefore collapse into one. Although Revelations, the scriptural account of the parousia, is itself highly charged with symbolic images and allegorical resonances, the domain of reference for this apocalyptic text are beings (angels, devils, humans) who have actually existed or will enjoy existence. In line with the notion suggested in chapter 2 of this study, collapsing the eschatological level into the literal level initiates the assimilation of two sets of phenomenologically similar ontological "entities" — historical humans. Similarly, the second or so-called " allegorical" level of significance is simply a register of the entire grid of typological configurations possible among the corpus of scripture. Since Abel as type and Christ as antitype are genuine salvation-historical figures, they belong, ontologically and formally, to the same taxonomic category. The Mountain Horeb where Moses receives the Ten Commandments is
Prudentius Psychomachia the prefigurative type of the Mount of Olives where Jesus ascends to heaven; both mountains are actual, geographic places locatable in the space and time of human history. Abel and Christ, Horeb and the Mount of Olives clearly belong, like the characters and places that would inhabit the historical parousia, to a physical or historical plane of significance. The only level of the traditional four-fold scheme of allegoresis that cannot be collapsed into the historical plane of ontology designated by real, physical persons is the " tropological" (in the pre-modern sense of the word) or moral level. This level presents the ethical ventures of the archetypal human soul struggling along the course toward individual salvation. As such, the areas of reference or "pretexts" (to borrow Quilligan's term, Allegory g?-i55) for tropological fabulation are ethics, axiology, and moral philosophy. This is because these disciplines systematically consider the individual person's dilemma of making morally or ethically informed decisions throughout life. Since scriptural tropology and ethics contain the same objects and telos, the former might be thought of as a less systematic version of the latter. Given all this, we can understand that the subjects of tropological fabulation must be moral or ethical abstract values: they are vices, virtues, feelings and thoughts, impulses, faculties, and by extension, institutions, disciplines, bodies or fields of knowledge, and so on.4 In line with the formal need of narration or fabulation for substantialized, concrete, spatio-temporal actants, the phenomenal or ontic world of the tropological plane must necessarily be peopled by and distributed with personification figures, reification objects, and moralized paysages. In short, the " characters " or " objects" found in this ontological domain amount to what Husserl called the eidetic realm in his phenomenological program. Eidetic entities exist only in mental or psychic terms and never in "real" or hyletic ones (more about the phenomenological bases of "personificational worlds" in the next chapter). It should therefore be evident that Philo's scheme is at once rich and simple in providing the framework for a taxonomy of character invention. It should also be clear that the narrative worlds generated out of this framework inscribe a binary opposition of character morphology: real human vs. personification figure. The implementation of this framework among a tentative set of narratological codes for the Psychomachia can now be undertaken. But before we can turn to the promise of such codes to sort out the formal operations of personification figures and real human characters in the 73
The poetics of personification poem, we must first select and review the narratological system that promises the greatest rigor and utility. The categories proposed by Gerard Genette in Narrative Discourse (216-62) seem the most clearly articulated and applicable. Genette understands the primary and encompassing narrative field in a literary text to comprise what he calls the "diegesis" of the text. This is story and descriptive commentary supplied directly by the "authorial" voice that circumscribes all the temporal action in the text. Any narrative of a secondary nature that is "embedded," to use Todorov's term for this structural motion (Poetics 70—73), in the primary diegesis Genette calls a "metadiegesis." Much of Genette's theoretical discussion of the complex novels of, say, Fielding or Proust, focuses on the interrelationship among these diegetic levels and on the differentiation, in terms of formal characteristics, between one level and another (Narrative 227—37).
Given the basic terms of Genette's system, we can proceed to ask the questions hitherto prompted: can there be a relationship between the two oppositional, ontologically different kinds of character invention we outlined above (human/personificational), and separate and different levels of diegesis in Prudentius' text? Is it possible that the historical register of narrative significance is somehow coterminous with one distinct diegetic level, while the moral register of narrative significance is coterminous with another distinct, "higher" or "lower" diegetic level? Perhaps more to the point: is there a reason for "quarantining" ontologically different entities, distributing them among the distinct levels of a verticalized spatial structure? I make these connections as part of an unavoidable metafigural inquiry. Genette's scheme and the Philovian or Dantean paradigms are constructed according to the master trope or macrometaphor of vertically ? The systems of Genette, Philo, and Dante posit a valorized, vertical layering of levels or valences, and consider the possible formal and phenomenological-ontological differences among the characteristic actants and objects that inhabit each valence. Uncovering this macrometaphor of verticality leads to attractive possibilities in devising a new tool for reading a good many medieval texts. The idea, however, that there are medieval literary allegories which have personification figures neatly self-contained on one diegetic level while human figures are self-contained on another level, is provocative and revealing but perhaps difficult to demonstrate. In fact, a primary characteristic of medieval personification tabulation is that human 74
Prudentius Psychomachia characters and personification figures interact freely: they converse, argue, fight with, or instruct one another on any given narrative level whether it is a diegesis narrated by the author, or by a character contained in the author's own diegesis. Without such freedom, Piers Plowman or many of Chaucer's works would be impossible. But the Psychomachia provides an empirical instance of the principle of strict diegetic quarantining. As another fountainhead of medieval allegory, Prudentius' poem is sufficiently prior to, and poetically different from, the later allegories to allow for the suspicion that the author's sense of character invention and distribution is radically innovative and distinct. An early and germinal work of personification fabulation, the Psychomachia has a correspondingly compact structure that enables ready dissection. A digest of the poem's simple structure goes as follows. After an initial reflection about the holiness of Abraham, followed by invocation of the martial figure that necessarily precedes moral action in the face of evil, the Prudentian narrator describes in sequence six single combats that constitute the "war" proper between the Virtues and the Vices. Each of the six fights is programmatically simple.6 Shouting boasts and invectives, a Vice usually advances from among her ranks toward a Virtue. Next, the Virtue slays the Vice in a graphically gruesome manner. She then concludes her noble act by breaking into a hortatory set-speech. Immediately evident is an inverse structural parallel between the performance of each Vice and its corresponding Virtue in a binary set: at times, a Vice will provide speech first, physical action second; a Virtue provides physical action first, speech second. No doubt this programmatic move on the narrator's part conveys an orthodox thematic value having to do with the medieval ethical notion of vita activa.7 More importantly, however, Prudentius' poem is narratologically unique because all the personification figures are entirely contained in the primary diegetic field of authorial narration. This is the mimetic line of action and its function is to describe in detail all events that arise during the battle: charges, retreats, slayings, and the advent of illocutions. The set-speeches performed by the personification figures divide into two modes. First, they are boasts, curses (optatives or exclamations, provided mainly by the Vices), or orders (imperatives) ; second, they are fully developed narrations (provided exclusively by the Virtues). This presents us with a narratological distinction in Prudentius' narrative fabric: the stories narrated by the personifications 75
The poetics of personification constitute a second or metadiegetic level of narrative. These are indeed embedded narrations, for nearly each set-speech contains a version of a biblical narrative passage. For example, when Superbia (Pride) crashes from her horse, Spes (Hope) steps forth, promptly beheads the Vice, and recounts the confrontation between David and Goliath: vidimus horrendum membris animisque Goliam invalida cecidisse manu: puerilis in ilium dextera fundali torsit stridore lapillum traiectamque cavo penetravit vulnere frontem. ille minax, rigidus, iactans, truculentus, amarus, dum tumet indomitum, dum formidabile fervet, dum sese ostentat, clipeo dum territat auras, expertus pueri quid possint ludicra parvi subcubuit teneris bellator turbidus annis. (We have seen how Goliath, terrible as he was in body and in valour, fell by a weak hand; it was but a boy's right hand that shot at him a little stone whizzing from his sling, and pierced a hole deep in his forehead. He, for all his stark menace, his boasting and his fierce and bitter speech, in the midst of his ungoverned pride and fearful raging, as he vaunted himself, affrighting the heavens with his shield, found what a little child's toy can do, and wild man of war as he was, fell to a lad of tender years.) (291-99) Similar biblical narrative is provided by the Virtues in the respective contexts of almost all the slayings. A close look at Prudentius' nearly identical structuring of each actantial confrontation and its rhetorical aftermath allows us to isolate at least three narrative proairetic codes: (1) human characters are conspicuously absent from the primary diegetic level; only personification figures are found here; (2) biblical human characters - to the complete exclusion of personification figures — comprise entirely the metadiegetic level; and (3) the historical-biblical topics of each separate metadiegesis are thematically consonant with the particular personification battles in the circumscribing primary diegetic moments, as Van Dyke and Barney have demonstrated. In other words, each metadiegesis presents us with a resonant " typologue" (that is, a discrete configuration of types and corresponding antitypes, countertypes, and allotypes from scripture; Paxson 105-06) that reflects and amplifies the corresponding diegetic moment. The poem is a sequence of typological—tropological correlations. Pudicitia, at the slaying of Libido, discourses upon the Judith and Holofernes episode from the apocryphal Book of Judith (58-65); Sobrietas, at the slaying of Luxuria, tells of Jonathan and the Honeycomb from 1 Samuel (397—400); and so forth. 76
Prudentius Psychomachia In view of the operation of these codes in the Psychomachia, we can conclude that the traditional significational levels of a "two-fold" paradigm correspond to modalities of character invention. This corresponding structure in turn corresponds to diegetic levels or fields of narration which are also vertically ordered by formal distinctions. To repeat, within the confines of the primary diegetic level of the battle-action, no human figures take part and speak, while within the Bible-stories narrated by the Virtues or Vices, only human figures appear. This codified narratological effect might also explain the similar ontological "quarantining7' of apologue discussed above in chapter 2. A narrative world filled entirely with children or fools or talking animals equates to a complete and discrete diegetic level within a larger narrative text. In the movie Bugsy Malone, hypotheticaly "real" American society controlled by adults exists on another ontic plane (outside the text, presumably) from the narrative world containing only children. The worlds of the apologue or of the diegetic level are hermetically sealed. Each functions because its inhabitants are ontologically (and structurally) defined in relation to what they are not — in relation to the inhabitants of an external (or internal and embedded) template world. Genuine apologue, usually of the personificational variety, is known for its ontologically restrictive, non-transgressable borders. The ostensible transgression of a personification figure into the metadiegetic level, or of a human figure into the diegetic level would involve, to borrow further from Genette's taxonomy, a transdiegetic "metalepsis."8 Genette defines a narrative metalepsis as the direct intermingling or collapsing of the elements belonging to two distinct levels of diegesis. A character who emerges from a book or painting within the narrated universe of a particular novel (the novels of RobbeGrillet furnish Genette with his most striking examples) involves one kind of metalepsis. Another kind would involve a narrator, like Tristram Shandy, who urges us (presumably outside or "above" the primary line of diegesis) to produce a direct effect on one of his characters — like closing the door to Walter Shandy's room {Narrative 234—37). The narratological scheme outlined in this chapter suggests that post-Prudentian, medieval personification allegories engage the figure of narrative metalepsis on the scale of entire texts. Beginning with Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy, we have a text in which (on the level of primary diegesis) the entire primary action consists of interchange between the narrator and Lady Philosophia. Moving 77
The poetics of personification forward to The Romance of the Rose or the works of Christine de Pisan, in which human characters and personification figures interact regularly and sometimes confusingly, we see that medieval personification tabulation would be drastically altered without metalepsis. Perhaps, then, this metaleptical effect becomes a macrometaphor of personification tabulation itself. If that is the case, the narratological structure of the Psychomachia is a formal exception rather than a rule to the genealogy of "traditional 7 ' Western personification narratives it subsequently suggests. Even as an exception or anomaly the encoded structure of the Psychomachia is strict but not "perfect"; its diegetic levels are not incontestably sealed off from one another. There is one site in the entire poem in which a human figure, albeit inactively and mute, transgresses into the primary diegetic field of narration. Job "appears" beside Patientia, attending her back to the Virtues' battle-phalanx after the suicide of Ira: ... secat medias inpune cohortes egregio comitata viro; nam proximus lob haeserat invictae dura inter bell magistrae, fronte severus adhuc et multo funere anhelus, sed iam clausa truci subridens ulcera vultu (... she makes her way unharmed through the midst of the battalions, escorted by a noble man; for Job had clung close to the side of his invincible mistress throughout the hard battle, hitherto grave of look and panting from the slaughter of many a foe, but now with a smile on his stern face as he thought of his healed sores) (162—66) Curiously, Patience supplies no metadiegetically contained Bible story. Rather, the protagonist from the ideally relevant typologue "emerges" into the primary line of diegesis. In effect, the figure Job functions as a metonymy of the narrative text Job from the Old Testament. (Traditionally, texts in Western literature are metonymically indicated through the use of their authors' names.) More precisely, "Job" can be construed as a personification of Job in much the same way that Swift "personifies" texts in The Battle of the Books. So understood, Job's emergence is not an ontological violation or transgression; he is equivalent to the personified Virtues whom he aids in combat. But viewed as a historical human from the Bible, the appearance of Job on the primary narrative level of the text could be construed as a negation of the proairetic code governing the text. This negation is engineered as a transdiegetic metalepsis. Because he is the only human figure to emerge in the poem, we can conclude that the Book of Job 7S
Prudentius Psychomachia bears unusual thematic significance for Prudentius. What is peculiar about Jobl Compared to the other biblical stories that provide the human characters in other diegeses in the poem, Job is unique in terms of its theme and rhetorical style. Because of its novel use of ironic point and counterpoint and of the rhetorical question on a large scale, the book is unlike any other text in the Old or New Testaments (Greenburg 283—304). Job is also unusual because it centers on a nonJew as an exemplum of moral virtue and righteousness. Also, the cosmic structure of the universe presented in Job is not orthodox: Job is the only book in the Bible in which Satan is depicted not as the adversary of God, but as his functionary - as God's ordained "examiner'' or inspector of humanity (Job 1.6-12). More important than these particular features, however, the book of Job is the first entry in Scripture to "dismantle the calculus of retribution" (Janzen 493). That is, the dialogues between Job and the three visitors Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar, fail to account for the unjust and sudden affliction of one who was so fervent and righteous a servant of God. Furthermore, Job is absolutely unique in that it is the only " antitheodicy " to appear in scripture. Instead of humanizing God and making his actions acceptable towards humanity, the book assigns humanity to the function of accident, of inconsequence. Humanity is not the focal object of divine attention as it is in Genesis. This thinking is conveyed through a debate structure (also unique in the Old Testament), the outcome of which is Job's resignation to the positions of his friends, and to the unfathomable will and logic of God. The debate topos is, as Angus Fletcher reminds us, a staple form in medieval allegory and closely linked to the allegorical battle convention (Allegory 157-59). As a formal allegorical pretext of the Psychomachia, the book of Job is a topical mirror of Prudentius' text: both texts provide the plotting of contests from which we expect victory for one faction, defeat for the other. The defeat of evil by virtue in Prudentius' poem is secured; but the programmatic Jobpretext of the Psychomachia, with its abandonment of contention or "combat" and its dismantling of retributional justice, is a centrifugal force that threatens to shut down Prudentius' poem, which concerns itself with the defeat of vice by virtue. Deactivation of the foundational martial topos of the Psychomachia has serious consequences for the ideological framework of late Christian antiquity. In an historical materialist argument, the allegorical war or bellum intestinum would be, to use Bakhtin's and Medvedev's term, an "ideological refraction" of 79
The poetics of personification the collapsing apparatus of late empire (21). As the first entry in the genealogy of all Western personification narratives that deal with symbolic conflict and resolution, the Psychomachia is the literary expression of the militarily grounded imperial consciousness. It is the inaugural literary manifesto of the then ascending theological principle of the bellum justitia, the principle that was universalized as church policy in the early fifth century, and that underwrote the future incidents of crusade and inquisition (Augustine 218-19). This entire ideological superstructure, symbolically summarized by the narrative action of the Psychomachia, is undermined by the thematics of the book of Job. Job's decisive appearance as the only human figure in the action of the Psychomachia cancels, in a grand gesture of irony, the entire poem's raison d'etre. Yet, Job's ontological status as a human being is itself subjected to scrutiny. The primary actants of the Psychomachia are, we agreed, makers of narrative fictions: they are prosopoetic characters who can be further classified as "poiopoetic" ones. Along with their propensity towards physical combat, verbal production is their prime ontological quality. But Job, as we noted above, is entirely mute. Of all the figures that appear in the primary mimetic action of the poem, he alone does not have the power of speech. This at first seems natural, since his sudden and brief appearance in line 163, in the service of his stock role, has the power of a locally engaged, pictorial tableau vivant (another staple convention in the tradition of Western personification and allegorical narrative). At most, Job has "a smile on his face" (subridens vultu, 166). But as we have seen above, the face in the Psychomachia is an important signal-image. And the smile is a reflex-response, an automatic gesture revealing an internal state. It is not necessarily an act of sign-production and transmission; it belongs to that category of signs that may or may not, for the medieval scholastic thinker, function as a moment of linguistic expression (see Eco and Marmo, "Animal Language," 3-20). This explicit thematization of the prosopon in conjunction with a non-verbal pseudo-sign (the smile), demands careful appraisal of Job as the sole exception, or the violation, of the proairetic code that governs the narratological constitution of the poem: inhabitants of the text's primary narrative level alone enjoy the powers of speech and story-telling. Job does not speak or narrate, but the text foregrounds the image of his face cast in a smile. In general, Job's silence or aphasia could simply be the dramatization of the idea, traced in the Old Testament text, about his final eschewing So
Prudentius Psychomachia of polemical dialogue and, in turn, verbal utterance itself. Job accepts the mystery of creation as God presents it in His final speech (Job 38-41). The necessary human response to such acceptance is embracing the ineffable. Thus: silence. The book of Job concludes, according to this perspective, with the engagement of a variation on the " inexpressibility topos," and Job's aphasia in Prudentius' poem is a stylized reflection of this topical engagement. But more in line with the narratological and semiological drift of this chapter, the aphasic condition of a human figure in direct diegetic proximity to a prosopoetic one appears to be a ratio of inverse proportionality. A further property of the auto-thematizing of prosopopeia in the Psychomachia, therefore, is the ironic and paradoxical ratio of personified characters to aphasic and thus "dispersonified," naturally human characters. Where there is an active prospopoetic character, we find humans robbed of their natural power of speech. This formal property bears little theological or ideological significance. It can only be the direct expression of the text's formal and figural self-reflection, for it underwrites, by ironic amplification, the ontic stakes of fictional personification and the corollary dilemma of phenomenological character differentiation. An effect not unlike the unreadability described by de Man in genuine allegory arises in the Psychomachia from the aporetics of character differentiation. When character differentiation gets subverted by an encoded mixing up of the powers and ontic qualities of figural (or eidetic) vs. human entities, creature taxonomy and hierarchization - the central, obsessive interests of ancient and medieval metaphysics — become impossible. The Psychomachia, which seems at first sight to be an embarrassing and wooden apologue on psycho-spiritual conflict, is the literary vehicle par excellence for deconstructing the medieval ontology of created beings.
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I Job's silence in Prudentius' Psychomachia functions as an index of the text's self-conscious ontological relationship between fictional but "historical" human characters and purely figural ones. As we saw in chapters 2 and 3, speech and voice exist as reflexive constants in personification tabulation. Anthropomorphized abstractions who enjoy the power of human speech entail the formal engagement of prosopopeia. A silent or aphasic human figure, spatially and temporally proximate to prosopopoetic figures in a single and closed narrative domain, signals the text's adoption of its own characterological critique. Job's role and function in the Psychomachia is strange and novel; but he is still a narratologically "peripheral" character, appearing only in a single, delimited, local site. Far stranger would be a similar treatment of the narrator of the Psychomachia. Prudentius' poem, however, has been placed by tradition squarely into the category of third-person, visionary doctrine-literature. In this kind of literature, the narrator-commentator spins a fabular core that serves to convey directly his doctrinal messages. Naturally, the narrator must adopt a detached third-person stance. This seems to be the case regarding the Psychomachia. Or is it? Near the conclusion of the poem and after the ending of the war proper, the narrator of the Psychomachia tells of the " assault" made by one last enemy intruder: nam pulsa Culparum acie Discordia nostros intrarat cuneos sociam mentita figuram. (For, when the Vices' army was driven off, Discord had entered our ranks wearing the counterfeit shape of a friend) (683—84) The narrator's employment of first-person plural possessive (nostros) to designate the "ranks" {cuneos) could, of course, have a general 82
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meaning: "ranks' 7 refers to the common ethical and moral status shared by the Christian reader, the narrator, and the Virtues. The word used in this sense is highly metaphorical. However, we need not ignore its literal and more immediately obvious sense. The Psychomachia is about an actual battle, and the cuneus is the standard, " wedge-shaped" maniple or phalanx formation into which troops draw themselves during a frontal assault. The narrator refers to himself as part of this battle wedge, "placing himself" on the actantial plane of his supposedly third-person narrative. Moreover, this site marks the only instance in the entire poem in which the narrator speaks in the firstperson plural. What are the stakes of this first-person involvement? Like Job, the narrator has metaleptically "entered" the primary line of narrative in the text, only to remain mute. In the Psychomachia, physical proximity between human figures and personification figures on the same diegetic plane seems to entail the ontological "diminishment" of the human figures. A reverse of this effect seems to obtain in Book vi of The Aeneid: as we noticed in chapter 2, Aeneas only sees the figures at the gates of Hades. As he passes among them, they do not talk to each other or to him. Vergil's figures are "diminished" in the same way that Prudentius' human figures are. The two " diminishment-effects" in the Psychomachia and in The Aeneid may reveal a latent code in certain examples of Roman personification tabulation: within a single diegetic field or plane, human figures that are physically juxtaposed with personification figures cause the prosopopoetic "neutralization" of each other. Never in the personification narratives of late antiquity do we see the two species of characterization freely mixed in terms of their powers and abilities. Such free mixing, as I suggested above, is nonetheless common in medieval literature. As Michel Zink writes, ... in the Songe d'Enfer, Raoul de Houdenc places personifications beside real characters. A little later, Huon de Mery uses the same procedure in the Tournoiment Antechrist... Raoul de Houdenc and especially Huon de Mery ... deal on the same footing with all their characters, allegorical, Biblical, mythological, literary - i.e., borrowed from the contemporary French literature in which Huon was steeped - and they assign to all these characters the same status within the allegorical narrative. (107—08). In discussing narrative "footing" and "status," Zink develops a point he argued a few sentences earlier: the personified abstractions encountered by Aeneas in Hades possess a different narrative and
The poetics of personification ontological status from Vergil's hero. Indeed, they are less substantial, less "real" than Aeneas and his men, for Vergil clearly describes the realm of Dis as vacua and inania (line 358). This kind of phenomenal and narratological quarantining breaks down with the development of medieval vernacular literatures, and the "equal footing" of personifications and humans becomes, as Zink demonstrates, the trademark of allegorical poetry written in the innovative traditions of thirteenthcentury French or Provencal lyric.1 However, exceptions to the equal-footing tactic still persist. In The House of Fame, Chaucer distributes character species among levels of diegesis in a way reminiscent of the Psychomachia. In the first building Geffrey the narrator enters, the story of Aeneas and Dido is presented upon the walls. Geffrey describes what he sees: First sawgh I the destruction Of Troye, thurgh the Grek Synon, And saugh I next, in al thys fere, How Creusa, daun Eneas wif, Which that he lovede as hys lyf, And hir yonge sone Iulo, And eke Askanius also, Fledden eke with drery chere ...
(151-52, 174-79)
It is unclear whether this "story" is an actual verbal text made up of engraved letters or a visual ekphrasis made up of painted images or sculptured bas-relief figures. This is because the verb "sawgh" in this context may denote either reading or the optical inspection of visual shapes and patterns (Sklute 38). In either case, the epic matter comprises a text embedded and inscribed within Chaucer's primary line of diegesis. It constitutes a metadiegesis. All the figures included in the embedded narrative are exclusively human. This treatment suggests a poetic legacy of the diegetic structure of the Psychomachia. However, no figures, human or personificational (aside from the solitary and out-of-place narrator), exist within the architectural space of the temple of Venus itself. The narratological structure created by Prudentius, therefore, is not perfectly replicated in Book 1 of The House of Fame.
In Book in, however, Chaucer's treatment of the characters inhabiting the temple of Fame is more complex than his treatment in Book 1 and more like Prudentius' design in the Psychomachia. All of the figures are personifications - from the goddess Fame and her major84
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domo Eolus (whose Greek name, "the wind/' has its metonymy in the character's two trumpets - reification objects named Clere Laude [line 1575] and Sklaundre [1580, 1625]), to the personified "utterances" that drift upward, from the earth, into Fame's temple. The " ryght gret companye" (1528) seen by Geffrey is the personified collection of "every speche, or noyse, or soun" that "come to Fames Hous" (783, 786), as the eagle tells him at the end of Book 11. Flanking the sides of Fame's court hall, however, are several metal pillars upon which stand the sculptured figures of great historians and poets. Geffrey describes that: Alderfirst, loo, ther I sigh Upon a piler stonde on high, That was of led and yren fyn, Hym of secte saturnyn, The Ebrayk Josephus, the olde, That of Jewes gestes tolde.
(1420-34)
In a subsequent catalogue of figures fixed upon other pillars, Geffrey describes Homer, Statius, Dictys, Dares, Guido of Collona, Geoffrey of Monmouth, Vergil, Lucan, Ovid, and others. All of these figures are real, historical humans. Because they are statues — plastic and visual, sculptured works — the narrative passages that contain them invoke the figure ekphrasis. And ekphrastic artifacts are themselves embedded artifacts: they are pictorial registers diegetically contained in the primary, verbal field of narration. Like the human figures in the Psychomachia, Chaucer's human characters are diegetically removed from the active and vociferous personification figures who people the primary field. Even if we reject the proposal that individual sculptures are true "ekphrases," and therefore not truly metadiegetic, we are faced with a peculiar structural relationship between mute, frozen, and lifeless beings who are makers (epic poets) and active, loquacious beings who are made (personified verbal utterances). Whether we consider the enshrined writers as ekphrastic elements narratologically quarantined from the personification figures, or as ontologically diminished human consciousnesses in direct physical proximity to enlivened personifications, we readily apprehend the text's deft and radical ironizing of the problem of literary character differentiation. The makers become the made; the made things gain the power and vitality of human makers. As J. Stephen Russell has argued, The House of Fame is a powerful Chaucerian vehicle for deconstructing the literary 85
The poetics of personification function of sources and auctores, the relationship between common, quotidian language and verbal art, and the utility of the dream vision itself (174-94). But the set of formal and ontological questions raised by the text of The House of Tame are not entirely unique to this poem. Chaucer conducts parallel investigations using these questions in The Parliament of Towls.
In The Parliament of Towls, Chaucer provides another narrator who suffers from artistic and intellectual aridity. The poem begins with a bald paraphrase, supplied by the classically naive waking narrator, of Macrobius' famous Commentary on the Dream of Scipio. This artless paraphrase has traditionally prompted critics to see the central theme in the Parliament as a metapoetic self-inquiry carried out by Chaucer into the problems of making poetry. The narrator's self-doubt about his powers as a poetic maker are amplified by the unusual structural and formal features of the poem. Even though the poem does not contain explicitly embedded verbal narratives of the kind found in the Psychomachia or The House of Tame, it is built around figural images of containment. First, the narrator falls asleep into his dream, wherein he enters a "park walled with grene ston" (line 122). Inside this park, he proceeds into a great brass temple (231). The narrator's physical itinerary charts his penetration into a dreamscape and through a series of literally embedded physical artifacts. This course reveals a number of ontological differences among characters and sites viewed along the way. After the initial synopsis of Macrobius' text, the narrator falls asleep only to meet with Scipio Africanus, who leads him to the park with green walls. Above and on both sides of the gate that opens into the park are two inscriptions. The first reads: "Thorgh me men gon into that blysful place Of hertes hele and dedly woundes cure; Thorgh me men gon unto the welle of grace, There grene and lusty May shal evere endure. This is the wey to al good aventure. Be glad, thow redere, and thy sorwe of-caste Al open am I - passe in, and sped thee faste!"
(127-33)
The second inscription provides a contradictory message. Thematically, it works in binary opposition to the first message: " Thorgh me men gon ... Unto the mortal strokes of the spere S6
Phenomenology of personification
Of which Disdayn and Daunger is the gyde, Ther nevere tre shal fruyt ne leves bere. This strem yow ledeth to the sorweful were There as the fish in prysoun is al drye; Th'eschewing is only the remedye!"
(134-40)
As the narrator remarks, the second text is " of ful gret difference " to the first inscription (125). The topos of the gate-with-contrarymessages is a common one in medieval folk literature. As Northrop Frye has argued, the inviting and enclosed place can be the ideal topified image of the demonic and the divine {Fables 6g-Sy). But the first inscription involves an ambiguity that opens a moment of textual self-reflexivity. First, the gate is a part of the wall that circumscribes the entire park and defines it as an architectural unit. The prosopopeias of lines 127 and 134 refer to the gates as well as to the entire park. Because the invitation to a potential " reader" is itself a commonplace which marks the beginnings of many medieval literary texts, the garden becomes a "text" to be entered, a text through which the reader will "speed" (read). The invitation, therefore, refers metaphorically to the narrative section of Chaucer's poem that contains the entire hortus conclusus action. It creates the illusion that the hortus episode is an embedded verbal artifact within the encompassing and primary line of diegesis. It makes the episode a metadiegesis, a narrative text "within" a narrative text. Inside the park, the two men encounter the standard stock of locus amoenus imagery - clear streams, a variety of animals, a tree catalogue, etc. The narrator first sees Cupid (line 212), and then a whole camp of personification figures including Will, Lust, Courtesy, Craft, Delight, and Peace (212-45). Inside the temple of brass the narrator sees Priapus, Venus, and her porter Richesse (253-61). Clearly the precincts of the garden and the temple are peopled exclusively with personification figures or with deities. There are no living, "genuine" humans present. But "ferther in the temple" (280), as the narrator notes, he sees a series of ekphrastic images "peynted overal" (284) on the walls. Exactly as in The House of Fame, the ekphrases are constituted entirely by historical and pseudohistorical or mythical human figures. The narrator sees Calisto and Atalanta on one wall, and Semyramis, Candace, and Hercules, Biblis, Dido, Thisbe, and Pyramus, Tristram, Isaude, Paris, and Achilles, 87
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Eleyne, Cleopatre, and Troylus, Silla, and ek the moder of Romulus: Alle these were peynted on that other syde.
(288-93)
These figures represent classical epic, Arthurian romance, and Roman history. They inhabit a narratological space that excludes personification figures, and includes only putatively historical humans. Because the structural effect of the garden-gate inscription promotes the illusion that the narrative episode of the hortus is a metadiegesis, the ekphrases on the walls of the brass temple constitute what Gerard Genette would call a "meta-metadiegesis." More tenaciously than in the Psychomachia, the structure of Chaucer's poem entails a strict division between humans and figural characters, and it distributes them among a precisely patterned series of nested diegetic registers. Back in the "sote and grene" spaces of the garden outside the temple, the narrator encounters Nature presiding over the congress of peculiar birds (lines 310 ff.). From this point through the poem's conclusion, the narrator recreates no dialogic interchange that he might have taken part in, and he refrains completely from commentary on the events he has beheld. His narration is comprised entirely of the mimetic representation of what Nature and the birds say to each other. The remaining passages are filled with debates, harangues, proclamations, and attempts at mediation made solely by Nature. The parliament, which had centered on the polemical cases mounted by the three tersel eagles for the favors of the formel eagle, ends with Nature's assigning each bird "his make/ By evene acord" (667—68). This gesture is followed by the birds' song of praise to Nature which has as its theme the refrain, "Now welcome, somer." As the song ends, the birds break into "shoutyng" (693), and the dreaming narrator awakens. The poem offers a number of narrative peculiarities focused upon the formal stakes of the trope personification. Whereas the narrator of The House of Fame asked questions and conversed with the golden eagle and with Eolus, the narrator here remains absolutely mute throughout the entire narrative episode that takes place within the garden walls. In a way, when the narrator and Africanus go inside the park, the movement constitutes a kind of metalepsis into an embedded poetic artifact. Once inside, their premier ontological property (the power of speech) is diminished. This effect marks a very peculiar turn in the traditions of the dream vision, because the Scipio Africanus of Macrobius' Commentary, like all genuine dream audores and magistri, is 88
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of necessity highly talkative. How else could he fulfill his function as educative dream instructor? Furthermore, the diminishment of the narrator's and Africanus' prosopopoetic properties develops incrementally as the poem moves toward its conclusion. Outside the garden wall, Africanus speaks. Inside, both men are mute. During the parliament, the narrator even refrains from diegetic commentary. The poem charts a gradual reduction of prosopopoetic powers among the human characters, and a runaway increase of it in the personifications. We should also note, however, that the text makes ontological distinctions among kinds of personifications as well as distinctions between historical humans and figural characters. The groups of personified abstractions viewed by the narrator near and inside the brass temple are entirely silent. Only Nature's speech is recreated for us by the narrator. The collection of abstractions (largely reminiscent of their topical predecessors who inhabit the garden visited by the dreamer at the opening of The Romance of the Rose) function more like the anthropomorphisms seen by Aeneas in Book vi of Vergil's epic. Their presence in the text depends on the economically deictic and nominational acts performed by the narrator. The phenomenal status of these anthropomorphisms seems tenuous. This general sense gets magnified by an isolated effect in the Parliament which recalls the programmatically self-referential defacement suffered by Prudentius' personified Vices. Among the group of personified abstractions in the park, the narrator sees: Craft that can and hath the myght To don by force a wyght to don folye — Disfigurat was she, I nyl nat lye
(220-22)
The de-facement of a character constituted by a faced or embodied essence equates to the dis-figuration of a character created through figural invention. The verb " to disfigure," which looks like a casually chosen adjective in a characterizational effictio, mimes the process of prosopopoetic making and unmaking. That the character involved is " Craft" intensifies the self-reflexive game: the word craft (along with shape) is one of the few native English substantives that translates the concept of the rhetorically charged Latin words forma and figura. Lexically, Chaucer's Craft can be thought of as a figure for figuration, a personification of the impulse and power whereby personifications are manufactured. In addition, her "might" to make one "do folly" ambiguously refers to Craft-as-cunning's propensity to make social 89
The poetics of personification mischief, as well as to Craft-as-figuration's drive toward fancy and fantasy. (Spenser's personification Phantastes in The Faerie Queene embodies the same valuational ideal; see chapter 6 below.) Conventional readings of the passage treat Craft in mild aesthetic terms, as, for instance, "the only truly unpleasant personification in the park" (Sklute 53). Her disfigured condition, however, parallels the aphasia of the human narrator and his guide. The parallel relation proclaims the equally tenuous phenomenal status of fictional human and personified abstraction. The most vigorously prosopopoetic characters in the poem are the birds. Their power of speech marks another self-reflexive anomaly in Chaucer's treatment of the trope personification, for a central theme of the poem is the out-of-control "parliament." The congress of birds evolves, in fact, into a collective Babel of verbal disorder. Nature presides over the colloquy and establishes order momentarily, but the final volley of shouts that wakes the narrator reveals the degenerative evolution in the text of prosopopoetic speech into sheer noise. The poem, therefore, takes us full circle: we begin with the images of aphasic humans (the diegetically quarantined tragic human lovers in the temple ekphrases); we next consider the only human figures in the primary lines of diegesis who are also mute; and we then come to a collection of personified birds in whom are parodied, through runaway loquacity, the figural effect prosopopeia. Finally, this parodic prosopopeia "devolves" or mutates into noise, into a moment of linguistic entropy that signals the dissolution of prosopopeia for the birds. The Parliament of Fowls experiments with the limits of figural and literary character invention by distributing characters among a discrete structure of diegetic levels (and images of containment), and by investing these characters with varying powers of language. The implicit thematic comparison between figurally invented human language and natural animal noise also appears in The Nuns Priest's Tale. In the linguistic systems posited by Augustine, Boethius, Aquinas, and Roger Bacon, these two quantities occupied positions tangent with the value of real human language (Eco and Marmo, "Animal Language"). The Nuns Priest's Tale plots such a valuational scheme according to a humorously elaborate concentric structure of embedded narratives. Schematically, the pilgrimage frame of The Canterbury Tales contains the Nun's Priest's story of the nervous rooster Chanticleer. The story containing Chanticleer, Pertelote, and Dan Russell the fox is the primary level of diegesis; it comprises go
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exclusively personified animals as vociferous and clever as the avian debaters in The Parliament of Fowls. Among other narrative acts, Chanticleer tells the story, borrowed from Cicero, of two travellers who separate in search of a night's lodging. The Ciceronian folk tale comprises a metadiegesis that contains only human characters. So far, the pattern repeats the narratological structure of the Psychomachia, maintaining especially the ontological quarantining of humans one diegetic level away from personifications. Chaucer's text complicates the basic Prudentian model, however. Embedded inside the metadiegesis told by Chanticleer are the dreams experienced by one of the lone lodgers. The third dream presents his now murdered friend pleading for justice: I am now slawe. Behold my bloody woundes depe and wyde! Arys up erly in the morwe tyde, And at the west gate of the toun ... A carte ful of dong ther shaltow se, In which my body is hid ful prively; Do thilke carte arresten boldely. (vn.3014-20) The poetic act whereby the dead friend speaks engenders the kind of apostrophic prosopopeia attended to in rhetorical theory since the taxonomies of Demetrius of Phalerum. The dead friend ambiguously exists either as a visiting ghost, in which case the dream is an oraculum, or as a personified figment, making the dream a somnium (Lewis, Image 63-64). In either case, the dead friend is an ontologically different being a numinous one or a figurally invented one. Moreover, the ontologically different fellow traveler is consigned to his own diegetic level contained inside the metadiegetic level of the folk tale. (Chapter 5 explains the rationale behind this narratological conclusion regarding fictionalized dreams.) The corresponding oracular dream in the second Ciceronian folk tale - the story of the two sailors - directly affirms its own doubly embedded diegetic status: the man who stands by the dreaming sailor's "beddes syde" claims, "If thou tomorwe wende,/ Thow shalt be dreynt; my tale is at an ende" (4271-72; italics mine). The Nuns Priest's Tale gathers its comic energy from the way Chaucer combines an array of tales, philosophical arguments, and allusions — all originally made by or about human characters — into the beak of a very learned bird. The narratological structure of the text
The poetics of personification seems to exclude human characters from the primary diegetic level of the animal apologue. But human characters do appear at the climactic ending of the brief interchange between Chanticleer and Russell. As the fox steals off with the rooster on his back, This sely wydwe and eek hir doghtres two Herden thise hennes crie and maken wo, An out at dores stirten they anon, And syen the fox toward the grove gon, And bar upon his bak the cok away, And cry den, "Out! harrow! and weylaway! Ha! ha! the fox!" and after hym they ran, And eek with staves many another man. (vn.33 75-83) The human " proprietors " of the little barnyard world, the world of the animal apologue, utter not one grammatically ordered sentence. With the exception of the single noun "fox," they do not even utter a genuine word. "Out," "harrow," "weylaway," and "ha" are quasiwords. They are really no more than clusters of phonemes - vocal convulsions, essentially - ejaculated at moments of emotional distress. Semantically, they function as variations on the apostrophic " O , " the primal laryngeal act which, devoid of any semantic content, signifies voice itself. These vocal convulsions are liminal utterances lying on the border of language and noise, speech and animal sound. So the "human" inhabitants of Chanticleer's diegetic domain experience a kind of aphasia in diegetic proximity to the personified animals. They lack prosopopoetic motivation. A semiological analysis, in line with the logical apparatus of chapter 2, partially reveals why this reduced or negated motivation happens in personification narratives. In Quintilian's juridical model of prosopopeia (6.1.25-26), we saw a confusion of "tropological directionality." That is, the example from the Institutio left unclear whether the lawyer was the prosopon or proxy for the client, or the client was the proxy for the machinating lawyer. When we take a bird in an animal apologue as the site of a personification, either a natural bird from our real world is the "personified," making the "personifier" a human consciousness, or a human consciousness is the personified masked or faced by a fictional bird. The former proposition has warrant because in apologue thinking and speaking beings serve as the fictional actants; naturally dumb animals must be transformed into those agents. The latter proposition has equal warrant because it replicates the parallel and 02
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germinal structure that makes possible the personification figure in the first place: the homologies of mind/body, psyche/soma, consciousness/sensoria, inside/outside. According to either proposition, the mere combination of a human consciousness (either as personifier or personified) into a duplex homology complemented by an animal entity (again, either as personifier or personified) reduces the concept of human consciousness simply because consciousness can be so combined. The controlling logic is homeopathic, an archaic quasi-rational modality of conceptualization that powers up the manifestly alogical world of rhetoric with all its unnatural configurations and deviations. After all, rhetoric and logic are really 'alien and asymmetrical', as one aphorism of deconstructive thinking reminds us. Because the very concepts of human consciousness and intelligence are reduced via the quasi-rational principle of similarity or homeopathy, the complementary quasi-rational principle of magical contagion or contact impels the grafting of this reduction onto any neighboring human consciousness in the text. Due to spatial or temporal proximity to a semiotically " self-reducing" personification figure, a human actant or narrator experiences the specular or transmitted condition of that reduction. J. G. Frazer's quaint terminological division between "homeopathic magic" and "contagious magic" (14) still provides a viable conceptual framework for describing the hidden forces at work in tropes, as Angus Fletcher has shown regarding metaphor and metonymy (Allegory 188). But as the title of this chapter promises, an extended phenomenological description of the "quarantined domains," "ontological statuses," and phenomenal "proximities" should now prove to be a more thorough explanational tool. In addition to the foregoing and brief semiological explanation of the diminishment-effect, a complex array of phenomenological propositions underlies the poetic aphasia and psychic reduction suffered by Prudentius' Job, the narrators in The Parliament of Fowls and The House of Fame, and the Nun's Priest's widow.
II Michel Zink maintains that psychic or linguistic diminishment among human personae in medieval personification narratives is perhaps the key issue in allegory theory. In his "The Allegorical Poem as Interior Memoir," Zink tries to identify and articulate the narrative com93
The poetics of personification monplace known as dorveille. As the etymological roots of this French term from medieval psychology suggest, dorveille is a peculiar psychic, physical, and spiritual condition traditionally suffered by the narrator or human protagonist of the allegorical poem. Dorveille can involve the bodily exhaustion that overcomes the narrator at the outset of his text. The classic example is Dante, who, at the opening of Inferno 1, describes himself as pien di sonno — "full of sleep" (line 11). Dorveille can also involve the hypnotic lull and dizziness that overcomes the weary horseman who, as he narrates his poem, suffers from a wandering sense of attention and alertness (French rever). The effect can also include the spiritual or intellectual dryness so common to the narrator of the medieval troubadour or trouvere lyric. Dorveille, Zink argues, is the universal psychological condition experienced by the narrator of the medieval allegory (104). The characterization of the dorveille-stricken human is always found in the proximity of personification fabulation. Early modern theorists grasped this partially. Ruskin anchored the pathetic fallacy in a "mind or body... borne away, or over-clouded, or over-dazzled by emotion" ( 6 6 ) - a theoretical move that recalls the psychodynamics of dorveille. The restlessness, vertigo, mental aridity, social withdrawal, reduction of feeling, and indolence that accompanies dorveille should remind us of another common psychological or moral "ailment" commonly expressed in medieval literature and didactic writing. The "sin" known as acedia, or sloth, involves similar psychic deterioration in a human persona. We need not embark upon an analytical history of this concept; the admirable studies written by Morton Bloomfield on sin and Siegfried Wenzel on acedia still provide the richest discussions of the subject. Wenzel's book has provided the foundation for a recent and noteworthy examination of the subject in Middle English literature — John M. Bowers's The Crisis of Will in "Piers Plowman". Much of Bowers's thesis hinges upon a psychobiographical analysis of William Langland as a man afflicted with severe acedia. Despite the dubiousness of this method, Bowers nevertheless provides some useful indications concerning the psychic condition of the narrator in Piers Plowman. Will the dreamer indisputably suffers from mental unrest, dryness, social withdrawal, and above all, a reduction of will, or voluntas. This reduction indicates psychic and social diminishment. Neither Zink's essay nor Bowers's book treats the earlier personification narratives of late antiquity. A short text like the Psychomachia 94
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does not provide enough material to warrant the conclusion that Job or the narrator suffer some kind of mental or spiritual diminishment. But the two characters are indeed mute — a marked contrast in relationship to the vociferous personification figures who engage in battle. Zink and Bowers are thorough and conclusive, however, regarding the traditional fact that major psychic diminishment is suffered by the narrator or prime human actant while he is about to provide narration dealing with the traditional agents of allegorical literature — namely, personification figures. For Zink, as for Bowers, the psychic reduction concomitant upon dorveille or acedia gives rise to the narratorial apprehension, or more accurately, the narratorial invention or generation of personified abstractions, objects, or places. Personification characters enjoy a metaphorical " emergence " from the mind of the diminished actant or narrator. In Paradise Lost, a striking narrativization or literalization of this personificational emergence occurs. Rewriting the imagery of Athena's mythological "birth'' from the forehead of Zeus, Milton configures the narrative scene of Sin's inception as a literal emergence too. The personification tells the story of her origin to her forgetful father: All on a sudden a miserable pain Surprised thee; dim thine eyes, and dizzy swum In darkness, while thy head flames thick and fast Threw forth, till on the left side op'ning wide, Likest to thee in shape and count'nance bright, Then shining heav'nly fair, a goddess armed Out of thy head I sprung.
(11.752-58)
Sin's curious prosopogenesis, if you will, involves the major features of psychic diminishment and subsequent figural character generation described above. Milton presents two images to convey the spiritual and psychic self-demolition Satan suffers. The first image suggests the conventional psychological torpor of dorveille: a "miserable pain," dimmed eyes, dizziness and darkness. The second image, one of incineration, implies a violent reduction or destruction of the angel's head. The effect amounts to a pyrotechnic decapitation or defacement, a defacement coeval with or resulting in the physical extrusion or ejection of a phenomenal humanoid body called "Sin." Satan's filial Sin is not just the index of the sin rebellion but of the sin acedia itself; it is the reflexive sign of sin and the sin of (unconscious) sign-making. The proposition discloses a neurotic circular trap. Perhaps we can augment Bloomfield's analysis of the medieval 95
The poetics of personification taxonomy of sins or pathologies of mind and spirit by initially acknowledging a psychoanalytical description of acedia. The condition "sloth'' closely resembles what modern psychologists might call clinical depression. (Angus Fletcher and Paul Piehler have already provided detailed psychoanalytical readings of personification figures as psychic "daemons" - as the literary images of the obsessivecompulsive mind or the manic-depressive consciousness in its manic phase.) Like the clinical depressive, the person suffering from acedia sleeps too much, is listless, uninterested in everything, uncommunicative, and above all, silent. Depression is a mental disorder. It involves a reduction and diminishment of all those powers, attributes, and abilities that mark the human being as vitally human. Clearly a psychoanalytical program of inquiry is distinct from the formal interest of this study, but it does provide some valuable insights. For example, we can begin to write an extension of Fletcher's formula regarding personification characters as images of the manic consciousness. At the heart of much medieval personification tabulation is a corollary between the narratorial consciousness and the personification figures it apprehends. In this structural corollary, speech is the signature of the vital, sentient mind. Its diminishment in the psychically reduced narrator (either through acedia-dorveille, depression, or melancholia) accompanies its proportional increase in proximate, figurally invented beings. As the narrator's or the protagonist's minds dissolve into stasis, the "mind" of the personification is generated. And this new mind can produce the signature of sentience and intelligence: speech. Again, the two human figures in the primary line of narrative in the Psychomachia do not suffer from actual psychic diminishment. But their aphasia rated against the speech of the Virtues and Vices occupies the same structural coordinates as the silence, withdrawal, and "solipsism" of the traditional, medieval allegorical narrator rated against the prosopopoetic qualities of personification figures in his narrative. This foundational postulate - that the diminishment of the fictional human consciousness is inversely proportional to the generation or germination of a fictional figural " consciousness " — necessarily entails phenomenological strategy. Phenomenological literary criticism in general tries to articulate the formal features of a literary text (characterological techniques, tropes, figures, shifts in narrative structure) using the authentic, phenomenal images experienced by the focal or narratorial human consciousness in the work, by the authorial 96
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consciousness that has crafted the work, and by the lectorial consciousness that recepts the work.2 Thus, the unmediated experience of conscious awareness becomes the starting point and telos of all investigations. Quite generally, dorveille, a threshold state of human consciousness (that is, the marginating " / " or stroke in the binary opposition "non-consciousness/consciousness"), serves ideally as the phenomenological experience of how one must "feel" consciousness in a radically empirical and bodily way. Such radically "felt consciousness" holds the spot as phenomenology's paramount theoretical goal and interest. But in more specific terms, such a phenomenology must describe figurally invented characters, such as prosopopoetic ones, as the specular images of the fictional human mind suffering from the privation of speech or voice and, by extension, consciousness. (Recall that voice, according to Paul de Man, is the phenomenal core of the physical human prosopon and of human consciousness or cognition.) As the figurated consciousnesses grow, the figurating consciousness shrinks. Poetic revasse or "daydreaming," a semiconscious act claimed by Gaston Bachelard to be the phenomenological model for all creative literary activities with their attendant figurations, entails the shrinking effect of dorveille: ... our more general philosophical thesis on the essentially augmentative potential of all awareness ... has a corollary: a consciousness which daydreams (revasse) is no longer a consciousness. Reverie puts us on the wrong path, the downhill path. (5-6) Phenomenological shrinkage so understood connotes a minimalization or miniaturization of the figurating conscious template. A personification begins as a germ that grows in and eventually out of the generating consciousness, while the generating consciousness ends up as that germ began — a psychic vestige, a fragment. Such a phenomenological axiom is not too different from Harry Berger's psychoanalytical description of personification figures as "facets" or "fragments" of a whole and complete human mind. In the strictly phenomenological perspective and in the psychoanalytic one proposed by Berger, the invention of personification characters entails a critique of the myth of "holism" attributable to the human consciousness, a critique at the heart of all phenomenology. As Erwin Strauss writes: Only a being which in its temporal existence is incomplete can will, strive, or move itself. The being incomplete in the particularity of the actual moment is the ontological ground of the possibility of a transition from a Here to a 97
The poetics of personification There, from one particularity to another. This being incomplete indeed makes spontaneous motion possible, that is, it makes possible the searching of an animal and the questioning of man. {270)
Physical motion and activity, sentience, understanding, intellectual inquiry, and language, are all made possible and necessitated by human temporality, by Being in time. For phenomenologists like Strauss, Richard Zaner, Edmund Husserl, Georges Poulet, or MerleauPonty, the natural human condition of temporal " incompleteness" translates into the problem of ontological holism. Fletcher's and Berger's characterological descriptions, therefore, are really phenomenological equations wherein personifications, as fragments or facets of an ostensibly "whole" human consciousness, function as synecdochal emblematic images of this superordinate consciousness which is itself incomplete. Our tentative description of complementary characterological ratios also works as a phenomenological formula that contrasts the diminished human narratorial consciousness (an emblem of incompleteness) with the activated figural consciousness of the personification character. In the phenomenological description heretofore presented, however, it is unclear whether the personification ultimately represents ontological "completeness" or "incompleteness." If we understand the personification to be a quantity proportional, in a structural ratio, to a diminished human consciousness with which it contrasts, then it is an emblem of incompleteness. After all, personified abstractions are "never quite human"; they often represent subordinate quantities contained in the human mind. But if we understand personifications as "universals" - as "complete," eternal qualities belonging to a transcendent ontic realm and describable in a Platonic or Thomistic conceptual framework — then they are beyond the confinement of temporality and are anything but emblems of phenomenological incompleteness. (This second proposition creeps toward the doctrines of medieval philosophical R