The Pentomic Era: The US Army Between Korea and Vietnam

O

LF~ Uv~ L,S\~ TH E U.S. ARMY BETWEEN KOREA AN D Vl ETNAM

The Davy Crockett weapon system (Heavy), XM-29, dep i c t e d on t he c o v e r , e m p l o y e d a 1 5 0 - p o u n d r o c k e t p r o p e l l e d n u c l e a r w a r h e a d d e s i g n e d to p r o v i d e a battlefield nuclear capability for the Army tactical combat b a t t a l i o n c o m m a n d e r . F i e l d e d in 1961, w h e n the Army's nuclear enthusiasm was still high, Davy Crockett looked like a large recoilless rifle and could loft a miniat u r e a t o m i c w a r h e a d to a range of 1.25 m i l e s . It is thought by some observers to be typical, even symbolic, of the Army's Pentomic Era.

Cover artwork by Laszlo L. Bodrogi, based on a US Army photo

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YIIII I~Ii I~Y()III I (; The US Army Between Korea and Vietnam

A.

J. Bacevich 1986

Na|lonal Defense University Press

Jl3"~"~JWashington, DC

National Defense University Press Publications To i n c r e a s e general k n o w l e d g e and inform d i s c u s s i o n , NDU Press p u b l i s h e s books on subjects relating to US national security. Each year, in this effort, The National Defense University, through the Institute for National Strategic: Similes. supports about two dozen Senior Fellows who engage in original research on national security issues. NDU Press publishes the best of this research. In addition, the Press publishes especially timely or distinguished writing on national security from authors outside the University, new editions of out-of-print defense classics, anti hooks based on conferences concerning national security affairs. Unless otherwise noted, NDU Press publications are m~t copyrighted and may be quoted or reprinted without peNllissioll. Pleas~ give full publication credit. Opinions. conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of tile National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other Government agency, Cleared for l:mblic release: distribution unlimited. NDU Press publicatiuns are sold by the US Government Printing Office. For ord e r i n g information, call (202) 783-3238, or write to: Superiutende~tt of Dot:uments. US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Bacevich, A. J. Tile pentomic era. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. United States. A r m y - - H i s t o r y - - 2 0 t h century. I. Title. UA25.B187

1986

355'.00973

86-8536

Editorial Research Associates, Washington, DC, indexed this hook under contract DAHC32-86-A-O002. SSR Inc., W a s h i n g t n n , DAHC32-86-A-0008. First printing, July 1986

vi

DC,

proofread

this

book

under

contract

to Casey Brower Rob Goff Bob Ivany

Bruce Korda Monty Meigs Scott Wheeler

comrades in arms, irreplaceable friends

Contents Illustrations Foreword

x xiii

Introduction

3

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

T h e Legacy of Korea 7 T h e " N e w Look": I m p a c t and C o u n t e r a t t a c k 19 Design for a N e w A r m y 49 Re-Equipping 71 103 Reorganizing: T h e P e n t o m i c C o n c e p t Reaction a n d Rejection 129

Endnotes

159

Selected Bibliography The Author Index

179

185

187

ix

Illustrations Figures 1. Comparative Service budgets in the E i s e n h o w e r era 17 2. The P e n t o m i c Division 107

Photographs The A r m y spruced up its image by replacing the olive drab uniform 23 US A r m y recruiters advertise their Service's c o m m i t m e n t to high technology 25 S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e C h a r l e s E. W i l s o n at his w e e k l y press conference in 1953 35 General Matthew B. Ridgway, A r m y Chief of Staff, 1953-55 37 General Maxwell D. Taylor, Army Chief of Staff, 1955-59 45 A NIKE missile guards America in 1957 79 A NIKE missile knocks d o w n a B-17 drone 81 The Army shows off its n e w NIKE Ajax missile during an A r m e d Forces Day program in 1954 83 The 280-ram atomic c a n n o n in action in May 1953 85

Illustrations

xi

The 280-mm atomic cannon prepared for movement 87 An Army Corporal missile being readied for firing in 1954 89 L a u n c h c r e w s train w i t h a Redstone m i s s i l e in Germany in 1956 91 Wilbur M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army during most of the Eisenhower era 93 Rotarians from Lawton, Oklahoma, learn about the Army's Honest John rocket in 1957 95 An Army H-34 Choctaw helicopter carries an Army Little John rocket in 1960 97 Artist's conception of the Army's planned "flying jeep" 99 A US Army sergeant prepares Davy Crockett for firing 101 US Army soldiers from a composite armored force, Task Force Razor, take part in O p e r a t i o n Desert Rock VI at Yucca Flat, Nevada, in 1955 111 Davy Crockett (Light), XM-28, at Aberdeen Proving Ground in March 1961 127 A recruiting poster for an ultra-modern, relevant Army 149 Lieutenant General James M. Gavin, Chief of Army R e s e a r c h a n d D e v e l o p m e n t , w i t h a m o d e l of the Redstone missile in 1956 155

Foreword l t h o u g h atomic w e a p o n s h e l p e d w i n World War Two in the Pacific, they raised the question of whether these weapons altered the nature of warfare, or s i m p l y warfare's d e s t r u c t i v e d i m e n sions. Responsibility for nuclear weapons development became a central issue in US service politics, particularly between the Army and Air Force during the early years of the E i s e n h o w e r administration.

A

In his history of the Army in the years between the Korean and Vietnam wars, Lieutenant Colonel A. J. Bacevich, US Army, accents the Army's mindfulness of the implications of nuclear warfare. The Army's concern, reflecting a complex mixing of institutional, strategic, and operational considerations, led to major changes in Army organization, doctrine, and weapons. The author argues that during these years, the Army not only survived an institutional identity crisis--grappling to comprehend and define its national security role in a

°°. Xlll

xiv

The Pentomic Era

nuclear age--but grew to meet new challenges by pioneering the development of rockets and missiles. Colonel Bacevich's analysis of the Army's postKorea, p r e - V i e t n a m era c o n t r i b u t e s valuable insights to the study of recent US military history. Especially i m p o r t a n t is Colonel Bacevich's caution that military professionals temper their enthusiasm for technological progress with an eye to those elements of warfare that remain changeless.

Richard D. Lawrence Lieutenant General, US Army President, National Defense University

Introduction he essay that follows is a brief history of the US T A r m y during the years i m m e d i a t e l y following t h e K o r e a n War. For m a n y in o u r o w n t i m e t h a t p e r i o d - - c o r r e s p o n d i n g to t h e t w o t e r m s of t h e E i s e n h o w e r p r e s i d e n c y - - h a s a c q u i r e d an a u r a of congenial simplicity. Americans who survived Vietnam, Watergate, and painful e c o n o m i c difficulties wistfully recall the 1950s as a time w h e n the nation possessed a clearly-charted course and had the will and the power to follow it. H o w e v e r comforting such views may be, the reality was far different. M a n y segments of America e x p e r i e n c e d the 1950s as a n y t h i n g but a G o l d e n Age. P r o m i n e n t a m o n g this group was the Army. Instead of the "good old days," the A r m y found the E i s e n h o w e r era to be one of c o n t i n u i n g crisis. New t e c h n o l o g y , c h a n g i n g v i e w s of the n a t u r e of war, and the fiscal principles of the E i s e n h o w e r administration p r o d u c e d w i d e s p r e a d doubts about the utility of traditional land forces. As A r m y officers saw it, these factors threatened the well-being of their Service and by implication e n d a n g e r e d the security of the United States. 3

4

The P e n t o m i c Era

This essay explores the nature of those threats and of the Army's response to them. By design, this essay is selective and interpretive. It does not prov i d e a c o m p l e t e n a r r a t i v e of e v e n t s a f f e c t i n g t h e A r m y after Korea. It e x c l u d e s i m p o r t a n t d e v e l o p m e n t s s u c h as f o r e i g n m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e , the growth of A r m y aviation, and the impact of alliance c o n s i d e r a t i o n s on A m e r i c a n m i l i t a r y p o l i c y . As a result, the history that follows is neither comprehensive nor definitive. What value it may possess derives instead from its explication of themes that retain some resonance for an Army in later decades confronted with its o w n challenges. A great institution like the Army always is in t r a n s i t i o n . A n d t h o u g h the c h a r a c t e r of r e f o r m is seldom as profound as the claims of senior leaders or t h e Army Times m a y s u g g e s t , in t h e 1950s c h a n g e o f t e n m a t c h e d t h e h y p e r b o l e of its advocates. The A r m y found itself grappling for the first t i m e w i t h t h e p e r p l e x i n g i m p l i c a t i o n s of n u c l e a r warfare; seeking ways of adapting its organization a n d d o c t r i n e to a c c o m m o d a t e rapid t e c h n o l o g i c a l advance; and attempting to square apparently revolutionary change with traditional habits and practical constraints of the military art. In retrospect, we may find fault with the Army's response to these c h a l l e n g e s . If so, w e h a v e all the m o r e r e a s o n to concern ourselves with h o w the Service derived the answers that it did. To a striking extent, challenges similar to those of the 1950s have returned to preocc u p y the A r m y today.

Introduction

5

When the Army reorganized to fight on the a t o m i c b a t t l e f i e l d , it u s e d u n i t s of " f i v e " t h r o u g h o u t - - f i v e p l a t o o n s per c o m p a n y , five companies per battle group, up to the newly christened "Pentomic" division. The term Pentomic became associated with the post-Korea era, and thus seemed a fitting title for my study. While this essay makes some use of archival sources, most notably in depicting the Army's perspective on sensitive questions of nuclear strategy, I have relied on such records only to a limited extent. In large part I have used contemporary statements by senior military officials and articles appearing in military journals. The emphasis on Service journals does not reflect a belief that the written musings of relatively junior officers influence American military policy to any significant degree. They do not. While the institutional organs of other professions presage and often inspire new developments, American military journals tend instead to reflect ideas that already enjoy official s a nc t i o n . They mirror A m e r i c a n m i l i t a r y t h o u g h t r a t h e r t h a n d e t e r m i n e its d i r e c t i o n . Alt h o u g h the placid character of A m e r i c a n military journals minimizes their utility as a forum for debating new ideas, this character makes them ideal for the h i s t o r i a n a t t e m p t i n g to u n d e r s t a n d the mind-set of the officer corps at a particular time. In preparing this study, I benefited greatly from the generosity of the US Army Center of Military History, w h e r e I w o r k e d as a Research Associate during the summer of 1984. The staffs of the National Archives and the US Army Military History Institute provided important assistance. In the latter

6

T h e P e n t o m i c Era

case, Mr. Richard Sommers was especially cordial in helping me explore the Ridgway Papers and pertinent parts of the Institute's oral history collection. At the N a t i o n a l D e f e n s e U n i v e r s i t y , Ms. J o a n n e Scott made my search through the papers of Lyman L. Lemnitzer and Maxwell D. Taylor efficient and productive. I thank General Lemnitzer and General Taylor for their permission to consult their personal papers. At the Eisenhower Library, Mr. Rod Soubcrs p r o v i d e d s oun d advice and responsive assistance that helped me make the most of the short time I spent in Abilene. My friends James L. Abrahamson, Casey Brower, John Mason, and Scott Wheeler each responded to my calls for help by providing a critical r e a d i n g of the m a n u s c r i p t at an early stage. Though they cannot be held responsible for the resuit, each in his own way made a valuable contribution to clarifying my thinking on this subject. I am especially grateful to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Without the time and financial assistance I received as an International Affairs Fellow with the Council, this study would never have been completed. As always, of course, my greatest debt is to my wife Nancy and our children for their patience, support, and love.

1. The Legacy of Korea or A m e r i c a n s w h o died fighting in Korea, there is still no m e m o r i a l . A l t h o u g h lamentable, the o v e r s i g h t also is a p p r o p r i a t e . M o n u m e n t s s i g n i f y a c c e p t a n c e of an event and s o m e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of its m e a n i n g . But m o r e t h a n 30 years after the armistice at P a n m u n j o m , the Korean War has yet to find its place in A m e r i c a n history. In the p o p u l a r m i n d , the war's significance r e m a i n s obscure, the war itself largely forgotten.

F

T h e war's b e w i l d e r i n g character a n d the bizarre c o u r s e that it f o l l o w e d a c c o u n t in s o m e degree for the haste w i t h w h i c h A m e r i c a n s s h o v e d aside its m e m o r y . Korea c o n f r o n t e d A m e r i c a n s w i t h i n t e n s e c o m b a t m e r e t r i c i o u s l y classified not as war but as a " p o l i c e action." It was a major conflict fought outside the a n n o u n c e d p e r i m e t e r of vital US interests; a war in w h i c h field c o m m a n d e r s were d e n i e d the u s e of w e a p o n s t h a t s o m e b e l i e v e d c o u l d h a v e d e t e r m i n e d its o u t c o m e ; a b l o o d y three-year contest p u r s u e d w i t h o u t t h e b e n e f i t of a c o n s i s t e n t 7

8

The Penlomic Era

statement of purpose capable of rallying bipartisan support in Washington or of satisfying the soldiers w h o did the fighting. The war's conclusion only reinforced A m e r i c a n uneasiness. Less than a decade before, t h e U n i t e d States h a d t r i u m p h a n t l y vanquished the forces of evil. In Korea we again conf r o n t e d evil, s a i d to be no less o d i o u s t h a n the Nazis. But this time we struck a bargain with the devil. Such a distasteful and embarrassing compromise s e e m e d un-American. Yet despite its perplexing character, Korea dem a n d s our attention as a pivotal event in American military history. Though shoved into the recesses of p o p u l a r m e m o r y , the K o r e a n War p r o f o u n d l y affected the political climate of the 1950s. It contributed to major changes in basic American national security policy and military strategy. Of particular interest, the "lessons" of Korea redefined the roles assigned to the armed services, with a major impact on t h e i n f l u e n c e a n d r e s o u r c e s t h a t e a c h c o u l d claim. As a result, the war had a lasting though not always beneficial impact on the structure of American defense forces. T h i s e s s a y e x a m i n e s t h e A r m y ' s a t t e m p t s to c o n f r o n t t h e l e g a c y of K o r e a d u r i n g t h e y e a r s 1953-61. This period corresponds to the two terms of the E i s e n h o w e r P r e s i d e n c y . It also was a t i m e that marked w h a t m a n y contemporary observers believed to be a "revolution" in warfare. For the Army it was a time of isolation and prolonged adversity: of shrinking m a n p o w e r ceilings, r e d u c e d budgets, a n d w i d e s p r e a d d o u b t s about its u t i l i t y in f u t u r e

The Lel~acy of Korea

9

wars. G e n e r a l M a x w e l l D. T a y l o r c a l l e d it the Army's "Babylonian Captivity. "1 Paradoxically, the period also was one of opportunity. Adversity provided an antidote to comp l a c e n c y . It f o r c e d the A r m y to g r a p p l e w i t h questions about the nature of American security interests, the character of the next war, and the doctrine, weapons, and organization needed to face its challenges. As we will see, many of the Army's ans w e r s to t h e s e q u e s t i o n s a p p e a r f l a w e d in retrospect. Still, they deserve attention today. From the historian's perspective they provide insight into the enduring character of the Army. And of greater immediate interest the debates, decisions, and policies of the 1950s imparted a shape to the Army that persisted long after that decade had passed into history. For better or w o r s e we still feel its effects today.

The Korean War's immediate effects on National politics are well known. First of all, the war c o m p l e t e d t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of the T r u m a n Presidency. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g his recent rehabilitation, Harry S. Truman was the least papular man to occupy the White House since Andrew Johnson. Accusations of corruption among his political cronies and of being "soft" on co mmu n ism already had cast a s h a d o w over his a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , m a k i n g a successful bid for r e e l e c t i o n in 1952 unlikely. Korea sealed Truman's fate. Held accountable for provoking Red Chinese intervention in the war, criticized for relieving General Douglas MacArthur from

10

The P e n t o m i c Era

c o m m a n d in the Far East, b l a m e d for the b l o o d y stalemate that existed on the battlefield while negotiations dragged on at Panmunjom, Truman lost his last shreds of credibility. In addition to discrediting Truman personally, the war also caused profound changes in popular views regarding US foreign and defense policies. Paying a bitter price for implementing the Truman Doctrine in no way diminished the hothouse antic o m m u n i s m that so m a r k e d A m e r i c a n o p i n i o n at that time. If anything, this confrontation with North Korea a nd the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of C h i n a - - b o t h widely viewed by Americans as pawns of the Soviet U n i o n - - o n l y reinforced anxiety about the Red Menace. But Truman's inability to bring the war to a satisfactory c o n c l u s i o n - - t h e c o n t i n u i n g sacrifice of American soldiers for no clear purpose--convinced many people that relying on conventional military means to stop communist expansion was folly. The v i c i o u s c h a r a c t e r of the f i g h t i n g - - w i t h o u t n u m b e r e d A m e r i c a n i n f a n t r y m e n battling " A s i a n hordes" at close quarters--seemed to play to their advantages. Many Americans considered it absurd that this situation stemmed from our refusal to use precisely those weapons that advanced technology had p r o v i d e d us. A m e r i c a n s w a n t e d policies that would check communism more effectively than had Truman (who in addition to his troubles over Korea also was b l a m e d for " l o s i n g " China). But t h e y w a n t e d to a c h i e v e that en d by c a p i t a l i z i n g on American strengths, particularly technology, rather than by s q u a n d e r i n g American m a n p o w e r . Above all, they wanted no more Koreas.

The Legacy of Korea

11

The p r e s i d e n t i a l c a m p a i g n of 1952 o c c u r r e d w h i l e the K o r e a n a r m i s t i c e talks f o u n d e r e d an d s t a l e m a t e on the f i g h t i n g front c o n t i n u e d . T h e White House would belong to the aspirant able to persuade the American people that he could both end the war and carry on the fight against commun i s m w h i l e a v o i d i n g f u t u r e d e b a c l e s like Korea. Thus the war paved the way for the election of the candidate able to persuade the electorate of his sup e r i o r i t y in h a n d l i n g m i l i t a r y and d i p l o m a t i c affairs. With the contest cast in those terms no one c o u l d m a t c h the c r e d e n t i a l s of the great h e r o of World War II, Dwight D. Eisenhower. Once Ike had d e c l a r e d his interest, his t r i u m p h in the g en eral elections was all but inevitable. P r e s i d e n t E i s e n h o w e r assumed office in January 1953 pledging to bring the fighting in Korea to a swift conclusion and to avoid similar wars in the future. To deter attacks of the type that North Korea had launched in June 1950--or failing that, to defeat t h e m - - h i s administrat:on devised th~ strategy of "massive retaliation." At the heart of this strategy was greatly i n c r e a s e d r e l i a n c e on n u c l e a r weapo n s - o n what Secretary of State John Foster Dulles p u b l i c l y t e r m e d "a great c a p a c i t y to retaliate instantly by means and at places of our choosing. ''2

Yet that strategy's o m i n o u s s h o r t h a n d n a m e hardly suggests the full dimensions of Eisenhower's national security policy. This policy had more to it than a pr of e s s ed w i l l i n g n e s s to bomb aggressors into the Stone Age. A document known as NSC 162/2, d r a f t e d in the early m o n t h s of his

12

The Pentomic E r a

administration, spelled out the full implications of Eisenhower's strategy. Entitled "Basic National Security Policy," this document was approved by the National Security Council (NSC) on 29 October 1953 and long remained a key directive. As a major theme that would have important i m p l i c a t i o n s for tile Army, N S C 162/2 posited an e s s e n t i a l link b e t w e e n security and a h e a l t h y economy. Economic recession in the United States, it said, would "seriously prejudice the security of the free world." Conversely, "a sound, strong, and growing US economy" would enable the nation "to support over the long pull a satisfactory posture of defense. ''3 According to standard Republican thinking of the day, the Federal Government best could encourage growth and maintain a strong dollar by putting a clamp on its own spending. Since defense outlays f o r m e d the largest part of the Federal budget, Republicans saw an inverse relationship between defense spending and economic well-being. Spending too much on defense was self-defeating. By threatening to bankrupt the economy, it would pose a positive threat to American security. In other words, N S C 162/2 implied that frugality in defense s p e n d i n g was n e e d e d to sustain the e c o n o m y , thereby benefiting the country's overall strength and security. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , then, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n sought a military capability that would counter the existing Soviet threat as c h e a p l y as possible. As E i s e n h o w e r saw it, n u c l e a r w e a p o n s far outperf o r m e d the old c o n v e n t i o n a l forms of military power in effectiveness and cost. This view explains

The Legacy of Korea

13

the prominence of nuclear weapons in NSC 162/2. Henceforth, that document stated, American military policy would rest on a "capability of inflicting m a s s i ve r e t a l i ato ry damage by offensive striking power." Lest any confusion exist about the type of w e a p o n s a v a i l a b l e for r e t a l i a t i o n , NSC 162/2 s pe c i f i e d that the U n i t e d States w o u l d " c o n s i d e r nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions" in the event of war. The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n b e l i e v e d that this stated willingness to employ nuclear weapons would preclude the requirement for their actual use. The mere threat of dropping a few atomic bombs, combined with the knowledge of their destructive potential, would intimidate would-be aggressors and maintain world order. In this sense massive retaliation represented a complete break from earlier strategic concepts. The United States henceforth would maintain m i l i t a r y forces not to fight wars but to p r e v e n t them, using the threat of nuclear response to guarantee peace and prevent the further spread of communism and Soviet influence. Rather than a serious attempt to describe how to employ force, massive retaliation was, in Russell F. Weigley's phrase, "a strategy of deterrence. ''4 Yet despite the emphasis placed on deterrence, the authors of NSC 162/2 recognized the relationship between a growing Soviet nuclear arsenal and the c r e d i b i l i t y of the A m e r i c a n retaliatory force. T h e y a l r e a d y f o r e s a w a "state ~f n u c l e a r p l e n t y " w h e n each side would possess the power to inflict u n a c c e p t a b l e d a m a g e on the other. S u c h

14

The P e n t o m i c Era

circumstances would "create a stalemate, with both sides reluctant to initiate general war." Mutual deterrence of this type would not of itself be inconsistent with American interests if it implied an absence Of conflict and a guarantee of the international status quo. Undermining the premise of massive retaliation, however, was the realization that growing Soviet nuclear strength could potentially "diminish the deterrent effect of US atomic power against peripheral Soviet aggression." Once Soviet nuclear forces threatened the United States, American promises to use nuclear weapons against "minor" instances of communist aggression would become less convincing. Once they recognized this o p p o r t u n i t y the Russians surely w o u l d exploit it. Therefore, the authors of NSC 162/2 believed that the United States could look forward to a Sovietd i r e c t e d c a m p a i g n of s u b v e r s i o n against nonc o m m u n i s t c o u n t r i e s that w o u l d " c o n t i n u e indefinitely" and "grow in intensity." To address this problem, N S C 162/2 developed a third, strongly pro-active theme that was consistent with the aim of minimizing defense costs, yet went far beyond the concept of nuclear deterrence. This t h e m e o u t l i n e d i n s t r u m e n t s that the U n i t e d States would employ to defeat aggression in situations w h e r e nu clear w eap o n s were inappropriate. According to N S C 162/2, the United States would use "all feasible d i p l o m a t i c , political, e c o n o m i c , and covert measures" to assist any country that appeared to be threatened by a communist takeover. More generally, the United States would "take overt and covert measures to discredit Soviet prestige and

The Legacy of Korea

15

ideology." Indeed, NSC 162/2 declared that US policy would be to "take feasible political, economic, propaganda, and covert measures designed to create and exploit troublesome problems for the U.S.S.R. . . .

The importance attributed to covert action was unmistakable. Its role at one end of the force spectrum was as clear as the role of strategic nuclear weapons at the opposite extreme. But what role remained for traditional conventional forces such as the Army?

T h e D e f e n s e P o l i c y that E i s e n h o w e r prescribed to implement massive retaliation answered this question, though hardly in a way that pleased the A r m y. The " N e w Look," as it was c a l l e d , reflected above all the commonly held belief that nuc l e a r w e a p o n s had r e v o l u t i o n i z e d warfare. T r a d i t i o n a l c o n c e p t s g o v e r n i n g the use of force were outmoded. The "New Look" redefined the role of each Service, aligning it with the requirements of an a t o m i c age. This r e a l l o c a t i o n of roles significantly changed the relative importance and influence of each Service. Eisenhower and his advisers believed that air p o w e r was the key to d e t e r r e n c e . T h u s , the Air Force, less than a decade after achieving independent status, was exalted to primacy among the Service. The i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l b o m b e r fleet of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) stood preeminent as the i n s t r u m e n t for d e l i v e r i n g n u c l e a r retaliatory

16

The P e n t o m i c Era

blows. As a result, t h r o u g h o u t the E i s e n h o w e r years, the Air Force had first claim on resources. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of this claim s h o w e d most clearly in the defense budget. (See figure 1.) In fiscal year (FY) 1953, the last year of the Truman administration, Air Force spending had lagged slightly behind Army's. Yet within two years the Air Force share of the budget had grown to nearly twice the Army's and remained so throughout the decade. Indeed, Air Force expenditures nearly equalled those of the Army and Navy combined. In FY 1957, for example, the Air Force spent $18.4 billion, $1 billion less t h a n the total o u t l a y s of the o th er two Services. 5 As the Air Force's importance grew under the " N e w Look," that of the A r m y d e c l i n e d . In Ike's view of defense in the atomic age the role of his old Service did not loom large. Some thought was given to the Army having to occupy an enemy's homeland o n c e it had b e e n d e v a s t a t e d by a hail of n u c l e a r bombs. And perhaps the Army would need to help maintain order at home in the unfortunate event of enemy bombers striking the United States. 6 But the notion of the Army performing major combat missions along the lines of World War II or Korea was the very antithesis of Eisenhower's thinking. Given its peripheral role, the Army became a lucrative target for b u d g e t - c u t t e r s looking for ways to r e d u c e overall defense expenditures. In these efforts they enjoyed support at the highest levels. Eisenhower himself told the American people in May 1953 that "in making all the economies that are possible, it is

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18

The Pentomic Era

necessary that we concentrate on that w h i c h is vitally n e c e s s a r y a n d t e n d to p u t into s e c o n d place, even to e l i m i n a t e w h e r e we can, those things w h i c h are m e r e l y desirable. ''7 T h r o u g h o u t the E i s e n h o w e r years the A r m y r e m a i n e d very m u c h m i r e d in seco n d place. More t h a n a few officers w o u l d at times w o n d e r n e r v o u s l y if the P r e s i d e n t had quietly dec i d e d that the A r m y was " m e r e l y desirable."

2. The "New Look": Impact and Counterattack he i m m e d i a t e effect of the "New Look," then, w a s to r e d u c e t h e r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e to t h e A r m y for fighting a land war. T h e A r m y e n d e d the Korean War w i t h a total force of 1.5 m i l l i o n soldiers a n d 20 c o m b a t divisions. S o m e r e d u c t i o n s in the a f t e r m a t h of t h e w a r w e r e i n e v i t a b l e . In p r a c t i c e , h o w e v e r , the e n d of the war began a series of progressive cuts that c o n t i n u e d t h r o u g h o u t lhe decade. By FY 1955 A r m y strength stood at 1.1 million. At the e n d of FY 1958 it r e a c h e d 899,000. A n d in FY 1961, the last year of the E i s e n h o w e r administration, A r m y strength b o t t o m e d out at 859,000. T h e force s t r u c t u r e suffered similar r e d u c t i o n s throughout the d e c a d e so that by 1961 the A r m y had o n l y 14 divisions. Of that n u m b e r , three were training div i s i o n s , in no s e n s e d e p l o y a b l e , c o m b a t - r e a d y

T

19

20

The P e n t o m i c Era

units. 1 By FY 1955 the A r m y ' s b u d g e t was barely half of w h a t it h a d been two years earlier. Its share of t h e d e f e n s e d o l l a r h a d s h r u n k to t h e s m a l l e s t a m o n g the three Services and r e m a i n e d so throughout E i s e n h o w e r ' s two terms in office. 2 T h e A r m y ' s i m p o v e r i s h m e n t at the h a n d s of the "New Look" extended beyond material aspects. Signs of d e m o r a l i z a t i o n a p p e a r e d in the ranks. Ree n l i s t m e n t rates p l u m m e t e d . Few soldiers s h o w e d any desire to stay in the Army. T h o s e w h o did too o f t e n w e r e of i n f e r i o r q u a l i t y . 3 J u n i o r o f f i c e r s res i g n e d t h e i r c o m m i s s i o n s in u n p r e c e d e n t e d n u m b e r s . 4 Even senior officers were not i m m u n e . In disgust, one general officer informed the Army Chief of Staff, General M a t t h e w B. Ridgway, that he was retiring because "I am c o n v i n c e d that if present t r e n d s c o n t i n u e the A r m y will soon b e c o m e a service s u p p o r t agency for the other a r m e d services. ''5 S o l d i e r s l a m e n t e d a p e r c e i v e d loss of s t a t u s a n d e s t e e m in the eyes of their c o u n t r y m e n . To civilians, the Air Force r e p r e s e n t e d m o d e r n technology, SAC, a n d Steve Canyon. T h e A r m y ' s i m a g e was h a p l e s s Beetle Bailey a n d television's Sergeant Bilko, w h o was described by an officer as "a fourf l u s h e r , a s h a r p i e , a c a d w h o e x p l o i t s an o a f i s h c o l o n e l a n d an e l e m e n t of t r a m p s , n o - g o o d s , a n d s e m i - c r i m i n a l s d o i n g n o t h i n g all d a y . ''6 To t h i s t h i n - s k i n n e d officer, Bilko a n d his c r o n i e s r e p r e s e n t e d the p o p u l a r view of h i m s e l f a n d his fellow soldiers. Public scorn m a d e it painful to be a soldier a n d s e e m e d to c o n t r i b u t e to the A r m y ' s talent drain. A n o t h e r o f f i c e r n o t e d t h a t t h e A r m y h a d become "an auxiliary service," apparently retained

The "New Look"

21

"for c e r e m o n i a l p u r p o s e s w h i l e the Air Force girds its loins to fight o u r wars." He w e n t on to suggest that "if the A r m y is no longer n e e d e d , it s h o u l d b o w out gracefully, a n d not hang on for the sake of tradit i o n . . . " He r e c o m m e n d e d s a r c a s t i c a l l y t h a t t h e A r m y be absorbed into the Air Force: s u c h a m o v e would save money, reduce inter-Service rivalry, a n d h e l p t h e a v e r a g e s o l d i e r ' s m o r a l e by p u t t i n g h i m in a snazzy blue uniform. 7 S u c h c o n f u s i o n about the A r m y ' s future even d o u b t that it retained a role in m o d e r n w a r f a r e - was w i d e s p r e a d . M a n y p e o p l e o u t s i d e the A r m y believed that "the A r m y is o b s o l e s c e n t and probably obsolete. "8 Increasingly, p e o p l e inside the Service h a d b e g u n to s h a r e t h a t v i e w . As M a j o r J o h n H. C u s h m a n , an o u t s t a n d i n g soldier w h o w o u l d rise to three-star rank, wrote in 1954, "I do not k n o w w h a t the A r m y ' s m i s s i o n is or h o w it plans to fulfill its m i s s i o n . A n d this, I find, is true of m y fellow soldiers. At a time w h e n n e w w e a p o n s a n d n e w mac h i n e s h e r a l d a r e v o l u t i o n in warfare, we soldiers do not k n o w w h e r e the A r m y is going a n d h o w it is going to get there. ''~ Reduced budgets and manpower strengths, w i d e s p r e a d q u e s t i o n s about the A r m y ' s future, dem o r a l i z a t i o n w i t h i n the ranks: little w o n d e r that e v e n s u c h a s e n i o r o f f i c e r as G e n e r a l L y m a n L. L e m n i t z e r c o u l d l a m e n t in 1955 t h a t " t o d a y it s e e m s to m e that the very survival of the A r m y ... is at stake. ''1°

However p l a i n t i v e , r e m a r k s s u c h as Lemnitzer's signified concern, not despair. With the

22

The P e n t o m i c Era

w e l l - b e i n g of t h e i r S e r v i c e in j e o p a r d y , A r m y leaders did not give up. Indeed, many believed that the stakes involved more than the health and prestige of t h e A r m y . T h e y a g r e e d w i t h G e n e r a l Ridgway, A r m y Chief of Staff from 1953 to 1955, that the " N e w Look" also was a misguided policy t h a t e n d a n g e r e d t h e n a t i o n ' s s e c u r i t y . Far f r o m bowing to the " N e w look," Ridgway and his successors challenged the very rationale of Eisenhower's defense policies, while reshaping the Army in the i m a g e of t h e i r o w n v i s i o n of t h e " r e v o l u t i o n " in w a r f a r e . U l t i m a t e l y , t h e y s o u g h t to o v e r t u r n massive retaliation. They hoped to substitute policies that w o u l d restore the Army to p r o m i n e n c e and recognize that strategic w e a p o n s alone could not guarantee national security. T h e A r m y c o u n t e r a t t a c k e d on several fronts, but not all could claim equal importance. At one level, for example, the Army greatly e x p a n d e d its public relations effort, hoping to shed its Beetle Bailey i m a g e for s o m e t h i n g m o r e u p b e a t . "It is not enough to do a good job," Army Secretary Wilbur M. Brucker told students at the C o m m a n d and General Staff College in 1956. "The American people m u s t k n o w t h e i r A r m y is d o i n g it. T h e t i m e has come w h e n no A r m y officer can sit in the bleachers and act as a mere spectator. Public relations is not a job of the few but of the many. ''11 In a d d i t i o n to e m p t y i n g the b l e a c h e r s figuratively, the Army's public relations offensive took on more substantive form. Soldiers turned in the uniforms of olive drab (OD shade 33) that the Army had w o r n for 50 years. The cut and color of the n e w " A r m y Green" uniform w o u l d present a smarter and

The "New Look"

23

US Army Photo The Army spruced up its image by replacing the olive drab (OD)uniform (right), which soldiers had worn for 50 y e a ~ , with a new uniform of "Army Green" (center).

more up-to-date a p p e a r a n c e - - o r so it was hoped. Freshly outfitted, the soldier henceforth would "appear beside the other Services without apology for his a p p e a r a n c e , " an Army spokesman predicted. The soldier could even "proudly meet and mingle with his civilian contemporaries. ''12 Along with

24

The P e n t o m i c Era

n e w u n i f o r m s , the A r m y touted n e w e q u i p m e n t . The A r m y ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n s to aviation, missile research, and the still-infant space program became major public relations themes. The Army's PR efforts capitalized on the latest m e d i a t e c h n i q u e s . In 1955 the Service released a feature-length-color d o c u m e n t a r y - - " T h i s Is Your Army"--for showing in theatres across the country. For television viewers who tuned in their sets on early Saturday or Sunday mornings, "The Big Pict u r e " p r o v i d e d a c o n t r a s t to Sergeant Bilko, depicting the Army as a progressive, technologically advanced organization with a vital worldwide mission. In 1955 the Army claimed that 394 of the nat i o n ' s 417 t e l e v i s i o n stations c a r r i e d " T h e Big Picture. ''13 Though not part of the Service per se, the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) became an increasingly important public relations instrum e nt . F o u n d e d in 1950, AUSA was a s o m e w h a t somnolent organization during its early years. But the " N e w Look" p r o d d e d AUSA and its j o u r n a l , Army, into b e c o m i n g aggressive advocates of the S e r vi c e ' s interests. Beginning in the fall of 1955, AUSA h e l d y e a r l y c o n v e n t i o n s that b r o u g h t together senior soldiers, politicians, journalists, and i n d u s t r i a l leaders. This a n n u a l meeting served to showcase the Army's latest hardware and permitted some modest bragging about recent Service accomplishments. It also helped the Army gain the ear of influential opinionmakers and express its views on defense issues.

The "New Look"

25

US A r m y Photo U S A r m y r e c r u i t e r s a d v e r t i s e their S e r v i c e ' s c o m m i t m e n t to h i g h t e c h n o l o g y b y c a r r y i n g r e p l i c a s of t h e NIKE Ajax missile on top o f their sedans in the early 1950so

More impo~ant t h a n these efforts to refurbish its image was the A r m y ' s attack on the very u n d e r p i n n i n g s of the " N e w Look." As our r e v i e w of N S C 162/2 illustrated, m a s s i v e retaliation c o n s t i t u t e d the basic m i l i t a r y strategy of the U n i t e d States from the early days of the E i s e n h o w e r administration~ Senior a d m i n i s t r a t i o n officials did not v i e w m a s s i v e retaliation m e r e l y as a theoretical p r i n c i p l e v a g u e l y related to US n a t i o n a l security~ Rather, the P r e s i d e n t h i m s e l f h a d e x p l i c i t l y e n d o r s e d it. H i s c l o s e s t

26

The Pentomic Era

associates had affirmed its central place in the administration's thinking. It was national policy. As s uc h, one m i g h t have e x p e c t e d A r m y lead ers to have accepted massive retaliation and to have foo cused their efforts on carrying out the President's will. But this view proved to be far from the case. From 1953 on the Army's spokesmen attacked massive retaliation relentlessly, criticizing it as ineffective, unrealistic, and immoral. In approving the concept of massive retaliation, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had taken only a first step tow a r d m a k i n g it into effective policy. Full implem e n t a t i o n m e a n t i n c o r p o r a t i n g the c o n c e p t into existing directives and plans that provided detailed guidance to the bureaucracy. This process gave opo ponents of massive retaliation opportunities to challenge it as each of these directives was revised in light of the new thinking. The Army's leaders seized on these opportunities. At first they confined their opposition to the closed inner circles of the National Security Council (NSC) a n d the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). But frustration soon inspired more vocal and at times d o w n r i g h t o b s t r u c t i o n i s t tactics. W h e t h e r due to the Army's doggedness or the cogency of its argu-: m e n t s , the S e r v i c e ' s c r i t i q u e e v e n t u a l l y e a r n e d w i d e s p r e a d a c c e p t a n c e . To the A r m y ' s c h a g r i n , however, the declining legitimacy of the concept of massive retaliation did not result in a redistribution of defense resources more favorable to the Army. That r e d i s t r i b u t i o n w o u l d await the c o m i n g to power of a new administration.

The "New Look"

27

In approving NSC 162/2 in October 1953, the President directed the National Security Council to use it as a basis for redefining US objectives in the event of war with the Soviet Union. Given a strategy i n t e n d e d to deter war, defining objectives to be pursued during war had the look of a fairly gratuitous exercise. Nonetheless, this requirement, eventually resulting in a d o c u m e n t k n o w n as NSC 5410/1, provided one of the first chances to challenge massive retaliation. The Army used this c h a n c e to point out some implications of the administration's willinghess to c o u n t e n a n c e all-out nuclear war. In a p r e l i m i n a r y draft the NSC Planning Board d e f i n e d t h e p r i m a r y US w a r t i m e o b j e c t i v e as the "destruction of both the military capability and military potential of the Soviet bloc. ''14 Military capability referred to the a r m e d forces of the Soviets and their allies. Military potential meant industrial cap a c i t y a n d , of n e c e s s i t y , c i t i e s . In s u b d u e d a n d u n r e m a r k a b l e language the National Security Council w a s p r o p o s i n g t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s r e d u c e Eastern Europe, the USSR, and China to a nuclear wasteland. Having achieved this aspect, the sole rem a i n i n g m i l i t a r y t a s k w o u l d be for o c c u p a t i o n forces to take control of the defeated and largely destroyed e n e m y nations. Asked by the JCS to c o m m e n t , the A r m y War P l a n s B r a n c h p r e p a r e d a s t i n g i n g c r i t i q u e of the NSC draft. Obviously, the NSC envisioned only a limited role for the A r m y in such a nuclear war. Yet the A r m y doubted w h e t h e r conditions following a massive nuclear attack w o u l d permit it to carry out even a simple occupation mission effectively. The

28

The P e n t o m i c Era

Army a c c u s e d the NSC of o v e r l o o k i n g " s e r i o u s problems" of fallout that would enormously complicate the occupation of defeated countries. More fundamentally, the Army questioned the sense of laying waste" to the Soviet bloc in the first place. What possible political purpose could such an act serve? According to the Army, the National Security Council had "failed properly to consider the implications of unlimited nuclear destruction of military potential" as an objective. In the Army's view, the political and e c o n o m i c i m p l i c a t i o n s of such an act were resoundingly negative. For exam~ pie, the United States had expressed a longstanding d e t e r m i n a t i o n to free Eastern Europe from Soviet domination. A war that made them nuclear targets, said the Army, w o u l d be u n l i k e l y to e n c o u r a g e Eastern Europeans to defect from the Soviet orbit. Even victory would create new problems on a scale m a t c h i n g the war's devastation. Not least among them, the United States would face stupendous difficulties in struggling to reintegrate its defeated adversaries into the world economy. The Army criticized the Council for ignoring the mind boggling p r o b l e m of e s t a b l i s h i n g " e c o n o m i c a l l y viable postwar successor states" out of the ashes of the defeated. And lastly, the Army speculated that even in victory, the United States would find its relations with allies and neutral powers poisoned. As perpetrators of a nuclear holocaust Americans would face grave i m p e d i m e n t s to the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a "postwar world e n v i r o n m e n t friendly toward the United States."

The " N e w Look"

29

T h e A r m y f o r w a r d e d its c r i t i q u e to t h e Joint Chiefs on 21 D e c e m b e r 1953. W h e n the P l a n n i n g Board's revised draft of 28 D e c e m b e r failed to incorporate any of the A r m y ' s points, the Service i m m e d i a t e l y w a d e d in w i t h a n o t h e r p a p e r . T h i s d o c u m e n t o f f e r e d an a l t e r n a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n of US w a r t i m e objectives. In it the A r m y o u t l i n e d a set of "clearcut g u i d e l i n e s " for a military strategy that unlike m a s s i v e retaliation, w o u l d be politically purp o s e f u l . T h e A r m y , in t h i s p a p e r , c a m e c l o s e to rejecting nuclear weapons altogether, a proposal that m u s t have s e e m e d quixotic to a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f f i c i a l s w h o v i e w e d n u c l e a r a r m s as a p a n a c e a . Specifically, the A r m y argued for the following: • T h e p r o h i b i t i o n , or m i n i m u m use, of weapons of mass d e s t r u c t i o n . • T h e restriction of attacks by w e a p o n s of mass d e s t r u c t i o n , if u s e d , to s e l e c t e d t a c t i c a l t a r g e t s w h i c h w o u l d cause m i n i m u m h u m a n loss a n d material loss a n d p r o m o t e the a c h i e v e m e n t of military objectives by c o n v e n t i o n a l forces. This effort s u c c e e d e d o n l y in p r e v e n t i n g a consensus on the draft NSC d o c u m e n t . Irreversibly deadlocked, the Joint Chiefs elevated their d i s p u t e to the N S C i t s e l f at a C o u n c i l m e e t i n g c o n v e n e d on 25 March. A l t h o u g h General Ridgway was in attendance, the President directed Admiral Arthur R a d f o r d , t h e JCS C h a i r m a n , to s u m m a r i z e abject i o n s to N S C 5 4 1 0 for t h e C o u n c i l . R a d f o r d , no f r i e n d of t h e A r m y , r e i t e r a t e d t h e S e r v i c e ' s v i e w that an all-out n u c l e a r attack on the Soviets w o u l d "inflict s u c h chaos a n d d e s t r u c t i o n a n d suffering"

30

The P e n t o m i c Era

as h a d not been seen since the Thirty Years War. He m e n t i o n e d the A r m y ' s c o n t e n t i o n that it was "impossible to visualize" the U n i t e d States c o p i n g w i t h the aftermath of a "victory" w o n t h r o u g h the indisc r i m i n a t e use of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . M i n d f u l of this prospect, he concluded, the Army was recomm e n d i n g t h a t t h e NSC r e c o n s i d e r its i n t e n t i o n to use n u c l e a r w e a p o n s on a large scale in the event of war w i t h the Soviets. E i s e n h o w e r a l l o w e d R a d f o r d to c o m p l e t e his p r e s e n t a t i o n , but t h e n r e s p o n d e d w i t h "considerable v e h e m e n c e and c o n v i c t i o n . " He r e m a r k e d w i t h evident displeasure that the issues raised "came pretty close" to q u e s t i o n i n g "the prerogatives of the C o m m a n d e r in Chief." He t h e n e x p r e s s e d his "absol u t e c o n v i c t i o n " t h a t t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s to b o t h s i d e s m e a n t t h a t " e v e r y t h i n g in any future war w i t h the Soviet bloc w o u l d have to be s u b o r d i n a t e d to w i n n i n g t h a t w a r . " W i n n i n g m e a n t w a g i n g w a r to t h e u t m o s t , u s i n g all a s s e t s available. T h e P r e s i d e n t c o n c e d e d that "ten years ago [he] might very well have subscribed ta ... limitations and restrictions" on the use of force. He also a d m i t t e d that " w e can't tell w h a t we will do after we a c h i e v e a victory in w h a t will be total a n d not in any sense limited warfare." Although acknowledging that his " p o i n t of view might seem brutal," the P r e s i d e n t c o n c l u d e d by insisting that he "simply c o u l d not c o n c e i v e of any other course of action t h a n [one] w h i c h w o u l d hit the Russians w h e r e and h o w it w o u l d h u r t most. ''15 E i s e n h o w e r s u f f e r e d no i l l u s i o n s a b o u t t h e probable effects of all-out nuclear war. The results

The " N e w Look"

31

of s u c h a c o n f l i c t w o u l d be h o r r i f y i n g b e y o n d belief. Yet in his view if the horror i n h e r e n t in allout n u c l e a r war m a d e it i m p o s s i b l e to c o n c e i v e of a m e a n i n g f u l strategy for s u c h a conflict, that same horror also i n v e s t e d the c o n c e p t of n u c l e a r deterrence w i t h its value. Fully e x p e c t i n g that he never w o u l d o r d e r t h e u s e of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , E i s e n h o w e r was baffled that the A r m y insisted on taking t h e r h e t o r i c of m a s s i v e r e t a l i a t i o n s e r i o u s l y , a n a l y z i n g it as if it w e r e a w a r f i g h t i n g s t r a t e g y . "That's the trouble with Ridgway," remarked the P r e s i d e n t s o m e m o n t h s later in a similar context. "He's talking t h e o r y --I'm trying to talk sense. ''16 In b r o o d i n g over the realities of c o n d u c t i n g all-out nuclear war, the A r m y was c o n c e r n i n g itself w i t h a c o n t i n g e n c y that E i s e n h o w e r v i e w e d as too r e m o t e to merit serious c o n s i d e r a t i o n . T h e A r m y took just the o p p o s i t e perspective. R i d g w a y believed that the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had become enamored with theory--the unproven hypothe s i s t h a t t h e t h r e a t of n u c l e a r r e t a l i a t i o n w o u l d p r e v e n t aggression. F u r t h e r m o r e , he was c o n v i n c e d that the t h e o r y was defective. Sense in his view req u i r e d that the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w e i g h the implications of a lapse in deterrence. Required by s u c h a lapse to c o n s i d e r the use of force to protect its interests, a n a t i o n too reliant on strategic n u c l e a r weapons w o u l d c o n f r o n t a choice b e t w e e n paralysis a n d catastrophe. In retrospect, E i s e n h o w e r and R i d g w a y clearly were talking a r o u n d each o t h e r - - m u c h to the frustration of each. Still, the P r e s i d e n t ' s outburst of 25 March h a d a c c o m p l i s h e d this m u c h : it had

32

The Pentomic Era

d e m o n s t r a t e d o n c e an d for all the f u t i l i t y of the Army's efforts to discredit massive retaliation by depicting all-out nuclear war as devoid of rational purpose. To the President such an argument was irrelevant. As a result, although not altogether abandoning its earlier theme, the Army began to shift the focus of its attack on mas s iv e retaliation. Rather than emphasizing the senselessness of general war, Service spokesmen instead pointed to the declining effectiveness of nuclear deterrent. The rapid growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal publicly was acknowle d g e d as fact. Well before 1960 the USSR w o u l d possess the capability to w reak u n a c c e p t a b l e destruction, the United States. When this point was reached, the Army argued, the two nuclear arsenals effectively would cancel each other out. A condition of mutual deterrence would exist--but one that inhibited nuclear attacks only. Under the cover of this nuclear shield, Soviet subversion and local aggression would continue on an expanded scale--as NSC 162/2 conceded. The strength of Soviet conventional forces would provide ample resources for such efforts. To defend its interests and its allies, the United States required comparable forces. The " N e w Look," the A r m y p o i n t e d out, was eliminating precisely such forces. 17 By the fall of 1954 the Joint Chiefs collectively began to appreciate the significance of the USSR'S ~ growing nuclear strength. But the Army remained alone in insisting that this situation called for an abandonment of massive retaliation and the "New Look." Certainly, the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s h o w e d no signs of r e c a n t i n g . For R i d g w a y , A m e r i c a n

The "New Look"

33

inflexibility in the face of c h a n g i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h r e a t e n e d to c r e a t e a s i t u a t i o n that w o u l d t e m p t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s to c o n s i d e r " p r e v e n t i v e w a r . " O n c e n u c l e a r parity s e e m e d i m m i n e n t , the conseq u e n c e s of S o v i e t c o n v e n t i o n a l s u p e r i o r i t y w o u l d b e c o m e inescapable. R i d g w a y feared that the logic of a p r e e m p t i v e s t r i k e to f o r e s t a l l s u c h a r a d i c a l c h a n g e in t h e b a l a n c e of f o r c e s w o u l d b e c o m e compelling. R i d g w a y ' s c o n c e r n s w e r e not w i t h o u t foundation. A m e r i c a n officials d i d c o n s i d e r p r e e m p t i v e attack as an o p t i o n at least theoretically available. In 1955, for e x a m p l e , the Air Force p r o p o s e d to the JCS that the U n i t e d States l a u n c h a strategic attack " w h e n e v e r it b e c o m e s clear that the i n t e n t i o n s of t h e c o m m u n i s t b l o c are to c o n t r o l m i l i t a r y a l l i e d n a t i o n s a n d destroy the U n i t e d States. ''18 T h e Presid e n t h i m s e l f was not i m m u n e to s u c h thinking. Ike w o r r i e d that the cost of an indefinite arms race w i t h the Soviets would drive the United States "into s o m e form of dictatorial g o v e r n m e n t . " Faced w i t h s u c h prospects, he c o n t i n u e d , " w e w o u l d be forced to c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r or not our d u t y to future generations d i d not require us to initiate war at the m o s t p r o p i t i o u s m o m e n t that we c o u l d designate. ''19 By the e n d of 1954 frustration w i t h i n the A r m y h a d r e a c h e d a d a n g e r o u s level. T h e A r m y ' s views no longer s e e m e d to receive serious c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Organizational factors a n d personalities c o m b i n e d to rob the A r m y ' s voice of its p r e v i o u s authority. T h e creation of the D e p a r t m e n t of Defense largely had e x c l u d e d the A r m y from the center of power. A l t h o u g h S e c r e t a r y B r u c k e r w a s an e n t h u s i a s t i c

34

The Pentomic E r a

advocate of the Army's viewpoint, the reduction of the A r m y Secretary to sub-Cabinet rank in 1949 limited his effectiveness as the Army's principal civilian spokesman. Ill defense matters, the Secretary of Defense had the d o m i n a n t voice within the Cabinet. Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense from January 1953 to October 1957, was a businessman with l i t t l e r e g a r d for u n i f o r m e d officers. W i l s o n a n d Ridgway disliked each other intensely, to the point that Ridgway scarcely could bring himself to speak to the Secretary of Defense. 2° Differences over issues became indistinguishable from the personality conflict separating the two men. General Barksdale Hamlett, then a brigadier assigned to the Pentagon, p u n g e n t l y c a p t u r e d the A r m y ' s v i e w of this conflict: "Wilson was out to get Ridgway; there is no doubt about it, and we k n e w it d o w n on the staff. ''21 On the u n i f o r m e d side, the formalization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff further r e d u c e d the Army's access to s e n i o r d e c i s i o n m a k e r s . S e r v i n g as A r m y Chief of Staff less than a decade earlier, General C. Marshall had enjoyed u n l i m i t e d access to the White I I o u s e . T h e P r e s i d e n t h a d c o n s u l t e d M a r s h a l l on virtually all major decisions relating to national security and had attached great weight to Marshall's opinions. By the time Ridgway a s s u m e d the Army Chief of Staff's mantle in 1953 he found his access to the President m u c h reduced. For the most part, he had to rely on the JCS Chairman to represent the Army's views in the White House. Neither Admiral Radford nor G e n e r a l N a t h a n T w i n i n g , the a i r m a n w h o s u c c e e d e d Radford as JCS Chairman, sympat h i z e d w i t h the A r m y ' s p e r s p e c t i v e on s e c u r i t y issues.

The " N e w Look"

35

S e c r e t a r y of D e f e n s e C h a r l e s E. W i l s o n at his w e e k l y press conf e r e n c e in 1953. He was a businessman w h o had Little regard for uniformed o ~ c e r s .

US Army Photo

General Ridgway felt keenly the problems resuiting from the d i m i n i s h e d status of the A r m y ' s two senior representatives. In April 1954 Ridgway urged Brucker as a matter of the "~eatest importance" to obtain Army r e p r e s e n t a t i o n at all NSC meetings. 22 A year later, on the eve of his retirement, Ridgway r e t u r n e d to this theme. Again he urged Brucker to "seek Service Secretary membership on the National Security Council." On this occasion Ridgway specified the additional need for either the A r m y Secretary or Chief of Staff to be "consulted by the President ... on all major matters ... in which the Army has a major interest. ''23 R i d g w a y ' s c o m m e n t s s u m m a r i z e nicely the Army's unhappiness with the state of civil-military relations in the mid-1950's. At the time, however, they proved totally ineffective as a blueprint for reform. Outside of the Army support for changes that would increase the voice of the individual Services

36

The P e n t o m i c Era

did not exist. Service views were considered "parochial" and "biased." Sound military thinking that c o n s i d e r e d the interests of the country as a w h o l e t r a n s c e n d e d S e r v i c e l i n e s . No o n e b e l i e v e d this more strongly than Eisenhower, whose experience with joint and c o m b i n e d operations during World War II and as NATO C o m m a n d e r during the Korean W a r h a d c o n v i n c e d h i m of t h e evils of S e r v i c e parochialism. E i s e n h o w e r v a l u e d the m i l i t a r y a d v i c e of the Joint Chiefs, but fully expected that it w o u l d come to him u n d i l u t e d by Service considerations. He told the Chiefs at one point that he personally involved himself in their selection only to assure himself that he was getting a JCS that w o u l d concern itself with " w h e r e we are going in overall security terms" and " h o w w e s h o u l d solve o u r o v e r a l l p r o b l e m s . " He told the Chiefs that they " s h o u l d not spend a lot of their time on their internal Services." Rather than acting as advocates of their Services, they should address "military doctrine in its overall terms, its entirety, n o t in m i n u t e details . . . " Above all they s h o u l d "think and act as a body. ''24 Eisenhower's hopes for inter-Service collegiality continually were frustrated. Nonetheless, the fact that he maintained s u c h e x p e c t a t i o n s d o o m e d R i d g w a y ' s h o p e s for a stronger voice for his Service and also suggests the President's lack of receptivity to the Army's continuing dissent on basic issues. Even so, at the very end of 1954 Ridgway made one last effort w i t h i n the Government to argue the A r m y ' s case. He r e q u e s t e d t h r o u g h S e c r e t a r y Wilson to have the c h a n c e to register formally the

The "New Look"

37

G e n e r a l M a t t h e w B~ Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff~ 1 9 5 3 - 5 5 . He t r i e d to a r g u e t h e Army"s case w i t h i n the G o v e r n m e n t , by c h a l lenging the view that massive retaliation c o u l d be the major de-, terrent to a ~ r e s s i o n . US A r m y Photo

A r m y ' s o b j e c t i o n s to e x i s t i n g n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y policies. He r e c e i v e d t h a t c h a n c e on 3 D e c e m b e r 1954 at a N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l m e e t i n g c o n v e n e d s p e c i f i c a l l y for t h a t p u r p o s e . R i d g w a y ' s p r e s e n t a t i o n c o n t a i n e d little t h a t t h e A r m y h a d not a l r e a d y said at o n e t i m e or a n o t h e r . He c h a l l e n g e d t h e t h e s i s t h a t " m a s s i v e r e t a l i a t o r y p o w e r " c o u l d be " t h e m a j o r d e t e r r e n t to a g g r e s sion." He s u g g e s t e d that t h e u s e of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s in f u t u r e w a r s w a s not inevitable; that if u s e d t h e i r effect m i g h t no t :prove decisive; that if u s e d indisc r i m i n a t e l y t h e i r effect w o u l d p r o v e so d e s t r u c t i v e as to call into q u e s t i o n t h e very c o n t e m p l a t i o n of s u c h a course, He c a l l e d on t h e NSC "to reject emp h a t i c a l l y a n y p o l i c y of p r e v e n t i v e w a r " as " d e v o i d of m o r a l principle." In lieu of r e l y i n g on n u c l e a r w e a p o n s R i d g w a y a d v o c a t e d t h e c r e a t i o n of forces

38

The P e n t o m i c Era

that were "properly balanced and of adequate readiness," c o n t e n d i n g that their availability w o u l d be "the most effective deterrent to general war." Furthermore, he insisted that such forces were entirely a f f o r d a b l e a n d w o u l d r e c e i v e p o p u l a r s u p p o r t if properly justified to the American people. 25 Having listened politely to Ridgway's presentation, the President dismissed him at its conclusion. The N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l t h e n p r o c e e d e d to consider w h a t it had heard. Secretary W i l s o n saw nothing in Ridgway's remarks except an attempted "justification for a m u c h larger Army." Secretary of t h e T r e a s u r y G e o r g e T. H u m p h r e y s a i d t h a t t h e United States simply could not afford to maintain "all kinds of forces designed to fight all kinds of w a r s at all t i m e s . " R i d g w a y e r r e d in " b e g i n n i n g with the one-sided premise that the whole [national s e c u r i t y [ effort s h o u l d be d i r e c t e d to m a i n t a i n i n g the US military posture, with little or no regard of for the m a i n t e n a n c e of t h e US e c o n o m y . " H a r o l d Stassen, the M u t u a l S e c u r i t y Director, q u e s t i o n e d Ridgway's "thesis that we w o u l d draw d o w n u p o n ourselves the hatred of most of m a n k i n d if we resorted to atomic warfare." Eisenhower himself rejected Ridgway's suggestion that the Soviets might wage war without using nuclear weapons. More to the p o i n t , he a g r e e d w i t h H u m p h r e y that " t h e United States could not afford to prepare to fight all kinds of wars and still preserve its free e c o n o m y and its basic institutions." "Since we cannot keep t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s an a r m e d c a m p or a g a r r i s o n s t a t e , " he a d d e d , " w e m u s t m a k e p l a n s to u s e atomic bombs if we become involved in a war. ''26

The " N e w Look"

39

From Eisenhower's perspective, Ridgway's appearance before the NSC had given the Army a fair c h a n c e to air its v i e w s . H a v i n g p r o v i d e d t h a t c h a n c e a n d h a y i n g b e e n u n p e r s u a d e d by t h e Army's presentation, the President now expected to i m p l e m e n t his policies without further obstruction. On 22 D e c e m b e r he s u m m o n e d S e c r e t a r y W i l s o n and the Joint Chiefs back to his office. He restated his c o m m i t m e n t to m a s s i v e retaliation, i n d i c a t i n g his " f i r m i n t e n t i o n to l a u n c h [the] S t r a t e g i c Air F o r c e i m m e d i a t e l y in c a s e of a c t u a l a t t a c k . " He stressed that "a major war will be an atomic war," and that the Army's role in such a war w o u l d be to " m a i n t a i n order" in the aftermath of a nuclear exchange. Given his view of war, the President stated that he " w a n t e d to make it clear that a priority approach is required" to reorient US forces. That reo r i e n t a t i o n e n t a i l e d " h o l d i n g b a c k on the A c t i v e A r m y " and e m p h a s i z i n g retaliatory forces, defense against Soviet nuclear attack, and such Reserves as w o u l d be n e e d e d for civil defense in the event that d e t e r r e n c e failed. T h e P r e s i d e n t e m p h a s i z e d that this decision was his final personal one. He conc l u d e d w i t h t h e r e m a r k t h a t "as C o m m a n d e r in Chief (he) is entitled to the loyal support of [his] s u b o r d i n a t e s of t h e o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n [he] has adopted, and (he) expects to have i t . ''z7

M u c h to the President's chagrin his end-ofyear session with the Joint Chiefs did not silence o p p o n e n t s of his defense policies. On the contrary, o p p o s i t i o n f r o m t h e A r m y in p a r t i c u l a r b e c a m e m o r e o p e n a n d m o r e v i r u l e n t as t h e n e w y e a r

40

The Pentomic Era

began. As if to signal the c h a n g e in tactics, The New York Times on 4 January p r o v i d e d a front page "rev i e w " of a n e w l y r e v i s e d e d i t i o n of FM 100-5, "Field Service Regulations, Operations," the A r m y ' s basic doctrinal publication. The Times reported that the A r m y was using the m a n u a l to assert its prim a c y o v e r t h e o t h e r S e r v i c e s a n d to c r i t i c i z e t h e policy of m a s s i v e retaliation. 28 Indeed, the m a n u a l s e e m e d to d r a w a m o r a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e A r m y a n d a d v o c a t e s of massive retaliation. An int r o d u c t o r y paragraph stated that " i n d i s c r i m i n a t e des t r u c t i o n is unjustifiable in a military sense." That s a m e p a r a g r a p h n o t e d p o i n t e d l y that " A r m y forces do not deliberately m a k e or invite war u p o n civilian p o p u l a t i o n s . ,,29 Writing that s a m e m o n t h in The Army Combat Forces Journal, an A r m y officer blasted US policy because it, a c c e p t e d "civil d e s t r u c t i o n as an object of war." T h e U n i t e d States had "forgotten that war is still a political i n s t r u m e n t w h i c h m u s t have political o b j e c t i v e s a n d m e t h o d s . " D e f e c t i v e A m e r i c a n t h i n k i n g was leading only to "the hrulalization of war w i t h o u t p u r p o s e , to a p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h mass d e s t r u c t i o n , [and] to t h e n e g l e c t of p o l i t i c a l realities."a° In an article p u b l i s h e d the next m o n t h , several officers b l u n t l y characterized massive retaliation as "a m a s s i v e bluff on our part." T h e y asserted that "U.S. c o n c e n t r a t i o n on p r e p a r i n g for t h e r m o n u c l e a r war" h a d " w e a k e n e d o u r p o w e r to resist creeping aggression." Insisting that the A r m y r e m a i n e d "the decisive a r m in war," the authors called for n e w defense policy that would provide a larger Army

The " N e w Look"

41

p r e p a r e d for any type of conflict: general or limited, c o n v e n t i o n a l or t h e r m o n u c l e a r . 31 Nor d i d General R i d g w a y s h r i n k from stating his c o n t i n u i n g r e s e r v a t i o n s a b o u t t h e a d m i n i s t r a tion's policies. A s k e d in a closed session of the Senate A r m e d S e r v i c e s C o m m i t t e e to g i v e h i s o w n views on r e d u c t i o n s m a n d a t e d by the " N e w Look," R i d g w a y stated that "the A r m y c o u l d not p e r f o r m its assigned m i s s i o n s if the cuts are i m p o s e d and that they w o u l d e n d a n g e r the security of the country." T h e C o m m i t t e e ' s Democratic c h a i r m a n i m m e diately a n n o u n c e d R i d g w a y ' s views to the press. 32 Since General R i d g w a y c o n t i n u e d forthrightly to place h i m s e l f at the h e a d of this o p p o s i t i o n to the " N e w Look," he soon b e c a m e persona n o n grata to the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Not surprisingly, as the e n d of his first two-year term as A r m y Chief of Staff app r o a c h e d , R i d g w a y was not asked to remain. So in J u n e 1955 R i d g w a y r e t i r e d , f r u s t r a t e d b u t by n o m e a n s giving u p the fight. He did not go quietly. Prior to s t e p p i n g d o w n , he sent a distillation of his v i e w s o n d e f e n s e p o l i c y to D e f e n s e S e c r e t a r y Wilson, arch a d v o c a t e of the " N e w Look." T h o u g h W i l s o n q u i c k l y directed R i d g w a y to classify the letter, it s u b s e q u e n t l y was "leaked" to The New York Times, thereby gaining the w i d e s p r e a d a t t e n t i o n for w h i c h it u n d o u b t a b l y w a s i n t e n d e d . W i l s o n dism i s s e d the letter as " n o t very i m p o r t a n t , " but it was a b o m b s h e l l signalling not a last gasp but a further e s c a l a t i o n of t h e A r m y ' s a t t a c k on a d m i n i s t r a t i o n policy. 33 In his letter to Wilson, R i d g w a y reiterated his v i e w t h a t t h e " m u t u a l c a n c e l l a t i o n of n u c l e a r

42

The Pentomic Era

a d v a n t a g e " was r e d u c i n g the likelihood that strategic nuclear weapons would be used for any purpose. Given these circumstances, he said, "no nation c o u l d regard n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t i e s a l o n e as s u f f i c i e n t , e i t h e r to p r e v e n t or to w i n a w ar." Ridgway did not doubt that the Soviets would continue to behave aggressively. But he expected that the c h a r a c t e r of s u c h a g g r e s s i o n w o u l d be nonnuclear. Indeed, he went so far as to say that the "USSR, like e v e r y o t h e r n a t i o n , w o u l d prefer to avoid the use of nuclear weapons." The critical gap in US d e f e n s e c a p a b i l i t y lay in the shortage of forces able to defeat such non-nuclear aggression. Ridgway characterized American military forces as " i n a d e q u a t e in strength and i m p r o p e r l y proportioned." The nation's foremost need was for "an imm e d i a t e l y available mobile joint military force of h a r d - h i t t i n g character, in w h i c h the versatility of the whole is emphasized and the preponderance of any one part is de-emphasized. T M If Secretary Wilson expected that Ridgway's departure would mean the end of criticism from the A r m y , he m i s c a l c u l a t e d . General M a x w e l l D. Taylor, who succeeded Ridgway, took up the same cudgel. Taylor was ably supported by the Army's brilliant and outspoken Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development (R&D), Lieutenant General James M. Gavin. In November 1955 Gavin published an article lamenting "the confused thinking and talking that have obscured defense matters since World War II." For a period of time, the naive belief that nuclear w e a p o n s w o u l d en d the " t o u g h b u s i n e s s of land

The"New

Look"

43

fighting" h a d h e l d sway, Gavin's article said. But n o w the U n i t e d States clearly " c o u l d not rely on any one w e a p o n s y s t e m or any single Service" for its s e c u r i t y . " T h e w i s d o m of t h i s j u d g m e n t , " he c o n t i n u e d , " b e c a m e quite a p p a r e n t w h e n the Comm u n i s t s a c q u i r e d a t o m i c w e a p o n s of their o w n . " As in the past, "no easy w a y to w i n wars" still did not exist. A m e r i c a n forces h a d to be ready "to w i n wars, large or small, atomic or n o n - a t o m i c . " This requirement, argued Gavin, d e m a n d e d an A r m y w i t h "sizeable forces in being, ready to m o v e by land, sea, or air a n d fight any time, any place. ''aS Along w i t h other senior A r m y leaders, Gavin believed that using strategic nuclear w e a p o n s c o u l d serve no sane p u r p o s e . He was not above m a k i n g this p o i n t in the most d r a m a t i c way. In secret testim o n y before a Senate A r m e d Services S u b c o m m i t tee Gavin p r e d i c t e d that all-out n u c l e a r war w o u l d cause several h u n d r e d m i l l i o n deaths. More frighte n i n g still, m a n y of the dead w o u l d be in neutral or allied countries "depending upon which way the wind blew." When Gavin's testimony later was " l e a k e d " to the Associated Press, an o u t c r y e n s u e d . Lewis L. Strauss, C h a i r m a n of the A t o m i c Energy C o m m i s s i o n , c o m p l a i n e d that the release of Gavin's testimony had violated NSC directives. General Alfred G r u e n t h e r , the S u p r e m e Allied C o m m a n d e r , E u r o p e , e x p r e s s e d c o n c e r n t h a t r e m a r k s s u c h as Gavin's w o u l d "foster d i s m a y and d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t in the value of the NATO alliance." But Gavin had m a d e h i s p o i n t : t h a t t h e p r o s p e c t of s u c h "incredible d e s t r u c t i o n " w o u l d serve to decrease the l i k e l i h o o d of a l l - o u t w a r , a n d t h u s i n c r e a s e t h e

44

The P e n t o m i c Era

p r o s p e c t s for conflicts.-36

what

Gavin

called

"localized

In a similar vein in early 1956, Taylor testified to the Congress that "as parity is a p p r o x i m a t e d in n u m b e r s a n d types of atomic w e a p o n s b e t w e e n East a n d West, every effort will be m a d e on both sides to avoid general a t o m i c war." The United States c o u l d a n t i c i p a t e " p r e s s u r e s on soft spots about the Soviet p e r i p h e r y t h r o u g h subversion, guerrilla action a n d c o u p s d'etat, [and] small-scale wars." R e s p o n d i n g to any of these situations i m p l i e d "a land o p e r a t i o n w i t h a very l i m i t e d role, if any, for h e a v y w e a p o n s of mass d e s t r u c t i o n . " The c o u n t r y n e e d e d not m o r e n u c l e a r w e a p o n s but a "versatile A r m y " to defeat n o n - n u c l e a r aggression. 37 S u c h s u g g e s t i o n s that strategic n u c l e a r w e a p ons w o u l d play no role in the "next war" contrad i c t e d the essential p r e m i s e of massive retaliation a n d i r r i t a t e d t h e JCS. Rear A d m i r a l T r u m a n H. H e d d i n g of the Joint Staff c o m p l a i n e d to A d m i r a l R a d f o r d t h a t " d e s p i t e p r e v i o u s a g r e e m e n t by t h e Joint Chiefs" on the use of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , "the A r m y at every o p p o r t u n i t y r e o p e n s the issue a n d att e m p t s to restate [revise] the policy. ''38 T w o m o n t h s later, Radford r e m i n d e d the Service Chiefs that for p l a n n i n g p u r p o s e s they w o u l d a s s u m e the e m p l o y m e n t of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s at the b e g i n n i n g of hostilities. He e m p h a s i z e d , moreover, that such w e a p o n s w o u l d be no less available in l i m i t e d wars t h a n in general ones. 39 Still, t h e A r m y r e f u s e d to a c q u i e s c e in argum e n t s that m a d e the use of strategic n u c l e a r weapoils an inevitable part of A m e r i c a n war policy. As if

The "New Look"

45

G e n e r a l M a x w e l l D. Taylor, Army Chief of Staff, 1955-59. He c a l l e d for a v e r s a t i l e A r m y to defeat nonnuclear aggression. Taylor referred to the two terms of the Eisenhower Presid e n c y and the corresponding revolution in warfare as the Army's "Babylonian Captivity."

US Army Photo

in response to Radford, officers on the Army General Staff passed to a friendly news correspondent a series of classified studies that detailed the Army's d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with US strategy. This so-called "Colonels' Revolt" immediately gained exposure for the A r m y ' s views on the front page of The N e w York Times. Three years into the Eisenhower administration and in the midst of an election year, one of these Army studies declared that "the United States is grossly unprepared to meet the communist threat." The administration had "violated the first principle of strategy--indeed, of common sense--by failing to shape our military strength to meet the likely dangers." Worse, the Army study noted, "we continue to pour excessive manpower and money

46

The P e n t o m i c Era

into an Air Force w h i c h has been substantially neut r a l i z e d [by t h e S o v i e t U n i o n ' s g r o w i n g n u c l e a r strength] and w h i c h pleads for more money, more money, more m o n e y . " The Army study predicted t h a t if t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f a i l e d to c o r r e c t t h e i m b a l a n c e s in its m i l i t a r y s t r u c t u r e , its p o s i t i o n w o u l d "disintegrate to a point where we shall be forced into either total war or subjugation. 4° O n e m o n t h later, the d r a f t i n g of t h e " J S O p (Joint Strategic Objectives Plan} Strategic C o n c e p t " p r o v i d e d a n o t h e r o p p o r t u n i t y for the Army to make its point. The Joint Staff's initial draft of this docum e n t asserted u n e q u i v o c a l l y that "in a general war, regardless of the m a n n e r of initiation, atomic weapo n s w i l l be u s e d f r o m t h e o u t s e t . " T h e A r m y refused to accept s u c h language. In its place the A r m y suggested a more c o m p l e x v i e w that w o u l d restrict the use of strategic nuclear w e a p o n s to certain specific (and relatively improbable) scenarios. Within a few years, the A r m y ' s alternative began, The reciprocal capability which each side will have for destroying the other may be expected to make the a d v e r s a r i e s very reluctant to initiate unrestricted atomic war and to incline them to seek a limited use of atomic weapons ... It is more likely that general war may start by a series of actions and counteractions between the Sino-Soviet bloc and the U.S. and its allies than by a Soviet onslaught at the outset. For planning purposes, it may be assumed that the U.S. will certainly use atomic weapons when USSR forces attack the United States or attack U.S. military forces overseas in a manner which threatens their survival. In other cases, the use of these weapons will depend on the decision

The " N e w Look"

47

of the P r e s i d e n t in the light of U.S. national interests. 4~ T h e i m p l i c a t i o n w a s c l e a r - - a t least as t h e A r m y saw i t - - t h a t o n l y in rare instances w o u l d "U.S. nat i o n a l i n t e r e s t s " b e n e f i t f r o m t h e u s e of s t r a t e g i c weapons. T h e A r m y b l o c k e d the c o n s e n s u s n e e d e d to red r a f t t h e JSOP a n d a n g e r e d t h e JCS C h a i r m a n . R a d f o r d t u r n e d to D e f e n s e S e c r e t a r y W i l s o n for h e l p . T h e t r o u b l e w i t h t h e A r m y , a c c o r d i n g to Radford, was that its t h i n k i n g was "still based on the large-scale use of US g r o u n d forces in p e r i p h eral a r e a s " - - a s had been the case in Korea. Worse still, the A r m y "visualizes p e r i p h e r a l wars of considerable m a g n i t u d e in w h i c h we do not use atomic w e a p o n s . " A g a i n , K o r e a p r o v i d e d t h e m o d e l for s u c h a n o n - n u c l e a r war. But such n o t i o n s were nons e n s e to a t r u e b e l i e v e r in m a s s i v e r e t a l i a t i o n . Radford insisted to Wilson that the role of g r o u n d f o r c e s in f u t u r e w a r s w a s n o t f i g h t i n g b u t " t h e m a i n t e n a n c e or restoration of law a n d order, and rehabilitation within the United States." The Army w o u l d clean up the m e s s y aftermath of n u c l e a r war, c o m b i n i n g the f u n c t i o n s of c o n s t a b u l a r y a n d civil d e f e n s e a g e n c i e s . S u c h r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w o u l d require n e i t h e r a large nor particularly w e l l - e q u i p p e d A r m y . B u t t h e y n e e d e d an A r m y t h a t i n s t e a d of f i g h t i n g t h e p r o b l e m q u i e t l y a c c e p t e d its a l l o t t e d role. 42 This struggle over military strategy and the A r m y ' s role in it persisted to the very e n d of the E i s e n h o w e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The A r m y ' s c o n t i n u e d

48

The Pentomic Era

attacks on strategic nuclear weapons persuaded n e i t h e r Radford nor his successor, General Nathan T w i n i n g . More i m p o r t a n t l y , the President never wavered in his c o m m i t m e n t to massive retaliation. A r m y leaders c o n s e q u e n t l y f o u n d E i s e n h o w e r ' s s e c o n d term as frustrating as his first. Both Gavin a n d Taylor f o l l o w e d Ridgway into exasperated retirement. Like Ridgway, both p u b l i s h e d w i d e l y - r e a d c r i t i q u e s of E i s e n h o w e r ' s m i l i t a r y p o l i c i e s a n d o u t l i n e d alternatives that p r o v i d e d a more promin e n t role for the Army. 43 In the end, the c u m u l a t i v e weight of criticism directed against massive retaliation--coming not only from i n s i d e the A r m y but from influential civilians as w e l l - - s u c c e e d e d in p e r s u a d i n g e v e r y o n e except E i s e n h o w e r a n d the core of his administration. By the time Ike left office his military policies w e r e in t a t t e r s , w i d e l y s e e n as t o o r i g i d , t o o u n i m a g i n a t i v e , too lacking in boldness. T h e stage w a s set for a n e w s t r a t e g y , o n e b u i l t a r o u n d t h e catch phrase, "Flexible Response," whose author, Maxwell Taylor, w o u l d enjoy a remarkable resurrection. T h e A r m y ' s role in this strategy w o u l d be p r o f o u n d l y different a n d m u c h more central to its i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . In that sense, the A r m y e v e n t u a l l y w o n its long struggle to discredit massive retaliation. W h e t h e r or not the n e w strategy w o u l d benefit either the A r m y or the nation r e m a i n e d to be seen.

go

Design for a N e w Army

H

o w e v e r persuasive, the A r m y ' s critique of mas. s i v e retaliation alone w o u l d not be e n o u g h to p r e s c r i b e t h e S e r v i c e ' s r o l e after Korea. If E i s e n h o w e r ' s defense strategy was inadequate, t h e n w h a t s h o u l d t a k e its p l a c e ? If, as G e n e r a l T a y l o r rem a r k e d in 1955, t h e A r m y " d e c l i n e [ d ] to a c c e p t civil d e f e n s e ... as a p r i m a r y m i s s i o n , " t h e n w h a t m i s s i o n d i d the Service p r o p o s e in its stead? 1 Efforts to a n s w e r those q u e s t i o n s a n d recast the A r m y into an i n s t r u m e n t for i m p l e m e n t i n g s u c h an alternative strategy absorbed the a t t e n t i o n of the Service's best m i n d s t h r o u g h o u t the E i s e n h o w e r years. L i e u t e n a n t General Paul W. Caraway later recalled that the critical i m p e r a t i v e d u r i n g the years after Korea was "to find s o m e use for the Army. ''2 T h e E i s e n h o w e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s strategy of deterrence created strong i n c e n t i v e s for the A r m y to organize itself to p r e v e n t wars rather t h a n fight them. R i d g w a y resisted that inclination. His view of war retained strong traditionalist overtones, largely

49

50

The P e n t o m i c Era

u n a f f e c t e d by t h e a d v e n t of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . " W h e n a nation chooses war rather than one of its political alternatives," he told the Council on Foreign Relations on early 1955, "it simply uses a dev i c e for a c h i e v i n g n a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s by force: a military means to a political end." Viewed in this context, the Army's priorities r e m a i n e d clear: "The A r m y exists for the single purpose of victory in battle and success in war," although he allowed that "it m a y h a v e t h e s u b s i d i a r y p u r p o s e of b e i n g a d e t e r r e n t . ''3 R i d g w a y t h u s r e j e c t e d not o n l y the strategy of massive retaliation, but one of the operative principles of deterrence: that the nation w o u l d m a i n t a i n m i l i t a r y forces not to fight w a r s , but to p r e v e n t t h e m . W h a t e v e r the o b j e c t i v e m e r i t of Ridgway's views, they were totally out of step with the political climate existing in the United States after Korea. The country was fed up with war and c o u n t e d on nuclear w e a p o n s to preclude fighting in the future. The idea that nuclear w e a p o n s had made all war obsolete was becoming increasingly fashionable. Ridgway's insistence in the face of such expect a t i o n s t h a t t h e A r m y e x i s t e d to fight m a d e his failure inevitable. Sensitive to Ridgway's failure yet no less opp o s e d to m a s s i v e retaliation, T a y l o r b e l i e v e d that the A r m y had erred in dismissing deterrence so cavalierly. As long as deterrence remained the corners t o n e of a t o m i c age s t r a t e g y , p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s required the A r m y to conform in some measures to its d e m a n d s . In order to obtain its fair share of a defense budget shaped by requirements of deterrence, the A r m y n e e d e d to demonstrate that it too could

Design for a N e w Army

51

play an important role in the prevention of war. As a result, during Taylor's tenure as Army Chief of Staff, the Army adopted the language of deterrence in establishing its claim on defense resources. "Like all o t h e r e l e m e n t s of our n a t i o n a l d e f e n s e progr a m s , " T a y l o r said in a s p e e c h in October 1955 "the Army justifies its existence primarily as a deterrent force to prevent war. ''4 Taylor agreed with Ridgway that non-nuclear aggression would flourish u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of n u c l e a r p l e n t y . Even in explaining the need for forces to counter such aggression, however, Taylor clung to the logic of deterrence. The nation needed "balanced strength ... in v a r i o u s forms a p p r o p r i a t e to d eter or to fight small w a r s , " he r e m a r k e d in a t y p i c a l s p e e c h , so that it could "put out brush fires promptly before they can spread into general w a r . ' ' 5 Did remarks such as Taylor's reflect a real shift in the Army's thinking? Probably not. A review of what Taylor told closed Army uudiences about the Service's role suggests that the Chief of Staff shaped his p u b l i c r e m a r k s to c o r r e s p o n d to the expectations of his listeners. Speaking in private, Taylor, like Ridgway, b e l i e v e d that the Army existed for " a c h i e v i n g n a t i o n a l objectives by force." Taylor summarized his own view of the world situation in a speech at the Army War College shortly after becoming Chief of Staff. The United States and its allies, he said, "represent in general the 'have' nations whose interest it is to preserve the status quo." The West's relative prosperity made it "a fair target for the aggressive designs of our enemies." Sustaining that prosperity required the West to maintain access

52

The P e n t o m i c Era

to the m a r k e t s a n d resources of c o u n t r i e s b e y o n d t h e A l l i a n c e . If t h r e a t s d e v e l o p e d a g a i n s t s u c h T h i r d World countries, Taylor v i e w e d it as in " o u r national interest to p r e v e n t the a b s o r p t i o n of their resources by the c o m m u n i s t bloc." In sum, the aim of A m e r i c a n national policy was to m a i n t a i n the exi s t i n g w o r l d o r d e r . M i l i t a r y force w o u l d s u p p o r t t h a t a i m by r e t a i n i n g its h i s t o r i c f u n c t i o n of bringing about or p r e v e n t i n g c h a n g e to that order. What d i d this historic f u n c t i o n m e a n for the A r m y ? In Taylor's view, it had g e n e r a t e d "a n e w a w a r e n e s s of [an] obligation to p r e p a r e to m e e t local aggression a n y t i m e , a n y w h e r e . ''~ Taylor a c k n o w l e d g e d that s u c h views were not w i d e l y h e l d o u t s i d e the Army. He r e t u r n e d to the War College a year later to report that the A r m y ' s efforts h a d b e e n " s o m e w h a t h a m p e r e d by w h a t I call ' t h e f i x a t i o n o n t h e big w a r ' . " He c o n t i n u e d as follows: Certainly when we get before Congress I'm always i m p r e s s e d with the fact that our civilian leaders when they think [of] war ... almost always equate that to general atomic war, the war w h i c h starts with a surprise onslaught on D-Day. [As a result] there is a blurred perception ... of the possibility •f other forms of warfare equally as i m p o r t a n t and which require preparation to an equal degree. 7 U n a b l e to generate e n t h u s i a s m for their c o n c e p t of a w a r f i g h t i n g A r m y , s e n i o r o f f i c e r s t h u s b o w e d to p r e v a i l i n g fashion in a d o p t i n g the language of deterrence to e x p l a i n Service needs. T h e y h o p e d to organize the Army, given a d e q u a t e resources, for both

Design for a New Army

53

a p o l i t i c a l l y e x p e d i e n t role in d e t e r r e n c e a n d for fighting the wars that they fully expected to occur w h e n deterrence failed.

T h e A r m y ' s r e j e c t i o n of m a s s i v e r e t a l i a t i o n and its skepticism about deterrence did not imply a static view of h o w wars w o u l d be c o n d u c t e d . On the contrary, most officers believed that warfare had entered a period of t r e m e n d o u s change. The purpose of warfare might remain constant, but its conduct was being altered by what Gavin described as "a t e c h n o l o g i c a l r e v o l u t i o n of the m o s t p r o f o u n d nature. ''8 As never before, the Army focused on a simple f a c t o r - - t e c h n o l o g y - - a s the principle determ i n a n t of h o w wars w o u l d be fought. Technology u n d e r m i n e d old assumptions, r e n d e r e d traditional practices obsolete, and s e e m e d to require a radical overhaul in the way that the A r m y e q u i p p e d and organized itself. In the 1950s, according to two influential soldier-scholars, "one of the few certainties is t h e c o n t i n u a l r a c i n g c h a n g e in m i l i t a r y t e c h n o l ogy. ''9 "The A r m y is burning its military textbooks," Taylor told a graduating class at the C o m m a n d and General Staff College, "to clear away the old and make w a y for the new. ''1° A letter from Lieutenant C o l o n e l W i l l i a m R. K i n t n e r , an i n f l u e n t i a l A r m y planner, to Henry Kissinger, then with the Council on Foreign Relations, captures the spirit infecting the A r m y as follows:

Tile new factor in evaluating the military equation is the dynamics introduced by a rapidly shifting weapons technology. In this sense, weapons are

54

The P e n t o m i c Era

crucial since new weapons require constant restructuring of forces and new strategy and tactical concepts. The upheaval this is causing in military circles is reflected in the fact that weapons ... are tending to become obsolescent before they even become operational. 1~ W e a p o n s t e c h n o l o g y meant, above all, nuclear weapons. Despite its rejection of massive retaliation the A r m y was far from blind to the implications of Hiroshima. Although unwilling to rely on strategic n u c l e a r w e a p o n s as the sole guarantor of A m e r i c a n n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , m o s t A r m y o f f i c e r s f i r m l y bel i e v e d t h a t n u c l e a r w e a p o n s of a tactical v a r i e t y w o u l d d e c i d e the o u t c o m e of the next war. As an officer wrote, in a rivalry b e t w e e n n u c l e a r - e q u i p p e d powers "the one w h i c h best e m p l o y s them, w h i c h m o l d s superior organization and tactics around the new tools of warfare, will possess an i m m e n s e , perhaps decisive, advantage. ''12 Moreover, few officers d o u b t e d that nuclear w e a p o n s w o u l d make their app e a r a n c e on the battlefields of the next war. Most agreed with a general officer who c o n c l u d e d that "as a t o m i c w e a p o n s b e c o m e r e l a t i v e l y p l e n t i f u l , they w o u l d also b e c o m e 'conventional'. ' ' a A n o t h e r o f f i c e r n o t e d w i t h a p p r o v a l t h a t " w e are g e t t i n g over the trembles and are now going about the business of working the atomic bomb into our w e a p o n s y s t e m s . ''a4 I n d e e d , o n c e t h e y h a d s t o p p e d tremb l i n g A r m y o f f i c e r s l o o s e d a f l o o d of d i s c u s s i o n about n u c l e a r issues. The contents of Military Review, the A r m y ' s foremost professional journal, prov i d e an i n t e r e s t i n g i n d i c a t o r . T h e i n d e x of t h e Review's V o l u m e 33, c o v e r i n g t h e p e r i o d A p r i l

Design for a N e w Army

55

1 9 5 3 - M a r c h 1954, l i s t s o n l y two items u n d e r "atomic warfare." Neither was a full-length article. The number of "atomic" entries increased with each year; Volume 38 (April 1958-March 1959), for example, contained 36 entries, most of article length. Yet coming to terms with this atomic revolution did not require the Army to sever its ties to the past. Indeed, in many respects American military history--as far back as the Civil War and as recent as K o r e a - - h a d p r e d i s p o s e d the Army to e m b r a c e n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . The A m e r i c a n a p p r o a c h to war long had favored the substitution of technology for manpower as a method of achieving military success with fewer casualties. Adding nuclear weapons to the Army's arsenal promised to reap such savings on an unprecedented scale. In the words of one officer, "the American tradition of [using] machinery and technology to save manpower" had established "an u n m i s t a k a b l e r e q u i r e m e n t for tactical n u clear weapons. ''15 Consistent with this preference for machinesover-men was the Army's perennial position in the debate on whether maneuver or firepower provided the decisive ingredient in land combat. In practice ( t h o u g h not a l w a y s in p u b l i s h e d d o c t r i n e ) , the Army traditionally had come down in favor of firepower. Lieutenant Colonel George B. Pickett, later a major general, called this e m p h a s i s on f i r e p o w e r " o u r m i l i t a r y h e r i t a g e . . . i n i t i a l l y c o n c e i v e d by General Ulysses S. Grant in front of Petersburg in 1864." The American Army long had recognized artillery as the "King of Battle." Pickett approvingly traced this primacy of firepower as far forward as

56

T h e P e n t o m i c Era

K o r e a , w h e r e t h e " ' V a n F l e e t ' d a y of f i r e " h a d p l a c e d a s i m i l a r e m p h a s i s on " v o l u m e of fire to smother the enemy defenders." Even without nuclear weapons, said Pickett, "Korea s h o w e d that f i r e p o w e r d e f e a t s m a n p o w e r in a l m o s t e v e r y encounter." 16 To most officers in the i m m e d i a t e afterm a t h of K o r e a n u c l e a r w e a p o n s s e e m e d o n l y to carry this " a s c e n d e n c y of firepower" to its logical a n d u l t i m a t e c o n c l u s i o n . 17 G e n e r a l W i l l a r d G. W y m a n , c o m m a n d i n g the Continental Army Comm a n d (CONARC), p o i n t e d to the i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s n o t i o n . T h a n k s to n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , he dec l a r e d , " t a c t i c a l f i r e p o w e r a l o n e can n o w a c c o m plish the purpose of maneuver. ''18 Thus, in the view of the officer responsible for developing Army doctrine, nuclear weapons had made maneuver obsolete. For w h a t p u r p o s e w o u l d t h e A r m y e m p l o y such awesome weapons? Traditionally, American soldiers had defined the proper objective of military action to be the destruction of the e n e m y force. Experience in Korea had both reinforced this view and e x p a n d e d the g r o u n d w o r k for adopting tactical nuclear weapons. In Korea, the Army had gained extensive experience fighting first North Korean and then Red Chinese forces. After the war soldiers extrapolated from their experiences to draw general conclusions about the tactics that c o m m u n i s t armies w o u l d employ in future wars. Many c o n c l u d e d that c o m m u n i s t s did not share the Western regard for h u m a n life. Poor in most of the resources n e e d e d to c o n d u c t war, comm u n i s t countries made good their material shortage through the prodigious expenditure of the

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m a n p o w e r that they p o s s e s s e d in plenty. T h e "hum a n w a v e " or " h u m a n sea" attacks in Korea were the result. Reflecting an assumption common t h r o u g h o u t m u c h of the A r m y in the 1950s, o n e ofricer c o n c l u d e d that the "disregard of h u m a n losses ... by C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t forces in Korea" w o u l d be "a s t a n d a r d t a c t i c of a n y S o v i e t i n d o c t r i n a t e d force. ''19 Here again the a p p a r e n t advantages of n u c l e a r weapons meshed well with preconceived notions c o m m o n in t h e o f f i c e r c o r p s . C o m m u n i s t t a c t i c s s e e m e d to d e m a n d the bigger bang that tactical nuc l e a r w e a p o n s w o u l d p r o v i d e . As o n e m i l i t a r y writer c o n c l u d e d , only n u c l e a r w e a p o n s c o u l d h e l p t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s " a v o i d t h e r u i n o u s s i t u a t i o n of h a v i n g to m e e t the h o r d e s of c o m m u n i s m m a n for m a n , g u n for g u n ...-2o A n d a n o t h e r b o o k by a pair of w e l l - k n o w n A r m y s t r a t e g i s t s e x t o l l e d n u c l e a r w e a p o n s as a " d e v a s t a t i n g rebuttal to ' h u m a n sea' tactics resorted to by aggressors utterly indifferent to casualties. ''21 T h u s , a t r a d i t i o n a l b i a s t o w a r d technology, a p e n c h a n t for firepower, a n d e x p e c t a t i o n s regarding c o m m u n i s t tactics all p r e d i s p o s e d the A r m y t o w a r d tactical n u c l e a r w e a p o n s in the 1950s even as the a r m y was c h a l l e n g i n g the utility of strategic n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . Yet c o u n t e r v a i l i n g factors, no less important, also were at play. T h e s e factors raised d o u b t s as to w h e t h e r tactical n u c l e a r w e a p o n s alone were the panaceas that their advocates claimed. These f a c t o r s , as a r e s u l t , c o m p l i c a t e d t h e b u s i n e s s of r e d e f i n i n g l a n d p o w e r for the 1950s a n d b e y o n d . F a i t h in t h e p r i m a c y of f i r e p o w e r a n d frighte n i n g images of c o m m u n i s t " h u m a n w a v e " tactics d i d not c o m p r i s e the Korean War's entire legacy to

58

The Pentomic Era

A m e r i c a n m i l i t a r y t h i n k i n g . T h e w a r also b r o u g h t a b o u t i n d e l i b l e c h a n g e s in the c o n c e p t of r e a d i n e s s . B e f o r e J u n e 1950, w i t h f e w e x c e p t i o n s , i n t e n s i v e t r a i n - u p p e r i o d s h a d p r e c e d e d the c o m m i t m e n t of A m e r i c a n g r o u n d forces to c o m b a t o p e r a t i o n s . After the d e c l a r a t i o n of h o s t i l i t i e s , r a t h e r t h a n i m m e d i a t e fighting, a crash t r a i n i n g p r o g r a m i n t e n d i n g to bring US forces u p to an a d e q u a t e s t a n d a r d of p r o f i c i e n c y was the norm. Depending on the opponent, the t r a i n i n g p r o g r a m m a y h a v e b e e n brief, as in 1898, or m u c h longer, as in 1917-1918. In a n y case, the exp e c t a t i o n of c o n d u c t i n g s u c h t r a i n i n g b e f o r e c o m m i t t i n g e v e n regulars to c o m b a t reflected a n d r e i n f o r c e d t h e i n d i f f e r e n t level of r e a d i n e s s m a i n t a i n e d in the p e a c e t i m e A r m y . In s o m e i n s t a n c e s , the A r m y h a d p a i d d e a r l y for its i n a b i l i t y to shift q u i c k l y to a war-footing. Cert a i n l y , t h e i n i t i a l A m e r i c a n c a m p a i g n s of W o r l d W a r II p a i n f u l l y i l l u s t r a t e d t h e p r i c e of u n p r e p a r e d n e s s . For the m o s t part, h o w e v e r , the A r m y a v o i d e d the i m p l i c a t i o n s of s u c h failures. After all, in the b r o a d m i l i t a r y sense, e p i s o d e s s u c h as Bataan or the K a s s e r i n e Pass* w e r e irrelevant. In t h e e n d *Bataan is a peninsula and province in western Luzon, the Philippines, between Manila Bay and the South China Sea. Early in World War II (December 1941-January 1942), the USFilipino army withdrew to Bataan, where it entrenched and fought a holding action that upset the Japanese timetable for conquest. The army finally was overwhelmed on 9 April 1942. The troops captured there were subjected to the infamous "Death March" to the prison camp near Cabanatuan; thousands perished. The Kasserine Pass is a two-mile-wide gap in central Tunisia, in the Grand Dorsal chain, an extension of the Atlas mountains. The pass was a key point in the allied offensive in Tunisia in World War II; the pass was the scene of an Axis breakthrough on 20 February 1943, but was retaken with very heavy losses by US forces on 25 February 1943.

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we w o n a n y w a y . So the A r m y f o u n d it easy after World War II, as it h a d after every other war, to revert to traditional habits: a p e a c e t i m e r o u t i n e m o r e notable for its easygoing pace t h a n for its rigor. T h e K o r e a n War s h a t t e r e d s u c h c o m p l a c e n c y ... a n d in this sense m a r k e d a decisive break w i t h the A r m y ' s past. The war began w i t h o u t warning. A m e r i c a n o c c u p a t i o n forces in Japan d e p l o y e d directly into c o m b a t w i t h i n days of the North Korean i n v a s i o n . T h e first u n i t s a r r i v i n g in K o r e a , m o s t n o t o r i o u s l y Task Force Smith, were u n d e r strength a n d short of e q u i p m e n t . T h e e q u i p m e n t that they h a d was in poor c o n d i t i o n . M u c h of it was obsolete. Soldiers and leaders alike were ill-trained and lacked the s t a m i n a to w i t h s t a n d the ordeal of combat. As a n o f f i c e r w r o t e in r e t r o s p e c t , t h e y disp l a y e d the "habitual, s l a p d a s h carelessness" that so often had marked American forces going into combat. 22 A n d as a direct result of the neglect that these units had suffered t h e y e n d u r e d h u m i l i a t i n g d e f e a t . B e c a u s e of t h e i r f a i l u r e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c a m e w i t h i n a hair's b r e a d t h of losing the war in its first three m o n t h s . 23 A l t h o u g h t h e U n i t e d States m a n a g e d to a v e r t c o m p l e t e d i s a s t e r in K o r e a , t h e A r m y c o u l d n o t d e n y that it h a d been a near thing. If Korea were to be a m o d e l for f u t u r e C o l d War c o n f r o n t a t i o n s - what a senior officer called "Limited War O n e " - - t r a d i t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s of readiness no longer w o u l d suffice. 24 T h e p r o s p e c t s of no-notice interv e n t i o n d e m a n d e d units that were instantly available for d e p l o y m e n t a n d prepared for c o m b a t . "In t h e p a s t , w e h a v e a l w a y s h a d t i m e " to c o m p l e t e

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such p r e p a r a t i o n s "after we had already declared w a r , " d e c l a r e d G e n e r a l W i l l i s t o n B. P a l m e r , t h e A r m y Vice Chief of Staff, in 1955. Henceforth, however, "if there is one t h i n g plain to every m a n , it is t h a t w e n o l o n g e r h a v e t h a t k i n d of t i m e at o u r disposal. ,,25 E x p e c t a t i o n s for a n o - n o t i c e w a r o b l i g e d t h e post-Korea A r m y to m a i n t a i n r o u t i n e l y an unpreced e n t e d l e v e l of r e a d i n e s s . But w h e r e w o u l d t h i s c o m b a t - r e a d y A r m y be d e p l o y i n g ? A n d w h a t kind of war w o u l d it fight w h e n it got there? T h e A r m y c o u l d f i n d no s i m p l e a n s w e r s to these questions. T h e w o r l d w i d e character of comm u n i s t a g g r e s s i o n a n d t h e w o r l d w i d e s c a l e of A m e r i c a n interests a n d military d e p l o y m e n t s suggested that war c o u l d break out in any of a score of localities. In this regard, Korea served not to focus the A r m y ' s a t t e n t i o n on Asia, but rather to reinforce an a w a r e n e s s that the next war c o u l d well break out w h e r e least e x p e c t e d . W h o , after all, w o u l d h a v e p r e d i c t e d before June 1950 that the U n i t e d States w o u l d fight a major land war in Korea? Nor was the A r m y at all certain w h a t type of w a r it w o u l d f i g h t . S u r p r i s i n g l y a b s e n t w e r e K o r e a n - i n d u c e d blinders that might have c o n v i n c e d A r m y leaders that the next war w o u l d echo the one fought from 1950 to 1953. Instead, the A r m y postulated a s p e c t r u m of c o n t i n g e n c i e s that it might face. At the far e n d of the s p e c t r u m was all-out n u c l e a r warfare or a war featuring c o n v e n t i o n a l forces on a scale a p p r o a c h i n g World War II c o m p l e m e n t e d by the use of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . Of greater l i k e l i h o o d were lower-intensity conflicts, wars that

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c o n v e n t i o n a l forces fought with or w i t h o u t tactical nuclear weapons--guerrilla conflicts like the French fought in Indochina, for example, or campaigns against the s u b v e r s i o n at w h i c h c o m m u n i s t s s e e m e d so adept. And, of course, e n d l e s s permutations of these t y p e s of conflicts were seen. A war might c o m b i n e c o n v e n t i o n a l fighting on one front with guerrilla warfare on another. The war might o c c u r in f r o z e n w a s t e s , or j u n g l e s , or d e s e r t ; it might begin w i t h c o n v e n t i o n a l w e a p o n s only and then go nuclear. Dismissing all-out nuclear war as the least likely of all contingencies, the A r m y saw its challenge as preparing itself to face all of these o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s p r a c t i c a l l y on a m o m e n t ' s n o t i c e . 26 " I n t h e u n c e r t a i n w o r l d of t o m o r r o w , " General Gavin wrote in 1955, the United States faces the need for greater military preparedness than ever before. As the Free World's leader, our nation seeks to prevent aggression in any form. The military role in supporting this national p o l i c y is to be able to win wars, large or small, atomic or non-atomic. This is a very big order. It establishes a new function for the Army; that is, in addition to being able to mobilize for a large-scale war, the Army must have sizable forces in being, ready to move by land, sea, or air and fight any time, any place. 27 It i n d e e d was a big order. While national leaders in the thrall of the "big bang" foresaw an ever diminishing utility of ground forces, the A r m y was claiming r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of b r e a t h t a k i n g s c o p e a n d difficulty.

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The P e n t o m i c Era

Reshaping the Army under such a multifaceted m i s s i o n - - a n d d o i n g so d u r i n g a period of c o n s t r a i n e d b u d g e t s - - c a l l e d for basic institutional c h a n g e s . As a r e s u l t , w i t h i n t h e S e r v i c e t h e E i s e n h o w e r years s p a r k e d an o u t p o u r i n g of innovation, debate, a n d controversial reform. T h e first p r o b l e m to present itself was intimidating. T h e next war might a s s u m e any of a halfd o z e n f o r m s a n d m i g h t o c c u r in a v a r i e t y of e n v i r o n m e n t s . What, if anything, did each of these h y p o t h e t i c a l conflicts share in c o m m o n ? W o u l d the A r m y h a v e to d i v i d e i t s e l f i n t o d i s t i n c t c o m p o nents, each training for a specialized type of combat? Or w o u l d a universal m e t h o d o l o g y prepare the A r m y as a w h o l e for any war across the s p e c t r u m of conflict? T h e s e p o t e n t i a l l y troubling q u e s t i o n s d e t a i n e d the A r m y o n l y briefly. For the m o s t part, the Service s i m p l y a s s u m e d away the issues these q u e s t i o n s raised. Fo practical m i n d e d soldiers 11o q u e s t i o n existed about the necessity of m a i n t a i n i n g an A r m y c o n s i s t i n g of several a r m i e s - - a n u c l e a r army, a conv e n t i o n a l army, a n d a counter-guerrilla army, one for jungle warfare a n d a n o t h e r for m o u n t a i n s . Limited resources ruled out s u c h a course of action, of course. Brigadier General William F. Train p o i n t e d o u t t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s in t h e s i m p l e s t terms as follows: We c a n n o t afford the l u x u r y of one type unit to fight an atomic war and another to fight under nonatomic conditions. Our tactics, organization, and equipment must be adaptable to either. 28

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General Taylor e n d o r s e d "this d u a l i t y - - t h e built-in capability to use atomic and n o n - a t o m i c w e a p o n s in a n y c o m b i n a t i o n " as a " b a s i c n e c e s s i t y . ''29 A l o n g w i t h T a y l o r , m o s t of t h e A r m y ' s l e a d e r s n e v e r d o u b t e d t h a t s u c h a d u a l c a p a b i l i t y c o u l d be a c h i e v e d . T h e y t r e a t e d as d o g m a t h e p r o p o s i t i o n that even in a n u c l e a r age all wars r e m a i n e d alike in t h e i r e s s e n t i a l s . C e r t a i n c o m m o n p r i n c i p l e s , described by General L e m n i t z e r as "by their very nature ... i m m u t a b l e , " g o v e r n e d the c o n d u c t of war a n d w o u l d c o n t i n u e to do so in the future. 3° Only in the a p p l i c a t i o n of those p r i n c i p l e s d i d conflict c h a n g e f r o m age to age. :~1 L i t t l e i n d i c a t i o n e x i s t s that officers in the 1950s in practice m a d e m u c h use of t h e c l a s s i c p r i n c i p l e s of war. N o n e t h e l e s s , tile u n p r o v e n b u t w i d e l y a c c e p t e d i d e a of t h e i r u n i fying relevance c o n v i n c e d m a n y that f i n d i n g a doct r i n e a p p l i c a b l e to w a r in all its v a r i e t i e s s i m p l y w a s a m a t t e r of i n g e n u i t y a n d h a r d work. If the c h a l l e n g e of organizing to do all things equally well still s e e m e d d a u n t i n g , the A r m y further r e d u c e d the scope of the p r o b l e m w i t h a n o t h e r key a s s u m p t i o n . A r m y leaders d e c i d e d that c o n v e n tional war s i m p l y was a lesser i n c l u d e d case of nuclear conflict. N u c l e a r war was the " w o r s t c a s e " t h o u g h n o t n e c e s s a r i l y t h e m o s t p r o b a b l e . If t h e A r m y c o u l d d e v e l o p t e c h n i q u e s to fight a n u c l e a r war successfully, other less-demanding conflicts w o u l d be manageable. C o n s e q u e n t l y , even as it arg u e d w i t h i n c r e a s i n g v e h e m e n c e against m a s s i v e retaliation, the A r m y bent its best efforts to d e v e l o p m e t h o d s that w o u l d m a k e it an effective i n s t r u m e n t of n u c l e a r warfare.

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W i t h i n r e m a r k a b l y short order, the A r m y evolved a conceptual view of the course such a war would follow and of the role that landpower would play in it. A l m o s t as q u i c k l y officers began to outline a set of broad concepts--hardly more than a vocabulary really--that prescribed the qualities the Army would need to fight a nuclear war. Throughout the 1950s A r m y officers r e p e a t e d l y r e f e r r e d back to the abstract generalities of this vocabulary. Much more s l o wly --an d in the end without achieving real s u c c e s s - - t h e A r m y stru g g led to c o n v e r t these concepts into concrete, practical methods for warfighting. In visualizing how the next war would occur, the A r m y d r e w a sharp d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n strategic a nd t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . As we have seen, the Army had argued that the strategic arsenals possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union offset each other, thereby creating a condition of m u t u a l d e t e r r e n c e . A r m y leaders also believed that, even in the absence of such an offsetting balance, the vast destructiveness of strategic nuclear weapons had made them militarily useless. Fundamentally, the Army rejected strategic nuclear weapons because they made no sense in the context of war as a political act. S u c h c o n s i d e r a t i o n s did not d i m i n i s h the Army's enthusiasm for tactical nuclear weapons. To most soldiers small-yield nuclear weapons used in support of battlefield operations were not a revolutionary development. Instead, they seemed a logical culmination of the longstanding historical trend toward fielding more efficient sources of firepower.

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Such w e a p o n s were noteworthy only as a singular e x a m p l e of the t e c h n o l o g i c a l g e n i u s that had become a hallmark of the A m e r i c a n way of war. They seemed to provide the ultimate in technology, establishing the qualitative edge that could compensate for A m e r i c a n n u m e r i c a l inferiority. :~2 In the next war tactic:al mmlear w e a p o n s w o u l d provide the great equalizer. :~:~ The Army expected war to begin not with a big bang, but with a small bang. Rather than l a u n c h i n g nuclea'r attacks against A m e r i c a n cities, c o m m u n i s t forces w o u l d initiate hostilities with nibbling aggression "carefully calculated in advance to be well below the high level of m u t u a l r i s k p o s e d by the s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r threat. ''34 These attacks and initial American resista n c e w o u l d be c o n v e n t i o n a l - - p e r h a p s r e s e m b l i n g the fighting in Europe during World War II. But to d e f e n d s u c c e s s f u l l y - - t o defeat the a g g r e s s o r - - t h e Army expected early in the war to resort to smallyield, limited-range, highly accurate nuclear weapons, d e l i v e r e d e i t h e r by c a n n o n or r o c k e t . T h e s e w e a p o n s w o u l d provide the crucial differential, allowing o u t n u m b e r e d American fighters to win. Y e t - - a n d this aspect was vitally i m p o r t a n t - - i n a c h i e v i n g v i c t o r y w i t h t h e s e w e a p o n s the A r m y w o u l d preserve the framework of traditional combat. For the d e s t r u c t i v e p o w e r of t h e s e w e a p o n s a l o n e w o u l d not be s u f f i c i e n t to b r i n g d e c i s i o n . Rather, their importance w o u l d lie in their matchless ability to provide support to ground tactical ope r a t i o n s . In this s e n s e t h e A r m y v i e w e d t a c t i c a l nuclear w e a p o n s not as small-scale strategic bombs, but as artillery of u n p r e c e d e n t e d effectiveness.

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Tactical n u c l e a r w e a p o n s therefore w o u l d comp l e m e n t g r o u n d forces, n o t s u p p l a n t t h e m . T h e y w o u l d h e l p the g r o u n d arms break the e n e m y attack, a n d create c o n d i t i o n s to allow our o w n armor a n d infantry to l a u n c h a counteroffensive. T h e req u i r e m e n t for sizable g r o u n d f o r c e s - - t o meet the attacker in close combat, eject h i m from friendly soil, and, if n e e d be, o c c u p y his t e r r i t o r y - - r e m a i n e d intact. F r o m this perspective, i n t r o d u c i n g tactical nuclear w e a p o n s in no way jeopardized the historic role of land power. 35 Yet d e s p i t e the survival of a traditional framew o r k for combat, s u c h a conflict w o u l d require n e w t e c h n i q u e s . To c a r r y on w i t h p r o v e n m e t h o d s of World War II a n d Korea w o u l d not do, especially since o u r adversary's ability a n d willingness to employ n u c l e a r w e a p o n s w o u l d trail only slightly beh i n d o u r o w n . To w i n t h e n e x t w a r t h e A r m y n e e d e d not only to master the t e c h n i q u e s of fighting on a n u c l e a r battlefield, but also to m i n i m i z e the effects of the other side's n u c l e a r capability. With this view in m i n d - - s t i l l at a broad c o n c e p t u a l l e v e l - - t h e A r m y a t t e m p t e d to define the qualities that atomicage forces n e e d e d to survive a n d to prevail. S e c u r i n g the f o r c e - - p r e s e r v i n g it from the effects of n u c l e a r a t t a c k - - w a s a major concern. Prot e c t i o n of t r e n c h a n d r a m p a r t no l o n g e r s u f f i c e d . T h e e x p e n s e of c o n s t r u c t i n g f o r t i f i c a t i o n s - - a s s u m i n g that an A r m y with a global m i s s i o n k n e w w h e r e to c o n s t r u c t t h e m - - p r o m i s e d to be a s t r o n o m ical: the Maginot Line s e e m e d a trifle in comparison. Worse, soldiers of the 1950s recalled v i v i d l y the p h y s i c a l and moral debilitation of the F r e n c h in

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1940, beguiled by their line of concrete fortresses. That v i e w - - a n d the ultimate irrelevance of the Maginot Line to the o u t c o m e of the Battle of F r a n c e - h a r d l y r e c o m m e n d e d static fortifications as the key to security on a nuclear battlefield. 36 An alternative to b u r r o w i n g into the earth was to a v o i d p r e s e n t i n g a t a r g e t w o r t h y of a n u c l e a r w e a p o n . A r m y planners a s s u m e d that even an era of n u c l e a r plenty w o u l d find combatants with only a finite n u m b e r of n u c l e a r weapons. P r u d e n t comm a n d e r s w o u l d reserve such w e a p o n s for the best targets. Perhaps the best w a y to r e d u c e the effects of tile e n e m y ' s n u c l e a r arsenal was to deprive h i m of those targets. Rather than massing in expectation of an ene m y attack, A m e r i c a n forces w o u l d disperse both laterally and in depth. "We see no lines of entrenchm e n t as we have k n o w n t h e m in previous wars," said General W y m a n , adding the following: No masses of men waiting in reserve. No roads jammed with trucks moving to the front. In fact we see no front. Only a battle area. Within the battle area, to a depth of as much as 100 miles or more, we see small mobile units deployed at intervals measured in miles instead of y a r d s . 37 Such scattered d e p l o y m e n t would lessen the e n e m y ' s incentive to e x p e n d his tactical n u c l e a r arsenal, since he w o u l d have difficulty finding targets w o r t h y of such costly weapons. Even if he used them, spreading out US forces in what an officer described as " d i s p e r s e d and well-ventilated

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formations" w o u l d m i n i m i z e the damage from any single weapon. 38 D i s p e r s i o n thus became the first i m p e r a t i v e in t h e A r m y ' s c o n c e p t of n u c l e a r warfighting. Of all the principles of war, security most lacks a positive aspect. Attention to the security of his force may keep a c o m m a n d e r from losing a battle, but it cannot of itself bring victory. A r m y leaders in the 1950s recognized that dispersion alone w o u l d not enable them to prevail in the next war. W h e t h e r attacking or defending, the successful c o m m a n d e r still w o u l d have to concentrate his f o r c e s - - h o w e v e r briefly--to blunt the enelny's attack or to take adv a n t a g e of his v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s . E v e n on a n u c l e a r b a t t l e f i e l d , m a s s d i d not e n t i r e l y lose its i m p o r tance. The trick was to mass forces rapidly at the critical time and place, to deliver the decisive blow, and then just as quickly to disperse again, thereby regaining the margin of safety against nuclear retaliation. "Concentrate to fight--Disperse to live" was one officer's succinct attempt to summarize a "formula for victory. ''39 T h i s r h y t h m of c o n c e n t r a t e - s t r i k e - d i s p e r s e w o u l d tax the abilities of c o m m a n d e r s and staffs. The area e n c o m p a s s i n g such operations necessarily w o u l d be m u c h greater than equivalent forces had o c c u p i e d in earlier wars. And the tempo of execution would quicken. Greater distance and more fluid m o v e m e n t s w o u l d combine to complicate the p r o b l e m s of g e t t i n g f o r c e s to t h e r i g h t t i m e a n d p l a c e in a c o h e r e n t p o s t u r e a n d of c o o r d i n a t i n g t h e i r u s e o n c e t h e r e . T h e c h a l l e n g e , as G e n e r a l Gavin saw it, lay in "learning h o w to control the

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a m o r p h o u s mass of m e n w h o must be d i s p e r s e d over an e n t i r e zone, an e n t i r e tract of land, dispersed thinly enough not to invite bomb blast, yet strongly enough to tackle the enemy ...,40 Flexibility, particularly as measured by responsive comm a n d and control, c o n s e q u e n t l y e m e r g e d as the second imperative for modern war. But flexibility comprised only one of the essentials needed for the fluid battles of the next war. No less important was m o b i l i t y . C o l o n e l E d w a r d L. Rowny, w h o after retiring as a lieutenant general would become the Reagan administration's chief arms negotiator, expected that the ability to move forces rapidly would a s s u m e " u n p r e c e d e n t e d s i g n i f i c a n c e " in future wars. He predicted that "words like 'fast,' 'quick,' 'speed,' and 'now' will inevitably dominate the language d e s c r i b i n g the t e c h n i q u e s of c o n d u c t i n g atomic warfare. ''41 Such sentiments appeared repeatedly in military w r i t i n g s of the 1950s. The atomic-age Army would require unprecedented mobility both tactically and strategically. Improving the Army's ability to move troops on the battlefield meant expanding m e c h a n i z a t i o n and e x p l o r i n g the p r o m i s e of the helicopter. 42 Gains in mobility would allow commanders to capitalize on the advantages of atomic fire support. As General Taylor told the Congress, "the problem of the ground commander will be to find the enemy, to determine his configuration, and then to destroy him by directing atomic fire upon him ..." At that juncture, he emphasized, "the commander will need instant mobility to exploit the effects of this destructive f i r e . ''43

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But given the country's global interests and the p o s s i b i l i t y of the next war breaking out in any c o r n e r of the world, the A r m y n e e d e d to move quickly not just on the battlefield, but to it as well. Improving strategic mobility required two things: a major i n v e s t m e n t in long-range airlift by the Air Force; and a redesign of the Army to make its organizations and equipment air-transportable. 44

Dispersion. Flexibility. Mobility. These three terms became the Army's watchwords in the years following Korea. Army spokesmen referred to them repeatedly--in congressional testimony, official reports, speeches, and articles. The terms took on the s e m b l a n c e of mantras, c h a n t e d again and again, cherished for their simplicity; but in the end they obscured as much as they enlightened. For despite the Army's apparent success in identifying military imperatives of the atomic age, moving from the abstract to the c o n c r e t e w o u l d prove m u c h more elusive.

4. Re-Equipping of the Army officer corps after T heKoreatouchstone was the belief that land warfare retained relevance in the atomic age. Circumstances might oblige the Army to play a role in deterrence, but its primary purpose remained to fight the land battle. T e c h n i q u e s for fighting that battle might change, but principles endured. And the importance of land forces continued undiminished. The Army directed most of its e n e r g i e s after Korea to p r o v i n g this hypothesis. H o w e v e r zealous their defense of traditional combat, Army leaders were not so imprudent as to think that the could rely henceforth on traditional h a r d w a r e . The t e m p o and e x p a n s i v e n e s s of an atomic battlefield would demand technologies providing i m p r o v e m e n t s in speed, flexibility, range, and precision, comparable to what the atomic bomb had done for explosive power. The Army needed new equipment that would enable other battlefield f u n c t i o n s to catch up with the leap forward that weapons effects had experienced since 1945. Apart from the prospect of greater combat effectiveness, pursuing new technologies promised other 71

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advantages as well. No less than the Services thems e l v e s , t h e c o u n t r y as a w h o l e h a d e m b r a c e d t h e idea that t e c h n o l o g y was t r a n s f o r m i n g warfare. Cong r e s s i o n a l s u p p o r t for e x p e n d i t u r e s o n " o l d f a s h i o n e d " e q u i p m e n t was limited. The Congress, the m e d i a , a n d a p p a r e n t l y the p u b l i c reacted m o r e e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y to m i l i t a r y e q u i p m e n t t h a t c o u l d claim to be i n n o v a t i v e or imaginative. Astute officers were not slow to pick up oil the c o u n t r y ' s m o o d ; they p r o p o s e d to turn this m o o d to the A r m y ' s advantage. In the early 1950s, for example, Major General John B. Medaris, l o n g t i m e chief of the A r m y ' s missile program, c o u n s e l l e d his coll e a g u e s w h o still t h o u g h t in t e r m s of t r a d i t i o n a l w e a p o n s that they were "fighting a losing game." He c o n t i n u e d as follows: If you put all your energy and effort into justifying these conventional weapons and ammunition . . . . I think you are going to get very little money of any kind. It is far easier to justify a budget with modern items that are popular ... Why don't you accentuate the positive and go with that w h i c h is p o p u l a r , since you cannot get the other stuff anyway? 1 Other A r m y leaders were m o r e c i r c u m s p e c t but they essentially agreed with Medaris. Combined with their belief that land forces needed new t e c h n o l o g i e s to "catch u p " w i t h n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , this a s s e s s m e n t of w h a t the public w o u l d bear prod u c e d an o u t b u r s t of i n t e r e s t in n e w a n d e x p e r i mental equipment. In retrospect, s o m e of the n o t i o n s that the A r m y toyed w i t h a p p e a r o u t l a n d i s h : disposable u n i f o r m s

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m a d e from " n o n - w o v e n film;" m a i n t e n a n c e - f r e e trucks that would be driven 1,000 miles and then discarded; and the use of cargo rockets for battlefield r e s u p p l y . ~ Oth er m o r e r e a l i s t i c p r o p o s a l s m a d e a l a s t i n g i m p a c t on the A r m y an d h e l p illustrate the real implications of this rush to high technology. In many respects, rockets and guided missiles p r o v i d e d the most exciting and d y n a m i c field of military t e c h n o l o g y in the 1950s. They p r o m i s e d radical improvements in range, accuracy, reliability, and, w h e n combined with nuclear warheads, in destructive potential. Their promise was not lost on any of the Services. As a result, development and control of guided missiles became the focus of int e n s e i n t e r - S e r v i c e r i v a l r y t h r o u g h o u t the postKorea period, with competition between the Army and Air Force especially heated. A letter written by G e n e r a l L e m n i t z e r to G e n e r a l Charles Bolte two days after E i s e n h o w e r ' s i n a u g u r a t i o n p r o v i d e s a succinct statement of how Army leadership viewed this competition. According to Lemnitzer, then the A r m y ' s D e p u t y Chief of Staff for Plans an d Res e a r c h , the Air Force was " b e c o m i n g m o r e an d more aware of the fact that guided missiles are going to be the aircraft of the future." As a result, the Air Force was "more and more anxious to gain the maximum amount of control over the entire guided missile field." But whatever the Air Force's intentions, concluded Lemnitzer, "I can assure you that we are not going to let them accomplish their e n d s J In the early years of their development, guided missiles had a three-fold promise. I,ooking well into

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rocketry held the key to space exploration. Of greater i m m e d i a t e interest, howthe future,

ever, were two m i l i t a r y a p p l i c a t i o n s . Missiles would provide an improved capability to strike targets d e e p in an e n e m y ' s rear, a capability that n o t h i n g - - n o t darkness, nor weather, nor e n e m y defenses---could stop. Such long-range attack missiles would surpass the destructive power of heavy bombers. Moreover, they would combine precision accuracy with the certainty that they always would get through. The second military application, and third prong of the three-fold promise, was air defense. Long-range aircraft carrying nuclear bombs posed an unprecedented threat to civilian populations. The devastation that even a handful of such bombs could cause served to impose a new, much h i g h e r s t a n d a r d of e f f e c t i v e n e s s on antiaircraft w e a p o n s . World War II gun systems lacked both range and accuracy. Many observers believed that missiles alone possessed the potential to intercept e n e m y bombers before they reached their targets, and destroy them without fail. For each of these u s e s - - s p a c e e x p l o r a t i o n , long-range attack, and air d e f e n s e - - t h e missile's primary medium would be the upper atmosphere and beyond. Despite this fact, at no time did the Army c o n s i d e r that it might c o n c e d e primacy in missiles to the Air Force. Rather, with persistence and no small a m o u n t of brashness, the Army elbowed its way into prominence in the expanding field of m i s s i l e d e v e l o p m e n t . It did so d e s p i t e sustained opposition from elsewhere in the Defense Department.

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To secure its niche, the Army vigorously pursued each of these potential uses of missiles. As a result, the Army really operated three missile programs: space exploration, in particular the effort to orbit an artificial satellite; air defense, i n c l u d i n g surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and tactical surfaceto-surface missiles (SSMs). Despite the space exploration program's implications for national security, the Army's primary interest was public relations. By demonstrating its leadership in space research to a fascinated public the Army could both garner support for a role in military missile development, and go far toward shedding its image as technically the most backward of the Services. During the Eisenhower years the Army luxuriated in its ability to t h r o w m i s s i l e s farther and more accurately than anyone else--as with the 3,000-mile Redstone shot of September 1956. The Service basked in the publicity that it gained from solving technical problems such as "nosecone reentry," however remote they m i g h t be from tactical r e q u i r e m e n t s . A n d ultimately, of course, the Army salvaged the country's pride when its Explorer I achieved orbit as the first American satellite in January 1958, four months after S p u t n i k I. We may doubt w h e t h e r such successes really affected the popular view of the Army as an i n s t i t u t i o n , or w h e t h e r the public i n s t e a d credited them to the ex-German scientists who happened to work for the military. Without question, however, such accomplishments demonstrated that the c o m p e t e n c e of the A r m y ' s m i s s i l e team was without equal in the United States.

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No less i m p o r t a n t t h a n t h e s e i n i t i a l s t e p s tow a r d outer space was the question of air d e f e n s e . F r o m its earliest days in office, the E i s e n h o w e r adm i n i s t r a t i o n s h o w e d an acute sensitivity to the Soviet b o m b e r threat. An a s s e s s m e n t a d o p t e d by the NSC on 22 July 1953, for example, declared that exi s t i n g d e f e n s e s w e r e " n o t n o w a d e q u a t e e i t h e r to p r e v e n t , n e u t r a l i z e , or s e r i o u s l y d e t e r " S o v i e t attacks against the c o n t i n e n t a l U n i t e d States. The report further declared that "this c o n d i t i o n constit u t e s an u n a c c e p t a b l e r i s k to o u r n a t i o n ' s survival. ''5 T h e risk was d o u b l e - e d g e d : Soviet b o m b e r s j e o p a r d i z e d A m e r i c a n cities, a n d t h r e a t e n e d SAC bases h o u s i n g US n u c l e a r retaliatory forces. Fears that Soviet bombers t h u s r e d u c e d the credibility of massive retaliation persuaded the administration that c o n t i n e n t a l defenses were essential a n d genera t e d s u p p o r t e v e n a m o n g b u d g e t c u t t e r s for t h e i r improvement. T h e A r m y a n d the Air Force both recognized the o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n h e r e n t in this growing interest in c o n t i n e n t a l d e f e n s e . W h i l e i n c l u d i n g p a s s i v e steps, s u c h as b u i l d i n g shelters, h a r d e n i n g i n d u s trial plants, a n d d i s p e r s i n g SAC bombers, c o n t i n e n tal defense f o c u s e d primarily on active m e a s u r e s - s u c h as d e s t r o y i n g an attacker before he could drop his bombs. A s s u r e d of w i d e s p r e a d s u p p o r t in and out of g o v e r n m e n t , the c o n t i n e n t a l air defense mission w o u l d involve a f o r m i d a b l e i n v e s t m e n t of people and e q u i p m e n t , i n v o l v i n g a sizable slice of the d e f e n s e b u d g e t . A r o l e in air d e f e n s e , m o r e o v e r , c o u l d allow the A r m y to lay claim to its o w n dist i n c t a n d u n a s s a i l a b l e c o n t r i b u t i o n to d e t e r r e n c e ,

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"proving" its relevance to skeptics who questioned its role in an era of m a s s i v e r e t a l i a t i o n . In this sense, air d e f e n s e offered a h e d g e ag ain s t the Army's bet that it eventually would demonstrate its continued utility as a ground combat force. To which Service did the mission rightfully belong? Despite Army attempts to depict continental air defense as a logical extension of its old role in coastal defense, the Key West a g r e e m e n t of 1948 had answered that question, explicitly assigning the m i s s i o n to the Air Force. Yet the a g r e e m e n t also stated that a "primary function" of the Army was to organize, train, and equip air defense units. 6 The distinction between one's Service mission and ano t h e r ' s p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n was a fine one that the agreement did little to explain. Were Army air defense units to protect the continental United States? Or were they merely intended to defend the army in the field? The Key West agreement shed no light on those q u e s t i o n s . In the f o l l o w i n g years the A r m y used this ambiguity to advance the thesis that while the Air Force might rightfully claim all interceptor aircraft, the Army was the proponent for all groundbased antiair systems. This claim, combined with the Army's technological lead in developing antiaircraft weapon systems, provided the rationale for the Army's massive continental air defense program of the 1950s. This p r o g r a m e n v i s i o n e d the a c t i v a t i o n of 150 air defense battalions deployed to protect major American cities from N e w York to San F r a n c i s c o . Initially, these battalions featured a u t o m a t i c cannon, the most modern being the radar-directed

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Skysweeper. Reflecting the trend toward missiles, however, the Army launched an effort to convert all its high-altitude air defenses to surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). By 1954 the first results of this effort appeared with the fielding of NIKE Ajax, winner of a sharp competition with the Air Force's Bomarc. Although the Army quickly purchased some 10,000 Ajax missiles, the limited 25-mile range and puny conventional warhead of the Ajax just as quickly made it o b s o l e s c e n t . 7 By 1956, the A r m y a l r e a d y had plunged into developing a replacement, NIKE Hercules, a missile that offered both longer range and a nuclear warhead. At this point, the Air Force attempted to disrupt the relatively smooth progress of the Army's SAM program. To defend its own bases across the country, the Air Force announced that it would acquire Talos--a Navy missile then only in the preliminary stages of development--and would bypass Ajax completely. The Air Force explained this decision in terms of Ajax's shortcomings, which it asserted were great. "Air Force Calls Army Nike Unfit to Guard Nation," proclaimed one headline in The New York Times. 8 The Air Force openly questioned the adequacy of the test program used to evaluate Ajax. It mocked the Army's attempts to demonstrate the missile's effectiveness by showing over and over again film footage of Ajax knocking down a "warweary" B-17. 9 Soviet bombers would be a great deal more elusive, the Air Force contended, and a missile with the range and altitude limitations of Ajax would have difficulty hitting them before they

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US Army- Photo A NIKE missile guards America in 1957. Chic:ago's Loop is in the background. Such air defense programs offered a hedge against the Army's bet that it eventually would demonstrate its continued utility as a ground combat Nrce.

reached their bomb release point. Nor did the Air Force believe that Hercules would be much of an improvement. The real issue was not which SAM should protect Air Force bases. Rather, it was which Service should control SAMs. Air Force leaders resented the way that "the Army [hadl stuck a foot ... into the door of the air defense mission and in a short time got in all the way." They were convinced that the Army's objective was to "take over all missile defenses and thereby wind up with an honest-togoodness air defense mission," in effect overturning the Key West agreement. 1° By calling into public question the Army's ability to protect the country

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from n u c l e a r attack, the Air Force h o p e d to break its rival's m o n o p o l y on SAMs. By 1956 the Nike-Talos c o m p e t i t i o n had flared i n t o v i t u p e r a t i v e c o n t r o v e r s y t h a t w a s an e m b a r r a s s m e n t to the E i s e n h o w e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . E n d i n g the d i s p u t e required the direct i n t e r v e n t i o n of Secretary Wilson. In N o v e m b e r 1956 Wilson a t t e m p t e d to settle the issue by a m e n d i n g the Key West agreem e n t in a w a y d i s t i n c t l y favoring the Army. Wilson d i r e c t e d that, h e n c e f o r t h , in air defense the A r m y w o u l d h a v e e x c l u s i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r all " p o i n t d e f e n s e " w e a p o n s . This jurisdiction w o u l d i n c l u d e all SAMs w i t h ranges u p to 100 miles, a category e n c o m p a s s i n g b o t h N i k e and T a l o s . By w a y of c o n s o l a t i o n , W i l s o n c o n c e d e d to t h e A i r F o r c e a n e b u l o u s "area defense" m i s s i o n along w i t h SAMs of greater t h a n 100 mile range, n o n e of w h i c h currently existed. 11 Wilson's directive killed Air Force aspirations to control its o w n SAMs. For the Army, the direct i v e m e a n t a c o n f i r m a t i o n of its S A M m o n o p o l y . Tile Service energetically p u s h e d ahead with plans to p h a s e out Ajax. By 1960, out of 26 existing NIKE b a t t e r i e s 92 h a d b e e n r e - e q u i p p e d w i t h Hercules. D e v e l o p m e n t of y e t t w o m o r e m i s s i l e s - - t h e med i u m altitude Hawk and antiballistic missile NIKEZ e u s - - w a s well u n d e r w a y . The A r m y ' s success in u s u r p i n g a major p o r t i o n of the air defense m i s s i o n was c o m p l e t e .

In program,

the only

Army's the

three-pronged development

of

missile tactical

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A N I K E m i s s i l e k n o c k s d o w n a B-17 d r o n e .

US A r m y Photos

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s u r f a c e - t o - s u r f a c e m i s s i l e s (SSMs) c o n t r i b u t e d directly to its effort to adapt land p o w e r to an atomic battlefield. Even this a p p a r e n t l y justifiable effort bec a m e the subject of bitter inter-Service rivalry. For in d e f i n i n g its SSM r e q u i r e m e n t s , the A r m y u s e d s u c h an e x p a n s i v e c o n c e p t of the tactical battlefield as to collide w i t h c h e r i s h e d Air Force prerogatives. T h e search for ways to a p p l y n u c l e a r w e a p o n s to the land battle actually p r e d a t e d the Korean War. D e v e l o p m e n t of a t o m i c artillery had b e g u n shortly after W o r l d War II w i t h e f f o r t s c o n c e n t r a t i n g o n p r o d u c i n g a n u c l e a r r o u n d for an existing 2 8 0 - m m g u n that the A r m y had d e v e l o p e d on an e x p e r i m e n tal basis. T h o u g h s h r o u d i n g its early efforts in secrecy, the A r m y began p u b l i c i z i n g the program as the Eisenhower administration took office. The 2 8 0 - m m g u n figured p r o m i n e n t l y in Ike's inaugural parade. A n d in May 1953 it b e c a m e the first artill e r y p i e c e to fire a n u c l e a r r o u n d s u c c e s s f u l l y . W i t h i n m o n t h s t h e A r m y h a d d e p l o y e d a halfd o z e n of t h e s e m o n s t e r - c a n n o n to E u r o p e to provide n u c l e a r fire s u p p o r t for NATO. T h i s a c h i e v e m e n t w a s a s t o n i s h i n g . Yet t h e 2 8 0 - m m atomic g u n was absurdly obsolete as soon as it arrived in the field. It p o s s e s s e d n o n e of the qualities that the A r m y d e e m e d necessary for the n e w b a t t l e f i e l d of t h e 1 9 5 0 s . Its l i m i t e d 1 7 - m i l e r a n g e g a v e it p r e c i o u s l i t t l e c a p a b i l i t y to r e a c h w o r t h w h i l e t a r g e t s . C o m m a n d e r s w o u l d h a v e to place the c a n n o n p r e c a r i o u s l y near the line of contact for it to have any use at all. The further forward the c a n n o n was d e p l o y e d , the m o r e v u l n e r a b l e it w o u l d b e c o m e to an e n e m y w h o w o u l d sm'ely spare

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US A r m y Photo T h e A r m y s h o w s off its n e w N I F ~ Ajax m i s s i l e d u r i n g a n A r m e d F o r c e s D a y p r o g r a m in 1 9 5 4 . A j a x w a s a w i n n e r in c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h the Air Force's B o m a r c in 1954, but its l i m i t e d range a n d p u n y w a r h e a d q u i c k l y m a d e Ajax obsolete.

no effort to e l i m i n a t e US n u c l e a r artillery. T h e m e r e p o s s e s s i o n of s u c h a w e a p o n w o u l d i m p o s e h e a v y security requirements on the local ground comm a n d e r , h a m p e r i n g his ability to deal freely w i t h t he e n e m y . As for mobility, the w e a p o n h a d severe d e f i c i e n c i e s . W e i g h i n g 83 t o n s , it w a s n o t

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t r a n s p o r t a b l e by even the largest aircraft. On the ground, two tractors were required to move the cannon on its carriage, one p u s h i n g and the o th er p u l l i n g . Even th en , the c a n n o n r e m a i n e d roadbound, cumbersome, and slow moving. Although impressive as a technological breakt h r o u g h , the 280-ram c a n n o n failed to meet the Army's requirements for a tactical atomic delivery system. Commanders needed a weapon that would pack an atomic punch, but that would be light, mobile, and able to reach targets deep in the enemy's rear. To a degree, the Army could meet these requirements by making smaller artillery nuclear capable. The 8-inch gun and 155-mm howitzer at least offered the advantage of being able to move quickly. And so the Army began developing nuclear rounds for these weapons. But all artillery retained range limitations. Their potential for greater range made SSMs an a p p e a l i n g - - a n d s e e m i n g l y n e c e s s a r y - alternative. In retrospect, the Army's SSM program of the 1950s is s t r i k i n g both for the v a r i e t y of s y s tems d e v e l o p e d - - w i t h one v a r i a n t r e p l a c i n g a n o t h e r w i t h s t a r t l i n g r a p i d i t y - - a n d for the s p e c t r u m of capabilities they e n c o m p a s s e d . Such a variety of systems accurately reflected the Army's views of its SSM requirements. As the pertinent Army Regulation stated, "the ground commander must be capable of delivering atomic weapons from missiles of a w i d e va r i e t y of ranges and uses." The regulation specified that the Army's family of missiles had to include "short-range," "medium-range," and "longrange" models. 12

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Photo

T h e 2 8 0 ~ m m a t o m i c c a n n o n i n a c t i o n i n M a y 1953. It f i ~ r e d p r o m i n e n t l y i n P r e s i d e n t E i s e n h o w e r ' s inaugu~ r a | p a r a d e ~ d w a s t h e f i ~ t a r t i l l e r y p i e c e to fire a nuw c l e a r r o u n d s u c c e s s ~ i l y ~ Yet it w a s o b s o lete as s o o n as it a r r i v e d i n t h e field.

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What d i d s u c h generalizations actually m e a n ? Was the 75-mile range Corporal (which in 1953 bec a m e t h e A r m y ' s first o p e r a t i o n a l m i s s i l e ) a m e d i u m - r a n g e or long-range w e a p o n ? If the A r m y categorized Corporal in the m e d i u m band, w h a t did it m e a n by long-range? H o w the A r m y chose to ans w e r t h e s e q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n e d t h e Air F o r c e in particular. As the Air Force saw it, the Army SSM program t h r e a t e n e d to u s u r p m i s s i o n s that r i g h t f u l l y w e r e t h e A i r F o r c e ' s . C i t i n g t h e 1948 Key W e s t agreement, the Air Force c l a i m e d sole responsibility for all c o m b a t o c c u r r i n g m o r e than 50 miles into the e n e m y ' s rear. Even a s s u m i n g a l a u n c h from positions a safe d i s t a n c e b e h i n d friendly lines, Corporal w o u l d reach the outer margins of the battle area all o w e d to the A r m y at Key West. 13

Corporal was a p o r t e n t of things to c o m e - - t o the Air Force a threat, to the A r m y a promise. In terms of range alone, it m a r k e d a vast i m p r o v e m e n t over the 280-ram gun. But Corporal had offsetting s h o r t c o m i n g s of its o w n : it w a s an u n w i e l d l y 46-feet long a n d liquid-fueled; and it required an a w k w a r d r e p o s i t i o n i n g f r o m its c a r r i e r b e f o r e l a u n c h . Corporal also lacked the r e s p o n s i v e n e s s to p r o v i d e t r u l y e f f e c t i v e s u p p o r t . Like t h e 2 8 0 - m m g u n , Corporal p r o v i d e d no m o r e t h a n an i n t e r i m solution. F r o m Corporal, A r m y SSM d e v e l o p m e n t proc e e d e d in two directions: on the one hand, t o w a r d smaller, m o r e flexible systems d e s i g n e d to p r o v i d e r e s p o n s i b l e atomic fire to the lowest possible

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US A r m y Photo T h e 2 8 0 - r a m a t o m i c c a n n o n p r e p a r e d for m o v e m e n t ,

echelon; and, on the other h a n d , t o w a r d long-range missiles that r e a c h e d far b e y o n d the traditional area of c o n c e r n of e v e n t h e m o s t s e n i o r g r o u n d commander. F o l l o w i n g its success w i t h Corporal, the A r m y d e v e l o p e d Redstone, a l i q u i d - f u e l e d m i s s i l e t h a t c a r r i e d a n a t o m i c w a r h e a d a n d w a s c a p a b l e of ranges u p to 240 miles. The A r m y l a u n c h e d the first Redstone p r o t o t y p e in May 1953 and by 1956 already had formed the first o p e r a t i o n a l u n i t t h e 40th Field Artillery Missile G r o u p - - a t Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. S i m u l t a n e o u s l y , the Army began crash d e v e l o p m e n t of an i n t e r m e d i a t e - r a n g e ballistic missile (IRBM), the Jupiter. The A r m y c o m p l e t e d

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a s u c c e s s f u l 1 , 5 0 0 - m i l e test s h o t w i t h t h e Jupiter m i s s i l e in M a y 1957, a p p a r e n t l y p u t t i n g it w e l l a h e a d in its c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h the Air Force to field the first IRBM. Even c o n c e d i n g the A r m y ' s view that tile battles of the next war w o u l d involve fighting to far greater d e p t h s , a w e a p o n with a 1,500-mile range s e e m e d to e x c e e d e v e n t h e b r o a d e s t d e f i n i t i o n of the g r o u n d battle. Publicly, the A r m y justified its l o n g - r a n g e m i s s i l e s in t w o w a y s . It a r g u e d t h a t g r o u n d c o m m a n d e r s n e e d e d i m m e d i a t e l y at h a n d the m e a n s to strike targets well in the e n e m y ' s rear. Moreover, the A r m y c l a i m e d that World War II a n d Korea h a d d e m o n s t r a t e d that it could not rely on the Air Force to hit s u c h targets. The Air Force's p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h heavy bombers and s u p e r s o n i c fighters suggested that the future w o u l d be no better. As T a y l o r t o l d a c o n f e r e n c e of s e n i o r A r m y c o m m a n d e r s in 1956: We haven't had close effective tactical air support; we cannot expect to have it in the future. The highperformance Air Force planes are flying away from us; they have left tile battlefield TM Besides being ill d e s i g n e d for r e q u i r e m e n t s of tactical air s u p p o r t , Air Force aircraft also were incapable of flying in all c o n d i t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g to Major General Holger N. Toftoy, Redstone Arsenal's comm a n d e r , e x p e r i e n c e s h o w e d that "tactical s u p p o r t a i r c r a f t w e r e t o o o f t e n h a m p e r e d by a d v e r s e weather; they were not the answer." What the A r m y n e e d e d was all-weather fire s u p p o r t " w h i c h can be

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US Army Photo A n A r m y Corporal m i s s i l e being r e a d i e d for firing in 1954. Corporal w a s a portent of things to come: a promise for the A r m y , a threat to the Air Force.

u s e d e f f e c t i v e l y , d a y or n i g h t , a n d w i t h o u t airsuperiority, and against which there are no k n o w n countermeasures." Such, c o n c l u d e d General Toftoy, w a s " t h e r e a s o n i n g b e h i n d the A r m y ' s exp a n d i n g g u i d e d m i s s i l e program. ''15

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The P e n t o m i c Era

In terms of m i s s i o n s a n d claims on the defense b u d g e t , h o w e v e r , t h e A r m y ' s a c q u i s i t i o n of longrange missiles w o u l d occur at Air Force expense. Despite the Air Force's comparative robustness t h r o u g h o u t the post-Korea era, that Service had no i n t e n t i o n of a l l o w i n g the A r m y a n y t h i n g that even resembled a strategic weapon. Successful Army missile initiatives c o u l d u n d e r c u t the rationale for A i r F o r c e b o m b e r or m i s s i l e p r o g r a m s . T h u s , t h e Air Force was d e t e r m i n e d that if the U n i t e d States n e e d e d an IRBM, it w o u l d be its o w n c a n d i d a t e , Thor. O c c u r r i n g at the same time as the f e u d i n g over S A M s , t h e Thor-Jupiter c o n t r o v e r s y also c a m e to rest on Secretary Wilson's desk. Wilson's a t t e m p t in N o v e m b e r 1956 to u n t a n g l e the Nike-Talos d i s p u t e also c o n t a i n e d g u i d a n c e on IRBMs. In this instance, h o w e v e r , W i l s o n r u l e d against the Army, giving the Air Force sole j u r i s d i c t i o n over IRBM e m p l o y m e n t . T h e A r m y c o u l d c o n t i n u e to d e v e l o p Jupiter, but when fielded the missile would come under Air Force control. Wilson also directed the Army h e n c e f o r t h to r e s t r i c t its S S M s to m i s s i l e s w i t h r a n g e s less t h a n 20 m i l e s . All S S M s w i t h g r e a t e r ranges w o u l d belong to the Air Force. 16 Observers i n t e r p r e t e d the Wilson m e m o r a n d u m as a clear-cut victory for the Air Force. In deprivin~ the A r m y of Jupiter, it was. But A r m y leaders reacted to Wilson's ruling in the spirit of the folk wisd o m t h e n c u r r e n t in t h e P e n t a g o n : " N o t h i n g is c o m p l e t e , n e i t h e r victory nor defeat. ''17 From this

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US A r m y Photo L a u n c h c r e w s t r a i n w i t h a R e d s t o n e m i s s i l e in G e r m a n y i n 1 9 5 6 . R e d s t o n e w a s liquidJf~.leled a n d c o u l d c a r r y a n a t o m i c w a r h e a d to r a n g e s u p to 2 4 0 m i l e s .

p e r s p e c t i v e , W i l s o n ' s order was only a t e m p o r a r y setback. W h e n Nell H. McElroy s u c c e e d e d W i l s o n in late 1957 the A r m y p e t i t i o n e d for a m o d e s t exe m p t i o n to begin " l i m i t e d feasibility studies" on a n e w m i s s i l e in the 5 0 0 - m i l e category. M c E l r o y granted this request. A r m e d w i t h this n a r r o w charter, t h e A r m y r a c e d f r o m m e r e s t u d i e s i n t o fullscale d e v e l o p m e n t , b u i l d i n g irresistible m o m e n t n m

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for t h e m i s s i l e t h a t w o u l d be f i e l d e d as t h e Pershing. I n d e e d , t h e A r m y c h o s e to i n t e r p r e t McElroy's action as all but reversing Wilson's direct i v e . As S e c r e t a r y B r u c k e r s u b s e q u e n t l y t o l d Congress: With that relaxation [by McElroy], I think we have enough encouragement, or a beckoning on the part of the Secretary of Defense, to indicate our requirements if we get other missiles or breakthroughs or things that we want. I would feel, for one, perfectly free to go back to him and say, "Look, we have had this exception to that order, and although I was against the order in the first place, I feel that now another exception should be made ... similar to the Pershing. TM Nearly buried in Brucker's tangled syntax was both a reassertion of the A r m y ' s prerogative to develop l o n g - r a n g e m i s s i l e s a n d a p r o m i s e to d e f i n e t h a t prerogative h o w e v e r the A r m y wished. In decades ahead, that definition w o u l d be a broad one. While bureaucratic "turf battles" raged over which Service would control intermediate-range missiles, the A r m y ' s fielding of short-range missiles p r o g r e s s e d w i t h far less c o n t r o v e r s y . In s o m e respects, the A r m y appeared to view smaller SSMs less as c o m p l e m e n t i n g longer-range missiles than as providing an alternative to them. For the A r m y to sponsor a w e a p o n with a range of more than 1,000 miles was at best marginally relevant to its efforts to p r e s e r v e a t r a d i t i o n a l l a n d force. S u c h w e a p o n s c o u l d m a k e l i t t l e i m m e d i a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e

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W i l l b u r M. B r u c k e r was Secretary of the Army during most of the E i s e n h o w e r era. He r e a s s e r t e d the A r m y ' s prerogative to develop long-range missiles, and p r o m i s e d to define that p r e r o g a t i v e h o w ever the A r m y w i s h e d . US A r m y Photo

l a n d battle. I n d e e d , e v e n to c o n s i d e r u s i n g t h e m i n t h a t r o l e w a s folly. A r m y l e a d e r s s u c h as G e n e r a l T a y l o r c o n c l u d e d t h a t s u c h w e a p o n s w e r e t o o des t r u c t i v e a n d too i n a c c u r a t e to be u s e d in p r o x i m i t y to f r i e n d l y f o r c e s or n o n c o m b a t a n t s . " T h e m o r e o n e r e f l e c t s u p o n t h e u s e of a t o m i c w e a p o n s in l i m i t e d w a r s i t u a t i o n s , " h e t o l d s t u d e n t s at t h e A r m y W a r College,

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the more one is i m p r e s s e d with the l i m i t a t i o n s which we would want to impose upon their emplayment: The so-called tactical weapons are small only by comparison to the megaton yields of the socalled strategic weapons. They are highly destructive to friendly peoples and friendly countries. TM Exercises and war games suggested that the use of large-yield weapons would cause widespread casualties among friendly troops. The new Army that leaders s u c h as Taylor s o u g h t was not s i m p l y a c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e w i t h a few o v e r s i z e d n u c l e a r t i p p e d missiles tacked on as an afterthought. Instead, these n e w leaders w a n t e d an A r m y that had integrated n u c l e a r capabilities into all of its ope r a t i o n s . A c h i e v i n g this c a p a b i l i t y w o u l d r e q u i r e vastly smaller a n d m u c h m o r e accurate w e a p o n s . By t h e t i m e T a y l o r s p o k e , e f f o r t s to d e v e l o p s u c h w e a p o n s had been u n d e r w a y for s o m e time. First c a m e H o n e s t John, i n i t i a l l y f i e l d e d in 1954. F u e l e d by s o l i d p r o p e l l a n t a n d l a u n c h e d d i r e c t l y from its t r u c k carrier, H o n e s t John a c h i e v e d major a d v a n c e s in r e s p o n s i v e n e s s . Its 2 2 - m i l e range, alt h o u g h only a fraction of that of Corporal, was at least greater t h a n that of the 2 8 0 - m m gun. But Honest John was a free rocket rather t h a n a g u i d e d missile, a n d t h u s its accuracy left m u c h to be desired. Of g r e a t e r c o n c e r n , its l a u n c h w e i g h t e x c e e d e d t h r e e t o n s . Honest John w a s t o o h e a v y to a i r l i f t a r o u n d the battlefield as post-Korea c o n c e p t s of mobility d e m a n d e d . So in 1956 the A r m y began devela p i n g Little John, a n o t h e r s o l i d p r o p e l l a n t free rocket, w i t h a range of only 10 miles, but l a u n c h e d from a small trailer and light e n o u g h to be carried by helicopter. Little John was a division c o m m a n d er's w e a p o n .

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US Army Photo Rotarians from Lawton, Oklahoma, learn about the A r m y ' s Honest John rocket in 1957o Honest John w a s f i e l d e d in 1 9 5 4 a n d its 2 2 - m i l e range w a s greater t h a n that of the 280-ram a t o m i c gun. Honest John w a s f u e l e d by s o l i d p r o p e l l a n t a n d w a s l a u n c h e d directly f r o m its t r u c k carrier.

T h e A r m y n e x t w e n t a step f u r t h e r to p r o v i d e n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y to t h e b a t t a l i o n c o m m a n d e r eng a g e d in the direct-fire war. This next step w a s Davy Crockett. T h o u g h not f i e l d e d u n t i l 1961, Davy Crockett b e g a n d e v e l o p m e n t w h e n t h e A r m y ' s n u c l e a r e n t h u s i a s m w a s at its h e i g h t . It w a s a 1 5 0 - p o u n d rocket that looked like a large m o r t a r

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a n d lofted a m i n i a t u r e atomic w a r h e a d to a range of o n l y a mile and a quarter. The initial intent was to p r o v i d e a m a n - p a c k e d version of Davy Crockett to infantry battalions. But the A r m y also s k e t c h e d out plans to adapt the w e a p o n to a variety of delivery s y s t e m s - - t a n k s , light a r m o r e d vehicles, drones, and a h y b r i d aircraft called a "flying jeep. ''2° S u c h proliferation of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s - - t h e i r integration into virtually all e c h e l o n s , and the e m p h a s i s given to the role they w o u l d p l a y - - w o u l d m a k e it almost inevitable that in c o m b a t against a first-class o p p o n e n t , the A r m y w o u l d resort to their use at an early hour. O n l y a f e w s o l d i e r s in t h e 1 9 5 0 s q u e s t i o n e d t h e w i s d o m of t h u s mortgaging the A r m y ' s success to its use of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s .

V i e w e d o n its o w n t e r m s , the army's missile effort, even a quarter of a c e n t u r y later, r e m a i n s a r e m a r k a b l e a c h i e v e m e n t . T h e A r m y m a d e exciting c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the fledgling A m e r i c a n space program. T h e strides m a d e w i t h both SSMs a n d SAMs in a few short years were impressive. T h e Service's l e a d e r s h i p , even d o m i n a n c e , in this field p r o v i d e s a u s e f u l c o r r e c t i v e to t h e i m a g e of a f o r l o r n A r m y s h o r n of p r e s t i g e a n d c l o u t in E i s e n h o w e r ' s Washington. F r o m a n o t h e r perspective, however, the A r m y missile p r o g r a m merits fewer plaudits. The A r m y in the 1950s was like an aging corporation c h a l l e n g e d to m o d e r n i z e or face e x t i n c t i o n . T h e m i s s i l e program let the A r m y off the hook. Missiles m e a n t diversification: they h e l p e d preserve the firm. But in d o i n g so, t h e y a b s o r b e d r e s o u r c e s a n d t a l e n t t h a t m i g h t o t h e r w i s e h a v e g o n e to s o l v i n g n e t t l e s o m e

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US A r m y Photo A n A r m y H-34 C h o c t a w h e l i c o p t e r c a r r i e s a n A r m y Lit~e John r o c k e t in 1960. Little John w a s a mobile missiie~ a solid p r o p e l l a n t ~ e e rocket, w i t h a r a n g e of 10 miles; it w a s d e s i g n e d as a d i v i s i o n c o m m a n d e r ' s weapon~ q u e s t i o n s m o r e c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to t h e A r m y ' s c e n t r a l purpose.

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That this view especially was true in the case of m i s s i l e s for c o n t i n e n t a l air d e f e n s e o c c u r r e d to Service leaders even then. In 1954, w h e n n e w s p a pers q u o t e d two junior officers as saying that the A r m y was interested only in air defense w e a p o n s t h a t w o u l d a c c o m p a n y field a r m i e s into c o m b a t , G e n e r a l L e m n i t z e r f i r e d off a l e t t e r to t h e i r c o m mander, warning him that such statements were " s e r i o u s l y d a m a g i n g the A r m y ' s prestige and interests. W h e t h e r w e l i k e it or n o t , " h e a d d e d , " t h e A r m y has an i m p o r t a n t role to play in c o n t i n e n t a l defense ...,21 T w o years later, Taylor a d m i t t e d that he was "not h a p p y about h o w m u c h m o n e y we're s p e n d i n g " on c o n t i n e n t a l defense, a m i s s i o n he described as "fixed a n d ... stagnant." Developing air d e f e n s e m i s s i l e s , c o n t i n u e d T a y l o r , " c o s t s lots of m o n e y a n d it's not good for the A r m y ..."~2

T h e s u g g e s t i o n w o u l d be u n f a i r t h a t , in lavishing s u c h a t t e n t i o n on the s e c o n d a r y m i s s i o n of air defense, the A r m y was abdicating responsibility for the land battle. Yet taken as a w h o l e the A r m y m i s s i l e p r o g r a m r e f l e c t s a p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h an e x c e s s i v e l y n a r r o w c o n c e p t of w a r - - d e s p i t e t h e S e r v i c e ' s t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r e c i a t i o n for a b r o a d e r s p e c t r u m of conflict. This e n o r m o u s i n v e s t m e n t in m i s s i l e d e v e l o p m e n t s h o w s t h a t in p r a c t i c e t h e A r m y a s s u m e d that atomic w e a p o n s w o u l d be u s e d in any future war and w o u l d d e t e r m i n e its o u t c o m e . Given this a s s u m p t i o n , A m e r i c a n soldiers c a m e to v i e w m o d e r n i z a t i o n as s y n o n y m o u s w i t h f i n d i n g ways to a p p l y a t o m i c w e a p o n s to battle. With missiles absorbing a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e share of the Service's research and procurement dollars,

99

Artist's c o n c e p t i o n of the Army's p l a n n e d "flying jeep," a h y b r i d a i r c r a f t s e e n as a d e l i v e r y s y s t e m for D a v y Crockett.

little r e m a i n e d for n o n - n u c l e a r combat. As Taylor a c k n o w l e d g e d in 1959, "the big m o n e y has gone for fhe w e a p o n s w h i c h are l i m i t e d in e m p l o y m e n t to general w a r situations. ''z;~ Consequently, a pronounced unevenness m a r k e d t h e A r m y ' s m o d e r n i z a t i o n effort a f t e r Korea. W h i l e the Service m a d e great strides in dev e l o p i n g n u c l e a r delivery systems and w e a p o n s to shoot d o w n strategic bombers, e l s e w h e r e m o d e r n i zation p r o c e e d e d on half-rations. As General Gavin told the Congress in 1957, "because of the need to

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s u p p o r t t h e big b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e p r o g r a m . . . w e have had to cut back on the other things such as a n e w family of tanks. ''24 Research and d e v e l o p m e n t (R&D) allocations for FY 1957 put Gavin's c o m m e n t into p e r s p e c t i v e . In that year, more than 43 percent of the Army's R&D effort went to missiles and nuc l e a r w e a p o n s . By c o m p a r i s o n , o n l y 4.5 p e r c e n t w e n t to n e w vehicles, 4.3 percent to artillery, and 4 percent to aircraft. 25 This imbalance in investment meant that apart from missile advances already described the Army m a d e only slow progress toward reequipping itself, u n d e r the imperatives of combat that it proclaimed to be so important. Again and again Service leaders a n n o u n c e d that, henceforth, with the Army's emphasis on strategic mobility " e q u i p m e n t n o t capable of air transportation will be the exception. ''26 But the r e a l i t y was q u i t e different. T h e A r m y f i e l d e d very few air-transportable systems, and those that did appear, such as a miniature truck (nicknamed the A r m y Mule) and the M56 90-mm selfpropelled antitank gun, were not notably successful. M e c h a n i z e d forces fared no better. As General Gavin's remark implied, improvements in tank design in the 1950s occurred in barely noticeable inc r e m e n t s . T h e m e c h a n i z a t i o n of i n f a n t r y - s u p p o s e d l y necessary to allow foot soldiers to survive and operate on a nuclear b a t t l e f i e l d - - m a d e little progress. The Army' T l 1 3 armored personnel carrier (APC) spent most of the 1950s in d e v e l o p m e n t and still had not been fully fielded w h e n the decade ended. As an officer c o m m e n t e d , "despite a greatly revised organization and tactical doctrine, combat units as usual are trying to do with t h e s a m e o l d e q u i p m e n t u n t i l t h e n e w gear

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US A r m y Photo A US A r m y s e r g e a n t p r e p a r e s D o ~ Crocken for firing. D a ~ Crocke~ w a s a 1501pound r o c k e t t h a t l o o k e d like a large m o r t a r a n d lofted a m i n i a t u r e atomic w a r h e a d to a r a n g e of o n l y a mile a n d a q u a ~ e r . a r r i v e s . ''27 O n e h a r d l y c a n a v o i d c o n c l u d i n g t h a t h a d t h e A r m y s p e n t less m o n e y o n n u c l e a r - t i p p e d missiles, the new gear would have arrived much sooner.

5. Reorganizing: The Pentomic Concept s we have seen, investment decisions favoring A missiles in the post-Korea era meant that hardw a r e m o r e d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to the l a n d b a t t l e received short shrift. By e m p h a s i z i n g programs most c o n d u c i v e to congressional and popular s u p p o r t - s p a c e e x p l o r a t i o n , h i g h a l t i t u d e air d e f e n s e , a n d IRBMs--the A r m y allowed its needs for i m p r o v e d conventional e q u i p m e n t to go unfulfilled. As a result, w h e n the E i s e n h o w e r era e n d e d in 1961, veterans of K o r e a or e v e n W o r l d War II w o u l d h a v e found most of the e q u i p m e n t in the Army's invent o r y q u i t e f a m i l i a r . A p a r t from m i s s i l e s a n d to a lesser degree aircraft, e q u i p m e n t m o d e r n i z a t i o n in the post-Korea era p r o c e e d e d at a snail's pace Surprisingly, the Army's d e t e r m i n a t i o n to dev e l o p c o m b a t u n i t s w i t h greater d e p t h , m o b i l i t y , a n d flexibility s u r v i v e d d e s p i t e the poor progress 103

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m a d e t o w a r d fielding n e w e q u i p m e n t . T h r o u g h o u t the post-Korea era, the A r m y p u s h e d ahead w i t h efforts to reorganize its divisions c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the n e w i m p e r a t i v e s of combat, and to d e v e l o p tactics a p p r o p r i a t e to e i t h e r a n u c l e a r or n o n - n u c l e a r battlefield. T h e i m p o r t a n c e of d i s p e r s i n g to i m p r o v e survivability against n u c l e a r w e a p o n s exercised the greatest i n f l u e n c e on the structure of this n e w organization. Dispersion meant that units within a d i v i s i o n necessarily w o u l d fight with greater autono m y than they w o u l d have in earlier wars. On the d e e p and fluid battlefield that A r m y theorists envisioned units would find themselves on their o w n - - s e l d o m tied in with friendly units on their flanks, u n a b l e to c o u n t on h i g h e r e c h e l o n s to assist w i t h e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n or m a t e r i e l . S u c h c i r c u m stances would require maneuver units that were self-contained and self-sustaining. C o m b a t u n i t s e m p l o y e d d u r i n g W o r l d War II and Korea did not possess those qualities. T h e regiments comprising the traditional division seemed too bulky a n d too d e p e n d e n t on s u p p o r t from elsew h e r e in the d i v i s i o n for their operational effectiveness. In s u c h a d i v i s i o n even a m i n o r w o u n d to the h e a d t h r e a t e n e d to paralyze all of the limbs. Leaders s u c h as General Gavin believed that in an atomic age a c o m b a t unit s h o u l d be like "an a m o r p h o u s biological cell. ''1 Even severe d a m a g e to one part of a d i v i s i o n c o m p o s e d of m a n y c e l l u l a r c o m p o n e n t s w o u l d not p r e c l u d e the rest from fighting on. D e t e r m i n i n g the size of these cells was critical. Reinforcing the traditional infantry regiment with

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combat support (artillery and engineers) and service support (signal and logistics) would give it the heft to fight i n d e p e n d e n t l y . But e x p e r i e n c e suggested that such a reinforced regiment would lack quickness and flexibility. More importantly, such a conglomeration would constitute an attractive nuclear target, the loss of which would render the division all but ineffective. The problem, according to General Gavin, was "to dissolve the [existing] organization down to the size of units you are not afraid of losing to one [nuclear] blast. ''2 To Gavin and others the echelon that satisfied the criteria of being large enough to fight independently but small enough to be expendable was the battalion. But the battalion that the Army developed as the building block of its new division differed from its Korean War-vintage predecessor, so much so that the Army gave it a new name: battle group. The battle group's design was intended to be more pliable and sustainable than traditional battalions. P l i a b i l i t y came from p r o v i d i n g each battle group with five companies, with each company in t u r n h a v i n g five p lato o n s. The Army h o p e d that w i t h a gr e ater n u m b e r of u n i t s at his d i s p o s a l a commander would have more options for deploying forces in depth or for disposing them to fight in all directions on a "non-linear" battlefield. S u s t a i n a b i l i t y c a m e from p e r m a n e n t l y assigning additional support assets. Each battle group had a headquarters and service company providing extensive reconnaissance, signal, maintenance, and medical support. Each battle group also had its own h e a v y m o r t a r battery. W h i l e a r t i l l e r y f o r m a l l y

106

The P e n t o m i c Era

r e m a i n e d a division asset, its organization into five separate units lent itself to semi-permanent distrib u t i o n a m o n g e a c h of the d i v i s i o n ' s five battle groups. 3 Emphasizing the ubiquitous recurrence of the n u m b e r five a n d t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s i n t e n d e d emp l o y m e n t in atomic war, the Army christened this n e w structure the Pentomic Division. (See figure 2.} In p r a c t i c e , P e n t o m i c u n i t s c a m e in t h r e e t y p e s : airborne, infantry, and armored. Of the three, the a i r b o r n e d i v i s i o n m o s t d e s e r v e s e x a m i n a t i o n . It served as the prototype of the Pentomic organization w h e n the 101st Airborne Division converted to that configuration in the fall of 1956. In addition, g i v e n the p e r v a s i v e i n f l u e n c e of the s o - c a l l e d "Airborne Club" within the Army's senior leaders h i p in t h e 1950s, t h e n e w a i r b o r n e d i v i s i o n received the most sympathetic attention and most c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e s t h e i n t e n t of the P e n t o m i c concept. 4 The P e n t o m i c airborne division represented a s t r i k i n g d e p a r t u r e f r o m its p r e d e c e s s o r . By c o m b i n i n g the f u n c t i o n s of the r e g i m e n t a n d the battalion in the n e w battle group, the division eliminated a complete c o m m a n d echelon. Its pattern of five subordinate elements at each remaining echelon greatly increased d e m a n d s on commanders. To be sure, with its battle groups and support elements fully air transportable, the airborne divisiun alone met the Army's stiff criterion for strategic mobility. But in doing so it sacrificed tanks, armored personnel carriers, and cannon artillery heavier than 105-ram. At the u p p e r end of the scale, the n e w

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Reorganizing

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The Pentomic Era

division c o m p e n s a t e d for this lack of heavy weapons with H o n e s t John rockets for nuclear fire support and u n a r m o r e d 90-mm and 106-mm antitank weapons. At the scale's lower end was a substantial i n c r e a s e in light crew-served w e a p o n s , s u c h as mortars and m a c h i n e guns. The n u m b e r of helicopters increased, too, from 10 to 37, an attempt to offset a r e d u c t i o n in w h e e l e d v e h i c l e s . T h e total n u m b e r of assigned soldiers dropped from slightly m o r e than 17,000 in the old division to 11,486 in the new. 5 The division possessed only a thin logistics base, but the A r m y d o w n p l a y e d this potential weakness with promises of " n e w logistical support systems and procedures. ''6 The real question was h o w the Pentomic division w o u l d fight. For tactics, even more than organization, reveals the e s s e n c e - - a n d s h o r t c o m i n g s - - o f the Pentomic experiment. For offensive operations, the A r m y developed tactics notable for their transparent simplicity. As the A r m y saw it, flanking m a n e u v e r s that classically had described the acme of offensive operations w o u l d lose t h e i r r e l e v a n c e on f u t u r e b a t t l e f i e l d s . Henceforth, penetration w o u l d become the predominant m o d e of attack. But it was penetration with a difference. As two A r m y theorists p o s t u l a t e d , the "frontal assault, always tempting as the most direct route to the e n e m y ' s vitals, w o u l d henceforth become the cheapest route after atomic weapons o p e n the way. ''7 Rather than the attacker pushing through the e n e m y ' s defenses, nuclear fires w o u l d blast a gap through the e n e m y front before m o v e m e n t on the ground e v e n began. Swiftly concentrated

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maneuver units then would follow, dashing through the gap to perform "the technical tasks and finishing touches" of the attack as they rolled u n i m p e d e d into the enemy's rear. a These advancing ground forces would deploy not for heavy fighting--the initial nuclear preparation having made that u n n e c e s s a r y - b u t for exploitation. The tactical requirements were tight control a n d r a p i d m o v e m e n t . With this aspect in m i n d , units would attack in column. Such a formation accommodated high-speed movement and also facilitated security since the shaken enemy would have difficulty fixing the attacker's fast-moving spearhead. While such a narrow array could bring little f i r e p o w e r i m m e d i a t e l y to bear, the Army did not see this lack as a serious impediment. 9 Army leaders billed their n e w offensive doct r i n e as a r e v o l u t i o n a r y d e p a r t u r e . But was it? G r a n t e d , a R o m m e l or G u d e r i a n * h a r d l y w o u l d h a v e r e c o g n i z e d it as m a n e u v e r warfare. But an earlier generation of British and French staff officers from World War I would have grasped its essentials immediately. Its principal aspect mirrored the app r o a c h they h ad u n f l i n c h i n g l y p u r s u e d t h r o u g h years of d e a d l o c k e d t r e n c h w arfare in Fran ce: a stubborn faith in the ability of fires to shatter prepared defenses; a belief that preliminary *Erwin Rommel, German field marshal, brilliantly c o m m a n d e d an a r m o r e d division in the attack on France in 1940; in February 1941 he took the specially trained tank corps, the Affika Karps, into Libya. For his success there, he earned the name "the desert fox." H e i n z Guderian, German general, was comm a n d e r in chief of armored units against Poland, 1939, France, 1940, and Russia, 1941.

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b o m b a r d m e n t s r e d u c e d the a t t a c k e r ' s role to securing by rapid, controlled advances the gain that fires had made possible; and a consequent attempt to improve responsiveness and control by simplifying tactics--attacking straight ahead, using stereotyped formations, and de-emphasizing factors such as d e c e p t i o n or s u r p r i s e that c o m p l i c a t e an operation. Army leaders in the 1950s did not acknowledge a ny s i m i l a r i t i e s b e t w e e n t h e i r t h i n k i n g an d discredited offensive doctrines of World War I. They believed that nuclear weapons made all the difference. A few w e l l - p l a c e d tactical warheads w o u l d accomplish what millions of shells fired over periods of days or weeks had failed to do in World War I. Armed with this faith in nuclear firepower, the Army believed the only question to be the technical one of l e a r n i n g h o w to pass e x p l o i t a t i o n forces through an area scorched by nuclear fires. By the middle of 1955 the Army tried to demo n s t r a t e that it had a n s w e r e d even that q u e s t i o n during a series of nuclear tests designed to illustrate its n e w tactics. The most i m p o r t a n t was a wellp u b l i c i z e d o p e r a t i o n c a l l e d Desert R o c k VI cond u c t e d at Yucca Flat, N e v a d a , and i n v o l v i n g a composite armored force, Task Force Razor, posit i o n e d 3,000 m e t e r s (about two miles) from a 3 0 - k i l o t o n (30,000 tons of TNT) a t o m i c d ev ice. When the device was detonated a choking dust and terrifying flash of light instantly filled the vehicles n e a r e s t to g r o u n d zero. But n e i t h e r v e h i c l e s nor crews appeared to suffer any adverse effects. Within a h a l f - m i n u t e T a s k Force R a z o r had o p e n e d fire with its tank cannon and machine guns. Within

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US Army Photo US A r m y s o l d i e r s f r o m a c o m p o s i t e a r m o r e d f o r c e , T a s k F o r c e R a z o r , t o o k p a r t in O p e r a t i o n Desert R o c k VI at Y u c c a Flat, N e v a d a , in 1955. The t r o o p s w e r e posit i o n e d 3,000 m e t e r s (almost two miles) f r o m p o u n d zero for the d e t o n a t i o n of a 30~kiloton atomic device (equivalent to 30,000 tons of TNT)~ N e i t h e r vehicles n o r c r e w s a p p e a r e d to s u f f e r a n y a d v e r s e e f f e c t s f r o m t h e explosion.

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t h r e e m i n u t e s c o m m u n i c a t i o n h a d b e e n established. A n d eight m i n u t e s after the blast, Task Force R a z o r w a s a d v a n c i n g t o w a r d its o b j e c t i v e , skirting w i t h i n 900 meters of g r o u n d zero, even as a m u s h r o o m c l o u d b i l l o w e d 40,000 feet above the desert floor. 1° It w a s a g r e a t s h o w , i m p r e s s i n g t h e c o r p s of n e w s reporters on h a n d for the occasion. Only a few of those p r e s e n t n o t e d the test's sterile laboratoryl i k e c o n d i t i o n s . T h r e e t i m e s t h e A r m y h a d postp o n e d t h e test w h i l e w a i t i n g for j u s t t h e r i g h t weather conditions. The featureless desert, ideal terrain for armor, was not a d u p l i c a t i o n of the forested hills, rivers, a n d urban c o m p l e x e s of Western Europe. T h e activities of Task Farce Razor--itself h a r d l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of an A r m y in w h i c h dism o u n t e d infantry still p r e d o m i n a t e d - - l e f t m u c h to be desired as a tactical exercise. A classified A r m y after-action report called the exercise "an unrealistic m a n e u v e r , " d e v o i d of tactical authenticity. Days h a d been s p e n t p o s i t i o n i n g each a r m o r e d veh i c l e , an u n d e r t a k i n g w h i c h t h e A r m y r e p o r t ack n o w l e d g e d w o u l d be " i m p o s s i b l e in a c o m b a t situation." To prepare for the detonation, the task force had a s s u m e d an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e posture, making itself c o m p l e t e l y v u l n e r a b l e to e n e m y action for 30 m i n u t e s p r i o r to H - h o u r . R a d i o s a n d e n g i n e s were t u r n e d off, turrets rotated to the rear, sight apertures sealed with tape, a n d all crews " b u t t o n e d u p " i n s i d e their vehicles. Task Force Razor could not see, move, or shoot; c o m m u n i c a t i o n s were possible only t h r o u g h a specially rigged n e t w o r k of tele p h o n e s linking each vehicle.

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After the d e t o n a t i o n the task force h ad adv a n c e d in a tight w e d g e f o r m a t i o n to f a c i l i t a t e control--with every vehicle monitoring a single radio frequency and many turning on their lights to h e l p in k e e p i n g s t a t i o n t h r o u g h the h e a v y dust thrown up by the blast. The Army had calibrated the shot to minimize any radiation hazard, hoping thereby to permit the armor to attack directly across ground zero. As it turned out, however, that w h e n the lead elements reached a point 890 meters (a little over a half mile} from ground zero the radiation level inside the tanks had reached 10 roentgens per hour, forcing the commander to order a 9fl-degree turn away from his assigned objective. The otherw i s e t h o r o u g h A r m y r e p o r t did not e x p l o r e the implications of having to exclude from any participation in the exercise the more than 100 wheeled v e h i c l e s on w h i c h Task Force Razor r e l i e d for reconaissance, medical evacuation, resupply, and maintenance support} 1 The Army staged exercises such as Desert Rock V I to c o n v i n c e o u t s i d e r s of the c o m p a r a b i l i t y of

ground forces and nuclear weapons. As the afteraction report of a subsequent test noted, in putting together such exercises, "planning proceeded from the basic d e c i s i o n that first p r i o r i t y be given to d e m o n s t r a t i n g the A r m y at its best." T h e r e p o r t went on to note that only "secondary consideration was ... given to achieving such test and evaluation as could be effected. ''~z But the exercise agenda encompassed more than generating propaganda about the survivability of equipment exposed to nuclear shocks or the trafficability of terrain after a nuclear explosion. To put to rest f~ars about the effects of a

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" f r i e n d l y " n u c l e a r blast on nearby troops, the tests h a d to i n v o l v e actual units with real soldiers. T h e A r m y u s e d the results of exercises such as Desert Rock VI to publicize reassuring c o n c l u s i o n s about the effect of r a d i a t i o n a n d fallout. For instance, an A r m y p h y s i c i a n , writing after Desert Rack VI, a d m o n i s h e d soldiers for their "bugaboo of radiation," a fear that he believed was based not on fact but on an irrational "fear of sterility." T h e effects of radiation, he claimed, generally d i d n o t e x t e n d b e y o n d 1,500 m e t e r s (a m i l e ) f r o m g r o u n d z e r o . In p r e d i c t i n g t h e e f f e c t s of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , therefore, " r a d i a t i o n casualties are not imp o r t a n t in n u m b e r s . " A n y w a y , he took comfort from the fact that even victims of a 700-rad dose* w o u l d not require " a n y significant a t t e n t i o n " for at least a w e e k a f t e r e x p o s u r e . 13 In a s i m i l a r v e i n , G e n e r a l W y m a n declared in 1958 that the p r o b l e m of radiat i o n h a d " a l r e a d y b e e n s o l v e d by s c i e n c e . " Sanitizing nuclear weapons not only made them " a d a p t i v e to a m u c h w i d e r variety of situations on the battlefield," but m a d e their e m p l o y m e n t " m o r e likely in v i e w of the r e d u c e d danger to the civilian p o p u l a t i o n of the areas involved. ''14 Observers in a d e c a d e m o r e sensitized to the p r o s p e c t i v e h o r r o r s of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s m a y f i n d u n c o n v i n c i n g s u c h o p t i m i s m a b o u t t h e ease w i t h w h i c h soldiers a n d civilians will survive their effects. But if the A r m y ' s n e w offensive doctrine *Rad (from RAdiation Absorbed Dose) is the unit of absorbed dose of ionizing radiation (X-rays, for example) equal to the amount of radiation that releases an energy of 100 ergs per gram of matter. The rad is used to measure the effect of radiation on living soft tissue.

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lacked both an awareness of history and a sense of realism, the concepts developed for defending on an atomic battlefield were even more eccentric. In 1956 Colonel Henry E. Kelly published an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d "Dig That A t o m i c F o x h o l e " that contained detailed guidance on how to do it. 15 Although Colonel Kelly's brief piece had no discernible impact, its concreteness and specificity made it almost unique among Army writings that discussed how to defend in the 1950s. For in designing concepts for use against a n u c l e a r - e q u i p p e d attacker, the Army pursued its obsessive concern with dispersion to its logical conclusion. The result was a doctrine that signalled a virtual abandonment of traditional precepts. Army leaders reasoned that the need to avoid concentrating friendly troops had made linear defenses obsolete. The threat of the enemy's nuclear weapons no longer would permit forces to defend along a single thickened front with units carefully tied in on their flanks. Such a daisy-chain defense w o u l d be i d e n t i f i a b l e , targetable, an d easily destroyed. C o n s i d e r a t i o n s of security therefore dem a n d e d that u n i t s s p r e a d t h e m s e l v e s in great d e p t h . Yet p r e s c r i b i n g d i s p e r s i o n raised its o w n problems: h o w co u ld d i s p e r s e d forces muster the combat power to stop an attacker? The concept that eventually emerged was area defense. In its simplest terms, this tactic consisted of establishing what General Wyman called "small islands of resistance widely separated over the most favorable terrain. ''16 Each island was a battle group situated on key terrain, organized into a defensive

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perimeter, and fighting an essentially independent battle. The division would have no reserve as such; even battle groups disposed in depth would have a primary mission of defending in place. Essential to understanding the concept was an appreciation of what the Army now meant by "key terrain." As Lieutenant Colonel James W. Edwards c o m m e n t e d , the e x i s t i n g n o t i o n of key t e r r a i n "which stresses fields of fire, concealment, observation, a nd n a t u r a l o b stacles is r a p i d l y b e c o m i n g obsolete. ''17 To seize the high ground, once the def e n d e r ' s f u n d a m e n t a l axiom, n o w m a r k e d the height of folly. In a nuclear era, according to Major General Hamilton H. Howze, "any force occupying the highest hill will be in s tan tly d e t e c t e d an d as quickly obliterated. ''18 Henceforth, the value of terrain stemmed not from any immediate utility it offered the defender, but from the indirect advantage gained by denying it to the attacker. No motorized a t t a c k e r c o u l d s u s t a i n an assau lt w i t h o u t maintaining his lines of communications unbroken. Even a momentary interruption in the flow of fuel, ammunition, and spare parts would cripple the most s u c c e s s f u l offensive. This m o d e r n A c h i l l e s heel gave key t e r r a i n its n e w d e f i n i t i o n . Co lo n el Edw a r d s c o n c l u d e d that h e n c e f o r t h critical terrain would be the ground which, if occupied, "will deny the enemy the use of supply lines." The commander who anchored his islands of resistance to such terrain would "enmesh the enemy in a web of defensive p e r i m e t e r s an d t h e n . . . strangle h im by denying him logistic support. ''19 Colonel Edwards viewed the elements of this defensive web as static, forcing the enemy to attack

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t h e m b e c a u s e of t h e i m p o r t a n t g r o u n d t h e y c o n t r o l l e d . G e n e r a l H o w z e , an a r m o r o f f i c e r a n d p i o n e e r of m o d e r n A r m y aviation, took a m o r e dyn a m i c view. The c o m m a n d e r c o n t r o l l i n g several islands of resistance, he wrote, w o u l d "react to attack by m o v i n g forward certain g r o u p s w h i l e others perh a p s m o v e s i d e w a r d or backward." Battle w o u l d res e m b l e "a game of chess, w h e r e pieces i n t e r m i n g l e a n d each side seeks to neutralize or destroy the critical parts of his o p p o n e n t - - i n a word, to c h e c k m a t e the king. ''2° A l t h o u g h this truly was a bold design, it d i d not lack p r o b l e m s . What was tile proper interval bet w e e n these islands of resistance? T h e c o m m a n d a n t of the Infantry S c h o o l declared that c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of survivability prescribed "three to five miles bet w e e n battalion centers of mass. ''23 That writer a n d others m a d e vague references to covering the resulta n t g a p s t h r o u g h f u t u r e i m p r o v e m e n t s in surv e i l l a n c e . S u c h e x p r e s s i o n s of h o p e r e a l l y w e r e a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s that n e i t h e r e x i s t i n g target acq u i s i t i o n m e t h o d s n o r available direct-fire w e a p o n s c o u l d cover s u c h distances. T h e A r m y ' s islands of r e s i s t a n c e i n d e e d w o u l d be i s l a n d s , w i t h t h e exp a n s e s b e t w e e n t h e m all b u t c o n c e d e d to t h e enemy. T h e d e f e n d e r s , m o r e o v e r , h a d to c o n c e r n t h e m selves w i t h the security of their o w n lines of comm u n i c a t i o n s . I n d e e d , in G e n e r a l H o w z e ' s m o b i l e v e r s i o n of the area defense, d e f e n d e r s w o u l d be as d e p e n d e n t o n u n i n t e r r u p t e d l o g i s t i c a l s u p p o r t as the attacker. H o w w o u l d the d i v i s i o n c o m m a n d e r h e l p s u s t a i n w i d e l y scattered units in a battle that a l l o w e d t h e e n e m y to p e r m e a t e b e t w e e n d e f e n s e

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p o s i t i o n s a n d to engage t h e m from all directions? General H o w z e saw the a n s w e r in an "increased use of air lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . ''2z But this s o l u t i o n was futuristic, w i t h l i m i t e d i m m e d i a t e application. R e c e n t h i s t o r y - - m o s t n o t o r i o u s l y the B a t t l e of Stalingrad *--gave l i t t l e c a u s e for c o n f i d e n c e in even the most d e t e r m i n e d efforts at aerial r e s u p p l y . Nor d i d the aircraft available to the P e n t o m i c division a p p e a r capable of m e e t i n g s u c h d e m a n d s . As n o t e d earlier, the airborne division had only 37 helicopters, all with limitations in range and capacity i n h e r e n t in the early types of that aircraft. Infantry and a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s had even fewer helicopters. D e n i e d r e s u p p l y , t h e i s l a n d s of r e s i s t a n c e would crumble. Isolation from other units would t h r e a t e n their self-confidence, a n d the casual willingness to accept soft spots s e e m e d to invite defeat in detail by a n u m e r i c a l l y s u p e r i o r foe. Only nuc l e a r w e a p o n s o f f e r e d s o m e h o p e of d e l i v e r a n c e . P e r h a p s i n s t e a d of i s l a n d s e a c h A m e r i c a n b a t t l e group w o u l d be a m a g n e t - - a t t r a c t i n g c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of the e n e m y that w o u l d s u r r o u n d it. S u c h c o n c e n t r a t i o n s w o u l d p r e s e n t i d e a l targets for A m e r i c a n tactical n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . Their use in s u c h circumstances p r o m i s e d to exact an e n o r m o u s toll of the e n e m y . U n a v o i d a b l y , of c o u r s e , t h e m a g n e t t o o w o u l d suffer. *The Battle of Stalingrad (summer of 1942-2 February 1943) was a major turning point in World War II: the unsuccessful assault on Stalingrad marked the limit of the German advance in the East and the beginning of a successful Soviet counteroffensive. (Stalingrad now is Volgograd, in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.)

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The area d e f e n s e thus r e i n f o r c e d the A r m y ' s growing dependence on nuclear weapons. For only the e a r l y a n d liberal use of s u c h w e a p o n s c o u l d make up for the doctrine's deficiencies. Yet the consequences of such an act were grim. By relying on nuclear weapons to stave off defeat, the Army might well be called on to destroy itself in the process. The i r r a t i o n a l i t y of such a c o u r s e did not escape thoughtful soldiers. H o w did these changes affect how the soldier felt about being a soldier? Of all the questions concerning the Army after Korea, this question may be the most d i f f i c u l t to a n s w e r , an d the one for which empirical evidence is most difficult to provide. World War II and the events that followed put an end to the clubbiness of the old Army. The character of the A r m y after Wo rld War II--far larger t h a n any p r e v i o u s p e a c e t i m e force, c o m p o s e d largely of short-service draftees, and dependent on f r e q u e n t r o t a t i o n s to man large o v e r s e a garrisons--virtually ensured that its ethos would be centralized, bureaucratic, and impersonal. The fighting in Korea reinforced such tendencies. Denied the chance to focus on victory as a final objective, commanders in the field sought other means of measuring operational efficiency. In practice, however, the methods that were devised betrayed only a tenuous relationship to real combat effectiveness. The Army in the field evi~aced a new i n t e r e s t in things that c o u l d be c o u n t e d : f r i e n d l y a nd e n e m y c a s u a l t i e s , a m m u n i t i o n e x p e n d e d , patrols conducted, and outposts manned.

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Once the Army legitimized such measures of performance, command--particularly at the higher levels--evolved into a business of managing statistics to obtain a prescribed result. Higher headquarters assigned quotas on everything from how many foxholes to dig in a d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n to the a m o u n t of e q u i p m e n t a unit c o u l d report lost in combat over a given period. When Lieutenant General James Van Fleet c o m m a n d e d the Eighth US Army in Korea, his favorite indicator was ammunition consumption--the more the better. According to General Taylor, "artillery officers got, if not decorated and p r o m a t e d , at least c o m m e n d e d for the number of rounds they fired"--regardless of what they hit. 23 Predictably, the emphasis on statistics vastly increased the burden of paperwork imposed on companies and battalions. Worse, the pressure imposed on overburdened commanders to produce the right n u m b e r s - - o r else--steadily u n d e r m i n e d the reliability of their reports. 24 Post-Korea reforms intended to modernize the Army caused this bureaucratic-managerial style to become further entrenched. The emphasis on high technology as a keynote of the new Army inevitably produced the inclination to see soldiers less as warriors than as operators and technicians. The 1954 report of a presidential panel on defense p e r s o n n e l - - t h e Cordiner C o m m i s s i o n - - r e flected this perspective. According to the Cordiner Report, " r a d i c a l l y a c c e l e r a t i n g t e c h n o l o g i c a l change" was forcing "every modern institution to critically reappraise old practices and old traditions as it battles to survive in this changing era." The

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military was no exception. "Fantastically complex" e q u i p m e n t was c r e a t i n g u n p r e c e d e n t e d requirements for technical competence among Service pers o n n e l . No l o n g e r w o u l d a s o l d i e r be e v a l u a t e d primarily in terms of "discipline and physical fitness." The new measure of effectiveness was technical competence. So too were demands on officers changing. The future, according to the Cordiner Report, w o u l d req u ire a " m i l i t a r y officer-manager" s c h o o l e d in " t h e t e c h n i q u e s of cost a c c o u n t i n g , budgeting, and a variety of industrial management operations. ''25 Advocates of efficiency in an organization of s t e a d i l y i n c r e a s i n g c o m p l e x i t y v i e w e d soldiertechnicians not as individuals but as interchangeable parts c o m i n g off an i n e x h a u s t i b l e a s s e m b l y line. With a large portion of the force serving an involuntary two-year hitch, the soldier seemed less a m e m b e r of the A r m y " f a m i l y " t h a n a c o m m o d i t y - s o m e t h i n g to be fashioned, used up, and eventually discarded in favor of a fresh replacement. As a predictable result, military service became less a calling or way of life than a job--and usually a temporary one at that. The entrance to the company orderly room became a revolving door, with personnel coming and going at an astonishing rate. During FY 1955, for example, the Army discharged 800,000 soldiers and b r o u g h t 500,000 n e w r e c r u i t s on active duty, all while reducing its overall strength from 1.4 million to 1.1 million. 26 The perpetual reassignment of personnel overseas to sustain the multi-division forces d e p l o y e d in E u r o p e an d Korea only a c c e n t u a t e d

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this t u r b u l e n c e . A long-time observer of the A r m y a t t e m p t e d to describe the effects of this t u r b u l e n c e on soldiers as follows: The s y s t e m takes hold of t h e m from the very outset--the formless, faceless, impersonal system. They are processed, classified, assigned to a training unit--among strangers. They never get to feel any sense of identity or belonging--what's the use? They won't be there long. [Ordered overseas], they travel with strangers. They are assigned to a unit in which they are strangers. [Within the unit], the noncoms who receive them and begin m o l d i n g them into real soldiers are rotated out before they've gotten acquainted; their officers are being constantly changed. [Very soon] their time is up and they're rotated back to the United States, assigned somewhere or other (any old where) to fill out their last few weeks, processed again, and released from active d u t y . 27 A n o t h e r writer, Colonel Richard W. Whitney, c r i t i c i z e d t h e S e r v i c e for " f a i l i n g to p r o v i d e t h e c o m b a t arms soldier w i t h a h o m e in the A r m y and a sense of belonging." A c o n t r i b u t i n g factor, he bel i e v e d , w a s t h e A r m y ' s p e n c h a n t for c o n t i n u a l l y d e a c t i v a t i n g a n d reactivating units, regardless of the l e n g t h or d i s t i n c t i o n of t h e i r s e r v i c e r e c o r d s . To Whitney, such a practice reflected "misguided e c o n o m y a n d administrative c o n v e n i e n c e " p u r s u e d at the cost of unit esprit. 28 The A r m y ' s senior l e a d e r s h i p m a d e one h i g h l y t o u t e d effort to r e d u c e p e r s o n n e l t u r b u l e n c e a n d b u i l d u n i t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . O p e r a t i o n Gyroscope, a w e l l - i n t e n t i o n e d but i l l - c o n c e i v e d p l a n to r e p l a c e

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the individual replacement system with one of unit rotation, was an n o u n ced in the fall of 1954 for imp l e m e n t a t i o n the following summer. Gyroscope-t he n a m e c h o s e n to suggest " r o t a t i o n w i t h s t a b i l i t y " - - w o u l d involve the regular exchange of w h o l e d i v i s i o n s b e t w e e n o v e r s e a g a r r i s o n s an d posts in the U n i t e d States. The S e c r e t a r y of the A r m y o p t i m i s t i c a l l y p r e d i c t e d that Gyroscope would permit some soldiers "to spend their entire career with a single division." By always returning a particular deployed division to the same stateside post, the Service also hoped to provide a better life for Army families. 29 Unfortunately, Gyroscope had problems from the outset. Few stateside units were maintained at their authorized strength. Consequently, preparing one outfit for m o v e m e n t o v e r s e a s often m e a n t d e p l e t i n g others that already were u n d e r s t r e n g t h and whose doubtful readiness suffered further as a result. Within deployed units scheduled to return to the United States, personnel who had served only br i e f l y o v e r s e a s - - i n p a r t i c u l a r t w o - y e a r i n d u c t e e s - o f t e n were diverted to complete their hitch in other units within the same theatre. The net effect across the Army was not to reduce turbulence but to aggravate it. After a certain amount of tinkering, the Army tacitly admitted its failure and in 1959 abandoned Gyroscope. TM

T h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f s o l d i e r i n g in the 1950s--epitomized by General Taylor's remark that e ve r y A m e r i c a n officer c a r r i e d a field m a r s h a l ' s baton, "not in his knapsack but in his briefcase"--

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resulted from the accumulation of many small, apparently inconsequential decisions. 31 No e v i d e n c e exists that senior leaders anticipated the impact of those decisions on their profession. Indeed, few of these leaders recognized how the internal life of the Army was changing. The sensitive ones who did, however, became uneasy about what they saw. Although an influential proponent of reform while Army Chief of Staff, Ridgway also spoke out frequently in defense of the warrior ethic and t r a d i t i o n a l s o l d i e r l y values. W h e n R i d g w a y called man "the supreme element in combat," he had in mind not a skilled technician but someone standing apart by reason of his "courage and endura n c e " a nd his "fig h tin g heart. ''32 Yet c o n s i d e r e d against the full flood of change that the Army experienced in the 1950s, Ridgway's views seem hardly m o r e t h a n a b a t t e r e d r e m n a n t of t r a d i t i o n a l i s m , bypassed by the forces of technology and bureauc r a t i z a t i o n . H o w e v e r r o m a n t i c t h e i r ap p eal, Ridgway's sentiments remained irrelevant to what most members of the atomic-age Army recognized as the experience of soldiering. One who did grasp better than most the implic a t i o n s of this n e w ethos was Roger W. Little. A junior officer in the 1950s, Little later became a professor of sociology. His article, " S o l i d a r i t y is the Key to the Mass A r m y , " p u b l i s h e d in F e b r u a r y 1955, c a p t u r e d better than any official d o c u m e n t what was happening to the Army after Korea. "Soldiering," announced Little at the outset of his piece, "is no l o n g e r a w a y of life." The old A r m y had vanished. In its place had emerged a force that was

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bigger, smarter, better paid, and m o r e reliant on mac h i n e s , a "mass a r m y in w h i c h the soldier has bec o m e m o r e like the civilian, a n d the garrison m o r e like the city." In this n e w A r m y the " i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n of military life" h a d b e c o m e obsolete. In an A r m y w h e r e "military units have b e c o m e m o r e like c r o w d s than ... regiments," r e l a t i o n s h i p s were too i m p e r s o n a l a n d transient for i n d i v i d u a l i s m to matter. M e m b e r s of this n e w mass Army, reflected Little, " d o n ' t really ' k n o w ' one a n o t h e r , " adding: The r e g i m e n t s are . . . a n o n y m o u s collections of people, constantly changing before their members develop common standards, and sharing few if any memories of the battle or the bivouac. The mass soldier thinks of his role in the Army as a temporary job, rather than a "calling" or a vocation, and compares it with other civilian jobs rather than other military jobs. That soldiers w o u l d view t h e m s e l v e s as civilians in u n i f o r m was a natural c o n s e q u e n c e of the n e w A r m y ' s p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h efficiency. According to Little, "military organization was c o n s c i o u s l y a d a p t e d to the image of the industrial plant." Utility a n d efficiency b e c a m e the p r i n c i p a l criteria for det e r m i n i n g h o w to do things or w h e t h e r to do t h e m at all. C u s t o m s formerly justified as b u i l d i n g esprit or m a i n t a i n i n g t r a d i t i o n s w e r e d i s c a r d e d , r e p a c k a g e d , or m o d e r n i z e d - - a s w i t h t h e r e p l a c e m e n t of the s o l d i e r - m u s i c i a n w h o b l e w retreat by a "bugler ... p r e s s e d into a m i c r o g r o o v e and regulated by the night clerk at post h e a d q u a r t e r s . " Ever narrowing specialization drastically s h r a n k the core of c o m m o n e x p e r i e n c e that all

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The Pentomic Era

soldiers shared. Specialization also increased the proportion of soldiers whose skills dealt with administration and management rather than fighting. "Even the commander ultimately becomes a 'manager,'" wrote Little, isolated by his staff so that his r e l a t i o n s w i t h his m e n w e r e " m e c h a n i c a l r a t h e r than personal." Soldiers no longer looked to their u n i t as a s o u r c e of a s s i s t a n c e but to the city-like military post that offered " s u p e r m a r k e t services" operating on a scale and level of efficiency that no orderly room could match. The future, predicted Little, would only further align the A r m y w i t h the v a l u e s of the i n d u s t r i a l plant and the modern city. To an increasing degree s o l d i e r s a n d c i v i l i a n s w o u l d "s eek the same rew a r d s " a nd " s h a r e the same s t a n d a r d s . " The criticality of technical skills that smart young draftees so adeptly mastered or carried from civilian life w o u l d r e d u c e the i m p o r t a n c e of long-service soldiers. Abandonment of the notion that "living and working together over a long period of time" were essential to a good outfit also would contribute to the career soldier's demise. His d e p a r t u r e further would blur the distinction between life in and out of uniform. Mobility between civil and military life w o u l d e x p a n d as skills r e q u i r e d of both b e c a m e comparable. Combat would consist of coordinating those skills, a responsibility to be overseen by technocrats drawn almost directly from civil life, helped by a class of m i l i t a r y m a n a g e r s w h o w o u l d inf l u e n c e s u b o r d i n a t e s not by l e a d e r s h i p but "by impersonal managerial techniques." Such mass soldiers still would win wars, Little bleakly insisted,

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b u t " t h e y w i l l e x p e c t it to be d o n e in a b u s i n e s s l i k e w a y , w i t h o u t f a n f a r e a n d t r u m p e t s , a n d t h e n go h o m e ,,:~:~

US A r m y Photo D a v y C r o c k e t t (Light), X M - 2 8 , at A b e r d e e n P r o v i n g G r o u n d in M a r c h 1961,

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h e n General Lyman l,emnitzer, Taylor's suc-

cessor as Army Chief of Staff, proclaimed in W 1959 that growing Soviet and A m e r i c a n nuclear arsenals w e r e creating "the equivalent of strategic nuclear d i s a r m a m e n t , " he was restating an old Army t h e m e that rapidly was b e c o m i n g the conventional w i s d o m . 1 T h e A r m y ' s l o n g - h e l d v i e w - - t h a t strategic nuclear w e a p o n s were not usable and that future threats to A m e r i c a n security most likely w o u l d t a k e t h e f o r m of c o n f l i c t s b e l o w t h e t h r e s h o l d of general w a r - - n o w was the informed public's view as well. A c k n o w l e d g i n g this shift in public opinion, G e n e r a l B r u c e C l a r k e , s p e a k i n g s o o n a l t e r Lemn i t z e r , t r i e d o n c e a n d for all to p u t to rest t h e Army's old fear that nuclear w e a p o n s had r e n d e r e d t h e s o l d i e r o b s o l e t e . A c c o r d i n g to C l a r k e , c o m m a n d e r of t h e C o n t i n e n t a l A r m y C o m m a n d (CONARC), "that dangerous m y t h of the frantic fifties is almost as dead as a dodo. ''~ I n d e e d , t h e a p p r o a c h i n g e n d of t h e d e c a d e s e e m e d to presage a resurgence in the Army's fortunes. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g Eisenhower's u n d i m i n i s h e d personal popularity, by 1960 the concept of massive retaliation had been thoroughly discredited. 129

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The Pentomic Era

A l t h o u g h the A r m y ' s c r i t i q u e alo n e had not achieved this outcome, the Service's early and persistent dissent had been vindicated. Highly touted products of the Army's modernization effort, with emphasis on nuclear weapons and missiles, were in the field or due there shortly. The Pentomic concept, with its radically new organization and doctrine for fighting either nuclear or non-nuclear wars, was in place. By and large, the Rid g w ay -T ay lo rGavin reform agenda was complete. Indeed, despite the Army's difficulties in the 1950s, Service leaders who reviewed the decade could look back on some significant and satisfying victories. More importantly, they could look with optimism to the future. "Flexible Response," the strategy so persuasively presented by General Taylor in his book The Uncertain Trumpet, was acquiring all the trappings of an idea whose time had c o m e . 3 Regardless of who won the 1960 presidential election, Eisenhower's departure from office certainly would mean new military policies that would increase the A r m y ' s share of d e f e n s e r e s o u r c e s and give it a more prominent role in national security affairs. Surprisingly, however, the mood of the Army at the end of the decade did not reflect optimism, but an uneasiness about what had been accomplished thus far. Many officers were having second thoughts about the w ay the A r m y had c o n d u c t e d its fight a ga i ns t the " N e w Look." Some began to express doubts about the direction in which the Army had m o v e d , s u g g e s t i n g that in s e e k i n g to e s c a p e one captor the Service may have surrendered itself to another, more dangerous one.

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These second thoughts took several forms. One critique came from those skeptical that the answer to challenges triggered by technological change lay in yet m o r e t e c h n o l o g y . T h es e t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s resisted any deviation from the principle that man remained the most important factor in the Army and in warfare itself. They questioned the notion that new weapons and technical gadgetry could guarantee the Army's relevance and effectiveness. Despite m u c h p i o u s A r m y r h e t o r i c to the c o n t r a r y , t h e y feared that changes effected within the Army in the 1950s betrayed a tendency to trade traditional sold i e r l y values for t e c h n o c r a t i c ones. And they ref u s e d to a c c e p t this a p p r o a c h . One p a r t i c u l a r l y e l o q u e n t s p o k e s m a n for this v i e w was S.L.A. Marshall, the journalist and military historian, a respected "insider" even though not a member of the r e gul a r A r m y e s t a b l i s h m e n t . Marshall was especially critical of the A r m y ' s i n f a t u a t i o n w i t h nuclear hardware at the expense of fighting skills. To read current Army doctrine, he wrote, "one might think that the whole future is to be won through the augmenting of fire power." His own reading of tile recent past, and expectations for future wars, led him to a different conclusion. The enemy seldom was so obliging as to provide a perfect nuclear target. In most conflicts since 1945 the enemy had presented only "elusive targets," often mingling with the civilian population and operating without fixed lines of communications. "To go after such forces with atomic weapons," observed Marshall, "would be like hunting fleas with an elephant gun. ''4

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That seasoned military professionals should fall p r e y to s u c h f a l l a c i o u s i d e a s e s p e c i a l l y bothe r e d M a r s h a l l . H o w w a s it p o s s i b l e , he r e f l e c t e d , that H i r o s h i m a c o u l d so a b r u p t l y p e r s u a d e soldiers that "all t h i n g s had c h a n g e d for their profession, ancient values been f l u s h e d d o w n the drain, and the w a y of the fighter ... m a d e sterile by the weight of the b o m b ? " Marshall saw the a n s w e r in the A r m y ' s a p p a r e n t c o m p u l s i o n to "genuflect" at the "altar of m a c h i n e p o w e r . " He n o t e d with regret that it is not just in the world of Christian Dior that what is fashionable provides entree to the purse. We live u n d e r the sign of the e p h e m e r a l . When an army looks outdated, its s u p p o r t falls away. There are other hungry services and some of their spokesmen might be rash e n o u g h to c o n s i d e r d o i n g the job alone. A d h e r i n g to fashion in order to e n s u r e institutional survival had not been w i t h o u t cost. Reform, w a r n e d Marshall, was a " r u n a w a y word, s o m e t i m e s m a k i n g g r e a t e r p r o b l e m s t h a n it s o l v e s . ''5 By i n s t i t u t i n g reforms that d e n i e d the p r i m a c y of the i n d i v i d u a l fighting m a n , the A r m y ignored the lessons of history a n d c o u r t e d disaster. A s e c o n d group of critics attacked the reforms of t h e 1 9 5 0 s f r o m a m o r e p r a g m a t i c p e r s p e c t i v e . Less sensitive than the traditionalists to threats to t h e w a r r i o r e t h i c , t h e s e officers e v a l u a t e d c h a n g e a c c o r d i n g to w h e t h e r the c h a n g e was realistic, practical, a n d a p p l i c a b l e to war as they u n d e r s t o o d it. Judging the reforms of the 1950s a c c o r d i n g to those criteria, they f o u n d m u c h that was wanting.

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Some q u e s t i o n e d the Army's cavalier assumpt i o n s a b o u t t h e f e a s i b i l i t y of c o n d u c t i n g c o h e r e n t operations in the m i d s t of nuclear war. In 1959, an officer c o m p l a i n e d of "too m a n y aspects of nuclear w a r f a r e t h a t w e h a v e v a g u e or no a n s w e r s to today. ''6 L i e u t e n a n t General Arthur S. Collins, Jr., rec a l l i n g t h e 1950s a s s e r t e d t h a t " t h e A r m y h a d n ' t t h o u g h t t h r o u g h the use of n u c l e a r weapons; there was a t r e m e n d o u s e m p h a s i s just to get some n u c l e a r capability, w i t h o u t regard to h o w it might be used." A c c o r d i n g to Collins, "the A r m y never related the w e a p o n to the battlefield, and h o w you w e r e going to f i g h t u n d e r t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t a n u c l e a r w a r w o u l d create in a forward area." The typical m a n e u ver exercise or map problem a s s u m e d that the A r m y w o u l d f i g h t c o n v e n t i o n a l l y u n t i l it b e g a n to lose and t h e n " w e ' d let loose several n u c l e a r w e a p o n s " to reverse the tide. Collins recalled one particular s c e n a r i o t h a t r e l i e d on t h e u s e of a s i n g l e 500kiloton (500 tons of TNT) w e a p o n as follows: They were talking about a tactical nuclear war ... in G e r m a n y s o m e w h e r e b e t w e e n Stuttgart and Munich .... I raised the question, "Do you have any idea of the a m o u n t of damage that w o u l d result from that size bomb?" Having seen what one small 20-KT w e a p o n had done to Hiroshima and the countryside, I could imagine what a 500-KT bomb would do in the Munich area. They just brushed the damage question aside, and I did not consider the reply adequate. Then when you took into consideration the other weapons that had been fired in that problem, it just didn't make sense to m e . 7

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Equally serious questions arose about the practicality of the P e n t o m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n . O p e r a t i o n a l c o m m a n d of a division designed for o p t i m u m flexib i l i t y t u r n e d out in t h e f i e l d to be a w k w a r d a n d u n w i e l d y . The span of control d e m a n d e d of comm a n d e r s exceeded the capability of even the most able. Reflecting the absence of an intermediate brig a d e or r e g i m e n t a l e c h e l o n , the d i v i s i o n c o m m a n d e r found himself directly c o n c e r n e d with the a c t i v i t i e s of as m a n y as 16 d i f f e r e n t s u b o r d i n a t e units. And the structure of the battle group itself, w h a t e v e r its p r e s u m e d merit in a nuclear environment, proved ill-suited for conventional operations. Units did not acquire a genuine dual capability. Instead, they found themselves organized almost exclusively for nuclear war even as expectations grew that the next war w o u l d be non-nuclear. C o m m a n d ers found the tasking of organized Pentomic units especially difficult. The inability to modify formal organizations to suit the needs of a particular mission r e d u c e d the division's effective combat power. To make matters worse, the Pentomic division's increased foxhole strength proved illusory. As organized, the division proved unable to sustain itself d u r i n g c o n t i n u o u s o p e r a t i o n s . C o m m a n d e r s resorted to stripping combat units to bolster service support elements too weak to support the division. 8 S e n i o r l e a d e r s c o n s e q u e n t l y t u r n e d on t h e Pentomic experiment with surprising vehemence. Most o f f i c e r s r e f r a i n e d f r o m c r i t i c i z i n g the Pentomic concept too o p e n l y as long as its architects rem a i n e d on active duty. Recollections recorded years later, however, allowed officers to be more candid

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a n d to e x p r e s s v i r t u a l l y u n a n i m o u s o p p o s i t i o n . General H a m i l t o n H. H o w z e blasted the P e n t o m i c c o n c e p t ' s " r i d i c u l o u s aspects," w h i c h he characteri z e d as " t o o r e d o l e n t of H o l l y w o o d or M a d i s o n A v e n u e . ''9 General D o n a l d V. Bennett d i s m i s s e d the P e n t o m i c d i v i s i o n as s i m p l y "a device to say 'Yes, tile A r m y h a s m o v e d i n t o t h i s n u c l e a r age.' " B e n n e t t believed that deficiencies in mobility a n d logistical d e p t h r e n d e r e d the d i v i s i o n virtually ineff e c t i v e . " S o it d i d n ' t w o r k , " he c o n c l u d e d w i t h s o m e w a r m t h . 1° "If I s o u n d bigoted on this, I am." In General Paul L. F r e e m a n ' s view, the P e n t o m i c div i s i o n was "a mess." "Every time I t h i n k of the ... P e n t o m i c division, I s h u d d e r , " he said. " T h a n k God we never had to go to war w i t h it. ''1~ Even General George H. Decker, L e m n i t z e r ' s successor as A r m y Chief of Staff, c o n c l u d e d that the P e n t o m i c d i v i s i o n w a s "a j a c k - o f - a l l - t r a d e s - a n d - m a s t e r - o f - n o n e " concept a n d stated flatly that it was not "a suitable vehicle for combat. ''12 Other officers f o u n d fault w i t h the a s s u m p t i o n s that h a d i n s p i r e d the P e n t o m i c concept. In a penetrating article entitled "Verbal Defense," Colonel Henry E. Kelly assigned A m e r i c a n tactical d o c t r i n e a failing grade on two counts. A c c o r d i n g to Kelly, A r m y d o c t r i n e always p r e s u m e d that "the attacker will e m p l o y tactics o b v i o u s l y unfavorable to h i m self." Worse, t h e A r m y ' s d o c t r i n e i m p l i e d that "a theoretical c o n c e p t can be practically i m p l e m e n t e d ... a l t h o u g h no m e a n s of e x e c u t i o n exist." To any " d i f f i c u l t p r a c t i c a l p r o b l e m " t h a t it e n c o u n t e r e d , A r m y d o c t r i n e offered only "a verbal s o l u t i o n " - - t h e " v i r t u o u s w o r d s " of dispersion, flexibility, and

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mobility. Kelly had nothing against what he called "these magic words," but he doubted that an army c o u l d acquire such qualities merely by repeating the words over and over again. " R e l i a n c e u p o n words which are not backed by practical ability," warned Kelly, "is extremely dangerous. ''13 In a similar vein, two instructors ai the Army Command and General Staff college argued that a predilection for defining the tactics of the next war in vague, "generic terms" was creating a "popular misconception of the ground battle." They worried that such terms might mislead American officers into thinking that "a few well-placed nuclear weapons" would suffice to set the stage for a "grand maneuver to 'sweep up the remains'" of the enemy. "Such generalities appeal to the imagination," they concluded "but are of only limited practical value." The Army's emphasis on new techniques and the promise of futuristic technology seemed to beg the basic question: "How do we fight today's battle with today's equipment? ''14 More f u n d a m e n t a l still was the criticism of those who questioned the sense of even trying ta build an Army equally capable of fighting a nuclear or non-nuclear war. Critics attacked the concept of dual capability from both sides. Representing one perspective was Colonel Francis X. Bradley, whose article, "The Fallacy of Dual Capability," appeared in the October 1959 issue of Army. Bradley believed that the Army's pursuit of a dual capability showed a refusal to a c k n o w l e d g e the realities of Soviet power. In his view, those who believed that the next war could be concluded using only

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conventional weapons were naive. Given the USSR's s u p e r i o r strength, any war against the Soviets inevitably w o u l d face the U n i t e d States w i t h the c h o i c e to " u s e n u c l e a r w e a p o n s or accept defeat." To t h i n k o t h e r w i s e was to engage in s e l f - d e c e p t i o n a n d e x p o s e the n a t i o n either to b l a c k m a i l or outright disaster. To Bradley, the lesson was clear: "We m u s t go nuclear. ''15 B r a d l e y ' s f o r t h r i g h t a d v o c a c y of n u c l e a r w a r p r o v o k e d a d i a m e t r i c a l l y o p p o s e d response. A r t h u r S. Collins, Jr., t h e n a colonel, a n s w e r e d Bradley in an article a p p e a r i n g in the next issue of Army. Coll i n s b e g a n by e x p r e s s i n g d i s b e l i e f that " a n y t h i n g w o r t h w h i l e or m e a n i n g f u l can result from the emp l o y m e n t of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s in war." Collins dism i s s e d as unrealistic efforts to differentiate b e t w e e n t a c t i c a l a n d s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . He c o u l d find " n o rational e x p l a n a t i o n ... of just n o w tactical n u c l e a r w a r w i l l be k e p t l i m i t e d - - w h i c h is t h e o v e r r i d i n g r e q u i r e m e n t in this type of military action." He c h a s t i s e d the A r m y for failing to calculate t h e i m p a c t of e v e n s m a l l n u c l e a r w e a p o n s o n nearby n o n c o m b a t a n t s . He argued that " w h a t m i g h t be a l i m i t e d n u c l e a r war to us m i g h t be the n u c l e a r h o l o c a u s t in the area of conflict." As a result, excessive A m e r i c a n reliance on nuclear w e a p o n s to d e f e n d places like Europe w o u l d " e n c o u r a g e o u r allies to be neutral a n d to tell us to go h o m e . " Collins t h o u g h t that the A r m y h a d d o n e no better in c o n s i d e r i n g the effects of n u c l e a r weapo n s o n its o w n o p e r a t i o n s . " W e t a l k a b o u t w h a t these w e a p o n s can do for us, but we s e l d o m discuss w h a t t h e y can do to us." His o w n view was that as

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long as the country's most likely enemies possessed n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , " l i t t l e a d v a n t a g e s e e m s to be gained by our use of them." All in all, Collins conc l u d e d that " o u r A m e r i c a n e n t h u s i a s m for m o r e gadgets and fewer m e n has carried us away" with results that were w r o n g h e a d e d and even dangerous. TM T h e A r m y ' s d o c t r i n e t h u s f o u n d itself u n d e r fire f r o m o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n s . B r a d l e y u r g e d the A r m y to a b a n d o n its hopes for a conventional conflict and embrace the expectation of nuclear warfare w i t h o u t reservation. Collins, on the other hand, argued that even the smallest nuclear weapons possessed no practical utility whatsoever. He believed t h a t t h e A r m y ' s c h a l l e n g e was to fight a n d w i n w i t h o u t being p u s h e d across the nuclear threshold. B o t h o f f i c e r s a g r e e d on o n e t h i n g o n l y : t h a t t h e A r m y should c h u c k the w h o l e notion of dual capability as unrealistic and unobtainable. H o p i n g to s a l v a g e that n o t i o n , and s o m e h o w reconcile the views of Bradley and Collins, Colonel William E. DePuy came up with yet a third perspective. D e P u y was a s o l d i e r of c o n s i d e r a b l e i n s i g h t w h o as a senior officer in the 1970s w o u l d become a p r i n c i p a l a r c h i t e c t of t h e A r m y ' s r e c o v e r y after Vietnam. His response to Bradley and Collins, also a p p e a r i n g in Army, was e n t i t l e d " T h e Case for a Dual Capability." DePuy believed that in pursuing a dual capability t h e A r m y h a d f o l l o w e d " t h e o n l y s e n s i b l e course," one that could be faulted only for "sufferling] from too thin a diet of resources." His article sought to preserve dual capability by providing a

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justification for the concept that reached beyond the concerns of Bradley and Collins. DePuy began by examining the capabilities of the nation's likely adversaries, above all the USSR. The Soviet threat to American national security, he a s s e r t e d, was both c o n v e n t i o n a l an d n u c l e a r . In c o n s i d e r i n g this d o u b l e - e d g e d threat, DeP u y believed that "suggest[ing] that we have a choice bet w e e n t h e m " was " g r o s s l y w r o n g . . . a n d by so doing suggest[ing] that we turn our backs upon certain aspects of the Soviet threat which may, in fact, do us in." DePuy knew that on the topic of defense, "national t e m p e r a m e n t " i n c l i n e d A merican s "to lean more heavily upon our technology than upon our manpower." He believed, nevertheless, that existing threats to US security, if assessed objectively, did not permit Americans to indulge that inclination. A foe that had both great numerical strength and the latest in m i l i t a r y t e c h n o l o g y d e n i e d the U n i t e d States the luxury of choosing to emphasize either m a c h i n e s or men. The c o u n t r y n e e d e d both. The need was imperative, he believed, to "maintain a rough symmetry of capabilities with the communist bloc in each category of force, or at some point we simply will be faced with a bet we cannot cover." To a c h i e v e this r o u g h e q u i v a l e n c e , he i n s i s t e d , would require that American forces "be greatly inc r e a s e d in both c o n v e n t i o n a l and n u c l e a r capabilities, increased in NATO, in the Far East, and in strategic reserve." DePuy's analysis suggested an important shift in e m p h a s i s . To a greater degree than Brad ley or

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Collins, DePuy had a n t i c i p a t e d f o r t h c o m i n g changes in the Army's nuclear doctrine. The Army initially had justified tactical nuclear weapons as necessary to make good the West's numerical inferiority. Although the Soviets had acquired the basic secret of the bomb, the Army b e l i e v e d that the U n i t e d States alone p o s s e s s e d the k n o w - h o w to make n u c l e a r w e a p o n s small e n o u g h , accurate enough, and in sufficient quantity to be usable in land combat. Super weapons produced by superior technology would give the Army a war-winning advantage that the Soviets would not be able to match. Unfortunately, American expectations regarding Soviet technological capabilities were disappointed. By the late 1950s the Soviets had developed their own family of formidable tactical nuclear weapons. As a result, attempts by the Army to justify such w e a p o n s for their s u p p o s e d warfighting edge no longer had any credibility. DePuy's endorsement of such weapons emphasized not the edge they prov i d e d but the n e c e s s i t y of k e e p i n g up with an equivalent Soviet capability. More to the point, the objective of keeping up no longer was to develop an arsenal for actual use; DePuy agreed c o m p l e t e l y with Collins that any war fought with tactical nuclear w e a p o n s w o u l d lead only to a senseless, "smoldering stalemate." The Army of the 1950s had spent billions in dev e l o p i n g n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . It had u n d e r g o n e a w r e n c h i n g reorganization and rewritten its basic tactical doctrine to gird itself for the expected dem a n d s of n u c l e a r warfare. Yet scarcely had the Army settled on its new course when thinking

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officers b e g a n to r e a l i z e that its n u c l e a r w e a p o n s could serve no purpose except to deter Soviet use of their own tactical nuclear arsenal--an arsenal w h o s e existence may well have been stimulated by the energetic A m e r i c a n e n d o r s e m e n t of such weapons. Henceforth, wrote DePuy, the sole rational object of m a i n t a i n i n g a tactical nuclear capability was to be "strong e n o u g h to d e n y an e n e m y the chance of victory through tactical nuclear warfare. ''17 For all its merit, DePuy's conclusion was not lacking in irony. The Army had begun the Eisenh o w e r era attacking the concept of massive retaliat i o n , i n s i s t i n g t h a t n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n c e b a s e d on s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r w e a p o n s i n e v i t a b l y w o u l d fail. The Army had assumed that when such failures o c c u r r e d , A m e r i c a n i n t e r e s t s w o u l d r e q u i r e US f o r c e s to e n g a g e in c o m b a t - - p r o b a b l y on a l e v e l well below that of general war. Because the " N e w Look" threatened to eliminate the forces n e e d e d in the event that d e t e r r e n c e broke down, the Army also placed itself in opposition to the administration's basic military policy. S i m u l t a n e o u s l y , the Army instituted on its o w n initiative extensive reforms i n t e n d e d to prepare for such w a r s - - w a r s that the administration itself did not expect even to come about. Yet having acquired its m i s s i l e s a n d n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , a n d h a v i n g a d o p t e d its P e n t o m i c structure, the A r m y found itself by the end of the 1950s organized not to fight but almost solely to deter. From the perspective of the war d e e m e d most likely to o c c u r - - o r of the war that actually did occur in V i e t n a m - - t h e reforms of the 1950s u n q u e s t i o n a b l y had m a d e the A r m y a less

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effective fighting force. In addition, these reforms had vastly complicated the problems of future military reformers by imposing on the Army an accum u l a t i o n of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s that w o u l d r e m a i n long after short-lived dogmas such as the Pentomic concept had been discarded. Corporal and Honest John--no less than their successors Pershing and Lance--cast an i n e r a d i c a b l e pall over f u t u r e attempts to define the purpose of land power and to develop rational methods to use its potential.

Considered in retrospect, Army reforms of the 1 9 5 0 s - - s e e m i n g l y so f a r - r e a c h i n g at the t i m e - - a p p e a r s t r i k i n g for t h e i r i m p e r m a n e n c e . W h e n John F. K e n n e d y s u c c e e d e d E i s e n h o w e r in January 1961 and proceeded to implement the concept of Flexible Response, the Army abandoned its 1950s initiatives with almost unseemly haste. Battle groups, P e n t o m i c divisions, the emphasis on dispersion and non-linearity, the quest for light formations, the c o m m i t m e n t to fighting w i t h tactical n u c l e a r w e a p o n s : all q u i e t l y w e r e s h e l v e d or unceremoniously dumped. Concepts hurriedly developed as quickly lost their attraction, superceded by another wave of "new ideas." Army publications crackled with a fresh v o c a b u l a r y - - b r u s h f i r e wars, counterinsurgency, nation-building, special forces--said to contain the essence of future wars. These were the concepts and skills that soldiers had to master. After 1960, perceptive officers were no more likely to speak out in favor of the Pentomic concept than they were to call for a return to horse cavalry. Professional journals instead featured

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articles with titles like "Revolutionary War and Psyc h o l o g i c a l Action," "Objectives and M e t h o d s of Communist Guerrilla Warfare," "When We Fight a Small War," and "Antiguerrilla Operations--A Case Study From History. ''18 More than words were involved: soldiers of the early 1960s again were whipsawed by reorganization: a new divisional structure, new doctrine, new types of units--and before long a new war in which to employ them. Repeating the experience of the previous decade, reforms of the 1960s sought to r e m a k e the Army according to a self-generated image of warfare that the Army itself continued to revise with unfailing regularity. As a consequence, the Army repeated this process again and again. By the mid-1970s a new doctrine, subsumed under the rubric "Active Defense," s u p e r c e d e d counterinsurgency, itself a casualty of Vietnam. Within a half-dozen years the Army discarded "Active Defense," replacing it with "AirLand Battle." Barely had the ink dried on the manual describing the principles of "AirLand Battie" w h e n that c o n c e p t f o u n d itself if not supplanted at least obliged to make room for another innovation--"Light Infantry." The f i t f u l n e s s of recent A m e r i c a n m i l i t a r y thought stands in contrast to the orderly and consistent evolution of Soviet doctrine. Consistency, e s p e c i a l l y if it i m p l i e s stagnation, may not be a virtue. On the other hand, n e i t h e r is c o n t i n u o u s change masquerading as reform. At some point, the frequency with which the leadership steps off in a new direction outstrips the institution's ability to follow. H o w e v e r well i n t e n t i o n e d , such c h a n g e

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leads to d i s o r i e n t a t i o n and confusion rather than improvement. W hy has the A r m y r e d e f i n e d its a p p r o a c h to war every few years? Objective factors have not required such frequent change. Since World War II, the nation's role in world affairs, its vital interests, and the perceived threat to those interests have remained remarkably constant. Rather than such factors, the absence of a consistent operational concept has inspired the Army's "new ideas," with technology being used as a fig leaf to cover the changes while they were being justified and attempts were being made to sell them. The ethos of p o s t - W o r l d War II A m e r i c a accounts in some measure for the Army's inability to a d h e r e to such a c o n s i s t e n t outlook. After 1945, with most Americans believing that Hiroshima had changed all war irrevocably, the country showed little interest in considering the role that land forces henceforth might play in national defense. Instead of p u n c t u r i n g n a i v e p o p u l a r e x p e c t a t i o n s about warfare, the fighting in Korea s t r e n g t h e n e d them, creating a strong prejudice against engaging in any more dirty land wars. E i s e n h o w e r ' s d efen se programs signified the adoption of such thinking as national policy, a turn of events made all the more d e c i s i v e by the P r e s i d e n t ' s m i l i t a r y c r e d e n t i a l s . Designating d e t e r r e n c e as the m i l i t a r y ' s p r i m a r y mission obliged Eisenhower to embark on a radical r e a l i g n m e n t of d e f e n s e forces. The r e d u c t i o n of r e s o u r c e s p e r m i t t e d to the Army, w h i l e the most obvious result of that realignment, was not, however, its most important effect. Of greater lasting

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significance, E i s e n h o w e r ' s policies left the Army shorn of its self-image as the nation's primary fighting force, a nd g r o p i n g for a w o r t h y r a i s o n d ' e t r e among a people largely uninterested in the Service's problems. Eisenhower understood full well how his policies were affecting his old Service. As he observed to Admiral Radford in 1956, "the lack of a doctrine that assigns the A r m y a d e f i n i t e an d p e r m a n e n t m i s s i o n has left t h e m s o m e w h a t u n s a t i s f i e d and even bewildered. Their role is rather hazy to many of t he m . ''1~ E i s e n h o w e r may even have felt some sympathy for the Army's predicament, but as Commander in Chief he insisted that the Army accept the diminished status that a strategy of deterrence prescribed. The savage cuts of the " N e w Look," the u n c o m p r o m i s i n g stance of the President, and the country's general apathy toward the Service combined to give the Army's inevitable protective backlash its r e m a r k a b l e e n e r g y an d its s o m e t i m e s reckless character, in addition to positive aspects, s u c h as efforts to " m o d e r n i z e , " i m p r o v e tactical concepts, and develop a more positive image, the Army's campaign to defend itself also included provocative jostling over roles and missions, attacks dir e c t e d at the o t h e r S e r v i c e s , and p r o g r e s s i v e l y virulent criticism of the President's own policies. Eisenhower was especially distressed by the growth of w h a t he c a l l e d " c o m p e t i t i v e p u b l i c i t y " a m o n g the Services, particularly when inter-Service rivalry resulted in the "leaking" of classified information. 2° This habit of airing Service gripes in the press, he

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r e m a r k e d in 1955, "might belong to a b u n c h of politicians, not to the military. ''a~ E i s e n h o w e r failed to see that his o w n policies h a d d o n e m u c h to p r o v o k e t h e b e h a v i o r t h a t he f o u n d so distressing. The President might have b e e n a b l e to c o n t a i n i n t e r - S e r v i c e r i v a l r y a n d g a i n a greater degree of s u p p o r t for his defense programs had he been more a c c o m m o d a t i n g toward certain Service i n t e r e s t s - - p a r t i c u l a r l y the A r m y ' s need to r e t a i n a f u l l y d e v e l o p e d m i s s i o n . L i k e so m a n y o t h e r s e n i o r o f f i c i a l s in r e c e n t d e c a d e s , h o w e v e r , E i s e n h o w e r chose to v i e w Pentagon p r o b l e m s as organizational ones. He believed that the c o n t r o v e r s y over his military policies reflected not substantive c o n c e r n s but an a b s e n c e of c o o p e r a t i o n and unity w i t h i n the Defense Department. Resolving that cont r o v e r s y he felt, s i m p l y w a s a m a t t e r of f o s t e r i n g t e a m w o r k and b r o a d m i n d e d n e s s . Yet his efforts to achieve u n i t y by making the existing JCS establishm e n t work p r o d u c e d only d i s a p p o i n t m e n t . "So far as I a m p e r s o n a l l y c o n c e r n e d , " E i s e n h o w e r confided to his friend S w e d e Hazlett in 1956, My most frustrating domestic problem is that of attempting to achieve any real coordination among the services .... I have tried to tell the Chiefs of Staff ... that their most important function is their corporate work as a body of advisers to the Secretary of Defense and to me .... Yet I have made little or no progress in developing real corporate thinking .... I try to make the Chiefs realize ... that they are men of sufficient stature, training, and intelligence to think of ... the balance between minimum

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requirements in the costly implements of war and the health of our economy Based on this kind of thinking, they habitually, when with me, give the impression that the[y] are going to work out arrangements that will keep the m i l i t a r y a p p r o p r i a t i o n s within manageable proportions and do it in a spirit of goodwill and of give and take. Yet when each service puts down its minimum requirements for its own military budgets for the following year, and I add up the total, I find that they mount at a fantastic rate. There is seemingly no end to all of this. Yet merely "getting tough" on my part is not an answer. I simply must find men who have the breadth of understanding and devotion to their country rather than to a single service ...22 More accurately, the President was seeking b r o a d - m i n d e d m e n as part of a r e f o r m e d JCS organization. He already had c o n c l u d e d that "the Chiefs of Staff system that we n o w have has failed. ''2:~ This p e r c e p t i o n e v e n t u a l l y led to the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, an attempt to increase the authority of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS at the e x p e n s e of the Services. Yet the specific content of that legislation is of less interest than the m i n d set it reflects: that the solution to deficiencies in the Pentagon lay in reorganization to suppress Service perspectives in favor of those representing a joint or unified point of view. E i s e n h o w e r believed that Service views inevitably w e r e t a i n t e d by p a r o c h i a l i s m , a v i e w w i d e l y s h a r e d b e f o r e a n d s i n c e . T h e P r e s i d e n t w a s mistaken, h o w e v e r , i~ thinking that suppressing

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p a r o c h i a l i s m and r e d u c i n g inter-Service rivalry were the major military issues of the day. They were only symptomatic. The real question was not h o w best to organize the military. Rather, as the Army alone recognized, it was to identify the range of contingencies for which military forces should prepare in light of the expected requirements of national security. For surely the Army was correct in asserting that the passive military role envisioned by massive retaliation was inadequate. Shrewd enough in pointing out the fallicies of massive retaliation, the Army failed d i s m a l l y in c o n t r i v i n g an alternative to replace it. More than anything else, this failure explains the short-lived nature of the reforms that the Army instituted in the 1950s. D e l u d e d by the chimera of n u c l e a r weaponry, hotly pursuing the false ideal of dual capability, driven by reasons of expediency to seek a share in deterrence, the Army never was able to articular a c o h e r e n t operrational concept that w o u l d both overcome the reigning skepticism about land pouter and p r o v i d e a c o m p r e h e n s i v e strategy that overcame the deficiencies of massive retaliation. The incessant emphasis on technology was little more than an artful dodge concealing the emptiness of the Army's thinking. The futurists who proc l a i m e d that changing technology was reshaping the face of warfare s u c c e e d e d only in laying the Service open to doctrinal fads. Captivated by the prospect of turning the latest technological breakthrough to the benefit of short-term institutional goals, Service leaders charged off to d e v e l o p the doctrine, tactics, and organization needed to

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convert technological promise into combat capability. The danger of this a p p r o a c h to judge by the 1 9 5 0 s - - w a s that the A r m y ' s unfettered e n t h u s i a s m b l i n d e d it to the limits of technology in the overall equation of war and to the real problems that technological change brings in its trail,

A r e c r u i t i n g poster for an u l t r a - m o d e r n , r e l e v a n t A r m y

The contrast between the Army's attitude toward strategic and tactical nuclear weapons provides the best illustration. Inspired in part by the threat that m a s s i v e r e t a l i a t i o n p o s e d to the A r m y ' s i n t e r e s t , Service leaders fashioned a critique of strategic nuclear weapons that was thorough, cogent, and wise. C o n v i n c e d , n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h a t t a c t i c a l v a r i a n t s of nuclear weapons w o u l d be helpful in preserving the Army's legitimacy, these same soldiers rebuilt the

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Service a r o u n d m i s s i l e s and l o w - y i e l d n u c l e a r w e a p o n s and p l u n g e d into the i l l - c o n c e i v e d , unrealistic Pentomic experiment. That experiment failed and did the Army i m m e a s u r a b l e harm, a judgment corroborated by those who endured the Pentomic Army and who junked it at the first opportunity. With their critical faculties neutralized by their anxiety over certain institutional needs. Service leaders had been stampeded into accepting a cockeyed technological fix without grasping its implications. Is this p r e o c c u p a t i o n with t e c h n o l o g y bad? Even if we conclude that the Army's preference for

certain t e c h n o l o g i e s in the 1950s was ill considered, t e c h n o l o g i c a l o p t i m i s m at other times does not necessarily follow as inappropriate. After all, nothing is inherently wrong with technological innovation. Certainly, habitual o b s a l e s c e n c e is an umpromising path to follow in search of military excellence. Yet a review of warfare since World War II shows few instances in which technological advantage has proven decisive. Instead, the record provides examples of superior technology powerless to avert d e f e a t - - a s in the US e x p e r i e n c e in Vietnam. The record contains at least one instance in w h i c h t e c h n o l o g y hardly s e e m e d relevant to a war's outcome: the reconquest of the Falklands by Royal Marines and British infantrymen. Even in the realm of high-intensity conflict, the most brilliant victories, such as those of the Israelis in the Six Day War, have been won with aging, h a n d - m e - d o w n equipment. This discussion is not meant to argue against the desirability of up-to-date material. But it sug-

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gests that Americans may be missing the point in emphasizing technology as the cornerstone of military effectiveness. For the Army of the 1950s, bent on preserving its existence, this view certainly was the case. R e v i e w i n g the d e c a d e from the vantage point in 1960, two distinguished soldiers, Colonel George A. Lincoln and Colonel Richard G. Stilwell, lamented the fact that the Army had expended "too much of the talent of our best minds to inter-Service debate and to the battle of the budget." Seizing on missile and nuclear technology to free itself from conditions imposed by the "New Look," the Army had f i e l d e d w e a p o n s that a p p e a r e d p r o m i s i n g in theory but whose "combat value ... against a numerically superior and nuclear-equipped foe is obscure." Lincoln and Stilwell doubted that tactical n u c l e a r w e a p o n s w o u l d ever serve an y p u r p o s e apart from d e t e r r e n c e . Like other t h o u g h t f u l soldiers, they w e r e d i s c o v e r i n g that an atomic army was not a fighting army. Yet given the scope of the A r m y ' s n u c l e a r i n v e s t m e n t , t h e y feared that the Service would find it almost impossible to revert entirely to its previously conventional character. As L i n c o l n a n d S t i l w e l l a s t u t e l y n o t e d , the A r m y ' s commitment to nuclear weapons thus threatened to "chain our country to a strategy, even though that strategy has become questionable. ''24 If the Army's compulsive commitment to nuclear technology in the 1950s led to a strategic dead end, asking whether any alternative existed is a fair question. Given the benefit of hindsight, one such a l t e r n a t i v e d i d exist. We can see t o d a y that the Army's primary task down to the present has continued to be precisely what it was in Korea: the ap-

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plication of force to maintain the global status quo that emerged from World War II. While the United States does not claim a formal empire, and the use of that term has severe pejorative connotations, the Army since 1945 has played the historic role of an imperial defense force, called on repeatedly to protect far-flung American interests threatened by global b r u s h f i r e s f a n n e d by the w i n d s of p o l i t i c a l change. This role was as true of Korea in 1950 as it later would be of Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, and Grenada. I n d e e d , it is e q u a l l y true r e g a r d i n g tile long-term US presence in Europe as part of NATO and the brief American intervention in Lebanon in 1958; though in neither of those instances has protecting the status quo involved fighting. Wether politically or m o r a l l y these i n t e r v e n t i o n s have been "good" or "bad" is a question beyond the scope of this paper. From a military perspective, the essential facts are that A m e r i c a n in teres ts r e p e a t e d l y have required the Army to intervene overseas and that w h e n these i n t e r v e n t i o n s involve hostilities, the A r m y has engaged in combat of a t r a d i t i o n a l and e v e n s o m e w h a t o l d - f a s h i o n e d character. Indeed, if recent American conflicts differ from earlier wars at all, this difference is less because of any new technology they may involve than because of the pronounced impact of politics on their conduct. In short, the model that the Army might have adopted in the 1950s was an interventionist one. In comparison to the Service's infatuation with high technology and dual capability, an interventionist model would have provided an operational concept far better suited to the tasks that political leaders

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s u b s e q u e n t l y d i r e c t e d the Army to perform. Viewing itself as an instrument for intervention in highly politicized conflicts of limited scale would have enabled the Army over the long run to equip, organize, and train its soldiers in ways far more pertinent to what they actually have been called on to do. Granted, an A m e r i c a n Army o p e n l y proclaiming itself to be an imperial police force would have difficulty garnering popular or congressional support. That s t a t e m e n t h o l d s as true today as it would have for the 1950s. Adopting something like an interventionist model as an operational concept assumes that the Army would find ways to explain the c o n c e p t i n o f f e n s i v e l y , using terms s u i t e d to American political discourse. The important point would not be the words, but the advantage gained by being able to govern the Army's enormous internal energies under a single, pertinent, unifying idea of why the Service exists.

The military profession's interest in history stems from more than i n t e l l e c t u a l curiosity. Historiographical debate does not attract soldiers to the past; but the hope of identifying lessons with some practical application does. Such an approach, however, is not w i t h o u t risk: superficial analysis easily produces false or misleading analogies--with potentially disastrous results. Nonetheless, if pursued with caution and intelligence, efforts to apply history are entirely legitimate and justify the present mindedness that pervades military history. Discovering useful lessons from history requires that we

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examine the past through a lens m a d e up in part of present-day concerns. Although such a utilitarian approach to history may bother academic purists, this approach does not bother soldiers at all. Soldiers of the 1980s rightly will ask w h e t h e r the Army's experience of three decades ago has any relevance to questions that they face today. The answer is yes, emphatically so. Again today the A r m y find itself in a period of reassessment. Once more, S e r v i c e l e a d e r s t a l k a b o u t c h a n g e t h a t is transforming the character of warfare. Many items high on today's military agenda in the United States--the utility of nuclear weapons; the impact of emerging t e c h n o l o g i e s ; t h e n e e d for light, u l t r a - m o b i l e forces--are echoes of issues from 30 years ago. As a result, the Army's efforts to address the problems of that day provide fertile ground for identifying lessons with application in the 1980s. Chief among those lessons must be the import a n c e of p o s s e s s i n g a c l e a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the utility of force in the m o d e r n world. The Army cannot afford either to pretend that the destructiveness of m o d e r n w e a p o n s has m a d e war obsolete, or to p e r s u a d e itself that such weapons alone hold all the answers to waging successful war. This issue is not one of mere theoretical interest; it is the crux of the m a t t e r . As G e n e r a l G a v i n o b s e r v e d to H e n r y Kissinger in 1955, the realization that they "can no longer use the products of h u m a n invention indiscriminately" has confronted soldiers with an "intellectual problem" of the first order: "For what purpose w o u l d one fight a war, and what w o u l d be the p r o p e r r o l e of A r m e d F o r c e s in a n y w a r ? ''25 T h e A r m y has yet to answer these questions in a satisfactory manner.

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US A r m y Photo Lieutenant General James M. Gavin, Chief of A m y Research and Development, with a model of the Redstone missile in 1056, He cautioned that the i n d i s c r i m i n a t e use of the products of human invention has confronted soldiers w i ~ the intellectual problem of the proper role of armed forces in war.

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A second lesson is the value of treating Utopian technologies with a modicum of skepticism. Without being L u d d i t e s , * soldiers must recognize that technology alone cannot guarantee fighting power; i n d e e d in s o m e respects the p e l l - m e l l p u r s u i t of technology actually can upset the sensitive balance of hum a n factors that invests a force with genuine q u a l i t a t i v e s u p e r i o r i t y in combat. As Martin Van Creveld has pointed out, modern wars repeatedly affirm the critical importance of fighting power, not t e c h n o l o g y , in p r o v i d i n g the margin of victory. 26 The US A r m y c a n n o t afford to lose sight of that truth. A final lesson concerns the neglected virtues of c o n s i s t e n c y and follow-through. The skittishness that has haunted the Army since the 1950s, with structural and doctrinal changes tripping o v e r one another, has eroded the sophistication with which s o l d i e r s f o r m e r l y v i e w e d t h e i r p r o f e s s i o n . As changes in the way the Army plans to fight become routine, the opportunity for mastering the essentials of the military art and even the incentive to do so decline. Frustration and cynicism result, reminiscent of the old Roman warrior whose saying too often is posted in modern orderly rooms as follows: We trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams, we would be *Bands of w o r k i n g m e n in the i n d u s t r i a l centers of England who r i o t e d b e t w e e n 1811 and 1816. The u p r i s i n g began in Nottinghamshire, where groups of textile workers, ira the name of a mythical figure called Ned Ludd or King Ludd, destroyed k n i t t i n g m a c h i n e s , to w h i c h they a t t r i b u t e d the p r e v a i l i n g unemployment and low wages. No political aim was involved in lhe m o v e m e n t , w h i c h d i d not s h o w any c o h e s i o n . The movement was suppressed harshly by the government

'

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reorganized. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing, and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while only producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization. Once it decides h o w to fight, the A r m y then must p r o v i d e a s t a b l e a n d p r e d i c t a b l e e n v i r o n m e n t in w h i c h its soldiers can develop the difficult skills that war will call on t h e m to employ. A n y t h i n g less is a waste of time and potentially a waste of lives. I f w e f i n d f a u l t with a r m y policies and decisions dating from the 1950s, we should r e m i n d ourselves of the u n c o m m o n l y difficult problems facing the Service at that time. Such shortcomings as h i n d sight m a y reveal never can d i m i n i s h the stature of an e x t r a o r d i n a r y g e n e r a t i o n of b a t t l e - p r o v e n soldiers w h o c o n f r o n t e d the challenges of the 1950s with integrity and imagination. To their eyes, the future was as difficult to discern as it is to our eyes t o d a y . As w e s t r u g g l e to u n d e r s t a n d t h e m i l i t a r y p r o b l e m s of o u r o w n t i m e w e w o u l d be w i s e to learn from their e x p e r i e n c e during the 1950s. At the s a m e t i m e , in u n d e r t a k i n g to a d d r e s s t h o s e problems, we will serve the A r m y well if we can m u s t e r the courage and d e t e r m i n a t i o n that so exemplified that earlier generation of military leaders.

Endnotes Chapter 1 1. M a x w e l l D. T a y l o r , The U n c e r t a i n T r u m p e t (New York, 1959), p. 108. The term Babylonian captivity {or exile) is commonly applied, in the history of Israel, to the period from the fall of Jerusalem (586 B.C.), when the Hebrews were deported to Babylonia from Judea, to the reconstruction in Palestine of a new Jewish state (after 538 B.C.); traditionally, the exile lasted about 70 years. The Babylonian King Nebuchadnezzar adopted the Assyrian policy of deporting conquered peoples to reduce local nationalism. In 538 B.C. King Cyrus permitted the Jews to return to their homeland. Various aspects of the Exile and the Restoration are described in the Old Testam e n t Books of Jeremiah, Ezekial, Daniel, Ezra, Nehemiah, II Kings, and II Chronicles. (The term also refers to the exile of the popes at Avignon from 1309 to 1377.) 2. The New York Times, 13 January 1954. 3. These and subsequent quotations are from NSC 162/2, "Basic National Security Policy," 30 October 1953, Record Group 273 (Records of the National Security Council), National Archives; hereafter cited as RG273, NA. 4. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War {New York, 1973), pp. 399--400. 159

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5. A n n u a l Report of the Secretary of Defense (July 1, 1959, to June 30, 1960) (Washington, DC, 1961), p. 34. 6. Robert H. Ferrell, ed. The Diary of James C. Hagerty (Bloomington, IN, 1983), p. 182. 7. " R e c o r d e d S u m m a r y of A d d r e s s to The A m e r i c a n People on The National Security and its Costs," 19 May 1953, Public Papers of the President: Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953) (Washington, DC, 1960), p. 318.

Chapter 2 1. Historical Resume, Division Force Structure, Active and Reserve, 1935-1963, undated, File 2-3.7/AC.A, Box 68, Office of The Chief of Military History Manuscripts, Record Group 319 (Records of the Army Staff), National Archiyes; hereafter cited as OCMH Manuscripts, RG319, NA. 2. Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense (July, 1959, to June 30, 1960). 3. Historical Summary tff Army Manpower and Personnel M a n a g e m e n t S y s t e m , " 12 F e b r u a r y 1965, File 2.37/AC.H, Box 69, OCMH Manuscripts, RG319, NA, p. 9 and chart 3. 4. Colonel Kenneth G. Wickham, "What the Cordiner Report Proposes," Army 7 (July 1957), p. 21. Between 1954 and 1956, 132,000 officers in the grades lieutenant to lieutenant colonel quit the Army. 5. Major General Gerald J. Higgins to General Matthew D. Ridgway, 8 June 1955, Box 26, The Papers of Matthew B. Ridgway, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA; hereafter cited as Ridgway Papers.

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6. M a j o r M u l t i s s i m u s , " T h e W e a r i n g of the A r m y Green," Army 7 (May 1957), p. 27. 7. Major Forward, "Curtains for the Army," The Army Combat Forces Journal 6 (August 1955), p. 52. 8. "A Program for the Army," The Army Combat Forces lournal 6 (September 1955), p. 19. 9. Major John H. Cushman, "What is the Army's Story," The Army Combat Forces Journal 5 (October 1955), p. 49. 10. L y m a n L. Lemnitzer, "This is a Significant Beginning," The Army Combat Forces Journal 6 ( N o v e m b e r 1955), p. 62. 11. W a l b u r M. Brucker, "A Vital E l e m e n t of Our National Strength," Military Review 36 (July 1956) p. 5. 32. Remarks by Lieutenant Colonel William D. Wise, US Senate S u b c o m m i t t e e of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriation for 1955, 83d Congress, 2d Session, 21 May 1954, p. 363. 13. Master Sergeant Stuart Queen, "The Big Picture," Army Information Digest 10 (February 1955) p. 34. 14. The Army's opposition to NSC 5410 is recounted in Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, Summary of Major Events and Problems, Fiscal Year 1954, File 20-2.4/AA 1954, Box 75"1, RG 3•9, NA. 15. "Memorandum of Discussion at the 190th Meeting of th~ National Security Council," 25 March 1954, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol. II: National Security Affairs, Part 1 (Washington, 1984), pp. 639-41; hereafter cited as FRUS, 1952-54. 16. Ferrell, ed. The Diary of ]ames Hc~gerty, p. 182. The quotation is from Hagerty's diary entry for 1 February 1955.

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17. Chief of Staff, US Army to JCS, comment on draft JCS Estimate of the Military" Posture throughoul the Free World, Fy 1956 through Fy 1959 (JCS 2101/131), undated [June 1954] CCS 381 US (1-31-50), sec 37, Box 32, JCS Geographic File 1954-1956, Record Group 218 (Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), National Archives; hereafter cited as RG 218, NA. 18. Brief of Plan of Action for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 23 November 1955, JSPC 877/299, CCS 381 (11-29-49), S e c t i o n 27, RG 218, NA. E m p h a s i s added. 19. "Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State," 8 September 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, p. 461. Emphasis in the original. 20. Interview with General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, 8 February 1985, The Pentagon. General Lemnitzer was Depu t y Chief of Staff for Plans and R e s e a r c h d u r i n g the period 1953 to 1955. 21. Conversations between General Barksdale Hamlett and Colonel Jack Ridgway and Lieutenant Colonel Paul Walter, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA (1976), Section 4, p. 66. 22. Ridgway to Secretary of the Army, Subj: National Security Council, 30 April 1954, Box 30, Ridgway Papers. 23. Ridgway to Secretary of the Army, Subj: Final Report, 9 June 1955, Box 30, Ridgway Papers. 24. Colonel A n d r e w J. Goodpaster, " M e m o r a n d u m for Record: Conference of Joint Chiefs of Staff with the President," 10 February 1956, Box 4, White House Office Files (Office of the Staff Secretary, DOD Subseries), Dwight D. E i s e n h o w e r : Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS; hereafter cited as Eisenhower Papers. Emphasis in the original.

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25. Ridgway to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Subj: Review of Basic National S e c u r i t y Policy, 22 N o v e m b e r 1954, Box 30, Ridgway Papers. Emphasis in the original. This memorandum, revised by Ridgway in his own hand, became the basis of his presentation to the NSC. 26. "Memorandum of Discussion at the 227th Meeting of the National Security Council," 3 December 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, pp. 804-06. 27. Goodpaster, "Memorandum of Conference with the President," 22 December 1954, Box 3. Ann Whitman File (Ann Whitman Diary), Eisenhower Papers. 28. The New York Times, 4 January 1955. 29. FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations (September 1954), p. 5. 30. Colonel Shillelagh, " . . . trouble with cavalry is .... "

The Army Combat Forces ]ournal 5 (January 1955), p. 35. 31. "Mission for the Army: The Winning of World War III," The Army Combat Forces Journal 5 (February 1955), p. 16. The a n o n y m o u s a u t h o r s of this a r t i c l e are described as "a number of soldiers whose interest in their profession goes far beyond their daily dnty." 32. Associated Press ticker, 28 February [1955], Box 3, White House Office Files (Office of the Staff Secretary, Alphabetical Subseries), Eisenhower Papers. 33. R i d g w a y , S o l d i e r : The M e m o i r s of Matthew B.

Ridgway (New York, 1956), p. 317. 34. Ridgway's letter to Wilson, dated 27 June 1955, is rep r i n t e d in Soldier, pp. 3 2 3 - 3 3 2 . E m p h a s i s in the original. 35. James L. Gavin, "We Can Solve Our Technical Difficulties," The Army Combat Forces Journal 6 (November 1955), p. 64.

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36. Associated Press ticker of Gavin's testimony, 28 June 1956, lCS 471.6 (Guided Missiles--1956), Box 56, Chairman's Files: Admiral Radford, 1953-1957, RG 218, NA. Lewis L. S t r a u s s to A d m i r a l Arthur Radford, 28 June 1956. Alfred Gruenther to Radford, 2 July 1956. 37. Taylor, Statement to Senate Armed Services Committee, 20 F e b r u a r y 1956, JCS 111 ( 1 9 5 6 - - B u d g e t ( 1 9 5 8 ) ) , Box 28, C h a i r m a n ' s File: A d m i r a l R a d f o r d , 1953-1957, RG 218, NA. 38. Rear Admiral Truman H. Hedding to Radford, Military Strategy and Posture, 1 February 1956, JCS 381 (Military Strategy and Posture), Box 47, C h a i r m a n ' s File: Admiral Radford, 1953-1957, RG 218, NA. 39. Radford to Joint Chiefs, Strategic Concepts and the Use of US Military Forces, 28 March 1956. 40. The New York Times, 19 May 1956. 41. Lieutenant General Clyde D. Eddleman to Hedding, The CNO Draft Flimsy re the ]SOP Strategic Concept, undated [June 1956], JCS 381 (Military and Strategic Posture, June--December), Box 47, Chairman's File: Admiral Radford, 1953-1957, RG 218, NA. 42. Radford to Wilson, Formulation of Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), 25 April 1957, JCS 381 (Military Strategy and Posture, June--December), Box 47, Chairman's File: Admiral Radford, 1953-1957, RG 218, NA. 43. Gavin's book was War and Peace in the Space Age (New York, 1958). Taylor's was Uncertain Trumpet.

Chapter 3 1. Taylor, remarks at The Army War College, 22 August 1955. Box 5, The Papers of Maxwell D. Taylor, National

Endnot~

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Defense University, Washington, DC; hereafter cited as Taylor Papers. R i d g w a y was e q u a l l y a d a m a n t in opposing a civil defense mission for the Army. See his Final Report to Secretary Brucker, 9 June 1955. Yet two years later. Eisenhower was still expressing "consternation at the reluctance of the Army to accept that as a role." The President was naively optimistic in thinking that the Army leadership would ever come around to his w a y of t h i n k i n g on this issue. John S.D. E i s e n h o w e r , M e m o r a n d u m of Conversation with the President, 20 August 1957, Box 1, White House Office Files (Office of the Staff Secretary, DaD Subseries), Eisenhower Papers.

2. Conversations Between Lieutenant General Paul W. Caraway and Colonel H. Ray, Senior Officers Debriefing Program (1971), Sec. 8, p. 58. 3. Ridgway, The Soldier and National Policy, remarks at a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations, 14 February 1955, vol. 21, Records of Meetings, Archives of the Council on Foreign Relations, New York. 4. Taylor, The Army--An Appeal to the Record, speech to the AI Smith Memorial Dinner, New York, 20 October 1955, Box 5, Taylor Papers. 5. Taylor, An Army Travelogue. speech to the Commonw e a l t h Club of California, San Francisco, 31 October •955, Box 5, Taylor Papers. 6. Taylor, remarks to Army War College, Carlisle Barracks. PA, 22 August 1955, Box 9, Taylor Papers. 7. T a y l o r , Security T h r o u g h Deterrence, r e m a r k s to Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 20 August 1956, Box 9, Taylor Papers. 8. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, p. 143. 9. Colonel George A. L i n c o l n and L i e u t e n a n t Colonel Amos A. Jordan, Jr., "Technology and the Changing

166

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Nature of General War," Military Review 37 (May 1957), p. 3. 10. Taylor, Address to the Graduating Class, Command and General Staff College, Fort L e a v e n w o r t h , KS, 18 June 1957, Box, 6, Taylor Papers. 11. L i e u t e n a n t Colonel William R. K i n t n e r to H e n r y Kissinger, 3 December 1955, vol. 61, Records of Groups, Archives of the Council on Foreign Relations. Kintner in retirement would become ambassador to Thailand and p r e s i d e n t of the Foreign P o l i c y Research Institute. In 1955. he participated with Kissinger in the Council on Foreign Relations' study group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. Generals Gavin, Lemnitzer, and Andrew O'Meara were other Army participants. The conclusions of the study group formed the basis for Kissinger's subsequent book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, 1957). 12. Colonel George C. Reinhardt, American Strategy in the Atomic Age, (Norman, OK, 1955), p. 58. An earlier and perhaps more influential statement of this viewpoint can be found in the 1952 report of Project Vista on A Study of Ground and Air Tactical Warfare with Special Reference to the Defense of Western Europe. That study c o n c l u d e d that the " t a c t i c a l e m p l o y m e n t of a t o m i c weapons against Soviet ground farce targets may give the NATO armies the necessary margin of advantage." It recommended accelerated efforts to provide the Army with the proper mix of such weapons. Record Group 407 (Records of The Adjutant General's Files), National Archives. 13. Brigadier General Carl F. Fitzsche, "Tomorrow's Infantry Today," The Army Combat Forces Journal 5 (April 1955), p. 20. 14. M a j o r R o d e r i c k A. S t a m e y , Jr., "Fire P o w e r and .Speed Will Beat the Odds," The Army Combat Forces Journal 6 (November 1955), p. 32.

Endnotes

167

15. "The Case for Tactical Nuclear Weapons," Army 6 (March 1956), p. 24. 16. Lieutenant Colonel George B. Pickett, "Squeeze 'em an' Blast 'em," Military Review 35 (September 1955), p. 57. Pickett, "What Profiteth a Nation," Military Review 34 (July 1954), p. 5. 17. Lieutenant Colonel Clarence C. DeReus, "Through the A t o m i c Looking Glass," Military Review 35 (June 1955), p. 11. 18. G e n e r a l W i l l a r d G. W y m a n , " T h e U n i t e d States Army: Its Doctrine and Influence on U.S. Military Strategy," Military Review 37 (March 1958), p. 10. 19. Pickett, "What Profiteth a Nation?" p. 5. 20. Reinhardt, American Strategy in the Atomic Age, p. 118. 21. R e i n h a r d t and Kintner, Atomic W e a p o n s in Land

Combat (Harrisburg, PA, 1953), p. 55. 22. Colonel A l e x a n d e r D. Surles, Jr., "Decision in the Face of Defeat," Military" Review 34 (March 1955), p. 34. 23. T.R. F e h r e n b a c h , '/'his Kind of War [New York, 1963), pp. 97-107 vividly describes the condition and fate of Task Force Smith. 24. C o n v e r s a t i o n s B e t w e e n General Paul L. Freeman, USA (Ret.) and Colonel James N. Ellis, Senior Officer Oral History Program (1974). See also Ridgway, Soldier, pp. 286-7. 25. General Willistom B. Palmer, "We Won't Have the T i m e , " The A r m y Combat F o r c e s J o u r n a l 6 ( O c t o b e r 1955), p. 37. 26. The Army's perspicacity did not extend to a recognition of "revolutionary warfare" as a peculiar type that the Army would confront. American officers did not draw any profound conclusions about the war in Indochina.

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Little discussion of the French failure there appeared in American military journals. That which did appear was seldom helpful. Even Bernard B. Fall, an analyst of insight and experience, was telling A m e r i c a n readers in late 1953 that the French experience could provide only "a few general lessons." Fall said that the Indochina war "cannot be considered a modern war since one of the opponents is entirely devoid of armor and air power." Fall, "Indochina: The Seven Year Dilemma," Military Review 33 (October 1953), p. 35. 27. Gavin, "Technical Difficulties," p. 64. Emphasis in the original. See also Taylor, letter to selected retired g e n e r a l officers, 29 N o v e m b e r 1955, Box 6, Toylor

Papers. 28. William F. Train. "The Atomic Challenge," Military Review 36 ( N o v e m b e r 1956), p. 5. E m p h a s i s in the original. 29. Taylor, The Army, Today and Tomorrow, speech to AUSA annual convention, Washington, DC, 25 October 1956, Box 5, Taylor Papers. 30. Lemnitzer, The Role of the Army in Modern War, Kermit Roosevelt Lecture, S a n d h u r s t , England, 5 May 1953, Box 75, the Papers of L y m a n L. L e m n i t z e r , Nat i o n a l Defense U n i v e r s i t y , W a s h i n g t o n , DC; hereafter cited as Lemnitzer Papers. 31. L i e u t e n a n t Colonel Lewis C. T a y n t o n , "Impact nf Atomic Weapons on Defense," Military Review 36 (September 1956), p. 57. 32. Colonel Frank J. Sackton, "The Changing Nature of War," Military Review 34 (November 1954), p. 60. 33. To m a i n t a i n the distinction between the utility of tactical n u c l e a r w e a p o n s and the f u t i l i t y of strategic w e a p o n s , the A r m y a r g u e d a g a i n s t the l i k e l i h o o d of escalation. The use of smaller tactical weapons would

Endnotes

169

not inevitably lead to the employment of larger ones, as the Service saw it. But such reasoning use owed more to f a i t h t h a n to logic. As the C o m m a n d i n g G e n e r a l of CONARC ( C o n t i n e n t a l A r m y C o m m a n d ) r e m a r k e d in 1958, the Army assumed restraint on the part of the Soviets since they "had no more intention of bequeathing the w o r l d to the o y s t e r - b o r i n g sea w o r m t h a n we h a v e . " Wyman, "The United States Army: Its Doctrine and Inf l u e n c e on US M i l i t a r y Strategy," Military Review 37 (March 1958), p. 12. 34. Wyman, "Highlights of Army Doctrine," Armor 67 (March-April 1958), p. 14. For a detailed view of how the Army viewed Soviet strategy, see Colonel Raymond L. Shoemaker et al, "Readiness for the Little War: Optimum Integrated Strategy," Military Review 37 [April 1957), pp. 16-22. 35. For a clear s u m m a t i o n of this v i e w p o i n t , see DA Pamphlet 21-70, The Role of the Army, 29 June 1955. 36. W y m a n , " I n v i t a t i o n to T h i n k , " I n f a n t r y School

Quarterly 46 (October 1956), p. 10. 37. Wyman, "Highlights of Army Doctrine," p. 16. 38. Sackton, "Atomic: Weapons for the Battalion Commander," The Army Combat Forces Journal 5 (December 1954), p. 44. 39. Captain Everett C. Royal, "The Team of Mobile Warfare: A r m o r a n d A i r b o r n e , " A r m o r 64 ( M a r c h - A p r i l 1955), p. 4. The Pentomic division was one of the few A r m y i n i t i a t i v e s of the 1950s to a t t r a c t P r e s i d e n t E i s e n h o w e r ' s e n t h u s i a s t i c support. The President believed that reducing the size of the division would allow the Army to accept further reductions in its overall pers o n n e l s t r e n g t h w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g the same n o m i n a l force structure. Such was never the Army's intent; indeed, the Army continued to push for more people and more divisions, A p p a r e n t agreement on organizational

170

The P e n t o m i c Era

reform further illustrates the depth of misunderstanding b e t w e e n the P r e s i d e n t a n d his f o r m e r Service. See G o o d p a s t e r , M e m o r a n d u m of Conference with the President, 11 October 1956, Box 19, Ann Whitman File (Eisenhower Diary}, Eisenhower Papers. 40. T h e o d o r e H. White, "An I n t e r v i e w w i t h General Gavin . . . . T o m o r r o w ' s Battlefield," The Army Combat Forces Journal 5 (March 1955), p. 22. 41. Colonel E d w a r d L. Rowny, " G r o u n d Tactics ill an Atomic War," The Army Combat Forces Journal 5 (August 1954), p. 19. 42. Gavin, "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses," Armor 63 (May-June 1954), pp. 18-22. 43. Taylor, "Remarks before the House Armed Services C o m m i t t e e , " 29 January 1957, JCS 111 (1958 Budget/, Box 28, Chairman's Files: Admiral Radford 1953-1957, RG 218, NA. 44. Taylor, " T h e Changing A r m y , " The Army Combat Forces Journal, 6 (October 1955), p. 10.

Chapter 4 1. John B. Maderis, Countdown for Decision /New York. 1960/, p. 65. See also Michael H. Armacost, The Politics

of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York 1969), p. 49. 2. Conversations Between Lieutenant General Paul W. Caraway and Colonel H. Ray, 8, p. 47. Caraway was a brigadier general in charge of Armv research and development in the period just after Korea. 3. Lemnitzer to Lieutenant General Charles L. Bolte, 22 January 1953, Box 1, Lemnitzer Papers.

Endnotes

171

4. See, for example, "Outstanding Army Rocket Record," Missiles and Rockets 1 (November 1956/, p. 33. 5. NSC 159, "Report of the Continental Defense Committee," 22 July 1954, RG 273, NA. 6. The New York Times, 28 March 1948. 7. Unless o t h e r w i s e noted, t e c h n i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n on weapons comes from various editions of lane's All the World's Aircraft or lane's Weapons Systems.

8. The New York Times, 21 May 1956. 9. "The Army's Bird in Hand," Air Force Magazine 39 (June 1956), p. 42. 10.. Ibid., p. 44. 11. The New York Times, 27 November 1956. 12. Army Regulation (AR) 525-30, Army Missiles, 28 August 1956. 13. T h e Key West A g r e e m e n t is p r i n t e d in The New York Times, 28 March 1948. 14. Taylor, remarks to Army Commander's Conference, Fort Bliss, TX, 5 April 1956, Box 9, Taylor Papers. 15. Major General Holger N. Toftoy, " A r m y ' s Role in G u i d e d M i s s i l e s , " Missiles and Rockets 1 (November 1956), p. 37. 16. The New York Times, 27 November 1956. 17. Douglas Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy Management (Lexington, KY, 1977), p. 74. 18. US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, 86th Congress, 1st Session, Organization and Management of Missile Programs, 2 March 1959, p. 298. 19. T a y l o r , A Program For Improving l,imited War Capabilities, remarks at Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 12 June 1958, Box 4, Taylor Papers.

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The Pentomic Era

20. Preliminary Concepts for Battle Group Atomic Delivery System, 9 April 1958, Box 3, White House Office Files (Office of the Staff S e c r e t a r y , A l p h a b e t i c a l Subseries), Eisenhower Papers. 21. Lemnitzer to Lieutenant General John E. Dahlquist, 4 F e b r u a r y 1954, Box 2, Lemnitzer Papers. E m p h a s i s added. 22. Taylor, remarks at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 20 August 1956, Box 9, Taylor Papers. 23. Taylor, Development of US Military Strategy, speech at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 26 January 1959, Box 4, Taylor Papers. 24. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 85th Congress, 1st Session, Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs, 13 December 1957, p. 490. 25. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army ]anuary 1-June 30, 1957, (Washington, DC, 1958J, p. 104; hereafter cited as Semiannual Report. 26. Semiannual Report FY 1956, ( W a s h i n g t o n , DC, 1957), p. 83. 27. L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l A n t h o n y L. W e r m u t h , "Modernization-Minus," Army 9 (October 1958), p. 31.

Chapter 5 1. Meeting of Subcommittee III, study group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 15 February 1956, vol. 61, Records of Groups, Archives of the Council on Foreign Relations. 2. White, An Interview with General Gavin, p. 22.

Endnot~

173

3. SemiAnnual Report of the Secretary of the Army, FY 1956, p. 89. 4. R i d g w a y , T a y l o r , and G a v i n each c o m m a n d e d airborne d i v i s i o n s during World War II. R i d g w a y also c o m m a n d e d XVIII (Airborne) Corps.

5. Semiannual Report, FY 1958, p. 106. 6. Semiannual Report, FY 1956, p. 87. 7. Reinhart and Kintner, Atomic Weapons in Land Combat, pp. 35-36. 8. Colonel Theodore C. Mataxis and Lieutenant Colonel Seymour L. Goldberg, Nuclear Tactics (Harrisburg, PA, 1958), pp. 164,211.

9. Ibid., pp. 169 7 0 , 184. 10. Anthony Leveiro, "Task Force Razor Shaves Big Apple 2," The Army Combat Forces Journal 5 (June 1955), pp. 3 8 - 4 3 . "The B r e a k t h r o u g h , " A r m o r 64 (May-June 1955), pp. 8-13. 11. The A r m o r e d S c h o o l , F i n a l Report of T e s t - Armored Task Force Participation--Exercise Desert Rock VI, 1 A u g u s t 1955. C o p y o b t a i n e d from the N a t i o n a l Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, VA. The report has been completely declassified. 12. Exercise Desert Rock VII and VIII, Camp Irwin, CA. Infantry Troop Test, Exercise Desert Rock VII & VIII, 11 December 1957. Copy obtained from NTIS. 13. L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l D o u g l a s L i n d s e y , M.D., " N o T i m e For D e s p a i r , " A r m o r 65 ( M a y - J u n e 1956), pp. 38-39. 14. Wyman, Highlights of Army Doctrine, p. 14. 15. Colonel Henry E. Kelly, "Dig That Atomic Foxhole," Army 6 (June 1956), pp. 38-39.

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The P e n t o m i c Era

16. Wyman, "Let's Get Going on our New Combinations For Combat," Army 6 (July 1956), p. 40. 17. C o l o n e l James E. E d w a r d s , "Web D e f e n s e , " The

Army Combat Forces Journal 5 (June 1955), p. 37. 18. Major General Hamilton H. Howze, "Cnmhat Tactics for Tomorrow's Army," Army 8 (October 1958), p. 30. 19. Edwards, "Web Defense," p. 32. 20. Howze, "Combat Tactics for Tomorrow's Army," p. 29. 21. Major General Joseph H. Harper and Colonel Joseph H. S t i l w e l l , Jr., " T h e Final D e c i s i o n is the I n f a n t r y man's," The Army Combat Forces Journal, 6 (September 1955), p. 44. Stilwell headed the Infantry School's Tactical Department. See also Lieutenant Colonel George B. Cullison, "The Integrated Battle Group," Military Review 36 (November 1956), p. 39. 22. Howze, "Combat Tactics for Tomorrow's Army," p. 28. 23. Conversations Between General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (Ret.) and Colonel Richard A. Manion," S~nior Officers Debriefing Program (1976), 3d interview, p. 26. 24. For a p e n e t r a t i n g critique of Army L e a d e r s h i p in Korea, see "Faithful To Our Trust," The Army Combat Forces Journal 5 (December 1954), pp. 18-21. The anonymous author of this article was a combat veteran of both World War II and Korea. 25. Report of the Defense Advisory" Committee on Professional and Technical Compensation, Volume I (Military Personnel), pp. 2, 4, 43, 78. 26. Taylor, An A r m y Traveloque s p e e c h to the Commonwealth Club of California, 31 October 1955, Box 5, Taylor Papers. Such turbulence did not result entirely from the d r a w d o w n after the Korean armistice. In FY

Endnotes

175

1956, with an Army of slightly more than one million, 460,000 soldiers were discharged and another 376,000 brought on active duty. Taylor, speech at Town Hall, Los Angeles, 21 May 1957, Box 6, Taylor Papers. 27. George Fielding Eliot, "Has the Army Lost Its Soul?,"

Military Review 33 (November 1953), p. 9. 28. Colonel Richard N. Whitney, "A Fighting Heart for the Army's New Look," Military Review 35 (April 1955}, pp. 9 10. 29. " O n e T h i r d of A r m y Will Be on the M o v e Each Year," A r m y - N a v y - A i r Force J o u r n a l 92 (2 O c t o b e r 1954), p. 122. 30. S.L.A. M a r s h a l l , " G y r o s c o p e ' s End P r o v o k e s No Widespread Protest," Army-Navy-Air Force Register and Defense Times 80 (19 September 1959), p. 11. 31. Remarks by General Taylor to the Army Staff, 7 July 1955, Box 5, Taylor Papers. 32. "For Atomic Warfare ... A Look into the Fllture," Armor 63 (September-October 1954), p. 5. This unsigned a r t i c l e c o n t a i n s a l e n g t h y e x c e r p t from a s p e e c h by Ridgeway. 33. Roger W. Little, "Solidarity Is the Key to the Mass Army," The Army C o m b a t Forces Journal 5 (February 1955), pp. 27-31.

Chapter 6 1. Lemnitzer, "Why We Need a Modern Army," Army 10 (September 1959], p. 17. Emphasis in the original. 2. General Bruce Clarke, "The Word is Go," Army 10 (March 1960), p. 39.

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The P e n t o m i c Era

3. Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, pp. 30-34. Somewhat inconsistently in light of his earlier assertions that Soviet and American strategic nuclear weapons tended to cancel each other out, Taylor also used the bugaboo of a "Missile Gap" to argue that American inferiority left the United States in serious jeopardy of a Soviet nuclear attack. Uncertain Trumpet, pp. 131-32, 135. 4. M a r s h a l l , " A r m s in W o n d e r l a n d , " A r m y 7 (June 1957), p. 19. 5. M a r s h a l l , " T h e Place of Man in a M o d e r n A r m y , " A r m y 10 (April 1959), pp. 26, 30. 6. Lieutenant Colonel Arthur W. Milberg, "Atomic War Q u e s t i o n s For Battle C o m m a n d e r s , " A r m y 9 (January 1959), p. 28. 7. Arthur S. Collins, Senior Officers Oral History Project, S e n i o r Officer D e b r i e f i n g Program (1982), pp. 239--43. 8. Ernest F. Fisher, Jr. Relationship of the ROAD Concept to Moral Considerations in Strategic Planning, File 2-3.7/AC.C, Box 68, Office of the Chief of Military History Manuscripts, RG 319, NA.

9. Conversation Between General Hamilton Howze and Lieutenant Colonel Robert Reed, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (1972), pp. 6-7. 10. Conversations Between General Donald V. Bennett and Lieutenant Colonel Smith and Lieutenant Colonel Hatcher, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (1976), Section 5, pp. 10-11. 11. C o n v e r s a t i o n B e t w e e n General Paul L. Freeman, USA (Ret.) and Colonel James N. Ellis, second interview, p. 30. 12. Conversation B e t w e e n General George H. Decker, USA (Ret.) and Lieutenant Colonel Dan H. Rails, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (1976), p. 65.

Endnotes

177

13. Kelly, "Verbal Defense," Military Review 35 (October 1955), pp. 4 5 4 6 , 51. 14. Lieutenant Colonel Linwood A. Carleton and Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Farnsworth, "A Philosophy for Tactics," Military Review 40 (July 1960), pp. 12,22. 15. Colonel Francis X. Bradley, "The Fallacy of Dual Capability," Army 10 (October 1959), pp. 18-19. 16. Collins, "The Other Side of the Atom," Army 10 (November 1959), pp. 18-19. 17. Colonel William E. DePuy, "The Case for a Dual Capability," Army 10 (January 1960), pp. 32-34, 38. 18. George A. Kelly, " R e v o l u t i o n a r y Warfare and Psyc h o l o g i c a l O p e r a t i o n s , " Military Review 40 /October 1960), pp. 4-13. L i e u t e n a n t Colonel George B. Jordan, "Objectives and M e t h o d s of C o m m u n i s t Guerilla Warfare," Military Review, 39 (January 1960), pp. 50-59. B r i g a d i e r G e n e r a l D a v i d N. Gray, " W h e n We Fight a Small War," Army 10 (July 1960), pp. 26-34. Lieutenant Colonel Donald V. Rattan, "Antiguerrilla Operations--A Case S t u d y from H i s t o r y , "Military Review 40 (May 1960), pp. 23-27. 19. Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conversation with the President, 18 April 1956, Box 15, A n n W h i t m a n File (Eisenhower Diary), Eisenhower Papers. 20. Goodpaster, M e m o r a n d u m of Conference with the President, 2 April 1956, Box 15, Ann W h i t m a n File (Eisenhower Diary), Eisenhower Papers. 21. Memorandum of Conference with the President, 17 May 1955, Box 5, Ann Whitman File (Ann Whitman Diary), Eisenhower Papers. See also Eisenhawer to Swede Hazlett, 26 February 1958, Box 18, Ann Whitman File (Name Series); record of telephone call, Eisenhower to Thomas Gates, 12 January 1960, Box 47, Ann Whitman File (Eisenhnwer Diary); Goodpaster, "Memorandum of

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The Pentomic Era

Conversation with the President," 5 July 1960, Box 50, Ann Whitman File (Eisenhower Diary), all Eisenhower Papers. 22. Eisenhower to Swede Hazlett, 20 August 1956, Box 17, Ann Whitman File (Eisenhower Diary), Eisenhower Papers. 23. Goodpaster, Memoramh~m of Conference with the President, 18 M a y 1956, Box 15, Ann W h i t m a n File (Eisenhower Diary), Eisenhower Papers. 24. Lincoln and Stilwell, "Scholars Debouch into Strategy," Military Review 40 (July 1960), pp. 67, 70. 25. Gavin to Kissinger, 9 October 1955, vol. 61, Records of Groups, Archives of the Council on Foreign Relations. 26. Martin Van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. A r m y Performance, 1939-1945 ( W e s t p o r t , CT, 1982), p. 174.

Selected Bibliography Manuscript Collections Archives of the Council on Foreign Relations, New York. The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS. The Papers of Lyman L. Lemnitzer, National Defense University, Washington, DC. The Papers of Matthew B. Ridgway, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA. The Papers of Maxwell D. Taylor, National Defense University, Washington, DC. Records of The Adjutant General's Files, Record Group 407, National Archives, Washington, DC. Records of the Army Staff, Record Group 319, National Archives, Washington, DC. Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, National Archives, Washington, DC. Records of the National Security Council, Record Group 273, National Archives, Washington, DC.

Interview Lyman L. Lemnitzer, 8 February 1985, The Pentagon. 179

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The P e n t o m i c Era

Oral Histories Senior Officer Debriefing Program, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA; recollections of the following: General Donald V. Bennett (1976) Lieutenant General Paul W. Caraway (1971) Lieutenant General Arthur S. Collins, Jr. (1982) General George H. Decker (1976) General Paul L. Freeman (1974) General Barksdale Hamlett (1976) General Hamilton H. Howze (1972) General Maxwell D. Taylor (1976)

Government Reports and Published Documents Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense (July 1, 1959 to June 30, 1960). Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (1961) The Armored School. Final Report of Test--Armored Task Force Participation--Exercise Desert Rock VI, 1 August 1955, Document number AD-A080 235, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA. Exercise Desert Rock VII and VIII, Camp Irwin, CA, "Infantry Troop Test, Exercise Desert Rock VII & VIII," 11 December 1957, Document number AD-A075 358, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954 vol II: National Security Affairs, part 1 Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (1984).

Selected Bibliography

181

Public Papers of the President: Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953) Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (1960). Semiannual Report of ~he Secretary of the Army. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (1954-1961). US Army. AR 525-30• Army Missiles• 28 August 1956. • DA Pamphlet 21-70• The Role of the Army. 29 June 1955. • FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations (September 1954). US Congress. House of Representatives• Committee nn Government Operations• 86th Congress, 1st Session, Organization and Management of Missile Programs• • Senate, Committee on Armed Forces• 85th Congress, 1st Session. Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs• • Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriation• 83d Congress, 2d Session• Department of Defense Appropriations for 1955.

Newspapers and Periodicals Air Force Magazine Armor Army The Army Combat Forces Journal

Army Information Digest Army-Navy-Air Force Journal Army~Navy-Air Force Register and Defense Times Infantry School Quarterly Military Review Missiles and Rockets The New York Times

182

The Pentomic Era

Books Armacost, Michael H. The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy. New York: Columbia University Press (1969). Eisenhower, Dwight D. Mandate For Change, 1953-1956. New York: Doubleday & Company (•963). F e h r e n b a c h , T.R. This Kind of War: A S t u d y of Unpreparedness. New York: Macmillian and Company (1963). Ferrell, Robert H., ed. The Diary of James C. Hagerty. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press (1983). Gaddis, John Lewis, Strategies of Containment. New York: Oxford University Press (1982). Gavin, James M War and Peace in the Space Age. New York: Harper and Brothers (1958). Geelhoed, E. Bruce. Charles E. Wilson and Controversy at the Pentagon. Detroit: Wayne State University Press (1979). Jane's All The World's Aircraft. New York: McGraw (various editions). Jane's Weapons Systems. New York: McGraw (various editions). Kinnard, Douglas. President Eisenhower and Strategy Management. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky (1977). Kissinger, Henry. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York: Harper and Brothers (1957). Maderis, John B. Countdown For Decision. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons (1960). Mataxis, Theodore C. and Seymour L. Goldberg. Nuclear Tactics. Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Company (1958). Reinhardt, George C. American Strategy in the Atomic Age. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press (1955).

Selected Bibliography

183

and William R. Kintner, Atomic Weapons in Land Combat, Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Company (1953). Ridgway, Matthew B. Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway. New York: Harper & Brothers (1956). Taylor, Maxwell D. Swords and Plowshares. New York: W.W. Norton & Company (1972). The Uncertain Trumpet. New York: Harper & Brothers (1959). Uhl, Michael and Tod Ensign. GI Guinea Pigs. np: Playboy Press (1980). Van Creveld, Martin. Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press (1982). Weigley, Russell F. The A m e r i c a n Way of War. New York: Macmillian and Company (1973). Yanarella, Ernest J. The Missile Defense Controversy. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky (1977).

The Author ieutenant Colonel A. J. Bacevich, US Army, L received his commission from the United States Military Academy. An armor officer, he has served w i t h a r m o r e d c a v a l r y u n i t s in the c o n t i n e n t a l United States, Germany, and Vietnam. He currently commands the 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Bliss, Texas. In preparation for a teaching assignment with the D e p a r t m e n t of History, USMA, C o l o n e l Bacevich earned an MA degree in American history at P r i n c e t o n U n iv ers ity . P r i n c e t o n later a w a r d e d him a PhD for his dissertation, American Military Diplomacy, 1898-1949: The Rale of F r a n k Ross

McCoy. Colonel Bacevich wrote this book while he was an International Affairs Fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations.

185

Index

"Active Defense," 143 Air defense, 74, 75, 76-80, 98 Air defense battalions, 77-78 Air Force, US, 20-21, 70, 73, 74 and air defense, 75-80 and deterrence, 15-16, 45-46 and preventive war, 33 and SSMs, 82, 86, 88-90 "Airborne Club," 106 "AirLand Battle," 143 Ajax, 78-79, 80 Antiaircraft weapon systems, 77-88. See also Missiles Area defense, 115-119. See also Dispersion of forces Army, 24, 136, 137 Army, Secretary of, 33--34, 123. See also Brucker, Wilbur M. Army, US. See also Gavin, Lt. Gen. James M.; Ridgway, Gen. Matthew B.; Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D. and the Air Force, 15-16, 20, 45-46, 73, 74, 76-77, 78-80, 82, 86-88, 90 image of, 20-21, 22. See also Public relations influence of, 33-36, 96 morale. See u11der Personnel o p p o s i t i o n to "New [,oak," 21-22, 25, 130-133, 141,145, 151. See also Massive retaliation, Army opposition to and reform, 132, 141-145, 156-157 role of, 15-18, 39, 47, 49-51, 52, 71,144-145, 146, 151-153, 164--165n.1 strength of, 19, 42, 121, 174n.26 Army Combat Forces Journal. 40 Army General Staff, 45 "Army Mule," 100 187

188

The P e n t o m i c Era

Army War Plans Branch, 27 Artillery, 100. See also Antiaircraft weapon systems; Nuclear weapons, tactical; Rockets 8-inch gun, 84 155-ram howitzer, 84 280-mm gun, 82-84, 94 Association of the United States Army (AUSA), 24

B-17, in missile test, 78 "Babylonian Captivity" of the Army, 9 "Basic National Security Policy," See NSC 162/1 Bataan, 58, 58n Battle group, 5, 105-106, 115-116 Battle of France, 66-67 Battle of Stalingrad, 118, 118n Beetle Bailey, 20 Bennett, Gen. Donald V., on the Pentomic Division, 135 "The Big Picture," 24 Bolte, Gen. Charles, 73 Bomarc, 78 Bradley, Col. Francix X., on dual capability, 136-137 Brucker, Wilbur M. (Sec. Army), 33-34, 35 on Gyroscope, 123 on missile program limits, 92 on public, relations, 22 Brushfire war, 51, 142, 152, See also Localized conflict Budget, 16-18, 19-20, 21, 50-51, 72, 90. See also Economic factors and defense i n v e s t m e n t imbalance, 9 8 - 1 0 1 , 1 0 3 , 151

Caraway, Lt. Gen. Paul W., and Army role, 49 "The Case for a Dual Capability" (DePuy), 138 Chief of Staff, A r m y , 34. See also Decker, Gen. George H.; L e m n i t z e r , Gen. Lyman L.; R i d g w a y , Gen. M a t t h e w B.; Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D. China. See People's Republic of China Clarke, Gen. Bruce, and the soldier in the atomic age, 129 C o l l i n s , Lt. Gen. A r t h u r S., Jr., on n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , 133, 137-138

Index

189

"Colonels' Revolt," 45 Combat effectiveness, measurements of, 119-120 Combat support, 105-106 Command and control, 68-69 Communications, 116, 117-119 Communist fnr~.es, 56-57, 65, 139. See also Soviet Union Concentration of forces, 68 Congress, US, and technology, 72 Contingency planning, 60-61, 147-148 Conventional conflict. See Non-nuclear aggression Cordiner Commission Report, 120-121 Corporal, 86-87, 94, 142 Counterinsurgency, 142, 143. See also Localized conflict; Nonnuclear aggression Cnvert action. 14-15 Creveld. Martin van, on technology and war, 156 Cushman, Maj. John H., on the Army's mission, 21

Davy Crocket, 94-95 Decker, Gen. George H., on the Pentomic Division, 135 Defense, Department of, 33, 74 Defense, Secretary of. See McElroy, Neil H.; Wilson, Charles E. Defense Reorganization Act. 1958, 147 DePuy, Col. William E. on dual capability, 138-140 on tactical nuclear weapons, 139-141 Desert Rock VI, 110-113, 114 Deterrence, 11, 13~14, 31, 32, 141. See also Massive retaliation; Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D. under Eisenhower, 11-14, 15, 30-31, 49, 141, 144-145 mutual, 13-14, 32, 41-42, 64, 140-141, 151 "Dig That Atomic Foxhole" (Kelly), 115 Dispersion of forces, 67-69, 70, 104, 142. See also Area defense Divisions 101st Airborne, 106 Pentomic. See Pentomic concept Dominican Republic, 152 Dual capability, 62-63, 130, 134, 136-140. See also Flexible Response; Localized conflict; N o n - n u c l e a r aggressive; Readiness

190

The P e n t o m i c Era

Dulles, John Foster (Sec. State), on retaliation, 11

Eastern Europe. 27, 28 E c o n o m i c f a c t o r s a n d d e f e n s e , 12, 33, 38, 5 1 - 5 2 . See also Budget Edwards, Lt. Col. James W., on key terrain, 116 Eisenhower, Dwight D. (President), 11, 142. See also Massive retaliation and the Air Force, 15-16 and the Army, 16-18, 39, 130, 144-1145, 164-165n.1 defense policy, 15-18. See also NSC 5410/1 and the JCS, 36, 39, 146-147 n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y p o l i c y , 1 1 - 1 4 , 38. See also NSC 162/2 and preventive war, 33 and preventive war, 33 and the Pentomic Division, 169n.39 and Ridgway, 31, 38 Equipment m o d e r n i z a t i o n , 96, 98-101, 103 Explorer I, 75

Fall, Bernard, on m o d e r n war and Indochina, 167-168n.26 "The Fallacy of Dual Capablity" (Bradley), 136 Field Artillery Missile Group, 40th, 87 Firepower, 55-57, 131. See also Nuclear weapons, tactical Flexibility of forces, 69, 70, 134 Flexible Response, 40, 130, 142. See also Dual capability: Localized conflict; N o n - n u c l e a r aggression; Readiness FM 100-5, "Field Service Regulations, Operations," 40 Foreign policy, US, 10, 14--15, 28 Freeman, Gen. Paul L., on the Pentomic Division, 135

Gavin, Lt. Gen. James M., 48 on defense policy, 4 2 - 4 4 on missile program costs, 99-100 on nuclear warfighting, 68--69, 104, 105 on readiness, 61 on technology and war, 53, 154 Grenada, 152 Gruenther, Gen. Alfred, on Gavin on defense policy, 43

Index

191

Guderian, Gen. Heinz, 109, 109n Guerrilla conflict. See Localized conflict Gyroscope, 122-123

Hamlett, Gen. Barksdale, on Wilson and Ridgway, 34 Hawk, 80 Hazlett, Swede, 146 Hedding, R. Adm. Truman H., on Army opposition to defense policy, 44 Helicopters, 108, 118 Hercules, 78, 79, 80 Hiroshima, 133, 144 Honest John, 94, 108, 142 Howze, Gen. Hamilton H., on area defense, 117, 118 on Pentomic concept, 134--135 "Human wave" tactics, 56-57 Humphrey, George T. (Sec. Treas.), 38

Indochina War, 61, 167-160n.26 Inter-Service rivalry, 36, 82, 145-147, 151. See also Army, and the Air Force Islands of resistance. See Area defense

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JSC), 26, 27, 29, 32, 34 and Eisenhower, 36, 39, 146-147 and use of nuclear weapons, 39, 44 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of, 34. See also Radford, Adm. Arthur W.; Twining, Gen. Nathan F. "Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) Strategic Concept," 46, 47 Jupiter, 87-88, 90

Kasserine Pass, 58, 58n Kelly, Col. Henry E. and "Atomic Foxhole," 115 and "Verbal Defense," 135-136

192

The Pentomic Era

Kennedy, John F. (President), 142 Key terrain, 116 Key West agreement, 77, 79, 80, 86 Kintner, Lt. Col. William R., on weapons technology, 53-54 Kissinger, Henry A., 53, 154 Korean War and the Army's historical role, 152 and defense policy, 10, 11, 144 and firepower, 55-56 and readiness, 58, 59 and Truman, 9-10

Lance, 142 Land power, 66, 142 Lebanon, 152 Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman L. on the Air Force and missile development, 73 on nuclear arsenals, 129 and principles of war, 63 and "survival of the Army," 21 "l.ight Infantry," 143 "Limited War One," 59 Lincoln, Col. George A., on the Army of the 1950s, 151 Little John, 94-96 Little, Roger W., on the "Mass Army," 124-127 Localized conflict, 32, 43-44, 60-61. See also Dual capability; Flexible Response; Non-nuclear aggression; Readiness Luddites, 156, 156n

M56, 1 0 0 MacArthur, Gen. of the Army Douglas, 9 McElroy, Neil H. (Sec. Def.), 90-91 Maginot Line, 66-67 Manpower, use of, 10, 55-57, 139 Marshall, Gen. of the Army George C., 34 Marshall, S.L.A., on the Army and the atomic age, 131-132 Massive retaliation, 11, 12-13, 14. See also Deterrence Army opposition to, 22, 25-33, 37-38, 39-48, 63, 129-130, 141, 144, 148

Index

193

Civilian opposition to, 48 under Eisenhower, 11, 12-13, 25-26, 27, 29, 30-31, 38--39, 48, 129 and the NSC, 27-28 and the Soviet bomber threat, 76, 76-.-77 Medaris, Maj. Gen. John B., on weapons and the budget, 72 Media, Army use of. See under Public relations Military Review, 54-55 "Missile Gap," 175n.3 Missiles, 74-75. See also Rockets antiballistic (ABM), 80 cost of, 96, 97-101, 103, 141-142 intermediate-range ballistic (IRBM), 87-90 surface-to-air (SAM), 75, 78-80 surface-to-surface (SSM), 75, 80, 82, 84-92 Mobility of forces, 69-70, 106

National Security Council (NSC), 26, 38, 76. See also NSC 162/2 and the Army, 27-30, 35 Planning Board, 27, 29 National Security Policy. See NSC 162/2 Nation-building, 142 NATO, 43 Navy, US, 78 "New Look,"' basis of, 15. See also under Army The New York Times, 40, 45, 78 NIKE, 78-79, 80 Non-nuclear aggression, 11, 13, 14-15, 32, 37-38, 40-41, 42, 43, 44, 51-53, 60-62, 65,131. See also Dual capability; Flexible Response; Readiness No-notice war, 59-60. See also Readiness North Korea, army of, 10, 56, 59 NSC 162/2, 11-15, 25-27, 32 NSC 5410/1, 27-30 Nuclear weapons costs of, 96, 97-101, 140, 141-142 and exercises, 94, 110-114, 133 and foreign relations, 28, 137 radiation and fallout, 113-114

194

The P e n t o m i c Era

strategic, 54, 64, 129, 137, 149, 168-169n.33. See also Massive retaliation tactical, 54-57, 64--66, 82-88, 92-96, 108, 118--119, 130, 131, 133, 1 3 6 - 1 3 8 , 1 4 9 - 1 5 0 , 151, 166n.12, 168-1169n.33. See also Missiles and warfare, 13, 15, 40, 50, 53-56, 144, 154 and warfighting, 64-70, 108-109, 115-118

Operation Gyroscope, 122-123 Organization, nuclear age, 62-63, 104-105. See also Pentomic concept

Palmer, Gen. Williston B., on readiness, 59---60 Panmunjom, 10 Pentomic concept, 130, 142 and organization, 5, 105-108, 133-135, 141, 169n.39 and tactics. 108-113, 115-119, 135-136 People's Republic of China, 27 army of, 10, 56-57 Pershing, 91, 142 Personnel morale, 20-21, 114, 121, 122, 124-125, 156-157 and rotation, 121-123 and technology, 120-121,124-127, 131, 139, 156. See also Manpower, use of Pickett, Lt. Col. George B., on firepower, 55--56 Plans and Research, Deputy Chief of Staff for. See Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman L. Preparedness. See Readiness P r e s i d e n t of the United States. See Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Kennedy, John F.; Truman, Harry S. Preventive war, 32-33, 37 Public relations Army use of, 22-24, 43, 45, 75, 82, 112, 113-114 and inter-Service rivalry, 145

Radford, Adm. Arthur W., 34, 44, 145 and the Army's role, 47

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Index

195

and NSC 5410/1, 29-30 Readiness, 37-38, 56-63, 141. See also Dual capability; Flexible Response; Localized conflict; Non-nuclear aggression Red Menace, 10 Redstone, 75, 87 Redstone Arsenal, Ala., 87 Research and D e v e l o p m e n t , Deputy Chief of Staff for. See Gavin, Lt. Gen. James M. Research and development allocations, 96-101 Revolutionary warfare, 167-168n.26 Ridgway, Gen. Matthew B., 29, 48 and Army status, 34--35, 36 and the Army's role, 49-50, 164n.1 and balanced strength, 37-38, 42 and massive retaliation, 22, 31, 37, 50 and the "New Look," 22, 41 and the NSC, 29-30, 35, 36-38, 39 and nuclear weapons, 31, 37, 38, 41-42 and preventive war, 32-33, 37 and Radford, 29-30, 34 and the warrior ethic, 124 and Wilson, 34, 36, 41, 42 Rockets, 73, 94--95, 108 Rommel, Field Marshal Erwin, 109, 109n Rowny, Col. Edward L., and mobility, 69

Security of forces, 66. See also Dispersion of forces Senate Armed Forces Committee, 41 Sergeant Bilko, 20 Service support, 105, 108 Skysweeper, 77-78 "Solidarity is the Key to the Mass Army" (Little), 124 Soviet Union, 27 nature of the threat from, 10, 13-14, 32, 33, 38, 41-42, 44, 76, 136-137, 139, 166-169n.33. See also Communist forces nuclear arsenal, 13, 32, 64, 140--141 Space exploration, 73-74, 75 Special forces, 142 Sputnik I, 75 Stassen, Harold (Mutual Security Director), 30

196

The P e n t o m i c Era

Steve Canyon, 20 Stilwell, Col. Richard G., on the A r m y of the 1950s, 151 Stragetic Air C o m m a n d (SAC), 15, 20, 76 Strauss, Lewis L. (AEC Chairman), 43

T l 1 3 , 100 Tactical air support, 88-89 Tactics. See u n d e r Pentomic concept Talos, 78, 80 Task Force Ruzor, 110--113 Task Force Smith, 59 Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 42 and "Babylonian Captivity," 9 and a civil defense mission, 49 and deterrence, 50-52 on dual capability, 63 and a Flexibile Response, 44, 48, 51, 52, 130 on missile d e v e l o p m e n t , 98, 99, 175n.3 on mobility, 69 on nuclear weapons, 92-93 on officers, 123 and statistics, 120 on tactical air support, 88 and technology, 53 The Uncertain Trumpet, 130 T e c h n o l o g y . See also M a n p o w e r , u s e of; M i s s i l e s ; N u c l e a r weapons; Personnel and A r m y reform, 144, 148 n o n - n u c l e a r m o d e r n i z a t i o n , 71-73, 98--101, 103 and the Pentomic concept, 149-150 Third World, 52 "This is Your Army," 24 Thor, 90 Toftoy, Maj. Gen. Holger N., and tactical air support, 88-89 Train, Brig. Gen. W i l l i a m F., oil adaptability, 62 Truman, Harry S. (President), 9 - 1 0 T r u m a n Doctrine, 10 Twining, Gen. Nathan F., 34, 48

Index

197

Uncertain Trumpet, The (Taylor), 130 Uniforms, 22,-23, 72 USSR. See Soviet Union

Van Creveld. See also Creveld, Martin van Van Fleet, Lt. Gen. James, 120 "'Van Fleet' day of fire," 55 "Verbal Defense" (Kelly), 135 Vietnam War, 143, 152

War, nature and p r i n c i p l e s of, 13, 15, 40, 50, 53-54, 63, 68, 144, 154 Weigley, Russell F., on massive retaliation 13 Whitney, Col. Richard W., on unit esprit, 122 Wilson, Charles E. (Sec. Def.}, 34, 36, 39 and air defense, 80 and IRBMs, 90 and "JSOP Strategic Concept," 47 and Ridgway, 34, 38, 41, 42 and Taylor, 42 W y m a n , Gen. Willard G. on dispersion, 67 on firepower, 56 on sanitized nuclear w e a p o n s , 114 and Soviet use of nuclear weapons, 168--169n.33 World War I, tactics of, 109-110 World War II, r e a d i n e s s for, 5 8 - 5 9 Yucca Flat, Nev., 110

Zeus, 80

The US Army Between Korea and Vietnam

Text and display lines in Melior [Melior is a variation af the roman serif design. The typeface has a definite horizontal stress, according to Rookledge's International Type-Finder, and its serifs normally are all horizontal. Me/ior is included in Raokledge's Categor3, 4 rls "New Transitional Serif." Typefaces in this category generally have little contrast between thick end thin strokes, and serifs usually are bracketed; the "W" in Melior, for example, has no center serif.J

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