The Oxford history of Islam

THE OXFORD HISTORY of I S L A M EDITED BY John L. Esposito OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS OXTORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Oxfo...

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THE

OXFORD

HISTORY of I S L A M

EDITED

BY

John L. Esposito OXFORD UNIVERSITY

PRESS

OXTORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Oxford Athens Cape Town Karachi Nairobi

Auckland

Chennat

Bogota

Dar es Salaam

Kuala I u m p u r Paris

Hew York

Bangkok

Delhi

Madrid

Sao Paulo

Buenos Aires Florence

Melbourne

Singapore

Taipei

Calcutta

H o n g Kong

Mexico City Tokyo

Istanbul

Mumbai

Toronto

Warsaw

utul asioemttd lumponip in Berlin

lhadan

Copyright <' 1999 by Oxford University Press Published by Oxford Univcrsit) Press. Inc. 198 Madison Avenue. New York, Now York I 0 0 I 6 - + 3 1 4 O x f o r d is a registered trademark ot O x f o r d University Press All rights reserved N o part o f this publication ma) be reproduced, stored u i a retrieval sjslem. or transmitted, in an)' f o r m or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopy iug. recording, or otherwise, w i t h o u i the prior permission o f O k ford University Press. l ibrary o l Congress Cataloging i n Publication Datd The Oxford History o f Islam/[edited by J John Esposito. p

cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index. I S B N - l i : 97H-0-l9-510790-s> ISBN 0-19-510799 i (alk. piper) I , Islam--History, BPS0 095 1999 297.09

[. Hsposito, John. 1 99-13219

dc21

99-1*219 Design by P O L L E N

9 8 Printed in Hong Kong on aiid-free paper

For H a s i b Sabbagh Builder of bridges of steel and of mutual understanding and I s m a i l R. a l - F a r u q i scholar and pioneer in Muslim-Christian dialogue

CONTENTS Introduction i.\ CHAPTER

ONE

M u h a m m a d and the Caliphate POLITICAL

HISTORY

OF

THE ISLAMIC

EMPIRE

UP

TO

THE

MONGOL

CONQUEST

Fred M. Donner I CHAPTER

TWO

F r u i t o f t h e Tree o f K n o w l e d g e THE

RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN

FAITH

AND

PRACTICE

IN

ISLAM

Vincent J. Cornell CHAPTER

THREE

Law a n d Society THE

INTERPLAY

OF

REVELATION

AND

REASON

IN

THE

SHARIAH

Mohammad Hashim Kamali 107 CHAPTER

FOUR

Science, M e d i c i n e , a n d T e c h n o l o g y THE

MAKING

OF A SCIENTIFIC

CULTURE

Ahmad Dallai CHAPTER

FIVE

Art and Architecture THEMES

AND

VARIATIONS

Sheila S. Blair and Jonathan M. Bloom 21c CHAPTER

SIX

Philosophy and Theology FROM

THE EIGHTH CENTURY

C E .

TO

THE

PRESENT

Majid Fakhry 269 CHAPTER

SEVEN

Islam and Christendom HISTORICAL, FROM

CULTURAL,

THE SEVENTH

TO

AND

RELIGIOUS

THE FIFTEENTH

INTERACTION CENTURIES

Jane L Smith CHAPTER

EIGHT

Sultanates a n d G u n p o w d e r E m p i r e s THE

MIDDLE

EAST

Ira M. Lapidas Ï47 vii

CONTENTS CHAPTER

NINE

T h e Eastward J o u r n e y o f M u s l i m K i n g s h i p ISLAM IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST

ASIA

Bruce B. Lawrence

395 CHAPTER

TEN

C e n t r a l Asia a n d C h i n a TRANSNATIONALIZATION, ISLAM1ZATION, AND ETHNICIZATION

Dru C. Gladney

433 CHAPTER

ELEVEN

I s l a m i n A f r i c a t o 1800 MERCHANTS,

C H I E F S , A N D SAINTS

Nehemio Levtzion

CHAPTER

TWELVE

Foundations f o r Renewal and R e f o r m ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS

IN T H E EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH

CENTURIES

John Obert Vbll

CHAPTER

THIRTEEN

E u r o p e a n C o l o n i a l i s m a n d t h e Emergence o f M o d e r n M u s l i m States S.V.R. Nosr

549 CHAPTER

FOURTEEN

The Globalization o f Islam THE RETURN

OF MUSLIMS

TO THE WEST

YvonneYa2beck Haddad

6oi CHAPTER

FIFTEEN

Contemporary Islam REFORMATION

OR REVOLUTION?

John L.EspositO

64? Chronology 691 Select Bibliography 697 Contributors 708 Image Sources 710 Index 7»

Introduction

John L . Esposito

A l t h o u g h Islam is the youngest o f the m a j o r w o r l d religions, w i t h i .2 b i l l i o n f o l lowers, Islam is the second largest and fastest-growing r e l i g i o n i n the w o r l d . To speak o f the w o r l d o f Islam today is to refer n o t o n l y t o countries that stretch f r o m N o r t h Africa to Southeast Asia b u t also t o M u s l i m m i n o r i t y c o m m u n i t i e s that exist across the globe. Thus, for example, Islam is the second or t h i r d largest r e l i g i o n i n Europe and the Americas. Both the M u s l i m w o r l d and the West have experienced the i m p a c t o f Islam politically, culturally, and demographically. Events i n the c o n t e m p o r a r y M u s l i m w o r l d have led to an explosion o f interest and scholarly w o r k o n Islam and the M u s l i m w o r l d . M u c h o f this w o r k i n r e l i g i o n , history, and the social sciences has c o n t r i b u t e d t o w a r d the redressing o f earlier imbalances o f coverage and stereotyping. The Oxford History of Islam is part o f this process. The c o g n i t i v e , i d e o l o g i c a l , p o l i t i c a l , and d e m o g r a p h i c m a p o f the M u s l i m w o r l d c h a n g e d d r a m a t i c a l l y i n the second h a l f o f the t w e n t i e t h century. M o d e r n nation-states e m e r g e d f r o m centuries o f European c o l o n i z a t i o n , often as a result o f successful independence movements. However, contemporaryM u s l i m h i s t o r y challenged the expectation that m o d e r n i z a t i o n w o u l d result i n the progressive w e s t e r n i z a t i o n and secularization o f societies. Secularization o f society has n o t p r o v e d a necessary p r e c o n d i t i o n for social, e c o n o m i c , and political development.

ix

X

INTRODUCTION

Islam today is the d o m i n a n t symbolic and ideological force i n the M u s l i m w o r l d , i n f o r m i n g social institutions (education, clinics, hospitals, social welfare services, and banks) and politics. I n contrast to the expectations o f only a few decades ago, Islam (Islamic symbols, ideology, organizations, and institutions) has reemerged as a significant force i n public life. Mainstream Islamic organizations have become major social and political actors i n society. The reassertion o f Islam produced n e w Islamic republics i n Iran, Sudan, andAfghanistan. At the same time, Islamic movements emerged as the major o p p o s i t i o n i n Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Yemen, Tunisia, Jordan, Pakistan, Palestine/Israel, Kaslirnir, Central Asia, and elsewhere. Radical Islamic movements have used violence i n attempts to destabilize and topple governments and attack M u s l i m elites as w e l l as Western governments and interests. O f equal importance, M u s l i m s are a significant presence i n the West.

INTRODUCTION

XI

In the 1950s and 1960s large numbers o f M u s l i m s emigrated to Europe and America as laborers, students, and professionals. Today they are a significant m i n o r i t y , addressing issues o f identity (assimilation or integration), values, p o l i t ical and social participation, and pluralism i n Western secular societies. The Oxford History of Islam is designed to provide ready access to the history o f Islam. W r i t t e n for the general reader but also appealing to specialists, o u r goal is to present the best o f scholarship i n a readable style, c o m p l e m e n t e d by a r i c h use o f illustrations. Technical terms have been severely l i m i t e d and diacriticals o m i t ted. The approach to understanding Islam and M u s l i m history and c i v i l i z a t i o n is interdisciplinary, relying o n historians o f Islamic r e l i g i o n , history, art, and science as w e l l as social sciences. C o n t r i b u t o r s represent different disciplinary perspectives and include scholars f r o m diverse national and religious traditions. As w i t h The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, it has been especially i m p o r t a n t to include M u s l i m as w e l l as n o n - M u s l i m scholars. W M e it is not possible to cover this topic exhaustively i n a single volume, The Oxford History is comprehensive i n its coverage. The first part o f die book provides an overview o f the origins and development o f classical Islam: its faith, community, institutions, sciences, and art. It also surveys the liistoric encounter o f Islam and Christianity, critical to w o r l d history and to relations between the M u s l i m w o r l d and the West. The M o n g o l invasion and destruction o f the Abbasid e m p i r e i n the thirteenth century appeared to b r i n g to an end Islam's p h e n o m e n a l expansion as faith and as empire. Instead, as seen i n the next chapters, the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries saw a p e r i o d o f sultanates and empires, extending f r o m T i m b u k t u to Mindanao. Sultanates f r o m Africa to China and Southeast Asia emerged alongside great e m p i r e s — t h e O t t o m a n and Safavid empires i n the M i d d l e East and the M u g h a l i n South Asia. W i t h i n each, Islam expressed itself i n diverse ways and flourished

as b o t h a faith and a c i v i l i z a t i o n . However, by the eighteenth century,

across the M u s l i m w o r l d the fortunes o f M u s l i m societies were i n decline. The next group o f chapters tracks the domestic and international challenges faced by premodern and m o d e m M u s l i m societies, i n particular movements o f Islamic renewal and reform. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed the rise o f premodern reform movements f r o m Africa to Southeast Asia, m d u d i n g theWahhabi, M a h d i , and Sanusi, w h i c h responded to internal causes o f stagnation and decline. By the nineteenth century, m u c h o f the M u s l i m w o r l d faced an external threat, the onslaught o f European colonialism. The colonial legacy and the history of M u s l i m responses to the political, economic, and religious challenges o f European i m p e r i alism i n the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have had a p r o f o u n d impact o n M u s l i m societies and u p o n relations between the M u s l i m w o r l d and the West. The final chapters o f the b o o k provide perspectives o n the c o n t e m p o r a r y landscape. The resurgence o f Islam i n the late t w e n t i e t h century has been a test i m o n y to the vitality o f Islam. At the d a w n o f the twenty-first century, Islam is

Xii

INTRODUCTION

indeed a global presence chat blurs o l d distinctions between the M u s l i m w o r l d and the West. Islam is t r u l y a w o r l d r e l i g i o n , necessitating coverage o f b o t h Islam and the West and Islam in the West. Islam is t o be f o u n d n o t o n l y i n the m o r e than çc M u s l i m countries o f the w o r l d b u t also i n significant M u s l i m m i n o r i t y c o m m u n i t i e s i n Europe and America as w e l l as such diverse countries as China, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines. As a result, Islam and M u s l i m history have played a n d continue t o play a dynamic and m a j o r role i n w o r l d history. I w i s h t o especially acknowledge m y colleagues, the c o n t r i b u t o r s t o this v o l u m e , w h o have been responsive t o m y requests for revision and additions. I a m i n d e b t e d t o James Piscatori ( O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y ) , Tamara Sonn (College o f W i l l i a m and M a r y ) , and John O. Voll (Georgetown U n i v e r s i t y ) for their invaluable assistance. Natana DeLong-Bas, m y senior research assistant, was especially helpful i n gathering the chronology. Sheila Blair and Jonathan B l o o m were a pleasure t o w o r k w i t h , invaluable i n i d e n t i f y i n g the many illustrations t o be f o u n d i n this volume. Jean Esposito, as always, was there w i t h advice and encouragement.

T H E O X F O R D H I S T O R Y of

ISLAM

CHAPTER

ONE

Muhammad and the Caliphate P O L I T I C A L H I S T O R Y OF T H E I S L A M I C E M P I R E UP T O T H E M O N G O L C O N Q U E S T

Fred M . Donner

Islam as a r e l i g i o n and c i v i l i z a t i o n made its entry o n t o the w o r l d stage w i t h the life a n d career o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d i b n A h d A l l a h (ca. 5 7 0 - 6 3 2 ) i n western Arabia. After his death, a series o f successors called caliphs claimed political a u t h o r i t y over the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . D u r i n g the p e r i o d o f the caliphate, Islam grew i n t o a religious tradition and civilization o f w o r l d w i d e importance. A p r o p erly h i s t o r i c a l v i e w o f Islam's appearance and early d e v e l o p m e n t ,

however,

demands that these processes be situated against the cultural b a c k g r o u n d o f sixth-century Arabia and, m o r e generally, the Near East.

Historical Setting The Near East i n the sixth century was d i v i d e d between t w o great empires, the

(Left) Pilgrims to Mecca

Byzantine o r Later Roman Empire i n the west and the Sasanian Empire i n the east,

worshiping around the

w i t h the k i n g d o m s o f H i m y a r i n southern Arabia and A x u m i n the H o r n o f Africa

Kaaba, the cubical stone

constituting smaller players i n the political arena. This Byzantine-Sasanian rivalry-

structure covered with cloth,

was merely the most recent phase i n a l o n g struggle between Rome and Persia that

which stands in the middle

had lasted for m o r e than five h u n d r e d years. The t w o empires n o t only raised c o m p e t i n g claims to w o r l d d o m i n i o n , they also represented different cultural traditions: the Byzantines espoused Hellenistic culture, w h i l e the Sasanians looked to ancient Iranian and Semitic cultural traditions and rejected H e l l e n i s m as alien.

1

of the Masjid al-Haram in Mecca. Muslims revere the Kaaba as the House of God and direct their prayers toward it five times a day.

2

THE OXFORD

HISTORY

OF

ISLAM

This cultural antagonism was specifically exacerbated by religious rivalry; i n the t h i r d and f o u r t h centuries the Byzantine emperors had declared themselves c h a m pions o f Christianity, w h i c h itself had been heavily i m b u e d w i t h Hellenistic c u l ture, whereas the Sasanian Great Kings espoused the I r a n i a n faith k n o w n as Zoroastrianism (Magianism) as their official r e l i g i o n . O n the eve o f Islam, r e l i gious identities i n the Near East, particularly Greek o r Byzantine Christianity and Zoroastrianism, had thus acquired acutely political overtones. A l t h o u g h both the Byzantine and Sasanian empires espoused official religions, neither empire had a religiously homogeneous p o p u l a t i o n . Large populations o f Jews were scattered t h r o u g h o u t the Near East; they were especially numerous i n such cities as Alexandria, Jerusalem, A n t i o c h , Hamadan, Rayy, Susa, the Byzantine capital at Constantinople, and the Sasanian capital at Ctesiphon. Many m o r e Jews were setded i n places like Tiberias i n Palestine and i n southern Mesopotamia, where Jewish academies c o n t i n u e d a l o n g tradition o f religious learning and c o n t r i b u t e d to p r o d u c i n g the Palestinian and Babylonian Talmuds (the authoritative bodies o f Jewish tradition) d u r i n g the f o u r t h , fifth, a n d sixth centuries. Christians were numerous, perhaps the m a j o r i t y o f the Near Eastern p o p u l a t i o n i n the sixth century", b u t they were d i v i d e d i n t o several sects that differed o n points o f theolThe great church of Hagia Sophia in Istanbul was built

ogy. Each sect viewed itself as the t r u e or o r t h o d o x

("right-confessing")

Christianity a n d dismissed the others as heterodox. The Byzantine (or Greek

by the Byzantine emperor

O r t h o d o x ) faith, the official c h u r c h o f the Byzantine Empire, was w i d e l y estab-

Justinian in the sixth cen-

lished i n Greece, the Balkans, and a m o n g the large Greek-speaking populations o f

tury. It was transformed into

Anatolia (Asia M i n o r ) . I n Syria-Palestine

a mosque after the Ottomans

c h u r c h was m a i n l y l i m i t e d to the towns. A few Byzantine Christians were even

conquered Constantinople in 1 4 5 3 , and the minarets were added then.

a n d Egypt, however, the Byzantine

f o u n d i n the Sasanian Empire, mainly i n Mesopotamia, but their p o s i t i o n was precarious. Christians f o l l o w i n g the teachings o f Bishop Nestorius (Nestorianism)

M U H A M M A D

AND THE CALIPHATE

3

had been forced to leave the By zantine Empire after Nestorius was deposed for heresy by the C o u n c i l o f Ephesus i n 431. They had to take refuge i n the Sasanian Empire, scattered w i d e l y between Mesopotamia, Iran, and the fringes o f Central Asia. A n o t h e r Christian sect, the Monophysites, had been declared a heresy by the C o u n c i l o f Chalcedon i n 451, but M o n o p h y s i t i s m was nonetheless the creed o f most i n d i g e n o u s Christians o f A x u m , Egypt, Syria-Palestine,

Mesopotamia.

A r m e n i a , and Iran, particularly i n the countryside. Zoroastrians were f o u n d m a i n l y i n Iran and southern Mesopotamia; few lived outside the Sasanian Empire. C o m m u n i t i e s o f all three religions (Christianity, Judaism, and Z o r o a s t r i a n i s m ) — w h i c h are called the scriptural religions because they shared the idea o f a divinely inspired, revealed scripture—were also found i n Arabia. The Byzantines and Sasanians fought many wars between the f o u r t h and sixth centuries i n an effort to secure and extend their o w n territories. They competed w i t h particular intensity for key border zones such as upper Mesopotamia and Armenia. They also tried to seize key towns f r o m one another to gain control over, and therefore to tax, the lucrative " O r i e n t trade." This commerce b r o u g h t southern Arabian incense, Chinese silk, Indian pepper and cottons, spices, and other goods f r o m the Indian Ocean region to die cities o f the Mediterranean basin. The Byzantines and Sasanians also attempted to gain the advantage by establishing alliances w i t h lesser states i n the r e g i o n . The most i m p o r t a n t o f these client states was the Christian k i n g d o m o f A x u m , w i t h w h i c h the Byzantines established an uneasy alliance. Both Byzantines and Sasanians also f o r m e d alliances w i t h tribal groups w h o lived o n the Arabian fringes o f their territories. Arabia was wedged between the t w o empires. The Sasanians established a series o f protectorates over tribes and small states o n the east Arabian coast and i n O m a n , whereas the Byzantines b r o u g h t tribes o n the fringes o f Palestine and Syria i n t o their o r b i t . Arabia occupied a strategic p o s i t i o n i n relation to the O r i e n t trade, a fact that led b o t h empires to intervene decisively i n its affairs d u r i n g the sixth century. I n 52c the Byzantines persuaded A x u m to invade and occupy the k i n g d o m o f H i m y a r i n Yemen and its i m p o r t a n t trading ports, thus b r i n g i n g the Red Sea trade to the I n d i a n Ocean securely w i t h i n the Byzantine o r b i t . I n 57c, however, the Sasanians, i n v i t e d by the Himyarites, sent an e x p e d i t i o n to oust the A x u m i t e s f r o m Yemen, w h i c h for the next several decades was a Sasanian province ruled The Sasanians, rulers of Iran a n d adjacent areas in the centuries before I s l a m ,

p'\

111

m i n

ffi'itiiiiEüti •;

I IIIIII M i l l '

J l l j m i j r ' i i !'• I

maintained their capital at Ctesiphon, near present-day Baghdad. The main room of their palace was a giant iwan, a barrel-vaulted space,

'ft-

under which the ruler sat.

c

4

T H E OXFORD

HISTORY

OF

ISLAM

by a governor appointed by the Great King. Some t i m e later, the Sasanians i n a u gurated the last and greatest o f the Sasanian-Byzantine wars by l a u n c h i n g a series o f assaults o n Byzantine t e r r i t o r i e s farther n o r t h . Between 611 and 620 the Sasanians seized most o f Anatolia, all o f Syria-Palestine, and Egypt f r o m the Byzantines. But i n the next decade the Byzantine e m p e r o r Heraclius regained these territories, and i n 628 he was able t o conquer the Sasanians' Mesopotamian heartlands, depose the Great K i n g , and install another, m o r e docile king. These dramatic events f o r m e d the political backdrop t o the career o f Islam's Prophet M u h a m m a d i n the western Arabian towns o f Mecca and M e d i n a . A l t h o u g h distant from the m a i n centers o f h i g h civilization i n the Near East, .Arabia was n o t isolated. The Arabian peoples were aware o f and affected by p o l i t i cal, economic, and cultural developments i n the more h i g h l y developed surrounding lands o f the Near East. Trends i n religion i n particular resonated i n various parts o f Arabia. Many religions had established themselves i n Arabia o n the eve o f Islam. Christianity was well-established i n parts o f eastern Arabia along the Persian G u l f coast and i n O m a n as w e l l as i n Yemen. The Yemeni city o f Najran i n particular later became famous because o f the m a r t y r d o m o f Christians there d u r i n g the sixth century. Christianity had also spread among some o f the pastoral nomadic tribes that occupied the northern fringes o f the peninsula, where i t bordered o n Syria and Mesopotamia, and may also have been current among some pastoral groups farther south, i n n o r t h e r n and central Arabia itself. Judaism was similarly widespread; important Jewish c o m m unities existed i n the string o f oasis towns stretching southw a r d along the n o r d i e r n Red Sea coast o f Arabia, i n c l u d i n g the towns o f Khaybar andYathrib (later called Medina, the Prophet Muhammad's adoptive home). Jews were also found i n eastern Arabia and especially i n Yemen. Zoroastrianism was far less widespread i n Arabia than either Christianity or Judaism, but a small f o l l o w i n g existed, particularly i n parts o f eastern Arabia and O m a n , where the Sasanian Empire had established protectorates among the local populations. Arabian communities o f all Uiree scriptural religions—Christianity, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism—sometimes maintained contact w i t h their co-religionists i n the lands surrounding Arabia, where these religions were m u c h more firmly established. For example, bishops from lower Mesopotamia were sent to Yemen, and .Arabian Jews ma)- have had some contact w i t h the great academies o f Jewish learning i n Mesopotamia. In a d d i t i o n t o the scriptural religions, Arabia also was h o m e t o a host o f local animist cults, w i n c h attributed d i v i n e powers t o natural objects—the sun, the m o o n , Venus, certain sacred rocks o r trees, and so o n . These cults seem t o have been late vestiges o f the animist religions once widespread a m o n g the peoples o f the ancient Near East, such as the Babylonians and Canaanites. A l t h o u g h anim i s m still existed in Arabia i n the sixth century, i t was being supplanted by the scriptural religions i n many areas. The r e m a i n i n g strongholds o f these animistic cults were i n central and western Arabia, especially i n t o w n s such as Taif and

MUHAMMAD

A N D THE CALIPHATE

C

Mecca, w h i c h contained sanctuaries (harams) w i t h i n whose confines members o f the cult were f o r b i d d e n to fight and had to observe other rules o f the c u l t — a feature that made such harams i m p o r t a n t centers for markets and for social transactions o f all kinds. I n Mecca the cultic center was a cube-shaped b u i l d i n g called the Kaaba, embedded i n w h i c h was a m e t e o r i c black stone a r o u n d w h i c h cult members p e r f o r m e d circumambulations to gain the favor o f the cult's dieties. The religious, cultural, economic, and poUtical environment i n Arabia and the Near East was thus a very complex one. Before examining Islam's rise, however, i t is i m p o r t a n t to note a feature o f the Near Eastern landscape that profoundly i n f l u enced the course o f the region's history, i n c l u d i n g its history d u r i n g the early Islamic centuries. There are extensive tracts o f agriculturally marginal land i n the Near East; these marginal lands consist either o f arid steppe and desert, as i n m u c h o f Arabia, or o f semiarid mountainous terrain, as i n parts o f Iran and Anatolia. I n these regions settled life, particularly larger towns and cities, tended to be w i d e l y scattered and i n some cases virtually nonexistent. Some such areas, however, could sustain thinly scattered populations o f pastoral nomads o r mountaineering peoples l i v i n g i n small settlements and relying o n a m i x t u r e o f subsistence agriculture and herding. These nomadic or m o u n t a i n e e r i n g peoples were often outside the effective c o n t r o l o f any state, and they organized themselves pohtically i n kinship-based entities (tribes) or i n larger confederations o f tribes. I n many cases they also had strong martial traditions, apparently rooted i n such diverse factors as their skill w i t h r i d i n g animals and a culturally based attitude o f superiority toward nonpastoralists o r lowlanders. The result was that for several m i l l e n n i a the history o f the Near East was marked by the repeated i n t r u s i o n o f powerful pastoral nomads or m o u n tain tribespeople i n t o the richer, settled lands and towns belonging to the various states o f the region. Sometimes diese intrusions were merely raids along a state's borders, usually undertaken w h e n a state was n o t strong enough to defend a district effectively. D u r i n g other intrusions, however, nomads or m o u n t a i n tribes toppled the r u l i n g dynasties o f m o r i b u n d states and supplanted the rulers w i t h members o f their o w n group, w h o became a new r u l i n g dynasty—-usually settling d o w n i n the state's heartlands i n the process, but keeping a power base i n the marginal region from w h i c h they had come. This process o f periodic i n t r u s i o n by peoples f r o m the marginal regions i n t o the state--dominated areas o f the Near East is one o f the m a i n themes i n the area's history.

The Prophet Muhammad and the Nascent Community of Believers The h i s t o r i a n , w h e t h e r M u s l i m o r n o n - M u s l i m , w h o wishes t o w r i t e about the life o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d faces grave problems o f b o t h d o c u m e n t a t i o n a n d interpretation. The first r u l e o f the h i s t o r i a n is t o rely whenever possible o n c o n -

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t e m p o r a r y documents-—yet for the life o f the Prophet these are virtually nonexistent. Fortunately, many accounts p r o d u c e d w i t h i n the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y i n later times provide us w i t h copious i n f o r m a t i o n about the Prophet. W h e n deali n g w i t h such accounts, however, the h i s t o r i a n must t r y t o i d e n t i f y and set aside those features that reflect n o t the Prophet's life and times b u t later attitudes and values o f all kinds that have been interpolated i n t o the story o f his life b y subsequent w r i t e r s , w h e t h e r consciously or unconsciously. This is never an easy task, and a significant measure o f honest disagreement inevitably emerges a m o n g historians engaged in the w o r k o f evaluating the r e p o r t e d events and p r o v i d i n g a sound i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e m . The b r i e f sketch o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d ' s life and career that follows is d r a w n largely o n the basis o f the t r a d i t i o n a l narratives, but the choice o f traditional materials selected, and the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f their overall m e a n i n g , reflect m a i n l y the author's general concerns as an h i s t o r i a n interested i n questions o f social and p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n and i n the e v o l u t i o n o f religious movements. Little is k n o w n w i t h certainty about the Prophet M u h a m m a d ' s early life. H e was b o r n M u h a m m a d i b n (son o f ) A b d Allah i n the small western Arabian t o w n o f Mecca some t i m e a r o u n d 570 c.E. (traditional accounts differ o n the date). H e belonged to the H a s h i m clan, one o f the smaller segments o f the tribe o f Quraysh that d o m i n a t e d Mecca. A t an early age M u h a m m a d was orphaned and came under the guardianship o f his paternal uncle, A b u Talib, head o f the H a s h i m clan, Mecca was the site o f an i m p o r t a n t pagan shrine, the Kaaba, d u r i n g M u h a m m a d ' s y o u t h . The Quraysh tribe served as guardians and stewards o f the cult o f H u b a l , centered o n this shrine. The tribe was also involved i n trade; although they p r o b ably dealt m a i n l y in h u m b l e goods such as hides, their commercial activity gave t h e m contact w i t h m u c h o f Arabia and the s u r r o u n d i n g lands, and i t p r o v i d e d t h e m w i t h a measure o f experience i n the organization and management o f people and materials. T r a d i t i o n a l sources portray M u h a m m a d as having been a p r o m i s i n g and respected y o u n g m a n w h o participated i n b o t h Mecca's cultic activities and its commerce. He also seemed to have had an i n w a r d , contemplative side, however, w h i c h expressed itself i n his periodic w i t h d r a w a l to secluded spots for p r o l o n g e d periods o f m e d i t a t i o n and reflection. It was d u r i n g such a retreat, i n about 610, that he began to have religious experiences i n the f o r m o f visions and sounds that presented themselves as revelations f r o m God. These experiences initially so terrified h i m that he sought comfort f r o m his first wife, Khadijah, but the visions occurred again and slowly M u h a m m a d came to accept b o t h the message itself and his o w n role as God's messenger. The revelations, c o m i n g to M u h a m m a d as sonorous utterances, were eventually collected to f o r m the Quran (sometimes spelled " K o r a n " i n earlier English w r i t i n g s ) , w h i c h is sacred scripture for Muslims.

To M u h a m m a d and. to all w h o have since followed his message, the Q u r a n is l i t -

In the first centuries of Islam,

erally the w o r d o f G o d , God's o w n eternal speech.

many fine manuscripts of the

The message M u h a m m a d received i n these revelations was a w a r n i n g that only t h r o u g h devotion t o the one and only God a n d through righteous observance o f the revealed law could people attain salvation i n the afterlife. Some revelations thus

Quran were copied on parchment in the distinctive angular script known as Kufic and embellished with gold

emphasized the oneness and omnipotence o f God, Creator o f the w o r l d and o f chapter headings. everything i n i t , including h u m a n k i n d . Others warned that the Last Judgment was near; and then those w h o had lived righteously w o u l d be sent to heaven and those w h o had lived evil lives w o u l d be sent to eternal damnation i n hell. Other revelations laid out the general guidelines for a righteous existence. These included w o r ship o f the one God and rejection o f idols and false gods; regular prayer; almsgiving and charitable treatment o f the poor, w i d o w s , orphans, and other unfortunates; observance o f strict modesty i n dealing w i t h the opposite sex, a n d o f h u m i l i t y i n all one's affairs; the need t o w o r k actively for the g o o d and to stand u p against evil w h e n one sees i t ; and many other injunctions. Still other revelations retold stories o f earlier prophets (among t h e m Abraham, Moses, David, and Jesus) w h o , like M u h a m m a d , had been charged w i t h b r i n g i n g God's t r u t h to their people, and w h o provided for Believers inspiring models o f righteous conduct: as the Quran put i t , "Surely i n this there is a sign for y o u , i f y o u believe," Many aspects o f M u h a m m a d ' s message were conveyed i n concepts a n d sometimes i n w o r d s that were already familiar i n Arabia. I n part, this was what made M u h a m m a d ' s message comprehensible to his first audience. The ideas o f

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m o n o t h e i s m , a Last Judgment, heaven and hell, prophecy and revelations, and the emphasis o n intense, even m i l i t a n t , piety were widespread i n the Near Eastern scripturalist religions i n the sixth century. I n this sense Muhammad's message can be seen as an affirmation and refinement o f certain trends among the scripturalist religions o f the late antique era, perhaps as an effort at their reformation. To adherents o f the pagan cults o f western Arabia, however, i n c l u d i n g M u h a m m a d ' s fellow tribespeople o f Quraysh, his message came as a b l u n t repudiation o f all they stood for. He proclaimed their p o l y t h e i s m as incorrect and p r o f o u n d l y sinful, an affront to the one God's unity, i n itself sufficient t o c o n d e m n t h e m eternally to hellfire. He made i t clear that i n their behavior, they failed i n many ways to meet God's demands for h u m i l i t y , for modesty, for charity for the less fortunate, and especially

for

pious

dedication

to G o d

h i m s e l f t h r o u g h regular

prayer.

M u h a m m a d p o i n t e d o u t that the tribe's pagan ancestors, even his o w n grandfathers, were similarly destined for p e r d i t i o n — a n idea certain to generate outrage i n a tribal society that h i g h l y revered ancestors. The Quraysh were aghast. M u c h o f M u h a m m a d ' s prophetic career, f r o m the t i m e he began p u b l i c l y preaching i n about 613 u n t i l his death i n 632, was consumed w i t h w a r d i n g off and eventually o v e r c o m i n g the o p p o s i t i o n o f his o w n t r i b e , the Quraysh. H i s early followers i n c l u d e d some close relatives, such as his paternal cousin, A l i i b n A b i Talib (ca. 6 0 0 - 6 1 ) , as w e l l as a few p r o m i n e n t Meccans o f leading clans, such as U t h m a n i b n Affan (ca. 575-656) o f the Umayya clan. H e was also j o i n e d at first by many people o f l o w e r social stature i n Mecca—clients, freed slaves, and individuals o f lesser clans o f Quraysh—perhaps because their weaker family ties made it easier for t h e m to act i n accordance w i t h their conscience. As his f o l l o w i n g grew, however, the o p p o s i t i o n and abuse by the r e m a i n i n g Quraysh h a r d ened; c o n d i t i o n s became so bad for some that M u h a m m a d arranged for a n u m b e r o f t h e m to take refuge w i t h the r u l e r o f A x u m i n perhaps about 615. His situation i n Mecca became critical w i t h the death, i n close succession, o f his w i f e Khadijah and his uncle A b u Talib, i n about 619; almost simultaneously, he had lost his m a i n source o f e m o t i o n a l support and his m a i n protector, because A b u Talib, although he never embraced the Prophet's message, had nonetheless used the solidarity o f the H a s h i m clan to defend M u h a m m a d . As M u h a m m a d ' s situation worsened, he began to l o o k to other t o w n s i n western Arabia for supporters. It was a r o u n d 620 that M u h a m m a d w o n over a few people f r o m Yathrib, an oasis t o w n about 250 miles ( 4 0 0 k m ) n o r t h o f Mecca. For some years the p o p u l a t i o n o f Yathrib, w h i c h i n c l u d e d t w o p r e d o m inantly pagan tribes and a n u m b e r o f Jewish tribes, had been r i v e n by intractable internal strife. C )ver the next t w o j cars m o r e people ot Yathrib agreed u 11 ibserve the Prophet's message, u n t i l finally a large delegation o f people f r o m Yathrib

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agreed t o f o l l o w his teachings a n d invited h i m t o c o m e t o Y a t h r i b as arbiter o f their disputes a n d de facto r u l e r o f the t o w n . M u h a m m a d gradually sent his beleaguered followers f r o m Mecca t o safety i n Y a t h r i b . f o l l o w i n g t h e m h i m s e l f and taking u p residence i n 622.Yathrib henceforth came t o be k n o w n as Medina ( f r o m the Arabic madinat al-nobi, " t h e Prophet's c i t y " ) . The Prophet's move (the hijra, e m i g r a t i o n ) t o M e d i n a m a r k e d the b e g i n n i n g o f a n e w chapter i n his life and that o f his followers. They were n o longer a small, oppressed religious g r o u p i n Mecca; they were n o w an a u t o n o m o u s r e l i g i o - p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y o f Believers that d o m i n a t e d the oasis o f Medina. M u h a m m a d ' s hijra t o M e d i n a i n 622 was thus the b e g i n n i n g o f Islam's l o n g life as a political force, a fact s y m bolized by the selection o f that year t o serve as the first year o f the Islamic era. D u r i n g his roughly ten years i n Medina ( 6 2 2 - 3 2 ) , M u h a m m a d consolidated his control over the town's disparate p o p u l a t i o n , and he extended Medina's power and influence i n Arabia. W h e n M u h a m m a d first arrived, Medina was still full o f smould e r i n g rivalries: between the town's t w o m a i n Arab tribes; between the muhajirun ("emigrants," the Believers w h o h a d emigrated to Medina f r o m Mecca or elsewhere) and the ansor ("helpers," Muhammad's first followers i n Medina, w h o had invited h i m and his Meccan followers to find refuge w i t h them); and between some o f Medina's Jews and the n e w Believers. W h i l e some o f Medina's Jews appear to have supported M u h a m m a d , those w h o challenged M u h a m m a d ' s claim t o prophecy, and i n some cases cooperated w i t h his political enemies (or whose leaders d i d ) , were handled harshly i n a series o f confrontations—exiled w i t h loss o f

R. J. Burtons nineteenthcentury drawing of Medina with the Mosque of the Prophet in the center. The Prophet settled here in 622. and his new house became the first mosque in Islam and later served as his place of burial.

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their lands, enslaved, or executed, depending on the case. Beyond Medina the most determined opponents o f Muhammad's efforts to extend his influence and his message were his erstwhile fellow citizens, the Quraysh o f Mecca. Mecca and Medina became locked i n an intense struggle to w i n over other towns and groups o f nomads, a struggle in w h i c h Mecca, w i t h its established commercial and tribal tics, initially appeared to have the advantage M u h a m m a d , however, launched raids against Meccan caravans, seizing valuable booty and hostages, and, more important, disrupting the commercial lifeblood o f Mecca. After a series o f raids and battles against the Quraysh that seem to have been indecisive i n their results (at Badr in 6 2 4 ; U h u d , 625; and Khandaq, 627), M u h a m m a d negotiated a truce w i t h the Quray sh at Hudaybiya i n 628. I n exchange for some short-term concessions, the truce gave M u h a m m a d and his followers the right to make the pilgrimage to Mecca's shrine, Kaaba, i n the f o l l o w i n g year. The treaty also gave M u h a m m a d a free hand to subdue one o f Mecca's key allies, the oasis o f Khaybar n o r t h o f Medina, whose large Jewish population (some o f them refugees from Medina) was hostile to the Prophet. This done, i t was relatively easy for M u h a m m a d to t u r n o n Mecca itself, w h i c h submitted virtually w i t h o u t bloodshed i n 630. Aware o f h o w dangerous the Quraysh could be i f their o p p o s i t i o n continued, and w i s h i n g to w i n their support, M u h a m m a d was careful to spare their pride. He tied t h e m to his movement by awarding many o f their leaders important commands and positions o f authority. W h i l e M u h a m m a d was engaged i n his struggle against Mecca, he was also slowly w o r k i n g to b r i n g more and m o r e n o m a d i c groups and towns w i t h i n Medina's orbit, either as loose allies or as full-fledged members o f the c o m m u n i t y o f Believers. I n d o i n g so, he used the appeal o f his religious message, promises o f material gain, or, o n occasion, o u t r i g h t force to b r i n g recalcitrant groups under Medina's sway. His conquest o f Mecca opened the way for victorious campaigns— w i t h the help o f the Quraysh—against the other m a i n t o w n o f western Arabia, Taif, and against the remaining groups o f powerful nomads i n the region. By this t i m e Muhammad's position as the most powerful political leader in western Arabia had become apparent to all, and tribal groups that had until then tried to h o l d Medina at arm's length n o w sent delegations to tender their submission. By Muhammad's death in 632, his c o m m u n i t y had expanded—more by religious persuasion and political alliance than by force—to include all o f western Arabia, and he had made fruitful contact w i t h some groups i n the n o r t h e r n Hijaz, N e j d , eastern Arabia, O m a n , and Yemen.

Early Expansion of the Community and State U p o n Muhammad's death i n 632, the y o u n g c o m m u n i t y o f Believers faced a set o f difficult challenges. The first and most basic challenge was to resolve the ques-

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t i o n : Were the Believers to f o r m a single p o l i t y under one leader even after M u h a m m a d ' s death, or were they to b e l o n g t o separate c o m m u n i t i e s , each headed by its o w n political leader? I n the end the Believers chose t o r e m a i n a single c o m m u n i t y and selected the Prophet's father-in-law and staunch supporter, A b u Bakr, to be his first successor. A b u Bakr and subsequent successors as leaders o f the Islamic c o m m u n i t y are k n o w n i n Islamic tradition as caliphs ( f r o m the Arabic khalifa, m e a n i n g "successor" or "representative"). A b u Bakr and the Believers i n Medina faced a second i m m e d i a t e challenge. A l t h o u g h the t o w n s o f Medina, Mecca, andTaif and the nomadic groups between t h e m were for the most part quite steadfast i n their support o f A b u Bakr, many groups i n Arabia that had once tendered their submission to M u h a m m a d t r i e d to sever their political or religious ties w i t h M e d i n a once the Prophet was dead. Some claimed that they w o u l d remain Believers b u t contended that they d i d n o t owe the tax that the Prophet had collected, w h i c h A b u Bakr c o n t i n u e d t o demand. Other groups gave n o assurances that they w o u l d remain Believers. I n still other cases religious leaders arose c l a i m i n g t o be prophets themselves. Against these threats, A b u Bakr acted quickly and decisively i n w h a t is usually called the Apostasy (or Ridda) wars, d u r i n g w h i c h he sent armed bands o f Believers to the m a i n centers o f o p p o s i t i o n i n Arabia: Yemen, N e j d , andYamama. By maki n g shows o f force first among wavering tribes, these campaigns picked u p allies as they proceeded, and grew large e n o u g h to defeat the m o r e serious opponents, such as the "false p r o p h e t " Musaylima o f Yamama. These campaigns were f o l lowed by incursions i n t o O m a n and n o r t h w a r d t o w a r d the Arabian fringes o f Syria and Mesopotamia (what is n o w Iraq). I n 634, at the end o f t w o years o f camp a i g n i n g , A b u Bakr and the Believers o f Medina had b r o u g h t the entire Arabian peninsula under their c o n t r o l , opening the way t o further conquests that w o u l d , w i t h i n a few m o r e decades, make the Believers the masters o f a vast empire. This was possible partly because the almost ceaseless m i l i t a r y activity o f the Ridda wars p r o v i d e d the setting i n w h i c h the loosely organized war parties f o r m e d at the b e g i n n i n g o f the Ridda wars began t o assume the character o f a standing army, w i t h a core o f devoted supporters ( m a i n l y t o w n s m e n o f M e d i n a , Mecca, andTaif) leading a larger mass o f allies d r a w n f r o m a w i d e variety o f Arabian tribes. It also represented the d o m i n a t i o n o f the pastoral and mountaineer populations o f Arabia by the e m b r y o n i c n e w state i n Medina, w h i c h was headed by an elite g r o u p c o m posed almost exclusively o f settled t o w n s m e n . The Ridda wars b r o u g h t the Believers to the very doorsteps o f the Byzantine and Sasanian empires, but they also d i d m o r e . The emergence i n Arabia o f a state where n o n e h a d been before, one that c o u l d harness the m i l i t a r y potential o f the Arabian p o p u l a t i o n , made i t possible for the Believers to organize campaigns o f conquest that penetrated the great empires a n d wrested vast territories f r o m

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t h e m . The great wave o f early conquests was the m a i n w o r k o f the second caliph, U m a r i b n al-Khattab (r. 6 3 4 - 4 4 ) , w h o m A b u Bakr u p o n his deathbed selected to lead the Believers. The conquests were further c o n t i n u e d d u r i n g the first years o f the reign o f the r i i i r d caliph, U t h m a n i b n Affan (r. 6 4 4 - 5 6 ) . The caliphs launched one set o f offensives against the Byzantine-controlled territories o f Palestine and Syria, h o m e to many Arabic-speaking tribes (part o f the p r i m a r y audience to w h i c h the Q u r a n had been addressed). These incursions elicited defensive reactions f r o m the Byzantine authorities i n Syria, against w h o m several battles were f o u g h t . Eventually, the Byzantine emperor Heraclius sent a large army f r o m Anatolia to secure Syria against the threatening Believers, b u t to n o avail; his force was decimated at a battle along theYarmuk valley (east o f the Sea o f Galilee) i n 636. Most o f the countryside and towns o f Syria and Palestine fell to the Believers shortly thereafter; the o n l y exceptions were some coastal t o w n s such as Ascalon and T r i p o l i , w h i c h h e l d o u t for years longer because the Byzantines c o u l d supply t h e m by sea. F r o m Syria the Believers sent campaigns i n t o n o r t h e r n Mesopotamia, A r m e n i a , and against the Byzantine frontier i n southern Anatolia. A n e x p e d i t i o n a r y force f r o m Syria also wrested the r i c h province o f Egypt f r o m the Byzantines, c o n q u e r i n g the c o m m e r c i a l and cultural h u b o f Alexandria i n 642. At the same time as the offensives i n Syria and Palestine, the Believers were faced w i t h i m p e n d i n g clashes w i t h the Sasanian Empire i n w h a t is n o w southern Iraq. The early contacts o f the Believers w i t h the Arabic-speaking pastoral nomads o f this r e g i o n , and their increasing boldness i n penetrating Iraq's interior, had caused the Sasanians to m o b i l i z e their armies to resist t h e m , b u t they fared n o better than the Byzantines. I n a great batde i n 637 at abQadisiyah ( m o d ern Kadisiya) i n southern Iraq, the Sasanians were decisively broken, o p e n i n g the r i c h alluvial lands o f Iraq to occupation by the armies o f the Believers. F r o m southern Iraq the Believers sent campaigns i n t o Khuzestan and Azerbaijan, and others pursued the fleeing Sasanians i n t o the Iranian highlands. Gradually the m a i n t o w n s o f western Iran, and w i t h t i m e areas farther east, fell to the Believers. By the m i d - 6 c o s the Believers r u l i n g f r o m Medina had loose c o n t r o l over a vast area stretching f r o m Yemen to A r m e n i a and f r o m Egypt to eastern Iran. A n d f r o m various staging centers i n this vast area, the Believers were organizing raids i n t o areas yet further afield: f r o m Egypt i n t o Libya, N o r t h Africa, and Sudan; f r o m Syria and n o r t h e r n Mesopotamia i n t o Anatolia; f r o m A r m e n i a i n t o the Caucasus region; f r o m lower Mesopotamia i n t o many unconsolidated districts i n Iran and eastward t o w a r d Afghanistan and the fringes o f Central Asia. A n i m p o r t a n t feature o f the early expansion o f the Believers was its quality as a religious m o v e m e n t , b u t this was colored by the presence o f the state. The caliphs and their followers believed, o f course, i n M u h a m m a d ' s message o f the

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need to acknowledge God's oneness and to live righteously i n preparation for the i m m i n e n t Last Day. They saw their m i s s i o n as jihad, o r m i l i t a n t effort to combat evil and to spread M u h a m m a d ' s message o f m o n o t h e i s m and righteousness far and w i d e . But their goal seems to have been to b r i n g the populations they encountered i n t o submission to the righteous order they represented, n o t to make t h e m change their r e l i g i o n — n o t , at least, i f they were already m o n o t h e ists, such as Christians and Jews. For this reason the early Believers collected t r i b ute f r o m conquered populations but generally let t h e m w o r s h i p as they always had; o n l y pagans and at times Zoroastrians appear to have been coerced i n t o embracing Islam o r had their places o f w o r s h i p sacked. The astonishing extent a n d r a p i d i t y o f this process o f expansion a n d c o n quest can o n l y be u n d e r s t o o d i f the nature o f the expansion i t represented is recognized. It was, first a n d f o r e m o s t , the expansion o f a n e w state based i n M e d i n a . The r u l i n g elite of this state were m o s t l y settled t o w n s m e n o f Mecca, M e d i n a , and Taif, w h o c o m m a n d e d g r o w i n g armies c o m p o s e d m a i n l y o f pastoral n o m a d s f r o m n o r t h e r n and central Arabia o r m o u n t a i n e e r s f r o m Yemen. It was n o t an expansion o f n o m a d i c o r m o u n t a i n e e r i n g peoples as such. The state-sponsored q u a l i t y o f the expansion is reflected i n a significant measure o f centralized d i r e c t i o n o f the expansion m o v e m e n t by the caliphs a n d their circle, w h o appear to have c o o r d i n a t e d strategy between various fronts, as w e l l as i n certain bureaucratic i n s t i t u t i o n s that were established d u r i n g the early conquests. The i n s t i t u t i o n s i n c l u d e d the c r e a t i o n o f a regular p a y r o l l (diwan) for the soldiers, as w e l l as the g a t h e r i n g o f the e x p e d i t i o n a r y forces i n distant areas i n t o t i g h t l y clustered g a r r i s o n settlements that became the nucleus o f n e w cities: Kufa and Basra i n s o u t h e r n M e s o p o t a m i a , Fustat i n Egypt, and s o m e w h a t later, M a r v i n northeastern Iran (651)

a n d Qayrawan i n Tunisia

( 6 7 0 ) . These garrisons h e l p e d the Believers live apart f r o m the vast conquered p o p u l a t i o n s they r u l e d , and so to avoid assimilation; later, as cities, these garrisons w o u l d be a m o n g the m o s t i m p o r t a n t centers i n w h i c h early Islamic c u l ture was elaborated. The consequences o f the conquests were m o m e n t o u s . They established a large new empire i n the Near East, destroying the Sasanian Empire completely and occup y i n g i m p o r t a n t parts o f the Byzantine Empire. Moreover, the leadership o f this new empire was c o m m i t t e d to a n e w religious ideology. N e w economic structures were created w i t h the demise o f the o l d r u l i n g classes and the rise o f a new one, consisting at first largely of people o f Arabian o r i g i n . Property and wealth—as w e l l as political p o w e r — w e r e redistributed o n a grand scale. Most i m p o r t a n t , the newly emergent state provided the political framework w i t h i n w h i c h the religious ideas o f the r u l i n g Believers, w h o were but a small part o f the p o p u l a t i o n , could gradually spread a m o n g the conquered peoples. The many captives taken d u r i n g

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the conqtiests came to be integrated i n t o the tribes and families o f their captors as clients (mmvali), a fact that facilitated this transformation.

The Early Caliphate and the Question of Legitimacy It was w i d e l y accepted i n the early c o m m u n i t y o f Believers that M u h a m m a d could have n o successor i n his role as Prophet. But the early Believers decided that someone should succeed M u h a m m a d as t e m p o r a l head o f the c o m m u n i t y . The first d o c u m e n t a r y references call the leader o f the c o m m u n i t y o f Believers n o t caliph but amir al-mu minin ( " c o m m a n d e r o f the Believers"), and this may be the

Interior of the Great Mosque at Qayrawan in Tunisia. Founded in the late seventh century, the mosque owes much of its present aspect to extensive rebuilding by the Aghlabid governors in the ninth century

M U H A M M A D

AND THE

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IC

o r i g i n a l t e r m for the heads o f the c o m m u n i t y , replaced only some t i m e later by the t e r m caliph, w h i c h was seen as synonymous but had the advantage o f being f o u n d i n the Quran. Whatever i t was called, c o m m u n i t y leadership was at first i n f o r m a l a n d personal, m u c h like t r i b a l leadership. O n l y gradually d i d the caliphate acquire greater prestige and formality, as the o r i g i n a l Islamic state grew i n t o a far-flung e m p i r e d u r i n g the early conquest era. A l t h o u g h the first t w o caliphs, A b u Bakr and Umar, appear to have enjoyed widespread support among the Believers, dissension arose under the t h i r d caliph, U t h n i a n . The reasons for this discontent probably included practical concerns, such as a tapering o f f i n the ready supply o f conquest b o o t y for i n d i v i d u a l soldiers, o r feelings that newly conquered lands outside the garrison t o w n s were not being made available for settlement by the soldiers and were instead being d o m i n a t e d by wealthy families. But they also seem to have involved perceptions that U t h m a n was n o t r u l i n g w i t h the fairness and disdain for private gain that most p i o u s Believers expected o f t h e i r c o m m a n d e r . U t h m a n was accused ( w h e t h e r rightly, i t may never be k n o w n ) o f favoring his relatives w h e n m a k i n g i m p o r t a n t and sometimes lucrative appointments, o f d i v e r t i n g monies f r o m the treasury, and o f other transgressions, some fiscal, some m o r a l . This dissension grew i n t o a violent u p r i s i n g , w h i c h culminated i n the m u r d e r o f the caliph i n 656. These developments began the complicated series o f events k n o w n as the First C i v i l War ( 6 5 6 - 6 1 ) , w h i c h was a struggle for leadership o f the c o m m u n i t y o f Believers waged by the p r o m i n e n t heads o f several families w i t h i n the Prophet's tribe, the Quraysh. This is a chapter o f the u t m o s t i m p o r t a n c e i n Islamic history, because this is w h e n the m a i n subgroups o r sects that have con¬ stituted the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y u p to the present day first emerged. After Uthman's m u r d e r the people o f M e d i n a , i n c l u d i n g some o f the c o n spirators, recognized as the next caliph Ah' i b n A b i T a l i b — c o u s i n and son-in-law o f the Prophet, therefore a m e m b e r o f his clan, the H a s h i m . Ali's acclamation as caliph was opposed by significant segments o f the c o m m u n i t y o f Believers, h o w e v e r — i n particular by U t h m a n ' s k i n s m e n o f the U m a y y a d clan, led by M u a w i y a h , and by leading members o f some other Quraysh families, i n c l u d i n g the Prophets favorite w i f e , Aishah, and t w o o f M u h a m m a d ' s early supporters, Talha i b n Ubaydallah and al-Zubayr i b n a l - A w w a m . The b i d for power by Talha, al-Zubayr, and Aishah was t h w a r t e d w h e n their forces were decisively defeated at the "batde o f the camel" near Basra i n southern Iraq by the supporters o f Ali (shial Ali, Arabic for "party o f A l i . " often referred to simply as the Shia o r Shiites). A l i and his backers established their base i n the garrison t o w n o f Kufa. They eventually felt strong enough to march n o r t h w a r d along the Euphrates River, i n t e n d i n g to take the war to Muawiyah's base i n Syria. Armies o f the t w o sides met at Siffin along the m i d d l e Euphrates, near the frontier o f Syria

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and Iraq, but many o n b o t h sides were uneasy about launching an attack against m e n w h o also considered themselves Believers, and w h o u n t i l recently had been their o w n comrades-at-arms. Skirmishing gave way, after many days, to a battle that was broken o f f w h e n A l i and M u a w i y a h agreed that the matter should be setUed by arbitration rather than fighting and w i t h d r e w to Kufa and Syria, respectively, to await the arbiters' decision. Eventually neither side was satisfied w i t h the arbitration results, and a p e r i o d o f desultory raiding between Syria and Iraq ensued. D u r i n g the p e r i o d o f arbitration and thereafter, Ali's situation was weakened by the w i t h d r a w a l f r o m his camp o f some militant pietists, w h o came to be k n o w n as Kharijites ( f r o m the Arabic khawarij, possibly meaning "seceders"). Some o f t h e m may have broken w i t h A l i because they feared that i f he reached an a c c o m m o d a t i o n w i t h M u a w i y a h , they w o u l d be called to account for their participation i n the m u t i n y against U t h m a n . Others may have fell that Ali's agreement to arbitrate revealed an i m p i o u s lack o f trust i n God's ability to render a just verdict between the t w o rivals o n the battlefield. As they said i n their battle cry, " O n l y G o d has the r i g h t to decide." A h was forced to massacre many Kharijites i n a batde at Nahrawan i n eastern Iraq, an event that shocked many and d i d little to advance his cause, because many Kharijites were r e n o w n e d for their piety. The First C i v i l War finally came to an end i n 661, w h e n a Kharijite assassin killed A l i (another was t h w a r t e d before he c o u l d assassinate M u a w i y a h ) . Shortly thereafter, the m a j o r i t y o f Believers agreed to recognize M u a w i y a h as caliph, perhaps less because they t h o u g h t h i m the ideal r u l e r than because, after five years o f t u r m o i l , they yearned for stability and u n i t y a m o n g the Believers. Muawiyah's r e c o g n i t i o n as caliph marks the b e g i n n i n g o f the Umayyad caliphate (661—750). D u r i n g his t w o decades as caliph, M u a w i y a h relied o n careful d i p l o m a c y and strong governors, especially i n Iraq and the east, to m a i n t a i n an uneasy peace i n the c o m m u n i t y . He kept discontented Shiite supporters o f Ali's family under cont r o l , and either subdued small uprisings o f rebellious Kharijites or forced t h e m to take refuge i n frontier zones, beyond the effective reach o f the caliph's agents. The relative stability o f his reign enabled the M u s l i m armies once again t o embark o n raids and campaigns o f conquest against n e i g h b o r i n g areas. But the issues that were at the heart o f the First C i v i l W a r — h o w leaders o f the c o m m u n i t y o f Believers were to be selected, and above all w h a t were the criteria for leadership—remained unresolved. It is hardly surprising that a n e w wave o f internal t u r m o i l , the Second C i v i l War (680—92), broke out u p o n Muawiyah's death. The Second C i v i l War was a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the first, because the same groups were involved, at the remove o f one generation. The Umayyads, whose h o l d o n the caliphate f r o m their capital i n Damascus was being challenged, were represented first by Muawiyah's sonYazid (r. 6 8 0 - 8 3 ) ,

a

n

d t h e n , afterYazid's early

death and a p e r i o d o f confusion w i t h i n the Umayyad family, by another relative,

MUHAMMAD

A N D THE CALIPHATE

I7

the caliph A b d al-Malik i b n M a r w a n (r. 685-705-). The Umayyads faced w i d e spread o p p o s i t i o n . F r o m Ali's o l d s t r o n g h o l d i n Kufa, the Shiites, w h o claimed that the caliphate s h o u l d belong to someone o f Ali's family, rallied first a r o u n d Ali's younger son, al-Husayn. After al-Husayn and his family were massacred i n 680 by U m a y y a d t r o o p s at Karbala i n I r a q , the Shiites c o n t i n u e d to resist Umayyad r u l e i n Kufa under the leadership o f a charismatic leader n a m e d alMukhtar, w h o claimed to be acting i n the name o f one o f Ali's sons. A b d Allah i b n al-Zubayr ( 6 2 4 - 9 2 ) , son o f that al-Zubayr whose b i d for the caliphate had been so quickly ended i n the First Civil War, established himself i n Mecca and was recognized by many i n the empire as caliph. His determination and broad support made his resistance to the Umayyads as formidable as his father's had been ephemeral. Meanwhile, several groups o f Kharijites took advantage o f die political disarray prevailing i n the c o m m u n i t y o f Believers to establish themselves i n various parts o f Arabia, Iraq, and Iran. I n the end, after a dozen years o f bitter strife, A b d al-Malik and his ruthless lieutenant, al-Hajjaj ibnYtisuf, were able to pacify first Iraq, then Arabia, and to b r i n g die w h o l e empire under Umayyad control. The road the Umayyads had f o l l o w e d to victory, however, was littered w i t h

The golden dome of the shrine at Karbala in Iraq marks the burial site of the Prophet's grandson Husayn

m a n g l e d dreams, m e m o r i e s o f w h i c h w o u l d haunt the dynasty's future and c o n -

and his family, who were

tribute to its downfall. Yazid's generals, i n the first unsuccessful efforts to subdue

murdered by the Umayyads

A b d Allah i b n al-Zubayr i n Mecca, had ruthlessly crushed an u p r i s i n g i n Medina w h i l e en route, and had even laid siege to the sacred precincts i n Mecca, i n the

in 680. This act of martyrdom marks the beginning of the separation of Shiites as a

process starting a fire that destroyed part o f the Kaaba. The Shiites had seen their

political party and distinct

hopes dashed, b u t the pitiless slaughter o f Ali's son al-Husayn and his family at

subgroup within the Islamic

Karbala p r o v i d e d t h e m w i t h an act o f m a r t y r d o m o f m y t h i c a l p r o p o r t i o n s .

community.

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N u r t u r i n g the m e m o r y o f this m a r t y d o m deepened their hatred o f the Umayyads and started a process whereby the Shiites began to feel themselves to be n o t merely a political party but a distinct subgroup w i t h i n the Islamic c o m m u n i t y . I n the course o f w o r k i n g out the differences w i t h i n their o w n house, the Umayyads had even managed to set some Syrian tribes against others i n a way that w o u l d later u n d e r m i n e their efforts to b u i l d a cohesive army o n these tribal groups. The i m p o r t a n c e o f the t w o civil wars goes far b e y o n d their i m m e d i a t e p o l i t ical impact, however. These c i v i l wars represented the arena i n w h i c h Believers first openly debated the ways i n w h i c h a u t h o r i t y to lead the Islamic c o m m u n i t y could be legitimately claimed. Kharijites h e l d that true piety and impeccably righteous behavior were the only qualities that p r o v i d e d true l e g i t i m a t i o n i n an Islamic context. Others, notably the Alids and their Shiite supporters, w h o contended that o n l y a m e m b e r o f Ali's family or o f the Prophet's clan o f H a s h i m should h o l d power, argued that legitimacy was essentially genealogical. Still o t h ers—such as the Umayyads-—claimed that the consensus o f the c o m m u n i t y o f Believers (jarruia, or c o m i n g together) was the most i m p o r t a n t element i n establishing a legitimate c l a i m to head the Islamic c o m m u n i t y . Later, some ( i n c l u d i n g the Umayyads)

w o u l d argue that their very ascent to p o w e r was

an

expression o f God's w i l l and therefore legitimate i n its o w n r i g h t . These claims and counterclaims w o u l d be raised repeatedly i n the centuries ahead. It is therefore d u r i n g the c i v i l wars that the m a i n sectarian subdivisions o f the Islamic c o m m u n i t y first emerged: the Shiites, the Kharijites, and (retrospectively, t h r o u g h an ephemeral g r o u p k n o w n as the M u r j i a ) the Sunni or o r t h o d o x m a j o r i t y sect o f Islam, w h i c h came to be defined as m u c h as anything by their rejection o f the central beliefs o f the Shiites and Kharijites. A l l members o f these subgroups w i t h i n the Islamic c o m m u n i t y justify their particular identity o n the basis o f their differing readings o f the events o f the c i v i l wars, particularly the first war. The c i v i l wars are thus the lens t h r o u g h w h i c h radiates the spectrum o f groups m a k i n g u p the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . The ideal o f a politically u n i f i e d c o m m u n i t y o f Believers (ummafi) headed by a caliph eventually became unrealizable i n practice, as the empire came to span thousands o f kilometers and the c o m m u n i t y to embrace m i l l i o n s o f people. Nonetheless,

the i n s t i t u t i o n o f the

caliphate (and indeed, the caliph h i m s e l f ) played an i m p o r t a n t role because i t stood as a symbolic e m b o d i m e n t o f M u s l i m religious unity. For this reason the i n s t i t u t i o n was retained l o n g after it had ceased to have real political meaning.

Apogee of the Caliphal Empire (700-950 C.E.) The age o f the first conquests and the civil wars ( r o u g h l y 6 3 0 - 7 0 0 C.E.) had seen the establishment o f the c o m m u n i t y o f Believers as a loosely organized political

M U H A M M A D

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ig

entity headed by the first caliphs. The early c o m m u n i t y and state had been united ( w h e n they were u n i t e d ) n o t so m u c h by institutional structures, most o f w h i c h were still e m b r y o n i c , but m a i n l y by i d e o l o g y — t h a t is, by the Believers' convict i o n that they were engaged i n a c o m m o n effort to establish, i n God's name, a n e w and righteous regime o n earth. The d e p t h o f this c o n v i c t i o n underlay the intensity w i t h w h i c h the Believers had disagreed over the legitimacy o f various rivals for the caliphate d u r i n g the c i v i l wars; but their c o m m i t m e n t to a c o m m o n cause also enabled the Believers to come together once again as a single political u n i t after the wars. By the end o f the second war i n 692, the Believers had embraced more clearly than before their identity as Muslims—that is, as a monotheist confession f o l l o w i n g the teachings o f M u h a m m a d and the Q u r a n , and for this reason distinct f r o m other monotheists such as Jews o r Christians. D u r i n g the t w o and a half centuries that followed the second w a r (ca. 700-ca. 950 C . E . ) , the rudimentary institutional structures o f the early c o m m u n i t y o f Believers fully matured, providing the caliphs w i t h the irhlitary and administrative machinery needed to contain the divisions that have reverberated d o w n through the subsequent history o f the Islamic c o m m u n i t y since the civil wars. The p e r i o d o f 700 to 950, then, represented the apogee o f the caliphal empires—an age o f political and c o m m u n a l expansion, great institutional and cultural development, and economic g r o w t h . The Umayyad dynasty was overt h r o w n i n 750 C . E . by a military uprising organized by the Abbasid family, descen-

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dants o f the Prophet Muhammad's uncle al-Abbas i b n A b d al-Muttalib (ca. c66-ca. 653), resulting i n a shift o f the i m p e r i a l capital eastward f r o m Damascus, i n Syria, to Iraq, where the early Abbasids founded a new capital, Baghdad. But several keyaspects o f the evolution o f the caliphate and the empire continued under b o t h the late Umayyad and the early Abbasid caliphs, and for this reason, despite the change o f r u l i n g dynasty, i t is fair to v i e w the p e r i o d o f 700 to 950 as a single phase i n the history o f the caliphate and o f the Islamic c o m m u n i t y . The most basic fact about this p e r i o d is that the caliphal empire and the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y continued to expand. The early conquests had g r o u n d to a halt d u r i n g the Second C i v i l War, as the Umayyads and their rivals devoted m i l itary resources to fighting each other. After the war, however, the Umayyads i n a u gurated a second phase o f i m p e r i a l expansion (the first h a l f o f the e i g h t h century). Some o f the conquests sponsored by the later Umayyads were m o t i vated by a desire to extend Islamic rule. For example, expansion seems to have been the objective o f the great ( i f unsuccessful) campaigns by land and sea against Constantinople, the capital o f the Byzantine Empire (669, 6 7 4 - 8 0 , and 716—17), as w e l l as the annual s u m m e r raids i n t o Byzantine border territories (a The mighty land walls of

p o l i c y c o n t i n u e d under the Abbasids u n t i l the m i d d l e o f the n i n t h c e n t u r y ) . The

Constantinople, built in the

caliphs also doubtless h o p e d to a f f i r m their legitimacy a m o n g M u s l i m s by spon-

centuries preceding the rev-

soring such campaigns o f j i h a d against n o n - M u s l i m states. The incentive for

elation of Islam, protected the city against repeated invasions, including the unsuccessful Arab campaigns

launching other campaigns, however, seems to have been the desire to benefit f r o m the seizure o f booty, particularly captives w h o c o u l d be e m p l o y e d or sold as slaves; this may have been the case w i t h many raids i n N o r t h Africa organized

in the seventh and eighth

by the later Umayyads. The throngs o f recruits w h o participated i n these cam-

centuries.

paigns were, o f course, responding to a w i d e range o f m o t i v a t i o n s — f r o m zeal

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to spread the faith or the hope o f attaining m a r t y r d o m o n the battlefield (and hence eternal salvation), to lust for b o o t y or hope o f f i n d i n g new lands to settle, to a simple thirst for adventure. W i t h o u t the organizing activity o f the caliphs and their governors, however, most o f these campaigns w o u l d not have occurred. Whatever the motivations, the scope o f the second phase o f conquests was astonishing. I n N o r t h Africa the M u s l i m s , w h o d u r i n g the c i v i l wars had stayed close to their strong points, such as the garrison t o w n o f Qayrawan, finally dislodged the last Byzantine outposts, such as Carthage, and pushed all the way to the Atlantic coast o f Morocco. The local Berber p o p u l a t i o n began to embrace Islam, and some were d r a w n i n t o the expansion process. I n 711 general Tariq i b n Ziyad led an a r m y consisting largely o f Berbers across the Straits o f Gibraltar (named after h i m ) i n t o Spain. Other troops, Berber and Arab, p o u r e d i n and w i t h i n a few b r i e f years seized the southern and eastern t w o - t h i r d s o f the Iberian peninsula f r o m the faltering Visigothic k i n g d o m , w h i c h vanished, leaving small, i m p o v e r i s h e d Christian k i n d g o m s o n l y i n the n o r t h e r n mountains. F r o m Spain the M u s l i m s sent raids across the Pyrenees i n t o the Languedoc and adjacent regions o f France, reaching the h i g h water mark o f their expansion i n the west somewhere near the Loire r e g i o n , w h e r e i n 732 they were defeated by the Frankish ruler Charles Martel. A l t h o u g h the M u s l i m s held several cities i n southern France for a f e w decades, ultimately their conquests there were ephemeral; by the late e i g h t h century they seldom ventured n o r t h o f the Pyrenees. D u r i n g the n i n t h century theAbbasids' governors o f Tunisia, the Aghlabids, raided Sicily (starting i n 827), southern Italy, and the French and Italian Rivieras, and established over m u c h o f Sicily a M u s l i m political presence that endured u n t i l the arrival o f the N o r m a n s i n the mid-eleventh century. In the east, U m a y y a d governors launched renewed campaigns f r o m their garrisons i n Khurasan ( i n northeast I r a n ) , particularly M a r v and Balkh, i n t o the regions beyond the Oxus River o n the fringes o f Central Asia. Between 70c and 713, Bukhara i n Transoxiana, the region o f Fergana and its capital, Shash ( m o d ern-day Tashkent), the r i c h district o f K h w a r i z m ( m o d e r n - d a y K h o r e z m ) south o f the Aral Sea—all located i n w h a t is n o w k n o w n as Uzbekistan—and m u c h o f Sogdiana, i n c l u d i n g its capital at Samarqand, were b r o u g h t i n t o the Umayyad Empire. Despite numerous rebellions and efforts by local groups to o v e r t h r o w M u s l i m r u l e d u r i n g the early n i n t h century, these areas remained forever after part o f the Islamic w o r l d . M e a n w h i l e , between 711

and 713, the caliphate was

establishing its first permanent f o o t h o l d i n Sind ( p a r t o f the Indus River valley); the teenage c o m m a n d e r o f M u s l i m troops, M u h a m m a d i b n al-Qasim, marched t h r o u g h southern Iran to conquer and establish an initial base at D a i b u l , the m a i n city i n the Indus delta. F r o m i t he conquered other major cities i n the region n o w k n o w n as Pakistan, i n c l u d i n g the religious center at M u l t a n and the p o l i t i c a l cap-

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ital o f Sind, Brahmanabad (where the city o f Mansura w o u l d later be built u n d e r the Abbasids). These first M u s l i m colonies i n Sind lived o n , but little about t h e m is d o c u m e n t e d , and they were doubtless almost c o m p l e t e l y

autonomous.

Nevertheless, recent archaeological evidence suggests that they m a i n t a i n e d ties o f trade, at least w i t h other parts o f the Islamic w o r l d such as Iran and Syria. D u r i n g the expansion o f the caliphal empire, the Islamic c o m m u n i t y itself spread beyond the empire. Whereas the spread o f the empire was carried out m a i n l y by armies, the spread o f the Islamic faith beyond the caliphate's borders was usually the w o r k o f merchants and pious preachers. Kharijite merchants f r o m N o r t h Africa, for example, appear to have been the first t o b r i n g Islam to the populations o f subSaharan West Africa. The m a i n spreading o f die Islamic community, however, took place w i t h i n the caliphal empire itself. In many parts o f the empire, even i n those conquered early o n , such as Egypt or Iran, the population remained predominantly n o n - M u s l i m for centuries. W i t h time, m o r e o f these conquered peoples embraced Islam; estimates suggest that i n the Near Eastern provinces Muslims became the majority only after about 800 C.H. I n other words, d u r i n g the golden age o f the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates Muslims were still a m i n o r i t y i n the lands diey ruled. The empire's conquered populations were gradually w o n over to Islam for various reasons. Forced conversions were rare, but i n some cases the i m p o s i t i o n o f higher taxes o n n o n - M u s l i m s may have created an economic incentive for embracing Islam. For the most part, however, the gradual Islamization o f the empire's p o p ulations was part o f a complex transformation o f the w h o l e social environment, involving many factors that i m p i n g e d simultaneously o n the individual and the family; economic and political advantage, social mobility, linguistic and cultural affinities, marriage and kinship requirements, and, above all, the intrinsic appeal o f Islam as a belief system. A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t feature o f this p e r i o d was c o n t i n u i n g r i v a l r y f o r the caliphate itself, that is, for supreme p o l i t i c a l power i n the empire. O n the p r a g matic side there were g r u m b l i n g s or actual uprisings directed against established caliphs, and various measures (such as t r a n s f o r m i n g the a r m y ) were taken by the caliphs themselves to safeguard their power. But the ideological struggle over the m e a n i n g o f the caliphate and the legitimacy o f various contenders' claims to i t also c o n t i n u e d unabated i n this p e r i o d . A l t h o u g h the U m a y y a d caliph A b d alMalik and his successors were able to b u i l d a fairly f i r m support base f o r t h e m selves after the Second Civil War, they nonetheless faced widespread o p p o s i t i o n . The l o n g - s t a n d i n g o p p o s i t i o n o f the Shiites and Kharijites c o n t i n u e d . The Umayyads used garrison troops to c o n t r o l numerous small Kharijite insurrections as w e l l as m o r e serious uprisings such as that m o u n t e d by the A l i d leader Zayd i b n A l i i n Kufa i n 740. But the Umayyads were also opposed by many n e w converts to Islam, most o f t h e m mawali, o r clients, o f Arab tribes, w h o felt that

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their conversion s h o u l d have e n t i t l e d t h e m t o equal treatment w i t h other M u s l i m s , particularly the lower rate o f taxes that Arab M u s l i m s enjoyed. A n u m ber o f pious M u s l i m s backed the n e w converts i n this c l a i m , however, or felt that the Umayyads had discredited themselves i n some other w a y by their earlier actions. Such concerns may have u n d e r l a i n the obscure qadaiiyya m o v e m e n t ( o n the surface, a debate over the degree to w h i c h God's o m n i p o t e n c e l i m i t e d h u m a n independence and responsibility) that plagued the last decades o f U m a y y a d rule. O n a m o r e m u n d a n e level, the later Umayyads faced a crisis as agricultural lands were abandoned i n the t w o richest provinces o f the e m p i r e , Egypt and Iraq. The f u l l reasons f o r this p h e n o m e n o n are n o t k n o w n — i t was probably linked i n part to the conversion to Islam o f the indigenous peasantry—but whatever the causes, this abandonment disrupted the flow o f taxes and i n some cases was reversed o n l y t h r o u g h draconian measures that f u r t h e r enhanced the Umayyads' reputat i o n f o r harsh and unjust rule. The Umayyads were n o t b l i n d to their opponents' varied claims, and they made serious efforts t o establish themselves as legitimate heads o f the Islamic c o m m u n i t y and rulers o f the state. They encouraged scholars to gather and c o m p i l e reports about the o r i g i n s o f Islam (the Prophet's life and career, the history o f the earlyc o m m u n i t y , and so o n ) . I n this way, the Umayyads played a central role i n establishing a M u s l i m identity, because the o r i g i n story a f f i r m e d that the Islamic c o m -

The Dome of the Rock in Terusalem is the third holiest site in Islam. Built over the remains of Solomon's temple, the structure is thought by many Muslims to mark the spot from which Muhammad began his night journey to heaven.

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m u n i t y they led was the direct descendant o f Muhammad's o w n , and diat i t f o l l o w e d his teachings and those o f the Q u r a n — p r o p o s i t i o n s to w h i c h Muslims still adhere. The Umayyads also asserted their legitimacy by continuing the ancient trad i t i o n o f royal patronage for sumptuous religious buildings, notably the D o m e o f Rock i n Jerusalem and the Umayyad mosque i n Damascus—two o f the first o u t standing examples o f Islamic architecture. The Umayyads' support for campaigns o f expansion and conquest also helped bolster their claim to b e i n g legitimate rulers o f the Islamic c o m m u n i t y . Despite these efforts, however, o p p o s i t i o n to the Umayyads intensified d u r i n g the second quarter o f the e i g h t h century. At the same t i m e divisions w i t h i n their Syrian-based a r m y — t h e product o f clashes d u r i n g the Second Civil War and r i v a l r y over royal patronage—made the army an increasingly unreliable support for the U m a y y a d regime. Yet i t was just at this t i m e that ceaseless campaigning o n the Byzantine frontiers and stubborn internal o p p o s i t i o n made firm support indispensable. The Alids and their Shiite supporters proved especially t r o u b l e some to the Umayyads, f o m e n t i n g numerous uprisings i n the last decades o f Umayyad r u l e . Eventually, i t was another branch o f M u h a m m a d ' s f a m i l y (the Abbasids), however, that f i n a l l y o v e r t h r e w the Umayyads and o c c u p i e d the caliphate i n 750. U n l i k e the Alids and their Shiite partisans, the Abbasids had patiendy organized an u n d e r g r o u n d o p p o s i t i o n movement and b u i l t u p a secure p o w e r base before r i s i n g i n open revolt. Moreover, w h e n they organized their rebelhon against the Umayyads f r o m the province o f Khurasan i n northeastern

Courtyard of the Great Mosque in Damascus, founded in the early eighth century. The walls were once entirely covered with glittering mosaics, largely covered with whitewash in this photograph taken in the early

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Iran, the Abbasids carefully kept secret their o w n identity as claimants to the caliphate, rallying supporters instead i n the name o f "the family o f M u h a m m a d . " This vague appeal enabled t h e m b o t h to avoid detection by the Umayyads and to w i n the backing o f many a m o n g the Shiites ( w h o naturally assumed that the movement was i n favor o f an A l i d ) and o f m a n y other d i s g r u n t l e d groups w h o yearned for m o r e righteous leadership than they thought the Umayyads had p r o vided. O n l y after decisively defeating U m a y y a d armies i n several battles i n Iran and Iraq, and k i l l i n g the caliph and many U m a y y a d princes, d i d the Abbasid leader A b u 1-Abbas al-Saffah c o m e o u t i n the open and receive the oath o f allegiance as caliph. For several t u r b u l e n t years the Abbasid caliphs al-Saffah (r. 7 5 0 - 5 4 ) and A b u Jafar a l - M a n s u r (r. 7 5 4 - 7 5 ) c o n s o l i d a t e d t h e i r p o w e r against r i v a l s w i t h i n the Abbasid family, d i s g r u n t l e d A l i d s , and f o r m e r p o w e r f u l s u p p o r t ers s u c h as the Abbasids' agent A b u M u s l i m , w h o had largely engineered the r e b e l l i o n i n Khurasan. By about 756, however, the Abbasid dynasty's p o w e r was securely established, and the Abbasids w e r e to o c c u p y the caliphate f o r the r e m a i n d e r o f its existence (that is, f r o m 750 u n t i l 1258), a l t h o u g h after about 950 t h e i r real p o w e r was severely c u r t a i l e d by a succession o f secular p o w e r h o l d e r s . The first Abbasids c l a i m e d to be s t a r t i n g the caliphate anew, p u r g i n g i t o f the evils o f t h e i r U m a y y a d predecessors. Shortly after c o m i n g to p o w e r , the second A b b a s i d c a l i p h , al-Mansur, f o u n d e d a n e w i m p e r i a l capital at Baghdad, o n the T i g r i s River i n I r a q , t o s y m b o l i z e this break w i t h the i m p i o u s U m a y y a d past. M a n y Islamic r u l e r s o f later p e r i o d s w o u l d f o l l o w this precedent by f o u n d i n g n e w capitals to s y m b o l i z e the start o f w h a t they c l a i m e d to be a n e w era. Even the Abbasids' overthrow o f the Umayyads d i d not end the struggle over the caliphate, however. The Shiites sdll believed that only an A l i d could legitimately lead the c o m m u n i t y , so they were usually n o more favorably disposed to the Abbasids than they had been to the Umayyads. The complex relationship between these t w o branches o f the Prophet's family, the Abbasids and the Alids, is a central theme o f Abbasid history (and o f many historical texts w r i t t e n i n this and later periods). The reverence that many early M u s l i m s felt for the family o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d , indeed for the entire H a s h i m clan, led some Abbasid caliphs, such as al-Mansur and al-Mahdi (r. 775-85), to favor their A l i d contemporaries by i n c l u d ing t h e m at court, seeking their advice, and otherwise t r y i n g to w i n their support. Other Abbasids, such as H a r u n al-Rashid (r. 7 8 6 - 8 0 9 ) , were suspicious o f the Alids, w h o m they assumed to be conspiring f o r the caliphate. For their part, the Alids were also divided i n dieir attitude toward the Abbasids, w h i c h naturally varied i n some measure w i t h the Abbasids' policies toward t h e m . Some A l i d s — s u c h as the brothers I b r a h i m and M u h a m m a d i b n A b d Allah ( d . 762-763) and al-

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Husayn i b n A h ( d . 786), and their m o r e radical s u p p o r t e r s — c o u l d not let go o f the idea that the)- were m o r e entitled to r u l e than the Abbasid "upstarts," and rose i n rebellion,

p a r t i c u l a r l y i f the

reigning

Abbasid had taken a h a r d l i n e t o w a r d them.

Others,

such

as

Jafar

al-Sadiq

(702/3—76c), were m o r e prudent i n deali n g w i t h the Abbasids and advanced a special A l i d claim to r u l e i n terms o f a strictly r e l i g i o u s leadership. By the late e i g h t h century, i f n o t earlier, some Shiites h a d developed a clearly articulated concept o f the imamate (the office o f the i m a m , or head o f the c o m m u n i t y ) , w h i c h posited The Abbasid capital at Baghdad, founded in 762 as reconstructed on the basis of medieval descriptions. The

that o n l y an A l i d i n a certain l i n e o f descent f r o m the Prophet's c o u s i n and

caliph's palace and mosque stood in the center of a vast

s o n - i n - l a w A l i i b n A b i Talib c o u l d r i g h t -

esplanade surrounded by shops and residences.

f u l l y c l a i m leadership o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . The social upshot o f this was a

gradually hardening sense a m o n g the Alids' Shiite supporters that they f o r m e d a distinct, separate g r o u p w i t h i n the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y , identified w i t h the f o r tunes o f the A l i d imams. This sense o f Shiite separateness f r o m w h a t was b e c o m i n g the Sunni m a j o r i t y i n the Islamic c o m m u n i t y begins to be visible by the b e g i n n i n g o f the n i n t h century at the latest; f r o m that t i m e o n , Shiites and Sunnis often appear as rival social and political factions i n the life o f Baghdad and many other places i n the Islamic w o r l d , independent o f the existence i n a particular historical m o m e n t o f an A l i d claimant to power. F o l l o w i n g the abortive rebellion o f al-Husayn i b n A l i i n the Hejaz i n 786, some Alids and their supporters seem to have decided that the Abbasids were too p o w e r f u l near the empire's centers o f p o w e r to be challenged there, and they established small, independent states i n inaccessible regions, such as the w i l d m o u n t a i n c o u n t r y south o f the Caspian Sea, i n Yemen, or in the far western reaches o f N o r t h Africa. F r o m these n e w bases, and f r o m u n d e r g r o u n d movements secretly organized i n the heart o f the e m p i r e , the Shiites eventually m o u n t e d m o r e effective challenges to Abbasid rule. This struggle for the position o f caliph also raged w i t h i n the r u l i n g dynasty (whether Umayyad or Abbasid), because there was n o clear tradition or rule o f succession. Many caliphs f o u n d themselves confronted by insurrections m o u n t e d by, or i n the name of, their o w n brothers, uncles, or other close relatives. Powerful

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factions i n the army, bureaucracy, caliphal court, and caliphal family (the different mothers o f t w o rival half-brothers, for example) lent their support to the claimant w h o m they t h o u g h t w o u l d best serve their o w n interests. Some caliphs, r e m e m bering their o w n close call at accession, hoped t o spare their offspring the same tribulations and drew u p detailed wills laying out the exact order o f succession o f several sons. Such arrangements seldom worked o u t as intended, however. A major example o f this was the bitter civil w a r that broke out f o l l o w i n g the death o f the Abbasid caliph H a r u n al-Rashid i n 809. Despite the fact that al-Rashid had made strenuous efforts to regulate the succession, al-Rashid's son M u h a m m a d a l - A m i n (r. 809-813) was o v e r t h r o w n by his brother a l - M a m u n (r. 813-33), w h o had been governor o f Khurasan. U n d e r l y i n g the dispute was a long-lasting tension between Baghdad and Khurasan, w i t h pro-Baghdad and pro-Khurasan factions i n the army, the court, and the landed aristocracy backing either a l - A m i n or a l - M a m u n . A l - M a m u n ' s attempt to govern the empire f r o m Marv, his capital i n Khurasan, aroused great discontent, and i n 819 he moved his court to Baghdad. By then, however, the civil war's disruptive events had done m u c h to u n d e r m i n e the Abbasids' legitimacy. These included not o n l y the l o n g siege o f Baghdad and its inhabitants and the execution o f a l - A m i n but also al-Mamun's effort to w i n Shiite support by backing, for a t i m e , an A l i d as his heir-apparent—only to d r o p h i m f r o m succession later, w h e n the idea proved a political embarrassment. This episode exacerbated tensions between Sunni backers o f the Abbasids and the Shiites, b o t h o f w h o m felt victimized i n ways that caused people to question Abbasid legitimacy. Abbasid legitimacy was also u n d e r m i n e d by clashes w i t h a religious elite increasingly jealous o f its r i g h t to interpret nascent Islamic law. By the n i n t h cent u r y religious scholars expert i n the Quran and the sayings o f the prophet had come to feel that they—not the caliphs—should be the final arbiters i n matters o f law. The mihna, or i n q u i s i t i o n , instituted by the Abbasid caliphs between 833 and 8 4 8 — w h i c h revolved a r o u n d a theological d o c t r i n e k n o w n as Mutazilism and focused o n the question o f whether the Quran text was created or eternal—was i n part an effort by the caliphs to enforce their claims to legal absolutism. The m a i n result o f this episode, however, was to make heroes out o f A h m a d i b n Hanbal (780-855) and other religious scholars i n Baghdad w h o had led the opposition.

Development of the Caliphal Army and Administration This p e r i o d ( 7 0 0 - 9 5 0 ) was also marked by i m p o r t a n t developments i n key i n s t i tutions o f the caliphate and the M u s l i m empire, particularly the army and the i m p e r i a l bureaucracy. The later Umayyads t r i e d to b u i l d a potent n e w army based o n the Arab tribes o f Syria, w h i c h they tied to their interests t h r o u g h

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lavish caliphal patronage. The early Abbasid armies, by contrast, relied especially o n soldiers f r o m Khurasan (often settlers o f Arabian o r i g i n ) w h o m the

first

Abbasids had r i d d e n to power. A l t h o u g h the Arabian and Syrian tribes that c o n stituted the core o f the Umayyad army were n o t completely swept away, i t was the Khurasanians and their descendants—the abnu al-dowla, or "sons o f the revol u t i o n , " n o w mostly settled i n I r a q — w h o d o m i n a t e d the Abbasid m i l i t a r y establishment for almost a century after the Abbasids' accession i n 750. But b o t h the Umayyad and early Abbasid armies were composed m a i n l y o f ordinary m e n w i t h ordinary social ties (that is, to their families, tribes, places o f o r i g i n , and so o n ) . I n many cases, soldiers were only o n d u t y part t i m e or were recruited by the army as auxiliaries as occasion demanded. Despite their loose structure and lack o f professional t r a i n i n g , such armies enabled the Umayyads and Abbasids to extend the empire's borders, quell dissident movements, and launch the annual s u m m e r raids against the Byzantines i n Anatolia. This pattern o f loose army organization was gradually replaced d u r i n g the n i n t h century by a n e w m o d e l b u i l t a r o u n d smaller, h i g h l y trained corps o f f u l l t i m e professional soldiers (ahulams), w h o lived and w o r k e d as tight cadres and w h o often had few permanent ties to the rest o f society (many were n o t even m a r r i e d ) . The change began w h e n the caliph a l - M u t a s i m (r. 833—42) assembled a b o d y g u a r d o f mercenaries—many

b u t not all o f t h e m slaves (mamluks) o f

Turkish o r i g i n , or recently freed slaves. The idea was that such soldiers w o u l d be completely loyal to the ruler w h o had raised i h e m to power, because they had few ties to the families, tribes, or institutions o f the capital and central lands o f the empire. Because these mercenaries were professionally trained, they were m o r e effective i n the field than other recruits, and they came to f o r m an increasingly large segment o f the army. They helped secure a l - M u t a s i m against p o t e n tial rivals and enabled h i m to impose m u c h tighter c o n t r o l over the provinces o f the empire (especially over their taxes). To reduce frictions between the Arabicspeaking p o p u l a t i o n o f Baghdad and the soldiery, w h o often d i d not even speak Arabic, al-Mutasim constructed an e n o r m o u s new capital at Samarra, r o u g h l y sixty-five miles (one h u n d r e d k m ) n o r t h o f Baghdad o n the east bank o f the Tigris. The vast scale o f the new capital offers some i n d i c a t i o n o f the size o f his army, and o f the wealth he was able to collect i n taxes to pay for i t . The g r o w t h o f the professional army c o n t i m i e d under al-Mutasim's successors al-Wathiq (r. 8 4 2 - 4 7 ) and al-Muta\vakkil (r. 847-61). Moreover, governorships o f i m p o r t a n t provinces were increasingly assigned to key commanders i n the n e w army rather than to the caliph's k i n s m e n or other civilian notables, and more traditional units o f the army were sidelined. Eventually, this m i g h t y m i l i t a r y machine got o u t o f h a n d , however, p r o v i n g itself m o r e effective as an agent o f factional politics than as a force o f i m p e r i a l defense. I n 861 army commanders

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conspired to assassinate the caliph a l - M u t a w a k k i l , ushering i n a decade o f chaos d u r i n g w h i c h m i l i t a r y factions fought a m o n g themselves for supremacy and for d w i n d l i n g revenues, m a k i n g and u n m a k i n g f o u r caliphs i n Samarra i n the process. M e a n w h i l e , the empire's affairs outside I r a q were neglected; many provinces were left o n their o w n , and n u m e r o u s rebellions sprang u p , some o f w h i c h seized entire regions and established virtually independent states, w h i l e others threatened to seize Baghdad itself. Under the late Umayyads and Abbasids the i m p e r i a l administration also underwent significant changes, aimed at creating a u n i f i e d bureaucracy under caliphal oversight that c o u l d manage the e m p i r e — a n d particularly its taxes—more effectively. Talented administrators such as A b d a l - H a m i d ibnYahya ( d . 750) and I b n alMuqaffa ( 7 2 0 - 7 5 6 ) oversaw the first efforts to professionalize the bureaucracy, i n c l u d i n g the development o f a new; l u c i d Arabic prose style. The Abbasids' rise to power b r o u g h t an increase i n the prominence o f individuals and families hailing f r o m Iran, especially Khurasan, not only i n the army b u t also i n the caliphal court and i n governmental institutions generally, i n c l u d i n g the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The viziers or heads o f this administration, such as the famed viziers o f the Barmakid family, were h i g h l y educated, and as heads o f a vast bureaucracy, they often held great power i n the Abbasid government. At its height a r o u n d the m i d - n i n t h century the Abbasid a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was composed o f a large n u m b e r o f separate departments (divvans), staffed by thousands o f clerks or secretaries (kuttub) w h o ran this administrative machinery. The administration dealt w i t h assessment and c o l lection o f land taxes f r o m the various provinces, w i t h incomes f r o m state lands and confiscated property and w i t h other kinds o f i n c o m e , as w e l l as w i t h disbursements to the army and to administrators and others o n government salary. It included a treasury that balanced receipts and expenses, an accounting office, an intelligence service, a chancery office to handle official correspondence, and a department for the caliph's special court o f appeal (mcizalim). Eventually, the costs o f r u n n i n g such a vast bureaucracy outstripped revenues, however. Struggles arose between the caliphs and their increasingly petulant army commanders and troops for c o n t r o l o f the bureaucracy and the revenues i t c o u l d provide. I n a few cases, p o w e r f u l army chiefs actually secured appointments as viziers—usually w i t h disastrous results because most m i l i t a r y m e n lacked the extensive scribal training, i n everything f r o m tax assessment and accounting to literature and c o m p o s i t i o n , required o f an effective vizier. After the chaos o f the 860s, the caliphate enjoyed a temporary resurgence o f power because several caliphs had close ties to the army chiefs. W i t h the help o f some cooperative viziers, they were able to p u t d o w n the most threatening rebellions. The caliph a l - M u t a d i d (r. 8 9 2 - 9 0 2 ) was able to regain c o n t r o l over Iraq, n o r t h e r n Mesopotamia, Al-Jazirah, n o r t h e r n Syria, and parts o f western Iran.

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Other areas o f the e m p i r e — i n c l u d i n g m u c h o f A r m e n i a , Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iran, N o r t h Africa, and Y e m e n — w e r e effectively a u t o n o m o u s under their "govern o r s " or local dynasties, however, and made little or no real financial or m i l i t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n to the caliphate. But even areas that were under Abbasid c o n t r o l at the b e g i n n i n g o f the tenth century n o w consisted o f a mosaic o f units headed by p o w e r f u l governors, tribes, or local families, and they were weakly integrated w i t h the caliphate. A vigorous and skillful caliph such as a l - M u t a d i d c o u l d rely o n t h e m for support, but w h e n the caliphal g r i p weakened again these areas also could venture to stand o n their o w n . The caliphal g r i p weakened decisively after 908, and the next forty years i n Baghdad were marked by continual i n f i g h t i n g o f bureaucratic and army factions for control o f the caliphs and whatever revenues c o u l d be raised by his bureaucracy, c u l m i n a t i n g i n a m i l i t a r y takeover i n 932. Thereafter the Abbasid caliphs had n o trustworthy units to rely o n , and key army factions ensured that the civilian bureaucracy paid t h e m first. The intensity o f the struggle was exacerbated by a general shortage o f money, generated by disarray and extravagance i n the bureaucracy, loss o f revenues f r o m independent provinces and recalcitrant tax farmers, and an unfortunate decline i n the agrarian p r o d u c t i v i t y o f Iraq itself, f o r m e r l y the caliphate's financial m a i n stay. To cope w i t h the revenue shortage, the Abbasids began to rely o n an i n s t i t u t i o n called iqw (loosely translated as "fief," although the t e r m had a w i d e and variable range o f meanings). Iqta was a k i n d o f administrative shortcut whereby a general or soldier was given the right to collect tax revenues directly f r o m a certain district. The advantage i n the short t e r m was that the troops were paid even i f the treasury was empty, and the relevant parts o f the bureaucracy c o u l d be eliminated. The disadvantages, however, particularly the potential for abuse o f the peasantry and loss o f administrative oversight, were significant. As a result o f these developments the once p o w e r f u l Abbasid caliphs were l i t tle m o r e than figureheads by the 940s, endowed w i t h symbolic religious authority, b u t lacking real political or military power or financial resources o f their o w n . That power and access to resources had passed to p o w e r f u l m i l i t a r y figures, especially the one w h o c o u l d occupy the coveted p o s i t i o n as the caliph's commanderi n - c h i e f (amir al-umara). As the power o f the caliphate was choked off, leaders o f the r e g i o n a l and local polities that emerged c o m p e t e d against one another for c o n t r o l o f Baghdad and the privilege o f being the caliph's "protector." The most n o t e w o r t h y o f these protectors were the chiefs o f the p o w e r f u l B u y i d family o f northwestern Iran ( w h o played this role f r o m 94c to 1055) and the sultans o f the Turkish Seljuk dynasty ( w h o d o m i n a t e d Baghdad f r o m 105c

u n t i l the m i d -

t w e l f t h c e n t u r y ) . F r o m the m i d - t e n t h century u n t i l the M o n g o l s ended the caliphate i n 1258, the Abbasid caliphs were recognized as overlords i n many parts o f the Islamic w o r l d , but only i n a symbolic sense. O n l y o n a few occasions d i d

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theAbbasids succeed i n regaining, albeit briefly, some o f their lost power. Knowledge o f the caliphs' eventual demise, however, must not overshadow the many positive achievements that t o o k place d u r i n g the age o f the i m p e r i a l caliphate. The expansion o f the empire created the p o l i t i c a l haven i n w h i c h the n e w faith o f Islam established itself a m o n g n e w populations f r o m Spain to India. Moreover, the i m p e r i a l caliphate gave b i r t h to a sophisticated and richly varied new civilization i n Eurasia, culturally the most advanced o f its day. This cultural genesis was linked to a n o t e w o r t h y process o f u r b a n i z a t i o n that took place d u r i n g the early Islamic centuries; a l t h o u g h u r b a n life i n the Mediterranean basin had declined sharply i n late antiquity, the early Islamic era saw a revival o f urban centers and o f the commerce and culture usually associated w i t h t h e m . The early m i l i t a r y garrisons o f the first conquest days—Kufa, Basra, Marv, H i m s , Fustat, Qayrawan—soon grew i n t o bustling t o w n s t o w h i c h M u s l i m s o f divergent c u l tural backgrounds, especially n e w converts, were d r a w n . I n the government offices, private salons, and marketplaces o f such t o w n s , as w e l l as o f the i m p e r ial capitals o f Damascus and Baghdad, a new Islamic literary culture i n Arabic began to crystallize—all the m o r e remarkable because before the rise o f Islam, Arabic had no t r a d i t i o n o f w r i t t e n literature. Poetry, grammar, Quranic studies, history, biography, law, theology, philosophy, geography, the natural sciences— all were elaborated i n Arabic and i n a f o r m that was distinctively Islamic. The social base supporting tins new Arabic-Islamic culture was to a certain extent bipartite. The religiously inclined cultivated such fields as Quranic studies, prophetic traditions, religious law, and theology, w h i l e topics such as history, philosophy, and statecraft were sponsored particularly by the scribes o f the imperial bureaucracy, w h o were often learned i n Sasanian and other traditions o f statecraft. Poetry, from the start the soul o f the Arabic literary tradition, was cultivated by botii groups i n religious and secular varieties. The full development o f Arabic-Islamic literary culture continued long after 950, o f course, but its foundations were laid, its first remarkable monuments completed, and many o f its distinctive genres and forms were first established d u r i n g the age o f the imperial caliphate. The caliphs also presided, w i t t i n g l y or n o t , over economic developments that had global repercussions. The vast extent and relative stability o f the empire over almost t w o centuries—as w e l l as the c o n t i n u o u s c i r c u l a t i o n w i t h i n i t o f soldiers, administrators, p i l g r i m s heading to or f r o m Mecca, and scholars w i s h i n g to study w i t h r e n o w n e d teachers—helped to keep routes open and made i t easier for merchants to travel far and w i d e . The rise o f Arabic as a c o m m o n w r i t t e n language made it easier for merchants f r o m distant parts o f the empire to c o m m u nicate. Moreover, merchants i n the Islamic domains i n this era were usually unencumbered by duties or the need f o r special travel documents. M e a n w h i l e , the rise o f large cities created a base o f d e m a n d for a variety o f products, as w e l l

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as centers o f culture. I n its heyday i n the early n i n t h century, Baghdad appears to have been a city o f about a m i l l i o n inhabitants—a staggeringly large size for preindustrial t i m e s — a n d had to i m p o r t even its basic f o o d supplies f r o m sources some distance away. Some l u x u r y goods i n d e m a n d i n Baghdad, particularly a m o n g the political and commercial elites, were b r o u g h t f r o m halfway a r o u n d the globe. Baghdad grew to a size unmatched by other cities, but smaller cities also c o n t r i b u t e d to the economic b o o m . The flourishing p o r t city o f Siraf, o n the eastern coast o f the Persian Gulf, symbolizes one d i m e n s i o n o f this c o m m e r c i a l activity. It was a key transit p o i n t for foodstuffs c o m i n g f r o m O m a n , as w e l l as textiles and other goods entering the caliphal domains f r o m east Africa, I n d i a , and beyond. In the other direction hoards o f Abbasid gold coins f o u n d around the Baltic Sea are silent reminders o f a once-thriving commercial connection that helped revitalize the economy o f n o r t h e r n Europe and may have helped stimulate the n i n t h century revival o f culture and economy c o m m o n l y called the Carolingian renaissance. The discovery o f N o r t h African coins i n Abbasid-period archaeological sites i n Jordan, or Iraqi (or Chinese) ceramics f o u n d i n Egypt, attest to yet other dimensions o f this thriving commerce. It is appropriate to think o f m u c h o f Eurasia i n this p e r i o d as a single, vast economic body, o f w h i c h Abbasid Baghdad i n particular was the heart, p u m p i n g the commercial lifeblood that kept the system alive. Iraq's prosperity i n particular, w i t h its r i c h tax base and t h r i v i n g commerce, was an i m p o r t a n t element c o n t r i b u t i n g to the political power and cultural brilliance o f the h i g h caliphate. W h e n Iraq's agrarian prosperity began to wane i n the tenth cent u r y — a result o f such varied factors as deterioration o f vital irrigation works, salinization o f the soil, and sheer administrative mismanagement—the caliphs f o u n d themselves increasingly unable to pay the bills o f their enormous government operations. This i n t u r n sparked the infighting among military and administrative factions that characterized the long decline o f Abbasid power.

Local Autonomy, Decentralization, and Regionalism Through I I O O The capture o f Baghdad by the Buyids in 94 c, and their reduction o f the caliphs to little more than figureheads, was merely the climax o f a long process o f change that saw ever more parts o f the Islamic empire gradual!) slip be) o n d the caliphs' real control. The emergence o n the former empire's terrain o f autonomous or independent political u n i t s — w h a t some historians call a " c o m m o n w e a l t h " o f regional M u s l i m states, united by their participation i n an emerging Islamic culture—makes tracing the political history o f the Islamic c o m m u n i t y after about 900 C E . m u c h more difficult than i t is for earlier periods, w h e n there existed a single main center o f polit-

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teal power. This section mentions some o f the m a i n political units that emerged and gives a general idea o f their significance and o f larger patterns o f political and cultural evolution o f w h i c h these units were part. Given the nature o f communications and travel i n preindustrial times, many provinces o f the Islamic empire, particularly those distant f r o m the capital at Damascus or Baghdad, enjoyed a significant measure o f a u t o n o m y even at the apogee o f caliphal power. The caliphs i n Damascus or Baghdad simply d i d not have the means to keep lands as far away as Ifriqiya or Khurasan, not to m e n d o n Spain or India, under close supervision. The caliphs therefore had to rely o n strong governors to manage distant provinces. It was taken for granted that provincial governors w o u l d operate w i t h a good deal o f autonomy, and the caliphs were usually w e l l satisfied i f governors recognized their overlordship, contributed to the caliphal treasury, and put additional military units at their disposal w h e n they were needed. One important measure o f truly centralized control under such conditions, however, is whether governors, despite the great independence o f action they w i e l d e d w i t h i n their provinces, could effectively be replaced by the caliphs. I n this regard, i t is notew o r t h y that the Umayyad and early Abbasid caliphs engaged i n frequent (sometimes almost annual) rotation o f their governors. Even provinces i n w h i c h the governorship was granted for Ufe or made hereditary, however, c o u l d remain loyal to the caliphs and offer m e a n i n g f u l support i n the f o r m o f tax revenues, m i l i t a r y backing, and diplomatic support. The first province to be definitively detached f r o m the caliphate was Spain. After the Abbasids overthrew the Umayyad caliphs and slaughtered many o f their k i n s m e n , one U m a y y a d prince w h o escaped made his way to N o r t h Africa, and i n 756 he invaded Spain. It then became an independent state under Umayyad rulers, w h o at first called themselves simply amir ( c o m m a n d e r ) . Eventually, i n 929, the greatest o f the Spanish U m a y y a d rulers, A b d al-Rahman I I I (891-961 ) , assumed the title o f amir al-mu'minin (caliph), i n defiance o f the Abbasids and o f the Ismaili Fatimids, w h o were closer and m o r e dangerous rivals. D u r i n g the n i n t h to the twelfth centuries a splendid and distinctive Islamic culture developed i n Spain, enshrined i n m a j o r w o r k s o f Arabic poetry and prose literature, i n signal c o n t r i b u t i o n s to Islamic philosophy, theology, and law, and i n m a j o r a r c h i tectural m o n u m e n t s such as the Great Mosque o f Córdoba and A b d al-Rahman's palace complex at Medinat al-Zahra. Many Christians and Jews i n Islamic Spain began to adopt their rulers' Arabic language and culture, and i n t u r n made their o w n c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o the culture's b r i l l i a n c e . The great Jewish

philosopher

Maimonides, for example, w h o composed works i n b o t h Arabic and Hebrew, was as m u c h a product o f Islamic as o f Jewish culture. The Umayyads i n Spain faced significant challenges, however. Tension a m o n g Arab settlers, Berber settlers, and local converts (muwallads) sometimes resulted i n

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armed clashes. Some Christians steadfastly resisted b o t h acculturation and assimi l a t i o n , and tensions between M u s l i m s and Christians sometimes ran h i g h . Disaffected elements—whether Christian or M u s l i m — o f t e n d i d not hesitate to call o n the Christian k i n g d o m s o f n o r t h e r n Spain or even o n the Carolingians beyond the Pyrenees for aid, and this e m b r o i l e d the Umayyads i n persistent r a i d i n g and warfare along their n o r t h e r n borders. The p o w e r f u l strongman Abu A m i r al-Mansur ( c o m m o n l y k n o w n as A l m a n z o r ) , w h o came to p o w e r as protector o f a y o u n g caliph and remained i n c o n t r o l o f affairs u n t i l his death i n 1002, The Great Mosque of Córdoba, founded in the late eighth century, was repeat-

cam-

paigned tirelessly i n the n o r t h , using a new army composed o f Berber recruits. After Almanzor's death, however, the caliphate fell u n d e r dispute a m o n g various claimants, backed by d o m i n a n t families i n the m a i n cities o f Islamic Spain.

edly enlarged to meet the

Finally, i n 1031,

needs of the expanding

caliphate altogether, ushering i n the era o f the " p e t t y k i n g s " ( m t i M al-tmvoif i n

Muslim population.The

Arabic, reyes de taifas i n Spanish), d u r i n g w h i c h Islamic Spain was d i v i d e d i n t o an

ingenious system of two-

unstable aggregation o f c o m p e t i n g city-states: Seville, Córdoba, Toledo, Badajoz,

tiered supports allowed builders to create a forest of supports using the short

the leading families decided to abolish the Spanish Umayyad

Saragossa, Valencia, Granada, and others. A l t h o u g h the c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g these local rulers was partly responsible for

stubby columns from

the brilliant cultural flowering o f Islamic Spain d u r i n g the eleventh century, the

Visigothic buildings.

same c o m p e t i t i o n , played out on the political plane, sapped the economic and m i l -

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itary strength o f each o f the petty kings, w h o often raided one another's territories or agreed to pay tribute to Christian k i n g d o m s o f n o r t h e r n Spain w h e n threatened w i t h attack. The era o f the petty kingdoms thus helped to make possible the relentless expansion o f the Christian k i n g d o m s o f n o r t i i e r n Spain at the expense o f the Islamic south that began w i t h the u n i o n o f Castile and Leon i n the late eleventh cent u r y — w h a t is k n o w n i n later Spanish historiography as the reconquisto. The first landmark i n the reconquista occurred i n io8c, w h e n Toledo fell to the astute and dynamic king o f Castile and Léon, Alfonso V I . The petty kings, recognizing that they were too weak to avoid suffering Toledo's fate, yet too divided by petty jealousies to agree o n any one o f t h e m as ruler o f t h e m all, invited the p o w e r f u l ruler o f the Almoravids i n Morocco, Yusuf ibnTashfin, to cross the Strait o f Gibraltar and lead their defense against Alfonso i n 1086. Thus began the p e r i o d o f A l m o r a v i d and Almohad d o m i n a t i o n , w h i c h delayed for m o r e than a hundred years the expansion o f the Christian kingdoms i n t o Islamic Spain. Parts o f N o r t h Africa also became independent o f the caliphate, i n fact or i n p r i n c i p l e , at an early date. U n l i k e Spain, w h i c h had a prosperous agrarian base and boasted numerous t h r i v i n g cities even i n early Islamic times, most o f N o r t h Africa was t h i n l y populated by pastoralists or marginal f a r m i n g c o m m u n i t i e s , and there were few large towns. U n d e r the Umayyad caliphs (before 750) the M u s l i m garrison center at Qayrawan—situated i n I f r i q i y a , the most fertile part o f N o r t h Africa, m o d e r n Tunisia—replaced Byzantine Carthage as the center o f government, and it l o n g remained the nucleus b o t h o f caliphal a u t h o r i t y and o f Islamic o r t h o d o x y i n N o r t h Africa. Even t h o u g h all o f N o r t h Africa was theoretically subject to the caliphate, vast areas, especially those m o r e distant f r o m Qayrawan, remained effectively outside the c o n t r o l o f the caliphs and their gov-

The Ribat at Monastir in

ernors. Moreover, d u r i n g the seventh and e i g h t h centuries, many Berbers were

Tunisia, founded at the end

w o n over to Kharijite Islam by Kharijite merchants, preachers, and refugees fleeing oppression i n their earlier centers i n Iraq and O m a n . Their egalitarian and puritanical variety o f Islam, w i t h its emphasis o n pious "bearers o f religious k n o w l e d g e , " seems to have struck a sympathetic c h o r d a m o n g the Berbers, i n w h o s e t r a d i t i o n a l beliefs h o l y (sometimes m i r a c l e - w o r k i n g ) m e n played a

of the eighth century, is one of a series of fortress/ monasteries established to protect the North African coast and extend Muslim power to Sicily.

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p r o m i n e n t r o l e . The Kharijites established n u m e r o u s small states i n L i b y a , Tunisia, and Algeria d u r i n g the e i g h t h and n i n t h centuries, such as that o f the Rustamids o f Tahert. Because many Kharijites were heavily involved i n commerce, they seem to have been the first to carry Islam across the Sahara to the peoples o f the western Sudan ( m o d e r n Chad, Niger, and M a l i ) . Other refugees f r o m Abbasid rule also f o u n d shelter i n die difficult m o u n t a i n terrain o f N o r t h Africa, i n c l u d i n g the A l i d prince Idris i b n A b d Allah, w h o fled after the abortive A l i d rebellion i n the Hejaz i n 786 and established a small state i n Morocco, w h i c h his successors r u l e d f r o m their n e w capital at Fez. By the late eighth century m u c h o f N o r t h Africa beyond the outskirts o f Qayrawan was a checkerboard o f independent tribes and small states that tendered neither recognition n o r taxes to the caliphs i n Baghdad. I n 800 C E . the Abbasid caliph H a r u n al-Rashid resorted to recognizing his governor, I b r a h i m i b n al-Aghlab, as hereditary governor o f Ifriqiya ( " A f r i c a , " as the province o f N o r t h Africa was then called) i n exchange for an agreed annual tribute. This arrangement had the advantage o f b r i n g i n g at least some revenue to Baghdad and o f preserving the appearance o f Abbasid rule. D u r i n g the century o f their rule the Aghlabid governors were often criticized by the strictly o r t h o d o x p o p u l a t i o n and religious scholars o f Qayrawan for their abuses o f power. Partly to quell such c r i t icism, they struggled m i g h t i l y against the Kharijite states a r o u n d t h e m , built mosques and i r r i g a t i o n w o r k s , and sponsored naval campaigns against Sicily, leadi n g to the establishment o f M u s l i m rule o n that island. Aghlabid Qayrawan also The Aghlabid basins at Qayrawan were among the

developed as a major center for theology and law, but m u c h o f N o r t h Africa nevertheless remained effectively beyond Aghlabid rule. Their r u l e was b r o u g h t to an

many waterworks built in

abrupt halt by the rise o f the Ismaili Fatimids i n Ifriqiya d u r i n g the first decade o f

the mid-ninth century by

the tenth century.

the rulers of present-day Tunisia. Water from aqueducts flowed into the smaller basin where the silt was

F r o m the t i m e o f its conquest i n 6 3 9 - 4 2 , Egypt was an i m p o r t a n t part o f the Islamic empire. The " p r o v i n c e " o f Egypt i n c l u d e d N o r t h Africa and Spain u n t i l these were split o f f to f o r m a separate province i n 70c. Despite a steady flow o f

deposited; the clear water

Arabic-speaking settlers t o Egypt, the local Copts ( M o n o p h y s i t e Christians)

then flowed into the adjoin-

remained the m a j o r i t y o f the p o p u l a t i o n f o r at least several centuries, and they

ing larger basin from which

l o n g remained i m p o r t a n t as administrators for their M u s l i m rulers. The ancient

it was distributed to the city.

city o f Alexandria c o n t i n u e d t o be a m a j o r trade e m p o r i u m , but the M u s l i m s

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developed their new g a r r i s o n t o w n o f Fustat ( O l d Cairo), w h i c h was f r o m the start the province's administrative center. By the n i n t h century Fustat was b e g i n n i n g to develop as an i m p o r t a n t economic and Islamic cultural center. The r i c h f a r m l a n d o f the N i l e valley made Egypt a m a j o r source o f revenue f o r the Umayyad and early Abbasid caliphs. Despite its i m p o r t a n c e , however, Egypt slipped o u t o f the effective grasp o f the Abbasid caliphs w h e n they were overw h e l m e d by m i l i t a r y factions i n Samarra and Baghdad; for most o f a century after 868, Egypt was virtually independent o f the caliphate u n d e r autonomous m i l i tary governors (the Tulunids, 8 6 8 - 9 0 5 , and the Ikhshidids, 935-69) or p o w e r f u l financial administrators (especially die Madharai family i n the early tenth century). D u r i n g this t i m e Egypt's economy seems to have suffered f r o m m i s management o f the tax system. But also d u r i n g this p e r i o d Egypt began to emerge, for the first t i m e since the Roman conquest almost a thousand years earlier, once again as an independent state. Egypt t o o k another giant step i n this d i r e c t i o n w h e n the Fatimid caliphs, c o m i n g f r o m I f r i q i y a , conquered it i n 969 and made i t the seat o f their caliphate shortly thereafter. M u c h o f n o r t h e r n and central Arabia was the preserve o f local pastoral n o m a d i c groups, over w h i c h the caliphs i n Baghdad often had m i n i m a l c o n t r o l . The caliphs d i d , however, endeavor to keep the h o l y cities o f Mecca and Medina, i m p o r t a n t for symbolic and cultic reasons as the focus o f the annual pilgrimage, firmly

under their governors' supervision, and to keep open the m a i n p i l g r i m -

The great Mosque at Sanaa in Yemen was founded in early Islamic times and repeatedly restored and repaired. The Sulayhids. adherents of Ismaili Shiism who ruled Yemen from Sanaa and Dhu Jibla from 1014 to 1138, were one of the many dynasties that established local control as the

age roads t h r o u g h tribal t e r r i t o r y f r o m Syria and Iraq. Southern Arabia (Yemen,

power of the Abbasid caliphs

Hadramawt, and parts o f O m a n ) was only loosely held by the caliphate even i n

declined.

38

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the best o f times. Under the Umayyads and early Abbasids, governors were regularly dispatched to Yemen, but generally they had little influence beyond the capital at Sanaa. Yemen's r u g g e d terrain was mostly d o m i n a t e d by various tribal chiefs, w h o often resided i n m o u n t a i n top castles and c o n t r o l l e d local market towns. Kharijism and particularly Shiism o f various varieties took h o l d at an early date a m o n g some groups i n this natural refuge zone. After the m i d - n i n t h century, as the p o w e r o f the Abbasid caliphs declined, local dynasties o f diverse o r i gins became established i n various centers, particularly Sanaa i n the m o u n t a i n s and Zabid along the Red Sea coast. Commerce w i t h the I n d i a n Ocean basin was an i m p o r t a n t clement i n the economic life o f the m a i n coastal towns, such as Sohar, A d e n , and Zabid. The rise o f local and regional a u t o n o m y o n the Iranian plateau occurred i n very diverse ways and at different times i n different parts o f Iran. The first trend t o w a r d autonomy (not yet independence) can be seen i n the career o f the Tahirid family, w h i c h rose to p r o m i n e n c e i n Abbasid service d u r i n g the c i v i l w a r o f 809-13. D u r i n g the m i d d l e o f the n i n t h century the Tahirids were recognized as hereditary governors o f m u c h o f eastern I r a n , centered o n the r i c h province o f Khurasan and i n c l u d i n g adjacent provinces

such as Sistan and m u c h

of

Transoxiana, w h i c h they governed by c o - o p t i n g i m p o r t a n t local families. The Tahirids ( w h o also h e l d i m p o r t a n t posts i n Baghdad and elsewhere) remained loyal to the Abbasid caliphs and consistently delivered considerable revenues to the caliphal treasury, i n exchange for w h i c h the Abbasids allowed the Tahirids virtually free rein i n their provinces. T a h i r i d d o m i n a t i o n o f eastern Iran was b r o u g h t t o an end a b r u p t l y i n 873 w h e n their capital N i s h a p u r ( i n the p r o v i n c e o f Khurasan) was conquered by the Saffarids o f Sistan, whose attitude t o w a r d the caliphate was as aggressive and hostile as the Tahirids' had been supportive. The r u g g e d and i m p o v e r i s h e d p r o v i n c e o f Sistan, t h o u g h conquered early by the M u s l i m s , had been o n l y m a r g i n a l l y integrated i n t o the caliphal e m p i r e . D u r i n g the U m a y y a d and early Abbasid periods, K h a r i j i t e bands and other local rebellions kept the r e g i o n t u r b u l e n t . The f r e e b o o t i n g Saffarid leaders, r i s i n g i n this context, expanded their c o n t r o l first i n t o Khurasan and western Afghanistan, t h e n i n t o the provinces o f K e r m a n ( i n southeast I r a n ) and Fars ( i n southwest Iran). By the 870s they had seized Khuzestan ( i n southwest Iran) and parts o f southern Iraq and came close t o o v e r t h r o w i n g the Abbasids i n 876, w h e n they were f i n a l l y t u r n e d back by the caliph's armies o n l y a few days' m a r c h f r o m Baghdad. For many years thereafter, however, the Saffarids r e m a i n e d p o w e r f u l and essentially i n d e p e n dent o f the caliphs, w h o were forced to recognize the Saffarids as " g o v e r n o r s " o f their h o m e province o f Sistan, as w e l l as o f Fars and K e r m a n ( u n t i l at least 898), and even awarded t h e m key posts i n Baghdad. A f t e r about 9 0 0 the

MUHAMMAD

A N D T H E C A L I P H AT t

39

Saffarids were restricted t o Sistan, as they were supplanted i n m u c h o f eastern Iran by the Samanids, a " l o y a l i s t " dynasty o f governors w h o had risen f r o m the w r e c k age o f the f o r m e r T a h i r i d d o m a i n s . The Samanid family came to prominence as subordinates o f the Tahirids, for w h o m they governed key towns o f Transoxiana. W h e n the Saffarids seized Khurasan, the Samanids retained control over Transoxiana. By about 900 the Samanids had reconquered Khurasan i n the name

of

the

Abbasids, w h o recognized them as governors, and extended their control over m u c h o f northern Iran, K h w a r i z m

(modern

K h o r e z m ) , and further east I n Transoxiana and Afghanistan as w e l l , paying special attention to w a r d i n g o f f depredations i n t o settled districts b y the n o m a d i c Turkish tribes o f Transoxiana. Like the Tahirids, the Samanids r e m a i n e d loyal t o the Abbasids, b u t they never c o n t r i b u t e d revenues to the caliphate and were, i n effect, an i n d e pendent state. They prospered especially because o f the lucrative trade i n slaves,

The tomb of the Samanids at Bukhara is one of the earliest mausolea to survive in the Islamic lands. It covers the graves of several mem-

captured a m o n g Turkish tribes l i v i n g o n

bers of the Samanid family, governors of Khurasan and Transoxiana

the f r i n g e s o f t h e i r d o m a i n s . M a n y o f

for the Abbasid caliphs in the early tenth century.

these slaves were trained i n m a r t i a l skills and sold as mercenaries or used to staff t h e i r o w n b u r g e o n i n g army. But the Samanid p e r i o d also saw the conversion o f parts o f Transoxiana's T u r k i s h p o p u l a t i o n t o Islam by i t i n e r a n t merchants and missionaries, and the b e g i n nings o f the peaceable m i g r a t i o n o f T u r k i s h converts i n t o Samanid d o m a i n s to settle. To manage their domains, the Samanids established an extensive bureaucracy, based o n the Abbasid m o d e l and staffed by cadres o f h i g h l y literate scribes. As earlier i n Abbasid Baghdad, the h i g h l y educated administrators i n the Samanid bureaucracy c o n t r i b u t e d to the development o f their m a j o r cities—Nishapur, Bukhara, Samarqand—as i m p o r t a n t centers o f Islamic culture. I n the Samanid case, however, this blossoming o f Islamic culture was not o n l y i n Arabic but also, for the first t i m e , i n Persian. This was a m o m e n t o u s development i n the history

40

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Mahmud of Ghazna crossing the Ganges, as portrayed in the Compendium of Chronicles composed and illustrated for the Ilkhanid vizier Rashid al-Din in the early fourteenth century.The Ghaznavids,Turkish military governors for the Samanids, were renowned in later times as the hrst to extend Muslim power into northern India

o f Islamic c i v i l i z a t i o n , w h i c h u n t i l t h e n had been elaborated exclusively i n Arabic. The development o f a Persianate variant o f Islamic culture broke this m o n o p o l y and opened the way for the development o f other Islamic languages i n later times, such as O t t o m a n Turkish and U r d u . ( A l l the Islamic languages, however, adopted a m o d i f i e d f o r m o f the Arabic script, closely i d e n t i f i e d w i t h Islam's sacred text, the Q u r a n , as the s y m b o l o f their religious i d e n t i t y ) The Samanids patronized such r e n o w n e d Persian poets as R u d a k i and F i r d o w s i , whose Shahnameh (Book of Kings), or Persian national epic, emphasized the " e t e r n a l " struggle between Iran, w h i c h was settled and agricultural, and Turan (the Turkish steppe), w h i c h was pastoral. This epic p o e m echoed the tense conditions o n the steppe f r o n t i e r over w h i c h the Samanids themselves r u l e d w h i l e saying little about the e c o n o m i c

interdependence

b e t w e e n settled people and pastoral

nomads that typified this frontier. I n the end the Samanids fell to just such a " T u r a n i a n " threat. The QaraKhanids, a confederation o f Turkish peoples l i v i n g east o f the Jaxartes River were the first p o l i t i c a l g r o u p i n g o f the i n n e r Asian steppe to be led by M u s l i m rulers. Crossing the Jaxartes, they entered Transoxiana f r o m the east, defeated the Samanids, and seized the province i n 999. Khurasan and parts o f Afghanistan

M U H A M M A D

A N D

T H E

C A L I P H A T E

4]

r e m a i n e d i n the hands o f the Samanids' Turkish m i l i t a r y governors o f Ghazni, w h o thus began their existence as an independent state. The Ghaznavids were a m o n g the first to regularly call themselves sultans, a Quranic w o r d that f r o m the tenth century was used t o refer to an Islamic secular m o n a r c h . (Other terms that came to be used i n this way were the Persian shah and the Turkish khan.) The Ghaznavid sultans, a l t h o u g h they m a i n t a i n e d a c u l t u r e d c o u r t that patronized some i m p o r t a n t authors ( i n c l u d i n g , i n his later years, F i r d o w s i ) , b u i l t a m i l i tary regime i n t e n t o n raising revenue t h r o u g h taxation and raiding. They frequently descended f r o m Afghanistan i n t o n o n - M u s l i m parts o f Sind ( m o d e r n Pakistan) to seize the r i c h b o o t y available there, particularly f r o m its many H i n d u temples. A f t e r 1040,

w h e n they lost Khurasan to the Seljuks,

the

Ghaznavids were l i m i t e d to Afghanistan and increasingly t u r n e d their attention to Sind. As a result o f this r e o r i e n t a t i o n , they c o n t r i b u t e d significantly to the spread i n India o f Sunni Islam, w h i c h had u n t i l then been restricted to relatively small c o m m u n i t i e s that were remote f r o m the rest o f the Islamic w o r l d . Some areas o f the Iranian plateau were f r o m the start beyond effective caliphal c o n t r o l because o f their difficult terrain, and they remained so even w h e n the caliphs were p o w e r f u l . The m a i n case o f such inaccessibility was the jungle-like r e g i o n along the slopes o f the Elburz M o u n t a i n s s o u t h o f the Caspian Sea (Daylam, Gilan, Tabaristan, Mazandaran). Here local chieftains, w h o at best paid l i p service to the caliphs, struggled w i t h one another for primacy. This area, like Yemen, served as a natural refuge zone and received several fugitive A l i d princes, w h o helped convert m u c h o f the p o p u l a t i o n o f Daylam, at least, to Shiism. This area also served as the initial base for the w a r l o r d Mardavij ( d . 93c), w h o made a s h o r t - l i v e d attempt to restore an Iranian m o n a r c h y and Zoroastrianism, and then for the Shiite B u y i d family, w h o emerged f r o m Mardavij's entourage to gain power i n m u c h o f central Iran—parts o f Daylam, Jibal, and the r i c h province o f Fars. By 94c one o f the B u y i d chiefs, A h m a d i b n Buyeh (later k n o w n as M u i z z al-Dawiah), had m o v e d his troops i n t o Iraq and taken possession o f Baghdad, where he was recognized by the Abbasid caliph as commander i n c h i e f (amir alumara). I n the process the caliphs were effectively reduced to figureheads, having significant religious a u t h o r i t y but usually little real power. The Buyids prevailed i n central and w e s t e r n Iran and i n central and s o u t h e r n Iraq for m o r e than a century, and i n t h e i r heyday they managed to exert their c o n t r o l also over O m a n , across the Persian G u l f f r o m Fars, and over M o s u l ( A l - M a w s i l ) and n o r t h e r n Iraq. T h e i r d o m a i n s , however, were not a u n i fied state b u t rather a loose confederation o f h o l d i n g s called appanages, each granted to a d i f f e r e n t m e m b e r o f the B u y i d family. A t times, a single B u y i d c h i e f was unquestionably head o f the f a m i l y — t h e most notable example b e i n g the ascendancy o f A d u d al-Dawlah (r. 9 4 9 - 8 3 ) — b u t

most o f the t i m e the

42

THE OXFORD

HISTORY

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ISLAM

B u y i d brothers and cousins were i n sharp c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h one another t o e x t e n d their appanages at the expense o f their relatives, or to oust t h e i r relatives a n d take over t h e i r appanages. The B u y i d princes w h o h e l d appanages i n I r a n usually established close relations w i t h the local l a n d h o l d i n g classes, w h i c h p r o v i d e d a s o l i d financial basis f o r their essentially m i l i t a r y d o m i n a t i o n . The m o s t prosperous o f the B u y i d appanages

was Fars, w h i c h had a

solid agrarian base and significant c o m m e r cial activity. Its capital at Shiraz also was h o m e to an extensive bureaucracy, a vestige o f Abbasid times, and an i m p o r t a n t c o u r t that sponsored a b r i l l i a n t l i t e r a r y c u l t u r e (always, despite the Buyids' Iranian o r i g i n s , i n A r a b i c ) . Other I r a n i a n appanages o f the B u y i d c o n f e d e r a t i o n , particularly Jibal and its

capital

Rayy,

were

relatively

stable

a l t h o u g h less w e l l developed than Fars. Baghdad under the Buyids, by c o m p a r i son, was an appanage o f q u i t e a different The Gunbad-i Qabus in northeastern Iran marks the grave of Qabus bin Washmgir, ruler of the focal

character. The presence o f the caliph and his court gave Baghdad great prestige and made i t

Ziyarid dynasty, who died in 1012. The flanged shaft

important as a center o f Arabic-Islamic c u l -

soars 52 meters above the artificial hillock on which

ture, b u t i t also meant that the Buyids and

it stands.

their Daylamite troops had to manage, and sometimes face the o p p o s i t i o n of, the t u r b u lent factions i n the Turkish army there. Moreover, the c o n t i n u i n g decline o f Iraqi agriculture deprived the Buyid amir i n Baghdad o f the k i n d o f agrarian base that c o n t r i b u t e d to the viability o f B u y i d appanages i n Iran and southern Iraq. The B u y i d era i n Baghdad proved to be o f great significance for the development o f Shiite culture, however. A l t h o u g h the Buyids were often o n g o o d terms w i t h the Abbasid caliphs, whose presence under their protection provided t h e m w i t h valuable Islamic legitimacy, as Smites they allowed Baghdad's large Shiite p o p u l a t i o n for the first t i m e to openly observe the major Shiite holidays. For the same reason Shiite scholarship entered its first great f l o w e r i n g d u r i n g the B u y i d p e r i o d , w h i c h saw the p r o d u c t i o n o f major w o r k s i n Shiite law, theology, and other disciplines. The Buyids f u r t h e r extended the use o f iqta, an i n s t i t u t i o n that had o r i g i n a t e d

M U H A M M A D

A N D

T H E

CALIPHATE

4<

under the Abbasids as a way o f paying troops w h i l e saving o n administrative costs. By letting soldiers and commanders collect tax revenues directly f r o m their iqta, the need for a costly tax bureaucracy was e l i m i n a t e d , and the troops got paid. But this system was prone to abuse by unscrupulous holders i f not closely supervised. Its extension i n t o n e w areas c o n t r i b u t e d b o t h to a general decline i n agrarian p r o d u c t i v i t y and to a loosening o f effective c o n t r o l by the r u l e r — w h o ever he was—over the districts assigned i n this way. The spread o f iqta was d i f ficult to reverse, however, for i t was the quickest way for a r u l e r to secure the soldiers' loyalty i n the competitive and increasingly m i l i t a r i z e d politics o f Iraq and Iran i n the tenth and eleventh centuries. The Buyids w o u l d be ousted f r o m most o f their territories i n Iran and Iraq by forces o f the Seljuk Turks between 1040 and i o c c , but the new masters—and their eventual successors—would rely even m o r e firmly o n the iqta system. As the Abbasid caliphs' real p o w e r contracted, even the central provinces o f t h e i r f o r m e r e m p i r e — I r a q , Syria, and n o r t h e r n A r a b i a — f e l l b e y o n d t h e i r grasp. Sometimes these areas fell u n d e r the sway o f p o w e r f u l rulers o f I r a n (such as the B u y i d s i n I r a q ) or o f Egypt ( s u c h as the T u l u n i d o c c u p a t i o n o f Syria i n the late n i n t h c e n t u r y ) . I n other cases, these areas were h e l d by a mosaic o f local powers. Some o f these were pastoral n o m a d i c tribes that t o o k advantage o f the empire's collapse t o establish t h e i r c o n t r o l over the key t o w n s w i t h i n or adjacent to t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l grazing t e r r i t o r i e s , and so enter the consciousness o f the c h r o n i c l e r s as s h o r t - l i v e d "dynasties." The most i m p o r tant were the H a m d a n i d s o f M o s u l and A l e p p o (935-1016), i m p o r t a n t players i n I r a q i p o l i t i c s u n d e r the f a d i n g Abbasids and early Buyids, b u t they q u i c k l y outgrew- t h e i r o r i g i n s a m o n g the Tanukh t r i b e a n d a c q u i r e d the c r u cial trappings o f a settled state, i n c l u d i n g mercenary troops. The pastoral n o m a d i c base was m o r e essential to groups such as the Jarrahids o f t e n t h - c e n t u r y Palestine, the M i r d a s i d s o f A l e p p o ( 1 0 2 3 - 7 9 ) ,

m

e

Uqaylids o f M o s u l , and

the Mazyadids o f H i l l a i n central I r a q . The Q a r m a t i s — m o s t o f w h o m were bedouins o f Syria, s o u t h e r n I r a q , or eastern Arabia ( i n the late n i n t h t h r o u g h the late eleventh c e n t u r i e s ) — b e l o n g e d

t o an activist b r a n c h o f Shiism, the

Ismailis, and established an I s m a i l i state i n eastern Arabia. M e a n w h i l e , i n the nearby m o u n t a i n s o f w e s t e r n I r a n , Azerbaijan, eastern A n a t o l i a , A r m e n i a , and the Caucasus, K u r d i s h tribes i n several instances established

independent

M u s l i m states, such as the M a r w a n i d s a r o u n d A m i d a ( m o d e r n D i y a r b a k i r i n Turkey) and the Hasanuyids a r o u n d H a m a d h a n ( i n western I r a n ) . I n a f e w cases, g r o u p s w i t h n o n t r i b a l i d e n t i t i e s f o r m e d the basis o f small p o l i t i e s . The most interesting case is that o f the Zanj, A f r i c a n slaves w h o f r o m 869 u n t i l 883 revolted against t h e i r masters and d o m i n a t e d parts o f s o u t h e r n I r a q , i n c l u d i n g the c i t y o f Basra.

44

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The Ismaili Challenge The most effective ideological challenge to the Abbasid caliphate f r o m w i t h i n the Islamic c o m m u n i t y arose f r o m developments i n Shiism i n the n i n t h and tenth centuries. The Shiites had articulated the d o c t r i n e that o n l y a descendant o f the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law, A l i i b n A b i Talib, c o u l d be i m a m or leader o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . Some Shiites argued that the imam's leadership was crucial because he possessed a secret knowledge. In their view this secret k n o w l e d g e , w h i c h each i m a m conveyed to his designated successor before his death, was vital to the proper guidance o f the c o m m u n i t y . This g r o u p split i n t o activist and quietist w i n g s . The quietists, usually called I m a m i or "Twelver" Shiites, believed that the line o f visible imams had ended i n 874 w h e n the t w e l f t h i m a m , still only an infant, had gone i n t o h i d i n g i n Samarra, f r o m w h i c h he w o u l d r e t u r n i n the fullness o f t i m e as the mahdi, a m i l l e n a r i a n figure expected to lead the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y i n righteous preparation for the Last Judgment. For many Twelvers, then, there was no longer any basis for political action after 874, because there was n o longer any i m a m i n whose name rebellion c o u l d be raised. A m o r e activist g r o u p , however, the Ismailis, argued that the imamate had not ended as the Twelvers c l a i m . Rather, i t continued i n a different line o f Ali's descendants. I n the Ismaili view, there never ceased to be a l i v i n g i m a m a m o n g M u s l i m s , even t h o u g h his identity at a particular m o m e n t m i g h t n o t be generally k n o w n . Periodically individuals emerged w h o claimed to be the i m a m . Clearly, this version o f Shiite d o c t r i n e was likely to appeal to those w i t h an activist t u r n o f m i n d . A t h i r d variant o f Shiism, called the Zaydiyya, argued that the imamate d i d not proceed i n a particular line o f descendants. Rather, i t resided i n the A l i d w h o was most capable o f p r o v i d i n g effective leadership for his generation. This variant became especially i m p o r t a n t i n Yemen. The Ismailis, w h o were initially a

LLnified

movement w i t h a secret, centralized lead-

ership, strove to w i n adherents by means o f dma (missionary w o r k ) carried out by agents highly trained i n theological argument. Their aim was to establish small groups or communities o f followers secredy pledged to follow the i m a m u p o n his appearance, even though his identity was for reasons o f prudence not divulged. By the late n i n t h century, as the Abbasid caliphate's power was d w i n d l i n g , Ismaili communities were established i n many areas: Yemen, N o r t h Africa, Iran, southern Iraq, eastern Arabia, and Syria. One group o f Ismailis, the Qarmatis, rebelled openly against the Abbasids i n die 890s and i n 899 established a small state i n northeastern Arabia; this state lasted until the 1070s and was for m u c h o f the tenth century a power to be reckoned w i t h i n northern Arabia and Syria. The most successful Ismaili m o v e m e n t , however, grew o u t o f the missionary w o r k o f a Yemeni agent i n N o r t h Africa, w h o d u r i n g the 890s established a strong

M U H A M M A D

AND

THE

CALIPHATE

I s m a i l i f o l l o w i n g a m o n g the Kutama Berbers, i n o p p o s i t i o n to the Abbasids' Aghlabid governors. By 899 a leader o f the Ismailis i n Syria, Ubayd Allah, had broken w i t h the Qarmatis, p r o c l a i m e d h i m s e l f to be the i m a m , and i n 902 made his way to I f r i q i y a to lead the n e w state. Because U b a y d A l l a h , as i m a m , claimed descent f r o m Ali's w i f e Fatima, he

and

his

descendants

are

called

Fatimids. Ubayd Allah was i m p r i s o n e d for a t i m e by the Aghlabids, but i n 909 the I s m a i l i m o v e m e n t i n N o r t h Africa succeeded

in

overthrowing

the

Aghlabids. U b a y d Allah was freed and assumed power, taking the regnal name a l - M a h d i (r. 9 0 9 - 3 4 ) and the title a m i r a l - m u m i n i n i n defiance o f the Abbasids. The Umayyads i n Spain responded t o the F a t i m i d c l a i m by also assuming this title i n 923. Ubayd Allah also f o u n d e d a n e w capital at M a h d i y a h , to symbolize his i n a u g u r a t i o n o f a n e w order. For sixty years ( 9 0 9 - 6 9 ) the Fatimids care-

The Great Mosque at Mahdiyah is the most important

f u l l y b u i l t u p a p o w e r f u l state i n N o r t h

structure to survive from the new capital established on

Africa, first consolidating their p o w e r

the Tunisian coast by the first Fatimid caliph al-Mahdi

against the very propaganda movement that had b r o u g h t t h e m to power, then

(r. 9 0 9 - 3 4 ) . The design of the portal was inspired by Roman triumphal arches and gateways in the region.

against w i d e s p r e a d local o p p o s i t i o n . The Sunni religious establishment i n Qayrawan and the Surrni p o p u l a t i o n o f I f r i q i y a generally were unsympathetic to the Ismaili's Fatimid claims. Even m o r e hostile were the large n u m b e r o f N o r t h African Berber tribes w h o had embraced K h a r i j i s m . These tribes m o u n t e d n u m e r o u s rebellions against the Fatimids, i n c l u d i n g a major one i n the 940s that nearly t o p p l e d the dynasty. I n the central and western Maghreb (northwest A f r i c a ) , the Fatimids had to face the resistance o f the small Rustamid and I d r i s i d states as w e l l as the challenge o f the m o r e p o w erful, but more distant, Umayyads o f Spain. The Fatimids overcame all these challenges, particularly d u r i n g the reign o f the great caliph a l - M u i z z (r. 953-75), whose b r i l l i a n t general, Jawhar, consolidated Fatimid rule as far as the Atlantic Ocean. A l - M u i z z also oversaw the construction o f a p o w e r f u l navy, w i t h w h i c h

46

T H F OXFORD

HISTORY

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ISLAM

the Fatimids established c o n t r o l over Sicily; i t also played a crucial role i n their conquest o f Egypt. As i m p o r t a n t as I f r i q i y a was t o t h e m , the Fatimids never seem t o . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B P

^ ^ ^ ^

have considered it as m o r e than an

W

i n t e r i m station o n the p a t h t o

l i

supreme

p o w e r i n the Islamic

w o r l d . A l m o s t i m m e d i a t e l y after their rise t o p o w e r i n 9 0 9 , they t r i e d unsuccessfully t o c o n q u e r Egypt. O n l y after the Fatimids had built a strong base i n I f r i q i y a and engaged i n extensive missionary w o r k i n Egypt was General Jawhar able t o organize a successful c o n quest o f Egypt i n 969. W i t h i n a few years the Fatimid c a l i p h left Ifriqiya

i n the hands o f t h e i r

Berber supporters, the Z i r i d s , and took u p residence i n a n e w capital i n Egypt at Cairo ( f r o m Arabic a\Qahira, m e a n i n g "the v i c t o r i o u s " ) , This ewer hollowed out from a single block of rock crystal epito-

a government a n d m i l i t a r y c o m -

mizes the luxury arts associated with the splendid court established

plex that they f o u n d e d

by the Fatimids after they conquered Egypt in 969. Texts desc ribe hundreds of such objects, but only a handful has survived.

beside

Fustat. The splendid mosque o f A l Azhar was b u i l t i n the n e w city t o serve as the center o f Ismaili w o r -

ship. The extensive education that underlay the Ismaili dawa was carried o u t at many locations. The Fatimids w o u l d govern Egypt f o r t w o centuries (969-1171). D t i r i n g the first century o f their r u l e there, they made impressive gains o n several fronts. They established a presence i n Syria and i n t e r m i t t e n t control over its m a i n towns. Damascus a n d Aleppo, but they continually faced o p p o s i t i o n f r o m the Qarmatis; f r o m bands o f Turkish mercenaries dislodged f r o m B u y i d Baghdad; f r o m local tribal powers, the Jarrahids i n Palestine and the H a m d a n i d s i n Aleppo; and f r o m the Byzantine Empire, resurgent under p o w e r f u l m i l i t a r y emperors f r o m 975 t o 1025. Their p o w e r was recognized i n the h o l y cities o f the Hejaz and by some Ismaili groups i n Yemen. F r o m Yemen, Ismaili agents established c o m m u n i t i e s o f supporters a m o n g the M u s l i m s o f I n d i a . Despite persistent d i p l o m a t i c a n d

M U H A M M A D

AND

THH CALIPHATE

47

propagnda efforts, however, the Fatimids failed to gain r e c o g n i t i o n i n Baghdad, then u n d e r c o n t r o l o f (Twelver) Shiite Buyids. U n d e r the caliphs al-Aziz (r. 9 7 5 - 9 6 ) , a l - H a k i m (r. 996-1021), and al-Zahir (r. 1021-36), the Fatimid caliphate i n Egypt became the most p o w e r f u l state i n the Islamic w o r l d and displayed a d u r a b i l i t y that enabled i t to weather n u m e r ous crisis—even the protracted chaos and terror unleashed by a l - H a k i m , whose repressions o f Egypt's large Christian p o p u l a t i o n , assassination o f many o f his key advisers and commanders, and many other unpredictable measures w o u l d have u n d o n e a less stable regime. Fatimid m i g h t was based o n a prosperous economy, an efficient, centralized a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a p o w e r f u l army, and skilled use o f m i l itary governors to manage complex provinces, particularly Syria. The economy burgeoned parti}' because o f a f o r t u i t o u s increase i n international trade passing t h r o u g h Egypt. This q u i c k e n i n g o f trade was to some extent the result o f increasi n g d e m a n d i n Europe, w h i c h was reviving economically, but i t was also fostered by the instability o f Iraq at this t i m e , w h i c h caused merchants c o m i n g f r o m the east to favor the Red Sea route t o the Mediterranean. The Fatimids also had access to p l e n t i f u l g o l d supplies i n N u b i a (along the U p p e r N i l e ) , w h i c h helped t h e m to pay their armies and to m o u n t the ambitious p r o g r a m o f missionary w o r k a i m e d at spreading r e c o g n i t i o n o f the Fatimid caliphate. Egypt's r i c h f a r m l a n d p r o v i d e d a steady f l o w o f tax revenues, thanks to careful management by the Fatimid bureaucracy, supervised by a series o f tal-

48

T H EO X F O R D

HISTORY O F

ISLAM

enled viziers (some o f w h o m were native Christians, and some, such asYaqub i b n Killis and al-Jarjarai, were o f Iraqi o r i g i n ) . The Fatimid army consisted o f a core o f Kutama Berber units—heritage o f their N o r t h African origins and staunch I s m a i l i s — a n d units o f African slaves a n d "easterners," m a i n l y Turks b u t also i n c l u d i n g Daylamis, Armenians, and others. Key m i l i t a r y m e n became i m p o r t a n t pillars o f the regime, such as the Turk Anushtakin al-Dizbari, w h o i n the 1020s and 1030s helped contain the threat posed t o Syria by the Jarrahids and other b e d o u i n groups. After about 104c the power and stability o f Fatimid rule slipped rapidly because o f the rise o f factional

fighting

between Berber a n d "eastern" cliques i n the

bureaucracy and a m o n g Berber, Turkish, and African contingents i n the army. The earlier Fatimids had been careful to maintain a balance a m o n g different groups, but w h e n this balance was lost, i t proved impossible t o restore. This internal strife caused the Fatimids t o lose Syria to the Hamdanids and then, later i n the eleventh century, t o the Seljuk Turks, w h o had ousted the Buyids as protectors o f the Abbasid caliphs i n Baghdad. The Abbasids and their Seljuk guardians were also recognized i n the Hejaz, i n c l u d i n g the h o l y cities o f Mecca and M e d i n a , by the end o f the eleventh century. The Fatimids' weakening g r i p was symbolized by the decision o f their Z i r i d vassals i n Ifriqiya to repudiate the Fatimids and shift their f o r m a l allegiance t o the Abbasid caliphs i n 1044. The Zirids were i n effect declari n g themselves independent, because the Abbasids were too far away t o have any real control over t h e m . I n retaliation, the F a t i m i d caliph al-Mustansir (r. 1036-94) sent the bedouin tribes o f Hilal and Sulaym, w h o had proven troublesome in Egypt, to find new abodes i n Ifriqiya. The l o n g - t e r m impact o f the so-called Hilalian invasion has been hody debated, but the arrival o f these groups i n Ifriqiya d i d disrupt the region politically (they sacked Qayrawan i n 1057) and hastened the spread o f Arabic as a spoken language i n parts o f the N o r t h African countryside. In 1073 the caliph al-Mustansir, facing grave civil disorder i n Cairo, called o n his military governor i n Syria, an Armenian named Badr al-Jamali, to restore order. Badr (r. 1073-94) and his son al-Afdal i b n Badr (r. 1094-1121) d i d restore order, but i n the process they reduced the Fatimid caliphs t o figurehead status, similar t o that occupied by the Abbasids d u r i n g the Buyid p e r i o d . Henceforth, real power i n the Fatimid domains was held by viziers and by key army chiefs, w h o were often engaged i n complex intrigues and factional fighting. The presence o f the Crusaders i n Syria after

1099 o n l y f u r t h e r complicated the situation o f the Fatimids.

Eventually, a desperate vizier called for support f r o m Saladin ( k n o w n i n Arabic as Salah al-Din i b n Ayyub), a Kurdish military commander w h o had risen i n the service o f a Seljuk successor state i n Syria, the Zangids. I n 1171, Saladin himself acceded to the vizierate. One o f his first acts after d o i n g so was to renounce the Fatimids and recognize the Abbasids once again—in theory at least—as the overlords o f Egypt.

M U H A M M A D

A N D T H E CALIPHATE

49

Despite the Fatimids' concern for the Ismaili dawa, Ismailism made surprisi n g l y little progress i n Egypt d u r i n g their r u l e . W h e n the dynasty fell i n 1171, Egypt's M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n was still staunchly Sunni, and Christian and Jewish c o m m u n i t i e s were still strong. The Ismaili n o t i o n o f the imamate as a linear p r o gression made i t prone t o schism; several o f these shook the Fatimid caliphate. One offshoot was the Druze faith, whose adherents considered the caliph alH a k i m t o be d i v i n e ; they established themselves (and are still to be f o u n d ) i n Lebanon and Syria. The so-called Assassins were another offshoot; i n the eleventh and t w e l f t h centuries they became the radical terrorists o f the Islamic w o r l d , striking d o w n selected political and cultural leaders to advance the cause o f an Ismaili r e v o l u t i o n . The positive accomplishments o f the Fadmids, however, were significant. The brilliance and prosperity o f Fatimid Cairo attracted many talented people i n the arts, architecture, literature, a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and m i l i t a r y service. Consequently Fatimid Cairo replaced Baghdad as the most i m p o r t a n t cultural, and t o some extent political, center o f the eastern Arabic-speaking w o r l d , a posit i o n i t has never relinquished.

Islamic Revivalism in the Maghreb F r o m the late eleventh t o the early t h i r t e e n t h century, the Maghreb (Islamic west) was d o m i n a t e d i n succession by t w o states: the Almoravids (al-murabitun) and the Almohads (al-muwahhidun), b o t h o f w h i c h began as Sunni revivalist m o v e ments a m o n g the Berbers o f N o r t h Africa. I n about

IOÇO

N o r t h Africa was p o l i t -

ically fragmented a m o n g rival tribes i n the wake o f the collapse o f Fatimid power and the Hilalian invasion, and M u s l i m Spain was d i v i d e d i n t o many small petty k i n g d o m s . Furthermore, N o r t h Africa still displayed a great religious diversity; Sunni Islam was strong i n the o l d bastion at Qayrawan, b u t K h a r i j i s m was still widespread, a n d many areas ( p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the m o u n t a i n o u s far Maghreb, where large towns were f e w ) were still o n l y n o m i n a l l y Islamized. The A l m o r a v i d s began as a Sunni r e f o r m m o v e m e n t a m o n g the l o w l a n d Sanhaja Berbers o f the Sahara, sparked by a scholar w h o had become filled w i t h an austere religious zeal f r o m his p i l g r i m a g e t o Mecca and his studies i n Sunni Qayrawan. He r e t u r n e d t o his people i n the Sahara to r e f o r m their Islam, f o u n d i n g a " p u r e " M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y somewhere near the Senegal River i n the 1040s. Alliance w i t h Sanhaja tribal chiefs gave the A l m o r a v i d m o v e m e n t the m i l i t a r y base needed t o expand n o r t h w a r d , w i t h the a i m o f establishing proper Islamic practice as they u n d e r s t o o d i t . U n d e r their greatest leader, Yusuf i b n Tashfin (1061-1106), the Almoravids subdued send-Islamized Berber groups, w h o m they v i e w e d as heretical, as w e l l as tribes w h o had been political rivals o f the Sanhaja d u r i n g the 1060s a n d 1070s. I b n Tashfin thus c o n q u e r e d m u c h o f

CO

T H EO X F O R D HISTORY

OE ISLAM

M o r o c c o and western Algeria. I n about 1060 I b n Tashfin established the settlement oí Marrakesh as a k i n d of m i l i t a r y camp; i t grew rapidly and became the A l m o r a v i d capital. I b n Tashfin emerged as the most p o w e r f u l figure i n the western Islamic w o r l d , just w h e n the petty k i n g d o m s o f Islamic Spain w ere c o n f r o n t e d by the threat o f the reconquista. The resurgent Christian k i n g d o m s o f n o r t h e r n Spam, led by Alfonso V I , had already seized Toledo and were pressing o n the M u s l i m city-states o f Andalusia. I n desperation, several o f the petty kings called o n I b n Tashfin to enter Spain and w a r d o f f the Christians. His decisive defeat o f Alfonso's army at the Battle o f Zallaqa i n 1086 kept southern Spain o u t o f Christian hands f o r the m o m e n t , but the various M u s l i m kings o f Spain were gradually deposed and the area was i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the s p r a w l i n g A l m o r a v i d e m p i r e , w h i c h n o w extended f r o m central Spain t o the Senegal River. Further Almoravid victories o n the battlefield helped to keep the Christian k i n g d o m s o f n o r t h e r n Spain at bay; yet many Spanish M u s l i m s resented the hegemony o f the Almoravids. I n part, this reflected a l o n g t r a d i t i o n o f hostility t o the Berbers i n Spain, legacy o f their frequent use as mercenaries; i n part, it was because the M u s l i m s o f Spain considered the Almoravids culturally unsophisticated; and finally, i n part it was because they were repelled b y the A l m o r a v i d s ' harsh enforcement o f Islam, w h i c h i n c l u d e d persecution o f Sufis and the b u r n i n g o f religious books deemed heretical. Widespread rebellions against the Almoravids i n the 1140s heralded the c o l The mosque at Tinmalla! ( u c j - 4 ) , located high in the Atlas mountains south of Marrakesh, is the sole

lapse o f their r u l e i n Spain. M e a n w h i l e , i n N o r t h Africa another

revivalist m o v e m e n t ,

that o f the

Almohads, was already challenging the Almoravids by about 112c. The founder

vestige of the Almohad

o f the A l m o h a d m o v e m e n t , M u h a m m a d I b n Tumart (ca. 1080-1130), was a

capital established there by

h i g h l a n d Berber o f the Masmuda tribe w h o , after study i n Cordoba a n d the

IbnTumart around 1125.

Islamic east, had r e t u r n e d t o the Maghreb t o preach a message o f strict piety,

MUHAMMAD AND THE CALIPHATE

£1

declaring h i m s e l f to be the mahdi, the eschatological just ruler, and c l a i m i n g that the Almoravids were i m p i o u s and c o r r u p t . I n about 112c he established a base at Tinmallal i n the Atlas M o u n t a i n s ( m o d e r n M o r o c c o ) and began to conquer nearby areas, having w o n many followers a m o n g the h i g h l a n d Masmuda Berbers. The speed w i t h w h i c h I b n Tumart w o n support may have been because his actions c o n f o r m e d to the traditional Berber concept o f a charismatic h o l y m a n . His attack o n the Almoravids and their Sanhaja supporters may also have articulated the h i g h l a n d Berbers' t r a d i t i o n a l d i s d a i n f o r l o w l a n d e r s , such as the Sanhaja. I n the 1130s

and early 1140s

I b n Tumart's successor, A b d a l - M u m i n

(1145-63), defeated the last Almoravids i n battle and seized m u c h o f n o r t h e r n Morocco and western Algeria, taking Marrakesh i n

1147.

The collapse o f A l m o r a v i d rule resulted i n a renewed p e r i o d o f political d i v i sion a m o n g the M u s l i m city-states i n Spain, w h i c h Alfonso V I I , the k i n g o f Castile, attempted to exploit. But the Muslims invited A b d a l - M u m i n to send an army to relieve t h e m , so that between

1147

and 1157

the f o r m e r A l m o r a v i d

domains were recovered f r o m Alfonso by A l m o h a d forces. M e a n w h i l e , A b d alM u m i n organized t w o massive expeditions i n the eastern Maghreb. The w h i c h began i n 1151,

first,

b r o u g h t A l m o h a d rule to the central Maghreb, ending the

reign o f local powers such as the Banu H a m m a d , a family that had established a small state i n the mountains o f w h a t today is Algeria. The second campaign was directed against I f r i q i y a , w h i c h had been seized by the N o r m a n s o f Sicily. By d r i ving them out o f M a h d i y a h i n 1160 and b r i n g i n g the region under Almohad cont r o l , A b d a l - M u m i n u n i f i e d the w h o l e Maghreb f r o m Tunisia to the Atlantic Ocean, as w e l l as the Islamic regions o f Spain. D u r i n g the last decades o f the t w e l f t h c e n t u r y the A l m o h a d s had t o overcome the s t u b b o r n resistance m o u n t e d by the last A l m o r a v i d h o l d o u t s f r o m the Balearic Islands (near the eastern coast o f Spain), w h o had seized m u c h o f I f r i q i y a . I n Spain the A l m o h a d s were engaged i n a c o n t i n u i n g struggle against the C h r i s t i a n k i n g d o m s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those o f Castile and Portugal. Despite

p r o m i s i n g offensives i n t o Castilian t e r r i t o r y i n the

A l m o h a d s w e r e c r u s h i n g l y defeated i n 1212

1190s, t h e

by a C h r i s t i a n c o a l i t i o n at Las

Navas de Tolosa ( i n s o u t h e r n Spain), the battle that really sealed the fate o f Islamic Spain. A l m o r a v i d c o n t r o l i n Spain u n r a v e l e d over the next

two

decades, and C h r i s t i a n forces seized i n r a p i d succession the m a j o r cities o f Andalusia: M e r i d a (1231), C o r d o b a (1236), Valencia (1238), Seville ( 1 2 4 8 ) , M u r c i a (1261), and Cadiz (1262). V i r t u a l l y a l l that r e m a i n e d o f M u s l i m Spain thereafter was the small, b r i l l i a n t k i n g d o m o f Granada, w h i c h h u n g o n u n t i l 1492, partly because o f the s k i l l o f its r u l e r s , the Nasrids, and p a r t l y because i n 1244 one o f the rulers had signed a treaty r e c o g n i z i n g the vague o v e r l o r d ship o f the k i n g d o m o f Castile.

C2

T H E

O X F O R D

HISTORY

OF

ISLAM

Matters d i d not go better for the Almohads i n N o r t h A f r i c a , where their empire gradually devolved i n t o several independent states. I n I f r i q i y a a former A l m o h a d viceroy o f Tunis, M u h a m m a d i b n Hafs, became effectively independent by 1235, b e g i n n i n g the Hafsid dynasty; I b n Hafs even dared to take for h i m self the title a m i r a l - m u ' m i n i n . The Banu M a r i n nomads o f the Sahara graduallyseized eastern Morocco f r o m the Almohads, o c c u p y i n g Marrakesh i n 1269; their capital at Fez w o u l d become an i m p o r t a n t cultural center i n their day. Southern M o r o c c o saw the rise to p o w e r o f the Zayyanid dynasty. The Almoravids and the Almohads b o t h demonstrated once again the power that could be built o n a combination o f tribally based military units and compelling Islamic religious ideologies. Their key leaders may also have w o n support among die Berbers because they fit the Berber tradition o f miracle-working holy men (igurramen). The fact diat the Almoravids, at least, sat astride important Saharan trade routes and controlled valuable sources o f gold i n western Africa also contributed to their ability to project their power. The seemingly evanescent nature o f the Almoravid and Almohad empires should not mask the fact that they helped create the Maghreb*—both as a political unit, w h i c h they unified for the first time, and as a distinct zone o f Islamic culture. Despite the presence i n their religious beliefs o f numerous idiosyncratic features, both movements were staunchly Sunni, and their piety-mindedness and intolerance o f other religious views caused them to repress many o f the remaining Kharijite, Shiite, and other heterodox forms o f Islam that were widespread in the Maghreb u n t i l die eleventh century. In cultural terms, too, their rule was important to the development o f the Maghreb, w h i c h had been a cultural backwater before the eleventh century. After their occupation o f Spain, w i t h its richly developed Islamic culture, the Almoravids i m p o r t e d many scholars and learned men o f religion f r o m Spain to their N o r t h African cities, particularly their capital at Marrakesh, w h i c h became a new center for the elaboration o f Islamic civilization o n the highly sophisticated Andalusian model.

The Turks Enter the Mashriq The eleventh century brought p r o f o u n d and e n d u r i n g changes to the eastern Islamic lands, or mashriq ( r o u g h l y Egypt and Islamic southwestern Asia). These changes were associated w i t h the arrival o f n e w populations o f Turkish-speaki n g peoples, w h o migrated i n t o the region f r o m the Central Asian steppe that had u n t i l then been their homelands. Turks had long been familiar i n the eastern Islamic lands as slaves, soldiers, and m i l i t a r y governors. By the early eleventh century some Turks had even succeeded i n establishing m i l i t a r y regimes that were essentially independent states, such as that o f the Ghaznavids i n Khurasan and Afghanistan. I n the early eleventh cen-

M U H A M M A D

A N D T H E CALIPHATE

Ç3

tury, however, another k i n d o f Turkish presence began t o make itself felt i n eastern I r a n : n o t i n d i v i d u a l slaves o r soldiers, o r even companies o f soliders, b u t T ü r k m e n — w h o l e tribes o f Turkish-speaking people, m a i n l y n o m a d i c or semisedentary, m o v i n g w i t h their flocks and possessions. D u r i n g the tenth century merchants, preachers, and border raiders f r o m the Samanid domains h a d converted Turkish tribesmen o n their frontiers t o Islam, some o f w h o m settled o r migrated i n t o K h w a r i z m ( m o d e r n Khorezm) and Transoxiana. D u r i n g the early eleventh century branches o f the Oghuz tribe o f Türkmen, facing desperate c o n d i t i o n s i n Transoxiana and the Central Asian steppe, began t o m i g r a t e i n t o Khurasan, across n o r t h e r n Iran, and i n t o Jibal and Azerbaijan, many u n d e r the leadership o f members o f the Seljuk family. I n Khurasan the Ghaznavids'

field

armies failed t o stem the arrival o f these u n w e l c o m e migrants, w h o d i s r u p t e d the towns and countryside, and i n 1040 the Seljuks' Türkmen followers decisively defeated the Ghaznavid army i n battle at Dandanqan, near the o l d M u s l i m g a r r i son t o w n o f Marv. The Seljuks were n o w n o t o n l y tribal chiefs b u t masters o f a setded state based i n Khurasan. After 1040 m o r e n o m a d i c or seminomadic Türkmen m o v e d across Iran i n t o the Jibal r e g i o n , Azerbaijan, and A r m e n i a ; others m i g r a t e d s o u t h w a r d i n t o K e r m a n a n d elsewhere i n Iran. The m i g r a t i o n o f large populations o f Turkishspeaking peoples i n t o Iran and Anatolia, and the establishment o f Seljuk r u l e i n Iran, Iraq, Anatolia, and Syria, were t w o different but related historical processes. They were related because the Seljuks relied t o some extent o n the Türkmen f o r their armies, and because many Türkmen recognized the Seljuks as their " r o y a l house." Seljuk sultans, however, continually faced the p r o b l e m o f t r y i n g t o c o n t r o l , o r at least influence, the r u g g e d Türkmen, whose migrations and r a i d i n g often had a m o m e n t u m o f their o w n that generated u n w a n t e d p o l i t i c a l a n d diplomatic problems for the sultans. For this reason soon after 1040 the Seljuks acquired mercenaries (often slave troops) t o serve as the core o f their army. This freed t h e m o f the need t o rely totally o n the Türkmen, and gave t h e m an i n s t r u m e n t t o c o n t r o l u n r u l y Türkmen w h e n necessary. A r o u n d this core they added groups o f allies, i n c l u d i n g Türkmen and others, t o construct large armies for specific campaigns. Seljuk c o n t r o l o f an area therefore usually f o l l o w e d the m i g r a t i o n i n t o i t by large numbers o f Türkmen, as was the case i n Khurasan, Kerman, Jibal, Azerbaijan, and m u c h o f Anatolia. I n other cases the Seljuks strove t o keep the Türkmen out o f certain areas, such as prosperous f a r m i n g districts o r those near cities that became i m p o r t a n t centers o f Seljuk power-—Baghdad, Hamadan, Isfahan, and so o n . They d i d this b y encouraging the Türkmen to engage i n r a i d i n g elsewhere, particularly i n frontier zones ( f o r example, against the Christian k i n g d o m s o f A r m e n i a and Georgia). As the Seljuks m o v e d i n t o western Iran, they overpowered o r outmaneuvered

Ç4

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Church of the Holy Cross on Aghtamar, an island in Late Van. Built between 91c and 921, the palace church of the Armenian king Gagik epito mizes the beautiful stone architecture encountered by the Seljuks when they con quered the region in the late eleventh century.

the B u y i d amirs there. Staunch Sunnis, like most o f the Türkmen they led, the Seljuks portrayed their struggle against the Shiite Buyids as a restoration o f Sunni Islam. I n ı o ç c sultan T o g h r i l Beg (r. ca. 1040—1063) entered Baghdad and e l i m inated the B u y i d "protectorate" o f the caliphate. The caliph's " p r o t e c t o r " was n o w the Sunni Seljuk sultan, w h o r u l e d over a loose empire stretching f r o m Transoxiana to Iraq ( k n o w n as the Great Seljuk domains). M e a n w h i l e , the Türkmen had continued pushing northwestward i n t o Armenia, the Caucasus, and Anatolia, eventually p r o v o k i n g a reaction f r o m the Byzantine Empire, w h i c h like the Ghaznavids f o u n d that their fixed border fortresses and armies were incapable o f stopping the i n f l u x o f nomads. The decisive defeat o f the Byzantine emperor and his vast army at Malazgirt ( f o r m e r l y Manzikert) near Lake

M U H A M M A D

A N D T H E CALIPHATE

SS

Van i n 1071 by the Seljuk army sent by sultan A l p Arslan (r. 1063-72)

ended

all hope

of

Byzantine resistance i n eastern Anatolia and A r m e n i a . Leaders f r o m a rival branch o f the Seljuk family, w h o came to be k n o w n as the Seljuks o f R u m , established themselves i n Konya, w h i c h by the 1070s had become the focus o f a p o w e r f u l state i n western Anatolia.

Princes

of

another

Turkish family, the Danishmendids, f o r m e d another p o w e r f u l T u r k m e n sultanate i n central and eastern Anatolia. For die next sev enty-five years Anatolia was the arena o f a complex struggle for political supremacy a m o n g the R u m Seljuks, the Danishmendids, a n d the Byzantines,

with

lesser roles played by the Great Seljuks, local Kurdish, Turkish, and A r m e n i a n chieftains, and the European Crusaders, w h o arrived İn Anatolia i n the 1090s. By the m i d d l e o f the t w e l f t h century, however, the R u m Seljuks were b e c o m i n g the d o m i n a n t power

The portal of the madrasa known as the Ince Minareli ("Slender Minaret") in Konya. Built in the mid-thirteenth century, the building was one of many theological schools built there.

i n Anatolia. The Danishmendids effectively collapsed, and the defeat o f the Byzantine army at M y r i o k e p h a l o n i n 1176 ended the threat o f serious Byzantine intervention i n central and southwest ern Anatolia. Under sultan Kilij Arslan I I (r. ı ı ç c - 9 2 ) , the R u m Seljuks built a pros perous state, commerce flourished, and Konya especially became an important center o f Sufism (Islajnic mysticism), fine arts, and literature—mainly i n Persian, because the Turks' first intimate contact w i t h refined Islamic culture had taken place i n Iran. Above a l l , the chaotic century between the battles o f Malazgirt and Myriokephalon saw Anatolia begin its decisive transformation f r o m an area that was p r i m a r i l y Cliristian i n faith and Greek or A r m e n i a n i n language, t o one that was primarily M u s l i m i n faith and Turkish in language. The Kurdish populations o f east-

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ern Anatolia and the Zagros Mountains o f western Iran, M u s l i m i n faith and tribally organized, sometimes fought and sometimes allied themselves w i t h the Turks, but survived, w i t h changes. The Great Seljuk domains were conceived as c o n s t i t u t i n g a collective Seljuk family possession, parts o f w h i c h were parceled o u t as appanages to i n d i v i d u a l princes under the loose c o n t r o l o f the sultan. As w i t h the Buyids, however, the appanage system led to intrigues and strife between rival princes. The early Seljuk sultans—Toghril Beg, A l p Arslan, and Malik Shah (r. 1 0 7 2 - 9 2 ) — m a d e significant efforts to create a m o r e centralized, bureaucratic regime by relying especially o n skilled administrators f r o m Khurasan w h o c o n t i n u e d the Samanid and Ghaznavid bureaucratic traditions. The great vizier N i z a m a l - M u l k (1018

or

1019-92, died at the hands o f an Assassin), w h o w r o t e a famous Persian h a n d book o n statecraft for sultan Malik-Shah, was the m a i n architect o f this effort. To encourage the study o f Islamic law and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , the Seljuks and their viziers also e n d o w e d special schools (madrasas), an i n s t i t u t i o n they had discovered i n eastern Iran that soon spread t h r o u g h o u t the Islamic w o r l d . Their goal i n d o i n g so was partly to strengthen Sunni Islam against Shiism, but also to help train administrators, and by dispensing patronage to make the religious elite responsive to their wishes. Despite these strivings t o w a r d centralization, by the early t w e l f t h century the various appanages o f the Great Seljuk " e m p i r e " — p a r t i c u l a r l y i n its western parts—were increasingly b e c o m i n g independent states. This tendency to decentralization was reinforced by the Seljuks' heavy reliance o n assignment o f lands as iqta to pay commanders and bureaucrats, and by the practice o f a p p o i n t i n g m i n o r sons as appanage holders under the p r o t e c t i o n o f experienced m i l i t a r y m e n (awbegs, tutor-guardians). Frequently, the atabeg pushed his charge aside and ended u p r u l i n g the appanage for h i m s e l f D u r i n g the t w e l f t h and first h a l f o f the thirteenth centuries the territories once claimed by the Great Seljuks i n Syria, Mesopotamia, and the mountains b o r d e r i n g Mesopotamia o n the n o r t h and east were held by m o r e than a half-dozen small atabeg states, such as the U r t u q i d s o f A m i d a ( m o d e r n Diyarbakir) and M a r d i n and the Zangids o f M o s u l and Aleppo. The European Crusaders, by their sheer g o o d f o r t u n e , happened to arrive i n the Near East at a t i m e w h e n the eastern Mediterranean coast and h i n t e r l a n d were fragmented i n this way, a fact that facilitated their advance and ultimate conquest o f A n t i o c h , Edessa, T r i p o l i , Acre, and Jerusalem i n 1098 to

1099.

Toward the m i d d l e o f the t w e l f t h century the Zangids succeeded i n consoli d a t i n g their h o l d over Mesopotamia and most o f Syria's i n t e r i o r against the Crusader k i n g d o m s . As the p o w e r o f the Zangids grew, they became entangled i n the factional intrigues that marked the last years o f the F a t i m i d caliphate i n Egypt. As a result o f this i n v o l v e m e n t , a K u r d i s h officer i n Z a n g i d service,

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57

Saladin (Salah a l - D i n i b n A y y u b , 1169-1193), seized effective c o n t r o l o f Egypt i n 1169 and abolished the F a t i m i d caliphate i n 1171. D r a w i n g o n his p o w e r base i n Egypt, Saladin was able t o establish h i m s e l f as master o f the f o r m e r Z a n g i d territories i n Syria a n d Mesopotamia. T h e n i n 1187 he decisively defeated the Crusaders at the Battle o f H a t t i n a n d reconquered Jerusalem. F r o m this t i m e u n t i l their v i r t u a l e x t i n c t i o n a century later, the Crusader " k i n g d o m s " typically led a tenuous existence i n some t o w n s along the Syrian coast. The A y y u b i d s , as Saladin's descendants are called, c o n t i n u e d to d o m i n a t e Syria u n t i l the m i d - t h i r teenth century. A l t h o u g h o f K u r d i s h o r i g i n , i n politics and statecraft they were truly products o f the e n v i r o n m e n t i n w h i c h they had r i s e n , the Seljuk atabeg states, and so helped t o b r i n g many i n s t i t u t i o n s t y p i c a l o f the Seljuks t o Syria and Egypt, particularly heavy reliance o n i q t a , a n d the e n d o w m e n t o f many madrasas. The appanage-type politics o f the Ay y u b i d s resulted i n almost c o n -

The Citadel of Cairo, founded by Saladin in the

tinuous internecine strife a m o n g A y y u b i d princes. The last A y y u b i d sultan b u i l t

late twelfth century, under-

a p o w e r f u l contingent o f Turkish slaves, h o p i n g thereby t o give h i m s e l f the m i l -

went its greatest expansion

itary advantage, but u p o n his death i n 1249 these slave troops seized p o w e r for

during the period of

themselves, m a r k i n g the b e g i n n i n g o f a p o w e r f u l new r e g i m e based i n E g y p t — the M a m l u k s (1250-1517). The one area o f the Great Seljuk e m p i r e that f o r a t i m e escaped the f r a g m e n tation o f the early t w e l f t h century was Khurasan, w h i c h under sultan M u i z z a d -

Mamluk rule (1250—1517). The citadel not only protected the capital but also symbolized the power of the military state.

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O F [SLAM

D i n Sanjar (r. 1118-57) enjoyed a p e r i o d o f relative stability and prosperity However, Transoxiana fell u n d e r the c o n t r o l o f the n o n - M u s l i m Kara-Khitai i n the 1140s. This weakened Sanjar's r u l e and forced i n t o Khurasan many restless O g h u z tribesmen, w h o o v e r t h r e w Sanjar i n 1153. I n the v a c u u m that resulted there arose the meteoric " e m p i r e " o f the K h w a r i z m s h a h s — T u r k i s h amirs w h o had governed the r i c h K h w a r i z m basin for the Seljuks and n o w were independent. U s i n g a large mercenary army, they conquered Transoxiana, Khurasan, central Iran, and m u c h o f Af ghanistan i n the second half o f the t w e l f t h century and first decade o f the t h i r t e e n t h ; they even intervened i n Anatolia and began t o plan an invasion o f Iraq. The e m p i r e o f the Khwarizmshahs, even their army, was p o o r l y integrated and overextended, however. It q u i c k l y collapsed before the M o n g o l forces o f Genghis Khan (ca. 1162-1227),

w

n

o

arrived o n the borders o f

Transoxiana i n 1219. As the real power o f the Great Seljuk sultans i n the western parts o f their domains weakened, the Abbasid caliphs began to reassert themselves. I n 1152 the caliph was able to eliminate the last vestiges o f Seljuk control i n Baghdad, and he r u l e d at least part o f Iraq as independent m o n a r c h for the first t i m e i n over t w o centuries. The caliph al-Nasir (1180-1225), the most capable o f the late Abbasid caliphs, became the most p o w e r f u l political figure o f his day i n Iraq. His ineffectual successors d i d little to enhance the p o w e r o f the caliphate, however. They proved utterly incapable o f w i t h s t a n d i n g the most terrible threat the Islamic w o r l d had ever faced: the M o n g o l s .

The Mongols and the End of the Caliphate in the East In the early thirteenth century the M o n g o l leader Genghis Khan embarked o n his career o f w o r l d conquest, w h i c h w o u l d eventually b r i n g inner Asia, China, Russia, Iran, Anatolia, and Iraq under his family's d o m i n a t i o n . The M o n g o l s tolerated n o o p p o s i t i o n and were careful to destroy any centers o f political power independent o f their o w n . Moreover, for some t i m e they clung to the pastoral traditions o f the steppe and had little interest i n , and n o sympathy for, cities o r agricultural areas, except as revenue sources. These factors, coupled w i t h their perhaps intentional use o f terror as a means o f social c o n t r o l , may explain the destructiveness o f the M o n g o l invasions, w h i c h saw the obliteration o f many cities and their inhabitants and the destruction or neglect o f many i r r i g a t i o n w o r k s o n w h i c h the agrarian prosperity o f the countryside depended. The M o n g o l forces arrived i n Transoxiana, o n the steppe fringes o f the Islamic w o r l d , i n 1219. Shortly thereafter they conquered Khurasan and K h w a r i z m , after w h i c h they swept t h r o u g h n o r t h e r n Iran and the Caucasus Mountains, leaving devastation i n their wake. The M o n g o l s ' consolidation o f power i n inner Asia led t o a

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59

massive migration o f T u r k m e n refugees i n t o Anatolia, w h i c h upset the prosperity that the Rum Seljuks had overseen there. Sensing die R u m Seljuks' weakness, the Mongols then invaded Anatolia, defeated the Seljuks i n 1243 at the Batde o f Kosedag, and reduced the Seljuks to a protectorate o f the M o n g o l Empire. I n i2c6 the Mongols, led by Genghis' grandson H i i l e g u (r. 1256-65), once again invaded Iran. After subduing eastern Iran and the Jibal region and systematically ehminating the Assassin centers i n n o r t h e r n Iran, H i i l e g u seized Baghdad and had the last Abbasid caliph executed i n 1258, along w i t h a good part o f the city's population. His armies then marched across n o r t h e r n Mesopotamia i n t o Syria. Their advance i n this direct i o n was finally stopped w h e n the newly established M a m l u k regime defeated the Mongols i n 1260 at the Battle o f Ayn Jalut i n Palestine. This victory spared Cairo, w h i c h was at this time the m a i n center o f Arabic culture, f r o m M o n g o l devastation. But Hiilegu's forces then controlled the majority o f the Islamic east. The advent o f the M o n g o l s m a r k e d a t u r n i n g p o i n t i n the history o f the Islamic Near East i n several ways. Their arrival accelerated the i m m i g r a t i o n o f Turkish-speaking peoples f r o m the steppes i n t o Anatolia and parts o f Iran. The strong n o m a d i c o r i e n t a t i o n o f the early M o n g o l s at first dealt a severe b l o w to city life and to r u r a l agriculture alike, b o t h o f w h i c h were slow to recover to f o r mer levels o f prosperity. Recovery, w h e n i t came, o f t e n f o l l o w e d n e w patterns: different cities rose to p r o m i n e n c e (such as Ardabil and Q a z v i n ) , w h i l e some f o r m e r l y i m p o r t a n t ones l a n g u i s h e d or v a n i s h e d (such as Baghdad

and

N i s h a p u r ) . Some once i m p o r t a n t regions, such as Khurasan, also w a n e d to r e l ative insignificance. N e w patterns o f c o m m e r c i a l activity were established, some o f w h i c h were related to the fact that the territories conquered by H i i l e g u were f o r a t i m e part o f the vast M o n g o l e m p i r e that extended f r o m Russia to China. I n intellectual terms, t o o , the M o n g o l invasions represented a watershed i n the history o f the Islamic w o r l d . It was the first t i m e , since the establishment o f the caliphate m o r e than six h u n d r e d years earlier, that a significant part o f the Islamic w o r l d had been subjected to the d o m i n a t i o n o f a n o n - M u s l i m p o w e r — a fact that must have called i n t o q u e s t i o n the a s s u m p t i o n made by m a n y M u s l i m s that God's favor for their c o m m u n i t y was revealed i n its c o n t i n u i n g political superiority. The M o n g o l s b r o u g h t n e w concepts o f legitimacy, such as descent f r o m Genghis Khan and the n o t i o n o f the ruler's decree as law. These concepts were w i d e l y emulated by many later dynasties i n the eastern Islamic w o r l d , even those that also appealed to Islamic traditions o f legitimacy.

The Caliphate as Agent of Political and Cultural Change The preceding pages have traced the simultaneous spread o f the Islamic c o m m u n i t y f r o m its o r i g i n s to the t h i r t e e n t h century and the rise and fall o f the

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caliphate. M u h a m m a d ' s c o m m u n i t y i n M e d i n a had been at once a small r e l i gious c o m m u n i t y and an e m b r y o n i c state or p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y . The p o l i t i c a l entity, under caliphal leadership, grew i n t o a vast e m p i r e w i t h explosive speed, but the religious c o m m u n i t y grew m u c h m o r e slowly. The early Believers were at first a small m i n o r i t y i n the e m p i r e they r u l e d , but they were politically d o m inant. The caliphate thus p r o v i d e d the sheltering aegis and a p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y that enabled the small Islamic religious c o m m u n i t y to survive, along w i t h the political and social c o n d i t i o n s w i t h i n the e m p i r e that attracted n e w converts to the faith. W h e n the caliphs lost real power i n the tenth century, moreover, the a u t o n o m o u s or independent states that sprang u p i n their f o r m e r territories, f r o m Spain to I n d i a , were also self-consciously M u s l i m regimes. U n d e r these M u s l i m successor states, Islam continued to p u t d o w n deep roots t h r o u g h o u t the Near East and N o r t h Africa. The caliphate also played another i m p o r t a n t role. By p r o v i d i n g a political and social haven for M u s l i m s , the caliphate also allowed the development o f a r i c h n e w culture, o f w h i c h the Islamic r e l i g i o n was the distinguishing element. The rise o f Islamic culture was even m o r e i m p o r t a n t than political and social factors i n d r a w i n g new people to the Islamic c o m m u n i t y , w h i c h n o w began to spread beyond the confines o f the caliphal empire. W i t h the political regionalism o f the tenth and f o l l o w i n g centuries came c u l tural regionalism. Spain, N o r t h A f r i c a , Egypt, Syria and Iraq, Iran, Anatolia, Yemen, and other regions developed distinctive variants o f a recognizably c o m m o n Islamic culture, focused particularly i n the m a i n cities: Córdoba, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Isfahan, Samarqand, Konya, and others. Changes i n d e m o graphic patterns and linguistic usage contributed to this cultural regionalism. The rise o f the new Persian language i n Iran, the flow o f Turkish-speaking peoples f r o m Central Asia t h r o u g h Iran i n t o Anatolia, the interplay o f Arabic and Berber i n N o r t h Africa, and many other phenomena all played their part. Needless to say, this process o f cultural evolution and diversification continued i n the later Islamic centuries, as Islam spread to many n e w areas and as new cultural developments took place i n the Islamic heartlands. By 1258, w h e n the M o n g o l s executed the last Abbasid caliph, the caliphate had effectively spent itself as a physical s y m b o l o f Islam's u n i t y and identity. Several o t h e r r u l e r s — i n c l u d i n g the Fatimids, the Umayyads o f Spain, one o f the Almohads, and even the Hafsid governor o f I f r i q i y a — h a d taken for themselves the once coveted titles o f amir al-mu'minin or caliph, and the Shiite development o f the rival concept o f i m a m (head o f the Islamic c o m m u n i t y ) had also called the caliphate's meaning i n t o question. But by this t i m e the Islamic c o m m u n i t y was no longer defined merely by p o l i t i c a l boundaries and hegemony. M o r e

M U H A M M A D

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6[

i m p o r t a n t n o w were a c o m m o n set o f religious beliefs, an elaborate system o f religious law and practice, and other elements o f Islamic culture, and this i d e n tity was firmly e n o u g h established to survive even r u l e by n o n - M u s l i m s such as the M o n g o l s . Above all, i t was this solid cultural basis, first fostered by the i m p e rial caliphate, that made possible Islam's survival over fourteen centuries and its spread to every corner o f the globe.

CHAPTER

TWO

Fruit of the Tree of Knowledge THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAITH AND P R A C T I C E I N I S L A M

Vincent J. Cornell

Knowledge without practice is like a tree without fruit. — T h e M o r o c c a n Sufi A h m a d i h n A s h i r o f Sale

Faith i n Islam is never b l i n d . A l t h o u g h belief i n the unseen is just as important i n Islam as i t is i n other religions, there comes a point at w h i c h the spiritually aware h u m a n being transcends the level o f simple faith. At this p o i n t the person is m o r e

(Left) Thousands of Muslims gather for communal worship at the Badshahi

than just a believer, for his or her spiritual consciousness has penetrated the fog o f

Mosque in Lahore, Pakistan,

the unseen, leading to knowledge o f the true nature o f things. The Quran speaks

to celebrate the Feast of the

o f this progression f r o m faith to knowledge as an i n w a r d metamorphosis i n w h i c h

Sacrifice that commemo-

belief (iman) is transformed i n t o certainty (vfltjin). This certainty is expressed i n the Quran i n terms o f three types o f knowledge o f G o d , w h i c h were discussed by philosophers, mystics, theologians, and jurists d u r i n g the Islamic Middle Period (the runth through fifteenth centuries C.E.).

63

rates the willingness of Ibrahim (the Biblical Abraham) to sacrifice his son and the end of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.

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God's word, as rev ealed in the Quran, is the centerpiece of Muslim faith. Copying the Quran was the noblest of arts and luxury manuscripts were produced at all times.This copy, transcribed in 1491 by the noted Ottoman calligrapher Shaykh Hamdullah and lavishly decorated with arabesque designs, is a worthy testament to Muslim faith.

Modalities of Certainty The most basic and fundamental type o f k n o w l e d g e is the " k n o w l e d g e o f cert a i n t y " (ilm al-yonin, Q u r a n 102:5). This type o f certainty, w h i c h is analogous t o Aristotle's concept o f intellectual k n o w l e d g e , refers to the k n o w l e d g e that results f r o m the h u m a n capacity for logical reasoning and the appraisal o f w h a t the Q u r a n calls the "clear evidences" (bayyinot) o f God's presence i n the w o r l d . It is also the k n o w l e d g e that comes f r o m the study o f Islam t h r o u g h the Q u r a n , the

FRUIT

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traditions o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d (hadith), and books o f theology a n d exegesis. By nature, the " k n o w l e d g e o f certainty" is rational and discursive, a p o i n t that the Q u r a n acknowledges w h e n i t admonishes h u m a n beings to "travel t h r o u g h o u t the earth and consider h o w [Allah] i n i t i a t e d the Creation" ( Q u r a n 29:20). The same type o f knowledge is involved w h e n the Q u r a n presents rhetorical arguments f o r the existence o f G o d : " I t is [Allah] w h o brings things to life a n d causes t h e m to die, and [Allah's] is the alteration o f the n i g h t and the day. W i l l y o u n o t understand?" ( Q u r a n 23:80). Over t i m e and under the influence o f contemplation and spiritual practice, the " k n o w l e d g e o f certainty" may be transformed i n t o a higher f o r m o f k n o w l e d g e o f G o d , w h i c h the Q u r a n calls the "eye o f certainty" (ayn al-yaqin, Q u r a n 102:7). This t e r m , w h i c h broadly corresponds to Plato's concept o f the " v i s i o n " o f the intellect, refers to the k n o w l e d g e that is acquired by the spiritual intelligence, w h i c h Islam locates metaphorically i n the heart. Before attaining this type o f know-ledge, the heart o f the believer must first be " o p e n e d to I s l a m " ( Q u r a n 39:22). Once opened, the heart receives k n o w l e d g e as a type o f d i v i n e " l i g h t " or i l l u m i n a t i o n , w h i c h leads the believer t o w a r d remembrance o f the Creator. Just as w i t h the " k n o w l e d g e o f certainty," w i t h the "eye o f certainty" the believer apprehends God's existence t h r o u g h God's presence i n the w o r l d . I n this latter case, however, w h a t leads the believer to the k n o w l e d g e o f G o d are n o t arguments to be u n d e r s t o o d by the rational intellect, b u t rather theophanic "appearances" (also called bayyinat) that strip away the veil o f w o r l d l y phenomena to reveal the d i v i n e reality beneath. The metaphor o f the "eye o f certainty" is thus m o r e than just a simple gloss o n the a x i o m "seeing is believing." F r o m a spiritual perspective the one w h o holds k n o w l e d g e o f G o d , w h o perceives reality i n this way, is the true "intellect u a l . " U n l i k e the scholar, w h o develops his o r her skills t h r o u g h years o f f o r m a l study, the spiritual intellectual does n o t need b o o k - l e a r n i n g to apprehend the d i v i n e l i g h t . A l t h o u g h the Prophet M u h a m m a d was barely able to read o r w r i t e , he has always been regarded by M u s l i m s as the greatest intellectual o f Islam. A spiritual intellectual can be anyone, scholarly or otherwise, whose k n o w l e d g e extends b o t h o u t w a r d , to take i n the physical w o r l d , and u p w a r d , to realize his o r her ultimate transcendence o f the w o r l d t h r o u g h his o r her l i n k w i t h the Absolute. W i t h o u t such a vertical d i m e n s i o n o f the spirit, the scholar's k n o w l edge, whatever its extent may be i n academic terms, is o f l i t d e w o r t h . By being b l i n d to d i v i n e i l l u m i n a t i o n , such a person is bereft o f real w i s d o m , and accordi n g to a famous prophetic t r a d i t i o n amounts to little m o r e than "a donkey carr y i n g a load o f books." The t h i r d and most advanced type o f knowledge builds o n the transcendent nature o f knowledge itself. This highest level o f consciousness is called the " t r u t h

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o f certainty" (haqq al-yaqin, Q u r a n 69:5"!). Also k n o w n as ilm ladunni ( " k n o w l e d g e by presence," Q u r a n 18:65), this f o r m o f k n o w l e d g e partakes directly o f the d i v i n e reality and leaps across the synapses o f the h u m a n m i n d to transcend b o t h cognitive reasoning and intellectual v i s i o n at the same t i m e . The " t r u t h o f cert a i n t y " refers to that state o f consciousness i n w h i c h a person k n o w s the " r e a l " t h r o u g h direct participation i n i t , w i t h o u t resorting to logical proofs and w i t h out o b j e c t i f y i n g either subject or object. Viewed i n terms o f Islamic sacred history, this type o f knowledge characterizes God's Prophets and Messengers, whose consciousness o f the t r u t h is b o t h i m m e d i a t e and participatory, because the k n o w l e d g e o n w h i c h i t is based comes f r o m direct inspiration. A l t h o u g h M u h a m m a d is the final Prophet o f Islam, many scholars i n the Islamic M i d d l e Period were o p e n to the p o s s i b i l i t y that d i v i n e i n s p i r a t i o n c o u l d r e m a i n accessible to believers even after M u h a m m a d ' s death. This poss i b i l i t y is s y m b o l i z e d i n Islamic t r a d i t i o n by the figure o f a l - K h i d r (Green O n e ) . A p p e a r i n g first i n the Q u r a n as an u n n a m e d servant o f G o d a n d c o m p a n i o n o f the Prophet Musa (Moses), a l - K h i d r is e n d o w e d w i t h a k n o w l e d g e o f the unseen that Musa h i m s e l f lacks. The Q u r a n describes this enigmatic sage, w h o is n o t a p r o p h e t yet partakes o f d i v i n e i n s p i r a t i o n , i n the f o l l o w i n g w a y : " W e have bestowed u p o n h i m a m e r c y f r o m Ourself, and have taught h i m a k n o w l e d g e f r o m O u r o w n presence" ( Q u r a n 18:65). Traditions o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d w o u l d later h i g h l i g h t the difference between a l - K h i d r s k n o w l edge and the k n o w l e d g e o f prophets, w h i l e at the same t i m e a f f i r m i n g its c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y t o prophecy. For e x a m p l e , i n the Sahih al-Bukhari, or " s o u n d c o l l e c t i o n " o f p r o p h e t i c t r a d i t i o n s by M u h a m m a d a l - B u k h a r i (810—70), a l K h i d r is depicted as saying to Musa: "Verily, I act o n k n o w l e d g e f r o m the k n o w l e d g e o f A l l a h , w h i c h He has made k n o w n t o m e b u t has n o t made k n o w n t o y o u , w h i l e y o u act o n k n o w l e d g e that He has made k n o w n to y o u b u t has n o t taught t o m e . " Thus, according to b o t h the w o r d o f God as expressed i n the Q u r a n a n d the traditions o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d , faith i n Islam has as m u c h to d o w i t h w h a t today w o u l d be called theoretical and experiential k n o w l e d g e as i t does w i t h simple belief. This m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l conception o f k n o w l e d g e comprehends a reality that lies h i d d e n w i t h i n the phenomenal w o r l d yet can be revealed by the h u m a n m i n d and the v i s i o n o f the s p i r i t u a l intellect t h r o u g h the signs o f God that are present i n the w o r l d itself. I n the Q u r a n , G o d calls o n h u m a n i t y to "bear witness to w h a t y o u see and w h a t y o u d o n o t see . . . a Message sent d o w n f r o m the L o r d o f the W o r l d s . . . verily this is the T r u t h o f Certainty" ( Q u r a n 69:3 8 - 3 9 , 43. 5i)The Quranic n o t i o n o f religious belief as dependent o n knowledge is actualized i n practice i n the t e r m Islam. I n Arabic islam is a verbal n o u n that is derived

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f r o m the root aslama, w h i c h means "he gave u p , surrendered, or s u b m i t t e d . " I n purely etymological terms, islam thus signifies the idea o f surrender or submission. F o l l o w i n g this logic, the r e l i g i o n o f Islam can be characterized as the r e l i g i o n o f self-surrender: Islam is the conscious and rational submission o f the contingent and l i m i t e d h u m a n w i l l to the absolute and o m n i p o t e n t w i l l o f God. Such a complete surrender o f one's personal w d l clearly is n o t easy for everyone and is likely to be resisted by the h u m a n ego. Islam's advocacy o f self-surrender should n o t be t h o u g h t o f as i r r a t i o n a l , however, or dismissed as the p r o d u c t o f a passive or fatalistic mentality. O n the contrary, the type o f surrender Islam requires is a deliberate, conscious, and rational act made by the person w h o k n o w s w i t h b o t h intellectual certainty and spiritual v i s i o n that Allah, the G o d w h o is the subject o f the Quranic discourse, is reality itself. This k n o w e r o f God is the muslim (fern, muslimah), " o n e w h o s u b m i t s " to the d i v i n e t r u t h , and whose relationship w i t h G o d is governed by taqwa, the consciousness o f h u m a n k i n d ' s responsibility t o w a r d its creator. But consciousness o f God alone is n o t sufficient to make a person a M u s l i m . Neither is i t enough to be merely b o r n a M u s l i m or to be raised i n an Islamic c u l tural context. The concept o f taqwa implies that the believer has the added responsibility o f acting i n a way that is i n accordance w i t h the three types o f knowledge previously discussed. The sincere believer must endeavor at all times to m a i n t a i n herself i n a constant state o f submission to God. By d o i n g so, she attains the h o n ored title o f "slave o f G o d " (abd Allah, fern, amat Allah), for she recognizes that all p o w e r and all agency belong to God alone: " A l l a h has w i l l e d i t . There is n o p o w e r but Allah's" (Quran 18:39). Trusting i n the mercy o f her divine master, yet fearing God's w r a t h , the slave o f God walks the road o f life w i t h careful steps, maki n g her actions deliberate so that she w i l l n o t stray f r o m the path that God has laid out for her (Quran 1 -.5-7). Such is the epistemological "leap o f f a i t h " that Islam requires o f its believers. It is an all-encompassing and h i g h l y personal type o f c o m m i t m e n t that has little i n c o m m o n w i t h the academic understanding o f Islam as a civilization or a cultural system. Rather, this "leap o f f a i t h " has m u c h m o r e i n c o m m o n w i t h the spiritual perspective o f the " b o r n - a g a i n " Christian or the mystic w i t h i n a traditional r e l i g i o n , whose heedless soul is "resurrected" or awakened by the l i g h t o f the t r u t h . This s i m i l a r i t y between the spiritual knowledge o f M u s l i m s and the adherents o f other religions is a r e m i n d e r that religious experience is not h m i t e d to specific peoples or cultures; it is universally h u m a n i n nature. The universality o f r e l i g i o u s experience is an i m p o r t a n t premise o f the Quran's argument against the profane or secular life. Taking a different tack f r o m the h a d i t h (the corpus o f prophetic traditions that provides detailed instructions o n h o w to act as a M u s l i m i n specific r i t u a l or moral contexts), the Q u r a n is less concerned w i t h d e f i n i n g creedal boundaries than w i t h a f f i r m i n g the universal

When praying, worshipers separate themselves from the ground with a mat or rug. Wealthy people might use a beautiful prayer carpet, such as this exquisite wool and siLk example made in the seventeenth century under the Mughal emperors.

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o b l i g a t i o n to believe i n one God. The Q u r a n thus speaks o f broad verities o f religious experience to w h i c h every h u m a n being can relate. Similarly, w h e n dealing w i t h religious practices, the Q u r a n is less concerned w i t h the details o f r i t u a l than w i t h the m e a n i n g that lies b e h i n d the rituals i t prescribes. The details o f r i t u a l practice, w h i c h serve to define Islam for most believers, are usually left for t r a d i t i o n t o define. By speaking i n a transcendental voice and presenting a discourse that is relevant to h u m a n experience i n general, the Q u r a n overcomes the cultural l i m i t a t i o n s o f the Arab c i v i l i z a t i o n i n w h i c h i t was o r i g i n a l l y revealed and makes its message accessible to peoples o f different cultural backgrounds. This u n i versalism has never been m o r e i m p o r t a n t than i n the present day, w h e n the m a j o r i t y o f M u s l i m s are South or Southeast Asian i n o r i g i n a n d w h e n o n l y o n e - f i f t h o f t h e m are Arabs. Such a transcendence o f culture is necessary for any religion that aspires to universal validity. As the vehicle for the w o r d o f God, it is necessary for the

The majority of Muslims today live in south or southeast Asia.

Q u r a n to overcome linguistic and cultural differ-

The universalism of Islam transcends the cultural boundaries

ences and express itself i n a metalanguage that can be understood even w h e n its o r i g i n a l Arabic is translated i n t o a non-Semitic

tongue

such

of Arab civilization for these children studying the Quran in Malaysia.

as

English or Indonesian. A n example o f this metalanguage can be f o u n d i n the t r i partite m o d e l o f knowledge previously discussed. Despite the exceptionalism o f postmodern philosophy, w h i c h accentuates cultural boundaries by hypostasizing the n o t i o n o f difference, the comparative study o f h u m a n societies reveals that most people—whatever their experiences and regardless o f variations i n c u l t u r e — t h i n k i n similar ways and have similar wants and needs. Responding to this fact, the Quran seeks to establish a c o m m o n f o u n d a t i o n for belief that is based o n such shared perceptions and experiences. Over and over again, the Quran reminds the reader to t h i n k about the truths that he behind the familiar or mundane things o f the w o r l d , such as the signs o f God i n nature, the practical value o f virtue, and the cross-cultural vahdity o f fundamental moral principles. What is good for Muslims is meant to be good for all h u m a n beings, regardless o f gender, color, or o r i g i n . The Quran thus appeals to b o t h reason and experience i n determining the criteria f o r differentiating between t r u t h and falsehood.

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The most i m p o r t a n t theological p o i n t made by the Q u r a n is that there is one G o d — A l l a h (The G o d ) — u n i v e r s a l and beyond comparison, w h o creates and sustains b o t h the material universe and the w o r l d of h u m a n experience: " [ A l l a h ] has created the heavens and the earth i n T r u t h ; exalted is He above the partners they ascribe to H i m ! " ( Q u r a n 16:3). A l l other f o r m s o f so-called t r u t h are either false i n their i n i t i a l premises or contingently true only i n l i m i t e d situations. The recognition o f this fact produces an alchemical effect o n the h u m a n soul that f o r ever transforms the o u t l o o k o f the believer. This is eloquently described i n the f o l l o w i n g passage f r o m Fi Zilal al-Quran ( I n the shade o f the Q u r a n ) , a c o m m e n tary by Sayyid Q u t b ( 1 9 0 6 - 6 6 ) , the Egyptian activist and c h i e f ideologist o f the Muslim Brotherhood: When a conception that sees nothing i n the world but the reality of Allah establishes itself i n the human mind and heart, it is accompanied by the vision of this genuine, permanent reality i n every other being that has sprung from it. This is the stage at which the heart feels the hand of Allah in everything and beyond which it feels nothing bul Allah i n the whole u n i verse. There would be no other reality to be felt. It is also accompanied by the attribution o f every event and every movement i n this life and i n this universe to the first and only cause, that is, Allah, that brings other causes about and influences their effectiveness. The Quran takes great care to establish this truth in the Muslims' concept of faith. It has always put aside apparent causes and associated events directly w i t h the w i l l of Allah. It says, "When you threw (a handful o f dust) it was not your act, but Allah's" [Quran 8:17]. "There is no triumph except that given by Allah" [Quran 8:10 and Quran 3:126]. "You have no w i l l except as Allah wills" [Quran 76:30].

A f a i t h such as Islam, based o n certain k n o w l e d g e , is b o t h a l i b e r a t i o n a n d a l i m i t a t i o n . It is a l i b e r a t i o n i n the sense that certainty o f the d i v i n e reality allows the h u m a n s p i r i t t o expand b o t h o u t w a r d and u p w a r d , so that the c o n sciousness becomes three d i m e n s i o n a l . But i t is also a l i m i t a t i o n , because w i t h the k n o w l e d g e o f God comes a c o n c o m i t a n t awareness o f the l i m i t s and responsibilities i m p o s e d o n the person as a created being. U n l i k e the secular h u m a n i s t , the true M u s l i m w h o submits to G o d cannot delude herself b y c l a i m i n g that she is the sole author o f her destiny. She k n o w s that such a statem e n t is absurd, f o r a person's fate is r o u t i n e l y i n f l u e n c e d by factors b e y o n d her c o n t r o l . This t r u t h has even been recognized b y some thinkers i n the Western secular t r a d i t i o n . The German p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r Karl M a r x , f o r example, a c k n o w l e d g e d that a person's destiny is t o a large extent dependent on external factors. For the M u s l i m , however, the " h i d d e n h a n d " that guides

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a person's fate is n o t some idealized construct such as p o l i t i c a l economy, class, or i d e o l o g y ; rather, i t is the d i v i n e w i l l that governs b o t h the social and the material universes. I n Islam it is n o t r e l i g i o n that is the " o p i u m o f the masses" but the heedless arrogance o f the h u m a n ego, w h i c h deludes itself by c l a i m ing that i t can be all things to all people: " [ A l l a h ] created the h u m a n b e i n g f r o m a tiny d r o p [ o f s p e r m ] ; yet see h o w he has b e c o m e a brazen d i s p u t e r ! " ( Q u r a n 16:4). A m i d d l e p o s i t i o n between the l i m i t s and possibilities o f h u m a n agency can be f o u n d i n the doctrine o f choice (ikhtiyar), w h i c h has become an i m p o r t a n t part o f Shiite theology. A c c o r d i n g to this d o c t r i n e , the overall fate o f the h u m a n b e i n g , like that o i all creatures, is governed by the f o r e - k n o w l e d g e (qada) o f an a l l - p o w e r f u l and all-just G o d . This does n o t mean that the believer must t h r o w u p his hands i n resignation and d o n o t h i n g o n his o w n behalf, however. Q u i t e the opposite. A c c o r d i n g to this perspective, God's d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f affairs is i m m u t a b l e o n l y on the universal level, the level o f the w h o l e . O n the level o f the part, the necessity o f a m e a n i n g f u l choice between g o o d and evil demands that absolute predestination be replaced by the possibility o f h u m a n agency, w h i c h allows the h u m a n being to choose between ethical alternatives. O n the personal level, an individual's fate (qadar) is to a large extent dependent o n the choices that he makes d u r i n g his life. These may be m o r a l choices such as seeki n g v i r t u e rather than vice, p o l i t i c a l choices such as w h o m to regard (the f a m i l y o f the Prophet

or subsequent dynasties o f caliphs)

as

Muhammad's

successors, or eschatological choices such as w h e t h e r to believe that the Shiite " H i d d e n I m a m " w i l l r e t u r n at the e n d o f t i m e . I n other w o r d s , each person's fate is the result o f an o n g o i n g and c o n t i n u o u s i n t e r a c t i o n , o n many levels and over many years, between the h u m a n w i l l and the w i l l o f G o d . Each i n d i v i d u a l makes his o r her choices freely, b u t the o p t i o n s f r o m w h i c h to choose are d i v i n e l y d e t e r m i n e d , and thus b e y o n d the i n d i v i d u a l ' s a b i l i t y to c o n t r o l . For the M u s l i m , belief i n God's d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f affairs is n o t fatalism b u t c o m m o n sense. A believer feels liberated i n k n o w i n g his or her l i m i t s , because the acceptance o f w h a t can never be changed removes the w o r r y and frustrat i o n o f striving i n vain and opens the d o o r t o constructive engagement w i t h the possible. Just as knowledge o f the t r u t h compels a person to accept God as the Creator and Sustainer o f the universe o n the level o f the m a c r o c o s m , the same k n o w l e d g e requires h i m or her t o accept the givens o f material l i f e o n the level o f the m i c r o c o s m . Either a person puts her m i n d at ease by practicing w h a t some Christians refer to as " l e t t i n g go and letting G o d , " or he suffers the e n d less f r u s t r a t i o n o f the "secular

fideist"

or d o c t r i n a i r e secularist, w h o vainly

believes that h u m a n k i n d can overcome all obstacles, o n l y to f i n d that no strategy can save h i m f r o m death. The Q u r a n admonishes such people i n the f o l -

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l o w i n g verse: " D o n o t be like those w h o forgot God so that [ G o d ] made t h e m forget

their o w n

souls"

( Q u r a n 59: 19). In

this

sense

Frithjof

S c h u o n , the n o t e d w r i t e r on

comparative

religion,

defines Islam i n his w o r k Comprendre I islam

(Under-

standing Islam) (1976) as " t h e juncture between G o d as such and m a n as such." Schuon adds that w h e n the M u s l i m conceives o f G o d , i t is n o t " i n the sense that [ G o d ] can manifest

Him-

self i n a certain way and i n a certain t i m e , b u t i n d e pendendy f r o m history i n The doctrine of choice (ikhtiyar) plays an important role in the ethical philosophy of Shiite Islam. Shiism is prevalent in modern Iran, where clerics often meet to discuss religious affairs in local shrines, as at the Imamzada Sayyid Ali in Nain.

that [ G o d ] is w h a t H e is, and also that He creates and is revealed by His nature." Conversely,

when

the

M u s l i m is c o n c e i v e d as a rational agent, i t is n o t " i n

the sense that he is lost and is i n need o f a saving miracle, b u t i n the sense that he is created after the image o f G o d (deiforme), is given an intelligence capable o f conceiving o f the Absolute, and a w i l l capable o f choosing that w h i c h w i l l guide i t . " I f h u m a n k i n d is to be saved tiirough faith, and the essence o f faith is k n o w l edge, t h e n i t is i n c u m b e n t u p o n G o d as the source o f all k n o w l e d g e to p r o v i d e h u m a n i t y w i t h the knowledge that w i l l enable i t to apprehend the t r u t h and thus save itself. I n this sense the message o f Islam echoes that o f the Gospel: "Ye shall k n o w the T r u t h , and the T r u t h shall make y o u free."

From the Knowledge of God to the Practice of the Sunna As a revealed text, the Q u r a n is God's b o o k , n o t the Prophet

Muhammad's.

A l t h o u g h one o f the discourses (surah) o f the Q u r a n is n a m e d after M u h a m m a d

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( Q u r a n 33) and the Prophet is often addressed directly by God i n the Quran, he is m e n t i o n e d by name only four times ( Q u r a n 3: i 4 4 ; 3 3 : 4 o ; 4 7 : 2 ; 4 8 : 9 ) . M o r e often die Q u r a n expresses itself i n the first-person o r imperative voice. I n all such cases, the voice that speaks i n the text is God's, not that o f the Prophet. This firstperson perspective imparts an i m m e d i a c y t o the Quranic discourse that is somew h a t similar to the tone used i n the N e w Testament. Also like the N e w Testament (and parts o f the Hebrew Bible), the Q u r a n is n o t o n l y didactic b u t " a u t o b i o graphical," because G o d is often depicted as speaking about God's o w n d i v i n e nature. Thus, t o assert that the authorship o f the Q u r a n is a n y t h i n g b u t divine is to strip the Q u r a n o f the very reality that i t claims for itself. Such a stance w o u l d never be acceptable t o a believing M u s l i m . W h i l e i t w o u l d be a travesty o f Islam's claim t o the t r u t h t o call the religion " M u h a m m a d a n i s m " o r to say that i n the Quran " M u h a m m a d says such-and-such," it is equally w r o n g to say that the Prophet had n o t h i n g whatsoever to d o w i t h the Quran. First, the Quranic revelation came o u t o f the Prophet's m o u t h and i n his o w n A r a b i c language, either as the result o f a direct revelation f r o m God or through the mediation o f the angel Gabriel. I n addition, d u r i n g more than t w e n t y - t w o years o f revelation, the Prophet was the p r i m e interpreter o f the Quran, and his recorded statements about h o w its teachings are t o be p u t i n t o effect f o r m the basis o f the Sunna, the paradigm o f behavior that every M u s l i m must follow. As God says to the Prophet: " W e have revealed u n t o y o u the Remembrance, so that y o u may explain to people that w h i c h has been revealed for t h e m " (Quran 16:44). The

c o n c e p t o f t h e Sunna is based o n the b e l i e f that t h e Prophet

M u h a m m a d is a role m o d e l f o r a l l M u s l i m s , b o t h male a n d female. This is c o n f i r m e d by the Q u r a n i n the f o l l o w i n g verse: " A g o o d example y o u have i n Allah's Messenger, f o r all w h o s e h o p e is i n A l l a h a n d i n the Final Day a n d who

r e m e m b e r A l l a h f r e q u e n t l y " ( Q u r a n 33:61). Besides b e i n g the h u m a n

vehicle o f revelation, the Prophet is also m e n t i o n e d i n the Q u r a n as the execut o r o f God's laws. For this reason the Prophet's orders m u s t be obeyed by M u s l i m s as i f those orders came f r o m G o d H i m s e l f : " O b e y A l l a h and the Messenger so that y o u may f i n d m e r c y " ( Q u r a n 3:132). Finally, b y e x t e n d i n g the w o r d o f G o d t h r o u g h t h e process o f Q u r a n i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the Prophet acts as a legislator f o r the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y : " [ T h e P r o p h e t ] w i l l make l a w f u l f o r t h e m all g o o d things and p r o h i b i t t h e m o n l y the b a d , and w i l l relieve t h e m o f t h e i r burdens a n d t h e fetters w h i c h they used t o w e a r "

(Quran

7:157). These Prophetic roles o f m o r a l exemplarity, executive decision m a k i n g , a n d legislative l a w m a k i n g all have an i m p o r t a n t bearing o n r e l i g i o u s practice. T h u s , i t is n o t s u r p r i s i n g t o discover that there are m o r e statements about practice i n the Sunna than i n the Q u r a n .

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D u r i n g his l i f e t i m e the Prophet's a u t h o r i t y was accepted w i t h o u t dispute, because i t was already c o n f i r m e d by G o d i n the Q u r a n and thus d i d n o t depend o n the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y ' s assent. The question o f the Sunna's a u t h o r i t y after M u h a m m a d ' s l i f e t i m e , however, was n o t e x p l i c i t l y discussed i n the Q u r a n . I n the first century after the Prophet's death, many M u s l i m s preferred to f o l l o w local or regional interpretations o f Islamic practice rather than uncertain accounts o f M u h a m m a d ' s behavior that were orally passed d o w n t h r o u g h the generations. I n the second and t h i r d centuries o f Islam, t r a d i t i o n - m i n d e d legal scholars such as Malik i b n Anas (ca. 715—795) a n d M u h a m m a d i b n Idris al-Shafii (767—820) argued t h r o u g h analogical reasoning that the collective example o f the Prophet, his Companions (al-Sahabah), and their followers (collectively k n o w n as al-Salaf aiSalih, " T h e V i r t u o u s Forerunners") was to be accepted along w i t h the w o r d o f G o d as a p r i m a r y and thus n o r m a t i v e source o f practice. This extension o f the l i v i n g a u t h o r i t y o f the Prophet and his Companions i n t o f u t u r e generations became so w i d e l y accepted i n the M u s l i m w o r l d that all pious M u s l i m s n o w see themselves as f o l l o w i n g the Sunna i n one way or another. Today the Sunna enjoys near canonical status as a source o f Islamic precedent—so m u c h so that i n the hands o f politically motivated Islamists, those w h o f o l l o w the doctrines o f the Wahhabis o f Saudi Arabia, and other so-called M u s l i m fundamentalists, the Sunna has been denuded o f ah historical contextualization and stands nearly equal to the Q u r a n as a source o f t r u t h . The r a w material o f the Sunna is the corpus o f hadith ( p i . ahadith). This consists o f collected accounts o f the Prophet's deeds and sayings, w h i c h are at times supplemented by the actions and comments o f the Prophet's Companions. The w o r d hadith means " r e p o r t o r saying." I n Sunni Islam this t e r m most o f t e n refers to a consensually legitimated b o d y o f sayings and reports about M u h a m m a d ' s behavi o r that was c o m p i l e d i n six m a j o r collections (the Six Books or al-Kutub al-Sittah) i n the late n i n t h to tenth centuries, about t w o and a h a l f centuries after the Prophet's death. These collections are seen today as p r i m a r y sources o f b o t h j u r i d i c a l and m o r a l precedent and are second o n l y to the Q u r a n i n their p r a c t i cal significance and authority. D u r i n g the p e r i o d i n w h i c h they were c o m p i l e d , the h a d i t h were classified according to the soundness o f their chains o f transmission and the character, piety, trustworthiness, and r e p u t a t i o n o f their transmitters. The Six Books o f Sunni h a d i t h attained their status as n o r m a t i v e sources because f e w i f any o f the traditions contained therein were f o u n d 10 be spurious. Two o f these collections have been designated by a consensus o f scholars as particularly s o u n d (sahih). These works—Sahih al-Bukhari ( m e n t i o n e d earlier) and Sahih Muslim (named after M u s l i m i b n al-Hajjaj al-Nisaburi, ca. 817—875)—are the most authoritative books

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o f Suririi h a d i t h . The r e m a i n i n g books are also n a m e d after their compilers a n d are k n o w n either as collections o f precedents (surion)—such as the Sunan o f A b u D a u d al-Sijistani (817-88), the Sunan o f I b n Majjah a l - Q a z w i n i ( 8 2 2 - 8 7 ) , and the Sunan o f al-Nasai (830—91c)—or as a collection (jami), such as Jami al-Titmidhi (named after a l - T i r m i d h i , 8 2 4 - 9 2 ) . Shiite Muslims consider the traditions o f their i m a m s (spiritual leaders descended directly f r o m the Prophet M u h a m m a d ) to be equal i n i m p o r t a n c e to those o f the Prophet h i m s e l f The most significant collections o f Shiite h a d i t h are those o f A b u Jafar M u h a m m a d al-Kulayni ( d . 9 4 0 ) , A b u Jafar M u h a m m a d i b n Babuyah, also k n o w n as Shaykh Saduq (ca. 923-91) and al-Hasan al-Tusi ( 9 9 5 - 1 0 6 7 ) . I n Sahih Muslim is a t r a d i t i o n k n o w n as the H a d i t h o f Gabriel (Hadith Jibril), w h i c h has l o n g been regarded by M u s l i m s as o n e o f the most i m p o r t a n t statements o n Islamic faith and practice. Like other traditions o f its k i n d , i t originates w i t h U m a r i b n al-Khattab (ca. 5 8 6 - 6 4 4 ) , a close c o m p a n i o n o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d a n d the second khalifa (caliph or successor t o M u h a m m a d ) o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . For many M u s l i m scholars the H a d i t h o f Gabriel constitutes the d e f i n i n g statement o f the Islamic creed (aqidah), because i t appears as a sort o f catechism o f Islamic d o g m a . Because i t is n o t part o f the Q u r a n , this h a d i t h is not f u l l y equivalent t o the w o r d o f G o d . I t enjoys a particularly h i g h status, h o w ever, because i t depicts the Prophet as being tested o n matters o f doctrine by the angel Gabriel, God's messenger i n the w o r l d o f spirits and the m a i n c o n d u i t o f the Quranic revelation. Because o f its importance t o the d e f i n i t i o n o f Islamic practice, the f u l l text o f this h a d i t h is reproduced below, except for the last sect i o n (probably added at a later date), w h i c h discusses the signs and portents o f the e n d o f the w o r l d and the advent o f the Day o f Judgment: [Umar ibn al-Khattab reported:] One day, while we were sitting w i t h the Messenger o f God (may God bless and preserve h i m ) , there came upon us a man whose clothes were exceedingly white and whose hair was exceedingly black. No dust of travel could be seen upon h i m , and none of us knew h i m . He sat down i n front of the Prophet (may God bless and preserve h i m ) , rested his knees against [the Prophet's] knees and placed his palms on [the Prophet's] thighs. " O h Muhammad, tell me about Islam," he said. The Messenger of God (may God bless and preserve him) replied: "Islam means to bear witness that there is no god but Allah, that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah, to maintain the [required] prayers, to pay the poor-tax, to fast [ i n the month of | Ramadan, and to perform the pilgrimage to the House [of God at Mecca] i f you are able to do so." "You are correct," [the man] said. We were amazed at his questioning [ o f the Prophet] and then saying that [die Prophet] had answered correctiy. Then

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he said, "Tell me about faith." [The Prophet] said: " I t is to believe i n Allah, His angels, His books, His messengers, and the Last Day, and to believe i n Allah's determination of affairs, whether good comes of it or bad." "You are correct," he said. "Now- tell me about virtue (ihsan)." [The Prophet] said: "It is to worship Allah as i f you see H i m ; for i f you do not see H i m , surely He sees you." . . . Then [the man] left. I remained for awhile, and [the Prophet] said to me: " O h , Umar, do you know- who the questioner was?" "Allah and His Messenger know best," I replied. He said: " I t was [the angel] Gabriel, who came to you to teach you your religion." A n i m p o r t a n t aspect o f the H a d i t h o f Gabriel is that the expected p o l a r i t y between f a i t h and practice is reversed. Instead o f faith b e i n g a prerequisite for practice, i t is practice that defines faith. This reversed p o l a r i t y is a r e m i n d e r that Islam is defined n o t o n l y as a set o f beliefs but also as a b o d y o f actions that reveal the i n n e r convictions o f the believer. This practice-oriented v i e w o f Islam is t y p i c a l o f the h a d i t h genre i n general. Each n o r m a t i v e p r e s c r i p t i o n o r explanatory statement that one finds i n these traditions acts as a c o m p l e m e n t to one o r m o r e verses o f the Q u r a n . A n o t h e r way to describe the relationship between the h a d i t h and the Q u r a n is to say that traditions such as the H a d i t h o f Gabriel express a " n o m o c e n t r i c " o r law-centered perspective o n Islam, i n w h i c h k n o w l e d g e o f spiritual realities is less i m p o r t a n t than the performance o f a p p r o priate behavior. This stands i n contrast t o the Quran's m o r e " l o g o c e n t r i c " o r w o r d - c e n t e r e d approach to Islam, i n w h i c h the d i v i n e w o r d arouses k n o w l e d g e o f G o d i n the h u m a n consciousness. This shift i n emphasis f r o m i n n e r belief to o u t w a r d practice is less s u r p r i s i n g w h e n n o m o c e n t r i c traditions such as the H a d i t h o f Gabriel are v i e w e d i n their historical context. The H a d i t h o f Gabriel was originally passed d o w n by Abdallah i b n U m a r , the son o f U m a r i b n al-Khattab, some t i m e after his father's death. The caliph U m a r is a central figure i n Islamic history, because i t was he w h o initiated the M u s l i m conquests o f Palestine, Syria, and Iran. Just before these conquests, the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y was forced to undergo the so-called Apostasy (Riddo) Wars, i n w h i c h Arab tribes used the death o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d as an excuse to reassert their independence f r o m the Islamic state. D u r i n g this t i m e o f transition, w h e n f o r m e r apostates were being taken back i n t o the Islamic fold and many n o n - M u s l i m s sought to avoid the social and economic disadvantages o f conquest by converting to the new r e l i g i o n , it was imperative for the Islamic state to define the m i n i m u m requirements for b e c o m i n g a believer. Once i d e n tified as a M u s l i m , the convert became exempt f r o m the jizyah (the p o l l - t a x levied against n o n - M u s l i m s ) and c o u l d claim a share o f the stipends that were paid o n an annual basis to participants i n the jihad or war o f Islamic expansion. This need for a creedal d e f i n i t i o n o f Islam is amply served by the H a d i t h o f Gabriel, w h i c h defines Islam i n three ways: ( i ) theologically, by asserting that Allah is the One G o d and n o t part o f a pantheon; (2) historically, by asserting

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that the Prophet M u h a m m a d is the messenger o f G o d , thus separating the nascent era o f Islam f r o m the previous era o f t h e o l o g i cal ignorance (Jahiliyyab); and ( 3 ) doctrinally, by m a n d a t i n g five basic and f u n d a m e n t a l pillars o f Islamic practice that f o r m a l l y d i f ferentiate Islam f r o m Christianity, Judaism, and the other religions o f the M i d d l e East.

The Five Pillars of Islam The Five Pillars o f Islam (arkan al-Islam), w h i c h are presented systematically for the first t i m e i n the Hadith o f Gabriel, are relatively simple to carry out and can easily be learned by the person w h o wishes to convert to Islam. The tirst pillar o l Islam is to openly proclaim and bear witness that there is no g o d but Allah and that M u h a m m a d is the messenger o f Allah. This is k n o w n as the Shuhadah (the act o f bearing witness). It may also be caUed al-

Five fundamental tenets, often described as the pillars

Shahadatayn (the t w o wimessings), because it

of Islam, distinguish Islam from other religions. The

consists o f t w o separate acts o f bearing w i t ness. The first witnessing, "There is n o g o d but A l l a h , " affirms the acceptance o f the divine reality by the h u m a n intellect. As a formal

proclamation

of

divine

singularity

first is the shahuda, or profession of faith, which attests that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is Gods messenger. In this modern Moroccan calligraphic panel embroidered in gold thread, the words of the profession of faith have been given the form of a human figure at prayer.

(tavvhid), i t is the creedal equivalent t o the " k n o w l e d g e o f certainty" discussed earlier. The second witnessing, " M u h a m m a d is the messenger o f A l l a h , " affirms one's submission to God, w h i c h is the meaning o f the w o r d islam itself. Here, the h u m a n being responds to the divine w i l l by acknowledging the Prophet M u h a m m a d as both the vehicle o f the Quranic revelation and the paradigmatic muslim or " s u b m i t t e r " to God. By stressing the sources o f b o t h the theoretical and the practical knowledge o f religion (i.e., Allah and the Prophet), the " t w o wimessings" o f the Shahadah thus reaffirm the complementarity o f faith and practice i n Islam. The second pillar o f Islam is to make the required five prayers each day i n the d i r e c t i o n o f the Great Mosque (al-Masjid al-Haram) i n Mecca. These prayers, c o l lectively k n o w n as al-Salat, are p e r f o r m e d just before d a w n , at n o o n , at m i d - a f t e r n o o n , just after sunset, and i n the evening, f r o m an h o u r after sunset t o a r o u n d m i d n i g h t . I n the h a d i t h , prayer is depicted as the quintessential act o f submission to God and the m a i n p r o o f o f Islam. I n Jami aJ-Tirmidhi, the Prophet is q u o t e d as saying: "Prayer is the p r o o f [ o f I s l a m ] . " T h e central importance given to prayer

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i n Islam is due t o the r e c o g n i t i o n that the performance o f al-Salat forces the h u m a n body to respond to the reality that has first been acknowledged by the heart and the tongue i n the Shahadah. I n a d d i t i o n , the

essential

contrast

between

the

absolute independence o f God and the o n t o l o g i c a l dependency o f the h u m a n b e i n g is r e a f f i r m e d i n the actions and attitudes o f the prayer. To p e r f o r m the prayer, the believer must first put herself i n a state o f p u r i t y by p e r f o r m i n g either a ritual ablution

(wuclu)

or a bath (ghusl). The symbolic nature o f the ablution is illustrated by the fact that either clean water or clean sand may be used to p e r f o r m this ritual. The full bath, i n w h i c h water is p o u r e d over b o t h the bod)' and the head, is needed only i n cases The second pillar of Islam is to worship God five limes a day in the direction of the Kaaba in Mecca. To determine

o f serious ritual p o l l u t i o n or after sexual intercourse.

In

general,

the a b l u t i o n

the direction of Mecca, known as the qibla, Muslims

should be seen as an expression o f respect

developed the science of astronomy. Twentieth-century

for God's majesty and as a means o f

worshipers can use this qibla compass.

preparing the believer f o r meeting and addressing the Lord and Creator.

The movements o f the M u s l i m prayer are patterned after attitudes o f obeisance that were associated i n late a n t i q u i t y w i t h entering i n t o the presence o f a great ruler. To visualize h o w the prayer movements correspond to the act o f greeting such a ruler, imagine a petitioner standing outside a king's throne r o o m . The first t h i n g that the petitioner is likely to d o before entering the royal presence is to s u m m o n the resolve to enter the throne r o o m . This corresponds to the act o f a f f i r m i n g the i n t e n t i o n (niyyah) that precedes not o n l y the canonical prayer b u t all other ritual observances i n Islam as w e l l . Next the petitioner enters the throne r o o m itself. After stepping over the threshhold she stops, raises her hands to her ears, and proclaims the g l o r y and majesty o f the r u l e r for all to hear. This corresponds to the act o f " m a g n i f i c a t i o n " (takbir), w h i c h begins the prayer. To p e r f o r m the takbir, the M u s l i m w o r s h i p p e r raises her hands to her ears and proclaims i n Arabic, " A l l a h is most great!" (Allohu akbur!). The petitioner then bows before the king i n an attitude o f reverence and uses a ritual formula to address the king. This corresponds to the next stage o f the prayer.

Before worship, Muslims must put themselves in a state of ritual purity, and many mosques, such as the Kairouiyyin in Fez, Morocco, provide fountains for ablution.

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i n w h i c h the worshipper recites Surat al-Fatihah, the Quran's opening discourse. This surah, w h i c h is translated below, has often been described by M u s l i m theologians as summarizing i n a few lines the essential message o f the Quran: Praise be to Allah, Lord of the Worlds; the Beneficent, the Merciful; Master of the Day of Judgment. You alone do we worship and from You alone do w e seek aid. Show us the StraightWay, the way o f those upon w h o m You have bestowed Your grace, not of those w h o have earned Your

wTath

or who go

astray (Quran i ; i - 6 ) . After reciting the Fatihah, the w o r s h i p p e r recites another verse f r o m the Q u r a n , w h i c h is chosen at her i n d i v i d u a l discretion. A l t h o u g h any verse f r o m the Q u r a n may be used, this second recitation is often used by M u s l i m s to further magnify God by recounting some o f the d i v i n e attributes. After greeting the k i n g f r o m the threshhold o f the throne r o o m , the petitioner next approaches halfway to the throne itself. At this points, she stops, bows, and utters another ritual f o r m u l a . This corresponds to the t h i r d part o f the prayer, w h i c h is called the " b o w i n g " (ruku). After again saying " A l l a h is most great!" the w o r s h i p p e r bows f r o m the waist and proclaims three times, " G l o r y to the Greatest L o r d ! " After raising herself to an u p r i g h t p o s i t i o n , she next utters: " A l l a h hears the one w h o praises H i m . " After this the w o r s h i p p e r immediately adds, " O u r L o r d , all praise belongs to Y o u ! " In the final act o f approaching the k i n g , the petitioner is s u m m o n e d to the foot o f the throne and falls prostrate before the ruler. This expression o f subm i s s i o n — w h i c h the secular individualist often sees as b o t h repellant and a n t i thetical to the concept o f personal d i g n i t y — w a s c o m m o n practice i n late antiquity. W h e n Islam first appeared i n the M i d d l e East, petitioners were expected to prostrate themselves before b o t h the Byzantine emperor (a Christian) and the Shah o f Persia (a Zoroastrian). This was because these rulers p e r f o r m e d the dual role o f k i n g and h i g h priest, exercising political a u t h o r i t y as heads o f state and religious a u t h o r i t y as heads o f their respective religious institutions. I n b o t h cases as w e l l , they were t h o u g h t to be the vicegerents o f G o d o n earth: the Byzantine emperor r u l e d over the lands o f " N e w R o m e " (the o n l y " R o m e " k n o w n to M u s l i m s ) as b o t h Caesar and Vicar o f Christ, w h i l e the Shah o f Persia r u l e d over Ins k i n g d o m as the semidivine representative o f the g o d Ahuramazda. I n Catholic Christianity i t is still required for those j o i n i n g monastic orders to prostrate themselves before the altar o f Christ. This religious attitude o f h u m i l ity is i n f u l l agreement w i t h the perspective o f the Islamic prayer. I f a person is w i l l i n g to h u m b l e h i m s e l f before the secular kings o f the w o r l d , is it not m o r e fitting

to h u m b l e h i m s e l f before G o d , w h o is the King o f Kings? Because Muslims

readily prostrate themselves before G o d , however, it does not mean that they are

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After raising his hands in lakbir, the petitioner bows his head in an attitude of reverence while reciting the faliha, the opening chapter of the Quran. The final two steps are bowing (ruku) and prostration (sajdah).

similarly i n c l i n e d to s u b m i t to w o r l d l y a u t h o r i t y figures. I n the first century o f Islam, M u s l i m s were notably s t u b b o r n i n their refusal to prostrate before anyone o r a n y t h i n g b u t Allah. The arrival i n the mid-seventh century o f a M u s l i m deleg a t i o n to the emperor o f Clhna was recorded as a remarkable event i n T'ang dynasty chronicles, because these Arab o r Persian visitors (called Ta-Shih by Chinese historians) refused to prostrate themselves before the emperor, w h o was believed to be the "Son o f Heaven." Before commencing the act o f prostration (sajdah or sujud), the worshipper must first repeat the takbir, "Allah is most Great!" At this point she falls to her knees and prostrates herself before God, placing both hands flat o n die g r o u n d and touching her forehead between t h e m . W h i l e i n the b o w i n g position she recites three times, " G l o r y to the Lord Most H i g h ! " After once again saying "Allah is most Great!", the worshipper sits back o n her heels and asks for God's mercy, saying, " O h God, forgive me and show me mercy." Repeating the f o r m u l a "Allah is most Great!" one m o r e time, she again resumes the attitude o f prostration and recites three rimes, " G l o r y to the Lord Most H i g h ! " After this, she stands up and repeats the entire cycle o f prayer, starting w i t h anotiier magnification o f God.

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Each cycle o f the M u s l i m p r a y e r — f r o m the initial takbir through the recitation o f the Quran, the b o w i n g , the prostration, the sitting, and the second prostration—is k n o w n as a rakiih ( p i . rakat). Every canonical prayer requires f r o m t w o to four rakat t o complete:

t w o for the d a w n (fajr)

prayer, four for the n o o n (zuhr) prayer, four for the mid-afternoon (asr) prayer, three for the sunset (maghrib) prayer, and four for the evening (isha) prayer. I n all, the total number

o f cycles p e r f o r m e d for

the

prayers is seventeen. After every t w o cycles and after the t h i r d cycle o f the sunset prayer, the worshipper sits back o n her heels i n an attitude k n o w n as the " s i t t i n g " (jalsoh).

While

in

this

position,

she

addresses God w i t i i a formula k n o w n as the "greeting" (tahiyyah). At this time she also calls f o r t h God's blessings o n the Prophet M u h a m m a d . A l t h o u g h the actual The third pillar of Islam is to pay a yearly poor-tax (zakah)

w o r d s o f this

greeting

vary

shghdy

to a religious official or a representative of the Islamic state.

according

to the different schools

of

Personal charity, such as almsgiving to this blind beggar in

Islamic law, the meaning is essentially the

Gambia, is an important article of faith.

same i n all cases.

After all o f the cycles o f the canonical prayer have been completed, the w o r shipper sits back o n her heels once again and recites a f o r m u l a k n o w n as the " w i t n e s s i n g " (tasnahhud), because it contains the w o r d s o f the "profession

of

f a i t h " (Shahadah). Outwardly, this witnessing acts as a f o r m a l reaffirmation o f the t r u t h o f Islam. Inwardly, i t is the p o i n t at w h i c h the w o r s h i p p e r engages i n her most direct c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h God. M u s l i m scholars consider this to be the most intimate part o f the canonical pray er, w h e r e the w o r s h i p p e r privately p e t i r

tions the favor o f her l o r d , w h o responds by sending d o w n d i v i n e mercy as a relief for her w o r l d l y cares. The witnessing is followed by a formal supplication that asks God's blessings for the Prophets M u h a m m a d and Ibrahim (Abraham), the last and first o f Allah's messengers, whose purpose was to bring salvific t r u t h to humanity t h r o u g h a revealed book. Finally, the prayer is ended w i t h an invocation o f peace (salam). To make this invocation, the worshipper turns her head first to the right and then to the left, utteri n g , "May the peace, mercy, and blessings o f Allah be u p o n y o u . " A l t h o u g h the most

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The fourth pillar of Islam is to fast during the month of Ramadan, the ninth month according to the Islamic lunar calendar. Muslims abstain from food and drink during the daylight hours. Here a family in Bahrain breakfasts in the predawn darkness.

probable objects o f this invocation are the fellow believers w h o sit at the w o r s h i p per's r i g h t and left d u r i n g die congregational (jamaa) prayer, Muslims have l o n g believed that w i t h this f o r m u l a they are also addressing their guardian angels, w h o hover over their shoulders as they pray. The t h i r d pillar o f Islam is to pay the yearly tithe to a religious official or a representative o f the Islamic state. This tithe is k n o w n as al-zakah (the purification) and is levied o n each i n d i v i d u a l believer. The official level o f this tithe, w h i c h is set at o n e - f o r t i e t h (2.5 percent) o f the value o f all l i q u i d assets and income-generating properties i n the worshipper's possession, is based o n a hadith text and was c o n firmed

by M u s l i m scholars f o l l o w i n g the usage o f the Prophet's Companions and

their successors. A c c o r d i n g to the Q u r a n , the tithe may be used to feed the poor, to encourage conversion to Islam, to ransom captives, to relieve debtors o f their b u r d e n , to help wayfarers, and to support those w h o devote themselves to the cause o f G o d (Quran 9:60). It may also be used i n defense o f the faith and for anyother purpose deemed appropriate by the ruler o f an Islamic state. I n Shiite Islam another tithe, called "the fifth" (khums), is also required o f believers. This consists o f a 20 percent tithe o n all n e w i n c o m e for the year a n d is used to support the juridical and educational institutions o f the Shiite c o m m u n i t y . The f o u r t h pillar o f Islam is t o observe the m o n t h - l o n g fast o f Ramadan, the n i n t h m o n t h o f the Islamic lunar calendar. D u r i n g the t w e n t y - n i n e or t h i r t y days

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o f the fasting p e r i o d , the believer m u s t abstain f r o m f o o d , d r i n k , and sex d u r i n g d a y l i g h t h o u r s . This pillar is k n o w n as al-Smvm o r Siyam Ramadan and is seen

by

M u s l i m s as b o t h a purificatory act o f sacrifice and an a f f i r m a t i o n o f ethical awareness. The sacrificial aspect o f Ramadan is reflected i n the Sahih Muslim hadith m e n t i o n e d earlier.

Just

after

stating that

prayer is the p r o o f o f Islam, the Prophet M u h a m m a d adds that "fasting is [the key t o ] heaven." The Ramadan fast is a key t o heaven because i t involves the sacrifice

o f a person's

bodily-

desires and is p e r f o r m e d for the sake o f G o d alone. By also denyi n g h i m s e l f d r i n k , the believer further ensures that the sacrifice w i l l be felt by the body. The pain that is felt by the believer d u r i n g The fifth pillar of Islam is the pilgrimage to Mecca, which takes

the Ramadan fast acts as a b r i d g e

place during the first ten days of the twelfth month in the lunar

that links the sacrifice to a larger

year. In medieval times pilgrims traveled together to Mecca in cara

sense

vans, as depicted in this illustration from a thirteenth-century manuscript of al-Hariri's Maoamal.

o f social responsibility.

Inwardly, the believer purifies the body by consecrating i t to G o d .

O u t w a r d l y ; the believer uses the fast to recall the responsibility that must be felt t o w a r d his f e l l o w h u m a n beings. By u n d e r g o i n g the pain o f h u n g e r and thirst for an extensive yet l i m i t e d p e r i o d o f t i m e , the believer recalls the pain o f the person w h o s e "fast" never ends because his stomach is never free f r o m w a n t . The fifth pillar o f Islam is the p i l g r i m a g e t o Mecca. This takes place i n the first ten days o f the m o n t h o f D h u l - H i j j a h (the t w e l f t h m o n t h o f the Islamic calendar) and is obligatory f o r every believer w h o is physically and financially able to make the journey and p e r f o r m the prescribed rites. This pillar o f Islam is called al-Hajj. Its n i n e essential rites are as f o l l o w s : i . To p u t o n the " g a r m e n t o f consecration" (ihram), w h i c h consists o f t w o pieces o f unsewn c l o t h for m e n and covers all parts o f the body except the face, hands, and feet f o r w o m e n . W h i l e i n the state o f

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i h r a m , i t is n o t permissible to have sexual relations, to k i l l animals o r insects, or to remove any hair f r o m the b o d ) 2. To circumambulate the Kaaba (literally, " c u b e " ) , also k n o w n as the House o f G o d (Bayt Allah), at the center o f the Grand Mosque o f Mecca. This is done seven times i n a counterclockwise direction. W h i l e c i r c u m ambulating the Kaaba, many p i l g r i m s also attempt to t o u c h the "Black Stone" (al-Hajar alAswad), a meteorite considered to be sent f r o m heaven and originally placed by the Prophets I b r a h i m and Ismail (Ishmael) i n one o f the comers

The pilgrim arriving in Mecca dons a special garment of consecration (ihrora), worn throughout the pilgrimage. For men this comprises two seamless lengths of white cloth; women must cover the entire body except hands, face, and feet.

o f the Kaaba. Pilgrims may also p e r f o r m the act o f " r u n n i n g " (say) seven times along a c o r r i d o r o f the Grand Mosque, i n c o m m e m o r a t i o n o f the Prophet Ibrahim's slave w o m a n Hajar (Hagar), w h o searched for water for her infant son, the Prophet Ismail. A l t h o u g h these last t w o rites are p e r f o r m e d by many i f not all p i l g r i m s , they are n o t official parts o f the pilgrimage. 3. To stand at Arafat, a plain southeast o f Mecca, o n the n i n t h day o f the m o n t h o f D h u l - H i j j a h , even i f i t is only for a short time. Those w h o have staked o u t a place for themselves and are able to remain for a longer p e r i o d listen to a sermon delivered f r o m the heights o f M o u n t Arafat. Tins commemorates the final pdgrimage o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d , w h o delivered his farewell sermon f r o m this site. 4. To spend the n i g h t at an e n c a m p m e n t near Mecca called Muzdalifah. c. To t h r o w stones at the three places where, according to M u s l i m trad i t i o n , Satan t r i e d to tempt the Prophet Ismail. This is to be done once before the sacrifice at M i n a h , and then again o n the t w o days f o l l o w i n g the sacrifice. 6. To sacrifice an a n i m a l (usually a sheep o r a goat, b u t sometimes a

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c o w o r a camel) at the place called M i n a h . This commemorates God's acceptance o f a sheep as a sacrifice i n place o f the Prophet Ismail. M u s l i m s disagree w i t h Biblical traditions about Ismail, w h i c h assert that this ancestor o f the Arabs c o u l d n o t have been the " f i r s t - b o r n " son and heir ( i f the Prophet I b r a h i m because he was b o r n f r o m Hajar the slave rather than f r o m Ibrahim's free w i f e Sarah. I n Islam, unlike either Christianity o r Judaism, the c h i l d o f a female slave and the c h i l d o f a free w o m a n are equally legitimate and b o t h can claim shares o f their father's inheritance. For this reason M u s l i m s believe that it was Ismail, the Prophet Ibrahim's firstb o r n son, and not his second son Ishaq (Isaac), w h o m I b r a h i m intended to consecrate to G o d as a sacrifice. They further believe that the Kaaba was a temple that I b r a h i m and Ismail built for G o d i n Mecca w h e n Ismail had reached a d u l t h o o d . The rites of the pilgrimage take the pilgrim to several sites in and around Mecca. Here, on the stony slopes of

7. To repeat the c i r c u m a m b u l a t i o n o f the Kaaba seven m o r e times. 8. To d r i n k the water f r o m the w e l l called Zamzam (literally, " b u b b l i n g " ) i n the precincts o f the Great Mosque o f Mecca, w h e r e

Mount Rahma overlooking

M u s l i m s believe G o d p r o v i d e d water for Hajar and her infant son

the plain of Arafat, where

Ismail d u r i n g their w a n d e r i n g s i n the desert.

the Prophet gave his farewell sermon, an Iranian pilgrim

9. To p e r f o r m t w o cycles o f the canonical prayer at a place k n o w n as the

beseeches God while others

Station o f Abraham (Maqam Ibrahim), w h e r e the Prophets I b r a h i m and

shelter from the blazing sun.

Ismail are believed to have prayed together after b u i l d i n g the Kaaba.

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While on the pilgrimage to Mecca, most pilgrims include a visit to the city of Medina, where Muhammad emigrated in 622. The most important spot there is the Prophet's mosque and tomb, represented here in a sixteenth-century religious texi from Morocco.

The m i n i m u m requirements o f the Hajj are the w e a r i n g o f the i h r a m , the standing at Arafat, and the second c i r c u m a m b u l a t i o n o f the Kaaba. A l t h o u g h the Hajj may be completed w i t h o u t p e r f o r m i n g the r e m a i n i n g rites, the p i l g r i m is r e q u i r e d to pay expiation (kaffarah) for his failure to complete t h e m . D u r i n g the entire H a j j the p i l g r i m must avoid t h i n k i n g about a n y t h i n g other than the remembrance o f G o d and the rites o f the p i l g r i m a g e itself. This is because circ u m a m b u l a t i n g the Kaaba, like the canonical prayer, symbolizes the believer's entry i n t o the divine presence. The earthly House o f G o d (Bayt Allah) that the p i l g r i m visits i n Mecca is believed by many M u s l i m s to replicate the cosmic House o f G o d i n the Seventh Heaven, w h i c h contains the d i v i n e t h r o n e and is c i r c u m ambulated by the angels and all o f the archetypes o f creation.

The Six Pillars of Faith The Five Pillars o f Islam are f o l l o w e d i n the H a d i t h o f Gabriel by another g r o u p o f creedal principles k n o w n as the Six Pillars o f Faith (arkan al-iman). Despite the Quranic l i n k between k n o w l e d g e and faith, these pillars o f faith are n o t associ-

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ated w i t h the highest levels o f knowledge that were discussed earlier. Like the Pillars o f Islam, they instead comprise a practice-oriented approach to r e l i g i o n because they are meant to be r i t u a l l y a f f i r m e d at the t i m e o f conversion or whenever one's doctrinal o r i e n t a t i o n is called i n t o question by the religious authorities o f the Islamic state. Like the pillars o f Islam, the pillars o f faith are thus associated o n l y w i t h the most p r i m a r y level o f k n o w l e d g e m e n t i o n e d i n the Q u r a n — i l m al-yaqin (the rational or d o c t r i n a l k n o w l e d g e o f the t r u t h ) - — a n d d o n o t involve the most advanced states o f k n o w l e d g e (ayn al-yaqin and haqq al-yaqin). The Six Pillars o f Faith i n Islam are as f o l l o w s : 1. To believe i n God (Allah). 2. To believe i n Allah's angels. 3. To believe i n Allah's revealed books, w h i c h include the Q u r a n , the N e w Testament, also k n o w n as the Evangel ( a l - I n j i l ) , the Psalms o f David (al-Zabur), the Torah (al-Tawrat), and the Pages o f Abraham (Suhuf I b r a h i m ) . 4. To believe i n Allah's messengers, w h i c h i n c l u d e many o f the prophets o f the H e b r e w Bible as w e l l as Jesus (Isa), John the Baptist (Yahya), and such previous Arab prophets as H u d and Salih. c. To believe i n the Last Day (al-Yavvm al-Akhir, also k n o w n as Yowm alQiyoma). Islamic eschatology is close to that o f Christianity and even includes an intercessory role for Jesus. Many M u s l i m s also believe i n a quasi-prophetic figure called the M a h d i ( G u i d e d O n e ) , w h o w i l l come after Jesus and usher i n a p e r i o d o f peace and justice that w i l l last u n t i l the Day o f Judgment. This figure does n o t appear i n the Q u r a n but is a later a d d i t i o n f r o m the h a d i t h . Significantly, the Mahdi's first appearance i n the h a d i t h is to be f o u n d , like the H a d i t h o f Gabriel, i n Sahih M u s l i m . 6. To believe i n Allah's determination o f affairs, whether g o o d or bad. This is a reaffirmation o f the concepts o f divine fore-knowledge (qada) and fate (qadar) discussed earlier. Were i t n o t for the details added to the Six Pillars o f Faith i n the h a d i t h , i t w o u l d be theoretically possible for most Christians or Jews to a f f i r m the Islamic pillars o f faith and still r e m a i n w i d l i n their o w n religions. This is w h y the p u b lic a f f i r m a t i o n o f the pillars o f faith is n o t accepted by most M u s l i m jurists as a sufficient p r o o f o f Islam w i t h o u t also being accompanied by the Five Pillars o f Islam. The first o f the five pillars, the witnessing or Shahadah, unequivocally

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requires the believer to accept the prophet M u h a m m a d as the messenger o f Allah. I n d o i n g so, the prospective believer must also acknowledge the t r u t h o f the Quranic revelation as w e l l as the normative nature o f the Sunna. Whenever the teachings o f the Q u r a n or the Sunna d i f f e r f r o m those o f the Hebrew Bible o r the N e w Testament, M u s l i m s are required to favor the later Islamic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n over the earlier doctrines o f Judaism o r Christianity. The p r i m a c y o f practice over faith that is reflected i n such traditions as the H a d i t h o f Gabriel is so w i d e l y accepted i n the M u s l i m w o r l d that some Western scholars have erroneously asserted that Islam has n o orthodoxy. I n their view, there is n o single creed o r b o d y o f doctrine—apart f r o m the Shahadah—that all M u s l i m s regard as n o r m a d v e . I n the absence o f such a d o c t r i n e , these scholars posit an orthopraxy, a f o r m o f Islam that is defined almost entirely i n terms o f ritual observance. F r o m a comparative perspective, however, this stance is difficult to justify. First, all M u s l i m s d o not pray i n exactly the same way. The schools o f Islamic j u r i s p r u dence differ o n m i n o r points o f what is to be said or done i n the canonical prayer. Second, n o o r t h o d o x y is static; all orthodoxies are " o r t h o d o x i e s i n the m a k i n g . " Official interpretations o f doctrine tend to fluctuate over t i m e and may be transf o r m e d i n response to changing social conditions or relations o f power. This can even happen i n a h i g h l y centralized institution such as the Catholic C h u r c h . It is n o coincidence, for example, that the doctrine o f papal infallibility was p r o m u l gated i n the m i d - n i n e t e e n t h century, at the very t i m e w h e n the ideals o f n a t i o n alism and participatory democracy were u n d e r m i n i n g the papacy's influence. Likewise, i t is n o coincidence that the official doctrine o f the V i r g i n M a r y is currently u n d e r g o i n g a review process i n the Catholic C h u r c h , at a t i m e w h e n f e m i n i s m has revolutionized the status and role o f w o m e n i n Western society. Islamic orthodoxies are n o different. Doctrines have changed repeatedly i n the fourteen h u n d r e d years o f Islamic history. For example, the theological rationali s m o f the Mutazilite school o f theology—a dogma that was officially i m p o s e d o n M u s l i m s by the caliph and enforced by an i n q u i s i t i o n — w a s replaced as " o r t h o d o x " doctrine after less than a century by its antithesis, the tradition-based fideism o f the A h l al-Sunnah wal-Jamaa (the people o f the Sunna and the m a j o r i t y ) . One may also recall h o w the mystical interpretations o f Sufism, once w i d e l y accepted as an alternative approach to Islamic theology, have recently been replaced and even anathematized by the hadith-driven scripturalism o f Wahhabism (a practiceoriented sect f r o m Saudi Arabia that advocates a literal interpretation o f the Q u r a n and hadith) and other movements o f Islamic r e f o r m . Today, the m o r e innovative aspects o f Sufism have been driven so far o f f the historical stage that even many Sufis themselves n o w differ little f r o m their reformist opponents i n adhering to a hadith-based approach to theology and Quranic exegesis.

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Yet t o give the advocates o f o r t h o p r a x y their due, i t must be admitted that the outcome o f b o t h o f these d o c t r i n a l disputes depended to a large extent o n the b e l i e f i m p l i e d i n the Hadith o f Gabriel, that practice is the c r i t e r i o n o f faith and not the other way around. Despite the Quran's emphasis o n the primacy o f k n o w l edge, the Sunna's emphasis o n the p r i m a c y o f practice has clearly prevailed among most M u s l i m s . Today, " o r t h o d o x " Islam is m o r e than anything else a " n o m o c e n t r i c " or law-centered religion. As the H a d i t h o f Gabriel illustrates, this trend began quite early i n Islamic history. Another early example can be f o u n d i n the t h o u sand-year-old creed o f the Tunisian jurist A b u M u h a m m a d i b n A b i Zayd alQayrawani (922—96). This creed, w h i c h appears i n the i n t r o d u c t o r y section o f i b n A b i Zayd's Ristilah, or treatise o n Islamic law, is n o w regarded as d o g m a by the adherents o f the M a l i k i school o f jurisprudence i n N o r t h and West Africa. I f a M a l i k i M u s l i m f r o m this region is asked to discuss the subject o f faith and practice i n Islam, he o r she is likely to respond by reciting one or m o r e passages f r o m the RisaJah. I n the passage reproduced below, a strong echo o f the H a d i t h o f Gabriel can be f o u n d i n i b n A b i Zayd's contention that faith is subject to increase and decrease according to the level o f a person's practice: Faith consists of a declaration by the tongue, sincerity i n the heart, and practice through the limbs. It increases through an increase i n practice and decreases through its decrease. Thus, both decrease and increase pertain to it. The declaration of faith is not completed except through practice. Also, neither the declaration [ o f faith] nor practice [is sufficient] except through the mediation of intention, and neither declaration, practice, nor intention [is sufficient] unless it is i n agreement w i t h the Sunna.

The Institutionalization of Islamic Practice in the Shariah I n creeds such as that o f ibn A b i Zayd al-Qayrawani, the concept o f practice becomes m o r e tiian just a matter o f doctrine; it also becomes a matter o f law. The n o t i o n o f the law i n Islam is expressed by t w o different but semantically related terms: shariah (the " w a y " or m e t h o d set o u t by God) and hqh (the "understanding" or application o f this m e t h o d i n specific cases). I n theory, all Islamic law is divine i n o r i g i n because i t is rooted i n God's commandments i n the Quran. I n practice, however, most o f the precedents for Islamic legal decisions are f o u n d not i n the Quran but i n the S u n n a — particularly i n that portion o f the haditii that reflects the prophet Muhammad's interpretations o f Quranic rulings. Despite this apparent discrepancy, i t is n o t correct to assume diat Islamic law is extrascriptural like the Western system o f secular laws. A l t h o u g h n o t all o f the content o f Islamic law comes direcdy f r o m the Quran, the Quran still retains its scriptural nature for Muslims because the Prophet's precedentsetting judgments are believed to be divinely inspired.

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W h e n speaking about Islamic law, i n f o r m e d M u s l i m s use the t e r m shariah to connote the sacred law as a global concept o r ideal, w h i l e fiqh is used to connote the o n g o i n g interpretation o f die law t h r o u g h the schools ( f o u r Sunni and one Shiite) o f juridical practice (madhhab, p i . madhahib). F r o m the earliest days o f Islamic history, knowledge o f the law was regarded by M u s l i m s as essential knowledge, the very epitome o f "science" (ilm) itself. But the science o f the law, like any other science, does n o t stand still. Ideal principles are useless unless they are p u t i n t o practice, and the changing conditions o f Islamic society demanded n e w interpretations and applications o f the way set f o r t h by G o d and the Prophet M u h a m m a d . For this reason the interpretive science o f huh was developed i n the first Islamic century. F r o m an historical perspective the relationship between shariah and f i q h can be summarized by saying that the shariah developed as the paradigm or m o d e l o f the Islamic way o f life, whereas fiqh, the application o f the shariah to specific cases, developed as the paradigm o f Islamic reasoning. I n these t w o concepts, one normative and ideal and the other hermeneutical and practical, a true c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y between d i e o r y and practice is achieved. W i t h o u t the open-ended interpretive process o f fiqh, the shariah is n o m o r e than an i m m o bile edifice, unresponsive to changing times. W i t h o u t the anchor o f tradition e m b o d i e d i n the shariah, the interpretive process o f fiqh is liable to cut itself o f f f r o m its scriptural roots and reduce Islamic law to a system o f situational ethics. As an institution, Islamic law has been weakened considerably over the past century. A c o m b i n a t i o n o f debilitating factors, i n c l u d i n g the substitution o f Western notions for Islamic conceptions o f justice under colonialism, attempts by authoritarian regimes to bypass the judicial process, the rise o f Islamic p o p u l i s m under various forms o f Islamic m o d e r n i s m , and the trivialization o f religious training i n m o d e r n secular education have conspired to undermine the status o f the four Sunni schools o f fiqh. Today, few Muslims can claim to be true scholars o f the law (fuqaha, sg. faqih), and most believers are confused about w h a t the shariah really means. A c o m m o n belief fostered by m o d e r n political Islamists is that o n l y the shariah—but not

fiqh—constitutes

the true law o f G o d . According to this perspective, the c o n -

tent o f the shariah is to be f o u n d i n the Quran, the Sunna, and i n cases i n w h i c h consensus has been reached among the four Sunni schools o f fiqh. However, the interpretive methodologies o f these schools—their very reason for being—are to be ehminated as sources o f dissension that u n d e r m i n e M u s l i m unity. This negative view o f Islamic j u r i s p r u d e n c e — w h i c h is advocated by such groups as the M u s l i m Brotherhood, the Jamaat-i-Islami o f Pakistan, and the Taliban o f A f g h a n i s t a n — ignores the essential complementarity o f shariah and fiqh and threatens to deny Islamic law the ability to adapt to changing conditions. Even worse, the refutation o f f i q h has o f t e n led to a travesty o f the Islamic practice o f justice hy opening the process o f legal reasoning to the influence o f political demagoguery.

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Partisans o f hadith and other scriptural literalists see fiqh as an extrascriptural (and hence, invalid) f o r m o f law because it entails the extension o f rulings f r o m the Q u r a n and Sunna i n t o n e w domains o n the basis o f analogical reasoning. Some rulings i n Islamic law come direcdy f r o m the Quran; these are seldom disputed. Others come f r o m the hadith and are usually held to be b i n d i n g i f they are transm i t t e d f r o m reliable sources. Still other rulings, however, are f o u n d neither i n the Quran n o r i n the hadith but are analogically derived f r o m similar or comparable cases f o u n d i n these p r i m a r y texts. This last category o f rulings provides most o f the differences o f o p i n i o n that separate the schools o f Islamic jurisprudence f r o m one another. This is also where culture and hermeneutical methods play their most significant roles in the process o f interpretation. The m e t h o d o l o g y o f each school o f fiqh is f o u n d e d o n the concept o f l i v i n g t r a d i t i o n , w h i c h consists o f a c o m b i n a t i o n o f the Sunna o f the Prophet and the practice (amaJ) o f a particular legal school. The m e t h o d o l o g i c a l perspective o f each school has been refined over centuries o f legal research and dialectical disputation and holds the status o f a canon to w h i c h all jurists i n a particular school adhere. This canon, or " i m i t a t i o n " (taqlid) o f the decisions and i n t e r p r e t i v e m e t h o d o l o g y o f a particular legal school, s h o u l d n o t , however, be t h o u g h t o f as a f o r m a l law code. Very few decisions o f Islamic jurists attain the status o f b i n d i n g consensus (ijma). Instead, j u r i d i c a l o p i n i o n (ijtihod) is likely to coalesce a r o u n d a m a j o r i t y interpretation or r u l i n g , w h i l e m i n o r i t y positions continue to exist as alternative interpretations. A l t h o u g h the o p i n i o n o f the m a j o r i t y may attain the status o f de facto consensus i n certain regions, the fiqh system, as traditionally applied, remained open to differences o f o p i n i o n and even allowed later revisions o f the m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n . Cases even exist i n w h i c h practices perm i t t e d by the Q u r a n or the Sunna were abandoned by M u s l i m s i n later generations, according to the needs o f e q u i t y (istihsan) or legitimate public interest (miLslahiih

mursalah). Such is the case, f o r example, w i t h the practice o f slavery.

A l t h o u g h the effects o f slavery are clearly m i t i g a t e d i n the Q u r a n , the practice itself was never abolished i n Islam. Slavery has become so abhorrent to m o d e r n sensibilities, however, that n o M u s l i m c o u n t r y officially allows i t w i t h i n its b o r ders. To justify this change o f o p i n i o n , M u s l i m jurists used the concept o f gradualism to argue that the m i t i g a t i o n o f slavery's cruelty i n the Q u r a n i m p l i e d God's i n t e n t i o n that the practice be ultimately abolished. The actions o f individuals i n Islamic law are judged o n the basis o f five valuations, w h i c h rate each act accorcling t o its p e r m i s s i b i l i t y i n a specific context. Most r e l i g i o u s obligations, such as the Five Pillars o f Islam, are regarded as obligatory (fard or wajib). These are acts whose c o m m i s s i o n is rewarded by God and whose omission may be punished by G o d , the Islamic state, or b o t h . I n many M u s l i m countries, for example, wailful neglect o f the fast o f Ramadan may result

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i n fines o r even i m p r i s o n m e n t . I n some countries, such as Saudi Arabia, parajudicial organizations exist whose purpose is to ensure that people make their five daily prayers at the proper times and adhere to consensual standards o f decency. Most acts i n Islamic law, however, a l t h o u g h still ethically valued, are n o t considered obligatory. Instead, they fall under the three central categories o f m o r a l valu a t i o n : approved (mandub o r mustahabb), m o r a l l y neutral (mubah), and m o r a l l y reprehensible (makruh or mahzur). A l t h o u g h the o m i s s i o n o f o b l i g a t o r y acts may b r i n g about p u n i s h m e n t f r o m the state, this is n o t the case for acts that are merely approved; conversely, the c o m m i s s i o n o f acts that are disapproved is n o t likely to b r i n g about p u n i s h m e n t . I n such cases, whatever r e w a r d or p u n i s h m e n t accrues f r o m the act is a matter for G o d t o decide, w h i l e the c o m m i s s i o n o r o m i s s i o n o f an act is a matter for each person's conscience. The neutrality or p e r m i s s i b i l i t y (ibaha) o f an act means exacdy w h a t i t says: neither r e w a r d n o r p u n i s h m e n t accrues to the perpetrator. At times, members o f the p u b l i c may seek an o p i n i o n (fatwa) about the permissibility o f an act f r o m a specialist i n Islamic law (faqih or mufti). I n c o m i n g u p w i t h his o p i n i o n , the legal expert is likely to collapse the three m i d d l e categories o f m o r a l valuation i n t o t w o : permissible (jaiz) f o r acts that are either approved or neutral, and impermissible (ghayr jaiz) for acts that are either disapproved o r f o r b i d d e n (harom). For the most part, acts that are clearly f o r b i d d e n are m e n t i o n e d i n the Q u r a n and include such vices as murder, sexual license, cheating, g a m b l i n g , eating p o r k , c o n s u m i n g alcohol, and taking usury. I n such cases the opposite o f the rule applied to o b l i g a t o r y acts pertains: the comission o f a f o r bidden act is likely to be punished by b o t h God and the state, w h i l e its o m i s s i o n is r e w a r d e d by G o d . F o r b i d d e n acts o f a p a r t i c u l a r l y severe nature, w h i c h threaten the social and m o r a l order o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y , are seen as transgressing the limits

(hudud,

sg.

hadd)

set by G o d H i m s e l f and thus have punishments

that are mandated i n the Q u r a n . I n such cases, w h i c h include the crimes o f m u r der, theft, and (by analogy) adultery, n o t only the rights o f the v i c t i m b u t also the " r i g h t s o f G o d "

(huquq

Allah) are violated.

The "five values" o f Islamic law were never meant to be abstract ideals, totally divorced f r o m the contexts i n w h i c h they occurred. This point is often forgotten by contemporary M u s l i m politicians, w h o seek to create legal mandates for m o r a l or ethical ideals w i t h o u t the benefit o f juridical training or experience. I n earlier, more judicious times a n u m b e r o f i m p o r t a n t questions were asked about h u m a n actions before they were assigned a specific stams i n die hierarchy o f values. Such questions included: W h i c h is the p r i m a r y valuation to be used w h e n judging an act: permissibility o r prohibition? I f an act is not explicitly p r o h i b i t e d i n the Quran or the Sunna, is it automatically permissible? O r should it be deemed forbidden until proven otherwise? W h i c h actions are obligatory for every M u s l i m (fard ayn) and

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w h i c h are obligatory only for the comrnunity i n general (fard kifoyah)? I f an act is fard kifayah, what is the r r h n i m u m number o f people required to p e r f o r m it? Questions such as these were often asked about Islamic rituals. For example, the five canonical prayers are required for every M u s l i m and thus are considered fard ayn. But the t w o festival (Id) prayers, w h i c h are performed i n commemoration o f the end o f Ramadan and the sacrifice made by the hajj pilgrims after the "standing" at Arafat, are fard kifayah. A l t h o u g h b o t h prayers are to be held congregational!); it is not required that every M u s l i m attend them. Similarly, w h i l e attendance at the Friday congregational prayer (salat al-jumu ah) is fard ayn for all Sunni men, for w o m e n it is fard kifayah. For Shiite Muslims the Friday prayer is fard ayn for m e n only w h e n the I m a m is present. I n the absence o f the I m a m ( w h o is presendy believed to be i n a state o f occultation), it is fard kifayah. This is w h y i n a Shiite country such as Iran the Friday prayer is often held i n only a single location i n each city Furthermore, is forbidden the opposite o f lawful? Does a rule apply i n all cases or must the jurist first investigate the merits o f each case before m a k i n g a decision? Is i t possible to f o r b i d an act because o f its consequences, even i f i t is n o t f o r bidden per se? What makes a t h i n g forbidden? Is it f o r b i d d e n intrinsically, i n that it is bad i n and o f itself, or is it f o r b i d d e n extrinsical])', i n that it is bad o n l y because o f the way i n w h i c h i t is used? Such questions are often asked about such f o r b i d d e n substances as p o r k or alcoholic beverages. Many I n d i a n and Pakistani M u s l i m s , w h o still preserve the notions o f i n t r i n s i c p u r i t y and i m p u r i t y held by the H i n d u r e l i g i o n , consider not o n l y the flesh but all other parts o f the swine to be f o r b i d d e n . Thus, they f o r b i d the use o f such products as pig-bristle hairbrushes or p i g s k i n footballs. I n the M i d d l e East and N o r t h Africa, however, it was usually not the p i g itself that was deemed f o r b i d d e n but o n l y the act o f eating its flesh. Ln these regions grafts made o f p i g skin m i g h t even be used to treat head w o u n d s . At w h a t p o i n t d o circumstances change the v a l u a t i o n o f an act? A l t h o u g h the flesh o f swine and c a r r i o n are f o r b i d d e n for M u s l i m s , it is permissible to eat t h e m i f the alternative is starvation. But w h a t about the Quranic order to " c o m m a n d the g o o d and f o r b i d evil?" ( Q u r a n y. 104). W h e n should this be applied? A n d m i g h t the imperative to enforce the good cause an even greater evil than the o r i g i n a l sin itself i f this leads to social unrest, t e r r o r i s m , or r e v o l u tion? Such questions are all too pertinent today i n such countries as Algeria and Egypt, where this i n j u n c t i o n has been applied by M u s l i m insurgents i n an especially severe and uncritical manner. The answers t o such questions he at the heart o f the differences between Islamic schools o f law. Other differences are methodological i n nature and revolve around the assessment o f tradition. The Hanafi school o f jurisprudence, for example, founded by the Iraqi jurist A b u Hanifa (699—767), tends to be somewhat distrustful o f the h a d i t h as a source o f law and gives greater weight to the analogical

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reasoning (ray or qiyas) o f jurists i n the f o r m a t i o n o f legal opinions. This stance has led to b o t h a greater flexibility i n decision m a k i n g and a potential for p o l i t i cal abuse. The M a l i k i school o f jurisprudence, f o u n d e d by the Medinan scholar Malik i b n Anas (ca. 715-795), is also somewhat critical o f the h a d i t h but still prefers to g r o u n d its decisions i n tradition. Malik chose to take the collective trad i t i o n o f the Prophet's city o f Medina as his m a i n source o f precedent, w h i l e later M a l i k i scholars saw this tradition continued i n the decisions made by Maliki jurists i n N o r t h Africa and M u s l i m Spain. A l t h o u g h i t was respected for its c o n sensual approach to tradition, the M a l i k i school o f law was often criticized for g o i n g its o w n way i n the M u s l i m West and i g n o r i n g a w i d e r consensus that may have f o r m e d i n other parts o f the M u s l i m w o r l d . The Shafii school o f l a w — f o u n d e d by the successors o f M u h a m m a d i b n Idris al-Shafii ( 7 6 7 - 8 2 0 ) , the first systematic legal theorist i n Islam—sought to balance reason and t r a d i t i o n by p r i o r i t i z i n g sources o f knowledge. For al-Shafii the p r i mary source o f legal decisions is the Q u r a n , f o l l o w e d by the Surma o f the Prophet, analogical reasoning, and b i n d i n g consensus. This m o d e l is n o w accepted by all schools o f jurisprudence i n Sunni Islam. The Hanbali school, founded by alShafii s student A h m a d i b n Hanbal ( 7 8 0 - 8 5 5 ) , also adheres to this m e t h o d , but it depends more o n tradition and uses analogical reasoning only as a last resort. The d o m i n a n t Shiite school o f jurisprudence, the Jafari, named after the sixth Shiite i m a m Jafar al-Sadiq (ca. 6 9 9 - 7 6 5 ) , adheres for the most part to the methodology associated w i t h the Hanbali school o f law, but i t includes traditions o f the twelve Shiite imams a m o n g its corpus o f hadith. Each o f these last three schools o f law can be criticized for reifying and idealizing t r a d i t i o n t o such a degree that the corpus o f hadith is not subjected to rational analysis or content criticism. Individual ahadith are accepted as true by these schools even i f only one transmitter links these traditions to either the Prophet or an i m a m and regardless o f whether they agree or disagree w i t h an apparent r u l i n g i n the Q u r a n .

From Shariah to Taqwa: Islam and Ethics The Islamic n o t i o n o f h u m a n responsibility is e p i t o m i z e d i n the Q u r a n by a covenant struck between G o d and h u m a n i t y before their placement o n earth. I n this Quranic covenant the archetypal (or " A d a m i c " ) h u m a n b e i n g — p r i d e f u l o f h u m a n superiority over all other creatures but u n m i n d f u l o f h u m a n l i m i t a t i o n s as a created being—assumes the responsibility o f the heavens and the earth and all that they c o n t a i n : " W e offered the trust o f the heavens, the earth, and the m o u n t a i n s [ t o the jinn and angels], but they refused t o undertake i t , being afraid [ o f the responsibility t h e r e o f ] ; but the h u m a n being undertook i t ; however, he was unjust and f o o l i s h " ( Q u r a n 33:72).

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The state o f m o r a l responsibility that is i m p l i e d i n this p r i m o r d i a l covenant is referred to i n the Quran as the vicegerency (khilafah) (Quran 2 : 3 0 - 3 3 ) . Those w h o u p h o l d the requirements o f the covenant are k n o w n as God's vicegerents (khulafa, sing, khalifah) o n earth. I n the Quran they are described as those w h o must "Fear Allah [ittaqu Allah] and speak the appropriate w o r d s , so that He may make y o u r conduct sound and forgive y o u r sins" (Quran 33:70—71). The society that is made u p o f such God-fearing people (muttaqin) constitutes a " m i d d l e n a t i o n " or "axial c o m m u n i t y " (ummah vvasat), whose collective responsibility is to bear witness to the t r u t h and act as an example for the rest o f h u m a n i t y (Quran 2:143). This c o m m u n i t y maintains itself i n a permanent state o f surrender to God (ummah muslimah) and is e x e m p l i f i e d historically by the p o l i t y f o u n d e d by the prophet M u h a m m a d and his companions in Medina between 622 and 632 C E . Evident i n the previous discussion o f the Sunna, the relationship between faith and practice i n Islam is e x e m p l i f i e d by the judgments, interpretations, and personal behavior o f the prophet M u h a m m a d . This example is canonized i n the Sunna and codified i n the shariah. Yet despite the o f t e n obsessive attention that is paid to the outer f o r m o f the Prophet's behavior by contemporary M u s l i m s , the inner state that influences this behavior is often overlooked. This subtle but crucial aspect o f the Sunna warrants further examination. This aspect is epitom i z e d i n w h a t the Prophet's w i f e Aishah once said w h e n s u m m i n g u p her husband's character. " H i s nature was the Quran [khuluquhu al-Quran]; he approved what it approved and he hated what it hated." In this famous h a d i t h the idea o f practice i n Islam intersects w i t h the concepts o f God-consciousness (taqwu) and ethics. A l l ethical systems, w h e t h e r religious or philosophical i n nature, must start by explaining what is meant by "the g o o d . " As w i t h so m u c h else i n Islam, the ultimate d e f i n i t i o n o f the g o o d is seen to reside i n the Q u r a n . A l t h o u g h the Q u r a n refers to the g o o d i n many ways, only a few Quranic terms, such as al-khayr (the g o o d ) and al-haqq (the t r u t h ) , deal w i t h w h a t m i g h t be called p h i l o s o p h i c a l principles. For the most part the Q u r a n does not so m u c h define the g o o d as illustrate it w i t h repeated examples o f v i r t u o u s behavior. This indicates that f r o m the Quranic perspective, ethics is m o r e a matter o f practice than o f philosophy. One o f the most i m p o r t a n t terms used t o describe the practice o f " g o o d " i n the Quran is maruf (virtue). This is expressed most significantly i n a Quranic verse that was previously alluded t o i n the discussion o n Islamic l a w : "Let there be a m o n g y o u a c o m m u n i t y that calls to the g o o d (al-khayr), c o m m a n d i n g virtue (yamuruna bi-l-maruf ) and f o r b i d d i n g vice (yanhawna an al-munkar); these are the ones w h o have attained f e l i c i t y " ( Q u r a n 3:104). I n Arabic, the m e a n i n g o f maruf is essentially social i n nature. It derives f r o m the root arafa (to k n o w ) and literally means "that w h i c h is k n o w n . " As an ethical t e r m , it signifies " k n o w n " or v i r t u -

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ous acts that are p e r f o r m e d i n the f u l l light o f day and thus d o not need to be h i d d e n away f r o m a neighbor's sight. This socially contextualized d e f i n i t i o n o f the g o o d comes q u i t e close to a practice that can be f o u n d i n Mexico and parts o f Central America, where the doors to village houses are left open so that n e i g h bors can see that n o t h i n g shameful is g o i n g o n inside. The antithesis o f maruf, the semantic d o m a i n o f secrecy and hypocrisy, is expressed by the Quranic t e r m munkar (vice). Literally meaning "that w h i c h is hated or despised," m u n k a r c o n notes those behaviors that w o u l d r u i n a person's reputation i f they were perf o r m e d i n the o p e n . A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t ethical t e r m i n Islam is salah (social v i r t u e ) . A l t h o u g h the w o r d itself does n o t appear i n the Q u r a n , there are n u m e r o u s references to this concept, as i n the verse that depicts m o r a l l y u p r i g h t M u s l i m s as r e s i d i n g " i n the c o m p a n y o f those w h o m A l l a h has favored: the prophets, the t r u t h f u l [siddiqm], the m a r t y r s , and the v i r t u o u s [salihin]" ( Q u r a n 4 : 6 9 ) . The p r a c t i t i o n e r o f salah is referred to i n the Q u r a n as a solih (fern, saliha) or a muslin, a m o r a l l y u p s t a n d i n g i n d i v i d u a l w h o w o r k s f o r the b e t t e r m e n t (islah) o f h i m s e l f and his f e l l o w M u s l i m s . By u p h o l d i n g the Sunna, he stands i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the fasid (the " r u i n e r " ) o r selfish i n d i v i d u a l i s t , w h o jeopardizes the m o r a l i n t e g r i t y o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y by u n d e r m i n i n g the standards o f v i r t u e that the salih seeks to establish. I n Islam this m o r a l d i s t i n c t i o n between socially conscious v i r t u e and asocial i n d i v i d u a l i s m replicates the d i c h o t o m y between f a i t h and u n b e l i e f that separates the social e n v i r o n m e n t o f Islam f r o m that o f n o n M u s l i m s . A l t h o u g h most M u s l i m s w o u l d hesitate to repudiate the faith o f a f e l l o w believer s i m p l y because he o r she has s i n n e d , the venal sinner or social deviant m i g h t w e l l be ostracized f r o m the c o m m u n i t y as a " r u i n e r . " The sinner w o u l d still theoretically retain the o p t i o n o f r e t u r n i n g to the f o l d , h o w ever, once he or she had stopped s i n n i n g and h a d sincerely resolved never t o sin again. M u c h o f the appeal o f contemporary reformist movements i n Islam is a result o f their advocacy o f social v i r t u e . Indeed, the Arabic t e r m for " r e f o r m i s t " (islahi) is related to the concept o f salah. T h r o u g h o u t the M u s l i m w o r l d reformist organizations, such as the M u h a m m a d i y a h o f Indonesia, devote a considerable percentage o f their budgets to social welfare projects, such as b u i l d i n g hospitals and medical centers and p r o v i d i n g various kinds o f family and social services. I n Egypt the Mustapha M a h m o u d Society, f o u n d e d by a reformist physician, p r o vides some o f the best medical care i n Cairo; the fee charged is based o n the patient's ability to pay. I n countries i n w h i c h state-supplied services are either lacking or inadequate, the honesty, selflessness, and dedication to the c o m m o n people displayed by such reformist activists count for m u c h m o r e than the theological or philosophical deficiencies that may exist i n their doctrines.

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Ethical terms such as maruf and salah recall the t h i r d d i m e n s i o n o f Islamic practice that was m e n t i o n e d earlier i n the discussion o f the H a d i t h o f Gabriel: the d o i n g o f g o o d or active v i r t u e (ihsan). A l t h o u g h this t e r m has been interpreted i n many different ways, i n the Q u r a n the concept o f active virtue is specifically linked to the concept o f justice (adl). This connection between v i r t u o u s and just forms o f action is clearly expressed i n one o f the most famous ethical verses o f the Q u r a n : "Verily Allah c o m m a n d s justice [adl], the d o i n g o f g o o d [ihsan], and g i v i n g to one's near relatives; He forbids acts o f wickedness, vice [munkar], and lust [bagha]" ( Q u r a n 16:90). I n a later verse o f the Q u r a n , the concept o f justice is expanded to include the n o t i o n o f epistemological t r u t h , This occurs i n a discussion o f the ends for w h i c h God created the universe: " N o t but for just ends [ilia bi-l-haqq] d i d Allah create the heavens and the earth and all that is between t h e m " ( Q u r a n 30:8). I n this verse al-haqq not only expresses the idea o f t r u t h i n an abstract sense, but i t also implies the n o t i o n o f collective and i n d i v i d u a l rights (huquq). as i n " h u m a n r i g h t s " (huquq al-insan) or even " d i v i n e r i g h t s " (huquq Allah). Therefore, w h e n the H a d i t h o f Gabriel defines active virtue as w o r s h i p i n g G o d "as i f y o u see H i m ; for i f y o u d o not see H i m , surely He sees y o u , " i t is clear that this involves m u c h m o r e than mere perfection i n the ritual observances o f Islam. In this statement the epistemological and behavioral c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y o f faith and practice coincides w i t h the m o r a l c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y o f t r u t h and justice. This is one o f the m a i n reasons w h y b o t h Sufis and politically active Islamic reformists have taken the t e r m ihsan to connote the highest degree o f Islamic practice. One Sufi social critic was so impressed by the c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y o f t r u t h and justice that he chose to conceptualize nearly all o f Islam a r o u n d it. This was A b u 1-Abbas al-Sabti ( d . 1204), the patron saint o f Marrakesh and the N o r t h African equivalent o f M o t h e r Theresa or St. Francis o f Assisi. I n a hagiographic w o r k that was w r i t t e n by one o f his disciples, al-Sabti discusses the social m e a n i n g o f ihsan and its importance to the spiritual life o f M u s l i m s : I found a verse in the Book of God that had a great effect on both my heart and my tongue. It was, "Verily, God commands justice and ihsan." I pondered this and said [to myself], "Perhaps [finding] this is no coincidence and I am the one w h o is meant by this verse." I continued to examine its meaning in the books of exegesis until I found [a work] which stated that [the verse] was revealed when the Prophet established brotherhood between the Emigrants and the Helpers [upon moving to Medina]. They had asked the Prophet to establish a pact of brotherhood between them, so he commanded them to share proportionately among themselves. In this way, they learned that the justice commanded [by God] was to be found through sharing . . . I understood that what [the Prophet] and his Companions adhered to were the practices of sharing in proportionate measure (mushatara) and selfless devotion to others [ithar]. So I vowed to God Most High that when anything

Islamic law was initially taught in mosques, but with time a new institution, known as a madiasa, or theological college, developed. This madrasa built in late fifteenth-century Cairo combined spaces for leaching with a small mosque where students and teachers could perform daily prayers.

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came to me, I would share it with my believing brethren among the poor. I followed this practice for twenty years, and this rule affected my ideas to the point where nothing dominated my thoughts more than [the concept of] absolute sincerity [sidq]. After reaching forty years of age, another idea occurred to me, so I returned to this verse and [again] meditated upon it, and discovered that justice was [indeed] in sharing but that ifasan went beyond that. I thought about it a third time and vowed to God that if anything, small or large, came to me, I would keep one-third o f it and expend two-thirds for the sake of God Most High. I followed this practice for twenty years, and the result of that decision among humankind was [both] respect and repudiation; I was respected by some but repudiated by others. After twenty [more] years, I meditated on the first requirement of the station of ihsan required by G o d Most H i g h for His servants, and found it to be gratitude for His bounty. This is proven by the emergence of the instinct toward good at birth, before the acquisition of either understanding or intellect. I then found that eight grades of behavior were required for charity and that seven other grades [were required] for ihsan in addition to [what was required for] justice. This is because there is a right for oneself, a right for the wife, a right for what is i n the womb, a right for the orphan, and a right for the guest [these rights are detailed in the S u n n a ] . . . . Once I arrived at [the station o f ihsan], I vowed to God that whatever came to me, whether it be little or m u c h , I would keep two-sevenths o f it for myself and my wife and [give up] five-sevenths to the one for w h o m it was due [i.e., the poor].

Toward the end o f his life, after al-Sabti had become a w i d e l y revered advocate for the poor and enjoyed the patronage o f the ruler o f Marrakesh, he refined his pracdee o f ihsan even further. I divide everything that comes to me into seven portions. I take one seventh for myself and the second seventh for that w h i c h I am required to spend on my wife and the small children under her care, as well as the slaves and slave girls [in our household], all of w h o m number thirty-two individuals. T h e n I look after those w h o have lost their sustenance; they are the neglected orphans w h o have neither mother nor father. I take them i n as my o w n family and see to it that not one of them lacks a [proper] marriage or a burial, unless someone else provides it for them. Then I look after my kinfolk, w h o number eighty-four individuals. They have two rights: their right as family members and their right as residents [in my household]. Then come those w h o have been deprived of their support as m e n tioned in the Book of G o d Most H i g h . They are the poor w h o have fallen into hardship on the Way of God—those w h o are unable to work the land

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and are thought o f as ignorant but w h o are rich i n patience and restraint; they are the ones unable to manage their own affairs . . . I take them i n as i f they are my own relatives, and when one of them dies, I replace h i m w i t h another. I carried out these obligations for fourteen years without respite. It is i m p o r t a n t to reproduce al-Sabti's comments i n detail because his discussion o f ihsan so clearly illustrates the interrelationship i n Islam between t r u t h and knowledge o n the one hand and justice and practice o n the other. A l t h o u g h manyother M u s l i m s , b o t h Sufi and n o n - S u f i , also discussed the Quranic notions o f t r u t h and knowledge and h o w they related to b o t h i n w a r d and o u t w a r d practices, f e w were as s i n g l e - m i n d e d as this Sufi o f Marrakesh i n f o l l o w i n g the relationship between knowledge and practice to its logical conclusion i n the d o m a i n o f social action. I n this regard, the trivialization by many Sufis o f the social aspect o f Islam comes as something o f a surprise, because Islamic law clearly recognizes that religious practice involves b o t h acts that are ritual i n nature (ibudat) and those that have a bearing o n social life (muamalat). For al-Sabti, r i t u a l acts c o u l d never be p e r f o r m e d correctly i f they were divorced f r o m their larger ethical and social

Prayers held to commemo-

contexts. Therefore, he set o u t to reestablish the connection between the r i t u a l

rate the end of Ramadan and

aspects o f the five Pillars o f Islam and their ethical implications. W h e n dealing w i t h the first pillar o f Islam, al-Sabti passes over the ritualized

the sacrifice made by hajj pilgrims are traditionally celebrated in an outdoor

aspect o f the Shahadah i n favor o f the m a i n p o i n t o f the declaration o f f a i t h —

praying place know- as a

the concept o f the oneness o f G o d (tawhid). As the witnessing o f the Shahadah is

musalla or idgaii. Like this

seen as the f o r m a l means o f entry i n t o Islam and the prerequisite for each o f the

twelfth-century example

f o u r other pillars, a f u l l understanding o f t a w h i d is seen by al-Sabti as the essential prerequisite for ihsan. For al-Sabti, t a w h i d as an ethical concept involves m o r e than anything else the r e l i n q u i s h i n g o f all sense o f personal o w n e r s h i p or pos-

from Bukhara, these were normally located on the outskirts of cities in order to hold all the men who were

session. This is because the a f f i r m a t i o n o f d i v i n e reality that is expressed i n the

old enough to engage in

declaration o f God's oneness implies the negation o f all f o r m s o f contingent exis-

prayer.

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tence. I f the goods o f the material w o r l d become the goals o f a person's life, they are functionally equivalent to idols. The material w o r l d thus becomes an object o f w o r s h i p whose mastery o f the h u m a n being increases i n direct p r o p o r t i o n to the i m p o r t a n c e i t is given. " E v e r y t h i n g that masters a person is his g o d , " says alSabti. For this reason to be a true muwahhid or affirmer o f God's oneness, the h u m a n b e i n g m u s t divest h i m s e l f o f e v e r y t h i n g but A l l a h — t h e One G o d , Absolute and U n i q u e . Al-Sabti gives a s i m i l a r l y ethical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the concept o f prayer. Like the Shahadah (the act o f bearing witness), the p e r f o r m a n c e o f al-Salat (the r e q u i r e d five prayers) is m o r e than a mere r i t u a l . It is also a s y m b o l i c act o f divestment i n w h i c h a w o r s h i p e r renounces before the Creator e v e r y t h i n g that he or she has vainly acquired and presumes t o o w n . " H e w h o does not u n d e r stand the [ e t h i c a l ] m e a n i n g o f prayer has not prayed." says al-Sabti.

"The

b e g i n n i n g o f prayer is the ' M a g n i f i c a t i o n o f Consecration,' w h i c h involves raising y o u r hands and saying, 'God is Most Great.' The m e a n i n g o f ' G o d is Most Great' is that y o u d o not begrudge G o d anything. W h e n the person c o n siders a certain aspect o f the material w o r l d t o be most i m p o r t a n t f o r h i m , he has n o t consecrated h i m s e l f and thus has not m a g n i f i e d G o d i n his prayers. The m e a n i n g o f raising one's hands to m a g n i f y G o d is that y o u have been e m p t i e d o f e v e r y t h i n g and are saying, ' I possess neither m u c h n o r a little.' " Such a person, w h o k n o w s w i t h certainty that the h u m a n being i n reality possesses n o t h i n g o f one's o w n , is the t r u e "slave o f G o d . " What is true for the canonical prayer is even m o r e true for the Ramadan fast: "The secret o f fasting is that y o u are h u n g r y , " says al-Sabti. " W h e n y o u are h u n gry y o u remember the one w h o is always h u n g r y and k n o w the strength o f the fire o f hunger that afflicts h i m , so that y o u become charitable t o w a r d h i m . Thus, i f y o u deny yourself f o o d but have n o compassion for the h u n g r y and y o u r fasti n g does n o t cause this idea to occur to y o u , y o u have not [ t r u l y ] fasted and have not understood the intended meaning o f the fast." The same is the case for the poor-tax (al-Zakah), a pillar o f Islam that is ethical by its very d e f i n i t i o n . Here, alSabti agrees w i t h the m a j o r i t y o f M u s l i m scholars, w h o h o l d that the poor-tax is made obligatory for M u s l i m s every year so that they become accustomed to spending o n others instead o f themselves. Also pertinent are al-Sabti's i n t e r p r e tations o f the p i l g r i m a g e to Mecca and w h a t Islamic activists o f t e n call the sixth pillar o f Islam: the concept o f struggle or j i h a d . For al-Sabti the p o i n t o f the hajj pilgrimage is not the c i r c u m a m b u l a t i o n o f the Kaaba. Instead, i t is that the p i l g r i m "appear i n the dress o f the poor, w i t h a shaved head, u n k e m p t , and wearing sandals, [after] having divested h i m s e l f o f fine c l o t h i n g , expending his efforts for the sake o f God Most H i g h , and s h o w i n g worshipfulness [ t o w a r d H i m ] . " As for the t e r m jihad, its real meaning is not h o l y war against the unbelievers, as

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M u s l i m exoterists believe, but rather, as al-Sabti says, "the expenditure o f oneself for the pleasure o f G o d Most H i g h , e m p t y i n g oneself o f everything f o r H i s sake, and divesting oneself o f reliance o n the material w o r l d . " Al-Sabti's interpretation o f the Five Pillars o f Islam t h r o u g h the conceptual lens o f ethics was meant to restore a sense o f balance t o w h a t scholar Charles Eaton has termed die " h u m a n paradox." A l t h o u g h the h u m a n being was created as the

In addition to upholding the Five Pillars of Islam, Muslims are exhorted to go beyond the miminum. For example, they should practice good deeds or active virtue (ihsan) to enrich their spiritual lives. In 1905 beggars gathered near the tomb of the great Persian poet Saadi in Shiraz in the expectation of receiving munificence from their brethren.

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vicegerent o f G o d o n earth, m o r e often than n o t she fails t o live u p t o the responsibilities o f the vicegerency because o f heedlessness o r vice: " A n d w h e n your L o r d said t o the angels, 'Verily I shall place o n the earth a vicegerent,' they said, ' W i l l Y o u place u p o n i t one w h o w i l l make m i s c h i e f therein and shed b l o o d w h i l e we praise You and g l o r i f y Y o u ? ' " ( Q u r a n 2:30). Al-Sabti r e m i n d e d his a u d i ence t h r o u g h his teachings that by i g n o r i n g the ethical d i m e n s i o n o f Islamic practice, the salvation o f b o t h society and the i n d i v i d u a l may be lost and its antithesis, social discord o r p e r d i t i o n , may be f o u n d . I n a d d i t i o n , t h r o u g h his selfless devotion to the poor, he shamed those w h o neglected their responsibility t o their fellow M u s l i m s and r e m i n d e d t h e m t h r o u g h his acts o f charity that the greatest losers by their w o r k s are "those whose effort is wasted o n the life o f the w o r l d , a l t h o u g h they believe that they are d o i n g g o o d " ( Q u r a n 18:104). For those w h o d i d not heed his w a r n i n g , al-Sabti reiterated the Quran's stern a d m o n i t i o n : "Those w h o desire the life o f the w o r l d and its glitter w i l l pay the price o f their deeds i n [this w o r l d ] w i t h o u t any alleviation" ( Q u r a n 11:15). One can therefore c o n c l u d e — f r o m the discourses o f the Q u r a n to the Sunna o f the Prophet, the laws o f the shariah, and the ethical teachings o f al-Sabti and other Islamic reformers—that the truest means to happiness is t o be f o u n d i n the proper balance between knowledge film) and practice (amal). This applies equally to acts that are purely religious i n nature and t o those that are essentially social. Faith, like speech, is b o t h social and i n d i v i d u a l . Acts o f faith always involve a dial o g u e — e i t h e r between the worshiper and the object o f her w o r s h i p , o r between the actor and his fellows i n a religious c o m m u n i t y . This is w h y , f o r b o t h the Sufi Abu-l-Abbas al-Sabti a n d the non-Sufi jurist i b n A b i Zayd al-Qayrawani, a faith that is n o t expressed i n the context o f structured social relationships is n o faith at all. According

t o the n o t e d

M u s l i m theologian

Abu Hamid

al-Ghazali

( i o c 8 - m i ) , m o r a l character (khuhiq) is n o t t o be f o u n d i n the knowledge o f good or evil o r even i n the capacity f o r g o o d o r evil; rather, i t is a state o f the h u m a n s p i r i t (nafs). Character thus precedes action for al-Ghazali and is a sort o f gestalt that enables m o r a l l y valued acts to occur immediately, w i t h o u t the need for reflection o r deliberation. This gestalt o f the soul reflects the vision o f the heart and is g o o d or bad t o the extent that the heart "sees" w i t h the Quranic "eye o f certainty." Herein

lies

the i m p o r t a n c e

o f Aishah's

statement

that

the p r o p h e t

M u h a m m a d ' s character "was the Q u r a n . " I f character refers t o an inner state or c o n d i t i o n o f the h u m a n being, then each person inclines t o w a r d g o o d o r evil t o the extent that his inner self has assimilated the m o r a l o u t l o o k o f the Quranic concept o f vicegerency. To say that a M u s l i m ' s character " i s the Q u r a n " is t o say

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that he is a complete vicegerent o f G o d : his intellect understands reality t h r o u g h the " k n o w l e d g e o f certainty," his eyes c o m p r e h e n d b o t h h i m s e l f and God's creation t h r o u g h the "eye o f certainty," and his spirit finds its center t h r o u g h the " t r u t h o f certainty." This assimilation o f the Quranic perspective is the practical essence o f the prophetic Sunna and the basis o f Islamic ethics. Because i t is rooted i n God's o w n " k n o w l e d g e f r o m the d i v i n e presence," it is the tree o f knowledge o u t o f w h i c h all ritual and ethical practices grow.

CHAPTER

THREE

Law and Society T H E I N T E R P L A Y OF R E V E L A T I O N AND R E A S O N I N T H E S H A R I A H

Mohammad Hashim Kamali

This chapter is d i v i d e d i n t o several sections, each addressing an aspect o f Islamic law that relates to the concerns o f M u s l i m society. The chapter begins w i t h an explanation o f the t w o terms, Shariah and fiqh, w h i c h are often used interchangeably b u t are not identical. A b r i e f explanation o f the differences between these terms sets f o r t h the context for the rest o f the chapter. The next section discusses the history and sources o f Islamic law. A review o f the distinctive c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f the leading schools o f law t o the development o f fiqh follows. Next is a general characterization o f the Shariah, b e g i n n i n g w i t h a discussion o f its religious and m o r a l dimensions, f o l l o w e d by explorations o f c o n t i n u i t y and change, the scope o f interpretation, and rational analysis (talil). The Shariah is also characterized as pragmatic, and the d o c t r i n e o f siyaso shariyya (Shariah-oriented p o l i c y ) is explained as an i n s t r u m e n t o f pragmatism i n Shariah. This is f o l l o w e d by a discussion o f the status o f the i n d i v i d u a l and the c o m m u n i t y i n Shariah. The chap-

(Left) The Imam al-Shafii (d. 8 2 0 ) founded one of the four major Sunni schools of law. His tomb in the southern cemetery of Cairo became a focus of venera-

ter ends w i t h a survey o f recent reforms i n M u s l i m countries that are seeking to

tion; a large mausoleum,

adapt Islamic law to the concerns o f m o d e r n society.

covered with a wooden

Shariah and Fiqh: The Duality of Islamic Law

dome, was erected over it in the early thirteenth century. The Shahi school of law is prevalent in Lower Egypt,

Islamic law originates i n t w o m a j o r sources: divine revelation (wahy) and h u m a n

southern Arabia, East Africa,

reason (aql). This dual identity o f Islamic law is reflected i n its t w o Arabic desig-

Indonesia, and Malaysia.

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nations, Shariah and fiqh. Shariah bears a stronger affinity w i t h revelation, whereas f i q h is mainly the p r o d u c t o f h u m a n reason. Shariah literally means "the r i g h t p a t h " or " g u i d e , " whereas fiqh refers to h u m a n understanding and knowledge. The d i v i n e Shariah thus indicates the path to righteousness; reason discovers the Shariah and relates its general directives to the quest for finding solutions to particular or unprecedented issues. Because the Shariah is m a i n l y contained i n divine revelation (that is, the Q u r a n and the teachings of the Prophet M u h a m m a d or the Sunna), i t is an integral part o f the d o g m a o f Islam. F i q h is a rational endeavor and largely a p r o d u c t o f speculative reasoning, w h i c h does not c o m m a n d the same a u t h o r i t y as Shariah. To say that the Shariah is contained i n the Q u r a n and Sunna, however, w o u l d exclude the scholastic legacy o f fiqh and its vast literature f r o m the Shariah. I n fact, i t is the clear i n j u n c t i o n s o f the Q u r a n and the Sunna that provide the nucleus o f the Shariah. The parts o f the Q u r a n that consist o f historical data and parables, for instance, are not included. The specific rules o f the Q u r a n and the Sunna—collectively k n o w n as the nusus, w h i c h are relatively small i n n u m b e r — The Shariah provides clear

represent the core o f the Shariah. Shariah is a w i d e r concept than fiqh, however;

rulings on ihe fundamentals

i t comprises the totality o f guidance that G o d has revealed to the Prophet

of faith and practice, includ-

M u h a m m a d relating to the d o g m a o f Islam: its m o r a l values and its practical legal

ing prayer, fasting, and other

rules. Shariah thus comprises i n its scope not only law but also theology and

devotional matters. At the Haydar Mosque in Kuliab, Tadjikistan, devout Muslims

m o r a l teaching. Dogmatic theology (ilm al-kalam) is p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h l i b erating the individual f r o m belief i n superstition and inculcating faith i n God and

prostrate themselves in

a sense o f enlightened c o n v i c t i o n i n the values o f Islam. M o r a l i t y (ilm al-akhlaq)

prayer towards the Kaaba in

educates the i n d i v i d u a l i n m o r a l v i r t u e , the exercise o f s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e a n d

Mecca.

restraint i n the f u l f i l l m e n t o f natural desires. Fiqh is concerned w i t h practical

legal rules thai relate to an individual's conduct. Fiqh is thus " p o s i t i v e " law, and

Other devotional matters

a l t h o u g h m u c h o f i t is i n c o m m o n w i t h the Shariah, i t does n o t i n c l u d e general

covered by the Shariah

guidelines o n m o r a h t y and dogma that are not legally enforceable. Yet jurists agree about the p r i m a c y o f m o r a l i t y and d o g m a i n the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f basic values. By c o m p a r i s o n , fiqh is described as a mere superstructure and a practical manifestation o f c o m m i t m e n t to those values. The Shariah provides clear r u l i n g s o n the fundamentals o f Islam: its basic m o r a l values and practical duties, such as prayers, fasting, legal alms (zakah), the hajj ( p i l g r i m a g e to Mecca), and other devotional matters. Its i n j u n c t i o n s o n w h a t is l a w f u l and u n l a w f u l (haloi and haram) are o n the w h o l e definitive, and so are its rulings o n some aspects o f civil transactions (muamalut). But the Shariah is generally flexible w i t h regard to most c i v i l transactions, such as c r i m i n a l law ( w i t h the exception o f the prescribed punishments or hudud), government policy and c o n s t i t u t i o n , fiscal policy, taxation, and economic and international affairs. I n many o f these areas the Shariah provides o n l y general guidelines. Fiqh is defined as the k n o w l e d g e o f the practical rules o f the Shariah, w h i c h are derived f r o m the Q u r a n and the Sunna. The rules o f fiqh are thus concerned w i t h the manifest aspects o f individual conduct. The practicalities o f conduct are evaluated on a scale o f five values: obligatory, r e c o m m e n d e d , permissible, reprehensible, and f o r b i d d e n . The d e f i n i t i o n o f fiqh also implies that the d e d u c t i o n o f the rules o f fiqh f r o m the Q u r a n and the Sunna is t h r o u g h direct contact w i t h the source evidence and necessarily involves a certain measure o f independent

include burial. Outside a small mosque at Marbat, Oman, the graves of pious Muslims are aligned so that the deceased can rise and face Mecca on the Day of Final Judgment.

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reasoning and intellectual exertion (ijtihad). The ability to use the Q u r a n therefore necessitates the knowledge o f Arabic and a certain degree o f insight and e r u dition

that

an

" i m i t a t o r , " or

one

who

memorizes

the

rules

without

understanding their implications, c o u l d not achieve. A jurist (faqih) w h o fulfills these requirements and has the ability to deduce the rules o f the Shariah f r o m their sources is a mujtahid, one qualified to exercise independent reasoning. The rules o f fiqh may be divided i n t o t w o types. First, there are rules that are conveyed i n a clear text, such as the essentials o f w o r s h i p , the validity o f marriage outside the p r o h i b i t e d degrees o f relationship, the rules o f inheritance, and so f o r t h . These are self-evident and therefore independent o f interpretation. This part o f fiqh is simultaneously a part o f the Shariah. Second, there are rules that are f o r m u l a t e d t h r o u g h the exercise o f independent reasoning i n that part o f the Quran and the Sunna that is not self-evident. Because o f the possibility o f error, the rules that are so derived are not i m m u t a b l e . They are not necessarily an integral part o f the permanent Shariah, and the m u j t a h i d w h o has reason to depart f r o m t h e m i n favor o f an alternative r u l i n g may d o so w i t h o u t c o m m i t t i n g a transgression. O n l y w h e n juristic o p i n i o n and independent reasoning are supported by general consensus (ijma) does that reasoning acquire the b i n d i n g force o f a r u l i n g (hukm) o f Shariah. The schools o f law vary i n their treatment o f the contents o f fiqh. Broadly speaking, the body o f law is d i v i d e d i n t o t w o m a i n categories: devotional matters (ibaddt) and c i v i l transactions (muamdaf). The devotional matters are usually studied under the six m a i n headings o f cleanliness, ritual prayer, fasting, the hajj, legal alms, and jihad (holy struggle); the schools o f law d o n o t vary m u c h i n their treatment o f these subjects. Juristic differences a m o n g the schools occur m a i n l y i n the area o f the c i v i l transactions, w h i c h are generally studied under the five headings o f transactions i n v o k i n g exchange o f values, equity and trust, m a t r i m o n i a l law, c i v i l l i t i g a t i o n , and administration o f estates. Crimes and penalties are often studied under a separate heading (uqubat) next to these t w o m a i n categories. The most detailed exposition o f the entire range o f fiqh remains the t h i r t y - v o l u m e Kitab al-Mabsut by Shams a l - D i n al-Sarakhsi ( d . 1083).

The History of Islamic Law Islamic legal history is i n a sense the history o f fiqh rather than o f the Shariah. The Shariah had a short history, as its development began and ended i n just over t w o decades d u r i n g the Prophet's mission i n Mecca and Medina. Only the r u d i ments o f fiqh were laid d o w n d u r i n g this p e r i o d , and there was no d i s t i n c t i o n between the legal subject matter o f Islam and its other parts at this early stage. Fiqh i n this p e r i o d referred to the knowledge o f r e l i g i o n i n general; the distinc-

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A N D SOCIETY

I I I

t i o n that confined fiqh to practical legal rules was made by the ultima (religious scholars) o f later periods. This was to a large extent stimulated by the d o c u m e n tation o f hadith (a verified account o f a statement

or

action

of

the

Prophet

M u h a m m a d ) and the extensive materials that were consequently made available for fresh i n q u i r y a n d research. Legal h i s t o r i ans have distinguished six periods i n the development

of

fiqh.

In

the

initial

phase—the prophetic p e r i o d (ca. 610-32 C . E . ) — t h e Q u r a n was revealed a n d the Prophet

explained

and

reinforced it

t h r o u g h his o w n teaching and practice, the Sunna. There was a general preoccupation w i t h the Q u r a n and the emphasis was not as m u c h on law as o n the d o g m a and m o r a l i t y o f Islam. The legal r u l i n g s of

the

Quran,

which

were

mainly

revealed d u r i n g the second decade o f the prophetic m i s s i o n , were p r i m a r i l y issueoriented and practical. There was n o need f o r speculative legal reasoning (ijtihdd) s i m p l y because the Prophet h i m s e l f p r o -

Devotional matters (ibadat), including cleanliness and ritual

v i d e d definitive r u l i n g s o n issues as and

prayer, are treated much the same by all schools oflaw. For

w h e n they arose.

example, everyone must remove shoes before prayer. Here,

The second period o f the development o f fiqh—die

era o f the Prophet's Companions

a group of Muslim men put their shoes back on outside a London mosque as they return to their daily lives.

(ca. 632-61)—is one o f interpretation and supplementation o f the textual subject matter o f the Shariah. In this period fiqh and i j t i h a d find their historical o r i g i n s . The Companions o f the Prophet took a r a t i o nal approach t o w a r d the textual materials—the Q u r a n and the Sunna. Their understanding and interpretation o f the texts were n o t confined to the m e a n i n g o f w o r d s ; rather, the Companions sought to understand their u n d e r l y i n g r a t i o nale, effective cause, and purpose. The C o m p a n i o n s ' interpretations are generally considered authoritative, n o t only because they were the direct recipients o f prophetic teachings but also because o f their participation a n d insight i n t o the Quran's p h e n o m e n o l o g y (usbab al-nuzul). The Companions frequently resorted to personal reasoning and consultation i n the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f issues. The first f o u r

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c a l i p h s — A b u Bakr, U m a r i b n al-Khattab, U t h m a n i b n Affan, and Ah" i b n AbiTalib, collectively k n o w n as the " r i g h t l y g u i d e d caliphs"—are particularly noted for their interpretations. The t h i r d phase i n the development o f fiqh, k n o w n as the era o f the successors, began w i t h the Umayyads c o m i n g to power a r o u n d 661 and ended w i t h that dynasty's demise i n 750. Because of the territorial expansion o f the Umayyad state, n e w issues arose that stimulated significant developments i n fiqh. This p e r i o d is marked by the emergence o f t w o schools o f legal t h o u g h t that left a lasting impact o n the subsequent development o f fiqh: Traditionists ( A h l alH a d i t h ) , w h o were centered m a i n l y i n Mecca and Medina i n the Hejaz, and the Rationalists ( A h l al-Ray), w h o were active i n the Iraqi cities o f Kufa and Basra. Whereas the Traditionists relied m a i n l y o n textual a u t h o r i t y and were averse to the use o f personal o p i n i o n (ray), the Rationalists were i n c l i n e d , i n the absence o f a clear text, t o w a r d a m o r e liberal use o f personal reasoning. A l t h o u g h the Traditionists opposed the approach, the Rationalists maintained that the rules o f the Shariah, outside the sphere o f devotional matters, pursued objectives and were f o u n d e d i n causes that p r o v i d e d the jurist and mujiahid w i t h guidelines for f u r t h e r i n q u i r y and research. The secession o f the Shiites f r o m the m a i n body o f M u s l i m s , the Sunnis, w h i c h took place as a result o f disagreement over political All schools require ritual

leadership, led to the emergence o f the Shiite school o f law d u r i n g this p e r i o d .

ablution (wufhi) before

The Shiites maintained that A l i , the cousin and s o n - i n - l a w o f the Prophet, was

prayer, and the Muslim must

the r i g h t f u l caliph and leader, but that his predecessors, A b u Bakr, Umar, and

wash the face, hands and arms, head, and feet. Most congregational mosques provide water for washing.

U t h m a n , denied Ali that r i g h t . The Shii school advocated doctrines that are significant!) different f r o m those o f their Sunni counterparts. The next t w o centuries (ca. 750-950), k n o w n as the era o f independent rea-

Here men are washing

soning, marked the f o u r t h phase i n the history o f f i q h . This phase saw major

before entering the mosque.

developments that were later manifested i n the emergence o f the legal schools

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Civil transactions (muamalot), including matrimonial law and civil litigation, vary significantly according to the different schools of law.This scene shows the bride carried to the groom's car in a traditional doli as she begins her married life with his family in Kashmir.

that have survived today: the Hanafi, M a l i k i , Shafii, and H a n b a l i . The Hanafi school, named after A b u Hanifah a l - N u m a n i b n Thabit ( 6 9 9 - 7 6 7 ) , presently has the largest f o l l o w i n g o f all the s u r v i v i n g schools, i n part because o f its official a d o p t i o n by the O t t o m a n Turks i n the early sixteenth century. A b u Hanifah advocated legal reasoning by analogy (qiyas), w h i c h gained general acceptance over t i m e , but his liberal recourse to personal o p i n i o n and juristic preference (istihson) were criticized by the Traditionists. To this day the Hanafi school has retained its relatively liberal stance. The M a l i k i school, f o u n d e d by M a l i k i b n Anas alAsbahi (ca. 7 1 C - 9 C ) , led the Traditionist m o v e m e n t i n Mecca and Medina and advocated the n o t i o n that the M e d i n a n consensus (ijmo) was the o n l y valid c o n sensus. Despite its traditionalist leanings, however, the M a l i k i school over t i m e has embraced a n u m b e r o f i m p o r t a n t doctrines that are inherently versatile, and its jurisprudence is i n many ways m o r e o p e n than that o f the other legal schools. It is the only school, for instance, that has accepted almost all the subsidiary sources and proofs o f the Shariah, about w h i c h the other schools have remained selective (accepting some and rejecting or expressing reservations about others). The M a l i k i school is p r e d o m i n a n t today i n M o r o c c o , Algeria, Tunisia, n o r t h e r n

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Egypt, Sudan, Bahrain, and Kuwait; the Hanafi school prevails i n Turkey, Pakistan, Jordan, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. M u h a m m a d i b n Idris al-Shafh ( 7 6 7 - 8 2 0 ) is also a leading f i g u r e i n the Traditionist camp, b u t he tried to reconcile the various trends and strike a m i d dle course between the Traditionists a n d Rationalists. The controversy between the Traditionists and Rationalists h a d by al-Shafii's time accentuated the need for methodology. Al-Shafh saw the need to articulate the broad o u t l i n e o f the legal theory o f the sources, the usul al-fiqh. He spent the last five years o f his life i n During the era of independent reasoning (ijlihad), four major schools of Islamic law developed—the Hanifi,

Egypt, where he f o u n d the customs o f Egyptian society so different f r o m those o f Iraq that he changed many o f his legal verdicts. The Shafu school is n o w prevalent i n s o u t h e r n Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, East A f r i c a , Indonesia, and Malaysia, and i t has many followers i n Palestine, Jordan, and Syria. Even al-

Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali.

Shafii's degree o f emphasis o n t r a d i t i o n and his strong advocacy o f the Sunna d i d

Most madrases, or theological

n o t satisfy the u n c o m p r o m i s i n g Traditionists, w h o preferred n o t to rely o n

colleges, are devoted to a

h u m a n reason and chose instead to base their doctrines as m u c h as possible o n

single school, but occasionall)' all four were included in a single building. The huge

the precedents established i n the Quran and the hadith. This was the avowed p u r pose o f the t w o n e w schools that emerged i n the n i n t h century. The first (and

funerary complex founded

the o n l y successful) o f these was the Hanbali school, founded by .Ahmad i b n

by the Mamluk Sultan Hasan

Hanbal (780-855-). The other was the Z a h i r i school o f D a w u d i b n A l i al-Zahiri

in the mid-fourteenth cen-

(819-91), n o w extinct. The n u m b e r o f i b n Hanbal's followers declined u n t i l the

tury in Cairo, seen in David Roberts' nineteenth-century lithograph, has a cruciform congregational mosque with a madrasa for each of the

eighteenth-century Wahhabi puritanical m o v e m e n t (named after the scholar M u h a m m a d i b n A b d al-Wahhab) i n the Arabian Peninsula gave i t a fresh i m p e tus. The Hanbali school is n o w p r e d o m i n a n t i n Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and O m a n . The fifth phase i n the formative history o f f i q h began around 950. This p e r i o d

four schools in the corners

is characterized by the institutionalization o f the d o m i n a n t schools, w i t h empha-

of the courtyard.

sis n o t o n n e w developments but o n f o l l o w i n g precedent (taqlid). The jurists

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occupied themselves w i t h elaboration and commentaries o n the w o r k s o f their predecessors. By far the longest phase, this p e r i o d lasted for about n i n e centuries and witnessed the d o w n f a l l o f the Abbasid and O t t o m a n Empires, the expansion i n the m i l i t a r y and political powers o f the West, and the industrial r e v o l u t i o n and colonial d o m i n a t i o n o f M u s l i m lands by European powers. The colonial powers propagated their o w n doctrines and legal codes i n almost every area o f the law. As a result, f i q h lost t o u c h w i t h social reality and u n d e r w e n t a sustained p e r i o d o f stagnation. O r i g i n a l t h i n k i n g and direct recourse to the sources o f the Shariah, w h i c h had characterized the first three centuries o f development, were n o longer encouraged. A climate o f o p i n i o n prevailed that the early predecessors had exhaustively used and developed the resources (the Q u r a n and the Sunna), and the digested version o f fiqh that they had p r o d u c e d was to be strictly f o l l o w e d . I m i t a t i o n and f o l l o w i n g precedent thus gained g r o u n d , and the so-called " c l o sure o f the gate o f i j t i h a d " f o l l o w e d .

Madrasas were initially established by Sunnis to combat the spread of Shiism, but with time, Shiites established madrasas of their own. The Madar-i Shah Madrasa in Isfahan, seen in this early photograph by Captain G. C. Rigby, was built by the Safavid Shah Husayn ( 1 6 9 4 - 1 7 2 2 ) . Since the Islamic Revolution, it has been returned to its original function as a theological college.

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The s i x t h and final phase i n the development o f fiqh began at the t u r n o f the t w e n t i e t h century. It is m a r k e d by less emphasis o n precedent and greater emphasis o n o r i g i n a l t h i n k i n g and the quest to make the Shariah once again relevant to the social reality and experience o f c o n t e m p o r a r y M u s l i m s . The revivification o f fiqh and its necessary adjustment to respond to the prevailing needs o f society is generally seen as an i m p o r t a n t c o m p o n e n t o f the Islamic resurgence o f the recent decades. A large number o f Sunni jurists have acknowledged the so-called "closure o f the gate o f i j d h a d " and die onset o f imitation around the m i d - t e n t h century'. The Sliiite jurists have held, alternatively, diat ijtihad is a collective obligation o f all Muslims in the absence o f the i m a m (the divinely appointed leader and successor o f M u h a m m a d ) . Independent reasoriing is thus viewed not simply as a meritorious endeavor that m i g h t succeed or fail but as an effort to reach the highest possible degree o f objective truth in the absence o f the infallible i m a m . This effort must constantly be renewed i n the hope o f c o m i n g ever closer to objective truth. Intellectual exertion thus remains an open process u n t i l the return o f the i m a m , w h o alone can offer certainty and truth. Furthermore, the Sliiite imams have gone o n record to instruct their disciples to remain dihgent i n ijtihad, especially regarding the i m p l e mentation o f the general principles o f Shariah. I n time, Shiite jurisprudence adopted the n o t i o n that a fully qualified mujtohid (one qualified to exercise independent reasoning) is a representative (naib) o f the i m a m and performs the functions o f the i m a m

Before the establishment of madrasas, mosques were the traditional setting for leaching and learning, and much instruction still takes place in mosques.Traditionally, the teacher sits against a column or wall surrounded by his students, as here at the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.

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The mosque of al-Azhar in Cairo, founded under the Fatimids in the tenth century, became a major center of learning in the Arab world. The curriculum there was reformed at the turn of the twentieth century, the time depicted in this photograph, and legal opinions issued by the shaykh there exemplify one type of independent reasoning (ijtihad).

regarding judgment and administration o f the people's affairs. The leading Shiite m u j tahids w h o expounded Shiite principles included Seyyed Morteza Alam al-Huda (d. 1060), Abu A b d Allah a l - M u f i d (d. 1044), M u h a m m a d ibn Hassan al-Tusi ( d . 1067), and Morteza al-Ansari (d. 1864). Morteza al-Ansari's t w o major words, Fdraid al-Usul and Makasib, are currendy used as textbooks o n Shiite law. I n m o d e r n times legal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o r reasoning has o c c u r r e d i n the f o l l o w i n g three ways: statutory legislation, j u d i c i a l decision and learned o p i n i o n (fatwa), a n d scholarly w r i t i n g s . Instances o f legislative i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , w h i c h N o e l Coulson referred t o as " n e o - i j t i h a d , " can be f o u n d i n the m o d e r n r e f o r m s o f f a m i l y law i n m a n y M u s l i m c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h reference t o p o l y g yny a n d d i v o r c e , b o t h o f w h i c h have been made c o n t i n g e n t u p o n a c o u r t order, a n d therefore are n o l o n g e r the unilateral p r i v i l e g e o f the husband. C u r r e n t r e f o r m i s t legislation o n these subjects derives some support f r o m the jurists' doctrines o f the M a l i k i and Hanafi schools, but these r e f o r m s are essentially based o n novel i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the Quran's relevant p o r t i o n s . N u m e r o u s instances o f i n d e p e n d e n t reasoning are also f o u n d i n the views o f the u l a m a , such as the collections o f p u b l i s h e d o p i n i o n s o f M u h a m m a d Rashid Rida i n the 1920s and those o f the late shaykh o f Azhar, M a h m u d Shaltut, i n the 1950s. I n

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the 1967 case o f Khursid Bibi vs. Muhammad Amin, the supreme c o u r t o f Pakistan's decision to validate a f o r m o f divorce, k n o w n as khula, that can take place at the wife's initiative, even w i t h o u t the consent o f the husband, can be cited as an example o f j u d i c i a l i j t i h a d . A n o t h e r example o f o n g o i n g r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is the scholarly c o n t r i b u t i o n o f the Egyptian scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi, w h o validated air travel by w o m e n unaccompanied by male relatives. A c c o r d i n g t o the rules o f f i q h that were f o r m u l a t e d i n p r e m o d e r n times, w o m e n were n o t perm i t t e d to travel alone. A l - Q a r a d a w i based his c o n c l u s i o n o n the analysis that the i n i t i a l r u l i n g was i n t e n d e d to ensure w o m e n ' s physical and m o r a l safety, and that m o d e r n air travel f u l f i l l s this r e q u i r e m e n t . He f u r t h e r s u p p o r t e d this v i e w w i t h an analysis o f the relevant hadiths o n the subject and arrived at a r u l i n g better suited to c o n t e m p o r a r y c o n d i t i o n s .

Sources of Shariah: The Quran, the Sunna, and Independent Reasoning As noted earlier, the sources o f the Shariah are o f t w o types: revealed and n o n revealed. There are o n l y t w o revealed sources—first, the Q u r a n ; second, the teaching and exemplary conduct (Sunna) o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d , i n c l u d i n g his sayings, acts, and tacit approval (or lack o f condemnation) o f the conduct o f his Companions and some o f the customs o f Arabian society. The a u t h o r i t y o f the Sunna as a source o f Shariah as next to the Q u r a n is indicated i n the Q u r a n itself. Some disagreement, however, prevailed over the precise meaning and a u t h o r i t y o f the Sunna u n t i l the theologian and jurist al-Shafii addressed the issue i n the early n i n t h century. The legal theory that al-Shafii articulated underscored the normative status o f the Sunna as a source o f revelation that explained a n d supplemented the Q u r a n . The nonrevealed sources o f Shariah are generally f o u n d e d i n juristic reasoning (ijtihad). This reasoning may take a variety o f f o r m s , i n c l u d ing analogical reasoning (qjyas), juristic preference (istihsan), considerations o f public interest (istislah), and even general consensus (ijma) o f the learned, w h i c h basically originates i n i j t i h a d and provides a procedure by w h i c h a r u l i n g o f juristic reasoning can acquire the b i n d i n g force o f law. Analogy and consensus have been generally recognized by the vast m a j o r i t y o f ulama, but there is disagreement over the validity and scope o f many o f the rational proofs that o r i g i nate i n ijtihad. The Quran, by its o w n testimony, consists o f the w o r d s o f God as recited i n Arabic to the Prophet M u h a m m a d t h r o u g h the angel Gabriel (Quran 26:193). M u c h o f the Q u r a n was revealed t h r o u g h actual events encountered by the Prophet, and questions asked and answered by h i m . The Prophet also used the Q u r a n as a basis o f his o w n teaching and adjudication. Nevertheless, the Q u r a n

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The Quran, God's word as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, is the basis of Muslim law. The text is divided into 114 chapters of unequal length. Eighty-five chapters, mostly short, were revealed in Mecca, as shown by the word Mecca written in gold in the margin near the gold chapter heading in this copy of the Quran transcribed by the famous calligrapher Ibn al-Bawwab at Baghdad in 1000-1001.

is neither a legal n o r a constitutional d o c u m e n t , a l t h o u g h legal materials occupy a small p o r t i o n o f its text; less than 3 percent o f the text deals w i t h legal matters. The legal contents o f the Q u r a n were m a i n l y revealed f o l l o w i n g the Prophet's m i g r a t i o n f r o m Mecca to M e d i n a , w h e r e he established a government and the need therefore arose for legislation o n social and governmental issues. The c o n tents o f the Q u r a n are n o t classified according to subject. Its pronouncements o n various topics appear i n unexpected places and i n n o particular thematic order. This fact has led many thinkers to conclude that the Q u r a n is an indivisible

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w h o l e , and its legal parts should n o t be read i n isolation f r o m its religious and m o r a l teachings. O f the i£0

legal verses i n the Q u r a n , k n o w n as ayat al-ahkam, close t o

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relate to d o g m a and d e v o t i o n a l matters, i n c l u d i n g such practical r e l i g i o u s duties as r i t u a l prayer, legal alms and other charities, fasting, p i l g r i m a g e , and so f o r t h . A n o t h e r seventy verses are devoted to marriage, d i v o r c e , paternity, c h i l d custody, i n h e r i t a n c e , and bequests. Rules c o n c e r n i n g c o m m e r c i a l transactions, such as sale, lease, loan, usury, and mortgage, constitute the subject o f another seventy verses. There are about t h i r t y verses o n crimes and penalties, another t h i r t y o n justice, equality, evidence, citizens' r i g h t s and duties, and c o n s u l t a t i o n i n g o v e r n m e n t affairs, and above ten o n e c o n o m i c matters. The ulama are n o t , however, i n agreement o n these figures, as calculations o f this nature tend to d i f f e r according t o the criteria and approach o f one's i n q u i r y . It is possible, f o r instance, to derive a legal r u l i n g f r o m the parables and historical passages o f the Q u r a n . Some o f the earlier r u l i n g s o f the Q u r a n were also abrogated and replaced because o f n e w circumstances, a l t h o u g h the scope o f these abrogations and their precise i m p o r t is a matter o f disagreement a m o n g scholars. As p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d , the u l a m a u n a n i m o u s l y believe that the n o r m a t i v e teachings (the Sunna) o f the Prophet are a source o f Shariah and that the Prophet's r u l i n g o n w h a t is l a w f u l and u n l a w f u l (halal iva haram) stands o n equal f o o t i n g w i t h the Q u r a n . The w o r d s o f the P r o p h e t , as the Q u r a n declares, are d i v i n e l y i n s p i r e d ( Q u r a n 53:3), and obedience to t h e m is every M u s l i m ' s d u t y ( Q u r a n 4 : 8 0 ; S9-7)-

Thus the Prophet's w o r d s were n o r m a t i v e

f o r those w h o actually heard t h e m . Subsequent generations o f M u s l i m s , w h o have received the Prophet's w o r d s t h r o u g h various verbal and w r i t t e n records, however, had t o ascertain t h e i r a u t h e n t i c i t y before accepting t h e m as n o r m a tive. The evidence o f a u t h e n t i c i t y may be d e f i n i t i v e , because it relies o n n u m e r o u s sources o f recurrent and c o n t i n u o u s t e s t i m o n y (tawatur), o r it m a y consist o f solitary reports that may n o t appear to be entirely reliable. One o f the first k i n d o f h a d i t h ( k n o w n as mutawatir) is a verbal m u t a w a t i r , a w o r d - f o r w o r d transmission o f w h a t the Prophet said. This is v e r y rare. There are n o m o r e t h a n ten such hadiths. A n o t h e r k i n d o f h a d i t h is k n o w n as the conceptual mutawatir, w h e r e i n the concept is taken f r o m the Prophet but the w o r d s are s u p p l i e d by a narrator. W h e n the reports o f a large n u m b e r o f transmitters o f h a d i t h c o n c u r i n their p u r p o r t b u t d i f f e r i n w o r d i n g , this is considered

as

m u t a w a t i r . This k i n d o f m u t a w a t i r is q u i t e frequent and is f o u n d i n reference t o the acts and sayings o f the Prophet that e x p l a i n the essentials o f the f a i t h , the rituals o f w o r s h i p , the rules that regulate the a p p l i c a t i o n o f certain p u n ishments, and so f o r t h . The C o m p a n i o n s o f the Prophet and subsequent gen-

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erations o f M u s l i m s have c o m p l i e d w i t h the Prophet's teachings o n these matters, and vast n u m b e r s o f people t h r o u g h o u t the ages have consistently adhered to t h e m . M a n y hadiths o n w h a t is l a w f u l a n d u n l a w f u l , as w e l l as those that e x p l a i n and s u p p l e m e n t the i n j u n c t i o n s o f the Q u r a n , are also classified as this type o f mutawatir. The Sunna relates to the Quran i n various capacities. It may consist o f rules that merely corroborate the Q u r a n , it may clarify ambiguous parts o f the Q u r a n , or i t may qualify and specify general r u l i n g s o f the Q u r a n . These three varieties comprise a m o n g t h e m the bulk o f the Sunna, and the ulama are i n agreement that they are integral and supplementary to the Q u r a n . The Sunna may also consist o f r u l i n g s o n w h i c h the Quran is silent, i n w h i c h case the Sunna represents an independent source o f Shariah. There are a n u m b e r o f hadiths that fall under this category; this type o f Sunna, k n o w n as " F o u n d i n g Sunna" (Sunna muassisa), is the m a i n argument i n support o f the generally accepted v i e w that the Sunna is not o n l y an explanation and supplement to the Q u r a n , but it is also an independent source o f the Shariah. For the Sunnis, the possibility o f d i v i n e revelation (vvahy) ended w i t h the death o f the Prophet. For the Shiites, however, d i v i n e revelation c o n t i n u e d to be transmitted after the Prophet's death, t h r o u g h the line o f their recognized leaders or imams. Shiite jurists have thus maintained that i n a d d i t i o n to the Q u r a n and the Sunna, the pronouncements o f their imams constituted d i v i n e revelat i o n and therefore b i n d i n g law. This is reflected i n the Shiite d e f i n i t i o n o f Sunna, w h i c h under Shiite law includes the sayings, acts, and tacit approvals o f the Prophet and the imams. The same d o c t r i n a l o u t l o o k is reflected i n the Shiite perception o f ijma (consensus), w h i c h is n o t possible w i t h o u t the imam's approval. I n other w o r d s , the consensus o f the jurists demonstrates the views o f the imams. Consensus thus becomes a part o f the Sunna as w e l l as a means o f discovering i t . I n some cases, this means that consensus becomes a carrier o f the decrees o f the i m a m . These are u n d o u b t e d l y i m p o r t a n t d o c t r i n a l differences, yet since the last i m a m (according to the m a j o r i t y o f Shiites) w e n t i n t o occultation and "disappeared" i n 874, Shiite jurists have carried the imam's mantle and have played a similar role to that o f their Sunni counterparts i n e x p o u n d i n g and interp r e t i n g the Q u r a n and the Sunna. Another source o f Shariah is ijtihad, w h i c h literally means " s t r i v i n g . " It is defined as exertion by a qualified scholar to the best o f his or her ability to deduce the r u l i n g o f a particular issue f r o m the evidence f o u n d i n the sources. U n l i k e the revelation o f the Q u r a n and the Sunna, w h i c h ended w i t h the Prophet's death, juristic reasoning continues to be the principal source and instrument that keeps the law consistent w i t h the realities o f social change. I t is a collective obligation (fard kifai) o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y , meaning that the obligation has been met i f

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performed sufficiently by at least one jurist (mujtahid) qualified to exercise i n d e pendent reasoning. It becomes a personal o b l i g a t i o n (ford ayn) o f all mujtahids w h e n it appears that the obligation has not been met and there is fear that justice may be lost i f ijtihad is not immediately attempted. Historically, analogical reasoning (qiyas) represented the most c o m m o n — according to the theologian al-Shafh, the o n l y v a l i d — f o r m o f ijtihad. As a p r i n cipal m o d e o f i j t i h a d , analogy ensured the c o n f o r m i t y o f juristic o p i n i o n w i t h the textual rulings o f the Q u r a n and the Sunna, w h i c h i t sought to extend to s i m ilar cases. Personal reasoning plays a role i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f analogy t h r o u g h the identification o f an effective cause (illah) beween an o r i g i n a l case and a n e w case. For example, the Q u r a n ( 2 4 : 4 ) calls for penalizing anyone w h o slanderously accused chaste w o m e n o f adultery by eighty lashes o f the w h i p . This p u n ishment was then analogically extended to those w h o accused innocent m e n o f the same offense because o f the c o m m o n a l i t y o f the effective cause—namely o f d e f e n d i n g the h o n o r o f an i n n o c e n t p e r s o n — b e t w e e n

the o r i g i n a l case

( w o m e n ) and the new case ( m e n ) . A n a l o g y was thus seen t o be the surest w a y o f developing the law w i t h i n the guidelines o f the text. But analogy was not altogether devoid o f difficulty, especially i n cases i n w h i c h the analogical extension o f a given r u l i n g to a similar but n o t identical situation c o u l d lead to undesirable results. Therefore, some felt the need for a n e w f o r m u l a to overcome the r i g i d i t i e s o f analogy. The Hanafis developed the d o c t r i n e o f juristic preference (istihsan), w h i c h enabled the jurist t o search for an equitable s o l u t i o n i n the event i n w h i c h strict analogy c o m p r o m i s e d the ideals o f fairness and justice. Al-Shafii, w h i l e strongly i n support o f analogy, totally rejected the n o t i o n o f juristic preference, c o n s i d e r i n g i t to be n o m o r e than an arbitrary exercise i n questionable o p i n i o n s . Shiite law does not recognize analogy as a source o f law. The s i x t h Shiite i m a m , Jafar al-Sadiq ( 6 9 9 - 7 6 5 ) , equated such analogical reasoning w i t h pure conjecture and thus rejected i t . Shiite law recognizes h u m a n reason as a source o f law a n d a means o f discovering the Shariah. Reason can thus d e t e r m i n e that f o r certain issues a permissive or p r o h i b i t i v e law necessarily exists. For e x a m ple, i f the revealed law is silent o n a certain matter, reason may d e t e r m i n e , by reference to the general p r i n c i p l e s o f Shariah and the best interest o f h u m a n beings, that a certain law exists c o n c e r n i n g that matter, especially w h e n jurists realize that the Shariah s i m p l y cannot r e m a i n i n d i f f e r e n t c o n c e r n i n g the m a t ter. A d d i c t i o n to o p i u m was not an issue d u r i n g the t i m e o f the Prophet, f o r example, a n d n o r u l i n g was issued o n it. Yet experience shows w i t h certainty that a d d i c t i o n to o p i u m causes h a r m and c o r r u p t i o n . Because the Shariah f o r bids c o r r u p t i o n , t h r o u g h the a p p l i c a t i o n o f reason, c o n s u m p t i o n o f o p i u m is therefore considered f o r b i d d e n . I n this manner, reason tells M u s l i m s that w h e n

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s o m e t h i n g is f o r b i d d e n by law, the means t o w a r d p r o c u r i n g it is also f o r b i d den. H u m a n reason thus becomes a p r o o f and source o f the Shariah and an i m p o r t a n t t o o l i n the service o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and i j t i h a d . Compared w i t h analogical reasoning, h u m a n reasoning is a m o r e o p e n c o n c e p t — i t is n o t e n c u m bered by the sort o f technicalities that are involved i n analogical reasoning. Analogies cannot be constructed w i t h o u t the p r i o r existence o f an o r i g i n a l case, a r u l i n g (hukm) i n the sources, and an effective cause that l i n k s the o r i g inal case to the n e w case. H u m a n reasoning basically consists o f unrestricted reasoning, w h i c h does n o t depend o n such requirements. For example, the Q u r a n p r o h i b i t s alcohol because i t is an i n t o x i c a n t . This p r o h i b i t i o n can be extended, by analogy, to narcotic drugs. But no such analogy can be extended to a d r u g that o n l y causes lapse o f m e m o r y or blurs the eyesight, f o r w a n t o f the effective cause, i n t o x i c a t i o n . But these can be p r o h i b i t e d by recourse t o h u m a n reasoning. A l t h o u g h the leading schools have also recognized considerations o f public interest (istislah) as a source o f law, they have generally tended to impose a variety o f conditions o n i t because o f its strong utilitarian leanings. O n l y the theo l o g i a n Malik advocated i t as a source o f law i n its o w n r i g h t , w h i c h is w h y the considerations o f public interest are seen as a M a l i k i c o n t r i b u t i o n to the legal theo r y o f the sources, the usul al-fiqh. Whereas analogy operated w i t h i n the given terms o f the existing law, and juristic preference basically corrected the rigidities o f analogy, public interest was not b o u n d by such l i m i t a t i o n s . Furthermore, i t vested the r u l e r and m u j t a h i d w i t h the initiative to take all necessary measures, i n c l u d i n g n e w legislation, to secure w h a t he considered to benefit the people. A l m o s t every m a j o r school o f law p r o p o s e d a p r i n c i p l e or m e t h o d to r e g u late i n d e p e n d e n t reasoning and to ensure its c o n f o r m i t y w i t h the o v e r r i d i n g a u t h o r i t y o f d i v i n e revelation. Whereas s o m e u l a m a , such as the Z a h i r i s , c o n f i n e d the sources o f law to the Q u r a n , the Sunna, and consensus, the Hanafis added analogy, j u r i s t i c preference, and c u s t o m , and the M a l i k i s added p u b l i c interest and the n o t i o n o f " b l o c k i n g the m e a n s " (sadd al-dharui), w h i c h ensured the consistency o f means and ends w i t h the Shariah by b l o c k i n g the attempt to use a l a w f u l means t o w a r d an u n l a w f u l e n d . Examples o f this i n c l u d e bann i n g the sale o f arms at a t i m e o f c o n f l i c t o r f o r b i d d i n g a sale that may merely disguise a usurious transaction. This practice also provides preventive measures that are taken even before the actual occurrence o f a feared event, such as b a n n i n g an assembly that is likely to lead to violence. A l t h o u g h some o f the o b v i ous applications o f this d o c t r i n e were generally accepted, the M a l i k i school has applied i t m o r e w i d e l y than m o s t . The Shafii school c o n t r i b u t e d the d o c t r i n e o f istishab ( p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o n t i n u i t y ) , w h i c h safeguards c o n t i n u i t y and pred i c t a b i l i t y i n l a w and i n court decisions b y p r o p o s i n g that facts and rules o f

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law and reason are presumed to r e m a i n v a l i d u n t i l there is evidence t o establ i s h a change. For example, certainty may not be o v e r r u l e d by d o u b t , and an u n p r o v e n c l a i m s h o u l d not affect the basic p r e s u m p t i o n o f innocence and c o n t i n u i t y o f the existing r i g h t s o f the people u n d e r the Shariah. These doctrines are all designed, each i n its respective capacity, t o regulate independent reasoning and to p r o v i d e f o r m u l a s f o r f i n d i n g solutions to n e w issues. The m e t h ods p r o p o s e d by these d o c t r i n e s also ensure the c o n f o r m i t y o f h u m a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and a p p l i c a t i o n to the basic p r i n c i p l e s and objectives o f the Shariah. The idea that the law must evolve and develop w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f a certain m e t h o d o l o g y lies at the r o o t o f these doctrines. Historically, i j t i h a d has been perceived as a concern p r i m a r i l y o f the i n d i v i d ual scholar and m u j t a h i d . But i n m o d e r n times, ijtihad has become a collective endeavor that combines the skills and c o n t r i b u t i o n s not o n l y o f the scholars o f Shariah, but o f experts i n various other disciplines, because a c q u i r i n g a mastery o f all the skills that are i m p o r t a n t to society is difficult for any one person. Ideally, independent reasoning s h o u l d be c o m b i n e d w i t h the Quranic p r i n c i p l e o f c o n sultation (shura), m a k i n g it a consultative process, preferably as an integral part o f the w o r k i n g s o f the m o d e r n legislative assembly. Ijtihad has also been seen i n the past as a juristic concept, a preserve o f the jurist to the exclusion o f specialists i n other disciplines. But as a m e t h o d by w h i c h to find solutions to new issues, ijtihad s h o u l d be exercised by the scholars o f Shariah as w e l l as by experts i n other disciplines, p r o v i d e d that those w h o attempt this independent reasoning acquire mastery o f the relevant data, the Quaran, and the Sunna. There is thus no reason w h y experts i n Islamic economics and medicine, for example, c o u l d not carry out ijtihad i n their o w n fields.

Scholastic Contributions to Legal Thought Hanafi application and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f l a w is d i s t i n g u i s h e d by its rationalist tendency and to some extent by its theoretical leanings i n that it deals n o t o n l y w i t h actual issues but also w i t h theoretical problems that are based o n mere supposition. Because he was a merchant, A b u Hanifah's c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the law o f c o m m e r c i a l transactions are particularly n o t e d . A b u Hanifah's legal t h o u g h t is also d i s t i n g u i s h e d by his emphasis o n personal l i b e r t y and his reluctance to impose u n w a r r a n t e d restrictions o n i t . H e thus m a i n t a i n e d that neither the c o m m u n i t y n o r the g o v e r n m e n t is entitled to interfere w i t h the personal l i b erty o f the i n d i v i d u a l as l o n g as the i n d i v i d u a l has n o t violated the law. H a n a f i fiqh thus entitles a w o m a n to conclude her o w n marriage contract w i t h o u t the consent o f a g u a r d i a n , whereas the other schools have stipulated the consent o f a g u a r d i a n as a r e q u i r e m e n t o f valid marriage. The Hanafis have reasoned that

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the Q u r a n ( 4 : 6 ) has e n d o w e d the adult female w i t h f u l l a u t h o r i t y to manage her o w n financial affairs. This r u l i n g has been extended by way o f analogy to marriage. The m a j o r i t y o f jurists o f the leading schools, however, have considered this an "analogy w i t h a d i f f e r e n c e " (qiyas ma al-fariq), w h i c h treats t w o d i f ferent things ( p r o p e r t y and m a r r i a g e ) o n the same f o o t i n g , and therefore i n v a l i d . But A b u H a n i f a h called f o r equality (kafaa) i n marriage a n d entitled the w o m a n ' s guardian t o seek a n n u l m e n t o f a marriage i n the event o f a w i d e discrepancy i n the s o c i o e c o n o m i c status o f the spouses. Equality is n o t a r e q u i r e m e n t according to the other leading legal schools s i m p l y because the guardian's consent is, according t o t h e m , a prerequisite o f a v a l i d marriage

contract.

Moreover, A b u H a n i f a h refused t o validate i n t e r d i c t i o n o f the f o o l i s h (safih) or the insolvent debtor o n the analysis that restricting the f r e e d o m o f these i n d i viduals is a h a r m greater than the financial loss that m i g h t otherwise occur. A b u H a n i f a h also held that no one, i n c l u d i n g a judge, may impose restrictions o n an owner's r i g h t to the use o f his or her property, even i f that p r o p e r t y i n f l i c t e d harm

on

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p r o v i d e d that

the

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exorbitant.

F u r t h e r m o r e , because the judge cannot restrict the owner's l i b e r t y , the o w n e r w o u l d not w a n t to restrict his o r her o w n l i b e r t y either. A charitable endow¬ m e n t (waqf) o f one's personal p r o p e r t y is consequently

not b i n d i n g o n the

owner, nor o n his or her legal heirs. I n other w o r d s , the o w n e r o r dedicator o f e n d o w e d p r o p e r t y is at l i b e r t y t o revoke the e n d o w m e n t and thereby remove the self-imposed r e s t r i c t i o n o n his or her r i g h t o f o w n e r s h i p . The other legal schools disagree, m a i n l y because they consider a charitable e n d o w m e n t as a b i n d i n g c o m m i t m e n t that the dedicator o f the p r o p e r t y must observe, once i t has been d u l y i n s t i t u t e d . I n one o f his w i d e l y q u o t e d statements, w h i c h represents a d e f i n i n g p r i n c i ple o f the Hanafis, A b u Hanifah declared: "Whenever the authenticity o f a h a d i t h is ascertained, that is w h e r e I stand." A m o r e general statement, also attributed to A b u H a n i f a h , is: " W h e n y o u are faced w i t h evidence, then speak for i t and apply i t . " Consequently, i t is evident that o n occasions A b u Hanifah's disciples have differed w i t h some o f the r u l i n g s o f the i m a m o n the basis o f newdy uncovered evidence, often stating that the i m a m h i m s e l f w o u l d have f o l l o w e d i t had he k n o w n o f it. A r u l i n g by a disciple that differs f r o m that o f the i m a m is thus still regarded as a r u l i n g o f the school, sometimes i n preference to that o f the i m a m . Another saying o f Abu H a n i f a h that represents another Hanafi p r i n c i p l e is: " N o one may issue a verdict o n the basis o f w h a t w e have said unless he ascertains the source o f o u r statement." These eminently objective guidelines were u p h e l d d u r i n g the era o f i j t i h a d , but the ulama o f subsequent periods departed f r o m the spirit o f that guidance. The early nineteenth-century Hanafi jurist I b n A b i d i n thus stated the n e w p o s i t i o n o f the school i n the f o l l o w i n g terms: " A

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jurist o f the later ages may not abandon the r u l i n g s o f the leading i m a m s and ulama o f the school even i f he sees h i m s e l f able to carry out i j t i h a d , and even i f he thinks that he has f o u n d stronger evidence. For i t w o u l d appear that the predecessors have considered the relevant evidence and have declared their preference." The o n l y exception here is made for "situations o f necessity," i n w h i c h case the jurist may give a different verdict to that o f the established r u l i n g o f the school, i f this provides a preferable s o l u t i o n to an urgent issue that is not adequately covered by an established precedent o f the school. The r e n o w n e d w o r k Al-Muwatta (The Straight Path) o f the eighth-century theologian M a l i k i b n Anas al-Asbahi is the earliest complete w o r k o f fiqh o n record. It relies heavily o n the h a d i t h , so m u c h so that many have considered i t to be a w o r k o f h a d i t h . Because i t uses the h a d i t h as basic evidence f o r juristic c o n c l u sions, however, i t is r i g h t l y classified as a w o r k o f fiqh. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g his leading p o s i t i o n i n the Traditionist camp ( A h l a l - H a d i t h ) , M a l i k relied extensively o n o p i n i o n ( r a y ) — i n some cases he d i d so even m o r e than representatives o f the other leading schools. M a l i k is the c h i e f source o f the t w o i m p o r t a n t doctrines o f p u b l i c interest and b l o c k i n g the means, b o t h o f w h i c h are e m i n e n t l y rational and rely m a i n l y o n personal reasoning. M a l i k i j u r i s p r u d e n c e also attempted to forge a closer l i n k w i t h the practicalities o f life i n M e d i n a and attached greater w e i g h t to social customs than other jurists d i d . This is borne out by its r e c o g n i t i o n o f the M e d i n a n consensus as a source o f law, a concept that is advanced o n l y by the M a l i k i school. M a l i k thus validated, o n this basis, using the testimony o f c h i l d r e n i n cases o f injury, p r o v i d e d they have not left the scene o f the i n c i d e n t . He also held that the w i f e o f a missing husband mayseek j u d i c i a l separation after a four-year w a i t i n g p e r i o d . M a l i k i law also recognized indicia I divorce on the grounds i >{ .1 husband's I n j u r i o u s treatmenl o f his w i f e . The m a j o r i t y r u l i n g entitles the w i f e to j u d i c i a l relief, whereby the court may p u n i s h the husband; M a l i k i law r u l e d that i f the treatment i n question a m o u n t e d to i n j u r y (darar), the w i f e c o u l d request d i s s o l u t i o n o f the marriage o n that basis. A n o t h e r M a l i k i c o n t r i b u t i o n i n this area is a type o f divorce k n o w n as khul, i n w h i c h the w i f e proposes d i s s o l u t i o n o f marriage against a financial

consideration, usually by r e t u r n i n g the d o w r y she received f r o m her

husband. Because the Q u r a n validates k h u l ( 2 : 2 2 9 ) ,

11

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recognized by all the

legal schools, but i t can o n l y be finalized w i t h the husband's consent. M a l i k i fiqh took this a step f u r t h e r by r u l i n g that i f there are irreconcilable differences the court may finalize the divorce even w i t h o u t the husband's consent. By the late t w e n t i e t h century the M a l i k i law o f divorce had generally been adopted i n the reformist legislation o f many M u s l i m countries. M u h a m m a d i b n I d r i s al-Shafii's impact, as founder o f the Shafii school o f law; o n the development o f Shariah is most noticeable i n the area o f the m e t h o d o l -

The Maliki school of law, which is prevalent in North Africa, prohibits an individual from appointing himself the administrator of a pious endowment, and most madrasas there were sponsored by the ruler, the only person who could afford such large sums.The BenYusuf Madrasa at Marrakesh, the largest in the Maghreb, was founded by the Saadian ruler Abdallah al-Ghalib in 1564-65.

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ogy o f law. His c o n t r i b u t i o n is manifested by his p i o n e e r i n g w o r k , the Risalnh, i n w h i c h he articulated the legal theory o f usul al-fiqh, w h i c h consequently emerged, a r o u n d the early n i n t h century, as one o f the most i m p o r t a n t disciplines o f learni n g i n the h i s t o r y o f Islamic scholarship. Al-Shafii's role i n articulating the m e t h o d o l o g y o f law has often been compared w i t h that o f Aristotle i n logic. He m a i n t a i n e d that the Sunna was a logical extension o f the Q u r a n and vindicated the exclusive a u t h o r i t y o f the prophetic Sunna as a source o f Shariah next to the Q u r a n . Al-Shafii's v i s i o n o f the basic u n i t y o f the revealed sources came close to saying that rejecting the Sunna also amounted to rejecting the Q u r a n , and that accepting the one and rejecting the other was untenable. He took his teacher, the theologian M a l i k , to task for placing undue emphasis o n the M e d i n a n consensus and the precedent o f the Prophet's Companions at the expense o f the Sunna o f the Prophet. In its general orientation Shafii law takes an intermediate posture between the Traditionist stance o f the M a l i k i school and the pragmatism o f the Hanafis. A l Shafii took an objective stand o n issues at a t i m e w h e n the Traditionists and Rationalists were engaged i n bitter controversies. He was critical o f Malik's validation o f unrestricted public interest and o f A b u Hanifah's frequent concession to specific at the expense o f general principles. Al-Shafii's approach to the interpretation o f contracts and verification o f their validity was almost entirely based o n the f o r m rather than the intent o f a contract. He thus overruled i n q u i r y i n t o the i n t e n t i o n o f the parties, even i n circumstances that m i g h t arouse suspicion. For example, a m a n is thus w i t h i n his rights i n b u y i n g a s w o r d , even i f he intends to k i l l an innocent person w i t h i t . A m a n may likewise buy a s w o r d f r o m someone he saw using that sword as m u r d e r weapon. Contracts and transactions are therefore to be judged by their obvious c o n f o r m i t y to the law, not by a mere susp i c i o n that they may have violated i t . Al-Shafii thus understood the Shariah t o be concerned w i t h the evident manifestation o f h u m a n conduct and maintained that the judge and jurist were n o t under d u t y to i n q u i r e i n t o the h i d d e n meani n g o f the text or i n t o the thoughts and motives o f individuals. This reliance o n the manifest f o r m o f conduct, contracts, and transactions is not peculiar to alShafii, as the Hanafis have also s h o w n the same tendency, but al-Shafii e x h i b i t e d it m o r e frequently than most. Al-Shafii maintained that a jurist should not hesitate to change his previous verdict (fatwa) i f that w o u l d make a better c o n t r i b u t i o n to the quest for t r u t h . Thus, it is noted that he frequently changed his verdicts, and he sometimes recorded d i f ferent rulings o n the same issue. If, for example, a m a n deceives a w o m a n by presenting her w i t h a false family pedigree, the m a n is liable to a deterrent (tazir) p u n i s h m e n t , such as being w h i p p e d , i m p r i s o n e d , or fined. Then t w o additional views are recorded o n the same issue f r o m the i m a m and neither is given prefer-

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ence. The first view entitles the w i f e to choose either to continue the marriage or to separate. The second v i e w says that the marriage is n u l l and void. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the c o m m o n p e r c e p t i o n or stereotype o f the H a n b a i i school as the most restrictive o f the leading legal schools, Hanbaii jurisprudence is i n some respects m o r e liberal than most. This is indicated by its extensive reliance o n considerations o f p u b l i c interest. The i m a m i b n Hanbaii issued a verdict, for example, that p e r m i t t e d c o m p e l l i n g the o w n e r o f a large house to give shelter to the homeless. H e also validated c o m p e l l i n g workers and craftspeople w h o j o i n together t o deprive the p u b l i c o f their services to continue t o provide those services at a fair wage to avoid i n f l i c t i n g hardship o n society. The H a n b a i i school also takes a considerably m o r e o p e n view o f the basic freedom o f contract than other schools do. The legal schools d i f f e r o n w hether the n o r m i n contract is permissibility, p r o h i b i t i o n , or an intermediate p o s i t i o n between the t w o . The m a j o r i t y tend to be restrictive i n m a i n t a i n i n g that the agreement o f parties creates the contract, but the contract's requirements and consequences are independently d e t e r m i n e d by Shariah. The parties therefore are not at l i b erty t o alter the substance o f these n o r to c i r c u m v e n t t h e m i n a w a y that w o u l d violate their purpose. The parties m a k i n g the contract d o n o t create the law but o n l y a specific contract; t h e i r stipulations and terms o f agreement s h o u l d therefore be i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h the provisions o f Shariah. The schools d i f f e r over details, however. The M a l i k i s and Hanafis tend to take a moderate p o s i t i o n by m a k i n g many exceptions t o the basic n o r m o f p r o h i b i t i o n . Similarly, the Shafii p o s i t i o n , like that o f the Zahiris, tends to proscribe altering the basic postulates and attributes o f contracts t h r o u g h m u t u a l agreement. The Hanbalis m a i n t a i n that the n o r m regarding contracts is p e r m i s s i b i l i t y (ibaha), w h i c h prevails i n the absence o f a clear p r o h i b i t i o n i n the Shariah. The reason is that the Q u r a n has o n l y laid d o w n the general p r i n c i p l e that contracts must be f u l f i l l e d ( Q u r a n 5:1), and that they must be based o n m u t u a l consent ( Q u r a n 4:19). Because the Lawgiver ( G o d ) has not specified any requirements other than consent, consent alone is the validating factor. The w i l l and agreement o f the parties can therefore create b i n d i n g rights a n d obligations. The principle o f permissibility under Hanbaii law can also f o r m the basis for unilateral obligation, w h i c h means that the individual is free to c o m m i t himself or herself i n all situations i n w h i c h this principle can apply. Thus a m a n may validly stipulate i n a marriage contract that he w i l l not marry a second w i f e . Because polygyny is only permissible (that is. it is not required) under the Shariah, the i n d i vidual is free to make i t die subject o f stipulation. The other legal schools disallow this, say i n g that the Shariah has made polygyny lawful, a position that should not be circumvented or nullified t h r o u g h contractual stipulation. Therefore, any stipulation that seeks to do so is not binding. I b n Hanbal slated that stipulations i n a

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marriage contract must be strictly observed, even more so than i n other contracts. Consequently, w h e n one spouse fails to c o m p l y w i t h the terms o f the agreement, the other spouse is entitled to seek the annulment o f the contract. Shiite law permits temporary marriage (mutah) for any p e r i o d o f t i m e up to die m a x i m u m o f ninety-nine years. Under Shiite law, temporary marriage is a contractual arrangement whereby a w o m a n agrees to cohabit w i t h a m a n for a specified period o f t i m e i n return for a fixed remuneration. This arrangement does not give rise to any right o f inheritance between the spouses, but the children are legitimate and entitled to inheritance. Sunni law prohibits temporary marriage altogether. The differential rulings o f Sunni and Shiite law relate to the interpretation o f verses i n the Quran (2:236; 4:24); because mutah can mean b o t h " t e m p o r a r y marriage" or a " g i f t o f consolation" given to a divorced w o m a n , the Sunnis have upheld die latter meaning and the Shiites the former. The Prophet himself p e r m i t ted m u t a h i n the early years o f Islam, but he later declared it f o r b i d d e n , according to Sunni but not according to Shiite reports i n the Prophetic hadith. Anodier area i n w h i c h Shiite law differs significantly f r o m its Sunni counterpart is the system o f priorities i n inheritance. Male agnates—such as the father's father, germane brothers ( w h o share b o t h parents) and consanguine brothers ( w h o share a father but have different mothers), and paternal uncles o f the deceased—are often entitled to a share o f the inheritance, even i f there are closer female relatives, under Sunni law, but they are likely to be excluded f r o m inheritance under Shiite law. Whereas Sunni law tends to u p h o l d the basic concept o f the extended family, Shiite law rests o n the n o t i o n o f the nuclear family, consisting o f parents and lineal descendants. Under b o t h systems the son o f the deceased enjoys the same entitlement, but all other male relatives, particularly the collaterals, are often m u c h less favorably placed under the Shiite law. The divergent systems o f Sunni and Shiite succession are premised on their respective political and theological doctrines. For example, the principle o f Shiite succession that any lineal descendant, particularly the c h i l d o f a daughter, has complete p r i o r i t y over all collaterals reflects the Shiite view that the political title o f the Prophet was properly inherited by his lineal descendant, t h r o u g h his daughter Fatima, not by the agnate collaterals t h r o u g h the Prophet's uncle al-Abbas i b n Abd al-Muttalib (c66-ca. 653).

Salient Features of the Shariah: Religious and Moral Dimensions and Continuity and Change This section draws attention to some o f the characteristic features o f die Shariah, such as its identity as a religious law and its capacity to adapt t h r o u g h interpretation and rational analysis. The Shariah is characterized as pragmatic, especially i n the area o f public policy, and it favors a gradual approach to social r e f o r m . The Shariah advo-

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cates the moral autonomy o f the individual and visualizes a basic harmony between private and public interests, and so the Shariah's orientation toward the concerns o f the individual and those o f the c o m m u n i t y as a w h o l e is also discussed. To say that Islamic law is God-given and an integral part o f the r e l i g i o n is to say that adherence to its rules is b o t h a legal and a religious d u t y o f Muslims. Related to this are the concepts o f halal and haram, the permissible and the p r o hibited. These are legal and religious categories that involve duty toward both God and fellow h u m a n beings. The religious and civil aspects o f the Shariah tend to enforce one another i n that legal compliance, as far as Muslims are concerned, is a religious duty. But for n o n - M u s l i m s l i v i n g under Islamic law, the law takes o n a civilian character. It is o f interest to note, however, that even w i t h regard to M u s l i m s , the jurists have d r a w n a distinction between the religious and the c i v i l ian aspects o f the Shariah, especially i n the area o f civil transactions. I n this area the rules o f the Shariah are enforced o n the basis only o f w h a t is apparent, whereas r e l i g i o n decrees based o n true reality and i n t e n t i o n . Thus the legal status o f one act may differ i n the judicial context f r o m what i t m i g h t be i n a religious perspective. Judges do not issue judgments o n religious considerations alone. This is w h y M u s l i m jurists often define their legal status i n relationship to particular cases, but religiously i t is the reverse. For example, assume that someone denies that he is a debtor, and the creditor is unable to prove the debt i n the court o f law. I f some property o f the debtor comes i n t o the creditor's possession, r e l i g i o n w o u l d entitle the creditor to take the equivalent o f what is due to h i m w i t h o u t the debtor's permission. But i f the matter is b r o u g h t before the court, the creditor w i l l not be allowed to take anyt h i n g unless he proves the c l a i m t h r o u g h legal methods. Consider a situation i n w h i c h the creditor first waives the debt by g i v i n g it to the debtor as charity w i t h out actually i n f o r m i n g the debtor o f the decision, and then changes his m i n d and sues the debtor for the gift. I n this case the creditor is entitled to receive payment judicially but n o t o n religious grounds, as charity may not be revoked and the debtor does not o w e the creditor anything i n the eyes o f God. The d i s t i n c t i o n here between religious and juridical obligations (vvajib dini and wajib qadai) also signifies the difference between adjudication (qada) and a juristic o p i n i o n (fatvra). The judge (qadi) must adjudicate o n the basis o f apparent evidence and disregard the religious position o f the dispute before h i m , whereas a mufti investigates b o t h the apparent and the actual positions and b o t h are reflected i n the verdict. I f there is a conflict between the t w o positions, the m u f t i pronounces his o p i n i o n o n religious considerations, whereas the j u d g e considers objective evidence only, regardless o f the religious motives or personal disposition o f the litigants. A pious i n d i v i d u a l i n a court case is n o t to be treated differently f r o m one o f questionable piety or o f n o apparent dedication to r e l i g i o n .

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The scholastic manifestation o f this dual approach to rights and duties can also be seen i n the different orientations o f the legal schools w i t h regard to external ity and intent, and the question o f the relative value that is attached to the m a n i fest f o r m as opposed to the essence o f conduct. As previously noted, the Shafiis and Hanafis tend to stress the externality o f conduct w i t h o u t e x p l o r i n g the intent behind i t , whereas the Malikis and Hanbalis are inclined t o w a r d e x p l o r i n g the intent. These different approaches can be illustrated w i t h reference to the i n t e n t i o n behind a marriage contract. I f a m a n marries a w o m a n w i t h the sole i n t e n t i o n o f sexual gratification followed by a q u i c k divorce, the marriage is invalid according to the Malikis and Hanbalis but l a w f u l according to the Hanafis and Shafiis. W h e n the legal requirements o f a valid marriage contract are objectively fulfilled, that is all that is necessary according t o die Hanafis and Shafiis, whereas the Malikis and Hanbalis base their judgments o n the u n d e r l y i n g intent and maintain that evil and abuse should be obstructed whenever they become k n o w n . A consequence o f this attitudinal difference can also be seen i n the approval or disapproval o f legal stratagems (al-hiyal aJ-fiqhiyyah) i n such cases as a catalyst mar riage (tahlil) and usurious sale (inalı). The former involves a m a n m a r r y i n g a w o m a n w h o has been divorced i n order to allow her to remarry her first husband. This is a perversion o f the requirement that there be a genuine intervening marriage before a divorced couple can remarry. I n usurious sale, person A sells a piece o f cloth to person B for S100, payable i n one year, and then immediately buys the cloth back for S8o, paid then and there. The difference İs a disguised usury (riba), as it amounts to charging an interest o f S20 for a loan o f S80 for one year. In b o t h examples, the acts are designed to circumvent the rules o f Shariah by violating their intention. Malikis and Hanbalis reject such stratagems altogether, but the Hanafis and Shafiis have upheld t h e m and recognize the legal consequences that flow f r o m them. The Maliki jurist A b u Ishaq I b r a h i m al-Shatibi (d. 1388) stated the Maliki position as f o l lows: "Anyone w h o seeks to obtain f r o m the rules o f Shariah something w h i c h is contrary to its purpose has violated the Shariah and his actions are null and v o i d . " The Hanbali scholar I b n Q a y y i m al-Jawziyyah ( 1289-1349) held substantially the same p o s i t i o n . Al-Shatibi added that the r u l i n g s o f Shariah regarding w h a t is permissible and p r o h i b i t e d generally consider b o t h the acts and their u n d e r l y i n g i n t e n t i o n . The M a l i k i - H a n b a l i p o s i t i o n is also upheld i n a hadith-cum-legal m a x i m that declares, "Acts are judged by the intentions b e h i n d t h e m . " A M u s l i m therefore must n o t seek to legalize for h i m s e l f or herself something that is p r o h i b i t e d even i f he or she obtains a judicial decree to that effect. This conclusion is based on the hadith in w h i c h the Prophet adjudicated a case o n the basis o f apparent evidence, but then said: I am but a human being. When you bring a dispute to me, some o f you may be more eloquent in slating your cases than others. I may consequently

According to Muslim law, a market supervisor, known in Arabic as muhtasib, is in charge of monitoring business transactions in the market. He was authorized, for example, to intervene and stop instances of cruelty to animals. Markets like this one in Kirman in central Iran were typically housed in vaulted structures that protected produce and people from the strong rays of the sun.

adjudicate on the basis of what I hear. I f I adjudicate i n favor o f someone something that belongs to his brother, let him not take it, for it would be like taking a piece of fire. This h a d i t h is p r e m i s e d i n the b i n d i n g force o f j u d i c i a l orders i n that n o one is at l i b e r t y to defy t h e m o n the basis m e r e l y o f a m o r a l a r g u m e n t . I f a miscarriage o f justice is due to false evidence, however, the person w h o w i n s the case

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because o f the false evidence bears a m o r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y n o t to insist o n e n f o r c e m e n t . The Shariah also contains p r o v i s i o n s o n expiations (kaffarat), w h i c h are self-inflicted punishments o f a religious character that the courts are not authorized to enforce. I f a person breaks a solemn oath, for example, he may expiate for i t by g i v i n g charity sufficient to feed ten p o o r people or fasting for three days. Other expiations have been p r o v i d e d for i n the Q u r a n , but none are legally enforceable. M o r a l i t y and r e l i g i o n are thus closely interrelated. The Prophet declared i n a h a d i t h that " I have n o t been sent but to accomplish m o r a l virtues." The m o r a l overtones o f the Shariah are clearly seen i n its propensity t o w a r d d u t y (taklif), so m u c h so that some commentators have characterized the Shariah as "a system o f d u t i e s " as compared w i t h statutory law, w h i c h often speaks o f rights. The Shariah clearly recognizes b o t h d u t y and r i g h t , b u t i t is nevertheless indicative o f the m o r a l u n d e r p i n n i n g s o f the Shariah that i t speaks m a i n l y o f d u t y rather than r i g h t . The fact that the Shariah proscribes usury, w i n e d r i n k i n g , and g a m b l i n g , proclaims legal alms as one o f its major duties, and encourages " l o w e r i n g o f the gaze" between m e m b e r s o f the opposite sex, as w e l l as declaring divorce as " t h e w o r s t o f all permissible t h i n g s " all reflect the Shariah's m o r a l o u t l o o k . This is also evident i n the rules p e r t a i n i n g to war, i n w h i c h the Shariah f o r b i d s m a i m i n g , i n j u r i n g c h i l d r e n , w o m e n , and the elderly, as w e l l as damagi n g animals, crops, and b u i l d i n g s . The Prophet and the early caliphs c o n d e m n e d cruelty to animals and took to task those w h o caused hardship to animals and neglected their needs. A l t h o u g h these are n o t justiciable i n the court o f law, the market controller (muhtasib) is nevertheless authorized to intervene and to stop instances o f c r u e l t y t o animals. The muhtasib, w h o became k n o w n i n the Abbasid p e r i o d (749—12c8) as market controller, m a i n l y i n charge o f price regulations, was i n i t i a l l y the officer i n charge o f the m o r a l and religious duties o f Islam, i n c l u d i n g the hisba (that is, c o m m a n d i n g g o o d and f o r b i d d i n g e v i l ) . Some o f the hisba f u n c t i o n s — s u c h as those relating to the observance o f r e l i gious duties i n the fasting m o n t h o f Ramadan, attendance o f Friday congregat i o n a l prayer, and so o n — w e r e gradually abandoned or taken over by o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t agencies. This d i s t i n c t i o n between the Shariah's m o r a l and legal precepts is also reflected i n its scale o f five values—obligatory, desirable, neutral, reprehensible, f o r b i d d e n . O n l y the t w o extremes—the obligatory (wajib) and the f o r b i d d e n (haram)—are legal categories. The r e m a i n i n g three categories, w h i c h cover a m u c h larger area, are basically m o r a l and n o t justiciable. A substantive distinction between the religious and legal aspects o f conduct can be seen even w i t h i n the t w o categories o f obligatory and f o r b i d d e n . Religious obligations, such as prayer, fasting, and the hajj, are classified as " p u r e r i g h t o f G o d " (haqq Allah) and

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are n o r m a l l y n o t justiciable. They d i f f e r i n that respect f r o m those obligations that fall under the r i g h t o f h u m a n beings (haqq flJ-addmi), such as debt repayment o r spousal support. These rights can be made the subject o f a j u d i c i a l order. I t is o f t e n said that Islamic law is i m m u t a b l e because it is d i v i n e l y ordained. Yet, i n its p h i l o s o p h y and o u t l o o k , d i v i n e law itself integrates a certain a m o u n t o f adaptability and change. Some o f the basic principles o f the Shariah, such as justice, equality, public interest, consultation, e n j o i n i n g g o o d , and f o r b i d d i n g evil, are inherently d y n a m i c . They are therefore i m m u t a b l e i n p r i n c i p l e , b u t they r e m a i n open to adaptation and adjustment o n the level o f i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . The fundamentals o f the faith and the practical pillars on w h i c h those fundamentals stand—the basic m o r a l values o f Islam and its clear i n j u n c t i o n s — a r e o n the w h o l e permanent and unchangeable. But i n many other areas o f the law, the Shariah only provides general guidelines, the details o f w h i c h may be adjusted and m o d i f i e d t h r o u g h the exercise o f h u m a n reasoning. The o v e r r i d i n g objectives o f Shariah are the p r o m o t i o n o f h u m a n dignity, justice, and equality; the establishment o f a consultative government; the realization o f the l a w f u l benefits o f the people; the prevention o f h a r m (darar); the removal o f hardship (haraj); and the education o f the i n d i v i d u a l by inculcating i n h i m o r her a sense o f punctuality, self-discipline, and restraint. I n their broad scope these objectives are permanent and unchangeable. W h e n the Q u r a n and the Sunna i d e n t i f y a certain objective to be o f o v e r r i d i n g importance, then all measures that can be taken t o w a r d its realization are automatically protected by the Shariah, p r o v i d e d that they are clear o f d i s t o r t i o n and abuse. I n other w o r d s , the means

The basic objectives of the Shariah are conveyed in the Quran and the Sunna.They include establishing a consultative government. Many modern Muslim states have parliaments.The Kuwait Parliament building was

t o w a r d attaining those ends are o f as m u c h value as the ends themselves. The

designed by the Danish

ulama have attempted to classify the basic benefits (masalih) i n t o the three broad

architect J. Utzon.

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yet interrelated categories: essential interests (daruriyyat), c o m p l e m e n t a r y interests (hajiyyat), and desirabilities (tahsiniyyat). The c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f the M a l i k i jurist al-Shatibi to these, and to the p h i l o s o p h y o f Shariah i n general, are particularly n o t e d . O n l y the m a i n categories o f benefits are predictable i n advance; their details are changeable according to the circumstances o f t i m e and place, h o w ever. They need therefore to be i d e n t i f i e d and pursued as and w h e n they arise. The means t o w a r d securing the Shariah's recognized objectives are flexible, as they are not specified i n the sources and therefore remain open to considerations o f public p o l i c y and justice. For example, vindicating the t r u t h is an objective i n its o w n r i g h t . T r u t h may be established by the testimony o f u p r i g h t witnesses or by other means as they become available, such as sound r e c o r d i n g , p h o t o g r a p h ) , and laboratory analysis, w h i c h are perhaps even m o r e reliable than verbal testimony. The Shariah only specifies the end that must be sought, but i t leaves open the means by w h i c h the ends are achieved. Another example is the issue o f female witnesses and the fiqh rule that the testimony o f t w o females is equal to that o f one male. This was the conclusion o f the ulama o f the past, whose readi n g o f the Quranic text i n l i g h t o f the prevailing conditions o f earlier times was generally accepted and perhaps also justified i n the Q u r a n . There is a reference i n the Q u r a n that validates the testimony o f m e n and w o m e n , i n that order, but the text does not preclude the testimony o f female witnesses. The reading o f the Q u r a n should be goal-oriented and responsive to the realities o f contemporary M u s l i m society. I f the o v e r r i d i n g objectives o f the Q u r a n , t r u t h and justice, are n o w better served by a d m i t t i n g equally the testimony o f female witnesses, especially w h e n they might be the only witnesses available in a particular case, the judge w o u l d not hesitate to a d m i t t h e m ; the rules o f fiqh o n this subject may also be adjusted i n the f u t u r e to that effect.

The Scope of Interpretation and Reasoning There are t w o types o f rules o f Shariah that occur i n the Quran and the Sunna: definitive (qati) and speculative (zanni). Definitive rules refer to injunctions that are self-evident and need n o interpretation. Some o f the injunctions o f the Quran are conveyed i n this f o r m ; they are definite and self-contained. There are also instances i n w h i c h the Quran lays d o w n a basic rule, w h i c h , however definitive, needs to be supplemented; i n this case, the necessary details are often supplied by the Sunna. The definitive injunctions o f the Quran and the Sunna constitute the c o m m o n core o f u n i t y among the various legal schools and among Muslims i n general. It is thanks mainly to definitive injunctions that the Shariah is often described as a diversity w i t h i n u n i t y : unity i n essentials but diversity in details; u n i t y o n matters o f belief, o n what is permitted o r p r o h i b i t e d , but diversity i n values that fall below

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these categories. A legal text is classified as speculative w h e n it is conveyed i n a language that leaves r o o m for interpretation and h u m a n endeavor. Also i n the Q u r a n and the Sunna are instances i n w h i c h a legal text may be definitive i n some respects but speculative i n others. For example, the Quran i n j u n c t i o n " f o r b i d d e n to y o u ( i n marriage) are your mothers and y o u r daughters . . ." (4:23) conveys a definite meaning o n the basic p r o h i b i t i o n i t contains, but questions arise about whether the w o r d daughters includes, i n addition to legitimate biological daughters, illegitimate daughters, stepdaughters, granddaughters, and foster daughters. A n d i f so, are they all entitled to inheritance? Because daughters is a general w o r d , i t includes all o f its possible meanings; this is the Hanafis' interpretation. But the m a j o r i t y o f legal scholars m a i n t a i n that this is conjectural and the application o f all o f its possible meanings is not a matter o f certainty. A l t h o u g h the Hanafis conclude that daughters includes all daughters, the majority o f legal scholars d o n o t , for example, include illegitimate daughters i n that meaning. There is a similar debate w i t h regard to the ablution (wudu) for ritual prayer. This is necessary, as the Quran says, w h e n one touches (lomastum) a m e m b e r o f the opposite sex ( Q u r a n 4:43). The precise meaning o f the w o r d — w h e t h e r it means merely t o u c h i n g or sexual intercourse—is a matter o f disagreement among the leading legal schools. The scope o f such interpretations is not confined to words but extends to entire sentences and the meaning conveyed i n a partictilar context. Even w i t h regard to such basic p r o h i b i t i o n s as m u r d e r and theft, questions arise as to the precise d e f i n i t i o n i n the Q u r a n . For example, does stealing f r o m a deceased person or p i c k i n g pockets f i t the standard d e f i n i t i o n o f theft? By far, the larger p o r t i o n o f the Quran's legal content is speculative i n this sense, although the w h o l e o f the Q u r a n is definitive i n respect o f authenticity The jurists have d i f f e r e d i n their approach to interpretation. A l t h o u g h some schools like the Zaliiris t o o k a literalist approach to interpretation, the m a j o r i t y have i n c l u d e d allegorical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n (tawil) i n a d d i t i o n to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n proper (tofsir). They have validated interpretation based o n personal o p i n i o n (tafsir bil ray) i n a d d i t i o n t o interpretation f o u n d e d o n valid precedent (tafsir hil mathur) i n their understanding o f the Q u r a n and the Sunna. Whereas interpretation proper signifies interpretation based o n the actual w o r d s o f the text, allegorical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n includes the m o r e remote interpretations, such as the i m p l i e d and metaphorical meanings that fall b e y o n d the confines o f the text. Because the Quran is characteristically devoted to broad guidelines and p r i n c i ples, its language is often versatile. Because o f this versatility, "every scholar w h o has resorted to the Quran i n search o f solution to a p r o b l e m , " commented the jurist alShatibi i n Muwufaqai, "has f o u n d i n the Quran a principle that has provided h i m w i t h some guidance o n the issue." Al-Shatibi also observed that the specific rulings o f the Quran are often related to a better understanding o f its general principles. For exam-

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pie, the f o l l o w i n g proclamations i n the Quran lay d o w n basic values rather than specific rules and procedures: " G o d permitted sale and prohibited usury" (Quran 2:275); " G o d does not intend to impose hardship u p o n people" (Quran 5:6); the charge to believers to "cooperate i n pursuit o f good works and piety and cooperate not i n hostility and s i n " (Quran 5:2); another charge to believers to "obey G o d and obey the Messenger and those w h o are i n charge o f affairs" (Quran 4 : 5 9 ) , or the precechng text i n the same chapter (Quran 4:58), addressing believers to " r e n der the trust al-amanat to w h o m that they belong and w h e n y o u judge among people, y o u judge w i t h justice"; and the proclamation regarding punishment " a n d the recompense o f evil is an evil equivalent to it, but one w h o forgives and makes reconciliation, his reward is w i t h G o d " (Quran 42:40). (Arnonat here include a variety o f public functions—a witness i n court, a judge, the guardian o f a m i n o r , or a holder o f public office—and also an object that is b o r r o w e d o n trust. Because a reference to justice immediately follows i n the verse, justice is understood to be one o f the most important amanat.) I n each case, the text is concerned w i t h laying d o w n a basic n o r m and a general principle, w h i c h may w e l l relate to new developments and be given a fresh interpretation i n light o f unprecedented issues. This is evident i n the f o l l o w i n g commands and statements: to "consult t h e m [the c o m m u n i t y ] i n their affairs" (Quran 3:159), to " f u l f i l l your contracts" (Quran 5:1), to "devour not each other's property i n vain, unless it be through lawful trade by your m u t u a l consent" (Quran 4:29), and the statements that everyone is responsible for his o w n conduct and " n o soul shall be burdened w i t h the burden o f another"

(Quran

6:164), the statement that " G o d commands justice and fairness" (Quran 16:90), the statement that "one w h o is compelled w i t h o u t intending to violate or revolt is not to be blamed" (Quran 2:173), and so

forth.

Ratiocination (exact reasoning) is a step beyond interpretation i n that i n t e r pretation is c o n f i n e d to the w o r d s and sentences o f the text, w h i l e ratiocination looks i n t o the text's rationale and purpose. W h e n the Quranic legislation is c o m pared w i t h m o d e r n statutes, it is notable that the textual r u l i n g s o f the Q u r a n are not confined to a series o f commands and p r o h i b i t i o n s ; rather, they are an appeal to the reason and conscience o f its audience. The Quran o n numerous instances expounds the rationale, cause, objective, and purpose o f its r u l i n g s , the benefit or reward that accrues f r o m c o n f o r m i t y to its guidance or the h a r m and p u n ishment that may f o l l o w f r o m defying it. This aspect o f the Q u r a n , k n o w n as talil (rational analysis), is also manifested i n the affirmative stance that the Q u r a n takes to the exercise o f reason and i n the frequent references that it makes to those w h o t h i n k , w h o i n q u i r e i n t o the w o r l d a r o u n d t h e m and investigate, those w h o possess k n o w l e d g e and draw rational conclusions f r o m their observations. Rational analysis is an essential component o f analogical reasoning i n that analogy cannot be constructed, as previously noted, w i t h o u t the identification o f an

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effective cause that is i n c o m m o n between the o r i g i n a l case and the n e w case. Rational analysis is n o t valid w i t h regard to devotional matters, b u t outside this sphere the Shariah

encourages investigation a n d i n q u i r y

i n t o its

rules.

Ratiocination i n the Q u r a n means that the laws o f the Q u r a n are n o t i m p o s e d f o r the sake o f mere c o n f o r m i t y to rules, b u t that they a i m at the realization o f certain benefits and objectives. W h e n the effective cause, rationale, and objective o f an i n j u n c t i o n are properly ascertained, they serve as basic indicators o f the cont i n u e d validity o f that i n j u n c t i o n . Thus w h e n a r u l i n g o f the Shariah outside the sphere o f w o r s h i p n o longer serves its o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n and purpose, it is the proper role o f the scholar to substitute a suitable alternative. I n the precedent o f the Companions o f the Prophet, instances can be f o u n d i n w h i c h some o f the rulings o f the Q u r a n and the Sunna were suspended or replaced because they n o longer served the purpose for w h i c h they were initially i n t r o d u c e d . Thus the second caliph, U m a r i b n al-Khattab, suspended the share o f the muallafah al-qulub (friends o f the faith) i n the tax revenues o f zakah. These friends were people o f influence, not necessarily devout M u s l i m s , whose c o o p eration was i m p o r t a n t for the v i c t o r y o f Islam. The Quran ( 9 : 6 0 ) had assigned a share for t h e m , w h i c h the caliph discontinued o n the g r o u n d that " G o d has exalted Islam and i t is n o longer i n need o f their s u p p o r t . " The caliph thus departed, o n purely rational grounds, f r o m the letter o f the Q u r a n i n favor o f its general purpose, and his r u l i n g is generally held to be i n h a r m o n y w i t h the spirit o f the text. Also noted i n the hadith is a case i n w h i c h the Prophet declared a request by some Companions, made at a time o f price hikes i n c o m m o d i t i e s , to i n t r o d u c e price c o n t r o l i n the M e d i n a n market o n the g r o u n d that this m i g h t a m o u n t to an unfair i m p o s i t i o n o n the traders. But changed circumstances some sixty years later p r o m p t e d the M e d i n a n ulama to validate price c o n t r o l , c o m i n g to the opposite c o n c l u s i o n based o n the same concerns the Prophet

had

expressed—to prevent unfair trading and abuse—although this t i m e the h a r m was likely to affect the c o m m u n i t y as a w h o l e . A c c o r d i n g to another report, the Prophet's w i d o w Aishah reversed the r u l i n g o f the h a d i t h that had a l l o w e d w o m e n to attend the mosque for congregational prayers, stating that o w i n g to the spread o f c o r r u p t i o n , the Prophet w o u l d have done the same were he alive. Because o f changing c o n d i t i o n s i n m o d e r n times, the prevailing custom permits w o m e n ' s participation i n almost all walks o f life, a n d i t w o u l d n o t make sense n o w i f the mosque were t o be the o n l y place where w o m e n c o u l d not go. The specific cause and argument may vary i n each case, b u t the basic rationale i n these examples is the concern that the people benefit and the aversion t o irrational c o n f o r m i t y to rules that is at the r o o t o f the idea o f t a l i f Rational analysis is therefore indispensable to the n o t i o n o f independent reasoning. Only the Zahiris opposed i t , b u t the m a j o r i t y o f jurists u p h e l d i t o n the analysis that a m e c h a n i -

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According to one report, the Prophet's widow Aishah reversed the practice that had allowed women to attend the mosque for congregational prayer. In many places, including this mosque in Regent's Park, London, women still pray in a separate area.

cal reading o f the Q u r a n , o b l i v i o u s o f p u b l i c welfare and d r i v e n only by considerations o f c o n f o r m i t y a n d i m i t a t i o n , should be avoided.

Graduality and Pragmatism: Shariah-Oriented Policy Islamic law favors a gradual approach to social r e f o r m to avoid hardship that may be caused by c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h the existing reality a n d customs. This is illustrated by the fact that the Q u r a n was revealed over a p e r i o d o f twenty -three years, and m u c h o f i t was revealed i n relation to actual events. The Meccan p o r t i o n o f the Q u r a n was devoted m a i n l y to m o r a l teaching and i n s t r u c t i o n i n the new r e l i g i o n , a n d it contained little legislation. Legislation i n social affairs is almost entirely a M e d i n a n p h e n o m e n o n . Even i n M e d i n a , some o f the Quran's laws were revealed i n stages. The final ban o n d r i n k i n g w i n e , for instance, was preceded by t w o separate declarations—one merely referred to the adverse effects o f i n t o x i -

The rules governing the dress appropriate for women vary according to different interpretations of the Shariah by the various schools of law In the Islamic Republic of Iran, for example, women must cover their entire bodies except their faces, and many women there wear a chodor or full veil.

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cation and the other proscribed d r i n k i n g d u r i n g r i t u a l prayer. Both measures prepared the g r o u n d f o r the final step that banned d r i n k i n g altogether. This m a n ner o f legislation can also be seen i n reference to the five daily prayers, w h i c h were initially fixed at t w o and later were raised t o five, and the legal alms, w h i c h was initially an o p t i o n a l charity and became obligatory after the Prophet's m i g r a t i o n to Medina; fasting was also o p t i o n a l at first a n d was later made i n t o a religious duty. Some o f the Quran's earlier r u l i n g s were subsequently abrogated and replaced i n l i g h t o f n e w circumstances that the c o m m u n i t y experienced. Islamic law therefore advocates realistic r e f o r m , but i t does n o t favor abrupt revolutionary change. This is conveyed i n the response, f o r example, that the Umayyad caliph U m a r i b n A b d al-Aziz (682 o r 6 8 3 - 7 2 0 ) gave to his ambitious son A b d a l - M a l i k , w h o suggested to his father that G o d had granted h i m the p o w e r to decisively fight c o r r u p t i o n i n society once and f o r a l l . The caliph advised his son against such a course, saying that A l m i g h t y G o d H i m s e l f denounced w i n e d r i n k i n g twice before he banned i t . The caliph said: " I f I take sweeping action even i n the r i g h t cause and i n f l i c t i t o n people all at once, I fear revolt and the possibility that they may also reject i t all at once." C o m m e n t i n g o n this.Yusuf al-Qaradawi w r o t e : "This is a correct understanding o f Islam, the k i n d o f understanding that is i m p l i e d i n the very m e a n i n g o f fiqh and w o u l d be unquestionably upheld by i t . " The pragmatism o f the Shariah is also manifested i n the frequent concessions it makes concerning those w h o face h a r d s h i p — f o r instance, difficulties the sick, the elderly, pregnant w o m e n , and travelers m i g h t f i n d i n daily prayers and fasting. It also makes provisions f o r extraordinary a n d emergency situations i n w h i c h the rules o f Shariah may be temporarily suspended o n grounds o f necessity. Thus, according to a legal m a x i m , the verdict o f the m u f t i must take i n t o consideration the change o f time and circumstances. For instance, people w ere r

not allowed i n the early days o f Islam to charge a fee f o r teaching the Q u r a n , as this was considered an act o f spiritual m e r i t . But w h e n people d i d not volunteer and the teaching o f the Q u r a n suffered a decline, the jurists consequently issued a verdict that reversed the p o s i t i o n a n d allowed teachers to be p a i d . Another example is the pragmatic verdict o f I m a m M a l i k that p e r m i t t e d the pledging o f allegiance (bayah) to the lesser qualified o f t w o candidates for leadership, i f that were deemed to be i n the public interest. The n o r m a l rule r e q u i r e d , o f course, that allegiance should only be given to the best q u a l i f i e d candidate. Similarly, n o r m a l rules require that a judge must be a qualified jurist and scholar, but a person o f lesser qualification may be appointed should there be a shortage o f q u a l ified people f o r j u d i c i a l posts. This also applies to a witness, w h o must be an honest person. If, however, the o n l y witness i n a case is a less-than-honest person the judge may admit the witness and adjudicate the case i f this is the only

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reasonable alternative available. Finally, the Prophet's w i d o w , Aishah, reported that "the Prophet d i d n o t choose but the easier o f t w o alternatives, so l o n g as i t d i d not a m o u n t to a s i n . " Thus the judge, jurist, and ruler are advised n o t to o p t for m o r e onerous decisions i f easier o p t i o n s c o u l d he equally justified. I n its broad scope, Shariah-oriented p u b l i c p o l i c y (siyasah shariyyah) authorizes government leaders to conduct government affairs i n h a r m o n y w i t h the spirit and purpose o f the Shariah, even at the expense o f a t e m p o r a r y departure f r o m its specific rules. The t w o most i m p o r t a n t objectives o f this p o l i c y are the reali z a t i o n o f social benefit and the prevention o f evil. Shariah-oriented policy is an i n s t r u m e n t o f good government, and it applies b o t h w i t h i n and outside the parameters o f the established Shariah, a l t h o u g h some ulama have h e l d that there is n o p o l i c y outside the Shariah itself. A c c o r d i n g to the H a n b a l i scholar I b n Q a y y i m al-Jawziyyah i n Al-Turuq ai-Hukmiyyah (Methods o f J u d g m e n t ) : Siyasah shariyyah includes all measures which bring the people closer to beneficence and furthest away from corruption, even i f it has not been approved by the Prophet (peace be upon him) nor regulated by divine revelation. Anyone who says that there is no siyasah shariyyah where the Shariah itself is silent is wrong. . . . A n y measures taken by a l a w f u l ruler that i n his j u d g m e n t secure a benefit o r repel a m i s c h i e f fall w i t h i n the a m b i t o f siyasah. The scope o f public p o l i c y (siyasah) is therefore exceedingly w i d e , as i t encompasses matters o f concern n o t o n l y to law but also to economic development, a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and politics. The Quranic a u t h o r i t y for siyasah is f o u n d i n its p r i n c i p l e o f e n j o i n i n g g o o d and f o r b i d d i n g evil, w h i c h is enunciated i n several places i n the Q u r a n . There are also numerous instances o f siyasah i n the Sunna o f the Prophet and i n the precedent o f the pious caliphs (the f o u r caliphs w h o r u l e d d u r i n g the forty years i m m e d i ately after the Prophet's death). Siyasah thus enables government leaders a n d judges to be effective i n responding to circumstances, b o t h under n o r m a l c o n ditions and i n emergency situations. I b n Q a y y i m thus observed that whoever sets free the accused for w a n t o f witnesses after he takes an oath swearing his i n n o cence, even t h o u g h he has the reputation for c o r r u p t i o n and robberies, verily acts contrary to siyasah. Conversely, it w o u l d be contrary to siyasah for a judge to treat a first offender w i t h the same degree o f severity as a recidivist w h o has an established record o f c r i m i n a l i t y and violence. Shariah-oriented policy may operate i n any o f the f o l l o w i n g f o u r ways: First, it can restrict what is permissible i n order to secure a benefit o r to prevent h a r m . A n example o f this is the caliph U m a r i b n al-Khattab's decision to ask the people n o t to consume meat o n t w o consecutive days i n a week at a t i m e w h e n meat was i n short supply i n M e d i n a . Other examples m i g h t be to specify a m a x i m u m

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acreage for certain agricultural crops o r to restrict i m p o r t s o f certain items i n order t o protect national industries. Second, it can legislate b o t h w i t h i n and outside the Shariah-regulated areas. This is an extensive field i n w h i c h p o l i c y can be used to great advantage, n o t only i n the sense o f administering the existing Shariah but also i n i n i t i a t i n g n e w law i n other areas. Legislation may be i n t r o d u c e d to i m p l e m e n t the Quranic i n j u n c tions o n consultation, equality, and justice—subjects o n w h i c h basic guidelines are f o u n d i n the Q u r a n but that must be adequately regulated i n l i g h t o f prevailing conditions. The r u l e r may also initiate new legislation. A n example o f this is the precedent set by the caliph Umar, w h o was once m a k i n g one o f his n i g h t tours o f Medina w h e n he heard the persistent cries o f a c h i l d . He alerted the child's m o t h e r but later he heard that the infant was still crying. U p o n f u r t h e r i n q u i r y , i t t u r n e d out that the w o m a n had weaned the c h i l d too early, because the caliph had allowed o n l y c h i l d r e n w h o had been weaned to o b t a i n welfare assistance. Consequently, the caliph issued orders that entitled c h i l d r e n o f all ages to welfare assistance. T h i r d , there is the possibility o f selecting one o f several available solutions. Should there be several juristic views o n a certain issue, the r u l e r may select one that he considers to be most suitable. W h e n he does so, his r u l i n g becomes the authoritative r u l i n g o f the Shariah to the exclusion o f all other interpretations. This is the subject o f a legal m a x i m that reads: "The c o m m a n d o f the i m a m puts an end t o disagreement." A n d finally, i n the area o f penal law, a p p l y i n g the deterrent p u n i s h m e n t (tazir), w h i c h is an i n s t r u m e n t o f siyasah, enables the judge t o exercise

flexibility

in

selecting b o t h the type and the q u a n t i t y o f p u n i s h m e n t that m i g h t seem suitable i n a case before h i m . This p u n i s h m e n t may vary f r o m a mere verbal a d m o n i t i o n to c o r p o r a l p u n i s h m e n t to i m p r i s o n m e n t and fines. It may be ordered o n l y by competent authorities and o n l y as a result o f conduct that amounts to a violation.

I n other w o r d s , the judge may not create the offense and may o n l y penal-

ize w h a t is a v i o l a t i o n under Shariah i n the first place.

The Coirirnuriity Versus the Individual Many commentators have held the v i e w that the d i v i n e Shariah does n o t relate to the concerns o f society i n the way that h u m a n - m a d e laws are expected to do. Instead o f taking its o r i g i n f r o m the needs and aspirations o f society, Islamic lawexpects the society t o c o n f o r m w i t h its mandate. I n this view. Islamic law is s h o w n to be nonparticipatory and authoritarian. But attention must be given to a different side o f this picture: Islamic legal theory also incorporates general c o n sensus (ij'ma), considerations o f p u b l i c interest (istisloh), and social c u s t o m (urf)

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a m o n g the recognized sources o f

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Consensus is particularly i m p o r t a n t because i t is the b i n d i n g source that ranks i n a u t h o r i t y next to the Q u r a n and the Sunna. F u r t h e r m o r e , the Q u r a n proclaims consultation as a p r i n c i p l e o f g o v e r n m e n t and a m e t h o d that m u s t be applied i n the administration o f p u b l i c affairs. Islamic legal theory thus recognizes a n u m b e r o f nonrevealed sources that are eminently participatory and founded i n social need and c o n sensus. F r o m this perspective.

Islamic l a w

responds positively to the prospect o f legislat i o n o n rationalist and u t i l i t a r i a n grounds that accommodate social change. The populist base o f Islamic law is strong e n o u g h to persuade many M u s l i m c o m m e n t a tors t o embrace the m i n o r i t y v i e w that sovereignty

i n an Islamic state belongs

to

the

M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y (ummoh). This is because i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theory o f the Shariah, t h e head o f state acts i n his capacity as the representative (wakil) o f the people, and he may be deposed by the people i n the event o f a flagrant v i o l a t i o n o f the Shariah. Legal theory recognizes general consensus as a b i n d i n g source o f law, and the government is also b o u n d by the Quranic mandate to consult the c o m m u n i t y i n public affairs. The conclusion is dial the M u s l i m

Muslim law extends into many areas of finance and banking. Muslims are obliged to pay alms and are forbidden to practice

c o m m u n i t y is the repository o f w h a t is k n o w n

usury. Islamic banks, as in this example from Doha, in Qatar,

as executive sovereignty. The m a j o r i t y v i e w ,

combine modern finance with the requirements of Muslim law.

however, is that sovereignty i n the Islamic state belongs exclusively to G o d , whose w i l l and c o m m a n d , w h i c h is the Shariah, binds the c o m m u n i t y and state. The d i g n i f i e d status o f the c o m m u n i t y finds supp o r t i n its Quranic designation as the vicegerent o f G o d i n the earth ( Q u r a n 22:31) and the declaration that G o d has subjugated the earth and the entire created universe for the benefit o f h u m a n beings (Quran 45:12). Public interest is n o t o n l y recognized as a source o f law, but Islamic law f u r ther requires that governmental affairs must be conducted i n accordance w i t h public interest. This is the subject o f a legal m a x i m that declares: "The affairs o f the i m a m are d e t e r m i n e d by reference to p u b l i c interest." A c c o r d i n g to another

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legal m a x i m , instances o f conflict between public and private interests must be determined i n favor o f public interests. Public interest is thus the c r i t e r i o n by w h i c h the success or failure o f government is measured f r o m the perspective o f the Shariah. Furthermore, the Q u r a n and the Sunna are emphatic o n solidarity w i t h the vast m a j o r i t y o f the c o m m u n i t y o f believers (jamaa). I n a n u m b e r o f places the Quran simultaneously praises and defines the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y as "a m i d most n a t i o n " (2:143),

a

nation o f m o d e r a t i o n that is averse to extremism; " i t

enjoins g o o d and forbids e v i l " (3:109); a c o m m u n i t y that is c o m m i t t e d to the t r u t h and administers justice o n its basis (7:181); a c o m m u n i t y that advocates u n i t y and shuns separation (3:102 and 21:92); and a c o m m u n i t y that i n its advocacy o f t r u t h is a witness u n t o itself and over m a n k i n d (16:89

a n

d

2 :

The

jurists have consequently f o r m u l a t e d the doctrine o f the i n f a l l i b i l i t y o f the c o l lective w i l l o f the c o m m u n i t y , w h i c h is the d o c t r i n a l basis o f consensus. A l t h o u g h consensus consists o f the agreement o f the jurists, they must act i n the capacity o f the representatives o f the c o m m u n i t y . Representation as such does not change the o r i g i n a l locus o f authority, w h i c h still remains the M u s l i m c o m m u nity. The Sunna is also emphatic o n solidarity w i t h the c o m m u n i t y , w h i c h is the subject o f numerous hadiths, i n c l u d i n g the f o l l o w i n g : " W h o e v e r separates h i m self f r o m the c o m m u n i t y and dies, dies the death o f ignorance [jahiliyyah]"; and "Whoever boycotts the c o m m u n i t y and separates himself f r o m it by the measure o f a span is severing his b o n d w i t h Islam." N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the concern o f the Shariah for social w e l l - b e i n g , the Shariah is also inherently i n d i v i d u a l i s t . Religion is a matter p r i m a r i l y o f i n d i v i d u a l c o n science. As religious law, the Shariah exhibits the same tendency. The i n d i v i d u alist o r i e n t a t i o n o f the Shariah is manifested i n a variety o f ways, i n c l u d i n g the fact, f o r instance, that the rules o f Shariah are addressed directly to the legally competent i n d i v i d u a l . The Shariah's focus o n the i n d i v i d u a l was evidently strong enough to persuade the Kharijites (literally, "outsiders"), w h o boycotted the c o m m u n i t y i n the early decades o f Islam, and the Mutazilite followers o f A b u Bakr al-Asamm i n the late eighth-century e m i g r a t i o n to embrace the minorityv i e w that f o r m i n g a government was not a religious o b l i g a t i o n . For the Shariah addresses the i n d i v i d u a l directly; i f every i n d i v i d u a l c o m p l i e d w i t h the Shariah, justice and peace w o u l d prevail even w i t h o u t a government. These and similar views were expressed w i t h i n a context that assumed basic h a r m o n y between the interests o f the i n d i v i d u a l and those o f the c o m m u n i t y . This is a corollary o f the Quranic doctrine o f m o n o t h e i s m (tawhid), that is, the oneness o f being that encourages u n i t y and integration i n Islamic t h o u g h t and institutions and discourages duality and conflict: God created the universe and every part o f i t is reflective o f the u n i t y o f its source and consequently synchronized w i t h every

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other part. Religion is inseparable f r o m politics, morality, and economics, just as the h u m a n personality cannot be compartmentalized i n t o religious, political, and economic segments. Broadly speaking, Islam pursues its social objectives t h r o u g h r e f o r m i n g the i n d i v i d u a l . The ritual ablution before prayer, the five daily prayers, fasting d u r i n g the m o n t h o f Ramadan, and the o b l i g a t o r y g i v i n g o f charity all encourage punctuality, self-discipline, and concern f o r the w e l l - b e i n g o f others. The i n d i v i d u a l is also seen not just as a m e m b e r o f the c o m m u n i t y and subservient to the c o m m u n i t y ' s w i l l , but also as a m o r a l l y a u t o n o m o u s agent w h o plays a distinctive role i n shaping the c o m m u n i t y ' s sense o f direction and purpose. This can be seen, f o r example, i n the c o n d i t i o n s that the Q u r a n and the Sunna have attached to the individual's d u t y o f obedience to the government, and the r i g h t the i n d i v i d u a l is simultaneously granted to dispute w i t h the rulers over governm e n t affairs ( Q u r a n 4:5-9). The i n d i v i d u a l obeys the ruler o n the c o n d i t i o n that the r u l e r obeys the Shariah. This is reflected i n the declaration o f the h a d i t h that "there is no obedience i n transgression; obedience is only i n righteousness." The citizen is thus entitled to disobey an oppressive c o m m a n d that is contrary to the Shariah. The hadiths convey a general r u l i n g that applies to all contexts, m i l i t a r y or otherwise. But the general r u l i n g o f the Q u r a n and the Sunna, according to the m a j o r i t y ( e x c l u d i n g the Hanafi school), is speculative and may be specified or qualified o n rational grounds. Other hadiths substantiate the m o r a l a u t o n o m y o f the i n d i v i d u a l . One o f these instructs the believers to " t e l l the t r u t h even i f i t be unpleasant"; the other declares that "the best f o r m o f jihad [ h o l y struggle] is to tell a w o r d o f t r u t h to an oppressive ruler." Because these hadiths are also conveyed i n general terms, their messages are not confined to m o r a l teaching; rather, they may be adopted i n t o legal rules. The d i g n i t y o f the h u m a n being is a central concern o f Islamic law. This is the clear message o f many o f God's proclamations i n the Q u r a n : " W e have bestowed d i g n i t y o n the progeny o f A d a m " (17:70), " W e created humans i n the best o f f o r m s " (95:17), and i n the a f f i r m a t i o n that " I breathed i n t o A d a m o f M y s p i r i t " (38:71) and " e n d o w e d h i m w i t h a s p i r i t u a l rank above that o f the angels" (2:30 and 17:70). The five essential values o f Shariah, o n w h i c h the u l a m a are i n agreement—-faith, l i f e , i n t e l l e c t , p r o p e r t y , and

lineage—are

premised o n the d i g n i t y o f the h u m a n being, w h i c h must be protected as a matter o f p r i o r i t y . A l t h o u g h the basic interests o f the c o m m u n i t y and those o f the i n d i v i d u a l may be said to coincide w i t h i n the structure o f these values, the focus is nevertheless o n the i n d i v i d u a l . The Quranic p r i n c i p l e o f e n j o i n i n g g o o d and f o r b i d d i n g evil is supportive o f the m o r a l a u t o n o m y o f the i n d i v i d u a l . This p r i n c i p l e authorizes the i n d i v i d u a l to act according to his or her best j u d g m e n t i n situations i n w h i c h his or her

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i n t e r v e n t i o n w o u l d advance a good purpose. The individualist m o o r i n g s o f this p r i n c i p l e can be seen i n a h a d i t h that addresses the believers i n the f o l l o w i n g manner: " I f any o f y o u sees an evil, let h i m change i t by his h a n d , and i f he is unable t o d o that, let h i m change it by his w o r d s , and i f he is still unable to d o that, then let h i m denounce i t i n his heart, but this is the weakest f o r m o f belief." This principle assigns to the i n d i v i d u a l an active role i n the c o m m u n i t y i n w h i c h he or she lives. It also validates i n p r i n c i p l e the citizen's power o f arrest, but i t is only o n grounds o f caution that the police have been made the exclusive reposi t o r y o f this power. The jurists have dealt w i t h the details o f this concept at length. Suffice i t to say that a person must act o u t o f c o n v i c t i o n w h e n he believes mat the initiative taken is likely to achieve the desired result. H e is advised n o t to d o anything i f he is convinced that his i n t e r v e n t i o n , however w e l l intended, m i g h t cause a h a r m equal to or greater than the one he is t r y i n g to avert. Another Quranic p r i n c i p l e that supports m o r a l autonomy o f the i n d i v i d u a l is that o f sincere advice (nosihah), w h i c h entitles everyone to advise and to alert a fellow citizen, i n c l u d i n g the head o f state and his officials, to w h a t she considers to be o f benefit or to w h a t may rectify an error o n her part. The m a i n d i f f e r ence between the p r i n c i p l e o f e n j o i n i n g g o o d and f o r b i d d i n g evil and that o f sincere advice is that the former is concerned w i t h events that are actually w i t nessed at the t i m e they occur, but the latter is n o t confined to the actual m o m e n t o f direct observation. Therefore i t is m o r e flexible. The broad scope o f sincere advice is clearly depicted i n a h a d i t h i n w h i c h die Prophet declared that " r e l i g i o n is good advice." Religion, i n other w o r d s , is meant to be the agent o f benefit and a r e m i n d e r to g o o d . These individualist leanings o f the Shariah are also evident f r o m the familiar tone o f the Quranic address to the believers to "take care o f y o u r o w n selves. I f y o u are righteous, the m i s g u i d e d w i l l not succeed i n t r y i n g to lead y o u astray . . ." (Quran 5:10c). W i t h i n the context o f m a t r i m o n y , f o r example, the Shariah opts f o r the separation o f property, and the wife's r i g h t to manage her o w n financial affairs remains unaffected by her marriage. Once again, although Islam encourages the call to r e l i g i o n (dawa), i t proclaims nevertheless that "there shall be n o c o m p u l s i o n i n r e l i g i o n " ( Q u r a n 2:256). For example, a husband is required to respect the i n d i v i d u a l i t y o f his n o n - M u s l i m w i f e ; he is therefore not allowed to press her i n t o embracing Islam. The individualist propensities o f Islamic law can also be seen i n the history o f its development. For instance, Islamic law is often characterized as the jurists' law, developed m a i n l y by private jurists w h o made their c o n t r i b u t i o n s p r i m a r i l y as pious i n d i v i d u a l s rather than as government functionaries and leaders. This aspect o f Islam's legal history is also seen as a stabilizing factor i n that i t was not particularly dependent o n government participation and support. Governments came and w e n t but the Shariah remained as the c o m m o n law o f the Muslims.

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A n o t h e r d i m e n s i o n o f Islam's individualist propensities is that relations between governments and the ulama remained generally less than amicable ever since the early years o f the U m a y y a d r u l e (661-750). The secularist tendencies o f the Umayyad rulers marked the end o f the "Righteous Caliphate"; the ulama became increasingly critical o f this change o f d i r e c t i o n i n the system o f government. The ulama retained their independence by t u r n i n g to p r o m i n e n t individuals a m o n g t h e m , w h i c h led eventually to the f o r m a t i o n o f the schools o f law that bore the names o f their founders (Hanafi, M a l i k i , and so o n ) . One o f the consequences o f this pattern o f development was that Islamic law made few concessions to the g o v e r n m e n t . The i m m u n i t i e s against p r o s e c u t i o n , f o r example, w h i c h are enjoyed to this day by the m o n a r c h , the head o f state, state assemblies, and d i p l o mats in other legal systems, are totally absent in Islamic law. N o one can claim any i m m u n i t y for his or her conduct merely o n account o f social and official status. Trial procedures i n the courts o f Shariah consequently d i d not p e r m i t the judge to treat the head o f state, i f he were involved i n a dispute, any differently than other citizens. There have been many instances o f this i n legal history. The schools o f law f u n c t i o n e d as g u i l d s and professional associations i n w h i c h o u t s t a n d i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n s f o u n d r e c o g n i t i o n and s u p p o r t , even i f they w e n t against o f f i c i a l policy. The t w o most i m p o r t a n t p r i n c i p l e s o f Islamic law-—personal reasoning (ijtihad) and general consensus (ijma)—can be c o n d u c t e d by jurists w i t h o u t d e p e n d i n g o n the p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f the g o v e r n m e n t i n power. These t w o p r i n c i p l e s manifested the nearest equivalent o f parliam e n t a r y legislation i n m o d e r n times. Personal reasoning has almost always been practiced by i n d i v i d u a l jurists. General consensus is broadly described as the u n a n i m o u s consensus o f the q u a l i f i e d scholars (mujtahidiin) o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y o n the r u l i n g o f a particular issue. As such, consensus can be i n i tiated by i n d i v i d u a l jurists, c o n c l u d e d , and made b i n d i n g o n the g o v e r n m e n t even w i t h o u t the latter's p a r t i c i p a t i o n . N e i t h e r i j t i h a d n o r i j m a were i n s t i t u tionalized and have r e m a i n e d u n i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d to this day. The j u r i s t w h o carries o u t i n d e p e n d e n t reasoning i n theory enjoys c o m p l e t e

independence

f r o m g o v e r n m e n t and is o n l y expected t o act o n the substantive m e r i t o f each case i n l i n e w i t h the correct procedure o f i j t i h a d . It is n o t s u r p r i s i n g therefore t o see that c o m m e n t a t o r s have described Islamic law and its m a i n advocates, the u l a m a , as c h a m p i o n s o f the r i g h t s o f the i n d i v i d u a l and bulwarks against arbitrary exercise o f o f f i c i a l power.

Consolidation, Reform, and the Current Status of Islamic LawPoor access t o Islamic law has been one o f the problems that has hampered efforts t o w a r d the revival o f rational and independent reasoning. The bulk o f

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scholastic Islarriic law is contained i n v o l u m i n o u s w o r k s o f medieval o r i g i n i n Arabic, w h i c h are p o o r l y classified and d i f f i c u l t t o use; this scholarship tends t o w a r d scholastic exclusivism and isolation. The 1876 O t t o m a n w o r k entitled Mejelle was an attempt by the Turkish government and the ulama t o c o d i f y the Hanafi law o f c i v i l transactions. It contains 1,8çi

articles that p r i m a r i l y address

contracts and transactions, evidence and c o u r t procedures, b u t i t excludes f a m ily law. It was f o l l o w e d i n 1917

b y the p r o m u l g a t i o n i n Turkey o f the Law o f

Family Rights. This law used Hanafi fiqh as w e l l as that o f the other three legal schools m o r e w i d e l y than the Mejelle. A l t h o u g h Turkey itself abandoned these laws, the w o r k s remained influential nevertheless. The 1929 Egyptian Law o f Personal Status d r e w not o n l y f r o m the justice legacy o f the f o u r leading schools but also f r o m the o p i n i o n s o f i n d i v i d u a l jurists, w h e n these issues were deemed to be conducive t o p u b l i c interest. The 1953 Syrian Law o f Personal Status was another step i n the d i r e c t i o n o f a t t e m p t i n g independent reasoning t h r o u g h the m o d a l i t y o f statutory legislation. This n e o - i j t i h a d i approach to legislation was f o l l o w e d by similar attempts i n M o r o c c o , Tunisia, Iraq, and Pakistan, w h e r e statutory reforms were i n t r o d u c e d i n the traditionally Shariah-dominated laws o f marriage, polygyny, and divorce. The Islamic Law Conference that was held i n Paris i n 19Ç1 called for the c o m pilation o f a comprehensive encyclopedia o f fiqh, and several projects were undertaken t o w a r d that end. The University o f Damascus began a project i n 1956, and the governments o f Egypt and Kuwait started their o w n projects i n 19Ç1 and 1971, respectively. The Egyptian and K u w a i t i encyclopedias, b o t h beari n g the title al-Mawsua uI-Fiqhiyya, have each exceeded t h i r t y volumes. The K u w a i t i e d i t i o n is soon to be completed, but its Egyptian counterpart is far f r o m ready. These and other c o m p i l a t i o n projects have s h o w n latitude by treating the major schools o f fiqh strictly o n the m e r i t o f their contributions. The i n f o r m a t i o n c o m piled is relatively free o f sectarian bias. Yet by the very terms o f their reference, the encyclopedic collections were designed to consolidate rather than to r e f o r m existing Islamic law. U n d o u b t e d l y they provide valuable resources, but they c o n sist basically o f an uncritical description o f the scholastic heritage o f fiqh. The need was then felt to supplement and e n r i c h the scope o f these endeavors by estabhshing a f o r u m to facilitate collective interpretation o n new issues. A project was undertaken by the Organization o f Islamic Conference, w h i c h led to the f o r m a t i o n o f the F i q h Academy i n Jidda, Saudi Arabia, i n 1981 and another Fiqh Academy i n Mecca b y the M u s l i m League. India and Pakistan have each established fiqh and Shariah academies o f their o w n . There are also a n u m b e r o f international institutes and organizations that undertake specialized research i n Islamic legal themes. A n even earlier attempt along these lines was made by ah Azhar University i n Cairo, w hich set u p the Islamic Research Academy i n r

1961.

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F o l l o w i n g that. King A b d u l Aziz U n i v e r s i t y i n Jidda established its International Center f o r Islamic Economic

Research i n 1977.

The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Islamic

University o f Malaysia and that o f Islamabad started operations i n the early 1980s and b o t h institutions are currently b u i l d i n g a stronger and m o r e balanced i n f r a structure for specialized research efforts i n Islamic law. Islamic law relates to society m o r e effectively i n some areas than others. I n the areas o f m a t r i m o n i a l law and inheritance, the Shariah has remained i n force w i t h revisions and has been adopted by statutory legislation i n almost every M u s l i m country. Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan have generally retained the Shariah. I n most other areas, however, the Shariah has been marginalized for many reasons. Some o f the earlier distortions, such as the closing o f the d o o r o f ijtihad and the ensuing prevalence o f the imitative t r a d i t i o n o f taqlid, were exacerbated by persistent alienation between the ulama and government. This was condoned and reinforced by the subsequent d o m i n a t i o n o f Western colonialism and the ascendant secularity that came w i t h i t . Western law d o m i n a t e d almost every aspect o f the law, f r o m constitutional to c o m m e r c i a l law, to c i v i l l i t i g a t i o n , c r i m i n a l p r o cedure, and evidence. The a b o l i t i o n o f Shariah courts i n Egypt i n the late n i n e teenth century was f o l l o w e d by similar developments i n other countries and the prevalence o f national courts that often c o m b i n e d elements o f b o t h Western and Shariah laws. This pattern is c u r r e n t l y prevalent i n most M u s l i m countries, a l t h o u g h some countries, such as Malaysia, operate a dual system o f national and Shariah courts, each h a v i n g separate j u r i s d i c t i o n s . I n recent decades many M u s l i m countries have attempted to revive the Shariah o n a selective basis and i n v a r y i n g degrees. O n l y Iran has adopted i t generally. Measures have also been taken i n M i d d l e Eastern countries, Pakistan, Sudan, Egypt, and elsewhere to c o n f i r m that their constitutions and laws o f court procedure, property, and evidence are acceptable to the Shariah. The latest development i n Malaysia was the government's announcement i n early 1997 that they w o u l d raise the status o f the Shariah courts, to b r i n g t h e m u p to that o f the c i v i l courts. Islamic laws o f transactions have also seen a concerted revivalist effort i n the wake o f successful experiments i n Islamic banking. Considerable interest is also taken by Islamic institutions o f higher learning i n the Islamization o f disciplines, w i t h a v i e w to h a r m o n i z i n g the teaching o f social sciences and humanities w i t h Islamic values and o u t l o o k . These efforts continue, but they have not been devoid o f difficulties because o f p o l i t i c a l upheavals and unrest that have been a feature o f the Islamic resurgence movement i n recent decades. Governments i n M u s l i m lands are apprehensive o f these m o v e m e n t s and the prospect o f the ulama and Islamist ascendancy to power. The Algerian experience i n the mid-1990s, w h i c h has involved violent c o n f r o n t a t i o n between the religious strata and government, and

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T H F OXFORD HISTORY OF ISLAM

the collapse i n June 1997 o f the Islamist government i n Turkey are cases i n p o i n t . Iran's example o f Islamic r e v o l u t i o n evidently has not been f o l l o w e d i n other M u s l i m countries. To a large extent, this revolution has remained a significant but nonetheless exceptional development. The i n d i v i d u a l i s t propensities o f the Islamic legal t h e o r y have already been discussed i n this chapter. The q u e s t i o n n o w is w h e t h e r the c o n t e m p o r a r y M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y has i n h e r i t e d a legacy that is o f t e n at odds w i t h t h e i r p r e v a i l i n g p o l i t i c a l reality and experience. Perhaps Islamic legal t h o u g h t has traveled t o o far i n its i n d i v i d u a l i s t , even a n t i g o v e r n m e n t , o r i e n t a t i o n t o offer easy o p t i o n s i n an era i n w h i c h the nation-state a n d its legal m a c h i n e r y have become increasingly collectivist and representative. Unless r e f o r m i s t measures The community of believers is exemplified by the gathering of Muslims for communal prayer in the congregational mosque at

are i n t r o d u c e d to make i n d e p e n d e n t reasoning a c o n c e r n o f the legislative assembly and p a r l i a m e n t , its practice by the p r i v a t e j u r i s t is n o l o n g e r a realistic alternative. Regarding the p r i n c i p l e o f consensus, i t basically envisioned the agreement o f private jurists w h o are relatively u n i n v o l v e d i n state affairs.

noon on Fridays and for

As such, the m a i n issue is also one o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n and the prospect o f

major religious holidays.

m a k i n g i t a part o f the n o r m a l f u n c t i o n o f the state m a c h i n e r y , measures that

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have been suggested m o r e than h a l f a c e n t u r y ago but that have r e m a i n e d u n f u l f i l l e d . The secularist o r i e n t a t i o n s o f the nation-state i n present-day M u s l i m c o u n t r i e s are n o t p a r t i c u l a r l y c o n d u c i v e to the revival o f consensus and independent reasoning as the p r i n c i p a l modes o f statutory legislation. But even so, a basic change o f d i r e c t i o n appears to have taken place, as there is n o w greater awareness o f Islamic values. F u r t h e r m o r e , the pressure o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n c o u n t r i e s w i t h m a j o r i t y M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n s is likely to i n f l u e n c e g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c y i n m a k i n g the Shariah a reality o f M u s l i m life. The era o f r e v o l u t i o n seems to be w a n i n g , and it is increasingly g i v i n g way t o selective a n d gradual restoration o f the Shariah t h r o u g h the recognized channels o f legal r e f o r m .

CHAPTER

FOUR

Science, Medicine, and Technology THE MAKING OF A SCIENTIFIC CULTURE

Ahmad Dallai

Science was an extensive cultural undertaking that occupied the m i n d s and energies o f many o f the leading intellectuals i n medieval M u s l i m societies. Indeed, science was practiced o n a scale unprecedented i n earlier or contemporary h u m a n history. I n urban centers f r o m the Atlantic to the borders o f China, thousands o f scientists pursued careers i n diverse scientific disciplines. Countless artifacts, rangi n g f r o m architectural m o n u m e n t s to intricate automata and instruments provide a v i v i d testimony to the scientific and technological achievements o f these scientists. Their w r i t t e n contributions are equally c o m p e l l i n g : thousands o f scientific manuscripts, f r o m various regions o f the medieval Islamic w o r l d , are scattered i n m o d e r n libraries all over the globe. Considerable resources were also devoted for

(Left) Astromony, one of the

the support o f scientific activity i n M u s l i m societies. U n t i l the rise o f m o d e r n sci-

oldest and most esteemed

ence, n o other civilization engaged as many scientists, produced as many scientific books, or provided as varied and sustained support for scientific activity.

exact sciences in antiquity, flourished in the Islamic lands from the ninth cen-

The study o f the history o f Islamic science is itself an extensive endeavor: i t calls

tury, when major Greek

for an examination o f wide-ranging cultural activities, i n a vast geographical area,

astronomical texts were

under different historical conditions, and for a period o f at least seven centuries. The sources for the study o f this subject are equally daunting, even w h e n only w r i t t e n evidence is examined. Historians o f Islamic science are fortunate to have a large number o f extant scientific manuscripts that promise to shed light o n its history. This abundance gives rise to a number o f methodological difficulties, however. Earlier

translated into Arabic. Manyastronomers served the court, as in this depiction of the observatory established by the Ottomans in 1575 at Istanbul.

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surveys o f the history o f Islamic science were based o n a handful o f random studies o f scientific treatises. Some o f the actual studies were o f a h i g h quality; yet i r o n ically, the paucity o f hard evidence available to early scholars often enabled them to cover all the fields o f science i n all-inclusive and often reductive narratives. I n the past few decades many more scientific treatises have been critically examined, w i t h the dual effect o f providing detailed i n f o r m a t i o n about die various scientific disciplines and highlighting the peculiarity o f the history o f each separate discipline or even fields w i t h i n disciplines.

The Cultural Context of Early Muslim Science Despite the significant increase i n studies o f Islamic science, the vast m a j o r i t y o f scientific manuscripts r e m a i n unexamined. Consider the example o f a l - B i r u n i ( 9 7 3 - 1 0 4 8 ) , one o f the greatest M u s l i m scientists o f all t i m e . A l - B i r u n i w r o t e more than 150 w o r k s , o f w h i c h only a t h i r d are extant. A l t h o u g h he is the most studied o f all M u s l i m scientists, about half o f his w o r k s have yet to be edited or to receive t h o r o u g h analysis. Other scientists are less fortunate, and many are k n o w n o n l y by name. This s h o r t c o m i n g n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , the recent accumulat i o n o f studies has enabled several historians o f Islamic science to provide m o r e i n f o r m e d and differentiated accounts o f the scientific disciplines. D r a w i n g o n these historical overviews, this chapter provides an account o f the scope and c u l tural significance o f scientific activity i n Islamic societies, and o f the m a i n trends i n the development o f specific scientific disciplines. Like most histories o f science, this chapter traces scientific developments under a succession o f famous scientists. The focus o n individuals may give the misleadi n g impression o f a linear course o f f o r w a r d progress that connects the various individuals u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n . The advance o f science, however, is s e l d o m orderly or predictable: new theories often coexist w i t h o l d ones for l o n g periods o f t i m e before they succeed i n replacing the o l d theories; the importance o f a new idea may sometimes go unnoticed for decades or even centuries before i t is revived and adopted; and scientific progress i n general seems to occur i n leaps rather than i n a s m o o t h f o r w a r d flow. It w o u l d be more misleading to suggest that the scientific developments i n Islamic societies were isolated occurrences, h o w ever, or to attribute such advances simply to the personal genius o f individual scientists. For every celebrated scientist k n o w n to have conducted rigorous research i n any field, there are many more practitioners w h o — a l t h o u g h they may not have made significant advances i n their

fields—provided

the context w i t h o u t w h i c h

such advances w o u l d have been impossible. Therefore, i t is essential to recognize the existence o f a scientific culture that enabled seemingly disjointed leaps f r o m one invention to another, and o f communities o f scientists that provided t e m p o -

S C I E N C E , M E D I C I N E , AND T E C H N O L O G Y

ral and spatial c o n t i n u i t y for the culture o f science. Recent research has p r o v i d e d c o m p e l l i n g evidence f o r the c o n t i n u i t y and coherence o f Arabic scientific traditions. Examples can be f o u n d i n the t r a d i t i o n o f r e f o r m i n g Ptolemaic astronomy that started i n the eleventh century and c o n tinued u n t i l at least the sixteenth, and that spanned most o f the Islamic w o r l d . Similarly, research o n the various disciplines o f Arabic mathematics has revealed that for each instance o f seemingly isolated scientific breakthrough, there are i n fact precedents and successors as w e l l as a c o m m u n i t y o f interested scholars and intellectuals. A l m o s t invariably, o r i g i n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s emerge f r o m and enhance a large body o f methodical research generated w i t h i n different traditions. I n some cases certain scientists may have been accorded a p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n s i m ply because they were accidentally discovered by m o d e r n scholars, or because their works happened to be translated i n t o European languages. Moreover, certain w o r k s may not be impressive w h e n considered i n isolation, w h i l e their real significance lies i n t r i g g e r i n g new trends o f research or i n laying the f o u n d a t i o n for future developments w i t h i n a particular discipline. Such is the importance o f a l - K h w a r i z m i ' s (ca. 7 8 0 - 8 5 0 ) Kitab al-Jabr wal-Mtiqabalo (The b o o k o f c o m p u l s i o n and c o m p a r i s o n ) , w h i c h i n t r o d u c e d the t e r m al-jabr (algebra). Despite its lack o f sophistication i n comparison to later w o r k s o f Arabic algebra, this treatise was the indispensable prerequisite for advanced future research i n the

field.

The cultural coherence o f scientific traditions is not merely a factor o f their o w n internal workings. Science flourished i n the heart o f Islamic urban centers, not only as an integral part o f Islamic civilization but also as one o f its social institutions. I n this sense it w o u l d be accurate to call this science "Islamic science." A l t h o u g h Islam played a role i n denning the position and role o f science i n society, i t d i d not define the cognitive content o f the sciences. Religious discourses o n science advocated its separateness f r o m religion. As a result, a concept o f value-free or ethically neutral scientific knowledge that is not specific to any one particular culture was able to develop. I n distinction f r o m religious knowledge, the exact sciences were often called "the sciences shared a m o n g all the nations." I n his masterly w o r k , the Muqciddima (Introduction [to the science o f h i s t o r y ] ) , the Arab historian Ibn Khaldun ( i 3 3 ~ i 4 - o 6 ) eloquently s u m m e d u p this universal conception o f science: 2

The intellectual sciences are natural to man, inasmuch as he is a thinking being. They are not restricted to any particular religious group. They are studied by the people of all religious groups who are all equally qualified to learn them and to do research in them. They have existed (and been known) to the human species since civilization had its beginnings in the world.

This ideal o f cultural neutrality was greatiy enhanced by the use o f Arabic as the language o f a n e w universal scientific culture. Science i n Islamic societies was

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international; it i n h e r i t e d all the earlier scientific traditions and fused t h e m i n t o one new w h o l e . The large geographic area under Islamic rule d u r i n g this p e r i o d enjoyed a h i g h degree o f cultural unity. W i t h i n this area, scientists f r o m diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds participated i n the p r o d u c t i o n , exchange, and dissemination o f scientific knowledge. The most i m p o r t a n t factor c o n t r i b u t i n g t o the universality o f this Islamic scientific culture was the emergence o f Arabic as the universal language o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , not o n l y for the elites but for all peoples w i t h i n the Islamic empire. Most i m p o r t a n t , this enabled a level o f scientific exchange unprecedented i n earlier civilizations. Many o f the scientists w h o w r o t e i n Arabic were not themselves Arabs. I n later periods a few scientists w r o t e some o f their scientific w o r k s i n their national languages, most notably Persian. I n such cases, these scientists also often produced Arabic translations o f their works. Still, the vast m a j o r i t y o f scientific w o r k s p r o duced i n the p e r i o d between the n i n t h and sixteenth centuries were w r i t t e n i n Arabic. Because o f the preponderance o f Arabic scientific works, and because o f the crucial role played by the Arabic language i n the subsequent development o f the scientific t r a d i t i o n , i t is perhaps m o r e accurate to call the scientific traditions o f Islamic societies "Arabic sciences" rather than Islamic. I n fact, the first m a i n cultural t r a n s f o r m a t i o n that occurred after the establishment o f the Islamic empire had m o r e to d o w i t h language than w i t h r e l i g i o n . After the early c o n quests most o f the regions and peoples o f the ancient w o r l d came under Islamic political rule. Outside Arabia, conversion to Islam was gradual and preceded at a slow pace. The linguistic conversion o f the conquered lands was m u c h faster, however. W i t h i n one century, Arabic became the official language o f the state and its bureaucracy, either completely replacing older languages or coexisting w i t h t h e m as the universal language o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h i n the empire's vast domains. References i n this chapter to Arab scientists are not necessarily to ethnic Arabs (or even Muslims); rather, these references are to scientists w h o adopted Arabic as a language o f scientific expression and c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n to religious w o r k s , the earliest scholarly c o n t r i b u t i o n s a m o n g M u s l i m s were o f a linguistic nature. O f particular relevance to the later development o f science was the extensive c o m p i l a t i o n efforts by Arabic philologists and lexicographers. The specialized lexicons that were produced i n the eighth and n i n t h centuries represent a large-scale attempt at collecting and classifying Arabic knowledge. These attempts were not always "scientific," and they were eclipsed by later, more systematic achievements. Nonetheless, these encyclopedic efforts provided a linguistic f o u n d a t i o n that fostered the development o f various i n t e l lectual disciplines. W h i l e the peoples o f the Byzantine and Sasanid (Persian) empires were u n d e r g o i n g a gradual l i n g u i s t i c conversion under the n e w Islamic rule, a d e l i b -

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erate e f f o r t was made to appropriate the cultures o f these ancient civilizations. I n its most o b v i o u s manifestation, this e f f o r t , once again, was l i n g u i s t i c . As early as the e i g h t h century, but p r i m a r i l y i n the n i n t h , scientific w o r k s were translated i n t o Arabic. The m a i n reason o f t e n adduced for the rise o f Arabic science is the translation i n t o Arabic o f scientific w o r k s f r o m Persian, I n d i a n , and Greek ( i n this order o f occurrence and i m p o r t a n c e ) . Q u i t e the reverse is true, however: translation was not the source o f the g r o w i n g interest i n science at the t i m e b u t a consequence o f this interest. Like all e m e r g i n g social p h e n o m ena, the rise o f science i n Islamic societies is historically c o n t i n g e n t , o w i n g as m u c h to active agency as t o external determinants. The most i n f l u e n t i a l body o f scientific k n o w l e d g e was u n d o u b t e d l y the Greek. Yet before the rise o f Islam, the existence o f the same Greek scientific w o r k s a m o n g a Greek-speaki n g p o p u l a t i o n was not i n itself sufficient to preclude a p e r i o d o f several centuries o f steady decline i n scientific activity. Therefore, other factors must have c o n t r i b u t e d to the emergence o f Arabic science. One factor was the g r o w i n g awareness i n the n e w society o f the status o f Islamic c i v i l i z a t i o n as h e i r to w o r l d civilizations. At a m o r e tangible level, the increasing c o m p l e x i t y o f social organization and the subsequent social d e m a n d for professional expertise p r o vided o p p o r t u n i t i e s and incentives f o r a s p i r i n g professionals to cultivate scie n t i f i c k n o w l e d g e . The f o u n d a t i o n a l p h i l o l o g i c a l w o r k d o n e by the early lexicographers was itself a first step i n the p r o d u c t i o n o f a scientific culture. This w o r k also e n r i c h e d Arabic technical d i c t i o n and effectively t r a n s f o r m e d Arabic i n t o a language o f science. Evidence f r o m the earliest extant scientific sources indicates that the translat i o n m o v e m e n t was concurrent w i t h , rather than a prerequisite for, scientific research i n the Islamic w o r l d . Simultaneous research and translation d i d not takeplace i n just one field; rather, such research was the d r i v i n g force b e h i n d the translation o f n u m e r o u s astronomical, mathematical, and m e d i c a l texts. The massive transfer o f scientific knowledge i n t o Arabic is a complex p h e n o m e n o n that cannot be reduced to a mechanical process o f translation. The translation movement was itself an aspect o f the emergence o f Arabic science rather than its sole cause. This emergence was not accidental; i t was a result o f deliberate and persistent efforts undertaken by professionals w h o were r e s p o n d i n g t o the demands o f their society—efforts that were supported by different segments o f society and stimulated by the internal needs o f scientific research. Most o f the translations were p r o d u c e d i n Baghdad i n the course o f the n i n t h century. D u r i n g the r e i g n o f the Abbasid caliph a l - M a m u n (r. 813-33), translation activities gained considerable m o m e n t u m , and they c o n t i n u e d under several o f his successors. Translations were frequently p r o d u c e d at the request o f patrons w h o c o m m i s s i o n e d and financed t h e m . I n a d d i t i o n t o such

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rulers as a l - M a m u n , these patrons i n c l u d e d g o v e r n m e n t officials and c i v i l servants as w e l l as scientists and physicians o f t e n e m p l o y e d by members o f the p o l i t i c a l elite. Some o f the officials w h o c o m m i s s i o n e d translations w e r e involved i n c o u r t politics as w e l l as large-scale development projects u n d e r taken i n the rapidly g r o w i n g u r b a n centers. The most famous example o f this g r o u p are the Banu Musa brothers, w h o i n a d d i t i o n to their p o l i t i c a l involvement were a m o n g the leading p r a c t i c i n g scientists o f the t i m e . Some translations were also prepared for various members o f the social elite. A n o f f i c i a l l i b r a r y n a m e d the Boyt al-Hikma (the house o f w i s d o m ) was established i n Baghdad u n d e r the Abbasid c a l i p h H a r u n al-Rashid (r. 7 8 6 - 8 0 9 ) , but gained its r e p u t a t i o n i n the context o f the translation movement d u r i n g the reign o f his son a l - M a m u n . Many o f the acquired and translated scientific and p h i l o sophical w o r k s were collected i n this library, and they were i n t u r n made available to the researchers and translators o f the p e r i o d . The most famous o f these translators was a Nestorian (Christian) Arab by the name o f H u n a y n i b n Ishaq al-Ibadi (808—73). Together w i t h a h a n d f u l o f students, he is responsible for the translation o f most o f the Galenic medical corpus, as w e l l as many other Greek philosophical and scientific treatises. H u n a y n left an autobiography i n w h i c h he lists a large n u m b e r o f the w o r k s that he translated f r o m Greek i n t o Syriac or Arabic. H e also describes some o f the circumstances o f his early career. H u n a y n started as a disciple o f a Baghdad-based Nestorian physician n a m e d I b n Masawayh. I b n Masawayh belonged to a g r o u p o f Nestorian families, o r i g i n a l l y f r o m the c i t y o f Gundishapur, that effectively m o n o p o l i z e d the practice o f m e d i c i n e i n the Abbasid court. The a m b i t i o u s H u n a y n — w h o at the t i m e k n e w o n l y Arabic and Syriac—was rebuffed by his teacher w h e n he i n q u i r e d about Greek medical texts. Disheartened by this experience, H u n a y n set o u t to study Greek o n his o w n to gain access to this medical knowledge. I n due t i m e he mastered Greek and was able t o o u t d o his teacher I b n Masawayh w i t h n e w l y acquired linguistic skills. Thus it was professional c o m p e t i t i o n that dictated the course o f Hunayn's career. W h e n he demonstrated the use o f this n e w skill, even members o f the small g r o u p o f Syriac-speaking physicians started requesting translations o f n e w Greek medical texts. These physicians c o u l d no longer m a i n t a i n their privileges by simple m o n o p o l y ; to survive i n an increasingly competitive e n v i r o n m e n t , they had to raise their standards. To d o so they needed m o r e books. Some o f the Syriac translations were also used as stepping stones for the preparation o f Arabic translations. W h e n the Arabic translations were p r o d u c e d , the Syriac intermediaries rapidly fell i n t o disuse. It was the professional demands o f the expanding Islamic society, therefore, that gave rise to this sudden and b r i e f surge i n Syriac scientific activity i n the n i n t h century.

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The context for n i n t h - c e n t u r y scientific translations f r o m Greek i n t o Syriac was decidedly Islamic. The rise o f Arabic science cannot be attributed to the agency o f a Syriac scientific culture; rather, this Syriac scientific culture itself received a significant—albeit b r i e f — i m p e t u s f r o m the emergence o f Arabic scientific activity. Despite the p a r a m o u n t importance o f Greek traditions i n the development o f the Arabic sciences, Arabic science was not a mere m u s e u m o f Greek scientific knowledge. Arabic science d i d more than simply preserve the Greek scientific legacy and pass i t to its European heirs. The complex process o f cultural transmission necessitates that this legacy, even as its texts were being translated, was reformulated and transformed. The final outcome o f this transf o r m a t i o n was a new science that was i n f o r m e d by (but not reducible to) its i n d i v i d u a l components. To appreciate the significance o f the emergence o f this n e w scientific t r a d i t i o n , the r e m a i n i n g part o f this chapter examines some episodes i n the development o f various Arabic scientific disciplines.

Astronomy Astronomy was one o f the oldest, most developed, and most esteemed exact sciences o f antiquity. Many o f the mathematical sciences were o r i g i n a l l y developed to facilitate astronomical research. Initial interest i n astronomy had its roots i n astrology and the fascination w i t h the powers and mysteries o f the heavens. Practical considerations, such as finding one's direction d u r i n g n i g h t travel or understanding the correlation between the seasons o f the year and the positions o f the planets, provided additional incentives for the study o f astronomy. The Babylonians, Greeks, and Indians had devised elaborate systems for the study o f astronomy that w e n t b e y o n d simple empirical observation and were characterized by various degrees o f mathematical r i g o r and sophistication. Before Islam, however, the Arabs had n o scientific astronomy. Their knowledge was e m p i r i c a l , and i t was l i m i t e d to the d i v i s i o n o f the year i n t o precise periods o n the basis o f the r i s i n g and setting o f certain stars. This area o f astronomical knowledge was k n o w n as anwa; it continued to attract attention under later Arab astronomers after the rise o f Islam, and its study gained m u c h f r o m the mathematical methods employed by these astronomers. F r o m its beginnings i n the n i n t h century t h r o u g h its m a t u r i t y i n the sixteenth century, astronomical activity was widespread and intensive. This activity is reflected i n the large n u m b e r o f scientists w o r k i n g i n practical and theoretical astronomy, the n u m b e r o f books w r i t t e n , the active observatories, and the n e w observations. Astronomy, i t should be n o t e d , was unambiguously differentiated f r o m astrology. Astrology c o n t i n u e d to be practiced and to draw o n and encourage astronomical knowledge. I n fact, a g o o d p o r t i o n o f the f u n d i n g for astro-

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n o m i c a l research was motivated by the desire to make astrological predictions. Nevertheless, a clear line was d r a w n between the t w o disciplines. The vast m a j o r ity o f the thousands o f w r i t t e n w o r k s are o n astronomy, whereas o n l y a h a n d f u l deal w i t h astrology. Many astronomers served as court astrologers, but many more c o n d e m n e d astrology and distanced themselves f r o m i t . Distinct terms were also used to refer to either field: ilm ahkam al-nujum or simply tonjim referred to astrology, whereas ilm ol-falak, ilm al-haya, or ilm al-azyaj referred to the science o f the celestial o r b , the science o f the c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f the heavens, and to major astronomical treatises c o n t a i n i n g tables for the m o t i o n o f the stars and instructions o n using these tables. The first astronomical texts that were translated i n t o Arabic i n the e i g h t h century w ere o f Indian and Persian o r i g i n . The earliest extant Arabic astronomical r

texts date to the second half o f the e i g h t h century. Two astronomers, M u h a m m a d i b n I b r a h i m al-Fazari ( d . a. 777) andYaqub i b n Tariq (eighth c e n t u r y ) , translated an eighth-century Indian astronomical w o r k k n o w n as Zij al-Sindhind (a zij being an astronomical handbook w i t h tables). Sources indicate that they produced this translation after 770, under die supervision o f an Indian astronomer visiting the court o f the Abbasid caliph al-Mansur (r. 754-75). Extant fragments o f the works o f these t w o astronomers also reveal a somewhat eclectic m i x i n g o f Indian parameters w i t h elements o f Persian o r i g i n as w e l l as some f r o m the Hellenistic prePtolemaic p e r i o d . These fragments also reflect the use o f I n d i a n calculation methods and the use o f the Indian sine f u n c t i o n i n t r i g o n o m e t r y , i n place o f the cumbersome chords o f arc used i n Greek astronomy. Late Arabic sources also contain references to Zij al-Shah, a collection o f astronomical tables based o n Indian parameters, w h i c h was compiled in Sasanid Persia over a period o f t w o centuries. Arab astronomers were first exposed to Persian and Indian astronomy, and they continued to use some o f the parameters and methods o f these t w o t r a d i tions, yet the greatest formative influence o n Arabic astronomy was u n d o u b t e d l y Greek. I n the early n i n t h century astronomers realized that the Greek a s t r o n o m ical t r a d i t i o n was far superior to that o f Persia or India, i n b o t h its c o m p r e h e n siveness and its use o f effective geometrical representations. One particular second-century Greek author, Ptolemy, and m o r e specifically one w o r k by this author, the Almagest, exerted a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e influence o n all o f medieval astronomy t h r o u g h the Arabic p e r i o d and u n t i l the eventual demise o f the geocentric astronomical system. That this text exerted so m u c h influence is neither accidental n o r s u r p r i s i n g , for i t is the highest achievement i n Hellenistic m a t h ematical astronomy and one o f the greatest achievements o f all o f Hellenistic science. Other w o r k s by Ptolemy, commentaries o n his w o r k s , and several treatises by other authors were also used i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the Almagest and as i n t r o ductions to it. These include eleven short treatises i n Greek, by different authors,

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called the "Small Astronom) Collection," w h i c h were all translated into Arabic d u r i n g the n i n t h century. I n the Almagest, Ptolemy synthesized the earlier k n o w l e d g e o f Hellenistic astronomy i n l i g h t o f his o w n n e w observations. The book's m a i n purpose was to establish the geometric models that w o u l d accurately account for observational phenomena. A large part o f the w o r k is dedicated to the methods for c o n s t r u c t i n g various models and f o r calculating their parameters. Ptolemy also provided tables for planetary m o t i o n s to be used i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h these m o d els. O f all the books o f antiquity, the Almagest represents the most successful w o r k o f mathematical astronomy: its geometric representations o f the universe p r o vided the most accurate and best predictive accounts for the celestial p h e n o m ena. The Greek tradition o f physical astronomy is reflected i n the Almagest and i n Ptolemy's other influential w o r k , Planetary Hypothesis. According to this p r e d o m i nantly Aristotelian t r a d i t i o n , the universe is organized i n t o a set o f concentric spheres, each carrying a star and rotating a r o u n d the stationary earth at the center o f the universe. Ptolemy a d o p t e d , at least i n theory, these t w o basic Aristotelian principles: that the earth is stationary at the center o f the universe and that the m o t i o n o f heavenly bodies o u g h t to be represented by a set o f perfectly u n i f o r m circular m o t i o n s . I n practice, however, mathematical considerations often forced Ptolemy to disregard these principles. Arabic sources report at least f o u r Arabic translations o f the Almagest, o f w h i c h t w o are extant. The first is a translation by al-Hajjaj i b n Matar i n the first half o f the n i n t h century. The second is a translation by Ishaq, the son o f the famous translator H u n a y n ; this second translation was revised by Thabit i b n Q t i r r a t o w a r d the end o f the n i n t h century. Separated by m o r e than fifty years, the seco n d translation reflected the m a t u r i t y o f Arabic technical t e r m i n o l o g y ; whereas certain parts o f the first translation lacked f u l l clarity, the second translation p r o v i d e d a coherent text that e l i m i n a t e d any need for f u r t h e r reference t o the Greek o r i g i n a l . The first extant o r i g i n a l w o r k o f Arabic astronomy is al-Khwarizmi's ( f l . 830) Zij al-Sindhind ( w h i c h is unrelated to the translation o f the I n d i a n text m e n t i o n e d earlier w i t h same name). This w o r k contains tables for the movements o f the sun, the m o o n , and five planets, w i t h explanatory remarks o n h o w to use these tables. Most o f the parameters used by a l - K h w a r i z m i are o f Indian o r i g i n , but some are derived f r o m Ptolemy's Handy Tables, and no attempt is made to h a r m o n i z e the t w o sources. This w o r k is significant not o n l y for its content but also because i t was w r i t t e n simultaneously w i t h the earliest translations o f the Almagest. The

first

i n t r o d u c t i o n o f Ptolemaic astronomy i n t o Arabic science thus occurred i n the context o f t w o significant trends. First, research i n Arabic astronomy w e n t hand i n hand w i t h translation; despite its manifest superiority, Ptolemaic astronomy

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d i d not exclusively set the agenda for future research i n Arabic astronomy. The second trend was the selective use o f parameters, sources, and methods o f calculation f r o m different scientific traditions. As a result, the Ptolemaic t r a d i t i o n was rendered receptive f r o m the b e g i n n i n g to the possibility o f observational refinement and mathematical restructuring. These revisionist tendencies characterize the first p e r i o d o f Arabic astronomy. A significant part o f the intensive n i n t h - c e n t u r y astronomical research was dedicated to the dissemination o f Ptolemy's astronomy, not just by translating parts or all o f his w o r k i n t o Arabic, but also by c o m p o s i n g summaries and c o m mentaries o n i t . Ptolemy's w o r k was thus made available and accessible to a large audience a m o n g the educated classes. I n the first half o f the n i n t h century, alFarghani ( d . ca. 8co), f o r example, w r o t e Kitab fi Jan-ami Ilm al-Nujtim (A c o m p e n d i u m o f the science o f the stars). This book was w i d e l y circulated i n the Arabic version and also i n later Latin translations. This w o r k provided a b r i e f and s i m p l i f i e d descriptive overview o f Ptolemaic cosmography, w i t h o u t mathematical computations. U n l i k e the Almagest, however, it started w i t h a discussion o f calendar computations and conversions between different eras. A l t h o u g h its p r i m a r y purpose was to introduce Ptolemaic astronomy i n a s i m p l i f i e d way, i t also corrected Ptolemy based o n findings o f earlier Arab astronomers. Al-Farghani gave revised values for the o b l i q u i t y o f the ecliptic, the precessional m o v e m e n t o f the apogees o f the sun and the m o o n , and the circumference o f the earth. This critical approach, thus far restricted to the c o r r e c d o n o f constants and parameters, had already been set by earlier astronomers at the b e g i n n i n g o f the n i n t h century. Under the Abbasid caliph a l - M a m u n , a p r o g r a m o f astronomical observations was organized i n Baghdad and Damascus. Like any organized research project, this p r o g r a m endowed astronomical activity i n the Islamic w o r l d w i t h f o r m a l prestige. It also set a precedent for future support o f scientific activity by other rulers and established patronage as one o f the modes o f supporting such activities. The professed purpose o f this p r o g r a m was to verify the Ptolemaic observations by c o m p a r i n g the results derived by calculation, based o n Ptolemaic models, w i t h actual observations conducted i n Baghdad and Damascus some seven h u n d r e d years after Ptolemy. The results were c o m p i l e d i n al-Zij al-Mumtahan (The verified tables), w h i c h is n o longer extant i n its entirety but is w i d e l y quoted by later astronomers. The most i m p o r t a n t correction i n t r o d u c e d was to show that the apogee o f the solar o r b moves w i t h the precession o f the fixed stars. O n a more general note, this p r o g r a m stressed the need for c o n t i n u i n g verificat i o n o f astronomical observations and for the use o f m o r e precise instruments. The p r o g r a m also represented the first recorded instance i n history o f a collective scientific undertaking.

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F r o m its beginnings, Arabic astronomy set o u t to rectify and c o m p l e m e n t Ptolemaic astronomy, Having n o t e d several discrepancies between n e w observations and Ptolemaic calculations, Arab astronomers then proceeded to reexamine the theoretical basis o f Ptolemy's results. This critical reexamination took several f o r m s . One example o f the critical w o r k s o f the n i n t h century is Fi Sana! al-Shoms (The book o n the solar year), w h i c h was w r o n g l y attributed t o the mathematician Thabit i b n Q u r r a h , but was produced a r o u n d his time. This w o r k corrected some o f Ptolemy's constants, and although i t retained Ptolemy's geometrical representations, i t questioned his observations and calculations. Other astronomers devised enhanced methods o f calculation. N e w mathematical tools were i n t r o d u c e d to m o d e r n i z e the c o m p u t a t i o n a l procedures. For example, i n his al-Zij al-Dimashqi (The Damascene zij) w r i t t e n a r o u n d the m i d d l e o f the n i n t h century, the mathematician Habash al-Hasib ( d . between 864 and 874) i n t r o duced the t r i g o n o m e t r i c functions o f sine, cosine, and tangent, w h i c h were at that t i m e u n k n o w n to the Greeks. Habash also w o r k e d o n a p r o b l e m that was n o t treated i n the Greek sources: he examined the visibility o f the crescent m o o n and produced the first detailed discussion o f this complicated astronomical p r o b l e m . Habash is an example o f an astronomer w h o u n d e r t o o k his study to verify the results o f the Almagest, but i n the process he expanded these results and applied t h e m t o n e w problems. A l t h o u g h the general astronomical research o f this p e r i o d was largely conducted w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f Ptolemaic astronomy, this research reworked and critically examined the observations and the c o m p u t a tional methods o f Ptolemaic astronomy and i n a l i m i t e d way was able to explore problems outside its f r a m e w o r k . One o f the m a i n n i n t h - c e n t u r y scientists f r o m w h o m several extant astron o m i c a l manuscripts exist today is Thabit i b n Q u r r a (ca. 836-901). Thabit was a pagan f r o m Harran ( i n southeast Turkey); his native language was Syriac, b u t he was fluent i n Greek and his w o r k i n g language was Arabic. Thabit j o i n e d the Banu Musa circle i n Baghdad, and p r o d u c e d n u m e r o u s w o r k s o n several scientific disciplines. O f about f o r t y treatises o n astronomy, o n l y eight are extant. A l l the treatises reflect Thabit's f u l l c o m m a n d o f Ptolemaic astronomy and illustrate the level t o w h i c h

this a s t r o n o m y

was

t h o r o u g h l y absorbed

by Arab

astronomers. A few o f these are o f particular interest. I n one treatise, for example, Thabit analyzed the m o t i o n o f a heavenly body o n an eccentric, and the m o d e l he used was Ptolemaic. I n contrast to Ptolemy's d e s c r i p t i o n , w h i c h was stated w i t h o u t proof, Thabit p r o v i d e d a r i g o r o u s and systematic mathematical p r o o f w i t h the aid o f the theorems o f Euclid's Elements. I n the course o f this proof, Thabit i n t r o d u c e d the first k n o w n mathematical analysis o f m o t i o n . For the first t i m e i n history, he also referred to the speed o f a m o v i n g body at a particular p o i n t . I n another w o r k , Thabit p r o v i d e d general and exhaustive proofs

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f o r problems that Ptolemy examined o n l y f o r special cases o r for b o u n d a r y c o n ditions. A n o t h e r w o r k is exclusively devoted t o lunar visibility. Thabit's s o l u t i o n , w h i c h was far m o r e complex than that o f Habash, e x h i b i t e d the same mathematical r i g o r apparent everywhere i n his w o r k : he p r o v e d the general law that applies to the visibility o f any heavenly body, t h e n he applied this law to the special case o f the crescent m o o n . Thabit's w o r k is significant because i t illustrates the h i g h creativity o f Arabic astronomy i n its earliest periods. The roots f o r this creativity lie i n the application o f diverse mathematical disciplines to each other. This application had the i m m e d i a t e effect o f expanding the frontiers o f various disciplines a n d i n t r o d u c i n g n e w scientific concepts and ideas. T h e use o f systematic m a i h e m a t i z a t i o n transformed the m e t h o d s o f reasoning and enabled further creative developments i n the diverse branches o f science. Another famous astronomer o f this early period is A b u A b d Allah M u h a m m a d ibn Jabir al-Battani (ca. 858-929), w h o originally came f r o m Harran but lived in Raqqa i n northern Syria. At Raqqa, al-Battani conducted observations for more than thirty years. The results o f his research were recorded i n al-Zij ul-Sabi (The Sabian tables), w h i c h was translated into Latin i n the twelfth century and into Spanish i n the thirteenth. Although al-Battani d i d not contribute significantly to theoretical astronomy, his meticulous observations enabled h i m to make some important discoveries. For example, he noted the variations i n the apparent diameters o f the sun and the m o o n and deduced, f o r the first time i n the history o f astronomy, the possibility o f an annular eclipse o f the sun. I n the n i n t h century, t h e n , Arabic a s t r o n o m y had already struck deep roots. It integrated a l l the k n o w l e d g e there was t o integrate f r o m earlier t r a d i t i o n s and was justly p o s i t i o n e d t o surpass this k n o w ledge. T h e achievements o f the n i n t h c e n t u r y laid the f o u n d a t i o n f o r the h i g h - q u a l i t y w o r k i n the f o l l o w i n g t w o centuries. The t e n t h a n d eleventh centuries witnessed i m p o r t a n t developments i n t r i g o n o m e t r y , w i t h dramatic effects o n the accuracy and facility o f a s t r o n o m i c a l calculations. I n this p e r i o d steps w e r e taken t o w a r d the f o r m a l establishment o f large-scale observatories. A l t h o u g h the i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m these t w o centuries is spotty and f r a g m e n t e d , several extant sources p r o vide evidence f o r significant attempts to reevaluate Ptolemaic astronomy. I n the t e n t h and eleventh centuries the earlier e x a m i n a t i o n s o f Ptolemaic astrono m y led t o systematic projects that rather than addressing the f i e l d i n its t o t a l ity, focused o n specific aspects o f astronomy. T h e w o r k o f A b d al-Rahman al-Sufi ( w h o was b o r n i n Rayy and w o r k e d i n the Iranian centers o f Shiraz and Isfahan, 9 0 3 - 8 6 ) illustrates this tendency. I n his famous b o o k , Kitab Stnvar alKawakib al-Thabita (Book o n t h e constellations), al-Sufi r e w o r k e d the star catal o g o f the Almagest o n t h e basis o f a corrected value o f i ° / 6 6 years f o r the precessional m o v e m e n t ( i n the place o f Ptolemy's 1 V 1 0 0 years), as w e l l as

Abd al-Rahman al-Sufi ( 9 0 3 - 8 6 ) reworked the star catalogue of Ptolemy's Almagest, and his book on the fixed stars, Kitab Suvvar al-Kavvakib al-Thabiic, became a standard work. This illustration of the constellation Centaurus, from a copy of the text made for iheTimurid prince Ulughbeg ibn Shahrukh, probably in Samarqand in the

14JOS,

transforms the centaur of

classical mythology into a turbaned man-horse.

several other n e w observations and verifications. A l - S u f i p r o d u c e d an accurate representation o f the constellations and their coordinates a n d magnitudes. His w o r k was translated i n t o Latin a n d is the source o f many Latin star names o f Arabic o r i g i n . A n o t h e r example o f the tendency t o synthesize is A b u al-Hasan A l i I b n Yunus' (Cairo, d . 1009)

al-Zij al-Hakimi al-Kabir (The H a k i m i z i j ) , a

m o n u m e n t a l w o r k i n e i g h t y - o n e chapters, o f w h i c h o n l y about o n e - h a l f is preserved. The b o o k is a c o m p l e t e treatise o n astronomy, w h i c h contains

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tables f o r the m o v e m e n t o f the heavenly bodies, their various parameters, and i n s t r u c t i o n s o n the use o f these tables. Here, t o o , the objective o f the w o r k was to p r o v i d e an exhaustive d o c u m e n t a t i o n o f previous observations, subsequent verifications o r corrections o f these, and n e w observations recorded by the author. Some o f the astronomers o f this p e r i o d were k n o w n as i n s t r u m e n t builders and for their association w i t h observatories. The astronomer A b u M a h m u d H a m i d a l - K h u j a n d i ( d . a. 1000), for example, w r o t e several w o r k s o n scientific instruments and b u i l t a large sextant at Rayy. The astronomer A b u al-Wafa alBuzjani (940—98) w o r k e d i n a large observatory b u i l t by the B u y i d ruler Sharaf al-Dawla i n the gardens o f the royal palace i n Baghdad. Like A b u Nasr Mansur i b n Iraq ( d . a. 1036)

o f Ghazna, al-Buzjani was a mathematician-astronomer

w h o made great c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n the field o f t r i g o n o m e t r y . A l t h o u g h m u c h o f the t r i g o n o m e t r i c w o r k s o f these early scientists is lost, ample i n f o r m a t i o n exists f r o m the extensive discussion o n these w o r k s by the i l l u s t r i o u s scientist al-Biruni. A l - B i r u n i was b o r n i n 973 i n K l i w a r i z m (modern-day Khorezm) and died i n 1048 i n Ghazna ( i n eastern Afghanistan). A m o n g other places, he w o r k e d i n Rayy, where he collaborated w i t h a l - K h u j a n d i . H e also studied w i t h A b u Nasr Mansur i b n Iraq, w h o was a student o f al-Buzjani. A l - B i r u n i considered these t w o scholars as his teachers, and w i t h t h e m he shared a focused interest i n t r i g o n o m e t r y and its application to astronomy. A l - B i r u n i ' s native language was Persian, but he composed the vast m a j o r i t y o f his w o r k s i n Arabic. He also k n e w Sanskrit, and as a result he had f u l l c o m m a n d o f I n d i a n astronomy i n a d d i t i o n to the w e l l established Greek and Arabic traditions. A l - B i r u n i w r o t e m o r e than 150 w o r k s o n most o f the k n o w n sciences o f his t i m e , i n c l u d i n g astronomy, mathematics, mathematical geography, mineralogy, metallurgy, pharmacology, history, and p h i l o s o p h y A l t h o u g h only a t h i r d o f his w o r k s are extant, these contain a w e a l t h o f scientific and historical i n f o r m a t i o n . His al-Oantin al-Masudi (Canon Macudicus) is a veritable treasure, w h i c h , as a great synthesis o f the Greek, I n d i a n , and Arabicastronomical traditions, has been compared to the synthesis produced i n the Almagest by Ptolemy. The book is also a history o f Arabic astronomy t h r o u g h the early eleventh century, and it provides the o n l y extant source o f i n f o r m a t i o n o n many o f the contributions o f earlier astronomers. The value o f this and other historical works by a l - B i r u n i is further enhanced by his keen historical consciousness and cultural sensitivity. Advances i n t r i g o n o m e t r y resulting f r o m the f u l l integration o f the I n d i a n achievements i n the field, as w e l l as f r o m n e w discoveries i n the tenth and eleventh centuries, played a central role i n the development o f Arabic astronomy. This tendency is itself part o f a larger phenomenon whereby the systematic m a t h -

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ematization o f disciplines c o n t r i b u t e d to the expansion o f their frontiers. Equipped w i t h new and m o r e rigorous mathematical tools, a l - B i r u n i , like man) o f his predecessors and contemporaries, p r o v i d e d exhaustive studies o f specialized topics w i t h i n astronomy. His "exhaustive" treatises cover such topics as shadows; the theory, construction, and use o f astrolabes; the coordinates o f geographical locations; and many more. I n most o f these monographs, a l - B i r u n i starts w i t h a t h o r o u g h critical overview o f older theories and mathematical m e t h ods for solving the particular problems i n question; he then proceeds either to choose one o f these theories or to propose his o w n alternative theory. Al-Biruni's w o r k as a w h o l e represents a critical assessment o f the state o f mathematical astronomy t h r o u g h the early eleventh century. Such comprehensive surveys o f earlier knowledge exhausted the possibilities o f expanding the astronomical disciplines f r o m w i t h i n ; to achieve further progress, scientists needed to move i n new directions, devise new strategies, and explore n e w research programs. Another characteristic o f this p e r i o d is the seemingly r a n d o m use o f o l d as w e l l as n e w mathematical methods i n the solution o f astronomical problems. Thus the same author may have used an archaic m e t h o d i n one place and an advanced m e t h o d i n another. A l - B i r u n i , for example, used b o t h the o l d , c u m bersome Menelaus theorem as w e l l as the new, elegant sine rule i n several solutions t o the p r o b l e m o f d e t e r m i n i n g the qibla, the d i r e c t i o n that M u s l i m s have to face i n prayers. This simultaneous use o f different mathematical procedures cannot be attributed to the slow dissemination o f scientific knowledge or to the l i m ited c i r c u l a t i o n o f this knowledge. There is ample evidence for a h i g h level o f m o b i l i t y and o f efficient and speedy c o m m u n i c a t i o n a m o n g scientists w o r k i n g i n various regions o f the M u s l i m w o r l d . A l - B i r u n i h i m s e l f d i d not travel to Baghdad, but he apparently corresponded w i t h scientists there and was fully aware o f scientific developments there and elsewhere. The use o f different m e t h ods is likely a result o f the increasing d i f f u s i o n o f scientific k n o w l e d g e a m o n g large segments o f the educated elites. W i t h i n the broad ranks o f these elites, " f u l l t i m e " scientists were expected to keep u p w i t h the latest research i n their fields, w h i l e scholars w i t h partial interest i n science w o u l d be familiar o n l y w i t h older theories and methods. The use o f a variety o f mathematical methods is thus an i n d i c a t i o n o f the degree to w h i c h scientific culture had filtered i n t o society, and the extent to w h i c h it became available to average members o f the educated class.

Expanding the Frontiers of Theoretical Astronomy A t h i r d , less noted aspect o f al-Biruni's w o r k attests to the emergence o f a n e w understanding o f the relationship between science and other f o r m s o f k n o w l edge. A b o o k entitled al-Asila wal-Ajwiba (Questions and answers) preserved an

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exchange between a l - B i r u n i and his c o n t e m p o r a r y I b n Sina ( 9 8 0 - 1 0 3 7 ) , the most celebrated M u s l i m philosopher o f all t i m e . I n this exchange, a l - B i r u n i presented I b n Sina w i t h a set o f questions i n w h i c h he criticized Aristotle's p h y s i cal theory, especially as i t pertained to astronomy. I b n Sina responded and a lively debate ensued. I n the course o f this debate, a l - B i r u n i questioned almost all o f the fundamental Aristotelian physical axioms: he rejected the n o t i o n that heavenly bodies have an inherent nature, and he asserted that their m o t i o n c o u l d very w e l l be c o m p u l s o r y ; he m a i n t a i n e d that there is n o observable

evidence

that rules out the possibility o f v a c u u m ; he further asserted that a l t h o u g h observation corroborates Aristotle's c l a i m that the m o t i o n o f heavenly bodies is c i r cular, there is n o inherent " n a t u r a l " reason w h y this m o t i o n cannot be, a m o n g other things, e l l i p t i c a l . W h a t is m o r e significant than the actual objections alB i r u n i raised is the argument he e m p l o y e d i n the course o f the debate. He drew a sharp and u n a m b i g u o u s d i s t i n c t i o n between his profession and that o f Aristotle and I b n Sina as philosophers. He argued that the metaphysical axioms o n w h i c h philosophers b u i l d their physical theories d o not constitute valid e v i dence for the mathematical astronomer. I n other w o r d s , a l - B i r u n i clearly dist i n g u i s h e d between the p h i l o s o p h e r and the mathematician, the metaphysician and the scientist. He conceived h i m s e l f as a mathematical astronomer f o r w h o m the only valid evidence is observational or mathematical. A l - B i r u n i ' s example illustrates h o w the systematic application o f rigorous mathematical reasoning led to the mathematization o f astronomy and, by extension, t o the m a t h e m a t i zation o f nature. Rather than s u b s u m i n g the various sciences u n d e r the allencompassing

u m b r e l l a o f p h i l o s o p h y , many scientists

considered

their

professions as a u t o n o m o u s mathematical enterprises, separate f r o m and o n par w i t h philosophy. To be sure, not every exact scientist c o n f o r m e d to this view. There existed a plurality o f viable possibilities that allowed scientists m o r e f r e e d o m to question the fundamental assumptions o f their disciplines. Philosophy, for such scientists, was not discarded: rather, i t was no longer sacred. After the eleventh century the efforts o f most theoretical astronomers were directed t o w a r d p r o v i d i n g a t h o r o u g h evaluation o f the physical and philosophical u n d e r p i n n i n g s o f Ptolemaic astronomy and proposing alternatives to it. The emergence o f this tendency i n astronomical research d i d not represent a move away f r o m the t h o r o u g h m a t h ematical examination o f astronomy, but i t was an o u t c o m e o f this increasing mathematization. Between the n i n t h and eleventh centuries Arab astronomers moved back and f o r t h between mathematical theory and observation. U s i n g r i g orous mathematical reasoning, they systematically e x a m i n e d every aspect o f Ptolemaic

a s t r o n o m y ; they recorded

possible

n u m e r o u s anomalies

and

attempted to rectify t h e m or to eliminate their causes. I n the course o f this activ-

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ity, these astronomers amassed a large n u m b e r o f critiques o f Ptolemaic astronomy. A r m e d w i t h a t h o r o u g h mathematical conceptualization o f their discipline, Arab astronomers were n o w ready to b o l d l y question its fundamental p h i l o sophical f r a m e w o r k . This line o f research was pursued by several eleventh-century scientists. In his b o o k Tarkib ol-Aflak ( C o m p o s i t i o n o f the heavenly spheres), A b u Ubayd al-Juzjani ( d . a. 1070) indicated that b o t h he and his teacher, I b n Sina, were aware o f the so-called equant p r o b l e m o f the Ptolemaic m o d e l . Al-Juzjani even proposed a solution for this p r o b l e m . The anonymous author o f an Andalusian astronomical manuscript referred to another w o r k that he composed entitled al-Istidrak ala Batlamyus (Recapitulation regarding Ptolemy), and indicated that he included i n this later b o o k a list o f objections to Ptolemaic astronomy. The most i m p o r t a n t w o r k o f this genre, however, was w r i t t e n i n the same p e r i o d by I b n al-Haytham ( 9 6 5 - 1 0 3 9 ) . In his celebrated w o r k Al-Shukuk ala Batlamyus (Doubts o n Ptolemy), I b n al-Haytham s u m m e d u p the physical and philosophical problems inherent i n the Greek astronomical system and p r o v i d e d an inventory o f the theoretical inconsistencies o f the Ptolemaic models. B u i l d i n g o n the cumulative achievements o f Arabic astronomy, the eleventh century witnessed the emergence o f a n e w t r a d i t i o n o f astronomical research, a t r a d i t i o n that thrived i n the thirteenth century, climaxed i n the fourteenth, and continued well i n t o the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Most astronomers o f this p e r i o d t o o k u p the theoretical challenge o u t l i n e d by I b n a l - H a y t h a m and attempted t o r e w o r k the models o f Ptolemaic astrono m y and to p r o v i d e , w i t h varying degrees o f success, alternatives to these m o d els. The list o f astronomers w o r k i n g w i t h i n this t r a d i t i o n comprises some o f the greatest and most o r i g i n a l M u s l i m scientists. Most o f the current i n f o r m a t i o n o n these scientists derives f r o m studies that were p r o d u c e d i n the past f e w decades; f u r t h e r research w i l l u n d o u b t e d l y expand the list o f reformers and p r o v i d e a m o r e detailed p i c t u r e o f t h e i r t r a d i t i o n o f r e f o r m . The astronomers w h o have received m o d e r n scholarly a t t e n t i o n i n c l u d e : M u a y y a d a l - D i n a l U r d i ( d . 1266), Nasir a l - D i n al-Tusi ( 1 2 0 1 - 7 4 ) , Q u t b a l - D i n al-Shirazi ( d . 1311), Sadr al-Sharia a l - B u k h a r i ( d . 1347), I b n al-Shatir ( d . 1375), and Ala alD i n a l - Q u s h j i ( d . 1474). I n his Almagest, Ptolemy used the results o f earlier Hellenistic astronomy and incorporated t h e m i n t o one great synthesis. O f particular geometrical u t i l i t y was the concept o f eccentrics and epicycles developed i n the second century B.CE. by Hipparchus and adopted by Ptolemy. I n an astronomical representation e m p l o y i n g the eccentric m o d e l (figure 1 ), a planet, P, is carried o n the circumference o f an eccentric circle that rotates u n i f o r m l y a r o u n d its o w n center, G. This center, however, does n o t coincide w i t h the location, O, o f an observer o n the earth. As

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a result, the speed o f the planet appears to vary w i t h respect to the observer at p o i n t O. I n an epicyclic m o d e l , the planet is carried o n the circumference o f an epicycle, whose center is in t u r n carried o n a circle called the deferent, w h i c h rotates u n i f o r m l y a r o u n d the center o f the universe, the earth. Viewed by an observer at p o i n t O, the c o m b i n a t i o n o f the t w o u n i f o r m m o t i o n s o f the deferent and the epicycle produces a n o n u n i f o r m m o t i o n that is mathematically equivalent to the m o t i o n o f the eccentric m o d e l .

Ptolemy's model for the sun employing either an eccentric or a deferent and an epicycle.

The Ptolemaic m o d e l for the m o t i o n o f the sun u t i l i z e d either a simple eccentric m o d e l or the equivalent c o m b i n a t i o n o f a deferent and an epicycle. O t h e r Ptolemaic models f o r planetary m o t i o n s were considerably m o r e c o m plex. For example, i n the m o d e l f o r the l o n g i t u d i n a l m o t i o n o f the upper planets, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn (figure 2), the center, G, o f the deferent circle n o longer coincides w i t h the earth, O. Moreover, the u n i f o r m m o t i o n o f the center o f the epicycle o n the circumference o f the deferent is measured a r o u n d the p o i n t E, called the equant center, rather than the center, G, o f the deferent. Ptolemy proposed this m o d e l because it a l l o w e d for fairly accurate predictions of planetary positions. However, circle G i n this m o d e l is made t o rotate u n i f o r m l y a r o u n d the equant E, w h i c h is n o t its center. This represented a v i o l a t i o n o f the Aristotelian p r i n c i p l e o f u n i f o r m circular m o t i o n that Ptolemy had adopted. I n other w o r d s , for the sake o f observation. Ptolemy was forced to breach the physical and philosophical principles o n w h i c h he b u i l t his astron o m i c a l theory. Still other Ptolemaic models were even m o r e complex, and w i t h each a d d i t i o n a l level o f c o m p l e x i t y , n e w o b j e c t i o n s Ptolemaic astronomy.

were raised

against

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Ptolemy's model for the longitudinal motion of Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn.

Other objections raised by I b n al-Haytham and taken u p by later astronomers include the p r o b l e m o f the prosneusis point i n the m o d e l f o r the l o n g i t u d i n a l m o t i o n o f the m o o n ; the p r o b l e m o f the i n c l i n a t i o n and deviation o f the spheres o f Mercury and Venus; the p r o b l e m o f planetary distances, and so o n . I n the case o f the m o o n , additional difficulties arise because Ptolemy's m o d e l has a deferent center that is itself m o v i n g . Moreover, the m o t i o n o f the center o f the epicycle o n this deferent is not u n i f o r m around the deferent's center; rather, i t rotates u n i f o r m l y a r o u n d the center o f the universe. To complicate matters further, the anomalistic m o t i o n o n the epicycle is measured away f r o m the mean epicyclic apogee, w h i c h is aligned w i t h a movable p o i n t called the prosneusis p o i n t , rather than being measured f r o m the true apogee, w h i c h is aligned w i t h the center o f the universe. This prosneusis p o i n t is the point diametrically opposite to the center o f the deferent o n the other side o f the center o f the universe. The model for the l o n g i t u d i n a l m o t i o n o f M e r c u r y contained complex mechanisms that were equally objectionable. A d d i t i o n a l complications also resulted f r o m the m o t i o n o f the planets i n latitude: the m o t i o n i n l o n g i t u d e is measured o n the plane o f the ecliptic, w h i c h is the great circle o f the celestial sphere that traces the apparent yearly path o f the sun as seen f r o m the earth. The deferents o f the Ptolemaic m o d e l s , however, d i d not coincide w i t h this plane. The least problematic is the case o f the lunar m o d e l , i n w h i c h the deferent has a fixed i n c l i n a t i o n w i t h respect to the ecliptic, and the epicycle lies i n the plane o f the deferent. The epicycles o f the upper planets d o n o t l i e i n the plane o f the deferent, however, and they have a variable deviation w i t h respect t o i t . I n the case o f the l o w e r planets, b o t h the i n c l i n a t i o n o f the deferent w i t h respect to the ecliptic and that o f the epicycle w i t h respect to the deferent are variable. It is easy to i m a g i n e the c o m p l e x i t y a n d

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potential problems o f the Ptolemaic models that attempted to account f o r these seesaw and oscillation m o t i o n s . The astronomers w h o attempted to solve these problems are classified i n t o t w o general schools: a mathematically oriented school p r e d o m i n a n t l y based i n the M u s l i m w o r l d ' s eastern parts, and a philosophically oriented school based i n the M u s h m empire's western regions. The Maragha school is the name often given to the eastern reformers, i n recognition o f the achievements o f a n u m b e r o f astronomers

working

i n an observatory established

at Maragha

(near

Azerbaijan). The c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f these astronomers were n o d o u b t m o n u m e n tal, but the r e f o r m o f Ptolemaic astronomy started before the establishment o f the Maragha observatory i n the thirteenth century. This r e f o r m reached its h i g h est p o i n t i n the fourteenth. I n fact, some o f the astronomers o f the Maragha g r o u p seem to have started their r e f o r m projects even before they j o i n e d this observatory; perhaps they were invited to j o i n the observatory team because they were already engaged i n such research. The eastern r e f o r m tradition was too d i f fused t o be associated w i t h any one geographical area or p e r i o d ; rather, i t includes several centuries o f Arabic astronomical research t h r o u g h o u t the eastern domains o f the M u s h m w o r l d . Astronomers o f the eastern r e f o r m tradition adopted several mathematical strategies i n their attempts to solve the theoretical problems o f the Ptolemaic models. One o f their m a i n objectives was to come u p w i t h models i n w h i c h the m o t i o n s o f the planets could be generated as a result o f combinations o f u n i f o r m circular m o t i o n s , w h i l e at the same time c o n f o r m i n g to the accurate Ptolemaic observations. Two useful and extremely influential mathematical tools were invented by the t h i r t e e n t h - c e n t u r y astronomers al-Tusi and a l - U r d i . The first t o o l , k n o w n i n m o d e r n scholarship as the Tusi couple, i n effect p r o d u c e d linear oscillation as a result o f a c o m b i n a t i o n o f t w o u n i f o r m circular motions. This tool was used i n various ways by many astronomers, i n c l u d i n g the Polish astronomer Nicolaus Copernicus. The Urdí lemma was an equally versatile mathematical tool used by a l - U r d i and his successors. To apply this lemma to the m o d e l o f the upper planets, f o r example, a l - U r d i reversed the directions o f m o t i o n and d i v i d e d the eccentricities o f the Ptolemaic m o d e l . H e was thus able to produce u n i f o r m m o t i o n a r o u n d the geometric center o f the sphere, w h i l e at the same time r e p r o d u c i n g the u n i f o r m m o t i o n a r o u n d the Ptolemaic equant center. To produce o p t i m a l representations that are physically and mathematically sound, other astronomers used various combinations o f these t w o tools and devised additional tools o f their o w n i n v e n t i o n . The most comprehensive and successful models were i n t r o d u c e d i n the fourteenth century by the Damascene astronomer I b n al-Shatir; his models for all the planets use combinations o f perfect circular m o t i o n s i n w h i c h each circle rotates u n i f o r m l y a r o u n d its center. I b n al-Shatir

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was also able to solve problems o f planetary distances and to provide m o r e accurate accounts for observations. A n u m b e r o f I b n al-Shatir's models were r e p r o duced a century and a half later by Copernicus, clearly situating the latter w i t h i n the eastern Arabic t r a d i t i o n o f astronomical r e f o r m . The development o f Arabic astronomy i n the M u s l i m states o f Andalusia and N o r t h A f r i c a f o l l o w e d different routes. T h e beginnings o f significant scientific activity i n Andalusia started i n the n i n t h century, yet this activity was almost c o m pletely dependent u p o n and lagging b e h i n d the sciences o f the eastern part o f the M u s h m w o r l d . Between the n i n t h and eleventh centuries, however, a f u l l fledged

scientific t r a d i t i o n emerged. Many scientists traveled east t o study sci-

ence; scientific books were systematically acquired and large private and public libraries were established. A c c o r d i n g t o t r a d i t i o n , under the patronage o f a h H a k a m I I (r. 9 6 1 - 7 6 ) , the Umayyad caliph o f Córdoba, o n e royal library is said to have amassed f o u r h u n d r e d thousand books. A solid f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the eastern astronomical t r a d i t i o n led, i n the eleventh century, t o intensive and at times o r i g i n a l astronomical activity i n Andalusia. The m a i n astronomers o f this p e r i o d include Maslama a l - M a j r i t i ( d . 1007) o f Córdoba, his student I b n al-Saffar, and al-Zarqiyal ( k n o w n as Zarqallu, d. a. 1100). Zarqallu, was one o f the m a i n c o n tributors to the c o m p i l a t i o n o f the celebrated Toledan Tables, w h i c h greatly i n f l u enced the development o f Latin astronomy. The emphasis o f the activity o f these and other astronomers was focused o n the c o m p i l a t i o n o f tables and o n spherical astronomy. Their p r i m a r y o r i g i n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n c l u d e d some n e w observations, but most o f their w o r k concerned the mathematics o f the trepidation m o v e m e n t o f the stars and the i n v e n t i o n o f h i g h l y sophisticated astronomical instruments. D u r i n g this p e r i o d , however, little w o r k o f significance was devoted to planetary theory. I n t h e t w e l f t h century, however, the focus o f a s t r o n o m i c a l research i n Andalusia shifted t o planetary theory. T h e names associated w i t h this research i n c l u d e the Andalusian philosopher I b n Bajja (ca. 1095-1138), the Andalusian astronomer Jabir i b n Aflah ( f l . 1120), the Andalusian philosopher and physician I b n T u f a y l ( d . 1185), the Islamic philosopher I b n Rushd (1126-98, k n o w n i n the west as Averroës), and the Andalusian astronomer A b u Ishaq a l - B i t r u j i ( f l . 1190). O f these, a l - B i t r u j i was the only one t o formulate an alternative t o Ptolemaic astronomy, w h i l e the others produced philosophical discussions o f this astronomy. These discourses o n Ptolemaic astronomy, as w e l l as al-Bitruji's actual p r o posed m o d e l , conceived o f astronomical r e f o r m i n reactionary t e r m s — t h a t is, i n terms o f a d o p t i n g older and mathematically i n f e r i o r models i n place o f the ones used since Ptolemy. The a i m o f this western school o f astronomical r e f o r m was to reinstate Aristotelian homocentric spheres and to completely eliminate any use o f eccentrics and epicycles. I n accordance w i t h the most stringent and literal

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interpretations o f Aristotelian principles, the western researchers demanded that the heavens be represented exclusively by nested homocentric spheres and perfectly u n i f o r m circular motions. Even epicycles and deferents that rotated u n i f o r m l y around their centers were n o t tolerated, because their use entailed an a t t r i b u t i o n o f compoundedness

t o heavenly phenomena, w h i l e according to

Aristotelian principles, the heavens are perfectly simple. Because the predictive power o f the Ptolemaic models and their ability to account for the observed phenomena relied o n the use o f epicycles and eccentrics, however, the western models were strictly qualitative and philosophical and were completely useless f r o m a mathematical perspective. These models were neither numerically v e r i f i able, n o r could they be used for predicting planetary positions. It is n o wonder, therefore, that all but one o f the western philosophers d i d not bother to produce actual geometrical models. The significance o f the difference between the eastern and western r e f o r m traditions o f Arabic astronomy cannot be overemphasized. The prevalent v i e w i n contemporary scholarship attributes the steady decline o f the intellectual sciences i n Andalusia and N o r t h Africa to the rise o f the so-called fundamentalist states o f the Almoravids (1091-1144) and Almohads (1147-1232). Precisely d u r i n g this p e r i o d , however, the greatest Andalusian philosophers w o r k e d under the patronage o f the rulers o f these t w o states. What transpired, therefore, was not a steady decline o f the intellectual disciplines b u t the rise o f some disciplines at the expense o f others. The decline o f mathematical astronomy had n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h the Almoravids or the Almohads or w i t h an alleged theological counterrevo l u t i o n . Rather, the decline was a result o f the adoption o f a specific research p r o g r a m o f astronomical research, a p r o g r a m that was driven by the untenable, and by then outdated, Aristotelian philosophical concerns that proved incompatible w i t h astronomy's advanced mathematical and scientific aspects. U n l i k e the western school, the eastern school o f Arabic astronomy d i d n o t favor philosophy at the expense o f mathematics. The objections o f the eastern school were mathematical and physical, and as the comparison w i t h their western counterpart clearly illustrates, these objections were certainly n o t p h i l o sophical. A c o m m o n v i e w prevalent i n earlier studies maintains that the eastern r e f o r m tradition o f Arabic astronomy was d r i v e n by philosophical considerations, a n o t i o n that is often used t o u n d e r m i n e the mathematical and scientific significance o f this t r a d i t i o n . Given the o v e r w h e l m i n g evidence o f detailed research o n this t r a d i t i o n , such a v i e w is n o longer tenable. The alternative solar m o d e l proposed by I b n al-Shatir is an example i n w h i c h r e f o r m was motivated purely by observational considerations, even t h o u g h the Ptolemaic m o d e l was completely unobjectionable f r o m a physical or philosophical perspective. M o r e generally, the eastern tradition o f astronomical r e f o r m had its roots i n the sys-

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tematic mathematization o f astronomy, and to some extent o f nature itself. A recent study o f dl-Takmila fi Sharh al-Tadhkira (The c o m p l e m e n t t o the explanation o f the m e m e n t o ) o f Shams a l - D i n al-Khafri ( d . after 1525) clearly illustrates one o f the m a i n characteristics o f this t r a d i t i o n . A l - K h a f r i was p r i m a r i l y a religious scholar w h o w r o t e a h i g h l y sophisticated commentary o n al-Tusi's Tiiilhkim, one o f the classics o f the eastern r e f o r m t r a d i t i o n . I n this w o r k A l - K h a f r i presented t h o r o u g h accounts f o r the various alternative m o d e l s proposed by earlier astronomers. The purpose o f this w o r k , however, was not to look for a correct m o d e l , n o r to decide w h i c h m o d e l c o n f o r m e d w i t h an ideal or preferred cosmology, but to establish the mathematical equivalence o f all o f these models.

Practical Astronomy A l t h o u g h the most i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f Arabic astronomy were i n the held o f theoretical astronomy, practical astronomical problems occupied a great many astronomers, w h o were responsible for significant advances i n the field. Some o f these problems had a specific Islamic character; other problems had to d o w i t h society's practical needs, i n c l u d i n g such problems as finding the direction o f one locality w i t h respect to another, a p r o b l e m that required d e t e r m i n i n g the l o n g i tudes and latitudes o f these localities as w e l l as other aspects o f mathematical geography. The " I s l a m i c " problems were those related to Islamic w o r s h i p , such as d e t e r m i n i n g the times o f prayer; the t i m e o f sunrise and sunset i n relation to fasting; the d i r e c t i o n o f the qibla; crescent visibility i n connection w i t h the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the b e g i n n i n g o f the lunar m o n t h ; and calendar computations. The methods e m p l o y e d to solve these problems varied f r o m simple approximative techniques t o complex mathematical ones. For the more c o m p l e x mathematical m e t h o d , studies often occasioned complex theoretical analysis that far exceeded the i n i t i a l scope o f the examined problems. One o f the m a i n topics addressed i n various astronomical treatises is the probl e m o f crescent visibility. The official Islamic calendar is a lunar calendar, w i t h die first year coinciding w i d i the year 622 c.E. The lunar m o n t h begins right after sunset w i t h the sighting o f the crescent. The visibility o f this crescent, however, is itself a function o f many variables, some o f w h i c h are more relevant than others. These variables include, for example, the celestial coordinates o f the sun and die m o o n , the latitude o f die place at w h i c h the crescent is sighted, and the brightness o f the sky. Various methods were devised to determine the conditions under w h i c h the crescent w o u l d be visible. Some o f these methods accounted for a l i m i t e d number o f variables i n the special case o f the m o o n , w h i l e other methods exhausted all possible factors that affect the visibility o f any heavenly body on the h o r i z o n just after sunset and treated the p r o b l e m o f crescent visibility as a special case.

Muslims use a lunar calendar, and the new month starts just after sunset with the sighting of the new crescent moon. This illustration from a sixteenth-century poetical text shows the sighting of the new moon that marks the feast of Id al-Fitr and celebrates the end of the monthlong fast of Ramadan.

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Finding the direction o f the qibla is another case i n w h i c h complex mathematical methods were employed. Muslims are enjoined to face Mecca d u r i n g their five daily prayers, and at least i n theory all mosques are supposed to be oriented t o w a r d the Kaaba, i n Mecca. Before mathematical methods were available, M u s l i m s d e t e r m i n e d the direction o f the qibla based o n the practices o f M u h a m m a d ' s early Companions and their successors. They also made use o f traditions o f folk astronomy and o f the fact that the Kaaba itself is astronomically aligned. Many early M u s l i m s , therefore, used the same astronomical alignment adduced for the Kaaba to orient themselves d u r i n g prayers. This m e t h o d p r o v i d e d a reasonable a p p r o x i m a t i o n i n locations close to Mecca, but it was quite inaccurate i n such far-away places as N o r t h Africa and Iran. Many o f the mosques that were built i n the early p e r i o d were misaligned, and although some retained their orientation, others were rebuilt to face the correct direction o f Mecca. N u m e r o u s simple, nonmathematical methods were employed i n the early p e r i o d and continued to exist even after the emergence o f mathematical sciences. W i t h this emergence, however, new methods were devised to compute the qibla for any locality o n the basis o f the geographical coordinates o f that locality and Mecca. The p r o b l e m o f d e t e r m i n i n g the direction o f the qibla was treated as one o f mathematical geography: the purpose is to find the direction o f Mecca along the shortest arc o f the great circle j o i n i n g the locality o f Mecca to the locality f r o m w h i c h the measurement is made. To solve this p r o b l e m , it is necessary to k n o w the geographical coordinates o f both Mecca and the locality i n question. Various methods c o u l d then be used to calculate the direction o f the qibla. Most astron o m i c a l handbooks contained chapters o n finding this direction by one o r more approximative or accurate methods. Separate treatises were also composed o n the subject. Approximative methods involved the use o f cartography to represent o n a plane o r t h o g o n a l g r i d o f latitude and longitude the relative location o f Mecca w i t h respect to a particular locality. The analemma solutions are accurate project i o n methods in w h i c h the meridian, celestial equator, and h o r i z o n planes are represented o n one plane, and the problem is solved by a series o f rotations o f these planes. I n the accurate s o l u t i o n , the p r o b l e m is transferred to the celestial sphere where the p o s i t i o n o f the zenith o f Mecca relative to the zenith o f the locality is determined. The direction o f the qibla is then calculated as the a z i m u t h (arc) o f the zenith o f Mecca o n the local h o r i z o n . As i n many other fields o f astronomy, attempts were made at devising universal solutions for all possible cases, and mathematical procedures o f considerable sophistication were used. Starting i n the n i n t h century, tables were c o m p u t e d displaying the d i r e c t i o n o f the qibla as a f u n c t i o n o f terrestrial l o n g i t u d e and latitude. These computations were based o n b o t h approximate and accurate methods. I n a d d i t i o n to the qibla tables, different tables were c o m p i l e d i n connection w i t h timekeeping and

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Constructing scientific instruments was particularly important to Muslim astronomers who needed to pinpoint the location and movement of the heavenly bodies in order to determine the direction of Mecca and the times of prayer. The astrolabe, a versatile observational instrument and calculator, was particularly useful in this respect. Some of the most beautifully decorated examples were made for the Safavid rulers of Iran, such as the one on the left, made for Abbas II in 1647-48. The astrolabe on the right was made by Abu al-Aimma in 1712-13.

other astronomical functions. Timekeeping received particular interest because o f its relevance to the regulation o f the times o f prayer. Each o f the five daily prayers that are r e q u i r e d o f M u s l i m s c o u l d be p e r f o r m e d w i t h i n set t i m e l i m i t s , w h i c h vary t h r o u g h o u t the year and i n different localities. These l i m i t s are defined i n terms o f the apparent position o f the sun i n the sky relative to the local h o r i z o n . I n other w o r d s , they vary as a f u n c t i o n o f the solar altitude and l o n g i tude as w e l l as the latitude o f the locality. I n the attempt to c o m p u t e the times o f prayers, extensive literature was generated o n various aspects o f timekeeping and o n the theory and construction o f sundials. The earliest k n o w n text o n timekeeping was composed by a l - K h w a r i z m i i n the earl) n i n t h century, and a comprehensive w o r k o n sundial theory was composed by the mathematician Thabit Ibn Q i u r a h . Standard works on timekeeping, such as the famous Jami al-Mabadi wal-Chayat fi Ilm al-Miaat (The comprehensive principles and objectives o f the science o f timekeeping) w r i t t e n i n Cairo by A b u A h al-Marrakushi around 1280, often included theoretical treatments o f spherical astronomy and sundial theory, discussions o f the construction and use o f various instruments, and extensive tables. Several such tables were universal, and they were compiled for all terrestrial latitudes. These tables were often augmented w i t h auxiliary trigonometric

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tables to facilitate the solution o f problems o f spherical trigonometry. The tables o f the fourteenth-century Damascene timekeeper al-Khalili are examples o f the finest accomplishments w i t h i n this tradition. They are the most accurate and exhaustive numerical solutions for all timekeeping problems and for die direction o f the qibla. Such problems gave a great impetus to the science and art o f i n s t r u m e n t b u i l d i n g . Astrolabes, quadrants, compass boxes, and cartographic grids o f varying degrees o f sophistication were designed and i n t r o duced t o solve some o f these problems. Many o f these i n s t r u m e n t s were also used for other astron o m i c a l observations and computations. The most i m p o r t a n t o f these is the astrolabe, w h i c h was a versatile medieval observational i n s t r u m e n t and calculator. Eleventh-century Andalusian astronomers

in

particular c o n t r i b u t e d i m p o r t a n t innovations i n the field o f astronomical instruments. The i n v e n t i o n o f the universal astrolabe and the simpler Shakkaziyya plate are rare examples o f creative activity that started

This horizontal pin gnomon and qibla indicator was used

i n Andalusia and later influenced the eastern part o f

t o

d e t e r m i n e

t h

* direction and times of prayer,

the M u s l i m w o r l d . I n s t r u m e n t s o f d i f f e r e n t sizes were also designed and used i n connection w i t h programs o f astronomical observation and w i t h i n the confines o f organized observatories. The earliest p l a n n e d and p r o g r a m m e d observations

were p r o d u c e d i n Baghdad and

Damascus d u r i n g the last years o f the reign o f the Abbasid caliph a l - M a m u n (r. 813-33). Since then, many other observations were recorded. Many o f these were conducted i n private observatories, where relatively small instruments were often used. Official observatories that enjoyed financial support tended to use larger instruments, w h i c h had the advantage o f p r o d u c i n g m o r e accurate observations. Toward the end o f the tenth century i n Rayy, for example, under the patronage o f the B u y i d r u l e r Fakhr al-Dawla (r. 9 7 8 - 9 7 ) the astronomer alKhujandi designed and b u i l t a large sextant that had a radius o f t w e n t y meters. A degree o f arc o n this sextant measured about t h i r t y - f i v e centimeters, enabling m u c h m o r e accurate solar observations. Another large instrument is described by the M u s l i m philosopher I b n Sina; a m o d i f i e d version o f this i n s t r u m e n t was later used i n the Maragha observatory. A n i m p o r t a n t development took place i n eleventh-century Isfahan, where a large and h i g h l y organized observatory was established under the patronage o f

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the Seljuk ruler Malikshah (r. 1072-92). The observations there were planned over a thirty-year p e r i o d , w h i c h is the t i m e taken by Saturn, the furthest planet f r o m the earth, to complete one f u l l revolution. The observatory f u n c t i o n e d f o r o n l y eighteen

years,

however, and was shut d o w n w h e n its founder d i e d . Nonetheless, this represented the first official observatory to last for such a l o n g p e r i o d o f t i m e . The observatory thus acquired the status o f a l o n g - l i v i n g scientific i n s t i t u t i o n . The most famous o f these institutionalized observatories was established i n the t h i r t e e n t h century i n Maragha under the patronage o f the Ilkhanid Hulagu and the directorship o f Nasir a l - D i n al-Tusi. It was built o n a large piece o f land and was financed by assigning

vvaqf ( r e v e n u e - y i e l d i n g source

often

endowed for a religious institution or charity) revenues to support i t . Because o f its financial a u t o n omy, the observatory was able to survive after the In addition to the astrolabe, many other

death o f its f o u n d e r H u l a g u , and it was active f o r

instruments were constructed for astronomi-

m o r e than f i f t y years. The Maragha observatory

cal observations and computations. This illustration to an Ottoman manuscript from the second half of the sixteenth century shows

served as a center o f astronomical research a n d attracted a large team o f astronomers f r o m all over

four scientists taking observations using a

the M u s l i m w o r l d . These were the most talented

giant armillary sphere made of wood.

astronomers o f the t i m e , and their collaboration, despite t h e i r diverse r e g i o n a l backgrounds, is a

c o m p e l l i n g illustration o f the h i g h m o b i l i t y o f scientists and the universality o f Arabic scientific culture. The Maragha astronomers engaged i n various kinds o f scientific research, i n c l u d i n g the b u i l d i n g o f specialized observational i n s t r u ments and the c o m p i l a t i o n o f n e w tables (Ilkhanid Zij), as w e l l as the m o s t advanced w o r k o n planetary theory. The Maragha observatory also served as a model for the organization o f the large

fifteenth-century

Ulegh Beg observatory

i n Samarqand, the sixteenth-century Taqi al-Din observatory i n Istanbul, and the eighteenth-century Jai Singh observatory i n Jaipur. Several sciences were m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y allied to astronomy. Mathematical geography, for example, required the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f latitudes as w e l l as l o n gitude differences between localities; the l o n g i t u d e difference was often calculated by measuring the difference i n the t w o places between the respective local times o f occurrence o f the same astronomical p h e n o m e n a , such as a lunar eclipse. N u m e r o u s sources give lists o f place names and their terrestrial c o o r d i -

The most famous observatory founded by the Muslims was established in the thirteenth century in Maragha under the directorship of Nasir al-Din al-Tusi. It served as a model for the large observatory that was built by theTimurid prince Ulugh Beg in Samarqand in the early fifteenth century and has been recently restored.

nates. A n o t h e r aspect o f mathematical geography is cartography. Advanced research o n p r o j e c t i o n theory was conducted by Arab scientists; as a result, several new theories were i n t r o d u c e d . I t seems, however, that there was little systematic application o f these theories i n the construction o f w o r l d maps. The extant examples o f such maps-—including the famous t w e l f t h - c e n t u r y map o f the Arab geographer a n d cartographer A b u A b d A l l a h M u h a m m a d a l - I d r i s i ( 1 1 0 0 - 6 6 ) that was c o m m i s s i o n e d by the N o r m a n K i n g Roger I I (1095-1154) o f Sicily—are h i g h l y schematized. The nautical sciences were also dependent o n astronomy. I n a d d i t i o n t o the experience o f the navigators, these sciences d r e w o n k n o w l e d g e o f astronomy, geography, a n d m e a s u r i n g a n d observational instruments. The o n l y s u r v i v i n g texts i n this field were w r i t t e n by I b n M a j i d and Sulayman a l - M a h r i toward the end o f the fifteenth and b e g i n n i n g o f the sixteenth centuries. The real nautical know ledge, however, was more dependent o n shipm a k i n g technology and practical experience i n navigating the I n d i a n Ocean than on purely scientific knowledge.

Mathematics The Arabs i n h e r i t e d and developed several arithmetic n u m e r a t i o n systems. Finger reckoning was used by the Arabs before Islam. It is also k n o w n as hisab al-jummal (sentence a r i t h m e t i c ) , i n reference t o the use o f a fixed order o f the letters o f the Arabic alphabet t o denote numerals. Because it is p r i m a r i l y mental, addition and

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subtraction i n this system are fairly simple, whereas various cumbersome schemes are employed for m u l t i p l i c a t i o n , d i v i s i o n , and ratios—complicated computations are especially difficult to p e r f o r m . This is w h y finger reckoning started to disappear w i t h the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f H i n d u arithmetic, the base for the current scheme o f n u m e r a t i o n and calculation. I n the H i n d u arithmetic system, any n u m b e r can be denoted using only nine digits and a zero. Its great versatility derives f r o m the use o f the decimal scale and the idea o f a place value. The sexagesimal system is also a place-value system, but i t is based o n a scale o f sixty. O f ancient Babylonian origins, this system was used extensively i n connection w i t h astronomy. Even after the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f decimal fractions, Arabic computations often m i x e d bases and systems. I n astronomy the c o m m o n practice was to use the decimal system f o r integers and the sexagesimal system for fractions; for b o t h integers and fractions the letters o f the Arabic alphabet were n o r m a l l y used instead o f numerals. Numerals took different forms i n different regions, w i t h a marked difference between the eastern and western parts o f the M u s l i m w o r l d . These numerals were k n o w n a m o n g Arabs as Indian numerals; the western version o f these numerals passed i n t o Europe and became k n o w n as Arabic numerals. The p h e n o m e n o n o f the reorganization and reconstruction o f disciplines by The tradition established by

cross-application was as true o f the fields o f mathematics as i t was for astronomy.

the Maragha observatory

The foundations o f each discipline were t h o r o u g h l y reorganized by systemati-

continued into the eigh-

cally applying other fields to i t and by generalizing its concepts and methods. The

teenth century, as shown by

three mathematical disciplines that interacted i n this generative way were a r i t h -

the one Jai Singh established in Jaipur, India. He modeled some of his instruments after

metic, algebra, and geometry. The n e w Arabic discipline o f algebra played a central role i n this process. Older mathematical traditions p r o v i d e d case-by-case

those of Maragha, including

solutions for specific equations. The equations themselves, however, were never

hemispherical and equinoc-

the autonomous object o f study. The first w o r k to consider algebraic expressions

tial sundials.

irrespective o f w h a t they may represent was a l - K h w a r i z m i ' s Kitab ol-Jabr wal-

Muslims developed several sciences related to astronomy, such as mathematical geography and cartography. One of the most important world maps of medieval times was drawn by al-Idrisi for the Norman King Roger II of Sicily (r.

109C-11C4).

The original has been lost, but this twentieth-century re-creation shows how

sophisticated it was, with seventy sectional maps covering the seven climes in ten columns. Like most maps made in the Islamic lands, this one has south at the top.

Muqabala ( k n o w n as The book o f algebra, literally "the book o f c o m p u l s i o n and c o m p a r i s o n " ) . W r i t t e n i n the first quarter o f the n i n t h century, this w o r k was considered by Arab mathematicians as w e l l as by early and late historians as an outstanding achievement i n the history o f mathematics. A I - K h w a r i z m i h i m s e l f was aware o f the novelty o f his w o r k : he used a title never used before i n earlier disciplines, and he p r o v i d e d an innovative technical t e r m i n o l o g y often w i t h o u t parallel i n earlier traditions. The objectives o f al-Khwarizmi's w o r k were equally o r i g i n a l : t o provide, f o r the first t i m e , a theory for the solution o f all types o f l i n ear and quadratic equations by radicals, w i t h o u t restricting the s o l u t i o n t o any one particular p r o b l e m . Thus, the subject o f al-Khwarizmi's n e w discipline was equations and roots: all geometric o r arithmetic problems were reduced, t h r o u g h algebraic operations, t o n o r m a l equations w i t h standard solutions. The w o r k o f a l - K h w a r i z m i was only the first i n a l o n g and increasingly more sophisticated t r a d i t i o n o f algebraic research. Almost immediately after the emergence o f this new field, other mathematicians started developing it and e x p l o r i n g the possibilities for applying it t o other mathematical disciplines. I n the tenth and eleventh centuries A b u Bakr M u h a m m a d al-Karaji ( f l . 1010) i n t r o d u c e d n e w research focused o n the systematic application o f the laws o f arithmetic t o algebraic expressions. I n the second half o f the n i n t h century, the Arab scientist Qusta i b n Luqa al-Balabakki

( d . a. 912) h a d translated the first seven books o f

Diophantus' Arithmetica i n t o Arabic. Significantly, the Arabic translation was given the title The Art of Algebra. The translator's use o f the language and conception o f the n e w field o f algebra reoriented the Arithmetica and provided instead an algebraic interpretation o f this arithmetic. I n this particular instance, the translation f r o m Greek i n t o Arabic was b o t h motivated and conditioned by the earlier o r i g i n a l research i n Arabic algebra. Thus, the Greek arithmetic that al-Karaji applied t o

,•

r $

Al-Khwanzmi s book Kitab ol-Jabr wd-Muqabala, written in the first quarter of the ninth century, is the oldest Arabic work on algebra. In it, al-Khwarizmi tried to provide a theory for the solution of all types of linear and quadratic equations. Partially translated into Latin by Robert of Chester, the text served to introduce the science of algeb ra to Europe.

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algebra had already been m o d i f i e d , even as i t was being translated, under the influence o f the w o r k o f a l - K h w a r i z m i and his successors. After al-Karaji's w o r k , the central efforts i n algebraic research focused o n the arithmetization o f algebra, a genre o f research that was new b o t h i n its contents and in its organization. For six centuries most of the i m p o r t a n t mathematicians continued to b u i l d o n and to develop the w o r k o f al-Karaji. The w o r k o f I b n Abbas al-Samawal a l - M a g h r i b i ( d . a. 1175) is o f particular importance w i t h i n this tradition. I n his al-Bahir fi al-Jabr (The splendid o n algebra), al-Samawal defined algebraic power, studied a r i t h metical operations o n polynomials, and examined the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n , division, a d d i t i o n , subtraction, and extraction o f roots for irrational quantities. W h i l e the application o f arithmetic t o algebra occupied center stage i n algebraic research, the theory o f algebraic equations also continued to develop. The mathematician Thabit i b n Q u r r a , f o r example, provided systematic geometrical interpretations o f algebraic procedures and explained quadratic equations geometrically. Other mathematicians attempted t o d o the reverse and explain geometrical problems i n algebraic terms. Aware o f the difficulty o f solving cubic equations by radicals and demonstrating such solutions geometrically, A b u A b d Allah M u h a m m a d i b n Isa al-Mahani ( d . a. 880) introduced the first algebraic f o r m u l a t i o n o f a solid p r o b l e m . Mathematicians then increasingly resorted to conic sections to solve cubic equations that could not be solved by radicals. U n l i k e earlier attempts t o geometrically demonstrate equations whose roots are k n o w n t h r o u g h algebraic solutions, the objective o f this last research was to find, w i t h the help o f geometry, the roots o f equations that are not solvable numerically. A continuous t r a d i t i o n o f partial c o n t r i b u t i o n s to this field began i n the n i n t h cent u r y and culminated i n the systematic w o r k o f the Persian mathematician U m a r al-Khayyam ( 1048-1131 ). A l - K h a y y a m elaborated a geometrical theory for equations o f degree equal to or less than three. For all types o f third-degree equations, he p r o v i d e d a f o r m a l classification according to the n u m b e r o f terms; he then solved these equations by means o f the intersection o f t w o conic sections. These solutions, as w e l l as al-Khayyam s m e t h o d o f using auxiliary curves and geometric figures t o solve third-degree equations, are often w r o n g l y attributed to the French mathematician and philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650). Al-Khayyam's m o n u m e n t a l contributions to the theory o f algebraic equations were not isolated, as general surveys o f the history o f mathematics often assert. I n fact, his w o r k constituted only the beginning o f a long and continuous tradition that was further transformed, a half century later, by Sharaf a l - D i n al-Tusi ( b o r n before

1135-d. a. 1213). I n its analytic approach, al-Tusi's w o r k o n equations

marks the b e g i n n i n g o f the discipline o f algebraic geometry: the study o f curves by means o f equations. Like al-Khayyam, al-Tusi continued to solve equations by auxiliary curves; unlike his predecessor, however, al-Tusi algebraically proved the

t 88

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A l . »LU1 '

\ i ¿ — ^ "T^p^t

Al-Khwarizmi is often considered the founder of algebra, and his name gave rise to the term algorithm.This page is from a manuscript of his treatise on algebra.

intersection o f curves by means o f their respective equations. Before al-Tusi, alKhayyam had already n o t e d , i n his classification o f third-degree equations, that some o f these equations are impossible; that is, they have n o positive solutions. Al-Khayyam only examined the equations that allow possible cases, however. A l Tusi also examined these cases, but i n the course o f his treatment o f the impossible cases, he i n t r o d u c e d new concepts and methods and charted even more n e w

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directions for mathematical research. Several n e w concepts usually attributed to later European mathematicians were introduced by al-Tusi. For the first time i n history, he formulated the concept o f a m a x i m u m o f an algebraic

expression,

w h i c h is often w r o n g l y attributed to the French mathematician François Viète (1540-1603): to f i n d the value o f an u n k n o w n x for w h i c h a cubic f u n c t i o n o f that u n k n o w n is a m a x i m u m . To do this, al-Tusi calculated the value o f the v a r i able x for w h i c h the derivative o f the above f u n c t i o n is equal to zero. Al-Tusi d i d not use the Arabic equivalent for the w o r d derivative, but he clearly introduced local analysis, the study o f m a x i m a , and the n o t i o n o f a derivative—all o f w h i c h were crucial concepts for the development o f algebraic geometry. Starting w i t h a l - K h w a r i z m i , and o n to al-Khayyam and al-Tusi, these mathematicians were fully aware o f the novelty o f their w o r k . They concocted unfam i l i a r titles f o r t h e i r books, c o i n e d technical t e r m i n o l o g y u n i q u e to their disciplines, organized their works i n decidedly different ways, and invented o r i g inal mathematical algorithms to solve the problems o f their disciplines. Above all, they conceived o f totally new subjects and mathematical concepts. Such innovations were made possible by the deliberate and systematic application o f three mathematical disciplines to each other: algebra, arithmetic, and geometry. The effect o f these trends was n o t restricted to the restructuring o f Hellenistic m a t h ematical k n o w l e d g e ; rather, it extended to the creation o f new mathematical disciplines. The professional contexts for the emergence o f these disciplines are w i d e and diverse. Outside the three mathematical disciplines, scientists were i n f o r m e d by the results o f research i n a w i d e array o f fields. I n certain cases, m o m e n t u m f o r scientific research derived f r o m interests totally unrelated to the exact sciences. C o m b i n a t o r i a l analysis, for example, was one such field; i t developed not just i n connection w i t h algebraic research but also linguistics. To c o m pile an exhaustive Arabic lexicon, al-Khalil i b n A h m a d ( 7 1 8 - 8 6 ) , one o f the earliest Arab lexicographers, enumerated f o r all the letters o f the Arabic alphabet ah the possible combinations o f w o r d s w i t h a m a x i m u m n u m b e r o f five letters. O f these possible w o r d s , the actual lexicon includes o n l y those that are e m p i r i cally verifiable. C o m m u n i t i e s o f scholars that i n c l u d e n o t o n l y first-class mathematicians but also commentators o f lesser reputation, as w e l l scholars w o r k i n g i n other fields, c o n t r i b u t e d to the creation and d i f f u s i o n o f a m u l t i t u d e o f mathematical traditions. Methods used for the solution o f certain kinds o f problems became i n themselves subjects for further examination and systematization. I n a d d i t i o n to these disciplines, new fields o f research developed, i n c l u d i n g intermediate analysis, integer Diophantine analysis, and the study o f asymptotic behavior and o f i n f i n i t e s i m a l objects, a m o n g others. Even i n geometry, w h i c h was the most advanced b r a n c h o f the i n h e r i t e d Hellenistic mathematical sciences, Arabic

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geometry acquired its o w n characteristic features at an early stage i n its development. This t o o was a result o f c o m b i n i n g geometry w i t h algebra and a r i t h metic. A l t h o u g h most advances i n geometry were deliberate and p r o g r a m m a t i c , some were u n i n t e n d e d . The most notable example is the l o n g t r a d i t i o n o f exami n i n g Euclid's theory o f parallels (the fifth postulate o f Euclid's Elements), w h i c h was initially aimed at p r o v i d i n g better proofs for Euclid's theory. I b n al-Haytham, al-Khayyam, and al-Tusi were a m o n g the many mathematicians w h o tried to p r o vide such proofs. I n the course o f these attempts, some o f the theorems o f n o n Euclidean geometry were proved. A l t h o u g h M u s l i m mathematicians d i d not finally formulate such a geometry, they established a tradition o f research that was central to its later discovery. Trigonometry was another h y b r i d mathematical discipline i n w h i c h Arab scientists enriched, and eventually reoriented, earlier scientific knowledge. Initially developed i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h research i n astronomy, t r i g o n o m e t r y finally became an independent mathematical discipline i n its o w n right. W h i l e Ptolemy's astronomy was superior i n its models, it rested o n elementary geometrical p r o p o sitions. Ptolemaic astronomical computations were based on a single f u n c t i o n , the c h o r d o f a circular arc. Moreover, the only tool for spherical c o m p u t a t i o n was Menelaus' theorem—a cumbersome f o r m u l a for the relationship between the six segments that result f r o m the intersection o f four arcs i n a complete quadrilateral. Soon after translating Ptolemy and adopting his models, Arab astronomers augmented his geometry w i t h the p o w e r f u l sine f u n c t i o n o f Indian trigonometry. I n the n i n t h century the tangent f u n c t i o n was also introduced. The emergence o f t r i g o n o m e t r y as an independent science, however, required t w o additional developments: first, i d e n t i f y i n g the spherical triangle as the object o f study as opposed to the calculus o f chords o n the spherical quadrilateral; and second, i n c l u d i n g the angles o f triangles i n this calculus and not restricting it to the sides. The

first

accounts o f the spherical triangle appeared by the end o f the tenth century. I n a testimony to the universality o f the scientific culture o f the time, the general theo r e m o f sines, k n o w n as the Rule o f Four Quantities, was discovered simultaneously and independently by three astronomers f r o m K h w a r i z m , Baghdad, and Rayy ( A b u Nasr Mansur i b n Iraq, A b u al-Wafa al-Buzjani, and A b u M a h m u d H a m i d al-Khujandi). I n the eleventh century all six relations o f the right-angled triangle appeared i n various texts, i n c l u d i n g , among others, al-Biruni's Motjalid Ilm al-Haya. I n die thirteenth century Nasir a l - D i n al-Tusi WTote the first independent treatise o n t r i g o n o m e t r y w i t h o u t reference to astronomy, thus sealing the process by w h i c h another independent discipline was created.

Optics The Arabs also inherited a large body o f Hellenistic optical knowledge, w h i c h covered the physical as well as geometric study o f vision, the reflection o f rays o n m i r -

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rors (catoptrics), b u r n i n g m i r r o r s , and atmospheric phenomena such as the rainbow. W i d i i n t w o centuries, however, the field o f optics was radically transformed, and Arabic optics acquired the characteristics o f a new field o f study w i t h distinct methods and approaches. As i n other scientific disciplines, the first Arabic translations o f Greek optical texts were produced at the same time as the first research i n Arabic was being conducted. Arabic compositions i n optics started i n the eighth century and c o n t i n u e d t h r o u g h the n i n t h w i t h the works o f I b n Masawayh, Hunayn i b n Ishaq, Qusta i b n Luqa al-Balabakki, and Thabit i b n Q u r r a . I n addition to its p r i m a r y focus o n physiological optics, n i n t h - c e n t u r y works also treated, i n separate studies, the subject o f b u r n i n g m i r r o r s , reflection on m i r r o r s , and geometrical and physical optics. Yaqub i b n Ishaq a l - K i n d i (ca. 8 o i - c a . 866) is said to have produced ten treatises i n the latter fields, o f w h i c h at least four are extant. Bodi Qusta i b n Luqa and a l - K i n d i adopted a deliberate strategy i n their research: To rectify the results o f one particular subfield o f Hellenistic optics, they drew o n other subfields o f this research, w i t h the i n t e n t i o n o f c o m b i n i n g the geometry and the physiology o f vision. One o f the most immediate results o f this innovative approach was to integrate catoptrics, the stud)' o f the reflection o f visual rays o n m i r r o r s , i n t o the mainstream o f optical research. The greatest w o r k o f Arabic optics is u n d o u b t e d l y I b n al-Haytham's Ki tab alManazir. I n the tenth century the earlier w o r k o f A b u Sad al-Ala i b n Sahl ( f l . 9 7 0 - 9 0 ) expanded the horizons o f optics and p r o v i d e d an i m p o r t a n t link i n the line o f research that c u l m i n a t e d i n I b n al-Haytham's seminal c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n the eleventh century. One o f I b n Sahl's o w n additions was the creation o f the field o f dioptrics, i n w h i c h the study o f b u r n i n g instruments was n o longer restricted to m i r r o r s but also i n c l u d e d lenses. I b n Sahl produced a systematic theoretical study o f refraction i n lenses, i n w h i c h he i n c l u d e d an examination o f various kinds o f curves and o f geometrical methods o f d r a w i n g t h e m . He also i n t r o duced the n o t i o n o f a constant ratio, w h i c h is the inverse o f w h a t is n o w called the index o f refraction. This ratio measures the refraction o f a visual ray i n a particular m e d i u m w i t h respect to air. Its discovery represents the first instance o f a fundamental p r i n c i p l e o f d i o p t r i c s , w h i c h is often referred to as the law o f Snellius ( i n reference to the 1621 discovery i n Europe o f the same l a w ) . The creative trend o f expanding optical research i n all o f its subfields reached a peak under I b n al-Haytham ( k n o w n as Alhazan i n the west), w h o covered i n an integrated research project all o f the traditional themes o f optics as w e l l as those invented by his forerunners. This project effectively u n d e r m i n e d the basic premise and structure o f Greek optical research. At a basic conceptual level, I b n al-Haytham rejected the Hellenistic theories o f vision and i n t r o d u c e d a radically different theory. V i s i o n , according t o earlier theories, is considered a result o f contact between the eye and the object, either t h r o u g h a ray e m i t t e d f r o m the eye to the object (as i n the extramission theories o f Euclid and Ptolemy) o r t h r o u g h die transmission o f a " f o r m " f r o m the object to the eye (as i n the i n t r o -

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T H E OXFORD HISTORY OF ISLAM

mission theories o f Aristotle and the atomists). I b n a l Haytham's remarkable insight was t o argue that w h a t is sensed is not the object itself and that an image o f the object is f o r m e d as a result o f the reflection

o f light

f r o m the object t o the eye. I b n al-Haytham c o u l d thus

'Li W%,/£iAfyj^*n?¿Att 2^

proceed t o study the geom e t r i c aspects o f the visual cone theories w i t h o u t havi n g t o explain at the same time the psychology o f perc e p t i o n . H e also benefited f r o m advances i n the study o f the eye's physiology, thus i n t e g r a t i n g i n t o his t h e o r y

^*'3C-

: tsS tt_/lj'j*^**> ?^/'* i

3

i

o f vision

the c u m u l a t i v e

results o f mathematical, physIbn al-Haytham (d. 1039), known in the West as Alhazan,

ical, and medical research.

was a leading Arab mathematician, astronomer, and physi -

This comprehensive

theory

cist. His optical compendium, Khab oI-Manazir, is the greatest

enabled I b n al-Haytham t o

medieval work on optics.

provide

various

levels

of

explanation. For example, the conditions o f the propagation o f light c o u l d be studied i n separation f r o m physical theories o f v i s i o n . Ibn al-Haytham b u i l t o n the already r i c h Arabic trad i t i o n and proceeded t o examine various aspects o f the rules o f propagation o f l i g h t . I n the course o f his systematic and integrated research, he conceived o f new problems that were n o t addressed i n earlier optical research. O n e such famous mathematical p r o b l e m is k n o w n as Alhazan's p r o b l e m : t o find the p o i n t o f reflection o n the surface o f a concave o r convex spherical m i r r o r , given the fixed positions o f the visible object and the eye. I b n al-Haytham's innovative conceptualization and approach also led t o the a d o p t i o n o f controlled experimentation as a practice o f investigation as w e l l as the n o r m f o r proofs i n optics and m o r e generally i n physics. M o r e systematic experimentation was employed by Kamal a l - D i n al-Farisi ( d . 1319), w h o pursued I b n al-Haytham's project o f r e f o r m i n g optics and w r o t e commentaries

on a

n u m b e r o f his works. To explain the f o r m a t i o n o f rainbows, al-Farisi i n t r o d u c e d

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an experimental setup i n w h i c h a glass sphere filled w i t h water simulated the water droplets suspended i n the atmosphere. He then proceeded to m a t h e m a t i cally justify the analogy between this artificial m o d e l and nature by arguing that a sufficiently t h i n glass sphere w o u l d produce negligible additional refraction. By c o n t r o l l i n g the m e d i u m i n w h i c h the experiment was conducted, al-Farisi was successful i n e x p l a i n i n g the shapes o f the p r i n c i p a l arc and the secondary arc o f the r a i n b o w as resulting f r o m t w o refractions and one or t w o reflections inside the sphere. It has often been argued that I b n al-Haytham's w ork had no effect o n Arabic r

optical research and was only appreciated i n later European scholarship. Yet the w o r k o f al-Farisi, i n a d d i t i o n t o recent evidence f o r an eleventh-century Andalusian version o f I b n al-Haytham's Manazir, seems to illustrate a c o n t i n u i t y i n the creative activity i n optical research not just before I b n al-Haytham but also after h i m . As i n all o f the other sciences considered thus far, c o m m u n i t i e s o f scientists always existed w i t h i n w h i c h n o r m a l science was practiced. These n o r malized practices p r o v i d e d the social and intellectual contexts for the exceptional m o m e n t s o f creativity i n the history o f Arabic science.

Engineering and Technology In a d d i t i o n to the classical scientific disciplines, great

energies—commensurate

w i t h the i m m e n s i t y and eminence o f the Islamic e m p i r e — w e r e b r o u g h t to bear o n technological developments. These developments c o n t r i b u t e d significantly to the material prosperity o f medieval Islamic societies and to the increased p r o d u c t i o n o f raw materials as w e l l as finished c o m m o d i t i e s . For most o f these techn o l o g i e s , o n l y samples exist o f the f i n a l products o f Arabic t e c h n o l o g i c a l knowledge. Buildings and fabrics, for example, provide l i v i n g evidence for a fine architectural t r a d i t i o n as w e l l as a developed textile industry. Yet there is little w r i t t e n material that describes the technological knowledge used i n such industries. As the field o f technology is a vast subject, this section provides only a b r i e f and selective overview, emphasizing technologies about w h i c h there are existi n g w r i t t e n documents. The Arabs i n h e r i t e d a n u m b e r o f Hellenistic theoretical studies o n g e o m e t r i cal statics, i n c l u d i n g , a m o n g other subjects, the mathematical study o f the laws o f e q u i l i b r i u m , the concept o f a center o f gravity, and hydrostatic studies o f the e q u i l i b r i u m o f bodies i n liquids. They also i n h e r i t e d practical studies o f simple machines for l i f t i n g and m o v i n g objects. The most famous Greek w o r k i n this field was that o f the mathematician and inventor Archimedes. B u i l d i n g o n this legacy, Arabic research i n statics was pursued o n three fronts. The first can be called practical statics, and i t includes the Arabic science (or art) o f designing

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ingenious mechanical devices (ilm al-hiyal). Several w o r k s were composed o n this subject, the most famous o f w h i c h are those o f Banu Musa ( n i n t h century) and i b n al-Razzaz al-Jazari ( f l . a. 1200). These w o r k s described several m e c h a n ical devices and automatic machines and p r o v i d e d diagrams illustrating h o w these devices operated. Some o f these machines had an obvious use, apparently designed i n response to general social needs; such devices include, for example, w a t e r - l i f t i n g machines. Other machines had a narrower use, designed at the d e m a n d o f smaller sectors o f society. Fine machines, water clocks, fountains, and various kinds o f automata w ere designed either for the entertainment o f r

affluent segments o f society, or to respond to the specialized needs o f professional groups. The second field o f research focused o n theoretical statics and hydrostatics and is best exemplified by A b d al-Rahman al-Khazini's t w e l f t h - c e n t u r y encyclopedia o f medieval statics, Kitab Mizan ctl-Hikma (The b o o k o f the balance o f w i s d o m ) . The t h i r d area focused o n the determination o f the specific weights o f metals and minerals. Scientists like a l - B i r u n i and al-Khazini p r o v i d e d t h o r o u g h theoretical treatment o f this p r o b l e m . They also invented practical machines and tools to easily determine the specific weights o f metals as w e l l as the relative compositions o f c o m p o u n d s and alloys. One o f the m a i n trends i n Arabic statics was the systematic use o f i n h e r i t e d as w e l l as n e w mathematical techniques, particularly algebra. This trend enabled b o t h a generalization o f Greek statics and the invention o f new fields w i t h i n the discipline. This dynamic approach to the study o f statics—itself a result o f the systematic application o f new mathematical s k i l l s — l e d to the emergence o f the science o f mechanics. The application o f this dynamic approach to hydrostatics, as reflected i n al-Khazini's study o f the m o t i o n s o f bodies i n fluids, led to the emergence o f the n e w field o f hydrodynamics. The discipline o f statics as a w h o l e represents a d o m a i n i n w h i c h theoretical science and technology clearly interacted. The findings o f the various theoretical sciences were continuously applied to develop innovative technologies and thus c o n t r i b u t e d i n the process to the development o f m o d e r n engineering, the art t h r o u g h w h i c h the results o f science are put to practical use. Many o f the c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f early Arabic statics were central to the development o f w h a t is k n o w n today as mechanical engineering. Many new mechanisms and machines were i n t r o d u c e d d u r i n g this time. To name only a few, these included the invention o f conical valves, the use o f complex gears to transmit h i g h torque, the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f double-acting p u m p s w i t h suction pipes, the use o f a crank mechanism i n a machine, and the i n v e n t i o n o f sensitive control mechanisms. The emergence o f mechanical engineering was equally dependent o n developing the procedures and techniques used i n the p r o d u c t i o n o f these

Al-Jazari s book on automata is the first mechanical engineering handbook thai provides full information for the construction of machines as well as illustrations of how they work.This artistic illustration from a copy of his text made in Syria in shows a handwashing device in the form of a servant pouring water from a ewer. When the water is poured, the servant offers ihe towel in his left hand.

The technology to handle and control water was of great importance in the arid regions where Islam flourished. In certain regions, such as Iran and Morocco, people tapped into underground aquifers to create conduits known as qanats or kholtatas, which are visible above ground by their crater-like cleanout holes.

n e w machines. Early descriptions o f mechanical devices were strictly schematic: diagrams were used to illustrate the theory u n d e r l y i n g a device, n o t to provide i n f o r m a t i o n o n its c o n s t r u c t i o n or relative dimensions. The first mechanical engineering h a n d b o o k was al-Jazari's fCitab fi Marifat al-Hiyal aJ-Handiisiyya (The book o f k n o w l e d g e o f ingenious mechanical devices). I n a d d i t i o n to schematic illustrations o f h o w machines w o r k , the book provided detailed instructions o n the dimensions o f their various parts; the materials to be used and their treatm e n t ; casting techniques; and i n f o r m a t i o n on f i n i s h i n g , calibration, and p r i m i n g procedures. I n short, this handbook p r o v i d e d all the i n f o r m a t i o n needed to manufacture a machine as w e l l as to understand its w o r k i n g s . Relatively elaborate and detailed guidelines for the application o f t e c h n o l o g ical k n o w l e d g e are preserved i n the field o f i r r i g a t i o n engineering. Many i r r i g a t i o n methods were i n h e r i t e d f r o m the practices o f agrarian-based ancient Near Eastern societies. The M u s l i m s also supported intensive agricultural development projects. Arabic chronicles provide considerable i n f o r m a t i o n o n the scale and significance o f such projects initiated by the Umayyads ( 6 6 1 - 7 5 0 ) , the Abbasids (750-1258), and others. These projects were crucial to the development o f the economies o f M u s l i m societies and for p r o v i d i n g the needs o f n e w l y established cities or expanded older ones. Many i r r i g a t i o n projects were o f a massive scale: they often involved the b u i l d i n g of dams to c o n t r o l and regulate the f l o w o f rivers; the use o f water-raising machines to transfer water for i r r i g a t i o n and water supply; and the b u i l d i n g o f extensive networks o f canals and qanats ( u n d e r -

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g r o u n d conduits) to divert water as necessary. H i g h l y advanced technical and administrative skills were needed to regulate large-scale i r r i g a t i o n and water supply projects. For example, Arabic chronicles report that a tenth-century s u p e r v i sor o f the i r r i g a t i o n system o f the city o f M a r v and its environs was i n charge o f m o r e than ten thousand workers w h o were e m p l o y e d i n the b u i l d i n g , m a i n t e nance, and c o n t r o l o f the i r r i g a t i o n system. Specialized technical skills, such as the surveying and excavation o f canals, were also developed i n connection w i t h i r r i g a t i o n . Several treatises were w r i t t e n d u r i n g this t i m e o n q u a n t i t y surveying methods, p r o v i d i n g detailed instructions for the management o f the construct i o n o f large-scale i r r i g a t i o n systems. O f particular i m p o r t a n c e was qonat i r r i g a t i o n , w h i c h r e q u i r e d the careful application o f standardized technologies. A qanat is an u n d e r g r o u n d c o n d u i t that runs almost h o r i z o n t a l l y and transfers water f r o m an aquifer to a specific locat i o n . This system was used extensively i n Iran and N o r t h Africa. A c c o r d i n g to some estimates, 70 percent o f all water use i n Iran u n t i l the m o d e r n p e r i o d came f r o m qanats, spanning a l e n g t h o f m o r e than one hundred thousand miles. The d i g g i n g o f an u n d e r g r o u n d c o n d u i t represented a m a j o r engineering undertaki n g that involved locating an u n d e r g r o u n d source, estimating its potential yield, surveying the land between the source and the surface outlet to determine the route, d i g g i n g vertical ventilation and cleaning shafts every t h i r t y to fifty yards along the desired route, and finally excavating the sections between these shafts

Large waterwheels, known as norias, were used to raise

at very slight inclinations to ensure s m o o t h water f l o w between the source and

water from rivers to a reser

the outlet. The procedure also required the application o f techniques to align the

voir level from which it

u n d e r g r o u n d tunnels and to test air quality for the safety o f workers. Other technologies were also used to handle, control, and divert water. Dams o f different designs, sizes, and purposes were constructed and often used to provide

would be distributed to sur rounding regions. The Syrian city of Hama on the Orontes River was famous

power for m i l l i n g or to drive waterwheels, w h i c h w o u l d raise the water to an ele-

for its enormous wooden

vated reservoir level so diat it could be used to supply a surrounding region. The large

waterwheels.

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wheel k n o w n as tile noria was such a water-raising machine. It was used i n the ancient Near East, but its hydrodynamk features were enhanced in the Islamic period and it was used extensively i n such places as Andalusia and Syria. The most popular o f diese machines was the saqiya, w h i c h was driven by animals. Many o f these machines are detailed i n al-Jazari's work. The w o r k o f the sixteendi-century mechanical engineer Taqi al-Din is also o f particular importance. He provided a description o f a six-cylinder p u m p , equipped w i t h one-way valves, pistons, and cams, w h i c h resembled, and may have influenced, later European machine teclmologies. A m o n g the most i m p o r t a n t o f the many technologies that developed i n the M u s l i m w o r l d are s h i p b u i l d i n g , m i n i n g , and metallurgy as w e l l as paper, textile, and military industries. The technological knowledge and practical skills amassed i n these crafts was not always recorded, but fortunately i n several cases w r i t t e n records exist. For example, many treatises discuss aspects o f the m i l i t a r y technologies, i n c l u d i n g such diverse topics as fortification, siege machines, weapons, s w o r d m a k i n g , g u n p o w d e r recipes, firepots and grenades, fuses for rockets and torpedoes, canons, and so o n . Many o f these technologies required an advanced level o f chemical knowledge. Yet chemistry, or rather alchemy, was not clearly and exclusively an exact science. At least i n part, it was an occult discipline w i t h metaphysical and spiritual concerns. Despite its ambiguous status, the field o f alchemy also had a strong technological d i m e n s i o n . Aside f r o m such questions as the transformation o f the spirit, a significant part o f alchemy dealt w i t h p u r e technological matters, i n c l u d i n g the preparation o f c o m p o u n d s and chemical p r o d ucts, chemical operations like distillation and crystallization, and the i n v e n t i o n o f technical apparatus for laboratory use. Most o f the k n o w n w o r k s o f alchemy, i n c l u d i n g those o f the celebrated Jabir i b n Hayyan (ca. 721-815) and A b u Bakr al-Razi (ca. 865-between 923 and 935), contain considerable sections o n practical chemistry. This aspect o f alchemy justifies its inclusion as one o f early Arabic technology's m a i n areas o f achievement.

Medicine Because o f its immediate social significance, medieval sources provide a wealth o f i n f o r m a t i o n o n the theory and practice o f Arabic medicine. I n a d d i t i o n to numerous medical treatises, many sources also shed light o n the lives o f scientists, the professional medical c o m m u n i t i e s , the social practice o f medicine, the various healing institutions, and the regulation o f the medical profession. Both t h e area and the p e r i o d i n w h i c h the Arabic m e d i c a l t r a d i t i o n evolved are immense. I n the n i n t h century Baghdad was the d o m i n a n t center for the p r o d u c t i o n o f the Arabic medical tradition. I n the tenth and eleventh centuries, h o w ever, many r e g i o n a l centers competed w i t h Baghdad. I n the t h i r t e e n t h and

The apparent uniformity of Arabic medicine can be traced to a shared Hellenistic heritage. This page from a thirteenthcenrury copy of Yahya al-Nahwi's summary of Galen's treatise show Andromachos and the eight Greek doctors of antiquity.

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fourteenth centuries, Syria emerged as the leading center i n medical activities. D u r i n g this p e r i o d many medical institutions were built there, and a large n u m ber o f physicians traveled f r o m all over the M u s l i m w o r l d to seek e m p l o y m e n t i n its institutions. A shared Hellenistic medical legacy accounts f o r the apparent u n i f o r m i t y o f Arabic medicine. The actual practice o f medicine produced diverse and at times c o m p e t i n g tendencies w i t h i n this t r a d i t i o n . Insights i n t o the rise o f such tendencies can be pieced together f r o m a variety o f sources, i n c l u d i n g medical treatises, specialized and general biographical w o r k s , vraqf charters,and

market

supervision manuals, as w e l l as man) anecdotes i n literary and historical sources. These sources contain references t o r u d i m e n t a r y medical practices a m o n g the Arabs before Islam, but an Arabic medical tradition per se, o r even quasi-scientific medicine, d i d not exist. The first references to learned medicine are under the Umayyad caliphate, w h i c h employed physicians trained i n the Hellenistic t r a d i t i o n . I n the eighth century a m e m b e r o f the Umayyad family is said t o have commissioned the translation o f medical a n d alchemical texts f r o m Greek i n t o Arabic. Various sources also indicate that the Umayyad caliph U m a r i b n A b d al-Aziz (r. 717-20) commissioned the translation f r o m Syriac i n t o Arabic o f a seventh-century m e d ical handbook w r i t t e n by the Alexandrian priest A h r u n . As i n the case o f the other sciences, these early activities increased dramatically under t h e A b b a s i d caliphs o f Baghdad, w h o employed Nestorian physicians f r o m the city o f Gundishapur. I n particular, eight successive generations o f the Bakhrishu f a m i l y were favored physicians i n the Abassid court w e l l i n t o the eleventh century. I n a d d i t i o n to the learned practice o f medicine, translations o f medical texts and n e w medical w r i t i n g s started t o appear i n the n i n t h century. Most o f these w r i t i n g s were based on Hellenistic medicine, but even i n the very early p e r i o d some n e w treatises contained o r i g i n a l features that were not f o u n d i n the earlier Greek sources. The most famous o f the early translators and physicians are Yuhanna i b n Masawayh (d. 857), the head o f Bayt a l - H i k m a , and H u n a y n i b n Ishaq ( 8 0 8 - 8 7 3 ) . W i t h his students, H u n a y n translated almost all o f the t h e n - k n o w n Greek medical w o r k s i n t o either Syriac o r Arabic. At the same t i m e these translations were made, o r i g i n a l w o r k s were c o m posed i n Arabic. H u n a y n , f o r example, composed a f e w medical treatises; o f these, al-Masail fi al-Tibb lil-Mutoallimin (Questions o n m e d i c i n e f o r students) a n d Kitab al-Ashr Maqalat fi al-Ayn (Ten treatises o n the eye) were b o t h i n f l u e n t i a l and considerably innovative. A l t h o u g h Hunayn's w o r k s i n c l u d e d very f e w n e w observations, their creativity lies i n a n e w organization, and i n the case o f the second book, i n its deliberate attempt t o exhaust all questions related t o the eye. I n any event, a solid c o m m a n d o f medical k n o w l e d g e was needed t o produce

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these w o r k s . The most famous w o r k o f the early p e r i o d was composed by A l i i b n Sahl Rabban al-Tabari (ca. 783-ca. 858), a Christian convert to Islam f r o m Marv. Al-Tabari's book Firdtms al-Hikmo (Paradise o f w i s d o m ) was the first c o m prehensive w o r k o f Arabic m e d i c i n e that integrated and compared the various m e d i c a l traditions o f the t i m e . This w o r k adopted a critical approach to enable readers to choose between different practices. A section o n I n d i a n m e d i c i n e p r o v i d e d valuable i n f o r m a t i o n o n its sources and practices. I n d i a n medicine was far less crucial than Hellenistic m e d i c i n e i n shaping the Arabic medical t r a d i t i o n , a l t h o u g h occasionally physicians w o u l d compare Greek and I n d i a n m e d icine and opt f o r the latter. This was the exception rather than the r u l e , however. The m a i n role o f I n d i a n m e d i c i n e was n o t to define the contours o f the Arabic medical t r a d i t i o n but to set the lone for some o f its initial interests and c u r i o s i ties. A l t h o u g h the Greek scientific legacy was d o m i n a n t , a mere awareness o f m o r e than one t r a d i t i o n encouraged a critical and selective approach that pervaded all fields o f early Arabic science. By the end o f the n i n t h century the Galenic h u m o r a l system o f pathology was completely integrated into Arabic medicine. A l t h o u g h extensive use was made o f the w r i t i n g s o f Hippocrates ( f o u r t h century B X . E . ) , they were used w i t h i n the m o r e systematic theoretical f r a m e w o r k o f Galenic medicine. H u m o r a l pathology was based on the n o t i o n o f four h u m o r s ( b l o o d , p h l e g m , y e l l o w bile, and black bile) and their relation to the f o u r elements (air, water, fire, and earth), as w e l l as to the f o u r qualities (hot, moist, c o l d , and d r y ) . The balance or e q u i l i b r i u m (itidal) o f these h u m o r s and qualities a m o u n t e d to health; imbalance, therefore, was considered to be the cause o f illness and disease. Emphasis i n treatment was placed o n m a i n t a i n i n g or reestablishing e q u i l i b r i u m by c o n t r o l l i n g the e n v i r o n m e n t and the internal constitution o f the body t h r o u g h the use o f certain kinds o f foods or medicines as w e l l as t h r o u g h bleeding and purgatives. This system o f medicine employed a significant degree o f logical reasoning along w i t h medical observation to explain illness and to devise treatment. Theoretical discourse was thus superimposed o n clinical observation, and theoretical considerations played a m a j o r role i n the s t r u c t u r i n g and organization o f medical knowledge. Arabic m e d i c i n e further developed this tendency to systematize and rationalize. For the first t i m e , attempts were made to organize the vast body o f medical knowledge i n all branches o f medicine i n t o one comprehensive and logical structure. A n equally i m p o r t a n t trend focused o n expanding empirical medical k n o w l e d g e — w i t h emphasis on clinical or case m e d i c i n e — a n d o n practical procedures for treatment, as opposed to the theoretical reflections on illness and health. One o f the greatest representatives o f this trend is the n i n t h - c e n t u r y scientist A b u Bakr al-Razi. I n his prolific w r i t i n g s , al-Razi generated various theoretical criticisms o f the body o f i n h e r i t e d medical knowledge. M o r e i m p o r t a n t than these c r i t i -

The Greek scientific tradition remained strong in Islamic times, and the theoretical framework of Galenic medicine of classical antiquity was integrated into Islamic practice. This illustration from a thirteenth-century Arabic translation of Dioscorides' Materia Medico shows a pharmacist preparing drugs.

asms, however, was his

focus o n m e t h o d and practice. T h r o u g h o u t his w o r k , al-

Razi p u t m o r e emphasis o n observational diagnosis and therapy than o n the theoretical diagnosis o f illnesses and their cures. Al-Razi surveyed all o f the available medical knowledge and then provided a critical review o f this i n h e r i t e d k n o w l edge o n the basis o f his o w n practice. His experience as a clinician was u n d o u b t edly w i d e and r i c h ; it was acquired i n a l o n g career as the head o f hospitals i n Rayya and Baghdad. Some o f al-Razi's most o r i g i n a l works also derived f r o m this p o s i t i o n . His Kitab fi a\-jadan WQ\-Hasba ( O n smallpox and measles) is the first thoro u g h account o f the diagnosis and treatment methods o f these t w o diseases and the differences between their symptoms. A focus o n clinical rather than theoretical issues is w h a t characterizes this w o r k and perhaps w h a t makes i t o r i g i n a l . A l -

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Razi w r o t e many other medical treatises o f considerable originality, covering such subjects as diabetes and hay fever. H e also w r o t e an influential general textbook o f medicine entitled Kitab al-Tibb al-Mansuri (The M a n s u r i book o f m e d i c i n e ) , w h i c h filled a vacuum because i t p r o v i d e d a concise overview o f medical theory that c o u l d be consulted by students and practitioners o f medicine. The reputat i o n o f this book, however, has less to d o w i t h its o r i g i n a l content than w i t h its brevity and organization. Al-Razi's most i m p o r t a n t work is his often mentioned but poorly studied book al-Hawi fi al-Tibb (The comprehensive book o n medicine), an enormous w o r k that i n one incomplete copy fills twenty-three volumes. The book is not organized according to f o r m a l theoretical paradigms; rather, i t is an encyclopedia o f clinical medicine, i n c l u d i n g earlier w r i t i n g s o n diseases and treatments as well as al-Razi s o w n clinical observations. I n several places, al-Razi criticized Galen and stated that the reason for this criticism was that his o w n clinical observations d i d not conf o r m w i t h Galen's assertions. Al-Razi's meticulous documentation o f his sources added to the m e r i t o f this w o r k and made it a veritable treasure for the history o f medicine. Al-Razi's p r i m a r y interest was therapeutics, not the theoretical classification o f medical knowledge. He d i d not devise treatments o n the basis o f l o g i cal inferences;

rather, he conducted w h a t o f t e n a m o u n t e d to c o n t r o l l e d

experimentation. I n the first volume o f the book, for example, he traced the exact effects o f bloodletting o n treating brain t u m o r (stirsam). To d o this, al-Razi divided his patients i n t o t w o groups; he treated one w i t h bloodletting and d i d not apply this treatment o n the other. He then recommended a treatment m e t h o d simply o n the basis o f the results o f his observations. This and other examples illustrate that although al-Razi proposed no alternative theoretical framework, a considerable part o f his research seems to have proceeded i n practical neglect o f Galenic theory. Theoretical medicine was simply irrelevant to al-Razi's rigorous research i n clinical medicine. His most original contributions are undoubtedly i n this field o f clinical medicine. The great aJ-Hawi o f al-Razi was not w i t h o u t fault, however. Its m a i n weakness was its enormous size and poor organization, w h i c h made the w o r k inaccessible even to expert physicians. Because o f these reasons, the w o r k was not able to fill the demand for comprehensive but structured medical handbooks. Later i n the tenth century Ah" i b n Abbas al-Majusi (ca. 9 2 5 - 9 4 ) w r o t e Kitab al-Kamil h al-Sinaa al-Tibbiya (The complete book o f the medical art), also k n o w n as Kitab al-Malaki (The royal book), w i t h the explicit intention o f filling this gap. Al-Majusi praised al-Razi's w o r k for its clinical comprehensiveness, but he noted its lack o f a theoretical framework that c o u l d have provided structure and an organizational principle. Al-Majusi thus set out to w r i t e an accessible book that people could easily copy, buy, read, and use. His w o r k was influential b o t h i n the M u s l i m w o r l d and later i n Latin Europe.

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In the same p e r i o d an equally influential w o r k was independently produced i n Córdoba by A b u al-Qasim al-Zahrawi (936-1013); Kitab al-Tasrif li man Ajiza an alTalif (Manual for medical practitioners), a large medical encyclopedia i n thirty books, was intended as a synthesis o f medical knowledge available at the t i m e . The largest part o f this w o r k deals w i t h symptoms and treatment, w h i c h reflects once again the increased interest a m o n g many Arab physicians i n clinical m e d i cine. The most popular and influential part o f this w o r k , however, is o n surgery; this part, w h i c h was often copied separately f r o m the rest o f the book, provided detailed descriptions o f medical operations, as w e l l as illustrations o f numerous surgical instruments. Further illustrating the practical trends i n Arabic medicine, al-Zahrawi maintained i n his w o r k that the active practice o f surgery was a prerequisite for theoretical k n o w l e d g e o f the

field.

A l t h o u g h al-Majusi's w o r k served as a popular handbook o f medicine, it was soon replaced by w h a t became the single most influential book on theoretical medicine i n the m i d d l e ages and u n t i l the seventeenth century: al-Qanun fi al-Tibb (The canon o f medicine) by the celebrated M u s l i m philosopher and physician I b n Sina (981-1037). I b n Sina composed several short treatises o n medicine, i n c l u d i n g a popular didactic p o e m . His m a g n u m opus Canon was w r i t t e n w i t h the i n t e n t i o n o f p r o d u c i n g the definitive canonical w o r k o n medicine, i n terms o f both comprehensiveness and theoretical rigor. I n this book, I b n Sina provided a coherent and systematic theoretical reflection o n the inherited medical legacies, starting w i t h anatomy, f o l l o w e d by physiology, then pathology, and finally therapy. A l t h o u g h he included many bedside observations and a few o r i g i n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f a purely practical nature, I b n Sina's m a i n achievement was n o t p r i m a r i l y i n the clinical d o m a i n . Rather, he produced a u n i f i e d synthesis o f medical knowledge, w h i c h derived its coherence f r o m the relentlessly sy stematic application o f logical and theoretical principles. The fame o f I b n Sina's school o f medical research often overshadows a significant tradition i n Arabic medicine that although not completely innocent o f p h i losophy practiced medicine essentially as a practical art. Medicine, according to this second tendency, was not p r i m a r i l y a matter o f reflection o n general rules and the deduction o f particulars f r o m them. Rather, for many Arab physicians, practice was the central concern o f medicine. It is hard to find a physician d u r i n g this time w h o promoted purely theoretical medicine w i t h o u t accounting for practical knowledge; it is equally hard to find advocates o f pure empirical medical knowledge w h o were free o f theoretical reflection. It is possible, however, to isolate tendencies that w e i g h i n favor o f either theoretical or practical medical knowledge. The careers o f manyphysicians seem to have been disproportionately devoted to the cultivation o f medicine as a practical scientific discipline. I n Andalusia and N o r t h Africa, for example, after the end o f the tenth century many physicians were also pharmacol-

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ogists. This was the case o f such famous physicians as I b n al-Jazzar ( d . 980) and Abu M a r w a n i b n Z u h r (ca. 1090-1162). I n fact, the first criticism o f Ibn Sina's Canon was w r i t t e n i n Andalusia by another Abu al-Ala i b n Zuhr ( d . 1131 ) o f the same family o f physicians, w h o objected mainly to the section that dealt w i t h pharmacology because its exclusive theoretical nature reduced its practical usefulness. A b u Jafar al-Ghafiqi (d. n 6 ç ) , another famous physician and pharmacologist, m e n tioned i n one o f his works that most physicians o f this period prepared medicines themselves, suggesting that such practical k n o w - h o w was part o f what constituted appropriate medical knowledge. I n contrast to abstract reasoning, experimenting w i t h medicines as w e l l as bedside observations was a c o m m o n occupation among a significant number o f physicians. Anatomy was another field i n w h i c h strong empirical tendencies were manifest. Quite understandably, the approach to surgery among most Arab physicians was cautious. Despite this caution, new surgical techniques were introduced i n many fields; i n ophthalmology, i n particular, entirely new methods were adopted. Yet this advanced status o f surgery does not i n itself constitute evidence for the existence o f a tradition o f experimental anatomical discovery. M o d e r n studies o n Islamic medicine often assert that because o f cultural taboos and religious restrictions anatomy was not pursued by Arab physicians, and that the notable anatomical observations were mere theoretical speculations o n inherited anatomical k n o w l edge. The most debated example o f Arabic anatomy is the thirteenth-century discovery by the M u s l i m physician Ala a l - D i n A l i ibn al-Nafis ( d . 1288)

o f the

pulmonary circulation o f blood. After obtaining his early education i n Syria, I b n alNafis moved to Cairo, where he pursued a career i n Islamic law and medicine. Ibn al-Nafis wrote several commentaries o n I b n Sina's Canon. I n his book Sharh Tashrih alQanun (Commentary o n the anatomy o f the Canon), he noted that Galen's and I b n Sina's assertions that blood moves between the right and left ventricles o f the heart through a hole between them was not correct. Anatomy, Ibn al-Nafis maintained, refutes this assertion because no such hole is detectable through anatomical observation. I b n al-Nafis dien argued that blood reaches the left ventricle t h r o u g h the lungs, thus providing the first explanation o f the m i n o r circulation o f blood. Despite some earlier reservations i n m o d e r n scholarship o n Islamic m e d i cine, there n o w seems to be n o d o u b t that the discoveries o f I b n al-Nafis had a d e f i n i t i v e and decisive influence o n the later European anatomical theories regarding b l o o d circulation. A m o r e controversial question is w h e t h e r these discoveries are scientifically significant. Many studies ( i n c l u d i n g those o f the hist o r i a n o f Arabic m e d i c i n e M a x M e y e r h o f ) have argued that I b n a l - N a f i s ' discovery was a "happy guess" and c o u l d not have been the result o f scientificanatomical e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n . The basis for this argument is that because Islam p r o h i b i t s dissection, I b n al-Nafis must have relied o n pure speculation. Yet even

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In addition to human anatomy, Muslim scientists also studied animals for practical and medical reasons.This illustration, from a

fifteenth-century

Egyptian manuscript, shows the skeleton of a horse.

a cursory reading o f I b n al-Nafis' w o r k suffices to disprove this c l a i m . I n the i n t r o d u c t i o n to his c o m m e n t a r y o n the anatomy o f I b n Sina's Canon, I b n al-Nafis stated that b o t h r e l i g i o n and general morality prevent h i m f r o m c o n d u c t i n g dissection. Yet the second chapter o f this same book was devoted to the theoretical and practical benefits o f dissection, and the f i f t h chapter discussed the m e t h o d s and tools o f p e r f o r m i n g dissection. M o r e i m p o r t a n t , I b n al-Nafis recurrently rejected or c o n f i r m e d earlier assertions by r e f e r r i n g to the results o f anatomical observation, using such expressions as "anatomy (tashrih) falsifies what they say" or "anatomy c o n f i r m s o u r findings and falsifies their view."

SCIENCE,

MEDICINE,

A N DT E C H N O L O G Y

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F u r t h e r m o r e , as an i n d i c a t i o n that he is n o t r e f e r r i n g m e r e l y t o i n h e r i t e d anatomical k n o w l e d g e , I b n al-Nafis o f t e n said that he observed certain things recurrently and d i d not find t h e m i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h earlier accepted theories. There seems t o be n o d o u b t that despite some restrictions, early Arab physicians p e r f o r m e d dissection, and used i t t o develop medical knowledge. h i addition t o I b n al-Nafis, there are many other references t o practical anatomical observations.

Disagreements w i t h Galenic accounts o f muscle and bone

anatomy, for example, could not have derived f r o m pliilosophical speculation. I n the twelfth and thirteenth centuries Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi provided yet another model through w h i c h ancient anatomy was criticized and developed. Al-Baghdadi w r o t e a description o f a famine that occurred i n Egypt i n 1200. In that description he reported diat after examining a large number o f skeletons, and after asking other people to conduct their o w n independent examinations o n other skeletons, he arrived at the conclusion that Galen's description o f the bones o f the lower jaw was erroneous. Although this correction d i d not amount to a complete rejection or reformulation o f Galenic anatomy, it does demonstrate a readiness to question this anatomy o n the basis o f experimental anatomical examination. The significant contributions o f al-Baghdadi and I b n al-Nafis d i d not occur i n a vacuum. The t w e l f t h and t h i r t e e n t h centuries witnessed a surge i n medical activity, as physicians f r o m all over the M u s l i m w o r l d sought careers i n the m e d ical institutions at Damascus and Cairo. At the social level, physicians were closely integrated w i t h the rest o f society, and many o f t h e m were leading authorities i n the rehgious disciplines as w e l l , especially law. I b n al-Nafis, f o r example, was a scholar o f hadith (the verified accounts o f the actions and sayings o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d ) . Diya a l - D i n i b n al-Baytar (ca. 1190-1248), one o f the leading physicians and botanists o f the p e r i o d , was also a leading jurist w h o collaborated i n his medical research w i t h a circle o f Syrian and Egyptian Hanbali scholars (one o f four schools o f law o f Sunni Islam). I n Cairo this circle i n c l u d e d A b u al-Faraj A b d al-Latif i b n A b d a l - M u n i m al-Harrani, the leading Hanbali jurist o f the time. Such profiles suggest the increasing social prestige o f larger numbers o f physicians and a higher degree o f participation i n the profession by larger and m o r e representative sectors o f society The first references t o a madrasa-like i n s t i t u t i o n (a college whose p r i m a r y purpose is the teaching o f Islamic law) f o r medical learning

also came f r o m this p e r i o d . I n t h i r t e e n t h - c e n t u r y

Damascus,

M u h a d h d h a b a l - D i n al-Dakhwar e n d o w e d a school for the exclusive teaching o f medicine. The school was inaugurated by the city's leading religious authorities and attracted many rehgious scholars as students; leading religious figures filled the prestigious p o s i t i o n o f head administrator o f this school. There are also several references t o medical i n s t r u c t i o n i n religious schools. A l - D a k h w a r h i m s e l f was a distinguished teacher o f a generation o f accomplished physicians i n c l u d -

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i n g I b n al-Nafis. As a result o f the enhanced social status o f physicians i n this p e r i o d , another student o f al-Dakhwar, I b n A b i Usaybia, decided to c o m p i l e a bibliographical dictionary for physicians, w h o were n o w fully recognized as members o f the social elite. The prestige o f the medical profession increased but d i d n o t start i n the t w e l f t h and thirteenth centuries. This prestige was closely dependent on m e c h anisms o f social and professional integration, most notably t h r o u g h hospitals. The hospital is one o f the greatest institutional achievements o f medieval Islamic societies. Between the n i n t h and tenth centuries five hospitals were b u i l t i n Baghdad, and several others were built i n other regional centers. The most famous o f these was the A d u d i hospital established under B u y i d rule i n 982. After this p e r i o d the n u m b e r o f hospitals increased significantly, w h e n such famous institutions as the N u r i hospital o f Damascus ( t w e l f t h century) and the Mansuri hospital o f Cairo ( t h i r t e e n t h century) were built along w i t h others i n Qayrawan, Mecca, Medina, and Rayy, to name a few. These institutions were open to everyone w h o needed medical care, regardless o f gender, r e l i g i o n , age, or social class and wealth. Medical care was also p r o v i d e d to prisoners, and m o b i l e clinics were regularly dispatched to remote villages. Many o f these hospitals were d i v i d e d i n t o different sections: m e n and w o m e n were treated i n separate halls; special areas were reserved for the treatThe hospital is one of the greatest institutional achievements of medieval Islamic societies. Hospitals were often part of pious foundations endowed by rulers, as in the one attached to the mosque complex built for the Ottoman Sultan Bayezit II in Edirne between 1484 and 1488.

m e n t o f contagious diseases; there were also separate areas for surgical cases, and others for the mentally i l l . The hospitals also had l i v i n g quarters for the physicians i n attendance as w e l l as for other members o f the service team. Some hospitals had their o w n pharmacies and libraries that could be used for medical instruction. Clinical training and bedside i n s t r u c t i o n were o f t e n provided i n these hospitals. A chief administrator, w h o usually was n o t a physician, was i n charge o f hospital a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , w h i l e a chief o f staff, w h o was also the head physician, was i n charge o f r u n n i n g the medical operations. Many o f these hospitals had enormous operating budgets, w h i c h were usually derived f r o m the

As part of their medical facilities, hospitals often had their own libraries and pharmacies. This old dispensary in Zanzibar has recently been restored by the Aga Khan Foundation.

revenues o f waqf properties dedicated for hospitals. Such revenues were spent o n the maintenance o f the premise and the staff, as w e l l as o n the cost o f treatment, w h i c h was provided to patients free o f charge. A l t h o u g h hospitals provided the most structured framework for the regulation o f the m e d i c a l practices, there were other means t h r o u g h w h i c h such regulation was attempted. The muhtasib (market supervisor) was a public officer, w h o was i n charge o f guarding against fraudulent practices and cheating i n all p u b l i c p r o -

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THE O X F O R D HISTORY OF ISLAM

fessions and crafts, i n c l u d i n g medicine, surgery, and pharmacology. Hisba (market supervision) manuals were compiled,

outlining

the

duties

of

the

muhtasib.

References i n such manuals to the medical profession appear only after the eleventh century, but other sources refer to earlier instances o f testing o f medical doctors by a c h i e f physician (Ra'is al-Attiba) w h o w o r k e d i n collaboration w i t h the state authorities. Several treatises that outlined the subjects i n w h i c h the physicians ought to be tested were also composed. A l t h o u g h the sources do not m e n t i o n many actual cases o f testing and e x a m i n i n g , it is likely that at least some such testing must have taken place to generate the considerable literature on this subject. A l t h o u g h this testing d i d not a m o u n t t o an organized system o f licensing, it certainly p r o v i d e d theoretical n o r m s , the systematic application o f w h i c h depended o n the general stability o f social institutions at any particular historical m o m e n t . A n even less organized f o r m o f r e g u l a t i o n was p r o v i d e d t h r o u g h the abundant literature o n medical ethics. I n f l u e n c e d by Medicines were often stored and shipped in glazed cylindrical jars with concave

Hippocratic and Galenic w r i t i n g s , this literature dealt w i t h appropriate codes o f professional conduct. Such

sides and a rim for securing the cover.

nonenforceable but h i g h l y normative codes were also

These jars were particularly popular in

passed on t h r o u g h teaching i n hospitals, special schools,

Syria, and man)' were exported to the

madrasas, and mosques, and w i t h i n families o f physi-

West, hence their name albarelli (s. albarello). They were decorated like other Islamic ceramics.This example, made in the fourteenth century, is decorated with pseudoArabic in yellowish-green luster on blue.

cians. Taken together, these social practices afforded Arabic medicine a level o f organization unprecedented i n history that c o n t r i b u t e d to the f u r t h e r development o f the Arabic medical tradition.

The Life Sciences: Botany and Pharmacology Any discussion o f the Arabic life sciences w o u l d be incomplete w i t h o u t reference to botany and pharmacology. Initially botany was linked to agronomy, as were discussions o f n o u r i s h m e n t to the healing effects o f plants. The most influential ancient w o r k i n this genre was al-filaha al-Nabatiyya (Nabatean agriculture), w h i c h was translated f r o m Syriac to Arabic at the end o f the eighth century. U n d e r the influence o f t w o Greek w o r k s , botany was separated f r o m agronomy. O f these t w o w o r k s o n l y the Materia Medicu o f the first-century physician Dioscorides is extant. It was first translated under theAbbasid caliph al-Mutawakkil (r. 847-61)

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but was subsequently revised and retranslated. A t the same t i m e , these treatises were b e i n g translated, the Persian botanist A b u Hanifa al-Dinawari (ca. 815-95) was c o m p i l i n g his botanical lexicon Kitab al-Nabat (The b o o k o f plants), w h i c h represented the c u l m i n a t i o n o f a t r a d i t i o n i n w h i c h a u t o n o m o u s botanical w r i t i n g s were part o f the sciences o f the Arabic language. The later development o f Arabic botany was to a great extent a result o f medical and pharmacological research. Andalusia i n particular was ahead o f other regions i n the fields o f agronomy, botany, and pharmacology. I n the m i d d l e o f the tenth century the Umayyad caliph A b d alRahman I I I (r. 891-961) received an illustrated m a n u script o f Dioscorides* Materia Medica f r o m the emperor o f Byzantium. W i t h the help o f a Byzantine m o n k , a g r o u p o f Andalusian physicians set o u t to revise the earlier eastern translation o f this book by Istifan i b n Basil. The team successfully identified all but a h a n d f u l o f the s i m ple u n c o m p o u n d e d drugs (called simples) described i n Materia Medica. After this achievement, Andalusia w i t nessed a rapid and sustained expansion o f research i n pharmacology

and botany. I n a d d i t i o n ,

theoretical

efforts were undertaken to make agronomy a " t r u e " science by reference to the m o r e developed sciences o f

This albarello, made in Syria in the fifteenth century, is decorated with flowers underglaze-painted in blue.This is a local Syrian interpretation of a popular type of

botany, pharmacology, and medicine. Andalusian agron-

Chinese blue-and-white ware.The sur-

o m y thus achieved a h i g h technical level that was n o t

face is slightly cloudy and iridescent

surpassed u n t i l the nineteenth century.

because it was buried for a long time.

A n equally i m p o r t a n t development i n the M u s l i m west was i n the field o f pharmacology. I n the twelfth century several pharmacological encyclopedic w o r k s were c o m p i l e d by such scientists as A b u Jafar a l Ghafiqi and A b u al-Abbas al-Nabati. These w o r k s attempted to integrate the k n o w n traditions o f pharmacology and eventually culminated i n the great synthesis o f I b n al-Baytar, al-Jami li-Mufradat al-Adwiya wal-Aghdhiya (The dictionary o f simple medicines and foods). This is the most complete treatise o f applied botany produced i n the M i d d l e Ages; it drew i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m m o r e than 150 sources and listed m o r e than t w o thousand simples i n alphabetical order. I b n al-Baytar brought together the accumulated knowledge o f numerous inherited traditions i n a d d i t i o n to his o w n experiences. H e gave the names o f simple medicines i n all the w r i t t e n languages he knew as w e l l as i n several local dialects. He also succeeded i n finding the Arabic names o f almost all o f the simples listed i n the w o r k

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THE OXEORD HISTORY OF ISLAM

o f Dioscorides. I b n al-Baytar's m e t h o d o f research is as significant as the results o f this research: F o l l o w i n g the lead o f several Arab botanists i n c l u d i n g his o w n teacher, I b n a]-Bay tar traveled to conduct on-site research i n N o r t h Africa, Greece, Anatolia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Arabia, and finally Egypt. He then setded i n Egypt, w h e r e he was appointed as the country's head pharmacist. Even after he settled, he continued to conduct field trips to Syria to collect n e w data and examine or verify earlier findings. Together w i t h many other contributions i n this field, I b n al-Baytar's dictionary illustrates the tendency to simultaneously synthesize and to Tely on observation for the expansion o f scientific knowledge. I b n al-Baytar's descriptions were extremely accurate, but the primary purpose o f his book was medical. O f special interest is a w o r k by A b u al-Abbas al-Ishbili (d. 1239), al-Rihla alMashriqiyya (The eastern journey). This book is lost, but Ibn al-Baytar quoted it in full i n more than one hundred entries. Unlike other works diat contained botanical iiiformadon but were ultimately interested i n the medical use o f plants, the interests o f al-Ishbili's book were purely botanical. Although he was a famous physician, alIshbili provided meticulous descriptions o f plants as plants, not for their potential medical use. As i n many o f the subfields o f mathematics, al-Ishbili's w o r k illustrated the familiar process through w h i c h new disciplines emerged as a result o f die expansion and systématisation o f older ones.

The Arabic Sciences: Syntheses and New Creations By nature, theories that synthesize and supplant earlier knowledge have to be c o m prehensive and conceptually distinct, not just anomalies w i t h i n die older systems o f knowledge. The characteristics o f any new syndiesis cannot be explained merely i n terms o f some revived archaic traditions, but ought to be sought i n the historical details diat account for the emergence o f this syndiesis. The inherited traditions o f Galenic medicine, Ptolemaic astronomy and optics, Euclidean geometry, and Diophantine aritiunetic were all conceptually situated w i t h i n the u n i f y i n g context o f Aristotelian physics. In these fields the Arabic sciences simultaneously refined, deconstructed, expanded, and superseded the Greek traditions. The most notable characteristics o f the Arabic sciences are the generation o f syndieses and die related creation o f new sciences. W i t h many more disciplines that correspond to a m u c h larger range o f research interests, the Arabic sciences were not h o u n d by the r i g i d categories o f scientific tliinking diat prevailed i n the older traditions. These older traditions were transformed at the hands o f the scientists o f the M u s l i m w o r l d , not so m u c h tirrough abrupt revolutions but by means o f enlarging the scope and transf o r m i n g die mediods o f earlier sciences. The transformation process was accelerated by the extension and systematic application o f empirical research. I n a sea o f changes the strict hegemony o f Aristotelian physics over the large number o f o l d and newscientific disciplines was simply lost.

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Religion d i d not play a direct role i n this process o f transformation. It neither shaped the cognitive content o f the sciences n o r d i d i t impede their development. The overall o u t come o f the religious discourse o n science was not to subjugate science to religion but to separate the t w o enterprises. This meant that the criteria o f one were not to be used to judge the other. It was precisely t h r o u g h this separation that Islam played a role i n shaping the destiny o f science i n the medieval M u s l i m w o r l d . Two immediate results o f this separation were o f great consequence for the later development o f science. First, science was considered a valuefree undertaking that needed no ethical or religious justification. That is, scientists could pursue their specialized professional interests and at the same d m e be fully integrated w i t h i n the institutions o f society. A n d so it was, for example, that most o f the distinguished physicians and astronomers o f t w e l f t h - and t h i r teenth-century Syria and Cairo were employed as jurists, teachers i n madrasa-like medical

Following Greek precedent, Muslim scientists separated botany from agronomy. Dioskorides" treatise was translated during the ninth century and later revised. This page, from one of the oldest surviving copies, made in the eleventh century, has brief

institutions, or timekeepers i n the region's

descriptions of the individual plants accompanied by

major mosques. The second important conse-

schematic representations.

quence o f the separation o f religious and scientific k n o w l e d g e was to d d u t e the h o l d o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l systems o n the specialized sciences, w h i c h i n t u r n resulted i n the fragmentation and professionalization o f scientific activity. The ultimate meaning o f any particular science was no longer sought by necessity i n a higher philosophical t r u t h b u t mostiy w i t h i n its o w n disciplinary confines. In many ways science i n the M u s l i m w o r l d was a secular enterprise, and religion neither made an enemy o f science nor championed its cause to the extreme. The locus o f science was society: as long as general learning flourished i n society, so d i d scientific learning, and the decline o f one usually ushered the decline o f the other. To be sure, w i t h the absence o f definite religious guidelines regarding the scientific disciplines, there were diverse independent attitudes toward die sciences. Some religious scholars opposed the sciences, w h i l e others sanctioned them o n religious grounds. These view-s were personal, however, and ihey lacked the normative authority that w o u l d either pitch religion against science or subsume science under religion. Fortunately for die Arabic sciences, neither o f these scenarios prevailed.

CHAPTER

FIVE

Art and Architecture T H E M E S AND VARIATIONS

Sheila S. Blair and Jonathan M. Bloom

A l l cultures t h r o u g h o u t history have expressed themselves visually, and Islamic civilization was n o exception. One need t h i n k o n l y o f oriental rugs, Persian miniatures, and M o r o c c a n tiles, n o t to m e n t i o n the D o m e o f the Rock, the Alhambra palace, the Sclimiye Mosque, and the Taj Mahal, to see the great range o f visual expression i n the Islamic lands over the centuries. Islamic art e n c o m passes all these and m u c h m o r e . As used i n this chapter, the t e r m Islamic art refers to all the visual arts p r o d u c e d i n the lands i n w h i c h Islam was the d o m i n a n t relig i o n , regardless o f the confessional affiliations o f the individuals w h o made the art o r the purposes for w h i c h it was made. U n l i k e the t e r m Christian art, the term Islamic art is not restricted t o w o r k s made only for religious situations and functions, and many o f the most cherished examples o f Islamic art have little, i f anyt h i n g , to d o w i t h the r e l i g i o n o f Islam. A page f r o m a parchment manuscript o f the Q u r a n is obviously considered a w o r k o f Islamic art, b u t so is a bronze b o w l inlaid w i t h Christian scenes f r o m thirteenth-century Syria.

(Left) A typical medieval library, as depicted in a

What Is Islamic Art? Islamic art could n o t have b e g u n , o f course, before the rise o f Islam i n early seventh-century Arabia, but i t was nearly a century after that before M u s l i m s began to be great and sophisticated patrons o f the arts. A t h o u g h Muslims began erect-

215

manuscript of al-Hariri's

Maqamat (Assemblies), transcribed in Baghdad in 1237. The leather-bound volumes were stacked flat in niches cut into the wall.

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T H E OXFORD HISTORY OF ISLAM

i n g structures soon after the revelation o f Islam, the first example o f Islamic architecture is generally considered to be the magnificent D o m e o f the Rock i n Jerusalem, ordered i n 692 by the Umayyad caliph A b d al-Malik i b n Marvvan (r. 685-705). F o l l o w i n g this broad d e f i n i t i o n , Islamic art continues to be produced to this day; artists continue to w o r k i n a variety o f m e d i a i n all M u s l i m countries. Nevertheless, the emergence o f national i d e n t i t i e s , especially i n the n i n e teenth and t w e n t i e t h centuries, has changed the ways i n w h i c h people t h i n k about w o r k s o f art produced i n the Islamic lands i n m o d ern times. Thus, a portrait o f the Qajar r u l e r Fath A l i Shah (r. 1797-1834) is m o r e o f t e n considered to e x e m p l i f y a distinctly Persian style o f p a i n t i n g rather t h a n to illustrate Islamic or Iranian attitudes t o w a r d representation i n the nineteenth century. I n current usage c o n c e r n i n g

m o d e r n art, the t e r m

Islamic generally refers to p u r e l y r e l i g i o u s expressions such as calligraphy. Today, many museums i n N o r t h America, Europe, and the Islamic lands p r o u d l y display t h e n masterpieces o f Islamic art, but traditionally the visual arts played a relatively m i n o r role i n Islamic civilization, especially The broadest definition oflslamic art would include

compared w i t h the i m p o r t a n t arts o f poetry

this life-size oil portrait of the nineteenth-century

and music. For example, there is no w o r d for

Qajar ruler Fath Ali Shah, although it can also be con-

art per se i n classical Arabic. The w o r d most

sidered to represent a distinctly Persian style of painting.

c o m m o n l y used today, farm, is a neologism because it traditionally

meant

" c r a f t " or

" s k i l l . " The same is true o f the Persian and Turkish w o r d s hunar and hiiner. I n addit i o n , artists d i d not usually enjoy h i g h status in Islamic society, and there were few i f any Michelangelos or Rembrandts, whose lives became the stuff o f legends. O f all the visual arts, the only one that was w i d e l y appreciated w i t h i n its o w n culture was calligraphy, the art o f beautiful w r i t i n g . The names and biographies o f calligraphers were collected and preserved, and treatises were w r i t t e n o n the aesthetics o f calligraphy Calligraphy was the exception rather than the rule,

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7

however, and there was n o Islamic equivalent to the first-century

B.C.E. R o m a n architect V i t r u v i u s or the

f i f t e e n t h - c e n t u r y Italian architect A l b e r t i ,

who

w r o t e treatises o n the theory o f architecture. N o r d i d Islamic civilization produce figures comparable to the Chinese literati, w h o w r o t e treatises o n the aesthetic appreciation o f Chinese p a i n t i n g as early as the p e r i o d o f the Six Dynasties ( 2 2 9 - 5 8 9 C.E.). Because M u s l i m s w r o t e so little about the aestheticappreciation o f their o w n visual culture, the study o f Islamic art dictates a positivist approach. It must be based o n the e x a m i n a t i o n o f the remains t h e m selves. Some present-day scholars have t r i e d to derive aesthetic principles for all Islamic art, but

This bowl, probably made in Iran or Central

these principles tend to reflect m o d e r n preoccupa-

Asia in the tenth century, is inscribed with the

tions, as they w e r e n o t generated by t r a d i t i o n a l Islamic society itself.

phrase "Blessings to the owner," followed by a proverb, "It is said that he who is content with his own opinion runs into danger."

Islamic art comprises an u n w i e l d y grab bag o f media, techniques, styles, periods, and regions. Its study, a relatively n e w discipline, developed n o t i n the Islamic lands b u t i n western Europe as an offshoot o f s t u d y i n g the history o f European art. F r o m the European perspective, Islamic art evolved i n the Near East o u t o f the remains o f ancient Near Eastern and late antique artistic traditions and b r i d g e d the gap between late classical and early medieval art. As Islam spread far beyond the geographical confines o f the Near East to western and Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, India, and Southeast Asia, and b e y o n d the t e m p o r a l confines o f the M i d d l e Ages, so d i d its visual expressions. The models created to understand the arts o f the Mediterranean r e g i o n i n the e i g h t h century thus are n o t necessarily valid for understanding the Islamic arts o f Indonesia or M a l i . The arts o f western civilization are traditionally understood i n a hierarchy, i n w h i c h architecture and the representational arts o f p a i n t i n g and sculpture have d o m i n a t e d the artistic landscape to this day. This hierarchy does not h o l d for Islamic art. A l t h o u g h architecture is equally i m p o r t a n t i n Islamic culture, Islam produced few- sculptures o r panel paintings. I n Chinese c i v i l i z a t i o n , another l o n g t r a d i t i o n o f artistic p r o d u c t i o n , there was a clear d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n

artists

(painters, calligraphers, and poets) and craftsmen (sculptors, potters, metalworkers, and so f o r t h ) , and therefore between art and craft. This d i v i s i o n does n o t h o l d i n Islamic art, because there was n o such d i s t i n c t i o n between art and craft. Indeed, a d i s t i n g u i s h i n g feature o f Islamic art was the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f utilitarian objects i n t o sublime works o f art. L o o k i n g at Islamic material culture,

2i8

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therefore, one should be prepared to find artistic expression i n a vast range o f situations, f r o m the h u m b l e s t o i l lamps to the most m o n u m e n t a l t o m b s . Nevertheless, Islamic art remains a useful r u b r i c under w h i c h to consider the visual cultures o f the past fourteen centuries i n m u c h o f Eurasia and Africa, because i t allows certain connections and relationships to be established. Architecture was universally the most i m p o r t a n t f o r m o f Islamic art. It cost the most, lasted the longest, and was seen by the widest audience. Buildings built for religious purposes, such as mosques and madrasas (theological colleges), are often the best k n o w n and best preserved because they c o n t i n u e d t o be used and m a i n tained over the centuries. Religious buildings may p r o v i d e the f r a m e w o r k for tracing the development o f Islamic architecture, but the conservatism inherent i n religious architecture means that these structures w o u l d have been slow to present innovations. It is more likely that architectural i n n o v a t i o n was i n t r o d u c e d i n secular b u i l d i n g s — s u c h as palaces, houses, caravanserais (medieval motels for caravans), bathhouses, markets, and the like—because they were constructed at the w h i m o f a particular person to meet his o w n needs. Far fewer o f these b u i l d ings, however, have s u r v i v e d : some literally have been w o r n to r u i n s , w h i l e o t h ers were deliberately destroyed. Few rulers, for example, saw any purpose i n preserving the personal fantasies o f their predecessors. Thus, the architectural sample available for study is skewed; i n attempting to reconstruct the shape o f the past, i t is i m p o r t a n t to r e m e m b e r that w h a t survives is n o t all that was made. As calligraphy and calligraphers were revered i n all Islamic societies, the arts o f w r i t i n g — a n d by extension all the arts o f b o o k m a k i n g — w e r e given extraordinary i m p o r t a n c e i n Islamic culture. I n the age before p r i n t i n g , all manuscripts, f r o m copies o f the Q u r a n to popular tales and scientific w o r k s , had to be laboriously transcribed by h a n d , first o n sheets o f papyrus and parchment and later o n paper. F r o m an early date, the w o r k s o f g i f t e d calligraphers were particularly appreciated and collected. The i n d i v i d u a l sheets were often embellished w i t h elegant decoration and, w h e r e appropriate, beautiful paintings, and then gathered together i n boxes or bindings made o f tooled and gilded leather. Books were pre served i n libraries attached to mosques and palaces. At a t i m e w h e n European monasteries m i g h t treasure a few dozen volumes, libraries i n the Islamic lands regularly contained hundreds, i f not thousands, o f volumes. A t h i r d m e d i u m that achieved preerninence i n Islamic art was c l o t h . The p r o d u c t i o n and trade o f fibers, dyes, and finished goods was a m a j o r source o f revenue i n many places. One m o d e r n historian has likened the textile i n d u s t r y i n medieval Islamic times to the heavy industries o f m o d e r n i n d u s t r i a l states, because textiles laid the economic foundations o f medieval Islamic society, The t w o major fibers were w o o l , produced f r o m sheep, and l i n e n , produced f r o m the flax plant. Silk and c o t t o n were also i m p o r t a n t because they, like w o o l , c o u l d be

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dyed relatively easily w i t h b r i l l i a n t colors. Manyother fibers were used where available. Perhaps the most telling image o f the centrality o f textiles i n Islamic culture is the kisvvti, the cloth veil covering the Kaaba i n Mecca, w h i c h may represent a vestige o f the sacred t e n t — s i m i l a r to the Israelites' tent for the A r k o f the Covenant (2 Sam. 6 : 1 7 ) — i n w h i c h G o d dwelled. A l t h o u g h today the kisvva is always black and e m b r o i d e r e d i n g o l d w i t h quotations f r o m the Q u r a n , i n the past it c o u l d be o f virtually any color, i n c l u d i n g w h i t e , green, o r even red. As in many societies, c l o t h i n g made the man or w o m a n . Dress distinguished not o n l y m e n f r o m A growing taste for abstract motifs was already

w o m e n and r i c h f r o m p o o r but also nomads f r o m

apparent by the ninth century, as in this bowl

t o w n s p e o p l e and M u s l i m s f r o m n o n - M u s l i m s .

decorated with a flowering plant painted in

Dress was also used to make countless other social

four colors of luster.

and r e l i g i o u s d i s t i n c t i o n s : green turbans w e r e w o r n by descendants o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d ,

turbans w r a p p e d a r o u n d a red baton signified followers o f the Safavid rulers o f Iran. A coarse cloak o f w o o l (suf i n Arabic) was o f t e n w o r n by mystics, whose very personal approach to r e l i g i o n became increasingly i m p o r t a n t alongside the c o m m u n a l practice o f Islam. These mystics became k n o w n as Sufis. Textiles were also used f o r f u r n i s h i n g s . There was little or n o need for the tapestries that kept d o w n the drafts i n the c o l d castles o f the medieval n o r t h , just as there was n o need i n the relatively d r y and w a r m climate that prevails i n most o f the r e g i o n for w o o d e n f u r n i t u r e to raise people o f f d a m p and c o l d floors. Most people sat o n mats o r carpets spread o n the g r o u n d , leaned against p i l l o w s or cushions, and slept o n rugs o n the floor. Meals were n o r m a l l y c o m m u n a l affairs; spread o n the carpet o r f l o o r was a washable cloth o n w h i c h diners w o u l d sit and serve themselves o f f c o m m u n a l trays laden w i t h f o o d , w h i c h were sometimes set o n a l o w stand. Perhaps most distinctively, textiles were also used for portable architecture i n the Islamic lands. The area i n w h i c h Islam originally spread encompassed the t w o great traditions o f tent construction. The bedouins o f the Arabian deserts used tents made f r o m l o n g strips o f woven cloth supported by posts and tied d o w n w i t h strings and pegs. By contrast, the Turkic nomads o f Central Asia used tents made f r o m self-supp o r t i n g w o o d e n frames covered w i t h felts. Under Islam b o t h types o f structures, the Arab tensile structure and the Turkic compression structure, spread i n t o the traditional regions o f the other group, and characteristic features were exchanged. Because o f the i m p o r t a n t and often p o w e r f u l roles played by nomads i n sedentary

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Islamic society, these h u m b l e d w e l l i n g s were adopted by rulers, w h o transformed the u t i l i t a r i a n structures w i t h l u x u r i o u s accoutrements made o f the finest and most costly materials. I n the study o f Islamic art, many o f its other aspects—such as m e t a l w o r k , ceramics, and glassware, ivory,

and

rock

a n d carved crystal—are

wood, usually

encompassed under the r u b r i c "decorat i v e " or " m i n o r " arts. I n Western art these terms have somewhat derogatory c o n n o tations because these media are considered less n o b l e than the m a j o r arts o f p a i n t i n g and sculpture. This is s i m p l y not true i n Islamic art. As i n many other c u l tures, craftsmen w o r k i n g for r i c h patrons transformed expensive materials, such as elephant tusks, g o l d , and precious stones, i n t o l u x u r y items. I n the Islamic lands, however, craftsmen also transformed the

Muslim artists transformed everyday objects into artistic

humblest materials, such as clay, sand, and

masterpieces. The Bobrinksi Bucket, cast of brass and

ores,

inlaid with copper and silver, was a bathpail made in

into

brilliantly

glazed

ceramics,

l i m p i d glasswares, and g l i m m e r i n g metal-

I 163 as a gift to the man who had everything.

wares used by m a n y classes o f society. These objects were o f t e n u t i l i t a r i a n , such as pitchers and basins for washing and trays and bowls for serving. It takes a great leap o f i m a g i n a t i o n to transport an earthenware b o w l , austerely displayed i n a m u s e u m case, to its o r i g i n a l setting as a serving dish at a medieval meal. The B o b r i n s k i Bucket, one o f the masterpieces o f Islamic art, exemplifies many o f these characteristics. Bought i n Bukhara ( n o w part o f Uzbekistan) i n 1885, it was later acquired by the Russian count A. B o b r i n s k i , f r o m w h o m the piece gets its name. The r o u n d cast-brass body is i n l a i d i n copper and silver w i t h h o r i z o n t a l bands o f inscriptions and figural scenes. A c c o r d i n g to the dedicatory i n s c r i p t i o n o n the r i m , the bucket was ordered by A b d al-Rahman i b n Abdallah al-Rashidi, f o r m e d by M u h a m m a d i b n A b d a l - W a h i d , and inlaid by Masud i b n A h m a d , the designer f r o m Herat ( i n present-day Afghanistan), for the merchant Rashid a l - D i n Azizi i b n A b u l - H u s a y n al-Zanjani. The handle is inscribed w i t h the date M u h a r r a m 559 o f the Islamic calendar, corresponding to December

1163.

N o n e o f the people m e n t i o n e d i n the i n s c r i p t i o n is k n o w n f r o m other sources,

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and the f u n c t i o n o f the bucket is somewhat o f a puzzle. It was once called a "kett l e " o r " c a u l d r o n , " but i t is t o o fancy to have been used for cooking. N o r c o u l d it have been i n t e n d e d for c a r r y i n g f o o d o r liquids, because contact w i t h the i n t e r i o r m i g h t have caused f o o d p o i s o n i n g f r o m verdigris ( c o r r o d e d copper). The most likely explanation is that the bucket was a bath pail, i n t e n d e d to h o l d water for washing w h e n the merchant w e n t t o the bathhouse. I n short, the B o b r i n s k i Bucket was a present for the m a n w h o had everything i n 1163,

the medieval

equivalent o f a costly gadget f r o m an expensive catalog store. Despite the e n o r m o u s variety i n Islamic art, w h i c h can range f r o m great structures to tiny objects p r o d u c e d between the Atlantic coast o f Africa and the islands o f Indonesia f r o m the e i g h t h century to the present, several themes have had universal and perennial appeal. I n the l i m i t e d space available i n this v o l u m e , it w o u l d be impossible to recapitulate the l o n g and varied history o f Islamic art over fifteen centuries and three continents. F u r t h e r m o r e , this approach tends to emphasize regional and c hronological

divisions

Instead, this chapter

lakes

a the-

matic approach that emphasises c o m m o n features that unite m u c h Islamic art over the continents and centuries. Five themes have been chosen: the art o f w r i t i n g ; a n i c o n i s m , the absence o f figures; the decorative themes o f arabesque and geometry; the exuberant use o f color; and the n o t i o n o f w i l l f u l ambiguity. Each o f these themes may not appear i n every w o r k o f Islamic art, but collectively they define an aesthetic approach that makes Islamic art distinct f r o m the artistic traditions o f s u r r o u n d i n g regions and cultures.

The Art of Writing W r i t i n g is the most i m p o r t a n t theme to r u n t h r o u g h all Islamic art. The use o f inscriptions is n o t u n i q u e to Islamic culture; the Islamic t r a d i t i o n developed i n part f r o m precedents i n the r e g i o n i n w h i c h Islamic civilization first developed. There was, for example, a l o n g t r a d i t i o n i n the classical w o r l d o f using inscriptions, particularly to decorate the fronts o f b u i l d i n g as w e l l as m o n u m e n t s , such as t r i u m p h a l arches, I n t u r n , this t r a d i t i o n passed to the Christian w o r l d , and Byzantine art was o f t e n decorated w i t h inscriptions ( a l t h o u g h pictures eventually became m o r e p o p u l a r ) . Similarly, i n the ancient Near East inscriptions were often used, as o n the w a l l reliefs at Bisitun (or Behistun) i n western Iran, where a t r i l i n g u a l i n s c r i p t i o n i n O l d Persian, Elamite, and Babylonian lauding the great Achaemenid k i n g o f Persia, Darius I (r. 5 2 2 - 4 8 6 B.C.E.), surrounds a m o n u mental relief s h o w i n g his t r i u m p h over the usurper Gaumata and the rebels. I n all these cases, however, w r i t i n g supplemented and explained the image. W h a t is different about Islamic art is that w r i t i n g became the m a i n , and sometimes the only, element o f decoration.

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This fundamental change was due, i n large part, to the pivotal role o f w r i t i n g i n the r e l i g i o n o f Islam. The first w o r d s that G o d revealed to M u h a m m a d were the five verses o p e n i n g chapter ninety-six o f the Q u r a n : Recite in the name of thy lord w h o created, Created man from a clot; Recite i n the name of thy lord, Who taught by the pen, Taught man what he knew not. I n other w o r d s , the k n o w l e d g e o f w r i t i n g distinguishes m a n f r o m God's other creatures. The i m p o r t a n c e o f w r i t i n g is stressed t h r o u g h o u t the Q u r a n . Chapter sixty-eight, another early revelation k n o w n either as surat al-Qtikim (The pen) or surat al-Nun (The letter n u n ) , opens w i t h the w o r d s " N u n . By the p e n and w h a t they w r i t e . " A c c o r d i n g to another pair o f verses revealed slightly later ( Q u r a n 5 0 : 1 7 - 1 8 ) , t w o n o b l e r e c o r d i n g angels sit o n

man's

shoulders to register his every action and t h o u g h t . The one o n the r i g h t w r i t e s d o w n g o o d deeds, the one o n the left evil ones. O n Judgment Day man's every deed w i l l be tallied for the final accounting i n the Book o f Reckoning ( Q u r a n 69:18-19). Given the i m p o r t a n c e o f w r i t i n g i n revelation, i t is n o surprise that w r i t i n g became such an i m p o r t a n t feature o f Islamic culture. Books and b o o k p r o d u c t i o n became m a j o r art f o r m s , a n d b e a u t i f u l l y w r i t t e n w o r d s became a m a j o r decorative m o t i f . Because the Q u r a n was revealed

Writing was one of the most common themes of Islamic art. Since Umayyad times, when the first Islamic coins were struck, almost all coins minted in the Islamic lands have been decorated exclusively with writing, as with this gold dinar minted for the Umayyad caliph Abd al-Malik in 696.

i n Arabic, the Arabic language a n d script q u i c k l y came to d o m i n a t e the languages that had been used i n the r e g i o n , b e c o m i n g the l i n g u a franca that u n i t e d the vast area. By the late e i g h t h century calligraphers were responsible for m a k i n g the Arabic script m o r e legible and b e a u t i f u l , and their efforts can be seen i n s u r v i v i n g examples r a n g i n g f r o m coins and milestones to b u i l d i n g s . Byzantine and Sasanian coins bore pictures o f the emperors under whose auspices the coins were struck. After a b r i e f p e r i o d o f e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n , M u s l i m rulers rejected this type o f figural c o i n i n favor o f one p u r e l y dependent o n words. Beginning i n 692, under the U m a y y a d caliph A b d a l - M a l i k , virtually all coins were exclusively decorated w i t h w r i t i n g . This is true, for example, o f early g o l d coins, k n o w n as dinars. O n the obverse or f r o n t , the center is filled by the

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profession o f f a i t h , w h i c h continues along part o f the edge; the rest o f the space contains a verse f r o m the Q u r a n ( 9 3 3 ) about t h e p r o p h e t i c m i s s i o n . :

O n the reverse the c o i n is inscribed i n the center w i t h a Quranic verse ( 1 1 2 ) stating God's oneness and r e f u t i n g the T r i n i t y ; the text a r o u n d the edge c o n tains the invocation, m i n t , and date. A l l o f this appears o n a c o i n less than twenty

millimeters

in

diameter

(smaller than a quarter). A l t h o u g h the style o f script changed

i n various

locales and periods, this type o f epi¬ graphic c o i n r e m a i n e d

characteristic

o f virtually all Islamic coinage t o m o d ern times, I n s c r i p t i o n s are f o u n d i n all media and materials, even those i n w h i c h the

technical

limitations

o f the

m e d i u m made i t extremely d i f f i c u l t t o i n c o r p o r a t e a r u n n i n g text. This is the case, f o r example, w i t h textiles. I t is relatively easy t o weave s y m m e t r i cal patterns o f repeating m o t i f s o n a The first great monument of Islamic architecture, the Dome

l o o m , b u t m u c h m o r e d i f f i c u l t t o set

of the Rock in Jerusalem, erected by the Umayyad caliph Abd

u p a d i r e c t i o n a l design that reads i n

al-Malik in 692. was decorated with writing. The top of the mosaic panels on the interior has texts from the Quran in gold letters set against a blue ground.

one d i r e c t i o n . B y the t e n t h century, however, Persian weavers h a d overc o m e the l i m i t a t i o n s o f the m e d i u m and f i g u r e d o u t h o w t o i n c o r p o r a t e

l o n g bands o f i n s c r i p t i o n s o n their elaborately patterned silks. A g o o d e x a m ple is the f r a g m e n t a r y silk textile k n o w n as the Shroud o f St. Josse, because i t was used i n medieval times t o w r a p the bones o f St. Josse i n the abbey o f St. Josse-sur-Mer, near Caen i n n o r t h w e s t e r n France, w h e r e i t w as probablyr

b r o u g h t b y a Crusader r e t u r n i n g h o m e f r o m the H o l y L a n d . I t shows h o w Islamic textiles were considered precious b o t h at h o m e and abroad. F r o m the t w o s u r v i v i n g pieces, the textile can be reconstructed as a large square meas u r i n g one and a h a l f meters (five feet) o n a side, w i t h a carpet-like design o f several borders s u r r o u n d i n g a central f i e l d . The borders c o n t a i n a train o f t w o -

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h u m p e d o r Bactrian camels, a n d the f i e l d w o u l d have had t w o i d e n t i c a l bands o f elephants. Beneath the elephants' feet is an i n s c r i p t i o n b a n d w r i t t e n i n Arabic. The animals are arranged s y m m e t r i c a l l y , b u t the i n s c r i p t i o n band can be read o n l y f r o m r i g h t t o left. T h e text invokes g l o r y a n d p r o s p e r i t y t o the c o m m a n d e r , A b u Mansur B a k h t i k i n , w h o is i d e n t i f i e d i n medieval texts as a Turkish c o m m a n d e r i n n o r t h e a s t e r n I r a n . H e was arrested a n d executed o n orders o f his Samanid sovereign A b d a l - M a l i k i b n N u h a r o u n d 9 6 0 . The silk had t o have been made before that, however, because i t invokes g o o d wishes o n a l i v i n g person. A l t h o u g h i t is the o n l y example t o survive, this silk m u s t have been o n e o f many i d e n t i c a l pieces. I t was extremely t i m e - c o n s u m i n g and expensive t o set u p a d r a w l o o m t o weave this c o m p l i c a t e d design i n seven c o l ors, b u t by weaving m u l t i p l e copies o f the silk squares the costs w o u l d have been spread m o r e reasonably. I t is n o t k n o w n exactly h o w the St. Josse silk was o r i g i n a l l y used, but i t probably was w o v e n t o be a saddlecloth f o r the troops serving u n d e r Bakhtikin's c o m m a n d . The St. Josse silk is just one example o f h o w artists i n medieval Islamic times used inscriptions t o decorate w o r k s o f art. O n objects made f r o m expensive materials, such as silk textiles o r jade cups, the inscriptions o f t e n name the patron or user w h o c o m m i s s i o n e d the object. O n objects o f m o r e h u m b l e materials or those made f o r the market, however, the inscriptions contain m o r e generalized texts. This is the case w i t h a b o w l w i t h f l a r i n g sides, p r o d u c e d , like the St. Josse silk, i n northeastern Iran i n the tenth century. Made o f b u f f - c o l o r e d earthenware covered w i t h a fine w h i t e slip, painted i n red and dark b r o w n slips, and covered w i t h a transparent colorless glaze, the deep b o w l is notable for its size and fine decoration o n the interior. I n the center the b o w l has an abstract p l a n t m o t i f o f a single stem w i t h five leaves, b u t the m a j o r d e c o r a t i o n is a w i d e b a n d o f elegant angular script encirc l i n g the walls. A s s u m i n g that the b o w l was meant t o h o l d f o o d , o n l y the scallops o n the edge w o u l d have been visible w h e n the b o w l was f u l l . As the f o o d was eaten, however, the i n s c r i p t i o n w o u l d have b e c o m e m o r e and m o r e visi b l e u n t i l all the d e c o r a t i o n w a s revealed w h e n the b o w l was empty. T h e Arabic text i n s c r i b e d o n the b o w l begins after a small decorative m o t i f set at about f o u r o ' c l o c k , w i t h the phrase "blessing t o its o w n e r . " A f t e r a small t e a r d r o p m o t i f set at about e i g h t o ' c l o c k , the text continues w i t h the proverb, " I t is said that he w h o is c o n t e n t w i t h h i s o w n o p i n i o n r u n s i n t o danger." A s s u m i n g that the b o w l was i n t e n d e d t o be h e l d a n d appreciated w i t h the stem o f the plant at the b o t t o m , closest t o the viewer, t h e n the most i m p o r tant part o f the i n s c r i p t i o n , the blessing t o the o w n e r , is i m m e d i a t e l y legible b e l o w i t . To read the proverb, the reader m u s t t u r n the b o w l a r o u n d i n a c o u n terclockwise direction.

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T H E O X F O R D HISTORY OF ISLAM

Other b o w l s and plates made i n the same m i l i e u are decorated w i t h similar aphorisms, such as "Planning before w o r k protects y o u f r o m regret; patience is the key to c o m f o r t , " or " K n o w l e d g e is an ornament f o r y o u t h and intelligence is a c r o w n o f g o l d . " The inscriptions o n these ceramics are t h o u g h t o u t extremely carefully, and the stylized script, quite distinct f r o m c o n t e m p o r a r y h a n d w r i t i n g k n o w n i n manuscripts f r o m that t i m e , justly deserves to be called calligraphy. M o d e r n viewers, even those w h o k n o w Arabic w e l l , find these inscriptions d i f ficult to decipher. It is likely that even i n their o w n t i m e they were meant to be entertaining puzzles for a sophisticated clientele, w h o n o t o n l y appreciated havi n g their dinnerware decorated w i t h stylized w r i t i n g b u t also k n e w the Arabic language w e l l enough to understand the m o r a l i z i n g aphorisms. I n tenth-century Iran and Central Asia, N e w Persian was c o m i n g to the fore as a popular language, but Arabic was m o r e appropriate f o r w r i t i n g . The earliest s u r v i v i n g manuscript w r i t t e n i n Persian dates o n l y f r o m the eleventh c e n t u r y These t w o inscribed wares—the s h r o u d and the b o w l — b o t h date f r o m the tenth century, b u t inscriptions are f o u n d o n objects created t h r o u g h o u t the history o f Islamic c i v i l i z a t i o n , f r o m the earliest times to the present. The earliest w o r k o f Islamic architecture, the D o m e o f the Rock i n Jerusalem, shows a sophisticated use o f inscriptions executed i n glass mosaic. I n the sixteenth century the O t t o m a n sultan Suleyman (r. 1520—66) had the mosaics o n the outside o f the

The Dome of the Rock in Jerusaleum was extensively decorated with glass mosaics like those that survive on the interior.Those on the exterior were replaced with tiles first in the sixteenth and again in the twentieth century; but it may well have had inscriptions like those on the interior.

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d o m e replaced w i t h tiles, w h i c h were themselves

replaced

again

in

the

t w e n t i e t h century, so it is impossible to say anything about the o r i g i n a l role o f i n s c r i p t i o n s there. The i n t e r i o r , however, preserves most o f its o r i g i nal aspect and is the most lavish p r o g r a m o f mosaics t o survive f r o m ancient or medieval times. T w o l o n g bands of inscriptions, w r i t t e n i n g o l d letters that sparkle against the deep blue g r o u n d , encircle the inner and outer faces o f the octagonal arcade. The texts contain pious phrases and verses f r o m the Q u r a n about God's omnipotence

and

Muhammad's

prophetic m i s s i o n as w e l l as the name

Writing remains a potent theme in modern Islamic art. The

o f the p a t r o n , the U m a y y a d c a l i p h

dome around the King Khalid International Airport, built in

Abd

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in 1984, is inscribed with verses from

al-Malik,

and

the

date

of

construction.

the Quran about God's glory.

As o n coins, the script used o n the D o m e o f the Rock is carefully t h o u g h t o u t and planned to fit the available space. The i n s c r i p t i o n s there p r o v i d e the first dated evidence for the w r i t i n g d o w n o f the Q u r a n , and they s h o w that there were already calligraphers t r a i n e d i n e x p l o i t i n g the decorative possibilities o f the Arabic script. N o manuscripts o f the Q u r a n have survived f r o m this early date, and some scholars have used this lack o f evidence to suggest that Arabic script evolved rather slowly over the centuries. Judging f r o m the inscriptions o n the coins and the D o m e o f the Rock, there can be n o question that the art o f w r i t i n g i n Arabic was already w e l l developed by the end o f the e i g h t h century. Inscriptions remain an i m p o r t a n t theme o f decoration i n m o d e r n Islamic architecture. They are p r o m i n e n t , for example, inside the mosque erected i n 1984 at K i n g K l i a l i d International A i r p o r t i n Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. As at the D o m e o f the Rock, the i n s c r i p t i o n i n this mosque is w r i t t e n i n a large band a r o u n d the dome's base, b u t i n this instance the text is entirely f r o m the Q u r a n (57:1—7). The verses state that whatever is o n the earth or i n the heavens declares the g l o r y o f G o d , the A l m i g h t y w h o has power over all things. The verses conclude w i t h the statement that w h o e v e r spends m o n e y o n a p i o u s w o r k w i l l be justly rewarded. The text was clearly chosen as a reference to the motives o f the patron i n f o u n d i n g a mosque.

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THE OXFORD HISTORY OF ISLAM

At all times and i n all places, Quranic verses were caref u l l y selected to fit a particular situation. Closely e x a m i n i n g the chosen verses can provide clues about the o r i g i n a l funct i o n or meaning o f a w o r k o f art. Tombs were often decorated w i t h verses referring to death and paradise, such as " A l l that dwells o n the earth w i l l perish, except the face o f thy L o r d " ( 5 5 : 2 6 - 2 7 ) . Doorways m i g h t be inscribed w i t h the verse asking God f o r a "just i n g o i n g and a just o u t g o i n g " (17:80). Other Quranic texts were chosen because certain w o r d s had particular resonance. For example, the f r o n t o f the t o m b i n the Shifaiye madrasa erected i n

1220

at Sivas by the R u m Seljuk ruler Kaykaus is inscribed w i t h a Quranic verse (69:28—29) that ends w i t h the w o r d sultaniyfl ( p o w e r ) , undoubtedly chosen as a p u n o n Kaykaus' most i m p o r t a n t title, sultan. W r i t i n g i n Arabic was also the means by w h i c h n o n Islamic f o r m s were made Islamic. This can be seen i n the arched screen that the M u s l i m r u l e r o f D e l h i , Q u t b a l - D i n Aybak (1206-10), added to the congregational there i n 1198.

mosque

K n o w n as Q u w w a t al-Islam ( " M i g h t o f

I s l a m " ) , the mosque had been b u i l t less than a decade earlier, f o l l o w i n g the Islamic conquest o f the r e g i o n . The screen, w h i c h stands i n the courtyard i n front o f the prayer hall, serves n o structural purpose and was apparently added to the hypostyle b u i l d i n g for aesthetic reasons, t o mask w h a t lay b e h i n d and to make the n e w b u i l d i n g look more attractive. The screen is r i c h l y decorated w i t h bands o f naturalistic vine scrolls and i n s c r i p t i o n s . The v i n e scrolls b e l o n g to the local t r a d i t i o n o f stone carving that can be seen o n H i n d u and Jain temples. There, the scrolls are usually accompanied by exuberant figural sculpture depicting the activities o f innumerable gods and goddesses w i t h m u l Medieval masons evolved sophisti-

tiple arms and legs. The new M u s l i m patrons f o u n d this

cated methods of laying bricks in

idolatry h o r r i f i c and had the local masons replace the

patterns. Contrasting light and shadow, these designs sometimes spelled out words and phrases. The

fig-

ures w i t h Arabic texts f r o m the Q u r a n . The desire to use w r i t i n g to decorate b u i l d i n g s and

minaret built around 1100 by the

objects i n the Islamic lands was o v e r w h e l m i n g , and

Ghaznavid sultan Masud III in

builders and designers, particularly i n medieval times, v i e d

Ghazna, Afghanistan, is the first sur-

t o create new styles and methods o f w r i t i n g out their mes-

viving example of this script.

sages o n buildings. I n some cases they added flowers and

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22

9

leaves a r o u n d and a m o n g the letters. This style was particularly popular i n Cairo, and many o f the stone b u i l d i n g s erected under the patronage o f the F a t i m i d dynasty, wealthy and sophisticated rulers there f r o m 969 t o 1171, have beautifully sculpted texts i n the style k n o w n as floriated Kufic. These are some o f the finest architectural inscriptions k n o w n f r o m the Islamic lands, because they judiciously balance the demands o f decoration and readability. I n I r a n a n d the adjacent r e g i o n , w h e r e baked b r i c k was the most c o m m o n m a t e r i a l o f c o n s t r u c t i o n , designers evolved other types o f script, p a r t i c u l a r l y those w i t h knots a n d o t h e r g e o m e t r i c elements o f d e c o r a t i o n . O n e o f the architectural styles that lasted t h e longest is k n o w n i n Persian as bannai o r builder's technique. The script developed o u t o f the techniques o f b r i c k l a y i n g , as b r i c k s a n d other elements o f c o n s t r u c t i o n were set i n r e l i e f t o spell o u t w o r d s and simple phrases. The earliest example o f this script survives o n the m i n a r e t erected

at G h a z n i

( i n eastern A f g h a n i s t a n )

about

1100 b y t h e

Ghaznavid r u l e r M a s u d I I I (r. 1098—1115). T h e panels o n the minaret's shaft spell o u t the ruler's n a m e a n d various titles. The text is u n u s u a l , as i t is one o f the o n l y examples k n o w n o f an i n s c r i p t i o n i n this t e c h n i q u e c o n t a i n i n g hist o r i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n . The text is also very d i f f i c u l t t o read, because the letters are f o r m e d by small pieces o f terra-cotta s a n d w i c h e d between larger b r i c k s that are l a i d vertically i n stepped b o n d . Designing and setting out this i n s c r i p t i o n m u s t have been extremely laborintensive (and therefore expensive), and builders and designers soon figured o u t h o w to adopt the technique to faster methods o f p r o d u c t i o n . They simplified the text itself, so that instead o f having the names and titles o f a specific ruler, the text contained sacred names o r a c o m m o n pious phrase, such as "There is n o prophet after M u h a m m a d " o r " D o m i n i o n belongs t o God." Builders and designers also

Builders also used colored bricks and tiles to spell out words and phrases. The walls of the shrine that Timur erected in the late fourteenth century in memory of the Sufi shaykh Ahmad Yasavi at Turkestan City in the Kazakh steppe glows with such sacred phrases.

2^0

THE

OXFORD

HISTORY

OF

ISLAM

simplified the technique. Instead o f setting pieces o f terra-cotta i n relief, they used the bricks themselves to spell out the text. They first exploited the spaces between the bricks so that the shadows cast i n the voids w o u l d f o r m the w o r d s or phrases. It was a short step for designers to fill the spaces between the bricks w i t h glazed elements, so that the w o r d s were spelled o u t by glittering surfaces that were flush w i t h the b r i c k bonds and contrasted w i t h the matte surface a r o u n d t h e m . This technique became widespread i n the eastern Islamic lands f r o m the t h i r teenth century, because i t was an ideal way o f covering large surfaces o f b r i c k b u i l d i n g s . A g o o d example is the s h r i n e that the Turkic c o n q u e r o r T i m u r (1336-1405-) b u i l t for the Sufi shaykh A h m a d Yasavi n o r t h o f Samarqand. The shrine is a huge rectangular block that floats above the flat, dusty steppe. The expanse along the side walls is d i v i d e d i n t o a g r i d o f cross shapes o u d i n e d i n bricks glazed dark blue. Each cross is filled w i t h l i g h t blue glazed bricks that spell o u t the names G o d , A l i , and M u h a m m a d . The technique w as n o t o n l y visually T

effective b u t also religiously resonant, because anyone staring at the b u i l d i n g f r o m afar could repeat the sacred names, just as a pious believer w o u l d repeat sacred names as part o f his o r her devotions. The b u i l d i n g was literally w r a p p e d w i t h sacred w r i t i n g .

Aniconism: The Absence of Figures I t is o f t e n said that the d e p i c t i o n o f l i v i n g things is f o r b i d d e n i n Islamic art, but this is s i m p l y n o t t r u e . The Q u r a n has very l i t t l e to say o n the subject o f f i g u r a l representation, a l t h o u g h i t does e x p l i c i t l y f o r b i d idolatry, d i v i n a t i o n , d r i n k i n g , g a m b l i n g , a n d other vices, w h i c h seem to have been c o m m o n l y practiced at the t i m e o f the revelation. M a k i n g pictures o f people was apparently n o t a t o p i c o f p a r a m o u n t i m p o r t a n c e i n Arabia i n the late s i x t h and early seventh centuries. F u r t h e r m o r e , there is n o reason to depict people i n Islamic r e l i g i o u s art, because M u s l i m s believe that God is u n i q u e and w i t h o u t associate a n d therefore that H e cannot be represented, except by H i s w o r d , the Q u r a n . G o d is w o r s h i p e d d i r e c t l y w i t h o u t intercessors, so there is n o place for images o f saints as there is i n C h r i s t i a n art. M u h a m m a d was God's messenger, but u n l i k e Christ, M u h a m m a d was n o t d i v i n e . H i s d e e d s — n o t his p e r s o n — represent the ideal to w h i c h M u s l i m s aspire. U n l i k e the Bible, l i t t l e o f the Q u r a n is narrative, so there was l i t t l e reason to use illustrated stories to teach the faith. I n t i m e , this lack o f m o t i v e a n d o p p o r t u n i t y hardened i n t o law, and the absence o f figures (technically k n o w n as aniconism) became a characteristic feature o f Islamic r e l i g i o u s art. Thus, few, i f any, depictions o f people can be f o u n d i n mosques and other b u i l d i n g s i n t e n d e d for religious purposes. Palaces, b a t h -

ART

A N D

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houses, a n d locales designed f o r other activities, h o w e v e r , may w e l l have h a d f i g u r a l d e c o r a t i o n , a l t h o u g h i n later p e r i o d s the a n i c o n i s m o i the r e l i g i o u s m i l i e u o f t e n s p i l l e d over i n t o the secular r e a l m . A c c o r d i n g t o the hadith ( t r a d i t i o n s o f the P r o p h e t ) , even M u h a m m a d was aware o f the d i f ference; he o r d e r e d all the i d o l s r e m o v e d f r o m the Kaaba i n Mecca, but he is recorded to have used c u r t a i n s and cushions decorated w i t h figures i n h i s house. Representations

o f people and animals were

used, o f t e n exuberantly, w i t h i n p r i v a t e settings. O n e example f r o m early Islamic times can be seen i n the r u i n s o f the U m a y y a d palace k n o w n K h i r b a t a l - M a f j a r near Jericho.

as

D e s t r o y e d i n an

earthquake i n the 740s, the b u i l d i n g was the retreat o f the playboy p r i n c e a l - W a l i d i b n Y a z i d , w h o part i e d w i t h his friends f o r t w o decades w a i t i n g to succeed his e l d e r l y u n c l e , the U m a y y a d c a l i p h H i s h a m i b n A b d a l - M a l i k (r. 724—43). The palace c o n t a i n e d an elaborate music h a l l , c o m p l e t e w i t h s w i m m i n g p o o l , h o t b a t h , and private audience r o o m . A l l that r e m a i n s intact is the e n o r m o u s mosaic floor, decorated w i t h an e x t r a o r d i n a r y array o f g e o m e t r i c patterns that resemble stone carpets. F r o m the many fragments o f stone and stucco that

Muslims disdained pictures or sculptures of living beings in religious settings, but they often used them in palaces and other secular

l i t t e r the site, the excavators were able to r e c o n -

settings.The entrance to the bath at Khirbat

struct m u c h o f the b u i l d i n g ' s superstructure. The

al-Mafjar near Jericho, a palace erected for

d o o r w a y , for e x a m p l e , was elaborately decorated w i t h a stucco statue, presumably representing the p a t r o n , and inside the p o r t a l m o r e stucco statues o f

the Umayyad prince al-Walid II in the eighth century, was decorated with stucco statues of bare-breasted dancers.

h a l f - n a k e d v o l u p t u o u s dancers suggested the pleasures that lay w i t h i n . The d o m e over the small audience r o o m c u l m i n a t e d i n a cap o f luscious acanthus leaves f r o m w h i c h p r o t r u d e d heads o f handsome y o u n g m e n and w o m e n , w h o peered d o w n over other carvings o f b i r d s a n d w i n g e d horses. Clearly, w h a t one d i d i n private c o u l d be q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f r o m w h a t one d i d i n p u b l i c . I n the same vein, German excavators i n the early t w e n t i e t h century f o u n d thousands o f fragments f r o m w a l l paintings that once decorated the houses, bathhouses, and palaces at Samarra, the site n o r t h o f Baghdad that served as the

232

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Abbasid capital i n the m i d - n i n t h century. The excavators were able to reconstruct some

o f the scenes f r o m the

palace,

w h i c h i n c l u d e d cornucopia scrolls i n h a b ited w i t h w i l d animals and naked ladies, h u n t i n g scenes, and one m u r a l s h o w i n g a pair of dancing girls. The t w o figures have interlocked arms; w h i l e they dance, each pours f r o m a long-necked bottle i n t o a cup h e l d by the other. The l i q u i d must surely be w i n e , because fragments o f painted w i n e bottles also littered the site. Official histories may chronicle the official acts o f the great and p o w e r f u l , but art, like p o e t r y a n d song, o f t e n shows aspects o f private life that are at variance Paintings of people decorated the walls of the ninthcentury palaces at Samarra, the Abbasid capital north of Baghdad. Excavators found one mural in the caliph's private quarters that shows two dancing girls with interlocked arms, pouring wine.

w i t h the official ideal. The same d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n

the

religious a n d the secular stands for b o o k d e c o r a t i o n . M a n u s c r i p t s of the Q u r a n were often embellished w i t h g e o m e t r i c or floral designs. Scholars d o n o t know-

o f any Q u r a n i c m a n u s c r i p t that was decorated w i t h paintings o f people, as were c o n t e m p o r a r y Christian manuscripts o f the Bible. By contrast, pictures were often i n c l u d e d i n other k i n d s o f books made i n the Islamic lands, i n c l u d i n g scientific treatises, literary w o r k s , epic poems, and histories. I n some cases these pictures were necessary t o make the text understandable, i n others, they made it pretty. O n l y fragments o f illustrated books survive f r o m the p e r i o d before i o o o C.E., but there is n o reason to d o u b t their existence, particularly because they are described i n other books. O n e o f the earliest illustrated manuscripts to survive is a copy o f A b d al-Rahman al-Sufi's treatise o n the fixed stars. The w o r k , u l t i mately derived f r o m classical w r i t i n g s , particularly Ptolemy's Almagest, was c o m posed around 96c by the astronomer al-Sufi ( 9 0 3 - 8 6 ) o f Rayy for the Buy i d ruler A d u d al-Dawla (r. 9 4 9 - 8 3 ) . The oldest s u r i v i n g copy was made f r o m the o r i g i nal by al-Sufi's son, and its illustrations show h o w classical traditions o f representing the constellations w ere adapted to M u s l i m taste. The figures, for example, T

wear turbans and robes w i t h l o n g f l o w i n g drapery. F r o m this t i m e , books o f all kinds, i n c l u d i n g illustrated ones, have survived i n greater n u m b e r s a n d represent a w i d e r range o f subject matter. One o f the

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This copy of al-Sufi's treatise on the fixed stars is one of the earliest Islamic manuscripts with illustrations to survive. It was transcribed from the original by the author's son in 1009. This illustration of Andromeda wearing a long flowing robe shows how classical traditions of representing the constellations were adapted to Muslim taste.

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T H E OXFORD HISTORY OF ISLAM

most

unusual is the Maqamat

(Assemblies), w r i t t e n by the Arab writer

al-Hariri

( 1054-1122),

w h o lived i n Basra. The Maqamat contains the merchant al-Harith's w i t t y account o f the rogue A b u Zayd's fifty adventures throughout the Islamic lands. Linguistically invendve and p u n n i n g i n style, die w o r k w a s i m m e n s e l y popular among the educated bourgeoisie o f the Arab lands. T h e verbal pyrotechnics o f the text d i d n o t lend themselves easily to illustrat i o n , b u t the d e m a n d f o r illustrated books was so strong that the w o r k was repeatedly illustrated. Eleven illustrated copies produced before 1350 have survived, suggesting that there were once many m o r e . T h e illustrations p r o v i d e rare glimpses o f daily

life

i n medieval

times,

s h o w i n g such scenes as markets Manuscripts of the Quran were never illustrated with human figures, but in addition to the beautiful calligraphy used to transcribe God's word, many manuscripts are decorated with plant and geo-

and libraries. While

books

metric designs, as with this fabulous thirty-volume copy made for

Maqamat w o u l d

the Ilkhanid ruler Uljaytu at Hamadan in 1313.

appropriate

such

as the

have been an

possession

for a

bourgeois b i b l i o p h i l e , u n d e r the M o n g o l rulers o f Iran w h o were k n o w n as the I l k h a n i d s , books were t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a m a j o r art f o r m f o r r o y alty, p a r t i c u l a r l y after the M o n g o l rulers converted t o Islam at the very end o f the t h i r t e e n t h century. Books became p h y s i c a l l y m u c h bigger, p r o b a b l y because larger sheets o f finer and w h i t e r paper were available, and these large surfaces p r o v i d e d m o r e r o o m f o r elaborate d e c o r a t i o n . S u m p t u o u s m a n u scripts o f the Q u r a n were p r o d u c e d . These were o f t e n presentation sets c o m p r i s i n g t h i r t y v o l u m e s , w^hich w o u l d have been g i v e n t o a m o s q u e , shrine, o r t o m b c o m p l e x , w h e r e o n e v o l u m e w o u l d have been read a l o u d each day d u r i n g the h o l y m o n t h o f Ramadan. The largest m a n u s c r i p t t o survive (each page measures 72 x c o centimeters) was c o p i e d at Baghdad a n d e n d o w e d t o the

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m a u s o l e u m o f the sultan M u h a m m a d Khudabanda Lfljaytu (r. 1304-16) at S u l t a n i y y a . I t t o o k e i g h t years t o c o p y ; each page has three lines of majestic muhaqqaq script i n g o l d o u t l i n e d i n black, a l t e r n a t i n g w i t h t w o lines o f a m o r e f l u i d thuluth-muhaqqaq script i n black o u t l i n e d i n g o l d — o n e o f the m o s t spectacular examples o f monumental

Quranic

calligraphy.

Like the other t h i r t y - v o l u m e sets, i t has m a g n i f i c e n t d o u b l e frontispieces c o n t a i n i n g g e o m e t r i c designs. Large manuscripts o f other w o r k s were p r o d u c e d i n the I l k h a n i d p e r i o d . H i stories,

for

example,

were

extremely popular, probably because the f o r e i g n M o n g o l rulers were i n t e r ested i n f i t t i n g themselves i n t o the l o n g traditions o f Islamic and Persian history. The M o n g o l sultan M a h m u d Ghazan (r. 1295-1304) c o m m i s s i o n e d his vizier Rashid a l - D i n t o w r i t e a hist o r y o f the M o n g o l s , a n d Ghazan s successor U l j a y t u expanded the c o m mission t o make i t a universal history, the first k n o w n o f its k i n d . Rashid alDin's Jami al-tawtirikh ( C o m p e n d i u m o f

Islamic art transformed many of the subsidiary elements of pre-Islamic art into major themes.The mosaics on the walls of the Great Mosque of Damascus, erected by the Umayyad caliph al-Walid in the early eighth century, show a paradisial

chronicles) was a m u l t i v o l u m e w o r k ,

riverside landscape of fantastic buildings separated by trees.

c o m p r i s i n g histories o f the M o n g o l

In earlier times, such landscapes would have been peopled

a n d the n o n - M o n g o l Eurasian p e o -

with figures.

pies, a genealogy o f r u l i n g houses, and a geography. To make his b o o k m o r e attractive and comprehensible, Rashid a l - D i n h a d i t illustrated. His painters d r e w f r o m the w i d e range o f sources available i n this c o s m o p o l i t a n society. Sections o n Chinese history, for example, were illustrated f o l l o w i n g Chinese models, and sections o n b i b l i c a l h i s t o r y f o l l o w e d Byzantine manuscript prototypes. Perhaps most interesting and unusual i n this m u l t i v o l u m e w o r k is the set o f illustrations s h o w i n g events f r o m the Prophet's life. As there was n o earlier trad i t i o n o f representing M u h a m m a d i n Islamic art, a n d as Rashid al-Din's text

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p r o v i d e d o n l y the m o s t skeletal details o f events i n M u h a m m a d ' s l i f e , the painters h a d t o l o o k elsewhere f o r i n s p i r a t i o n . O n e p a i n t i n g f r o m the w o r k shows M u h a m m a d m o u n t e d o n a horse leading the M u s l i m s i n battle against the Banu Qaynuqa, a Jewish t r i b e o f Arabia. The Prophet is depicted against a u l t r a m a r i n e blue b a c k g r o u n d and s u r r o u n d e d by w h i t e clouds and angels. B e h i n d h i m are the M u s l i m forces, i n c l u d i n g his uncle Hamza, identifiable because he has a red beard and carries the Prophet's banner. The angels have bare heads w i t h tight curls and wear l o n g garments d e r i v e d f r o m the chiton, the basic garment w o r n by Greek m e n and w o m e n . I n M o n g o l Iran, there seems to have been quite a b i t o f interest i n d e p i c t i n g the Prophet, a n d several s u r v i v i n g manuscripts illustrate scenes f r o m his life. These depictions o f M u h a m m a d are n o t religious images; they are historical illustrations n o t i n t e n d e d f o r devotional use. Somewhat unusual i n the larger scheme o f Islamic art, these images nevertheless s h o w the c o n t i n u i n g d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n the r e l i g i o u s a n d secular realms o f Islamic art.

The Decorative Themes of Arabesque and Geometry Because f i g u r a l i m a g e r y was unnecessary i n I s l a m i c r e l i g i o u s art, o t h e r themes o f d e c o r a t i o n became i m p o r t a n t . Several o f these themes had been subsidiary elements i n the arts o f p r e - I s l a m i c times. I n Byzantine art, f o r example, d e p i c t i o n s o f p e o p l e had been set off, f r a m e d , o r l i n k e d by geom e t r i c elements (shapes and patterns) a n d vegetal designs (that is, stylized f r u i t s , f l o w e r s , and trees). I n early Islamic t i m e s these subsidiary elements were t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o m a j o r artistic themes. Thus, the mosaics decorating the Great M o s q u e o f Damascus,

erected by the U m a y y a d c a l i p h a l - W a l i d (r.

7 0 5 - i c ) i n the early e i g h t h century, were clearly d e r i v e d f r o m the t r a d i t i o n s o f late a n t i q u i t y . The panel that survives a l o n g the west w a l l o f the mosque shows a c o n t i n u o u s landscape o f fantastic b u i l d i n g s separated by trees and set above a f l o w i n g river. I n classical a n d Byzantine art these subjects w o u l d have been b a c k g r o u n d elements for large f i g u r e s , b u t i n this panel the landscape itself is the subject, p r o b a b l y meant to depict the garden paradise p r o m i s e d t o M u s l i m s i n the Q u r a n a n d described as a place o f l o f t y chambers

beneath

w h i c h rivers f l o w . I n the Damascus mosaics the trees and b u i l d i n g s are still readily recognizable, but w i t h the g r o w i n g reluctance to depict figures, such specific representations were replaced by m o r e stylized, abstract, and geometric m o t i f s . This style was already popular by the n i n t h century, evident i n a small ceramic b o w l f r o m this p e r i o d that is decorated w i t h f o u r colors o f luster. The m a i n m o t i f s h o w n i n the center o f the b o w l is a plant w i t h a central stalk and paired leaves. The basic

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237

design is quite simple, but i t has been elaborated w i t h many d i f f e r e n t geometric patterns—spots, herringbones, blots, peacock's eyes, and so f o r t h — t h a t cover as m u c h o f the surface as possible and negate the organic q u a l i t y of the m a i n m o t i f . I n short, naturalistic elements, such as the flowers and leaves, were b e c o m i n g increasingly stylized and subjected to the laws o f geometry. Little o f the decoration has survived f r o m the mosques i n the Abbasid capital at Samarra, b u t one can get an idea o f the abstract style o f decoration that m i g h t have been used o n the mosques there by l o o k i n g at copies erected elsewhere. The m o s q u e i n Cairo, c o m p l e t e d i n 879 o n the orders o f the Abbasid governor A h m a d i b n Tulun ( 8 3 5 - 8 4 ) , for example, is said to have been a close copy o f a mosque i n Samarra. I n contrast to the earlier Damascus mosque, the decoration at the mosque o f I b n Tulun is restrained. A l o n g w o o d e n i n s c r i p t i o n r u n s a r o u n d the b u i l d i n g under the ceiling, and the undersides and borders o f the heavy brick arches are embellished w i t h stucco carved w i t h simple elements to create patterns that c o m b i n e geometric and floral elements. The decorated surface is totally

An original style of Islamic art evolved in the ninth century, when artists abstracted

filled so that there is n o d i s t i n c t i o n between the background and the subject. This

organic forms into a geomet-

decoration, i n w h i c h organic elements are subjected to the rules o f geometry, can

ric style, in which there is no

be extended i n f i n i t e l y h i any d i r e c t i o n . A similar type o f decoration was used i n a small mosque at Balkh i n n o r t h e r n Afghanistan, datable o n stylistic grounds to the n i n t h century. A l t h o u g h badly

distinction between subject and background. This style was first developed in ninthcentury Iraq, as exemplified

r u i n e d , the small square b u i l d i n g has f o u r massive c y l i n d r i c a l piers that once

in the plaster panels discov-

supported the n i n e covering domes. Most o f the upper part was covered w i t h

ered at Samarra.

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T H E O X F O R D HISTORY OF ISLAM 1

stucco, carved i n g e o m e t r i c a l and vegetal patterns w i t h a distinctive slanted cut. The use o f a s i m i l a r style, d o c u m e n t e d

from

Cairo to eastern Iran i n the n i n t h century, suggests that i t must have had a c o m m o n source, u n d o u b t e d l y i n the Abbasid capitals i n Mesopotamia. Its widespread use shows h o w styles c o u l d be disseminated over w i d e areas d u r i n g

this p e r i o d o f

centralized

power. This type o f design, w h i c h is based o n such natural f o r m s as stems, tendrils, and leaves rearranged to f o r m i n f i n i t e geometric patterns, became a hallmark o f Islamic art and architectural ornament f r o m the tenth to the

f i f t e e n t h centuries.

Europeans

To

describe i t ,

c o i n e d the t e r m arabesque, first

used i n the f i f t e e n t h o r sixteenth century, when

Renaissance

artists

incorporated

Islamic designs i n book o r n a m e n t and decA more evolved stage i n the abstraction of vegetal

orative b o o k b i n d i n g s . Over the centuries the

motifs can be seen in the plaster decorating the arches

t e r m has been applied to a w i d e variety o f

ofthe mosque oflbnTulun (879) in Cairo.

w i n d i n g , t w i n i n g vegetal decoration i n art and meandering themes i n music and dance,

but properly i t applies o n l y to Islamic art. The mneteenth-century Viennese art historian Alois Riegl laid o u t the p r i n c i p a l features o f the arabesque: The tendrils o f its vegetation are heavily geometricized and d o n o t branch o f f as i n nature f r o m a single continuous stem; rather, the tendrils g r o w unnaturally f r o m one another. F u r t h e r m o r e , the arabesque has i n f i n i t e correspondence, meaning that the design can be extended i n f i n i t e l y i n any d i r e c t i o n . The structure o f the arabesque gives sufficient i n f o r m a t i o n so that the viewer can extend the design i n his or her i m a g i n a t i o n . Like the Samarra style o f o r n a m e n t , the arabesque was probably disseminated f r o m Iraq, the capital province o f the Islamic w o r l d i n the tenth century, and q u i c k l y spread to all Islamic lands. A n early stage o f this distinctive and o r i g i n a l development may be f o u n d i n carved marble panels

flanking

the mihrab (the

niche i n the w a l l facing Mecca) o f the Great Mosque o f Córdoba, w h i c h was completed i n 96c. A central stem, itself patterned, has tendrils g r o w i n g unnaturally f r o m its base and r i p ; the stem provides the armature for a symmetrical interlacing o f tendrils, leaves, and flowers that seems to press o u t against the c o n -

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fines o f the similarly patterned frame. I n Islamic art the arabesque's p o p u l a r i t y lasted u n t i l the fourteenth century, w h e n i t was slowly displaced by designs using the Chinese-inspired c h r y s a n t h e m u m , peony, and lotus m o t i f s that became p o p ular i n Iran and by the fantastic naturalistic foliage o f the saz style that became popular under the Ottomans. Even these designs retain some o f the arabesque's geometric u n d e r p i n n i n g s , however. The p o p u l a r i t y o f the arabesque was due n o d o u b t to its adaptability, because it was appropriate to virtually all situations, f r o m architecture to the i l l u m i n a t e d pages that were added to decorate the b e g i n n i n g and end o f fine manuscripts, particularly copies o f the Q u r a n . One small manuscript o f the Q u r a n , for exam-

The new style of geometricized vegetal designs was

ple, has five sets o f double pages, three at the b e g i n n i n g o f the manuscript and

widely popular. Here, in the

t w o at the end. Some manuscripts contain tables w i t h w r i t i n g added o n top o f

ruins of a small mosque

the geometric and floral o r n a m e n t ; others are purely geometric and vegetal. The designs are elaborately d r a w n i n b r o w n i n k and enhanced w i t h g o l d , blue, w h i t e , green, and red. The circles o n the vertical axis are self-contained, but those o n

erected at Balkh, Afghanistan, in the ninth century, artists carved these motifs into the wet plaster

the h o r i z o n t a l axis can be extended i n f i n i t e l y ; the design thus achieves an e q u i -

covering the piers and

l i b r i u m between static and d y n a m i c .

arches.

Arabesques, in which vegetal forms grow infinitely in all directions according to the laws of geometry, appeared in many media. In this detail of a carved marble panel, probably added to the Great Mosque of Córdoba in 965, the arabesque ornament betrays its early stage of development because it is still restrained by a frame.

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These pages are the w o r k o f a master h a n d , and according to the c o l o p h o n , this m a n u s c r i p t

was

c o m p l e t e d by the scribe A l i i b n H i l a l i n Baghdad i n 1 0 0 0 - 1 0 0 1 . He can be i d e n t i f i e d as the famous calligrapher c o m m o n l y k n o w n as I b n al-Bawwab, w h o refined the "proportioned

script"—devel-

o p e d a century earlier by the Arab calligrapher

Ibn

Muqla—in

w h i c h letters were measured i n terms o f dots, circles, and semicircles. The script used i n this manuscript

confirms

Ibn

al-

Bawwab's talents; the 280 folios arc transcribed i n a b o l d r o u n d e d h a n d o f the type called naskh. The script is remarkable for its clarity and

regularity,

all

the

more

impressive because there are n o traces o f b l i n d - t o o l e d lines o f the k i n d used by later calligraphers to guide their hands. The manuscript also represents a technical i n n o v a t i o n because i t is one o f the first s u r v i v i n g copies o f the Q u r a n

Arabesques were a major element used in decorating books, particularly manuscripts of the Quran. This page of illumination from the copy of the Quran transcribed by the noted calligrapher Ibn al-Bawwab in Baghdad in 1000-1001 is one of the earliest examples to survive.

transcribed o n paper. The double pages o f i l l u m i n a t i o n w i t h geometric designs, o f t e n k n o w n as carpet pages, became increasingly splendid over the years. Some o f the finest were produced under the M a m l u k s , the sequence o f sultans w h o c o n t r o l l e d Egypt and Syria f r o m 1249 to 15:17. These rulers and their intimates commissioned elaborate copies o f the Q u r a n as furnishings for the large charitable foundations that they ordered i n Cairo and elsewhere to preserve their names and fortunes after their death. A c c o r d i n g to Islamic law, property endowed to institutions f o u n d e d for charitable purposes was safe f r o m seizure by the state. This type o f charitable e n d o w m e n t is k n o w n as waqf ( p i . awqaf) or, i n N o r t h Africa, as hobus. I n unsettled times, w h e n rulers fell like dominoes, such charitable foundations allowed f a m i lies to pass o n their fortunes safely, as the deed o f e n d o w m e n t c o u l d specify that the founder o r his descendants be appointed as trustee.

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To f u r n i s h these charitable foundations, the M a m l u k s o f t e n ordered large m a n u scripts o f the Q u r a n , typically embellished w i t h elaborate frontispieces decorated w i t h designs o f star polygons. The most famous is a manuscript commissioned by an amir o f Sultan Shaban, A r g h u n Shah al-Ashrafi, w h o was p u t to death i n 1376.

Its rectan-

gular frontispiece is d i v i d e d i n t o a square central field bordered by rectangular panels w i t h a stylized k u f i c script. The central square contains is a sixteen-pointed star set w i t h i n a geometric trelhs. This c o m p o s i tion, w h i c h is often likened to a sun, seems to explode f r o m the center but is actually closed and cannot be extended beyond the frame. The various frames are decorated w i t h arabesque and

floral

arrangements,

i n c l u d i n g many Chinese-inspired elements such as peonies and lotus flowers. C o m p l e x g e o m e t r i c effects were also achieved i n other media, i n c l u d i n g w o o d w o r k . W o o d was

o f t e n used

for fine

mosque f u r n i t u r e , such as Q u r a n stands, lecturns, and bookcases, b u t the largest Egyptian woodcarvers transformed the

pieces were minbars or pulpits. The m i n ¬

abstract curved forms of the beveled style

bar was the place i n the congregational

into birds and other animals, as on this

mosque f r o m w h i c h the weekly s e r m o n

ninth- or tenth-century panel of Aleppan

was

pine.

given d u r i n g

the Friday

bidding

prayer, so i t became a potent s y m b o l o f political authority. Patrons w h o ordered

n e w minbars wished to make t h e m as splendid as possible, b u t w i t h the deforestation o f the Mediterranean lands due to overharvesting i n medieval times, w o o d was increasingly scarce. To make the most o f this expensive material, n e w techniques o f w o o d w o r k i n g were exploited. One technique c o m m o n f r o m the eleventh century was marquetry, i n w h i c h large panels were f o r m e d o f angular interlacing strapwork radiating f r o m central stars. To make these large and i m p o r tant pieces even fancier, artisans used different colors o f exotic w o o d s , w h i c h were sometimes i n l a i d w i t h other precious materials, such as i v o r y and m o t h e r of-pearl.

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Aleppo (located i n modern-day Syria) became a center for w o o d w o r k i n g i n the m a r q u e t r y technique, and the finest and most famous piece p r o d u c e d there was the exquisite m i n b a r that the Zangid r u l e r N u r a l - D i n ordered i n 1168-69 for the Aqsa M o s q u e i n Jerusalem. The c i t y was then i n the hands o f the Crusaders, and N u r a l - D i n ordered the m i n b a r i n anticipation o f taking the city. It was installed i n its intended place t w o decades later after his nephew, the A y y u b i d sultan Salah a l - D i n (also k n o w n as Saladin), successfully conquered the city, i n 1187. This minbar, w h i c h was the most famous example o f this p r o l i f i c school o f w o o d w o r k i n g a n d signed by n o less t h a n f o u r craftsmen, destroyed by arson i n Nur

was

1969.

al-Din's m i n b a r f o l l o w e d the t y p i c a l t r i a n g u l a r f o r m . A l o n g the

hypotenuse was a n a r r o w flight o f steps leading to a p l a t f o r m at the t o p ; b o t h the steps and the p l a t f o r m were enclosed by railings, and the p l a t f o r m , evident i n many other examples, was s u r m o u n t e d by a cupola. The m a j o r fields o f deco r a t i o n w ere the large triangular sides. O n N u r al-Din's m i n b a r they were decor

rated w i t h e i g h t - p o i n t e d stars, and the extensions o f their sides were traced i n a net o f joinery. The p o l y g o n a l interstices were

filled

w i t h m i n u t e l y detailed

arabesques. The intricacy o f the design was matched by the expense o f the materials, for the m i n b a r showed an extensive use o f i n l a i d ivory, b o t h for the o u t lines o f the p o l y g o n a l figures and f o r some o f the smaller interstitial stars. The marquetry technique made the most o f expensive materials, but the geometric design, i n w h i c h the arabesques varied f r o m p o l y g o n to p o l y g o n , added to the aesthetic effect by i n v i t i n g c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f the design f r o m near and far. Geometric designs were also popular methods o f decorating buildings i n the Islamic lands. I n Iran and m u c h o f the eastern Islamic lands there was n o suitable stone for construction, so the typical b u i l d i n g material was b r i c k . M u d b r i c k had the advantage o f being cheap and remarkably serviceable i n areas w i t h little r a i n , and its fragile surface c o u l d be protected by plaster or stucco revetments, w h i c h c o u l d be carved or painted to enliven the inherent drabness of the material. I n the n i n t h century w h e n the Abbasids needed to decorate the e n o r m o u s palaces and other m u d brick structures i n their sprawling new capital o f Samarra, they used m o l d e d panels w i t h geometric designs that c o u l d be q u i c k l y executed i n stucco. Baked b r i c k was m o r e expensive because i t required scarce supplies o f f u e l f o r firing.

It had the advantage that i t was m u c h m o r e durable, however, and w h e r e

affordable, its d u r a b i l i t y was preferred, particularly i n regions w i t h greater precipitation and a m o r e extreme climate, such as the Iranian plateau. A l t h o u g h baked b r i c k c o u l d also be covered w i t h plaster, particularly o n i n t e r i o r s , i t was usually left exposed o n exteriors. W i t h the a d o p t i o n o f fine quality baked b r i c k , builders i n Iran and adjacent areas q u i c k l y t u r n e d the material o f c o n s t r u c t i o n i n t o the material o f decoration. By setting the bricks i n patterns, they c o u l d

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enliven the w a l l surface. These patterns were particularly effective i n a climate i n w h i c h b r i g h t sun often rakes over the b r i c k walls, and p r o j e c t i n g and recedi n g bricks c o u l d create patterns o f l i g h t and shade. One o f the earliest examples o f this decorative use o f b r i c k w o r k is the t o m b o f the Samanids i n Bukhara. Constructed and decorated w i t h baked b r i c k , the t o m b is a small cube w i t h sloped walls s u p p o r t i n g a central d o m e and little cupolas at die corners. Despite the s i m ple forms, the i n t e r i o r and exterior are elaborately

decorated

with

patterns

w o r k e d i n die cream-colored brick. The quality and h a r m o n y o f c o n s t r u c t i o n and decoration show that this b u i l d i n g , 7

although the first o f its type to have survived, could n o t have been the first to have been built. By the early tenth century there must have been a l o n g tradition o f b u i l d i n g ornate brick structures in the greater Iranian w o r l d . This so-called naked style o f b r i c k Builders in the Seljuk period exploited the decorative possibilities of light and shade on brick, particularly for the tall

w o r k became a h a l l m a r k o f medieval a r c h i t e c t u r e i n the r e g i o n . Builders

cylindrical towers known as minarets. Horizontal bands

e x p l o i t e d the decorative possibilities o f

with different brick designs decorate the shaft of the Kalyan

b r i c k p a t t e r n i n g , particularly for the tall

("tall") minaret finished in 1127 in Bukhara, Uzbekistan.

c y l i n d r i c a l towers k n o w n as minarets. These

towers,

often

attached

to

mosques and used as the place f r o m w h i c h the m u e z z i n gives the call to prayer (adhan), are o f t e n considered to be hallmarks o f Islamic architecture. A l t h o u g h a c o m m o n feature o f Islamic religious architecture, the m i n a r e t is neither a necessary o r u b i q u i t o u s one. M i n a r e t s w e r e apparently n o t used u n d e r the Umayyads, a n d o n l y u n d e r theAbbasids was the idea o f a single massive t o w e r located i n o r beyond the m i d d l e o f the w a l l opposite the m i h r a b disseminated t h r o u g h o u t the Islamic lands, perhaps as a sign o f caliphal authority. By the e n d o f the t w e l f t h c e n t u r y the m i n a r e t , i n the f o r m o f a slender freestanding shaft, had become the universal s y m b o l o f Islam f r o m the A t l a n t i c to

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the I n d i a n Oceans. M i n a r e t s were o f t e n added to mosques.

They

earlier

were

less

expensive than b u i l d i n g a new m o s q u e and were g r a t i f y i n g l y visible b o t h f r o m afar, w h e r e they indicated the presence o f a

town—or

from

nearby,

w h e r e they indicated the location

of

the

mosque.

They

served to advertise the presence o f Islam at the same t i m e that

they

demonstrated

the

piety o f the founder. M o r e than sixty towers dati n g f r o m the medieval p e r i o d still stand i n I r a n , Central Asia, and

Afghanistan,

either

attached to mosques o r isolated and

freestanding.

This

large

n u m b e r attests t o the explosion i n p o p u l a r i t y o f this f o r m , and the assurance o f their decorat i o n attests to the skill o f their builders

a n d the

esteem

in

w h i c h these tall towers were held. Their shafts are typically decorated i n b r o a d bands geometric

brick

of

decoration,

often separated by guard bands and

inscriptions.

Builders

exploited the decorative possibilities o f the g e o m e t r i c pat-

Muqarnas, tiers of superimposed niche-like elements, is a unique contribution of Islamic architects to the decoration of their buildings. Muqarnas half-vaults were often above important doorways, as on the entrance to the hospital Nur al-Din, founded in Damascus in 114Ç.

terns, dehberately w i d e n i n g the bands o r setting the bricks i n deeper relief along the height o f the tall shaft. Another f o r m o f architectural decoration diat developed at tins time is k n o w n as muqarnas. Sometimes likened to stalactites, muqarnas consists o f tiers o f niche-like elements that project out f r o m the r o w below. Apparendy developed i n the late tenth century, muqarnas was first applied to supporting elements inside domes, such as squinches or arches over the corners, and to d i v i d i n g elements between different

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parts o f buildings, such as cornices o n tombs or minarets. By the eleventh century muqarnas elements were used to cover the entire inner surface o f vaults. A l t h o u g h the earliest muqarnas may have had a structural role, diey increasingly became a purely decorative element. I n Iran and the eastern Islamic lands decorative muqarnas vaults were made o f plaster and suspended by w o o d e n beams f r o m the brick vault above, h i die Mediterranean region, where stone is the prevalent m e d i u m o f construction, muqarnas vaults, set over the portals o f i m p o r t a n t buildings, were often laboriously carved i n stone. Like w r i t i n g , muqarnas was adopted by builders f r o m Spain to Central Asia and beyond, so that it became the most distinctive decorative feature o f Islamic architecture. Unlike other decorative motifs, muqarnas was never applied to any m e d i u m other than architecture and such architectural fittings as m i n bars. The repeated m o d u l e typical o f b r i c k c o n s t r u c t i o n made geometric o r n a m e n t appropriate decoration; such ornament was equally appropriate to textiles, wdiere the crossing o f w a r p and w e f t threads also generates a geometric g r i d . N o w h e r e is this m o r e apparent than i n k n o t t e d carpets, where a weaver c o u l d easily create geometric designs by t y i n g knots o f different colors o n t o the w a r p threads. T h r o u g h o u t history, weavers w o r k e d to c o m b i n e more-or-less stylized floral and animal m o t i f s w i t h the geometric grids. K n o t t e d carpets have been produced for m i l l e n n i a i n the Near East and Central Asia. The oldest s u r v i v i n g example, perhaps dating to the f i f t h century B.C.E., is the carpet that was discovered i n a frozen t o m b at Pazyryk i n Siberia. Other fragments perhaps dating f r o m the n i n t h o r tenth century have been discovered i n Egypt. The oldest carpets to have survived i n significant quantities, however, were made i n Anatolia i n the early f o u r t e e n t h century, using a fairly l i m i t e d range o f strong colors, such as red, yellow, blue, b r o w n , a n d w h i t e . Some o f the carpets have designs o f repeated

geometric

m o t i f s , others have extremely stylized representations o f animals, but all have borders o f geometrical m o t i f s or stylized letter f o r m s .

The Exuberant Use of Color The epigraphic and geometric designs c o m m o n l y used i n Islamic art were often enhanced by color, and the exuberant use o f color is another h a l l m a r k o f Islamic art. The Arabic language itself has a particularly r i c h chromatic vocabulary, a n d i n i t concepts can easily be associated t h r o u g h similarities i n m o r p h o l o g y . The Arabic r o o t kh-d-r, for example, gives rise to khudra (greenness), akhdar (green), khudara (greens o r herbs), and al-khadra (the verdant, or the heavens). Blue, the color o f the sky i n the western t r a d i t i o n , is o f t e n conflated w i t h green i n the Islamic lands, w h e r e the spectrum is traditionally d i v i d e d i n t o yellow, r e d , a n d green. Tonality was less i m p o r t a n t than l u m i n o s i t y and saturation, probably

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247

Geometric designs were especially easy to execute in the traditional techniques of woven textiles and knotted carpets. One of the earliest carpets to survive, probably from the fourteenth century, shows four stylized quadrupeds.

because o f the sun-drenched e n v i r o n m e n t i n m u c h o f the r e g i o n . I n the early Islamic p e r i o d various p h i l o s o p h i c a l schools elaborated the Aristotelian theory o f color, and this interest i n color was taken u p by mystics, w h o saw parallels between the p h e n o m e n o n o f colors and the inner v i s i o n o f die divine. The symbolic use o f color runs t h r o u g h o u t m u c h Islamic literature. The

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great Persian poet Nezami (ca. 1141 — 1203 o r 1217), for example, structured his classic p o e m , Haft paykar (Seven portraits) around the seven colors (haft rang) t r a d i tional i n Persian t h o u g h t (red, yellow, green, and blue c o m p l e m e n t e d by black, w h i t e , and sandalwood). I n this p o e m the ideal ruler, e x e m p l i f i e d by the Sasanian k i n g Bahrain Gur, visits seven princesses, each housed i n a p a v i l i o n o f a different color; the princesses recount seven stories, w h i c h can be interpreted as the seven stations of h u m a n life, the seven aspects o f h u m a n destiny, or the seven stages along the mystical way. The seven colored pavilions o f the Haft paykar became favorite subjects for b o o k illustration i n fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Iran. One o f the m o s t famous manuscripts o f Nezami's p o e m has an unusually l o n g and w i t t y c o l o p h o n that recounts the manuscript's peregrinations and shows h o w i m p o r t a n t these illustrated manuscripts were to rulers o f the t i m e . The T i m u r i d p r i n c e A b u l - Q a s i m Babur, r u l e r o f Herat ( i n n o r t h w e s t e r n Afghanistan) f r o m 1449 to 14C7, c o m m i s s i o n e d the calligrapher Azhar to transcribe the m a n uscript, b u t i t was u n f i n i s h e d at the prince's death. After Jahan Shah (r. 1438-67), the Q a r a q o y u n l u r u l e r o f Azerbaijan, sacked Herat a year later, the manuscript passed to Tahan Shah's son Pir Budak. It then w e n t to the A q q o y u n l u r u l e r Khalil Sultan (r.

1478), w h o c o m m i s s i o n e d

the calligrapher A b d a l - R a h m a n a l -

K h w a r a z m i ( k n o w n as A n i s i ) to finish c o p y i n g the text and t w o artists, Shaykhi and Darvish M u h a m m a d , to illustrate i t . Still unfinished at Khalil Sultan's death i n 1478, the manuscript passed to his b r o t h e r Y a q u b (r. 1478—90). He also d i e d before the b o o k was finished, and the manuscript ultimately passed to the Safavid shah Ismail I (r. i c o i - 2 4 ) , f o u n d e r o f the Safavid dynasty, under w h o s e p a t r o n age the last o f the nineteen illustrations were completed. The p a i n t i n g Bahrain Gur in the Green Pavilion exemplifies the lush style o f m a n u script i l l u s t r a t i o n practiced at the A q q o y u n l u court. It was probably added by the artist Shaykhi w h e n the m a n u s c r i p t was i n the possession o f the sultan Yaqub. It shows the Sasanian m o n a r c h r e c l i n i n g w i t h his w r i t i n g table and books beside (Right) Color was used symbolically and extravagantly in much of Islamic art and culture.The Persian poet Nezami structured his classic poem, Haft paykar, around the

h i m , listening to one o f his ladies read a p o e m w h i l e another massages his feet. The r e c l i n i n g figure may actually represent the y o u n g A q q o y u n l u p r i n c e , w h o w o u l d have been less than t w e n t y years o l d at the t i m e . The n o m i n a l subject, the p r i n c e i n the p a v i l i o n , however, is engulfed i n a r i o t o f fantastic vegetation. Nature bursts f r o m the constraint o f the frame, as l o l l i p o p trees w i t h i m b r i c a t e d

seven colors traditional in

leaves sprout a m o n g rocks concealing h u m a n and a n i m a l faces. The colors are

Persian thought. In a fine

particularly v i v i d , w i t h acid greens set against rosy reds and b r i l l i a n t blues.

manuscript of the poem prepared for several fifteenth-century princes, the

This flamboyant color typical o f the A q q o y u n l u court style can be contrasted w i t h the carefully m o d u l a t e d style that is associated w i t h c o n t e m p o r a r y Herat

painter Shaykhi used bril-

and e x e m p l i f i e d i n the w o r k o f Bihzad (ca. 14CO-15-35) the most famous Persian

liant color to depict Bahrain

painter, and the one w h o s e n a m e is attached ( r i g h t l y or w r o n g l y ) t o m o r e p a i n t -

Gur in the Green Pavilion.

ings than any other artist. Bihzad's masterpiece is generally a c k n o w l e d g e d to be

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The Seduction of Yusuf The p a i n t i n g illustrates a manuscript o f the Persian poet Sadi

(ca.

1213—92)

entitled

Bustun

( O r c h a r d ) , transcribed i n 1488 for the l i b r a r y o f the T i m u r i d r u l e r Sultan Husayn M i r z a by the most r e n o w n e d calligrapher Mashhadi.

o f the Sadi's

age,

text,

Sultan A l i written

on

u n c o l o r e d paper i n c l o u d bands at the t o p , m i d d l e , and b o t t o m o f the illustration, mentions

the s e d u c t i o n

of

Yusuf, the biblical Joseph, by Potiphar's w i f e , k n o w n i n Islamic t r a d i t i o n as Zulaykha, b u t n o t h i n g i n the requires Bihzad's elaborate

text

architec-

tural setting. Instead, this setting is described i n the mystical p o e m , Yusuf and Zulaykha, w r i t t e n by the T i m u r i d Medieval potters revolutionized the industry by developing a

poet Jami (1414—92) five years before

technique to paint on the surface of a ceramic with designs

the Sadi manuscript was transcribed.

that did not run into the glaze. A black heron struts across the turquoise-glazed surface of this twelfth-century Syrian bowl.

Four

lines

from

Jami's

poem

are

inscribed i n w h i t e o n blue a r o u n d the arch i n the center o f the p a i n t i n g .

A c c o r d i n g to Jami, Zulaykha b u i l t a palace w i t h seven splendid r o o m s that were decorated w i t h erotic paintings o f herself w i t h Yusuf. She led the u n w a r y Yusuf f r o m one r o o m to the next, l o c k i n g the doors b e h i n d her u n t i l they reached the i n n e r m o s t chamber. There, she threw herself at Yusuf, but he fled f r o m her grasp t h r o u g h the seven locked doors, w h i c h miraculously opened before h i m . Just as Jami's text is an allegory o f the soul's search for d i v i n e love and beauty, Bihzad's image invites mystical c o n t e m p l a t i o n . The splendid palace stands for the material w o r l d , the seven r o o m s represent the seven climes, and Yusuf's beauty is a metaphor for God's. As there was n o witness, Yusuf c o u l d have yielded to Zulaykha's passion, but he realized that G o d was all-seeing and a l l - k n o w i n g . The seven locked doors, w h i c h f o r m the m a t r i x o f the c o m p o s i t i o n , can be opened o n l y by G o d . This brilliant image transcends the literal requirements o f the text and evokes the mystical themes that were p r o m i n e n t i n contemporary literature and society. Bihzad was obviously p r o u d o f his creation, because he signed it o n the architectural panel over the w i n d o w i n the r o o m o n the upper left and dated it 893 (corresponding to 1488) i n the final b l u e - a n d - w h i t e cartouche o n the arch f o l l o w i n g the verses f r o m Jami's p o e m .

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Metalworkers exploited the chromatic possibilities of metals by inlaying copper, silver, gold, and a black bituminous substance into brass and bronze.The master metalworker Muhammad ibn al-Zayn inlaid this large basin with an extraordinary range of figural scenes, many depicting life in the Mamluk lands around

I J O O .

Bihzad's masterpiece shows a sophisticated b u t subdued use o f color, i n w h i c h blues and greens p r e d o m i n a t e b u t are tempered by c o m p l e m e n t a r y w a r m colors, especially a b r i g h t orange. The carefully m o d u l a t e d use o f color leads the eye t h r o u g h the c o m p l e x architectural setting to focus o n Zulaykha, s t r i k i n g i n her flamboyant orange robe, a stark contrast toYusuf, w h o is dressed i n c o o l green. The colors are j e w e l - l i k e ; the fine q u a l i t y p i g m e n t s were made f r o m such expensive minerals as lapis lazuli and g o l d , w h i c h were carefully g r o u n d , m i x e d w i t h binder, and applied w i t h fine brushes. The colors appear all the m o r e b r i l l i a n t i n the d r e a m - l i k e w o r l d o f Persian book p a i n t i n g , as they were u n m o d u l a t e d by cast shadows o r atmospheric perspective, t w o p i c t o r i a l techniques that were o n l y i n t r o d u c e d i n t o Persian p a i n t i n g f r o m European art i n the seventeenth century. The use o f brilliant color was not l i m i t e d to fancy books made i n the Persian w o r l d i n the later centuries. The spirited use o f color is f o u n d i n most Islamic art f r o m an early date. Potters i n the Islamic w o r l d h i d drab earthenwares under cloaks of b r i g h t l y colored slips and glazes. The most significant i n v e n t i o n for the future history o f ceramics i n the Islamic lands, as w e l l as i n China and Europe, was underglaze decoration, i n w h i c h a fine and w h i t e ceramic body p r o v i d e d an ideal surface for p a i n t i n g i n colored metallic oxides. This painted surface was

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then covered by a transparent alkaline glaze, w h i c h protected the painted surface but, unlike lead glazes, d i d n o t cause the p i g m e n t s to r u n together d u r i n g

firing.

Similarly, one o f the most i m p o r t a n t contributions of medieval Islamic metalworkers was the development o f the inlay technique, i n w h i c h the m o n o c h r o m e object, usually made f r o m brass o r bronze, was enlivened w i t h inlays i n g o l d , silver, and copper, as o n the Bobrinski Bucket. Other objects, such as magnificent basins to be used for handwashing before and after eating, were inlaid w i t h inscriptions and figural scenes w o r k e d i n silver and a black b i t u m i n o u s substance. Color is also one o f the most distinctive features o f Islamic architecture, f o r g l i t t e r i n g azure domes and dazzling expanses o f m u l t i c o l o r e d tile decorate many o f the best k n o w n b u i l d i n g s . The first great m o n u m e n t o f Islamic architecture, the D o m e o f the Rock, o r i g i n a l l y had p o l y c h r o m e and g o l d glass mosaic coveri n g b o t h inside and outside. The coloristic effects o f the i n t e r i o r mosaics were enhanced by a brilliantly painted and gilded ceiling and a lavish use o f marble. The dadoes ( l o w e r walls) were decorated w i t h panels o f quartered marble, sliced and arranged so that the natural grain w o u l d f o r m symmetrical patterns. In some cases vegetal m o t i f s were inlaid i n black mastic to contrast against the w h i t e marble. The same color c o m b i n a t i o n was extended to the arches, w h i c h were c o n structed o f alternating black a n d w h i t e voussoirs (the wedge-shaped pieces f o r m i n g the arch). This b r i g h t l y colored style typical o f Umayyad architecture set a precedent that was o f t e n repeated by later patrons. But just as the fragile mosaics o n the exter i o r o f the D o m e o f the Rock suffered f r o m w e a t h e r i n g , the coloristic effects o n many other b u i l d i n g s , m u c h like those o n Greek temples and Romanesque churches, have o f t e n faded under a haze o f dust and smog to u n i f o r m earth tones, g i v i n g an erroneous impression that o n l y later b u i l d i n g s were b r i g h t l y c o l ored. I n other cases, as under the puritanical A l m o h a d dynasty, w h i c h r u l e d i n Spain and M o r o c c o i n the t w e l f t h and t h i r t e e n t h centuries, rather plain exteriors and w h i t e w a s h e d interiors were preferred f o r mosques. But many b u i l d i n g s were b r i g h t l y colored. In the tenth century, for example, whe n one o f the Umayyad cahphs o f Spain decided to enlarge the congregational mosque at his capital o f Córdoba, his builders attempted to imitate many o f the coloristic effects o f U m a y y a d architecture i n Syria, a l t h o u g h they k n e w these only at great remove. The o r i g i n a l Córdoba mosque, completed i n 7 8 6 - 8 7 , had

(Left) The coloristic effects

used an inventive system o f double-tiered c o l u m n s and arches to s u p p o r t the

of the mosaics decorating

w o o d e n roof, probably because o n l y short, stubby c o l u m n s were available f r o m abandoned Visigothic b u i l d i n g s i n the r e g i o n . By stacking t w o short c o l u m n s o n t o p o f each other, the mosque's designers could achieve the necessary height,

the interior of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem were enhanced by a brilliantly painted and gilded ceiling

although they needed to add intermediate arches to stiffen the i n h e r e n t l y unsta-

and lavish use of marble

ble c o n s t r u c t i o n . They u n i f i e d this motley collection o f columns and capitals

paneling.

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w i t h a striking design for the voussoirs o f the arches, w h i c h were alternately o f w h i t e stone and courses o f red brick. The striped effect o f the t w o - t i e r e d arches was m a i n t a i n e d by later builders, w h o enlarged the mosque i n the n i n t h and tenth centuries. These renovations culminated w h e n the U m a y y a d caliph al-Hakam I I (r. 961—76) expanded the prayer hall and added a d o m e over the center entrance to the a d d i t i o n and domes i n front a n d o n either side o f the n e w mihrab. The screened area, w h i c h was c o n nected to the palace by a passageway i n the w a l l o f the mosque facing Mecca, was a maqsura, an enclosure for the ruler, meant n o t to protect the caliph f r o m h a r m (as the early maqsuras were said to f u n c t i o n ) b u t to emphasize the great p o m p and ceremony w i t h w h i c h the Umayyad caliph s u r r o u n d e d himself. These areas were distinguished by elaborate screens o f intersecting arches and r i c h l y colored revetments i n glass mosaic; the glass mosaics were clearly meant to evoke the great mosaics that decorated the U m a y y a d b u i l d i n g s o f Syria. A c c o r d i n g to local Arabic histories, there were n o laborers i n Spain capable o f executing these mosaics, so the caliph sent an ambassador t o the Byzantine e m p e r o r i n Constantinople, requesting h i m to send a w o r k m a n to decorate the mosque. The

The area immediately in front of the mihrab added to the Great Mosque of Cordoba in 965 was elaborately decorated with intersecting arches supporting mosaic-covered vaults, clearly meant to recall the mosaic-covered buildings of Umayyad Syria.

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emperor c o m p l i e d , and the ambassador r e t u r n e d w i t h a master craftsman and sufficient mosaic cubes t o complete the job. A l t h o u g h the d i f f i c u l t technique of glass mosaic was i n f r e q u e n t l y repeated i n later centuries and usually w i t h some reference to the Umayyads o f Syria, m u l ticolor revetment i n glazed ceramic tile became a h a l l m a r k o f later Islamic a r c h i tecture f r o m Spain and N o r t h Africa to the borders o f India. By the late eleventh century builders i n the eastern Islamic lands had reached the u l t i m a t e exploitat i o n o f carved- and patterned-brick decoration and were ready to experiment w i t h glazed revetment. They began by i n c o r p o r a t i n g small pieces o f cut tile, m a i n l y colored a l i g h t (turquoise) blue, w h i c h was easy to make f r o m the readi l y available copper deposits i n Iran. Soon they expanded the surfaces covered, and by the fourteenth century the palette was extended to include dark blue (colo r e d w i t h cobalt), black (manganese), and w h i t e as w e l l as green and ocher. I n c l u d i n g the b u f f natural color o f the b r i c k surface, this b r o u g h t the total n u m ber o f colors to seven, the n u m b e r o f colors i n the traditional Persian palette. W i t h the expanded range o f color came the elaboration o f design, and geometric patterns gave w ay to naturalistic and floral designs, made by c u t t i n g small r

pieces f r o m m o n o c h r o m e tiles and fitting the irregular pieces together. The technique reached its apogee i n the late f o u r t e e n t h a n d fifteenth centuries, alongside the development o f Persian book painting. Some o f the finest tile panels were prepared for the gargantuan palace that the Turkic conqueror T i m u r erected i n his h o m e t o w n o f Shahr-i Sabz, b u t o n l y fragments r e m a i n to attest to its o r i g i n a l spendor. M o r e can be seen at the Blue Mosque, b u i l t by the Q a r a q o y u n l u i n their capital at Tabriz ( i n n o r t h w e s t e r n Iran) a r o u n d 146c. The mosque takes its name f r o m its superb tile revetment, w h i c h was never surpassed i n later m o n u m e n t s . A l t h o u g h i n r u i n s , the Blue Mosque displays an unusual variety o f tile decoration o f magnificent quality. Seven-color tile mosaic covers the exterior and m u c h o f the i n t e r i o r walls above a marble dado. Particularly striking are the f l u i d arabesque m o t i f s and the inscriptions, o f t e n set o u t i n w h i t e or g o l d against a deep blue or green b a c k g r o u n d . The b u i l d i n g is a virtual catalog o f tile techniques. Hexagonal dark blue glazed tiles covered the upper surfaces a n d vaults o f the m a i n chamber, and p u r p l e tiles overpainted i n g o l d were set i n the sanctuary. Luster tiles were set at the base o f the cable m o l d i n g o n the entrance p o r tal, one o f the very rare instances o f this technique i n the fifteenth century. H i g h l y embossed m o l d e d fragments o f underglaze-painted tile r e m a i n o n the corner buttresses. Tile mosaic is a laborious and expensive technique because i t is t i m e - c o n s u m i n g to cut a n d fit the tiny pieces together. I n the fifteenth c e n t u r y i t was gradually replaced by a cheaper technique i n w h i c h large tiles o f u n i f o r m shape

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were painted w i t h patterns w o r k e d i n d i f f e r e n t colors o f glaze. To prevent the glazes f r o m r u n n i n g together d u r i n g

firing,

they w e r e separated by a greasy

substance m i x e d w i t h manganese, w h i c h left a matte black line between the c o l ors after firing. The technique, k n o w n i n Spanish as cuerda seca, is m u c h faster t h a n tile mosaic, b u t the colors are not as b r i l l i a n t because they are all fired at one temperature. Tile mosaic was also popular at the other end o f the Islamic lands i n the Maghreb or Islamic west, w h e r e i t is k n o w n locally as zallij. The technique m a y have developed even earlier there, b u t i t f l o w e r e d d u r i n g the f o u r t e e n t h century u n d e r the M a r i n i d s i n M o r o c c o . I n the eastern Islamic lands the p r e d o m i n a n t c o l o r was blue, whereas i n the west the m a i n colors were green and tan, usually Builders enveloped their

on a w h i t e b a c k g r o u n d . Lower walls were covered by tiled dadoes, w h i c h w e r e

structures with glittering

n o r m a l l y s u r m o u n t e d by epigraphic friezes w i t h the black letters f o r m e d b y

webs of glazed ceramic tile.

scraping t h r o u g h the glaze to the clay body. U p p e r walls were covered w i t h elab-

Perhaps the finest example is the ruined Blue Mosque in Tabriz (ca. 146c), decorated

orately carved stucco decoration and capped by w o o d e n friezes, consoles, and cornices. Floors, unlike those i n the east, often had glazed h i g h l i g h t s or w e r e

with exquisite tile mosaic in

completely covered i n tiles. Even the piers and c o l u m n s i n courtyards were revet-

seven colors.

ted i n tile. The overall effect o f such i n t e r i o r s is glistening, and the tripartite c o m -

Builders in the western Islamic lands decorated interiors with tilework combined with carved plaster and wood, as in the courtyard of the Attarin Madrasa

(1325)

in Fez, Morocco.

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b i n a t i o n o f tiled dado, stucco w a l l , and w o o d e n superstructure remained standard i n the r e g i o n for centuries. Perhaps the most refined coloristic effects were achieved i n the b u i l d i n g s erected under the Mughals i n the I n d i a n subcontinent. Polished w h i t e marble that reflected l i g h t was played o f f against matte r e d sandstone that absorbed i t . The effect was heightened by the use of pietra dura, m u l t i c o l o r e d inlay i n such hard and rare stones as lapis, o n y x , jasper, topaz, carnelian, and agate, w h i c h e m p h a sized the jewel-like qualities o f the b u i l d i n g . The small t o m b o f I t i m a d al-Dawla, the minister o f finance to the emperor o f I n d i a , Jahangir (r. 1605-27), is like a jewelbox. Constructed by N u r Jahan, w h o was I t i m a d al-Dawia's daughter (and The Taj Mahal, the enormous tomb built by the Mughal emperor Shah Jahan for his

Jahangir's w i f e ) after her father's death i n 1622, the small t o m b is decorated w i t h traditional geometric designs and arabesques, c o m b i n e d w i t h representational m o t i f s o f w i n e cups, vases w i t h flowers, and cypress trees, visual allusions to the

wife, shows a sophisticated

Quran's descriptions o f Paradise. The intricate inlay i n yellow, b r o w n , gray, and

sense of color. The polished

black contrasting w i t h the s m o o t h w h i t e marble prefigures the later phase o f

white marble used for the

M u g h a l decoration i n w h i c h w h i t e marble was garnished w i t h g o l d and precious

tomb reflects light and contrasts with the red sandstone used for the outlying build-

stones. Elsewhere, particularly i n m o r e p u b l i c settings, the repertory o f designs and colors was somewhat narrower. For example, at the Taj M a h a l , the t o m b c o n -

ings and with the black inlaid

structed by Jahangir's son, Shah Jahan, this decoration is restrained and used o n l y

decoration of arabesques and

for slender arabesques and extensive inscriptions done i n black that constrast

inscriptions.

w i t h the polished w h i t e marble.

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Perhaps the most s u m p t u o u s o f the M u g h a l private quarters were at the Red Fort

in

Delhi.

They

were

part

of

Shahjahanabad, the quarter o f the city laid out under the emperor Shah Jahan's auspices f r o m 1639 to 1648. These palaces, n o w called the Rang

Mahal

(Painted

Palace) and the D i v a n - i Khass (Private Audience H a l l ) , are set b e h i n d the m a i n audience hall and overlook the river. They are decorated w i t h lavishly carved marble, paintings, and pietra d u r a inlay i n gold and precious stones. The extravagant use o f color i n Islamic art and architecture has been explained i n several ways. It is o f t e n t h o u g h t to be a reaction to the d u l l and m o n o c h r o matic landscape i n m u c h o f the t r a d i -

Mughal architects achieved some of the most refined col-

tional

oristic effects by inlaying white marble with semiprecious

heartland

of

Islam,

but

this

explanation is simplistic. Colors also had a w i d e range o f s y m b o l i c associations i n

colored stones, as on a panel from the Red Fort in Delhi, built by Shah fahan (r. 1 6 2 8 - 5 7 ) .

the Islamic lands, b u t these were often contradictory and m e a n i n g f u l o n l y i n specific geographical or c h r o n o l o g i c a l contexts. Thus, black was o f t e n associated w i t h the mysterious Black Stone embedded i n the Kaaba at Mecca t o w a r d w h i c h all M u s l i m s pray, b u t black was also associated w i t h vengeance and revolt, as i n the black flag that became the standard o f the Abbasid dynasty. I n the Maghreb black c o u l d be the accursed color o f hell, and i n order to avoid p r o n o u n c i n g the name, the opposite color ( w h i t e ) was substituted. Thus, t o this day coal is sometimes k n o w n i n N o r t h Africa as al-abyad ("the w h i t e [ t h i n g ] " ) . W h i t e generally conveyed a sense o f brightness, loyalty, royalty, and death, m u c h the same values as i n m a n y other cultures. Two seamless w h i t e lengths o f cloth made u p the garment w o r n by all male p i l g r i m s to Mecca, and these were often saved f o r use as a burial shroud. W h i t e was also the color associated w i t h the Fatimid caliphs, the opponents o f the Abbasids. Blue had prophylactic connotations, and many people w o r e blue, particularly beads, to w a r d o f f the evil eye. The magical power o f blue made i t the dispenser o f evil f o r t u n e and at the same t i m e a defense against i t . Green, the color o f plants, was t h o u g h t to b r i n g e q u i l i b r i u m , g o o d luck, fertility, and y o u t h . Green was the color o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d ' s flag and the cloak o f his son-in-law and successor A l i . I n later times

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green turbans were w o r n by descendants o f the Prophet, and the heavenly throne is said to have been carved f r o m a green jewel. Tiled domes and roofs were most often green o r blue, but the auspicious o r heavenly associations may have been o u t w e i g h e d by practical considerations, because copper oxide, a u b i q u i t o u s c o l o r i n g agent, produces a green color i n a lead glaze and a turquoise or blue color i n an alkaline one.

The Notion of Willful Ambiguity The changing and variable interpretations given to any particular color at any particular t i m e o r place e x e m p l i f y a final characteristic o f m u c h Islamic art: its w i l l f u l ambiguity. Because there is n o clergy i n Islam to prescribe or m a i n t a i n any given m e a n i n g for any particular s y m b o l or theme, there was m u c h m o r e latitude for the viewer to interpret i t at w i l l . One example is f o u n d o n a lusterware dish discovered i n the course o f the 1911-13 German excavations at the Abbasid capital o f Samarra. The design is caught somewhere between abstraction and representation. At first glance the design seems to be abstract, b u t o n closer observation i t can be interpreted as a plant or a b i r d . A circle i n the m i d d l e o f the dish is transformed i n t o the body o f a b i r d by adding palmettes at the sides to f o r m w i n g s and at the top to f o r m the bird's head h o l d i n g another sprig i n its m o u t h . Similar a m b i g u i t y marks m u c h o f the stucco decoration o f the c o n t e m p o rary Abbasid palaces at Samarra. Scholars have d i s t i n g u i s h e d three styles o f stucco c a r v i n g there. The first style is a carved t e c h n i q u e derived f r o m the geom e t r i c i z e d vegetal decoration used i n the U m a y y a d p e r i o d . The second style is characterized by the use o f crosshatching for details. Subjects are somewhat s i m p l i f i e d b u t are still d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m the b a c k g r o u n d . The t h i r d style, k n o w n also as the beveled style, is a m o l d e d t e c h n i q u e suitable for c o v e r i n g large w a l l surfaces. It uses a d i s t i n c t i v e slanted cut w h i c h allows the plaster to be released easily f r o m the m o l d . D e c o r a t i o n i n the beveled style is d i s t i n guished by r h y t h m i c a n d s y m m e t r i c a l r e p e t i t i o n s o f curved lines e n d i n g i n spirals that f o r m abstract patterns i n w h i c h the t r a d i t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n between subject and b a c k g r o u n d has been dissolved. The beveled style was u n d o u b t edly developed for stucco, but was soon a p p l i e d to w o o d a n d other carved media such as rock crystal, n o t o n l y i n the m a j o r cities o f Iraq b u t also i n p r o v i n c i a l centers. The transfer o f techniques and designs f r o m one m e d i u m t o another is another hallmark o f Islamic art. By contrast, i n pre-Islamic times specific designs had been used for different materials—one design was appropriate for textiles, another for metalwares, stLll others for architectural decoration or for glassware. This division

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does n o t h o l d i n Islamic art, w h e r e a textile design

m i g h t reappear

on

metalware

or

ceramics and an architectural m o t i f o n glassw a r e , despite the e n o r m o u s differences i n scale.

For

example,

the

same

design

of

roundels w i t h pearl borders enclosing m y t h i cal lion-headed birds, called simurahs, is k n o w n o n textiles, metalwares, and w a l l p a i n t i n g s made i n early Islamic times over a w i d e region f r o m Central Asia to the Mediterranean. The beveled style clearly d e r i v e d f r o m plant m o t i f s , b u t c o n t e m p o r a r y viewers, like m o d e r n ones, m u s t have seen that these repeated m o t i f s c o u l d also be interpreted as h u m a n faces o r other animate m o t i f s . A w o o d e n panel f r o m Egypt, for example, is carved i n a pure abstract beveled style, b u t the vegetal m o t i f s have been arranged i n such a

Ambiguity characterizes many of the designs decorating works of Islamic art. The figure on this ninthcentury luster-painted dish might be interpreted as as an abstract design, a plant, or a bird.

way that they can also be seen as representing a b i r d . A l t h o u g h i t clearly is n o t a b i r d , i t is m o r e than some abstract leaves. This

The interior walls of many

w i l l e d sense o f a m b i g u i t y is an essential part o f the object's artistic content.

residences at the Abbasid

W r i t i n g , t o o , c o u l d deliberately be made a m b i g u o u s , as o n the B o b r i n s k i Bucket. The b o d y o f the bucket is decorated w i t h five h o r i z o n t a l bands. The t o p , m i d d l e , a n d b o t t o m bands c o n t a i n Arabic i n s c r i p t i o n s b e s t o w i n g g o o d

capital at Samarra were decorated with molded decoration, characterized by a distinctive slanted cut that

wishes o n an ( a n o n y m o u s ) owner. The t w o bands i n between c o n t a i n f i g u r a l

allowed the panels to be

scenes. The second b a n d f r o m the t o p shows scenes o f e n t e r t a i n m e n t , i n c l u d -

released easily from the mold.

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i n g d r i n k i n g , music m a k i n g , a n d game playing such as b a c k g a m m o n , w h i c h was k n o w n i n the medieval Islamic lands as nard. The second band f r o m the b o t t o m contains scenes o f horsemen h u n t i n g a n d f i g h t i n g . U n l i k e the

dedicatory

i n s c r i p t i o n w r i t t e n clearly a r o u n d the r i m and handle i n Persian, the Arabic i n s c r i p t i o n s on the b o d y o f the bucket are e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t t o read. I n the t o p a n d b o t t o m bands, the upper parts o f the letters are f o r m e d f r o m h u m a n f i g ures and some o f the l o w e r parts are f o r m e d f r o m animals. I n the m i d d l e b a n d the stems o f the letters are elaborately k n o t t e d . The text i n The design of a simurgh on an octagonal silver dish attributed to ninth- or tenth-century Iran probably derives from a textile pattern.

the a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c a n d k n o t t e d scripts is so b a n a l — " g l o r y ' a n d p r o s p e r i t y a n d p o w e r and t r a n q u i l i t y a n d happiness . . .

to its o w n e r " —

that any viewer c o u l d i m m e d i a t e l y guess its c o n tent. These i n s c r i p t i o n s were probably n o t meant t o be deciphered a n d read literally b u t rather taken metaphorically as representing the same g o o d life depicted i n the accompanying f i g u r a l scenes. Even architecture c o u l d be made ambiguous. Designers and builders juxtaposed and played w i t h the concepts o f i n t e r i o r and exterior. This is seen readily i n the A l h a m b r a , the medieval palace complex b u i l t o n the hills overlooking the city o f Granada i n southern Spain. One o f its most distinctive and attractive features is the c o m m i n g l i n g o f the outside and the inside. A courtyard is open to the sky b u t is inside a b u i l d i n g ; a p o r c h is covered o n three sides b u t opens to the courtyard. This a m b i g u i t y was enhanced by the use o f water to connect the exterior w i t h the interior. Water, carried by aqueducts f r o m the s u r r o u n d i n g hills, was p i p e d i n t o b u i l d i n g s , where it f l o w e d f r o m fountains t h r o u g h an elaborate system o f channels i n the floor. The u b i q u i t o u s sound o f flowing water f u r ther b l u r r e d the d i s t i n c t i o n between inside and outside. Vistas also b r o u g h t outside and inside together. Many r o o m s had w i n d o w s or loggias (roofed open galleries) designed to c o m m a n d an extensive o u t l o o k and f r o m w h i c h one could gaze o n gardens or the city below. Similar a m b i g u i t y can be seen i n muqarnas, the distinctive stalactite-like m o t i f used i n Islamic buildings f r o m Spain to Central Asia. The playful a m b i g u i t y inherent i n the f o r m often makes it difficult to determine its load-bearing capability i n i n d i v i d u a l cases. Just as its visual and structural roles were often ambiguous, so were its symbolic implications, and it may well have had different implications at different times. Some scholars have suggested, for example, that the fragmenta-

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t i o n and ephemerality i n h e r ent i n muqarnas were suitable metaphors for the atomistic t h e o l o g y o f Abbasid a p o l o gists. I n Iran and n e i g h b o r i n g areas muqarnas vaults were often used over the tombs o f saints and mystics, probably to enhance the sanctity of the specific site. At the shrine o f A h m a d Yasavi, for example, stunning

muqarnas

vaults

cover the t o m b r o o m and the mosque. The muqarnas m o t i f was also exploited as a metaphor for the d o m e o f heaven. This is clear at the Alhambra palace, w h e r e w r i t i n g drives h o m e the message suggested by the form.

Two

muqarnas

magnificent

vaults

are

sus-

pended over the r o o m s i n the center o f the l o n g sides o f the C o u r t o f the Lions. To the n o r t h is the so-called H a l l o f the T w o Sisters, a r o m a n t i c

This detail of a silk caftan worn by a prince in the Caucasus mountains in the eighth century shows the same design of a simurgh as seen on the octagonal silver plate.

name applied i n m e m o r y o f t w o captive sisters w h o are said to have perished f r o m love at the sight o f the amorous happenings they c o u l d witness i n the gardens below b u t i n w h i c h they could n o t participate. The m u q a r nas vault is set over an octagonal d r u m w i t h eight paired w i n d o w s , itself supported by muqarnas squinches over the square r o o m . O n the opposite side o f the court is the so-called H a l l o f the Abencerrajes, whose apocryphal name derives f r o m the famous family brutally m u r d e r e d at the end o f M u s l i m rule i n Spain. I n this case die muqarnas vault is set over an e i g h t - p o i n t e d star. The walls o f b o t h rooms are inscribed w i t h verses taken f r o m a longer p o e m by the fourteenth-cent u r y court poet I b n Zamrak. The verses describe the m o v e m e n t o f the celesdal bodies through their orbits i n the heavens and reinforce the metaphor o f the rotati n g d o m e o f heaven. As sunlight passed f r o m w i n d o w to w i n d o w i n the d r u m o f

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Writing could be ambiguous. The Bobrinski Bucket, for example, is decorated with an inscription band in which the letters end in human heads.They contrast with the figural scene of a game of backgammon below.

the muqarnas vaults i n these t w o r o o m s , the movement o f shadows w o u l d create the effect o f a rotating starry sky. Paradoxically, the a m b i g u i t y inherent i n many f o r m s a n d m o t i f s used i n Islamic b u i l d i n g s may have c o n t r i b u t e d to their survival, as they were reinterpreted to suit the needs and aspirations o f later users. This hypothesis of variable m e a n i n g and changing interpretation may i n part explain w h y the D o m e o f the

ART

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Muqarnas vaults were often used to sanctify the space underneath, as at the late fourteenth-century shrine of Ahmad Yasavi at Turkestan City

Rock i n Jerusalem, especially its i n t e r i o r mosaics, has survived so w e l l . Scholars are still at somewhat o f a loss to explain w h y the caliph A b d a l - M a l i k ordered its c o n s t r u c t i o n , a l t h o u g h several different and even c o n t r a d i c t o r y explanations were p u t f o r w a r d for its presence. One early explanation, k n o w n since the e i g h t h century, was that A b d a l - M a l i k had the D o m e o f the Rock erected as a substitute focus o f p i l g r i m a g e to replace the Kaaba i n Mecca, w h i c h at that t i m e was i n the hands o f his rival Abdallah i b n al-Zubayr. This heretical idea is discounted by many today, b u t it certainly carried currency for a l o n g t i m e . A second interpretation, still held by many today, connects the D o m e o f the Rock to Muhammad's miraculous n i g h t j o u r n e y (isra) f r o m Mecca to Jerusalem and his ascension fmiraj) i n t o heaven. This event is m e n t i o n e d i n the Q u r a n (17:1). A c c o r d i n g to the text, M u h a m m a d traveled f r o m the sacred m o s q u e (masjid al-haram) to the farthest mosque (masjid al-aqsa). The sacred mosque is c o m m o n l y taken to refer to the mosque i n Mecca, a n d by the m i d - e i g h t h century the farthest mosque was taken to refer to some location i n Jerusalem. Gradually, each o f the events i n the j o u r ney was related to a specific site i n the city, b u t only f r o m the t w e l f t h or t h i r teenth century can a direct association between the D o m e o f the Rock and the

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Muqarnas vaults could also be exploited as a metaphor for the dome of heaven. This one soars over the fourteenth-century' Hall of the Two Sisters at the Alhambra. the palace-city of the Nasrid rulers of Granada.

Prophet's j o u r n e y be d o c u m e n t e d . Regardless o f the u l t i m a t e t r u t h o f either explanation, w h a t is i m p o r t a n t is that variable explanations c o u l d be and were accepted by different audiences. The same is true o f the mosaic p r o g r a m i n the interior o f the D o m e o f the Rock. Some scholars have related the iconographical p r o g r a m o f trees and other vegetation to medieval stories about Solomon's temple, particularly his palace, and associated the mosaic decoration w i t h the garden paradise that is promised to believers. Similar eschatalogical explanations have been proposed for the contemporary mosaics i n the Great Mosque o f Damascus, and such an explanation fits Jerusalem, the t h i r d holiest city i n Islam. A second interpretation focuses o n the jewelry depicted i n the mosaics, particularly the crowns and other regalia. These are interpreted as trophies f r o m conquered enemies that were arranged as offerings i n a sanctuary or m e m o r i a l m o n u m e n t . However, none o f these explanations—pilgrimage, n i g h t journey, ascension, paradise, or victory—are m e n t i o n e d i n the contemporary inscriptions, w h i c h speak about Islam and Christianity Patrons, artists, and consumers i n the Islamic lands seem to have delighted i n such ambiguity. Just as the Arabic language encourages plays o n w o r d s , so too

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was Islamic art open to m u l t i p l e and even contradictory interpretations. W r i t i n g c o u l d i m p a r t i n f o r m a t i o n , b u t i t was also decorative. Geometry f o r m e d the architectural m o d u l e o f construction, b u t it was also used as a m a j o r theme o f decoration n o t only for biddings b u t also on objects. Color was attractive and enlivening to the eye, but i t also had symbolic overtones. The m u l t i p l e meanings and w i l l e d ambiguities are part o f the appeal o f Islamic art, w h i c h can be b o t h u n c h a n g i n g and variable to the m o d e r n eye.

CHAPTER

SIX

Philosophy and Theology FROM T H E E I G H T H CENTURY C . E . TO T H E P R E S E N T

Majid Fakhry

Islamic theology (kalam) was to a large extent a by-product o f Islamic philosophy To place Islamic philosophy i n its proper historical context, one must first review the various stages t h r o u g h w h i c h its predecessor, Greek-Hellenistic philosophy, passed, to the eventual capture o f Alexandria by Arabs i n 641 c . E . Founded by Alexander the Great i n 330 period (323-30

B.C.E.)

B.C.E.,

Alexandria had become d u r i n g the Ptolemaic

the heir to Adiens as the cultural center o f the ancient w o r l d .

By the beginning o f the c o m m o n era, Alexandria had become the major h u b o f philosophical, scientific, and medical studies, as well as the center o f the interaction o f Greek thought w i t h Near Eastern religions: Egyptian, Phoenician, Chaldean, Jewish, and Christian. By the t h i r d century c . E . a new brand o f philosophy k n o w n as Neoplatonism attempted to fuse the purely Greek legacy w i t h those o f the ancient nations o f the Near East. What characterized the new amalgam was the p r o f o u n d religious and mystical spirit that animated it and the urge to transcend the intellectual categories that Greek philosophy i n its greatest moments had consecrated as the chief channels for truth seeking. Identified w i t h Aristotle, k n o w n i n Arabic sources

(Left) Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. m i ) was the greatest

as the Master o f Logic and the First Teacher, tins ancient brand o f philosophy was

theologian of Islam, and his

n o w challenged by a new variety tiiat claimed Plato as its master and fully exploited

treatise \Uya ulum ol-din

the religious-mystical tendencies inherited f r o m Pythagorean ism.

enjoyed wide circulation.

The Egyptian-Greek philosopher Plotinus (205—70) is the accredited founder o f N e o p l a t o n i s m , but he made n o claims to originality. Plotinus contends i n his

269

The Mamluk sultan Qaitbay donated this fine copy to his

madiasa at Sahra in 149c.

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w o r k the Enneads, that his sole a i m was to c o m m e n t o n or interpret the w o r k s o f the " D i v i n e Plato." Plotinus' chsciple and editor, P o r p h y r y o f Tyre (ca. 2.34-305-), a Syrian, carried o n his teacher's legacy and pushed i t one step f u r t h e r i n the d i r e c t i o n o f m y s t i c i s m . Porphyry argued that the ultimate goal o f plulosophy is self-purification, or cleansing o f the soul f r o m w o r l d l y passions and t u r n i n g t o w a r d the i n t e l l i g i b l e w o r l d . One o f the most i n f l u e n t i a l figures i n the history o f Islamic logic and ethics, Porphyry was a great critic o f Christianity. He f o u n d support for this thesis i n Plato's Theaetetus, w h i c h describes p h i l o s o p h y as an attempt to rise above the material w o r l d and to seek "likeness u n t o G o d " (homoiosisTheo). Porphyry's successor was another Syrian, Jamblichus ( d . 330), a s h i n i n g star i n the Neoplatonic f i r m a m e n t . Jamblichus' disciple Syrianus ( d . ca. 430) was the teacher o f Proclus o f Athens (ca. 410—485"), w h o w r o t e Elements of Theology. This w o r k was partially translated i n t o Arabic i n the tenth century as the Pure Good and later i n t o Latin as Liber de causis (Book o f Causes), and it f o r m s a major l i n k i n the The Sasanian academy at Gundishapur, founded in southwest Iran around 555 by Anushirwan, continued in

development o f Islamic and Latin N e o p l a t o n i s m .

The Eclipse of Philosophy during the Byzantine Period

the early centuries of Islam to be a major center for the transmission of Greek science and medicine. Nothing is left at the site, but the nearby ruins of the Sasanian

The school o f Athens, w h i c h had been philosophy's h o m e f o r almost a thousand years, was the last bastion o f Greek paganism. I n 529 the Byzantine emperor Justinian, as defender o f the O r t h o d o x faith, ordered that school to be closed, because its teachings constituted a threat to Christianity. After the school's clos-

dam and bridge over the

i n g , seven o f its teachers, headed by Simplicius and Damascius, crossed the bor-

Juhayl River at Shushtar tes-

der i n t o Persia, l u r e d by reports o f the philhellenic sympathies o f the Persian

tify its importance.

emperor Khosrow I , k n o w n i n Arabic and Persian sources as Anushirvan (the

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I

Just). A r o u n d 555, A n u s h i r v a n f o u n d e d the s c h o o l o f G u n d i s h a p u r , w h i c h became a staging station i n the transmission o f Greek m e d i c i n e and science to the M u s l i m w o r l d . W h e n Baghdad became the capital o f the Abbasid Empire i n 762, Gundishapur p r o v i d e d the caliphs w i t h a l o n g list o f court physicians, such as the members o f the famous Nestorian family o f Bakhtishu. These physicians served the caliphs well and were i n s t r u m e n t a l i n setting up the first hospital and observatory i n Baghdad, m o d e l e d o n those i n Gundishapur d u r i n g the reign o f the caliphs H a r u n al-Rashid (r. 7 8 6 - 8 0 9 ) and his second son, a l - M a m u n (r. 813—33). M e d i c i n e , astronomy, and p h i l o s o p h y flourished i n Gundishapur, p r i m a r i l y because ofYahya al-Barmaki ( d . 80c), Harun's vizier a n d mentor, whose zeal for Hellenic studies was i n s t r u m e n t a l i n p r o m o t i n g the translation o f Greek philosophical w o r k s i n t o Arabic. The p r i m a r y channel t h r o u g h w h i c h Greek p h i l o s o p h y was transmitted to the M u s l i m w o r l d was Alexandria, w h e r e the study o f Greek p h i l o s o p h y and science was

flourishing

w h e n the Arabs conquered i t i n 641. I n Syria and Iraq the study

o f Greek was pursued by Nestorians and Jacobites, Syriac-speaking scholars i n the cities o f A n t i o c h , Edessa, and N u s a y b i n , w h o read or translated theological w r i t i n g s f r o m Alexandria. These w r i t i n g s i n c l u d e d Eusebius' Ecclesiastical History, St. C l e m e n t s Recognitiones, the Discourses o f Titus o f Bostra against the Manicheans, and the w o r k s o f Theodore o f Mopsuestia and D i o d o r e o f Tarsus. The translations o f Greek logical texts often accompanied the translations o f these theological texts, to serve as preparatory instruction. Accordingly, Porphyry's Isagoge and Aristotle's Categories, Hermenéutica, and the first part o f Prior Analytics were translated i n t o Syriac, laying the g r o u n d w o r k for their eventual translation i n t o Arabic. There is no evidence that Syriac scholars were interested i n the other parts o f Aristotle's Organon—including the Posterior Analytics, w h i c h dealt w i t h demonstrative syllogisms, and Sophistica, w h i c h dealt w i t h sophistical arguments or fallacious modes o f discourse—perhaps because i t was feared that these parts constituted a threat to the Christian faith. It was left t o Baghdad's M u s l i m logicians some centuries later, w i t h the philosopher A b u Nasr al-Farabi (ca. 878—950) leading the way, to break this tradition. These logicians eventually c o m m e n t e d o n or paraphrased the range o f Aristotle's logical treatises, as w ell as his Rhetoric and Poetics, w h i c h were r

regarded as an integral part o f the Organon i n the Syriac and Arabic traditions.

The Arabic Translation of Greek Philosophical Texts It is significant that the first accredited Arabic translations o f Greek p h i l o s o p h i cal texts correspond to the same Syriac t r a d i t i o n o f logical scholarship, as attested by the logical translations f r o m Pahlevi by the e i g h t h - c e n t u r y Arab translator A b d u l l a h i b n al-Muqaffa or his son M u h a m m a d . These translations were c o n -

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fined to the first three parts o f Aristotle's Organon: Categories, Hermenéutica, and Prior Analytics. They were made d u r i n g the r e i g n o f the Abbasid caliph al-Mansur (r. 7S4--7S).

w r i

° is c o m m e n d e d i n Arabic sources for his frugality and love o f learn-

ing. Also translated i n t o Arabic d u r i n g al-Mansur's r e i g n was Ptolemy's Almagest, Euclid's Elements, and several o f Aristotle's treatises. This was f o l l o w e d , d u r i n g the caliph Harun's r e i g n , by the translation o f a variety o f astronomical and medical w o r k s , i n c l u d i n g Ptolemy's Quadripartius and the I n d i a n treatise Sidhanta, k n o w n i n Arabic as Sindhind, by Brahmagupla. The earliest translations f r o m Greek or Syriac o f philosophical texts (as a distinct f r o m logical and astronomical texts), however, appear to have started t o w a r d the end o f the eighth century. A n u m b e r o f Platonic Dialogues i n the synopses o f the great A l e x a n d r i a n physician-philosopher Galen (129—ca. 199), i n c l u d i n g Republic, Timaeus, and Laws, were translated by Yahya i b n a l - B i t r i q ( d . 820) and revised shortly thereafter by H u n a y n i b n Ishaq al-Ibadi ( 8 0 8 - 7 3 ) and his associates. This translation process was at first haphazard, but w i t h the accession o f the Abbasid caliph a l - M a m u n i n 813, the picture changed dramatically. A poet and scholar i n his o w n r i g h t , a l - M a m u m appears to have had a passion f o r " f o r e i g n l e a r n i n g , " especially Greek p h i l o s o p h y and science. As a concrete expression o f this passion, i n 830 he f o u n d e d the House o f W i s d o m i n Baghdad to serve as an institute f o r translation and research; accordingly, the translation m o v e m e n t accelerated d u r i n g his r e i g n . Aristotle's Metaphysics and the apocryphal Theology of Aristotle, a paraphrase o f Plotinus' last three Enneads, were translated d u r i n g this p e r i o d . Before l o n g , the entire Aristotelian corpus was translated i n t o Arabic, w i t h the exception o f Politics, for w h i c h a fabrication by i b n a l - B i t r i q called Secret of Secrets was substituted and falsely attributed to Aristotle. In a d d i t i o n , a large n u m b e r o f Galen's ethical a n d logical treatises were translated along w i t h his vast medical corpus i n sixteen books, w h i c h f o r m e d the basis o f medical i n s t r u c t i o n for centuries. A n u m b e r o f Porphyry's logical, e t h i cal, and metaphysical treatises were also translated i n t o Arabic. Porphyry's w o r k s i n c l u d e d his famous Isagoge, or i n t r o d u c t i o n to Aristotle's logic; a lost twelve-book c o m m e n t a r y o n Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, k n o w n only f r o m the Arabic source; as w e l l as the already-mentioned paraphrase o f Plotinus' last three Enneads, attributed to Aristode and translated by I b n N a i m a h a l - H i m s i ( d . 83c) d u r i n g the reign o f a l - M a m u n . The u n k n o w n Greek author o f the Enneads c o u l d very w e l l have been P o r p h y r y himself.

The Beginning of Systematic Philosophical Writings Also d u r i n g al-Mamun's r e i g n , i n a d d i t i o n to these translations ( w h i c h f o r m e d the g r o u n d w o r k o f Arabic-Islamic p h i l o s o p h y ) , the first genuine philosopher o f

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Islam,Yaqub i b n Ishaq al-Sabah a l - K i n d i (79C-866), started his literary activity. A p r o l i f i c encyclopedic author to w h o m some three h u n d r e d w o r k s are attribu t e d , a l - K i n d i was the first c h a m p i o n o f Greek p h i l o s o p h y , w h i c h was approached w i t h some suspicion i n t r a d i t i o n a l and popular circles as a foreign and pagan i m p o r t . A l - K i n d i believed that the study o f philosophy, regardless o f its f o r e i g n extraction, should not be feared by the true believer, because philosophy's c h i e f subject o f i n q u i r y is the True One, source o f all being and unity. Rather than c o n f l i c t i n g w i t h religious or Islamic t r u t h , a l - K i n d i h e l d , p h i l o s o p h y actually reinforces that t r u t h . M o r e explicitly than any other M u s l i m philosopher before or since, A l - K i n d i p r o c l a i m e d his adherence to the p r i n c i p a l M u s l i m articles o f faith, i n c l u d i n g the existence o f G o d , the creation o f the w o r l d out o f n o t h i n g and i n time, the resurrection o f the body, and the truth o f prophetic revelation. A c c o r d i n g to a l - K i n d i , these articles, e m b o d i e d i n the Q u r a n , could be demonstrated p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y and their t r u t h dialectically r e i n f o r c e d . They belong to that body o f d i v i n e w i s d o m , w h i c h surpasses h u m a n w i s d o m but is perfectly compatible w i t h i t . As a p i o n e e r i n g w r i t e r on philosophical subjects— w h i c h covered the entire range o f classical learning, f r o m logic t o astronomy, ethics and metaphysics—al-Kindi was responsible for developing an adequate philosophical and scientific vocabulary that influenced his successors although it was later replaced by a more precise vocabulary. The next outstanding w r i t e r o n philosophical subjects was the great Persian physician-philosopher A b u Bakr al-Razi (ca. 86c—between 923 and 93c), w h o t o o k a diametrically opposite stand to a l - K i n d i o n the relationship between p h i losophy and revelation, generally referred to i n Arabic sources as " p r o p h e t h o o d . " Like a l - K i n d i , al-Razi was a great admirer o f Greek philosophy. In Platonic-Socratic fashion, al-Razi saw i n the study o f phdosophy the only means o f hberating the soul f r o m the bondage o f the body and its ultimate release f r o m the w h e e l o f b i r t h and rebirth. Accordingly, his chief ethical treatise is entided Spiritual Physic (therapy), to serve as a counterpart o f the b o d i l y physic (conventional medicine). The greatest n o n c o n f o r m i s t i n M u s l i m religious history, al-Razi repudiated the entire c o n cept o f revelation or p r o p h e t h o o d as superfluous, because for h i m reason was perfectly competent o n its o w n to lead to the discovery o f t r u t h and the cultivat i o n o f morals. More radical, perhaps, was his concept o f the five eternal p r i n c i ples f r o m w h i c h the w o r l d was o r i g i n a l l y fashioned: the Creator, the soul, matter, space, and t i m e . Because most o f these principles can be s h o w n to have a basis i n Plato's Timaeus, al-Razi should be regarded as Islam's greatest Platonist. He refers to Plato i n his Spiritual Physic as the "master and leader o f die philosophers," whose theories o f the soul, creation i n time, and the ultimate liberation o f the soul f r o m the bondage o f the body he incorporated i n t o his o w n system t h r o u g h the study o f philosophy. Al-Razi even defended i n the strongest terms the Platonic theory o f

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the transmigration o f the soul, w h i c h was never i n vogue i n pliilosophical or theological circles. The o n l y part o f Plato's philosophy that al-Razi overlooked is p o l itics. Later philosophers, such as A b u Nasr al-Farabi i n the tenth century and I b n Rushd i n the t w e l f t h century, inspired by Plato's Republic, either c o m m e n t e d o n or used it as a m o d e l i n their political w r i t i n g s . For reasons u n k n o w n , al-Razi also seems to have overlooked i n his some t w o h u n d r e d w o r k s another favorite Platonic discipline: mathematics.

Islamic Neoplatonism and Neopythagoreanism Neither the eclecticism o f a l - K i n d i n o r the Platonism o f al-Razi was destined to d e t e r m i n e the shape or d i r e c t i o n o f Islamic p h i l o s o p h y and give i t its characteristic stamp; rather, an Islamic b r a n d o f N e o p l a t o n i s m and Neopythagoreanism, whose foundations were laid i n the tenth century, played this role. A b u Nasr a l Farabi (ca. 8 7 8 - 9 5 0 ) , f r o m n o r t h e r n Persia and o f Turcoman o r i g i n , was the first truly systematic philosopher o f Islam and the founder o f Islamic N e o p l a t o n i s m . In his b e s t - k n o w n w o r k , the Opinions of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City, he developed a cosmological and metaphysical system at the head o f w h i c h stood the First Principle or the One o f Plotinus, f r o m w h i c h a series o f t e n intellectual emanations arose, and generating i n progressive fashion the series o f heavenly spheres, beneath

w h i c h lay the w o r l d o f the elements.

I n this

system,

h u m a n k i n d , w h o marks the apex o f the terrestrial order o f generation and corr u p t i o n , is the highest b y - p r o d u c t o f the c o m b i n a t i o n o f the elements and for that reason is described as the m i c r o c o s m . U n l i k e inanimate objects or lower a n i mals, however, h u m a n k i n d possesses, i n a d d i t i o n to the n u t r i t i v e , sensitive, and appetitive faculties, the faculty o f reason w i t h its f o u r subdivisions: the theoretical, the practical, the deliberative, and the productive. The u l t i m a t e goal o f h u m a n activity is the " a c q u i s i t i o n o f happiness," w^hich al-Farabi discussed i n a n u m b e r o f treatises. This happiness consists i n the soul's total dissociation f r o m everything material or b o d i l y and as a result j o i n i n g the hosts o f "separate intelligences" i n the i n t e l l i g i b l e w o r l d , w h i c h , like Plato, alFarabi believed to be the u l t i m a t e abode o f the soul. Like Aristotle, however, alFarabi believed h u m a n k i n d to be a zoon politikon, or p o l i t i c a l a n i m a l , w h o cannot achieve the h u m a n goals o f happiness outside society. Al-Farabi rejected the s o l i tary l i f e advocated

by the Sufis, a n d postulated h u m a n association

as

h u m a n k i n d ' s natural c o n d i t i o n i n this life. O f the three f o r m s o f h u m a n assoc i a t i o n — t h e large, or inhabited w o r l d ; the intermediate, o r n a t i o n (ummah), and the small, or city-state—the last f o r m is the appropriate vehicle for achieving h u m a n k i n d ' s goal o f happiness or v i r t u e , w h i c h w h e n p r o p e r l y ordered may be called " t h e v i r t u o u s city." This v i r t u o u s city corresponds t o Plato's ideal state; all

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other f o r m s o f association are c o r r u p t i o n s t h e r e o f Because o f this p r o f o u n d preoccupation w i t h p o l i t i c a l association and the v i r t u o u s or ideal m o d e o f such association, to w h i c h al-Farabi r e t u r n e d i n a n u m b e r o f treatises, he is regarded as the f o u n d e r o f p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y i n Islam. H e was the first major logician o f Islam to c o m m e n t o n all parts o f Aristotle's Orgonon as w e l l as his Rhetoric and Poetics. Furthermore, better than any medieval l o g i c i a n , al-Farabi devoted a series o f treatises to the analysis o f logical terms i n a manner that was unequaled u n t i l m o d e r n times. Al-Farabi's emanationist scheme was f u r t h e r developed and refined by the b e s t - k n o w n Neoplatonist o f Islam, I b n Sina ( k n o w n i n the West as Avicenna, 980-1037). A l t h o u g h I b n Sina acknowledged his debt to al-Farabi, his style o f w r i t i n g was m o r e fluid and l u c i d than that o f his predecessor, w h i c h ensured a w i d e r d i f f u s i o n i n medieval learned circles, b o t h i n the East and the West. His greatest w o r k . Book of Healing, covered the entire range o f learning k n o w n i n his d a y — f r o m logic to physics, psychology, metaphysics, a n d astronomy. The w o r k consists o f some twenty volumes o f w h i c h he w r o t e an a b r i d g m e n t entitled alNajat (Salvation). In these t w o books and elsewhere, I b n Sina fully developed alFarabi's n o t i o n o f " c o n j u n c t i o n " o f humankind's material intellect w i t h the active intellect, or tenth emanation f r o m the One or Necessary Being. W h e n the soul has attained that stage, he wTote i n al-Najat, i t w o u l d become " a n intelligible w o r l d o f its o w n , i n w h i c h are inscribed the f o r m o f the w h o l e , the rational order o f that w h o l e , and the g o o d pervading i t . " I n other w o r d s , the soul w o u l d become a replica o f the i n t e l l i g i b l e w o r l d , f r o m w h i c h the w h o l e order o f i n t e l lectual, celestial, and terrestrial entities o r i g i n a l l y emerged b y w a y o f emanation. I b n Sina, w h o was b o r n i n Afshaneh i n n o r t h e r n Persia, m e n t i o n e d i n his autobiography that he was d r a w n to the study o f p h i l o s o p h y as a result o f discussions i n w h i c h his father and brother, w h o were addicted to reading Epistles of the Brethren of Purity, apparently engaged. His brother had been w o n over t o the Egyptian (Ismaili) cause that the Epistles advocated. W r i t t e n by a secret society called the Brethren o f Purity, these Epistles ( t o t a l l i n g f i f t y - t w o ) e m b o d i e d a p o p ular version o f Neopythagorean doctrine. A c c o r d i n g to the Brethren, this doctrine derived f r o m the teaching o f Pythagoras, " w h o was a monotheistic sage w h o hailed f r o m H a r r a n , " and his first-century disciple, Nicomachus o f Gerasa, w h o is sometimes confused w i t h Aristotle's son i n Arabic sources. The key to understanding the w o r l d , according to the Brethren, is the study o f " n u m b e r . " w^hich possesses certain physical and metaphysical properties. W h e n properly understood, this study w i l l lead the d i l i g e n t searcher to the knowledge o f the soul, the spiritual w o r l d , and ultimately God. For the Brethren, n u m b e r had m o r e than a numerical or arithmetical connotation; i t had a metaphysical and ethical connotation as w e l l , because i t reflected the very nature o f reality. N u m b e r

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The Epistles of the Brethren of Purity embodies a popular version of Neopythagorean doctrine. This fine illustrated copy made in Baghdad in 1287 has a double-page frontispiece showing the author and his attendants.

four, for instance, was intended by God to reflect the quadruple reality o f the spiritual w o r l d , w h i c h consists o f the Creator, the universal intellect, the universal soul, and p r i m e matter. Similarly, G o d caused the elements t o consist o f a total o f four or quadruples thereof: the basic natures or properties, the h u m o r s o f the body, the seasons, the corners o f the earth, and so o n . Even justice, according to the Brethren, corresponds to this p r i m o r d i a l number. The chief advantage o f the study o f number, according to the Brethren, is t w o f o l d : i t leads to the k n o w l e d g e o f the soul and this k n o w l e d g e leads i n t u r n to the knowledge o f G o d , as stated i n the prophetic t r a d i t i o n (hadith): " H e w h o knows his soul w i l l k n o w his L o r d . " This refers to the refinement o f character and the sharpening o f the m i n d . This double k n o w l e d g e w i l l lead one w h o is b o r n under an auspicious sign o f the zodiac to discover the true nature o f the soul as a spiritual substance. F u r t h e r m o r e , one w i l l then strive to assist the soul to regain its o r i g i n a l abode i n the intelligible w o r l d , " t h r o u g h the profession o f spiritual,

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religious creeds and the discourse o n noble philosophical matters according to the Socratic p a t h , w h d e practicing m y s t i c i s m , asceticism, and

monasticism,

according to the Christian path, and c l i n g i n g to the Hanafi r e l i g i o n (i.e., Islam)." The c h i e f m e r i t o f philosophy, then, is that it enables its adepts to probe the h i d den (batin) m e a n i n g o f revealed texts and teaches t h e m not to stop at their external (zahir) meaning i n the manner o f the ignorant and the vulgar. Ismailism, the extreme variety o f Shiite Islam, achieved political ascendancy i n the tendi and eleventh centuries, w h e n i t was proclaimed the official creed o f the Fatimid caliphate o f Cairo, w h i c h entered into violent confrontation w i t h the Sunni Abbasid caliphate o f Baghdad. I n this confrontation, the Brethren formed the philosophical arm o f Ismailism and the Assassins o f A l a m u t formed its militant arm. Those Assassins targeted the Crusaders, w h o gave them their infamous name i n the European languages, as well as important Abbasid statesmen such as the famous vizier o f the Seljuks, Nizam al-Mulk, w h o i n 1092 fell victim to die dagger o f an Ismaili Assassin.

Interactions of Philosophy and Dogma The chief merit o f the Brethren's teachings is that i t recognized no serious conflict between philosophical and religious t r u t h . The other philosophers discussed u n t i l n o w concurred i n principle i n the harmony o f the t w o forms o f t r u t h , but they developed elaborate cosmological and metaphysical systems inspired by the legacy o f the great Neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus and his master Plato. Aristode figured prominently only i n those more discursive areas, such as logic, ethics, physics, and cosmology. A parallel development i n learned circles gaining g r o u n d i n the n i n t h century was systematic theology, generally referred to as the science o f dialectic (ilm al-K
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actions were part o f the ck'vine decree. Two leaders o f the Qadari movement, Ghaylan al-Dimashqi and Mabad al-Juhani, challenged those Umayyad claims and were p u t to death by order o f Umayyad caliphs i n 743 and 699, respectively. It is possible that al-Basri, k n o w n for his Qadari leanings, may have recanted out o f fear for his o w n life, as some sources m e n t i o n . Wasd i b n Ata, c o n t i n u i n g al-Basri's libertarian or the Qadari line, is generally regarded

as the f o u n d e r o f the greatest theological

movement

i n Islam:

M u t a z i l i s m . This movement reached its zenith i n the first half o f the n i n t h century, w h e n i t enjoyed the patronage o f the great Abbasid caliph a l - M a m u n , whose passion for Greek philosophy and the "ancient sciences" was great, as well as his t w o immediate successors o n the caliphal throne, I n token o f his Mutazilite sympathies, i n 827 and 833 a l - M a m u n instituted the notorious mihna or i n q u i s i d o n , w h i c h stipulated that any religious judge (qadi) w h o refused to profess the Mutazilite thesis o f the "created" Quran w o u l d be dismissed or jailed. The most famous opponent o f this thesis was the r e n o w n e d scholar and Traditionist, A h m a d i b n Hanbal ( 7 8 0 - 8 5 5 ) , w h o was u n c o m p r o m i s i n g i n his conviction that the Q u r a n , as the w o r d o f God, was b o t h "uncreated" and eternal. T h r o w n i n t o jail and publicly scourged, he refused to relent but was eventually released and restored to favor by the Abbasid caliph al-Mutawakkil, w h o ascended the throne i n 847 and reversed i n a decisive way the religious policies o f his three predecessors. D u r i n g the first half o f the n i n t h century the leading Mutazilite theologians flourished.

They included AbuJ-Hudhayl al-Allaf ( d . 8 3 6 / 8 4 5 ) , I b r a h i m al-Nazzam

(ca. 775-ca. 8 4 5 ) , A m r i b n Bahr al-Jahiz (ca. 7 6 6 - 8 6 8 or 869), w h o belonged to the Basra branch o f M u t a z i l i s m , Bishr i b n a l - M u t a m i r (d. 825), A b u Musa alMirdar ( d . 841), Jafar i b n Harb ( d . 851), and A h m a d i b n A b i Duad ( d . 855), w h o belonged to the rival Baghdad branch. Despite their divergences o n certain p e r i p h eral points, these theologians were i n agreement o n five fundamental principles, as reported by the n i n t h - c e n t u r y scholar A b u Husayn al-Khayyat i n his Book of Vindication, one o f the earliest Mutazilite treatises. These five principles consisted o f God's justice, God's unity, the "intermediate position," God's irreversible threats and promises, and God's c o m m a n d i n g the r i g h t and p r o h i b i t i n g the w r o n g . These p r i n ciples can best be understood as Mutazilite responses to their rivals: the Literalists, (literal interpreters o f Quranic texts), the Determinists (believers i n unqualified predestination), and the Traditionists (specialists i n the study o f the hadith). These principles further illustrate the u n c o n d i t i o n a l c o m m i t m e n t to the rationalist and humanist perspective o f the philosophers and their n e w methodology, as developed by a l - K i n d i , whose Mutazilite sympathies are w e l l documented. The c h i e f a i m o f Mutazilite m o r a l theology was the v i n d i c a t i o n o f God's justice, w h i c h Determinists like Jahn i b n Safw an ( d . 7 4 c ) threatened, and w h i c h the :

Q u r a n a f f i r m e d i n n u m e r o u s verses. By r e d u c i n g h u m a n actions to natural or mechanical occurrences, the Determinists (Jabriyah) made a mockery o f the entire

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concept o f d i v i n e justice and religious o b l i g a t i o n (taklif). To be w o r t h y o f God's promises i n the hereafter-—which like His threats are b o t h true a n d irreversible, according to the M u t a z i l a h — h u m a n s must be able to discriminate rationally between r i g h t and w r o n g , even before revelation (sam), and m u s t be able to freely choose their actions. That d i s c r i m i n a t i o n is connected to the fact that right a n d w r o n g are i n t r i n s i c qualities o f h u m a n actions that are k n o w n i n t u i t i v e l y to be either commendable or reprehensible, susceptible o f r e w a r d and p u n i s h m e n t . God, b e i n g entirely w i s e and just, can o n l y c o m m a n d the f o r m e r and p r o h i b i t the latter. This is contrary to the claims o f the Determinists a n d Traditionists that as the L o r d o f Lords, G o d is n o t subject to c o m p u l s i o n o f any k i n d ; so that w h a t G o d c o m m a n d s is by d e f i n i t i o n r i g h t and w h a t G o d p r o h i b i t s is w r o n g . The Mutazilites disagreed w i t h those religious groups that like the Kharijites (the secessionists w h o broke away f r o m the ranks o f A l i , the f o u r t h caliph) c o n tended that a believer w h o c o m m i t s a grave sin (kabirah) ceases to be a M u s l i m and becomes t h e r e u p o n an i n f i d e l (kafir) deserving o f death. For the M u t a z i l a h , such a person is really i n an intermediate p o s i t i o n between s o u n d belief and i n f i delity and is i n fact s i m p l y a sinner (fbsiq) to w h o m the sanctions against apostates or infidels d o n o t apply. Regarding the second grand thesis o f God's unity, the

Mutazilite

theologians

vehemently

protested

the

Attributists

and

A n t h r o p o m o r p h i s t s , w h o h e l d that G o d possesses a series o f attributes, usually seven i n n u m b e r : k n o w l e d g e , power, life, w i l l , speech, h e a r i n g , and sight. These attributes were regarded by b o t h groups as distinct f r o m God's essence (dhat) and co-eternal w i t h G o d , so that H e was compared by some A n t h r o p o m o r p h i s t s (also called Corporealists i n some Arabic sources) to an "eternal m a n , " as the p h i l o s o p h e r I b n Rushd later w r o t e . For the M u t a z i l a h , apart f r o m its gross character, this v i e w entailed a p l u r a i t y of "eternal entities" a n d accordingly threatened b e l i e f i n God's unity. Their o w n v i e w was that i n God essence and attribute are i d e n t i c a l , a v i e w that corresponded to Aristotle's and Plod m i s ' , as w e l l as to those o f t e n t h - and eleventh-century M u s l i m philosophers, i n c l u d i n g al-Farabi and I b n Sina. The t w o attributes o f w i l l and speech presented the M u t a z i l a h w i t h a cluster o f problems, however. First, insofar as d i v i n e w i l l bears o n created accidents, i t was d i f f i c u l t to safeguard its eternity. Accordingly, some Mutazilites, like A b u l H u d h a y l , argued that the d i v i n e w i l l is a contingent accident that does n o t inhere i n any substratum and is i n fact reducible to God's c o m m a n d (omr), whereby G o d has created the w o r l d . Other Mutazilites, like Bishr i b n a l - M u t a m i r , argued that i t is necessary to d i s t i n g u i s h between t w o aspects o f the d i v i n e w i l l : essential and active. Essential w i l l includes God's essence, whereas active w i l l is s i m p l y the act o f creating the w i l l e d objects. Still other Mutazilites, like al-Nazzam, f o u n d the concept o f w i l l so b a f f l i n g that they decided that i t is n o t predicable o f G o d at all. They m a i n t a i n e d instead that the statement that G o d has w i l l e d an inanimate

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object means that He has created i t , and the statement that H e has w i l l e d the actions o f h u m a n agents means that He has c o m m a n d e d t h e m . For al-Nazzam and his followers, the question o f d i v i n e w i l l was a p u r e l y a semantic question. Tire problem o f chvine speech raised the same cluster o f difficulties. The Mutazilah argued that divine speech, manifested m divine utterances i n the Quran and elsewhere, was a created accident and for that reason could not be joined as eternal (qfldi'm). W h e n the caliph a l - M a m u n proclaimed the Mutazilite thesis o f the "created" Quran as die official doctrine o f the state, the tiieological batde was sparked i n a most violent way. The Hanbalites (followers o f the renowned Traditionist A h m a d i b n Hanbal) and the masses at large could not reconcile themselves to the n o t i o n tiiat the Quran, as God's w o r d (kalom), could be described as a created accident, because it has existed since die beginning o f time i n the Mother o f die Book or the Preserved Tablet, as stated i n the Quran i n a variety o f places, such as 13:39, and 85:22. The star o f the Mutazilites began to set w h e n the caliph al-Mutawakkil ascended the throne i n 847 and reversed state policy o n the question o f the created Quran and other Mutazdite propositions. T h r o u g h o u t the second half o f the n i n t h century, however, Mutazilite theologians, such as al-Jubai ( d . 915) and his son A b u H a s h i m ( d . 933), Abul-Husayn al-Khayyat ( d . 9 0 2 ) , and A b u l - Q a s i m al-Balkhi ( d . 931), continued to bear the Mutazilite torch. Before l o n g , however, a successor theological movement appeared o n the h o r i z o n : Asharism. Its founder, A b u al-Hasan al-Ashari ( 8 7 3 - 9 3 5 ) , had been a Mutazilah u p to his f o r t i e t h year, w h e n the Prophet appeared to h i m i n a dream, u r g i n g h i m to "take charge o f m y c o m m u n i t y [ummah]." After this, al-Ashari m o u n t e d the p u l p i t at the mosque at Basra and proclaimed his recantation o f the "follies and scandals o f the M u t a z i l a h . " The teachings o f the new theological movement that al-Ashari launched was eventually i d e n t i f i e d w i t h o r t h o d o x Sunni Islam. It d i f f e r e d radically f r o m the teachings o f earlier scholars or Traditionists, such as M a l i k i b n Anas (ca. 715—795) o f M e d i n a and A h m a d i b n Hanbal o f Baghdad. U n l i k e those t w o scholars, w h o f o u n d e d t w o conservative M u s l i m schools, the M a l i k i and the H a n b a l i , al-Ashari was n o t w i l l i n g to foreclose the use o f Kalam's dialectical methods and tended to tread a m i d d l e course between theology's conservative and liberal w i n g s . Thus i n methodology, he agreed w i t h the Mutazilites that i t was the d u t y o f every "reasonable M u s l i m , " as he w r o t e i n his Vindication of the Use of the Science of Kalam, to defer i n those matters that are the subject o f controversy " t o the body o f principles consecrated by reason, sense-experience or c o m m o n sense" as w e l l as to the explicit pronouncements o f the Q u r a n and the h a d i t h . O n all substantive issues, however, al-Ashari diverged f r o m his M u t a z i l i t e masters and embraced the trad i t i o n i s t or Hanbali perspective. Thus, he rejected the M u t a z i l i t e v i e w that a person is the "creator" o f his or her deeds o n the g r o u n d that this amounts to p o l y t h e i s m (ishrak) or d u a l i s m , charging the M u t a z i l a h f o r that reason as being

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the Magians or Manicheans o f Islam. For al-Ashari, God's p o w e r is u n l i m i t e d and His decrees irreversible, therefore " a l l g o o d or evil is the result o f God's decree and

f o r e - o r d i n a t i o n , " w h i c h n o h u m a n can escape or alter. Nevertheless, al-

Ashari, as m u c h as he rejected the libertarianism (qadariyah) o f the M u t a z i l a h , was not w i l l i n g to endorse the strict predestinadonism (jabriyah) of their opponents, the Traditionists and Hanbalites. He opted instead for a theory o f acquisition (kasb), for w h i c h he f o u n d a basis i n the Q u r a n , according to w h i c h G o d creates the actions o f h u m a n k i n d , but h u m a n k i n d acquires t h e m and becomes accordingly liable to p u n i s h m e n t or reward. Al-Ashari was n o t w i l l i n g to concede, however, that God's attributes are i d e n tical w i t h God's essence or distinct f r o m i t , because the m o d e o f predicating t h e m o f G o d is u n k n o w n . His chief objection to the Mutazilites and the philosophers' view that God's attributes are identical w i t h God's essence was that i t rendered those attributes identical w i t h G o d , so that h u m a n k i n d c o u l d address prayers o r petitions to God's power, God's know ledge, or God's life, instead o f G o d Himself. God's u n i t y was unquestioned, however, because His essence was u n k n o w n and must be believed w i t h o u t asking h o w (bila kayfa). As for God's justice, i t is n o t an object o f rational discourse either, because whatever G o d does o r commands is by d e f i n i t i o n just; whatever G o d prohibits is by d e f i n i t i o n unjust. To rationalize the way God operates i n the w o r l d , the Asharite theologians, starting w i t h A b u Bakr al-Baqillani ( d . 1013), developed an elaborate theory o f atoms and accidents. According to this theory, everything i n the w o r l d consists o f atoms (sg. juz), i n w h i c h a series o f accidents, whether positive or negative, inhere. The nature o f these accidents, however, is such that they cannot endure for t w o successive moments. Thus, God has to constantly create o r recreate them for as l o n g as G o d wishes the body i n w h i c h they inhere to endure. Otherwise, that body w o u l d cease to exist. Some Asharite theologians argued that the destruction o f the body i n question, however, requires that G o d create i n i t the accident o f cessation o r extinction (fana), w h e r e u p o n the body ceases to exist. The t r i u m p h o f Asharism i n subsequent generations was ensured by a long list o f outstanding scholars, the best k n o w n o f w h o m were al-Baghdadi (d. 1037), al-Juwayni (d. 1086), A b u H a m i d al-Ghazali ( I O C 8 - I I I I ) , al-Shahrastani

( d . nc/3), and Fakhr al-Razi ( d .

1209). These theologians laid the foundation for all subsequent theological discussion, and their w r i t i n g s continue to be studied today i n such major Sunni institutions as al-Azhar University i n Egypt.

The Assault on Islamic Neoplatonism The

flowering

o f Asharism i n the t e n t h and eleventh centuries signaled the

renewal o f the struggle between the Neoplatonic philosophers, represented p r i -

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m a r i l y by al-Farabi and I b n Sina, and the Asharite theologians. To begin w i t h , the Asharite theologians, as w e l l as the grammarians and legal scholars, l o o k e d w i t h suspicion o n the deductive methods o f the logicians a n d the philosophers and were content to apply the linguistic and explanatory methods o f interpretation to the sacred texts or juridical problems. Metaphysics, w h e t h e r i n its Neoplatonic o r Aristotelian forms, was deemed i n i m i c a l to the Islamic w o r l d v i e w and the teachings o f the Q u r a n because i t rested on the t w i n principles o f causal efficacy and the u n i f o r m i t y o f nature, w h i c h are irreconcilable w i t h the Quranic concept o f God's u i d i m i t e d power and inscrutable ways. A b u H a m i d al-Ghazali, the greatest theologian o f Islam and one o f its most fascinating figures, was the Asharite theologian w h o was the standard bearer o f The Seljuk vizier Nizam al¬

the assault o n philosophy i n the eleventh century. B o r n i n Tus, Persia, i n ioc8,

Mulk (d. 1092) founded the-

al-Ghazali started his studies o f logic, philosophy, m y s t i c i s m , and theology w i t h

ological schools known as

a series o f outstanding scholars, the most i m p o r t a n t o f w h o m was al-Juwayni.

Nizamiyah in the major

I n 1091 al-Ghazali was appointed by the vizier o f Persia, N i z a m a l - M u l k , as head

cities of the realm. The ruins of the one at Khargird in northeastern Iran are silent

o f the N i z a m i y a h school i n Baghdad, where he r e m a i n e d u n t i l 1095. The assassination o f N i z a m a l - M u l k i n 1092 by an Ismaili c o m m a n d o and the death o f the

testimony to the way it once

Seljuk sultan Malik-Shah shortly thereafter probably i m p e l l e d al-Ghazali to leave

flourished as a center of

Baghdad and travel t h r o u g h o u t the M u s l i m w o r l d disguised as a Sufi. Al-Ghazali

scholarship and teaching.

eventually r e t u r n e d to Nishapur, Persia, where he resumed his teaching u n t i l his

PHILOSOPHY

death i n 1111.

A N D THEOLOGY

283

Al-Ghazali was particularly w e l l e q u i p p e d to m o u n t the onslaught

o n N e o p l a t o n i s m i n the name o f Asharism and Sufism, because he was fully c o n versant w i t h the philosophers' teachings, evident i n his Intentions of the Philosophers, a succinct s u m m a r y o f Neoplatonic physics and metaphysics, w h i c h he w r o t e as a prelude to that onslaught i n the Incoherence of the Philosophers. His e p i t o m e o f l o g i c , the Criterion of Knowledge, w h i c h is a very l u c i d s u m m a r y o f Aristotelian logic, s h o u l d be added to this s u m m a r y as w e l l as his ethical treatise, The Balance of Action, w h i c h has an Aristotelian base and a Sufi capping. Al-Ghazali began Incoherence of the Philosophers by d e f i n i n g his strategy as clearly as possible, d i s t i n g u i s h i n g three parts o f the philosophical sciences: ( i ) a part that includes logic and mathematics and has n o direct " b e a r i n g o n r e l i g i o n " and should therefore not be questioned, except by " a n ignorant f r i e n d , w h o is worse than a learned f o e " ; (2) a part that deals w i t h political and ethical m a x i m s u l t i mately derived f r o m the teachings o f the prophets and the Sufi masters, w h i c h should not be questioned either b u t should be approached w i t h c a u t i o n ; and (3) a part that contains the b u l k o f the philosophers' errors, namely physics and metaphysics. Al-Ghazali then listed the three most pernicious questions o n w h i c h the philosophers deserve to be declared infidels (takfir); namely, the eternity o f the w o r l d , God's knowledge o f universals but n o t o f particulars, and the denial o f b o d i l y resurrection. O n all other issues, w h i c h he reduced to seventeen, the philosophers should be declared heretical (tabdi). The philosophers' thesis o f the eternity o f the w o r l d opens the list o f the t w e n t y " p e r n i c i o u s " questions o f Incoherence, because according to al-Ghazali this thesis entails that the w o r l d is uncreated and therefore the existence o f its Creator is indemonstrable. A l - K i n d i and the Asharite theologians had i n fact predicated the existence o f G o d o n the existence o f a created (hadith,muhdath) w o r l d ; because i t is created, the w o r l d necessarily requires a Creator (muhdith), as a l - K i n d i p u t i t . I n t i m e , this became the favorite argument o f the mutakallimun ( M u s l i m t h e o l o gians), both Mutazilite and Asharite, for the existence o f G o d . As for God's k n o w l e d g e o f universals but not o f particulars, al-Ghazali leveled his attack o n I b n Sina i n particular, because I b n Sina had contended that the k n o w l e d g e o f c h a n g i n g particulars entails change i n the essence o f the " k n o w e r " ; so that the o n l y k n o w l e d g e G o d can have o f the w o r l d is universal, bearing o n species and genera and n o t individuals. For al-Ghazali, however, n o t o n l y reason but the Q u r a n itself a f f i r m e d that " n o t a single atom's w e i g h t i n the heavens o r o n earth is h i d d e n f r o m H i m " ( 3 4 : 3 ) . To deny God's k n o w l e d g e o f particulars, t h e n , reduces God to the status o f the ignorant o r the dead. Regarding b o d i l y resurrection, al-Ghazali accused the philosophers o f having failed to prove demonstratively the i m m o r a l i t y o f the soul, let alone the resurrection o f the body. Because o f this failure, the only recourse open to the believer, he argued, is to defer to the a u t h o r i t y o f scripture, w h e r e i n b o t h the Q u r a n and

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the h a d i t h are explicit that o n the Day o f Judgment, souls shall be u n i t e d to the appropriate bodies, made u p of the same matter as the o r i g i n a l b o d y o r one o f a different nature. Once the soul has thus "repossessed the i n s t r u m e n t , " o r the material body to w h i c h i t was o r i g i n a l l y u n i t e d or its analog, the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l n o t o n l y revive, but he o r she w i l l i m m e d i a t e l y regain the ability t o experience those b o d i l y pleasures and pains o f w h i c h the Q u r a n has spoken so graphically. A f o u r t h m a j o r issue, assigned t o the physical part o f Incoherence, is that o f the Aristotelian concept o f necessary connection between causes and effects. Neither experience n o r reason, argued al-Ghazali, justifies the assertion o f necessary causal connection. Experience (mushohüdah) s i m p l y proves that the alleged effect occurs simultaneously w i t h the cause, not t h r o u g h i t (ma ahu la bihi). The associa t i o n between the t w o creates i n the m i n d the belief that the f o r m e r is indeed the effect and the latter the cause. Individuals should believe instead, he w r o t e , that effects i n the w o r l d are caused directly by G o d , w h o is the sole agent i n the universe, o r t h r o u g h the agency o f those angels "charged w i t h the affairs o f this w o r l d . " To assert that effects f o l l o w necessarily f r o m their antecedent causes, as Aristotelian physical theory stipulates, concluded al-Ghazali, is i n the end i n c o m patible w i t h the universal M u s l i m belief i n God's power for miracle making.

The Resurgence of Peripateticism in Muslim Spain Partly as a consequence o f the reverses i t received i n the East at the hands o f the Asharites, the Hanhalites, and others, and partly as a deliberate attempt t o rival the Abbasid caliphate o f Baghdad, p h i l o s o p h y i n M u s l i m Spain (Andalusia) received a new lease o f hfe under the aegis o f the U m a y y a d caliphs o f Córdoba i n the t e n t h century. The U m a y y a d caliph H a k a m I I , k n o w n as al-Mustansir (r. 961-76), ordered the i m p o r t o f scientific and philosophical books f r o m the East, so that w i t h its university and l i b r a r y Cordoba d u r i n g his r e i g n rivaled Baghdad. The three outstanding scholars d u r i n g this p e r i o d were I b n Masarrah ( d . 931), a l - M a j r i t i ( d . 1008), and a l - K i r m a n i ( d . 1068), whose interests were n o t confined to p h i l o s o p h y and included geometry, occult sciences, and mysticism. The first t r u l y eminent philosopher o f M u s l i m Spain was A b u Bakr i b n Yahya i b n al-Sayigh (ca. 1095-1138 o r 1139), better k n o w n i n Arabic sources as I b n Bajjah and i n Latin as Avempace. H e was b o r n i n Saragossa, i n northeastern Spain, lived i n Seville and Granada, and d i e d i n Fez, Morocco, probably by poison. I b n Bajjah was a versatile philosopher and physician w h o w r o t e significant c o m mentaries o n Aristotle's w o r k s , i n c l u d i n g Physics, De Anima, a n d Meteorológica. A l t h o u g h these extant commentaries reveal a sound philosophical acumen, they are n o t f u l l y developed. I b n Bajjah also w r o t e extensive interpretations o f all the parts o f al-Farabi s logic. Perhaps because o f al-Farabi's ethical and p o l i t i c a l inter-

PHILOSOPHY

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28c

ests, Ibn Bajjah singled h i m o u t as his c h i e f master. He exhibits a certain measure o f dependence o n al-Farabi i n his best-known w o r k , Conduct of the Solitary. I n that b o o k — w h i c h , like al-Farabi's Virtuous City, exhibits definite Platonic i n f l u ences—Ibn Bajjah's c h i e f p r o b l e m was not to delineate the type o f ideal city or m o d e o f association, w h i c h al-Farabi t r i e d to do i n his

Utopia.

Rather, as

the

title

o f this treatise implies, he examined the mode o f life suited to the solitary or true philosopher, w h o is destined to live i n a " c o r r u p t " city-state that has fallen short o f al-Farabi's ideal o f the " v i r t u o u s " city. I n this connection I b n Bajjah d i d not question Aristotle's (or al-Farabi's) m a x i m that h u m a n k i n d is a political a n i m a l by nature (a zoon politikon); rather, he observed that h u m a n k i n d may nevertheless be forced i n certain circumstances to shun this ideal and to seek f u l f i l l m e n t i n a life o f solitude. For h i m , this life is intellectual and is achieved ultimately t h r o u g h c o n j u n c t i o n or contact (ittisal) w i t h the active intellect. A l t h o u g h I b n Bajjah vacillates at this p o i n t between the mystical ideal o f the Sufis and the Aristotelian ideal o f the contemplative life, his basic sympathies r e m a i n Aristotelian and Neoplatonic. I n his Farewell Message, he stated categorically that "reason is God's dearest creation t o H i m . . . and to the extent m a n is close to reason, he is close t o G o d . This is possible only t h r o u g h rational k n o w l e d g e , w h i c h brings m a n close to G o d , just as ignorance cuts h i m o f f f r o m H i m . " The Neoplatonic tradition i n M u s l i m Spain was revived i n even more dramatic fashion by another physician-philosopher o f the A l m o h a d p e r i o d , A b u Bakr i b n Tufayl, w h o died i n 1184. U n l i k e most o f his predecessors, I b n Tufayi chose an o r i g i n a l literary f o r m , the philosophical novel, to express his ideas. The title o f

Cordoba, under the Umayyad caliphs in the tenth century, became a center of philosophy equal to Baghdad.The library of the caliph alHakam (r. 961-76) is reputed to have housed over four hundred thousand volumes. The city, with the Great Mosque at its center, grew

his famous novel is Risalat Hayy ibnYaqzan, w h i c h depicts the life and g r o w t h o f a

around a bridge crossing the

fictitious

Guadalquivir River.

figure,

b o r n o n a desert island i n the Indian Ocean. This figure is able

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to rise by degrees to the highest level o f philosophical insight or discovery. T h r o u g h observation and reflection, he is able, w i t h o u t any contact w i t h other h u m a n beings, to discover the t r u t h about G o d , the physical w o r l d , and the u l t i mate " c o n j u n c t i o n " w i t h the active intellect. U n l i k e his predecessor Ibn Bajjah, Ibn Tufayl argued that the contemplative or intellectual ideal o f the Neoplatonists is n o t e n o u g h , because i n that ideal the soul is not able to overcome the c o n sciousness o f its separate identity i n relation to the Necessary Being. I n Sufi fashi o n , I b n Tufayl argued instead that to achieve the c o n d i t i o n o f perfect u n i o n w i t h its source, the soul must rise to that level o f ecstasy that the Sufis have called e x t i n c t i o n (fana) i n u n i t y This represents the total a n n i h i l a t i o n o f selfhood and the r e c o g n i t i o n that i n reality n o t h i n g exists other than the True One; everything else, spiritual or corporeal, considered i n itself is n o t h i n g , as the Sufi masters, i n c l u d i n g al-Ghazali, had always contended. These Sufi overtones d i d not make m u c h headway i n Muslim-Spanish p h i l o sophical circles, as illustrated by the case o f the greatest Aristotelian o f Islam: I b n Rushd, k n o w n i n the West as Averroës. B o r n i n Córdoba i n 1126,

he was

i n t r o d u c e d at the age o f f o r t y to the c a l i p h A b u Yusuf Yaqub by I b n Tufayl, the caliph's court physician and minister. As a result o f this i n t r o d u c t i o n , the c a l i p h ordered I b n Rushd to e x p o u n d for h i m the w o r k s o f Aristotle, w h i c h the c a l i p h had

f o u n d " i n t r a c t a b l e . " I n a d d i t i o n to this c o m m i s s i o n , I b n Rushd was

appointed qudi (religious judge) o f Seville i n 1169 and t w o years later as c h i e f judge o f Córdoba. I n 1182

he was appointed physician-royal at the A l m o h a d

c o u r t i n Marrakesh. I n 119c, probably i n response to p u b l i c pressure i n c i t e d by religious conservatives and critics, the caliph A b u Yusuf Yaqub ordered I b n Rushd to be exiled to Lucena to the southeast o f Córdoba, his books to be b u r n e d i n p u b l i c , and the teaching o f p h i l o s o p h y and the "ancient sciences" w i t h the exception o f astronomy and m e d i c i n e , to be proscribed. I b n Rushd's disgrace d i d n o t last l o n g , however, because t w o years later he was restored to favor. He d i e d shortly thereafter i n

1198.

I b n Rushd's c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n philosophy, theology, medicine, and j u r i s p r u dence were v o l u m i n o u s and match i n scope and thoroughness those o f al-Farabi and I b n Sina, his only equals i n the East. H e outstrips t h e m b o t h , however, i n his thoroughness i n c o m m e n t i n g o n Aristotle's w o r k s and his serious attempt to grapple w i t h the perennial p r o b l e m o f reason and faith i n t w o o f his most i m p o r t a n t theological w o r k s : Decisive Treatise and Exposition of the Methods of Proof Concerning Religious Beliefs. Another i m p o r t a n t w o r k is his response to al-Ghazali's Incoherence of the Philosophers. K n o w n i n the M i d d l e Ages as "the commentator," or as the Italian poet Dante called h i m che'I gran commento feo, I b n Rushd w r o t e three types o f commentaries o n Aristotle's w o r k s : large, i n t e r m e d i a t e , and small. Rather than c o m m e n t i n g o n Aristotle's Politics, w h i c h for an u n k n o w n reason was

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n o t translated i n t o Arabic u n t d m o d e r n times, I b n Rushd w r o t e a u n i q u e c o m mentary o n Plato's Republic. A l m o s t all his commentaries have survived i n H e b r e w o r Latin translations and a fair n u m b e r o f t h e m i n the o r i g i n a l Arabic. The Latin commentaries were reprinted i n 1967 as part o f the edition o f Omnra Opera Aristotelis Cum Commentants Averrois.

Ibn Rushd ( 1 1 2 6 - 9 8 ) , known

I b n Rushd stands o u t as the greatest advocate since the n i n t h - c e n t u r y p h i l o s o pher a l - K i n d i o f the h a r m o n y o f p h i l o s o p h y and r e l i g i o n , o r m o r e specifically o f Aristotle and the Q u r a n . A c c o r d i n g to I b n Rushd, the issues that had pitted the M u s l i m theologians against the philosophers o f Islam were o f t e n matters o f

in the West as Averroës, was the most important medieval commentator on the works of Aristotle. Ibn Rushd attempted to harmo-

semantics. Properly i n t e r p r e t e d , he believed, the statements o f the Q u r a n are

nize Aristotelian philosophy

readily reconcilable w i t h philosophy. The Q u r a n itself recognized this fact: i n

with the teachings of the

3 : ç—6, the Q u r a n distinguishes between those verses that are " s o u n d " and those

Quran. Raphael portrayed

that are ambiguous. The f o r m e r constitute the core o f the Q u r a n or the M o t h e r o f the Book, the latter are o p e n to various interpretations. O n l y God and those

Ibn Rushd wearing a green robe and white turban and standing behind Aristotle in

" w e l l - g r o u n d e d i n k n o w l e d g e , " I b n Rushd argued o n the basis o f his o w n read-

his painting The School of

ings o f these verses, k n o w its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . By those " w e l l - g r o u n d e d i n k n o w l -

Athens in the Stanza della

edge,"

Signatura in the Vatican.

I b n Rushd

was

emphatic

that the

philosophers

or

"people

of

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d e m o n s t r a t i o n " should be understood. The o t h e r s — i n c l u d i n g the theologians or "people o f dialectic" and the masses at large or " r h e t o r i c a l " group)—are n o t c o m petent to engage i n this interpretation and are thus p r o h i b i t e d f r o m disclosing this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , w h i c h can o n l y lead to dissension and strife a m o n g M u s l i m s . To demonstrate this p o i n t , I b n Rushd proceeded i n his Incoherence of the Incoherence and Exposition to rebut al-Ghazali's arguments against the philosophers. O n the first issue o f the eternity o f the w o r l d , he argued that contrary to al-Ghazali's cont e n t i o n , the philosophers d o n o t believe the w o r l d to be really eternal or really t e m p o r a l . A c c o r d i n g to I b n Rushd, the f o r m e r thesis entails that like G o d , the w o r l d is uncreated; the latter that i t is c o r r u p t i b l e . The genuine teaching o f the philosophers, he explained, is that the w o r l d is generated ab cteterno ( f r o m etern i t y ) . This is so because the c l a i m that i t was generated i n t i m e (muhdath) simply derogates f r o m God's p o w e r or perfection, because i t w o u l d entail that God c o u l d n o t have b r o u g h t the w o r l d i n t o being before the specific t i m e He created it and w o u l d raise the question w h y H e chose to create i t at that specific time and n o other. O n the second issue, that the philosophers deny God's k n o w l e d g e o f particulars, I b n Rushd reported that w h a t the philosophers i n fact deny is that God's k n o w l e d g e is analogous to that o f humans and thus divisible i n t o particular and universal. The t w o are radically different: h u m a n k n o w l e d g e is an effect o f the t h i n g k n o w n , whereas God's k n o w l e d g e is the cause o f the t h i n g k n o w n and a c c o r d i n g l y is n e i t h e r universal n o r particular b u t is o f its o w n k i n d . Moreover, its m o d e is u n k n o w n to us, because, like God's w i l l , i t is part o f the mystery o f God's creative power. O n the t h i r d issue o f resurrection, I b n Rushd explained, the philosophers and the religious creeds o f his day are i n accord regarding the fact o f resurrection, b u t they differ o n its m o d e . The philosophers, he h e l d , subscribe to spiritual resurrection or i m m o r t a l i t y (maad) and regard the Quranic references to corporeal resurrection and the pleasures and pains o f heaven and h e l l as so m a n y p i c t o r i a l or sensuous representations o f spiritual truths, i n t e n d e d to sway or deter the masses, w h o are unable to understand the subtle, s p i r i t u a l language o f revelation. I b n Rushd f u r t h e r i m p u g n e d al-Ghazali's sincerity i n d e n y i n g the necessary correlation between cause and effect, o n the g r o u n d that this denial is a sophistical gambit i n w h i c h " o n e denies verbally w h a t is i n his heart," that is, w i t h o u t serious c o n v i c t i o n or s i m p l y o u t o f malice. H e t h e n proceeded to r i d i c u l e alGhazali's n o t i o n that the alleged correlation between cause and effect is a matter o f habit, b o r n o f h u m a n k i n d ' s observation o f the recurrence o f cause-effect sequences. By habit, al-Ghazali c o u l d only mean God's habit, w h i c h the Q u r a n {Z5

:

4 5 ) denies o n the g r o u n d that God's ways are i m m u t a b l e ; that o f inanimate

objects, w h i c h is absurd; or finally, humankind's o w n habit o f j u d g i n g the correlation o f events i n the w o r l d . This is synonymous w i t h the activity o f reason,

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w h i c h is n o t h i n g other than the k n o w l e d g e o f the cause u n d e r l y i n g any given effect o r series o f effects. Thus, " h e w h o repudiates causality," I b n Rushd w r o t e , "actually repudiates reason." This r e p u d i a t i o n logically entails the r e p u d i a t i o n o f that d i v i n e w i s d o m that presides over creation and has ordered i t according t o a fixed causal pattern f r o m w h i c h the m i n d is able t o rise t o the discovery o f its Maker o r First Cause. I n the context o f European medieval t h o u g h t , I b n Rushd's standing was u n r i valed. W h e n his commentaries o n Aristotle were translated i n t o Latin i n the first half o f the t h i r t e e n t h century at the hands o f a galaxy o f European

scholars—

Michael the Scot, H e r m a n the German, Gundissalinus, and many others—-they caused a genuine stir i n intellectual circles. By the m i d - t h i r t e e n t h century a large contingent o f Latin Averroists, led b y the French philosopher Siger o f Brabant a n d the t h e o l o g i a n Boethius o f Dacia, were b a t t l i n g i n Paris against the Augustinian-Avicennian party, c h a m p i o n e d by the Franciscans. Eventually, i n 1270 a c o n d e m n a t i o n o f thirteen Aristotelian-Averroist theses was issued, at the insistence o f the Bishop o f Paris, Etienne Tempier, and was f o l l o w e d i n 1277 by a m o r e sweeping c o n d e m n a t i o n o f 219 theses, many o f w h i c h were o f Averroist inspiration. They i n c l u d e d the eternity o f the w o r l d , the double t r u t h , the denial o f d i v i n e providence, the u n i t y o f the intellect, the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l resurrection, the superiority o f philosophical over religious t r u t h , and the i m p o s sibility o f miracles. A l t h o u g h I b n Rushd was innocent o f some o f these charges, especially that o f the double t r u t h , i t is a measure o f his intellectual impact that European philosophers a n d theologians d u r i n g the t h i r t e e n t h century, i n c l u d i n g Thomas Aquinas ( 1 2 2 5 - 7 4 ) , were actually battling u n d e r the strange banner o f pro-Averroists and anti-Averroists.

The Recrudescence of Literalism and Theological Reaction Al-Ghazali's assault o n p l u l o s o p h y i n the tenth century was devastating, b u t i t allowed for the r i g h t o f reason t o arbitrate i n theological conflicts. Even the f o u n d e r o f the Asharite school himself, A b u al-Hasan al-Ashari, had lauded " t h e merits o f engaging i n theological discourse [kalam]." Before l o n g , the antira¬ tionalist tide began t o swell, however, as illustrated by the cases o f I b n H a z m , the Zahirite ( o r literalist) ( 9 9 4 - 1 0 6 4 ) , I b n Taymiyah (1263-1328), and I b n Q a y y i m al-Jawziyah (1292-1350) i n the eleventh t h r o u g h the f o u r t e e n t h centuries. I b n H a z m was a leading figure i n the h i s t o r y o f Islamic literature, ethics, and historiography. His learning was vast, as s h o w n b y his Discriminations of Fancies and Religious Creeds, his Ethical Traits and Modes of Conduct, and his Book of Rebuttal. I n the Book of Rebuttal, he rejected, o u t o f h a n d , all f o r m s o f d e d u c t i o n , analogy, o p i n i o n , o r i m i t a t i o n o f authoritative masters (taqlid), w h i c h the various schools o f theology

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and jurisprudence had applied over the centuries i n some f o r m or other. He then proceeded to denounce all methods o f theological discourse, w h e t h e r Mutazilite or Asharite, and conceded o n l y the testimony o f sense experience, i n t u i t i o n , or the explicit statements o f the Q u r a n and the h a d i t h , literally interpreted. I b n H a z m was o u t s t r i p p e d i n his advocacy o f e m p i r i c i s m and literalism by a t h i r t e e n t h - and fourteenth-century scholar: I b n Taymiyah. Like I b n H a z m , I b n Taymiyah denounced all theological and philosophical m e t h o d s o f proof and called for a r e t u r n to the ways o f the " p i o u s ancestors" (al-salaf al-salih). This call was destined to become the slogan o f modernists i n the nineteenth century and is still a potent religious slogan today. A c c o r d i n g to I b n Taymiyah, the only genuine sources o f religious t r u t h are the Q u r a n and the h a d i t h , as interpreted by the Companions o f the Prophet or their i m m e d i a t e successors. The a u t h o r i t y o f Damascus was a center of

those interpreters, c o n f i r m e d by the consensus {ijma) o f the c o m m u n i t y , is i n f a l -

theology in medieval times.

lible. A l l subsequent interpretations or theological, p h i l o s o p h i c a l , and mystical

Sunni rulers of the Ayyubid

developments since that t i m e are deviations or heresies (bida). I n his Harmony of

and Mamluk dynasties built theological colleges around the Great Mosque, founded

Reason and Tradition, I b n Taymiyah attacked I b n Rushd for h r n i t i n g the n u m b e r o f theological groups to f o u r : the esoteric, the Literalist, the Mutazilite, and the

by the Umayyads in the early

Asharite. This excluded the creed o f the " p i o u s ancestors," w h i c h is the "best

eighth century. Al-Ghazali,

creed o f this ( M u s l i m ) c o m m u n i t y till the Day o f Resurrection."

the major figure in the assault against Neoplatonism. spent several years in meditation there, and IbnTaymiyya (d. 1328),

I b n Taymiyah also attacked the philosophers, but unlike al-Ghazali, he d i d not spare any o f the philosophical sciences, i n c l u d i n g logic, w h i c h al-Ghazali had regarded as an " i n s t r u m e n t o f t h o u g h t " and as such religiously neutral or i n n o c u ous. The Aristotelian theory o f d e f i n i t i o n , w h i c h is one o f the cornerstones o f

great champion of empiri-

logic, is untenable according to I b n Taymiyah because o f the difficulty o f deter-

cism and literalism, spent

m i n i n g the infinite n u m b e r o f species and the essential distinguishing traits u p o n

most of his life in the city.

w h i c h d e f i n i t i o n actually depends. The theory o f the syllogism is equally unten-

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able because the ultimate validity o f the syllogism depends on

self-evident p r o p o s i t i o n s i n t u i t i v e l y

apprehended.

Considering the diversity o f human aptitudes, such apprehension w i l l always remain dubious or questionable. Even demonstration (barbon), regarded by the philosophers as the highest f o r m o f reasoning, is vacuous because it bears o n universals that exist i n the m i n d and are far removed for that reason f r o m particulars that constitute the very fabric o f reality. I b n Taymiyah's b e s t - k n o w n disciple was I b n Qayyim al-Jawziyah, another key figure i n the history o f the reaction against philosophy and theology that was i n i tiated i n the n i n t h century by A h m a d i b n Hanbal. This reaction culminated i n the eighteenth century i n the rise o f the Wahhabi m o v e m e n t , founded by M u h a m m a d i b n A b d al-Wahhab (1703—92), w h i c h i n t i m e became the official creed o f the Saudi dynasty i n Arabia. The Wahhabis share w i t h I b n Taymiyah and his school, i n addition to literalism, strict observance o f the M u s l i m rituals and the condemnation o f the cult o f saints and w h a t they consider to be "similar excesses" o f the Sufi orders. The f o u r t e e n t h c e n t u r y is d o m i n a t e d by the Arab philosopher, historian, and sociologist I b n K h a l d u n , w h o was b o r n i n Tunis i n 1332

and d i e d i n Cairo i n 1406. A

versatile and encyclopedic genius, I b n K h a l d u n developed

Tunis, located near the ancient site of Carthage, was

the o n l y coherent p h i l o s o p h y o f history i n Islam that was

the birthplace of Ibn Khaldun ( 1 5 3 2 - 1 4 0 6 ) , the ency-

based o n the dialectic o f transition f r o m n o m a d i c life t o

clopedic genius who developed the only coherent

sedentary or u r b a n life and i n w h i c h geographic, ecological, and economic factors were the potent forces determ i n i n g the cyclical pattern o f social and political change i n the w o r l d . An e m p i r i c i s t by nature, I b n K h a l d u n agreed

philosophy of history in Islam. Religious learning there centered around the Zitouna Mosque, founded in the ninth century, particularly when Tunis became home to many scholars fleeing the Marinid invasion of Morocco in the mid-fourteenth century.

w i t h al-Ghaz.ali and I b n Taymiyah i n their r e p u d i a t i o n o f the p h i l o s o p h i c a l methods o f discourse, because their arguments t u r n o n universals or conceptual matters, whose

correspondence

w i t h reality cannot be conclusively demonstrated. I n fact, the " s p i r i t u a l entities" that f o r m the subject matter o f metaphysics can never be k n o w n rationally; thus the philosophers' conclusions regarding those entities are, at best, matters o f o p i n i o n (doxa), as Plato h i m s e l f acknowledges. As for their physical speculations, they are entirely futile, "because questions o f physics d o not concern us, either in o u r r e l i g i o n or o u r l i v e l i h o o d , and therefore w e should abandon t h e m , " as I b n Khaldun w r o t e i n his discussion o f the plulosophical sciences i n his famous

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Prolegomena. I b n K h a l d u n , w h o was mystically i n c l i n e d , also rejected the Neoplatonist concept o f happiness as l y i n g i n " c o n j u n c t i o n " w i t h the active intellect. This c o n j u n c t i o n , he believed, is purely intellectual and rests o n r a t i o nal deductions r o o t e d i n " b o d i l y cognitions." Genuine happiness is attainable o n l y t h r o u g h the practice o f the Sufi way and the m o r t i f i c a t i o n o f the self. To r e t u r n t o theological developments, the most i m p o r t a n t figure d u r i n g the t w e l f t h c e n t u r y was Fakhr a l - D i n al-Razi, w h o was b o r n i n Rayy i n 1149 and d i e d i n Herat i n 1209. U n l i k e al-Ghazali and I b n Taymiyah, al-Razi recognized n o serious c o n f l i c t between p h i l o s o p h y and t h e o l o g y and deferred constantly i n h i s discussion o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l and theological questions t o the a u t h o r i t y o f I b n Sina, w h o s e i n f l u e n c e o n al-Razi's t h o u g h t was p r o f o u n d . D u r i n g the t h i r t e e n t h and f o u r t e e n t h centuries t h e o l o g y began t o decline and the c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f scholars d u r i n g that p e r i o d and b e y o n d was l i m i t e d t o c o m m e n taries o r s u p e r c o m m e n t a r i e s

o n the w r i t i n g s o f the classical masters. T h e

n o t e w o r t h y theologians o f this p e r i o d i n c l u d e al-Nasafi ( d . 1310), a l - I j i ( d . 1355), al-Taftazani ( d . 1390), and al-Jurjani (1339-1413). The most i m p o r t a n t theologians o f the f i f t e e n t h and sixteenth centuries are a l - B i r g i l i ( d . IÇ70), a l Laqani ( d . 1621), and al-Sialkuti ( d . 1657). I n the n i n e t e e n t h century al-Bajuri (d.

i860)

h e r a l d e d the m o d e r n p e r i o d , o f w h i c h the E g y p t i a n scholar

M u h a m m a d A b d u h ( 1 8 4 9 - 1 9 0 5 ) , considered the f o u n d e r o f Islamic m o d e r n i s m , was the c h i e f representative.

The Ishraqi Movement in Persia A partial reaction against Aristotelianism, k n o w n as the " w i s d o m o f i u u m i n a t i o n " (ishraq), took i n the t w e l f t h century the f o r m o f a revised version o f Avicennian N e o p l a t o n i s m , w h i c h succeeded i n reconciling philosophy t o Sufism. I b n Sina h i m s e l f had expressed i n some o f his later works a certain dissatisfaction w i t h the purely discursive methods o f the Peripatetics and proposed to lay the g r o u n d w o r k o f an " O r i e n t a l w i s d o m " i n t o w h i c h certain " o r i e n t a l " (Eastern) elements were incorporated. He d i d not w o r k o u t the full implications o f this philosophy, how ever. It was left to another Persian philosopher-mystic to draw these implications. Shihab a l - D i n al-Suhrawardi was b o r n i n Aleppo, Syria, i n 1154 and was killed by order o f the sultan Saladin i n 1191 o n an undefined charge o f blasphemy. Like I b n Sina, al-Suhrawardi expressed his dissatisfaction w i t h the discursive m e t h o d o f the Peripatetics o f his day, w h o misunderstood the intent o f Aristotle, the First Teacher and Master o f W i s d o m , as he called h i m . Aristotle appeared t o al-Suhrawardi i n a dream and engaged h i m i n a discussion o f the nature o f knowledge, conjunction, and u n i o n , as w e l l as the status o f the philosophers o f Islam and the Sufis, w h o had attained the level o f "concrete k n o w l e d g e " and visual contact and were

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accordingly the true philosophers and sages o f Islam. W h a t distinguishes those sages, al-Suhrawardi believed, is that they have partaken o f an ancient w i s d o m that goes back to Plato, and beyond h i m to Hermes and the other ancient Greek, sages such as Empedocles and Pythagoras. I n addition, this w i s d o m has an Eastern source and rests on the dualism o f Light and darkness that was preached by such ancient Persian sages as Jamasp, Frashustra, Buzurgimhr, and their predecessors. The chief representatives o f this w i s d o m i n the West were Plato, Agathadaimon, The Syrian philosopher Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi ( ¡ 1 5 4 - 9 9 ) developed a revised version of Avicennian

and Ascelepius, and i t culminated i n the w o r k o f al-Bistami ( d . 876), the mystic al-Hallaj (ca. 855-922.), and al-Suhrawardi himself. The core o f the " w i s d o m o f i l l u m i n a t i o n " al-Suhrawardi proposed is the sci-

Neoplatonism, called the

ence o f l i g h t , w h i c h he defined as a substance diffused t h r o u g h o u t the universe

"Wisdom of Illumination"

that gives everything its reality and its capacity for self-manifestadon. At the t o p

(ishraq), which succeeded in

o f the scale o f b e i n g stands the L i g h t o f Lights, i d e n t i f i e d w i t h I b n Sina's

reconciling philosophy to

Necessary Being. It is the source o f all being and l u m i n o s i t y i n the w o r l d . The

Sufism. The walls of the Firdaws madrasa, built in his native city of Aleppo in 1236,

first emanation f r o m the Light o f Lights is the first l i g h t , corresponding to I b n Sina's first intellect, f o l l o w e d by the secondary lights that differ f r o m the L i g h t

are inscribed with texts that

o f Lights only i n the degree o f their p u r i t y or perfection. Then come the heav-

suggest Suhrawardi s philos-

enly bodies, physical objects and material compounds or simple elements, w i i i c h

ophy was studied there.

together constitute the physical w o r l d . A c o m b i n a t i o n o f l i g h t and darkness, this

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w o r l d may be described as the shadow or penumbra o f the w o r l d o f l i g h t . Like its o r i g i n a l source, this w o r l d is eternal. This Ishraqi w i s d o m became Persia's distinctive philosophy, i n response t o alGhazali's onslaught o n N e o p l a t o n i s m a n d the enthusiastic

patronage o f the

Safawid dynasty, inaugurated by Shah U s m a i l (r. i c o o - 1 Ç 2 4 ) , w h o c l a i m e d descent f r o m a Sufi family. A n u m b e r o f Shiite scholars distinguished themselves d u r i n g this p e r i o d , o f w h i c h M i r Damad ( d . 1631) a n d a l - A m i l i (ca. iÇ46-ca. 1622) are w o r t h m e n t i o n . They were teachers of Sadr a l - D i n al-Shirazi, w h o is generally regarded as the greatest philosopher o f m o d e r n Persia. Al-Shirazi, better k n o w n i n Persia as M u l l a Sadra, was b o r n i n Shiraz a r o u n d 1571 and died i n Basra i n 1640 o n his way back f r o m the seventh pilgrimage t o Mecca. Al-Shirazi's philosophical c o n t r i b u t i o n s were v o l u m i n o u s , b u t his most i m p o r t a n t w o r k is Transcendental Wisdom, i n t e n d e d as a c o u n t e r p a r t t o al-Suhrawardi's Wisdom of Illumination and better k n o w n as Four Journeys. These f o u r journeys are ( 1 ) f r o m cre-

Mulla Sadr-al-Din (1571-1640),

regarded as the

greatest philosopher of postmedieval Persia, left his native Shiraz for the new

ation t o the true reality, ( 2 ) t h r o u g h the true reality t o the true reality, ( 3 ) f r o m

Safavid capital of Isfahan,

the true reality t o creation, a n d ( 4 ) i n creation t h r o u g h the true reality.

where he studied for several

According t o al-Shirazi, the Necessary Being or Light o f Lights creates the w o r l d i n t i m e " b y o r d e r i n g it t o be and it becomes," as the Q u r a n 3142 and 16:42 state. Accordingly, it is far f r o m being eternal, as al-Suhrawardi, I b n Sina, and the

years with leading scholars attracted there by Shah Abbas' patronage.The great square with its new congre-

Neoplatonists generally held. Being a c o m b i n a t i o n o f l i g h t and darkness, the soul

gational mosque dates from

serves as a link between the intelligible w o r l d or " w o r l d o f c o m m a n d , " as the Sufis

this period.

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called i t , and the material w o r l d or " w o r l d o f creation." The w o r l d o f creation begins w i t h the universal sphere, w h i c h separates the w o r l d o f intelligible f o r m s or souls f r o m the material w o r l d o f sensible entities. Al-Shirazi is categorical that both soul and body w i l l rise f r o m the dead o n the Day o f Resurrection. Once resurrected, the b o d y w i l l assume an ethereal f o r m and thereupon become i d e n t i fied w i t h the soul, because " i n the Hereafter, everything is alive and its life is identical w i t h its essence," as he w r o t e i n his treatise, Mustering and Resurrection. A n o t e w o r t h y feature o f al-Shirazi's metaphysical a n d historical d o c t r i n e is the application o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l categories to Shiism. H e argued that w o r l d history's p r o p h e t i c stage came t o an end f o l l o w i n g the death o f M u h a m m a d , the Seal o f the Prophets, and t h e r e u p o n started the I m a m i t e stage, w h i c h is represented by the c h a i n o f twelve Shiite i m a m s . This stage c o n t i n u e d u n t i l the return o f the t w e l f t h i m a m , w h o was i n t e m p o r a r y concealment, according to Shiite d o c t r i n e . Since the seventeenth century Al-Shirazi's influence has c o n t i n ued to d o m i n a t e Persian t h o u g h t .

Modern Philosophical and Theological Developments As already m e n t i o n e d , the Ishraqi tradition, w h i c h culminated i n al-Shirazi's transcendental w i s d o m d u r i n g the Safavid p e r i o d , continued w e l l i n t o m o d e r n times. Al-Shirazi's disciples and successors include his t w o sons, I b r a h i m and A h m a d , and others: Fayaz al-Lahiji ( d . 1662), M u h s i n Fayd Kashani ( d . 1680), M u h a m m a d Baqir Majlisi ( d . 1700), and Nimatulla Shustari ( d . 1691). I n the nineteenth century, al-Shirazi's most i m p o r t a n t successor was the Persian philosopher Haji H a d i Sabzevari (1797

or 1798-1878), w h o c o m m e n t e d o n al-Shirazi's works. Other

commentators include such eminent philosophers and scholars as Mirza A b u l Hasam Jilwah, M i r z a h M a h d i Ashtiyani, and M i r z a Tahir Tunikabuni. In m o r e recent years, the Ishraqi t r a d i t i o n has c o n t i n u e d to f l o u r i s h i n Persia ( m o d e r n I r a n ) , as illustrated by the c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f M u h a m m a d Qasim Assar, Sayyid Abul-Hasan Q a z w i n i , a n d M u h a m m a d HusaynTabatabaii. A l t h o u g h these scholars have aligned themselves w i t h the Ishraqi t r a d i t i o n as represented by alShirazi, some have contended that al-Shirazi was far m o r e dependent o n I b n Sina's Peripetatic p h i l o s o p h y than most o f his disciples o r successors have been w i l l i n g to a d m i t . Other c o n t e m p o r a r y Persian philosophers w h o have c o m m e n t e d o n the w o r k s o f I b n Sina a n d al-Shirazi i n c l u d e M a h m u d Shahabi, M u h a m m a d M i s h k a t , the Persian Lady, Yak B a n u - y i I r a n i , a n d Sayyid Jalal Ashtiyani. Other philosophers, such as Murtada M u t a h h a r i , Akkamah Shaiati, and the Ayatollahs K h o m e i n i , M u n t a z i r i , a n d T a l i q a n i , have concentrated o n political subjects a n d the problems facing Islam today. Their t h o u g h t , however, continues to reflect the influence o f the Ishraqi-Shiite t r a d i t i o n . Sayyed Hossain Nasr is

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often m e n t i o n e d as the leading Persian philosopher t o w r i t e i n English and t o address the question o f the encounter o f Islam w i t h m o d e r n Western t h o u g h t . I n w h a t is n o w India and Pakistan, Islamic p h i l o s o p h y was i n t r o d u c e d by the Ismaili propagandists (dais) as early as the late n i n t h century. The Ismadis, w h o succeeded i n f o u n d i n g an I s m a i l i state i n Sind (part o f the Indus River valley) i n 977, were o v e r t h r o w n by the Ghaznavid dynasty. D u r i n g the Ghaznavid p e r i o d , the most n o t e w o r t h y scholar was Abul-Hasan a l - H u j w i r i ( d . 1072), author o f a famous mystical treatise entitled Uncovering the Hidden. D u r i n g the rule o f the successor dynasty, the Ghurids, the t w o most eminent scholars were Fakhr a l - D i n alRazi and A d u d a l - D i n al-Iji ( d . 1355), w h o were succeeded d u r i n g the M o n g o l p e r i o d by such scholars and theologians as Sadr a l - D i n al-Taftazani ( d . 1390), alSharif al-Jurjani ( 1339— H ^ ) . J

a i a i

al-Din al-Dawwani (d.

ICOI

), Shaykh A h m a d

Sirhindi ( i Ç 9 3 - i 6 2 4 ) , and A b d a l - H a k i m Siyalkuti ( d . 1657). T h e most famous I n d i a n scholar o f the eighteenth century was Shah W a l l i u l l a h ( d . 1762), w h o w r o t e i n b o t h Arabic and Persian. H e attempted to reconcile the f o u r schools o f Islamic law and t o b r i n g together the Sunni and Shiite branches o f Islam. As Islam came into contact w i t h Western t h o u g h t i n the nineteenth and t w e n tieth centuries, some I n d i a n scholars, such as the educator and jurist Sayyid .Ahmad Khan o f Bahador ( 1817-98), spearheaded a modernist movement that saw n o genuine conflict between Islam and Christianity because o f their c o m m o n m o r a l message. A h m a d Khan's disciple, Sayyid A m i r A h (1849-1928), believed the spirit o f Islam is ultimately reducible t o that cluster o f m o r a l ideas or principles that are at the basis o f m o d e r n Western liberalism and h u m a n i s m . The poetphilosopher M u h a m m a d Iqbal ( 1877—1938) continued essentially the same line o f speculation and attempted, m o r e seriously than his predecessors, t o interpret Islam i n contemporary philosophical terms. I n his famous Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Iqbal rejected the antirationalism o f al-Ghazali and I b n Taymiyah and argued that r e l i g i o n is n o t i n o p p o s i t i o n to philosophy but is rather the core o f that total experience u p o n w h i c h phdosophy must reflect, as b o r n o u t by the Quranic exhortation t o reflect u p o n God's creation and t o pursue knowledge for its o w n sake. For Iqbal the Quranic w o r l d v i e w is that o f a dynamic reality i n w h i c h the ideal and the real coalesce. It is n o t a " b l o c k universe" o r finished product; rather, i t is i n process o f constant actualization, at the hands o f h u m a n k i n d , the principal co-worker w i t h G o d . I n some respects, Iqbal's ideas appear t o be a n adaptation o f the "creative e v o l u t i o n " o f the French philosopher H e n r i - L o u i s Bergson, the "process p h i l o s o p h y " o f Alfred N o r t h Whitehead, and the "absolute i d e a l i s m " o f the German philosopher Georg W i l h e l m Friedrich Hegel. I n Southeast Asia, w h i c h came under Islam's influence as early as the t h i r t e e n t h century, a p r o f u s i o n o f w r i t i n g s o n jurisprudence, theology, and Sufism appeared d u r i n g the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries i n Malay. O f these w r i t i n g s , the

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works o f Hamzah al-Fanzuri ( d . ca. 1600), N u r a l - D i n al-Raniri ( d . 1666), Shams a l - D i n al-Sumatrani (d. 1630), and A b d al-Rauf al-Singkeli ( d . 1693) are p a r t i c u larly noteworthy. These w r i t i n g s reflected the p r o f o u n d impact o f Sufism o n the Malaysian m i n d , w h i c h tended to be less philosophical or discursive than the Indian or Persian. Interest i n Sufism began to decline d u r i n g the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, b u t the situation changed somewhat d u r i n g the twentieth century, as the w o r k s o f M u h a m m a d N a g u i b al Attas and others show. O f al-Anas' many w r i t ings i n English, The Mysticism of Hamzah al-Fanzuri, Meaning and Experience of Happiness in Islam, and Islam, Secularism, and the Philosophy of the Future are noteworthy. I n Islam, Secularism, and the Philosophy of the Future, al-Attas vehemently c r i t i c i z e d Western Christianity, w h i c h he said is not a revealed r e l i g i o n b u t a "sophisticated f o r m o f culture r e l i g i o n . " Like other fundamentalists, al-Attas dwelled o n Islam's superiority, as the only r e l i g i o n that is t r u l y global because i t encompasses every aspect o f h u m a n life, private or p u b l i c , spiritual and temporal, i n contradistinction to Christianity, w h i c h he claimed o n l y stresses the spiritual aspects o f life.

Philosophy in the Arab World Today W h e n the p o l i t i c a l activist and journalist Jamal a l - D i n al-Afghani (1838—97) visited Egypt for the first t i m e , he was struck by the fact that a l t h o u g h the study o f p h i l o s o p h y had continued i n Persia, i t was completely forgotten i n Syria and Egypt. His disciple, the Islamic m o d e r n i s t M u h a m m a d A b d u h ( 1 8 4 9 - 1 9 0 5 ) ,

was

actually the first M u s l i m scholar to lecture o n p h i l o s o p h y at al-Azhar University, w h i c h he sought to r e f o r m . Significantly, A b d u h chose as his theme the p h i l o s o p h y o f I b n K h a l d u n , the last great w r i t e r o n the history o f ideas and the o r i g i nal author o f Islam's o n l y p h i l o s o p h y o f history. A r o u n d the same t i m e , Farah A n t u n (1874—1922) w r o t e o n philosophical questions i n his Arabic magazine aljamiah, and i n 1903 he published the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd, one o f the first i m p r e s sive treatises o n the subject i n Arabic. Serious w o r k o n the history o f Islamic p h i l o s o p h y flourished d u r i n g the first decades o f the t w e n t i e t h century at the hands o f such eminent scholars as Jamil Saliba, I b r a h i m Madkour, Yusuf Karam, and Father George Anawati, w h o laid the f o u n d a t i o n o f historical scholarship i n Arabic. Their p i o n e e r i n g w o r k was c o n t i n u e d by such leading scholars as A b d alRahman Badawi and Zaki N a j i b M a h m u d . I n the 1970s, Badawi m a d e a valuable c o n t r i b u t i o n to philosophical scholarship w i t h his critical editions o f a vast n u m b e r o f Arabic p h i l o s o p h i c a l texts and his French Histoire de la Philosophie Musulmane. M a h m u d c o n t r i b u t e d to the critical reinterpretation o f the Islamic philosophical heritage w i t h his 1971 p u b l i c a t i o n o f Renewal of Arabic Thought. H i s Egyptian disciple, Fuad Zakariyah, carried the discussion and evaluation o f the

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Arabic philosophical heritage (ai-turath) one step further, calling for total c o m m i t m e n t to rationalism, p o s i t i v i s m , and m o d e r n scientific culture.

Modernism, Secularism, and Fundamentalism Today the major religious currents, w i t h their divergent theological presuppositions, take a variety o f rival f o r m s . M o d e r n i s m ( w h i c h calls for a m o d e r n interpretation o f Islam), secularism ( w h i c h calls for the separation o f r e l i g i o n and politics), and fundamentalism ( w h i c h is unwavering i n its c o m m i t m e n t t o trad i t i o n a l Islam and its anti-Western bias) are the major contending currents. The modernist (or reformist) m o v e m e n t was launched by Sayyid A h m a d Khan and Sayyid A m i r Ali i n the second h a l f o f the nineteenth century. Both o f these r e l i gious thinkers conceived o f m o d e r n i s m as a m o d e o f isolating the m o r a l and s p i r i t u a l core o f Islam, w h i c h A h m a d Khan believed to be analogous to Christianity and A m i r A l i believed to be timeless and universal. The philosopher M u h a m m a d Iqbal conceived o f Islam i n dynamic terms best understood i n l i g h t o f m o d e r n Western philosophical developments. I n Egypt the t w o c h i e f protagonists o f m o d e r n i s m were Jamal a l - D i n a l A f g h a n i and his disciple, M u h a m m a d A b d u h , w h o spearheaded a religious movement k n o w n as the Salafi movement. This movement aimed to modernize Islam, demonstrate its v i a b i l i t y for all times, and p r o m o t e social and political change w i t h i n the confines o f the Shariah. I n their defense o f Islam against its European detractors, such as the French politician Gabriel Hanotaux and the English L o r d Cromer, these Islamic modernists proclaimed, like their I n d i a n counterparts, Islam's global character and its complete c o m p a t i b i l i t y w i t h rational canons o f argument or debate. According to A b d u h , a l t h o u g h Christianity calls for g i v i n g to Caesar w h a t is Caesar's and to God what is God's, Islam calls for the s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f everything to God and thus rejects the separation o f the spiritual and the temporal. I n a d d i t i o n , unlike Christianity and other supernatural religions, Islam is f u l l y c o m m i t t e d to rationality and rejects any preternatural or supernatural explanations, such as miracles or mysteries. M o r e radical, and i n some cases m o r e violent, p o s t - m i d c e n t u r y f u n d a m e n talists, such as Sayyid Q u t b ( 1 9 0 6 - 6 6 ) i n Egypt and Mawlana Abul Ala M a w d u d i (1903—79) i n Pakistan, have tended to target Christianity and the West as the causes o f the decadence o f the M u s l i m people o n the one hand and the spread o f secularism and i r r e l i g i o n o n the other. Because o f its exclusive spiritual character, they have argued, Christianity has abandoned h u m a n k i n d to its egotistic and materialistic resources and has violated the supreme p r i n c i p l e o f d i v i n e u n i t y (tawhid), w h i c h stipulates that God's sovereignty and l o r d s h i p is not c o n fined to the spiritual aspects o f h u m a n life; rather, it dominates and regulates

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every aspect o f that life. I n his critique o f Western civilization, A b u l Ala M a w d u d i inveighed against Western nationalism, democracy, and secularism. A c c o r d i n g to Abul Ala M a w d u d i , nationalism culminates ultimately i n the cult o f the n a t i o n , democracy i n the tyranny o f the majority, and secularism i n the r e p u d i a t i o n o f God's universal l o r d s h i p and ultimately i n i r r e l i g i o n or atheism. To the extent that M u s l i m s are w i l l i n g to adopt Western democracy, nationalism, or secularism, he proclaimed, they are i n fact abandoning their r e l i g i o n , betraying their Prophet, and rebelling against G o d H i m s e l f . Based o n these sentiments, the Islamic Movement was f o u n d e d i n 1941 i n Pakistan; A b u l Ala M a w d u d i was its first president, and it was dedicated to leading the M u s l i m people back to G o d , to f i g h t i n g Western ideologies, and to r e n o u n c i n g c o r r u p t leadership. These aims c o u l d n o t be achieved w i t h o u t recourse to jihüd, w h i c h A b u l Ala M a w d u d i defined i n his Moral Foundation of the Islamic Movement (1976) as " t h e attempt t o establish the divine order," by wresting leadership f r o m the c o r r u p t and unbelieving m e n w h o are i n power. Islam demands f r o m its followers total submission to God and shuns every f o r m o f p o l y t h e i s m and materialism. It thus " p u r i f i e s the soul f r o m self-seeking, egotism, tyranny, and wantonness," he w r o t e , " I t induces feelings o f m o r a l responsibility and fosters the capacity for self-control." Sayyid Q u t b i n Egypt was as vehement as A b u l Ala M a w d u d i i n his critique o f Western civilization, w h i c h he said has led h u m a n i t y d o w n the road o f c o r r u p t i o n and i r r e l i g i o n , f r o m w h i c h only Islam can save it. As he w r o t e i n his Islam and the Problems of Civilization (1962), Islam, unlike Christianity, recognizes n o conflict between reason and faith, science and r e l i g i o n , and it conceives o f r e l i g i o n "as the crucible o f the w h o l e o f life i n w h i c h all its f o r m s and hues are fused." As the "global r e l i g i o n , " Islam was thus at peace w i t h science f r o m the earliest times and has paved the way for the rise o f the inductive m e t h o d and the scientific progress of modern

times.

As one w o u l d expect, secular inteUectuals have been at loggerheads w i t h the fundamentalists o n a variety o f issues. To begin w i t h , they challenge the concept o f theocracy u p o n w h i c h the medieval caliphate rested and call for the separat i o n o f the political and spiritual. I n that respect, they are unquestionably inspired b y Christian t h e o l o g y and Western p o l i t i c a l t h o u g h t . The most t h o u g h t f u l M u s l i m secularists have gone beyond this somewhat negative stand and have taken the line, c h a m p i o n e d i n the first half o f the t w e n t i e t h century by a learned Azharite scholar, A l i A b d al-Raziq. I n his classic w o r k , Islam and the Principles of Government (192c), A b d al-Raziq argued that Islam is essentially a religious call to the w h o l e o f h u m a n k i n d and as such a purely spiritual r e l i g i o n . The Q u r a n , the h a d i t h , and ijma (consensus o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y ) — t h e three p r i n c i p a l sources o f Islamic law and d o c t r i n e — a l l concur i n a f f i r m i n g the spiritual character o f Islam and the consequent separation o f r e l i g i o n and politics. D u r i n g the

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early decades o f Islamic history, the Prophet acted as the political head o f the nascent M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y i n Medina, not i n his capacity as Prophet or religious teacher but rather as the acknowledged leader o f that c o m m u n i t y . He was c o m pelled by circumstances to attend to legislative, j u d i c i a l , and m i l i t a r y matters peripheral to his prophetic office, w h i c h was purely spiritual. I n support o f these claims, A b d al-Raziq quoted a n u m b e r o f p r o p h e t i c traditions p u r p o r t i n g to stress the d u t y o f M u s l i m s to rely o n reason and c o m m o n sense i n the managem e n t o f their w o r l d l y affairs, rather than o n d i v i n e revelation, w h i c h legislates exclusively f o r spiritual matters and is addressed t o the w h o l e of h u m a n k i n d . I n that respect, the separation between the spiritual and t e m p o r a l is clearly recognized by Islam. In the m i d - t w e n t i e t h century, Khalid M u h a m m a d Khalid, a fellow-graduate o f al-Azhar U n i v e r s i t y i n Cairo, pursued and defended this secularist thesis m o r e radically i n his From Here We Begin (1950). I n this w o r k , he h i g h l i g h t e d , like A b d al-Raziq, the sharp d i s t i n c t i o n i n Islam between the truly spiritual, w h i c h is u n i versal and timeless, and the t e m p o r a l , w h i c h is susceptible to constant chatige or m o d i f i c a t i o n . U n l i k e his predecessor, K h a l i d sounded an anticlerical and socialist note, w h i c h has marked the t h o u g h t o f many contemporary secularists. Some secularists, like the Egyptian Zaki Nagib M a h m u d , aligned themselves w i t h l o g ical p o s i t i v i s m ; others, like the Moroccan A b d al-Aziz Larawi and the Syrian Sadiq a l - A z m , a l i g n e d themselves w i t h M a r x i s m . Still others, like Hasan Sab and H i s h a m Sharabi, took a liberal, pro-Western stand o n current political and r e l i gious issues. The list o f such liberal and secular intellectuals and scholars can o f course be expanded, but they continue today to be o u t n u m b e r e d by the m u c h larger contingent o f traditional fundamentalist M u s l i m apologists. These apologists have achieved great n o t o r i e t y t h r o u g h o u t the w o r l d , chiefly because o f their radicalism, anti-Westernism, and open espousal o f violence.

The Interactive Relationship of Philosophy and Theology Philosophy, w h i c h f o u n d its way i n t o the M u s l i m w o r l d as early as the eighth century, was i n constant interaction w i t h theology, A l t h o u g h as early as the first decade of the eighth century, theology (kakim) grew out o f mora! and political disputes, closely l i n k e d to the interpretation o f the Quran and the hadith i n Damascus and Basra, i n its m o r e sophisticated f o r m , theology i n the M u s l i m w o r l d was dependent to a large extent o n Greek philosophy. By the beginning o f the ninth century; a vast n u m b e r o f Greek and Syriac philosophical texts had become available to scholars i n Baghdad and elsewhere. This was s h o w n by the lively discussion i n b o t h Mutazilite and post-Mutazilite circles o f such questions as atoms and accidents, the "natures" or p r i m a r y qualities (tuboi), being and nothingness, causes and

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effects, and similar physical or metaphysical questions. D u r i n g the tenth and eleventh centuries, however, the most violent c o n t r o versies between Asharite theologians, such as al-Baghdadi and al-Ghazali, and the M u s l i m Neoplatonists, represented chiefly by al-Farabi and I b n Sina, began to rock the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . The upshot o f these controversies was the gradual eclipse o f phdosophical activity and the virtual t r i u m p h o f Asharite t h e o l o g y Attempts by such philosophers as I b n Rushd (Averroes) o r such theologians as Fakhr a l - D i n al-Razi to moderate the conflict between philosophy and theology were n o t entirely successful. Those attempts proved the vitality o f A r a b i c - M u s l i m philosophy, however, w h i c h received a n e w lease o f life i n M u s l i m Spain to the West and Persia to the East. The chief historical significance o f the Muslim-Spanish phase i n the rise and development o f M u s l i m p h i l o s o p h y is that i t served as a m a j o r l i n k i n the transmission o f Greek philosophy to western Europe. The M u s l i m s had been the c h i e f custodians o f that philosophy, w h i c h had been almost completely f o r g o t t e n i n western Europe since the s i x t h century, w h e n the Roman consul Boethius ( d . The Persian or Ishraqi tradition of philosophy that began in the twelfth century

c2c) was chiefly responsible for the I ^ t i n translation o f Aristotelian logic. By the end o f the t w e l f t h century the translation o f Arabic philosophical and medical w o r k s i n t o Hebrew or Latin, at the hands o f such eminent scholars as Gerard o f

has continued into modern

Cremona, Michael the Scot, and H e r m a n the German, w r o u g h t a genuine i n t e l -

times. It is still taught in

lectual revolution i n learned circles. The most influential M u s l i m philosopher to

theological centers such as

leave a lasting impression o n Western t h o u g h t was I b n Rushd, the great c o m -

Qum, the city in central Iran

mentator o n Aristotle. D u r i n g the t h i r t e e n t h century philosophers and t h e o l o -

that grew up around the tomb of Fatima, sister of the eighth Shiite imam, which

gians split i n t o t w o rival groups: the Latin Averroists w i t h Siger o f Brabant and Boethius o f Dacia at their head, and the anti-Averroist g r o u p w i t h Albertus

stands under the golden

Magnus and Thomas Aquinas at their head. The c o n f r o n t a t i o n between the t w o

dome.

groups became so violent that by the second half o f the thirteenth century the

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Bishop o f Paris, Etienne Tempier, had to intervene, and i n 1270

and 1277

303

he

issued an ecclesiastical c o n d e m n a t i o n o f a total o f 219 propositions that were o f Aristotelian o r Averroist i n s p i r a t i o n . Thanks to the Latin translations o f Averroes' commentaries, the rediscovery o f Aristotle i n western Europe and the concurrent emergence o f Latin Scholasticism, one o f the glories o f late medieval t h o u g h t , were made possible. The other phase o f the revival o f Islamic p h i l o s o p h y and theology was the Persian or Ishraqi t r a d i t i o n , w h i c h has c o n t i n u e d w e l l i n t o m o d e r n times. Inaugurated by al-Suhrawardi, this phase c u l m i n a t e d i n the rise o f the " t r a n scendental w i s d o m " o f al-Shirazi, a blend o f N e o p l a t o n i s m and Sunsm. A characteristic feature o f the Ishraqi t r a d i t i o n , w h i c h continues to be taught i n the theological centers o f Q o m , Meshhed, and Tehran i n northwestern Iran and Najaf i n I r a q , is that it recognizes no conflict or hostility between philosophy and theology o f the type that became the hallmark o f Asharite (Sunni) theology, I n fact, the Ishraqi t r a d i t i o n dwells o n the analogies between philosophical categories and Shiite ( I m a m i t e ) theology. In the Arab w o r l d o f today, controversy at the theological level has taken the f o r m o f m o d e r n i s m , secularism, or f u n d a m e n t a l i s m . At the philosophical level, t h r o u g h o u t the second h a l f o f the t w e n t i e t h century, the o u t p u t o f Arabic-speaki n g scholars has t u r n e d o n historical and textual research and p u b l i c a t i o n , a l t h o u g h a small n u m b e r o f Western-oriented authors have grappled w i t h contemporary philosophical and theological issues, either f r o m a logical-positivist, existentialist, or Marxist perspective. A l t h o u g h proscribed i n some parts o f the Arab w o r l d , such as Saudi Arabia, philosophy continues to be taught i n most educational institutions, secondary or collegiate, t h r o u g h o u t most o f the Arab c o u n tries. As the h a n d m a i d o f philosophy, theology tends to f o l l o w i n its footsteps: W h e r e philosophical activity proliferates, theology tends to proliferate; w h e r e philosophy is proscribed, theology (kalam) tends to be proscribed too.

CHAPTER

SEVEN

Islam and Christendom HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, AND RELIGIOUS INTERACTION F R O M T H E S E V E N T H TO T H E FIFTEENTH CENTURIES

Jane I . Smith

The Christian w o r l d i n t o w h i c h Islam so unexpectedly burst i n the seventh cent u r y C . E . h a d undergone a succession o f divisions, controversies, and power struggles such that east and west were at serious odds, and each contained w i t h i n its regions deep tensions and disagreements. It is little w o n d e r that the new r e l i g i o n o f Islam, arising o u t o f the heart o f Arabia, appeared to those w h o k n e w o f its existence as another Christian heresy, n o t u n l i k e the many other heresies that had w r i n k l e d the face o f C h r i s t e n d o m since its i n c e p t i o n . The fact that w i t h i n a century o f the death o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d i n 632 Islam had spread across m u c h o f the k n o w n w o r l d was for many Christians inexplicable, f r i g h t e n i n g , and theologically incomprehensible. M u s l i m s , for their part, o n the basis o f the Q u r a n i c revelations, f o u n d i t impossible to understand w h y Christians insisted o n i m p u g n i n g the oneness o f G o d by their a f f i r m a t i o n o f the d i v i n i t y o f Jesus and use o f T r i n i t a r i a n f o r m u -

(Left) After the Christians reconquered Spain from Muslim rule, many mosques

las. I n the b e g i n n i n g o f his career, M u h a m m a d seems to have u n d e r s t o o d his

were changed into churches.

role as the final prophet o f a m o n o t h e i s t i c faith o f w h i c h Jews and Christians,

In Seville, for example, the

before their perversion o f the o r i g i n a l revelations given to t h e m by G o d , were

top of the fifty-meter-high

the earlier members. It was o n l y w h e n M u h a m m a d encountered

unexpected

resistance f r o m these c o m m u n i t i e s and their refusal to recognize his status as the final prophet o f t r u e m o n o t h e i s m that his c o m m u n i t y came to understand itself as the bearers o f a faith that was related to, b u t different f r o m , the extant

J O ?

minaret of the Almohed mosque, built from 1184 to 1198, was remodeled and transformed into a cathedral bell tower.

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religions o f the Jews and Christians. This f a i t h became k n o w n as Islam, submission to the one God.

The Effect of Early Islam on Christians and Christianity Arabia was the h o m e o f significant Jewish and Christian c o m m u n i t i e s , p a r t i c u larly i n the s o u t h . D u r i n g the Prophet's l i f e t i m e , Christians w e r e l i v i n g i n M e d i n a , Mecca, Khyber,Yemen, and Najran, although their numbers were small i n the areas i n w h i c h M u h a m m a d carried on his preaching mission. A l t h o u g h M u s l i m doctrine attests to the fact that the Prophet c o u l d not read or w r i t e , thus ensuring that he d i d not " c o p y " f r o m the scriptures or w r i t i n g s o f Christians and Jews, there is also a record o f his interaction w i t h Christians t h r o u g h o u t his life. One popular t r a d i t i o n records a meeting i n Syria between a y o u n g M u h a m m a d and a Christian m o n k named Bahira. The m o n k recognized the seal o f p r o p h e t h o o d between the boy's shoulders as attested to by scripture. The use o f Christian scripture to c o n f i r m M u h a m m a d ' s p r o p h e t h o o d was also evidenced w h e n a Christian cousin o f his first w i f e Khadijah, Waraqa i b n N a w f a l , acknowledged Muhammad's recitation o f the revelation to be identical w i t h that sent d o w n to Moses. D u r i n g the early prophetic p e r i o d i n Mecca, M u h a m m a d ' s small c o m m u n i t y was o f t e n persecuted by the Quaraysh tribe, w h i c h was concerned for the maintenance o f its h o l d over the city's ancient and lucrative h o l y places. At one p o i n t the Prophet sent a number o f his followers to Abyssinia ( w h a t is h o w Ethiopia) to find shelter. The Abyssinians are reported t o have listened to the preaching Prophet w i t h great respect and awe, especially the description o f Mary, m o t h e r o f Jesus, leading t h e m to a f f i r m that this indeed was God's revelation. These and other incidents c o n f i r m for M u s l i m s their belief that Islam is not a derivative o f Christianity but a divine revelation, a fact that at least some o f the Christians o f M u h a m m a d ' s lifetime recognized. The Q u r a n itself identifies Jews and Christians as the recipients of earlier revealed books or scriptures, namely the Torah, the Psalms, and the Gospel. These scriptures are believed to have been corr u p t e d by the c o m m u n i t i e s t o w h i c h they were sent and are thus abrogated and i n some senses superseded by the Q u r a n . They are nonetheless held i n esteem insofar as they were o r i g i n a l l y God's revelation, and the peoples to w h o m they were given are thus considered in a special category, namely the People o f the Book. A l l prophets are said to have taught the identical message that came f r o m God to M u h a m m a d . Perhaps because o f their greater resistance to the presence o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y i n M e d i n a , Jews are treated m o r e harshly i n the Q u r a n t h a n are Christians. The p r i m a r y offense o f the Christians is that they h o l d t o a T r i n i t a r i a n doctrine o f G o d and the d i v i n i t y o f Jesus. Jesus is referred to i n ninety-three

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verses o f the Q u r a n , a f f i r m i n g that he was b o r n o f M a r y the V i r g i n , that he was a righteous p r o p h e t , that he was given clear signs f r o m G o d , that he had disciples (helpers), that he p e r f o r m e d such miracles as healing the b l i n d and the lepers a n d raising the dead b y the power o f God, and that he w i l l be a sign o f the c o m i n g o f the h o u r o f j u d g m e n t . The Q u r a n also says very specifically that those w h o refer t o Jesus as God are blasphemers, and that Christians saying that Christ is the son o f G o d is an i m i t a t i o n o f Jews, w h o earlier had said that Ezra is the son o f God. According t o the Q u r a n Jesus was only a servant; Jesus the son o f M a r y was n o m o r e than an apostle o f God. Quranic verses dealing w i t h Jesus' death have been interpreted differently by commentators, b u t generally they have been taken t o mean that Jesus d i d n o t die by c r u c i f i x i o n . For Christians the Q u r a n has thus served as a denial o f Jesus' incarnation and death o n the cross and o f the reality o f the Trinity. About Christians themselves the Quran is quite charitable. Apart f r o m accusations o f heresy for their stand o n the Trinity and some c h i d i n g for their conviction that theirs is the true r e l i g i o n , the Q u r a n declares tiiat Christians are people o f compassion and mercy, that they w i l l be able t o enter paradise, and even that they are nearest i n love t o the ( M u s l i m ) believers. One Quranic verse is interpreted to mean that Jesus h i m s e l f foretold the c o m i n g o f a prophet called A h m a d ( f r o m the same root as M u h a m m a d ) . I n 632, only months before he d i e d , M u h a m m a d apparently m e t f o r the first t i m e w i t h a Christian c o m m u n i t y as such. A n official delegation o f Christians, probably led by a bishop, came to Mecca f r o m Najran i n Yemen. After engaging the Christians i n discussion, the Prophet is said t o have realized that Christian teachings are indeed incompatible w i t h Islam, after w h i c h the revelation f o l l o w e d that only Islam is acceptable t o God as a r e l i g i o n . The early c o m m u n i t y o f M u s l i m s i n Medina established its presence a n d extended its d o m a i n p r i m a r i l y t h r o u g h carrying o u t a series o f razzias or marauding expeditions against hostile tribes. These led to more serious encounters, d u r ing w h i c h Muslims were n o t always the aggressors. I n any case, i t was only the pagans t o w h o m the choice o f becoming M u s l i m or suffering serious consequences was given. As the so-called People o f the Book, Christians and Jews, along w i t h Magians, Samaritans, Sabians, and later Zoroastrians and others, were treated as rninorities under the protection o f Islam (dhirnrnis), believers i n God despite their refusal t o accept the p r o p h e t h o o d o f M u h a m m a d . Adult male Christians were thus not required t o convert (although that o p t i o n was always open to t h e m ) , but they were required t o pay a p o l l tax as the price for this protection. Because o f the income accrued f r o m this tax, Muslims i n general preferred that Cliristians (and Jews) n o t convert t o Islam b u t m a i n t a i n their status as protected m i n o r i t i e s . D h r m m i s were granted the right to practice their religion in private, t o defend themselves against external aggression, and to govern their o w n communities. Later

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they were exempted f r o m military service, although some Christians fought o n the side o f Muslims i n the early expansion o f Islam. I n fact. Christian subjects were often allowed a g o o d deal o f latitude i n paying their p o l l and other taxes. The specifics o f the requirements for Christians w h o enjoyed d h i m m i status were spelled o u t i n w h a t has come t o be referred to as "the covenant o f U m a r , " w h i c h exists i n several versions and most likely was attributed to rather than designed by the second caliph, U m a r i b n al-Khattab (r. 6 3 4 - 4 4 ) . The covenant stipulated p r o h i b i t i o n o f the b u d d i n g o f n e w churches or repair o f those i n towns inhabited by M u s l i m s , although i n some cases w h e n financing was available Christians d i d construct n e w places o f w o r s h i p . Beating the w o o d e n clapper that Christians used t o call people to prayer was f o r b i d d e n , as was l o u d chanting or carrying the cross or the Bible i n processions. D h i m m i s were allowed to keep their o w n c o m m u n a l laws, a l t h o u g h they c o u l d apply to a M u s l i m judge i f they w i s h e d . They were n o t , however, allowed to give testimony concerning a M u s l i m i n a c o u r t o f law. The r e c r u i t i n g o f n e w Christians was f o r b i d d e n , as was any insult about Islam or its Prophet. As a means o f identification, particular dress, such as a special girdle, was required for Christians. Over the first several centuries o f Islam, dress stipulations grew increasingly stringent for Christian m e n and w o m e n . A M u s l i m w o m a n was n o t allowed to m a r r y a Christian m a n , although the Q u r a n does allow marriage o f a M u s l i m m a n to a Christian w o m a n . Nevertheless, Islamic law f r o m early o n stipulated a great range o f conditions under w h i c h such a marriage m i g h t take place. The c h i l d r e n o f a m i x e d marriage were always considered M u s l i m . A M u s l i m c o u l d o w n a d h i m m i slave, but never the opposite. Some o f the judges and lawyers o f Islam were strict i n the interpretation "of d h i m m i status, especially i n reaction against Christians and Jews occupying h i g h administrative positions, w h i l e others showed m o r e

flexibility.

The different

legal schools were not i n complete agreement as to w h a t privileges should be allowed to d h i m m i s , and customs d i f f e r e d f r o m one place to another. The strictest interpretations were applied i n Baghdad and other major Islamic cities, w h i l e enforcement o f regulations i n small towns and rural areas was often more lenient. D h i m m i s were allowed to live anywhere except i n Mecca and Medina. I n actual practice. Christians and M u s l i m s o f t e n had very f r i e n d l y relations. M u s l i m s , for example, are said to have especially enjoyed the hospitality o f m o n k s i n C h r i s t i a n monasteries. Christians o c c u p i e d h i g h positions i n the caliphal courts as physicians, engineers, architects, and translators, and sometimes they were treated as having virtually equal rights w i t h M u s l i m s . M u s l i m writers and poets sometimes gave great t r i b u t e t o Christians i n their literature. The d h i m m i status seems to have been a changing one, i n that laws were made and either broken or forgotten, and relations between Christians and M u s l i m s

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obviously were dependent o n individual w h i m and personal advantage as w e l l as o n w h a t was stipulated by the law. A l t h o u g h Christians and Jews were often i n positions o f p u b l i c service i n M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s , and sometimes were a m o n g the ranks o f the very wealthy, they were never free f r o m the w h i m s o f i n d i v i d u a l rulers w h o m i g h t choose to enforce strict regulations, or f r o m the caprice o f mobs expressing their passions i n prejudicial and h a r m f u l ways. I n general, the first Arab M u s l i m dynasty, that o f the Umayyads, was fairly flexible i n terms o f its Christian citizens, but i n Islam's second century the laws became m o r e stringent. U n d e r the reign o f the caliph a l - M u t a w a k k i l (r. 847-61), laws against d h i m m i s were most severe, sometimes resulting i n persecution o f Christians as w e l l as o f Mutazilis, Shiites, and others considered opponents o f the state. T h r o u g h the M i d d l e Ages there was a hardening o f attitudes against d h i m m i s , due m o r e to political than to religious reasons, especially after the p e r i o d o f the Crusades.

The Expansion of Islam into Christian Territories The Christian w o r l d i n t o w h i c h Islam moved w i t h such rapidity was one that was far f r o m u n i t e d . The c h u r c h was d i v i d e d i n t o five apostolic sects, located i n

Christianity flourished in Syria in the centuries before

Rome, A n t i o c h , Constantinople, Jerusalem, and Alexandria. A series o f c o n t r o -

the rise of Islam. A magnifi-

versies over the nature o f Jesus' relationship t o G o d had failed to b r i n g all

cent and extensive

Christians under one umbrella o f belief. The resulting sectarian divisions, p i t t i n g Christian against Christian, had significant consequences for the spread o f Islam. To n o small degree, these controversies served to exacerbate the already existing divisions between Greek-speaking and Syrian-, A r m e n i a n - , or Coptic-speaking Arab Christians.

monastery, for example, grew up around the site near Antioch where St. Simeon Stylites (d. 4 5 9 ) spent twenty-seven years in a small cell atop a pillar.

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The creed resulting f r o m the Council o f Nicaea i n 32c a f f i r m e d that Christ was one substance w i t h God, a perspective that d o m i n a t e d ensuing theological discussions. This was reaffirmed i n succeeding sessions at Constantinople, Ephesus, and finally at Chalcedon i n 45-1, and was h e l d by b o t h Latin-speaking Roman Catholic and O r t h o d o x Christians. This creed was opposed by dissenting groups such as the Arians, the Monophysites, and the followers o f the Antiocene theologian Nestorius, each w i t h their o w n subtle but distinctive theological interpretations. The Council o f Ephesus branded Nestorianism a heresy, but Nestorian missionary activity c o n t i n u e d to move eastward t h r o u g h inner Asia. The

c h u r c h o f Alexandria split between

the Copts, w h o held to

the

Monophysite doctrine condemned at Chalcedon, and the Melchites, w h o a f f i r m e d the o r t h o d o x y o f Chalcedon. I n Syria the Monophysites organized i n t o an i n d e pendent Jacobite c h u r c h , f o l l o w i n g one o f its leaders. Jacobus Baradaeus. A fifth Damascus was an important

c h u r c h c o u n c i l i n 556,

h e l d i n Constantinople,

basically

reaffirmed

the

center of Christianity before

Chalcedonian understanding, a p o s i t i o n held by b o t h the Roman Catholic and the

the Muslims took the city in

Greek O r t h o d o x c o m m u n i o n s . Arab Christians w h o affirmed this doctrine, mainly

63c, but many Christians

f r o m Syria, were also referred to as Melchites. I n the second half o f the sixth cen-

soon converted to Islam.The Umayyad mosque, founded by the caliph al-Walid in

tury, the M a r o n i t e c h u r c h came i n t o being, later to become the first eastern c h u r c h to accept the supremacy o f the Pope.

705, was built on the site of

This was the complex background of the Christian c h u r c h that the forces o f

the Byzantine church dedi-

Islam encountered. The Roman c h u r c h o f the West was i n an uneasy c o m p r o m i s e

cated to St. John.

w i t h the Byzantines; O r i e n t a l c o m m u n i o n s fragmented over l o n g - s t a n d i n g

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Christological controversies and were generally considered heretical by b o t h Romans and Greeks. The Byzantine state r u l e d its eastern subjects w i t h an authority that was o f t e n experienced as ruthless and oppressive. Thus it was that many Oriental Christians w e l c o m e d M u s l i m p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y as a relief f r o m Byzantine oversight and cooperated w i t h their n e w M u s l i m rulers. This was one o f the most i m p o r t a n t factors i n the remarkable ease w i t h w h i c h Islam was able to spread across Christian lands. W i t h i n t w e n t y years o f the Prophet's death, the Byzantine Empire lost the provinces o f Palestine, Egypt, and Syria. For many Christians the arrival o f Islam was actually seen as a liberation f r o m the tyranny o f f e l l o w Christians rather than as a menace or even a challenge to their o w n faith. Such acquiescence, o f course, was encouraged by the fact that under Islam they were guaranteed the r i g h t to continue as independent c o m munities. The d h i m m i status, despite the obligations and lower status attached to i t , was for m a n y a preferable o p t i o n to Byzantine oppression. The grandfather o f John o f Damascus, f o r example, was i n s t r u m e n t a l i n the c a p i t u l a t i o n o f Damascus to the forces o f the M u s l i m c o m m a n d e r Khalid i b n a l - W a l i d i n 63c, signaling the e n d o f Byzantine r u l e i n Syria. Tensions between Syria and Constantinople had been h i g h because o f theological disagreements between the Monophysites and the Chalcedonians as w e l l as for reasons o f taxation and heavyhanded Byzantine rule. The arrival o f the M u s l i m s i n Damascus was w e l c o m e d by a significant p o r t i o n o f the p o p u l a t i o n , many o f w h o m were o n l y vaguely

Jerusalem is holy to the three great monotheistic religions. This nineteenth-century lithograph by David Roberts, seen from the Mount of Olives, shows sites venerated by Jews, Christians, and Muslims.

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aware that their n e w rulers represented another religious faith. The M u s l i m s , f o r their part, had little interest i n Christian theological disputes, and a l t h o u g h they forbade Christians f r o m b u i l d i n g new edifices, their rule was considerably m o r e benign than that o f the Byzantines. Significant numbers o f the members o f these eastern c o m m u n i o n s eventually converted to Islam, significantly r e d u c i n g the size o f the Nestorian and Jacobite c o m m u n i t i e s . It was because o f a c o m b i n a t i o n o f factors, then, that Islam spread so rapidly after the Prophet's death; Christian a c c o m m o d a t i o n for b o t h p o l i t i c a l and r e l i gious reasons was only one o f those reasons. The t w o major empires i n the M i d d l e East—the Persian Sasanian and the Greek Byzantine—were

exhausted

after m a n y years o f struggle, and Islam was able to occupy w h a t a m o u n t e d t o a power v a c u u m i n many o f the areas to w h i c h it spread. The r a i d i n g tactics that had w o r k e d so w e l l , as one after another Arabian tribe capitulated to the n e w faith, c o n t i n u e d to f u n c t i o n i n expanded ways, w i t h the p l u n d e r rendered i n goods and taxes. M i l i t a r y expeditions were political i n nature and not undertaken for the purpose o f f o r c i n g conversion to Islam as an alternative to the s w o r d . D h i m m i status was t o o profitable for this to have been the case. Conversion was accepted, o f course, but not encouraged, and for a n u m b e r o f centuries Christians remained the m a j o r i t y i n m u c h o f w h a t was n o m i n a l l y M u s l i m territory. O f the many victories enjoyed by M u s l i m s i n Christian territories soon after the Prophet's death none was to have m o r e significance for the relationship o f Islam and C h r i s t e n d o m than the taking o f Jerusalem shortly after the defeat o f Christians venerate Jerusalem

the Byzantine troops at the Battle o f Yarmuk i n 636. Always considered the H o i ) '

as the place where Jesus died

City by Christians, Jerusalem f r o m Islam's b e g i n n i n g was also a place greatly ven-

and was resurrected. The

erated by M u s l i m s . O r i g i n a l l y i t was the place t o w a r d w h i c h the Prophet

Church of the Holy Sepulchre, erected by the Byzantine emperor

M u h a m m a d asked his followers to t u r n i n prayer. A l t h o u g h he later changed the prayer d i r e c t i o n to Mecca, the city c o n t i n u e d to be a site o f p i l g r i m a g e and

Constantine in the early

prayer. For Christians, Jerusalem is the place o f the death and resurrection o f

fourth century and repeatedly-

Jesus. For M u s l i m s i t is venerated as the location f r o m w h i c h M u h a m m a d is said

restored and rebuilt, marks

to have ascended o n his miraculous " n i g h t j o u r n e y " t h r o u g h the heavens. The

the site of Christ's tomb. Its prominent dome is visible on the skyline of Jerusalem's Old

conquest o f the city was one o f the most peaceful o f its l o n g and p a i n f u l history. Shortly after its capture, the caliph U m a r h i m s e l f is said to have traveled to the

City as seen from the platform

H o l y C i t y t o establish a treaty w i t h the patriarch Sophronius, by w h i c h Christians

on which the Dome of the

l i v i n g there were allowed freedom o f life, property, and w o r s h i p i n r e t u r n for

Rock stands.

paying the poll-tax and h e l p i n g to fight o f f Byzantine raiders. U m a r ordered the

Temple M o u n t to be cleansed o f the piles o f garbage that had accumulated o n i t , and he had a temporary mosque built o n the site. Christians remained the majority p o p u l a t i o n i n Jerusalem for many years; the city thus consisted m a i n l y o f d h i m m i s . I n 661 M u a w i y a h (r. 6 6 1 - 8 0 ) was p r o c l a i m e d caliph i n Jerusalem, first ruler o f the near c e n t u r y - l o n g U m a y y a d dynasty. M u a w i y a h is said to have done the initial p l a n n i n g for the construction o f the D o m e o f the Rock o n the site o f Umar's mosque; the edifice was completed by his successor A b d al-Malik i b n M a r w a n i n 691. The oldest Islamic m o n u m e n t still existing, the D o m e has held a place o f e n o r m o u s importance i n the religious life o f Islam and was the scene o f great r e j o i c i n g w h e n i t was r e t u r n e d to M u s l i m hands after the defeat o f the Franks at the t i m e o f the Crusades. The adjacent mosque o f al-Aqsa, i n Islamic t r a d i t i o n the second and holiest sanctuary o n the Temple M o u n t , was b u i l t either by A b d a l - M a l i k or his son a l - W a l i d I , arid i t has served t h r o u g h the centuries as a preeminent place o f w o r s h i p and prayer. As M u s l i m s pushed the boundaries further i n virtually all directions, m i l i t a r y advances were made by b o t h land and sea. F r o m the m i d d l e o f the seventh cent u r y M u s l i m naval strength grew i n the Mediterranean, w h e r e the Byzantines had

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r u l e d supreme. O c c u p y i n g Cyprus and Rhodes, M u s l i m s besieged Constantinople u n t i l finally r e t i r i n g i n 667. O n the n o r t h e r n coast o f Africa they m o v e d again t o consolidate power, gaining c o n t r o l o f the major Mediterranean base o f Tunis at the t u r n o f the e i g h t h century. Resistance o r i g i n a l l y p u t u p by the Berbers o f N o r t h Africa was overcome w i t h their (at least n o m i n a l ) conversion to Islam, w h i c h was to prove key to the M u s l i m advance i n t o Spain and France. I n 711

an

army o f Berber converts crossed the Straits o f Gibraltar and soon took c o n t r o l o f southern Iberia. T w o years later the governor o f N o r t h Africa c l a i m e d Toledo to be u n d e r the sovereignty o f the caliph o f Damascus. The final advance o f the M u s l i m east i n t o the Christian west came w h e n M u s l i m armies crossed over the Pyrenees i n t o the south o f France i n 718. They took Bordeaux, destroyed the army o f the defending Duke Eudes o f Aquitaine, and pillaged Poitiers. Eudes then fled n o r t h to seek assistance f r o m the Frankish ruler Charles Martel, w h i l e the M u s l i m Jews venerate Jerusalem as

armies sacked and pillaged cities and abbeys. I n 732 the M u s l i m troops were met

the site of Solomon's Temple,

by Eudes and Charles M a r t e l near Poitiers, w h e r e Islam's advance i n t o western

which was repeatedly

C h r i s t e n d o m was finally checked. M u s l i m s c o n t i n u e d to foray i n t o Frankish

destroyed and rebuilt. In 70 C.E. the Romans destroyed the temple built by Herod the Great, and the site remained largely vacant until Muslims conquered the city in 638.They built the first mosque in the city, later known as the al-Aqsa, over

lands, m a i n t a i n i n g their h o l d o n the coast o f Provence u n t i l 759, w h e n Charles Martel's son Pepin was able to secure the city o f N a r b o n n e i n southern France, e l i m i n a t i n g the last outpost o f M u s l i m strength n o r t h o f the Pyrenees. The picture o f C h r i s t i a n - M u s l i m interaction d u r i n g this p e r i o d is far f r o m clear, as is the reality o f w h o the adversaries actually were. Accounts o f the events are sketchy f r o m b o t h western and Arab sources. What is n o w France was divided a m o n g the n o r t h e r n Franks, the southern Franks, and the Visigoths, w h o r u l e d

the huge stone blocks

parts o f Languedoc and Provence. The d r a w i n g o f lines o f allegiance was often

remaining from the walls of

complicated by the fact that rulers were generally n o t strong, court intrigues

the Herodian platform.

were commonplace, and the p o p u l a t i o n consisted o f many c o n f l i c t i n g elements.

Alliances were i n constant flux. Christian rulers, concerned w i t h m a i n t a i n i n g

Muslims from North Africa

their o w n power, are k n o w n to have invited M u s l i m forces to garrison their cities

conquered Sicily from the

for p r o t e c t i o n . Duke Eudes himself, for example, gave his daughter i n marriage

Byzantines in the ninth cen-

to the M u s l i m r u l e r of Cerdaha ( i n the eastern Pyrenees), thereby f o r g i n g an alliance to secure his southern borders. N o r t h o f Spain the M u s l i m s were never again serious o p p o n e n t s o f the

tury. After the Normans reconquered the island in the late eleventh century, a cosmopolitan culture devel-

Carolingian Christians, w h o under the r e i g n o f the e m p e r o r Charlemagne,

oped that merged Byzantine,

crowned i n 800, consolidated power d o w n to the Pyrenees. M u s l i m incursions i n t o

Islamic, and Latin Christian

the area i n the earl) part o f the n i n t h century were little m o r e than annoying. M o r e

elements.The twelfth-century palace chapel of the Norman rulers in Palermo, for example, is decorated with a typically Islamic muqarnas ceiling.

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troublesome were the raids o f M u s l i m pirates along the eastern coasts o f the Mediterranean. Attacks o n monasteries were sometimes devastating, w i t h the result that many monks abandoned them to move further inland. Monastic revival that had been g o i n g o n i n Provence was stopped, and there are records o f existi n g abbeys s i m p l y disappearing. I n the tenth century M u s l i m raids continued i n the i n t e r i o r o f Provence, causing considerable damage i n areas around Aix a n d Marseille. Ports and cities i n the western Mediterranean were virtually deserted because o f the raiding M u s l i m pirates. At the same t i m e that M u s l i m s were advancing t h r o u g h Spain i n t o France, M u s l i m s were also m o v i n g i n t o the Christian t e r r i t o r i e s o f Switzerland, n o r t h e r n and southern Italy, and Sicily. I n the early part o f the n i n t h century, M u s l i m s advanced w e l l i n t o Italy, m o v i n g t o the walls o f R o m e before b e i n g pushed back b y C h r i s t i a n forces. By this t i m e Christians h a d v i r t u a l l y lost c o n t r o l o f the

Mediterranean.

(>332 1406) —

As the m e d i e v a l

Muslim

historian

I b n Khaldun

r e m a r k e d , the Christians c o u l d n o l o n g e r float a plank u p o n the

sea. Christians o n l y navigated the ports o f the east, w h e r e the Byzantines effectively prevented M u s l i m s f r o m complete d o m i n a t i o n . W h a t had f o r m e r l y been the m o s t active part o f the e m p i r e h a d b e c o m e the most threatened a n d attacked, a n d thus the most economically devastated. O n land the M u s l i m s were stopped at the n o r t h e r n b o r d e r o f Spain i n the west a n d o n the b o u n d aries o f B y z a n t i u m i n the east. I n the m e a n t i m e they h a d taken m u c h o f w h a t had f o r m e r l y been Byzantine territory, i n c l u d i n g Syria, Egypt, a n d the A f r i c a n provinces. W h i l e Hispano-Romans i n Spain capitulated w i t h relatively little resistance, such relative ease o f conquest was never the case i n southern Europe. Several centuries o f repeated invasion o f the island o f Sicily, f o r example, were needed before i t finally became a M u s l i m territory. B e g i n n i n g i n 652 M u s l i m forces raided Sicily, first f r o m Syria and then f r o m the coast o f N o r t h Africa. I n 831 the citizens o f Palermo finally surrendered and accepted d h i m m i status. M u s l i m s q u i c k l y occupied nearly h a l f o f the island, t h o u g h i t was n o t u n t i l 966 that the Byzantines finally signed a peace treaty a c k n o w l e d g i n g complete M u s l i m sovereignty. Events t u r n e d a r o u n d completely w h e n a g r o u p o f N o r m a n Crusaders r e t u r n i n g f r o m Palestine began t o reconquer the island. I n 1072 the last small rebel states i n the i n t e r i o r had been subdued, Palermo yielded t o the N o r m a n s , and a n e w Christian Sicilian k i n g d o m was established. M u s l i m culture flourished i n Sicily i n the tenth a n d eleventh centuries, and was allowed t o continue even under N o r m a n rule. By the e n d o f the Crusades, however, most o f the oriental ethos o f the island had been destroyed. Despite the c o n t i n u i n g raids and pirate attacks, i n the early centuries o f Islam the Frankish Carolingian rulers were m u c h m o r e focused o n the possible expan-

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sion o f territories to the n o r t h , namely i n t o Saxon lands, than they were concerned about Arab advances. There was even some diplomatic exchange as relations began to develop between Baghdad and the French court. These began under the Carolingian House o f Pepin, w h o i n his zeal to be seen as a cosm o p o l i t a n r u l e r is said to have received embassies f r o m many Mediterranean nations i n c l u d i n g the Saracens (Arabs). The emperor Charlemagne, whose coronation was not recognized by the Byzantines, is said to have sought his allies further to the east. I n 797 an ambassador was sent f r o m the court o f Charlemagne to the caliph H a r u n al-Rashid, f r o m w h o m i t is reported that Charlemagne obtained precious gifts, i n c l u d i n g an elephant for the royal menagerie and a marvelous clock. Popular belief, based o n Frankish chroniclers, was that after a series o f m i s sions back and f o r t h between the east and the west by H a r u n al-Rashid and Charlemagne, somewhere i n the p e r i o d f r o m 797 to 802, the emperor traveled to the east to gain f r o m the caliph protective r i g h t s f o r Christian p i l g r i m s i n Jerusalem. This supposed journey o f the Frankish k i n g was recorded i n one o f the twelfth-century Chansons deGeste (literally "songs o f heroic deeds," a genre o f literature filled w i t h warfare and chivalry) entitled "The Pilgrimage o f Charlemagne." A l t h o u g h recent scholarship has disproved most o f this, i t does a f f i r m the fact that Charlemagne and the caliph were o n friendly terms and corresponded w i t h each other, and that t h r o u g h this an i m p o r t a n t c h u r c h i n Jerusalem was secured for the Latin clergy.

Christians and Muslims in Andalusia In the Iberian peninsula the establishment o f a M u s l i m presence d i d not take place w i t h o u t serious difficulties. The r u l i n g g r o u p was composed o f Arabs, Syrians, and Egyptians w i t h Berber troops, all uncertain o f the trustworthiness o f the other. Aside f r o m the Berbers, the actual n u m b e r o f invaders f r o m the east was very small. Nonetheless, i n the forty years i t took to set u p a stable a d m i n istration i n Spain, i t was clear that the Islamic presence was a reality and that their successes were not to be seriously reversed for a l o n g t i m e . I n 756, six years after the o v e r t h r o w o f the Umayyads by the Abbasids i n the eastern Islamic t e r r i t o ries, an U m a y y a d prince named A b d al-Rahman fled west to escape Abbasid persecution. H e established the emirate o f Cordoba, f o r m i n g an a d m i n i s t r a t i o n that w o u l d last f o r t w o and a half centuries. The t i m e d u r i n g w h i c h M u s l i m s and Christians, along w i t h Jews, lived i n p r o x i m i t y i n the Iberian peninsula has often been cited as a Icind o f ideal era o f interfaith harmony. To some extent that claim may be justified, but i f so the era was fairly short and was soon supplanted by the tensions, prejudices, and treatment o f m i n o r i t i e s by b o t h M u s l i m s and Christians that more often has characterized

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relationships between the communities. By the tenth century the chaos o f earlier invasions had settled, and the Iberian peninsula was pretty w e l l split between the Christian K i n g d o m o f Leon i n the n o r t h and the considerably larger M u s l i m alAndalus ( k n o w n as Andalusia) i n the south, w i t h a t h i n frontier zone i n between. D u r i n g the rule o f A b d al-Rahman I I I i n Córdoba (912-61, the first Andalusian caliphate officially b e g i n n i n g i n 929), the Spanish Islamic state reached the height o f power and fame. It was a t i m e o f great opulence and achievement, i n w h i c h intellectual circles o f M u s l i m s , Jews, and Christians u n d e r A b d al-Rahman's Córdoba was the capital of the Umayyad caliphate in Spain. Although Christians and Jews occupied high

patronage c o n t r i b u t e d to a flourishing o f the arts, literature, astronomy, medicine, and other cultural and scientific disciplines. M u s l i m tolerance o f the so-called People o f the Book was h i g h , and social intercourse at the upper levels was easy

positions at court in the

and constant. It was also a p e r i o d d u r i n g w h i c h a significant n u m b e r o f Christians

tenth century, many con-

chose to convert to Islam, although Christians continued to o u t n u m b e r M u s l i m s

verted to Islam. The center

i n Andalusia u n t i l the second half o f the tenth century.

of the Muslim community was the Great Mosque, founded in the eighth cen-

Christians l i v i n g i n Andalusia gradually became Arabized, a d o p t i n g certain elements o f the speech and dress o f their rulers, often i n c l u d i n g Arabic names.

tury and repeatedly enlarged

They were thus k n o w n by the designation o f Mozarabs. This was n o t alway s

and restored, as shown by

received w e l l by the jurists o f Islam, w h o saw i n this a danger o f c o n t a m i n a t i o n

this tenth-century portal.

and a threat to the f a i t h o f M u s l i m societies. Arabs, whether for reasons o f p r i d e

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o r disdain, refused to learn the language o f the populations they conquered, forcing the westerners to learn their language. Arabic words began to infuse the vocabulary such that some Arabic w o r d s still remain i n Spanish today and many have f o u n d their way i n t o the English language. Learned Christians, w h o had once w r i t t e n i n Latin, increasingly c o m posed their w o r k s i n Arabic. Eulogius, Bishc >p o f Toledo ( m a r t y r e d i n 859), is said to have complained

that

his

co-religionists

of

Cordoba k n e w the rules o f Arabic grammar better than the infidels, and that many a m o n g t h e m were ignorant o f Latin. A r a b i z a t i o n d i d n o t stop w i t h the l a n guage. Mozarab w o m e n o f a certain social status became accustomed to g o i n g o u t w i t h their faces veiled. M a n y Christians l i v i n g i n M u s l i m Spain gav e u p the practice o f eating p o r k and o f t e n refused even t o raise pigs. They f o u n d themselves increasingly appreciating

and

a p p r o p r i a t i n g Arabic

music,

Jewish culture nourished under Islamic rule in Spain The lavish carved plaster decoration of the thirteenth-century synagogue of Toledo, later converted into the church of Santa Maria la Blanca, attests to the intermingling of faith and culture in this period.

poetry, and other f o r m s o f culture. Popular pre-Islamic melodies were conserved i n Spain over the centuries. Records even tell o f Christians and M u s l i m s j o i n i n g together i n m e r r y m a k i n g and sexual indulgences. Christian moralists denounced as c o r r u p t i o n w h a t they saw to be the l i b e r t i n e nature o f the conquerors' manners, whereas i n fact b o t h M u s l i m clerics and Christian theologians were w o r r i e d that sensuality was t a k i n g over the culture. O n e i m p o r t a n t means o f rapproachment between the elites o f the t w o p o p u l a t i o n s was the marriage o f an Arabic-speaking Christian o f h i g h rank w i t h a M u s l i m . Nevertheless, records indicate that actual contacts between M u s l i m s and Christians were relatively l i m i t e d . Mozarabs o f the I b e r i a n peninsula, w h o were l i v i n g c o m f o r t a b l y i n the M u s l i m state, seemingly d i d not attach m u c h importance to the difference i n r e l i g i o n . Nonetheless, Arabization had its l i m i t s . As assimilated as he or she m i g h t be, the d h i m m i always r e m a i n e d an i n f i d e l i n the eyes o f the M u s l i m . N o matter h o w integrated Christians were i n the Arabo-Islamic culture, by virtue o f their Christian i d e n t i t y ultimately they remained strangers i n their o w n society. This became m o r e evident as the centuries o f M u s l i m rule i n Spain passed. I n the days o f the h i g h Cordoban caliphate under A b d al-Rahman I I I , Christians generally-

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were tolerated, protected, and treated w i t h charity. This began to change w i t h the rule o f A b u A m i r al-Mansur ( A l m a n z o r ) i n the late t e n t h century, w h o began a series o f ruthless campaigns against Christians, i n c l u d i n g the p l u n d e r i n g o f churches and other Christian sites. A l m a n z o r was regarded by Christian w r i t e r s as a k i n d o f satanic scourge. W i t h the decline o f the prestige o f the Cordobán caliphate, official policies became reflected i n social intercourse. The most pious M u s l i m s refrained f r o m speaking to the infidels except at a distance. I f a M u s l i m and Christian met o n a public road, the Christian always had to give way to the M u s l i m . Houses o f Christians h a d to be lower than those o f Muslims. A n " i n f i d e l " Christian c o u l d never e m p l o y a M u s l i m i n service. It was f o r b i d d e n for Christians to learn the Q u r a n o r to speak about it to their c h i l d r e n , as it was f o r b i d d e n for t h e m to speak about Christ w i t h M u s l i m s . Christians c o u l d not b u i l d new churches or monasteries o r repair o l d ones i f they deteriorated, a l t h o u g h they c o u l d provide m i n i m a l maintenance. Churches and chapels had to be kept open day and n i g h t s h o u l d a M u s l i m traveler w i s h to find l o d g i n g . C h u r c h bells c o u l d o n l y be sounded softly, voices c o u l d n o t be raised i n prayer, and n o cross c o u l d be placed outside o f any b u i l d i n g . A priest c o u l d not carry a cross or gospel i n a visible manner i n case he s h o u l d pass a M u s l i m . Christians were b u r i e d i n their o w n cemeteries, far f r o m M u s l i m s , and funeral processions c o u l d not pass t h r o u g h M u s l i m areas. A M u s l i m w h o converted to Christianity was i m m e d i a t e l y sentenced to death, even i f he had f o r m e r l y been a Christian w h o converted to Islam. Islamic authorities, concerned that M u s l i m society n o t be contaminated and i n the attempt to contain rebellions, forced Mozarabs to live i n special quarters. By 1250 most o f Iberia was r u l e d by the kings o f Aragón, Castile, and Portugal, w i t h only the M u s l i m p r i n c i p a l i t y o f the N a s r i d emirate o f Granada surviving. Schools o f Latin a n d Arabic were established i n Seville, especially to train missionaries to M u s l i m s . Rebellions o f mudejars ( M u s l i m s w h o s u b m i t t e d to Christian r u l e ) i n Castile and Aragón led to severe persecutions and expulsions. Thus the era o f h a r m o n i o u s interaction between M u s l i m s and Christians i n Spain came to an end, replaced by intolerance, prejudice, and m u t u a l suspicion. M u s l i m Almoravids and Almohads f r o m N o r t h A f r i c a , c o m i n g to power i n the eleventh century, represented a m u c h m o r e aggressive Islamic fervor, and relations w i t h Christians became increasingly hostile. Christian attitudes hardened against Islam, i n f l u e n c e d by the revival and spread o f the Catholic monastic houses o f Cluny. I n the m e a n t i m e Christian forces f r o m the n o r t h were m o v i n g gradually b u t steadily to recapture Andalusian territories. By 1212

the Almohads

were defeated by m a j o r C h r i s t i a n powers w h o then reconquered

Córdoba,

Valencia, and Seville. By the m i d d l e o f the thirteenth century M u s l i m control i n Spain was greatly reduced, and Christian fervor, k i n d l e d also by the temporary

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successes o f the Crusades i n the H o l y Land, led to persecutions, emigrations, and the e x p u l s i o n o f M u s l i m s f r o m n e w l y regained Christian t e r r i t o r i e s . Those M u s l i m s w h o remained were f o r b i d d e n f r o m g i v i n g the call to prayer f r o m minarets, f r o m going o n p i l g r i m a g e , and f r o m p u b l i c l y practicing their f a i t h . H i g h taxes led to an increasingly l o w standard o f l i v i n g for M u s l i m s . The g r o u n d was laid for the final expulsion o f Islam f r o m the land o f Andalusia at the end o f the fifteenth century.

Medieval Christian Views of Islam and Its Prophet It is clear that f r o m the earliest encounters o f the West w i t h Islam, the Arab (Saracen) invaders were not seen as essentially different f r o m any other m a r a u d ers or predators. For m o s t o f those w h o s e t e r r i t o r i e s were threatened

by

M u s l i m s , there was very little reference to the fact that the intruders represented a n e w r e l i g i o n . Clerics and those w h o were interested i n r e l i g i o n i d e n t i f i e d Islam as a Christian heresy, b u t f e w others took account o f its religious s i g n i f i cance. The names by w h i c h Christians k n e w and referred t o M u s l i m s changed over the centuries. D u r i n g the early p e r i o d they were often referred to as Agarenes, a r o u g h identification for Arab descendants o f Hagar. Later the Greek w o r d Saracen became m o r e popular. This was a t e r m that had been used f r o m the early centuries o f Christianity for all n o m a d i c people but came to be applied specifically to Arabs. F r o m the t w e l f t h century, w h e n w i t h the Crusades the " e n e m y " became better k n o w n to the Franks, the t e r m Saracen was an umbrella t e r m for any M u s l i m and i t n o longer applied to other Arabs. The t e r m Moor was used b o t h generally for M u s l i m s and specifically to refer to those w h o came directly f r o m Africa. Later, w i t h the advances o f the Turkish armies, Turk was the general t e r m applied to the followers o f " M a h o m e t " or M u h a m m a d . At times w h e n anger at M u s l i m aggression was the highest, as i n western Europe, the t e r m used to i d e n t i f y the aggressors was not Saracen but Barbari, m e a n i n g b o t h barbarian and enemy. D u r i n g the M i d d l e Ages the West i n general f o u n d i t very d i f f i c u l t to f o r m u late a coherent vision o f Islam, constrained by its o w n n a r r o w horizons as w e l l as by a lack o f sufficient and accurate i n f o r m a t i o n . For the most part Christians k n e w virtually n o t h i n g about the r e l i g i o n o f Islam, b u t saw the Saracens only as the enemy. It was only i n Spain, w h e r e the t w o c o m m u n i t i e s were i n close t h o u g h often hostile interaction, that a clearer picture o f the r e l i g i o n as such emerged. Two quite different populations i n the West expressed a v i s i o n o f Islam. One was that o f the c o m m o n people, fostered p r i m a r i l y by the propaganda that led u p to and supported the Crusades and fed by the largely inaccurate i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m the Chansons de Geste (the body o f literature filled w i t h adventure and romance, warfare and c h i v a l r y ) . The other was that o f the scholastics, emerging

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p r i m a r i l y i n the context o f Spain. A l t h o u g h sometimes i t was reactionary, seeing Islam as violent and fanatic, i n general the scholastics' -vision o f Islam was reasonably balanced and attempted t o portray Islam m o r e reahstically than was the case t h r o u g h the stereotypes that i n t r i g u e d Christian society at large. A l t h o u g h the factual i n f o r m a t i o n conveyed b y these t w o segments o f society differed considerably, westerners i n general shared an u n d e r l y i n g attitude toward those described as Saracens, M o o r s , and Turks. Governed by a " w e " and " t h e y " mentality, most Christians saw the lands o f Islam, despite their scientific and c u l tural advances, by d e f i n i t i o n t o be outside the civilized w o r l d as they k n e w it. The way i n w h i c h Islam was c o n d e m n e d was n o t unlike the w a y many i n the weste r n c h u r c h c o n d e m n e d Oriental churches as heresies, as beyond the bounds o f orthodoxy. Considered as alien peoples, M u s l i m s were natural candidates for the objects o f crusade at the t i m e w h e n that was called for. One o f the earliest Christians t o undertake a serious study o f Islam was John o f Damascus, a government official d u r i n g the r e i g n o f the U m a y y a d caliph A b d a l - M a l i k (r. 6 8 5 - 7 0 5 ) , w h o left his p u b l i c post to take u p a life o f c o n t e m p l a t i o n at a Greek O r t h o d o x monastery. Knowledgeable i n Arabic, he was w e l l versed i n the m a i n doctrines o f Islam, especially those relating to Jesus and Christianity His major theological w o r k contains a section dealing w i t h the so-called heresy o f the Ismailites ( M u s l i m s ) and his designation o f M u h a m m a d as the Antichrist. I n another m o r e moderate w o r k he presents a series o f supposed debates between a C h r i s t i a n a n d a M u s l i m , i n w h i c h the C h r i s t i a n ( n o t s u r p r i s i n g l y ) w i n s . A l t h o u g h n o t overly appreciative o f Islam, he nonetheless expressed a desire for b o t h sides t o reason together i n their debate. For his pains, despite his standing as a c h u r c h theologian, John was c o n d e m n e d at the iconoclastic s y n o d o f 754 for being "Saracen-minded" and i n c l i n e d t o w a r d the r e l i g i o n o f Islam. Scholastic w r i t i n g s c o m i n g o u t o f the eastern part o f the e m p i r e i n the n i n t h and t e n t h centuries, especially f r o m B y z a n t i u m , tended t o be contemptuous and even abusive o f the Prophet. I n general this p o l e m i c was apocalyptic (prophesyi n g the e n d o f the Arabs) and h i g h l y uncharitable. The w o r k p r o d u c e d i n Spain, such as the w r i t i n g o f Isadore o f Seville i n the m i d 800s, p r o v i d e d the first attempt at a comprehensive v i e w o f the r e l i g i o n o f the Saracens, despite its p r e d i l e c t i o n t o see Islam as a p r e p a r a t i o n f o r the f i n a l appearance o f the Antichrist. Spanish Christian apologetic q u i c k l y took o n m o r e o f the character o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l a r g u m e n t a t i o n , even u s i n g Islamic m e t h o d s

based o n

Aristotelian logic. Notable a m o n g several significant attempts i n the t w e l f t h cent u r y t o present Islam i n a somewhat m o r e tolerant, or at least realistic, way was that o f the French m o n k Peter the Venerable, A b b o t o f Cluny (ca. 1092-1156). After having visited the Cluniac monasteries i n Spain, Peter began a m o v e m e n t to better understand Islam, t o be able t o combat i t m o r e intelligently. As part o f

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this effort he engaged the English scholar Robert o f Ketton t o translate the Q u r a n , w h i c h he completed i n 1143. This first f u l l translation, despite its errors and omissions, p r o v i d e d the Latin West its first t o o l f o r significant study o f the r e l i g i o n o f the Saracens, an o p p o r t u n i t y that unfortunately f e w chose t o pursue. Despite the importance o f his p i o n e e r i n g efforts, Peter c o n t i n u e d like such earlier w r i t e r s as John o f Damascus t o v i e w Islam as a Christian heresy that must be combated, reflected i n the title o f his Latin p o l e m i c , Against the Loathsome Heresy of the Sect of the Saracens. The reality o f the Crusades i n the t w e l f t h a n d t h i r t e e n t h centuries a n d the a n t i - M u s l i m feelings encouraged i n the efforts t o s u p p o r t the wars d i d l i t t l e t o foster i n t e r f a i t h understanding. The fact is that Islam was never really believed t o be any k i n d o f alternative t o C h r i s t i a n t r u t h , a n d f o r the most part i t was n o t treated seriously b y t h e scholastics. I n t h e late 1200s, f o r example, t h e great I t a l i a n scholastic T h o m a s A q u i n a s ( 1 2 2 5 - 7 4 ) i n h i s Summa Contra Gentiles i n c l u d e d some p o l e m i c against M u h a m m a d , yet o n t h e w h o l e i t p a i d l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n t o Islam as a r e l i g i o n . The Andalusian p h i l o s o p h e r a n d t h e o l o g i a n R a m o n L l u l l (ca. 1235-1316), w r i t i n g at the same t i m e , again resorted t o t h e f a m i l i a r tactic o f p o s i t i n g dialogical a r g u m e n t a t i o n between Christians a n d M u s l i m s , i n w h i c h M u s l i m s never fared w e l l . O n e o f t h e f e w westerners o p p o s e d t o t h e Crusades as e v i l , L l u l l urged o t h e r means o f b r i n g i n g t h e Saracens t o " t h e t r u t h . " H e was p r o p h e t i c i n h i s concern that the Tartars, t h e n o n t h e m o v e i n t h e eastern lands, s h o u l d b e c o m e attracted t o t h e l a w o f M u h a m m a d , w a r n i n g that i t w o u l d be a great danger t o C h r i s t e n d o m . By the end o f the t h i r t e e n t h century R i c o l d o da Montecroce o f Florence, a D o m i n i c a n scholar a n d missionary i n Baghdad, was one o f the first t o r e p o r t the fall o f Acre t o the M o n g o l s and the reality that they were t u r n i n g t o Islam a n d n o t t o Christianity. R i c o l d o , u n l i k e m a n y other Europeans, k n e w Arabic w e l l and d r e w creatively o n the similarities he saw i n the Q u r a n a n d the Bible. Nevertheless, like others he c o u l d n o t resist l u m p i n g together all the heresies t o w h i c h he saw C h r i s t i a n i t y opposed, i n c l u d i n g N e s t o r i a n i s m a n d Islam, w i t h little c r i t i cal d i s t i n c t i o n d r a w n between t h e m . One o f the few medieval Christians t o take b o t h Islam and religious p l u r a l i s m seriously was the German philosopher Nicholas o f Cusa ( 1 4 0 1 - 6 4 ) i n the m i d dle o f the fifteenth century. A t a t i m e w h e n absurd stories were being spread about I s l a m a n d i t s founder, Nicholas t r i e d t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e f a i t h o f t h e Saracens. H e u n d e r t o o k a t h o r o u g h historical a n d literary study o f the Q u r a n , even t h o u g h i t was f o r purposes o f refutation. Such efforts at better understandi n g were n o t reflected i n the w o r k o f the giants o f the Protestant R e f o r m a t i o n i n the early 1500s. The German religious reformer M a r t i n Luther (1483-1546) saw the Turks, as they were then called, as God's rods o f chastisement, whose g o d was

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equal to the devil and whose so-called h o l y book was b o t h f o u l and shameful. The French theologian a n d r e f o r m e r John Calvin (1509-64), f o r his part, likened the Turks to his m o r e i m m e d i a t e enemies the Papists, a t t r i b u t i n g to b o t h the evils o f gross deception. Despite the fact that i n the understanding o f medieval Christian clergy Islam was a Christian heresy ( a l t h o u g h technically a heretic is one w h o has been baptized i n the f a i t h ) , i n the popular literature o f this t i m e M u s l i m s were clearly considered to be pagans. This tension between the necessity o f seeing Islam b o t h as " o t h e r " and at the same t i m e o f understanding i t as a deviation f r o m , a salacious heresy w i t h i n , the b o d y o f Christianity itself remained t h r o u g h o u t the M i d d l e Ages. Christians enjoyed feelings o f b o t h r e p u l s i o n for a n d fascination w i t h the Prophet and his r e l i g i o n . M u h a m m a d was almost universally t h o u g h t o f a m o n g Christians as a m a n o f depravity, d i s h o n o r , falsehood, and i l l i c i t power. I n a d d i t i o n , he was seen as a sexual l i b e r t i n e , demonstrated most specifically by the w e l l - k n o w n facts o f his o w n m u l t i p l e marriages and the details o f his (that is, the Quran's) d e s c r i p t i o n o f the pleasures o f the gardens o f paradise, w h i c h was seen by the west as b o t h material and carnal. Such rewards p r o m i s e d to the f a i t h f u l were c o n v i n c i n g p r o o f t o the Christians that Islam was a r e l i g i o n utterly devoid o f spirituality. The i l l regard w i t h w h i c h Christians held the Prophet o f Islam d i d n o t h i n g to prevent t h e m f r o m a fascination w i t h w h a t they deemed t o be the m o r e s o r d i d aspects o f his life and teachings. They saw h i m as having presented t h r o u g h o u t his l i f e a p r i m e example o f sensuality, violence, and i m m o r a l i t y , an example that guaranteed that his followers w o u l d d e m o n strate those same u n f o r t u n a t e qualities. Christians' o p i n i o n s about the Prophet a n d his r e l i g i o n had as their starting p o i n t the c o n v i c t i o n o f the depravity o f M u h a m m a d , b u t this never stopped t h e m f r o m analyzing whatever elements o f the f a i t h were familiar to t h e m and p r o n o u n c i n g t h e m t o be f u r t h e r p r o o f o f the absolute inadequacy o f Islam as a r e l i g i o n . I n western eyes, the other p r i m a r y offense o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d and his followers was the advocacy o f force and violence. This m o v e d f r o m the realm o f simple analysis o f the life and teachings o f the f o u n d e r o f Islam to the actual experiences that Christians had, or sometimes believed that they had, o f M u s l i m s invading their lands and p r o f a n i n g their churches. Such violence was seen as a natural o u t g r o w t h o f the Saracen terror that was associated w i t h Arab lands as a legacy f r o m the w a r r i n g tribes o f the O l d Testament. It was at once projected u p o n Islam and expected o f i t , fostered i n the awareness that M u s l i m s understood the w o r l d to be d i v i d e d i n t o w h a t they termed " t h e abode o f I s l a m " and that w h i c h is not M u s l i m , namely "the abode o f war." (One school o f Islamic law, the Shafu, added a t h i r d category, "the abode o f truce," for those territories w i t h w h i c h a M u s l i m government has concluded a treaty.) This was especially true i n

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Europe's southern regions, where the skirmishes c o n t i n u e d at such a pace that i t was d i f f i c u l t n o t to i m p u t e to the M u s l i m s marauders qualities o f violent behavior. The hardening o f this m i n d - s e t i n the European consciousness is at least part o f the explanation o f the apparent lack o f conscience displayed i n the acts o f aggression a n d violence perpetrated by the Franks at the t i m e o f the Crusades. A l t h o u g h i n reality a great deal o f reliable i n f o r m a t i o n was avadable about Islam and its Prophet, i t was fashionable and served the appropriate polemical purpose to circulate popular tales that ranged f r o m gross exaggeration to complete and baseless

fiction.

M u c h o f the i n f o r m a t i o n o f the medieval western w r i t e r s and poets came f r o m the Byzantines, whose hatred for the Prophet o f Islam h a d always been intense. It fueled the propaganda efforts o f those generating enthusiasm for the Crusades, b o t h i n the Chansons de Geste and i n the notably inaccurate histories o f such medieval w r i t e r s as H i l d e b e r t o f Tours, Walter o f C o m p i e g n e , a n d Vincent o f Beauvais. H i l d e b e r t was the author o f the eleventh-century Latin p o e m Historia de Muhamete, probably the most w i d e l y read medieval poetic w o r k dealing w i t h Islam. I t includes scurrilous narratives about the Prophet o f Islam, such as his h a v i n g r e t u r n e d h o m e i n a d r u n k e n stupor, fallen i n t o a d u n g h i l l , and been eaten by pigs. I n some versions o f the p o e m , i t includes the m e n t i o n o f M u h a m m a d having prophesied his o w n resurrection three days after he was to have d i e d , an o b v i o u s slander o f Islam based o n a Christian theme. After three days, the p o e m reads, M u h a m m a d ' s followers left, disgusted by the lack o f a miracle and nauseated by the stench o f putrefaction, and the b o d y was devoured by dogs. This is r e p o r t e d as the reason M u s l i m s d o n o t eat p o r k . Hildebert's Historia also contains

the tale, repeated

t h r o u g h o u t the M i d d l e Ages,

of

M u h a m m a d ' s remains being b u r i e d i n a t e m p l e o f marble a n d g o l d , w i t h his c o f f i n suspended by magnets to t r i c k his f o l l o w e r s i n t o believing he had m i r a c u l o u s powers. One o f the most i n f l u e n t i a l narratives about the Prophet o f Islam was the French Roman de Mahomet, w r i t t e n by Alexandre d u Pont i n 1258. This is a r h y m e d story based o n a Latin p o e m o f the same theme by a m o n k named Walterius (Gautier), w h i c h pretends to be the recitation o f a converted Saracen. I n Gautier's w o r k M u h a m m a d is portrayed as an imposter w h o f o u n d e d his r e l i g i o n w i t h the help o f c h i l d i s h trickeries. A l t h o u g h Hildebert and Gautier were clerics, d u Pont w r o t e f r o m a lay perspective and t u r n e d his w o r k i n t o a novel reflecting the ideals o f chivalrous life. His narrative is a k i n d o f c o m p e n d i u m o f the various stories that were current about the Prophet, nearly all o f i t repeated i n the p o p u l a r poetry o f the t i m e . I n c l u d e d are M u h a m m a d ' s marriage to a wealthy w i d o w o u t o f greed and a m b i t i o n , such false " m i r a c l e s " to dupe his followers as a trained calf appearing w i t h pages o f the Q u r a n fastened o n its h o r n s , his licentious rela-

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t i o n s h i p s w i t h w o m e n , a n d the magnet-suspended

coffin. This version o f

M u h a m m a d ' s life o m i t s the popular tale o f a dove trained to pick c o r n o u t o f his ear, w h i c h he pretends is the h o l y spirit g i v i n g h i m revelations, and o f his body having been devoured by swine. I n c l u d e d i n d u Pont's " b i o g r a p h y " is the o f t e n repeated story that M u h a m m a d was actually a Christian cardinal w h o had been p r o m i s e d the p o n t i f i c a l t h r o n e i f he converted the Saracens to Christianity. Having f u l f i l l e d that task, he was subsequently betrayed and as a result started the heretical sect o f the " M a h o m e t a n s . " M u c h o f this apocryphal narrative about the Prophet M u h a m m a d was available t h r o u g h the Chansons de Geste. For the most part, lay people were neither knowledgeable about n o r m u c h interested i n Islam, but they f o u n d the tales related i n the Chansons entertaining and reflective o f many o f the societal ideals that they most valued. The songs were w r i t t e n f r o m the eleventh t o the f o u r teenth centuries, many at the h e i g h t o f crusading fervor, b u t they p u r p o r t e d to be set i n the t i m e o f the e m p e r o r Charlemagne and his son Louis. There are three p r i n c i p l e cycles o f the Chansons i n w h i c h the Saracens appear, o f w h i c h the "Song o f R o l a n d " is considered to be the oldest. I n the first t w o cycles the action takes place m a i n l y i n Europe. The t h i r d cycle is situated entirely i n the east, w r i t ten after the Crusaders first took Jerusalem i n 1099. These songs became the vehicles for a k i n d o f revenge for the defeats suffered earlier at the hands o f the M u s l i m s , and i t is n o t s u r p r i s i n g that i n t h e m the Saracens are m i g h t i l y c o n quered. This literature was extreme!) popular i n the west, simple i n style and intended for a w i d e audience, reflecting sentiments and beliefs that were c o m m o n l y accepted. The context was one i n w h i c h Christians and Saracens b o t h shared i n a single chivalrous culture. The songs illustrate the religious faith o f the knights as w e l l as their desire for conquest, the spoils o f war, personal glory, romance, and v i c t o r y over their enemies. Descriptions o f Islam i n the Chansons are w i l d l y inaccurate, n o t reflective o f w h a t was certainly k n o w n i n the west at that t i m e but rather designed for p o p ular appeal and crusading fervor. Some descriptions relate that M u s l i m s w o r shiped a great n u m b e r o f gods, o f w h o m the most i m p o r t a n t and p o w e r f u l was " M a h o m e t " or " M a h o n . " Occasionally there was reference to his claim that he was a prophet sent by G o d w h o w o u l d become a g o d h i m s e l f w h e n he died. Other poets i m a g i n e d that Islam supported a t r i n i t y o f deities composed o f M a h o m e t ( M a h o n ) , Tervagent (Tervagan), and A p o l l i n . N o n e o f these n o t i o n s is f o u n d i n literature outside the Chansons. The "Song o f R o l a n d " knew o n l y the three i d o l s , but the list o f accompanying gods, to w h o m the Christian w r i t e r s assigned the names o f various devilish creatures, grew l o n g e r w i t h the other cycles. I n the songs the name o f G o d is never cited. I n fact, they p u t the expression "By M a h o n [ M u h a m m a d ] ! " i n the m o u t h o f the Saracens, suggesting that

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i t is he w h o is i n fact their g o d . The places o f w o r s h i p o f the Saracens often are referred to as "sinagogues," revealing a tendency to attribute to Islam some o f w h a t was k n o w n about Judaism, o r as " m a h o m e r i e s . " Images o f M a h o m e t were said to be huge, carved i n marble o r crystal, w i t h b r i l l i a n t colors,

sometimes

studded w i t h jewels, g o l d , and silver. As a g o d , M a h o m e t c o u l d be carried around by his people o n their expeditions o r i n battle and c o u l d be consulted for advice. There are even references to M a h o m e t having made an i d o l o f h i m s e l f w h i l e he was still alive and filling it w i t h a l e g i o n o f devils. Saracens c o u l d approach the i d o l safely, b u t should a Christian come near i t , the Christian w o u l d perish. A n u m b e r o f the songs note the anger w i t h w h i c h the Saracens treat the idols w h e n they have suffered losses o n the battlefield. A c c o r d i n g to the "Song o f Roland," they r u s h o n A p o l l i n i n his shrine, s t r i k i n g and cruelly shattering h i m , and t h r o w M u h a m m a d i n t o a d i t c h w h e r e hogs and dogs devour and trample h i m . This renunciation o f the idols is said to be i n contrast to the Christians, w h o never renounce their G o d u p o n defeat. O n the w h o l e the songs are far less interested i n M u h a m m a d either as a m a n or as a g o d than they are i n p o r t r a y i n g his followers. The Saracens themselves are often described i n grotesque terms, having huge noses and ears, blacker than i n k w i t h o n l y their teeth s h o w i n g w h i t e , eyes like b u r n i n g coals, teeth that can bite like a serpent, some w i t h horns like the antlers o f stags. Typically they are said to be e n o r m o u s i n size, n o d o u b t to make Christian victories over t h e m m o r e impressive. Despite the fact that there are various instances o f the poets referring to the Saracens as creatures o f Satan, i t is clear that M u s l i m s were n o t regarded as t r u l y diabolical beings. They were recognized as having souls, a l t h o u g h they c o u l d n o t go to paradise because they were pagans, a n d a f e w were even presented as having pure hearts, i n v i t i n g a d m i r a t i o n as w e l l as p i t y for the fact that they were n o t Christian. U n d e r l y i n g all the songs is the theme that i f the Saracens c o u l d be defeated o n the battlefield, they c o u l d be persuaded to accept the r e l i g i o n o f the vanquisher, namely Christianity. The goal was n o t the e x t e r m i n a t i o n o f the enemy, but the conversion o f as m a n y as possible. The Saracen soldiers themselves are o f t e n portrayed as brave a n d noble, w o r thy enemies o f the Christian k n i g h t s , whose p r i m a r y fault is that they f o l l o w such a depraved r e l i g i o n as Islam. The false references to bizarre Islamic practices were o n l y a small part o f this b o d y o f literature that was, i n fact, reflective also o f a deep respect f o r the m i l i t a r y skills and even the c h i v a l r y o f the Arab w a r r i o r s . This is especially t r u e i n the cycle that represents the w r i t i n g o f the second crusade, notably i n the p o e m e n t i t l e d "Saladin" after the great t w e l f t h century M u s l i m leader and hero Salah al D i n . Despite the e x t r e m i t y w i t h w h i c h M u h a m m a d and his r e l i g i o n are p o r t r a y e d , there was an understanding that Franks and Arabs shared a w o r l d and even a culture i n w h i c h certain ideals such

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I n t h e p o p u l a r m i n d , m e d i e v a l C h r i s t i a n s s a w M u s l i m w a r r i o r s as b r a v e a n d n o b l e , w o r t h y e n e m i e s o f C h r i s t i a n k n i g h t s . T h i s m a r g i n a l i l l u s t r a t i o n t o a psalter m a d e before 1 3 4 0 f o r Sir G e o f f r e y L u t t r e l l (1276-1345) s h o w s K i n g B i c h a r d I o f E n g l a n d o n t h e l e f t t i l t i n g at t h e g r e a t M u s l i m l e a d e r S a l a h a l - D i n , k n o w n a s S a l a d i n i n t h e

west.

as chivalry, loyalty, and bravery were reflected. Such qualities were thus appreciated i n b o t h the Christian heroes and the M u s l i m w a r r i o r s . The theme o f romance also r u n s t h r o u g h many o f the songs, o f t e n w i t h Saracen w o m e n falling i n love w i t h Christian k n i g h t s . The romance generally begins w h e n the French k n i g h t is a prisoner o f the Saracens, a n d he eventually regains his l i b erty, thanks to the efforts o f the M u s l i m princess. The r o m a n t i c c o n c l u s i o n was all the m o r e delicious for having been set i n the context o f battle and intercul¬ tural prejudices. The Saracen w o m e n w h o were w o o e d by the knights were p o r trayed as b e a u t i f u l , i n t e l l i g e n t , devoted, v i r t u o u s , h u m b l e , and courageous, w e l l w o r t h y o f the love o f t h e i r C h r i s t i a n consorts. The inevitable conclusion is the conversion o f the Saracen w o m e n to Christianity, o n l y after w h i c h is any sexual relationship allowed. Thus a l t h o u g h the Chansons de Geste and other f o r m s o f romance literature served as vehicles for Crusade propaganda, they also reflect attitudes that are m o r e generous t o w a r d M u s l i m s . O f t e n the stories were based o n real interactions and relationships w i t h those w h o m official d o g m a p r o c l a i m e d t o the ultimate enemies o f C h r i s t e n d o m . The m o r e charitable expressions were based o n the experience o f Frank to Arab, however, a n d n o t Christian to M u s l i m . Those w h o were most knowledgeable about I s l a m — t h a t is, those w r i t i n g for religious p u r poses—were generally the least charitable. The greatest falsehoods were c o n tained i n the literature o f those w h o were least knowledgeable about the faith, but w h o also expressed the greatest appreciation for the Saracens as w o r t h y participants i n a c o m m o n feudal and chivalrous culture.

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Medieval Muslim Views of Europe, Christians, and Christianity The vast m a j o r i t y o f M u s l i m s i n the eastern part o f the e m p i r e h a d little i f any knowledge o f the western regions o f C h r i s t e n d o m , as w e l l as little interest i n discovering a n y t h i n g about lands they considered bleak and r e m o t e , i n h a b i t e d by peoples they t h o u g h t to be little m o r e than barbarians. They considered the Europeans' manners and habits to be loathsome, their level o f culture exceedinglylow, and their r e l i g i o n superseded by Islam. The fact that Europeans spoke many different languages was regarded as a serious liability, a l l o w i n g n o n e to understand the other. The earliest available records o f any M u s l i m n o t a t i o n o f western Europe were i n the n i n t h century, taken p r i m a r i l y f r o m Greek sources. A century later the great M u s l i m geographer al-Masudi reported i n his Fields of Gold o n the peoples o f the n o r t h , listing sixteen Frankish kings, o f w h o m at least ten are authentic. I n his Book of Instruction he talked about the translation o f the Septuagint, the ecumenical councils o f the c h u r c h , Christian sects and heresies, and a n u m ber o f details o f Christian theology. A l - M a s u d i was one o f the f e w M u s l i m s w h o had any interest i n the west, however, and i t was really the o n l y t i m e that a m e d i e v a l M u s l i m h i s t o r i a n dealt w i t h any k i n d o f h i s t o r y o f the lands o f C h r i s t e n d o m . To the extent that M u s l i m s k n e w a n y t h i n g o f the papal city o f Rome at a l l , i t was o f t e n confused w i t h B y z a n t i u m , because b o t h were referred to as Rum. A f e w venturesome easterner travelers managed to visit the city, w h i c h served as the center o f R o m a n Christianity, but their records are meager. Most M u s l i m s preferred to go east, to areas that they considered m o r e civilized, than to venture i n t o the c o l d and inhospitable areas o f Europe. I n the m i d d l e o f the tenth century I b r a h i m i b n Yaqub al-Israili p r o v i d e d an interesting and at that p o i n t unprecedented account o f France, Germany, and the lands o f the Slavs, one o f the few personal descriptions given by a n a m e d M u s l i m visitor to Europe u n t d reports o f the O t t o m a n embassy centuries later. Even by the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries Muslims had little interest i n , and thus generally little knowledge of, the west. W h a t few reports are available come f r o m geographers f r o m the far western reaches o f the Islamic empire, namely Andalusia or N o r t h Africa. The eleventh century saw the p r o d u c t i o n o f the Book of the Categories of Nations by the Andalusian Qadi Said i b n A h m a d , i n w h i c h he discusses the Greeks, Romans, Franks, and a n u m b e r o f groups f r o m eastern Europe, categ o r i z i n g Frankish Europeans along w i t h Negro Africans as w h i t e and black barbarians o f the regions beyond the civilized w o r l d . I n 1154 a geography by the Arab geographer and cartographer al-Idirisi, w r i t t e n i n Sicily, gave some descriptions o f Italy and other parts o f western Europe, w h i c h was the basis for m u c h o f w h a t Muslims k n e w about die Franks. M u s l i m chronicles f r o m this p e r i o d treat the activities o f the Christian Crusaders i n some detail, but they contain little i n f o r m a t i o n

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o n w h a t motivated the invading armies o r what the differences were i n their national constituencies. W i t h very little exception, Muslims were quite unaware of, and clearly disinterested i n , the possibility o f any k i n d o f cultural developments i n the west i n the areas o f r e l i g i o n , philosophy, science, o r the arts. Even the great historian and philosopher I b n Khaldun d i d not give m u c h attention to areas n o r t h o f Spain except to note that some Slavs, other Europeans, and Turkish nations adopted Christianity; the qualities o f those l i v i n g t o the n o r t h , he noted, are akin t o w h a t one finds i n animals living i n savage isolation w h o have n o c o m m u n i t y and even eat each other. I n discussing Christianity itself, I b n Khaldun displayed his k n o w l edge o f the Bible and church organization. Virtually n o works i n Latin or any other western language were translated i n t o Arabic. By the f o u r t e e n t h century, w h e n the conversion o f many o f the M o n g o l tribes was greatly changing the face o f eastern Islam, the Persian physician and scholar Rashid a l - D i n (1247—1318) w r o t e his history o f the Franks (1305—06), part o f the second v o l u m e o f a larger w o r l d history. This w o r k deals w i t h ancient Rome and its m o n u m e n t s , miracles o f the saints, and some pagan traditions. It contains i n f o r m a t i o n about the b i r t h and y o u t h o f Jesus, the conversion o f the emperor Constantine, some o f the b e t t e r - k n o w n popes, and a g o o d deal o f legendary material concerning Christians i n the M i d d l e Ages. It was t h r o u g h Rashid al-Din's history that the eastern Islamic w o r l d learned for the first t i m e m u c h o f this Christian history and lore. O n the w h o l e , i t was v i e w e d as somewhat o f a curiosity, however, w i t h o u t significant i m p o r t a n c e o r influence. This general lack o f interest o n the part o f medieval M u s l i m s i n the lands o f western Christianity d i d n o t mean, however, that the Christian r e l i g i o n itself was n o t a matter o f concern for many Islamic theologians and scholars. A l o n g w i t h the development o f the schools o f law and exegesis o f the Q u r a n there developed a b o d y o f literature dealing w i t h Christian d o c t r i n e for reasons o f p o l e m i c and refutation. As was true w i t h Christian p o l e m i c against Islam, M u s l i m s sought t o support their refutation by l o o k i n g t o their o w n scripture. For b o t h sides o f the argument such retreat i n t o internal resources was d o o m e d t o failure. Christians c o u l d n o t be persuaded by the Q u r a n , a scripture that diey believed t o be false, as M u s h m s c o u l d n o t be persuaded by the Gospel, a scripture they believed t o be distorted f r o m its o r i g i n a l f o r m . The Bible itself, i n the f o r m held sacrosanct by Christians, received little attent i o n f r o m M u s l i m polemicists. A few used portions o f the Biblical text t o buttress their arguments, relying o n traditional M u s l i m exegetical style t o d o so. Their p r i m a r y interest i n the Bible was as a proof-text for predicting the c o m i n g o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d , f i n d i n g occasional references t h r o u g h the text that c o u l d be employed for that purpose. I n rare instances p o r t i o n s o f the Gospel were translated i n t o Arabic and m o d i f i e d to make the text m o r e congenial to the tenets o f

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I

Islam. This was justified by the M u s l i m conviction that the Christian scripture had been changed and distorted and was thus fair game for revision to b r i n g i t closer to the o r i g i n a l revelation. After Islam had spread to Syria and Mesopotamia, Persia, N o r t h Africa, and Spain, the polemical debate between M u s l i m s and Christians was sparked by the different forms o f contact between members o f the t w o faiths. The Arabic language was adopted by g r o w i n g numbers o f Christian d h i m m i s , especially those l i v i n g i n urban centers, a l l o w i n g people to read the Q u r a n for themselves and p r o v i d i n g for the translation o f the Bible i n t o Arabic. Even w h e n b o t h sides were able to quote n o t o n l y their o w n scripture but that o f the other, however, i t was still difficult to move beyond attacking the texts held sacred by their opponents o n the basis o f their o w n texts. As early as the n i n t h century there were a n u m b e r o f M u s l i m efforts at r e f u tation o f the doctrines o f Christianity, particularly as they were k n o w n t h r o u g h Christians l i v i n g i n Arab lands. A l i al-Tabari (d. 855), a Nestorian Christian w h o converted late i n life to Islam, w r o t e a rebuttal o f Christianity that sounds like a version o f Nestorian polemics against other Christian sects. I n the 8 6 o s A b u Isa al-Warraq p r o v i d e d the most comprehensive o f the early anti-Christian p o l e m i cal w o r k s , entitled Reply to the Three Sects of the Christians. A i m e d especially at the Nestorians, Jacobites, and Melchites, i t deals particularly w i t h the "inconsistencies" o f the doctrines o f the T r i n i t y and the incarnation. Shortly after that A m r i b n Bahr al-Jahiz w r o t e a r e f u t a t i o n o f the Christians for the c a l i p h alM u t a w a k k i l , w h o was w a g i n g an offensive against the Christians. It is an especially b i t i n g attack o n the T r i n i t y a n d o n Christianity as a false r e l i g i o n , w h i c h , said al-Jahiz, is a sore and a social evil i n the midst o f the body p o l i t i c . W h e n the Abbasid caliph a l - M a m u n (r. 813-33) established the institute o f p h i losophy or "House o f W i s d o m " i n Baghdad i n 830, Greek and Syriac texts o n a range o f issues, f r o m philosophy to medicine to astrology and mathematics, were translated into Arabic. M u s l i m scholars soon became as well versed i n these materials as their Christian counterparts, often m o r e so, changing the playing field f r o m scriptural argumentation to the more c o m m o n l y agreed-on basis o f the authority o f Aristotelian logic and philosophy. I n some cases, such as that o f the ninth-centuryArab philosopher Abu YusufYuqub al-Kindi (795-866) i n his Refutation of the Christians, Aristotelian logic was used to combat the Christian idea o f the Trinity. (It is an interesting illustration o f the way i n w h i c h refutation was used to promote one's o w n interpretation that al-Kindi's w o r k , not itself extant, is k n o w n t h r o u g h the counteri n g arguments o f the Jacobite Christian scholar Yahya i b n A d i , w h o refuted these M u s l i m arguments i n making his o w n case for the Trinity.) The numbers o f scholars o n either side w h o were able to engage i n this k i n d o f intellectual debate were l i m i t e d , however, w h i c h is w h y b o t h Muslims and Christians for the most part carried out their polemic f r o m w i t h i n their o w n theological and scriptural frames o f

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reference. I n Islam most jurists and theologians were suspicious o f such philosophical methodology as somehow r u n n i n g counter t o the explicit revelations contained i n the Quran. Most o f the surviving Islamic w r i t i n g that has made u p the body o f anti-Christian polemics, then, is Quranically based apologetic not intended to debate any issues but simply to a f f i r m what Muslims already- believed to be true. Some M u s l i m speculative theologians made use o f f o r m s o f Aristotelian logic i n shaping their d o c t r i n a l arguments, however, still keeping w i t h i n the bounds o f w h a t was acceptable t o the m a i n schools o f Islamic theology. They used these arguments t o the extent t o w h i c h they were engaged i n c o m b a t i n g the ideas o f Christian w r i t e r s , especially regarding the doctrine o f the incarnation. The M a h k i jurist A b u Bakr al-Baqillani ( d . 1013), f o r example, w r i t i n g i n Baghdad i n the eleventh century, is said t o have effectively silenced the arguments o f Christians by means o f sophisticated p h i l o s o p h i c a l arguments, especially i n relation t o claims o f Jesus' divinity. Such a conclusion, o f course, was made b y his f e l l o w M u s l i m s , and f o r either side o f the debate the result was p r e d e t e r m i n e d by their unshakable faith i n the t r u t h o f their o w n dogmas. The eleventh century also gave birth

t o the w o r k o f the A n d a l u s i a n p h i l o s o p h e r - t h e o l o g i a n

I b n Hazm

( 9 9 4 - 1 0 6 4 ) , w h o attacked the Christian scriptures harshly o n the basis o f a very t h o r o u g h k n o w l e d g e o f the Bible. His w e l l - k n o w n and erudite Book of Sects, p u r p o r t e d t o be the first M u s l i m w o r k o n comparative r e l i g i o n , is really a defense o f Islam against the error o f other faiths, particularly Christianity. The most famous o f the late M i d d l e Ages critics o f Christianity was the f o u r teenth-century Hanbali jurist, theologian, and religious reformer Taqi al-Din i b n Taymiyah (1263-1329). H e was an independent thinker w h o was w e l l grounded i n a w i d e range o f religious and nonreligious sciences. His e n o r m o u s w o r k , m o r e than one thousand pages l o n g , entitled The Correct Answer to Those Who Have Changed the Religion of Christ, is a r e f u t a t i o n i n particular o f the w o r k o f a Transjordanian Melchite bishop named Peter w h o w r o t e at the end o f the n i n t h century. I b n Taymiyah argued against the possibility o f the incarnation o f God i n Christ, w h i c h he refuted b y using Peter's o w n arguments against h i m . A deeply scholarly a n d incisive w o r k , The Correct Answer provides a g o o d example o f the way i n w h i c h challenges between Christianity and Islam were m u c h m o r e often made by the process o f textual refutation than t h r o u g h actual face-to-face exchange.

The Influence of Islam on Medieval Europe It has l o n g been recognized that one o f the most significant a n d lasting c o n t r i butions o f the medieval M u s l i m w o r l d t o C h r i s t e n d o m was t o p r o v i d e access f o r western scholars t o the great classics o f Greece and Rome by their translation i n t o Arabic, f r o m w h i c h they were rendered i n t o European languages. Most o f the

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w o r k s o f Plato and Aristotle were k n o w n to Arab M u s l i m s . A m o n g the earliest o f the translators was the Nestorian H u n a y n i b n Ishaq al-Ibadi ( 8 0 8 - 7 3 ) ,

w r i 0

was

active i n the court o f the Abassid caliphs i n Baghdad. H u n a y n i b n Ishaq and those w o r k i n g w i t h h i m i n this i m p o r t a n t school o f translators rendered m o r e than one h u n d r e d o f Galen's m e d i c a l and p h i l o s o p h i c a l treatises i n t o Arabic. The use o f Greek d i d n o t cease i n provinces that came under M u s l i m r u l e ; rather, i t c o n tinued

at least u n t i l the m i d d l e o f the n i n t h century, a l l o w i n g H u n a y n i b n Ishaq

to f u r t h e r his translation w o r k i n the early part o f that century w i t h manuscripts f r o m Egypt, Palestine, Syria, a n d Mesopotamia. A l t h o u g h i n the Latin-speaking west there h a d been little i f any i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h the Greek w o r l d f r o m the seco n d century, there was an u n b r o k e n c o n t i n u i t y i n the eastern Mediterranean i n terms o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d m e d i c a l teaching t o w h i c h the Arab M u s l i m s were heir. There was also, o f course, n o lack o f struggle w i t h i n Islam itself between the basic Islamic f o r m u l a t i o n s o f faith a n d the traditions o f H e l l e n i s m , a n d the issues contained i n Greek p h i l o s o p h y were h o t l y debated a m o n g the scholars o f Islam. O n e o f the p r i m a r y tasks o f those w h o translated Greek texts i n t o Arabic was t o make available the body o f materials necessary f o r the p r o p e r u n d e r standing o f the issues and the r e s o l u t i o n o f conflicts. Transmission o f k n o w l e d g e f r o m Arabic t o Latin came close o n the heels o f the Christian reconquest o f Sicily a n d o f large

areas o f M u s l i m

Spain. W h e n Toledo was taken i n 108c, a major step i n the Christian reconquest o f Spain, a large n u m ber o f Arabic m a n u s c r i p t s were made available t o Christian scholars. By the t w e l f t h century Toledo had become a center o f study as scholars

from

a l l over

Europe

came t o w o r k w i t h native speakers o f Arabic. This served as an i n i t i a l foray i n t o the study o f Arabic a n d Arabic texts that f l o u r i s h e d i n later centuries. Missionary activities o f D o m i n i c a n a n d Franciscan friars,

Crusaders and other travelers to the Holy Land often brought back

based o n their hope o f the conver-

luxury objects and souvenirs, which became treasured in ecclesias-

sion

of

Muslims,

encouraged

m o r e serious study o f Islam a n d

tical and princely collections.This silk textile, made for a Samanid commander in eastern Iran in the mid-tenth century, was used in 1134 to wrap relics in the abbey of St. Josse-sur-Mer in northern

Arabic. Before the sixteenth cen-

France.The cloth was probably brought back by Etienne de Blois,

tury, however, i t was very rare f o r

patron of the abbey and a commander of the First Crusade.

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European scholars to have acquired, or have had m u c h interest i n , Arabic m a n u scripts. Some exceptions were f o u n d at Gurry i n France, i n the episcopal library at York, i n England, and i n the Vatican library. By the tenth century most Arabic translators had lost the use o f Greek and w o r k e d exclusively f r o m Syriac translations. It is remarkable that the outstanding M u s l i m philosophers o f the M i d d l e Ages—notably a l - K i n d i , al-Razi, al -Farabi, I b n Sina, and I b n Rushd—all were ignorant o f Greek and relied completely on translations rendered for the most part by Jacobite or Nestorian Christians. Thus the survival o f Greek philosophy i n the w o r l d o f Islam came t h r o u g h the m e d i u m o f the Syriac language. Naturally enough, those d o i n g the translating used their o w n j u d g m e n t as to what was w o r t h y o f transmission, most often t u r n i n g to those works that appealed to their o w n philosophy and theology. Thus the w r i t i n g s o f Plato and Aristotle, as w e l l as the works o f Hellenistic scientific medicine, were preserved, w i t h the resulting achievements o f Arabs i n these sciences far surpassi n g those o f die Christian inheritors o f Greek civilization. By the b e g i n n i n g o f the twelfth century Aristotle's w r i t i n g s were being translated i n the west, both f r o m the Arabic and direcdy f r o m the o r i g i n a l Greek. It is n o t entirely true, therefore, that western scholars were w h o l l y dependent on Arabic versions o f these works. Some scholars have argued that it was chiefly for the sake o f their commentaries that the Arabic works were considered so important, especially those o f I b n Sina and I b n Rushd. It is clear that the medieval Catholic w o r l d o f the west was w i l l i n g , even eager, to take what it could t h r o u g h the mediation o f the Islamic east i n the areas o f science and technology, materials reasonably n e u tral i n content. For the most part the subject matters that i t absorbed and took i n t o its o w n culture were those that reinforced its o w n culture radier than threatened it. Europe was clear about what it wanted and needed and was free to leave the rest. As was the case earlier w i t h M u s l i m translators, little was taken that was i n conflict w i t h what European scholars and theologians believed and held dear. I n the western m i n d there was never an association between Arab science and the r e l i g i o n o f Islam. Those w h o advocated the use o f scientific principles gleaned f r o m the Arabic texts were never suspected o f being crypto-Muslims. Robert o f Ketton, k n o w n for his e m p l o y m e n t by Peter the Venerable as a translator o f the Q u r a n i n the t w e l f t h century, w o r k e d tirelessly i n die effort to translate f r o m Arabic i n t o Latin out o f the conviction that the knowledge o f the Latin west was greatly inadequate i n the scientific fields. By the thirteenth century Arabic thought was really more o f an influence than a direct source o f western intellectual speculation, as writers were better able to control and make use o f the material than i n the earlier centuries. Europe was n o longer dependent i n the same way o n the Arabs for knowledge o f the Hellenic w o r l d , and translation directly f r o m the Greek was more

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c o m m o n than translation t h r o u g h the m e d i u m of the Arabic, although Arabic remained a very strong influence o n Europe at that time. Europe had by then recovered what i t wanted i n terms o f philosophy and science, received initially i n a f o r m that had been m o d i f i e d by many centuries o f Arab reflection o n i t .

Christian Visitors to the Holy Land O n e o f the ways i n w h i c h Christians came to learn m o r e about the M u s l i m s w h o inhabited and r u l e d the Holy Land o f Palestine was t h r o u g h centuries o f visitations by explorers and p i l g r i m s . B e g i n n i n g as early as the f o u r t h century, after the t r i u m p h o f Christianity i n the R o m a n Empire, p i l g r i m a g e to the east was fashionable a m o n g Europeans, encouraged by the c h u r c h as a k i n d o f private penance. The arrangements made between the emperor Charlemagne and the caliph H a r u n al-Rashid for establishing a hostel i n Jerusalem gives evidence that there were significant numbers o f p i l g r i m s c o m i n g to the city. Most o f these visitors, whose numbers increased d u r i n g the f o l l o w i n g centuries, were motivated by a sincere desire to visit the holy places o f Jerusalem and its environs, for w h i c h they felt that they received special religious m e r i t . I n many cases an i m p o r t a n t person w o u l d make such a p i l g r i m a g e , accompanied by numbers o f followers w h o w o u l d take advantage o f the security p r o v i d e d by such g r o u p travel. The great abbey at Cluny i n France, established i n the early tenth century, sponsored significant n u m b e r s o f p i l g r i m s b o t h to Christian shrines i n M u s l i m Andalusia and to Jerusalem. The Cluny abbey was responsible for b u i l d i n g hostels along the eastern route to p r o v i d e shelter for p i l g r i m s . I n some instances p i l g r i m s came by sea, b u t most p i l g r i m s n o r m a l l y f o l l o w e d a route t h r o u g h the lands o f western C h r i s t e n d o m , t h r o u g h eastern Europe and the Byzantine Empire. By the b e g i n n i n g o f the eleventh century the numbers o f p i l g r i m s to the H o l y Land increased considerably. This was due to a n u m b e r o f reasons, i n c l u d i n g the m o r e conciliatory attitude o f M u s l i m s t o w a r d Christians after the destruction o f the H o l y Sepulchre by the Fatimid caliph a l - H a k i m (r. 996-ca. 1021) i n 1009 (for w h i c h act he was designated by some western Christians as the Antichrist spoken o f i n the Apocalypse), and the o p e n i n g o f the overland route to Jerusalem t h r o u g h the conversion o f H u n g a r y to C h r i s t i a n i t y and the retrieval o f A n t i o c h i n t o Byzantine Christian hands. Most o f the p t i g r i m s , a l t h o u g h significant i n number, actually came f r o m a few provinces o f France and the Rhineland. The dukes o f N o r m a n d y were o n l y fairly new Christians by the eleventh century and were devoted to sending alms to the H o l y Land. Their subjects were k n o w n as the most enthusiastic o f p i l g r i m s , some o f w h o m became the leaders o f the early crusadi n g movements. D u r i n g the t i m e w h e n the Crusades were taking place it was d i f -

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ficult to distinguish the p i l g r i m s f r o m the crusader

c r o w d s , al-

t h o u g h Christian p i l g r i m s were generally motivated n o t by p o l i t ical b u t by votive purposes. Such visitors were p r i m a r i l y not interested i n the contemporary c o n d i tions o f the area but were attracted to the historical and religious significance o f the holy places o f the O l d and N e w Testaments.

The

i m p o r t a n c e o f p i l g r i m s i n the Christian K i n g d o m o f Jerusalem is attested to by the treaties c o n cluded w i t h the Muslims d u r i n g the t h i r t e e n t h century t o assure Medieval Christian rulers appreciated the luxury goods made by

Christians free access to the sacred

the Muslims. Hugh IV of Lusignan, King of Cyprus and Jerusalem

places w h e n those were reoccu-

(r. 1 3 2 4 - 5 9 ) , for example, ordered this splendid inlaid bronze basin

pied by Islam. Special roles were

from metalworkers in the Mamluk domains.

played by Christian saints w h o visited

the

Holy

Land,

most

notably Francis ofAssisi, w h o i n 1219—20 was one o f the first to attempt to convert the M u s l i m s to Christianity. It is reported that Francis was impressed by the piety and reverence o f those he came to missionize. For the most part the p i l g r i m s were f r o m the l o w e r classes o f European society, obscure m e n and w o m e n encouraged for reasons o f personal piety and hope for a b s o l u t i o n o f sins to undertake the arduous j o u r n e y east. Some represented m o r e educated and elite strata o f society, i n c l u d i n g d i s t i n g u i s h e d c h u r c h m e n and lay princes. N o matter w h a t their educational level, however, these e x p l o r ers and p i l g r i m s d i d not leave b e h i n d many records o f t h e i r observations. F r o m the available i n f o r m a t i o n it is clear that western Christians had n o m o r e expectation o f finding a n y t h i n g o f religious or p h i l o s o p h i c a l value i n Islam than d i d their M u s l i m counterparts i n reflecting o n the barren lands o f n o r t h e r n Europe and its m i s g u i d e d Christianity. U p t o the t h i r t e e n t h c e n t u r y these travelers r e m a i n e d strangers to the lands they v i s i t e d , r e c o r d i n g o n l y the vaguest i m p r e s sions o f the i n d i g e n o u s populations. K n o w i n g o n l y that M u s l i m s were outside the circle o f Christianity, and therefore generally to be despised, they e x h i b i t e d little interest i n Islamic r e l i g i o n and culture. This began t o change significantly by the t h i r t e e n t h century, w h e n as a result o f the Crusades, as w e l l as a r i s i n g interest i n Islam a m o n g the learned i n western Europe, visitors to the M i d d l e East began to talce m o r e notice o f the cultures to w h i c h they had traveled, and

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they thus p r o v i d e d better w r i t t e n records. By the fifteenth century and later, missionaries, p i l g r i m s , businessmen, explorers, and others were g i v i n g vohLrninous reports of their o w n journeys and o f the customs, habits, and religious practices o f M u s l i m populations. Such a visitor was Ghillebert de Lannoy, knight o f the court o f Bourgogne i n the early fifteenth century, w h o traveled to Andalusia, Egypt, and Syria and provided unusually detailed commentary o n M u s l i m dress, habits, and customs. Rarely u n t i l the latter centuries o f the second m i l l e n n i u m , however, were Christian travelers able to break free f r o m their o w n deep preconceptions about Islam. Pilgrims and scholars o u t d i d one another i n presenting Islam as an erroneous and idolatrous r e l i g i o n that must be condemned i n any way possible. Those w h o actually stayed for some period o f time i n M u s l i m lands, however, f o u n d themselves observing and even a d m i r i n g w h a t they saw o f M u s l i m piety and m o r a l conduct. Proceeding initially f r o m preconceived ideas about Islam as idolatrous, i m p i o u s , licentious, and i m m o r a l , by the end o f the medieval p e r i o d they o f t e n came to see the r e l i g i o n o f the Saracens as at least p r o v i d i n g a code o f behavior deserving o f praise.

The Crusades and Their Aftermath Many complex factors went i n t o the call o f Pope Urban I I for a crusade against the M u s l i m s , w h o since 638 had occupied Jerusalem. For m o r e than f o u r centuries Christians had been allowed to practice their r e l i g i o n freely i n that city. I n

1076,

however, Jerusalem was taken by the Seljuk Turks, w h o were said to have desecrated the holy places o f Christianity and treated the Christian p o p u l a t i o n w i t h brutality. Pilgrims r e t u r n i n g f r o m Jerusalem brought sad news o f their fellow Christians there. A l t h o u g h the n o t i o n o f avenging these w r o n g s and regaining the holy city for Christianity had been seeping i n t o western consciousness for some time, i t was not u n t i l the preaching o f such m o n k s as Peter the H e r m i t o f Amiens that popular o p i n i o n began to rise i n support o f such an effort. Encouraged by an appeal for assistance f r o m the emperor Alexis I i n Constantinople, Pope U r b a n I I p r o m i s e d his help and sent o u t the call f o r the first crusade. At the C o u n c i l o f C l e r m o n t i n 1095 the Pope was greeted w i t h great enthusiasm w h e n he called for an international crusade to recapture Jerusalem f r o m the infidels. Europe at that t i m e was generally ignorant o f the lands o f the east, w h e t h e r Christian or M u s l i m , and was intolerant and xenophobic. Narrowness o f m i n d met w i t h religious zeal for the liberation o f the Holy Land, d r i v i n g the Franks to a near frenzy o f enthusiasm and excitement. Virtually for the first t i m e since the early spread o f Islam, except f o r some movement against M u s l i m - h e l d territories i n the Iberian peninsula, Christians were i n a position o f reacting o f f e n sively and n o t just defensively to Islam. It was a heady venture, c o m b i n i n g centuries o f pent-up resentment against the Saracens w i t h the hope for spiritual

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regeneration b o t h o f the individuals w h o dedicated themselves to the venture and for a m o r a l l y lax Christendom itself. It was supported eagerly b y the medieval papacy and by the feudal knights and commoners alike. Many o f the crusading efforts were grossly m i s g u i d e d , however, a n d like the ill-fated "Children's Crusade" i n w h i c h numbers o f y o u t h were sold i n t o slave markets, they ended i n disaster. But i n the b e g i n n i n g , however, at least i n the eyes o f the west, there were crucial victories and the temporary attainment o f the prize o f Jerusalem. The first significant g r o u p o f crusaders t o arrive i n Palestine, consisting p r i m a r i l y o f knights and others f r o m France and Italy, set o u t i n 1096. They m o v e d In 109c, Pope Urban II

t h r o u g h the lands o f the Byzantines, w h o despite the emperor's plea f o r help

called for a crusade to liber-

greeted t h e m w i t h extremely m i x e d feelings and offered support and aid out o f

ate the Holy Land, especially

self-interest rather than enthusiastic approval. I n M a r c h o f 1098 the crusaders

the city of Jerusalem, from

captured A n t i o c h i n Syria, a n d b y July 1099 they were finally able to claim

the Muslims. One of the

Jerusalem. The victory, unfortunately, was accompanied b y a vicious and cruel

leaders of the First Crusade was Godfrey of Bouillon (ca. 1 0 6 0 - 1 1 0 0 ) , who was

elected first ruler of

slaughter o f Jews a n d M u s l i m s i n the city, c h r o n i c l e d b y b o t h Christian a n d M u s l i m w r i t e r s . Many M u s l i m w r i t e r s referred t o the arrival o f the Christians n o t as a crusade b u t as a Frankish invasion, a n d they described the carnage o f the

Jerusalem. He became the

Christian massacre o f M u s l i m s , i n c l u d i n g many religious leaders and Sufi mys-

hero of two French

tics, as the acts o f savage and cruel western barbarians. The sack o f Jerusalem is

Chansons de Geste dealing

often said t o be the effective b e g i n n i n g o f m a n y centuries o f an active m u t u a l

with the Crusades. This four-

hostility between east a n d west that was rarely k n o w n i n earlier days.

teenth-century illustration shows Muslims defending

D u r i n g the tenth century the Byzantines, taking advantage o f p o l i t i c a l disor-

their city against the

der i n the M u s l i m lands, h a d declared war against Islam and gained back m u c h

Christian invaders.

o f n o r t h e r n Syria w i t h the hope o f recovering Jerusalem. W h e n the F a d m i d

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caliphate was established i n 983, however, the tide began to t u r n and m u c h o f the t e r r i t o r y taken by the Byzantines was returned to M u s l i m hands. The violent attack f r o m the west i n the f o r m o f the c r u sading armies took the w o r l d o f Islam by surprise. I n a general state o f p o l i t i c a l disunity, i t was to be almost h a l f a century before the M u s l i m s gathered their forces to move against the Christian invaders i n a call for jihad o r h o l y war. The Latin K i n g d o m o f Jerusalem, a m o n a r c h y established u n d e r the leadership o f B a l d w i n o f Edessa, was established partly because o f the prevailing d i s u n i t y o f the M u s l i m w o r l d under the Seljuks, the Fatimids, and the w a n i n g Abbasid caliphate. The M u s l i m s attempted to restrain the invaders, but the crusaders were able to spread and consolidate their p o w e r i n the p r i n c i palities o f Edessa and A n t i o c h a n d f i n a l l y

the

K i n g d o m o f Jerusalem. This c o n q u e r e d t e r r i t o r y was referred to i n the west as " O u t r e m e r " (over the sea). The p r i n c i p a l i t y succeeded w e l l for some t i m e , but w h e n the Turks m o v e d i n t o Edessa i n 1144,

an

appeal was made for a second crusade. A n army consisting o f the rulers o f Germany and France set o u t i n 1147,

but after an unsuccessful attempt to

capture Damascus they were forced to r e t u r n h o m e . By this t i m e the M u s l i m Turks were g a i n i n g i n strength, w h i l e the Christians were starting to lose g r o u n d . Crusader zeal was g i v i n g way to l u x u r y and waste a n d t e r r i t o r i a l squabbling o n the part o f

In 1168-69 die Zangid prince Nur al-Din ordered woodworkers in Aleppo to make a splendid minbar for the al-Aqsa mosque at Jerusalem in anticipation of his reconquest of the city from the Crusaders. His successor, the Ayyubid ruler Salah al-Din, installed the minbar in the mosque after his conquest

the Christian rulers. The death o f A m a l r i c I , k i n g o f

of the city in 1187. The minbar, one of the finest examples of

Jerusalem, t o w h o m n o successor seemed w o r t h y ,

medieval woodwork, was destroyed by arson in 1969.

came at the t i m e o f the rise t o p o w e r o f the A y y u b i d general Saladin. I n 1187 the C h r i s t i a n h o l d o n the H o l y Land was effectively ended w h e n Saladin defeated t h e m at H a t t i n , a l t h o u g h they c o n t i n u e d for some t i m e to m a i n t a i n a small p o r t i o n o f the area. The M u s l i m leader m o v e d s w i f t l y to gain c o n t r o l o f most o f the other t e r r i t o r i e s h e l d by Christians, a n d finally

he regained Jerusalem f o r Islam nearly a c e n t u r y after the first Christian

invasion. Records o f the t i m e indicate that Saladin's treatment o f the Christian p o p u l a t i o n was h u m a n e and reasonable, i n notable contrast to the w a y i n w h i c h Christians h a d earlier dealt w i t h M u s l i m s and Jews u p o n t h e i r a r r i v a l i n Jerusalem. A l t h o u g h he r e t u r n e d the C h u r c h o f the H o l y Sepulchre to Greek

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O r t h o d o x custody, however, a n u m b e r o f churches were t u r n e d i n t o mosques, and Jerusalem clearly was once again a M u s l i m city. The loss o f the h o l y c i t y p r o m p t e d a t h i r d crusade f r o m the west i n

1189.

A c c o m p a n i e d b y m u c h dissension w i t h i n a n d slaughter w i t h o u t , these c r u saders gained l i t t l e except for Christian possession o f coastal t o w n s i n Palestine a n d free access to Jerusalem for C h r i s t i a n p i l g r i m s . Further struggles represented i n the f o u r t h , f i f t h , a n d f i n a l s i x t h crusades c o n t i n u e d u n t i l

the

M a m l u k s , w h o h a d taken over c o n t r o l o f Egypt f r o m the weakened A y y u b i d s , finally drove the crusading Christians f r o m all o f Palestine. T h r o u g h o u t the t w o centuries o f active c o n f l i c t , m e m b e r s o f the eastern c h u r c h , Byzantines a n d Arab Christians, were caught i n a t e r r i b l e m i d d l e p o s i t i o n . A l t h o u g h part o f the crusader r h e t o r i c i n the west h a d to d o w i t h freeing the eastern Christians f r o m the yoke o f Islam, actual encounters w i t h the Byzantines l e d to increased p o l i t ical and c u l t u r a l h o s t i l i t y between the co-religionists. W h e n the Franks m o v i n g t h r o u g h eastern C h r i s t i a n lands f r o m H u n g a r y t h r o u g h Greece to Syria a n d Palestine were n o t m e t w i t h aid a n d s u p p o r t , they h a d n o c o m p u n c t i o n s about l o o t i n g a n d p l u n d e r i n g . C h r i s t i a n Arabs w e r e never any m o r e

sympathetic

w i t h , or loyal to, the Frankish k i n g d o m i n Palestine than they h a d been to the Byzantines. A l l parties to the years o f c o n f l i c t — R o m a n s a n d Byzantines, easte r n a n d western Christians, Christians and M u s l i m s — t o o o f t e n t h o u g h t o f each other as barbarians and f r e q u e n t l y h a d those prejudices c o n f i r m e d i n the

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reality o f hostile i n t e r a c t i o n . The Latin K i n g d o m o f Jerusalem itself d u r i n g the near century o f its greatest flourishing

saw most o f Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine i n Christian hands. The

M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n was d i v i d e d a m o n g the farmers, the city dwellers, and the slaves. It was n o w the t u r n o f the Christians to exact o n the M u s l i m s a poll tax as w e l l as rental o f f a r m i n g properties. Those M u s l i m s w h o t r i e d to resist were treated harshly, and there were numerous attempts at rebellion. I n fact, treatment o f the subjugated M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n differed a m o n g the various Frankish lords. B a l d w i n , k i n g o f die Latin K i n g d o m , was k n o w n for his h u m a n e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and for many M u s l i m s life under the Franks was n o worse and perhaps better than they had k n o w n previously. The earliest o f the crusaders, w h o then became the long-standing inhabitants o f the Latin K i n g d o m , were generally m o r e tolerant o f the native p o p u l a t i o n than the newer arrivals and t r i e d to m a i n t a i n m o r e supportive relationships. Those m o r e recently arrived were intent o n expanding Christian t e r r i t o r y and thus o n seeing the M u s l i m s as the Saracen enemy. O f t e n the n e w arrivals forced their co-religionists w h o had become " n a t i v e " to revoke existing treaties made w i t h the M u s l i m s i n order to aid their aims o f expansion. Nevertheless, as i n Spain, the t w o c o m m u n i t i e s o f Christians and Muslims attempted to cooperate and coexist, although they constituted t w o separate societies w i t h their o w n laws and administration. Battles were pitched, but those w h o were not engaged i n fighting continued to live n o r m a l lives. Muslims and Christians traded w i t h each odier, rented properties f r o m each other, and generally carried o u t their commercial activities uninterrupted. Christians controlled the eastern coast o f the Mediterranean, but they allowed Muslims to sail their ships w i t h the appropriate passes. Piracy and pillaging continued as ever, o f course, w i t h all parties participating to some degree i n looting and taking prisoners to sell o n the slave markets. D u r i n g the t w o centuries i n w h i c h the Christians occupied Palestine, there was a constant pattern o f shifting alliances. M u s l i m rulers were played o f f against each other, and Franks were sometimes i n treaty w i t h one, sometimes w i t h another. This gradually changed as the disarray i n w h i c h the first crusaders f o u n d the Muslims was replaced by a more united front. Many prisoners f r o m among b o t h Muslims and Christians were taken, and elaborate negotiations often were made for their release. Trading i n prisoners was an active industry, w i t h many never returned to tiieir o r i g inal homes. W o m e n prisoners i n particular were victimized, often being taken into domestic service u p o n release, taken as wives o r concubines, or sold i n t o slavery.

The End of the Middle Ages The last several centuries o f the near m i l l e n n i u m o f interaction between Islam and Christendom saw a n u m b e r o f events that served as a k i n d o f transition f r o m the M i d d l e Ages to a new era o f international engagement. Two events i n particular, the

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fail o f Constantinople i n the m i d d l e o f the fifteenth century and the final expulsion o f M u s l i m s f r o m Andalusia at the end o f that century, illustrate this transition. Beginning i n the eleventh century the Turks, b o t h armies a n d tribesmen, had taken over a significant part o f Anatolia f r o m the Byzantines. The frontier between Islam and Christendom, defined for centuries by the Greek Christian h o l d o n the eastern borders o f Byzantium, began a process o f redefinition. The Turkish Empire, first under the Seljuks and then the Ottomans, grew i n t o one o f the three great empires i n the history o f Islam. M u c h o f that g r o w t h was at Christian expense. I n the m i d - 1300s a Byzantine contender to the throne b r o u g h t over a Turkish army as an ally, giving the Turks a h o l d o n the European side o f the Dardanelles. They occupied the ancient city o f Gallipoli as a garrison and m o v e d quickly over other parts o f w h a t was then k n o w n as Thrace. Soon they had gained c o n t r o l o f all o f the Balkan peninsula, and i n 1430

the Turks conquered the Byzantine city o f

Thessalonica. Less than a quarter century later, under the leadership o f the sultan M e h m e d I I , they were able to m o u n t their successful siege o f Constantinople. For some eleven h u n d r e d years o f its m o r e than t w o thousand years o f existence, Constantinople had stood as the capital o f the Byzantine Empire, an international city o f fame, beauty, and repute, and the seat o f eastern Christianity. It had been besieged many times i n its l o n g history, b u t d u r i n g the rule o f the Byzantines, Constantinople had been captured o n l y by western Christians i n the ill-fated F o u r t h Crusade. I n 1261, a half century later, i t was recaptured by the Byzantines. By the m i d d l e o f the fifteenth century the Byzantine Empire had l o n g been i n decline, caught i n the m i d d l e o f struggles b e t w e e n east and west. Suffering f r o m internal political strife, the p o p u l a t i o n o f Constantinople had shrunk drastically over the centuries. Nonetheless, i t r e m a i n e d a t e m p t i n g p l u m for M u s l i m m i l i t a r y objectives. Its fall to the i n v a d i n g Turks i n 1453

signaled a

dramatic change i n the p o w e r relationships between Islam and C h r i s t e n d o m . M e h m e d I I , as r u l e r o f Constantinople, became the titular heir o f the Roman Empire, and the specter o f a M u s l i m takeover o f all o f Europe was raised anew. This Anatolian base gave the O t t o m a n sultans the o p p o r t u n i t y t o lay siege o n Vienna i n 1529, and by 1542 they were i n c o n t r o l o f Hungary. They were perceived by western Christians to be a m o r e potent threat to the i n t e g r i t y o f Europe than the M u s l i m s w h o had been c o n f i n e d to the lower part o f the Iberian p e n i n sula were. I n the fifteenth and succeeding centuries M u s l i m naval forces r o a m e d the Mediterranean, attacking European ships as w e l l as coastal towns. By the b e g i n n i n g o f the seventeenth century, A l g e r i a n a n d M o r o c c a n sailors u n d e r O t t o m a n c o n t r o l raided as far as the southern coasts o f England and Ireland. M u s l i m fortunes w e n t otherwise i n Spain, w h e r e after the g l o r y o f n i n t h - and tenth-century Córdoba, and the succeeding rule o f the Almoravids a n d A l m o h a d s f r o m N o r t h Africa, they suffered a steady loss o f territories under the Christian

The conquest of the great Byzantine city of Constantinople had been the goal of Muslims since the seventh century. The city had been beseiged repeatedly but unsuccessfully and it remained a tempting plum for Muslim military commanders. Several decades after this drawing was made in 1422, the city was successfully conquered by the Ottoman sultan Mehmet I I .

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r e c o n q u e r i n g forces. Initially M u s l i m s under Christian r u l e , called mudejars, were the recipients o f a p o l i c y o f toleration for the so-called People o f the Book. They were p e r m i t t e d f r e e d o m o f w o r s h i p and the r i g h t to be governed under their o w n laws. Gradually, however, this gave way to increased f o r m s o f intolerance and persecution. M u s l i m s i n Christian territories were f o r b i d d e n f r o m m a k i n g the call to prayer, p e r f o r m p u b l i c sacrifice d u r i n g their feast days, or g o i n g o n p i l g r i m a g e , and many mosques were converted i n t o churches. M u s l i m s were forced to wear special k i n d s o f dress, as they h a d previously r e q u i r e d their Christian citizens to d o , and they had to prostrate themselves before the cross as i t was carried i n procession. The t w o c o m m u n i t i e s became completely segregated, and the death penalty was m e t e d o u t to Christians w h o t r i e d to convert to Islam. A r i s i n g tide o f anti-Semitism h a d serious consequences f o r b o t h M u s l i m and Jewish c o m m u n i t i e s i n Spain. I n 1474 Ferdinand I I o f Aragon a n d Isabella o f Castile, husband and w i f e , succeeded to c o n j o i n t b u t separate thrones. For the first t i m e i n nearly eight centuries the I b e r i a n peninsula was governed by one u n i t e d authority, the Christian k i n g d o m s o f Castile a n d A r a g o n . The k i n g and queen were to be r e m e m b e r e d as " t h e Catholic m o n a r c h s , " a measure o f their dedication to the r e u n i t i n g o f all o f Spain u n d e r C h r i s t e n d o m . By 1492 they h a d recovered Granada, the last s t r o n g h o l d o f M u s l i m occupation. W i t h that conquest the struggle for c o n t r o l o f Andalusia, w h i c h h a d c o n t i n u e d between M u s l i m s a n d Christians for some eight centuries, ended w i t h a v i c t o r y for C h r i s t i a n i t y and c o n t r o l o f the I b e r i a n peninsula. The takeover was f o l l o w e d by intense efforts at conversion, accomp a n i e d by translation o f the Christian scripture and l i t u r g y i n t o Arabic. Soon baptisms were n o l o n g e r o p t i o n a l b u t forced, a n d by the t u r n o f the f i f t e e n t h century n o t o n l y i n Granada b u t t h r o u g h o u t Castile M u s l i m s h a d to choose between conversion, e m i g r a t i o n , o r death. Because the emigrants h a d to leave their c h i l d r e n b e h i n d , most chose to stay and "convert." O f course m a n y c o n t i n u e d t o practice their Islamic f a i t h i n secret (thereby k n o w n as M o r i s c o s ) , r e m a i n i n g for generations to c o m e an unpersuaded, unassimilated, and unaccepted segment o f Spanish society. After a r e b e l l i o n i n the next century they were finally expelled f r o m the l a n d that earlier h a d seen, at least for awhile, one o f the f e w examples o f Christian and M u s l i m c u l t u r a l harmony. Despite the fact that the spread o f Islam was o f t e n peaceful a n d sometimes even received favorably by Christians i n t o whose t e r r i t o r i e s i t m o v e d , and despite the protected status a f f o r d e d by Islam to its f e l l o w "People o f the Book," the centuries o f Christian and M u s l i m i n t e r a c t i o n were m a r k e d as m u c h by strife a n d warfare as by h a r m o n i o u s relations. Yet o f f i c i a l tensions o r hostilities at the p o l i t i c a l level o f t e n were balanced by local cooperation a n d even f r i e n d ships between m e m b e r s o f the t w o faiths. Trade and c o m m e r c e between east

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and west c o n t i n u e d i n the same areas i n w h i c h parties were technically at war w i t h each other. Both c o m m u n i t i e s illustrated i n their respective leadership examples o f tolerance and o f p r e j u d i c e , sometimes

w i t h p r o t e c t i o n o f f e r e d to

their subject m i n o r i t i e s and other times subjection to the extremes o f persecution. By the close o f the M i d d l e Ages, hostilities between Islam and western C h r i s t e n d o m once again were intense, w i t h active warfare to c o n t i n u e o n a n u m b e r o f fronts for several centuries. Many factors c o n t r i b u t e d to this layered history

o f Christian a n d M u s l i m

interaction.

Territorial ambitions cut b o t h ways, as armies vied over territories h e l d by the other and the spoils o f w a r attracted mercenaries as w e l l as faithful to the attack. Cultural interactions sometimes fostered m u t u a l respect and even camaraderie, as i n Andalusia at the t i m e o f the Cordoban caliphate or a m o n g certain strata o f society i n Palestine under the Latin K i n g d o m . But deep-seated prejudices seldom fully abated, as M u s l i m historians, jurists, and clerics viewed w i t h disdain the barbarous and theologically m i s g u i d e d Christian p o p u l a t i o n o f the west,

Following the Christian reconquest of the Iberian peninsula, many mosques were converted into churches. Around 1187, for example, the small brick mosque of Bab Mardum, built in Toledo in 999-1000, became the Church of Cristo de la Luz, and a voluminous apse was added to its east side.

and Christian theologians j u d g e d the w a r l i k e and deluded followers o f " M a h o m e t " by doctrine and deed alike.Yet a l t h o u g h the seeds o f mistrust and antipathy so often sown f r o m the rise o f Islam to the fail o f Constantinople c o n t i n u e d to g r o w i n the f o l l o w i n g centuries, new developments came to bear, such as the f o r g i n g o f significant changes i n the relationship o f Islam and C h r i s t e n d o m . The rise o f rationalism, a fascination o n the part o f the west w i t h the cultural trappings o f the east, and the necessities o f international p o l i t i cal a n d e c o n o m i c

exchange were soon to m o v e the w o r l d s o f Islam and

C h r i s t e n d o m inevitably closer.

CHAPTER

EIGHT

Sultanates and Gunpowder Empires T H E MIDDLE EAST

Ira M . Lapidus

The era o f gunpowder empires represents a new phase i n die development o f Middle Eastern and Islamic societies. The term gunpowder empires imputes a great importance to the innovative military technology o f infantry armed w i t h muskets, operating i n conjunction w i t h siege and batdefield artillery, diat allowed the new empires to sweep away their rivals and to establish a d o r n i n i o n that w o u l d last until the eve o f the m o d e r n era. Yet the achievements o f die Ottoman and Safavid empires were not merely technological or tactical. Their endurance and their success i n deploying new technologies was based o n a deeper structure o f political institutions. I n t u r n the political regimes must be understood as the embodiment o f a comprehensive civilization. The Ottoman and Safavid empires were the umbrellas, the holding companies, for complex societies. They represented novel military tactics, the consolidation o f political institutions, and the restoration o f imperial political controls over vast territories after centuries o f near anarchy. They also fostered important economic and urbanistic developments, new forms o f religious organization, and a fresh phase i n the history o f M i d d l e Eastern and Islamic cultures. Illustrated manuscripts and

(Left) The Ottoman sultans built great mosque and school complexes to adorn their cities and express their authority. The crowning

mosques f r o m the O t t o m a n and Safavid empires remain to the present day treasures

achievement of Ottoman

o f w o r l d civilization. Less w e l l - k n o w n but equally brilliant are die achievements i n

architecture is the immense

poetry, philosophy, and religious studies i n these empires. As comprehensive systems o f government, society, economy, and culture, the O t t o m a n and the Safavid empires represent a cTjhninating phase i n the history o f Middle Eastern civilization—the h i g h

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domed Selimiye mosque at Edirne designed by the architect Sinan for sultan Selim in 1574.

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imperial phase, w h i c h precedes the nineteenth-century transformations and the advent o f the m o d e r n era.

The Fundamental Structures of Middle Eastern Societies and the Early Islamic Era The basic features o f these empires derive f r o m the historical past. F r o m ancient times, and even i n t o the m o d e r n era, the small c o m m u n i t y has remained the focus o f the deepest loyalties, the basis for widespread, c o m m u n a l cooperation, and the w e l l s p r i n g o f c o m m o n identity. Those w h o f o r m e d a family, a lineage, a clan, or a clientele g r o u p loyal to a master—the people o f a hamlet, a village, a n o m a d i c camp, a t o w n quarter, l i v i n g i n close p r o x i m i t y to each o t h e r — c o n s t i tuted the c o m m u n i t y for r e p r o d u c t i o n , for n u r t u r i n g and educating the y o u n g , for earning a l i v i n g , and for defense and m u t u a l aid. Their story w i l l not be t o l d i n this history o f the O t t o m a n and Safavid eras, but nonetheless they were the fundamental entities i n the e m p i r e systems. Such groups sustained the m o r e encompassing domains o f the economy, the religious i n s t i t u t i o n s , and the state, and i n t u r n their w e l l - b e i n g was the u l t i m a t e measure o f the success and the value o f the e m p i r e systems. Small c o m m u n i t i e s were the b u i l d i n g blocks o f larger formations. Three such f o r m a t i o n s were o f particular historical i m p o r t a n c e : tribal organizations; r e l i gious c o m m u n i t i e s ; and political regimes, states, and empires. Tribal organizations consisted o f various g r o u p s — f a m i l i e s , lineages, clienteles, and political gangs—that coalesced under the leadership o f a patriarch o r other p o l i t i c a l o r religious chieftain. A l t h o u g h tribes have c o m m o n l y been t h o u g h t o f as extended families, i n reality they were alliances o f families, clientele groups, and bands o f w a r r i o r s w h o p r o m o t e d c o m m o n interests. The second large-scale c o m m u n a l institutions were religious c o m m u n i t i e s . Since ancient times, family, lineage, and tribal units h a d been affiliated i n c o m m o n w o r s h i p and in the shared c o n s t r u c t i o n , maintenance, and veneration o f shrines and temples. W i t h the emergence o f the monotheistic religions, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Christianity, certain beliefs became virtually universal: belief i n the transhuman w o r l d o f spiritual forces, i n the sacred quality o f all being, a n d i n a supreme d i v i n e being, universal, transcendent, and unknowable; belief i n the ethical responsibility o f all h u m a n beings; and belief i n a life i n the w o r l d to come. These religions also taught the b r o t h e r h o o d o f m a n k i n d and p r o m o t e d the organization o f congregations for w o r s h i p and parishes for the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f their educational, legal, and charitable affairs. Jews and Christians i n particular, i n synagogues and churches, f o r m e d strong c o m m u n a l bodies and had a strong sense o f shared identity.

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The t h i r d agglomerating i n s t i t u t i o n — p o l i t i c a l regimes, states, and e m p i r e s — was the umbrella organization that r u l e d over the families, client groups, tribes, and religious bodies w i t h i n its t e r r i t o r i a l reach. The ruler was considered to represent the d i v i n e p l a n for order i n society. Rulers had a quasi-religious f u n c t i o n , i n that their g o o d behavior was supposed t o ensure the favor o f the gods. Empires were supposed to defend the realm o f civilization, p r i m a r i l y agricultural and urban, against the barbarians, w h o were usually nomadic peoples. Internally, the rulers were supposed to protect their subjects against injustice and to secure order i n society. I n practice, empires represented the d o m i n a t i o n o f the r u l e r — t h e ruler's household, courtiers, armies, and bureaucrats—over the rest o f the p o p u lation. Rulers policed, taxed, punished, and subdued their o w n peoples. At the same t i m e , the apparatus o f rule depended o n the resources i t c o u l d draw f r o m the subordinated political, religious, and c o m m u n a l units—revenues and supp o r t i n g labor from families, l e g i t i m a t i o n f r o m churches and religious groups, and m i l i t a r y support f r o m tribes. Rulers' relations w i t h tribal and religious bodies, however, were always contested. The struggle for power i n these societies t u r n e d o n the state's relations to these partly independent bodies. M i d d l e Eastern peoples also shared linguistic, cultural, or regional identities, but these identities d i d not necessarily have political meanings. Thus mere were Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, Persians, Turks, and so o n and such cultural identities as those o f the Hellenistic, Iranian, and Semitic literary cultures, but i n premodern times the most important units were tribes, religious groups, and empires. Only i n the m o d e r n era have ethnicity and nationality become the basis o f m o d e r n states. Many technologies (such as those for p r o d u c i n g f o o d : agriculture and h e r d i n g ; the techniques for preparing c l o t i i i n g : spinning, weaving, and tanning; and m e t h ods o f construction) and institutions (such as the institutions o f money, markets, and commercial law) also derived f r o m ancient times. These were older and more widespread than either the O t t o m a n or Safavid empires. The Arab-Islamic conquests and the early Islamic empires perpetuated the basic constellation o f earlier institutions but redefined t h e m i n Islamic terms. F r o m the seventh to the tenth centuries die Arab empires created the first Middle Eastern-wide political regime, b r i n g i n g an overarching u n i t y into the region f r o m the Aral Sea to the Adantic Ocean. Regions that had been part o f the Byzantine and the Sasanian empires as w e l l as regions i n the far east ( i n Central Asia) and i n the far west ( i n N o r t h Africa and Europe) that had never been part o f a M i d d l e Eastern empire were brought under the reign o f Islam. The n e w unified Middle Eastern empire allowed for an expanded international trade and a larger arena for the cooperation o f local elites, t h e n integration i n t o the i m p e r i a l system, and the creation o f new elite i d e n tities o n the basis o f Islam and the M i d d l e Eastern high-literary cultures i n Arabic and Persian.

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A l t h o u g h the new empires i n h e r i t e d the i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k o f the past, they gave i t a distinctly Islamic character. The Arab-Islamic empires b u i l t on the administrative mechanics o f their predecessors—the ruler's court, w h i c h was the empire's c o m m a n d center; the military, w h i c h was constituted i n part by a central army and i n part by tribal auxiliaries; and the bureaucracies developed for tax collection and c o m m u n i c a t i o n — b u t at the same t i m e they redefined their political identities. The new rulers were called caliphs, heirs and executors o f the r

teachings o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d , as w e l l as heirs t o the Byzantine and Sasanian empires. T h r o u g h patronage o f architecture and the visual arts, philosophy, science, and new literatures i n Arabic and Persian, they assimilated the heritage o f a n t i q u i t y i n t o their Islamic identity, creating a n e w f o r m o f M i d d l e Eastern courtly, aristocratic h i g h culture. I n the early Islamic era the n e w r e l i g i o n was established n o t o n l y i n court and r u l i n g circles b u t t h r o u g h o u t the M i d d l e East. Islam, w h i c h espoused religious beliefs analogous to those o f Judaism and Christianity, was at first the r e l i g i o n o f the i m p e r i a l elite and o f the Arab c o n q u e r i n g forces settled i n garrison towns and cities t h r o u g h o u t the empire. Gradually it became the r e l i g i o n o f converts w h o j o i n e d the Arab rulers i n their garrison centers. As late as the tenth century, h o w ever, Islam was still the r e l i g i o n o f urban elites and o f o n l y some peasant and b e d o u i n elements. The great masses o f the M i d d l e Eastern p o p u l a t i o n had yet to be converted. F r o m these M u s l i m populations emerged a new Islamic culture. M u s l i m s generated studies o f the Q u r a n and the hadith (verified accounts o f a statement or action o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d ) as w e l l as legal, theological, and mystical studies; they opened u p the study o f philology, grammar, and history as a u x i l iary subjects. M u s l i m holy m e n , readers o f Q u r a n , teachers o f h a d i t h , scholars o f law, and mystics gathered adherents and followers, and they created a plethora o f small c o m m u n i t i e s , sometimes sectarian, dedicated t o the study and l i v i n g out o f one or another variant version o f M u s l i m beliefs and practices. By the tenth century a M u s l i m literary-religious culture and many c o m m i t t e d c o m m u n i t i e s were i n f u l l b l o o m . Islam was established i n parallel to the previously existing Christian, Zoroastrian, and Jewish populations. A l t h o u g h the early Islamic era d i d not complete the process o f the Islamization o f the M i d d l e East, it p r o v i d e d the critical concepts and social models. The legacies o f this early era i n c l u d e d the concept o f the caliphate and the Islamic state as a u n i f i e d expression o f m o r a l and political interests; the system o f beliefs that constituted the Islamic r e l i g i o n ; such social organizations as schools o f law, Sufi coteries, and Shiite c o m m u n i t i e s ; the i n s t i t u t i o n a l f o r m s o f mosques and c o l leges; and the authority o f ulama (religious scholars) and Sufis, scholars, and holy m e n as leaders o f their people.

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The Sultanate Era, 950-1^00: Between the Abbasid Caliphate and the Gunpowder Empires The collapse o f the Abbasid empire i n the tenth century opened the way for the f u r t h e r transformation o f M i d d l e Eastern regimes, societies, and cultures and for a new and creative, albeit t u m u l t u o u s era i n the history o f the region. O n the surface the political changes were anarchic. W i t h the breakup o f the Abbasid empire, provinces and even small districts came under the r u l e o f new m i l i t a r y elites. N o m a d i c peoples broke t h r o u g h the f r o n t i e r defenses, invaded, and m i g r a t e d en masse i n t o the M i d d l e East. A g r i c u l t u r a l and trading economies were badly d a m aged, and the standard o f l i v i n g declined. Yet o n a deeper level this p e r i o d o f upheaval was also an era o f reconstruction. N e w f o r m s o f state and c o m m u n a l organizations were created and innovative variants o f culture and i d e n t i t y were expressed, setting the foundations for the later O t t o m a n and Safavid empires. The p e r i o d 9 5 0 - 1 coo fell i n t o f o u r phases. I n the first phase ( 9 5 0 - 1 0 5 0 ) , local elites took c o n t r o l o f the empire's f o r m e r provinces. I n Egypt and Syria, the Fatimids, a Shii, rival o f the Abbasids, came to p o w e r w i t h their o w n claims to the caliphate. I n Mesopotamia t r i b a l forces, i n c l u d i n g the H a m d a n i d dynasty, seized c o n t r o l . M i l i t a r y adventurers f r o m Daylam seized c o n t r o l o f western Iran, m u c h o f Iraq, and Baghdad, w h i c h were the heartlands o f the f o r m e r caliphate. Eastern Iran and Transoxiana were r u l e d by the Samanids, a local l a n d o w n i n g elite. They were partly supplanted by the Ghaznavids, a regime based o n slave m i l i t a r y forces, w h o for the first t i m e selected their o w n sultan. The second phase lasted f r o m about 1040 to 1200, w h e n the collapse o f a u n i fied central authority and the many regional power struggles allowed for the breakdown o f the eastern Iranian frontiers against nomadic invasions. Already i n the seventh century the T'ang rulers o f China had closed their frontiers to Central Asian nomads, thus setting i n m o t i o n a westward movement that w o u l d i n the tenth, eleventh, and later centuries spill over i n t o the M i d d l e East. Inner Asian nomads searching for pasturage m o v e d i n t o the regions n o r t h o f the Aral Sea and i n t o Transoxiana and Afghanistan. F r o m contact w i t h settled peoples, trade, a n d the activity o f missionaries, Turkish peoples began to convert to Islam, and t h e n chieftains became tutored i n the ways o f agriculture, city a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and trade, and knowledgeable about the i m p e r i a l conception o f rule and order. By the end o f the tenth century the Qarakhanids, leaders o f the Q a r l u q peoples, established their regime i n Transoxiana, w h i l e the Oghuz peoples under the leadership o f the Seljuk family w e n t o n to conquer m u c h o f the f o r m e r Abbasid empire. The Seljuks took control o f Khurasan i n 1040; by 1055 they r u l e d over Baghdad. The migrations led to the f o r m a t i o n o f Seljuk offshoot states i n Mesopotamia, Syria, and eventually Egypt. Turkish peoples also m o v e d i n t o lands that had not been

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under caliphal c o n t r o l , w h i c h b r o u g h t Islamic d o n u n i o n to parts o f A r m e n i a , Georgia, and Anatolia at the expense o f the Byzantine Empire. A n i m p o r t a n t Seljuk offshoot state established i n Anatolia, the sultanate o f R u m , was the direct ancestor o f the O t t o m a n Empire. The Seljuk conquests lent but a temporary and superficial political u n i t y t o the M i d d l e East. The conflicts o f nomadic peoples seeking independence a n d r u l i n g families w i s h i n g t o subordinate the tribal forces, the rivalries among the members o f r u l i n g families for fiefdoms and independent territories, and the widespread d i s t r i b u t i o n o f iqtas (lands instead o f salaries) led to an ever greater decentralization, fragmentation, and dispersal o f political power. Seljuk-related regimes broke u p i n t o numerous independent states and tiny t e r r i torial fragments. The period after the collapse of the Abbasid caliphate in the tenth century led to the rise of new military elites, often of nomad origin.TheTurco-

The Seljuk decline opened the way t o a t h i r d phase i n the history o f the r e g i o n , f r o m about 1150 t o 1350. This was a p e r i o d o f f u r t h e r n o m a d i c invasion f r o m i n n e r Asia, c u l m i n a t i n g i n the M o n g o l invasions and the establishment o f M o n g o l regimes over m u c h o f the M i d d l e East. I n 1153 Ghuzz peoples destroyed

Mongolian conqueror known

the Seljuk r e g i m e i n eastern Iran. They were f o l l o w e d by the Naymans and then

as Timur or Tamerlane

the devastating M o n g o l invasions. T h e I l k h a n i d M o n g o l r e g i m e i n I r a n

(d. 1405) created a vast but

(1256-1336), however, b r o u g h t renewed stability a n d ushered i n a b r i l l i a n t

ephemeral empire centered on his capital at Samarqand. The Gur-i Mir, his majestic blue-domed tomb there, epitomizes the splendor of Timurid architecture.

p e r i o d i n Iran's art and culture. To the west, the slave rnihtary forces i n Egypt and Syria, the o n l y holdouts against M o n g o l rule, consolidated the M a m l u k regime (1250-1517). The f i n a l phase o f this i n t e r r e g n u m was the T i m u r i d p e r i o d i n Transoxiana and I r a n ( 1 4 0 0 - 5 0 0 ) . M o n g o l r u l e was succeeded by a n e w t i m e o f troubles

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and the e x t r a o r d i n a r y conquest o f the Turkic c o n q u e r o r T i m u r ( k n o w n i n English as Tamerlane,

1336-1405). A l t h o u g h T i m u r i d r u l e left a n u m b e r

of

unstable succession regimes, like M o n g o l r u l e i t also p r o m o t e d greatness i n architecture, the arts, and the sciences. This era o f repeated n o m a d i c invasions b r o u g h t p r o f o u n d d e m o g r a p h i c changes i n the ethnic and religious i d e n t i t y o f p o p u l a t i o n s . A n e w Turkic-speaking p o p u l a t i o n m i g r a t e d i n t o Transoxiana, the H i n d u Kush m o u n t a i n range, eastern and n o r t h w e s t e r n I r a n , the Caucasus, Anatolia, and Mesopotamia.

Large p o r t i o n s o f this n o r t h e r n t i e r became

Turkic-speaking. Turkish settlement l e d to the Islamization o f parts o f n o r t h eastern I r a n , A r m e n i a , and Anatolia, b o t h f r o m the settlement o f n e w c o m e r s and by the conversion o f existing populations. Islam was also carried i n t o Transoxiana and f u r t h e r parts o f i n n e r Asia and the n o r t h e r n steppes. Turkish m i g r a t i o n s meant an expansion o f the boundaries o f I s l a m d o m . Ethnic changes also led to important ecological changes. I n some regions the newcomers displaced

f o r m e r nomadic

populations, as i n Transoxiana and

Mesopotamia. I n other areas the Turkish migrations increased pastoralism at the expense o f agriculture. Turkish tribal formations also became a lasting part o f the political process. Under the leadership o f w a r r i o r chieftains and holy m e n , the migrations shifted the balance o f power i n favor o f tribes at the expense o f centralized states. These conquests are interesting to compare w i t h the Arab invasions o f earlier centuries. A l t h o u g h i n many ways die conquest process and the f o r m a t i o n o f new empires was m u c h the same, there is one striking difference. The Arab conquests brought a new linguistic and religious identity to the M i d d l e East that became the predominant identity o f later M i d d l e Eastern civilization, w h i l e the Turkish conquerors accepted Islam. W h i l e maintaining their Turkic language and identity, they became patrons o f Arabo-Persian civilization.

The New Political and Social Order The basic political facts make it hard to grasp tliat beneath the surface o f events, this was also a p e r i o d o f reconstruction and the creation o f new governmental and societal institutions. Everywhere the legacy o f the Islamic caliphate and the heritage o f Persian concepts o f imperial monarchy were blended w i t h Turkish concepts o f political chieftaincy, law, and w o r l d conquest. W h i l e regimes came and went, w h i l e conquerors succeeded each other, the system o f governing came to be fixed i n similar modes. The Seljuk period (1040—1200) was particularly i m p o r t a n t i n this regard. Seljuk institutions, first f o r m e d i n Khurasan and western Iran and Iraq, were carried westward to Syria, Egypt, and Anatolia. Later M o n g o l and post-Mongol p e r i o d governments added additional elements f r o m their historical heritage to the synthesis o f new institutions.

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During the period when nomadic chieftans ruled, authority often passed to alabegs, guardians for princes who had not yet reached the age of majority. The Armenian-born convert Badr al - Din Lulu, for example, served as vizier to the last Zangid prince of Mosul in 1222 and then became regent of the city from 1234 until his death in 1259. Badr al-Din is depicted on a frontispiece from a multivolume copy of Kitab dl-Aghoni (The Book of Songs), aJ-Lsfahani's collection of early Islamic poetry, made in 1219.

The caliphate, a l t h o u g h d e p r i v e d o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and m i l i t a r y p o w e r , retained its s y m b o l i c i m p o r t a n c e as the e m b l e m o f a M u s l i m w o r l d order a n d as the bearer o f ultimate guarantees for religious belief, justice, and p o l i t i c a l order. For centuries all p r o v i n c i a l governors and w a r l o r d s l o o k e d to the caliphs for r e c o g n i t i o n o f their r i g h t to rule. Even after the extinction o f the Ahhasid line i n U ç 8 , regional substitutes emerged. The M a m l u k s i n Egypt c r o w n e d a surv i v o r o f the Abbasid family as their caliph. Great w a r l o r d s c l a i m e d i m p l i c i t l y and explicitly to e m b o d y the caliphate i n their o w n persons. The O t t o m a n sultans considered themselves caliphs, a n d the Safavids regarded themselves as descendants a n d e m b o d i m e n t s o f the Shiite i m a m s .

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At the same t i m e , the conquerors a n d warlords cultivated a parallel n o n M u s l i m concept o f authority. They gave themselves such titles as shah, malik, and sultan, all supreme rulers. They recalled historical tribal genealogies to guarantee their descent f r o m famous rulers o f the past; they patronized court cultures replete w i t h poets, scientists, philosophers, theologians, artists, and architects. They built magnificent mosques, t o m b s , colleges, minarets, caravanserais, and palaces i n the fashion o f past M i d d l e Eastern rulers, to say by their patronage o f culture that they were the protectors a n d overlords o f the d o m a i n o f h u m a n civi l i z a t i o n . They sponsored religious activities, schools, w o r s h i p , and charities, and gave gifts and pensions to scholars and h o l y m e n . I n practice, they made t h e m selves patrons o f r e l i g i o n and necessary to the success o f Islam. The governments established after the fall o f the Abbasid empire were o f t w o principal types. The most c o m m o n , represented by the Qarakhanids, Seljuks, and M o n g o l s , were nomadic chieftaincies transformed i n t o monarchies. The nomadic chief ruled by virtue o f his conquests o r descent f r o m conquerors. He was supported by a coalition o f aristocratic Lineages that was entitled to share i n the spoils o f victory. Nomadic states c o m m o n l y divided their territories into domains for the leading members o f the r u l i n g family. Family chieftains and the guardians o f chieftains w h o were still underage ( k n o w n as atabegs) became the provincial governors and tributaries o f the reigning sultans. The nomadic populations constituted a m i l itary elite that was c o m m o n l y moved toward die frontiers, b o t h to further the conquest o f new lands and to prevent further h a r m to the agricultural and urbanized societies that had become part o f the chieftain's domains. The post-Abbasid states were typically built o n the support o f tribal populations that extended the reach o f the r u l i n g circle beyond that o f the governing family coalition. A l t h o u g h the empires were conquered by nomadic peoples, they were ruled f r o m the center by quite different elites. Turkish chieftains c o m m o n l y built u p a governing apparatus that made t h e m independent o f their o w n nomadic supporters. A d o p t i n g historic mechanisms o f rule, they created court complexes o f familyretainers, servants, noble companions, m i l i t a r y officers, and h i g h - r a n k i n g a d m i n istrators that constituted the political elite o f dieir regimes. The sultans btuTt up slave m i l i t a r y corps to serve as praetorian guards and to serve i n battle against both foreign enemies and their o w n n o m a d i c supporters. These slaves were the best trained, best equipped, and were thought to be the most loyal subjects o f the ruler. The court and the slave m i l i t a r y apparatus were supported by a tax-collecting administration. Post-Abbasid rulers continued to use the bureaucratic techniques o f their predecessors, m a i n t a i n i n g scribal staffs for recordkeeping, tax collection, correspondence, and payment o f salaries and pensions, but bureaucratic a d m i n istration greatly shrunk i n the post-Abbasid era. Economic regression cut i n t o the cash flows that were essential for a centralized a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and forced post-

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Abbasid governments to rely m o r e and m o r e heavily o n decentralized f o r m s o f administration. The most c o m m o n m e t h o d came to be the direct assignment o f iqtfls—tax revenues f r o m specific territories paid as salaries to m i l i t a r y officers and often collected directly f r o m the peasants. The iqta system bypassed the c u m bersome process o f tax collection, sale o f produce, and r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the revenues i n the f o r m o f cash salaries, b u t i t also gave direct access to and c o n t r o l o f the land to the warlords. This was a quasi-feudal system o f government, but one i n w h i c h the central government retained a u t h o r i t y over the l a n d and the r i g h t to grant and w i t h d r a w grants o f land made i n r e t u r n f o r m i l i t a r y service. It was not feudal i n the European sense because i n p r i n c i p l e assignment o f a benefice d i d n o t i m p l y ownership o f the land, or judicial, administrative, or personal c o n t r o l o f the peasants. I n practice, i t o f t e n meant just that. The second type o f r e g i m e was the purely m i l i t a r y slave elite. I n the case o f the Ghaznavids i n Afghanistan or the M a m l u k s i n Egypt, the slave officers t h e m selves overthrew dynastic rulers and built governments solely o f slaves, f r o m o r d i n a r y soldiers to the heads o f states. The slave regimes, however, f u n c t i o n e d i n m u c h the same manner as the n o m a d i c chieftaincies i n terms o f court, m i l i tary, and bureaucratic structures. These regimes faced t w o political problems. The first p r o b l e m was the tendency toward progressive decentralization o f power. Control o f the provinces had to be delegated to family members and nomadic chieftains. Iqtas had to be assigned to the m i l i t a r y leaders. The weakness o f the bureaucratic apparatus prevented close control over these assignments. The result was usurpation o f power at both p r o v i n cial and local levels and the establishment o f independent microregimes, sometimes even hereditary regimes, w i t h i n the n o m i n a l territories o f the state. The second p r o b l e m was the paradoxical relationship o f the sultans and the central government to the nomadic forces. The nomads conquered the new territories, but they soon came i n t o conflict w i t h their o w n chieftains. The royal and w o u l d - b e royal families wanted to centralize power, protect the conquered and settled p o p ulations f r o m damage, and tax the productive economies, w h d e the nomadic interest lay i n obtaining booty, lands for pasturage, and f r e e d o m f r o m government control. I n the early phases o f a conquest, sultans channeled the nomadic m i g r a tions t o w a r d the frontiers; b u t as each wave o f conquerors settled, nomadic p o p ulations and their royal clueftains c o m m o n l y came i n t o conflict over territory, privileges, and taxation. Rulers tried to reduce the once c o n q u e r i n g peoples i n t o docile subjects. The success, power, and longevity o f their regimes depended i n g o o d measure o n the balance o f central and nomadic powers. I n m a n y respects the critical achievement o f the ephemeral post-Abbasid regimes was cultural. Each ruler m a i n t a i n e d a court as the center o f literary, artistic, and religious p r o d u c t i o n , as an indispensable sign o f his legitimacy and his

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claims to equal status w i t h other rulers. I n the post-Abbasid p e r i o d n o t only Baghdad b u t also Samarqand,

Bukhara, Ghazna, Nishapur, Isfahan, M o s u l ,

Damascus, Cairo, Fez, Córdoba, and many other cities became i m p o r t a n t centers o f M u s l i m learning, art, and literature. Political fragmentation fueled an extraordinary outburst o f cultural creativity. Many local courts became patrons o f architectural c o n s t r u c t i o n and producers o f books and illustrated manuscripts as w e l l as patrons o f such l u x u r y objects as fine pottery, metalware, rugs, glass, and other finely crafted materials. Courts were also often patrons o f scientific research, p h i l o s o p h i c a l speculation, literature, poetry, history, and religious subjects. Moreover, the courts c o m m o n l y patronized very similar, often the same, versions o f culture. Poets, w r i t e r s , and philosophers made their livings by m o v i n g f r o m court to c o u r t , creating the same achievements i n different places. Skilled craftsmen, seeking refuge f r o m the M o n g o l s , fled Mesopotamia for Cairo i n the m i d d l e o f the thirteenth century, r e v i v i n g the o l d regional arts i n a n e w location. Sometimes conquerors forcibly transferred skilled artists to their n e w capitals, as d i d the Turkic conqueror T i m u r w h e n he tried to b u i l d the g l o r y o f Samarqand. Also, rulers demanded similar products. Copies o f the History of Alexander the Great or the tales o f the Kalila wa Dimna were translated and illustrated for numerous courts, such as Samanid Bukhara, T i m u r i d Samarqand, and M a m l u k Cairo. By these processes a c o m m o n culture o f kings emerged, and w i t h i t the concept o f the f a m i l y o f kings and the b r o t h e r h o o d o f rulers w h o had the same responsibilities, the same status, and a c o m m o n lifestyle. Thus, o u t o f the conquest and fragmentation there developed broad zones o f c o m m o n culture. I n the courts o f the Samanids and Ghaznavids a n e w I r a n o Islamic language and Persian culture developed. It was characterized by the preservation o f the literary legacy o f ancient, pre-Islamic I r a n , and i t was deeply influenced by caliphal Arabic poetry a n d by the translation o f Literary and r e l i gious classics f r o m Arabic i n t o Persian. The new language had its o w n standard metrical f o r m s for odes and the c o m m o n Sufi love and w i n e poems. A standard a r c h i t e c t u r a l f o r m for mosques a n d madrasas also developed—a

building

arranged symmetrically a r o u n d a central d o m e , constructed o f b r i c k and decorated w i t h tiles and mutjcirnas (a decorative element that resembles a stalactite). The new Persian language, literature, and artistic style q u i c k l y became the c o m m o n c u l t u r a l i d i o m o f all the f o r m e r eastern lands o f the caliphate, i n c l u d ing Iran, Transoxiana. and inner Asia, and they eventually reached i n t o n e w l y conquered Islamic lands i n India and the East Indies. This Irano-Islamic culture i n t u r n fostered the creation o f a n e w Turko-Persian culture. The Qarakhanid rulers o f Transoxiana, f o l l o w e d by the M o n g o l s and the T i m u r i d s , sponsored the translation o f Persian classics i n t o Turkic languages. Variants spread t h r o u g h o u t i n n e r Asia u n d e r M o n g o l a n d Chagatay r u l e and later became the basis o f

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O t t o m a n culture. M e a n w h i l e , Arabic literature derived f r o m the caliphal era and f r o m Islamic religious studies became the c o m m o n language and literary m e d i u m o f the f o r m e r western territories o f the Arab-Islamic e m p i r e , f r o m Iraq to the Atlantic Ocean. Just as certain p o l i t i c a l i n s t i tutions had become by i m i t a t i o n and d i f f u s i o n the c o m m o n f o r m s o f state organization a m o n g the numerous regimes o f the i n t e r r e g n u m era, so t o o a c o m m o n h i g h culture had emerged i n A r a b i c , Persian, a n d Turkic versions,

despite

intense decentralization i n all the domains o f M i d d l e Eastern Islam. The political upheavals o f the intermediate era were also the impetus for a correspondingly p r o f o u n d transformation o f the social organization o f M i d d l e Eastern

populations. T h r o u g h o u t the

r e g i o n , the subject p o p u l a t i o n was exposed to extraordinary danger f r o m m a r a u d i n g armies, economic hardship, rapid changes o f p o l i t i c a l overlords, the decline o f older l a n d o w n i n g and bureaucratic elites, and the i m p o s i t i o n o f n e w foreign rulers. In response, people throughout the r e g i o n drew together i n defensive

movements

and created a new c o m m u n a l structure. This n e w order was based o n Islam. Paradoxically, the Abbasid e m p i r e i n m a n y The Persian language became

ways delayed the d i f f u s i o n o f Islam to the mass

the cultural idiom both of all

o f M i d d l e Eastern populations. A l t h o u g h the e m p i r e was the o f f i c i a l sponsor and

the former lands of the east-

protector o f Islam and p r o m o t e d Islamic law and w o r s h i p , the n e w r e l i g i o n

ern caliphate and of the

remained nonetheless the r e l i g i o n o f a m i n o r i t y . The Abbasid e m p i r e accepted

newly conquered regions of

the e x i s t i n g C h r i s t i a n , Jewish, a n d Zoroastrian c o m m u n i t i e s , accepted the

the Indian subcontinent. Arabic texts, such as Ibn Bakhtishu's bestiary, Manafi alHayawan (The advantages of animals), were translated into Persian, as in this illustrated copy made at Maragha in northwest Iran in the 1290s.

a u t h o r i t y o f c h u r c h elites, a n d cooperated w i t h n o n - M u s l i m administrators, landowners, and bankers i n the management o f the e m p i r e . The political system had thus removed the w o r l d l y incentives for conversion to Islam. W i t h the breakup o f the Abbasid empire, however, the o l d social elites were swept away. Churches c o u l d n o longer protect their peoples, l a n d o w n i n g f a m i lies were dispossessed, and the administration c r u m b l e d . The result was a vacuum

of

leadership

into

which

was

drawn

the

only

surviving

elite

e l e m e n t — M u s l i m scholars (ulama), teachers, preachers, a n d h o l y m e n . The

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Karramiya (a religious m o v e m e n t that c o m b i n e d theological principles, Sufi practices, and a social mission) established networks o f khanaqas or Sufi residences, w h i c h eventually became the basis o f c o m m u n i t y organization and c o n version i n eastern Iran. Sufis i n western Iran, for example, under the leadership o f the Sufi preacher Shaykh A b u Ishaq al-Kazeruni (963—1033), began to convert Zoroastrian villagers to Islam. Town quarters became organized under the aegis o f Islamic schools o f law, Shii c o m m u n i t i e s , or Sufi and other religious leadership. By the t w e l f t h century the m a j o r i t y o f M i d d l e Eastern populations was identified w i t h Islam; its c o m m u n a l leaders were M u s l i m ulama and Sufis; Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians had become demographic as well as political minorities everywhere. The n e w l y Islamized populations were p r o v i d e d w i t h new forms o f c o m m u nal organization. These forms had their o r i g i n s i n the earlier Islamic p e r i o d . As early as 660, M u s l i m s had begun to d i v i d e i n t o t w o camps: the Sunnis, supporters o f the existing U m a y y a d and later Abbasid caliphates, and the Shiites, w h o opposed the established regimes and h e l d that o n l y the descendants o f A l i had the r i g h t to the leadership o f the M u s l i m s . I n the tenth century the Shiites, by then deprived o f the l i v i n g i m a m s , codified their tradition i n books o f hadith, law, and theology, and elaborated a ritual calendar focused o n the veneration o f the tombs o f A l i at A n - N a j a f ( i n southern-central Iraq) and Husayn ( w h o was massacred by Umayyad troops at Karbala i n 680) at Karbala ( i n central Iraq). A m o n g the Sunnis a variety o f small religious c o m m u n i t i e s took f o r m as people gathered around readers o f the Q u r a n , reciters o f the h a d i t h , scholars o f law, and theologians and mystics, to w h o m they looked for religious inspiration and guidance. The legal schools evolved f r o m i n f o r m a l discussion groups o f scholars, students, and judges i n t o quasi-administrative bodies p r o d u c i n g codes o f law under slate patronage, staffing the judiciary, carrying on legal instruction, a d m i n istering c o m m u n a l and intestate properties, and p r o v i d i n g i n f o r m a l leadership and i n s t r u c t i o n for the c o m m o n people. By the n i n t h century the Hanbali school ( f o u n d e d by the theologian and jurist A h m a d i b n Hanbal) was already an organized pressure g r o u p t r y i n g to impose its concept o f Islam o n the caliphate. W i t h the breakup o f the Abbasid empire, the legal schools were m o d i f i e d to become the basis o f a mass Islamic society. Provided w i t h endowments, the schools created permanent institutions k n o w n as madrosas (teaching colleges and residences) as the basis o f their activities. The colleges provided b u i l d i n g s , residences, libraries, kitchens, a n d stipends for b o t h teachers and students. The ulama also assumed a larger role i n their c o m m u n i t i e s . They often m a r r i e d i n t o local l a n d o w n i n g and administrative families and organized gangs, quarters, and sectarian associations under their leadership. The ulama also represented

the

urban populations to the conquerors, p r o v i d i n g local a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and justice, arranging for local security, p u b l i c w o r k s , taxation, charities, and other services.

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At the same t i m e , a new f o r m o f Islamic c o m m u n a l organization under Sufi auspices came i n t o being. Sufis had for centuries coalesced a r o u n d charismatic h o l y m e n , sometimes taking u p residence i n khanaqas p r o v i d e d to shelter t h e m and facilitate their meetings, w o r s h i p , and i n s t r u c t i o n . I n the t w e l f t h century Sufi organizations, partly under the influence o f the legal schools and o f state supp o r t , became m o r e f o r m a l still. The a u t h o r i t y o f shaykhs over disciples became absolute; the rituals o f d e v o t i o n and transmission o f a u t h o r i t y were m o r e elaborate, as Sufis adapted the khirqa (the transmission o f the robes o f the master) and the silsila (the chain o f masters and disciples g o i n g back to the Prophet h i m s e l f ) as the badges o f their affiliation. Soon Sufis became organized i n tariqot ( b r o t h erhoods), as disciples and lieutenants created new branches to w h o m they transm i t t e d t h e i r particular f o r m s o f w o r s h i p . The t r a n s m i s s i o n o f dhikr (the Sufism, or Islamic mysticism, emerged as a basic socializing force during this period.The authority of shaykhs became

m e d i t a t i o n a l m e t h o d o f concentrating the soul o n the veneration o f G o d ) was the d e f i n i n g quality o f each b r o t h e r h o o d . As Sufi b r o t h e r h o o d s became m o r e formally organized, they t o o k o n m o r e i m p o r t a n t social roles. I n t o w n s and v i l -

absolute, and they passed

lages t h r o u g h o u t the M i d d l e East lay M u s l i m s came to the Sufis for supplemen-

their authority to their disci-

tary w o r s h i p , f o r spiritual consolation, healing, and charity, and for political

ples, who were organized

m e d i a t i o n o f problems between the people and the governments or between fac-

into brotherhoods.The shrine of Shaykh Nimatullah Vali (d. 14.31) at Mahan, for example, became a major

tional and tribal rivals. Alongside the legal schools, Sufi c o m m u n i t i e s emerged as a basic organizing social force a m o n g M u s l i m s . Sufism also p r o v i d e d the rationale for a looser type o f c o m m u n a l organiza-

Sufi center for southeastern

t i o n . The tombs o f famous ancestors and Sufi masters came to be venerated as

Iran and India.

the providers o f miraculous help, and shrines emerged as a focus o f M u s l i m w o r -

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ship. Descendants o f sainted Sufis, and their lineages and brotherhoods, became custodians o f the holy places to w h i c h thousands o f people w o u l d come, seeki n g the intercession o f the b u r i e d h o l y m e n and the transmission o f barako (God's power t h r o u g h the Sufi to his needy clients). Shrines became the focus o f p i l grimages and fairs. I n m a n y parts o f I r a n , Sufi brotherhoods organized m i l i t a r y defense and resistance to predatory nomadic clans and g o v e r n i n g chieftains. O f t e n espousing a m i x o f Shii and Sunni v i e w s — o r f r o m the perspective o f the governments and the urban ulama, heretical teachings—Sufi movements became the expression o f r e l i g i o - p o l i t i c a l protest against abusive elites. The consolidation o f Shhte sectarian communities, Sunni schools o f law, and Sufi lineages, brotherhoods, and shrine communities thus provided a c o m m u n a l structure for Muslims throughout the M i d d l e East. In this period oí upheaval, Islamic authority and Islamic religious bodies provided the basis for c o m m u n i t y order and solidarity. A new mass Middle Eastern society based o n Islam had come i n t o being.

The State and Religion The emergence o f n e w p o l i t i c a l and religious bodies raised again the p r o b l e m o f the d i v i s i o n o f a u t h o r i t y between the state and religious institutions. I n M i d d l e Eastern societies this issue goes back to the ancient temple c o m m u n i t i e s o f Mesopotamia and the emergence o f the first empires. Ever after, the boundaries o f a u t h o r i t y and f u n c t i o n s between rulers and priests w o u l d be an o p e n quest i o n . The Islamic era began w i t h its o w n p o s i t i o n o n this issue. For M u s l i m s the Prophet h i m s e l f e m b o d i e d b o t h religious and p o l i t i c a l authority. H e revealed God's w i l l and God's law for his people; he was the r u l e r o f the c o m m u n i t y , w h o also collected taxes, waged wars, and arbitrated disputes. The early caliphs also c l a i m e d religious a u t h o r i t y to make p r o n o u n c e m e n t s o n r e l i g i o u s law and beliefs as w e l l as the prerogatives o f emperors. I n the e v o l u t i o n o f the caliphate, however, the tendency t o separate p o l i t i c a l a n d r e l i g i o u s a u t h o r i t y seemed unavoidable. As conquerors and emperors, the caliphs increasingly became p o l i t ical leaders w i t h only a symbolic f o r m o f religious a u t h o r i t y ; the a u t h o r i t y to p r o m u l g a t e or discover law, t o make judgments o n matters o f belief, and to instruct o r d i n a r y M u s l i m s devolved o n the ulama and the holy m e n . By the t i m e o f the Abbasid empire's collapse, p o l i t i c a l and religious a u t h o r i t y thus belonged i n practice to different people, a l t h o u g h this was n o t yet recognized i n theory. The Turkish invasions and the establishment o f n o m a d i c o r slave m i l i t a r y regimes made acute the question o f religious or state a u t h o r i t y and functions. N o m a d s and slaves were foreigners i n o r i g i n and culture, w a r r i o r s i m p o s e d o n the civilian populations, w h i l e the t o w n and village elites o f the post-Abbasid era were M u s l i m religious leaders. The d i v i s i o n o f personnel and realms o f author-

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ity was patent. W h a t w o u l d be the relation between the t w o elites: state m i l i t a r y and administrative o n the one h a n d or local, c o m m u n a l , and religious o n the other? This p r o b l e m was solved i n the i n t e r r e g n u m p e r i o d by the creation o f t w o autonomous b u t cooperating elites. Turkish nomadic and slave m i l i t a r y authorities were eager to establish internal order, to facilitate taxation, and to m i n i m i z e resistance f r o m their subject populations. They needed the help o f educated f u n c tionaries and scribes. They needed the l e g i t i m a t i o n and r e c o g n i t i o n that o n l y the holders o f religious p u r i t y c o u l d supply. They wanted the presence o f cultivated scholars and h o l y m e n , poets, philosophers, historians, teachers, intellectuals, and artists to adorn and g l o r i f y tiieir courts. They craved to enter i n t o the fraternities o f cultured M i d d l e Eastern peoples. The m i l i t a r y elites thus sought the s u p p o r t o f the religious elites by u n d e r w r i t i n g t h e i r activities. They lent their forces to the suppression o f Shiism; they p r o v i d e d e n d o w m e n t s f o r mosques and khanaqas a n d stipends for teachers, h o l y m e n , a n d students. Seljuk rulers constructed a n d e n d o w e d madrasas i n every m a j o r city o f their empires. They endowed Sufi khanaqas to foster the h o l y m e n w h o served as missionaries f o r Islam. A l t h o u g h Seljuk rulers at first p a t r o n ized particular schools or factions, by the t w e l f t h and t h i r t e e n t h centuries. M i d d l e Eastern rulers had w o r k e d their way to a pan-Sunni policy, s u p p o r t i n g all the m a j o r schools o f law, h a d i t h , and theology. I n r e t u r n , the religious leaders accepted the Seljuk states, recognized their legitimacy, justified t h e m t o the subjects, and taught the necessity o f obedience. They cooperated i n r o u t i n e administrative matters, o c c u p y i n g an i n t e r m e d i a r y p o s i t i o n representing

the

regime to the people a n d the interests o f the people to the regime. By the t w e l f t h century the t w o elites o f state and r e l i g i o n h a d w o r k e d o u t a p o l i c y o f cooperation. A M u s l i m society became i n practice a society governed by state elites, w h o protected and p a t r o n i z e d Islam, and r e l i g i o u s leaders, w h o l e g i t i m i z e d alien states. This c o n d o m i n i u m o f elites a n d cooperative

relations

between i n s t i t u t i o n s w o u l d be for m a n y centuries the M i d d l e Eastern M u s l i m s o l u t i o n to the p r o b l e m o f state and r e l i g i o n . N o t all M i d d l e Eastern peoples accepted this arrangement, however. M o u n t a i n , nomadic, and tribal peoples sought to maintain political independence, avoid econ o m i c subordination, and cultivate cultural autonomy. To unite disparate small communities, to organize and justify resistance to sute control, many harked back to die image o f the Prophet, embodying b o t h political and religious authority, making political interests a holy cause and holy aspirations a w o r l d l y endeavor. Such groups often looked to Sufi holy m e n to provide t h e m w i t h u n i f i e d r e l i g i o - p o l i t i cal leadership, sometimes i n opposition to established states, sometimes i n conquering ventures o f their o w n . The Safavid empire had its origins i n this alternative concept o f Islamic religious leadership.

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The Safavid Empire The Safavid empire was strongly shaped by the political and religious instimtions and the cultural accomplishments o f the previous era. The Turkish and M o n g o l migrations had profoundly changed the character o f northern Iran. A large Turkish population had settled i n eastern Iran, i n the region o f the Oxus River, and i n northwestern Iran and eastern Anatolia. Turkish peoples constituted about 2c percent o f the total population, and the Turkish presence radically changed b o d i the economy and the society. Large districts were converted f r o m agriculture to pasturage, and a new political system was introduced. Turkish territories were parceled out among tribal chieftains, w h o gadiercd their families, clients, bands o f individual freebooters, and others into a single political unity. These units, c o m m o n l y called tribes or uymuq, used dieir power to bring lesser chieftains into line and to subdue and govern local towns and villages. They became the de facto government i n m u c h of northern Iran. I n reaction, religious leaders emerged t o shelter the local populations. Sufi preachers promised to invoke occult and mysterious powers that w o u l d protect their followers. Other leaders taught the doctrine o f the qutb (saintly pillar o f the w o r l d ) w h o w o u l d protect oppressed peoples. Still others taught that a savior w o u l d come t o redeem the g o o d people f r o m the traumatic upheavals o f the time. In these turbulent regions a n u m b e r o f Sufi-led religio-political opposition movements emerged t o contest the power o f Turkish and M o n g o l chieftains. One o f these Sufi leaders was the Persian mystic Shaykh Safi a l - D i n (1252-1334), based i n Ardabil i n northwestern Iran, w h o founded the Safavid Sufi b r o t h e r h o o d , provided schools and residences, and cultivated a hierarchy o f students, disciples, l i e u tenants, and missionaries. The heads o f the brotherhood brought uprooted i n d i viduals and small-lineage chieftains i n t o the order, and they occasionally m a r r i e d i n t o local tribal princely families. The Safavid followers, whatever their political o r i gins, considered themselves devotees (murshids). By the fifteenth century they had come t o believe that the head o f the order was their Sufi master, their shah or k i n g , the reincarnation o f A l i , and the h i d d e n i m a m w h o m they awaited as God's mes¬ siah. I n the turbulent fifteenth century; after the breakup o f the T i m u r i d empire, the Safavids turned to more m i l i t a n t political activities, attacking Christian p o p u lations i n Georgia and eastern Anatolia i n the name o f jihad (religiously sanctioned warfare against n o n - M u s l i m s ) . B o u n d together by religious belief, the Safavids waged war against other Turkish principalities and conquered Iran i n a rapid set o f victories between 1500 and 1510. O u t o f the conflict o f T u r k i s h tribal and religious movements came the first stable empire t o rule Iran since the Abbasid dynasty. This stability, however, was n o t based o n a direct c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the m o v e ment's o w n religious culture and organization. Rather, i n the very first Safavid postconquest reign, Shah Ismail (r. 1500-1524) began to replace his Sufi e n t h u -

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Ms

git LS. " *

„1

To support their legitimacy, the Safavid dynasty of Iran (1501-1752) developed a cultural policy to establish their regime as the reconstruction of the historic Iranian monarchy. To that end, they commissioned elaborate copies of the Shahnamch, the Iranian national epic, such as this one made for ShahTahmasp in the 1520s and 30s and illustrated with more than 250 exquisite paintings.

siasts w i t h the apparatus ot a centralized statu. For m o r e than a century, f r o m the reign o f Shah Ismail t h r o u g h the reign o f Shah Abbas I (r. 1588-1629), the successive leaders o f the dynasty b u i l t u p loyal slave cadres apart f r o m their tribal and religious supporters and tried t o establish a centralized bureaucratic apparatus to make possible direct taxation and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f the area, The leaders also attempted to develop a cultural policy that w o u l d support the legitimacy o f the n e w regime, n o t just as a Sufi religious m o v e m e n t but as the

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reconstruction o f the historic Iranian monarchy. The shahs became the patrons o f those imperial arts that for centuries had been understood to be the hallmark o f kings. Shah Ismail transferred the T i m u r i d school o f p a i n t i n g f r o m Herat to the Safavid capital o f Tabriz. Safavid rulers endowed workshops to produce illustrated manuscripts and a royal library to house t h e m . Their patronage led to the product i o n o f the Shahnomeh (Book o f Kings), w h i c h contains paintings o f battles, h u n t i n g scenes, and royal ceremonies that are adorned w i t h exquisite animal images, real and mythical, and depictions o f gardens. There are some 250 paintings i n all; this w o r k is one o f the masterpieces o f Iranian and Islamic art. It is a celebration o f the glory o f Iranian monarchy and o f the Safavids as the heirs o f that tradition. I n the seventeenth century, however, a m o r e mature regime preferred realistic depictions o f daily life, paintings that bore emotional expression and secular scenes o f beauty and love. The first p e r i o d expressed the need for political l e g i t i m a t i o n , w h i l e the second era expressed the taste o f aristocratic soldiers, officials, and courtiers for the g o o d life. Safavid rulers also maintained workshops that produced famous carpets, silk cloth and hangings, and metalworks and ceramics to adorn the i m p e r i a l court, mosques, and shrines as a reminder o f the g l o r y o f the monarchy. Perhaps the supreme artistic creation o f the Safavid r e g i m e and the u l t i m a t e s y m b o l o f the restoration o f Iranian m o n a r c h y was the city o f Isfahan. Built as a great new capital, Isfahan was the geographic base for administrative centralizat i o n . It was also the locus o f a vibrant u r b a n economy whose products and rev-

Fearing the proximity of the Ottoman frontier, in the late sixteenth century the Safavids moved their capital from northwestern Iran to Isfahan in the center of the country. The Safavids extended the city with a new royal square surrounded by two stories of shops that symbolized the key role of trade in the centralized slate.

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enues were essential to i m p e r i a l finances. Isfahan's bazaars c o n centrated the p r o d u c t i o n and m a r k e t i n g o f goods, c o m p e t i n g w i t h the resources o f tribal chieftains; they were an essential river o f tax revenues t o s u p p o r t the central state a n d the basis o f Iranian international trade. Built w i t h unparalleled grandeur and beauty, Isfahan e m b o d i e d Safavid legitimacy. The new city was b u i l t a r o u n d a single great central square, the M a y d a n - i Shah, w h i c h measured m o r e than coo by 1600 feet and served as a market, p o l o g r o u n d s , and carnival arena. The square was surr o u n d e d by t w o - s t o r i e d r o w s o f shops and by great archways o n each o f the cardinal sides. M o n u m e n t a l b u i l d i n g s adorned the square. The Mosque o f Shaykh Lutfallah rose o n the east side (constructed f r o m 1603 to 161c); the royal mosque stood to the south (constructed f r o m 1611

to 1629). O n the west stood the A l i

Qapu or the royal palace, the Sublime Port o f the Safavids. To the n o r t h a m o n u m e n t a l arch marked the entrance to the m i l e - l o n g covered bazaar o f Isfahan, itself a g l o r i o u s achievement o f M i d d l e Safavid rulers maintained state workshops that produced fine carpets made of silk and metallic threads. Many of the finest carpets were made for export to Europe. This exam-

Eastern u r b a n design, w i t h its innumerable shops, caravanserais, baths, mosques, a n d schools. F r o m the central square the Chahar Bagh Avenue, b o r d e r e d by gardens

a n d the residences

of

ple, which retains its vivid colors, is one of a

courtiers and f o r e i g n ambassadors, ran t w o and a half miles to

pair once owned by the Doria family in Italy.

the s u m m e r palaces o f the shahs.

Shiism in Early Iran The most astonishing chapter i n the Safavid consolidation o f power was the decision to p r o m o t e Shiism as Iran's official religion. U n t i l the Safavid era, Iran was largely Sunni, although there was a m i n o r i t y Shiite presence i n Q u m and Isfahan. A l t h o u g h the Safavid shaykhs claimed descent f r o m the seventh i m a m and integrated Shiism i n t o their religious identity and authority, the o r i g i n a l Shiism o f the Safavids was a nrinority orientation. The murshids and loyalists understood Shiism as a claim to embody d i v i n i t y They w o r s h i p e d the master o f the order as the bearer o f the l i v i n g spirit o f God. The new official religion o f the shahs, however, was Twelver o r ithna ashari Shiism, a m u c h m o r e institutionalized and mainstream version o f Islam, but one that was neither g r o u n d e d i n Iranian culture and history nor even acceptable to their most devout followers. It w as a way o f elevating the shahs above b o t h their supporters and their subjects. The n e w Shiite establishment was b u i l t u p over the course o f a century. The process began w i t h the i m p o r t a t i o n o f Shiite scholars f r o m Syria, Iraq, Arabia, and Bahrain. The new cadres were organized i n t o an a d m i n i s t r a t i o n controlled

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by the state. A n official called the sadr was appointed to be the i n t e r m e d i a r y between the shahs and the ulama, and eventually this f u n c t i o n a r y was given responsibility for the a p p o i n t m e n t o f judges and teachers and for the a d m i n i s tration o f e n d o w m e n t s . A supreme religious court was created. The Safavids f u r ther extended t h e i r c o n t r o l over r e l i g i o n by e n d o w i n g the p r i n c i p a l Shiite shrines, f o u n d i n g the teaching colleges, and p r o v i d i n g grants o f i n c o m e f r o m landed estates for the leading ulama families. A n ulama landed aristocracy was created as a buttress o f the regime. The creadon o f this apparatus was i n some respects an extension o f earlier Iranian Islamic practices and i n other respects extremely innovative. The Scljuks had o r i g i nated the policy o f patronage for religious activisLs, w h o were all Sunni, as a way o f gaining influence over the religious elites. The Safavids adopted tins policy as well, but went m u c h further i n centralizing control o f the ulama i n the hands o f die shahs. They brought the ulama f r o m the position o f clients to that o f servants o f the state. The Safavids also suppressed all rival forms o f religion i n Iran. The Seljuks had waged war w i t h m i n o r i t y Shiite communities; the Safavids destroyed Iranian religious p l u ralism by the persecution o f Sunni, alternative Shiite, and Sufi rivals. Sufi shrines were destroyed; Sufi brotherhoods were banned. For example, tombs o f the Naqshabandi Sufi order were desecrated; khanaqas o f die Nimatullahi Sufi order were seized and turned over to Shiite organizations. The pilgrimage to Mecca was deemphasized and replaced by the visitation o f Shiite shrines.

I s f a h a n ' s r o y a l s q u a r e is d o m i n a t e d b y e n t r a n c e s to f o u r great b u i l d i n g s . O n the w e s t is the A l i Q a p u , o r " S u b l i m e P o r t , " t h e e n t r a n c e t o a v a s t p a l a c e p r e c i n c t . F r o m its v e r a n d a h o v e r l o o k i n g t h e g r e a t s q u a r e , a n d his c o u r t c o u l d v i e w the e v e r - c h a n g i n g pageantry below.

the

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The success o f Twelver Shiism i n I r a n , however, was n o t just a q u e s t i o n o f state power. Under Safavid sponsorship, Shiism entered a period o f exuaordinary religious, literary, and philosophical creativity and genuinely became the religious culture o f Iranians. Although die original Sufi—Shiite concepts o f the Safavids and the Sufi movement were proscribed, the veneration o f Ah and Husayn became an integral part o f Iranian Islam. The great shrines o f Mashad and Q u m were rebuilt d u r ing the reign o f die shah Abbas I (r. 1588-1629), generously endowed, and made an essential part o f die practice o f Shiism i n Iran. Shrines called imamzoddis were founded i n m e m o r y o f the imams or associates o f the imams; imombaros (sliines devoted to Husayn and Hasan) replaced villages shrhies. The pilgrimage to Karbala became for Iranian Muslims even more important than the pilgrimage to Mecca. The c o m m e m o r a t i o n o f the death o f Husayn i n the m o n t h o f M u h a r r a m (the first m o n t h i n the Islamic year) became the e m o t i o n a l core o f Iranian Shiism. I n the first ten days o f M u h a r r a m , Iranians gathered t o hear the heartrending stories o f the m a r t y r d o m o f Husayn at the hands o f the Umayyads i n 680 C . E . Sermons, recitations o f elegies i n m e m o r y o f Husayn, passion plays, and the processional m o v e m e n t o f shrines accompanied by columns o f m o u r n e r s and flagellants a n c h o r e d Shiism i n p o p u l a r feeling. N e i g h b o r h o o d g r o u p s , y o u t h gangs, and religious sects competed t o o u t d o each other i n the veneration o f Husayn. Shiism was n o t just a state-sponsored bureaucratic r e l i g i o n ; it had seized h o l d o f popular feeling to become the deeply felt religious i d e n t i t y o f the Iranian masses. At the same time, h i g h - c u l t u r e gnosticism a n d p h i l o s o p h y also flourished. The Iranian philosopher and teacher M i r Damad ( d . 1630) a n d his disciple M u l l a Sadra (1571-1640) sought t o integrate neo-Platonic ideas w i t h the mystical v i s i o n o f the Persian theologian and philosopher al-Suhrawardi, the sayings o f A l i , a n d the p h i l o s o p h y o f the Islamic m y s t i c I b n a l - A r a b i (1165-1240). Thus Shiism emerged as o n e o f the great p h i l o sophical religions o f the Islamic era. As a f o r m o f state r e l i g i o n , intellectual c u l t u r e , a n d mass passion, Shiism had become a comprehensive alternative version o f Islam. Despite this singular institutional creation, however, relations between the state and U n d e r che S a f a v i d s , T w e l v e r S h i i s m b e c a m e t h e state r e l i g i o n o f I r a n . T h e great s h r i n e s at Q u m a n d Mashhad were enlarged, a n d imamzaddis, s m a l l e r s h r i n e s i n m e m o r y o f

the religious establishment eventually became strained. Already i n the seventeenth century there were subtle shifts i n the posit i o n o f the religious elites. A l t h o u g h Shiism h a d been i n s t i t u -

other d e s c e n d a n t s o r associates o f the

tionalized b y the p o w e r o f the state, deeply h e l d religious values

i m a m s , b e c a m e the focus o f local piety a n d

encouraged an attitude o f w i t h d r a w a l f r o m w o r l d l y affairs a n d

veneration.

disdain f o r p o l i t i c a l engagement. As religious leaders w i t h d r e w

f r o m politics, they were n o longer w i l l i n g to passively accept the a u t h o r i t y o f the state. Shiite scholars began to contest the n o t i o n that the Safavid shahs were the representatives o f the h i d d e n i m a m . They claimed instead that the scholars t h e m selves were the highest religious a u t h o r i t y and the true representatives o f the i m a m o n earth. As the religious establishment separated itself f r o m political c o n t r o l , the scholars began to debate the basis o f t h e n o w n authority. The usuli school claimed that religious scholars knowledgeable i n the teachings o f the Q u r a n , the sayings o f A l i , and the historical consensus o f the c o m m u n i t y (ijma) were mujtahids (scholarsjurists) entitled to independent religious j u d g m e n t (ijtihad). Their opponents, the akhbaris, restricted the authority o f individual scholars and insisted o n literal adherence to the letter o f the tradition passed o n by the Prophet and the imams. By the eighteenth century the debate had sliifted f r o m the role o f the m o n a r c h to the l i m its o f ulama authority. The religious establishment, although b o r n as the creature o f the state, had effectively become independent, w i t h consequences that echo i n Iran to the present day. This transformation o f die religious establishment f r o m a servant o f the state to an independent i n s t i t u t i o n was actually the consequence o f

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a second aspect o f Safavid h i s t o r y — t h e relation o f the state to the tribes. As m u c h as the Safavid regime was able to build u p slave forces and a central tax administration, as m u c h as it created a religious organization, i t was n o t able to fully subordinate the tribal forces. I n northeastern and northwestern Iran, and to the south i n what is n o w Afghanistan, Turkish uymaqs (bands o f tribal chieftans, their clients, and individual freebooters organized i n t o a single political entity) remained p o w erful. I n many places they were able to rule independendy; i n other areas they were tributaries, but never were they crushed or eliminated. I n most parts o f Iran the m o n a r c h y had to relyo n quasi-independent intermediaries for the government o f the country. Apart f r o m the reign of Shah Abbas I , the Safavid state remained a court-centered regime w i t h relatively little power i n the countryside. For reasons that are still unclear, the late seventeenth cent u r y was a t i m e o f decay f o r the Safavid central state. The Safavid a r m y was n o l o n g e r a c o m p e t e n t m i l i t a r y m a c h i n e , and

central

a d m i n i s t r a t i o n fell

apart. The

uymaqs-—

Afghans, Afshars, Qajars, Zands, a n d others—rose u p a n d p a r t i t i o n e d the c o u n t r y a m o n g t h e m . I n Afghans seized Isfahan, a n d i n 1726

1722

Ghalzai

they e l i m i n a t e d the

dynasty that h a d r u l e d Iran f o r m o r e than t w o h u n d r e d years. I n some respects the Safavids were the direct c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the p o l i t i c a l system o f the M o n g o l s a n d the T i m u r i d s . A l t h o u g h they raised the concept

o f Iranian

i m p e r i u m to new level o f l e g i t i m a c y and c u l t u r a l brilliance and adapted the same i n s t i t u t i o n a l mechanisms t o centralize state power, like their predecessors they c o u l d n o t f u l l y succeed i n t a m i n g the T u r k i s h tribes. The Safavid state r e m a i n e d a c o u r t r e g i m e i n a f l u i d society i n w h i c h p o w e r was w i d e l y dispersed a m o n g c o m p e t i n g t r i b a l forces. These Safavid society was a courtcentered regime, and people

forces w o u l d i n the e n d o v e r t h r o w the dynasty. The Safavids differed p r o f o u n d l y f r o m their predecessors i n their relation t o

flocked to the capital to

Islam. W h i l e earlier states had been patrons o f Islamic activity, the Safavids cook

work for royal patrons. The

this further. Initially they claimed to be the l i v i n g representatives o f the d i v i n e

painter Reza (d. 1635), for

c o m m a n d . I n a later phase, however, they created a h i g h l y centralized and c o n -

example, earned his epithet "Abbasi" from his major patron. Shah Abbas, and earned his living painting portraits of Abbas' courtiers, such as this turbaned man in a blue coat.

trolled religious elite as the backbone o f their a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f Iran and their c l a i m to legitimacy as the defenders and patrons o f Islam. The Safavid state thus left as its legacy to m o d e r n Iran a Persian tradition o f g l o r i f i e d monarchy, a soci-

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ety p a r t i t i o n e d a m o n g tribal p r i n c i p a l i ties, and a m o n o l i t h i c b u t liberated and a u t o n o m o u s religious establishment.

The Ottoman Empire: Its Origins and World Conquests The O t t o m a n empire also had its origins i n the t w o great trends o f earlier centuries: the Turkish m i g r a t i o n s and the postAbbasid reconstruction o f state and society, w h i c h provided the institutional and cultural precedents for later O t t o m a n society. The legacy o f Persian monarchical, Byzantine and Roman, Seljuk Anatolian, and M o n g o l a n d T i m u r i d

precedents

interacting w i t h Turkish cultures and transformed by the O t t o m a n s)Tithesis led to the O t t o m a n version o f h i g h i m p e r i a l , late M i d d l e Eastern civilization. The Seljuk invasions had b r o u g h t O g h u z peoples i n t o Georgia, A r m e n i a , and Byzantine Anatolia i n f r o n t i e r c o n d i t i o n s similar t o those that existed i n n o r t h e r n Iran. I n the vanguard o f the c o n q u e r i n g forces were small bands o f n o m a d i c

At the time of the Ottoman conquest, the people of western Anatolia were slowly converting to Islam.The

peoples under the leadership o f beys ( w a r r i o r chieftains) and Sufi h o l y m e n

small mosque of Haci Ozbek,

(bubas). Like the tribes o f n o r t h e r n I r a n , these small bands were likely t o have

built at Iznik in 1335, two

been groups o f allied families and clients o f an a d m i r e d o r venerated chieftain.

years after the Ottoman sul-

The Sufi babas n o t o n l y p r o v i d e d m i l i t a r y leadership, they helped t o organize a viable c o m m u n i t y life i n the n e w territories. These holy m e n established residences, b r o u g h t lands i n t o c u l t i v a t i o n , built hospices, m i l l s , and schools, m e d i ated disputes, and created the infrastructure o f a settled life a m o n g m i g r a n t w a r r i o r s . I n the wake o f the c o n q u e r i n g bands came the Seljuk n o b i l i t y , w h i c h set about t o construct a centralized state o n the m o d e l o f those that had been created by Seljuk f a m i l y elites i n Iran and Iraq. The Seljuks b u i l t u p slave forces, administrative cadres, a n d an Islamic religious infrastructure. Scholars were i n v i t e d f r o m Iran; qadis (judges) were p u t i n t o office, colleges were b u i l t , a n d professorships were e n d o w e d . A consequence o f the activities o f b o t h the state a n d the m i g r a t o r y Sufi influences was the eventual t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f Anatolia i n t o a M u s l i m society. U n d e r Seljuk r u l e ( 1 0 7 1 - 1 2 4 3 ) , m u c h o f the Greek, A r m e n i a n , G e o r g i a n , a n d Syrian p o p u l a t i o n was progressively converted t o Islam. The weakening o f the

tan Orhan took the city from the Byzantines, exemplifies the combination of Muslim needs and Byzantine building techniques.

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The Ottomans ruled the

Byzantine state, the decline o f the o r t h o d o x c h u r c h , a n d the b r e a k d o w n o f

greatest of Muslim empires,

A n a t o l i a n society i n the face o f conquest facilitated the u l t i m a t e conversion o f

which extended into Europe, North Africa, Egypt, Arabia, Mesopotamia, Iran, and Anatolia, In 1529 Ottoman

the r e g i o n . The socially constructive measures taken by the c o n q u e r o r s , their tolerance o f n o n - M u s l i m peoples, and the many c o m m o n p o i n t s o f p o p u l a r Islam a n d p o p u l a r C h r i s t i a n i t y — C h r i s t i a n s a n d M u s l i m s revered the same

forces unsuccessfully

saints and h o l y places and shared magical a n d superstitious beliefs as well as

besieged Vienna, and

c o m m o n m o n o t h e i s t i c and ethical p r i n c i p l e s a n d B i b l i c a l l o r e — w o r k e d over

Ottoman - Hapsburg wars

the centuries to create a M u s l i m m a j o r i t y .

continued for more than 150 years without major territorial change. In the summer

Sufis played an i m p o r t a n t role i n these conversions. They were generally m o r e accepting o f a great variety o f religious practices and beliefs, w h e t h e r M u s l i m o r

of 1683, an Ottoman army of

n o t , as possible routes to G o d . Sufis also organized residences as centers o f social

150,000 unsuccessfully

service and assistance to o r d i n a r y people. The Bektashi Sufi order i n the rural

attacked the city, marking the

areas, Mevlevi Sufis i n the cities, and i n the smaller t o w n s akhis ( y o u n g m e n p r o -

beginning of the end of

v i d i n g charity to the p o o r and to travelers) created the devotional, charitable,

Ottoman domination in eastern Europe.

educational, and c o m m u n a l e n v i r o n m e n t that led to the Islamic conversion o f

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Anatolia. A l t h o u g h there w o u l d later be substantial conversions i n the Balkans t o o , there the m a j o r i t y remained Christian, largely because o f the smaller Turkish p o p u l a t i o n and because o f the O t t o m a n p o l i c y o f s u p p o r t i n g a n d using the Balkan churches as an administrative convenience. A l t h o u g h effective i n its domains, the Seljuk Turkish system o f expansion and occupation generated chronic tension between the central state and a host o f peripheral nomadic principalities and w a r r i o r bands. A l t h o u g h the state tried to consolidate its power, the o u t l y i n g peoples sought to m a i n t a i n their autonomy. This i m p e l l e d many o f t h e m to f u r t h e r expansion i n western Anatolia at Byzantine expense, as the local chieftains sought to enhance their power, w i n g l o r y for Islam, and m a i n t a i n their distance and independence f r o m the Seljuk state. The O t t o m a n empire h a d its origins i n just such a band o f frontier w a r r i o r s operating i n late thirteenth-century western Anatolia. E r t u g r u l , w h o may have died around 1280, was the f o u n d e r o f a dynasty that over t w o centuries, n o t swifdy but ineluctably, first conquered Bursa i n western Anatolia i n 1326, crossed the straits o f Gallipoli i n 134c, conquered w h a t is n o w Bulgaria. Macedonia, and m u c h o f Greece, and defeated the Serbian e m p i r e at the Battle o f Kosovo i n 1389.

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O n the basis o f their Balkan conquests, the O t t o m a n s t u r n e d eastward and absorbed

M u s l i m - r u l e d Anatolia as w e l l .

In

1453

the

Ottomans

seized

Constantinople, b r i n g i n g to an e n d the eleven-hundred-year tenure o f the Byzantine Empire and establishing themselves as successors to the Roman Empire. The conquest of Constantinople was b o t h the capstone o f previous O t t o m a n achievements i n war and the o p e n i n g o f a n e w phase i n O t t o m a n ambitions. M e h m e d the Conqueror (r. 1444-46, 1451-81) saw h i m s e l f as successor to R o m a n emperors and Arab caliphs. His victories realized age-old Turkish ideas o f a destiny o f w o r l d d o m i n a t i o n , the i m p e r i a l a m b i t i o n s o f the R o m a n empire, and M u s l i m j i h a d and expansion o f the d o m a i n o f Islam. W i t h the conquest o f Constantinople, the Ottomans redoubled their ambitions. The conquest o f the Balkans opened the way for a t w o - c e n t u r y - l o n g struggle against the powers o f Europe. The Ottomans were opposed by the Habsburg emperors o f Spain, by the Netherlands, by Austria and Hungary, and by the czars o f Russia. The wars u n f o l d e d along three p r i n c i p a l fronts. I n central Europe the Ottomans pushed beyond the Danube River and absorbed Romania by 1504. Belgrade was taken i n 1520 and H u n g a r y came under O t t o m a n r u l e i n 1529, and i n the same year the Ottomans besieged but failed to take Vienna. W i t h o u t m a j o r t e r r i t o r i a l changes, O t t o m a n - H a b s b u r g wars c o n t i n u e d for another century a n d a h a l f u n t i l the seco n d O t t o m a n siege o f Vienna i n

1683.

I n the Mediterranean the Ottomans waged an equally vast struggle. They seized Algiers i n 1529 and Tunis i n 1574. I n 1580 they negotiated an historic truce w i t h Philip I I o f Spain that c o n f i r m e d the boundaries o f their domains. This was a fateful agreement because i t still marks the boundaries between the Christian and M u s l i m parts o f the Mediterranean. I n the n o r t h the Ottomans and Russia s t r u g g l e d for c o n t r o l o f the steppes beyond the Black Sea a n d the regions between the Black and the Caspian seas. W h i l e the Ottomans held Romania and the Crimea, the Russians d o m i n a t e d the lower Volga r e g i o n . The struggle c o n t i n u e d u n t i l 1676, w h e n f o r a short t i m e the Ottomans consolidated their c o n t r o l o f the Black Sea, the steppes, a n d part o f the Ukraine. This was the apogee o f their expansion i n n o r t h e r n Europe. M e h m e d and his successors b r o u g h t the O t t o m a n domains eastward to the borders o f Iran, absorbed the Arab provinces and N o r t h Africa and the h o l y places o f Arabia, and they carried their ambitions i n t o the I n d i a n Ocean,

fighting

the

Portuguese for control o f the spice trade. O t t o m a n expansion, b e g i n n i n g i n western Anatolia, continued for three centuries u n t i l the Ottomans had b r o u g h t southe r n and eastern Europe as far as Vienna; the n o r t h e r n steppes o f die Black Sea as far as the Ukraine; .Anatolia to the borders o f Safavid Iran; and the Arab countries, Egypt, Yemen, and N o r t h Africa as far as the borders o f M o r o c c o , under their c o n t r o l . This was the greatest o f the M u s l i m empires. M u c h o f O t t o m a n history was

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shaped by their extraordinary c o m m i t m e n t to conquest i n the name o f Islam. The O t t o m a n wars gave t h e m a reputation a m o n g M u s l i m s as the greatest o f M u s l i m states devoted to the j i h a d . In Europe they left the reputation of the scourge of God and a terror for centuries. The image o f the ferocious Turk lives o n today. The O t t o m a n success can be attributed to a n u m b e r o f considerations. The first was the tactical advantage o f their frontier location and the skill w i t h w h i c h they seized locations that were i m p o r t a n t to a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , and trade. Also the Ottomans kept their t e r r i t o r i e s intact u n d e r a single heir as opposed to the practice o f most o f the rival principalities, w h i c h d i v i d e d t e r r i tories a m o n g the descendants o f the ruler. Their political flexibility i n creating alliances across religious, ethnic, and tribal lines and a m o n g n o m a d i c and settled c o m m u n i t i e s was another factor i n their favor. So too was the ghazi ( f r o n tier w a r r i o r ) ideology, w h i c h motivated t h e m to wage jihad i n the name o f Islam and self-interest, and justified a flexible policy i n dealing w i t h allies and enemies. Yet i n the last analysis the O t t o m a n s o w e d their success to the p o l i c y o f strengthening the hand o f the dynasty and the central state as opposed to that o f the Turkish w a r r i o r leaders. The Ottomans were the greatest o f M i d d l e Eastern conquerors, i n part because they ran the most h i g h l y centralized i m p e r i a l state i n the region's history. They eliminated the frontier w a r r i o r s and w a r l o r d s , babas, and tribal chieftains. They suppressed independent local dynasties and replaced the p r e - O t t o m a n elites w i t h O t t o m a n f u n c t i o n a r i e s . W i t h the conquest

of

Constantinople, the centralist tendency w o n o u t completely. A nomadic conquest was transformed i n t o an Islamic monarchy. The ruler was reconceptualized f r o m patriarch and elder to m o n a r c h and emperor. The levee en masse o f tribal peoples was replaced by slave and client forces; the b o o n companions and w a r r i o r cohort o f early days by professional administrators.

The Ottoman State Apparatus and Religion The O t t o m a n state was built o n die very same institutional base as its M i d d l e Eastern predecessors. At the center was the court or palace apparatus, the household o f the ruler, comprising his family, his harem, his b o o n companions, and his highest ranking officers, administrators, and religious functionaries. The court served as an extended family and the government's nerve center, a training Institute for Ottoman cadres, and a theater o f cultural display. Centered at the Topkapi Serai, overlooking the Golden H o r n o f Istanbul, the court was divided i n t o t w o sections. The inner section was made up o f the residences o f the sultan and his harem, the treasury, and the school for pages and officers. In O t t o m a n society and politics the w o m e n o f the royal family were particularly important. I n the historic Turkish understanding, powers were vested not only i n the reigning prince but also collectively i n his fam-

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ily. W o m e n were therefore important i n the ceremonials o f the regimes, i n its charitable activities, and by their role i n negotiations and i n t r i g u e at court. They were important i n die selection o f o f f i cers and policies. The outer secdon o f the court was the administrative zone proper, including state offices and palace functionaries. The city o f Istanbul c o u l d be c o n sidered

an

extension

of

the royal

palace. After the conquest, the sultan M e h m e d f o u n d Constantinople r i c h i n history b u t virtually abandoned by its p o p u l a t i o n . The Ottomans resettled the c i t y and b u i l t u p its p o p u l a t i o n n o t only w i t h servants o f the state but w i t h useful c o m m u n i t i e s o f M u s l i m s and m i n o r i t i e s , w h o c o u l d d o the c o m m e r cial, craft, and other w o r k essential to an expanding society. Successive sultans b u i l t great m o s q u e and school c o m plexes, p r o v i d e d w i t h such facilities as hospitals, libraries, bazaars, bakeries, inns, residences, and soup kitchens. Such great complexes as the Selimiye and the Suleymaniye, n a m e d after the sultans w h o f o u n d e d t h e m , became n e i g h b o r h o o d c o m m u n i t y centers for Istanbul's The nerve center of the Ottoman capital at Istanbul

p o p u l a t i o n . Just

as

the

Safavids b u i l t Isfahan, so too d i d the Ottomans r e b u i l d Istanbul as an essential base o f operations and a d o r n m e n t for

was the palace known as

their e m p i r e . At its apogee, Istanbul had a p o p u l a t i o n o f about seven h u n d r e d

Topkapi Saray. Unlike

thousand, an e n o r m o u s n u m b e r for a sixteenth- and seventeenth-century city.

European palaces, it com prised a series of four con-

The m i l i t a r y was essential to O t t o m a n power, and as early as the reign o f the

centric courtyards of

sultan M u r a d I (r. 1360-89) they had b e g u n to b u i l d u p slave forces to supple-

ever-increasing privacy. In

m e n t , subdue, and replace free Turkish w a r r i o r s . The Ottomans w e n t further than

this depiction from the offi-

any previous M i d d l e Eastern regime to ensure the supply o f slave soldiers. I n the

cial history of Suleyman's reign, the sultan receives the admiral Barbarossa in the third court.

past, slave soldiers originally came f r o m the Caucasus o r f r o m Central Asia, o u t side the areas i n w h i c h they w o u l d serve. The Ottomans changed this by institut-

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i n g the devshirme, a tax i n m a n p o w e r o n the Christian p o p u l a t i o n o f the Balkans. This was b o t h the first systematic r e c r u i t m e n t o f slaves and the first recruitment f r o m w i t h i n the domains o f the state itself The Ottomans created a f u r t h e r i n n o v a t i o n i n slave armies. Whereas most M i d d l e Eastern slave forces were trained t o be elite cavalry, w i t h a keen sense f o r m i l i t a r y a n d tactical i n n o v a t i o n the Ottomans trained their most i m p o r t a n t units as infantry, p r o v i d e d t h e m w i t h firearms, a n d used phalanx tactics t o c o m b i n e massed musket firepower w i t h artillery. Thus were b o r n the famous janissaries and the tactics that made t h e m f o r centuries the most advanced o f European a n d M i d d l e Eastern armies. I n part a result o f this i n n o v a t i o n , the appellation G u n p o w d e r Empire applies above all to the Ottomans. The O t t o m a n s organized cavalry as w e l l as infantry forces, b u t the cavalry forces were completely d i f f e r ent i n character f r o m the janissaries. The cavalry were recruited a m o n g Turkish w a r r i o r s . They were n o t garrisoned as a central a r m y ; rather, they were p r o v i d e d w i t h incomes f r o m land grants t h r o u g h o u t the O t t o m a n domains. F r o m their

The fourth and most private of Topkapi courtyards con-

timars (the equivalent o f the Arab iqtos) the t i m a r holders p r o v i d e d local security

tained freestanding garden

a n d served i n O t t o m a n campaigns. They were an old-fashioned quasi-feudal

pavilions in which the sultan

rather than a centralized a r m ) . The slave system was also used t o b u i l d u p a p o w -

and his intimates lived.The

e r f u l bureaucratic apparatus. The Ottomans converted their y o u n g slaves t o Islam a n d educated t h e m i n the palace schools to be pages i n the royal h o u s e h o l d , o f f i cers i n the army, or g o v e r n m e n t officials. Whatever their o r i g i n , the slaves were u n i t e d by d e v o t i o n t o the sultan a n d by their u p b r i n g i n g i n the " O t t o m a n way."

Baghdad Kiosk, built in 1638-9 to commemorate the victory of Murad IV at Baghdad, overlooks a garden and the Golden Horn.

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Thus the regime was b u i l t n o t o n ethnic h o m o g e n e i t y but o n the slaves a n d clients o f the rulers, c o m i n g f r o m a variety o f backgrounds, w h o by t r a i n i n g a n d education were qualified as a r u l i n g caste. U n t i l the seventeenth century, w h e n the O t t o m a n system began to break d o w n , the political class was organized to prevent the accumulation o f private power and its transmission to later generations. The slave system was the key to this concept, because o n l y newly recruited slaves could be inducted i n t o positions o f power. Children o f slaves c o u l d n o t be. A l t h o u g h m i d d l i n g administrators, sons o f governors, and r i c h timar holders were sometimes able to pass estates to their c h i l The domed mosque with pencil-thin minarets

came

to s y m b o l i z e O t t o m a n

dom-

dren, O t t o m a n policies were inimical to the accumulation o f private property. Large private fortunes could be and were readily confiscated. U n l i k e the Safavids, w h o failed to suppress tribal resistance to the state, the Ottomans progressively

ination throughout their

eliminated all rival organized political bodies and imposed a salaried bureaucracy

real m.Thi s detailed

i n most o f their provinces. Most tributaries were annexed and subjected to cen-

1559

d r a w i n g o f the I s t a n b u l s k y -

tralized rule. Eastern tribal populations were subordinated. Independent r u r a l

l i n e b y the G e r m a n artist

landowners and Sufi leaders were incorporated into the O t t o m a n state. O n l y a few

Melchior Lorichs shows mosque complex

Mehmet

the C o n q u e r o r built

imme-

diately after he t o o k the in

1453-

the

city

remote provinces, such as Romania, the Crimea, and parts o f eastern Anatolia, remained i n the control of quasi-independent Greek. Turkish, and Kurdish t r i b u taries. M o r e than any other M i d d l e Eastern state, the Ottomans succeeded i n centralizing political power and overcoming tribal autonomy. They b r o u g h t to an end

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i n their r e g i o n the historical struggle o f tribes and states. The O t t o m a n drive t o w a r d centralization was particularly marked i n the d o m a i n o f r e l i g i o n . Like the Seljuks before t h e m , the Ottomans c o n t i n u e d the practice o f p a t r o n i z i n g the ulama and the Sufis. They built mosques and madrasas. They e n d o w e d teachers a n d students;

they o r g a n i z e d j u d i c i a l

a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and e m p l o y e d religious scholars as judges and professors. They e m p l o y e d r e l i g i o u s functionaries,

such

as notaries,

registrars,

and

administrators o f orphans' and intestate properties. The Ottomans went f u r t h e r than their Seljuk predecessors, however, i n that they n o t o n l y patronized the religious elites, they i n c o r p o r a t e d t h e m i n t o a hierarchically ordered bureaucracy and made t h e m functionaries o f the state as w e l l . The p o s i t i o n o f shaykh al-Islam or c h i e f m u f t i (a mufti was an expert i n Islamic law and a m e m b e r o f the ulama establishment) dates to 1433. O r i g i n a l l y , the m a n h o l d i n g this p o s i t i o n was the personal religious adviser to the sultan, a n d his office may have been created to increase the religious l e g i t i macy o f the state—perhaps to parallel the ancient caliphate a n d to respond to c r i t i c i s m about the regime's secularization. The earliest m u f t i s had n o administrative functions; o n l y late i n the r e i g n o f

The sultans commissioned elaborate furnishings for their

M e h m e d I I was the c h i e f m u f t i recognized as the

mosque complexes.This magnificent walnut box, designed

head o f the ulama. The p o w e r o f a p p o i n t i n g other ulama seems to have been given to the c h i e f m u f t i i n the m i d d l e o f the sixteenth century.

hold a manuscript of the Quran in thirty volumes, was ordered by Bayezit in i ç o ç - 6 , probably for his mosque com plex in Istanbul completed in the same year.

The teaching system was also transformed i n t o state offices. Whereas previous regimes had endowed madrasas i n the i m p o r t a n t cities, the Ottomans gave t h e m a hierarchical rank: those o f the r e i g n i n g sultan at the top, f o l l o w e d by foundations o f earlier sultans, f o l l o w e d by madrasas f o u n d e d by government officials and religious functionaries. By the m i d d l e o f the sixteenth century the p r i n c i p l e that a scholar had to serve i n a graded series o f colleges was firmly established. Professors were n o longer merely appointed to teaching positions for life; n o w they c o u l d be p r o m o t e d f r o m one position to another. The schools were also organized by functions. The low est-level madrasas r

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were assigned to teach Arabic language and linguistic studies, astronomy, m a t h ematics, theology, and r h e t o r i c ; the m i d d l e - l e v e l colleges taught literature a n d rhetoric; and the highest-level subjects were law and t h e o l o g y The j u d i c i a r y was organized i n a similar way. The o r i g i n a l judicial positions were located i n Istanbul, Edirne, and Bursa, but many positions were added i n The Ottomans transformed the teaching system into a state bureaucracy. Madrasas were organized hierarchically,

other cities i n the late sixteenth century, probably to create new jobs for an ever larger cadre o f p o s i t i o n seekers. The positions i n Istanbul, Bursa, and Edirne ranked at the t o p o f the hierarchy, f o l l o w e d by those i n Damascus, Cairo,

with those founded by the

Baghdad, M e d i n a , Izmir, and Konya. The shaykh al-Islam was the head o f the

reigning sultan at the top of

judicial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n as a w h o l e ; the qadi-askars ( c h i e f judges o f the m i l i t a r y ) o f

the system.The Suleymaniye

the Balkans and Anatolia ranked next. Judges were seasoned by a p p o i n t m e n t u p

complex (içsy) at Istanbul

the ladder o f positions. The judicial hierarchy and the teaching hierarchy were

was the largest in the empire, with four theological colleges, a medical school, and

linked i n that an appropriate level i n the teaching system was a prerequisite to appointment to a judicial p o s i t i o n . Qadis had considerable administrative i m p o r -

another school for prophetic

tance; their duties not o n l y included the j u d g i n g o f petitions but also inspection

traditions, as well as other

o f the military, oversight o f tax collection, supervision o f the urban economy, and

charitable institutions.

the application o f g o v e r n m e n t regulations i n all d o m a i n s o f state interest. To get

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a j o b i n this system, the student h a d to be sponsored by someone w h o h e l d a h i g h - r a n k i n g post. The student's first p o s i t i o n w o u l d as a repeater i n a college. H e w o u l d teach at a n u m b e r o f graded colleges, and eventually he c o u l d reach the level o f a judgeship. The p o s i t i o n o f a m u f t i was n o t reached t h r o u g h a hierarchical gradation o f " m u f t i - s h i p s " ; rather i t was approached t h r o u g h the c o l lege professorships and judgeships. The Ottomans thus gained c o n t r o l over the ulama and made t h e m f u n c tionaries o f the state, and they also co-opted the leading Sufi brotherhoods. Sufiled t r i b a l rebellions were crushed d u r i n g the f o u r t e e n t h to the sixteenth centuries. The Bektashis became the patrons o f the janissaries. U r b a n Sufis were provided i n the t i m e - h o n o r e d manner w i t h gifts, e n d o w m e n t s , and a place i n O t t o m a n court ceremony. The Mevlevi leaders had the ceremonial f u n c t i o n o f g i r d i n g a new sultan u p o n his accession w i t h a h o l y s w o r d . The representatives o f spiritual o t h e r w o r l d l y power thus became the protectors o f the state. I n c o m parison w i t h other M u s l i m societies this was an extraordinary organizational achievement, but i t came at a h i g h price. Insofar as the ulama and leading Sufis became functionaries o f the state, they ceased to represent the mass o f M u s l i m believers and c o u l d n o longer protect the people f r o m abuses o f political power. To the extent that they were the servants o f the state and the defenders o f O t t o m a n legitimacy, they c o u l d n o t effectively resist c o r r u p t i o n i n the g o v e r n m e n t . As m u c h as they became a class o f functionaries dependent o n government offices and o n offices for their c h i l d r e n and students, they became a self-interested and p o w e r f u l interest g r o u p w i t h i n the state itself. By the eighteenth cent u r y a closed aristocracy o f O t t o m a n ulama was i n existence. The ulama were particularly favored because they had considerable o p p o r t u n i t i e s to acquire p r o p erties t h r o u g h woofs ( e n d o w m e n t s ) , and they were not threatened w i t h confiscation o f property after death. Ulama families lasted longer i n power than any other element o f the g o v e r n m e n t elite, and a small g r o u p o f families d o m i n a t e d the religious establishment. F r o m 1703 t o 1839, eleven Istanbul families accounted for t w e n t y - n i n e o f the

fifty-eight

shaykh al-Islams.

But as the bureaucracy became ossified, the protest movement o f Kadizadeli developed. N a m e d after Kadizade M e h m e d ( d . 1635; he was a preacher at the mosque o f Aya Sofia), it was a p u r i t a n i c a l m o v e m e n t to r e f o r m b o t h the ulama and the general society. The movement was opposed t o the c o n s u m p t i o n o f coffee, tobacco, and o p i u m ; to s i n g i n g , m u s i c , and dancing i n Sufi ceremonies; and to pilgrimages to saints' tombs; they denounced the w r i t i n g s o f the t h i r t e e n t h century philosopher I b n al-Arabi and called o n g o o d M u s l i m s not o n l y to lead m o r a l lives b u t to force others to f o l l o w "the straight p a t h . " The m o v e m e n t i n many ways was i m p l i c i t l y a n t i - O t t o m a n , because the Ottomans had l o n g tolerated religious variation i n their e m p i r e and historically had parlayed religious

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spectacles i n t o O t t o m a n legitimacy. The m o v e m e n t was only partially successful, however, because the d o m i n a n t Istanbul families f o u g h t to keep c o n t r o l o f the bureaucracy. Their reaction led to m o r e conservative religious teaching and to the f u r t h e r consolidation o f a small religious elite. I m p e r i a l support was always f o r t h c o m i n g because it seemed that this was essential to the stability o f the empire. The r e l i g i o u s elites, once r e c r u i t e d to sustain the r e g i m e , h a d thus become a self-perpetuating body.

Ottoman Culture and the Concept of Empire: Rulers and Subjects The a u t h o r i t y o f the O t t o m a n sultans was derived f r o m several layers o f M i d d l e Eastern cultural tradition. The Ottomans p r i m a r i l y derived their legitimacy f r o m T u r k o - M o n g o l concepts o f royal family supremacy, w a r r i o r sovereignty, and w h a t they considered to be a divinely given m i s s i o n to conquer the w o r l d . This p a t r i m o n i a l conception, w h i c h based the r i g h t to r u l e o n aristocratic noble lineage c o m b i n e d w i t h victories i n battle, had its o r i g i n i n the O t t o m a n Turkish and Central Asian past. I n the early centuries o f O t t o m a n r u l e , this conception was dramatized by the open struggle for power a m o n g the sons o f a deceased ruler. The w i n n e r o f that struggle was considered to have been selected by G o d for his reign. F u r t h e r m o r e , the w h o l e o f the conquered d o m a i n was considered i n patr i m o n i a l terms to be the personal property o f the sultan. The state was his househ o l d ; the soldiers, courtiers, and a d m i n i s t r a t o r s were his slaves, personally devoted to h i m ; the subjects were his flocks. The t e r r i t o r y o f the e m p i r e was his to distribute a m o n g his f a m i l y and retainers. F r o m the Islamic tradition came the claim to be the protector and defender o f Islam and therefore successor to the caliphate. Suleyman I (r. 1520-66) took the title Halife-i Ru-i Zemin (caliph o f the w o r l d ) . The sultan was viewed i n Islamic terms as the defender o f Islam, the protector o f M u s l i m peoples; a ghazi, a w a r r i o r w h o waged jihad to expand the domains o f Islam. The sultan thus protected M u s l i m s against Christian enemies w i t h o u t and m a i n t a i n e d their supremacy over Christians w i t h i n the empire. The Ottomans were the defenders o f the t w o h o l y sanctuaries o f Mecca and M e d i n a . M u s l i m s outside O t t o m a n d o m a i n s appealed to t h e m for help against infidel enemies. F r o m Spain, f r o m A c h e h , o n the island o f Sumatra, and f r o m Central Asia came appeals for aid against n o n M u s l i m enemies. As the greatest c o n q u e r i n g state i n Islamic history, the O t t o m a n empire acquired an absolute legitimacy i n M u s l i m terms. Moreover, the O t t o m a n sultans were considered to be tantamount to caliphs, because they were the executors o f Islamic law. The rulers p r o v i d e d justice and protection for the c o m m o n people against the depredations o f government o f f i -

SULTANATES

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383

cials. They p a t r o n i z e d , s p o n sored, and organized M u s l i m judicial and educational affairs. T h e i r d u t y to i m p l e m e n t the Shariah gave t h e m the r i g h t t o issue

supplementary

regula-

t i o n s (firmans) that were later gathered (kanuns). decrees

into The

legal sultans

defining

the

codes issued status,

duties, and dress codes for all o f their functionaries; laws t o i m p l e m e n t the l a n d h o l d i n g and tax systems, economic regulations, m i l i t a r y and administrative matters, c r i m i n a l justice, the discipline o f officials, and the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f r e l i g i o u s affairs. The sultans' activities as lawgivers s u p p l e m e n t i n g Shariah

derived

from

the both

M u s l i m and Byzantine

tradi-

tions. This f u n c t i o n was itself a source o f legitimacy. It was an historical part o f the emperor's prerogative. O t t o m a n a u t h o r i t y was f u r ther based o n a cosmopolitan culture,

comprising

Arab,

Persian, Turkish, Byzantine, and European

elements.

From

M i d d l e Eastern monarchical concepts came the conception universal glory. F r o m Roman

tradition

of

eastern

came

the

Like the Safavids, the Ottomans were great patrons of the arts. Under iheir patronage, the tribal craft of carpet-weaving was transformed into a state industry. Some of the finest pieces, such as this small prayer rug knotted in wool and silk on a cotton ground, were made for the court.

notion o f the O t t o m a n ruler as emperor and heir to the Roman empire, causing Ottoman rulers to take the tide Padishah (supreme shall). Sultan M e h m e d I I generously patronized Persian poetry and European painting. Arab and Persian writers, Italian artists, and Greek and Serbian poets were part o f his entourage. Many o f the sponsored arts had themes that

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embellished royal claims. For example, illustrated m a n u scripts produced i n the sultans' o w n workshops, like those o f the Safavids and other rulers, depicted the greatness o f the monarchy. Histories o f the conquests o f Alexander the Great and o f past Persian emperors, mystical poetry, love stories, fables, and other works long part o f the repertoire o f royal patronage were produced to demonstrate the sophisücaüon, cultivation, and grandeur o f the Ottomans. I n the sixteenth century, O t t o m a n workshops turned f r o m classic works to the illustration o f contemporary history w i t h depictions o f court ceremonies, receptions o f ambassadors, conquests o f famous fortresses, festivals, and processions. In these m a n u scripts the sultans appear i n realistic fashion, directing their armies, presiding over the court, surrounded by their janissaries, viziers, scholars, holy m e n , merchants, craftspeople, and their subjects. These illustrated histories are a particular O t t o m a n contribution to the many varieties o f M u s l i m w o r l d artistic culture, self-consciously celebrating the O t t o m a n sultans and die Ottoman elite as rulers o f the w o r l d . The patronage o f philosophy, science, and other u n i versal subjects was also a way o f asserting the O t t o m a n c l a i m to universal authority. O t t o m a n architecture, w h i l e devoted to mosques and colleges, nonetheless b o r r o w e d the stylistic m o t i f s o f Aya Sofia and Greek ecclesiastical structures to symbolize the O t t o m a n t r i u m p h over and the a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f the genius o f C h r i s t i a n i t y and the Byzantine e m p i r e . The O t t o m a n palace itself was organized i n a way that s y m b o l i z e d the cosmic nature o f the

SVLIMAN'OTOMAN'REX The Ottomans manipulated

ruler's power. Both public ceremonies i n w h i c h the sultan spoke and his k n o w n private pleasures ( h u n t i n g , d r i n k i n g ,

ceremony to legitimize their

and dancing girls) were crafted to symbolize that he stood above o r d i n a r y m o r -

authority. They staged pro-

tals. I n the seventeenth century the increasing i m p o r t a n c e o f pleasure i n the

cessions and pageants in the

daily life o f sultans probably reflected the r i s i n g power o f an institutionalized

capital and received foreign ambassadors with elaborate ceremony. Although Muslim

bureaucracy that intensified the symbolic roles o f the sultanate. The Ottomans also sought to present their claims i n symbols derived f r o m

rulers traditionally wore tur-

Europe. M e h m e d I I had invited i m p o r t a n t Italian artists to Istanbul, and i n the

bans, Suleyman commis-

1530s Suleyman the Magnificent renewed this o r i e n t a t i o n . I n 1532 he acquired

sioned an extraordinary

an extraordinary Venetian-made g o l d and jeweled helmet o r c r o w n . Built w i t h

crown from Venetian goldsmiths whose four tiers were meant to outdo the crowns of the pope and the Hapsburg emperor.

f o u r c r o w n s s u p e r i m p o s e d , i t rivaled the papal tiara. O t h e r regalia, such as scepters, orbs, and ceremonial canopies i n t e n d e d to r i v a l those o f Western

SULTANATES

enemies, were also acquired i n this p e r i o d

A N D

GUNPOWDER

(15-32-36), even

EMPIRES

j8c

t h o u g h the posses-

sion o f such emblems was u n t i l this p o i n t outside the O t t o m a n t r a d i t i o n . This Western o r i e n t a t i o n s y m b o l i z e d the a m b i t i o n t o be recognized as a d o m i n a n t figure a m o n g European rulers and was connected to O t t o m a n claims to be heirs to the R o m a n Empire, the rulers o f Italy and indeed the w h o l e o f the Mediterranean basin. O t t o m a n p o w e r was f u r t h e r l e g i t i m i z e d by c e r e m o n i a l

demonstrations.

Istanbul, the capital, was used as the stage f o r demonstrations o f O t t o m a n authority. I m p e r i a l constructions and p u b l i c w o r k s u n d e r t a k i n g s , parades o f guilds and the m i l i t a r y and o f f o r e i g n ambassadors and their gifts, celebrations o f c a m p a i g n victories and feasts celebrating life events f o r the r u l i n g f a m i l y were all demonstrations o f O t t o m a n authority. Public festivals, especially at an O t t o m a n prince's c i r c u m c i s i o n , a princess's marriage, or a sultan's ascension, were a f o r m o f theater that renewed the p o p u l a t i o n ' s attachment to the ruler. Finally, the O t t o m a n rulers were t h o u g h t o f i n mystical terms as the viceroys o f G o d o n earth, w h o were meant to b r i n g o r d e r i n t o h u m a n affairs. The language o f d i v i n e selection and personal charisma was thus i n v o k e d to g l o r i f y each sultan as a q u a s i - d i v i n e being. This was the u l t i m a t e expression o f the s u l tans' a l m i g h t y supremacy. The O t t o m a n elite was a heterogeneous, cosmopolitan class recruited f r o m diverse o r i g i n s , but i t d i d not m i r r o r the empire's populations. The elites were a caste apart, elevated above the c o m m o n people b y their education, aristocratic manners, c o u r t and political functions, and personal devotion to the ruler. This elite g r o u p was m a i n l y Turkish, Arab, and Balkan M u s l i m , but the O t t o m a n Empire was n o t , strictly speaking, a regime o f M u s l i m s over n o n - M u s l i m s . The elite also i n c l u d e d Jewish bankers, Phanariot Istanbul Greek merchants, and European renegades. The subject p o p u l a t i o n belonged i n all respects to another and lesser o r d e r o f existence. The O t t o m a n s were the rulers o f an extremely heterogeneous, multiethnic, multilinguistic, multireligious, and multitribal population. A l l c o m m o n e r s , M u s l i m and n o n - M u s l i m , were considered the reava (the flocks), taxpayers t o be s h o r n i n the interests o f the p o l i t i c a l elite. B o t h M u s l i m and n o n - M u s l i m c o m m o n e r s were organized i n t o small religious c o m m u n i t i e s , w h i c h were p e r m i t t e d a considerable i n t e r n a l a u t o n o m y regulated by religious laws and values. For the M u s l i m s these i n c l u d e d the schools o f law and the Sufi fraternities. Most o f the n o n - M u s l i m s w e r e considered eastern O r t h o d o x , w h i c h i n c l u d e d Greek, R o m a n i a n , Slavic, B u l g a r i a n , and Arab churches. The A r m e n i a n c h u r c h was the administrative body f o r A r m e n i a n s , M o n o p h y s i t e s i n Syria and Egypt, Assyrians, B o g o m i l s , a n d Gypsies.

Maronites, Uniate

A r m e n i a n s , and Latin Catholics i n Hungary, Croatia, and Albania were c o n s i d -

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ered separate churches w i t h d o c t r i n a l affiliations to Rome and administrative o r g a n i z a t i o n u n d e r O t t o m a n authority. The O t t o m a n Empire proved a haven for the Jews o f Mediterranean Europe and the M i d d l e East. Aslikenazis f r o m Germany, France, and H u n g a r y ; Italian Jews f r o m Sicily; a n d Sephardic Jews f r o m Spain and Portugal settled i n O t t o m a n d o m a i n s . M e h m e d the C o n q u e r o r i n v i t e d Jews f r o m A n a t o l i a , Salonica, and Edirne to m o v e to Istanbul, and he gave t h e m special privileges not g i v e n t o Christians, such as p e r m i t t i n g t h e m to b u i l d n e w synagogues. Jews generally l i v e d i n t h e i r o w n quarters, each o f w h i c h operated as a separate m u n i c i p a l i t y responsible for tax c o l l e c t i o n , expenditure f o r c o m m u n i t y a c t i v i ties, m a i n t a i n i n g schools, synagogues, settling i n t e r n a l disputes, and so o n . O t t o m a n Jews d i d n o t f o r m a single organized body, b u t rather numerous quasidependent kahila or local c o m m u n i t y congregations w i t h many different r e l i gious practices and beliefs. A l l subjects, M u s l i m and n o n - M u s l i m , were thus organized i n t o small c o m munities that served to administer their educational, judicial, familial, and charitable affairs and t o assist the state by collecting taxes and e n f o r c i n g social discipline. A l l were headed by religious, clerical, or priestly leaders (and sometimes by lay representatives), and they enjoyed a degree o f internal autonomy, a l t h o u g h they were responsible to the sultan and the O t t o m a n authorities. This organization o f the populace i n t o quasi-autonomous religious bodies is c o m m o n l y referred to as the " l n i l l e t system." A l t h o u g h there was never an e m p i r e w i d e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f the n o n - M u s l i m populations, the Ottomans made h i g h r e l i g i o u s f u n c t i o n a r i e s responsible for their c o m m u n i t i e s u n d e r O t t o m a n a u t h o r i t y and intervened even i n the a p p o i n t m e n t o f patriarchs, bishops, and other n o n - M u s l i m religious officials. The n o n - M u s l i m s were considered dhimmis or protected peoples, subject to a special tax and some d i s c r i m i n a t o r y measures.

The Economy of the Ottoman Empire: Land, Urban Markets, and International Trade The O t t o m a n empire was unusual among Middle Eastern empires i n the degree to w h i c h i t was able to b r i n g the subject population under state control. Critical to this control was the regulation o f the economy. The Ottomans operated o n the p r i n c i ple that the subjects should serve the interests o f the state, and the economy was organized to ensure the f l o w o f tax revenues, goods i n k i n d , and services needed by the government and the elites. The populace was systematically taxed; the Ottomans were the best recordkeepers i n Middle Eastern history. The tax base was exhaustively described i n cadastral surveys that took stock o f the population, households, p r o p erty, and other resources. Ottoman economic policy o n trade was based o n a fiscal-

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ism that was aimed at accumulating as m u c h bullion as possible i n the state treasury, but at the same t i m e balancing this w i t h a concern for the general well-being o f the M u s l i m population. The Ottomans d i d not see trade policy or scientific and technological development as a means o f creating wealth. Ratiier, they still thought i n terms o f wealth derived f r o m conquered and annexed territories. Peasant lands were organized i n t o family f a r m units; villages were n o t usually collectivities i n possession o f lands but rather agglomerations o f i n d e p e n d e n t peasant households, a l t h o u g h there w e r e c o m m o n interests, such as village meadows, threshing f l o o r s , water, and pasturage. For the O t t o m a n s the p r o d u c t i v i t y and the taxation o f the land was the p r i m a r y concern. I n theory all lands were o w n e d by the state (miri), b u t there were t w o subclassifications: tdpulu, lands that were o n perpetual lease to peasants w h o had the r i g h t t o the usufruct and to assign that right to their male descendants, and mukatalu, lands that were leased to a tax collector i n r e t u r n f o r the payment o f a fixed lease. Incomes f r o m state lands were also d i s t r i b u t e d i n the f o r m o f timars and other stipends. The peasants were taxed by m e a s u r i n g the surface o f the l a n d , the size o f the h o u s e h o l d , and the oxen available for labor, w h i c h was i n effect a r o u g h measure o f productivity. This system o f taxation (called the cifthanc system) was appropriate to s e m i a r i d , d r y f a r m i n g devoted largely to wheat and barley, and it was derived f r o m Roman and Byzantine precedents. A study o f north-central Anatolia i n the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries p r o vides a deeper understanding o f the w o r k i n g s o f the land and tax systems. W h e n the Ottomans obtained c o n t r o l o f these regions i n the m i d - f i f t e e n t h century, they had to concede Turkish m i l i t a r y rulers and M u s l i m religious leaders o w n e r s h i p rights to the land. I n the course o f the next century and a h a l f the state struggled to dispossess the local notables and to reassign the tax rights to t i m a r holders appointed by the central government. Still, m u c h p r o p e r t y remained mulk ( p r i vate p r o p e r t y ) or waqfs ( e n d o w m e n t s ) , but these tended to be fragmented small holdings often i n the possession o f allies o f the central government. I n the sixteenth c e n t u r y general p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h was s t i m u l a t e d by increased security and by the settlement o f nomads. The regional economy grew enormously, w i t h an expansion o f peasant p r o d u c t i o n o f perhaps one h u n d r e d percent accompanied by considerable p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h . As surplus p o p u l a t i o n moved to the t o w n s , increased demand p r o v i d e d new markets for agricultural produce. Truck gardening, f r u i t g r o w i n g , and viticulture expanded. Peasants produced ever more fruits, vegetables, and sheep, for w h i c h they had a cash market, t h o u g h grain p r o d u c t i o n for taxes and subsistence still d o m i n a t e d the r u r a l economy. The economy's expansion took place by an increase o f o u t p u t f r o m small peasant plots. A l t h o u g h the surplus was largely taken by officials and revenue collec-

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tors, this d i d not residt i n the dispossession or enserfment o f peasants or their conversion to wage laborers o n large holdings. L i m i t e d commercialization favored revenue holders but d i d not go so far as to disrupt the peasant economy. State p r o tection o f peasant interests also played a large role. The state protected the rights o f peasants to the usufruct o f the land, controlled the amounts o f produce that could be taken in taxes, and set the rules for the marketing o f the produce. The state thus protected the peasants against the rise o f feudal authorities and kept a smallholding peasantry o n the land. The provisioning o f Istanbul was a principle concern o f O t t o m a n economic p o l icy The Ottomans d i d not use market mechanisms so m u c h as requisitions to supply the court, the army, the adnvLnistration, and the populace o f Istanbul. Provincial merchants and officials were required to provide a steady stream o f goods—grain, sheep, f o o d products, leather, w o o d , metal, and other p r o d u c t s — f o r direct i m p e rial use or for sale o n the Istanbul market. O t t o m a n workshops produced l u x u r y products such as silk garments direcdy for the court. O t t o m a n regulations forbade the export o f numerous products u n t i l the needs o f the capital had been met. The Ottomans also regulated p r o d u c t i o n t h r o u g h an extensive g u i l d system that organized workers under the control of guild functionaries, market officials, and m i l i tary authorities to ensure the p r o d u c t i o n o f goods of standard quality, at reasonable prices, for d i s t r i b u t i o n to the state elites and to the p o p u l a t i o n o f the capital. The enormous size o f Istanbul and its economic demands had a tremendous impact o n the s u r r o i m d i n g territories. Istanbul's demand for grain turned the region f r o m the Dnieper River to Varna ( i n modern-day east Bulgaria) i n t o a commercial agriculture and livestock region. A l o n g the Sea o f Marmara ( i n northwest Turkey), villages produced w i n e , olives, and f r u i t for the Istanbul market. F r o m Anatolia came sheep, hides, grain, and many other products. A l t h o u g h the O t t o m a n e c o n o m y was based p r i m a r i l y o n a g r i c u l t u r a l and craft o u t p u t and O t t o m a n p o l i c y was o r i e n t e d t o w a r d the conquest and c o n t r o l o f t e r r i t o r y as t h e basic source o f w e a l t h , i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade was nevertheless o f considerable

i m p o r t a n c e . The O t t o m a n s h e l d a central place i n

w o r l d trade l i n k i n g the M i d d l e East and East Asia t o Europe, and i n the n o r t h - s o u t h trade f r o m I n d i a and Arabia t o central a n d eastern Europe. A great deal o f O t t o m a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y , i n c l u d i n g its i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , Central Asia, Yemen, I r a q , and the I n d i a n Ocean, can be seen i n t e r m s o f the i m p o r t a n c e o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade. A f t e r the conquest o f C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , the first p o l i t i c a l task f o r the O t t o m a n s was t o wrest c o n t r o l o f the Black Sea,

t h e A e g e a n , and the eastern M e d i t e r r a n e a n

f r o m the

Venetians and the Genoese. The conquest o f the Arab provinces a n d Egypt i n i ci 7 gave the O t t o m a n s c o n t r o l o f the trade routes and the f l o w o f resources t h r o u g h the Levant ( t h e eastern shores o f the M e d i t e r r a n e a n between west-

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e r n Greece a n d Western E g y p t ) , a n d p o s i t i o n e d t h e m t o take over Mecca a n d M e d i n a , Yemen, a n d s o u t h e r n Iraq and t o fight the Portuguese f o r c o n t r o l o f the I n d i a n Ocean trade. W i t h these territories i n O t t o m a n c o n t r o l . Bursa emerged as the p r i n c i p l e entrepot o f the e m p i r e . I n d i a n spices c o m i n g to Jidda (a p o r t o n the Red Sea) were caravanned to Mecca and then t o Damascus, A l e p p o , Konya, and Bursa. The sea route f r o m Alexandria to Antalya ( i n southwestern Turkey) was also i n use. Eastern goods f r o m the Sudan, Egypt, Syria, and Arabia passed t h r o u g h Bursa o n their way to Istanbul and to f u r t h e r destinations i n eastern and central Europe. Edirne, Sarajevo, and D u b r o v n i k became i m p o r t a n t centers for the trade o f the Balkans, the A d r i a t i c , the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , and Europe. O n these routes the Ottomans exported silk, rhubarb, wax, pepper, drugs, fine cotton c l o t h , hides and furs, i m p o r t e d w o o l e n c l o t h , metals, and money. A n o t h e r route f r o m Bursa to Istanbul t o A k k e r m a n ( i n southwestern Ukraine; renamed Belgorod-Dnestrovski i n 1944) b r o u g h t O t t o m a n and eastern goods i n t o Poland and central Europe. This trade consisted o f such local products as wheat, fish, and hides, and such oriental luxuries as paper, silk, and English, Florentine, and other fine w o o l e n cloths. A n alternative r o u t e f r o m Bursa b r o u g h t goods i n t o Romania

and

H u n g a r y The Black Sea trade was equally lively. I m p o r t a n t routes ran f r o m Caffa to Kiev and to Moscow. Caffa gathered goods f r o m the w h o l e o f the Black Sea r e g i o n but also f r o m Istanbul, the Aegean Sea r e g i o n , and Europe. Slaves, i n c l u d i n g Slavs captured i n war, sub-Saharan Africans, and captives taken f r o m the steppes o f inner Asia, were an i m p o r t a n t product i n the international trade. The Portuguese incursions into the Indian Ocean i n the sixteenth century led to a major reorientation o f w o r l d trade. N o w eastern goods could be shipped around Africa to Lisbon, avoiding the Ottoman-controlled Middle East and the Venetian hold o n l u x u r y trade i n the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, die Portuguese d i d not cut o f f the spice trade t h r o u g h O t t o m a n territories. The Ottomans maintained forces in both Yemen and Basra; they inaugurated cooperative ties w i t h Gujarat ( i n Western India) andAcheh i n Sumatra to keep alive both political resistance to the Portuguese and commercial contacts. Even Venice's Levantine trade recovered i n midcentury. By the late sixteenth century goods caravanned to Damascus o r to Cairo were being picked u p at Alexandria and T r i p o l i by Venetian ships. Trade t h r o u g h the O t t o m a n empire was reinforced by the ever-growing popularity o f coffee f r o m Yemen. Despite this restoration o f the international transit trade t h r o u g h O t t o m a n t e r r i tories, a more dramatic menace made itself felt by the end of the sixteenth century. The British and the D u t c h entered the struggle for control o f the international spice trade and seized colonies i n India and the East Indies as bases for an effort to monopolize the trade. By \6ig the n o r t h Atlantic sea powers finally cut o f f the spice trade to the Mediterranean. The Ottomans could still compensate by a lively trade

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i n silk and coffee and i n Indian cotton goods and dyes, but the most lucrative part o f the trade was lost to the cape routes to western Europe. Moreover, f r o m dieir controlling position i n the Indian Ocean the British and the D u t c h began to compete directly w i t h O t t o m a n trade i n the Mediterranean. I n ic8o the British made their first trade treaty w i t h the Ottomans and began to buy silk and sell cotton goods and metals to the Ottomans. Even spices began to come into the Mediterranean f r o m Europe rather than directly f r o m the Indian Ocean. At the end o f the sixteenth century, I z m i r became the leading O t t o m a n p o r t , gradually eclipsing b o t h Bursa and Aleppo. As the Ottomans lost their g r i p o n the I z m i r r e g i o n , French, D u t c h , English, and Venetian merchants flocked to the area. I z m i r became a c o s m o p o l i t a n t o w n , h o m e to Arab camel caravaners

and

A r m e n i a n , Greek, Jewish, and Turkish merchants. The Europeans p r o m o t e d a lively trade i n cotton, w o o l , dried f r u i t , and grain, and b u i l t up a strong internal supply system. O t t o m a n janissaries, customs collectors, and other officials began to act as free agents and to evade the a u t h o r i t y o f Istanbul. Izmir's links to Istanbul were cut as i t was partially integrated i n t o the European economy. The Ottomans were losing control o f the Mediterranean trade to European merchants. I n other respects, too, the O t t o m a n empire was falling b e h i n d i n international trade c o m p e t i t i o n . The Atlantic economy and the g r o w d i o f trade i n such western staples as sugar, coffee, tobacco, and cotton had come to greatly overshadow the silk trade. N o w the most lucrative trade was shifting f r o m rare luxuries to goods for mass c o n s u m p t i o n , to the advantage o f the Atlantic trading states. Europeans were gaining relative advantages i n banking, insurance, and shipping profits, and w i t h the beginnings o f the industrial revolution diey were i n a position to sell h i g h value-added manufactured goods and skilled services i n r e t u r n for raw or semiprocessed raw materials. U n t i l the end o f the sixteenth century the Ottoman empire was a self-contained trading system not dependent o n the w o r l d economy. I n the seventeenth century the Ottoman empire still retained a degree o f commercial autonomy. Ottoman merchants were still able to b u d d their o w n trading networks, accumulate capital, and dominate the trade i n locally produced products, but by the m i d - to late eighteenth century European economic supremacy was assured, and the O t t o m a n empire became a dependent part o f a European-dominated w o r l d trading economy.

Crisis and Change in the Ottoman System: The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries For centuries the O t t o m a n r u l i n g system was b u i l t u p o n the basis o f the systematic rationalization o f regional political, cultural, and historical precedents. O t t o m a n state power was g r o u n d e d i n a refinement o f the Byzantine, M u s l i m ,

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Seljuk, and M o n g o l precedents f o r regional power. By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the era o f construction was over and the O t t o m a n society was evolving i n ways that were detrimental to the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f a d o m i n a n t centralized state. One critical factor i n the d e f o r m a t i o n o f O t t o m a n power was the decline o f the central state. As the slave elites gained f u l l c o n t r o l o f the government and as religious functionaries were entrenched i n a bureaucratic regime, they began t o serve their o w n interests rather than the l o n g - t e r m interests o f the sultan and the state. Janissaries demanded and received exemptions f r o m the strict requirements o f the slave system and were allowed to establish families, to w o r k i n the c i v i l ian economy, and eventually to r e m a i n o n the state payroll w i t h o u t p r o v i d i n g m i l i t a r y service. Provincial officials s q u i r m e d out o f central c o n t r o l and began to usurp local resources, c o m p e t i n g w i t h the capital for c o n t r o l o f local economies, d i v e r t i n g the flow o f requisitioned goods to Istanbul, converting tax farms i n t o various types o f quasi-private property, and b u i l d i n g u p local m i l i t a r y support. As patronage relationships became ever m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h r o u g h o u t the seventeenth century, O t t o m a n officials at all levels created large households resembling the sultan's household, households that served as a basis for patronage networks and the e m p l o y m e n t o f large numbers o f m e n . Prominent chieftains i n pastoral regions rose i n importance. Tax farmers had an o p p o r t u n i t y to make themselves independent and to b u i l d political bases i n the countryside. T h o u g h peasant landow n i n g continued to be the most i m p o r t a n t f o r m o f tenure, large estates were being f o r m e d i n the Black Sea r e g i o n , Macedonia, Thessaly, and some parts o f A n a t o l i a , as it became increasingly lucrative to supply Istanbul and the European markets. T h r o u g h o u t the e m p i r e local notables—beys,

pashas, and

ayans—w ere taking power i n t o their o w n hands. y

Economic changes beyond O t t o m a n c o n t r o l helped to u n d e r m i n e the centralized state. The discovery o f the new w o r l d and the tremendous supplies o f silver b r o u g h t back to Europe f r o m A m e r i c a n mines u n d e r m i n e d the price stability o f the w h o l e M e d i t e r r a n e a n and unleashed an intense c o m p e t i t i o n i n the O t t o m a n empire for c o n t r o l o f resources. European economic c o m p e t i t i o n was w i n n i n g away c o n t r o l o f international trade. The c o m p e t i t i o n f r o m India and Italy, and later f r o m B r i t a i n , was u n d e r m i n i n g O t t o m a n craft p r o d u c t i o n . Rawmaterials grew m o r e costly, but selling prices declined. Moreover, there were deep disturbances i n the economy o f the Anatolian heartlands. O t t o m a n security and prosperity was u n d e r m i n e d at the end o f the sixteenth century and i n the seventeenth century by r i s i n g p o p u l a t i o n , large increases i n the n u m b e r o f u n e m p l o y e d , d e m o b i l i z e d , and unsalaried soldiers, and vagabond students and bands o f a r m e d peasants r o a m i n g and ravaging the countryside. Provincial administrators and irregular soldiers f o u g h t against the g o v e r n m e n t forces.

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Istanbul janissaries and local militias struggled for p o w e r i n the provinces. The O t t o m a n response was counterproductive. The treasury t r i e d to reduce the expenditure o n a r m e d forces, w h i c h led t o the f u r t h e r displacement o f provincial soldiers, w h o then t u r n e d to brigandage. To reinforce central authority, the g o v e r n m e n t had t o station permanent garrisons, w h i c h t h e n became i d e n t i f i e d w i t h local economic interest groups that e x p l o i t e d their positions for their o w n benefit. These upheavals, collectively k n o w n as the celali rebellions, appear chaotic, b u t they had a deep political significance. As the central state weakened and as p r o v i n c i a l officials and notables struggled to aggrandize their power, Anatolian M u s l i m subjects also f o u g h t to acquire the privileges reserved for the political elite. The celali rebellions then were n o t c r i m i n a l o r peasant protest movements; rather, they represented a political struggle o f u p w a r d l y m o b i l e peasants and s m a l l - t o w n populations a t t e m p t i n g to gain a share o f the prerogatives o f power. F r o m the O t t o m a n perspective, these changes were particularly o m i n o u s i n the Balkans, where the tendencies t o w a r d decentralization o f power and usurpat i o n o f lands, tax revenues, and supplies were exaggerated by the trade w i t h Europe. The ready availability o f export markets increased local incentives t o evade O t t o m a n regulations and to develop local p o w e r by trading w i t h Europe. Merchants w h o refused to ship fruits and grains directly to Istanbul b u t instead sold t h e m to European merchants also i m p o r t e d muskets to defend their i n t e r ests. As the de facto a u t o n o m y o f the Balkan provinces increased, a n e w political p h i l o s o p h y began to take h o l d a m o n g Balkan intellectuals, merchants, l a n d o w n ers, traders, a n d others. M a i n l y Christians, less closely i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the Ottomans than were the M u s l i m s , Greeks, Serbs, Romanians, and others began to speak o f their national i d e n t i t y and heritage and their right to independence f r o m the O t t o m a n empire. The seeds that w o u l d u n d o the m u l t i r e l i g i o u s , m u l tiethnic O t t o m a n society i n favor o f m o d e r n national states were already s o w n . The d e c l i n i n g power o f the central state was part and parcel o f a disastrous series o f m i l i t a r y setbacks. The empire, w h i c h was still expanding i n the sixteenth century and stable i n the seventeenth, began to lose g r o u n d to its Russian and Habsburg opponents. The Habsburgs defeated the O t t o m a n attack o n Vienna i n 1683 and invaded H u n g a r y and Serbia, and i n 1696 the Russians took Azov and gained a f o o t h o l d o n the Black Sea. A l t h o u g h the Ottomans were able to c o u n terattack i n the early decades o f the eighteenth century, by the later decades o f that century they suffered staggering losses. I n 1774 the Russians established their supremacy i n the Crimea and Romania; by the Treaty o f Jassy i n 1792 they were i n c o n t r o l o f the Black Sea and i n a p o s i t i o n to threaten Istanbul. I n 1798

the

French emperor Napoleon invaded Egypt. These defeats were clear w a r n i n g s that

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the O t t o m a n empire had fallen m i l i t a r i l y as w e l l as c o m m e r c i a l l y b e h i n d its European competitors and that its territorial integrity, even its survival, had come i n t o question. I n this crisis the empire was swept by proposals for r e f o r m and rejuvenation. Conservative critics called for a r e t u r n to the policies o f the great sultan Suleyman the Lawgiver; more radical critics called for the a d o p t i o n o f European t e c h n o l ogy, m i l i t a r y organization, and administrative arrangements. O t t o m a n society was awash i n a wave o f European cultural fascination. European p a i n t i n g , rococo decoration, and t u l i p gardens were the rage. A celebration o f personal sensibility and expressiveness overcame the O t t o m a n elites. O u t o f this cultural ferment, the O t t o m a n Empire w o u l d renew itself again i n the nineteenth century.

CHAPTER

NINE

The Eastward Journey of Muslim Kingship ISLAM I N S O U T H AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Bruce B. Lawrence

Islam is above all a pan-Asian r e l i g i o n . It shapes the beliefs and practices o f m i l lions o f Asians, f r o m Central to South to Southeast Asia. There are other pan-Asian r e l i g i o n s — H i n d u i s m to the far south. B u d d h i s m to the far east—but none that spans the southern r i m o f the Asian continent to the extent that Islam does. But h o w d i d Islam become n o t only a religious m a r k i n g b u t also a civilizational force f r o m the Arabian Sea to the shores o f the Pacific? That question cann o t easily be answered. The emergence o f distinctive social patterns i n South Asia have parallels, t h o u g h n o t equivalents, i n Southeast Asia. M u s l i m invaders f r o m the northeast b r o u g h t w i t h t h e m (or developed after their arrival) traits that have since characterized the Islamic experience i n South Asia for m u c h o f its k n o w n history. Centuries later, M u s l i m traders, c o m i n g f r o m Arabia and India, began to settle i n significant numbers i n the archipelago k n o w n today as Southeast Asia.

(Left) The Mughal emperor Shah Jahan (r. 1628-66) considered himself the apogee of the dynasty that the great

They also professed and pursued Islamic loyalty, b u t i n different circumstances,

steppe conquerer Timur had

w i t h disparate outcomes.

founded 250 years earlier.

Despite their c o n j u n c t i o n i n this chapter, the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s o f South and Southeast Asia r e m a i n discrete and separate, b o t h i n the ideal n o r m s they profess and i n the day-to-day practices they pursue. A l t h o u g h i t is difficult to l i n k together t w o distant regions o f Asia that have never k n o w n a fully shared history,

Shah Jahan is depicted in this painting as the just emporer standing on a globe, and the roundels in the umbrella over his head

the one symbolic m a r k i n g that they share, Islam, justifies such an effort, espe-

give his genealogy back to

cially in book that takes as its subject the entire spectrum o f Islamic history.

Timur.

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The Prehistory of Islamic South Asia Certain patterns o f social m o b i l i t y arid civic organization t y p i f y South Asia f r o m the I n d o - A r y a n p e r i o d ( 1 0 0 0 B.c.E.) o n : a m i l i t a r i z e d society, w i t h a standing army that requires regular use, o f t e n to invade and conquer adjacent regions; the autocratic r u l e o f a m i l i t a r y leader w h o is invested w i t h instrumental p o w e r but w h o often claims d i v i n e a u t h o r i t y and patronizes scholars to further that claim; and the existence o f m o n u m e n t s that commemorate religious heroes and rulers o f the past, b u i l t b y m i h t a r y leaders to strike awe i n their subjects. I n this sense the prehistory o f Islamic South Asia is n o t located i n the life o f M u s l i m societies further to the west; rather, this history is located i n the reigns, or the imagined reigns and legacies, o f the most illustrious kings o f earlier dynasties. Two such figures stand o u t : Alexander the Great (356-323 B . C E . ) andAsoka the M u n i f i c e n t (r. 272-236 B . C E ) . Together they projected Greek and Buddhist legacies i n t o South Asia. Alexander was a brilliant soldier w h o w a n t e d to be remembered as a wise king. A m o n g the scholars he p a t r o n i z e d was Aristotle. H e represented

the

Achaemenid style o f governance hnked to the Persian emperors Cyrus and Darius. Asoka f o u n d e d the M a u r y a n dynasty. He had n o courtier to rival Aristotle, b u t t h r o u g h the m o n u m e n t a l b u i l d i n g i n s p i r e d by his dramatic conversion t o B u d d h i s m he c o n t i n u e d the style o f royal patronage familiar f r o m his PersianGreek predecessors. Even t h o u g h n o literary texts survived, Asoka's m o n u m e n t s d i d , and they were used and reused by successive dynasties, i n c l u d i n g the later M u s l i m monarchs o f Central Asia. Persian is the crucial element, and the thesis thus presented about Islam i n South Asia accents Persian influence. A l t h o u g h Arabic and Turkish elements can be identified, they matter less than the Persian. Despite the fact that Islam is often identified w i t h Arabic language and Arab n o r m s , these merely provided the patina for M u s l i m expansion i n t o the subcontinent. Although the Turks comprised the m a i n source for M u s l i m armies, neither the Turkic language nor its cultural forms characterized the o u t l o o k o f these newcomers to Hindustan (South Asia). Beyond the Arabic patina and the Turkic frame was the central image o f this n e w l y emerging social f o r m a t i o n . The picture had its o w n design: Persianate. Persiatiúte is a n e w t e r m , first coined by the w o r l d historian Marshall Hodgson. It depicts a cultural force that is linked to the Persian language and to self-identified Persians. But the t e r m applies to m o r e than either a language or a people; it lúghlights elements that Persians share w i t h the I n d o - A r y a n rulers w h o preceded Muslims to the subcontinent. Two elements are paramount: hierarchy, w h i c h c o n sists o f t o p - d o w n status markings that link all groups to each other i n a clear order o f rank that pervades all major social interactions; and deference, w h i c h requires rules o f c o m p o r t m e n t toward those at the top o f the status scale, especially the

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reigning m o n a r c h o r emperor. The office o f emperor first depended o n military prowess, w i t h defense o f the realm, provision o f public works, cultivation o f land, collection o f taxes, and dispensation of justice among his major administrative tasks. Equivalent to these functional aspects o f his office, however, were the adornments o f that office: magnificent palaces, expansive gardens, a lofty throne, and garments o f unimagined splendor. I n short, the emperor was the focal p o i n t o f a court culture that included a range o f specialists: architects and artists, craftsmen, musicians, poets, and scholars. I f this profile describes the totalitarian ideal o f a hermetically sealed hierarchical system o f governance, it o m i t s several crucial elements that came t o describe the k i n d o f imperial rule exercised by the new Aryan elites—the Persianate Turks, w h o came t o dorninate N o r t h India f r o m the tenth century o n . Chief among these, as noted by Robert L. Canfield, were the use o f the Persian language itself i n a w i d e range o f functions, administrative as w e l l as literary, and the development o f an expanding cultural elite that saw itself as expressing Persianate values, even w h e n they were n o t f u l l y allied w i t h Islamic n o r m s . This expansion and rearticulation o f I n d o - A r y a n social values may be called either Persianate, t o stress the importance o f Persian as a linguistic c o m p o n e n t , o r Islamicate, to acknowledge the way i n w h i c h Islam was invoked even w h e n the connection between cultural observance and religious loyalty was very slim. The t w o terms are so close that sometimes they can be used interchangeably. Crucial i n each case is the expansion o f connotative meaning t o include m o r e than linguistic usage (Persian) o r religious c o m m i t m e n t (Islamic).

The Great Indo-Muslim Rulers in South Asia Four I n d o - M u s l i m rulers stand o u t as e m b o d i m e n t s o f this n e w Turko-Persian Islamicate culture that prevailed i n South Asia f r o m the eleventh century o n : M a h m u d o f Ghazna (r. 997—1030), I l t u t m i s h (r. 1211-36), M u h a m m a d i b n Tughluq (r. 1325-51), and Akbar (r. 1555-1604). Because the reign o f Sultan M a h m u d o f Ghazna (what is n o w Ghazni i n eastern Afghanistan) set the tone for m u c h o f what followed, his legacy has been marked by controversy. M a h m u d was a dogged campaigner w h o conducted n o less than seventeen military forays into India, and he delighted i n c h r o n i c l i n g his o w n m i l itary feats. Like other Persian and Turko-Persian rulers, M a h m u d commissioned the official histories that he wanted to stand as the record o f his reign for posterity. Was he a religious zealot o r a cosmopolitan pragmatist? Fiistorians remain divided, but Malunud's repeated military campaigns provided the basis for his successful rule. He not only pillaged and destroyed; he also built and rebuilt cities \\ithin his reign. As a patron, he was particularly adroit. I n the 1020s the celebrated poet Firdowsi

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came to Mahmud's court to present his epic p o e m , the Shahnomeh. Other courtiers included historians, lingists, and mathematicians, and even a p o l y m a t h w h o was all three: the incomparable comparativist, A b u al-Rayan A h m a d al-Biruni. M a h m u d lured al-Biruni to j o i n his royal entourage i n 1018, but because the sultan was o f t e n campaigning, the scholar had to accompany l i i m . A l - B i r u n i crisscrossed northwestern India w i t h die Ghaznavid army d u r i n g several forays before M a h m u d and al-Biruni settled i n Ghazna i n the m i d - 1020s, where they remained until Mahmud's death i n 1030. A l - B i r u n i resented the i m p o s i t i o n o f royal demands, but his forced travels allowed h i m to expand his mathematical achievements to include a comprehensive cultural and historical survey o f India that still remains a classic. His Kitab al-Hind (Book o f India) surveys the range o f H i n d u culture, distinguishing among history, social customs, and doctrines w i t h a rare ethnographic sensitivity. It was completed just before Mahmud's death. Despite his prolific o u t put, w i t h m o r e than 146 wTitings to his credit, al-Biruni is renowned chiefly for this survey and a handful o f r o u g h l y twenty-one other extant works, a mere ic percent o f his entire corpus. M a h m u d ' s legacy fared better than a l - B i r u n i ' s , at least f o r a w h i l e . Because Ghazna was a c i t y o n the edge o f a p o w e r f u l I r a n i a n e m p i r e , the Samanid,

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M a h m u d b u i l t it u p to be a capital c i t y to r i v a l Baghdad i n its c u l t u r a l r e f i n e m e n t . The w a r r i o r s , w h o w e r e the mainstay o f M a h m u d ' s conquests and his a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , w e r e actually T u r k i c slaves w h o h a d served u n d e r Persian rulers. I n the eleventh c e n t u r y they asserted t h e i r independence, so m u c h so that this i n i t i a l p e r i o d o f Turko-Persian-Islamicate

expansion is o f t e n k n o w n

as " t h e Slave Dynasties." The n e w M u s l i m elites o f South Asia w e r e Turks w h o favored Persianate c u l t u r e and w h o governed i n the name o f I s l a m . They still favored t h e i r w e s t w a r d f l a n k , and i n a d d i t i o n t o seeking c a l i p h a l r e c o g n i t i o n ,

The immense congregational

they t r i e d but failed to c o n q u e r Khurasan ( i n northeastern I r a n ) . Instead, they

mosque in Delhi known as

expanded t o the east a n d s o u t h , n o t l i m i t i n g t h e i r patronage t o Ghazna but

Quwwal al-Islam ("Might of

e x t e n d i n g i t to another city, Lahore. The w e a l t h o f I n d i a d r e w t h e m f u r t h e r

Islam") was one of the first

i n t o the s u b c o n t i n e n t , l e a d i n g t h e m t o develop Lahore as another center o f Islamicate c u l t u r e . The Ghurids displaced the Ghaznavids i n 1192, and pushed the leading edge o f Turko-Islamicate culture further into the Aryan heardand to Delhi. Invading f r o m the H i n d u Rush m o u n t a i n range, the Ghtrrids razed Ghazna and captured Lahore before w i n n i n g Delhi. The Ghurids dien made Delhi their capital and established a c o m posite architectural style that became a pattern for other parts o f Hindustan. The Ghurids' successors became k n o w n as the Mamluks, or "slave kings," o f N o r t h India

built in India. Begun in 1191, the mosque stands on the site of a pre Islamic temple whose ruins were incorporated in the structure. The tall iron pillar in the courtyard, originally dedicated to the Indian god Vishnu around 4 0 0 , was re-erected as a trophy to symbolize

(not to be confused w i t h the Mamluks o f N o r t h Africa, another slave dynasty o f

Islam's triumph over

premodern Islamic history). The Mamluks and their successors—the Khaljis, the

Hinduism.

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TughJuqs, the Sayyids, and the Lodis—were collectively k n o w n as the Delhi Sultanate. From the thirteenth to the early sixteenth centuries (1206-1526), they d o m i n a t e d N o r t h India. I n the aftermath o f M o n g o l incursions to the n o r t i i and west, they welcomed refugees, m c l u d i n g architects and artists, musicians, poets, and religious scholars, most o f them specialists i n h i g h Persianate culture. W h a t these specialists had learned i n Central Asia, i n regions such as Transoxiana and Khurasan, they i n t u r n transmitted (and further refined) i n the n e w cosmopolitan centers o f South Asia that were n o w ruled by f o r mer Turkic slaves. A m o n g the m a n y m o n u m e n t s that c o m e f r o m the M a m l u k p e r i o d , f e w r i v a l the Q u w w a t al-Islam m o s q u e ( " T h e M i g h t o f I s l a m " ) l o c a t e d i n D e l h i . A l t h o u g h the actual n a m e o f t h e m o s q u e is still debated, its central l o c a t i o n i n the n e w capital underscores

its

symbolic

importance

C o n s t r u c t i o n o f the mosque began i n 1191.

to

Muslim

rulers.

It featured an e n o r -

m o u s o p e n quadrangle c o u r t y a r d set o n an earlier H i n d u t e m ple site. H i n d u craftsmen used m a t e r i a l f r o m the d e m o l i s h e d temples to construct a c u l t u r a l l y h y b r i d place o f w o r s h i p , c o m b i n i n g H i n d u tastes and art i n an Islamic structure. I n c l u d e d i n the central c o u r t y a r d o f the m o s q u e is a h u g e i r o n p i l l a r o f p a r The towering Qutb Minar (1199—1368), the minaret attached to the Quwwat al¬ Islam mosque in Delhi,

ticular interest. The p i l l a r predates M u s l i m r u l e by at least six h u n d r e d years. I t is an i m p o s i n g structure made o f p u r e malleable i r o n , i m p e r v i o u s to r u s t , and an i n s c r i p t i o n , still preserved, dedicates i t to the g o d V i s h n u i n m e m o r y o f a H i n d u k i n g . That same h y b r i d is c o n f i r m e d i n another edifice

combines foreign and

that separates the Q u w w a t a l - I s l a m m o s q u e f r o m o t h e r s : the d o m i n a n t

indigenous elements. Like

m i n a r e t k n o w n as the Q u t b M i n a r that stands next to the m o s q u e . Five stories

earlier minarets in Afghanistan, it was built in flanged stages separated by

i n gradually d i m i n i s h i n g h e i g h t , i t shows a p e r f e c t i o n o f calligraphic s y m m e t r y and f l o r a l o r n a m e n t a t i o n . D e p e n d i n g o n the perspective o f the viewer, i t

balconies, but it uses a local

can seem to be a m a r k e d l y Islamic b u i l d i n g , w i t h Arabic w o r d s clearly etched

material, sandstone.

i n each b a n d , or a d i s t i n c t i v e b l e n d o f Islamic and H i n d u m o t i f s can be n o t e d , because the floral patterns that f r a m e and interlace the Arabic w o r d s are r e m iniscent o f b o t h H i n d u and B u d d h i s t structures f r o m South Asia. Also part o f the same m o s q u e c o m p l e x is a t o m b that is a m o n g the earliest that M u s l i m rulers i n I n d i a had b u i l t f o r themselves. Its c o n s t r u c t i o n w as r

o r d e r e d by the p o w e r f u l M a m l u k r u l e r , Sultan Shams a l - D i n I l t u t m i s h (r. 1211-36), six years before his death. I l t u t m i s h d i d w h a t n o r u l e r before h a d done: H e consolidated the disparate regions o f N o r t h India i n t o an independent polity, a k i n g d o m bearing an Islamic stamp but a l l o w i n g H i n d u s first safety then i n c l u s i o n w i t h i n the r u l i n g strata o f the D e l h i Sultanate. H e also held off, as

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m u c h by d i p l o m a c y as by a r m e d force, the

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feared

M o n g o l s , w h o s e zeal for conquest had b r o u g h t t h e m to the borders o f H i n d u s t a n . H e f u r t h e r cultivated Sufi masters, a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h e m as spiritual lodestones, n o t o n l y f o r his subjects but also for h i m s e l f and his court. It is fitting that U t u t m i s h w o u l d choose to have his o w n t o m b set w i t h i n the p r e m i e r m o s q u e o f t h i r teenth-century D e l h i , because he himself had extended the scope o f the Q u w w a t al-Islam mosque and c o m pleted the Q u t b Minar. A l t h o u g h never c o m p l e t e d , his t o m b became the benchmark for royal mausoleums i n M u s l i m South Asia. It boasts a marble cenotaph beautif u l l y centered w i t h i n receding red sandstone arches. Its decorative inscriptions and geometrical designs e x h i b i t a h i g h level o f w o r k m a n s h i p , reflecting b o t h Islamic and H i n d u aesthetic m o t i f s . I f Ututmish set the tone f o r inspired rule i n the t h i r teenth century, the most i m p o r t a n t o f the Turkic slave rulers i n the next century was the sultan M u h a m m a d i b n T u g h l u q (r. 1325-51). H i s father, Ghiyas u d - D i n T u g h l u q , had earlier m i l i t a r i l y defended the sultanate against M o n g o l threats. The levels o f fear and revulsion o f the nascent I n d o - M u s l i m Turks at the M o n g o l legions w o u l d be difficult to exaggerate. I n the words o f the prem i e r m i d - f o u r t e e n t h - c e n t u r y Deccani historian, Isami, the M o n g o l s were "a w r e t c h e d people, w i t h n a r r o w eyes, flat noses, and m o u t h s as w i d e as the gates o f a palace. F r o m their depressed noses f l o w s a paste-like y e l l o w i s h fluid, day and n i g h t . " Ghiyas u d - D i n n o t o n l y c o p e d w i t h the M o n g o l s ,

In carving the decoration of

he also annexed a m a j o r r e g i o n i n the s o u t h a n d p u t d o w n a r e b e l l i o n i n Bengal. U p o n his death i n 1325,

he left his son and successor a vast, t h o u g h

far f r o m i n t e g r a t e d , t e r r i t o r y . It was the singular m a r k o f M u h a m m a d i b n T u g h l u q s r e i g n that he t r i e d t o subdue a n d consolidate

several rebellious

r u l e r s — M u s l i m as w e l l as H i n d u — - i n the s o u t h to f o r g e a n

expanded

Islamicate r e a l m . H e p i c k e d a b o l d means to effect this goal: he s h i f t e d m a n y Turko-Persian elites f r o m t h e n o r t h w e s t to the central s o u t h , f r o m D e l h i t o Devagiri i n Deccan (the I n d i a n peninsula s o u t h o f the N a r m a d a River). This was not an easy move. It i n v o l v e d the f o r c e d transfer o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 0 p e r cent o f Delhi's M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n . It w r o u g h t havoc u p o n the M u s l i m elites

the Qutb Minar, Indian stonemasons replaced the traditional representational motifs of Indian architecture with Arabic inscriptions and vegetal ornament.

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w h o were "chosen"

to realize the i m p e r i a l project.

M a n y d i e d f r o m the r i g o r o f the l o n g j o u r n e y f r o m n o r t h e r n to southern India. O n e can d o c u m e n t the s u f f e r i n g and r e s e n t m e n t f e l t by the u n f o r t u n a t e m i g r a n t s , a n d several c o n t e m p o r a r y a n d later h i s t o r i a n s have taken this a p p r o a c h , b u t o n e may also see i n t h i s m o v e M u h a m m a d i b n T u g h l u q ' s p r a g m a t i c genius. H e was faced w i t h a d a u n t i n g c h a l lenge i n the n o r t h w e s t e r n p a r t o f his k i n g d o m . F r o m the

m i d - t h i r t e e n t h century

on

the

Mongol

threat

l o o m e d l a r g e , p r e e m p t i n g o t h e r i m p e r i a l strategies. A l t h o u g h his predecessors p l u n d e r e d the s o u t h i n o r d e r to r e i n f o r c e the n o r t h , M u h a m m a d i b n T u g h l u q s o u g h t t o i n t e g r a t e the s o u t h ( t h e Deccan

region) into

the

n o r t h w e s t ( t h e I n d o - G a n g e t i c p l a i n ) . H i s g o a l was t o safeguard and p r o t e c t Islamicate society f r o m the feared M o n g o l i n f i d e l s . T h e r e s u l t i n g m i g r a t i o n lasted t e n years (1313-23), a n d i t m a d e possible w h a t o t h e r w i s e w o u l d have been u n i m a g i n a b l e : the a n n e x a t i o n o f t h e f o r m e r l y i n d e p e n d e n d e n t k i n g d o m s o f Deccan i n t o t h e D e l h i Sultanate. To seal the s y m b o l i c s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s large s h i f t , M u h a m m a d i b n T u g h l u q h a d the f o r m e r capital c i t y o f D e v a g i r i r e n a m e d Dawlatabad and m a d e The Delhi sultan Shams alDin Ututmish (r. I Z I I - 6 )

i t a c o - c a p i t a l o f the Sultanate, o n a par w i t h D e l h i . T h e success o f t h e sultan's m a n a g e r i a l boldness d e p e n d e d o n s p i r i t u a l as

exemplifies theTurko-

w e l l as m a t e r i a l resources. B u t w h i c h h a d p r i o r i t y ? Even f o r those w h o

Persian-Islamicate culture

o p p o s e d the m o v e f r o m D e l h i t o D a w l a t a b a d , as d i d the h i s t o r i a n I s a m i , its

that dominated South Asia

o u t c o m e was seen as d e p e n d e n t o n a s p i r i t u a l resource w h o s e m e d i a t o r s

from the eleventh century.

w e r e shaykhs rather t h a n sultans. I n a b o l d reversal o f h i e r a r c h i c a l l o y a l t y ,

His tomb in Delhi, made of red sandstone that contrasts with the white marble ceno-

I s a m i a t t r i b u t e d the u l t i m a t e source o f p o w e r n o t t o the M u h a m m a d i b n T u g h l u q b u t t o t h e s p i r i t u a l slave o r fatjir. T h e " t r u e " masters o f the r e a l m

taph, set a standard for royal

w e r e the Sufi masters, those w h o m U t u t m i s h had earlier a c k n o w l e d g e d as

mausoleaums in the region.

s u p e r i o r b e i n g s . Later r u l e r s also i d e n t i f i e d f a q i r s w i t h the core values o f T u r k o - P e r s i a n - I s l a m i c a t e c u l t u r e , a n d a m o n g t h e i r m a j o r representatives i n H i n d u s t a n w e r e t h e C h i s h t i saints o f N o r t h and S o u t h I n d i a . T h i s l o g i c o f h i e r a r c h i c reversal presents a n e w r e a d i n g o f h i s t o r y . W h a t h a d saved N o r t h I n d i a f r o m the M o n g o l s , a c c o r d i n g t o I s a m i , was was n o t M u h a m m a d i b n T u g h l u q ' s a r m y b u t h i s respect f o r the s h r i n e o f Shaykh M u i n a d - D i n C h i s h t i ( d . 1236)

i n A j m e r . T h e evidence was the sultan h i m -

self, w h o h a d j o u r n e y e d to A j m e r as a p i l g r i m after a successful engagement

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The burgeoning Muslim population of the Indian subcontinent in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries led to the construction of mosques and the copying of the Quran. This manuscript of the Quran, transcribed at Bijapur in Deccan in 1 4 8 3 , uses the rough paper and swooping bihari script typical of the region.

w i t h the M o n g o l s . The s u l t a n c o u l d n o t c o n t r o l saintly p o w e r , however, a n d the d e c l i n e o f D e l h i as an i m p e r i a l c i t y f r o m 1327

o n was c o n s i d e r e d

a

r e s u l t , above a l l , o f t h e loss o f its saintly p a t r o n , i n this case, M u i n a d - D i n ' s p r i n c i p a l successor i n D e l h i , N i z a m a d - D i n A w l i y a ( d . 132c), b u t also t o the sultan's subsequent rudeness t o w a r d N i z a m a d - D i n ' s successor, Nasir a d - D i n C h i r a g h - i D i h l i ( d . 1356). By the same l o g i c , I s a m i e x p l a i n e d the p r o s p e r i t y o f D a w l a t a b a d after the great m i g r a t i o n e n d i n g i n 1323.

T h e c i t y ' s p r o s p e r i t y was n o t due t o

m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c a l , social, or e c o n o m i c factors b u t rather t o the s p i r i t u a l i n f l u e n c e o f t h e C h i s h t i y a . A g a i n , the l i n k w a s t o Shaykh N i z a m a d - D i n , f o r the C h i s h t i p a t r o n o f D e l h i h a d c o m m i s s i o n e d one o f his o w n successors to m i g r a t e t o D e c c a n . I t was the lineage o f t h i s m a n — B u r h a n a d - D i n ( d . 1337), t h e n succeeded by Z a i n a d - D i n D i n S h i r a z i ( d . 1 3 6 9 ) — t h a t made Deccan prosper. I n the w o r d s o f a p o e m by I s a m i : It was the grace o f Zain ad-Din that made This stormy w o r l d like the garden o f heaven.

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From his aroma the Chishti garden became fragrant; Under his protection the w h o l e o f Deogir was saved. Because the Tughluq governor sought his shelter, The Tughluq star rose to the height o f Saturn. Wherever you see a fortunate amir It's due to the blessing o f a l o w l y faqir. D i s c e r n i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p between amir a n d faqir is c o m p l i c a t e d , however, b y the n a t u r a l tension b e t w e e n t h e i r respective roles. O f t e n that t e n s i o n is concealed i n the h i s t o r i c a l sources that p r o j e c t the o n l y e x i s t i n g r e c o r d , apart f r o m a r c h e o l o g i c a l artifacts, o f p r e m o d e r n South Asia. As p r e v i o u s l y i n d i cated, nearly all the sources result f r o m i m p e r i a l patronage: the s t o r y is thus t o l d by the r u l e r ' s a p p o i n t e d h i s t o r i a n ; they are versions

doublechecked,

t h e n a p p r o v e d b y the subjects b e i n g r e c o r d e d . I n every sense, these records are o f f i c i a l biographies o r c h r o n i c l e s . I n the case o f M u h a m m a d i b n T u g h l u q , f o r e x a m p l e , i t is n o t his o w n h i s t o r i a n b u t the h i s t o r i a n o f a p o l i t i c a l r i v a l , the B a h m a n i d e m p i r e o f Deccan, w h o gives h i m b o t h a b a c k h a n d e d c o m p l i m e n t , t o have been blessed by M u i n a d - D i n , a n d a direct r e b u k e , _to have neglected N i z a m ad-Din's successor, Nasir a d - D i n ( d . 1356). At the same t i m e , the Sufi sources are o f t e n reluctant t o a c k n o w l e d g e l i n k s b e t w e e n notable saints a n d n o n - S u f i r u l e r s . For example, M u h a m m a d i b n T u g h l u q is usually classed as a n o n - S u f i ruler, yet i t is k n o w n f r o m an Arabic source, the travelogue o f the famous traveler I b n Battutah (1304—68 o r 1369), that M u h a m m a d i b n T u g h l u q , even before he became the sultan, h a d consulted Shaykh N i z a m a d - D i n . The shaykh allegedly e x c l a i m e d : " W e have g i v e n h i m the k i n g d o m . " It w o u l d seem natural t h e n that M u h a m m a d i b n T u g h l u q was one o f the p r i v i l e g e d few t o bear the bier o f the shaykh to his final resting place i n 132c, yet n o C h i s h t i source records that fact. The key is t o see the r e l a t i o n ship, always f r a u g h t w i t h t e n s i o n , between the autocratic t e m p o r a l r u l e r and his ally, w h o was also his r i v a l , the a l l - p o w e r f u l eternal ruler, the Sufi saint. The m o s t frequent o u t c o m e was c o o p e r a t i o n between the shaykhs and the sultans. That t r a d i t i o n c o n t i n u e d t h r o u g h o u t the D e l h i Sultanate as w e l l as i n other parts o f I n d i a , b u t i t d i d n o t supplant o r erase the i m p l i c i t r i v a l r y between these t w o repositories o f p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y .

The Influence of Saints Indeed, one can trace the i n f l u e n c e o f saints, and their r i v a l r y w i t h rulers, f r o m M u h a m m a d i b n T u g h l u q to the next giant o f I n d o - M u s l i m culture, the M u g h a l e m p e r o r Akbar (r. 15.55-1604). I f saints h a d become the m a j o r custodians a n d

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transmitters o f Turko-Persian-Islamicate values b y the m i d - f o u r t e e n t h century, b y the m i d - s i x t e e n t h century they were even m o r e i m p o r t a n t . A revealing barometer o f this development is Akbar's checkered r e l a t i o n s h i p t o C h i s h t i saints i n general, a n d t o Shaykh Salim Chishti ( d . 1571) at Fatehpur Sikri ( i n n o r t h e r n I n d i a ) i n particular. The Mughals were n o t M o n g o l s , as their name implies, but I n d o - T i m u r i d s ; they were the Indian legatees o f the Turkic conqueror T i m u r ( 1336-1405), w h o , t h o u g h n o t a M o n g o l , claimed lineage traceable t o Genghis Khan. T i m u r ( o r Tamerlane) was also heir t o M o n g o l m i l i t a r y and r u l i n g ideals. H e was b o t h a great m i l i t a r y c o n q u e r o r and a supreme spritual leader. His f u n c t i o n was similar t o that o f the f a m i l iar Turko-Persian k i n g s , but his extensive conquests lent even m o r e c r e d i b i l i t y t o h i s c l a i m o f d i v i n e i n s p i r a t i o n a n d support. Characteristic o f M u g h a l

m

veneration f o r their esteemed ancestor is the m i n i a ture i n a M u g h a l c h r o n i c l e e m b e l l i s h i n g his death. F r o m the ornate d o m e at the t o p t o the h u m b l e servants at the b o t t o m , all seem t o be f r o z e n i n t h e m o m e n t o f loss that is represented by the deceased h e r o i n the center. A l t h o u g h the focus o f the m i n i a ture is T i m u r , its p a t r o n isAkbar. The exquisite exec u t i o n is characteristic o f t h e n u m e r o u s

album

folios that date f r o m the p e r i o d o f Akbar. I t i n d i cates Akbar's interest

i n , a n d patronage of, t h e

To emphasize his dynasty's

w h o l e spectrum o f art f r o m the portable t o the m o n u m e n t a l . Akbar i d e n t i f i e d

d e s c e m

w i t h T i m u r , and at the same t i m e he raised the I n d o - T i m u r i d legacy t o n e w

M u

heightS. Akbar began, as d i d all his most illustrious ancestors, w i t h a stLinning record o f military success. H e assumed rule w h e n he was merely thirteen years o l d . A brief glance at die extent o f the Mughal empire i n the mid-sixteenth century reveals the challenge Akbar faced. H e ruled a realm diat represented more closely the Ghurid than the Tughluq map o f Hindustan. His father H u m a y u n . after succeeding Babur as the second M u g h a l ruler, had spent more dian fifteen years i n exde i n Safavid Iran and the reconquest o f India was left to Babur's grandson, Akbar. Akbar spent almost all the early years o f his reign engaged i n military campaigning. The results o f bis tactical skill and extraordinary presence as a military leader are evident. H e w o n

fromT

"™.

S emperor Akbar often commissioned lavishly illustrated manuscripts about h a l

Timurid history. This scene showing the death of Timur i s o n e

° f '3

2

lar

ge illustra-

tions f r o m a manuscript

m a d e i n t h e late s i x t e e n t h century.

406

The Mughal emperor Akbar commissioned a magnificent tomb for his father, Humayun.The octagonal

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major battles that consolidated Mughal rule over northern, central, and western India. Akbar combined military success w i t h economic reform. A m o n g Ms major economic achievements was uniting the m a r i t i m e , commercial province o f Gujarat

tomb is built of red sand-

w i t h the agricultural heartlands o f the Punjab and Gangetic basins, making possible

stone enhanced with white

an enormous expansion o f trade and production. But it was his ability to conquer

marble, a combination that

rruliiarily and then to assuage his former enemies diplomatically that earned h i m the

had been introduced several centuries earlier. Unlike earlier tombs, Humayun's is

most revered place i n Mughal annals. Akbar also succeeded i n attracting able m e n , b o t h H i n d u and M u s l i m , to serve

located in a large garden

h i m as courtiers. His c h i e f tax officer was Todar M a i , a H i n d u w h o m Akbar

crossed by water channels

recruited over objections f r o m M u s l i m notables. T h r o u g h Todar Mai, Akbar exper-

and pathways.

i m e n t e d w i t h tax reforms u n t i l he developed a system o f administration and

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extraction that o p t i m i z e d his resources. This system remained i n place u n t i l m o d ern times. Akbar had more trouble achieving control and accountability i n the religious establishment, i n c l u d i n g his management o f Sufi shaykhs as an alternative source o f authority, not only to the ulama (guardians o f everyday ritual and law) but also to the Mughal court. N o n e o f the official Mughal accounts explain either die nature o f the Sufi brotherhoods or die attitude o f their legatees and devotees toward the emperor. The Akbarnameh, die official history o f Akbar's reign, w r i t t e n by A b u l Fazl under Akbar's direction, tells only the perspective o f Akbar's royal patron and reduces the emperor's attitude toward Sufi masters to a single central frame narrative that highlights the blessings Akbar received f r o m Shaykh Salim Chishti. I n the story the reclusive, ascetic saint f r o m a village near Agra solves die major problem facing die young emperor: h o w to produce a male heir. At age twenty-eight Akbar had produced only daughters, but i n a visit to Shaykh Salim en route to Ajmer, Akbar was told by the saint that his favorite w i f e w o u l d produce a male heir and that he w o u l d be blessed w i t h no fewer than three male heirs. Both predictions proved true, and i n witness to the saint's power and its sequel, the future emperor o f India, Jahangir (r. 1605-27), was named Prince Salim at b i r t h . The account o f Shaykh Salim, E m p e r o r Akbar, and Prince Salim l o o m s large i n the Akbarnameh because i t p r o v i d e d the pretext f o r Akbar's later decision to m o v e his i m p e r i a l capital f r o m Agra t o S i k r i , renamed Fatehpur Sikri. W h a t the i m p e r i a l version o m i t t e d , however, is w h a t later readers m u s t deduce: a series o f suppressed m o t i v e s that b o u n d the e m p e r o r to the shaykh w h i l e s t i l l a l l o w i n g the e m p e r o r t o be the f i n a l r e p o s i t o r y o f t r u t h a n d a u t h o r i t y . W i t h o u t d e n y i n g the s p i r i t u a l m o t i v e s that A b u l Fazl a t t r i b u t e d t o the e m p e r o r i n the o f f i c i a l account, also evident is another pragmatic m o t i v e : Akbar i d e n t i f i e d w i t h an i l l u s t r i o u s India-specific order, e n h a n c i n g his o w n l e g i t i m a t i o n as a South Asian M u s l i m m o n a r c h . For all the retrospective stress o n the s o l i d i t y o f Akbar's c l a i m to r u l e , i t is u n l i k e l y that he q u i c k l y f o r g o t the exile o f his father H u m a y u n f r o m I n d i a , an exile p r o m p t e d i n p a r t by H u m a y u n ' s i n a b i l i t y to c o u n t e r the i d e o l o g i c a l claims a n d m i l i t a r y prowess o f the A f g h a n e m p e r o r Sher Shah o f Sur (r. 1 5 4 0 - 4 5 ) , w h o defeated H u m a y u n at the Battle o f Chansa i n 1539 and again at Kananj i n

1540.

Alternatively, Akbar m i g h t have l i n k e d h i m s e l f to the t h e n - d o m i n a n t t o m b c o m p l e x o f N o r t h I n d i a , the mazar ( t o m b ) o f Shaykh N i z a m a d - D i n i n D e l h i . W h y d i d n ' t he? H i s d e c i s i o n to b u i l d a t o m b h o n o r i n g his father, H u m a y u n , was i n part dictated by the p r o x i m i t y o f its site t o the t o m b o f N i z a m a d - D i n . The t o m b c o m p l e x o f H u m a y u n remains today a m a g n i f i c e n t example

of

Akbar's a t t e n t i o n t o m e m o r i a l s f o r the dead. A l t h o u g h the t o m b ' s actual designer may have been H u m a y u n ' s w i d o w , its p a t r o n and g u i d i n g force was the y o u n g emperor. Its central structure c o m b i n e s i n d i g e n o u s b u i l d i n g t r a -

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ditioris w i t h f a m i l i a r Persianate emphases. As w h i t e m a r b l e i n l a i d i n red sandstone l i g h t e n e d the octagonal f o r m a l i t y o f H u m a y u n ' s t o m b , its setting i n a f o u r - c o r n e r e d garden o n a vast plane augured a n e w t r a d i t i o n o f t o m b gardens k n o w n as the M u g h a l style. A l t h o u g h his predecessors favored D e l h i , the y o u n g Akbar was suspicious o f its past. D e l h i was, after all, the s t r o n g h o l d o f T u r k o - A f g h a n elites w i t h m i n i m a l loyalty t o the fledgling M u g h a l dynasty. For m o r e than three h u n d r e d years, D e l h i had been the capital o f M u s l i m dynasties i n N o r t h I n d i a , and i t was o n l y the A f g h a n k i n g Sikander L o d i (r. 1489-1517) w h o had opted t o make Agra his n e w capital. Agra c o n t i n u e d t o serve as the capital for his successor, the last L o d i sultan, I b r a h i m (r. 1517-26). I t remained the i m p e r i a l center for the b r i e f p e r i o d o f Babur's r e i g n (r. 1526-30), but H u m a y u n , b o t h before and after his exile i n Iran, preferred D e l h i . I n securing his o w n rule at Agra ( 1 5 5 6 - 7 0 ) , Akbar had t o be aware o f the tension between Agra and Delhi as rival i m p e r i a l centers. I n part because o f their asymmetry ( D e l h i had the longer history, Agra the m o r e i m m e Akbar founded a red sandstone capital twenty-five miles west of Agra at Sikri,

d i a t e strategic advantage), Akbar sought still another base f r o m w h i c h t o p r o ject his distinctive version o f i m p e r i a l authority. But another site c o u l d n o t s i m p l y be chosen; the choice had t o have symbolic and l e g i t i m a t i n g p o w e r such

site of the hermitage of Sufi

that others w o u l d be led t o accept the T i g h t n e s s o f the emperor's decision. By

Shaykh Salim Chisti

l i n k i n g the location o f Sikri t o the saint w h o predicted the b i r t h o f Akbar s heirs

(1479-1571). The emperor

and successors, Akbar made its selection as a n e w i m p e r i a l center seem logical,

hoped to tap the Sufi's boraka

even c o m p e l l i n g .

or "spiritual power" and promote his claims to legiti-

There were also other advantages that appealed t o the spiritual d i m e n s i o n o f

macy. The saints grave was

Akbar's multifaceted personality. Having chosen Fatehpur Sikri, he was able to

marked by a splendid white

c o n f i r m and continue his affiliation w i t h the t o m b o f Shaykh M u i n a d - D i n i n

marble tomb.

A j m e r w h i l e also d r a w i n g o n the power o f a l i v i n g saint, Shaykh Salim, a n d

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t h r o u g h h i m o n the spiritual baraka (blessing) that d e r i v e d f r o m his ascetic p a t r o n , Shaykh Farid a d - D i n Ganj-i Shakar ( d . 126c) i n Punjab. T h r o u g h a t w o f o l d , redoubled Chishti loyalty, Akbar c o u l d spiritually anchor his i m p e r i a l legitimacy i n provinces adjacent to Uttar Pradesh: Punjab and Rajasthan. Both regions were crucial to the p o l i t i c o l - m i l i t a r y a m b i t i o n s o f his r e i g n .

The Monumental Art of the Mughal Emperors Akbar had begun to sponsor m o n u m e n t a l art o n a n e w and expansive scale even before the f o u n d a t i o n the n e w capital at Fatehpur Sikri. As i m p o r t a n t as Akbar's affiliation w i t h Chishti saints was for the Fatehpur Sikri phase o f his life, it became irrelevant d u r i n g the final twenty years o f his r e i g n , as he m o v e d f r o m one t e m porary capital to another. This abrupt shift i n loyalty had an impact o n institutional Sufism that reverberated t h r o u g h o u t the M u g h a l p e r i o d . As neither Shaykh Salim n o r Shaykh M u i n a d - D i n remained a constant focus o f Akbar s allegiance, Fatehpur Sikri was sited as a temporary rather than a permanent capital city. For Akbar i t was the emperor, n o t a place o r a saint, w h o lauded as the apogee o f spiritual and temporal a u t h o r i t y i n the M u g h a l polity. To the extent that his person became the metaphor for his realm, spiritual luminaries c o u l d o n l y f u n c t i o n by being linked to or subordinated w i t h i n the aura o f his ultimate, i m p e r i a l authority. The absolutist claims that were raised by Akbar, o r by Abul-Fazl i n Akbar's name, forced a redefinition o f b o t h sainthood and dynastic succession. I n 1577 Abul-Fazl s father, Shaykh Mubarak, drafted the mahzar (decree). Its i n t e n t i o n was to a f f i r m the e m p e r o r s s p i r i t u a l supremacy; at this t i m e the emperor officially became superior to all religious functionaries and institutions. By this t i m e the Chishtiya h a d already lost whatever benefit its p a r t i s a n s — w h e t h e r shrine custodians, l i v i n g saints, o r H i n d u - M u s l i m devotees—may have gained by the favor that Akbar had showered o n t h e m . Such courtiers as the c h i e f religious officer, A b d a n - N a b i , and Shaykh M u b a r a k were removed f r o m active advocacy o f either their o w n Sufi legacy o r the active mystical interests o f o t h ers. N o r d i d the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f Shaykh Salim's t o m b w i t h i n the w a l l e d c o u r t yard o f the central mosque at Fatehpur Sikri p r o m o t e the spiritual agenda o f the C h i s h t i lineage that he represented. Instead, the f o u n d i n g o f the capital at Fatehpur Sikri a f f i r m e d A k b a r — h i s b r a n d o f Islamic observance and his l e g i t i mate c l a i m t o r u l e as T i m u r ' s o f f s p r i n g . Akbar s visits to saints' tombs after 1577 reveal his changed m o o d . He visited Delhi only once, and spent most o f Ms time at Humayun's tomb. W h e n he d i d visit a couple o f provincial saindy sMines, he used diese visits to draw attention to Ms o w n superior claims to spiritual favor. The Sufi exemplars w h o shaped the first phase o f Akbar s rule were eclipsed and then gradually forgotten toward the final years o f Ms life.

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One o f Akbar's most solemn acts o f remembrance concerned his o w n burial site. Like the powerful M a m l u k ruler I l t u t m i s h , Akbar planned his o w n t o m b The site—named Sikandara, suggesting the link between Akbar and another legendary military genius, Alexander the Great—was located o n the outskirts o f Agra i n a sumptuous garden complex. The actual construction, and perhaps even the elements o f the design, were left to Akbar's son and successor, Jahangir. Its major feature, dwarfing the t o m b itself, is the tomb's e n o r m o u s gate, w h i c h was not finished u n t i l 1614. Red sandstone forms the backdrop for intricate geometric

I

.^•K^Ejfl

patterns, i n c l u d i n g the reverse swastika, as w e l l as delicate floral designs, all etched in black and w h i t e marble. Floating atop the entire edifice, almost suspended by their light surface, are foui w h i t e marble minarets. The elderly Akbar may not have anticipated the full beauty o f his final resting place, but the depiction o f h i m commissioned by his grandson, Shah Jalian, shows a figure so engaged by nature ( i n this case, by a tiny sparrow) that the ethereal quality o f his t o m b seems entirely

fitting.

I f the g l o r i f i c a t i o n o f the emperor lay at the heart o f M u g h a l art and architecture for Akbar, i t was an emphasis that he transm i t t e d to his successors. The Great M u g h a l — w h e t h e r Akbar, Jahangir, Shah Jahan, o r A u r a n g z e b — w a s m o r e com erned w i t h his o w n office and image than w i t h loyalty t o another Like Humayun's comb at

spiritual or t e m p o r a l authority. Sufi saints fit the emperor's

Delhi, Akbar's own tomb at

clothes, not the reverse. Jahangir (1569—1627) is often portrayed as similar to his

Sikandara, five miles north-

father, devoted t o b r o t h e r h o o d s i n general b u t t o the Chishtiya i n particular. But

west of Agra, was set in a

after 1618 Jahangir also t u r n e d f r o m C h i s h t i d e v o t i o n a l i s m to a m o r e diffuse

vast garden complex crossed by water channels. A soaring gateway' crowned by four

spirituality, one that also encompassed the rival Naqshbandi Sufi order. I n a m i n i a t u r e t h o u g h t to have been painted i n 1616, t o w a r d the end o f a three-year

white marble minarets gave

p e r i o d w h e n Jahangir resided i n Ajmer, Jahangir is portrayed as h a n d i n g a b o o k

access to the complex.

to a saintly figure, Shaykh H u s a i n , w h o was the p r i m a r y custodian o f the A j m e r shrine. A Persian quatrain o n the b o r d e r suggests that the emperor, a l t h o u g h c o u r t e d by kings ( i n c l u d i n g James I o f England), looks to dervishes instead for guidance. But the m i n i a t u r e communicates another message that may contradict lyrical t r u t h : angelic figures above and b e l o w an hourglass throne attend t o the emperor, and the e m p e r o r alone, as the figure o f destiny. The ones above register b o t h awe at his halo and distress at their broken arrows, w h i l e the ones b e l o w are w r i t i n g a band that reads: " O k i n g , may the span o f y o u r life be a thousand years." I n the register o f eternity, b o t h the saint and other kings are but witnesses to the axis o f D i v i n e Favor, the I n d o - T i m u r i d emperor.

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W h a t is h i n t e d at i n this m i n i a t u r e becomes m o r e c o m p e l l i n g l y clear i n the architectural achievements o f Jahangir's reign. Many are m o n u m e n t s to the dead. W h i l e Jahangir's father's t o m b at Sikandara registers Akbar's o w n genius, other mausoleums

o f lasting i n f l u e n c e are at least i n part due t o the i m p a c t o f

Jahangir's favorite w i f e , N u r Jahan, w h o m he m a r r i e d i n 1611.

N u r Jahan,

together w i t h her brother, Asaf Khan, and her father, I t i m a d al-Dawla, f o r m e d a family clique that increasingly came t o c o n t r o l the affairs o f the M u g h a l empire, especially as Jahangir began to suffer i l l health i n the 1620s. W h e n her father and m o t h e r b o t h died i n 1621,

Nur

Jahan, as an act o f filial d e v o t i o n , oversaw the financing and c o n struction o f a garden t o m b for t h e m that is at once lovely and lavish. It builds o n the concept o f n i n e bays, w h i c h characterized H u m a y u n ' s t o m b , but subordinates each bay to a central vault. Each i n t e r i o r r o o m is painted w i t h flowers, vases, and w i n e vessels, w h i l e the exterior surface o f w h i t e marble is suffused b o t h w i t h precious stone inlays o f paradisiacal images and w i t h marble screens not u n l i k e those f o u n d at the t o m b o f Shaykh Salim Chishti at Fatehpur Sikri. W h a t is perhaps most i n t r i g u i n g about the t o m b o f I t i m a d alDaw la, however, is its anticipation o f the c r o w n i n g achievement o f M u g h a l funerary architecture, the Taj M a h a l . It is n o accident that the t o m b , w h i c h was not completed u n t i l 1628 and o n l y after the outlay o f vast sums, was the first m a j o r m o n u m e n t o f M u g h a l India to be fully executed by a w o m a n . A l t h o u g h H u m a y u n ' s t o m b and Akbar's plan f o r his o w n m a u s o l e u m signaled the h o n o r accorded emperors, the m a u s o l e u m for I t i m a d al-Dawla indeed h o n o r e d a first minister and his w i f e , but also the w o m a n w h o made its c o n s t r u c t i o n possible, his daughter, w h o was also the emperor's w i f e , N u r Jahan. M o r e than p r o x i m i t y i n Agra l i n k the t o m b o f N u r Jahan's parents, k n o w n as I t i m a d al-Dawla, and the Taj M a h a l . It was soon after her o w n marriage to Jahangir i n 1611 that N u r Jahan arranged to have her niece, the daughter o f her brother, Asaf Khan, h i m s e l f a courtier at the M u g h a l c o u r t ,

The red sandstone

gateway

m a r r i e d to the heir apparent, Prince K h u r r a m , w h o later became Shah Jahan.

t o A k b a r ' s t o m b is

decorated

N u r Jahan's niece, A r j u m a n d Banu, later became k n o w n as M u m t a z M a h a l . It is

i n w h i t e , gray, a n d

black

she, o f course, w h o occasioned the still m o r e extravagant o u t p o u r i n g o f funds

marble. I n a d d i t i o n to Arabic

f r o m the i m p e r i a l treasury, the result o f w h i c h was the m o n u m e n t k n o w n as the Taj Mahal. It is not possible to understand the vagaries o f history that produced such an extraordinary architectural legacy w i t h o u t realizing that its p l a n n i n g and execu-

inscriptions, the panels c o n tain geometric designs and large-scale

floral

arabesques

derived f r o m the patterns contemporary

textiles.

on

412

THE

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Like o t h e r M u g h a l e m p e r o r s , A k b a r glorified his lineage, and paintings m a d e for h i m e m p h a s i z e his kingly role. I n this portrait c o m m i s s i o n e d by his g r a n d s o n S h a h Jahan a r o u n d

1650.

the e m p e r o r h o l d s a s m a l l t u r b a n

o r n a m e n t . T h e s m a l l vignettes i n the m a r g i n s o f the page s h o w M u g h a l interest in the n a t u r a l w o r l d , daily life, and European prints.

THfc

EASTWARD JOURNEY

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413

I ike his father, Akhar. Jahangir was devoted to the Sufis. This image, made for an album now in St. Petersburg, shows the emperor presenting a book to the aged Shaykh Husayn, descendant of Muin alDin Chishti and superintendent of his shrine at Ajmer, where Jahangir lived from 1613 to 1616.

414

T

H

E

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t i o n depended o n the absolute supremacy o f the r e i g n i n g m o n a r c h . The n o t i o n o f divine kingship, stretching back to the Turkic conqueror T i m u r b u t strengthened by Akbar, was c o n t i n u e d by Jahangir but even more by his son, the emperor Shah Jahan (r. 1628-58). D u r i n g his reign, he g u i d e d the affairs o f stale as a m i l itary officer, an administrator, a p a t r o n , and a conciliator, w i t h the firm hand that The tomb at Agra built for Itimad al-Dawla (1622-28), Jahangir's father-in-law and minister of finance, and for his wife, was the first major Mughal monument

com-

missioned by a woman. Like other imperial tombs, it is set in a quadripartite garden, but the tomb itself is the first structure in India

his grandfather, Akbar, had earlier displayed. The result was extraordinary material wealth but also the recirculation o f that wealth t h r o u g h patronage, i n portable arts but even m o r e so i n m o n u m e n t a l architecture. Illustrated i n one m i n i a t u r e is the extent to w h i c h Shah Jahan, whose name means " w o r l d r u l e r , " conceived himself as the apogee o f the T i m u r i d lineage. N o t only are the angels m o r e riveted on h i m than those o n the earlier m i n i a t u r e o f Jahangir, but an angel i n the m i d d l e holds an umbrella o n the border o f w h i c h is inscribed Shah Jahan's geneaology g o i n g back to T i m u r . Like the l i o n and the sheep, natural rivalries a m o n g humans are e l i m i n a t e d ; all are cowed by the

in which white marble is

i m p e r i a l presence. So too are the h o l y m e n depicted o n the m i n i a t u r e : i n t w o

inlaid with multicolored

rows they stream t o w a r d the center. They face t w o scales, representing the bal-

semiprecious stones.

ance o f justice maintained i n the w o r l d by the emperor, w h o c o m b i n e d p o w e r

THE

EASTWARD

JOURNEY

OF

MUSLIM

KINGSHIP

41c

(the angel w i t h the s w o r d ) and patronage (the angel w i t h the c r o w n ) . A l t h o u g h the artistic technique o f this m i n i a t u r e m i g h t be criticized as less than perfect ( i m p e r i a l trousers s h o u l d never be fully exposed!), its message is clear: Shah Jahan r u l e d as Shahanshah-i Adil, the Just Emperor. The Taj M a h a l , even m o r e than the actual seat o f M u g h a l emperors, the Peacock Throne, or the massive m o n u m e n t s o f D e l h i , became the m a j o r achievem e n t m a r k i n g Shah Jahan's t h i r t y - y e a r r e i g n o f justice. It commemorates N u r Jahan's niece, M u m t a z Mahal, w h o died i n c h i l d b i r t h i n 1631. It was her death that spurred the g r i e f - s t r i c k e n emperor to construct a m o n u m e n t o f staggering p r o p o r t i o n s . Situated o n the bank o f the Yamuna River i n a garden c o m p l e x cove r i n g f o r t y - t w o acres, i t is flanked by t w o perfectly p r o p o r t i o n e d m o s q u e structures (only one o f w h i c h is an actual mosque) that serve as a backdrop to the transcendent perfection o f the central t o m b complex, the Taj itself. Begun one year after M u m t a z Mahal's death, i t was nearly completed by 1643 w h e n Shah

The Taj Mahal (1631-47), the tomb that Shah Jahan built in memory of his wife Mumtaz Mahal, is the crowning achievement of

Jahan lavishly celebrated the anniversary, or urs, o f his wife's death. The w h o l e

the emperors reign and

c o m p l e x is essentially Persianate i n tone and T i m u r i d i n structure. Its basic struc-

one of the landmarks of

ture resembles Humayun's t o m b , yet its fluid character, its graceful i n c l u s i o n o f

world architecture. The

i n l a i d m o t i f s w i t h marble screens, harks back to the t o m b o f I t i m a d al-Dawla. Because o f the extensive and h a u n t i n g Quranic verses that lace its borders f r o m every side, the Taj Mahal may be a vast allegorical anticipation o f the Day o f

octagonal shape and tall dome hark back to Timurid prototypes, but the vast scale and perfect proportions

Resurrection as imagined i n M u s l i m cosmology and graphically depicted i n die w r i t -

attest to Mughal mastery of

ings o f die major Andalusian sbaykh, Ibn al-Arabi (116 c-1240), w e l l k n o w n both to

materials and forms.

4l6

Set in a garden complex on the banks of the Yamuna River in Agra, the Taj Mahal stands

THE

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Shah Jahan and to his courtiers. It is possible to relate every feature o f die Taj to the allegory o f the Final Judgment. Its vast gardens become the gardens o f paradise, the

opposite the tomb of Itimad

m a i n entrance its gateway, the fountains heavenly streams, w h i l e the marble t o m b

al-Dawla. Like its predecessor,

looms as the base o f the throne o f God, supported by the four minarets.

the Taj Mahal is made of white marble inlaid with multicolored semiprecious stones. The cenotaphs of the emperor and

Even i n a less-exalted interpretation o f the Taj Mahal, it remains an architectural wonder, the apotheosis o f Shah Jahan's attempt to harmonize his vision o f Islamic loyally and T i m u r i d glory. Fits vision o f perpetual justice, divinely ordained and

his wife are decorated with

artistically etched, was channeled to his oldest son and successor, Dara Sliikoh

Arabic inscriptions and

(1615-59). He was a mercurial figure, trained i n die military and diplomatic arts,

exquisite floral arabesques.

w i t h o u t w h i c h no r u l e r could succeed, but at the same time he was genuinely c o m -

THE

EASTWARD

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OF MUSLIM

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4 J 7

rriitted to mystic pursuits. Unlike his father, grandfather, and great-grandfather, Dara Shikoh seemed n o t only t o engage saints i n his service but also t o submit h i m s e l f to their guidance. W h i l e still a y o u t h , he is said to have visited a famous Q a d i r i saint i n Lahore w h e n i n the throes o f a debihtating illness. H e recovered and credited

Although primarily known for their monumental tombs, the Mughal emperors

his recovery to that saint, M i y a n Mir. Later, i n 1640, he became the disciple o f one

also founded congregational

o f M i y a n Mir's major successors, M u l l a h Shah Badakhsi A miniature completed i n

mosques. Shah Jahan, for

163c, just before M i y a n Mir's death, shows Dara Shikoh at the feet o f the t w o saints. The contrast w i t h the earlier miniatures o f Jahangir and Shah Jahan cottld not be m o r e complete. It was not Dara Shikoh, however, but his younger brother, Aurangzeb (1618—1707),

example, included a large one in his new walled city of Shahjahanabad in Delhi. Built between 1650 and 1656, the mosque, like the Red

w h o succeeded Shah Jahan and became the last, longest r u l i n g , and possibly most

Fort opposite, is faced with

controversial o f the great Mughal emperors. After defeating his brothers i n a bitter war

red sandstone.

4ï8

THE

OXFORD

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İSLAM

o f succession, he also imprisoned his aged fadier, Shall Jahan, i n Agra Fort. F r o m 1658 to 1707 Aurangzeb (also k n o w n as Alamgir) maintained at least the

outer

unity

of

the

far-flung

Mughal domain. D u r i n g the first half o f his reign (1658—81), he conducted protracted military operations against the insurgent Marathas from Delhi. He moved liis capital to a t o w n i n Deccan, w h i c h he expanded, fortified, and renamed Atirangabad. A l t h o u g h

he

was not successful i n defeating the Marathas, Aurangzeb perpetiiated the Turko-Persian-Islamicate

tradition.

M o r e than his I n d o - T i m u r i d prede cessors, he stressed Islamic juridical n o r m s as the heart o f his o w n life quest. He lived a simple life, keeping dress, food, and diversions to a r n i n i m u n i . He earned income f r o m w r i t i n g copies o f the Q u r a n , w h i c h he then distributed to die poor. His o w n modesty is reflected i n his tomb, o r i g inally a stone cenotaph Chishti t o m b complex

near known

the as

Khuldabad. It was covered w i t h a plain marble slab inside a marble-screened terrace by the Nizam o f Hyderabad i n die early twendeth century'. Aurangzeb was not o n l y person ally p i o u s , he extended

his o w n

preferences to the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f the e m p i r e . He either curtailed or Dara Shikoh, eldest son and successor of Shah Jahan, was interested in mys

altogether

ticism like his forefathers, but his devotion seemed more sincere. In this

patronage o f music, poetry, history,

painting, made around 163c, Dara Shikoh (wearing an orange robe) is seated before two Sufi saints, his teacher Miyan Mir (wearing white), the great Sufi mystic from Lahore, and his successor, Mulla Shah (wearing black).The

and

even

efforts

to

eliminated

official

painting. Although repair

and

his

maintain

halos distinguishing these three figures are allegorical elements assimilated

mosques w o n h i m the gratitude o f

from European paintings.

the M u s l i m r e l i g i o u s classes, less

THE

EASTWARD

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419

popular was his creation o f a m o r a l policeman (muhtasib) for all m a j o r t o w n s and cities i n the empire. The m u h t a s i b c o u l d enforce j u r i d i c a l limits on w i n e consumption, gamb l i n g , and other

"objectionable"

f o r m s o f behavior. Even less p o p u lar was his decision i n 1679

to

reimpose the jizya, w h i c h obliged his H i n d u subjects to pay a p r o p erty tax levied on all n o n - M u s l i m s . N o t all aspects o f Aurangzeb's personality were consistent. He is said to have criticized the extravagance involved i n the construction o f the Taj Mahal, even t h o u g h its occupants were his o w n m o t h e r (and after 1666 his father as w e l l ) . Yet he clearly loved gardens a n d c o u l d n o t suppress the urge to have his

own

favorite

wife,

Rabia

Daurani, w h o died i n 1657, b u r i e d i n a m o n u m e n t a l w h i t e t o m b that he had modeled after the Taj Mahal. The resulting edifice is a gaunt structure. Completed i n four years by the son o f the architect o f the Taj M a h a l , i t captures the marvelous

Aurangzeb, the last and most controversial of the Mughal emper-

central d o m e o f the Taj b u t the

ors, was buried near the tombs of Chisti saints at Khuldabad in

structure is only half the size o f its

western India. His grave was originally marked by a simple stone

m o d e l , and i t seems to have its minarets so sharply positioned near the t o m b that its verticality, n o t its

cenotaph, reflecting his piety and modesty, but in the early twentieth century, the Nizam of Hyderabad added a white marble facing and screened terrace.

harmony, is accented. Furthermore, there is no inlaid w o r k i n die t o m b itself and the exterior panels are covered w i t h less intricate or gracious panels than the Taj Mahal. Yet the Bibi ka Maqbara (Tomb o f the W i f e ) , as i t is popularly k n o w n , is the last i m p e r i a l M u g h a l t o m b built i n a four-cornered garden complex. Like its patron Aurangzeb, i t represents the fading o f an aesthetic tradition that dominated for m o r e than a century f r o m the accession o f Akbar i n icç6 to the i m p r i s o n m e n t o f Shah Jahan i n 1658.

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A l t h o u g h it is impossible to b r i n g o u t the f u l l legacy o f M u g h a l r u l e , and by extension M u s l i m rule, i n South Asia, this is evident i n the t o m b s and books that stand o u t as royal emblems. They remain marks o f a Turkish then T i m u r i d i m p e rial w i l l to stamp the f u t u r e w i t h the actions o f the past. F r o m I l t u t m i s h to Akbar t o Shah Jahan, one can glean a consistency o f i n t e n t , i f n o t o f style, and Aurangzeb, even t h o u g h he tended to stress the sacred w o r d , still made r o o m for the visual, expressive element o f Persianate culture. I n every case, i t is kings and The presence of Islam in

kingships that perpetuate, even as they redefine, a t r a d i t i o n o f absolute rule i n the

Southeast Asia should be

name o f Islam.

understood through the series of harbor cities that served as places for the exchange and transshipment

The Emergence of Islam in Southeast Asia

of goods between China and

The emergence o f Islam i n Southeast Asia is b o t h an extension o f M u s l i m his-

the West. Melaka, founded

t o r y i n the Asian subcontinent and an independent expression o f Islamic c i v i -

around 1400, was the major

lization unrelated to any h i s t o r y except its o w n . The m a j o r feature o f Southeast

entrepot on the northern side of the strait of Malacca, and the city's power and cul-

Asia is t o p o g r a p h i c a l : i t provides access to m a j o r trading routes, a l l o w i n g i t t o connect t w o m a i n l a n d masses, India and China, by sea. The strait o f Malacca

ture expanded to include

(Melaka) was the strategic l i n k i n the trade between I n d i a and C h i n a . It c o n -

other neighboring regions,

nected the Bay o f Bengal w i t h the South China Sea. Like the Malabar coast, the

such as Kuala Kangsar, 2 0 0

strait was a h i n g e i n the m o n s o o n a l sailing system. Vessels crossing the Bay o f

miles to the northwest.

Bengal eastbound o n the s u m m e r m o n s o o n c o u l d n o r m a l l y reach China before

THE E A S T W A R D J O U R N E Y OF M U S L I M KINGSHIP

42 I

the o p p o s i n g northeast w i n d set i n . They w o u l d then w i n t e r i n a p o r t along the strait before c o n t i n u i n g a r o u n d the Malay peninsula and across the South China Sea i n A p r i l or May. The easiest o p t i o n for India-based merchants was t o sell their goods i n the strait t o w n s and t h e n r e t u r n directly to Malabar o n the w i n ter w i n d . Chinese shippers w o u l d f o l l o w the same seasonal pattern o f travel and trade, o n l y i n reverse. So i m p o r t a n t was trade and travel to Southeast Asia that one m i g h t expect t o f i n d pictures o f the vessels i n w h i c h merchants

and

migrants voyaged to the archipelago. Yet such pictures are rare. The closest e x i s t i n g replica may be a f i g u r e taken f r o m a M u g h a l m a n u s c r i p t , w h i c h describes a s i x t e e n t h - c e n t u r y

I n d i a n s h i p d o i n g service as " N o a h ' s

ark,"

a l t h o u g h i t may i n fact resemble the k i n d o f vessels that b r o u g h t I n d i a n traders to parts east, i n c l u d i n g the archipelago. Because trade i m p e l l e d I n d i a n M u s l i m s to make the l o n g , o f t e n p e r i l o u s t r i p s t o Southeast Asia, i t is n o t s u r p r i s i n g that the M u s l i m traveler I b n B a t t u t a h p r o v i d e d the f i r s t w r i t t e n r e c o r d o f M u s l i m s e t t l e m e n t s i n the archipelago. A fourteenth-century exemplar o f wanderlust, I b n Battutah j o u r n e y e d f r o m the west to the east, s a i l i n g f r o m A n d a l u s i a to n o r t h e r n A f r i c a , t h e n across the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , the Red Sea, a n d the I n d i a n Ocean u n t i l he reached the Malay a r c h i p e l a g o

en r o u t e t o C h i n a . I n 1345

Ibn

Battutah was o n b o a r d an I n d i a n vessel that s t o p p e d i n Pase, a p o r t c i t y i n present-day Sumatra. H e n o t e d the presence o f a f l o u r i s h i n g M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y there, yet I b n Battutah tells l i t t l e else about the h i s t o r y o f e i t h e r Pase or the s u r r o u n d i n g c o m m u n i t i e s . H i s t a n t a l i z i n g r e c o r d m i r r o r s the rest o f t h e Malay a r c h i p e l a g o : i t has a v i b r a n t past b u t l i t t l e c o n t e m p o r a r y

data,

e i t h e r a r c h e o l o g i c a l or h i s t o r i c a l , o n w h i c h t o r e c o n s t r u c t the emergence o f M u s l i m polities. The first task f o r serious i n q u i r y i n t o Southeast Asia's past is to go b e h i n d the names o f such m o d e r n nation-states as Indonesia and Malaysia. Even the t e r m Southeast Asia m u s t be abandoned, a n d the simple geographic facts o f the r e g i o n m u s t be considered. There is a s t r i n g o f islands, most o f w d i i c h are incapable o f sustaining large p o p u l a t i o n s . Above all, there is severe i n t e r n a l fragm e n t a t i o n , w i t h the p r i m a r y f o c a l p o i n t s b e i n g the h a r b o r cities, w h i c h become places for the exchange a n d transshipment o f goods between China and the West. I n other w o r d s , there is n o t a history, a heritage, or a t r a d i t i o n that c o u l d i d e n t i f y a n d stand for the r e g i o n as a w h o l e i n the way that the Turko-Persianate

t r a d i t i o n came to d o m i n a t e Islamic South Asia i n the pre¬

m o d e r n p e r i o d . Instead, i n Southeast Asia there is a mosaic o f starts, stops, a n d piecemeal development. One m u s t never lose sight o f the discrete, i d i o s y n cratic, and diverse character o f the p o r t cities o f the r e g i o n , w h i c h were the focus o f Islamic settlements.

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T h e m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t feature o f I s l a m i n Southeast Asia b e f o r e 1700

there-

fore is the absence o f m a i n narratives. I n v a i n , scholars have l o o k e d f o r o f f i cial o r u n o f f i c i a l records that m i g h t have been preserved i n the m u l t i p l e m a n u s c r i p t s n o w available f o r p u b l i c scrutiny. U n l i k e t h e D e l h i Sultanate or the M u g h a l e m p i r e , w h i c h shaped the Turko-Persianate

t r a d i t i o n o f the

I n d i a n s u b c o n t i n e n t , t h e Malay a r c h i p e l a g o does n o t p r o v i d e signposts t o use t o i d e n t i f y a n d d i s c e r n the patterns o f Southeast A s i a n Islamicate c i v i l i z a t i o n . Instead, there are discrete areas, o f w h i c h f i v e w i l l be discussed: A c h e h , Samudra, M e l a k a , Moluccas and Sulawesi, a n d Java.

The Early Muslim Kingdoms of Acheh Acheh w as the first r e g i o n o f modern-day Indonesia i n w h i c h M u s l i m k i n g d o m s r

were f o u n d e d . Marco Polo observed a M u s l i m k i n g o n the n o r t h coast o f Sumatra i n 1292, m o r e than a h a l f century before the oceanic voyage o f I b n Battutah landed h i m further t o the south o n the same island. The Portuguese voyager Tome Pires, w r i t i n g i n the early sixteenth century, p r o v i d e d the earliest e t h n o graphic record o f Acheh. His account reinforces the n o t i o n o f fragmentation: the center is h e l d together by a strong ruler, but the s u r r o u n d i n g villages b o t h p r o tect and challenge the harbor cities. There are n o city walls, n o forts, n o m o u n tain castles but instead a system o f constant exchange and negotiation. The rulers o f Acheh are i d e n t i f i e d as o r t h o d o x M u s l i m s h o l d i n g sway over a splendid court. Their wealth depended o n the t r i b u t e that they levied f r o m n e i g h b o r i n g regions and also f r o m ships that used the harbor at Acheh. Later the rulers o f Acheh were able to benefit f r o m overseas ties to p o w e r f u l M u s l i m allies, b o t h i n India (the Mughals) and Turkey (the Ottomans). Yet they never subdued the i n t e r i o r o f the island. Even w h e n the Achinese empire was at its height, d u r i n g the second half o f die sixteenth and first half o f the seventeenth centuries, the sultan's authority was confined to the immediate v i c i n i t y o f the capital. Acheh itsef was d i v i d e d i n t o many smaller districts, each governed by hereditary chiefs w h o constandy feuded w i t h one another. It was the prince o f the p o r t o f Acheh w h o served as the c o m m o n overlord and carried the title o f sultan. It is t e m p t i n g to see parallels w i t h the Mughals, because the seal o f the sultan o f Acheh was based o n a n i n e f o l d pattern, as was that o f the M u g h a l emperors. A m i d - n i n t e e n t h century c o i n , w h i c h traces the Achinese royal lineage back to the early t h i r t e e n t h century, f u r t h e r suggested c o n t i n u i t y w i t h South Asian M u s l i m monarchs, b u t this c o n t i n u i t y is l i m i t e d by t w o i m m e d i a t e , o v e r r i d i n g differences: first, the m e a n i n g o f the seals was not the same, because the shadow o f God o n earth, a key epithet o f the r u l e r i n b o t h polities, projected the great M u g h a l as the semidivine l o r d o f a vast realm, w h i l e it is d o u b t f u l that m o r e than

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a h a n d f u l o f Achínese courtiers ever a t t r i b u t e d suprahuman qualities to the sultan o f A c h e h ; and second, the n i n e f o l d seal was not itself the most i m p o r t a n t seal o f the Achínese c o u r t . For the hereditary chiefs o f A c h e h , James Siegel has argued, the paramount seal was the fivefold seal, w h i c h signified the h a n d as a s y m b o l o f power and meant the chief's a b i l i t y n o t only to project p o w e r over others b u t also to protect his o w n possessions and t e r r i t o r y F r o m a r e l i g i o u s perspective, w h a t became evident is the d e v e l o p m e n t o f a f o r m o f Islamic d e v o t i o n that is l i n k e d to the m e d i a t i n g p o w e r o f M u s l i m saints. Scholars i m a g i n e that there m a y have b e e n i n t r i c a t e

relationships

between t e m p o r a l a n d s p i r i t u a l p o w e r i n Southeast Asia that resembled those i n South Asia, b u t that remains a conjecture. Despite occasional literary giants, such as the Sufi poet H a m z a h al-Fansuri, w h o w r o t e i n the m i d - s i x t e e n t h to the early seventeenth centuries, there is n o c o n t e m p o r a r y h i s t o r y o f m a j o r saints or their tombs. Yet saint's t o m b s were b u i l t and their m e r e existence is itself i m p o r t a n t . Even t h o u g h the t o m b s are less g r a n d t h a n those o f M u g h a l I n d i a , i n A c h e h as elsewhere the t r a d i t i o n o f v i s i t i n g saintly t o m b s still exists. The purpose o f these visits resembles wdiat was observed i n South Asia: w h a t -

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ever their b a c k g r o u n d o r status, p i l g r i m s came w i t h gifts and v o w s seeking the s p i r i t u a l favor o f saints for material or m e d i c a l r e l i e f M o r e open to question is the relation o f f o r m a l religious authorities to representatives o f indigenous traditions. The oft-repeated dyad pits preconversionary disbelief (jahiiya) against d i v i n e l y revealed faith (iman or islam). This is an attractive dyad because i t suggests a radical experiential break between the o l d and the new, the i m p u r e and the pure, the false and the true. I n Southeast Asian Islam the dyad is framed as adat, referring to all that stands outside j u r i d i c a l Islam, and hukum, m e a n i n g " l a w s " or the announced guidelines o f an Islamic code that governs collective life. Yet the d i s t i n c t i o n is m o r e projected than observed; i t remains an ideal type, n o t a lived experience. I n Achinese h i s t o r y the t w o polar extremes o f social i d e n t i t y can, and often do, merge. Instead o f o u t r i g h t h o s t i l ity, one finds at least tacit politeness, and frequently m u t u a l respect, between the so-called representatives o f adat, the hereditary chiefs, and the champions

of

h u k u m , the ulama (religious scholars). The greatest source o f tension i n Achinese history, and Malay history i n general, lies outside religious w o r l d v i e w s and their exponents. It is the u n e n d i n g struggle between m a r g i n a l and central groups. Before the D u t c h ascendancy i n the archipelago f r o m the early seventeenth century and i n Acheh f r o m the m i d nineteenth century, the harbor sultan t r i e d to keep Acheh integrally cohesive by subsuming hereditary chiefs under his authority. But the D u t c h declared w a r against the Achinese, and that w a r lasted m o r e than t h i r t y - f i v e years, c o n t i n u i n g i n t o the t w e n t i e t h century. It reduced the p r o m i n e n c e o f Acheh and shifted the reins o f political p o w e r to Java. N o t u n t i l 1956, and o n l y after a bloody guerilla campaign against Indonesian forces, d i d Acheh become again w h a t i t had been i n the p r e m o d e r n p e r i o d : an autonomous province, characterized by i n d e p e n dent practices, b o t h p o l i t i c a l and religious, f r o m the d o m i n a n t center.

The Pivotal Role of Samudra in the Expansion of Islam A l t h o u g h the history o f Samudra is l i n k e d to that o f Acheh, i t is nonetheless discrete and i n d e p e n d e n t i n many respects. The first recorded M u s l i m k i n g o f Samudra, Merah Silu ( d . 1297), assumed the Islamic tide o f al-Malik as-Salih (the Righteous K i n g ) . There are no chronicles, either official or u n o f f i c i a l , to trace the subsequent history o f his dynasty. Samudra, along w i t h Melaka, seems to have played a pivotal role i n the expansion o f Islam t h r o u g h o u t the archipelago. A l l conjectures depend o n decoding opaque references i n tombstones and coins as w e l l as a h a n d f u l o f chronicles, mostly f o r e i g n . Dynastic p o w e r and influence were l i n k e d to the p o r t cities. F r o m the p o r t o f Samudra, also k n o w n as Pasai, Islamic loyalty radiated to other parts o f the Malay archipelago. Its internal v e h i -

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cle o f transrnission remained linked to courts, w h i c h were also located i n o r near the m a j o r p o r t cities. Rather t h a n extracting w e a l t h f r o m i n t e r i o r sources, w h e t h e r t h r o u g h commerce o r agriculture, the rulers o f Samudra and other har b o r sultans depended o n the w e a l t h that was generated t h r o u g h trade. F r o m the fourteenth century o n , foreign trade remained i n M u s l i m hands, and so the ethos o f p o r t cities reflected Islamic cultural n o r m s . Indigenous n o r m s were i n c o r p o rated but never e l i m i n a t e d . Retrospectively, t h e n , the h i s t o r i a n is perpetually faced w i t h the question o f w h a t s h o u l d be stressed, the Islamic difference (epit o m i z e d as hukum) or the persistence o f indigenous n o r m s (adat). A g a i n , the precious details f r o m I b n Battutah's account a l l o w scholars to i m a g i n e a M u s l i m court i n Samudra-Pasai. The Andalusian adventurer attended the central mosque f o r the Friday prayer service. H e also frequented the court w i t h f o r e i g n scholars i n attendance, speaking Arabic o r Persian to a small g r o u p o f l i k e - m i n d e d people. ( M o d e r n scholars presume that the conversations were t h e n s u m m a r i z e d i n Malay for the ruler's benefit.) I n every other respect, h o w ever, the palace o f Samudra f o l l o w e d custom and r i t u a l that d i f f e r e d little f r o m the H i n d u - B u d d h i s t states o f the Malay archipelago. W h a t most concerned the M u s l i m rulers o f Samudra-Pasai was n o t the propagation o f Islam to the h i n terland but relations w i t h their regional rivals. The traditional enemy o f Pasai was another Sumatran regional power, Pedir, but Pasai also rivaled A c h e h for overseas trade. W h e n the Portuguese captured Melaka i n i cı i , A c h e h was t e m p o r a r i l y weakened to Pasai's benefit, but by the e n d o f the sixteenth century Pasai was already i n the throes o f an economic and p o l i t i c a l decline f r o m w h i c h it never recovered.

The Muslim Port State of Melaka Because Melaka (also k n o w n as Malacca) was f o u n d e d i n about 1400, it has claims to be almost as early a M u s l i m p o r t state as either Acheh o r Pasai, yet this kernel o f historical t r u t h is elusive. I n the case o f Melaka, the historical account derives b o t h f r o m the Portuguese records o f Tome Pires, w r i t t e n after the c o n quest o f Melaka i n içi 1, and f r o m an indigenous source, the Sejurah Melayu, w h i c h can o n l y be corroborated as a w r i t t e n record i n the early seventeenth century. Both accounts agree that an extraordinary entrepot emerged o n the n o r t h e r n side o f the Strait o f Malacca. It can be traced back to the p r e - M u s l i m k i n g d o m o f Srivijaya, and i t was n o d o u b t the power and wealth o f mercantile culture i n the Malay peninsula that p r o d u c e d b o t h Srivijaya and its successor state, the Melaka state. The Melaka state, like its archipelago rivals, boasted a M u s l i m royal lineage that began w i t h its founder and ruler, the Malay prince Paramesvara (r. 1403-24), w h o converted to Islam i n 14.13, and extended to the sultan M a h m u d Shah (r.

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1488-1511). T h o u g h i t never conquered either Pasai o r Acheh, Melaka rivaled t h e m for regional influence. Because Melaka was also a c o n q u e r i n g state and expanded territorially t o include other regions t o the n o r t h and vassal states t o the south, i t m i g h t even be said that Melaka p r o v i d e d the catalyst for a c o m m o n cultural i d i o m that over t i m e came t o characterize m u c h o f the archipelago. I n literature, governance, music, dance, dress, and f o o d , Melaka set a standard that other p o r t city sultanates emulated. Startling even t o the Portuguese conquerors was the extent t o w h i c h most o f Sumatra's east coast had been i n f l u e n c e d b y its n o r t h e r n n e i g h b o r ; almost all u r b a n elites spoke Melakan Malay, and they also acknowledged n o t oidy correct speech but also g o o d manners and appropriate behavior as Malay custom. Islam also came t o be measured by its practice i n Melaka. A l t h o u g h both Acheh and Samudra-Pasai h a d a m a j o r role i n p r o m o t i n g Islamic i d e n t i t y among their o w n vassals, the Malay society o f Melaka set its stamp o n the n e w l y emer gent f o r m s o f Islamic loyalty and identity, so m u c h so that t o become M u s l i m was i n effect to maşuk Melayu, that İs, " t o enter the realm o f the M e l a y u " or Malays. I n the late fifteenth century the Portuguese became cornmitted to m o n o p o l i z i n g the Asian spice trade, and they viewed Melaka as a crucial target o f future con quest. Because o f superior firepower, aided by internal dissent a m o n g Melaka's r u l i n g elites, the Portuguese w a r r i o r extraordinaire. Afonsode Albuquerque, was able to capture the capital city i n 1511 and to expand Portugese influence progres sively further to the east. Eventually Portuguese commercial and military ambitions were thwarted, although n o t by indigenous resistance b u t rather by the arrival o f a superior European naval force, the D u t c h , i n the early seventeenth century.

The Spice-Rich Islands of the Moluccas and Sulawesi The prize for b o t h the Portugese and the D u t c h were t h e spice-rich islands k n o w n as the Moluccas a n d Sulawesi. A l t h o u g h the Moluccas are so small as to m e r i t almost n o attention i n studies o f Southeast Asia, they are significant as the furthest edge o f the Malay cultural zone, w h i c h begins i n A c h e h but had its cen ter o f d i f f u s i o n t o the n o r t h , i n Melaka (Malacca). I f Molucca sounds like Malacca, it is because the t w o extremes o f the Malay archipelago are related by c o m m o n linguistic and cultural patterns as w e l l as by c o m m e r c i a l and social exchange. Despite t h e earlier caveat that there is t o o m u c h i n t e r n a l f r a g m e n t a t i o n i n Southeast Asia t o speak o f a c o m m o n civilization i n the p r e m o d e r n p e r i o d , the history o f the Moluccas suggests that at least the elements o f a core Southeast Asian Islamicate w o r l d can be derived f r o m the Malay cultural c o m p l e x and then traced eastward t h r o u g h m u c h o f the archipelago. The Moluccas bring out what is only liinted at i n most sources but needs to be stressed repeatedly: Adat and h u k u m can and d o coexist, w i t h o u t existential angst

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or psychic breakdown, i n the same groups w h o identify themselves as Muslims. I n parts o f the central Moluccas participation i n the m o r e iconic practices o f I s l a m — such as abstaining f r o m eating pork, attending c o m m u n a l prayer, and observing Ramadan—coexist w i t h an open invocation o f the ancestors, magic, and sorcery I n some places pilgrimage to sacred places is regarded as an acceptable substitute for the hajj, w i t h it being seen as an Arab custom not required o f " t r u e " Muslims. I n practice, the seeming contradictions between adat and h u k u m are often m i n i m i z e d ; they remain latent and potential rather than actual, especially because they can often be resolved through skillful resort to the Shuriah (eternal Islamic law). Next d o o r to the Moluccas, i n Sulawesi, i t is equally d i f f i c u l t to demarcate t o o sharply the particular f r o m the universal. Hereditary k i n g s h i p , however spoltily d o c u m e n t e d , seems to be the l i n c h p i n to understanding the emergence o f n e w Islamic c o m m u n i t i e s . Islam was i n t r o d u c e d to Sulawesi t h r o u g h the connection w i t h Melaka and Acheh. As the Malay language increasingly became a lingua franca for the entire archipelago t h r o u g h the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the rulers o f southern Sulawesi were d r a w n to imitate the M u s l i m m o d e l o f success. Impressed by the example o f the sultanate o f Acheh, they embraced Islam i n 1605.

There are n o coins celebrating k i n g s h i p , as noted i n Samudra, b u t

because commerce between I n d i a and the archipelago was constant, the legend o f M u g h a l dynastic success must have been at least as impressive i n Makassar, the capital o f south Sulawesi, as it was i n R o m e o r L o n d o n . It is also likely that the sultan o f Sulawesi k n e w that the power o f A c h e h , especially after the fall o f Melaka, had been buttressed by help f r o m the O t t o m a n k i n g o f kings, Suleyman the Magnificent (r. i c 2 o - 6 6 ) . Despite the anti-Arab bias i n many circles, p i l g r i m s r e t u r n i n g f r o m the Hejaz (the seat o f the holy cities o f Mecca and M e d i n a ) w o u l d have reinforced the mystique o f M u s l i m kings, w h e t h e r O t t o m a n o r M u g h a l . Each Sulawesi ruler, like his Achinese counterpart, was thus able to project h i m s e l f t h r o u g h c o u r t chroniclers and Sufi poets as the true k i n g , just and wise, the shadow o f G o d o n earth, the axial p o i n t o f a new and expanding M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . The p r o b l e m o f fragm e n t a t i o n remained, however. I n Sulawesi, as i n Acheh and Melaka, the n u m b e r o f those receptive to such a lofty n o t i o n o f Islamic k i n g s h i p was l i m i t e d to the p o r t cities and the regions that supported t h e m t h r o u g h tax levies. W h a t is evident to even the casual observer is that Islam itself became an i d i o m for symbolic and administrative c o n t r o l : the sultan w h o claimed d i v i n e lineage c o u l d be supreme arbiter and absolute m o n a r c h w i t h o u t challenge to his dual exercise o f authority. Yet the hereditary chieftains o f the archipelago i n Melaka, Samudra, and Sulawesi c o n t i n u e d to claim their rights o n the basis o f ancient cust o m a r y law. In effect, the struggle-—and i t was a protracted struggle f r o m the fifteenth century o n — w a s between t w o very different kinds o f leaders: centripetal rulers, w h o converted to Islam and invoked Islam to retain all rights w i t h i n their

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o w n courtly p u r v i e w , and t r a d i t i o n a l rulers, w h o also became M u s l i m but c o n tinued to e m b o d y and protect the customary practices o f the c o m m u n i t y , o f t e n described as magic, superstition, or soothsaying. The multiple invocation o f Islam can be seen i n the portrayal o f spiritual contests, w h i c h are often depicted i n folklore as pitting M u s l i m kings against their opponents. The c o m m o n theme is the mandate o f Islamic kingship to overcome and eradicate local pre-Islamic beliefs. Muslims kings d o n o t always vvtn; what is perhaps even m o r e interesting, at least f r o m a narrative perspective, is the identical structure o f the tales. There are always t w o combatants w h o represent the opposing communities. The loser always goes first, d o i n g a seemingly impossible task that is then topped by his opponent, the eventual w i n n e r . For instance, i n a spiritual contest waged i n n o r t h e r n Sumatra, i n the r e g i o n o f Acheh, i t is the M u s l i m sultan w h o outduels an Indian yogi. Yet i n southern Sulawesi the contest takes a different t u r n : i t involves a k i n d o f tag-team contest i n w h i c h a cadre o f M u s l i m religious officals (ulama) are locked i n duel w i t h a cadre o f local soothsayers (botos). A religious official goes first: he sits on top o f a banana leaf to say his prayers, after w h i c h a soothsayer proceeds to recite his prayers standing o n his head o n the same banana leaf! A second religious official then piles up thousands o f eggs w i t h o u t breaking one, and o f course, the second soothsayer then takes out rows o f eggs f r o m different parts o f the pile . . . w i t h o u t breaking a single one. A n d so i t goes u n t i l the ulama are vanquished and the soothsayers emerge victorious. The details o f the narrative are finally less i m p o r t a n t , despite their intrinsic appeal as displays o f m i n d - n u m b i n g virtuosity, than the l i m i t s that they place o n official, centrist r u l e : a l t h o u g h wrapped i n a seamless Islamic ideology o f autocratic c o n t r o l , M u s l i m officials are n o t able to vanquish adroit local p r a c t i t i o n ers, w h o also define themselves as M u s l i m . Contest stories, for example, d o not explain w h i c h prayers the religious official and the soothsayer recited, but presumably b o t h p e r f o r m e d M u s l i m ritual prayer (saint).

The Islamic Conquest o f the Javanese K i n g d o m A l t h o u g h Java is very i m p o r t a n t to contemporary Southeast Asia, p r o v i d i n g b o t h the demographic and the bureaucratic center o f m o d e r n - d a y Indonesia, scholars find that importance receding as they move back t o w a r d the precolonial p e r i o d . Again, there is a paucity o f historical data that w o u l d allow scholars to trace plausible connections between the Indie past and the islamic present o f Javanese cities or their h i n t e r l a n d . Most scholarship has tried to find historical clues i n extant Islamic literature, yet t o o httle is k n o w n about the m a j o r m a n u s c r i p t collections, w h i c h were o n l y assembled i n the nineteenth century, and there is almost n o background i n f o r m a t i o n available o n their provenance. Some contemporary m o n u m e n t s do exist, however, that reflect structures o r i g -

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irtally built to commemorate the arrival o f M u s l i m rule i n Java. A m o n g t h e m are t w o mosques: the Yogyakarta a n d C i r e b o n mosques. The c o m m u n i t y m o s q u e o f Yogyakarta is said t o have been b u i l t by the foremost M u s l i m r u l e r o f the second Mataram dynasty, Sultan A g u n g (r. 1613-45), although it was n o t completed u n t i l die late eighteenth century. The mosque is an impressive structure, although it has been renovated often since its o r i g i n a l foundation. It is dwarfed by the central palace complex k n o w n as the Kraton, b u i l t i n the late eighteenth century t o reflect a Javanese-Indie w o r l d v i e w that h i g h l i g h t s the r u l e r as the center o f the universe i n a manner reminiscent o f the Turko-Persianate m o d e l discussed earlier. The pattern o f juxtaposing royal structures w i t h religious sites occurs elsewhere i n Java, notably i n Cirebon o n the n o r t h coast. The c o m m u n i t y mosque o f Cirebon is a m o n g the oldest landmarks o f the M u s l i m presence i n Java; its c o n s t r u c t i o n is said t o g o back to the early sixteenth century. Its elaborate w o o d e n scaffolding and expansive outer c o u r t y a r d reveal a refined aesthetic t r a d i t i o n , yet i t t o o has been m u c h renovated i n subsequent centuries. At the same t i m e , the Cirebon central mosque is architecturally d w a r f e d by the royal complexes o n either side o f it, b o t h o f w h i c h bear witness t o a style o f o r n a m e n t a t i o n that is t o o diffuse t o be neatly classified b u t that accents furnishings f r o m Europe a n d China w i t h i n an overall Javanese structure. Overall, the locus o f spiritual power for Java was n o t dissimilar f r o m its locus

Mosques were built on the island of Java to commemorate the arrival of Muslims there. The congregational mosque at

i n the n e i g h b o r i n g islands o f Sumatra and Sulawesi. It was r u r a l rather than urban;

Yogyakarta in central

even w h e n i t embraced an Islamic i d i o m , i t c o n t i n u e d t o reflect the d i s t i n c t i o n

Java, for example, was

between c o u r t and countryside, w i t h p r i o r i t y given t o those landscapes o f villages, rice fields, forests, and m o u n t a i n s , w h i c h , according to A. Day, c o u l d extend i n t o seascapes, islands, and m y t h i c a l places across the seas, f o r m i n g a c o n t i n u u m o f l i t erary space outside and m o v i n g away f r o m the palace. A l t h o u g h the actual Islamic conquest o f the Javanese k i n g d o m o f Majapahit took

founded by the foremost ruler of the Mataram line, Sultan Agung (r. 1613-45), but it was not

completed until the late eighteenth century.

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place i n 1478, regional courts and r u r a l customs persisted, underscoring the emergence o f a u n i q u e pattern o f M u s l i m loyalty.- O n the one h a n d , Southeast Asian Islam c o u l d be l i n k e d to the patterns o f Turko-Persianate Islamic culture e x a m i n e d i n South Asia, b u t that w o u l d be to adopt the v i e w p o i n t o f sultans and the courts that were constructed to reflect and perpetuate their v i s i o n o f a "perfect" Islamic society. O n the other h a n d , i t is impossible to i g n o r e the d u r a b i l i t y o f a broad spectrum o f local t r a d i t i o n s : customary law h a d its custodians and its exemplars, most o f w h o m were attracted to aspects o f the Islamic w o r l d v i e w but w h o adapted i t to their needs rather than replacing the local w i t h the universal, the i n d i g e n o u s w i t h the f o r e i g n . It is wise to refrain f r o m too d i c h o t o m o u s a reading o f Islam i n Southeast Asia. To compartmentalize and then philosophize is to i n d u l g e i n an excess o f presentmindedness; that is, to t r y to read all h i s t o r y t h r o u g h the most recent developThe congregational at C i r e b o n o n t h e

mosque north

ments w i t h o u t according sufficient difference to p r e m o d e r n , earlier epochs and their distinctive features. Present-mindedness

undergirds the f a m i l i a r dyadic

coast o f Java r e p o r t e d l y

reading o f Malay and then Indonesian religious h i s t o r y : i t provides a m a i n nar-

dates f r o m the early

rative t o e x p l a i n m o d e r n - d a y events. Consider the c o m p l e x i t y o f m o d e r n

six-

t e e n t h c e n t u r y , b u t it h a s b e e n repeatedly restored. Its courtyard

and

pitched

from local

internal t u r m o i l o n a massive scale. N o t o n l y hereditary chiefs but also their f a m -

a

ilies were the p r i n c i p a l victims. Was that atrocity the final settling o f a centuries-

derived

o l d struggle between customary law and Islam, as some have suggested, o r was

w o o d e n roofs show refined aesthetic

Achinese history. I n 1945, f o l l o w i n g the Japanese occupation, A c h e h witnessed

models.

i t rather the use o f r e l i g i o n as an ideology, i n this case. Islamic " o r t h o d o x y " scrv-

THE

EASTWARD

JOURNEY

i n g as the i n s t r u m e n t o f drastic socioeconomic

OF

MUSLIM

KINGSHIP

43 1

change? Customary law and

Islam d o not represent cultural oppositions so m u c h as t e m p o r a r y p o l i t i c a l alliances, and the invocation o f Islam by the " v i c t o r i o u s " g r o u p i n 194c had as m u c h to d o w i t h efforts to centralize and homogenize all parts o f the new])- independent island-nation o f Indonesia as it d i d w i t h doctrinal or r i t u a l differences a m o n g theAchinese. One caveat remains for Southeast Asia as for South Asia: Islam should be examined as m o r e than either its exponents o r detractors w i s h to make i t . Civilizations d r a w o n the symbolic and i n s t i t u t i o n a l power o f all available r e l i gions, yet they d o not exhaust the availability o f any one r e l i g i o n to oppositional groups. I n the case o f Acheh and the n e i g h b o r i n g Malay polities, scholars f i n d groups w h o resist a M u s l i m r u l e r i n the n a m e o f the same G o d , the same Prophet, and the same c o m m u n i t y o f behevers. The contest is over p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y even w h e n i t is framed as a contest over religious t r u t h . The lesson f r o m b o t h South and Southeast Asia is to recognize Islamic n o r m s and values as transferable and persistent in many contexts, w h o m e v e r the rulers and whatever the stake i n local or regional contests for powder.

CHAPTER

TEN

Central Asia and China TRANSNATIONALIZATION, ISLAMIZATION, AND E T H N I C I Z A T I O N

Dm C . Gladney

D u r i n g his 1994 visit to each o f the newly established Central Asian states (except Tajikistan), Li Peng, then premier o f China, indicated that China intends to b u i l d a " n e w Silk Road" i n the r e g i o n , t h r o u g h investments estimated t o surpass all other foreign investments by the end o f the twentieth century. This prediction began to r i n g true w h e n Premier Li traveled to Kazakhstan i n 1996 to sign an exclusive agreement for Chinese rights to the Ozen o i l field, the largest o i l field i n Kazakhstan, and perhaps i n Central Asia. This indicates the g r o w i n g importance o f Central Asian trade to Cruna's international economy. I n short, China hopes to downplay its political role i n the region by emphasizing its historical and econ o m i c roles, attempting to " b u y " stability o n its n e w Central Asian borders. The history o f this p o l i c y extends back to the H a n and Tang dynasties, w h e n strong, centralizing Chinese empires sought to establish t r i b u t a r y states o n its borders and to e m p l o y n o m a d i c khanates as buffer zones between m o r e estab-

(Left) There are nearly twenty million Muslims in China, more than in all of Saudi Arabia. Seagoing merchants brought Islam to coastal China, while over-

lished Eurasian k i n g d o m s . China's desire lor influence i n Central Asia today is

land traders brought it

reminiscent o f the Great Game o f the late nineteenth century, w h e n China com¬

across the mountains of

peted w i t h Russia and Britain for dominan< e c« ex the strategic region oi Central

Central Asia to western

Asia. A n e w Great Game is c u r r e n t l y being played out i n the r e g i o n for critical access to its i m p o r t a n t m i n e r a l and energy resources. But today the players include n o t o n l y China, Russia, and t o a lesser extent B r i t a i n but also m u l t i n a t i o n a l corporations, the U n i t e d States, Japan, South Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia,

433

China. Here, Muslims in a cemetery at Kashgar in the western province of Xinjiang recite prayers at a funeral.

434

THÍ

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and Turkey. Caught i n the m i d s t of this " g a m e " are the local peoples and c u l tures, m o s t l y M u s l i m and Turkic, w i t h a large variety o f different c u l t u r a l and historical traditions. This chapter examines current Sino-Central Asian relations i n l i g h t o f the l o n g history o f exchanges across the Eurasian continent t h r o u g h the rise o f the southe r n and n o r t h e r n Silk Roads. Three aspects o f the Sino-Central Asian historical and contemporary relations endure until this day: transnationalization

(both

because o f the rise o f the Silk Road and u n i f i c a t i o n u n d e r the M o n g o l s ) , Islamization (leading to social and e c o n o m i c transformations affecting b o t h Chinese and Central Asian sides o f the r e g i o n ) , and the ethnicization o f local identities (because o f i m p e r i a l , Soviet, and Chinese socialist policies). These issues pervade China's historical and contemporary relationship w i t h Central Asia and go beyond traditional analyses o f the region, w h i c h have been p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h trade and state-to-state relations, generally taking for granted the Inner Asia is distinguished by a rugged terrain, with soaring peaks and harsh deserts. The Tien Shan

identities o f the people concerned and the abdity o f the e c o n o m i c development m o d e l to integrate t h e m . Each o f these processes significandy transformed the vast region o f Eurasia into

mountains divide the region

what i t is today. Transnationalization was thus a gradual process that linked disparate

into two sections, an eastern

tribes and kingdoms t h r o u g h the interlinks o f die ancient Silk Road, the unification

part comprising the Chinese province of Xinjiang, and a western section now divided between the central Asian

o f the Mongols, and the gradual transformation o f ancient satrapies and kingdoms into m o d e r n nation-states. Islamization molded the plethora o f multireligious and pluralistic cultural traditions (mcluding Manichaeanism, Buddhism, and widespread

republics of Tajikistan,

shamanism) i n t o a fairly widespread acceptance o f the basic tenets o f one major

Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.

w o r l d religion: Islam. Finally, ethnicization is an ongoing process i n w h i c h formerly

CENTRAL ASIA AND CHINA

45Ç

tribal and religious c o m m u n a l groups have gradual!) come to d u n k o f themselves as ethnic groups w i t h rights and aspirations for nationhood. Perhaps the best example o f this process is the U i g h u r people, once a tribal confederation, then a k i n g d o m , and

finally

a

M u s l i m nationality o f the People's Republic o f China, w i t h many Uighurs seeking to establish their o w n separate nadon, Uighuristan. China has recently awakened to the fact that it is a nation w i t h a significant M u s l i m and Central Asian p o p u l a t i o n ; the expansion o f Islam t h r o u g h Central Asia i n t o China is an important

issue t h r o u g h o u t this

chapter.

W i t h nearly t w e n t y m i l l i o n M u s l i m s , China

As far back as the Han and Tang

ranks as one o f the w o r l d ' s most p o p u l o u s

strong centralizing Chinese empires tried to establish tributary states

M u s l i m nations. A l t h o u g h its M u s l i m p o p u -

on their borders and use nomadic khanates as buffer zones. The

l a t i o n is m i n u s c u l e w h e n c o m p a r e d

with

China's total p o p u l a t i o n (about 2 percent o f

dynasties of

pre-Islamic times,

nomadic Kazakhs, who still herd sheep in the Heavenly Mountains, were one of these groups.

i . i b i l l i o n ) , the M u s l i m s o f China play a c r u cial role disproportionate to their numbers i n i n f l u e n c i n g China's domestic and i n t e r n a tional relations w i t h Central Asia. This is particularly

true

i n the

border

regions

of

X i n j i a n g , Gansu, and N i n g x i a where M u s l i m s are i n concentrated populations and w h e r e recent M u s l i m - l e d unrest and independence movements have influenced China's domestic and international relations. The

opening

of

the

Pakistan-China

K a r a k o r a m highway i n 1986, die establishment o f the direct air route from U r u m q i to Istanbul i n 1988, to Almaty ( i n southeastern Kazakhstan) i n 1992, and to Islamabad i n 1994, and the completion

of

the

Sino-Soviet

Trans-Eurasian

Railway through CentralAsia i n 1991 have led to dramatic increases i n the trade o f goods and hard currencies. This heralded the first real reoperiing o f the ancient Silk Route since its decline nearly a thousand years ago. For the first

New communication links, such the Karakoram Highway linking China with Pakistan, opened in 1986, and the Sino-Soviet TransEurasian Railway, completed in 1991, have led to dramatic increases in trade in the region.

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In addition to the special sections where Russian bulk goods such as cloth, cotton, and steel are sold, the bazaars in Urumqi and Kashgar also stock local produce.

time, the markets i n the Chinese cities o f Kashgar and U r u m q i have special sections for "Russian Goods" that sell such bulk goods as cloth, cotton, steel, fencing, and so o n , trucked i n and sold to private entrepreneurs, w h o then sell the goods to small industries i n the region or throughout China. At the same time, Chinese shops w i t h manufactured goods f r o m China line the market streets o f Almaty, Bishkek ( i n Kyrgyzstan), and Tashkent ( i n Uzbekistan). However, discussions that regard the peoples o f the region as " 6 0 percent M u s l i m " often fail to take i n t o account each state's role i n the " e t h n i c i z a t i o n " o f these identities, their cross-border interactions, interethnic rivalries, religious factionalisms, and regional diversities w i t h i n the groups themselves. N o t only must the progress o f Russian-Turkic and M u s l i m relations i n the new Central Asian states be watched, but H a n Chinese m a j o r i t y and (mainly Mushrn) m i n o r i t y relations i n the region, as well as i m p r o v i n g SinoRussian ties, must also be examined. Rather than taking for granted national identities i n the n e w Central Asian states as a resurfacing o f pre-Soviet " t r i b a l " identities, this chapter argues that Marxist policies have directly c o n t r i b u t e d to the ethnicization o f local identities i n the r e g i o n . This chapter not o n l y examines the e c o n o m i c , p o l i t i c a l , a n d transnational connections that link China to Central Asia, but it also discusses

CENTRAL

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437

h o w the legacy o f Stalinist-Leninist nationality policies continues to affect the specific peoples involved i n the r e g i o n , particularly the D u n g a n ( H u i M u s l i m Chinese), H a n , Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Russian, U i g h u r , and Uzbek p o p u l a t i o n s . A l t h o u g h most recent analyses o f China's relations w i t h Central Asia have stressed economic ties, state-to-state exchanges, and g o v e r n m e n t policies, this chapter suggests that larger forces, such as state-sponsored Islamization, transnational i s m , and ethnicization, are the lines by w h i c h these interactions s h o u l d be measured. These fault lines o f interaction have become m o r e salient i n the p o s t - C o l d War era, w h e n security issues have become m o r e localized and t e r r i t o r y has become increasingly associated w i t h national identity. After e x a m i n i n g the hist o r y and development o f such issues as Islamization, transnationalism, and ethnicization, and their influence o n the region's peoples, the chapter

concludes

w i t h a discussion o f h o w the reassertion o f national identities i n the region w i l l become increasingly significant for interregional trade and economic developm e n t , i n v o l v i n g a n e w Great Game i n the p o s t - C o l d War era.

Transnational Connections on the Old Silk Road A l t h o u g h scholars once believed that the early civilizations o f die Eurasian continent were fairly isolated f r o m each other, recent archaeological, textual, and historical evidence suggests that the civilizations o f Europe and China were linked transnationally since the d a w n o f time. N o t only have several N e o l i d i i c sites been linked to early African migrations and D N A evidence used t o suggest descent f r o m a c o m m o n "Eve," but scholars such as W i l l i a m Watson have traced the o r i g i n o f die bronze-socketed ax that arrived i n Europe f r o m China i n the Late Bronze Age, and Victor M a i r

has

recently reported that the " m u m m i e s o f X i n j i a n g " f o u n d naturally preserved as desiccated corpses i n the Taklimakan Desert, are possibly more than f o u r thousand years o l d and o r i g i nated i n the Caucasus. The extensive trade i n silks and other precious c o m modities that flourished between the Roman and H a n empires f r o m the seco n d century B . C E . to the second cen-

The ethnic groups of Central Asia and China were linked by trade, and nomadic civilizations were important in fostering cultural continuities between sedentary populations. The traditional means of transport has always been the Bactrian (two-humped) camel, which is able to carry large burdens across the harsh terrain.

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tury C.E. followed w e l l - w o r n tracks diat only became labeled as the Silk Road i n the late nineteenth-century heyday o f European orientalism by die German scholar Baron Ferdinand v o n Richthofen. Indeed, the t e r m could

not

be

more

misleading

because the roads and caravan tracks that crisscrossed the r e g i o n were legion, and they carried m u c h m o r e than just silk. They were also c o m plemented by the southern mari t i m e route that l i n k e d Africa and South Asia w i t h

China

through

southeast Asia, a route diat rose i n Some Chinese blue-and-white porcelains were specifically made for export to Muslims, for Arabic inscriptions form part of their decoration. This large bowl, made in the early sixteenth century at the famous kilns in Jingdezhen in eastern China, is inscribed with good wishes in Persian.

importance as the overland trade declined. Furthermore, the t e r m central Asia, w h i c h presumes an " o u t e r " Asia and a large gap between Europe and

Asia, between East and West, is also a product o f orientalist scholarship, a t r a d i t i o n that Edward Said says is as misleading as i t is i n f o r m a t i v e about different cultural practices and is often politically motivated. China, as the late Joseph Fletcher said, was never as closed o f f f r o m the outside w o r l d as Western scholarship portrayed. This is demonstrated by the i m p o r t a n c e o f the central Asian and European trade to the various empires o f China and its being subject to the same flows o f ideas and c o m m o d i t i e s that influenced m u c h o f the h i s t o r y o f the r e g i o n , i n c l u d i n g its t r a n s f o r m a t i o n by such w o r l d religious traditions as B u d d h i s m and Islam. Indeed, even the Greek historian Herodotus d i d n o t speak i n terms o f the m i g r a tions o f isolated " e t h n i c " groups { a l t h o u g h the Greek t e r m ethnos was certainly k n o w n to h i m ) but rather o f a " c u l t u r a l c o n t i n u u m " that flowed across the Pontic steppes to the far east. This chapter suggests that current t h i n k i n g about isolated " e t h n i c " and " n a t i o n a l " groups is a product o f the rise o f the nation-state and the w r i t i n g o f nationalist histories. Indeed, the region n o w k n o w n as central Asia is perhaps the best example there is o f i n t e r m i n g l e d and interconnected peoples, places, and political processes. H e r o d o t u s h i m s e l f w o n d e r e d w h y the o l d w o r l d i n his day was already d i v i d e d i n t o three places, Asia, Europe, and Africa: " W h y three n a m e s . . . should ever have been give to a tract o f land w h i c h is i n reality one?" I n his masterful i n t r o d u c t i o n to the concept o f central Asia i n The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia

CENTRAL

ASIA

A N D

CHINA

439

(1990), Denis Sinor has suggested that a m o r e appropriate t e r m for the r e g i o n w o u l d be central Eurasia. The r e g i o n developed n o t o n the so-called p e r i p h e r y b u t at the core intersections o f c i v i lizations that i n c l u d e d Europe, the M i d d l e East, I n d i a , Southeast and East Asia. Because all o f the great

c i v i l i z a t i o n s o f central Asia f l o u r i s h e d

before the m i d d l e o f the first m i l l e n n i u m , a n d n o single c i v i l i z a t i o n occupied all and only that particular r e g i o n (the M o n g o l s c o n t r o l l e d nearly the entire c o n t i n e n t , f r o m Europe to east and s o u t h east Asia), the t e r m central or inner Asia was always relational and never stable. It was k n o w n as i n n e r Asia to i n c l u d e Pannonia (a province i n c l u d i n g t e r r i t o r y n o w m o s t l y i n H u n g a r y ) , and the Greek territories

i n Asia

Minor

(Anatoha)

by

the

Romans, then by the H u n s ( f i f t h century) a n d the Seljuk Turks (eleventh c e n t u r y ) . N o r t h e r n China was considered to be inner Asia once i t was occupied

by

the

Mongols,

a n d the

Khitan,

the

Manchus.

Jurchen,

Except

for

Other Chinese blue-and-white porcelains bear owners' marks showing that they were exported through Central Asia to the Islamic lands. This large dish with a landscape scene, made in the early fifteenth century, was probably imported

the

into Persia under theTimurids. Inscribed on the

the

back with the owner's name—Qarachaghay,

p e r i p h e r y o f the Eurasian continent, the surface features o f the l a n d prevented dense p o p u l a t i o n s w i t h agrarian empires. At the core o f i n n e r Asia, one finds " a g r i c u l t u r a l alternatives" that i n v o l v e d pastoralist a n d other h i g h l y adaptive t e c h n o l o -

chief page at the court of the Safavid shah Abbas-—it was part of the imperial collection of Chinese porcelains endowed to the shrine of Ardabil in northwestern Iran by the Safavid shah in

1611.

gies, none o f w h i c h supported large populations. Cultural continuities developed between the sedentary civilizations, a n d transitory or n o m a d i c civilizations often became the mediators and brokers for m u c h m o r e than just material c o m m o d i ties. To m e n t i o n perhaps the greatest examples. B u d d h i s m and Islam thus became dramatically transformed i n their m i g r a t i o n eastward f r o m the south and west. One m i g h t suggest that globalization had its b e g i n n i n g s i n the r e g i o n n o w k n o w n as central Asia. Certainly, transnationalism and the f l o w o f goods and ideas between i n n u m e r a b l e peoples was never n e w t o the area. The horse and perhaps the cart were the o n l y material c o m m o d i t i e s that l i n k e d the entire r e g i o n w i t h its peripheral k i n g d o m s . China's direct relations w i t h central Asia date to one century before the c o m m o n era, w h e n the H a n dynasty general Zhang Qian r e t u r n e d to the capital o f Changan ( m o d e r n Xian) f r o m a mission i n 138 B.C.E. to f o r m an alliance against the H u n s . This was one a m o n g m a n y m i l i t a r y missions to central Asian capitals

44°

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as far as Samarqand, Bukhara, A n d k h u i , Herat, Shiraz, and Isfahan. These missions s o l i c i t e d alliances and " t r i b u t e " (gong), w h i c h Joseph Fletcher said o n l y indicated an exchange o f gifts and never established

political submission.

clearly There

were times w h e n Chinese m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l extended i n t o central Asia, such as i n the Han

(206

B . C . E . - 2 2 0 C . E . ) and Tang

(618¬

9 0 9 7 ) dynasties, b u t i t was just as f r e quently c o n t r o l l e d by inner Asian empires, such as the Jin, Uao.Yuan. and Q i n g dynasties. The r e g i o n today k n o w n as X i n j i a n g (meaning " n e w d o m i n i o n " ) received that The Silk Route, a term coined in the nineteenth century by the

label i n 1759, w h e n the r e g i o n was

German orientalist Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen, existed since pre-

b r o u g h t under the c o n t r o l o f the Q i n g , a

Islamic times as the major route for goods and ideas between China,

dynasty established

India, and the West. Buddhism was carried along it from India to

Manchus to r i d the r e g i o n o f c o n t i n u e d

China, and monasteries were established along the way. Here, at Bezelik, on the fringe of the Taklimakan Desert, Buddhist monasteries were carved into the cliffs.

Mongolian

finally

by the i n n e r Asian

(Zungharian)

c o n t r o l . Even

M a n c h u c o n t r o l was s h o r t - l i v e d i n the r e g i o n , disrupted by Taiping and U i g h u r

rebellions, Russian influence, and finally its o w n collapse i n

1911.

The so-called Silk Road was one o f several routes that Zhang Qian traveled again i n 126

B.c.E.

i n search, n o t o f silk, but o f the famous Ferghana horses that

"sweated b l o o d , " w h i c h the H a n e m p e r o r had h o p e d to use against the n o m a d i c Huns. In a d d i t i o n to silk and horses, there were innumerable c o m m o d i t i e s traded along the way, and rarely d i d one person or g r o u p travel the entire route. Chinese merchants were never sighted i n Rome, and Romans were not f o u n d i n Changan. Even later, Europeans rarely traveled overland to China, and scholarly d o u b t regarding the great Marco Polo e x p e d i t i o n has been popularized. C h i n a - b o u n d caravans carried g o l d and other precious metals, w o o l and l i n e n , ivory, amber, coral, jade and other rare stones, asbestos, and glass, w h i c h was n o t produced i n China u n t i l the fifth century. O u t b o u n d caravans carried a w i d e variety o f bronze weapons and tools, i r o n , furs, pottery, ceramics, c i n n a m o n , and rhubarb. F r o m the China side the famous collection o f tracks across the Eurasian steppe started f r o m Changan, passing the famous H e x i c o r r i d o r i n Gansu i n the n o r t h w e s t , t o D u n h u a n g o n the fringe o f the Gobi Desert. F r o m D u n h u a n g the route passed t h r o u g h the famous Jade Gate (Yumen quan, where the Chinese collected taxes o n jade, a m o n g other things, entering China f r o m Central Asia) and then d i v i d e d i n t o a n o r t h e r l y and southerly route, s k i r t i n g the impassable Taklimakan Desert,

CENTRAL

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44 1

f o l l o w i n g glacial-fed oases at the base o f the Tian Shan m o u n t a i n s i n the n o r t h and the Himalayan escarpments and great Pamirs i n the south. Once reconnecti n g i n Kashgar, the m a i n r o u t e c o n t i n u e d w e s t w a r d t h r o u g h

Kokhand,

Samarqand, Bukhara, Merv, Persia, and Iraq to the Mediterranean, w h i l e southern and n o r t h e r n routes w o u n d their way to India and Russia. Lesser spurs intersected these routes and f o r m e d a n e t w o r k o f i n t e r m i t t e n t

communications,

a l t h o u g h travel between the nodes was lengthy and was hampered by p o l i t i c a l and e c o n o m i c ruptures. A l o n g these routes B u d d h i s m and then Islam f o u n d their ways i n t o China. I n central Asia and the oasis cities a r o u n d the Taklimakan B u d d h i s m was transf o r m e d i n t o its current " S e r i n d i a n " f o r m , w h i c h i n the ancient city o f Gandhara gave the image o f the Buddha his physical and Greco-Indian and even Chinese features. These features included a physical body w i t h Hellenic features (a chiseled nose and forehead, wavy hair, and classical lips), adorned i n a toga-like robe. Buddhist art as f o u n d i n the cave l i b r a r y at D u n h u a n g and the Chinese capitals o f Changan and Loyang t o o k o n decidedly east Asian features, as w e l l as absorbi n g Chinese and even Taoist notions o f the afterlife and the way o f suffering, c o n -

44 2

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t r i b u t i n g to the rise o f the n e w Pure Land and Chan (or Zen) schools o f B u d d h i s m . N e s t o r i a n i s m and M a n i c h a e a n i s m

also

f o u n d their ways i n t o China along these transnational tracks, t r a n s f o r m i n g Christian and Persian teachings i n t o n e w h y b r i d f o r m s , as the N e s t o r i a n m o n u m e n t i n the X i a n p r o v i n c i a l m u s e u m indicates. The r e l i g i o n is r e m e m b e r e d i n China by this stele, w h i c h depicts a Nestorian cross o n a lotus f l o w e r base, dati n g to the mid-seventh century w h e n a Nestorian c h u r c h was o f f i cially established i n Changan. Indeed, d u r i n g the heyday o f the Tang dynasty, its capital was a t r u l y transnational city, w i t h an o f f i cial p o p u l a t i o n o f five thousand foreigners, i n c l u d i n g H i n d u s , Jews, Manichaeans, described

Nestorians, a n d Zoroastrians, and peoples

as Arabs, A r m e n i a n s ,

Indians, Iranians, Japanese,

Koreans, Malays, Mongolians, Sogdians, and Turks. Dwarfs f r o m all over Europe were p a r t i c u l a r l y sought o u t as

entertainers,

accompanied by exotic animals f r o m t h r o u g h o u t the w o r l d . W i t h the decline o f the Tang dynasty, the Silk Road also declined. This process was heralded by the gradual retreat o f the glaciers at the end o f the Ice Age, and the d r y i n g u p o f the glacier-fed streams that made life o n the fringe o f the Taklimakan possible for several smaller oasis cides, i n c l u d i n g such p r o m i n e n t cultural centers as Lou Lan, Lop Nor, Niya, and Yotkan, n o w k n o w n only as sandb u r i e d cities. M o r e i m p o r t a n t , the arrival o f Islam signaled the begmning o f a new transnationalization o f central Asia, w i t h its roots n o t i n Europe, China, or south Asia but i n the M i d d l e East. The rapid Islamization o f central Asia, beginning as early as the mid-seventh century and reaching Balkh ( i n n o r t h e r n Afghanistan), across

ittMt

the Parthrs f r o m Kashgar by 699, led to the cultural, political, and social transformation o f the entire region, supersecling its earlier transnationalization but certainly n o t displacing i t . Interestingly

s « a S W ^ . . / ' . f i - ' i ' r f . ' J . 11 With the advent of Islam, Muslims added their distinctive religious buildings to Buddhist sites. At Turfan, for example, a tall tower known as the Imin Minaret marks the presence of the nearby congregational mosque.

enough, although Islam reached the Pamir borders o f China by the end o f the seventh century, n o t unlike Alexander the Great, it was almost prevented f r o m going any further. Islamization d i d not take place h i Kashgar u n t i l the eleventh century, and it took nearly four hundred years to travel across the Taklimakan to the eastern oases o f Turpan and H a m i , where people w h o called themselves Uighurs

continued to practice B u d d h i s m until the sixteenth century. As Islam penetrated China by land across the Taklimakan and by sea along the southeastern coast, the people k n o w n as the H u i emerged, and the U i g h u r s disappeared, only to reappear again i n the early twentieth century.

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I s l a m i / a t i o n a n d China T h o u g h Denis Sinor, i n emphasizing the early multicultural and multireligious roots o f central Asia, has suggested that " i n Inner Asia n o one faith has ever c o m manded the allegiance o f more than a fraction o f its p o p u l a t i o n , " this certainly cannot be said to be true o f Islam. Scholars estimate tiiat today nearly 60 percent o f the entire region bows t o w a r d Mecca i n religious allegiance, although political allegiance may bend to various national capitals, i n c l u d i n g Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, Istanbul, Alrnaty, and Tashkent. I n China the largest M u s l i m group today call t h e m selves the H u i people, and they are recognized by the state as the t h i r d largest m i n o r i t y nationality. They represent perhaps more than any other M u s l i m group i n China today, a fascinating blend o f Cliinese, M i d d l e Eastern, and central Asian c u l tural, religious, and historical traditions. The H u i are the most numerous o f ten M u s l i m nationalities recognized by the state i n China. N u m b e r i n g more than half o f China's nearly twenty m i l l i o n Muslims, the H u i are classified by the state as the one M u s l i m m i n o r i t y that does not have a specific language shared by all o f its m e m bers. The odier M u s l i m nationalities include eight TurkicAltaic M u s l i m language groups i n China (Uighur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tatar, Salar, Bonan, Dongxiang) and one Indo-European Tadjik group). Unlike these odier groups, w h o are concentrated p r i m a r i l y i n northwest China near the Sino-Soviet frontier, die H u i have communities i n 97 percent o f China's counties, w i t h concentrations i n the northwest (Xinjiang, Gansu, Qinghai, and the Ningxia H u i Autonomous Region), the southwest (Yunnan, Guizhou), and the n o r d i China plain (Hebei, Henan, Shandong). They are the largest urban edinic m i n o r i t y i n most o f China's cities ( 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 i n Beijing, 150,000 i n T i a n j i n , and 50,000 in

Shanghai),

and

they

traditionally

dominated

certain trades throughout China (noodle, beef, and lamb restaurants, leather m a k i n g , jewelry m a k i n g , and w o o l trading). A l t h o u g h the H u i have been labeled as the "Chinesespeaking M u s l i m s " or "Cliinese M u s l i m s , " this is m i s leading because many H u i speak o n l y the non-Chinese dialects o f the place w h e r e they live, such as the Tibetan,

The Memorial Mosque to the Prophet, the Huai Sheng Si, also known as the Beacon Tower Mosque, at Guangzhou (Canton) in Guandong province, is reportedly the oldest

M o n g o l i a n , T h a i , and H a i n a n M u s l i m s , w h o are also

mosque in China. It is said to have been founded in the

classified by the state as H u i . Yet most H u i are closer t o

Tang period by the Arab missionary Abu Waqqas.

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The largest Mustim group in China calls itself the Hui people. They represent a blend o f Chinese, Middle Eastern, and central Asian cultural, religious, and historical traditions. Here Muslims in Gansu province gather together for prayer in the house of a recently deceased saint.

the H a n Chinese than the other M u s l i m nationalities i n terms o f demographic p r o x i m i t y and cultural a c c o m m o d a t i o n , adapting many o f their Islamic practices to H a n ways o f life, w h i c h often became the source f o r m a n y o f the criticisms o f the M u s l i m reformers, I n the past this was not as great a p r o b l e m for the Turkic and Indo-European M u s l i m groups, as they were traditionally m o r e isolated f r o m the H a n and t h e i r identities n o t as threatened, a l t h o u g h this has begun to change i n the last forty years. Cultural p r o x i m i t y o f the H u i and H a n may account for some o f the dynamics and urgency o f Islamic reforms a m o n g H u i M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s . Because they have n o single language o f their o w n and are so w i d e l y dispersed, the H u i d i d n o t o r i g i n a l l y conceive o f themselves as one nationality. As a result o f state-sponsored nationality i d e n t i f i c a t i o n campaigns over the course o f the last t h i r t y years, they have begun t o t h i n k o f themselves as a national ethnic g r o u p , s o m e t h i n g m o r e than just " M u s l i m s , " w h i c h is w h a t the t e r m Hui originally meant. Islam i n China was k n o w n as the " r e l i g i o n o f the H u i " (Hui jiao) u n t i l the nationalist campaigns o f the 1940s and 1950s classified the H u i

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as one a m o n g several nationalities w h o believed i n Islam. The H u i became the residual M u s l i m g r o u p that c o n tained anyone w h o d i d not fit the m o r e stringent l i n guistic categories, many o f w h i c h had been previously established i n the Soviet U n i o n (Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tatar, U i g h u r , and so o n ) . The H u i are also unique a m o n g the fifty-five i d e n t i f i e d nationalities i n China i n that they are the o n l y n a t i o n a l i t y for w h o m r e l i g i o n is the o n l y u n i f y i n g category o f identity. T h r o u g h a process o f stateinfluenced ethnogenesis and transnational

association,

the H u i , like such other nationalities as the U i g h u r s , began to t h i n k o f themselves as one nationality category officially recognized by the state and eventually as one ethnic group. Today i t is possible to travel t h r o u g h o u t China and meet people w h o i d e n t i f y themselves solely as H u i — o n l y later do tremendous l i n g u i s t i c , c u l t u r a l , and religious chfferences become apparent. Resulting f r o m a succession o f Islamic r e f o r m movements that swept across China over the last six h u n d r e d years, there exists a w i d e s p e c t r u m o f Islamic

belief

a m o n g the H u i today. The variety o f religious orders w i t h i n H u i Islam represents a history o f r e f o r m s and

Chinese Muslims follow a wide spectrum of beliefs.

Islamic movements that derived f r o m b o t h interaction

Followers of traditional Islam are called Gedimu, from

w i t h and i s o l a t i o n f r o m the Islamic w o r l d .

Joseph

Fletcher was the first to suggest that the nature o f China's present-day

Islamic c o m m u n i t i e s and orders can

be

traced to successive " t i d e s " o f influence and individuals

the Arabic qadim, meaning "old." They usually live in small communities clustered around a central mosque Here in Beijing, Muslim men meet for communal prayer in the congregational mosque.

w h o entered China d u r i n g critical periods o f exchange w i t h the outside w o r l d . Like a swelling and e b b i n g tide, Fletcher argued, the influence o f these movements grew or d i m i n i s h e d w i t h the interaction o f China's M u s l i m s and the Islamic w o r l d . This influence was n o t based o n p o p u l a t i o n movements so m u c h as the gradual and p r o f o u n d exchanges o f ideas between the t w o regions. Fletcher's argument had a p r o f o u n d influence o n the history o f Islam in China, but reflection o n the Salafiyya (the early t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y Islam r e f o r m movement that called for a r e t u r n t o the principles f o l l o w e d by the v e n erable ancestors) has led some scholars to reject his metaphor o f " t i d e s " o f Islam, because i t suggests not o n l y u n i d i r e c t i o n a l m o v e m e n t ( f r o m the M i d d l e East to China) but also the n o t i o n that there was one m o m e n t , i n d i v i d u a l , or movement that touched all o f China's M u s l i m s and transformed t h e m i n one wave o f religious r e f o r m a t i o n . I n reality, a m o n g China's M u s l i m s there is enor-

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mous complexity, cliscontinuity, and continued coexistence o f a w i d e variety o f religious orders. Each new " t i d e " or religious m o v e m e n t d i d not replace the f o r mer movements; rather, they debated each other, sometimes violently, and g e n erally established uneasy coexistences. They were also n o t only one way. Rather, China's M u s l i m s and Chinese culture exerted as m u c h i f not m o r e influence o n the movements that came i n t o China f r o m the M i d d l e East and central Asia as the other way a r o u n d . Moreover, each " t i d e " is not easily isolated to one n a r r o w p e r i o d o f t i m e , but hundreds o f Islamic movements spread t h r o u g h o u t China over the course o f a m i l l e n n i u m , and many o f t h e m are just as vibrant today as they were f r o m the b e g i n n i n g . These " t i d e s " are better u n d e r s t o o d as " m o d e s " o f Islamic r e f o r m i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h other Islamic m o v e m e n t s that spread t h r o u g h o u t the Islamicw o r l d , reaching China w h e n i t became m o r e open politically, economically, o r philosophically to the outside w o r l d . Newer movements d i d n o t replace earlier modes o f belief i n China; rather, they helped to define t h e m . For example, the association k n o w n today as the G e d i m u i n China are n o t one " t i d e " (Fletcher's first) o f Islam i n China; they represent a w i d e variety o f Islamic practices and organizational orientations that are similar o n l y i n their rejection o f later Sufiand Wahhabi-inspired r e f o r m movements. Followers o f traditional Islam in China o n l y began to define themselves as G e d i m u or " o l d teachings" w h e n " n e w teachings" an r e f o r m movements rose i n their m i d s t and criticized the " o l d teachings." A l t h o u g h these newer modes o f Islamic practice and belief drew their converts f r o m the earlier M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s , they d i d not replace the older c o m m u n i t i e s entirely. Instead, they provided a w i d e spectrum o f religious alternatives f r o m w h i c h M u s l i m s i n China c o u l d choose. For i t is o f t e n ritual practice that distinguishes Islamic affiliation i n China and elsewhere, but this practice is o n l y an i c o n i n d i c a t i n g the appeal o f one movement over another for M u s l i m believers i n the northwest enmeshed i n the Chinese state and society. A l t h o u g h this chapter does n o t b e g i n to address Islam's complex history i n China, an i n t r o d u c t i o n to the context o f Islamic reforms is necessary for an understanding o f the rise o f Islamic r e f o r m movements i n China. Each o f these " m o d e s " can be characterized by certain kinds o f related and successive r e f o r m movements seeking to r e f o r m Islam i n China by reference to discursive and m o r a l standards encountered i n the M i d d l e East by M u s l i m s f r o m China o n the hajj ( p i l g r i m a g e ) , or preached by peripatetic M i d d l e Eastern representatives

of

these movements i n China, often a r r i v i n g i n China overland f r o m central Asia. The somewhat q u i x o t i c quest o f these M u s l i m s at the distant edge of Islamic expansion for the fundamentals o f their faith, and the dialectic i n t e r a c t i o n between p e r i p h e r y and center, society and state, engendered the rise o f a series o f r e f o r m i s t tides that washed across the Chinese Islamic h i n t e r l a n d .

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The First Mode: Traditional Chinese Islam The earliest M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s i n China were descended f r o m the Arab, Persian, Central Asian, and M o n g o l i a n M u s l i m merchants, m i l i t i a , and officials w h o settled along China's southeast coast and i n the northwest i n large and small numbers f r o m the seventh t o the fourteenth centuries. Generally residing i n independent small c o m m u n i t i e s clustered a r o u n d a central mosque, o n l y later d i d they become k n o w n as the G e d i m u ( f r o m the Arabic qadim, " o l d " ) , w h e n later Islamic movements criticized them as o l d and antiquated. The m o d e for these c o m m u n i t i e s was characterized by what Jonathan L i p m a n has t e r m e d a patchwork o f relatively isolated, independent Islamic villages and u r b a n enclaves that related w i t h each other t h r o u g h t r a d i n g n e t w o r k s and r e c o g n i t i o n o f b e l o n g i n g to the w i d e r Islamic umrnah (cx) n u n u n i t y ) . For these c o m m u n i t i e s Sunni Hanafi Islam became so standard that few m o d e r n - d a y H u i i n the n o r t h west had even heard o f Shiism even d u r i n g the I r a n - I r a q war. F r o m the b e g i n n i n g , the earliest Islamic c o m m u n i t i e s established a consistent pattern o f zealously preserving and p r o t e c t i n g their i d e n t i t y as enclaves ensconced i n the d o m i n a n t H a n society. Each village was centered o n a single mosque headed by an ahong ( f r o m the Persian akhun[d]) w h o was invited to teach o n a m o r e or less temporary basis. These ahong generally m o v e d f r o m one mosque to another o n an average o f every three years. A c o u n c i l o f senior local ciders and ahong were responsible for the affairs o f each village and the i n v i t i n g o f the itinerant i m a m . Late nineteenth-century and early t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y travelers noted the maintenance o f these isolated c o m m u n i t i e s : " I k n o w o f no strictly f a r m i n g village where there is an equal m i x t u r e o f the t w o groups [ H a n and H u i ] , " Robert Ekvall once observed i n Cultural Relations on the Kansu-Tibetan Border ('939)' "

m

every case the village is p r e d o m i n a n t l y one or the other. I n some

instances, the p o p u l a t i o n is composed almost entirely o f one g r o u p , w i t h only a few hangers-on o f the other." He goes o n to suggest that because o f different c u l tural, r i t u a l , and dietary preferences that sometimes led to open conflict, the c o m m u n i t i e s preferred physical separation. This isolation was m i t i g a t e d somewhat d u r i n g the collectivization campaigns i n the 1950s, w h e n H a n and H u i villages were often administered as clusters by a single c o m m u n e . They have also been b r o u g h t closer together t h r o u g h national telecommunications and transportation networks established by the state, i n c l u d i n g such umbrella organizations as the China Islamic Association, established i n 195c, w h i c h seeks to coorclinate religious affairs a m o n g all M u s l i m groups. W i t h the d i s m a n t l i n g o f the c o m m u n e system in the early 1980s i n many areas, h o w ever, these homogeneous H u i c o m m u n i t i e s are once again b e c o m i n g m o r e segregated. A l t h o u g h these disparate c o m m u n i t i e s a m o n g the G e d i m u were

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generally l i n k e d o n l y by trade and a sense o f a c o m m o n religious heritage—an attachment to the basic Islamic beliefs as handed d o w n t o t h e m by their ancest o r s — i t was the entry o f the Sufi brotherhoods i n t o China that eventually began to l i n k many o f these isolated c o m m u n i t i e s together t h r o u g h extensive socioreligious networks. Sufism, or Islamic mysticism, made a substantial impact in China from the late seventeenth century. Four major orders, locally called menhuan, became

The Second Mode: Sufi Communities and National Networks Sufism d i d not begin to make a substantial impact i n China u n t i l the late seventeenth century, d u r i n g the second m o d e o f Islam's entrance i n t o China. Like Sufi centers that proliferated after the thirteenth century i n other countries, many o f

important. The

these Sufi movements i n China developed socioeconomic

Naqshbandiyya emphasized

institutions b u i l t a r o u n d the schools established by descendants o f early Sufi

popular practices, which

saintly leaders. The institutions became k n o w n i n Chinese as the menhuan, the

often revolved around the veneration of saints. Believers often sought inspiration and blessing by visit-

and r e l i g i o - p o l i t i c a l

" l e a d i n g " or " s a i n t l y " descent groups. The i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n that Sufism made to r e l i g i o u s o r g a n i z a t i o n i n China was that the leaders o f mosques t h r o u g h o u t their order o w e d their allegiance to their shaykh, the founder o f the

ing and meditating at saints'

order w h o appointed t h e m . These designated followers were loyal to the leader

tombs, as in Hezhou, in

o f their order and remained i n their prayer c o m m u n i t i e s for l o n g periods o f

Gansu province.

t i m e , unlike the G e d i m u ahong, w h o were generally i t i n e r a n t , n o t w e l l - c o n -

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nected to the c o m m u n i t y , and less i m b u e d w i t h appointed authority. G e d i m u mosque elders were loyal to their congregation first and connected o n l y by trade to other c o m m u n i t i e s . M a n y Sufi r e f o r m s spread t h r o u g h o u t n o r t h w e s t China d u r i n g the early decades o f the Q i n g dynasty (mid-seventeenth to the early eighteenth centuries). Increased travel and c o m m u n i c a t i o n between M u s l i m s , i n b o t h east and west, d u r i n g what Joseph Fletcher called the "general o r t h o d o x revival" o f the e i g h teenth century and A. H . Johns refers to as the "second expansion," had great influence o n M u s l i m s f r o m west Africa to Indonesia, n o t least o f all o n China's H u i M u s l i m s . Exposure to these n e w ideas led to a r e f o r m u l a t i o n o f traditional Islamic concepts that rendered t h e m m o r e salient, posing a challenge to b o t h trad i t i o n a l clerical and state authorities. A l t h o u g h a mystical interpretation and social organization were perhaps Sufism s most lasting contributions to Islam i n China, the public conflict between Sufis and non-Sufis was over the contested t u r f o f Islamic practice. Sufis criticized traditional H u i Muslims for being too Chinese: materialistic, b o u n d to their mosques, incense, and Chinese texts, and refusing to fully experience the presence o f Allah i n their worship. They condemned the non-Sufis for their use o f Chinese i n w o r s h i p , adorning then mosques w i t h Chinese Quranic quotations and hadith. They condemned the Muslims for wearing traditional Chinese w h i t e funeral dress and sullying Islam w i t h many other Chinese cultural practices, calling for a p u r i f i e d return to the ascetic ideals o f the Prophet and Ids early followers. They also offered a m o r e i m m e diate experience o f Islam t h r o u g h the rimais o f remembrance and meditation, and the efficacy o f the saints, instead o f the daunting memorization and recitation o f Quranic texts. A l t h o u g h theirs was a reformist movement, i t was less textual than experiential, revealing the power o f Allah and his saints to transform lives through miracles, healings, and other transformative acts. Sufi orders were gradually institutionalized i n t o sociopolitical organizations k n o w n as the m e n h u a n . O n l y f o u r orders m a i n t a i n significant influence among the H u i today, what Claude Pickens as a Protestant missionary i n northwest China first discovered as the f o u r m e n h u a n o f China: the Qadariyyas, Khufiyyas, Jahriyyas, and Kubrawiyyas. A l t h o u g h these are the four m a i n groups, they are subdivided i n t o a m y r i a d o f smaller branch solidarities, d i v i d e d along i d e o l o g ical, p o l i t i c a l , geographical, and historical lines. These divisions and alliances reveal the disparities encountered between the indigenous practice o f Islam i n China and n e w Islamic ideals as represented by r e t u r n e d Hajji or itinerant, often Central Asian, preachers w h o m a i n t a i n e d , i n their eyes, m o r e " o r t h o d o x " interpretations o f Islam. It is unfortunate that Western scholarship has p r o l o n g e d the confusion o f early Chinese w r i t e r s over the rise o f Sufism and later Islamic orders i n China. As each

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Islamic r e f o r m e r established a n e w f o l l o w i n g i n China, o f t e n i n conflict w i t h other older Islamic orders, these " n e w " arrivals challenged or converted the " o l d " traditional Islamic c o m m u n i t i e s . Chinese officials and even less k n o w l edgeable M u s l i m s f r o m the b e g i n n i n g naturally referred t o these c o m m u n i t i e s w i t h their n e w teachings as xin jiao (literally, " n e w r e l i g i o n " o r " t e a c h i n g , " n o t " n e w sect," as i t has been erroneously translated). As each n e w arrival replaced the older Islamic c o m m u n i t i e s , they became k n o w n as the " n e w " or even " n e w n e w teachings" (xin xin jiao), as i n the case o f the arrival o f the I k h w a n i n China, w h i c h w i l l be described below. Traditional Islam a m o n g the H u i generally was referred to as lao jiao ("the o l d teachings"), and even some orders that were n e w at one t i m e w h e n others arrived were gradually classed as lao jiao. This was the case w i t h the Khufiyyas, an early Naqshbandiyya Sufi order, w h i c h itself is n o w classified as an " o l d t e a c h i n g " even t h o u g h w h e n it first flowered i n China as a Sufi r e f o r m m o v e m e n t i t was k n o w n as a " n e w teaching." It was o f t e n the case that those w h o regarded themselves as m a i n t a i n i n g the established traditional beliefs o f Islam i n China represented the reformers, w h o were their critics, as " n e w " a n d thus suspect, w h i l e they portrayed themselves as " o l d " or m o r e true to their traditions. The reformers generally t h o u g h t o f t h e m selves as the m o r e o r t h o d o x , based o n a m o r e i n f o r m e d , sometimes esoteric i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Islam due to m o r e recent contact w i t h m o v e m e n t s i n the M u s l i m heartlands. They thus resented the title o f " n e w teachings" or the even m o r e derisive " n e w n e w teachings," calling themselves by the m o r e exact names o f their orders: Qadariyya, Naqshbandiyya, W a h h a b i . Y i h e w a n i , and so f o r t h . The stigmas " n e w teachings" or " n e w sects" stuck, as they were applied n o t o n l y by their critics but o f t e n by the state as w e l l . Even the name G e d i m u for the " o l d e r " Islamic c o m m u n i t i e s i n China is a not-so-subtle jibe at the other Islamic orders as being newer and thus removed f r o m the traditional fundamentals o f Islam i n China. Thus, i n China there is a c o n t i n u e d debate over o r t h o d o x discourse, w i t h each Islamic m o v e m e n t seeking to portray itself as loyal to the o r i g i n a l ideals, the spirit as w e l l as the texts o f Islam. As each m o v e m e n t sought to exert t a x o n o m i c c o n t r o l over the labeling o f itself and its rivals, the state was o f t e n called i n to adjudicate, leading to f u r t h e r debates over legitimacy according to the categories o f the state. N o longer Islamic, these criteria were o f t e n Confucian or legalistic in content, seeking to judge a movement's c o m p a t i b i l i t y w i t h the Chinese order. The designations o f the movements thus became i m p o r t a n t politically as w e l l as theologically. For example, d u r i n g the m i d - n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y rebellions i n the n o r t h w e s t , some o f w h i c h were led by Sufi leaders, the Chinese state p r o scribed all o f those movements that became k n o w n as " n e w teachings" i n order to r o o t o u t w h a t they saw as the m o r e rebellious H u i c o m m u n i t i e s The state became convinced by opponents to the largely Sufi-led uprisings that they were

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all s i m i l a r l y " n e w " a n d thus suspect. This is precisely the rationale whereby a w i d e variety o f Buddhist sectarian movements were proscribed u n d e r the general r u b r i c o f the " W h i t e L o t u s " rebellion i n China, whereas recent scholarship has revealed that o n l y a few Buddhist movements fell under the shadow o f that t e r m . Unfortunately, Chinese and Western scholars perpetuated the designations o f " n e w " and " o l d " teachings, and u n t i l recently there were n o accurate representations o f the H u i ' s o w n h i s t o r y o f their Islamic orders i n China. The o p e n i n g o f China t o the West after 1979 has allowed the appearance o f Chinese publications o n these groups as w e l l as Western fieldwork for the first t i m e , g i v i n g a better, albeit still quite l i m i t e d , glimpse i n t o their origins and socioreligious complexity. These depictions b y outsiders continue to plague M u s l i m r e f o r m movements and their quest for legitimacy. A l t h o u g h there is some dispute a m o n g the Sufis themselves about w h i c h order was the earliest t o enter China proper, because there had been regular c o n tact o n an i n d i v i d u a l basis w i t h the Sufi orders o f Central Asia that had already b e g u n to proliferate i n X i n j i a n g i n the early part o f the fifteenth century, i t is generally agreed that one o f the earliest t o be established f i r m l y o n Chinese soil was the Qadari tariqah (Sufi order or b r o t h e r h o o d , literally " p a t h " ) . The founder o f the Qadariyya g r o u p i n China was Q i Jingyi, H i l a l a l - D i n (1656-1719). K n o w n a m o n g the H u i as Q i Daozu (Grand Master Q i ) , he was b u r i e d i n Linxia's "great t o m b " (da gongbei) shrine c o m p l e x , w h i c h became the center o f Qadariyya Sufism i n China. One o f the reasons that Grand Master Q i continues to be greatly revered a m o n g all Sufis i n China is that the t r a d i t i o n suggests that he received his earlyt r a i n i n g under t w o o f the most famous Central Asian Sufi teachers, Khoja Afaq and Khoja A b d Alia. Q i J i n g y i supposedly met w i t h the revered Naqshbandi leader Khoja Afaq i n X i n i n g i n 1672, w h e r e according t o Qadariyya records, the master sent the sixteen-year-old acolyte h o m e , saying " I a m n o t y o u r teacher, m y ancient teaching is n o t to be passed o n t o y o u , y o u r teacher has already crossed the Eastern Sea and arrived i n the Eastern land. You must therefore r e t u r n h o m e quickly, and y o u w i l l become a famous teacher i n the l a n d . " Qadariyya f o l l o w ers today feel that their saint received the blessing o f the great Naqshbandi Khoja Afaq, w h i l e their order was f o r m a l l y f o u n d e d by his second teacher, Khoja A b d Alia, a t w e n t y - n i n t h - g e n e r a t i o n descendant o f M u h a m m a d . Chinese Sufi records state that Khoja A b d Alia entered China i n 1674 a n d preached i n G u a n g d o n g , Guangxi, Yunnan, G u i z h o u and L i n x i a , and Gansu, before his eventual death i n G u i z h o u i n 1689. W h i l e A b d al-Kadir al-Jilani is the reputed f o u n d e r o f the Qadari order, i t is n o t s u r p r i s i n g t o find that Khoja A b d Alia perhaps studied i n M e d i n a u n d e r the r e n o w n e d K u r d i s h mystic I b r a h i m i b n Hasan a l - K u r a n i (1616-90), w h o was initiated i n t o b o t h the Naqshbandi and Qadari tariqahs, as w e l l as several other Sufi orders.

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The appeal o f Qadariyya Sufism as a renewal m o v e m e n t a m o n g the H u i is related to its c o m b i n i n g ascetic mysticism w i t h a n o n i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d f o r m o f w o r s h i p that centers a r o u n d the t o m b complex o f deceased saints rather than the mosque. The early Qadariyyas advocated l o n g - t e r m isolated m e d i t a t i o n , poverty, and vows o f celibacy. The head o f the order d i d n o t m a r r y and eschewed family life, a radical departure f r o m other Islamic traditions i n China. Qadariyya Sufis continue to attend the G e d i m u mosques i n the local c o m m u n i t i e s i n w h i c h they live, gathering at the tombs f o r holidays and i n d i v i d u a l w o r s h i p . The founder Q i Jingyi was k n o w n for his emphasis o n poverty, self-cultivation, a n d ascetic w i t h drawal f r o m society. Formalized Islamic ritual as represented by the Five Pillars o f Islam (fasting, p i l g r i m a g e , prayer, almsgiving, and recitation o f the shahadtih, the obligatory M u s l i m profession o f faith) was de-emphasized by Q i Jingyi i n favor o f private m e d i t a t i o n . The Qadariyya m a i n t a i n that "those w h o k n o w themselves clearly w i l l k n o w A l l a h " and "the Saints help us to k n o w ourselves first before k n o w i n g A l l a h . " U n i o n w i t h the d i v i n e , t h e n , is

accomplished

t h r o u g h m e d i t a t i o n and self-cultivation, rather than formalized p u b l i c r i t u a l . "The m o m e n t o f t h i n k i n g about A l l a h , " they m a i n t a i n , "is superior to w o r s h i p p i n g h i m for a thousand years." A l t h o u g h the Qadariyya m e n h u a n has always been less i n f l u e n t i a l than other Sufi orders i n China because o f its rejection o f " w o r l d l y " p o l i t i c a l involvement, i t set the stage for many Sufi orders to follow. By stressing the i n t i m a t e experience o f Allah t h r o u g h the power o f his appointed shaykh, Sufism i n China became a force for renewal and t r a n s f o r m a t i o n : a r e t u r n to the pure ascetic ideals o f Islam, as w e l l as i n i t i a t i n g a n e w sociopolitical Islamic order. At once fundamentalistic and transformative, i t i n i t i a t e d a n e w tide o f r e f o r m that swept across China. The Naqshbandi order became most rooted i n Chinese soil t h r o u g h the establishment o f t w o groups: the Khufiyyas and Jahriyyas. Both groups exercised tremendous influence o n the history o f Islam i n China, specifically i n the n o r t h west. As Joseph Fletcher argued, the r e f o r m m o v e m e n t emphasized a shar'ist orthoproxy, political activism, propagation o f the r e l i g i o n , and a strong Sunni orientation that came to mark the Naqshbandiyyas i n a way that proved d e f i n i tive i n the mystical path's subsequent history. T w o other general characteristics o f popular m y s t i c i s m — n a m e l y the veneration o f saints (misleadingly called "saint w o r s h i p " by n o n - M u s l i m w r i t e r s ) a n d the seeking o f i n s p i r a t i o n by visiting and m e d i t a t i n g at the saints' tombs (misleading!)' referred to as " t o m b w o r s h i p " ) were also p r o m i n e n t features o f the Naqshbandiyyas i n southern Xinjiang and later i n northwest China. Founded by Bahaad-Din Naqshband ( 1318-89), w h o lived i n Mawarannahr (a Central Asian r e g i o n west o f the Pamirs), the Naqshbandiyya order graduallyspread east across the trade routes and by the m i d d l e o f the

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gained ascendance over other Central Asian Sufi orders i n the oasis cities o f Altishahr, s u r r o u n d i n g the Tarim river basin i n what is n o w southern Xinjiang. The Naqshbandi order that gained the most p r o m i n e n c e i n the Tarim basin and played an i m p o r t a n t role i n later eighteenth- and nineteenth-century politics i n X i n j i a n g was the M a k h d u m z a d a , established by M a k h d u m - i A z a m (also k n o w n as A h m a d Kasani, 1461-1542). It was his great grandson, Khoja Afaq ( d . 1694), k n o w n i n the Chinese sources as Hidayat A l l a h , w h o was the saint most responsible f o r establishing the Naqshbandiyyas a m o n g the H u i i n n o r t h w e s t China. Khoja Afaq ( K h w a j a - y i Afaq, " t h e Master o f the H o r i z o n s " ) , f o u n d e d the Afaqiyyas i n X i n j i a n g , and f r o m 1671 t o 1672 he visited Gansu, w h e r e his father, MuhammadYusuf, had previously preached, reportedly converting a few H u i and a substantial n u m b e r o f the Salars to Naqshbandi Sufism. D u r i n g this influential tour, Khoja Afaq visited the northwest cities o f X i n i n g , Lintao, and H e z h o u ( n o w Linxia, China's " l i t t l e M e c c a " ) , preaching t o H u i , Salar, and northeastern Tibetan M u s l i m s . T w o o f these early H u i Gansu M u s l i m s became his disciples and w e n t to Central Asia and the p i l g r i m a g e cities t o become f u r t h e r trained i n the order. W h e n they r e t u r n e d t o China, they established the t w o m o s t i m p o r t a n t Naqshbandi b r o t h e r h o o d s among the H u i i n the N o r t h w e s t : the Khufiyyas and the Jahriyyas. A s A n n e M a r i e Schimmel has eloquently d o c u m e n t e d , t h r o u g h o u t its history the Naqshbandiyyas have stressed an active p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n w o r l d l y affairs. Their shaykhs w o r k e d wonders, chanted the p o w e r f u l Mathanawi texts o f the Turkish mystic Jalal a d - D i n a l - R u m i al-Balkhi, Mawlana Jalluddin (ca. 1207-73), and advocated scriptural reforms. They emphasized b o t h self-cultivation and f o r m a l r i t u a l , w i t h d r a w a l f r o m and involvement i n society. U n l i k e the Qadariyyas, their leaders enjoyed families and the material w e a l t h accrued f r o m the donations o f their followers. They also became c o m m i t t e d to political involvement and social change based o n the principles o f Islam. Some o f the Naqshbandiyya orders i n China advocated m o r e o f a " t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i s t " perspective, i n w h i c h they sought t o change the social order i n accord w i t h their o w n visions o f p r o p r i e t y a n d morality. This inevitably led to conflicts w i t h Chinese rule and local governments, causing some Naqshbandiyya orders, especially the Jahriyyas, t o be singled o u t for suppression and persecution. " D u e t o the arduous way i t has traversed," one H u i scholar Yang H u a i z h o n g ( h i m s e l f raised i n a Jahriyya h o m e ) w r o t e " t h e branch [Jahriyya] has always advocated the m i l i t a n t spirit o f the M u s l i m s , organ i z i n g uprisings t o resist the oppression o f the Q i n g and K M T [Nationalist, o r K u o m i n t a n g ] governments against the ethnic H u i m i n o r i t y and their religious belief." By contrast, the Khufiyyas tended t o seek m o r e c o n f o r m i s t solutions t o local conflicts, stressing personal i n t e r n a l r e f o r m over political change. The d i f ferent stance that the Naqshbandiyya orders took i n China w i t h regard t o the

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state and Chinese culture reflects their dialectical interaction w i t h local i n t e r p r e tations o f i d e n t i t y and changing sociopolitical realities i n the N o r t h w e s t . A b r i e f i n t r o d u c t i o n o f these t w o movements is necessary f o r understanding the later challenges to the movements b y t h e Y i h e w a n i s and the Salafiyyas. D u r i n g his 1672 visit t o H e z h o u , Khoja Afaq played an i m p o r t a n t role i n the life o f M a Laichi (1673-1753), a H e z h o u H u i o f extraordinary talent w h o w e n t o n t o f o u n d one o f the earliest and most influential Naqshbandiyya orders i n China: the Khufiyyas. A c c o r d i n g t o Sufi t r a d i t i o n , M a Laichi was b o r n t o a c b i l d less couple after they received Khoja Afaq's blessing. H e was later raised a n d trained by one o f Khoja Afaq's disciples, Ma Tai Baba ("Great Father"), w h o later gave M a Laichi his daughter i n marriage and passed o n to h i m the leadership o f the mystical path that M a Tai Baba had received f r o m Khoja Afaq. F r o m 1728 t o 1781 M a Laichi went o n the p i l g r i m a g e to Mecca, Yemen, and Bukhara, where he studied several Sufi orders a n d became p a r t i c u l a r l y i n f l u e n c e d by Mawlana M a k l i d u m , a m a n o f uncertain o r i g i n w h o m John Fletcher hypothesized may have been I n d i a n . W h e n he r e t u r n e d f r o m his p i l g r i m a g e , M a Laichi established the most p o w e r f u l o f the Khufiyya groups: the Ffuasi ( " f l o w e r y m o s q u e " ) branch. He propagated the order for t h i r t y - t w o years a m o n g the H u i a n d Salar i n Gansu and Q i n g h a i before his death i n 1766 at the age o f 86. The g r o u p is still quite active a n d centered i n Linxia H u i A u t o n o m o u s Region, Gansu, at the t o m b o f M a Laichi, w h i c h was restored i n 1986. O r i g i n a t i n g i n an earlier Central Asian and Yemeni Naqshbandi Sufism, the K h u f i y y a order was permeated w i t h an emphasis o n a m o r e passive participation i n society, the veneration o f saints, the seeking o f i n s p i r a t i o n at tombs and the silent dfiikr ( " r e m e m b r a n c e " ;

properly, " K h a f i y y a " means " t h e silent ones").

There are n o w m o r e than t w e n t y subbranches t h r o u g h o u t China, w i t h mosques i n B e i j i n g , X i n j i a n g , and Yunnan. M o s t K h u f i y y a orders are concentrated i n Gansu, N i n g x i a , Q i n g h a i , and X i n j i a n g , w i t h several o f the o r i g i n a l K h u f i y y a practices i n such o u t l y i n g areas as n o r t h e r n N i n g x i a b e g i n n i n g t o lose their distinctiveness over t i m e . The second Naqshbandi order, the Jahriyyas, was f o u n d e d i n China under the dynamic leadership o f Ma M i n g x i n (1719—81). One o f the most fascinating detective stories i n historical discovery is the tracing o f Ma M i n g x i n s spiritual lineage to Mizjaja, a village o n the outskirts o f Zabid i n n o r t h e r n Yemen, by Joseph Fletcher. A l t h o u g h Chinese Sufis have k n o w n f o r generations that their saint M a M i n g x i n studied i n the M i d d l e East, i t was never clear w h o m he received his " n e w teaching" f r o m or where he studied. M i d d l e Eastern Sufi accounts recorded the presence o f Chinese M u s l i m s studying i n certain Sufi areas, but o n l y Joseph Fletcher was able to p u t the t w o together. This was an i m p o r t a n t discovery, as M a M i n g x i n ' s Sufi practice was t h o u g h t t o be novel, even heterodox, and the subject

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o f many conflicts i n N o r t h w e s t C h i n a . This controversy is m a i n l y over M a M i n g x i n s use o f the jahr i n remembrance (vocal dhikr, f r o m whence comes the name Jahriyya, "the vocal ones"), w h i c h he openly advocated i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the Khufiyya's silent remembrance, the m o r e standard Naqshbandi practice. After an extensive search t h r o u g h arcane Sufi documents i n Arabic, Persian, Turk, and Chinese, and a final personal t r i p to Yemen, Fletcher discovered that the name o f the Sufi saint under w h o m Chinese M u s l i m records indicated Ma M i n g x i n studied but whose identity was u n k n o w n was a Naqshbandi Sufi named az-Zayn i b n M u h a m m a d A b d al-Baqi a l - M i z j a j i (1643

o r 1644-1725), whose family h o m e

was i n Mizjaja, the Zabid. Chinese Sufi records o n l y indicate that M a M i n g x i n studied i n Yemen i n a Sufi order k n o w n as the Shazilinye, whose shaykh was M u h a m m a d B u l u Seni, but the records d o n o t contain the f u l l ancestry and o r i gins o f the order. Most Jahriyyas o n l y say: "The root o f o u r order is Arabia, the branches and leaves are i n China." It is k n o w n that az-Zayn had studied i n M e d i n a under the famous Kurdish mystic I b r a h i m i b n Hasan a l - K u r a n i (1616—90), w h o also advocated the use o f vocal formulas i n the remembrance o f Allah (al-johr bi-dh-dhikr). Al-Kurani's students were at the f o r e f r o n t o f Islamic r e f o r m and fundamentalist movements t h r o u g h o u t the Islamic w o r l d . U n d e r al-Kurani's student's d i r e c t i o n , i t is not surp r i s i n g that Ma M i n g x i n r e t u r n e d after sixteen years o f study i n Yemen and the Arabian peninsula i n 1744 w i t h m o r e activist and radical r e f o r m s o n his m i n d . W h i l e advocating the use o f the vocal remembrance, he generally opposed the heavy emphasis o n the veneration o f Islamic saints that had become popular i n China. These disputes led to bloody conflicts well i n t o the early t w e n t i e t h century. As the disputes g r e w worse and conflicts e r u p t e d , Q i n g troops, fresh f r o m the conquest o f X i n j i a n g i n 1759, d i d n o t w i s h to have any m o r e trouble among the M u s l i m s i n Gansu. They arrested M a M i n g x i n i n 1781

and executed h i m as

his followers attempted to free h i m . Three years later they crushed another uprisi n g led by a Jahriyya Sufi, Tian W u . F r o m this p o i n t o n , the Q i n g sought to l i m i t the spread o f the movements, o u t l a w i n g many o f the so-called n e w teachings, p r i m a r i l y the Jahriyyas. The great Northwest H u i rebellion (1862-76) was led by Ma H u a l o n g , another Jahriyya Sufi leader

fifth-generation

descendant o f Ma M i n g x i n . His rebellion was

responsible for cutting the Q i n g state o f f f r o m the N o r t h w e s t , m a k i n g way for the great 1864-1877 U i g h u r - l e d rebellion i n X i n j i a n g under Yakub Beg. I n 1871

Ma

Hualong was captured and executed, supposedly w i t h his entire fairnly. His body is e n t o m b e d i n Dongta Township, Jinji, just east o f the Yellow River i n N i n g x i a , although his head is reported to have been b u r i e d i n Xuanhuagang, a Jahriyya center, n o r t h o f Zhangjiachuan i n south Gansu. There is also evidence diat suggests D u W e n x i u , the Panthay H u i M u s l i m rebellion i n Yunnan (1855-73), was also

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influenced by Jahriyya ideas. FoUowing the failure o f these uprisings, the Jahriyyas became m u c h m o r e secredve and dispersed, leading to the establishment o f five m a i n Jahriyya branch orders, all named after their r i t u a l and historical centers: Banqiao, Beishan, Nanchuan, Shagou, and X i n d i a n z i The i m p o r t a n c e and extensiveness o f these Sufi orders f o r u n i t i n g disparate H u i c o m m u n i t i e s across China must n o t be

underestimated.

Unlike

the

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G e d i m u c o m m u n i t i e s that had been the n o r m u n t i l that t i m e , Sufi orders p r o v i d e d the leadership and o r g a n i z a t i o n that c o u l d help the H u i survive p o l i t i c a l l y and economically. D u r i n g the fragmented Republican p e r i o d (1911 —49), extensive Sufi n e t w o r k s p r o v e d h e l p f u l to some H u i w a r l o r d s i n the N o r t h w e s t and d i s r u p t i v e to others. Even today, m e m b e r s h i p i n various Islamic orders a n d t h e i r c o n c o m i t a n t Islamic practices o f t e n significantly i n f l u e n c e social interact i o n , especially a m o n g the Sufi orders w h o o f t e n d i s t i n guish themselves by dress. U n l i k e the r o u n d e d w h i t e hat w o r n by most H u i m e n , Sufi f o l l o w e r s o f t e n wear a six-cornered hat, sometimes black. M a n y Jahriyya H u i shave the Sufis in China often wear distinctive dress. Most Chinese Muslims wear round white hats.

sides o f their beards to c o m m e m o r a t e their founder, M a M i n g x i n , whose beard is said to have been s h o r n by Q i n g soldiers before his e x e c u t i o n i n 1781. A l t h o u g h these m a r k ers are almost universally u n n o t i c e d by the H a n m a j o r i t y —

f o r w h o m a H u i is a H u i — t h e N o r t h w e s t H u i can easily i d e n t i f y i n the marketplace m e m b e r s o f the various orders that d i v i d e t h e m internally. The exclusivity o f Sufi orders i n China illustrates the c r u c i a l i t y o f i d e n t i t y and a u t h o r i t y f o r Sufi H u i . The H u i can enter these orders t h r o u g h r i t u a l v o w or by b i r t h b u t s e l d o m m a i n t a i n allegiance to t w o orders at once. This is u n l i k e Sufi t r a d i t i o n a l orders, w h i c h tend to be less exclusive a n d a l l o w simultaneous m e m b e r s h i p i n several orders. I n China m e m b e r s h i p i n these orders is e x c l u sive; c h a n g i n g to a n e w o r d e r is t a n t a m o u n t t o an " i n t e r n a l " conversion experience f o r M u s l i m s i n C h i n a , perhaps the o n l y one they w i l l ever have, because m o s t M u s l i m s i n C h i n a entered Islam by b i r t h . Despite the tremendous variety f o u n d a m o n g Sufis i n China today, f r o m the traditionalist and fairly apolitical Kliufiyyas t o the p o l i t i c a l l y active Jahriyyas and the mystically esoteric Qadariyyas, Sufism may still be generally characterized as a m o d a l i t y that has i n f l u e n c e d m u c h o f Islam i n China. It is distinguished f r o m other Islamic modalities i n its hierarchical organization, its veneration o f saints and tombs, and its emphasis o n m e d i t a t i o n and self-transformation. Given its

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often t i g h t l y organized networks and capability to f o r m secretive oppositional movements, i t is not s u r p r i s i n g that i t is one m o d a l i t y that the state i n China has most often sought to either eradicate or co-opt. To the extent that various Sufi orders and their shaykhs have been able to m a i n t a i n their legitimacy t h r o u g h either secret resistance to the state or p u b l i c compliance, they have maintained their appeal a m o n g M u s l i m s not only i n the N o r t h w e s t , w h e r e Sufism is most popular, but i n the eastern urban centers and n o r t h e r n plains as w e l l .

The Third Mode: Scripturalist Concerns and Modernist Reforms A t h i r d m o d e identifiable i n Chinese Islam began at the end o f the Q i n g dynasty, a p e r i o d o f increased interaction between China and the outside w o r l d , w h e n many M u s l i m s began traveling to and f r o m the M i d d l e East. I n the early decades o f the t w e n t i e t h century, China was exposed to many new f o r e i g n ideas and i n the face o f Japanese and Western imperialist encroachment sought a Chinese approach to governance. Intellectual and organizational activity by Chinese M u s l i m s d u r i n g this p e r i o d was intense. Increased contact w i t h the M i d d l e East led Chinese M u s l i m s to reevaluate their traditional notions o f Islam. The m i s sionary Claude Pickens recorded that f r o m 1923

to 1934 there were 834 k n o w n

H u i M u s l i m s w h o made the hajj to Mecca. I n 1937, according t o one observer, m o r e than 170 H u i p i l g r i m s boarded a steamer i n Shanghai b o u n d for Mecca. By 1939 at least thirty-three H u i M u s l i m s had studied at Cairo's prestigious alAzhar University. A l t h o u g h these numbers are not significant w h e n compared w i t h p i l g r i m s o n the hajj f r o m other Asian M u s l i m areas, the influence and prestige attached to these r e t u r n i n g H u i hajji was p r o f o u n d , particularly i n isolated c o m m u n i t i e s . " I n this respect," Joseph Fletcher once observed, " t h e

more

secluded and remote a M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y was f r o m the m a i n centers o f Islamic cultural life i n the M i d d l e East, the m o r e susceptible i t was t o those centers' most recent trends." As a result o f political events and the influence o f foreign M u s l i m ideas, many n e w H u i organizations emerged. I n 1912,

one year after SunYat-sen was i n a u -

gurated provisional president o f the Chinese Republic i n N a n j i n g , the Chinese M u s l i m Federation was also f o r m e d i n that city. This was f o l l o w e d by the establishment o f other H u i M u s l i m associations: the Chinese M u s l i m M u t u a l Progress Association i n Beijing i n ¡ 9 1 2 , the Chinese M u s l i m Educational Association i n Shanghai i n 192c, the Chinese M u s l i m Association i n 192c, the Chinese M u s l i m Young Students Association in N a n j i n g i n 1931, the Society for the P r o m o t i o n o f Education A m o n g M u s l i m s i n N a n j i n g i n 1931, and the Chinese M u s l i m General Association i n Jinan i n

1934.

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The M u s l i m periodical press flourished as never before. A l t h o u g h i t was reported that circulation was l o w , there were more than one h u n d r e d k n o w n M u s l i m p e r i o d i cals produced before the outbreak o f the Sino-Japanese War i n 1937. T h i r t y journals were published between 1911

and 1937 i n

Beijing alone, p r o m p t i n g one author to suggest that a l t h o u g h Chinese Islam's t r a d i tional

religious center was still

Linxia

( H e z h o u ) , its cultural center had shifted to Beijing. This t o o k place w h e n many H u i intellectuals traveled t o Japan, the M i d d l e East, and the West. Caught u p i n the n a t i o n alist fervor o f the first h a l f o f the twentieth Islamic reformist movements emerged in China in the late nineteenth

century, they p u b l i s h e d magazines and

and early twentieth centuries. Pilgrims returning from Arabia, where

f o u n d e d organizations, q u e s t i o n i n g their

the conservative Wahhabis were in power, introduced the Yihewani movement, Chinese for the Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood). Stressing orthodox practice, they proscribed such cul-

identity as never before i n a process that H u i h i s t o r i a n M a Shouqian has t e r m e d " t h e

tural accretions as the decoration of mosques with Arabic and Chinese

N e w Awakening o f the H u i " at the end o f

calligraphy, the most striking feature of traditional Chinese mosques.

the nineteenth and t h e b e g i n n i n g o f the twentieth centuries. As many o f these H u i

hajji returned f r o m their pilgrimages to the M i d d l e East, they initiated several reforms, engaging themselves once again i n the contested space between Islamic ideals and Chinese culture. Influenced by Wahhabi ideals i n the Arabian peninsula, r e t u r n i n g H u i r e f o r m ers i n t r o d u c e d theYihewanis (Chinese for the Ikhwan al-Muslimin) to China—a relig i o - p o l i t i c a l m o v e m e n t that s u p p o r t e d , i n some cases, China's nationalist concerns, a n d i n others, its w a r l o r d politics. A l t h o u g h t h e I k h w a n M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d elsewhere i n the Islamic w o r l d has been depicted as antimodernist and recidivist, this is n o t true o f the m o v e m e n t i n China. I n fact, theYihewanis i n China eventually diverged so far f r o m their I k h w a n M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d b e g i n n i n g s , that i t is m i s l e a d i n g to even refer to the Yihewanis i n China as " I k h w a n " o r as a single m o v e m e n t o r order. It has n o w become merely an another " m o d e " o f Islamic practice, an alternative to GecLimu (traditional Islam) and Sufism i n China. The beginnings o f the Y i h e w a n i m o v e m e n t i n China can be traced to M a W a n f u (1849-1934), w h o r e t u r n e d f r o m the hajj i n 1892 to teach i n the H e z h o u area. The i n i t i a l reformers were p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h religious scriptural¬ ist o r t h o d o x y — s o m u c h so that they are still k n o w n as the "venerate-the-scrip-

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tures f a c t i o n " (zunjing pai). A l t h o u g h the reformers were concerned w i t h larger goals than merely " c o r r e c t i n g " w h a t they regarded as u n o r t h o d o x practice, like previous r e f o r m s i n C h i n a , i t is at the practical and r i t u a l level that they i n i t i ated their c r i t i q u e . Seeking perhaps to replace " I s l a m i c theater" w i t h scripture, they p r o s c r i b e d the veneration o f saints, their t o m b s , and their shrines, and sought to stem the g r o w i n g influence o f w e l l - k n o w n i n d i v i d u a l a h o n g and Sufi m e n h u a n leaders. Stressing o r t h o d o x practice t h r o u g h advocating a p u r i f i e d " n o n - C h i n e s e " Islam, they c r i t i c i z e d such c u l t u r a l accretions as the w e a r i n g o f w h i t e m o u r n i n g dress (dai xiao) and the decoration o f mosques w i t h Chinese o r Arabic texts. At one p o i n t , M a W a n f u even proposed the exclusive use o f Arabic and Persian i n all education instead o f Chinese. Due to M a Wanfu's contacts w i t h the W a h h a b i d u r i n g his s o j o u r n , the Y i h e w a n i f o l l o w strict W a h h a b i practice. T h e i r mosques are d i s t i n g u i s h e d by their almost complete lack o f a d o r n m e n t on the inside, w i t h w h i t e walls and n o i n s c r i p t i o n s , as w e l l as a preference f o r Arabian-style m o s q u e architecture. This contrasts sharply w i t h other m o r e

Traditional Chinese-style

Chinese-style mosques i n China, typical o f the " o l d " G e d i m u , whose architec-

mosques often resembled

ture resembles C o n f u c i a n temples i n their sweeping roofs and s y m m e t r i c a l

Confucian temples, with

courtyards ( w i t h the X i ' a n H u a j u e Great Mosque as the best example). The

sweeping roofs and symmet-

Yihewanis also proscribed the a d o r n m e n t o f their mosques w i t h Arabic a n d especially Chinese Q u r a n i c texts and banners. This is the most s t r i k i n g i c o n o graphie marker o f Sufi mosques a n d w o r s h i p centers i n the N o r t h w e s t , whose walls a n d t o m b s are o f t e n layered w i t h Arabic and Chinese texts o n silk a n d

rical courtyards, as at the mosque in Yunnan shown here. The Yihewanis rejected this style, preferring plain white mosques.

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c l o t h banners i n t h e distinctive H u i - s t y l e art that fluidly combines Arabic a n d Chinese calligraphy. TheYihewanis flourished i n N o r t h w e s t China under the patronage o f several M u s l i m warlords d u r i n g the Nationalist p e r i o d , most notably M a Bufang. I n a m o d e r n i s t discourse, arguing that the Yihewanis supported education, a rationalized, less-mystical religious expression, a n d a strong Chinese n a t i o n , M a Bufang supported the expansion o f theYihewanis t h r o u g h o u t N o r t h w e s t China. He must have also been aware that wherever theYihewanis w e n t , the h i e r a r c h i cal a u t h o r i t y o f the Sufi shaykhs and the solidarity o f their m e n h u a n were contested, thus protecting M a Bufang f r o m other organized religious organizations that m i g h t orchestrate an effective resistance t o his expansion. This c o u l d n o t have been lost o n the early C o m m u n i s t s either, w h o traveled t h r o u g h M a Bufang's t e r r i t o r y and the Northwest o n their Long M a r c h , w h i c h ended i n Yenan, near N i n g x i a , a heavily populated M u s l i m area d o m i n a t e d at that time by Ma H o n g k u i , a cousin o f Ma Bufang's, w h o also supported theYihewanis. After the f o u n d i n g o f the People's Republic i n 1949, the state q u i c k l y suppressed all Sufi m e n h u a n as feudalistic and gave tacit support t o theYihewanis. A l t h o u g h Ma Bufang and M a H o n g k u i b o t h fled w i t h the Nationalists to Taiwan, their policy o f opposing Sufi organizations was left b e h i n d w i t h the Communists. The China Islamic Association, established i n 1955-, was heavily d o m i n a t e d by theYihewanis and was supportive o f the 1957-58 p u b l i c criticisms a n d show trials o f the Naqshbandi Shaykh Ma Z h e n w u specifically and Sufism generally as feudalist and exploitative o f the masses. After the purges o f the Cultural Revolution ( 1 9 6 6 - 7 6 ) , i n w h i c h all Islamic orders eventually were affected, theYihewanis were the first to receive renewed state patronage. Most o f the large mosques that were rebuilt w i t h state funds t h r o u g h o u t China as compensation for damages and destruction caused by the Red Guards d u r i n g the n o w repudiated Cultural Revolution happened to be Y i h e w a n i mosques, although all orders were equally criticized d u r i n g the radical p e r i o d . A l t h o u g h n o Chinese o f f i c i a l w i l l a d m i t that the Yihewanis receive special treatment, this is cause f o r some resentment a m o n g M u s l i m s i n China. The great S o u t h Gate M o s q u e

i n Y i n c h u a n , the capital o f the N i n g x i a H u i

A u t o n o m o u s R e g i o n , was one o f the first mosques rebuilt i n N i n g x i a w i t h state f u n d s — i t just happened t o be staffed by Y i h e w a n i i m a m s , a l t h o u g h the state said it was a nonsectarian mosque. After the state spent m o r e than f i f t y t h o u sand y u a n t o r e b u i l d the m o s q u e i n 1982, the local M u s l i m s , most o f w h o m were G e d i m u and K h u f i y y a , refused t o attend. The b u i l d i n g sat almost e m p t y for the first few years and the state attempted t o recoup its losses f r o m the large Arab-style architectural structure b y t u r n i n g i t i n t o a tourist attraction and selli n g tickets at the entrance. T h i s , o f course, o n l y c o n f i r m e d its lack o f r e l i g i o u s

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I

l e g i t i m a c y a m o n g m a n y local H u i M u s l i m s , especially the G e d i m u and Sufis. I n 1985 a v i s i t i n g K u w a i t i delegation t o the m o s q u e became aware o f the situ a t i o n a n d instead o f d o n a t i n g m o n e y to the South Gate M o s q u e as o r i g i n a l l y p l a n n e d , they gave S 10,000 (about t h i r t y thousand y u a n ) for r e f u r b i s h i n g the m u c h smaller t r a d i t i o n a l Central M o s q u e , a G e d i m u m o s q u e p o p u l a r a m o n g the locals. T h e Y i h e w a n i s c o n t i n u e to be a p o w e r f u l Islamic g r o u p t h r o u g h o u t China. Like the G e d i m u , theYihewanis emphasize leadership t h r o u g h t r a i n i n g a n d e d u cation rather than inheritance and succession. The Yihewanis differ f r o m the

Much to the resentment of other Chinese Muslims, the reformist Yihewani movement receives special treatment from the Chinese government.The great South Gate Mosque inYinchuan city was rebuilt with state funds in 1982. It is staffed by Yihewani imams.

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G e d i m u p r i m a r i l y i n ritual matters and their stress o n r e f o r m t h r o u g h Chinese education and m o d e r n i s m . U n l i k e the G e d i m u , they d o not collectively chant the scriptures, visit tombs, celebrate the death days o f their ancestors, o r gather for Islamic festivals i n remembrance o f saints. Because o f their emphasis o n n a t i o n alist concerns, e d u c a t i o n , m o d e r n i z a t i o n , and decentralized leadership, the m o v e m e n t has attracted m o r e u r b a n intellectual M u s l i m s . This is w h y the Yihewanis i n China cannot be regarded as a t i g h t l y f o u n d e d " o r d e r " as the M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d is o f t e n portrayed i n the M i d d l e East; i t is instead a m o d e o f Islamic r e f o r m and o r i e n t a t i o n i n China. T h e Y i h e w a n i s ' nationalistic ideals, and their co-optation by the earlier Republic Nationalists and the C o m m u n i s t Party led many o f the more religious Yihewanis to become disillusioned w i t h the order. It w as seen by many to be n o longer a fundamentalistic agent o f r e f o r m , but an institutionalized organ o f the state for systematizing and m o n i t o r i n g Islamic practice. T h o u g h still i n f l u e n t i a l politically, i t has lost its d y n a m i c appeal to many o f the most conservative M u s l i m s i n China. For the vast m a j o r i t y o f urban H u i M u s l i m s , and even man)' rural M u s l i m s i n the small t o w n s o f the n o r t h e r n plains, however, i t is merely the mosque that they belong to by v i r t u e o f b i r t h o r marriage, and few H u i M u s l i m s can tell the difference between the Yihewanis and the G e d i m u , let alone between the m y r i a d orders o f Sufis. A H u i w o r k e r i n H a n g z h o u once said that the basic difference between the G e d i m u (he used the termlaojiao, " o l d teachings") and i n this case the Yihewani (xin jiao, " n e w teachings") was that theYihewanis d i d n o t eat crab and the G e d i m u d i d ; the Yihewanis d i d n o t because "crabs w a l k e d sideways." A l t h o u g h the total p o p u l a t i o n o f the v a r i o u s Islamic associations i n China has n o t been p u b l i s h e d , one M u s l i m Chinese scholar, Yang H u a i z h o n g , estimates that o f the 2,132

mosques i n , N i n g x i a H u i A u t o n o m o u s R e g i o n ,

560

b e l o n g to t h e Y i h e w a n i s , 560 t o the K h u f i y y a s , 4 6 4 to the Jahriyyas, 41c to the t r a d i t i o n a l G e d i m u , and 133

to Qadariyya r e l i g i o u s w o r s h i p sites (some o f

w h i c h i n c l u d e mosques). The most c o m p r e h e n s i v e estimate g i v e n so far f o r H u i m e m b e r s h i p i n Islamic orders t h r o u g h o u t C h i n a is by M a Tong. O f an estimated total at that t i m e o f 6,781 , c o o H u i M u s l i m s i n the late 1980s, M a Tong r e c o r d e d that there w e r e c8.2 percent G e d i m u . 21 percent Y i h e w a n i . 10.9 percent Jahriyya, 7.2 percent K h u f i y y a , 1.4 percent Q a d a r i y y a , a n d 0.7 percent Kubrawdyya.

Etrinicization of the Silk Road Peoples: The Case of the Uighur I n 1997 bombs exploded i n a city park i n Beijing o n May 13 ( k i l l i n g one) and on t w o buses o n M a r c h 7 ( k i l l i n g t w o ) , as w e l l as i n the northwestern border city o f U r u m q i , the capital o f Xinjiang U i g h u r A u t o n o m o u s Region, o n February 2c

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( k i l l i n g n i n e ) , w i t h m o r e than thirtyother b o m b i n g s i n 1997

and six i n

Tibet alone. Most o f these b o m b i n g s are t h o u g h t to have been related to demands by M u s l i m and Tibetan separatists. Eight members o f the U i g h u r M u s l i m m i n o r i t y were executed o n May

29

f o r alleged

northwest

China,

bombings

with

in

hundreds

arrested for suspicion o f taking part i n ethnic riots and engaging i n separatist activities. At a time w h e n China celebrates its recovery

o f H o n g Kong,

w h i c h took place o n July

1,

1997,

many w o n d e r i f i t can h o l d o n to rebellious parts o f its restive west. Most analysts agree that China is n o t v u l n e r a b l e to the same e t h n i c separatism

that

split

the

former

Soviet U n i o n . But f e w d o u b t that s h o u l d C h i n a fall apart, i t

would

d i v i d e , like the Soviet U n i o n , along centuries-old regional,

ethnic,

linguistic,

and c u l t u r a l f a u l t

lines.

These divisions s h o w e d themselves at the end o f China's last e m p i r e , w h e n it was d i v i d e d for m o r e than t w e n t y

Modern-day China has to confront many ethnic problems. For example, the Uighur people were first a tribal confederation, then a kingdom, and finally a Muslim nationality of the People's Republic.The main Uighur town is Urumqi, capital of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, and the main mosque there is known as the Grand Islam Mosque.

years by regional w a r l o r d s w i t h local and ethnic bases i n the n o r t h and the s o u t h , and by M u s l i m w a r l o r d s i n the west. E t h n i c i z a t i o n has meant that the current c u l t u r a l fault lines o f China and Central Asia increasingly f o l l o w o f f i c i a l designations o f i d e n t i t y . For Central Asia the breakup o f the Soviet U n i o n thus d i d n o t lead t o the creation o f a greater "Turkestan" or a pan-Islamic c o l l e c t i o n o f states, despite t h e p r e d o m i nantly Turkic and M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n s o f the r e g i o n . Rather, the breakup fell a l o n g ethnic and national lines. China clearly is n o t about t o fall apart, n o t yet anyway. But it also has ethnic p r o b l e m s , and i t m u s t solve t h e m f o r m o r e pressi n g reasons. This section examines recent events i n X i n j i a n g i n l i g h t o f a nearly c e n t u r y - l o n g process o f e t h n i c i z a t i o n that has taken place a m o n g the U i g h u r s and m a n y o t h e r peoples o f Central Asia and China as a result o f Sino-Soviet policies and the rise o f the nation-state i n the r e g i o n . A l t h o u g h i t was n o t e d

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earlier that Islamization was an i m p o r t a n t force i n f o r m i n g the c o n t e m p o r a r y consciousness o f the people k n o w n as the H u i , this section discusses the r o l e o f e t h n i c i z a t i o n i n the r e g i o n . Chinese histories n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , every U i g h u r f i r m l y believes that his or her ancestors were the indigenous people o f the T a r i m basin, w h i c h d i d not become k n o w n i n Chinese as Xinjiang ( " n e w d o m i n i o n " ) u n t i l the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, the i d e n t i t y o f the present people k n o w n as U i g h u r s is a rather recent p h e n o m e n o n related to Great Game rivalries, Sino-Soviet geopolitical maneuverings, and Chinese nation b u i l d i n g . A l t h o u g h a collection o f n o m a d i c steppe peoples k n o w n as the U i g h u r s have existed since before the e i g h t h century, this i d e n t i t y was lost f r o m the fifteenth to the t w e n t i e t h centuries. It was not u n t i l the fall o f the Turkish khanate ( 5 5 2 - 7 4 4 c . E . ) to a people reported by the Chinese historians as Hui-he or Hui-hu that the beginnings o f the U i g h u r e m p i r e are f o u n d . At this t i m e the U i g h u r s were but a collection o f nine nomadic tribes, w h o initially, i n confederation w i t h other Basmil and K a r l u k h nomads, defeated the second Turkish khanate and t h e n d o m i n a t e d the federation under the leadership o f Koli Beile i n 742. The U i g h u r s defeated the T u r k i s h khanate and settled d o w n as a g r i c u l t u r alists just as trade w i t h the u n i f i e d Tang state became especially l u c r a t i v e . Sedentarization and i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h the Chinese state was a c c o m p a n i e d by s o c i o r e l i g i o u s change: the t r a d i t i o n a l shamanistic T u r k i c - s p e a k i n g U i g h u r s came increasingly u n d e r the i n f l u e n c e o f Persian M a n i c h a e a n i s m , B u d d h i s m , and eventually N e s t o r i a n Christianity. Extensive trade a n d m i l i t a r y alliances a l o n g the o l d Silk Road w i t h the Chinese state developed to the extent that the U i g h u r s gradually a d o p t e d c u l t u r a l , dress, and even a g r i c u l t u r a l practices o f the Chinese. Conquest o f the U i g h u r capital o f Karabalghasun i n M o n g o l i a by the n o m a d i c Kyrgyz i n 8 4 0 , w i t h o u t rescue f r o m the Tang, w h o may have b e c o m e by t h e n i n t i m i d a t e d by the w e a l t h y U i g h u r e m p i r e , l e d t o f u r t h e r sedentarization and crystallization o f U i g h u r i d e n t i t y . O n e b r a n c h that e n d e d u p i n w h a t is n o w T u r p a n , t o o k advantage o f the u n i q u e s o c i o e c o l o g y o f the glacier-fed oases s u r r o u n d i n g the T a k l i m a k a n Desert and w e r e able t o p r e serve t h e i r m e r c h a n t a n d l i m i t e d agrarian practices, gradually establishing K h o c h o or Gaochang, the great U i g h u r city-state based i n T u r p a n f o r f o u r centuries (850—1250). The Islamization o f the U i g h u r s f r o m the tenth century to as late as the seventeenth century, w h i l e displacing their Buddhist r e l i g i o n , d i d little to b r i d g e these oases-based loyalties. F r o m that t i m e o n the people o f " U i g h u r i s t a n " centered i n Turpan, w h o resisted Islamic conversion u n t i l the seventeenth century, were the last to be k n o w n as U i g h u r s . The others were k n o w n o n l y by their oasis or by the generic t e r m o f Turki. W i t h the arrival o f Islam, the e t h n o n y m Uighur

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fades f r o m the historical record. A c c o r d i n g to M o r r i s Rossabi, i t was not u n t i l 1760 that the M a n c h u Q i n g dynasty exerted f u l l a n d f o r m a l c o n t r o l over the r e g i o n , establishing i t as their " n e w d o m i n i o n s . " (Xinjiang), an administration that lasted barely one h u n d r e d years, w h e n i t fell t o the Yakub Beg r e b e l l i o n ( 1864—77) a n d expanding Russian influence. The end o f the Q i n g dynasty and the rise o f Great Game rivalries between China, Russia, a n d B r i t a i n saw the r e g i o n t o r n by c o m p e t i n g loyalties and marked by t w o short-lived and drastically different attempts at an independence: the short-lived proclamations o f an "East Turkestan R e p u b l i c " i n Kashgar i n 1933 a n d another i n Y i n i n g (Gulja) i n 1944. As A n d r e w D. W. Forbes has n o t e d i n Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia (1986), these rebellions a n d attempts at self-rule d i d little t o b r i d g e c o m p e t i n g p o l i t i c a l , r e l i g i o u s , a n d regional differences w i t h i n the Turkic people, w h o became o f f i c i a l l y k n o w n as the U i g h u r s i n 1934 u n d e r successive Chinese K u o m i n t a n g w a r l o r d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s . This designation was achieved

under

Soviet sponsorship i n a meeting o f regional delegates i n Tashkent i n 1921, w h o voted t o revive the ancient e t h n o n y m Lfighur and apply i t t o the sedentarized Turkic people o f the T a r i m basin. Today, despite c o n t i n u e d regional differences along three a n d perhaps f o u r m a c r o r e g i o n s — i n c l u d i n g

the n o r t h w e s t e r n

Zungaria plateau, the southern T a r i m basin, the southwest Pamir r e g i o n , and the eastern K u m u l - T u r p a n - H a m i c o r r i d o r — t h e r e are nearly nine m i l l i o n

people

spread t h r o u g h o u t this vast r e g i o n w h o regard themselves as U i g h u r s . Many o f t h e m dream of, and some militate for, an independent " U i g h u r i s t a n . " T h e recogn i t i o n o f the U i g h u r s as an o f f i c i a l Chinese " n a t i o n a l i t y " (minzu) i n the 1930s i n X i n j i a n g under a Soviet-influenced p o l i c y o f nationality r e c o g n i t i o n c o n t r i b u t e d to a widespread acceptance today o f continuity w i t h the ancient U i g h u r k i n g d o m and their eventual ethnogenesis as a bona fide nationality. The so-called n a t i o n ality policy under the K u o m i n t a n g i d e n t i f i e d five nationalities o f China, w i t h the Han i n the majority. This p o l i c y was c o n t i n u e d under the C o m m u n i s t s , eventually recognizing

fifty-six

nationalities, w i t h the H a n o c c u p y i n g a 91

percent

m a j o r i t y i n 1990. The "peaceful l i b e r a t i o n " by the Chinese C o m m u n i s t s o f X i n j i a n g i n 1949, and its subsequent establishment o f the Xinjiang U i g h u r A u t o n o m o u s Region o n October 1, 1955, perpetuated the Nationalist p o l i c y o f recognizing the U i g h u r s as a m i n o r i t y nationality under Chinese rule. This nationality designation n o t o n l y masks tremendous regional a n d hnguistic diversity, i t also includes such groups as the Loplyk a n d Dolans that h a d very little t o d o w i t h the oasis-based Turkic M u s l i m s that became k n o w n as the U i g h u r s . At the same t i m e , c o n t e m porary U i g h u r separatists look back t o the b r i e f periods o f independent self-rule under Yakub Beg (1820—77)

a n f

i the eastern Turkestan republics, i n a d d i t i o n t o

the earlier glories o f the U i g h u r k i n g d o m s i n Turpan and Karabalghasan, as evi-

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dence o f their r i g h t f u l claims to the region. C o n t e m p o r a r y U i g h u r separatist organizations

based

in

Istanbul,

Ankara, Almaty, M u n i c h .

Amsterdam,

M e l b o u r n e , and Washington, D.C., may differ o n their political goals and strategies for the r e g i o n , but they all share a c o m m o n v i s i o n o f a u n i l i n e a l U i g h u r claim o n the region, disrupted by Chinese and Soviet i n t e r v e n t i o n . The independence o f the f o r m e r Soviet Central Asian republics i n 1991 has done m u c h to encourage these U i g h u r organizations

i n t h e i r hopes f o r an

independent

" U i g h u r i s t a n , " despite the fact the new m a i n l y M u s l i m Central Asian governments all signed protocols w i t h China i n early 1996 to the effect that they w o u l d not harbor or support separatist groups. W i t h i n the region, a l t h o u g h many portray the U i g h u r s as u n i t e d around separatist or Islamist causes, the U i g h u r s continue to be d i v i d e d f r o m w i t h i n by r e l i gious conflicts, i n this case c o m p e t i n g Sufi and non-Sufi factions, t e r r i t o r i a l loyalties ( w h e t h e r they be oases or places o f o r i g i n ) , linguistic discrepancies, c o m m o n e r - e l i t e alienation, and c o m p e t i n g political loyalties. These d i v i d e d l o y alties were evidenced by the attack i n May o f 1996 o n the i m a m o f the Idgah Mosque i n Kashgar by other U i g h u r s , as w e l l as the assassination o f at least six U i g h u r officials i n September o f 1997. It is also i m p o r t a n t to note that Islam was only one o f several u n i f y i n g markers for U i g h u r identity, depending o n those w i t h w h o m they were i n cooperation at the t i m e . For example, to the H u i M u s l i m Chinese discussed earlier, the U i g h u r s d i s t i n g u i s h themselves as the legitimate indigenous m i n o r i t y , because b o t h share a belief i n Sunni Islam. I n contrast to the nomadic M u s l i m peoples (Kazakh or Kyrgyz), U i g h u r s m i g h t stress their attachment to the land and oasis o f o r i g i n . I n o p p o s i t i o n to the H a n Chinese, the U i g h u r s w i l l generally emphasize their l o n g history i n the region. This suggests that Islamic f u n d a m e n t a l i s t

g r o u p s , s u c h as the Taliban i n

Afghanistan, w i l l have o n l y l i m i t e d appeal a m o n g the U i g h u r s . This contested understanding o f history continues to influence m u c h o f the current debate over separatist and Chinese claims to the region. Another pressing issue for the U i g h u r s is economic. Since 1991

China has

been a net o i l importer. It also has t w e n t y m i l l i o n M u s l i m s . M i s h a n d l i n g o f its M u s l i m problems w i l l alienate trading partners i n the M i d d l e East, w h o are p r i m a r i l y M u s l i m s . After an ethnic r i o t i n February o f 1997 i n the northwestern X i n j i a n g city o f Y i n i n g , w h i c h left at least nine U i g h u r M u s l i m s dead and several hundred arrested, the Saudi Arabian official new spaper d-Bilud warned China about the " s u f f e r i n g o f [its] M u s l i m s whose h u m a n rights are violated." Turkey's defense minister, Turhan Tayan, officially c o n d e m n e d China's h a n d l i n g o f the issue, and China responded by telling Turkey not to interfere i n China's internal affairs. M u s l i m nations o n China's borders, i n c l u d i n g the n e w Central Asian states, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, a l t h o u g h officially unsupportive o f U i g h u r sep-

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aratists, may be increasingly critical o f harsh treatment extended to f e l l o w Turkic o r M u s l i m co-religionists i n China. Unrest i n the X i n j i a n g U i g h u r A u t o n o m o u s Region may lead to a decline i n outside o i l investment and revenues, w h i c h are already operating at a loss. Exxon recently reported that its t w o wells came u p d r y i n China's supposedly o i l - r i c h Tarim basin o f southern X i n j i a n g , w i t h the entire r e g i o n y i e l d i n g only 3. ic m i l l i o n m e t r i c tons o f crude o i l , m u c h less than China's overall o u t p u t o f ic6 m i l l i o n tons. The W o r l d Bank loans m o r e than S3 b i l l i o n a year t o China, investing m o r e than $780.5 m i l l i o n i n fifteen projects i n the X i n j i a n g r e g i o n alone, w i t h some o f that money allegedly g o i n g to the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), w h i c h h u m a n r i g h t s activist H a r r y W u has claimed employs p r i s o n (lao-goi) labor. Senate hearings i n the U n i t e d States o n W o r l d Bank investment i n X i n j i a n g have led Assistant U.S. Treasury Secretary David A. L i p t o n t o declare that the treasury department w o u l d n o longer support W o r l d Bank p r o jects associated w i t h the XPCC. International companies and organizations, f r o m the W o r l d Bank to Exxon, may n o t w i s h to subject its employees and investors to social and p o l i t i c a l upheavals. It is clear that ethnic separatism o r M u s l i m c o m plaints regarding Chinese p o l i c y w i l l have i m p o r t a n t consequences for China's economic development o f the r e g i o n . Tourists and f o r e i g n businesspeople

will

certainly avoid areas w i t h ethnic strife and terrorist activities. China w i l l continue to use its economic leverage w i t h its Central Asian neighbors and Russia to prevent such disruptions. China's international relations w i t h its b o r d e r i n g nations a n d internal regions such as X i n j i a n g and Tibet have become increasingly i m p o r t a n t n o t o n l y for the e c o n o m i c reasons discussed earlier, b u t also for China's desire to participate i n such i n t e r n a t i o n a l organizations as the W o r l d Trade O r g a n i z a t i o n and the AsiaPacific Economic C o u n c i l . A l t h o u g h Tibet is n o longer o f any real strategic or substantial e c o n o m i c value to C h i n a , i t is politically i m p o r t a n t to China's c u r rent leadership to indicate that they w i l l n o t s u b m i t to f o r e i g n pressure and w i t h d r a w its i r o n h a n d f r o m Tibet. U i g h u r s have b e g u n to w o r k closely w i t h Tibetans i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y to p u t p o l i t i c a l pressure o n C h i n a i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r u m s . I n an A p r i l 1997 i n t e r v i e w i n Istanbul that this author h e l d w i t h A h m e t Türkoz, vice-director o f the Eastern Turkestan F o u n d a t i o n , w h i c h w o r k s for an i n d e p e n d e n t U i g h u r h o m e l a n d , Türkoz noted that since 1981

meetings h a d

been taking place between the Dalai Lama and U i g h u r leaders, i n i t i a t e d by the late

U i g h u r nationalist

Isa Yusup A l p t e k i n .

The

elected

leader

of

the

Unrepresented Nations and People's Organization, based i n The Hague, an organ i z a t i o n o r i g i n a l l y b u i l t o n Tibetan issues, is Erkin A l p t e k i n , the son o f Isa A l p t e k i n . These i n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r u m s cannot force China to change its p o l i c y any m o r e than can the annual debate i n the U n i t e d States over the renewal o f

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China's Most Favored N a t i o n status. Nevertheless, they c o n t i n u e to influence China's ability to cooperate internationally. As a result, China has sought to respond rapidly and o f t e n m i l i t a r i l y to domestic ethnic affairs that m i g h t have international implications. I n a d d i t i o n to the o f f i c i a l m i n o r i t i e s , China possesses tremendous ethnic, l i n guistic, and regional diversity. The ethnicization o f the U i g h u r s has i m p o r t a n t implications for other cultural groups across China. Intolerance t o w a r d d i f f e r ence i n Xinjiang m i g h t be extended to l i m i t i n g cultural p l u r a l i s m i n Guangdong, w h e r e at least fifteen dialects o f Cantonese are spoken and folk religious practice is rampant. M e m o r i e s are strong o f the repressions o f the Cultural Revolution, w h e n all f o r m s o f diversity, p o l i t i c a l or cultural, were severely curtailed. I f rising Chinese nationalism entails reducing ethnic and c u l t u r a l difference, then anyone w h o is regarded as " o t h e r " i n China w i l l suffer, n o t just the U i g h u r s .

China and Central Asian Relations: Contemporary Connections and Contradictions Since the breakup o f the Soviet U n i o n i n 1991, China has become an i m p o r t a n t c o m p e t i t o r for influence i n Central Asia and is expected to serve as a counterweight to Russia. Calling for a n e w interregional Silk Route, China is already c o n structing such a l i n k w i t h rails and pipelines. As n o t e d earlier, the ethnicization o f several Central Asian peoples and their rise to prominence as the leading m e m bers o f the n e w Central Asian states means that e c o n o m i c development a n d cross-border

des w i l l be strongly i n f l u e n c e d by ancient ethnic relations a n d

geopolitical ties. A 1997 study by fames P D o r i a n , Brett H . W i g d o r t z , and D r u C. Gladney discussed the g r o w i n g interdependence o f the r e g i o n . Trade between Xinjiang and the Central Asian republics has g r o w n rapidly, reaching S77C m i l l i o n i n 1996, a n d the n u m b e r o f Chinese-Kazakh j o i n t ventures continues to rise, n o w approaching t w o h u n d r e d . Xinjiang exports a variety o f products to Kazakhstan as w e l l as to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Ukraine. Increased economic cooperation w i t h China provides Central Asia w i t h a d d i t i o n a l o p t i o n s for markets, trade routes, a n d technical assistance. As noted i n the discussion o f the U i g h u r s , whose m o d e r n i d e n t i t y depended on a conference i n Tashkent i n 1921

that revived their long-extinct e t h n o n y m ,

cross-border ethnic ties and interethnic relations vvithin X i n j i a n g continue to have tremendous consequences for development i n the r e g i o n . M u s l i m s comprise nearly 60 percent o f Xinjiang's p o p u l a t i o n , and most o f t h e m are U i g h u r s . Being Turkic, the Uighurs share a c o m m o n Islamic, linguistic, and pastoralist heritage w i t h the peoples o f the Central Asian states. Turkic nationalists proclaimed an "East

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Turkestan Republic" i n Kashgar i n 1933, and another one i n Y i n i n g i n 1944- As Linda Benson has documented, b o t h republics were short-lived. The U i g h u r s and other Turkic groups i n the region are also closer culturally and linguistically to their Central Asian neighbors than they are to the H a n Chinese. The H a n (the official m a j o r i t y nationality o f China) are also relatively recent i m m i g r a n t s to Xinjiang. The b e g i n n i n g o f the t w e n t i e t h century m a r k e d an e n o r m o u s m o v e m e n t o f Russian and H a n Chinese settlers to o u t l y i n g Central Asian regions. From 1949 to 1979 China sent H a n professionals to X i n j i a n g to h e l p " o p e n the N o r t h w e s t . " I n 1990 estimates put the H a n Chinese at 38 percent o f Xinjiang's p o p u l a t i o n , u p f r o m 5 percent i n 1949. A l t h o u g h Russian p o p u l a tions have b e g u n to decline i n parts o f the f o r m e r Soviet U n i o n since i n d e p e n dence, the H a n m i g r a t i o n to X i n j i a n g continues to escalate. O p p o r t u n i t i e s i n Xinjiang's energy sector attract many m i g r a n t s . China's rapidly g r o w i n g economy has the c o u n t r y anxiously developing domestic energy sources and l o o k i n g abroad for n e w sources. I n 1993, w i t h domestic o i l c o n s u m p t i o n rising faster than p r o d u c t i o n , China abandoned its energy self-sufficiency goal and became a net i m p o r t e r o f o i l for the first t i m e . D u r i n g

1996

China's crude o i l p r o d u c t i o n reached a record h i g h o f 156.5 m i l l i o n tons, w h i l e i m p o r t s o f crude were u p 37.5 percent over 1995, to 22 m i l l i o n tons. China is expected to i m p o r t as m u c h as 30 percent o f its o i l by the year 2000. As China develops i n t o a m o d e r n economy, i t should see a rise i n d e m a n d comparable to that experienced i n Japan, w h e r e demand for natural gas and other energy needs has q u a d r u p l e d i n the past t h i r t y years. This is particularly w h y China has b e g u n to l o o k elsewhere for m e e t i n g its energy needs; i n September 1997 L i Peng signed a contract for exclusive rights to Kazakhstan's second largest o i l field. It also indicates d e c l i n i n g expectations for China's o w n energy resources i n the T a r i m basin. Once estimated to contain 482 b i l l i o n barrels, even the president o f China N a t i o n a l P e t r o l e u m C o r p o r a t i o n admits that today there are k n o w n reserves o f o n l y 1.5 b i l l i o n barrels. China hopes to make u p for its dependence o n Kazakhstan o i l by increasing trade. China's t w o - w a y trade w i t h central Asia has increased dramatically since the Chinese government opened X i n j i a n g to the r e g i o n f o l l o w i n g the collapse o f the Soviet U n i o n i n 1991. By the end o f 1992 f o r m a l trade had j u m p e d by

130

percent; total border trade, i n c l u d i n g barter, is estimated to have t r i p l e d . Ethnic ties have facilitated this trading surge: those w i t h family relations benefit f r o m relaxed visa and travel restrictions. Large numbers o f " t o u r i s t s " f r o m Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan make frequent shopping trips i n t o X i n j i a n g and r e t u r n h o m e to sell their goods at small village markets. X i n j i a n g has already become dependent o n central Asian business, w i t h the five republics accounting f o r m o r e than h a l f o f its international trade i n 1993.

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C h i n a - C e n t r a l Asia trade

is b e t w e e n

Xinjiang and

(Xinjiang's largest t r a d i n g partner by far). F r o m 1990 to 1992

Kazakhstan Kazakhstan's

i m p o r t s f r o m China rose f r o m just less than 4 percent to 4 4 percent o f its total. A b o u t h a l f o f China-Kazakh trade is o n a barter basis. T h r o u g h 199c China was Kazakhstan's f i f t h largest trade partner, b e h i n d Russia, H o l l a n d , Germany, and Switzerland. China's trade w i t h Kyrgyzstan has increased rapidly. T h r o u g h

199c

Kyrgyzstan was Xinjiang's t h i r d largest t r a d i n g partner, after Kazakhstan and H o n g Kong. As early as 1992, China ranked as Uzbekistan's leading n o n - f o r m e r Soviet republic t r a d i n g partner. Since t h e n , bilateral trade has increased by as m u c h as 127 percent a year, m a k i n g Uzbekistan China's second largest central Asian t r a d i n g partner. This may be one o f the most p r o m i s i n g e c o n o m i c relat i o n s h i p s d e v e l o p i n g i n central Asia. The large and relatively affluent U z b e k p o p u l a t i o n w i l l eagerly purchase Chinese goods w h e n the r e m a i n i n g b o r d e r restrictions are relaxed and better t r a n s p o r t a t i o n is b u i l t . Bilateral trade w i t h Tajikistan increased nearly n i n e f o l d f r o m 1992 to 1995. W i t h m u c h o f Tajikistan recently i n t u r m o i l and the c o u n t r y s u f f e r i n g f r o m a d e t e r i o r a t i n g standard o f l i v i n g , however, trade d r o p p e d by h a l f i n 1996. Trade between China a n d T u r k m e n i s t a n has also risen rapidly. C h i n a is expected t o eventually i m p o r t T u r k m e n gas to satisfy the g r o w i n g energy requirements i n the n o r t h w e s t c o r ner o f the country. The sale o f natural gas accounts for 60.3 percent o f the t o t a l v o l u m e o f T u r k m e n exports. A l t h o u g h the increasing trade between central Asia and China is noteworthy, it reflects China's rapidly g r o w i n g trade w i t h the entire w o r l d : trade w i t h central Asia increased 25 percent f r o m 1992 to 1994; d u r i n g the same p e r i o d total Chinese trade increased almost twice as fast. I n fact, d u r i n g 199c only 0.28 percent o f China's $280.8 b i l l i o n i n overseas trade involved the five central Asian republics, about the same as w i t h A u s t r i a or Denmark. Despite the small trade v a l ues, China is clearly a giant i n the r e g i o n and w i l l play a m a j o r role i n central Asia's f o r e i g n economic relations. For example, China's t w o - w a y trade w i t h Kazakhstan is greater than Turkey's trade w i t h all five central Asian republics. This is so even t h o u g h p r e d o m i n a n t l y M u s l i m central Asia is o f a m u c h higher p r i o r ity f o r Turkey than for China. M u l t i n a t i o n a l corporations are b e g i n n i n g to play a larger role i n the region's development. I n Kazakhstan, for instance, f o r e i g n firms are estimated to c o n t r o l m o r e than 60 percent o f electric power o u t p u t . A proposed Turkmenistan-ChinaJapan natural gas pipeline, part o f the envisaged "energy Silk Route," w h i c h w o u l d connect Central Asia's r i c h gas fields w i t h northeast Asian users, d e m o n strates the potential for cooperation a m o n g countries. But i t also h i g h l i g h t s the g r o w i n g importance o f international c o m p a n i e s — i n this case M i t s u b i s h i a n d E x x o n — i n financing and i n f l u e n c i n g the course o f o i l and gas development i n

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I

the r e g i o n . W i t h a potential price tag o f $22.6 b i l l i o n , this pipeline-—as w e l l as many smaller and less costly o n e s — w o u l d not be possible w i t h o u t f o r e i g n participation. The new Great Game between China and central Asia thus involves many m o r e players than the largely three-way Great Game o f the nineteenth century. Yet these n e w i n t e r n a t i o n a l corporate forces d o n o t supersede local ethnic ties and connections that extend back for centuries. Landlocked Central Asia and X i n j i a n g lack the road, r a i l , and pipeline i n f r a structure needed to increase economic cooperation and foreign investment i n the region. O i l and gas pipelines still pass t h r o u g h Russia, and road and rail links to other points are inadequate. A n e w h i g h w a y is planned between Kashgar i n X i n j i a n g , China, to Osh, Kyrgyzstan, to facilitate trade i n the area. China is also p l a n n i n g a new rail link between U r u m q i and Kashgar. N e w links f r o m central Asia c o u l d f o l l o w several routes west t h r o u g h Iran and Turkey, or Georgia and Azerbaijan, to the Black Sea o r the Mediterranean; south t h r o u g h I r a n to the Persian G u l f or t h r o u g h Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea; or east t h r o u g h China to the Pacific. A l l the routes pass t h r o u g h vast, remote, and perhaps politically unstable regions, and those i n v o l v i n g Iran face difficulties i n gaini n g Western

financing.

F o l l o w i n g the breakup o f the Soviet U n i o n , the Chinese g o v e r n m e n t feared that the n e w independence o f the n e i g h b o r i n g Central Asian republics m i g h t inspire separatist goals i n X i n j i a n g . It also w o r r i e d that p r o m o t i n g regional econ o m i c development c o u l d f u e l ethnic separatism b y resurrecting o l d alliances. China, however, was reassured

by an A p r i l

1996

agreement

w i t h Russia,

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to avoid m i l i t a r y conflict o n c o m m o n borders. I t is also resting easier after assertions f r o m M u s h m states that they w o u l d not become involved i n China's internal affairs. China's p o l i c y o f encouraging economic development w h i l e keeping a tight l i d o n political activism thus seems to have the support o f n e i g h b o r i n g governments, despite not satisfying many demands o f local and cross-border ethnic groups. Despite increasing investment and the creation o f m a n y n e w jobs i n X i n j i a n g , the U i g h u r s and other ethnic groups c o m p l a i n that they are not benefiting as m u c h as are recent H a n i m m i grants to the r e g i o n . This is a m a j o r c o n t r i b u t i n g factor to recent U i g h u r M u s l i m activism. The U i g h u r s insist that the g r o w i n g n u m b e r o f Han Chinese n o t only take the jobs (and eventually the profits) back h o m e w i t h t h e m , but that they also dilute the natives' t r a d i t i o n a l way o f the life, and leave t h e m w i t h little voice i n their o w n affairs. M o r e than one h u n d r e d ethnic groups live i n central Asia: M u s l i m peoples (Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, Karakalpaks, and Dungans), Russians (and other European settlers), and peoples w h o were b r o u g h t to the area by Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s d u r i n g the Stalinist p e r i o d (Germans, Crimeans,

Tatars,

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Koreans, Armenians, Chechens, and Meskhetian Turks). Deteriorating l i v i n g standards are increasing tensions a m o n g m a n y o f t h e m . The densely p o p u l a t e d Fergana valley, h o m e to m a n y o f the region's ethnic groups, has been the site o f clashes over jobs, l a n d , and natural resources, especially water. I n June

1989

Meskhetian Turks, w h o had been exiled to the area by Stalin, were attacked by Uzbeks and Tajiks. A n o t h e r s k i r m i s h f o l l o w e d a year later between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz i n Osh. There is particular concern about the Tajik-Uzbek conflict, given serious tensions between the t w o groups and their p r o x i m i t y . One m i l l i o n Tajiks live i n Uzbekistan, w h i l e b o t h Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have sizable Uzbek p o p ulations i n their parts o f the Fergana valley. I n Kazakhstan, Rus si an-Kazakh t e n sions r e m a i n h i g h ; 60 percent o f Kazakhstani Slavs and Germans still consider their h o m e l a n d to be the f o r m e r Soviet U n i o n , not Kazakhstan. T h r o u g h o u t the r e g i o n , Russians, mostly technicians and other professionals w h o came after the 1917

r e v o l u t i o n , make u p r o u g h l y o n e - f i f t h o f the p o p u l a t i o n . Their fears that

g r o w i n g nationalism i n countries o f the r e g i o n may become increasingly a n t i Russian has p r o m p t e d many o f t h e m to r e t u r n to their homelands. Efforts t o b u i l d a Kazakhstani i d e n t i t y have failed to b r i d g e Slavic-Turkic and O r t h o d o x M u s l i m differences.

The New Great Game and the Old Silk Route China and central Asia w i l l continue to be shaped by historical forces, policies, and economic development that have b r o u g h t t h e m closer together i n the last few years than i n the past thirty, w h e n the b r e a k d o w n i n Sino-Soviet relations i n the early 1960s virtually cut o f f almost all direct contact except between M o s c o w and Beijing. Historically, however, central Asia has always been an i m p o r t a n t crossroads and meeting place i n the heart o f Eurasia; i t is n o w reassuming this role i n the international marketplace. The post-Deng X i a o p i n g leadership o f China must seek n e w solutions to the o l d ethnic problems i n the region. Deng's many crackdowns o n separatist movements i n the borderlands (he led the

1959

invading army to Tibet) n o longer make sense i n a c o u n t r y t r y i n g to o p e n itself to w o r l d markets and global expectations. China must go b e y o n d its f o r m e r t w o p r o n g e d p o l i c y i n the border areas: p o l i t i c a l repression coupled w i t h economic reinvestment. N o t only has erecting a "steel Great W a l l , " to use Regional Party Secretary Wang Lequan's terms, failed to keep out separatists i n X i n j i a n g , but i t can n o longer hide China's problems f r o m the w o r l d . China's M u s l i m s are the last M u s l i m s w h o live under c o m m u n i s m . W i t h the independence o f the largely M u s l i m nations o f f o r m e r Soviet central Asia, the end o f the w a r i n Bosnia, the Israeli-PLO r a p p r o c h e m e n t , and the recent peace accords w i t h M u s l i m separatists i n Chechnya and the Philippines, w o r l d M u s l i m s

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have begun to focus their attention o n the U i g h u r situation i n China. China cann o t ignore the fact that support for the Bosnian M u s l i m s was the only issue o n w h i c h I r a n i a n , Saudi, and T u r k i s h governments c o u l d agree. Turhan Tayan, Turkish minister o f defense, recently t o l d China "that many l i v i n g [ i n X i n j i a n g ] are o u r relatives and that w e w i l l always be interested i n those people's welfare. O u r government is and w i l l continue to be sensitive over the p l i g h t o f o u r Turkic and M o s l e m brothers t h r o u g h o u t the w o r l d . " T h r o u g h a m o d e r n process o f transnalionalization and ethnicization, Turks see themselves as directly linked to their " b r o t h e r s " i n China and central Asia. M u s l i m s , t h r o u g h the global c o m m u n i t y o f M u s l i m s (ummah) and Islamization, also see themselves l i n k e d t o the r e g i o n . These international connections and ethnoreligious ties w i l l continue to shape and influence China and central Asian relations. Interethnic cooperation and political stability are critical i f plans to develop the r e g i o n are to succeed. Faced w i t h n e w l y independent M u s l i m nations on its b o r der and interethnic conflicts w i t h i n X i n j i a n g , China is stressing e c o n o m i c develo p m e n t and national u n i t y These are crucial issues i n this t i m e o f post-Deng transition and r e u n i f i c a t i o n w i t h H o n g Kong. These issues also signal a n e w b e g i n n i n g for the ancient Silk Road l i n k i n g China and central Asia.

CHAPTER

ELEVEN

Islam in Africa to 1800 MERCHANTS, C H I E F S , AND SAINTS

Nehemia Levtzion

Islam moved i n t o Africa f r o m three directions. It came f r o m N o r t h Africa across the Sahara to Bilad al-Sudan (The Lands o f the Black People), w h i c h is between the Adantic Ocean and Lake Chad. Despite six centuries o f resistance f r o m N u b i a n Christians, Islam expanded f r o m Egypt southward, u p the Nile valley, and west to Darfur and W a d a i Islam also m o v e d f r o m the Arabian peninsula across the Red Sea to the H o r n o f Africa, and f r o m there further south to the coast o f East Africa. This chapter w i l l analyze the diverse patterns o f the Islamization o f Africa and the variety o f religious experiences encountered by African Muslims until the beginning o f the nineteenth century. D u r i n g the eighteenth century, several factors contributed to the change f r o m accommodation w i t h local cultures to Islamic militancy, w h i c h brought about the jdiad movements o f the nineteenth century.

Ghana and Mali The earliest Arab expeditions i n N o r t h Africa i n the seventh and eighth centuries penetrated the Sahara i n t w o directions, f r o m T r i p o l i t o w a r d Fezzan i n southweste r n Libya and f r o m the Sus i n southern Morocco. These Arab expeditions made their way o n beaten routes along w h i c h trade had been carried for some time. Trade across the Sahara was carried by nomadic Berbers, w h o occupied b o t h ends o f the Sahara. By the t e n t h century M u s l i m traders f r o m N o r t h Africa had their base

47 5

(Left) Islam was carried to Sub-Saharan Africa from the Maghreb, where most mosques had square minarets. Builders in SubSaharan Africa adopted this form to their local architectural traditions, as at this mosque at Agagdes in Niger.

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in

the

commercial

centers

of

Awdaghust and Tadmekka i n the southern Sahara. F r o m these towns they traded w i t h the capitals o f the k i n g d o m s o f Bilad al Sudan, Ghana and Gao ( i n eastern Mali). Each capital city was composed o f a M u s l i m t o w n and a royal t o w n . This residential separation

a l l o w e d each

group to practice its o w n religious rites w i t h o u t offending the other. W r i t i n g i n 1068, the Andalusian geographer al-Bakri ( d . 1054)

was

able to gather precious i n f o r m a t i o n about I s l a m i n three c o n t e m p o rary

Arab expeditions penetrated the Sahara Desert along trade routes from the north. Sijilmasa, located in an oasis in southern Morocco, was one of the great trans-Saharan entrepots of the Middle Ages. Archaeologists are just beginning to penetrate the mounds that remain at the site.

African

Ghana,

and

kingdoms: Takrur

(in

Gao, lower

Senegal). The k i n g o f Gao was M u s l i m , b u t the c o m m o n people a d h e r e d t o t h e i r ancestral

reli-

g i o n , a n d pre-Islamic customs persisted at the c o u r t . The p a r t i a l acceptance o f Islam i n Gao is contrasted w i t h the zealous adherence to I s l a m o f the k i n g o f Takrur, w h o c o m p e l l e d his subjects t o observe Islamic law a n d c a r r i e d o u t a j i h a d against his n e i g h b o r s . The Islamic m i l i t a n c y o f Takrur was exceptional, whereas Gao's s y m b i o t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n Islam a n d the t r a d i t i o n a l r e l i g i o n was m o r e t y p i c a l o f Islam i n West A f r i c a . I n Ghana, M u s l i m s l i v e d under the auspices o f a n o n - M u s l i m k i n g , w h o i n v i t e d M u s l i m traders to the capital and e m p l o y e d literate M u s l i m s i n his court. A c c o r d i n g to the geographer A b u Abdallah M u h a m m a d i b n A b i Bakr alZ u h r i ( £ . 1 1 3 7 - 5 4 ) w r i t i n g i n 1137,

the people o f Ghana converted t o Islam i n

1076. This m u s t have happened u n d e r the i n f l u e n c e o f the A l m o r a v i d s , a m i l i tant Islamic m o v e m e n t i n the southwestern Sahara. A c c o r d i n g to the geographer al-Sharif al-Idrisi (1100—65), Ghana was a M u s l i m state i n 1154

a n d was still

a m o n g the most p o w e r f u l i n western Sudan. By the m i d d l e o f the t h i r t e e n t h century, however, Ghana's p o w e r had declined a n d the p o l i t i c a l center o f gravi t y shifted s o u t h w a r d , w h e r e M a l i , o n the upper reaches o f the N i g e r River, emerged as the d o m i n a n t power. Al-Bakri's w r i t i n g s i m p l y that there were also local M u s l i m s i n Ghana, traders w h o were part o f a c o m m e r c i a l n e t w o r k that extended f r o m the t o w n s o f the Sahel t o the sources o f g o l d i n the south. M u s l i m s established t r a d i n g centers that b y the e n d o f the f i f t e e n t h century

ISLAM

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reached the fringes o f the forest. They created a c o m m e r c i a l diaspora w i t h a c o m m o n r e l i g i o n , language, a n d legal system, the Shariah, a personal a n d e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l d i v i n e l y ordained law, w h i c h added to the m u t u a l trust a m o n g merchants. Conversion to Islam thus became necessary for those w h o w i s h e d t o j o i n the c o m m e r c i a l n e t w o r k . The next phase i n the process o f Islamization began w h e n M u s l i m religious leaders established c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h host kings. A l - B a k r i presents

an

account o f such an encounter that b r o u g h t about the Islamization o f the k i n g o f Malal, a small p r i n c i p a l i t y that t w o centuries later developed i n t o the e m p i r e o f M a l i . The M u s l i m religious leader, a c c o r d i n g to this account, succeeded i n w i n n i n g over the k i n g by d e m o n s t r a t i n g Allah's o m n i p o t e n c e . I n this instance, p r a y i n g to Allah saved the k i n g d o m , whereas the sacrifices p e r f o r m e d by local priests had failed. Al-Bakri's accounts, like other t r a d i t i o n s , emphasize the role o f the rulers as early recipients o f Islamic influence and therefore the i m p o r tance o f k i n g d o m s i n the process o f Islamization. I n d e e d , Islam d i d n o t penetrate i n t o segmentary societies even w h e n a n d w h e r e M u s l i m traders a n d r e l i g i o u s leaders were present, because there were n o rulers to mediate Islamic influence.

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I n the p r i n c i p a l i t y o f M a l a l , as i n Gao, o n l y the k i n g , his family, a n d his entourage accepted Islam. I n this respect, Islam c o u l d have become a divisive factor between the Islamized kings a n d the n o n - M u s l i m c o m m o n e r s .

Situated

between their subjects and an i n f l u e n t i a l M u s l i m m i n o r i t y , kings adopted a m i d dle p o s i t i o n between Islam and the local traditional r e l i g i o n . Kings behaved as M u s l i m s i n some situations b u t f o l l o w e d t r a d i t i o n a l customs o n other occasions. They patronized M u s l i m religious experts but also referred t o traditional priests. F r o m this m i d d l e p o s i t i o n , dynasties and i n d i v i d u a l kings c o u l d develop greater c o m m i t m e n t t o Islam or fall back o n ancestral r e l i g i o n . The M a l i n k e (literally, " t h e people o f M a l i " ) were the Mande-speaking people associated w i t h the e m p i r e o f M a l i . Malinke chiefs had come under Islamic influence before the t i m e o f Sundiata, the f o u n d e r and ruler o f M a l i . Sundiata, a great h u n t e r and magician, led his people i n a w a r o f l i b e r a t i o n against another p o w e r f u l magician, S u m a n g u r u , the k i n g o f Soso, i n the Battle o f Kirina. T h o u g h a n o m i n a l M u s l i m , Sundiata t u r n e d t o the traditional r e l i g i o n for support. T w o centuries later, Sonni A l i , w h o made the small k i n g d o m o f Songhay i n t o a large empire, behaved i n a similar way. Kings such as Sundiata and Sonni A l i , founders o f empires, are the heroes o f the national traditions, whereas the exploits o f their M u s l i m successors—Mansa Musa o f M a l i and Askiya M u h a m m a d o f S o n g h a y — were recorded only by the Arabic sources. F r o m its center o n the upper N i g e r River, M a l i expanded i n t o the Sahel i n the d i r e c t i o n o f the Sahara. M u s l i m t o w n s became part o f the empire, and M u s l i m traders traveled over routes that traversed the e m p i r e . T h r o u g h the c o n t r o l o f the Saharan trade a n d the p i l g r i m a g e t o Mecca, M a l i came closer t o the larger M u s l i m w o r l d . As the small Malinke k i n g d o m evolved i n t o a vast m u l t i e t h n i c e m p i r e , w i t h i n f l u e n t i a l M u s l i m elements inside and extensive Islamic relations outside the e m p i r e , its kings m o v e d along an i m a g i n a r y c o n t i n u u m , f r o m attachment t o the traditional heritage t o w a r d greater c o m m i t m e n t t o Islam. T h e e m p e r o r Mansa Musa (1312-37) made his e m p i r e part o f the land o f Islam. H e built mosques w i t h minarets, instituted p u b lic prayer, and attracted M a l i k i scholars. Mansa Musa visited Cairo o n his way t o Mecca i n 1324, where he was described by an Egyptian o f f i c i a l as a pious m a n , w h o " s t r i c t l y observed the prayer, the recitation o f the Q u r a n , and the m e n t i o n o f Allah's name." The same i n f o r m a n t t o l d Mansa Musa that his treatment o f free w o m e n as i f they were slave concubines was f o r b i d d e n by Islamic law. " N o t even to kings?" Mansa Musa asked. " N o t even t o k i n g s , " replied the official, "Ask the learned scholars." Mansa Musa responded, "By Allah. I d i d n o t k n o w that. N o w I w i l l renounce i t completely." Shortcomings i n the application o f M u s l i m law were most apparent i n marriage customs and sexual behavior. I n 1352-53, d u r i n g the r e i g n o f Mansa Sulayman, Mansa Musa's brother, the great traveler and author I b n Battutah ( 1 3 0 4 - 6 8 ) visited the king's court. He was

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impressed by the way M u s l i m s i n M a l i observed public prayer o n Fridays and by their concern for the study o f the Q u r a n . He described the celebration o f the t w o great Islamic festivals: the "sacrificial least" o n the tenth day o f the m o n t h o f the p i l g r i m a g e a n d the festival o f the " b r e a k i n g o f the fast" at the end o f

Ramadan.

The presence o f the k i n g made p u b l i c prayer an official occasion to w h i c h n o n M u s l i m s were also d r a w n . I n r e t u r n , the prestige o f the n e w r e l i g i o n was m o b i lized to exhort loyalty to the ruler. The alliance between k i n g s h i p and Islam made Islam i n t o an i m p e r i a l cult. As national feasts the Islamic festivals accommodated such t r a d i t i o n a l ceremonies as the recitation o f songs praising the k i n g and the appearance o f masks. I b n Battutah crtiticized these and other pre-Islamic customs. I b n Battutah was also critical o f the practice o f s p r i n k l i n g dust and ashes o n the head as a sign o f respect before the king. I n eleventh-century Ghana, under a n o n - M u s l i m k i n g , o n l y those w ho f o l l o w e d the king's r e l i g i o n knelt d o w n and s p r i n k l e d themselves w i t h dust; M u s l i m s were exempted f r o m this practice and they greeted the k i n g by clapping hands. I n the Islamized e m p i r e o f M a l i all subjects, M u s l i m s and n o n - M u s l i m s , had to f o l l o w the c u s t o m . I n other w o r d s , under a n o n - M u s l i m ruler M u s l i m s were n o t o b l i g e d to p e r f o r m some traditional ceremonial acts, but under Islamized kings, w h o themselves

In much of West Africa a vernacular style of architecture is used for mosques and other large Muslim buildings. They are generally constructed of mud-brick, with

c o m b i n e d Islamic and t r a d i t i o n a l elements, pre-Islamic customs h a d t o be

wooden posts used to hold

accommodated.

scaffolding when the surface

I n the f i f t e e n t h c e n t u r y M a l i lost its c o n t r o l over the Sahel a n d was cut o f f f r o m direct contact w i t h the trans-Saharan routes and the larger M u s l i m w o r l d .

needs repair, as at the mosque inTelli in the Dogon area of Mali.

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The capita] declined and was eventually deserted by the f o r e i g n M u s l i m c o m munity. As m o r e ethnic groups escaped Mali's d o m i n a t i o n , the k i n g d o m g r a d u ally contracted

back

to its M a l i n k e

nucleus, and the traditional particularistic spirit o f the M a l i n k e n a t i o n t r i u m p h e d over the universal supratribal appeal o f Islam. M u s l i m religious leaders, remained attached to the courts o f the successor states o f M a l i and c o n t i n ued to render religious services to those Islamized

chiefs,

but they lost

the

Islamic zeal encouraged by the f o u r teenth-century kings o f M a l i . The chiefs The Tuareg, a Saharan tribe of Berber origin, conquered Timbuktu in 1433 and became rulers of the area. More than a million Tuareg still live in Niger, Mali, Morocco, Algeria, and Libya. Tuareg men wear large turbans and wrap the ends across their faces to protect them from blowing sand.

returned

to

the

middle

position

between Islam and the traditional r e l i g i o n , w i t h a greater i n c l i n a t i o n t o w a r d the latter. M u s l i m s i n the capital and i n provincial

centers

of

government

became integrated i n t o the state's social and political systems. They were p i o u s and observant believers themselves, b u t they often had to tolerate the m o r e d i l u t e d f o r m s o f Islam as practiced by their kings and to take part i n ceremonies i n w h i c h pre-Islamic rites were p e r f o r m e d . The situation o f these M u s l i m s was d i f f e r e n t f r o m that o f M u s l i m s i n c o m m e r c i a l t o w n s , w h i c h were o f t e n a u t o n o m o u s . For example, the k i n g o f M a l i d i d n o t enter Diaba, a t o w n o f the fuqahii (those w h o are experts o n Islamic j u r i s p r u d e n c e ) , w h e r e the qadi (a judge a d m i n i s t e r i n g religious l a w ) was the sole authority. A n y o n e w h o entered Diaba was safe f r o m the king's oppression and outrage; i t was thus called "the t o w n o f Allah." Merchants were carriers o f Islam rather than agents o f Islamization. They opened routes and exposed isolated societies to external influences, b u t they were n o t themselves engaged i n the propagation o f Islam, w h i c h was the w o r k o f religious leaders. The leaders became integrated i n t o A f r i c a n societies by playi n g religious, social, and political roles simdar to those o f traditional priests. Like traditional priests, M u s l i m m e n o f r e l i g i o n were peacemakers, w h o pleaded for those w h o broke the king's laws. Mosques, like traditional shrines, were considered sanctuaries. I m m u n i t y o f life and p r o p e r t y was extended to m e n o f r e l i g i o n o n l y as l o n g as they kept o u t o f politics and posed n o threat t o the existing sociopolitical order.

ISLAM

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1

Songhay and Timbuktu I n the f o u r t e e n t h century, W a l a t a — w h i c h served as the southern t e r m i n u s o f the Saharan t r a d e — w a s still m o r e i m p o r t a n t as a c o m m e r c i a l t o w n than was T i m b u k t u . The emperor Mansa Musa sought to encourage intellectual life i n T i m b u k t u and M a l i a n scholars to study i n Fez. By the first h a l f o f the

fifteenth

century the level o f scholarship i n T i m b u k t u was such that a student w h o came f r o m the Hejaz realized that the scholars o f T i m b u k t u surpassed h i m i n the k n o w l e d g e o f Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). Under Malian rule the imams o f die Friday mosque were Sudanese. (A Friday mosque is the large mosque where a town's entire population could gather for Friday prayer. A t o w n c o u l d have many regular mosques but w o u l d most likely have only one Friday mosque.) After the Tuareg conquest o f T i m b u k t u i n 1433,

schol-

ars f r o m the oases o f the n o r t h e r n Sahara replaced Sudanese scholars as the imams o f the Friday mosque. It was about the same time that the Sankore scholars, m e m bers o f diree Sanhaja families w h o had migrated f r o m Walata, became p r o m i n e n t i n T i m b u k t u . Those three Sanhaja families became very closely associated w i t h A k i l l u , the Tuareg chief. W h e n Sonni A l i , founder o f the Songhay k i n g d o m , conquered T i m b u k t u , A k i l l u brought a thousand camels to carry the fuqaha o f Sankore to Walata. Those people o f Sankore w h o had remained b e h i n d i n T i m b u k t u were persecuted, killed, and h u m i l i a t e d by Sonni Ah because, he claimed, "they were close friends o f the Tuareg." Even a source as hostile to Sonni A l i as Tcirîkh al-Sudan (The history o f the Sudan) admits that Sonni Ali's persecution o f the scholars o f T i m b u k t u notwithstanding, "he acknowledged their eminence, saying: ' w i t h o u t the ulama the w o r l d w o u l d be no good.' He d i d favors to other ulama and respected t h e m . " The ulama favored by Sonni A l i were the descendants o f scholars w h o h a d come f r o m the n o r t h e r n Sahara and beyond, w h o unlike the Sanhaja o f the southe r n Sahara had no relations w i t h the Tuareg, Sonni Ali's enemies. Sonni A l i c o m b i n e d elements o f Islam w i t h beliefs and practices o f the Songhay traditional r e l i g i o n and was greatly respected as a magician-king. H e observed the fast o f Ramadan and gave abundant gifts to mosques, but he also w o r s h i p e d idols and sought the advice and help o f traditional diviners and sorcerers. H e p r o n o u n c e d the shahadah (declaration o f f a i t h ) , w i t h o u t understanding its meaning. He prayed b u t was careless i n observing the correct t i m e o f the prayers. Sonni A l i therefore was n o different than most West African kings w h o maintained a m i d d l e p o s i t i o n between Islam and the traditional r e l i g i o n , but he encountered unique historical circumstances. H i s successful m i l i t a r y exploits b r o u g h t h i m to rule over regions that had previously been under stronger Islamic influence. The p o l i t i c a l c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h the representatives o f Islam, not the deficiency i n the practice o f Islam, b r o u g h t about the declaration o f Sonni Ali as

482

THE

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an i n f i d e l . The legal and d o c t r i n a l justification o f the takfir (charge o f b e l i e f ) against Sonni A l i , against the general consensus, was p r o v i d e d b y the N o r t h African m i l i t a n t M u h a m m a d i b n A b d a l - K a r i m a l - M a g h i l i ( d . 1503). Shortly after Sonni Ali's death his son was o v e r t h r o w n by Askiya M u h a m m a d , a senior c o m m a n d e r i n Sonni Ali's army, w h o entered i n t o an alliance w i t h the scholars o f T i m b u k t u and w i t h chiefs and governors o f the m o r e Islamized western provinces. A n e w balance was achieved between those provinces west o f the Niger bend and Songhay proper, d o w n die river, w h i c h remained strongly traditional and had hardly been affected by Islam. Askiya M u h a m m a d made Islam one o f the central pillars o f the state. He made the pilgrimage to Mecca and visited Egypt o n the way. There he met the Egyptian w r i t e r and Sufi teacher Jalal a l - D i n al-Suyud ( 1 4 4 5 - i c o c ) , w h o introduced h i m to the Abbasid caliph. According to al-Ifrani, Askiya M u h a m m a d " t o o k f r o m h i m fal-Suyuti] his theological teachings and learned f r o m h i m what is lawful and w h a t is forbidden. H e [Askiya M u h a m m a d ] also heard his [al-Suyuri's] lessons o n the precepts and prescriptions o f the Shariah and benefited f r o m his advice and admonitions." He came back w i t h the tide o f caliph, w h i c h was granted h i m by the Abbasid caliph i n Egypt. F r o m w h a t is k n o w n about Songhay under the Askiyas (the royal title o f the dynasty established by Askiya M u h a m m a d ) , little was done i n practice to r e f o r m the e m p i r e i n line w i t h Islamic political theory. The Askiyas sought the advice o f the scholars o f T i m b u k t u o n religious issues rather than o n matters o f state p o l icy, i n w h i c h a r m y c o m m a n d e r s a n d o t h e r senior o f f i c i a l s at the c o u r t w e r e m o r e i n f l u e n t i a l . I n 1498 Askiya M u h a m m a d a p p o i n t e d M a h m u d i b n U m a r A q i t as q a d i . H e was succeeded by his three sons, w h o h e l d o f f i c e u n t i l t h e end o f the s i x t e e n t h century. The transfer o f the o f f i c e o f q a d i t o the A q i t f a m i l y m a r k e d the g r o w i n g i n f l u e n c e o f the Sankore Sanhaja scholars. As q a d i M a h m u d i b n U m a r A q i t asserted his i n d e p e n d e n c e i n T i m b u k t u to t h e extent that he sent away Askiya M u h a m m a d ' s messengers, p r e v e n t i n g t h e m f r o m c a r r y i n g o u t the askiya's o r d e r s . There w e r e also tensions i n the n e x t g e n e r a t i o n b e t w e e n Askiya D a w u d , s o n o f Askiya M u h a m m a d , and the q a d i a l - A q i b , son o f the q a d i M a h m u d . O n c e , f o l l o w i n g an exchange o f h o s t i l e w o r d s , the q a d i refused t o see the A s k i y a , w h o was m a d e t o w a i t b e f o r e the qadi's h o m e f o r a l o n g t i m e before he was g i v e n p e r m i s s i o n t o enter. T h e A s k i y a h u m i l i a t e d h i m s e l f before the q a d i u n t i l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . T h e r e w e r e o t h e r u l a m a i n Songhay, w h o played the t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e o f M u s l i m d i v i n e s i n Sudanic states as i n t i m a t e advisers w h o s e relations w i t h the r u l e r s w e r e d e v o i d o f the tensions b e t w e e n the Askiyas a n d the qadis. These u l a m a prayed f o r the r u l e r a n d r e c r u i t e d s u p e r n a t u r a l aid to p r o t e c t h i m and his k i n g d o m , r e c e i v i n g i n r e t u r n grants o f l a n d and charters o f p r i v i l e g e . Such d o c u m e n t s w e r e k n o w n as hurma i n Songhay and mahram i n B o r n u , m e a n i n g

ISIAM

I N AFRICA

TO

1800

483

"sanctity," " i m m u n i t y , " or " i n v i o l a b i l i t y . " Askiya M u h a m m a d was deposed i n 1528 by his son Musa, w h o defied the intercession i n the dispute w i t h his brothers. This was a departure f r o m the accepted n o r m s o f political conduct, a sign o f the u n m i t i g a t e d rule o f violence. The p e r i o d o f illegitimate despotism came to an end w i t h the accession o f Askiya Ismail i n 1537. H e set free his father, Askiya M u h a m m a d , w h o i n r e t u r n cerem o n i a l l y invested Askiya Ismail w i t h the insignia that he had received i n Cairo f r o m the Abbasid caliph: a green g o w n , green cape, w h i t e t u r b a n , and an Arabian sword. Askiya D a w u d , the last r u l e r i n the line o f Askiya M u h a m m a d ' s sons, r u l e d for t h i r t y - t h r e e years (1549-82). As a prince he received a g o o d Islamic educat i o n , and as k i n g he c o n t i n u e d to study w i t h a shaykh w h o came t o the palace every m o r n i n g . He exceeded his father i n generosity t o w a r d M u s l i m scholars. He gave his daughters i n marriage to scholars and merchants. W h e n one o f the scholars o f T i m b u k t u visited Askiya D a w u d i n his palace, he was shocked by the persistence o f pre-Islamic practices at the court. " I was amazed w h e n I came i n , " the scholar said, " a n d I t h o u g h t y o u were m a d , despicable, and a f o o l , w h e n I saw the people carry dust o n their heads." The askiya laughed and r e p l i e d , " N o , I was n o t m a d myself, and I a m reasonable, but I a m the head o f sinful and haughty m a d m e n , and I therefore made myself mad to f r i g h t e n t h e m so that they w o u l d n o t act unjustly towards the M u s l i m s . " Even a devoted M u s l i m like Askiya D a w u d was therefore unable to relieve the m o n a r c h y o f its pre-Islamic heritage. There were between 150 a n d 180 Quranic schools i n T i m b u k t u i n the m i d d l e o f the sixteenth century, w h i c h f o r m e d a broad basis f o r higher levels o f learni n g i n all the branches o f the Islamic sciences. Students studied a subject w i t h the scholar best k n o w n f o r his a u t h o r i t y i n that field. By the end o f the sixteenth century scholarship i n T i m b u k t u matched that o f Morocco. D u r i n g the time that the most p r o m i n e n t M u s l i m scholar i n T i m b u k t u , A h m a d Baba (1556—1627), was exiled to Marrakesh (1594-1607), the leading scholars o f the Maghreb, i n c l u d i n g the qadis o f Fez and Meknes and the m u f t i o f Marrakesh, came to hear his lessons. At that t i m e intellectual life i n T i m b u k t u was influenced by Egyptian scholars, w i t h w h o m scholars f r o m T i m b u k t u studied w h e n they visited Cairo on their way to Mecca. Most

o f those scholars were f r o m the Shafii school o f

law, w i t h w h o m the M a l i k i scholars o f T i m b u k t u studied subjects other than law, such as the hadith and mysticism. Scholarship i n T i m b u k t u thus had w i d e r exposure than the parochial M a l i k i scholars o f M o r o c c o . Indeed, the scholars o f T i m b u k t u preferred the view o f the m o r e sophisticated Egyptian a!-Suyuti to the zealous Maghrebi reformer M u h a m m a d i b n A b d a l - K a r i m a l - M a g h i l i o n issues that were central to West A f r i c a n M u s l i m s . Al-Suyuti saw n o h a r m i n the m a n u facture o f amulets, p r o v i d e d there was n o t h i n g reprehensible i n t h e m , but a l M a g h i l i was against any trade i n amulets. Al-Suyuti gave license to some f o r m s

484

THE OXFORD HISTORY OF ISLAM

o f association w i t h n o n - M u s l i m s , but a l - M a g h i l i insisted that between M u s l i m s and infidels there was o n l y jihad. Sufism was brought to T i m b u k t u f r o m the Maghreb and the n o r t h e r n Sahara i n die fifteenth century. I n die sixteenth century the leading scholars o f T i m b u k t u were Sufis. Like contemporary Egyptian Sufis, they were not affiliated to any Sufi b r o t h e r h o o d (tariqah). Corrrmerce seems to have been problematic for mysdcs; a mystic w h o engaged i n commerce was gradually deprived o f his nightly visionary encounters w i t h the Prophet. Still, some o f the scholars famous as saints and ascetics were quite wealthy, mainly from gifts by the city's merchants, and more so t h r o u g h die generosity o f the Askiyas. Members o f scholars' families were sometimes i m p o r t a n t merchants. Individuals m i g h t have spent the first part o f their lives as merchants before tiiey retired to pursue advanced studies. The scholars o f T i m b u k t u were also Students traditionally learned the Quran by memorizing verses copied onto

spokesmen for the city's tiading c o m m u n i t y . Even legal opinions were influenced by commercial interests, such as Ahmad Baba's r u l i n g o n the lawfulness o f tobacco, because T i m b u k t u became an important center for die tobacco trade.

an oblong wooden tablet. With the increased availability of paper this tradition has been abandoned in many regions, but it is still prac-

Songhay and Timbuktu in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

ticed in West Africa, where

F o l l o w i n g the Moroccan conquest i n 1591, under the qadis' leadership the peo-

these two young students

ple o f T i m b u k t u adopted a p o l i c y o f passive submission and n o n c o o p e r a t i o n

display their tablets.

w i t h the c o n q u e r i n g army. T i m b u k t u , w h i c h had been a u t o n o m o u s under the

ISLAM

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Songhay rule, became the seat o f a m i l i t a r y government. T h e presence o f an o c c u p y i n g force disturbed life i n this city o f commerce and scholarship a n d led to a conflict between the m i l i t a r y and the civilian populations. The pasha ( h i g h est-ranking official) and his troops resorted to harsh disciplinary measures w h e n all conventions were b r o k e n . The pasha ordered the arrest o f the leading fuqaha, and their houses were pillaged. Seventy p r o m i n e n t fuqaha were d e p o r t e d i n chains to Marrakesh, a m o n g t h e m the qadi U m a r i b n M a h m u d Aqit and A h m a d Baba. The fuqaha were under arrest i n Marrakesh f o r t w o years, and U m a r d i e d in p r i s o n . Even after their release they were n o t allowed t o r e t u r n to T i m b u k t u . O n l y A h m a d Baba r e t u r n e d , after almost twenty years i n exile. After the exde o f the fuqaha, according to the seventeendi-century author o f Tarikh al-Sudan, T i m b u k t u "became a body w i t h o u t a soul." The suffering o f the people o f T i m b u k t u increased as die struggle for power among die Moroccan military c o m manders intensified. The supply o f food f r o m the inner delta was cut off, as the routes were intercepted by the Fulbe and the Tuareg. D u r i n g the seventeenth century the elite o f T i m b u k t u was made up o f the tirma, descendants o f the Moroccan conquerors, w h o held military and political power, the merchants, and die scholars. The political influence o f the merchants increased because the pashas needed their financial support, and the merchants n o longer needed the scholars as intermediaries. By the end o f the seventeenth century, Timbuktu's impoverished mercantile c o m m u n i t y was n o longer able to support a large specialized c o m m u n i t y o f scholars. Lesser scholars, k n o w n as aiids, earned their livings as traders

a n d artisans,

mainly

weavers and tadors. By die m i d dle o f die eighteendi century the pashalik o f T i m b u k t u was i n total eclipse. In about 1770 the Tuareg took possession o f Gao, and i n 1787 they entered T i m b u k t u and abolished the office o f the pasha. The harshness o f the nomads was mitigated by the scholars, whose religious prestige also carried political influence, reaching its peak w i t h the revivalist movement led by Sidi al-Mukhtar al-

Sufism came to Timbuktu from the Maghreb in the fifteenth century.

Kunti (1729-1811).

The Moroccan mystic al-Jazuli (d. 1465), for example, became the center of a popular religious brotherhood that revolved around the

Linked by the N i g e r w a t e r way t o T i m b u k t u , the t o w n o f

recitation of his celebrated book of prayers, and many copies of this work circulated in the region.

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Djenne ( i n south-central M a l i ) developed as a d i s t r i b u t i o n center for trade to the south. Merchants f r o m the Sahara and N o r t h Africa extended their business f r o m T i m b u k t u to Djenne. Their agents were the Dyula, w h o carried the trade to the sources o f g o l d and kola i n the Akan forest. I n Djenne, deep i n w o r l d o f the M a n d i n g u e , Islam slowly gained g r o u n d , and pre-Islamic customs persisted there u n t i l the end o f the fifteenth century, w h e n a pious Dyula came f r o m the south and destroyed the " i d o l s ' house," where people had c o n t i n u e d to w o r s h i p . The ulama i n Djenne were all Soninke and M a n d i n g u e and were h i g h l y respected by the rulers o f Djenne, w h o sought their blessings. The Bambara state o f Segou ( i n s o u t h e r n M a l i o n the N i g e r River) was f o u n d e d i n the m i d d l e o f the eighteenth c e n t u r y by B i t o n K u l i b a l i , w h o f o r c e d greater centralization to overcome older egalitarian patterns o f Bambara c o m m u n a l life. H e was s u p p o r t e d by M u s l i m merchants and the ulama but was careful t o m a i n t a i n the balance between t r a d i t i o n a l and Islamic elements. It was customary for chiefs t o send their sons to study w i t h a M u s l i m cleric as part o f t h e i r p r i n c e l y education. A l t h o u g h they were n o t meant to b e c o m e M u s l i m s , some d i d ; some even became scholars. A q a d i o f Djenne i n the seco n d h a l f o f the sixteenth century was " f r o m a m o n g the sons o f the chiefs o f Kala. H e w i t h d r e w f r o m a u t h o r i t y and became a scholar." I n this w a y B i t o n Kulibali's son, Bakary, became a M u s l i m . As the r u l e r o f the y o u n g Bambara state, Bakary failed t o m a i n t a i n the balance between Islam and t r a d i t i o n and was therefore deposed and k i l l e d . At that p o i n t N ' g o l o Diara, a f o r m e r slave o f B i t o n K u l i b a l i , seized p o w e r and established a new dynasty i n Segou. H e also 7

c o m m u n i c a t e d o n several occasions w i t h the ulama i n Djenne and T i m b u k t u , b u t he s k i l l f u l l y m a i n t a i n e d the balance between t r a d i t i o n a l i s m and Islam. W h i l e o b s e r v i n g some Islamic rites, N ' g o l o also r e m a i n e d the "great priest o f the p r o t e c t i n g i d o l s . " T h r o u g h c h i e f l y courts, w h e r e Islamic rituals w e r e h e l d , Islamic elements penetrated the culture o f the Bambara, i n c l u d i n g the celebration o f Islamic festivals as national feasts. The Scottish e x p l o r e r M u n g o Park (1771 — 1806), w h o v i s i t e d Segou i n 1796

d u r i n g the r e i g n o f M a n s o n g , N ' g o l o ' s s o n , was

impressed by the i n f l u e n c e o f the M u s l i m s at the c o u r t o f Segou. I n the r i v a l Bambara state o f Kaarta, Park observed that " t h e disciples o f M a h o m e t c o m posed nearly o n e - h a l f o f the army," and therefore " t h e mosques were very c r o w d e d " w h e n the entire army gathered i n t o the capital. But Park also reco g n i z e d the persistence o f pre-Islamic beliefs and practices: "Those Negroes, together w i t h the c e r e m o n i a l part o f the M a h o m e d a n r e l i g i o n , r e t a i n all t h e i r ancient superstitions and even d r i n k strong l i q u o r s . " I n the eighteenth century there was an abundant supply o f slaves i n West Africa. M u s l i m s o w n e d m o r e slaves for f a r m i n g than d i d their n o n - M u s l i m

ISLAM I N AFRICA TO 1 8 0 0

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neighbors. Whereas Bambara peasants o w n e d a f e w slaves, w h o w o r k e d i n the fields alongside m e m b e r s o f the h o u s e h o l d , the M u s l i m Marka o w n e d many slaves, w h o w o r k e d i n the fields under the supervision of a f o r e m a n , w h o was h i m s e l f a slave. The Marka master was then able to f o l l o w his c o m m e r c i a l or clerical pursuits. Using slaves for f a r m i n g gave M u s l i m s the leisure to pursue learni n g and to teach. This was elaborated by the Jakhanke, w h o c o n t r i b u t e d to the g r o w t h o f a rural t r a d i t i o n o f Islamic scholarship. By the fifteenth c e n t u r y M u s l i m s developed a c o m m e r c i a l n e t w o r k covering the area f r o m the fringes o f the Sahara i n the n o r t h to the fringes o f the forest i n the s o u t h , and f r o m the A t l a n t i c coast o f the Senegambia i n the west t o Hausaland and B o r n u ( i n northeastern N i g e r i a ) to the east. Most o f the traders over this n e t w o r k were extensions o f the Wangara, the M a n d i n g u e traders w h o carried o n trade a n d Islam f r o m at least the eleventh century. Those w h o traded to the west o n the Gambia were the Jakhanke. Those Wangara w h o opened routes to Hausaland m e r g e d w i t h the Hausa-speaking traders. Those traders o f

Dyxila traders made the town of Djenne, two hundred

the m i d d l e N i g e r w h o entered the A k a n forest, w h e r e the g o l d was, i n the fif-

miles downstream from

teenth c e n t u r y became k n o w n as the D y u l a . These traders and the ulama,

Timbuktu, an entrepot in

w h e t h e r Dyula o r Jakhanke, operated i n the lands o f the unbelievers, and for

the fifteenth century. The

l o n g periods they h a d to live i n s y m b i o t i c relations w i t h n o n - M u s l i m s . They developed an ideology and a w o r l d v i e w that helped t h e m to survive u n d e r these c o n d i t i o n s , w h i c h Ivor W i l k s has associated w i t h al-Hajj Salim S u w a r i , w h o lived probably i n the late fifteenth century. Suwari is regarded by the Dyula and

congregational mosque, built in traditional style on the foundations of an earlier mosque, still provides the backdrop for a large market.

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the Jakhanke as the architect o f their ways o f life, having f o r m u l a t e d precepts f o r the conduct o f M u s l i m s l i v i n g a m o n g unbelievers. U n d e r this ideology, M u s l i m s may accept the a u t h o r i t y o f n o n - M u s l i m rulers, and even support t h e m t h r o u g h the p r o v i s i o n i f religious services, so far as the M u s l i m s are a l l o w e d t o strictly observe Islam. Because they were aware o f the danger o f spiritual backs l i d i n g , as they lived i n close p r o x i m i t y to unbelievers, the M u s l i m s were also dedicated to Islamic learning. Because o f their relative isolation, they were u r g e d to travel to central places o f learning i n search o f k n o w l e d g e . I n t h e n southern dispersion, west o f the Black Volta River where most o f the Dyula operated, the Dyula settled a m o n g "stateless" peoples, w i t h w h o m they interacted socially and culturally but over w h o m they had httle religious i n f l u ence. Sometimes w a r r i o r s w h o shared w i t h the D y u l a a c o m m o n c u l t u r a l M a n d i n g u e background m o v e d along the trade routes, perhaps even as a r m e d guards, and i m p o s e d their a u t h o r i t y over these stateless people, as was the case o f the K o n g and the Gonja peoples. I n the process o f the state f o r m a t i o n o f Gonja, the w a r r i o r s accepted Islam f r o m the hands o f a Dyula cleric w h o helped t h e m to w i n a battle. The Gonja rulers were probably the first i n the Volta basin to accept Islam. Shordy thereafter, at the b e g i n n i n g o f the eighteenth century, Islam was i n t r o d u c e d to Dagomba, w h e r e the k i n g encouraged trade and the m i g r a t i o n o f M u s l i m s . A study o f Islam i n Dagomba reveals i t to be a m o d e l f o r the cultural, social, and political integration o f Islam i n t o a state structure i n ways that were typical o f M a l i and Songhay f u r t h e r n o r t h f o u r or five centuries earlier.

The Senegambia The first chapter i n the history o f Islam i n present-day Senegal began w i t h Takrur, whose Islamic militancy was described earlier by al-Bakri. Except for a few references i n the Arabic sources o f the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and some oral traditions that are difficult to interpret, little is k n o w n about the history o f Islam i n this r e g i o n u n t i l the end o f the fifteenth century. At that time Portuguese sources and the chronicles o f T i m b u k t u converge to shed light o n a process o f state b u i l d i n g led by a Fulbe w a r r i o r n a m e d Tengella. He first created a Fulbe state i n Futa Jallon (the mountainous district i n western Guinea), and then m o v e d f u r ther n o r t h t o Futa Toro. I n I Ç 1 2 Tengella was defeated and killed by a Songhay army, and the conquest o f Futa Toro was accomplished by Tengella's son, K o l i Tengella, w h o created the Deniankobe dynasty o f Futa Toro. A c c o r d i n g to Ibrikh al-Sudan, the descendants o f Koli Tengella were considered as g o o d M u s l i m s as the rulers o f M a l i But contemporary Tokolor scholars o f Futa Toro viewed the Deniankobe as w a r r i o r chiefs. At the intersection o f the Sahara and the Senegal valley, scholars were i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h w a r r i o r s . The Tokolor

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scholars o f Futa Toro were k n o w n as Torodbe, a t e r m that covered people o f diverse social status and ethnic o r i g i n s . They spoke Fulfulde and embraced customs o f the pastoral Fuble, b u t unlike the Fulbe they were sedentary, and they were n o t necessarily o f Fulbe o r i g i n . The m a x i m " T o r o d o is a beggar" associated t h e m w i t h the mendicant activities o f M u s l i m scholars and students, w h o lived o n charity. The openness o f the Torodbe society is expressed i n another m a x i m : " I f a

fisherman

pursues learning, he becomes a Torodo." I n Futa Toro, however,

learning among the Torodbe was at a lower level compared w i t h the scholarship o f their Toronkawa brethren o f Hausaland. The Torodbe o f Futa Toro were an integral part o f the peasant society, unlike the Toronkawa o f Hausaland, w h o separated themselves f r o m b o t h the Fulbe pastoralists and the Hausa-speaking peasants. A l t h o u g h the Toronkawa lived i n rural enclaves, they cultivated an urban t r a d i t i o n o f learning. The symbiotic relations between the Deniankobe and the Torodbe h a d first been disturbed i n 1675, w h e n the Torodbe joined the m i l i t a n t movement o f Nasir a l - D i n that spilled over the f r o m the southern Sahara to Futa Toro. This m o v e ment was defeated by a c o a l i t i o n o f the Deniankobe and Arab w a r r i o r tribes. The nomads o f the Sahara, n o r t h o f the Senegal River, c o n t i n u e d d u r i n g the eighteenth century to d i s t u r b life i n Futa Toro. The Torodbe rose again i n the 1770s against the Deniankobe, w h o had failed to stop the nomads' raids. This u p r i s i n g developed i n a jihad m o v e m e n t that overthrew the Deniankobe and created an Islamic imamate i n Futa Toro. Oral traditions connected the h i s t o r y o f t h e W o l o f to the Almoravids t h r o u g h the f o u n d i n g k i n g o f Jolof, w h o is said to have been a descendant o f A b u Bakr i b n Umar. T h o u g h little k n o w n compared w i t h M a l i , Jolof, i n the west, was nevertheless one o f the great M u s l i m states i n medieval West Africa. Its o r i g i n s go back to the t h i r t e e n t h century. For some t i m e i t was a t r i b u t a r y o f M a l i , b u t because o f its marginal p o s i t i o n , and w i t h its o w n direct c o m m e r c i a l relations w i t h the Sahara, Jolof was culturally and economically a u t o n o m o u s . The k i n g d o m o f Jolof disintegrated i n the sixteenth century, however, under the i m p a c t o f the Atlantic trade. Kayor emerged as the most p o w e r f u l state o f t h e W o l o f , b o t h because o f its favorable p o s i t i o n o n the coast and the benefits i t derived f r o m European trade. Intensive c o m m e r c i a l activities and a process o f p o l i t i c a l centralization enhanced the p o s i t i o n o f M u s l i m s i n Kayor. Since the m i d d l e o f the fifteenth

century European visitors were impressed by the role o f M u s l i m s i n the

courts o f t h e W o l o f chiefs as secretaries, counselors, and religious leaders. They considered theWolof chiefs themselves as Muslims. It is significant, however, that neither i n the European sources n o r i n the oral traditions is there any account o f a viable traditional A f r i c a n r e l i g i o n a m o n g t h e W o l o f . Oral traditions k n o w n o other r e l i g i o n than Islam f r o m the d a w n o f W o l o f history. It seems that most ves-

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tiges o f organized traditional r e l i g i o n were e l i m i n a t e d under Islam's influence. M u s l i m religious leaders took over functions o f the traditional priests, a n d even magic and r e l i g i o n were the prerogative o f M u s l i m religious leaders. The political a n d m i l i t a r y elite were a w a r r i o r class, f o r w h o m d r i n k i n g alcoh o l became a s y m b o l o f b e l o n g i n g , w h i c h o n l y c o n t r i b u t e d to the tensions and c o n f r o n t a t i o n between the ulama and the w a r r i o r s . The g r o w i n g influence o f the M u s l i m s i n the court was counterbalanced by the tyeddo, the m i l i t a r y core o f Kayor. For the m i l i t a r y and political elite, conversion to Islam i m p l i e d j o i n i n g the clerical c o m m u n i t y , a change o f vocation and lifestyle. The W o l o f chiefs therefore rejected demands by M u s l i m militants to convert. Tensions i n the W o l o f states g r e w w h e n m i l i t a n t Islamic movements erupted i n n e i g h b o r i n g countries, m a i n l y i n Futa Toro. W h e n W o l o f clerics collaborated w i t h the m i l i t a n t s , they were severely punished and even sold i n t o slavery, w h i c h was a violation o f cler-

The foundation of the Fulbe (or Fulani) state in the early sixteenth century marked a major turning point in the history of the Senegambia, the region comprising modern Senegal, Gambia, and Sierra Leone. The receni Great Mosque atTouba, 9 0 miles east of Dakar, Senegal, shows the internationalization of Islamic culture there, where Islam remains the dominant religion.

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ical i m m u n i t y . C o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h m i l i t a n t Islamic movements changed p o l i t i cal perceptions t o w a r d Islam. Whereas earlier European accounts referred t o the W o l o f as M u s l i m s , later European travelers (since the end o f the eighteenth cent u r y and t h r o u g h o u t the nineteenth c e n t u r y ) , said that the W o l o f were M u s l i m s but their rulers were "pagans." It was only since the end o f the nineteenth cent u r y that the entire W o l o f society converted t o Islam.

Kanem and Bornu A n early trans-Saharan route connected T r i p o l i o n the Mediterranean w i t h Lake Chad. Kanem ( n o w part o f Chad) emerged as one o f the earliest A f r i c a n k i n g d o m s o n the northeastern corner o f Lake Chad. According to Kitab al-Istibsar, an anonymous w o r k w r i t t e n i n 1191, and I b n Said (1217-86), w r i t i n g some t i m e after 1269, the people o f Kanem converted t o Islam at the beginning o f the t w e l f t h century. M o r e than i n any other early African state i n w h i c h Islam remained restricted t o the court, i n Kanem Islam spread t h r o u g h out the land t o the entire p o p u l a t i o n shortly after the king's conversion. According to the

fifteenth-century

Egyptian historian a l - M a q r i z i , the k i n g o f Kanem w e n t o n

a pilgrimage t o Mecca a n d built a madrasa i n Cairo for students f r o m Kanem i n the first half o f the thirteenth century. At the same t i m e a devout M u s l i m king broke w i t h tradition by o p e n i n g "a certain t h i n g w r a p p e d u p and h i d d e n away, w h e r e o n depended their v i c t o r y i n war, called M u n e , w h i c h n o one dared t o open." Traditions suggest that this act b r o u g h t about the hostilities between the Saifawa r u l i n g dynasty and the rival Bulala clan, o f m o r e traditionalist disposition. The Saifawa were forced t o abandon Kanem and to resettle i n B o r n u , o n the southwestern corner o f Lake Chad. This was i n the m i d d l e o f the fourteenth century, but the Saifawa consolidated their h o l d over the new c o u n t r y only t o w a r d the end o f the fifteenth century, w i t h the establishment o f the capital at N'Gazargamu. This took place d u r i n g the r e i g n o f A l i Ghaji i b n D u n a m a (r. 1476- IÇ03), w h o is remembered as an exemplary M u s l i m , always surrounded by ulama, w h o were his confidants. He was a c o n t e m p o r a r y o f other reformist rulers, such as Rumfa o f Kano and Askiya M u h a m m a d o f Songhay. H e was also the first ruler o f B o r n u to assume the tide o f caliph. The c l a i m t o the caliphate m i g h t have been i n response t o a similar claim by the Songhay ruler Askiya M u h a m m a d . A l i Ghaji visited Cairo o n his way t o Mecca i n 1484 and met the Egyptian w r i t e r and Sufi teacher Jalal a l - D i n al-Suyuti. It is likely that al-Suyuti obtained the title o f caliph f r o m the Abbasid caliph o f Cairo for M a i A l i Ghaji, as he h a d earlier for Askiya M u h a m m a d . The B o r n u caliphate reached its peak under M a i Idris A l a w m a (r. 1570-1603), w h e n a l l the state d i g n i t a r i e s were M u s l i m a n d the capital at N'Gazargamu was an i m p o r t a n t center f o r Islamic learning. Qadis, i m a m s , and

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teachers were granted privileges and were exempted f r o m taxation. The shariah became the law o f the state, w h i c h was i m p o s e d o n the entire p o p u l a t i o n . M a i Idris had d i p l o m a t i c relations w i t h the Ottomans, w h o conquered T r i p o l i i n

ICCI

and annexed Fezzan ( i n southwestern Libya) i n 1577. Fearing the g r o w i n g power o f the Ottomans, i n 15-82 M a i Idris sent a delegation t o the Moroccan sultan a l Mansur (1578—1603) w h o also had ambitions t o w a r d Sudan. I n w e s t e r n Sudan the o p e n i n g o f n e w sources o f g o l d e x t e n d e d trade routes f u r t h e r s o u t h , w h i c h encouraged the d e v e l o p m e n t o f c h i e f d o m s a n d the spread o f I s l a m . But a r o u n d Lake Chad t h e p r o v i s i o n o f slaves b y raids created a h o s t i l e b o u n d a r y . U n t i l t h e s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y K a n e m a n d B o r n u e x p a n d e d o n l y n o r t h w a r d t o t h e Sahara. The c o u n t r i e s s o u t h o f Lake C h a d , a h u n t i n g g r o u n d f o r slaves, w e r e l e f t o u t s i d e the b o u n d a r i e s o f B o r n u . The s o u t h w a r d e x p a n s i o n o f B o r n u was also h i n d e r e d b y n a t u r a l b a r r i e r s : the M a n d a r a m o u n t a i n s , the dense v e g e t a t i o n , a n d marshes created b y t h e seasonal f l o o d i n g o f Lake Chad and t h e L o g o n e and Shari Rivers. T h e s o u t h e r n b o u n d a r i e s o f K a n e m a n d B o r n u w e r e also t h e s o u t h e r n f r o n t i e r f o r t h e e x p a n s i o n o f I s l a m . A f t e r the O t t o m a n s c o n q u e r e d Fezzan, B o r n u c o u l d n o t e x p a n d t o t h e n o r t h a n d thus t u r n e d t o t h e s o u t h . M a i I d r i s o c c u p i e d the n o r t h e r n parts o f t h e l a n d o f the K o t o k o as w e l l as M a n d a r a and the r e g i o n o f Lake F i t r i . People i n the c o n q u e r e d lands became M u s l i m . A b o u t the same

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t i m e , i n the sixteenth century, the state o f B a g i r m i emerged o n the r i g h t bank o f the Shari River, i n a r e g i o n that h a d f o r m e r l y been r a i d e d f o r slaves. Shortly thereafter, the rulers o f B a g i r m i became I s l a m i z e d . The rulers o f B o r n u i n the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were pious and learned. Scholars held disputations before the m a i concerning d o u b t f u l points o f law and d o g m a . Scholars and venerated saints received mahrams (charters), w h i c h removed all obstacles f r o m their w o r l d l y existence, o n c o n d i t i o n that they seek d i v i n e favors for their royal benefactors. The mai generously supported scholars and attracted students f r o m far and w i d e . Distinguished scholars were persuaded to live there, they were given houses, and great h o n o r was bestowed u p o n t h e m . The greatest scholars o f the eighteenth century i n central Sudan spent t i m e i n N'Gazargamu as a necessary part o f their education and enjoyed the mai's patronage. Scholars f r o m B o r n u studied at al-Azhar University i n Cairo, w h e r e the madrasa that had been established i n the thirteenth century was still i n existence i n the eighteenth century. But even w h e n most o f the scholars c o l laborated w i t h the B o r n u ruler and recognized h i m as caliph, there were scholars w h o criticized their colleagues for h o l d i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l offices o f the state. These radical scholars w i t h d r e w f r o m the centers o f political p o w e r and established a u t o n o m o u s religious c o m m u n i t i e s . But even they received mahrams, to encourage and sustain the development o f Islamic learning. These enclaves o f rural scholarship, k n o w n as mallamati, were considered a m o n g the most i m p o r tant centers o f learning in central Sudan. Succession to leadership i n the mallamati was hereditary because o f die belief that the baraka (divine blessing) is transmitted i n die family and because the mahram was granted to the ulama and his descendants. These communities jealously guarded their autonomy and maintained m i n i m a l c o m munications w i t h the larger society and w i d i the state. They criticized existing religious practices and provoked the hostility o f die established scholars. The scholars sensed the threat o f such communities that refused to be integrated into the existing sociopolitical order. The mallamati were i n fact Sufi communities in rural enclaves that performed mystical exercises, including retreats in the bush. Like their contemporary Sufis i n T i m b u k t u , they claimed no affiliation w i t h a tariquah or Sufi brotherhood. By the end o f die eighteenth century Islam was deeply rooted i n the everyday life o f the ordinary people, affecting them f r o m die naming ceremony to their funerals. This was admitted by M u h a m m a d Bello i n Infaq al-Muysur (1951): "Islam was w i d e spread not o n l y among the rulers and ministers, but also among die local people. Indeed diere are not to be f o u n d i n these countries ordinary people more scrupulous than they i n reciting the Quran and reading it and m e m o r i z i n g it and w r i t i n g it out." But even i n Bornu, perhaps die most Islamized o f all African states, pre-Islamic elements persisted. There was m u c h dissatisfaction i n the eighteendi century. Many o f the scholars w h o criticized Kanuri society were Fulbe. But the most damaging crit-

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icism o f the contemporary scene was made by a Kanuri scholar, M u h a m m a d i b n alHajj A b d al-Rahman al-Barnawi (d. 1755), k n o w n as Hajirmai, w h o called the rulers o f Bornu tyrants, accusing them o f being c o r r u p t and for imposing illegal taxation; the rich for hoarding f o o d at times o f famine i n the hope o f profit; and judges and governors for accepting gifts. There were allegations o f h u m a n sacrifices at the time o f the annual flood in the river KomaduguYobe, and o f libations o f milk f r o m a black cow before the annual repairs to the city w a l l . These accusations were echoed by M u h a m m a d Bello as a pretext to the jihad against Bornu: "Their rulers and d u e l s have places to w h i c h they ride, and where they offer sacrifices and then pour the b l o o d on the gates o f their towns. . . . They also p e r f o r m rites to the river. . . ."

Hausaland before the Jihad I n the entire corpus o f Arabic sources for West African history there is n o reference to the Hausa states, w i t h one exception. W h e n i n Takedda i n the A i r (the m o u n t a i n o u s region i n n o r t h - c e n t r a l N i g e r ) , I b n Battutah referred to G o b i r as one o f the destinations for the export of Takedda copper. Because the i n f o r m a t i o n o f the Arab geographers came t h r o u g h c o m m e r c i a l routes, Hausaland was not directly connected to N o r t h Africa by trade routes across the Sahara. The Kano Chronicle, w h i c h is the p r i n c i p a l source for the development o f Islam i n Hausaland, had first been w r i t t e n i n the m i d d l e o f the seventeenth century. The reigns o f leaders and the events since 1650 were recorded as c o n t e m p o r a r y o r eyewitness accounts. Records o f the century before 1650 were based o n l i v i n g m e m o r y . But accounts o f earlier periods were basically oral traditions, reflecting seventeenth-century interests and realities. The Kano Chronicle provides a c h r o n o logical f r a m e w o r k for the o p e n i n g o f trade routes to Hausaland. I n the m i d d l e o f the f o u r t e e n t h century M a n d i n g u e traders, the Wangara, came f r o m Mali i n the west. A century later salt came f r o m A i r (called Asben u n t i l c o n q u e r e d by Berbers) in the n o r t h and kola nuts f r o m Gonja i n the south. Bornu traders came Traders from Mali brought Islam to the central African region of Hausaland in the fourteenth century. Pre-Islamic traditions remained strong and were often integrated into traditional Islamic practices. This small copy of the Quran, made in the late seventeenth or early eighteenth century,

f r o m the northeast. The Wangara ulama that accompanied the traders f r o m M a l i i n the f o u r t e e n t h century are credited in the traditions o f

combines a distinctive African type of Arabic script with

Kano as being the first to b r i n g Islam t o

bold graphic designs.

Kano. U n d e r their influence, the c h i e f o f

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Kano began to pray, and a mosque was b u i l t beneath the sacred tree. The leadi n g ulama were given o f f i c i a l appointments to serve the k i n g and the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y O p p o s i t i o n to the M u s l i m s came f r o m the local priests, but they were unable to stand the magical p o w e r o f the M u s l i m prayers. The custodians o f the traditional r e l i g i o n were defeated o n their o w n g r o u n d by a superior magical power. But the real lesl to the efficacy o f the new r e l i g i o n was w h e n the M u s l i m s b r o u g h t victory to the k i n g o f Kano over his most forceful enemy. D u r i n g the first crisis, w h e n the k i n g o f Kano failed to w i n a war, disappointed by the M u s l i m s , he t u r n e d back to the t r a d i t i o n a l priest, w h o p r o m i s e d his help i f the king restored the rites that his father had destroyed. The c h i e f o f Kano c o m p l i e d and the traditional priest secured v i c t o r y over the enemies. Islam t e m porarily lost g r o u n d . The second g e n e r a t i o n reverted to t r a d i t i o n a l r e l i g i o n , b u t the t h i r d gene r a t i o n t u r n e d over c o m p l e t e l y t o I s l a m . I n Kano, as i n o t h e r A f r i c a n states, k i n g s ' sons received elementary Q u r a n i c i n s t r u c t i o n . A few w e n t b e y o n d w h a t was expected o f princes, became attached t o t h e i r masters, a n d t u r n e d sincere M u s l i m s . There was, however, the b u i l t - i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n between b e i n g a w a r r i o r c h i e f and b e i n g a M u s l i m . This was e x p l a i n e d t o U m a r , the k i n g o f Kano, by his M u s l i m f r i e n d , after w h i c h U m a r r e m a i n e d f a i t h f u l to Islam a n d abdicated as king. The c o m i n g o f I s l a m to Kano c o i n c i d e d w i t h the shift o f the Saifawa dynasty f r o m K a n e m to B o r n u , closer to Hausaland. A l t h o u g h the first M u s l i m ulama came f r o m M a l i i n the west, i t seems that Islamic i n f l u ence f r o m B o r n u was at least as i m p o r t a n t . In the m i d d l e o f the fifteenth century the Toronkawa, settled Fulbe scholars, b r o u g h t a higher level o f Islamic learning compared w i t h that o f the earlier Wangara ulama. The Islamic t r a d i t i o n o f learning among the Toronkawa was s i m ilar to that i n T i m b u k t u i n the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The Toronkawa lived i n rural enclaves, d i d not render religious services to the local rulers, and were n o t involved i n non-Islamic ceremonies. They c o m m u n i c a t e d w i t h the rulers but d i d n o t become integrated i n t o the political system. The tensions generated by that mental and physical distance later led to c o n f r o n t a t i o n and to a jihad. The Toronkawa d i d not seem to have been softened physically by their clerical habits, a n d unlike urban scholars, they were not strangers to horsemanship and warfare. Islam became integrated i n t o Hausa religious, social, and cultural life w i t h o u t breaking w i t h the past, w h i c h was symbolized by the c u t t i n g o f the sacred tree under w h i c h the o r i g i n a l mosque had been b u i l t . This r e f o r m is associated w i t h the k i n g o f Kano, M u h a m m a d R u m f a , a c o n t e m p o r a r y o f the r e f o r m i s t kings Askiya M u h a m m a d i n Songhay and A l i Ghaji i n B o r n u . The reformist ideology was articulated by A b d a l - K a r i m a l - M a g h i l i , the N o r t h African m i l i t a n t scholar, w h o visited Kano i n 1491 before his visit to Songhay.

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In the sixteenth century the level and sophistication o f scholarship was heightened, w i t h the g r o w t h o f the repertoire o f books taught i n Kano. Piety and scholarship a m o n g the kings o f Kano seem to have reached their peak in the second h a l f o f the sixteenth century, a p e r i o d parallel to that o f M a i Idris i n B o r n u . Scholars f r o m T i m b u k t u visited b o t h Kano and Katsina, the most i m p o r t a n t m a r ket t o w n i n Hausaland u n t i l the end o f the eighteenth century, o n their way t o the p i l g r i m a g e to Mecca, taught there for some t i m e , and c o n t r i b u t e d to the g r o w t h o f local Hausa scholarship. N o n - M u s l i m s w h o were absorbed i n the Hausa states and culture became k n o w n as Maguzawa, f r o m the Arabic majus, " t h e M a g i . " They were o f diverse ethnic o r i g i n s but shared a c o m m o n Hausa language and culture. For the m a j o r i t y o f the peasants, Islam was n o m o r e than one c u l t a m o n g many. The c u l t o f bori spirits was the most widespread pre-Islamic prac-

As everywhere in the Islamic lands, Muslims celebrate the end of Ramadan, the month of fasting, with a festival. Here, a group of mounted notables rides through the streets of Kano, Nigeria, celebrating the Id al-Fitr with drums and tambourines.

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497

tice that survived i n Hausaland, m a i n l y a m o n g w o m e n . B o r i spirits were given M u s l i m names, and M u s l i m jinns (genies, w h o s e existence are

completely

accepted i n official Islam) became i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the b o r i spirits. The fact that the b o r i spirits became Islamized made i t m o r e d i f f i c u l t to eradicate t h e m . D u r i n g the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Kano was repeatedly attacked by the Jukun, called Kworarafa i n the Kano Chronicle, f r o m the south. The kings o f Kano sought r e l i e f i n rituals and magic f r o m b o t h " n o n - M u s l i m " Maguzawa priests and f r o m local M u s l i m divines w h o e m p l o y e d similar practices. Each o f the Hausa city-states had its o w n experience w i t h Islam. Katsina

also had the

largest Wangara commercial c o m m u n i t y , w h i c h influenced politics there. By the end o f the eighteenth century the rulers and the p o p u l a t i o n o f Katsina were largely Islamized. But the legitimacy o f the dynasty was still based o n the traditional belief system. Even those rulers more c o m m i t t e d to Islam were genuinely t o r n between t w o systems o f religious beliefs. The slaves o f the palace opposed attempts to revive the Sunna and to impose the shariah. The ulama, w h o were alienated f r o m the rulers, preferred to five i n the p e r i p h ery o f Katsina, i n towns w i t h i n a radius o f fifteen kilometers f r o m Katsina, where they enjoyed greater autonomy. The mosques o f these towns attracted more people to pray than mosques i n the capital. The rulers ignored them because o f their small numbers and t h e n peripheral location, but i t was f r o m these small towns that the supporters o f the jihad o f U t h m a n dan Fodio (17CC-1817) came.Yandoto had been created by the Wangara merchants for die trade i n kola nuts f r o m the Akan forest, soudiwest o f Hausaland. Yandoto prospered i n the second half o f the eighteenth century w h e n the kola trade was at its peak, w h i c h made its merchants and scholars supporters o f the status quo and opponents o f the jihad o f U t h m a n dan Fodio. He enumerated the sins o f the Hausa rulers that justified the jihad: the veneration o f trees and rocks by malting sacrifices and p o u r i n g libations; divination by sand, stars, spirits, and by the sound o f the movements o f birds; consultation w i t h soothsayers; use o f magic; and w r i t i n g o f the names o f Allah or extracts o f die Quran o n polluted dungs, such as the bones o f the dead, and d r i n k i n g the solution w h e n i t is washed o f f and m i x e d w i t h snake skin. A l l these "sins" may be counted i n many M u s l i m societies i n Africa, representing the surviving pre-Islamic Lraditions. Most scholars d i d not challenge this ambiguous situation. The dramatic point o f no return i n the development o f Islamic militancy was w h e n militants reintroduced the concept o f takfir by declaring as infidels those w h o had previously been considered Muslims.

Eastern Sudan The defeat o f the Arabs i n 652 before the walls o f the N u b i a n capital was the worst that they suffered d u r i n g their conquests. The Nubians were able to resist the M u s l i m expansion to the south for almost six centuries. Arab and M u s l i m

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For more than two centuries the sultans of the Funj dynasty

(1CC3-1762)

of SLnnar (modern

Sennar) on the Blue Nile dominated the eastern Sudan. The court of Sinnar attracted many holy men. and dervishes still play an important role in Sudanese life, as shown by these dancing dervishes in Omdurman.

penetration i n t o the c o u n t r y south o f Egypt was not by means o f m i l i t a r y conquest but t h r o u g h gradual i n f i l t r a t i o n . Slave r a i d i n g and g o l d m i n i n g b r o u g h t Arabs to the land o f Béja, between the N i l e and the Red Sea. I m m i g r a n t Arabs w h o became absorbed a m o n g the n o r t h e r n Béja developed b i l i n g u a l c o m m u n i ties o f m i x e d descent, w h i c h d u r i n g the t e n t h c e n t u r y were the first Béja M u s l i m s . By the tenth century M u s l i m s represented a quarter o f the merchants i n the capital o f the Christian k i n g d o m o f N u b i a . I n the tenth and eleventh centuries the Fatimid rulers o f Egypt were anxious to push the Arab nomads o f the Banu Hilal and related tribes away f r o m the cultivated lands o f Egypt. Most o f the Banu Hilal m o v e d west t o w a r d N o r t h Africa, w h i l e others penetrated the n o r t h -

ISLAM

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e r n pans o f the Christian k i n g d o m o f N u b i a . By 1174

this zone had a m a j o r i t y o f M u s l i m s

and was recognized o f f i c i a l l y as an Islamic province under an Arab d i g n i t a r y k n o w n as Kanz al-Dawla. As the Christian k i n g d o m was disintegrati n g , the M a m l u k sultan o f Egypt and Syria, Baybars (r. 1 2 6 0 - 7 7 ) , sent a force i n 1276 that conquered M a k u r i a ( i n the Sudan). As " p r o tected people," the N u b i a n s were allowed to keep their Christian r e l i g i o n . The

Egyptians

appointed a m e m b e r o f the o l d royal f a m i l y to r u l e i n their name. Repeated attempts by the Nubians

to shake o f f f o r e i g n

defeated

and caused the r e i n f o r c e m e n t

M u s l i m garrisons.

In

1324

rule

Kanz

were of

al-Dawla

seized the t h r o n e f r o m the o l d dynasty and the c o u n t r y disintegrated i n t o w a r r i n g factions. D u r i n g the t i m e between the eclipse o f the Christian k i n g d o m a r o u n d 1300 and the rise o f the first M u s l i m states a r o u n d 1500, the pastoral

communities

who

inhabited

the

extensive lands beyond the i r r i g a t e d banks o f the N i l e were free o f any p o l i t i c a l authority. The central lands o f eastern Sudan were d o m inated for m o r e than t w o centuries by the sultans o f the Funj dynasty o f Sinnar. It is said

Militant puritanical movements, sometimes with millenarian ele-

that the O t t o m a n sultan Selim (r. 1512-20),

ments, transformed central African Islam from the late eighteenth

who

century. Observance of the rules of Islam became the criterion to

conquered

Egypt

advance f u r t h e r s o u t h

in

1517,

to conquer

did

not

Sinnar

because o f the Islamic credentials o f the first Funj sultan. Whatever the h i s t o r i c i t y o f this

evaluate a person's status as a Muslim.These prayer beads from elFasher in the western Sudan were a pilgrim's souvenir of his pilgrimage to Mecca, one of the Five Pillars of Islam.

t r a d i t i o n , i t clearly indicates that f r o m the b e g i n n i n g , Islam played an i m p o r t a n t role i n the sultanate o f Sinnar. The court o f Sinnar attracted i m m i g r a n t h o l y m e n , w h o received generous royal patronage t h r o u g h royal grants o f landed estates o r t h r o u g h a p p o i n t m e n t s to p r i v i l e g e d positions. H o l y m e n enjoyed various e x e m p t i o n s f r o m taxation a n d r i g h t s o f geographical m o b i l i t y and personal security. The f o r m a l status o f M u s l i m h o l y m e n i n Sinnar was i n between that o f n o b l e m e n and that o f c o r n -

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moners. A n i m m i g r a n t h o l y m a n held a higher status than a n a t i v e - b o r n cleric. H o l y m e n w h o used their p o w e r to defend the interests o f the c o m m o n people enjoyed greater p o p u l a r i t y than those w h o h e l d official positions as courtiers and judges. Adherence t o Islam i n the sultanate o f Sinnar was n o t i n d i v i d u a l ; rather, i t was corporate and c o m m u n a l , because ah subjects o f a M u s l i m ruler were assumed to be M u s l i m s by d e f i n i t i o n , even w i t h o u t a f o r m a l act o f c o n version, and regardless o f lifestyle. Disobedience to the k i n g , however, i m p l i e d rejection o f Islam and therefore the c o m m u n i t y , and penalties were a p p r o p r i ate to apostasy and unbelief. The next significant stage i n Sinnar began i n the t h i r d quarter o f the seventeenth century, w h e n the sultan o f Sinnar established a fixed capital and built an impressive royal mosque. He also encouraged trade by sending caravans to Egypt and to the Red Sea p o r t o f Sawakin, w h i c h was c o n t r o l l e d by the Ottomans. Before that, commerce had been a royal m o n o p o l y , and contacts w i t h visiting merchants were o n l y t h r o u g h royal agencies, at designated places near the capital. As trade became free o f royal monopoly, an i n d i g e n o u s urban-based m i d d l e class developed, and new t o w n s appeared at the b e g i n n i n g o f the eighteenth century. Social and e c o n o m i c changes u n d e r m i n e d the existing political system i n Sinnar. The o l d matrilineal dynasty was o v e r t h r o w n i n 1718.

The Funj system,

w h i c h had u n i t e d the elite and enforced hierarchy a m o n g its m e m b e r s , gave way t o the sale o f titles and offices to c o m p e t i n g w arlords. I n the second half o f the r

eighteenth century these warlords engaged i n internal c i v i l wars. In the n e w t o w n s , people made wealth and achieved status t h r o u g h economic gains. For the n e w urban p o p u l a t i o n , legally oriented interpretations o f Islam offered authoritative paradigms o f lifestyles. Islamic i n s t r u c t i o n , public prayers, and conformist dress gave the n e w urban-based m i d d l e class an entirely new c u l tural and ethnic i d e n t i t y as Arabs. Observance o f the rules o f Islam became the c r i t e r i o n t o evaluate a person's status as a M u s l i m . F o l l o w i n g the conquest o f eastern Sudan by the Egyptian ruler M u h a m m a d A l i Pasha i n 1821, this emergent m i d d l e class o f Sinnar allied itself w i t h the Turko-Egyptian regime. I n Sinnar as w e l l as i n Darfur and Wadai, the t w o western states that emerged i n the seventeenth century, the southern c o m m u n i t i e s — k n o w n as N u b a i n Sinnar, Fertit in Darfur, and K i r d i i n W a d a i — w e r e compelled to pay taxes i n the f o r m o f ivory, gold, or slaves. I f they failed, they were liable to p u n i t i v e raids and selective or mass enslavement.

The Horn of Africa In the seventh century, w h e n Islam began its expansion i n t o Africa, Christianity was the d o m i n a n t religion i n the lands that extended along the Mediterranean, f r o m

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Morocco to Egypt, i n the hinterland o f Egypt and o f the Red Sea, i n N u b i a and Ethiopia. By die twelfth century the last indigenous Christians disappeared f r o m N o r t h Africa west o f Egypt. I n Egypt the Chrisdans, w h o still f o r m e d about half o f the p o p u l a t i o n i n the tenth century, were later reduced to a m i n o r i t y o f n o more than fifteen percent. I n eastern Sudan Christianity began to loose g r o u n d i n the twelfth century and was eliminated by the fourteenth century. It was therefore only in the highlands o f Ethiopia that Christianity survived centuries o f confrontation w i t h Islam. Ethiopia is Arabia's closest neighbor, separated only by the Red Sea. I n the pre-Islamic periods the Ethiopians crossed the Red Sea to invade Arabia, but the narrow stretch o f water was enough o f a barrier to the Arab bedouins. But what deterred these Arab warriors was not a p r o b l e m for Arab traders, w h o f r o m the ports o f the Red Sea and the g u l f developed a m a r i t i m e trade that brought Islam to die islands and the shores o f the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. As early as the e i g h t h c e n t u r y the i s l a n d o f Dahlak Kebir was the o u t l e t for Arab trade and a p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e f o r the d i f f u s i o n o f Islam t o the E t h i o p i a n h i n t e r l a n d . M o g a d i s h u (a seaport o f Somalia), w h i c h had been f o u n d e d s o m e t i m e b e t w e e n the e i g h t h and t e n t h c e n t u r i e s , d e v e l o p e d i n t o a sultanate i n the t w e l f t h c e n t u r y . By t h e t h i r t e e n t h c e n t u r y there w e r e M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s i n t h e E t h i o p i a n h i g h l a n d s that t r a d e d u n d e r

the

p r o t e c t i o n o f the C h r i s t i a n state. T h e r e w e r e also a n u m b e r o f M u s l i m p r i n c i p a l i t i e s a l o n g trade routes f r o m the coast t o the C h r i s t i a n h i g h l a n d s and t o t h e R i f t Valley Lakes t o t h e s o u t h . By that t i m e m a n y o f the n o m a d s o f the H o r n , such as the A f a r and the S o m a l i , had b e c o m e M u s l i m s . As t h e S o l o m i n i d dynasty o f E t h i o p i a b e g a n its e x p a n s i o n t o the s o u t h , it clashed w i t h the M u s l i m p r i n c i p a l i t i e s over the c o n t r o l o f the l o n g - d i s t a n c e routes. I n 1332

trade

an alliance o f the M u s l i m p r i n c i p a l i t i e s was defeated a n d

the p r i n c i p a l i t i e s b e c a m e t r i b u t a r y t o E t h i o p i a . T h e s u l t a n a t e o f A d a l , w h i c h e m e r g e d as the m a j o r M u s l i m p r i n c i p a l i t y f r o m 1420 t o 1560, seems to have r e c r u i t e d its m i l i t a r y force m a i n l y f r o m a m o n g the Somalis. I n its p r o t r a c t e d w a r s w i t h t h e C h r i s t i a n state o f E t h i o p i a , A d a l s o u g h t the s u p p o r t o f the M a m l u k sultanate o f E g y p t . Ethiopia's continuous m i l i t a r y campaigns encouraged the development

of

Islamic militancy, w h i c h i n 1529 took the f o r m o f a jihad led by A h m a d I b r a h i m al-Ghazi o f Harar, k n o w n as A h m a d Gran (ca. 1506-43). A h m a d Gran conquered most o f the Ethiopian state. The strife between M u s l i m s and Christians i n the first half o f the sixteenth century i n Ethiopia and the H o r n became part o f a larger M u s l i m - C h r i s t i a n confrontation i n the Red Sea between the Portuguese, w h o had penetrated the I n d i a n Ocean, and the Ottomans, w h o had conquered Egypt i n 1517 and Yemen i n 1525. A l u n a d Gran was k i l l e d i n 1543 i n an engagement w i t h a small contingent o f Portuguese soldiers that came to the aid of their Christian

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Ethiopian allies. Because A h m a d Gran h a d n o t consolidated his conquests, the entire Islamic imamate that he was about to create collapsed. By [53-5 the Ethiopian state regained all the territories it had held before the j i h a d , w h e r e they f o u n d a significant n u m b e r o f M u s l i m s . I n about 1630 a Portuguese missionary estimated that M u s l i m s constituted o n e - t h i r d o f Ethiopia's p o p u l a t i o n . The emperor o f Ethiopia, Yohannes I (r. 1667-82), w h o sensed the threat o f the expansion o f Islam, took measures t o isolate the M u s l i m s . He ordered that M u s l i m s live i n separate villages and t o w n quarters, and that Christians must n o t eat w i t h M u s l i m s or d r i n k f r o m cups used by M u s l i m s . They greeted Muslims w i t h the left hand, as a sign o f contempt. In 1322-23 Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad, ruler of the city of Mogadishu in what is now Somalia, struck coins made mostly of base metal and inscribed with his name (above). In the twelfth century. Sultan Hasan ibn Sulayman of the island of Kilwan, off the coast of modern Tanzania, minted this copper coin (below).

M o r e i m p o r t a n t s t i l l , the w e a k e n i n g o f b o t h the C h r i s t i a n state and the M u s l i m p r i n c i p a l i ties l e f t the l a n d o p e n t o the mass m i g r a t i o n s o f the pastoral O r o m o p e o p l e i n t o the f e r t i l e h i g h l a n d s . The O r o m o , who selves

between

the

inserted t h e m -

Muslims

and

C h r i s t i a n s , b r o u g h t about the s u s p e n s i o n

the of

h o s t i l i t i e s b e t w e e n the t w o c o n t e n d i n g r e l i g i o n s . By the e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h e O r o m o g r a d u a l l y became M u s l i m a n d played an active role i n the e x p a n s i o n o f Islam i n the r e g i o n . T h e i r c h i e f l y families embraced

I s l a m , gave

patronage t o M u s l i m scholars, and a p p o i n t e d qadis to make Islam increasingly an integral part o f their subject's lives.

The East African Coast The story o f Islam o n the East African coast is t o l d by a mosque at Shanga i n the Lamu archipelago ( o f f the eastern coast o f Kenya). Its o r i g i n a l c o n struction is dated between 780 and 850, and it survived u n t i l the early fifteen century. The c o n -

ISLAM

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S°3

tinual reconstruction o f this mosque was aimed at accommodating a constantly

Isiam came 10 East Africa

g r o w i n g M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . The accelerated expansion o f Islam o n Africa's east

primarily from Yemen and

coast occLured i n the thirteenth century, as suggested by the remains o f medieval towns i n excavations at K i l w a ( i n southeastern Tanzania) and elsewhere. By the f o u r t e e n t h century there w e r e m o r e than t h i r t y M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s w i t h mosques along the coast and i n the C o m o r o Islands and i n Madagascar. From

the Hadramawt on the south coast of Arabia. Muslim sailors crossed the Indian Ocean in special lateenrigged ships called dhows,

Arabia the Shafii school o f law spread to East Africa and elsewhere along the shores

similar to the ones still seen

o f the Indian Ocean.

in the harbor of Lamu on

The reconstruction o f the history o f Islam o n the East African coast, according to the archaeological evidence, is c o n f i r m e d by the Arabic sources. I n the tenth century the Arab h i s t o r i a n and traveler a l - M a s u d i recorded the presence o f Muslims i n the land o f the Zanj, as the East African coast was k n o w n to the Arabs. Muslims gradually became the m a j o r i t y i n settlements that enjoyed the prosperity of an ever-growing trade. Islamic influences came to East Africa f r o m several directions, but the most i m p o r t a n t influence was f r o m Yemen and the Hadramawt

the Kenyan coast.

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(a region i n the southern Arabian, peninsula), f r o m where shurafa families reached the East A f r i c a n coast, particularly since the thirteenth century. One o f these f a m ilies provided the A b u l - M a w a h i b dynasty o f Kilwa. I b n Battutah visited K i l w a i n 1331,

w h e r e the ruler's court was frequented by h o l y m e n and shurafa. I b n

Battutah reported about the experts o n Islamic jurisprudence also i n Mogadishu. Conversion i n the early centuries proceeded s l o w l y and unevenly, but by the t i m e the first Europeans arrived Islam had already achieved m a j o r i t y status i n dozens o f coastal towns. I n the seventeenth century Pate ( i n Kenya) became an i m p o r t a n t entrepôt o f the slave trade. The M u s l i m traders o f Pate had connections w i t h Arabia, w i t h I n d i a , and even w i t h Java. K n o w l e d g e o f spoken and w r i t t e n Arabic was restricted to first-generation m i g r a n t s f r o m the Arabian peninsula and t o those few w h o studied abroad. Swahili became a w r i t t e n l a n guage o n l y i n the eighteenth century, and the Swahili-speaking M u s l i m s were therefore practically illiterate. The l i m i t e d i n t e r a c t i o n o f Arabic and S w a h i l i The Lamu archipelago

explains w h y there was n o significant b o r r o w i n g o f Arabic w o r d s i n t o the

became the religious and

Swahili language before the seventeenth century. The H a d r a m i i m m i g r a n t s c o n -

cultural heartland of the East African coast between ICCO

and

1800.

Many

mosques were built there,

t r i b u t e d to the development o f a w r i t t e n coastal literature. They began by w r i t i n g w o r k s i n their native Arabic, b u t as they became integrated i n t o the local Swahili-speaking society, coastal scholars o f H a d r a m i b a c k g r o u n d began w r i t -

including this one, at Shela

i n g i n Swahili. Consequently, the earliest w r i t t e n poetry f r o m the coast dates

on Lamu Island.

f r o m the m i d d l e o f the seventeenth century.

ISLAM

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The L a m u archipelago became the religious and cultural heartland o f the coast between i ç ç o and 1800. F r o m Pate shurafa families m o v e d f u r t h e r south, b r i n g i n g w i t h t h e m their spiritual charisma and scholarly traditions. The Swahili dialect o f the Pate-Lamu r e g i o n had a large preponderance o n the s o u t h e r n coastal dialects at that t i m e , thus i n d i c a t i n g a southward m i g r a t i o n o f a large and prestigious g r o u p o f n o r t h e r n i m m i g r a n t s f r o m the Pate r e g i o n . The shurafa, scholars and holy m e n o f Pate, k n o w n for their learning and piety, m i g h t have c o n t r i b u t e d to i n f u s i n g a certain m i l i t a n c y to East A f r i c a n Islam. They fueled Islamic resistance to the Portuguese, w h i c h spread f r o m Pate to other parts o f the East A f r i c a n coast. The final expulsion o f the Portuguese f r o m the coast n o r t h o f M o z a m b i q u e i n 1728 opened a n e w era i n the history o f Islam i n East Africa. This n e w p e r i o d is connected w i t h the arrival o f the Omanis i n the eighteenth century and the estab-

Many Muslims came to East Africa from India in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when both regions

lishment o f the Zanzibar sultanate i n the 1820s. One aspect o f the change was the

were part of the British

institutionalization o f the administration o f the shariah t h r o u g h appointed qadis,

Empire. Muslims comprise

whereas before the relocation o f the sultanate f r o m O m a n to Zanzibar, the a d m i n -

only a small portion of the

istration o f the shariah had been i n f o r m a l and irregular i n most coastal centers. Local scholars served i n advisory capacities to local rulers, w h o reserved for t h e m selves the actual rights o f adjudication. M u s l i m s arrived to the Cape colony i n South Africa as early as i 6 ç 2 . They were political exiles f r o m Indonesia, w h o m the D u t c h defeated i n their homelands.

population of modern-day Kenya, but they play an important role in life there. The main mosque in Nairobi is modeled on Indian prototypes.

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M u s l i m s were therefore referred to i n the Cape as "Malays." The D u t c h also b r o u g h t convicts f r o m all over the I n d i a n Ocean t o w o r k i n gangs o n the f o r t i fication

and harbor o f Cape T o w n . The convict p o p u l a t i o n remained a source o f

M u s l i m s , provided the early ulama, and became leaders o f an alternative Cape c o m m u n i t y . There were many M u s l i m s a m o n g the sixty-three thousand slaves w h o came ashore i n South Africa between 1652 and 1807 f r o m the Indian Ocean. By the 1790s free M u s l i m s were numerous e n o u g h to f o r m a small but selfassured mercantile c o m m u n i t y i n Cape T o w n . Some o f t h e m made the p i l g r i m age to Mecca by way o f Mauritius.

The Islamization of Africa The process o f Islamization began w h e n M u s l i m s ' prayers and amulets succeeded w h e r e the local priests failed. Rulers were the early recipients o f Islamic influence, and the royal courts mediated Islamic influence to the c o m m o n people. Pre-Islamic customs persisted even at the courts o f rulers w h o were fully c o m m i t t e d to Islam, however. I n about icoo the rulers o f Songhay, Kano, and B o r n u attempted to r e f o r m Islam, w i t h l i m i t e d results. Most scholars collaborated w i t h the rulers, but the m o r e radical scholars w i t h d r e w f r o m the centers o f political p o w e r and established a u t o n o m o u s religious c o m m u n i t i e s , enclaves o f rural scholarship based o n slave f a r m i n g , where the spirit o f Islamic m i l i t a n c y was c u l tivated. Pre-Islamic customs that had persisted for centuries and been accepted as part o f the accoiTimodation o f Islam became unforgivable i n the v i e w o f m i l i t a n t M u s l i m s . Rulers w h o h a d p r e v i o u s l y been considered M u s l i m s were declared infidels, and became the target for j i h a d . I n Sudan, three m a j o r states developed i n the grasslands s o u t h o f N u b i a since î ç o o — F u n j , Darfur, and W a d a i — w h e r e Islam was corporate a n d c o m m u n a l . A l l o b e d i e n t subjects w e r e considered M u s l i m s , whatever t h e i r way o f l i f e , w h i l e disobedience i m p l i e d r e j e c t i o n o f the c o r p o r a t e Islam o f the c o m m u n i t y , a n d therefore apostasy. T o w a r d the e n d o f the seventeenth c e n t u r y a n e w urban-based m i d d l e class e m e r g e d that assumed an e n t i r e l y n e w c u l t u r a l and ethnic i d e n t i t y as Arabs. Observance o f the rules o f I s l a m became the c r i t e r i o n to evaluate a person's status as a M u s l i m . The p o p u l a r Islam o f the h o l y m e n a n d the m o r e c o n f o r m i s t Islam o f the u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n were b r o u g h t together by r e f o r m e d b r o t h e r h o o d s that developed i n Sudan since the last quarter o f the eighteenth century. It was o n l y i n the h i g h l a n d s o f E t h i o p i a that C h r i s t i a n i t y s u r v i v e d centuries o f c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h Islam. Ethiopia's c o n t i n u o u s m i l i t a r y

campaigns

encouraged the d e v e l o p m e n t o f Tslamic m i l i t a n c y , w h i c h i n 1Ç29 t o o k the f o r m o f a j i h a d l e d by A h m a d Gran. The w e a k e n i n g o f b o t h the C h r i s t i a n state

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and the M u s l i m p r i n c i p a l i t i e s l a i d the l a n d o p e n to the mass m i g r a t i o n s o f the pastoral O r o m o p e o p l e i n t o the fertile h i g h l a n d s . By the eighteenth century, the O r o m o gradually became M u s l i m a n d played an active role i n the e x p a n s i o n o f Islam i n the r e g i o n . The accelerated expansion o f Islam o n the coast o f East A f r i c a o c c u r r e d i n the t h i r t e e n t h century. M u s l i m s gradually became the m a j o r i t y i n settlements that enjoyed the p r o s p e r i t y o f an e v e r - g r o w i n g trade. By the sixteenth century, w h e n the first Europeans arrived, Islam had already achieved m a j o r i t y status i n the coastal t o w n s . The arrival o f die Omanis i n the eighteenth century, and the establishment o f the Zanzibar sultanate i n the 1820s, b r o u g h t about the creation o f m o r e f o r m a l Islamic institutions o n the East A f r i c a n coast.

CHAPTER

TWELVE

Foundations for Renewal and Reform ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS IN THE E I G H T E E N T H AND N I N E T E E N T H C E N T U R I E S

John Obert Voll

The M u s l i m w o r l d experienced many different movements o f activism, revival, and r e f o r m d u r i n g the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A l t h o u g h some o f these movements were responses to the d e c l i n i n g effectiveness o f m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , many o f t h e m show the c o n t i n u i n g expansion o f the Islamic c o m m u n i t y o f believers. The p e r i o d f o l l o w i n g the sixteenth-century era o f the greatness o f the m a j o r sultanates and g u n p o w d e r empires was a t i m e o f

(Left) Following the political

transition i n terms o f social and p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h r o u g h o u t the M u s l i m

chaos of eighteenth-century

w o r l d intellectuals and rulers were actively engaged i n i n t e r p r e t i n g the Islamic

Iran, the town of Karbala in

heritage i n ways that w o u l d p r o v i d e effective f o u n d a t i o n s f o r the e m e r g i n g

Iraq, site of the martyrdom

sociopolitical structures. I n Islamic terms this i n v o l v e d l o n g - s t a n d i n g traditions

of Muhammad's grandson

o f i n v o k i n g and u s i n g i n d i v i d u a l i n f o r m e d j u d g m e n t i n i n t e r p r e t i n g the f u n damental p r i n c i p l e s o f Islam (called ijtihod) and engaging i n renewal o f faith and society

Husayn ibn Ali in 680, became the major center of Shiite scholarship.The mosques near the graves of

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were times o f t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f societies and states t h r o u g h o u t the eastern hemisphere, and m o v e m e n t s

of

Islamic renewal and r e f o r m were also part o f that broader context. I n Europe the n e w institutions and ideologies associated w i t h the emergence o f the early m o d -

Husayn and his half-brother Abbas have golden domes, signifying their importance as shrines for the many Shiite pilgrims from Iran,

ern nation-states were developing, and by the early nineteenth century the indus-

where Shiism has been the

trial r e v o l u t i o n was creating bases o f increased economic and m i l i t a r y p o w e r for

dominant sect since the

western European states. The i m p e r i a l expansion o f these states b r o u g h t m u c h

Safavid period.

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o f the M u s l i m w o r l d u n d e r either direct or indirect European c o n t r o l by the b e g i n n i n g o f the t w e n t i e t h century. The European i m p e r i a l expansion o f the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries became an increasingly i m p o r t a n t factor i n M u s l i m movements o f renewal and r e f o r m . A l t h o u g h the older dynamics o f Islamic renewal c o n t i n u e d to operate, the internal e v o l u t i o n o f M u s l i m societies w i t h i n the older historical modes o f renewal and r e f o r m was preempted i n many ways by the success o f European m i l i t a r y and economic expansion. D u r i n g the eighteenth century most r e f o r m efforts were w i t h i n the m o r e Islamic f r a m e w o r k , b u t i n the nineteenth centuryIslamic activist movements were increasingly involved i n resistance to European i m p e r i a l expansion and i n intellectual adaptation to the challenges o f European ideas and technologies. The early m o d e r n era was a t i m e o f i m p o r t a n t transitions and transformations i n the M u s l i m w o r l d . The great i m p e r i a l slates o f the sixteenth century began to lose wars and lost their characteristic openness t o n e w technologies and techniques. For m a n y observers, and later historians, this is i d e n t i f i e d as an era o f decline because o f this r e d u c t i o n i n m i l i t a r y p o w e r and regional political d o m i n a t i o n . The l o n g - t e r m trends o f the Islamization o f societies i n Sub-Saharan Africa and i n South, Central, and Southeast Asia c o n t i n u e d , however, and sometimes accelerated as movements o f renewal and r e f o r m emerged i n response b o t h to weakness and to new opportunities for n o n m i l i t a r y expansion. This expansion was at times aided rather than h i n d e r e d by European i m p e r i a l expansion.

Reform and Renewal in the Large Central States D u r i n g the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the three largest states i n the central parts o f the M u s l i m w o r l d — t h e O t t o m a n , M u g h a l , and Safavid e m p i r e s — faced b o t h i n t e r n a l and external challenges. There were administrative and i n s t i tutional r e f o r m efforts that were sometimes n o t specifically Islamic i n the w a y they were defined. I n the eighteenth century, however, movements that were explicitly Islamic i n their advocacy o f renewal and r e f o r m became i m p o r t a n t elements i n the responses o f M u s l i m societies to the changing historical conditions. The m i l i t a r y expansion o f the O t t o m a n Empire ceased by the end o f the seventeenth century. The failure o f the last great e f f o r t by the Ottomans to capture Vienna i n 1683 was a sign o f O t t o m a n weakness, w h i c h was c o n f i r m e d by the defeats o f the Ottomans i n wars at the end o f the century. The Treaty o f Karlowitz i n 1699 ratified the loss o f significant territories to European powers and set the stage for a n e w era o f O t t o m a n history. O t t o m a n governmental and official r e f o r m efforts were not distinctively Islamic, either i n style or i n the way the need f o r change was presented. D u r i n g the late seventeenth century members o f the

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K o p r u l u family served as grand viziers and succeeded f o r a t i m e i n i m p o s i n g reforms that increased administrative efficiency and reduced official c o r r u p t i o n . A l t h o u g h these reforms were presented as a necessary part o f the preservation o f the sultanate, they were n o t programs o f explicitly Islamic renewal. A different style o f official r e f o r m efforts developed i n the eighteenth century. O t t o m a n officials had previously been aware o f problems, but they had largely used past successful experiences and domestic sources o f inspiration as the basis for their r e f o r m programs. Governmental r e f o r m , especially i n m i l i t a r y developments, gradually came to be based o n efforts t o adopt European methods and technologies, however. European advisers, such as Comte de Bonneval i n the

The 1718 Treaty of Passarovitz with the

1730s and Baron deTott later i n the century, were recruited to introduce new m i l -

Austrians and the Venetians

itary techniques. Such fads as the " t u l i p craze" d u r i n g the reign o f Sultan A h m e d

opened Ottoman society to

I I I (r. 1703-30) reflected the greater interest i n European culture a m o n g some o f the r u l i n g elite. The climax o f this type o f r e f o r m effort came w i t h the attempt t o i m p l e m e n t a relatively comprehensive governmental r e f o r m p r o g r a m called the

European methods and technologies. I n the trail of European advisers came European artists, such as

N i z a m - i Jedid o r " N e w System" by Sultan Selim I I I (r. 1789-1807). This p r o g r a m

Antoine Ignace Meiling,

called for the creation o f a Western-style army and significant changes i n a d m i n -

court artist of the French

istrative structures. A l t h o u g h Selim was deposed by a coalition o f conservative

emperor Louis XVIII.

forces, a significant f o u n d a t i o n f o r the identification o f official governmental r e f o r m w i t h westernization had been laid. A l t h o u g h such r e f o r m programs were not anti-Islamic, they were n o t p r i m a r i l y programs o f Islamic renewal. Movements o f Islamic renewal developed w i t h i n the O t t o m a n Empire d u r i n g the eighteenth century, but they d i d n o t have governmental r e f o r m as t h e n goal.

Meilings Voyage pittoresque de Constantinople, published in Paris in 1819, contained engravings showing scenes of daily life in the Ottoman capital.

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They w o r k e d for a sociomoral reconstruction o f society i n a broader sense. Some movements built o n long-standing traditions o f encouragement o f a strict adherence t o the specifics o f Islamic law i n the traditions o f such scholars as the f o u r teenth-century teacher A h m a d i b n Taymiyyah, w h i l e others w o r k e d w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f some o f the great Sufi orders t o encourage a m o r e active life o f i n d i v i d u a l and g r o u p piety. I n the central O t t o m a n lands, revivalist movements were less likely to take overtly political f o r m s than those that were i n territories that were o n the fringes o f O t t o m a n c o n t r o l . The great Sufi brotherhoods and devotional traditions (tariqahs) had become an i m p o r t a n t part o f societal structure t h r o u g h o u t the M u s l i m w o r l d by the eighteenth century I n the O t t o m a n Empire many o f the scholars a m o n g the r u l i n g elite were identified w i t h orders that c o m b i n e d a relatively strict adherence t o Islamic law w i t h an active participation i n Sufi brotherhoods as a way o f emphasizing the importance o f Islamic piety w i t h i n society. Scholarly and especially Sufi networks were cosmopolitan i n nature and n o t tied t o the boundaries o f the O t t o m a n state. The developments o f the Naqshbandiyyah a n d Khalwatiyyah tariqahs i n O t t o m a n lands illustrate some o f the most i m p o r t a n t aspects o f this style o f Islamic revivalism. The Naqshbandiyyah originated i n Central Asia and came relatively late t o O t t o m a n territories. By the late seventeenth century it was w e l l established i n a n u m b e r o f areas, and some o f its leaders were supported directly b y O t t o m a n sultans. One major center was i n Damascus, w h e r e M u r a d al-Bukhari settled as a scholar and a transmitter o f the Naqshbandiyyah traditions after c o m i n g f r o m Central Asia. He had traveled extensively and developed close contacts w i t h Sultan Mustafa I I (r. 1695-1703), w h o granted h i m properties i n Damascus. The descendants o f M u r a d , the M u r a d i family, were p r o m i n e n t leaders i n Syria, serving as teachers and muftis (legal consultants) as w e l l as w o r k i n g w i t h i n the order. The Naqshbandiyyah, as presented by people like the Muradis, was not a m i l i t a n t o r activist reformist order, but i t d i d represent a c o m m i t m e n t t o traditions o f Islamic piety by people w h o were also actively involved i n the political processes o f the day. The order provided a cosmopolitan reminder o f the broader c o m m u n i t y o f believers and the importance o f c o m b i n i n g personal piety w i t h a sense o f an authentically Islamic sociolegal order o f society. Another Naqshbandiyyah center i n the broader eighteenth-century O t t o m a n w o r l d was i n the coastal cities o f Yemen, especially the city o f Zabid. Students and scholars c o m i n g f r o m many different parts o f the M u s l i m w o r l d gathered i n Zabid and engaged i n the study o f the traditions (hadith) o f the Prophet and o f Sufism. N a q s h b a n d i y y a h teachers i n such scholarly families as the M i z j a j i attracted and trained scholars f r o m many different places, i n c l u d i n g M u h a m m a d Murtada al-Zabidi, a scholar w h o came f r o m India and w e n t o n t o become one o f the leading intellectuals o f eighteenth-century Cairo, and Ma M i n g - h s i n , a stu-

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dent f r o m western China w h o r e t u r n e d t o his h o m e l a n d and o r g a n i z e d a N a q s h b a n d i y y a h m o v e m e n t that opposed older-style M u s l i m practices and Chinese i m p e r i a l rule, leading a rebellion i n

1781.

The Khalwatiyyah order was i m p o r t a n t i n the eastern Mediterranean and N o r t h Africa. By the eighteenth century i t had become an i m p o r t a n t part o f the lives o f scholars i n Egypt, w h o again c o m b i n e d piety w i t h an emphasis o n a more universalist and cosmopolitan m o d e o f Islam as opposed to local styles o f shrine cults and w h a t some observers speak o f as "saint w o r s h i p . " Mustafa alBakri (1688-1749), a Syrian scholar w h o spent considerable t i m e teaching in Egypt, gave greater visibility to the Klialwatiyyah. Some o f his students, especially M u h a m m a d i b n A b d a l - K a r i m al-Samman (1718-75) and M u h a m m a d i b n Salim a l - H i f n a w i (1688-1767), established their o w n orders, w h i c h had significant influence i n many different parts o f the M u s l i m w o r l d , f r o m West Africa to Southeast Asia. Sometimes orders such as the Sammaniyyah p r o v i d e d the organizational f r a m e w o r k and i n s p i r a t i o n for m o r e m i l i t a n t movements o f Islamic renewal. I n other contexts, they were m o r e a factor i n g i v i n g vitality to devotional life i n times o f rapid change. The experiences o f the M u g h a l Empire were a f f e r e n t i n many i m p o r t a n t w^ays f r o m that o f the O t t o m a n . A l t h o u g h there had been some loss o f power and effectiveness d u r i n g the seventeenth century, as a result o f internal factional conflict as w e l l as external threat, the European i m p e r i a l and m i l i t a r y challenge was still l i m -

Following the British victory at the Battle of Plassey in Bengal in 1757. the British East India Company expanded its interests in the Mughal domains. British artists and architects flocked to India, and views such as Thomas Darnell's 1789 aquatint of theTaj Mahal provoked an interest in orientalism back in Europe.

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ited. Greater problems were raised by the fact that the vast m a j o r i t y o f the subjects were n o n - M u s l i m , and the M u s l i m rulers always had to balance the demands of the M u s l i m teachers w i t h those o f the H i n d u majority. A n exclusivist position demanding allegiance to Islamic law and rejecting some o f the policies and customs that represented a blending o f Islamic and H i n d u elements had been articulated by A h m a d Sirhindi (1564-1624), w h o claimed t o be the renewer (mujaddid) o f the second Islamic m i l l e n n i u m ( w h i c h began d u r i n g his lifetime). Sirhindi was identified w i t h the Naqshbandiyyah, and his branch o f the order came t o be called the M u j a d d i d i . Sirhindi's style o f a more activist r e f o r m i s m that opposed c o n r i l iation w i t h H i n d u s became the characteristic tone o f M u g h a l policy d u r i n g the reign o f the emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707). His reign was followed by a l o n g p e r i o d o f civil wars a m o n g South Asian powers and the gradual expansion o f the activities o f the British East India Company. M u g h a l leadership d i d not undertake any significant reforms involving adoption o f new European technologies. D u r i n g the eighteenth century Islamic renewal was advocated by Shah Wali Allah ( 1 7 0 3 - 6 2 ) , an intellectual w h o developed i m p o r t a n t approaches t o the study o f the traditions o f the Prophet and advocated the sociomoral reconstruct i o n o f M u s l i m society. He w o r k e d to define an approach to Islamic law that c o u l d c o m b i n e the different schools o f law i n a broad-based legal synthesis w h i l e reco g n i z i n g the legitimacy o f some diversity o f views a m o n g the scholars. His teachings were i m p o r t a n t i n p r o v i d i n g a f o u n d a t i o n f o r subsequent M u s l i m t h o u g h t i n South Asia, but he himself d i d not create a f o r m a l reformist organization or lead an activist movement. The cosmopolitan nature o f the networks o f renewalist scholars i n the eighteenth century is reflected i n the fact that M u h a m m a d Murtada al-Zabidi, w h o had studied w i t h the scholars o f Zabid i n Yemen and became a major figure i n Cairo's intellectual life i n the eighteenth century, was initially a student o f Shah Wali Allah i n India before he began his travels. The Safavid state came t o an end early m the eighteenth century. After the r e i g n o f Shah Abbas (r. 1588-1629), the effectiveness o f Safavid central a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and m i l i t a r y capacity declined significantly. Local revolts and invasions b y regional rivals created a crisis for the dynasty, w h i c h came to an end w h e n a m i l itary commander, Nadir, deposed the Safavid i n c u m b e n t and named h i m s e l f shall i n 1736. Nadir Shah was successful militarily, but he was not able to establish the basis for a central state that c o u l d survive his death i n 1747. Iran entered a t i m e o f political and m i l i t a r y anarchy u n t i l the conquests o f the Qajar family i n the 1790s reestablished the basis f o r a centralized m o n a r c h y and the Qajar dynasty, w h i c h r u l e d u n t i l 1924. Nadir Shah attempted a m a j o r religious reorientation by p r o m o t i n g a reconciliation o f Sunni and Shiite Islamic traditions. The Safavid state had c o n f i r m e d Shiite Islam as the religion o f the dynastic state i n Iran, and the m a j o r i t y o f the

FOUNDATIONS FOR RENEWAL AND REFORM

Ç1Ç

p o p u l a t i o n had become strongly Shiite d u r i n g the Safavid era. At the same time the Sunni identification o f the Ottoman state had been emphasized, so a Sunni-Shiite synthesis m i g h t have provided a basis for better relations between Nadir's state and the Ottomans. Nadir proposed the recogn i t i o n o f the Shiite school o f law associated w i t h the sixth Shiite i m a m , Jafar al-Sadiq (ca. 700—765) as an equal to the four

Sunni

schools o f law. B o t h

the

O t t o m a n ulama (religions scholars) and the leading Shiite ayatollahs rejected this effort. The political chaos i n Iran d u r i n g the eighteenth century increased the i m p o r tance o f the great schools and shrines under the control o f the Shii ulama. These institutions developed an a u t o n o m y and capacity f o r a c t i o n i n d e p e n d e n t o f the political and m i l i t a r y institutions o f the day, w h i c h c o n t i n u e d t h r o u g h o u t the m o d e r n era i n many different f o r m s , u l t i mately p r o v i d i n g the basis for the establishment o f the Islamic Republic i n 1979, w h i c h was based o n the p r i n c i p l e o f the "rule

of

the

legal

scholars."

Safavid

patronage f o r scholarship had strengthened schools and shrines i n Iran. The end

The Peacock Throne was one of the imperial trappings that the Afsharid military prince Nadir brought home to Iran after he sacked the Mughal capital at Delhi in 1759. It came to symbolize the Iranian monarchy. Although Nadir had declared himself shah in 1736, he could not establish

o f Safavid r u l e opened the w a y f o r a

the basis for a central state, and his line was replaced by the Qajars. Nasir

restoration o f the importance o f the older

al-Din Qajar is shown seated in front of the Peacock Throne in this offi-

m a j o r shrines in Iraq around the t o m b o f

cial photograph, taken around 1895.

A l i i n Najaf and especially a r o u n d the shrine o f Husayn i n Karbala. D u r i n g the eighteenth century Karbala emerged as the p r e m i e r center o f Shii scholarship. The m a j o r r e f o r m movement w i t h i n Shiism in the eighteenth century was the victory o f the U s u l i school o f legal t h o u g h t over the A k h b a r i school. The Usuli school ( f r o m the t e r m usual al-fiqh or " p r i n c i p l e s o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e " ) emphasized the i m p o r t a n c e o f rational i n f o r m e d analysis (ijtihad) as the basis for legal r u l i n g s and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f Islamic law. This school had been d o m i n a n t i n the early Safavid era. B e g i n n i n g i n the late seventeenth century, however, the A k h b a r i

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school came to d o m i n a t e the Shiite legal scholarship, especially i n the c h i e f centers o f Shiite scholarship i n Iraq f o l l o w i n g the collapse o f the Safavid state. The A k h b a r i p o s i t i o n was a radically restrictive one, d e m a n d i n g that rulings be based solely o n akhbtir, the reports o f the sayings o f the Twelve Imams o f Shiism, w h o were believed to be infallible. Rational analysis was thus rejected. By the late eighteenth century debates between the t w o schools raged, particularly i n the great shrine schools. The final v i c t o r y came to the Usulis under the leadership o f Aga M u h a m m a d Baqir Bihbahani ( 1 7 0 4 - 9 3 ) , whose t r i u m p h reached a point at w h i c h he w as able to declare that the Akhbaris were "unbelievers." The v i c t o r y o f the U s u l i school had great l o n g - t e r m significance. The role o f those scholars w h o were recognized as b e i n g capable o f exercising i j t i h a d because o f the breadth o f their learning and the excellence o f their scholarship became central to Shiite life. It became w idely accepted that every believer w h o d i d not have the capacity for i j t i h a d should select a scholar w h o w o u l d serve as a "source o f i m i t a t i o n . " Obedience to such a capable legal scholar became a requirement o f the faith, and this gave the leading ulama tremendous influence and power. A l t h o u g h the f a i t h f u l c o u l d choose any appropriate scholar as a guide, by the m i d d l e o f the nineteenth century r e c o g n i t i o n i n the m a i n Shiite c o m m u n i t y o f one scholar as the supreme a u t h o r i t y i n matters o f law became established. The first such scholar was Shaykh M u r t a d a Ansari ( 1 8 0 0 - 1 8 6 4 ) , a scholar i n Najaf. I n the later t w e n t i e t h century more than one scholar was sometimes recognized as such authoritative "sources o f i m i t a t i o n . " I n the great central slates movements o f r e f o r m and renewal had great i m p a c t , not only in the context o f the times but also i n shaping societies i n the nineteenth and t w e n t i eth centuries. I n Safavid and M u g h a l domains most r e f o r m efforts c o n t i n u e d to be shaped by the dynamics o f internal and M u s l i m history. I n the O t t o m a n Empire, however, i n a d d i t i o n to such renewal movements, a new type o f r e f o r m emerged that was p r i m a r i l y based o n adapting O t t o m a n institutions t o ideas and techniques that were developing i n western Europe.

Renewal on the Muslim Frontiers and Peripheries Movements o f Islamic renewal developed t h r o u g h o u t the M u s l i m w o r l d i n the eighteenth century. Outside o f the m a j o r central states, there was a great diversity o f format and style i n a w i d e variety o f contexts and circumstances.

Such

movements c o u l d draw f r o m a broad repertoire o f experiences w i t h i n Islam. Some were more legal or puritanical i n tone, w h i l e others took more charismatic and messianic forms. I n some areas r e f o r m was a response to the declining effectiveness o f existing i n s t i t u t i o n s , w h i l e i n other areas, movements thai were c o n ceived o f as movements o f " r e n e w a l " were i n fact m o r e a part o f the o n g o i n g

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processes o f Islamization o f societies o n the frontiers o f the Islamic w o r l d . They were, i n effect, part o f the " f o r m a t i o n " o f Islamic societies rather than the " r e f o r m a t i o n " o f existing ones. I n other cases the movements arose i n response to particular crises, such as early European i m p e r i a l expansion. The Wahhabi m o v e m e n t , w h i c h developed o n the peripheries o f the O t t o m a n Empire, is possibly the best k n o w n o f the eighteenth-century movements o f Islamic revival. It is called " W a h h a b i " after the name o f the scholar w h o was its initiator, M u h a m m a d i b n A b d al-Wahhab (1703-91). B o r n i n the N e j d r e g i o n o f central Arabia, he was raised i n a family o f strict Hanbali scholars. H e was e d u cated by these scholars and also i n the schools o f Mecca and Medina. He soon became convinced that most M u s l i m s were not l i v i n g i n accord w i t h the rules o f the Q u r a n and the traditions o f the Prophet, and he was especially disturbed by the popular religious practices that were c o m m o n i n central Arabia. These i n c l u d e d visitation o f tombs and apparent veneration o f natural sites. He began a campaign against this idolatry i n the name o f the special theme o f his renewali s m : the absolute one-ness and sovereignty o f God (tawhid). A l t h o u g h this affirm a t i o n o f m o n o t h e i s m is at the heart o f the faith o f all M u s l i m s , I b n A b d al-Wahhab expanded its m e a n i n g t o i n c l u d e o p p o s i t i o n to a n y t h i n g that appeared to be c l a i m i n g authority separate f r o m God. This b r o u g h t h i m i n t o o p p o s i t i o n to the Sufi orders, whose shaykhs were respected as being especially close to God and able to give particular spiritual guidance to their followers, w h o submitted to the shaykhs' authority. M u h a m m a d i b n A b d al-Wahhab began his campaign o f renewal i n the smaller city-states o f central Arabia, and his zeal aroused the o p p o s i t i o n o f established authorities w h o feared that he m i g h t cause unrest. I n 174c he established a relationship w i t h M u h a m m a d i b n Saud, the r u l e r o f A d D i r i y a h ( i n m o d e r n central Saudi Arabia). The alliance between the w a r r i o r and the teacher was successful and a m i l i t a n t renewalist state was established. The n e w Wahhabi-Saudi state expanded relatively rapidly, gaining c o n t r o l o f m u c h o f central Arabia and establ i s h i n g its capital i n Riyadh after it was conquered i n 1773. A l t h o u g h I b n A b d alWahhab died i n 1791, the movement and the state c o n t i n u e d to expand, w i t h the successors capturing Mecca and Medina i n 1805-06. The m i l i t a r y success o f the Saudi state threatened O t t o m a n authority, and the sultan sent the governor o f Egypt, M u h a m m a d A l i , w i t h a n e w l y reorganized Egyptian army to Arabia t o restore c o n t r o l . Mecca and Medina were retaken i n 1812, and the last areas o f the first Saudi state were conquered by

1818.

A l t h o u g h the m o v e m e n t was defeated m i l i t a r i l y , the Wahhabi experience was h i g h l y visible i n the M u s l i m w o r l d . It represents the most legally oriented and literalist o f the m a j o r eighteenth-century renewalist movements, i n contrast to movements associated w i t h Sufi orders, such as the Naqshbandiyyah. Because o f

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The pilgrimage to Mecca was a major catalyst in spreading the revivalist movements that came to the fore in the eighteenth century. Pilgrims to Arabia, like the ones shown in this photograph taken in 1936-37 near Muzdalifa, became familiar with the revivalist interpretations of Islam and the activities of renewalist movements in many areas. Upon returning home, the pilgrims often worked to renew the Islamic authenticity of faith and practice in their homelands.

its geographic location at almost the center o f the Islamic w o r l d , later observers tended to see the Wahhabis as the inspiration for the many movements o f renewal that had developed i n the eighteenth century. This was not the case, however, as M u h a m m a d i b n A b d al-Wahhab was not the teacher o f any o f the other major revivalist leaders. He and his movement were a part o f the broader spectrum o f movements o f renewal, however, and i t is w o r t h n o t i n g that b o t h M u h a m m a d i b n A b d al-Wahhab and Shah Wali Allah studied under some o f the same teachers as students i n Mecca and Medina. The Wahhabi movement arose w i t h i n the context o f a society that had been part o f the M u s l i m w o r l d f r o m the very earliest times. It was a movement that opposed what its leaders thought w as a regression into unbelief O n the frontiers o f the r

M u s l i m w o r l d , however, there were man)' "renewalist" movements whose efforts to establish greater adherence to Islamic rules and n o r m s were part o f the longer historical dynamic o f the Islamization o f society. I n many societies i n w h i c h M u s l i m merchants and itinerant teachers had been active, a new phase i n the processes o f Islamization w o u l d be reached w h e n a significant p r o p o r t i o n o f die population w o u l d become more directly familiar w i t h Islam's more universal and cosmopolitan articulations. Earlier combinations o f Islamic and indigenous elements came to be viewed as idolatrous innovations by scholars w h o were familiar w i t h Islam's more standard versions. The catalyst i n this awareness was often a p f i grimage to Mecca, f o l l o w i n g w h i c h a local scholar w o u l d return h o m e and begin

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w o r k to " r e n e w " the Islamic authenticity o f faith and practice i n his homeland. At times this c o u l d create tensions and conflict w i t h those rulers and establishment scholars whose prestige was built o n the syncretism o f the early stages o f the Islamization o f society. Sometimes, as i n the movement led by the scholar Ma M i n g - h s i n in western China, dris w o u l d be expressed as a conflict between the " o l d teachings" and the "new." I n the frontier areas such movements o f renewal were m o r e likely t o result i n major political conflict and the creation o f new states and state systems than was the case i n the central M u s l i m lands. I n west Africa a m a j o r t r a d i t i o n o f renewalist holy war (jihad) developed, w i t h the result being the creation o f a n u m b e r o f explicitly Islamic states. Jihads were p r o c l a i m e d a n d j i h a d states were established i n the Senegambia region d u r i n g the eighteenth century. I n the Futa Jallon region a teacher k n o w n as Karamoko Alfa ( d . 175-1) declared a jihad i n 1726 against n o n - M u s l i m elites and established a state r u l e d by a c o m b i n a t i o n o f w a r r i o r s and scholars, w h i c h lasted u n t i l the French conquests o f the region i n the late nineteenth century. A similar jihad state was established i n the Futa Toro region under the leadership o f Sulayman Bal ( d . 1776). M u s l i m teachers w h o were part o f a broader n e t w o r k o f scholarship played an i m p o r t a n t role i n the development o f the ideology and the subsequent state structures. This tradition o f m i l i t a n t r e f o r m i s m reached a climax w i t h the j i h a d o f the scholar and reformist U t h m a n dan Fodio (1755—1817) i n the area o f m o d e r n N i g e r i a and beyond at the end o f the eighteenth century. Other scholars avoided the extreme o f a jihad, w h i l e w o r k i n g for closer adherence t o m o r e standard Islamic n o r m s . There were i m p o r t a n t families o f scholars that o f t e n c o m b i n e d legal scholarship w i t h leadership i n a Sufi order. T h e Q a d i r i y y a h order was the most widespread i n West Africa i n the eighteenth century, and its leaders played an i m p o r t a n t role i n Islamization. One o f the bestk n o w n families i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the Q a d i r i y y a h was the Kunta family, whose influence was felt i n M a u r i t a n i a , Senegambia, and elsewhere i n West Africa. Sidi a l - M u k h t a r a l - K u n t i (1728-1811) strengthened the importance o f the M a l i k i school o f law and established schools and Q a d i r i y y a h centers i n many areas. Other Q a d i r i y y a h leaders, such as Jibril i b n U m a r ( f l . late eighteenth century) i n the central Sudan r e g i o n , were m o r e active advocates o f reformist j i h a d . Jibril was a teacher w h o provided t r a i n i n g i n the study o f hadith and law as w e l l as Sufism f o r U t h m a n dan Fodio, the leader o f the m a j o r jihad i n Nigeria. A similar interaction o f r e f o r m i s m w i t h Islamization o f the broader society is visible o n Islam's "eastern f r o n t i e r " i n Southeast Asia. By the eighteenth century many o f the states i n the region had become officially Islamic, w i t h a b r o a d based synthesis o f earlier traditions w i t h M u s l i m ideas o f social structure and political authority. Some areas emerged as particularly identified w i t h Islam. I n Acheh o n n o r t h e r n Sumatra the sultanate became o n e o f the m a j o r M u s l i m

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states and a m a j o r center o f scholarship. As i n West Africa, scholars were also frequently associated w i t h Sufi orders and traditions, and a distinctive Southeast Asian Islamic literature developed that c o m b i n e d Sufi mysticism w i t h studies o f law and hadith and r e c o g n i t i o n o f i m p o r t a n t local customs and traditions. A leadi n g figure i n the development o f this early synthesis was the Sufi poet Hamzah al-Fansuri (died a r o u n d 1600), w h o established the Q a d i r i y y a h order i n the Southeast Asian islands. D u r i n g the seventeenth century debates over Islamic legitimacy were vigorous, as the c o m m u n i t i e s became m o r e directly involved i n the w o r l d o f c o s m o p o l i t a n Islamic scholarship. N u r a l - D i n a l - R a n i r i was a scholar f r o m India w h o came to Acheh i n the midcentury. He was a strong critic of the local synthesis, and his w r i t i n g s provided an effective basis for m o r e standard-style scholarship i n the region. Later i n the century A b d al-Rahman Singkeli returned to Acheh f o l l o w i n g a pilgrimage to Mecca and gave f u r t h e r strength to this "renewalist" tendency and established the Shattariyyah order i n the region. By the eighteenth century the tensions between more localized and m o r e standard, cosmopolitan constructions o f Islamic life were a m a j o r part o f Southeast Asian Islamic history. I n Minangkabau i n western Sumatra the older social order faced a movement calling for a m o r e strict adherence to the rules o f Islamic law and celebration o f Islamic rather than m o r e purely local religious festivals. A key figure i n this m o v e m e n t was Tuanku N a n Tua, an eighteenth-century leader o f the Shattariyyah order. By the end o f the century the renewalist challenge had reached the p o i n t at w h i c h the next step was the j i h a d , led by people w h o have c o m e t o be called the Padris. O n the n o r t h e r n frontiers o f the M u s l i m w o r l d i n Central Asia similar developments took place, a l t h o u g h by the eighteenth century the broader lines o f Islamization were made more complex by the expansions o f the Russian and Chinese empires. Some Central Asian societies had long been parts o f the M u s l i m w o r l d , w h i l e others were still i n relatively early stages o f Islamization. Significant conversion o f Kazakhs to Islam, for example, only began i n the eighteenth century. I n the case o f the Kazakhs, conversion was accelerated by Russian conquest; Catherine the Great gave official support to Sunni scholars i n hopes that conversion to Islam w o u l d b r i n g stability to the n e w l y conquered n o m a d i c Kazakhs. Some o f the major cities, like Samarqand and Bukhara, had been i m p o r t a n t centers o f trade and M u s l i m learning i n the days o f the early caliphates. Changing econ o m i c and political conditions, however, left these areas out o f the mainstream o f trade and intellectual developments. This was the r e g i o n w i t h i n w h i c h the Naqshbandiyyah order had originated and where it developed its distinguishing characteristics—giving emphasis to the strict observance o f Islamic law, active m i s sionary w o r k , and a rejection o f quietism, w h i c h meant that the order was actively involved i n the region's political systems. By the seventeenth century i n many o f

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the principalities Naqshbandi leaders d o m i n a t e d the rulers or became part o f the r u l i n g families themselves. The Juybari shaykhs o f the order played an i m p o r t a n t role in the politics o f Bukhara and the Uzbek state, w h i l e f u r ther n o r t h and east t w o lines o f descendants i n the branch o f the Naqshbandiyyah order established

by A h m a d

Kasani (1461-1C42), k n o w n as M a k h d u m - i Azam ("the Supreme Teacher"), r u l e d i n Altishar and Uighuristan i n the eighteenth century. The M a n c h u ( Q i n g ) dynasty, w h i c h came to power i n C h i n a i n the mid-seventeenth century, began

active

expansion i n t o Central Asia. This created a context i n w h i c h a movement o f Islamic renewal also became a movement o f opposition to foreign i m p e r i a l rule. Ma Ming-hsin

(1719-81)

studied

at

many

of

the

Naqshbandiyyah centers w h i l e he went o n a pilgrimage to Mecca as a young man. He was apparently especially influenced by the teachers i n Zabid inYemen, and on his r e t u r n to western China he established a branch o f the Naqshbandiyyah order called the " n e w teaching," w h i c h criticized many o f the existing practices among M u s l i m s , even among the established Naqshbandi groups. The f o l lowers o f the " o l d teachings" had accommodated t h e m selves to the new imperial rulers, and w h e n Q i n g officials arrested Ma M i n g - h s i n , his followers rebelled. W h e n Ma M i n g - h s i n was executed i n 1781,

the n e w

teachings

became identified w i t h o p p o s i t i o n to Chinese imperial rule as well as a m o r e renewalist f o r m o f Islam. I n East Africa the response to foreign imperial ride was more successful but less clearly involved i n movements o f Islamic renewal. The Portuguese had defeated the estab-

Bukhara and Samarqand, major centers of learning in the early period, were left out of the mainstream of trade and intellectual development in the eighteenth

lished M u s l i m merchant city-states o n Africa's east coast

and nineteenth centuries. Traditional centers of learning

d u r i n g the sixteenth century. The Portuguese position i n

such as the Kalyan complex of mosque, madrasa, and

the western parts o f the Indian Ocean weakened relatively quickly, however. They were driven out o f the Persian G u l f by 1650, and they faced increasingly strong competition i n

minaret, founded in Bukhara in the twelfth century as one of the largest teaching establishments in Central Asia, attracted fewer and fewer students.

East Africa f r o m the emerging m a r i t i m e power o f the sultanate o f O m a n . I n 1696 the Portuguese were driven f r o m their strong p o i n t o f Fort Jesus i n Mombasa (an island o f f the southern coast o f Kenya), and by the end o f the eighteenth century they had been driven f r o m all o f their positions o n the East

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African coast n o r t h o f Mozambique. The mercantile Swahili city-states revived and ultimately became a part o f an extended O m a n i maritime empire w i t h a capital i n Zanzibar. Even i n Mozambique, Islam continued to expand so that i n the modern independent state o f Mozambique, possibly as many as 15 percent o f the population is M u s l i m . The later recstablishment o f European imperial control i n East Africa d i d not stop the continuing processes o f Islamization. W i t h the vast variety o f f o r m s and content, it is clear that the advocates o f Islamic renewal and r e f o r m i n the eighteenth century were not part o f a single grand movement. Yet, at the same t i m e , it is also clear that the eighteenth century was a time o f major change and transition i n societies t h r o u g h o u t the M u s l i m w o r l d . Some o f the most effective responses to the changes and crises, at least i n terms o f ability to inspire and sometimes m o b i l i z e large numbers o f M u s l i m s , were those that represented a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the l o n g t r a d i t i o n o f renewal i n its many forms i n Islamic history. I n this, networks o f scholars interacted to help develop the language o f renewal, w h i c h c o u l d then provide the repertoire o f ideas, concepts, and organizations for the movements i n their d i f ferent forms. I n these networks the Sufi brotherhoods often p r o v i d e d a framew o r k w i t h i n w h i c h the revivalists c o u l d w o r k , b o t h i n terms o f institutional organization and o f personal interactions w i t h i n the organizations. Similarly, the pilgrimage provided a context for c o m m u n i c a t i o n and interaction, and the sanctuary cities o f Mecca and Medina were vital centers for renewalist scholarship, just as w i t h i n the Shiite w o r l d the sanctuaries i n Najaf and Karbala w ere central r

places i n i m p o r t a n t redefinitions o f the Shiite traditions. One d i m e n s i o n o f the transformations taking place i n the Islamic w o r l d i n the eighteenth century was the changing role o f European states and societies and their relationships w i t h Muslims. The changing patterns o f trade and the beginnings o f the industrial revoludon had an impact on M u s l i m societies, creating new markets for products and changing the terms o f trade for Muslims i n their econ o m i c relations w i t h the West. I n the Indian Ocean basin the emergence o f the British and D u t c h East India Companies represented the beginnings o f the rise o f the British and D u t c h empires i n the region. I n the eighteenth century, however, this was balanced by the decline o f Portuguese power. Western European i m p e r i alism was at this time only one o f many factors involved i n the dynamics o f the histories o f M u s l i m societies. M u c h o f the history o f M u s l i m movements o f renewal and r e f o r m was still shaped more by Islamic than by external factors.

Renewal in Transition: The Early Nineteenth Century At the end o f the eighteenth century a n u m b e r o f m a j o r movements o f renewal i n different parts o f the M u s l i m w o r l d represented b o t h a c u l m i n a t i o n o f the

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developments o f the preceding century and a p r o l o g u e to the dynamics o f the

Dolmabace, the palace built

era o f European i m p e r i a l d o m i n a t i o n . These movements reflect the critical tran-

in 18C3 on the shores of the

sitions that were taking place t h r o u g h o u t the M u s l i m w o r l d . Starting w i t h the older-style emphases o n rejection o f synthesis o f local popular religions w i t h Islam and the a f f i r m a t i o n o f the m o r e cosmopolitan, standard Islamic faith and practice o f such reformers as M u h a m m a d i b n A b d al-Wahhab and Shah Wali

Bosporus near Istanbul, epitomizes the Ottomans' efforts to continue the reforms begun in the previous century. Modeled on European-

A l l a h , these movements engaged i n m o r e activist r e f o r m and sometimes jihads.

style palaces with imposing

I n the process their activism w o u l d contact and frequently come i n t o conflict

facades, terraces, a grand

w i t h expanding European i m p e r i a l powers, so that jihads i n the nineteenth cen-

staircase, and a clock tower,

t u r y developed more i n response to external threats and f o r e i g n rule than to the older stimulus o f syncretism and compromise. In the m a j o r states i n the central Islamic lands the most i m p o r t a n t aspects o f the transitions at the b e g i n n i n g o f the nineteenth century were political and m i l i t a r y N e w rulers and new approaches to state structures were the keynotes i n terms o f change and r e f o r m . At the center o f the O t t o m a n Empire, the sultans c o n t i n u e d the r e f o r m efforts i n the style set by the efforts o f Sultan Selim I I I . R e f o r m meant the effort to change techniques and administrative structures u s i n g western European experience as the m o d e l . The p r o g r a m s o f Sultan M a h m u d I I (r. 1808—39) represented the b e g i n n i n g o f comprehensive westerni z i n g r e f o r m . A l t h o u g h this activity was an attempt to preserve a m a j o r M u s l i m state, Islamic r e f o r m o r r e n e w a l was n o t its p r i m a r y goal. Explicitly Islamic endeavors d i d not become a h i g h l y visible part o f government policy u n t i l later i n the century, and the m a j o r movements o f Islamic renewal i n O t t o m a n lands were not part o f the political system. Even i n this arena o f m o r e secular r e f o r m .

it was designed to replace Topkapi Palace, which was identified with the past.

The Nusretiye Mosque (1826) was designed by Krikor Balyan, the first Ottoman architect to study in Europe. He was one of the many artists and architects whom Ottoman rulers sent to study in Europe as part of their reform effort, and his buildings combine traditional Ottoman forms such as slender minarets and hemispheric domes with Baroque curves and sinuous moldings popular in European architecture.

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however, the transition character is i m p o r t a n t , w i t h the reforms o f Selim I I I representing i n many ways the c u l m i n a t i o n o f the developments o f the preceding century and the w o r k o f M a h m u d I I being the p r o l o g u e and foundation-creati n g stage o f reforms i n the era o f explicit westernization and g r o w i n g European imperial domination. Iran was r e u n i f i e d as a result o f the conquests o f the Qajars i n the 1790s. The Qajar dynasty led a tribal confederation that was able t o reestablish the central monarchical state. However, the Qajar shahs faced the increasing and independent strength o f the Shiite ulama, whose influence was increased by the n e w importance given t h e m and their leadership as a result o f the v i c t o r y o f U s u l i doctrines at the end o f the eighteenth century. The Qajar state also faced the g r o w i n g p o w e r o f Russia, w h i c h conquered

t e r r i t o r i e s i n the Caucasus.

Westernizing reforms were attempted but o n a m u c h m o r e l i m i t e d scale than i n the O t t o m a n Empire, leaving Iran open t o increasing European p o l i t i c a l , econ o m i c , and m i l i t a r y influence. The establishment o f the Qajar state and dynasty was an i m p o r t a n t transition i n b r i n g i n g an end t o the last era o f political decentralization and anarchy i n the area and i n establishing the central state as the core o f the political system i n m o d e r n Iran. I n contrast t o the Safavids, the Qajars were not a religious b r o t h e r h o o d seeking t o establish a state. Their conquests d i d not represent a conscious effort o f Islamic revival. Movements o f Islamic renewal and r e f o r m took place but not w i t h i n the political networks o f the Qajar state itself. The eighteenth-century decline o f the t h i r d major central state, the M u g h a l Empire i n India, c o n t i n u e d and intensified i n the early nineteenth century. The areas u n d e r B r i t i s h c o n t r o l grew a n d the nature o f that c o n t r o l

changed.

A l t h o u g h the East India Company was still the agent f o r this g r o w i n g British d o m i n a t i o n , it had become more and m o r e o f a local government rather than a trading company. The India Act o f 1784 made company officials responsible t o the British parliament, and India was gradually transformed i n t o a c r o w n colony i n a process that was completed i n 1857—58, w h e n b o t h the East India Company's administrative roles and the M u g h a l sultanate were b r o u g h t t o an end. Already i n 1803 the M u g h a l sultan had accepted the f o r m a l protection o f the East India Company, m u c h t o the distress o f Shah A b d al-Aziz, the son o f the eighteenth century renewalist Shah Wah Allah. I n response, Shah A b d al-Aziz w r o t e a legal r u l i n g (fatwa) declaring that India was n o longer part o f the f o r m a l l y recognized Islamic w o r l d , "Dar al-Islam." I n the three central M u s l i m states, there were major movements o f Islamic renewal and revival, b u t they were outside the f o r m a l structures o f those states. T h r o u g h o u t the w o r l d this was still an era o f e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n a n d even the nation-state f o r m a t i n western Europe was still being defined. W h i l e the rulers i n the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d Iran w e r e increasingly i n s p i r e d b y d e v e l o p i n g

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Western models for state and society and the Mughals were forced t o adapt t o British modes o f r u l e , many M u s l i m s were still engaged i n efforts o f sociomoral and p o l i t i c a l reconstruction that were p r i m a r i l y Islamic i n their i n s p i r a t i o n . The movements o f renewal were n o t simply d o c t r i n a l reformations, they were efforts to establish n e w societies that w o u l d be i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h the n o r m s o f Islam. A l m o s t inevitably, this spirit o f renewal came i n t o conflict w i t h the established authorities and the result was some f o r m o f j i h a d . I n the central O t t o m a n lands Sufi orders provided the most i m p o r t a n t framew o r k for explicitly Islamic renewalism. One o f the most significant leaders i n this type o f effort was Shaykh Khalid al-Baghdadi ( 1776—1827). K h a l i d was b o r n i n southern Kurdistan ( i n m o d e r n Iraq) and as a student w e n t t o I n d i a , where he studied w i t h a leading teacher i n the M u j a d d i d i t r a d i t i o n o f the Naqshbandiyyah order. H e r e t u r n e d t o the M i d d l e East i n 1811, w h e r e he w o r k e d t o establish a clearly centralized order. H i s goals were t o establish Islamic l a w as the basis f o r society a n d t o oppose European expansion. This was a p r o g r a m o f p o l i t i c a l The early nineteenth-century gate at Simnan is typical of buildings erected under the Qajars, rulers of Iran from 1779 to 1925. The multicolor tile decoration, with pictures of the rulers juxtaposed to scenes from Persian epics, was meant to underscore the

r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f society, a n d K h a l i d was successful i n r e c r u i t i n g i m p o r t a n t members o f the O t t o m a n elite, i n c l u d i n g the Shaykh al-Islam, the head o f the Islamic administration w i t h i n the i m p e r i a l structure. The Khalidi m o v e m e n t was n o t a m o v e m e n t o f governmental administrative r e f o r m , however, i n contrast t o the c o n t e m p o r a r y efforts o f m o r e secular-oriented reformers i n the capital. Instead, Khalid's attention was focused more broadly o n societal goals, w i t h the c o m m u n i t y o f believers rather than the state being the basic u n i t . This broader v i s i o n is reflected i n the fact that Khalid's f o l -

role of the shah as the main-

lowers had significant effects i n many areas, r a n g i n g f r o m p r o v i d i n g organiza-

stay of the political system.

t i o n a l and inspirational bases f o r e m e r g i n g Kurdish nationalism and for M u s l i m

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527

o p p o s i t i o n to Russian expansion i n the Caucasus to strengthening renewalist

The Kurds, seen here in a

movements i n Southeast Asia. W i t h i n the O t t o m a n Empire the followers and suc-

photograph taken by Major

cessors o f Shaykh Khalid helped to give strength to pan-Islamic policies that developed d u r i n g the reign o f Sultan A b d a l - H a m i d I I (r. 1876-1909) at the end o f the century. Shaykh Khalid and his followers illustrate the transitional character o f the

K. Mason at Serdka in Iraq around 1915-19, have been fighting to establish a nation for centuries. Followers of the Sufi Shaykh Khalid (d.

renewalist movements i n the early nineteenth century. I n many ways Khalid is

1827) often provided organi-

similar to previous renewers, explicitly i d e n t i f y i n g h i m s e l f w i t h the t r a d i t i o n o f

zational and inspirational

the M u j a d d i d ( " t h e r e n e w e r " ) , A h m a d S i r h i n d i . The K h a l i d i b r a n c h o f the Naqshbandiyyah order is a c u l m i n a t i o n o f that renewalist t r a d i t i o n , and the w r i t i n g s o f his followers can be seen as a final florescence o f scholarly Sufi w r i t i n g i n the O t t o m a n Empire. At the same time the K h a l i d i y y a h order faced d i f -

support to the Kurds, who achieved a measure of autonomy by playing up the rivalry between the Ottomans and Persians.

ferent challenges, p r o v i d i n g ways o f responding to the new threats o f European

Following World War I and

i m p e r i a l expansion and also o p e n i n g the way for setting an Islamic d i m e n s i o n

the demise of the Ottoman

for developing national ethnic identities like the Kurds. A n t i - i m p e r i a l i s m and c o p i n g w i t h m o d e r n i t y c o u l d be done w i t h i n the older f r a m e w o r k o f the Naqshbandiyyah order as renewed by Shaykh Khalid. In I n d i a , M u s l i m revivalism was solidly rooted i n the f r a m e w o r k set by Shah Wali Allah i n the eighteenth century but shaped by the changing context o f the increasing ineffectiveness o f the M u g h a l state. Islamic r e f o r m i s m m o v e d i n the d i r e c t i o n o f creating alternatives to the o l d M u g h a l traditions o f state-based political Islam. Shah A b d al-Aziz (1746—1824), Shah Wali Allah's son, c o n t i n u e d

Empire, however, Kurdish lands were divided among Syria, Iraq, and Turkey.

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his father's w o r k as a scholar and teacher, c o m p i l i n g large collections o f legal r u l ings (fatwas) that c o u l d serve as a comprehensive resource for M u s l i m s engaged i n the sociomoral reconstruction o f society. One o f his m a j o r concerns was the rise to p r o m i n e n c e i n I n d i a o f Shiite M u s l i m s , and he w o r k e d actively t o refute Shiite positions as a part o f his efforts t o reestablish a r e f o r m e d and renewed M u s l i m society. This w o r k o f refutation o f Shiism is a long-standing concern a m o n g Sunni movements o f renewal and was an i m p o r t a n t part o f the w r i t i n g s o f M u h a m m a d i b n A b d al-Wahhab at this same t i m e i n Arabia. Shah A b d al-Aziz also took note o f the n e w c o n d i t i o n s that were developing i n South Asia, and some o f his r u l i n g s related directly t o the issues that were raised by the g r o w i n g British p o w e r and social influence. Some r u l i n g s dealt w i t h specific issues relati n g t o social a n d e c o n o m i c

interactions w i t h B r i t i s h officials a n d w e a r i n g

Western-style clothing. O f broader concern was his p o s i t i o n o n the impact o f British r u l e o n India's place i n the M u s l i m w o r l d : he believed that a B r i t i s h - r u l e d India c o u l d not be considered a part o f the w o r l d o f the c o m m u n i t y o f believers. Such a p o s i t i o n laid the legal and theological foundations for jihads. A student o f A b d al-Aziz, Sayyid A h m a d Barelwi {1786-1831), developed the theme o f jihad m o r e fully and ultimately led a holy war to establish a new, strictlyIslamic state and society i n I n d i a . Sayyid A h m a d was b o r n i n a f a m i l y k n o w n f o r its scholarship and piety and studied as a y o u n g m a n i n D e l h i w i t h members o f Shah W a l i Allah's family. H e soon left for a m o r e active life and spent seven years as a w a r r i o r i n the armed forces o f a Pathan chief. A m i r Khan, d u r i n g w h i c h time he gained i m p o r t a n t m i l i t a r y experience. He returned to the scholarly c o m m u nity o f D e l h i i n 1811 and soon distinguished h i m s e l f by the severity and strictness o f his o p p o s i t i o n t o p o p u l a r religious practices and local customs. A g r o u p o f followers gathered and first f o l l o w e d M m o n an extensive preaching tour o f n o r t h e r n India and then, i n 1821, o n a pilgrimage to Mecca. Sayyid Ahmad's p i l grimage experience f u r t h e r c o n f i r m e d his c o n v i c t i o n o f the need f o r activist renewal o f M u s l i m society, and o n his r e t u r n t o India he began t o prepare for a j i h a d . H e began w o r k t o establish his n e w Islamic state i n the N o r t h - W e s t Frontier areas and assumed the title o f i m a m and " c o m m a n d e r o f the f a i t h f u l . " The n e w state was an alternative t o existing p o l i t i c a l structures and independent o f the o l d M u g h a l political system. He came i n t o conflict w i t h a n u m b e r o f local rulers and was killed i n a battle w i t h a large Sikh army i n 1831. A l t h o u g h his example and ideas helped t o encourage later m i l i t a n t reformers, his state and m o v e m e n t collapsed as an effective force w i t h his death. Sayyid Ahmad's career takes the sociomoral reconstruction effort one step further than the w o r k o f Shah A b d al-Aziz by t r y i n g to create an alternative sociopolitical order. This new order was neither " t r a d i t i o n a l " n o r m o d e r n i n its f o r m a t but shows the diversity that was still possible for r e f o r m i s m i n the first half o f the t w e n t i e t h century.

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The transitional r e f o r m i n the t h i r d m a j o r central state i n the M u s l i m w o r l d , Qajar Iran, took a different f o r m , shaped t o some extent by the Shiite context. However, i n Iran there was also a m a j o r renewalist movement, w h i c h represented both a c u l m i n a t i o n o f the trends o f the previous century and a p r o l o g u e t o the dynamics o f the m o d e r n w o r l d . This was the m o v e m e n t o f Sayyid A l i M u h a m m a d Shirazi (1819-50), k n o w n as the Bab. I n the c o m p e t i t i o n between the U s u l i and A k h b a r i positions d u r i n g the eighteenth century, the U s u l i v i c t o r y did not mean the disappearance o f followers o f the Akhbari position. The emphasis o n the traditions o f the imams, w h i c h was characteristic o f the A k h b a r i posit i o n , was expanded by Shaykh A h m a d al-Ahsai (1753-1826), whose p o s i t i o n came to be identified as the Shaykhiyyah. H e argued that the I m a m o f the Shiite t r a d i t i o n , w h o was n o w considered t o be h i d d e n , had an agent or deputy i n each age w h o w o u l d act as the gate (al-l>ab) t o the presence o f the " H i d d e n I m a m . " A l Ahsai's student, Sayyid Kazim Rashti, c o n t i n u e d this teaching i n Karbala and developed this i n t o a relatively f o r m a l school w i t h a n u m b e r o f followers. One o f his students was a y o u n g merchant f r o m a prosperous f a m d y i n Shiraz, M u h a m m a d A l i . A l t h o u g h this student d i d not have the extensive t r a i n i n g o f one o f the ulama, he came t o be recognized as possessing special spiritual qualities. W h e n Rashti died i n 1844, a n u m b e r o f younger ulama w h o were Rashti's students recognized M u h a m m a d A l i as Rashti's successor and as the Bab, or " t h e Gateway o f the Age to the H i d d e n I m a m . " The Bab gained g r o w i n g ulama and popular support f o r his claims, w h i c h he expanded to include the claims o f receiving special d i v i n e inspiration f o r the d e f i n i t i o n o f prophetic revelation f o r the n e w age. The Bab gained a relatively large popular f o l l o w i n g i n a time w h e n man)" people were expecting dramatic events o f a cosmological character. His v i s i o n was not a m o d e r n i z i n g v i s i o n but a traditional messianic message p r o c l a i m i n g a new society o f the r u l e o f God's designated agent o n earth, b u t i t appealed to many i n a t i m e o f great change i n Iranian society. H e was arrested and executed i n 1850, and w i t h his death the medieval messianic phase o f the movement came t o an e n d . O n e o f his followers, M i r z a Hussein A l i N u r i , w h o later became k n o w n as Baha Allah (1817-92), redefined the message o f the n e w age i n m o r e cosmopolitan and universalistic terms, however, and by the end o f the nineteenth century the Shiite messianic revolt o f the Bab had become the m o d e r n Bahai faith, w i t h followers i n many different parts o f the w o r l d . In the large states i n the central parts o f the M u s l i m w o r l d there were n e w style r e f o r m efforts, w h i c h began the process o f the m o d e r n i z i n g reforms o f the slate systems. Parallel t o these m o r e secular r e f o r m efforts, however, there were major movements o f Islamic renewal that also aimed at the creation o f new styles o f institutions for state and society. These movements were both culminations o f

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developments that h a d been i m p o r t a n t i n the eighteenth century a n d also the beginnings o f i m p o r t a n t Islamic initiatives i n the n e w contexts o f g r o w i n g European-controlled m o d e r n i t y .

Frontier Revivalism in Transition In the frontier regions o f the M u s l i m w o r l d , the issues o f Islamic renewal were also those o f transition. The movements o f the eighteendi century that w o r k e d to create more clearly Islamic societies that were free f r o m syncretism and compromise reached a enhninating phase o f activism and sometimes jihads. These movements also became involved i n the interactions w i t h g r o w i n g European d o m i n a t i o n i n many areas, however, and provided foundations for responses to Western expansion. It is clear f r o m the experiences o f movements from West Africa to Southeast Asia that Islamic renewalism was not simply a response to European imperialism but was an already established dynamic o f Islamic history diat became involved i n the process o f confronting the new conditions o f the nineteenth-century m o d e r n w o r l d . One o f the m a j o r figures i n the development o f movements that shaped Islamic life i n many different regions was A h m a d i b n Idris (1749 o r 1750-1837). He was a scholar w h o was b o r n i n Morocco, where he received his early educat i o n . This i n c l u d e d t r a i n i n g i n the standard Islamic disciplines i n the great mosque school o f Q a r a w i y y i n . It was the era o f Mawlay M u h a m m a d (r. 1757-90) and Mawlay Sulayman (r. 1792-1822), rulers c o m m i t t e d t o s u p p o r t i n g active reforms that encouraged study o f basic w o r k s rather than secondary c o m m e n taries ( w i t h special emphasis o n the study o f the h a d i t h ) and that opposed the more extreme versions o f popular veneration o f " h o l y m e n " or marabouts. Ibn Idris began his life as an active Sufi w i t h affiliation to the Shadhiliyyah, a tariqah o f major i m p o r t a n c e i n N o r t h Africa. I b n Idris left M o r o c c o a r o u n d 1798 and spent the rest o f his life i n the eastern Arab w o r l d . For m u c h o f that time he was a teacher i n Mecca and M e d i n a , a l t h o u g h he traveled briefly t o upper Egypt. I n 1828 he was forced t o leave Mecca, possibly as a result o f disputes w i t h the ulama i n the sanctuary cities, and settled i n Yemen, w h e r e he d i e d . He was a w e l l - k n o w n spiritual guide w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f Sufism but was also a p r o m i n e n t and controversial scholar o f the hadith. I n his teaching he emphasized the importance o f i n d i v i d u a l piety a n d fear o f God and the responsibility o f the i n d i v i d u a l believer to strive t o understand the Q u r a n and the Sunna. I b n Idris strongly opposed strong adherence t o i n d i v i d u a l schools o f Islamic law and w o r k e d t o create a m o r e u n i f i e d f o u n d a tion for faith and action based o n fear o f G o d rather than legal rules. As a teacher i n Mecca, i b n Idris came i n t o contact w i t h students f r o m many d i f ferent parts o f the M u s l i m w o r l d . H e d i d not establish his o w n independent and

hOUNDATlONS

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separate tariqah, but he taught a m o r e general Sufi path that was a synthesis o f his devotional guidance a n d other existing orders. It was o n l y later that o n e o f his sons, A b d a l - A l , f o r m a l l y established the A h m a d i y y a h - I d r i s y y a h as the t a r i q a h o f A h m a d i b n Idris. However, many o f his students established orders that were t o play i m p o r t a n t roles i n different parts o f the

Muslim world.

Among

the most

important o f these orders is the Sanusiyyah i n Libya and N o r t h Africa, the Khatmiyyah i n Sudan, and other orders i n East Africa. By the end o f the nineteenth century his prayers were translated i n t o local languages and were w e l l k n o w n i n places as far apart as Bosnia, India, and Southeast Asia. I b n Idris lived i n a t i m e w h e n European influence was g r o w i n g i n the central M u s l i m lands, and he traveled i n Egypt i n the days o f the reforms o f M u h a m m a d A l i . There is little trace i n any o f his w o r k s o r activist piety o f an explicit response t o the West, however. His life and thought were w e l l w i t h i n the long-established traditions o f renewal

a n d r e f o r m . H i s students,

t h o u g h , were actively involved i n the p o l -

The zawiya of Sayyid Ahmad al-Tijani in Fez is the center for propagating

itics o f faith i n the m i d - n i n e t e e n t h century

the teachings of the Tijaniyya order, a Sufi brotherhood with many

and faced the choice o f opposing or w o r k -

adherents in the Maghreb and West Africa. Its founder Ahmad al -Tijani

ing

with

westernizing

reformers a n d

European powers. Like K h a l i d al-Baghdadi

{1737- 181c) was instrumental in bringing revivalist Sufism to the region, and the order became an effective vehicle for organizing efforts to reform society and enforce a stricter adherence to Islamic law and practice.

and others i n this era o f transition, i b n Idris represents b o t h a c u l m i n a t i o n and a prologue i n the development o f movements o f renewal and r e f o r m i n the M u s l i m w o r l d . Other Sufi orders were also i m p o r t a n t parts o f the movements o f renewal and r e f o r m i n the era o f transition. A h m a d al-Tijani (1737-1815) was another N o r t h African scholar w h o established an i m p o r t a n t tradition o f activist Sufism. He was b o r n i n southern Algeria and studied i n Fez before he w e n t o n pdgrimage t o Mecca. W h i l e o n pilgrimage, he became affiliated w i t h some o f the i m p o r t a n t revivalist teachers o f the t i m e , especially those associated w i t h the Knalwatiyyah

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order, such as M a h m u d al-Kurdi i n Cairo and A b d al-Karim al-Samman i n Medina. W h e n al-Tijani returned to Algeria, he began to have distinctive v i s i o n ary experiences that gave special character to the devotional practices that he f o r mulated as the basis for a new order, the Tijaniyyah. The litanies o f the order are believed to have been taught to al-Tijani directly by the Prophet M u h a m m a d i n al-Tijani's visions. I n these visions al-Tijani was also instructed to break ties w i t h other orders, and followers o f the Tijaniyyah path were restricted to affiliation w i t h only the Tijaniyyah. At the t i m e such exclusivity was rare a m o n g tariqahs. In devotional practice the Tijaniyyah was a s i m p l i f i e d path that d i d away w i t h many o f the complex prayer requirements and chains o f a u t h o r i t y and authorization. It opposed many o f the practices associated w i t h t o m b visitations and the veneration o f holy m e n that w e r e c o m m o n i n N o r t h A f r i c a . The

order

became an effective vehicle for o r g a n i z i n g efforts t o r e f o r m society and to enforce a more strict adherence to Islamic law and practice. As al-Tijani's f o l l o w i n g grew, O t t o m a n authorities i n Algeria compelled h i m to leave and he settled i n Fez. M o r o c c o at that t i m e was under the rule o f a r e n e w a l - m i n d e d sultan, Mawlay Sulayman, w h o w e l c o m e d al-Tijani and p r o vided h i m and his order w i t h support and patronage. The Tijaniyyah i n return p r o v i d e d an i m p o r t a n t source o f support for the sultan i n his campaigns to l i m i t the power o f the marabouts and the sharifs (descendants o f the Prophet). Mawlay Sulayman was h i m s e l f an i m p o r t a n t representative o f the renewalist t r a d i t i o n , c o m m i t t i n g the state to a m o r e activist role. A l t h o u g h he is o f t e n identified as sympathetic to the Wahhabis, and is quoted as saying that he was " M a l i k i i n law but H a n b a l i [sometimes q u o t e d as " w a h h a b i " ] i n d o c t r i n e , " he was n o t as extreme as M u h a m m a d i b n A b d al-Wahhab i n his o p p o s i t i o n to Sufi concepts and practices. As a result, the Tijaniyyah provided an i m p o r t a n t expression o f this style o f renewalism. A l t h o u g h the Tijaniyyah order was closely i d e n t i f i e d w i t h governmental structures and was sometimes an i m p o r t a n t force for social stability, it also p r o v i d e d the means for organizing effective o p p o s i t i o n . Al-Tijani's w o r k was an i m p o r t a n t transition. H i s tariqah was presented and conceived w i t h i n older traditions o f piety and renewal, but d u r i n g the nineteenth century it became a vehicle b o t h for jihad o p p o s i t i o n to European i m p e r i a l expansion i n Africa and for w o r k i n g w i t h the new i m p e r i a l rulers. Sufi orders were also laying the foundations at this rime for later jihad opposition to imperial expansions. Followers o f Shaykh Khalid al-Baghdadi spread the Khalidiyyah-Naqshbandiyyah orders i n t o such regions o f the Caucasus as Dagestan and Chechnya, where Islam itself was expanding at the same time as Russian i m p e rial conquest was intensifying. I n the early years o f the nineteenth century these activities d i d not create < >pen militant < >ppi isition but rather laid the organizational foundations for m i d c e n t u r y jihads. Shaykh Ismail a l - K u r d u m i r i , a follower o f

FOUNDATIONS

Khalid,

was

active

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533

in

Shirvan ( w h i c h n o w forms a

part

of

northeastern

Azerbaijan) i n the 1810s but was forced to leave w h e n the Russians t o o k c o n t r o l o f the khanate i n 1820. I n Dagestan, Russian p u n i t i v e expeditions a n d economic policies created problems and disruptions for die general populace, w h i l e i n Chechnya

pro-

grams o f setding Cossacks o n Chechen lands and m i l itary

sanctions

created

additional hardships. Many o f the local rulers s u b m i t ted to Russian rule as a way

Iman Shamil, who led the Muslims of Dagestan and Chechnya in their resistance to Russian rule, posed for this fiercely formal portrait around 1890.

o f preserving some o f their o w n positions, so that the political estabhshment was increasingly discredited. I n this context the message o f the rencwalist Naqshbandiyyah order had strong p o p ular appeal, a n d the movement grew under the leadership o f M u h a m m a d a l Yaraghi, a student o f Shaykh Ismail. A l t h o u g h there were many uprisings against Russian rule, w h i c h the Russians attributed to al-Yaraghi's followers, there were few organized jihad efforts at first. Al-Yaraghi's first concern was t o establish respect for and adherence to Islamic law and to r e f o r m local practice. In this context the message was that it was p e r m i t t e d t o submit t o Russian rule until the conditions were appropriate for a victorious jihad. The Russian victory i n 1829 over the Ottomans changed the situation, however, as many local rulers prepared to surrender t o the Russians. I n 1829 a gathering o f tariqah leaders under the leadership o f the i m a m o f Dagestan met t o organize what was to become thirty years o f militant resistance to Russian expansion under a series o f imams, i n c l u d i n g the most famous, i m a m Shamil (1798-1871). M o r e m i l i t a n t movements developed i n this era o f transition i n a n u m b e r o f areas. I n Southeast Asia the renewalism o f such eighteenth-century teachers as Tuanku N a n Tua i n Sumatra laid the foundations for m o r e activist revivalism at the b e g i n n i n g o f the nineteenth century. A m o n g the most i m p o r t a n t o f the resulting groups was the Padri movement. I n 1803 a small g r o u p i n c l u d i n g a f o r m e r student o f Tuanku Nan Tua, Hajji M i s k i n , returned f r o m a p i l g r i m a g e t o

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Mecca. Their pilgrimage experience had c o n f i r m e d their conviction o f the need for m o r e explicit adherence to the fundamentals o f Islam. The results o f their first efforts at r e f o r m were l i m i t e d , and soon Padri leaders established '•$w>

JM,-

c o n t r o l over certain villages, w h i c h were reorganized as B

special separate c o m m u n i t i e s i n w h i c h popular religious customs were f o r b i d d e n , the inhabitants w o r e distinctive c l o t h i n g , and Islamic practice was enforced. The Padri villages engaged i n jihads against nonadherent villages and the local monarchy, and by 1819 they seemed poised to gain f u l l control over the Minangkabau r e g i o n . At that t i m e , however, the D u t c h had returned to Southeast Asia f o l l o w i n g Napoleon's defeat and w o r k e d t o establish c o n t r o l i n Sumatra and other m a j o r islands. The r e m a i n i n g leaders o f the local m o n a r c h y and anti-Padri v illage leaders q u i c k l y accepted D u t c h sovereignty and j o i n e d the D u t c h i n fighting Padri c o n t r o l . The relationship between the rise o f the Padri m o v e m e n t and the expansion o f European states is complex. I n many ways the Padri movement can be viewed as a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f long-established renewalist traditions.

In nineteenth-century Sumatra, leaders of the local monarchy joined the Dutch in opposing the revivalist

However, the socioeconomic

context o f village life i n

Sumatra was being changed significantly already i n the

Padri movement based in coffee-growing villages.

eighteenth century. Later that century the d e m a n d for

Following the Padri War of 1821-38, the Dutch retained

coffee i n the w o r l d market expanded rapidly and p r o -

administrative control, and the Great Mosque in the

v i d e d n e w w e a l t h f o r the c o f f e e - g r o w i n g areas o f

capital Kota Raja on the north coast was built under their auspices.

Sumatra. The more f o r m a l Islamic school-centers had p r o v i d e d i m p o r t a n t regulation for the developing trade networks. W h e n the Padri movement developed, some o f

its i m p o r t a n t centers were coffee villages, and this may have p r o v i d e d the econ o m i c resources necessary f o r the establishment o f the independent renewalist village c o m m u n i t i e s . I n this way, a l t h o u g h the early goals were w i t h i n the older renewalist traditions, the context was new. Soon, however, the early renewalist jihad became the Padri War o f 1821-1838, a war o f anti-imperialist resistance as w e l l as a j i h a d . In Java the restoration o f D u t c h rule f o l l o w i n g the hiatus o f the Napoleonic era was a t i m e f o r a similar c o m b i n a t i o n o f Islamic revivalism and a n t i - i m p e r i alism. D u r i n g the eighteenth century some o f the o l d princely states, b u i l t o n a c o m b i n a t i o n o f local traditions o f d i v i n e rule and Islamic concepts, had been supported by the D u t c h East India Company i n their rivalry w i t h the ulama,

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whose ideas were m o r e i n accord w i t h the cosmopolitan, m o r e standard articulation o f Islam. By the b e g i n n i n g o f the nineteenth century, some D u t c h officials had begun t o establish a m o r e centralized c o n t r o l , and these trends were emphasized w h e n the British took c o n t r o l o f Java i n 1811 and f u r t h e r strengthened w h e n the D u t c h returned to Java i n 1816. As the D u t c h i m p o s e d increasing taxes and controls o n court elites and the peasantry alike, discontent grew and reached a breaking p o i n t i n 1825. D i p o N e g o r o (ca. 1785-1855), a prince w i t h a reputat i o n for piety and mysdc v i s i o n , came i n t o conflict w i t h a D u t c h official and a major conflict broke o u t . A m o n g his early and strongest supporters were the leading ulama, w h o l e d h i m t o assume the role o f head o f the c o m m u n i t y o f faith, and the conflict rapidly took o n the character o f a jihad. I n this conflict, often called the Java War o f 1825-1830, the D u t c h tended t o identify Islam as the basis for o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e m , and the w a r took o n the tone o f being an antiimperialist j i h a d . D u t c h m i l i t a r y superiority, and eventually divisions a m o n g the resistance, b r o u g h t an end to the war after m u c h loss o f life and property. One i m p o r t a n t consequence o f the w a r was that renewalist, ulama-defined Islam became i d e n t i f i e d w i t h o p p o s i t i o n t o f o r e i g n r u l e . T h e D u t c h , i n response, w o r k e d t o associate the o l d court elites w i t h their r u l e , leaving cosmopolitan Islam as the ideology o f revolt and g i v i n g added strength t o the processes o f Islamization o f social life a m o n g the peasantry. M i l i t a n t movements o f renewal also w^ere an i m p o r t a n t part o f this era o f transition i n West Africa, w h e r e the well-established t r a d i t i o n o f reformist jihad reached a c u l m i n a t i o n i n the movement o f U t h m a n d a n Fodio

(1755-1817).

T h r o u g h o u t Hausaland, as was c o m m o n elsewhere i n West Africa, Islam was an increasingly i m p o r t a n t part o f society, and the political systems reflected the efforts t o c o m b i n e M u s l i m and local traditions. As the n u m b e r and importance o f M u s l i m scholars i n these societies grew, their ability to challenge the validity o f the synergistic systems strengthened. Dan Fodio was b o r n i n t o a Fulani f a m ily o f M u s l i m scholars i n the Hausa k i n g d o m o f Gobir, i n the n o r t h e r n r e g i o n o f m o d e r n Nigeria. He received a standard education and became associated w i t h the r e n e w a l - m i n d e d teacher Jibril i b n U m a r and w i t h the Q a d i r i y y a h order. He began a career as an itinerant scholar i n 1774 and taught f o r a w^hile i n the court o f Gobir. H e insisted o n a m o r e explicit adherence t o Islamic practices and was strongly critical o f compromises w i t h local cultural traditions and practices. H e c o m b i n e d a knowledge o f M u s l i m law (and clear loyalty t o the M a l i k i legal school) w i t h a strong sense o f mystical experience w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f Sufism. Dan Fodio was a talented w r i t e r o f b o t h scholarly literature and popular poetry, and he soon gained a substantial f o l l o w i n g . W h e n the ruler o f G o b i r attempted t o place restrictions o n dan Fodio and his followers, an open conflict resulted. The teacher left G o b i r t e r r i t o r y and estab-

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lished a separate c o m m u n a l society i n w h i c h dan Fodio was recognized as the i m a m and head o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . H e also became the c o m m a n d e r o f the believers i n a jihad declared against the Hausa states i n 1804. M u c h o f the actual leadership o f the m i l i t a r y campaigns and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was i n the hands o f dan Fodio's brother, Shaykh Abdallah, and dan Fodio's son, M u h a m m a d Bello, w h o succeeded his father as commander o f the believers i n 1817.

By 1808 the

jihad had defeated most o f the major Hausa states and continued to expand i n t o the Lake Chad region and other areas. The state established by dan Fodio is k n o w n as the Caliphate o f Sokoto, w h i c h he led as " c a l i p h , " w i t h his brother c o n t r o l l i n g the western t e r r i t o r i e s and his son the eastern lands. In m a n y ways the Sokoto state was still a s y n thesis of Islamic and Hausa m o n a r c h i c a l t r a d i t i o n s , b u t Islamic law had a substantial and h i g h l y visible role in d e f i n i n g p o l i c y and the legal system. The j i h a d state represented a significant phase i n the Islamization o f society i n West A f r i c a i n w h i c h M u s l i m scholars and teachers gained a p r i m a r y role i n the a r t i c u l a t i o n o f the p u b l i c dimensions o f c i v i l society, and the state system was changed f r o m a basically Sudanic m o n a r c h y that tolerated Islam to a f o r m a l l y Islamic state that c o n t i n u e d to use some o f the f o r m s and customs o f the earlier Sudanic-Hausa monarchies. This l a i d the basis f o r m u c h o f state and society i n m o d e r n West A f r i c a . In b o t h the large central states o f the M u s l i m w o r l d and the societies o n the frontiers, significant changes were taking place i n terms o f adaptations o f basic institutions and perspectives to new conditions. Such changes can be viewed as being a n o r m a l part o f the dynamics o f the history and development o f great societies. Movements o f Islamic renewal had l o n g been a part o f M u s l i m historical experiences. These changes can also be seen w i t h i n a m o r e global framew o r k , however. T h r o u g h o u t the m a j o r societies o f the w o r l d , there were significant transformations taking place. I n all major urban societies the basic structure o f the sociopolitical order was i n a process o f transformation involvi n g b o t h local and global factors. The victory o f Western industrial-imperial societies i n global rnilitary and p o l i t ical terms focused attention o n the influence and impact o f the Western models o n die rest o f the w o r l d . However, the movements o f Islamic renewal i n the era o f transition at the beginning o f the nineteenth century show that there was still a strong development o f institudonal alternatives that were emerging w i t h o u t direct i n f l u ence ofWestern models or attack. There were many efforts to reformulate the way state and society should operate, ranging f r o m the efforts o f U t h m a n dan Fodio and Sayyid A h m a d Barelwi to create new Islamic societies to the more reformist and less radical Sufi affiliations developed by Ahmad al-Tijani and A h m a d i b n Idris. The European expansion efforts tended to o v e r w h e l m and preempt these efforts, so that

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the context o f M u s l i m renewalism was transformed d u r i n g the nineteenth century, but the traditions o f Islamic renewal d i d not disappear.

The Warrior-Defenders of the Faith The M u s l i m w o r l d faced the m i l i t a r y powers o f European i m p e r i a l expansion i n many different areas. I n the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century an i m p o r t a n t part o f the M u s l i m response took the f o r m o f jihads organized by m o r e traditional movements o f Islamic renewal. Many o f these early movements had begun as efforts o f r e f o r m w i t h i n society and were o n l y later d r a w n i n t o conflict w i t h European forces. By m i d c e n t u r y , however, n e w movements o f Islamic revival developed i n direct response to European attack, a l t h o u g h the older type o f e v o l u t i o n f r o m movements o f local renewal to jihads defending against i m p e r i a l expansion c o n t i n u e d to be i m p o r t a n t . Some o f the most effective efforts o f m i l i t a r y o p p o s i t i o n to European expansion were these m o v e ments, w h i l e the n e w l y m o d e r n i z e d armies o f the larger M u s l i m states proved to be m u c h less o f an obstacle to the European forces. The e m e r g i n g w a r r i o r - d e f e n d e r s o f the M u s l i m w o r l d were n o t L u d d i t e opponents o f n e w technologies or methodologies. W h e n m o d e r n weapons were available, they were used by the renewalists. The strength o f these movements, however, came f r o m their abilities to m o b i l i z e large numbers o f people i n organizations w h o s e formats were familiar. Most frequently, the n e w defense groups were Sufi tariqahs i n structure, i n their self-definition, and i n their leadership. A n additional source o f strength for these movements was that they were able t o use the tactics o f guerrilla warfare o f a m o d e r n style l o n g before these had been m o r e f o r m a l l y defined by M a o Zedong. Militant j i h a d movements were not as i m p o r t a n t a factor i n the large central M u s l i m states as they were i n other parts o f the M u s l i m w o r l d d u r i n g the n i n e teenth century. Significant movements o f explicitly Islamic r e f o r m d i d develop i n the central O t t o m a n lands. However, they were not actively advocating jihads, n o r were they w i t h i n m o r e traditional organizational formats that provided a basis for militant renewal movements i n other parts o f the M u s l i m w o r l d . Instead, this r e f o r m i s m that developed i n the second half o f the nineteenth century w o u l d later be called "Islamic m o d e r n i s m . " Major governmental r e f o r m programs i n the central lands o f the O t t o m a n Empire were p r i m a r i l y efforts i n m o d e r n i z a t i o n using Western models and inspiration rather than being actions o f Islamic renewal and were part o f the rulers' o n g o i n g activities to strengthen the empire. Movements diat sought to affirm a historical identity or tradition often developed i n nationalist rather than religious forms. Nationalism among the n o n - M u s l i m peoples w i t h i n the O t t o m a n Empire developed as an early and p o w e r f u l force o f o p p o -

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sition. Later i n the century nationalist sentiments also were manifested among Muslims i n the empire w h o advocated significant change, eitiier demanding recogn i t i o n o f their rights as citizens w i t i r i n the empire or independence. I n this way assertions o f identity and demands for political r e f o r m among Arabs i n the O t t o m a n Empire began to be articulated i n nationalist terms by the end o f the century. D u r i n g W o r l d War I , w h e n there was a significant revolt against Ottoman rule i n Arab lands, even t h o u g h i t was led by the Grand Sharif o f Mecca, the movement was k n o w n as the "Arab Revolt" and made n o claims o f offering a program o f Islamic renewal. Although the Grand Sharif suggested that he m i g h t be named caliph, this was a political proposal rather than a statement of advocacy for a program of Muslim revival. I n Egypt the dynasty established by M u h a m m a d Ali achieved a h i g h degree o f autonomy w i t h i n the O t t o m a n Empire and was actively reformist i n policy, but its p r o g r a m was based o n westernization rather than Islamic renewal. Late i n the century, similarly, the emergence o f a movement o f Egyptian nationalism sometimes made appeals for popular support i n Islamic terms, but i t was p r i m a r i l y a nationalist movement i n more secular and Western terms than an Islamic movement. I n Qajar d o m a i n s , g o v e r n m e n t a l r e f o r m was also i n the f r a m e w o r k o f attempting t o m o d e r n i z e i n the Western m o d e . Outside o f the movement o f the Bab, there was little p o p u l a r m o b i l i z a t i o n f o r e x p l i c i t l y Islamic m o t i v a t i o n s o f r e f o r m or societal transformation. By the end o f the century n e w Iranian n a t i o n alism was b e g i n n i n g to emerge as a synthesis o f m o r e traditional groups w i t h those created by the economic a n d cultural changes o f the m o d e r n era. The o p p o s i t i o n t o the Tobacco Concession o f 1890 and the Constitutional Revolution o f 190c—06 were crucial parts o f the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f Iranian politics b u t i n many ways were not basically movements o f Islamic renewal. M i l i t a n t movements d i d develop i n the t h i r d m a j o r central M u s l i m state, the M u g h a l sultanate o f I n d i a , and this reflected the m i l i t a n c y and renewalism o f the transitional era, w h i c h i n many ways were parallel to the m o v e m e n t o f Sayyid A h m a d Barelwi. A student o f Barelwi, T i t u M i r (1782—1831), r e t u r n e d t o h i s h o m e o f western Bengal and gathered a g r o u p o f followers, w h o f o r m e d a separate c o m m u n i t y distinguished by dress and dietary restrictions. T i t u M i r emphasized strict adherence t o Islamic law and soon came i n t o conflict b o t h w i t h the Sufi orders and the local landlords, w h o feared his ability t o arouse and organize their peasant tenants. After he declared a j i h a d , he was k i l l e d i n 1831 by the m i l itary forces sent t o suppress his u p r i s i n g . Similar t o some other movements o f the t i m e , T i t u M i r attempted t o create an alternative society. A m o r e significant and broad-based m i l i t a n t m o v e m e n t developed i n eastern Bengal under the leadership o f Hajji Shariat Allah (1781-1840), w h o was b o r n i n Bengal and had lived and studied f o r an extended p e r i o d o f t i m e i n Mecca. W h e n he r e t u r n e d t o Bengal, he organized an e f f o r t t o impose a stricter obser-

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vance o f the faraid (religious duties), and his m o v e m e n t became k n o w n as the Faraidi. He gained a large n u m b e r o f followers, especially a m o n g the peasants and w o r k e r s , w h o were increasingly oppressed by B r i t i s h plantation owners and H i n d u landlords. F o l l o w i n g his death i n 1838, his son, D u d u M i a n (1819-62) gave the m o v e m e n t a m o r e explicitly c o m m u n a l organization w i t h a h i e r a r c h i cal administrative organization. The Faraidi clashed w i t h authorities, and D u d u M i a n was jailed a n u m b e r o f times. The more exphcitly Islamic movements that resulted i n militant o p p o s i t i o n to existing conditions and the declarations o f jihads were n o t p r i m a r i l y aimed at combatting the expansion o f British control i n India. They d i d involve conflict w i t h British authorities, however. The largest uprising to be specifically chrected against the British i n the nineteenth century was the great revolt i n 1857, sometimes called the Sepoy Mutiny. The cumulative pressures o f British policies helped to create conditions w i t h i n w h i c h g r o w i n g Indian frustration expressed itself i n a w i d e spread revolt against British authorities i n w h i c h M u s l i m s and H i n d u s joined together. The British crushed o p p o s i t i o n severely and f o r m a l l y abolished the M u g h a l sultanate, as w e l l as b r i n g i n g an end to the administration o f the British East India Company. A w i d e spectrum o f M u s l i m leaders participated, but the u p r i s i n g d i d not assume the character o f a unified jihad. Despite the fact that manyBritish officials continued to believe that there was a major threat to British rule

The Qajar palace in Tehran, seen here in a photograph taken by W. L. Schnaider around 1913, symbolized the old regime in Iran. In the late nineteenth century reformers attempted to modernize the country following Western models. During the reign of Muzaffar al-Din Shah (r. 1896-1907), they demanded political reforms, including a new constitution.

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f r o m M u s l i m militants, the events o f 1857 marked the end o f the era o f potentially effective jihad movements i n South Asia u n t i l w e l l i n t o the twentieth century Warrior-defenders o f the faith were m o r e active i n a n u m b e r o f the M u s l i m world's f r o n t i e r areas. A l t h o u g h the movements c o n t i n u e d t o be i n s p i r e d by renewalist traditions, many came t o be increasingly involved i n efforts o f o p p o sition t o expanding European c o n t r o l and less concerned w i t h the p u r i f i c a t i o n o f local practices. Some movements were direct continuations o f earlier renewal movements, w h i l e others represented new organizations or traditions. In a number o f areas, Sufi orders provided a framework for some o f the most effective resistance t o European imperial expansion. I n the Caucasus r e g i o n the foundations laid b y Naqshbandi shaykhs earlier i n the century opened the way for leaders t o organize j i h a d o p p o s i t i o n to Russian i m p e r i a l rule as the Russians attempted to consolidate control i n the region. A series o f active imams inspired the peasants i n the region, especially i n Chechnya and Dagestan, t o rise i n jdiad against the Russians. These imams continued the dual emphasis o f fighting the foreigners and insisting o n rejection o f local religious customs, replacing t h e m by a more strict adherence to Islam. I n this way the Naqshbandi h o l y wars were an important part o f the Islamization process o f the societies as w e l l as a significant deterrent to imperialist expansion. The jihads began i n the 1820s and reached their peak o f effectiveness under the leadership o f I m a m Shamil, w h o led the w a r effort f r o m 1834 u n t i l 18C9. A l t h o u g h the movement was defeated and its leaders kdled or i n exde, the Naqshbandiyyah and activist Islam remained a force i n the region. There was another u p r i s i n g i n 1877, and i n the i n t e r i m p e r i o d between the collapse o f the czarist state and the establishment o f C o m m u n i s t rule at the end o f W o r l d War I , the Naqshbandiyyah established a short-lived imamate. The l o n g - t e r m impact is reflected i n the fact that a portrait o f I m a m Shamil continues to have a place o f h o n o r i n offices o f officials i n post-Soviet Dagestan. The Q a d i r i y y a h tariqah developed along parallel lines i n the Caucasus and was at times i n alliance w i t h the Naqshbandiyyah order; at at other times they were competitors f o r influence a n d support. The Q a d i r i y y a h was b r o u g h t t o the r e g i o n by Kunta H a j i Kishiev, w h o was b o r n i n Dagestan and lived i n Chechnya. H e j o i n e d the order w h i l e o n p i l g r i m a g e , and o n his r e t u r n i n 1861, after the defeat o f I m a m Shamil, he advocated acceptance o f Russian r u l e and was less puritanical i n his devotional path. H e gained a large f o l l o w i n g i n a r e g i o n that was exhausted by decades o f fighting, and Q a d i r i teachers successfully c o n t i n ued the process o f the conversion o f the Ingusheuans (people w h o l i v e d i n a region n o r t h o f the Caucasus Mountains and west o f Chechnya), whose conversion was completed b y the 1870s. The Russian rulers feared the rapidly g r o w i n g tariqah, however, and arrested Kunta H a j i , w h o died i n p r i s o n i n 1867. The m e m bers o f the Q a d i r i y y a h took an active role i n the major revolt o f 1877, j o i n i n g

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w i t h the Naqshbandiyyah. A l t h o u g h advocacy o f a j i h a d was abandoned, b o t h orders were major forces, w i t h Q a d i r i influence strongest i n Chechnya and the Naqshbandiyyah strongest i n Dagestan. French i m p e r i a l expansion i n N o r t h Africa i n the first h a l f o f the nineteenth century f o u n d its most effective o p p o n e n t i n a leader o f the Q a d i r i y y a h tariqah, the a m i r A b d al-Qadir (1808-83 )• The French invaded Algeria i n 1830 and rapidlyconquered the coastal cities, b r i n g i n g an end to O t t o m a n rule i n the country. A b d al-Qadir's father, Sidi M u h y i a l - D i n al-Hasani, was the head o f the Q a d i r i y y a h i n the r e g i o n , and he declared a j i h a d against the European invasion. A b d al-Qadir assumed leadership o f the resistance and soon w o r k e d t o establish a M u s l i m state i n w h i c h he t o o k the title o f the c o m m a n d e r o f the believers. The n e w c o m m u n i t y was t o be a state organized i n the traditions o f renewalism as w e l l as an army engaged i n j i h a d . The c o m b i n a t i o n o f the state organization and the Sufi f o u n dations f o r loyalty created an effective vehicle f o r m o b i l i z i n g tribal o p p o s i t i o n to the French as w e l l as creating a n e w m i l i t a r y force. A b d al-Qadir and the French alternated between open w a r and negotiations. A t one p o i n t i n the conflict i n 1837, there was a treaty that p r o v i d e d m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n f o r the French r u l e i n die urban areas and A b d al-Qadir's a u t h o r i t y i n some i n t e r i o r areas. Hostilities restimed, however, a n d the French

finally

defeated A b d al-Qadir's forces i n 1847. A b d al-Qadir w e n t i n t o exile, finally sett l i n g i n Damascus, w h e r e he d i e d . Most effective resistance t o the French ended w i t h the defeat o f A b d al-Qadir, but there were some significant o p p o s i t i o n movements after 1847. There were a n u m b e r o f movements led by people c l a i m i n g messianic authority, w h i c h were rapidly

suppressed.

I n this

turmoil

a recently

established

t a r i q a h , the

Rahmaniyyah, played an i m p o r t a n t role. I n 1870-71 the various movements o f local discontent were b r o u g h t together i n a major u p r i s i n g w h e n a local a d m i n istrator, M u h a m m a d a l - M u q r a n i , w o r k e d w i t h leaders o f the Rahmaniyyah order i n eastern Algeria to oppose French rule. After the defeat o f the o p p o s i t i o n forces, the French confiscated large amounts o f land and w o r k e d to complete the process o f the destruction o f Algerian M u s l i m society. The c o m b i n a t i o n o f renewalist r e f o r m o f M u s l i m society w i t h a j i h a d against foreign c o n t r o l w i t h i n the organizational f r a m e w o r k o f Sufi orders c o n t i n u e d t o be one o f the most visible modes o f Islamic r e f o r m i n many areas o f the M u s l i m w o r l d i n the nineteenth century. The l o n g t r a d i t i o n o f such r e f o r m movements i n West Africa continued w i t h great strength t h r o u g h o u t most o f the century. The successors t o U t h m a n dan F o d i o i n the j i h a d states maintained an advocacy o f renewalism but n o w w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f an established state structure. This meant that w h e n Great Britain established control i n N i g e r i a , the leaders o f the dan Fodio t r a d i t i o n represented states that came t o an agreement w i t h the B r i t i s h

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rather than creating a new jihad m o v e m e n t . I n the Senegambia r e g i o n , the Tijaniyyah order was a vehicle for a m a j o r renewalist jihad. Al-Hajj U m a r Tal (1794-1864) c o m b i n e d many important lines o f renewalism. He was b o r n in Futa Toro, the heartland o f die o l d jihad tradition, and went o n a pilgrimage i n 1826 to Mecca, where he was initiated i n t o the Tijaniyyah. O n his r e t u r n to West Africa he stayed i n Sokoto, where he m a r r i e d a granddaughter o f Utlrman dan Fodio. W h e n U m a r arrived back i n his h o m e l a n d . he began an major effort to oppose compromises w i t h local religious customs and to create an authentically Islamic c o m m u n i t y . He created an army that used French weapons and gained a large following. He declared a jihad i n 1852, conquered Futo Toro, and established a new jihad state o f w h i c h he was the commander o f the believers. U m a r used the hierarchical organizational principles as well as many o f the theological concepts o f the Tijaniyyah order in creating his movement. Ulnar's new state soon came i n t o direct conflict w i t h the French i n the Senegal River valley. H e was defeated h i i860 and signed a treaty w i t h the French. I n Ms r e f o r m activities he came i n t o conflict w i t h M u s l i m groups along die Niger valley, especially facing the Qadiriyyah order led by the Kunta family, w h o had emerged as a major force by this time. A coalition o f forces opposed to U m a r defeated and killed h i m i n 1864. However, he had established a strong enough political system so that Ms son succeeded h i m as ruler o f a smaller state centered around HamdallaM i n the Niger bend region, w h i c h lasted u n t i l the French conquest o f the area i n 1893. The vitality and appeal o f the renewalist message, as w e l l as its viability i n the context o f nineteenth-century West A f r i c a , are s h o w n by the n u m b e r o f other jihad movements that were relatively successful. Each movement built on a base o f reformist mission and w o r k e d to establish a separate and authentic alternative c o m m u n i t y . For example, Ma Ba ( 1 8 0 9 - 6 7 ) , a teacher i n Gambia, declared a j i h a d against the political leaders o f his area t o establish an Islamic state. H e was aided by Lat Dior, a local ruler w h o had been deposed by the French and w h o c o n t i n ued the efforts to expand the Islamic state after Ma Ba's death i n 1867. These and other smaller jihad efforts resulted i n the effective conversion o f the W o l o f people t o Islam and hastened the Islamization o f society. I n many ways the final phase o f the older jihad t r a d i t i o n i n West Africa came w i t h the career o f Samory Ture (ca. 1830-1900), w h o was b o r n i n Guinea and spent his early fife as a merchant w o r k i n g in the area's trade networks. He t h e n became a soldier and a student i n a small jihad state established by a local c o m mander, M o r e - U l e Sise, and i n 1845

he succeeded Sise as the state's leader.

Samory transformed the state i n t o a m a j o r conquest e m p i r e i n the 1870s a n d 1880s. He created as m o d e r n an army as was possible at the t i m e and established M u s l i m teachers as officials i n his conquered territories t o ensure compliance w i t h Islamic law. He actively destroy ed non-Islamic religious sites and cult s y m -

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bols. H e came i n t o conflict w i t h the French and came to an agreement w i t h t h e m that caused h i m to shift his state to the east i n the upper Volta r e g i o n . I n the 1890s, however, Samory f o u g h t w i t h b o t h the French and the B r i t i s h , was defeated i n 1898, and died i n exile i n

1900.

In the 1890s British and French m i l i t a r y expansion b r o u g h t European c o n t r o l to all o f the areas o f western and central Africa. The existence o f an independent African-ruled state i n any f o r m was no longer possible. The long tradition o f the jihad states came to an end as Samory was defeated, the last o f the followers o f alHajj U m a r Tal were conquered, and the territories o f the Sokoto caliphate were occupied by the British. For t w o centuries, however, the c o m b i n a t i o n o f a renewal mission, opposition to local non-Islamic customs, and defense against foreign rule provided a h i g h l y successful format for the efforts to create alternative, authentically Islamic communities and states. For a time these jihad states were m o r e effective than virmally all other alternatives i n resisting European expansion. In Southeast Asia m u c h o f the region had already come under European control by the midcentury, and even the earl)' nineteenth-century warrior-defenders had been engaged i n major and-imperialist jihads. D u r i n g the second half o f the century, i n broad terms, there was a significant development o f greater involvement i n activities o f M u s l i m piety. M u c h o f this was related to the impact o f European expansion. The opening o f new transportation facilities meant that many more people went o n the pilgrimage to Mecca, and the expansion o f m o d e r n means o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n meant that many more Muslims i n Southeast Asia had access to the w o r l d o f Islamic learning. A significant c o m m u n i t y o f scholars f r o m Southeast Asia developed i n Mecca, and p i l g r i m s studied w i t h these scholars and became affiliated w i t h major tariqahs. O n their return home, the orders provided structure for renewalist activities. These developments created a larger audience o f support for M u s l i m renewalism, although this d i d not inevitably involve jihad. The D u t c h d i d face significant revolts representing the o p p o s i t i o n o f the M u s l i m scholar class and peasants, how evcr, w h i c h was expressed i n terms o f r

renewalist Islamic opposition to b o t h the D u t c h and those local elites w h o w o r k e d w i t h the i m p e r i a l rulers. I n western Java there was a major u p r i s i n g against the Dutch in 1888 i n w h i c h the Qadiriyyah tariqah played a m a j o r role. One o f the longest jihads was the wars i n Acheh, i n n o r t h e r n Sumatra, w h i c h lasted f r o m 1871 to 1908. By the end o f the nineteenth century the D u t c h began to i m p l e m e n t policies that sought to w o r k w i t h less m i l i t a n t ulama rather than v i e w i n g all M u s l i m movements as threats to D u t c h rule. This helped to b r i n g an end to the era o f jihads o f the o l d renewalist style. By the early twentieth century o p p o s i t i o n to the D u t c h began to take o n a more nationalist and less religious tone. One o f the last traditionally conceived jihads organized by Sufi leaders against the European i m p e r i a l powers was i n Somalia. I n the late nineteenth century the

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Somalis faced a n u m b e r o f challenges. The Ethiopian empire was expanding, but more i m p o r t a n t , i n the "scramble for A f r i c a " i n the late nineteenth century Italy, France, and Great B r i t a i n all h o p e d t o gain c o n t r o l o f Somali t e r r i t o r i e s . Territories o f various Somali clans were being conquered by these forces, but the Somalis had n o centralized organization to develop effective o p p o s i t i o n . Somali society was held together by a shared language and poetic traditions and structures o f clan relationships rather than by a more unitary state. The major ties that transcended clan loyalties were affiliations to Sufi orders, the largest o f w h i c h was the Q a d i r i y y a h . It was Sufi organization that provided the basis for the Somali battle against i m p e r i a l expansion at the end o f the nineteenth century. The

leader o f the j i h a d i n Somalia was M u h a m m a d A b d a l l a h

Hasan

(1864—1920), a scholar w h o c o m b i n e d knowledge o f Islamic law- and activist Sufism w i t h a great poetic talent that made his message readily accessible to all Somalis. He was b o r n i n n o r t h - c e n t r a l Somalia i n t o a family w i t h some reputat i o n f o r Islamic learning and piety. He received a standard M u s l i m education, travehng as a y o u n g man to such regional centers o f Islamic learning as Harer and M o g a d i s h u . I n 1893—94 he w e n t o n a pilgrimage and studied for a t i m e i n Mecca and Medina. W h i l e there he came i n t o contact w i t h Shaykh M u h a m m a d i b n Salih al-Rashidi, w h o initiated h i m i n t o his n e w l y established order, the Salihiyyah. This order was part o f the broader cluster o f tariqahs f o l l o w i n g the t r a d i t i o n o f A h m a d i b n Idris and helped to c o n f i r m i n M u h a m m a d Abdallah Hasan a sense o f renew alist m i s s i o n . M u h a m m a d Abdallah Hasan returned to Somalia i n the late 1890s and began a campaign o f o p p o s i t i o n to local practices o f veneration o f holy m e n and other activities, such as the use o f tobacco, coffee, and qat (whose leaves are chewed as a s t i m u l a n t ) , w h i c h were not i n accord w i t h a strict interpretation o f Islamic fundamentals. He w o r k e d to p r o m o t e a life o f strict piety and began the process o f establishing a separate c o m m u n a l association that was tied together w i t h i n the f o r m a t o f the Salihiyyah order. This b r o u g h t h i m i n t o conflict w i t h another i m p o r t a n t , n e w l y established tariqah i n Somalia, the U w a y s i y y a h , a branch o f the Q a d i r i y y a h organized by Shaykh Uways al-Barawi (1847-1909). Uways had left his h o m e l a n d o f southern Somalia for a pilgrimage and study and received extended i n s t r u c t i o n i n the Q a d i r i y y a h at the center o f that order i n Baghdad. The Uwaysiyyah believed i n the importance and efficacy o f the m e d i a t i o n o f h o l y m e n , and the traditional practices o f t o m b visitation were an i m p o r t a n t part o f the devotional life o f the Uwaysiyyah. Uways was also w i l l i n g to w o r k w i t h the rulers o f the day, especially the sultans o f Zanzibar, but he also made some a c c o m m o d a t i o n w i t h Italians. By the 1890s the Uwaysiyyah was a large and influential order along the East A f r i c a n coast. The Uwaysiyyah clashed w i t h the Salihiyyah i n many different ways, and some o f this was reflected i n

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exchanges o f hostile poetry, because Uways was also a talented poet. The rivalry reached a climax w h e n a g r o u p o f members o f the Salihiyyah attacked an agricultural settlement that Uways had established and m u r d e r e d the shaykh i n 1909. By the time o f the k i l l i n g o f Shaykh Uways, the p r i m a r y war i n w h i c h M u h a m m a d Abdallah Hasan was engaged was a j i h a d against European imperialism. In 1899 he had declared a jihad against the British, Italians, and Ethiopians. For a short p e r i o d o f truce, his control was recognized i n 1905 by the British and the Italians, but fighting soon resumed. The c o m m u n i t y that was given recognition by the truce arrangement emphasizes the similarity o f the Salihiyyah's efforts w i t h other jihad groups i n w o r k i n g to create alternative societies i n w h i c h the message o f Islam was comprehensively applied. The jihad soon resumed and continued diroughout W o r l d War I , although the shaykh was unable to benefit f r o m potential German and Turkish support. After the war i n 1920 the British m o u n t e d a major m i l itary campaign that crushed the movement, and M u h a m m a d Abdallah Hasan died in die same year i n a h i d i n g place to w h i c h he had fled. His jihad had succeeded i n slowing European expansion i n die H o r n o f Africa for almost t w o decades.

The Spectrum of Renewal in the Nineteenth Century There were significant movements o f renewal and r e f o r m i n the nineteenth century that were n o t i n the f o r m a t o f the tariqah-oriented movements o f j i h a d . There was a b r o a d spectrum, w h i c h ranged f r o m messianic movements and c o n tinuations o f earlier r e f o r m to expressions o f Islamic r e f o r m w i t h i n the n e w c o n texts o f the m o d e r n era. There was virtually n o part o f the M u s l i m w o r l d that d i d n o t experience some m a j o r renewal and r e f o r m effort. The c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the Wahhabi t r a d i t i o n o f absolutist renewalism was the strongest l i n k to earlier movements. A l t h o u g h many o f the n i n e t e e n t h - c e n m r y movements, like that o f Sayyid A h m a d Barelwi i n India, were identified as W a h h a b i , the o n l y m o v e m e n t that was a direct c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the w o r k o f M u h a m m a d i b n A b d al-Wahhabi was the reestablishment o f the Wahhabi-Saudi state i n central Arabia. F o l l o w i n g the destruction i n 1818 o f the state established by i b n A b d al-Wahhab and i b n Saud, there were still many people i n central Arabia w h o remained loyal to the Wahhabi cause. I n the m i d d l e o f the century descendants o f i b n Saud reestablished a Saudi state as a small p r i n c i p a l i t y i n N e j d for a t i m e , b u t die f a m i l y was d r i v e n i n t o exile by the end o f the century. The f o u n d a t i o n remained, however, to enable A b d al-Aziz i b n Saud to return i n 1902 a n d restore the Wahhabi-Saudi political system as the m o d e r n k i n g d o m o f Saudi Arabia. W i t h i n this f r a m e w o r k , the concept o f an absolute renewalism that rejected most Sufi practice, demanded strict adherence to a literal interpretation o f Islamic law, and rejected m u c h o f the culture o f m o d e r n Western society c o n t i n u e d to be called the " W a h h a b i "

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m o d e o f renewal and had c o n t i n u i n g influence. The messianic m o d e o f renewal is usually associated w i t h the concept o f the mdhiii, the divinely designated leader w h o w i l l come and f i l l the w o r l d w i t h justice at a t i m e ordained by God. The c o m i n g o f the m a h d i i n the "Last Days" is most frequently identified w i t h Shiite eschatology, but throughout Islamic history there have been been Sunni mahdist movements as well. The best-known m o d e r n mahdist movement began i n the 1880s and was led by M u h a m m a d A h m a d (1844-85), the Sudanese m a h d i . The Sudanese mahdist movement had many o f the characteristics o f other activist Sunni renewalist movements. The m a h d i began his career as an active m e m b e r o f a Sufi order and began to preach against the excesses and n o n Islamic practices o f many o f the people i n his society. At that time Egypt r u l e d Sudan as a result o f M u h a m m a d Ali's conquests. The m a h d i opposed the oppressive Egyptian rule and soon came into direct conflict w i t h Egyptian forces. By 1885 the mahdi's army conquered K h a r t o u m , and a new mahdist state was established i n w h i c h there was a demand for strict adherence to Islamic law as interpreted by the mahdi and then by his successor, Khalifah Abdallahi, w h o ruled Sudan f r o m

1885

until the country was reconquered by an Anglo-Egyptian army i n 1898. A l t h o u g h most other e x p l i c i t l y mahdist movements were relatively small i n the nineteenth century, many jihad movements i n c l u d e d some significant elements o f mahdist expectations. There were strong mahdist themes, for example, i n the movements and teachings o f U t h m a n dan Fodio and al-Hajj U m a r T a l i n West Africa. The success o f the Sudanese m a h d i was w i d e l y k n o w n i n the M u s l i m w o r l d and helped to give strength to the belief that the late nineteenth century, w h i c h was the e n d o f the t h i r t e e n t h Islamic century, was a time o f messianic importance. Mahdist messianism remained an i m p o r t a n t part o f the perspective o f renewal even after the era o f the Sufi-based j i h a d movements had passed. In some areas Islamic renewal efforts and concepts were only part o f the m o t i vation for movements o f M u s l i m activism d u r i n g the nineteenth century. I n China a number o f movements resulted i n the establishment o f M u s l i m states. I n Yunnan a M u s l i m state was proclaimed and maintained f r o m 1856 to 1873, w h i l e a M u s l i m revivalist m o v e m e n t i n the tradition o f the Naqshbandi " n e w teaching" provided the basis for a state i n Shaanxi and H i , w h i c h received r e c o g n i t i o n f r o m Great Britain and Russia d u r i n g the 1870s. It was suppressed by Chinese i m p e r i a l forces, and i n the 1880s diplomatic agreements between the Russian and Chinese empires completed the d i v i s i o n o f M u s l i m Central Asian lands. I n the nineteenth century Islam provided a basis for organizing revolts against oppressive social c o n d i t i o n s i n places as distant as Brazil. D u r i n g the first half o f the century large numbers o f slaves were b r o u g h t directly f r o m West Africa to work i n mines and plantations i n northeastern Brazil. M u s l i m slaves were dhectly involved i n at least t w e n t y revolts i n Bahia province, where most o f the M u s l i m

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slaves had been sent. The most serious o f these was i n 1835 and was explicitlyled by M u s l i m teachers. A l t h o u g h the older traditions o f M u s l i m r e f o r m and renewal had been remarkably successful i n p r o v i d i n g a basis for activist efforts t o hasten the Islamization o f society and for jihads against c o r r u p t and f o r e i g n rulers, the era o f the old-style tariqah-jihad and other older formats for renewal and revolt had passed. Such movements had flourished i n the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but general historical conditions were being transformed by the end o f the nineteenth century. I n region after region the ability t o organize movements i n the o l d formats disappeared as European i m p e r i a l control was firmly established and also as the socioeconomic c o n d i t i o n s w i t h i n the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s themselves changed. N e w types o f associations were needed t o provide effective vehicles for mass m o b i l i z a t i o n or for persuasion o f the intellectual elites. The long-standing heritage o f renewal and r e f o r m was n o t disappearing, however. It was, instead, b e g i n n i n g to find new formats and modes o f expression that c o u l d be effective i n the conditions o f the m o d e r n w o r l d . Similar transformations had taken place i n earlier eras o f great societal change. Older concepts o f c o m m u n i t y and c o m m u n a l identity were being challenged by the new ideas o f " n a t i o n , " " n a t i o n a l i s m , " and other ideals. Similarly, the older understandings o f reason and r e l i g i o n , o f science and faith, appeared to require new forms o f articulation w h i l e a f f i r m i n g the fundamental t r u t h o f the Islamic heritage. The older traditions o f renewal and r e f o r m provided i m p o r t a n t resources for the many n e w movements and ideologies that were being developed by Muslims i n many parts o f the M u s l i m w o r l d by the nineteenth century. The active affirm a t i o n o f pan-Islamic ideals by Jamal a l - D i n a l - A f g h a n i (1839-97)

a n f

l the

development o f Islamic m o d e r n i s m i n many different f o r m s by M u h a m m a d A b d u h (1849-190.5-) i n Egypt, Sir Sayyid A h m a d Khan (1817-98) i n India, and Ismail Gasprinskii (1851-1914) i n Russia reflect the vitality o f the aspiration f o r Islamic renewal at the b e g i n n i n g o f the t w e n t i e t h century Even i n more secular nationalist movements that developed w i t h i n the M u s l i m w o r l d , there was a strong element o f Islamic renewalist i n s p i r a t i o n . Such movements represent a new era and new ways o f expressing the aspirations o f Islamic renewal. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were an i m p o r t a n t era o f major movements o f Islamic renewal and r e f o r m . These movements had distinctive characteristics, w h i c h made t h e m effective i n the conditions o f the t i m e . By the end o f the nineteenth century, however, b o t h local and global conditions had been transformed. The desire for renewal i n M u s l i m societies d i d n o t end, but the effective ways o f manifesting that aspiration changed. The b e g i n n i n g o f the twentieth century marked the end o f one great era i n the history o f movements o f renewal and r e f o r m and the b e g i n n i n g o f another.

CHAPTER

THIRTEEN

European Colonialism and the Emergence of Modern Muslim States

S.V.R. Nasr

There are today more dian fifty M u s l i m states, extending f r o m the Adas Mountains in the West to the Malay Archipelago i n the East, and f r o m Sub-Saharan Africa to the steppes o f Central Asia. They include some o f the most populous countries i n the w o r l d , such as Indonesia, Nigeria, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, as w e l l as some o f the smallest, such as the Maldives and the Comoros. Some are strong states w i t h effective government institutions; others, like Bosnia-Herzegovina, enjoy only a precarious existence. Some, like Mali and Bangladesh, are poor; others, like Libya, Brunei, Turkmenistan, and Saudi Arabia, are endowed w i t h great natural wealth; still

(Left) Islam is a common

others, like Malaysia—the world's seventh most exporting country i n 1997-—owe

thread in die politics of

their wealth t o successful industrialization. Some M u s l i m states are ethnically u n i f o r m ; others include sizable ethnic, linguistic, or religious minorities. Nearly the entire spectrum o f social, economic, ideological, institutional, and political expres-

Muslim states and is often crucial in overcoming the ethnic nationalism mat is a legacy of the colonial era.

sions are represented i n these states. From the Islamic Republic o f Iran to secular

Although ethnic rivalries

republics i n the Arab w o r l d or Indonesia, f r o m monarchies i n the Arab w o r l d ,

continue, they can be over-

Malaysia, N i g e r i a (where monarchies rule over provinces), and Brunei, to democ-

shadowed by a sense of

racies i n Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Malaysia, M u s l i m states include great diversity i n politics and the workings o f governments. Despite this diversity, a c o m m o n thread also exists i n the politics o f M u s l i m

Islamic community, as in the celebration of Id by rival factions during the Afghan civil war, following the

states. The most obvious is Islam, not o n l y as a faith but also as a source o f i d e n -

expulsion of the Soviet army

tity and an i m p o r t a n t factor i n social relations and politics. Islam has l o n g been

in 1989.

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i m p o r t a n t t o M u s l i m politics. It has played a role i n the struggles for liberation f r o m colonialism i n Sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the M i d d l e East. I n various stages o f the colonial era, Islamic forces, thinkers, and political leaders have played an i m p o r t a n t part i n shaping M u s l i m politics. Liberation f r o m c o l o n i a l i s m was elaborated as an Islamic m o v e m e n t , f r o m Sayyid A h m a d Shahids (1786-1831) u p r i s i n g i n I n d i a i n 1826 t o the a n d - i m p e r i a l i s t undertakings o f Iran's M i r z a Hasan Shirazi (1815-94)

a n d Shaykh Fadlullah N u r i

( ' 8 4 3 - " 9 0 9 ) o r Central Asia's I m a m Shanul (1796-1871), Algeria's A m i r A h d a l Qadir ( 1 8 0 8 - 8 3 ) , Somaliland's M u h a m m a d i b n A b d i l l e Hasan (1864-1920), Sudan's M a h d i ( d . 1885), Iran's j a m a l al-Din a l - A f g h a n i (1838-87), o r the Tijani jihads ( h o l y wars) i n West Africa between the 1780s a n d the 1880s (the Sokoto caliphate o f U t h m a n dan Fodio [c. 1754-1817] and the revolt o f al-Hajj U l n a r Tal o f FutaToro [c. 1794-1864]). Other "Islamic" movements have i n c l u d e d Malaya's H i z b u l Islam (Islamic Party), India's Jamiat-i U l a m a - i H i n d (Party o f U l a m a ) , Iran's Shiite ulama i n the 1920s, Libya's Sanusiyyah ( l e d b y U m a r Mukhtar, Anticolonialists in the Muslim lands have often invoked Islam in their struggle for liberation from

1858-1931), o r Egypt's M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d . The M u s l i m leaders o f various intellectual endeavors d u r i n g the colonial p e r i o d have i n c l u d e d M u h a m m a d Iqbal (1877-1938), A b u l - K a l a m Azad (1888—1958), and India's Mawlana Husain A h m a d M a d a n i (1879-1957) and Mawlana A b u l - A l a M a w d u d i ( 1 9 0 3 - 7 9 ) , later

imperialism. Chechnya's war

o f Pakistan. These movements and thinkers were a m o n g the first to organize an

of liberation against Russia

i n d i g i n o u s anticolonial m o v e m e n t . They articulated anticolonialism i n the l a n -

in 1996 is one of the most

guage o f the j i h a d , relating struggles for l i b e r a t i o n t o Islam—a p o w e r f u l para-

recent examples. It left

digm

much of Grozny, the capital, in ruins.

that continues

today t o be relevant

to M u s l i m

struggles

against

i m p e r i a l i s m , most lately i n the Afghan jihad against the Soviet U n i o n i n the 1980s

E U R O P E A N C O L O N I A L I S M A N D T H E E M E R G E N C E O F M O D E R N M U S L I M STATES

and Chechnya's w a r o f liberation against Russia i n

Ç ÇI

1996.

In this the Islamic movements were the precursors to the later nationalist uprisings. I n Indonesia the efforts o f M a s j u m i (Majlis Sjuro M u s l i m i n Indonesia, the consultative c o u n c i l o f Indonesian M u s l i m s ) w o u l d play an i m p o r t a n t role i n nationalist anticolonialism efforts and early state f o r m a t i o n i n Indonesia. Later, Islam influenced the values and the goals o f p o l itics, and i n recent years Islamist movements have redefined the nature o f politics and laid claim to control o f the state. The continued political importance o f Islam, its r e l evance to the struggle against colonialism i n particular, has prevented secular nationalism f r o m completely d o m inating politics i n the M u s l i m w o r l d . This has i n t u r n made state f o r m a t i o n , and its relation to precolonial and colonial eras, complex and at times problematic. Another feature that M u s l i m states share is the fact that w i t h o u t exception, they are developing states; namely, for the most part they have emerged d u r i n g the course o f the t w e n t i eth century and have been closely tied to the efforts o f their societies to advance and industrialize. In so d o i n g , they share i n the historical legacy, cultural m i l i e u , and

The French ruled vast territories in Africa and Asia.

o f t e n the p o l i t i c a l and social problems that c o n f r o n t

This engraving from the February 1894 edition of Le

development i n the T h i r d W o r l d . M u s l i m states have

Petit Journal shows a French view of their flag being

responded to the challenges before them differently, just

raised in Timbuktu in Mali.

as size, geographic location, and economic e n d o w m e n t have also meant different patterns o f development. The legacy o f colonialism is key i n explaining both the diversity and the u n i t y o f different experiments w i t h state formation in the M u s l i m w o r l d . Just as Islam, ethnic identity, social characteristics, and other indigenous religious and cultural factors can explain the commonalities between M u s l i m states—and conversely, economics, ideology, and leadership can explain divergences—colonialism too can explain the points o f convergence and divergence i n experiences w i t h state formation across the M u s l i m w o r l d . M u s l i m have lived w i d i nearly all the colonial p o w ers. I n m u c h o f Africa, Asia, and the Arab w o r l d , the British and the French r u l e d over vast M u s l i m territories. The Dutch ruled over territories that later became Indonesia, and the Germans, Spanish, Portuguese, and Russians held M u s l i m t e r r i tories i n East Africa, the Philippines, Malaya (what is n o w k n o w n as Malaysia), the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Israel's control o f the West Bank and Gaza Strip may be seen as the last and only o n g o i n g colonial relationship in M u s l i m lands. A l t h o u g h

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the defining characteristics o f colonialism were at w o r k i n all o f these locales, there were differences i n h o w colonial powers approached their colonial mandates, even differences i n h o w the same colonial powers exerted power and influence i n different territories. There are thus fundamental similarities between various M u s l i m polities as there are particularities, w h i c h have their roois i n history, and more important, w i t h the experience o f each colonial territory. This chapter identifies colonialism's legacy for the development o f the M u s l i m states i n the twentieth century. It discusses the c o m m o n legacy that M u s l i m states share as a result o f their experiences w i t h colonialism and explains h o w colonization also accounts for d i f f e r i n g patterns of development by l o o k i n g at i n d i vidual experiences w i t h colonialism. The colonial era lasted less than a century, but it forever changed all aspects o f geography, the economy, social relations, and politics i n the areas that it r u l e d .

Shaping the Modern Muslim World: Colonialism and State Boundaries The colonization o f M u s l i m territories began w i t h the rise o f European empires, the conquest o f India, and the scramble for Africa i n the nineteenth century. Its last phase included the division o f the Arab territories o f the O t t o m a n Empire after W o r l d War I . The colonial era ended after W o r l d War I I , w h e n Britain and then France w i t h d r e w f r o m the majority o f dieir colonial territories. M u s l i m states began to emerge i n earnest f r o m 1947

o n — a l t h o u g h some, such as Iran or

Afghanistan, had always remained independent, albeit nominally. The emergence o f M u s l i m states involved negotiated withdrawals o f colonial powers, as was the case i n Malay a, India, and the Persian G u l f emirates, as well as brutal and bloody wars o f independence, as i n Algeria. The decolonization also occurred i n spurts, as European powers sought to protect their economic interests f o l l o w i n g their political and military withdrawals i n a changing global environment. Iran i n 1953 and Egypt i n 1956 were examples o f the reassertion o f colonialism, w h i c h nevertheless marked the gradual yet effective end o f direct European rule over Muslims. By the mid-1970s most M u s l i m territories, f r o m Sub-Saharan Africa to Southeast Asia, had gained independence f r o m colonialism and constituted either independent M u s l i m states or parts o f independent n o n - M u s l i m states. Still, the legacy o f colonialism continued to shape and reshape their polities, economies, and societies. The impact o f colonialism went far beyond the relationships o f economic and political imperialism dial theorists o f the Left have amply elaborated u p o n . Colonialism also survived i n the forms that stale ideologies, political visions, and institutions o f the new stales took. The impact o f colonialism was circumspect, but it was nevertheless pervasive. It was a manifestation o f the historical continuity between a past f r o m

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Afghanistan was created as a buffer state between the British Indian and Czarist Russian empires, both of which sought to control Central Asia's access to the Indian Ocean in the south. Colonial intervention left a powerful legacy in the region, including the dependence of Afghan governments on colonial powers, as depicted in a Punch cartoon of 1878.

w h i c h the new states sought to distance diemselves and dieir independent existences. The M u s l i m w o r l d today is a collection o f nation-states. A l t h o u g h Islamic u n i t y continues to animate politics across the M u s l i m w o r l d and has been a central d e m a n d o f Islamic movements, the u n i t y o f M u s l i m states does n o t extend beyond the l i m i t e d mandate o f the Organization o f Tslamic Conference, an i n t e r national organization o f M u s l i m states that is m o d e l e d after the U n i t e d Nations. The concept o f a t e r r i t o r i a l state is o f relatively recent o r i g i n i n the M u s l i m w o r l d . I n the p r e m o d e r n era M u s l i m s were conscious o f ethnic, l i n g u i s t i c , a n d regional differences a m o n g t h e m , but politically they were u n i t e d u n d e r first the caliphate and later empires and sultanates, whose s h i f t i n g boundaries represented n o t the borders o f nation-states as the t e r m is u n d e r s t o o d today, b u t the w r i t o f rulers w h o r u l e d i n the name o f Islam. The idea o f a M u s l i m t e r r i t o r i a l state, m u c h like the idea o f n a t i o n a l i s m , is thus an i m p o r t f r o m the West. The

:

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The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is the major force for unity among the diverse collection of nation-states in the modern Muslim world. Modeled after the United Nations, it has cc members, whose heads of state meet every three years in different countries to review conditions in the Muslim world and consider international political developments.

i n c l u s i o n o f the concept o f the t e r r i t o r i a l state i n t o M u s l i m politics and the actual boundaries o f M u s l i m states are b o t h products o f c o l o n i a l i s m . This is not to say that ethnic affiliations and national identities were absent i n the M u s l i m w o r l d before the advent o f colonialism. Such sentiments were always strong. For instance, Iranians f r o m early o n viewed themselves as distinct f r o m Arabs and Turks, and Shiism i n h a n i n m a n y ways became a m a r k o f its national identity, separating Iranians f r o m the S u n n i Turks, Arabs, and T u r k m e n a r o u n d it. Similar distinctions between Arabs and Berbers, Arabs and Turks, or Malays and Javanese have also been p r o m i n e n t . Ethnic nationalism and its association w i t h a nation-state, however, is new to the M u s l i m w o r l d and has its o r i g i n s i n the colonial era. It was t h e n that nationalism as a p r i m a r y f o r m o f political i d e n t i t y — o n e that is n o t subservient to Islamic identity b u t supersedes it absolutely and is associated w i t h a t e r r i t o r i a l state m o d e l e d after those i n the W e s t — g r e w roots and became a part o f M u s l i m p o l i t i c a l consciousness. For this reason tensions have existed across the M u s l i m w o r l d between c o n ceptions o f the nation-state—-associated w i t h the relatively m o r e recent n a t i o n -

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alist political i d e a l — a n d the Islamic ideal o f the ummah (holy c o m m u n i t y ) , w h i c h continues t o u n d e r g i r d the M u s l i m political ideal. The concept o f the u m m a h calls M u s l i m s n o t only t o u n i t e across national boundaries b u t t o place Islam above all other political allegiances i n their everyday lives. The scope o f tensions between the state and its cidzens over this issue has depended o n the extent t o w h i c h the state has been w i l l i n g t o accommodate Islamic

consciousness.

Whereas Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Malaysia have sought to b r i n g about h a r m o n y between n a t i o n h o o d and the ideal o f the u m m a h , Turkey, Pahlavi Iran, Tunisia, Algeria, and Indonesia have consciously sought t o assert the p r i macy o f the nation-state over the u m m a h . Also i m p o r t a n t i n this regard is h o w strong the n o t i o n o f nationalism is. I n states w i t h strong national identities, such as Turkey, I r a n , and Egypt, the state has asserted its prerogatives m o r e forcefully, as is also the case where large n o n - M u s l i m m i n o r i t i e s reside, such as Malaysia o r Nigeria. Conversely, i n places such as Pakistan, where national identity is weak, the ideal o f the u m m a h holds greater sway. M u s l i m states gained independence i n territories that were delineated by the colonial powers. They largely accepted the shapes i n w h i c h they were b o r n as w e l l as the fact that states w o u l d be b o u n d by international borders i n t o distinct sovereign entities. Expansionism d i d occur, however: Morocco's claim t o Western Sahara, Indonesia's t o East Timor, Turkey's t o n o r t h e r n Cyprus, Iran's to Bahrain u n t i l the m i d - 1970s, Syria's t o Lebanon, and Iraq's t o Kuwait. These claims were put f o r w a r d i n the name o f nationalism and o n behalf o f a nation-state, as defined and legitimated by international norms. M u s l i m states, by and large, have not challenged the division o f the territories o f the Islamic empires, and by i m p l i c a t i o n , the Islamic w o r l d by colonial powers or the criteria used by those powers i n determ i n i n g new borders. M u s l i m states have not sought to reconstruct the u m m a h but only t o expand the boundaries o f nation-states. The reality o f those borders have been accepted, although where they he has o n occasion been contested. The only exceptions t o this general rule have been the ideologies o f Arab nationalism and Islamism. Arab nationalism, w h i c h was a widely popular political ideal i n the 1960s and has been a general political and cultural thrust since then, has i n p r i n ciple questioned the division o f the Arab w o r l d into t w e n t y - t w o states. Even i n this case, t h o u g h , the rhetoric o f unity, beyond yielding a number o f symbolic unification pacts—-most notably the U n i t e d Arab Republic, consisting o f Egypt and Syria between 1958 and 1961 and the Arab League—never effectively undermined the division of Arab lands by colonialism. Only N o r t h and South Yemen siiccessfuily united and then not i n the name o f Islam or Arab nationalism but o f Yemeni nationalism. Even Jordan, a state that was created arbitrarily by England w h e n A m i r Abdullah, its first king, was given a fixed stipend and six months to see i f die idea worked, has stood the test o f time. Furthermore, Arab nationalism was n o t an

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Islamic ideology, arid i n that sense it d i d not seek to reverse the division o f M u s l i m lands so m u c h as i t d i d the division o f Arab ones. Islamist movements too have argued for the unity o f all Muslims above and beyond their national identities and to accept the reality o f the u m m a h i n lieu o f nation-states. I n practice, however, Islamist movements have conducted their politics i n accordance w i t h the territorial reality o f the M u s l i m w o r l d . The Islamic Party (Jamaat-i Islami) organizations o f Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka are thus independent o f one another, as are the M u s l i m Brotherhood organizations f r o m Nigeria and Senegal to Sudan, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Palestine. I f and w h e n state boundaries have given way, i t has n o t been because o f lack o f resolve h i statehood, but rather because o f the ability o f a larger expansionist state to o v e r w h e l m a smaller neighbor. Kuwait has remained independent o w i n g to outside assistance; others have not been as fortunate. For example, Western

The region of Kuwait has been governed since the early eighteenth century by shaykhs of the al-Sabah clan.The modern nation was one of the Gulf states created by British oil interests in the region. The first well in Kuwait was drilled at Bahrah in

1956.

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Sahara was forcibly u n i t e d w i t h M o r o c c o , as was East T i m o r w i t h Indonesia. Iran annexed some small islands i n the Persian G u l f that i t took f r o m the U n i t e d Arab Emirates i n the 1970s. The emirates continue to demand the r e t u r n o f the islands, and the struggle for independence f r o m M o r o c c o , led by the Polisario m o v e m e n t , has been waged unabated; the chapter o n an independent Western Sahara is far f r o m closed. Consequently, the colonial d i v i s i o n o f M u s l i m territories, i n p r i n c i p l e as w e l l as along the lines that were initially i n t r o d u c e d , have been largely accepted by the successor M u s l i m states and have been instituted i n t o the international syst e m . The legacy o f c o l o n i a l i s m here has not been free o f tensions, however. First, m a n y o f the divisions were problematic. Some were carried o u t arbitrarily to accommodate local colonial officials w i t h o u t regard to their i m p a c t o n peoples and resources. Other divisions reflected the needs o f colonial powers to resolve d i p l o m a t i c tensions a m o n g themselves. I n many cases colonies were thus created to satisfy d i s g r u n t l e d European allies or to serve as buffers against expansionist ones. The p o s t - W o r l d War I plans for the d i v i s i o n o f the O t t o m a n Empire were made to appease France, Italy, and Greece. The need to protect I n d i a f r o m Russia m e a n w h i l e led to the creation o f Afghanistan, as similar concerns about France after 1798 led to British occupation o f Egypt, w h i c h i n t u r n w a r r a n t e d British c o n t r o l o f Palestine after W o r l d War I . Strategic decisions and economic interests finally led to the creation o f n e w colonial territories, w h i c h m o r e o f t e n than n o t became the bases for future states. British interests i n Persian G u l f o i l led to the creation o f Kuwait and a similar attempt at creating "Arabistan" o u t o f Iran's Khuzestan province i n the early t w e n t i e t h century. Decades later, similar econ o m i c considerations led Britain to encourage B r u n e i not to j o i n Malaysia. Local political considerations led to further divisions. France created Lebanon o u t o f Syria to f u l f i l l its desire to create a Christian-Arab state; and Britain created Jordan to accommodate A m i r A b d u l l a h , w h o had f o u g h t o n the side o f the British i n W o r l d War I and whose f a m i l y felt betrayed by the d i v i s i o n o f the Arab lands o f the O t t o m a n Empire between European powers. H o w c o l o n i a l i s m actually w o r k e d and w h a t its i m p r i n t s were have shaped M u s l i m s ' perception o f their identities and politics and separated the path that various M u s l i m states have taken since independence. Early o n , t h r o u g h the aspiring new elite that the c o l o n i a l rulers trained i n European languages and ways to create a machinery o f government, the d i v i s i o n o f M u s l i m territories took shape. As perceptions o f w h o m the elite w o u l d control and w h a t the possibilities and l i m i t s before t h e m were became entrenched, c o m m i t m e n t s to borders t o o k f o r m . These c o m m i t m e n t s

b u i l t o n existing ethnic identities,

articulating visions o f nationalism that w o u l d give greater m e a n i n g to those

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boundaries. A bureaucrat i n Kuala L u m p u r or Damascus eventually developed a vested interest i n "Malaysianness" or "Syrianness," for example, lest his p o w e r r e m a i n l i m i t e d as that o f a provincial f u n c t i o n a r y i n a larger Malay or Arab entity. It was such feelings that i n later years d o o m e d the Egyptian-Syrian u n i t y pact o f 1958-61. Iraqi and Syrian bureaucrats, w h o under the Ottomans w o u l d operate i n the same ambient p o l i t i c a l , social, and literary culture, n o w developed ties t o different European traditions and languages and helped to finalize their "separateness." The varied administrative and p o l i t i c a l experiences thus helped t o consolidate parochial nationalisms at the cost o f m o r e universal ones. The c o l o nial experience, and the arenas o f operation that it presented the new elite, u l t i mately laid the foundations o f states w h e r e none had existed before. In the Malay w o r l d the same process forced a separation between Malaysian and Indonesian identities and between M u s l i m Malay and n o n - M u s l i m Malay identities as w e l l . Bureaucrats and politicians i n British Malay and the D u t c h Indies came to v i e w the diverse cultural, linguistic, and religious arena o f respective B r i t i s h and D u t c h territories as t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and administrative arena, whereas the possibility o f a Malay arena i n c l u d i n g the Malay parts o f Indonesia and Malaysia, or a Muslim-Pattani r e g i o n i n Thailand and M i n d a n a o i n the Philippines, and excluding the n o n - M u s l i m and non-Malay parts o f b o t h became an u n w o r k a b l e idea. Boundaries o f colonialism and the differences i n cultural and historical experiences and developments that it engendered determined the shape o f future states and polities. A u n i t e d Islamic Malaya w o u l d not emerge because its peoples were r u l e d by different c o l o n i a l authorities. Conversely, Borneo, and briefly Singapore, w o u l d become part o f Malaysia because all were r u l e d by the same British colonial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Colonialism thus helped to define the borders o f states and their realities i n contradistinction to other c o n ceptions o f independence and statehood. N e w states often appropriated existing ethnic identities or semblances thereof, such as "Iraqiness" or "Syrianness," and at other times c o n t r i v e d n a t i o n h o o d , as i n the cases o f Jordan or Malaysia, to produce nationalist ideologies that c o u l d sustain state f o r m a t i o n . The process also entailed sublimating c o m p e t i n g ethnic identities and preventing t h e m f r o m developing i n t o nationalisms. Iran, Iraq, and Turkey have sought to prevent Kurdish i d e n t i t y f r o m asserting itself as a n a t i o n alism. Iran sought to integrate Kurds i n t o an Iranian nationalist identity, and Turkey depicted t h e m as " M o u n t a i n Turks." The success of experiments w i t h state f o r m a t i o n often depended o n h o w successful the development o f national c o n sciousness was. That, i n t u r n , depended o n the strength o f the ethnic identity that f o r m e d the basis o f nationalism. Over t i m e , ethnic and t e r r i t o r i a l definitions became the boundaries for national i d e n t i t y f o r m a t i o n s ; they grew roots and developed as a secular and d o m i n a n t f o r m o f p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y i n lieu o f m e m ories o f a u n i t e d Islamic w o r l d i n history. Colonial powers had perhaps never

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meant for the t e r r i t o r i a l demarcations to have the lasting effects that they had, but i n reality these boundaries became embedded i n the f u t u r e states. T e r r i t o r i a l divisions have also been a source o f tension between various M u s l i m states that claim mutually exclusive rights to the same territories. Jordan and Syria, for example, early after independence b o t h set their eyes o n reconstit u t i n g larger Syria, w h i l e Jordan also m a i n t a i n e d a c l a i m t o Palestine a n d M o r o c c o to Mauritania and parts o f Algeria; Syria and Turkey have contested sovereignty over Alexandretta (iskenderun); Iran and Iraq over the Shatt al Arab channel; Egypt and Sudan over waters o f the N i l e ; Pakistan and Afghanistan over the D u r r a n d line; Pakistan and India over Kashmir; Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and Saudi Arabia and the U n i t e d Arab Emirates, over b o r d e r l i n e oases and o i l fields; Libya and Chad over their border regions; and Iran and the U n i t e d Arab Emirates over the Tunbs and A b u Musa islands. I n some cases the very existence o f some M u s l i m states have been challenged by neighbors that view the M u s l i m states as artificial constructions o f c o l o n i a l i s m . Syria's claims to Lebanon, Malaysia's to B r u n e i ( u n t i l recently), Iraq's to Kuwait, and Morocco's to Western Sahara are examples. Borders p r o d u c e d the shape o f the states but d i d not guarantee their viability. Colonial authorities d r e w boundaries but d i d little to u n i f y the peoples that fell w i t h i n those boundaries i n t o a national culture. At times they d i d exactly the opposite; namely, the colonial powers sought to m a i n t a i n c o n t r o l by encouraging c o m p e t i t i o n between ethnic, linguistic, religious, or tribal g r o u p i n g s . The t e r r i t o r i a l d i v i s i o n o f M u s l i m lands thus remained unchallenged, but it went hand i n hand w i t h national c o n f u s i o n and the fracturing o f the future national society. Unresolved tensions between peoples and regions that were i n c l u d e d w i t h i n the same state, but never consolidated i n t o one n a t i o n , have resulted i n challenges to state boundaries. Confessional tensions i n Lebanon; ethnic and religious clashes i n N i g e r i a , Pakistan, and Malaysia; and the Kurdish p l i g h t i n Iran, Iraq, and Turkey are examples o f the many problems inherent i n state f o r m a t i o n o n the basis o f colonial t e r r i t o r i a l demarcation. Still, none o f these problems has been a result o f attempts to reconstitute " I s l a m d o m . " I n fact, the preponderance o f nationalism i n M u s l i m political consciousness is so pervasive that Pakistan, w h i c h was created i n the name o f Islam, d i v i d e d along ethnic lines i n 1971

into

Pakistan and Bangladesh. A l t h o u g h fraught w i t h problems, the t e r r i t o r i a l c o n ception and reality o f M u s l i m states continues today i n the colonial m o l d .

The Modern Muslim State and the Ideological Legacy of Colonialism Many M u s l i m states today view the transformation o f society, its development and modernization, to be their principal a i m . As a result, they have been concerned

c6o

T H E O X F O R D

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I S L A M

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such ideals as social

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legacy o f the colonial state, w h i c h unlike its parent state i n Europe was overtly c o n cerned w i t h its subjects' c u l tural life. Controlling popular culture as a prerequisite for socioeconomic

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European colonialists often believed that they had a paternal responsibility for their subjects. The British spoke of the "white man's burden" and the French "la mission civilatrice," as shown in this cover from the October 1891 edition of Le Petit Journal. A "friend of France" was assassinated by Moroccan chieftans who thought he had made a secret deal with the colonial rulers.

Turkey to pre-revolution Iran, f r o m socialist Indonesia t o the revolutionary Arab states. To a lesser extent, this has also been the case i n Malaysia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Arab emirates and monarchies. The state's

concerns

w i t h music, dress, popular beliefs, and the cultural o u t l o o k o f Muslims has perforce made the issue o f cultural change, and its implications for development, and the extent o f state control o f society central to politics. This is a legacy o f the colonial state, n o t the consequence o f emulating the Western m o d e l o f the state. The i d e o l o g y o f c o l o n i a l i s m was r o o t e d at some level i n the b e l i e f that European powers had a paternal responsibility for their subjects. This meant that

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M U S L I M STATES

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I

n o t o n l y were they o b l i g e d to protect and manage t h e m b u t also to strive to better t h e m . Evelyn Cromer, a British colonial administrator, saw colonialism as an exact process o f management o f colonial subjects, w h o were incapable o f r u l i n g over themselves. C o l o n i a l i s m p r o v i d e d a " g o v e r n m e n t o f subject races," w h i c h managed their affairs and as such also changed t h e m " f o r the better." N o t i o n s o f the " w h i t e man's b u r d e n " or la mission avilatrice clearly captured the essence of this belief. French colonialism was m o r e attached to such goals than was British colon i a l i s m . French colonial administrations sought to change their vassal p o p u l a tions m o r e aggressively, v i e w i n g the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the superior French culture to the locals as a noble and necessary objective. But the B r i t i s h accepted cultural diversity m o r e easily and thus operated t h r o u g h local cultural institutions and beliefs, rather than seeking to simply supplant t h e m . Still, to varying degrees all colonial administrations pursued cultural change and charged t h e n p o l i c y makers and institutions w i t h the duty to realize this change. These efforts were t i e d to colonialism's claim to be d o i n g g o o d for the people, as the colonial order tied development and advancement to westernizing cultural change. The postcolonial state, often r u l e d by those w h o served i n the colonial administrations, remained true to the colonial ethos and its views o n cultural change. The postcolonial M u s l i m state has therefore m o d e l e d itself after the colonial one and thus seeks to change society according to blueprint that leads to its claim to u n l i m i t e d authority. The M u s l i m state has been r u l e d by a westernized elite that has internalized the vision o f the colonial state, w h i c h is dissociated f r o m local social institutions and values, at least i n its p u b l i c p o l i c y choices. The bluep r i n t that is propagated as the state's agenda f o r progress is thus deeply rooted i n colonialism's ideologies, f r o m the volksraod i n the D u t c h Indies to the Raj i n British India and the Bulo Matari (literally, "crusher o f stones," a t e r m used to refer to the colonial state i n Africa) i n Sub-Saharan Africa. The c o n t i n u i t y between the colonial and postcolonial eras has created a disjuncture between w h a t the states have v i e w e d as the proper course o f developm e n t and the values that M u s l i m society holds near and dear; between h o w the state envisions the society and h o w M u s l i m s v i e w themselves and their goals. Whereas the state f o l l o w e d a secular vision o f development, the society has been deeply r o o t e d i n Islam. The disjuncture between the secular nationalism o f Kemalism i n Turkey, Pahlavi rule i n Iran, or the National Liberation Front (Front de Liberation Nationale, FLN) i n Algeria and popular perceptions o f politics attests to this fact. State policies have therefore created social tensions and u l t i mately p o l i t i c a l crises. I n Iran and Algeria these tensions translated i n t o serious challenges to state a u t h o r i t y I n Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, and Indonesia they have produced significant Islamic o p p o s i t i o n to the state. The i d e o l o g y and p o l i t i c a l programs o f c o n t e m p o r a r y Islamist

movements

across the M u s l i m w o r l d have been shaped i n response to this disjuncture.

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Islamists have questioned the state's agenda and p u t f o r t h alternative visions o f sociopolitical change, w h i c h they c l a i m b o t h i n c l u d e Islam and p r o m o t e develo p m e n t , w h i l e a n c h o r i n g state policy i n society's Islamic values. This line o f a r g u m e n t is reflected i n the programs o f diverse Islamic m o v e m e n t s f r o m Malaysia's Islamic party (Partai Islam Se-Malaysia, PAS), to the Jamaat-i Isiami i n Bangladesh and Pakistan, Afghanistan's H i z b - i Isiami, Turkey's Welfare (Refah) Party, Tajikistan's Islamic Renaissance Party ( H i z b - i Nahzat Isiami), the M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d i n Sub-Saharan and N o r t h Africa and the Arab Near East, Indonesia's Muhammadiyyah movement

or its ulama m o v e m e n t

(Nahdat

al-Ulama),

Tunisia's Islamic Tendency Movement ( M o u v e m e n t de la Tendance Islamique, also k n o w n as the Renaissance or Ennahda Party, later k n o w n as H i z b al-Nahda), Morocco's Justice and Benevolence party ( a l - A d l wal-Ihsan), to Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique de Salut, FIS). The Islamic Republic o f Iran has f o l l o w e d such a policy since 1979. and the state i n Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Sudan, and even Saudi Arabia have i n c o r p o r a t e d some o f the Islamists' demands i n t o their policy making. I n this sense Islamism has emerged not as a rejection o f development but as a consequence o f the disjuncture between the state's v i s i o n o f society and h o w i t s h o u l d be developed and the society's perception o f itself and its goals. Similar tensions between state p o l i c y and national aspirations have also existed. Colonial administrators generally v i e w e d themselves as the most capable representatives o f the aspirations and hopes o f the local populations and the most efficient vehicle for the advancement and progress o f their subjects. I n fact, nationalist liberation struggles often began w i t h challenges to this claim; local elites f r o m M u h a m m a d A h Jinnah o f Pakistan, Sad Zaghlul o f Egypt, A b u a l Kalam Azad o f I n d i a , and O n n Jafar and T u n k u A b d u l - R a h m a n o f Malaysia, or activists f r o m Gamal A b d e l Nasser o f Egypt, A h m a d Ben Bella o f Algeria, and Sukarno o f Indonesia began to question w h e t h e r colonialism c o u l d possibly manifest local aspirations and i f indigenous leaders were n o t clearly better suited to do so. These nationalist figures f o r m e d parties f r o m the Istiqlal (Freedom) party i n M o r o c c o to the Neo-Destur ( C o n s t i t u t i o n ) party i n Tunisia, the W a f d (Delegation) i n Egypt, the A l l - I n d i a M u s l i m League i n I n d i a , and the U n i t e d Malays N a t i o n a l Organization ( U M N O ) i n Malaysia. Many o f these parties c o n tinued after independence, f o r m i n g the basis for politics i n the new states. Still, that the colonial administrations v i e w e d themselves as representing local interests vested colonialism w i t h a m i s s i o n — h o w e v e r d u b i o u s — o f serving the development o f the local populations. That the nationalist elite challenged this c l a i m o f c o l o n i a l i s m , and the nationalist struggle was animated by the c o m p e t i t i o n for the r i g h t to represent local aspirations, made the task o f development central to the mission o f the M u s l i m states that succeeded colonialism. The post-

EUROPEAN

C O L O N I A L I S M A N D THE EMERGENCE

colonial M u s l i m state thus became even m o r e openly tied to the goals o f develo p m e n t , w h i c h has since independence become the measure o f the state's success or failure and the most i m p o r t a n t

O F M O D E R N M U S L I M STATES

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d e t e r m i n a n t o f its legitimacy. As a result, u n d e r m i n i n g colonialism's legitimacy, f r o m Java to A l g e r i a , meant rejecting its claim to serving local interests and p r o p o s i n g a superior agenda for progress. Nationalism and development efforts were therefore j o i n e d and became the bedrock o f the struggle independence under Sukarno, Nasser, and the Algerian FLN, a m o n g others. B e y o n d a n c h o r i n g state f u n c t i o n and l e g i t i m a c y i n the goals o f development, state's

colonialism

view

of

the

affected

the

development

process and its c o n c o m i t a n t processes o f social change. C o l o n i a l i s m was disd a i n f u l o f local c u l t u r a l beliefs and practices. It v i e w e d local religions as i n f e r i o r t o C h r i s t i a n i t y — a b e l i e f that

Colonialists often looked down on local practices. Muslims

u n d e r g i r d e d its support o f m i s s i o n a r y

were seen as prone to violence, and Muslim doctrines such

activities—and archaic

and

local

harmful

customs to

as

progress.

A l t h o u g h c o l o n i a l administrations t o l erated many local beliefs and practices

as jihad were used as evidence of Islam's hostility to progress.This French magazine cover from 1906 illustrated the French view of an Algerian urging his followers to wage holy war against the oppressors.

and d i d not always seek to change t h e m , there was never any d o u b t that they were not h e l d i n h i g h esteem. Whereas the earliest officers o f the B r i t i s h East I n d i a C o m p a n y adopted I n d i a n ways i n Bengal, w i t h the c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f B r i t i s h r u l e over I n d i a all s u c h practices w e r e eventually a b a n d o n e d , and instead the local recruits i n t o the bureaucracy were made to adopt B r i t i s h ways, at least i n the p u b l i c sphere. At the height o f the e m p i r e figures such as Thomas Babington Macaulay i n I n d i a or Evelyn Baring C r o m e r i n E g y p t — k n o w n f o r t h e i r p a t r o n i z i n g attitudes t o w a r d the local cultures—set the tone for evaluati n g and characterizing local customs and mores. Macaulay once said of the c u l tural w o r t h o f the East, " [ A ] single shelf o f European books [ i s ] w o r t h the w h o l e literature o f India and A r a b i a " ; and C r o m e r o p i n e d , " T h e European is a

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close reasoner . . . he is a natural l o g i c i a n . . . . The m i n d o f the o r i e n t a l [ A r a b ] , Some European colonialists

o n the other h a n d , like his picturesque streets, is e m i n e n t l y w a n t i n g i n s y m -

were interested in local cul-

metry. His reasoning is o f the m o s t slipshod d e s c r i p t i o n . . . [ t h e y ] are s i n g u -

ture. Major Gayer-Anderson,

larly deficient i n the logical faculty."

an Englishman who lived in Cairo from 1935 to 1942, for

Islam received p a r t i c u l a r l y harsh c r i t i c i s m f r o m c o l o n i a l rulers. M u s l i m s

example, joined together

resisted c o l o n i a l i s m i n Africa and South and Southeast Asia. For this they were

two medieval houses that he

seen as p r o n e to violence and less likely to be c o n t r o l l e d , changed, or converted.

restored and furnished in

Islam was therefore viewed as a challenge to b o t h c o l o n i a l c o n t r o l and efforts

traditional style. Known as

t o t r a n s f o r m the local population's life and t h o u g h t . Such Islamic doctrines as

the Bayt al-Kritliya, the house is now maintained as the Gayer-Anderson

j i h a d , polygamy, strict obedience to religious law (shoricih), and the tendency t o i n t r o d u c e Islamic values t o p u b l i c l i f e were seen as evidence o f Islam's hostility

Museum by the Islamic sec-

to progress. These criticisms shaped colonial attitudes f r o m M o r o c c o to Malaya;

tion of the Egyptian

they also shaped the broader intellectual and academic interest i n Islam t h r o u g h

Antiquities Organization.

the w o r k s o f early scholars o f Islam w h o were t i e d to c o l o n i a l administrations,

E U R O P E A N C O L O N I A L I S M A N D T H E E M F R G E N C E O F M O D E R N M U S L I M STATES

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such as W. W. H u n t e r i n India or Snouck H u r g r o n j e i n the D u t c h Indies. I n t i m e , their scholarship w o u l d become entrenched i n Western attitudes t o w a r d Islam and i n t u r n w o u l d c o n d i t i o n M u s l i m attitudes t o w a r d the West and therefore w hat the West has i n store f o r Islam. The impact o f all this was to instill a sense o f i n f e r i o r i t y a m o n g many local elites and rising bureaucrats. Even those w h o rejected colonialism were deeply influenced by the persistent denigration o f their cultural, religious, and social values. A l t h o u g h reactions varied f r o m a c c o m m o d a t i o n to rejection o f the colonial culture, all reactions showed the mark o f colonialism's successful assertion o f its c l a i m to civilizational superiority. I n India, for instance, Sayyid A h m a d Khan's r e f o r m m o v e m e n t — w h i c h w o u l d produce many o f M u s l i m South Asia's f u t u r e leaders—sought to u p l i f t the M u s l i m s by accepting many precepts o f Western t h o u g h t and social values. O t h e r movements o f revival and r e f o r m showed to varying degrees, explicitly as w e l l as implicitly, the impact o f grappling w i t h colonialism's assertion o f its cultural s u p e r i o r i t y . Most expressions

of

Islamic t h o u g h t i n the postcolonial p e r i o d , f r o m Islamic m o d e r n i s m to Islamism, thus i n some f o r m were (and still are) concerned w i t h addressing w h a t is seen as the p r o b l e m o f Western cultural superiority. Various proponents o f Islamic m o d e r n i s m — f r o m its earliest exponents o f Egypt's M u h a m m a d A b d u h to the Young O t t o m a n s i n Turkey, the Jadidis i n Central Asia, the Aligarh movement i n India, to its m o r e recent advocates, the M u h a m m a d i y y a h movement i n Indonesia, Malaysia's Sisters-in-Islam, Pakistan's T u l u - i Islam ( D a w n o f Islam), Iran's A l i Shariati or A b d u l - K a r i m Surush, Egypt's Hasan Hanafi, Algeria's M u h a m m a d A r k o u n , Pakistan's Fazlur Rahman, Syria's M u h a m m a d Shahrur, Malaysia's Kassim A h m a d , or India's Asghar A l i E n g i n e e r — have all sought to grapple w i t h the p r o b l e m o f Islam's decline o n the one h a n d and Islam's a c c o m m o d a t i o n i n m o d e r n society o n the other h a n d . The t w o issues are interconnected, and for the modernists these issues involve interpreti n g Islam i n terms o f d o m i n a n t Western values. Islamists f r o m Mawlana Sayyid A b u l Ala M a w d u d i to Sayyid Q u t b ( 1906-66) to the Ayatollah K h o m e i n i ( 1902-88) have also been animated by the same c o n cerns. U n l i k e the modernists, the Islamists have not sought to interpret Islam i n terms o f d o m i n a n t Western values—at least n o t explicitly. Rather, they have sought to assert Islam's d o m i n a d o n , to interpret m o d e r n i t y according to Islamic values. Discussions o f the Islamic state, Islamic economics, or the Islamization o f k n o w l e d g e all have this goal i n m i n d . Both the m o d e r n i s t and Islamist interpretations as intellectual endeavors have failed. Islamism, however, has proved p o l i t ically potent, whereas m o d e r n i s m has failed o n that account as w e l l . I n the political arena those w h o i n h e r i t e d the colonial state were even more directly influenced by colonialism's ideological vision. The bureaucratic, military.

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and p o l i t i c a l elite w h o constituted the r u l i n g order i n M u s l i m states at the e n d o f the colonial era were often educated i n colonial educational i n s t i t u t i o n s , w o r k e d for the c o l o n i a l order, and were deeply influenced by the i d e o l o g y and vision o f the colonial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Consequently, this elite core believed that the task o f development, to w h i c h it was utterly c o m m i t t e d , was o n l y possible i f those aspects o f the local culture that were deemed to be regressive were d i s carded and replaced w i t h progressive Western ones. Thus, n e w states—and i n t e r estingly also Iran and Turkey, w h i c h were n o t direct colonies but subject to similar ideological pressures—initiated changes i n script, dress, and customs and sought to secularize society and culture and to adopt Western mores, laws, a n d practices. They targeted Islam, its values, institutions, and role i n public life, blaming i t for the ills o f society and p r o m i s i n g that secularization w o u l d pave the way for m o d e r n i z a t i o n . I n these efforts they were supported by those segments o f the p o p u l a t i o n that had already been affected by colonialism and had to varying degrees adopted Western ways, as well as by those w h o accepted the state's p r o m i s e — f o r the t i m e being at least—that secularization and westernizing c u l tural change w i l l b r i n g about development. As a result, secularization and westernization became embedded i n the developmental ethos o f the n e w states. The postcolonial M u s l i m state therefore emerged i n the m o l d o f the c o l o n i a l o n e — d e v e l o p m e n t - o r i e n t e d i n a i m , hostile to Islam, and m o d e r n i z i n g and weste r n i z i n g i n practice. The ideology that g u i d e d the e v o l u t i o n o f the postcolonial state, however, was n o t u n i f o r m across the M u s l i m w o r l d . Some M u s l i m states remained allied w i t h the west and f o l l o w e d capitalist economic policies; others gravitated t o w a r d the Soviet U n i o n and the N o n - A l i g n e d Movement and adopted socialist practices. A l t h o u g h these ideological positions produced different h i s i< irit al experiences and levels o f industrialization and political change, the developmental goal and westernizing direction o f state f o r m a t i o n was largely the same across the M u s l i m w o r l d . I n short, a l t h o u g h i n foreign and economic p o l i c y m a k i n g , states may have been distinguished according to their c o m m i t m e n t s to capitalism or socialism, t o the West or the Soviet bloc, i n domestic politics the fundamental issue was the same: secular development at the cost o f Islamic identity o f society.

Patterns of Development M u s l i m states are also distinguished by the pace w i t h w h i c h they pursued develo p m e n t . Some arrived at their independence m o r e developed than others. For example, Turkey was more advanced economically and politically than the Arab territories o f the O t t o m a n Empire. Some Arab states, such as Egypt and Syria, were m o r e developed than others, such as Yemen or O m a n . Some M u s l i m states

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C O L O N I A L I S M A N D T H E EMERGENCE

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developed m o r e quickly, because o f greater international aid, natural resources, or their size and the possibilities o f trade. After the o i l price hike i n the 1970s, the Arab monarchies thus outpaced the Levant states (Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon) and Egypt i n development. But, Iran and Egypt were better able t o use international aid and assistance i n their development programs i n the 1960s a n d the 1980s, respectively. Larger states were better able t o m o b i l i z e resources to push ahead w i t h development. Smaller states proved m o r e versatile i n r e s p o n d i n g t o changes i n the international economic trends, however. Whereas Indonesia i n i tially advanced faster i n industrialization than Malaysia, since 1980 Malaysia has outpaced Indonesia i n that regard. The centrality o f the western m o d e l t o the e v o l u t i o n o f the M u s l i m states has been i m p o r t a n t t o their poUtics. Given the legacy o f the struggle against colon i a l i s m , any development m o d e l that looked t o the west and p u r p o r t e d t o westernize ran the risk o f m o b i l i z i n g political o p p o s i t i o n and cultural resistance. Such reactions tended t o escalate w h e n and i f the promises o f development failed t o materialize, as i n Nasser's Egypt, o r were deemed as t o o costly i n terms o f c u l tural sacrifices, as was the case i n Pahlavi Iran. I n the 1960s and the 1970s resistance t o , and the c r i t i q u e of, state-led development strategies d r e w o n secular ideologies that were themselves o f western o r i g i n . Socialist M u s l i m states thus had liberal oppositions; m o r e notably, capitalist states had vociferous leftist o p p o sitions. I n these cases the o p p o s i t i o n objected t o close alliances between the r u l i n g elites and the west but d i d n o t oppose the development agenda itself Rather, they favored p u r s u i n g development based o n another western ideology. Since the late 1970s, a different f o r m o f critique o f state-led development has surfaced i n the M u s l i m w o r l d . Islamist movements n o w question some o f the foundational principles o f the postcolonial state, most notably that development is predicated o n secularization and begins w i t h accepting the qualitative superio r i t y o f western civilization values; thus, development must necessarily entail replacing some Islamic values i n favor o f western ones. I n the Arab w o r l d Islamists have rejected the arguments o f Arab nationalists regarding the "backwardness" o f Islam and the s u p e r i o r i t y o f socialism, just as i n Iran and Turkey Islamists have refuted similar arguments presented by Kemalism and the Pahlavi state's nationalist rhetoric. Interestingly, secular M u s l i m states such as Malaysia and Indonesia also subscribe t o a similar line o f reasoning. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir M u h a m m a d has been at the forefront o f the m o v e m e n t t o defend Asia's r i g h t t o live by its o w n values, rejecting the universality o f western social, legal, and h u m a n rights values. The Islamist o p p o s i t i o n has also challenged the w i s d o m o f the state's i n d u s trialization policy. I n Algeria, Nasser's Egypt, and Syria, inefficiencies caused by socialism and centralized economic p l a n n i n g produced poverty, u n e m p l o y m e n t ,

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a b r e a k d o w n i n social services, u r b a n i z a t i o n , and a decline i n standards o f l i v ing. I n Pahlavi Iran, post-Nasser Egypt, Indonesia, and Malaysia, capitalist econ o m i c development produced i n c o m e disparties, c o r r u p t i o n , u r b a n i z a t i o n , and rapid cultural change. Islamism has not specifically rejected development, b u t as Islamism challenged the ideological u n d e r p i n n i n g s o f developmentalism and adopted the cause o f the p o o r and the d i s g r u n t l e d , i t became a p o i g n a n t c r i t i q u e o f development strategies. I n Malaysia, Islamist forces d i d not initially discuss state economic strategies directly, but they criticized the state f o r n o t f a v o r i n g Malays. I n Iran, the Islamist revolutionaries criticized economic development f o r its westernization and the i n c o m e disparities i t generated, and they proposed greater state control of the economy. In Algeria and Turkey, conversely, the FIS and the Refah party favored open economies and less government c o n t r o l . The FIS actually became a force i n the b u r g e o n i n g private markets that p r o v i d e d c o n sumer goods to the p o p u l a t i o n and as such became a critique o f the state's heavy industrialization strategies that had denied the p o p u l a t i o n those basic goods a n d instead produced c o r r u p t i o n and p r o m o t e d socialism. The Refah party m e a n w h i l e was strongly tied to small merchants and the business c o m m u n i t y . I n all these cases Islamism has for the most part criticized the ideological u n d e r p i n nings o f development. It has proposed its o w n development strategies as alternatives to those i m p l e m e n t e d by the state. As such, those Islamists w h o c o n f r o n t socialist and state-controlled economies favor greater market reforms, whereas those Islamists w h o are i n o p p o s i t i o n to capitalist development favor greater state c o n t r o l o f the economy. Still, i t is by challenging the ideological legitimacy o f the development process i n the secular state that Islamism poses the most f u n damental challenge to state development strategies. The Islamist o p p o s i t i o n also challenges the validity o f the state's attempts to c o n t r o l the role o f Islam i n the p u b l i c arena. Since their independence, manyM u s l i m states have sought to regulate Islam i n public life. I n Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran, for instance, the state t o o k over the management o f religious e n d o w m e n t s . I n Turkey the state also took over the schools that train preachers and Islamic scholars. I n Malaysia and Egypt preaching i n mosques n o w requires a license, a n d i n Malaysia the state has gone to great lengths to establish a n a t i o n w i d e n e t w o r k o f mosques that are r u n by state-appointed prayer leaders. F r o m Algeria t o Indonesia, Islamic law was replaced by c i v i l codes i m p o r t e d f r o m the west, and Islamic courts were disbanded. I n some states, such as M o r o c c o , Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Malaysia, the state has shied away f r o m an o u t r i g h t secular image and has couched its policies i n Islamic language and s y m b o l i s m , g o i n g so far as to speak for Islam. Still, the intent o f state policy clearly has been i n the direct i o n o f secularizing change, and the c o n t r o l and marginalization o f Islamic i n s t i t u t i o n s , thus l i m i t i n g the role o f Islam i n public life.

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Islamism has p u t f o r w a r d a political p l a t f o r m that is n o t h i n g short o f a reject i o n o f b o t h the reality and the intent o f the secular state's penetration o f s o c i e t y — the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the c o l o n i a l establishment's programs o f c o n t r o l and transformation o f society to serve coloniahsm's a i m o f i m p r o v i n g the lot of the local peoples. I n this regard, Islamism has served as an i m p o r t a n t source o f resistance to the expansion o f state p o w e r and as the focal p o i n t for the rallying o f those social forces that resist state d o m i n a t i o n . This f u n c t i o n began i n Turkey, Iran, and Egypt i n the early part o f the t w e n t i e t h century. Since the 19COS i t has gained m o m e n t u m , as ulama and Islamist groups across the M u s l i m w o r l d have been at the forefront o f o p p o s i t i o n to land r e f o r m and nationalization o f industries, and o f course to state d o m i n a t i o n o f education, commerce, charities, and religious endowments. The scope o f Islamist resistance to state power is so broad that it undermines the entire raison d'être o f the postcolonial M u s l i m state, as it denies the state the r i g h t to change society and to do so based o n the same presuppositions that guided the colonial state. The legacy o f the colonial state has been so deeply entrenched i n the postcolonial M u s l i m state that Islamism itself has not been able to avoid the tempta-

A f e w c o l o n i a l i s t s w e r e s m i t t e n b y t h e l o c a l c u l t u r e , s u c h as H a r r y St. J o h n P h i l b y , b e r e d as a n e a r l y W e s t e r n e x p l o r e r o f A r a b i a . I n 1925 cal officer, s e t t l e d i n J i d d a , a n d c o n v e r t e d

1930s

remem-

P h i l b y g a v e u p h i s p o s t as B r i t i s h

to Islam, t a k i n g the n a m e A b d a l l a h . By the

politi-

early

he had become a confidant o f the Saudi Arabian k i n g A b d al-Aziz and was a l l o w e d to

t r a v e r s e a n d p h o t o g r a p h p r e v i o u s l y u n k n o w n a r e a s o f t h e r e g i o n , r e c o r d i n g s u c h s i t e s as palace o f Sultan A l i .

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[ i o n o f c h a m p i o n i n g developmentalism. A l t h o u g h Islamism rejects the cultural assumptions o f c o l o n i a l i s m and the secular state's r i g h t to transform social relations, i t accepts the ideal o f social advancement, albeit according to Islamicn o r m s and w i t h o u t westernization. I n so d o i n g , Islamism portends to float an alternative p a r a d i g m for development, w h a t Malaysia's PAS calls " d e v e l o p i n g w i t h the u m m a h . " Islamism also, therefore, seeks to m o l d the i n d i v i d u a l and to regulate his o r her music, dress, private beliefs, and cultural o u t l o o k — a l l as a prelude to its v i s i o n o f d e v e l o p m e n t — a n d to change the d i s t r i b u t i o n

of

resources i n society. One can therefore conclude that Islamism t o o is concerned w i t h development and predicates the process o n t o p - d o w n social e n g i n e e r i n g — the hallmark o f the colonial state and its successor. Islamism's o p p o s i t i o n to state power, therefore, emanates f r o m the ability o f the secular state t o use i t to f u r ther its secularist agenda. I n effect, resisting state a u t h o r i t y is tied to Islamism's rejection o f state-sponsored secularization. I n fact, i n Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan, once Islamist forces were i n a p o s i t i o n to c o n t r o l p o l i c y m a k i n g , they c o n t i n u e d w i t h the expansion o f the state's p o w e r and reach and extended the c o n t r o l o f the state over private life, r e l i g i o n , and education. I n essence, the p u b l i c debate i n the M u s l i m w o r l d — b e t w e e n secular a n d Islamist forces-—has focused o n i d e o l o g y alone and has largely i g n o r e d the p r o b l e m o f the g r o w i n g size o f the state, w h i c h was a legacy o f c o l o n i a l i s m , and the reach o f its p u b l i c policies, w h i c h is e m b e d d e d i n the p r o g r a m s o f b o t h the state a n d its Islamist o p p o s i t i o n . M u s l i m societies—as have m a n y other d e v e l o p i n g societies—have become stuck w i t h the n o t i o n o f a large a n d i n t r u s i v e state, a n d the ideal o f d e f i n i n g M u s l i m s has become central to all p o l i t i c a l discourse. The b o n e o f c o n t e n t i o n is n o t the state's r i g h t t o manage d e v e l o p m e n t b u t the goal a n d content o f its policies. I n short, whereas the i d e o l o g i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n — t h e degree t o w h i c h society is secularized o r Islamic i d e n t i t y is accepted as a part o f n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y — - a n d p o l i c y content o f develo p m e n t a l i s m have been debated and f o u g h t over i n the M u s l i m state, the m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l legacies o f c o l o n i a l i s m have r e m a i n e d intact. A l l conceptions o f the M u s l i m s t a t e — f r o m capitalist to socialist to I s l a m i s t — v i e w the p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n o f the state t o be t o p - d o w n social t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , w i t h the a i m o f realizing d e v e l o p m e n t . The Islamist c o n c e p t i o n however, has entailed a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f this grand v i s i o n o f the state's role and f u n c t i o n i n that i t n o l o n g e r accepts that the West is the sole r e p o s i t o r y o f the values that s h o u l d g u i d e the state i n t r a n s f o r m i n g society i n its greater w i s d o m . The Malaysian Islamic y o u t h m o v e m e n t , A B I M ( A n g k a t a n Belia Islam Malaysia, the Islamic Y o u t h Force o f Malaysia), f o r instance,

d i r e c t e d its energies at i n f o r m i n g

the

Malaysian development agenda o f Islamic values, and m a n y o f its m e m b e r s pursued this goal by e n t e r i n g i n t o g o v e r n m e n t service.

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I

The Economic Legacy of Colonialism M u s l i m countries, m u c h like other T h i r d W o r l d countries, initially v i e w e d develo p m e n t , especially i n the economic sphere, to be a matter o f setting i n m o t i o n a set o f processes that w o u l d

culiTLinate

i n industrialization, g r o w t h , a n d w e a l t h .

They were supported i n this v i e w by Western theorists w h o characterized econ o m i c development as a matter o f reaching the " t a k e - o f f " p o i n t , as Europe had f o l l o w i n g the Marshall Plan i n the

t9COS.

M a n y M u s l i m states sought to shortcut

the process by assigning t o the state a greater role i n m a n a g i n g the economy. I n this they were influenced by the examples o f the Soviet U n i o n under Stalin and such T h i r d W o r l d leaders as Jawaharlal N e h r u o f India. This vision o f development closely paralleled prevalent conceptions o f political development that saw successful sociopolitical change to be a matter o f completing a set o f processes, identified to have been key i n the European experience. It also sat w e l l w i t h the predilections o f die new states, w h i c h as successors to the colonial state viewed progress as a t o p - d o w n and state-managed process. A l t h o u g h scholars debated over the n u m b e r and sequence o f die stages involved, they were i n agreement that the ideas d r a w n f r o m the European example were readily applicable to the developing w o r l d and that development was a linear cause-effect process. W h e d i e r in the political arena or i n the economic one, however, developing states, including M u s l i m states, defied die logic o f modernization theory. States were able to b r i n g about social change and economic g r o w t h but d i d n o t replicate western models o f the state and the economy. Rather, h y b r i d polities and economies emerged, reveali n g uneven development across sectors, classes, regions, and areas o f the polity. Disappointments were often blamed o n state leaders and their p o l i c y choices. The elusive nature o f development eventually led many to argue that perhaps the developing state c o u l d n o t reproduce the European experience because the T h i r d W o r l d society and e c o n o m y was n o t the same as the p r e m o d e r n European one. M o d e r n i z a t i o n theory n o w argued that the T h i r d W o r l d state was hampered i n its desire for development by cultural and social obstacles. Religious beliefs, social mores, customs, a n d the fractured society o f the T h i r d Worlders were held accountable f o r h o l d i n g back the state—suggesting that Christianity and weste r n values accounted for the historical achievements o f the west. This " d u a l c u l tures" thesis was a reiteration o f the g u i d i n g belief o f the colonial state, w h i c h had also v i e w e d the u p l i f t i n g o f the colonized to be a matter o f the passing o f their cultures and religions and their replacement w i t h a western value s y s t e m — a task that was possible o n l y i f the c o l o n i a l state saw to i t — w h i c h i n t u r n , at a f u n d a m e n t a l and " m o r a l " level, justified colonialism. Islam was, and continues to be, a favorite target o f the advocates o f this thesis. F r o m the first versions o f the " d u a l cultures" thesis to its recent incarnation

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i n the "clash o f c i v i l i z a t i o n s " argument, this approach has p o i n t e d to various aspects o f I s l a m — f r o m its theology to its law, its rituals, and its \iews o f the economy, societal relations, w o m e n , and m i n o r i t i e s — a s responsible for lackluster development i n M u s l i m countries. M a n y M u s l i m leaders b o u g h t i n t o this m y t h , w h i c h reinforced the legacy o f c o l o n i a l i s m that had already shaped state attitudes toward M u s l i m society and the Islamic faith. F r o m Sukarno o f Indonesia to Ayub Khan o f Pakistan, the Shah o f Iran, Bathist leaders i n Syria and Iraq, to Suharto o f Indonesia and H a b i b Bourgiba o f Tunisia, state leaders sought to m a r ginalize Islam and to p r o m o t e secular conceptions o f society and politics. I n the 1960s the anomalies i n the T h i r d W o r l d experience w i t h development w e r e explained i n a d i f f e r e n t manner. T h i r d W o r l d intellectuals and leftist thinkers i n the West posed a " d u a l economies" thesis i n place o f the " d u a l c u l tures" one, g i v i n g shape to w h a t came to be k n o w n as the dependency theory. It was argued that T h i r d W o r l d societies were not the same as p r e m o d e r n European ones because the latter had simply been undeveloped, whereas the T h i r d W o r l d societies had been m a n g l e d and d e f o r m e d . C o l o n i a l i s m had damaged T h i r d W o r l d economies

by d i s t u r b i n g the balance between

economic

sectors.

C o l o n i a l i s m had been premised o n u s i n g the colonial territories as a source o f cheap raw materials and a market for European products. It had therefore encouraged the development o f raw materials and discouraged industrial developments. The economies o f colonial territories had become unnaturally dependent o n raw materials and had not developed i n d u s t r i a l sectors. I n fact, c o l o n i a l i s m had systematically eliminated the traditional artisan classes that i n Europe had evolved i n t o the industrial sector. As Egypt grew m o r e and more c o t t o n , or Java and Africa agricultural c o m m o d i t i e s , for example, the export crops and raw materials d o m inated their economies. The dual dependency o n European markets for the raw materials and the European industries f o r final products led to absolute dependency, w h i c h enriched the West and i m p o v e r i s h e d the developing w o r l d . T h i r d W o r l d economies typically had overdeveloped raw materials export sectors and underdeveloped indigenous manufacturing. U p o n independence, M u s l i m economies displayed these characteristics

of

dependency. C o t t o n d o m i n a t e d i n Egypt, c o t t o n and jute i n Pakistan, coffee and spices i n East Africa and Java, c o t t o n and sdk i n Syria, o d i n the Persian Gulf, and r u b b e r i n Malaysia. Economies o f the M u s l i m states had become tied to the f l u c tuations o f the w o r l d economy, i n w h i c h they produced the lowest value-added products and consumed finished goods. T h e i r products were subject to greater p r i c e f l u c t u a t i o n and e m p l o y e d m i n i m a l t e c h n o l o g y ; w h a t they c o n s u m e d employed far m o r e technology and had m o r e stable prices. The pattern o f i n t e g r a t i o n o f these economies i n t o the global economic order also influenced the development o f infrastructure, urban development, and the like. Ports became

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d o m i n a n t i n colonial territories. I n the M u s l i m w o r l d such cities as Karachi and Beirut emerged, sometimes i n places w h e r e n o m a j o r p o p u l a t i o n center had existed before, and soon overshadowed the older cities o f the interior. F r o m Zanzibar i n East Africa t o Malacca and Penang i n Malaysia, ports became the centers o f wealth and power i n the colonies. Lines o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , roads, railways, and p o p u l a t i o n movements f o l l o w e d the directions i n w h i c h raw materials and finished goods f l o w e d . I n many cases the overdevelopment o f the export sector l e d t o the emergence o f "enclave" economies that were largely divorced f r o m the local economy. The o d sector i n the Persian Gulf, f o r example, clearly had such a characteristic. To some extent, patterns o f economic change led to large-scale m i g r a t i o n t o m e t r o p o l i t a n centers as traditional patterns o f f a r m i n g and the balance between urban and rural economies were altered. Colonial agricultural policy led t o r u r a l poverty, w h i c h i n Java, Egypt, and Algeria broke d o w n r u r a l economies and led to f l i g h t t o urban centers. Later economic policies o f such M u s l i m states as Iran and Egypt w o u l d o n l y encourage this tendency. I n some instances u r b a n develo p m e n t occurred i n the interior. Lyallpur (later Faisalabad) i n Pakistan o r Kuala L u m p u r were n o t ports, but they developed because o f the n e w economic relations that were spawned by colonialism. For the T h i r d W o r l d , development was therefore n o t a matter o f s i m p l y setting i n m o t i o n a set o f cause-effect economic processes u n t i l " t a k e - o f f " w o u l d be reached but o f r e m e d y i n g the destructive effects o f the relationship o f dependency Development w o u l d have t o b e g i n b y u n d o i n g the impact o f colonialism. I n many M u s l i m states, such as Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, and Algeria, the state saw its role i n the economy i n exactly such terms, as one o f correcting the i m b a l ances that were p r o d u c e d by colonialism. State-led industrialization thus became a means o f b r i n g i n g about patterns o f economic change that the society and the e c o n o m y were incapable o f achieving o n their o w n . I n Pahlavi Iran and Pakistan the state saw its role as merely corrective; i n socialist states, such as Sukarno's Indonesia, Nasser's Egypt, o r the FLN's Algeria, the state saw its role as m o r e f u n damental. Development thus f o u n d an additional justification as the state became the i n s t r u m e n t f o r correcting biases i n the e c o n o m y — e x p e d i t i n g development but also m a k i n g sure that development w i l l happen. Remedying the ills o f colon i a l i s m became a justification f o r states t o veer society away f r o m Islam by d i v e r t i n g attentions away f r o m questions o f faith and i d e n t i t y t o ones about i m p e r i a l i s m and its consequences. W h e r e state control o f economy progressed unchecked, i t stifled market forces to the l o n g - r u n d e t r i m e n t o f the economy. It achieved i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and weaned the economy away f r o m its dependency o n the export o f agricultural products o r raw materials, but i t d i d n o t produce viable and self-sustaining

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Under the impact of colonialism and with the discovery of oil, small fishing villages, such as Kuwait City, were transformed into major centers of wealth and power. Often dependent on such exports as oil, these ports exemplified the enclave economy that was largely divorced from local concerns.

industrialization. I n many cases, as i n Egypt under president A n w a r Sadat, Iran u n d e r Ayatollah A l i Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Indonesia u n d e r Suharto, o r Tunisia under Ben A l i , the state n o w relaxed its c o n t r o l o f the economy. Suharto and Ben Ali's r e f o r m s were m o r e far-reaching, i n v o l v i n g p r i v a t i z a t i o n a n d r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f the economy, and have thus proved m o r e m e a n i n g f u l t h a n Sadat's infitoh or Rafsanjani's liberalization initiative. The belief that c o l o n i a l i s m had thus produced fundamental imbalances i n local economies added f u r t h e r w e i g h t to the state's v i e w that i t had the d u t y to oversee development. Whereas initially its f u n c t i o n was to hasten development, n o w its p r i n c i p a l role was to first correct the problems caused by c o l o n i a l i s m — a n d later by i m p e r i a l i s m — a n d t h e n to see t o r a p i d development. W h e r e state leaders accepted the logic o f dependency theory, the role o f the state i n the society a n d e c o n o m y thus expanded and f o u n d f u r t h e r justification. Beyond the general ways i n w h i c h c o l o n i a l i s m accounts for w h a t M u s l i m states have come to view economic development to be, and the reasons develo p m e n t has proved to be an elusive goal, the colonial experience t h r o u g h its everyday policies and practices gave shape to the economies i n w h i c h i t operated. Land-tenure policies i n Java d u r i n g the D u t c h p e r i o d and i n Syria and Algeria, the settlement o f tribal lands and the conversion o f forests i n t o arable land i n Punjab, patterns o f capital investment, choice o f c r o p , and the like were i n s t r u mental i n shaping local economies. Whereas dependency theory underscored

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those legacies o f colonialism that all developing and M u s l i m economies share, these m o r e parochial differences i n colonial policies and practices explain w h y Algeria was different f r o m M o r o c c o and w h y b o t h were different f r o m Syria. I n Algeria, for instance, a large p o r t i o n o f the l a n d — t h e best and the most p r o d u c t i v e — w a s o w n e d by the European settlers. I n Syria the l a n d r e m a i n e d i n the hands o f local landowners. I n Algeria, u n l i k e Syria, the French settlers' (colons) presence and a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f land broke d o w n r u r a l relations and created a strong racist-imperialist order that then decided the pattern o f resistance politics. French p o l i c y also led to wide-scale pauperization o f the Algerian society w h e n i t became independent. A t independence, Algeria had the lowest n u m b e r o f professionals—administrators, doctors, engineers, and the l i k e — o f any other Arab colony or mandate. Most Algerian social and e c o n o m i c relations had been dismantled by the French r u l e i n the nineteenth century. Whatever n e w structures replaced t h e m were then weakened d u r i n g the w a r o f independence. The flight o f the settlers d u r i n g and after the w a r o f independence w e n t hand i n hand w i t h w a n t o n destruction and flight

o f capital. Thus, French impact o n the n e w state was p r o f o u n d , a l t h o u g h

n o t only i n continuities between the colonial and postcolonial states b u t also i n the abrupt break w i t h the past. The local social structure was i m p o r t a n t i n these different outcomes but so was

A goal of colonialism was to

the t i m i n g o f the colonial settlements. Syria was controlled by France, n o t as a

extract material wealth from

colony but as a mandate—a temporary arrangement under the supervision o f the League o f Nations to see to Syria's eventual independence. This, c o m b i n e d w i t h the fact that the French arrived i n Syria after W o r l d War I w h e n colonialism's hey-

the local economy. I n Java and Sumatra the agricultural system set up by the Dutch was designed to transform

day had passed, meant that there was very little enthusiasm i n France f o r l o n g -

these areas into large-scale

t e r m investment i n Syria. The meager capital o u t f l o w f r o m France to Syria

producers of spices and

therefore to a g o o d degree accounts for differences i n the shape o f agrarian relations and land o w n e r s h i p i n Algeria and Syria under the same colonial power. I n some instances colonialism benefited t h r o u g h direct extraction o f material

exotic agricultural goods. On this coffee estate in Sumatra around 1 9 0 0 , for example, female pickers labor on lad-

w e a l t h f r o m the economy, w h i l e i n other cases i t helped t r a n s f o r m the economy

ders with European overseers

and earned its profits t h r o u g h taxation o f the higher o u t p u t and income. I n the

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first case, o f t e n witnessed i n Java or Africa, colonialism c o u l d i m p o v e r i s h , d a m age, and disturb the local economy and culture, whereas i n the second case colon i a l i s m c o u l d produce tangible developments. I n Java the agricultural system set u p by D u t c h c o l o n i a l administrator van den Bosch a i m e d t o convert Java i n t o a large-scale producer o f spices and exodc agricultural e x p o r t c o m m o d i t i e s . Large tracts o f land and u p w a r d o f 56 percent o f the p o p u l a t i o n were p u t to the service o f the Dutch agricultural interest. Production o f f o o d s t u f f declined, and spices and coffee replaced t h e m . A peasantry emerged that lacked e c o n o m i c a u t o n o m y and the ability t o sustain itself. Dependent o n the D u t c h for e m p l o y m e n t , this peasantry became increasingly squeezed by the local elite that c o n trolled it and by the vagaries o f the global economy. It thus became exceedingly weak and poor. I n Africa, French colonialism extracted surplus, whereas i n the Levant i t sought to accrue w e a l t h by e n r i c h i n g local agriculture. The British Empire, w h i c h was at its core mercantile, d i d not rely o n European settlers but benefited f r o m customs and taxes. In many instances colonialism also invested i n infrastructure that later became central to economic progress. I n India, Malaya, and Egypt the British b u i l t roads, railways, and ports; i n Punjab they also b u i l t canals, an infrastructure for a g r i cultural development, and even some degree o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g activity. Many roads across the M u s l i m w o r l d were b u i l t by the colonial powers. I n some c o u n tries, such as I n d i a , the taxation system was i n t r o d u c e d , institutionalized, and given its place i n the m o d e r n economy by the colonial establishment. I n those developments that infrastructure has made possible, or otherwise i n h i b i t e d , colonialism has influenced economic change i n M u s l i m states.

The Social Impact of Colonialism Colonialism had a p r o f o u n d impact o n b o t h the social stratification and the cohesion o f M u s l i m societies. The e c o n o m i c impact o f colonialism p r o d u c e d n e w classes and altered the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o w e r a m o n g the existing ones. For instance, i n N o r t h A f r i c a French settlers emerged as a d o m i n a n t social and econ o m i c class. I n India the British created and maintained a feudal class t h r o u g h w h i c h the colonial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o u l d c o n t r o l the r u r a l masses, and i n the D u t c h Indies the colonial agricultural policy reinforced the social p o s i t i o n o f the local elite. I n urban areas mercantile and commercial interests tied to the colonial trade policies gained i n stature, as d i d the emerging bureaucracy that was trained by and w o r k e d for the colonial administration. The rise o f these n e w social groups c o i n c i d e d w i t h the relative decline o f artisans, small-scale agricultural producers, and i n some cases the traditional elite. The p o l i t i c a l consequences o f this process were m o m e n t o u s . I n I n d i a , for instance, the decline o f

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the o l d elite tied to the M u g h a l c o u r t was i m p o r t a n t i n the Great M u t i n y o f

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and i n the tensions between M u s l i m s and the British Raj i n the f o l l o w i n g cent u r y o f colonial r u l e . The rise o f mercantile classes and an e m b r y o n i c m i d d l e class i n the f o r m o f educated functionaries i n the colonial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n also changed the structure o f local politics. Emphasis gradually shifted f r o m the t i m e - h o n o r e d patterns o f exertion o f a u t h o r i t y to the politics o f nationalism and the struggles o f liberat i o n , w h i c h ultimately ended colonialism. The n e w nationalist elite were often tied to and emerged f r o m the colonial order's educational, bureaucratic,

and

social institutions; f r o m the m e t r o p o l i t a n centers rather than the h i n t e r l a n d .

The buildings of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Ranking Corporation dominated the crowded waterfront of Singapore, the most important city in the Riau Archipelago, traditional home to the Malay people. Completed in 1892, the bank offices stood until 1919, when they were demolished

Their points o f reference and their ideas came f r o m the colonial culture and d i d

to make way for new

not p u r p o r t to assert traditional notions o f authority.

premises.

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Such social developments as the entrenchment o f feudalism, where and w h e n it occurred, proved t o have a l o n g - t e r m effect o n social development i n M u s l i m societies. The political f u n c t i o n that landowners p e r f o r m e d i n n o r t h e r n India allowed them to develop strong class interests and tied their economic roles to political ones. Their power and position therefore remained unaffected i n the postcolonial state, i n Pakistan, where feudalism remains a pillar o f the political system, a legacy o f colonialism's social policy. I n the Persian G u l f similar trends were evident i n the entrencliment o f the power o f tribal chieftains, w h o also served as means o f social control for the colonial establishment and i n t u r n used colonial patronage and policies to fully entrench their sociopolitical positions and i n many cases to evolve i n t o monarchies. Across the Persian G u l f independence has only marginally changed the political role o f these traditional forms o f authority. Colonialism also affected local societies by encouraging and strengthening m o d e r n i z i n g trends. Colonial rulers across the M u s l i m w o r l d encouraged e d u cation and invested heavily i n educational institutions. Such institutions as the University o f Punjab and the University o f Malaya were established to educate those w h o w o u l d eventually r u n the machinery o f colonialism. Over t i m e these institutions p r o d u c e d generations o f M u s l i m leaders and influenced intellectual developments i n M u s l i m societies. They also helped to create the n e w m i d d l e classes and to p r o v i d e space for this n e w class to develop roots. The colonial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n also encouraged the sons o f the elite, and later p r o m i s i n g m i d dle-class y o u t h , to study at m o d e r n educational institutions or i n Europe. The Atchison College i n Lahore was established for the sons o f chiefs, princes, and landlords and the Kuala Kangsaw Malay College i n Malaya for r e c r u i t i n g sons o f Mala) aristocrats i n t o the bureaucracy. Over t i m e they also became the t r a i n i n g g r o u n d for c h i l d r e n o f the rising bureaucratic elite. Others went to school i n Eton and H a r r o w i n England and studied at O x f o r d and Cambridge, or i n Paris and Amsterdam. The name Pakistan is alleged to have been coined at C a m b r i d g e ; M u h a m m a d Iqbal, the e m i n e n t M u s l i m poet-philosopher o f South Asia, was educated at C a m b r i d g e and Heidelberg universities as w e l l as i n law at the Lincoln's I n n i n England, w h e r e M u h a m m a d A h Jinnah, w h o led the Pakistan m o v e m e n t , also received his law degree. Many leaders in the N o r t h African l i b eration movements were students i n the French schools i n N o r t h Africa and at the university i n Paris. A similar trend was also evident i n the military, whose officer corps came f r o m the colonies but wdiose education occurred i n Europe at such places as Sandhurst or Saint Cyr, or i n officer schools modeled after European m i l i t a r y schools and staffed by European officers, such as the Quetta Staff College i n Pakistan. The colonial administration had hoped that western education for the o l d elite and those i n positions o f power w o u l d create an affinity between t h e m and the colonial elite.

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This view had gained currency after the colonial establishment encountered the first wave o f resistance t o its p o s i t i o n by traditional chiefs and religious leaders. Over time, however, those educated i n m o d e r n ( " w e s t e r n " ) subjects proved to be equally u n c o m p r o m i s i n g foes. The n e w leadership educated i n western ways employed European ideals t o question the m o r a l i t y o f c o l o n i a l i s m , however, whereas the o l d elite had relied o n Islam to resist colonialism. I n the end the f o r mer approach proved m o r e potent, as it paved the way for independence. The impact o f the colonial education i n the intellectual realm was equally p r o f o u n d . T h r o u g h the educational system many indigenous thinkers became aware o f western literature and p h i l o s o p h y Some even w r o t e and t h o u g h t i n western languages. F r o m Indonesia t o M o r o c c o a great deal o f intellectual activity has o c c u r r e d i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h a n d t w e n t i e t h centuries i n D u t c h , French, a n d English; and an even greater a m o u n t o f intellectual activity has occurred i n the genre o f western intellectualism, but i n local languages. N e w f o r m s o f literature and literary activity, such as novels o r free-verse poetry, began t o surface i n the 1920s and the 1930s. I n I n d i a , so p r o f o u n d was the impact o f western t h o u g h t that the bulk o f the p r o d u c t i o n o f its literary geniuses i n the late t w e n t i e t h cent u r y is i n English. The p o l i t i c a l ramification o f this was t o shape M u s l i m intellectuals f r o m N o r t h Africa t o Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and Indonesia i n the image o f western intellectuals. First J. S. M i l l o r Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and i n time JeanPaul Sartre and Albert Camus, became models for dissenting intellectuals, just as L e n i n , Fidel Castro, M a o , o r Che Guevara captured the i m a g i n a t i o n o f m o r e m i l itant activists such as the Marxist Fidaiyan-i Khalq (the People's Devotees) o f Iran, activists i n the Parcham (Flag) and Khalq (People) Parties i n Afghanistan, c o m m u n i s t activists i n Yemen or Turkey, c o m m u n i s t guerilla factions i n Malaysia, M o r o freedom

fighters

i n the s o u t h e r n P h i l i p p i n e s , a n d m e m b e r s o f the

C o m m u n i s t Party o f Indonesia (PKI). The n o t i o n o f political c o m m i t m e n t a m o n g intellectuals and o p p o s i t i o n t o the state thus grew roots. Many such intellectuals congregated i n L o n d o n a n d Paris and interacted w i t h European intelligentsia, w h i c h reinforced this trend. The impact o f this f o r m o f intellectual activity o n Algeria, the Arab w o r l d , and Iran has been p r o f o u n d . It undergirded Arab socialism and was an i m p o r t a n t source o f power for the revolutionary m o v e m e n t i n Iran. The leadership o f the FLN and Iran's A l i Shariati were members o f the same left-of-center circles i n Paris and shared i n the elaboration o f " T h i r d W o r l d i s m " (tiermondisme), w h i c h they then exported to their countries o f o r i g i n . N o t all educational endeavors were motivated by the needs o f the colonial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , however. Colonial rulers as w e l l as voluntary organizations, such as Christian missionary movements, sought to hasten the advancement o f the local populations by educating t h e m . Catholic a n d Protestant colleges i n the Levant, such as A m e r i c a n University i n Beirut or St. Joseph's College i n Lebanon,

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and Roberts College i n Turkey and the Forman Christian College i n Lahore (some o f w h i c h later lost their Christian character), are examples i n this regard. The impact o f these undertakings o n the y o u t h culture or o n the u p l i f t i n g o f women's status was even m o r e p r o n o u n c e d . H i g h schools, such as the A m e r i c a n College i n Tehran, and women's schools, such as the Iran Bethel school i n Tehran or the K i n n a r d College i n Lahore, i n t r o d u c e d m o d e r n education to precollege students and to w o m e n i n general. M u s l i m s themselves w o u l d eventually adopt many o f the educational principles o f these i n s t i t u t i o n s , thus creating a m o m e n t u m for m o d e r n education and the development o f the m o d e r n m i d d l e classes. I n India the Jamiah-i N i z a m i y a h ( N i z a m i y a h U n i v e r s i t y ) and the Fawqaniyah schools sought to incorporate m o d e r n education i n t o the Islamic traditional c u r r i c u l u m s o f h i g h school students i n Hyderabad, whereas the A n g l o - O r i e n t a l College at Aligarh sought to do the same at the university level, and N a d w a t u l - U l a m a i n a seminary setting. After independence, Western e d u c a t i o n w o u l d be w i d e l y adopted i n India to shape the postcolonial society. Another i m p o r t a n t legacy o f colonialism involves its implications for national u n i t y o f later M u s l i m states. Colonial territories d i d little to u n i f y the peoples that fell w i t h i n those territories and thus d i d not result i n national societies or p r o duce national cultures. Colonial administrations were p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h protecting the boundaries o f their colonies against encroachment o f other colonial powers and lessening the burden o f r u l i n g over the colonies. The first c o n cern led t h e m to emphasize the sanctity o f the borders o f the colony, w h i c h accounts f o r the fact that the map o f the M u s l i m w o r l d is largely die one that was o r i g i n a l l y d r a w n by the colonial powers. The second concern obviated the possibility o f the consolidation o f lasting national identities. Colonial boundaries were often d r a w n i n c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h other colonial powers. Therefore they d i d not take i n t o account the d i v i s i o n o f groups o f the peoples or the inclusion o f ethnically, linguistically, or religiously diverse populations w i t h i n the same borders. I n many ways colonial demarcations o f territories helped to create n a t i o n ally diverse states rather than homogeneous ones. Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, I n d o nesia, and N i g e r i a are all examples o f this p h e n o m e n o n . This p r o b l e m was c o m p o u n d e d by the colonial administrations' reliance o n divide-and-rule policies to reduce the b u r d e n o f governance. I n India the British p o i n t e d to India's d i v e r s i t y — w h i c h was painstakingly detailed i n their census r e p o r t s — t o argue that only the British c o u l d b r i n g order and cohesion to such a fundamentally divided land. Diversity was thus a necessary justification for the continuation o f colonialism. The consequence was that diversity gradually developed roots and f o u n d a life o f its o w n . It was also politicized and made center stage. I n the same vein, the British also went to great lengths t o show that Islam's roots were not i n India and therefore India had been previously r u l e d by outsiders;

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I

thus i t f o l l o w e d that it should not be strange that India w o u l d once again be r u l e d by outsiders. M u s l i m rule i n India clearly had many m o r e indigenous sources o f support than the British Raj. Still, the m y t h persisted and eventually shaped the M u s l i m s ' v i e w o f their o w n history i n India as w e l l as the H i n d u views o f it. The H i n d u nationalist rhetoric o f today echoes the British argument that Islam and M u s l i m s are outsiders—Turkish, Persian, and Arab invaders. Similar arguments were made by the British i n Egypt, again to try to give legitimacy to British rule. Here too the arguments eventually grew roots. One often hears that Gamal A b d e l Nasser was the first Egyptian ruler o f Egypt since the pharaohs. Colonial administrations also encouraged rivalry among diverse ethnic, l i n guistic, and religious communities. Such rivalries preoccupied the various c o m m u n i t i e s , d i v e r t i n g their attention f r o m the question o f c o l o n i a l i s m . It also encouraged them to curry favor w i t h the colonial establishment i n their struggle w i t h their rival communities. In India, British authorides actively sowed dissension among Muslims and Hindus. Some argue that the r u m o r that the M u g h a l emperor Babur had built a mosque o n top o f the b i r t h place o f the H i n d u god Ram i n Ayodhya were first circulated by the British to break d o w n M u s l i m - H i n d u c o m i t y i n northern India. The British also played o n tensions between Sikhs and Muslims. It was Sikh soldiers f r o m Punjab w h o broke the back o f the m u t i n y i n L u c k n o w ( i n northern India) i n i8c8, avenging the hardships that their c o m m u n i t y had suffered under the M u g h a l emperor Aurangzeb. The British policy culminated i n the great debate a m o n g Indian Muslims d u r i n g the interwar p e r i o d . Whereas some Indian Muslims advocated standing w i t h Hindus i n a c o m m o n front against British Imperialism, others, f r o m the M u s l i m League to religious activists, questioned j o i n i n g i n a c o m m o n cause w i t h Hindus. The British used the M u s l i m ambivalence to pressure the naüonalist movement. A l d i o u g h they d i d not stave o f f independence, the Indian subcontinent was eventually split between Muslims and Hindus. In short, the colonial policy deliberately manipulated diversities to strengthen the r u l e o f the state, to keep various c o m m u n i t i e s busy w i t h rivalries and c o n frontations, and to play the broker w i t h the antagonists. I n the process c o l o n i a l society became increasingly fractured. Hence, some conceptions o f the postcolo¬ nial state, such as a u n i t e d India, Malaya ( i n c l u d i n g Singapore), or Syria ( i n c l u d i n g Lebanon), were never viable; and those states that became viable have w i t h i n t h e m , to varying degrees, disintegrative tensions. Civil wars i n Sudan or Iraq and tensions between c o m m u n i t i e s i n Malaysia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, and Chad, to name o n l y a few, are i n good measure products o f colonial rule. The colonial policy toward religious minorities has been even more significant. European powers always maintained close relations w i t h religious and ethnic minorities, especially w i t h religious minorities. First, European powers viewed themselves as the protectors o f Christian minorities. The O t t o m a n Empire under

There are more than n o million Muslims in India. They constitute one of the largest Muslim populations in the world, roughly equal to that of Pakistan and Bangladesh, though the partition of British India in 1947 was meant to separate the groups along religious lines. Muslims in Delhi, the capital of India, gather here for prayer celebrating the end of Ramadan.

pressure eventually conceded such a status to them. France thus became the p r o tector o f the Catholic Maronites i n die Levant, Russia o f the O r t h o d o x c o m m u n i ties; f o r lack o f a better candidate, Britain chose the Druze despite Druze protestations. European protection provided the religious minorities w i t h considerable power, elevating their social standing and altering their relations w i t h the d o m i n a n t communities. The Europeans w o u l d eventually demand o f the Ottoman Empire and Iran the same capitulatory privileges—exemption f r o m prosecution by local c o u r t s — f o r their allies a m o n g the m i n o r i t i e s that they themselves enjoyed. As the local populations began t o rebel against colonial rule, they came to view the m i n o r i t y communities as "collaborators." This label was o f great importance i n the future o f relations between the minorities and the d o m i n a n t communities i n states that were b o m o f struggles against colonialism. I n some cases the differences were so hreconcilable diat they led t o secessionism. Singapore separated f r o m Malay sia, and Lebanon rejected rejoining Syria. The idea o f protection o f m i n o r i ties at times became a central a i m o f the colonial powers. I n the case o f France's rule over Syria, this idea translated i n t o the French policy o f creating a Christian Arab state i n the f o r m o f Lebanon. I n addition, because the minorities were often better

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represented i n commercial affairs, it meant that they dealt w i t h the Europeans first and then more frequently. The minorities were incorporated i n t o the European commercial networks f r o m w h i c h they benefited materially and developed vested interests. Christian communities i n die Levant and Anatolia, Parsis i n India, and Copts i n Egypt are examples o f this. The commercial links also helped to alter the balance o f power between the d o m i n a n t communities and their minorities. It also gave the t w o communities radically different views o f colonialism. M i n o r i t y c o m m u n i t i e s , w h i c h had enjoyed o n l y l i m i t e d privileges and d i d n o t v i e w themselves as i n c l u d e d i n M u s l i m societies, saw o n l y o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r gain i n c o l o n i a l i s m . Their reaction to c o l o n i a l i s m was therefore very different f r o m that o f the d o m i n a n t c o m m u n i t y . For example, m i n o r i t i e s saw the o p p o r t u n i t y for the generation o f w e a l t h i n c o m m e r c i a l alliances w i t h the colonial powers, social u p l i f t by r e l y i n g o n the colonial regime, and advancement by taking advantage o f w h a t c o l o n i a l educational systems had to offer. Christians i n the Arab Near East, Anatolia, and Iran embraced European values and ideals and subscribed to the ideologies o f c o l o n i a l i s m . Such ideological c o m m i t m e n t , for instance, t h o r o u g h l y t r a n s f o r m e d the Parsi r e l i g i o n i n I n d i a and gave the Maronites o f Lebanon a sense o f "Europeanness." This was also because o f the fact that they m o r e readily enrolled i n m o d e r n schools and therefore m o r e easily j o i n e d the c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and i n greater number. I n some cases, as i n A f r i c a , Indonesia, or I n d i a , Christian m i n o r i t i e s emerged t h r o u g h the c o n version o f local populations. I n these cases the m i n o r i t y ' s dependence o n colon i a l i s m and the majority's disdain were all the greater. Even i n i 8 ç 8 , Sayyid A h m a d Khan p o i n t e d to this p r o b l e m i n India. There H i n d u s , w h o w e r e n o t a m i n o r i t y i n n u m b e r but had been subservient

to

M u s l i m s for centuries, were j o i n i n g the administrative institutions o f the British Raj m o r e rapidly than M u s l i m s , w h o viewed British education w i t h disdain. One consequence o f this was that m i n o r i t i e s became better represented i n the f u t u r e political and intellectual leadership o f their societies. I n Africa, f r o m N i g e r i a to Eritrea, n o n - M u s l i m s have been p r o m i n e n t i n national politics. I n Senegal the most i m p o r t a n t nationalist leader, and later the president o f the country, was Leopold Sedar Sengor, a Christian. Arab nationalism as an intellectual c u r r e n t — f r o m the w r i t e r George A n t o n i u s to the ideologue M i c h e l A f l a q — w a s d o m i n a t e d by Arab Christians, w h o also d o m i n a t e d i n the bureaucracy and political i n s t i t u tions i n that r e g i o n . A disproportionately h i g h n u m b e r o f the early leadership o f the Palestinian Liberation Organization were Christians, as were some o f its most radical leaders, such as George Habash and N a y i f Hawatma. A l t h o u g h relations between colonial powers and Christian m i n o r i t i e s were m o r e fecund and w i t h greater significance for later developments, similar trends were also evident i n relations w i t h other religious and ethnic m i n o r i t i e s . I n Syria

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the French maintained close ties w i t h the Alawis, and i n India the British w i t h the Ismailis. D o m i n a n t M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s tended t o v i e w such relations w i t h greater alarm than relations between colonialists and n o n - M u s l i m m i n o r i t i e s , because they were tantamount t o altering not only the balance o f power between social groups but between o r t h o d o x y and those i t sought t o exclude. O f t e n the d o m i n a n t c o m m u n i t i e s suspected the colonial h a n d i n all religious schisms, especially those that arose d u r i n g colonial rule. I n d i a n M u s l i m s have viewed the A h m e d i y a as a creation o f the British, just as Iranians have depicted Bahaism i n similar terms. I n recent years these sentiments have been echoed i n the charge i n some quarters that all schisms are the w o r k o f the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Such views o w e d t o colonial administrations' r e c r u i t m e n t a m o n g the m i n o r i t i e s as w e l l as t o m i n o r i t i e s ' greater participation i n the colonial educational system, b o t h o f w h i c h had the effect o f e m p o w e r i n g the m i n o r i t y , weste r n i z i n g its c u l t u r a l o u t l o o k , and allying i t w i t h the colonial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I n India i n 1931,1.2 percent o f the p o p u l a t i o n were literate i n English but o n l y 0.9 percent o f the M u s l i m s were. I n Syria this trend eventually led t o the d o m i n a t i o n o f the c o u n t r y by Alawis, w h i c h continues i n President Hafiz al-Asad's rule. A particularly i m p o r t a n t legacy o f colonialism is the representation o f particular communities i n the police and m i l i t a r y forces. The colonial powers often recruited a m o n g the m i n o r i t i e s for the local army and police forces. N o t o n l y were the m i n o r i t i e s m o r e closely allied w i t h the colonial order, b u t they were m o r e likely to be w i l l i n g to engage and t o suppress members o f the d o m i n a n t c o m m u n i t y — w i t h w h i c h they d i d not identify and against w h i c h they may have borne a grudge. M i n o r i t i e s were also less likely t o respond t o the religious call for rebellion and j i h a d . The legacy o f the Great M u t i n y o f 1857

a n

d

m

e

M u s l i m Sepoy

army's siege o f L u c k n o w d o m i n a t e d m u c h o f the colonial t h i n k i n g i n the t w e n tieth century. Hence, the Syrian army was largely composed o f Alawis, and the British army i n India o f Punjabis, M u s l i m as w e l l as Sikh. Here Punjabi Muslims had a different relationship w i t h the British than those o f the M u g h a l territories. Consequently, die national armies that were b u i l t o n the basis o f the colonial army tended t o be composed o f a large n u m b e r o f minorities. This has been o f i m p o r tance i n many M u s l i m states f r o m N i g e r i a to Syria. I n Jordan a variation o f this scenario u n f o l d e d , where t r i b e s m e n — a n d not m i n o r i t i e s — w e r e recruited i n t o the Arab Legion t o control the urban and r u r a l populations o f western J o r d a n — the Palestinians. The o n l y exception t o tins general rule were the Shiites, w h o m the colonial powers never incorporated i n t o an alliance and w h o m i n the 1920s and the 1930s served as the m a i n source o f o p p o s i t i o n i n Iraq to British rule. The Shiites were therefore not p r o m i n e n t i n British colonial armies i n the Near East. Elsewhere the c o l o n i a l powers actually created ethnic o r religious diversity, w h i c h produced the same conditions as previously o u t l i n e d . I n Algeria, French

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settlers t o o k over large tracts o f land and numbered close to t w o m i l l i o n at the t i m e o f independence. They left Algeria after independence. I n East Africa and South Africa, I n d i a n and Malay labor, w h i c h was i m p o r t e d to w o r k o n c o l o n i a l projects, remained to f o r m i m p o r t a n t c o m m e r c i a l c o m m u n i t i e s f r o m Kampala and

Mombasa

to

Zanzibar,

Dar

es

Salaam,

Cape T o w n , and

Durban.

" A f r i c a n i z a t i o n " campaigns i n East Africa eventually ended i n the mass expulsion o f South Asians f r o m Uganda and their marginalization i n Kenya and Tanzania. H o w the issue w i l l be resolved i n South Africa remains to be seen. I n Palestine the B r i t i s h facilitated the settlement o f European Jews f o r p o l i t i c a l and h u m a n i tarian rather than economic reasons. That policy c u l m i n a t e d i n the creation o f the stale o f Israel i n 1948. I n Sind, i n the late nineteenth century, Punjabi w o r k ers were b r o u g h t i n to w o r k for the B r i t i s h . Their presence fueled resentments a m o n g Sindhis, w h i c h continue to animate ethnic politics i n Pakistan. H o w economic considerations led to the movements o f populations, and the implications o f these movements for the successor states, is best reflected i n the case o f Malaysia. Here the British negotiated concessions for land and mines w i t h local chiefs but b r o u g h t i n Chinese and I n d i a n migrant labor, w h o eventually f o r m e d large communities. These " m i n o r i t y " c o m m u n i t i e s developed the same c o m m e r c i a l , rehgio-cultural, and political alliances that colonial rulers had established w i t h m i n o r i t y c o m m u n i t i e s elsewhere. The Chinese and Indians as a result became financially and politically m o r e advanced than the indigenous Malays, w h o s e p o l i t i c s were c o n t r o l l e d by chiefs and centered i n r u r a l areas. The University o f Malaya, most commercial and social institutions, and the staff o f the colonial establishment were dominated by Chinese and Indians. The power o f the " i m p o r t e d " m i n o r i t i e s led to m a j o r civil strife i n Malaysia i n 1969 and continues to be a major p o i n t o f contention i n Malaysian politics. After three decades o f affirmative action policies to benefit the burniputra ("sons o f s o i l " ) 80 percent o f private sector wealth is still controlled by the Chinese and Indians. The ethnic dilemmas c o n f r o n t i n g postcolonial M u s l i m states thus have their roots i n the colonial era. A l t h o u g h ethnic consciousness is by n o means u n i q u e to the T h i r d W o r l d or t o M u s l i m states, the particularities o f the p r o b l e m — d i v i s i v e national societies, weakness o f national identity, imbalances i n the wealth, education, and power o f m i n o r i t y and majority c o m m u n i t i e s — a r e u n i q u e to the postcolonial state.

The Institutional Foundations of the Postcolonial State A n i m p o r t a n t , and yet u n t i l recently ignored, legacy o f colonialism is the manner i n w h i c h i t has given f o r m to the institutional foundations, and thus the parameter o f politics, o f the postcolonial state. Independence ended the sovereignty o f European powers over their territories; i t d i d not, however, produce states de novo.

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The postcolonial state inherited the machinery o f the colonial state, and to varying degrees, f o l l o w e d the m o d e l o f the colonial state. I n such cases as India, the c o n t i nuity between the t w o was quite conspicuous. M u h a m m a d A l i Jinnah first became the governor-general o f Pakistan, and the India Act o f 193c was the law o f the land u n t i l the Constitution of 19C6 was promulgated some nine years after independence. Elsewhere the continuity is less apparent, as i n Algeria or Libya. Still, even i n these countries the maimer i n w h i c h the state works and relates to social forces has m o r e i n c o m m o n w i t h the colonial era than state leaders w o u l d a d m i t . Ideological continuities generally have been easier to discern. The rhetoric o f state leaders may also have had a hand i n c o n f o u n d i n g the relations between the colonial and postcolonial states. It has become increasingly evident, however, that the postcolonial state, all protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, has been less a seed planted at independence and more a later g r o w t h i n an o l d tree—new branches o n the t r u n k that grew d u r i n g the colonial era. Even w h e n h i g h politics o f the state may have sought to chart new courses, at its foundations the state ineluctably f o l l o w e d i n the footsteps o f the colonial era. Colonialism accounts for more i n postcolonial states than previously assumed. Policy choices, the way those choices have been i m p l e m e n t e d , and h o w the state has d e v e l o p e d — all o f this has occurred i n a framework that was conceived and entrenched d u r i n g colonial rule. A l t h o u g h the a i m and the general structure o f authority o f colonialism was m u c h the same f r o m Indonesia to Nigeria, there were i m p o r t a n t variations i n h o w the colonial administrators actually r u l e d over their vassal populations. These variations account for differences among the experiences w i t h state f o r m a t i o n after independence. Colonial administration exerted authority directly as w e l l as i n d i rectly, through local elites, chiefs, and mercantile forces. I n Algeria and Libya colonial rule was direct, w h i l e i n Morocco, Tunisia, Malaya, Java, and India it used local elites to a good extent. I n Java the numerical weakness o f the D u t c h led them to rely o n local elites and chiefs to manage the labor supply. The consequence was to entrench the sociopolitical position o f the intermediary elite, to create dependencies between the peasantry and the elite, and also to p e r m i t extensive exploitation and impoverishment o f the masses i n die process o f generating a labor supply. In India a t h i r d o f the p o p u l a t i o n were r u l e d , n o m i n a l l y at least, by some 2co maharajas ( H i n d u princes and kings) and nawabs ( M u s l i m princes and kings) as w e l l as the N i z a m (hereditary r u l e r s ) o f Hyderabad (a state that was larger than France) and the Aga Khan. These princes had little real a u t o n o m y and were carefully controlled by British political officers, but they w i e l d e d m u c h a u t h o r i t y over their populations. The relations between the subjects o f the princes and those w h o lived under direct British r u l e was very different, however. T h r o u g h the princes the British w-ere able to c o n t r o l a large part o f India w i t h the least a m o u n t o f p o l i t i c a l cost. Even i n those territories i n w h i c h British r u l e was

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direct, landowners, traditional elites, and local chiefs and grandees were used to bolster British rule. B e g i n n i n g i n 1861, landlords were i n d u c t e d i n t o the largely h o n o r i f i c advisory body called the Viceroy's C o u n c i l and allowed to dominate local p o l i t i c s — t h i s lasted u n t i l the i n t e r w a r p e r i o d . A symbiotic relationship then developed between the princes and local elites and the British, whereby the British agreed to the social status o f the local elites and the elites i n t u r n p r o v i d e d local support and social c o n t r o l for the British. This pattern o f p o l i t i c s made

the local elites i m p o r t a n t p o w e r

brokers,

entrenched their sociopolitical positions, and encouraged t h e m to favor the cornpar tmentalization o f the policy i n place o f a u n i f o r m national p o l i t i c a l arena, w h e r e i n they c o u l d w i e l d power by c o n t r o l l i n g segments o f the p o l i t y and negotiate for its support w i t h the center. The patronage o f the British often allowed the institutional power and reach o f the princes and local elites to increase, w h i c h made i t m o r e difficult f o r the nationalist elite to penetrate their d o m a i n and later

The British occupied Kabul in 1880 as part of the second Anglo-Afghan war.They

for the state to c u r b i t . For instance, British policy i n India gave the l a n d o w n i n g

installed Amir Abd al-

class tremendous p o w e r over the peasantry, w h i c h helped to consolidate the c o n -

Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901)

t r o l o f the landowners over the r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n . I n Pakistan this trend has been most evident. The l a n d o w n i n g class has not only w i e l d e d tremendous p o w e r i n the country, c o n t r o l l i n g politics at all levels, but i t also has successfully resisted

as ruler. With substantial annual subsidies and technical assistance from the British, the "Iron Amir" con-

l a n d r e f o r m . The l a n d o w n i n g class therefore controls p o l i t i c a l support i n its

solidated power over the

estates and is i n a p o s i t i o n to bargain w i t h the center. I n the Persian G u l f e m i -

entire country.

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rates British policy helped t o strengthen tribal chiefs, and i n Malaysia the local kings. The power o f the m o n a r c h y i n the Persian G u l f emirates and i n B r u n e i is to a large extent a result o f these colonial policies. Similar trends also characterized relations between the B r i t i s h and t r i b a l chiefs i n East Africa and N i g e r i a , w i t h a similar i m p a c t o n state f o r m a t i o n . A l t h o u g h French colonial rule was generally centralized, i t too at times f o l l o w e d policies similar to British colonialism. Where and w h e n the French used the intermediary role o f the local elites, however, i t had less to d o w i t h the efficacy o f this approach and more w i t h limitations to centralized colonial rule or the perceived importance o f the colony to France. Lisa Anderson has w r i t t e n that i n Tunisia, because the protectorate was not very i m p o r t a n t to France, the French let local institutions o f power persist and used the local mercantile classes as the means o f pushing i n t o the countryside. A local bourgeoisie thus emerged that helped to strengthen the colonial state and i n t u r n benefited f r o m the strengthening o f that state. U n d e r the Neo-Destur party i n Tunisia, state consolidation followed the pattern first established under French rule and thus involved f o l l o w i n g the French pattern o f extending the state's reach i n t o untapped areas and extending Tunis' admmistrative reach. I n M o r o c c o , similarly. General Lyautey conceived o f the French role as recognizing Moroccan political culture and accepting the social mores o n w h i c h it was based. H e saw France as a protector, best served i f it w o r k e d Tripoli, Libya, was occupied by the Italians in 1912, as the Ottoman Empire's hold over the region weakened. The Italians constructed Westernstyle buildings and insisted on segregating settlers from locals, especially in economic matters, and so no local elite developed to take over once the Italians departed after World War I I .

t h r o u g h the existing political, cultural, and social institutions. I n A l g e r i a and Libya u n d e r French and Italian rules a d i f f e r e n t p a t t e r n emerged. There the c o l o n i a l state d i d n o t seek to operate t h r o u g h local elites as m u c h as i t sought to establish the p a r a m o u n t role o f the colonial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and to r u l e t h r o u g h the settlers. It can be argued that M o r o c c o , Tunisia, and later Syria were exceptions to French rule, w h i c h typically had a penchant f o r centralization that may have been embedded i n France's o w n political culture. That M o r o c c o and Tunisia were protectorates and Syria later o n l y a mandate may have made these territories less attractive or central t o the French scheme o f e m p i r e , and thus led to less investment i n centralized r u l e and greater reliance o n local

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forces. That France came to v i e w Algeria as a part o f France—a sentiment captured i n a famous saying o f the t i m e : "France is cut by the Mediterranean as Paris is cut by the Seine"—encouraged r u l i n g it directly, b o t h because that was acceptable to the settlers and because centralized rule w o u l d guarantee greater integ r a t i o n i n t o France. French rule i n Algeria was n o t only interested i n economic gain b u t also i n the integration o f Algeria i n t o France. It is i m p o r t a n t to note that to the extent to w h i c h French c o l o n i a l i s m i n Algeria was engaged i n economic gain, i t was m a k i n g such gains t h r o u g h the large numbers o f French citizens w h o had settled the best land i n Algeria, and n o t the local p o p u l a t i o n , the mercantile classes, or the emerging bourgeoisie. Political compromises, necessary for facilitating e c o n o m i c gains f r o m the local economy, were thus n o t necessary i n Algeria. A l l compromises involved the economy o f the settlers, whose leaders were distinctly hostile to all Algerian political expressions. It is also arguable that i n Algeria, France f o u n d only a weak local power structure, one that c o u l d be easily overcome and one that w o u l d n o t have been a suitable basis for colonial authority. It was thus q u i c k l y replaced w i t h direct administration. In Libya, by contrast, the Italians had a different attitude, although they followed similar policies. Italy's m a i n concern was not managing the economy but proving its o w n primacy. Hence, they too saw n o need to forge political alliances w i t h local elites that w o u l d facilitate extracting economic gain f r o m the local economy. Italy, i n fact, insisted o n segregating the settlers and the locals, especially i n economic matters. Therefore n o local bourgeoisie emerged, and the local population was not tied to the expansion o f the colonial state, whereas i n Tunisia nationalist leaders had established their ties o f patronage to the population as part o f the expansion o f the colonial state. The colonial state had thus facilitated the emergence o f a Tunisian power structure centered i n an urban bourgeoisie that had penetrated die rural areas at the back o f the colonial state; Libya, by contrast, had n o viable local state elite to take over f r o m Italy, because n o expansion o f the local state involving the local bourgeoisie had happened. The urban Libyans had not developed any ties o f patronage beyond their immediate locales because they had not had any reason to venture beyond t h e m . Italian rule i n Libya was absolute and led to little local instit u t i o n budding. At independence, Libya thus lacked a stable state machinery and was n o t able to continue i n the footsteps o f the Italians. Libya actually had to create a state. The colonial legacy gave Libya its independence and shape but not a viable state. The Libyan state was at the outset an ad hoc one, w h i c h lacked continuity and penetration o f society and had little authority It relied heavily o n the w r i t o f the monarchy, w h i c h made it viurierable. The monarchy's collapse and the rise o f the absolutist and arbitrary rule o f M u a m m a r Qaddafi occurred i n this context. Differences between h o w colonial powers conceived o f their a u t h o r i t y and h o w this a u t h o r i t y had to be i m p l e m e n t e d had t o d o w i t h t w o issues: h o w best

THE

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to maxirnize economic gain f r o m the colony, and whether the colonial power had a political-cultural agenda i n m i n d . I f economic gain was the p r i m a r y motive, and this gain was n o t tied to a large settler p o p u l a t i o n , i t was likely that colonial administrations w o u l d appeal to local elites for political support or create c o n d i tions for the rise o f a mercantile and bourgeois elite. Both o f these elite groups w o u l d develop vested interests i n the colonial state and w o u l d eventually become tied to the w o r k i n g s o f the parent state centered i n Europe. Both groups w o u l d therefore be i m p o r t a n t to the future w o r k i n g s o f the successor state. W h i c h g r o u p w o u l d eventually d o m i n a t e — t h e landowners i n Pakistan or the bourgeois elite i n T u n i s i a — w o u l d depend o n their relative power d u r i n g colonial rule. W h e r e and w h e n colonialism saw its e c o n o m i c gain i n a settler c o m m u n i t y , or saw the purpose o f colonialism as p r o v i n g the political and cultural supremacy o f the parent state, i t was less likely to r u l e t h r o u g h the local elites or support the rise o f a local elite. I n such cases, as i n Algeria and Libya, the colonial state w o u l d lack any serious local components that w o u l d have ties to the colonial a d m i n i s tration and have vested interests i n its p o w e r and reach. The postcolonial state i n such cases w o u l d be weak and vulnerable, lacking i n a social base and strong econ o m i c and political institutions. Beyond the structure o f c o l o n i a l a u t h o r i t y , h o w the c o l o n i a l state exercised that a u t h o r i t y a n d h o w i t was perceived by the local p o p u l a t i o n was o f great importance

t o later state d e v e l o p m e n t s .

The

c o l o n i a l state, u n l i k e

the

European state, was f r o m i n c e p t i o n based o n segregation o f Europeans f r o m locals i n law, e c o n o m i c relations, a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , p o l i t i c a l matters, and social life. It was n o t based on the European c o n c e p t i o n o f c i v i l societies b u t o n centralized a n d nonrepresentative bureaucracies that r u l e d by force a n d e n c o u r aged as w e l l as managed social d i v i s i o n s . As a result, mass-based parties are a r a r i t y i n M u s l i m states. The U n i t e d Malays N a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n i n Malaysia or the Neo-Destur i n Tunisia are examples o f genuine party organizations. The N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n Front i n A l g e r i a or Bath parties i n Syria and I r a q to a l i m i t e d extent have served as g e n u i n e parties. Elsewhere, however, personalized r u l e has been the order o f the day. Nasser's Arab Socialist U n i o n never evolved into

a genuine

(Resurrection)

party, a n d

the

Shah's e x p e r i m e n t

with

the

Rastakhiz

party or the Ayatollah K h o m e i n i ' s w i t h the Islamic Republic

party d i d n o t a m o u n t to m u c h . The essence o f the colonial state became giving shape to those agencies and institutions that w o u l d assume d o m i n a t i o n . U n b o u n d by constitutional limitations and citizenship rights, the colonial state had broad powers to act, and it d i d so viewing itself as b o u n d to the " s u p e r i o r " European values. It acted o n reasons o f state (those o f Europe), w h i c h i n the eyes o f the local population w ere condescending r

and paternal, unaccountable, and by nature avowedly transformative rather than

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1

managerial. These are exactly the attitudes that w o u l d become a part o f the developmentalist ideology o f the postcolonial state. The postcolonial state and its nationalist elite had rejected the colonial state's right to rule their populations and to represent their interests, but they never rejected the colonial state's views o f the state's f u n c t i o n i n the colonial territories. I n many regards the postcolonial state became an indigenization o f the colonial state. The o p p o s i t i o n to the state i n the M u s l i m w o r l d today, although couched i n Islamic rhetoric, i n large measure reiterates these original nationalist complaints about the colonial state. Just as the nationalist elite rejected colonialism's claim to represent local aspirations i n transf o r m i n g society, the Islamist opposition similarly questions the r u l i n g regime's claim to represent popular aspirations i n pursuing secularization and development. Generally speaking, the c o l o n i a l state's goal was to establish d o m i n a t i o n , to ensure legitimacy as w e l l as security (internal and external), to m a i n t a i n a u t o n o m y first f r o m the local society but eventually also f r o m its parent state i n Europe, and to extract economic surplus. These aims were achieved as the colonial state devised and refined its i n s t i t u t i o n a l setup. That i n s t i t u t i o n a l setup i n t u r n determ i n e d the w o r k i n g s o f the successor states, the nature o f relations between the state and society w i t h i n t h e m , and the paradigm that governs their politics. The institutional setup is perhaps the most pervasive legacy o f c o l o n i a l i s m . The colonial state was by nature h i g h l y centralized and dependent o n a core o f i n s t i t u tions (such as the police, the military, and the bureaucracy) that served as the repositories o f its a u t h o r i t y . That a u t h o r i t y guaranteed the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f European d o m i n a t i o n and extraction o f resources to the advantage o f the European power. Some i n s t i t u t i o n s , such as the bureaucracy, were n o t designed p r i m a r i l y to enforce order but to efficiently manage the r u n n i n g o f the m a c h i n ery o f government and the economy. Other institutions, such as the judiciary, were intended to help w i t h the management o f order w i t h i n a legal f r a m e w o r k , but their character had m o r e t o do w i t h European traditions than w i t h the f u n c tions they had to p e r f o r m . Still, the confluence o f the activities o f the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the coercive instruments o f the colonial state constituted an i n s t i t u t i o n a l structure that allowed a small European m i n o r i t y to r u l e over vast territories w i t h the help o f local agents, and to manage the e c o n o m i c flow o f goods and resources between c o l o n i a l territories and Europe. So i m p o r t a n t were these institutions that they eventually constituted the basis o f the postcolonial state and thus determined the character o f that state and the nature o f its relation w i t h the society. I n many ways states such as Pakistan are replicas o f the colonial state, not only i n the manner i n w h i c h they are set u p and f u n c t i o n , but m o r e i m p o r t a n t i n h o w they envision their o w n roles. The m i l i t a r y and the police are perhaps the most evident examples o f the i n s t i t u t i o n a l and ideological c o n t i n u ity o f colonialism.

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Military, Police, and Civilian Bureaucratic Institutions T h r o u g h o u t colonial territories, local armies and police forces were trained to support the colonial state. This was by and large a very successful undertaking, enough so that I n d i a n soldiers fought i n European battlefields d u r i n g b o t h w o r l d wars, and the elite Himalayan Gurkha soldiers continue to fight battles for the British, the last instance being d u r i n g the Falkland Islands war i n 1982. The Sepoy M u t i n y o f 1857, w h e r e i n M u s l i m and H i n d u soldiers i n n o r t h e r n India rose i n rebellion against their English officers, was not repeated o n that scale, at least n o t u n t i l the time o f independence, w h e n armies i n Egypt and Syria took to a n t i i m p e r i a l i s m . Recruitment a m o n g m i n o r i t i e s and deployment o f soldiers i n alien c o m m u n i t i e s to some extent accounted for the facility w i t h w h i c h c o l o n i a l administrations created and managed their militaries. Sikh soldiers thus p r e d o m inated i n units that kept order i n H i n d u and M u s l i m areas, w h i l e i t was Baluch troops f r o m western Pakistan, w h o opened fire o n Sikh worshipers i n Julianwala Bagh i n the Amritsar Massacre i n 1919. Still, the power o f colonial militaries came f r o m the discipline and esprit de corps that intensive trainhig had instilled i n the soldiers and m o r e i m p o r t a n t , i n the officer corp. The colonial armies had internalized the military ideas and political values o f the colonial administration. To the extent to w h i c h they f o u n d a role i n state f o r m a t i o n i n later years, they d i d so w i t h the benefit o f their colonial outlooks. Even in Algeria the m i l i t a r y has remained one o f the most Francophone institutions i n the country. More i m p o r t a n t , the colonial legacy determined their attitudes toward politics. Colonial militaries were generally unnaturally large, far larger than the size o f the local economies warranted. Colonial militaries were based o n the economic and political interests o f the European power; they were not conceived, armed, or trained based o n the economic and techno logical abilities o f the colonial territory. The size and power o f the military itself was the most important legacy that postcolonial states had to deal w i t h . M u s l i m states thus inherited omnipotent militaries, far too large f o r their relative p o p u l a t i o n sizes and economic capacities. Furthermore, the militaries had fought alongside the colonial rulers r i g h t u p to the time o f independence. Their attitudes t o w a r d the struggles for independence and those w h o led those struggles were not necessarily sympathetic. Military and police forces had clashed w i t h and arrested politicians; they had viewed the champions o f the independence struggles w i t h the same cynicism and disparaging glare that their superior European officers had. The Indonesian generals thus remained w a r y o f Sukarno and lost n o time i n deposing h i m w h e n the threat o f c o m m u n i s m p r o vided them w i t h the pretext to do so. The same may be said o f those w h o w o u l d lead coups i n Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Sudan, They w o u l d remain preoccupied w i t h order and show impatience w i t h the politics o f the masses.

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I n the n e w states the officers w h o had served the c o l o n i a l order and the politicians w h o had f o u g h t for independence had to share i n the task o f state form a t i o n . The relationship between the m i l i t a r y and the civilian order was often d e t e r m i n e d by this reality. Even i n the Arab w o r l d and Sub-Saharan Africa, w h e r e left-leaning j u n i o r officers overthrew senior officers o f the o l d school to j o i n the anti-imperialist struggle, they d i d n o t resolve the inherent tensions between the

Local armies and police forces were usually trained to support the colonial stale. One of the few instances when they rebelled was the Sepoy Mutiny of 1 8 5 7 , in which Muslim and Hindu

m i l i t a r y and civilian orders. These tensions i n Egypt, Libya, Iraq, and Syria even-

soldiers in northern India

tually led to m i l i t a r y takeovers. The military's disdain for politicians and their

rose in rebellion against

perceived r i g h t t o interfere i n politics to restore order were i n g o o d measure

their British officers.

legacies o f the colonial era—whose m i l i t a r i e s , w i t h f e w exceptions, were n o t meant for external war b u t for preservation o f internal order. These legacies were internalized by the rank-and-file o f the colonial armies and became a part o f their postindependence ethos. The officers i n most colonial settings, and even i n the O t t o m a n Empire and Iran, were m o r e educated than the average p o p u l a t i o n , and at the institutional level militaries had been m o r e exposed to Western ideas. They

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therefore v i e w e d themselves as better equipped i n leading the n e w states to development and progress. The c o m b i n a t i o n o f their belief i n their greater capab i l i t y to oversee development—a v i e w that i n the 1950s was shared by Western p o w e r s — a n d their disdain for politicians, w h o m were seen as demagogues, often set m i l i t a r y leaders o n a path o f c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h the p o l i t i c a l elite. I n this the m i l i t a r y leadership filled the shoes o f the f o r m e r colonial rulers as they c o m peted w i t h the nationalist leaders for the r i g h t to represent and t o deliver o n the aspirations o f the local p o p u l a t i o n . M u c h like the military, the bureaucracy also served as a pillar o f the colonial order. Trained and m o l d e d i n the ethos o f the colonial culture, bureaucrats i n the empire's service shared and f o l l o w e d the values and p o l i t i c a l o u t l o o k o f the European rulers. Because they controlled the machinery o f the colonial state, they ineluctably occupied a central role i n the postcolonial order. Politicians had o n l y l i m i t e d success i n c o n t r o l l i n g t h e m , lest they disrupt the entire w o r k i n g s o f the state. As a result, the bureaucracy had a m a j o r role i n state f o r m a t i o n i n the postcolonial era and i n creating continuities between the ethos and m o d e o f operat i o n o f the state before and after independence. I n Pakistan, for instance, soon after independence i n 1947 the bureaucracy eclipsed the p o l i t i c a l elite i n m a n aging the country. Political leaders M u h a m m a d Ah" Jinnah (1876—1948) and Liaqat A l i Khan (1895—19C1) were replaced at the h e l m after 1951

by senior

bureaucrats G h u l a m M u h a m m a d (1895-1956) and Iskandar Mirza (1899-1969), w h o had risen t h r o u g h the ranks o f the bureaucracy under the British. The power o f the bureaucracy varied across colonial territories, depending o n the extent o f the investment that colonial rulers had made i n their administrative institutions. For example, the I n d i a n Civil Service was exemplary i n its efficient f u n c t i o n i n g and elaborate structure, b u t the bureaucracies i n the Arab Near East and Libya were generally undeveloped. The power and efficiency o f the bureaucracy was a double-edged s w o r d . It c o u l d serve as a major source o f resistance to effective exertion o f a u t h o r i t y by the political elite, and i t could infuse the n e w states w i t h the political values o f the colonial order. Still, the same power and efficiency was often an asset i n m o b i l i z i n g resources for development. Over the years the standards by w h i c h colonial bureaucracies operated declined; some even lost their independence and preeminence. As a result, their political role and their cont r i b u t i o n to socioeconomic change have been d i m i n i s h e d . The j u d i c i a r y presents a very d i f f e r e n t case. To b e g i n w i t h , i t is o f primaryi m p o r t a n c e t o s t u d y i n g f o r m e r B r i t i s h colonies, w h e r e the c o l o n i a l state c o n sciously p r o m o t e d a system o f justice m o d e l e d after Britain's and gave i t a u t o n o m y to f u n c t i o n w i t h i n the structure o f the c o l o n i a l order. As a result, Britain's colonial subjects developed a strong respect for the judiciary, and its i n d e p e n dence f r o m the w r i t o f the executive b r a n c h became embedded i n the struc-

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ture o f the p o s t c o l o n i a l state. In Pakistan, for example, the j u d i c i a r y has defied the executive b r a n c h over the years to assert the p r i m a c y o f the law and the c o n s t i t u t i o n . It v o t e d against the m i l i t a r y g o v e r n m e n t o f General A y u b Khan w h e n he banned the Islamist party (Jamaat-i Lslami) i n 1964; and i n 1993

the

j u d i c i a r y r u l e d against President G h u l a m Ishaq Khan for having dismissed the g o v e r n m e n t , and they ordered the g o v e r n m e n t r e s t o r e d — a n d i t was. That A y u b Khan and G h u l a m Ishaq Khan abided by the w r i t o f the j u d i c i a r y showed that the judiciary's i n s t i t u t i o n a l power, as conceived o f by the colonial state, has become i n s t i t u t e d i n the postcolonial state. I n 1996 P r i m e M i n i s t e r Benazir Bhutto's attempts to r e i n i n the j u d i c i a r y a n d to assert the executive

branch's

supremacy over i t was one o f the p r i n c i p a l reasons cited by President Faruq Leghari i n dismissing Bhutto's government. Similarly, i n Malaysia the j u d i c i a r y has rendered a n u m b e r o f verdicts against the government. W h e n a power s t r u g gle e r u p t e d i n the r u l i n g party, the U n i t e d Malays Nationalist Organization, i n 1986-88, a g o o d deal o f the w r a n g l i n g occurred t h r o u g h the i n t e r m e d i a r y o f the courts. Despite Prime M i n i s t e r M a h a t h i r M u h a m m a d ' s success i n c u r b i n g the powers o f the j u d i c i a r y i n 1988-89, the courts c o n t i n u e to enjoy a certain degree o f autonomy. N o t i n every postcolonial stale—even a m o n g those that had been B r i t i s h colonies—can

this degree o f judicial a u t o n o m y and power be seen. I n Malaysia,

for instance, since 1988 the a u t o n o m y and powers o f the j u d i c i a r y have been significantly reduced t h r o u g h legislation and s t r o n g - a r m tactics by the governm e n t . W h e r e and w h e n the j u d i c i a l branch has been weak i n the new states, i t was m o r e likely that a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m and arbitrary r u l e became the order o f the day. The manner i n w h i c h the colonial state established and then i n s t i t u t i o n a l ized the d i v i s i o n o f powers between the various branches o f government thus had a great bearing o n the internal politics o f the successor states. British colonies generally tended to be less dependent o n centralized r u l e and m o r e emphatic o n the a u t o n o m y o f the various state agencies f r o m the executive b r a n c h . As a result, f o r m e r British colonies f r o m Pakistan to Malaysia have been m o r e likely t o have pluralist f o r m s o f government and m o r e benevolent and o p e n a u t h o r i tarian regimes. These colonies tend to v i e w legal and constitutional issues m o r e seriously as frameworks for managing b o t h political and social relations. The judiciary also had the effect o f instituting particular patterns o f political activity i n the body politic o f the colonial society, w h i c h continued to domhiate the postcolonial scene and by the same token to allow legislations and the courts to become avenues for political activism. The judiciary's autonomy and respect for the law under British rule often led to resistance to colonial rule and die use o f l e g a l channels to assert nationalist aspirations. For instance, i n 1913

M u h a m m a d A h Jinnah

helped to push t h r o u g h the Mussalman Wakf ( M u s l i m Endowments) Validating Act

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to protect M u s l i m endowments and thereby l i m i t the penetration o f Indian society by the British. Similar efforts in Southeast Asia had the same effect, delineating the boundaries o f M u s l i m society and tiiereby protecting M u s l i m cultural life against colonial control. I n Malaya the British compensated the local kings for their loss o f political control by giving them the final say o n all cultural and religious matters. As a result, control over Islamic law and its implementation became an important marker o f monarchical authority. The local Icings have guarded their prerogative w i t h great vigilance, w i t h the result that in Malaysia all issues pertaining to Islamic law fall under the jurisdiction o f state governments. In effect, Muslims used the law and the courts o f the colonial order to l i m i t state power. Many o f these laws d i d not stand after independence, however. For instance, f r o m 1959 o n w a r d the state o f Pakistan has systematically reduced the scope o f private religious e n d o w m e n t s and increased the state's c o n t r o l o f t h e m , and since 1980 the federal center i n Malaysia has stripped the sultans o f some o f their legal powers. Still, the legacy o f M u s l i m legal efforts against colonial rule has continued to influence the u n f o l d i n g o f politics. First, the law and the courts have remained i m p o r t a n t to the resolution o f p o l i t i c a l disputes. Second, the same issues that once protected M u s l i m society i n the colonial order and were thus p o l i t i c i z e d — s u c h as the endowments—have c o n t i n u e d to serve as determinants i n struggles between the state and the society. That the postcolonial state succeeded the c o l o n i a l state made this c o n t i n u i t y easier. Pakistan may have done away w i t h the s p i r i t o f Jinnah's law o f 1913, but the fact that endowments are still a contentious issue is p r o o f o f the c o n t i n u e d salience o f the avenues that were used by local p o l i t i c a l leaders i n keeping the colonial state at bay. O n a different level, h o w the colonial state interacted w i t h society has been i m p o r t a n t to the w o r k i n g s o f the postcolonial state and h o w i t has i n t u r n interacted w i t h M u s l i m societies. Colonial rule was often made possible by m a n i p u lating divisions w i t h i n society. Colonial rule thus accentuated social divisions and helped to institute t h e m by treating different c o m m u n i t i e s differently, i n the eyes o f the law, at the p o l l i n g b o o t h , and i n h o w resources were allocated. Separate electorates or patronage handed out along l i n g u i s t i c , ethnic, or religious lines thus encouraged politics o f identity at the cost o f the development o f u n i f o r m c i v i l societies. I n I n d i a this encouraged the emergence o f the A l l - I n d i a M u s l i m League i n 1906,

w h i c h l o b b i e d w i t h the British for separate electorates f o r

M u s l i m s and H i n d u s . I n Malaysia the same trend o f events led each c o m m u n i t y to f o r m its o w n party. At the t i m e o f independence i n 1957, Malays gathered under the U n i t e d Malays National Organization, w h i l e the Indians rallied b e h i n d the Malaysian I n d i a n Congress and the Chinese b e h i n d the Malaysian Chinese Association. I n essence, elections i n the colonial p e r i o d p r o v i d e d a critical p o l i t ical framevvork that shaped the conception o f c o m m u n i t i e s o f their relation to p o w e r at the center as w e l l as their o w n identity and self-definition.

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The postcolonial state leaders, many o f w h o m came f r o m a m o n g the colonial bureaucracy and military, often f o l l o w e d i n the footsteps o f their predecessors. Stale leaders i n South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, or the Arab Near Hast w o u l d c o n tinue to manipulate social divisions even as they spoke o f national unity. That the political leadership after independence inevitably belonged to one social g r o u p made the task o f m a n i p u l a t i n g social divisions all the m o r e difficult. There have been few cases i n w h i c h the state has risen above the politics o f identity o r has been able to u n d o colonialism's divisive impact. Malaysia succeeded b u t d i d so o n l y after the separation o f Singapore and the ethnic riots o f 1969. Other p o l i ties across the M u s l i m w o r l d continue to operate o n the belief i n the inherent d i v i s i o n o f society—a legacy o f colonial rule. The nationalist rhetoric often belies the reality o f everyday politics i n w h i c h c o m m u n a l , tribal, or ethnic i d e n tities supersede national ones. I n the same vein, rules and procedures i m p l e m e n t e d by the colonial state to control local populations, especially d u r i n g times o f war, had an i m p o r t a n t effect o n d e f i n i n g relations between the state and society i n later years. For instance, restrictions placed o n free expression d u r i n g W o r l d War I and again d u r i n g W o r l d War I I i n India and the Arab Near East, o r d u r i n g the emergency (the suspension o f c i v i l liberties) d u r i n g the wars i n Malaya, set the precedent for later a u t h o r i t a r i a n practices. Clauses i n Pakistan's c o n s t i t u t i o n s o r i n Malaysia's Internal Security Act o f i960 that restrict i n d i v i d u a l rights or give the state extraordinary powers often have their roots i n w a r t i m e British restrictions, such as the Rowlett Act o f 1919,

the India Act o f 1935, and emergency rules and laws i n

Malaya. Especially because W o r l d War I I i m m e d i a t e l y preceded independence, the structure o f relations between the state and society d u r i n g the war had a greater impact o n the politics o f the independent states than the character o f state-society relations d u r i n g colonialism's earlier years. Across the M u s l i m w o r l d the W o r l d War I I p e r i o d was one o f direct assaults by the colonial state o n c i v i l l i b erties. Restrictions o n personal freedoms, the press, the r i g h t to due process and free association, the r i g h t to protest, and the like altered the nature o f state-society relations. That independence f o l l o w e d shortly thereafter, and before the w a r t i m e regulations c o u l d have been rescinded and the nature o f state-society relations restored to its pre—war status, p r o f o u n d l y affected the exercise o f p o w e r and state a u t h o r i t y i n the postcolonial state. The w a r strengthened the colonial and postcolonial states, weakened social institutions that c o u l d have kept the state at bay, and strengthened pluralism. Relations o f patronage between state and society d u r i n g the colonial era also have left an indelible m a r k o n future states. I n areas that were deemed strategically i m p o r t a n t to c o l o n i a l rulers, such as n o r t h w e s t I n d i a , or where c o l o n i a l i s m arrived late and thus was unable to d o m i n a t e completely, c o n t r o l was secured t h r o u g h generous relations o f patronage between the colonial state and the local

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populations. Northwest India—the

t e r r i t o r y that w o u l d

later

constitute

Pakistan—bordered o n Afghanistan and t h r o u g h o u t the colonial era had been a source o f concern to the British. N o r t h w e s t India was also the area f r o m w h i c h the I n d i a n army drew most o f its soldiers. As a result, the British asserted their c o n t r o l over this region t h r o u g h patronage, w i t h the colonial state p r o v i d i n g the local economy and political elite w i t h financial support. I n Malaya a similar situadon held w i t h the rural Malay p o p u l a t i o n , w h o d i d not benefit directly f r o m the financial activities o f the colonial establishment, but whose loyalty was purchased t h r o u g h patronage given to the rural power structure. I n the Arab lands o f the O t t o m a n Empire, colonialism arrived late after the first w o r l d war. As a result, colonialism was never able to establish the k i n d o f state that r u l e d over India or Algeria. The temporary presence o f European powers i n the region, moreover, was often justified by strategic imperatives rather than c o m merce. As a result, the power relations were anchored not so m u c h i n direct exertion

o f p o w e r — a l t h o u g h the French i n Syria often used force—as i t was i n

entangling the local p o p u l a t i o n i n the web o f the colonial state's patronage. I n Syria, for instance, the French were unable to attract settlers to the colony because o f the temporary nature o f the mandate system. The colonial economy and society therefore lacked the distinct settler d o m i n a t i o n that was the mark o f French rule over N o r t h Africa. The colonial establishment therefore dealt direcdy w i t h local landowners. The emerging relationship was one o f state support for local agriculture, w h i c h i n t u r n the French hoped, w o u l d establish French control over rural Syria. The absence o f setders and the patterns o f colonial despotism that were associated w i t h the French allowed t h e m to develop a very different k i n d o f colonial relationship i n Syria. As W o r l d War I I neared, the colonial establishments i n the Arab Near East became more dependent o n securing their h o l d , and m i n i m i z i n g the costs o f control o f the r e g i o n , by generously supplying patronage to the p o p u l a t i o n . The consequences o f state patronage, especially so close to independence, was to determine the pattern o f later state-society relations. The state i n such cases emerged as paternalistic, and the society came t o view patronage as a f u n c t i o n o f the state. The d o m i n a t i o n o f the public sector i n the Arab Near East and the state's extensive patronage networks, w h i c h took shape under the ideological banner o f Arab socialism, thus had its roots i n the character o f the colonial state. I n Malaysia the relations o f patronage led the Malay p o p u l a t i o n to remain aloof f r o m c o m mercial activities and instead to rely o n the state to guarantee its economic and social standing. The links o f patronage between the d o m i n a n t party, the U n i t e d Malays National Organization, and the political structure o f rural Malaysia is very m u c h based o n the colonial structure o f authority. I n Pakistan the relations o f patronage had i n part to do w i t h the relative weakness o f the Indian nationalist

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Congress party i n those regions—especially i n Punjab—and after independence laid the foundations for the rise o f a large and paternalistic state. A l t h o u g h ideological factors and policies adopted by r u l i n g governments have also been i m p o r t a n t i n the eventual d o m i n a t i o n o f the state over society, and g r o w t h i n the size o f state patronage, it is arguable that the existence o f such relations d u r i n g colonial rule may have greatly facilitated such outcomes.

Elsewhere,

w h e r e strong links o f patronage d i d not exist, such as i n Iran i n the Qajar and Pahlavi eras, the state emerged as far weaker. I n Iran, i n fact, i m p e r i a l i s m was very i m p o r t a n t to keeping the Iranian state weak t h r o u g h o u t the nineteenth century. There is evidence that the British may have looked favorably o n the rise o f the Pahlavi state as a means o f shoring up state power to prevent Iran's collapse before an expansionist Russia. Even there, t h o u g h , the British support was short-lived. Soon after the rise o f Reza Shah Pahlavi to power, the British fell o u t w i t h h i m and eventually insisted that he abdicate and leave Iran o n the eve o f the second w o r l d war. As a consequence, the Iranian s t a t e — u n t i l the f o r m a t i o n o f the Islamic Republic i n 1979—did n o t develop the k i n d o f c o n t r o l and therefore power that characterized the states where colonialism had spawned strong relations o f patronage and c o n t r o l . Colonial institutions, policies, and attitudes toward governance determined the trajectory o f state developments i n the postindependence era, leaving a strong intellectual, legal, and institutional legacy i n the M u s l i m w o r l d . M u s l i m states developed i n the shadow o f colonialism, and their developments, modes o f operation, and politics cannot be f u l l y understood w i t h o u t considering the c o n t i n u ities between the pre- and postcolonial eras and the manner i n w h i c h colonialism determined fundamental attitudes t o w a r d politics, society, and governance.

CHAPTER

FOURTEEN

The Globalization of Islam T H E R E T U R N OF M U S L I M S TO T H E WEST

Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad

Since the early 1970s, western Europeans and N o r t h Americans have become increasingly concerned about an apparent change i n the nature and patterns o f h u m a n m i g r a t i o n . For some this change threatens to alter the ethnic and religious c o m p o s i t i o n o f their nation-states, their democratic and capitalist traditions, and their liberal social values. The e m i g r a t i o n and settlement o f M u s l i m s f r o m m o r e than seventy nations to the West has been o f some concern. For those i n the West w h o believe i n the p u r i t y o f race, civilization, and culture, or i n a supersessionist

(Left) Many types of

"Judeo-Christian" w o r l d v i e w , tills movement o f M u s l i m s is a

mosques and community

menacing threat to w h a t they believe to be a homogeneous Western society. For

centers have been built in

others it increasingly represents a significant demographic shift that posits a major cultural challenge, the precise consequences o f w h i c h are unpredictable and unforeseen, because they require a variety o f adjustments by b o t h the host countries and the new i m m i g r a n t s .

America to serve the large and varied Muslim community there. One of the most elegant is the Islamic Center of New York. Designed by the

U n t i l recently many Europeans and N o r t h Americans tended to identify Islam w i t h the Arabs. M o r e knowledgeable scholars added parts o f Asia and Africa to the abode o f Islam. Other scholars were reluctant t o admit that not o n l y is Islam a universal r e l i g i o n w i t h adherents t h r o u g h o u t the globe, but that i t has increasingly become part and parcel o f the West. I g n o r i n g "the facts o n the g r o u n d , "

architectural firm Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill, and located on 96th Street on Manhattan's tony Upper East Side, it attests to the presence of an international

they persist i n t h i n k i n g o f M u s l i m s as displaced persons t e m p o r a r i l y residing i n

community of Muslims in

the West, w h o w i l l one day pack u p and r e t u r n to where they came f r o m or to

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" w h e r e they belong." Still others, w h o for religious or p o l i t i c a l reasons w i s h away these M u s l i m i m m i g r a n t s , have become m o r e s h r i l l i n declaring their presence a threat.

The Encounter of Islam with the West The M u s l i m encounter w i t h "the West" dates back to the b e g i n n i n g o f Islam's expansion. As Arab armies spread t h e i r h e g e m o n y over m a j o r parts o f the Byzantine Empire in Southwest Asia and N o r t h Africa, large segments o f the Eastern Christian churches

(Byzantines, Jacobites, Copts, Grcgorians,

and

Nestorians) came under their c o n t r o l . This close encounter generated a variety o f experiences, r a n g i n g f r o m peaceful coexistence and cooperation to m u t u a l vilification and armed conflict. It also helped craft a corpus o f polemical literature w r i t t e n by b o t h M u s l i m s and Christians, each seeking to demonstrate and p r o c l a i m the t r u t h and superiority o f their o w n r e l i g i o n . Each g r o u p faulted the other for basing their faith o n falsified scriptures as w e l l as p r o c l a i m i n g errant doctrines. The M u s l i m d e p i c t i o n o f the Christian " o t h e r " and the Christian d e p i c t i o n o f Islam have inevitably been forged by the historical context i n w h i c h they were conceived. M u s l i m expansion f r o m N o r t h Africa i n t o western Europe was stopped at Poitiers i n 732, but the Ottomans i n the East kept p r o b i n g Europe's defenses for several centuries u n t i l they were halted after the failure o f the siege o i Vienna i n 1683. European areas that came under M u s l i m jurisdictions i n Spain, Portugal, Sicily, and southern France between the e i g h t h and the fifteenth centuries experienced a t h r i v i n g cultural revival that became a m a j o r influence i n the transmission o f civilization that sparked the European Renaissance. The fall o f Grenada i n 1492 b r o u g h t M u s l i m r u l e i n western Europe to an end. A significant n u m b e r o f the Ottomans continued to live i n eastern Europe, where some o f the i n d i g e nous p o p u l a t i o n converted to Islam i n Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and Serbia. The recent dramatic transplantation o f Muslims i n t o western Europe and N o r t h America has thus been called "the new Islamic presence." Other scholars, n o t i n g the fact that Islam has m o d i f i e d the religious c o m p o s i t i o n o f western Europe and become its second largest r e l i g i o n , have begun to talk about "the new Europe." The second m a j o r M u s l i m encounter w i t h " t h e West" was w i t h Catholic Christianity d u r i n g the crusades and the Reconquista. A l t h o u g h the crusades took place at the p e r i p h e r y o f the Islamic empire and seem to have been c o n cerned w i t h c o n t a i n i n g and weakening Eastern O r t h o d o x y as m u c h as Islam, the bloody story o f the crusaders sacking A n t i o c h and Jerusalem and slaughtering all the inhabitants is increasingly depicted i n today's Islamic literature as one o f Western w a r r i o r s consumed w i t h Christian hatred, bent o n eradicating M u s l i m s

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arid u s u r p i n g their l a n d . Similarly, the leaders o f the I n q u i s i t i o n , a r m e d w i t h the assurance o f Christian t r u t h and v i r t u e and i n an effort to "de-Islamize" Spain, offered M u s l i m s the options o f conversion to Christianity, expulsion, or execut i o n . I n the process they all but eliminated the M u s l i m presence i n western Europe, as the last M u s l i m s were expelled i n 1609. This phase provides an image o f a West n o t so m u c h interested i n g u i d i n g Muslims away f r o m their errant ways or debating the efficacy or t r u t h o f their beliefs as m u c h as eradicating t h e m . Polemics shifted f r o m issues o f errancy o f doctrines and supersession to m u t u a l declarations o f kufr ( u n b e l i e f ) and apostasy, hence sanctioning violence as a means o f restoring t r u t h . The t h i r d encounter is marked by Western colonial expansion i n t o M u s l i m terr i t o r y f o l l o w i n g the fall o f Grenada i n 1492. I n this phase M u s l i m s have encountered the West as a t r i u m p h a n t , c o n q u e r i n g , and i m p e r i a l presence. The colonial experience that initially pitted various European powers against one another i n their quest to subjugate M u s l i m s and m o n o p o l i z e their economic

resources

lasted u n t i l after the end o f the second w o r l d war. By its end Europeans were able t o create imaginary lines i n the sand, parceling out M u s l i m territories i n a v a r i ety o f schemes, carving u p the three Islamic empires (the O t t o m a n , Safavid, and Mughal)

i n t o w h a t is today some f i f t y

nation-states

(members

of

the

Organization o f Islamic Conference). Meanw hile, m o r e than o n e - f o u r t h o f the M u s l i m s i n the w o r l d continue to live under non-Islamic rule. The colonial experience appears to have left a mark o n the consciousness o f those w h o were colonized. Islamist literature increasingly depicts the West as obsessed w i t h c o m b a t i n g Islam o n all fronts. The West is often portrayed as marshaling its forces to launch a m o r e pernicious attack under the guise o f " c i v i l i z i n g " the M u s l i m s and liberating t h e m f r o m "backwardness" and

economic

dependency, as seeking to subvert the influence o f Islam o n society by p r o m o t i n g the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f certain secular values as the f o u n d a t i o n o f political, economic, ideological, cultural, and social institutions. D u b b e d as a " c u l t u r a l attack" (al-qham aJ-thaqaft), it is seen as a multifaceted attack launched by colonial bureaucrats and their w i l l i n g cadre o f orientalists and Christian missionaries ( b o t h Catholic and Protestant). These bureaucrats and missionaries struggled to cast d o u b t about Islam by propagating the superiority ofWestern culture t h r o u g h such colonial institutions as schools, hospitals, and p u b l i s h i n g firms, whose goal was to separate the M u s l i m s f r o m Islam. The current encounter, still i n progress, is a b y - p r o d u c t o f W o r l d War I I . W h i l e this encounter has been c o n d i t i o n e d and shaped d u r i n g the t h i r d quarter o f the twentieth century by the heritage o f the postwar relationships between c o m m u n i s m and capitalism, it is also marked by t w o distinct features. The first is the assumption o f w o r l d leadership by the U n i t e d States w i t h the consequent

604

THE

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creation and e m p o w e r m e n t o f the state o f Israel and the i n v e n t i o n o f the "JudeoC h r i s t i a n " w o r l d v i e w . The second is the e m i g r a t i o n and settlement o f M u s l i m s and their acquisition o f citizenship i n the West, i n western Europe, as w e l l as i n such established regions o f European m i g r a t i o n as Australia and N e w Zealand, Canada, Latin America, South Africa, and the U n i t e d States.

Muslim Communities of the West A l t h o u g h there are n o reliable statistics o n the n u m b e r o f M u s l i m s currently living in the West, a 1986 estimate placed about twenty-three m i l l i o n M u s l i m s i n Europe. The m a j o r i t y lived i n the Balkans and southeastern Europe; they were Slavic converts and remnants o f the Turkish expansion i n t o Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Bosnia or o f the westward m i g r a t i o n o f Tatars i n t o Finland and Poland. M o r e recent M u s l i m sources speculate that the current estimate

of

M u s l i m s i n western Europe (Austria 100,000; B e l g i u m 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 ; D e n m a r k 6 0 , 0 0 0 ; France 3 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ; Germany 2 , ç o o , 0 0 0 ; Greece 150,000; Ireland 5,000; Italy 500,000; L u x e m b o u r g 1,000; the Netherlands 4 0 8 , 0 0 0 ; N o r w a y 22,000; Portugal 15,000; Spain 4 5 0 , 0 0 0 ; Sweden 100,000; Switzerland 100,000; and the U n i t e d K i n g d o m 2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ) and the Americas (Canada 200,000; Latin America 2 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 ; and the U n i t e d States 5 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ) may be as h i g h as 17.4 m i l l i o n . The c o m p o s i t i o n o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s i n various nations o f western Europe is i n part a b y - p r o d u c t o f earlier relations established between European nations and the M u s l i m w o r l d as w e l l as the European expansion i n t o M u s l i m t e r r i t o r y d u r i n g the nineteenth and t w e n t i e t h centuries. It is also c o n d i t i o n e d by the predatory political, economic, and cultural relationships that were developed d u r i n g the colonial p e r i o d . Thus the first significant g r o u p o f M u s l i m s to settle i n France i n the t w e n t i e t h century were N o r t h African and Senegalese mercenaries w h o were recruited to fight i n French colonial wars, i n c l u d i n g a g r o u p that was the vanguard o f the A l l i e d troops that liberated Paris f r o m Nazi occupation. A significant n u m b e r o f harkis, Algerian soldiers w h o f o u g h t w i t h the French colonial government to suppress the Algerian revolution, settled i n France after 1962 to avoid reprisals. I n Germany early settlers were Tatars and Bosnians, many o f w h o m enlisted i n the German army. In the Netherlands the first significant M u s l i m m i g r a t i o n came f r o m its colonies o f Indonesia and Surinam, and in Britain they were f r o m South Asia and Africa. The m a j o r i t y o f Muslims in western Europe, however, were recruited as temporary guestworkers to relieve the shortage o f manual labor d u r i n g the p o s t - W o r l d War I I economic reconstruction. The host European countries had the f u l l expectation that i m p o r t e d f o r e i g n laborers were a transient c o m m o d i t y , and that once their contracts expired, they w o u l d r e t u r n to their homelands. Since then a large n u m b e r o f asylum seekers

THE G LO BALI Z AT ION OF ISLAM

6oc

and refugees f r o m Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Iran, and Kashmir have a u g m e n t e d the n u m b e r o f M u s l i m s i n the West. The o i l boycott that was declared d u r i n g the Arab-Israeli war i n 1973 precipitated an economic

depression

and widespread u n e m p l o y m e n t i n Europe.

Consequently, European economies u n d e r w e n t a dramatic r e s t r u c t u r i n g that decreased the demand for unskilled labor, as more emphasis was placed o n service industries w h i l e manufacturing jobs were exported to Asia. These changes exacerbated the u n e m p l o y m e n t p r o b l e m i n the ranks o f the guestworkers. Several European nations, i n c l u d i n g Germany, France, and the Netherlands, eager to shrink the ranks o f the u n e m p l o y e d and to expedite foreign laborers o n their way home, offered financial incentives for their repatriation. A few took advantage o f the offer, but the majority—faced w i t h the prospects o f unemployment i n their home c o u n try and the lack o f future access to the European labor market—decided to stay, pref e r r i n g the u n e m p l o y m e n t and welfare benefits o f l i v i n g i n Europe. This inadvertently led to a substantial increase i n the number o f Muslims i n Europe, as various governments later allowed family reunification. The policy o f t h i n n i n g f o r eign labor thus backfired, swelling the ranks o f Muslims w i t h unemployed dependents, straining social services as w e l l as the educational systems i n the settlement areas. I n the process the M u s l i m s were transformed f r o m a collectivity o f migrant,

The largest concentrations of Muslims in western Europe

predominantly male laborers to i m m i g r a n t families, f r o m sojourners to settlers,

live in former imperial

and f r o m transients to citizens. The passage o f legislation i n the 1970s i n most

powers. Britain, for example,

European countries that virtually halted labor m i g r a t i o n has led to the creation o f

is host to many Muslims

M u s l i m m i n o r i t y communities, w h o increasingly appear to have become a permanent fixture i n western European nations. The e m i g r a t i o n o f M u s l i m s d u r i n g the last quarter o f the t w e n t i e t h century to Europe and the Americas is part o f the w o r l d w i d e m o v e m e n t o f people f r o m

from the Indian subcontinent, such as these Pakistani Muslims crossing a snowystreet after prayer in the mosque in Bradford.

6o6

THE OXFORD

HISTORY

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ISLAM

east t o west and f r o m south t o n o r t h i n search o f higher education, better econ o m i c o p p o r t u n i t i e s , and p o l i t i c a l and religious freedom. Other emigrants are refugees, often the b y - p r o d u c t o f Euro-American m i l i t a r y o r political activities. This movement also includes a smattering o f those opposed t o the authoritarian regimes that dominate the M u s l i m landscape. The largest M u s l i m concentrations i n western Europe are i n f o r m e r i m p e r i a l powers: Britain and France. As an econ o m i c powerhouse that attracts many i m m i g r a n t s , Germany also holds a large M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n . Each European n a t i o n has a particular relationship w i t h its i m m i g r a n t s , w h i c h has been influenced by its colonial legacy, its historical m e m ory, and its traditional perception o f its f o r m e r subject people. Each n a t i o n is i n the process o f developing policies and models for the treatment o f its newest citizens, w h o p u t the nation's self-perception o f liberal traditions and religious t o l erance to the test. The British m o d e l , f o r m a l i z e d by the creation o f the C o m m o n w e a l t h , perm i t t e d citizens o f the m e m b e r nations o f the C o m m o n w e a l t h and the colonies to reside i n the British Isles. The m a j o r i t y o f M u s l i m i m m i g r a n t s i n B r i t a i n , f o r Most of the Muslims living in Scandinavia, as elsewhere in northern Europe, were recruited to work as laborers

example,

came f r o m the I n d i a n s u b c o n t i n e n t

(Indians,

Pakistanis, and

Bangladeshis) and Africa. As m e m b e r s o f the C o m m o n w e a l t h , they enjoyed the privileges o f citizenship and were granted equal political and c i v i l r i g h t s , a p r i v -

in the 1960s and 1970s.

ilege n o t available t o M u s l i m s in the rest o f Europe. Most o f the M u s l i m i m m i -

Sweden's liberal policies

grants are lower class laborers, except f o r a small n u m b e r o f professionals and a

towards the settlement of

small g r o u p o f wealthy Arabs f r o m the G u l f o i l - p r o d u c i n g states w h o m a i n t a i n

refugees has meani that there is a sizable number of Muslims from various countries there, as reflected in the

l u x u r y homes i n L o n d o n . M o r e recently, conflicts i n various M u s l i m countries have increased the ethnic m i x o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y i n B r i t a i n . Muslims i n France are predominandy o f M a g h r i b i ( N o r t h African) o r i g i n ( f r o m

congregation worshiping in

Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia), w h o have mostly come after W o r l d W a r II. They also

the mosque at Uppsala.

include Muslims from such various M u s l i m states as Nigeria, Iran, Malaysia, Bosnia,

THE

G L O B A L I Z A T I O N OF ISLAM

607

Turkey, Senegal, M a l i , and Pakistan. M o r e than 30 percent o f M u s l i m s i n France are second generation. Because Germany has had extensive diplomatic relations w i t h M u s l i m nations since Charlemagne, a small number o f Muslims have lived i n Berlin since 1777. A M u s l i m cemetery still i n use b y the Turks was opened at C o l u m b i a D a m i n 1798 w h e n the O t t o m a n envoy to Germany, A l i Aziz Effendi, died. W h e n a M u s l i m society that was organized i n Berlin i n 1922 w i t h members f r o m forty-one nationalities attempted to construct a mosque, however, it faded because o f a shortage of funds. The g r o w t h o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y in Germany, however, is a twendeth-century p h e n o m e n o n , the result o f the guestworkers' decisions not t o return to their homelands. The M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n i n the Netherlands and B e l g i u m is p r e d o m i n a n t l y made u p o f Turkish and Moroccan i m m i g r a n t s w h o were recruited as laborers i n the 1960s and 1970s. I n the Netherlands i t also includes a substan-

Muslims, who were a significant presence in Sicily in medieval times, have immigrated to Italy in large numbers in the last two

tial number o f i m m i g r a n t s f r o m S u r i n a m , the

decades. Students were followed by laborers. There are now suffi-

f o r m e r D u t c h colony that w o n its indepen-

cient numbers to require a large congregational mosque in Rome,

dence i n 1975. The pattern f o r Scandinavian

the heartland of Catholicism.

nations is similar except f o r F i n l a n d , w h i c h has a tiny m i n o r i t y o f Tatar traders and craftspeople w h o have lived there since the nineteenth century, w h e n it was part o f the Russian Empire. Their n u m b e r has recently increased because o f the i n f l u x o f Somali refugees w h o arrived by way o f Moscow. I n Sweden and Denmark, M u s l i m labor m i g r a t i o n came i n the late 1960s m a i n l y f r o m Turkey andYugoslavia. Smaller n u m b e r s have come f r o m M o r o c c o , Pakistan, and Egypt. I n the 1980s Sweden's hberal policies toward the settlement o f refugees augmented the numbers o f M u s l i m s by a steady i n f l o w o f Iranians, Lebanese, Kurds, and Palestinians. Labor m i g r a t i o n t o N o r w a y began a decade later than labor m i g r a t i o n t o other western European countries. The largest n u m b e r o f migrants in N o r w a y are f r o m Pakistan, w i t h small contingents f r o m Turkey, M o r o c c o , Iran, Yugoslavia, Somalia, and India. The m a j o r i t y live around the capital, Oslo. M u s l i m emigration to southern Europe came a decade after e m i g r a t i o n to western Europe, w h e n the southern economies began t o prosper and they changed

608

THE OXFORD

HISTORY

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ISLAM

f r o m labor-exporting to l a b o r - i m p o r t i n g nations. The first significant number o f Muslims began emigrating to Spain i n the 1970s. M u s l i m s had a presence i n Sicily as early as the seventh century, however, and d o m i nated the island between the n i n t h and the eleventh centuries. Vesdges o f their history can be seen all the way to northern Italy, wdiere a small M u s l i m m i n o r i t y continued t o five u n t i l the nineteenth century. M u s l i m emigration to Italy is a recent phenomenon that has taken place d u r i n g the past t w o decades, spearheaded by students f r o m Jordan, Syria, and Palestine w h o decided t o settle. They were followed by the labor migration f r o m other parts o f die M u s l i m w o r l d . M o r e recently,

illegal

immigrants,

mostly

Bosnians,

Albanians, and Kurds, have been trying t o settle i n Italy, to the consternation o f the other members o f the European U n i o n . In Western nations w i t h a tradition o f European immigration—the America, African Americans make up the largest convert community to Islam; estimates show that between one and two million African Americans are Muslim.

United

and Australasia

States,

Canada,

(Australia

Latin

and N e w

Zealand)—the suitability o f Muslims for citizenship was questioned i n a variety o f ways and eventually somewhat resolved. This has n o t necessarily lessened the prejudice against their presence. The d o m i n a n t

characteristic o f the M u s l i m population i n N o r t h America is its diversity, w h i c h is apparent i n national o r i g i n and class as well as i n political, ideological, and theological c o m m i t m e n t . The M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y i n the U n i t e d States and Canada is composed o f several generations o f M u s l i m people w h o have emigrated in a quest for a better life, beginning i n the mid-1870s w i t h groups f r o m Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine. A small n u m b e r o f displaced people came f r o m eastern Europe after W o r l d War I . The repeal o f the Asian Exclusion Act in the 1960s i n the U n i t e d States and the m e m b e r s h i p o f Canada i n the British C o m m o n w e a l t h brought a large number o f i m m i g r a n t s f r o m Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. The majority o f those immigrants initially admitted were the educated professionals (doctors, scientists, and engineers) recruited t o fill the needs o f the technological industry. Immigrants continue today t o come f r o m all over the w o r l d , i n c l u d i n g displaced people seeking refuge for political, ideological, o r religious reasons. Muslim immigrants f o u n d freedom i n western Europe and N o r t h America not only to practice but also to propagate their faith. They have taken advantage o f this opportunity and created a variety o f missionary outreach activities i n various c o u n -

THE

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609

tries. They have also created a corpus o f literature geared toward proselytizing. A substantial number o f Europeans and Euro-Americans have converted to Islam, including an estimated fifty diousand Germans and one hundred thousand N o r t h American " A n g l o s " : Christians, Jews, and agnostics, the m a j o r i t y o f w h o m are w o m e n . The largest convert community, however—estimated by various scholars at anywhere between one m i l l i o n to t w o m i l l i o n — i s African American. Their conversion initially came d i r o u g h the teachings o f the Nation o f Islam, headed by Elijah M u h a m m a d and promulgated by his disciple M a l c o l m X, w h o initially p r o m o t e d a racist theology o f black supremacy, a m i r r o r image o f the teachings o f the Ku Klux Klan. The movement developed i n the urban U n i t e d States as a response to the racism encountered by African Americans w h o emigrated f r o m the cotton fields o f the South to the industrial N o r t h . Their relegation to particular w o r k i n g and l i v i n g spaces in the ghettos consolidated new forms o f w h i t e supremacy and oppression. Observers estimate that more than eighty nations i n Africa, Asia, and eastern Europe are represented i n the mosque c o m m u n i t y o f the U n i t e d States and that these many groups constitute one

ummah

(Islamic n a t i o n ) , yet they b r i n g w i t h

t h e m a variety o f traditions and practices as w e l l as a kaleidoscope o f doctrines and beliefs fashioned over t i m e i n alien contexts. Members o f the c o m m u n i t y are initially surprised at the discrepancy between the ideals they have appropriated and the reality o f their differences. Their similar experience o f the West is f o r g i n g some o f them i n t o a c o m m u n i t y o f believers engaged i n a process o f creati n g a sense o f solidarity t h r o u g h c o m m o n traditions and seeking c o m m o n g r o u n d i n their quest to provide a c o m f o r t zone where they can fashion a better future for their c h i l d r e n .

Western Immigration Policies H a n Entzinger has identified three European models for the i m m i g r a t i o n o f non-Europeans. The first is the guestworker m o d e l , adopted mostly i n Germanic countries (Germany, Austria, and Switzerland), i n w h i c h the presence o f the i m m i g r a n t s is considered temporary i n perpetuity. The government does n o t expend any effort to integrate t h e m or their families i n t o the new e n v i r o n m e n t , regardless o f the fact that their c h i l d r e n are b o r n and raised i n these countries and d o not appear to have any desire to be repatriated. The second is the assinv ilationist m o d e l that is p r o m o t e d i n France. This m o d e l insists that i f the i m m i grants seek to become French citizens, they must eschew their f o r e i g n cultural, religious, political, and ideological allegiances and accept and assimilate i n t o the already existing consensus o f reality and p o l i t y o f the prevailing system, shedd i n g all alien characteristics. The French policy o f Gallicization expects that the end result o f i n t e g r a t i o n is that r e l i g i o u s practice is p r i v a t i z e d , w h i l e each

6 10

THE OXFORD HISTORY OF ISLAM

M u s l i m w o u l d become socially and economically assimilated. The t h i r d m o d e l is the ethnic m i n o r i t y m o d e l prevalent i n a variety o f fashions i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m , the Netherlands, Belgium, L u x e m b o u r g , and the Scandinavian nations. This m o d e l recognizes that the i m m i g r a n t has an alternative cultural identity that can be preserved and accommodated w i t h i n the larger context. In Canada the government has been p r o m o t i n g the idea that it is a m u l t i c u l tural society, p r o v i d i n g funds for new i m m i g r a n t s to create ethnic organizations, maintain ethnic cultures, and teach their distinctive languages. The propagation o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m as a national m o d e l was adopted i n the hope o f c i r c u m venting the separatists a m o n g the French Quebecois. Questions are currently being asked about w h e t h e r these efforts have gone too far i n creating m u l t i p l e identities, and whether the ramifications o f m a i n t a i n i n g ethnicities p o r t e n d a balkanized Canada, because m o r e than co percent o f the populations o f Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver are foreign b o r n . In the U n i t e d States " A n g l o c o n f o r m i t y " was perceived as the n o r m t h r o u g h the nineteenth century. Later scholars defined the U n i t e d Slates as a m e l t i n g pot u n t i l i t was discovered that there were too many unmeltables. I n the

19.COS

Will

Herberg p r o m o t e d the idea o f an America w i t h equal religious conglomerates: Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish. There are currently t w o paradigms that are c o m p e t i n g for a d o p t i o n ; b o t h are controversial, and b o t h have their devoted advocates and detractors. The first is p r o m o t e d by Christian fundamentalists, some i n the Jewish c o m m u n i t y , and a large n u m b e r o f politicians. It identifies America as g r o u n d e d i n Judeo-Christian values. Its critics note that besides i n f r i n g i n g o n the idea o f separation o f r e l i g i o n and state, this m o d e l tends t o m a i n t a i n the current power structure, c o n f i n i n g Buddhists, H i n d u s , M u s l i m s , and a host o f other faiths and values to the periphery. The second m o d e l advocates a pluralistic society that celebrates difference. This has raised the fear o f the d i v i s i o n o f America according to ethnic identities, or "grievance groups," w i t h the potential loss o f a cohesive identity shared by all Americans, one that is c o m mensurate w i t h the demands o f the o n l y superpower i n the w o r l d . The situation o f M u s l i m s i n western Europe and N o r t h America, however, is by no means static. N e w legislation that constrains and manipulates i m m i g r a t i o n and citizenship laws has been adopted at a fast pace since the 1970s by Western countries i n an effort to stem the tide o f i m m i g r a t i o n . They are d r i v e n by a v a r i ety o f factors. Some countries are governed by economic necessities, given the fact that h i g h labor costs and technological innovation i n the West have reshaped European and N o r t h American economies. At the same time, most o f these c o u n tries are experiencing a great deal o f pressure o n the resources o f the welfare state because they have an aging p o p u l a t i o n . They are also influenced by political c o n siderations, given the dramatic rise i n racist tendencies i n a n u m b e r o f nations.

THE

GLOBALIZATION

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ISLAM

6l

I

I n Britain the government issued the first measures restricting i m m i g r a t i o n in 1962,

but the restrictions d i d n o t apply to those w h o held British passports,

w h i c h included citizens o f the C o m m o n w e a l t h . As the flow o f i m m i g r a n t s d i d not abate, the government f o u n d i t necessary to institute additional measures i n 1968. As a consequence, those seeking t o emigrate had to prove that they had connections to a f a m i l y i n Britain before they were allowed i n t o the country. I n 1976 the Race Relations Act recognized ethnic c o m m u n i t i e s and their r i g h t t o be different, thus p r o v i d i n g rights for M u s l i m s by p r o h i b i t i n g indirect d i s c r i m i n a t i o n based o n race. It d i d not provide f o r equal rights based o n religious affiliat i o n , however. In the U n i t e d States several measures have been taken to restrict M u s l i m i m m i gration. The quota system has recently been revised to favor w h i t e European i m m i g r a n t s , especially f r o m Ireland a n d eastern Europe. There are reports that the U.S. Department o f State has given instructions to its consular offices overseas n o t to accept people w i t h an Arab background.

Muslims and the Challenge of Life in the West M u s l i m s have emigrated to Western nation-states that have a fully developed m y t h o f national identity, w h i c h has been inculcated i n the citizens over t w o centuries t h r o u g h schools and codified t h r o u g h legends and a particular reading o f history. This identity has shaped several generations o f Europeans and Americans t h r o u g h the cauldron o f t w o w o r l d wars. It has been celebrated i n literature, art, music, and dance. The nation-states have fashioned distinctive identities based o n collective assumptions, p r o m o t i n g a particular w o r l d v i e w that includes a core o f values and attitudes that are taken for granted as unique to a superior West. At the same t i m e , the process o f nation b u i l d i n g has delineated what is considered alien, strange, and w e i r d . I m m i g r a n t s have also been shaped i n their h o m e countries by the particular events and perceptions o f their generation. Most o f the adults among t h e m have a p r e - f o r m e d distinctive i d e n t i t y not o n l y o f their tribe, village, t o w n , or city b u t also o f a national i d e n t i t y instilled by the schools and the institutions o f the state f r o m w h i c h they emigrated. This i d e n t i t y provides the i m m i g r a n t s w i t h a particular understanding o f w h o they are and what their relationship is to the state i n w h i c h they live; it therefore conditions their understanding o f events and reality. I m m i g r a n t s also b r i n g a p r e f o r m e d understanding o f Western culture based o n a particular interpretation o f the shared heritage between the M u s l i m w o r l d and Europe, one that is particularly focused o n the recent experience o f c o l o n i a l i s m and neocolonialism. These perceptions are enhanced and shaped by Western movies and television, w h i c h tend to depict Western society as i m b u e d

6 I 2

T H E OXFORD HISTORY OF ISLAM

w i t h drugs, violence, racism, and pornography. M u s l i m s w h o come f r o m societies that favor strong family solidarity are repelled by w h a t they see as a degenerate Western society consumed by premarital and extramarital sex, burdened by a h i g h rate o f divorce and births to u n m a r r i e d w o m e n , latchkey kids, and fragile family bonds. They c o n d e m n Western values as lacking i n the responsibilities o f parents and c h i l d r e n t o w a r d one another, and they believe that Western society puts too m u c h emphasis o n i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m and not enough o n c o r p o rate responsibility. The f o r m a t i o n o f M u s l i m m i n o r i t y c o m m u n i t i e s i n the West by choice became problematic to some M u s l i m intellectuals, especially those f r o m India, where " m i n o r i t y n e s s " involves the survival o f Islam under n o n - M u s l i m rule. The late Mawlana A b u l Ala M a w d u d i , w h o traveled all over Europe, the U n i t e d States, and Canada, admonished M u s l i m s to avoid integration i n t o their new e n v i r o n ment or to leave lest they lose their souls i n the West's w a y w a r d ways. Other scholars have insisted that such opinions are m i s g u i d e d because the proper interpretation o f Islamic law allows Muslims to live outside the abode o f Islam, as long as they have the freedom to practice and propagate their faith. Still other scholars are o f the o p i n i o n that M u s l i m presence i n the West provides t h e m w i t h an unprecedented o p p o r t u n i t y to f u l f i l l their Islamic d u t y to propagate the faith. I n the process they not o n l y obey God's c o m m a n d m e n t to call people to Islam, they also help to redeem Western society f r o m its evil ways and to restore it to the w o r s h i p o f G o d . The e m p o w e r m e n t o f M u s l i m s overseas and the propagation o f the Islamist ideology as normative f o r the w o r l d s h o u l d supersede personal gain. For Zain e l - A b e d i n , the founder o f the Institute for M u s l i m M i n o r i t y Affairs i n Jidda, Saudi Arabia, the greatest challenge the M u s l i m s face i n the West is the loss o f i d e n t i t y i n an alien social and ideological context. The fear is that i n its eagerness to fit i n , the m i n o r i t y c o m m u n i t y reluctantly but steadily gives up its cherished values, w h i l e the hostile environment slowly but surely chips away at its core beliefs. To protect the c o m m u n i t y f r o m disintegration, A b e d i n determ i n e d that it was necessary to p r o m o t e Islam as an ethnicity and i n the process erect ramparts not o n l y to keep the aliens out b u t , m o r e i m p o r t a n t , to h o l d the M u s l i m s i n . He was aware that this was n o t an easy task given the diversity o f the c o m m u n i t y . He thus identified i m p o r t a n t ideological constructs as w e l l as behavioral distinctions as indispensable markers o f the cultural d i v i d e . He therefore called for the creation by consensus o f a particular body o f ideals, values, aspirations, goals, and doctrines. W h i l e crucial i n setting the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y against other w o r l d v i e w s , the ideals i n themselves are not sufficient, n o r is such a task easy, because M u s l i m s must "squarely c o n f r o n t the reality o f the m o d e r n secular, m u l t i n a t i o n a l state." W h d e m a i n t a i n i n g the unquestioned p r i m a c y o f allegiance t o Islam, M u s l i m s i n the West thus need to determine the proper atti-

THE GLOBALIZATION O F ISLAM

6 I 3

tucle t o w a r d the n e w social reality i n w h i c h they live. Also to be d e t e r m i n e d is the nature and extent o f their c o m m i t m e n t to and participation i n the n e w envir o n m e n t . In the process they must clearly i d e n t i f y the ideological constraints that impede full participation i n the e c o n o m i c and social spheres, f u l l y cognizant o f the consequences o f adhering to a precise and ideologically exclusive stance. They also need to "see h o w some o f the political and social effects o f this stance can be softened and m i t i g a t e d and learn to live w i t h those that cannot." There must be an i n d i v i d u a l as w e l l as a corporate willingness to pay the price for the decision to live o n the social, p o l i t i c a l , and economic margins o f society. Abedin p r o m o t e d the idea o f fashioning Islam as an ethnicity defined by relig i o n , admittedly a rather difficult task because most i m m i g r a n t s have been fashioned by the nation-state f r o m w h i c h they came and identify w i t h its causes and feel particular allegiances to ethnic and linguistic preferences and racial origins. The West thus becomes a laboratory i n w h i c h a new m o d e r n identity is to be fused, one that fosters particular behavioral patterns and promotes a c o m m o n language, distinctive customs and traditions, and recognizable styles o f dress and f o o d , among other cultural distinctions. These are easier to i d e n t i f y and particularize than the effort to inculcate ideas because they are more tangible. At the same time, Abedin was aware that ethnicity could be very divisive, given the diversity o f migrant groups. The difficulty is i n d e t e r m i n i n g whose language, customs, or behavior is more Islamically legitimate. Abedin was aware o f the d i l e m m a his recommendations posed for M u s l i m s because o n a very i m p o r t a n t level, ethnicity itself is un-Islamic. A l t h o u g h cultural distinction promotes cohesion and functions as a barrier to being absorbed or assimilated i n t o a m u l t i c u l t u r a l society, it may also veer f r o m the t r u t h o f Islam, w h i c h affirms that "physical traits, cultural traditions, dress, f o o d , customs, and habits are subordinate or subsidiary to their m a i n doctrinal identity, that G o d created differences i n people i n order to facilitate recognition, that the true identity is determined by the manner i n w h i c h a person or g r o u p o f any race, colour or physical type approaches the business o f l i v i n g , uses his faculties, selects ends and means for his w o r l d l y endeavours." Khalid Ishaque o f Britain is under n o illusion that the host societies are about to accept an ideological m i n o r i t y that seeks to m a i n t a i n its self-respect by p r o m o t i n g c o m m i t m e n t s and priorities that are deliberately incompatible w i t h those o f the host culture. Thus the c o m m u n i t y must realize that suffering is not o n l y inevitable, but it is to be w e l c o m e d i n some cases because it provides the o p p o r t u n i t y to demonstrate the c o m m i t m e n t to a higher cause and walk i n the footsteps o f the early M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y , w h o were persecuted for their faith, under the leadership o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d i n Mecca. Ishaque notes that M u s l i m s w h o choose to live i n nations that are not governed by Islamic law should realize that they must assume certain obligations. W h i l e accepting adversity, they

6 14

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must constantly endeavor to establish a relationship w i t h the m a j o r i t y that w i l l foster an atmosphere conducive to the propagation o f Islam, i n w h i c h the larger society is receptive to the M u s l i m solutions to the problems o f h u m a n i t y By the 1990s there began to be a shift i n the perspective o f leaders o f the Islamist m o v e m e n t o n this issue. Azzam a l - T a m i m i o f B r i t a i n , f o r example, recently identified the rcalit) facing Muslims l i v i n g in the

Wesl as a state o f

cri-

sis. H e feels that the options fostered for M u s l i m s i n the West i n the 1970s have not succeeded. His assessment is that a l t h o u g h not all o f the obstacles i n the relations o f M u s l i m s and n o n - M u s l i m s i n Western societies are b r o u g h t about by M u s l i m s , the more dangerous and d i f f i c u l t ones are the consequences o f M u s l i m perceptions and behavior. Some M u s l i m s erroneously seek to overcome these obstacles by m e l t i n g i n t o Western culture and abandoning some or all o f dieir Islamic identity. Others insist o n avoiding these obstacles by resorting to isolat i o n and h i d i n g i n cocoons, w h i c h some fear c o u l d eventually f o r m ghettos s i m ilar to those occupied by the Jewish c o m m u n i t i e s i n previous centuries. For al-Tamimi this discrepancy i n dealing w i t h the crisis led to the sundering o f relations between the generations. O n the one hand is the generation o f the fathers, mothers, and grandparents, w h o have an e m o t i o n a l and cultural tie to the o r i g inal h o m e l a n d , w h o h o l d o n to the same customs and traditions whether or not they accord w i t h the new e n v i r o n m e n t . O n the other hand is the generation o f the c h i l d r e n and g r a n d c h i l d r e n , w h o have n o e m o t i o n a l ties to the homeland and find little o f value i n those customs, w h i c h are seen as counterproductive, an i m p e d i m e n t to progress i n the society i n w h i c h they have been b o r n . The new M u s l i m presence i n Europe has made some Europeans more self-consciously reflective about being European. I g n o r i n g the history o f i m m i g r a t i o n into Europe over the centuries, the tendency o f scholars and politicians is to depict European nations as unique, cohesive, and integrated societies w i t h distinguislung pre-formed and established characteristics. The presence o f Muslims w h o are able to exercise their political rights i n Britain as citizens and the possibility o f granting citizenship to these M u s l i m immigrants and their children i n Germany, France, and odier European countries has become a contentious matter. At the same time, the recent encounter has also made M u s l i m immigrants more reflective about their identity, as a g r o w i n g number have become more self-consciously M u s l i m . Many w h o w o u l d not have entered a mosque i n their homelands have become acdve i n the mosque movement i n the West and are increasingly defiriing the mosque as the center around w h i c h M u s l i m life should revolve. They seem to seek refuge i n relig i o n , r u m m a g i n g t h r o u g h tradition for i d e n t i f y i n g proper belief, and eager to Islamize behavior, demeanor, and lifestyle as w e l l as to erect cultural boundaries. For a g r o w i n g n u m b e r o f M u s l i m s , strict adherence to ritual practice i n the adopted c o u n t r y marks the boundaries o f distinction. A n n o u n c i n g the need for a

THE

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6lÇ

clean space for daily prayer, die act o f praying, refraining f r o m eating pork and improperly slaughtered meat, and lasting d u r i n g the m o n t h o f Ramadan have become i m p o r t a n t self-delineated boundaries that help the M u s l i m i m m i g r a n t feel secure, distinct, and outside the bounds o f p o l l u t i o n . For some, c o n f o r m i n g to Islamic p r o h i b i t i o n s has become a conscious act o f witness o f a distinctive faith despite public r i d i c u l e and a demonstration o f steadfastness and perseverance i n the face o f social obstacles. For others the act o f a f f i r m i n g uniqueness itself has become an i m p o r t a n t a f f i r m a t i o n o f the need to u p h o l d their identity despite the pressure to change and to abandon the faith. It is a declaration that not o n l y is d i f ference n o r m a l , but i n a most i m p o r t a n t way i t is divinely designed, approved, and sanctioned. Some M u s l i m s w i l l not associate w i t h other M u s l i m s w h o d o not practice these rituals. Those M u s l i m s are deemed as being outside the pale. Inculcating this message i n M u s l i m children is a mechanism to keep them w i t h i n the fold. Thus for some, the r i t u a l is Islam and Islam is the ritual.

Institutionalization: The Creation of the Mosque Culture The m a j o r i t y o f M u s l i m m i g r a n t laborers i n the West—whose p r i m a r y focus was the c o u n t r y they left b e h i n d , where they h o p e d to r e t u r n w i t h e n o u g h assets to restart their lives—demonstrated ver)" little interest i n establishing Islamic institutions. Once they decided to settle and raise families i n the West, their concern centered o n m a i n t a i n i n g their c h i l d r e n in the faith and creating space for c o m m u n a l activities. Their i n i t i a l efforts to b u i l d mosques were generally hampered by lack o f funds. I n Europe the early mosques were constructed either by or for diplomats or by the Ahmadiy yah movement i n Islam, w h i c h sought to convert western Christians to Islam by i n i t i a t i n g a mosque-planting p r o g r a m i n Europe and N o r t h America. Most o f the M u s l i m i m m i g r a n t s i n the West today came f r o m Islamic states i n w h i c h the government organizes, subsidizes, and administers religious institutions. I n most o f these states civic organizations, especially p r i vate Islamic i n s t i t u t i o n s , are deemed suspect and a potential source o f undermining

the government's

legitimacy. F u r t h e r m o r e , the m a j o r i t y o f the

i m m i g r a n t s are Sunnis, w h o believe that there is no clergy in Islam; thus the creation and maintenance o f Islamic institutions i n the West is a n e w experience for the m a j o r i t y o f the M u s l i m diaspora c o m m u n i t y . There is n o consistent m o d e l or pattern i n the West f o r the establishment o f mosques. Each European and N o r t h A m e r i c a n nation-state, i n its efforts to p r o vide for f r e e d o m o f religious faith and practice, appears to have particular p o l i cies that g o v e r n the f o r m a t i o n , a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and the tax-free status o f religious organizations. Every M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y i n the West is thus predisposed to organize itself w i t h i n the j u r i d i c a l boundaries o f the place o f emigra-

6 I 6

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t i o n . The nature and f o r m o f its i n s t i t u t i o n s are dependent o n w h a t the host country's legal system recognizes as the j u r i s d i c t i o n o f M u s l i m authority. The space as w e l l as the nature o f the organizations that can be developed are constrained by the legal parameters o f the relationship between the state and religious i n s t i t u t i o n s i n each nation-state as w e l l as the policies that each state has t o w a r d the i m m i g r a n t c o m m u n i t y . This has challenged the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y t o ascertain that i n the process o f taking advantage o f or adjusting t o these laws, the i n s t i t u t i o n s created i n the West are g r o u n d e d i n Islamic precedent and prescriptions. M u s l i m s thus face a variety o f legal statutes that govern the establishment o f c o m m u n i t i e s and regulate the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f buildings. I n the Netherlands, for example, there is a difference i n the k i n d o f j u r i s d i c t i o n that the g o v e r n m e n t has i n regulating associations and foundations. The executive o f an association

is elected by the m e m b e r s h i p o f the g r o u p a n d is

accountable t o t h e m for changes i n policies, w h i l e the executive o f a f o u n d a t i o n can appoint h i m s e l f or herself. I f the leader i n any way contravenes the statutes, the m e m b e r s h i p can protest o n l y t h r o u g h the c o u r t system. Thus, w h i l e i n the 1970s the t r e n d f o r M u s l i m s i n The founding of mosques is a key

the Netherlands was to incorporate themselves as foundations led by

method of reinforcing Muslim identity.

i n d i v i d u a l leaders, the need f o r m o r e democratic f o r m s o f o r g a n i -

The mosque is often marked by a tall minaret, the signpost of Islam in the cityscape.The glass-fronted mosque at Kingsland Road, Hoxton, London, has a three-story pencil-thin minaret modeled on those found in traditional Ottoman mosques.

zation became evident i n the 1980s as m o r e groups i n c o r p o r a t e d themselves as associations. Both western Europe and N o r t h America have the expectation that the organizational unit for religious c o m m u n i t i e s w o u l d be an i n s t i t u t i o n similar t o the c h u r c h . Thus, for example, i n Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands the host governments, as w e l l as concerned

c h u r c h groups, encouraged the establishment o f M u s l i m prayer centers and r e l i gious services. Part o f the incentive was the need t o develop leadership and t o locate interlocutors w h o represent the group. Also operative was the g r o w i n g apprehension o f the potential for the g r o w t h o f Islamic fundamentalism a m o n g the marginalized guestworkers. This eventually led t o arrangements w i t h the Turkish and M o r o c c a n governments t o supervise the c o m m u n i t y ' s religious affairs. Both M o r o c c o and Turkey w e l c o m e d the o p p o r t u n i t y i n an effort t o blunt the g r o w t h o f fundamentalism and t o curtail its dissemination i n their countries by r e t u r n i n g laborers. M u s l i m i m m i g r a n t s i n the U n i t e d States began b u i l d i n g mosques d u r i n g the Great Depression, w h e n they realized that they were n o t r e t u r n i n g " h o m e " soon. They held annual conventions t o p r o v i d e a venue f o r celebrations and an o p p o r t u n i t y for t h e i r c h i l d r e n to meet suitable marriage partners. W o m e n were

THE

GLOBALIZATION OF ISLAM

very active i n mosque activities and i n f u n d - r a i s i n g . By 195-4 there were

6 I 7

fifty-

t w o Islamic mosques and centers that were m e m b e r s o f the Federation o f Islamic Associations o f the U n i t e d States and Canada. I n 1957, f o r example, a m o s q u e was b u i l t i n W a s h i n g t o n , D.C., f i n a n c e d a n d f u r n i s h e d by various M u s l i m nations t o serve the d i p l o m a t i c c o m m u n i t y . By 1998 the M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n i n the W a s h i n g t o n m e t r o p o l i t a n area h a d g r o w n t o about 5 0 , 0 0 0 , a n d it is n o w served b y m o r e than 30 mosques and centers that cater t o different ethnicities, nationalities, and ideological preferences. W i t h the reopening o f the doors o f i m m i g r a t i o n and the repeal o f the Asian Exclusion Act i n the 1960s, the makeup o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y i n b o t h countries changed dramatically. The n e w i m m i g r a n t s were scandalized by the compromises made by those w h o preceded t h e m i n integrating i n t o the society, and they set o u t t o create their o w n ideological mosques w i t h connections t o the M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d o f Egypt and the Jamaat-i Island o f Pakistan. The dramatic g r o w t h i n the n u m b e r o f mosques and Islamic centers i n Europe and N o r t h America since the 1970s is indicative o f the r a p i d g r o w t h o f the M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n that they serve i n the West. This g r o w t h is also m o r e directly affected by other factors, such as the availability o f funds f o r such p r o jects. Raising funds locally was an f o r m i d a b l e task, given the fact that most o f the i m m i g r a n t s were p o o r a n d c o n d i t i o n e d t o have governments p r o v i d e f o r t h e i r religious needs. B o t h f o r e i g n d o n o r s and European governments stepped up t o the task. I n the 1980s there was a concerted d r i v e t o organize M u s l i m s i n t o congregations and t o establish i n s t i t u t i o n s i n Europe and N o r t h A m e r i c a . This mosque m o v e m e n t was spurred by a confluence o f a variety o f interests, including M u s l i m governments

f l u s h w i t h cash ( i n c l u d i n g Saudi A r a b i a ,

K u w a i t , Libya, and the U n i t e d Arab Emirates) and eager t o support the nascent M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s i n the West. Also actively s u p p o r t i n g such efforts were various Christian d e n o m i n a t i o n s and Islamists. A f e w European

governments—

Most people assume that mosques must have domes and minarets, but actually they can be built in any style or reuse existing structures. This Islamic center in Evansville, Indiana, was a

the Netherlands, Sweden, N o r w a y , a n d France—also p r o v i d e d funds f o r the

church that has been con-

c o n s t r u c t i o n o f Islamic centers a n d mosques. T h e estimated n u m b e r o f

verted to Muslim purposes.

6 i8

THE OXFORD HISTORY OF ISLAM

mosques, Islamic centers, and prayer halls c u r r e n t l y i n the West i n c l u d e 2,000 i n Germany, 1,450 i n the U n i t e d States, 1,000 i n France, 600 i n B r i t a i n , 350 i n the Netherlands, 300 i n Spain, 200 i n Italy, 200 i n B e l g i u m , 100 i n Canada,

100

i n D e n m a r k , 40 i n N o r w a y , 4 0 i n Switzerland. 40 i n Austria, and 35 i n Sweden. The i d e o l o g i c a l mosques established i n b o t h Europe and N o r t h A m e r i c a have been able to p r o v i d e a religiously based sense o f solidarity i n the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y that is capable o f transcending ethnic, l i n g u i s t i c , and national divisions. They have been able to integrate a diverse m e m b e r s h i p that is generally disenchanted w i t h the leadership o f the c o u n t r y left b e h i n d and therefore lacks the c o m m i t m e n t to preserve its national identity. These c o m m u n i t i e s generally believe that n a t i o n a l i s m and e t h n i c i t y are " u n - I s l a m i c , " and they are also opposed to the c u l t u r a l r e p r o d u c t i o n o f music, dance, art, celebrations, o r other f o r m s o f e n t e r t a i n m e n t that serve to b i n d people o f the same ethnic o r national b a c k g r o u n d . In man) places, the professionals

w h o belonged to the ideological mosques

were unable to cater to the needs o f the new i m m i g r a n t s . Policies o f family r e u n i fication w h i c h b r o u g h t large contingents o f relatives (aunts, uncles, and grandparents f r o m the subcontinent), as w e l l as the g r o w t h o f the refugee p o p u l a t i o n fr< >m southern Lebain >n, Iraq, Palestine, S unalia, Kashmir, and Afghanistan, have b r o u g h t to the West a substantial n u m b e r o f people w i t h little or no education. This chain m i g r a t i o n has led to the s p l i n t e r i n g o f the mosque p o p u l a t i o n i n t o distinctive g r o u p s that i d e n t i f y by nationality, ethnicity, or language. I n the process this has also made it possible for M u s l i m s to re-create the sectarian, i d e ological, and theological divisions that exist overseas; thus the development o f mosques or centers persist that identify as Barelwi, Deobandi, Jamaat-i Island, A h l i H a d i t h , Shiite, Ismaili, A h m a d i y y a , A l a w i , Tableeghi, Tahrir, or H i z b o l l a h or affiliate w i t h one o f the various Sufi organizations. A l t h o u g h some o f these groups have reestablished themselves i n different parts o f Europe, o n the w h o l e the European patterns have been different, given the fact that the M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n was recruited f r o m specific countries. Ethnic The Dar al-Islam Foundation Islamic Center Village was built in Abiquiu, NewMexico, in 1980-1981. Designed by the renowned Egyptian architect Hassan Fathy, the mosque is the centerpiece of a complex that includes a school, a clinic, a shopping center, and other public buildings.

b a c k g r o u n d s have therefore generally d e t e r m i n e d the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f the mosques

in Europe. In B e l g i u m , L u x e m b o u r g , and Germany the Turkish

mosques are m o s t l y under the supervision o f the Directorate o f Religious Affairs i n Ankara, Turkey (Diyanet Baskanligi). The second largest organization is the

THE

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6 I 9

In Europe, ethnic background has generally determined who attends which particular mosque.The mosque on Shearbridge Road in Bradford, England, is a converted church, and most of the Muslims gathered for Friday prayer are originally from Pakistan, as shown by their distinctive clothes.

Sulaymanci, w h i c h runs Q u r a n schools. Also operating a m o n g the i m m i g r a n t s are the politically active M i l l i Gorus and the apolitical Risale-i N u r m o v e m e n t , w h i c h is n o w a t t e m p t i n g a reconciliation o f r e l i g i o n and science. A l t h o u g h mosques and Islamic centers cater t o about 10 t o iç percent o f the M u s l i m p o p u l a t i o n i n the West that is involved i n organized r e l i g i o n , they meet other needs as w e l l . The mosque functions as a social center, w h e r e the c o m m u n i t y meets for a variety o f events that help to cement relationships and to p r o vide c o m m u n a l celebrations. It has become the center f o r Islamic knowledge and education, where Islam is taught to the next generation and w h e r e people can reflect o n Islam's meaning i n the new environment. The mosque has also become an island o f sanity w h e r e people's h u m a n i t y is respected, a haven o f security w h e r e their self-esteem is restored, w h e r e they can find respite f r o m the harassment, d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , and h u m i l i a t i o n o f the social environment. It is a venue f o r the sharing o f experiences, the ratification o f n o r m s , and the validating o f values, a place where people's i d e n t i t y is a f f i r m e d i n the c o m m u n i t y o f friends and famil) and. most i m p o r t a n t , m tin- compan) o f fellow believers. As such, the mosque has become a center f o r the c o n f i r m a t i o n as w e l l as the dissemination o f shared social and cultural values, where c o m m u n i t y is forged and f o r m a l i z e d , w h e r e c o m m o n concerns and visions are shared and reaffirmed. The mosque

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Mosques function as social and community centers for the whole Islamic community. Women crowd the entrance to the mosque in Regent's Park, London, for the prayer to celebrate the end of the fast of Ramadan.

structure has become the p r i m a r y s y m b o l n o t o n l y o f the presence o f Islam i n the West but o f its permanence and its future. Its cupolas and minarets are f i x tures i n the Western urban skyline, set i n stone, tile, b r i c k , steel, or concrete. It is the place w h e r e the demarcation line between the c o m m u n i t y and its surr o u n d i n g culture are located and emphasized, or w h e r e they are carefully negotiated and f o r m a l i z e d . A l t h o u g h the message preached i n the mosque may vary according to the leadership's ideological c o m m i t m e n t , there is a consensus a m o n g some r e l i gious leaders that Islam is the antidote to w h a t ails Europe and N o r t h A m e r i c a . They present Islam as the d i v i n e l y sanctioned alternative to what prevails i n the degenerate society i n w h i c h many M u s l i m s consider themselves l i v i n g . Islam stands i n c o n d e m n a t i o n o f Western culture, w h i c h is depicted as hedonistic and m o r a l l y depraved, w i t h dysfunctional families, people h o o k e d o n d r u g s , sexual i m m o r a l i t y , meaningless lives, and psychological disorders. Islam offers a m o r a l order and p r o m o t e s a collective responsibility that keeps the y o u t h f r o m b e i n g lost. Islam calls f o r an equitable and just society, obedience t o parents and respect f o r elders; it restores the a u t h o r i t y o f the parents and provides a sense o f purpose i n life.

THE GLOBALIZATION

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621

The Development of Umbrella Organizations The f o r m a t i o n o f Islamic umbrella organizations that are independent o f the state is a recent p h e n o m e n o n i n the experience o f M u s l i m i m m i g r a n t s . Such o r g a n i zations are the n o r m i n the West, as governments and civic institutions expect to deal w i t h a recognized national leadership, a religious hierarchy; simply p u t , i t is the Western way o f o r g a n i z i n g r e l i g i o n , and M u s l i m s are pressed to r e f o r m u late themselves accordingly. Another factor has been the interest o f foreign-based organizations such as the M u s l i m Brotherhood o f Egypt and the Jamaat-i Island o f Pakistan. The students w h o adhere to the teachings o f these organizations f o r m e d the M u s l i m Student Association, w h i c h helped to establish several h u n dred mosques o n U.S. and Canadian campuses. They later reformulated t h e m selves i n t o the Islamic Society o f N o r t h America (ISNA). A m o r e conservative g r o u p split f r o m ISNA and f o r m e d the Islamic Circle o f N o r t h America. Also involved i n the process are foreign governments w h o seek c o n t r o l o f the mosques to manage their affairs and to keep their ideologies i n c o n f o r m i t y to those advocated overseas. Saudi Arabia established a European office o f the M u s l i m W o r l d League i n Belgium and t w o offices i n N o r t h America ( i n N e w York and Toronto) i n an attempt to supervise the mosque's leadership and its message by r e c r u i t i n g mosques t o register as members o f the C o u n c i l o f Masajid i n Europe or N o r t h America. Both M o r o c c o and Turkey have also been involved i n staffing mosques that are being established f o r their expatriates i n Europe. M u s l i m s w h o have experienced m i n o r i t y status i n other countries appear to be at the forefront i n i t i a t i n g organizations. The Surinamese, for example, were the pioneers i n f o r m i n g Islamic associations i n the Netherlands. They had the experience o f the D u t c h methods i n Surinam. They k n e w the language and c o u l d negotiate their way i n the state bureaucracy as w e l l as i n the society. They emphasized cultural identity and obtained subsidies f r o m public funds and f r o m the M i n i s t r y o f Welfare, Health, and Culture. Other groups that were successful i n creating effective organizations were the A h m a d i y y a and the Ithna Ashris o f Indian b a c k g r o u n d , w h o had the earlier experience o f being a m i n o r i t y g r o u p i n East Africa. Efforts to organize umbrella organizations that transcend ideological c o m m i t m e n t , theological particularities, ethnic allegiances, and personal rivalries have not been t o o successful. This is not for lack o f trying. For example, the Federation o f M u s l i m organizations i n the Netherlands functioned between

197c

and 1981. W h e n i t began to sink, its staff f o u n d e d the M u s l i m I n f o r m a t i o n Center i n the Hague. I n 1979 the Federation o f Turkish and Cultural Associations was f o r m e d ; i t i n c l u d e d eight local Turkish organizations and cooperated w i t h the Directorate o f Religious Affairs i n Ankara. A n o t h e r Turkish organization, the

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Islamic Center Foundation (representing seventeen local groups), was inspired by the Suleymanci movement i n Turkey and had no government connection. The U n i o n o f M o r o c c a n M u s l i m Organizations, representing forty groups i n the Netherlands, was f o u n d e d i n 1978. The Netherlands Islamic Society f u n c t i o n e d between 1973 and 1982, serving the Surinamese c o m m u n i t y ; i t was t h e n taken over by the Foundation for the Welfare o f M u s l i m s i n the Netherlands. N a t i o n a l M u s l i m u m b r e l l a organizations that were representative o f more than one g r o u p included the M u s l i m Organizations i n the Netherlands Foundation, w h i c h was established by Turks and Moroccans i n 1981. A Surinamese initiative that sought the inclusion of other nationalities was the Netherlands Islamic Parliament, established i n 1982. Most o f these organizations failed because o f lack o f funds and the proper staff necessary to create coalitions.

Islamic Education The highest p r i o r i t y for most M u s l i m parents i n the West is p r o v i d i n g Islamic instruction for their c h i l d r e n . Where that was not available, some o f the earlyi m m i g r a n t s i n the U n i t e d States, eager that their c h i l d r e n acquire religious values, Education is an important way to create and reinforce feelings of solidarity in the Muslim community. Although the central place

sent them to Christian Sunday schools. Those M u s l i m parents w h o were c o n cerned about the values that were t h o u g h t to be propagated i n public schools sent their children to Catholic or Baptist schools. W h a t parents often object to is the i n t r u s i o n o f school officials i n t o what they perceive to be parental prerogatives.

of Islamic education in

They are concerned about the school's inculcation o f cultural patterns that are

America is still the home,

antithetical to the parents' traditions and the Islamic faith. Many object to m i x i n g

many children attend pri-

o f boys and girls i n class, coed g y m and s w i m m i n g classes, sex education, and

mary schools run by

counseling by school officials that promotes rebellion against the parents' values.

mosques or Islamic centers. More than one hundred

The central place for Islamic education continues to be the h o m e , although i n

such primary schools are

the U n i t e d States and Canada religious instruction is increasingly being carried o u t

licensed in various states.

i n more than fifteen hundred Sunday schools, y o u t h groups, and retreats r u n by

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623

the various mosques and Islamic centers. More dian one hundred Islamic religious day schools have been licensed by various states. The m a j o r i t y provide p r i m a r y education. The most famous h i g h school is

the

Saudi

Academy

in

northern

V i r g i n i a ; 9 c percent o f its graduating class goes to college. Religious schools f o l l o w the required local c u r r i c u l u m and supplement it w i t h Islamic studies and Arabic language classes. A m o n g the converts i n the African American c o m m u nity, Islamic education is

considered

crucial for the proper instruction o f c h i l dren. The N a t i o n o f Islam under the

Islamic instruction is the highest priority for most Muslim parents in the West. These boys and girls, wearing traditional dress and headscarves, are

leadership o f Elijah M u h a m m a d estab-

attending Arabic class at the Islamic School in London. Opened in April

lished about one hundred schools that

1998, the school was the first state-funded Islamic school in Britain.

he named Universities o f Islam. These were closed in 1976 by Warith Deen M u h a m m a d , Elijah's son and successor. It was after a protracted process o f re-educating the membership in the Sunni faith and retraining the imams and teachers that Warith Deen reconstituted some o f the schools as Sister Clara M u h a m m a d Schools. In Britain the Queen is officially the head o f the c h u r c h , and there is no pretense o f separation o f c h u r c h and state. The 1944 Education Act required that the school day should begin w i t h a Christian-inspired assembly or collective prayer, w h i l e a l l o w i n g parents w i t h alternative religious beliefs to w i t h d r a w their c h i l dren f r o m participating i n Christian activities. A 1988 law made religious instruct i o n obligatory. M u s l i m requests for parity w i t h other religious groups i n B r i t a i n , such as Jews and Catholics, w h o receive state f u n d i n g to support the operation o f their religious schools, have been denied. Instead they have been offered a compromise that allows M u s l i m students to go to single-sex schools. I n several inner-city schools i n Britain 80 to 90 percent o f the student body is M u s l i m . Several confrontations occurred i n the 1970s over school u n i f o r m s that required girls to wear short skirts. Girls w h o d i d not c o m p l y wdth the regulations were expelled f r o m school, and i n some cases parents took their daughters o u t o f school over the issue. A M u s l i m liaison c o m m i t t e e was f o r m e d i n Bradford to negotiate w i t h the educational authorities about issues i m p o r t a n t to M u s l i m s . C o m p r o m i s e s w e r e eventually w o r k e d o u t , a l l o w i n g M u s l i m girls to wear trousers as l o n g as the trousers match the colors o f the school u n i f o r m . Girls are generally allowed to put o n headscarves and they can wear tracksuits for p h y s i -

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cal education classes. Several schools have tried to organize separate s w i m m i n g classes for boys and girls and allow M u s l i m students to wear s w i m m i n g suits in the shower. The first state M u s l i m school i n Britain opened i n early 1998 i n L o n d o n . A second stale M u s l i m school was scheduled to open i n B i r m i n g h a m i n September 1998. In the Netherlands about 60 percent o f Moroccan and Turkish students w h o attend either parochial or p u b l i c school receive religious education that is subsidized by the g o v e r n m e n t . Because C h r i s t i a n i t y is taught i n confessional schools, and rabbis and ministers teach religion i n state schools, M u s l i m s sought to have i m a m s hired as instructors o f Islamic education. A l t h o u g h i n s t r u c t i o n i n Islamic tenets was legally guaranteed i n the state schools, the law required that i t must be taught i n D u t c h , w h i c h few o f the i m a m s mastered. I n 1986 the Diocesan Catholic school board i n Breda denied requests f r o m a f e w Catholic schools to be a l l o w e d to give Islamic i n s t r u c t i o n . I n 1988

the C o u n c i l o f

Churches i n the Netherlands w r o t e a letter to the Association o f D u t c h m u n i c i palities concerning this issue. A l t h o u g h Muslims were appreciative that their c h i l d r e n , w h e n attending Christian schools, were being educated in an atmosphere i n w h i c h G o d is revered, they were apprehensive about efforts at conversion. I n 1988 t w o Islamic schools were opened i n Rotterdam and Eindhoven; the latter was associated w i t h a Protestant school, and the one i n Rotterdam was connected to a public school. For different reasons b o t h M u s l i m s and n o n - M u s l i m s had reservations about the venture. Questions were raised about w h e t h e r there were e n o u g h students to justify the dedication o f an entire school to one g r o u p . Fear was expressed that such a school w o u l d impede i n t e g r a t i o n , and serious questions were raised about the lack o f qualified M u s l i m teachers. By 1992 there were more than twenty Islamic schools in the Netherlands, however: 1 (Forts to make r o o m for Islamic i n s t r u c t i o n i n Christian schools appear to have f o u n d e r e d , as Christians began to question w h e t h e r that was their responsibility. The only exception was the Juliana van Stolbergschool, w h e r e i n i t i a l experiments a l l o w i n g the i m a m t o provide i n s t r u c t i o n in D u t c h eventually led to the school's b e c o m i n g an interreligious p r i m a r y school w i t h its o w n board composed o f b o t h Christians and M u s l i m s . The question o f w h o decides the content o f Islamic education exists i n all Western nations. I n Germany, for example, the government agreed that the Turkish consulate w o u l d provide religious instruction i n Turkish. The c u r r i c u l u m , p u b lished i n Turkey, strives to foster devotion to Turkey and Kemalism as well as nationalistic sentiments to a foreign nation. The c u r r i c u l u m continues to be structured as i m p o r t e d Islam taught by i m p o r t e d teachers w h o d o not understand the German c o m m u n i t y and the daily issues o f life that the children face. Questions are raised about whether this k i n d o f instruction w i l l impede the integration o f

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the Turkish c o m m u n i t y i n t o the German body politic that calls for tolerance and integration o f all groups. Several European countries, i n c l u d i n g B e l g i u m , Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands, are n o w s u p p o r t i n g imams i m p o r t e d f r o m Turkey, Morocco, and elsewhere to provide i n s t r u c t i o n i n Islam to the M u s l i m student population. I n the Netherlands imams were recruited to serve the i m m i g r a n t s i n their o w n language and inculcate them i n their particular culture. By the m i d d l e o f the 1980s there were an estimated 120 foreign i m a m s (seventy Turkish, forty Moroccan, and ten Surinamese, i n c l u d i n g the Ahmadiyya). I n the U n i t e d States, w h i c h constantly r e a f f i r m s the separation o f r e l i g i o n and state, various state and federal officials have h i r e d and credentialed i m a m s f o r service as chaplains i n the p r i s o n system. The chaplaincy office o f the U.S. a r m e d services has also c o m m i s s i o n e d f o u r i m a m s as chaplains and are i n t r o d u c i n g a novel idea i n t r a i n i n g a w o m a n to be an assistant chaplain. I n the Western context the i m a m ' s leadership, social r o l e , and f u n c t i o n have been enhanced and t r a n s f o r m e d to parallel that o f the priest or the rabbi. H e is n o t merely the leader o f prayer as overseas; rather, he has increasingly become expected t o f u n c t i o n as a spiritual leader i n a n o n - M u s l i m e n v i r o n m e n t , an educator and teacher p r o v i d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n o n h o w to live an Islamic life. H e presides over w e d d i n g s and funerals, serves as a chaplain i n hospitals, jails, and the m i l i t a r y . He provides counseling for y o u t h and the t r o u b l e d i n his c o n gregation and has become the representative o f the M u s l i m s as w e l l as t h e i r spokesman to the larger c o m m u n i t y , a propagator o f the faith i n dialogue w i t h n o n - M u s l i m s , and the ambassador t o the host c u l t u r e , a t t e m p t i n g to b u i l d bridges to other f a i t h c o m m u n i t i e s . The M u s l i m s are h a r d pressed t o f i n d i m a m s adequately e q u i p p e d f o r such a role. F o r e i g n - b o r n and - t r a i n e d i m a m s have o f t e n failed to provide the c o m m u n i t y w i t h the k i n d o f leadership that makes M u s l i m s c o m f o r t a b l e i n t h e i r n e w homes i n the West. They have generally insisted o n replicating f o r e i g n c u l tural standards and constraints as n o r m a t i v e for all times and places. They have displayed l i t t l e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the pressures y o u n g p e o p l e face i n the Western e n v i r o n m e n t and have little sympathy w i t h those w h o advocate that r e l i g i o n s h o u l d pertain o n l y to the area o f belief and not t o c u l t u r e . A f e w M u s l i m leaders have raised the issue o f w h e t h e r i t is t i m e to start t r a i n i n g i m a m s f r o m a m o n g the i m m i g r a n t s and their c h i l d r e n . The q u e s t i o n is w h e r e the n e w breed o f i m a m s w o u l d get their education. Efforts t o o p e n schools f o r the t r a i n i n g o f i m a m s i n the U n i t e d States and B r i t a i n have been m e t w i t h skepticism f r o m those w h o suspect particular theological advocacy o n the part o f the leadership. They also have been c o n d e m n e d by those w h o believe that any c o m p r o m i s e or adjustment t o the Western e n v i r o n m e n t is t a n t a m o u n t t o rejection o f the f a i t h .

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Interfaith Relations Efforts t o create a context for interreligious dialogue and i n t e r f a i t h activities i n the West generally have been initiated by Christians and Jews and have been a source o f M u s l i m suspicion, focused particularly on the goals and purposes o f such ventures. Several Christian umbrella organizations i n the West, i n c l u d i n g the Conference o f European Churches and the C o u n c i l o f Bishops' Conferences i n Europe, sponsored a joint project focused o n Islam in Europe. The W o r l d Council o f Churches i n Geneva opened an office that deals w i t h interfaith issues; it has engaged overseas M u s l i m scholars for several decades. The National C o u n c i l o f Churches i n the U n i t e d States finds itself hamstrung by its bureaucratic structures w a i t i n g f o r the f o r m a t i o n o f a comprehensive Islamic umbrella organization that brings together the various groups. O n l y then can the organization initiate o f f i cial dialogue w i t h M u s l i m s o n the national level. M u s l i m s have taken note that the proclaimed u n d e r l y i n g principles for establ i s h i n g relationships w i t h people o f other faiths by these organizations and by the Vatican differ i n their perception and treatment o f Jews and M u s l i m s : Judaism often receives a m o r e amicable treatment. Because o f this, M u s l i m s have often demonstrated a great reluctance to participate. The suspicion is that dialogue and other interfaith activities are a n e w phase i n Christian efforts to convert M u s l i m s or that they have a h i d d e n agenda a i m e d at u n d e r m i n i n g Islam. Also operative is the prevailing M u s l i m belief that Islam provides all pertinent i n f o r m a t i o n about Judaism and Christianity, thus there is n o need for M u s l i m s to learn anything more about these t w o religions. Some M u s l i m s refuse to appear at a c h u r c h unless i t is to i n f o r m Christians about Islam's virtues and m o r a l values. Others take interfaith activities as an o p p o r t u n i t y to preach Islam. They disseminate a variety o f publications w r i t t e n by overseas scholars w h o have n o understanding o f the Western context or the protocols f o l l o w e d i n i n t e r f a i t h activities, or w h o d o not package their material i n the Western i d i o m . I n fact, some o f the material disseminated—such as the videotapes o f dialogues by A h m a d Deedat and Jimmy Swaggart's "Is the Bible the W o r d o f God?" M u s l i m literature that attempts to prove that the Bible prophesied the c o m i n g o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d , or the w r i t i n g o f converts f r o m Christianity c o n d e m n i n g their f o r m e r faith—have had the opposite effect o f deepening the misunderstandings between the t w o religious c o m m u n i t i e s . Interfaith efforts have also been hampered by Jewish suspicion o f ChristianM u s l i m collaboration that does not include t h e m , by the reticence by some evangelical Christian participants w h o see Muslims as the agents o f the Antichrist, and by those Muslims w h o see any cooperation or collaboration between Muslims and people o f other faiths as bordering o n i n d u l g i n g i n kufr, or abandoriing the faith.

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The Jewish c o m m u n i t y for m o r e than half a century has been able to organize and maintain interfaith relations w i t h various Christian groups. Generally speaking, i n the U n i t e d States the Jewish c o m m u n i t y has stipulated up front that such activity is conditional o n the acceptance o f the state o f Israel as a genuine expression o f Jewish expectations. Criticism o f Israel and its policies toward Palestinian Christians and Muslims is characterized as being anti-Semitic. Interfaith activities are thus perceived by some Muslims as a ploy to provide a protective shield over the c o n t i n u ing dispossession o f the Palestinian people. In Sweden, w h e r e interfaith activities are supported by the state, a m o r e trusting m i l i e u has been achieved. F r o m the b e g i n n i n g , a priest, a rabbi, and an i m a m held public dialogue sessions t o w h i c h they were invited by churches, universities, and the media. Their first j o i n t project was a study o f fundamentalism. I n August 1994 they went o n a peace mission t o Sarajevo. I n 1996 they f o u n d e d the N o r d i c Center for Interreligious Dialogue, for w h i c h they received donations f r o m the government of Göteborg. The center has nine board members, three f r o m each faith c o m m u n i t y . Its c o m p o s i t i o n does not represent the n u m e r i c a l strength o f the c o m m u n i t i e s , because there are twelve thousand Jews, mostly around Stockholm, and t w o h u n d r e d and fifty thousand M u s l i m s , w h i l e the m a j o r i t y o f the rest o f the p o p u l a t i o n has Christian roots. M u s l i m efforts are directed t o w a r d n o n - M u s l i m s . They d i s t r i b u t e publications d e m o n s t r a t i n g Islam's virtues and m o r a l values. I n Sweden, as elsewhere, members o f the M u s l i m Brotherhood have taken the initiative i n actively p r o m o t i n g dialogue, w h i l e the Salafiya groups are opposed to any dialogue and vehemently oppose i n v i t i n g n o n - M u s l i m s , w h o are deemed apostate, to the mosque. I n B r i t a i n , the U n i t e d States, and Canada, the i n i t i a l M u s l i m response to interfaith overtures is being reconsidered. The theme o f the 1970s and 1980s, founded o n the conviction that the message o f Islam is p o w e r f u l and persuasive enough that all Westerners w i l l see the light and convert to Islam, appears to be w a n i n g . What M u s l i m s are seeing instead is actually an increased antipathy t o w a r d Islam o n the part o f many Westerners. This has led to a serious reassessment o f the role o f M u s l i m s and Islam i n the West. Such reflection is taking i n t o account the reality that the M u s l i m s o f the West have vital interests that can best be tackled t h r o u g h cooperation w i t h the larger c o m m u n i t y Azzam al-Tamimi o f Britain has identified these interests as f o l l o w s : h e l p i n g to address such problems as racism and the deterioration o f m o r a l i t y i n Western societies by participating i n this society and t r y i n g to influence the decision makers; spreading Islamic daivo (the call to Islam) i n a manner that is comprehensible to Western society; and t r y i n g to alleviate the conditions o f M u s l i m s overseas caused by imperialist policies o f Western governments by w o r k i n g w i t h those w h o are nonaligned i n the West to help pressure their governments.

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A few M u s l i m i n d i v i d u a l s and congregations are b e g i n n i n g t o see the value o f p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n i n t e r f a i t h d i a l o g u e . M e a n w h i l e , serious questions

con-

t i n u e t o be raised about the goals a n d consequences o f i n t e r f a i t h a c t i v i t y f o r believers o f all faiths. There is c o n c e r n that such p a r t i c i p a t i o n involves r i s k , because it may weaken the r e l i g i o u s c o m m i t m e n t o f those i n v o l v e d s h o u l d they f i n d v i r t u e i n the faiths o f others. They q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r the openness to the other may strengthen tolerance o f fanaticism, i n the process s a c r i f i c i n g the t r u t h , or w h e t h e r the c o m m i t m e n t to i n t e r f a i t h d i a l o g u e creates an alternative r e l i g i o u s c o m m u n i t y at the expense o f b e l o n g i n g t o the participant's o w n . It f u r t h e r poses the question o f w h e t h e r such activity provides an atmosphere that presupposes permissiveness

and relativism because the c o m m i t -

m e n t is to p l u r a l i s m .

The Concern for Security The discourse s u r r o u n d i n g the current experience o f M u s l i m s i n the West has revolved around t w o issues deemed o f paramount importance by b o t h Muslims and the nations i n w h i c h they have sought to live: security and cultural coherence. That M u s l i m s i n western Europe chose to become permanent

residents

rather than m i g r a n t laborers, and t o become citizens w h e r e possible i n some European countries and N o r t h America, has increasingly become a p r o m i n e n t concern o f many Westerners. M u s l i m i m m i g r a n t s and their c h i l d r e n have come to the realization that they have to cope w i t h the prevalent p r e - f o r m e d stereoDuring the revolution in Iran in 1979. an imam led a demonstration in support of Ayalollah Khomeini outside

types, h o n e d over centuries o f conflict and c o m p e t i t i o n . They also have to deal w i t h the increasing rhetoric o f d e m o n i z a t i o n and prejudice. I n the U n i t e d States some conservative commentators and pundits have created such controversies.

the Iranian embassy in

This rhetoric often holds M u s l i m s i n the West and Islam as the r e l i g i o n respon-

London.

sible for the acts o f irresponsible individuals overseas.

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The Islamic r e v o l u t i o n i n Iran i n 1978-79 was a major catalyst i n refocusing Western attention o n Islam's perceived potential threat. It tapped i n t o a heritage o f Western suspicion and fear o f Muslims. The hostage taking, made intimate by its exposure o n television, f o l l o w e d by the attack o n Islam's holiest shrine i n Mecca by w h a t was depicted as M u s l i m fanatics, has resurrected the long t r a d i t i o n o f associating M u s l i m s w i t h violence and jihad. I n 1980 the violence came h o m e to Europe w i t h the b o m b i n g o f a synagogue and an assassination attempt o n an Iranian i n Paris. This was followed by the assassination o f the French ambassador i n Beirut i n 1981, a b o m b explosion i n the Paris-Toulouse train, and a shootout i n Paris. Fifty-eight French soldiers were killed i n Beirut o n October 23, 1983. A parallel attack o n the same day k i l l e d 241 American marines w h e n trucks packed w i t h explosives were driven i n t o their headquarters there. A c o u ple o f years later several French citizens were taken hostage. D u r i n g 198c and 1986 several bombs exploded i n Paris. The headlines i n the press were no longer about events far away b u t about the w o u n d e d and the dead d o w n t o w n . Europeans began to fear what the M u s l i m s next d o o r could d o to t h e m . The Muslims were depicted as the obscurantist sinister enemy, ruthless followers o f a religion that promotes violence and b l i n d adherence to tradition. Similar attitudes have been f o r m e d i n the U n i t e d States as a consequence o f terrorist acts that have resulted i n the death and injury o f American citizens. These include the bombings o f Pan A m flight 103 i n 1988 and the W o r l d Trade Center i n N e w York i n 1993, the murder o f t w o Central Intelligence Agency employees i n Washington, D C , i n 1993, and the discotheque b o m b i n g i n Germany i n 1986. Such acts have heightened fears o f Islamic fundamentalism as being driven by irrational people w h o place no value o n h u m a n life. The fatwa (legal o p i n i o n ) by the Ayatollah K h o m e i n i sanctioning the death o f Salman Rushdi for defaming the Prophet M u h a m m a d i n his Satanic Verses and die debates that followed reaffirmed these perceptions. The press depicted Islam as antiliberal, antimodern, anti-intellectual—the epitome o f what is not "West."The b u r n i n g o f Rushdi's book in Britain created fear i n the British public that Muslims i n their midst were intolerant and averse to freed o m o f thought. Some Muslims i n Britain sought what they perceived to be parity o f treatment. They wanted the implementation o f the British blasphemy law that w o u l d at least ban the book's circulation. They f o u n d out that the law d i d not cover Islam but protected only the official state religion: Anglicanism. It brought home to many M u s l i m s that their concerns are considered to be outside the pale, h i the United States, Muslims noted that some books, i n c l u d i n g Little Black Sambo, are kept out o f libraries because they offend certain segments o f the society, but the same sensitivity was not shown to Muslims i n the case o f Satanic Verses. Muslims consider some segments o f the Western press to be extremely biased against t h e m , p r o v i d i n g unfavorable spin about issues that are o f paramount

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importance for the welfare o f M u s l i m s in the w o r l d . The press generally c o n demns Islamists because they espouse an anticolonial r h e t o r i c , that by d e f i n i t i o n is anti-West. They also c o n d e m n the West for its silence o n the shedding o f M u s l i m b l o o d i n Chechnya, Kashmir. Palestine, and Bosnia and for its u n q u a l i fied support o f Israel. As v i c t i m s o f hate speech and hate crimes, i n c l u d i n g assault, murder, and the b u r n i n g o f mosques i n b o t h Europe and N o r t h America, M u s l i m s ' apprehension about their security and their future has increased. They are convinced that Westerners d o not value M u s l i m life as they d o their o w n . H o w else c o u l d they have stood by i n 1992 w h i l e tens o f thousands o f Bosnians were v i c t i m s o f ethnic cleansing? I n 198c several mosques and Islamic centers were vandalized and threatened i n different parts o f the U n i t e d States ( i n San Francisco and Orange County, California, i n Denver, Colorado, i n Quincy, Massachusetts, and i n D e a r b o r n , M i c h i g a n ) . Also i n 198c t w o pipe bombs exploded i n the South West mosque i n H o u s t o n , Texas, d u r i n g the celebration o f the e i d , an Islamic holiday. N o one was h u r t because the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y had gathered i n a different place, because o f the expected presence o f thousands for the celebration. Various Arab o r g a n i zations also received death threats at this t i m e . These acts were b r o u g h t to the attention o f a few U.S. legislators, w h o included mosques w i t h the other religious institutions being protected i n the Hate C r i m e Bill that was signed i n t o law i n 1988.

A l t h o u g h the law became effective i n 1990,

r e q u i r i n g the Justice

D e p a r t m e n t t o collect and p u b l i s h i n f o r m a t i o n o n hate c r i m e s , i t has n o t deterred the g r o w i n g acts o f vandalism against mosques and Islamic institutions. There appears to be a correlation between overseas events and the rise in the n u m b e r o f hate crimes i n the U n i t e d States. Mosques and Islamic centers increasingly are targeted d u r i n g heightened periods o f c o n f r o n t a t i o n between the West and M u s l i m nations. In several European countries housing discrimination as well the l o w income level o f the M u s l i m laborers, many o f w h o m are n o w o n welfare, has confined them to particular residential areas that have become virtual ghettos o f foreign residents. Some M u s l i m s d o not speak the language o f the countries i n w h i c h they dwell or have not had a chance to meet or interact w i t h a single European, even after l i v i n g for more tiian twenty years i n Europe. In France the spectacular rise o f the far right d u r i n g the 1980s is partly a consequence of a xenophobic platform that projects all problems facing French society o n the presence o f i m m i g r a n t s . A l t h o u g h at first it was dismissed as being p r o m o t e d by a racist fringe, its p r o p o nents gained crcdibihty, given France's economic recession and the g r o w t h o f u n e m p l o y m e n t . A consensus is slowly emerging that the i m m i g r a t i o n o f N o r t h Africans presents a special set of issues that previous immigrants d i d not pose for French society: Their African o r i g i n and Islamic faith have become the issue.

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I

Several European p o l i t i c a l parties have become vocally a n t i - M u s l i m . These i n c l u d e the Front Nationale i n France, the Vlaams Blok i n B e l g i u m , and the Republikaner i n Germany. The C e n t r u m p a r t i j o f the Netherlands is less p o w erful than s i m i l a r a n t i - i m m i g r a n t parties o f western Europe. It has o n l y one o f 150 m e m b e r s i n the second chamber o f Parliament. A l t h o u g h attacks o n asyl u m centers and Islamic i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the Netherlands have increased, they d o n o t m a t c h w h a t occurs i n n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s . Since 1991,

w h e n Frits

Bolksteini o f the conservative liberal party raised some u n c o m f o r t a b l e issues about the presence and i n f l u e n c e o f ethnic m i n o r i t i e s o n D u t c h society, there has been m o r e o p e n p u b l i c debate o n i m m i g r a t i o n i n the Netherlands. I n 1993 there was m o r e p u b l i c expression o f x e n o p h o b i a and panic about the rate o f i m m i g r a t i o n ; the issue o f w h e t h e r the Netherlands can accommodate

any

m o r e people was raised. The public discussion o f w h a t d o w i t h the M u s l i m s i n Europe and the threat they pose t o its security, as w e l l as the accompanying violence against M u s l i m life and property, has been disconcerting. For many M u s l i m s the massacre o f 200 Algerians i n Paris i n 1 9 6 1 , i n the 1993 k i l l i n g o f an Algerian i n Paris, and the image o f German hooligans b u r n i n g a hostel for Turkish i m m i g r a n t s in Solingen i n 1993—has left an indelible mark. As a consequence, M u s l i m s i n the West have generally favored keeping a l o w profile for security reasons. They see themselves as the latest v i c t i m s o f c h a u v i n i s m and xenophobia. The M u s l i m s i n the West have thus become the new villains o n the block, j o i n i n g Jews, gypsies, Italians, and African Americans i n being reviled.

The Cultural Divide The scramble to identify the next threat to Western democracies that ensued after the fall o f c o m m u n i s m has n o t yet abated. Islam and M u s l i m culture have been depicted by certain interests i n the U n i t e d States as the next challenge, i f not the enemy challenging the West. It is accused o f being a religion that is devoid o f integrity and progressive values, a religion that promotes violent passions in its adherents, a menace to c i v i l society, and a threat to the peace-loving people o f the w o r l d . M u s l i m s are often cast as b l o o d t h i r s t y terrorists, whose loyalty as c i t izens must be questioned because they are perceived to be obsessed w i t h the destruction o f the West. Samuel H u n t i n g t o n ' s p u b l i c a t i o n o f "The Clash o f C i v i l i z a t i o n s " i n Foreign Affairs, p r o m o t i n g a thesis that the next conflict w i l l not be between nadon-states or ideologies but civilizations, appears to have gained support a m o n g some p o l icy pundits. His thesis has r e c o n f i r m e d to M u s l i m s that colonialism is n o t over, because it has echoes o f themes heard since the nineteenth century. O n the sur-

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face it appears as a rehash o f a c e n t u r y - o l d m y t h that undergirded European hegemonic policies j u s t i f y i n g wars o f colonial expansion and missionary c r u sades d u r i n g the nineteenth century under the r u b r i c o f "civilizational m i s s i o n , " " w h i t e man's b u r d e n , " or Manifest Destiny. It posited the superiority o f European m a n , the acme o f h u m a n c i v i l i z a t i o n , w h o w i l l i n g l y assumes the burden o f shari n g his values and achievements w i t h the rest o f the backward w o r l d . I n the process, this m y t h justified the ransacking o f the cultures o f the conquered people and c o n f i n i n g M u s l i m achievements to ethnological museums or the dustb i n o f history. M e a n w h i l e , the i m m i g r a n t s b r i n g w i t h t h e m a different u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f their c u l t u r e . Many believe that they have been v i c t i m s o f Western c u l t u r a l hegemony. For t h e m the preservation o f distinctive culture is the last l i n e o f defense against total o b l i t e r a t i o n . Battered by Western weapons o f d e s t r u c t i o n , overcome by Western scientific achievements, and reduced to vassal states, M u s l i m s have been a t t e m p t i n g to resist by h a n g i n g o n to Islamic c i v i l i z a t i o n as the last bastion o f h u m a n d i g n i t y and w o r t h , a means o f galvanizing people and keeping t h e m f r o m total d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . Consequently, c o n f o r m i t y to Islamic c u l t u r e , t r a d i t i o n s , and n o r m s is n o t o n l y a source o f p r i d e i n M u s l i m c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o h u m a n c i v i l i z a t i o n , it has become a d i v i n e i m p e r a t i v e , a cure f o r w h a t ails M u s l i m society and the w o r l d . It is p r o m o t e d as possessing redemptive powers. Public performance o f the rituals o f Islam and m a i n t a i n i n g a distinctive c u l t u r e has thus b e c o m e a vehicle o f healing. Deviating f r o m the consensus o f w h a t is p u b l i c l y considered n o r m a t i v e by the m a j o r i t y p o p u l a t i o n i n w h i c h the i m m i g r a n t s live is not backwardness; rather, it is a w i l l f u l act o f coherence and an o p t i o n o f a m o r e m e a n i n g f u l reality. I n the process, f o r some, r i t u a l has b e c o m e an i n s t r u m e n t o f protest against a society that continues to treat Islam as an alien r e l i g i o n w h o s e adherents are fixated i n the seventh century.

Islamic Law Many M u s l i m leaders in the West w o u l d like to see Western states recognize Islamic law as a body o f public law, w h i c h w o u l d provide parallel legal status for Muslims w i t h those o f other religions. In a few instances Muslims i n the West have been able to negotiate some accommodation o f their particular traditional, c u l tural, and religious needs regarding burial practices. A m o n g the early immigrants, the fear o f being buried a m o n g the "unbelievers" led to repatriating corpses to the country o f o r i g i n . The acquisition o f cemeteries dedicated to Islamic burials i n the West have all but put an end to this practice i n the U n i t e d States, Canada, and many parts o f w estern Europe, although some families repatriate the dead for

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emotional reasons. Furthermore, despite laws to the contrary, i n some instances M u s l i m s have been able t o prepare the corpse for burial i n accord w i t h Islamic tradition and have been allowed to

use

shrouds

in

place

of

coffins. A few mosques i n western Europe and N o r t h America have even b u i l t r o o m s o n the premises for the ritual washing o f the dead. I n other

places

exceptions have been made i n v i o l a t i o n o f z o n i n g laws. For example,

some

mosques

in

B r i t a i n that d o n o t meet the specifications o f religious areas, such as adequate parking space, have been legalized to accommodate the needs o f the p o p u l a t i o n .

Eating meat thai has been slaughtered according to correct ritual practice has become increasingly important for many Muslims in the West as a means to distinguish themselves from Westerners and maintain their cultural identity. This shop in Manningham, England, advertises that it uses ritually slaughtered (halal) meat for the kebab it sells along with fish and chips.

D u r i n g the 1984 general election i n Britain, Muslims demanded recognition o f the shariah i n matters o f personal status law: marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. Although law i n Britain covers all citizens regardless o f their religious affiliation, some consideration to M u s l i m legal traditions appears to have been made i n at least t w o divorce cases i n w h i c h the husband had to pay the specified amount i n the marriage contract rather than to f o l l o w British custom. I n several cases, i n b o t h the U n i t e d States and Canada, the family courts have recognized the Islamic marriage contract as a legal document, equivalent to a prenuptial agreement, whose stipvdation for setdement i n the case o f divorce is approved by the courts. Eating halal f o o d (meat f r o m animals that have been properly slaughtered and contains

n o p o r k b y - p r o d u c t s ) has assumed

a vital s y m b o l i c d i m e n s i o n .

A l t h o u g h early i m m i g r a n t s f o l l o w e d the fatwa by the Islamic

modernist

M u h a m m a d A b d u h sanctioning the eating o f meat killed for Christians and Jews, mosques are increasingly disseminating i n f o r m a t i o n and raising consciousness, declaring that eating such f o o d is un-Islamic. The i m m i g r a t i o n o f M u s l i m s f r o m the subcontinent since the late 1960s and the g r o w t h o f the Islamist ideology a m o n g i m m i g r a n t s have p u t a great deal o f emphasis o n dietary laws to keep M u s l i m s f r o m m i x i n g socially w i t h n o n - M u s l i m s . I n the U n i t e d States, A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n M u s l i m s have a t r a d i t i o n o f using dietary laws as boundaries around

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the c o m m u n i t y . I n Bradford, England, t w o M u s l i m butchers were f i n e d 3,500 pounds i n 1986 for operating outside the parameters governing the slaughter o f animals. This brought a strong reaction f r o m the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y , but w h e n the Bradford Council for Voluntary Services allocated special funds to take care o f the dietary concerns o f M u s l i m s , other people i n the c o m m u n i t y objected. The c o u n c i l proposed that meat sandwiches w o u l d be served o n separate platters and f o o d containing alcohol w o u l d not be served to M u s l i m s . A n ethnic m e n u and halal meat w i l l , whenever possible, be p r o v i d e d by the catering services hired by the council. They also proposed in-service t r a i n i n g i n ethnic cooki n g for all council cooks. W h i l e issues o f diet and proper space for worship and burial are being negotiated and resolved by government institutions, the g r o w i n g public debate concerns the consequences o f the M u s l i m presence for liberal societies i n the West. The focus is most recently on the role o f w o m e n i n Islam, w h o i n Western perception are considered to be oppressed. Such views have been reinforced by televised reports about the treatment o f w o m e n i n revolutionary Iran and in Afghanistan under the rule o f the Taliban and by the vocal rejection o f the universal values for w omanhood as r

p r o m o t e d by the U n i t e d Nations. The issues range f r o m abortion, female genital m u t i l a t i o n , and sexual orientation to wearing the veil. The issue o f w e a r i n g the hi job (headscarf) took o n national significance i n France w hen several female students were banned f r o m w e a r i n g t h e m o n the g r o u n d s that such dress is t a n t a m o u n t to p r o s e l y t i z i n g , a proscribed activity i n the secular schools o f France. The debate that f o l l o w e d i n the French press d w e l l e d o n related issues. Is the hijab a cover f o r the persecution and repression o f w o m e n ?

Is i t the M u s l i m standard raised to challenge the French

Tricolor? Is it a means o f s n u b b i n g a hospitable French society by an ingrate p o p u l a t i o n f l a u n t i n g its reactionary customs i n the m i d s t o f the center o f Western civilization? For M u s l i m s the ban was seen as an a n t i - M u s l i m act because Christians are allowed to wear crucifixes and Jews yarmulkes, b o t h o f w h i c h s h o u l d similarly, u n d e r the circumstances, be i n t e r p r e t e d as acts o f propagating a f a i t h . The issue o f the hijab has surfaced u n d e r different r u b r i c s i n other Western nations. For example, i n Canada feminists c h a m p i o n e d

the

b a n n i n g o f headscarfs, w h i c h they depicted as a s y m b o l o f oppression. Young M u s l i m w o m e n w h o d o n n e d the scarf insisted that it was an act o f obedience to a d i v i n e i n j u n c t i o n and was therefore protected u n d e r f r e e d o m o f r e l i g i o n . Some M u s l i m w o m e n viewed wearing the In jab as an instrument < it liberation f r o m being a sex object. I n the U n i t e d States the C o u n c i l o n A m e r i c a n - I s l a m i c Relations reported that there was a co percent increase i n 1996 i n the n u m b e r o f incidents o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against w o m e n w h o wear the hijab.

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Muslims and Politics in the West Regardless o f their g r o w i n g n u m b e r s i n Europe and N o r t h A m e r i c a , and their increasing wealth i n the U n i t e d States and Canada, M u s l i m s are aware that they have little political power to influence the government, the m e d i a , or the elites i n the West. They have very f e w channels o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n to p o l i c y makers i n the societies i n w h i c h they live. A variety o f factors hamper effective partic i p a t i o n i n the political process, i n c l u d i n g the lack o f experience i n participat i n g i n political activities, the fear o f the consequences o f political i n v o l v e m e n t , and the lack o f experience i n grassroots organizations or c o a l i t i o n b u i l d i n g . M u s l i m s also lack seasoned leaders and efficient organizations that are able to forge coalitions w i t h other groups to b r i n g about change and to influence leg islation. This is generally ascribed to a lack o f experience i n Western-style democracy, w h i c h is based o n c o m p r o m i s e , w h i c h many M u s l i m s believe to be tantamount to abandoning the principles o f justice and t r u t h . There are exter nal factors as w e l l ; a m o n g t h e m is their belief that M u s l i m s i n the West are o f t e n shunned by political candidates and parties as a perceived liability, because their participation m i g h t antagonize the Jewish lobby. Democratic presidential can didates have t u r n e d d o w n A r a b - A m e r i c a n endorsements for fear o f alienating Jewish support. The issue o f participation i n the political process is n o w being debated w i t h i n the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . Can a M u s l i m participate i n the r u n n i n g o f a kuffar (unbelievers) society? Should they vote for representatives w h o are accountable to various interests? W o u l d such participation lead to defending the freedom to engage i n things Islamically prohibited? Ali Kettani, a N o r t h African consultant to the Saudi government on M u s l i m m i n o r i t y affairs, has called for Islamic p o l i t ical representation: " O t h e r w i s e , M u s l i m politicians w o u l d be p u t i n office by n o n - M u s l i m forces and w o u l d consequently be used to subjugate the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . " The political interests o f the i m m i g r a n t generation are generally focused o n the countries left b e h i n d . The second generation demonstrates m o r e interest and savvy i n local politics. Younger Muslims i n Britain, for example, are increasingly involved i n British politics. Their interests focus o n antiracist and antideportation organizations. They have also w o r k e d o n campaigns for legisla t i o n to a l l o w family reunions and to fight police violence. In B i r m i n g h a m , M u s l i m political participation is mostly aimed at the local level. I n 1982 the first M u s l i m labor representative to the w a r d was elected. The f o l l o w i n g year the n u m b e r increased by t w o , and by 1987 the first M u s l i m w o m a n was elected. Many M u s l i m s i n Britain vote for the Labour Party because many are laborers and w o u l d therefore benefit f r o m the party's programs. I n

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1984 a M u s l i m charter appeared r e c o m m e n d i n g that M u s l i m s vote for those w h o w o u l d support their agenda concerning schools, sex education, M u s l i m personal laws, and provisions for M u s l i m s i n state schools. N o t h i n g came o f i t ; nor has the call for the establishment o f a M u s l i m parliament. I n Britain local authorities r u n social services, h o u s i n g , leisure, and c o m m u n i t y services, public health p r o grams, and economic, urban development, and equal o p p o r t u n i t y programs. Most M u s l i m concerns are tackled o n the local level. I n 1993 there were twelve M u s l i m councilors o f 117 i n B r i t a i n , all members o f the Labour Party. In the Netherlands consultative ethnic m i n o r i t y councils were established i n various areas, especially i n the major cities where immigrants congregate: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the Hague, and Utrecht. The councils are recognized by the authorities as representing the community, thus they have to be consulted o n matters o f interest to minorities. Under the minoriries policy, immigrants were extended new rights in the 1980s that included such matters as providing for proper Islamic burial rites and halal slaughtering o f animals, to the consternation o f animal rights advocates. They were allowed to be employed i n the civil service, except for positions in the police and the armed forces. A l t h o u g h they maintain their foreign citizenship, immigrants were granted the right to vote i n local elections but could not participate i n provincial or national elections. D u r i n g the local elections o f 1986 and 1990, a few foreigners were elected to municipal councds. I n the U n i t e d States initial political activity came as a result o f the Arab-Israeli conflict. A m e r i c a n government support for the state o f Israel, conjoined w i t h a press that is generally considered by M u s l i m s as acting as a gatekeeper suppressi n g any reports that w o u l d show Israeli policies i n a negative l i g h t w i i i l e p r o m o t i n g w h a t is considered a defamation o f Arabs, led to the development o f Arab political action groups. Their activities have generally centered around three areas: p r o v i d i n g accurate i n f o r m a t i o n to the A m e r i c a n p u b l i c about Arab culture, history, and r e l i g i o n ; challenging and correcting the prevalent negative stereotypes o f Arabs and Arab Americans; engaging w i t h U.S. p o l i c y makers w h o seek a m o r e equitable and balanced American policy i n the Arab w o r l d , especially i n regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The American-Arab University Graduates was f o u n d e d i n 1967 by professionals, university professors, lawyers, and doctors, a large n u m b e r o f w h o m had participated i n the Organization o f Arab Students, w h i c h flourished on U.S. campuses i n the late

19COS

and early 1960s. The tar-

geting o f Americans o f Arab background by the N i x o n administration gave the impetus to the f o r m a t i o n o f the National Association o f Arab Americans, organized i n 1972 and m o d e l e d after the pro-Israeli lobby, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. Its a i m was to create access to members o f the U.S. Congress and to e x p l a i n the issues f r o m an Arab perspective, w h i l e educating Arab Americans about the political process.

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The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, modeled after the A n t i -

Muslims in the West are

Defamation League o f the B'nai B'rith, was established in 1980 to fight racism,

increasingly beginning to see

prejudice, and discrimination against Arabs in the U n i t e d States. Founded by-

the usefulness of participat-

James Aburezk, a former U.S. senator f r o m South Dakota, it continues to be the largest grassroots Arab organization i n the U n i t e d States, w i t h chapters i n various parts o f the country. Its efforts focus o n issues o f interest to the c o m m u n i t y , f r o m

ing in interfaith dialogue and political activities that promote common causes. In 1988, for example, the

seeking to halt the production and distribution o f movies that vilify Arabs and

Muslim Political Action

Muslims by Walt Disney Productions to helping immigrants unjustly targeted for

Committee hosted the

deportation by the U.S. I m m i g r a t i o n and Naturalization Service. It has sought apologies f r o m television anchor Dan Rather and former secretary o f state Henry Kissinger for defamation and ethnic slurs, filed legal suits to stop certain advertisements that traded o n racist sentiments, and more recently advocated the l i f t ing o f the U.S. ban o n travel to Lebanon and o f the siege o f Iraq. The Arab American Institute (AAI) was established in 1984 by James Zoghby, w h o was active i n Jesse Jackson's presidential campaign i n 1988. Zoghby was appointed as

Reverend pesse Jackson when he ran for President.

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national co-chair o f the campaign and was able to raise $700,000 for Jackson's campaign. The AAI encourages participation i n the political system and is eager to get Arab Americans to r u n for office. The institute establishes D e m i >cratic and Republican clubs i n various parts o f die country. All Arab A m e r i c a n organizations include b o t h Christians and Muslims. I n the 1980s several M u s l i m political action committees were f o r m e d , i n c l u d i n g the A m e r i c a n M u s l i m C o u n c i l , the C o u n c i l for American-Islamic Affairs, and U n i t e d M u s l i m s o f America. Their w o r k generally parallels that o f the Arab A m e r i c a n organizations. They restrict their activities to M u s l i m rather than .Arab concerns and cast a w i d e r net o f interest, i n c l u d i n g the fate o f M u s l i m s i n Cyprus ( K i b r i s ) , Kashmir, Bosnia, Kosovo, Bulgaria, and Somalia, a m o n g other locales. These political action committees have been recognized as representative institutions o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . The leadership has been i n v i t e d to the W h i t e House for Islamic celebrations; they have also cosponsored petitions and issued statements w i t h n o n - M u s l i m political and religious organizations.

The Muslim Presence: Positing a Challenge for the West The M u s l i m presence i n western Europe and the Americas has posited a challenge and raised concerns that need to be addressed by b o t h the i m m i g r a n t s and the host nations. These issues t o u c h o n such social and cultural matters as s h i f t i n g demographics, race, class, r e l i g i o n , and ethnicity and challenge the very premise o f democracy itself, because they i m p i n g e o n areas o f p o w e r sharing, law, e d u cation, and public policy. M u s l i m i m m i g r a n t s i n the West are noted for their diversity. Their experiences o f the West vary according to w h a t beliefs, perceptions, and c o n d i t i o n i n g they acquired before their emigration as w e l l as the envir o n m e n t i n t o w h i c h they settled. Their experiences and their responses are c o n d i t i o n e d by the reasons the) chose to emigrate, their educational backg r o u n d , and their social class, as w e l l as the historical relationship between their country o f o r i g i n and the nation i n t o w h i c h they have m o v e d . This relationship is also influenced by die policies o f the host c o u n t r y : whether it welcomes foreigners and grants t h e m citizenship r i g h t s , its perceptions o f Islam, and its national policies governing the relationship between r e l i g i o n and state. M u s l i m identity i n the West is influenced by the dynamic interaction between the variety o f conscious and unconscious perspectives that the i m m i g r a n t brings and the context i n w h i c h he or she settles. It is also the b y - p r o d u c t o f the c o m promises w i t h the host culture that become necessary to lead a coherent life. The i m m i g r a n t ' s perspective is dependent o n the background f r o m wdiich he or she comes, the class, the experience o f social m o b i l i t y , the level o f e d u c a t i o n , whether he or she is a settler, a refugee, or a sojourner. It is also fashioned by the

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political identity and the religious perspective o n w h i c h the i m m i g r a n t was raised. These factors are constantly renegotiated and refashioned i n a society that is perceived and experienced as racist and a n t i - M u s l i m , w i t h certain sectors i n i t engaged or exclusively dedicated to demonize or fan d i s t o r t i o n and fear. It also makes a difference w h e t h e r the i n d i v i d u a l sees h i m s e l f or herself as a b o r n M u s l i m , a born-again M u s l i m , or a convert; or w h e t h e r he or she is defined by ethnic o r i g i n , nationality, place and language o f o r i g i n , and by religious affiliat i o n (Sunni, Shii, A h m a d i , Wahhabi, A l a w i , Druze). A l t h o u g h some M u s l i m s c o n t i n u e to contemplate the o p t i o n o f r e t u r n i n g to their homelands as a safety valve s h o u l d c o n d i t i o n s become intolerable, their c h i l d r e n , b o r n and reared i n the schools o f the West, are caught i n the m i d d l e : The West is their h o m e l a n d . They are b i c u l t u r a l , w i t h an i n t i m a t e experience and k n o w l e d g e o f the West, as w e l l as an i n t i m a t e experience o f their parents' culture as r e m e m b e r e d and reinvented i n the West. For the i m m i grants the struggle to m a i n t a i n their i d e n t i t y and t o preserve i t f r o m disappearing i n t o the Western culture appears to be an o n g o i n g project. They are increasingly challenged and changed, as their c h i l d r e n are b e c o m i n g m o r e i n d i g e n i z e d i n t o Western culture. This has b r o u g h t about n e w interpretations by a few d a r i n g people w h o attempt to be relevant t o the n e w reality i n w h i c h they find themselves. The q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r they can develop a rational means o f m i n o r i t y j u r i s p r u d e n c e to guide t h e i r lives i n the West. I f i t is develo p e d , the next q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r the M u s l i m s i n the m a j o r i t y nations w i l l recognize such j u r i s p r u d e n c e as authentic and v a l i d . M e a n w h i l e , some Western authors have c o n t i n u e d to q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r Muslims are w o r t h y o f citizenship i n a democratic nation or whether their presence w i l l put their particular stamp o n Europe and America, forever changing the West as i t is k n o w n . Some European scholars fear that M u s l i m s ' presence i n a m u l t i c u l t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t w i l l erode Europe's u n i q u e i d e n t i t y and make it s i m ilar to what exists i n the U n i t e d States or Canada. Still others deny that Muslims are a variable that w i l l make a difference i n reshaping Europe. They d o not see any difference i n the impact o f their presence than w h a t has happened i n earlier migrations o f poorer populations, such as the Poles and Italians. It is clear f r o m the shrill tone o f some o f those engaged i n the debate about whether Muslims belong in the West that they are fully aware that M u s l i m s have become p a n and parcel of the West. Still to be addressed is the M u s l i m demand f o r accountability f o r Western i m p e r i a l i s m , as w e l l as the demand that the West come to terms w i t h Islam and recognize its equal status w i t h Christianity and Judaism as a legitimate m o n o t h e istic r e l i g i o n . W i l l the p l u r a l i s m and democratic principles espoused by b o t h Europe and N o r t h America make r o o m for a different culture and allow its m e m -

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Louis Farrakhan, [he current

bers to operate w i t h respect and dignity? Once again, the M u s l i m presence chal-

leader of the Nation of

lenges Europeans not only t o reflect o n their self-assured perceptions o f their l i b -

Islam, has much of the

eralism, p l u r a l i s m , democracy, and tolerance; it has also challenged Europeans to

charisma of Malcolm X {192C-1965), the enormously influential Black Muslim leader. In October 1995

think o f ways that they can guarantee the M u s l i m s f r e e d o m o f r e l i g i o n and the r i g h t to propagate their faith and enjoy the culture o f their choice. M u s l i m s c o n tinue to ask w h e t h e r Western democracies are liberal enough to include Islamic

Farrakhan organized the

input i n t o the national consensus, or w i l l there be an insistence o n a Judeo-

Million Man March on

Christian culture. W i l l Western pluralism or m u l t i c u l t u r a h s m be flexible enough

Washington, D.C.. and hun-

to provide for Islamic i n p u t i n t o the shaping o f the future o f Western society?

dreds of thousands of Muslims and non-Muslims raised their hands in unity on the mall, vowing to renew their commitments to family, community, and personal responsibility.

O r w i l l M u s l i m s continue to be marginalized, ostracized, studied, and evaluated, always judged as lacking, always the " o t h e r " ? Finally, w i l l the juggernaut o f assimilation that has reshaped Europe and N o r t h America i n a long process o f secularization, m o d e r n i z a t i o n , and liberalization be able to reshape M u s l i m s to the extent that they can dissolve i n t o the Western m i x , abandoning their distinctive identities, practices, and cultures? Or w i l l they opt for integration, h o l d i n g o n to their distinctive identities and preferences, at the same time participating i n the political and social life o f their adopted countries, demanding equal rights, and p r o p o r t i o n a l representation as a distinct group? The questions arc not o n l y concerned w i t h what w o u l d happen to the M u s l i m s w h e n

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they choose between assimilation, integration, or separation, b u t , more i m p o r tant, the questions are also concerned w i t h the manner i n w h i c h M u s l i m s ' integ r a t i o n , assimilation, or separation w o u l d affect the fabric o f Western society. W h a t k i n d o f a society w i l l Europe and America become as a consequence o f the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the new m i x o f peoples and cultures w h o a f f i r m a vibrant r e l i g i o n that they insist transcends borders and supersedes all other claims to truth?

CHAPTER

FIFTEEN

Contemporary Islam R E F O R M A T I O N OR R E V O L U T I O N ?

John L. Esposito

The t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y has been one o f the m o s t d y n a m i c , explosive, a n d i n n o v a t i v e i n Islamic history. W i t h i n a span o f a f e w centuries M u s l i m societies have passed f r o m s u b j u g a t i o n t o European i m p e r i a l i s m to n a t i o n a l i n d e pendence, f r o m remnants o f medieval e m p i r e s t o m o d e r n nation-states, f r o m a transnational b u t s o m e w h a t r e g i o n a l l y f i x e d c o m m u n i t y to a g l o b a l c o m m u n i t y n o t o n l y o f M u s l i m - m a j o r i t y c o m m u n i t i e s i n A f r i c a , the M i d d l e East, and Asia b u t also o f s i g n i f i c a n t M u s l i m - m i n o r i t y c o m m u n i t i e s i n Europe a n d the U n i t e d States.

(Left) The many faces of contemporary Islam include not only the more visible reassertion of Islam in

A t every stage the predictable has p r o v e n unpredictable: m i g h t y European colonial powers were o v e r t h r o w n , artificially d r a w n nation-states emerged and engaged i n nation b u i l d i n g , the desert G u l f sheikhdoms discovered o i l and expe rienced rapid development, a remote and quiescent M u s l i m Southeast Asia has produced an Asian tiger i n Malaysia, and the secular presuppositions and expec-

Muslim politics but also the revitalization of Muslim piety and spirituality.These adherents of the Sufi Naqshbandi order at the Islamic Institute in Cairo

tations o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n theory were swept aside by an Islamic tide that seemed

represent one of the major

to c o m e o u t o f n o w h e r e and challenged m u c h o f the M u s l i m w o r l d , f r o m N o r t h

mystical orders in Islam. Not

Africa to Southeast Asia t o the West.

only did they play an impor-

The h i s t o r y o f c o n t e m p o r a r y Islam is a story o f challenge a n d response, t e n s i o n a n d c o n f l i c t , atavism a n d c r e a t i v i t y o r renaissance, retreat

and

tant role in reformist and anticolonialist movements throughout the Islamic

advancement, r e l i g i o u s and i n t e l l e c t u a l r e t r e n c h m e n t , r e f o r m a t i o n and revo-

world in the past, they also

l u t i o n . It has been d o m i n a t e d by t w o m a j o r struggles: the f i r s t , the wars o f

do so today.

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In the twentieth century

independence at the t u r n o f the t w e n t i e t h century, w h e n m u c h o f the M u s l i m

many of the old stereotypes

w o r l d s t r u g g l e d to free i t s e l f f r o m d o m i n i o n by European p o w e r s ; and the

and assumptions about Islam

second, i n the latter h a l f o f the century, the i n t e r n a l battle over r e l i g i o - c u l t u r a l

and the Islamic lands have been reversed. Mighty European colonial powers

i d e n t i t y and i n t e g r i t y associated w i t h c o n t e m p o r a r y Islamic r e v i v a l i s m a n d the reassertion of Islam i n t o p u b l i c life.

have been overturned. This drawing shows the pomp and circumstance surrounding the entry of the Prince of Wales at Baroda during his visit to India.

Islam, European Colonialism, and Modernity: Renewal and Reform The nineteenth and twentieth centuries proved to be a period o f major transform a t i o n i n the history o f Islam: a t i m e o f h u m i l i a t i o n and subjugation, independence and r e v o l u t i o n , revival and r e f o r m . Islamic history had witnessed the emergence o f Islam, its rapid and dynamic expansion, the spawning o f vast Islamic empires and sultanates, and the florescence o f a rich and varied Islamic civilization, but European colonialism seemed to b r i n g it all to a crashing halt. The age o f European expansion, penetration, and dominance (euphemistically called the Age of Discovery by Europeans) began i n the sixteenth century but came to f r u i t i o n i n

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the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By the nine¬ teenth century the balance o f power had clearly shifted t o w a r d Europe. European governments (Great Britain, France, Spain, Russia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Italy) extended their political influence or d o m a i n internationally. The emergence o f the West as a d o m i n a n t global power proved a military, political, economic, and ideological challenge to H i n d u , Buddhist, and M u s l i m societies i n Asia, Africa, and the M i d d l e East. By the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y m u c h o f the M u s l i m w o r l d f o u n d itself subjugated t o European i m p e r i a l powers, demonstrating its p o l i t i c a l , economic, and m i l itary impotence and challenging the veracity o f Islam itself. W h y had Europe (that is, C h r i s t e n d o m ) p r o v e d t r i u m p h a n t ? Was i t the s u p e r i o r i t y o f its science and technology

or o f its r e l i g i o n a n d culture?

Many

M u s l i m s h a d long believed that their historical success and florescence were due to the t r u t h o f their faith and

Major changes to the Middle East in the twentieth century have resulted from the discovery of oil. The first well was drilled at Masjid-i Sulaiman in Iran around 1908. A gusher with wooden derrick was typical of the

mission, b u t w i t h the p o l i t i c a l , economic, and m i l i t a r y

period when precautions taken to control the flow of oil

success o f European i m p e r i a l powers at h a n d , w h a t

were not always adequate.

were M u s l i m s n o w to conclude? For several centuries M u s l i m s i n diverse circumstances had recognized the decline i n their c o m m u n i t i e s as a result o f b o t h internal (domestic) and external ( f o r e i g n ) threats and had i n i t i a t e d various revival and r e f o r m movements. A sense o f c o m m u n i t y disintegration and the c o r r u p t i o n o f " t r u e I s l a m " generated revivalist movements i n the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries

(Wahhabi,

M a h d i , Fulani, Padri, and others) that stretched across the M u s l i m w o r l d f r o m Africa to Southeast Asia. M u s l i m responses to European colonialism and i m p e r i alism were c o n d i t i o n e d b o t h by the source o f the threat and by Islamic tradition. They ranged f r o m h o l y w a r to e m i g r a t i o n and n o n c o o p e r a t i o n to adaptation and cultural synthesis. Faced w i t h Christian European d o m i n a n c e o f the M u s l i m w o r l d , some M u s l i m s concluded that the only proper responses were those o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d w i i e n he faced o p p o s i t i o n and rejection: to fight (jihad, struggle) i n defense o f Islam or to emigrate (hijra) as M u h a m m a d and his early followers h a d done w h e n they w e n t f r o m Mecca to M e d i n a i n 622 C . E . M i l i t a n t resistance i n Africa, the M i d d l e East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, however, proved i m p o t e n t i n the face o f the European's m o d e r n technology and army weapons. A l t h o u g h e m i g r a t i o n was possible for some, i t proved impractical for many. Some religious leaders counseled cultural isolation, w i t h d r a w a l , and n o n cooperation, to resist the Western threat to their Islamic way o f fife. Others, r a n g -

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ing f r o m secular to Islamic modernists, pursued a path o f a c c o m m o d a t i o n t o harness the West's scientific and technological p o w e r t o revitalize the c o m m u n i t y and to regain independence.

Modernist Responses: The Limits and Legacy of Islamic Modernism For M u s l i m rulers i n the O t t o m a n Empire ( M o r o c c o , Egypt, and I r a n ) , the West's power was based u p o n its superior technology and weapons. These they set o u t to acquire. Their focus was p r i m a r i l y m i l i t a r y and bureaucratic: to create a strong m i l i t a r y and central a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I n the nineteenth and early t w e n t i e t h centuries students were sent to Europe to study languages, science, and politics; European experts were b r o u g h t i n ; translation bureaus and p r i n t i n g presses were i n t r o d u c e d to make technical i n f o r m a t i o n m o r e accessible. This was accompanied by m o d e r n i z a t i o n o f education, law, and the economy. N e w universities and curricula were created a n d m o d e r n c u r r i c u l a were i n t r o d u c e d to a l l o w student to acquire the k n o w l e d g e necessary to m o d e r n i z e . European legal codes became the basis for legal reforms, and Islamic law was restricted to personal status or family law (marriage, divorce, inheritance). M o d e r n economic systems and i n s t i t u t i o n s were established. The state increasingly asserted its r i g h t to regulate and administer religion, creating ministries o f religious affairs and e n d o w m e n t s

(waqf, sg.; awqaf, p i . ) that

attempted to control previously autonomous organizations and institutions, m c l u d i n g Sufi orders, mosques, shariah courts, and religious schools and endowments. Change was mandated by the state and i m p l e m e n t e d f r o m the top by a small political elite. Thus, the m o d ernization process introduced by rulers was not concerned w i t h political liberalization and greater local autonomy but rather w i t h strengthening regime power and control t h r o u g h a m o r e centralized administration and

modernized military

and security

apparatus.

Reform was imposed f r o m above, a t o p - d o w n rather than b o t t o m - u p process, w i t h a n a r r o w base o f support. Issues o f authority, legitimacy, security, and popular participation w o u l d continue to become significant issues Oil is found in many regions of the Middle East. Shaykh Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah is about to turn a silver valve wheel inaugurating the first cargo of crude oil for export from Kuwait on June 30.

1946.

in the contemporary Islamic revival movement. The reformist spirit o f the times was especially evident i n the emergence f r o m Egypt to Southeast Asia o f

CONTEMPORARY

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647

an Islamic m o d e r n i s t m o v e m e n t that called for a " r e f o r m a t i o n " or reinterpreta¬ t i o n (ijtihad) o f Islam. Responding to the p l i g h t o f M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s and the intellectual and religious challenge o f the West, Islamic m o d e r n i s m sought to bridge the gap between conservative religious scholars (olim, sg.; ultima, p i . ) , characterized as c l i n g i n g (taqlid, f o l l o w i n g o r e m u l a t i n g ) b l i n d l y to the past, and the Western-oriented secular elites, regarded as u n c r i t i c a l i n their i m i t a t i o n o f the West and insensitive to Islamic t r a d i t i o n . The ulama's static sanctification o f Islam's classical o r medieval f o r m u l a t i o n and their resistance to change were blamed for the backwardness and p l i g h t o f the Islamic c o m m u n i t y . Islamic m o d ernists o f the nineteenth and early t w e n t i e t h centuries, like secular reformers, were o p e n to a c c o m m o d a t i o n and assimilation; they w i s h e d to produce a new synthesis o f Islam w i t h m o d e r n science and learning. Thus, they distanced t h e m selves f r o m the rejectionist tendency o f r e l i g i o u s conservatives

as w e l l as

Western-oriented secular reformers w h o restricted r e l i g i o n to the private life, and they looked to the West to rejuvenate state a n d society. As Europe d u b b e d its age o f i m p e r i a l i s m and conquest an Age o f Discovery, Islamic reformers m i g h t have called their quest o r m i s s i o n one o f "rediscove r y " — r e d i s c o v e r y and r e a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f the r i g h t f u l place o f reason and science i n the Islamic t r a d i t i o n . They argued that Islam and m o d e r n i t y , revelation and reason, were indeed compatible. I n contrast to earlier seventeenth- and eighteenth-century revivalist movements, w i t h w h i c h they shared the desire f o r renewal and r e f o r m , modernists d i d n o t s i m p l y w i s h to restore the beliefs and practices o f the past. Rather, they asserted the need to reinterpret and reapply the principles and ideals o f Islam to f o r m u l a t e n e w responses to the political, scientific, and cultural challenges o f the West and o f m o d e r n life. Most modernists c o m b i n e d a quest to rejuvenate the Islamic c o m m u n i t y w i t h an anticolonialist agenda, the ultimate goal o f w h i c h was national independence. Jamal a l - D i n a l - A f g h a n i and M u h a m m a d A b d u h pioneered modernist visions a n d agendas i n the M i d d l e East, as d i d Sayyid A h m a d Khan a n d M u h a m m a d Iqbal i n South Asia. Despite some distinctive differences, each argued that Islam was a dynamic, progressive r e l i g i o n that was made stagnant by the forces o f history and the mind-set o f many ulama. They i d e n t i f i e d the sources o f M u s l i m weakness and asserted the c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f religion and reason and science. They reclaimed the glories o f Islamic history, r e m i n d i n g M u s l i m s that a l t h o u g h they were n o w weak, they had once been strong, spawning vast Islamic empires a n d an Islamic c i v i l i z a t i o n whose wonders i n c l u d e d m a j o r achievements i n science, medicine, and philosophy. Reformers set o u t to initiate a r e f o r m a t i o n , to b o l d l y redefine o r reconstruct Islamic belief and t h o u g h t , to r e f o r m Islamic theology and law. At the same t i m e , they emphasized M u s l i m p r i d e , unity, and solidarity to face the p o l i t ical and c u l t u r a l threat o f European c o l o n i a l i s m .

648

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Jamal a l - D i n al-Afghani (1838-97), b o r n and educated i n Iran and then British India, traveled t h r o u g h o u t m u c h o f the M u s l i m w o r l d and to Europe. A l - A f g h a n i believed that M u s l i m s c o u l d repel European c o l o n i a l i s m not by i g n o r i n g or rejecting the sources o f its strength—science and t e c h n o l o g y — b u t by reclaimi n g and reappropriating reason, science, and technology, w h i c h , he maintained, were integral to Islam and had spawned Islamic c i v i l i z a t i o n . He emphasized that Islam was b o t h a r e l i g i o n and a c i v i l i z a t i o n , an i d e o l o g y that p r o v i d e d the raison d'etre for M u s l i m s b o t h as i n d i v i d u a l s and as a sociopolitical c o m m u n i t y . A l Afghani's critique o f the status q u o , call for m o d e r n reforms, and advocacy o f constitutionalism and parliamentary government to l i m i t the p o w e r o f rulers made h i m popular w i t h many o f the younger educated generation, w h o had traditional u p b r i n g i n g s but were attracted by m o d e r n reforms and calls for national independence. M u h a m m a d A b d u h (1849-1905-), a disciple o f a l - A f g h a n i and a r e f o r m m i n d e d Egyptian religious scholar, differed f r o m the conservative o u t l o o k o f many other ulama. Focusing o n religious r e f o r m , he advocated significant legal, social, and educational change. Thus, A b d u h argued that a l t h o u g h the religious observances o f Islam w*ere i m m u t a b l e , the social aspects o f Islamic law c o u l d be r e f o r m e d i n such areas as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. H e argued that the Quranic ideal was monogamy, not p o l y g a m y ; he supported w o m e n ' s education and m o d e r n i z e d the c u r r i c u l u m at al-Azhar University, a major international center and t r a i n i n g g r o u n d for M u s l i m religious scholars. Sayyid A h m a d Khan (1817-98) surveyed the abysmal state o f the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y i n India (defeated, powerless, and demoralized) after the Sepoy M u t i n y o f 1857,

w h i c h resulted i n f o r m a l British colonial r u l e and the end o f

M u s l i m d o m i n a n c e i n the I n d i a n s u b c o n t i n e n t . For A h m a d K h a n , M u s l i m s needed to change the way they saw and responded to the m o d e r n w o r l d ; he devoted his life to religious, educational, and social r e f o r m . Like al-Afghani and A b d u h , he called for a b o l d " n e w t h e o l o g y " or reinterpretation o f Islam and the acceptance, n o t rejection, o f the best i n Western t h o u g h t . H e insisted that he was r e c l a i m i n g "the o r i g i n a l r e l i g i o n o f Islam, w h i c h God and the messenger have disclosed, not that r e l i g i o n w h i c h the ulama and preachers have fashioned." His interpretation o f Islam was g u i d e d by his belief that Islam was compatible w i t h reason and the laws o f nature and therefore i n perfect h a r m o n y w i t h m o d e r n scientific t h o u g h t . The Q u r a n and Sunna o f the Prophet (the customs and practices o f the Prophet that became the example f o r all M u s l i m s ) were interpreted f r o m this perspective. A h m a d Khan was q u i c k to d i s t i n g u i s h between literal and metaphorical or allegorical meanings o f the Q u r a n w h e n addressing issues o f e v o l u t i o n , angels, and miracles. H e called for a critical reassessment o f the hadith (prophetic traditions), challenging their h i s t o r i c i t y and authenticity.

Ci > \ T I M P O R A R Y

İSI \ M

6.( 9

A h m a d Khan c o m b i n e d theory vvith practice, seeking t o i m p l e m e n t his ideas and train a n e w generation o f M u s l i m leaders. His p r o l i f i c w r i t i n g was accom panied by his leadership i n many educational reforms: a translation society t o make Western t h o u g h t m o r e accessible, the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f their o w n journals, and the f o r m a t i o n o f the A n g l o - M u h a m m a d a n O r i e n t a l College (later renamed A l i g a r h M u s l i m U n i v e r s i t y ) , w h i c h was m o d e l e d after Cambridge University. M u h a m m a d Iqbal ( 1877-1938), the poet-philosopher o f the I n d i a n subconti nent, judged the c o n d i t i o n o f the Islamic c o m m u n i t y as one o f five centuries o f " d o g m a t i c s l u m b e r " as a result o f the b l i n d f o l l o w i n g o f t r a d i t i o n , and he called f o r the " r e c o n s t r u c t i o n " o f religious t h o u g h t to revitalize the M u s l i m c o m m u nity. Educated i n England and Germany, where he earned a law degree and a doc torate i n philosophy, Iqbal c o m b i n e d m o d e r n Western p h i l o s o p h y (that o f Nietzsche, Bergson, Hegel, and Fichte) w i t h his Islamic t r a d i t i o n and constructed a m o d e r n , d y n a m i c , Islamically i n f o r m e d w o r l d v i e w . Iqbal distinguished between eternal, i m m u t a b l e principles o f Islam (shariah) and those regulations that were the p r o d u c t o f h u m a n interpretation and thus subject to change. I n contrast t o the ulama, w h o m he charged h a d halted the dynamic process that o r i g i n a l l y produced Islamic law and instead were content t o merely perpetuate established traditions, Iqbal believed that M u s l i m s must once again reassert their r i g h t t o reinterpret and reapply Islam t o changing social conditions. H e reinterpreted o r redefined ijtihdd ( i n d i v i d u a l interpretation) and ijma (consensus), suggesting that the r i g h t t o interpret Islam for the c o m m u n i t y be transferred f r o m the ulama t o a national assembly o r legislature. This collec tive o r corporate consensus w o u l d then constitute the authoritative consensus o f the c o m m u n i t y . Iqbal a d m i r e d the dynamic spirit, intellectual t r a d i t i o n , and technology o f the West b u t c o n d e m n e d its European c o l o n i a l i s m , the e c o n o m i c e x p l o i t a t i o n o f capitalism, the atheism o f M a r x i s m , and the m o r a l bankruptcy o f secularism. He believed that Islam p r o v i d e d its o w n r e l i g i o - p o l i t i c a l alternative for M u s l i m soci eties, and thus he t u r n e d t o the past t o "rediscover" the principles and values nec essary t o reconstruct an Islamic m o d e l f o r m o d e r n M u s l i m society w i t h Islamic versions o f democracy and parliamentary government. Thus, for example. Iqbal concluded that the centrality o f such beliefs as the equality and b r o t h e r h o o d o f believers made democracy a political ideal i n Islam, w h i c h , a l t h o u g h historically unrealized, remained a d u t y for M u s l i m s i n the t w e n t i e t h century. The M u s l i m doctrine o f God's oneness (tanhid, m o n o t h e i s m ) — t h a t is, Allah's role as creator, sustainer, and judge o f the universe—Iqbal believed, i m p l i e d that God's w i l l

o r l a w governed

every

aspect o f life. T h i s , c o m b i n e d

with

M u h a m m a d ' s role as Prophet a n d head o f state, led Iqbal t o m a i n t a i n that the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y is a r e l i g i o - p o l i t i c a l state governed by Islamic law. It was this

6C0

THE

OXFORD

HISTORY

OF

ISLAM

b e l i e f that led Iqbal to call for an a u t o n o m o u s M u s l i m state or slates i n I n d i a , for w h i c h he came to be regarded as one the founders o f the m o d e r n state o f Pakistan. For some t i m e Islamic m o d e r n i s m remained p r i m a r i l y an intellectual m o v e m e n t a m o n g a small elite sector o f society. Failure t o produce an effective organization or movement w i t h a leadership cadre, systematic

program, and

institutional support

resulted i n the d i f f u s i o n o f the m o d e r n i s t m o v e m e n t i n m a n y directions. Moreover, m o d e r n i s t s were vulnerable t o c r i t i c i s m that their reforms often resulted i n a r e d e f i n i t i o n o f Islam i n l i g h t o f Western criteria and therefore a m o u n t e d to a westernization or Europeanization o f Islam. The legacy o f Islamic modernists, however, was The mosque built by late sultan Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin I I I

substantial, i n f l u e n c i n g the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the

(r. 1950-67) in the lagoon in Brunei is one of the largest in

M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y and its attitude t o w a r d the West.

Asia.The substantial income from oil exports since the 1930s

Their v i s i o n i n s p i r e d M u s l i m

allowed the ruler of this tiny island on the northwest coast

activists f r o m A l g e r i a to Indonesia to emphasize

of Borneo to address the disaffection of his poorer subjects

educational r e f o r m s that i n c o r p o r a t e d a m o d e r n

through an extensive social welfare system and the promotion of Islam.

intellectuals

and

c u r r i c u l u m , legitimated legal and social change, and c o n t r i b u t e d to the f o r m a t i o n o f anticolonial i n d e pendence movements.

Reformers

r e k i n d l e d the

spirit o f M u s l i m unity, solidarity, and autonomy, restored M u s l i m p r i d e i n Islam's intellectual and scientific heritage, and generated m o d e r n ideological i n t e r p r e tations o f Islam that i n c o r p o r a t e d m o d e r n concepts, disciplines, and institutions f r o m textual c r i t i c i s m to nationalism, parliamentary g o v e r n m e n t , and democracy. Thus, Islamic modernists i n t r o d u c e d and r e i n f o r c e d a change-oriented mind-set that rejected the b l i n d f o l l o w i n g o f t r a d i t i o n and accepted the necessity as w e l l as the legitimacy o f reinterpretation and r e f o r m . O f equal significance, these Islamic modernists reasserted the r i g h t o f laity as w e l l as ulama to interpret Islam.

Nationalist Movements and the Emergence of Modern States The first h a l f o f the t w e n t i e t h century was d o m i n a t e d by t w o interrelated issues: nationalism and independence, and the creation o f the m o d e r n state. Between W o r l d Wars I and I I , M u s l i m s increasingly pressed for an end to colonial r u l e . Independence movements sprang u p and i n some places, such as Algeria, l o n g ,

CONTEMPORARY

ISLAM

6 c i

b l o o d y wars were f o u g h t before achieving autonomy. To v a r y i n g degrees, d e p e n d i n g o n local populations a n d contexts, Islam and M u s l i m i d e n t i t y played a role i n nationalist struggles. I n I r a n the ulama j o i n e d w i t h secular forces a n d pressed for reforms to l i m i t the shah's power. I n the Tobacco Protest (1891-92) they used mosques as sanctuaries for protestors and fatwas (legal o p i n i o n s ) to oppose the selling o f tobacco concessions, fearing that the shah's propensity to sell concessions for railroads, b a n k i n g , and tobacco c o m p r o m i s e d Iran's i n d e pendence by m a k i n g it economically dependent o n Europe. Similar concerns i n f o r m e d o p p o s i t i o n i n the [95,0s to o i l concessions. F r o m 190c

to 1911

the

ulama i n Iran supported a constitutional revolution i n an attempt to circumscribe the shah's power. I n N o r t h A f r i c a , Islamic r e f o r m e r s had been a m o n g the founders and leaders o f early nationalist organizations a n d p o l i t i c a l parties emphasizing resistance to French r u l e a n d the dangers o f cultural assimilation and advocating independence and national i d e n t i t y based o n an Arab-Islamic heritage. Allal al-Fasi led Morocco's Independence party (Istiqlal), A b d al-Aziz T h a l b i was a f o u n d e r o f Tunisia's Constitutional party (Destour), a n d A b d a l H a m i d Ben Badis organized the Association o f Algerian Ulama. I n the I n d i a n subcontinent the M u s l i m League used Islamic symbols and M u s l i m nationalism as the ideological t o o l i n m o b i l i z i n g support for its d e m a n d for a separate M u s l i m h o m e l a n d , Pakistan. Both the f o r m a t i o n o f m o d e r n states and independence movements i n the M u s l i m w o r l d were the products o f European colonialism whose legacy had p r o f o u n d l o n g - t e r m negative consequences. Colonial powers, c o n t r o l l i n g or i n f l u encing the selection o f leaders, configured and reconfigured the borders o f many countries, and created other countries such as Jordan. The breakup o f the O t t o m a n Empire, the creation by Great Britain and France o f mandate countries i n the M i d d l e East ( i n c l u d i n g Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and K u w a i t ) , the division o f South Asia i n t o India and Pakistan, and the division o f Southeast Asia i n t o Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and Indonesia are examples o f an often-calculated attempt to create states that w o u l d foster o r at least n o t threaten European interests. Similarly, the first kings o f Jordan, Syria, and Iraq were defeated and displaced Hashimites o f the Hejaz (what is n o w western Saudi Arabia). The result was the image o f a m i l i t a n t , imperialist West, whose artificially d r a w n states u n d e r m i n e d M u s l i m u n i t y and whose appointed or approved rulers had little legitimacy. The creation o f the Jewish state o f Israel was viewed as the placement o f a Western colony i n the M i d d l e East, f u r t h e r u n d e r m i n i n g M u s l i m unity. This legacy w o u l d continue to have p r o f o u n d effects t h r o u g h contemporary times. By the

19COS

most M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s had gained independence, a l t h o u g h

i t w o u l d n o t be u n t i l 1962 that Algeria d i d so. M o d e r n state f o r m a t i o n varied c o n siderably. The end result was a varied spectrum o f patterns. At one end, Mustafa

6ç2

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Kemal ( k n o w n as Ataturk, "Father o f the Turks") established a t h o r o u g h l y secular state, f o r m a l l y e n d i n g the caliphate, suppressing or m a r g i n a l i z i n g religious institutions, and replacing t h e m w i t h European-based laws and institutions. At the other e n d , Saudi Arabia was created as a self-styled Islamic state, w i t h the Q u r a n as its c o n s t i t u t i o n and the shariah its law. The vast m a j o r i t y o f states fell somewhere i n between these t w o poles. They became " M u s l i m states" i n that the m a j o r i t y p o p u l a t i o n was M u s l i m , and they incorporated Islamic provisions, such as the requirement that the head o f state be a M u s l i m and that there be some reference to the shariah as a source o f law. Many M u s l i m states, such as Egypt, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, t u r n e d to Western models o f political, legal, economic, and educational d e v e l o p m e n t . I m p l i c i t i n t h e i r developm e n t was the p r e v a i l i n g p a r a d i g m that equated m o d e r n i z a t i o n w i t h the progressive westernization and secularization

of

societies. A l t h o u g h the late decades o f the t w e n t i e t h century were characterized by the p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f Islamic activist movements, their patriarchs a n d m o d e l s were t o be f o u n d i n the 1930s and 1940s. Two remarkable i n d i v i d u a l s established m a j o r Islamic movements i n the M i d d l e East and South Asia d u r i n g this p e r i o d . Hasan al-Banna i n Egypt and Mawlana A b u l Ala M a w d u d i i n India seized the banner o f Islam to create the M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d and the Jamaat-iIslami (Islamic Society) respectively. Both were critical o f Western

secular-oriented

elites, the r i g i d conservatism o f the ulama, a n d the " w e s t e r n i z e d I s l a m " o f Islamic modernists. I n contrast to earlier Islamic modernists, they c h a m p i o n e d the self-sufficiency

o f Islam and were far m o r e critical

o f the West. Islam, they asserted, was a selfsufficient

alternative

capitalism,

Mustafa Kemal, commonly known as Ataturk, "Father of

M a n d s n i i

the Turks," established a thoroughly secular state in ^ , . , , ., , . ,? , Turkey i n 1922. He is shown here with his wire seated beside him in a Western-style portrait, taken the year

i n particular w r o t e prolihcally, attempting ' delineate a comprehensive Islamic sys-

TT

after

the establishment of the Turkish republic.

m

d

s o c i a l i s m

r

1

.

to A b u l

A

b

Mawdudi r

0

t o

tern, encompassing

such topics as Islam

CONTEMPORARY

ISLAM

6cj

and government, nationalism, democracy, economics, r e v o l u t i o n , w o m e n , and the family. In contrast to Islamic modernists, al-Banna and A b u l Ala M a w d u d i emphasized organizational development to i m p l e m e n t their visions o f an Islamic state and society. A l t h o u g h they have been d u b b e d "fundamentalists" and equated w i t h a retrogressive v i s i o n , they were i n fact m o d e r n i n their o r i e n t a t i o n and organizat i o n . Both m e n w i s h e d neither to escape n o r to r e i m p l e m e n t a seventh-century past; they d i d n o t w a n t to reject m o d e r n science and technology. Rather, al-Banna and A b u l Ala M a w d u d i sought to reapply Islamic doctrine and values to the c o n t e m p o r a r y w o r l d and thus respond to the challenge

o f m o d e r n i t y . They

denounced the westernization and secularization o f M u s l i m societies. A l t h o u g h bitter opponents o f the W e s t — f r o m European colonialism and secular nationalism to the cultural penetration o f the West—they d i d not reject but rather valued m o d e r n science and education. Many members o f the M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d and the Tamaat-i-Islami were m o d e r n professionals (teachers and university p r o fessors, physicians, lawyers, scientists, engineers) w h o established m o d e r n i n s t i tutions (schools, clinics, cottage industries, p r i n t i n g presses, p u b l i s h i n g houses) and used m o d e r n technology. Both the M u s l i m Brotherhood and the Jamaat shared a c o m m o n ideological w o r l d v i e w : First, w as the belief that Islam was a comprehensive way o f life and that the u n i o n o f religion and the state (din vva dawk) was the God-ordained Islamic ideal. Second, the separation o f r e l i g i o n and p o l i t i c s , a Western

secular

artifact

adopted by M u s l i m societies, was

the cause o f

Muslim

decline. T h i r d , restoration o f the u n i t y and a u t o n o m y o f M u s l i m societies r e q u i r e d a r e t u r n to " t r u e I s l a m " and thus i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f the shariah,

the

blueprint for

Islamic society. Finally, this Islamic r e v o l u t i o n was the required struggle o f all true Muslims.

The

Muslim

B r o t h e r h o o d and the Jamaat

The University of Riyadh. Saudi Arabia, was founded by Saud I I I ibn

d i f f e r e d i n their organiza-

Abd al-Aziz (r. 1952-64). It is one of many universities and other insti-

t i o n a l approaches,

however.

The B r o t h e r h o o d was a p o p -

tutions founded by Muslim rulers in the twentieth century to overcome the perceived technical and financial superiority of the West and modernize education, law, and the economy.

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ulisi m o v e m e n t that recruited f r o m all sectors o f society, w h i l e the Jamaat took a m o r e elitist path, seeking t o attract and train a n e w leadership cadre: m o d e r n , educated, but Islamically o r i e n t e d m e n . W h i l e the B r o t h e r h o o d espoused a bott o m - u p approach, the Jamaat's was t o p - d o w n . The desire t o t r a n s f o r m society invariably led t o involvement i n politics and confrontation w i t h the state. Activists and authoritarian regimes accused each other o f instigating violence. Activists were arrested and their organizations suppressed. Al-Banna was assassinated i n 1949, and some M u s l i m Brotherhood leaders w h o i n the face o f state repression espoused a m o r e n h l i t a n t revolutionary path were executed, i m p r i s o n e d , o r d r i v e n u n d e r g r o u n d i n Egypt under the Arab president Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-70) i n the 1960s. By the end o f the 1960s most believed that the Brotherhood had been successfully suppressed. The 1970s and 1980s w o u l d witness its resurrection, however, and the extent to w h i c h violence and repression radicalized many w h o became the founders o f radical, violent revolutionary movements. A l t h o u g h Abul Ala M a w d u d i was condemned t o death and at times the Jamaat was threatened w i t h suppression, the Jamaat was able to participate w i t h i n the p o l i t i c a l system m o r e freely than the Brotherhood, and as a result it d i d n o t experience the same degree o f alienation and radicalization. Liberal and r e g i o n a l n a t i o n a l i s m and socialism w e r e the p r e d o m i n a n t i d e ologies o f n e w l y emergent M u s l i m states. Nationalist ideologies based o n c o m m o n t e r r i t o r y , history, and language became typical means f o r n e w regimes and rulers t o create a c o m m o n i d e n t i t y and m o b i l i z e p o p u l a r s u p p o r t . T h o u g h p r e d o m i n a n t l y secular i n o r i e n t a t i o n , ideologues o f t e n f o u n d i t necessary t o assert some l i n k ( h i s t o r i c a l , r e l i g i o u s , o r l i n g u i s t i c ) w i t h t h e i r Islamic past. By the late 1960s, Arab nationalism and socialism had become the p r e d o m i nant i d e o l o g y ushering i n a n u m b e r o f revolutionary regimes i n Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Syria, and Iraq. I n time they w o u l d prove vulnerable, however. The case o f Nasser, the enormously popular Egyptian leader, is particularly instructive. Nasser was part o f a m i l i t a r y c o u p against the government o f K i n g Farouk. A l t h o u g h supported by the M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d , Nasser crushed its expectation that v i c t o r y w o u l d usher i n an Islamic government, o p t i n g instead f o r a m o r e secular socialist o r i e n t a t i o n . W h e n a frustrated B r o t h e r h o o d engaged i n active o p p o s i t i o n , Nasser m o v e d q u i c k l y t o contain and repress it. V i o l e n t clashes and assassin a t i o n attempts o c c u r r e d i n 1954 a n d 196c. Thousands

were arrested a n d

B r o t h e r h o o d leaders—among t h e m the m i l i t a n t ideologue o f Islamic revolution, Sayyid Q u t b ( 1 9 0 6 - 6 6 ) — w e r e executed. By the late 1960s Islamic critics at h o m e ( c h i e f a m o n g t h e m the M u s l i m Brotherhood) and Saudi Arabian policy abroad led Nasser t o seek Ms o w n brand o f Islamic legitimacy. He nationalized Cairo's al-Azhar University, the venerable bastion o f o r t h o d o x y and training g r o u n d for Muslims all over the w o r l d . He created a j o u r n a l , The Pulpit of Islam, w h i c h featured p r o m i n e n t religious scholars and

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intellectuals w h o legitimated Nasser's Arab socialism i n the name o f Islam. Nasser's Arab socialist-popuhst critique o f Saudi Arabia a n d other G u l f monarchies as feudal was countered by Prince (later K i n g ) Faisal's developm e n t o f a p o l i c y that emphasized Saudi Arabia's regional and global Islamic leadership. The Saudi government countered Nasser's appeal t o Arab socialism w i t h a pan-Islamic ideology diat i n c o r p o rated Arab nationalism and appealed t o the entire Islamic c o m m u n i t y (urnmah), declaring themselves the patrons o f Islam and custodians o f the holy cities o f Mecca and Medina. Nasser'sArab nationalism and socialism were condemned as "un-Islamic." By the late 1960s and early 1970s events t h r o u g h out m u c h o f the M u s l i m w o r l d reinforced a sense o f the failure o f m a n y m o d e r n M u s l i m states and societies. The Israeli rout o f the c o m b i n e d Arab forces o f Egypt, Syria, and Jordan i n the 1967 Six-Day War, accompanied by the massive Arab loss o f t e r r i t o r y (Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem), was devastating. B o t h secularists and Islamists reeled f r o m the shock and apparent utter impotence o f the A r a b - M u s l i m w o r l d i n w h a t came to be called "the catastrophe." Fought i n the name o f Arab nationali s m and socialism, the disastrous defeat discredited Arab nationalism, i n f l a m e d passions against Israel and A m e r i c a n n e o i m p e r i a l i s m (given America's p r o m i n e n t role i n the creation o f Israel and its substantial support d u r i n g the 1967 w a r ) , and served as Colonel Gamal Abd al-Nfasser came to power in Egypt in 1952

a p r i m a r y catalyst for an Islamic resurgence. The loss o f Jerusalem stunned the M u s l i m w o r l d a n d assured

that h e n c e f o r t h the l i b e r a t i o n o f

as part of a military coup against the government of the profligate King Farouk. Nasser's socialist orientation

transformed

his erstwhile allies, the Muslim Brotherhood, into militant

Palestine and Jerusalem were global Islamic issues.

opposition. Nasser and the Brotherhood became locked in a

Similar signs o f f a i l u r e — t h e Pakistan-Bangladesh

round of violent confrontations.

c i v i l w a r o f 1971

(which witnessed

the secession

of

East Pakistan, n o w Bangladesh, and the fadure o f M u s l i m nationalism, Pakistan's f o u n d i n g i d e o l o g y ) , the Lebanese c i v i l w a r o f the m i d - 1970s, and Malay-Chinese riots i n Kuala L u m p u r i n 1969—signaled the military, political, economic, a n d cultural failures o f M u s l i m societies and c o m m u n i t i e s . Lebanon, whose capital Beirut was p o p u l a r l y called the "Paris o f the M i d d l e East," was t o r n by a c i v i l w a r

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i n the m i d - 1970s that shattered the mosaic o f a Christian-doniinated confessional state (a nation o f Christian, M u s l i m , and Druze c o m m u n i t i e s ) . Disenchantment w i t h the "failures" resulting f r o m f o l l o w i n g the West ( b o t h its models o f development and its role as an ally) produced an i d e n t i t y crisis, characterized by a quest f o r a m o r e i n d i g e n o u s , authentic identity o n w h i c h t o base national d e v e l o p m e n t . F r o m Cairo t o Kuala L u m p u r , M u s l i m societies i m b u e d w i t h a r i c h Islamically i n f o r m e d cultural heritage experienced a revival that saw a greater emphasis o n their Islamic identity, history, culture, and values. Islam h a d always been present i n these societies. However, the secular d r i f t o f many societies seemed reversed as Islam became m o r e p r o m i n e n t and visible i n personal and p u b l i c life. In many ways the Iranian revolution o f 1978-79 was die denning m o m e n t that signaled and symbolized f o r many the contemporary resurgence o f Islam. For a Western w o r l d and modernizing elites i n the M u s l i m w o r l d , blinded to the resurgence o f Islam i n M u s l i m politics by a secular predisposition and definition o f m o d ernization, the specter o f Iran's Islamic revolution was unthinkable. That a m i g h t y shah o f Iran, w i t h oil wealth, formidable military and security forces, and Western support, could be toppled by a popular revolution led by the Ayatollah Ruhollah K h o m e i n i ( 1 9 0 0 - 8 9 ) , at that time exded in France, seemed impossible. Subsequent events reinforced fears o f a militant radical Islamic resurgence, popularly referred to as "Islamic fundamentalism."

Political Islam Islam reemerged as a potent global force t h r o u g h o u t the 1970s and 1980s. M u c h o f its impact i n the 1970s went unnoticed, however. It was the Iranian revolution that shattered the secular bias and expectations o f modernization and development theories and cast a light o n the significant changes that had already been taking place i n many M u s l i m societies throughout the 1970s. Ironically, its most potent manifestations o f the Islamic resurgence, both i n the 1970s and i n later decades, occurred i n those societies regarded as the most " m o d e r n " o r m o d e r n i z i n g , those possessing a well-trained, Western-oriented, secular elite: Iran, Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, Turkey, and Algeria. F r o m Cairo t o Kuala L u m p u r , the resurgence o f Islam manifested itself i n personal and public life, i n piety and politics. Many became m o r e religiously observant i n prayer, fasting, dress, a n d behavior. Greater emphasis o n piety a n d spirituality were also reflected i n the revitalization o f Sufism—Islamic m y s t i c i s m — b o t h w i t h i n the M u s l i m countries and abroad. M a j o r Sufi leaders and such orders as t h e Naqshbandi were t o be f o u n d not o n l y i n M u s l i m countries f r o m Egypt t o China but also i n Europe and the U n i t e d States, w h e r e they c o n tinue t o f u n c t i o n as effective missionaries o f Islam. At the same t i m e , govern-

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merits and o p p o s i t i o n i n countries as diverse as Egypt, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia increasingly appealed to Islam to enhance their legitimacy and m o b i lize popular support. Islamic ideology, rhetoric, symbols, actors, p o l i t i c a l parties, and organizations became p r o m i n e n t fixtures i n M u s l i m politics and society. Libya's M u a m m a r Qaddafi and Sudan's Jafar N u m a y r i seized power i n the late 1960s; they d i d so i n the name o f the Arab socialism o f Nasser, w h o m they a d m i r e d . By the early 1970s, w i t h the discrediting o f Arab socialism after the 1967 w a r and Nasser's death i n 1970, b o t h Qaddafi and N u m a y r i t u r n e d to Islam to buttress their Arab nationalism, legitimate their seizure o f power, and broaden their base o f s u p p o r t . Each r e i n f o r c e d his Islamic i d e n t i t y and image. B o t h e m p l o y e d a heavy does o f Islamic rhetoric and p o s t u r i n g . N u m a y r i published Why the Islamic Way, a n d Qaddafi issued his Green Book, in w h i c h he delineated his " T h i r d Way" or Islamic alternative to Western capitalism and Soviet M a r x i s m . Both i n t r o d u c e d Islamic laws, regulations, and taxes. Their interpretations o f Islam domestically and internationally varied significantly, however, i n f l u e n c e d by their distinctive personalities, local experiences (domestic policies), and international ambitions. N u m a y r i , having been betrayed by Sudan's c o m m u n i s t party, i n c o r p o r a t e d the p h i l o s o p h i e s o f Hasan Turabi (leader o f Sudan's M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d ) i n t o his government and assumed an a n t i c o m m u n i s t , pro-Western profile. He became an A m e r i c a n ally and the o n l y major Arab leader n o t to break relations w i t h Egypt over than President A n w a r Sadat's s i g n i n g o f the Camp David Accords. I n contrast, Qaddafi c h a m p i o n e d a radical populist-socialist message and played an international audience m o r e effectively. H e denounced the conservative monarchies o f the Arab w o r l d , used Libya's abundant o i l revenues and the draw o f Islam to compete w i t h Saudi Arabia for influence and leadership 7

i n the Arab and broader Islamic w o r l d , and supported revolutionary movements internationally f r o m Ireland's I r i s h Republic A r m y to the southern Philippines's M o r o N a t i o n a l Liberation Front. Similarly, w h e n Sadat (1918-81) succeeded the charismatic and e n o r m o u s l y p o p u l a r Nasser, he used Islam to enhance his legitimacy, distance h i m s e l f f r o m the left, and garner popular s u p p o r t . Sadat appropriated the title "the Believer president," relied o n a heavy use o f Quranic references and Islamic symbols i n speeches and at public gatherings, and cast the 1973 Arab-Israeli w a r as a j i h a d . H e attempted to co-opt Islamic organizations; for example, he p e r m i t t e d the o u t lawed and i m p r i s o n e d M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d , suppressed by Nasser, to f u n c t i o n i n society and fostered the g r o w t h o f Islamic student organizations o n u n i v e r sity campuses to b l u n t the p o w e r o f Nasserites and leftists. Pakistan's Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928—79), a secular socialist w h o came to power after the 1971 civil war w h e n Pakistan splii into Pakistan and Bangladesh, turned to Islam to strengthen ties w i t h the o d - r i c h states o f the Arabian G u l f and to counter his Islamic critics ( i n particular, the Jamaat-i-Islami). Under President Bhutto,

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The Afghan civil war continued after the Soviet withdrawal in February 1988. Here, a group of mujahideen (Muslim militias) rest during a lull in the heavy fighting with government troops over the city of Jalalabad, which was a vital link in the black-market arms trade from Peshawar, Pakistan, through the Kunar valley to Afghan guerrillas.

Pakistan became a host t o numerous international Islamic conferences. Legislation was introduced t o restrict alcohol use, g a m b l i n g , and the frequenting o f n i g h t clubs, as well as to l o w e r bank interest and to impose Islamic taxes (zakah and ushr). Bhutto renamed o r "Islamized" his secular socialism, calling it the equality o f the Prophet. Reflecting the g r o w i n g Islamic climate, i n 1974 Pakistan hosted an international Islamic conference at the Badshahi mosque, one o f the great mosques o f South Asia, at w h i c h Qaddafi preached and Sadat attempted to mediate between Pakistan and Bangladesh i n the name o f their c o m m o n Islamic brotherhood. During the 1970s and 1980s Islam proved an effective source for opposition and popular protest i n such countries as han, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, as well as i n Egypt and Lebanon. I t was used to legitimate the overthrow o f the shall o f han and o f President Bhutto o f Pakistan, as well as to legitimate the i m p o s i t i o n o f Islamic forms o f government by the Ayatollah Khomeini and clergy o f h a n , General M o h a m m a d Zia-ul-Haq (1924-88) and the army i n Pakistan, and the Taliban i n Afghanistan. Islamic symbols, slogans, ideology, religious leaders, organizations, and i n s t i tutions played i m p o r t a n t roles i n the organization and mass m o b i l i z a t i o n o f p o p ular support f r o m diverse sectors o f society. I n Iran clerical and lay leaders such as the Ayatollah K h o m e i n i and A l i Shariati (1933-77) became the p r i m a r y ideologues o f a popular r e v o l u t i o n that b r o u g h t together clergy, intellectuals, stu-

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dents, journalists, and m e n and w o m e n f r o m diverse classes, professional backgrounds, and p o l i t i c a l positions under the banner o f Islam. In Pakistan, Bhutto's appeals to Islam so incensed religious and secular leaders and parlies that a broad-based o p p o s i t i o n , the Pakistan N a t i o n a l Alliance, representing a cross section o f the p o l i t i c a l spectrum, m o b i l i z e d under the banner o f Islam, p r o m i s i n g an Islamic system (nizom-i-islom) o f government. The l i b e r a t i o n o f Afghanistan f r o m Soviet occupation i n 1979 d i d not b r i n g peace to this w a r - t o r n country. The struggle o f brave A f g h a n mujohidcen ( M u s l i m militias) against the occupation o f their country by an "atheist" Soviet army had captured the support and sympathies o f many i n the West and the M u s l i m w o r l d alike. I n contrast to the West's fear o f the Islamic resurgence or "Islamic f u n d a m e n t a l i s m " i n I r a n and the M i d d l e East, Afghanistan's M u s l i m m i l i t i a s were seen as f r e e d o m fighters whose jihad received substantial aid f r o m the U n i t e d States, Saudi Arabia, and other countries. The m u j a h i d e e n v i c t o r y d i d not b r i n g peace, however. The c o m m o n Islamic identity that had served to m o b i l i z e and inspire, to u n i f y the m i l i t i a s i n their j i h a d against the Soviet U n i o n , was n o w eclipsed by Afghanistan's age-old tribal, ethnic, and religious d i f f e r ences and rivalries, p r i m a r i l y between the Sunni and Shiite branches o f Islam. Afghanistan, a predominantiy Sunni country, had enjoyed a fragile unity, offset by the realities o f its multiethnic tribal society (Pathans, Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Persian-speaki n g Shiites i n the west). The leadership vacuum created by the Soviet defeat n o w unleashed a factional power struggle. Having driven out the Soviets i n 1989 and defeated the c o m munist regime o f Najibullah i n Kabul i n 1992, the mujahideen Islamic government then fell prey to a bloody internal power struggle as mujahideen leaders (or perhaps more accurately, warlords) vied for supremacy, resulting i n more deaths and devastation than its liberation had cost. Two major groups came to the f o r e f r o n t : H i z b - i - I s l a m i , led by Gulbudeen Hekmatyar, and Jamaat-i-Islami, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. M u c h o f Afghanistan, i n c l u d i n g Kabul, was caught i n the rivalry and crossfire between these t w o groups. After almost eighteen years o f c i v i l w a r i n Afghanistan, a seemingly endless state o f carnage and chaos was abruptly reversed. As i f o u t o f n o w h e r e , a band o f students (toliban) f r o m the miidrcisas (colleges whose p r i m a r y purpose is die teaching o f Islamic law and related religions subjects) appeared i n late 1994 and w i t h i n t w o years swept across the country. D e n o u n c i n g all the warlords and representing no

A In Afghanistan, the Taliban government requires women to wear a full veil that allows them to see only through a screened area in front of their eyes.

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ouiside interests, they claimed the mantle o f m o r a l leadership as representatives o f the Afghan m a j o r i t y w h o were victims o f the internecine warfare. A l t h o u g h i n i tially portrayed as y o u n g students f r o m the madrasas w i t h n o rmlitary backg r o u n d , i n fact they were a force o f mullahs and taliban, religious leaders and students. The mullahs were p r i m a r i l y veterans o f the Afghan-Soviet war w h o had returned t o the madrasas after the Soviets' departure. Their leader, M u l l a h Omar, reflected this older generation. M u l l a h Omar had been a student o f Islam before j o i n i n g M o h a m m a d N a b i M o h a m m a d i ' s Islamic R e v o l u t i o n a r y M o v e m e n t (Harakat-i-inqilabi-i-Islami). D u r i n g the 1980s O m a r f o u g h t against the Soviet occupation, losing an eye and b e c o m i n g deputy c o m m a n d e r o f the movement. I n 1994 he launched the Taliban campaign to restore stability and order and to establish an Islamic state. Because little was k n o w n about the Taliban and they were portrayed simply as y o u n g students f r o m religious schools, inexperienced i n w a r fare and p o o r l y armed, they were initially not taken seriously. I n t i m e they proved to be a formidable force, however, feared by warlords but embraced by ordinary citizens, w h o captured Kabul and controlled three-fourths o f the country. A l t h o u g h initially hailed as liberators w h o secured t o w n s , made the streets safe, and cleaned u p c o r r u p t i o n and graft, the Taliban's strict f o r m o f Islam soon became an issue f o r some. The Taliban subscribed to a very conservative, p u r i tanical interpretation o f Islam. Their doctrines are close t o those o f Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi r e l i g i o u s establishment

and Pakistan's Jamaat-i-Is!ami.

As Sunni

M u s l i m s , they denounced their Shiite o p p o s i t i o n as infidels. W h e n they captured the A f g h a n capital Kabul after a two-year battle, the Taliban not o n l y restored law and order but also sought to create or impose a m o r a l shariah-governed society, m a n d a t i n g their brand o f Islamic r e f o r m . They segregated the sexes outside the h o m e , closed girls' schools, r e q u i r e d that w o m e n be f u l l y covered i n p u b l i c , and banned w o m e n f r o m the workplace. They also banned television, cinema, and music, ordered m e n t o g r o w beards and pray five times a day, and i n t r o d u c e d the hudud punishments ( p u n i s h m e n t s for certain crimes as prescribed b y the Q u r a n and h a d i t h , such as a m p u t a t i o n for theft, death for murder, stoning for adultery). In Egypt, after i n i t i a l periods o f support, b o t h the M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d and the Islamic student organization (the Gamaa Islamiyya) became m o r e vocal i n their criticisms o f the Sadat government d u r i n g the late 1970s. Radical underg r o u n d groups w i t h such names as M u h a m m a d ' s Y o u t h , Takfir wal H i j r a , and Islamic Jihad, c o m m i t t e d t o the o v e r t h r o w o f the Sadat government and the i m p o s i t i o n o f an Islamic government, sprouted and began their guerilla w a r against the regime, g o v e r n m e n t officials, m i n o r i t i e s , and other M u s l i m s . I n 1981 Sadat, a N o b e l p r i z e w i n n e r f o r his negotiated peace (the Camp David Accords) w i t h Israel's p r i m e m i n i s t e r Menachem Begin (1913-92), was assassinated by the m i l i t a n t g r o u p Islamic Jihad. In Lebanon demographic changes prompted Muslims, both Sunni and Shhte, to

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1

call for a redistribution o f power i n a state whose political system had been based o n the proportional representation o f Lebanon religious communities (Christian, Sunni M u s l i m , Shiite M u s l i m , and Druze, i n that order). A p r o m i n e n t Shiite leader. I m a m Musa Sadr, established the Movement for die Dispossessed (and subsequently its militia, AMAL, Lebanese Resistance Battalions). In the aftermath o f die Iranian revo l u t i o n , the hanian-inspired, -trained, and -funded Hi/.boliah (Party o f God) undertook its militant struggle w i t h the Israeli occupation and the Christian (especially Maronite) dominance o f Lebanon. I n b o t h cases—AMAL and Hizbollah—Shiite belief and ritual were reinterpreted, though not h i precisely the same ways, to supp o r t social and political movements o f protest and r e f o r m . For Hizbollah the goal was the creauon o f an Islamic state. For A M A L the object was a more equitable redist r i b u t i o n o f political and economic power w i t h i n Lebanon's mulliconfessional state.

Anatomy of a Revolution: The Islamic Republic of Iran Iran captured the headlines and imaginations o f many t h r o u g h o u t the M u s l i m w o r l d and the West, so m u c h so that many w o u l d come to view Islam and Islamic revivalism t h r o u g h die lens o f the Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran. A seemingly m o d e r n , enlightened, and invincible shah was o v e r t h r o w n by a movement led by an ayatollah i n exile i n France. Intellectuals, merchants (bazaaris), students, and j o u r nalists as w e l l as clergy mobilized under the banner o f Islam. Islam was not o n l y a rallying cry for its supporters but also a symbol o f protest for all w h o opposed the shall, whatever their political or religious beliefs. Islamic symbols, rhetoric, and institutions provided the infrastructure for organization, protest, and m o b i lization o f a coalition o f forces calling for r e f o r m and i n the end f o r r e v o l u t i o n . Iran seemed a textbook candidate for successful m o d e r n i z a t i o n and developm e n t , the most u n l i k e l y prospect for r e v o l u t i o n . O u t w a r d l y , the goal o f the W h i t e Revolution, the a m b i t i o u s m o d e r n i z a t i o n p r o g r a m o f Shah M o h a m m a d Reza Pahlavi (1919-80), was to b r i n g Iran i n t o the t w e n t i e t h century w i t h i n a matter o f decades. O i l wealth, the best equipped military i n the M i d d l e East ( w i t h the exception o f Israel), close tics w i t h the U n i t e d Stales, Europe, and even Israel, and a w e l l - t r a i n e d elite c o n t r i b u t e d to the image o f Iran, i n the w o r d s o f U.S. President J i m m y Carter, as " a n island o f stability" i n the M i d d l e East. Beneath the surface, however, was g r o w i n g discontent. A l t h o u g h the shah's m o d e r n i z a t i o n p r o g r a m d i d improve the l o t o f many, the benefits o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n tended t o favor disproportionately a m i n o r i t y of m o d e r n elites and urban centers. Economic, educational, and m i l i t a r y reforms were n o t accompanied by political liberalization. Traditional merchants (bazaaris) and religious leaders (ulama), l o n g m u t u a l l y supportive and connected t h r o u g h m a r riage and business relationships, were alienated by the shall's religious and econ o m i c reforms. State control o f religious affairs ( t h r o u g h the courts, endowments.

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and education) and a tilt toward Western markets and the corporate sector threatened their interests, authority, and power. M a n y m o d e r n , educated academics, professionals, and journalists increasingly expressed concerns over the excessive dependence o f Iran o n the West (economically and m i l i t a r i l y ) , w i t h its negative religio-cullural impact. Some m o d e r n , Western-educated intellectuals like Jalal al¬ e - A h m a d and A l i Shariati spoke o f the dangers o f "Westoxification," an excessive dependence o n the West that threatened to r o b Iranians o f their independence and cultural identity. These were issues that resonated across many sectors o f society. Early i n his r u l e , the shah w o r k e d o u t a tacit agreement and a c c o m m o d a t i o n w i t h m a n y o f Iran's leading clerics. H o w e v e r , some clerics, like R u h o l i a h K h o m e i n i (later the ayatollah) f r o m Q u m , exiled first to Iraq and later France, were less c o m p l i a n t . I n the mid-1970s, as the voices o f discontent increased, gov-

By the 1970s in Iran, there was widespread discontent with the authoritarian rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Shiite Islam offered the broadest basis for a mass movement, and many people united to support Ayatollah Khomeini, as in this demonstration in Tehran in February 1979.

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e m i n e n t security forces m o v e d q u i c k l y to contain and repress m o u n t i n g o p p o sition. By the late 1970s, w i t h widespread suppression o f dissident intellectuals, politicians, journalists, liberal nationalists, socialists, and Marxists, Shiite Islam (Iran's religious and cultural heritage and therefore the r e l i g i o n o f most Iranians) offered the most i n d i g e n o u s broad-based basis f o r a mass m o v e m e n t . Shiite Islam p r o v i d e d a c o m m o n set o f symbols, historic identity, and v a l u e s — an i n d i g e n o u s , n o n - W e s t e r n alternative. Shiite belief p r o v i d e d the basis f o r an ideological f r a m e w o r k for o p p o s i t i o n and protest against oppression and injustice. Clerical and lay intellectuals, such as the Ayatollah K h o m e i n i and Ali Shariati, reap propria ted Shiite history, beliefs, and rituals to support and sustain r e l i giously legitimated o p p o s i t i o n to the shah's regime. After an early revolutionary history, Shiite Islam had developed doctrines that enabled i t to survive and coexist in a Sunni-dominated w o r l d . N o w reformers t u r n e d to Shiite Islam's early revo l u t i o n a r y p e r i o d as a base f o r their r e f o r m i s t and r e v o l u t i o n a r y ideology. M e m o r i e s o f a persecuted, dispossessed, and d i s i n h e r i t e d remnant's struggle and m a r t y r d o m took o n m o d e r n meanings. The paradigmatic Shiite event—the mart y r d o m o f the caliph Ali's righteous son al-Husayn (the Prophet's grandson) by the forces o f the " e v i l " Sunni Umayyad r u l e r Yazid at the battle o f Karbala i n 680—was n o w likened to the oppression and injustice i n f l i c t e d u n d e r the shah, the new Yazid. The m u l l a h mosque n e t w o r k enabled the clergy and Iran's t h o u sands o f mosques to serve as centers for organization, propaganda ( d i s t r i b u t i o n o f audiotapes and flyers), and m o b i l i z a t i o n . A l t h o u g h the o p p o s i t i o n u n i t e d u n d e r the u m b r e l l a o f Islam i n a c o m m o n p u r p o s e — o p p o s i t i o n to the shah and the desire f o r a m o r e independent, i n d i g e nously rooted m o d e r n i t y — i t encompassed heterogeneous political and religious groups. They ranged f r o m secularists to Islamic activists, f r o m liberal democrats to Marxists. Similar differences existed a m o n g the clergy and senior ayatollahs, as w o u l d later b e c o m e m o r e evident. N o w h e r e was the d i v i s i o n

among

Islamically o r i e n t e d activists m o r e p r o n o u n c e d than i n the t w o most p r o m i n e n t ideologies o f the r e v o l u t i o n : the Ayatollah K h o m e i n i , a traditionally madrasatrained cleric, and A l i Shariati, w h o c o m b i n e d a traditional religious education w i t h a Sorbonne doctorate. A l t h o u g h banners d e p i c t i n g each were juxtaposed i n many homes and i n protest marches, their interpretations o f Islamic identity and ideology were i n fact quite different. K h o m e i n i , a m e m b e r o f Iran's Shiite r e l i gious hierarchy, p r i v i l e g e d ulama leadership and t r a d i t i o n ; A l i Shariati called for a b o l d reinterpretation o f Shiite Islam to recapture its early revolutionary message. He c r i t i c i z e d the religious establishment f o r its a c c o m m o d a t i o n w i t h the state ( w h a t he called Safavid Islam) and its betrayal o f the true m e a n i n g and legacy o f early Shiism ( A l i d Islam) w i t h its radical c o m m i t m e n t to social justice. The r e v o l u t i o n o f 1978—79 b r o u g h t together a diverse cross section o f lay and clerical leadership, social and economic classes, political parties, and guerilla

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groups. W i t h the passing o f their c o m m o n enemy, the shah, differences o f v i s i o n and ideology ( b o t h religious and socioeconomic)

surfaced almost i m m e d i a t e l y

after the r e v o l u t i o n . The struggle between moderates and militants became evident. Rather t h a n r e t u r n i n g to t h e i r mosques and madrasas, the Ayatollah K h o m e i n i and many o f his clerical disciples m o v e d q u i c k l y to consolidate their power and c o n t r o l o f government. The Islamic Republic's first p r i m e minister, M e h d i Bazargan,

and president, A b o l Hasan

Bani-Sadr. a l t h o u g h i n i t i a l l y

approved by Ayatollah K h o m e i n i , were d r i v e n f r o m office. Bazargan resigned i n N o v e m b e r 1979

and Bani-Sadr fled Iran after being impeached i n 1981.

The

ulama consolidated their power and set about f u l f i l l i n g the t w i n goals o f i n s t i tutionalization and export o f the r e v o l u t i o n . The n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n o f the Islamic Republic was a m i x t u r e o f m o d e r n Western and Shiite religious institutions that incorporated m o d e r n political language and such institutions as those o f a republic, parliamentary government, o r the executive, legislative, and j u d i c i a l branches. The o v e r r i d i n g concept o f state, however, was the n o t i o n o f government by the ftiqih or legal expert (wilayut al-faqth, guardianship o r rule by the jurist). W h i l e many, i n c l u d i n g moderate or liberal intellectuals and ulama, expected the ulama to r e t u r n to their mosques and schools and at best advise the government o n Islamic matters. K h o m e i n i and the bulk o f more m i l i t a n t and conservative ulama believed i n a clerically g u i d e d state. At the apex o f government it was the Ay atollah K h o m e i n i , the supreme authori t y assisted by other clergy, w h o d o m i n a t e d the branches o f government and its organizations i n a clerical state or theocracy. Voices o f dissent, lay and clerical, were i n t i m i d a t e d or s i l e n c e d — f r o m secularists a n d leftists to Islamically o r i e n t e d intellectuals such as Bazargan and Bani-Sadr. Sadeq Ghotbzadeh, an early protégé o f the Ayatollah K h o m e i n i w h o had h e l d a n u m b e r o f senior government positions i n c l u d i n g foreign minister, was executed f o r an alleged plot to assassinate K h o m e i n i . Dissident clergy, i n particular those w h o refused to accept K h o m e i n i ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Islam, w h i c h had y i e l d e d his d o c t r i n e o f " r u l e by the j u r i s t , " were h o u n d e d and harassed by f e l l o w clerics. Many were silenced; the Ayatollah M u h a m m a d Kazem Shariatmadari, a senior ayatollah revered for his k n o w l e d g e and piety, was even defrocked i n

1982.

Institutionalization o f the r e v o l u t i o n at h o m e was accompanied by its export abroad. The p r o m o t i o n and spread o f Islam and Iran's "Islamic r e v o l u t i o n " was a foreign policy goal o f the K h o m e i n i government, explicitly stated i n the exhortation o f Iran's c o n s t i t u t i o n : " t o perpetuate the r e v o l u t i o n b o t h at h o m e and abroad." Both preaching and propagation o f the faith (throxigh d i s t r i b u t i o n o f publications, conferences, and f u n d i n g o f religious institutions abroad)

were

c o m b i n e d w i t h c o n f r o n t a t i o n a n d a r m e d s t r u g g l e . At the same t i m e , the Ayatollah K h o m e i n i and other government officials, as w e l l as Iran's radio broad-

CONTEMPORARY

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cast "Voice o f the Islamic R e v o l u t i o n , " called o n the M u s l i m s of the G u l f and t h r o u g h o u t the w o r l d to rise u p and o v e r t h r o w "oppressive, u n - I s l a m i c " governments. G u l f states were c o n d e m n e d because o f the nature o f their govern ments ( m o n a r c h y was dismissed as " u n - I s l a m i c " ) and because o f their close ties w i t h America, w h i c h was often referred to as " A m e r i c a n I s l a m , " that is, o f f e r i n g a f o r m o f Islam acceptable to the West. In Iran, as t i m e passed political and ideological divisions deepened not o n l y between those w h o were f o r and against the r e v o l u t i o n but also a m o n g supporters o f the revolution. Differences o f religious i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and class interests d i v i d e d rather than u n i t e d the Islamic Republic's debate over economic and social r e f o r m . The m a j o r i t y o f the parliament favored a social r e v o l u t i o n that i n c l u d e d state c o n t r o l o f the economy and controls o n the private sector and free enterprise, to improve the c o n d i t i o n o f the urban poor, farmers, and villagers. Merchants, w h o had been m a j o r financial supporters o f the r e v o l u t i o n , and landowners, i n c l u d i n g many clerics, strongly opposed these measures and l o b bied senior clerics. The C o u n c i l of Guardians, clerical experts o n Islamic law w h o d e t e r m i n e d whether legislation was Islamically acceptable, consistently blocked such legislation. The Ayatollah K h o m e i n i , w h o c o u l d have broken these deadlocks, chose not to intervene. D u r i n g the p o s t - K h o m e i n i p e r i o d economic policy and ideological differences c o n t i n u e d to affect Iran's development. Ineffective economic policies fed g r o w i n g discontent and d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t , leading many to look back l o n g i n g l y to the relative prosperity o f the shah's rule. Iran's Islamic i d e n t i t y seemed m o r e w r a p p e d u p i n debates over w o m e n ' s dress and conduct i n society than i n i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f effective political and economic policies. Yet, despite w h a t some v i e w e d as Iran's r i g i d " f u n d a m e n t a l i s m , " w i t h i n the state's ideological l i m i t s and controls Iran d i d conduct parliamentary and local elections; w o m e n were able to f u n c t i o n i n society ( t o vote and h o l d elected office, t o w o r k , t o p u b l i s h magazines that advocated women's r i g h t s issues); and strong differences o f o p i n i o n were debated i n parliament and i n the press. This stood i n sharp contrast to the m o r e restrictive policies o f many o f Iran's G u l f neighbors. The 1980s were d o m i n a t e d by fears o f "radical Islamic f u n d a m e n t a l i s m , " the spread o f Iran's Islamic revolution, o r the p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f extremist u n d e r g r o u n d m i l i t a n t organizations bent on destabilizing and t o p p l i n g entrenched governments. Both M u s l i m andWestern governments feared a d o m i n o effect, the spread o f revolutionary Islam leading to " o t h e r Irans." The fear seemed verified by events: eruptions i n Saudi Arabia's o i l - r i c h eastern province, w h i c h w as heavilyr

populated by its Shiitc m i n o r i t y ; disturbances i n Kuwait and Bahrain; Iran's significant support for militant Shiism i n Lebanon, such as H i z b o l l a h (Party o f G o d ) and Islamic Jihad; and the attempt by K h o m e i n i t o t u r n the Iran-Iraq w a r i n t o a jihad and m o b i l i z e a revolt by Iraqi Shiites. At the same time, m i l i t a n t groups like

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Islamic Jihad and H i z b o l l a h were responsible f o r the assassination o f the Egy ptian president Sadat i n 1981 and a rash o f hijackings across the M i d d l e East and i n South Asia. For a secular-oriented West the specter o f the spread o f revolutionary Islam seemed b o t h retrogressive and a threat to Western allies and interests ( o d and trade). The reality was i n fact far m o r e complex. Iran proved far m o r e effective as a source o f i n s p i r a t i o n rather than e m u l a t i o n . There were n o Iranian-inspired or - f u n d e d revolutions. Shiite disturbances d i d n o t lead to the fall o f governments. K h o m e i n i was n o t able to m o b i l i z e the Iraqi Shiites i n a w a r i n w h i c h ancient rivalries (Arab versus Persian), and m o d e r n Iraqi and Arab nationalism In the 1980s many governments, both Muslim and

proved stronger than c o m m o n religious affiliation. Indeed, even after the defeat o f Iraq i n the G u l f War i n M a r c h 1991, the Iranians d i d n o t h i n g to encourage the

Western, feared that Iran's

emergence o f a Shiite republic in the south o f a devastated Iraq. Moreover, as t i m e

Islamic revolution would

passed, the failures and excesses o f the Iranian government became a source o f

spread. Their worst fears

disillusionment to many o f its initial admirers.

were realized in the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, and Ayatollah Khomeini's

As a result, few noticed or distinguished between the violent extremists w h o w i s h e d to seize power a n d populist p o l i t i c a l and social movements that quietly

attempt to mobilize a revolt

p u r s u e d change f r o m below, f r o m w i t h i n t h e i r societies, like the M u s l i m

by Iraqi Shiites against

B r o t h e r h o o d s o f Egypt and Jordan, the Islamic Tendency M o v e m e n t

Saddam Hussein.

renamed H i z b al-Nahda, the Renaissance Party o r Ennahda), the Jamiy ai al-Islah

(later

CONTEMPORARY

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667

( R e f o r m Society) i n K u w a i t , the Jamaat-i-Islami i n Pakistan or A B I M and PAS i n Malaysia, and the Jamat al-Nasr (Society for V i c t o r y ) i n N i g e r i a .

Islam and Democracy By the late 1980s and 1990s the t w o faces o f Islamic activism became evident: ( 1 ) anti-Western

radical

revolutionary

governments

(in

Iran,

Sudan,

and

Afghanistan) and movements ( j i h a d groups i n the M i d d l e East and the Gamaa Islamiyya i n Cairo, f o r example), seeking to o v e r t h r o w regimes i n the M u s l i m w o r l d , and ( 2 ) a host o f Islamic movements f u n c t i o n i n g w i t h i n mainstream society to foster social and political change. F r o m Egypt to Indonesia, Islamic movements and organizations created alter native educational, medical, legal, and social services (schools, clinics, hospitals, y o u t h centers, and legal aid societies, for example), p u b l i s h i n g houses, and finan cial institutions. Islamists held p r o m i n e n t positions and participated i n profes sional associations and unions. I n countries and areas w i t h large populations and p o o r economies ( i n w h i c h there was often poverty, h i g h u n e m p l o y m e n t , and a lack o f adequate h o u s i n g and social services)—such as Egypt, Algeria, the West Bank and Gaza, a n d Indonesia—Islamically motivated educational,

economic,

and social welfare institutions (many t h o u g h not all Islamist i n orientation) p r o vided an alternative to state services, w h i c h were o f t e n inadequate, too expensive, or nonexistent. Regimes regarded t h e m as an i m p l i c i t critique o f the state's fail ure to provide for its citizens. For example, w h e n earthquakes devastated parts o f Egypt and Algeria, it was the Islamists (the M u s l i m Brotherhood and the Islamic Salvation Front), n o t the state, that were the first o n the scene, p r o v i d i n g needed relief. A n embarrassed and somewhat threatened Egyptian government under President H o s n i Mubarak subsequently banned nongovernmental organizations f r o m responding t o such disasters. Social activism has always been part o f the r e d e f i n i t i o n o f the n o t i o n o f davva, the call to Islam. W h i l e the p r i m a r y d e f i n i t i o n o f dawa has been o f preaching and spreading God's w o r d and c o m m u n i t y (calling all to " t h e straight p a t h " o f Islam), i t has also i n c l u d e d the call to M u s l i m s to return to Islam, to become m o r e religiously observant. To these understandings has been added the i n s t i t u t i o n a l ization o f Islam's teaching that M u s l i m s are socially responsible and accountable. The Islamic r e q u i r e m e n t to p r o m o t e social justice has been coupled w i t h the v i e w o f Islam as a total way o f life and provided the rationale for the g r o w t h o f social welfare agencies or organizations, the creation o f organizations that relate the r e l i g i o n o f Islam to the needs o f society. The social welfare organizations dis cussed above are k n o w n as Islamic call societies, as are the m y r i a d o f relief agen cies that have been created for Palestine, Bosnia, Kashmir, and Afghanistan. The t e r m has also been p o l i t i c i z e d by governments as w e l l as o p p o s i t i o n movements.

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Libya's Jamiyyat al-Dawa has served as a f o r e i g n p o l i c y t o o l , disseminating Qaddafi's religious and political ideas and p r o v i d i n g funds for schools, mosques, and hospitals. The Iraqi Islamic call society H i z b al-Dawa al-Islamiya was founded i n o p p o s i t i o n t o m i l i t a r y and political leader Saddam Hussein's r u l e . A notable sign o f the mainstrearning o f Islamic revivalism o r activism was the emergence o f Islamists as leaders i n professional associations and trade unions. Their presence underscored the extent to w h i c h the strength o f Islamic revivali s m was n o t s i m p l y due t o its attractiveness t o the p o o r and uneducated b u t i n fact to a m o d e r n educated but Islamically o r i e n t e d elite. The strength o f Islamists i n professional associations o f physicians, lawyers, engineers, journalists, a n d teachers reflected the extent t o w h i c h M u s l i m societies n o w had an alternative sector o f society alongside the traditional Islamic and m o d e r n Western-oriented sectors, and an alternative elite t o the Western secular elite. As the Soviet U n i o n a n d eastern Europe were swept along by the wave o f democratization i n 1989—90, the M i d d l e East a n d the broader M u s l i m w o r l d showed signs o f modest change i n response t o political unrest i n Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria, M o r o c c o , a n d Pakistan. A l t h o u g h some M u s l i m radicals, hke secular nationalist radicals, rejected any f o r m o f parliamentary democracy as westernizing and i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h Islam and local M u s l i m traditions, many, i f n o t most, Islamic intellectuals and activists t r i e d t o c o m e t o terms w i t h the idea and the process. Islamic movements i n Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, and Pakistan chose t o f u n c t i o n w i t h i n the political system and participate i n electoral politics. The m a j o r i t y o f M u s l i m countries have been r u l e d by a u t h o r i t a r i a n governments buttressed by m i l i t a r y a n d security forces. Few rulers have held elective office; most have been kings or m i l i t a r y or e x - m i l i t a r y officers. W h e r e parliaments a n d political parties have existed, they have generally remained s u b o r d i nated to the r u l i n g government or party. W h i l e some M u s l i m countries, such as Pakistan and Turkey, have held elections, the m i l i t a r y have also h a d significant influence o n pohtics. I n the late 1980s and early 1990s several m a j o r events l e d to an o p e n i n g o f the political system, ushering i n political liberalization a n d democratization. A m o n g the most i m p o r t a n t were n u m e r o u s e c o n o m i c crises and " f o o d r i o t s , " the fall o f the Soviet U n i o n a n d liberation o f eastern Europe, and the G u l f War. Countries as diverse as Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, and Algeria responded by o p e n i n g their political systems, enabling Islamists t o participate i n electoral politics. To the surprise o f many, Islamists and Islamic parties emerged as the leading o p p o s i t i o n i n Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan. I n Algeria they seemed poised t o come t o power. In Pakistan opposition t o Zia u l - H a q i n the 1980s had been coorchnated i n the Movement for the Restoration o f Democracy, w h i c h included secular as w e l l as r e l i gious (Islamic) parties. I n October

1990 elections Zia ul-Haq's democratically

CONTEMPORARY

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elected successor, Benazir Bhutto, was defeated by a coalition that

took

the

name

the

Islamic

Democratic

Alliance.

T h r o u g h o u t this p e r i o d such groups as the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Jamiyyat U l a m a - i Pakistan, and the Jamiyyat U l a m a - i Islam called for the restoration o f democracy and participated i n national and provincial elections. Egypt and Jordan, l o n g regarded as having moderate p r o Western governments, i n t r o d u c e d p o l i t i c a l reforms to alleviate the g r o w i n g o p p o s i t i o n due to deteriorating e c o n o m i c conditions and h i g h u n e m p l o y m e n t and to defuse the threat o f " f u n d a m e n t a l i s m . " B o t h c o u n t r i e s attempted to keep Islamic moderates separated f r o m militants—-a k i n d o f cont a i n m e n t p o l i c y — a n d to avoid radicalization.

President

Mubarak o f Egypt distinguished m o r e sharply than his pre-

Islam has been effective in mobilizing opposition

decessor, A n w a r Sadat, between p o l i t i c a l dissent and direct

and popular protest against governments. In 1977

challenges t o the state's authority. Islamic groups such as the

General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq deposed Zulfikar

M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d were a l l o w e d to participate i n p o l i t i -

Ali Bhutto, a secular socialist, with the support of

cal and e c o n o m i c life and to express t h e n criticism o f gov-

the Jamaat al-Islam; he then instituted an Islamic

e r n m e n t policies. As early as 1941,

form of government.

the B r o t h e r h o o d h a d

accepted p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n electoral p o l i t i c s . Six

Brothers

( i n c l u d i n g Hasan al-Banna, its f o u n d e r ) contested the parliamentary election o f 1945. but n o n e was successful i n an election that was seen by many as c o r r u p t . F r o m the r e v o l u t i o n i n

1952

to the post-Sadat p e r i o d i n the

1980s, the

B r o t h e r h o o d either boycotted elections or, m o r e o f t e n , was p r o h i b i t e d f r o m o p e r a t i n g o p e n l y as a p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . I n 1984,

however, w h e n the

B r o t h e r h o o d was allowed to contest parliamentary elections, a l t h o u g h n o t as a political party, i t f o r m e d an alliance w i t h the N e w W a f d party and w o n twelve seats. I n 1987 i t created an "Islamic alliance" w i t h the Socialist Labor Party and the Liberals a n d increased its parliamentary strength to t h i r t y - t w o seats. I n Jordan, K i n g Hussein i n i t i a t e d a process o f political r e f o r m i n N o v e m b e r 1989, f o l l o w i n g serious r i o t i n g i n A p r i l o f that year after government-announced increases i n the price o f major c o m m o d i t i e s . Parliamentary elections were h e l d for the first t i m e i n t w e n t y - t w o years. Islamic candidates, c a m p a i g n i n g w i t h slogans such as "the Q u r a n is o u r c o n s t i t u t i o n " and " I s l a m is the s o l u t i o n , " scored an upset,

taking t h i r t y - t w o

o f eighty

parliamentary

seats. The

Muslim

B r o t h e r h o o d w o n t w e n t y seats, w h i l e twelve went t o other Islamic candidates. The B r o t h e r h o o d also d i d w e l l i n local elections. I n 1990 i t w o n n i n e o f ten seats i n a local c o u n c i l election i n Zarqa, the second largest t o w n i n Jordan, and f o u r o f nine scats i n m u n i c i p a l elections i n Rusaifah. I n January 1991, given its parl i a m e n t a r y s t r e n g t h , the B r o t h e r h o o d received five cabinet

positions—the

M i n i s t r i e s o f Education, Religious A f f a i r s , Justice, Social D e v e l o p m e n t , a n d

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Health. Moreover, a M u s l i m Brother was elected speaker o f the parliament. Islamic organizations i n Tunisia a n d Algeria j o i n e d w i t h their f e l l o w citizens d u r i n g the 1980s i n pressing f o r a

m u l t i p a r t y system

a n d representative

elections.

Governments i n b o t h countries h a d a record o f r i g o r ously c o n t r o l l i n g Islamic movements. H a b i b Bourguiba's thirty-year r e i g n as president i n Tunisia was characterized by a Western secular o r i e n t a t i o n that excluded r e l i g i o n f r o m p u b l i c life. I n the 1980s he i m p r i s o n e d and threatened

t o execute

leaders

o f the Islamic

Tendency

M o v e m e n t . After seizing p o w e r f r o m Bourguiba i n 1987, Z e i n A b i d i n e Ben A l i , the p r i m e m i n i s t e r o f Tunisia, p r o m i s e d democratization and h e l d parliamentary elections i n A p r i l 1989. However, despite the fact that the Islamic Tendency

M o v e m e n t r e n a m e d itself H i z b a l -

Nahda (the Renaissance Party) to c o m p l y w i t h Ben Ali's insistence that n o single g r o u p should m o n o p o l i z e the c l a i m t o be Islamic, the government d i d n o t p e r m i t i t to participate as a legal p o l i t i c a l party. H i g h i n f l a t i o n , g r o w ing u n e m p l o y m e n t , a n d increased poverty proved t o be critical issues. Islamic candidates w o n 14. c percent o f the vote n a t i o n w i d e and a s t u n n i n g 30 percent i n such cities Most Muslim rulers in the twentieth century have been kings or military or ex-military officers, like

as Tunis, Gabes, and Sousse. I n N o v e m b e r 1989 Ben A l i reneged o n his earlier promises t o recognize H i z b a l -

King Hussein of Jordan, shown here just before leav-

Nahda as a p o l i t i c a l party, a n n o u n c i n g that he w o u l d n o t

ing Amman i n 1970. In 1989, after riots in response to

allow any party t o c o m b i n e r e l i g i o n and politics. The

reported increases in the price of major commodities.

M i n i s t r y o f Education r e i n t r o d u c e d a decree f r o m the

Hussein instituted political reforms, and parliamentary elections were held for the first time in twentytwo years.

B o u r g u i b a p e r i o d that banned the w e a r i n g o f Islamic headdress b y w o m e n i n schools a n d offices.

Student

demonstrations, strikes, i m p r i s o n m e n t o f H i z b al-Nahda leaders, and the closing d o w n o f its newspaper, al-Fajr, signaled the onslaught o f the regime's attempt t o destroy the group. The Tunisian government's shift t o a m o r e hardline policy t o w a r d Islamic activists was influenced by events i n Algeria. I n what had long been regarded the most m o n o h t h i c , single-party political system i n the Arab w o r l d (dominated by the National Liberation Front, or FLN), President Chedli Ben Jadid introduced greater political pluralism f o l l o w i n g the bloody antigovernment riots i n October 1988. This included recognition o f the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Isiamique d u Salut, FIS), N o r t h Africa's first legal Islamic political party, led by Ali Abbasi al-Madani. The

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I

government o f Ben Jadid, faced w i t h such intractable economic difficulties as a 2c percent u n e m p l o y m e n t level, foreign debt o f some S20 b i l l i o n , and f o o d shortages, felt constrained to concede these reforms. Islamic groups flourished as Algerian state socialism failed to resolve the c o u n try's social a n d e c o n o m i c problems. The FIS, w i t h a national organization and an effective mosque a n d social welfare n e t w o r k , emerged as the largest Islamic party and one o f the strongest o p p o s i t i o n parties. I n the June 1991 m u n i c i p a l elections, the first m u l t i p a r t y elect i o n i n Algeria since independence i n 1962,

the FIS

scored a s t u n n i n g victory, capturing 54 percent o f the vole, w h i l e the FLN garnered 34 percent. This success was partly explained by the boycott o f t w o m a i n o p p o s i t i o n parties and by a v o t i n g abstention rate o f r o u g h l y 4 0 percent. But also c o n t r i b u t i n g to the FIS v i c t o r y was an electoral system that allowed husbands to vote by p r o x y for their wives and that awarded 51 percent o f the seats o n a c o u n c i l to w h i c h e v e r g r o u p secured

the

largest n u m b e r o f votes. The FIS w o n a m a j o r i t y o f votes i n all the m a j o r cities: 64 percent i n A l g i e r s , 71 percent i n O r a n , and 72 percent i n Constantine. The Algerian government m o v e d q u i c k l y to discredit a n d c o n t a i n the FIS victory. Funds to FIS-controllcd municipalities were cut o f f to l i m i t their effectiveness i n office, scheduled p a r l i a m e n t a r y elections were postp o n e d , FIS leadership fal-Madani a n d A l i Belhadj, a p o p ular A l g e r i a n preacher) were i m p r i s o n e d , and v o t i n g districts were redrawri to favor the FLN i n f u t u r e parliamentary elections. W i t h these measures i n place and w i t h n o access to an FLN-controlled media, the defeat o f the FIS i n parliamentary elections appeared assured. O n December 26, 1991, Algeria held the first m u l t i party parliamentary elections i n its thirty-five-year history. W i t h .5-9 percent o f eligible voters casting ballots, the FIS scored another victory i n the first o f t w o rounds. It

Ali Abbasi al-Madani (b. 1931) is leader and official spokesman of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Saint, FIS), the first legal Islamic

w o n 48 percent o f the vote, 188 o f 231 parliamentary

political party in North Africa. A professor at the

seats, twenty-three votes short o f a majority. The FLN f i n -

University of Algiers with a doctorate from the

ished w i t h sixteen seats. I n t w o government-controlled

University of London, he became active in the 1980s

democratic elections, the FIS had w o n and n o w seemed poised to control the parliament, w i t h an expected vict o r y i n the second r o u n d o f elections scheduled for

during the clashes between the state and Islamic students and was a founding member of the FIS. Following the FIS victory in the June 1991 municipal elections, he was arrested by the government and remains in prison.

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January 16,

1992.

O n January 12 the Algerian m i l i t a r y i n a de facto coup seized power to prevent the FIS f r o m w i r m i n g their democratic victory. Their rationale was that the FIS was an antidemocratic " r a d i c a l " Islamic m o v e m e n t that w o u l d use the ballot box to "seize" power. Once i n power, it was asserted, the FIS w o u l d hijack democracy, taking c o n t r o l o f the government. The Algerian m i l i t a r y ' s message, a i m e d i n part at the West, was unmistakable and c o u l d be encapsulated as f o l l o w s : "The governments i n power are w o r t h preserving. For n o matter w h a t their shortcomings, r a n g i n g f r o m political exclusion to severe h u m a n rights violations, they f o r m the o n l y barrier against fanatics w h o w a n t to c o n f r o n t the West." A c c o r d i n g to this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , local f o r m s o f a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m are regrettable, but they are the only road t o w a r d Western-style political p l u r a l i s m . The m i l i t a r y takeover was f o l l o w e d by a m o v e to suppress the FIS, w h i c h precipitated a v i r t u a l civil war i n w h i c h m o r e than seventy-five thousand Algerians ( i n a c o u n t r y o f t w e n t y - n i n e m i l l i o n ) lost their lives. The m i l i t a r y and security forces m o v e d quickly, arresting FIS leaders and i m p r i s o n i n g m o r e than

fifteen

thousand members i n detention camps, closing d o w n their institutions, and seizi n g their properties and funds. As government repression and violence m o u n t e d . Islamists responded b o t h defensively and offensively. The military's c r a c k d o w n saw many i n the FIS move f r o m a nonviolent legal o p p o s i t i o n to a combative, and i n some cases revolutionary movement. The FIS split i n t o a moderate g r o u p and a more m i l i t a n t w i n g , the Islamic Salvation A r m y . The spiral o f government and Islamist violence and counterviolence swept across Algeria's cities and countryside as the battle raged between government security forces and those i n the FIS w h o f o r m e d their o w n m i l i t i a , the Islamic Salvation Army. Moreover, b o t h the security forces and the Islamists also spawned radical m i l i t i a s , the m i l i t a r y ' s eradicateurs and the A r m e d Islamic G r o u p (GIA). A n extremist guerrilla g r o u p , the GIA, rejected any attempt at a p o l i t i c a l solution or c o m p r o m i s e , demanded an Islamic state, w a g e d a w a r ( j i h a d ) o f t e r r o r i s m against all opponents ( p r o - g o v e r n m e n t , Islamist, or n o n c o m m i t t e d ) . Like other radical movements i n the M u s l i m w o r l d , the G I A d i v i d e d their w o r l d i n t o " t r u e believers" (those w h o fully accepted their views and agenda) and unbelievers (kafirs), M u s l i m and n o n - M u s l i m alike. They c o n d e m n e d the FIS for its moderat i o n and k i l l e d m i l i t a r y and civilians ( i n c l u d i n g leading secularists, journalists, and schoolchildren), combatants and noncombatants alike. For rulers i n the Gulf, response to the strength and threat o f Islamic political activism was complicated by the fact that many o f t h e m were Sunni rulers w i t h significant Shiite populations. I n Kuwait, for example, a l t h o u g h the regime had attempted to enhance its legitimacy by p e r m i t t i n g parliamentary elections since

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1963, the e m i r t w i t e dissolved the National Assembly, i n 1976 and 1986, i n the

The conflict between gov-

face o f open c r i t i c i s m o f government action. W h e n Islamists and other political

ernment and Islamists has

g r o u p s d e m a n d e d r e i n s t i t u t i o n o f the N a t i o n a l Assembly, the

government

responded w i t h a c r a c k d o w n o n pro-democracy leaders and permanently disbanded the National Assembly. In the p o s t - G u l f War p e r i o d , Kuwait's r u l i n g al-

been particularly violent in Algeria. The imprisonment of many leaders of the Islamic opposition has

Sabah dynasty, overseeing the country's reconstruction, faced increasing demands

spawned extreme guerrilla

for " d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n . " The G u l f War strengthened

and

groups that have provoked

impelled Kuwait's Islamists, as the m a j o r i t y o f citizens, to rally behind the gov-

the government to equally

e r n m e n t — a p o s i t i o n that c o n t r i b u t e d to their c r e d i b i l i t y i n p o s t - G u l f War par-

violent reactions.

sectarian relations

liamentary elections i n 1992. Islamists w o n 2c percent o f the vote, h o l d i n g eight to ten seats i n parliament, w i t h a total o f eighteen deputies backed by Islamic groups. A l t h o u g h these Islamists s u p p o r t e d i n p r i n c i p l e the a p p l i c a t i o n o f shariah, what that meant for each i n reality differed markedly. The Saudis for many years assiduously avoided the creation o f a parliamentary body. In times o f crisis kings often promised one, but they d i d not introduce such a body. In 1962, on the heels o f considerable internal unrest. C r o w n Prince Faisal promised the p r o m u l g a t i o n of a Constitution that w o u l d allow the creation o f

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The spiraling violence in

regional and national assemblies. Shortly after the seizure o f the Grand Mosque o f

Algeria's cities and country-

Mecca by a group o f militants in November 1979, C r o w n Prince Fahd announced

side has caused many deaths

a "basic law o f governance," w h i c h w o u l d include provision for a consultative

on both sides. Women in Ait Said village in the Kabylie region mourn at the funeral of a young militiaman.

assembly (majlis al-shura). To rally popular support at h o m e i n its w a r w i t h Iraq i n 1990-91. the House o f Saud i n November 1990 again promised a consultative assembly whose members w o u l d be appointed by the k i n g ; there was n o i n t e n t i o n to introduce elections or to p e r m i t political parties. Saudi Arabia's K i n g Fahd, forced to balance demands for political participation f r o m b o t h religious leaders and technocrats and the traditional concentration o f power w i t h i n the Saudi elite, created an appointed consultative c o u n c i l i n M a r c h 1991, w h i l e emphasizing that Islam was i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h democracy. A cross section o f society, f r o m intellectuals and technocrats to w o m e n and Islamists, pressed for greater political participation and socioeconomic reforms. W h i l e the religious establishment remained supportive, younger and m o r e m i l i t a n t ulama and Islamists c o n t i n u e d to voice their o p p o s i t i o n and press their demands. Just w h e n the government's crackdown against religious dissidents and its policy o f containment seemed to have silenced its critics, b o m b attacks against U.S. m i l i tary installations occurred i n N o v e m b e r 199c and June 1996. The shock o f these acts o f violence, attributed to u n d e r g r o u n d Islamic groups, coupled w i t h the broader challenge f r o m militant Islamists, led to a closing o f ranks between p o l i t ical and religious elites.

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The Compatibility of Islam and Democracy M u s l i m discourse o n polidcal liberalization and democratization has embraced a broad spectrum o f positions, f r o m M u s l i m secularists w h o w i s h to separate r e l i g i o n f r o m politics and Islamic reformers w h o have reinterpreted Islamic traditions in support o f m o d e r n elective forms o f government to those Muslims w h o reject democracy. Indeed, i n contemporary M u s l i m politics Islam has often been used to legitimate democracy and dictatorship, republicanism and monarchy. W h i l e some Islamic leaders i n the past spoke o u t against Western-style d e m o c racy and a parliamentary system o f government, this negative reaction w~as o f t e n part o f the general rejection o f European colonial influence, a defense o f Islam against f u r t h e r dependence on the West rather than a wholesale rejection o f democracy. For other M u s l i m s , Islam is totally self-sufficient, w i t h a divinely mandated system, based o n divine sovereignty and sacred law (shariah), w h i c h is i n c o m p a t i b l e and irreconcilable w i t h n o t i o n s o f p o p u l a r sovereignty a n d c i v i l law. Still other M u s l i m s insist that M u s l i m s s h o u l d generate their o w n f o r m s o f political participation or democracy f r o m w i t h i n Islam; they have n o need to l o o k to Western f o r m s o f democracy. The spectrum o f those M u s l i m s w h o believe that Islam and democracy are i n c o m p a t i b l e has been b r o a d and diverse. I n Iran d u r i n g the Constitutional M o v e m e n t o f 1 9 0 5 - 1 1 , Shaykh Fadlallah N u r i , i n debates over the constitution's f o r m u l a t i o n , argued that one key democratic i d e a — t h e equality o f all c i t i z e n s — is " i m p o s s i b l e " i n Islam. He maintained that unavoidable and insurmountable inequalities exist, such as those between believers and unbelievers, the r i c h and the poor, husbands and wives, the healthy and the sick, and the learned jurist and his followers. Neither is i t possible for a legislative b o d y to exist; N u r i believed that "Islam does n o t have any shortcomings that require c o m p l e t i o n . " Sayyid Qutb, the great theoretician o f the M u s l i m Brotherhood w h o was executed by die Egyptian regime i n 1966, strongly objected to any n o t i o n o f popular sovereignty as incompatible w i t h God's sovereignty. A l t h o u g h Q u t b stressed that the Islamic state must be based o n the Quranic principle o f consultation, he also believed that shariah is so complete as a legal and m o r a l system that no further legislation is possible. I n addition, he believed that for one group o f people to legislate for others was contrary to the equality and absolute dignity o f believers. Mawlana A b u l Ala M a w d u d i , founder o f the Jamaat-i-Islami, c o m b i n e d parts o f N u r i ' s and Qutb's perspectives and yet subtly differed f r o m t h e m . A b u l Ala M a w d u d i held that Islam constitutes its o w n f o r m o f democracy, but he concentrated o n the relationship between divine and popular sovereignty. A r g u i n g that

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democracy as c o m m o n l y understood is based solely o n the sovereignty o f the people, A b u l Ala M a w d u d i concluded that Islam is "the very antithesis o f secular Western democracy." For this reason his critics charged that he was an "absolutist" or "doctrinal purist." Yet he w e n t o n to argue that i f democracy is conceived as a l i m i t e d f o r m o f popular sovereignty, restricted and directed by God's law, there is n o i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y at ah. H e used the t e r m theodemocracy t o describe this alternate view. This argument has resonance i n the current w o r l d o f M u s l i m p o l i t i c a l activism. For example, the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f the Islamic Republic o f I r a n , w h i c h m i g h t have been expected s i m p l y to r e a f f i r m the absolute sovereignty o f G o d , makes reference to both divine a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty. Principle 2 o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n

acknowledges

that G o d has " t h e faculty t o rule and i m p l e m e n t the d i v i n e l a w " a n d that there is a "necessity t o obey H i s orders." Yet Principle 1 indicates the h o l d that the idea o f popular sovereignty has o n m o d e r n Iranian M u s l i m consciousness. It notes that the Republic's government was "endorsed by the Iranian nation by an affirmative vote o f 98.2 percent of the m a j o r i t y o f eligible voters." Mawlana Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979), the founder of the Jaamat-i-Islami, had a far-reaching impact on Muslim thinkers and activists throughout the Islamic world.

This r e c o g n i t i o n o f the central importance o f p o l i t i c a l participation is further delineated i n other articles i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n that a f f i r m that the people should p a r t i c i pate " i n d e t e r m i n i n g their p o l i t i c a l , e c o n o m i c , a n d social destiny" (Principle 3). Furthermore, the Republic

should p r o v i d e f o r a popularly elected national consultative assembly (Principle 62) and for p e r i o d i c referenda o n issues that are submitted " d i r e c t l y to the people f o r a j u d g m e n t " (Principle 59). M o r e conservative voices i n the M u s l i m w o r l d c o u l d also be heard i n the 1980s and 1990s, however. I n 1982 Shaykh M u h a m m a d M u t a w w a l i al-Sharawi, a p r o m i n e n t Egyptian religious leader a n d popular preacher w h o s e w r i t i n g s a n d television broadcasts enjoyed an audience t h r o u g h o u t the Arab w o r l d , created controversy b y saying that Islam a n d democracy are incompatible and that shura (consultation) does n o t mean simple d o m i n a t i o n o f the m a j o r i t y I n Algeria i n the early 1990s the popular preacher A l i Belhadj, one o f the FIS leaders, accepted participation i n elections b u t echoed the refrain that democracy is a JudcoChristian concept a n d s h o u l d be replaced w i t h inherently Islamic principles o f governance. H e f o u n d the concept o f m a j o r i t y rule objectionable because issues

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7 7

o f r i g h t and justice cannot be quantified; the greater n u m b e r o f votes does not translate i n t o the greater moral position. K i n g Fahd o f Saudi Arabia, l o n g regarded as a c o n servative m o n a r c h and an ally o f the West, declared that democracy is a Western i n s t i t u t i o n f o r e i g n t o Islam, w h i c h has its o w n f o r m s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n : " [ T ] h e democratic system prevalent i n the w o r l d is not appropriate i n this region. The election system has n o place i n the Islamic creed, w h i c h calls f o r a gove r n m e n t o f advice and consultation and for the shepherd's openness to his flock, and holds the r u l e r f u l l y responsible before his people." Yet, increasingly, many M u s l i m s have accepted the n o t i o n o f democracy, a l t h o u g h they have different

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been a period of transformation, as shown by this Moroccan woman, who wears traditional dress as she exercises her right to vote.

o p i n i o n s about its precise meaning. M u s l i m interpretations o f democracy generally b u i l d o n the well-established Quranic concept o f consultation, but these interpretations vary i n the degree to w h i c h "the people" are able to exercise this duty. Some argue that Islam is inherently democratic, n o t o n l y because o f the p r i n c i p l e o f consultation but also because o f the concepts o f independent reasoning (ijtihad) and consensus (ijma). The attempt to generate Islamic f o r m s o f democracy is based o n a reinterpretation o f traditional concepts and institutions. Consultation or political deliberation and c o m m u n i t y consensus have been reinterpreted to support parliamentary democracy, representative elections, and political parties. Thus, for example, the consultative assembly or g r o u p (majlis al-shura) that selected or elected a n e w caliph has been transformed and equated w i t h a parliament or national assembly. As M u h a m m a d Asad noted i n The Principles of State and Government in Islam f 1980) : The legislative assembly—majlis dl-shura—must be truly representative o f the entire community, both men and women. Such a representative character can be achieved only through free and general elections; therefore the members of the majlis must be elected by means of the widest possible suf frage, including both men and women. I n Tunisia the g r o u p H i z b al-Nahda accepted the democratic process and sought to become a legalized political party. This c o m m i t m e n t to pluralist p o l i tics reflected the t h i n k i n g o f its leader, Rashid al-Ghannoushi. He c o m b i n e d the criteria o f Islam w i t h that o f democracy to c r i t i q u e the Tunisian government and to serve as a p l a t f o r m i n H i z b al-Nahda's appeal for popular support. For alGhannoushi, democracy, popular sovereignty and the role o f the state ("The state

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is n o t s o m e t h i n g f r o m G o d but f r o m the people . . . the state has to serve the benefit o f the M u s l i m s " ) , m u l t i p a r t y elections, and constitutional law are all part o f a " n e w Islamic t h i n k i n g " whose roots and legitimacy are f o u n d i n a reinter¬ pretation o f Islamic sources. I n a f f i r m i n g H i z b al-Nahda's c o m m i t m e n t to the democratic process, al-Ghannoushi c h i d e d the West for not p r o m o t i n g its d e m o cratic ideals: " W h i l e the West criticizes Islamic governments for not being d e m o cratic, it also supports governments w h o are n o t democratic and are keeping Islamic movements f r o m developing their ideas." There are differences between Western notions o f democracy and Islamic traditions. A l t h o u g h the great m a j o r i t y o f M u s l i m s today w o u l d subscribe to the idea that shura (consultative g o v e r n m e n t ) is central to the Islamic state, the proper relationship between popular and d i v i n e sovereignly is a subject o f dispute. Most M u s l i m s w o u l d accept that the d i v i n e w i l l is supreme, and, i n theory, that God's law is i m m u t a b l e and cannot be altered b y h u m a n desire or w h i m . Yet, at the same t i m e , by the insistence o n the need o f rulers to consult and to r u l e on the basis o f consensus, M u s l i m s effectively concede that some f o r m o f p o p ular participation is r e q u i r e d . Questions about the specific nature and degree o f participation r e m a i n unanswered. W h i l e some M u s l i m s debate w h a t to call such a system, M u h a m m a d Natsir, f o r m e r Indonesian p r i m e m i n i s t e r and o n e - t i m e leader o f the Islamically o r i e n t e d M a s j u m i party, c o m m e n t e d , " I s l a m is n o t one h u n d r e d percent democracy, neither is i t one h u n d r e d percent autocracy. Islam is . . . Islam." I n many places today p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and democratization have become a l i t m u s test by w h i c h b o t h the openness o f governments and the relevance o f Islamic groups are certified. A l t h o u g h democracy is n o t entrenched i n m o d e r n Islamic political t h o u g h t and practice, i t is a p o w e r f u l s y m b o l o f legitimacy. It is used b o t h to legitimate and to delegitimate precisely because i t is seen to be a universal g o o d . A major hurdle facing Islamic movements today involves their willingness to t o l erate diversity w h e n i n power. Some i n the M u s l i m w o r l d and the West believe that Islamic movement participation i n electoral politics is merely tactical and that once diey are successful these Islamists w o u l d impose an intolerant, m o n o l i t h i c order o n society. This issue was raised by die electoral v i c t o r y o f Algeria's FIS part)'. Despite the fact that its leader, Ali Abbasi al-Madani, a f f i r m e d his acceptance o f democracy in the face o f accusations that he had opposed die democratic process i n the past, some o f the FIS's m o r e impatient voices—such as that o f the popular preacher A h Belhadj—unhesitatingly questioned whether democracy can be Islamic. The record o f Islamic experiments i n Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Sudan raised serious issues about religious tolerance. I n b o t h Pakistan and Iran the belief that d i v i n e sovereignty naturally sets l i m i t s o n the popular w i l l has, i n practice, led to a restriction o n the rights o f m i n o r i t i e s and w o m e n . This is seen i n the

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Jamaat-i-Islami's traditional hostility toward the A h m a d i y y a h (a nineteenth-cent u r y messianic m o v e m e n t that has been criticized by the Jamaat and others and declared a n o n - M u s l i m m i n o r i t y i n Pakistan) and advocacy o f the separation o f the sexes. I n Pakistan, Z i a - u l - H a q distinguished between democracy, w h i c h was presumably Western and objectionable, and "shurocracy" (consultative governm e n t ) , w h i c h was Islamic and desirable. H e used Islam to legitimate martial law and banned political parties as un-Islamic. I n Iran the government proved i n t o l erant o f the religious movement Bahai and its other political opponents. In Sudan the military governments o f b o d i Jafar al-Numayri and Omar al-Basliir, i n association w i t h the M u s l i m Brotherhood, exacerbated die civil war by being unresponsive to c r i t i c i s m f r o m the p r e d o m i n a n t l y n o n - M u s l i m southerners (Animists and Christians) that i m p o s i t i o n o f the shariah discriminates against t h e m . These examples raise serious questions about the willingness ofTslamically oriented governments to tolerate dissent and to respect the rights o f w o m e n and minorities. At the same tune, the role o f the military i n Algeria, the Tunisian government's suppression o f its Islamic o p p o s i t i o n , and Egypt's c r a c k d o w n o n the M u s l i m Brotherhood to "restore democracy" by denying Islamists that w h i c h they earned or proved capable o f w i n n i n g i n electoral politics have been equally problematic. The result i n Algeria was a civil war that claimed the lives o f m o r e dian seventy-five thousand people. Tunisia crushed its Islamic o p p o s i t i o n ( H i z b al-Nahda) a n d President Hosni Mubarak o f Egypt no longer clearly distinguished between violent

The twentieth century has been a period of major religious, political, and social transformation as Muslim governments have responded variously to calls for democratization. Pakistan has an elected government, housed in these buildings in Islamabad.

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underground movements like the Gamaa Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad and the M u s l i m Brotherhood, w h i c h functioned nonviolendy w i t h i n society. All took control o f the electoral system, banned or marginalized their Islamic opposition and indeed any significant opposition, and rigged or manipulated elections. For example, i n 1993 President BenAli ofTunisia w o n reelection by 99.91 percent o f the vole, and President Mubarak o f Egypt took 94 percent i n the 199c elections.

Issues and Prospects for the Future Twentieth-century M u s l i m history reveals a p e r i o d o f major religious, political, and social transformation. A m i d the diversity o f events and issues, fundamental questions emerge regarding religious interpretations and the authority o f the pasi. A m o n g them are Whose Islam? and What Islam? Both questions occur at the juncture o f tradition and m o d e r n i t y , for contemporary M u s l i m societies incorporate the simultaneous presence and interplay of past, present, and future. "Whose Islam?" Historically, rulers (caliphs and sultans) were the protectors o f Islam and the ulama; by s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n , they were the guardians and interpreters o f Islam. I n the second h a l f o f the t w e n t i e t h century, rulers as diverse as m o n archs ( K i n g Fahd o f Saudi Arabia and King Hassan o f M o r o c c o ) , m i l i t a r y leaders ( M u a m m a r Qaddafi, M o h a m m a d Z i a - u l - H a q , Jafar a l - N u m a y r i , and O m a r alBashir), e x - m i l i t a r y leaders ( A n w a r Sadat), and religious leaders and students (the Ayatollah K h o m e i n i and the Taliban) have overtly used Islam to enhance their legitimacy and to m o b i l i z e popular support. The ulama have also played a significant role i n the c o n t e m p o r a r y M u s l i m w o r l d . The Ayatollahs K h o m e i n i , Shariatmadari, M u t a h a i r i , and others o f Iran, Abul-Qasem K h o i o f Iraq, I m a m Musa Sadr and Shaykh Fadlallah o f Lebanon, M u h a m m a d al-Ghazali andYusuf Q a r d a w i , and many p o p u l a r preachers across the M u s l i m w o r l d have been significant clerical voices, f r o m masters o f theology and law to social and p o l i t i c a l activists. W h i l e some w i s h to continue that legacy i n the t w e n t i e t h century, however, many i f not most reformers and activists have i n fact been lay rather than clerical. The Islamic m o d e r n i s t m o v e m e n t and its legacy p r o d u c e d generations o f reformers (lay and clerical) f r o m Egy pt to Indonesia: Jamal a l - D i n a l - A f g h a n i , M u h a m m a d Iqbal, Sayyid A h m a d K h a n , Chiragh A l i , Allal al-Fasi, A b d a l - H a m i d Ben Badis, M u h a m m a d Natsir, Prof Hamka, M u h a m m a d Asad, many o f w h o m often f o u n d the ulama a m o n g their sharpest critics. The m a j o r founders o f neorevivalist movements, f r o m the p i o neers (Hasan al-Banna, Maw lana Abul Ala M a w d u d i , Sayyid Q u t b ) to present-day movements, are i n large part n o n - u l a m a or w h a t some m i g h t call the new ulama or intellectuals. Laity or n o n - u l a m a are the backbone o f the second and t h i r d generation o f M u s l i m intellectuals and activists across the M u s l i m w o r l d , a m o n g

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t h e m : Sudan's Dr. Hasan Turabi and Sadiq a l - M a h d i ; Tunisia's Rashid a l Ghannoushi, Iran's A l i Shariati and A b d u l K a r i m Sorush; Algeria's Dr. A l i Abbasi al-Madani; Pakistan's Professor K h u r s h i d A h m a d ; Turkey's Dr. N e c m e t t i n Erbakan; Jordan's Dr. Ishaq Farhan; Egypt's Dr. Hasan Hanafi, K a m a l A b o u l Magd, M . Selim al-Awa, and Fahmy H o w e i d y ; Indonesia's Dr. N u r c h o l i s h M a d j i d , A b d u r a h m a n W a h i d , and Dr. Deliar Noer; and Malaysia's M o h a m m a d Kamal Hassan, Osman Bakar, and A n w a r I b r a h i m . They have also included w o m e n , such as Egypt's Zaynab al-Ghazali and Heba Raouf Ezzat, Pakistan's M a r y a m Jameelah and Riffat Hassan, Malaysia's Khalijah M o h d . Salleh, America's A m i n a W a d u d , and others. Both laity and the ulama w r i t e prolifically o n Islamic d o c t r i n e , law, politics, science, and economics. A l t h o u g h there is notable cooperation a m o n g some o f these activists, many continue to challenge the a u t h o r i t y o f the ulama as the sole o f p r i m a r y guardians o f faith and belief. Emphasizing that there is n o o r d a i n e d clergy in Islam and that c o n t e m p o r a r y problems require a variety o f experts and specialties (economics, medicine, science, and so o n ) that are beyond the ulama's m o r e traditional areas o f expertise, they a f f i r m a m o r e inclusive n o t i o n o f the religious scholar or expert. As Hasan Turabi has c o m m e n t e d : "[B]ecause all k n o w l e d g e is d i v i n e and religious, a chemist, an engineer, an economist, a jurist are all ulama." Despite their c o m m o n Islamic o r i e n t a t i o n , they display a diversity o f intellectual positions and orientations. The second question is "What Islam.''" W h a t interpretations o f Islam? Islam, like all religious traditions, has been subject to multiple interpretations t h r o u g h o u t history. Islamic tradition is the product o f text and context, sacred scriptures (the Quran and Sunna o f the Prophet) and sociohistorical contexts, divine revelation and h u m a n interpretation. The key issue is the relationship o f tradition to modern i t y or postmodernity. Is the process o f Islamization or re-Islamization to be based o n a process o f restoration or reformation, a reapplication o f classical Islamic doctrine, or a reconstruction o f Islamic drought that draws inspiration f r o m the past b u t formulates new responses to the challenges and realities o f a rapidly changing world? The issue is not change but rather h o w m u c h change. H o w m u c h change is necessary? H o w m u c h is permissible? W h a t is the Islamic rationale for change? Thus, for example, although Iran was often characterized as a fundamentalist state led by a medieval, anti-Western religious figure, its government and constitution incorporated many m o d e r n concepts and institutions-—including that o f a republic, elected parliament, president, and p r i m e n r i n i s t e r — w i n c h have no clear precedent i n Islamic history. There are f o u r discernible orientations t o w a r d change: secular, conservative (or

t r a d i t i o n a l i s t ) , neorevivalist

(or

f u n d a m e n t a l i s t ) , and

neomodernist.

Secularists advocate the separation o f r e l i g i o n and politics. W h i l e their critics sometimes characterize or dismiss t h e m as nonbelievers w h o represent a small

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westernized elite sector o f society, secularists counter that they are M u s l i m s w h o believe that r e l i g i o n should be restricted to private or personal life (prayer, fasti n g , personal m o r a l i t y ) . They charge that those w h o m i x r e l i g i o n and politics d o so for political rather than religious ends. The three religiously oriented positions, a l t h o u g h d i f f e r i n g i n distinct ways, nevertheless overlap because they are orientations rather than fixed, m u t u a l l y exclusive positions. W h i l e each o r i e n t a t i o n may advocate a r e t u r n to Islam, they differ i n their presuppositions, interpretations, and methods, The conservative o r traditionalist p o s i t i o n is that o f the m a j o r i t y o f mainstream ulama, w h o believe that Islam is expressed quite comprehensively and adequately i n classical f o r m u lations o f Islamic law and doctrine. A l t h o u g h change can and does occur, the o r i entation o f conservatives to past practices severely l i m i t s substantive change. Conservatives are reluctant to distinguish between revealed, i m m u t a b l e principles and historically c o n d i t i o n e d laws and institutions that were the product o f h u m a n reason and experience. The h o l d o f tradition is especially reflected i n those w h o i n p r i n c i p l e are open to reinterpretation but reflexively c l i n g to past practices w h e n faced w i t h specific changes. They see n o need to go back to the Q u r a n o r Sunna to develop answers to new m o d e r n problems or questions. N o r are they interested i n a broad-based r e f o r m u l a t i o n or reinterpretation that alters or replaces traditional Islamic laws. Thus, conservatives emphasize the f o l l o w i n g o f past traditions o r practices and are w a r y o f any i n n o v a t i o n that they regard as " d e v i a t i o n " (bida), the M u s l i m equivalent to Chrisdan heresy. W h e n change does occur, i t is gradtial and by way o f exception i n areas clearly n o t covered by any legal precedents. Conservatives believe that i t is n o t the law that must change but a society that has strayed f r o m God's path. Thus, a l t h o u g h many ulama acquiesced to statei m p o s e d m o d e r n , Western-inspired legal systems, i t was a temporary compromise rather than an internalized change. I n the 1980s a n d 1990s the climate and politics o f Islamic revivalism led man) ulama f r o m Egypt and Iran, to Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia, to challenge m o d e r n reforms and call for the i m p o s i t i o n o f traditional f o r m u l a t i o n s o f Islamic law. However, even i n these cases, beneath the ostensible unity, there has been a diversity o f o p i n i o n and practice reflecting different c o m m u n i t i e s (Sunni and Shii), schools o f Islamic law (Hanafi, Hannah', Jafari, M a l i k i , and Shafii), and local customs o n such issues as women's dress and education and sexual segregation. Thus, General Zia ul-Haq's call for r e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f Islamic law i n Pakistan set o f f sharp differences and conflict between Sunni a n d Shiite and a m o n g c o m p e t i n g schools o f Sunni religious t h o u g h t . Iran's mullahs, w h i l e abrogating the shah's reformist family protection act and advocating a return t o Islamic law, also bitterly criticized Afghanistan's Taliban i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f Islamic l a w

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Neorevivalists or Islamists, often popularly referred to as "fundamentalists," share m u c h i n c o m m o n w i t h conservatives or traditionalists. They t o o emphasize a r e t u r n to Islam to b r i n g about a new renaissance. A l t h o u g h they respect classical f o r m u l a t i o n s o f Islam, they are less w e d d e d to t h e m . Neorevivalists claim the r i g h t to go back to Islam's o r i g i n a l sources, t o reinterpret and reapply t h e m to contemporary society. Like conservatives, they attribute the weakness o f the Islamic w o r l d p r i m a r i l y to the westernization o f M u s l i m societies, the penetration o f its f o r e i g n , " u n - I s l a m i c " ideas, values, and practices. I n contrast to conservatives, however, they are m u c h m o r e flexible i n their ability to adapt to change. At the same t i m e , neorevivalists have taken issue w i t h the Islamic m o d e r n i s m o f M u h a m m a d A b d u h and M u h a m m a d Iqbal, w h i c h they believe succ u m b e d to the West and produced a westernized Islam, i n their insistence that Islam is fully capable i n and o f itself to be the sole basis for a M u s l i m renaissance. Neorevivalists have produced a host o f Islamic p o l i t i c a l and social movements and organizations that protest and challenge the p o l i t i c a l and religious establishments i n the M u s l i m w o r l d , and they are often sharply critical o f the West. The leadership cadre is often lay rather than clerical, graduates and professionals trained i n the m o d e r n sector rather than i n seminaries. They are thus m o r e likely to be educators, journalists, scientists, physicians, lawyers, or engineers than ulama. The earlier d i v i s i o n o f elites i n many M u s l i m societies i n t o m o d e r n secular or traditional (the u l a m a ) — b a s e d

o n the b i f u r c a t i o n o f education i n m o d e r n ,

Western-oriented schools and i n t r a d i t i o n a l Islamic or religious schools—is c o m p l e m e n t e d today by a h i g h l y educated but m o r e Islamically oriented sector o f society, an alternative elite. The contemporary revival has also p r o d u c e d a newgeneration o f Islamic reformers: n e o m o d e m i s t s , w h o seek to b r i d g e the gap between the traditionally and the secularly educated. They too are activists w h o l o o k to the early Islamic p e r i o d as e m b o d y i n g the n o r m a t i v e ideal. A l t h o u g h they overlap w i t h neorevivalists or Islamists, w i t h w h o m they are often g r o u p e d , neomodernists are m o r e flexible and creative i n their t h o u g h t . After an early traditional

education,

many

obtain

degrees

from

Western-oriented

national

universities or at m a j o r universities i n the West. They emphasize the importance o f "Islamic m o d e r n i z a t i o n and development." This n e w sector has produced a diverse g r o u p o f leaders and intellectuals. Islamic neomodernists d o not reject the West i n its entirety; rather, they choose to be selective i n approach. They w i s h to appropriate the best o f science, technology, m e d i c i n e , and intellectual t h o u g h t but to resist acculturation or the assimilation o f Western culture and mores, f r o m secularism and radical i n d i v i d ualism to the b r e a k d o w n o f the f a m i l y and sexual permissiveness. The goal is thus to learn f r o m the West but not to westernize M u s l i m society. The distinc-

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t i o n is d r a w n between the rejection o f change ( m o d e r n i z a t i o n ) and the u n c r i t ical, indiscriminate, b l i n d i m i t a t i o n o f the West. Contemporary Islamic reformers or neomodernists

also stress the need to

renew Islam b o t h at the i n d i v i d u a l and the c o m m u n i t y levels. They advocate a process o f Islamization or re-Islamization that begins w i t h the sacred sources o f Islam, the Q u r a n and Sunna o f the Prophet, b u t that also embraces the best i n other cultures. They see themselves as engaging i n a d y n a m i c process that is as o l d as Islam itself. M u c h as early M u s l i m s interpreted and applied Islamic p r i n ciples and values to their times and adopted and adapted political, legal, and econ o m i c practices f r o m the cultures they had c o n q u e r e d , the

neomodernist

reformers w i s h t o b r i n g about a n e w Islamic renaissance (nahdo) p u r s u i n g a s i m dar selective, self-critical path. They distinguish between God's revelation and h u m a n interpretations, between that part o f Islamic law w h i c h is eternal and that w h i c h is contingent and relative, between i m m u t a b l e principles and regulations that were h u m a n constructs c o n d i t i o n e d by t i m e and place. I n contrast to neorevivalists, neomodernists are m o r e creative and w i d e - r a n g i n g i n their reinterpretalion o f Islam and less tied to traditional interpretations o f the ulama. For this reason, they are often accused o f " d e v i a t i o n i s m " by the ulama, w h o charge that neomodernists lack the necessary t r a i n i n g and credentials to interpret Islam.

Contemporary Muslim Societies: Old and New Realities Islam i n the t w e n t i e t h century has been associated w i t h r e f o r m a t i o n and revol u t i o n . Political and intellectual movements responded to the challenge o f European c o l o n i a l i s m , achieved independence, and established m o d e r n M u s l i m states and societies. I n the last decades o f the t w e n t i e t h century, a second struggle emerged. This Islamic resurgence signals b o t h the failures o f M u s l i m societies and deep-seated, unresolved religio-cultural issues, as M u s l i m s continue to struggle w i t h the meaning and relevance o f Islam i n the w o r l d today. The issues have extended f r o m textual c r i t i c i s m and interpretation o f the Q u r a n and Prophetic traditions to the role o f r e l i g i o n i n state and society. This resurgence has yielded a variety o f questions, f r o m the nature o f the state and Islamic law to pluralism and the status and rights o f w o m e n and m i n o r i t i e s . A l t h o u g h the Quran and Sunna o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d r e m a i n normative for most M u s l i m s , questions o f interpretation, authenticity, and application have become contentious items. Some Muslims see little need to substantially redefine past approaches and practices; others strike out i n t o n e w territory. Some M u s l i m scholars distinguish the eternal, i m m u t a b l e principles and laws i n the Quran f r o m those prescriptions that are contingent responses to specific contexts. Other scholars distinguish between the Meccan and Medinan suras (chapters): the Meccan

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685

chapters are regarded as the earlier and m o r e r e l i g i o u s l y b i n d i n g texts; the Medinan are seen as p r i m a r i l y political, concerned w i t h Muhammad's creation o f the M e d i n a n state and therefore n o t universally binding. Still other M u s l i m scholars have distinguished between the Quran's eternal principles and values, w h i c h are to be applied and reapplied to changing sociopolitical contexts, and past legislation that was p r i m a r i l y intended for specific historical periods. A l t i i o u g h the example o f the Prophet M u h a m m a d has always been normative i n Islam, f r o m earliest times M u s l i m scholars saw the need to critically examine and authenticate the enormous number o f hadith (Prophetic traditions), to distinguish between authoritative texts and pious fabrications. I n the twentieth century a sector o f m o d e r n Western scholarship questioned the historicity and authenticity o f the hadith, maintaining that the hulk ol the Prophetic traditions were w r i t t e n m u c h later. Most M u s l i m scholars and some Western ( n o n - M u s l i m ) scholars have taken exception w i t h this sweeping position. Many ulama continue to unquesnoningly accept the authoritative collections o f die past; other M u s l i m scholars have i n fact become m o r e critical i n their approaches and uses o f hadith literature. N e w approaches to the study and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Islam's sacred sources have been accompanied by similar debates over the nature o f Islamic law, the shariah. As n o t e d , many ulama continue to equate the shariah w i t h its exposition i n legal manuals developed by the early law schools. Other M u s l i m s — f r o m Islamic m o d ernists such as M u h a m m a d A b d u h , Sayyid A h m a d K h a n , and M u h a m m a d Iqbal to Islamic revivalists and neomodernists—have distinguished between those laws based o n clear texts o f the Q u r a n and hadith and those that are the p r o d u c t o f h u m a n interpretation and application, the product o f reason and custom. Some express this d i s t i n c t i o n as that between the eternal law o f God (shariah) and its h u m a n interpretation and application (iiqh) by early jurists. The d i s t i n c t i o n is often articulated i n terms o f the classical d i v i s i o n o f law i n t o a Muslim's duties o r obligations to God (ibadat, w o r s h i p ) and his or her duties to others (muamtilut, social obligations). The f o r m e r (for example, the performance o f the Five Pillars o f Islam, the essential beliefs and practices) are seen as u n c h a n g i n g ; the latter are contingent u p o n historical and social circumstances. C o n t e m p o r a r y M u s l i m discussion and debate over the role o f Islam i n state and society reflect a broad array o f questions: Is there one classical m o d e l o r many possible models for the relationship o f r e l i g i o n to political, social, and econ o m i c development? I f a new Islamic synthesis is to be achieved that provides c o n t i n u i t y w i t h past t r a d i t i o n , h o w w i l l this be accomplished, i m p o s e d f r o m above by rulers and the ulama o r legislated f r o m below t h r o u g h a representative electoral process? Legal r e f o r m remains a contested issue i n many M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s . Many emerging M u s l i m states f o l l o w e d a pattern o f i m p l e m e n t i n g Western-inspired

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legal codes. The process o f legal change d i d n o t reflect widespread social change so m u c h as the desires o f a small secular-oriented sector o f the p o p u l a t i o n . Governments imposed reforms f r o m above t h r o u g h legislation. The process, c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , and tensions i n h e r e n t i n m o d e r n i z a t i o n p r o g r a m s i n most M u s l i m societies were starkly reflected i n f a m i l y law (marriage, divorce, and inheritance) reforms. Family law, w h i c h is regarded as the heart o f the shariah and the basis for a strong, Islamically o r i e n t e d f a m i l y structure and society, was the last area o f law to be touched by reformers. Even then, u n l i k e most areas o f law that i m p l e m e n t e d Western-inspired legal systems and codes, M u s l i m family law was not displaced or replaced but instead subjected to selective r e f o r m . Officials often employed an Islamic m o d e r n i s t rationale, i n an ad hoc and haphazard mariner, to provide an Islamic facade and legitimacy. Family law ordinances were d r a w n u p and i m p l e m e n t e d by the state, not by the ulama, p i t t i n g rehgious leaders against b o t h secular and Islamic modernists. The ulama tended to object to any tampering w i t h Islamic law, m a i n t a i n i n g that ( 1 ) they and they alone were the qualified experts i n Islamic doctrine and law; ( 2 ) the law was sacred and unchangeable; and (3.) modernists were u n d u l y i n f l u enced by the West and thus family law reforms were simply an illegitimate attempt to "westernize" God's law. However, the government imposed reforms that were ultimately accepted, albeit reluctantly. M o d e r n i z i n g elites accommodated the force o f tradition i n their unwillingness to directly challenge or invalidate classical Islamic law. Thus, v i o l a t i o n o f the law d i d not render an act invalid, only illegal. Moreover, punishments i n the f o r m o f fines and i m p r i s o n m e n t f o r m e n w h o ignored reforms that l i m i t e d their r i g h t to polygamous marriages or to divorce were often m i n i m a l . The contemporary resurgence o f Islam triggered the ulama's reassertion o f the authority o f the past, as they called for a r e t u r n t o the shariah and sought to repeal family law reforms and reassert classical, medieval f o r m u l a tions o f M u s l i m family law. I n m o r e recent decades, the debate over w h e t h e r the shariah should be part o f or the basis o f a country's legal system has become a sensitive, and at times contentious, issue. I f i t should be, to w h a t degree? Does Islamization o f law mean the wholesale r e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f classical law, the development o f n e w laws derived f r o m the Q u r a n and Sunna o f the Prophet, or s i m p l y the acceptance o f any law that is n o t contrary to Islam? W h o is to oversee this process: rulers, the ulama, parliaments? As I r a n , Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia demonstrate, the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f shariah has n o t f o l l o w e d a fixed pattern or set interpretation even a m o n g those d u b b e d conservative or fundamentalist. For example, w o m e n i n Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan u n d e r the Taliban cannot vote or h o l d public office. I n Pakistan and Iran, despite other strictures and problems, w o m e n vote, h o l d political office i n parliaments and cabinets, teach i n u n i v e r s i -

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ties, and h o l d responsible professional positions. However, Islamization o f law has underscored several areas that have proved particularly problematic: the hudud (punishments as prescribed by the Q u r a n and h a d i t h for certain crimes, such as alcohol c o n s u m p t i o n , theft, f o r n i c a t i o n , adultery, and false witness) and the status o f n o n - M u s l i m s (dhtmmi), m i n o r i t i e s , and w o m e n . A l l involve the question o f change i n Islamic law. A l t h o u g h many traditionalists and neorevivalists or fundamentalists call for the r e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f the h u d u d punishments, other M u s l i m s argue that they are n o longer appropriate. A m o n g those w h o advocate i m p o s i t i o n o f the h u d u d (for example, a m p u t a t i o n for theft or stoning for adultery), some call f o r its immediate i n t r o d u c t i o n and others argue that such punishments are contingent upon the creation o f a just society i n w h i c h people are not driven to steal i n order to survive. Some critics charge that although appropriate relative t o the t i m e p e r i o d i n w h i c h they were i n t r o d u c e d , h u d u d punishments are unnecessarily harsh i n a m o d e r n context. A l t h o u g h many Muslim

rulers and governments

t r y to avoid d i r e c t l y

addressing the issue o f the h u d u d , Prime M i n i s t e r Mahathir M o h a m a d o f Malaysia, advocate o f a m o d e r n i z e d Malaysia w i t h a moderate, tolerant Islam, directly criticized the c o n servatism o f his country's ulama, their legal o p i n i o n s (fatwas), and religious courts. I n a d d i t i o n , he refused to allow the Malaysian state o f Kelantan, the o n l y state controlled by PAS (the Islamic Party o f Malaysia), an Islamic o p p o s i t i o n p o l i t i c a l party, t o i m p l e m e n t the h u d u d . The r e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f Islamic law has often had a partic-

it*

iiiieesigiVieV

fcfc. iiiiilïïïgBBBgE! "'»»•tum:

ularly p r o n o u n c e d negative impact o n the status and role o f w o m e n and m i n o r i t i e s , raising serious questions

about

w h e t h e r i t constitutes a setback i n the gains made i n many societies. D u r i n g the postindependence p e r i o d , significant changes occurred i n many countries, broadening the e d u cational and e m p l o y m e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s and enhancing the legal rights o f M u s l i m w o m e n . W o m e n became m o r e v i s i ble i n the professions (as teachers, lawyers, engineers, p h y s i cians) and i n g o v e r n m e n t . A d m i t t e d l y ,

these changes

affected only a small p r o p o r t i o n o f the p o p u l a t i o n and varied f r o m one c o u n t r y or region t o another, influenced by religious and local t r a d i t i o n s , economic and educational d e v e l o p m e n t , a n d g o v e r n m e n t leadership. The

contrasts

could be seen f r o m Egypt and Malaysia to Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Parliament House in Kuala Lumpur is one of the government buildings in the constitutional monarchy of Malaysia. Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad and former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim have advocated a modernized state with a moderate, tolerant Islam.

688

THE

OXFORD

HISTORY

OF

ISLAM

One result o f contemporary Islamic revivalism has been a reexamination o f the role o f w o m e n i n Islam, and at times a bitter debate over dieir role i n society. M o r e conservative religious voices among the ulama and Islamists have advocated a return to veiling and sexual segregation as w e l l as restricting women's education and e m p l o y m e n t . M u s l i m w o m e n are regarded as culture bearers, teachers o f f a m ily faith and values, whose p r i m a r y roles as wives and mothers l i m i t or exclude part i c i p a t i o n i n p u b l i c life. The i m p o s i t i o n o f r e p u t e d Islamic laws by some governments and the policies o f some Islamist movements reinforced fears o f a retreat to the past: i n Afghanistan, the Taliban enforcement o f veiling, closure o f women's schools, restriction o f w o m e n i n the workplace; i n Pakistan, General Zia ul-Haq's r e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the h u d u d p u n i s h m e n t s and a law that counted women's testimony as hah that of men's; greater restricdons on w o m e n i n the Islande Republics o f Iran and Sudan; the murderous brutahty of Algeria's A r m e d Islamic Group toward unveiled or m o r e westernized professional w o m e n . I n fact, the picture is far m o r e complex and diverse, revealing b o t h o l d and new patterns. M u s l i m w o m e n i n the t w e n t i e t h century had t w o clear choices o r models before t h e m : the m o d e r n westernized lifestyle c o m m o n a m o n g an elite m i n o r ity o f w o m e n or the m o r e restrictive t r a d i t i o n a l " I s l a m i c " lifestyle o f the m a j o r ity o f w o m e n , w h o lived m u c h the same as previous generations. The social Women are active partici-

impact o f the Islamic revival, however, p r o d u c e d a t h i r d alternative that is b o t h

pants in modern Islamic

m o d e r n and f i r m l y rooted i n Islamic f a i t h , identity, and values. M u s l i m w o m e n ,

society. Many have not

modernists, and Islamists have argued o n Islamic grounds for an expanded role

returned to wearing tradi-

for w o m e n i n M u s l i m societies. D i s t i n g u i s h i n g between Islam and patriarchy,

tional dress, but have

between revelation and its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by the (male) ulama i n patriarchal set-

adopted new forms that are both modest and stylish, like the one displayed by these

tings, M u s l i m w o m e n have reasserted their r i g h t to be p r i m a r y participants i n redefining their i d e n t i t y and role i n society. I n m a n y instances, this change has

mannequins in a shop in

been symbolized by a r e t u r n to the w e a r i n g o f Islamic dress. This has n o t s i m -

Cairo.

ply meant a wholesale r e t u r n to traditional Islamic f o r m s o f dress, however. For

C O N T [• M P O R A R Y

ISLAM

689

some i t is the d o n n i n g o f a head scarf (hijab); others f r o m Cairo to Kuala L u m p u r have adopted n e w f o r m s o f Islamic dress, modest but stylish, w o r n by students and professionals. I n i t i a l l y p r o m i n e n t p r i m a r i l y a m o n g u r b a n middle-class w o m e n , this new m o d e o f dress has become m o r e c o m m o n a m o n g a broader sector o f society. For m a n y i t is an attempt to c o m b i n e religious belief and values w i t h c o n t e m p o r a r y levels o f education and e m p l o y m e n t , to subordinate a m u c h - d e s i r e d process o f social change to i n d i g e n o u s , Islamic values and ideals. The goal is a m o r e authentic rather than s i m p l y westernized m o d e r n i z a t i o n . Islamic dress has the practical advantage o f enabling some w o m e n to assert their modesty and d i g n i t y w h i l e f u n c t i o n i n g i n p u b l i c life i n societies i n w h i c h Western dress often symbolizes a more permissive lifestyle. It creates a protected, private space o f respectability i n c r o w d e d u r b a n environments. For some it is a sign o f f e m i n i s m that rejects what they regard as the tendency o f w o m e n i n many M u s l i m societies to go f r o m being defined as sexual objects i n a m a l e - d o m i n a t e d t r a d i t i o n to being exploited as sexual objects Western-style. Western f e m i n i s m is often seen as a l i b e r a t i o n that has resulted i n a n e w f o r m o f bondage to dress, youthfulness and physical beauty, sexual permissiveness and e x p l o i t a t i o n , a society i n w h i c h w o m e n ' s bodies are used to sell every f o r m o f merchandise f r o m c l o t h i n g to automobiles and cellular phones. Covering the body, i t is argued, defines a w o m a n and gender relations i n society i n terms o f personality and talents rather than physical appearance. Contemporary M u s l i m societies reflect b o t h the o l d and the n e w realities. Traditional patterns r e m a i n strong and are i n d e e d reasserted and defended by those w h o call f o r a m o r e widespread r e t u r n t o t r a d i t i o n a l f o r m s o f Islamic dress and sexual segregation or seclusion ( p u r d a h ) i n public life. At the same t i m e , however, M u s l i m w o m e n have also become catalysts for change, e m p o w e r i n g themselves by entering the professions, r u n n i n g f o r elective office and serving i n parliament ( i n countries as diverse as Egypt and I r a n ) , b e c o m i n g students and scholars o f Islam, c o n d u c t i n g their o w n w o m e n ' s study groups, and establishing w o m e n ' s professional organizations, journals, and magazines. Women's o r g a n i zations f r o m Egypt and Iran to Pakistan and Indonesia—such as W o m e n L i v i n g U n d e r M u s l i m Laws, based i n Pakistan but international i n m e m b e r s h i p , and Malaysia's Sisters i n Islam—are active internationally i n protecting and p r o m o t i n g the rights o f M u s l i m w o m e n . The s i m u l t a n e o u s call f o r greater p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and f o r m o r e Islamically oriented societies has n o t o n l y had a negative impact o n n o n - M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s , but it has also sparked a lively discussion and debate a m o n g M u s l i m intellectuals and religious leaders over the status o f n o n - M u s l i m s i n an Islamic state. The t r a d i t i o n a l d o c t r i n e o f n o n - M u s l i m s as "protected p e o p l e , " enabling m a n y to practice their faith and h o l d positions i n society, was advanced

690

T H t

OXFORD

HISTORY

OF

ISLAM

relative t o its times and t o the t h e n far m o r e exclusive approach o f Western C h r i s t e n d o m . By m o d e r n standards o f p l u r a l i s m and equality o f citizenship, however, it amounts to second-class status. M o r e conservative M u s l i m voices c o n t i n u e t o celebrate and defend this d o c t r i n e , w h i l e other M u s l i m s f r o m Egypt t o Indonesia have advocated a r e d e f i n i t i o n o f the status o f n o n - M u s l i m s , i n terms o f their r i g h t to f u l l and equal citizenship, w h i c h w o u l d enable an egalitarian and pluralist society o f M u s l i m s and n o n - M u s l i m s . This is reflected i n debates i n Egypt over w h e t h e r the Copts can serve i n the a r m y or should have to pay a special tax and similar discussions about issues o f r e l i g i o u s and p o l i t i cal p l u r a l i s m i n countries such as Lebanon, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Ironically, questions o f citizenship and the exercise o f political rights have become increasingly significant for Muslim m i n o r i t y communities i n the second half o f the twentieth century. At no time in history have M u s l i m minorities been as numerous and widespread. Both the sw elling numbers o f M u s l i m refugees and the m i g r a t i o n o f many Muslims to Europe, Canada, South America, and the U n i t e d States, where Islam is n o w the second or t h i r d largest r e l i g i o n , make the issue o f m i n o r i t y rights and duties w i t h i n the majority c o m m u n i t y an ever-greater concern for Islamic jurisprudence. Can M u s l i m m i n o r i t y c o m m i m i t i e s accept full citizenship and participate fully political!)' and socially w i t h i n n o n - M u s l i m majority c o m munities that are not governed by Islamic law? What is the relationship o f Islamic law to civil law? W h a t is the relationship o f culture to religion? Are Muslims w h o five i n the U n i t e d States American Muslims or Muslims i n America? H o w does one distinguish between culture and r e l i g i o n , that is, between the essentials o f Islam and its cultural (Egyptian, Pakistani, Sudanese, Indonesian) expressions? The history o f Islam i n the contemporary w o r l d , as t h r o u g h o u t m u c h o f history, continues to be one o f dynamic change. M u s l i m societies have experienced the effects o f rapid change, and w i t h it the challenges i n religious, p o l i t i c a l , and economic development. M u s l i m s continue to grapple w i t h the relationship o f the present and future to the past. Like believers i n their sister traditions, Judaism and Christianity, the critical question is the relationship o f f a i t h and t r a d i t i o n to change i n a rapidly changing and pluralistic w o r l d , As Fazlur Rahman, a d i s t i n guished M u s l i m scholar, observed i n Islam and Modernity (1982), M u s l i m s need " s o m e first-class m i n d s w h o can interpret the o l d i n terms o f the new as regards substance and t u r n the new- i n t o the service o f the o l d as regards ideals."

CHRONOLOGY

ca. 5 7 0 B i r t h o f P r o p h e t

670

Muhammad

M u s l i m conquest o f northwest Africa

6 8 0 - 6 9 2 Second M u s l i m c i v i l w a r — H u s a y n , son

610 M u h a m m a d r e c e i v e s c a l l t o P r o p h e t h o o d

o f A l i . leads r e b e l l i o n against U m a y y a d

61; M u h a m m a d begins p u b l i c preaching i n Mecca:

C a l i p h Yazid a n d is m a r t y r e d , c r e a t i n g p a r a -

first e m i g r a t i o n o f M u s l i m s t o Abyssinia,

d i g m o f protest a n d suffering f o r Smiles

a l t h o u g h M u h a m m a d remained i n Mecca t o c o n t i n u e p r e a c h i n g against p o l y t h e i s t s

691

619 D e a t h s o f M u h a m m a d ' s w i f e , K h a d i j a h , a n d

D o m e o f ihe Rock completed i n Jerusalem b y Caliph A b d a l - M a l i k

uncle, A b u Talib, leaving M u h a m m a d w i t h -

705-715 Great U m a y y a d Mosque o f Damascus

o u t a p r o t e c t o r ; M u h a m m a d t r i e s t o leave

built

Mecca

711 B e r b e r c o n v e r t s t o I s l a m cross S t r a i t s o f

621 M u h a m m a d ' s f i r s t c o n t a c t w i t h M e d i n a

Gibraltar and enter southern

622 M i g r a t i o n (hijru) o f e a r l y M u s l i m s t o M e d i n a ;

e x p a n d i n g Islam i n t o Europe

I s l a m l a k e s f o r m o f p o l i t i c a l state; f i r s t y e a r

7 J 2 C h a r l e s M a r t e l d e f e a t s M u s l i m s at B a t t l e o f

o f Islamic calendar.

Tours, France, h a l t i n g e x p a n s i o n o f I s l a m

624 Battle o f B a d r — M u s l i m s o u t n u m b e r e d , b u t

into Europe 7 4 4 - 7 5 0 T h i r d M u s l i m c i v i l w a r a n d defeat o f

v i c t o r i o u s : serves as s y m b o l f o r M u s l i m s o f divine intervention and

guidance

Umayyads b y Abbasids

62c Battle o f U h u d — M u h a m m a d a n d M u s l i m s

750-850 Consolidation o f Abbasid M u s l i m e m p i r e

attacked and defeated by Meccans 627 Battle o f the T r e n c h

in Iraq, western Iran, Khurasan,

—Muhammad and

M e s o p o t a m i a , Egypt, and Syria by caliphs

M u s l i m s v i c t o r i o u s over Meccans a n d bedouin mercenaries: M u h a m m a d

a l - M a h d i , H a r u n al-Rashid, and a l - M a m u n

consoli-

750-1258 Ahbasid caliphate—height

dates l e a d e r s h i p i n M e d i n a

patronage o f art and culture, b o o m i n g

m a k e pilgrimage t o Mecca

trade, c o m m e r c e , agriculture, a n d i n d u s t r y

650 M u h a m m a d o c c u p i e s Mecca Death o f M u h a m m a d ; A b u Bakr becomes

756

Emirate o f Córdoba f o u n d e d by Umayyad

762

B a g h d a d f o u n d e d as A b b a s i d c a p i t a l

765

Death o f sixth Shiite I m a m and founder o f

first

prince Abd

Caliph 651-661

Reign o f (he Four Rightly G u i d e d

Caliphs—normative p e r i o d f o r Sunni Islam 654

succession d i s p u t e d , t r e a t i n g s p l i t b e t w e e n

Khattab becomes second Caliph

Sevener a n d T w e l v e r S h i i t e s

6 j 8 M u s l i m s occupy Jerusalem

767

6 4 4 C a l i p h U m a r i b n a l - K h a i t a b stabbed.

Dies

Mughal

select successor, s e l l i n g p r e c e d e n t f o r

Empires

7 8 6 - 8 0 9 H a r u n al-Rashid caliph

Uthman ibn

(legendary

e x p l o i t s r e c o u n t e d i n The Thousand and One

A f f a n becomes t h i r d C a l i p h ; Q u r a n is c o l -

Nights), h e i g h t o f A b b a s i d

l e c t e d a n d p i n i n final f o r m a t d u r i n g r e i g n

795

of Uthman

caliphate

Death o f M a l i k i b n Anas, f o u n d e r o f M a l i k i s c h o o l o f law, d o m i n a n t i n I s l a m i c A f r i c a

6 5 6 C a l i p h U t h m a n i b n A f f a n assassinated; A l i i b n

9 t h century-1962 Z a y d i i m a m s r u l e Yemen 801

AbiTalib becomes f o u r t h Caliph

Death o f Rabiah a l - A d a w i y a h . female Sufi mystic credited w i t h fusing asceticism w i t h

656—661 A i s h a l e a d s M u s l i m o p p o s i t i o n f o r c e s

love o f G o d

again f o u r t h C a l i p h . A l i . A l i v i c t o r i o u s .

8 1 9 - 1 0 0 5 Samanid dynasty rules Khurasan a n d

First instance o f M u s l i m c a l i p h i n v o l v e d i n

Transoxiana

m i l i t a r y a c t i o n against o t h e r M u s l i m s 820

C a l i p h A l i i b n A b i T a l i b assassinated; M u a w i y a ibn A b i Sufyan founds U m a y y a d dynasty

661— 750

Death o f A b u Hanifa, founder o f Hanafi school o f Islamic law, d o m i n a n t i n O t t o m a n a n d

one week after a p p o i n t i n g c o m m i t t e e t o

661

al-Rahman

Jafari s c h o o l o f I s l a m i c l a w , Jafar a l - S a d i q ;

Death o f C a l i p h A b u Bakr; U m a r i b n a l -

o r d e r l y transfer o f caliphate.

o f Islamic

c i v i l i z a t i o n , d e v e l o p m e n t o f I s l a m i c law,

628 Treaty o f H u d a y b i y a h p e r m i t s M u s l i m s t o

632

Iberia,

Death o f M u h a m m a d al-Shafu. founder o f S h a f i i s c h o o l o f I s l a m i c law, d o m i n a n t i n A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g areas o f e a s t e r n

U m a y y a d caliphate-—Arab m i l i t a r y aris-

tocracy

Mediterranean

69

I

692

CHRONOLOGY

850 C a l i p h a l - M a m u m establishes " H o u s e o f

Venerable, A b b o t o f Cluny

W i s d o m " (Bayt a l - H i k m a h ) i n Baghdad,

1169—1252 A y y u b i d d y n a s t y r u l e s E g y p t

responsible f o r translating m a n u s c r i p t s

1171

f r o m o t h e r languages a n d c u l t u r e s i n t o

1187 S a l a d i n defeats F r a n k s at B a t t l e o f H i t t i n a n d

Arabic

Saladin conquers Egypt, restoring S u n n i rule recovers Jerusalem f o r I s l a m

8 3 3 - 9 4 C E m e r g e n c e o f r e g i o n a l states w i t h i n

1191 C o n s t r u c t i o n o f Q u w w a t a l - I s l a m M o s q u e i n

Abbasid territories (present-day Iraq, western I r a n , Khurasan, Egypt, and Syria) 836 A b b a s i d c a p i t a l t r a n s f e r r e d f r o m B a g h d a d t o

Delhi 1198 D e a t h o f p h i l o s o p h e r I b n R u s h d

(Averroes)

1206-1370 M o n g o l s r u l e Central Asia 1206-1555 D e l h i sultans

Samarfa 855 D e a t h o f A h m a d i b n H a n b a l , f o u n d e r o f H a n b a l i

1220—1260 M o n g o l i n v a s i o n s o f M u s l i m t e r r i t o r i e s

s c h o o l o f I s l a m i c law, d o m i n a n t i n Saudi

1225 A l m o h a d r u l e r s a b a n d o n

Arabia and p r o m i n e n t a m o n g fundamentalist

1227-1363 Chaghatayids i n Transoxiana,

groups

Spain

Semirechye. a n d eastern T u r k e y

867— 1480 S a f f a r i d s r u l e S i s t a n

1241 D e a t h o f S u l t a n I l t u t m i s h

868— 9 0 5 T u l u n i d d y n a s t y i n E g y p t a n d S y r i a

1250-1517 M a m l u k dynasty i n Egypt a n d Syria

8 7 4 T w e l f t h I m a m goes i n t o o c c u l t a t i o n ; e n d o f

1256—1336 M o n g o l I l k h a n i d s r u l e Persia 1256—1483 Q a r a m a n i d s r u l e c e n t r a l A n a t o l i a

direct r u l e o f Shiite I m a m s 929 A n d a l u s i a n c a l i p h a t e f o u n d e d b y A b d a l 9 3 4 - 1062 B u y i d d y n a s t y r u l e s i n w e s t e r n I r a n , Iraq, and Mesopotamia 9 3 5 - 9 6 9 I k b s h i d i d dynasty rules Egypt a n d Syria 969-1171

1258 M o n g o l s sack B a g h d a d 1260

Rahman I I I

F a t i m i d dynasty rules N o r t h Africa,

M a m l u k s d e f e a t M o n g o l s at A y n J a l u t

1261-1517 A b b a s i d c a l i p h a t e i n C a i r o ca. 1280 E r t u g r u l b e g i n s O t t o m a n e x p a n s i o n 1281-1924 O t t o m a n E m p i r e 1292 M a r c o P o l o v i s i t s A c h e h i n n o r t h e r n S u m a t r a 1295-1304 Ghazan—first M o n g o l K h a n t o convert

Egypt, and Syria

to Islam

977-1186 Ghaznavids r u l e Khurasan, Afghanistan.

1297 D e a t h o f a l - M a l i k a s - S a l i h i n S a m u d r a

and n o r t h e r n India E n d o f 10th c e n t u r y - 1 2 1 5 G h u r i d dynasty

1326 O t t o m a n s take B u r s a

E a r l y 11 t h c e . n t u r y - 1 1 4 7 A l m o r a v i d d y n a s t y i n

1334 D e a t h o f first Safavid m a s t e r , Safi a l - D i n I s h a q I 3 4 i O t t o m a n s cross S t r a i t s o f G a l l i p o l i ; I b n

N o r t h A f r i c a and Spain 1009

Fatimid Caliph a l - H a k i m orders destruction

B a t t u t a h visits Sumatra Death o f Sultan M u h a m m a d i b n T u g h l u q

o f C h u r c h o f the H o l y Sepulchre i n

1351

Jerusalem

1370-1405 Conquests o f Tamerlane 1389

O t t o m a n s d e f e a t S e r b i a n s at B a t t l e o f K o s o v o

1394

T a m e r l a n e b u i l d s s h r i n e o f A h m a d Y a s a v i at

1 0 3 8 - 1 1 9 4 S e l j u k d y n a s t y r u l e s I r a q a n d Persia

1400

Founding o f Melaka

1041-1186 S e l j u k s u l t a n s r u l e K i r m a n

1407-1506 T i m u r i d s r u l e Herat

1058-1111 A b u H a m i d a l - G h a z a l i , t h e o l o g i a n , l e g a l

1444

Last a n t i - O t t o m a n E u r o p e a n c r u s a d e

'453

Ottomans capture Constantinople

1030

Death o f Sultan M a h m u d o f Ghazni

1031 E n d o f A n d a l u s i a n c a l i p h a t e 1037 D e a t h o f p h i l o s o p h e r I b n S i n a ( A v i c e n n a )

Turkestan City

scholar, a n d m y s t i c w h o i n t e g r a t e d Sufism into mainstream Sunni thought 1071 B a t t l e o f M a n k i z e r t — T u r k i s h n o m a d s d e f e a t Byzantine e m p e r o r a n d enter A n a t o l i a 1071-1178 D a n i s h m e n d i d s r u l e C e n t r a l a n d e a s t e r n

Java 1488-1528 Rule o f Sultan M a h m u d Shah o f 1491 G r a n a d a — l a s t M u s l i m s t r o n g h o l d i n S p a i n — falls t o C h r i s t i a n r u l e r s F e r d i n a n d a n d

1078-1117 S e l j u k d y n a s t y r u l e s S y r i a P o p e U r b a n I I calls f o r c r u s a d e against I s l a m

Isabella 1500— 1599 S h a y b a n i d s r u l e

at C o u n c i l o f C l e r m o n t 1099

Crusaders capture Jerusalem and establish

12th

c e n t u r y Sufi orders begin t o p r o v i d e o r g a n i -

Latin K i n g d o m zational f r a m e w o r k f o r social

1478 I s l a m i c c o n q u e s t o f M a j a p a h i t k i n g d o m i n

Melaka

Asia 1071 —1243 S e l j u k d y n a s t y r u l e s i n A n a t o l i a 1095

d e f e a t e d at V a r n a

Samarqand

1 5 0 1 - 1725 S a f a v i d d y n a s t y i n Persia 1511 P o r t u g u e s e c a p t u r e M e l a k a ; M a h m u d S h a h sets

movements

1130-1269 A l m o h a d d y n a s t y i n N o r t h A f r i c a a n d Spain 1143 F i r s t t r a n s l a t i o n o f Q u r a n i n t o L a t i n c o m m i s s i o n e d t o R o b e r t o f K e t t o n by Peter t h e

u p n e w capital elsewhere i n archipelago and v a i n l y tries t o recapture c i t y u n t i l he dies 1511 —1659 S a a d i a n d y n a s t y r u l e s M o r o c c o 1514 O t t o m a n s d e f e a t Safavids at B a t t l e o f Chaldiran

CHRONOLOGY 1517 O t t o m a n c o n q u e s t o f E g y p t , S y r i a . M e c c a , a n d Medina 1510 O t t o m a n s c a p t u r e

693

1722 A f g h a n s seize I s f a h a n , b r i n g i n g e n d t o S a f a v i d rule i n Iran

Belgrade

• 7 3 6 - 1 7 9 5 A f s h a r i d s i n Persia

1520-1566 Süleyman theMagnificent ruler, h i g h point o f Ottoman Empire

1737-1815 A h m a d a l - T i j a n i , f o u n d e r o f T i j a n i y a h Sufi order, m a j o r n e o - S u f i o r d e r i n

1510-1857 M u g h a l E m p i r e i n I n d i a

M o r o c c o , w h i c h i n s p i r e d West a n d N o r t h

1514 D e a t h o f S h a l l I s m a i l o f S a f a v i d d y n a s t y 1516 B a t t l e o f P a n i p a t . b e g i n n i n g o f M u g h a l r u l e

A f r i c a n j i h a d a n d resistance m o v e m e n t s 1745 B e g i n n i n g o f W a h h a b i m o v e m e n t i n A r a h i a

1516-1858 M u g h a l e m p e r o r s r u l e S o u t h Asia

1747-1842 D u r r a n i s r u l e Afghanistan

1519 F a i l e d siege o f V i e n n a b y O t t o m a n s

1 7 5 0 - 1 7 9 4 Z a n d s r u l e Persia

1554 O t t o m a n o c c u p a t i o n o f B a g h d a d

1754-1817 U t h m a n d a n F o d i o , l e a d e r o f n o r t h e r n

1535-1536 Death o f Bihzad, master o f Herat school

1556-1605 Akbar rules India, h i g h p o i n t o f Mughal Empire

1757-1790 Sultan M u h a m m a d i b n A b d a l l a h r u l e r o f M o r o c c o ; encourages revival o f Islamic

1 5 6 4 - 1 6 2 4 Shaykh A h m a d S i r h i n d i , advocate o f I s l a m i c state a n d s o c i e t y i n I n d i a 1571 B a t t l e o f L e p a n t o — E u r o p e a n s

N i g e r i a n r e f o r m i s t o p p o s i t i o n t o Hausa states

of painting

s c h o l a r s h i p a n d s t u d y o f hadith 1774 T r e a t y o f K u c h u k K a y n a r j a — - R u s s i a n s

block O t t o m a n

advance i n t o M e d i t e r r a n e a n

1 7 7 9 - 1 9 2 4 Q a j a r s r u l e Persia

1574 S i n a n b u i l d s S e l i m i y a m o s q u e i n E d i r n e

1785-1868 M a n g i t s r u l e C e n t r a l Asia

1583 B r i t i s h n e g o t i a t e first t r a d e t r e a t y w i t h

1785-present

Ottoman Empire

N a q s h b a n d i y y a h m o v e m e n t leads

a n d - R u s s i a n resistance i n Caucasus

1 5 8 8 - 1 6 2 9 S h a h A b b a s r u l e r o f Persia, h i g h p o i n t o f Safavid E m p i r e

1 7 8 6 - 1831 S a y y i d A h m a d B a r e l w i , l e a d e r o f j i h a d m o v e m e n t i n I n d i a against S i k h s a n d

1599-1785 Janids i n B u k h a r a

British

1 6 0 3 - 1 6 2 9 Safavids b u i l d M a y d a n o f I s f a h a n 1605

Death o f E m p e r o r A k b a r

1606

Treaty o f Z s i t v a T o r o k — Habsburgs recognise

1 7 8 7 - 1859

M u h a m m a d A l i i b n al-Sanusi o f Libya.

f o u n d e r o f Sanusiyyah t a r i q a h a n d I s l a m i c

Ottoman rule i n Romania,Transylvania, and H u n g a r y

state 1789-1807 Sultan Selim I I I rules O t t o m a n Empire and tries t o i m p l e m e n t Tanzimat reforms;

1613-1645 Rule o f Sultan A g u n g i n second

resisted d u e t o w e s t e r n i z a t i o n i n h e r e n t i n reforms

Mataram dynasty 1631 D e a t h o f M i r D a m a d . f o u n d e r o f I r a n i a n school o f illuminationist philosophy 1 6 3 1 - p r e s e n t Filali ( A l a w i ) dynasty i n M o r o c c o 1639 T r e a t y o f Q a s r S h i r i n — p e r m a n e n t b o r d e r s o f

1792 T r e a t y o f Jassy—Russians c o n s o l i d a t e c o n t r o l o f G e o r g i a , B l a c k Sea, a n d R o m a n i a ; b e g i n ning o fOttoman reforms 1 7 9 4 - 1 8 6 4 J i h a d state i n area o f p r e s e n t - d a y

Mali

a n d Senegal

I r a q a n d I r a n established

1798 F r e n c h o c c u p a t i o n o f E g y p t u n d e r

1643 T a j M a h a l n e a r l y c o m p l e t e d 1658-1707 Aurangzeb rules M u g h a l E m p i r e ,

Napoleon; M u h a m m a d A l i comes to

i m p l e m e n t i n g r e l i g i o u s r u l e o f ulama a n d

power, initiating period o f r e f o r m o f

I s l a m i c basis f o r c h a r a c t e r o f state a n d s o c i -

political and economic structures along Western

ety 1696

take

c o n t r o l o f B l a c k Sea f r o m O t t o m a n s

lines

19th c e n t u r y E u r o p e a n i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n i n t h e

Russia takes A z o v i n C r i m e a

18th c e n t u r y Rise o f n e o - S u f i s m a n d r e n e w e d

Muslim world

i n t e r e s t i n hadith s c h o l a r s h i p as m e a n s f o r

1803-1837 Padri m o v e m e n t i n Sumatra

m o r a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f society; A k h b a r i vs.

1809—1903 S o k o t o

U s u i i debate over p r o p e r source o f g u i d -

1 8 1 7 - 1898 S i r S a y y i d A h m a d K h a n , l e a d e r o f

ance f o r I s l a m i c c o m m u n i t y

Islamic modernist m o v e m e n t i n India

1702-1762 S h a h W a l i A l l a h o f D e l h i , I n d i a , leader

1818- 1845 F a r a i d i o f B e n g a l o p p o s e s H i n d u s a n d British

o f Islamic revival i n India 1703 E d i r n e I n c i d e n t i n O t t o m a n E m p i r e

caliphate

-Shaykh

al-Lslam Feyzullah dominates g o v e r n m e n t

iH 1 9 - 1 9 7 . 3 B a r a k z a i s i n A f g h a n i s t a n 1 8 2 2 - 1 8 9 5 A h m a d C e v d e t Pasha S h a y k h a l - I s l a m

a n d g r a n d v i z i e r s ; h i g h p o i n t o f ulama i n f l u -

o f O t t o m a n Empire formulates civil code

ence o v e r a f f a i r s o f state; o u s t e d b y

c o m b i n i n g Islamic legal p r i n c i p l e s w i t h

Janissaries a n d l o w e r - l e v e l r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r s and students 1707 D e a t h o f E m p e r o r A u r a n g z e b

n e w l e g a l ideas a n d

influencesTanzimat

1 8 2 5 - 1 8 3 0 D i p a n e g a r a leads r e v o l t i n lava 1830 F r e n c h i n v a d e A l g e r i a ; A b d a l - Q a d i r , l e a d e r o f

694

CHRONOLOGY Q a d i r i y y a h t a r i q a h . leads r e s i s t a n c e u n t i l 1847

1837 D e a t h o f A h m a d i b n I d r i s , f o u n d e r o f

o f caliphate

Idrisiyyah

1924

Islamic

modernism

1925-1979 Pahlavi dynasty i n I r a n 1926

1927 T a b l i g h i I s l a m f o u n d e d b y M a w l a n a

a n d f o u n d e r o f I s l a m i c state 1849— 1905 M u h a m m a d A b d u h . I s l a m i c

modernist

a n d reformist and c o f o u n d e r o f Salanyyah

M u h a m m a d Uyas 1928

c o m b i n i n g Russian a n d M u s l i m e d u c a t i o n

g i o n o f state e l i m i n a t e d i n T u r k e y 1952 K i n g d o m o l S a u d i A r a b i a f o u n d e d o n basis o f alliance between r e l i g i o n and politics w i t h

t o achieve m o d e r n i z a t i o n

sharíaas l a w

1 8 5 6 - 1 8 7 3 Y u n n a n leads r e b e l l i o n against C h i n e s e r u l e a n d t r i e s t o e s t a b l i s h M u s l i m state

1933-1977 A l i Shariati, ideologue o f I r a n i a n revo

1862—1867 J i h a d i n Senegal l e d b y M a Ba against French

l u t i o n o f 1979 1941 ] a m a a t - i I s l a m i f o u n d e d i n I n d i a / P a k i s t a n b y Mawlana Abu al-Ala M a w d u d i

1865-1935 Rashid R i d d a , c o f o u n d e r o f Salahyyah m o v e m e n t i n Egypt a n d I s l a m i c

modernist

1943

movement

N a t i o n a l Pact o f L e b a n o n a g r e e d u p o n , a s s u r i n g d o m i n a n c e o f C h r i s t i a n Arabs i n p o l i t i cal process based o n n u m e r i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y

1 8 7 3 - 1 9 0 8 U l a m a - l e d resistance t o D u t c h o c c u p a

i n 1932 census; p r e s i d e n t o f c o u n t r y t o b e

tion ofAcheh

Maronite Christian, p r i m e minister Sunni

modernist

w h o developed ideology f o r f o u n d a t i o n o f

M u s l i m , a n d speaker o f c h a m b e r o f

Pakistan

deputies Shiiie M u s l i m : o t h e r key g o v e r n ment positions distributed proportionally

D e o b a n d i s c h o o l f o u n d e d t o c o m b i n e hadith

along confessional lines

studies a n d Sufism 1 8 7 6 - 1909

Sultan A b d u l h a m i d I I rules O t t o m a n

1947

P a k i s t a n f o u n d e d as state f o r M u s l i m s o f

1948

State o f I s r a e l dec l a r e d

1949

Religious education r e i n t r o d u c e d i n Turkish

E m p i r e a n d p u r s u e s p a n - I s l a m i c i d e a l as caliph 1 8 7 9 - 1 8 8 2 U r a b i r e v o l t against E u r o p e a n

influence

India

i n Egypt, l e a d i n g t o B r i t i s h o c c u p a t i o n and

s c h o o l s as e l e c t i v e c o u r s e ; H a s a n a l - B a n n a

later rise o f n a t i o n a l i s m i n Egypt

assassinated b y E g y p t i a n p o l i c e

1891-1892 Tobacco Protest i n I r a n — u l t i m a a n d

1950

m e r c h a n t s o p p o s e d t o Shah's g o v e r n m e n t g r a n t i n g tobacco concessions t o Europeans; sets p a t t e r n o f c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n

Religious education m a n d a t o r y i n Turkish schools unless parents object

1951 I d r i s i b n a l - M a h d i , g r a n d s o n o f M u h a m m a d

two

ibn A l i al-Sanusi, becomes k i n g o f n e w l y

s o c i a l classes l a t e r u s e d d u r i n g 1979 I r a n i a n

created Libya, h i g h l i g h t i n g leadership and

revolution

nationalistic roles o f Sanusiyah l a r i q a h

1897-1975 Elijah M u h a m m a d , leader o f N a t i o n o f

1952 G a m a l A b d a l - N a s s e r seizes p o w e r i n E g y p t

I s l a m m o v e m e n t i n U n i t e d Slates 1898

M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d f o u n d e d i n E g y p t byH a s a n a l - B a n n a ; r e f e r e n c e t o I s l a m as r e l i

m o v e m e n t i n Egypt 185-1-1914 I s m a i l G a s p r i n s k i , s p o n s o r o f s c h o o l s

1876

I s l a m i c law r e p l a c e d b y S w i s s - a n d I t a l i a n based system i n T u r k e y

1883- M u h a m m a d A h m a d , M a h d i o f S u d a n

1 8 7 5 - 1938 M u h a m m a d I q b a l , I s l a m i c

O t t o m a n / T u r k i s h c a l i p h a t e a n d shariah c o u r t system abolished by Muştala K e m a l Atatürk

movement

1838-1897 Jamal a l - D i n a l - A f g h a n i , father o f

1848-

1919-1925 K h i l a f a t m o v e m e n t i n I n d i a i n s u p p o r t

a n d t r i e s t o e s t a b l i s h I s l a m i c state

under banner o f pan - Arabism and Arab

M a h d i s t state o f S u d a n d e f e a t e d b y B r i t i s h ; R a s h i d R i d d a b e g i n s p u b l i s h i n g ul-Manur i n

socialism, s u p p o r t e d b y shaykhs o f a l - A z h a r 1954

M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d f o u n d e d i n Sudan,

E g y p t — j o u r n a l becomes leading publica

advocating Islamic p o l i t i c a l a n d social o r d e r

t i o n f o r Islamic r e f o r m i s t ideas

v i a a d o p t i o n o f I s l a m i c c o n s t i t u t i o n based

1 8 9 9 - 1 9 2 0 M u h a m m a d A b d a l l a h H a s a n leads

o n the Q u r a n and i n t r o d u c t i o n o f Islamic

resistance t o B r i t i s h i n S o m a l i a

law

1905-1911 C o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v o l t i n I r a n places l i m

1908

1956

Pakistan adopts c o n s t i t u t i o n d e c l a r i n g itself

its o n Shah's p o w e r ; l o c a l r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r s

an Islamic Republic w i t h a M u s l i m head o f

play key r o l e i n o p p o s i t i o n t o Shah

state a n d based u p o n I s l a m i c p r i n c i p l e s :

Young Turk revolution i nOttoman

Empire

I s l a m i c r e s e a r c h c e n t e r d e e m e d necessary for r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f M u s l i m society o n

1912 M u h a m m a d i y a f o u n d e d i n S o u t h e a s t Asia t o

I s l a m i c basis

p r o m o t e e d u c a t i o n a l a n d social r e f o r m 1919—1924 E n d o f O t t o m a n E m p i r e f o l l o w i n g

1965

C r a c k d o w n o n M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d i n Egypt

W o r l d War I and creation o f Turkish

a f t e r Nasser accuses t h e m o f p l o t t i n g t o

Republic

assassinate h i m

CHRONOLOGY 1966

E x e c u t i o n o f Sayyid Q u t b , p r o m i n e n t w r i t e r

1979

f o r M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d w h o gave m o v e -

1967

f o u n d e d ; A m e r i c a n Embassy seized by m i l i t a n t s u p p o r t e r s o f K h o m e i n i p r o t e s t i n g U.S.

Egypt

ties t o shah; seizure o f G r a n d M o s q u e o f

A r a b - I s r a e l i w a r — A r a b forces r o u t e d by

M e c c a by m i l i t a n t s l e d b y M a h d i i n S a u d i A r a b i a ; S h i i t e r i o t s i n Eastern P r o v i n c e o f

secular p o l i c i e s l i k e n a t i o n a l i s m a n d s o c i a l -

Saudi Arabia, c a l l i n g f o r fairer d i s t r i b u t i o n

ism and sparking Islamic revival

o f o i l w e a l t h a n d services; l i b e r a t i o n o f Afghanistan

M n a m m a r Q a d d a f i seizes p o w e r i n L i b y a ,

1980

a l - N u m a y r i seizes p o w e r i n t h e S u d a n : a l -

tant Tanzim al-Jihad; H a b i b Bourguiba o f

s u m m i t conference c o m b i n i n g p a n -

Tunisia cracks d o w n o n Tunisia's Islamic Trend Movement

O r g a n i z a t i o n o f the Islamic Conference first o f f i c i a l p a n - I s l a m i c

1982

institu-

p t i t d o w n o p p o s i t i o n m o v e m e n t l e d by M u s l i m B r o t h e r h o o d ; Israel i n v a d e s

ernments

L e b a n o n f o r s e c o n d t i m e ; massacre o f

d e c l a r a t i o n o f i n d e p e n d e n t state o f

i n h a b i t a n t s o f Sabra a n d S h a t i l l a i n L e b a n o n 1983

B a n g l a d e s h ( f o r m e r l y East P a k i s t a n )

courts; c o m m i s s i o n established by G u l f states t o s t u d y a n d d e v e l o p u n i f i e d c o d e o f shariah l a w

and p o l i t i c a l party, rejecting capitalism and s o c i a l i s m a n d p r o m o t i n g I s l a m as a n a l t e r native p o l i t i c a l and e c o n o m i c

1987

system

intifada d e c l a r e d i n Palestine;

Benazir B h u t t o elected p r i m e m i n i s t e r o f P a k i s t a n , first e l e c t e d f e m a l e h e a d o l state

w i t h Egypt r e c o v e r i n g s o m e o f t e r r i t o r y

i n M u s l i m w o r l d ; e n d of I r a n - I r a q W a r ;

l o s t t o Israel i n 1967

M T I ( M o u v e m e n t d e la T e n d a n c e

war; Arab oil embargo

against W e s t s h o w s A r a b s t o b e w o r l d e c o -

I s l a m i q u e ) b e c o m e s Tunisia's l e a d i n g o p p o -

nomic power

sition group, p e r f o r m i n g impressively i n national

M u s a al Sadr f o u n d s M o v e m e n t o f t h e 1989

elections

D e a t h of A y a t o l l a h R u h o l l a h K h o m e i n i , f i r s t

social and p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m i n Lebanon

ruler of Islamic Republic o f Iran and

favoring redistribution o f power and

a u t h o r o f d o c t r i n e o f vilayat-i faqih; H a s h e m i

resources t o i n c l u d e Shiite m a j o r i t y o t h e r -

Rafsanjani elected president o f I r a n :

wise excluded; m i l i t a n t w i n g develops i n t o

Ayatollah SayycdAli Khamenei becomes

AMAL.

faqih; O m a r Hassan a l - B a s h i r seizes p o w e r

Outbreak o f civil war i n Lebanon, resulting i n radicalization o f Shiite p o p u l a t i o n ; M u a m m a r Q a d d a f i o f L i b y a p u b l i s h e s The Gteen Book, o u t l i n i n g h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Islam and the w o r l d Z u l f i k a r AB Bhutto's g o v e r n m e n t i n Pakistan o u s t e d by G e n e r a l iiia u l - H a q , w h o i n t r o duces Islamization

1978

1988

"Operation Badr"—second Arab-Israeli war,

Disinherited, a populist movement for

1977

HAMAS

f o u n d e d i n r e s p o n s e t o intifada

b y N e c m e t t i n E r b a k a n ; g o a l is I s l a m i c state

1975

C r a c k d o w n o n Tunisia's Islamic T r e n d m o v e m e n t by H a b i b B o u r g u i b a g o v e r n m e n t :

N a t i o n a l Salvation Party f o u n d e d i n T u r k e y and Islamization o f Turkish life

September Laws i m p l e m e n t e d i n Sudan, r e i n t r o d u c i n g Islamic laws and military-

A B 1 M ( M a l a y s i a n League o f M u s l i m Y o u t h ) f o u n d e d i n M a l a y s i a as m i s s i o n m o v e m e n t

1974

H a f i z a l - A s a d o f S y r i a levels c i t y o f H a m a t o

tion for cooperation a m o n g Islamic gov1970-1971 E a s t - W e s t P a k i s t a n c i v i l w a r r e s u l t s i n

1973

A n w a r a l - S a d a t o f E g y p t assassinated b y m i l i -

against I s r a e l a n d t o o r g a n i z e a n I s l a m i c

founded-

1972

Hhibollall founded i n Lebanon; Islamic Jihad Brotherhood

1981

Islam ism w i t h Arabism

1971

o c c u p a t i o n b y Soviet

f o u n d e d i n Palestine by M u s l i m

Aqsa M o s q u e i n Jerusalem b u r n e d , l e a d i n g K i n g Faisal o f S a u d i A r a b i a t o c a l l f o r jihad

from

U n i o n , l a r g e l y d u e t o e f f o r t s o f mtijuhidin

later i m p l e m e n t i n g o w n version o f Islamic state as " T h i r d U n i v e r s a l A l t e r n a t i v e " ; Jafar

1970

Iranian R e v o l u t i o n - Islamic Republic o f Iran

m e n t r a d i c a l , m i l i t a n t t o n e , b y Nasser i n

Israel, leading t o Arab d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t w i t h

1969

695

Disappearance o f Musa al-Sadr d u r i n g t r i p t o Libya, giving h i m popular " h i d d e n i m a m "

i n Sudan

tied to N a t i o n a l Islamic Front;

FIS ( I s l a m i c S a l v a t i o n F r o n t ) i n A l g e r i a sweeps m u n i c i p a l e l e c t i o n s ; T u n i s i a r e f u s e s t o a l l o w Renaissance p a r t y ( f o r m e r l y M T I , o r M o u v e m e n t d e la T e n d a n c e I s l a m i q u e ) to participate in elections i n order to keep r e l i g i o n a n d p o l i t i c s separate 1990—1991 Persian G u l f W a r results

from

Iraq's

invasion o f Kuwait 1990 Islamists w i n 32 o u t o f 80 seats i n J o r d a n i a n

status a m o n g Shi is o f L e b a n o n ; I s r a e l

Parliament and m e m b e r o f M u s l i m

invades L e b a n o n ; Pakistan a n n o u n c e s c r e -

B r o t h e r h o o d is e l e c t e d speaker o f n a t i o n a l

a t i o n o f shatiah c o u r t s

p a r l i a m e n t ; FIS ( I s l a m i c S a l v a t i o n F r o n t ) w i n s

696

CHRONOLOGY m u n i c i p a l a n d regional elections i n Algeria,

w a r ; Refah (Welfare) p a r t y w ins m a y o r a l

c o r n i n g t o p o w e r t h r o u g h d e m o c r a t i c process,

elections i n m o r e t h a n a dozen m a j o r cities i n Turkey, i n c l u d i n g A n k a r a a n d I s t a n u l

rather than revolution 1991

FIS ( I s l a m i c S a l v a t i o n F r o n t ) w i n s p a r l i a -

N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y t o m a k e i t s leader,

m e n t a r y elections i n Algeria 1 9 9 2 I r a n i a n elections place conservatives

1 9 9 5 ; R e f a h ( W e l f a r e ) P a r t y w i n s e n o u g h seats i n

in con-

trol o f parliament, marginalizing h a r d - l i n ers a n d p a v i n g w a y f o r l i m i t e d liberalization o f political participation and dissent; all m o s q u e s i n Egypt placed u n d e r

N e c m e t t i n E r b a k a n , T u r k e y s first Islamist prime minister 1 9 9 5 D a y t o n Peace A g r e e m e n t f o r r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e Bosnian conflict 1 9 9 7 M o h a m m a d K h a t a m i elected president o f

g o v e r n m e n t c o n t r o l ; m i l i t a r y p r e v e n t s FIS

I r a n , o p e n i n g d o o r t o U n i t e d States f o r c u l -

(Islamic Salvation Front) f r o m c o m i n g to

t u r a l , scholarly, a n d e c o n o m i c exchanges;

p o w e r i n Algeria, cancelling results o f

Algeria resumed parliamentary

democratic parliamentary

a l t h o u g h FIS ( I s l a m i c S a l v a t i o n F r o n t )

elections;

elections,

A l g e r i a n g o v e r n m e n t c r a c k d o w n o n FIS,

barred f r o m participating; alternative

l e a d i n g t o c i v i l w a r w h i c h has c l a i m e d o v e r

Islamic movement MSP (Movement o f

100,000

lives

1 9 9 3 B o m b i n g o f W o r l d Trade Center i n N e w York City; t i e d t o Shaykh U m a r A b d a l - Rahman 1 9 9 4 Baruch Goldstein (Jewish setder) k i l l s 2 9

S o c i e t y f o r Peace) w i n s s e c o n d h i g h e s t n u m b e r o f votes 1 9 9 8 Refah party declared u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d b a n n e d f r o m p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y a n d assets

w o r s h i p e r s at M o s q u e o f t h e P a t r i a r c h i n

seized b y state; d e p u t y p r i m e m i n i s t e r a n d

H e b r o n , p r o v o k i n g s u i c i d e b o m b i n g s by

leader o f A B I M , A n w a r I b r a h i m , r e m o v e d

Qassam Brigade ( m i l i t a r y w i n g o f H A M A S ) ; Taliban, c o m p o s e d o f religious leaders a n d

f r o m p o w e r i n Malaysia 1 9 9 8 I n c r e a s i n g v i o l e n c e i n K o s o v o leads t o i n t e r -

students, appears i n Afghanistan, c l a i m i n g

n a t i o n a l s a n c t i o n s against t h e Y u g o s l a v i a n

m a n t l e o f m o r a l leadership a n d e n d i n g c i v i l

(Serbian) government

SELECT

CHAPTER

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ONE

CHAPTER

Hor a Heft survey o f t h e N e a r Eastern b a c k g r o u n d

TWO

B o o k s have a habit o f g o i n g o u t o f p r i n t w i t h a l a r m ¬

against w h i c h I s l a m e m e r g e d , c o n s u l t Peter

i n g f r e q u e n c y i n t h e field o f l s l a m i c s t u d i e s . W h a t

B r o w n ' s The World of Late Antiquity ( L o n d o n : H a r t o u n .

f o l l o w s is a s h o r t l i s i o f w o r k s t h a i m i g h t h e l p i h e

Brace, J o v a n o v i c h , 1971). A sensible t r e a t m e n t o f

reader w h o is i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e issue o f l s l a m i c

t h e l i f e o f the P r o p h e t M u h a m m a d , w l i i c h m a n -

f a i t h a n d practice a n d its relevance to i h e fields of

ages t o a v o i d the e x t r e m e s o f e i t h e r u n d u e s k e p t i -

l a w a n d eth.es. W o r k s q u o t e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r are

c i s m o r c r e d u l o u s a p o l o g e t i c that m a r m a n y

also l i s t e d b e l o w .

w o r k s , is F. E. Peters' Muhummud and the Origins of Islam

M u h a m m a d A h u l Q u a s e m ' s The Ethics oful Gha7ali:A

( A l b a n y , N.Y.: S U N Y Press. 1 9 9 4 ) . T h e best r e c e n t

Composite Ethics in Islam ( D e l m a r , N e w Y o r k : Caravan

s u r v e y o f early I s l a m i c h i s t o r y i n i h e mashriq is

B o o k s . 1978)

f o u n d i n H u g h Kenned)''s The Prophet and the Age of the

a l - G h a z a l i ' s e t h i c a l t h e o r i e s . A l t h o u g h t h i s b o o k is

Caliphates:The Islumic Near Fust from [he Sixth to the Eleventh

o u t o f p r i n t , i t can be f o u n d i n m a j o r u n i v e r s i t y

Centuries ( L o n d o n : R o u t l e d g e , 1986). For t h e I s l a m i c

a n d p u b l i c l i b r a r i e s . C h a p t e r t h r e e o f V i n c e n t J.

West, see J a m i l M . A h u n - N a s r ' s A History of the

C o r n e l l ' s Realm of the Saim. Pmver and Authority in

Maghrib in the Islamic Period ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e

Moroccan Sufism ( A u s t i n , T e x a s : U n i v e r s i t y o f Texas

U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1987)

Press, 1998)

o n N o r t h A f r i c a . O n Spain,

is t h e sole s o u r c e o f i n f o r m a t i o n o n

A b u - 1 Abbas al-Sabti a n d h i s t e a c h i n g s i n the

see t z h e m a n y v a l u a b l e essays i n Salma K h a d r a

E n g l i s h language. Charles l.e G a i Eaton's Mum and the

J a y y u s i . e d . . The Legacy of Muslim Spain ( L e i d e n ,

Destiny of Man ( C a m b r i d g e : I s l a m i c Texts Society.

N e t h e r l a n d s : E. J. B r i l l , 1991). A c o n c i s e r e v i e w o f d e v e l o p m e n t s i n I r a n f r o m the e l e v e n t h t o the t h i r t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s is f o u n d i n the relevant c h a p t e r s of D a v i d M o r g a n ' s Medieval Persiu, 1 0 4 0 - 1 7 9 7 ( L o n d o n :

1994)

is o n e o f i h e best i n t r o d u c t i o n s t o I s l a m f o r

the g e n e r a l reader, especially w i t h r e g a r d 10 d i e relationship between faith and practice. A l t h o u g h M a j i d F a k b i y ' s Ethical Theories in Islam ( L e i d e n a n d

R o u t l e d g e . 1988); a m u c h f u l l e r t r e a i m e n t is p r o v i d e d b y t w o r i c h v o l u m e s o f t h e Cambridge History of Iran: v o l u m e 4, From the Arab Invasion to the Saljuqs, a n d

N e w Y o r k : E. J. B r i l l , 1991)

focuses m o s t l y o n p h i l o -

s o p h i c a l ethics, its c h a p t e r o n s c r i p t u r a l m o r a l i t y contains useful i n f o r m a t i o n o n ethical principles

v o l u m e ç. The Suljuq and Mongol Periods ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 197c a n d

is i h e besi s o u r c e o f i n f o r m a t i o n o n

i n the Q u r a n a n d the h a d i t h . R i c h a r d M . Frank's

1968,

" K n o w ledge a n d Taqlid:The F o u n d a t i o n s o f

respectively).

R e l i g i o u s Belie! i n Classical A s h a r i s m . " Journal of ihc

A readable o v e r v i e w o f the early spread of I s l a m In

American Oriental Society 109:1

(January-March

1989),

A n a t o l i a , associated w i t h t h e a r r i v a l o f the T u r k s , is

3 7 - 6 2 , p r o v i d e s t h e classical I s l a m i c j u s r i f i c a U o n

C l a u d e Cahen's Pre-OttomunTurkey ( N e w Y o r k :

f o r m a n y o f t h e t h e o l o g i c a l assertions m e n t i o n e d

T a p l i n g e r , 1 9 6 8 ) . T h e m o r e a m b i t i o u s reader may-

above. A l t h o u g h T o s h i h i k o b u t s u ' s Ethico-Religious

l o o k to M a r s h a l l G. S. H o d g s o n ' s m a g i s t e r i a l The

Concepts in the Quran ( M o n t r e a l : M c G i l l U n i v e r s i t y

Venture oflslum, 3 v o l s . ( C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y of

Press, 1966) is n o w o u t o f p r i m , i t s h o u l d be

C h i c a g o Press, 1975); a l t h o u g h i t is n o t a l w a y s easy

s o u g h t i n m a j o r u n i v e r s i t y a n d p u b l i c l i b r a r i e s as

to read, this w o r k remains ihe m o s t intellectually

the best source o f i n f o r m a t i o n o n Q u r a n i c e t h i c s .

s t i m u l a t i n g synthesis o f the e n t i r e t y of M u s l i m h i s -

Cod and Man in [he Koran: Semantics of the Koranic

t o r y a n d c i v i l i z a t i o n , a n d i t is especially s t r o n g o n

Weltanschauung ( N e w Y o r k : A r n o Press, 1980)

t h e p e r i o d s c o v e r e d i n t h i s chapter. A n i n t e r e s t i n g

a n o t h e r classic w o r k b y l z u t s u . I i is especially v a l u -

recent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f I s l a m i c

able f o r its c h a p t e r o n t h e e t h i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p

c u l t u r e is f o u n d i n R i c h a r d B u l h e t ' s IslomTbcVtew

beiw-een G o d a n d m a n i n I s l a m a n d ils d i s c u s s i o n

from the Edge ( N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y Press.

o f i h e t e r m islam a n d the c o n c e p t o f r e l i g i o n .

1994). For readers w h o have d i f f i c u l t y g r a s p i n g the

Sayyid Q u i b ' s In ihe Shade o( [he Quran, trans. M . A d i l

realities of r e m o t e p e r i o d s of h i s t o r y , because they

Salahi a n d A s h u r A . S h a m i s ( L o n d o n : M W H

is

have lift le sense o f w h a t l i f e i n p r e m o d e m t i m e s

Publishers. 1979). is t h e E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n o f the

w a s actually l i k e . Patricia C r o n e ' s Pre-Industrial

t h i r t i e t h part of Q u i b ' s Fi Zilal ul-Quran, w h i c h was

Societies ( O x f o r d : Basil B l a c k w e l l . 1989) is highly-

p u b l i s h e d after t h e a u t h o r ' s d e a t h i n 1966. A b u

recommended.

Bakr Siraj a d - D i n ' s Book of Certainty ( C a m b r i d g e :

697

698

SELECT

B I B I I O G RAP H Y

I s l a m i c Texts Society; 1992) is o n e o f t h e best d i s -

a n d e n h a n c e d e d i t i o n o f t h i s w o r k is f o r t h c o m i n g

c u s s i o n s i n any l a n g u a g e of t i n - Q u r a n i c c o n c e p t s

f r o m t h e I s l a m i c Texts S o c i e t y S u h h i M a l i i l i a s s a n i ' s

o f t h e " k n o w l e d g e o f c e r t a i n t y , " t h e " e y e o f cer-

Fulsolut of-TashriThe Philosophy ol Jurisprudence in Islam,

t a i n t y . " a n d t h e " t r u t h o f c e r t a i n t y " Finally, F r i t h j o l

trans, f a r h a t Z i a d e h ( L e i d e n , N e t h e r l a n d s : E.J.

S c h u o n ' s Undemanding Islam ( B l o o m i n g t o i i , I n d i a n a :

B r i l l . 1961), p r o v i d e s c o n c i s e a n d r e l i a b l e i n f o r m s

W o r l d W i s d o m B o o k s , 1994). t h e E n g l i s h transla

t i o n o n t h e s o u r c e s , s c h o o l s , a n d legal m a x i m s o f

t i o n o f Comprendre L'lslam {Paris. 1976). p r o v i d e s o n e

I s l a m i c law a n d d r a w s i n t e r e s t i n g c o m p a r i s o n s

o f the best o v e r a l l c o m p a r i s o n s o f t h e Q u r a n i c

w i t h R o m a n law T h i s h o o k also p r o v i d e s a u s e f u l

w o r l d v i e w w i t h that o f C a t h o l i c C h r i s t i a n i t y . T h i s

h i h l i i i g r a p h ) 1 it A r a b i c w o r k s o n t h e s u b j e c t . N o d

h i g h l y i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t r o d u c t i o n t o I s l a m is n o t suit-

J, C o i i l s o n ' s Islamic Survey*: A History of Islamic Law

able f o r every reader, h o w e v e r

( E d i n b u r g h , S c o t l a n d : E d i n b u r g h U n i v e r s i t y Press.

C o p y r i g h t s i n A r a b i c p u b l i s h i n g are o f t e n loosely

1964)

a n d Joseph Schacht's An Introduction to Islamic

e n f o r c e d . I n a d d i t i o n , classic w o r k s o f I s l a m i c

Law { O x f o r d ; C l a r e n d o n P u s s . 1964) pros i d e use-

s c h o l a r s h i p may be r e p r i n t e d ( o f t e n f r o m t h e same

ful i n f o r m a t i o n o n the history o f Islamic law a n d

o r i g i n a l ) i n m o r e t h a n o n e c o u n t r y as a service t o

l e a d i n g s c h o o l s a n d j u r i s t s . Schacht's b o o k also

the M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y . F o r reasons s u c h as these,

c o n t a i n s b r i e f chapters o n f a m i l y law, i n h e r i t a n c e ,

e d i t i o n s o f t h e Q u r a n a n d p r o p h e t i c r a d i i h are

p e n a l law. a n d c o n t r a c t s N o e l J. C o u l s o n ' s Succession

usual!) c i t e d g e n e r i c a l l y i n b i b l i o g r a p h i e s , l e a v i n g

in the Muslim Family ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e

o u t t h e m e n t i o n o f p u b l i s h e r a n d date. F o r e x a m -

U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1971) p r o v i d e s a d e t a i l e d treat

ple, t h e v e r s i o n o f M u s l i m i b n a l - H a j j a | a l -

m e n t o f b o t h t h e S u n n i and Shine laws o f i n h e r i -

N'isaburi's Sahib Muslim used f o r t h i s c h a p t e r ( t h e

tance Reliable i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h e sources a n d

s o u r c e o f the H a d i t h o f G a b r i e l discussed i n t h i s

v a r i o u s b r a n c h e s o f I s l a m i c law c a n be f o u n d i n

c h a p t e r ) w a s c o p i e d f r o m an u n s p e c i f i e d o r i g i n a l

A b d u r R a h i m ' s Principles of Muhammudun Jurisprudence

a n d p u b l i s h e d ai a n u n s p e c i f i e d date i n B e i r u t b y

( L o n d o n : Luzac & C o . , 1911).

Dar al K u t u b al A r a h i y y a . A p p e n d e d t o t h e text is a

A h m a d V o n D e n f f e r ' s Ulum al-Our'an. lniroduction to the

c o m m e n t a r y o n Sahih Muslim by t h e f a m o u s Shafiite

Sciences ol the Qui an {Leicester. E n g l a n d : I s l a m i c

j u r i s t A b u Z a k a r i y a al-N'avvawi ( n j j - 7 7 ) . S u c h

F o u n d a t i o n , 1985) o f f e r s g e n e r a l b u t c o n c i s e i n f o r -

c o m m e n t a r i e s are o f t e n u s e f u I f o r d e t e r m i n i n g t h e

m a t i o n o n t h e Q u r a n Said R a m a d a n s Islamic La» Tts

m a j o r i t y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a n o r m a t i v e text . T h e

Scope and Fuuity, 2nd e d . ( n . p , . 1970) is l u c i d o n t h e

o t h e r Arabic w o r k s cited u i this chapter were p u b -

sources o f law a n d ijtihad a n d has u s e f u l i n f o r m a -

lished w i t h full attention t o c o p y r i g h t regulations.

t i o n o n s u c h subjects as n a t i o n a l i t y a n d c i t i z e n s h i p .

A b u M u h a m m a d i b u A h i Zayd a l - Q a y r a w a n i ' s Ma:n

A n o t h e r r e l i a b l e w o r k o n these a n d s u c h o i l i e r

al-Risuiuh [ t e x t of t h e treatise] (Rabat, M o r o c c o :

t h e m e s as w a r . peace, a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l law is

M i n i s t r y o f E n d o w e d Properties and Islamic

M u h a m m a d H a m i d u l l a h ' s Muslim Conduct of State.

A f f a i r s , 1984) w a s W r i t t e n b y a l - Q a y r a w a n i w h e n

2nd e d . ( l a h o r e . Pakistan: Shah M u h a m m a d

he w a s o n l y seventeen years o l d . C o m p o s e d as a

Ashraf. 1955). M u h a m m a d Iqbal's Reconstruction of

response t o an e a r l i e r S h i i t c c r e e d , i t is t h e m o s t l y

Religious Thought in Islam ( r e p r i n t , L a h o r e . Pakistan:

w i d e l y k n o w n S u n n i c r e e d i n N o r t h a n d West

A s h r a f P r i n t i n g Press, 1983) is a classic a n d p r o -

A l r i c a . Q u o t a t i o n s f r o m A b u - l - A b b a s al-Sabti came

v i d e s c o n c i s e i n f o r m a t i o n a n d t h o u g h t f u l analysis

f r o m Y u s u f i b n al Zayyat al Tadili's al Tashawivuf ila

o n t h e salient aspects o f I s l a m a n d t h e Shariah.

rijalal

Jamal J. Nasir's The Islamic Lai* of Personal Status

tasawvvuf no akhbarAbi-I-Abbas al-Sabti [ I n s i g h t

i n t o the m e n o f Sufism a n d i n f o r m a t i o n o n A b u - l -

( L o n d o n : G r a h a m & T r o t m a n . 1986) is d e t a i l e d a n d

Abbas al-SabriJ, e d . A h m e d T o t i f i q (Rabat,

r e l i a b l e o n f a m i l y l a w . T h e r e are several o t h e r g o o d

M o r o c c o : C o l l e g e o f Letters. M o h a m m e d V

w o r k s o n I s l a m i c p e r s o n a l law. i n c l u d i n g Asaf A .

U n i v e r s i t y . 1 9 8 4 ) . T h i s w o r k , first p u b l i s h e d i n the

Fyzee's Ou[lines of Muhammadcn Law. 4th e d . ( D e l h i :

early

thirteenth

c e n t u r y , is o n e o f the oldest

O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1974) a n d D. F. M u l l a ' s

sources o n t h e f o u n d e r s o l t h e M o r o c c a n Sufi tra-

Principles of Mohomedun Low. 16th e d . ( B o m b a y , I n d i a :

dition.

T r i p a t h i Private L t d . . 1968). J o h n L . Esposito's Women in .Muslim family Law ( N e w Y o r k : S) racuse U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1982) p r o v i d e s a l u c i d o v e r v i e w o f m o d e r n r e f o r m s o f M u s l i m f a m i l y law i n E g y p t

CHAPTER

THREE

A useful b i b l i o g r a p h y o f English and Arabic w o r k s o n I s l a m i c law c a n be f o u n d i n M o h a m m a d F l a s h i m K a m a l i ' s Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 2nd e d . ( C a m b r i d g e : I s l a m i c Texts Society. 1991 ) . T h i s b o o k also p r o v i d e s a n e x t e n s i v e t r e a t m e n t o f the sources of I s l a m i c law a n d legal t h e o r y . T h e t h i r d revised

a n d Pakistan. A u s e f u l collec t i o n a n d extracts o f t h e s t a t u t o r y laws o f v a r i o u s M u s l i m C o u n t r i e s , w i t h special r e f e r e n c e t o m o d e r n r e f o r m s , c a n be f o u n d i n T a h i r M a h m o o d ' s Family Lai> Reform in the Muslim World ( N e w D e l h i : I n d i a n l a w I n s t i t u t e . 1972). H e r b e r t J. Liebesny's Low of the Near and Middle East

SELECT ( A l b a n y : N o v Y o r k U n i v e r s i t y Press. 197c)

is also

i n f o r m a t i v e o n ttta a p p l i e d aspects o f the Shariah

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FOUR

T h e latest a n d m o s t successful a t t e m p t t o p r o v i d e a

M o h a m m a d H a h s i m K a m a l i ' s Freedom of E.tpression in

c o m p r e h e n s i v e o v e r v i e w o f A r a b i c science is

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the legal a n d m o r a l p c r s p e c l i v e s o f I s l a m . K a m a l i ' s

the Physical Sciences, v o l . 2; Technology.Alchemy, and the Life

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t h i s e n c y c l o p e d i a , especially i n the c o n t r i b u t i o n s

the subject, a l t h o u g h b r i e f references t o t h e s u b j e c t

by Régis M o r e l o n , G e o r g e Saliba, a n d R o s h d i

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W o r l d o f I s l a m Festival P u b l i s h i n g C o m p a n y L t d .

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O n t h e o r e t i c a l a s t r o n o m y the closest w o r k t o a syst e m a t i c o v e r v i e w o f the r e f o r m t r a d i t i o n i n A r a b i c

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al Shuri>-ya (Methods of Judgmeni in a Shariuh-Oriented Policy) ( C a i r o : al-Muassasa a l - A r a b i > ya lil-Tabaa, 1961)

1970-80).

is a w o r k o l a u t h o r i t y o n s e n t e n c i n g p o l i c y

a n d m e t h o d s o f j u d g m e n t , especially \\ i t h i n t h e

( N e w Y o r k ; N e w York U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1994). O t h e r c o l l e c t i o n s o f s p e c i a l i z e d studies w i t h u s e f u l g e n e r a l o v e r v i e w s i n c l u d e E. S. Kennedy .

general f r a m e w o r k of Siyasa s h a r i a h . A b u I s h a q

" C o l l e a g u e s a n d F o r m e r S t u d e n t s . " i n eds. D a v i d A .

I b r a h i m al Shatibi's al Muuuluuu! h usul ul Ahkum

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o f B e i r u t . 1983); a n d J u l i o Samso. Islamic Astronomy

T i j a r i y y a a l - K u b r a , n . d . ) , is w i d e l y k n o w n l o r its

and Medieval Spain ( A l d e r s h o t , E n g l a n d : V a r i o : u m

pioneering c o n r r i h u i i o n to the philosophy o f

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I s l a m i c law a n d m a r k s a d e p a r t u r e f r o m t h e h a l -

t r a n s l a t i o n s , a n d studies o f i m p o r t a n t classics o l

l o w e d t e x t u a l i s t r e a d i n g o f the sources of s h a r i a h

A r a b i c a s t r o n o m y can he f o u n d i n t h e b i b l i o g r a p h y

that h a d h i t h e r t o d o m i n a t e d I s l a m i c j u r i s t i c

o l H a s h e d , e d . , Encyclopedia of the History of Archie Science

t h o u g h t . M u h a m m a d A m i n i b n A b i d i n . Majmuah

i n e n t r i e s u n d e r E. S. K e n n e d y . G e o r g e Saliba. D a v i d

Rasail Ibn Abidin [ c o l l e c t i o n o f treatises by I b n

K i n g . R é g i s M o r e l o n . a n d J a m i l Ragep

A h i d i n J ( U h o r c , Pakistan: Stihayl A c a d e m y .

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is a reliable b o o k ( 2 sols, i n o n e ) o f H a n a f i l a w o n selected issues that stands o u t m o r e f o r its l u c i d i t y rather U i a n its o i i g i n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n . T h e c o n t e m p o r a r y Egy p t i a n s c h o l a r Shay k h Y u s u f a l - Q a r a d a w i ' s Madkhol li-Durasat al Shariah al-tslamiyya ( a n e n t r y t o the study o f shariah) (Cairo: Maktaba Wahba, 1990) p r o v i d e s a c o n c i s e i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e s h a r i a h a n d c o n t a i n s many o f t h e a u t h o r ' s o w n r e s p o n s es t o c o n t e m p o r a r y j u r i s t i c issues A n d lasdy, t h e O t t o m a n M e j e l l e o f 1876, s i o n , i n a b o u t 1,8co

w h i c h is a c o d i f i e d s-er

articles, o f the H a n a f i l a w o f

c i v i l transac t i o n s is a g e n e r a l w o r k o f reference that is w i d e l y accepted i n the c o u r t s o f s h a r i a h t h r o u g h o u t t h e M u s l i m w o r l d . A n E n g l i s h translat i o n o f t h i s w o r k is p r o v i d e d b y C. R.Tyser, The

O n p r a c t i c a l a s t r o n o m y Ay d i n S a y i l i , The Observaiory in Islam ( A n k a r a , T u r k c y : T u r k T a r i h K u r u m u B a s i m e v i , i 9 6 0 ) , r e m a i n s a classic. Several studies o n i n s t r u ments, timekeeping, and astronomical coniputa t i o n s are c o n v e n i e n t l y c o l l e c t e d i n D a v i d K i n g ' s Astronomy in the Smice of Islam ( A l d e r s h o t , E n g l a n d : V a r i o r u m R e p r i n t s . 1993); i n K i n g , Islamic Mathematical Astronomy ( L o n d o n : V a r i o r u m R e p r i n t s . 1986); a n d i n K i n g . Mamie Mathematical Instruments ( L o n d o n : V a r i o r u m R e p r i n t s , 1987). I n t h e past t w o decades t h e w i d e - r a n g i n g research o f R o s h d i Rashed has b e e n i n s t r u m e n t a l i n a d v a n c i n g scholars' u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the various disciplines o f A r a b i c m a t h e m a t i c s . Rashed has p r o d u c e d several c r i t i c a l e d i t i o n s , t r a n s l a t i o n s of, a n d c o m m e n taries o n A r a b i c m a t h e m a t i c a l l e x i s i n the

70O

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Technology:An Illustrated History ( C a m b r i d g e :

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S c o d a n d : E d i n b u r g h U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1978).

Scyyed H o s s e i n Nasr's Islamic Art and Spirituality

.Another u s e f u l o v e r v i e w is t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n b y

( A l b a n y : State U n i v e r s i t y o f N e w York Press. 1987).

M i c h a e l D o l s t o A d i l S. G a m a l , e d . , a n d M i c h a e l D o l s , t r a n s . . Medieval Islamic Medicine:Ibn Ridivan'sTreatise "On the Prevention of Bodily Ills in Egypt" (Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1984). A c o l l e c t i o n o f several i n f l u e n t i a l essay s is M a x M e y e r h o f . Studies in Medieval Arabic Medicine:Theory and Practice ( L o n d o n : V a r i o r u m R e p r i n t s . 1984). O n A r a b i c p h a r m a c o l o gy, see the w o r k s b y I b r a h i m i b n M u r a d , especially his Buhuth fiTarikh ul-Tibbwul-Saydala indal-Arab [ Studies o n t h e h i s t o r y o f A r a b i c m e d i c i n e a n d p h a r m a c o l o g y ] (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Gharb alI s l a m i . 1991). O n h o s p i t a l s i n t h e M u s l i m w o r l d , the m o s t c o m p r e h e n s i v e w o r k t o date r e m a i n s A h m a d Isa, Tarikh aJ-Bimaristanat fi al-Islam ( T h e h i s t o r y o f h o s p i t a l s i n I s l a m ) , ( D a m a s c u s , S y r i a : alM a t b a a a l H a s h i m i y y a . 1939). For t h e q u o t e f r o m I b n K l i a l d u n , a n d also f o r a n elaborate

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and passim.

CHAPTER

SIX

Charles A d a m s ' Islam and Modernism in Egypt ( L o n d o n : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1933)

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high-

l i g h t s t h e Shii t e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o p h i l o s o p h y a n d c o n t a i n s a d e t a i l e d b i b l i o g r a p h y M a j i d Fakhry's A History of Islamic Philosophy, 2nd e d . ( L o n d o n a n d N e w Y o r k , L o n g m a n s a n d C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1983) is the s t a n d a r d w o r k o n t h e subject i n E n g l i s h . I t has b e e n translated i n t o n u m e r o u s l a n guages. A l s o see Eakhry. trans.. The Quran ( R e a d i n g , P a . : G a r n e i P u b l i s h i n g , 1997). L. G a r d e t a n d M , M . A n a w a t i ' s Introduction a la thenlogie musulmane (Paris: V r i n , 1948)

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FIVE

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i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e arts o f the I s l a m i c l a n d s f r o m

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E t r i n g h a u s c n a n d O l e g Grabar's The A n and

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S i m o n Van d e n B e r g h , t r a n s . . The Incoherence of the

e x c e r p t s f r o m t h e w o r k s of A r a b c h r o n i c l e r s o f the

Incoherence ( T a h a f u t a l - T a h a f u t } ( L o n d o n : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1954). A . J . W e n s i n c k ' s The Muslim Creed ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1932)

is still a valuable d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e o l o g i c a l

developments i n Islam. A comprehensive

and

authoritative discussion o f the development o f I s l a m i c p h i l o s o p h y is g i v e n i n H a r r y A u s t y n W o l f s o n ' s The Philosophy ofKolam ( C a m b r i d g e , Mass.: H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1976). Nasr, S e y y i d H o s s e i n . Ideas and Reulities of Islam ( B o s t o n : B B e a c o n Press. 1964).

provides

Crusades, i n c l u d i n g eyewitness accounts. Jane D a m m e n M c A u l i f i e ' s Qui'anicChnstiuns: An Analysis of Classical and Modern Exegesis ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1991)

presents a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f

Q u r a n i c c o m m e n t a r y c o n c e r n i n g verses d e a l i n g w i t h Christ:ans and Christianity. Eugene A. M y e r s ' Arabic Thought and the Western World ( N e w Y o r k : F r e d e r i c k U n g a r , 1964) p r o v i d e s a n i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e c u l t u r e o f I s l a m t h r o u g h w h i c h Greek science a n d p h i l o s o p h y r e a c h e d t h e West. Jaroslav Pelikan's The Spirit of Eastern Christendom ( 6 0 0 - 1 7 0 0 ) . v o l . 2 ( C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o Press, 1974)

R a h m a n , E a / l u r . Islam and Modermiy ( C h i c a g o :

Chicago

U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1982).

pre-

sents an e x a m i n a t i o n o f the d i v i s i o n s b e t w e e n Eastern a n d W e s t e r n C h r i s t e n d o m , i n c l u d i n g the

W a t t . W M o n t g o m e r y , The Formative Period of Islamic Thought ( E d i n b u r g h : E d i n b u r g h U n i v e r s i t y Press). W o l f s o n , H a r r y A u s t y n , The Philosphy of the Kalam

d e v e l o p m e n t o f G r e e k . S y r i a c . a n d early Slavic d o c t r i n e . R W S o u t h e r n ' s Western Views of Islam in ihe Middle Ages ( C a m b r i d g e , Mass : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y -

( C a m b r i d g e , Mass.: H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press.

Press, 1962)

197&)-

responses to e i g h t c e n t u r i e s o f c o n f r o n t a t i o n

H o u r a n i , A l b e r t . Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age ( L o n d o n :

is a survey o f m e d i e v a l C h r i s t i a n

b e t w e e n C h r i s t i a n a n d M u s l i m c u l t u r e s . J. W i n d r o w Sweetman's Islam and ChristianTheology:A

O x f o r d U r i i v e r s i r y Press, 1962.)

Sludyof the Interpretation of Theologicul Ideas in ihe Two Religions, v o l . [ . ( L o n d o n : B u t t e r w o r t h Press. CHAPTER

K e n n e t h Cragg's The Arab Chhsiiiin. A History in the Middle East ( L o u i s v i l l e , Ky.: West m i n s t e r / J o h n K n o x Press. 1991)

1955)

is i s t u d y o f i h e t w o r e l i g i o n s . D a v i d J.

SEVEN

provides a study o f Christianity i n the Arab

Wasserstein's The Caliphate in [fteWescAn Islamic Political Institution in the Iberian Ftninsula ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n Press, 1993)

is a s t u d y o f the caliphate i n I s l a m i c

w o r l d f r o m b e f o r e the rise o f I s l a m t o the present.

Spain f r o m its b e g i n n i n g i n 929 t o its d e m i s e i n

N o r m a n Daniel's Islam and the West: The Making of an

1031.

Image ( E d i n b u r g h , S c o d a n d : E d i n b u r g h U n i v e r s i t y Press, i 9 6 0 ) is a d e t a i l e d e x a m i n a t i o n a n d analysis o f m e d i e v a l C h r i s t i a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a n d p o l e m i c against the r e l i g i o n o f I s l a m , its P r o p h e t ,

CHAPTER

a n d practices. Francesco G a b r i e l l i ' s Arab Historians of

E s i n A t i l . Turkish Art ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: S m i t h s o n i a n

EIGHT

the Crusades ( L o n d o n : R o u t l e d g e a n d K c g a n Paul,

I n s t i t u t i o n Press. 1980) is a c o l l e c t i v e w o r k w i t h

L t d . . 1969) c o n t a i n s e x t r a c t s f r o m t h e w r i t i n g s o f

b e a u t i f u l l y i l l u s t r a t e d articles o n the m a i n f o r m s o f

M u s l i m historians, chroniclers, and biographers

O t t o m a n art a n d a r c l i i i e c t u r e . Sheila Blair a n d

that d e a l w i t h battles b e t w e e n C h r i s t i a n s a n d

J o n a t h a n B l o o m , The Art and Architecture of Islam,

M u s l i m s i n die Crusades.YvonneY.

Haddad and

1250-1800 ( N e w H a v e n , C o n n . : Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y

W a d i Z. H a d d a d . eds.. Christian-Muslim Encounters

Press, 1994)

( G a i n e s v i l l e : U n i v e r s i t y Press o f F l o r i d a ,

I s l a m i c arts f o r o u r p e r i o d . E c r n a n d Braudel's The

199c)

p r o v i d e s p r o c e e d i n g s of a c o n f e r e n c e o n r e l a t i o n s

is t h e best s i n g l e v o l u m e survey o f

Mediterranean and the Meditenanean World, 2 v o l s . , t r Sian

between M u s l i m s and Christians i n historical and

R e y n o l d s ( N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r a n d R o w , 1972)

c o n t e m p o r a r y perspectives, i n c l u d i n g s c r i p t u r e ,

classic study o f the g e o g r a p h y a n d c u l t u r e , t h e

c o n t a c t s , r e g i o n a l s t u d i e s , a n d t h e o l o g i c a l reflec

societies a n d e c o n o m i e s , a n d of the great

t i o n s . M a r s h a l l G. S. H o d g s o n ' s TheVenture of Islam. 2

H a b s b u r g - O t t o m a n s t r u g g l e f o r the c o n t r o l o l t h e

v o l s . , The Classical Age of Islam, v o l . 1, a n d The Expansion

M e d i t e r r a n e a n i n [he s i x t e e n t h c e n i u r y Soraya

is a

702

SELECT

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g l e - v o l u m e h i s t o r y o f the Jewish m i n o r i t y u n d e r

e x m i n c s the O t t o m a n pros inces a n d the C h a n g i n g

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the seventeenth c e n t u r y a n d t h e p o l y g l o t c o m m u n i t i e s that a s s e m b l e d t h e r e G o d f r e y G o o d w i n . A History of Ottoman Architecture ( L o n d o n : T h a m e s a n d H u d s o n , 1971) is a c o m p r e h e n s i v e survey o f the p r e m i e r r o y a l art. A n d r e w Hess. The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Si xieenth-Century I hero African Frontier ( C h i c a g o , 111.: U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o Press, 1978) e x p l o r e s the c u l m i n a t i o n o f d i e c e n t u r y

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struggle for the control o f the Mediterranean w i d i d e e p i n s i g h t s i n t o t h e r o l e of sea a n d l a n d p o w e r i n these wars.

emergence o l nationalism and mosenients for i n d e p e n d e n c e i n the Balkans. Speros V r y o n i s , Jr.. The Decline ol Medieval Hellenism m Asia Minor (Berkeley. C a l . : U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1971) is d i e best case study o f t h e processes b y w h i c h Christian populations were converted t o İslam

İm m a n t l e I W a l l c r s t e i n ' s The Modern World

System. 3 v o l s . (San D i e g o . C a l . : . A c a d e m i c Press, 1974- 8 9 ) , is a g r a n d l y c o n c e i v e d c o m p a r a t i v e study o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the g l o b a l e c o n o m y a n d a n i m p o r t a n t theory a b o u t h i s t o r i c a l process. Stuart Cary W e l c h . A King s Book of Kings.Thr Shah-numeh of ShuhTahmasp ( L o n d o n . 1972). is a n elegant w o r k

H a l i l Inalcik's The Ottoman EmpireTheClassicalAae, 1300-1600, tr. N . l l / k o w i t z a n d C. I m b e r ( I n n d o n , 1973)

i n g t h e e c o n o m i c a n d social basis f o r t h e e v e n t u a l

o n t h i s m o s t e x q u i s i t e o f Persian i l l u s t r a t e d m a n u scripts.

is the classic w o r k o n O t t o m a n i n s t i t u t i o n s .

H a l i l I n a l c i k a n d D o n a l d Q u a i a c r t ' s An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Fmpire, 1300-1914

CHAPTER

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For g e n e r a l texts see Joseph E. S c h w a r t z berg's A

a c o l l e c t i v e a n d a u t h o r i t a t i v e appraisal o f O t t o m a n

Historical Atlas of South Asia for South Asid ( C h i c a g o :

NINE

e c o n o m y a n d society. H o u r i I s l a m o g l u - I n a n ' s State

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and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire ( L e i d e n , E. ] . B r i l l .

C a n f i e l d . e d . . Turko-Persia in Historical Perspeitiic

1994)

probes the A n a t o l i a n c o u n t r y s i d e t o b r i n g

n e w i n s i g h t s i n t o the s t r u c t u r e a n d d e v e l o p m e n t o f O t t o m a n r u r a l e c o n o m y a n d society

Cemal

( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1991). For l e x i s o n S o u t h Asia see R i c h a r d Eaton's " K e n í e m b e r i n g / I m a g i n i n g Persia; M e d i e v a l

Kafadar's Between Two WoridsThe Construction ol the

Deccani M i g r a n t s and die Iranian H o m e l a n d , "

Otromun Sttite (Berkeley, C a l . : U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a

paper d e l i v e r e d at i h e R o c k e f e l l e r W o r k s h o p 3 o n

Press. 1995) e x p l o r e s the c h a n g i n g h i s t o r i o g r a p i n

" S o u t h A s i a n I s l a m a n d the Greater M u s l i m W o r l d "

eal perspectives o n t h e o r i g i n s o f t h e O t t o m a n sys

at N o r t h C a r o l i n a State U n i v e r s i t y i n R a l e i g h , N . C . .

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f r o m 2 2 - 2 5 M a y 1997. S i m o n D i g b y ' s " T h e Sufi

Ottoman Empire ( N o r m a n . O k l a . : U n i v e r s i t y o f

S h a y k h a n d d i e Sultan: A C o n f l i c t o f C l a i m s t o

O k l a h o m a Press. 1963) a f f o r d s a c o n v e n i e n t i n t r o

A u t h o r i t y i n M e d i e v a l I n d i a , " Iron 28 ( 1990);

d u c t i o n t o the largest c i t y of t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n i n

7 1 - 8 1 , p r o v i d e s a m a p r study o f c o n t e s t e d sources

the s i x t e e n t h a n d seventeenth c e n t u r i e s . Sayyid

o f a u t h o r i t y i n sultanate I n d i a . M i l o C. Beach's The

H u s a y n Nasr. " T h e S c h o o l o f I s f a h a n . " A H i s t o r y o f

Imperial Image: Paintings for ihe Mughal Court

Muslim Philosophy, I I , e d . M . M S h a r i f ( W i e s b a d e n ,

( W a s h i n g t o n . D C : Freer Gallery. 1981) e x a m i n e s

1966, p p 904— j i ) i s a b r i e f a n d i n s i g h t f u l i n t r o

the r a n g e o f r o y a l p a t r o n a g e f o r p o r t r a i t art e x a l t

d u c t i o n tn Iranian I l l u m i n a t i o n i s t philosophy.

ing the emperor d u r i n g M u g h a l India. M i l o C

Leslie Peirce. The Imperial HaremWomen and Sex in the Ottoman Fmpire ( N e w Y o r k , O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, •993)- breaks new g r o u n d i n h e r s i u d y o f the r o l e of w o m e n 111 the O t t o m a n f a m i l y a n d p o l i t i c a l sys tems. R i c h a r d R e p p , Mufti of IstanbuhA Study in the Development cif ihe Ottoman Learned Hierarchy ( L o n d o n , U t h i c a Press, 1986), c h r o n i c l e s t h e e m e r g e n c e a n d d e s e l o p m c n i o f the o f f i c e o f t h e S h a y k h a l - I s l a m o r c h i e f M u f t i o f the O t t o m a n Empire. Roger M . Savory. Iran under the Sdfuvids ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1980), is i h e best o n e - v o l u m e h i s t o r y o f Safavid I r a n . S t a n l b r d J. Shaw. The lews of the Ottoman Empire and ihe Turkish Republic ( N e w Y o r k :

Beach's Mughal and Ra/pul Puinting. v o l . 3. of The Nov Cambridge History of India ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press. 19911 c o m p a r e s t h e m a l e r i a l e v i d e n c e f o r assessing the a c h i e v e m e n t s o f Rajput artists a n d t h e i r s o m e t i m e r i v a l M u g h a l c o u n t e r parts C a t h e r i n e B. Ashcr's Architecture of Mughal India, v o l . 4 o f The Nov Cambridge History of India ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1992) is the firsl systematic o v e r v i e w o f b o i h the p o l i t i c a l a n d the c u l t u r a l i d e o l o g i e s that i n f o r m M u g h a l p a t r o n a g e o f m o n u m e n t a l s t r u c t u r e s . J o h n F. R i c h a r d s ' The Mughal Empire, v o l . 5 o f The Nov Cambridge History of India ' C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e

SELFCT U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1993) p r o v i d e s a valuable synthe¬

BIB! IOGRAPHY

Etlinic R e l a t i o n s . " Central Asian Survey 16:4 (1997,

sis o l t h e v a r i e d , o f t e n c o n f l i c t i n g s c h o l a r s h i p o n

4 6 1 - 8 6 ) , o u t l i n e s recent t r e n d s i n trade a n d p o l i t i -

the m a j o r i n s t i t u t i o n s o f M u g h a l I n d i a .

cal r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n C h i n a a n d C e n t r a l A s i a , w i t h

For texts o n Southeast Asia see A n t h o n y H . J o h n s '

p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o the ways i n w h i c h e t h n i c

" I s l a m i n t h e Malay W o r l d , " i n eds. FA. Israeli and A

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Tibetan Nomadit Bisionulism ( N e w Y o r k : H o l t .

L. D u n n ' s The Adventures of IbnButtuiu ( B e r k e l e y :

R i u e h a r t . a n d W i n s t o n , 1968) is a classic l e x t , w r i t -

U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1989) i s t h e p r e m i e r

ten b y a f o r m e r medical missionary w h o lived f o r

t r a n s l a t i o n o f t h e m o s t w i d e l y c i t e d traveler i n t h e

several years o n t h e Gansu T i b e t a n f r o n t i e r , gives

p r e m o d e r n phase o f A f r o - E u r a s i a n Islamicate h i s

first-hand i n f o r m a t i o n o n the transformation of

t o r y . M . B. H o o k e r , e d . Islam in South-Last Asia ( L e i d e n , N e d i e r l a n d s : F. J. B r i l l . 1981) i n c l u d e s essays b y several c o n t r i b u t o r s b u t t h o s e b y Roy F. E l l e n a n d A. Day are es|>ecially u s e f u l . L e o n a r d Y Andaya's TheWorld of Muluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period ( H o n o l u l u : U n i v e r s i t y o f H a w a i i Press, oflers a comprehensive view o f the f o r m a -

1997) tion

o f I n d o n e s i a o n its f u r t h e s t Pacific f r o n t i e r .

Barbara W a t s o n A n d a y a a n d L e o n a r d Y Andaya's A History of Molaysia ( L o n d o n : M a c m i l l a n . 1982) is t h e best o v e r v i e w h i s t o r y o f I n d o n e s i a ' s s m a l l e r b u t c r u c i a l n o r t h e r n n e i g h b o r . James SiegcTs Shadow and SoundThe Historical Thought of a Sumutran People ( C h i c a g o :

T i b e t a n p a s t o r a l i s m i n the face o f e x p a n d i n g C h i n e s e i n f l u e n c e . Joseph Fletcher's Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia, ed. Bearrice Forbes M a n z ( H a m p s h i r e , E n g l a n d : V a r i o r u m Press, 199c) is a n invaluable collection o f ihe w o r l d ' s leading authori t y o n China's h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n s a n d i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h I s l a m i c C e n t r a l Asia. A n d r e w D. W F o r b e s ' Warlords and Muslims in Chinese CcmralAsiu ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1986) is t h e d e f i n i t i v e w o r k o n X i n j i a n g p o l i t i c s d u r i n g t h e Republican p e r i o d , 1910-40. H e r h e n F r a u k e a n d D e n i s T w i t c h c t t ' s Alien Regimes and Border States (907-1368). v o l . 6 o f Cambridge History of China ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m h r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y -

U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o Press, 1979) traces b o t h d i e

Press, 1994) is t h e m o s t d e f i n i t i v e c o l l e c t i o n o f

t r a n s o c e a n i c d e v e l o p m e n t s a n d t h e local p a t t e r n s

historical discussions of China's relations w i t h its

o f i n f l u e n c e that shaped c u r r e n t - d a y S u m a t r a .

b o r d e r i n g p e o p l e s a n d states a n d i t s d o m i n a t i o n b y m a n y o f t h e m . D r u C. G l a d n e y ' s Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic ( C a m b r i d g e .

CHAPTER T E N

Mass ; H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1996) is t h e lead

T h o m a s Barfield's The frrilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and

i n g w o r k o n contemporary islam and ethnic

China ( C a m b r i d g e : Basil Blackvvell, 1989) is a

p r o b l e m s f a c i n g c o n t e m p o r a r y C h i n a . Peter

sweeping o v e r v i e w o f China's four-thousand-year

H o p k i r k ' s The Greot Gume.The Struggle lor Empire in

h i s t o r y o f i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n sedentary a n d

CcntrulAsia ( N e w Y o r k a n d T o k y o : K o d a n s h a

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s y m b i o t i c a n d c y c l i c a l . L i n d a Benson's The Hi

C h i n e s e . R u s s i a n , a n d B r i t i s h r i v a l r i e s as t h o s e

Rebellion:The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in

powers attempted to divide u p the region i n the

Xinjiang, 1944-1949 ( A r m o n k . N.Y.: M . E. S h a r p e .

late n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . J o n a t h a n N . L i p m a n ' s

1990)

i s the d e f i n i t i v e w o r k d e s c r i b i n g t h e i l l - f a t e d

familiar Strangers:A History of Muslims in Northivesr China

U i g h u r - i e d r e b e l l i o n that h e l p e d d e f i n e t h e issues

(Seattle: U n i v e r s i t y o l W a s h i n g t o n Press. 1998) i s

f a c i n g C h i n a as i t s o u g h i t o i n t e g r a t e t h e X i n j i a n g

an o v e r v i e w o f m o r e m o d e r n d e v e l o p m e n t s .

r e g i o n i n i o t h e People's R e p u b l i c . C y r i l E. Black,

M o r r i s Rossabi's Chinu and Inner Asia from 1368 lo the

L o u i s D u p r e e . Elizabc-ih L h d i c o i t West, D a n i l e C.

Present Day ( L o n d o n : T h a m e s a n d H u d s o n , 1981) is

M a t u s 7 e w s k i , Eden Naby. a n d A r t h u r N . W a l d r o n ' s

an invaluable o v e r v i e w o f China's relations w i t h

The Modemi/aUon of Inner Asiu ( A r m o n k . N . Y . : M . E.

C e n t r a l Asia f r o m t h e e n d o f t h e M o n g o l E m p i r e

Sharpe, 1991) i s a g e n e r a l o v e r v i e w o f issues f a c i n g

u n t i l t h e f o u n d i n g o l t h e People's R e p u b l i c .

c o n t e m p o r a r y d e v e l o p m e n t i n C e n t r a l Asia,

A n n e i n a r i e S c h i m m e l ' s Mystical Dimensions of Islam

e m p h a s i z i n g p o l i t i c a l a n d c u l t u r a l cliflerences i n

( C h a p e l H i l l : U n i v e r s i t y o f N o r t h C a r o l i n a Press.

the r e g i o n a n d t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t e x t . James P

197c)

p r o v i d e s a g e n e r a l o v e r v i e w o f t h e Sufi

D o r i a n , Brett H . W i g d o r t z , a n d D r u C. G l a d n e y ' s ,

o r d e r s that p e r v a d e n o t o n l y t h e M u s l i m w o r l d

" C e n t r a l Asia a n d X i n j i a n g , C h i n a : E m e r g i n g

b u t C e n t r a l Asia a n d C h i n a as w e l l . D e n i s Sinor,

Energy. E c o n o m i c , a n d E t h n i c R e l a t i o n s . " Asia-Pacific

e d . . The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia

Issues 31 ( M a y , 1 - 8 ) p r o v i d e s an u p - t o - d a t e

( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1990)

o v e r v i e w o f the issues p l a g u i n g C h i n a a n d C e n t r a l

is [ h e m o s t a u t h o r i t a l i v e o v e r v i e w o f C e n t r a l

A s i a n r e l a t i o n s t o d a y James F D o r i a n , Brett

A s i a n h i s t o r y available f r o m t h e p a l e o l i t h i c era 10

W i g d o r t 7 , a n d D r u Gladney's " C e n t r a l A s i a n a n d

the M o n g o l e m p i r e i n the t h i r t e e n t h century.

X i n j i a n g , C h i n a : E m e r g i n g Energy. E c o n o m i c , a n d

7 0 4

SELECT

CHAPTER

BIBLIOGRAPHY e x c e l l e n t i n t e r p r e t i v e essay that h e l p s to place e i g h -

ELEVEN

A c o l l e c t i o n of d o c u m e n t s d a t i n g f r o m t h e first t o t h e

teenth- and nineteenth-century movements i n a g l o b a l perspective.

n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s is g a t h e r e d i n G.S.P F r e e m a n - G r e n v i l l e ' s East African Coast: Selected

J o h n L. F s p o s i t o . e d . The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern

Documents ( O x f o r d . U K : C l a r e n d o n Press. 1962). A

Islamic World ( N e w Y o r k : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press. is the essential g e n e r a l r e f e r e n c e w o r k f o r a l l

d i s c u s s i o n o f the O r o m o o r Galla c o n t r i b u t i o n t o

1995)

I s l a m i n E t h i o p i a can be f o u n d i n M o h a m m e d

o f the specific p e o p l e a n d g r o u p s m e n t i o n e d i n

Hassen's The Oromo of Ethiopia: A History, i c j o - i S c o

this c hapter. Joseph F. Fletcher's Studies on Chinese and

( C a m b r i d g e . U K : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press,

Islamic Innei Asia, V a r i o r u m C o l l e c t e d Studies series

1990). M e r v y n H i s k e l t ' s A History of Hausa Islamic Verse

( B r o o k f i e l d . V t . : V a r i o r u m , 1995)

( L o n d o n : S c h o o l o f O r i e n t a l a n d A f r i c a n Studies,

tant c o n t r i b u t i o n t o i h e s t u d y o f the

197c)

N a c | s h b a n d i y y a h o r d e r a n d the g e n e r a l d e v e l o p -

traces w r i t t e n Hausa l i t e r a t u r e f r o m its

m e n t o f M u s l i m societies i n C e n t r a l Asia. M a r s h a l l

b e g i n n i n g s t o the e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . A d e t a i l e d site r e p o r t o f t h e e x c a v a t i o n o f Shanga. inc l u d i n g n e w e v i d e n c e a b o u t the early d e v e l o p m e n t o f Sw-ahib c i v i l i z a t i o n , can be f o u n d i n M a r k H o r t o n ' s The Archeology of a Muslim Trading Community on the Coast of East Africa ( N a i r o b i . Kenya: T h e B r i t i s h I n s t i t u t e i n East A f r i c a , 1996). J o h n O. H u n w i c k ' s Shonu in Songhai ( L o n d o n : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press f o r the B r i t i s h A c a d e m y , 198c) is t h e i c x t . transla l i o n , and historical i n t r o d u c t i o n to "The

Replies"

b y al M a g h i l i . N e h e m i a L e v t / i o n ' s Ancient Ghana and Mali ( L o n d o n : M e t h e u n , 1973)

is t h e o n l y f u f

b o o k - l e n g t h s t u d y o f the early e m p i r e s o f west S u d a n ; the same author's Islam in West Africa: Religion. Society,and Politics to 1800 ( L o n d o n : V a r i o r u m ,

1994)

is a c o l l e c t i o n o f essays o n those t o p i c s .

G. S. H o d g s o n ' s The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times, v o l . 3 o f TheVenturc of fslam:Conscience und History in a World Civilization ( C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o Press. 1974), t h e t h i r d v o l u m e o f an e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t interpretation o f Islamic history , p r o v i d e s i m p o r t a n t b r o a d e r perspectives f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g the d y n a m i c s o f e i g h t e e n t h - a n d nineteenth-century Islamic history. Ira M . L a p i d u s ' A History of islamic Societies ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1988)

is a u s e f u l s u r -

vey of evenis i n a l l p a r t s o f t h e M u s l i m w o r l d , w h i c h a d d e d b r e a d t h t o the c o v e r a g e i n t h i s c h a p ter. N e h e m i a L e v t z i o n a n d J o h n O. V b l l , eds.. Eighteenth Century Renewal and Reform in Islam (Syracuse, N . Y . : Syracuse U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1987)

R. S. O ' F a h e y a n d Jay S p a u l d i n g ' s Kingdoms of the Sudan ( L o n d o n : M e t h e u n , 1974)

is a v e r y i m p o r -

is a h i s t o r y o f the three

is a c o l l e c -

t i o n o f essays o n specific m o v e m e n t s of r e n e w a l i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . B. G. M a r t i n ' s Muslim

k i n g d o m s o f the S u d a n , the Sinnar. the W a d a i , a n d

Brotherhoods in Nineteenth-Century Africa ( C a m b r i d g e :

t h e D a r f u r . R a n d a l l L. P011 w e l l s ' Horn and Crescent:

C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1976)

Cultural Changes and Traditional Islam on the East Africcn

s t u d y o f the m a j o r m o v e m e n t s o f I s l a m i c r e n e w a l

Coast, 800—1900 is a c o m p r e h e n s i s e analysis o f the

i n A f r i c a i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . R. S. O'Faliey's

h i s t o r y o f I s l a m o n the east A f r i c a n coast. Elias N .

Enigmatic Saint:Ahmad ibn Idris and the Idrisi Tradition

Saad's Social History ofTimbuktu ( C a m b r i d g e , U K :

( E v a n s t o n . I I I . : N o r t h w e s t e r n U n i v e r s i t y Press,

C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1983)

is a c o m p r e -

1990)

is a t h o r o u g h

is 1 p a t h - b r e a k i n g s t u d y o f o n e o f the m a j o r

hensive history o f T i m b u k t u u p to the nineteenth

r e n e w a l i s i figures a n d h i s t r a d i t i o n . Fazlur

century.

Rahman's "Revival and R e f o r m i n Islam." i n vol. 2 o f The Cambridge History of Islam, e d . R M . H o l t a n d Others ( C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1970)

CHAPTER

TWELVE

Rifaat A l i A b o u - E l - H a j ' s Formation ol the Modern StaicThe Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries (.Albany: Slate U n i v e r s i t y o f N e w Y o r k Press, 1991)

is an

i m p o r t a n t r e i n t e r p r e tat i o n o f d i e e v o l u t i o n o f t h e O t t o m a n p o l i t i c a l c o n t e x t . A z i z A h m a d ' s Islamic Culture in the Indian Emiionmeni ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n Press. 1964)

pp.

6 3 2 - 5 6 . is an i n f l u e n t i a l d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e b r o a d e r t r a d i t i o n o f r e n e w al i n I s l a m i c h i s t o r y . J o h n O b e r t Voll's " R e n e w a l a n d R e f o r m i n I s l a m i c H i s t o r y : Tajdid a n d Islah." i n Voices of Resurgent Islam, e d . J o h n L. Esposito ( N e w Y o r k : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1983). p p . 3 2 - 4 7 , is a d e s c r i p t i o n o f the r e n e w a l i s i t r a d i t i o n by i h e a u t h o r o f t h i s chapier.

c o n t a i n s h e l p f u l essays o n the m a j o r

m o v e m e n t s o f I s l a m i c r e n e w a l i n S o u t h Asia. C h r i s t i n e D o b b i n ' s Islamic Revivalism in a Changing

CHAPTER

Peasant Economy:Central Sumatra. 1784-1847 ( L o n d o n :

S a i d A . A r j o m a n d ' s " C o n s t i n i l i o n s and Struggles for

C u r z o n Press, 1983)

is a n essential w o r k f o r u n d e r

s t a n d i n g t h e P a d r i m o v e m e n t a n d the b r o a d e r c o n text o f r e v i v a l i s m i n Southeast Asia. R i c h a r d

M

THIRTEEN

P o l i t i c a l O r d e r : A Study i n the M o d e r n i z a t i o n o f R e l i g i o u s T r a d i t i o n s , " Archives Europccnes de Sociologie. 33:1

(1992, p p . 3 9 - 8 2 ) . p r o v i d e s an e x c e l l e n t

Eaton's Islamic History as Global History ( W a s h i n g t o n ,

c o m p a r a t i v e analysis o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l debates a n d

D.C.: A m e r i c a n H i s t o r i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n . 1990}

p o l i t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t s across t h e M u s l i m w o r l d .

is a n

SELECT

BIBLIOGRAPHY

7 0 c;

B e n e d i c t A n d e r s o n , Imagined Communities: Reflections on

t i o n i n the A r a b w o r l d . C l e m e n t H e n r y M o o r e ' s

the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 2 t i d e d . , ( N e w Y o r k :

Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia

Verso, 1991), presents a p r o v o c a t i v e e x a m i n a t i o n o f

( B o s t o n : L i t t l e . B r o w n . 1970) discusses t h e r e l a t i o n

t i l e m a n n e r i n w h i c h n a t i o n a l i s m is c o n s t r u c t e d i n

b e t w e e n n a t i o n a l i s m a n d state f o r m a t i o n i n N o r t h

r e s p o n s e t o p o l i t i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c interests.

A f r i c a . O n S o u t h A s i a . H a r n z a A l a v i ' s " T h e Stale i n

R u p e r t E m e r s o n ' s From Empire to Nation:The Rise of Self-

P o s l c o l o n i a l Societies: Pakistan a n d B a n g l a d e s h . " i n

Asserliun of Asian and African Peoples ( C a m b r i d g e . M A :

K a d i l c e n G o u g h a n d H a r i P S h a r n i a . eels.,

H a r v a r d , i 9 6 0 ) is a n i n d e p t h analysis o f t h e e v o -

Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia ( N e w Y o r k :

lution o f anticolonial nationalism and the manner

M o n t h l y R e v i e w Press. 1973. p p . 1 4 5 - 7 3 ) p r o v i d e s

i n w h i c h i t u n f o l d e d at the e n d o f t h e c o l o n i a l era.

a c o m p e l l i n g analysis o f t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e

N i k k i K e d d i e , " T h e Revolt o f I s l a m , 1700 t o 1995:

c o l o n i a l legacy f o r slate f o r m a t i o n i n S o u t h Asia.

Comparative Considerations and Relation t o

Jama! M a l i k ' s Colonizing Islum: Dissolution of Traditionul

I m p e r i a l i s m . " Comparative Sludies in Society and History,

Institutions in Pakistan (New* D e l h i : M a n o h a r , 1996)

j 6 : j ( f u l y 1994. p p . 4 6 3 - 8 7 ) , p r o v i d e s a u s e f u l

details t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h Pakistan has dealt w i t h

overview of the role o f colonialism and i m p e r i a l -

t h e r o l e o f I s l a m i n society. C. A . Bayly, Rulers,

i s m i n t h e genesis o f Islamic a c t i v i s m . Joel S.

Townsmen and Bazaars: Nonh Indian Society in the Age of

M i g d a l , Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society

British Expansion, 1770-1870 ( N e w Y o r k : C a m b r i d g e

Reunions and State Capabilities in ihe Third World

U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1983) is a t h o r o u g h analysis o f

( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press) presents an

the n a t u r e o f t h e i m p a c t o f B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l i s m o n

overarching conceptual treatmeni o f the relation

I n d i a . T h o m a s M e t c a l f ' s Land, Landlords and ihe British

b e t w e e n t h e r e l a t i v e p o w e r s o f p o l i t i c a l leaders a n d

Raj:Northem India in the Nineteenth Century ( B e r k e l e y :

i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h o s e o f s o c i a l forces i n t h e

U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1979) discusses t h e

process o f state f o r m a t i o n . O n A f r i c a , C a t h e r i n e

i m p a c t o f B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l i s m o n social s t r u c t u r e i n

B o o n e , "States a n d R u l i n g Classes i n P o s l c o l o n i a l

S o u t h Asia. H i s Ideologies of ihe Raj ( N e w Y o r k :

A f r i c a : T h e E n d u r i n g C o n t r a d i c t i o n s o f Power," i n

C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1994) e x a m i n e s t h e

Joel S. M i g d a l , A n d K o h l i , a n d V i v i e n n e S h u t , eds..

w o r l d v i e w s that u n d e r p i n n e d t h e c o l o n i a l a d m i n

Stole Power and Social Forces ( N e w Y o r k : C a m b r i d g e

i s t r a t i o n o f I n d i a a n d t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r later

U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1994, pp. 1 0 8 - 4 0 ) , discusses t h e

slate d e v e l o p m e n t i n S o u t h Asia. Ayesha Jalal's The

i m p o r t a n c e o f the c o l o n i a l legacy t o p o s t - c o l o n i a l

Slate of Manial Rule:The Origins of Pakistan's Political

state d e v e l o p m e n t . Frank F u r e d i . CoIonialWars and the

Economy of Defence ( C a m b r i d g e :

Politics of Thiid World Naiiontilism ( L o n d o n : L B . T a u r i s ,

U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1990) is a d e t a i l e d e x a m i n a t i o n of

1994)

relates r e s o u r c e m o b i l i z a t i o n f o r c o l o n i a l

Cambridge

t h e c o n t i n u i t i e s b e t w e e n t h e B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l state

conflicts to ihe development o f T h i r d W o r l d

a n d Pakistan, a n d t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s l i n k a g e

n a t i o n a l i s t m o v e m e n t s . C r a w f o r d Y o u n g ' s The African

foT Pakistan's p o l i t i c s . S e y y e d V a h Reza Nasr's

Colonial State in Comparative Perspective ( N e w H a v e n : Yale

" P a k i s t a n : State, A g r a r i a n R e f o r m , a n d

U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1994) e x p l a i n s state f o r m a t i o n i n

I s l a m i z a t i o n . ' ' International Journal of Politics, Culture and

A f r i c a i n the c o n t e x t o f the c o l o n i a l legacy o f that

Society, 10:2 ( W i n t e r 1996. p p . 2 4 9 - 7 2 ) e x a m i n e s

c o n t i n e n t . O n the A r a b w o r l d , P h i l i p S. K h o u r y ' s

the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n state f o r m a t i o n , f e u d a l i s m ,

Syria and the French MandateTbe Politics of Arab Nationalism.

a n d I s l a m i z a t i o n i n Pakistan

I9JO-I94C ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press.

W i l l a r d A H a n n a ' s Seguel to Colonialism The 1957-1960

1987)

is a c o m p r e h e n s i v e e x a m i n a t i o n o f F r e n c h

O n Southeast A s i a ,

Foundations for Malaysia ( N e w Y o r k : A m e r i c a n

c o l o n i a l p o l i c i e s a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n t h e Levant.

U n i v e r s i t i e s F i e l d Staff, 1965) e x a m i n e s t h e c o n t i -

W i l l i a m R o g e r L o u i s ' The British Empire in the Middle

n u i t i e s b c i w e e n t h e c o l o n i a l a n d p o s l c o l o n i a l states

Eosi. 1945-1951 ( N e w Y o r k : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press.

i n M a l a y s i a . A n t h o n y M i l n e r ' s The Invention of Poliiics in

1984)

provides a similar account o f British colonial

Colonial Malaya ( N e w Y o r k : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y

p o l i c i e s i n t h e M i d d l e East. Lisa A n d e r s o n ' s The State

Press. 1994) e x a m i n e s the e m e r g e n c e o f M a l a y

and SocialTtansformution in Tunisia and Libya: 1H30-1980

n a t i o n a l i s m a n d its r o l e i n f o r m a t i o n o f t h e

( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1986) i s an

M a l a y s i a n state i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e p o l i t i c s a n d

e x c e l l e n t c o m p a r a t i v e analysis o f the d i f f e r i n g

c u l t u r a l I m p a c t o f c o l o n i a l i s m . G e o r g e T. K a h i n .

i m p a c t o ! c o l o n i a l i s m o n f u t u r e state f o r m a t i o n i n

Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia ( I t h a c a . N Y :

L i b y a a n d T u n i s i a . G i a c o m o L u c i a n i , e d . . The Arab

C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1952) is a classic s t u d y o f

Stale ( B e r k e l e y : U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1990)

t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e m o v e m e n t a n d early slate f o r -

c o n t a i n s a n u m b e r o f useful studies o f the n a t u r e

mation i n Indonesia

a n d f u n c t i o n i n g o f the A r a b state. M a n f r e d H a l p e r n ' s m The Politics of Social Change in Middle East and North Africa ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1963), p r o v i d e s a n o v e r v i e w o f early state f o r m a CHAPTER

FOURTEEN

Barbara C. A s w a d a n d Barbara Bilge's Family and Gender

706

SELECT

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Among Amrrıcun Muslims: issues Fating Middle Eastern

policies, citizenship rules, e c o n o m i c s , and interna

Immigrants and Thru Descendants ( P h i l a d e l p h i a : T e m p l e

t i o n a l linkages o n i m m i g r a n t a n d i n d i g e n o u s

U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1996)

M u s l i m s i n Eastern a n d W e s t e r n E u r o p e . R i c h a r d

covers p r a c t i c a l issues fac

i n g f a m i l i e s a n d m terg c u e r a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t as w e l l

Brent T u r n e r ' s Islam in the African-Amer i can Experience

as q u e s t i o n s o f i d e n t i t y , c o m m u n i t y i n v o l v e m e n t ,

( B l o o m i n g i o n : I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1997)

gender, a n d the needs o f y o u t h a n d the elderly.

s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n 10 the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of

M a n i a s GardcH's In the Name of Elijah Muhammad: Louis

the roles o f i n d i s i d u a l s . r e l i g i o u s g r o u p s , a n d t h e

Fairukhan and the Nation of Islam ( D u r h a m . N C : D u k e

r e l i g i o n o f I s l a m i n s h a p i n g the A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n

U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1996)

M u s l i m identity.

provides a unique and

is a

u n p r e c e d e n t e d v i e w o f the e n i g m a o f L o u i s F a r r a k h a n , weav i n g t o g e i l i e r i n f o r m a t i o n I r o m a n i m p r e s s i v e c o l l e c t i o n o f d o c u m e n t s that have n o t b e e n treated b y o t h e r scholars. I n The Muslims of America ( N e w Y o r k : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press.

1991)

Y v o n n e Yazbeck H a d d a d b r i n g s t o g e t h e r studies i n the r e l i g i o n o f I s l a m as i t is e x p e r i e n c e d i n a v a r i et) o f c o n t e x t s i n N o r t h A m e r i c a . T h e w o r k addresses the h i s t o r y , o r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d c h a l l e n g e s t o I s l a m i n N o r t h A m e r i c a , the w r i t i n g s of M u s l i m i n t e l l e c t u a l s , a n d the p r o s p e c t s o f t h e M u s l i m c o m m u n i t y i n the U n i t e d States a n d C a n a d a . D a v i d H o r r o c k s a n d Eva K o l i n s k y ' s Turkish Culture m German Soc iety Today (Pros i d e n c e . R l : B e r g h a h n B o o k s , 1996)

addresses the c o n d i t i o n o f T u r k i s h

g u e s t w o r k e r s i n G e r m a n y , as w e l l as t h e c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n o f m i n o r i t i e s i n G e r m a n society. It p r o v i d e s a u n i q u e f o c u s o n issues o i i d e n t i t y . I n Muslim Minorities in t he World Today ( L o n d o n : M a n s c i l . 1986), M . A h Kcttani examines the p o s i t i o n o f m i n o r i t y c o m m u n i t i e s in their struggle to maintain a M u s l i m way o f life. T h e a u t h o r p r o m o t e s a n o r m a tive p a t h i n m a i n t a i n i n g Islamic identity i n a n o n Muslim environment. I n Islamic Britain: Religion. Politics, and Identity Among British Muslims ( L o n d o m T a u r i s . 1994), P h i l i p L e w i s p r o vides an o v e r v i e w o i t h e status o f M u s l i m c o m m u

CHAPTER

FIFTEEN

M o h a m m e d A r k o u n ' s Rethinking Lslum: Common Questions, Uncommon Answers ( B o u l d e r , C o l o . : West v i e w Press. 1994)

provides a b o l d and provocative critique o l

b o t h Western and t r a d i t i o n a l Islamic

scholarship

that presents a v i s i o n o f I s l a m that c h a l l e n g e s that w h i c h is prevalent t h r o u g h o u t m u c h o f t h e M u s l i m w o r l d . M u h a m m a d Asad's The Principles of Stan and Government in (slum (1961; r e p r i n i . G i b r a l t a r : D a r a l - A n d a l u s , 1980)

p r o v i d e s a n early a n d i n f l u

e n t i a l analysis o f the basis f o r a m o d e r n I s l a m i c state. J o h n J. D o n o h u e a n d J o h n L. Esposito, eds., Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives ( N e w Y o r k : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1982)

is a c o l l e c t i o n o f M u s l i m

w r i l i n g s that reficcts the d i v e r s i t y o f M u s l i m voices i n d i e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . Farid Esack's Quran. Liberation.and Pluralism ( O x f o r d : O n e s s o r l d P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1997)

is a creative a n d c h a l l e n g i n g

analysis o f t h e r o l e o f I s l a m a n d t h e M u s l i m c o m munity in

fighting

a p a r t h e i d . T h i s event b e c o m e s

t h e take o f f p o i n t f o r the a u t h o r l o e x p l o r e t h e t r a ditional M u s l i m altitude toward pluralism and to advocate a r e r e a d i n g o f Q u r a n i c texls l o s u p p o r t a m o r e inclusive, pluralistic vision. J o h n L. E s p o s i t o . e d . . Voices o i Resurgent lslum ( N e w Y o r k :

n i t i e s i n B r i t a i n , hased o n w e l l researched

O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1983)

fieldwork

t i o n o f studies o f m a j o r t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y I s l a m i c

f r o m the i n d u s t r i a l cities i n t h e c o u n t r y ' s

provides a collec

center, i n c l u d i n g B r a d f o r d . K a t h l e e n M . M o o r e ' s oJ-

r e f o r m e r s a n d activists, w i t h a c o l l e c t i o n o f

Mughtarihun: American Law and the Transformarion of Muslim

M u s l i m acliv ist w r i t i n g s o n t h e n a t u r e o f t h e

Life in the United States ( A l b a n y : Slate U n i v e r s i t y o f

I s l a m i c r e v i v a l , the I s l a m i c state, law. a n d social

N e w York Press. 199c)

r e f o r m . J o h n L. Esposito's The Islamic Threat: Myth or

explores the influence o f

A m e r i c a n law o n M u s l i m l i f e against the b a c k d r o p

Reality.' ( N e w Y o r k : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press,

o f l i b e r a i c o m m i t m e n t s t o the ideals o f p l u r a l i s m

is a s t u d y o f the h i s t o r y o f I s l a m a n d t h e W e s t that

a n d religious tolerance i n America. J o r g e n N i e l s e n ' s Muslims in Western Europe, s e c o n d e d i t i o n ( E d i n b u r g h , U K : E d i n b u r g h U n i v e r s i t y Press, 199c)

is a n i n t r o d u c t i o n t o M u s l i m l i l e i n c o n t e m

p o r a r y W e s t e r n E u r o p e . I t p r o v i d e s an o v e r v i e w o f the history, development, and current conditions o f M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s i n France, West G e r m a n y , die U n i t e d K i n g d o m . B e l g i u m . H o l l a n d . Scandinavia, a n d S o u t h e r n E u r o p e . I n Muslim Communities m the Nov Europe ( B e r k s h i r e , Ithaca Press, 1996), t h e e d i t o r s , G e r d N o n n e m a n . T i m N i b l o c k .

1995)

focuses o n c o n t e m p o r a r y M u s l i m p o l i t i c s a n d t h e f u t u r e o f M u s l i m - C h r i s t i a n r e l a t i o n s Is t h i s rela t i o n s h i p o n e o f c o o p e r a t i o n o r c o n f l i c t ? J o h n L. E s p o s i t o a n d J o h n O. Voll's Islam and Democracy ( N e w Y o r k : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1996)

gives an

analysis of ihc- n a i u r e o f d e m o c r a c y a n d M u s l i m r e a c t i o n s a n d responses t o issues o f p o l i t i c a l p a n i c i p a i i o n a n d d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n , w i t h case s i u d i e s that span the M u s l i m w o r l d , f r o m A l g e r i a a n d Egypt t o Pakistan a n d M a l a y s i a . Dale E i c k c l m a n a n d James P Piscatori's Muslim Politics

a n d B o g d a n S z a j k o w s k i , have g a t h e r e d a c o l l e c t i o n

( P r i n c e t o n . N.J.: P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press,

o f essays that address t h e e f l e c l s o f g o v e r n m e n t

presents an analysis o f the d i v e r s e p o l i t i c s o f I s l a m

1996)

SELECT i n M u s l i m l i f e . T h e w o r k is especially e f f e c t i v e i n its e x a m p l e s , w h i c h are d r a w n I r o m across t h e

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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(Chicago:

M u s l i m w o r l d . Y v o n n e Y . H a d d a d ' s Contemporary Islam

U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o Press, 1982)

and the Challenge of History ( N e w Y o r k : S U N Y Press.

a n d p r e s c r i p t i v e s t u d ) o f the h i s t o r y o f I s l a m i c

1982)

p r o v i d e s a study o f che w a y s i n w h i c h A r a b

is a d e s c r i p t i v e

i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m a n d e d u c a t i o n , w h i c h seeks t o set

M u s l i m s have d e f i n e d a n d r e d e f i n e d the m e a n i n g

out a m e t h o d o l o g y for reinterpretation and

o f f a i t h a n d h i s t o r y i n r e s p o n d i n g t o the c h a l l e n g e s

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o f the n i n e t e e n t h a n d t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s . D e l i a r

Beliefs and Practices, v o l . 2 o f The Contemporary Period ( L o n d o n : R o u t l e d g e , 1993)

N o e r ' s The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia ( L o n d o n : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press. 1973)

provides

an analysis of t h e o r i g i n s , causes, leaders, a n d ideas o f modernist movements i n Indonesia f r o m

1900

t o 1942. Seyyed H o s s e i n Nasr's Traditional Islam in the ModernWorid ( L o n d o n : K P I , 1987)

is a s t u d y of t h e

historical role a n d e n d u r i n g significance o f t r a d i tional

I s l a m b y a l e a d i n g M u s l i m scholar, Nasr

seeks t o d i s t i n g u i s h t r a d i t i o n a l I s l a m f r o m m o d -

is a study o f M u s l i m

p e r c e p t i o n s o f a n d responses to t h e m o d e r n w o r l d , w i t h special e m p h a s i s o n the r e l e v a n c e o l t h e Q u r a n a n d M u h a m m a d . J o h n O.VoH's Islam: Continuity cind Chdngr rn the ModernWndd ( N e w Y o r k : Syracuse U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1994)

provides an

excellent study o f the role o f Islam i n m o d e r n M u s l i m h i s t o r y , d i s t i n c t i v e f o r its g e o g r a p l i i c coverage.

comprehensive

CONTRIBUTORS

Conquests a n d Narratives of Islamic Origins.The Beginnings of

The Editor

Islamic Historical Wnting a n d he has w r i t t e n m a n ) articles o n early a n d m e d i e v a l I s l a m i c h i s : o r y .

J o h n L . E s p o s i t o is professor o f r e l i g i o n a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l affairs a n d f o u n d i n g d i r e c t o r of the C e n t e r f o r M u s l i m - C h r i s t i a n U n d e r s t a n d i n g at the E d m u n d

M a j i d F a k h r y is e m e r i t u s professor o f p h i l o s o p h y at

Walsh S c h o o l o f F o r e i g n Service at G e o r g e t o w n

the A m e r i c a n U n i v e r s i t y o f B e i r u t ; h e is c u r r e n t l y a

U n i v e r s i t y . E d i t o r i n c h i e f o f the Oxford Encyclopedia of the

v i s i t i n g research associate at G e o r g e t o w n U n i v e r s i t y

Modern Islamic World, h i s o t h e r b o o k s i n c l u d e Islam:The

H i s E n g l i s h - l a n g u a g e p u b l i c a t i o n s i n c l u d e A History of

.Straight Path:The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality. ; Islam and

Islamic Philosophy; Ethical Theories in Islam;A Short Introduction

Dernocracy ( w i t h J o h n V o l ! ) ; islam and Politics; Islam in Asia;

to Islamic Philosophy Theology and Mystinsm; Philosophy. Dogma

Women in Muslim family Luiv; Political Islam: Radicalism,

and the Impact of Greek Though in Islam; and The Qu'run:A

Resolution, or Reform.'; a n d Muslims on the Americanization Path

Modern English Version. H e has also p u b l i s h e d m a n y

1

(withYvonne Haddad).

works i n Arabic .

The Authors

D r u C. G l a d n e y is c n r r e n t l y Dean o f A c a d e m i c s at the Asia-Pacific Center; he is n o w o n leave f r o m his p o s i -

S h e i l a B l a i r a n d J o n a t h a n B l o o m are a w i f e - a n d - h u s -

t i o n as p r o f e s s o r o f A s i a n studies a n d a n t h r o p o l o g y at

h a n d t e a m o f scholars w h o have j o i n t l y a n d i n d i v i d u -

the U n i v e r s i t y o f H a w a i ' i at M a n o a . H e has w r i t t e n

ally w r i t t e n m a n y b o o k s a n d articles o n v a r i o u s

the a w a r d - w i n n i n g b o o k Muslim Chinese:Ethnic

aspects o f I s l a m i c art a n d a r c h i t e c t u r e . Together t h e y

Nationalism in the People's Republic, a n d is also d i e a u t h o r o f

have w r i t t e n The A n and Architecture of Islam: 1250-1800

Ethnic Identity in China.Thc Making of a Muslim Minoriiy

a n r Islamic A i t ; Sheila Blair has w r i t t e n Islamic Inscnpiions

Nationality a n d Dislocating China; Muslims, Minorities, and Other

anci J o n a t h a n B l o o m is w o r k i n g o n Paper Before Print.

Sub-Altem Subjects: he is the e d i t o r o f Making Majorities:

T h e y are n o w b o t h at w o r k o n a b o o k t o a c c o m p a n y

Composing die Naiion in Japan. China. Korea, Malaysia, Fin.Turkey,

a

f o r t h c o m i n g PBS series o n I s l a m i c c i v i l i z a t i o n .

and the United States.

V i n c e n t J. C o r n e l l is an associate professor o f r e l i g i o n

Y v o n n e Y a z b e c k H a d d a d is professor o f t h e h i s t o r y o f

a n d A s i a n a n d A f r i c a n languages a n d l i t e r a t u r e at D u k e

I s l a m a n d C h r i s t i a n - M u s l i m r e l a t i o n s at G e o r g e t o w n

U n i v e r s i t y H e has w r i t t e n TheWay of Abu Madyan a n d

U n i v e r s i t y a n d past p r e s i d e n t o f the M i d d l e East

Realm of (he Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism. H e is

Studies A s s o c i a t i o n . She is the a u t h o r o f Contemporary

c u r r e n d y w r i t i n g a b i o g r a p h y o f the N o r t h A f r i c a n

Islam and the Challenge of History a n d is c o - a u t h o r o f The

S u f i A b u al-Hasan a l - S h a d h i l i a n d is c o l l a b o r a t i n g w i t h

Islamic Understanding of Death and Resurrection; IslamicVblues in

Professor J o h n N i k d i s i , d e a n o f t h e law s c h o o l at

the United Staies:A Comparable Study; a n d Mission to America:

Loyola U n i v e r s i t y i n N e w O r l e a n s , o n a casebook o f

f ire Islamic Sectarian Communities in North America. She has

I s l a m i c law.

e d i t e d Muslims of Amenta a n d c o - e d i i e d islam, Gender and Social Change; Islamic Impact; Muslims on the American i/at ion Path.'; a n d Christian-Muslim Encounters.

A h m a d D a l l a l is an associate p r o f e s s o r o f A r a b i c a n d Islamic studies at S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y . H e w r i t e s o n t h e h i s t o r y o f I s l a m i c science a n d m o d e r n I s l a m i c

M o h a m m a d H a s h i m K a m a l i is professor o f law at

t h o u g h t . H e is t h e a u t h o r o f An Islamic Response to Greek

the I n t e r n a t i o n a l I s l a m i c U n i v e r s i t y i n Malaysia. H e

Astronomy, a n d his articles have b e e n p u b l i s h e d i n Arabic

has also s t u d i e d a n d l a u g h i I s l a m i c l a w i n A f g l i a n i s t a n ,

Science and Philosophy; Journal of the American Oriental Society:

E n g l a n d , Canada, a n d the U n i t e d States. H e is the

National Journal of Middle East Studies: a n d o t h e r p u b l i c a -

a u t h o r o f Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence a n d freedom of

tions.

Expression in Islam, a m o n g o t h e r w o r k s .

F r e d M . D o r m e r is professor o f Near Eastern h i s t o r y

I r a M . L a p i d u s is e m e r i t u s professor o f h i s t o r y a n d

i n the O r i e n t a l I n s t i t u t e o f the U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o ,

f o r m e r c h a i r o f the C e n t e r f o r M i d d l e Eastern Studies

w h e r e he is also p r o f e s s o r o f N e a r Eastern h i s t o r y a n d

at t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a at Berkeley. H e is t h e

c h a i r o f the d e p a r t m e n t o f N e a r Eastern languages a n d

a u t h o r o f A History of Islamic Societies: Muslim Cities in the

c i v i L z a t i o n s . H e is the a u t h o r o f The Early Islamic

Later MiddleAge; a n d Middle Euslern Cities.

708

CONTRIBUTORS

709

B r u c e B . L a w r e n c e is professor o f h i s t o r y o f r e l i g i o n

Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution:The Jamaat-i Islami of Pakistan

a n d I s l a m i c studies at D u k e U n i v e r s i t y , w h e r e h e also

a n d Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism. H e special-

serves as c h a i r o f the d e p a r i m e n i o f r e l i g i o n . H e has

izes i n the relations b e t w e e n state a n d society i n

w r i t t e n e x t e n s i v e l y o n b o t h the p r e m o d e m a n d t h e

M u s l i m c o u n t r i e s a n d i n the r o l e o f Islam i n p o l i t i c s .

m o d e m phases o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l I s l a m . H i s special interests are I n d o - P e r s i a n S u f i s m a n d the c o m p a r a t i v e

Jane I . S m i t h is p r o f e s s o r o f I s l a m i c studies at

s t u d y o f r e l i g i o u s m o v e m e n t s . H i s latest w o r k is

H a r t f o r d Seminary and co-director o f the M a c d o n a i d

Shattering the Myth: Islam BeyondViolence.

C e n t e r f o r the Study o f I s l a m a n d C l i r i s r i a n - M u s l i m

N e h e m i a L e v t z i o n is F u l d a n d B a m h e r g e r Professor

Councils o f Churches i n interfaith dialogue. H e r most

o f the H i s t o r y o f t h e M u s l i m Peoples at H e b r e w

recent b o o k is Islam in America; she is e d i t o r o f t h e j o u r -

U n i v e r s i t y i n Jerusalem. H e is f o r m e r p r e s i d e n t o f the

n a l The Muslim World a n d an associate e d i t o r o f t h e

O p e n U n i v e r s i t y i n Israel, a n d h e is c u r r e n t l y c h a i r o f

f o r t h c o m i n g Encyclopedia ofWomen in the Muslim World.

Relations. She is active i n the N a t i o n a l a n d W o r l d

the C o u n c i l f o r H i g h e r Education's P l a n n i n g a n d B u d g e t i n g C o m m i n e e t h e r e . A m o n g his p u b l i c a t i o n s

J o h n O b e r t V o l I is professor o f I s l a m i c h i s t o r y at

are Muslims and Chiefs in West Africo:A Study of Islam in the

G e o r g e t o w n U n i v e r s i t y a n d associate d i r e c t o r o f

Middle Vol ta Basm in the Pre-Colonial Period; Ancient Ghana and

G e o r g e t o w n ' s Center f o r M u s i i m - C h r i s t i a n

Mali; a n d Islam in the West: Religion. Society and Politics to 1800.

U n d e r s u n d i n g . H e is past p r e s i d e n t o f t h e M i d d l e East Studies A s s o c i a t i o n . H i s p u b l i c a t i o n s i n c l u d e

S.V. R. N a s r is a n associate professor o f p o l i t i c a l science

Islam:Continuity and Change in the Modern World a n d . w i t h

at the U n i v e r s i t y o f San D i e g o . H e has w r i t t e n The

J o h n Esposiio, Islam and Democracy .

IMAGE

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Judy A l d i i c k : 503; A n a n d H i s t o r y T r u s t C o l l e c t i o n : B l a i r a n d J o n a t h a n B l o o m : 2. 26. 54, 3 6 . 4 5 . 208.

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4 4 4 . 4 7 4 . 48c (42.15). 4'8

183,,

184,

196,

197,

2 6 ç , 266,

270.

285.

291,

292.

294,

29c.

4 0 2 . 411,

439. 476,

Ç i l . 523,

188.

233;

117,

(Bibliothèque

167

259,

304,

Nationale. Paris).

4 0 6 . 417,

bço; Werner

( 3 0 . 7 5 R ) , 217

( 5 7 . 2 4 ) . 250

( 4 7 . 8 ) . 282.

394

Lui:

Forman

(39.49)-

4 5 9 ; S o n i a H a l l i d a y : 23.

4 4 0 , 442. 443, 445. 448, 456, 458,

4'*

G e o f f H o w a r d : 81,

181;

6 0 8 , 6 6 2 , 6 6 6 ; Israel A n t i q u i t i e s A u t h o r i t y : 231 ; A.F. K e r s l i n g : 14.

252,

505.

564; O m a r K h a l i d i : 6 0 0 . 617.

54; H a r v a r d

Her/feld Archives. Smithsonian

6 2 8 ; H u l t o n G c i l y : 533. 490,

199

( 8 6 . 0 4 3 2 ) , 4 3 8 ; G e r m a n A r c h a e o l o g i c a l I n s t i t u t e , M a d r i d : 240; D r u

I n s t i t u t i o n : 282; M u s e u m o f t h e H i s t o r y of S c i e n c e , O x f o r d : 180, 416.

Company

CruhaStock/Chrisiopher

241;

318.

U n i v e r s i t y A r t M u s e u m s . C a m b r i d g e . M A . G i f t o f J o h n G o e l e t : 219;

352.

531;

British Library. L o n d o n :

Ç02; British Petroleum

223.

526.

(British

( M r s . B a s h i r M o h a m e d C o l l e c t i o n ) ; 4 9 4 ; Freer G a l l e r y o f A r t , S m i t h s o n i a n

G l a d n e y : 4 3 4 , 4 3 5 a . 4 3 6 . 437,

310.

524,

N a t i o n a l e / G i r a u d o n ) , 343

C h c s i c r B e a n y L i b r a r y . D u b l i n : 119.

I n s t i i u i i o n , W a s h i n g t o n . D C : 7 ( 3 0 . 6 0 a ) . 19c ( 8 6 . 0 4 0 2 ) . 413

178,

(Julia Guest); C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y L i b r a r y

J.-L. C h a r m e t :

577;

Sheila

133,

B o d l e i a n L i b r a r y . O x f o r d : 186.

575,

N a t i o n a l e , P a n s : 8 4 , 114:

127.

( G o o d m a n B e q u e s t ) , 211,

4 6 3 ; C a r i n CHneQ: 6 0 6 ; D o u g l a s D i t k i n s : 141,

4 3 ç b , 461.

106.

(Bibliothèque

6 4 5 . 6 4 6 ; C a m e r a Press: 6 6 9 , 677

574,

101.

2 Ç 7 , 258,

( B r i t i s h L i b r a r y ) , 338

B r i t i s h M u s e u m , L o n d o n : 210

p . l . c : 515.

2 4 Ç . 2S4, 367,

Bibliothèque

178;

50. 72, 77.

111,

616,

K h u d a Bakhsh L i b r a r y . Patna:

618;

623,

35, 57.

99.

405:

B r u c e L a w r e n c e : 399, 4 0 0 . 4 0 1 , 4 0 8 , 4 1 0 , 4 1 9 ; Los A n g e l e s C o u n t y M u s e u m o f A r t : 269; M a g n u m : 677;

M a g n u m , Abbas: 86.

108.

4 32, 4 8 4 ,

550.

554.

582,

642.

671,

673,

674.

152,

688; M a g n u m , B u r t G l i n n :

6 4 0 ; M a g n u m . Steve M c C u r r y : 658; M a g n u m . C S t e e l e - P e r k i n s : i t 6 , 5 4 8 , 6 5 9 ; M a r l b o r o u g h P h o t o L i b r a r y : 9, 24, 4 0 ( E d i n b u r g h U n i v e r s i t y L i b r a r y ) , 6 4 . 87, M u s e u m s ) , 378 L i b r a r y ) , 511,

( L e i d e n U n i v e r s i t y L i b r a r y ) , 379

513,

N e w Y o r k : 22o

553.

114,

6 4 4 ; M a r y Evans P i c t u r e L i b r a r y : 560,

( g i f t o f Horace Havemeyer,

366.

170

(Harvard University Art

( T u r k ve I s l a m E s e r i e r i ) . 4 0 3 , 415 563,

593:

(India Office

Metropolitan Museum of Art,

1941.The H . O . Havemeyer Collection. (41.165.)!.

247

P u r c h a s e , H a r r i s B r i s b a n e D i c k F u n d , J o s e p h P u l i t z e r B e q u e s t , L o u i s V Bell F u n d a n d F l e t c h e r . P f e i f f e r . a n d R o g e r s F u n d s . 1990. ( 2 2 . 1 0 0 . 5 1 ) ) , 384

( 1990.61 ) , 383 T h e James F. B a l l a r d C o l l e c t i o n , G i f t o f James F. B a l l a r d .

( 4 9 9 7 . 1 7 6 ) ; S e y y e d V a l i N a s r : bjb;

L i b r a r y , C a i r o : 234; N a t i o n a l L i b r a r y . C o p e n h a g e n : Christine Osborne:

37,

\i2.

62. 69, 8 2 . 83, 85,

Bibliothèque

N a t i o n a l e , Paris: 84.

354; B e r n a r d O ' K a n e :

135.

140,

145,

U n i v e r s i t y of O x f o r d : 4 9 9 ; P o p p e r f b t o : 534, 155,

182,

228,

239,

256,

380; P u b l i f o t o : 315;

G e o g r a p h i c a l Society. L o n d o n : 3, 17,

103,

115.

587.

652.

637;

430;

ç ı 8 , 527.

504,

539,

569.

Suleymaniye Mosque Lihrary. Istanbul: 276;Topkapi

2 ç ı , 333.

263,

336;

79, Royal

588; P r i n c e S a d r u d d i n A g a K h a n :

109; T i m S m i t h : 113

( B H R U ) , 605,

619,

633;

Palace L i b r a r y . I s t a n b u l : 2 4 9 .

S i a a i s b i b l i o t h e k z u B e r l i n - Preussischer K u l t u r b e s i t z - O r i e n t a b t e l l u n g : 192; 221,

620.

6 7 0 ; J o s e p h i n e P o w e l l : 2o. 39, 4 2 , 55.

S i a a t l i c h e M u s e e n z u R e r l i n - P r e u s s i s c h e r K u l i u r b e s i t z , M u s e u m l i i r I s l a m i s c b e K u n s t : 237, Petersburg:

414;

508.

Pitt Risers M u s e u m ,

R e u n i o n des M u s é e s N a t i o n a u x : 242.

Scala: 287; R o b e r t S e l k o w i t z : 78, 653: L i n d a S h u a i b : Stalıl: 6 2 2 ,

655.

1922.

National

1, 3 0 2 ; T r i s h O ' R e i l l y :

209, 420. 480. 496. 498,

679. 68 7; P i e r p o n t M o r g a n L i b r a r y . N e w Y o r k : 358; James Peacock: 4 2 9 ,

167;

26ı,

364;

C Jolie 376; 262;

Stale H e r m i t a g e M u s e u m , Si

264; T h y s s e n - B o r n e m i s z a F o u n d a t i o n . L u g a n o : 6 8 ; U n i v e r s i t y L i b r a r y , I s t a n b u l :

2od; F o t o Vasari: 6 0 7 ; C o u r t e s y o f t h e T r u s t e e s o f t h e V i c t o r i a a n d A l b e r t M u s e u m . L o n d o n : 4 6 , Estelle W h e l a n : 290: C a r o h n e W i l l i a m s : 4 7 9 ,

487.

710

I16.

311 ;

INDEX

A

Ahdulhaniid I I . Sultan. paii-IsUnnsinol.

"Abbasi." as epithet for Re?a, 369 al-Ablus i b n Abd al-Mutıalib. Abbasid descendants of, 20, 130 Abhasicls. agricultural development under, 19b. b9j, Alids and. l ( ; a p o l o gisıs of, 263: architecture and m of.

699

426.427- 428. Japanese occupation at, 430. Marco Polo i n . 695; renevsalisi

Abdullah.Amir. k i n g of Jordan. 356, 557

movements i n . 519 520; role i n Asian

Abdul-Rahman.Tuiiku. as Malay sian

irade. ¡ « 9 . 4 2 ? ; ulaitia led resistance

leader, 562

10 Diuch in, 699

d Ahedln.2ain.ini prcservaiiuii o f M ushil 11 den n 1 y. bi 2 - b 13

Acre. Crusader conquest o i . ( b ; Mongol capture of, 323

243. 244.260. 693: black flag of, 239;

aNııüou.prior 10 praying. 78.79. 112. 147

a* caliphs, 11, 24-25, 2b. 28,29.

Ada! sultanate, wars ss ith Ethiopia. ; o i

"abode o f Islam." 324

JO-JI. I * , 33, ¡ 6 . 37. î 8 . 39, 42.48.

adat (mdigenous norms). 424, 423, 427

"abode ol trace," 324

al-Adaw iy ah, Rabiah. as teniale Sufi mys

58, 39. 134. 159. ibo.162, (64. 181,

"abode o f war." 324

210.132. 2J7.177. 278, 284, 333,

abortion. Muslim views o n . 634

Aden, as trade center. 38

154. i ç 8 . 3bj. 482.492. 693: decline

Ahn al-Ala ibn 7uhr. as Arab physician.

adjudication. Islamic law o n . 131

of. 3 2 . 4 İ . 4 4 . 4 8 . I I Ç . 3 Î 9 . J i ' - l s i . 354. İ S İ . ii*>. İ i " - î i 9 , i * » : Egyptian comrol by. b93. 693; Ismaih challenge of, 44 49; legacy IL> Ottoman Frnpire, 371; Mongol overthrow o l , ( 9 . 6 0 ;

tic, 693

îoç

Adriatic Sea, Ottoman trade mules o n .

Abu al-Ala Mawdudi. Mawiana Say yid. as Islamist. 299-300. çbç. bi 2, 652-653. 654, 67b, 700

Adudi hospital IBaghriad). 208

Abu Rakr al-Asamm; as (irsl caliph. 11.

Nesiorian physicians of, 200. 271;

12. 15, 112, 692; Mutazilie followers

political system of. 348; rclugccs from

of. 14b

rule of. 35. 3b; regional suiesof. 693: Sunni supporters of, 339; Umayyad conquest by. 19-20. 24. 25. 34, 692 Abhas I, as Safavid ruler. 193. 364. 370. 439. s 09. tx>7 Ahhas I I , as Safavid ruler, 180 Abd ai-AI. as Islamic reformer. 331 Abd a l - A / i / . Shah, as islamic reformer. Abd al-Hauiid ibnYahya, as Islauut adminisiraioi, 29 Abd al-Haiuid ll.Sutian. pan-Islamic policies of. 517 Abd AUa. Khoja. as Central Asian Sufi Ahdallah, Shaykh, as dan Fodio's hroiher, Abdallaiu. Klialifah. as malidisl succes

Abu Daud al-Sijisıaııi, Sunan of, 75 Abu Hanifah al-Nuinan ibnThabil, as early jurist. 94 95. 113. 124. 126-127. 128. 693

sor. 346

Ahu Jafar Muhammad al Kulayni, Slıiiıe

Abd al-Malik i b ı ı M a n v a n . 142. 223-224, 32 2; as caliph. 17. 22. 224.

Abu Jafar Muhamniad ibn Hahiiyah,

raids of. 12. civil war of. 549.638, 639; colonialism i n . 353; creation o l , 557: Durrani rule of, 698; Ghaznasid

Ahul-Hudhayl, as Mutaziliie, 279 Abu Mansur Bakhlikin. silk saddlecloth Ahu Marwan ibn Zuhr.as,Arabphysi Abu Musa Islands. United Arab Emirates' claim lo, 359

cer. 409 Abdul), Muhammad, as Islamic mod ernisl. 293. 298, 299. çfaç, 633, fi47, b 8. 4

astronomer. 168. 191 ArabAnti discrim i nation Coinmiuee. 6J7 AbııTalib, Ah I b n , as Muhammad's uncle and guardian, b, 8, 691

300-301 Abd an-Nabi, as Mughal religious ntfi

b»3. b 8 . 699 t

modernist. 298. 547. 550. (147. 648.

Abul Hasau-Qazwini. Sayyid. as Ishraqi

Aburezk, James, as founder o f American

Abd al-Ra/iq, Ali. as Islamic secularist.

man. 48

Abul-Fazl. Akhnrnnmefi o l , 407,409

Abu Nasr Mansur ibn Iraq, as early

54. I N . 318. ¡ 1 9 - 3 2 0 . 693.694

al-Afdal ibn liadr. as Egyptian military

Afghanisiau; Baxakzais i n . 698: caliph

sioned by, 21b, 224. 263. 313, 691

Abd al-Rahman i l l . as Umayyad caliph.

454

Abu I-Ahhas al Saffali, as caliph. 23

Ahu Muslini, asAbhasid agent. 23

sor, 51

441.

Afaqiyya Snnsiil, i n China

680. 699; Salah movement o l . 299

Sliiiie hadnh of. 7i

277; Dome o f die Rock commis A b d a l Mumu», as Ibn Tumart's succes

Afaq. Khoja. as Naqshbandi Sufi. 451.

al-Afghani. Jamal al-Din; as Islamic

cian. 205

S

148 149

Afar peoples, as MusUms. 501

Abu I las h i m , as Mutaziliic. 2 Ho

of. 225

Abd Allah ibn al-Zubayr. as caliph. 17.

Quranic r u l es o u , 122

Aegean Sea. Ottoman control of. 388

Mogadishu ruler. 502

Abul-Mawahib dynasty, o f Kilvva. 304

«6

2b

Abu Batr i b n Muhammad, as

philosopher. 29b

leather. 451

adultery: Islamic prohibition of, 93. 687; advice, sincere, as Quranic principle.

hadith of, 75

İV-S18

J»9 Adud al-Dawiah. as Buy i d ruler. 42. 232

Abu Zayd. in Mmjamui, 2 j

regime i n . 40-41. 54. 356, 694: Ilanafi school i n . 114; H u b 1 Islam. 5*11. Islamic modernism i n . 682; jihad against Soviet U n i o n , 330- 551. bbo; KhvvariTmshah conquest ot, 38, n u l l taut activists i n , 579; minorities i n . 679: Muslim refugees f r o m . 603. 618; as Muslim siaie. 552; nomad invasion into, 351; relief agencies i n . 668; •evo lutionary movements i n . 667. SafTarid control o l . 38; shariali implementa tion i n , 151. 686—687; Soviet Union expelled btm, i + g . cs"0. 659, (>6o, 702;Talihan i n , 91,466. 658. 6 8 j . 687, b8fi, 703-704; treatment o f women i n . 634.687. b8K;Turkish uymaqs i n , 370

4

Abyssinia, early Islam i n . 306. 691

Afghans, defeal o l Safavids by, 170, 697

Achacinenid style, o f governance. 396

Ailaq. Michel. s8j

A c h f h (Sumatra); appeals (0 Ottomans

Africa; Christian iniimnlics i n , 583;

f r o m . 582; Islam i n . 1B9.422 424.

7"

colonialism In. 464. 576; trench ler-

7

I2

INDEX

riiories i n . 551; Islamic militancy i n . 475- 47Í>. S ° !

In- 4 7 S - 5 ° 7 . 5 ' ° -

]

601; islamúanon of. 306-507; mosques i n , 4.5.475. 479. 480, 487. 49' • 497- C03- 5 ° 4 - S°s": Muslim incursions into. 316; Muslim migrants f r o m . 604. 606; "scramble" for. 344. 552; trade route w i t h China. 438 African-American Muslims. 608. 609. 640: c h i l d education of. 623: dietar)*

.Ahmad Baba. asTimbuklu scholar, 484. 485

242.243

Ahmad Cevdet Pasha Shaykh al-Islam. as Islamic reformer, 698-699

African Americans, as racism victims.

Alexandretta (Iskenderun). Syria's and Turkey's claim to, 539

501-302.307 Ahmad i b u Huych. conquest o f Baghdad

Alexandria; as ancient cultural center. 269. 271; apostolic sect of. 309; caliph

by. 4 ' - 4 2 Ahmadiyyah-ldrisyyah. as tariqah o f I b n

control of. 12; Jews i n . 2: as trade center, 36. 389

Idhs. 331 621.

Alexis I . role in Crusades. 5 1 7 Alfa. Karamoko. jihad of. 519

625.638. 679 Ahmad Khan, Sayyid. as Islamic m o d -

631

Alexander the Great. 269.410: in South Asia, 396

Ahmad Gran, jihad against Ethiopia of.

Ahtnadiyyah movement. 615. 618,

laws of. 633-634

center. 389. 390; woodworking i n .

Al-Fo|r I Tunisian newspaper|, 670

" A f i i c a n u a i i o n " campaigns, 585

ernist. 297. I99. 347. 563, 583.

alfas, as Islamic sc holars. 486

Africans, migrations 10 Central Asia. 437

647-648,680,685,698

AlfonsoVI, King o l Castile and Leon. 35.

Afshars. defeai o f Safavids by. 570, 697 afterlife, Senndiaii Buddhist notion of.

AhmadYasavi. shrine of. 229. 230. 263.

algebra; Arabic discipline of,

Ahmed HI. Sultan. 511

441

Ahmediya. 584

Agoinsi rhe [odihsomr Heresy of the Sect of the

ahong. as Muslim Chinese leader. 447

313

Ahrun. medical handbook of. 2oo al-Ahsai. Shaykh Ahmad. Shaykhiyyah

Aga Khan, 386 Aga Khan Foundation, resioranons by,

movement of, 529

Europe. 187 algehrak geometry: Arab contribution to. 189 Algeria, civil war i n . 680. 703; colonial

Aluiramazda, as Zoroasrrian god, 80

209

157.

184-188. 194, introduction into

Agagrirs ( N i g e r ) , mosque at. 475 Sumiera (John o f Damascus),

50 Alfonso VII, King o f Castile, ; i

26s, 695

armies of. 592: colonialism i n , 563.

Agarc-nes. as name for Muslims. 311

al-Aimma. Aha. astrolabe made by. 180

573. 386. 588. 590. 598: earthquake

Aga th ad aim on, 294

Air (Asben), as salt source, 495

aid to, 667; economic development

Age o f Discovery, as European

air navel, by islamic women. 118-119

i n , 573. 574. French control of.

euphemism for colonialism. 644. 647 Aghlabids: as early Islamic governors, 21. 36; Great Mosque rebiuding by.

Aishafi; on Muhammad's character. 96.

588-589; French settlers i n , 584-585;

105: as Muhammad's wife. 15, 143:011

intellectual activity i n . 579; Islamic

w o m e n in mosques, I J 8 , 140

aniicoloniabsiu i n . 550; Islamic con

[4; overthrow of. 45; Sicilian raids of.

Aix. Muslim pirate raids of, 316

sens i n . j 6 : Islamic law- replacement

21

Ajmer (India); Chishti shrine in,

i n . 568; Islamic modernism i n . 565,

-

Aght amar (Armenia), Church o f the Holy Cross o n , 52 aging population, o f Europe and North

402-4O3. 408.413; Jahangir residence

656. 668. 681. Islamic pobiics i n . 668. 670-672. 678. 703, 704; Islamic

i n . 410.413

Salvauon From i n , 562: Islamism i n ,

Akbar; depiction o l . 412: as Indo Muslim ruler, 597,404.405-410.411,

567, 568, 667; jihad I n . 563; land

agnostics. Islamic conversion of, 609

412,414, 420, 696, 697; lineage ot,

ownership i n , 575; Malik: school i n .

Agra: as Mughal capital. 407.408. 410;

405. 409.412; monumental a n of.

113; military i n . 679; Morocco's claim

409-410.419

to. 539; Muslim insurgents i n . 94;

Amenta, 610

Ta| Mahal i n , 416 Agra Fon, Shah Jaban s imprisonment i n . 418 agricultural altemanves, of Cenural Asia. 439

Muslim migrants f r o m . 606: Muslim

Akbununidi (Abul-Fazl). 407. 409 akhbans, as mujtahiri opponents. 369

refugees f r o m , 6 0 ; ; national activists

Alchbarj school o l Shiism. 515-516. 529;

of. 562. 650: National Liberation From i n , 561. 563; narionhood-

debate with Usuli school. 697 akbis, as Sufi charitable group, 372

ummah disharmony i n , 555. Ottoman

Akillu. as Tuareg chief, 481

c o n n o l of, 342, 374. 541 ¡ as postcolo¬

agronomy, i n early Islam. 210. a l l , 213

Alamgir. See Aurangzeh

nial stale, 586; rural economy of,

Agung. Sultan: Java mosque of. 428.429;

Alawi Musbms, 618,638.697

violence i n , 674; war o f independence

agriculture, i n Ottoman Empire, 387. j 88

i n Mataram dynasty. 697 Ahainad Madam. Mawlana Husain. as Islamic modernist, 550 .Mil al Hadith (Tradinonists), fiqh legal diought of. 111 Ahl al-Ray (Raoonahsts). fiqh legal thought of. 112 Ahl af-Suiinah wal-Jamaa. as people of the Sunna. 89

Alhania: Islamic converts i n . 602. 604:

Algerians. Paris massacre of, 631

refugees from. 605

Algiers, French conquest of, 541

of. 262; hlamic architecture of, 215;

A l b e m . as Itahan architect. 217

muqarnas of. 264

Al-Bilod [Saudi newspaper], b b 4

Albuquerque-, Afonsade. Melaka capture

by, 4lt>

Ahmad, perceived as pruphct. 307

alcohol consumption. Islamic p r o h i b i -

Ahmad. Khurshid. as Islamic modernist, 681 Ahmad, Muhammad, mahdisi movement of. 346. 699

tion of. 93. 94. 123. 134. 140,

Alhazan. as early mathematician and physicist. 171,

alchemy, i n early Islam. 198

662

algorithm, source o f name. 188 The Alhamhra: ambiguous architecture

211

Ahb Hadith Muslims. 618 Ahmad. |alal al e. as Iranian intellectuarl.

of. 552, 575, 604. 650-651

Lann Caibolics i n . 385: Muslim albarelli. as medicinecontainers, n o .

571:

173. 190. 191.

192-193

Alha/ans problem. 192 142,

230. 634.687; by non-conforming Muslims. 488.491 Aleppo: atabeg stales of. 56. Fatimid

Ali, Chlragh, as Islamic modernist. 680 Ali. Muhammad; Egyptian dynasty of. 538. 698: as Rashti's successor. 529 Ah, Sultan, palace of. 569 Ali (Ah IbnAbiTalib). assassination of.

power i n , 46; Hamdanids of. 43;

692; as fourth Caliph. 15. 16, 663,

Mirdasids of, 43; as Ottoman trade

692, as herediiary i m a m . 44; as

INDEX Muhammad's cousin and KM in-law. 26.44. n 2 , 259; perceived reincarna

AMAL (Lebanese Resisiance Battalions). 661, 702

7 I 7,

Anglo-Muhammadan Oriental College (Aligarh),649

tion of. 363; as "rightly g u i d e d "

amanat. Quranic rulings o u . 138-139

Anglo-OrieniaJ College (Ahgarh). 580

cahph. 112; sayings of. $68. 369; t o m b

American-Arab Anti -Discrimination

anicomsm [absence o f hguresj. i n

as holy site. 559. 368. 515 Alids. 18. 22. 24, 2C. 26, 36, 41, 44, 6 6 ; ; Abbasids and, 25 Ahgarh movement (India), as Islamic modernism, 565 Ahgarh Muslim University. 649 Ali Jinnah, Muhammad; English educa rion of. 578: as Pakistani leader. 562. 586. 594, C95-C96 Ali Pasha. Muhammad, conquest o f Sudan by. 500 Ali Qapu (Isfahan), 36b, 367 al-Islam, Shaykli, as Ottoman law expert, 379. J80.381 al Allaf. Abul-Hudhay'l. as Mutazllite the ologian, 278 Allah; d e f i n i t i o n of, 76; islamic belief i n singularity of, 70, 517; lack o l representations o f . 230; M u h a m m a d as messenger of, 77;

Committee. 637

Islamic a n . 222, 230-236

American Arab University Graduates. 636

animals, cruelty to, Islamic proliihinon of. 133. H 4

American College (Tehran). 580 "American Islam," as bile for Gulf siaies, 664

animal sacrifice, during pilgrimages, 83-86 Animists. inArabi* and Sudan. 4 - 5

American Israel PublicAiiairs Committee, 6;6

Anisi, as calligraphcr. 248 Ankara. U i g h u r separatists i n , 466

American Muslim Council, 638

An-Najaf (Iraq). Ah shnne al, 359

American University (Beirut). 579

ansar (helpers), 9

Ainida; aiaheg stales of. 5b; Marwanids

Ansan. Shayh Murtacia. as legal scholar, 516

in,4i al-Amih. as Shine scholar. 295 al-Amin, Muhammad, overthrow of. 27 amir; faqu compared to. 404, Umayyad

.Antalya (Turkey). Ottoman trade route through. 389 Anihropomorpbists, 279 Antichrist; al-Hakim viewed as. 335;

rulers as, 5 4 Amir A l l . Sayyid. as Islamic modernist.

Muhammad viewed as, 322. 626 Aııtı-Defam at ion League (B'nai B n t h ) .

297-199 amir a l - m u ' m i n i n ; Ibn llafs as. 52.60: Ubayd Allah as, 45

*37 Antioch; aposiolic sect of. 309:Crusader

revealed books o f . 88. subordina

Amritsar Massacre, Baluch troops i n , 593

l i o n t o . 299

Amsterdam, Uighur separatists i n , 466

anti Semmsm, 627; in early Spain. 344

amulets. African trade i n . 485. 506

anti W s t e r n i s m . Islamic. 301

analogical reasoning, as source o f shari-

.Anton i us. George, 583

Allah. Hajji Shanat, as Bengali Islamic reformer, 559-440 All-India Muslim League. 562. 596 Almojot (Ptolemy); Arabic rranslaiionsof. 163, 272; description of, 171-172, 232: influence o n Arabic astronomy. 162. 164, 165. 167. 168 d Manai [reformist journal]. 700 Almanzor. 5 « al-Mansur, Abu Amir

ah, 119. 122. 126

conquest of, 56. 339, 602; |ews i n . 2

Aniitn. Farah. 298

Anatoha. as early name for Inner Asia.

Anuslurvan. Gundisliapur academy lounded by, 270-271

«9 Anatolia: caliph raids and control of, 12. 28; Christians i n . 583; early carpels f r o m . 246; Greek Orthodox faith i n . Islamic conversion of, 372-373.

Anushtakin al-Dirbari. as Faiimid army man. 48 Apollin. as purported Islamic deiry, 326. 3*7

Almaric I , King of Jerusalem, 339

392, Islamic culture i n . 60, 371;

Almaty (Kazakhstan), 445; air service to.

Ottoman accepiance of Jews f r o m .

433; as trade center, 436; U i g h u r sepa

386; Ottoman control of, 342.372.

ratists i n . 466

371. 377. 3801^87. 388, 391:

Almohad mosque (Seville), 305

"appearances." theophanic. 65

Qaramanid rule of. 693: Safavid

al Aqib, asTimbuktu qadi. 483

Almohad(s); as l a l i p h , 60; decline of,

Empire i n . 363; Seljuk rule i n . 54. 33,

Aqit family, asTimbuktu qadis. 483.485

35^.353.371.694

Aqqoyunlu rulers. 148

31. 32. 695; i n N o r t h Africa, 694; rev ivalisi movements of. 49. 50-51. 52-33. 176; i n Spain. 35. 253. 285. 320. 342. 694 Ahnoravids;Almohad rivalry w i t h , 51; i n

anaromy studies, in early Islam,

Andalusia: Arab medicine in, 204-205.

Arah American Insııtuıe (AAI), 637-738

317-321, 344, 345; Clirisuan shrines

movements of, 49-50, 52-53. 176; i n

i n . 334; Chrisuan takeover o l , 51.

southwestern Sahara, 476;Wolof as

341-342. 344; early astronomers m .

possible descendants of. 490

171, 175. 181; early irrigation i n , 198; end o f caliphate of. b 9 ; as Islamic 4

required by Islam, 73, 82, 103;

cultural area. 5;. 318.413; in Islamic

Shah ah r u l i n g o n . 109. 134

empire, 50. 329,694; Feripaielicism i n , 284-289 Anderson. Lisa. 588

Unrepresenlcd Nations and People's

Andkhui, early Clunesc missions to, 440

Organization. 467

Andromachus. as Greek doctor. 199

Alpetkin, IsaYusup. as Uighur nalionalist. 467 Altlshahr. Naqshbandi Sufism founded i n . 453

al-Aqsa Mosque (Jerusalem). 116, 243. Aquinas. St Thomas. 289. jo2

political collapse o l . 51: revivalist

Alpcckin, Erkin. as leader o f

Seljuk domains, 56, 57

Anawau. George. 298 2 i i ; Christian-Muslim relations i n ,

AlpArslan. as Seljuk sultan, 55. 56

appanages; o f Buyids, 42, 56; o f Great

I13. 314. 339. arson of. 701

205-207

Islamic Spain. 35, 320, 342.694;

alms; Quranic rules o n , 120, 145. 147.

Apostasy wars. 11, 76

Andromeda, depicuon of, 233 angels, o f Allah, 83. 88.95 Angkatan Bella Islam Malaysia (AB1M), 570. 701.704

Allishar, Naqshbandi rulers of, 521

Anglo-Afghan War. 587

alyans, 391

"Anglo conformity." i n Uniied Slates. 610

Arab Americans, organizations of, 636-638 Arab Christians. 310; in Lebanon. 700. Ottoman churches of. 3B5; relations w i t h Crusaders. 340; role i n Arab nationalism, 583 Arah civilization; Islam's transcendence of. 69-70; science i n . 157 arabesque motifs; detail of, 240; i n Islamic a n . i n . 236-246. 155. 258. 411.416; principles of. 138 Arabia. Abbasiddecline i n . 43; early Christians i n , 306: early jews i n , 306; early religions i n . ; . 4: Indian Muslims viewed as invaders f r o m , 581; Islamic converts I n . 10. 22-23. 76; Islamic reform i n . 545; Muslim slave irade w i t h . 504; national identity

714

INDEX

oC 554- 556; Ottoman Empire i n . 57J. 374. 388, 389: Shafii school i n , 114: trade expeditions of, 1-4. 589. 475. 501; Umayyad control of. 27-28 Arabic; adoption by Christian d h i m m i s , I j i . African speakers o l . 504; o n Chinese export ware. 458; o n Chinese

Ark o l the Covenant, klswa compared 10 lent of, 220 Arkoun. Muhanunad. as Islamic m o d ernist, 565 Armed Islamic Group (GL\). of .Algeria.

assimilaiionisl model, of immigration. 609—610 Association o f Algerian Ulama. 651 Assyrians. Armenian Church of. 585 astrolabe, as Muslim Uivennon, 169. 180. 181

672,688 Armenia; caliph control of. 12. 30;

astrology, use i n early Islam. 161-162 astronomy ; in early Islam. / 8 . 155.

mosques. 459. 460; language classes

Clmsnaniiy i n . 1. 55; Faiiinid army

for. 623; lexicons i n , 158, 189; literary

unns from. 48; Kurdish misai states

works i n . J49. i c o , s(8; new prose

İ U . 4 Î . 55, 56;Tiirkmen i n , 54. 55,

162, 163. 164; eastern reform tradition

style of. 29. plays on words i n , 266;

3S2. ï 5 3 . 37"

of. 174-175, 176-177; instruments for.

of Quran, translation of, 70. role in Islamic cullure. 60, 358; scientific translations into, 159-160. 162. 163. 164. 191, 331 , 69J; scientific works

Armenian Church, 111 Ottoman Empire. Armenians; i n Central Asia. 472; i n earlyChang an, 442 armillary sphere. Muslin design of. 182

f o r m of. 40. 223. 2 2 6 . 228. 241. 495;

an. Islamic

spread 10 N o r t h Africa. 48; use i n

anısaıı classes, elimination by colonial

color i n . 246

ism.

Sec Islamic an

572

al-Asad, H a l ı / , as Syrian president, [84,

.Arabic alphabet, lexicon of, 189 Arabic numerals, o r i g i n of, 184 Arab-Islamic empires, 349. 550 .Arab-Israeli War. 701, Arab poliiical

164. 168, 180. 181. 182: practicaf problemsof. 177 183; theoretical.

385-386

i n . 157-158, 159, 166. 168; script

South Asian Islam, 396; words for

161-183. 184. J ' î . 27" ; early texts o n .

/02 Asad. Muhammad, as Islamic modernist, 677.680

169-177; translated texts o n . 159; western reform iradihon of, 176 aiabeg. as guardian of pruices, 56-57, 354-35s Aiaturk Str Kern a I. Mustafa Atchison College ( U h o r e ) . 578 atomic theory, o f al Baqillani. 281 Allartn Madrasa (Fez), 257 al-Attas, Muhammad Naguih. 298 Auribuusts. 279

Ascalon. caliph offensives againsi, 12

Augusunian-Avicennan party. 289

action groups ailer. 636; as a jihad.

Ascelcpius. 294

Aurangabad (Deccan). 418

657; o i l bo) cott of. 605

al-Asliari.Abu al-Hasan. as founder o f

Aurangzeb; as Mughal emperor.

"Arabman," creation o l , 547 Arab League. 556

Asharism, 280-281, 289 Asharism, 280. 281-282. 283. 284, 289.

Arah Legion, jordanian tribesmen i n , 584

290, 302. 303 Asliitiyani. Mirzah Mahdi. as Ishraqi

Arah monarchies, dcvelopmenl of. 567 Arab Near Easl. postcolonialism i n . 597. 598

philosopher. 296 Ashkenazi Jews. Ottoman acceptance o l . 386

Arabo-IVrsian civilization.Turkmen as pan of. 353

Ashmad. Kassim. as Islamic modernist. S65

" Arah Revolt." 538

al-Ashrafi. Arghun Shah. Quranic m a n u

Arabs, in early Chang an. 442; Islam identification w i t h , 601 Arab Socialist U n i o n , 390 .Arafat, role in pdgramages. 85.86. 87.

script of, 2422 Ashtiyaui. Sayyicl Jalal. as Ishraqi philosopher, 296 Asia; French territories i n . 551. Islam in. 6oi. So? also individual countries

94

417

418, 420. 514, 581, 697; l o m b o l ,

417.418 Australia, Muslims i n , 604, 608 Austria: Islamic mosques and centers i n . 618; Muslim guest workers i n . 609; Muslims i n . 604: Ottoman opposition by. 37+ authoritarian govenunenis. o f Muslim countries. 668 Avempace. Set i b n Bajjah Averrocs, as Islamic philosopher, 173. 274. 279, 286 289. 290. 298, Î 0 2 , 303. 333. 314. 695 Avitenna. as Muslim philosopher-physi cian, 170. l8t, 204—205. 272,

Aragon. Iberian rule by, 320

Asia Minor. Greek territories i n . 439

275-276. 279. 281. 283, 293. 296.

Archimedes. Arab research based o n .

Asian Exclusion Act o f 1960s (U.S.).

302.333.334. 694 al-Awa. M. Scllm. as Islamic modernisi.

repeal of, 608.617

193-194 architecture; Islamic. Set Islamic archileilure. o f Mughal emperors.

Asian tiger, in Malaysia. 643 Asia-Pacific Economic Council. China and.467

409-420 Ardabil (Iran). 59, 363, 439

Al-AVilu IWI-AJWIIHI ( a l - B i r u m ) , 169-170

Arians, ; i o

Askıya Uawud. asTimbuktu ruler, 483

Aristotelian Averroisi ihescs. 289

Askiya Ismail. asTimhuktu ruler.

Aristotelian! sin. Islamic reaction against.

483-484 Askiya Muhammad, as Muslim king o f

191 .Aristotle, 64. 118, 269. 270, 274. 276.

Songhay. 478. 482 -483. 492. 496

681 Awdaghusi (Saliara), as early uade ren ier. 476 Avvliya. N i / a m ad-Din. at Indian siihan. 403,404 "axial community." moral

responsihibly

of. 96 A x u m ; Christianity i n . 3: k i n g d o m of. 1. 8

277. 279, 283, 284, 28 , 293. 322.

Askiyas. generosity 10 scholars. 485

Aya Sofia Mosque. 581, 384

331. 332; Alexander the Great and.

Atoka the Magnificent, i n South Asia.

ayatollahs, objections to Nadirs Shiism,

S

396; as astronomer. 163, 172, 175-176. 176; color theory of. 247; Islamic commc-iuaries o n , 284. 286.

Ï96 Assar, Muhammad Qasim. as Ishraqi philosopher. 296

289. 290; physical iheory of, 170. [92, assassinaoon; of Ali ihnAbiTallb, 16. 212; rediscovery of, 305; Syriac trans

692; of Anwar Sadat. 660. 666. 702;

lationsof, 271. 334

of Hasan al-Banna. 701 : o f Nizam al¬

arithmetic. Arah development of. 183-184. 189. 212 AnlhiTirlnil (Dlopliaiilus). 185

Mulk. 282; o f Umar ibn al-Khatiab. 15, 16, 692 Assassins. 49, 56. 39. 277

5'5 Ayn Jalui Ran le. Mongol defeat at, 39. 695 Ayodha (India), mosque buill 011 Hindu site i n . 581 Ay yubids. 290. 339. 340; Fgyptian rule by, 695: Syrian dorniuaUon by. 57 Azad. Abul Kalani, as Islamic modernist. «0

INDEX Azerbaijan: caliph control of, 12. j o ;

Bahrain; extremist activities i n . 665:

Kurdish tribal Mates i n . + j ; S>ljuk c o n

Iranian expansion to, 55b; Maliki

trol of, j s T u r k m e n migration i m o .

school i n , 114

54

Bahrain C.ui. as Sasaman king. 248

Wiar. as calligraphic. 248

Bdhnim Cur in tht (Jictn ftruliun. as painting

Al-A/har Mosque (Cairo), 46, 117

by Shayki. 24R, 249

Al-Azhar University (Cairo): Chinese

al-Bapuri. as modern theologian. 29;

7 i5

Raradaeus. Jacobus, as founder o f Jacobite church, ; i o liaraka ( d o ine blessing), j b t . 408.494 Rarakzais. i n Afghanistan. 698 barbari. as name lor Muslims, 321 Barelwi. Sayyid Ahmad, as Islamic reformer. 328, 53b, 538. 345. f*)8

Muslim srudcius at. 457; Islamic stud

llakar. Osman, as Islamic modernist. 6H1

Barelwi Muslims. bi8

ies at. 151. 281. 298, 300. 301, 494.

Rakhushu family, as phy sitians to

al-Barmaki. promonon o f Hellenic stud

647; nationalization o l , r.54

Ahbasids, 200, 271

ies by, 271

al Aziz, as f a i i m i d caliph. 47

al-Kakri. as early African traveler. 47b.

Barmakid family. inAbbasld govern

al Azi?. Abd. 569, 652: falsvaol, 525

489 al-Bakri, Mustafa, role i n Khalwatlyyah

al-Barnawi, Muhammad i b u al I Ian ^ b d

al-Aziz Laravsi.Ahd. as Islamic secularist. i°'

order. 513

al-Aziz Thalbi.Abd, as Tunisian national ist. 651 al-Azm. Sadiq. as Islamic secularist, 301 Azov (Crimea). Russian conquest of. 697

al-Balabakki, Qusta i h n Luqa; as early

Basmil nomads, as Uighur allies. 464

191

Basra (Iraq); African slave domination

ThtRuliinccofAction (al-Ghazab), 283 S38-3J9. 34"

Tbc Bah. as Islamic relormer. 529, c,j8

Balearic Islands. Al moras i d control of, 51

babas (Suh holy m e n ) . ¡ 7 1 . 375

Balkan peninsula: Creek Orthodox faith

Bab Mardum Mosque (Toledo), convert ed to church, 545

bath, prior 10 pray ing, 78

389. 391 Turkish takeover ot, 342.

inscription, 221 metic of, 184: as astronomers, ibi

al-Balklii. Abul-Qasim, as Muianlite, 280

Bath parties (Syria and Iraq), 590

Balkh (Iran); Islamization of. 442:

al-Baitaiti. Abu Abd Allah Muhammad

mosque decoration i n , 257-238, 139; Umayyad campaigns I r o m . 21

Kadajoz. as Islamic city-state. 34

Baltic Sea. Abbasid trade i n . 32

Badakhsi, Mullah Shah. Dara Shikoh as

Baluch uoops (Pakisian), in Ainritsar

disciple of. 417

Massacre, 592

Badaivi.Ahd al-Rahman. as Islamic m o d ermst. 298

Balyan, Krikor, mosque designed by. 524 Bambara, Islam i n . 48b. 488

Badr. ISartle of, 10, 691

Bangladesh;colonial annies of, 392:cre

Badr al-Jamali. as Egy plian military gov

230. 231 Baihist leaders (Sy ria and Iraq), secular izaiion policy of. 572

604

Babylonians-animist cults o l . 4: a r i t h

nationalists i n . 112 al-Basri. al-Hasan. as Qadari. 277,278 bathhouses, Islamic archiieciure of, 218,

in, 580; Ottoman trade centers i n ,

4

Islamic theology i n , 278, Mutazilism in. 278; Ottoman control of. 389;

Muslims i n , b04; Ouoman judiciary

Babtir. Abul-Qasim. Nezamim manu script of, 2 8

of. 43; Islamic louquesl of, l ; i , 13. it,;

in. 2, Islamic conversion i n , 373;

Babur. as Mughal emperor, 405, 408. 581

Baby Ionian language, in trilingual

al Rahman. SecHajinnai al Bashir. Omar. (179, b8o. 703

mathematician. 185, optic studies of.

Baldwin. King o f die Latin Kingdom, B

ment. 29

i b n j a h i n . as early astronomer, ibb Baltic o f Ayn falut, Mongol defeat at, 59. 695 Ratile o f Badr.

10.1

Battle o f Chaldiran. Safavid defeaı ai, 696 Battle ol ("hansa. Humay aıı's dcleat at. 407 Rattle o l H i l t i n . b g ;

ation of. cbo, b55, 637, 7 0 i ; e m i

Haille o l Kirina.478

grams f r o m . bo5. bob. bo8; Islamic

Bailie o f Kosovo ( 1389), 37;. b g i

Badshai Mosque (Lahore), 6;, 657

modernism i n , 682; Islamic Party of,

Baulc o f Lepanlo, bgb

Baghdad; Ahhasid oterihrow i n , 37. 42,

53/, as modern Muslim stale. 549;

Batdc o f Mankizen. 694

46, 59; Buyid capture and control of.

Muslim population of, 582; nation

Bailie o f PaiUpat. as Mughal beginning,

J2.42.47; decline of, 59; early

h o o d - u m m a h harmony i n . 555

ernor. 48

astronomy i n . 181. 191; as early m e d ical center. 198. l o o . 202, 208. 271: early military control of, j $ i ; a s

Bani Sadr, Abol Hasan, as banian presi dent. 664 al Banna. Hasan: assassination o l .

696 Bailie o f Plassey. C13 Bailie o f the Camel. 15 Bailie of the Trench, 10.691

Islamic capital. 20, 25. 2b, 28. 29. 50,

701700; Islamic movements of, 652.

RatllcoITours. 692

31. 33. 36, J7. j 8 , 277. 693; as Islamic

653, (169. b8i. 700

Battle o f U h u d . 10, 691

cultural center. 59. do. 160, 164, [69. in.

168,

357. Khurasan rhalry w i t h .

bannai (huilder's technique), 219

Haye/il, as Ottoman sultan, 5/9

Banqiao Chinese Sulism. 456

Rayezit I I , Sultan. 208

27; Mongol conquest of. 59. 695;

Banii.Arjumand. SrrMumtaz Mahal

Bay o f Bengal, role in Sino-Indian trade,

Mota/ilism i n , 278, 280; Ottoman

Bai HI I lammad family, as Maghreb

occupation of, 380,696; Seljuk c o n trol of, 55, 58 al-Raghdadi, Abd al-Latif; as.Arah aiiacomisi. 107; as Asharttc cheologian. 281. 302 Baghdad Kiosk. olTopkapl Serai. 377 Baginui. Islamic rulers o l . 4 9 ; Rahai faith, 584. Shiism o r i g i n o l , 529 Raima. Muhammad's meeting w idi, 30b AI-Buhiiliul-kibr (Al SamawalalMaghribi), 1877 Bah man id empire. ufDecean.404

rulers, 51

420 Bayı al-Hikma, translations f r o m , Joo

Rami Hilal, as Muslims. 499

Bayı al Kritliya [Cairo museuinj. 364

Rami Marin nomads, conquest o f

bayyinat ("bayylnat"). 65

Morocco by. 32 Banu Musa brothers, as early scientists. 160,

194

Kanu Qaynuqa, Muslim battle againsi, 2J6 Baptist Church. Muslims i n schools of. 622 al-BaqiUani.Ahu Bakr: ami-Christian polemics of. 332; as.Ashrarile. 281

lîazargaıı. Mehdi, as Iranian prime m i n ister, 664 Beacon Tower Mosqyc (Guangzhou|. 44Î bedoums;oI Arahia. 501; tents used by. 22o Begin. Menachim. b6o Beijing; as Muslim cultural center. 438; Muslims i n , 443. 445. 454

7

ı6

INDEX

Beirut; ambassador's assassination i n . 629: civil war effects o n . 655; as port

courtier. 398; scientific texts of. 156.

botany, m early Islam, 207. 210-212, 213

168. 169. 398

hotos (soothsayers), 428

Bishkek (Kyrgyzsiant. as trade center. Beishan Chinese Sufism. 456

4J6

Beja (Nubia). Islam i n . 498

al-Bistami. as early philsopher. 294

Bckiashi Sufi order, role i o O l r o m a n

al-Bitru)i.Abu Ishaq. as Andalusian

Empire. 372. 380 Belgium; anil Muslim poliucal p i n y c m . 631; ethnic m i n o r i t y model of.

astronomer. 175

Bourguiha. Habib; secularization policy of, 57!, as Tunisian president. 670. 702, 703 Brabant. Siger de, 289, 302 Bradford Council for Voluntary Services

hlack, use in Islamic art. 258, 259

(Great Britain 1, r u l i n g on Islamic-

Black Sea; Ottoman control of. 374. 388.

foods. 634

610. Islamic mosques and centers i n .

389, 391,698;Russian control of.

Brahmagupta. as Indian philosopher. 272

618; Muslims i n . 604. 607: Muslim

392. 698

Brahmanabad. early Muslim conquest

World league office i n . 621 Belgrade, Ottoman conquest oi, 696 Belhad|. All, o n democracy and Islam. 677. 678 "The Believer president," as tide for Sadat, 657 Believers; "commander of." 14-13; as Muhammad's early followers. 9. 11-13. 60 Bello. Muhammad; o n African Islam. 494.495: as dan Fodio's son, 536 Ben . \ l i . Zein Abidine. Tunisian policies of. 374, 670. 680 Ben Badis. Abd al-Hamid. as Algerian nationalist. 651.680 Ben Bella. Ahmad, as national activist. C&2 benefits, class! ficanon of, 135-136 Bengal; British colonialism i n , 363; Islamic reform i n . 338-339 Ben ladid.Chedli. as Algerian president. 6;. Benv>n. 1 inda. 469 Benrusuf Madrasa (Marrakesh). 125

Black Stone, embedded in Kaaba. 85, 259 black supremacy. Nation o f Islam and, 609 "blocking the means." as Shariah ruling. '23

of, 22 Brazil. Muslim slaves i n , 546-547 bricks, use in Islamic architecture. 229. 230. 243-244 246, 233 British hasi India Company, colonialism

blood circulation. .Arab discovery of, 205

of. 563; emergence and decline of,

bloodletting, in early Greek medicine.

522, 525. 539; Mughal Empire and,

201. 203 blue (color). Islamic connotations of. 259 Blue Mosque (Tabriz), decorative motifs in. 255.256 Bobrinsk) Bucket, as Islamic art object. 221-222, 253, 261-262, 163 bodily cognitions, o f Ibn Khaldun. 293 Boethius o l Dacia. 289. 302 Bogomils. Armenian Church of, 383 Bolkstelni. f r i t s , on Dutch ethnic minoriıies, 6 ; i Bonan.Turkic-.Altaic language of. 443 Bonneval, Cornre de. as Ottoman adviser. 5ti hookmaking. as Islamic art f o r m . 218. 232.234, 239.241

5"3. 514 British Malay, diversity i n . 558 brotherhoods, o f Sufis, 360. 448.485. 494.512.522 Brunei; creation of. 651; Malaysian claims to, 557, 559; as m o d e m Muslim stale, 349; monarchy i n . 588; social welfare system of, 650 Buddha. Central Asian images of. 441 Buddhism. 438; in Central Asia, 434; colonialism effects o n , 645; dissem ination by Silk Road, 440. 441. influence o n U i g h u r s . 464: i n South Asia, 396; " W i i t e Lotus" rebellion of. 451 Buddhisls. as penpheial U.S. group, 610 Bukhara; Chinese pilgrimages to, 454;

bequests. Quranic rules o n , 120

Book of Cause (Produs o f Athens). 270

early Chinese missions to. 440. as

Berbers. Islamic conversion of. 21. 34,

Book of Healing (Avicenna), 275

Islamic cultural center. 39. 244. 357.

3 i - l 6 . 45. 46. 48. 49. 50. 51. 314.

Book of Instruct 1011 (al-Masudi), 329

520. 521; Janids in. 697; musalla i n ,

317, 480. 692; language o t . role i n

Book of RrİKitlut (Ibn H a r m ) . 289-290

Islamic culture. 60. national i d e n t i

Book ot Reckoning, men's deeds record

ty of. 354; as Saharan traders. 473. 495

ed in. 223 Book of theCategories ol Millions (Ibn Ahmad).

Bergson. Henri-Louis, 297. 649 Book olVindıcuııon (al-Khayyat), 278

beys (warrior chieftains). 371, 391

book painting, Persian. 255

Bhutto, Benazir; defeat of. 595. 669; elec

Books of Setts (Ibn H a r m ) . 332

Bhutto. Zulfikar A h . as Pakistani leader. 657, 658, 669. 702 Bibi La Maqbara. as Mughal tomb. 419 The Bihle. Arabic translations of, 331; fig-

Bula Matari. in colonial Sub-Saharan

tice. 497 bom-again Christians, Muslim failh company) to, 69 Borneo, as part o f Malaysia. 538

Usuh leader. 516 Bihzad. as Persian painter. 248. 250. 251. 696 Rilad al -Sudan. African Islam i n . 475; as eaily uade center. 476 al-Birgili. as early theologian, 293 al-Birum; as early astronomer. 168. 169-170. 191. i94;asGhaznavid

66-67, 74-75

bori spirits. inAfrican pre-Islamic prat

Islamic interest i n , 330, 626

Bihhaham. Aga Muhammad Baqir, as

astronomer, 171 al-Bukhari, Sabih.Sunna hook of, Bulala clan, in Karcm, 492

born-again Musbins, 639

bihah scripr. o f Deccan Quran. 403

ar, 512

Bordeaux. Muslim takeover of, 314

u r i l representations of. 230. 232; bicukuralism.ofWfcsiern Muslims, 639

al-Bukhan. Murad. as Naqshhandi schol al-Bukhari. Sadr ai-Sharia. as early

beveled style, o f Islamic an. 260. 261

tion of, 703

101; o n Silk Road, 440; (Imayyad cono-ol of, 21

B o m u (Nigeria); Islam in, 493-494, 496. 506; Muslim traders i n . 488 Bosnia; Dayton ftace Agreement for. 704; i b n Idris prayers used i n . 531: Muslim migrants f r o m . 605. 606; Muslims i n . 472, 47;, 604, 638. Muslim victims i n , 6 ; o ; relief agen ties i n , 668 Bosnia-Herzegovina, as m o d e m Muslim state. 549 Bosnians, i n Germany, 604

Africa, 561 Bulgaria; Islamic converts i n . 602, 604; Muslim refugees from. 605, 638, Ot Ionian churches of. 385; Ottoman conquest of, 373 bumiputra (sons o f the soil). Malaysian affirmative action for. 585 Burban ad-Din, Detcan prosperity and, 403 burial pracnccs.ofMuslims. 109. 632 -633, 634, 636 Bursa; Ertugrul'sconquest o f 375, 695; Ottoman judiciary i n . 380; as Ottoman trade center. 389. 390 Buiroji [Sadi p o e n ] , 250 Buyids, as caliph protectors. 30. 32. 41.

INDEX 47.48, 168. (81, 208, 232, 693;

ing of.

oust-

43. 46

32

al Ruzjani, Ahu al-Wafa, as early

H*

Buzurgimhr, as ftrrsian sage, 294 Byzantine Fmpire. 1. So,

caliph offensives against, 11, 12, 13, Christianity i n .

2 . 310-311. 602;

246,

247. 383; f r o m Ottoman Empire,

383; from Safavid Empire, 365. ;66 Carthage, Muslim conquest of. 21. ¡5

Crusades and. 337, 338; decline of,

cartography, use for Mecca location. 179

342,

canograpy, i n early Islam, 183. 185

372, 374, 694; decorative art of.

234; decorative w r i t i n g i n , 222. 22;;

Castile; Iberian rule by. ;2o; Islamic-

legacy to Ottoman Empire. 371. 390;

Chrisnan rivalry i n . 51; Ijeon union

linguistic conversion of, 138-139;

w i i h , 35

M u s l i m incursions i n t o . 315. 316. philosophical eclipse i n .

¿02;

270-271.

Chaldiran. Battle of, 696 Chang an. early foreigners i n . 442 Chang an (Xi an); Buddhist an i n , 441; as Han dynasty capital, 45-1. on Silk Road, 440 Chansons de Gcstc. depiction o f Islam in.

321.325, 326-327. 328. 338

Charlemagne. 326. 607; M u s l i m o p p o nents of, 315; relations w i t h Hanin al-

655

Sasanian wars w i t h , 3.4, 312;

Categories (Aristotle), 271. 272

Turkmen invasion of, 53

Catherine the Great, support o f Sunni

Rashid,

scholars hy, 520

317, 334-335

chauvinism. Muslims as victims of. 631 cheating. Islamic disapproval of. 95

Catholic Church. 310. 334; in America.

C

Chaldean religion, 269

chaplains, imams as, 625

"the catastrophe." as t e r m for Six-Day War.

695

Chakedon. early Clinstians i n . 310, ; n

carpels; Islamic. 215. 220, 246; lenoned.

235. 313-314;

Chagatays. as inner Asia rulers. 357 Chaghatayids, territories control led by.

carpet pages, o l Islamic manuscripts,

astronomer. 168, 191

28;

Carolingian renaissance. Abbasid role i n ,

7i 7

Chec hens, i n Central Asia, 472

Cadi/, Christian takeover of, 51

610; attitude o f h u m i l i t y i n , Bo. doc-

Caffa, Ottoman trade w i t h . 3B9

trine changes i n . 89; in early Spain,

Mushm separatists i n . 471;

Cairo; al-Shahi's t o m b i n , 107; Citadel of,

344; Muslim encounters w i t h . 602,

victims i n . 6;o; revivalist Sufi orders

57: as Islamic capital, 46; as Islamic

603; Mushins i n schools of, 622, 624;

in- 532, 533. 540m341; war againsi

cultural center.

Muslim-stale colleges of. 379

49. 59,60, 357.

312,

514; Islamic decoration i n , 229, 2;8;

Caucasus; caliph raids i n . 12; Furopean

Chechnya; M u s l i m refugees f r o m , 605. Muslim

Russia of. 550, 551 chemistry, in early Islam, 198

Islamic medicine i n , 97. 207. 213;

colonies i n . 551; Kurdish tribal states

child custody. Quranic rules o n , 120, 63;

madrasa i n , 99; Ottoman judiciary i n .

i n , 43; M o n g o l conquest of. 58;

children; Islamic education for.

380

Qadiriyyah movement i n . 540-541;

622-625;

Turkmen in, 35

6,5

caliphate; as agent o f poliucal and cul-

o f M u s l i m immigrants,

614.

luial change, 39-61, army and

cavalry, in Otioman armies. 377

Children's Crusade. 337

administration of.

celali rebelbons. in O t i o m a n Empire.

China: art motifs of. 239: caliphate trade

31;

early,

27-32;

demise of,

empire o l .

14-27;

18-27;

Mongol destruction of.

58-59;

Muhammad and, 1-61;

rivalry i n . 2 2 ;

sultans as descendants o f 382: symbolic importance of, 354 caliphs, 11. 71. 89, 340, i n Africa, 492; "rightly guided," 112,692

400.

The Cambridge Hilton

0 1£

camels, i n Central Asian transport, 437 Camp David Accords. 660

Islamizatioii of,

of.

439,440, 695;

M u s l i m monarchs

of. 396; Umayyad campaigns into. 21 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); m u r -

Canaanites. animist cults of. 4 Canada; headscarf debate i n , 634, interfailh activities i n , 627; Islamic mosques and centers i n . 618, 621; multicultural ism i n , 610; M u s l i m edu690

Ç46;

Central Eurasia, o f Si nor, 439

Camus, Albert, 379

Muslims i n .

Islamic modernism i n , 565; Islam i n , 520; Mangn rule of. 698. Mongol rule

Cambridge University, 578, 649

60S, 639.

early

471; European colonies i n . 551.

433,47' • 5'o.

(Sinor). 438-439

622-623;

97

CennalAsia. SeeolsoInnerAsia;Chinese

Islamic anticoloniahsm i n . 550. 323-324

arfy Inner Asia

cation In,

Central America, o p e n - d o o r practice i n .

countries i n . 439; edinic groups of. 241.

401

Calvin. John, views on Islam,

Centaurus, constellation of, 167

Danishmendid rule of, 694;

mosque adornment by. 458; as 216-217. 2t8.

ment of. 471; early religions i n , 442;

cemeteries, M u s l i m , 607. 632

relations w i t h . 468-472, 546;

calligraphy; in China. 217; Chinese Islamic an f o r m ,

w i t h . 32; Central Asia military agree-

392

604.

Cantonese, dialects of, 468 Cape Town (South Africa); Indian and Malay immigrants i n . 5H5; Islam i n ,

der o f employ ees i n . 629: schisms and,584

Central Mosque (China). Kuwaiti donations to. 461 Cencrumpartij (Netherlands), as antiM u s l i m political party. 6;i ceramics, as Islamic an f o r m . I l l . 2CI, 2S1. 3*5

ceramic tiles, 215. 221 Ccrdanna (Pyrenees), M u s l i m ruler of,

506

capitabsm, M u s l i m view of. 653 caravans, in Central Asia. 44O caravanserais, Islamic architecture of. 218 Carolingian Empire.

315. 316-317

315

certainty, modalities of, 64-72 Chad; Islam i n . 36.492; posicolonial tensions i n . 581 chador. as Islamic women's dress. 141

early trade w i t h Europe. 4;?; ethnic minorities i n . 443. 465; ethnic problems of,

463.466:

frontier closure t o

nomads. 331, Islamic renewal i n . 546; Islam i n ,

433-473.

See also l l n i Muslim

Chinese; mosques i n ,

443.445. 447.

454.4S8.459-46o, 461,462. 463.

466; Most Favored Nation status of. 468;

Mughal trade w i t h ,

420,421;

M u s l i m visit to emperor of. 81, Naqshbandi movement in, 512-513, 521; as oil importer, 433, 466.467.

469:painong treatises of, 217. 235: relations w i t h Central Asia,

433-437.

439-440. 468; w o r l d trade of, 470 China Islamic Association,

447,460

China National Petroleum Corporation, 469

Chinese, i n Malaysia, 585, 596 Chinese M u s l i m Association. 457 Chinese M u s l i m Educational Foundation. 457 Chinese M u s l i m Federation. 457 Chinese Muslim General Association. 457 Chinese M u s l i m Mutual Progress Association. 457 Chinese MuslimYoung Students Association, 457 Chiraghi D i h l i . Nasir ad-Din. as Indian sultan. 403. 404 Chishn. M i n n ad-Din, as Indian sultan.

7 i 8

I N D t X

402-403. 404.40R. 409.411 Chıshti saints; in early India. 402. 405. 409. lombs Of, 418. 419 Chisluiya. spimnal influence of, 40J, 404.409,410 chiton, as Greek dress, 236

civil wars; o l Muslims. 092; postculonial. 581 "clash o l civilizations" argument, Islam and. 572 "The Clash o l Civilizations" (Huntington), 631-632

c h o k e , doctrine of. 71. 72

cleanliness, fiqh rulings o i l . 110. i n

Christendom. Islam and. 305-345, J72.

"clear evidence." o f God's presence

507. 6o2, 62(l. 6 4 i

(Quran). 64

ChriSlian Arabs. Sor Arab Christians

Clement l.Si.. as theologian. 271

Christian fundameniahsis, Judco-

clinics, mobile. 208

Christian values of, 610 Christianity; apostolic sects of. J09; o f

"closure o f the gale o f qtihad." 113, 116 Cluny; Arabic manuscripts i n . 333;

By /antines, 80.170; colonialism and,

monasteries in, 320; pilgrimages

563, 571, 58 J, doctrine of. 72; In early

sponsored by, 535

Africa. 501. m early Nuhia, 499; early sects of. 2. 1; in Egypt. 49; Greek thought and. 2(19. 270. 27*1; Islam

coeducation. Muslim objections to. 622. 623 coffee: as Muslim states eicpon. 572. 575.

Conduct of iht Solitary ( I b n Bajjah). 285 Conlerence o l B w u f M i n Churches. 626 Confucianism. 459 conical valves. Arab invention of, 194 consensus, in Islamic legal theory. 144. •4Ç. 149. "s2,290 consensus o f the learned, as source o f 1

Shariah. Il8. 123 conservative (traditionalist) changes, i n Islam. 682 Constanluie I, 312: as Christian convert. Îİ0 Constantinople. Srrulso Istanbul: apos tolic seel of. 309: as Byzantine capual. 20; daily life In, 511 ; early church council i n . 310. Jews i n , 2; Ottoman conquest of, 314. 3 4 I - S 4 2 , İ 4 İ - İ4S". 374. 388.69*

compared to. 77, 86, 88,89. 266. 270.

C76; Ottoman trade i n . 189. 390;

r I III III III l l 111 Movement. 673

297. 298. 299. İOO. İ J 2 . ICO. 6J9.

Salihiyyah opposition to, 544;

Constitutional party (Destour).ot

690; Islamic polemics agamsi.

Sumairan rradc in. 534. 575

330-332. 602, 603; medicsal Muslim

coins.calligraphy o n . 223-224

views of. 329—332; minorities i n ,

Cold War. 4 3 ;

381-584; missionary movements of.

"collaborators." minority communities

579; as monotheism, 19, 305; in

as, 582

Spain, J4, 33. 320; universal beliefs

collective rights, Islamic concept o f 98

of. 348

colonialism, agricultural policies of. 573;

Christians; Abbasi d acceptance of. 358;

army and police forces i n . 584; eco

Arahizcd. Ui Andalusia. 319. "hora-

nomic impact of. 371-376; effect o n

again." 69; conversion 10 Islam. 318.

Muslims. 580. 603, 611. 644-646.

319. 320, 609; inicrlaith relations

698; ideology of, 5110-566; m o d e r n -

with Jews. 62/; inlcrfanb relations

day. 631—632; modern Muslin slates

with Muslims. 626; in Islam. 583.

and. 349-599; social impact o f

679: Islamic schools of. 624; in

576-5R5

lehanon, 66o; medieval Muslim views of. 329 -3 32. as Middle Eastern minorities. 339; as missionaries in Islam. 336, 379=380, Muslim dress

color, exuberant use i n Islamic an, 222, 246-260. 267 Columbia Dam. Muslim cemetery at. 607

Tunisia, (62. 388, 651 Constitutional Revolution of 1905—ob. Iranian opposition to, 538 contemporary islam. 643 690 contracts and transactions; 1 laubali n i l i n g o i i . 129. Islamic law o n . 1 ï J ; Shafii ruling o n . 128 control mechanisms, Arab invention of. 194 conversion, forced, o f Spanish Muslims. 144 convicts, i n Cape colony, as early Muslims, 506 Copernicus. Nicolaus. Arabic model use by. 1/4. >7S copper. .African sources of. 495 Copts; as adnillustrators tor caliphs. 36: as Egy ptian Christians, 58;, 602. bgo

stipulations for. 308, ( W o m a n man

The Commeniaior, Aviccnna as, 286

power tas o n . 377; as pilgrims.

commerce, caliphaie contributions to. 32

of. 51. 320; as Islamic cullural center.

Î î 4 " î i 6 ; support of mosque move

c o m m o n wealth, o l regional Muslim

bo, 204, 357: Islamic takeover o l . 34,

ment by. 617 chrysanthemum motif, in Chinese an, 219 churches; mosques remodeled f r o m . i ' o . 339, 345, from remodeled mosques. 305 Church o f the Holy Cross (Aghi amar). Ç2 Church o f the Holy Sepulchre (Jerusalem). 312; destruction of, 333, 694: Saladin's return of, 339 cilihane. as O n u n u n lax method. 587 Cirrhon (Java), mosque i n . 429. 430 Citadel o f Cairo, 57 citizens' rights and duties. Quranic rules o n , 120 civilian bureaucratic mstitunons. o f posieolonial slates, 392-399 "civilization a I mission," o f missionaries, 6ll civil liberties, colonial state effects o n , s97 civil transactions, fiqh rulings o n . 110, 113

siaies. 32 communism, Muslim encounters w i t h . 603

Cördoha. 3;. 34: Christian reconqnest

318, 319-320. 342, 345:Muslim scholars i n . 284: Umayyad enliraie ot. 693

communist acnvists. ui Muslim siaies. 579

Corporealisls. 279

Communist Party (China), Muslim rela

TfieCurrcit Answer to Those Whu Hose Chunpnl

tions w i t h . 461.462: Uighur recogni tion by. 465

the Religion al Christ ( I b n Tayini y ah). 332 cosine function, in.Arab mathematics, 162

Communist Parly o f Indonesia (PKI), 579

cosmology, i n Greek philosophy, 277

community, individual vs., 144 150

conon. as Muslim stales export. 572

Comonis; Islam i n , 503; as modern Muslim slate. 549 Companions o f the Prophet. 74. 75. 83. 96. 119, 179, 290: Quranic and Snnna

cotton textiles. 218 Coulson. Noel, 117 C o n n u I (or American-Islamic Affairs.

638

rulings suspended by. 139. 140; textu

Council of Bishops' Conferences. b2b

al uiterpretations of. I l l — I I I ,

Council oi Chalcedon. 3

120-121. 128

Council ol Churches i n the Netherlands.

compass hones. Muslim design of. 181 Compendium of Chronicle., 40 complimentary interests, i n shariah, 135-136

614 Council o f Clermont. Crusades estab lished by. 337. 694 Council o f Hphesus. ;

ComprendreI'lslam (Schuon). 72

Council o f Guardians (Iran). 665

concubines, slaves as. Quranic proscrip

Council o f Masajid, 621

tion of, 478

Council o f Nicaea. 310

INDEX C o u n c i l rm A m e r i c a n - I s l a m i c R e l a t i o n s , report o n i n c i d e n t s involv i n g hijab.

S3i-S"36. 341-34'. 546. 698 D a n h u a n g . o n Silk R o a d . 440 D a n i f l l . T h o m a s , 313

c o u r t , o f O n o m a u leaders. (75 C o u r t o f the L i o n s , i n the A l h a m h r a . 264

D a n i s h m e n d ids. T u r k m e n sultanaie of,

55.694

7 I 9

Dependency Theory, colonialism and.

574-475 d e r v i s h e s . 410 I V s c a n e s . R e n e . 187 desirabilities. 111 s h a r i a h , 135-136

covenant of U m a r , 50H

D a n t e , 286

D e r e m l i n i s t s . 278, 279

C r i m e a ; O t t o m a n c o n q u e s t o l . 374. 577;

" D a r a l - l s l a i n . " I n d i a l i a n i s h e d f n i m , 323

D e v a g i r i . r e n a m e d Davsiatabad. 402

R u s s i a n control of, 392 C n m e a n s . i n C e n t r a l A s i a . 471 c r i m e s , Q u r a n i c r u l e s o n . 110 C r i s i o d e l a Lu7. C l l u r c h of, as r e m o d e l e d m o s q u e . 345 Cntrrionul KnoivWor ( a l G h a z a l i ) . 283

D a r a l - I s l a m Foundation Islamic Center Village ( N e w M e x i c o ) . 618 D a r a S l t i k o h , d e p i c t i o n of. 418. as S h a l l Jehan's successor. 416-417 D a r es S a l a a m . I n d i a n a n d Malay i m i u i grants i n . 585

" d e v i a t i o n i s m . " o f u e o m o d e r i l i s t s . 684 d e v s h i r m c . as O t t o m a n m a n p o w e r tax,

177 d h i k r . S u h adaptation of. 360 d i i i m m i s ; Arabic a d o p t i o n hy. 331; C h r i s t i a n s as. 507 309. ; i 1. 312. 313,

C r o a t i a , Latin Cat holies i n . 385

Darftir. I s l a m i n . 47s. 300. 306

C r o m e r , Kvclyn R a r i n g . 1st Earl of, 299,

D a r i u s I . K i n g of'FVrsia. 221, 396

d h o w s , o f Lası Africa. 5 0 ;

D a n i s h M u h a m m a d , as m a n u s c r i p t

D i a h a ( M a l i ) , as " l o w n o f A l l a h . " 480

561. Sf>i cxosshatchlng, i n I s l a m i c art, ibo C r u s a d e r s , 224. 243; advance i n N e a r Hasi. cfa; i n A n a t o l i a , 55; as Assassins' target. 177; m e d i e v a l M u s l i m v i e w s

artist, 138 D a u r a n i , R a b i a , A u r a n g r e h ' s l o m h for.

419 davva (call 10 I s l a m ) . 4 4 . 4 6 . 6 2 7 ; o f

of. 529; p i l g r i m s c o m p a r e d to, 355;

I s m a i l i s . 49. s o c i a l a c t i v i s m role i n .

Saladin's defeat of. 57. v i e w s o l

667

M u s l i m s . j22; v i o l e n c e of. 323 C r u s a d e s . 309. 316, 321. (»94. 696: M u s l i m encounters w i t h . 602-603; o p p o s i t i o n to. 32;; p r o p a g a n d a ibr. 325. 328. p u r p o s e of. 337-341 C t e s i p h o n , as Sasanian capital, 2. 3

dialectic, i n I s l a m i c p l u l o s o p h y . 277 Dialogues ( P l a t o ) . 272 dietary r e s t r i c t i o n s , o l M u s l i m s . 615.

655-634.636 al D i m a s h q i . G h a y i a n . as Q a d a n . 277

a l - D a i v l a , Fakhr, as B u y i d ruler. 181

a l - D u i . Badr. as M o s u l n-gent. 354 a l - D i n , Shay kh Safi. as Persian m y s t i c .

Davsiatabad. as D e l h i Sultanaie capital.

402.403 a l - D a t w s a n i . Jalal a l - D u i . as I s l a m i c p h i l o s o p h e r , 297 Day. A . 430

Cultural Relations an ibeKansu Tibeiun Burdcr

D a y l a m : a r m y u m t s from. 4?. 48. 331: c o n v e r s i o n to S h i i s m . 41

C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n ( C U u i a ) ; cfFcct o n

Day ( i f J u d g m e n t , 75.88. 284.416

M u s l i m s , 461; r e p r e s s i o n s of. 468

Day o f R e s u r r e c t i o n , for d e c e a s e d

culture, transcendence o l . in Islam.

diabetes, early A r a b treatise o n . 202

a l - D a w l a . K a n z , 499

t u e r d a s e c a , i s ille m e t h o d . 236

(EkvaU).447

316. 319; status of. 687

M u s l i m s . 109. 290. 296, 41;

J63 d i n a r s , decorative w r i t i n g o n . 223-224 a l - D i n a w a r i . A b u H a n i f a . as Persian botanist, 211 a l - D i n A y b a k . Q u t b . as D e l h i ruler. 228 a l - D i n I s h a q . Safi. »193 a l - D i n Qajar. Nasır, as I r a n i a n s h a h , 515 a l - D i n S h a h . MuzatTar. as I r a n i a n ruler.

539 D i o d o r e o t T a r s u s , as t h e o l o g i a n . 271

Day 1011 Peace A g r e e m e n t . 704

D i o p h a n t i n e analysis, 189. 212

c u s t o m , as legal s o u r c e . 123

DtAnima ( A n s t o U e ) , 284

D i o p h a i u u s . as G r e e k m a t h e m a t i c i a n .

C y p r u s . I s l a m i c takeover of, 314,

debts. I s l a m i c law o n . 131

69-70

M u s l i m s i n . 638:Turlcish e x p a n s i o n to.

si 6

Dectan peninsula. I n d o - M u s l i m rule ol.

401.402 Decisis Treatise ( A v e r r o e s ) , 286

185 d i o p t r i c s , c r e a t i o n b y I B n Sahl, 191-192 D i o s c o r i d e s . Matma Medico, of. 202, 210,

211-212, 213

C y r u s , as Persian e m p e r o r , 396

d e c o l o n i a l i z a t i o n . i n M u s l i m territories.

D

Deedat. A h m a d . 626

D a g c s i a n . revivalisi Sufi o r d e r s i n . 532.

definitive r u l e s , o f s h a r i a h . 136, 137

d i s c o t h e q u e b o m b i n g ( G e r m a n y ) . 629

de I j i m o y . G h i l l e h e r t . d e s c r i p t i o n s o f

Discounts ( T i t u s o f Bostra), 271

5S2

ill.

54°.S4i

D a g u u i b a . Islam i n , 489 D a l d a k K c b i r . A r a b trade i n , 501 D a i b u l . M u s l i m c o n q u e s t of. 21 al Dakhw-ar. M u h a d h d h a b a l - D i n .

207-208 Dalai L a m a . U i g h u r s u p p o r t b>. 467 D a m a s c u s ; a s t r o n o m y studies i n , 164, 174. i 8 i ; a s c a l i p h capital, 16. 20. 31. 33. 314; as center o l p h i l o s o p h y J90. 301: early C h r i s t i a n s i n . 310; as early m e d i c a l center. 207. 2 o 8 ; F a t i n u d p o w e r i n , 4b: as I s l a m i c c u l t u r a l t e n ter, 60.236-237. 357.692; m i g r a t i o n to Persia. 270: M u s l i m c o n q u e s t of. 311-312; as N a q s h h a n d i tenter, 512; n a t i o n a l identity of, 5 5 8 : O t t o n i a n j u d i c i a r y i n . 380. O t t o m a n trade route t h r o u g h . 389; role i n C r u s a d e s . 339 D a n d a n c j a n , G h a z n a v i d defeat a i , 34 d a n Hodio, U t h m a u . j i h a d of. 497, 519,

M u s l i m s by. 336 D e l h i ; C h i s h t i patron of. 403; M u s l i m r u l e of. 228. 3 9 9 . 4 0 0 - 4 0 1 , 4 0 3 . 408. 409: Q u w w a i a l - I s l a i u M i » q u o i n .

228, 399. 400. 401695 D e l h i Sultanate, m e m b e r s of. 399-400,

401. 402. 404,422. 695 d e m o c r a c y . Islam a n d . 667-680; I s l a m ' s Incompatibility w i t h . 6 7 5 680 DemocTatic Party; A r a b A m e r i c a n s i n .

D i p a n c g a r a revolt, i n Java. 699 Directorate o f R e l i g i o u s Affairs, as s u p e r v i s o r o f T u r k i s h m o s q u e s . 618.621

d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ; agaiıısı Arabs. 637; against M u s l i m labor m i g r a n t s , 630 DivnminaliiRS ol Farcies and Religious Creeds (Ibnlla7m).289 D i v a n - i K l u s s . as S h a h fehan palace. 259 d i v i n e i n s p i r a t i o n , o f I s l a m i c sages, 66 d i v i n e rights. I s l a m i c c o n c e p t of, 98 d i v o r c e ; Hanafi r u l i n g s o n . 131. H a n b a l i r u l i n g s o n , 132; I s l a m i c law o n , 117, 118, 132, 646; law r e f o r m s o n . 150.

b i 8 ; refusal o f Arab A m e r i c a n

647, 686; M a l i k i r u l i n g s o i l , 127, 132;

e n d o r s e m e n t s . 635

M u s l i m a b h o r r e n c e of, 612. Q u r a n i c

D e n g X i a o p i n g , separatist c r a c k d o w n s

by. 472.47J D c n i a n k o b e dynasiy. o l F u i a T o r o . 489.

49« D e n m a r k ; I s l a m i c m o s q u e s a n d centers i n . 618; M u s l i m s i n , 604. 607 D e o b a n d i M u s l i m s , 618. 699

r u l e s o n , 120; S h a h i r u l i n g s o n . 132; s h a r i a h r u l i n g s o n . 134. 633 d i w a n s . 13. 29 D i y a r b a k i r ( T u r k e y ) . SeeAmida D j c n n e ( M a l i ) , I s l a m i n . 486. 487 D N A evidence, o f Neolithic migrations to C h i n a . 437

J20

INDEX

"dogmatic slumber." as Iqbal descrip-

Eastern Orthodox Church, Crusades as weakeners of, 602

lion o f l s l a m . 649

Eastern Turkestan Foundation. Uighur

Dolam, as Uighurs, 46; Dohnabace palace-. as Ouoman edifice. 4iJ Dome o f the Bock (Jerusalem); as Islamic architecture, 215, I16. 224. 226, 2(3, 264-265; as Islamic holy site. 23, 312, 31;. 692; mosaic decora

support by. 467

tomb i n , 455 Dongxiang. Turkic-Altaic language of.

Tulunid dynasty i n . 694; Wafd (Delegation) of. 562; women's status

East Timor. Indonesian expansion to,

i n . 688

556.557 "EasiTurkesian Republic," olTurkic nationalists. 465.468-469

Egy ptian-Syrian unit pact o f 1958-61, 558 eighteenth cennny. Islamic movements i n , 509-547

Ecclesiastical History (Eusebius). 271

Ekvall. Robert, o n Chinese Muslims. 447

economics; colonial legacy of, 571-576;

Hamue. i n trilingual inscription. 222

Islamic. 124; Quranic rules o n . 120 economy, state control of. 573-574

441

573; Seljuk rule i n . 351. 353; Shafii school i n . 114, shariah i n , 151. IÇ2;

East Indies. Irano-Islamic culture of. 357

Eaton. Charles, 104

tion of, 266 Don gta Township (China), Ma Hualong's

389. 499, 538, 696; rural economy of,

Dorian, James P. 468

Edessa. role in Crusades. 56, 339

dress; in early Islam. 220; o f Iranian

Edirne; Ottoman acceptance o f Jews

Elburz Mountains, local chieftains o i , 41 Elements (Euclid). 165. 190 Elrmenb ofThenlogy (Produs o f Athens). 270

w o m e n . 665; of Islamic w o m e n . 141.

f r o m , ;86, Ottoman judiciary i n . 380.

Empcdodes, 294

623. 634, 659. 660.663, 677, 682.

as Ottoman trade center, 389;

enclave economies, i n Muslim srates.

688. 689: o f Musfims. 623. 656: o f

Sclimiye mosque at. 347.696

Muslim school children. 623-624;

Edirne Incident, in Ottoman Empire, 697

required for early Christians, 308: o f

education; colonial encouragement of.

Sufis. 220.256; ofTuareg men. 480 drugs; Muslim abhorrence of. 6i2. 620;

378, 383; missionary schools, 579-580; o f Muslims, 622-625 Effendi. Ah Aziz, as Ottoman envoy to

shariah ruling o n . 122 Drii7e. 49, 65. 639; British protection of.

Germany, 607 Egypt; Abbasid stale i n . 693.695. ancient

582; i n Lebanon, 660

religion of. 269; Ayyubid rule of, 695,

"dual nılnıres" thesis. Islam and.

British rule o f 557. 581, 699;

s7'-57 = "dual economies" thesis. 371

Byzantine loss of. 311. 316;

Dudu Mian, as Bengali Islamic reformer.

Christianity i n . 3.47, 501; colonial armies of. 592; colonial benefits to.

54P Dungans See H i n Muslim Chinese

578; control by Saladin, 57, dccolo-

Dunhuang. Buddhist art i n . 441

niahzation o f 552: development of,

du Pnnt.Alexandre.poemon

566-567, 568; earthquake aid to, 667; economy of. 574; exports of, 572;

Muhammad by. 325. 326 Durban. Indian and Malay immigrants

Fatimid rule of, 46, 47. 56, 57. 351. 693; fiqh encylopedia project of. 150.

i n , 585

151; French occupation of. 698;

Durrand line, Pakistan's and

Iksfudid dynasty i n . 37. 694. Islamic

Afghanistan's claim to. 559 Durranis. Afghanistan rule by. 698

art In, 261; Islamic conquest and con

Dutch. Set also The Netherlands; Javanese

trol of. 12. 13. 22. 23. 30, 36-37. 43.

rule by. 534. 535. 543. 374. 575.

376;

46.475. 483. 693: Idamic culture i n .

i n Melaka. 426.427; Ottoman opposi

60; Islamic law i n , 150; Islamic m o d

tion hy. 374: i n PadriWar. 534; in

ernism i n , 299, 550, 565. 646-647.

spice trade. 389: war withAchinese,

654,656, 681.682; Islamic movement

424. 54!

i n . 550; islamic opposition to state i n ,

Dutch East India Company, emergence of. 522. 534 Dutch Indies; colonialism i n . 365, 576; diversity i n . 558 Du Wenxiu. as Chinese Muslim rebel leader. 455-456

561; Islamic political panics i n , 668; Islamism i n . 567. 568. 569, 667. 668; Khalwaiiyyah order i n , 513, niahdist opposition i n . 546, Maliki school i n . 114; Mamluk dynasty of. 57.292.340. 15 . 334. 356. 695; as member cif J

573.

574

endowmem(s); i n colonial states. 596. Hanafi ruling o n , 126. Maliki ruling on,125 "energy Silk Route," 470 Engineer, Asghar A l l . as Islamic m o d ernist. 565 engineering, i n early Islam. 193—198 England. Sec Great Britain Enneads (Plotinus). 270. 272 Enizinger, Hans, immigrarion models of.

609 Ephesus, early church council i n . 310 EpisdeonFtttWill (al-Basri), 277 The Epistles of the Brcibrm of Purity (Avicenna), 275,277 equality. Quranic rules o n . 120 equant center, in astronomy. 172, 174 Erhakan. Necmettin, as Islamic m o d ernist. 681. 702. 704 Frttigrul, as founder o f Ottoman dynasty, 373.695 essential interests, in shariah. 135—136 Ethical Traits and Modes of Conduct ( I b n Hazm). 289 ethics, in Greek philosophy, 277 Ethiopia; Christianity i n , 501; Islamic reform i n , 544; |ihad against, 501-502. 507 ethnic changes, m early- Middle East, 353 ethnic dashes, i n Central Asia, 472 ethnic cleansing, in Bosnia. 630 ethnicizanon; i n Central Asia. 434-435. 4j6, 437: in Muslim w o r l d . 554, o f

dwarfs, as Tang dynasty eniertainrrv. 442

United Arah Republic. 556. military

Dyula traders, in Africa. 487. 488. 489

takeovers til. 593; mosque control by.

E

Muslim Brotherhood of, 557. 617,

Eion, 578

621, 655, 660. 666, 669. 675, 679.

Euclid: Elements of. 165. 190. 272;theo-

703; Muhammad Ah's rule i n , 538: earthquakes. Islamic aid for victims of. e ¿7 fası Africa; "Africanization" campaigns

680. 700. 701; Muslim insurgents i n , 94; Muslim migrants from. 607; as

i n . 585. European colonies i n . 551;

Muslim slate. 652; Mustapha

exports of, 572; Indian and Malay-

M a h m o u d Society i n , 97; Napoleon's

immigrants i n , 585; Islam i n ,

invasion of, 392: national identity of.

503-506, 544-545; Shafii school i n .

555: nationalist leaders of. 562;

114; iribal chiefs i n , 588

Ottoman control o l . 372. 374. 385.

Silk Road peoples. 462- 468 edinic minority model, o f immigration. 610

rcmsof, 165, 190, 192.212 Eudes o f Aquitaine; Muslim alliance of. 315; Muslim defeat of. 314 Eulogius, Bishop ofToledo. 319 Euro-Americans, conversion to Islam. 609 Europe; early irade centers of. 390;

INDEX imperial expansion o f 510. 522,

525,

178; fic|h ridings o n . n o ; Q u r a i i i c

1

72

of. 116; shariah comparison w i t h ,

5361—537. S+o; as market for colonial

rules o n , 120, 142, 147, i n Ramadan.

108-109. i i o ; T i m b i i k t u scholars of.

products. 572; medieval. Islamic

83-84,92—93. 102. 134, 615; shariah

481

influence o n , 332-354; medieval

ruling o n . 109.

134

Fiqh Academics, i n Saudi Arahia and

Muslim views of. 329-332: Muslims

fatalism. Islamic doctrine and. 71. 72. 88

i n . 602. 604. 614. 643. 690. 692;

Fatehpur Sikri, as Mughal capital. 407.

Ottoman Empire i n . 372

Mecca. 151 Firdaws madrasa (Aleppo), 294 Firdowsi. Gliaznavid panonagc of. 41.

408,409,411

Europeans, conversion 10 Islam. 609

Fath Ali Shah, portrait of, 216

Eusebius,

Lathy, Hassan, as Egyptian architect, 618

firmans, o f Ottoman sultans, 383

Fanma; as A l l s w i l e , 45; as Muhammad's

First Civil War. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19

271

Evangel, as Allah's revealed book, 88 Evansville (Indiana), Islamic center in, 617 ev idence. Quranic rules o n . 120

397-398; Slmhnameli of, 40. 398

daughter. 130; as sister o f 8th Shiite

first pillar o f l s l a m , 77

i n u m . 302

Fi Sundial-Shams, as astronomy text. 165

Fatimids. 34, 36, 117, 694; as caliphs. 37.

existentialism. 303

49, 60, 229, 277, 351,498,694; cul-

expiations. Islamic law o n . 134

tural advances of. 49: decline i n rule

exports, f r o m Muslim slates. 572-573

of, 48, 339; origin of, 45; white color

Exposition (Averroes). 288

1

associated w i t h , 258

Exposition of (he Methods of Proof Concerning Religious Beliefs (Averroes), 286

fatwa (legal r u l i n g ) , 117.

ment. 467, 470-471

101.

102, 105, 452, 499; al-Sabti's interpretation of, 104; as unchanging, 685 Fi Zilal nJ-Quran ( Q u l b ) , description o f .Allah's jjowcr i n , 70

1 28. 131; o f

Ayatollah Khomeini. 629. o n eating

Exxon, role i n Asian oil and gas develop-

Five Pillars o f l s l a m , 77-87, 88. 92.

un-Islamic food. 635: o f Shah Abd alAziz. 325. 528

FIcrcher. Joseph, on Chinese Muslims. 438. 440. 445. 446, 449. 432, 454-455.457 floral ornamentation, in Islamic an. 400

eye, early medical treatise o n . 200-201

Fawqaniyah schools (Hyderabad), 580

" f o o d riots," i n Muslim countries. 668

"eye o f certainty" (Quran). 64,

al-Fazari. Muhammad ihn Ibrahim, as

foods. Arab dictionary of, 211

104

early astronomer. 162

Forbes. Andrew D W , 465

F

Feast o f the Sacrifice, 63

Eadlallah N u n . Shaykh. on human

Federation o f Islamic Associations o f the

inequalities. 675. 676; as Lebanese

the Netherlands. 621

Faisal. King o f Saudi Arabia, 654, 674. faith; i n Islam, 63- 105: as shariah value. 147 Falkland Islands war. Gurkha soldiers i n . false witness, Islamic liudad for, 687 686 family solidarity, Muslim emphasis of,

al Fansuri, H a m / a h , as Sufi poet and 520

al-Farabi.Abu Nasr. as early Islamic plulosopher, 271, 274-275. 279.

281,

284-285. 286, 302. 311 Faraidal-Usul (Morieza al-Ansari). as Sbii 117

Faraidi movement, 539. 698 Farrvvll Message (Ibn Ba||ah). 285

fourdi pillar of Islam. 83-85 Frante;Algenan uivasion of, 699; antiMuslim political party o m . 631; colo-

festival prayers, 94

nial ideology of. 361. 576. 582.

Fez. as Islamic capital. 36. 31. 337.481, 532

588-589. 598. 645; Galhcization policy of. 609; headscarf debate i n . 634; imperialism o f 551.651: international trade of. 390; Islamic mosques and

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. 649

centers in, 618, medieval Muslim

Fidaiyan-Klialq (People's Devotees), o f

views of, 329; Middle Eastern coun-

Iran, 579

faqir (spiritual slave). 402,404

buildings. 262

Ferghana horses, trade i n . 440

conquest of. 492,493

fann. as Arabic for art. 2i6 renewalist. 298. 423,

Fergana, Umayyad control of, 21;

Fe//an (Libya); Islam i n . 475:Ottoman

fanaticism. Muslims and. 628,629

"Founding Sunna," 121

Four Journeys (al Shirazi). 295

under. 344. 696

484;Ti|aniyya order i n , 531.

612. 618. 620. 684. 686

Foundation for the Welfare of Muslims

fountains, for ahiution. 79; i n Islamic

w o m e n . 89; i n the West. 689 Ferdinand H o f Aragon, Christian Spain

Uzbeks i n , 472

128. 150, 646; reform of,

Fort Jesus (Mombasa). Portuguese loss

in the Netherlands, 621

Associations, 621 fenunism, effect o n sums and role o f

701

shariah rulings o n , 134 Forman Chrisnan College (Lahore). 580 of. 521

Federation ofTurkish and Cultural

democracy and Islam, 677

lawbook.

United States and Canada. 617 Federation o f Muslim Organizations i n

u lama, 680 Fahd. King o f Saudi Arabia. 674. 680; o n

family law, 117.

forbidden; Islamic concept of, 93, 94;

tries created by, 651; Muslim advances

fideism. 89

into, 2t, 314. 316; Muslim guestwork

Fields of Gold (al-Masudi). 3*9

crs i n . 605; Muslim mercenaries of.

fifth pillar o f l s l a m . 84-87

604. Muslims i n , 604, 605. 606-607.

"the fifth" tithe, as Shiite requirement.

614; Muslim xenophobia in, 630: North African expansion of, 541.

83 Al filahaal-Nabatiyya (Nahatean agriculture), 210

575;

occupation u f Egypt by, 698; support of mosque movement by, 617

al-Farghani, as early astronomer. [64

Filah dynasty (Morocco), 697

Francis o f Assist. St.. 98; as ptigrun, 336

Parhan. Ishaq. as Islamic modernist. 681

finance and hanking, Islamic laws of.

Franks; medieval Muslim views of. 329;

al-Farisi. optic studies o l . 192—193 Farouk. King o f Egypt. 654. 655 Farrakhan. Louis, as leader of Nation o f Islam, 640 Ears ( I r a n ) ; B u y i d control of, 41,42: Saffarid control of. 38 al-Fasi,Allal. as Islamic modernist. 651. 680 fasting; astronomic calculations for, 177,

141.

H2

linger reckoning, as Arab numeration system, 183-184 Finland,Tatars i n , 604. 607 fiqh. Hauafi. 124; history of, 110-119: as Islamic law interprelation, 90-93. 107-110. 136. 481, 685; Ki la b al-Mutism o n . 110; Maliki, 127. proposed encyclopedias o n . 150-151; revivification

Rashid al-Dln's history of. 350; territory ruled by, 314 Frashustra. as Persian sage. 294 Friday congregational prayer, 94 Friday mosques, i n Africa. 481 FromHereWeBegin (Khalid), 301 From National party (France), as aniiMushm political party, 631 Fulam movement, 645

7

2 2

INDF.X

Ful be state (Guinea), 486,489, 491.494, 49* FulfuldY. as Futa T o m language. 4 9 ° fundamentalism; Hanhah school o f l a w i n . 693; Islamic. 7 4 . 1 9 9 - J O I . 616, f.27. 633. 656. 659.669. 682. 683:

geography, in early Islam, 177. 182-183

glassware, as Islamic an f o r m . 2bo

geometric motifs, i n Islamic art, 222.

glazed revetment, i n Islamic decoration.

243. 258. 267 geometry, Arab development Off, 183-184,189, 193,2i2 Georgia; Russian control of. 698; Safav id Fmpire i n . 36î;Türk-men posser i n ,

radical, 635 Fun] dynasty, o f Sudan. 499, 500. 506 fuqaha (Islamic law experts), 480.481.

48S Fusıaı. Islamic conquest o f 13. 31, 37,

54. 55. 35'. İ 7 '

Fuiajallon, jihad state o l . 519 FutaToro: jihad i n . 342. 330: militant

101-102; Quran as word of, 67; three

Germany : ann M u s l i m political party of. Muslim nauons. 607: imperialism of. 551. islamic concern i n , 609; Islamic

qucsi of, 489

schools i n . 624: medieval Muslim views of. 329. M u s l i m guesiworkers i n . 605. 607.609; Muslims i n . 604. 606. 614 al-Ghafiqi. Ahu Jafar. as Arab physician,

75. 76. 119 Gagik. King o f Armenia. 52 Galen: Arab disagreements w i t h . 203, 203, 207; Arahic translations of. 272, 333; as Greek physician. 199; humoral

205. 211 Ghaji. Mai A h . as Bornu caliph, 492,496 al-Ghalib.Ahdallali. madrasa founded hy, 125

sysicm o( pathology o £ 201. influence

GhalzaiAlghans, Isfahan seizure by. 370

on Arab medicine. 210,

Ghana. Islam i n . 476.479

212

Galhciralion policy, for French u n m i grants, 609-610 Gallipoli.Turkish takeover of. 342, 373, 695 Gamaa Islamiyya, as militant group, 660, 667. feSo Gambia. 491; jihad in. 542 gambling. Islamic prohibition of. 93. '14.230 Gandhara. Buddhist a n i n . 441 Gansn (China); Jahnyya Suhsm i n . 455; Klio|a Alxl.Alia i n . 431; Kho|a Afaq i n , 431; Kbuffiya Snfism i n . 454; Muslims in- 434- 443- 444- 448. 454: o n Silk Road. 440

al-Ghannouslu, Rashid, as Islamic m o d ernist. 678. 681 al-Ghazali. Abu H a m i d . as great Islamic theologian, 104, 269, 281, 282-284, 286, 288, 289. 290, 291, 293, 295, 297. 302. 694 al-Ghazali, Muhammad, as contc-mpory ulama. 680 Gba/an. M a h m u d . Sultan, as Islamic convert. 695 al-Ghazi. Ahmad lhrahım. Set Ahmad Gran gliazi ( h o m i e r w a r r i o r ) , as Ouoman ideology. 375.381 Gha/na, Indo-Muslmi rulers of.

Gao, Islam i n . 476.478. 486

397~398: as Islamic cultural center,

garden paradise. Quranic promise of.

117.

236, 258, 266. 324. 416

İ98

Ghaznavids: as cultural pairons. 357:

gardens, i n Mughal tombs. 408.411.

Ghurid displacement o l . 399: as gov¬

414-414.416.419 "garment ol 1 onset ration." for pi Ig rams

ernors for Samanids. 40. 41. 56. 228,

10 Mecca. 84-85.87 Gasprinski. Ismail, as Islamic modernist, Ç47-699 Cannula. Darius I's victory over. 222 Gaul ier.Wa İleri us, poem o n Muhammad by. 525-526 Gayer-.Anderson Museum (Cairo). 564 Gaza.,Arab losses i n , 655; Islamism i n , 667 gears, Arab invennon of. 194 Gedimu, as Chinese traditional Muslims.

229. 351; military regimesoi. 54. 55. 297. Î 5 6 . 694 ghettos. Islamic coiiuiuinilics likened In. 614. 630 Ghiyas u d - D i n T u g h l n q . as I n d o - M u s l i m ruler, 401 - 4 0 2 Ghoibradeh. Sadeq. as Khomeini u p p o nent. 664 ghulams. as professional soldiers. 28 Ghurid dynasiy. 297. 399.405. 694 Ghuzz peoples, conquest o f Seljnks hy, 352

445. 446, 447-448.450. 451.456.

Gilan. local chieftains of, 41

458,459.461,462

glaciers, alongXiklun.ikau Desert, 441.

Genghis Khan; conquests of, 58-59: descendants of. 59.405 genual mutilation (female). Muslim views o n . 634

center. 495 God. Islamic view of. 70. 71.72. ly pes o f knowledge o l . 63

mosques and centers i n , 618; Islamic

Gabriel, as Muhammad's mediator. 73.

Gohir; Islamic renewal i n . 535; as trade

Germans, in Central Asia. 471. 472

Mushms i n . 491, s"i9:Tcngdla's con-

G

Gobi IX'sert. 440

Gerard o f Cremona, 302

631; early dıplonıaııc relations w i t h

4(>

>SS glohahzation of Islam. 6OI-641

442 Gladney.Dru C, 468 glass mosaics, use in Islamic archiieclure. 226. 253. 255

Godfrey of Bouillon, in First Crusade.

338 gold. African trade i n . 47. 53.476.486. 488. 492. 498.500; use in islamic art. 221 Goldslein. Raruch. mosque bomhing by, 7°3 gong (Chinese tribute). 440 Gon|a peoples, as Islamic converts. 489 The Gospel; Arabic translations o l . 530, Quranic m e n t i o n of. 306 government, in Islam. 135.658 govenunent affairs. Quranic rules o n , 120 governors, in Islamic empire. 30, 33 gradualiry, sharıah o r i c ı ı i e d polity of, 140-144 Granada; Christian takeover of. 696; as Islamic city -state. 34. 51 Grand Islam Mosque ( U r u m q i j , 463 Grand Mosque (Mecca): militant seizure of. 674.702; pilgrimages l o . 85. 86; prayers said in direcnon of, 77 Great Britain; in Central Asia. 433. colo nial ideology of, 561. 576. 581. 584-588,645; colonial judiciary of. 594-595; ethnic m i n o r i t y model of. 610; imams 111, h25; i m m i g r a t i o n restrictions of. 611: unperialism of. 551: Indian rule by, 528. 539. interfauh activities i n , 627; international trade of. 389. 390: Islamic mosques and centers i n . 618.619.620.633; Islamic schools i n , 623-624; Middle Easiern cocmiries created by. 651; Muslims i n , 604. 605, 606. 614; Muslims in jioliiics of. 635; Ottoman competition f r o m . 391; as SoudiAsian power, 528 Great Depression, mosque building dur ing. 616 Great Game. 433; new, 437. 471. 4 / 1 - 4 / 5 ; rivalries of. 464. 465 Great Mosque; in C_rdoha. 33. 34, 238-239, 240, 253. 285. 318; i n Damascus. 24. 236. 266. 290, 692; i n Kota Raja. 534; i n Mahdiyah (Tunisia), 45; in Qayrawan (Tunisia). 14. in Sanaa (Yemen). 37: atTouba (Senegal). 491 Greal M u t i n y o f 1857. 577. 584 Great Sel|uk domains. 55; appanages i n , çh. decline of. 58 Greece, legacy of. i n South Asia. 396;

INDEX

723

Muslims in, 604; Ottoman conquest

130, 132-135. 147, Islamic reform

281.284. 332.359, 332, 682. 693;

of. 373

and. 530.685.698: Islamic theology

principles of. 129. 131. 143

Greek, Arabic translations o f classics til.

and. 301; Malik), 127; modernist

Han Chinese; as major nationality, 465,

352-354; scientific works i n , 158, 159;

views o n , 648: scholars of, 207. 280.

469; relations w i t h Muslim m i n o n

Arabic translations of. 1 6 0 - i b i . 185,

484, 519. 520, 697; secularism and,

lies. 436,447; Russian policies affect

191. l o o , 171 Greek Orthodox Church. 2. 110. 522. 339; ill Ottoman Eiupiie. 385 Greek philosophy. 269. 27j;Arabic trans lationsof. 269, 271-272, ¡ 0 1 , «02

300: o f Shiitrs, 75; Sufism combined w i t h studies of, 699; types of, 120; Zabid scholars of, 512 Hadith o f Gabriel; five pillars o f Islam i n .

ing, 437; trade w i t h Fiiropc. 437 I Ian dynasry. political policy of. 433, 435.419.44° Handy ToNes (Ptolemy), 163

77-87. 92, t o t ; Islamic creed i n ,

Hang7bou (China), Muslims i n . 462

75-90.98; islamic imponance of,

H a n o u u x . Gabriel. 299

168: independent, i n Ottoman states.

75-77; six pillars o f faith i n , 87-90;

happiness, as goal o f human activity,

J78; medieval Muslim views of. J29

text of, 75 -76

Greeks: as early astronomers, 161, 162,

green; as color ol Muhammad's flag, 259; as turban color o f Muhammad's descendants, 2 20

I ladramawt; caliphate of. 37; Islamic spread f r o m . 503. 504, 505 Halsid dynasty, i n Ifriqiya, 52, 60

274. 29J Iwams. 5 hardship, Quranic ruling o n , 135, 138 harems, i n Ottoman c o u n , 375

Theorem Honk (Qaddafi). 657. 702

Hofr puykor (Nezemi). 24S

Harcr. as Islamic learning center. 544

"greeting" formula, i n Muslim prayers.

Hagia Sophia. 2

a l - H a n n . 84; Mooonul of. 84, 215. 234

Hainan. H u i Muslims i n , 443

harkis (Algerian soldiers), 604

Gregorians. 601

82

Hajar. 85.86

Harmons of Reason ıinıf Tradition ( Ibn

Gn-nada, Muslim loss o l , 602, 603

Hajirmai, as critic o f Bomu rulers.

"grievance groups," eihiut minorities as. 610 Guangdong; Cantonese dialects o l . 468; KhojaAbd Alia i n , 451 Guangxi. KhojaAbd Alia i n . 451 Guangzhou, mosque i n . 4 4 ;

494-495 al-Hajjaj i b n Maiar. as stiennc translator. 163 al-Hajjaj ibnYusuf. role i n Umayyad conirol o f early Islam. 17 baj) (pdgrimage); o f Chinese Muslims,

guerilla warfare: atArmed Islamic

446, 447, 457. 458; as fifth pillar o l

Group (Algeria). 672. 673; o f

Islam, 84 '87; fiqh rulings o n . 110:

Egyptian underground. 660; i n

requirements for, 84-87, 101. 102.

Iranian resolution. 6 6 ; ; o f Islamic

427; shariah ruling o n , 109. 134

warrior-defenders, 537

hap-a. o f Muhammad to Medina. 9

Taymiyah), 2909 al-Harrani. Abu al-Faraj A b d a l Latif i b n Abd al-Muntin. as Hanbab jurist, 207 Harrow, 578 Harun al Rashid; asAbhasid caliph. 25. 27, 36. 160, 271, 272. 693; Charlemagne's relations w i t h . 317, 334-3JS Hasan. Muhammad Abdallah, as leader of Sonialian jihad, 544, 545, / o o e x i l ; Hasan. Sultan, madrasas huili by, 114 al-HasanAli Ibn Yunus.Abu.as early

guestworkers; immigration model for,

al Hakim; asCordoban caliph. 48, 175,

609: Muslim migrants as. 604. 60c.

284: as Faiimid caliph. 47. 335.694:

al-Hasan al-Tusi, Shiiie hadith of. 75

608, 616

mosque of, 254-255. 283: revered in

al-Hasani, Sidi Muhyi al-Din, as leader o f

Guinea, jihad i n . 542 Guizhou; KhojaAbd Alia In, 451: Muslims i n . 443 Gujarat (India); Mughal leaders of. 406. Oltoman trade ties w i t h . 189 Gulf War, 668: Khomeini's role i n . 663-666 Gunbad-i-Qabus. as grave o f Qabus bin Waslimgir, 41 Cundishapur academy, as center for sci ence and medicine, 270 Gundissalinus. 289 Gunpowder Empire, o f Ottomans. 377

Druze faith. 49 halal Idod. Muslim requirement for. 635-634.636 Halife-i Ru-i Zemin (caliph o f the w o r l d ) , as Sulcyman title. 382

French Qadiriyy a, 541 Hasanuyids. tribal stales of. 43 Hashim clan. Muhammad as member of. 6. 8, 18 Hashimiles, displacement of. 652

al-Hallaj. as early mystic. 294

Hassan. King o f Morocco. 680

Hall o f thcAbcncerrajes, in the

Hassan, Mohammad Kamal, as Islamic

Alhambra. 264 Hall o f the Two Sisters, i n the Alhambra, 264 Hama. Syrian attack o n . 702 Hamadan/Hamadhan; Jews i n . 2; Scfuk control of, 55, Uibal states i n , 43

Gur-i Mir, asTimur's tomb, 351

HAMAS, founding of, 703

Gurkhas, as elite soldiers, 592

Hamdallabi. Qadiriyy ah siale i n . 542

Gypsies; Armenian Church o f 383; as

Hamdanids; conquest o f Syria by. 48.

racism victims. 631

astronomer. 167-168

modernist. 681 Hassan, RifTai. as female modernist, 681 Hate Crime Law o f 1988. 630 Hanin, Baıdc of. Crusaders' defeat at, 57, ÎÎ9 Hausaland; Islam i n . 535. 536: before the jihad, 495-500; Muslim traders i n . 490;Toronkawa of. 488 Hawaitua. Nayif. 583

351; as Fan m i d enemies. 46: i n Iraqi

Haydar Mosque (Tadjikistan), 108

politics. 43

hay fever, early Arab treatise o n , 202

H

Hamdullah, Sliay kli. as calligrapher, 64

headscarf See hijab (headscarf)

Habash, George, 583

Hami. lslamiranon of, 442

heavenly bodies, motion of, 163. 164.

Habash al-Hasib. trigonometric func

Hiinka. Prof. as Islamic modrrnist. 680

tions of, 165, 166 Habsbtirg emperors, Ottoman opposi tion by. 374. 392 hahus, as revenue source, 241 hadith. 276. 283. 284, 290, 350. 660: o f Chinese Muslims, 449; definition of. i n ; o n idols. 231; insiructions for Muslims i n . 69. 74-75, 8 j , 92. 96.

Hanafi, Hasan, as Islamic modernist. 365.681 Hanafi school o f law. 94, 113, 114. 117. I 22. 123, I49. 276, 682, 693; Ol H l l i

165.168, 170 Hebci, Muslims i n . 443 Hebrew Bible: prophets of. as Allah's messengers. 88. Quran compared to. 73.88

Chinese Mushms. 447; Mrjfllt as c o d i

Hegel. G W F_. 297. 649

fication of, 150; principles of, 124,

Heidelberg University. 578

126. 128. 129. 137. 147

Hcjaz: Abbasids i n . 48. Islam i n . 481;

Hanbali school o f l a w . 95. 114, 207, 280,

rebellion i n , 26, 36

7^4

INDEX

Hekmaıyar. Gulbudectı. as leader o f H i / h - i - l s l a m , 659 Hellenism, Byzantine espousal of. T Hellenistic period; astronomy i n . 162. 171-174. Stcilsn Ptolemy; malhematİLs i n , 189; medical legacy of, 199. 200. 201, 202; optics i n . 191-193 Henan. Muslims i n . 441 Heraclius. 4. 12 Herat; early Chinese missions to. 440: school o f painting i n , 365,696; Tımtırid rule of, 365, 696 Herberg, W i l l , o n U.S. religious con glomerates, 610 Herman die German, 289, 302 Hnmrneutirji (Aristotle). 271, 272 Hermes. 294 Herodotus, on Central Asia, 438-439 Herod the Great. Solomon's Temple built by. 314 Hexi corridor, o f Silk Road. 440 Hezhou (China); Muslim shrine in, 448: Naqshhandi Sialism i n . 4 5 ; , 434 "Hidden I m a m . " o f Shiism. 71. 5 Î 9 . 701 al-Hifnavri. Muhammad ıbn Salim. Islamic renewal order of. 313 hijab (headscarf), as female Muslim dress. 623. 634. 689 hijackings, by Islamic militants, 666 Hijaz. Muhammad's community i n . 10 hi|ra (emigrate). 645. 691 Hilal al-Din. as founder o f ClUnese Qadariyyas. 431 Hilahan invasion. 48. 49 Hddeberl oiTburs. views o n Islam. 325 Hilla. Mazyadids o f , 4 ] Eimialay as. oases near. 441 Huns. Islamic conquest of. çı Hımyar. k i n g d o m of. 1, 5 Hindu arithmetic, 184 H i n d u i s m . Islam and. 399, 314. 339 Hindu Rush, nomad invasion of, 353 Hindus; coloniabsm eflects o n . 643; as converts to British Raj. 383: dissension with Muslims, 581; in early Chang an, 442; as peripheral U.S. group. 610 Hindustan. Islam spread to. 396.402 Hippocrates. Arab medicine and. 201, 210 hisab a l j u m m a l (sentence arithmetic). 183-184 hisba, 134 Hı-ı.'iır Ji lu Phılusopbe Musulmont (Badawi), 298 Historw it Muhomctr (Hddeben ofTours), 325 history, [hn Khaldun's philosophy of. I91 History of Alexander the Gitot. Islamic translanons of. 337. 384 H i m n . Banlt of. 693 Hızb al Dawa al-lslamiya (Iraq). 668 H i / b al-Nahda (Tunisia). 362,667.670. 677-678. 680

I l i r b - i Islamı. o l Afghanistan, 361. 639

Hııngronje. Snoııck. as colonialist schol ar, 365

Hizbollali Muslims; in Lebanon. 702; militancy of, 61B. 661.663.666 Hizbul Islam (Islamic Party), o f Malaya. 5ÇO

Huns, i n Inner Asia. 439.440 H u n t e r . W W . a' colonialist scholar, 565 Huntington. Samuel, o n c i vibrational conflicts, 631

Hodgson. Marshall. Prrsiarwit corned by. 396

Husain, Shaykh.as Ajmer shrine custodi an. 410,413

Holy Land, early Christian visitors to, 354-336

Husay n . SalavidShah. madrasa built by. 115

holy men; Berber tradiuon of. 532; i n Islamic Africa. 500.304, 303. 307,

al-Husayn ihn Ali. as assumed Muslim ruler. 26; Iranian veneration of. 368.

530. 3 32. 344: i n Islamic Middle Last,

515. 663, massacre of. 17, 509,692

350; i n Mughal courts. 414; as posiAbhasidleaders. 358:0!Sufis. 371;

Hussein. King of Jordan, pohucal reform of. 669-670

Turkish endow ments for. 362 Hong Kong; Chinese reunification w i t h .

Hussein, Saddam: i n GulfWar. 666; opposition to, 668

473: trade w i t h Xinjiang. 470 Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (Singapore). 377 H o r n of Africa. Islam i n . 475. 301-502; jihad against Europeans i n . 545 hospitals, in early Islam, 202, 208-209, 245. 271 House of God IMeeca). pilgrimages 10, 87 House o f W i s d o m . philosophical transla tions of. 272. 331, 693 Howeidy. Fahmy. as Islamic modernist. 681 Huai Sheng Si (Chinese mosque). 443 Iluasi Chinese Sufis. 454 Hubal cult. 6 H u d . as Arab prophet. 88 hudad punishments. 660. 687. 688 Huday biya,Treaty of, 10,692 H u i Muslim Chinese, 442. 443-444. 464.466; i n Central Asia. 471 : dress of. 456.459. Han Chinese compared to. 443-444. modernist reforms of, 443. 457-462; numbers of. 462; orga nizations of. 457-458, 4462; periodi cals of. 438. rebellions of. 450. 4 ( 5 . religious orders w i t h i n . 4 4 5 - 4 4 6 , Russian policies affecting. 437; irades of, 443 al-Hujwari. A h n l H a s a n , as Islamic philosopher. 297 h u k u m (Islamic code). 424.425, 427 Hulagu. as science patron. 182 Huûlegü. invasion o f Iran and jibal by .

59 hitman, as Persian lot an. 216 human dignity. Quranic doctrine of. 147 human rights, Islamic concept of, 98 Humayan. as Akhar's iadier. 405.406. 407, t o m b complex of. 407-408. 409,410. 411. 415 Hunayn ibnlshaq al-!badi; as early physician. 200 201 ; optic smdies of. 191 ; as translator, 160, 163. 272. 333 hiiner. as Turkish lor an, 216 Hungary: Latin Catholics i n , 385; Ottoman conquest of. 374. 697; Ottoman trade svith. 389

I fyderabad, Hawqauiyah schools of, 580 hydrodynamics, Arab studies o n . 194 hy drology; early Arab research o n . 196

1 Iberian peninsula; Christian reconqucst of. 344, 345; Muslim conquest 0!. 21. 692 Ibn Abd al Aziz, Umar. advice to son, 142 Ibn Abd Allah, Ibrahim, as Muslim ruler. 25 Ibn Abd Allah. Idris. Islamic Moroccan stale of. 36.43 Ibn Abd Allah. Muhammad See Muhammad; as Abd ruler, 25, 698 Ihn Abdallah, Sultan Muhammad, as Moroccan ruler. 698 Ibn Abdallah al-Rashidi. Abd al-Rahman. Bobrinski Bucket ordered by. 221 I b n A b d al-Wahid, Muhammad, Bohrinski Buckei formed hy, 221 Ihn Abdılle Hasan. Muhammad, antiimperialist mnvcmeni of, 550 Ibn.Abi Bakral-Ziihri. Abu Abdallah Muhammad, as early geographer, 476 Ihn Ahidin. as Hanafi jurist. 126-127 Ibn Abi Dııad, Ahmad, as Mutazilite the ologian, 278 Ihn A b i Zay d al-Qay ravvani. Abu Muhammad. Islamic law treatise of. 90. 104 Ibn Abul-Husaynal-Zanjani. Rashid al Din Azizi, Bobrinski; Bucket given to. 221 Ibn A d i , Yahya, as Jacobite Clırıstian scholar. 331 Ibn Aftan. UÜunan

Sec Umar ibn,Affan

Ihn Analı, Jabir, as early astronomer, 175 Ibn Ahmad, Masud, Bobrinski Buckei designed by, 221 Ibn Ahmad. Qadi Said, o n European peoples. 329 Ibn al-Aghlah. Ihrahim, as governor o f Ifriqiya, 36 Ihn al-.Arabi. as Is amic mystic. 368. 381. 415

INDEX Ibn at-Bavs wab. as Quranic lalhgrapher. 118. 241 Ibn al-Bay lar, Diya al-Din, as early physi cian, 207, 211-212 Tbn al-Bitriq, Sard of Stents of. 272 Ibn al Hajjaj al Nisaburi. Sunna book of, 74"75

Ibn Masawayh.Yuhanna, as Nesiorian physjrian. 160. 191. 200 Ibn Mugla. as calUgrapher. 241

127. 369. 647; "closure o f ı l ı r gate of." 115. tie,; in modern times. 124.

revelations, j o b Ibn Ftushd

SrrAverroes

I b n al-Jaz/ar, i s physician. 205

Ihn Sahl.Abu Sad al-.Ala. optic studies of.

Khattab lator, 29. 27 i Ibn al Muqaffa, Muhammad, as Arah iranslaior, 271 Ibn al-Mutanur. Bislir. as Mutazililc the ologian. 278. 279 Ibn a l - \ a f i s . Ala al-Din AU. 205-207. 208 Ibn al-Qasim, Muhammad, as Muslim commander, 21 Ibn al-Safiar. as early astronomer. 17; Ibn al-Sayigh,Ahii fUkribnYahya See Ibn Bauah I b n al-Shatir. as early astronomer. 171. "74-t7i. '7<> I b n al-Zayn. Muhammad, as early metal worker. 2C1

191-192 Ibu Said, o n Islamic Kanem. 492 Ibn Salih al-Rashadi. Muliammad. as founder o f Salihiyyali, 544 Ibn Saud.Abd al-Aziz, resioration o f Wahhabi-Saudi state by. 545 Ibn Saud, Muliammad, al Wahhab's alliance w i t h . 317. 545 IbilSina SceAvice-nna Ibn Sulay man. Hasan, as Kilwan sultan. S

o2

IbnTariq.Yaqub. as early astronomer. 162 IhnTashlin.Yusuf. as Almoravid rider, 15. 49-50 IbnTaymiyah.Taqi al-Din: anti-Christian polemic of. 332; as lateralis!, 289, 290-291. 293, 297 IbnTaymiy y ah, Ahmad, Islamic renewal and. 512

Ibn Anas, Malik, as jurist. 74. 280

IbnTufayl. Abu Bakr. as physician

Ibn Aia.Wasd. asQadari. 277. 278

philosopher, 175, 28; 266

Ibn IJahr al Jahiz. Amr, as Mutazilite theologiau, 2/8. 331 Ibn Bajjali. as philospher-physician, 175, 284,286 Ibn Bakhtishu. bestiary of, J J S Ibn Rait Utah. African travels of.

view of. 649 ijiihad (juristic reasoning), 117, 126,

Ibn Nannah al-Himsi. as translator. 272

Ibn Safwau, Jahn, as Deiemunisi. 278

Ibn al Muqaffa, Abdullah, as Arab trans

ijma (conse)isus). 369, 677; modernist

Ibn Nawfal.Waraqa.on Muliammad's

Ibn al-Haytharn. SaAlha/an Ibn al-Kliattab. Uniar. See Umar ibn al-

72Ç

IbnTughluq. Muhammad, as Indo¬

649.677; in Shiism. 516; as source o f shariah. 119. m - 1 2 2 . 123 Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood], m China. 450.458 Iksbidid dynasty, i n Egy pt and syna. 37. 694 iktiyar. as doctrine o f choice, 71,72 Ili (China). Naqshbandi order i n , 546 Ilkhanid Mongol regime, i n Iran. 234. 235- 352. 695 illegal immigrants. Muslims as. 608 illumination, i n Islamic manuscripts. 241 illumination is! philosophy. 697 Ihuimish. Shams al-l>in. as Indo-Mushm ruler. 397,400-401.402,410,420. 695 Ilyas, Mawlana Muhammad.Tabhghi Islam founded by. 700 imamate: ismail 1 notion of, 49: Sliiite concept of. 26. 44, 60. 75.94.95, 115. 121,296 nil am liar is, as Husayn and Hasan shrines. 368 Imami. as Shiitc quietest wing, 44 imams. 628; In Africa. 492; in Dutch

Muslim ruler. 397.401. 402, 404.

Muslim schools. 624,62Ç: funtrinns

405.695

of, 625; i n interfaith activities. 627.

IbuTulun. Ahmad, mosque commis sioned by, 237, 238 IbnTumart. Muhammad, as founder o f

opposition in European expansion by. 540; public intcresl ruling o n , 143; Safavid shrines of. 368. in US. Muslim schools. 625

478-479. 495. 504. 691; Asian travcl-

Almohad movement, 40

ogue of, 42c, 422.425; as early travel

Ihn U b a y d . A m r . i s Q a d a r i . 27/

Imamzada Sayyid AU (Iran). 72

er. 404

Ibn Umar, Abu Bakr. Jolof king as possi

imamzadehs. as imam shrines, 368

I b n Dunama.Ali Gliaji, as Bornu ruler, 492 Ihn I l i f t , Muhammad, control o f Ifriqiya by, 52 Ibn Hanbal. Ahmad, as early jurist. 95. 114. i 2 9 - r j o . 278. 280, 291. 359. 693 Ibn Harh. (afar, as Mutazilile theologian. 278 Ibn Hassan al-Tusi. Muhammad, as Shine mujtahid, 117 Ibn ilayyan. Jabir. as early akhemist. 198 Ibn l l a z m ; anr-Chnsiiai) polemic o l . 332;as Islamic Literalist, 2B9-290

ble descendant of, 490 Ibn Umar, Jibril. as dan Fodio's teacher. 535 ibn Umar Aqit, Mahmud. as T i m b u k t u qadi, 483

cies alfcenng. 609-611; mosque zations for. 621 -623: Western c o m

Ibrahim, Anwar, as Islamic modernist, 681.687. 7 ° 4 Id al-Fitr. as post-Ramadan least. 178. 482.549

munities of, 604-609 immigration policies, in the West. 609-611 incarnation. Christian doctrine of. 332

Idgah Mosque (Kashgar). 466

İnce Minareli, i n Konya. 53

al ldrisi. Abu Abd Allah Muliammad. as

Incoherence of the Incoherence (Avcrroes). 288

European countries. 329

European culture and peoples. J50

lenges for. 611-615; immigration p o l i cullure of. 615-620: umbrella organi

Ibn Idris. Ahmad, as Islamic reformer.

Ibn MahmudAqit. Umar, as Timbuktu

immigrant Muslims, 601—641 • chal

Ibrahim, i s Prophet, 63, 82. 86, 88

early geographer, i 8 j , 185. 476; o n

list, 157.191-295. 298. 316:00

İ m i n Minareı (Turfan). 442

Ibn Zamrak. i s court poet. 264

Ibn Hilal.Ali. Srr Ibn al Bawwah 510-531. 536.699 Ibn Khalduiu as Arab philosopher-sc ien-

iman (revealed laith), 63,424

Idrisiyyah movemenr. 699 al tfram.on AskiyaMuhammad. 4 8 2 - 4 8 ; Ifriqiya; Almohad control of. 51, 52; Islamic control of. 33. 35. 36. 37. 46. 48; Sunni population o l . 45

Incoherence of [he Philosophers (al-Gha/ali). 283, 286 Independence party (Istiqlal), of Morocco. 562. 651 independent reasoning, in Islamic legis lation. 112-114, '52 India: All India Muslim League of, 562;

iuurmrnai. as Berber holy men. 53

Briush rule of, 528. 539. 552;

disan (active virtue), 98. I O O - I O I . 103

Chnsnan minorities i n , 583; colonial

Ibn Majjah al Qazwini, Sunan of. 75

Ihyu tilumal-din (al-Ghazali). 269

benefits to. 578; colonialism i n . 564.

Ihn Masarrah. as Islamic philosopher.

al l]i. Adiid al-Din. as early theologian.

qadi. 483,485 Ihn Majid. as early nautical scientist, I 8 J

284

29J. 197

580-581. 586, 597;colonial patronage In, 597 598; decolonialization of,

726

INDEX

55;. diversity i n . 580; early medicine

policy 111. 572: Shafu school i n . 114;

in. 2oi; economy of. 471 ; English lit

ulama movement 111. 562

eral) i n . 584: fiqh and shariali acade mies i n . 151; ühaznavid rule of. 694;

Indus RiserValley. Muslim campaigns i n . 21

refugees f r o m . 605; as Muslim stale. 549. 542. 554. 652; national identity of. 554. 555.560. 651; Ottoman Empire i n . 372. parronage i n . 599:

İfan Idris prayers used i n . 531; Irano

Jnloij al Maysur (Bello). 494

qanai irriganon i n . 197; n-voluiionary

Islamic culture of. 357: Islamic anti-

inlitah. o l Sadat, 574

movements i n . 667, 699, 700. 702:

colonialism i n . 550; Islamic

inheritance; fiqh rulings o n . n o ; Islamic

Safavid painting of. 365: Salavid rule

modernisin i n . 547, 550, 648; Islamic

laws o n , 151, 635, 646. 647. 686.

of, 363.697; Sasaman cultural

Party of. ÇÇ7; Islamic philosophy i n .

Quranic rules o i l , 120; Sunni law o n .

espousal of, 1; Shah o f See Pahlavi.

297; islamic reform i n . 54c. 697;

lio

Islam i n . 21. J l . 32. 31.40, 41 . 6 0 . 595-404; Ismailis i n . 46; jihad move ment i n . 698; Khilalal movcmeni in, 700; modern education i n . 580; Muslim migrants from, 607, 608: Muslim population of. 582, 611; Muslim slave irade w i t h . 504; Muslims viewed as outsiders i n . 581;

inlay w o r k , as Islamic art f o r m . 221. 242. 253.411.414.411114 Inner Asia Sw ulso Central Asia; earlycountries i n . 439 Inquisition. efleci o n Muslims. 603. enforcement o f Mutazihsm by 89 Insiitute for Muslim Minority Affairs. 612

Mohanunad Rcza. Shall o f Iran; shariah implementation i n . 151. 686—687: Shiism i n . 72. 94. 366-371. 509. 550. 663. 664: slruggle withTuran, 40, Sufis i n . i 5 9 ; T i m u r i d period i n . 352; Turkish rule i n , 54. 353. 363; ulama role i n . 680; women and minorities in. 679; women's dress code i n , 141; women's rights and status i n . 654. 687. 688

nationalist leaders o l . 562. 652; native

uitellect. as sfiariah value. 147

rulers of, 586; Ottoman competition

Intentions of the Philosophers (al-Ghazali |. 283

Iran Beihel school (Tehran), 580

f r o m . 391. Rarsis i n . ç 8 j ; Persianate

inlerfaith relations, of Muslims,

Irani.Yak Banu-yi. as Ishraqi plutoso-

Turk conquest of, 397; as postcolonial state. 581, 586; Shiism i n . 528; Silk Road to. 441; social changes i n . 576-577. 578;Wcstcrn influence o n , 579 India Act o f 1784, C2t India Act o f 1935, 586. (97

626—631. 637 Internal Security Ac 1 o f i960 (Malaysia). 597 International Islamic University o f Islamabad. Islamic law research ai, 151 International Islamic University o f Malaysia. Islamic law research at. 151

pber. 296 Iranians, in early Chang an. 442 Iran-Iraq War. 637. 705 Irano-lslamic culture, i n early Middle * *

357

Irano-lslamic language, development of. 117

Indian Civd Service, 594

intifada, in Palestine. 703

Indian Nationalist Congress, 599

Iqhal. Muhammad, as Islamic m o d

Bath party- of. 390; Ruy id dy nasty of,

ernist. 297. 299. 530. 578,647.

43, 693; civil war i n . 581. 654, early

649-650.680,683.685.699

military control o l , 351; expansion of,

Indian Ocean. Islamic commerce o n , 58; Ottoman fight for. 189; Portuguese commerce o n . 521; rise o f British and Dutch empires i n . 322 Indians, as early astronomers. 161, 162, 168. in early Chang an. 442: as early

iqca; i n early Middle Kasl. 352. 356; as

Iraq, 16,697; Abhasid decline i n . 43. 58.

556: Greek studies i n . 271. Hizh al

lax t o l l e i t i o n method, 30, 42-41. 56.

Dawa al-Islamiya of, 668, Islamic con

57. J77

trol of. 23. 29. 32. 15, 238. 515.693;

Iran. 697. See oho Pahlavi Iran; Abbasid

Islamic culture i n . 60; Islamic law-

mathemancians. 168-168; 111 Great

state i n , 695; annexation o f Persian

Britain. 605. 606; in Malaysia, 585.

G u l f islands, 557; Buy id control i n .

559; as mandate couniry. 651; military

596

42. 694. Buyid ousting from. 43;

takeovers i n . 593; Muslim refugees

individuality, shariali's focus o n . 146

caliph control of. 12. 22. 25. 29. 30.

f r o m . 605.618; as Muslim stale. 652;

Indo-Aryan period, in South Asia. 590.

76. 180. Christians i n . 3, 583; decolo

national identity of, 558, 580,

n i z a t i o n of, 552; development of.

Oitoman coiurol of, 189; in Persian

567. 571; early military control of.

GulfWar. 701: Salfarids i n , 38; secu

351; economy of, 574; European pro

larization polity i n , 572; Seljuk rule

197 Indo-European Tadjik language, o f Chinese Muslims. 4 4 j Indonesia; activist movements i n . 667; Christian minorities i n . 58;; colo

tection o f minorities In, 582; expan

in. 54, 55. 153, 694; Shiism i n . 666;

sion of. 556: Ilkhanid Mongol regime

siege of. 637; Sdk Road ihrough. 440;

mal army of. 592; communist

in, 234. 235. 352. 695; intellectual

guerilla factions i n , Ç79; creation of.

activity i n . 579; interest in Central

feci; cultural activity i n . 579. devel

Asia. 455; Islamic anticoloniahsm m.

opment of. 567, 568. 573; economy

550. 566: Islamic culture i n . 60. 357.

of, 374; expansion of. 556. (57;

Islamic decoration i n , 229, 239. 245.

Islamic anticoloniahsm i n , 531; Islamic art i n . 2 22: Islamic law replacement i n . 5(18; Islamic m o d ernism i n . 565, 656, fe8ı; Islam i n . 4(0, 431; Masjumi party i n , 678; as m o d e r n M u s l i m slate. 549. Muhammadiyyah movement i n . 97. 562; M u s l i m intellectuals of, 579; M u s l i m migrants f r o m . fe04. nation al activists of. 562: national identity of. 558. 560. 380: n a ı i o u f ı o o d u m m a h disharmony i n , 555, 561; pluralism i n , 690; secularization

changes i n . 150; Kurdish identity i n ,

ulama role i n . 680 Ireland: Muslims 111. 604; U.S. emigra tion of.fei1 Irish Republitan Army. Qaddafi's support of. 657

2 6 2 , Islamic modernism i n , 565. 681,

"Iron Amir." o l Kabul. 587

682; Islamic poUtlcs i n . 703: Islamic

imgarion engineering, i n early Arab

renewalism i n . 514. 525-526. 518. 656; Islamic Republic of, 562. 661-667; Islamic revolunon i n . 152.

countries. 196-198 Isabella of Castile. Cltristian Spain under. 344.696

629. 661; Islamisni i n , 568. 569.570:

Isadore of Seville, writings o n Islam, 322

Khwariznishah conquest of, 58;

isami. as Dctcani historian. 401,402.

Kurdish identity i n , 559; local and regional autonomy i n . 38. mibtant activists i n . 579; militaries of. 59J,

403-404 fsfahan; early Chinese missions 10. 440; Ghal/ai Afgahn seizure of. 370. 697;

Mongol tonquesl o f 58, 59, 352. 363;

Islamic culture o^ 60. 295, 357;

Muslim intellectuals of. 579; Muslim

Maydan-i Shah of, 366, 697: observa

migrants I r o m . 606.607; Muslim

tory at. 181-182: as Safasid capilal.

INDEX 365, 376; Stljnk control o f 55; Shiisiu

s37-S4s: worship in, astronomy and.

in. 366

'77

727

replacement of. 568; research o n . 151: rUsulnh as treatise o n . 90. 128; scholas-

al-Isfahani. poetry collection of. 354

islam, meaning o l word, 66, 6 / , 77,424

tic contributions to. 124-130: schools

Ishaq; as Ibrahim's win. 8b; as srientic

Islam. Sdularnm.dnJ tic PJiiluwphy of ihc Finnic

at, 94-95. secularism and, 300. shari-

translator, 163 Ishaque. Khalid. o n Muslim imnugranr com murti tic's, 613—614 al-Ish b i l l . Abu al-Abbas. Ixitanical ircalise of. 212 Isliraqi movement, i n tarsia. 293-296. i02. i O ! Islam; activist movements i n . 667; i n Africa, 475-307; ancr-srral reUgion coexistence w i t h . 427; aniiiolonial movements i n , 551. 650: in Asia, 69, 195 473-astronomy i n , 161-183. 184;

(al- Atlas). 298 Islamabad, air service to. 435

lslam as expert in, 380: society and.

hlum and Modernity I Rahman), 690

107-153: virtue concept in, 96;

Iblum and the Principle, of Government (Ahd al-

Wahhahism and. 545

Kaziq). 300 Mum and the Problems of Ciiiliiation ( Q u i b ) . 300 "Islamdom," efforts 10 reconstitute, 559-560 al-lslam Feyzullah. Shaykh, In fcdirne Incident, 697 "Islamic Alliance." o f Muslim

in Central Asia. 510: change move-

Rroiherhisod and Socialist labor Party,

ments i n . (#2;Christcndnm and.

669

105-345. 572. 507: Chrisnan converts

ah concept of. 91. 135; Shavkh al-

Islamic architect!.ire. 215-267; ambiguous

Islamic Law Conference (Paris. 1951). 150 Islamic modernism. 295. 299-301, 537, 547. 565, 6 4 ; ; al-Afghani as founder o f 699; critics of. 652; law reform and. 686. limits and legacy of. 646—650: proponents of. 565, 680 Islamic Movement, ; o o Islamic Party (Jatnaat i Islam) organizations. 557,362 Islamic Pari) (Parrai Islam Sc-Malaysia. PAS), o f Malaysia. 562, 570. 687

to, 3!2; Christianity compamd to, 77,

designs in. 262; color use in, 253; early

86,88: chmnology of. 691-704; colli

period (if. 193-198; figurai depictions

dogma interaction w i t h , 277-281 • o f

nial criticism of. 564; contemporary.

in, 231-232. 236; as mosl important an

history, 291; interaction with theolo-

643-690; converts to. 609.639; creed

form, 218; o f Mughal emperors, 255,

gy. ; o i - 3 0 ; ; m o d e r n period of.

o f (Hadilhof Gabriel), 75-77;

159.409-420, in Gunman Empire,

296- 299; in Muslim Spain, 284-289;

Crusade effects o n . 338; culture of.

347; weaiberuig o£ 233

systematic writings i n . 272-274

60—61; decentralization and regional-

Islamic an. 2i5-267:absrract motifs i n ,

Islamic philosophy, 170. 269-30;;

Islamic Renaissance Party ( I l i z b - i Nah/al

ism of. 32-43: democracy and.

220; anitonism in, 222. 230-236;

667-680; dissemination by Silk Road.

arabesque motifs i n , 2 2 2, 236-246;

441, dogma of. 108. i t i . 120; early

calligraphy as. See calligraphy. color

constitutional principles o f 676;

Christian slews of, 336; early expan

i n , 222. 246 260. 267. definition of.

esiabhshmcni of, 515. 599, 702. 703.

sionof, 10-14, 306-309: education

215-222; geometric motifs i n . 222.

i n . 578-580; empires of, 349. 603. See

236—246. 267; Safavid painting as,

also Mughal Empire; Ottoman Empire:

365, 370: w i l l f u l ambiguity i n . 222,

Safavid Empire; encounter w i t h

250-167

Western thought, 297; ethics of. 95— 105; expansion into Christian territories, 309-317, 350. 602-603; faith and practice i n , 63-103; fundamental-

lslamicaic, use m describe Asian rcli gious siaies, 397,401 Islamic call societies, as relief agencies, 667-668

Islami). ofTajikistan. 561 Islamic Republic o f Iran. See ulsti Iran;

women's status i n . 688 Islamic RepubUt o l Sudan, women's sta tus in. 688 Islamic Republic party, c f Ayatullah Khomeini, 590 Islamic Research Academy (Cairo), 151 Islamic Revolution, 115 Islamic Revolutionary Movement. 660

ism i n , 74, 299-301, 616.653. 656.

Islamic Center Foundation (Turkey). 62 2

Islamic Salvation Army (Algeria). 672

659, 665, 669, 683: future propsecis

Islamic Center o f New York, 601

Islamic Salvation Front (Front lslamique

of, 680; globalization of, 601 -641;

Islamic Circle of North America, 621

de Salut. LIS), as Algerian relief

gunpow der empires of, 347-391;

Islamic culture; preservation of. 632; i n

agency. 562, 568, 667, 671

influence on medieval Europe, 35 2-354; languages of. 40; law of. See Islamic law; medieval Christian views of. 321-328; in Middle East. 347-391: Middle Period of. 63. 66; militancy o l . 13, 20, 47;, modernism i n , 116, 152, 547: mysticism i n . See Sufis: Siihsm; nascent law of. 27; nationalist move ments i n . 650—656; non-Muslims i n , 385-386,583. 690; orthodoxies of. 89; Ottoman role i n expansion of. 3 7 5 - 3 7 6 ; » political forte. 656—661. political history of, 1 -61: i n public

Spain, 54 Islamic Democratic Alliance (Pakistan). 669 Islamic Jihad, as militant group. 660. 665, 666,680, 702 Islamic law, 90-95. 350; adaptability and change i n . 135; i n colonial states, 596; current status o l . 150 151; develop mem of. 149. 693; duality of, 1 0 7 - n o ; five values of. 93; i n Hadidi o f Gabriel. 76. history of. 110-119;

672, 676.

678. 70J. 704 Islamic science. 155-214, 270. 334; astronomy. 161-183. 'R4;eultural context of, 156-161; engineering and technology. 193-198; history of, 156; medicine, 198-210. 170; optic*, 191-193. translation movement i n , 15-9—160. 163. 164, 185. zoo, 270 Islamic Society o f North America ([SNA), 621 Islam icTendency Movement

individual vs. community i n .

(Renaissance or Ennahda Pari)). i n

144- 145; modernism and. 649-650,

Tunisia. 562. 666. 670. 702. 703

life, 568; rapid spread of. 311-312;

681; moral valuation m , 93; Muslim

reformist organizations i n . 97; renew-

immigrants and, 612. 690;

al and reform i n , 509-547- rituals of.

Naqshhandi emphasis o n . 520: i n

Islamic theater, replarrmem w i t h scripture, 459 Islamic theology. 269-303. 3;2:A1-

94; in Safavid Empire. 370 -371; Six

Ottoman Empire. 385, 512,646:

Ghazali as greatest theologian, 269; as

Pillars o f Faith of. 87-90; in South

Ottoman sultans as executors of.

by-product o f Islamic philosophy:

Asia, 510; in Southeast Asia. 510;

382-38;; recognition by Western

269: fundamentalism in, 299-301;

stereotypes o f 644; sultanaies of.

states. 632-634; reform of. 686; rein-

Greek translation use i n , 271: interac-

347- 391; violent dcpicuons of.

t r o d u t i i o n of, 687; in renewal move

tion w i t h phdosopb). ¡ 0 1 - 3 0 3 ; m o d

324—32;; warrior-defenders of.

ments, 514, 535. 538. 648;

emlsm i n , 299-301: modern period

7

28

IN

DFX

of. 296-298; secularism i n . 299-101

Jatar al-Sadiq, as sixth Shine i m a m . 95.

al-Jawziyyall. Ibn Qayyim. as 1 lanbali

Jafan school o f jurisprudence. 93. 682.

al-Jizari. lhn al Razazz, machines of.

jurist and Literalist. 132. 143. 289. 291

Islamic Youth Force ot Malaysia (AB1M). ¡.7°. 701.

704

Islamism. 565. 567. 667; political plaif o r m of, 569; postcolonial develop-

192-191. 195, 196.

693 Jahangir; depiction of, 417; as Mughal

ment and. 569-570; professionals

emperor. 407.410.411; N u r Jalian as

i n . 668; support o f mosque move

svife of. 238.411. 414; Sufi courtiers

inent by, 617; women's rights i n , 688 Islamist movements, 562. 614 Islann/ation; in Central Asia. 4 1 4 , 4 3 7 : inlerpretanons of. 681 Ismail. Sliah; as cultural patron. 365: Safavid reign of. 1 6 1 - 1 6 4 . 6 9 6 Ismail. Shaykh, C J J

of. 4"S fahan Shah. Nezami manuscript of. 248 jahhya (precon version disbelief), 4*4 Jahriyyas; branch orders of, 456; as

Prophet, 8;. 86

Chinese Sub order. 449,452. 431, jahr (remembrance), Jahriyya Sufi use 184

Jakhanke. as African Islamic scholars.

Ismaihs, 281. (84.618; as activist Shiiies. 4 1 . 277: as challenge to.Abbasids.

Jerusalem; apostolic sect o í 309; Arab loss of. 635; Crusader capture of. 56, l l 8 , 602, 694; early Christians 111.

313.

holy siies of, 311, 112; Jews i n , 2; Muslim occupation o f (638), 692; Jesus, 330; death and resurrection of.

454-4SS.436.462

Jai Singh observatory (Jaipur). 182.

al-Jazuli. as Mortsccan Sub. 486

Saladin's conquest of. 37, 695

of. 455

Ismail I ; Nezami manuscripr of. 24S; as

198

al-J¿zirah, caliph connol of, 29

312. Islamic intercessory role for. 88; as one substance w i t h God. 310. Quranic description o l , 306-307 Jews; Abbasid acceptance of, 338; in America. 610; conversion 10 Islam.

4S8.489 Jamaat-i Islami; Mawdudi as founder of.

318, i n early Chang an, 442; i n early

700; of Pakistan and Bangladesh. 91.

Near East, 2.4. 9; i n early Spain. 344:

w i n g of. sot Fatimids; in India and

562. 595. 617. 618. 621. 652.657. 667.

in Egy pt. 49; ghettos of, 614; interfaiili

Pakistan. 297

669. 675; Rabbani as leader of. 639;

relations w i t h Christians, 627; inter-

Isodddc ( f t x p h y r y ) , 271,272

Taliban compared to. 660; worldvicw

faith relations w i t h Muslims, 626;

Israel; colonialism of, 551; creation of,

of. &51

4 4 - 4 9 ; i n Eqypt. 49. 276; Faiimid

Islamic conversion of. 609; as Middle

Jamasp. as Persian sage. 294

Eastern minorities, 359: as monothe-

of Lehanon by. 702; Saudi jihad

Jamat al-Nasr (Nigeria). 667

isms, 19, 305; Ottoman acceptance of.

against. 701; In Six-Day War. 655; sup-

JaiubLchiis. as Ncoplatonist, 270

385. 386; as racism victims, 631;

port for. 630

Jamcelah, Maryam. as female modernist,

slaughter by Crusaders. 338. 339

585. 604.627, 6 t 2 , 6 5 5 . 700, invasion

al-Israeli, Ibrahim ibnYaqub, visit to Europe by. 329

JibaJ; Buyid control of, 41. 42: Scljuk

68i lames I , King o f England. 410

Israch-PI.O repprochcmeni, 472

Jami. hiaiiond Zuiaykha o d . 250

Istanbul. StralsoConsiantinople;

al-fcimidfi. 298

control of. 55.Turkmen migration inlo, 34 Jihril i h n Umar. as Qadiriy yah leader.

Ouoman judiciary i n . 380; Ottoman

Jamiah-i Nizamiyah (India). 580

rebuilding of. 376, 385, provisioning

(ami a! MabuJi m l G h l M Ii Ilm ul-Miqui (Al-

of. 388. 391. Uighur separatists i n ,

S19

Marrakushi). 180 kimi d-Tirmidhi. asSunan tollecnon. 75. 77

466 "Is the Bihlc the Word o f God?" ISwaggart), 626

Jamiai-iUlaina-i H i n d (Pari) o f Ulama). o f India. 550

Istifan ibn Basil, as translator. 211 Istiqlal (Freedom) party, o f Morocco, 562. 651

ft (ami li-Mufnidiir ill - .Adwiyn «nl-Agidlliyil

64 c. Islamic mosques and centers i n ,

Jamiyyat Ulama-i Islam (Pakistan). 669

618; Muslim incursions into. 315;

Jamiyyat Ulania-i Pakistan. 669

Muslim migrants to. 608; Muslims i n ,

Janids, i n Bukhara, 1197

604

Janissaries, in Ottoman armies. 377.

Islamic art. 221.

¡ 8 0 . 390- J92, 697 Japan. Chinese relations w i t h . 457; inter-

Ouoman trade center. 390

Japanese, in early Chang an. 4 4 2

586;

o f 514. 586; exports o f 572; Islam i n .

translations of. 271,

333

Jaddis (Central Asia), as Islamic m o d enlists. 56; Jade Gate, on Silk Road. 440 Jafar. O n n , as Malaysian leader. 562

389.424,428.429-431,696; landtenure policies i n , 574; M u s l i m slave trade svirh. 504: national identity o l . 534. rural economy of, 573 Java War of 1825-1830. as jihad. 535 Jawhar. consolidation o f Faiimid rule by. 45. 46

532;

againsl Russia. 531: ofSafavids. 363;

Jackson, [esse, Muslim suppon lor. 637 312

534; Middle East groups of, 667;

334; role i n Islamic reform. 510.

Jassy. Treaty of. 698 Dipanegara revolt i n . 699: Dulch rule

Jacobites, 331,602; Greek studies and

sion. 13. 20. 519. 537: Java War as.

teenth century. 523. 526; o f

J Jacobite church. 310.

n o ; againsl French,Algiers. 541; in India. 698; as Islamic militant mis-

Ottomans, 375. 382; PadriWar as.

Jarrahids. o l Palestine. 4 1 , 4 6 lava: colonialism i n . 563,575. 576.

550: against Fnropean imperialism,

Muslim fanaticism and. 629: m nine-

al-Jarjari, as Fatimid vizier. 48

Izmir. Ottoman judiciary i n . 380: as

564; against Crusaders, 338; o f dan Fodio.497. 519, 535-536. Í 4 ' - Í 4 2 . 533. 545. 547. 550: fiqh rulings o n .

est in Central Asia. 433 243

519.

555-536. 543. 697: inAlgerla, 563: India, 528. 539; colonial criticism of.

Jamiyyai al-Dawa (Lihya). Libya. 668

ivory; African trade i n , 300; use in

550. Ç51. 659; of African Muslims. 475- 476.490. 495. 506.

Arab-Israeli War as, 657; in British

Italy; colonial ideology ot. 5B8-589,

«11.4*4

645; in A c h t h . 541: o f Afghanistan,

211-212 Jamiyai al-fslah (Kuwait), 667

I l i i u i d al-Dawla. Mughal t o m b of. 258.

jihac (holy w a r ) . 76. 102.485. 509.

[medical d i a i o n a r y o f l b n al-BaytarJ.

Italians, as racism victims. 631

IthnaAshari Shiism. See Twelver Shiism

Jidda, O u o m a n trade route thniugti, 389

o f T i t u Mir. 538: use to oppose buropeau expansion. 540; i n West .Ahita. 519. 515, 536542 Jilw ah, M i r / a Abul. as Ishraqi phi loso pher. 296 Jin dynasry. relations vviih Central Asia, 440 Jingdezhcn (Cliina). porcelains made at. 4J8 linns (Muslim gcrucs), 95,497

INDEX jirya, as Mughal lax. 419 John o f Damascus, views on Islam, p i , 3 « . 323 Johns.A.H.,449 John the Baplisi. as Allah's messenger. 88 Jolof. as West African kingdomf, 490 Jordan; Abbasid sites i n , 32; creation of.

Kadizadeli movement, ami-Ottoman natumof, 381-382 Kadizade Mehmed, reform movement of, 381 kahila. as Ottoman lew ish community. 386 Kairouiyyui mosque (Fez). 79

729

Kemal. Mustafa, secular Turkish siatc of. 651. 652. 700 Kemalisin, inTurkey. 561. 567. 624 Kenya; "Africanization" campaigns i n . 585; Islam i n . 503, 505; postcolonial tensions i n . 581 Kerman ( I r a n ) ; Saffarid control of. 38;

556, 557; development of, 567; Hanafi

Kake Fitri, Mai Idris's conquest of. 493

school i n . 114; Islamic political parties

al Kalanı Azad.Abu, as Indian leader. 562

Keuani, Ali, as Saudi consultant. 635

i n . 668. 669-670. 701; Eslamism i n ,

kaiam (dialectic), i n Islamic phdosophy.

Khadijah. as Muhammad's first wife. 6.

668, 681; monarchy of. 651-652; M u s l i m Brotherhood of. 557, 666, 669-670, 703; M u s l i m migrants

277, 280, 289, 303 Kdlild »0 Dirnnn. Islantic translations of, 357

f r o m . 608; as Muslim slate. 556, 559:

Kalyan minaret (Bukhara). 244. 521

national identity of, 558; Shafii school

Kampala. Indian and Malay immigrants

in, 114; tribesmen i n Arab l egion of, 584

i n , 585 Kananj, Humayan's defeat at. 407

al-Juhai, as Mutazilile, 280

Kailem (early Chad). Islam i n , 492-495

fudaism. j . 269. {50. Islam compared

Kano. Islam i n . 493-497. 306

to, 77. 86. 88, 327, 639, 690: universal

Kana Chronicle, 495.497

beliefs of, 348

kanutis (legal codes), o f Ottoman sul

Judeo-Christian worldvicw ; in America, 610. 640; Muslims and. 601, 604. <>77 Judgment Day. Book of Reckoning revealed o n , 2 I J judiciai system, of Ottoman Empire. 580-381 judiciary, colonial legacy of. 594 al-Juhani. Mabad. asQadari. 277

tans, 383 Kaniiri society. Islamic scholars i n , 494 Karabalghasun (Mongolia); Kyigyz c o n quest ot. 464; as Uighur k i n g d o m , 465 Karachi, as port city. 573 al-Karaji. Abu Bakr Muhammad, as early mathematician. 185-186. 187

Iukun, attack o n Kano by. 497

Karakalpaks. i n Central Asia. 471

Juliana vail Stolhergscbool. Islamic

Kara-Khiiai.Transoxiana conquest by, 58

instruction i n , 624

Karakoram lUghway. 435

Scljuk control of, 54-55

8, 306. 691 al-Khafri, Slums al-Din. as early astronomer. 177 Khabd. Khahd Muhammad, as Isfamic secularist. 501 Khabd al-Baghdadi. Shaykh, as Islamic reformer. 526-527, 532, 533 Khahdi movement, i n Islamic reform, 526-527 Khahdi yy ah-Naqqshbandiy yah orders, spread of, 532 al-Kbalili. as early astronomer, 181 al-Khalil ibn Ahmad, as Arab lexicogra pher. 189-190 Khalil Sultan. Nezami manuscript of. 248 Khaljis. i l l Delhi Sultanate, 399-400 Klialq (People) Party (Afghanistan). 579 Khahvaiiyyah order. Islamic renewal by. 5'3. 531-SJl Khamenei, Ayaiollah Sayyed, as faqih i n Iran. 703

Jupiter, Ptolemy's model for, 172, 173

Karam,Yusuf as Islamic m o d e m i s i , 298

khan, as term for secular monarch. 41

Jurcheu. Chinese occupation by, 439

Karhaia. Battle of. 663: Husayn shrine at.

Khan. Amir, as Pathan chief. 528

jurisprudence. Islamic. Set Islamic law

17. Î 5 9 , 509. 515: pilgrimages to, 368;

Khan. Asaf. as Nur Jahan's brother. 411

juristic preference, as source o f shariah.

Shii renewalism i n . 521

Khan.Ayuh; military government of.

119. 12; juristic reasoning, o n social change. 121-122 al-Jurjaiii. Aj-Sharif, as early theologian, 193.297 justice; Islamic concept of, 98. Quranic rules o n , 120 Justice and Benevolence party (al-Adi w a l l h s a n ) , o f Morocco, 562 Justinian. 2; closure o f Athens school by, 270 jute, as M u s l i m states export. 572 a] Juwayni. as Ashante. 281, 282 [uybari shaykhs, as Naqshbaudiyyah. 521 al-Juzjani. Abu Ubayd. as early astronomer. 171

Karlowtiz.Treary of, 510 Karluk nomads, as Uighur allies. 464 Kasam. Ahmad. Set M a k h d u m - i A z a m Kashani, Muhsin Fayd, as Ishraqi philosopher. 296 Kashgar; "EastTurkesian Republic" i n ,

Kaaba: asnonical alignment of. 179:

Turkish endowmenls for, 362

M u s l i m cemetery i n . 433; new trans

Kharijism, 38,49. 279: Berber conver

portation links to, 471; as uadc center. 4İ5. 4Î&.441 Kashmir, bridal party i n . i i 3 ; M u s l i m refugees f r o m . 605. 618. 6;8: M u s l i m vienms i n . 63O; Pakistan's and India's claim to, 559; relief agencies i n , 668

sion 10,45; Sunni repression of, 53 Kharijites, 16, 17, 18, 22. 35: community boycotting by, 146; Islamic proselytiz ing by. 35-36 Khatami, Muhammad, as Iranian presi dent. 704

Katsina. Islam i n , 497

Khatmiyyah order, o f Ibn Idris, 531

Kaykaus. Sultan, t o m b of. 228

khattars (water conduits), 196

Kayor. as state o f the WJIOI. 490

Khay bar oasis, 10

Kazakhs, in Central Asia, 471

al-Khayyam, Umar. as early mathemati

tary agreement w i t h . 471; Chinese o i l

Black Stone embedded i n . 259; idols

agreement w i t h , 433. 469; ethnicizarton i n . 436; Islamizationof. 520;

ages to. 10. 85. 86. 87, 102; as Islamic-

Russian policies affecting. 437. 472;

sacred site, 1.5. 10, 17, 78, 86, 108

Slavs and Germans i n , 472;Turkic-

Kaana (Mall). Islam i n . 487

Altaic language of. 4 4 ; . 445: Xinjiang

Kabul; British occupation o l . 5S7;Talihan

trade w i t h . 468.469. 470

control of. 660

kbanaqas; as Sufi residences. 360. 367; Khandaq. 10

removed f r o m , 231; Islamic p i l g r i m

Kadisiya, 12

missal by, 595 Khan. Liaqat Ali. as Pakistani leader. 594

465, 469. Islamizauon of. 442, 466,

Kazaklisian. 434. 435. 466: Chinese m i l i

K

595. secularization policy of. 572 Khan, Ghulam Ishaq, government dis

al Kazeruni. Shay kli Abu Ishaq. asSuh preacher. 359

cian, 187. 188 al-Khayyat. Abu Husayn, as Mutazilitc theologian. 278. 280 al-Khazani. Abd al-Rahman, sialics research of. 194 al-Khidr (Green One), as Islamic sage. 66 Khilalal movement (India), 700 Khirbat al-Mafja, as Umayyad palace. 2;i khirqa. Sufi adaptation of, 360

730

INDEX t6. 17. 31; Rationalists i n . 112

Khitan. Chinese occupation by. 439

Kissinger. Henry, ethnic slurs of. 637

K h o t h o (Gaochang), as Uighur city, 464

kisvva. as Kaaba veil. 220

kufic script, use for Quran, 7. 229. 242

Choi, Abu] Qasem. t t Iraqi ulama, 680

Kniib ul-Aohuni (al Istahani), 354

Ku Klux Klan. 609

Khomeini.Ayatollah Ruhollah. 628. 680,

Kitab al-Ashr MJJJIJI h al-Ayn (Hunayn i b n

701. 703; h t t w i on Salman Rushdie 664-665; Iranian support of. 628. J

i

Kulibalı. Bakarı, as Islam convert. 487 Kulibali, Biton. as Segou founder, 486-487

Kitab UI-HOMI ifi dl-Tibbul-Munsiiri (al-Razi).

of. 629: government control by. 662-663;

Ishaq). 200

Ishraqi Shute. 296; as

Islamist. 565. 590.656. 658 Khosrow I, Emperor o f Persia See

203 Kitubul-Hind (al-Biruni), 398

450, 452. 453. 454. 456". 4i>l. 462 al-Khu|andi. Abu Mahmud Hamid. as

al-Kuntl. Sidi al Muklitar; as Qadiriyyah

Kilabd-Istihar.492

leader. 519: revivalist menemeni of.

Kiliihal-jabnvul Miiqubulu (al-Khwarizmi).

486

as first work on algehra. 157. 184-185.

Anushirvan KhuByyas. as Chinese Sufi order. 449.

Kunta family, as Qadiriyyah. 519. 542

Knominiang (KMT) government; Muslim oppression by. 453; Uighur

186

recognition by. 465

Kitah d-Kamil fi al-Sinm al Tihbiya (alMajusi), 203

al-Kurani. Ibrahim ibn Hasan, as Kurdish

Kitab d Mabsut (al-Sarakhsi). 110

earlyastronomer, 168, 181. 191 Khuldabad. as Chishu t o m h complex.

Kitab al-Mdoki (al-Majusi), 203

mystic.451.455 al Kurdi. Mahmud. as Islamic revivalist,

KiIoM-Mono/ir (Alba/an). 190. 191. '93

418.4'9 k h u l ' k h u k (divorce), legal rules o n .

Kitab nl-Nabat (al-Dinawari). 2n

53 i Kurdish peoples; etlinic plight of. 559; as

Kilab d-Tasnf li man Ajua an d-Talif [medical

118. 127 Khurasan: Abbasid power i n . 28. 29. 693. Baghdad rivalry w i t h . 27;

"MountainTurks." 559, as Muslim

encyiopedia], 204

migrants. 607; as Muslims. 55. 36. 57.

Kitabd Tibbd Mansun (al-Razi), 202

451. i n Ottoman slates. J78, 527

Ghaznavid regime i n . 54, 56. 694;

Kilab fi d-judan •',„ H.; Is: (al-Razi). 202

Kurdistan, 526

Islamic control of, 33. 38.40;

Kitab ft |m«imi llmd-Xujum (al-Farghani).

al- Kurdunun. Shaykh Ismail, as Islamic

Kliwar izti ishah conquest of. 58; M o n g o l conquest of. 58. 400: Saffarid control ot". 38. 39; Samanid dynasty

164 Kitab fi Marifutal-Hiyd d Hondas) yyo (al Jazari), 196

reformer, 532-53; kuttab. as Abbasid clerks. 29 Kuwait; donation lo Chinese mosque.

of, 693; Scl]iik control of, 54-55, 56,

Knub Miiunul-Hikmci (al-Khazani), 194

401; extremist activities in, 665; bqh

57-58. 35" ; Turkmen migration into.

KitabSu»ord-lWiwikihal-Thabi(a (al-Suh),

encyiopedia project of. 150; indepen

54. 399; Umayyad campaigns

from.

21. 24-25 K h u r r u m , Prince Sir Shah Jchan

dence of. 557; Iraqi claims ro. 556,

166, 167

559; Islamic politics of. 673; Jamiyai

knights; as Christian heroes, 328; role in

al İslah of. 667; Maliki school i n . 114;

Crusades. 338

KhuisiJ Bibi v s. Muhummud Amin. 118

knowledge, three types of, 64-66, 70

as mandate country, 651; o i l exports

Khuzcstan (Iran); caliph control of. 12;

"Lnovsledge by presence" (Quran). 66

of. 556. 574; i n Persian GulfWar. 703;

Saffarid control of. 38 Khuzestan province. "Arabistan" crearion from, 557 al-Khwara/mi.Abd al-Rahman SeeAnisi Khwarizui; astronomy 111. 191; Mongol conquest of. 58; Samanid control of. 39. 54; Umayyad control of. 21 al Khwarizmi; algebra and trigonometry development by. 157. 184-187. 188. i89:as early astronomer. 163; time keeping test of. 180 Khwarizmsliahs, Near East empire of. 58 Khyber. Christians i n , 306 Kiev, Ouoman trade w i t h . 389 Kilij Arslan II.Sultan. 55 Kilwa (Tanzania);AhuI Mawahib dy nasty of. 504: early Edam i n . 503 al-Kindi.Yaqub ibn Ishaq al-Sabah; as early philosopher, 273. 274. 278. 285. 287, 331, 333; optic treatises of. 191 King Abdul Aziz University (Saudi

63*. 77 kola nuts. African sources of. 486. 495. 497

Konya (Anatolia); Ince Minareli i n . 53; Islamic culture of, 60; Ottoman Trade

Koran. Set Quran Koreans; i n Central Asia. 472: i n early Chang an. 442 Koosedag, Rattle of, Mongol victory i n . (9 Kosovo; Battle o f (1389). 373. 695; Muslims i n . 638: violence u i (1998). 704

guage of. 443. 445; Uighars and, 466 Kyrgvzstan: Chinese mdnary agreement w i t h , 471: new transportation bnks to, 471 L labor migrants. Muslims as. 604. 605. 608.6;o Labour Patty (Great Britain). Muslini councilors i n , 635-636 al-Lahiji. Fayaz. as Ishraqi plUlosopher. 296 iahore. as Islamicale center. 399. 41B

Kraton. near Yogyakarta mosque, 430

laity, as Islamic modernists. 681

Krgy zstan. Xmpang trade w i t h , 468, 469

lake Chad, Muslim kingdoms along.

578 Kuala Lumpur, economic development of. 573; Malay-Chinese riots i n . 655;

Kirina. Bat lie of. 478

national identity o l , 558, 656

ment. 540

cies allecting. 437;Turkic-Altaic lan

Kotoko. Mai Idris's conquest of, 493

Kinnard College (Lahore), 580

Kishiev, Kunia Haji. in Qadiriyyah mnve-

Karabalghasun by. 464. Russian p o l i

Koprulu family, as Ottoman viziers. 511

Kuala Kangsaw Malay College (Malaya),

al-Kirmani. 2K4

Kyrgyz; in Central Asia. 471; conquest o f

route through. 589; Seljuk rule i n . 55

Islamic Economic Research of. 151

Kiiiuan, Seljuk sultans of. 694

Kvvixarafa. attack on Kano by. 497

Kong peoples, as islamic converts. 489

Kuala Kangsar. Islam i n . 420

Quranic intriptions i n . 227

Kuwait Parliament, 135

Koli Beile, as Uighur leader, 464

Arabia). International Center for King Khalid International Airport.

suppon o f mosque movement by. 617

"knowledge o f certainly" (Quran), 64.

Kubravsiyyas. as Chinese Sufi order. 449. 461 Kuchiik Kaynarja.Treaty of. 698 Kufa (Iraq); Islamic conquest of, 13. 15.

491.493. 536 lake Van, Byzantine defeat near. 55. Church o f the Holy Cross o n , 52 "la mission civilairice." as colonial pater nalism. 56a. 561 LamuArchipelago. Islam i n , 504, 505 land tenure policies, i n Java, 574 languedoc. Muslim raids of. 21 lao jiao (old teachings). o f Chinese Islan. 462

INDEX i l Laqani. as carl) theologian, 293

life, as sharlali value, 147

lasNavas dcTolosa (Spain). Almohac!

Light o f lights; o f al-Shirazi. 295; of'al

defeat at, 51

Suhrawirdi, 294

731

al-Madani, Ali Ahbasi, as Algerian politi cian, 671. 678,681

Lincoln's Inn, 578

Madharal family, as Eg) jilian administra tors. J /

Last Judgment, Muhammad's idea of. 8

lineage, as shanah value. 147

madhi. IbnTumart as. 51

latchkey kids, Muslim disapproval of, 612

linen textiles, 218

madhist movements. 546

lat Dior, Gamhian jihad of. 541

I intao, Naqshbandi Sulism i n . 453

Madjid, Nurcbolish. as Islamic m o d

Latin; Arahic translations o f classics i n ,

Liiucia (China); as center oi Qadanyya

last Day. Muslim hclicf of. 88. 346

i l l —312. 314; scientific translations

Sufism. 431, 458; as Chinese "little

into. 139-160, [62, [63, 164, 166. 186 Latin America. Muslims i n . 604. 608

Mecca.' 453; Khoja Abd.'Vila i n , 431 I inxia H u . Autonomous Region

Latin Catholics, i n Ottoman t m p i r e , 383 Latin Kingdom o f Jerusalem. 338. 340-341,343. 694 I .u 1 1 1 Scholasticism. 303

Eg) I". 491. 4 9 4 ;

414

218. 228, 257; as Islamic school, 36,

Linzia. Naqshbandi Sufism i n . 453 261

l a w o f Family Rigliis (Turkey). 130

Li Peng, 433.469

Law 11CPersonal Status, i i i Egypt and

Lipton. llavidA.,467

Syria, 150

I ilerabsm. i n Islamic philosopy. 289

Lo»s (Plato). 171

Literalists, 278, 289

League o f Nations, 573

literary culture; Arabic-Islamic. 31; i n

"leap o f faith." o f believers. 69

298 madrasa(s); architecture of. 357; i n

(China), Huasi Chinese Sufism i n .

lion-headed birds, as Islamic an motif.

lass, o f Islam Set Islamic lass

ernist. 681 Madkour. Ibrahim, as Islamic modernist.

Shira/,42

i s

Islamic an f o r m .

57.99- ""4.115. '25. 207. 213. 269, 292, 294. 359; in Konya. 53; o f Ottomans. 379-380; as source o f Tabban, 659-660 Magii. kamal About, as Islamic m o d ernise. 681 al-Maghih, Muhammad ihn.Abd Karim. i s Maghriebi reformer. 485,496 Maghreb; BenYusuf Madrasa i n . 125;

leases. Quranic rules o n , 120

little Black sumbn. library ban o n , 629

Berber rebellion i n . 45; black color

Lebanon; ban on travel to. 637;ChrUtian

Mull. Ramon, views o n Islam. 323

avoidance i n . 259; French Muslims

rule i n . 340, 557; civil war i n . 633,

loans, Quranic rules o n . 120

f r o m , 606; Islamic revivalism in,

701; confessional tensions i n , 339;

I.odi, Sikiiidcr. as Afghan king. 408

4 9 - Ç 3 ; Islam movement f r o m , 475,

crearion of. 337. 582.631; develop

Iridis, N o r ü i India rule by, 400

485.486;Tijaniyya order i n , 531 ; tile

ment i n . 367; Hanafi school i n , 114;

logic, in Greek philosophy, 27t, 272.

Hizhollah founded i n , 702: Islamic

¿83

modernism i n , 6;6, 660; Israeli inva

logocentric perspective, u l Quran. 76

sions of. / o l ; Muslim migrants f m m .

l o n g Match. ofCliinese Communists.

607, 608, 618; Muslim relugccs f r o m .

461

mosaics of. 256 Magiamsm. Stt Zoroastrianism "magnification" act. i n Muslim prayers, 78,81.102 Magnus. Albert us. 302

605; national identity of, 380; plural-

loplyk, as Uighurs. 465

Maguzawa. i n Hausaland. 497

Ism i n . 690; as postcolonial stale. 581:

Lop Nor. as oasis city, 441

nl-Mahani. Abu AbdAllah Muhammad

Shiism i n , 660. 661, 700; Syrian

Lorichs. Melchior. Istanbul drawing of.

expansion to, 336, 559; ulama role i n . 68o

577 loms motif, i n Chinese art, 239

legal reform, in Muslim srates. 686

Louis I, King of Aquitaine. 326

Leghari, Faruq. Bhutto dismissal by. 395

Inuis XVIII, F.mperor o f France. 511

Leon. Castile union w i t h , 35

l ou I a n . as oasis city. 442

Lepanto. Bat do of. 696

"lowering o f the gaze," o n opposite sex.

L( Prut Journal. 331. 360. 563 The Levanı; Christian missionaries i n .

114 loyang. Buddlusl art i n . 441

379; Christians i n . 383; colonialism

l ucknow mutiny o f 1858.581. 584

in. 376; development of, 367;

Luddites, 337

Maronites i n . 382; Ouoman control

lunar calendar, of Islam. 177-179

of, 388-389 Uao dynast), relations w i t h Central Asia. 44°

Luther. Martin, views on Islam, 323-324 Luttrell. Geoffrey, 327 Luxembourg; etluuc m i n o r i t y model of. 610; Islamic mosques and centers i n ,

liberalization initiative, o f Rafsanjani.

618; Muslims i n , 604

574 liberlarianisiu. o f Mutazilah, 281

lyallpur (Faisalabad). economic devel opment of. 573

libraries, in early Islam. 173. 215. 218. 285

Lyautey, General, o n French role i n Morocco. 588

I ı by a cahph raids o f 1-. Islamic conseris i n . 36; Islamic movement i n , 550; Italian control of. 388-589; Jamiyyat al-Dawa of, 668; lack o f bureaucracies i n . 594; land claims of. 559; military takeovers i n . 593. 654. 701; as modern Muslim state. 349; as

mahdi. as Islamic millenarian figure, 44, 88. 546. 550,645 al-Mahdi; as Abbasid cahph. 25.693. as first Faiimid cahph. 45 al-Mahdi. Idris i b n . as long o f Liby a. 701 al-Mahdi, Sadiq, as Islamic moderuisi, 681 Mahdi movement. 645. 699. 702 Mahmud. Zaki Najib. as Islamic m o d ernist and secularist. 298. 301 Mahmud I I . Sultan, we-sienii/ing reform Of. Ç23- S2S Mahmud o f Ghazna, as lndo Muslim ruler, 40. 397"199- ^94 Mahmud Shah, o f Melaka. 423-426.696 mahomeries, 327 Mahomet (Mahon), as purported Islamic deity 326, 327, 345 Ma H o t i g k u . asYihewani leader, 461 nialirams (characters). 494 al-Mahri, Sulayman. as early nautical sci

M Ma Ba. Gamhian jihad of. 542. 699 Ma Bufang. asYihewani leader. 460-461 Macauly. l o r d , o n Easierti culiurc. 563-364

postcolonial stale, 586, 588;

Macedonia, Ouoman control ot, 373,

Saiiusiyyah order i n , 531. 701: sup

19' Madagascar. Islam i n , 503

port of mosque movement by. 617

i b n Isa, as early mathematician. 187 maharajas, as Indian rulers. 586

entist. 183 Ma Hualong. as Northwest Hui rebellion leader, 455 mahzar (decree), o f ShaykliMubarak. 409 Mai Idris Aiawma, as Bornu caliph.492. 491. 49^

732

INDEX

Maimonides. U n k and Jewish culture

Malay sian Cltiiiese Association. 596

OC İ 4 Mair. Victor. 437

Malay sian Indian Congress. 596

Majapahit Kingdom ( j m ) , Islamic con quest of, 696 Majlısı. Muhammad Baqir. as Ishraqi philosopher. 296 majlisi al-shura (consultative g r o u p ) , 677 al-Majriti, Maslama. as early astronomerphilosopher, 173. 284 al-Ma|usi.Ali ı b n Abbas, medical treatise ut, 203, 204 Mahasıb (Morteza al-Ansari). as Shii law book, 117 Makassar (Sulawesi). 427 M a k h d u m - i A / a m , Naqshbandi order founded by. 433, 321 Makhdumzada Sufism. i n China. 453 Malabar coast, role S i no Indian trade, 420. 421 Malacca, as p o n city, 373 Malacca (Melaka) St ran. as Sino-Indun trade link, 420 Ma laichi, as founder o f Khufiyya Sutism, 4 54 Mala). Islamic king of. 477.478 Malay; dyadic reading of. 430: Islamic anticolonialism in, 550; Islamic w r i l ings i n . 297- 298; as language o l Melaka, 426.427 Malaya: colonial benefits to. 578, colo

al-Mansur.Abu (afar. asAbbasid caliph, 25.272 Mansura (Sind). Muslim founding of, 22

Malaysian League o f Muslim Youth

Mansuri hospital (Cairo). 208

(ABIM). 570. 701, 704 Malazgirt. Seljuk defeat at. 55

Mao Zedong, guerilla warfare of. 537

Malcolm X. as leader o f Nation o f Islam.

map-making. Srr cartography Maqolid Mm d-Hoyu (al-Biruni), 191

609. 640 Maldives, as modem Muslim state. 549

Muqomal (al-Hariri). 84. 215. 234

Mali; Islam i n , 3b. 476. 478-480, 489.

al-Maqrizi. on Islamic Kanem. 492

490. 495: jihad state i n , 698, Muslim

marabouts, in Morocco, 531

migrants from. 607

Ma rag ha observatory. 174. "8". 182.

Malik, Imam. 142

Marathas, Aurangzeb's conflict w i t h , 418

Mabk ibil Anasal-Asbahi. as pjrly- jurist.

Marbat (Oman). MusUm graves at

95. 113, 123. 127. 128, 280, 693 Maliki school o f law. 90.95. 113,

mosque of . 109 114.

117. I1J- H i . 149- 332. Î 3 2 . 6 8 2 . 693: importance in Qadinyy ah movement, 5 I 9 . 333: principles of. 127. 128.

129.

131; scholars of. 478. 484

424.

Malik-Shah, as Seljuk sultan, 56, 182, 282 Malinkc. as people o f Malı. 47S, 480 mallamati (rural scholarship). 494 Ma M i n g - h s i n , Naqshbandi movement 321

Mamluks ( N o r t h Africa), 269. 290; an works of. 241. 242. 251; conquest o f 501. 695: conquest o f Makuria by.

Malay sia; Brunei and, 537: communis! guerilla factions i n , 579; creation o l .

Mardin, atabeg stales of. 56 Marka, M u s l i m - o w n e d slaves of, 488 Maroniie church, development of, 310 Maromtes; Armenian Church of, 383; "iiiropcanncss" of. 5B3; trench pro tection of, 582; in Lebanon. 661. 700 marquetry, as Islamic an f o r m . 242-243 Almovand capital. 50: al-Sabti as

Sufism. 454-455, 456

Eg)'P' by. 57. 292. 340. 352- 354. 336.

trade. 420

41E Marco Polo, 422.440. 695

Marrakesh; Almohad seizure of, 51; as

Ma M i n g x i n . as founder nf Jahriyya

patronage i n . 598; Islamic law i n . 596

Malay s, i n early Chang an, 442

marble screens, i n Mughal tombs, 411.

Marinids. in Morocco. 256. 291

t-95

of. Ç'2-513. 319,

marble, use i n islamic buddings, 253

Mardavij, as Iranian warlord. 41

al-Malik Salih, as tide for Mcrah Silu.

nialism i n , 564, 581. 58b; colonial Malay peninsula, role in Sino-Indian

183.

184

mabk. as title for ruler. 355

499; conquest o f Syria by. 695; as

patron sainl of. 98. 100.

ioi:Banu

Marin seizure of. 52; fuqaha deportn o n to. 485: as Islamic cultural center. 53. 484 al-Marrakuslii.Abu Ali. as early

mercenaries, 38. Mongol defeat by.

astronomer. 180 marriage; of early Mushms and

59- &9S

Christians. 308, 319; fiqh ridings o n ,

Mamluks ( N o r t h India), 399. 410 al-Mamum; asAbbasid caliph. 27, 693;

n o , ii3;Hanafi rulings011. 124,

126;

631: decolonialization of, 552; devel

"House o f W i s d o m " of. 272. 331. 693;

Hanbali rulings o n , 129. 132; Islamic

opment of. 5(17, 568; ethnic and reli

as Mutaziliie. ¡ 8 0 . promonon ot

laws o n . 151, 478. 646.686: law-

gious clashes in, 559; European

Hellenic studies by, 271. 278; science

reforms o n , 150, 647; Maliki ridings

colonies i n . 551; export economy of.

studies in rule of. 159

o n , 127. 132: Muslim customs o l . 616;

t6o, 164,

181

S 7 . 373: independence of, 596;

Maneh 11 dynasty. Sec Qing dynasty

Quranic rules o n . t2o, 137; Shafii r u l

h i ami c law i n , 596; Islamic law

Manchus. Chines: occupation by. 439.

ings o n , i28-i29;shariah rules o n .

1

research i n . ı ; ı ; Islamic modernism

440

•49. 63s: temporary ( m u t a h ) . 130

in. 565. 681; Islamic Party of. 562.

Mande. as Malinkc language. 478

Mars. Ptolemy's model for. 172.

687. Islamic politics of. 704. Islam i n .

Mandingue; as African uadcrs, 495;

Marseille. Musbm piraie raids of, 316

69. 424. 426-429. 643; Islamism i n .

Dyula as, 489

568; judiciary of. 595; minority c o m

Mtmb al-Huvunun (Ibn Bakhtishu). 358

munities i n . 585; Muslim migrants

Mangits, as Central Asian rulers. 698

f r o m . 606: national identity of, 554, 558, 560; nationalist leaders of, 562;

Manicheanism. 280.434; influence o n Ulghurs, 464

nationhood ummah harmony in.

Manichcana, in earl) Chang an. 442

555- Ç70; patronage i n . 598; plural

Maııilesı Destiny, nf missionary c r u

ism i n . 690: posicolonial problems

sades. 632

i n . 581; posicolonial state leaders of.

Mankizen. Batileof. 694

597; Shafii school i n . H4;shariah

Mansa Musa, as Muslim king o f Mali.

court i n , 151, slate conirol o f Islamic public life 111. 568; United Malays National Organization of. 562;

478 Mansa Sulayman. as Muslim king o f Mab, 478

w o m e n modernists i n . 681. women's

al-Mansur, asAbbasid caliph. 162.492

organizations i n . 689; women's slams

al-Mansur. Abu Amir (Almanzor). as

in. 688

Spanish caliph. 34, 320

173

Marshall Plan. 571 Martel. Charles. Musbm defeat by, 21, 314.692 m a r u f (virtue), in Islamic law, 96. 98 Mars (Iran); Islamic conquest of. 13, 27, 31. 54; Umayyad campaigns f r o m , 21 Marwanids. tribal states of, 43 Mane. Karl. 71 Marxism, 301, 303, 579. 649, 653. 657, 663 Marxist policies, role in eihnici/aiion of Central Asia, 436, 437 Mary theVirgin, Muhammad's descrip tion of. 306. 307 Mtisuil fi dl-Tibb 111 Mumdimin (Hunayn ibn Ishaq), 200

INDEX \l.ı-ıı,":. as Shıite tomb, 368

mechanical engineering, in early Islam,

Ma Shouqian. as Muslim CTtincse hisloriaii, 458 Mashriq.Turkish entrance inio,

194-196

41-58

of. 50

Messengers; of Allah. 88; consciousness

213; in Suleyiuaniye complex. 380 medicine; in early Islam. 124.

Masrauda tribe. IbnTumart as member

Ottoman Empire in. 372; SelpikTurks in. 351 ; Turkmen in. 353

medical schools; in early Islam. 207,

Masjumi party (Indonesia), 551, 678

733

160.

of truth of. 66 messiamsm. in Islamic renewal move

198-210, 213, 271. 334,Galen legacy

ments. 546

of. 201. 202; Hellenistic heritage of.

metallurgy, in early Islam. 198

Mason. K.. 317

199, 271, 334; translated texis on. 159.

metahvorking, in early Islam, 215,

al-Masudi, as early Arab trascler. 3 Î 9 .

271.272.334 medicines. Arab dictionary of. 211: con

504 Masud III. Sultan, minaret cuuimis

tainers for, 210. 2ii

sioned by. 228. 229

Medina. 4. 48; Christians in. 306; early

maştık Mel aya. as Melaka saying. 428

Islam in. 11. 12, 13, 15. 140, 143,

MaTai Baba. as KhufiyyaSufi. 454

280, 307; early Sufism in. 451; as

Mataram dynasty. SultanAgung of. 697

Islamic holy city. 37. 427; Muhammad

materialism. Islamic rejection of. 300

in, 9. 60. 87. 95. 96, 110, 119.

Maimo Mafica (Dioscoridcs). 202. 210.

301.674. 691; Ottoman control of.

144,

142.

382. 389, 696; Ottoman judiciary in,

211-212, 213 Malhanawi lexis. ofTurkish mystic, 453

380; renewalisl scholarship in. 522;

mathematics; in early Islam. 183—191; of

suras (chapters) of, 685; Traditionists in, M2; inVVahhabi-Saudi state. 517

Plato. 274: translated lextson, 159 Mauretania. Qadiriy jab movement in,

Medinan consensus, 113. 127.

128

Medina! al-Zahra.Abd al-Rahman's

S'9

palace al. 34

Mauriiania. Morocco's claim 10, 559 mausoleums, of Mughal rulers. 402.411 massali, Islamic captives as. 14. 22 MaWaidu, inYihewani movement. 458. 4S9

31; Khalwatiyyah order in. 513; Onoman conquests in, 374. 385, 388 Mediterranean Sea; Muslim pirates in. 316; Ottoman trade routes on. 389. 390; Silk Road to. 441

Masvtana lalluddin. 455

Mehmed II, 386; as art patron, 383-384;

Mass lana Makhdum. influence on

Constantinople takeover by. 342. 343.

Khuffiya Sufis. 454

374. 376. 377

M aw I ay Muhammad, as Islanuc reformer. 530 Maw ley Sulayman, as Islamic reformer. 3jo.532 AI-MmvsiMnl-hicjhiyyd, as fiqh encylopedia. "SO

347-391; Islamic anticolonialism in, 550: Islamic movements in. 652; Islam i ration of, 347-391; mandate countries of. 651; societal structures "middle nation." moral responsibihey of. 96 migrant workers. Muslims as, 604, 605. 608. 609, 615 mihna. asAbbasidinquisinon. 27;ofalMumnn, 278 milestones, calligraphy on, 223 militancy of Islam, 13, 20, 475, 476, Stt olso jihad

renewalisl movement. 519. 533. 537.

427-428.696

538

Melbourne. Uighur separatists in, 466

mihtary industries, in early Islam. 198 military institutions, of postcolonial

332

-_-: c Memorial Mosque to the Prophet (China), 443 Menelaus theorem, 190, al-Biruili's use of. 169 menhuan. as Sufi orders. 448. 449, 459,

"43

middle classes, til Muslim states. 578. 580 Middle East; gunpowder empires of.

Edam; against other Muslims. 692; as

melting pot. United Slates perceived as.

Mecca, 4, 5. 8,48. 185. 655; Christians

Michael the Scot, 289. 302

Melaka. Islam in. 389.424.425-426.

Mazandaran. local chieftains of 41

meat consumption, caliph ruling on.

Meyerbof^ Max, 205

Meknes. Islam in. 484

Melling. Antoine Ignace, 511

measles, early Arab ireatise on, 202

Empire, 372. 381 Mexico, open-door practice in, 97

(holy war): warrior defenders of

Melchitcs. 310. 331.

Mazyadids, of Hilla, 43

Mevlei i Sufi order, role ill Otloman

490. 491. 513. 519. 579

Maydan 1 Shah, in Isfahan. 366.697

46!

Mfleurok)o,ici) (Aristodc). 284

Motur. as Hanafi law condificanon. 150

maralını, as caliph court of appeal, 29 Ma /.henwu. as Naqshbandi Shaykh.

metaphysics, Neoplatonic, 282 Metaphysics (Aristode). 272. 282

of 348-350

Mediterranean area; Islamic culture in,

Mauryan dynasty, of Asoka. 396

221.

251.253.260. 337. 365

461

states, 592-599 military officers, foreign education of. 578-579 M i " . I S..379 "millet system." of non Muslim Ottomans, 386 Mini Gorus, as Muslim immigrant group. 619 Miltion Man March. 640

mental illness, early treatment of. 208

Minah, role in pilgramages, 85. 86

FiqhAcademy in. 151; Grand Sharif of,

Merah Silu. as Sainudran king, 424

Minangkabau (Sumatra). Islamic renew

Ottoman revolt of. 538; Ibn Idris as

mercantile classes, in Muslim states, 577

teacher in. 530-531; Islamic scholar

merchants (bazaaris); alienation hyShah

in. 30b; early Islam in. 11, 13. 17,

140;

al in. 520 minarets; in Muslim architecture. 228.

ship in. 543: Kaaha in. 1. 5;

oflran. 661; as carriers of Islam. 480.

229. 244, 378,400, 410.416.419.

Muhammad in. 110. 119. 30(1. 613,

485.486 as critics of Khomeini 665

475. 524,3s symbol of Eslam.

645.691.692: Muhammad's birth in.

Mercury. Ptolemy's model for. 173

b; Muhammad s raids against. 10.

Mérida (Spain). Christian takeover of. } i

minbars (pulpits), woodcarved. 242.

Ottoman control d£ 382, 389, 696;

Merv. on Silk Road, 440

pilgrimages to. 10. 31. İ 7 . 4 9 - 63. 75.

Meskhetian Dirks, in Central Asia. 472

143.246.339 Mindinao (Philippines), diversity in.

84-87. 102. 312.427.457-478. 484¬

Mesopotamia; atabeg stales in. 56-57:

244-245. 616

558

499. 518. 528; prayers said indirec

Buyid dynasty of. 694; cabph control

tion of, 179. 312; renewahst scholar

of. 12. 13, 29, 351, 693; Ctuistiiury in.

ship in. 522; suras (chapters) o f 685:

3;control bySaladin. 57;early Islam

mining, in early islam, 198

Traditionistsin. ii2;mWabbabi-Saudi

in. 11. 331. 351, 353; Jews in. 2.4:

minorities; In colonial army and police

sıaıe, 517

Mongol conquest of. 59. 357.

miniatures, as Mughal art form. 410. 411.414-415.417

forces. 584; in Islanuc countries. 679.

734

1 MDEX

684. 687: in Malaysia, 484 minority communities, o f Muslims. 611

8. 13. '9. 305;Quranic dextrine of.

605.615. 619. 620. 632. importance 10

146-147.517

immigrants, 619-620; as important

miracles, attributed 10 Sufis, 360. 361

Montreal, foreign populations of. 610

Islamic art f o r m , 218; 111 India. 399.

M i r Damad, as Shiile scholar. 295, j68,

m o o n . e a r l y A r a b s m d i e s o n . [65, 177

403: i n Iran, 663; u i Java. 428,429,

Moors, as name for African Mushms.

430. preaching licenses for. 568;

«97 al-Mirdar.Abu Musa. as Mutazjlite the

repair by Aurangzcb. 418-419; in

J2I.322 Moral Rıundctrion ol ihr Islamic Moianmi ( Abul

ologian. 278

morality, i n Islamic law. 108. 109.

m i r i . Ottoman lands as, 387 M i r Sayyid A h . as Persian painter, 219

111.

134. '35- "40. 147-148

M i r r a . Iskandar, as Pakistani leader. 594

moral valuation. In Islanuc law. 93

Mislikar, Muhammad, as Ishraqi

Moristos, as name lor Spanish Muslims,

philosopher, 296

344

Miskin. Hajji, in Padri movement. iJI-534

Rome. 607: rooms for preparation o l dead i n . 633; f r o m Safavid Empire.

ala Masvdudi), 300

Mirdasids, o f Aleppo. 45

365. 3 6 6 ; as sites o f instruction, r re.; in Sweden. 606.Turkish endowments for. 362; i n United States. 617 Most Favored Nauon status, o f China, 468

Morocco; Chnsnanity i n . 501 ; colonial

Mosul, aiabeg stales of, 56. 354; Buyid

ism i n . 564. 386; cultural activity i n ,

control of, 42; Hamdanids of. 43; as

579: expansion of. 556; Filab dynasty

Islamic cultural center. 357; Uqaylids

632; Muslim conversion by. 603;

of, 697; foreign mosque staffing by,

of. 43

Muslims as. 608

621 ; French control oC, 588. 651,

Modier u f t h c Book, o f Quran. 280, ¡ 8 7

Islamic architecture i n . 253: Islamic

m o t i o n . Arab mathematical analysis of.

missionaries; early Christians as. ; Ji>.

Mitsubishi, role i n .Asian o i l and gas

associations of. 622; Islamic law-

development, 470-471 Miyan Mir. Dara Shikoh's veneration of,

485. 486, 677; Islamism i n . 668;

4'7.4'8 Mizjaia (Yemen). JahnyyaSuhsm found

Isiiqlal (Freedom) parly of, 562; Justice and Benevolence party of. 462;

ed i n . 444.455 al-Mizjaji. az-Zayn ihn M u h a m m e d A b d al-Raqi. Ma Mingxin's teacher, 455 M i / j a j i family, as Naqshbandi teachers,

land ownership i n . 575; Maliki school i n . 113; Muslim conquest of, 21 ; Muslim migrants f r o m . 606.607. 616, 624; nationalism i n , 651 ; neo-Sufism

ill modernism. Islamic

changes i n . 150: Islam i n . 475.484,

Sec Islamic m o d

ernism Mogadishu (Somalia). Islam i n . 501. 502. 504. 544 Mohamad. Mahtahir. o n hudad puhishment, 687

in, 697; Otioman control of. 342. 492; Saadian dynasty o l . 696. state control of Islamic public fife 111. 568; Western Sahara united w i t h . 557; Zayyanid dynasty of, 52 M o r o National libération From (Philippines), 579; Qaddah's support

"Mohametons." 526

of. 657

Mohammadi. Mohammad Nahi, as

M o n c / a A l a m al-Huda. Seyyed. as Shiitt

leader o f Islamic Revolutionary

mujlahid, 117

Mosement. 660 M o h d . Khalijah. as lemale modernist.

Morte/a al-Ansari. as Shute mujtahid, 117

Moluccas, Islam i n . 422.426-429

mosaics, use i n Islanuc architecture.

ill

mortgages. Quranic rules o n , 120 226. 253.255-156

Mombasa. Portuguese loss of, 521 monasteries. 309; along Silk Route. 440; Muslim hospitality i n . 308: Muslim

Moscow. Ottoman trade w i t h . 389 Moses, revelations of. Muhammad's rev elations compared 10, 306

pirate raids of. 316

mosque culture, o f Muslim immigrants.

Mongolia. H u i Mushms i n . 443

615-620

Mongolians, i n early Chang an, 442 Mongols; Baghdad sacking by. 59. 695; caliphate destruction by, 30, 58-59. 60. 61; Central Asia control by, 439. 440, 695; Chinese occupation by, 439;

Mosque o f Shaykh Lutfallali (Ldalıaıı). 366 Mosque o l the Patriarch (Hebron). b o m b i n g of. 703

conquests of, 58-59. 357.400.401.

Mosque o f the Prophet (Medina), 9

695; ellect o n Muslim w o r l d , 59, 353.

mosques; i n Africa. 45. 475. 479. 480.

165 mountain peoples. Islamic leadership of. 362 Mouvemcni de laTendcnte Islamique ( M T I ) . inTunisia, 703 Movement for die Dispossed (Lebanon). 661, 702 Movement for ihe Restoration o f Democracy (Pakislan), 669 Mov ement o f Society lor Peace (.Algeria), 704 Mozambique; Islam i n , 505, 521-522; Portuguese expulsion f r o m . 505. S2I-J22 Mozarabs. as Iberian Arahizcd Christians, 319.3*0 muamalai (social obbgalions). changes i n . 684 Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan. as founder o f Umay yad dynasty. 15. 16, 313.692 Mubarak, 1 iosni; banning o f NGOs by. 667: as Egyptian president. 669. 680 Mubarak. Shaykh, mahzar o l , 409 mud-brick, use in African mosques, 4 / 9 . 488 mudejars. Christian tolerance of, 342. 344, Iberian rebellions of, 320 muezzin, call 10 prayer by, 244 a l - M u h d . A h u And Allah, as Shute m u | tahid. 117 muftis (legal consultants), 131. 512, o f Ottoman sultans, 379. 380 Mughal Fmpirc; decline of. 325, 527. 577; early Indian rulers of, 405—408,

557, 363.402; history of. 235-236.

487.491. 503. 504. 505: arcbiiecturc

330. 434: as Islamic scholars. 297;

of. 253. 357; arson and vandalism of.

Indian archiiecmre eif, 258, 259,

legacy to Ottoman Empire, 371,

630; astronomical alignment 0!. [79;

409-420: Indo-Timurids of, 405;

Mamluk defeat of. 59.695: Middle

m Brunei. 650: built by Ottoman sul

Islanuc lavs in. 693; Islanuc renewal

Eastern regimes of. 352. 353:as

lans, 347. 378. 379; in CcntralAsia.

in, 513-514. 516. 538: Muslim nation-

nomadic chieftains. 3:5: Satavid lega

442; in China, 4 4 3 , 4 4 5 . 4 4 7 . 4 5 4 ,

states f r o m . 603

cy f r o m . 370

391;

411, 422.423. 427, 528: in India, 696;

458,459-460,461.462.463.466;

muhaiirun, 9

monogamy, modernisi sanction of. 648

conversion 10 churches. 310. 339.

Muhammad; al-Tijani's visions f r o m .

Monophysitism. 3. 310. 3 i i ; i n O t t o m a n

144. 345;F.gyptian control o l . 703;

532: al Arafat. 85: caliphate and. 1 -61:

established by Muslim Student

death of. 8. 10, 66. 74. 76. 296, 304,

Association. 621 ; 111 Great Britain.

692; depictions of, 233-256. 325.

Empire. 385 moniiiheism. Muhammad's teaching o f

I N D F. X early believers o f 5-14; early life of, 6,691; as final Prophet o f Islam, 66,

Muradi famdy. as Naqshbandi scholars. 512

73c;

al Mutadid, as caliph, 29. 30 Mutahari. Murtada, as Ishraqi philoso-

j o ; , 615, 6 4 ; , 691: interaction with

Mnrad TV, as Ottoman sultan, 377

Christians, 306, 307; niedies'al

Murcia (Spain), Christian takeover o l . 51

Christian views of. 321-328; as mes-

murder. Islamic prohibition o f 93, 137

muiakallimum. 183

senger o f Allah. 77. 82. 88: mosque

Murjia, as Islamic separatists. 18

al Mmasim. Mamhik army of. 28

and l o r n b o f (Medina). 8/; as M u s l i m

murshids (devotees), Safavid followers

al-Mutaw-akkd;asAbbasidcabph, 28. 29,

role model. 73-74. 96; night |Oumey

as, 363,

pher, 296.680 mutah (temporary* marriage). 130

366

210-211. 278. 309. 331 ; opposition to

f o m Mecca, 265-266, public preach

musalla (idgab), 101

lug of. 8; religious visions of, 6-8, 90.

Musa (Moses), as Prophet. 55

108. 119, 121, 223; submission 10 God

Musaylima.as"falseprophet," i t

mutawatir, as t y p r o f h a d i t h . 120. 121

by, 96: successors of. 66. 71: traditions

musket firepower, o f Ottomans. 377

o f 65.67

Muta/ilism. 27. 89. 146, 2/9. 283, 290.

m u s l i m ; meaning o f w o r d , 67; as "sub-

M u h a m m a d . Eli|ah, as leader o f Nation o f Islam. 609.623.699 Muhammad. Ghulam, as Pakistani Muhammad.Mahathir, as Malaysian Islamist and leader. 567 M u h a m m a d . W a n i h Deen. as Elijah Muhammad's successor, 623 Muhainmadiyyah movement (Indonesia): as Islamic modernism. 56c; social welfare projects of. 97. 700 Muhammad's Youth, as Egypi underground group, 660 muhaqqaq scripi, use i n Quranic callig

Christians by, 309

301 : decline o l . 280-281 ; five princi-

mitter" to God, 77 Muslim Brotherhood organizations. 70, 91,462, 550, 557. 562. 617. 6 2 l , 627. 652. 655. 657, 669, 675, 679. 680.

leader. 594

Mutarihsra of. 280; treatment o f

701, 702, /03; changes faun, 666: creation of. 700; professionals i n . 653: as relief agency. 667. wurldview of. 653-634 Muslim Information Center (the Hague). 621 Muslim League. 581. 651 : fiqh academies of, [51

ples o f 278; founding of, 278 Muivtifkic|d( (al-Shalihi), 137 muwallads, as Spanish Islamic converts. 34 Al-MuHutto (The Straight Path), as w o r k o l fiqh. 127 Muadalilah, as pilgrims' camp, 85 Myriokephalon. Byzantine defeat al. 55 mysticism. 270, 284, 294 Scr also Sufis; Sufism,Timbuktu scholars o l . 484 TIK Mysticism of Harrtztifial Farueiri.Meaningjrvl hjwiaict of Happiness in Islam (Al-Attas).

Muslhn Organ 1 rat ions i n the Netherlands Foundation. 622

298

Muslim Pattani region, diversity i n . 558

H

muhdath, 283

Muslim ftihncal Action Committee, 637

al-Nabati. Abu al-Abhas. as early phar-

muhiasib (markei controller). 133. 134.

Muslims; African Americans as. 608.

raphy. 235

209-210; creation by Aurangzeb, 419

609; " b o r n again," 639; in Chinese

macologist, 211 Nadir Shah, as Islamic

reuewalist,

al M u i r r , as Faiimid caliph. 4 5 - 4 6

population. 433.435: contemporary

Mu i77 al-Dawlah Ser Ahmad ibn Buyeh

societies of. 684-690: conversions of.

Nadwatul Ulama (India), 580

Mujaddidi order, o f Naqshbandiyya.

624; cultural divide affecting,

al-Nahw i.Yahya, Galen's treatise of, 199

631-632; dissension w ith Hindus and

Nairobi, Islam i n , 505

Sikhs. 581, 583; diversity of, 638-639;

Napf. Shii renewalism i n . 522

early esiablisltmcnt of, 19; education

Al-Nujat (Avicenna). 275. 276

of. 622-625: lntcrfaith relations of.

Najbullah. communist regime o f

514. 526, 527 mujahidin, in Afghan civU war, 658, 659, 702 mujtahids, as Islamic |urists. n o , 112, 115. 117, 122, 140.

369

mukatalii, Ottoman lands is. 387 m u l k . as Ottoman private property, 387 mullahs. 111 Afghanistan, 659-660 MullaSadra. Sn al-Sliira/i. Sadr al-Oui Mulla Shah, i s Sufi saint, 418 Multan (Pakistan), early M u s l i m con quest of, 32 multiculturahsm; i n Canada, 610; in the West, 640 multinational corporations. i n Central Asia. 4 J I . 4 7 » muluk al-iawa. as Spanish era o f petty kings. 34 Munilaz Mahal.Taj Mahal constructed lor. 415 M u n i c h , Uighur separatists i n , 466 munkar (vice), in Islamic ethics. 97. 98 Muntaiiri.Ayalollali. as Ishraqi-Shiile, 296 Muqaddmw (Ibn Klialdun). 157 muqarnas (niches), as archirectural f o r m , 245-246. 262-265.157 al Mnqrani, Muhammad, opposition to French Algeria. 541 Mnrad I , as Ottoman sultan. 376

626-631. 637; migration of. 605-606,

5I4-S'S

Afghanistan of. 659

690; m i n o r i t y communities of, 612,

Najran. Christians i n . 4. 306. 307

690; under non-Islamic rule, 603;

Nanchuan Chinese Sufism, 456

perceived as "backward,*' 603; as

Napoleon; defeat of, 534; French occu-

peripheral U.S. group. 610; proselytizing by, 608-609,612, 615, 627: security concerns for. 628-631 : slaughter by Crusaders. 338. 339, serotypes o l .

pation o f Egypt under. 698 Naqshbandi, Baha ad D i n . Sufi order founded by, 432-453 Naqshbandi Sufi order, 455; i n A n n -

628;Weslern politics and. 635-638

Russian resistance. 698: i n China. 448.

Muslim states; concept of. S 5 Î - 5 4 4 . 652;

450. 441. 452-454. 546; Chistiya and.

development patterns i n . 566; emer-

4to; i n India, 514; Islamic renewal

gence of, 650-656; intcllccnial activi-

fused on, 412-513, 517-418; Khalidi

ty i n . 579; iniernational aid to. 467;

hranch o l . 527. 533; opposition to

number and description of. 549; post-

European expansion. 540. 541 ; origin

colonial, 561, 566; socialism i n . 567

of, 452-453, 520: Ottomans recruited

Muslim Student Association, 621 Muslim World League, foreign offices of. 621 MussalmanWakl (Muslim Endowments)

by. 526, persecution of, 367, 453 Narbonnc, Muslim defeat at. 314 al-Nasafi. as early theologian. 293 al-Nasai. Sunan of, 75

Validating Act of 1913, Ali [innah's

al-Nasir, as Iraqi caliph, 58

support of. 595-596

Nasir al D i n . militant movement of, 490

Mustafa I I . as Naqshhandi supporter. 512 al-Musiansir. Set Hakam II Mustapha M a h m o u d Society (Cairo), medical care provision by, 9 / Mustering intd Res mice lion (al-Shirazi), 295

Nasr. Sayyed Hossain, as modern Persian philosopher. 297 Nasrids. as rulers of Granada, 51 Nasser. Gamal Abdel, as Egy puan ruler, 562, 563, 567. Ç68, 573, 581, 590-

736

INDEX

8 t 4 - * S J . 65*. 657, 701 National Association of Arab Americans.

tğt

The Netherlands Islamic Society. 622

Uniicd States, 626 National Islamic f r o m . 70J nationalist movements, i n Islam. 650-636 National Liberation Front (Front de

Dialogue (Sweden), 627 norias (waier-whccls). in early Arab

618

Naıional Council o f Churches in thi-

Nordic Cenier lor Lnterrrhgious

Ness Mexico. Islamic CenterVillagc in,

countries, 197-198

Ness Persian, development of, 2 26 New Testament; as Allah's revealed book. 88; Quran compared to, 73, 89

Normandy, dukes o f as Cltrisrians. 335 Normans, i i N o r t h Africa; Almohads i n . 52, 694;

NewWafd Party (Egypt). 669

Almoravid dynasty i n , 694: Arab

New York City: Islamic Center of. 6ot;

medicine i n , 204-205. caliph con

Muslim World 1 eague office in. 621

Liberation Nanonak-. FIJsiJ. i n

Ness Zealand. Muslims in, 604. 608

trol of. 12. 30, 32, 35. 329. 692; early

Algeria. 561. 573, 579, 590. 6 7 1 - 6 7 Î

Nczami, color motifs in poetry ol, 248

astronomers i n , 171, 175; Faiimid

N'Gazargamu. as Islamic Kanem capital.

dynasty i n , 4 5 . 4 8 . 4 9 . 694; French-

National Pact o f Lebanon. 700 National Salsation Party (Turkey). 702 Nation of Islam. 609. 640. 699: schools r u n by, 625 Natsir. Muhammad; on Islam and

educaied liberation leaders of, 578;

49 .494 2

680

Nietzsche, Friecirich, 649

f r o m , 602, M t i s l i m immigrants

Niger. Islatıl in, 36,475

nasvabs. as Indian rulers. 586

Nigeria; British control ol. 540-341.

Naymans. m early Iran. 352

colonial armies of. 591; dan Fodioas

al-Nazzam. Ibrahim, as Mutazılıtc the

reformist in, 698; ethnic and religious

f r o m , 630; M u s l i m i me Hernials o l . 479; M u s l i m settlers i n , 604, nation alism i n , 631", Ottoman Empire i n , 572; qanat irrigation i n , 197;

dashes in, 559; Islam m. 482. 488,

Near East; Christians i n . 483; Islam i n , 60

519; Jamal al-Nasr of, 667; as modern

Necessary Being; o f al-Shirazi. 295: o f

Muslim state, 549: Muslim

of. 129

Kharwatiyyah order i n . 513; Maliki jurists i n , 95, 125: M u s l i m expansion

natural gas. Chinese imports of. 470

Negro Africans, mcdievai Muslim views

Ismail missionary w o r k i n , 4 4 - 4 5 .

\icomachnw Fthits (Arislollc). 272 Mcomachus of Gerasa. 276

Avicenna. 294

art i n , 222; Islamic culture i n . 60;

Nicolas of Cusa, view s on Islam. 323

democracy. 078; as Islamic modernist,

ologian. 278.279-280

Islamic architecture i n . 255; Islamic

N'golo Diara. as Djenne ruler. 487

Brotherhood of. 557. Muslim

Sanusiyyah order i n , 531; Sufism i n , S3«» N o r t h America. MuslUu migration to.

migrants from. 606: national identity

602

of. 555. 380; postcolonial tensions in.

Northwest H u i rebelhon. 435

N e h r u . Javvalıarlâl. C71

581; prominent non-Muslims in. 583:

Norway: Islamic mosques and centers

N c j d ; Muhammad's community i n , 10,

tribal cluefs in. 588

11; Saudi slate i n . (45 neocolonialism, effects o n Muslims, 6t 1 Neo-Destur (Constitution) party, o f Tunisia. 562. 588. (90 neo ijrihad. 117. 150 neomodemist changes, in Islam. 682. 683-684,685 Neoplatonism, 269-270. 281, 283. 283. 286, 368: Islamic. 274-277. 281-284. 290, 293, 295. 302. 303; rehitation of.

295

The Nde. Egypt's and Sudan's claim to.

Neopythagorcanism, Islamic, 274-277 ments, i n Islam, 680-681. 682, 683. 687 Neo-Sufism. rise of. 697 Nestorianism, 2-3. 312, 323. 531; i n China. 442; influence o n Uighurs, 464; spread of. 310 Nestorians; in Byzantine Empire. 60 2; as physicians, 200, 271: translations by, 3J3

Tlie Netherlands Str also Dutch; antiMuslim political parry o f 631; ethnic minority model of. 610; imperialism of, 551, 645; international trade o t Strr under n i n t h , Islamic associations i n . 616. 621, 62 2; Islamic mosques and centers i n , 618; Islamic schools i n . 624-625; Muslim gurstworkers in. 605. 607; Muslims i n . 604: Muslims in councils of. 636: support of mosque menemeni by, 617 The Netherlands Islamic Parliament. 622

of mosque movement hy. 617 Nubia; Arab defeat i n . 498; Edam i n .

559

498-499

Nimatullatu Sub order. Safavid persecu

al-Numayn. Jafar. as Sudanese leader.

tion of. 367

656-657.679. 680. 701

nineteenth century. Islamic movements

Nur al-Din; hospital of. 245; m i n b a r o l .

in. 509-547

245- 339

Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. Muslims in. 443.461 Nishapur (Persia):declineof,

N u n hospital (Damascus). 208 Nur Jahan; Indian tomb constructed hy. 258; as (ahangir's w i f e . 411,415

59;as

Islamic cultural center. 39. 282. 357;

neorevisahst (fundamentalist) move

160,

111,618; Mushms i n . 604. 607; support

"night journey." of Muhammad, 312

Nusretiye Mosque. 524

Saffarid conquest of. 38 Nucon adminisnation, Arab-Americans as iarget of, 636 Niya, as oasis city. 442 Nizam ai-Malik, statecraft handbook of.

O .41 Oununııl-Musudı (al-Binini), 168 oases: around Tak)imakan Desert. 441. 464. 465. Saudi Arabian claim to, 559 obligation; Islanuc collective ruling o n .

Nizam al Mulk, assassination of. 282 Nizam-i Jedid, as Ottoman "New Systeni," 511 Nizainiyah school. 282 Nizamiyah University (India), 580 Nizam of Hyderahad. 586; restoration ol Mughal tomb by. 418, 419 Noah's ark. Mughal trade depicted as, 421

121—122; shariah rulings o n . 134 observatories, in early Islam. 155. 168. 174. 181-182. 183. 184, 271 Oghuz tribesmen (Turkmen); migra tions of. 44. 351. 371; Sanjar's over throw by, 58 oil boycott, of Arab Israeli War, 605, 702 o i l invesanents. o f China. 433,466. 467. 468

Noer, Debar, as Islamic modernist, 68t

oil portraits. 2t6

nomads. Islamic leadership of, 361:

o i l reserves, o f Brunei. 630: o f Iran. 661;

Middle Eastern invasion of, 331. 352.

o f Kuwait. 556. 574. 646; o f Libya.

353. 361; tents used by. 22o-22t

657; o f Muslim stales. 572, 574. 666;

nomocentnt perspective, of Hadiih of Gabriel. 76. 90 Non-Abgned Movement, in postcolonial Muslim states, 566

in Persian Gulf. 557. 572. 573. 606. 64J, 645; role in Arah economic dcvelpmerii, (¡#17, o f Saudi Arabia. 159- 702

INDEX Old Persian, in Trilingual inscription. 222 Oman; Buy i d com rol of. 4;. Christianity i n . 4; development of, 566-567;

737

ters of. 388-390. tdama influence i n .

tion policy i n , 572: shariah imple-

697; world conquests of. 371-374

mentation i n . 152, 686-687, VW

Oiioman-Habsburg wars. 372.374

social developments i n , 578; state

Ouomans.asari patrons, 383; elite class

control o f Islamic pubUc life in, 568;

Hanbah school i n , 114; Islamic con-

of. 383, fierce reputation of, 375:

women and minorities i n , 679;

rrol o l , 10, i l , 37; Kharijitc refugees

Hanifi school adoption by. 113; sue

women modernists i n , 68:; women's

f r o m . 35;.Sasanianpn>reciorate i n , j ;

cess at, ¡73

organizations i n , 689, women's rights

as rradp center, 32

Ot toman Turkish language, development

Omanis, in East Africa. 505. 506. 507, 521.522

of, 40 Outremer, as name for Crusader con-

Omar, Mullah, as leader of Afghan Taliban. 660 Omnia Optra Amiu'du Cum Commmtanis

quests, 339

3"6

Ozen o i l held (Kazahstanj. Chinese

Palestine; British control of, 557;

riglus lo. 433

Byzantine loss o£ 311; caliph offen-

"Operanon Badr," as second Arab-Israeli war. 702

Pakistan Nan o nal Alliance. 658 Palermo (Sicily), Muslim takeover of,

Oxford University. 578

4irrruis Codiuhfiisis, 287

i n , 687 Pakistanis, i n Great Britain. 605. 606

sives against. 12.76; Christian rule i n . P

340; early Christian visitors to,

ophthalmology, i n early Islam. 205

Padishah, as Ottoman title. 383

314

Opinions of the Inhabitants of tor Virtuous City

Padri movement; jihad of. 520; as

of. 43; Jewish senlement of, 585;

(al- Farahi). 274 optics; Alhazan's thesaurus o n . 190, early Arab ss-orfc o n , 191 -193 oral traditions, o f Islamic Africa. 490. 49'

renewalist ellurt. 533-534; in

Jordan's claim io, 559; Muslim

Sumatra. 698

Brotherhood of, 557, 702; Muslim

Padri War of 1821-1838, 534

migrants f r o m , 607. 608; Muslim

Pages o f Abraham, as Allah's revealed

refugees f r o m . 605. 618; Muslim victims i n . 630; relief agencies i n . 668;

book. 85

Organization of Arab Students. 636

Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza. Shah o f Iran.

Organization o f Islamic Conference

599, 661, 700. Stc dsn Pahlavi Iran,

(OIC). 141, 553, 354. 603,701

discontentment w i t h . 663. 699. 700,

Oigonon (Arisiode). 271. 272. 275

702;overthrow of. 658; secularization

"Oriental w i s d o m . " o f Asiceiuia. 293

policy of. 572. 651. 661

Orient trade, early rivalry for. 3 - 4 O r o m o people, o f early Ethiopia. 502, S°7 Orontes River, water-wheels o n . 197 orthopraxy, as f o r m o f Islam. 89. 90 Osh (Kyrgyzsian). new transportation

336; intifada i n . 703; Jarrahids

f^ahlavi Iran; development of. 567,

Shalii school i n . 114: tribesmen i u control of, 584 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). early Christian leaders of. 583 Pamirs. 441, 442.452

568,

Pan A m flight 103, b o m b i n g of. 6I9

700, economic development i n . 573:

Paiupat. Battle o f (1526), 696

nation hood - u m i n a h d i s h a r m o n y i n .

pan-Islamic ideology, 547, 654, 699. 701

555. 561; patronage i n . 599;White

Pannonia. as Inner Asia province, 439

Revoluuon o f 661

Panthay Hui Muslim rebellion. 455. 699

Pakistan. 466; Civil war of, 655. 701;

paper making, i n early Islam. 198

colonial armies of, 592. as colonial

Paraniesvara, as Islam convert, 425

slate replica. 591. 594. creation of.

Parcham (Elag) Parly (Afghanistan), 579

Cliristians as. 602, Muslims depicted

560, 586, 650, 651, 700; divorce law

Paris. Algerian massacre i n , 631; bomb

as. 640

i n . n8;economicdevclopmenl i n ,

links to. 471 The "other"; Muslim depiction of

Ottoman Empire. 365,422. 695; Arab

573; ethnic and religious clashes i n ,

territories of. 566; architecture of,

559; ethnic politics i n . 585; exports

explosions i n . 629; liberation by Muslim mercenaries. 604 Park. Miingo. o n Segou Muslims.

347. 384; art i n . 239, 547; astronomy

of. 572; fiqh and shariah academies

i n . 155; British trade treaty w i t h . 697;

i n . 151; Hanafi school i n . 114; Iqbal

Parsis. in India, 583

Christian muiorities i n . 581-582;

ideology for. 699; Islamic antitolo-

"Party uf A l i . " 15. 18

colonialism i n . 598; crisis and change

nialism i n , 550; Islamic law i n . 150,

Pasai (Samudra). Islam i n . 424. 425.426

682; Islamic modernism i n . 565, 656,

Pase (Sumatra), Ibn Battuiah's stay i n .

i n , 390-393; cultural achievements of, 347-348; cultural precursors of, 358; decline of, 115, 378. 390. 391-393. 510. Ç27, 552, 588. 651. 700; division of. 557. 651. 700; economy of. 386-390; growth of, 142, 347. 602. 695: Islamic law i n . 693; Islamic reform i n . 511-313. 515. 516. 517. 525, 525-526. 4 i 2 , 537-538, 700: judicial system of. 380-381; leadership concepts of, 382 -386. 390-391; Mai ldris Alawma's relations w i t h . 492; m i l i larics of, 593; Muslim states f r o m , 603: non-Muslims i n , 3 8 5 - 3 8 6 ; o r i ginsof. 371—375; reform fflnrts of. 510-511: renewal of, 393; slave system

658, 668. 679. 681. 682. Islamic

487-488

421

Movement i n . 300: Islamic Party of.

pashas. 39j;oITimhukni,48s,

557; Islamic philosophy i n , 297; as

Pashuuis. i n Afghanistan. 659

Islamic Republic, 701; Islamism i n .

Passarovit7. Treaty of. 511

562, 568, 570. 668; islamization of,

Pate (Kenya). Muslim iradeli of, 504.

702; Jamaat-i Islami of, 91, 595. 617.

486

504

618. 6 I I . 652,657.660, 667, 669.

paternity. Quranic rules o n , 120

679, 700. judiciary i n . 595. 596;

Paihans. i n Afghanistan. 659

Karakuram Highway 10. 434.

patronage, by colonial powers. 597-598

landowning class i n . 587. 590. m i l i -

Pazyryk (Siberia). early carpets from.

tary politicians i n . 668. 669: as m o d -

246

ern Muslim state. 549; Muslim

Peacock Throne, 5'5

conquesi of. 21; Muslim migrants

peasant lands, in Ottoman Empire. 387.

f r o m . 607. 608, 619; Muslim popula-

39'-392

of. 5/6-377, 391; societal structures

tion of, 582; national identity of. 560;

Penang. as port city, 573

of. 348-330; stale apparatus of,

nation h o o d - u m n u h harmony i n .

peony m o t i f in Chinese an. 239

375-382; SuSsmin. 526; sultans

555; origin o f name. 578; patronage

People o f t h e Book; Christian lolerance

regarded as caliphs i n . 354; trade cen-

i n . 59l"-599: plurahsm i n . 690. post-

of. 342. 344. Muslim tolerance of.

colomal tensions i n , 581: seculariza-

319, 344; as Quranic name for

738

INDEX reforms on, 150

ratists i n . 472

Christians ami Jews, 306, 307 People's Republie o f China. Sec oko China; etluiic problems of, 463; Muslims i n , 435,461

philosophy; Greek. See Greek philosophy; Islamic

Set Islamic philosophy

Philosnphy of Ibn Rushd ( A n t t m ) ,

porcelains, as Chinese export ware for

Phoenician religion. 269

Pen palet icism. in Muslim Spain.

physics, in Greek pftilosophy, 277

of. Ottoman patronage. 383

Mushms. 438.439 pork consumption. Islamic" p r o h i b i t i o n

Physics (Aristotle), 284

Persia; Afsharids i n . 697; arts and culture 384;

Pickens. Claude, o n Chinese Sufi orders,

liul an Muslims viewed as invaders

pietra dura, as type o f inlay. 258. 259 pdgrimages; to Acheh tombs. 423: to

293-296; Islamic culture development

Bukhara, by Chinese Muslims, 454; to

i n . 39-40. 33. 60. 337; legacy t o

Holy Land, by Christians. 334

Ottoman Empire. 371 ; Ottoman rival-

339; toKarbala, 368; to Mecca, 10, 31,

255;

of, 93. 94. 5=5 pornography. Muslim abhorrence of, 612

449.457

f r o m . 58] ; Ishraqi movement i n ,

ry w i t h , 327; painting i n , 231,

300 poor tax, required by Islam, 75, 82. 102

298

Pépin, defeat o f Muslims by. 314 184-289. 293,296

polytheism. Islamic rejection of, 280,

336,

Porphyry ofTyre; as Neoplatoiiisi. 270, 271; translations o f 272 [sorts, importance i n Muslim stales. 572-573 Portugal; chronicles o f Islamic Africa of,

37.49. 63,75, 84, 102. 344; hy

489; Eas 1 African conquests by. 521;

Qajar rulers of, 698: rivalry w i t h

African Muslims, 468. 482.484. 492.

expulsion from Mozambique. 505;

Roman Empire. 1 ; Safavid dynasty of,

499. 506; by Chinese Muslims, 454;

Iberian rule by. 320; imperialism of,

696; Seljuk rule of, 694; Silk Road

by Indian Muslims, 528; Islamic

551, 645: Islamic Christian rivalry i n ,

through, 440; Zand rule of. 698

renewal by. 518-519. 528; Quranic

51; Islam i n , 602; loss o f EasiAfrican

Persian; Arabic translations into, 357;

rules o n , 120; Safavid deemphasis of,

lands by. 521-522; Mclaka conquest

cultural influence of, 357, 338; literary-

367, 368; shariah ruling o n . 109:

by. 425.426; Muslims i n . 604; spice

works i n . 349, 350. role i n Islamic

white garments w o r n for, 259; 10 Sufi

conquest of North India, 397; role in

shrines, 361 ; to Yemen, by Chinese

South Asian Islam, 396; scientific works i n , 158. 139 Persianate influence, in South Asia. Ï 9 6 - Ï 9 7 . 3 9 9 . 4 0 O . 420 Persianate Turks, conquesr o f North India by. 397 Persian Gull; commercial activity i n , 32; oil exports f r o m , 372, 373, 643. 637; oil reserves i n . 437; social develop-

trade of, 374. 389 postcolonial state, institutional foundations of. 585-591

Muslims, 454 Pillars o f Islam, 77-87, 102

ftstaior Arwlyrirs (Aristode). 271

pirates, early Muslims as. 316

pottery, as Islamic art f o r m , 217. 220,

Pir Budak. Nezami manuscript of. 249 Pires.Tomre. Asian travelogue of, 422,

96

425 Pkmnary Hypoiheit (Ptolemy). 1163 planets; ancient studies o n , 161,

225-226, 250, 260. 264 practice. Islamic importance of, 88, 89,

164;

Ptolemy's models for, 172

pragmatism, sliariah-orienied policy of. 140-144 prayer beads, as hajj souvenir. 499

ments i n , 378; wealthy Arabs f r o m .

Plasscy. Battle o f 513

pray er carpel, 67

S°£

Plato, 269. 270, 273-274. 277. 291, 294;

prayers; ethical interpretation of, 102;

Arabic translations of. 272, 334;

fiqh ridings o n . n o ; movements i n ,

of, 532: Islamic political activism m,

Islamic commentaries o n , 287; vision

78-79; Quranic rules o n . 120,

673; Khomeini's criUcism of, 663;

o f the intellect of. 65

147: required by Islam, 66, 75, 77—78,

Persian Gulf emirates; decoloniahzation

shariah studies i n . 702: rribal rulers in. 587-388 Persian Gulf War. 703 Persian lady, as Ishraqi phdosopher, 296 Persian m i n i attires. 215

Ploiinus. 279; Arabic translations of. 272; as founder o f Neoplatonism, 269-270.274.277 pluralism; in Islam, 640; in the West. 640

Persians, as early astronomers, 162

Parties (Aristode). 271. 275

personal injury. Maliki rulings o n , 127

poetry; in Arabic-Islamic tullure, 31. 34:

personal reasoning, as Islamic law' p r i n ciple, 149-150 personal status. Islamic law on, 150 Peter [Melchuc bishopj. Christian w r i t ings of, 332 Peier the Hermit o f Amiens, role i n Crusades, 337 Peter the Venerable, writings on Islam, 322-323, 334. 694 phalanx lactlcs, o f Ottomans. 377 Phanariot Istanbul Greek merchants, as Ottoman elite, 385 pharmacolog), in early Islam, 204-205, 208, 109, 210-211 Philby. Harry St. John, as Islanuc convert, S&9 PhUipll (of Spain),Ottoman treaty w i t h . 374 Philippines; diversity i n , 558; M o r o freed o m fighters i n . 579; Muslim sepa-

in China, 217 Poitiers (France); Muslim expansion stopped at. 602: Muslim takeover of. 314 Poland; Ottoman trade w i t h , 38g;Tatar expansion into, 604 police institutions, o f postcolonial states. 592-599

94. 108, 134. 148. 242.427,433,445, 479, 615; ritual differences i n . 89; said in direction o f Mecca, 179; as second pillar o f Islam, 77; shariah rulings o n , 134: time limits of, 180 precious stones, use i n Islamic art. 221 primary schools, for U.S. Muslims. 622 Prince of Wales, Indian ceremony lor. 644 The Principles of Stotr iind Govrrnmeni in Ijlctrn (Atari), 677 Prior Andy tits (Anslode), 271, 272 prisoners, medical care of. 208 privatization, o f M u s l i m economy, 574 Proclus til Athens, as Neoplatonist. 270

Pofisario movement, in Morocco, 557

Prolcgomenii (Ihn Khaldurt). 293

political regimes, i n early Middle East,

properly, as shariah value. 147

349. 358 politics: i n Muslim w o r l d . 553; Western Mushms and, 635-638 Politics (Aristotle). 272. 286-287 poll tax; required o f Latin K i n g d o m

137,

"prophethooet," i n Islamic philosophy, 173 Prophet Muhammad. See Muhammad Prophets; consciousness o f truth of. 66; ride inheritance by, 130

MusUms, 341 ; required o f People o f

proportioned script, o f Arabic, 241

the Book, 307, 308, 312

proselyli/ing. hy Muslims. 6o8-fiog,

polygamy; colonial criticism of. 564; modernist nonsuppon of. 647, 686 polygyny; Islamic law o n . 117, 129; law

612, 615, 626. 627 prosneusis point, in planetary m o t i o n , '73

INDFX

739

prostration, during Muslim prayers. 80

Ai-Qumim fi nl Tibb (Ibn Sina). 204. 204

Protestant Church: i n America, 610:

knowledge o f God in. 63. 64; Lann

al-Qaradawi.Yusuf; on f i q h . i 4 2 ; o p i n

translation of. 323, 334. 694; legal r u l

Islamic schools of, 6(4; missionaries

i o n on female air oavel of. 118-119

uigs of, m ; literary studies ol] 31;

Qara-Khanids; as nomadic chieftains.

of, 603 Psalms. Quranic mention of, 506 Psalms o f David, as Allah's revealed book, 88

logorenuic perspective of. 76; m o d -

355; Samanid defeat by, 40;

ernist iiuerprelations of, 648. 684.

Transoxania control by, 351, 357

685; as Muhammad's revelations, 6 - 7 ,

Qaramanids, Anatolian rule of, 695

73, 80; as Saudi Arabian conslitution,

Ptolemy; AuiuyrM 1 if. 5rt Almuyrsi. as Greek Qaiaqoyunlu rulers, o f Azerbaijan and asoonomcr. 162-164, •6f '66, 167. >

Iran. 248. 255

168. 170-176, 190, 192; influence on

Qaravsiyyin. mosque school of. 530

Arab science. 212. 273

Qardawi.Yiisuf. as contemporary ulama,

public interesl, legal rulings o n , 119.

ism and. 300; solidarity ruling of. 146; as source of shartal 1. 119-124, l

pumps, Arab mvention of, 194 Punch, 553

Timbuktu schools of, 484. transla-

of, 351

tions of. 323, 334, 694; use in Islamic prayers. 80. 81; vices forbidden hy, 93:

Qarniatis; as Faiimid enc-mies. 46; as

walnut box for, 379; o n wooden

Ismailis. 44. 45

Punjab: colonial benefits to, 578, economy of. (74; Mughal leaders of. 406. 409; patronage i n . 599

tablets. 484

Qasr Sturin.Treaty of. 697 Qassam Brigade, suicide bombings of.

Quraysh tribe, Muhammad as member of, 6.8, 10. 15

703

Punjabis, ui Brinsh colonial armies, 584

qat, Salihiyyali opposition to. 544

purdah, traditional pattern of. 689

Qatar: claim t o o i l fields. 449: Hanbali

PtrrGcwl (Proclns o f Athens). 270 Pure [and Buddhism, origin o l . 442 "pure riglu o f C o d , " Islamic religious 135

purgative use, in early Greek medicine.

school i n . 114; Islamic bank i n , 145

al-Qusliji.Ala al-Din. as early astronomer. 171 Qutb, Sayyid; execution of, 701; as Islamic fundamentalist. 70. 299. 300.

Qayrawan (Tunisia); bedouin sacking of. 48; Greal Mosque at. 14; Islamic r o n -

565, 654. 675, 676. 681

quesi and control of, 13, 21. 31, 35,

Qutb Minar, as ntinaret. 400. 401

36. 49; Sunnis i n . 45

Quwwai al-Islam mosque (Delhi), 228,

Qazvin, rise to prominence, 49

201 P> renées, Muslim incursions into, 21. Pythagoras, 276. 294 Pythagoreanism, 269 treatise, 188

i 9 0 ; a s d i r e c r i o n o l Mecca. 78. 169,

R

177. 179

Rabliani. Rurhannddin. as leader o f

Qadariyyas, 451.452 Qing dynasty; Chinese Islam at end o l , 4 5 / , 464; relations w i t h Centra] Asia.

Q

440: Sufi reforms during, 449, 453.

Qabusbin Washmgir. grave of. 41

455. 4 i 6 . 521

qada. 88

Qinghai; Huasi Chinese Sufis i n , 454;

qadar. 71. 88. 277

Khuffiya Sufism i n . 454; Mushms i n .

Qadaris, I77-278

443

Qaddafi. Muammar. as 1 ibyan leader. 589. 656-647, 668, 680, 701. 702

Q o m , Shiism i n . 366. 368 quadranis, Muslim design of, 181

qadi-askars. of Ottoman judiciary, 380

Ouuilriporitus (Prolemy), 272

al-Qadir. Abd; ami-imperialist move-

Quaraysh tribe, perseculion of Muslims

ment of, 540; as leader o f Qadiriyya.

by, 306 Quebecois. separatism of. 610

54".699 qadi (religious pidgej, 371. 480.484.

Quetta Staff Col I el e (Pakistan). 378 quietisi w i n g . o f Shiites. 44

485.492.502 Qadiriyyah Sub order. 13. 417. 519. 4J5. 440, 441,inCaucusus. ( 4 0 - 5 4 1 ; « !

399.400.401.695

q i N a . determination of. 179-180. 181.

Qi Jingyi. as founder of Clunesc

Py thagorean theorem, in al K h w a r i / m i

35. 136; teacfung of, 142; texts of, use

in Islamic architecture, 224, 227—230:

680 Qarluq people, Qara Khanid leadership

1*5. 144. i 4 Ç - ' 4 & The Pulpit u! Islam | Muslim journal |, 654

obligations as, 134.

642; schools for sniily of. 619; seculai

Q u m (Iran), as theological center. 302 Quran. 12. 15. 19. 40. 325, 330. 350.

Jamaat i Islaini. 649 Race RelauonsAci o f 1976 (Greai Britain), 611 racism:against arabs, 637; Muslim abhorence of. 612; rise i n , 610 radicalism. Islamic. 301 Rafsanjmi. Ayatullah Ali Akbar 1 lashemi. as presidcni o f Iran. 574, 703 Rahman. Fazlur. as Islamic modernist, 565.690 al-Rahman, Shaykh Ulnar Abd. role i n WorldTradc Center bombing, 703 Rahrnaniyyah. 111 Algerian resistance. Hi al Rahman Khan, Amir Abd. as Kabul ruler, 587 al-Rahman Singkch. Abd. Shattariyyab movement of. 520 rainbows, early Arab studies o n . 193

China. 449. 4 5 0 . 4 5 1 . 4 5 - 4 5 Ï . 456;

681. 682; in African Arabic script. 495.

mosques of. 462: numbers of, 462;

Aurangzeb s copies of, 418; calligraph-

opposition 10 French expansion of,

ic manuscripts of. 215. 2i8. 232,

Ra|asdnn. Mughal control of, 409 Ramadan observance, 234- 235. 427; by

1

Raj: in colonial British India. 561, 581. 586-587: M u s l i m tensions w i t h , 477

541, 699: in Somali uprising, 444; in

233-234. 239.403; o f Chinese

Southeast Asia. 520: in uprising

Muslims. 449. Christians described

African Muslims, 479,481.482; lunar

against Dutch, 543

i n . 306-307; collection and final for-

calendar and. 178, prayers al end o l .

al Qadisiyah. Battle of. 12

mal of. 692; copying of. 64. 403;

94. 101. 582. 62o: required by Islam.

Qaitbay. Sultan, 268

description o l . 118. 119-120; figural

75- *3-84. 92-93. '02. 147. 615:

Qajar. parronage i n . 599

representation and. 230: as God's

shariah rulings o n . 134

Qa]ars; defeat of Salavids by. 370; as

book. 73. 88. 282. 284; importance of

Rang Mahal ( A i m e d Palace), as Shah

529, 539. 69R; as Islamic reformers.

w r i t i n g i n . 223; interpretations of, 27. 136—140; Islamic law i n , 90, 92;

al Raniri, N u r al Din, as Malaysian the-

5Ï8

Islamic philosophy and. 273. 277,

Iranian leaders, 314, 515, 525, 526.

qanats, as early irrigation systems, 196. '97

[ehan patace, 259 ologian, 298

280. 288, 290, 297, 301-303. lews

Raphael, 287

and Clirisiians mentioned i n , 306;

Rashidal D i n ; as Ilkhanid vizier, 40;

740

INDEX

Mongol history by. 255-236, 330 Rasfiid Rida. Muhammad, as Islamic Rashli, Say yid K a / i m . i n Shaykbiy yah movement. 529 Rasiakhiz (Resurrecrinn party. Iran), 590 Rather, Dan, ethnic slurs of. 637 lationnation. in i h e Q u r a n , 139

education, 699; imperial conquests of. S32. 533. 5Si • 5SÎ- 645. 697: Islamic

275

modernism in, 347; jihad opposition

Rhodes. Islamic takeover of. 314 Rihat. at Monastir (Tunisia). 35

10, 530; Muslim migrants f r o m . 607;

Richard I . K i n g o f b n g l a n d d . 327

Orthodox protecnon by, 582;

Richtholen. Ferdinand von. 438,440

Oitoman opposition by, 374. 392; Silk

Ricoldo da Momecroce, views o n Islam.

Road 10, 441; uade w i t h Central Asia. 433.435,436.Xinjiang uade w i d i .

m

ranonahsm. rise of. 345 Rationalisis. fiqh legal thought of.

112.

128

Ridda. Rashid. as Islamic mtsdermsi. 699 Kiddaw-ars, 11

Rayy. Buyid control of, 42. 168; Jews i n . 2: as scientific cenicr. 168, 181.

educanon i n . combined w i t h M u s l i m

Reza. as Safavid court painter, 370 Rhetoric (.Aj-istode), 271.

jurist, 117

114.

revivalism Soe renewal and revivalism

191.

202 al-Ran. Abu Bakr. as early physicianphilosopher. 198. 201-203. 273-274. 281 al-Ra/i. Fakhr al-Din. as early theolo gian. 293.297. 302 razaas, in Medina. 307

Rusiamids, ufTahcrt, 36,45

Riegl. Alois, o n arahesquc, 238 "rightly guided" caliphs, 112.

468 Russians, in Central Asia. 471

149.692

Risnkih. as Lslamic law treatise. 90.

128

Risolat Huyy ibnlaq/an (ihnTufayl).

S Saadian dynasty, o f Morocco. 696 Saadi [Persian p o c i j . 103

285-286 Risale-i N u r movement. 619

Sab. Hasan, as Islamic seculanst. 301

ritual pollution, bath required for, 78

al Sabah. Ahmadal-Jabir. 646

riiual practice. Musbm adherence to.

al-Sabah clan, as rulers o f Kuwait, 556, 673

614-615.632

Rccojniiinns (St. Clement), 271

Riyadh, asWahhabi-Saudi capital, 517

Sahlans. as People ol the Book. 307

Recoiiquista. in i i t h century Spain. 35.

Robert of Chester, algebra w o r k translat

Sabian rabies, 166

50, 602 Ratiiui ruction of Rdijtious Thought in Idom (Iqbal). 297 Red Fort, 417; as Mughal architecture. 219 Peel Guards (China), mosque destruc tion hy, 461 Refali Parry, olTurkey, 562. 568. 704 Reformation. 323 reformist legislation. 127 Kmitjrjonof the Christians (al-Kindi), 331 re-lslamization. as contemporary move ment. 684 religion. Muhammad o n . 148 religion of the H u i ( H u i jiao), o f Cuinese Muslims, 444

Sabra, massacres i n . 702

ed by. 187 Robert of Ketton, Quran translation by. Roberts College (Turkey). 580 rock crysial; carvings made of. 46. 260: use i n Islamic art. 221 Roger I I , King of Sicily, 183,

183

702; as Egyptian leader. 574. 660,669,680

religious experiences, role i n Islam. 69 toward. 381-583 religious obligations, shariah rulings o n . '34

al-Sadiq, Jafar, as early Shii jurist, 122.

32£ Mehmed IT as head of. 342; Ottoman heirs to. 371. 374. 385; rivalry w i t h frrsia.

1; trade w i t h Cluna. 437

Romania; Islamic converts i n , 602, Ottoman conquest of. 374. 377.697;

Romanian church, in Ottoman Empire, Rome; apostolic sect of. 309. medieval Muslim views of. 329

6+4-646.668; four types of. 682; i n

RuleofFourQiiantiiies, 191

Iran. 661. in the Maghreb, 4 9 - 3 3 .

Rumfa. Muhammad, as M u s l i m Kano

Warraq). 331

431.

509,315, 525. 695, 696; cultural achievemenis of. 347-348, 383. 384, 516,

696. 697; o f Iran. 180, 248. 295,663, 696; Islam i n . 370-371. 514-515. 516;

362. 363-366; tribal resistance i n .

rubber, as Muslim states export, 572

"rule by the jurist," o f Khomeini. 664

Kepi) to rheThret Setts of the Christians (al-

Safavid Empire. 334. 374. 376. 405.

Muslim stales from. 603; rise of. 351.

597

r u k u , 80. 81

688-689

reformist.

660-661. 680, 702

Rowlcit Act o f 1919.

renewal and reform in Islam, 509-347,

RcntHol of Arabic Though! ( M a h m u d ) . 298

71. 529. 702; as Lebanese

Rousseau. Jean-Jacques. 479

renaissance (mahda), Islamic. 684

530-537; women's status and.

366-367 ai-Sadr. Musa; "hidden i m a m " status of ,

legacy to modern Iran. 370-371;

Rossabi. Morris, 465

Rudaki, as Persian poet. 40

eries. 516-522; in transition.

sadr. as ulama-shih intermediary.

697; decline of. 370. 514, 515.

385

Ren;issance. Islamic influence o n , 602

486; on M u s l i m frontiers and periph

657.

Roman Empire; Inner Asia and. 439.

control of. 392, 698

religious minorities, colonial policy

Sadat, Anwar, assassination of, 660, 666.

Roman de Mahomet (Alexandre dn Poni).

Ottoman trade w i t h . 389; Russian

Muslims, 623

pher. 296

Roman Catiioficism Sir Catholic Church

religious belief. Quranic notion of. 67 J4«

Sabzevan. Haji H j d l . as Ishraqi philoso sacrificial feast, ai end o f Ramadan, 479

religious tonununines, in Middle Fast. religious day schools. f o r V * s t e m

al-Sabri. Ahud-Abbas. as Sufi social crit ic. 98. iciO-102, 104

J23. JJ4. 694

ruler, 492, 496 al-Rumi, Jalal ad-Din. as Turkish mystic. 453 Rum Seljuks. 55. 59. 22B; as ancestors o f Ottoman Empire. 352

378; nirhans worn i n . 220 SafTarids; Nıshapı.r conquest by. 38; as Sistan rules, 693 Sahara; Islam i n , 475. trade routes across. 475- 476.478.480. 481.488. 492. 49S The Sahrl. Islam in, 476.478 Sahih al-Bulthuri. 66 Sahih Muslim. 74-7;. 84, 88 Said. Fdward, 438 Saifawa dynasty, in Kanem, 492.496

Rushdi. Salman, fatwa against. 629

St. Joseph's College (Lebanon), 579

Russia. Seealso Soviet U n i o n ; Afghanistan

Saint Cyr. 578

Republican Party. Arab Americans i n . 638

as buffer to. 557. Chrchnyan war

Kcpubic (Plato). 272. 287

against. 550, 551. Chinese military

influence of, 404 409; M u s l i m vener

Repihlikaner (Germany), as anti-

agreement w i t h , 471. 546: control o f

ation of, 444. 448. 449, 452, 455,

Crimea and Romania by. 392. 698.

456.459.462,494

Miislim political parry. 631

saints, Ac hell incili» of. 425; early Indian

ix n i x Saladin; a* Crusader's opponent, 327, J28, 339; Egyptian control hy, 48, 57. 695; Jerusalem conqucsi by, 24J, 695 Salafiyyah movcmeul, as modern

Sanskrit, astronomy works in. 168

699

628-631

founder of Sanusiyy all tariqali. 698, 701:

tions M fables, 326, 327-328; as name for Muslims. 321, 322. 323. 326

98 salam. 82

Saragossa. as Islamic city scale. 54

Salars; conversion to Islam. 4 5 3 , 4 Ç 4 ,

Sarah, as Ibrahim's wife. 86

Turkic-Altaic language of, 443 sales, Quranic rules on. 120

al-Sarakhsi, Shams al Adin, hqh exposi tion of. 110

511,

523, 525. 698 Selimiye, as Otioinan complex. 376 Selimiye Mosque, as Islamic archiiecSeljukTurks; Buyid ousting by. 43. 48. 55. as caliph jtrotectors, 30, 182, con quest of Abhasid Empire hy. 35i;eon-

Saliba, Jamil, as Islamic modernist. 298

Sartre. Jean-Paul. 579

Salih, as Aralı prophet. 88

Sasanian Empire, 1—3, 31. 248; astrono

Salihiyyah order: clash with

Selim III. Sultan, Islamic reforms of,

mre, 215. 696

Sarajevo, as Ottoman trade center. 389

salai. as Islamic prayers, 77. 78.429

Sclim, Sultan; conquest of Egypt by. 499. mosque built for, 215. 347. 696

Saracens; Christian view s of. 336; depic

salah (social virtue), in Islam ethics, 97,

TıKSducüonofYusul [Bihzad paiming], 240 Segoti (Mali), Islam in. 486.487

Sanusiyyah order; of Ibn Idris. 531. in Libya, 550, 698

Salah al-Din Ay yv b. SaSaladin

T

security concerns, for Western Muslims.

al-Samisi. Muhammad Ali ibn, as 7D0

Muslim reform, 299,445,454, 617.

74

quest of Armenia by, 5 2; decline of, 352; in early Iran. 367. Inner Asia and,

my in. i62;Byzanunrwarswuh. 3.4.

439; institutions of, 47- 333. 379:

Uwaysiyyah. 544-545; origin and

¡ 1 2 ; caliph raids against. 11; decora

invasions by. 371; as Iraqi rulers, 44,

principles of. 544-545

tive writing m. 223;Gundishapur

55. 353. 694; Islamic conversion of.

Salim. Prime. Sccjahangir

academy of. 270. Islamic desmieiion

362; Jerusalem takeover by. 337; lega

Salim, Shaykh: Akbar's visit to, 407. 408;

of. 13, 312; linguistic conversion of,

cy 10 Ottoman Empire, 371.

158-159: Zoroastrianism in, 2

migration inio Mashriq. 54-55;

lomb of. 409.411 Salleh. Khalijah Mohd, as female mod emist, 681 Salonica, Ottoman acceptance of Jews

Sa 1 unicVerses (Rtishdi). latwa on, 629

Mongol defeat ol. 59; as nomadic:

Saturn; Muslim studies on. 182:

chieftains. 355; as Persian rulers. 694:

Ptolemy's model for, 172,

of Rum. 55. 352

173

Saudi Arabia. 651.654; claim to oil

from, j86

391;

Scmirechye, Chaghatayids in. 695

salt. African sources ol. 495

fields. 559; extremist activities in, 665;

Semitic culture. Sasanian espousal of. ı

Samanids; as cultural patrons. 40, 357;

Tiqh Academy in, 151; founding of.

Senegal; Islam In. 476, 491; jihad sıaıe in. 698. 699; Muslim Brotherhood of.

defeat of, 40, as Iranian governors. 39.

700: Hanbali school in. 114. 693:

54. 56. 35'. 357- 398-J99- ^93

interest in Central Asia. 433; Islamism

337; Muslim mercenaries from. 604;

in. 562: as modern Muslim slate. 549.

Muslim migrants f rom. 607; promi

Samaritans, as People of the Book, j o / Samarqand, early Cluncsc missions to. 440; Islamic conquest of. 21; as Islamic cultural renter. 39. 60.

157.

520. 421; Shaybanid rule of. 696; on Silk Road, 440; asTimurid capital. 352. 357 Samarra; Ahbasid overthrow in. 37; Islamic an in. 231-232. 237. 238, 243, 260, 261; as Islamic capital, 28. 693 al-Samawal al-Maghribi. ibn Abbas, as early mathematician, 187 Saminids. architecture of. 244 al-Samman. Abd al-Karim. as Islamic revivalist, 532 al-Samman. Muhammad ihn Abd alKarim. Islamic renewal order of. 513 Sammaniy yaii order. Islamic renewal in. 5'3 SamoryTure, Guiuean jihad of. 542, 543 Samudra. Islam in, 389.424-425.426. 427-428, 695 Sanaa (Yemen): Great Mosque at, 37; Islamic control of. 38

652; nationhood ummah harmony in, 555; offices of Muslim World League of. 621. parajudicial groups in,

states in, 419. 442; Muslim traders

93; philosophy proscription in. 303;

in, 488; Qadiriyyah movement in,

shariah implementation in. 151. 686-687; stale control ° f Islamic pub lie life in, 568; support of mosque movement by. 6i7;Wahhabism in, 74. 89, 545: women's riglus and status in, Sacdi dynasry (Arabia). Wahhabism as Sand III ibn Abd al Aziz, university rounded by. 652 Sawakin. Ottoman control of, 500 Sayyuds. Nonh India rule by. 400 Scandinavia; eilinic minority model of, 610; Muslim guestwtirkers in. 606. 607

481.483 Sanjar. Muizz ad-Din. as sultan of Kb. ur usan, 57-58 Sankore, Muslim scholars of, 481, 483

system. [83- 184 386

593 Scptemher Taws (Sudan). 702 Serbia, Islamic converts in, 602 Serbian Empire, defeat of. 373. 695 Serindian Buddhism, origin of. 441

Schnaider.W L.. 339

Seven er Shiism, 693

Th<School uf Athens (Raphael). 287

Seville: Christian reconquest of, 51, 305,

Schuon. Erithjof. definition of Islam by.

320: as Islamic city-state, 34 sex education, Muslim objections to,

72 scriptural religions. 3.4; Muhammad's

ment. 49. 51

shaykh.455

Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, 539, 484. 592,

science. Islamic. See Islamic science

Sanhaja families, as Muslim scholars.

president, 583 Sem. Muhammad Bulu. as Shariliuye

Scphardic Jews. Ottoman acceptance of.

creed of, 291, 545

sandstone, as Islamic building material. 400.401.402, 408,410. 417

ÇI9 Sengor, Leopold Sedar, as Senegalese

sentence arithmetic, as Arab numeration

687, 688

Sandhurst. 378

Sanhaja Berbers, m Almoravid move

uent non-Muslims in, 583 Sencgambia; Islam in. 489—491; jdiad

621 sextants. Muslim construction of. 168. [81

ideas from, 8 Seal of the Prophets. 298

sexual behavior, Muslim law on. 478

Second Civil War, 16, 18, 19. 20. 22

sexual intercourse; ahstinance from in

second pillar of Islam,

garineui ol consecration. 85: in

77-81

Ramadan, 84; bach required after. 78;

Secret of Scons (Ibn al Bitrtq). 27a secularism; Islamic. 299-301.682; mod secidarizauon. state-sponsored,

Quranic definition of. 137 sexual license. Islamic disapproval of. 93.

emist view of. 649 570

612. 620. 684, 687, 688

74^

INDEX

sexual orieniauon. M u s l i m views o n . 634 sexual segregation, as modernist issue.

90 105, features ot. 130—136; ftqh

separatists. 17. 18. 22. 23. 26. t i 2 ; o r i -

comparison w i l h , 108-109. n o ; five

gin of. 15. religious hooks of. 359; rit

lawsol. 104. :o9, 112. 115, 129.

6 8 i . 688. 689 Shaanxi (China), Naqshhandi order i n , 546

ual calendar of. 559; as scholars, 295

values of. 134, 147. history of. 110; 151.

427; meaning of. 108; modernism

Sluraz, early Chinese missions 10. 440

and. 299. 649, 685.686; objectives of.

al-Shirazi, Ahmad, as Ishraqi plidoso

Shadhdiyyah. as Sufi lariqah, 530

1 jÇ— t^tj; pragmatism of, 142. public

a) Shalii. Muhammad ibn Idris.

policy of. 143: recognition In Greal

Sbafil school o f law; as earl) jurisi. 74.

Britain. 633; rcvivificanon of, 116,

95, 107. 114. 119. 112, 127—128, 695

649; rules of. 136-140; as Saudi

Slialii school oflaw, 94. 107.

114,

153,

Arabian law. 632, 700. Shalii impact

ples of. [27-128. 129. |J2

implementation of. 382; violations o l .

88, 89. [01. 102,442, 481 5hahanshali-i Add, as Shah Jahan litle. 4IC

Shahhi. Maliinud. as Ishraqi philoso pher. 296 Shahid, Say-yid Ahmad, anticolonial lllovcmc-ril of, 550 Shall Jahan. + i o . 412.420: depiction of,

pher. 296 Shirazi, M i r r a Hasan, anu-imperialist

o n . 127; sources of. 119-124, sultanic

Shahadah. as prolcssionof faiih. 77. 82,

plier. 296. 303 al-Shirazi. Ibrahim, as Ishraqi philoso

123-124.124.484.682. 695: princi Shagou Chinese Suusm. 446

shipbuilding, in early Islam. 198

movement of. 550 al-Shirazi.Quth al D i n , as early astronoma,

1/1

al-Shirazi. Sadr al-Din, as Shiite philoso

Hi Sharian. Ah. as Islamic modernist. 565.

pher. 294-296. 368 Shirazi. Sayyid Ah Muhammad. Set The

579, 638, 662, 663. 681. 700 Shariatmadari. Ayatollah M u h a m m a d Kazem, as Islamic modernist. 664,

Bab Shirazi. Tain ad-Din D i n . Deccan pros perity and. 403-40.1

680 sharifs, in Morocco, 432

Shirvan, Islamic reform i n . 533

Shash. Set also Tashkent: Umay yad control

shrines; Islamic worship of. 513; Iroin Safavid Empire, 365

of, 21 al Shaiibi, Abu hhaq Ihrahim; as Maliki

395. 416.417; imprisonment of, 418:

pırisı. 132; on Quranic rulings.

palaces of. 259. 417; purported

137-138

Shroud o f Si ]osse. as Islamic textile. 224-225, 226-227 Al-Shııkukdk AaiUmyns (Ibn al-Haythani).

ilesccnl f r o m T i m n r , {94.Tag Mahal

Shaiilla. massacres i n . 702

constructed by, 248, 415-416.419

Shalt al Arab channel, haq's claim to, 459

shura (consultative government), 678

Shah|ahanabad (Delhi), Mughal arc h i -

Shaiianyyah movement, renesvalism i n .

shuraia families, role in Fast African

lecture of. 259. 417 Shuiiiwiiich (Firdowsi). 40; Safavid copies of, 164. 365. 39S Shah o f I-ersia. early Islamic obeisance 10. 80 al Sliahrastam. asAsharite. 2S1 Shahr-i Sabr.Ti mux's palace i n , 254 Shahrur, Muhammad, as Islamic m o d ernist, 465 shah(s);ofSafavid Empire, 364. 566. I67. 569; as title for ruler. 41. 355 Shah I Ismail, in Safaw-id dynasty. 294 Shah Wall Allah, as Islamic renewahsi. P4 Shaiati. Akkamah. as Lshraqi philosopher. 296 Shakar, l a r i d ad-Din Ganj-i. as Ak bar's pa iron, 409

171

c20

dynasties. 404. 505

Shaybanids. as Samarqand rulers. 696 Shaykhi. as manuscript artist, 238

pher. 296

Shaykhiyyah. as reform movement, 529

al Sialkuii, as early theologian. 293

shayklis, early authority of, 360

Sicily; Christian reconquest of, 333,

ShaykSaduq. StrAbuJalar Muhammad ibn Balmy ah

316, 602, 607, 608 Sidhunii: IBralunagnpta). 272

Slier Shah o l Sur, H ü m a y u n s defeai by.

Siegel.James. 423

407

Sierra I eone. 491

Shifaiye madrasa. Quranic inscriptions o n . 228

Sikandara. Akbar's t o m b a l . 410. 411

44. 71. 72. 112. 546; end o f direct rule

Sikhs; i n British colonial armies. 584.

o l imams of. 694. in India. 428.

591; jihad against. 698; M u s l i m ten

inheritance law of. tJO; in Iran. 366-371, 509. 514-S'C 325. 554, branch of. 43. 277; Karbala as center

550; jihads of, 540 Shandong. Muslims i n . 4 4 ] Shanghai. Muslims i n . 44 c Sharahi. Hisham, as Islamic secularist, 301 al-Sharawi, Shaykh Muhammad Mutawwah, on democracy and Islam. 671

of, 515; law o f 91, 95. 112. 115,

117,

122. 516. 682-683: in Lebanon. 660, 661. 700; philosophic categories of. 296: pray er requirements of. 94; q u i etest w i n g of. 44. reform movements of. 529. Sufism and. ; 6 i ; Surma defin ı n o n ı n . 121: Snnni Edam and. 297, 359, 659. 66o;Sunni repression of. î î - 55- i ^ . 115; temporary marriage

shariah. of African Islam. 477. 492. 497.

sions w i i h , 581 Sikri. as Mughal capital. 407.408 silk, as Muslim slaies export. 572 Silk Road(s); description of. 440-441 : e ı h n i c i r a ı i o n along, 462-468; new Greai Game and. 472-473: old. 435, 437. proposed "new," 433.468; irai is nationalization by. 434.437 silk texnlcs. ii8. 224-224 silsila. Sufi adaptation of. ¡ 6 0 silver, f r o m America, effect o n Ottoman economy, 391

i n . 130,Turkish suppression of, 362,

Simeon Styhtes.St.. 309

Twelver w i n g ni. 44,47. 366. 368,

Simpliciiis, migration to Persia, 2/0

516, /aydiyya wing of, 44

Sinai..\rab losses i n , 655

SlurhTflshrihal-Qanum (Ibn al N'afis). 205, 2o6

ter. 476

cultural flowering of, 42; doctrine o l .

Shaliui. M a h m u d . as Islamic jurist.

Slianul. I m a m ; as Islamic reformer. 533,

Siffin, skirmish ai. 15—16 Sqdmasa (Morocco), as early- trade cen¬

Shiism. 38. 447,638; converts to. 41;

662. 663. 664 i n Iraq, 666; Ismaili

shamanism, in Central Asia. 434

Musftin conquest of. 21, 35, 46, 315,

Shazilinye Sufi order. 455

Shakkaziya plaie, '?? 117-118

Shustan. Nimalulla. as Ishraqi philoso

Shiites, 16, 17, 24. 25, 27, 60, 351. 584, 618.69i; Buyids as. 55; hadith collec

306.679; colonial criticism of. 564;

tions of. 75. 359; imams of. 354;

concept of Islamic practice i n .

ishraqi tradition and. 303. as Islamic

Sinan, as builder o f Selimiya mosque. Ï 4 7 . 696 Sind; early M u s l i m control of. 21, 2 2; Gha/navid raids inio, 41 ; Punjabi workers i n , 584

INDEX sine fimcUcn; in Aralı mathematics, 162. 191 ; i n Indian mathc-marics. 162 Singapore; as pan o f Malaysia. 548. ç ö l ;

743

Sohar. as trade center. 38

Islamic arcliiiecnire i n , 255, 262:

Sokoto cahpliatc; British defeat of. 443.

Islamic Christian rivalry i n . 34, 34,

698; dan Fodin as head of. 536, 550

50. 51. 317-321; Islamic culture i n .

as port Lily. 577. as [Kntcolonial nty,

Solominid dynasty, of Ethiopia, 501

51. 60, 253. 302; Islamic mosques and

S81

Solomon's Temple, Dome o f die Rock

centers i n . 618; Islam i n , 21, 31. 35.

alSıngkeli, A b d a l Raid, as Malaysian theologian. 298 single-sex schools, for M u s l i m students, 623 Sinnar (Sudan). Islamic Funj dynasty of. 499-foo

Somalia, jihad against Europeans i n ,

Sinor. Denis. 439.443 smo-SovletTrans Eurasian Kaitw-ay. 434 Siraf, as irade center, 32 Sirhindi. Ahmad; as Islamic philosopher. 97. S'4. S 7. 696; Mujaddidi order 2

of. CI4

34. IS. 36.49. 5i. 33. 264. 314. 316. 317-321. 342.602, 692; Matiki jurisis

543-444. 700, Muslim migrants

i n . 95; M u s l i m migrants to. 608:

h o r n . 607.618: Muslims i n . 401.638

Muslims i n , 604. Peripaleticism i n .

Somaldand. Islamic anticokiniahsm i n , ceo

Sino-JapancscWar, 458

2

built over, 23. 314

Songhay empire. 478, 489: Islam i n . 481-489. 496m5o6; Muslim kings of. 478.481.491 "Song of Roland," depiction of Islam i n . 326. 327 Sonni A l i , Songhay empire of. 478. 481-482

284- 289; Umayyads i n , 45, 60. 254. 3.8 Spanish.Arabic words i n . 319 speculative rules, o f shariah. 136 spite trade, English and Dutch i n . 389; in Moluccas and Sulawesi, 426—429; o f Muslim states, 472, 576; Ottomans i n . 374. 388.390 Spiritual Physic ( A l Razi). 273

Sise. More-Ule, Guinean jihad of. 542

Sopfaistica (Aristotle), 271

Sri Lanka. Lslamic Party of, 557

Sisian, SafTarid control of, 48, 39. 691

Sophronlus. Ulnar's treaty w ith, J I 2

Srivi]aya. pre-Mnslim kingdom of, 425

Sisler Clara Muhammad Schools, o f

The Sorbonne. 663

Stalin, Joseph, 571

Sorush. Abdul Kanın, as Islamic m o d

Siafiuisi leninisi policies, effect o n

Nation o f Islam. 623 Sisters i n Islam (Malaysia). t 6 j . 689

ernist, 681

Central Asia. 437.472

" s i t t i n g " position, in Muslim prayers. 82

The South, colonialism i n . 464

stars. l a t i n o r i g i n of names of. 167

Six Rooks, as sources of judicial and

South Africa; Indian and Malay I m m i

statics. Arab research o n . 194

moral precedent. 74 Six-Day War. face Si\ Pillars o f Faith, o f M a m , 87-90 Siyalkulı.Abd al Hakim, as Islamic philosopher, 297

grants i n , 585; Islam i n , 506; Muslims i n . 604 South America. Muslini migration to. 690 South Asia; I n d o - M u s l i m rulers of.

Station o f Abraham, role i n pilgramages, 86 "steel Great Wall." as term for China's economic policy. 472 steppes. Timur conquest of. 395

siyash. Quranic authority for, 143

597-404, 696. Islamizauon of. 410.

slercotypes, o f Muslims, 628

Slave Dynasties, in South Asia, 399

514; jihad movements i n . 539-540;

Sublime Port, of Safavid Isfahan, 366,

"slave o f G o d " (Quran), 67

Muslim leaders i n . 565; Mushin

slaves. African.43. 389, o f African

migrants f m m . 604: postcolouial stale

Muslims. 4 8 8 . 4 9 ; ; Brazilian import

leaders o i . 597; prehistory of,

of, 346-447; Cape Muslims as former.

396-397

406; i n Latin Kingdom, 541; Mamluks as former. 47. 35i. military forces of, j ç ı , 342. 335, 336, 361. 364; M u s l i m

South China Sea, role Sinn-Indian trade. 420.421 Southeast Asia, colonialism i n . 564;

367 submission to God, 66, 67, 80. 96; as first pillar o f Islam. 7/. 299. 300 Suh-Saharan Africa; colonial armies of, 4113; decolonialiaaÜOn of, 552; Islamic anticolonialism i n . 550: Islamizatioii of, 510; postcolouial stale leaders of,

trade i n , 2 0 . 3 9 . 9 2 . too, 498.500.

decolonialLiatiou of. 552; ibn Idris

404; 111 Ottoman military. 376-377.

prayers used i n . 531; Islamic aniicolo

successors, era of. 112

391: Ottoman trade In, 389:Turkic.

nialism i n . 550. Islamic modernism

Sudan; al Bashir seizure o f power i n ,

399

i n , 646-647; Islamic writings of.

679, 680. 703: al-Nutnayri's seizure o f

Slavic churches, i n Ouomaii Empire. 385

297-298; Islam i n . 420-422, 643;

power i n . 701; caliph raids o l . 12,

Slavic countries, medieval Muslim news

islami ration o l . 510. 520. 530. 443;

492; Christianity i n . 401; civil war i n .

of, 329.

330

"Small Astronomy Collection." as early Greek treatises, 162-163 smallpox, early Aran treatise o n , 202 SııcUıus's law, 191

597

mandate countries o l , 651. Qadariyya

581; colonial armies 0!, 592; Funj

movement In, 520: renewal!st move

dynasty i n . 499; Islamic antlcolonial-

ments i n . 519-510, 530. 533

ism i n . 550; Islam i n . 36, 476, 493.

Soudi Gale Mosque (Yinchuan). rebuiding w i t h state lunds. 460.461

494.498—500, 507. 519; Islamism i n . 562, 570.654. 656-647.668. 681.

social activism, role in Islam. 667-668

South Korea, interest in Central Asia. 433

699; Khatmiyyah order i n . 531:

social custom, in Islamic legal theory.

Soviet U n i o n . Set also Russia;Afghan

malidist movement i n . 546. 699;

144 socialism, i l l M u s l i m states, 367, 568. S79 sonal reform, shariah approach to, 130-131 social welfare pro|ccls: in Brunei. 650: o f Muhammadiyah. 97 Society for ihe Promotion o f Education Among Muslims (China), 457 Socrates. 276 Sogdiana. early M u s l i m control of. 21 Sogdians. i l l early Chang an. 442

expulsion of, 549, 550. 659. 660. 702;

Maliki school i n , 114; M u s l i m

breakup of. 463.468.471, 668; econ

Broiherhood of. 547. 679, 701;

omy of. 571. postcolonial M u s l i m

Ottoman trade f r o m . 389; revolution

states and. 566. Uigtiur recognition

ary movements in, 6b/; September

by. 465.466

Laws of. /02; shariah implementation

Spam; abolition o f Umayyad caliphate i n . 34; Almohad dynasty i n . 694. 695; Almoravid dynasty i n . 694; appeals to Ottomans from, 382; Christian reconquestof, 305, 333, 344; colonialism of. 645; "de-lslamization" o l . 603; Farimids i n . 45; imperialism of, 551;

i n . 152, 686-687, 702; women and minorities i n . 679; women's status 111. 688 al-Sufi. Abd al-Rahmaii. as early astronomer. 166-16/, 232. 233 Sufis; active virtue o l , 98, 101, Almovarid persecution o l . 40; architecture of.

744

INDEX center, 200, 207, 213; economy of,

229. broth erh(K>ds of, 160,4(1.4.(3.

modernisi interpretations of, 648,

485, 522, 530; (ires' of. 220. 4(6; in

681. 684; role i n Islamic reform, (30;

474; expansion 0!, (46, 559; exports

earl> Middle Fast. 350. 359. 360-361 .

Sfiafii rejection of, t28;solidarity r u l -

of. 572; Fatimid loss of. 48; Fatimid

363. 364; i n Ottoman Empire. 3/2.

ing of, 146; as source o f shariah, 108.

rule of. 46, 351, 693; French rule of,

377.178. 379- 381. 383; poetry of.

119-124, 135,

423: Safavid persecution of, 567;

136

(82. 588, (98; Greek siudies i n . 271 ;

Sunni Islam. 18. 26. 27,45, 207. 290.

Ikshidid dynasty i n . 37.694; Islamic

639; Asharism i n , 280. 303; Catherine

an i n , 215, 254, 245; Islamic culture

the Great's suppon of. (20: i n China.

in. 60; Islamic law i n . 150; Islamic

29c-296.646; i n Africa. 492.494; in

447. 452; i n earl) Iran, 366, 367. (14.

modernism i n . [6(; islam i n , 331;

China. 446. 448-457; integration i n

515; in Egypt. 49.281.695; o f Gulf

Islamism i n , (67. 654; land owner-

Sunni thought. 694, Islamic renewal

State leaders. 673; in India. 41; law of.

ship i n . 57(; Mamluk contnil of, 695:

based o n , (12. 517 5'8, 519, 320,

91. 9(, 10/, 359, 682-683; '

a- mandate- country, 651 ; as member

Sj0-c31.c-.fe. (37. (38. 54fe:

Lebanon. 660, 700; madrasas of, 114.

mosques and centers of. 6t8; i n

i n the Maghreb. 53. malidist movc-

takeovers i n . 593: Mongol conquest

Mughal empire. 407, 408.409. 412.

meni of, 546, marriage law of. 130;

of, 59; Mushm Brotherhood i n . 547,

social movements of, 694 Sufism. 63. 104. 274. 283. 283. 286. 293.

—

n

of United Arab Republic, 556, military

418; neo-Sufism. 697; i n Ottoman

Nation o f Islam as part of. 623; prayer

702; Mushm migrants f r o m . 608; as

Empire. (26; replacement by

requirements of. 94: repression o l

Muslim state. 652; Naqshbandi schol-

Wahhabism, 89. 291; in Southeast

Shiism by, 53. 55. 56; revivalist move-

ars i n . 512: national identity of. 558.

Asia. 297. 298. 402.4O4. i n

ments of. 49; Rightly Guided Caliphs

(80; non-Muslims I n . 385; Ottoman

T i m b u k t u , 485, 486, as Uighur fac-

of. 692, Safavid persecution of. 367;

conquest of, 696; Ottoman trade

tion. 466

Seljuk members of. 55. 162. 367;

f r o m . 389; as pos[colonial state. 581 ;

Suharto, policies of. 572, 574

Shiite Islam and. 297. 359. 554.659.

secularization policy i n . 472; Seljuk

al-Suhrawardi. Shihab at D i n . as philos

660; Sufism and, 361: Sufism intcgra-

rule i n . 54, 56. 351, 353, 37t. 694;

tionn into. 694,Turkmen as members

Shahi school i n , ti4;Tulunid dynasty

pher-mystic. 293, 294. 295, 303, 368 suicide bombuigs. by Qassam Brigade. 703 Sukarno. Achmed, as national activist. (62, (63. (72. (73.(92

i n , 694

of. (5: Uighur bchef in, 466 Suruiis; early religious groups of. 359;

Syriac; pltilosphical lexis i n , 301 ; scien-

Western immigrants as. 615

tific translations inio, 160- 16t. 200;

SunYal sen. 447

translations into Arabic. 333

Sulawesi, Islam i n . 422, 426, 430

Sural al-Eaiihah, 80

Syrianus, as Neoplalonist, 270

Sulayhids. as rulers olYemen, 37

surgery, in early Islam. 204. 204. 208

Syria-Palestine. Clirlstinity i n . 3

Sulaym tribe, banishment t o l f r i q i y a , 48

Surinam; Dutch control of. 621: Muslim

Suleyman, 393; aid to Melaka hy. 427: as

immigrants from. 604. 607. 621, 622.

T

625

al-Tabari. Ah i b n Said Rabban. medical

"caliph o f the w o r l d . " 376; court of. 376; gold regalia of, 384-585. rule as

surrender, as meaning o f islam, 66, 67

high point o f Ottoman Empire. 696:

Surush, Abdul-Karim. as Islamic m o d -

• work on Dome o f ihe Rock commissioned by, 226-227 Sulcymanci movement. 622: Quran schools o l . 619 Su ley 1 nam ye complex (Istanbul), 376 Sultanate Era (950-1500). 351-353 sulun(s), as cultural patrons, 379:

ernist. 565 Susa, Jews i n , 2 Suwari, al Hajj Salim. as early African Muslim. 489 al-Suyuti, Jalal al-Din. as Egyptian Sufi teacher, 482-483,485,492 Swaggarl. Jimmy. 626

Gha/navids as, 41; as quasi-divine

Swahili. Muslim speakers of. 504-505

being. 385; Seljuk. 54; slave military

swastika, i n Islamic a n . 410

corps of. 3(5. 377-378; as Ode lor

Sweden; interfaith activities i n , 627;

ruler, 3(5.422 Sumauguru. king o f Soso, 478 Sumatra. Dutch connol of, 534, 543. 57C. Islam i n . 422. 428. 430, 520; Padri movement i n . 698 al-Sumatrani. Shams al-Din. as Malaysian theologian. 298

Islamic mosques and ceiiiers i n , 618;

Tabatabaii. Muhammad Husayn. as Ishraqi philosopher, 296 Tahlceghi Muslims. 618 Tablighi Islam, 700 Tabriz, as Safavid capital, 290/ IbdhJuiD (al-Ttisi). 177 Tadmekka (Sahara), as early uade cenier. 476 al-Taftazani. Sadr al-Din. as Islamic philosopher and theologian. 293, 297, 33'

Muslims i n , 604. 6o6, 607: support of

Tahert, Rustamids of, 36

mosque movement by. 617

Tahirids, as Iranian governors, 38. 39

Sw it/erland; Islamic mosques and t e n -

Tahmasp. Shall, 364

ters i n , 618; Muslim guesrworkcrs i n .

Tahrir Muslims. 618

609: Muslim incursions Into, 315;

Taif (Arabia), 4. 10, 11,

Muslims i n , 604

Taiping rebellion. 440

sun, Piolemy's model for. 172

syllogism, theory of. 290-291

Sunan, compilers of, 75

synagogues; b o m b i n g of, 629; in

sundials, use for prayer timekeeping. 180

Ottoman Empires. 386; o f Saracens i n

Sundiata. as Mali ruler, 478

tables. 327

The Sunna. 497, 682; authoritative books

treatise of. 201 Tabaristan, local chieftains of. 41

Syria;Abbasid state i n . 43. 693;Alawis of,

13

Tajikistan. 434; Chinese miliiary agreement w i t h . 471 ; Chinese uade w i t h . 470; Islamic Renaissance Party of. 562; Xinjiang trade w i t h , 469 Tajiks; in Afghanistan. 659; i n Central

of, 74~7(: description of, 121; empha-

583-484; Bath party of. 580.

Asia. 471 : clash with Meskhetian

sis o n practice i n , 90, 96; Hebrew-

By2antine loss of. 311, 316: caliph c o n -

Turks, 472

Bible and New Testament compared

trol of. 11.12.15. 16, 27. 29. 76. 351.

10. 88; importance of. 74. 89, 105;

693; Christian rule i n , 340; colonial

interpretation of, 137; Islamic law and. 92. 93.95. 97. 104, 108, 10; as Islamic paradigm o f behavior. 73;

armies of. 592: control by Saladin. 47;

Taj Mahal. 697; Aurangreb's copy of. 419; early depiction of. 513; Mughal architecture o l , 215. 248.411,415-416

development o f 566-567. early

lakbir (magnification). 78, 81, 82

Christians i n . 309: as early medical

Takedda (Niger), as copper source, 495

INDEX i A h r (chargeof belief);againstHausa rulers. 497: against Sonni A l i . 482 Taklir wal Hi|ra, as Egypt u n d f r g r o u n d group, 660 Takhmakan Desert, 4 - 7 . 440. 441,442, 464 Al-Tolunilti fi Sfiadi d-Todhkira (al-Khalri).

74Ç

4 2 - 4 3 . 47, 76. 140; levied by

481-489,494.496;Tuareg conquest

Egyptian pashas. 500. levit-d by

of. 480. 481

Mughal emperors, 406, 419; levied by Ottomans. 386, 38/, 58B; levied by Selj uks. 56 Tayan.Turhan, o n Uighur rights, 466. 47Ï

timekeeping,

in early Islam. 180-181.

213 Timur; Ak bar's descent f r o m . 414; c o n quests of. 353. 356. 357, 395. 695; downfall of. 363. 365. Genghis Kahn

technology, in early Islam, 193-198

lineage o l , 405; Gur-i Mir t o m b of.

Takrur (Senegal). Islam i n . 476.489

Tehran. Qajar palace i n , 539

352; palace of. 255; shrine built hy.

Tallia i b n Uhayadallali. as early

Telli ( M a l i ) , mosque i n . 479.488

177

Muhammad supporter, 15 Taliban. o f Afghanistan. 91.466. 658. 659, 680, 683, 688, 703-704; as fun

Tcuipier. Etienne. 289. 303 Temple Mount (Jerusalem), as Islamic holy site, 313

130 Timurids; as Herat rulers, 696; legacy to Ottoman Empire, 371; Safavid legacy from, 370

damentalist group. 466; treatment o f

Tcngella. as early Senegambia leader. 489

Tinmallal (Morocco), mcssque at. 50

women under. 6-4. 687

Tcngella. Koli. Deruankohe dynasty of.

al-Tirmidhi. Sunan collccnon of, 75

tali I, 107

489.490

tithing,

required by Islam, 83

Taliqani.Ayatollah. as [shraqi-Shute. 296

tents, o f early Islam, 220-221

T i n Mir, as Bengali Islamic reformer. 538

Tamerlane. SrrTlmur

Teresa, Mother, 98

T i t i s o f Bosira, i s theologian, 271

al-Taminii. Arzam: as Islamist. 614; o n

terrorist acts; by Armed Islamic Group.

tobacco: Ahmad Baha's r u l i n g o n . 485;

Muslims i n die West, 627 Tang dynasty. 443. 464, foreign popula tions i n , 442; frontier closure to

672, Muslims and. 629. 631 Tervagent (Tervagan), as purported Islamic deity, 326

nomads by. 351, M u s l i m visit to China

testimony. Quranic ruling o n , 156

i n . 81; pohtical policy of. 4 3 3 , 4 I i .

lexnle industry', i n early Islam. 193-198.

44° tangenl function, in Arab mathematics. 162 Tanukh tribe. Hamdanids f r o m , 41 Tanzania: "Africanization" campaigns i n . 383; early Islam i n , 303; posicolonial tensions i n . 581 Tanzim al-Jihad. Sadat's assassination by. 702 Tanzimat reforms; o l Ahmad Cevdet Pasha, 699; o f Selim in, 698 Taoism, effects o n Serindian Buddhism, 44' Taqi al-Din, as early mechanical engi neer. 198 Taqi al-Din observatory (Istanbul). T8; taqltd. 1(1 taqwa, as responsibility to God, 67, 93-103 Tdnkh d-Sudan, 475,490 Tarim basin; energy resources i n , 469; Naqshbandi order founded near, 4(3. Uighurs as indigenous to, 464,463, 467 ranqahs (brotherhoods). o f Sufis. 36c. 451.453.485. 494. 5'2. 5 3 ° . 53' • 533. 540. 541.543.S45. 700 Tariq ibn Ziyad, Gibraltar conquest by. 21 Tadub al-Aflok (al-Jii7|ani), 171 Ta Shih. as Muslim visitors to China, 81 Tashkent (Uzbekistan). 21. 443. 468.as trade center, 436 Tatars: in Central Asia. 471; in Germany. 604; migration to Finland. 604. 607; Turkic-Altaic language of. 443. 44f taxation system, colonial introduction of, 376 taxes; Islamic, i n Pakistan. 657; levied by caliphates, 28, 29, 30, 34. 36, 38.

218-220, 224, 247. S«also carpets Thabit i b n Qutra; as early astronomer and mai hemati d a n . 163. 165-166. 180. 187; optic studies of. 191 Thailand, diversity i n . 558; H u i Muslims m . 443 Thrueietiis (Plato). 270 theft. Islamic prohibition o l , 93, 137. [43 Theodore o f Mopsuestia, as theologian. 27' theology, Islamic. S « Islamic iheology Theology of Anstodt, 272 Tliessaloniea,Turkish takeover of. 342 Thessaly, Ottoman control of, 391 t h i r d pillar o f Islam, 85 " T h i r d Universal Alter native." o f Qaddafi. 701 T h i r d World; colonialism effects o i l . 572: economic development i n , 573; Muslim states i n . 551, 571

Salihiyyah opposition to. 544 Tobacco Protest ( I r a n ) . 538. 651. 699 Todar Mai. as Mughal tax officer. j.ci- 407 Toghnl Beg. as Seljuk sullan, 55. 56 Tokolar scholars, o f Senegal. 490 Toledan Tibles. in astronomy, 175 Toledo; Christian reconquest of, 333; conquest by Alfonso V I . 35; as Islamic city-stale, 34; M u s l i m takeover of, 314 tombs; Muslim veneration of, 456, 517; Quranic inscriptions o n , 218 Topkapi Palace, as site o f Ottoman court. 375. 376. 377.523 Torah; as Allah's revealed book, 88, Quranic mention of, 306 Torodbc (Senegambia). as Islamic schol ars. 490 "Torodo is a beggar," as Senegal m a x i m . 490 Toronkawa (Senegambia). as Islamic scholars, 490, 496 Toronto; loreign populations of, 610; M u s l i m W o r l d League office i n , 621

" T h i r d W o r l d i s m . " 579

Tcitt, Baron dr, as Ottoman adviser. 511

TheThomand and One Nights. Hanın al-

Tours, Battle of. 692

Rashid's exploits i n , 693

t r i d c ( s ) ; in Centra! Asia. 435.437. 468.

Thrace. Turkish takeover of, 342

469. maritime. 501; of M u s l i m

Tianjin, Musfims i n . 443

Chinese. 443; role in spread o f Islam.

Tian Mian mountains, 434. oases near, 44'

S95.477.4B8.4B9. S ° i . s22 trade centers, in Islamic empire. 32, 36.

T i a n W u . as JahriyyaSuli, 455

38.47; i n Ottoman Empire. 386-390;

Tiberias (Palestine). Jews i n . 2

i n Safavid Empire. 365-366; i n Sahara.

Tibet; Chinese relations w i t h , 467,472; U u i Muslims i n , 443 "tides." o f Muslims inco Clima, 44s al-Tijani. Sayyid Ahmad, as Islamic reformer, 531-532, 536, 607 Ti)aniyya Sufism. 531. 531. 542. 530. 697 tiles, arcliitectural use of. 253. 255, 526 Timones (Plato). 272. 273 Ulnars, as Ottoman land grants. 377, 378,387 T i m b u k i u ; French rule o l , 551. Islam i n .

53 Traditionisis. 278, 279. 280. 281; fiqh legal thought of. 112. 115. 114. 117. 128 transactions. Islamic laws of, 152 Tirdi* tridental Wisdom (al-ShirazI). 295 uanslation movement, in Islamic sti encc. 159-160. 163. 164. 185, 2oo. 271.693 transnational 1 nation, in Central Asia. 434.437

INDEX Transoxania. Chaghatayids in, 695

Turke>. Chaghatay ids in, 695; commu nisi activists i n . 579; development

Uhayd Allah, as self-declared imam. 45

Irano-lslamii culture in. 347. Kara-

i n . 566; expansion of. 556; foreign

Uganda. "Africanization" campaigns in.

Khiui conquest ol. 58;

mosque staffing by. 621; Hanafi

Khwarizmshah conquesl of, 58;

school in, 114: interest in Central

Uhud.Bauleof. 10.691 Ilighuristan, 435. 464. 463,466;

Transoxiana; government of. 38, 39:

S85

Mongol conquest of, 58, 353,400: as

Asia, 434; Islamic associations of,

part of Great Seljuk domains, 55.

621-622; Islamic law in. 140.

Samamd control of. 351,

693;

Islamic modernism in. 565. 656,

Timurid period in, 352,

353;

681; lslamism in. 568. 569. 702:

ethnicization of. 462-468; as

Islamist government of. 152.

Muslims, 435.442.443- 445¬

Turkmen in. 34

700.

566;

N'aqshbandi rulers of. 521 Uighurs: Chinese policy toward, 473.

Transylvania, Ottoman rule of, 697

Kemal ism i n . 561. 567, 624;

464-465; rebellion of. 440: resent

Treaty of Muday biy ah. 10.692

Kurdish identity 111, 559, military

ment of Han Chinese by. 471; Russian

Treaty of Jassy. 392, 698

politicians i n , 668; Muslim intellec

policies affecting. 437; separatist

Treaty of Karlowirz, 510

tuals of. 579; Muslim migrants

Treaty of Km link Kaynarja, 698

from. 607. 616, 624; nanonal ideu-

Treaty of Passarovitr,

tiı> " I . £53-, 560; nationhood-

311

org nidations of. 466 Ukraine; Ottoman conquesl of. 374; Xinjiang uade with. 468

Treaty of Qasr Shirin. 697

umtnah disharmony in, 455.

Treaty of /.sitvaTorok, 697

Refah Party of. 562, 568. 704; reli

151; m.Africa, 488. 492.494.495.

Trench. Battle of the. 691

gious education in, 700. 701; shari-

497, 506; Enrich rivalry with.

tribal chiefs, m Muslim states. 588

ah court abolished in, 700; Welfare

33-4-535. 543; In early Middle East.

tribal organizations, in early Middle E m ,

Party of. 562

! . 148, 349. 35'. lis". J63 tribal peoples; Islamic leadership of, 362; in Ottoman Empire, 373, 377; in Safavid Empire. 370 191

The Trinity, of Christianity. 303. 306. i°7.33' conquest of 36; Islam in, 473. Oltoman conquest of, 492 •'truth of certainty" (Quran). 6 5 - 6 6 . 6 7 Tuanku NanTua; Padri movement and. 533:asShaitany yahleader. 520 Tuareg [Berber tribe|. 480. 486 Tughluqs. North India rule hy. 400 Tukoz.Ahmet. Uighur support hy. 467 "tulip craze." 511 ernist movement,

465. use in Soudi Asian Islam. 396 Turkic peoples, in Central Asia. 434, 463.

565

Tulunid dynasty, in Egypt and Syria. 37. 43. 694 Tunbs islands. United Arab Emirates' claim to. 559 Tunikabuni, MirraTahir. aslsliraqi philosopher. 296

ulama movement (Nahdai al-Ulama). of

Turkish Republic, creation of. 700 Turkmen, in Central Asia. 471. migrauons of. 54-55. 59. 363; national

Turko-Persiau culture; in early Middle

562. 588. 651: secularization policy in. 572. 656 Turabi. Hasan, as Sudanese modernist. 657. 681 Turan. Iran's struggle with, 40

text made for. 167 Umar. as king of Kano, 496

422,430

Umar ibn al Khallab; assassination ol.

Turko-Persian-Islamicate culture, of Turks; Anatolia takeover by, 342; as chief tains. 344;in early Chang an.442; entrance into Mashriq, 53-58; inde

362; as name lor Muslims. 321.

322.

144.

312-313.692 UmarTal, al-Hajj: defeat of, 543; as and. 546; revolt of. 550 Umayyad Mosque (Damascus). 310 Umay yads. 8. 15; agricultural develop ment under, 196; architecture and

al-Turutj ül-Hultmiyyıah (Methods of

244.

13. 16. 27, 28. 29. J3. 35. 37. 38. 60. 142. 149. 175, 200. 2 i i ,

143

al-Tusi. Nasir al-Diu. as early astronomer. 174. 177. 182. 183, 19]

al-Tusi. Sharaf al-Din. as early mathe 174

Twelver Sluism. 44. 47. 366. 368. 516. 693; Islamic associations of. 621 tyeddo (Kayor military). 491

277.

284. 313. 692; campaigns of, 21, 28: coinage of, 223. medical transla tions commissioned by. 200; over throw' of, 19-20, 25, 34. 112.

matician. 187-189, 190 Tusi couple, in astronomy.

an of. 216. 224. 231. 244. 253.

260; as caliphs. [6-17, 18. 19. 22.

city-state, 464,465

171.

Caliph. 12. 15. 76. 139- 14O, 143.

leader ofTijamyyah. 542; madhism

353.

Turpaii; Islamization of. 442: as Uighur

Judgment),

692; covenant of, 308; as "rightly guided" cahph. 75. 112; as second

South Asia. 397-404.403. 418

323, 324. national identity ol, 554; as

Neo-Destur (Constitution) party of.

Ulughberg ibn Shahrukh. astronomy

East. 357: in early Southeast Asia. 421.

Sunni. 454

hood-ummah disharmony in. 555;

183

Uljaym. Muhammad Khudabanda. dlus irated Quran of, 234

as modem Muslim slate. 549

590; economy of. 374; Islamic con

Muslim migrants from. 606; naliun-

Indonesia, 562 Ulegh Beg observatory (Sainarqand). 182,

identity of. 554 Turkmenistan; Chinese trade with, 470.

verts in, 3(, 36; islamic law changes

668. 681. Maliki school in, 113;

529:asSonniAlifavorites.

rights and. 688-689

Turkish mosques, in Europe. 618

Islamic conversion of. 39. 351.

Movement in. 362. 702; lslamism in.

525,

481; views on hadith, 685; women's

60

Tunisia; Aghlabids as governors of, 21;

677-678. 679. 680. IslamicTendcncy

650; in Mughal Empire. 697, in Ottoman Empire. 379. 380. 515; as Safavid Empire. 367, 369: Shii. in Iran.

pendent, in Ottoman slates, 378;

in, 150; Islamic politics in. 670-671.

682. 683. 684. in Islamic Southeast Asia. 424. 428. laic mterprciors and.

Turkish language, role in Islamic culture,

Dinis. Ottoman conquest of, 374 Believers in. 13; colonial rule in. 5B6.

664; Islamic law and. 686: Islamic

post-Abbasid leaders. 358. 361. in

i *

Tutko-Egyptian regime, in Sinnar. 500

Tulu-i Islam (Pakistan), as Mamie mod

149.

modernism and. 469. 647. 680. 681.

Muslims, 443 Turkic languages; Persian classics Trans

Turkish khanat. downfall of. 464

Tripoli; caliph raids against. 12; Crusader

ulaina. 119. 120. 123. 135, 140. 147.

350, 359; in India. 550: in Iran. 661.

Turkic-Altaic languages, of Chinese

lated into. 357; use by Uighurs. 464.

trigonometry; m early India, 161, in early Islam. 165. 166. 168. 181, 190.

561.

692;

in Spain. 45. 60. Sunni supporters of, 339; treatment of Christians by. 3©9 umbrella organizations, lor Muslim

INDEX i m m i g r a n t - . 611

-61c

Uwaysal Barawi, Sliaykh. 544-444

ummah (holy c o m m u n i t y ) . 18,654; 609

uymaq I tribal units), i n early Iran, 363, Uzbekistan, 434; Chinese iradc- w i t h ,

J85 Union o f Moroccan Muslim Organizations (Netherlands), 622 Untied Aral) Emirates, claim to » d fields.

Wafd (Delegation), in Fgypt. 562

21: cthmcization i n . 436; Russian

al Wahhab. Muhammad ibu Abd. as

policies affecting. 437;Ta]iks i n .

founder of Wahhab ism, 114, 291.

47t: Turkic -Altaic language of. 443.

51B. 523.528.332. 545

517,

Wahhabi-Saudi state. 317, 545

Uzbeks; in Afghanistan, 659, in Central Asia. 4/1; clash w i i h Kyrgyz. 472

support o f mosque movement by. 617

Wadud. Annua, as female modernist. 681

470. 4468; early M u s l i m control of.

445

459: Iranian annexation of islands I r o m , 557; national identity of, 560;

W Wadai. Islam in. 475. 500,506

370

Unlate Armenians. Armenian Church of,

SU

of. S44-S4S

Uncovering the Hidden (al H u j w a r i ) . 297

UniledAzab Repuhhe, 556

Wahliabisiii. 446.458. 638. 645. 697; i n China. 450, 459; i b n Hanhal's follow ers i n . 114. 517: principles of. 291;

United Malays National Organi7ation ( U M N O ) . 562. 590. 595- 59*. 59«

V

renewalisi movements based o n . 518.

Valencia; Christian reconquest of, 41, 320; as Islamic city-state, 34

United Muslims of America. 638 Utuled Nations. 55;. 544; universal val-

Vah. Shaykli Nimamllah. shrine of. 360 Vancouver, foreign populations of, 610

ues for w o m e n of. 634 U S Department of Siaic.Arab immigra-

van den Bosch, as Dutch colonial adiiiuiVarna, crusade defeat at, 696

Service, unjust immigrant deportation

Vatican; Arabic manuscripts I n , 333; treatment o f Muslims by, 626

by. 637 United Slates: interest in Central Asia.

vegetal designs; i n By zantine an. 236; i n

433; inierfaith activinesin. 627;

Islamic art. 236. 239, 240. 248. 243.

Islamic female modernist i n . 6Hi;

260. 400. 401.410, 411,

416

veiling, by Muslim w o m e n , 634, 659.

Islamic mosques and centers i n . 617-618. 621; Muslim education i n .

688

622-623; Muslim migrations to. 611,

Venice, luxury trade of, 388. 389

690; Muslims i n . 604. 608,6t6. 639.

Venus, Ptolemy's model for. 173

643

viceregency, as moral responsibility. 96. 104. 105.

Universities o f Islam. 623

145

Viceroy 's Council. Indian landlords i n ,

University o f Algiers. 671 University o f Damascus, tiqh enrylopedia project of. 150

587 vices, prohibited hy Quran. 93,96,97

University of London. 671

Vieiuia. Ottoman siege of. 372, 374, 392.

University o i Malaya. 578: Chinese and Indian domination o i , 585

510. 602. 696 viUyal-i faqih. as Khomeini doctrine.

University oi Punjab, 578

703

University o f Riyadh (Saudi Arabia). 652

Vincent o f Beauvais. v iews o n Islam. 314

Unrepresented Nations and People's

Vindication of the Use of the Science of Solum (al-

Organization, Uighur leadet of. 467

Ashari). 280 violence; Islamic espousal of. 301;

Uqaylids. o f Mosul. 43 Urabi revolt, i n Egypt, 699

Muslim abhorrence of, 612

Urban LI. call for Crusades by. 337,694

Virgin Mary. Catholic doctrine of. 89

a l - U r d i . Muayyad al-Din. as early

virtue, in Islam ethics. 97,98 virtuous City (Al-Farabi), 285

174

"ThcVirtuous Forerunners," o f die

Urdi lemma, i n astronomy. 174 U r d u , development o l . 40

532. 545; Suhsm replacemenr by. 89. 532, 445;Taliban compared to. 660 Wahid. Ahdurahman. as Islamic m o d ernisr, 681 Walata. islam i n . 481 Wali Al|ah, Shah, as Islamic reformer.

sirator. 576

utin policy of, 611 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization

astronomer. 171.

ttrçugc pmoresuue dc Consluntinuplr I M e l l i n g ) .

Uwaysiyyah order, o r i g i n and principles

purpose of, 555. 557. i n United Stales,

747

Prophet. 74

518, 523. 525. 527-328. t>97 al-Walid, Khalid i b n . 310.

311

al W a l i d l , 313 al-Walid ibuYazid. 310: Umayyad palace of, 231 Walliullab, Shall, as Indian philosopher. 297 Wall Disney Productions, Arabs and Muslims depicted i n , 637 Walter of Compiegne. views o n Islam. 325 Wangara; as Islamic traders. 488.495; in Kaisina, 497 Wang Lequan. "steel Great Wall" of, 472 waqt. as Islamic revenue source. 182. 209. 241. 381. 387, 646 Waqqas.Abu. mosque attributed to. 443 war. sliariah rulings o n , 134 Warlord onrj Muslims in Chinese Cmlrd Asia (Forbes), 465 al-Warraq, Abu Isa. anti-Christian polemic by, 331 warrior-defenders of Islam, 337—545 Washington, D.C.; mosque i n , 617; Uighur separatists i n , 466 water control Ser hydrology: irrigation engineering water wheels, in early Arab countries. 197-198

Urtuqids. atabeg stales of. 56

Vishnu, mosque pillar of. 399.400

waterworks, budt by Aglilabids. 36

U n i m q i ; bombings i n , 462-463; as

Visigothie kingdom. Islamic use o f

al-Wathiq, as al-Mutasim successor, 28

Main Uighur tow n, 463; new trans

remains f r o m , 243; Muslim conquest

Waison, W i l l i a m , 437

portaiion links lo, 435,471: as trade

o f Spain f r o m , 21

welfare assistance, i n early Ulam. 144

Visigoths. 314

center, 435.436 Usuli school o f Shi ism. 36% 515. 525. 529; debate w i t h Akhbari school, 697 usury; Islamic law o n , 93, 132, 134,

138,

145; Quranic rules o n , 120 Utliman ibiiAiTan. 8; assassination of. 15, 16, 692:as"rightly guided" caliph. 112.489; as third Caliph, 12, 15,692 Uttar Pradesh. Mughal control of, 409

Welfare (Refah) Party, ofTurkey, 462, 468

Vlcte. Francis. 189

welfare slates, pressures OU. 610

Viuuvius. as Roman an lute. t. 217

The West; antipathy toward Muslims u i .

viziers, in Farimid Fgypt, 48

627; challenges to Muslims i n ,

Vlaams Blok (Belgium), as anti-Muslim

611-614; immigration policies i n .

political party. 631 "Voice of the Islamic Revolution," as Khomeini radio program. 664-665

609-611; Islamic modernism and. 686; Islamic mosques and centers i n . 617-619; Muslim communities i n ,

volksraad, 111 colonial Dutch Indies. 561

604-609; Muslim criticism of, 612.

voussoirs, i n Islamic buildings, 253, 254

620. 653; Muslim migrants to, 605.

INDEX

748

618-641; Muslim return to, 601-641.

World Bank, loans to China. 467

Chinese pilgrimages 10.454;

national identity of. 6t t; pluralism in,

World Council of Churches, 626

Christians in, 4, 306; communist

640

WorldTrade Cenier (NewYork), bomb-

activists in, 579; development of.

555. Si*.. 542. 550, 697: Islamic renewal orders in, 513, 319, 530.

536;

566-567: Islamic culture in, 60.

ing of. 629, 703

West Africa, holy war tradition in. 519.

WorldTrade Organization, China and. 467

Islamic reformers in. 530; Islamic

World War 1; Arah territory division

spread from. 503, 504; Ismadi move-

Qadiriyyah mnvrmenl in. 519;

after, 552. 557. French colonialism

meni in, 4 4 - 4 5 , 46; Muhammad's

Tijaniyya order in. 531

after. 575; jihads during. 545; Muslim

community in, 10. 11,

migration after, 608; Ottoman divi-

Naqshbandi Sufism in. 454, t i l ;

sion after. 557. 700; restrictions on

nationalism in. 556; as natural refuge,

free expression in. 597; revoli against

41; Onoman control of, 374.

Ottomans in. 53B; Russian

389; Zaydi imam rule of, 693:

West Bank;Arab losses in. 655: Islamism in. 667 westernizing reforms, in Ottoman Empire. 513.

525

557.

World War II; Muslim siaie emergence

559

"Westoxihcation." Iranian perception of, 661 white ¡color). use in Islamic an, 139 Wlutehead.Affred North, 297

458: Chinese preferential treatment

ters after. 603-604, restrictions on

of, 460,461; mosques of, 462; num-

worship; liqh rulings on, 110,

bers of. 462: religious principles of.

Yinchuan (China), mosque in 460, 461 Yining (Cul|a); "EastTurkestan Republic"

261-262. ScrakiMalligraphy

in. 465.469: ethnic riot in. 466 yogi, Achinese sultan in duel with. 428

6;2

While Revolution (Iran). 661

X

Why [hi IsloinicVViiy (Numayr). 657

xenophobia. Muslims as victims of, 630.

Wigdortz. Bren H . . 468

Yogyakarta (Java), mosque at. 428. 429,

Xindianzi Chinese Sufism. 446

willful ambiguity, in Islamic a n . 222,

Xinjiang. 434, 463. 464.465. 466;

250-267 Wisdum ul Illumination (al-Suhrawardi),

430 Yohannesl. emperor of Ethiopia. 402

631

Wilts. Ivor, on African Muslims. 489

York (England). Arabic manuscripts in.

is!

Afaqiyya Sufism in. 453: Han

Yotkan. as oasis city. 442

Chinese in, 469; KhufTiya Sufism in.

Young Ottomans (Turkey), as islamic

454. Makhdumzada Sufism in, 453;

29Í. 2 9 4 - 2 9 ! witnesses. 136.

461-462

in:

Quranic description of. 120

"white man'5 burden." as colonial pater nalism. 560, 561.

after. 552, 650, Muslim-West encoun-

writing. Islamic an of, 222—230,

Buddhists, 4Si

Yihewanl Muslims; in China. 450. 454.

free expression in, 597

"White Lotus" rebellion, of Chinese

388.

Zaydiyya Shiism in. 44

Communism after, 540

Western Sahara. Moroccan claims ro,

26;

mummies found in. 437; Muslims

142

modernists.

in. 431. 414. 443. 4 5 ' . 4*8. 473;

"witnessing" formula, in Muslim

name origin of, 440; Naqshbandi

prayers, 82 Wolof. Islamizaiion of, 490-491, 542

Sufism in. 453; new transportation

woman, as U.S. chaplain. 625

links to, 471; Russian settlers in, 469.

women, air travel by. n 8 - i i 9 ; d i s c r i m i -

separatists in, 472. irade with Central

modernist support. 647; in Muslim

Xinjiang Production and Construction

states. 580. 687, 688; feminism's

Corps (XPCC). as alleged employer of

effects on status uf. 89; financial affairs

prison labor, 467

of, 149; importance in Ottoman soci-

against. 704; Muslim migrants from. 607; Muslims in, 604 Yunnan; Islamic renewal in. 546; Khoja Abd Alia in, 451; Muslims in, 443. 459; Panlhay Hui Muslim rebellion in.

462,463.465.467

455.699 Yusuf. Muhammad, as Naqshbandi Sufi,

Xin )iao (new teachings), of Chinese Islam. 462

Islamic dress of, [41. 634. 659. 665. 670. 677, 682, 688; as Islamic mod-

440 Yugoslavia: international sanctions

Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.

ety. Í 7 5 - J 7 6 ; in Iran. 665; in Islam, 6J4. '•'il- as Islamic converts. 609;

Empire. 700 Yuan dynasty, relations with Central Asia.

Asia. 468. 470

nation against. 634; education of

Xuanhuagang. as Jahriyya center. 455

565

Young Turk revolution, in Ottoman

453 Yusuf and Zuloykhtt [Jami poem], Bihzad's painting of, 250-251

ernists. 681; in Islamic polines, 395, 6*9. 703; legal rights of, 687-688; in

Y

Z

Muslim fund-raising. 616—617; as

Yakub Beg rebellion. 465

al-Zabidi, Muhammad Mintada. as

Muslim politicians. 635; non-Muslim,

Yamama. Muhammad's community in,

marriage to Muslims. 149; organizations lor. 689: prayer requirements for, 94. Quranic rulings on. 126,478;

10,

11

Yang Huaizhong. as Muslim Chinese scholar. 462

Naqshbandi scholar. 512.

514

Zabid (Yemen); Islamic renewalism in. 514. 52i: Jahriyya Sufism founded in. 454. 455: as trade center. 38

Yaqub, Abu Yusuf. asCordoban caliph. 2B6

Zaghul, Sad, as Egyptian leader. 562

62o. slandering of, 122; status of,

Yaqub ibn Kilhs. is Fatimid vizier, 48

al -Zahir. as Fan mid cab ph. 47

687-688; as Sufi mystics. 693;Talihan

Yaqub Sultan. Nezami manuscript of, 238

al-Zahiri, Dawud ibn Ah. as early yurist. 114

requirements for, 659. 660. voting

yaquin, 63

Zahiri school of law. 114. 123. principles

rights of. 687; as witnesses, 136, 688

al-Yaraghi. Muhammad, as Islamic

separate mosque area tor, 138,

139.

Women's Living Under Muslim Laws

Yarmuk, Battle of. 312

f Pakistan), 689 women's rights, m Islamic countries.

242 wool textiles, ;i8

Yathrib. 4, 8-9. Sec olio Medina; Muhammad in. 8 - 9

665. 679.6B7 woodcarving. as Islamic an form.

reformer. 533

221.

Yazid: as Muawiyah's successor. 16. 692; as Sunni Umayyad ruler, 663 Yemen; caliph control of. 30. 37. 38:

of. 129, 137.

[40

ZahMsm, 289 al-Zahrawi, Abn al-Qasim, medical encylopedia of. 204 Zahriyya madras (Cairo), 292 Zakariyah, Fuad, as Islamic modernist. 298-299 Zallaqa, Baideof. 50

INDEX Zatuzam, role i n pilgranuges. 86

Zaydiyya, as Shiite variant, 44

Zands. defeat o f Saiavids by. 370: Persian

Zayyanid dynasty, in Morocco. 52

rule of, 698 Zangids, atabcg stiles of. 56 -57,

354

Zanj (East Africa): African slave domina tion o f 43. early Muslims i n . 504 Zanzibar: Indian and Malay immigrants i n , 584; old dispensary i n . 209; as port city. S73 Zanzibar sultanate, establishment of. 3-0?. 306. 307 Zarqallu (al-Zarqiy al). as early astronomer, 175

749

Zirids; independence o f 48, as Muslim Berbers. 46

Zen Buddhism, o r i g i n of, 442

Zitouna Mosque (("anhage).

Zhang Qian. alliance against I lu its, 439.

Zoghby.Jim. in Jesse Jackson 's cam

440 Zia-ul-Haq, Mohammatl, as Pakistani leader, 648. 669, 679. 680. 688. 702 ol-ZijoI-Dimashqi (Habaslıal-Hasih), as astronomy text, 165 al-Zij di-Hakimi al-Kabır (al Hasan Ali Ibn Yunus). 167-168

191

paign. 637-638 Zoroastrianism, 2. 3,4, 13, 41, 80; Ahbasid acceptance of. 338: universal beliefs of, 348 Zomastrians; conversion to Islam, 359: i n early Chang an. 442; as People o f the Book, 307

ol-Zij al Mtrrntohan. 164

ZsitvaTorok,Treaty of, 697

al-Zijal-Sabi (al-Battani). 166

al-Zuhayr i b n al-Awwam. as early

zawiya. o f al-Tijani, 331

Zij al-Snub, as Indian astronomy text. 162

Muhammad supporter. 15, 16, 17

Zayd i b n AM. uprising started by. i i

Zij al-Sindltind (al-Khwarizmi). as astron

Zungharians, control o f CentralAsia by.

Zaydi imams, as Yemeni rulers. 693

my text, 163

440