The Noun Phrase in Functional Discourse Grammar

The Noun Phrase in Functional Discourse Grammar

≥

Trends in Linguistics Studies and Monographs 195

Editors

Walter Bisang (main editor for this volume)

Hans Henrich Hock Werner Winter

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York

The Noun Phrase in Functional Discourse Grammar

edited by

Daniel Garcı´a Velasco Jan Rijkhoff

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York

Mouton de Gruyter (formerly Mouton, The Hague) is a Division of Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin.

앝 Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines 앪 of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The noun phrase in functional discourse grammar / edited by Daniel Garcı´a Velasco, Jan Rijkhoff. p. cm. ⫺ (Trends in linguistics. Studies and monographs ; 195) Includes bibliographical references and indexes. ISBN 978-3-11-019867-6 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Grammar, Comparative and general ⫺ Noun phrase. 2. Functionalism (Linguistics) I. Garcı´a Velasco, Daniel. II. Rijkhoff, Jan. P271.N679 2008 4151.5⫺dc22 2007050816

ISBN 978-3-11-019867-6 ISSN 1861-4302 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. ” Copyright 2008 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, D-10785 Berlin All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Cover design: Christopher Schneider, Berlin. Printed in Germany.



     Abbreviations  Introduction    

vii

1

Prototypical and non-prototypical noun phrases in Functional Discourse Grammar 

43

Layers, levels and contexts in Functional Discourse Grammar 

63

On noun phrase structure in Functional (Discourse) Grammar: Some conceptual issues   ! " #

117

Reference and ascription in Functional Discourse Grammar: An inventory of problems and some possible solutions " 

181

Interpersonal meaning in the noun phrase $ %& '()%

221

Freestanding noun phrases within documents: A pragmatic approach based on Functional Discourse Grammar ($*

263

Agreement in the noun phrase: The dynamic expression of terms and what can go wrong ) +

287

Functional Discourse Grammar and extraction from (complex) noun phrases    

321

vi

,#%%

Index of authors Index of subjects Index of languages

365 369 375



      1 2 3 A ABL ABS ACC Adv AdvP ALL ART AP ASP AUG BNC C CLF CNPC

first person second person third person addressee / adjective ablative absolutive accusative case adverb(ial) adverbial phrase allative article adjective phrase aspect augmentative British National Corpus common gender classifier Complex Noun Phrase Constraint COND conditional COP copula CREA Corpus de Referencia del Espa  D discourse DAT dative case INF infinitive DEF definite DEM demonstrative DET determiner DI Domain Integrity DIM diminutive DS different subject ECC Extra Clausal Constituent EIC Early Immediate Constituents hypothesis

EXH exhortative F feminine F(D)G Functional Grammar and Functional Discourse Grammar FDG Functional Discourse Grammar FG Functional Grammar FUT future GEN genitive case HP Head Proximity HPSG Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar IND indicative INDEF indefinite IRR irrealis LCA Linear Co-occurrence Axiom LFG Lexical Functional Grammar M masculine N noun / neuter NEG negative NF non-future NH non-human NOM nominative case NP noun phrase NUM numeral OBJ object PRF perfective PL plural POSS possessive PP prepositional phrase PPT past participle PRES present

viii -## %

PROG PROH Q R REFL REL RSM S SG SIM STC TNR TR V Vf Vi VP VOC

progressive prohibitive question marker realis reflexive relative marker resumptive marker speaker / subject / sentence singular simultaneous Stepwise Term Construction time nominalizer transitional sound verb finite verb nonfinite verb verb phrase (see fn. 9 in Introduction) vocative

         1 A

Ag CL d/def Exp i IL ILL IMP

Zero (semantic function) singular Discourse Act / addressee / anaphorical operator Agent (semantic function) clause definite Experiencer (semantic function) indefinite Interpersonal Level illocution imperative

L Lex m ML P1

layer lexeme plural Morphosyntactic Level the (special) clause-initial position P speech act participant Pat Patient (semantic function) PL Phonological Level PredP predicative phrase prox proximity R Referential Subact / relative operator RL Representational Level RP referential phrase So Source (semantic function) T Ascriptive Subact UR underlying representation VP verb phrase in FDG       C E e ep f F l M p t x X

Communicated content Speech act (FG) State-of-Affairs Episode Property / relation Speech occurrence Location Move Propositional content (FDG) Time Individual Propositional content (FG)



        The articles in this volume analyse the noun phrase within the framework of .%  // (FDG), the successor to Simon C. Dik  .% // (FG). , 0 +  was the main conference theme of the 11% 2% % $   .% // , which took place at the University of Oviedo (Gij 2004 and the present anthology consists of a selection of the manuscripts that were submitted after a call for contributions following the conference.1 There were several reasons to devote the theme session of the conference to the noun phrase (NP). First, the most recent treatment of NPs by Dik in terms of  

    !"  umously) in 1997, in the first volume of ,, *.% // . Given the fact that FDG presents a strongly revised version of Dikkian FG with respect to rules, variables, representations and overall design, it seemed appropriate to investigate how the new theory deals with one of the most basic grammatical constructions, the noun phrase. Secondly, in a recent, cross-linguistic investigation on the structure of the NP, Rijkhoff (2002) presented an alternative analysis of the NP within the FG framework. This study contains several new facts and ideas, which made it an interesting challenge to investigate to what extent the proposals he put forward could or should be integrated into the new FDG model (see also Rijkhoff this volume). All in all, the time seemed ripe for a detailed investigation of the way NPs are handled in FDG. Moreover, to analyse a major linguistic construction from various perspectives (textual, typological, logical, semantic, morphosyntactic, etc.) is an excellent way to test a new model of grammar with regard to some of the standards of adequacy for linguistic theories (see also section 1). In order to contextualize the papers in the present volume, we will first lay out the main differences between FG and FDG and explain why some FG scholars felt that a general reorganization of the model was necessary. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the history of the way NPs have been analysed in F(D)G,2 paying special attention to variables for the various entities (i.e. the   #$!  %  #&  '   ! 

2

   

(i.e. the  (  ntational frames, layers, levels, modules). Finally, in section 3, we will summarize the most relevant aspects of the articles included in the volume. The reader is invited to consult Dik (1997a; 1997b), Anstey and Mackenzie eds. (2005), Hengeveld (2004a), Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2006) and Hengeveld and Mackenzie (forthcoming) for more detailed expositions of F(D)G.          ! FDG may be seen as the natural descendant of FG inasmuch as it shares many if not most of the central assumptions and goals formulated by Dik (see Butler 2003 and Anstey 2004 for excellent presentations of the evolution of FG). In Dik ")**+(),-13) view the aim of FG was to provide the means and principles by which functional grammars of particular languages can be developed. And the highest aim of a functional grammar of a particular language is to give a complete and adequate account of the grammatical organization of connected discourse in that language (- .    '   #  !  '      !!  ' !quacy (in particular descriptive adequacy) such as have been formulated by Chomsky 

But since FG does not share Chomskys syntactocentric perspective on grammar, Dik (1989: 12; 1997a: 13) added that  $ / !''rences with respect to what has been called / atory adequacy-   point he introduced three additional standards of adequacy for grammatical theories, which subsequently have also been accepted in other functional approaches to grammar (e.g. Van Valin and LaPolla 1997: 8): pragmatic, psychological and typological adequacy. Undoubtedly, the standard of typological adequacy has been satisfied to a greater extent than the other two, as many FG publications contain references to studies on a wide variety of linguistic phenomena in languages from many different families, which have had a considerable influence on the general architecture of the model. This strong commitment to typology continues to be an important hallmark of FDG. There is little doubt that FG has been less successful in its aim to become a theory of grammar that is also pragmatically and psychologically adequate (Butler 1991; 1999), and to some extent this has motivated the birth of FDG. As far as pragmatic adequacy is concerned, some FG practi-



2% %

3

tioners felt that the 1997 model (in spite of Dik  # 

in the quotation above) contained two major obstacles to progress towards a truly functional theory of grammar: (i) the fact that research in FG concentrated almost exclusively on the analysis of the sentence and its constituents, and (ii) the lack of integration of FG into a theory of verbal interaction. As for psychological adequacy, which roughly requires the theory to be compatible with well-established findings in the field of psycholinguistics, let us simply say that the number of studies in FG that make reference to the results of psycholinguistic research is extremely limited, which means that the theory has remained untested from a psycholinguistic point of view. Thus, on the one hand FDG can be seen as a continuation of FG, on the other hand the original model as conceived by Dik has been restructured in such a way that it is better equipped to meet the standards of adequacy mentioned above. Another major difference between FG and FDG is that FDG is explicitly designed to model the speakers #     (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 669). So even though FDG shares certain features with its predecessor FG, the differences are substantial enough to say that it offers a new research programme in the linguistic landscape. Next we will examine the differences between the two models under the headings %  //  (    // , %&34  #%%/3 &, and  * (

1.1. Sentence grammar vs. discourse grammar In various places Dik expressed his commitment to the study of connected discourse in language and it is true that over the years some FG linguists have concerned themselves with discourse phenomena. Nevertheless, in reality FG has mostly concentrated on the analysis of the internal organization of single, isolated sentences. In fact, this development was already anticipated in the first presentation of the theory, when Dik (1978: 15) stated: FG is meant to cover any type of linguistic expression (-0    estricted to the internal structure of sentences, inasmuch as there are combinations of sentences related by syntactic and semantic rules. ( 2 & 3 %5 4 5 4  /%* #   4% % %  % %   % [emphasis ours].

4

   

Perhaps the focus on the internal structure of sentences was simply a matter of priorities in the early stages of the theory, but Butler (1991) suggests that it may also be a consequence of the formal (in the sense of explicit) orientation of the theory, as discourse pragmatic aspects may be rather difficult to capture in a rigid notational system such as the one employed in FG. This is arguably an important drawback, which, according to Siewierska (1991: 2) makes FG amenable to the attacks of both formalists and functionalists alike. It seems, then, that over the years FG has reinterpreted its commitment to the study of language-in-use towards developing a grammatical theory that is merely /&%# with a model of verbal interaction. The need for a more serious treatment of discourse phenomena in FG and a greater integration of grammar (the rules) and pragmatics (when to apply these rules) into the theory was especially strongly felt in the late nineties (see the papers in Hannay and Bolkestein eds. 1998). In this period several authors proposed to enrich the architecture of the model either by adding a pragmatic module, the so-called / && (Kroon 1997, Bolkestein 1998, Vet 1998), or by extending Hengeveld ")*1* $# analysis of the sentence to account for the hierarchical organization of discourse (&4  *  && 5 G&   1996, Hengeveld 1997). Essentially, this set the pillars for the new architecture of the model, since traits of both approaches can be found in FDG. Significantly, in his presentation of FDG, Hengeveld (2004a) notes that a considerable number of grammatical phenomena relate to units that are either larger or smaller than the clause and for that reason cannot be adequately described by a sentence grammar. In particular, he argues that FDG must account for the fact that a quite a few verbal exchanges are not realized in the form of fully-fledged sentences, but rather in the form of fragments, or, generally speaking, non-clausal linguistic units (Mackenzie 1998a). Thus, FDG replaces the sentence with the  -%(Hannay and Kroon 2005) as a basic unit of grammatical analysis. The following utterances are examples of non-sentential discourse acts: (1)

a. 6 b. -&( c. ,%/ %(

The expression in (1a) may act as a vocative or address in order to initiate a verbal interaction, whereas (1b) and (1c) can serve as natural replies to a question. Hence, apart from their non-sentential nature, what these expres-



2% %

5

sions have in common is that they serve as complete contributions to discourse interaction, and must obviously be studied within the context in which they occur. At the same time, there are linguistic phenomena that relate to the organization of connected discourse and extend their influence over several sentences. In his chapters on the representation of discourse, Dik (1997b) cites a number of phenomena that serve to establish coherence relations. These include iconic sequencing, topic continuity, focus assignment and %3, which is here illustrated with an example from Kombai (adapted from De Vries 2005: 364): (2)

a. 3     #7433    /( go.3SG.NF-until.DS year one finished.3SG.NF-TR-DS die.3SG.NF 0 !# $!  !!- b. /33  /( die.3SG.NF-TR-DS bury.3PL.NF 2!!! $! -

Tail-head linkage usually involves the repetition of the verb at the beginning of the next clause (as in the case of /in the example above), but sometimes it involves the verb of the penultimate clause or even the verb of the clause before that. Such cases show even better that tail-head linkage can only be properly handled by a grammatical theory that goes beyond the boundaries of a traditional sentence grammar.

1.2. Top-down vs. bottom-up Unlike FG, FDG is a %&34/ in which the generation of a linguistic expression is assumed to start from a communicative intention which ultimately leads to the grammatical coding of a piece of information and its final articulation or execution ('  n to articulation-  ! by Anstey (2004: 45), this adds to the pragmatic-centricity of the model as opposed to the predicate-centricity of FG. In this respect FDG differs from most contemporary grammatical theories, which see the lexicon as the point of departure in the generation of linguistic structures. The top-down organization of FDG is a reflection of its commitment to the standard of psychological adequacy mentioned earlier and was strongly inspired by the psycholinguistic research of Levelt (1989).

6

   

Levelt  !  '  3    !''   ( $&%  , a . /% and an - %% . Conceptualization involves the creation of a communicative intention and the construction of preverbal message, i.e. a conceptual structure that will serve as input to the Formulator. The process of Formulation translates this preverbal conceptual structure into a linguistic structure (Levelt 1989: 11) and Articulation involves the execution of an acoustic plan by means of the appropriate physiological organs. All three components have a place in the FDG model, as can be seen in .  1 (cf. $&%$/&%5. /3 %and- %%). Figure 1 shows that there are four major modules in the organization of FDG: the conceptual, the contextual, the grammatical and the output components. Hengeveld (2004b: 369) emphasizes that the conceptual component is the trigger for the grammatical component to operate. In his view, the conceptual component is responsible for two types of processes: the development of a communicative intention, which has a direct link with the interpersonal level in the grammar (see 1.3 below), and the creation of a conceptualization of that communicative intention, which directly connects to the representational level (Figure 2).3 The contextual component represents the speech situation and includes both linguistic and non-linguistic perceptual information. As the dynamics of discourse unfold, the contextual component receives information from the grammatical component and provides the conceptual component with data that are potentially relevant for the creation of new communicative intentions and conceptualizations. One could say that it is of the major functions of the contextual component to connect the grammatical component with the other modules. The output component corresponds to Levelt   ator. However, given the fact that FDG attempts to understand the structure of discourse acts as reflections of different kinds of knowledge deployed by the %    (J. Lachlan Mackenzie, personal communication), rather than just the & , the output may take different forms of expression (written, signed or spoken signs). It is important to emphasize that the conceptual, the contextual and the output components are not part of the grammatical component (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 669). Although some scholars have made proposals as to the contents or internal structure of the conceptual component (Anstey 2002, Nuyts 2004) and the contextual component (Connolly 2004),4 FDG, as a linguistic theory, is centrally concerned with the grammatical



2% %

7

component, whose internal structure will be laid out in greater detail in the following section. "  " 

Formulation

Pragmatics, Semantics

Primitives

Encoding

Morphosyntax, Phonology

" # " 

  " 

Primitives

Articulation $  "  Expression

. 1(General layout of FDG (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 669)

1.3. Levels and layers The grammatical component in FDG is shown in more detail in Figure 2 (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 670).

8

   

Frames Lexemes Primary operators

Formulation

Interpersonal Level

Representational Level

Templates Auxiliaries Secondary operators

Morphosyntactic Encoding

Morphosyntactic level

Prosodic patterns Morphemes Secondary operators

Phonological Encoding

Phonological level

. 9( The grammatical component in FDG

Figure 2 shows that FDG posits four levels of representation in the grammatical component: the Representational level, the Interpersonal level (both inherited from classical FG), as well as the Morphosyntactic level (also referred to as the ":&  or '% % ) and the Phonological



2% %

9

level. As noted by Anstey (2004), there is a clear correspondence between the levels and the main areas of linguistic analysis: (3)   

+ /% '/% ; &*%: +*

2% &  & %% ; &*%% +

The ovals in Figures 1 and 2 indicate stages in the procedure at which particular operations take place in the grammatical component. . /% means that at this point pragmatic and semantic representations are being produced; the two " stages indicate where morphosyntactic and phonological representations (in that order) are being generated. Each operation has of its own set of primitives in the form of frames, templates and operators (among others). Although primitives are assumed to be language-specific (the lexemes of a language are perhaps the most obvious examples of language-dependent primitives), FDG aims at discovering significant cross-linguistic generalizations and hierarchies, which can predict the number and type of frames and templates that a language employs on the basis of a limited set of parameters. Unlike FG, the four levels of representation are independently organized and relate to one another through /&& , signified by arrows. One of the features of FG that is preserved in FDG concerns the use of hierarchical (layered) representations to account for differences in scope. In the next section we will discuss the internal organization of each level in the grammatical component in more detail. The discussion of layering, however, has been postponed to section 2.2, which deals with the layered analysis of both NPs and clauses (or  %).

1(<(1(,% &  The interpersonal level captures the relevant details of the linguistic expression that '            3 ! addressee"2#% ! and Mackenzie 2006: 671). The structure of the interpersonal level is shown in (4) (Hengeveld 2005: 63): (4)

(M1: [(A1: [ILL (P1)S (P2)A (C1: [...(T1) (R1)...] (C1))] (A1))] (M1))

10

   

The central unit of analysis at this level is the Move (M), which is defined after Kroon (1997: 20) as   ' of discourse that is able to enter into an exchange structure-4 %  #  &  ' communicative intentions (invitations, proposals, requests, etc.) and are made up of one or more Discourse Acts (A). Mackenzie (2004: 183) argues that the expression in (5) contains one move, but three discourse acts, and can thus be represented as in (6). (5) (6)

=/* 5% 5/*  (M1: [(A1, A2, A3)] (M1))

Each discourse act is characterized on the basis of its illocution, represented by means of an illocutionary frame in which variables are introduced for the speaker (P1)S and the addressee (P2)A5 The general inventory of illocutionary primitives is given in the following table (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 672): ,#1. Illocutionary primitives DECLarative INTERrogative IMPERative PROHibitive OPTATive HORTative IMPRectaive ADMOnitive CAUTionary COMMissive

The third argument of the illocutionary frame is the communicated content (C), constructed on the basis of  % (R) and - &%(T) '#%. These variables, which were absent in FG, make it possible to distinguish between semantic entities and the pragmatic functions of reference and predication or ascription. This is shown in the following example, in which a term designating a spatial object (   !'  act in (7a) and in an ascriptive act in (7b):



(7)

2% %

11

a. 2%%%   ( b. ;*#    (

The two NPs are now formalized as in (8): (8)

a. (R1: [a carpenter] (R1)) b. (T1: [a carpenter] (T1))

Since all pragmatic aspects that determine the actual form of the linguistic expression must be specified at the interpersonal level, pragmatic functions such as Topic and Focus are also added to the schema at this level. 1(<(9(, & %% The representational level   '   '     ' #stic unit that reflect its role in establishing a relationship with the real or imagined world it describes"2#% ! and Mackenzie 2006: 673), that is, it reflects the use of language as a representational system rather than as a socializing system as at the interpersonal level. The following representation shows the hierarchical organization of this level (adapted from Hengeveld 2005: 64): (9)

(ep1: [(p1: [(e1: [(f1: "'1))] (e1))] (p1)) "n) ] (ep1))

The variable  !  '  &, defined as a set of & &%. There is an important difference between FG and FDG in that the proposition (represented by the p-variable in FDG) is now assumed to be part of the representational level rather than the interpersonal level. As in FG, the representational level is constructed on the basis of predicates (symbolized by the f-variable6) which designate a property or a relation. All lexemes of a language are analysed as predicates and therefore represented as in (10): (10) (f1: :/ (f1)) When the :/ slot is filled by a first-order noun (i.e. a nominal predicate designating a property of a spatial entity), the schema in (10) is used to give a semantic description of one or more individuals (represented by the x-variable; variables for other entity types are discussed below):

12

   

(11) (x1: (f1: :/N (f1)) (x1)) Terms and predicates may be combined to create predications, which designate States of Affairs and are represented by the e-variable. As an example, consider the representation of the predication    !   door (see section 2.3 for a more complete representation of NPs in FDG): (12) (Past e1: (f1: openV (f1)) (1 x1: (f2: manN (f2)) (x1))Ag (1 x2: (f3: doorN (f3)) (x2))Pat (e1)) The verbal predicate & designates a relation between two individuals, / and  , which are characterized as the Agent (Ag) and the Patient (Pat) of the action, respectively. The combination of these three units is used to describe a State of Affairs (symbolized by the e-variable), which, in turn, is located in the past time by the 5   -. e representation in (12) also contains the term operator )'   / and  , which stands for singular number. 1(<(<(,/ &*%% In classical FG, underlying representations like (12) are converted into actual linguistic expressions after the application of a number of expression rules that take care of the form and order of the constituents in sentences. Since these expression rules involve language specific features, it is here that the differences between individual languages are made explicit. This indicates that in FG syntax is merely regarded as the actualization of an underlying semantic representation. Indeed, syntactic constituents and word order are not considered primitive notions in FG, but the result of complex interactions between general ordering principles. In FDG, by contrast, linear order and constituent structure have been given a more prominent status with the introduction of a separate morphosyntactic level. In accordance with basic functional methodology, FDG assumes that syntactic order can generally be explained on the basis of the meaning and use of linguistic expressions. However, the theory also admits that certain syntactic facts may be governed by independent principles, which warrant      ' arate morphosyntactic level within the grammar, rather than as the output of the grammar as in FG (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 675).



2% %

13

Like the other levels of representation, the morphosyntactic level is fed by primitives in the form of *%%%/&%, which provide slots for the insertion of lexical units. Syntactic templates are reminiscent of % &%% 7 in FG, i.e. rather simple ordering schemas which define basic clausal syntactic configurations. Here are the functional patterns proposed by Dik (1980: 218, 220) for some clause types in English (Vf = finite verb, Vi = infinitival verb):8 (13) a. P1 S Vf Vi O X b. P1 Vf S Vi O X c. P1 Vf Vi S X

 %% %

%% :%%%

Constituents at the representational level are assigned a position in a functional pattern through the application of placement rules, which are in turn sensitive to information specified in the underlying representation. However, in this approach a      ational level does not always map directly onto a syntactic position in the functional pattern. This problem does not occur in FDG, where the separation between the representational and the morphosyntactic level allows for independent semantic and morphosyntactic representations of linguistic expressions. In view of the fact that F(D)G does not permit movement operations, this is especially useful in the case of syntactic discontinuity, extraposition, raising, etc. (see Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2005). Having separate levels of representation in the grammatical component also makes it possible to account for cases where different semantic representations are mapped onto the same syntactic template (De Groot 2005: 150). Moreover, since functional patterns as used in FG cannot handle any restrictions on the ordering of elements within a construction, FDG has extended its inventory of syntactic templates, which now also includes templates for the constituents of the clause. The organization of the morphosyntactic level has been slightly modified since the first presentation of the FDG model. Initially the following hierarchical structure was proposed (Hengeveld 2004a: 6): (14) (Para1: [(S1: [(Cl1: [(PrP1: [(Lex1)] (PrP1)) (RP1: [(Lex2)] (RP1))] (Cl1))] (S1))] (Para1)) The units distinguished in (14) are: +  & (Para), '% (S), $ (Cl), + % +  (PrP),  %+  (RP) and :/ (Lex). It was understood at the time that this representation is only a first ap-

14

   

proximation, given that languages may be more specific in the syntactic units they distinguish. In subsequent publications, though, the terms Predicative Phrase and Referential Phrase have been replaced by traditional constituency labels such as Verb Phrase or Noun Phrase, for reasons to be discussed in section 2.9 Moreover, the structure has been simplified by eliminating the variables on the right of the representation, whose role in the representation was not entirely clear. Thus, the morphosyntactic level in current FDG may also be represented as follows: (15)

Para

[ S [ Cl [ VP [ Lex1 -6/n]

NP [

Lex16/n ] ] ] ]

Although the morphosyntactic (and other) levels in FDG are supposed to be fed by primitives, and can thus be considered static, some authors have argued for a dynamic interpretation of FG expression rules (Bakker 2001, 2005; Bakker and Siewierska 2002). Hengeveld (2005) shows that this idea is compatible with the general architecture of FDG, thus adding to the psychological adequacy of the model. %  &'        ( Before presenting a brief overview of the way Noun Phrases (Terms, Referential Acts/Phrases) have been represented in .% // and .%  // , we must first say a few words about the label 0 + . There has always been a fair degree of reluctance to use the label Noun Phrase in FG and its successor FDG. The reason why Noun Phrase is generally avoided in these theories is that it is a formal label which only informs us about the intrinsic properties of a constituent, rather than a functional name that specifies the relation of a constituent to the construction in which it occurs (cf. Dik 1997a: 126-127). If we were to use only functional names (such as '#%, ,& or -%), however, we would know very little about the intrinsic properties of the constituent in question. Ideally there should be straightforward names for linguistic categories that tell us something about the formal  the functional properties of a linguistic form or construction, but apparently such category labels are not always easy to find (see below). So as to avoid the use of purely formal category labels in F(D)G, several alternatives for the name Noun Phrase have been proposed, but so far



2% %

15

it has been difficult to come up with an acceptable label that avoids the form/function bias in its name. Thus, Hengeveld   % +  (Hengeveld 2004a: 7; on 

, see also Hengeveld this volume) met with some resistance, because it did not quite cover all the forms and constructions it was supposed to include (for example, semanticists claim that phrases can only be referential if they have definite or specific reference; cf. Saeed 2003: 25).10 Earlier Dik (1997a: 55, 127) had proposed the word , /, which was defined as 78 $ /

   ich can be used to refer to an entity or entities in some world-9   !'  ':ferential Phrase is perhaps too narrow, the definition of Term is rather wide, since it basically includes any kind of expression that can fill an argument or adjunct (satellite) position (e.g. pronouns, complement clauses, headless relative constructions).11 In sum, when we use a formal label such as Noun Phrase, we exclude forms and constructions that can occur in the same function as a noun phrase (such as pronouns or complement clauses). On the other hand, names such as Term or Referential Phrase are either too general (covering a wide variety of forms and constructions) or too narrow in that the definition only includes certain terms or noun phrases. The basic problem with names for linguistic categories seems to be that they tend to be based either on formal or on functional properties and that there is usually no direct relationship between them. The same constituent may occur in different functions, and the same function may apply to different forms or constructions (cf. Dik 1997a: 26). This is shown in the following examples from Dutch, each of which involves an adnominal modifier introduced by the preposition   '- .   /mples demonstrate that the same kind of form or rather construction (ositional phrase can be employed as a classifying, a qualifying or a localizing modifier.12 '/ />%% #%& &%& 4%?%@>  $* (16)  /    a man of God  ' ! (i.e. a priest, a prophet, a religious leader) A* (17)   4      a woman of medium age !! -aged woman

16

   

  (18)  %       the car of my sister $   r Conversely, a qualifying modifier (a functionally defined category) can take the form of an adjective, a noun phrase introduced by  '  % clause: '/%>B*/ ?"@>  A*% (19) / A*0+?&@ (20) 4/     A* % (21) /     These examples also show that we can characterize a linguistic category by using a combination of a formal and a functional name. Thus, a name such as A* -% informs us about the function (qualifying, rather than e.g. quantifying or localizing) as well as the form of the modifier in question (namely that the constituent belongs to the word class Adjective). One could do the same with Noun Phrase, i.e. combine this formal category label with functional labels such as Subject ('#% 0+) or Qualifying (A*0+), but it seems that in this case the problem outlined above is more difficult to circumvent (perhaps this is typical for higher-level categories like Noun Phrase or Term).13 In spite of this labelling problem, and for all practical purposes, we have decided to use the name Noun Phrase, even though this volume is not restricted to prototypical noun phrases (also devoting discussion to proper names, pronominal terms and other terms not headed by a proper noun) and in spite of the fact that a wide variety of both formal and functional issues concerning         % #!      3 '    same chapter (see e.g. Garc     ution; for more discussion on the terminology issue see Bakker and Pfau this volume).



2% %

17

2.1. The Noun Phrase in Functional (Discourse) Grammar It is possible to recognize three stages in the representation of NPs in F(D)G: 1. FG I: '      -up model; 2. FG II: multi-layered (hierarchical) representations in a bottom-up model; 3. FDG: multi-layered representations in a multiple-level, top-down model. The first two stages are separated by the introduction of a layered model of the NP in Dik .% // ; the introduction of .%3   // (section 1) marks the beginning of the third and present stage. Initially NPs (erms   !    -hierarchical or '  structures (Dik 1978: 57; Dik 1989: 55, 115):14 (22) (xi: 1(xi): 2(xi): ...: n(xi))

[n 1]

or (Dik 1997a: 132): (23) (xi: 1(xi): 2(xi): ...: n(xi))

[n 1]

In this NP schema / stands for various kinds of grammatical categories in the NP (called term operators), such as "!'

 "  ! ! ") #     ! $"$! mber). xi is the variable ranging over the set of potential referents (see below on variables for semantic categories).15 Each / signifies a predicate (typically a nominal, adjectival or verbal predicate), and each (xi)/(xi) is an open predication in (xi), i.e. a frame in which all the argument positions but that of xi have been filled. Open predications are also called restrictors, because they successively restrict the range of possible referents of the NP. The first restrictor (1/1) is normally the head noun; the others restrictors can take a variety of forms, such as an adjective, a verb (often heading a relative clause), or a possessor NP (in which case we would be dealing with a so-called term predicate; see (25) below). The colon between the restrictors indicates that the information to the right gives a specification of, or a restriction on, the possible values of xi as it has been specified at that point. To give an example, the underlying structure of the simple NP %% #is as follows:

18

   

(24) (d3xi: dogN (xi): bigA (xi))  three big dogs This is to be paraphrased as !'  /i such that the property ! #      /i, such that the property #      /i ";3 1989: 115). A complex NP, which contains one or more /# modifiers, may look like this: (25) (d3xi: dogN (xi): bigA (xi): {d1xj: gardenN (xj)Location}(xi))   #! #  #! In this example the third restrictor {d1xj: gardenN (xj)Location}(xi) is expressed as a prepositional phrase ( %  ), which is analysed as a term predicate with the semantic function Location (on term predicates, see Dik 1997a: 204-206).16 The next example has as the second restrictor a relative clause headed a verb, which refers to an event or situation (i.e. a temporal entity), which is symbolized by the e-variable, introduced in Vet (1986), which is also employed in FDG (see also section 1.3.2; m = plural, R = relative operator): (26) (dmxi: dogN (xi): [Past ei: attackV (Rxi)Agent (dmxj: childN (xj))Goal])  ! #  3!   ! Several changes were proposed to modify the original schema; this section only highlights the use of different  # for semantic categories in the modelling of linguistic expressions. The employment of * , another major change in the representation of NPs, is discussed in section 2.2. Apart from variables for term operators () and predicates (), the first book-length publication on FG used only variables /' # ! $'    ";3 1978: xi). With the introduction of layering into FG (Hengeveld 1989), however, the number of variables for/%%3

 expanded considerably. Dik (1989: 50; 1997a: 93) lists variables for five categories (notice that the y-variable has disappeared): (27) ORDER 0 1 2 3 4

STRUCTURE predicate 1st order term predication proposition clause

TYPE Property/Relation Spatial entity17 State of Affairs Possible fact Speech Act

VARIABLE f x e X E



2% %

19

Dik (1989: 113; 1997a: 129) explicitly stated that entities are mental constructs. Presumably many mental constructs of spatio-temporal entities do not exist independently of entities in the external physical world, but the relation between a mental construct of an entity and its counterpart in the real world is a difficult issue with a long philosophical history that we will not discuss here. Suffice to say that the problematic relation between mental and physical entities in the representation of linguistic expressions has also been given due attention in FG and FDG (e.g. Vet 1998), and is also touched upon in this book (see, for example, the contributions by Escribano, Keizer and Rijkhoff). Having different variables for the various kinds of entities offers several advantages for the representation of linguistic expressions. To mention one that is relevant for the current volume, they make it possible to distinguish between nouns that are used to talk about different kinds of entities (Dik 1989: 180-181). Thus, an NP headed by a noun denoting a concrete object like %# (a first-order noun) contains an x-variable, as in (d1 xi: tableN (xi))18 %%#, whereas an NP headed by an event noun such as /% (a second-order noun) will contain an e-variable as in (d1 ei: meetingN (ei)) %/% (Dik 1997a: 214-216). The use of different variables for different kinds of entities is also motivated by the fact that different kinds of entities are specified for different kinds of properties. Thus, a first-order noun like %# can be specified for spatial properties (such as weight, size, or colour   *C C# %#), whereas a second-order noun like 4 can be characterized in terms of temporal properties (e.g. duration, as in  B 4; cf. Rijkhoff 2001).19 There are also other grammatical phenomena that can be accounted for by using separate variables for distinct categories, such as the fact that languages may employ different anaphoric pronouns for different kinds of entities (Dik 1997b: 223-228). For example, English uses anaphoric % for spatial objects (symbolized by the x-variable), whereas anaphoric is used for possible facts (here symbolized by the X-variable; notice that we only use skeleton representations to bring out the contrast): (28) a. $  &&D%# E 5#%,*&& b. drop (Cherie) (xi: the briefcase), but pick_up (Tony) (Axi) (29) a. %%%%D)44E +% %% % b. think (John) (Xi: [Bill would win]) and think (Peter) (AXi) too

20

   

In addition to the categories listed in (27), variables have been proposed for places, times, manners and quantities and it seems that    logy of entities" $ and Mackenzie eds. 2005: 166) will continue to be expanded.20 The current list of variables for semantic categories in FDG at the Representational Level is as follows (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 673):21 (30) SEMANTIC CATEGORY Individual State-of-Affairs Propositional content Property/relation Location Time

VARIABLE x e p f l t

EXAMPLES (NOUNS)  5# % 354 %  /%5F5/ 5#F5&  5F5  5%&F5# 4 * 45F5*%/

Notice furthermore that linguistic expressions such as NPs and clauses can be regarded as constituting a separate ontological category with their own set of variables. This makes it possible to distinguish between linguistic expressions and the referents of those expressions (Rijkhoff 2002: 228).22 For example, one could argue that in (31) the pronoun  refers to the referent of '&, but that the pronoun in boldface %% refers to the name .% rather than the referent of that name: (31) A:2%'&.%( B: G*%&  H (i.e. 9  did you stop calling her (  ? In FDG anaphoric reference to linguistic forms or constructions is accounted for at the morphosyntactic level, where they are provided with an index (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 675; Hengeveld this volume). 2.2. Layering in the noun phrase The most significant development in FG was Hengeveld     alyse the clause as a hierarchically organized layered structure, in which each layer defines a different kind of entity. Furthermore, each individual layer comes with its own set of operators and satellites, symbolized by indexed variables  and  (representing various kinds of grammatical and lexical modifiers respectively; Hengeveld 1989; Dik 1989: 50).



2% %

21

Hengeveld   $ %   '   $!     !      '   (Hengeveld 1990: 3-6, 12): (32) (Ei: 4 ILL: 4 (S) (A) (3 Xi: 3333 (Xi): 3 (Xi))] (Ei): 5 (Ei)) (2 ei: [1 Predicate : 1 (xi) "/n)] (ei): 2 (ei)) *  /   xi: term pred: predicate frame ei: predication Xi: proposition ILL: illocution frame Ei: clause

& %       : term operators 1: predicate operators 2: predication operators 3: proposition operators 4: illocution operators



IL

RL

%%

1: predicate satellites 2: predication satellites 3: proposition satellites 4: illocution satellites 5: clause satellites

To illustrate this proposal with a concrete example, let us consider the representation of + ##*5%% #4 # % . At the Representational Level (RL), the speaker describes one event in which three big dogs engage in the activity of barking. This is constructed on the basis of the predicate frame (roughly, argument structure) of the lexeme # , which offers one slot for the agent of the action. It is in that position that the NP representation in (23) is inserted. The verbal predicate is furthermore modified by the 1 operator Prog (progressive aspect), and the whole predication is located in time by the 2 operator Past and in space by the 2 satellite % : (33) (Past ei: [Prog barkV (d3xi: dogN (xi): bigA (xi))Agent ] (ei): (d1xj: gardenN (xj))Location (ei)) At the Interpersonal Level (IL), the speaker evaluates the actual occurrence of the State of Affairs described in (33) as probable through the 3 proposition satellite & ##*. Finally, the whole linguistic expression is characterized as a declarative speech act, which is represented through the 4 illocution operator DECL:

22

   

(34) (Ei: DECL ILL (S) (A) (Xi: 33333333(Xi): (probableA)Manner (Xi))] (Ei))

(Past ei: [Prog barkV (d3xi: dogN (xi): bigA (xi))Agent] (ei): (d1xj: gardenN (xj))Location (ei)) Hengeveld  $!  '        ! ! $ ;3 (1989, 1997a), but not in its entirety. One major difference concerned the way speech acts are represented in FG: as an E-variable in Dik (1989: 50; 1997a: 66) and as a predicate in Hengeveld  #    !rrent FDG. The schema in (32) shows that Hengeveld   $!icate ILL takes the speaker (S), the addressee (A) and the proposition (X) as its arguments and in this schema the E-variable stands for the utterance rather than the speech act. The illocutionary predicate frame is maintained in FDG, as we saw in section 1.1.1, although the variable for speech participants is now 5    %!!   '   3  the addressee. Hengeveld  #     !$! # ! 0rpersonal Level and the Representational Level, a distinction due to B<  ([1934] 1999) and Halliday ([1985] 2004). Even though there are obvious similarities between the schema in (32) and the schemas that are used at the interpersonal and representational levels in FDG (section 1), there are also certain differences, in particular with respect to the distribution of layers and entities. In current FDG, for example, the proposition (now symbolized by the p-variable) is an entity that is specified at the Representational level, as shown in (9), rather than the Interpersonal Level, as in FG (shown in (32) above). Inspired by Hengeveld ")*1+-b, 1988, 1989) first proposals for a layered analysis of clausal structures and by some of Aristotle  #   (+* V. II), Rijkhoff (1988) subsequently proposed a layered model of the noun phrase. Initially only three layers were recognized: the innermost layer for qualifying modifiers (A%** ), the outermost layer for localizing modifiers (% * ) and in between a A%%* * to accommodate quantifying modifiers (it is important to point out that in this approach  !'       #  ! /   !' categories, i.e. operators and restrictors or satellites). It was argued from the very beginning that the three-layered analysis of NPs also applied to clauses, indicating that NPs and clauses (or rather !     analysed in a similar fashion. To emphasize parallels between the underly-



2% %

23

ing structure of the NP and the clause, non-first restrictors were analysed as satellites.23 In Figure 3 the hierarchical organization of the layers is represented in a concentric fashion, showing more clearly that modifiers at an outer layer have semantic scope over material specified at the inner layer or layers ( = clause satellite, = NP satellite). Recall that there is no oneto-one relationship between form and function and this is especially true for satellites (as was shown in examples (16-21) above). Consequently, semantic modifier categories such as % or %, which are expressed by affixes, function words or other grammatical markers, can still be more or less profitably connected with a certain layer, but in the case of satellites the relation between form and function is so indirect that we can only list the various forms or constructions that are used as modifiers in the clause or NP (e.g. adverb(ial), adjective, relative clause). The three-layered NP structure also contained a slot for nominal aspect markers, a new grammatical category whose members further specify the ' % of a noun (i.e. lexicalized nominal aspect or  ! ' # indicating that the entity it denotes is, for example, a singular object rather than a collective entity (Rijkhoff 1991; 2002: 100-121; this volume).24 Nominal aspect is, of course, the counterpart of verbal aspect: perfective or imperfective aspect markers further specify the -% % of a verb (lexicalized verbal aspect or  ! ' As in the case of Hengeveld  $! $   '     layered analysis of NPs (and clauses or rather !ications  # $ adopted by Dik (1997a), in particular the distinction between qualifying, quantifying, and localizing operators (Dik 1997a: 163, 218). (35) a. I *$'% %  2-Loc 2-Quant ei: [1-Qual pred [V/A] (args)] b. I *, /'% %  2-Loc 2-Quant xi: [1-Qual pred [N]

(args)]

Notice, however, that both localizing and quantifying operators are treated as   ! $     ;3 (1997a: 219) believed   esearch should be done on the interaction between Quantification and Localization of SoAs-

24

   

//%:& 5A%*5 A%%*%% Location

3

3

Quantity

2

Quality

1

2,"-,2"5",$(

")-

-'+"$,

-'+"$,

2 1 Clause satellites: e.g.  #  #/ 5 &5 B*5%/5&5

'";".-$,2", ,"0'"

::& 5A%* A%%*%%

VERB N O U N '+-,2-"2J2'5

0I;)"5

0=;20-

NP satellites: e.g(%5 5& 5&3 %& 5 %

?20@".202,"0"'' $-20-2,K -'+"$,   

1 2 3

1 Quality Quantity

2

3

Location //%:& 5A%*5 A%%*%%0+ . <.

::& 5A%*5 A%%*%%0+

Symmetry in the underlying structure of the clause and the NP: 1992 version

Since then Rijkhoff has added two layers of modification to his version of the layered NP/clause model, one for  3  %/  in the outer periphery (layer number 4), the other for */  close to the core (layer number zero). Figure 4 shows how the five layers distinguished in Rijkhoff proposal (plus two additional clausal layers) are distributed over the Interpersonal and the Representational Levels in FDG (notice that in this model all four entities have an intersubjective dimension).



2% %

25

&)*')*+$&,,)),,&-)+)."/&) At the 2% & , modifiers are concerned with the Interpersonal Status of  kinds of entities in the G  : [i] clauses (or rather the messages contained in the clauses), [ii] propositions, [iii] events and [iv] things.  

0$)*+&/)",-+)

2 + &%/  (5, 5) inform  about +   assessment of / attitude towards a proposition Xi as regards the probability, possibility or desirability of the actual occurrence of event ei.

0$)*+&/)&$-&'/*+) 3 3(/ (4, 4) 3  3(/ (4, 4) specify the existential status of thing xi or event ei in the G  (

'& 

1 2% */  (6, 6) inform ddressee about the illocutionary status of the clause (Decl, Int, ).

*)'*)+)&$&,,)),,&-)+"**)*$"$&)& At the & %%, modifiers specify properties of spatio-temporal entities (things, events) in the G   in terms of the notions Kind (Class), Quality, Quantity, and Location. 3.  /  2. A%*/  1. A*/  0. $*/ 

(3, 3) (2, 2) ( 1) (0, 0)

3.  /  2. A%*/  1. A*/  0. $*/ 

(3, 3) (2, 2) (1) (0, 0)

 . L. Parallels in the layered model of the noun phrase and the clause 25 (Rijkhoff to appear, this volume).

The 5-layered NP model can be formally represented as the structure in (36), in which each operator (,    " , 3 rtain layer (L) as its argument. Notice that in this representation the Interpersonal and the Representational levels do not clearly co-exist as separate entities (as in current FDG) and that the f-variable has been omitted (see note 17).

26

   

(36) NPi: 4[ 3[ 2[ 0[ NOUN(xi) ]L0 1(L0) ]L1 2(L1) ]L2 3(L2) ]L3 4(L3) A somewhat simplified representation of the NP %% #   looks like this: (37) NPi: Def [ DemRemote [ 3 [ 0 [ dog(xi) ]L0 sniffer(L0) ]L1 black(L1) ]L2 3(L2) ]L3 4(L3) In this schema, xi symbolizes the referent of the NP and L stands for  $"-#-63 is the layer accommodating localizing modifiers 3 and 3). Operators and satellites of layer N take the same argument (i.e. information specified in LayerN-1). The indexed variable NPi allows for reference to the noun phrase as such. Rijkhoff argued that certain localizing modifiers, such as definite articles and noun modifiers like / or % , are better analysed as discourse-referential operators (4) or satellites (4), in that they are directly concerned with the status of an entity in the shared world of discourse (Rijkhoff 2002: 229-238). Instances of discourse-referential modifiers in the clause are realis/irrealis markers (4) and adverbials such as %* or

* (4). The claim that articles and (ir)realis markers should occupy the same kind of modifier slot in a layered representation of the NP and the clause is substantiated by the fact that some languages use the same marker for spatial and temporal entities to indicate that an entity is grounded in the world of discourse (Rijkhoff 1990; Rijkhoff and Seibt 2005). In these examples from Fongbe the element in question is glossed as DET (!rminer(26 .# (Lefebvre 1998: 94, 99; see also Lefebvre and Brousseau 2002) (38)        I eat crab DET 0 (in question/that we know of) (39)  4!  John arrive DET  $> %! Further research into the layered NP structure and similarities between the underlying structure of the NPs and the clause has resulted in a schema that also has a special layer for classifying modifiers (Rijkhoff to appear, forth-



2% %

27

coming a-b; this volume). Classifying modifiers (0/ 0, 0/0) indicate what  of entity is being denoted, specifying features that (sub)-categorize entities into a system of smaller sets, as in (40a-b): (40) a.  4*  b(   %27 There is no longer a complete symmetry between operators and satellites in the 5-layered NP/clause model (Figure 4). It has emerged that the elements that were originally categorized as B* operators are actually 3 * operators and that ? '$#    ably do not occur (this is explained in Rijkhoff this volume).

2.3. The noun phrase in Functional Discourse Grammar. We have seen two major developments in the representation of the NP in F(D)G. One was Rijkhoff     /!2#% !  $! ysis of clausal structures to the NP, first suggested in 1988 and later partly adopted by Dik (1997a). The other major change occurred with the introduction of FDG (Hengeveld 2004a-b, 2005; Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006). As mentioned in section 1, in certain respects FDG is a continuation of FG, in particular with regard to the basic assumptions, methods and goals that characterize structural-functional approaches to grammar (Butler 2003). But we can also see a clear break between FDG and its predecessor: the top-down organization, the focus on discourse acts rather than sentences as the basic unit of analysis, and the strictly modular approach with respect both to the four main components in FDG (grammatical, conceptual, contextual, output) and to the four levels inside the grammatical component (pragmatic, semantic, morphosyntactic, phonological). As to the NP, some features of the way NPs were analysed in FG have been adopted in FDG, albeit perhaps in some modified form, but there are also some important differences. First of all, we find a strict separation between the four levels in the grammatical component mentioned earlier. This is shown in (41) and (42) for the interpersonal and the representational levels (Hengeveld thisvolume): (41) 2% & > (R RI: ............ (RI): R (RI))

28

   

(42) & %%> (x xi: (f fi: LexN (fi): f (fi)) (xi): x (xi)) 

=& %        R Identifiability, Specificity x Location, Number f Shape, Measure



;  R Subjective attitude x Referent modification f Reference modification

Since discourse units are now analysed at four distinct levels, we also get four representations of the same NP:  at the Interpersonal Level (IL)  at the Representational Level (RL)  at the Morphosyntactic Level (ML)  at the Phonological Level (PL). If we temporarily ignore the Phonological Level, the NP %%%  is represented as follows in FDG (Hengeveld this volume; R = referential subact, T = ascriptive subact): (43) ( id RI:   (1 xi:

TI

TJ

(RI))  

(fi: girlN (fi)) (xi): (fj: intelligentA (fj))(xi))

[[theart] [[intelligentA]AP girlN-8NP1]NP2

(IL)

(RL)

(ML)

The same unit would be represented in classical FG as follows: (44)

(d1xi: girlN (xi): intelligentA (xi))

The most conspicuous difference between the two models resides in the greater degree of exhaustiveness of the FDG representation thanks to the separation of levels. The FG representation in (44) comes close to the Representational Level in (43), but again, there are some significant differences. Definiteness, symbolized by !"@@  '! 0rsonal level in FDG and represented through the combination of the Identifiability operator (!! :'ntial subact variable :-.  



2% %

29

opens the way to a search for more interpersonal modifiers in the NP, a topic which is touched upon by several authors, especially Butler, in their contributions to this volume. Another obvious difference results from the addition of the morphosyntactic level in FDG. FG representations show semantic rather than syntactic properties and relations and, consequently, there is no underlying syntactic structure. Differences in constituent order across languages are accounted for through general principles, which restrict the range of possible syntactic configurations. FDG, however, assumes that general principles of word order impose restrictions not on semantic representations, but on syntactic configurations, and thus restrict the potential set of templates which are available as primitives in the grammar of languages. The representations in (43) also show that, strictly speaking, we cannot use labels such as     0sonal and the Representational Levels in FDG. At the Interpersonal Level we only know that the linguistic expression to be produced in the output component is the result of a definite referential subact (RI), which contains the two ascriptive subacts TI (girlN) and TJ (intelligentA). The Representational Level just gives us a semantic schema or frame in which the '      filled with the nominal predicate  . Another important contrast, this time with Rijkhoff    , concerns the way layers are organized in FDG, which uses the same basic format at all levels (Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 671): (45) (A 1: [head] (1): A"1)) In this structure, 1 symbolizes some variable (e.g. R '   x '  !$ ' $A    

 &  % %

by operator A (and function ), and by the head and optional modifiers A-

By contrast, Rijkhoff  !      "instead of non-first restrictors) and both operators and satellites basically serve as predicates that take a certain layer in its scope (rather than a variable). Nevertheless, one could still argue that at some abstract level of representation NPs and clauses are assigned the same underlying structure both in Rijkhoff B5A   !  and in FDG (even though this is perhaps not always evident from the names used for same-level operator and modifier categories in FDG, as shown in (42)).

30

   

Notice, finally, that the superscripts on the variables for operators and modifiers in (40) and (42) indicate that FDG layers are not so much established on the basis of scopal differences between the various kind of operators and satellites, as in Rijkhoffs model, but is rather motivated by the availability of a variable for a particular kind of entity (R, x, f). 4     The previous sections have shown that there are basically three proposals concerning the way NPs should be analysed in F(D)G: 1. the analysis according to  

 ";3 1997); 2. the analysis proposed in FDG (Hengeveld this volume; Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006); 3. the combined NP/clause analysis put forward by Rijkhoff (this volume; to appear). FDG, as the natural successor to FG, has adopted some aspects of the way NPs have been analysed in FG, but as we saw above, the new architecture has also made it possible, and sometimes even necessary, to come up with some new features (notably the strict separation between levels). To what extent FDG can or will accommodate Rijkhoff    sals depends on several factors. One of the major obstacles seems to be that in FDG layering is intricately connected with variables for entities at the representational level, whereas in Rijkhoff    %   $ ' !fferences in the semantic scope of operators and satellites. As may be expected, some of the papers in the present volume (those by Hengeveld, Escribano, Rijkhoff and Keizer) primarily deal with matters of representation. Others, however, are more concerned with the practical application of the model with regard to discourse-interpersonal matters (Butler, Connolly), whereas the contributions by Bakker and Pfau and by Garc    mainly deal with morphosyntactic issues. It is also true, however, that one cannot make a very strict thematic division between the chapters in this volume, as one of the advantages of the FDG model is precisely the fact that grammatical phenomena can be treated from different perspectives (pragmatic, morphosyntactic, etc.) in a coherent fashion. In the opening article, Kees Hengeveld (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands) lays bare the analysis of the NP within the general structure of FDG. He argues that the separation between the interpersonal, the repre-



2% %

31

sentational, and the morphosyntactic levels of analysis in FDG allows for a more transparent and systematic treatment of noun phrases. Hengeveld takes the prototypical noun phrase as his point of departure, which he defines as an NP with a nominal head that denotes a concrete, first-order entity by lexical means and is used referentially rather than ascriptively. He then discusses examples of non-prototypical NPs from various languages and shows how they can be analysed in FDG. Jan Rijkhoff (University of Aarhus, Denmark) puts forward an alternative, 5-layered model of the NP (with parallels in the clause) within the general framework of FDG, which has separate layers for classifying, qualifying, quantifying, localizing and discourse-referential modifiers (in this approach the term  !'  !   # ! /  modifier categories). In his view, there should be no special slot for a modifier that specifies a subjective attitudinal meaning (Hengeveld  :modifiers), since such meanings can be expressed in many different ways (e.g. lexically, grammatically, morphosyntactically, prosodically  or a combination of these). Rijkhoff then suggests that all components of the FDG model represent some kind of context and argues that a separate ":3 % C'%%$/&% (C-context  !!!!  odate elements from the extra-linguistic context (notably the speech situation, including the speech participants), which in current FDG are represented in the $%:%$/&% and at the Interpersonal level in the //%$/&%. JosD 6   &E & C      "F% $ ' G%!   provides a critical assessment of the ways the NP has been analysed in FG and FDG. He observes a number of inconsistencies in the way FDG uses variables, operators and scope, which, he argues, can be eliminated if a hierarchical, binary-branching NP structure is assumed. He suggests FDG should reintroduce Dik  idea of */ , / $% % and extend the current ontology of entities. The result would be a more cogent treatment of scope and NP syntax, which does not force the theory to abandon any of its fundamental methodological principles. Evelien Keizer (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands) also deals with matters of representation in her analysis of the notions of reference and ascription in FDG. She argues that variables at the representational level represent the   /   t '   ntity described, rather than the intended referent. As a consequence, a clear separation is established between the grammatical component and the contextual component in FDG. She tests the validity of her proposal against a wide variety of

32

   

forms and constructions, such as copular sentences, proper names, pronouns and appositive structures. In his article on interpersonal meaning, Christopher S. Butler (University of Wales, Swansea, UK) deals with several issues. The first part focuses on the way speaker attitude is handled in the two NP models presented in this volume: as a modifier by Hengeveld and as a global qualification of an entity by Rijkhoff. In the second part Butler argues that there are two types of interpersonal meaning: one is concerned with the discourse context (orienting the addressee towards the actuality or nonactuality of an event), the other with speech acts and certain types of modality (having to do with social and personal context). The main body of the article investigates in considerable detail the kind of interpersonal meaning that is oriented towards the social and personal context (i.e. the second type), which is illustrated with many examples from English and Spanish. The last section offers a detailed corpus-based investigation of English & as an interpersonal modifier, when it is used to express sympathy towards the referent named in the NP. Pragmatic issues also take centre stage in the article by John Connolly (Loughborough University, England, UK) on freestanding NPs in written documents: NPs that are more or less peripheral to the main body of discourse and have been characterized as instances of  3 nguage (Quirk et al. 1985: 845847). The article investigates how freestanding NPs may be treated in FDG and in particular examines the implications for the integration of grammar and pragmatics. Connolly discusses several kinds of pragmatic functions that a freestanding NP can fulfil, showing that these extra-clausal NPs are used in relation with linguistic as well as nonlinguistic material (such as images). He argues that FDG should incorporate freestanding NPs, proposes a preliminary list of additional pragmatic functions and suggests that the formulation of   '# rules  !'acilitate the integration of FDG into a wider theory of verbal interaction. Dik Bakker and Roland Pfau (both University of Amsterdam) deal with agreement in the NP against the background of the */ ":&   proposed by Bakker in several earlier studies. The authors assume a process interpretation of the F(D)G model in which matters of form and order are interlaced. Their contribution is particularly concerned with agreement phenomena in the German noun phrase, which is noted for its morphological complexity. They show that their model can account for NP-internal agreement phenomena, including speech errors, as attested in a large corpus of spoken German.



2% %

33

Daniel Garc    (University of Oviedo) examines the so-called Complex Noun Phrase Constraint within the context of FDG. The existence of restrictions on the displacement of syntactic units is arguably a challenge to functional theories of grammar, which do not make use of movement transformations, because they seem to provide a strong argument in favour of the need for an autonomous syntactic component in grammar. However, the author argues that the constraint cannot be explained on the basis of configurational restrictions alone and that the activation status of referents in discourse is crucial to a proper understanding of the phenomenon. He then shows how the cognitive status of referents can be represented in the contextual component of FDG. We hope this introduction gives the reader a good idea of the way NPs are handled in FDG and that it shows that this new theory offers an interesting and valuable framework in which to describe and explain grammatical phenomena. The relation between linguistic theories and linguistic research should be bidirectional: theories open up new paths of research, and research, in its turn, provides results that eventually lead to changes in the theory. Most of the papers in the present volume illustrate this dual relationship: they test the theory by analysing the NP from different angles and on the basis of facts from various languages, ultimately suggesting certain modifications of the theory. This, we believe, is clear evidence of the strength and the flexibility of the new theory of .%   // . Given the youth of the model there are of course many aspects that have remained undiscussed or need a more detailed treatment, but we look forward to the start of a lively debate on the basis of the data and proposals presented in this volume. Finally, we wish to express our sincere gratitude to several people who offered their generous help in the editing process. Unfortunately, the names of about a dozen colleagues cannot be revealed as they have acted as anonymous referees in the selection procedure, but we would like to express here our warmest thanks for their valuable advice. We are also grateful to Lachlan Mackenzie who carefully read the entire manuscript and offered many very useful comments, with regard to both form and content. Daniel Garc    also wishes to acknowledge the financial support of the Dept. of Anglogermanic and French Studies and the Research Vice-Rectorate of the University of Oviedo. Gij" H  ";3 October 2007

34

   

&   The name .% // is still used in the conference announcements, even though nowadays most of the contributions are concerned with .3 %  // . 2. In what follows, we will employ the acronym F(D)G as a way of conflating the theory of Functional Grammar (FG) and Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG). 3. The need for a conceptual component in FG was noted as far back as Nuyts (1992). Anstey (2002) is a proposal for the internal structure of the conceptual component within FDG. 4. See the articles by Butler, Connolly, Rijkhoff and Garc   in this volume. 5. In Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2006) the Illocutionary frame restricts a variable    3 ! gnate a Speech Occurrence. 6. However, as will be shown in 2.1, FDG introduces two more variables  ! ' ! ! ## %!     ctively. 7. As a matter of fact, Connolly (1991) renamed functional patterns as syntactic templates( 8. Dik (1989: 348) defines P1 as  %  $  %    initial position (...), used for special purposes, including the placement of constituents with Topic or Focus function9. In FDG  # &  or & % &  only includes the predicate and its modifiers, so it should not be confused with the VP in Chomskyan-type generative grammars (this is the way it is used in Escribano   . Thus, the predicate phrase in  %# only consists of one element, . Section 2 discusses the way &  is used in this book. 10. For this reason Dik (1997a: 130) distinguished between two kinds of 'rring(  % % % and  % %%. Notice that in F(D)G we cannot really speak of    '  % !   $ntactic level. 11. In its logical sense, a % / (Latin % /) is an atomic element without a structure of its own (Vendler 1971: 116; Lyons 1977: 148). Even though in FG the notion 

 $ % $3! '/

  nserted into an argument slot of a predicate or into a adjunct (satellite) position, it was added that   $ $  ! ' ' -order spatial entities";3 1997b: 223). In a similar vein, Hengeveld (this volume) characterizes   !!  $          inal head that denotes a concrete object and is used referentially. 12. It is shown in Rijkhoff (forthcoming b) that the formal properties of this possessive construction in Dutch depend on the function it has as a modifier and vary systematically along certain parameters (Attribution, Predication, Reference). 1.



2% %

35

13. See also Dik (1997b: 92) who uses the name '  !'      are used to talk about spatial entities. 14. Mackenzie (1987) suggested omitting the x-variable after the colon in an attempt to get away from the logical-semantic nature of the representation and make it more pragmatically adequate (see also Dik 1989: 262; Dik 1997a: 63; Butler 2003: 278-279). 15. The x-variable gets a similar interpretation in FDG: the set of possible firstorder referents. 16. Mackenzie (1992b) has argued that certain prepositions are better categorized as predicates (rather than the formal expression of some function). 17. For the distinction between first-order entities (spatial objects), second-order entities (events, states, and other temporal objects or states of affairs), thirdorder entities (i.e. propositions), etc. see Lyons (1977). 18. Note that this representation does not contain an '% -Dik (1997a: 63) justifies its absence in representations for the sake of simplicity. 19. These are simple examples. In practice matters can be rather more interesting. For example, when a second order modifier such as % is used in combination with a first order entity such as #, as in  %#, the adjective forces us to interpret the book as a temporal entity, as it refers to the moment the book was published (i.e. an event). 20. See Mackenzie (1992a, 1998b, 2001) on variables for places, times and manners, Olbertz (1998) on times and Hengeveld and Wanders (2007) on quantities. Some important contributions concerning variables for entities in FG can be found in a collection of  !# !!$ $ and Mackenzie (2005), who also put the articles in a wider historical perspective. 21. Note that the C% ;  !     ysis of the Interpersonal level in FDG with the variables for the Discourse Act (A) and Speech Occurrence (F), as shown in 1.1.1. 22. For a critical discussion of this proposal, see Keizer (this volume). On variables in the NP schemas, see also Rijkhoff (1992: 190-191). Escribano (this volume) is a critical treatment of variables in F(D)G from a strictly logical perspective. 23. The name % /%% was first used in Mackenzie (1983). Interestingly, in FDG a development in the reverse direction has taken place: the clausal adjuncts that were called    #!!    ;24. On ' % see Rijkhoff (2002: ch. 2). 25. In Rijkhoff's version, modifiers at the Interpersonal Level specify % #3 % rather than #% properties (as in FDG). 26. The relationship between discourse-referential modifiers in the clause and the NP is discussed in more detail in Rijkhoff and Seibt (2005); see also Rijkhoff (this volume).

36

   

27. The phrase #* % is potentially ambiguous, meaning either    ' an unidentified boy" -classifying) or  3! of shirt" 

'ying); cf. Taylor (1996: 665) and Willemse (2005).

*    Anstey, Matthew P. 2002 Layers and operators revisited. G  +&   .% // 77. 2004 Functional Grammar from its inception. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar! J#  &-GonzE &"! --04- %3 %    .% // , 2371. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Anstey, Matthew P. and J. Lachlan Mackenzie (eds.) 2005 $    .% // (Functional Grammar Series 26). Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Bolkestein, A. Machtelt 1998 What to do with Topic and Focus? Evaluating pragmatic information. In: Mike Hannay and A. Machtelt Bolkestein (eds.), .% //  #2% %, 193214. Amsterdam: Benjamins. B< K 1999 Reprint. '& % >   %%   '& . Stuttgart: UTB. Jena: Fischer, 1934. Butler, Christopher S. 1991 Standards of Adequacy in Functional Grammar.  3 % 27: 499-515. 1999 Nuevas perspectivas de la GramE ncional: los estE!  ! adecuaci !   - 0( L     - M  :!  4  Javier Mart !    >- :& "! - 0& &% /!%.5 219-256. Barcelona: Ariel. 2003 '% %   .%>   % ,  ;  '% % 3 .% , ( + % 1> -&&  % % '/&: $M + %9>. /$% )*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. this vol. Interpersonal meaning in the noun phrase. Connolly, John H. 1991 $%%%=  .% // . Berlin: Foris. 2004 The question of discourse representation in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar !  J#   N mez-GonzE &"eds.), -04- %%  .% // ,



2% %

37

211242. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. this vol. Freestanding noun phrases within documents: A pragmatic approach based on FDG. Connolly, John H., Roel M. Vismans, Christopher S. Butler and Richard A. Gatward (eds.) 1997  + /%.% // ( Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Dik, Simon C. 1978 .% // (Publications in Language Sciences 7). Dordrecht: Foris. 1980 '%.% // . London: Academic Press. 1989 , , *  .% // ( + % 2> , '% %   % $ (Functional Grammar Series 9). Dordrecht: Foris. 1997a , , *  .% // ( + % 1> , '% %   % $ (Functional Grammar Series 20). Second, revised edition. Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 1997b , , *  .% // (+ %9>$/&:  $% % (Functional Grammar Series 21). Second, revised edition. Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Escribano, JosD6  &E & this vol. On noun phrase structure in F(D)G: Some conceptual issues. Garc   ; this vol. Functional Discourse Grammar and extraction from (complex) noun phrases. G&  > D1996 La organizaci OE? !  /  ! ! %'ncional. In: M. Caneda and J. PD&"! -="%23   $%:%  0 ,, 42-68. Vigo: Universidade de Vigo. Groot, Casper de 2005 Morphosyntactic templates. In: Casper de Groot and Kees Hengeveld (eds.), ; &*%% ":&   .% // , 135161. (Functional Grammar Series 27.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Hannay, Mike and A. Machtelt Bolkestein (eds.) 1998 .% //    # 2% %. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Hannay, Mike and Caroline Kroon 2005 Acts and the relationship between discourse and grammar. .% 12-1: 87124.

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Halliday, Michael Alexander Kirkwood 2004 - 2% % % .% // (third edition, revised by Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen). London: Arnold. First published 1985. Hengeveld, Kees 1987a The Spanish mood system. G +& .% //

22. 1987b Clause structure and modality. In: Johan van der Auwera and Louis Goossens (eds.), 2=%%+ % (Functional Grammar Series 6), 5366. Dordrecht: Foris. 1988 Illocution, mood and modality in a functional grammar of Spanish.  '/% 6: 227269. 1989 Layers and operators.    % 25: 127-157. [also in: Anstey and Mackenzie (eds.), 146] 1990 The hierarchical structure of utterances. In: Jan Nuyts, A. Machtelt Bolkestein and Co Vet (eds.), * & %% , *>.%4, 123. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 1992 03 # + %>, *5,*&*5 *. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 1997 Cohesion in Functional Grammar. In: John H. Connolly, Roel M. Vismans, Christopher S. Butler and Richard A. Gatward (eds.), 3    + /%  .% // 5 116. (Functional Grammar Series 18.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2004a The architecture of a Functional Discourse Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar! J#  G&-GonzElez (eds.), -04 - %%    .% // , 121. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2004b Epilogue. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar !  J#   N mez-GonzE &"! - -04- %%  .% // , 365378. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2005 Dynamic expression in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Casper de Groot and Kees Hengeveld (eds.), ; &*%% ":&   .% // , 53-86. (Functional Grammar Series 27.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. this vol. Prototypical and non-prototypical noun phrases in FDG. Hengeveld, Kees and J. Lachlan Mackenzie 2005 Interpersonal functions, representational categories, and syntactic templates in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Mar J- &GonzE &! >- 6  43& "! - '%  .%   // , 927. Bern: Peter Lang.



2% %

39

Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Keith Brown (ed.), "*& %5 2nd Edition, Vol. 4, 668676. Oxford: Elsevier. fc. .%  // . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hengeveld, Kees and Gerry Wanders 2007 Adverbial conjunctions in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Mike Hannay and Gerard Steen (eds.), '% % 3% %  "  // > 2     ; , 211-227. Amsterdam/Philadelphia PA: Benjamins. Keizer, Evelien this vol. Reference and ascription in FDG: an inventory of problems and some possible solutions. Kroon, Caroline 1997 Discourse markers, discourse structure and Functional Grammar. In: John H. Connolly, Roel M. Vismans, Christopher S. Butler and Richard A. Gatward (eds.),  + /%.% // 5 1732. (Functional Grammar Series 18.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Lefebvre, Claire 1998 Multifunctionality and variation among grammars: the case of the determiner in Haitian and in Fongbe.  +$   13-1: 93150. Lefebvre, Claire and Anne-Marie Brousseau 2002 - // .#. (Mouton Grammar Library 25.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Levelt, Willem J.M. 1989 '&> . / 2%% % - %%. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. Lyons, John 1977 '/%(II vols.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mackenzie, J. Lachlan 1983 Nominal predicates in a Functional Grammar of English. In: Simon C. Dik (ed.), -.% // (Publications in the Language Sciences 11), 31-51. Dordrecht: Foris. 1987 The representation of nominal predicates in the fund. G  +3 & .% // 25. 1992a Places and things. In: Michael Fortescue, Peter Harder and Lars Kristoffersen (eds.), *  '% %       .3 %+ &%, 253276. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 1992b English spatial prepositions in Functional Grammar. G +&  .% // 46. 2006

40

    1998a

The basis of syntax in the holophrase. In: Mike Hannay and A. Machtelt Bolkestein (eds.), .% //    # 2% 3 %, 267296. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 1998b On referring to manners. In: Johan van der Auwera, Frank Durieux and Ludo Lejeune (eds.), "/>,   , 245-251. Munich: Lincom Europa. 2001 Adverbs and adpositions: The Cinderella categories of Functional Grammar. %$ "%2 41: 119135. 2004 Functional Discourse Grammar and language production. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar! J#  &-GonzE &"! -- 04 - %%    .% // , 179195. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Mackenzie, J. Lachlan and G&-GonzE &4! J#  "! - 2004 -04- %%  .% // ( (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2005 '%.%  // ( (Linguistic Insights 26.) Bern: Peter Lang. Nuyts, Jan 1992 -&%$%3+ /%, *. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 2004 Remarks on layering in a cognitive-functional language production model. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar! J#eles G&GonzE &"! --04- %%  .% // , 275 298. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Olbertz, Hella 1998  #+ & .% // '& (Functional Grammar Series 22). Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Quirk, Randolph, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech and Jan Svartvik 1985 - $/&  //   % " . London: Longman. Rijkhoff, Jan 1988 A typology of operators. G  +&   .% //

29. 1990 Toward a unified analysis of terms and predications. In: Jan Nuyts, A. Machtelt Bolkestein and Co Vet (eds.), *  &3

%%% *>%4, 165191. Amsterdam: Benjamins. [also in: Anstey and Mackenzie (eds.), 4774]. 1991 Nominal aspect.  '/% 8: 291309. 1992 The noun phrase: a typological study of its form and structure. Ph.D. diss., University of Amsterdam. 2001 Dimensions of adnominal modification. In: Martin Haspelmath et al. (eds.)5  ,*&*  % I > - 2% 3



2% %

41

%#?/1@, 522-533. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter. 2002 , 0 + . Oxford: Oxford University Press [a revised and expanded paperback edition was published in 2004]. this vol. Layers, levels and contexts in Functional Discourse Grammar. to appear Descriptive and discourse-referential modifiers in a layered model of the noun phrase.% 46-4, 2008. fc. a Synchronic and diachronic evidence for parallels between the layered structure of NPs and sentences. In: Folke Josephson and Ingmar SP "! -. /%>&%5%5/5% *(+ %. %$B/,*3 &*     + &%  % N%#  I %*5 1O%391%0(9PPL. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. fc. b On the co-variation between form and function of adnominal possessive modifiers in Dutch and English. In: William B. McGregor (ed.), ,":& + (The Expression of Cognitive Categories, Volume 2). Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Rijkhoff, Jan and Johanna Seibt 2005 Mood, definiteness and specificity: A linguistic and a philosophical account of their similarities and differences. '&  3 , %   '&   32: 85-132. [http://ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/tfs/index] Saeed, John I. 2003 '/%, 2nd Edition. Oxford: Blackwell. Siewierska, Anna 1991 .% // . London: Routledge. Taylor, John R. 1996 +". Oxford: Oxford University Press. Van Valin, Robert D., Jr. and Randy J. LaPolla 1997 '*%:( '% % 5 /  %. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vendler, Zeno 1971 Singular Terms. In: D. D. Steinberg, L. and A. Jakobovits (eds.), '/%, 115133. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vet, Co 1986 A pragmatic approach to Tense in Functional Grammar. G  +& .% // 16. 1998 The multilayered structure of the utterance. In: Mike Hannay and A. Machtelt Bolkestein (eds.), .% //    # 2% 3 %, 113. Amsterdam: Benjamins. [also in: Anstey and Mackenzie (eds.), 299324]

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Vries, Lourens de 2005 Towards a typology of tail-head linkage in Papuan languages. '% 29-2: 363384. Willemse, Peter 2005 Nominal reference-point constructions: possessives and esphoric NPs in English. Ph.D. diss., Catholic University of Leuven.



'  ( 5  (         

   1 The aim of this paper is to show how the various functions and forms of a noun phrase can be handled in Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG). In order to do so, I will take what may be called the standard, prototypical noun phrase as my point of departure. The standard noun phrase (i) has a nominal head; (ii) denotes a concrete, first-order entity; (iii) denotes by lexical means; and (iv) is used referentially.2 This type of noun phrase is discussed in section 3, after a brief introduction to FDG in section 2. Sections 47 then study noun phrases which lack one of the properties of standard noun phrases, in the order in which these properties are listed above. The conclusion will be that the separation between the interpersonal, the representational, and the morphosyntactic levels of analysis in FDG allows for a systematic treatment of standard and non-standard noun phrases. %    3 2.1. Introduction Figure 1 gives a general overview of the FDG model. A summary of the various properties of this model may be found in Hengeveld (2005) and Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2006); a full presentation of the model is given in Hengeveld and Mackenzie (fc.). At the interpersonal level the hierarchical structure given in (1) applies: (1)

(M1: [(A1: [ILL (P1)S (P2)A (C1: [...(T1) (R1)...] (C1))] (A1))] (M1))

The hierarchically highest unit of interpersonal analysis given here is the move (M), which may contain one or more discourse acts (A). A discourse act is organized on the basis of an illocutionary frame (ILL), which has two

44



speech act participants (P, the speaker S and the addressee A) and the communicated content C evoked by the speaker as its arguments. The communicated content, in turn, contains a varying number of ascriptive (T) and referential (R) Subacts. Note that the latter two units are operative at the same layer, i.e. there is no hierarchical relation between them. In general, then, at the interpersonal level units are analysed in terms of their communicative function.

Frames Lexemes Primary Operators

Formulation

(M1: [(A1: [ILL (P1)S (P2)A (C1: [(T1) (R1)] (C1))] (A1))] (M1)) (Interpersonal Level)

(ep1: [(p1: [(e1: [(f1) (x1)] (e1))] (p1))] (ep1) (Representational Level)

Templates Auxiliaries Secondary Operators

Morphosyntactic Encoding

[[[lexemeAdj]AdjP lexemeN]NP [lexemeV [lexemeAdv]AdvP]VP]CL (Morphosyntactic Level)

Prosodic Patterns Morphemes Secondary Operators

Phonological Encoding

/ xxx#XXX#xxx#XXX \ / (Phonological Level)

. 1( Outline of FDG



+ %%*&3& %%*&& . 

45

At the representational level the layers presented in (2) are relevant: (2)

(ep1: [(p1: [(e1: [(f1) (x1)] (e1))] (p1))] (ep1))

At this level of analysis linguistic units are described in terms of the entity type they denote. These entity types are of different orders: third-order entities or propositional contents (p); second-order entities or states of affairs (e); first-order entities or individuals (x); and zero-order entities or properties (f). Propositions may furthermore be joined into episodes (ep). Note that first-order and zero-order entities belong to the same layer, i.e. there is no hierarchical relation between them. At the structural level, constituent structure representations of clauses, phrases and words are given, such as for instance in (3): (3)

[[[lexemeA]AP lexemeN]NP [lexemeV [lexemeAdv]AdvP]VP]CL e.g. .  A manN dancedV badlyAdv.

At this level underlying units become more language-specific, but the assumption is that differences between languages can be described systematically along typological parameters. An important property of the model is that the interpersonal, representational, and morphosyntactic levels of linguistic organization are built up using different sets of primitives. The interpersonal and representational levels of organization are structured on the basis of pragmatic and semantic frames, into which lexemes and primary operators (i.e. operators that are defined in terms of their meaning) are inserted. The morphosyntactic level is organized in terms of structural templates, into which, apart from lexical material from the preceding levels, grammatical words and morphosyntactic secondary operators (i.e. operators anticipating bound grammatical expressions) are inserted. Finally, it is important to note that levels are related to each other through operations, represented in ovals Figure 1. There is a fundamental distinction between . /% on the one hand, and " on the other. The process of formulation is concerned with specifying those pragmatic and semantic configurations that are encoded within the language. In terms of formulation, languages may differ in e.g. the kind of pragmatic and semantic functions that are relevant for a description of their grammatical system, irrespective of whether these functions are encoded through syntax, morphology, etc. The process of encoding is concerned with the morphosyntactic and phonological form pragmatic/semantic con-

46



figurations take in the language. In terms of encoding, languages may differ in e.g. their word order, morphological types, phoneme inventory, etc. 4      3.1. Introduction An example of the standard noun phrase is given in (4): (4)

  &%:/(

The noun phrase %%%  is (i) headed by a noun ( ); (ii) denotes a first-order entity (the concrete object #lQ"!    #  lexical means, i.e. uses lexical items (%%,  ) to build up a picture of the concept transmitted; and (iv) is used by the speaker to refer to the first order-entity denoted.

3.2. The standard case in FDG In FDG a noun phrase such as the one in (4) may be represented as in (5): (5)  

(RI))  

( id RI:

TI

(1 xi:

(fi: girlN (fi)) (xi): (fj: intelligentA (fj))(xi))

TJ

[[theart] [[intelligentA]AP girlN-8NP1]NP2

(IL)

(RL)

(ML)

The referential use of the noun phrase is represented at the Interpersonal Level (IL), where RI indicates that the noun phrase instantiates a referential subact. This referential subact contains two instantiations of ascriptive subacts (TI and TJ). The denotation of the noun phrase is dealt with at the Representational Level (RL). Here xi indicates that the noun phrase denotes a first-order entity. This first-order entity has the lexically expressed properties fi and fj, which shows that denotation is achieved by lexical means. The nominal nature of the noun phrase is indicated at the represen-



+ %%*&3& %%*&& . 

47

tational level, too, where the subscript of the lexical item functioning as the head is  "B-G    ' '  #% rsonal and representational levels, the morphosyntactic encoder produces a noun phrase at the morphosyntactic level (ML).

3.3. Operators and modifiers <(<(1(2% % As indicated in section 2, and illustrated in (5), there are positions at the interpersonal and representational levels for various kinds of primary operators, i.e. operators that capture grammatical distinctions in terms of their meaning. For every layer within these levels, there is a separate category of operators, represented by     % !  entational level. Similarly, every layer may be modified by a separate category of modifiers, captured by     % ! presentational level. Within the maximal structure for noun phrases used as referential subacts, the operator and modifier positions given in (6) are available: (6)

(R RI: .......................................... (x xi: (f fi: LexN (fi): f (fi)) (xi): x

(RI): R (RI)) (xi))

<(<(9(=& %  The various operator positions in (6) capture the following types of meaning: (7)

=& %  R Identifiability, Specificity x Location, Number f Shape, Measure

Identifiability and specificity are properties of referential subacts (R), since they have to do with the speaker  ssessment of the knowledge of the hearer concerning the referent of the noun phrase. Location and number concern properties of the entity denoted by the noun phrase as a whole in the external world, and therefore operate at the highest layer of the repre-

48



sentational level. Shape and measure specify properties of the property (f) expressed by the head noun, rather than of the entity (x) denoted as a whole, and therefore apply at the lowest layer of the representational level. An example of a noun phrase containing expressions of all three operator types is given in (8), represented in (9):4 % (8) R  

f HEAD &  3 DEF THREE PAIR shoe-PL .    '  

(9)

x   

(+Id RI: ............................. (RI)) (3 xi: (paar fi: schoenN (fi)) (xi))

This example shows how the surface order of the various operator expressions within the noun phrase iconically reflects the underlying scope relations, similar to what one tends to find at the clausal level (see Foley and Van Valin 1984; Hengeveld 1989). This relation between noun phrases and clauses has been stressed in work by Rijkhoff, most recently in Rijkhoff (this volume). <(<(<(;  The various modifier positions in (6) capture the following types of meaning: (10) ;  R Subjective attitude x  Referent modification f Reference modification Modifiers of R apply at the interpersonal level and are therefore speakerbound. They express the attitude of the speaker with respect to the referent of the term. Modifiers at the highest layer of the representational level (x) specify properties of the entity denoted as a whole. And those at the lowest level (f) specify subproperties of the property expressed by the head noun, rather than of the entity denoted as a whole. The latter two types of modification have been called '  !'  ! '  !'a-



+ %%*&3& %%*&& . 

49

tion % $$M # (1967). The differences between examples (11)(13), all involving the adjective & , illustrate these three classes of modifier. The examples were all encountered in a free internet search. For a detailed corpus-based study of these constructions, and a discussion of their theoretical implications, see Butler (this volume). (11) =/*5%(R)% 4%%%/%

%6 (12)  2  % %  %  &5  /% && 4  %%4:%%%4% 4 >(x)% H (13) -(f)% 5%%   /%&%% 1Q/%%1Q4(  In (11) the speaker expresses his or her sympathy for the doctor referred to by means of the use of & . In (12) the adjective indicates a property of the entity referred to: this entity is a doctor and is poor. In (13), on the other hand, the adjective has a more restricted scope: the entity referred to is poor as a doctor, i.e. it is the doctorhood that is modified by the adjective. The structure in (6) offers three different positions for these three different readings of & , as illustrated in (14)(16), where in each case the layer modified is different in the sense that the scope of the adjective decreases from the R-level in (14), through the x-level in (15) to the f-level in (16): (14) (RI: (xi:

........................ (RI): (fj: poorA (fj)) (fi: doctorN (fi)) (xi))

(RI))

(15) (RI: (xi:

........................................................ (fi: doctorN (fi)) (xi): (fj: poorA (fj))

(RI)) (xi))

(16) (RI: (xi:

...................................................... (fi: doctorN (fi): (fj: poorA (fj)) (fi))

(RI)) (xi))

The differences between the various uses of & in (11)(13) are reflected in its behaviour in certain grammatical contexts. Examples (17)(19) show how & behaves differently from , which can only be used for referent-modification:

50



(17) a. + /6 b. R/6  (18) a. ,% & ( b. ,%  ( (19) a. /& % ( b. R/ % (  Example (17) shows that only an interpersonal adjective can be used in exclamations of the type illustrated; (18) shows that both adjectives may be used at the x-level specifying opposite values, excluding the $   and the ! $ 3 !   '& ; and (19) shows that in the context of / ... 0, which forces a low-scope reading upon the adjective, only reference modification is possible.5 3 &5    I will now turn to a type of noun phrase that is different from the standard noun phrase only in the fact that its head is not a noun. Consider the following example from Hupa: & (Na-Dene; Golla 1985: 59) (20) /33:3> 3SG.POSS-horn-3SG.OBJ-plenty  " -    $  At first sight it seems that the expression in (20) is not a noun phrase but a clause. However, as shown in (21), the same expression may take a possessive prefix, which a clause could never take, thus clearly showing the phrasal nature of the expression: & (Na-Dene; Golla 1985: 59) (21) 43/33:3> 1SG.POSS-3SG.POSS-horn-3SG.OBJ-plenty y cow" -$   plenty on it One way of interpreting this construction is that a concrete entity is characterized in terms of a state-of-affairs in which it is typically involved. In



+ %%*&3& %%*&& . 

51

other words: a first-order entity is characterized in terms of a second-order entity. Example (20) may be represented as in (22): (22) (xi: (ei: [(fi: le:n (fi)) (xj: de"/j): (xi: mi (xi))Poss (xj)) (xi: xo (xi))Ref] (ei)) (xi)) This analysis is similar to the one given by Dik (1997b: 92) for internally headed relative clauses, and indeed, as (22) shows, the variable (xi) of the term as a whole is filled in with another coreferential term (xi: xo (xi)) within the predication (ei) that occupies the head position of the term as a whole. This predication is thus a closed predication in FG terms. The possibility of a term containing an open predication as its head may now also be considered. As proposed by Van der Auwera (1990: 151ff.), cases like (23) are instantiations of this situation: (23) 24    ( The headless relative (in italics) in (23) can be represented as in (24): (24) (xi: (Pres ei: [(fi: read (fi)) (xj: you (xj))Ag (xi)Pat] (ei))) Note that here the variable (xi) within the embedded predication is not filled with any lexical material, but bound by the variable of the term as a whole. In this sense it is different from the Hupa noun phrase in (21), which contains a closed rather than an open predication. Taking this analysis one step further, productive nominalizations like the one in (25) may receive a similar treatment: (25)   INDEF



%3  teach-AG.NR

This nominalization might be represented as in (26): (26) (1 xi: (ei: [(fi: teach-V (fi)) (xi)Ag] (ei))) The fact that this configuration is expressed as a noun would then be taken care of by the morphosyntactic encoder. An advantage of this approach, over the one generally advocated in FG, is that no predicate formation rule is needed, and derivational expression is dealt with in the same way as inflectional expression. Of course, such a syntactic approach to deriva-

52



tional morphology is only possible to the extent that the derivation involved is productive and regular. As soon as a derivation becomes lexically specialized it would have to be entered into the lexicon as a separate lexeme. 2 &5      Another way in which noun phrases may deviate from the standard case is by denoting a non-first order entity. Cases in point are listed in (27): (27) %%&  x individual 

f property 

e state-of-affairs /% p propositional content  l location % * t time 4 As demonstrated in Hengeveld and Mackenzie (fc.), semantic classes such as the ones listed in (27) are needed to account for differences in the grammatical behaviour of classes of nouns and noun phrases crosslinguistically. A case in point is nominalization in English, where different derivational processes produce lexemes denoting properties of different kinds of entities. Consider the nouns in (28): (28) 0/ % x 4 %3 , /&*3 , 3

f /35353 e :& 3%, 35&3% p &3S, 43S, #3S l # 43 *5#3 * t // 3%/5*3%/ Note that the resulting meanings of the various processes can be classified in terms of the semantic categories in (27). English does not have a productive derivational process for time expressions, but some other languages do, and this then produces meanings that are expressed in English by compounds such as // 3%/ or 4% 3%/. Consider the following example from Supyire:



+ %%*&3& %%*&& . 

'&* (Carlson 1994: 113) (29) I  %TT343    * V  /   his TNR-die-DEF.CL NEG PRF be.long.time .  '  !    ## -

53

/ NEG

FDG uses different types of variables at the representational level to account for grammatically relevant semantic classes denoted by noun phrases. Thus, the examples listed in (27) would be represented as in (30): (30) (xi: (fi: (ei: (pi: (li: (ti:

(fi: chairN (fi)) (fi: colourN (fi)) (fi: meetingN (fi)) (fi: ideaN (fi)) (fi: gardenN (fi)) (fi: weekN (fi))

(xi)) (fi)) (ei)) (pi)) (li)) (ti))

1      (#   6.1. Two cases of lexical non-denotation A third way in which noun phrases may differ from the standard case is when they denote, but not by lexical means, or when they do not denote at all. These cases are discussed in turn in the following sections.

6.2. Proper names and pronouns Proper nouns and pronouns can be said to have no meaning of their own, in the sense that they do not designate properties of entities in the external world, but have a conventionalized referential use6 only. In FDG these words are therefore interpreted as direct and unique instantiations of referential subacts. For this reason, they are represented at the interpersonal level, as restrictors of referential subacts, rather than at the representational level, as restrictors of entity descriptions.7 The sentence in (31) can therefore be represented as in (32): (31) 24(

54

(32)



(TI ) (RI: 2 (RI)) (RJ:  (RJ)) (ei: [ (fi: seeV (fi)) (xi)Exp (xj)Pat ] (ei))

Given their interpersonal status, proper names and pronouns may be expected to be modifiable by R operators and R modifiers only, but not by operators from the representational level. Consider examples (33) and (34) and their representations in (35) and (36): (33) + *6 (34) + 6 (35) (RI: you (RI): (fj: poorA (fj)) (RI)) (36) (RJ: John (RJ): (fj: poorA (fj)) (RJ)) + in (33) and (34) can only be interpreted as an expression of a subjective attitude of the speaker with respect to the referent of the term, and never as an instance of referent modification or reference modification (see section 3.3.3).

6.3. Vocatives In (35)(36) the pronoun and proper name have a representational counterpart, even though it is one that is not lexically filled. When these same elements are used as vocatives, they have no representational counterpart at all. They do not denote an entity in the external world, but have an interpersonal function only, bound to the speech situation itself. The expressions in (37)(38) can be formalized as in (39)(40) (see Hengeveld and Mackenzie fc.: ch.4): (37) 6 (38) *5*6 (39) (M1: [(A1: [(FI: VOC (FI)) (P1)S (P2: John (P2))A] (AI))] (MI)) (40) (M1: [(A1: [(FI: hey (FI)) (P1)S (P2: you (P2))A] (AI))] (MI)) In some languages the different uses of proper names are reflected in their grammatical behaviour. Thus, in Portuguese, proper names carry a definite



+ %%*&3& %%*&& . 

55

article when used referentially, but appear without an article in vocative function, as in the following examples: )  + % (41)          see.PAST.PRF.1SG DEF.SG 0 > -

W( JoR

(42) =

W5    B %3!     3H VOC JoR  DEF.SG what COP-2SG.PRES do-PROGR >  $ ! #S

The fact that the vocative use of pronouns and proper names is different from their referential use is furthermore reflected in the fact that subjective modifiers such as & in (33) and (34) cannot be used in the vocative construction. )  + % (43)          see.PAST.PRF.1SG DEF.SG 0  > -

&#  poor

(44) *= &#  W5    VOC poor JoR  DEF.SG >  are you doing?

W( JoR

B %3!     3H what COP-2SG.PRES do-PROGR

6.4. (Non-)denotation: summary In sum, Table 1 represents the situations with regard to the denotation or non-denotation of noun phrases. Each situation may be interpreted as a combination of features obtaining at the interpersonal and representational levels of representation. ,#1. (Non-)denotation

Standard case Proper names Vocatives

Interpersonal (R: ": (R: Lexeme (R)) (P: Lexeme (P))

Representational (x: Lexeme (x)) (x: "/ 

56



6 &5      7.1. Two cases of non-referentiality A fourth way in which noun phrases may differ from the standard case is when they are non-referential. Here again there are two different cases that may be distinguished (cf. Rijkhoff 2002: 5657): One in which the noun phrase has no interpersonal function at all, and one in which it has an ascriptive rather than a referential interpersonal function. These cases are discussed one by one in the following sections.

7.2. Noun incorporation Smit (2005) distinguishes three cases of noun incorporation, differentiating the three types according to the layered underlying structure of the incorporated unit. These three cases are listed in (45): (45) , 3 & % f-incorporation: (fi: LexN (fi)) x-incorporation: (xi: (fi: LexN (fi)) (xi)) R-incorporation: (RI: .................... (RI)) (xi: (fi: LexN (fi)) (xi)) In the first case what is incorporated is a noun, not a noun phrase. In the other two cases what is incorporated is a noun phrase. The phrasal nature of these two cases can be demonstrated by the fact that the incorporated noun allows an (external) modifier. The difference between the two phrasal cases has to do with the referentiality of the incorporated unit: if it is a case of x-incorporation it is impossible to refer back to the incorporated unit; if it is a case of R-incorporation anaphoric reference is possible. These various properties are listed in Table 2. ,#9. Noun incorporation

f-incorporation x-incorporation R-incorporation

Modification + +

Reference +



+ %%*&3& %%*&& . 

57

R-incorporation is simply a matter of a different type of morphosyntactic expression of a standard noun phrase. The case of x-incorporation, however, cannot be interpreted as a standard case, since the noun phrase is not used referentially. Consider the following example from Caddo, discussed in Mithun (1984: 864866): $ (Caddoan; Mithun 1984: 866) (46)   !3!3Y 3Y. a.lot PROGR-grass-grow-PROGR .    '#

- The incorporated noun Y% #

    /  !O%   !ifier 4*            '    oration. At the same time, it is not a referential phrase. As Mithun (1984: 866) notes:   #  !$ ' '  '0B 7 orated nouns, KH] in these [...] constructions is often deducible from context, the IN   mselves are not, strictly speaking, referential. An extensive examination of texts shows that they are not used to establish discourse referents as independent N -!  (0  atively rare cases where entities first appear in discourse as IN $  equent mention of them regularly includes a restatement of the N, either incorporated or independent. In view of this non-referential nature of the noun phrase, the head of which is incorporated, it may be represented in FDG as in (47): (TI) (47) (ei: [ (fi: - - (fi))

 (xi: k'uht (xi): wayah (xi))]

(ei))

This representation indicates that at the representational level there is a full phrasal description of a first order entity, but that this semantic unit has no interpersonal counterpart.

7.3. Ascriptive noun phrases A second case in which noun phrases are used non-referentially is when they have an ascriptive interpersonal function. A case in point is (48): (48) ,/ /( This sentence may be represented as in (49):

58



(TI) (RI) (49) (ei: [ (1 xi: (fi: criminal (fi)) (xi)) (prox xj: (fj: man (fj)) (xj))] (ei)) The formalization in (49) indicates that the first-order entity description xi does not instantiate a referential subact (R) but an ascriptive subact (T).8 Once the distinction between the ascriptive and referential use of noun phrases is made and can be formalized, some differences in their behaviour can be accounted for. One example concerns anaphoric reference. Consider the following examples: (50)   (   4%( - +% ( (51) "  %(  ,%4%( Anaphoric reference to a noun phrase used ascriptively requires the use of %% or  as in (50), while the use of a personal pronoun is required in the case of referential use. Once the above analysis is accepted, identificational constructions have to receive an analysis different from the one advocated in Dik (1980: chapter 4) and Hengeveld (1992). Keizer (1992, this volume) already noticed problems with this analysis. Consider the following example: (52) +% ( If +% in (52) is taken as the predicate, as it is in Dik (1980) and Hengeveld (1992), then one would expect (53) to be grammatical, which it isn( (53) R,%4%( Rather than being an ascriptive subact, +% should thus be taken as the instantiation of a referential subact, and (52) should be represented as in (54), in consonance with Keizer (1992): (RI: [he] (RI)) (RJ: Peter (RJ)) (54) (Pres ei: [ (xi) (xi) ] (ei))



+ %%*&3& %%*&& . 

59

The copula is then introduced at the morphosyntactic level, to accommodate the expression of the tense operator in the absence of a verbal element.

7.4. (Non-)referentiality: summary The cases of (non-)referentiality discussed in this section may now be summarized as in Table 3. ,#<. (Non-)referentiality

Standard case Predicate nominals Incorporation

Interpersonal R T 

Representational x etc. x etc. x etc.

7 "   In the previous sections, the various types of noun phrases have been distinguished from one another in the way summarized in Table 4. ,#L. Summary

Standard noun phrase (TU Non-nominal noun phrase (T@ Non-first order noun phrases (TV Proper names and pronouns (TW-, Vocatives (TW-U x-incorporated noun phrases (T+-, Ascriptive noun phrases (T+-U

Head Order Representational N 1 (x: lex (x)) non-N 1 (x: ([..lex..]) (x)) N non-1 (e: lex (e)) etc. N 1 (x: "/ N 1  N 1 (x: lex (x)) N 1 (x: lex (x))

Interpersonal (R: ": (R: ": (R: ": (R: lex (R)) (P: lex (P))  (T: ".

Table 4 shows, among other things, that standard noun phrases (TU nominal noun phrases (T@! -first order noun phrases (TVnnot be distinguished from one another at the interpersonal level, while they are distinct at the representational level. Conversely, standard noun phrases (TU /-incorporated noun phrases (T+-, !  %       (T+-U    ! # ! '  e another at the representational level, while they are distinct at the interpersonal level. Thus, by combining

60



the interpersonal and representational levels, unique configurations arise that are sufficient to trigger the encoding devices that are needed to account for the morphosyntactic differences between these construction types. &   1.

2.

3. 4. 5.

6. 7.

8.

 

This article is to a large extent inspired by joint work with Lachlan Mackenzie on Functional Discourse Grammar (Hengeveld and Mackenzie fc.). I am grateful to the editors of this volume and to an anonymous referee for comments on an earlier version of this paper. I use the term !  '      # /ssion and the entities external to the language system to which that expression applies (Lyons 1977: 207f). The term '  !#   for the use a speaker makes of a linguistic expression to identify an entity for an addressee. As Lyons (1977: 177) states, ---it is the speaker who refers (by using some appropriate expression): he invests the expression with reference by the act of referring.  !   !$:O3 '' (2002: 228) when he talks about the descriptive versus referential function of noun phrases. This section is largely based on Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2005). The fact that & does not take a plural ending shows that it is a grammatical expression rather than a head noun. Note that this subdivision of adjectives solves the problem mentioned by Escribano (this volume) that not all modifiers are intersective. In the classification used here only x-modifiers, as illustrated in (15), are intersective. This is probably the reason why they were called       ";3 1997a: 61). See also Coates (2006), who provides a series of arguments for the pragmatic nature of referring by means of proper names. See also Keizer (this volume) for an alternative view, in which proper names are treated as restrictors at the representational level. Keizer (this volume) provides the noun phrase used ascriptively with an additional f-variable at the representational level. I see no need for this additional variable, as the property-assigning nature of such noun phrases is sufficiently captured by the fact they are used as ascriptive subacts.



+ %%*&3& %%*&& . 

61

*    Bolinger, Dwight 1967 Adjectives in English: Attribution and predication.  18: 134. Butler, Christopher S. this vol. Interpersonal meaning in the noun phrase. Carlson, Robert 1994 - //   '&*  (Mouton Grammar Library 14). Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Coates, Richard 2006 Properhood.  82-2: 356382. Dik, Simon C. 1980 '%.% // . London: Academic Press. 1997a , , *  .% // ( + % 2> , '% %   % $ (Functional Grammar Series 20.) Second, revised edition. Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 1997b ,, *.% // (+ %22>$/&:  % % (Functional Grammar Series 21.) Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Escribano, JosD6  &E & this vol. On noun phrase structure in F(D)G: Some conceptual issues. Foley, William A. and Robert D. Van Valin, Jr. 1984 .%'*%:I  // . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Golla, Victor 1985 -' %+ % // &. Hoopa Vally: Hupa Language Program. Hengeveld, Kees 1989 Layers and operators in Functional Grammar.  % 25-1: 127157. 1992 03 # & %> % *5 %*&*5  * (Functional Grammar Series 15). Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2005 Dynamic expression in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Casper de Groot and Kees Hengeveld (eds.) ; &*%% ":&   .% // 5 5386. (Functional Grammar Series 27.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Hengeveld, Kees and J. Lachlan Mackenzie 2005 Interpersonal functions, representational categories, and syntactic templates in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Mar de los J#  G&-GonzE & ! >- 6  43& "! - '%  .%   // , 927. (Linguistic Insights 26.) Berne: Peter Lang.

62



Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Keith Brown (ed.), "*& %5 2nd Edition, Vol. 4, 668676. Oxford: Elsevier. fc. .%  // . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Keizer, M. Evelien 1992 Reference, predication and (in)definiteness in Functional Grammar. A functional approach to English copular sentences. Ph.D. diss., Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. this vol. Reference and ascription in FDG: an inventory of problems and some possible solutions. Lyons, John 1977 '/% (II vols.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mithun, Marianne 1984 The evolution of noun incorporation.  60: 847894. Rijkhoff, Jan 2002 ,0+  (Oxford studies in typology and linguistic theory). Oxford: Oxford University Press. this vol. Layers, levels, and contexts in Functional Discourse Grammar. Smit, Niels 2005 Noun incorporation in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Casper de Groot and Kees Hengeveld (eds.), ; &*%% :&   .%Grammar, 87134. (Functional Grammar Series 27.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Van der Auwera, Johan 1990 $/%% /. Thesis, Universitaire Instelling Antwerpen. 2006



,( 8   #      

   1 This contribution has three main goals. Firstly, so as to be able to accommodate classifying modifiers, I will propose a revised model of the noun phrase, which consists of five concentric layers of modification rather than four, as it did in the previous model (section 2).2 It will also be claimed that discourse-referential modifiers, which are specified at the Interpersonal Level, only relate to the status of the referent in the world of discourse (Rijkhoff fc. a; Rijkhoff and Seibt 2005). That is to say, attitudinal modifiers of the kind proposed in Hengeveld (2004b) (see also Hengeveld this volume; Butler this volume) are not deemed to have their own slot in the layered model of the noun phrase defended here. Secondly, I will propose some modifications regarding the contextual component with special attention to noun phrases and argue that external reality (the  / '   !      ! $  arate component and that each component of the FDG model constitutes a different kind of context (section 3). A single rule will be proposed to capture the influence of any contextual factor on the form, function or meaning of a linguistic expression. Section 4, finally, argues that in the current FDG model the Interpersonal Level in the grammatical component contains elements that actually belong to the external component (or C-context!oposes alternative schemas for the NP and the clause without variables for Speaker and Addressee. In this proposal the descriptive modifiers (i.e. classifying, qualifying, quantifying, and localizing modifiers) are specified at the Representational Level ( ##  ' ntent-. 0  6%   regarded as that part of the grammatical component that is concerned with  ##   / # !   !    $  '  !'ation, one for things or events, one for propositions, and one for clauses.

64



%         In Rijkhoff (2002) the noun phrase (NP) is analysed as having four layers of modification, accommodating (i) qualifying, (ii) quantifying, (iii) localizing, and (iv) discourse modifiers (or discourse-referential modifiers). It appears, however, that a complete analysis of the NP requires an additional, fifth layer of modification for what might be called * /  of the noun (as announced in Rijkhoff 2004, fc. a). Moreover, it will be argued that discourse-referential modifiers, which are specified at the Interpersonal Level in the grammatical component, are only concerned with the status of the referent (thing, event) as a discourse entity and not, as Hengeveld (2004a, 2004b, this volume) has claimed, also with emotional or attitudinal phenomena. This section is structured as follows. After a brief presentation of the  !' -layered model of the noun phrase (section 2.1), I will argue for the existence of an additional, fifth category of so-called */3  , which (further) specify 4%%%* is being referred to by the speaker (sections 2.2 and 2.3).

2.1. The four-layered analysis of the NP In Rijkhoff (2002) modifiers in the NP are divided into two main categories: descriptive and discourse-referential modifiers (or representational and interpersonal modifiers respectively). This division reflects the double function of NPs: they provide a physical description of an entity and at the same time they are the constructions used to refer to entities in the world of discourse. Descriptive modifiers specify properties of the referent of the NP or clause in terms of the notions Quality (how it is), Quantity (how much/many it is) and Location (where it is). The fourth and outermost layer of modification accommodates discourse-referential modifiers, which pertain to ,-, IT IS-- $ !     ' # "  events) in the shared world of discourse (e.g.  Definite'  # -dnominal adjectives, possessives and relative clauses are instances of lexical NP modifiers or     " $ lized by in Figure 1), because they involve members of lexical categories (verbs, nouns, adjectives, adverbs). Operator slots (symbolized by  in Figure 1) are reserved for grammatical modifier categories in the NP such as articles or demonstratives, which can be expressed as free forms, particles or affixes (for a discussion of / &%, see Rijkhoff 2002: 100121). Figure 1 also shows that clauses can



* 5%:%. 

65

be analysed in a similar fashion ( symbolizes operators,  stands for satellites; see Rijkhoff 2002: chapter 7); discourse-referential modifiers, which are symbolized by the variables - - - ! 

!' elow (Figure 3). //%:& A%*5 A%%*%%

::& A%* A%%*%% Location

3

3

Quantity

2 1

2

Quality

1

))& /%, % %%( &%

 %

/% %5 /# 5  / 

 # &% / &%

& %? #@ 

 #C #> /  %/ &5  B* &

% :

%(  / & 0+

/& 

1

1 2

Quality Quantity

3

2

3

Location //%:& A%*5 A%%*%%0+ . 1(

::& A%*5 A%%*%%0+

Symmetry in the underlying structure of the clause and the NP as in Rijkhoff 2002: descriptive modifiers (but cf. Figure 10 below).

Languages use only a subset of the modifier categories mentioned in Figure 1 and there is no one-to-one relationship between the form and the function of a modifier (only some typical forms or constructions are specified in Figure 1). For example, in many languages the adnominal distal demonstrative (a localizing operator) is also used as a discourse-referential

66



operator to mark definiteness, and relative clauses can be employed as qualifying, quantifying or localizing satellites (Rijkhoff 2002 and fc. a). A simplified version of the layered NP model is represented in (1), in which each operator (,    " , 3  $"6 as its argument (cf. Escribano this volume). Note that I am here only concerned with the analysis of NPs used for first-order or spatial entities (symbolized by the x-variable) and that the schema in (1) does not contain the predicate variable f (see Figure 3 and further below on discourse-referential modifiers !Q"@V  ,-,-U#%    (3 (1)

NPi: 4[ 3[ 2[ 1[ NOUN(xi) ]L0 1(L0) ]L1 2(L1) ]L2 3(L2) ]L3 4(L3)

x referent variable (symbolizes the referent of the NP); A term (NP) operator: 1 = qualifying operator, 2 = quantifying operator, 3 = localizing operator, 4 = discourse-referential operator;

/ term (NP) satellite: 1 = qualifying satellite, 2 = quantifying satellite, 3 = localizing satellite, 4 = discourse-referential satellite. L1 constitutes the B%** , which contains the head of the construction and accommodates B*& %  (1 in the NP, 1 in the clause) and %% ( 1 in the NP, 1 in the clause). In the 2002 model these modifiers only relate to the property that is designated by the head, such as nominal or verbal aspect markers, (typically) adjectives  if the language under analysis has them  and adverb(ial)s of manner or speed (but cf. section 2.2). The B%%** (L2) contains the quality layer and accommodates B%* /  (2, 2; 2, 2), which have to do with number distinctions (singular, plural) or cardinality. The %* (L3) contains both the quality layer and the quantity layer and accommodates   /  (3, 3; 3, 3), which specify properties concerning the location of the thing or event, such as demonstratives, tense markers, (localizing) relative clauses or adverb(ial)s such as  #! $ !$"ecall there is no direct correlation between form and function of modifiers, especially in the case of satellites).



* 5%:%.  THOSE

TWO

DOG

BLACK

1 2 3

67

IN THE GARDEN

1 Quality

2

Quantity

3

Location A*5A%*   & % %0+ 

 

 

 

 

A*5A%*  %%%0+

. 9. Simplified representation of    3! #  #!-

Thus, in an NP like    3! #  #!# only modifies the head noun and the quantifying modifier %4 specifies the number of black dog entities. Both % and %  specify the location of dog entities with all their qualitative and quantitative properties. In addition to the three descriptive layers shown in Figure 1, the underlying NP/clause structure contains a layer to accommodate modifiers that are concerned with the status of the thing or event as a discourse entity (Figure 3). Here we find values for operators such as Definite or Specific (in the clause: Realis or Actual) and satellites such as    " the clause e.g.  $ $-4 Discourse-referential (DR) modifiers appear in the outermost layer, as they have the descriptive modifiers in their scope (see also Figures 14 and 15 on other interpersonal modifier categories). Parallels between discourse-referential operators in the clause and in the NP are particularly interesting because of the various relationships that hold between realis/irrealis and definiteness/indefiniteness. I will show below that, in order to understand these relationships, we must make crucial reference to the grammatical category of specificity (see Rijkhoff and Seibt 2005 for a more detailed discussion).

68



& % %  





%%%

2'$=I'"3".""0,2-;=2.2"'

4

(3-2-0) (0-1-2-3) ("'$2+,2";=2.2"') X: 

(X  ))& e.g.  $ally ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X;' /& e.g.     X' ("'$2+,2";=2.2"') (3-2-0) ( 0-1-2-3) 4

2'$=I'"3".""0,2-;=2.2"'

4

& % %0+    %%%0+  . <. Symmetry in the underlying structure of the clause and the NP: Discourse-Referential modifiers - - - -

9(1(1('*//% *#%4? @ /?@% The grammatical categories Realis and Definite are similar in that they both indicate that the entity, i.e. the event or thing referred to by the speaker, (already) has a certain location (is # !!      ! ' discourse. By contrast, Irrealis and Indefinite signal that the entity referred to by the speaker does % have a proper location (is not # !!  world of discourse  at least not yet. There are thus two symmetries, one linking the grammatical categories Realis and Definite, the other linking Irrealis and Indefinite.



* 5%:%.  Noun Phrase (thing) Definite

$""-**)&")& 9$*,$+"$-*+) THING OR EVENT (ALREADY) HAS A

69

Clause (event) Realis

LOCATION IN THE DISCOURSE WORLD

Indefinite

THING OR EVENT DOES NOT HAVE A LOCATION IN THE DISCOURSE WORLD (YET)

Irrealis

 . L. Symmetry between Definite/Realis and Indefinite/Irrealis

9(1(9(-%3*//% *#%4? @ /?@% There is also an interesting anti-symmetry between (in)definiteness and (ir)realis (Rijkhoff 1988), which has to do with the number of ways an entity can be definite/indefinite (thing) or actual/non-actual (event). Here Definite aligns with Irrealis in that both definite things (referents of definite noun phrases) and non-actual events (referents of irrealis clauses) can occur in the world of discourse for many different reasons. For example, the referent of an NP can be definite because  it has been mentioned before (anaphoric use) (2)

2 % #%  #    ( ' & *5   4 /& %   (  it is available in the physical context (situational or deictic use)

(3)

04%/4%* H  it is deemed identifiable (or accessible) by the speaker because of socalled !##

-reference"

% 

(4)

2 %  %:  / % %%(   % / %  4  # % (

  it is relatively unique in the given contextual setting, so that the hearer can identify it on the basis of his or her general knowledge. (5)

 4 *# %%%(

70



There are also many reasons why reference is made to a non-actual event; for example, because the speaker expresses a wish or a request: (6) (7)

24*4   [interlocutors are not in the same place] G*&% H [the door is not closed]

In both cases the speaker refers to an event which has not occurred (yet) and which therefore cannot be located in a particular spatio-temporal region in the world of discourse, i.e. the referent of a non-actual event is not # !!      ! ' !   -5 All languages have linguistic devices to mark the various kinds of moods (e.g. epistemic, epistemological, deontic) and speech acts (e.g. indicative, imperative, optative) that signal in a more or less indirect fashion to the addressee whether or not reference is being made to an actual event. There are, however, quite a few languages that (also) employ a special realis or irrealis marker for this purpose. One such language is the Papuan language Amele. -/ (IRR = irrealis; Roberts 1990: 371372) (8)  #3#3#    pig SIM-run.out-3SG.DS.** 3PL . $ 3  #   - (9)

 #3#3#   pig SIM-run.out-3SG.DS.** K  #   Y

(10)

 #3#3#   pig SIM-run.out-3SG.DS.** ; 3  #   Y

B3B3 hit-3PL--

 3PL

B33 hit-3PL-0'



B34 hit-NEG.F.3PL

'*$/

By contrast, there is basically one reason why an NP is indefinite: because the entity (thing) designated by the indefinite NP has not been properly introduced into the world of discourse  hence the speaker assumes that the addressee does not know (yet) what particular thing is being referred to. (11) 2%  # /%%%( There is also only one reason why a sentence is in the realis mood: because the entity (event) designated by the sentence is real, i.e. it has happened (or is happening).



* 5%:%. 

-/ (R = realis; Roberts 1990: 371372) (12)  #3#3    pig SIM-run.out-3SG.DS.* 3PL . $3 # #   -

71

B33 hit-3PL-'*)+

Thus there are many reasons why the speaker may assume the referent of a definite NP to be recoverable for the hearer (anaphoric reference, deictic reference, etc.), but there is basically only way for an event to be actual: because it (has) occurred or is occurring. And vice versa: while there is basically one reason why the speaker assumes the referent of an indefinite NP to be irretrievable (because its referent is unidentifiable / unfamiliar / inaccessible when it is being referred to for the first time), there are numerous reasons why the speaker chooses to refer to a non-actual event. For example, because the speaker expresses a desire, a wish, a hope, a fear, an intention, a possibility, a probability, a request, or a command.6 Noun Phrase (thing) Definite Indefinite

&-0:)*$9;+$*& )&;$:) &)&)$***), MANY

ONE

ONE

MANY

Clause (event) Realis Irrealis

. Z. Anti-symmetry between Definite/Realis and Indefinite/Irrealis.

9(1(<(, &%*:&% %&#%4 ? @ /?@% In order to explain symmetrical and anti-symmetrical relations between (ir)realis and (in)definiteness we need to distinguish between specific and non-specific indefinite reference. Consider the following examples (Karttunen 1976): '&3%  : (13) ;:4% (2%#( 0&3%  : (14) ;:4% (2%/%##( 

72



These examples show that there are two ways to continue 4/    dog-. !'' !  ' ")U' !  specific dog (4/     ! #      3      3 whereas in (14) the speaker does not refer to any particular dog (English has no special article for specific or non-specific reference unlike, for example, many Polynesian or sub-Saharan African languages). It will be recalled that realis events and definite things are located in a certain spatio-temporal region in that world of discourse; in other words, these events and things can be said to be grounded in that world of discourse. There is a difference, however, in that realis events, which are typically tensed (if the language uses tense marking), ground themselves upon being referred to by the speaker, whereas definite things often first need to be introduced by an indefinite NP before they can be grounded. Referents of irrealis clauses (see examples 810) and nonspecificindefinite NPs (as in 14) are events and things that may also be said to exist in some fashion once they have been mentioned (since it is possible to refer to them anaphorically), but they are not grounded in the world of discourse: it is impossible to say where or when they are actually occurring or have occurred. By contrast, referents of &-indefinite NPs (such as      G4) are grounded immediately in the world of discourse once they have been referred to by the speaker (see also 13).7 In this sense referents of specific-indefinite NPs are like realis events in that they ground themselves (anti-symmetry).8 Notice that non-actuality of an event does not necessarily mean that tense is always absent (in languages that have tense marking). When tense is used for a non-actual event, it specifies 4an event was 3%. The following example from Nyigina (Australia) illustrates: 0* (Stokes 1982: 24) (15) /  433/3  NEG 3SG-NF.IRR-go-PAST 2!!#  ;$

#

3 Derby-ALL

Summing up, we can now say that the symmetry between (in)definiteness and (ir)realis is due to the fact that (a) % and  indicate that the thing or event being referred to by the speaker is grounded (occupies a certain spatio-temporal region) in the world of discourse, and



* 5%:%. 

73

(b) &3% and 

 indicate that the thing or event being referred to by the speaker is not grounded (does % occupy a certain spatio-temporal region) in the world of discourse. Noun Phrase (thing) Definite Nonspecificindefinite

$""-**)&")& 9$*,$+"$-*+) GROUNDED IN DISCOURSE WORLD NOT GROUNDED IN DISCOURSE WORLD

Clause (event) Realis Irrealis

 . Q. Symmetry between Definite/Realis and Nonspecific-indefinite/Irrealis.

Fongbe (a Kwa language mainly spoken in Benin) is an example of a language that employs the same marker for realis and definite reference: .# (Lefebvre 1998: 94, 99; see also Lefebvre and Brousseau 2002) (16)       I eat crab DET 0 (in question/that we know of) 

    John arrive DET  $> %!

Jacaltec (Mayan) uses the same marker for irrealis and nonspecificindefinite reference (the variation is due to vowel harmony): % (Craig 1977: 93, see also Martin 1998) (18) G*3 #  sleep-OJ EXH CLF/he 9  !   Y7   !8 (19)

JS3Y 

# :  *3Y PL woman look_for-FUT 3 /# INDEF-OJ pot .   ed looking for a pot. [nonspecific-indefinite reference] ASP-ABS.3-start



74

Summing up, anti-symmetry between (in)definiteness and (ir)realis is due to the fact that (a) there is basically one way for an entity to be indefinite (thing) or actual (event); also, referents of &3% 0+ and   # !    %       ! ' !    #'!  for the first time. (b) there are numerous ways an entity can be definite (thing) or less than completely actual (event). Noun Phrase (thing) Definite

&-0:)*$9;+$*& )&;$:) &)&)$***), MANY

ONE

Clause (event) Realis

(GROUNDS ITSELF) '&indefinite

ONE

MANY

Irrealis

(GROUNDS ITSELF)

. [( Anti-symmetry between Definite/Realis and Specificindefinite/Irrealis.

9(1(L(=% & %%& %%% I would like to make clear at the outset that this section is not concerned with attitudinal modifiers as described in Dik (1997: 295f.), which specify the speaker    #%! !  # -order entities in the discourse world, such as the propositional contents of his or her own utterance, as in: (20) (21)

  52/% %# %( $    5**  (

Here I will mostly be concerned with manifestations of the speaker otional attitude such as sympathy or scorn towards animate entities. For example, in many languages the diminutive is used to express affection (Jurafsky 1996):



* 5%:%. 

% (22) 2 # % /% / 3%   I have just with my colleague-DIM 0O  3! $ #-

75

&  talked

Adjectives like        !         /

   speaker  $ $  !       typically human or animate entity: (23) %%& /& % &# 4%( In a recent article Hengeveld (2004b) has argued that & in (23) is an instance of a special category of modifiers (:-modifiers    esented at the Interpersonal Level in the FDG model (see also Butler this volume; Keizer 2004: 15).9 There are several reasons why I am reluctant to posit a special category of attitudinal modifiers at the Interpersonal Level of the NP model presented above (Figure 3). First of all, a layered model of any linguistic structure is supposed to reflect differences in semantic scope that exist between the various modifier categories. There is, however, no good evidence to show that the scope of & in the sense of  "  in 23) differs from the scope of & with another sense ( %#   money    %$ 3 !- .      $  %     '   attributive modifier & , it only has the noun in its scope. This does not imply that all adjectives, or rather all qualifying satellites, are equal. Properties denoted by qualifying satellites range from objective/permanent (e.g.  !A table  !A chair   O%A $ "-#- A apple A book # !A idea    !!A performance- .     iconically reflected in the way qualifying adjectives are ordered relative to the head noun: across languages adjectives denoting more inherent (permanent, objective) properties have a strong tendency to occur closer to the head noun than adjectives denoting less inherent (temporary, subjective) properties:10 (24) G *#*%%#%- -%#H (25) ? G *#*%% -#%-%#H Thus, the observation that a modifier such as & in (23)  !   subjective evaluation by the speaker"2#% ! 2004b: 373) is no reason to introduce a special category of attitudinal satellites at the Interpersonal

76



Level of the NP ( O%   not the same as  Octive-11 We noted above that many, perhaps most adjectives reflect some kind of subjective evaluation by the speaker (#, #%, *, %, 4 %, % %). In fact, a wide variety of modifier categories can be said to express subjective evaluations: verbal aspect markers (Comrie 1976: 17), expressions such as   vs.  /&%*, adverbial modifiers such as  * or % , forms of address (expressing different degrees of politeness)  they all involve the speaker  O%%      speaker might have said something else under similar circumstances.12 Nevertheless it is true that the NP % &  /&  in (23) has an additional communicative value in that it displays sympathy for the referent of the phrase on the part of the speaker. However, treating & as an interpersonal modifier in this construction would imply that the surplus attitudinal value is only situated in the adjective, whereas in fact speaker attitudes such as sympathy or scorn tend to manifest themselves in a variety of ways (morpho-syntactically, prosodically, in voice quality) as a property of a construction rather than through a distinct modifier category represented at one particular layer in the underlying structure (Halliday 2004: 61, 238, 3189; Butler this volume). In the following example scorn is expressed morpho-syntactically through the use of a distal demonstrative ! !% ''/-je!  al possessive construction %O (13 % (26) 2  % 4 #3    /  I find that new book-DIM of you totally nothing 0!   3  '  3" - 3  '$  - Leaving out the diminutive and using the proximal form of the demonstrative or the prenominal possessive turns the NP into a neutral expression. % (27) 2    4 # /  I find your new book absolutely nothing 0!   3  '$    3 Thus it seems that attitudes of the kind discussed here are global properties at the level of a construction rather than a local property that resides in a single modifier.



* 5%:%. 

77

How can we capture such global expressions of speaker attitude in FDG? Obviously, when the input from the pre-linguistic conceptual module enters the grammatical component, it must already be clear which part of the structure will be affected by speaker attitude. In FDG one could use, for example, a dotted line to indicate which elements in the underlying representation are within the Attitude Domain, which will effect the form, content and expression of material in that attitude domain. This kind of representation is in fact rather similar to the way discourse pragmatics, in particular Focus Structure, is handled in     //

(Van Valin and LaPolla 1997: 210218). In RRG a dotted line is used to mark the potential focus domain (that part of the sentence in which focus can occur) and a triangle indicates what part of the structure is the actual focus domain (the part of the sentence which is in focus).

2.2. Evidence for the layered NP/clause model The fact that in languages such as Jacaltec or Fongbe the same morpheme is used as a discourse-referential operator in the NP and in the clause (section 2.1.3) provides strong support for the NP/clause model defended here. Evidence for the descriptive layers in the NP/clause model in Figure 1 comes from parts-of-speech systems, historical linguistics, cognitive linguistics and morpho-syntax. As to syntactic evidence, there are 24 ways to linearize a demonstrative, a numeral, an adjective and a noun in a single integral noun phrase, but most logically possible patterns are not attested in the world  ##es. Interestingly there are no gaps in the eight     --tterns that reflect the layered organization of the NP presented above (with the adjective  typically a qualifying modifier  always next to the noun and the demonstrative  typically a localizing modifier  always in the periphery (Rijkhoff 2004):

78



(28) 2&%%   dem num A N

dem num N A dem A N num dem N A num num A N dem num N A dem A N num dem N A num dem

 Alamblak, Dutch, Georgian, Hungarian, Kayardild, Ket, Nama Hottentot, Imbabura Quechua, Pipil, Tamil, Turkish Burushaski, Guaran "  -#-   !   Romance languages) Zande Bambara Berbice Dutch Creole, Bislama, Sranan Basque, Hmong Njua Sango Oromo, Fa d'Ambu, Nubi

By contrast, languages that employ one of the remaining 16  -iconic patterns as the basic order seem to be extremely rare. Greenberg (1966: 8687) had one such language in his sample, Kikuyu, which has the order [N dem num A], but Seiler (1978: 322) claims that this is a  

   variant  K3$      ! # 7B A num dem]. Hawkins (1983), whose sample contained over 300 languages, mentioned two other Bantu languages with a non-iconic basic pattern in the NP: Aghem [N A dem num] and Noni (which has [N dem num A] as well as [N dem A num]). It remains to be seen, however, if the Aghem and Noni sequences are really integral NPs (see Rijkhoff 2002: 2726 for some arguments to show that we may be dealing with appositional or complex structures rather than simple integral NPs in the case of non-iconic patterns). There is also evidence from morphology and clause-internal syntax to support the layered model outlined in Figure 1. In English, for example, different kinds of temporal satellites tend to occur in the order time duration ('    ZB*%%), time frequency (%$!$ or soZB%*%%) and time position (>$Z  %%), as in Quirk et al. (1985: 551): (29) 24%       %     Regarding morphological evidence, Bybee  % #  '   !# of inflectional morphemes relative to the verb in a representative sample of fifty languages revealed that 7---8             ' llowed by tense, and then by mood. The only exception to this ordering found in the 50-language sample is in Ojibwa, where the Dubitative suffix precedes the Preterite suffix"M$)*1V()*W-



* 5%:%. 

79

Historical evidence to support parallel treatment in the layered analysis of the clause and the noun phrase comes from various sources. For example, Gildea (1993) has shown how demonstratives have developed into tense markers in Panare. Several authors have described phonological similarities between markers of nominal and verbal plurality (see for example Frajzyngier 1977, 1997; Mithun 1988; Newman 1990) and historical connections between markers of collectivity and perfectivity (both: Quality) were already discussed by Von Garnier (1909). As to lexical word classes, it appears that languages across the globe employ one of the seven major parts-of-speech systems listed in Figure 8 (for a more detailed typology of parts-of-speech systems that also includes intermediate types, see Hengeveld et al. 2004). #   && 

  & %33& *%/

. \(

Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5 Type 6 Type 7

    &  noun adjective adverb noun adjective verb noun verb verb

verb verb verb

noun

Partsofspeech system (adverb = manner adverb; based on Hengeveld 1992: 69).

Apart from quantitative differences (number of distinct word classes, ranging from one to four), languages may also differ with respect to the degree of flexibility displayed by the members of a certain word class. For example, in English the adjective beautiful needs to be provided with an adverbializing suffix * before it can modify a verb: (30) '  #% (31) '#%* But there are also languages such as Ngiti (Type 3), which do not distinguish between adjectives and (manner) adverbs (Kutsch Lojenga 1994: 336):

80



0% (Kutsch Lojenga 1992: 338) (32) #!#  3]%^      V child RSM-carry:PRF.PRES light load .   !! #  ! (33)  #!#  3]%^     V light child RSM-carry:PRF.PRES load .   !!  load easily In other words, Ngiti and other languages with a Type 3 parts-of-speech system the same element is used as a qualifying modifier (? $ lliten Figure 1) in the NP and in the clause. 9(9(1 -3* /%0+% It appears that the four-layered model presented above needs to be expanded with another layer of modification, both for the NP and the clause. This layer concerns */ , which further specify the  of entity denoted by the noun (or verb) and forms the innermost layer of modification, i.e. that between the head constituent and the layer that accommodates qualifying modifiers. Classifying satellites are lexical items that further specify what kind of entity is being denoted by the head noun, for example:  in   report & % in  !     %  in   or  in    $-. 3  ginal numbering of the layers intact, this additional descriptive layer will be referred as the & -layer (Figure 9).14 Classifying modifiers typically appear adjacent to the head noun and differ from qualifying modifiers in that they do not specify an objective property of the entity (  %#,   ) or the speaker  O% attitude towards the entity (% % %%, #%&% ), but rather a particular subclass of the entity in question. Here are some more examples of classifying satellites from English and other languages: " (34) a.  4*

b(     % c.  % d.   15



* 5%:%. 

81

'4 (Koptjevskaja-Tamm 2003: 53940) (35) a. " 3%3     %%

a:C people-DEF.C-GEN theatre  '     b.  3     a:C school-DEF.C.-GEN  3'    

&&% task

% (Koptjevskaja-Tamm 2002: 155) (36) a. 3   & breadGEN knife ad knife b. 3  & coffee-GEN cup  '' Clause operators (A

Clause satellites (A

4. Discourse-Referential 3. Location 2. Quantity 1. Quality 0. Kind ))& & %? #@  /& 0. Kind 1. Quality 2. Quantity 3. Location 4. Discourse-Referential NP operators (A 

NP satellites ( A

. O( A five-layered NP/clause model: preliminary version (cf. Figure 10).

82



Classifying satellites also occur in the kind of classifier construction that is attested in Arrernte and other Australian languages. -

 % (Wilkins 2000: 179200) (37) a. *

   

 ant meat-ant b. 4*      

 traditional medicine meat-ant c. &/        

 socially relevant place meat-ant Even though all the constructions in (37) could be translated as  Wilkins (2000: 192) states that in each case the semantic effect of the classifying noun is different. For example, the combination 4* 

 in (37b) could be paraphrased as follows: In using the classifier construction 4*  

 !   ! meat-ant     3  ddressee to think about the referent of the noun phrase from the point of view of its having the properties of an  

 -ant !      rrent point in the discourse are its properties as an 4* !  !icine-

In other words, the classification is based on the way 'gures in a particular context: as food in (37a), as a medicine in (37b), or as an entity in a ;%"U+In English classifying adjectives differ from qualifying adjectives in that they usually do not admit intensifiers, comparison, or predicative position (Quirk et al. 1985: 1339; on non-predicative adjectives, see also e.g. Farsi 1968, Levi 1973): (38) % %  vs. * *% %  [intensifier] (39) /:/% vs. */ /:/% [comparison] (40) %& %% vs. *%%& % [predicative position]



* 5%:%. 

83

The semantic range of classifying satellites is rather broad and includes such categories as material, purpose and function, status and rank, origin, and mode of operation (Halliday 2004: 320). Essentially they relate to any feature that may serve to classify entities into a system of smaller sets. The examples show that various forms and constructions may serve as an adnominal classifying satellite (e.g. adjective, noun, genitive NP), and that it may be difficult to draw the line between a noun + classifying satellite combination and compounds or quasi-compounds (cf. also Giegerich 2005).16 Furthermore, the same adjective can function either as a classifying or a qualifying satellite (Farsi 1968; Halliday 2004: 319). For example, an adjective such as  serves as a qualifying satellite in %  $ (%$%  $!  

'$#  % #  "[%$ civil rightsExamples of classifying satellites at the level of the clause are more difficult to find, since it seems they tend to occur as incorporated forms, as in (41b): ; 0% (Merlan 1976: 185) (41) a.  %    where 3.SG:is knife 9   3'S 2 & %: (41) b. K  33%%  & 3.SG 3.SG:it-knife-cut bread 2 ! 3' There is, however, also the phenomenon called   # "4 1986, 1989; Gerds 1998) or     $ O/   "4  1984). Whereas an incorporated element is part of another word, a stripped noun is a separate word (according to phonological criteria such as stress placement), which must appear next to the verb. Thus, in Kusaiean adverbs can appear between verb and object (42a) but not between verb and stripped noun (42b).  (Gerds 1998: 94; original example in K. Lee 1975) (42) a. '  %4/  &   /%/%  Sah he sharpen diligently knife the    # 3'! # $

84



'% &&> (42) b. '  %4%4 /%/% & Sah he sharpen knife diligently   ! # $3'-sharpening As in the case of incorporation we see that in (42) a distinction is made between sharpening in general and a certain kind of sharpening, namely knife-sharpening. The crucial difference is that in the case of a stripped noun we are dealing a more or less independent element that serves as a classifying satellite at the level of the clause.17 9(9(9($*& %  Classifying operators are members of grammatical (rather than lexical) modifier categories which (further) specify what kind of spatial or temporal entity (thing, event) is being referred to. As a matter of fact classifying operators were already represented as a distinct modifier category in the  !' -layered NP/clause model, where they were erroneously categorized as ? '$#   "# )d 2). In earlier studies I argued that, just as verbs are coded for a particular -% % ( ! '       / $  !! '     ' % ( ! ' #     

        % noun   #  O  un-   $ O    %     3 '% ! '%  !'$   -% % (Dik 1997: 224f.; note that -% % is also known as lexicalized aspectuality), nominal aspect markers can change the ' % of a noun (Rijkhoff 2002: 100 121). For example, nouns in Oromo are lexically coded for a ' % that I have called     "--G      ! direct construction with a numeral), but when they are provided with a (what I call) collective or an individual aspect marker, they designate a special kind of set, viz. a % % or a % % (with just one member) respectively: = / (Stroomer 1987: 7677, 8485) (43)  horse/horses"3! set) vs.        (collective set) (44) / A"3! %  / A  (singleton set)



* 5%:%. 

85

It turns out now that the nominal and verbal aspect markers I erroneously regarded as qualifying operators in the  !' -layered model have to do with 3!     ? $      '  !$ !icated in the way they were characterized (Rijkhoff 2002: 101): It is important to make clear at the outset that .. nominal aspect markers .. specify what kind of .. entity is being referred to ..-0   !  3  

'$# rather than qualifying operators in that they relate to the kind of thing (e.g. individual, collective) or event (e.g. process, action) that is being referred to by the speaker. But that leaves us with the question: what about qualifying operators? What is the grammatical equivalent of the qualifying satellite in the NP and in the clause? This is discussed in the next section. 9(9(<(B*& % :%H Operators are members of modifier categories that are expressed grammatically rather than lexically. They belong to a closed paradigm and manifest themselves morphologically as inflectional modifications of lexical items or as '   !  "  3    #tical or function words). For example, if the operator value \;' %    ological expression it typically takes the form of an article or an affix, but note that Definiteness may also be expressed through phonological or syntactic means (Rijkhoff 2002: ch. 6). Since the members of a grammatical word class by definition constitute a smallish, closed set of items, the distinctions expressed by operators are absolute (Dik 1997: 160). For example, if Definiteness is a grammatical category in a language, the only two available choices are +Definite or Definite (indefinite). More examples are given in Table 1, which shows that operator values in the various semantic domains typically capture a limited number of crucial distinctions (no attempt has been made to give an exhaustive listing of domains or values).

86



,#1. Distinctions in operator categories (based on Dik 1997: 160) $0& NUMBER TENSE POLARITY ASPECT MOOD ILLOCUTION

,-)  & % B  &%& %%  &%% /& %& % %&%/&%/  %%

%/& %

Let us now return to the question posed in the title of this section: ;  qualifying operators exist? ] '$#  !'         

 inherent objective or subjective properties of an entity, typically expressed by adjectives  if a language has them. Interestingly all major semantic types of adjective distinguished in Dixon (1982: 16) include gradable properties: dimension (#  ##  ## Q ' $ # xtremely big  $    $ " !  %$   lour (#    $ " % O   # " ! $ # value (# ! ! ! "'   - 0' #! $      feature of qualifying modifiers (as is suggested by these facts), this would explain why there are no qualifying operators: operators do not lend themselves to specifying degrees of some variable property: an object can be ' $ %$Satellite [fairly SingularOperator-18 2.3. Formal representation A formal representation of the underlying structure of the NP may appear as in (45). Note that here the interpersonal and the representational levels are conflated, whereas in Hengeveld and Mackenzie %   %  co-exist as separate entities (cf. Hengeveld this volume): (45) NPi: 4[ 3[ 2[ - [ 0[ (NOUN (fi))(xi) ]Lc 0(Lc) ]L0 1(L0) ]L1

2(L1) ]L2 3(L2) ]L3 4(L3) As in (1), each operator (,    " , 3  $   argument. For example, quantity layer L2 is the argument of operator 3 and satellite 3.



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A = term (NP) operator; the argument of classifying operator 0 is the innermost layer (the core layer, hence labeled LC), whereas the argument of discourse-referential operator 4 is layer L3 (which contains all other layers); f= predicate variable (here symbolizing the head noun); x= referent variable (symbolizes the referent of the NP);

/Z term (NP) satellite; the argument of classifying satellite 0 is the core layer (Lc), whereas the argument of discourse-referential satellite 4 is the material contained in localizing layer L3. CLAUSE OPERATORS 4

CLAUSE SATELLITES 4

4. Discourse-Referential

3

2

3. Location 2

2

2. Quantity 1

1. Quality 0

0. Kind

0

))& & %? #@ /&   0

0. Kind

0

1. Quality 2 3 4

2. Quantity 3. Location 4. Discourse-Referential

NP OPERATORS . 1P( A five-layered NP/clause model.

1

2

3 4 NP SATELLITES

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4 " #  This section investigates how (elements in) the revised NP structure proposed above interact with contextual factors.19 The three main claims of this section are: (a) the contextual component in the current FDG model must be split up into two separate contextual components (see also Keizer this volume): one for discourse (co-text) and another for the discourse event or  / '   "! $ /       '   external world); (b) all major components in the FDG model provide a context of some sort: a grammatical context (G-context), a conceptual/cognitive/ mental context (C-context), a discourse context (D-context), and a situational/external context (E-context); (c) a single rule can account for any kind of contextual influence on a linguistic expression. 3.1. Components as contexts The current FDG model (Figure 11) consists of four interacting modules: one central grammatical unit surrounded by three marginal modules (the conceptual, contextual, and output components).

<(1(1(,%:%/&% The contextual component is characterized as follows (Hengeveld 2005: 58): The CONTEXTUAL COMPONENT contains a description of the discourse domain as it has been built up during the current discourse to the extent that this is relevant to the form that subsequent utterances may take. It does not only contain a description of the content and form of the preceding discourse, but also of the actual perceivable setting in which the speech event takes place.



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"  " 

Frames Lexemes Primary operators

Formulation

Interpersonal Level

Templates Auxiliaries Secondary operators

Morpho-syntactic Encoding

Structural Level Prosodic patterns Morphemes Secondary operators

" # " 

  " 

Representational Level

Phonological Encoding

Phonological Level

$  " 

Articulation

Utterance    . 11( General layout of FDG (Hengeveld 2005: 61).

This description clearly states that the contextual component actually consists of two distinct parts: a textual component (co-text) and a situational

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component. Since FDG is a theory of grammar (rather than a theory of the world), I believe there are several reasons to argue for a strict division between the purely linguistic context and  / '  "4alinowski 1923). Firstly, it is important not to confuse different kinds of entities:   in the sense of co-text is a linguistic entity, a  % is not.20 Secondly,   as co-text is a finite entity (basically consisting of the linguistic material preceding and following an utterance in some discourse), whereas the external context in which a discourse event takes place is essentially an open-ended phenomenon.21 Consequently, we have to be very selective in our representation of the situational context if we want to avoid the impossible (and for linguists: unnecessary) task of having to give a complete description of the physical context, which could mean the entire universe (where does  / '    S L'-   1978: 210f.). The discriminative and subjective nature of event representation is also reflected in statements by e.g. Dik (1997: 13) and, more recently, Connolly (2004: 105), who wrote: L  $$ / ! ption will have to be selective. There is no possibility of including every fact about the situation. The basic principle is to include what one feels to be relevant, insofar as one 3 ledge and the evidence permits. The problem is complicated further by the fact that features of the components of the speech situation (such as sex, age, class, caste, country of origin, generation, region, schooling, ethnicity, kinship relation and degree of intimacy with other speech participants, occupational status; the physical and psychological setting of the speech act; topic and purpose of communication) are often intricately connected, and that their relative importance varies from language to language (Rijkhoff 1998). For example, whereas the social significance of sex is primary in one language, social rank may override all other features in another language (see e.g. ErvinTripp 1972: 224225 on such differences in the systems of address in Bisaya and Korean). In my view grammarians must construct and test theories of (discourse) grammar; it is not their task to give a principled account of all the elements in the extralinguistic context that may have an influence on linguistic forms, meanings or functions. Therefore I suggest that one FDG component be strictly reserved for discourse in the sense of co-text (D-context) and another component for those elements in the speech event (E-context) that are considered to have an impact on the form, function, or meaning of (part of) an utterance (see also Butler this volume).



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<(1(9(,&%/&% Hengeveld (2005: 57) gives the following characterization of the conceptual component: The CONCEPTUAL COMPONENT is not part of the grammar but is the driving force behind the grammatical component as a whole. [...] it represents the conversion of a prelinguistic conceptual representation into the linguistically relevant semantic and pragmatic representations that are allowed by the grammar of the language concerned. The conceptual component is responsible for the development of both a communicative intention relevant for the current speech event and the associated conceptualizations with respect to the relevant events in the external real or imaginary world.

This description more or less covers the notion of context as employed in the cognitive sciences, where context is first and foremost a mental phenomenon. The FDG interpretation of conceptual knowledge also clearly relates to the way context is defined by language philosophers and pragmalinguists: the set of background assumptions that are necessary for an utterance to be intelligible (Ungerer and Schmid 1996: 4546). I will refer to this component in the FDG model as C-context (see also fn.19). <(1(<(, //%/&% The grammatical component constitutes yet another kind of context in the FDG model (G-context). This is the module where the discourse act is analysed pragmatically, semantically, morphosyntactically and phonologically (but see section 4.1). Essentially each level provides another environment containing elements that may affect the form, function or content of (part of) the linguistic expression. For example, at the Representational Level the plural operator is nothing but a contextual element in the underlying representation of the NP that affects the form and meaning of an English nominal predicate in the head slot (Dik 1997: 349). (46)

Pl [#N] = #

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<(1(L(,%&%/&% The actual linguistic expression, which manifests itself as a series of spoken, signed or written symbols, is an entity that is produced and perceived in the external world and which is, therefore, located in space and time. For this reason I regard the output component, which #     signed, or orthographic expressions"2#% ! 2004a: 6), as part of the E-context. Obviously, the same goes for the collection of linguistic expressions that together constitute the co-text. However, the % % %  of these two entities (the co-text and its constituent expressions) are #3 % %%% to be modelled in the grammatical and the discourse components and as such they are only theoretical constructs that exist in linguists minds. 3.2. FDG components: some modifications Having motivated the need for a separate component in FDG to account for the influence of elements in the external/situational context (section 3.1.1), and having established that all major components in the FDG model represent some kind of context in the cognitive, anthropological, philosophical, grammatical or textual sense (sections 3.1.24), we can now draw the following picture of the components in a revised FDG model.

)5  # (External/Situational Component) "5  #   (Conceptual Component)

5  # (Grammatical Component)

5  # 

a. Interpersonal Level (pragmatic analysis) b. Representational Level (semantic analysis) c. Structural Level (morpho-syntactic analysis) d. Phonological Level (phonological analysis)

(Discourse Component) Co-text

. 19( Contextual components in FDG.

Linguists working in the framework of FDG are mostly concerned with the G-context and the D-context. The most conspicuous difference between the model outlined in Figure 12 and the current FDG model (as represented in



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Figure 11) concerns the organization of the components, but there are also differences regarding the contents of the components. They will be discussed in section 4. 3.3. A context rule In section 3.1 I argued that the plural operator is an example of a contextual element in the underlying structure of the NP in the grammatical component of the FDG model. The rules that deal with the effect of an operator on some linguistic expression are called xpression rules   ";k 1997: 349358) and take the following general format: (47) Operator [Operandum] = Value This rule is easily transformed into a general  /      ; model which produces linguistic output for the grammatical component (which in turn can serve as the input for another context rule):22 (48) Context [input]  output Thus, the plural formation of English nouns may be accounted for as follows in FDG: (49) +  /%" G-context: ([.. [.. [PL [ - [.. [ N ] ..]L0 ..]L1 ..]L2 ..]L3 ..]L4) input: bookN output: bookN-PL This could be paraphrased as follows: ' -context contains an operator with the value 56 ! 3  %!!   for an inflectional suffix to mark plural number:  3-PLInfl-.   form of this inflectional plural suffix is specified at the phonological level and depends on the properties of the input predicate (Dik 1997: 351). This means that, in order to produce the appropriate form, the grammar needs to check the following set of rules:

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(50) $% &  /% 1. Pl = /Iz/ if last phoneme of input predicate is sibilant; otherwise 2. Pl = /s/ if last phoneme of input predicate is voiceless; otherwise, 3. Pl = /z/ (51) +  /%" G-context: N-PLInfl input: /bk/ [Condition: if the last phoneme of the predicate is voiceless, then PL = /s/] output: // This could be paraphrased as: ' -context (at the phonological level) contains a marker for inflectional suffix PLInfl '   3   # for possible conditions, then substitute PLInfl        ement" A A. Let us now look at some cases where the form or meaning of a linguistic structure in the grammatical component is sensitive to some contextual element in another component (C-context, D-context, E-context). <(<(1($3%:% The interaction between NP structure in the grammatical component and information in the conceptual component (C-context) is manifested, among other ways, in the value taken by certain operators after the formulator has produced an underlying structure for the grammatical component. For example, the reason why we normally refer to   !'$ ! to our long-term knowledge of the world (or rather universe), which is contained in the conceptual component. It is part of our conceptual knowledge that there is only one such entity in our solar system. Since there is no danger that this entity will be confused with another entity of the same type in normal conversation, the speaker may assume that the addressee will be able to identify the intended referent of   % #    entity may not have been mentioned before or is invisible at the time of speaking. In other words, the fixed value for the discourse-referential operator in the NP      $  / ! $ '#     Lcontext:



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(52) %/ " C-context: the sun is a unique entity in our solar system input: ([value 4 = ? [.. [.. [ - [.. [ sunN ] ..]L0 ..]L1 ..]L2 ..]L3 ..]L4) output: ([value 4 = Def. [.. [.. [ - [.. [ sunN ] ..]L0 ..]L1 ..]L2 ..]L3 ..]L4) <(<(9 3%:% The discourse component (D-context) contains a description of the co-text of the utterance. Obviously, FDG needs this component to account for all sorts of reflections of discourse phenomena in a clause, such as tail-head linkage (Hengeveld 2005: 55). ,  (Van Staden 2000: 275): tail-head linkage (53) ... %          _  %  ... then Jafa carry.on.the.back basket 3.NH=there then _  &   (  $       3.NH=there ascend upwards. upwards 3.SG.M pick banana... --  >' !     !  ! - 9 !   picked the bananas .. Discourse phenomena like tail-head linkage, clause-chaining or switchreferencing (cf. de Vries 2005) often require multiple interactions between various components, but a simplified account of tail-head linkage could look like this: (54) ,3,  D-context: In episode E of discourse D, the speaker wants to express coherence between Sentence B (whose underlying structure is being prepared for the grammatical component) and preceding sentence A (which is part of the Dcontext). Input: prelinguistic version of sentence B in conceptual component. Output: underlying structure of sentence B in grammatical component ('           ! ' sentence A.  $%: at the Structural Level the last word of Sentence A must be the first word in Sentence B.

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<(<(<("3%:% Since linguistic expressions are always used by && at a particular %/ and &, each language has devices to integrate information from the external, situational context. In the FDG model this means that the Econtext needs to be checked for all instances of person, time, and place deixis (notice that here the world of discourse overlaps with the external reality; cf. fn. 19). For example, in Spanish a predicate adjective is marked for the gender of the addressee: '& (Hengeveld 2005: 58) (55) `A &!3   %3!6 what pale-F.SG COP-IND.PRES.2.SG 2  $  3Y (56)  / %& %'&> E-context: Addressee is singular female person Input: predicative adjective (&!) Output: predicative adjective + - suffix (&!3) In the last couple of decades two more deictic categories have been introduced: 1. discourse deixis, which concerns references to portions of the surrounding discourse; 2. social deixis, which is concerned with the grammaticalization, or encoding in language structure, of social information (Levinson 1987: 93).23 Whereas discourse deixis is obviously concerned with the D-context, social deixis must also be explained on the basis of information specified in the E-context. For example, many languages have a set of pronouns for special situations, as when the speaker wants to show respect or deference for the addressee. The impact of the social status of the addressee in the external reality (to be measured relative to the speaker        cture in the grammatical component can be captured in the following way:



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(57) +% / % E-context: Addressee is a person who in the current situation needs to be addressed in a respectful fashion by the Speaker. Input: A=2SG Output: U [= polite form of 2SG pronoun] 3 9    <    = FDG is a theory of grammar in which the discourse act is the basic unit of analysis. The term !     %  $ ' #  it may suggest that the basic unit of analysis is a verbal activity, rather than a linguistic form or construction, i.e. the product of that activity.24 This is especially true in studies in which FDG is presented as a dynamic model reflecting the various phases in the process of language production ('  intention to articulation-0  ! 3 3     '   section that in my view a theory of grammar must provide a model for the analysis of linguistic expressions, not a model of verbal activities or the production process that results in these linguistic expressions (for a similar point see Hengeveld 2004b). In other words, what is being modelled in the grammatical component is not an activity or a process but a linguistic construction (or Q'-   2004). So far we have been concerned with the layered structure of the NP and the various modules ( /  ; ! -.    ' 3  a closer look at the contents of the grammatical component or G-context. I will argue that the grammatical component is not the place in FDG to describe non-linguistic entities such as (features of) Speaker and Addressee or other aspects of the physical and psychological setting of the speech situation. The G-context must only be used to describe and analyse the form, function and meaning of linguistic constructions. In section 4.2 I will elaborate on the observed parallels between NPs and clauses (Figure 10, section 2.2.3). It will be argued that descriptive modifiers (concerning Kind, Quality, Quantity, and Location) are specified at the semantic or Representational Level ( #uage as carrier of content  !   -referential and other interpersonal modifiers are specified at the pragmatic level ( ##   / #  ##   communicational processQ M  2003: 111; Halliday 2004: 61). The other interpersonal modifiers in the clause inform the Addressee about:

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the :%% %% of a spatial or temporal entity (thing xi and event ei) in the world of discourse (some relevant modifier categories: Definite, Specific, Realis, expressions of objective modality, discourse-referential satellites; section 2.13); b. the /%% of proposition Xi, in particular the speaker ntal or cognitive attitude towards the proposition (some relevant modifier categories: expressions of subjective modality and evidentiality, propositional satellites; Dik 1997: 295299); c. the % *%% of the clause (some relevant modifier categories: Declarative - Interrogative - Imperative - Exclamative, illocutionary satellites; Dik 1997: 300307). This means, among other things, that propositions, which are part of the Representational Level in current FDG, appear at the Interpersonal Level in the version proposed here (section 4.2). a.

4.1. The place of speaker and addressee in FDG If the grammatical component is concerned with the grammatical analysis of linguistic entities (NPclauseco-text), this component should not include descriptions of psychological or physical entities that are part of the extra-linguistic context. For example, both Hengeveld (2004b) and Connolly (2004: 108, 112) have proposed that the Interpersonal Level can also be used as a platform for the specification of (features of) Speaker P1 and Addressee P2. In current FDG, the linguistic expression (symbolized by C = communicated content, i.e. the information transmitted in the discourse act) is an argument of an abstract three-place illocutionary predicate (the other two arguments being the Speaker and the Addressee).25

(M1: [(A1: [ILL (P1)S (P2)A (C1: [...(T1) (R1)...] (C1))] (A1))] (M1))  . 1<( The Interpersonal Level (Hengeveld 2004a: 5).

In the FDG model defended here, the grammatical component is strictly separated from the external/situational component, which contains (features of) entities that are part of the external, physical world (section 3.1.1). A modified version of the discourse act (i.e. the product) may be



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shown as (58). For the sake of simplicity, the move in (58) consists of one discourse act, which in turn consists of a single, full clause. In (58) the interpersonal and the representational level are connected, but recall that they co-exist as separate entities in Hengeveld and Mackenzie  %rsion (see section 3.2.; the distribution of layers over the Interpersonal and the Representational Level is discussed in section 4.2). (58) THE UNDERLYING STRUCTURE OF THE CLAUSE (Lc = core layer; see also (45)): Interpersonal Level (LANGUAGE AS EXCHANGE) Movei: ([6 [5[4[))&]L3 4(L3)]L4 5(L4)]L5 6(L5)]L6)

[3[2[-[0[(+"((fi))(ei)]Lc 0(Lc)]L0 1(L0) +- '(]L1 2(L1)]L2 3(L2)]L3 Representational Level (LGE. AS CARRIER OF CONTENT; see Fig. 10) Operators and satellites at the Interpersonal Level:26 4 / 4 = discourse-referential operator / satellite (L3: Event or  ' Affairsi) 5 / 5 = proposition operator / satellite (L4: proposition Xi) 6 / 6 = illocutionary operator / satellite (L5: discourse act Ai) In (58) the discourse act (a linguistic entity; see note 24) is still the basic unit of analysis within the move (Kroon 1995), but note that the schema does not contain variables for (features of) Speaker or Addressee, and that 0 locution   # $"6) rather than an abstract frame (cf. Dik 1997: 667, 300f.).

4.2. Parallels between the NP and the clause revisited: the place of modal categories in FDG In section 2.2.3 I proposed a five-layered model of the NP: four layers to accommodate descriptive modifier categories (classifying, qualifying, quantifying, localizing modifiers) and one layer for modifiers that are concerned with the status of entities in the world of discourse (hence !scourse-referential modifiers- 0   # component of FDG the descriptive modifiers are specified at the Representational (semantic)

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Level, whereas discourse-referential modifiers are specified at the Interpersonal (pragmatic) Level; recall that here we are only concerned with NPs that are used for spatial entities (symbolized by the x-variable):

,(  $   +   Discourse-Referential 4 4 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------REPRESENTATIONAL LEVEL (LGE. AS CARRIER OF CONTENT Descriptive modifiers specify properties of an entity in the G    in terms of Kind, Quality, Quantity, and Location ,( Location Quantity Quality Kind

$  3 2 0

+  

3

2

1

0

'& 

INTERPERSONAL LEVEL (LANGUAGE AS EXCHANGE Interpersonal modifiers in the NP are concerned with the status of things in the G  .

. 1L( NP layers at the Interpersonal and the Representational Level.

If we now also include the other layers in the underlying structure of the clause, we see that two layers must be added:



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&)*')*+$&,,)),,&-)+)."/&) At the 2% & , modifiers are concerned with the Interpersonal Status of  kinds of entities in the G  : [i] clauses (or rather the messages contained in the clauses), [ii] propositions, [iii] events and [iv] things.  

0$)*+&/)",-+)

2 + &%/  (5, 5) inform  about +   assessment of / attitude towards a proposition Xi as regards the probability, possibility or desirability of the actual occurrence of event ei.

0$)*+&/)&$-&'/*+) 3 3(/ (4, 4) 3  3(/ (4, 4) specify the existential status of thing xi or event ei in the G  (

'& 

1 2% */  (6, 6) inform ddressee about the illocutionary status of the clause (Decl, Int, ).

*)'*)+)&$&,,)),,&-)+"**)*$"$&)& At the & %%, modifiers specify properties of spatio-temporal entities (things, events) in the G   in terms of the notions Kind (Class), Quality, Quantity, and Location. 3.  /  2. A%*/  1. A*/  0. $*/ 

(3, 3) (2, 2) ( 1) (0, 0)

3.  /  2. A%*/  1. A*/  0. $*/ 

(3, 3) (2, 2) (1) (0, 0)

. 1Z( NP and clause layers at the Interpersonal and the  Representational Level (Rijkhoff fc. a).

Figure 15 shows that we find three layers of modification at the Interpersonal Level, each of which is concerned with language as an instrument of social interaction (Dik 1997: 5):27 (i) discourse-referential modifiers, which inform the Addressee about the status of first and second order entities in the world of discourse (e.g. Definite, Realis). These modifiers specify whether or not an entity occupies a certain spatio-temporal region in the discourse world. Or they may

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indicate the chance of occurrence of an event as measured against the background of the speaker  3  !# of the world and systems of moral, legal, or social norms (i.e. expressions of objective modality; Dik 1997: 2413). (ii) proposition modifiers, which inform the Addressee about the status of a proposition (a third-order entity) in the discourse. They specify the speaker    #%! ! "   



 ' proposition Xi with regard to the probability, possibility or desirability of event ei actually taking place. Interestingly, propositions (symbolized by the p-variable in Figure 16 below) appear at the Representational Level in FDG, despite the strong interpersonal nature of propositional modifiers (Halliday 2004: 146150).28

(pi: [(ei: [(fi) (xi)] (ei))] (pi)) . 1Q( The representational level in FDG (Hengeveld 2004a: 6).

I consider propositional modifiers to be part of the Interpersonal Level, because they clearly contain an instruction on the part of the speaker indicating to what extent statement Xi about event ei can be taken to be true or factual by the addressee. The relevant modifier categories are attitudinal satellites and expressions of evidentiality or subjective modality (Dik 1997: 2956). (iii) illocution modifiers, which inform the Addressee about the status of the message (a fourth-order entity). These modifiers specify how the message that is being communicated should be interpreted: as a statement (declarative), a question (interrogative), etc. (Sadock and Zwicky 1985). 2 "   This article argues that the Interpersonal Level in the grammatical component of the FDG model accommodates three layers of modification, each of which is concerned with  ## / #  ##  unicational process"M  2003: 111; Halliday 2004: 61): one for clauses (fourth-order entities), one for propositions (third-order entities) and one for things or events (first and second order entities, respectively). All three layers are relevant for the analysis of clauses at the Interpersonal Level,



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whereas only one is relevant for the analysis of linguistic expressions that are used to talk about concrete things, i.e. noun phrases. According to the model of FDG defended here, the Representational Level in the grammatical component accommodates four layers of modification for both clauses and NPs. These descriptive layers are concerned with  ##    '     ##   representation"Mtler 2003: 111) and operators and satellites at this level are distributed over classifying, qualifying, quantifying, and localizing layers of modification (but recall that there are no qualifying operators). Since the speaker otional attitude towards persons or things is a global property rather than a lexical feature of a particular modifier category, this is accounted for in terms of an !! --  '    that the speaker uses to express his or her emotional attitude (this could be marked by a dotted underscore or other typographical means). This will be an indication that a special (non-lexical) meaning has been added, which will then also trigger the appropriate morpho-syntactic and phonological rules. In this version of the FDG model, the grammatical component does not contain descriptions of elements from the external world (such as Speaker or Addressee), which is represented by a separate component, and all components are treated as different kinds of contexts:    

$&%/&%  /&% ":% C'%%/&% //%/&%

   

$3%:% 3%:%?3%:%@ "3%:% 3%:%

 Finally, it was shown that a single  /  '  ' uence that any contextual factor in these components may have on the form, meaning or function of (part of) a clause. &   1. 2. 3.

I am grateful to Daniel Garc   o and J. Lachlan Mackenzie for their valuable comments; the usual disclaimers apply. In this article,  !'  !  !   !#   / ! grammatical modifier categories (satellites and operators). Since the NP as well as its referent (x) can be the referred to anaphorically, both need to be indexed in some fashion in order to be able to distinguish between the two, but I am no longer convinced that the structure proposed in

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Rijkhoff (2002) is the best way to do so. Hence an alternative schema is proposed here, where xi symbolizes the referent and the indexed label B5 stands for the construction that is used to refer to that entity. 4. Although genericity is often discussed together with definiteness and specificity, it is perhaps better regarded as a property of propositions rather than NPs. Whereas one can find many languages with articles for definiteness or specificity, I am not aware of any language that employs a special article for generic reference (Behrens 2005: 276, Rijkhoff fc. a: fn. 7). 5. It is safe to say that there is no consensus on the status of referents, i.e. whether they are entities in the external, physical world or mental representations of entities that exist in a discourse world (cf. Keizer this volume; see also fn. 19). For the sake of the argument I will simply assume that in a normal conversation speaker and hearer set up a shared world of discourse in which realis clauses are used to refer to events that are deemed to have a correlate in the external, physical world and in which irrealis clauses are used to refer to events that may or may not have a counterpart in the external world. 6. Chung and Timberlake (1985: 241) wrote: 9         $  way for an event to be actual, there are numerous ways that an event can be less than completely actual.  $    %  !  '   # ( whereas there is basically one way for a thing to be indefinite, there are numerous ways for a thing to be definite (Rijkhoff 1988). 7. Cf. Von Heusinger (2002a: 2): 7--8 '$-- --  &!   property of an NP being referentially anchored- 2 #",^^, for a recent discussion of the notion  '$8. The difference between referents of specific and nonspecific-indefinite NPs may also have to do with the fact that in the case of nonspecific reference we need to set up separate discourse worlds for the various interlocutors (rather than having just one shared world of discourse for both speaker and hearer; cf. Kamp 2004). 9. As to the other meanings of   ")- 0  Q ,- M! $ 3 d or trained) one could hypothesize that each sense of   # #  !''rent set of meaning components of the nominal predicate !  "'-Huang and Ahrens 2003 on classifier coercion of nouns). Thus,  -1  s to features concerning personal, human qualities (poor as a person), whereas  2 # #   '  %# !   '

  ?  "  qua doctor). Essentially the same procedure is used to account for the semantics of flexible parts-of-speech (see Hengeveld et al. 2004, Hengeveld and Rijkhoff 2005, Rijkhoff fc. b). 10. See e.g. Farsi (1968); Clark and Clark (1977: 474); Hetzron (1978); Ney (1982, 1983); Fries (1985); Sichelschmidt (1986). 11. See Traugott and Dasher (2001) and Smith (2004) on diachronic developments from subjective to intersubjective.



* 5%:%. 

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12. In Tongan a speaker  $ $ ! ' 'B5 /

!$ selecting a special    !"L hward 1953, Hendrick 2005: 908). Tomasello (2003: 12) notes that  #  $   'damentally perspectival in the sense that a person may refer to one and the same entity as 5 /, &%, or &%, or the same event as , , /, or    depending on the communicative goals with respect to the listener  nal states [813. The Interpersonal Level in FDG was inspired by the interpersonal metafunction in Halliday $   "-M  ; this level is concerned with discourse and attitudinal phenomena, only the latter are part of the interpersonal metafunction in SFG (discourse phenomena fall under the textual component). It may also be useful to point out that in SFG no distinction is made between operators and satellites, grammar and lexicon, semantics and pragmatics, indicating that it can be dangerous to simply copy an element of one theory into another. Note furthermore that Hengeveld  $   ' ",U  !ifier at the Interpersonal Level may have been motivated by his idea that NPs should be compared with propositions rather than predications (Hengeveld 1998). For this comparison to work, one would need to find a counterpart of subjective modality in the NP. In current FDG, however, subjective mood is represented at the Representational Level (see also section 4.2). 14. See Chappell and McGregor (1989: 28); Quirk et al. (1987: 133940); Halliday (2004: 319-320). 15. Apparently % is ambiguous, meaning either   tail of an unidentified canine  3! ' "6 43&, personal communication); see also below on the difficulty of distinguishing between classifying and qualifying modifiers without a proper context. Notice furthermore there is a dependency relation between the value of the discourse operator and the function of a satellite (Quirk et al. 1987: 1276). For example, in a definite NP such as %& or%%&   % as a localizing or identifying satellite, whereas in an indefinite NP such as &3  or %&    

'$#  16. In addition to the observed relation between compounding and classification there also a connection between inalienability and classification (as in  mountain top % -     '   Q '  ! 

   -#- L  and McGregor 1989). 17. Consider also examples such as 2' !   ' '%$    handwashed the laundry18. On gradable adjectives see e.g. Cruse (1986: 202f.); for a recent discussion of gradability, see Wechsler (2005).

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19. Some recent studies on the notion of  / #  ' /  Akman and Bazzanella (2003) and Giv (2005). 20. The   ! ' !        ! !#   !    %     open-ended and could either be represented in the conceptual component (since this component is responsible for the development of  

iated conceptualizations with respect to the relevant events in the external real or imaginary world see section 3.1.2) or in a separate module in the FDG model. 21. On this problem, see also e.g. Giv (1989: 76): G ' $   the existence of an irreducible residue, a recalcitrant escape clause concerning the open-endedness of  /- .    !  %  ' $ ptured, however exhaustive and refined one /  $ay be. 22. Ultimately this rule is probably due to Frege (1891): .%C)  [- 3 /%C %]  G %4 %. 23. Bystander deixis is usually regarded as a subcategory of social deixis and subsumes a variety of linguistic phenomena such as haplology, avoidance styles and secret languages (Rijkhoff 1998). 24. The fact that   %, as well as the acts that they contain ( &% % and  % %) are said to be /! "2#% ! 2004a: 5-6) also suggests that what is being analysed in FDG are activities rather than the & % of these activities. 25. M = move, A = discourse act, Ill = illocution, C = communicated content, T = ascriptive subact, R = referential subact. Since all linguistic constructions are indexed, they can still be connected to Speakers, Addressee and other entities in the non-grammatical modules ( / 26. In theory one could also include operators and satellites at the level of the Move, as in (7[6 [---]L5 6(L5)]L6 7(L6)), where 7 is a move operator and 7 a move satellite. 27. There is of course also the pragmatic status of an entity in terms of newsworthiness (topic, focus), but this is realized as a function rather than a modifier. 28. Before the introduction of FDG, the proposition was still part of the Interpersonal Level (cf. Hengeveld 1990: 1, 6; see also fn. 12).



* 5%:%. 

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*    Akman, Varol and Carla Bazzanella (eds.) 2003 The complexity of context.  + /% 35-3 (special issue on L /Anstey, Matthew P. 2004 Functional Grammar from its inception. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and MarJ-&-GonzE &"! --04- %%  .3 % // , 22-71. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Bateson, Gregory 1979 ;0% >0 *I%*. New York: Dutton. Behrens, Leila 2005 Genericity from a cross-linguistic perspective. % 43-2: 275-344. Butler, Christopher S. 2003 '% %   .%>   % ,  ;  '% %  .% , ( + % 1> -&&  % % '/&: $M + %9>. /$% )*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. this vol. Interpersonal meaning in the noun phrase. Bybee, Joan L. 1985 ; &*> - '%*  % % #%4 ;  . /. (Typological Studies in Language 9.) Amsterdam: Benjamins. Chappell, Hillary and William McGregor 1989 Alienability, inalienability and nominal classification. In: Kiria Hall, Michael Meacham and Richard Shapiro (eds.), +   % .%%-;%%) *%'%*5.# 3  * 1\9P5 1O\O(   '  +   , % 2% %, 2436. Berkeley: Berkeley Linguistics Society. Chung, Sandra and Alan Timberlake 1985 Tense, aspect, and mood. In: Timothy Shopen (ed.),  ,*3 &*'*%% &%(/222> //%$%3

  % :, 202258. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Churchward, C. Maxwell 1953 , // . London: Oxford University Press.

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Clark, Herbert H. and Eve V. Clark 1977 +**  > - 2% % % +*%. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Comrie, Bernard 1976 -&%. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Connolly, John H. 2004 The question of discourse representation in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and MarJ-& &E & (eds.), -04- %%  .% // , 89116 (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Craig, Colette Grinevald 1977 ,'% % %. Austin: University of Texas Press. Cruse, David Alan 1986 :'/%. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Denning, Keith and Suzanne Kemmer (eds.) 1990 =>'%G %&( # ( Stanford: Stanford University Press. Dik, Simon C. 1997 , , *  .% // ( + % 2> , '% %   % $ (Functional Grammar Series 20.) Second, revised edition. Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Dixon, Robert M.W. 1982 G -%-% H=% "*'/% '*%:. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Ervin-Tripp, Susan 1972 On sociolinguistic rules: Alternation and co-occurrence. In: John J. Gumperz and Dell Hymes (eds.),  %'%>% "% &*  $//%, 213250. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Escribano, JosD6  &E & this vol. On noun phrase structure in F(D)G: Some conceptual issues. Farsi, A.A. 1968 Classification of adjectives.   18: 4560. Fortescue, Michael 2004 The complementarity of the process and pattern interpretations of Functional Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzieand MarJ-& GonzE &"! --04- %%  .% // , 151 178 (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Frajzyngier, Zygmunt 1977 The plural in Chadic. In: Paul Newman and Roxana Ma Newman (eds.), +&   $ %, 3756. Leiden: AfrikaStudiecentrum.



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Grammaticalization of number: from demonstratives to nominal and verbal plural. %,*&* 1-2: 193242. Frege, Gottlob 1983 & %. Function und Begriff (Nachdruck). In: Karel Berka and Lothar Kreiser, 3,:%(//% %-4   %   /  , 6382. (dritte, erweiterte Auflage unter Mitarbeit von S. Gottwald und W. Stelzner). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. First published 1891. Fries, Peter H. 1985 Towards a discussion of the ordering of adjectives in the English noun phrase. In: Benjamin F. Elson (ed.),  #+ 3 &%>+&  %ZP%-  *%'// 23 %%%%1O"*+ /%. Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 2005 $%:%=% ;>%+ /%'%*5$% $//%. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Greenberg, Joseph H. 1966 Some universals of grammar with particular reference to the order of meaningful elements. In: Joseph H. Greenberg (ed.), I    (2nd edition), 73113. [Reprinted in Denning and Kemmer (eds.), 4070.] Cambridge: The MIT Press. Halliday, Michael Alexander Kirkwood 2004 - 2% % % .% // (third edition, revised by Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen). London: Arnold.

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Hawkins, John A. 1983 G  =  I . (Quantitative Analyses of Linguistic Structure.) New York: Academic Press. Hendrick, Randall 2005 Tongan determiners and semantic composition.  81-4: 907 926. Hengeveld, Kees 1990 The hierarchical structure of utterances. In: Jan Nuyts, A. Machtelt Bolkestein and Co Vet (eds.), * & %% , *>.%4, 123. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 1992 03 # + %>, *5,*&*5 *. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 1998 Terms and propositions. Paper read at the"%2% %$3    .% // (ICFG8), Free University Amsterdam, 8 July 1998. 2004a The architecture of a Functional Discourse Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar J- &  &E & "! - - 04 - %3 %    .% // , 121. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2004b Epilogue. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and MarJ-& &E & (eds.), - 04 - %%    .% // , 365378. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2005 Dynamic expression in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Casper de Groot and Kees Hengeveld (eds.), ; &*%% ":&   .% // , 5386. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. this vol. Prototypical and non-prototypical noun phrases in FDG. Hengeveld, Kees and J. Lachlan Mackenzie 2005 Interpersonal functions, representational categories, and syntactic templates in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Mar J- &GonzE & ! >- 6  43& "! - '%  .%   // , 927. Bern: Peter Lang. 2006 Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Keith Brown (ed.), "*& %5 2nd Edition, Vol. 4, 668676. Oxford: Elsevier. Hengeveld, Kees and Jan Rijkhoff 2005 Mundari as a flexible language. %,*&* 9-3: 406431. Hengeveld Kees, Jan Rijkhoff and Anna Siewierska 2004 Parts-of-speech systems and word order.  % 40-3: 527570. Hetzron, Robert 1978 On the relative order of adjectives. In: Hansjakob Seiler (ed.), 3   > +&   / % $  % // 3



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#C$5  /* =%#  <\5 1O[Q, 165184. T<ngen: Narr. Heusinger, Klaus von 2002a Specificity and definiteness in sentence and discourse structure.  '/% 19: 209211. 2002b The cross-linguistic implementations of specificity. In: K. Jaszczolt and Ken Turner (eds.)5;% $% %( Volume 2, 405421. (Pragmatics and Beyond NS 100.) Amsterdam: Benjamins. Huang, Chu-Ren and Kathleen Ahrens 2003 Individuals, kinds and events: Classifier coercion of nouns. 3 ' 25: 353373. Jurafsky, Daniel 1996 Universal tendencies in the semantics of the diminutive.  72-3: 533578. Kamp, Hans 2004 Specific-indefinites and anchored logical form. Paper presented at Copenhagen Determination Symposium, Copenhagen Business School (Denmark), 26 August 2004. Karttunen, Lauri 1976 Discourse referents. In: James D. McCawley (ed.), 0%  / % % I  , 363387. (Syntax and Semantics 7.) New York: Academic Press. Keizer, Evelien 2004 Term structure in FG: A modest proposal. G +& .3 % // 78. this vol. Reference and ascription in FDG: An inventory of problems and some possible solutions. Koptjevskaja-Tamm, Maria 2002 Adnominal possession in the European languages: form and function. '& %*&I   (STUF) 552: 141172. 2003 A woman of sin, a man of duty, and a hell of a mess: non-determiner genitives in Swedish. In: Frans Plank (ed.), 0+ '% %  %   " &, 515558. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Kroon, Caroline 1995  + %%>'%* nam, enim, autem, vero at. Amsterdam: Gieben. Kutsch Lojenga, Constance 1994 0%>$% 3'a . KP (KP-

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Lee, K. 1975   // . Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii. Lefebvre, Claire 1998 Multifunctionality and variation among grammars: The case of the determiner in Haitian and in Fongbe.  +$   13-1: 93150. Lefebvre, Claire and Anne-Marie Brousseau 2002 - // .#. (Mouton Grammar Library 25.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Levi, Judith N. 1973 Where do all those other adjectives come from? Papers from the ninth regional meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society, April 13 15. In: Claudia Corum, T. Cedric Smith-Stark and Ann Weiser (eds.), K , %  0  2Y , % 4 0( +&   / % O%  ;%  % $ % '%*5 -&  1<1Z51O[<, 332345. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society. Levinson, Stephen C. 1987 + /%. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. First published 1983. Malinowski, Bronislaw 1923 The problem of meaning in primitive language. In: C. Ogden and I. Richards (eds.), , ;;>'%*%2   & ,%   % '  '*/#/, 296 336. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. Martin Laura 1998 Irrealis constructions in Mocho (Mayan). -% & 3 % 402: 198213. Merlan, Francisca 1976 Noun incorporation and discourse reference in Modern Nahuatl. 2% % -/ % 42-3: 177191. Miner, Kenneth L. 1986 Noun stripping and loose incorporation in Zuni. 2% % 3 -/ % 52-3: 242254. 1989 A note on noun stripping. 2% %    -/  3 % 55: 4767. Mithun, Marianne 1984 The evolution of noun incorporation.  60-4: 847894. 1988 Lexical categories and the evolution of number marking. In: Michael Hammond and Michael Noonan (eds.), , % ; &*> -&& ; %, 211234. New York: Academic Press.



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Newman Paul 1990 0/   # + %*  $. (Publications in African Languages and Linguistics 12.) Dordrecht: Foris. Ney, J.W. 1982 The order of adjectives and adverbs in English. . /%/ 6: 217257. 1983 Optionality and choice in the selection of order of adjectives in English.  % 23: 94128. Quirk, Randolph, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech and Jan Svartvik 1985 - $/&  //   % " . London: Longman. Roberts, John R. 1990 Modality in Amele and other Papuan languages.  3 % 26: 363401. Rijkhoff, Jan 1988 A typology of operators. G  +&   .% //

29. 1998 Bystander deixis. In: Yaron Matras (ed.), , / "/%  03'%  '&, 5167. (Sondersprachenforschung 3.) Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. 2002 , 0 + . (Oxford Studies in Typology and Theoretical Linguistics.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2004 Iconic and non-iconic word order patterns: on symmetry in the NP and counter examples to Universal 20. In: Henk Aertsen, Mike Hannay and Rod Lyall (eds(@5G , +>-.% % (  ; , 169180. Amsterdam: Free University, Faculty of Arts. fc. a Descriptive and discourse-referential modifiers in a layered model of the noun phrase.% 46-4 (2008). fc. b On flexible and rigid nouns (and verbs). To appear in '%  . Rijkhoff, Jan and Johanna Seibt 2005 Mood, definiteness and specificity: A linguistic and a philosophical account of their similarities and differences. '&   , %   '&   32: 85132. [http://ojs.statsbiblioteket.dk/index.php/tfs/index] Sadock, Jerrold M. and Arnold M. Zwicky 1985 Speech act distinctions in syntax. In: Timothy Shopen (ed.), 3 ,*&*'*%% &%(/2>$'% 3 % 5155196. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Searle, John 1978 Literal meaning. " % 13: 207224.

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Sichelschmidt, Lorenz 1986 Optionality and choice in the analysis of adjective order: comments on Ney. '%% 40-2: 135148. Seiler, Hansjakob 1978 Determination: A functional dimension for interlanguage comparison. In: Hansjakob Seiler (ed.),  I > +&   / % $  % // #C$5  /* =%#  <\5 1O[Q, 301328. T<#(BSmith, John Charles 2004 An analysis of Romance  !% -5! ,1th Penn Linguistics Colloquium, 27-29 February 2004, Department of Linguistics, University of Pennsylvania PA, USA. Staden, Miriam van 2000 Tidore: A linguistic description of a language of the North Moluccas. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Leiden. Stokes, Bronwyn 1982 A description of Nyigina, a language of the West Kimberley, Western Australia. Ph.D. dissertation, Australian National University. Stroomer Harry 1987 - $/& % '%*, '% = /%*> +*5; &*# *. (Cushitic Language Studies 6.) Hamburg: Buske. Tomasello, Michael 2003 $% %  > - I3) , *   -B%. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press. Traugott, Elizabeth Closs and Richard B. Dasher 2001  %*  '/% $. (Cambridge Studies in Linguistics 97.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ungerer, Friedrich and Hans-JP# ! 1997 -2% %%$%%( London/New York: Longman. Vries, Lourens de 2005 Towards a typology of tail-head linkage in Papuan languages. '%  29-2: 363384. Van Valin, Robert D., Jr. and Randy J. LaPolla 1997 '*%:( '% % 5 ;  .%. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wechsler, Stephen 2005 Weighing in on scales: A reply to Goldberg and Jackendoff. 3  81-2: 465473.



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Wilkins, David P. 2000 Ants, ancestors and medicine: A semantic and pragmatic account of classifier constructions in Arrernte (Central Australia). In: Gunter Senft (ed.), '*%/0/$%, 147216. (Language, Culture and Cognition 4.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



$        +   

    ! " #

       1 The F(D)G account of noun phrase (NP) senses rests crucially on the concepts of  #, & % , and &. Yet, the status of F(D)G variables and operators is problematic, and extant F(D)G pronouncements on their scope as well as that of other constituents of the underlying structure of NPs are contradictory. To a great extent this is because the F(D)G theory of construction is vague. Correspondingly, surface NP syntax largely rests on /% %* (DI), & :/%* (HP), and &, which, in the FG version, yield only weak predictions. The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to such shortcomings, diagnose their causes, relate them to wider issues of ontology, semantics, and syntactic theory, and extract the relevant consequences in the area of NP structure and interpretation. Although inevitably critical, the paper is meant as a sympathetic outsider     F(D)G programme, and its ultimate aim is therapeutic. Hence, along with careful critical discussion of term structures and their surface consequences, some suggestions will be offered that might yield a more coherent and elegant account without abandoning any of the constitutive assumptions of F(D)G. It must be emphasized, though, that the article remains basically critical-therapeutic: it is just a well-meaning outsider     ! F(D)G scholars to clarify certain aspects of their account of NPs. It is not an alternative full F(D)G theory of NPs (e.g., no attempt is made to decide which operators, core types, or types of satellites are appropriate, etc.), nor a plea for any competing version of F(D)G. The suggestions that accompany critical discussion below are not incompatible with any deep F(D)G principle, but they do diverge from current F(D)G doctrine and, to the extent that they amount to a significant strengthening of its key principles, make the theory more vulnerable to empirical refutation. On methodological grounds, this is as it should be, and, with respect to Indo-European languages like English, the empirical consequences are favourable, but

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whether such a strengthening is desirable in view of the facts F(D)G has collected about Language in general is a different matter well beyond the scope of this article or its author  -.   ! ##stions below, in sum, are offered in good faith and for what they may be worth. It remains for F(D)G scholars themselves to decide whether building an alternative account of terms/NPs along such lines is wise and suits their overall research strategy or not. %   Current F(D)G term representations have become very heterogeneous as to the nature of the information they represent (which results from merging different analytical levels), and they are packed with variables whose import is not always clear, cf. Escribano (2004b). Of course, some are straightforward: for example, every semanticist will understand why the representation of a quantified NP contains a variable, and, to the extent that any NP can pick out different extralinguistic entities, why it carries a variable ranging over possible referents, although whether sense and reference should be represented in a single formula is, of course, a moot point (cf. Keizer this volume). Yet, what some other F(D)G variables are doing at the representational level is more difficult to understand. For example, why should all lexical predicates carry variables? Apparently, the idea of endowing lexical predicates with variables first appeared in Dik (1989: 50) and was developed in Keizer (1991, 1992) and Hengeveld (1992a), cf. Dik (1997a: 55 footnote). However, although considering every predicate as the specific value of a predicate variable may be appropriate in a representation of the speech act as a set of action choices available to the speaker, such variables can hardly play any role in a formula that intends to capture the  of an NP, where lexical items, by definition, must have replaced such variables. The same applies to the variables that lexical items receive in current FDG for a different reason, i.e., B categories with semantic import. As Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2006: 673) put it, .    / that ontological categories are reflected in the language system, they have the status of semantic categories, each of which is provided with its own variable-2 Hence, every lexical item (and every NP, etc.) is entitled to carry both a Dikkian variable and one of Hengeveld and Mackenzie  of course, those two among many others, since there are many other analytical perspectives (e.g., to the extent that it consists of a phonological form, it might carry a phonological variable; if it plays a discourse role, it



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may be endowed with a discourse-functional variable; to the degree that it stands for an entity of the psychological world, it may carry a Psych-W variable, etc.). However, it would be absurd to try to integrate all those heterogeneous variables along with predicates, arguments, and #  variables3 (if any are needed) into, say, a representation of the sense of terms as reflected at the representational level so the basic point is: which variables, if any, do play a role in the computation of the NP  se and its intrinsic referential potential?4 It seems that this essential question has been somewhat lost sight of in recent F(D)G work, and the result is very heterogeneous  esentations in which most variables are doing no work at all but, on the contrary, creating confusion in the formalism and its interpretation. It may be necessary, therefore, a. to recall the nature and role of variables in general b. to clarify the variables that figure in current F(D)G representations, and c. to distinguish those that are appropriate to sense representations from those that belong to other analytical levels. Since this article is meant as a small contribution towards a better F(D)G account of NP semantics and syntax, only variables involved in the computation of the sense of terms will be discussed here in some detail, but the issues that arise apply to F(D)G variables in general, and the Ockhamian reasoning deployed here has multiple consequences at clause and other levels which will be tacitly invoked but not discussed in depth.

2.1. Why variables? To place the issues in perspective, it is convenient to start by asking whether, and why, term representations should contain variables at all. For natural language semanticists, the source of variables is the standard logical treatment of elementary quantification, in which first-order variables are introduced, bound by quantifiers, to replace awkward conjunctive statements with appropriate generalizations. In predicate logic formulae like (x) [P1(x)_ 5n(x)]  Q(x), for example, the (presumed) !%dual variable /  !$ iversal quantifier  and saturates the open position of the first-order predicates P15n, and Q. That argument position is supposed to be exactly the same as is alternatively satisfied by the referent of an ordinary name like  in  /, represented by the

120

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constant O' rmula like S(j). Hence, the variable /!    O '  % -occur. Yet, on a little reflection, / %$!'''  j  ntent, for whereas O ! ' ' $ '!!%!     determined partly by linguistic convention (in English,  is the name of a male, etc.) and partly through use in an appropriate discourse context, / stands only for a strange entity whose ontological status metaphysicians have been discussing, inconclusively, for over two thousand years, and which suffices to saturate a predicate only to the extent that it is  ! by a quantifier. Predicate Logic quantifiers, in their turn, are analyzed, after Frege, as second-order predicates that apply to structures like P(x) and express existential statements like 5"/ ! '    / 5"/ ! '   x-5 Under such an analysis, whereas a sentence like & contains two semantically relevant constituents coextensive with the linguist  anonical NP and VP, one like '/ %% & has no semantic constituent to match the NP / %%. This consequence, which has always seemed counterintuitive to grammarians, is justified to the extent that it accounts for the strange properties of /%% under negation, i.e., the puzzling non-contradictoriness of '/%%&/%3 %%&or -%%%&5#%/. An ordinary proper name like 5on the contrary5 being well-behaved under negation, cf. R &  ?@  % &, can be directly represented as an individual constant O'   35"O!`5"O!  %ariable at the representational level. Admittedly, most NPs are not like proper names. When terms are expressed by phrases with a common noun as head and perhaps one or more modifiers, as in %%  4 , if the right truth conditions and entailments are to follow, it is necessary to lay bare the intensional contribution of their various constituents. In the simplest cases, such phrases are constituted by monadic predicates ( 5 %5  5  5 4  , etc.)6 and, of course, predicates need subjects, so the question arises what the subject of such predicates is, an issue that entails determining what is a possible subject or predicate, i.e., choosing an ontology7 and struggling with rather complex metaphysical problems, cf. Strawson (1959). Playing on the safe side metaphysics-wise, early philosophical semantics assumed an austere ontology containing only individuals, according to which only extensional individuals could be subjects and the only predicates were first-order predicates. Russell  ")*^V   $ ' !' !e-



=0+% % .?@ >'/&%

121

scriptions, for example, would represent the meaning of lexically complex NPs like % %       4   as a conjunction of first-order predications upon a  O %!!$ !ividual%iable /  !$ ?'" -     a variable does intervene in the logical form of definite NPs. Obviously, /      # O   y by empiricist standards, but convenient in that it left the smallest possible unanalysed residue and allowed for a straightforward representation of the truth conditions introduced by the internal constituents of complex NPs. Yet, the ontological status of the !%! % / !emains, far from clear. Under some metaphysical interpretations, e.g., Locke  "7)W*^8 1997: 268-276) or Wittgenstein  "[1918] 1922: 2.021, 2.024, 2.0131), if %%  4  is represented by a formula including the string (...x)  (x) &  (x) & ,(x)..., the variable /  ! %  !' 3! '    rties !      $ icist standards on precisely those grounds. On the other hand, interpreting /    

" cluster of necessarily concurrent properties of an entity) is unwarranted, since in such a formula the 

  $  (x) is one of the predicates of /   t be a constituent of /- .   $ # alternative, apparently (cf. Loux 2002: 96-138), is to interpret / ding to the !  eory of individuals. Yet, under a !   $/ must stand either for the bundle or for a selected subset of the bundle, and, in either case, insurmountable logical problems arise: If / ! '   bundle in ...P(x) & Q(x) etc., where properties like P and Q are themselves constituents of the bundle, P(x), Q(x) etc., become tautological or downright inconsistent; if, on the contrary, / ! '    ' !  each of P(x), Q(x) etc., may well be informative, but, then, by definition, the content of / %ious clauses P(x), Q(x), etc. that are supposed to characterize an individual cannot be unified, and the bundle-theoretic definition of individual identity disintegrates. To put it simply, P, Q, etc., are in that case being predicated of different particulars and the formula is no longer a representation of any consistent bundle. The status of such !%! %      ! any of the major metaphysical theories of individuals on the market, but one thing seems clear: if we grant, for the sake of argument, that /3  out !-specified individuals"   $  '! nder-specified "& substratum theorists) cannot be synonymous with property-less, for /       $ !%!      #$ that has long been far richer. Hence, / %   to be, must

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minimally consist of the ontological properties distinguishing individuals from other entities (events, properties, etc.), except existence, since that is what an existential quantifier contributes to such formulae. Although, somewhat surprisingly, the uncertain status of /     perceived as a flaw (to my knowledge), that early approach to the logical form of NPs soon proved to have other important limitations. For example, modifiers do not always receive intersective interpretations (e.g.,     is not an individual who is both good and a driver). Various attempts were made in the literature to handle such cases without abandoning an austere first-order ontology. A popular one consisted in increasing the adicity of  to introduce a hidden argument, i.e., saying that  really means # !' !% # ! !% # - %  $  patch would not work for cases like  /4* or modal NPs like  &%%%/ , and eventually semanticists had to assume higher-typed predicates, subjects that were themselves properties, and a much richer ontology. Correspondingly, it became technically possible to quantify over properties (cf. natural language expressions like ,%/% & & %%%%5 %2*, etc() via formulae like P [P(i)  P(j)], (where P = a property and i, j individuals), and property variables became appropriate in such cases of quantification. Otherwise, the usual computational machinery suffices: second-order predicates combine with first-order predicate subjects in exactly the same way first-order predicates like & combine with first-order arguments like  to yield  &5 i.e., both cases reduce to % &&3 %C/&%.8 Thus,   , itself a first-order predicate (type <e, t>), is the result of a second-order predicate  (type <<e, t>, <e, t >>) being functionally composed with a first-order predicate   (type <e, t>) (cf. Partee 1995, Heim and Kratzer 1998: 68-73). Informally, predicates like  just need  bjects 3   in such cases, and the resulting predicate   will in its turn saturate an appropriate determiner of type <<e, t> e> to yield a name of type e (= individual), but neither the individual variable / $  %   $$   utation of such senses. In other words, higher-order properties and their  O  esented, but nothing else need be. A linguist like Dik (1997a: 133-136, 149-150) might surely object that such logical representations of complex NPs, even if they capture their bare truth-conditional aspects, are just too poorly structured to do justice to the way semantic composition operates to yield senses in natural language. For example, there is plenty of empirical evidence (e.g., from standard constituency tests like =-anaphora, Ellipsis, Coordination, etc.) that, in



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cases of multiple modification, the modifiers of natural languages are not just added one after another, as suggested by the '  O%' ulae of predicate logic, but stacked, or even attached to different hierarchically organized invisible heads within the NP (cf. Cinque 1994 and work in Cinque ed. 2002). Thus, the four modifiers in #%% 2   modify not the head noun, but different expansions thereof, i.e., minimally (more structure may be involved), if the lowest modifier modifies the noun  , the next higher one modifies 2 , etc., and, depending on which modifiers and operators (functional categories, etc.) intervene, the higher heads may, but need not, be of the same semantic type. This is absolutely correct, and further types are surely involved, but that need not entail new variables in term representations. The semantic ontology did not long remain austerely limited to individuals and properties. Another early influential enrichment was Davidson ")*W+ !  '%  orated on in Parsons (1990) and subsequent work, to capture entailments among predicates of different adicity sharing homonymous heads. Of course, predication and quantification over events9 did require a new event variable 10 and new semantic types for events, predicates of events, and events as modified in various ways, although Davidson  '   O%   ' %  ignore the hierarchical organization of natural language VPs, where arguments and modifiers appear at different layers of structure and affect different heads and different types of entities.11 Thus, constructing Logical Forms to mirror the way expressions are compositionally built in natural languages surely entails allowing for recursion of entities within entities, properties within properties, events within events,12 etc., and accepting a rich type system, a fact acknowledged in all major linguistic approaches, including F(D)G,13 but representing stacking and recursion does not require any new variables in the internal structure of sense representations, which, as argued below, reduces to functional application/composition of thorder predicates and their arguments. In sum: as semanticists have attempted to capture more subtle aspects of the sense of NPs in natural languages, the ontology has expanded to include properties/sets, events, etc., with their own properties, recursion, etc., but variables remain necessary to compute senses only to the extent quantification is involved, if at all, and play no role otherwise. The rule of thumb is just this: symbols can only be compositionally computed if they stand for entities belonging to homogeneous ontological domains (sounds, inscriptions, actions, speech acts, senses, etc.), and, by definition, if the value of a variable symbol is computed in a formula, the variable cannot be so

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computed, which makes it redundant at whatever analytical level is involved.

2.2. Variables in F(D)G term structures The original term formulae in Dik (1978: 16, 57) and subsequent FG work down to Dik (1997a: 160 footnote 1) are obviously inspired by the standard Fregean-Russellian treatment of quantification, i.e., an FG term is a structure x: (x): (x): (x), where /  ! "'- ) by a set of grammatical operators  and  !$  'onadic firstorder predicates : : .14 Although FG terms do not quite have the properties of predicate logic ones (cf. Dik 1989: 117-118), term variables raise the same issues discussed above with reference to the status of !ividual "! % %           -specific problems that have remained unsolved, if not unnoticed.15 In this section, an attempt will be made to identify them and diagnose their causes. First, the variable /  !! by Dik at the core of FG terms is problematic, and for the same reasons the logicians!%! %   were. Dik (1989: 55, 115-118; 1997a: 136) presents it as a first-order variable picking out individuals, but such a statement immediately clashes with his other assumptions. Observe that if /   !%!  %  expressions denoting individuals should be freely substitutable for it, but, of course, that is incorrect (no expression denoting an individual may replace /   erm formula), as well as being incompatible with the FG view (e.g., Keizer 1991; Dik 1997a: 131; 1997b: 11) that only terms refer to individuals. The term-variable /    !' !%!  in the FG sense any more than it can pick out individuals in the logicians representations. Dik himself (1989: 126; 1997a: 148) observes that ' llows from the definition of      !ividuals cannot be restricted  /     ! $         !'  ' it stands for an individual.16 Dik !!   ";3)**+()@*  the effect that in the case of terms structures, ntity  !!  ! as $  '!'!$ ! nstruction  $   that it is not !ividuals         " : /  !   figure as saturating their open position). But if / !     ! '   individual, what do FG operators bind, and what saturates the open position of restrictors? Dik (1989: 122, 171 footnote 8; 1997a: 140, footnote 10) alternatively analyses individuals as singleton sets, but that does not rescue /   '-standing theoretical entity: if /$ !'  -



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member set (intensionally: a property), then, type-wise, /   ! nguishable in such cases from the property variable '  #  % sets. One of them at least is otiose, or, rather, both are (cf.  ). The problem does not seem to have been clearly perceived, but the early status of /   % ! ?       FG scholars, for, since then, they have tended to deprive it of its original referential import, to add to the NP new discourse-functional, referential, or pragmatic variables (#a'-:O3 '' 1992, 2002, :2#% !  3 and to keep /   nverting it into a ! % %   gmatic %    # $! '   - :O3 '' ",^^,( ,,+-229; 2004; this volume) and other recent F(D)G writings distinguish within their underlying NP structures the ! % $ " :O3 '')**, 2002 i.e., Quality, Quantity, and Location, four in Rijkhoff this volume, by implication more in Keizer 2004, Mackenzie 2004, and Hengeveld this volume, cf.  ) from a higher !    $ !  rsonal level in Hengeveld  3"'- M  this volume). Correspondingly, aside from the term variable /' $ !B5 dditional variable, #a:Okhoff ",^^,  'B5 !    or :2#% !  &  ' rsonal level.17 Of course, something equivalent to a referential variable is still necessary if NPs are to be referentially usable, but not in the representations of the sense of NPs (cf. Escribano 2004b and Keizer this volume). Dik / of course, figured in such representations because it was meant to serve a double (representational and referential) purpose, although for the reasons described it cannot play the former role well. If a new a %  ccounts for the NP  'ntial potential, then /    !! $ justified, perhaps as a variable standing for linguistic entities (= senses). However, if / !   % / $  

   as with the logicians!;3 /       % -!  same holds if /  !    # ;3 !  #  expressions bind variables, to capture the fact that the NP corresponds to the speaker   '    /

  " ! '  % ones) to refer to a certain referent (cf. Rijkhoff 2002: 229). Anyway, treating /      $    %  !  NP-choice variable is simply incoherent. In sum, Dik  # % / #   and inconsistent, and to the extent it remains in formulae down to the latest F(D)G approaches to term structure (e.g. Hengeveld this volume; Rijkhoff this volume), the original inconsistencies remain unsolved. An early proposal to sever /'  ' '  ' ! Rijkhoff ")**,()*)!  !ferent%  -

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In the mature form of that proposal, cf. Rijkhoff (2002: 227-229), the term variable /       #ferential, a function now entrusted to a-0 !  /'     ations: in some passages (e.g., Rijkhoff 2002: 229) it ranges over the set of NPs available to the speaker as descriptions of the referent, whereas elsewhere (Rijkhoff 2002: 228) /    !   ! '   3! '   !'    /

! B5 via lexical or grammatical restrictors.18 However, the term variable /  ltaneously a    $ !  B5-choice variable, unless by B5   understood just the sense of an NP. On the contrary, what a speaker uses to refer to a referent is not the sense of an NP, but the NP %% %, i.e., a linguistic NP and its sense are categorially different things; if NPs BNPs (i.e., linguistic expressions in their full individuality) are particulars used by speakers to refer to entities of the world of discourse (or their mental correlates), the entities in the range of   /    ities from a different ontological domain. However, even if    /   O     %     xactly the same problems the logicians!;3 / !(:O3 '' / (and similarly, Hengeveld !K&   terally stand either for the sense of an entire NP or for a zero-sense entity. It cannot pick out full NP senses, which obviously cannot replace /   O '!icates expressed by nouns and their modifiers (i.e., the sense of an NP like % #%   2   cannot become the  O '  , 2, etc.), and it cannot stand for zero sense, either, for, if it does, by definition it cannot denote anything at all, and in that case nothing is bound by the operators or saturates the open position of the restrictors, and the whole term structure collapses. Observe that, in virtue of the correlation [zero intension] <> {universal extension}, a strictly property-less /  !3 out the whole Universe of Discourse (call it W for   ! -- %ything in W. However, in Rijkhoff (2002), as in F(D)G generally, the world contains much more than individuals, e.g., properties, events, predications, possible facts, speech acts, locations, times, manners, and what not (cf. Mackenzie 2004; Hengeveld this volume; Hengeveld and Mackenzie fc.), so, clearly, /nnot range over the set W, either. Under present F(D)G ontology, /"' !!/   !   '   have some content, but by no means that of a full NP: as stated above with reference to the metaphysician     imally /   3  entities with the ontological features that distinguish individuals from the rest of the ontology,19 whatever they are, and no matter what its content is, as the underlying structure of an NP is gradually built, its value must be



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!! "'- ;3 )**+( )V^ !  ). The result is that, finally, the various tokens of the term variable pick out sets that cannot be unified, which makes any conjunctive representation incoherent.20 Hengeveld      esentational structure of NPs still keep Dik  B5-internal    / %  " atively  '  event-denoting nouns, ' '   $-denoting ones, etc., cf. Hengeveld 2004: 372; Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 674, Hengeveld this volume, Hengeveld and Mackenzie, fc.) as the  O #  "

 $ complex) nominal head plus its optional modifiers. In other words, still essentially Dik  $  -.  cture proposed for the referential subact in Hengeveld (2004: 372), in particular, is (:1: [/1 ['1: LexemeN (f1) : "'1))] (x1): "/1))] (R1): ":1)).21 However, on careful inspection, certain differences emerge: whereas in Dik  

%       / straightforwardly saturated the open predicates of the restrictor and all the satellites, and thus contributed in a transparent way to the determination of the NP   !  !'   "  #   caveats expressed above), Hengeveld /" '-!    rate the head nominal in that formula, it is not an argument of the Lexeme, and it is unclear how it can be an argument of the whole head structure ['1: Lexeme N (f1): "'1))], which is already internally quantified and fully saturated. A parallel problem arises at the higher level, where the loosely added referential variable R1 is bound by a referential operator :1 (irrelevant here) and restricted by a saturated NP [/1 ['1: Lexeme N (f1) :  "'1))] (x1): "/1))] and a modifier ":1), but, again, although R1 is an argument of  nclear how it can fit into the argument-structure of the saturated nominal. On the other hand, it seems implausible to claim that both N and the NP each take two arguments of different ontological types or even domains, i.e., in the case of N, a property ('"--  !!%dual (the value of small /! in the case of the NP, an individual (but hardly the same individual) and a speech act R. The problem has not been solved even in Hengeveld         "2#% !    volume), where a head noun like   or an adjective like %% in % %%  each carry two arguments, an 'i%  !$  level operator and the term variable /i !$  # x xi operator. Such difficulties are ignored in Hengeveld pproach, and variables are treated as if they could be freely added to previously saturated structures, but the price to pay is high:    / " ' -  $        compositional derivation of sense and reference potential, and, correspondingly, :  !!!  bel to the NP, but nothing in the sense or

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reference of the NP constrains its range. Thus, the correspondence among sense, reference, and use becomes essentially arbitrary. Perhaps as a reaction to criticism in Escribano (2004b), Rijkhoff (this volume) has now removed some of the variables in Rijkhoff (2002), including all (tokens of) '%   ! " 3  '  / but one. If I do not misunderstand his proposal, in his new term formula   /esents * the (full) term variable, and stands for the referent of the NP (a discourse entity/its mental representation), but, contrary to traditional FG practice, unexpectedly occurs only once per term, at the very core, next to the noun. Obviously, this avoids one of my criticisms of Dik  and Hengeveld    ( '  $   3 '      / %    used, its value, whatever it is, will be unique, and the overall structure of the term will not become inconsistent on account of different tokens of / representing different sets or sense entities. However, if    /     term variable and stands for the referent, its placement in the core of the term structure, as an argument of the bare noun, is inexplicable, for it is not the noun &  that denotes the referent. In that case,   /  ! at the top of the representational formula, i.e., where # a    Rijkhoff ",^^,ccount.22 As shown, the tension provoked by the Janus-like status of Dik  #inal term variable has not yet been satisfactorily resolved within F(D)G. The fluctuation between Dik  2#% !  ! :O3 ''  %  '   /   ";    ## #  '$ concept of ference !        ' !     ! B5 choice, etc. That variables should proliferate in term representations, thus, is unsurprising, for in recent F(D)G work several non-isomorphic ontological spheres are invoked whose mutual relations need to be made more precise, i.e.: 1. The extra-mental world(s) endlessly shifting along the dimension of Time (Phys-W  '  ! $ 

!     evant in F(D)G (cf. Dik 1997a: 129; Mackenzie 2004; Hengeveld and Mackenzie fc.). 2. The different psychological world(s) of Speaker and Addressee (Psych-W  '!  $  !! !  ' reference (cf. Dik 1989: 113, 140; 1997a: 129; Keizer 1991: 1; Rijkhoff 2002: 27, 336; Mackenzie 2004: 973, etc.). 3. The transitory discourse-generated world(s) successively negotiated by S and A at particular stages of discourse and, again, different from each other, and obviously distinct from the Phys-W ! Psych-W  '!"; -W  '-



=0+% % .?@ >'/&%

4. 5.

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The speech-act world (Sp-Act-W, hereafter), constituted by S, A, their referential and ascriptive acts, time, place, etc. And, finally, The intralinguistic (! %   !  '     "6#-W  hereafter), which also differ across speakers (and are bound to differ for each individual speaker along the time dimension, although linguists tend to dismiss changes of sense occurring within short spans of time as irrelevant).23

Thus, clarifying the nature of F(D)G denotation/reference and the ontological domain over which each of the various F(D)G variables ranges should contribute to understanding which should be kept and which removed from the term formulae of the representational level. Let   ! this briefly. Starting with the variables attached at the top of NPs, Hengeveld  : apparently ranges over events in Sp-Act-W (acts of reference). As to the classical term variable / '' $'    '5 $ W, and individuals from Psych-W (or Psych-W as linguistically construed) is what Dik /   :O3 '' a pposed to be bound by, cf. Dik (1997a: 129),24 Rijkhoff (2002: 336), and Keizer (this volume, on ntal extension sets- :O3 ''  ",^^, # a %   3  out individuals from Disc-W,25 in principle distinct from Psych-W(s), although, obviously, Disc-W and Psych-W may overlap (e.g., in internal monologue), and Disc-W(s) will be internally represented for both S and A. Hengeveld B5% /"!  !/:O3 '' 2002) cannot range over '     #a!    is no reason to take it to range over      B5/ssion does not reduce to its sense. If it is interpreted as a sense variable comparable to '!  /"/ #  %B5-senses), it is a Ling-W entity; otherwise it could range over events of Phys-W (physical NP occurrences, in whatever medium, i.e., sounds, inscriptions) or entities of some other   !Q !  ' $%-rther down, in the ! % $  "; %    !!  range over Ling-W entities (cf. Hengeveld this volume; Keizer this volume). Rijkhoff  ",^^,    / !     3  $ #  5 $ W(s) or Disc-W(s), and is said to belong to the descriptive dimension of the term, which suggests that it stands for a   --$ '  Ling-W, like the th-order properties over which his ' %   #- Yet, Rijkhoff also says that    / 3     egions with minimal properties (2002: 228, fn. 19, 229), and in that case it must be a referent in Phys-W, an ontological domain that FG traditionally considers

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irrelevant, and the     !         '    /    /   :O3 ''  ",^^, ccount cannot be reconciled. Significantly, in Rijkhoff (this volume), which contains a revised version of term structure, /  !  !'  ferent of the NP, presumably a Disc-W entity as psychologically represented in virtue of the nature of linguistic construction. However, under that interpretation, why / ssociated with the core layer, a purely ! % $    said. In sum: it is necessary to clarify the ontological domain of /!  other variables in F(D)G term representations, which means no less than deciding what kind of semantics F(D)G wants, perhaps a long-term enterprise, although, in my view, only immanentist theories will eventually be capable of accounting for what happens in natural languages. However, the immediate problem with all extant F(D)G proposals concerning the underlying structure of NPs is not just that the variables range over heterogeneous domains, relevant at different analytical levels, and clutter representations (cf. Escribano 2004b; Keizer this volume), but the fact that the logical architecture of the formulae makes even those variables that should play a role in the computation of senses ornamental (cf.  ). As a consequence, the NP sense that must help the speaker assign a value to #a!3 the NP suitable to play the R role in a speech act does not result from the intensional value of the various tokens of    / ' - via simple inheritance or any explicit compositional operation. In other words, even & / relevant sense variables play no role in the computation of the intension of the NP, nor in the determination of its referential value or range of use in speech situations, which must be stipulated by extracompositional means.

2.3. Multiple variables/variable-tokens and the unification/update issue Let us now turn to a different aspect of the problem of FG variables. The structure of a term like (1), represented in (2), contains several variables or variable tokens whose mutual relations also need clarification. I illustrate the problem with Dik  # % /  !''   arise with alternative  %  !   % '%   at the head N, its expansions, and its satellites, that remain in Rijkhoff  Keizer !2#% ! and Mackenzie   -



(1) (2)

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,% 4%% /-/% /( dprox3xi: studentN (xi): newA (xi): {(d1xj: AmsterdamN)Source (xi)}

According to Dik (1997b: 30) the relation between the various instances of /     '     aphoric "!( /      %  and has the same index value throughout), and he even introduces an anaphoric operator  3      icuous. That assumption faithfully echoes the logicians !!% ' ndividual%iable / ! 

!  %         ;3    $ ' dynamically constructed terms (cf. Dik 1997b: 31). Indeed, Dik (1989: 116-119) had long before clearly stated that the structure of a term like (1) does not resolve into the simple conjunction of clauses that constitutes its predicate logic representation. The difference is that natural language restrictors are stacked, the construction of terms being a step-wise process (Dik speaks of !$      .L '26 whose effect is that restrictors previously attached constrain possible subjects and the predicability of subsequent restrictors, cf. Dik (1989: 116119, 127-128; 1997a: 150; 1997b: 31-33, 37). In fact, that is what the order of the predicates separated by (   ! /

 ' rmulae.27 This, of course, has immediate consequences for the value of the possibly various occurrence(s) of the term variable /-;3")**+()@* is very clear in this respect: 0   '  $  ! be understood as $  '!'!$ !    and, discussing the predicability of new restrictors, Dik (1997a: 150) adds: . 

 '! $   !$ '   '  eries of restrictors placed on a term as construed so far which determines the predicability of the next restrictor in the series-G'      $ consistent with his idea of dynamic term construction, but it has a consequence that Dik apparently did not notice: each successive occurrence of the /%  ! ' !''"#! $! #  '  i.e., it is a different variable. Which sets are represented by each variable is not entirely clear, though. Interpreting Dik  %     ements on the structure of terms and the relative scope of operators and restrictors (cf. Dik 1989: 127128, 138, 308; Dik 1997a: 132ff.; Dik 1997b: 23; cf. also Keizer 1991: 6, fn. 4) is tricky, for they are contradictory and the FG theory of scope is too vague (cf.  ), but, if operators are themselves stacked (Dik 1989: 308)28 and restrictors (including the head noun, cf. Dik 1997a: 151) are attached in the order implied by the ( ation, what Dik ' ulae claim about the structure of a term like (2) might be more perspicuously represented as

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in our preliminary tree (3), left-to-right order irrelevant, and paraphrased as in (4) (parallel to Dik     '  / %%  *3 &%, cf. Dik 1997a: 161). (3)

(4)

Term [d prox 3xi: studentN (xi) : newA (xi) : {(d1xj: Amsterdam N) Source (xi) }]  xi {(d1xj: Amsterdam N) Source(xi)  }  xi newA (xi)  xi studentN (xi)   d ?  prox ?  3 xi , 3& % %% %%545 / -/% /(

 Observe, though, that in that case an inconsistency arises, i.e., the variable xi can hardly remain identical to itself throughout the stepwise derivation, or the effects of stacking will be vacuous. At the bottom of tree (3), xi would presumably stand for the universe of discourse (Psych-W, in Dik  work), or the subset of ! '! !%!uals  - 2 % ' the operator %  applies, trios of such entities (whatever they are) are denoted; after the operator % applies, trios of such entities near the speaker are denoted; after the definite operator applies, discourse/contextrelevant proximate trios of such entities are denoted, etc. The first restrictor, the head noun %%5 will then restrict that set of contextually relevant proximate trios of individual entities in Psych-W to relevant proximate trios of students, then the second restrictor, 45will restrict that set to that of trios of 4 %%, and  / -/% /5 in its turn, will restrict the resulting set, etc., until no further modifiers remain. In other words, the range of referents of the presumed term variable xi must be pdated      nstruction of the term proceeds. If the variable at the top represents the set to which the full term is intended to refer, the lower /



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variables will stand for different supersets thereof which cannot be unified with it or among themselves. Thus,& Dik, the relation between occurrences of /  !!$  ction. The same difficulty arises if   / ! % esumably is in Rijkhoff (2002): assuming it is not a &   %iable, after all, but has some content, the lowest /  !'    '!enotations in Ling-W, i.e., type /   !specified individuals" opposition to properties, events and other kinds of entities), but as    x 

 $     #ument of N and of Quantity and Location satellites (cf. Rijkhoff 1992: 191; 2002: 228), it, too, must be pdated  ''  ' 3# %  Yet, obviously, if   / !!!$ ' ations, the effect is devastating: the formula ceases to be a coherent description of an individual or set (for the same reason a metaphysician !    to be a bundle if / ! ' !''    '    ' ndle). Of course, what holds of small / !  '   !#"   variables, and ultimately of all variables that recur in stacked modification structures within NPs, VP 5    -.      the earliest FG theory of terms, and, at bottom, a consequence of the ontological incoherence of / ! !!  $       ' individuals, remains unsolved in all later F(D)G analyses (e.g., Keizer 2004; Keizer this volume; Hengeveld 2004; Hengeveld this volume; Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 674) except Rijkhoff (this volume), where occurrences of the term variable / !    #  if that single occurrence is attached to the core noun, it will not pick out the referent of the full term, but a superset thereof, i.e., all individuals of the type specified by the head noun.

2.4. The variable-binding issue As argued above, in formulae of the representational component there is no reason to add variables unless they have to be quantified over, and they are not quantified over when the predicates that carry them are saturated by appropriate arguments, so it is unclear why variables should figure, along with items that express their values, in F(D)G representations. However, to stick to FG   

   '  %   3  ': nbach  # %iables, as Dik (1997a: 54 footnote) says, variables must be bound by operators term-internally,29 and this is not always the case in

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  ! " #

current F(D)G term formulae. On the contrary, multiple variable-binding violations arise. To start at the bottom, the f %   

!     ! ! satellites (1-n) of Rijkhoff  ",^^,( ,,+-229) formulae raise a !# problem, for they are not bound by any operator (assuming that the 1, 2a, and 2b operators cannot simultaneously bind x ! '    #ically disparate categories, a reasonable assumption). Although Rijkhoff (2002: 227-228, and fn. 18) treats Quality satellites as being of a higher type than the rest (i.e., second-order, in the basic case) and has them take the value of the 'i%  'B  # nbound variable 'i '  !B O % $ !60: if the nominal predicate is to project its properties in a compositional way to its higher expansions, the result at L1 must be the fusion of the two predicates (N, Quality satellite). Even if the variable of the satellite is !scharged   ! by the sense of the head N, the ' %  '          bound by an operator, and there is no other operator. This part of the problem is not solved in Rijkhoff (this volume), where the ' %   % been dispensed with in the higher layers, but the ' %  '     noun remains, and remains unbound, cf. Rijkhoff '  "@VFurther binding violations arise with Rijkhoff ",^^,/!a(' occurrences of / ! a  !  ! "# ring the implications of STC, cf. & ) as tokens of the same variables, respectively, as the representation suggests, biuniqueness issues arise, i.e., / ! a   ! by more than one operator each, an impossible configuration under standard views on operator-variable relations; if, on the contrary, /!a are cover symbols for sets of different variables with !!ations, as STC entails, then either each operator can bind several different variables, an offending configuration, or some variables remain unbound. The problem persists in recent work like Hengeveld (2004: 372), Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2006: 673-674), Hengeveld and Mackenzie (fc.). In Hengeveld (2004), for example, the Quality operator '1 must bind the '1%   /B 

 !#   !  '1 %iable at the modifier  remains unbound, and the same applies to the higher operators /1 and :1 with respect to the pairs of variables of type /)! :1    !  !  !'  '   %   levels. This problem is not solved in Rijkhoff "  % % !'%tier model of terms, where operators no longer bind the term variable that survives at the core noun. Rijkhoff proposes, instead, to analyze operators as predicates taking the remainder of their respective layers as their argument, a solution I approve of (cf. Escribano 2004b, 2006), but still: that



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leaves the surviving /%iable of the noun as unbound as the surviving '% :O3 '' ' rmula (45). Needless to say, the variable-binding problem becomes more acute the more articulate the internal structure of terms grows. Keizer (2004: 15-16) reasonably recalls that, since nouns may denote entities of different order (zero, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th), we must expect arguments and modifiers of different  %  "K& ,^^@( )1-   term, I suggest, is just different  rders $    %    # $    ' (at least) the levels Rijkhoff (2002, this volume) postulates (in fact, rather more), no term can have more than one type of variable at its core, i.e., a term may denote an individual, or an event, or a speech act, etc., but not several of such entities at various structural levels; the parallelism with clauses breaks down here. However, the point is that Keizer  pproach obviously multiplies the $  ' !  !  !'  ! !   present F(D)G approach, the number and types of the variables awaiting suitable operators to bind them. I leave to the interested reader the task of specifying how many variables will remain unbound under a more articulated NP structure like Keizer -

2.5. Summary on variables In short, leaving aside (as heterogeneous and intensionally irrelevant, in principle) big a" B5%  ! X' iate) and :%   e top of NPs, the variables that figure in the lower, ontologically homogeneous, layers of FG   esentational formulae (the ! % $          (  /   $ neither an ndividual &   %ble, and each complex term may well contain several   /%  "   !# $ %  %     ' #% - !''%lues, some, including Rijkhoff  "   %  # / %riable, inevitably unbound, as are some of the '%   :O3 ''",^^,   volume) and Hengeveld (this volume) introduce and Keizer  ",^^@    volume) implied higher-order sense variables. Furthermore, in principle, the results of stacking under the stepwise construction of the term cannot be computed if variables are not pdated!  $ !   other hand, the formulae become inconsistent if they are, as they no longer represent the intended entity. As a consequence, current F(D)G term representations are ultimately incoherent and fail to capture the compositional relations between different elements of term-structure or their respective

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contribution to the determination of sense, reference and pragmatic adequacy. This is a serious flaw, for once the status of variables is shown to be questionable, everything else in the F(D)G representation of terms is, i.e., it is unclear what operators bind, what restrictors restrict, or how senses are assembled and reference compositionally determined. 4 $   Another major aspect of F(D)G term representations is the set of  ators-M ! $ 3#    !$ # ?ifiers, cf. Dik (1989: 137, fn. 1; 1997a: 160 fn. 1), but, under close inspection, they are rather unlike them, after all. As stated above, standard predicate logic quantifiers are formula-level constituents, explicitly take scope over restrictors containing unique unbound variables, and (vacuous quantification ignored) bind them. The syntactic and semantic function and scope of FG operators, on the contrary, is rather less clear, which casts further doubt on the soundness of the FG formalism. The first difference between logical quantifiers and FG term operators is that, as Dik himself observes (1989: 149; 1997a: 168), term operators are not sentence-level constituents, but NP-level ones. Strictly speaking, therefore, Frege   $   ' ?'         FG, and the semantic quirks of / etc. must ultimately be captured under a modifier analysis (e.g., that of Montague 1974 or Generalized Quantifier Theory; cf. Barwise and Cooper 1981). However, what is specially disturbing about the nature of FG operators is that, as shown directly, it is often unclear how they fit into term structures, whether they must have restrictors in their scope, whether they must bind variables (for variables are often unbound, as shown), and, if they must, whether they bind only one variable or are expected to bind more, even of different ontological types and domains, as implicit in current F(D)G formulae (cf. & ). Therefore, the conceptual problems surrounding variables and operators intertwine and boost each other. Dik presents term operators primarily as elements of abstract term structure, but does not clearly define either their semantic function or their syntactic structure with respect to their operands in the structure of terms/NPs, respectively. In general, an FG operator is a grammatical function applying to an  ! $ !?% "'-;3)*1*(,**-300), but it is clear that Dik did not consider operators #  predicates, since they are not assumed to take arguments and are not listed in the Fund, cf. Dik



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(1997a: 160-161). Apparently, in Dik   eory, they are '  " imately: predicates) applying to the term variable /    /   %iously operated on by lower operators (cf. Dik 1989: 308; Keizer 1991: 6), as suggested in our structure (3) above, or of / %  $ !'! by both lower operators and lower restrictors, under Dik ")**+ layered account of terms. Of course, if operators are indeed abstract features, we need not expect them to surface as free forms with identifiable syntactic functions (i.e., they can as well be realized as morphological or lexical features on the head noun), but in English and similar languages most do have overt exponents, and archetypal ones are discrete determiners or quantifiers in surface syntax, i.e., under the F(D)G analysis of NPs, noun dependents of some sort in the syntax. Rijkhoff (2002: 99) calls them #mmatical modifiers in opposition to  /   !'iers "Z    ! 2#% ! and Mackenzie (2006: 671) further add that what makes them different from other functional features is that they are non-relational (i.e., monadic) predicates, an analysis shared by Rijkhoff (this volume), where each operator takes the next lower layer of structure as its argument. To my knowledge, Rijkhoff          far, but also a major departure from traditional FG doctrine on term operators. It definitely distinguishes them from logical ones, makes them modifiers, and of course entails that they cannot bind variables. As a consequence, either the variables are removed (as claimed in Escribano 2004b and here), or they will remain unbound, and Rijkhoff removes most of them, although not all, cf. & .30 However, that is not the standard FG view of term operators. If we consider what has been written on term operators since Dik (1989), their broad role as #   !'       $'  $   on  !'$"--  $/!    -0;3  #  at least two different views co-exist:31 a. In his formulae, and even more explicitly in his occasional paraphrases thereof, e.g., Dik (1989: 315-316; 1997a: 62, 161; 1997b: 23, etc.), operators operate on the term-variable before any restrictors (not even the head!) apply, which strictly corresponds to the derivation (3) above. However, Dik  '' %   ( b. Operators are distributed in  hierarchical layers, with those at any one layer taking scope over operators and satellites at lower layers, cf. Dik (1989: 138), Dik (1997a: 161).

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The problem, of course, is that no single standard derivation, as represented by a graph structure, can satisfy both (a) and (b), so it is necessary to make a choice and adapt formulae to their paraphrases and graphic representations. Structure (3) above, in particular, satisfies clause (a) but violates (b). To satisfy clause (b), the structure of a term like (2) should be like (5). The layered representation (5), in the spirit of Dik ")*1*(V^)U1rlier parallel analysis of layered clause structure, corresponds to what is taken to be the intended view in Dik (1997a: 161), and is approximately the analysis of terms assumed in current F(D)G work like Rijkhoff (2002: 218228, 238, 314, 337, 341-343), Hengeveld (2004: 372), Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2006: 671), Keizer (2004), Hengeveld and Mackenzie (fc.), and Rijkhoff (this volume), except in what concerns the number of layers, which varies somewhat (five, in Rijkhoff     Kzer 2004). (5)

d

Term [dprox3 xi: studentN (xi) : newA (xi) : {(d1xj: AmsterdamN) Source (xi)  }]32 (xi)

? {(d1xj: Amsterdam N) Source (xi) } (who came earlier, above mentioned)

prox (xi) ? {(d1xj: Amsterdam N) Source (xi)  }  3 xi newA(xi)  xi ? {(d1xj: Amsterdam N) Source (xi)  }  studentN (xi)  xi The conflict between (a) and (b) arises because, unfortunately, Dik  formulae are vague as to the structure of operators and were not revised in Dik (1997a, 1997b) to match his new layered account of terms. The vagueness is due to the lack of explicit indications as to how operators fit into terms. Observe that whereas the hierarchical structure of restrictors is clearly defined by (/ !  '  !   ctors contribute to the semantics of the term and their scope, cf. Dik (1997a: 62), operators are not separated by colons in term formulae, but juxtaposed. In Dik (1997a: 181), the term formula for %%  # is



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still (6), but all (6) suggests is that all the operators apply to /' $ of the restrictors does, as in derivation (3) above. Since Dik also says elsewhere (Dik 1989: 308) that operators are stacked and take scope over each other, in derivation (3) they have been hierarchically ordered, but as a matter of fact no hierarchical ordering follows from term formulae.33 The same ambiguity remains in the schematic formula of underlying term structure that Dik (1997a: 163) offers, i.e., exactly (7), which, again, suggests that the higher operators (all except Quality) apply to the variable / "   complex predicate?; observe that in (7) only Quant has a variable) before the restrictors do, i.e., essentially still clause (a) and derivation (3) above, rather than clause (b) and derivation (5). (6) (7)

(d prox 3 xi: # [N]:  [A]) 2 -Loc 2 - Quant x : [ 1 - Qual pred [N] (args)]

Thus, even if Dik  ")**+( )W) % ight as to operators 3#   over the whole term is ignored as inconsistent with his pronouncements elsewhere, FG term formulae, his own paraphrases thereof, and the layered view of terms do not quite match in what concerns what operators operate on or modify, and substantial ambiguity remains. Adopting clause (b) raises another problem: The '   ' yers in all current F(D)G term structures is inconsistent with STC and entails that operators and satellites of the same layer have each other in their scope, which, in its turn, causes an argument-binding violation.34 The first point should be obvious: if STC holds, layers containing more than two constituents, say an operator, a head and a satellite, just cannot be '  and nothing prevents multiple satellites (or even multiple operators) within any given layer. As to the second point, Rijkhoff (p.c.) rejects it and prefers to say that operators and satellites of the same level Ln take the same argument (Layer Ln-1), as he claims in Rijkhoff (this volume). Yet, it is unclear how two constituents of the same structural layer that contract predicate-argument relations with a third constituent can fail to take scope over each other. If A is an argument of P1, where P1 is, say, an operator, P1 and A must be constructed with each other, and must be in each other  scope (i.e., sisters); if a second predicate P2  say, a satellite  also takes A (and not [P1+A]) as its argument, then P2 must also be constructed with A, and a sister to A. Hence A is eventually constructed with both P1 and P2, and, since    '  %  5)!5,   sters, and therefore in each other   -2 (D)G   !   not mean what       #ic and all other kinds of linguis-

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tics,35 or operators and satellites of the same layer are indeed in each other   -G'  (D)G     !itive relation, or just not be based on      $  !36 an asymmetric relation, but in that case F(D)G scope should be carefully stated and regulated, or constituent ordering predictions based on it will be untestable, cf. section 4  . However, nothing in the F(D)G literature suggests that      ething different in F(D)G from what it means in all other major theoretical approaches in the field. As stated, the problem also has an argument-binding side: A constituent cannot, in general, be simultaneously an argument of two predicates P1 and P2. This is a standard assumption in most linguistic approaches that take semantics seriously. The relevant constraint has different names in various theories (.% IB, in Bresnan  6/     mmar, the ,% $ %  in Chomskyan Principles and Parameters Theory/Minimalist Grammar, etc.) but the basic idea is very simple and can be stated in theory-neutral terms: argumenthood is a functional concept, and functions must yield a unique value; hence, as soon as an argument receives a context-dependent semantic role (Zero, Experiencer, etc.) from a predicate P1, it cannot receive a second semantic role from a second predicate P2. It follows that if a layer Li is an argument of the satellite, it cannot simultaneously be an argument of the operator, and vice-versa.37 The other worrying respect in which F(D)G term operators differ from standard logical ones is that, under either Dik ")*1*)**+ :O3 ''  (2002) account, whenever a term contains a different number of operators and variables, either the variables must be multiply bound, a non-standard property of variables, or operators need not bind variables, a non-standard property of operators. This is the case in both (3), and (5) above, but the technical problem is different depending on how variable occurrences are interpreted. If different occurrences of / "' -  !   tokens of the same variable, the variable is usually multiply bound (assuming operators are operators and must bind a variable) and the resulting structure is incoherent; on the contrary, if they are taken to stand for different variables, some of them may remain unbound, along with all variables (e.g., '-'   (D)G term formulae simply do not provide operators, cf. & . Under Rijkhoff's (2002: 228) analysis, for example, the lower operators )! ,! ! /i%  3  but the variable, like Dik  

! !    '  #  and ends up multiply bound. On the contrary, as stated, the '%   ' Rijkhoff's (2002) formulae are all unbound unless his operators can each bind two variables of different ontological types (i.e. '!/ c-



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tively), an uncanonical assumption. Even in more recent work like Hengeveld (2004), the operators '/: ch bind two variables corresponding to non-identical sets (i.e., ' B /% -'  modifier, /  !% -/  !'!' :  head vs. :    '   !'-38 As to Rijkhoff  % !  model (Rijkhoff this volume), only two variables remain (/!'  core N), and they are both unbound. Such problems result from a) the heterogeneous content of term formulae and consequent proliferation of extraneous variables in them, and b) their layered, but weakly integrated, architecture. Within current F(D)G assumptions, the obvious way out of the vacuous quantification pitfall is to further refine the hierarchical structure of terms, distinguish more layers with variables denoting intermediate entities (sets, ensembles, restricted sets, quantified restricted sets, etc.), and allow each such layer to contain its own operator binding its own variable, i.e., to expand current analyses like Keizer (2004) or Rijkhoff (2002, this volume) by adding new binary branching layers as determined by STC. Since, as argued here, different occurrences of / "' -  !     ! '  !''   (i.e., they are technically different variables), adjusting layers to STC will surely leave variables unbound. To get them bound may seem trivially easy at first sight: FDG might simply introduce, beside  variables, exactly  (ad hoc) operators to biuniquely bind them. However, even if the additional operators can be justified within a richer type system, enforcing biuniqueness in operatorvariable relations will not of itself yield an integrated term structure that can be compositionally computed. The problem, in a nutshell, is this: to the extent it could be maintained, Dik   %iable / !    %  that held the various semantic elements of the term together, but once / is shown to stand for different sets, the glue that held terms together vanishes, and it is necessary to replace it with something. Piling up perfectly canonical layers of operators, correctly bound variables, etc. on top of each other does not help, for such layers contain predications with respect to different objects (sets), and no integrated structure results whose sense can be compositionally calculated. If the current strategy is pursued, FDG will have to develop some other device to hold the various constituents of term structure together as parts of a unified semantic representation of some entity or set of entities. In sum, the real issue, at bottom, is that the computation of sense (and reference potential) cannot be compositionally done as Dik assumed, so some other means is needed, but piling up parallel and carefully symmetri-

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cal layers of structure on top of one another or even endowing each of them with related variables and operators, predicates and arguments, satellites and heads, etc. will not make the slightest difference. What is needed, instead, is a more closely integrated representation of terms and a compositional mechanism that monotonically calculates the intensional contribution of the various heads and modifiers involved. One way to achieve that, of course, is to treat current F(D)G term operators as one-place functions (i.e., predicates) directly taking distinct layers of the term as their argument, with no variables involved, as proposed in Escribano (2004b) and Rijkhoff (this volume), although, obviously, such a strategy represents a significant departure from FG tradition, with wide-ranging implications at other levels (clauses, etc.). 3 &' ( #"  8 8( 8 8   

4.1. Current '  $  %    ';3  . Construction To the extent each layer Ln of term structure contains one (or more) operators ( n1       "Z 6n-1), and possibly one or more satellites (n1,..), an additional conceptual objection to current F(D)G doctrine is simply that such multiple branching abstract structures cannot even be built unless Dik  ant idea of     ction".L'-;3 1997a: 134-136; 1997b: 31ff, 37) is abandoned. According to STC, not only operators, but also satellites, cannot just be flatly added as sisters to previous structure, but must be stacked bottom-up in the order in which each makes its semantic contribution to the term.39 Dik .L!% properly crystallized into an explicit FG principle, although it plays an important role in all his discussions and paraphrases of how the sense of terms is built and interpreted, but in my view he underestimated its importance, for, if STC is observed, drastic consequences follow, e.g., only binary-branching structures can be derived, functional uniqueness follows, new operators and restrictors automatically acquire asymmetric scope40 over previously attached ones, and, by definition, the structural depth (i.e., the number of construction stages) of a term representation built out of  constituents is = 31.41 In the case at hand, of course, STC leaves -ary branching layers out of the question. Observe that, if only two term constituents intervene (i.e., operator and core,42 or core and satellite), no problem arises, but if the



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elements to be constructed into a given layer are a core, an operator, and a satellite (the prototypical case under current F(D)G analyses of intra-layer constituency), STC requires two of them to be attached to each other first, i.e., either [Op+Core], or [Core+Sat] (left-to-right order irrelevant) must first become a new constituent, and the third element (Sat, Op, respectively) must wait until the next constructive operation allows it to get attached to the new core, i.e., under STC *[Op+Core+Sat] is an unreachable output; possible outcomes are either [[Op+Core]+Sat] or [Op+[Core+Sat]]. To my knowledge, the STC idea has never been explicitly abandoned in FG, but, in practice, Dik himself ignored it in his analysis of clauses and NPs, and all subsequent work on term and NP structure (e.g., the current layered theory) has been flagrantly inconsistent with it. I take it, then, that STC is no longer, %, a principle of F(D)G, but this is an unfortunate accident, for if only the implications of STC are systematically extracted, there follows a much more explicit and semantically well motivated account of construction, constituency, domains, layers, scope, and surface constituent order. Also, given STC, current F(D)G principles like / 2% %* (DI, hereafter) and  + :/%* (HP, hereafter) can be strengthened, particularly as to their hierarchical importance,43 many apparent violations of DI and HP are avoided, their systematic exceptions explained, and better empirical predictions follow. Even more, not only DI and HP, but also other descriptively useful, but non-categorical and only approximately accurate FG    3 2 =  5   = 3  5$% &%= %%, and the core cases of 2 $/&:3 %*, cf. Dik (1997a: 399-401) become redundant, since they follow as consequences of more general principles, systematic exceptions to them can be explained, and the resulting structures make the conceptual problems above easier to solve. On the contrary, if STC is ignored, as has unfortunately occurred in FG, given  constituents, possible outcomes of construction multiply, constituents that are necessary at both the semantic and the syntactic level are not constructed, only loosely integrated domains like NP and Clause tend to be considered, constituent ordering possibilities and DI and/or HP violations proliferate, scope between constituents is symmetric where, under asymmetric scope, predictions would improve, etc. The negative consequences affect all aspects of semantics and syntax, including constituent order at surface structure, and cast unnecessary doubts on the standard (and, indeed, optimal) view that expression rules must operate subject to Iconicity on underlying semantic representations, cf. Rijkhoff (2002: 226, 253, 337338, etc.).

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4.2. Nice consequences of strengthening key F(D)G syntactic concepts Unfortunately, although the concepts and constructive operations % used in F(D)G do not differ significantly from those in other major and explicitly formalized linguistic theories, what exactly happens when two elements A and B are constructed into a bigger element C has never been carefully discussed in the F(D)G literature, to my knowledge, and the result is an informal view of $% %and loose concepts of/5 and'&which negatively affect the nature of the principles that F(D)G can formulate (preference rules) and unnecessarily weaken their empirical predictions. Such formal details, simply, have not attracted much attention in F(D)G, but it is necessary to work them out, or rather it is a pity not to, so I will here, in a more constructive vein than in the preceding sections, try to spell out, in terms as theory-neutral as possible, what Dik .L! really entails given F(D)G    

   !  $    # !! and must be reinstated to the place of honour it deserves among F(D)G principles. We must start with the concept of $% %. Needless to say, when A and B are here said to yield [A+B] the symbol \  ! $  convenient indication of the existence of a construction (dependence, etc.; a theory-neutral term intended) between A and B. As a matter of fact, the construction of A and B can hardly reduce to a set-theoretic operation like the sum (or the product) of A and B (& Chomsky 2005; cf. Escribano 2005b). Rather, all linguistic theories explicitly or tacitly agree that A must be functionally integrated into the structure of B (or  ), and it is so integrated to the extent it   ' M   $? "  $neutral terms intended; read % $ #      features -- Fnder various names, what everybody sees occurring in cases of Construction corresponds to the intuitive idea of   'ction ' functional properties of various kinds (adicity, semantic role, inflection, etc.). Roughly, A may be constructed with B mainly for one of three reasons: 1) to satisfy B !$"-#-M  / $? # of a certain type and assigns to it a certain semantic role, but that argument remains unsatisfied, i.e., valueless, until A is attached to B); 2) to satisfy one of its own functional attributes, e.g., if A is a referring term, it will be interpretable only if it receives a semantic role, so a valued semantic role feature is inherently expected, but the value of that feature44 (Agent, Beneficiary, Zero,emains unspecified until A is constructed with some head B; and, depending on how morphology is handled, another reason may be 3) to license A  M '   'atures (e.g., a NP in the Nominative,



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Accusative, etc., or a verb form carrying certain inflections, fit only in construction with certain other heads or dependents, etc.), cf. Escribano (2005b). When appropriate items come to be in construction with each other, their respective requirements are satisfied, and the resulting structure '  together and becomes fully interpretable in exactly the sense in which an algebraic formula can be fully evaluated only when all its variable symbols have been valued. Again, terminology varies greatly, some theories will say that construction rests on '    '     #ement -     '      '!   #    shared by everybody, as far as I know. I try to use the terms that seem more theory-neutral and either in (tacit) use in F(D)G or not likely to be resisted by F(D)G scholars. See Escribano (2004a, 2005b) for details on what I really think happens. It is '%% that allows/drives the constructive process. Notice that if, say, B is fully satisfied, that is, functionally saturated for all its attributes (adicity, roles, etc.), there will be no functional slot available for (a feature of) A to fill into B, and A will simply not be constructible with B and will not be constructed with it. Observe, furthermore, that Satisfaction is a two-place relation, i.e., A satisfies B, not a 3- or -place relation (cf. *A satisfies B C), which entails that Satisfaction-based construction is inherently a binary process (like Dik  .L- 4   'ction, even multiple mutual Satisfaction, is allowed,45 but Satisfaction must be unidirectional or bi-directional, and involve just two participant structures A and B each time it occurs, although each participant may consist of a rich set of attribute value pairs. Crucially, it is not possible for A to satisfy both B and C, or vice-versa, for B and C to both satisfy A. The former case would violate functional uniqueness (in whatever respect, semantic, inflectional, etc., is relevant); as to the latter, Satisfaction will trigger two distinct constructive operations, and one will necessarily occur first. As a consequence, two of the three participants (say, B and A) will be constructed into a new object O, and C will eventually satisfy a feature of A or B only in the sense that all features of A and B will have become features of O, but, strictly speaking, C will be satisfying a feature of O at the point it is constructed with O. In the case of term structures, assuming participants to be Op(erator), Core, and Sat(ellite),46 Satisfaction (> STC) yields two possible outcomes: a) Op+[Core], and b) [Core]+Sat, where [Core] may correspond to either a) or b), i.e., successive Cores (1-    omatic adjustment of their senses and referent potential (in the direction of increasing inten-

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sion and decreasing extension). *Op+Sat, *Op+Op, *Sat+Sat, *Core+Core are all directly forbidden provided Ops and Sats are basically predicates (#  s, in the first case) and core segments are nominals functioning as their arguments, as assumed in F(D)G analyses like Rijkhoff  "   % - .   # % %!   vial: informally, a predicate needs an argument, and will not contract a Satisfaction relation with another predicate, so it will not be constructible/constructed with it;47 correspondingly, a Core nominal inside an NP functions as an argument (of Sats or Ops, cf. Escribano 2004a, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, and Rijkhoff this volume), and will not satisfy, or be satisfied by, another nominal.48 Furthermore, a natural, and stronger, concept of / immediately results: a !   O   bMc Msfaction relation, or, informally, a step of STC in which a successful Satisfaction relation is established, i.e., the noun with its first complement, or Corei and its Sat (e.g., AP, PP, Cl, etc.), form a '% /, and so do Op and its Corej (e.g., Determiner and Corek, Quantifier and Corel, etc.). On the other hand, a full NP structure is not a strong domain, since many items in a complex NP may be completely unrelated from a semantic and syntactic viewpoint (i.e., not in a Satisfaction relation). The advantage of such stronger domains is their strict cohesiveness, i.e., by definition, nothing may intervene between Op and its Core, or Core and its Sat. If a constituent X occurs between Core and its Sat, X must be constructed with either Core or Sat; if X is constructed with Core, [Core+X] will become accessible to Sat, but Core itself will not, and since [Core+X] will not be of the same ,*& as [Core] (if it is a possible type at all), even though it became accessible, it would not trigger construction with Sat under Satisfaction; correspondingly, if X is constructed with Sat, [Sat+X] will be accessible to Core, but Sat itself will not, and [Sat+X] will anyway not be the right type of predicate to combine with Core. Thus, (% )/2%3

%* follows automatically, and since eak (= FG !   %  recursive construction of strong domains, DI is redundant and need not be added to the theory at all. Similarly, a new concept of  relativized to different stages of construction (= Core) can be defined, with further consequences in the area of surface constituent order. In fact, STC already entails that the noun is the head of the NP only at the first stage of construction; as N is constructed with its own arguments, satellites, or operators, the Head (= Core) becomes a gradually expanding nominal phrase. It follows that at any stage S in a STC, the participants in construction are invariably a Core (acting as Head, in the revised sense) and just another element, Arg, Op or Sat. That re-



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moves the anomaly that Keizer (2004: 8) observes concerning the fact that only terms contain multiple restrictors, a problem not solved by just relabelling N as the only restrictor and the rest as satellites, as she proposes. If only Core and Op are involved, assuming that Ops are monadic predicates taking the Core as their only argument, Op cannot but be adjacent to Core, since arguments must be satisfied and, by assumption, Op has only one argument, cf. Rijkhoff (this volume). Observe, furthermore, that, since both Op and its Core now are head(s), HP automatically follows from Satisfaction in this case. If it is only Sat that is constructed with Core, as the ultimate heads of satellites may not be monadic, two cases must be distinguished. If Head(Sat)49 is monadic (e.g., an adjective like #%), it will only require its  O"ZL !2!" !O L  25 requires. Of course a monadic Sat may carry its own satellite (e.g., an adverb, as in :% /*#%), but in that case the internal satellite of Sat will never intervene between Core and its Sat. The reason is, again, Satisfaction as applied subject to +  %*, another common assumption across contemporary linguistic theories, i.e., in the broadest theory-neutral version, that attributes are satisfied in a certain order as a consequence of their 3 "  /

! $ %       -#-   ,/%   3 *. Of course, Priority is itself a corollary of the binary character of Satisfaction: if two features are to be satisfied, one must -0   hand, Core is an argument of Sat, and arguments of heads must generally be satisfied before the resulting phrase, in its turn, satisfies a satellite, or it will be too late to satisfy them at all, as the types of the head as modified by the satellite and its still unsatisfied argument would no longer match.50 Hence, Head(Sat)+Core will form a continuous constituent, and both DI and HP, again, follow directly. Now, if Head(Sat) is polyadic, in principle it would seem possible for a non-subject argument of Sat to be satisfied first and linearly intervene between Head(Sat) and Core, in violation of DI and HP, and yet, interestingly (in languages like English, Spanish, French, Italian, etc., at least) such cases never occur, cf. R &  5 R%##:5R##*4(cf. Escribano 2004a, 2005b). The reason is that an independently necessary additional principle with an  $ ' %  tervenes to control the correspondence between hierarchical position and linear precedence (i.e., a possible FG /

  principle!O     3  25%   -.  3  formulation of that principle is Kayne  ")**4)   $3

 -:/ (LCA, hereafter), which, in an informal, theory-neutral, version that

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FDG may easily adopt, says simply that if A has asymmetric scope over B, A precedes B. In conjunction with the type of construction defended here, LCA plays a crucial role in preserving HP in this case for reasons, again, related to Satisfaction. When a phrase (e.g., a Sat) is constructed with another (e.g., a Core), their respective internal heads may both previously have been constructed with arguments (typically) or satellites. As a consequence, if both the noun and its Sat initially had arguments to satisfy, their respective arguments must be adjacent to their heads and may separate Head(Core) from Head(Sat), in violation of HP. Yet, as stated, the Satisfaction of arguments is subject to priority, cf. Escribano (2004a, 2005a), and, in particular, subjects are always satisfied last, hence the open slot of Sat will always be the last argument of Head(Sat) to be satisfied. Since    STC ( ttom up !%       #   ' 6L    '  Core, being the subject of Sat, will always be hierarchically higher than other Sat arguments. It follows that Core will invariably take asymmetric scope over Head(Sat) and all Sat   er arguments, and that Core will precede Sat and all Sat     That reasoning predicts two possible orderings, i.e., Core+[Head(Sat) +Comp(Sat)], or Core+[Comp(Sat)+Head(Sat)]. In the second case, Comp(Sat) will intervene between Core and Head(Sat) and HP will still be violated. However, LCA applies systematically, to all phrases, and this has particularly nice empirical consequences in SVO languages like English:51 since Head(Sat) is itself hierarchically higher than, and takes asymmetric scope over, the constituents of Comp(Sat) (by definition, since it is a sister of Comp(Sat)), Head(Sat) itself precedes its own complement. In sum: Core precedes Head(Sat), and Head(Sat) precedes complement of Sat. The only possible configuration, then, is Core+[Head(Sat)+Comp(Sat)], i.e., Core precedes any Sat containing complements (PPs, Clauses, complex APs, etc.), and Head(Sat) is adjacent to Core, which, again, saves HP (under the definition of head = Core). This captures the true side of HP, but HP has systematic exceptions, and it is important to understand why sometimes HP just cannot hold. With  ! !    /  !     ' 25         bound to enter into conflict with the higher-ranking principle of Satisfaction. For example, the head of the Core nominal *  % & #/ can never be adjacent to the head of the Sat %*. & & in ?@ *  % & #/ %* .  & &, cf. R * %*  % & #/ .  & &, R  % & #/ * %* .  & &, R %* *  % & #/ . 



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& &, etc. The reason is that all such hypothetical possibilities violate Satisfaction under Priority and/or LCA once or more. For example, in the first case, the argument of * and the first argument of %* have not been constructed with their proper heads, and, of course, the attempt to satisfy HP between * and %* causes two HP violations elsewhere. In the second example, LCA is violated, since * has asymmetric scope over ?@%& #/ and should precede it, which will cause the systematic HP violation cited. Finally, in the third example, it is the complement of %* that has not been properly attached to its head, in violation of Priority and Satisfaction (plus HP elsewhere). Granted Satisfaction under Priority, the complement of %* should have been satisfied before its subject, not the converse, which yields the idiomatically correct solution (at the expense of a systematic violation of HP). However, HP is just what Satisfaction predicts when the participants are lexical heads, and when they are not, HP holds or not depending on other principles. In short, HP is not a  # &  t sometimes holds and sometimes systematically does not, but the crucial point is that, in either case, the right facts follow from the way the  !  general principles of Satisfaction, Priority, and the LCA interact. Thus, it is not necessary to add to the grammar such ordering preferences. As a matter of fact, much the same can be said of nearly all the other FG general ordering principles in e.g., Dik (1997a: 399-404). Why it is so should be obvious to the reader at this point, but let us briefly recall the trivial reasoning involved in the case of SVO languages; for SOV and VSO languages the reasoning is more complex, and depends on assumptions about displacement that F(D)G does not share, so they will be ignored here. 2=   depends on semantic function, which depends on Construction under Satisfaction, i.e., a constituent C will have function F with respect to another constituent C"-#-#    ator) to the extent it satisfies (arguments), or is satisfied (satellites), or both satisfies and is satisfied by (features of) C"   ! '   subject to Priority, which fixes stage of attachment to the construct (roughly: first arguments, if any, according to their prominence, then satellites, according to the types they select, then operators; same sequence applied to all participants in construction), and stage of attachment determines Scope, which, under LCA, in turn determines surface order. Similarly, $% &%= %% has two sides, one vertical, the other horizontal, or, informally speaking,  nion-like 3#     image ?#- .  '  % $ '   '    ! ' Construction under Satisfaction, which fixes the relative scope of dependents; the latter is an automatic consequence of the internal structure

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the latter is an automatic consequence of the internal structure of the dependents themselves, which follows from the same principles and the LCA as applied inside the dependents. Briefly, if a Sat (of whatever scope) is monadic, it will precede its Core and Head(Sat) will be at the right edge of Sat and closest to its subject (a case of HP above); if Head(Sat) is not monadic, Sat will follow its Core, which is its subject, has asymmetric scope over Head(Sat) and Comp(Sat), and, granted LCA, must precede them (i.e., in the case at hand, complex APs, PPs, and Clauses will follow the Core; monadic adjectives and participles will precede the Core and be adjacent to it). Finally, on the vertical axis, Op will be where its scope dictates (i.e., where Satisfaction licenses its construction with the Core), and, under the present analysis (cf. also Rijkhoff this volume), being a monadic predicate, it will always precede and be adjacent to the Core (HP) unless it is an affix and special morphological rules apply. As to 2 $/&:%* ( % %, another preference rule in FG, cf. Dik 1997a: 404), of course, insofar as it is a consequence of right-branching, it follows neatly: non-branching operators and satellites (monadic predicates) will precede the Core and all right-branching satellites will follow it. However, increasing complexity correlates with semantic weight and the need to add information, and to that extent it does not entirely follow from sheer geometry: if two or more APs, PPs, or Clauses, etc. concur, our principles predict only that all will be postnominal; whether one or the other linearly precedes depends on its relative scope. Of course scope is predictable, but there is no obvious correlation between scope and  #  Z   ' '  -    $llabic word may have widest scope (e.g., an article), and a longish clause may belong next to the head (a complement clause like %%/

*/ in %%%/

*/). Thus, it is not reasonable to expect LCA, etc. to predict Increasing Complexity in full. Finally, the orders due to + /%% also follow from Satisfaction and LCA if it is assumed that a constituent may have additional attributes to satisfy which may force it to participate in ' * $3 % % elsewhere. E.g., if a constituent C (with its semantic role, inflection, etc.) is additionally specified as Focus, Topic, (Subject), Relative, etc., the Satisfaction of such additional features may lead to processes of fronting, inversion, topicalization, extraposition, etc. of C (theory-neutral terminology intended). Incidentally, that constitutes the only violation of DI the present theory tolerates, i.e., systematic violations of DI due to !splacement" eory-neutral term intended) triggered by Satisfaction. Thus, why !     ntirely explicable: a constituent C marked



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as [D-F: Foc/Top], [Cl-F: Subj], [Cl-F: Rel],52 etc., is a Focus, Topic, Subject or Relator  '    constituent C " L    B5- L  equently, such features just may not be satisfiable until C     ' been built (recall that construction works bottom-up according to STC) and becomes available to C for the purposes of Satisfaction. Of course, the positions assigned to Focus, Subject, etc. may vary, and displacement may not be involved in all cases (or the features may be realized by morphological means subject to other rules), but in some languages topics, foci, etc. are syntactic constituents and displacement occurs. In English, for example, Topic, Subject, and certain types of Focus (WHInterrogative, Neg-Constituent Preposing, Adverb Preposing, etc.; theoryneutral versions intended) do involve fronting, whereas unmarked Focus is XP-final and does not. Can the present theory predict the position of Topic, Focus, Subject, etc. in English-like languages? Indeed: a constituent C marked as Topic, Focus, or Subject must satisfy its own attribute of topicality, focality, or subjecthood and also supply a value to the topic, focus or subject attribute of its clause, C           nvalued [A: v] pair [Top(C(S87 "L(S8-2 %$ L can be constructed with C L    # -branching structure, so C will immediately acquire asymmetric scope over everything inside C ! granted LCA, will precede it. Thus, in English, topics, subjects, and such foci will occur at the left edge of their clauses. Since Rel is also a clause feature, but one with wider scope than Subject, Focus, and Topic, a constituent marked [Cl-F: Rel] must attach to C #        consequence: XP[Rel] will immediately take asymmetric scope over everything inside C ! #! 6L ! L- .   !    ntirely correct, and the reasoning can be extended to account for comparable facts in many other languages. Other theories invoke metaphors like Copying, or Movement in such cases, and various other devices (Slash, Unification, etc.) are available in HPSG, LFG, Categorial Grammar, etc.). FDG must also provide some device to account for displacement phenomena, be it at the abstract level or in the expression module. I suggest that displacement must be a) a deep phenomenon, since it has semantic consequences, but b) with surface reflexes. As to how it should be conceived of, FDG will have its aesthetic preferences, but in my view the appropriate concept is just (secondary) Construction, i.e., ultimately Satisfaction. Finally, as to the technical details, my broad suggestion is that phonological material be muted % and realized in the Topic, Focus, or Subject slot, where it can satisfy the clause-level

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feature that supports the relevant semantic interpretation of the !  ! constituent. Needless to say, this is a very quick and schematic account of how semantic and syntactic computation work under Satisfaction, and empirical discussion is necessarily scarce and limited to SVO languages, but the essential point is this: Satisfaction, as specified, entails Dik .L!  theories, including F(D)G, assume that arguments are hierarchically ordered (= Priority, basic case), so all that it has been necessary to add to what F(D)G tacitly assumes is LCA, or an expression rule to that effect. In other words, an extremely simple and general machinery that comes for (almost) free to F(D)G will elegantly account for binary branching structure, the integrity of domains, predicability constraints, functional uniqueness, head update, correct scope relations, and correct surface order, including FG general ordering preferences, to the extent they are correct, as well as explanations for systematic exceptions to them. As to the semantic front, appropriate semantic types must be defined for heads, arguments, successively richer cores, satellites, and operators/modifiers, but F(D)G, like all theories, has to do that anyway. The advantages of this approach, on the other hand, are substantial: no variables are involved in sense representations, no variable-binding problems arise, no vacuous quantification results, different intensions are automatically assigned for each core nominal as well as the topmost NP, correct scope follows, and, crucially, the various levels of term construction will be functionally integrated in the strongest possible way,  predicate-argument relations, and the sense and reference potential of the term will be compositionally determinable. All that follows from STC (<Satisfaction) once it is properly spelled out as to what it presupposes and entails and its formal details are worked out; what has been done here is just to fill in the gaps and systematically extract the consequences of a particular interpretation of STC that is perfectly compatible with F(D)G doctrine in all essential respects, in my view. On the contrary, abandoning Dik  .L !   ! $  !     allowed F(D)G doctrines that cause, severe semantic and syntactic problems. I have already extensively referred to the former (cf. discussion of the inconsistency of variables, the variable-update issue, variable-binding problems, functional uniqueness, and general semantic disintegration above). As to the syntactic problems, of course, in languages like English, loose multiply branching structures are blatantly incompatible with the results of all standard syntactic tests (e.g., coordination, zeugma, substitution by proforms, anaphora, mobility, etc.), and adopting them simply amounts to



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giving up on a precise formulation and explanation of processes like coordination, substitution, anaphora, ellipsis, processes resting on asymmetric scope (binding of reflexives, interpretation of pronouns, etc.), predicability, the fine details of constituent order and its structural motivations, and explicit accounts of syntactic and semantic composition, in general. In the case at hand, the flat layers predicted inside F(D)G NPs do not correspond to the structure that standard tests indicate exists, and make rules like NPinternal Coordination, One-Pronominalization, or NP-internal Ellipsis (theory-neutral interpretations intended) unstatable, apart from obscuring the transparent iconic relation that exists between the adicity and selection properties of lexical predicates and their patterns of occurrence in NP structures. Arguing and illustrating all that in detail would entail repeating well known textbook level facts and require much more space than is available here, and, on the other hand, sadly, F(D)G is not overly concerned with surface constituency, so I will in closing refer only to an aspect of NP structure with which the fullest F(D)G account of NPs to date, Rijkhoff (2002), is deeply concerned, i.e., the surface order inside NPs. My main claim here will be that adopting DI, HP, and other standard FG principles unnecessarily diminishes the accuracy of the predictions that accounts like Rijkhoff ",^^,3 Cglish NPs.53

4.3. Unnecessary weakness of current F(D)G predictions on NP-internal surface order One of the crucial concepts in Rijkhoff    ' B5-internal order is /, which in turn supports / 2% %* (DI). Rijkhoff ",^^,( 248-253) domains coincide with NP and clause, but NPs are too big and loose structures. A single NP may contain multiple elements that bear no semantic or syntactic relation to each other, and as a consequence DI is violated more often than it would be if domain were equivalent to the set of constituents in a given unique relation of Satisfaction. Observe that even elements of the nucleus of an NP, like two arguments of the same N, do not contract any semantic or syntactic relations with each other. Hence even the strict   "   #         to constitute a useful domain for the purposes of, say, effectively constraining surface order. Of course, beyond the nucleus, the #  % nner: a determiner or a modifier and an argument of the noun are unlikely to have any connection whatsoever, and the same holds of quantifiers and

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relative clauses, modifiers of different levels, operators, etc. As a consequence of this loose concept of Domain, Rijkhoff, like Dik (1997a: 402), must state DI in a weak form, as another tendency, cf. Rijkhoff (2002: 250) and add stipulations such as that embedded domains ! heral and not intervene between A and N, for example. On the contrary, if our concept of domain above (= construction, based on Satisfaction) is adopted, DI is a categorical fact, although it need not be stated as a specific principle, since it follows from Satisfaction, and, in fact, the + & %* of embedded domains needs no special provision, either, as, to the extent they are descriptively correct, both follow from the way Satisfaction and LCA work, as shown above, cf. Escribano (2004a, 2005a) for details (within a different theoretical framework). As a consequence of his flat view of layers, Rijkhoff ",^^,(U)UU@W '& principle, another key factor in his account of NP-internal order, is also much too weak, unsurprisingly, since it is a structure-dependent relation and must rest on F(D)G 3% '   !!  -0 the version that applies to satellites (a particular case, presumably), Rijkhoff states it as follows: 4 !'  !    /      ' the expression that they have in their scope- .      moderate content54 when only one modifier is present, but the fact that modifier and modified will be adjacent follows from Satisfaction, anyway (recall that the modified is an argument of the modifier), and, if there are more modifiers, Rijkhoff  ecomes vacuous. Rijkhoff (2002) does not discuss adjective order, but, just as an exercise in theory-checking, think of a ' ] $ $! $'    like Sat1, Sat2, Sat3, and Core, e.g., % % 4. All four are in each other    "'- ! 

  & ), so Rijkhoff    !  nothing useful about their respective order. It is compatible with results like, say, R%  %45R %% 45R % % 45 R%4%  5 * 4% %, etc., as well as the desired % % 4.55 On the contrary, a process of construction under Satisfaction, as above, would enforce a binary branching structure, Sat1, Sat2, Sat3 and Core would contract asymmetric scope relations, and such ordering ambiguities would disappear, i.e., if, assuming delicate typing of adjectives, a structure [% +[%+[ +4]]]] results from lexical selection specifications and Satisfaction, clearly %  or % will never occur between e.g.  and 4, and, granted LCA, outputs like *%  4%or * 4% % will just never be generated. Observe that % has asymmetric scope over [ b4], and must precede them, just as %  has asymmetric scope over [%+[ b4]]



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and must precede them. In sum, there is much to be gained from adopting Satisfaction, strong Domain, and asymmetric Scope. The third crucial factor of Rijkhoff    ' B5-internal order is  + :/%*, which, again, Rijkhoff (2002: 263-264) formulates weakly, as just another tendency (cf. also Dik 1997b: 402; Rijkhoff 2002: 264-290). This may be descriptively useful, but is theoretically inadequate in two respects: First, it does not give HP its due, predicting many more HP violations than actually occur, and second, it does not explain why HP systematically does not hold in certain cases. The first point is obvious: if layers are flat, HP is bound to suffer multiple violations; for instance, if a noun is simply preceded (or followed) by two modifiers (two As, two Ops, an A and an Op, two PPs, two Rel Clauses, etc.) in the same layer, and the structure is '  4 !)\4 !,\BB\4 !,\4 !)-  ! ' one of the modifiers and N will always violate HP. On the contrary, if such a nominal is built under Satisfaction, the relativized concept of Head, strong Domains, asymmetric scope, etc., the structures will be binarybranching, e.g., [Mod1+[COREMod2+[COREN]]], [[COREMod2+[COREN]] +Mod1], or [[[COREN]+Mod2]+Mod1], etc., order subject to LCA, as above, the relevant heads Mod2 and Core and Mod1 and Core will always be adjacent, and no HP violation will arise.56 Other statements by Rijkhoff in relation to HP, i.e., that the head N is as close as possible to the head V of the clause, or his first HP-derived (negative) prediction that the preferred position of any adnominal modifier57 is not between the head noun and the head of the clause (Rijkhoff 2002: 263, 290), are also inaccurate/incomplete and inferior to what Satisfaction, Priority and LCA predict. Observe that, if correct, in SVO languages like English, NP objects carrying pre-modifiers (cf. 2 %   %  %  4) and NP subjects containing post-modifiers (cf. ,4) : %%2  4 ) would both be non-preferred options, whereas, in fact, they are not only perfectly normal, but the only options available, even if the post-modifiers are long branching APs, PPs or Rel Clauses. In general, in SVO languages like English we would expect modifiers to systematically occur on opposite sides of the core depending on the NP  function and distribution with respect to the higher head, i.e., if the core noun is the head of a subject, its accompanying modifiers should all be prenominal, whereas if it is the head of an object, they should all be postnominal, etc. Obviously, that is not the case, either in English or in related SVO languages, so a stronger statement is justified: there are perfectly systematic circumstances in which an adnominal modifier of a subject (e.g., a PP or Clause) must be exactly in Rijkhoff  pposedly non-

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preferred position, between the head of the subject and the verb, and there are circumstances in which a satellite cannot be there, etc. Rijkhoff  '25-derived PHP1, i.e., that attributive adjectives are expected next to the noun, sounds sensible, and yet, under scrutiny, sometimes it does not hold, and when it does it follows automatically from more general principles. The latter needs no comment: if the noun is an argument of the adjective, it must be constructed with it under Satisfaction. More interesting is why PHP1 is systematically false sometimes, i.e., precisely whenever the noun  !   !Octive    '  ' -   example, granted Satisfaction and Priority one or more arguments of the noun may have to be satisfied (cf.   /) before any adjectival modifier of the NP can in its turn be satisfied by taking the resulting NP as its subject. If the adjective itself is monadic, it will be constructed with that NP and will not only be adjacent to it, but, in English, granted LCA, it will necessarily precede it (cf.      /, vs. R    / );58 however, if the adjective is not monadic (cf. / 4% 3 %*&%), adjacency between the two heads is impossible, in violation of HP (which does not predict why this is so), i.e., the only possible output is  // 4% %*&%, cf. */   /4% %*&%, */  4% %*&% /, etc. Now, if PHP1 were an option open in all cases, it might make sense to include it in the grammar, but it is not, and with the right sort of theory we know why, so mentioning incomplete/inaccurate generalizations like PHP1 (or indeed HP itself, for the same reasons) is misleading and unnecessary. Actually, there is more evidence that PHP1 is just a false/incomplete generalization and that more abstract and subtle principles than HP are involved. For example, HP/PHP1, like Satisfaction / LCA, predict R /%%%, but the unacceptable R%%/3 % should in Rijkhoff  $ O   '   !  violations. Observe that the two heads are adjacent, as HP demands, and that the embedded NP domain is at the periphery, as DI and Increasing Complexity/Peripherality recommend. Of course, under the F(D)G analysis, the head of  /% is not yet adjacent to , against HP, so there is no other way to satisfy both HP demands but the configuration  %%/%, which is exactly what Satisfaction, Priority and LCA also predict will happen. However, R  %% /% is not just mildly deviant, but unacceptable, so the violation is not a tolerable one in that case. Now, since what causes intolerable unacceptability inR  %%  /% is the same kind of   25 %    



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occurs in /  %/, the latter should be as marginal as the former, but as a matter of fact it is not: the   5/  %/ is quite acceptable in spite of its obvious HP violation. Of course, what causes the contrast between    5  3    R  %%  /% and  /    % / has little to do with HP/PHP1, and much to do with the adjectives# ! $#  must be satisfied, cf. Escribano (2005a). Under the layered account of NPs, in short, HP counterexamples are bound to proliferate, and Rijkhoff (2002: 290, 308) must add that    ones (e.g., those caused by the piling up of non-branching APs) are tolerated better than large ones (those arising when embedded domains such as NPs or clauses intervene). Well, other reasons (LCA, etc.) prevent the embedding of XPs, as we saw, but, leaving that aside, the fact is that some such    25 %        !   - G!#     among adjectives of size, colour, etc. which Rijkhoff does not discuss have already been mentioned in this respect, so I will cite just a more interesting case that suggests a necessary revision of the status of prepositions in FG. PPs like ) : in %  4) :5 or  /-/% / in 4&   /-/% /, being structurally as simple as adjectives in underlying FG representations59 are under Rijkhoff 

   predicted to cause only the same   25% ations as multiple adjectives cause. However, at least in English and similar languages, this is, interestingly, wrong when the violation occurs to the left of the noun: In pre-nominal position, an intervening surface PP is always much worse than an intervening noun or adjective on the left hand side of an NP. In fact, aside from idioms like 3%3 in  3%3  *  3 , PPs are completely impossible in pre-nominal position, cf. R,* % ) :45R-4 /-/% /&   

; see Escribano (2004a). Unless a bare noun with a role feature qualifies as an !!! !  ! such examples can somehow be excluded by DI, a dubious possibility, it follows that   expression principles would have to be added to HP, DI, etc., to allow some    HP violations (those involving bare adjectives and nouns, cf.  in %# ) and block others.60 Observe, though, that this problem arises only as a specific consequence of the FG view of prepositions. Under broadly similar approaches to FG  like Hawkins  ")**@   '    ! n terms of an Early Immediate Constituents principle (EIC; 4& ;omain  23  2001), it does not, as prepositions are there all along and count for the evaluation of internal complexity. The same can be said of our approach

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here: if ) :,  /-/% /, etc., are the result of combining a dyadic predicate ,  / with its first argument to yield a monadic restrictor, both the semantics and the syntax of such satellites follow nicely from Satisfaction and LCA, i.e.,  /-/% / still needs a subject (e.g., & 3  ), and the subject will have asymmetric scope over  / and its internal argument -/% /, hence, granted LCA, &  will also have to precede  / -/% / and such deviant examples will be neatly excluded. What this solution entails is an analytical distinction between freely selectable prepositions like  /, on the one hand, and governed ones (e.g., 4% in /&*4%, etc.) or bare functional  ''/  3  in % 

  % , etc. The latter may arise from late shallow features and expression rules, but since the former clearly add semantic content and their own arguments, they must be treated as dyadic predicates to all purposes (i.e., they must be available in the Fund). This is a small and well motivated modification which immediately brings a surprising number of facts under the maximally general and elegant principles of Satisfaction and LCA, cf. Escribano (2004a). 2 "   In sum, the relatively poor performance of current F(D)G principles at predicting and explaining the fine details of NP-internal order is but another consequence of the general looseness of F(D)G concepts that our previous discussion of variables, operators, scope, and NP semantics had already revealed. That looseness not only endangers the status of operators, variables, and other aspects of abstract structure, as shown above, but also largely invalidates F(D)G       ' $/ -#- :O3 ''  (2002: 313-335, 346) otherwise correct claim that important surface ordering facts follow from Scope. They certainly do, as we have tried to prove, if Scope is explicitly formulated. Unfortunately, F(D)G   #$ has not been one of tightening its formalization and exploiting the interaction of semantic and syntactic principles to simplify the grammar. On the contrary, Hengeveld has now apparently abandoned the idea of deriving order from meaning through structure and Scope. In Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2006: 675) order is said to follow, not from meaning, but from !!  rpho-syntactic principles "S !  2#% !   - (2004: 45-46) the order of head and modifier is said to be fixed either by some templatic constraint, or by special indicators of the modification relation. Such an approach to surface order amounts to saying that it is not



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subject to any more general principles than the low-level idiosyncrasies of individual constructions, but, unless what has been said above about Satisfaction, Priority and LCA is completely off the mark, that is an unnecessarily weak assumption. On the contrary, a precise theory of construction, structure, and scope, coupled with the optimal assumption of iconicity between abstract and visible structures, as regulated by LCA, yields most of surface order (cf. Kayne 1994; Ernst 2002; Escribano 2004a; 2005a). Obviously, this comparison of the Satisfaction-based account and the standard F(D)G one in the area of NP-internal order is not conclusive evidence that the former is neatly superior %% %. Before accepting such a conclusion, it would be necessary to compare the performance of the two approaches with respect to the rich cross-linguistic body of order facts in e.g. Rijkhoff (2002). However, an important difference should be underlined: in the Satisfaction-based solution, all surface order predictions are directly obtained as a result of elegant interactions between principles like Satisfaction, Priority, or the iconicity constraint LCA which also control all other aspects of construction. Granted such powerful principles, phenomena like DI or HP, to the extent they hold, clearly appear as mere consequences, or incomplete generalizations, which may be useful from a descriptive point of view, but fail to identify the real forces at play and lack explanatory power. Once the stronger principles are revealed, there is no point, in my view, in proposing intuitive principles that are known to be subject to categorical and completely predictable exceptions. Most of the problems the F(D)G account of NPs faces ultimately result from a vague theory of Construction. If Construction is made to depend on strong (and, at bottom, cross-theoretically assumed) principles like Satisfaction subject to Priority and rigid (iconic) correspondence between structure and linear order (Kayne 6L    $! #ation between different elements of term structure are enforced, shallow differences like that between complementation and modification dissolve, cf. Escribano (2004a), correct constituency based on unambiguous binarybranching structures and rigid scope arises directly, FG principles like Iconic Ordering, Centripetal Orientation, Domain Integrity, Head Proximity and Increasing Complexity or even Pragmatic Highlighting (cf. Dik 1997a: 399-404, and Rijkhoff 2002) all follow as consequences of interactions among such more powerful forces, and their limits and systematic exceptions are elegantly explained, at least in English-like languages. In the case of NP structure, the functional layers assumed in current F(D)G can only arise if Dik .L !    #principles are ignored, and are not likely to be correct. Although they constitute a good

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first approximation to the most important functions of various tracts of NP construction and allow a moderately successful account of the surface order of determiners, quantifiers, heads, complements, and modifiers, the fine details do not quite fit. The higher referential and discourse layers probably do not exist as such, cf. footnote 16, (although NPs surely have such functions), whereas, on the contrary, many other layers (= constructions = domains = cores) are very likely to exist, for rather more delicate distinctions are needed both inside the nucleus of NPs and also above it, in the broad area of modification, cf. Keizer (2004) and Rijkhoff (this volume) for recent F(D)G work in that direction, and e.g., Crisma (1993), Cinque (1994), Bernstein (1997), Longobardi (2001), Giusti (2002), Scott (2002), for relevant fine details from several well-studied languages. In fact, aside from conceptual considerations (only binary-branching structures may result from Satisfaction), there is substantial empirical evidence, derived from constituency tests, binding facts, surface order, and semantic facts, that points towards that kind of structure in NPs as well as clauses. For reasons of space, such evidence has not been cited here against F(D)G B5 $  ?     $// 3 and theoretical discussions of constituency (cf. e.g. Pesetsky 1995). Certain minor syntactic details may also need rethinking in F(D)G, e.g., the status of prepositions and relative operators. In my view, very nice consequences follow from assuming that prepositions with semantic import are # dyadic predicates, with their complement and their  O (here, a nominal; in the case of adverbial PPs, a verbal phrase), cf. Escribano (2004a). As to relative operators, most of their properties can be coherently derived from the assumption that Rel is also a dyadic predicate with a special capacity to attract a clause-internal constituent, and that Rel (not the verb!) is the head of the Rel Clause. For one advantage, under such an analysis,  ! /$  ! ' : L  !  core nominal follows, and, particularly, the order of relative clauses with respect to other NP constituents in English-like languages follows nicely from scope and LCA, cf. Escribano (2003; 2004a). The major focus of attention in this article, though, has been placed on semantic issues and problems derived from the representation of NP meanings in current F(D)G, mainly two, a) the ontological status of what is meant, including the question of what symbols belong/do not belong in underlying NP representations, and b) the overall architecture of term formulae. As to the former, F(D)G seems to operate with a broad concept of #    %    ' !      !    h acts, which makes F(D)G term representations very heterogeneous. Of



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course, it is perfectly legitimate to design models of speech situations with various slots for participants and relations in them and treat linguistic expressions as values of appropriate variables in such models, or to connect NP senses with referents in e.g., models of Psych-W or Disc-W, but the theory must first show how the senses of NPs are compositionally derived, and how they constrain referential and use potential. Thus, in my view, it is necessary to be less ambitious and start from a more constrained concept of #   -61 NPs are used by speakers to refer to extralinguistic entities, but what they can name or describe is just entities of our Ling-W, i.e., senses.62 Therefore, only (symbols standing for) senses should figure in the representations on which the meaning = sense of NPs must be calculated (cf. Escribano 2004b; Keizer this volume). That excludes :a ! X    /   !icate variable ' !   %   that Dik (1989: 50) envisaged for lexical items. What remains is a) the senses of nouns of various types (individuals, substances, events, etc.) and adicities (properties, relations), b) the senses of their arguments, also of various types (individuals, events, propositions) and adicities, and c) the senses of their modifiers (properties, also of different adicities and thorder). The senses of predicates and arguments are composed by .3 % -&&%, those of modifiers and their modifieds, i.e., higherorder predicates and the predicates that saturate them as their subjects, by .% $/&%, both essentially the same operation based on Satisfaction of sense-related properties (Types). Operators are nth-order predicates, and no variables need be involved in the representation of senses,63 since, by definition, a variable appears instead of a constant. Thus, the relation and composition of Ops and Cores is essentially the same as that of Sats and Cores, cf. Escribano (2004b, 2006), but a Sat and an Op never apply to the same core (%  Rijkhoff this volume and Hengeveld this volume). Under Satisfaction, the richness of the hierarchical structure inside NPs directly entails a highly differentiated structure in what concerns semantic Types, which has not yet been elaborated. As a real compositional account of NP semantics and syntax is worked out, new, more delicate semantic Types will emerge to be added to existing ones like !%!uals   % "! #  ! properties of the latter two), cf. Pustejovsky (1995) for one such system, but that does not entail, and is not likely to determine, enrichments of the machinery in charge of construction (i.e., Satisfaction) and the monotonic computation of senses (Functional Application, Functional Composition), which is powerful enough, especially if semantic Co-Composition, cf. Pustejovsky (1995), is allowed along with (multiple) mutual satisfaction.

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Of course, what specific types should be assigned to N and all the nominal cores above N is a matter that we cannot settle here, as it entails decisions on complex issues connected with morphological derivation and other matters, but, whatever semantic types are chosen, no variables need be involved in sense representations. Needless to say, this quick overview just summarizes our previous diagnosis of conceptual problems in the area of term structure and adds bare guidelines, not detailed solutions to the substantive empirical issues that arise, e.g., Which Types (possibly different from metaphysical types of     ! .$-Shifting operations are relevant in natural language semantics? However, it hopefully will have shown that a clearer view of the implications of Satisfaction, rigid concepts of Construction, Domain and Scope, and a universal? expression principle like Kayne  LCA that enforces a tight correspondence between structure and surface order are a prerequisite to any adequate account of NP form and sense. In fact, Dik  ! ' .L   !    '  

 $ correct, programmatic statement anticipating what is formally proposed here, and ideas like Satisfaction and Priority are already assumed % in F(D)G. Also, since F(D)G has also already developed a rich linguistic ontology (individuals, masses, ensembles, properties, events, etc.), further enrichment of its Type system, as proposed here, is a matter of degree, not a deep modification, and should not raise special difficulties. On the other hand, it is true that the changes defended here would make F(D)G very different from what it is now as to the details, more rigid, and more vulnerable to empirical refutation, which is as should be from a methodological viewpoint. As to the critical tone that has prevailed in this paper, in conclusion, although in its present form the F(D)G treatment of underlying terms and surface NPs is seriously inconsistent in various respects, the problems are understandable, largely accidental (inherited from certain types of philosophical semantics) and by no means inherent to the theory, whose basic principles seem to me correct and fertile. F(D)G should be further developed into a proper account of the way natural languages work, semantically and syntactically. For this reason, the ultimate purpose of this contribution has been critical, but in a well-meaning, constructive sense, i.e., to help F(D)G scholars identify and perhaps solve some of their more pressing theoretical problems, acting from the vantage point of a sympathetic outsider with a broad view of linguistic theory, absolute academic freedom, and no axe to grind.



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&    1.

2.

3. 4.

5.

6.

7.

This work owes much to Daniel Garc   , who facilitated my access to some crucial sources, read several versions of the text, and gave me wise advice on how to write a delicate piece like this, to Jan Rijkhoff, who, as an author, reacted very elegantly to my objections, and, as editor of this volume, offered very detailed criticism and suggestions, and to three other anonymous referees who discovered various obscurities and other infelicities in earlier versions that I hope have been avoided in this. I also thank Lachlan Mackenzie for quickly sending to me an offprint of an article of his that I needed. The underlying semantic research has been sponsored by the Spanish Ministry of Education under contract I+D MEC-04-HUM2004-018. Interestingly, operators do not have them, which implies that they are not semantic categories under the authors !' - .   '     $ from the fact that FG operators are considered grammatical modifiers. Yet, operators are ' !in the language system! %  $ %  consequences. This view of Hengeveld and Mackenzie      elian concept of #  "Z bjects and predicates), but leaves operators in a semantic limbo. That is, those biuniquely bound by operators, cf.  . Assuming, in the spirit of Hengeveld and Mackenzie  %/ above (cf. semantic categories = ontological categories as reflected in the language system), that at the representational level F(D)G semantics is, like all linguistic semantics, concerned with the sense of expressions, and that reference (to entities of psychological worlds in the case of FG, cf. Dik 1997a: 129) is, along strictly Fregean lines, a function of linguistic sense plus additional parameters. Actually, a logical quantifier like (x) is conventionally assumed to vacuously apply also to formulae like (z) P(z) that contain no unbound variables, and even to formulae like P(j) containing no variables at all. Thus, in Predicate Logic, (x) [(z) P(z)] and (x) P(j) are not syntactically ill-formed, although the quantifier is semantically inert in them, but the motivation has to do with economy of statement of the syntax of Predicate Calculus. Natural languages, of course, radically disallow vacuous quantification (cf. R" *5%%3  *%). Properly, predicates of higher adicity are often involved, but the various modifiers around a noun all behave as one-place predicates at the stage they are attached to their respective heads. Obviously, the head noun may itself be dyadic or even triadic (e.g., 5   , respectively) and modifiers may be headed by dyadic adjectives (e.g., , as in     &%), dyadic prepositions, participles of any adicity, etc. The term   #$  $   -  !   %ntory (or closed system) of types of entities (e.g., individuals, substances, events, etc.) that can be linguistically named or described.

164 8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

  ! " # Such terminology is standard in logic textbooks and in all Fregean approaches to linguistic semantics, e.g., Montague Grammar, Categorial Grammar(s), LFG, GPSG-HPSG, and broadly L  3$ 3  35 O % 3$")**V or Jackendoff (1990). McGee Wood (1993), Steedman (1993) and Heim and Kratzer (1998) contain clear and easy accounts for linguists. E.g., representing )/%A%  as (e) [Meeting (e) & Agent (e, b) & Theme (e, q) & At (e, h) & Time (e, < now) ], or G ,/) )  as (e1) [Seeing (e1) & Experiencer (e1, t) & Theme (e1, b) & Time (e1, t) ]  (e2) [Reading (e2) & Agent (e2, b) & Time (e2, t)], etc. Incidentally, a variable which is subject to exactly the same metaphysical difficulties posed by / %-.    #  " '  '  also affected). Actually, on the negative side, Davidson      o induced generative grammarians to counter-intuitively treat all constituents of the clause (i.e., the head predicate, the subject, objects, adjuncts, tense affixes, etc.) as predicates of events, suppressing the important differences between heads, arguments, and modifiers. Although any clause constituent adds its own truth conditions and to that extent can be thought of as a      !fferent status of heads, complements and adjuncts has wide-ranging syntactic and semantic consequences in natural languages and cannot be ignored in any structuredependent account of senses. The problem is particularly acute in current Chomskyan linguistics as understood by Kayne and Cinque, cf. Escribano (2006). In fact, apart from stacking, recursion is also involved, for events recur embedded inside more encompassing events. Davidson ")*W+  did not recognize the fact that coexisting verb modifiers often do not even make sense if predicated of a unique event. For example, it has been well known since at least Dowty (1979) that whereas a!%  !'$ telic VP  "-#- /& % %%   4), '  a  dverbials modify atelic ones (e.g., 4 %&  * ), and, insofar as no verb sense can be both telic and atelic, we do not expect the two types of adverbials to co-occur. Yet, they do, and in either order (cf. )/&%% 4     * 5 ,*  /   % *   %/%), which proves that even seemingly simple VP ! !     event structure, and therefore we need not only stacked modifiers, but modifiers applying to different event structures embedded within a single VP, i.e., complex event structures and a hierarchy of types of events and properties of events. Particularly since Dik (1989) and Hengeveld (1989) (cf., e.g., Keizer 1992, 2004; Rijkhoff 1992; Mackenzie 2004), Yet, the structure attributed to events in current F(D)G is still pretty much Davidsonian. The formulae offered in current work as representations of expressions like ' &% % #    are absolutely flat. There is no attempt to capture the fact that accom-



14.

15.

16.

17.

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plishment verbs like &% involve three different sub-events (state, change of state, causation thereof, plus an       6 ation, Theme and Agent are constituents of different sub-events. The ontology assumed in F(D)G has, of course, expanded considerably since Dik (1978), and therefore neither predicates nor their arguments need any longer be first-order, as explicitly acknowledged in Dik (1989) and later work. Keizer (2004), Hengeveld and Mackenzie (fc.), and Mackenzie (2004) contain recent discussions of the various types of entities (properties, individuals, places, times, manners, states of affairs, propositions, speech acts), and their modifiers. In fact, the test for entity-hood is: whenever it is possible to refer anaphorically to or focus a WH-word on a constituent, its denotatum is an entity (cf. Hengeveld and Mackenzie fc.). Whether the ontological enrichment affects only the intralinguistic world of senses or also the    !  

 obvious. Current pronouncements (e.g., in Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 673) to the effect that properties have no independent existence and perhaps Dik  ")**+( )U) !   between ' ! ! # ggest that the extralinguistic ontology assumed in F(D)G is still austere, but, be that as it may, its intralinguistic ontology is certainly rather rich (cf.  ). As the ontology that terms must name has expanded, parallel variables standing for properties (' %  "         "     "C etc., occur alternating with /   'F(D)G terms (cf. Dik 1989: 180-182; Keizer 1992 on properties; Hengeveld 1992a: 7, on speech acts; Dik 1997a: 131-132, 136-138; Dik 1997b: 93; Hengeveld 2004; Keizer 2004: 1516; Hengeveld 2005, and Mackenzie 2004 for a good short overview). Although I discuss matters here mostly with reference to the /% llel reasoning applies to '- To be fair, at least early FG seems to have simply inherited the problem from the logicians of the time. Russellian-Davidsonian accounts were just about all the semantic doctrine available on NPs in the early seventies, and it was natural for Dik to adopt their views. Although FG did not share the realist theory of meaning, he probably saw the mental world that FG terms refer to as sufficiently isomorphic to the     ' %$   tment. Hengeveld (this volume) shares the view that proper nouns are not modifiable in the representational level, although they can be modified by predicates of the interpersonal level (cf. + 6 Cf. also Butler this volume). Whether the higher variable and its function can indeed be associated with a specific level of structure, rather than with a function of the full NP, is dubious, though. Rijkhoff  ",^^,( ,,*-231) discourse  %    $ !     correspond to any well-defined continuous stretch of structure at the top of NPs, since discourse-oriented modifiers like  /%5  / 5 %% 5 /, etc. must also often be structurally attached under the scope of Location operators and modifiers. And, as a matter of fact, the same applies to

166

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19.

20.

21.

  ! " # Hengeveld    %      !   #ical features that account for the referential vs. ascriptive use of NPs, but also other elements (e.g., Hengeveld this volume). Since articles crucially help the addressee construct or identify the referent, it seems & / reasonable to associate them with that level, but articles cannot be purely  representational "--  '       $ !    % predicative uses, and, to that extent, their association with the rsonal level is questionable (cf. Keizer this volume). On the other hand, other interpersonally relevant items may occur fairly deeply embedded within NP structure (e.g. in %& 4, & is visible at the interpersonal level but not at the representational level (cf. Hengeveld this volume). Thus, whether the grammar is top-down, as in current F(D)G, or bottom-up, as in classical FG, the interpersonal and discourse  vels   '  ' the representationally relevant ones. Hence, calling reference/discourseoriented properties of NPs a further  %  '    sleading: such a structural level does not seem to exist (cf. Butler this volume). A hint in this respect is that, according to Hengeveld and Mackenzie (fc.), Hengeveld (this volume) the difference between referential and ascriptive NPs is just functional, not structural. If so, labelling referential tokens of NPs :'5 "'--#-2#% !,^^VQ2#% ! -,^^@ # $stake. I suspect, though, that structural differences between referential and predicative NPs may well be indirectly detectable, as they are in languages like Spanish, and, anyway, Hengeveld and Mackenzie ",^^W(W+@  # view that nothing at the representational level distinguishes ascriptive from referential uses of NPs is implausible: after all, ascriptive NPs denote properties, whereas referential ones must denote individuals. Such a radical difference in sense is unlikely to be irrelevant precisely at the representational level (cf. also Keizer this volume). Properly, in that passage, Rijkhoff  %'3  $ fits well with the metaphysical analysis of individuals in        ttempt to separate a substratum from the remaining intensional properties that may constitute an NP   Correspondingly,        '    , etc., as appropriate in NPs describing events, properties, propositional attitudes, etc. that Rijkhoff (2002) does not discuss. Apart from   /:O3 ''    !icate variables (fi'm) ranging over senses, at N and the heads of all satellites. For reasons already stated, they play no role in the computation of senses or referents and will be ignored here, although their status will re-emerge briefly below in our discussion of operators and binding issues surrounding them. Terms denoting other types of entities follow the same pattern, with different variables -



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22. A further issue is what binds    / '- ! 

  ' % -binding problems  . 23. Admittedly, this multiplicity holds only if individual competence matters. What view current F(D)G adopts with respect to the internalism/externalism issue and the private language debates is unclear to me. If individual competence does not matter in F(D)G, there is a single, idealized  #stic world the world of senses generated by each  #    

  - M that as it may, Ling-W has a place of honour in linguistic semantics. For structural/internalist semanticists like Coseriu (1992) and Chomsky (2000), what we here call 6#-W      $   !      -wise. As to F(D)G, to the extent the equation [semantically relevant entity] = [entity as construed by the language system] is assumed (cf. Dik 1997a: 129; Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006), it is Ling-W, not really Psych-W, that is the core domain for semantics in F(D)G too. 24. Dik (1997a: 131) restricts the concept of '  ities named by terms functioning as arguments or satellites in clause structure, but that must be an oversight, or an NP like /* inside another NP like %*%/*  will not be a referential expression. Why predicates, predications, propositions and clauses do not 'o entities of type f, e, X and E, respectively, but merely ! #   -0 ##     $ ician, Dik was a realist with an austere Phys-W ontology (just extensional individuals) and considered predicates, predications, etc. as names of Ling-W entities (mere senses), which would explain why he adds that designation is similar to constructive reference. However, the rest of Dik  !    make room for such an asymmetry between terms naming first-order entities and those naming higher order ones. 25. Correspondingly, #C#5-  ! -order variables bound by discourse-constructed events, facts, speech acts, etc. 26. Although Dik uses both terms,      ' '  what Dik has in mind and will be preferred here. 27. Of course, the truth conditions (but just the truth conditions) of a term like % #%% 2  can, in principle, be adequately represented by a flat unordered conjunction of clauses like ... [girl(x) & Indian(x) & beautiful (x) & dark (x) & tall (x)], etc., but such a formula does not capture the fact that in natural languages head and modifiers are attached in a certain order that is subject to strict, near-categorical, constraints, cf. R%2%#%   , R% 2#%% , etc. Obviously, the grammarian can simply stipulate such constraints, but that is hardly an elegant strategy if it is possible to derive the order of modifiers from deeper principles, and Dik was clearly taking the latter course when he talked about !ynamic construction !  !    $   '      & #% C #% & on predicability (hence, on the extension of the respective sets involved). Spelling out that idea a bit, the result is that predicates like  5#3

168

28.

29.

30. 31.

32.

33.

  ! " # %5%5 52, etc., are predicable of different sets, but in that case the sets cannot be represented by the same variable /(  $  '  3  of / ' conjunctive formula above will have a different range;  , the various instances of /  3  '  %iable. Observe that when several operators occur, they are not separated by (-- they are not attached in the order of their left-to-right position in the formula. If they are stacked, as Dik (1989) claims, the determiner is predicted to have scope over the numerator, and the same result is obtained when, following Rijkhoff   3 ;3 ")**+( )WU 

ciates each operator with a different layer of term structure. Of course, that would not yield a tree like (3), cf. infra. See Reichenbach (1947: 87, footnote and ff.). Term-internal binding is the only formal difference that Dik (1997a: 168) acknowledges between FG quantifying operators and logical ones. Recall that Frege ?'iers are functions applying to propositional functions. It also entails revising the status of all other      $  usal ones: a very significant rethinking of F(D)G, all in all. Arguably, there is a third. Number, definiteness, and case, in particular, are also said to extend their influence over the whole term on which they operate, cf. Dik (1989: 138-139, 317-319). A similar statement, generalized to all term operators, remains in Dik (1997a: 161), but must be a mistake there, for a few lines down on the same page Dik approvingly introduces Rijkhoff  ccount of term operators as associated with successive onion-like layers of term structure. That organization, of course, is strictly parallel to Dik    treatment of clause-level operators as stacked around their operand, with inner operators falling within the scope of outer ones, cf. Dik (1989: 308), which is kept in the revised version of Dik (1997a). However, Dik   $ % ' number, etc. is far from dead in F(D)G. Bakker and Pfau (this volume) still insist on the idea that the number, definiteness, and case operators are #   operators with scope over the whole term, although this may be due to a misreading of Dik /-yway, there are very good reasons why e.g. case must be a very /   '-C  (2005c) and section 4  . In (5),  / -/% / will be higher or lower (hence S !!#  whether it is taken to be an identifying satellite (cf. Keizer 2004) or a qualifying one, but the point does not affect the argumentation here. I stick to the same example just for the purposes of comparing alternative structures. If, instead of  / -/% /, the last restrictor were a relative clause like 4 /  or a discourse-level identifier like  */% they would definitely be attached as sisters to the operator d, as suggested. Observe that although the left-to-right sequence of restrictors is meant to express increasing scope, if the same criterion is applied to the sequence d prox 3 we obtain exactly the converse of what Dik elsewhere claims to be the relative scope of d, prox, and 3: the numeral will have scope over prox, and prox over d. Assuming the contrary, the operators are themselves stacked onion-like



34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

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with respect to the variable /    $lds structures like (3), not (5). From Dik '    #'         ! espect to restrictors. Just as variables must be uniquely bound by appropriate operators, arguments must be uniquely  !$  3! "rminology varies, but the differences are immaterial here) appropriate predicates, or they will not receive a semantic function and will be uninterpretable (just like uninterpreted variables in a calculus). The standard view of scope, used in mathematics, formal logic, and formal linguistics, entails that if A and B are constructed into a new entity [A*B] (order irrelevant; * = whatever combinatory operation applies), then A and B have scope over each other, and that if [A*B], in its turn, is constructed with a new object C into a structure C*[A*B] or [A*B]*C, then C and [A*B] are in each other   L   $   %!M!   B has scope over C. Linear precedence is a non-starter, though, if the structure of terms is as claimed in current layered models and the aim is to say that e.g., satellites at Ln have scope over constituents of layer Ln-1, since when the onion-like term structure is projected onto a linear sequence, the head noun precedes (and therefore would have scope over) all post-nominal satellites. Functional uniqueness entails that full NPs will not be further restricted: since the full NP must be able to receive a semantic function from the head it is constructed with (e.g., a verb), it cannot receive a second semantic function as subject of a restrictor. Hence, restrictors must operate at intermediate levels of term structure, and on categories different from the NP (i.e., not on the term variable /- 0   '   '  'ctional uniqueness that the same head nominal cannot be restricted by more than one restrictor, or by one restrictor and one operator, i.e., the structure cannot be ' Q   $$ branching, as STC predicts. The head nominal is constantly !!   construction of the term proceeds (cf. our discussion of the variable update issue above). In what concerns the ' %             !  Hengeveld (this volume), where each of the restrictors (e.g.,  , %%, in %%% ) carries its own operator and its own variable. However, the higher /     !    '/  nnot stand for the same set (i.e., two different variables). Note that, stepwise construction, according to Dik, is a deep property that affects the sense of terms, not just a surface realization detail. Actually, Dik even attributes psycholinguistic significance to it, for he claims that it reflects !! #  "#    logy), cf. Dik(1997a: 62, 135). A has asymmetric scope over B if A has scope over B but B does not have scope over A, as in the structure A[B, C]. Sisters, on the contrary, have symmetric or mutual scope, as in structures like [A, B, C].

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41. Obviously, this is consistent with grouping subsets of such    '  ction into as many functional     #           nature and semantic contribution of operators and satellites, e.g., a term may have a discourse status segment (for (in)definiteness), a spatial location segment (for deictics), an ordinator segment (for  %5%5etc.), a quantification segment, a modal segment (for modifiers like &# or 43#), and as many aspectual, qualification, classification, and complementation segments as need to be established. Current F(D)G ' ur or five layers have that functional character, but the functional distinctions so far established, especially in what concerns the intermediate and lower levels, are still too broad. Work like Scott (2002) reported in Cinque ed. (2002) suggests that a much more delicate layering of modifiers is justified, and recent proposals by F(D)G scholars like Keizer (2004) and Rijkhoff (this volume) point in the same direction. 42. I will use  :O3 '' "  %    ! !  its successive expansions as a consequence of stepwise construction with satellites and operators, i.e., in the sense of lexical or phrasal head of the NP. If necessary, sub-indices can be used to unambiguously identify successively bigger nominal cores, as X-bar theories do with bar levels, following an idea due to Zellig S. Harris. 43. This is an important respect in which F(D)G differs from other approaches that also explain facts, particularly constituent order facts, in terms of a compromise among competing '  -G     G $.  $'- papers in Barbosa et al. eds. (1998). The difference is that in OT, the respective  #  '  '  eting principles is explicitly defined in a hierarchy, the import of each type of violation is strictly quantified, and to that extent it is possible to predict which of the competing forces will prevail in cases of conflict. On the contrary, F(D)G does not say anything on the relative strength of its ordering preferences, and it is impossible to predict what will happen, except ex post facto. 44. It is assumed here that theoretical linguistic objects are sets or matrices of [attribute: value] pairs. An [A: v] pair is a function that applies to its carrier and yields a unique value over a restricted domain. Informally, an [A: v] pair simply expresses a proposition about its carrier. All sorts of properties can be formalized with precision in that format, which is extensively used in grammars like LFG, GPSG, HPSG, Construction Grammar, and all related computational approaches. Traditional features like +F, used in FG and many other theories, correspond to a particular subset of [A: v] pairs whose value range is Boolean (+,-). Since many attributes necessary to characterize linguistic items are not Boolean, the [A: v] format is preferred, though. An attribute is %lued     '  #%   #-F% !  leave their carriers as incalculable factors in computations, causing incompleteness or anomaly.



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45. E.g., the construction of a verb, adjective or noun with its (PP) complement, or an adjective with its N(P), satisfies both an adicity requirement on the verb, noun or adjective, and a role value, and often a case value requirement, on the complement, and semanticists like Pustejovsky (1995) claim that cocomposition (= bi-directional functional application) must be allowed. 46. Also Core+Argument, obviously; I ignore that case here, since the discussion is here focused on the structure of the upper FG layers at which Sats and Ops intervene. Arguments are also attached in a stepwise fashion, but I will ignore the details here, since I suspect in matters like event structure inside nominals there is little common ground across different linguistic schools and I want to keep this discussion as close to theory-neutral as possible. 47. In cases of predicate composition, one of the predicates functions as an argument of the other, i.e., one is type <<e,t>,<e,t>>, a property of a property, (an th order property), whereas the other is just <e,t> a property of order n-1. 48. This does not entail that a noun cannot in the earlier stages of term construction function as a predicate and take its own arguments, cf. Keizer (2004) for an F(D)G view of this. What is claimed here is that even relational nouns, once saturated, form cores that function as arguments of satellites at higher levels, but cannot satisfy or be satisfied by another core nominal. 49. 2! '  '      #   -0  present context, head refers to the   ! '   -- /  predicate, usually an adjective, a semantically non-trivial preposition (cf. infra), a participle, etc. 50. There is a systematic but innocuous apparent exception: Since the subject is the last (sometimes called xternal # '   /  ! "   that it is also the  O '' !, the head of that predicate may have to satisfy a satellite of its own before satisfying its subject, since the semantic type of the object resulting after the head is completely satisfied would no longer be constructible with the satellite. This may happen only when the satellite does not alter the type of the head in a significant way, e.g., in cases like  %  :% /*    , vs. R :% /* %     . In this example, :% /* is a second-order degree property. It will therefore satisfy its argument if it combines with  , a gradable monadic predicate, but will not match the type of the combination resulting when  satisfies its subject, i.e., %     , a non-gradable property. Hence, either the adverb is satisfied first or it remains unsatisfied, dangling, and the whole structure fails. Thus, Satisfaction forces a violation of Priority in this case, unsurprisingly, as Satisfaction is the real principle; Priority just defines how it is to be applied. 51. The facts of SOV languages are different, and must be accounted for by additional principles, either Kayne "--4 %     25$  so easily deduced and saved from counterexamples in all cases. In this pro-

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grammatic conceptual discussion, I will limit attention to how much follows from Satisfaction in English-like languages. 52. It is assumed here that Focus and Topic are !   '  !   constituents that discharge them carry attributes like [D-F(unction): Top], etc., and that the Subject is a    '  "--   O   5-internal argument), hence, a subject will be marked as e.g. [Cl-F(unction): Subj]. In other theories the subject is treated as a special or / #-. logy is immaterial. What matters is that the subject is not just an argument of the verb, although it is also an argument of the verb. 53. Only a few suggestive examples can be discussed here, though. Further coverage of data is clearly impossible in the space available in this already long article, and well beyond my competence in what concerns non-IE languages. It follows that current F(D)G concepts might still prove descriptively preferable to the present version in view of the facts of a large sample of languages like that used by Rijkhoff (2002), so I am well aware that the adequacy of either the proposal sketched here or F(D)G as currently developed cannot be judged with reference to just English and similar languages. However, those few languages, especially English, happen to be those about which we know incomparably more, and to that extent it is understandable that the adequacy of theories be first of all judged with respect to how well they handle really well investigated problems known to a great majority of linguists. Also, under the assumption that Human Language is based on a unique universal computational mechanism (N.B.: such a mechanism need not be a  $/! $  not an      $/    tegy to adopt as a zero hypothesis that if an elegant set of principles makes really strong and delicate predictions in one or a few well investigated languages, such principles may well be appropriate to a wider domain. In this respect, the versions of Satisfaction, Priority, etc., presented above have a simplicity, coherence, and explanatory power (if only, in English and similar languages) that make them strong candidates worth comparing with alternative concepts. Obviously, it will be much easier to produce & / counterexamples to them than to HP, DI, etc. as currently understood in F(D)G, since the theory argued for here is more rigid, but the real issue is to determine whether the apparent counterexamples are genuine and really invalidate the principles, or just follow from low level facts, or further principles of morphology, etc., without need to abandon the principles. Of course, that cannot be done here, so all I will do is compare the predictions of the theory above with those that follow from the standard F(D)G concepts as developed mainly in Rijkhoff (2002) and Keizer (2004). 54. Even ignoring the hedge ! !   !'! !ified B will usually be adjacent, but does not say in which order (A+B, B+A?) they will occur. As shown above, depending on the internal structure of A and B, it is possible to do rather better, cf. Escribano (2004a) for details.



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55. Refining the layer structure, as in Keizer (2004) and Rijkhoff (this volume), may avoid piling up modifiers at a single layer and exclude some of the bad predictions, e.g., if one of the modifiers of 4 is ) : () *5 5 etc.), in Rijkhoff  '%-layer model it might belong to the classifier layer, which would force it to at least be adjacent to the head, i.e., only orderings containing the sub-string ) :b4 or the deviant *4b) : will be predicted. 56. Of course, the FG analysis of PPs and Rel Clauses automatically induces a violation of HP as soon as a PP or Rel Clause is attached to a noun, even if no other dependent intervenes, whereas under analyses that assume that P and Rel are heads no HP violations arise in such cases. There is strong evidence in support of the view that both unselected P and Rel are heads with their own arguments, cf. Escribano (2004a) on Ps and Escribano (2003) on Rel Clauses. 57. Rijkhoff (2002: 290, 308) directly excludes demonstratives, numerals, and adjectives from the scope of his HP constraint. The reason adduced is that such elements cause only minor violations that speakers can tolerate, whereas phrases cause intolerable processing difficulties. However, in the case of articles, demonstratives and numerals, there is no need to weaken HP: since they never take any other complements but the core nominal, appropriate layering and the relativized concept of Head above will immediately eliminate the false minor HP violation anyway. On the contrary, in the case of adjectives, which can take complements, it is a mistake to exempt them from HP, and the immediate consequence is that constructions like * %#* will be licensed (cf.  ). Of course, Rijkhoff (2002) does not really discuss complex phrases, which disguises this type of problem, but it is a problem. 58. There are a few exceptions, of course, cf. % && & %, %   #, etc., but they are not significant at this level of abstraction. See Escribano (2004a) and (2005a) for a possible explanation in terms of Focus. 59. Underlyingly, ) : is just a noun with a role feature; recall that prepositions are not predicates in FG and do not exist until the expression rules introduce them later. 60. One of the editors questions this analysis of  / -/% / as  # within FG. Yet, as far as I know, there is no other FG analysis of such modifiers: if prepositions are inserted    &   ' ' !rlying structure that PP is just a noun with an Origin/Source? role feature. If the PP contained a full NP (e.g.,  /%I %*-/% /), it could arguably be treated as an embedded domain and excluded as a O 25%olation, but, as it stands, it is no different, in my view, from having adjectives or quantifiers intervening between determiners and nouns (the  %    that Rijkhoff   rates by excluding them from the scope of HP). 61. It need not be an impoverished concept of sense, though. Thus, the affectiveinteractional aspects of meaning that Butler (this volume) discusses need not be extraneous to Ling-W as here understood. This is obvious: to the extent

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such features are expressible through linguistic means (i.e., not by means of gestures, musical resources, etc.), they belong to the language, are subject to its conventions, etc. 62. Keizer (this volume) defends the same view. Rijkhoff (this volume), and Hengeveld (this volume) emphasize the ! % yers, but it remains unclear to me whether their NPs ultimately denote Ling-W entities, or rather extralinguistic ones. As to Butler      #$      rather seems to correspond to what we here call C-World, i.e., his meanings seem to be conceptual in a broad sense compatible with the existence of different modules to handle affective-interactional concepts and narrowly conceptual-representational structures. The approach defended here, on the contrary, is not conceptualist, but internalist, or language-immanentist, i.e., our semantics is the kind of semantics that Saussure, Hjelmslev, Coseriu, (and, when he is consistently internalist, Chomsky) had in mind. The mind with all its content is surely relevant to any explanation of performance, and to the integrated account of linguistic behaviour that F(D)G aims at (cf. Dik 1989, Butler this volume), but linguistic expressions name what they can name, i.e., entities from Ling-W. The relation between Ling-W entities and C-World (and Phys-W) ones is altogether a different story, and a fascinating one. 63. In Escribano (2004b), I proposed eliminating variable-binding issues and the variable-update problem by limiting term operators and variables to a higherorder one at the top of the term structure. Of course, that was my compromise with the traditional FG assumption that all terms and clauses have an (/ [ "/8' -2 % :O3 '' (this volume) now proposes to treat operators as modifiers and nearly dispenses with variables altogether, I feel free to propose here in an F(D)G framework what I proposed in Escribano (this volume [written 2004]), in a broadly Chomskyan one. This proposal, therefore, differs from, and is incompatible with all those that maintain sense/term variables in the formulae of the representational component, e.g., Rijkhoff (this volume), Hengeveld (this volume) and Keizer (this volume).

*    Bakker, Dik and Pfau, Roland this vol. Agreement in the noun phrase: The dynamic expression of terms and what can go wrong. Barbosa, Pilar, Danny Fox, Paul Hagstrom, Martha McGinnis and David Pesetsky, (eds.) 1998 2 % )%  "H =&%/%*  $/&%%  '*%:. Cambridge, M.A.: The MIT Press.



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Barwise, Jon and Robin Cooper 1981 Generalized quantifiers in natural language. %+3 &* 4: 159219. Bernstein, Judy 1997 Demonstratives and reinforcers in Romance and Germanic languages.  102: 87-113. Butler, Christopher S. this vol. Interpersonal meaning in the noun phrase. Chomsky, Noam 2000 04     % '%*    ;. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2005 Three factors in language design. %2B * 36: 122. Cinque, Guiglielmo 1994 On the evidence for partial N-movement in the Romance noun phrase. In: Guiglielmo Cinque (ed.), +% %4  I  // , 85110. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press. Cinque, Guiglielmo (ed.) 2002 .% '% %   +  2+. , $ % &*  '*%% '% % ( Oxford: Oxford University Press. Coseriu, Eugenio 1992 SemE  $ E #%-0(5 ' sco MarsE- > !  !  # ,U*-282. Barcelona: Universidad de Barcelona. Crisma, Paola 1993 On adjective placement in Romance and Germanic event nominals. % //%  % 18: 61100. Davidson, Donald 1967 The logical form of action sentences. In: "*  -%  "%( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Dik, Simon C. 1989 ,, *.% // (+ %2( Dordrecht: Foris Publications. 1997a , , *  .% // ( + % 2> , '% %   % $ (Functional Grammar Series 20.) Second, revised edition. Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 1997b ,, *.% // (+ %22>$/&:  % % (Functional Grammar Series 21.) Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Dowty, David 1979 G ;;% // . Dordrecht: Reidel. Ernst, Thomas 2002 ,'*%:-%( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Escribano, J. Luis G. 2003 On relative clauses. % $   "% 2 47: 157 182. 2004a Head-final effects and the nature of modification.  3 % 40: 143. 2004b On the structure of terms in FG: Some conceptual issues (A sympathetic outsider %-Paper presented at11%2% %$ 3   .% // ( University of Oviedo, September, 2004. 2005a Discontinuous APs. % 43: 563610. 2005b Semantocentric Minimalist Grammar. -%% 27-2: 5774. 2005c English compounds and the theory of abstract case. In: Luis Quereda (ed.), ,4   I %  % " ( '%   . '

 , 107131. Granada: Universidad de Granada. 2006 NPs as just NPs. ' 28-6: 529-579. Frege, Gottlob 1952 , % /%+&G % %%#. ( Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Giusti, Giuliana 2002 The functional structure of noun phrases: A bare phrase structure approach. In: Guiglielmo Cinque (ed.) .% '% %   + 2+, 54-90. Oxford: Oxford University Press Hawkins, John A. 1994 - +  / , *  =    $%%*( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2001 Why are categories adjacent?  % 37: 134. Heim, Irene and Angelika Kratzer 1998 '/%  % // . Oxford: Blackwell. Hengeveld, Kees 1989 Layers and operators in Functional Grammar.  % 25: 127157. 1992a 03 # + %> , *5 ,*&*5  *. (Functional Grammar Series 15.) Berlin/New York: Mouton-de Gruyter. 1992b Parts of speech. In: Michael Fortescue, Peter Harder and Lars Kristoffersen (eds.), *  '% %       .3 % + &%, 2955. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 2004 Epilogue. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar !  J#   G&-GonzE & "! - - 04 - %%    .% /3 / , 365378. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.



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Dynamic expression in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Casper de Groot and Kees Hengeveld (eds.) ; &*%% ":&   .% // 5 5386. (Functional Grammar Series 27.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. this vol. Prototypical and non-prototypical noun phrases in FDG. Hengeveld, Kees and J. Lachlan Mackenzie 2006 Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Keith Brown (ed.), "*& %5 Volume 4, 668676. Oxford: Elsevier. fc. .%  // . Oxford: Oxford University Press Hengeveld, Kees, Jan Rijkhoff and Anna Siewierska 2004 Parts of speech systems and word order.    % 40: 527570. Jackendoff, Ray 1990 '/%'% % . Cambridge, M.A.: The MIT Press. Kayne, Richard S. 1994 ,-%3*//% *'*%:. Cambridge, M.A.: The MIT Press. Keizer, Evelien 1991 Referring in FG: How to define reference and referring expressions( G +& .% // 43. 1992 Predicates as referring expressions. In: Michael Fortescue, Peter Harder and Lars Kristoffersen (eds.), *  '% %    3    .% + &%, 127. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 2004 Term structure in FG: A modest proposal. G +& .3 % // 78. this vol. Reference and ascription in FDG: An inventory of problems and some possible solutions. Locke, John 1997 Reprint. - "* $  / I %. London: Penguin Books, 1690. Longobardi, Giuseppe 2001 The structure of DPs: some principles, parameters, and problems. In: Mark Baltin and Chris Collins (eds.), , #  $%/&3

 *'*%%, *, 562603. Oxford: Blackwell. Loux, Michael J. 2002 ;%&*5  $%/&  * 2% % (2nd. ed.). London and New York: Routledge. Mackenzie, J. Lachlan 1992 English spatial prepositions in Functional Grammar. G +&  .% // 46. 1996 English nominalizations in the layered model of the sentence. In: Betty Devriendt, Louis Goossens and Johan van der Auwera (eds.),

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$/&: '% % > - .%% + &%, 325355. (Functional Grammar Series 17.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2004 Entity concepts. In: Geert Booi, Christian Lehmann, Joachim Mugdam and Stavros Skopeteas (eds.), ; &*>-#23 %  G 3 /%, vol. 2. 973982. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. McGee Wood, Mary 1993 $%  // . London/New York: Routledge. Montague, Richard 1974 The proper treatment of quantification in ordinary English. In: . 3 / +&*( '% +&     ;%. Edited by Richard Thomason), 247270. New Haven/London: Yale University Press. Parsons, Terence 1990 "%% // "(-'%*'#%/'/%. Cambridge, M.A.: The MIT Press. Partee, Barbara H. 1995 Lexical semantics and compositionality. In: John Gleitman and Mark Liberman (eds.), (-2%%%$%', 311 360. Cambridge, M.A.: The MIT Press. Pesetsky, David 1995. a '*%:( Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Pustejovsky, James 1995 ,  %:. Cambridge, M.A.: The MIT Press. Reichenbach, Hans 1966 Reprint. "/%  '*/# . New York: The Free Press, 1947. Rijkhoff, Jan 1992 The noun phrase: a typological study of its form and structure. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Amsterdam. 2002 , 0 + . (Oxford Studies in Typology and Theoretical Linguistics.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. this vol. Layers, levels and contexts in Functional Discourse Grammar. Russell, Bertrand 1905 On denoting. ; 14: 479493. Scott, Gary J. 2002 Stacked adjectival modification and the structure of nominal phrases. In: Guiglielmo Cinque (ed.).%'% % +2+, 91 120. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Steedman, Mark 1993 Categorial Grammar.  90: 221258.



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Strawson, Peter F. 1959 2( - "*   &% ;%&*. London/New York: Routledge. Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1922 Reprint. , %% 3+&. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. First published 1918.



*         (    

    "  

    In the standard theory of Functional Grammar (henceforth FG), the distinction between reference and predication has always proved to be somewhat problematic, both before and after the introduction of the layered model (Hengeveld 1989; Dik 1989; see Keizer 2004). As such, this topic provides a genuine challenge for Functional Discourse Grammar (henceforth FDG): to design, within the broad outline of the model developed so far, a coherent, psychologically plausible and intuitively appealing way of dealing with reference and ascription.2 Traditionally, the terms reference and ascription (or predication) have been taken to belong to the realm of semantics. In FDG, however, they are used to describe acts performed at the interpersonal level. It will, therefore, be worthwhile to see whether the distinction made within the FDG model between an interpersonal and a representational level may pave the way for a more adequate treatment of reference and ascription. At this moment, however, it is difficult to evaluate the possible contribution the new model can make, since the internal structure of referential and ascriptive subacts (at the interpersonal level) and the semantic units (at the representational level) have not yet received systematic treatment; nor has the relation between the two levels been fully explored. If, in the development of the FDG model, we want to avoid lapsing into the same old mistakes, now is the time to reconsider the way FG dealt with reference and ascription. The aim of this article will, therefore, be to offer an inventory of the problems with regard to reference and ascription that can be, and have been, identified in existing treatments within FG (Dik 1978, 1989, 1997a, 1997b; Rijkhoff 2002; Anstey 2002), and to indicate ways in which (some of) these problems can be avoided in FDG. More specifically, this article will address the following questions:

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 What is the nature of representation at the representational level? What does the x-variable at this level stand for?3  Is it justified to represent/symbolize the (extra-linguistic) referent of an expression within a grammar model?  What is the relation between the variables at the representational level and any extra-linguistic entities in the contextual component? Is this relation part of the grammar model or not?  How can we best exploit the possibilities offered by different combinations between, on the one hand, the subacts of reference and ascription at the interpersonal level and, on the other, the different semantic categories of the corresponding expressions at the representational level? Throughout the article, proposals will be tested by applying them to copular constructions in English, as it is in these constructions that the distinction between reference and ascription is far from clear-cut. Detailed analyses will therefore be provided of classificational constructions (   ), identity statements ( 2'%"'% ) and identificational sentences (2/+% ), both at the interpersonal and at the representational level, first of all to demonstrate the need for a new approach, and secondly to show the advantages of the new analysis to be presented. This article is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses various proposals concerning reference in FG. Next, Section 3 describes the relevant new features of FDG, in particular those relating to the treatment of reference and ascription. It will be shown that, although in some respects the FDG treatment of reference and ascription is an improvement on former approaches, some problems still persist. Section 4 addresses more fundamental questions about the nature of the variables at the representational level and their relationship to the contextual component. It will be argued that if we conceive of these variables in a different way, this will allow for a treatment of reference and ascription that is both more consistent and more psychologically adequate. Section 5 demonstrates the advantages of the new proposal by applying it to proper names and pronouns, as well as to restrictive and non-restrictive appositive constructions. Finally, Section 6 offers a brief summary of the main points.



  &%. 

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% *     2.1. Standard FG: Dik (1978, 1980, 1989, 1997a) In standard FG, terms are defined in a seemingly straightforward manner as referring expressions (Dik 1997a: 127; see also Dik 1978: 55; 1989: 111): By a term we understand any expression which can be used to refer to an entity or entities in some world. The entities that a term can be used to refer to are the potential referents of that term. The entities that a term is meant to refer to are the intended referents of that term in that use.

To account for their formal properties, Dik (1978: 16, 57) offers the following general schema for representing terms: (1)

( /i: i (xi): j (xi): ... n (xi))

where  ! '       /i is a variable ranging over a set of potential referents and each "/i) is an open predication in xi. The representation is to be read as follows: the domain of the potential referents xi is first restricted to the set of entities of which i (xi) is true; this latter set is restricted to the subset of which j (xi) is true, and so on until the open predication n (xi) gives the last restriction on the set of potential referents. In subsequent versions of the theory of Functional Grammar, this basic schema for terms remained virtually unchanged (Dik 1989: 115; 1997a: 132). With the introduction of the layered model (Hengeveld 1989; Dik 1989), the number of variables was, of course, extended, which meant that the term variable xi was from then on used only in terms referring to firstorder entities (objects, individuals), while higher order entities (states-ofaffairs, propositions, speech acts) were all provided with their own variable. These variables (e, X and E, respectively) were also used in terms referring to these entities. At a later stage, the f-variable was introduced to symbolize properties (Keizer 1992a, 1992b; Hengeveld 1992a, 1992b). None of these changes, however, affected the basic function and structure of the term as defined in Dik (1997a): terms still consisted of a term variable, one or more term operators and one or more restrictors. Thus, the important distinction between the actions of referring and predicating was maintained, both within the predication and within the term (cf. Strawson [1971] 1950; Searle 1969). In Dik (1997a: 127), for instance, we read that

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The predication may be understood in terms of the two basic acts of referring and predicating  :'#    #  $   which something is going to be predicated; predicating means assigning properties to, and establishing relations between, such entities.

Within the predication, the difference was reflected in the distinction between the predicate (verbal or non-verbal) on the one hand and its arguments (typically filled by terms) on the other; within the term, between the term variable, representing a referent, and its restrictors, designating the properties assigned to this referent. Since the actions of referring and predicating were generally assumed to be mutually exclusive (Strawson 1959: 142), this meant that terms could not be used to fulfil a predicating function. Nevertheless, it was felt that in Dutch copular constructions of the kind illustrated in (1) and (2), the post-copular expressions do serve to fulfil a predicating function (Dik 1980: 99-101). The examples in (1) could be accounted for by arguing that the expression  is not a term, but simply a nominal predicate. Confirmation for such an analysis was found in the fact that in Dutch such bare nominals do not contain a determiner, numeral or quantifier, may appear in the singular even with a plural subject, and do not allow for (pre- or post-) modification. In other words, they behave more like adjectives than like the first restrictor of a term; consequently, these nominal expressions were analysed in the same way as adjectives in this position, i.e. as non-verbal predicates (with the copula being inserted at a later stage through the rule of copula support; Dik 1980: 100). (1)

a.    ( Jan is painter > - b. +%   ( Jan and Piet are painter >!5 - c. *  # /  . Jan is famous painter

In (2a), on the other hand, the expression  cannot be analysed this way. Here the post-copular expression displays several of the formal properties of a term (see also examples (2b and c)); as such, it was analysed as a term.



(2)

  &%. 

185

a.     ( Jan is a painter b. +%   ( Jan and Piet are painters c.    # /  ( Jan is a famous painter

Since, at the same time, it was still regarded as serving the same predicating function as the bare nominal in (1a and 1b), a predicate formation rule was introduced to convert terms into non-verbal predicates. This Term Predicate Formation rule, first introduced in (Dik 1980: 103), has remained part of the standard theory (Dik 1997a: 205): (3)

, /& % /% input: any term (t) output: {(t)} (x1)

A final important, and by now generally accepted, modification made in Dik (1989) concerns the nature of the entities referred to. Whereas originally referents were thought of as entities in the real world, Dik (1989) describes them as entities in the mind (Dik 1989: 113; see also Dik 1997a: 129). As such they are part of a mental world, which need not correspond to the real world but may just as well be a representation of some mythical, fictional or hypothetical world.

2.2. Hengeveld (1992a, 1992b) In Hengeveld (1989, 1990) we find the layered model presented for the first time. Inspired by Foley and Van Valin (1984), this model offered a hierarchical representation of the clause which distinguished between an interpersonal level and a representational level. The interpersonal level consisted of two layers: the clause, represented by the variable E, and the proposition (X). At the lower, representational level the proposition was in turn restricted by a State-of-Affairs (e) consisting of (at least) a predicate and one or more terms (x). At a later stage the f-variable was introduced to symbolize the properties and relations designated by verbal, nominal and adjectival predicates (Hengeveld 1992a: 31; 1992b: 52-55). The need for this f-variable is illustrated in the following examples, which show that anaphoric reference can

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be made to properties (such as  in example (4a)) and that these properties can take their own modifiers (as shown for the adjectival predicate %% in (4b)) (Hengeveld: 1992a: 33): (4)

a. #%# 24#*  ( b. # %% (

The f-variable also proved to be useful for the analysis of non-verbal predications (Hengeveld 1992b: 77-80), where the non-verbal predicate (whether derived or non-derived) could now be provided with its own fvariable. Hengeveld also differs from Dik  #      nstead of a category of term-predicates, he distinguishes a larger class of referential predicates, which  ! !icates based on terms, i.e. referring expressions with a nominal head, and predicates based on larger referential units, i.e. predications, propositions, and clauses"2#% !)**,( 77). Apart from these differences, however, Hengeveld   ' nominal non-verbal predicates was similar to that of Dik (1980, 1997a). Thus bare nominals like & % in (5a) were analysed as non-referential predicates, while post-copular terms like /*#%  in (5b) were analysed as referential predicates (Hengeveld 1992a: 32; 37; 1992b: 80), i.e. as predicates (f) with a referential expression (x) in their scope. The difference between the two analyses was reflected in their respective underlying representations (given here in simplified form):4 (5)

a. & %( a- {(f1: president)} (x1: John) b. /*#% ( b- {(f1: (d1x1: (best friend): my))} (x1: John)

Now, copular constructions with referential predicates come in different kinds. Although various typologies have been proposed (e.g. Gundel 1977; Higgins 1979; Declerck 1988; see also Keizer 1992b, chapter 2), most of them acknowledge a basic distinction between classifying (or predicational) and identificational copular constructions. Hengeveld (1992b: 91), too, makes this distinction, relating it to a difference in the definiteness of the post-copular expression: whereas in classifying constructions the postcopular expression is indefinite, in identificational constructions the postcopular expression is definite.5 Both categories of copular construction are subsequently further subdivided into (reversible) specificational sentences and (non-reversible) characterizing sentences. Specificational and charac-



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terizing sentences (whether classifying or identificational) further differ with regard to the number of referents they involve: whereas in specificational sentences subject and referential predicate refer to the same entity, in characterizing sentences the two expressions refer to different entities. This results in the following typology (Hengeveld 1992b: 89): ,#1. Referential predicates +     (reversible)      (definite referential predicate)

"

    (indefinite referential predicate)

,&%. +  {(fi: (dxi)} (xi) -# /

/ {(fi: (ixi)} (xi)

"  >  (non-reversible) +   % &%  6 .  {(fi: (dxi)} (xj) -%/ {(fi: (ixi)} (xj)

Note finally that so-called identity statements (e.g. Declerck 1988: 110113) are described by Hengeveld (1992b: 87) as specificational constructions & :. Thus, an example like (6) is seen as serving no other purpose than to state that two names, ; '% and "'% , may be used for the same referent set (xi). (6)

a. ,; '%  %"'% (simplified): a- (f1: (d1x1: Evening Star (x1)) (f1)) (d1x1: Morning Star (x1))

2.3. Keizer (1992a, 1992b) In Keizer (1992a, 1992b) I drew attention to what I still consider to be a major problem in both Dik  ! Hengeveld   '  -verbal predications (see also Section 4). Whether we refer to the post-copular expression as a term-predicate or a referential predicate, in both cases the implication is that such expressions fulfil two functions at the same time: they refer to some entity while at the same time they predicate a property of an entity (either the same entity or some other entity). This means, first of all, that referring and predicating are no longer two separate acts. Secondly, from a logical point of view it does not seem to make sense to assume that if in a copular construction an expression like /*#% is

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regarded as fulfilling a predicating (property-assigning) function, it should nevertheless be analysed as referring to an entity. In Keizer (1992a, 1992b) I therefore proposed putting the f-variable in non-verbal predications to a slightly different use. As in Hengeveld  analyses of such constructions, it was used to symbolize the property assigned to the expression in argument position. However, in those cases where the copular construction is a classifying one (whether specificational, descriptional or predicational; see Keizer 1992b: 90-96), the fvariable was no longer restricted by a term; instead it merely represented the property denoted by the (combined) predicate(s) contained within this expression. As the post-copular expression was no longer regarded as fulfilling a referential function, it no longer contained an x-variable. Thus, expressions like those in (7a) were seen as involving only one referent and one referential expression (); the expression   has a propertyassigning function and, as such, does not refer to an entity. Unlike in (5b therefore, the post-copular expression in (7) contains only an f-variable (representing the property) and no x-variable: (7)

a. John is a fool. a- {(fi)} (xi)

The two approaches can thus be said to differ in terms of what is given more emphasis: the form of an element or its function in the predication. Thus, in the Dik-Hengeveld approach the post-copular expression in classifying copular constructions is analysed as a referential expression because it has (some of) the formal properties of a term. In my own approach it is the function of this expression, as a non-verbal predicate, which leads to its analysis as a non-referring expression, despite the fact that it shares a number of formal properties with terms. Evidence supporting this latter stance can be found in the fact there are also differences in formal behaviour between referring expressions (in argument position) and the post-copular expressions in question. One of these concerns the set of pronouns used to indicate anaphoric relations with the two types of expression: whereas expressions like  or ## &* , when used to refer to an individual, will be anaphorically referred to by means of the definite masculine or feminine personal pronouns  or , the same expressions, when used predicatively, trigger the neuter definite pronouns %, 4 or %%, or the indefinite pronoun  (cf. Keizer 1992b: 124):



(8)

  &%. 

189

a. $ 5 %%' * %( b. $ ##&* ( ((  4%2%#5%(

In other words, there is both functional and formal evidence for the nonreferring status of post-copular nominal expressions. Note furthermore that the approach suggested is also more efficient in that it allows for a simplification of the theory: if the post-copular expressions in question are not terms but property-assigning expressions, they can be used as predicates straight away, which means that there is no longer any need for a term-predicate formation rule. Finally, problems also arise with the analysis of identity statements proposed by Hengeveld (1992b). First of all, it needs to be mentioned that  according to Declerck (1988), on whose work the classification proposed by Hengeveld is based  identity statements like (6) are not specificational (see Declerck 1988: 113). In true identity statements, where the emphasis is on the copular verb, neither of the two expressions serves as a specification of the other, nor does either of the two expressions predicate over the other. After all, given that the order between the elements is reversible, and the focus is on the copular verb, how can one determine which part predicates over the other? A more plausible analysis is one in which both elements in an identity statement are regarded as taking argument position (for more details, see Keizer 1992b: 167). A second problem concerns the fact that on Hengeveld   $   specificational constructions, as well as identity statements, take the form of xi = xi; that is as expressing a relation between two identical entities. As pointed out by Frege ([1892] (1977: 56), this would mean that a sentence like ,; '% %"'% does not differ from ,; 3  '%   % ;  '% , which holds  &  , and can hardly be thought of as informative. Clearly, however, the two statements do not convey the same message; moreover, identity statements can be highly informative. This suggests that an analysis involving equation of one and the same entity is not adequate. Frege     #!? $   a relation between two (identical objects), but as a relation between the names, or signs, used to designate these entities (Frege 1977: 56): What is intended to be said by _# seems to be that the signs or names  and # ! #     #         %   ! under discussion; a relation between them would be asserted.

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Effecting such %  /  ns to our knowledge"# 1977: 56) is certainly one function of identificational constructions (see also the discussion of non-restrictive apposition in Section 5). Identity statements, however, seem to serve a different function: here two previously introduced discourse entities are asserted to be identical (at least in the speaker ntal representation of some world). It would therefore seem more appropriate to regard these constructions not as merely asserting a relation between two names, nor as equating two identical objects, but as equating two separate (mental) entities. (For further discussion, see Section 4.) This leaves us, however, with the question of why it is that, in the case of a (non-referring) noun phrase in post-copular expression, a predicating element displays so many of the formal properties of referring noun phrases? Moreover, when faced with such a discrepancy between the (typical) form and function of a noun phrase, which criteria do we use to determine whether we are dealing with a referring or a non-referring expression? And is it plausible to assume that the distinction between referring and non-referring expression is a clear-cut one? In Keizer (1992b: 139) I tried to resolve this issue by distinguishing between prototypical and nonprototypical referring expressions.7 A prototypical referring expression (or '   ! % ' #  (8 (9) 

 %:  /:



%:

first-order entity nominal head no valency (is non-relational) all term operators may (in principle) apply argument9

The underlying assumption is, of course, that the category of referring expressions is a graded category: some of its members are better examples of the category than others. This in turn raises the question of whether it is nevertheless a bounded category, i.e. whether we are to assume that all expressions are to some extent (no matter how small) referring expressions, or whether there are also expressions which do not belong to the category. In view of earlier remarks concerning the distinction between referring and predicating, the latter option seems the more likely one. In Keizer (1992b) I therefore suggested using the third criterion (that of function) to determine category membership; that is to say, for an expression to be a (prototypical or non-prototypical) referring expression, it must fill argument position.10 It will be clear that this approach not only makes it possible to use the term non-referring meaningfully, but also leaves intact the important distinction



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between the basic acts of referring and predicating (see also Keizer 1992b: 360).

2.4. Rijkhoff (2002) This section will be concerned with one of the several additions and modifications to the theory of FG introduced by Rijkhoff (2002): the introduction of an extra variable to refer to the linguistic expression (in this case the noun phrase) itself. In his proposal for a layered structure of noun phrases, Rijkhoff (2002: 227-229) distinguishes between X and x: the former, as the referent variable, symbolizes the referent of the noun phrase, whereas the latter, the NP or term variable, symbolizes the noun phrase used by the speaker to refer to a discourse entity (Rijkhoff 2002: 228). This, Rijkhoff (2002: 229) explains, brings out the dual function of noun phrases: they have a referential side (concerned with the entity that is talked about and figures in the world of discourse) and a descriptive side (concerned with properties of this referent as a spatial entity). Rijkhoff uses this distinction to tackle the problem of identity statements. Thus, he argues (following Frege 1977), in sentence like (10), we have two different noun phrases (xi and xj) referring to the same referent (Xi). (10) ,; '% ?J5:@%"'% ?J5:@ A further advantage of such an analysis, Rijkhoff points out, is that the extra variable enables us to specify in the formal representation whether anaphoric reference is made to a noun phrase (x) or to the referent of a noun phrase (X). Consider in this respect examples (11a and 11b) (where A = anaphoric operator): (11) A: ;*# ?J5:@%4#%4  &  ?J5:@#he?-J@ /#%3 *( B: G**him?-J@ ?-:@H In this example the pronouns  and / refer to the discourse entity (Xi), whereas %% refers to one of the speaker !    ' $  noun phrase indexed as (xj).

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Both examples, however, turn out to be problematic. First of all, the most likely interpretation of (10) is one in which the hearer is assumed to be unaware of the fact that both descriptions can be used to refer to one and the same entity. Or rather, since entities are mental constructs, it may be more correct to say that the speaker realizes that there is a discrepancy between the mental representation of the hearer and his/her own, and, apparently convinced that his/her own representation is  "--ccordance with the speaker % ' $  #   !O  his/her mental representation accordingly. In other words, in the hearer  mental representation, the two descriptions correspond to two different entities. The speaker, to achieve his/her goal, takes the hearer   ctive, thus using the two expressions to refer to two different mental entities. This then also accounts for the fact that the sentence is informative: rather than Xi = Xi, the sentence states that Xi = Xj, the intended result being a mental world in which the two descriptions apply to one and the same entity (see also Keizer 1992b: 97). In (11B) we are faced with a different problem. According to Rijkhoff, the pronoun %% refers back to the noun phrase. Closer examination, however, shows that %% does not refer back to the noun phrase, but only to the restrictors within the noun phrase, i.e. the string & %%. This is clear from the fact that the anaphoric reference does not include any term operators (note that replacing %% by the relevant descriptive element would yield an indefinite noun phrase). In other words, the anaphoric relation does not hold at the level of the noun phrase, but at the level of the predicates within this noun phrase. In FG, this can be captured by analysing the anaphoric relation at the f-level, which means that (for the representation of this particular example) there is no need to introduce the extra NP-variable. 4 *     As the name suggests, the newly developed grammatical model of Functional Discourse Grammar (e.g. Hengeveld 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2005, 2006) is to be regarded as an expansion of Functional Grammar (FG) from a sentence grammar into a grammar that is also sensitive to discourse features. It has a number of novel features, some of which turn out to be relevant to the present discussion. One of these concerns the top-down nature of the model, which takes as its point of departure the communicative intention of the speaker. This intention, however, is not



  &%. 

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part of the grammatical component itself; instead it is conceived at a prelinguistic conceptual level. Information from this conceptual level functions as input to the grammatical component, where it triggers the formulation of linguistic activity. In addition to this conceptual component, the grammatical component is also linked to a contextual component, with which it interacts at various stages during the production process, and with an output component, which takes as its input the fully specified underlying representations produced by the grammatical component and converts these into the perceivable (spoken or written) expressions. A final important feature is the model   !  #&   rticular the distinction between a pragmatic module, which converts the prelinguistic, conceptual information into representations at the interpersonal level, and a semantic module, resulting in representations at the representational level. Thus, the interpersonal level accounts for all the formal aspects of a linguistic unit that reflect its role in the interaction between speaker and addressee "Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 671), while the representational level    for all the formal aspects of a linguistic unit that reflect its role in establishing a relationship with the real or imagined world it describes, i.e. it concerns designation rather than evocation, the latter being the job of the interpersonal level"Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 673). For referring expressions this means that they are no longer thought of as being built up in bottom-up fashion from the various predicates (now lexemes), but instead as originating as (sub)acts of reference at the interpersonal level. In other words, what we see is a separation between the pragmatic act of referring (representing the speaker      ' and the semantic means selected by the speaker to transmit this intention (in this case, the grammatical and lexical clues provided by the speaker to enable identification of the intended referent by the hearer). At both levels the relevant units are represented by different variables (see e.g. Hengeveld 2004a, 2005; Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006). At the interpersonal level, each discourse act (A1) consists of an illocution (F1), the two speech participants (P1 and P2), and a communicated content (C1). The communicated content, which contains all the information the speaker wishes to transmit in his/her communication with the addressee, contains one or more subacts. These subacts come in two kinds: a subact of ascription (T1), which reflects an attempt by the speaker to evoke a property, and a subact of reference (R1), reflecting an attempt by the speaker to evoke a referent. At the representational level we find the following (partly familiar) variables:

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(12) '/%% *>  Individual State-of-Affairs Propositional Content Property/relation Location Time

 #> x e p f l t

The general schemas for the representation of referring expressions at both levels are given in (13): (13) IL: RL:

( R1 [8":1):  (R1)) ( i: "i):  (i))

where  and  stand for the relevant operators,  and  for the relevant modifiers,  and  for the functions of the respective units, and, finally, R1 for the subact of reference and i for any of the variables listed in (12). Now, it will, of course, be interesting to see how these innovations affect the analysis of copular constructions. First of all, the distinction between a pragmatic level and a semantic level makes it possible to account for the fact that one and the same description at the representational level can be used to perform different kinds of subact at the interpersonal level (Hengeveld 2005: 13; see also Hengeveld 2004a: 12; Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2005). Consider in this respect the sentences in (14) and (15) (from Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006: 674): (14) a. ,%  ( (Ascription of zero-order entity: T/f) b.   

/& %% ( (Reference to zero-order entity: R/f) (15) a. '   ( (Ascription of first-order entity: T/x) b. )   %/%%( (Reference to first-order entity: R/x) In his analysis of these examples, Hengeveld distinguishes between the type of subact at the interpersonal level (T or R) and the type of entity designated at the representational level (f or x). Thus, in examples (14a) and (14b), the same property (     ! "    ' ' /

 



  &%. 

195

% % ) in (14a), but referred to in (14b). Similarly, in (15), one and the same the nominal expression, /*#% , fulfils an ascriptive function in (15a), but a referring function in (15b). In both instances, Hengeveld continues, the type of entity is the same: in (15a) a first-order entity is ascribed, while in (15b) a first-order entity is referred to (Hengeveld 2005: 13).11 This, however, leaves us with the same problem noted in Keizer (1992b) (see Section 2.3). According to the analysis offered here, the expression /*#%  in (15a) is used to ascribe a first-order entity to the referent of the subject noun phrase ('). First-order entities, however, cannot be ascribed; only properties can be ascribed. First-order entities are concrete objects, with their own physical properties (colour, size etc.); one can ascribe these properties to a concrete object, but one cannot ascribe one concrete object to another. It is, therefore, much more plausible to analyse sentence (15a) at the representational level as involving only one first-order entity (the individual Sheila) and one property assigning element (/*#% ). The difference between /*#%  in (15a) and (15b) thus not only concerns the type of subact performed at the interpersonal level, but also the type of entity involved at the representational level (firstorder versus zero-order). This leads to the following representations: (16) a. '   ( (Ascription of property: T/f) b. )   %/%%( (Reference to first-order entity: R/x) What causes the confusion is the fact that in both cases the same form of expression is used: a noun phrase. Now, as pointed out by Hengeveld (this volume), the prototypical noun phrase has a nominal head, is lexically designating,12 denotes a first order entity, and is referential. An example is the noun phrase /*#%  in (15b)/(16b). The noun phrase in (15a)/(16a), on the other hand, is not prototypical: here /*#%  is not used referentially (in terms of the definition of referring expressions in (9)) and does not denote a first-order entity. What we are dealing with, therefore, is a non-referential, non-prototypical noun phrase, which functions to assign the complex property (or combination of properties) /* #%   to a first-order entity. This non-prototypical status is also reflected in the fact that, despite first appearances, the expression /*#%  does not have all the formal properties of noun phrases either (witness the use of different anaphoric pronouns; see example (8) above). At the same time, it will be

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clear that the subact of ascription is carried out by non-prototypical means at the representational level: whereas an ascriptive subact is typically performed by means of a verb, adjective or bare nominal, here it takes the form of a noun phrase. Finally, let us consider the effect of the new features of FDG on the analysis of identity statements. Originally, the FDG treatment of identity statements was similar to the FG treatment proposed in Hengeveld (1992b). Consider once again example (6), here repeated as (17): (17) ,; '%  %"'%

In Hengeveld (2004a: 15), we read that   3 7")+8    prosodically prominent copula, serve the purpose of stating that the act of referring to an object by using a certain name is equivalent to the act of referring to that same object by another name; hence they are statements about the validity of acts of reference. .     $  rpreted as meaning that (17) consists of two identical subacts of reference, i.e. Ri = Ri. Obviously, however, this is logically impossible: every linguistic act is uniquely situated in time; even the exact repetition of a linguistic act results in a new act. Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2005: 16) therefore offer a modified analysis, according to which identificational sentences like (18) (i.e. Declerck )*11!   $!ifying sentences) are regarded as consisting of two different subacts of reference at the interpersonal level, but as involving only one entity at the representational level (see also Hengeveld this volume): (18) 2  IL: RL:

/      (R1: [+S, -A] (R1)) (x1)

+%

(R2: Peter (R2)) (x1)

The distinction of two separate R-subacts at the interpersonal level is clearly an improvement on the original treatment of identificational sentences. Nevertheless, the proposed treatment is still problematic. First of all, we still have an equation of two identical entities at the representational level. As pointed out before, however, for such a construction to be communicatively informative, the two descriptions, though possibly applying to one and the same entity in the speaker    !"!

 $ even the    !  $     esentation of the hearer. Secondly, sentence (18) is not an identity statement (unless the copula is given prosodic prominence). This is important, since



  &%. 

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the two types of construction seem to differ exactly in the status of the post-copular expression. To try and solve (part of) the puzzle, let us begin by distinguishing various kinds of   !-             !   'ictional or mythical world  something that /   !! $ ' $ !    situation or any particular speech participants. Secondly, there are the speech participants     '    ! -0    these will show considerable overlap, but there will always be differences between them. Thirdly, there is the discourse world (or discourse domain, Vet 1986), consisting (among other things) of entities introduced into the discourse by textual means, as well as entities present in the immediate discourse situation. In the model of FDG this discourse world is represented by the contextual component (see Connolly 2004: 103; Hengeveld 2004b: 369). In what follows, I hope to show that a further distinction has to be made between the discourse world (consisting of entities introduced into the discourse by linguistic means) and the immediate situation (perhaps better regarded as part of the real or some fictional or mythical world).13 Now, let us see what happens in the case of an identity statement. According to Dik (e.g. 1997a: 3), language is   '  ction between human beings, used with the intention of establishing communicative relationships-.  ommunicative relationships, in turn, are established with the aim of bringing about a change in the knowledge (or pragmatic information) of the addressee:  $ # ' %  ction both S and A possess a huge amount of pragmatic information, PS and PA, respectively. In saying something to A, S        ''  modification in PA ";3 )**+( *- 0 !   !   ''% $    have a more or less detailed picture of the pragmatic information of A. This estimate of PA is thus part of PS, but clearly not of the discourse world. We can apply this to identity statements by placing them in a context. Consider in this respect the dialogues in (19) and (20). (19) (Two people staring at the sky:) A: 56 B: G H2*%"'% ( A: )%2'%"'% (

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(20) A: , *%*#/( B: 2%%%4; *4/( A: )% *2'; *( In both cases, we have (at least) three different worlds or domains of reference. Consider (19). Here we have an immediate situation shared by A and B, which includes a clearly visible, and presumably uniquely identifiable object x1, referred to by A as  and by B as %"'% . In addition, there is the pragmatic information of the two participants, PA and PB. This pragmatic information can best be seen as mental representations of the real world (as well as of any number of fictional or mythical worlds). Since for both A and B the object referred to forms part of the real (visible) world, it can also be assumed to form part of their respective mental representations of this world. However, despite the fact that the immediate situation includes only one element x1, the expressions used to refer to this object,  and %"3 '% enter two entities into the discourse world. This situation corresponds to PB, which, judging from B  ")*   # '  discourse includes two entities: one labelled % " '% (an object already familiar to B) and now also one labelled  (an object B is not familiar with, and which he or she assumes to be a separate entity). The discourse world does not, however, correspond to A #' ation, in which the labels  and %"'% apply to one and the same entity. Thus A, believing his/her representation to be correct, sets out to bring about a change in the mental representation of B. To achieve this, A utters an identity statement with the intention of bringing B # information (i.e. B     '    !    his/her own. In this identity statement reference is made to two different discourse entities, the intended result being a modified PB in which the two discourse entities are represented as one entity. The example in (20) can be accounted for in much the same way, the only difference being that here reference is made not to something in the immediate situation, but to a (largely shared) fictional world. Once again, what are equated are not two identical entities, nor the descriptions used to refer to these entities, but two different discourse entities which, in some other world or domain, correspond to one and the same entity. Let us finally return to example (18). As pointed out before, this is not an identity statement. The intention of the speaker is entirely different. Instead of equating two discourse entities, the speaker simply enters a new lexeme (a new label) into the discourse, which applies to the (already iden-



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tifiable) referent of the subject noun phrase. This means that the expression +% is not used referentially here: this sentence consists of one subact of reference (performed by means of the pronoun 2) and one subact of ascription (assigning the name +% to the individual referred to by 2). I will return to the use of proper names in constructions of this kind in Section 5. 3           In the previous sections I have indicated a number of weaknesses in FG and FDG treatments of copular constructions and have tried, within the new framework provided, to offer some suggestions for a more consistent treatment of these constructions. The treatment eventually proposed differs from existing analyses mainly in the way in which the post-copular term is represented at the representational level: as a property rather than an entity in classificational (or predicational) sentences, and as a separate discourse entity in identity statements. The present section will address the more fundamental question of what exactly the variables at the representational level stand for, and, crucially, whether these variables should, in fact, be part of the grammatical component. This will be the subject of Section 4.1, which will present a new proposal for the interpretation of variables at the representational level. In Section 4.2 this proposal will be applied once more to classificational sentences and identity statements.

4.1. Variables at the representational level The grammatical component includes information relating to the formal aspects of linguistic expressions. These expressions are regarded as being built up, in a modular fashion, from linguistic primitives of various kinds (frames, lexemes, operators etc.). If, however, the grammatical component is meant to contain linguistic information only, it follows that the variables used within this component can only be interpreted as representing linguistic entities, i.e. either the linguistic primitives selected during the production of an utterance or the larger linguistic units built up from these primitives. At the interpersonal level, this requirement seems to be met. At this level representations contain all (and only all) the linguistic information needed to reflect an expression       ction. Thus, the discourse act, represented by the variable A, is a linguistic unit, brought into

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existence through the process of language production. The same can be said of all the other units distinguished at the interpersonal level.14 The fact that these entities, once created, enter the discourse world (feed into the contextual component) is irrelevant in this respect: they do not exist prior to the act of communicating and are, as such, linguistic entities. Nor does the morphosyntactic level form a problem in this respect. Here, too, the units represented (phrases, clauses) are clearly linguistic in nature, the outcome of the linguistic actions performed at the preceding stages of language production. Note that it is at this level that we now find the actual expressions used to refer to some entity (cf. Rijkhoff /-variable). But what about the variables at the representational level? In Hengeveld (2004a: 6) we read that 0  #    ative intention the speaker will in most cases have to fill his utterance with basic semantic content, i.e. with descriptions of entities as they occur in the non-linguistic world. M#       !     ' !     representational level. Thus, what we should find here are the semantic units used to describe extra-linguistic entities, not the extra-linguistic entities themselves. In other words, the variables at the representational level cannot be interpreted as representing extra-linguistic entities (of whatever type): the extra-linguistic entities described at this level are part of the conceptual or contextual component, not of the grammatical component. It is, in fact, not difficult to see why extra-linguistic entities cannot be part of the grammatical component. After all, as pointed out before, the relation between the description used and some (intended or selected) referent is one of intention (in the case of the speaker) or interpretation (in the case of the hearer). The relation itself is not established through language: the linguistic expression merely serves to enable the hearer to identify the intended referent (or restrict the set of intended referents). To achieve this, speakers will choose descriptions which are likely to lead the hearer to the intended referent, but this does not mean that the description actually applies to this referent (in the real world or in the discourse world); nor does it mean that reference will be successful. Neither the intended referent nor the relation between the linguistic description and this referent are part of the grammar; as such, neither ought to be represented at the representational level. This, of course, is a major departure from standard FG, where variables symbolized the intended referent(s) of an expression. Recently, however, the problem of what exactly the variables at the representation level stand for has been acknowledged, the result being a different conception of the role of these variables in FDG, namely as indicating the type of entity de-



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scribed by an expression (Hengeveld, p.c.). Now, although this is an interesting idea, it is not unproblematic. First of all, it would mean that the variables at this level no longer actually represent an entity, but merely serve as additional instructions to the hearer. If so, it becomes difficult to defend the presence of an index. After all, if the variable merely reflects the type of entity referred to, it will suffice to choose the right type of variable: since the types (orders of entities) themselves are unique, indexing becomes superfluous. Finally, indicating the type of entity described is not what variables are for: within FDG this is typically the kind of (nonlexical) information that is provided by operators (but operators on what?). I would therefore like to suggest a different use of the variables at the representational level; a use which combines the useful ingredients of earlier approaches while respecting the function of variables and the nature of representation at the representational level. What I would like to propose is to regard the variables at the representational level as symbolizing what I will call a speaker  /    '!  -. ! ' extension set is, of course, not new  going back at least as far as John Locke "* / % (1690)  and is generally defined as the set of entities to which the property described by a lexeme applies (e.g. McCawley 1981: 154; Hanna and Harrison 2004: 232; Allen 2001: 72).15 However, the exact nature of the relationship between language and reality has been an important subject of discussion in the philosophy of language from antiquity to the present. In their very detailed discussion of this debate, Hanna and Harrison (2004) distinguish two broad camps: the Russellians and the Wittgensteinians.16 The former are advocates of referential realism, which insists that there is a direct relation between a word and (some element in) the world, and that meaning is derived from this relationship. Wittgensteinians deny the need for such a link, believing instead that meaning exists independently of the external world. On a radical relativistic view, people have no access to reality at all, only to some mental representation of reality. In what follows I will adopt a moderate relativist view, according to which the relation between a linguistic expression and some extra-linguistic element is indirect, i.e. mediated by a level of mental (or conceptual) representation.17 Instead of the term extension set I will, therefore, use a similar but nevertheless crucially different term, that of speaker  /   (18

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(21) ;%:%%:&  The entire set of mental entities to which, in the view of speaker, the property (or properties) described by the lexeme(s) used in an expression applies (apply). As such, this mental extension set is not a set of external, extra-linguistic entities  first of all because a speaker cannot possibly know all the members of this set (which would mean that the speaker him/herself does not know what he/she is referring to); and secondly because, even if this were possible, no two speakers would ever select the same set (in which case communication would become impossible). Instead, this mental extension set can be seen as a linguistic entity, in that it forms part of the long-term linguistic knowledge of a speech participant, being determined by the meaning definitions of the linguistic elements in question in the speaker  mental lexicon.19 This does not, of course, mean that this information is completely invariable. First of all, the meanings of lexemes can change, lexemes can obtain additional meanings, and new lexemes are introduced into the lexicon. As part of the linguistic knowledge of a speech participant, however, the mental extension set of a lexeme forms a relatively constant factor. Regarding the variables at the representational level as symbolizing the mental extension set of the lexical elements (restrictors) used in an expression means that it no longer represents the intended referent (set), but the entire class of mental entities from which the intended referent (set) is to be selected. Thus, whereas the selection of the referent set of an expression may require further (context-dependent) information, including the kind of information provided by operators, the mental extension set exists independently of these operators (i.e. the operators have scope over the extension set) and is determined by lexical restriction only20 (Lyons (1977) uses the term tterance-independent- B      '    %!! $ the lexemes includes information about the type of entity described. It is therefore possible to use the existing range of variables to reflect this information; it is, however, not necessary to do so. Consider the simple noun phrase in (22) as an example: (22) a. % b. (1 prox x1: [f1: dog]) Here the term variable x1 symbolizes the mental extension set of the description, i.e. the entire set of mental (first-order) entities to which the lex-



  &%. 

203

eme dog applies. The term operators )! / %!' ' rmation about the intended referent; information which the speaker assumes will be required for the hearer to pick out this referent. The intended referent itself, however, is not represented at the representational level but either forms part of (or is introduced into) the contextual component or is assumed to be retrievable from long-term pragmatic information of the hearer. The relation between the description and the referent remains a matter of intention (speaker) or interpretation (hearer) and is therefore not coded in the grammar model. In this respect the approach suggested here differs crucially from the representation proposed by Connolly (2004). Connolly, too, assumes that the contextual component includes, among other things, the referents of the terms used in the discourse (Connolly 2004: 103). Where the present proposal differs from Connolly !    ation approach is that in his representations the variables at the interpersonal, representational and morphosyntactic levels are all co-indexed with (i.e. uniquely linked to) the non-linguistic entities at the contextual level. Thus we read that (Connolly 2004: 108) The line :CC:"/251, x252)7    % CK8     individuals x251, x252 (which are primarily constituents of the representational level, and given shape as JayN and KayN at the expression level) are referring to certain phenomena in the context. These referents are enumerated in the contextual description.

In the present proposal, by contrast, it will be assumed that the actual relation between the linguistic expressions and their intended or selected referents is not coded in the language, and should as such not be represented at any level in underlying representation. The subact of reference at the interpersonal level merely reflects the speaker   '  ntity, but is not in any way linguistically linked to that referent. Similarly, the lexical and formal features provided at the representational and morphosyntactic levels merely serve to help the hearer in his/her attempt to pick out the intended referent(s). The reference, may, however, not be successful, in which case the wrong entity is selected, or no entity at all. This is possible exactly because the identity of the extra-linguistic entity is not part of the linguistic expression. The links between expressions and extralinguistic entities will, of course, be part of the speech participants ntal representations of the discourse world. As argued earlier, however, these need to be distinguished from both the grammatical and the contextual components: the grammati-

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cal component contains only (largely shared) linguistic information, and the contextual component consists of shared knowledge only (identity of the speech participants, time and place of the discourse, (perceivable) entities in the immediate situation), while a speech participant  esentation of the discourse world may include much more information and may differ considerably from that of other speech participants. Next, I would like to argue that for the proposed use of variables at the representational level it is still useful to provide these variables with an index. Different (combinations of) lexemes introduce different mental extension sets and there is reason to assume that these need to be distinguished (uniquely) within the grammar model. Consider in this respect examples (23) and (24). (23) A: 2#%3   *% *( B: =5they:&5 %%*H (24) A: 2#%+%9PL%* ( B: They %5 %%*H So far the use of the italicized anaphoric pronouns in these examples has always been somewhat puzzling. Since they obviously do not refer back to the discourse referents explicitly introduced in the preceding sentences ( 3&* and +%9PL), their use could only be explained in terms of inference, with the pronouns referring to all the members of a class inferred from the specific referent. We can now explain this use of the definite pronoun %* by assuming that it is meant to refer to all the members of the mental extension set introduced by the noun phrases  3&* and +%9PL. For this to be possible, these extension sets must have been introduced as discourse entities into the contextual component, thus becoming available for anaphoric reference; as such it may be argued that, like all other linguistic elements, these extension sets need to be distinguishable from each other. Note finally that such an analysis confirms the idea that mental extension sets are determined by lexical restrictors only: what is included in the anaphoric reference in (23) and (24) is the information supplied by the nominal and adjectival lexemes (3&* and +%9PL/, respectively), not the information provided by the term operators.



  &%. 

205

4.2. Copular constructions revisited In this section I will describe the implications of the new proposal for the analysis of copular constructions. We saw that, as far as classificational copular constructions are concerned, the main problem consists in the fact that it is difficult to reconcile the function of the post-copular expression with its linguistic form. Since these expressions are used in an ascriptive function, they may be assumed to describe a property: after all, it is properties that are ascribed. Thus, in a sentence like $ , the noun phrase  is felt to describe a property to the individual referred to as Charlie. Such an analysis is supported by the fact that a separate set of pronouns is used to indicate anaphoricity with these expressions (the indefinite pronouns , as well as the neuter pronouns 4, %% and % in cases of an antecedent describing a person; again see example (8) above). At the same time, the form (a noun phrase, even if non-prototypical) suggests the presence of a (first-order) referent. Now let us look at expressions of this kind in the light of what has been proposed in this section. Consider the following example: (25) A: ;* +%9PL( B: ,*  %5 %%*H As in examples (23) and (24), the definite pronoun %* here seems to take as its referent a mental extension set; in this case the extension set introduced by the post-copular expression +%9PL. This clearly suggests that post-copular expressions do have an extension set, even if the description as a whole does not refer to a specific entity from that set. We can now exploit the f-variables and the (newly defined) x-variables at the representational level to represent this situation: (26)

,    IL: (T1) RL: (f1: [mx1: [f2: car]: [f3: old]])

At the interpersonal level, the post-copular expression is analysed as an subact of ascription (T1). At the representational level, we find a complex property (f1), restricted by the mental extension set x1 ( ), which in turn is determined by two properties,  (f2) and  (f3). The extension set is specified by the plural operator, thus giving the noun phrase   . Now the use of different anaphoric pronouns can be accounted for. The

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pronouns 4, %%, % and , in example (8) take as their antecedent the complex property ascribed to the referent of the subject noun phrase (i.e. f1). The pronoun %* in (25) takes as its antecedent the extension set of the description in post-copular position (i.e. x1). Finally, the indefinite pronoun  can be used to replace only the property ascribed by the nominal first restrictor (i.e. f2, as in , 4). The approach advocated also allows for a more insightful analysis of identity statements. Consider once more example (27) (cf. example (19); CC = contextual component): (27)

   IL: (R1) RL: (x1: [f1 8 CC: entity-1

   = =

%"'%

(R2) (x2: [f2 8 entity-2

The representations in (27) no longer involve any contradiction. Sentences of this type do not involve the equation of two subacts (there is no equation at the interpersonal level), nor of two identical entities. Instead, what is asserted is that the mental extension sets of the two descriptions (at the representational level) as well as their respective discourse referents (in the contextual component), taken to be different by the hearer, are (according to the speaker) identical. A sentence like (27) is thus informative in the sense that it is meant to change the pragmatic information of the hearer, both linguistic (equation of two long-term mental extension sets) and nonlinguistic (equation of two discourse entities). This shows that, although primitives (in this case lexemes) are part of long-term knowledge, they are not invariable. Different people may attach different meaning definitions to certain lexical elements. More generally, this means that, for the FDG-model to have some kind of psychological adequacy, it must be assumed that the primitives used for creating linguistic expressions (not only lexemes, but also frames, templates, operators etc.) are those available to the speaker, i.e. those primitives that are part of the linguistic pragmatic information of the speaker. Obviously, most of these linguistic primitives are shared by all adult native speakers of a language. Nevertheless, there are always borderline cases, where native speaker judgements vary. This can only be accounted for by assuming speakers to have access to slightly different sets of primitives. Linguistic knowledge, in other words, does not differ from any other kind of long-term knowledge: it varies from person to person and can be modified and extended.



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207

Note, however, that the change in pragmatic information brought about by an identity statement need not be linguistic in nature. In sentence (27) above, the modification intended concerned a change both in long-term linguistic and in long-term extra-linguistic (contextual) information: the new information being that the mental extension of the lexeme  is identical to that of the lexeme "'% , and that the two corresponding discourse entities are, in fact, one and the same. In other cases, however, the change is only a short-term and contextual one. Consider (28): (28)

,%/  IL: (R1) RL: (x1: [f1 8 CC: entity-1

   = =

/*# %  (R2) (x2: [f2 8 entity-2

Here, again, the speaker wishes to convey the information that two discourse entities, which correspond to two separate entities in the hearer  mental representation of the real word, are one and the same entity. The speaker thus asserts that in the given context (note the use of contextdependent elements such as %% and /*), the two expressions are coextensive. However, since the descriptive elements involved clearly have different intensions (or meanings), they can be used to refer to different entities in other contexts. As such, the descriptions in (28) are merely used as an instruction to the hearer to find the two discourse referents in question; their (long-term) mental extension sets are not equated. 2 +      The analysis of descriptions at the representational level proposed in the previous section can also be fruitfully applied to various other types of construction. In what follows we will look at some of these constructions: proper names and pronouns in Section 5.1 and appositive constructions (restrictive and non-restrictive) in Section 5.2.

5.1. Proper names and pronouns Let us first of all consider the analysis of proper names. According to recent proposals (Hengeveld this volume), referentially used proper names are analysed as referential subacts restricted by the proper name (a lexeme)

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at the interpersonal level. At the representational level, these constructions are represented by means of the term variable only: 24 

(29) IL RL

+%   *% *( (R1: Peter) (x1)

This analysis reflects the idea that proper names have a pragmatic function (identification of a referent) but are semantically empty and should therefore not be represented at the representational level. Application of the analysis proposed in Section 4, however, leads to the following representation in (30): 24 

(30) IL RL

+%   *% *( (R1) (x1: Peter)

Here, the proper name is represented at the representational level, as it is regarded as fulfilling a semantic (restrictive) function. It is true that proper names fail to assign a property, but they do have an extension set (all the entities known by the name Peter).21 Moreover, they do provide the hearer with semantic information about the intended referent (such as gender).22 Their lack of descriptive meaning is reflected in the fact that they are not provided with an f-variable. In this way we can account for the fact that anaphoric reference can take the form of a definite pronoun, but not of the indefinite pronoun . In addition, we are now in a position to provide a more plausible analysis of example (18), which, using a somewhat simplified form, was represented as follows: (31) IL: RL:

2  / (R1) (x1)

+%  (R2: Peter) (x1)

As the intention of the speaker is not to equate two first-order entities, we are not dealing with an identity statement here; nor is the post-copular expression used to assign a property to the referent of the subject. Instead, +% is used as a special type of ascription: rather than instructing the hearer to assign a property, it instructs him/her to attach the label +% to an existing discourse entity; or, to put it differently, to expand the mental



  &%. 

209

extension set of the lexeme +% to include the referent of 2. If variables at the representational level stand for the extension set of an expression, this means that the variables of the two nominal expressions in (31) should not be co-indexed, as the extension sets of the two expressions are not identical. I would therefore like to suggest the following representation instead: (32) IL: RL:

2  / +%  (R1) (T1) (x1) (x2: Peter)

Unlike proper names, the extension sets of first person singular and second person pronouns can be thought of as being fully determined at the interpersonal level, where 2will automatically be identified as the speaker and * as the hearer(s). It seems therefore justified to analyse these pronouns at the interpersonal level as restrictors on the R-subact. The status of the first person plural pronoun 4 is a bit more problematic, since reference includes individuals other than the speaker  referents whose identity is not determined by the reference act itself. The same is true for the third person pronouns, which provide the minimum of lexical information needed to lead the hearer to some intended referent (set). For these pronouns, representation at the representational level may seem a more plausible option. The fact that the pronouns / and  provide semantic information (on gender) seems to support such an analysis.23

5.2. Restrictive and non-restrictive apposition Keizer (2005, 2007) gives an analysis of the form and function of restrictive (or close) appositions of the kind =  G % % , % %  = G, % = G, etc. Although the different subtypes call for slightly different analyses, it is argued that all close appositions ought to be regarded as involving one referring expression (the appositional construction as a whole), which consists of two non-referential nominal constructions. Furthermore, it is argued that, irrespective of the type of close apposition, the first element functions as the head and the second element as a modifier. Translated into FDG terminology, this means that an expression like =  G % % is the result of a single R-subact at the interpersonal level, while at the representational level we find two elements: a proper name and a description. Since the extensions sets of the two ele-

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ments are clearly not identical, they will be represented by different variables (for arguments see Keizer 2005, 2007). Once again, the proper name is analysed as directly restricting the x-variable: since it does not assign a property, it is not provided with an f-variable. Observe also that, in accordance with proposals so far, the modifier is analysed as a T-subact within the R-subact.

IL: RL:

= G      (R1: (x1: (x2: [Orson Welles])

%% ( (T1) ) (x3: [f1: actor]) )

IL: RL:

,%      (R1: (x1: (x2: [f1: actor])

= G( (T1) ) (x3: [Orson Welles]) )

(33)

(34)





The present proposal also proves useful in the representation of nonrestrictive apposition constructions. Hannay and Keizer (2005) offer a discourse-based classification of non-restrictive nominal appositions in English, along with a (provisional) FDG-analysis of the various types distinguished. In the analysis proposed, the appositive element is in all cases represented as a separate discourse act, consisting of either a subact of reference or a subact of ascription. In one of the types distinguished, the speaker uses the apposition to reformulate the description provided in the host element. An example can be found in (35) (from Hannay and Keizer 2005: 173): (35) - '/  /   %%/%  / %% %  4 #  %%  %% 2 B  /#      *4 24 Reformulation can serve a number of purposes. In (35) the non-restrictive apposition *4 is added as a simplification of the description used the host element (). In examples of this kind, the host is typically an R-act at the interpersonal level, while the apposition will be interpreted as a separate discourse act consisting of a T-act only. At the representational level, however, both expressions will be analysed as having the same mental extension set: both descriptions apply to the same set of entities,25 the only difference being that the description provided in the appositive element is simpler or more accessible for the hearer than that provided in the



  &%. 

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host element. The actual lexemes used in the two descriptions are, of course, not identical. This leads to the following representation at the interpersonal and representational levels: (36) IL: RL:

      (A1:  (R1)  )Nucl (x1: [f1: jihad])

*4  (A2: (T1))Simpl (x1: [f2: war] [f3 holy])

1 "   This article has addressed a number of issues related to reference and ascription in FDG, all of which have turned out to centre around two main questions: (1) how to deal with reference and ascription in FDG, especially in copular constructions? and (2) what is the nature of representation, more specifically of the x-variable, at the representational level? In order to answer these questions a number of basic assumptions of the FDG model needed to be made explicit. One of these is the assumption that in the grammatical component only linguistic entities and relations are represented. It was argued that this requirement is fulfilled at the interpersonal level, where variables represent units that are created in the process of language production. At the representational level, however, variables are traditionally regarded as representing (discourse) entities; i.e. extralinguistic entities. In other words, whereas the referents of the units distinguished at the interpersonal level are part of the linguistic system, those at the representational level are not. This does not mean, however, that the information provided at the representational level is extra-linguistic. After all, it is at this level that the semantic content (or meaning) of an expression is specified, which is, of course, very much linguistic in nature. All that needs to be done to solve the problem is, therefore, to have the variables at the representational level represent the semantic content of expressions, rather than the entities referred to. It was therefore suggested that rather than the intended referent, the variables at this level be regarded as symbolizing the mental extension set of an expression. This mental extension set  the entire set of mental entities to which, in the view of speaker, the property (or properties) described by the lexeme(s) used in an expression applies (apply)  is part of the long-term linguistic knowledge of the speaker and is not directly related to any entity or entities in some (discourse) world; as such it fulfils the requirement of being linguistic in nature. Such an approach was shown

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to have the additional advantages of being psychologically adequate and of retaining representational and notational consistency over the various levels and modules of the model. In addition, the proposal calls for a strict separation of the grammatical and contextual components. Whereas the former contains only linguistic entities, the latter includes the extra-linguistic entities referred to by a speaker performing a referential act. Although the linguistic entities represented at the representational level may themselves become (extralinguistic) discourse entities (i.e., be fed into the contextual component), neither these extra-linguistic entities themselves, nor the relation between the linguistic expressions used and these entities form part of the grammatical component. Instead, the grammatical component is seen as consisting only of the (long-term) linguistic knowledge of the speaker, a considerable part of which (in most cases) overlaps with (long-term) linguistic knowledge of the hearer. Finally, it has been shown that the approach suggested not only leads to a moreconsistent treatment of copular constructions, but also proves useful in dealing with proper names and pronouns, as well as with restrictive and non-restrictive appositive constructions in English. &   1.

2.

3.

4.

Thanks are due to Lachlan Mackenzie for useful comments on an earlier version of this article and to Kees Hengeveld for fruitful discussions on the subject (which, however, have not yet led to consensus on all points; see Hengeveld this volume). I am also much indebted to the detailed comments of three anonymous referees, which, I hope, have resulted in a clearer presentation of my ideas. Any remaining errors or inconsistencies are, of course, entirely my own. In FDG, the term predication is reserved for the representational level, where it is used to describe the unit designating a state-of-affairs. At the interpersonal level, the term ascription is used in the sense of !#   perty of/assigning a property to some entity-   %   %  $  subacts of reference and ascription that are being performed; the linguistic means to perform these acts are specified at the representational level. This question is also addressed by Escribano (this volume), who describes  from the logician   '%w  the problems involved in the F(D)G use of variables, and their relation to sense, reference and the choice of NP. Following standard FG theory, the possessive pronoun is here a restrictor on the x-variable. As argued by Mackenzie (1987), it might be more appropriate



5.

6.

7.

  &%. 

213

to analyse possessive constructions as arguments (in the case of inherent relations) or satellites (in the case of possession proper) of the nominal predicate, with the semantic functions Reference and Possessive, respectively. Such an approach, the expression /* #%   would be represented (again simplified) as (d1x1: (best friend) (d1xj: I)Ref). See also Keizer (1992b, 2004). Note, however, that in most classifications of copular constructions (including Declerck 1988), there is no direct link between the type of copular construction and the (in)definiteness of the post-copular expression: generally speaking, it is assumed that both identificational and classificational constructions can contain either a definite or an indefinite post-copular expression (see also e.g. Keizer 1992b, chapter 6). The elements in this sentence can, of course, be reversed. In that case, however, the sentence is no longer regarded as a characterizational sentence, but as a specificational sentence. As pointed out by Higgins (1979) and Declerck (1988), the two types of construction are used in different contexts and exhibit different syntactic behaviour. Specificational sentences contain two referential elements, one of which is weakly referential (a kind of variable: we know the entity referred to exists, but cannot identify it), the other strongly referential (a value) (Declerck 1988: 5). The function of a specificational sentence is to specify the value of the variable, i.e. to fully establish the identity of the weakly referential element. It is typically used in answer to some (explicit or implicit) 4-question of the type 9 A      aS !   aphrased as a  ' #(d-The value (Y) therefore forms the focus of the sentence; as such it is given prosodic prominence and may appear as the focus of an %-cleft (2%+ %%%&%. ). Finally, specificational sentences have an /  %

!#( ey imply that the list of values satisfying the variable is exhaustive (Paris is the only capital of France). Hengeveld   &   ntences seem to cover Declerck  !ational and descriptionally identifying sentences (Declerck 1988, chapter 1). They are used to assign a property (i.e. provide information, in this case % &%. ) to an entity (+ ) and typically answer the question 9  is X (like)?/Tell me more about X-.      !Q   either element is given focal stress (the sentence has a neutral intonation pattern), and %-clefts are inappropriate. Finally, they are not exhaustive: Paris can be characterized in many ways. Note that Hengeveld (this volume) uses the notion of prototypicality in his treatment of noun phrases. According to Hengeveld  !'     otypical noun phrase (a) has a nominal head; (b) is lexically designating; (c) denotes a first order entity; and (d) is referential. It is important to realize that, despite the overlap in defining features, we are dealing with two separate types of category: where referring expressions form a functional category (partly defined in terms of form), noun phrases form a formal category (partly defined in terms of function). See also the discussion in Section 3.

214 8. 9.

10.

11. 12. 13.

14.

15.

"   This is a simplified version of the definition given in Keizer (1992b: 139). It might be argued that fully referential NPs can also appear in satellite position, as in  # %    ; *, where the (fully referential) NP ; * functions as a satellite term (with the semantic function of beneficiary). Note, however, that the basic distinction between referring and predicating applies to the nuclear predication, and that within this nuclear predication, full terms must indeed function as arguments. Moreover, if we assume that most prepositions (including  ) are predicates (e.g. Mackenzie 1992, Keizer to appear), it is not the term ; * that functions as a satellite, but the prepositional phrase  ; *, where ; * functions as the argument of  . This means that non-specific and generic expressions do belong to the category of referring expressions. They are taken to refer to some non-specific entity or a class of entities, respectively. As such they are not prototypical referring expressions; they do, however, fill an argument slot (and, therefore, are being predicated about). Note that on this approach, there is no longer a need for term-predicate formation (see Garc   and Hengeveld 2002). As pointed out by one of the reviewers, this term is tautological, in the sense that only (and all) lexical elements designate. It goes without saying that the contextual component contains more than representations of discourse entities and entities present in the immediate context. As, in this article, I am concerned with the availability and identifiability of discourse referents, I will restrict myself to that part of the contextual component that is relevant to the discussion. For further discussion of the contextual component, see Rijkhoff (this volume); compare also Escribano  "   % lume) distinction between Physical World, Psychological Worlds, Discourse Worlds, Speech-Act Worlds and Linguistic Worlds. For a discussion of the interaction between the contextual and the conceptual components, see Butler (this volume). Note that including the speech participants (PS and PA) at the interpersonal level is justified on account on the fact that what is relevant here are their roles in the communicative situation, not the (extra-linguistic) individuals in question. Since these roles are fixed elements of any communicative setting, and since their specific (discourse-dependent) features may be reflected in the formal aspects of a linguistic expression, their representation at the interpersonal level seems to be justified (for an alternative view, see Rijkhoff this volume). The term extension is closely related to the notion of !  "    to other related terms like intension, designation, connotation, meaning and sense; e.g. Frege 1892 [1977]; Mill 1856; Carnap 1956; Lyons 1977; for a discussion, see e.g. Harder 1996: 16-29). Unfortunately, these terms have been used in many different, but often very similar and partially overlapping ways, leading to what Geach (1970: 55) describes as  !  ' '  -



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215

16. Apart from Bertrand Russell, the realist camp is represented by such philosophers as Willard V.O. Quine, Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, Donald Davidson, Michael Dummett and John McDowell; among the followers of Ludwig Wittgenstein we find Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jacques Derrida. 17. For a detailed discussion of the cognitive dimension in meaning, see Harder (1996), Chapter 3. 18. Note that, despite its conceptual nature, this  /       same as the intension of a expression. The intension of an expression is generally defined as   

!  /

 "2 and Harrison 2004: 232), or, somewhat more specifically, as '  

iates to each world the EXTENSION of that expression in that world. (McCawley 1981: 401). The intension, in other words, can be seen as the meaning definition of a lexeme, that which determines its (mental) extension set. 19. One of the reviewers raised the interesting question of whether the concept of extension can be applied to temporal (t) and locative (l) terms as well. He or she correctly pointed out that in that case the difference between the expressions %%# and %%#, represented (in standard F(D)G) as (1x1: (f1: table)) and (1l1: (f1: table))Loc, respectively, cannot be derived from the meaning definition of the lexeme %#, but that the correct interpretation can be arrived at by analysing prepositions as lexical elements, with their own extension set. I do, indeed, believe that this is the right approach (see Keizer to appear). 20. I deliberately avoid use of the term &%% referent(s), since it is not clear to me whether the information provided by term operators plays a role in determining this set. 21. This has, in fact, been the generally accepted view among logicians since John Stuart Mill (1856): proper names lack sense but do have denotation; or, as Coates (2006: 371) puts it, properhood can be defined as    

! ting- Note that Coates himself prefers the term    

'#!'# perhood as $ ''# !iscounts the sense of any lexical items  in the expression that is used to do the referring"L  ,^^W(U+1Q--% descriptive expressions like ,  % or ,=  can become proper if they are used merely to refer to an object, without ascribing any properties. However, since (synchronically) senseless proper names (such as +% ) need not be used to refer (see example (32)), I still prefer the term senseless denoting. 22. For a similar view, see Allan (2001: 87-99). Here proper names are seen as designators conveying a certain amount of lexical information (e.g. referent is human, female, etc.). It is true that they are typically used as #!! #ators "K3 1972: 269), i.e. as designating the same object in any possible world (Allan 2001: 89). In that case, the proper name will function as a noun phrase (Allan 2001: 97). As a linguistic element, however, a proper name is a

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"  

noun, which means that it can be (and indeed often is) used as a regular first restrictor (see also Keizer 1992b: 97). 23. In logical semantics this may be an unusual point of view: here pronouns are typically seen as mere pointers, devoid of any meaning. Within the pragmatic discourse-based tradition, as well as in cognitive approaches, on the other hand, pronouns are seen as having a certain degree of lexical content. Allan (2001: 69), in an attempt to bring together the various views, describes pronouns as having %$    (-#- none for the zero anaphor;    ' /. 24. This example is taken from the British component of the International Corpus of English (ICE-GB), a fully tagged, parsed and checked one-million word corpus of written and spoken English, compiled and grammatically analysed at the Survey of English Usage, University College London, between 1990 and 1998. 25. Note that  has, by now, two senses: apart from designating a  ggle    #  !$ ! 4    !0 $ging war, it has come to denote any conflict waged for principle or belief and is often translated to mean  $   "4-Webster Online Dictionary). Although in example (35) the expression  can have either interpretation, the analysis provided here is based on the second sense of .

*   Allan, Keith 2001 0% '/%. Oxford: Blackwell. Anstey, Matthew P. 2002 Layers and operators revisited. G  +&   .% // 77. Butler, Christopher S. this vol. Interpersonal meaning in the noun phrase. Carnap, Rudolph 1956 ;0%*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Coates, Richard 2006 Properhood.  82: 356382. Connolly, John H. 2004 The question of discourse representation in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar !  J#   N mez-GonzE &"! - -04- %%  .% // , 211242. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.



  &%. 

217

Dik, Simon C. 1978 .% // . (Publication in Language Sciences 7). Dordrecht: Foris. 1980 '%  .% // . London/New York: Academic Press. 1989 ,, *.% // . Dordrecht: Foris. 1997a , , *  .% // ( + % 2> , '% %   % $ (Functional Grammar Series 20.) Second, revised edition. Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 1997b ,, *.% // (+ %22>$/&:  % % (Functional Grammar Series 21.) Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Declerck, Renaat 1988 '%  $&  '%5 $%  +%. Leuven: Leuven University Press/Foris Publications. Escribano, JosD6  &E & this vol. On noun phrase structure in F(D)G: Some conceptual issues. Foley, William A. and Robert D. Van Valin 1984 .%'*%:I  // . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Frege, Gottlob 1977 Reprint. On sense and reference. In: P.T. Geach and M. Black (eds.), 1977, , %  / % +& G %  %%# . , 5678. Oxford: Blackwell. First published 1892. Garc   ; !K 2#% ! 2002 Do we need predicate fames? In: Ricardo Mairal Us ! 4 Jese  5D& ]  "! - 04 + &%  - /% '% 3 %   .% // , 95123. (Functional Grammar Series 25.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Geach, Peter T. 1970    %*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Gundel, Jeanette K. 1977 Where do cleft-sentences come from?  53: 543559. Hanna, Patricia and Bernhard Harrison 2004 G cG . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hannay, Mike and M. Evelien Keizer 2005 A discourse treatment of English non-restrictive nominal appositions in functional discourse grammar. In: Mar J- &-GonzE &! J. Lachlan Mackenzie (eds.), '%  .%   // ,151185. (Linguistic Insights 26.) Bern: Peter Lang. Harder, Peter 1996 .%'/%(-, *;5'% % , "( Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

218

"  

Hengeveld, Kees 1989 Layers and operators in Functional Grammar. % 25: 127 157. 1990 The hierarchical structure of utterances. In: Jan Nuyts, A. Machtelt Bolkestein and Co Vet (eds.), * & %%  , *>  .% 4, 123. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 1992a Parts of speech. In: Michael Fortescue, Peter Harder and Lars Kristoffersen (eds.), *  '% %       .3 % + &%, 2955. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 1992b 03 # + %> , *5 ,*&*5  *. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2004a The architecture of a Functional Discourse Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzieand Mar! J#  &-GonzE &"! --04 - %%    .% // , 121. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2004b Epilogue. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar !  J#   N mez-GonzE &"! - -04- %%  .% // , 365378. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2005 Dynamic expression in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Casper de Groot and Kees Hengeveld (eds.) ; &*%% ":&   .% // 5 5386. (Functional Grammar Series 27.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. this vol. Prototypical and non-prototypical noun phrases in FDG. Hengeveld, Kees and J. Lachlan Mackenzie 2005 Interpersonal functions, representational categories, and syntactic templates in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Mar de los J#  G&-GonzE & ! >- 6  43& "! - '%  .%   // , 927. (Linguistic Insights 26.) Berne: Peter Lang. 2006 Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Keith Brown (ed.), "*& %5 2nd Edition, Vol. 4, 668-676. Oxford: Elsevier. Higgins, F. Roger 1979 ,+3%$% %". New York: Garland Publishing. Keizer, M. Evelien 1992a Predicates as referring expressions. In: Michael Fortescue, Peter Harder and Lars Kristoffersen (eds.), *  '% %    3    .% + &%, 127. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins.



  &%.  1992b

219

Reference, predication and (in)definiteness in Functional Grammar. A functional approach to English copular sentences. Ph.D. diss., Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. 2004 Term structure in FG: a modest proposal. G +& .3 % // 78. 2005 Close appositions. In: Casper de Groot and Kees Hengeveld (eds.), ; &*%% :&   .% // , 381417. (Functional Grammar Series 27.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2007 ,"0+ %0% %$%  %. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. to appear English prepositions in Functional Discourse Grammar. .%  15-2, 2008. Kripke, Saul 1972 Naming and necessity. In: Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (eds.), '/%0% , 353355. Dordrecht: Reidel. Lyons, John 1977 '/%. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mackenzie, J. Lachlan 1987 The representation of nominal predicates in the fund. G  +3 & .% // 25. 1992 English spatial prepositions in Functional Grammar. G +&  .% // 46. McCawley, James D. 1982 " *% %% %  -4* G% % 4 #% ( Oxford: Blackwell. Mill, John Stuart 1856 -'*%/51. 4th ed. London: John W. Parker and Son. Rijkhoff, Jan 2002 ,0+ . Oxford: Oxford University Press. this vol. Layers, levels and contexts in FDG. Searle, John 1969 '&%. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Strawson, Peter F. 1971 Reprint. On referring. In: Peter F. Strawson (1971), 3% +& , 127. London: Methuen. First published 1950. Strawson, Peter F. 1959 2. London: Methuen. Vet, Co 1986 A pragmatic approach to tense in Functional Grammar. G  +& .% // 16.



  <    $ %& '()% 

    This article has two interrelated aims: firstly, to develop the account of interpersonal meaning in the noun phrase given, within the framework of Functional (Discourse) Grammar, by Hengeveld and Rijkhoff; and secondly to illustrate some of the complexities which we must face up to if we are to develop an account which genuinely attempts to model the interpersonal dimension of the language actually used by speakers and writers. The main body of the article is arranged in four major sections, with progressively greater degrees of & #     'nterpersonal meaning. T,      '2#% ! and Rijkhoff with respect to those properties of units realized morphosyntactically as noun phrases which Hengeveld considers to belong to the interpersonal level of the grammar. This comparison will lead to the recognition, in TU of two types of broadly interpersonal meaning (in units realized as clauses as well as in those realized as noun phrases), one oriented towards the social and personal context of interaction, the other towards the discourse context (co-text). The remainder of the article focuses on interpersonal meaning oriented towards the social and personal context. In T@   ' /   ' different types are discussed, from both English and Spanish. Focusing down even further, TV     ! !   -based study of just one type of interpersonal modifier: the use of & in English as an indicator of the speaker or writer  $ ! !  '! the noun phrase. This study is used to illustrate the richness of detailed patterning which must be accommodated in a model which aims to show how we exploit the resources of our language in order to carry out important functional tasks such as the expression of attitudes. Some consequences of such data for the FDG model are outlined. The article ends with a brief section (TW &#       !-

222

$ %& '()% 

%   </< *?@         The current FDG model (see Hengeveld 2005, this volume; Hengeveld and Mackenzie 2006, forthcoming) consists of four components. The central  //% component interacts with a &% component which   responsible for the development of both a communicative intention relevant for the current speech event and the associated conceptualization with respect to the relevant events in the external real or imaginary world (Hengeveld 2005: 57), and with a %:% component which !    only contain a description of the content and form of the preceding discourse, but also of the actual perceivable setting in which the speech event takes place "2#% ! ,^^V( V1- .       %&% component which #     #!   ographic expressions (Hengeveld 2005: 57). The grammatical component consists of four levels: the % &  (pragmatic) level, which represents a linguistic unit in terms of the communicative function it fulfils; the & %% (semantic) level, which is concerned with the ontological status of a linguistic unit; the / &*3 %% level (called the % %  level in earlier work); and the &3  level, housing phonological representations (Hengeveld 2005: 5960). At the interpersonal level, the utterance is represented as a discourse move, consisting of one of more acts, each specified for its illocutionary force and its communicated content, this latter consisting of ascriptive and referential subacts.2 The schematic structure at the interpersonal level is as in (1) below (Hengeveld 2004a: 5, 2005: 63, this volume): (1)

(M1: [(A1: [ILL (P1)S (P2)A (C1: [".1) (R1) 8"L1))] (A1))] (M1))

Here, M represents a move, A an act, ILL the illocutionary force, P a participant in the discourse, C the communicated content, T a subact of ascription and R an subact of reference, and the subscripts S and A represent speaker and addressee, respectively. At the representational level, the schematic structure is as in (2) (Hengeveld 2005: 64, this volume): (2)

(ep1: [(p1: [(e1: [(f1) (x1)] (e1))] (p1))] (ep1))



2% & /%& 

223

where & represents an episode (a set of propositional contents joined together in narrative texts), & the propositional content,  the state of affairs,  a property or relation, and : an individual. Hengeveld (2004b: 372) notes that the structures proposed in FDG make available new slots for operators and modifiers, with respect to classical FG, and that one of the areas in which this would appear to be useful is the layered structure of the term phrase. He proposes a layered structure for the referential subact in which there are three sets of operators and three corresponding sets of modifiers. Hengeveld points out that the structure he sets out has the same number of operator and modifier slots as that proposed by Rijkhoff (1992), and claims that these slots can now be underpinned with their functions at various layers. Hengeveld (this volume) proposes the maximal structure shown in (3) for the standard or prototypical noun phrase, which is referential, has a lexical head, is used to designate a concrete first order entity, and designates by lexical means. (3)

(R RI: --":1): R (RI)) (x xi: (f f1: LexN (f1): f (f1)) (x1): x (x1))

R operators/modifiers are concerned with the situating of the referential subact in the communicative situation, while x operators/modifiers relate to the properties of the set of entities designated, and f operators/modifiers are concerned with the nature of the property f itself. At the R level we have operators for identifiability and specificity, concerned with the speaker  



 '      arer knows about the referent, and also modifiers indicating subjective attitude; at the x level we have operators for location and number, and modifiers indicating referent modification; and at the f level the operators are concerned with shape and measure, and the modifiers with reference modification.3 Hengeveld (2004b, this volume) points out that such a schema allows us to account for the different values of & in &   , where the adjective modifies the property of being a driver (i.e. (f) in the most recent representation),  &  /, in which it selects a subclass of the entities referred to by the head noun / (x), and & *6, where the adjective encodes a subjective attitude on the part of the speaker (R). In Rijkhoff (this volume), his earlier 4-layer structure for the noun phrase (see Rijkhoff 2002: 227) is expanded into a 5-layer structure as shown in (4):

224

$ %& '()% 

(4)

NPi: 4[ 3[ 2[ - [ 0[ (NOUN (fi))(xi) ]Lc 0(Lc) ]L0 1(L0) ]L1

2(L1) ]L2 3(L2) ]L3 4(L3)

where subscripts 0 to 4 indicate the five layers, / represents a term (NP) operator and /T a term (NP) satellite (parallel to Hengeveld  !' ' being a predicate variable symbolizing the property represented by the head noun, and x a variable symbolizing the referent of the noun phrase. Operators at layer 0 in this new model correspond to what in the earlier (2002) model were labelled as ? '$#    '$#/ &%, i.e. the kind of thing (e.g. individual, collective) being referred to by the head noun; level 0 satellites relate to the % of the type of entity represented by the head noun, as in % %  or  %*. Both operators and satellites at level 0 take the core layer (Lc) as their argument. There are now no operators at level 1, as indicated by the empty slot at this point in 4; level 1 satellites are concerned with more or less inherent properties of the referent normally expressed by adjectives in languages which have them. Level 2 houses operators and satellites concerned with quantity, i.e. number distinctions and cardinality. Level 3 accommodates operators and satellites which locate the referent in space and time. While levels 0 to 3 are descriptive, level 4 is concerned with the status of the referent in terms of the discourse itself, and so deals with definiteness and specificity and with notions of sameness, difference, etc. If we compare the latest schemes of Hengeveld and Rijkhoff, we see that Hengeveld f operators correspond to Rijkhoff 0 operators, in that both are concerned with specifying the nature of the property f itself. Hengeveld  x operators, however, cover two of Rijkhoff  #   namely 2 operators concerned with quantity and 3 operators relating to location. The R operators of Hengeveld    ! #   !'iability and specificity, clearly have the same role as the  4 discourse operators of Rijkhoff. Although there are clear, if incomplete, parallels between the two schemes in terms of operators, there is much less similarity between the two accounts as far as modifiers/satellites are concerned. Hengeveld  f modifiers would presumably include Rijkhoff   

'$# 0 satellites. Rijkhoff (this volume), however, rejects Hengeveld  $   '   interpretations of & in & % (f, x and R), partly on the grounds that no differences of scope appear to exist for the three meanings, and partly because subjectivity is a property shared by many adjectives, and indeed also by several other modifying categories. For Rijkhoff, then, all three readings would be analysed in terms of 1 (qualifying) satellites. Fur-



2% & /%& 

225

thermore, Hengeveld  x category presumably covers lexical expressions of number (Rijkhoff  1) and location ( 3). It also remains an open question as to where Rijkhoff  !       ".4), such as  /3 % or % / C%% , would fit into Hengeveld   Central to the discussion in the present article is the differentiation between, on the one hand, the expression of speaker attitude in the noun phrase, which Hengeveld deals with in terms of R modifiers and Rijkhoff in terms of the global qualification of a whole construction, and on the other hand the discourse properties of the noun phrase, which Hengeveld handles as interpersonal R operators and Rijkhoff as  4 discourse operators. It is to a more detailed discussion of this issue that we now turn. 4  ! (  (  < Attitudinal meanings and meanings related to discourse properties are similar in some respects but different in others. They are similar in that both are concerned with how the speaker or writer chooses to present the content of what s/he wants to say: in that sense, both are broadly interpersonal in nature. They differ, however, in that attitudinal markers are speaker-oriented: they represent the speaker  #     #'  particular point of view, while discourse properties such as definiteness are hearer-oriented, in that they represent the speaker  



 '   hearer   '3  !#e of the entities referred to in the discourse. These two types of meaning are sharply distinguished in Systemic Functional Linguistics (see Halliday and Matthiessen 1999, 2004), where attitudinal meaning falls under the interpersonal component, while discourse properties such as definiteness/indefiniteness and specificity form part of a textual component of meaning which has not been separately recognized in any version of FG.4 A number of types of evidence are cited by systemic linguists in favour of the recognition of these two components in addition to ideational meaning (consisting of an experiential subcomponent which is parallel to the representational level of FG, plus a logical subcomponent dealing with relations such as coordination, subordination, etc.). Although, as discussed in detail in Butler (2003a: 241-246), this evidence is in many ways problematic, it is at least possible to see a clear difference between the kinds of contextual parameter towards which the various types of meaning are oriented. The attitudinal content of a message (which I see as deriving from the affective/interactional part of a   component       onent TV-@-U

226

$ %& '()% 

is related to the context of interaction in personal and social terms, in the sense that the appropriate expression of attitudes depends on, for example, those social relationships between speaker and addressee which are reflected in the degree of formality of the interaction; on the other hand, discourse meanings such as (in)definiteness are related to the context provided by the unfolding discourse itself and its relationship with the world described. I therefore propose to distinguish, within FDG, between two types of broadly interpersonal phenomenon: those which are oriented towards the social and personal context and those oriented towards the discourse context. The distinction made here thus relies on a parallel distinction between two kinds of context. The  ial and personal context oposed in the present article forms part of what Connolly (2004a, 2007; see also Connolly 2004b: 103-104) refers to as ediate context        part of     /  $!scourse context       -text   ' L  $  !scourse context-0 similar vein, Rijkhoff (this volume) proposes that the contextual component of FDG should be split into two separate components, one relating to social context and the other to the co-text. The former is seen as a situational/external E-context, while the latter is part of the D-context, relating to the discourse. Thus there is now a considerable measure of agreement on the need to recognize the two types of context which underlie the distinctions I am proposing here. Note, however, that as we saw in T,2#% ! still appears to hold a very restrictive view of the contextual component, according to which it comprises the discourse context and & # aspects of the immediate situation, such as the participants and the entities available to interactants, a view which is perpetuated by Keizer (this volume). If we are to account for the kinds of phenomenon studied in the present article, we need to go beyond this, to include relevant aspects of the social situation as specified by Connolly and Rijkhoff. The split between two kinds of broadly interpersonal meaning proposed above clearly has implications which go beyond the noun phrase. Rijkhoff (1992, 2002, this volume, forthcoming) has shown that there are clear parallels between the layered structures he proposes for the noun phrase and those for the clause. Particularly interesting in terms of the topic of the present article is his suggestion that the clause should be provided with discourse operators and satellites, concerned with the actuality or nonactuality of the event designated by the clause. Rijkhoff points out that there is a parallel between these discourse operators and satellites and those for the noun phrase, in that both are concerned with whether the re-



2% & /%& 

227

spective referents do or do not have an identifiable place within the discourse world. Reinterpreting this in terms of our two types of interpersonal meaning, operators and satellites concerned with orienting the addressee towards the actuality or non-actuality of an event belong to that part of the interpersonal meaning which is oriented towards the discourse context, while those concerned with speech acts and certain types of modality belong to interpersonal meaning oriented towards the social and personal context. 3   <  !     

 # +#  A number of types of phenomenon can be considered to fall under the socially and personally oriented type of interpersonal meaning within the noun phrase. Firstly, there is the kind of item which served as an example of an R-modifier in Hengeveld   Q    xamples from English and Spanish are given in (5) and (6) below:5 (5)

+ /6 (BNC CK0 3608)

(6)

$

%/% B   Usually say-3PL that in the



/#   # man not speak . $  $ $ t home the poor man doesn 3-(CREA sample XXI, text 2M/2H-197-d [Venezuela])

  house

  the

&#  poor

In English, more than one interpersonal modifier is often used to emphasize the meaning, as in (7), in which neither & nor  carries its referential meaning, since the referent need be neither impecunious nor aged for the utterance to be felicitous: (7)

+ //*6 (BNC G12 2473)

Swear words are also good examples of interpersonal modifiers, which can be used directly as a modifier of the head noun, as in (8) and (9), or attached to another modifier, as in (10):

228

$ %& '()% 

(8)

2/4 4%#*/% . (BNC KD5 5835)

(9)

K #*/ 5/  . (BNC HH9 1051)

(10) '4#* %4 % . (BNC GUN 2153) Examples of R-operators are the diminutive and augmentative in Spanish, in some though not all of their uses. Compare (11), in which the diminutive encodes a representational meaning, that of small size (% = %% = 3 "),    rsonal meaning, in this case the affectionate attitude of the speaker towards the grandfather: (11) K* /  %  %% I I in house my have-1SG a kitten 0%# 3  (CREA Centro de ense &# %,WA^UA*)78 (12) K  / #%       And my grandfather-DIM was English !$#! C#   (CREA CSHC-87 text 115, [Venezuela]) In (13), which forms part of a conversation on football, this operator is combined with the choice of a modifier which itself carries interpersonal meaning. Note also the augmentative ending d on the word for 33 again carrying interpersonal meaning, but this time of a negative nature, contrasting with the speaker  $ $'   ( (13) &# % #d %      &%d( poor-DIM ball all to-it give-3PL kick-AUG     %$ #% ##33 (CREA, "%+ , 06/06/1986, TVE1 [Spain] The interpersonal use of the diminutive can carry other positive attitudinal meanings besides affection (as in 12) and sympathy (as in 13), as is evident in the following example:



2% & /%& 

(14) !#/ % /&%5   left-3PL all clean-DIM the

229

    &%  * vegetables peeled-DIM and

     /&% the cooking-pots clean-DIM 9 '%$ #!  %#    !!  cooking pots cleaned up "L:CL2L-87 Entrevista 158) So far, my illustration of interpersonal meaning which is realized in the noun phrase has been by means of examples of morphosyntactic modification through operators, and also lexical modifiers which have been presented as having an attitudinal function. There are, however, some complications here which need to be attended to. Firstly, note that even modifiers which convey a primarily attitudinal meaning often do so via their representational import. Consider, in this respect, example (15) below: (15) #4% %%%# %%#%3 %%' (BNC CG1 444) Although the modifier %% clearly carries on the positive attitudinal stance indicated by #%, it is highly unlikely that one would refer to one of the North American Great Lakes as % #% %% : rather, the smallness of the lake is seen as one of its charming features.6 Secondly, speakers have available to them another important mechanism for representing their attitude, namely the choice between attitudinally loaded lexical items and more neutral ones, or between positively and negatively loaded items, and this applies to head nouns as well as to modifiers. In (16), the use of the word 

 carries strong negative overtones, compared with the neutral 4/: (16)   %/&%/5%#% 

& & %/ &( (BNC CRE 2234) Consider also (17) and (18): (17) -%4/4%4%%*%%/%/  **4*#%3*%%#% % %( (BNC G07 126)

230

$ %& '()% 

(18) -/%% %    (BNC AE0 1984) In (17) the woman is presented negatively as being %, this being reinforced by other modifiers, %*, %%, / and 4*5and by reference to  % and %. In (18), on the other hand, the girl is presented positively as /, the favourable impression being strengthened by the further use of %% %. Similarly, in (19) we have an example where the property of there being many people living and working in a city is presented negatively by means of the modifier %, while in (20) the same basic property is presented from a positive viewpoint by means of #%: (19) '/  % % & & %* &  *4     /3  ;%% #% %%% ,*. (BNC AB6 1384) (20) ,   / 5 #%  % %    4&   /%%4%% & %( (BNC AM0 432) The examples discussed above demonstrate that interpersonal meanings can be realized at various places in a single nominal phrase, through the selection of attitudinally loaded nouns as heads, and of modifiers with an interpersonal function overlaid on their representational import, together with grammatical devices such as diminutivization in languages such as Spanish. In spoken language a further important contribution is made by the intonation, and sometimes also voice quality, chosen by the speaker. This tendency for interpersonal meanings to be strung out through nominal phrases has been commented on by Halliday and Matthiessen (2004: 238): indeed, it is claimed (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 61) that such osodic &   #     '  ning not only in noun phrases but also in the clause. This tendency has also been noted by Rijkhoff (this volume). It is not clear from the current literature how choices between lexical items with roughly the same representational content, but different interpersonal overlay, should be handled within Functional Discourse Grammar. Although the lexicon has become much more prominent in FG in recent years, largely through the work of proponents of the Functional Lexematic Model (see e.g. Mart Mingorance 1998, Faber and Mairal Us 1999), the factors involved in selecting from a range of possible lexical items, in order to refer to some entity or quality, have not received the attention they deserve. This is no doubt due largely to the concern of main-



2% & /%& 

231

stream FG practitioners to concentrate their efforts within the bounds of the grammar itself. Even in FDG, with its conceptual and contextual components, it has been made clear that the linguist   still with the grammatical component of the model. On the other hand, data such as those presented in the present article suggest that we need to go beyond this, to look at the role of the interpersonal component in mapping conceptual material on to linguistic categories, a process which is strongly conditioned by contextual factors. In this respect, Systemic Functional Linguistics, with its strong interest in the relationship between linguistic choice and context, has advanced rather further than F(D)G. 2     )<   5  ( 5.1. Introduction to the study In T,!T@  !   '  $  'rsonal meaning realized in the noun phrase is concerned with the use of adjectival modifiers with attitudinal function. This section reports the results of a detailed study of the modifier & in the British National Corpus (original version), using the concordancing program WordSmith Tools.7 The concordance for & (with more than 15,000 occurrences in the corpus) was sorted firstly on the position 1 to the right of the headword &  (henceforth position 1R), and within this ordering a further sort was made on position 2 to the right (2R), so facilitating the study of & as a modifier of following nouns. By means of the collocation tool provided by the software, the most frequent collocates at positions 1 to 5 to right and left of the headword were obtained. The concordance and collocation list were then used to study the properties of & as a modifier. Three main senses of & were found in the corpus:   %#   $ 



     '? $A A     ! rable/expected  the interpersonal use, to express sympathy. In the first of these senses, & collocates with the word &&, words for categories of people (e.g. /, %, &%) and for geographical entities (e.g.  , % %, ). In the second sense, it is associated with a wide range of items such as B%*, &  /, , %, / , %%, etc. It is, of course, the third sense which we are particularly interested in here.

232

$ %& '()% 

5.2. Types of nominal head modified by interpersonal poor In its interpersonal usage, & collocates at position 1R with several types of nominal head, and I shall concentrate on these collocates here, though it should be realized that some of these nouns will also appear at position 2R, with a further adjective between & and the noun (see also the discussion of these other adjectives in TV-U- Firstly, there is a very large group of examples where this modifier is followed by a proper name, which may or may not be preceded by a title (e.g. ; *, , ; C; C; + surname). We may also include here uses of names for relatives (e.g. ;/, *)when used as forms of address. Secondly, & is followed by the personal pronouns / (12 times) and * (11 times). The use of & with proper nouns and pronouns is commented on by Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 430, 520), and Biber %  (1999: 509) note its use with pronouns. Hengeveld (this volume) comments that given their interpersonal nature, proper names and personal pronouns would indeed be expected to take only interpersonal operators and modifiers, and that this seems to be the case (R6). Thirdly, there is a further large group of examples in which & is followed by a common noun. In Table 1 are shown all the common nouns at 1R which occur at least twice with & in its interpersonal usage.8 For each of these nouns, the total frequencies and the frequencies of clearly interpersonal usages are given, together with an indication of whether the combination appears in each of the possible syntactic environments.



2% & /%& 

233

(       <<  <   @ ( (     << 

 

 



! 

   <      < D<<(      !     D   <  <D<D<  <(            @   

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

* * * *

*

* *

* *

* * *

*

* * * *

* *

* *

* *

* *

*

*

* *

* *

* *

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

0  

C*   &'

?&'+<8 

C    &'

  

 C 

* *

* * *

 C

 C 

100 100 100 78 100 100 100 87 93 100 100 100 76 90 100 100 100 100 100 100 90 100 100 100 33 94 100 100 75 100 70 100 100 100

 C  

16 9 16 9 6 12 6 61 14 21 3 45 117 10 44 28 29 52 22 8 20 44 9 4 6 156 21 3 4 4 10 2 41 24

 

B  

&$-&

  A (

,#1( Interpersonal & + common noun at position R1, in the BNC (original edition)

* * * *

* * *

* * *

*

* *

*

* * *

234

$ %& '()% 

(D  

 <     D          

 

 

 

  <  ! D!  !D! !  

22 10 2 10 3 311 2 56 2 237 31 13 8 47 63 142 18 139 18

100 100 100 100 100 57 100 86 100 9 10 100 100 100 100 93 100 71 100

* *

*

* * * *

*

*

*

*

*

* * * * * * *

*

*

*

* *

* *

* *

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*

*

* * *

Table 1 allows us to draw some quite clear and interesting conclusions about the use of & as an interpersonal modifier with common nouns in the corpus. Firstly, note that 37/53 or 70% of the items in Table 1 co-occur with & only in its interpersonal meaning, and 42/53 or 79% of the combinations have & in its interpersonal sense in 90% or more of the cases. Examination of the nouns themselves reveals that they may be classified into five groups: (i) Generic nouns for male and/or female human beings, /, 4/, ,  , #*, ##*, & , &&,which are neutral as to register and also normally used literally, though they can occur with interpersonal overlay, as in example (21) below, where #* is clearly being applied to a man, quite probably advanced in years, and in example (22), where /* &  ##* is addressed to a grown woman: (21) ; .##4%:42/%  %  #% % * / 5 &   #*5 %    # %  /% %  %    &  %% %  ( (BNC HTG 0288)



2% & /%& 

235

(22) /%4  5 /%% %5#%/(=5 05/*& ##*54*(,%& *4*2% 4%*%/%%&%(2/%*& ##*(2*   %( 2 % 4% * /  :#%  * ( -/(( (BNC CCM 2662 2669) (ii) A group of words which also refer generically to a male or female human being, but which are informal in register: e.g. #, *, , &, 4C C, , .The data in the first column of Table 1 reveal an interesting difference between this group and the more neutral group: while many of the neutral items occur quite frequently with & in its literal sense of        ' &  used with the informal items is almost always the interpersonal one. The choice of an informal rather than a neutral lexeme serves to reinforce the sympathetic attitude encoded in & . This is even clearer with the nouns , 4,  ,  3 , , %/, *, , , # , #% , &, , %,  % , # , #% , all of which have a clear interpersonal overlay. Again, most of these nouns take & only in the interpersonal use, the exceptions being %/, # , 4 and %: significantly, when % is used with poor in its literal sense, it does not refer to a person but has its more neutral meaning of  O(iii) A set of words for relatives (/% 5 //5 //5 % 5 # % 5 % 545#), some of which, as we have already seen, can also be used as proper nouns. (iv) Words which refer not to human beings as wholes, but to their bodies (#*) and body parts, especially at the extremities (%C%55 5), though not necessarily so ( %). In these cases, the syntactic environment in the corpus is always that of a noun phrase with a definite, possessive determiner. (v) Items (?*@5 %) referring to domestic animals which are often treated as quasi-human (e.g. by the use of the pronouns C).  5.3. Syntactic environments Now let us turn to the syntactic environments in which interpersonal &

+ noun appears, as detailed in Table 1. We may recognize two broad environments (excluding the      # $ '    ' instances which did not fit into any of the other groups), both of which can be divided into sub-types:

236

$ %& '()% 

(i) Occurrence as an independent unit, which may be appositional or left- or right-dislocated: (a) simply & + noun: (23)   ,( (BNC G3B 1038) (24) '& %*unhappy,  , and perhaps  %%&*% %( (BNC ARJ 0569) (b) & + noun, preceded by a definite determiner (article, possessive, demonstrative): (25) 2 %% =,     I  $ %    4   45( (BNC CBF 12768) (26) )   5/4 /* #*% ( (BNC AC5 0976) (27)   . I4 4%%*4 ( (BNC K8V 3031-3032) (c) & + noun, preceded by a pronoun (*5C4) (28) =5  5. +.  (BNC CM7 1287-1288) (ii) In a noun phrase which is fully integrated into the clause: (a) indefinite, in a singular noun phrase with , /, *, , , 4%H or a plural noun phrase with zero determiner, numeral, /C*CC/*, %, etc. (29) + % # %%    % #  3%/ #      ( (BNC G1M 1560) (30) 2%%/*4/*% 5  4  4 # %/&%5 (BNC HGS 0535)



2% & /%& 

237

(31) 2% % %%%   %%#%4# %%*%4%( (BNC CB5 2955) (32)  2   * %        4 %* B% */%%% (BNC JSY 062) (b) with definite determiner, in a singular or plural noun phrase (33) 2%gave hope54 % 4( (BNC JY6 4179) (34) 4*% #%# %  % &% %/2  %( (BNC G02 0899) As expected from the anaphoric function of definite noun phrases, these structures are frequently used in place of pronominal reference, where a sympathetic attitude is being conveyed. (c) bare, with ellipsis of article in a singular noun phrase acting as Subject (35)  4542% %%( (BNC KBD 1631) (36) K % ( (BNC KCY 1899) (d) preceded by 4/: (37) 2 %  %% * *  % 4%   %  %   / %% &%*49Pb%%     4%%66 (BNC J1E 0700) (38) , /%#% 524 6  (BNC CD8 1141) Of these various syntactic patterns, the most widespread are that with a definite determiner in a fully integrated clause NP (52/53 or 98% of items include this pattern) and the independent form with no determiner (40/53 or 75%). In addition to combinations in which & is immediately followed by a noun, there are those in which a further adjective separates & from its

238

$ %& '()% 

head. By far the most frequent of these additional adjectives are CC (546 occurrences), %% (281) and * (34), all of which, significantly, refer to a property which confers vulnerability, through either age (low or high) or small size. The conditions for the use of these adjectives are more complex than those for & itself: while, as noted in T@  referent characterized as  does have to be adult (we do not find & ##*, for example), advanced age is not a prerequisite: + - % 6 (BNC KBL 0877) does not imply that Arthur is literally old. On the other hand, %% and * are not used for referents other than those which relate to small or young animate entities: for instance the speaker who says +  %% $ 6 (BNC GV6 2448) is unlikely to be referring to a seven foot giant. The types of noun which occur in these combinations are basically those which occur with & by itself.   5.4. Interpersonal meaning within a conceptual and contextual framework: Integrating the properties of interpersonal poor into FDG Z(L(1(4/%H,&.  We have seen that & , used as an interpersonal modifier, has a complex set of properties, involving strong collocational tendencies and preferred syntactic environments. What, then, are the implications of this rich patterning for Functional Discourse Grammar? The answer to this question depends on what we see as included in the FDG model, and this is something about which there is considerable ambiguity. For instance, although Hengeveld (2004b) and Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2006) present the conceptual and contextual levels as & %  the FDG model, in the latter account (2006: 669) we also find the statement that ;  #  component of a wider theory of verbal interaction- 0    !    extragrammatical components are % themselves part of FDG, but adjuncts to it, within the kind of wider theory of verbal interaction proposed for FG by Dik (1997). Thus there is still considerable reluctance to engage fully with the description of either the concepts which the grammar encodes or the context, social and personal as well as discourse-oriented, in which language is embedded and which shapes the formation of appropriate utterances, as well as being progressively modified by those utterances. If we take the more conservative stance, then all we need to do is what Hengeveld has already done, i.e. show that & can act as an interpersonal modifier, and set up appropriate structures within the grammar to deal with



2% & /%& 

239

this. But if we are committed to a truly functional explanation of why we use particular forms of utterances (and this, after all, is surely the ultimate aim of functional linguistics), then we must boldly go where few FG linguists have been before, and tackle the thorny issues of concepts and context, as well as the area of lexical choice, all of which have so far been the Cinderellas of FDG. What follows is no more than an initial step in this direction, using interpersonal & as an example. In attempting to account, within an FDG framework, for the complex set of properties displayed by interpersonal & in English, there are a number of issues we need to address: (i) What are the relevant concepts which the speaker needs to activate in referring to the entity which is viewed in sympathetic terms? (ii) Where do attitudes themselves belong in the global FDG model? (iii) What are the choices the speaker has available when s/he wishes to express a sympathetic attitude towards a referent using & ? (iv) Finally, how can the answers to the above three questions be integrated into an FDG account? I shall examine each of these issues in turn. Z(L(9(,&%# The entity itself will have a corresponding concept in the conceptual ontology on which the speaker draws, and this concept will preferentially be in that part of the ontology which is concerned with animate beings, either human or treated as quasi-human, such as entities with the conceptual features [ANIMAL], [DOMESTIC].9 Even more restrictedly, constructions with interpersonal & relate to particular subparts of the category  ( (i) concepts which represent specific human beings; (ii) concepts which represent generic categories of human being, characterizable by means of conceptual features such as [MALE/FEMALE], [ADULT/NOT ADULT]; (iii) concepts which represent relationships between human beings, characterizable by means of conceptual features such as [PARENT OF], [OFFSPRING OF], [SPOUSE OF], as well as gender features; (iv) concepts characterized as [BODY PART], and usually also as [PERIPHERAL].

240

$ %& '()% 

Z(L(<(G %%%#H Clearly, expressing some attitude towards a referent (or a situation: see later) has some extralinguistic basis, just as the expressions we use to refer to entities have a basis in the conceptual ontology. The question then arises as to whether attitudes and their expression are also part of the conceptual component. If they are not, then we need to decide just where in the overall model they are to be placed. A search for definitions of the term  $  '  #  search engine yielded two broad classes. Firstly, there is the everyday use of the term to mean a general idea. Secondly, we have the more technical definitions of the term which are of interest in the present context, and in which concepts are seen as mental entities which classify objects, events, properties and relations according to their shared characteristics. Clearly, then, accepted usage links concepts to entities (in a broad sense of the term) and their extensional properties, whose linguistic correlates enter into propositional structures. Attitudes such as sympathy, on the other hand, are not reflected in propositional structures, but rather in the situation-bound, non-extensional and non-propositional structures of the interpersonal level of the grammar. It therefore seems unwise to treat them as concepts. This view is confirmed by work on conceptual ontologies designed in association with computational applications, such as that embedded in the Mikrokosmos knowledge-based machine translation system (see e.g. Beale, Nirenburg and Mahesh 1995). In this system, the ontology itself is purely representational in that it consists only of concepts related to objects, events and properties in the world under description, while nonpropositional aspects of text structure are dealt with by means of icrotheories   '  #      logy. An alternative might be to see attitudes, illocutionary and perlocutionary intentions, and the like, as aspects of the mental context for the production of an utterance. This, however, seems to me to be incorrect. Context, as I see it, is a complex of factors which, in the production of utterances, condition both the choice of concepts and the selection of ways of representing those concepts linguistically; it need not, however, be part of what the speaker wishes to express. For this reason I part company here with the account given by Connolly (2004b), who holds that we do not need a separate conceptual component, but that if such a component is indeed proposed, it should be seen as a proper subset of the contextual component.



2% & /%& 

241

Since attitudes, emotions and the like are not concepts, and yet are still part of what we express using language,10 I propose that instead of just the conceptual component of the current FDG model, we should recognize a %% /&%, composed of two sub-components: the &% %%properand the %C% %%%,11 the latter being the home not only of the attitudes and emotions we express through language and also other means such as gesture, but also of the speech act forces we wish to convey: for instance, the speaker may choose directive speech act force and a particular, high level of politeness from the interactional content component (the second of these being conditioned by specifications in the contextual component), and this may then be realized linguistically in English as, say, a modalized interrogative (e.g. $*H). Furthermore, just as concepts can relate to  3  '!fferent kinds and sizes in the world under representation, so can the interactional content which accompanies them. For instance, just as a conceptual ontology can contain nodes for events (or more generally, what we might call situations) as well as objects (entities) and properties, so the interactional content may relate to whole situations as well as to the entities and properties which form part of these situations. For example, the modal concept of possibility may be attached to a situation, as in (39) below, or to (a property associated with) an entity, as in (40). (39) ; ,% /%&#*# %. (BNC AAV 1126) (40) 4 '% %  / *% * %%  /%  % 4   4#/4%4#%4% %&#%. (BNC AKY 0007) Similarly, a sympathetic attitude can be attached either to a whole situation (example 41), to an entity (42), or indeed to both (43): (41) 2

* %&& %  #%*%% %4 ( (BNC CEP 10522) (42) ,& /%54& ( (BNC GW8 0150) (43) 2

* %& /6 (BNC KD2 0840) The conceptual and affective/interactional content sub-components clearly link up with the representational and interpersonal levels of the FDG

242

$ %& '()% 

model, respectively. It also seems possible that they are related in interesting ways with aspects of human neurophysiology.12 Springer and Deutsch (1998: 181) report that 78          '   ! some qualities of humor seem to depend on right-hemisphere abilities- Schumann (1997: 216-221) and Wray (2002: 241242) survey a range of studies which link damage in the right hemisphere of the brain to abilities concerned with pragmatics and discourse structure, and with processing of emotional/affective aspects of language. The literature survey by Joanette, Goulet and Hannequin (1990), cited by Schumann (1997: 216-217), shows that the pragmatic effects of right hemisphere lesions can include organizational difficulties (e.g. with the combining of utterances into coherent discourse or the elaboration of stories), problems of interpretation (e.g. relating discourse to its context, dealing with metaphor, or understanding indirect speech acts), and difficulties with both production and comprehension of types of prosody which convey emotional reaction or speech act force. Both Wray and Schumann also cite the work of Locke (see e.g. Locke 1995), who postulates that first language acquisition is controlled by two different neural systems, one which has responsibility for what Locke terms  l cognition! nder the control of the right hemisphere, the other concerned with grammatical analysis, and under left hemisphere control. Particularly interesting in the present context is the account of Solms and Turnbull (2002), who distinguish between brain mechanisms for dealing with the external world of things and situations, and with the internal world of emotions, claiming (p. 19) that    3 '   to mediate this divide- .  '   of the brain which deal with information from the outer world are rily -dependent functions "- )@      #  ! #-fenced, using directed pathways in the brain. On the other hand, communication of information concerned with the internal world   #

!% % 4&  #% that reflect changes in the %% of the organism"-UV emphasis in original). This distinction correlates with a difference in the types of neurotransmitters involved: the channel-dependent functions are mediated primarily by the so-called  

      "/atory, such as glutamate and aspartate, or inhibitory, such as gammaaminobutyric acid), while what Solms and Turnbull call the   'ctions ! with the inner world, are also mediated through the action of other transmitters such as serotonin and dopamine (p. 36). In terms of language, what I have called conceptual content lines up with our perception and representation of the world, whereas affective or    



2% & /%& 

243

content rather reflects ption of % %%  % #%, not of the object world"-)^+-0     ''   ##   !stributed nature of emotional responses in the brain may be iconically related to the linguistic realization of affective meanings in distributed  !      '-contained propositions. Z(L(L($#%%&  Given the choice of a particular combination of conceptual and interactional content, a number of decisions need to be made about how the speaker  $ !  !!-0gure 1 are shown the choices which are revealed by the corpus-based study described earlier, expressed as the kind of system network used to model paradigmatic options in Systemic Functional Grammar. The notations used are shown in Figure 2, and the realizations of choices are given in Table 2. The symbol -'   3!  &  & -C''% $ twork and its realization rules account for the ways in which sympathetic attitude can be expressed lexically in the whole noun phrase, through the combination of choices in heads and modifiers. In this way, we can maintain Hengeveld    ' !  #   cular items, while at the same time accommodating the observation of Halliday and Rijkhoff that such meaning is often distributed  ! $   #   linguistic unit. Clearly, we could also add to the network choices which are realized phonologically, in intonation contours and stress. The systematization of speaker choice in this way raises the question of how such choices might be represented within a Functional Discourse Grammar. One possibility would be the incorporation into the model of an explicitly paradigmatic schema within the conceptual and affective/interactional components, on the lines of the networks used in Systemic Functional Grammar and co-opted for use here. Space does not permit the further discussion of this possibility here: for further detail of what a paradigmatic component might offer to FG and Role and Reference Grammar, see Butler (2003a: 235239, 439448; 2003b: 493494).





_

attached to referent

_

as situation





_

indefinite

personal

possessive

definite

_

informal item for head

_

2nd person

1st person

demonstrative

neutral

bare

added expression of sympathy in modifier

integrated

independent

. 1(Choices in the expression of sympathy







244     



2% & /%& 

x

245

x either x or y

y

y

x or y or z

z x y both (x or y) and (a or b) a b

x

a b

y

if x or y, then a or b or c

c

. 9(Notational conventions for system networks

 ,#9( Realizations of choices in the sympathy network   as situation attached to referent bare independent integrated indefinite 2nd person 1st person neutral possessive demonstrative added expression of sympathy in modifier informal item for head

*>  #C

* X, #C*/&%%%4  X,  */&%* X noun phrase with & as modifier &  isolated noun phrase noun phrase as constituent of clause , /, *, , , 4% + & (singular) zero det., numeral, /C*CC/*, %, etc. (plural) * before &

4/ before &

% before &

possessive determiner (/*, , * , etc.) before &  demonstrative det. (%C%, %%C%) before &  additional modifier (%%, ) after &

choice of head lexeme with feature [infml.] (e.g. , *)

246

$ %& '()% 

Z(L(Z(. /&%%C% %%%%% % % .  The structure in (44) for %& % , where the modifier is used interpersonally, is modelled on that given by Hengeveld (this volume): (44) (Def RI: ----":I): (fj: poorA (fj)) (RI)) (xi: (fi: doctorN (fi)) (xi)) We may now see this as the first stage in the linguistic representation of a       " ptual) entry which maps on to the English word % is accompanied by an (affective/interactional) entry corresponding to sympathetic attitude. This entails a lexicon in which lexemes are indexed for the conceptual and affective/interactional features which they realize. But this is clearly not the whole story. The choice of appropriate lexical items to encode the relevant content depends on selections from the contextual component, especially in terms of degree of formality. Adopting a highly simplified three-point scale of formality (informal, neutral, formal), we may say that the use of interpersonal modifiers such as & is characteristic of interactions with informal or neutral formality rather than those at the top end of the scale. This claim is strongly supported by the information in Table 3, which lists, for various combinations involving & , the sections of the BNC (World Edition) which have at least three occurrences, together with the frequency per million words in each section13. 



2% & /%& 

247

,#<( Distribution of combinations with & in the BNC (World Edition) "  poor thing

poor things

poor sod poor sods poor bugger poor devil poor devils my poor

you poor poor little

+  :&" written, fiction, prose spoken, conversation written, biography written, popular lore written, miscellaneous written, fiction, prose written, non-academic, humanities, arts spoken, conversation written, miscellaneous written, fiction, prose spoken, conversation spoken, conversation written, fiction, prose written, fiction, prose written, fiction, prose spoken, conversation written, fiction, prose written, fiction, drama spoken, interview, oral history written, biography written, fiction, prose written, religion written, non-academic, humanities, arts spoken, conversation written, popular lore written, miscellaneous written, non-academic, social science written, fiction, prose spoken, conversation written, fiction, prose spoken, conversation written, biography written, popular lore written, miscellaneous

&  

   58 15 3 5 4 12 3

A ( !  3.6 3.6 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.8

3 4 19 4 3 6 11 18 3 10 6 7

0.7 0.4 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.7 1.1 0.7 0.6 131.1 8.6

33 97 6 9

6.2 6.1 5.3 2.4

6 4 4 3

1.4 0.5 0.4 0.7

44 8 174 33 13 7 8

2.8 1.9 10.9 7.8 3.7 0.9 0.9

248

$ %& '()% 

poor old

poor young

spoken, live sports commentary spoken, consultation spoken, lecture, social science spoken, conversation written, fiction, prose spoken, interview, oral history written, newspaper, tabloid written, newspaper, other, social spoken, meeting spoken, broadcast discussion written, popular lore written, religion written, biography written, non-academic, social science written, newspaper, other, sports written, newspaper, broadsheet, national, miscellaneous written, miscellaneous written, non-academic, political, law, education written, non-academic, natural science written, non-academic, humanities, arts written, academic, social science written, fiction, prose

5

150.1

6 4

43.5 25.0

78 261 12

18.5 16.4 14.7

6

8.2

9

7.9

6 3

4.4 4.0

29 4 12 14

3.9 3.6 3.4 3.4

3

2.9

3

2.9

18 6

2.0 1.3

3

1.2

3

0.8

6

1.4

14

0.9

It can be seen that most of the combinations listed are most prevalent in conversation and in those registers of written English which might be expected to incorporate quite large amounts of dialogue (dramatic and prose fiction, biography): indeed, it is interesting that more use seems to be made of these expressions of sympathy in the simulated conversation of fiction



2% & /%& 

249

than in real conversation. This corroborates the findings of Biber % ( (1999: 509), who report that in fiction, premodifying & is commonly emotive. Furthermore, in informal contexts only, there is the further choice of whether to use an item of neutral formality such as  or /, or an informal term such as  or *C#C&. This second choice, as we have seen, reinforces the sympathetic attitude, even though items such as  or * do not themselves have any inherent interpersonal meaning. A third choice is to use as a head noun one of the items which does have interpersonal overlay, such as # C#% C# C&. Thus there are some items which must be marked in the lexicon for their conceptual and affective features and for their register specificity. Consider the example in (45): (45) ) %  4%  % % 5     %% % 4/  %  #%( " %%5 % &  %%  % ( (BNC CDE 1938 1939) In the production of % &  %% , the conceptual features [HUMAN, are activated  indeed, they are already activated by previous mentions of the same referent by means of other expressions (in the extract given in (45), these are % and  ). If all these features were realized in the linguistic output, the corresponding lexemes would be   or one of the more informal equivalents such as . But of course the speaker is not obliged to realize all the conceptual features every time the referent is mentioned. Instead, s/he may choose a superordinate term, such as , , corresponding to just the features [HUMAN, NOT ADULT]. The choice of  rather than , or rather than  , is motivated not by conceptual factors but by a complex of other considerations: sympathetic attitude, the contextual factor of informality, and also, in the case of , the socio-geographical characteristics of the speaker. Informality (or neutrality) in the contextual component also licenses the use of the interpersonal modifier & , and also, together with the conceptual feature [NOT ADULT], the use of the further interpersonal modifier %%. Also at the interpersonal level, we must represent the distinction between the uses which I have labelled as !ependent!    the noun phrase containing & is integrated as a constituent of the clause. The first type can be treated as a separate discourse act, while in the second case we have a referential phrase which, in the most recent manifestations of FDG, would be seen as constituting just one of a number of subacts within an act. NOT ADULT, FEMALE]

250

$ %& '()% 

By way of summary, let us look at the complete derivation of a particular noun phrase containing & , in its literal and non-literal uses. (46) 04%* %  45 # %%# % ( - *%*5#*/*  % % %& # ( (BNC FUB 0776 0777) (47) 2:&%%& # %/4% &&( (BNC HNY 2693) The contexts of these examples in the corpus show that in the first, both & and # are being used literally, to refer to an impecunious mendicant, while in the second we have the interpersonal use expressing sympathy for the person referred to. The noun phrase % & # in (46) reflects the choice of a conceptual configuration which specifies that we are dealing with a male person who lives by asking people for money or food, and that a property of this person is that he has little money. This configuration is encoded in the interpersonal and representational levels of the grammatical component as in (48), modelled on a slightly simplified version of the parallel structure given in Hengeveld (this volume): (48) (Def RI) (1 xi: (fi beggarN (fi)) (xi): (fj: poorA (fj)) (xi))Rec We have here a structure in which the referent is specified as a beggar and then as poor. Both # and & will need to be specified in the lexicon with reference to the conceptual configurations they realize (see TV-@-W- The structure in (48) is passed to the morphosyntactic level, where it is reinterpreted as in (49): (49) [[theArt] [[poorA]AP beggarN-]NP1]NP2 Finally, at the phonological level we have the configuration in (50): (50) /  / Turning now to the same surface noun phrase in (47), we need a very different configuration in the content component, in both conceptual and affective/interactional subcomponents. The only strictly necessary concep-



2% & /%& 

251

tual feature for the use of % &  #  in its interpersonally-oriented sense is [+HUMAN], but in this case (and indeed in the very few other cases of this usage in the corpus examined, though the sample is too small to allow firm conclusions) the referent is also characterized as [+MALE]. This use of # is specialized for co-occurrence with an evaluative, interpersonally-coloured adjective, which in this case brings with it from the affective/interactional subcomponent the feature of sympathetic attitude on the part of the speaker, although with adjectives other than & we may find different attitudes (e.g. envy in *# , mild criticism in *#3  ). We also have the specification of informality in the contextual component. All these features lead to the encoding of the content in the interpersonal and representational levels shown in (51): (51) (Def RI: (fi: beggarN (fi)) ":I): (fj: poorA (fj)) (RI)) (1 xi)Ag The structures at the morphosyntactic and phonological levels are the same as before. Z(L(Q('/& / *%%:%  The specification of lexical entries is not yet highly developed within FDG, so I shall make only a few brief and informal suggestions for how we might handle the kind of variation documented here. As shown in the previous section, a lexical entry may need to contain information not only about the conceptual structure represented by a lexeme and any affective / interactional components of the meaning, but also about contextual variables such as register and dialect. In Table 4 I present an informal specification for various lexemes discussed in TV-@-V14. Items in small capitals are assumed to be taken from the conceptual ontology. It must be emphasized that the entries sketched in Table 4 are not intended as anything more than preliminary informal notes: in particular, I do not wish to claim any inherent superiority for the notation I have used, and it is obvious that most of the conceptual labels used are themselves complex and in need of further explication. I hope, however, to have given some idea of the kinds of information which need to be present if we are to deal adequately with the complexities of interpersonal as well as representational meaning, and with social contextual variation in the lexicon.

+(   

 <(

N

N

N

N

N

child

kid1

lass

beggar1

beggar2

 

 



 

a 

' 5  

(x) & FEMALE (x) &

(x) & NOT (ADULT

(x) & NOT (ADULT

HUMAN (x) & HUMAN (y) & ((LIVE (x) (REQUEST (x, (GIVE (y, MONEY  FOOD, x))))Means) HUMAN (x)

YOUNG (x)

HUMAN

(x))

HUMAN

(x))

HUMAN

"    

SYMP (S(x))

  D   

 



,#

,#L(Lexical entries

Informal

Informal

Informal



Northern UK, inc. Scotland

" #    *<   

(xi)

(xi: (fi: beggarN (fi)) (xi)) (RI: (fi: beggarN (fi)) (RI): (fj: (LexInterpers-adj) (fj)) (RI))

(xi: (fi: lassN (fi)) (xi)) (RI)

(xi: (fi: kidN (fi)) (xi)) (RI)

(xi: (fi: childN (fi)) (xi)) (RI)

(RI)

+   

252     

+(   

 <(

A

A

A

,#

poor1

poor2

poor3

(x, LITTLE (MONEY &

DO (x,

Activityx) (BAD)Manner

___



POSSESSIONS))

HAVE

"    





' 5  

SYMP (S(x))



  D   

 

Informal/ neutral







" #    *<   

(xi: (fi: LexN (fi)) (xi))

(xi: (fi: LexN (fi): (fj: poorA (fj)) (fi)) (xi)) (RI: --":I): (fj: poorA (fj)) (RI))

(xi: (fi: LexN (fi)) (xi): (fj: poorA (fj)) (xi)) (RI)

(RI)

+   

        253

254

$ %& '()% 

The entry for  specifies simply that the referent must be characterized as HUMAN and as NOT ADULT. The entry for 1 (so labelled because there is at least one other meaning for ) adds to that of  the fact that the register must be informal for the appropriate use of the lexeme. For , we specify not only that the referent must be HUMAN, FEMALE and YOUNG (though not necessarily NOT ADULT), but also that that the register is informal and that the lexeme is used in Northern and Scottish dialects of British English. The entry for # 1 is that for the literal use, and specifies that a beggar is HUMAN and LIVEs by REQUESTing some other HUMAN entity to GIVE him or her MONEY or FOOD. In all these cases, the    pattern !    /  !  !  'eferring phrase. The entry for # 9, on the other hand, simply indicates that the referent must be HUMAN, and the structural pattern shows that this usage of # co-occurs with an evaluative adjective such as & and/or %% and involves an instance of speaker-bound, interpersonal modification expressing the speaker  $ $  !    '- The entry for & 1 indicates the literal usage, in which the referent is said to HAVE LITTLE MONEY and POSSESSIONS, and the structural pattern is for referent modification. That for & 9 is for the meaning in which what is being described is the bad manner in which the referent carries out the activity implicit in the designation (e.g. & % in the sense of one who does the job of doctoring badly), and so its structural pattern indicates reference modification; furthermore, the activity mentioned in the conceptual structure is indexed to show that it is the activity in which the entity characterized as &  is assumed to engage by virtue of being described by a particular head noun. The entry for & <, on the other hand, is the subjective, interpersonal use, specifying only the sympathetic attitude of the speaker towards the referent and the fact that the register must be informal or neutral, together with a structural pattern showing modification at the interpersonal level. During the process of language production, the speaker needs to draw on lexical entries such as these, together with information from the conceptual, affective/interactional and social contextual and discourse contextual components of the revised FDG model. For instance, consider the following input from the various components:

 



"       D   +   #      # 

2% & /%& 

255

[HUMAN, MALE, ADULT] Sympathetic attitude of speaker towards referent Informal register Referent already activated

The combination of conceptual and social contextual features allows15 the selection from the lexicon of an item with matching features, such as # or *,16 while the social contextual information leads to the choice of an entry for & in its interpersonal function, and that from the discourse context results in the choice of a definite noun phrase, signalled by the definite article %. The resulting noun phrase is thus %& #C*. Similarly, in language comprehension, if the speaker produces a phrase such as %& #, this gives the hearer access to the information that (i) the speaker is referring to a male, adult human being, (ii) s/he is expressing a sympathetic attitude towards this referent,17 (iii) s/he regards the context of interaction as informal, (iv) s/he regards the referent as already activated in the discourse and so recoverable by the hearer. 1 "    In this article, it was first demonstrated that the parallels between Hengevelds structure for the noun phrase within FDG and the structures proposed by Rijkhoff are not as simple or as complete as they might first appear to be. Detailed consideration of these proposals led to the postulation of two types of broadly interpersonal meaning, one oriented towards the social and personal context of interaction, the other towards the discourse context. A more detailed examination of the first of these types of interpersonal meaning, as expressed within the noun phrase, highlighted the need to study the factors which lead to the choice of one lexical item rather than another, an endeavour which inevitably takes us beyond the grammatical component of FDG, requiring an examination of the interaction between the grammar and the conceptual and contextual components. The way in which this might work was demonstrated by a detailed corpus-based study of the use of & as an interpersonal modifier in the English noun phrase. This study led to the postulation that the conceptual component of current FDG should be replaced by a content component, divided into two parts, conceptual and affective/interactional, a proposal which accords with what is known about the partitioning of brain functions and

256

$ %& '()% 

their mediation. The choices available to the speaker in the expression of sympathy using & were then systematized using a network notation. The stages in the conversion of a complex of conceptual and affective/interactional content into an FDG structure were then discussed, and finally some very preliminary and sketchy suggestions were made for the content of lexical entries relating to some of the lexical items investigated in this work. &   1.

2.

3. 4.

5.

6. 7. 8.

The work reported here was carried out within the research project Discourse Analysis in English: Aspects of cognition, typology and L2 acquisition, awarded to the SCIMITAR research group (http://ietsil.usc.es/scimitar) and sponsored by the Spanish Ministry of Education, FEDER funds and the Xunta de Galicia (XUGA) (grant numbers BFF2002-02441, PGIDIT03PXIC 20403PN). I am grateful to Lachlan Mackenzie and to three anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article, which led to substantial improvements. The usual disclaimers apply. In Mackenzies (1998, 2000) Incremental Functional Grammar model, a variant of FDG, the referential and ascriptive   ' 2#% !     re-labelled as    !     #$      !  2#% ! ! Mackenzie (2006). I shall adopt the term     The distinction between ' !' !' !'  is taken from Bolinger (1967). A broad interpretation of interpersonal meaning within FG is also found in the work of Hannay (1991) on the  !  ' 

# #ement     suggests govern the distribution of Topic and Focus pragmatic functions, and which he treats as subtypes of declarative illocutionary force. He thus treats as a kind of interpersonal meaning what, in SFG terms, would be treated as part of the textual metafunction. For discussion see Butler (2003b: 96-97). English examples are from the original version of the British National Corpus (see http://info.ox.ac.uk/bnc for details). Spanish examples are from the Corpus de Referencia del Espa    "L:C         !  http://www.rae.es. I am grateful to Gordon Tucker for first pointing out this interaction to me. For details of WordSmith Tools see http://www.lexically.net/wordsmith. Usually, the surrounding context indicated clearly those cases in which the meaning was representational (i.e.     # !' cases, especially with the noun &&, categorization proved more difficult. The frequencies given for interpersonal usages in Table 1 are for those examples which were clearly non-representational.

 9.

10. 11.

12.

13.

14. 15.

16.

17.

2% & /%& 

257

I leave open here the important and somewhat vexed question of whether conceptual features should be regarded as universal. Work on a Natural Semantic Metalanguage by Wierzbicka and her colleagues (see e.g. Wierzbicka 1992, 1996; Goddard and Wierzbicka 1994, 2002) suggests that we may indeed be able to express conceptual meanings in terms of a set of universal primitives, while Levinson (1997) claims that we normally package sets of atomic conceptual features into what he calls    -0$  that while some concepts are truly universal because of their importance in all human cultures, others are specific to particular sets of languages/cultures, and perhaps yet others to a particular language. What is clear, however, & the approach in Wierzbicka  3    !     nceptual and semantic representations (for discussion see Levinson 1997, Pederson and Nuyts 1997, Nuyts 1992, 2001). In other words, they are still part of    &  ! sense, as pointed out by Nuyts (2001: 6). The substance of this proposal is adumbrated by Hengeveld (2004b: 369), who states that 78   ptual component there is an important distinction between communicative intentions on the one hand, and conceptualizations on the other-2 %'    #%   'rable not to regard communicative intentions, attitudes, etc. as conceptual in nature. I am grateful to Lachlan Mackenzie for alerting me to this possibility and making me aware of the work of Solms and Turnbull. I am also indebted to Alison Wray for information on Schumann  3The information in this table was derived from the Variation in English Words and Phrases (VIEW) online search facility for the BNC World Edition developed by Mark Davies (http://view.byu.edu). Note that the frequencies given are for all occurrences of the word pairs in question, irrespective of their syntactic contexts. The word definitions are based on information in the Collins Cobuild Dictionary. It should be noted that the choice of a lexeme marked as informal is probably best regarded as an option in informal contexts, rather than obligatory, since a phrase such as % &  / would not be out of place in such situations. What is blocked, however, except for humorous effect, is the choice of an item marked as being formal. If the social and/or geographical dialect parameters in the contextual component were suitable, other more restricted choices such as   would also be possible. The question arises here of how the hearer knows that the speaker is expressing a sympathetic attitude rather than attributing an impecunious status to the referent. My intuition is that if the attribute of poorness has not been mentioned in the recent discourse context, and if & is not stressed, then the in-

258

$ %& '()%  terpersonal reading is the most likely, especially if other elements of the discourse context are conducive to such an interpretation. However, it would need a further study to corroborate or refute these hunches.

*    Beale, Stephen, Sergei Nirenburg and Kavi Mahesh 1995 Semantic analysis in the Mikrokosmos Machine Translation Project. In: +   % ' '*/&/  0%   + ?'0+3OZ@, August 24. Kaser Sart University, Bangkok, Thailand. Biber, Douglas, S. Johansson, G. Leech, S. Conrad and E. Finegan 1999 / // '&G %%". Harlow: Pearson Education Limited. Bolinger, Dwight 1967 Adjectives in English: attribution and predication.  18: 134. Butler, Christopher S. 2003a '% %   .%> -  % ,  ;  '% % 3 .% , ( + % 1> -&&  % % '/&: $. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 2003b '% %   .%> -  % ,  ;  '% % 3 .%, (+ %9>. /$% )*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Connolly, John H. 2004a Context in Functional Discourse Grammar. Unpublished ms. 2004b The question of discourse representation in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar !  J#   N mez-GonzE &"! - -04- %%  .% // , 89116. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2007 Mental context and the expression of terms within the English clause: An approach based on Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Mike Hannay and Gerard J. Steen (eds.) '% % 3.% '%  " // >2 ; , 193-208. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Dik, Simon C. 1997 , , *  .% // ( + % 2> , '% %   % $ (Functional Grammar Series 20.) Second, revised edition. Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Faber, Pamela and Ricardo Mairal Us 1999 $% %  :  "  #( (Functional Grammar Series 23.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.



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Goddard, Cliff and Anna Wierzbicka (eds.) 1994 '/%  : I  , *  "/&  .( Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 2002 ;I  // >, *"/& .( /19( Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Halliday, Michael A. K. and Christian M. I. M. Matthiessen 1999 $%  ":&  %  ;> - 3) -&3 & %$%( London/New York: Cassell. 2004 -2% %%.% // , 3rd edn., revised by Christian M. I. M. Matthiessen. London: Arnold. Hannay, Mike 1991 Pragmatic function assignment and word order variation in a functional grammar of English.  + /% 16: 13155. Hengeveld, Kees 2004a The architecture of a Functional Discourse Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar! J#  &-GonzE &"! --04 - %%    .% // , 121. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2004b Epilogue. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzieand Mar !  J#   G&-GonzE & "! - - 04 - %%    .% /3 / , 365378. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2005 Dynamic expression in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Casper de Groot and Kees Hengeveld (eds.) ; &*%% ":&   .% // 5 5386. (Functional Grammar Series 27.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. this vol. Prototypical and non-prototypical noun phrases in FDG. Hengeveld, Kees and J. Lachlan Mackenzie 2006 Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Keith Brown (ed.), "*& %5 2nd Edition, Vol. 4, 668-676. Oxford: Elsevier. fc. .%  // . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Huddleston, Rodney and Geoffrey Pullum 2002 , $/#  //   % " . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Joanette, Yves, Pierre Goulet and Didier Hannequin 1990 %/&  #$//%. New York: Verlag. Keizer, Evelien this vol. Reference and ascription in F(D)G: an inventory of problems and some possible solutions.

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Levinson, Stephen C. 1997 From outer to inner space: linguistic categories and non-linguistic thinking. In: Jan Nuyts and Eric Pederson (eds.), $3 &% %,1345. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Locke, John L. 1995 Development of the capacity for spoken language. In: Paul F. Fletcher and Brain MacWhinney (eds.) ,#$3 , 278302. Oxford: Blackwell. Mackenzie, J. Lachlan 1998 The basis of syntax in the holophrase. In: Mike Hannay and A. Machtelt Bolkestein (eds.), .% //    # 2% 3 %, 267-295. (Studies in Language Companion Series 44.) Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 2000 First things first: towards an Incremental Functional Grammar. -% % 32: 23-44. Mart, Mingorance, Leocadio 1998 " / :/!%3>   7 %   ; %  ; ( Edited by Amalia Mar :ales. Granada: University of Granada. Nuyts, Jan 1992 -&%   $%3+ /% , *  ( Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 2001 "&%/;%*5$&% %>-$%3 + /%+ &%. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Pederson, Eric and Jan Nuyts 1997 Overview: on the relationship between language and conceptualization. In: Jan Nuyts and Eric Pederson (eds.) $&3 % %, 112. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rijkhoff, Jan 1992 The noun phrase: A typological study of its form and structure. Ph.D. diss., University of Amsterdam. 2002 ,0+ ( Oxford: Oxford University Press. this vol. Layers, levels and contexts in FDG. fc. Layering and iconicity in the noun phrase: Descriptive and interpersonal modifiers. In: Christopher S. Butler and Miriam Taverniers (eds.), special issue of % devoted to layering in functional grammars. Schumann, John H. 1997 The neurobiology of affect in language. Supplement 1 to    48. Solms, Mark and Oliver Turnbull 2002 ,) %2 G >-2% %%%0  '#%":& . New York: Other Press/Karnac Books.



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Springer, Sally P. and Georg Deutsch 1998 % )  % ) > + &%  / $% 0 . 5th edn. New York: Freeman. Wierzbicka, Anna 1992 '/%5 $% 5  $%> I  / $&%  $% 3'&$ %. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1996 '/%>+ /I ( Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wray, Alison 2002 . /  %:. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



 <   !    <         ($*

    In English and many other languages, the noun phrase (NP) is capable of fulfilling a variety of functions. An NP may typically appear as any of the following: (1)

a. A constituent of a clause, for example subject or object. b. A constituent of another phrase, for example complement of the adposition within an adpositional phrase. c. An extra-clausal constituent (ECC), as defined and described in Dik (1997b: 379-407).

The category of ECC is subdivided by Dik (1997b: 383) into four positional subcategories: (2)

a. Freestanding or absolute (unattached to any clause). ":/&> Sam! b. Pre-clausal. ":/&> Sam, you have been most helpful! c. Clause-internal or parenthetical. ":/&> You, Sam, have been most helpful! d. Post-clausal. ":/&> You have been most helpful, Sam!

Among these subcategories, the present paper is concerned specifically with freestanding NPs, as found in (written English-language) documents such as books, articles, web-pages, and so forth. We shall take it for granted that any of these documents may contain not only language-text but also non-linguistic material, particularly images,

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such as pictures or diagrams. As Kress and van Leeuwen (1996: 39) remind us, discourse is in general multimodal. Attention will be focused here especially upon those freestanding NPs which can be characterized as being: (3)

a. Relatively peripheral to the main body of discourse. b. Characterized by the sort of syntactic structure for which Quirk et al. (1985: 845-847) employ the term  3 nguage.

The term  3 ##  !$]3 et al. to the following: (4)

a. b. c. d. e. f.

Headings. Titles. Labels. Notices. Newspaper headlines. Advertisements.

Quirk et al. (1985: 845) state that simple block-language expressions tend to take the form not of sentences but of NPs or nominal clauses. Other types of structure are also found. However, in the present paper, of course, we are concerned only with those of the NP category. Before going any further, let us make clear how the term B5 # used in the present paper. It will be assumed that (in English syntax) an NP consists of the following: (5)

a. A head-word, which is either a noun or a pronoun, and which is obligatory, except in instances of ellipsis b. Optionally, one or more modifiers. Structurally, a modifier may comprise (i) a single word, (ii) a group of two or more words forming an embedded phrase, or (iii) an embedded clause. Subject to various constraints, modifiers may appear either before or after the head-word. However, because modifiers are generally optional, it is possible for an NP to contain just its head-word.

We need also to consider the representation of freestanding NPs within FDG. As an example, let us suppose that the NP ,+ #/ (6a) occurs as the heading of a chapter in a document. This NP would be represented along the lines of (6b) at the interpersonal level and (6c) at the representational level:2



(6)

. %& 4%/%

265

a. ,+ #/ b. (+id R1: T1 (R1)) c. (1p1: (f1: problemN (f1)) (p1))

No syntactic or semantic function has been assigned to this NP, as the term plays no role within any larger grammatical structure. (If one were to insist upon at least a semantic function, then this would presumably have to be f on grounds of consistency with possible expansions such as ,  % & #/ or , & #/   4 in which the f '    !  assigned to the NP in question.) Nor is any proposition-related representation suggested, since (6a) does not embody a claim of either truth or falsity. Rather, the salient function of the chapter-heading (6) consists in its discourse-pragmatic role of introducing (or ushering in), and at the same time encapsulating, the ensuing  !$/       -6 us, therefore, turn to the subject of pragmatics, for it is with this domain, rather than with grammatical details, that the present paper is fundamentally concerned.3 In the next section we shall consider how freestanding NPs may be treated from the point of view of pragmatics and discourse, within the framework of Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG) outlined by Hengeveld (2004a, 2004b). This will lead on to a discussion of the implications for the broader theory of verbal interaction envisaged by Dik (1997a: 4). Finally, some general conclusions will be drawn. % '<      <    Let us, then, consider the pragmatic treatment of freestanding NPs. We shall begin with functions that reflect the structure and subject-matter of discourse, such as the titles of books or articles and the headings of chapters, sections and sub-sections within individual chapters. A freestanding constituent is, as noted above, a type of ECC. Dik (1997b: 384) states that an ECC may have one of the following functions:

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(7)

a. Interaction management ":/&> Kim! (attracting the addressee    ! to engagement in conversation). b. Attitude specification ":/&> Wow! (expressing amazement). c. Discourse organization ":/&> Introduction (as a chapter heading). d. Discourse execution ":/&> Yes (in response to a question during the conduct of a conversation).

Clearly, the kind of headings with which we are currently concerned belong in principle to Dik '  # $ '!    #& - However, there is a slight problem here. Dik (1997b: 386-403) divides the category in question into the following subcategories: (8)

a. Boundary marking ":/&> Anyway... (indicating the transition of one part of a conversation to the next part). b. Orientation ":/&> As for you, ... c. Tail ":/&> [It # !8  -

All of these subcategories apply to constituents that are attached to clauses, rather than to freestanding items like headings or titles, and are therefore not suitable for our present purpose. Instead, we shall employ a subset of the functions identified by Quirk et al. (listed in (4) above), plus some others: (9)

a. b. c. d. e. f.

Heading Titling Prelim Finish Label Caption

These terms will be explicated more fully as we proceed. (It is possible that future research will indicate the need for additional functions, but for present purposes we shall confine ourselves to those in (9).)



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2.1. Heading, Titling, Prelim and Finish First of all, we shall consider headings and titlings. A  !# %   usher in a particular unit within the discourse hierarchy. Headings can be layered, with the topmost (layer-1) being the most general, while subordinate headings occupy layer-2, and so on downwards. For purposes of discourse representation, a layer-1 heading may be denoted as in (10a), a layer-2 subheading as in (10b), and so on. (10) a. heading[1] b. heading[2] A  #   % ! #  ' !   ' some self-contained item (such as an image) that appears within a document. The term  # !!  mpass not only the title itself, but also any directly-associated material, particularly the name of the author, if this is juxtaposed to the title. How may we accommodate headings and titlings within the framework of FDG? Let us start with an example. Suppose that we have a book called .%% by J. Smith, and that we are going to treat this book as constituting a single, coherent discourse. Suppose also that the first chapter is headed 2% %, and that we are going to regard that chapter as one of the transactions within the discourse concerned (though not necessarily the first, as there may, for example, be a preface). Suppose, further, that the opening sentence of the first chapter reads: .% 3 %  % %*  /    *%/  / //%( In sum: (11) a. ,%#> Functional Linguistics J. Smith b.  %&% > Introduction c. '% %#* %&% > Functional Linguistics is the study of human language as a system of human communication. In the present example, the titling of the book can, in fact, be considered to be the opening move in the entire discourse. This move contains two assertive acts, communicating respectively the title and the author.

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Note that if the title had been .% %> G%   % ;2H5 then this would, in itself, have consisted of two acts: an assertion and a question.4 The second of these acts would conventionally be called the  -titlet the latter term is not really necessary for our purposes. The titling in (11a) also doubles up as the topmost heading of the discourse hierarchy. However, a titling can generally be expected to do more than just usher in the text of the document. It can also be expected to provide what we might (figuratively) call the '     !  esents to the outside world. That is to say, the titling generally appears on the cover of the document, and furthermore it serves to identify the document distinctively (and perhaps uniquely) and thus to provide a handle for storage and retrieval, as for instance in a situation where books or reports are catalogued and requested by their authors and titles. Consequently, we shall treat the function of  #   distinct from that of  !#- Moreover, we shall encounter examples below in which titlings do not simultaneously serve as headings. Accordingly, employing (in essence) the style of discourse representation developed in Connolly (2004) and omitting dispensable detail, we may represent the material in (11) in the following manner:5 (12) ENTER DISCOURSE D1  ENTER MOVE M1 M1 = titling = heading[1]  ENTER ACT A1 /* %%# */6 A1: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m1) (Audience)] (A1) ILLS(A1) = ILLA(A1) = representative LEAVE ACT A1 ENTER ACT A2 /* % # */ A2: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m2) (Audience)] (A2) ILLS(A2) = ILLA(A2) = representative LEAVE ACT A2 LEAVE MOVE M1   ENTER TRANSACTION T2  ENTER MOVE M11



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269

M11 = heading[2]  ENTER ACT A51 /*  %&% */ A51: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m51) (Audience)] (A51) ILLS(A51) = ILLA(A51) = representative LEAVE ACT A51 LEAVE MOVE M11 ENTER MOVE M12 /* % %#* */  ENTER ACT A52 /* &% %&% */ A52: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m52) (Audience)] (A52) ILLS(A52) = ILLA(A52) = representative LEAVE ACT A52 LEAVE MOVE M12   LEAVE TRANSACTION T2     LEAVE DISCOURSE D1 The fact that this representation makes explicit the assignment of the pragmatic functions  !# ! #   %B5   rtant, as it makes clear that although these NPs may lack a syntactic or semantic-relational function, nevertheless they do have a specific discourserelated function. The term  !   '  '' !#aterial which precedes the body text, but does not act as a heading or titling, while a '      ' !# erial that occurs at the end of a body text. Examples of prelim material can be seen when the sender  !!

 and the date are included at the top of a letter, or when the date and place of publication are displayed at the beginning of a book. Such information may help to contextualize the discourse. However, if information referring to the date and place of the origin of a document is placed at the end of a body text, such as the preface of a book, then it constitutes a finish. Note that the salutation (  ) at the beginning of a letter and the sign-off at the end (K ) belong under the heading of interaction man-

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agement rather than discourse organization; see (7) above. Dik (1997b: 384-385) uses the terms !!

 !  %-taking   !    respective functions.

2.2. Other matters of block language At this juncture it is convenient to consider briefly those items listed in (4) above that we do % propose to adopt here as functions of freestanding NPs, namely notices, headlines and advertisements. An example of a block-language notice would be a road-sign containing just the freestanding NP: (13) Low Bridge This has very little structure, and from the discourse point of view there is no titling or heading, but simply the message itself. The latter comprises a single move containing only one assertive act. The latter serves as a warning to the drivers of tall vehicles, and thus has the illocutionary force of a directive,7 since it seeks to influence the overt behaviour of drivers who read it. An appropriate FDG-style representation of this notice would therefore be as follows: (14) ENTER DISCOURSE D1  ENTER MOVE M1  ENTER ACT A1 A1: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m1) (Audience)] (A1) ILLS(A1) = ILLA(A1) = directive LEAVE ACT A1 LEAVE MOVE M1 LEAVE DISCOURSE D1 Simple as this may be, it appears to be all that is required, and there seems to be no reason to include a discourse-pragmatic function such as  Of course, it is possible for notices to be more elaborate than this. For instance, we could imagine a notice with a heading (such as % ) and a body (such as 0 /65 0 /6 and so forth). In sum:



. %& 4%/%

271

(15) a. > Rules of the House b. )*> No smoking! No denims!  Such a notice would be represented along the following lines: (16) ENTER DISCOURSE D1  ENTER MOVE M1 M1 = heading[1]  ENTER ACT A1 /* % */ A1: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m1) (Audience)] (A1) ILLS(A1) = ILLA(A1) = representative LEAVE ACT A1 LEAVE MOVE M1 ENTER MOVE M2 /* % %#* */  ENTER ACT A2 /*  % %% */ A2: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m2) (Audience)] (A2) ILLS(A2) = ILLA(A2) = directive LEAVE ACT A2 ENTER ACT A3 /*  %% */ A3: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m3) (Audience)] (A3) ILLS(A3) = ILLA(A3) = directive LEAVE ACT A3   LEAVE MOVE M2 LEAVE DISCOURSE D1 As for headlines in newspapers, these can be considered to constitute a type of heading. However, accommodating newspaper headlines and articles within discourse analysis is not necessarily straightforward. Let us take an example. Suppose that there exists a newspaper entitled /, 3

% *, aimed at UK-nationals living overseas who wish to be kept up-todate with current events in the UK. This newspaper is likely to consist of

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($*

articles on a set of topics which bear little relationship to one another, other than the fact that they happen to be of current interest. Consequently, we may be reluctant to regard the entire document as a single discourse, but may prefer, instead, to treat each article (together with its associated headline) as a separate discourse-strand.8 To continue with our example, suppose that an issue of this newspaper contains an article with the headline 2/& /%, +%%* and another with the headline 2 G2/& %. The first article opens with the sentence: %   /4*% *( The second begins: ,) %&&%% 44#%( In sum: (17) a. ,%4&& > Home Territory b.  % %> Improvement in Train Punctuality c. '% %#* % %> Rail travellers received some good news yesterday. d.  %> Increase in Wine Imports e. '% %#* %> The British appetite for wine shows no sign of abating. Note that because the titling NP stands outside of all the various discoursestrands, it does not function as a discourse heading. Thus, the material in (17) may be represented along the following lines: (18) ENTER DOCUMENT  ENTER MOVE M1 M1 = titling  ENTER ACT A1 /* %%4&& */ A1: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m1) (Audience)] (A1) ILLS(A1) = ILLA(A1) = representative LEAVE ACT A1 LEAVE MOVE M1 ENTER DISCOURSE D1  ENTER MOVE M2 /*  % % */



. %& 4%/%

M2 = heading[1]  ENTER ACT A2 A2: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m2) (Audience)] (A2) ILLS(A2) = ILLA(A2) = representative LEAVE ACT A2 LEAVE MOVE M2 ENTER MOVE M3 /* % %#* */  ENTER ACT A3 /* &% % % */ A3: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m3) (Audience)] (A3) ILLS(A3) = ILLA(A3) = representative LEAVE ACT A3 LEAVE MOVE M3   LEAVE DISCOURSE D1 ENTER DISCOURSE D2  ENTER MOVE M11 /*  % */ M11 = heading[1]  ENTER ACT A61 A61: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m61) (Audience)] (A61) ILLS(A61) = ILLA(A61) = representative LEAVE ACT A61 LEAVE MOVE M11 ENTER MOVE M12 /* % %#* */  ENTER ACT A62 /* &% % */ A62: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m62) (Audience)] (A62) ILLS(A62) = ILLA(A62) = representative LEAVE ACT A62 LEAVE MOVE M12   LEAVE DISCOURSE D2   LEAVE DOCUMENT

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There are two further points to note. Firstly, if an article contains subheadings, then these can be treated as layer-2 headings, as before. Secondly, the article headings will almost certainly appear subordinated to the newspaper titling through being printed in smaller-sized lettering. However, as already stated, this does not mean that the newspaper titling constitutes, in terms of discourse-level analysis, the top-level heading for the individual articles. This state-of-affairs is reflected in the representation (18). As for advertisements, a comprehensive treatment of this large subject is not feasible here. However, see, for instance, Cook (2001) who provides a useful overview, and Rush (1998) whose study of the NP in this type of discourse reveals further syntactic details, especially in relation to the structure of the modification preceding the head-word. Nevertheless, we are in a position to make some brief remarks. To begin with, certain advertisements consist of language-text only, while others are multimodal in character. For the moment, we shall confine ourselves to the purely linguistic type. Some advertisements are very simple, for instance    '65 while others are more complex. A newspaper or magazine may have columns of classified advertisements of items for sale, organized under headings such as $ , ;2% /%, and so on. In the body text of the column are listed a series of entries, such as I& %&3 %( + P19


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(19) a. ,% %/%> University of Cheesebury b.  %*> Lecturer in Linguistics. c. '% %#* %*> An interest in FDG would be an advantage. d.  %> Lecturer in Phonetics e. '% %#* %> Experience of Experimental Phonetics essential. It is apparent that this example is capable of being assigned a representation along much the same lines as (18) above. 4 <5     Let us now proceed to a consideration of freestanding NPs that relate not to discourse units but to the visual illustrations that often occur in documents of various kinds. Again it will be helpful to take an example. See Figure 1.

20

10

Currency Crisis

0 1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

Year

. 1(Exports of lollipops from Slurpland during the 1990s

This chart contains several freestanding NPs, representing three different functions:

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(20) a. ,%> b. #> 

c( $&%>

Figure 1 Exports of lollipops from Slurpland during the 1990s Exports (millions) Year9 Currency Crisis

The term  #   !$/ !-Brally, it applies to the image as a whole. A         !    /  otation which indicates the intended meaning of some element within the image. In the present example the horizontal axis is labelled K and the vertical axis is labelled ":& %?/@( A        the image or to some element within it, for the purpose of aiding interpretation; cf. Kosslyn (1994: 16). Here, the NP $

*$  helps us to understand the sharp downturn in the number of exports during 1995, and therefore functions as a caption. It is not a label, since the element of the graph to which it applies (namely the %  !!emand a label such as % %& #%4 % *   % /#   :& % and the lowest point on the curve would demand a label such as /// . The chart is not, of itself, intended to represent a graph of the occurrence of the causal factors that might influence the level of exports, and this is, of course, precisely why additional information supplied by the explanatory caption is helpful. We are thus put in mind of the fact pointed out by Barthes (1977: 3741) that images typically allow for more than one possible interpretation. For instance, a chart portraying a curve within the framework of two orthogonal axes (as in Figure 1), but without any textual annotation or accompaniment, would be capable of being assigned an indefinitely large number of possible meanings. What titlings, labels and captions do, however, is to point the viewer of the image towards one particular interpretation among the different possibilities. Barthes terms this effect  rage         %   '/ ' $    '   rather than drifting from one possible understanding of the image to another. (It would also be possible for the suggested interpretation to be given an attitudinal slant, for instance by replacing $

*$  in Figure 1 with a more pejorative caption such as "/;//%.) Titlings, labels and captions attached to images can all be analysed in terms of their pragmatics. Each of the five examples in (20) constitutes an individual communicative act that is not directly a part of a larger language-text (though the image to which it is attached could be regarded as a constituent of the overall, multimodal discourse out of which the document



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is constructed; see Connolly 2000 for further details). These communicative acts may be represented along the following lines: (21) ENTER MOVE M40 M40 = titling ENTER ACT A101 /*  &% */ A101: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m101) (Audience)] (A101) ILLS(A101) = ILLA(A101) = representative LEAVE ACT A101 ENTER ACT A102 /* %%/ */ A102: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m102) (Audience)] (A102) ILLS(A102) = ILLA(A102) = representative LEAVE ACT A102 LEAVE MOVE M40 ENTER ACT A103 /* #: */ A103 = label A103: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m103) (Audience)] (A103) ILLS(A103) = ILLA(A103) = representative LEAVE ACT A103  ENTER ACT A105 /* &% */ A105 = label A105: [ASSERT (Author) (Message m105) (Audience)] (A105) ILLS(A105) = ILLA(A105) = representative LEAVE ACT A105 The pragmatic functions of titling, label and caption, respectively, are duly made explicit in this representation. It may be noted that the titling in this example is not a heading within a discourse hierarchy. Within the titling there are two acts  the title itself being preceded by a descriptor (.  1) whose purpose is to identify the image as a graphical element within the discourse and to number it within a sequence of such elements within the text as a whole. Another issue calling for comment is the question of whether the pragmatic functions with which we are concerned in the present paper apply to moves, acts or both. The examples adduced above suggest that if the discourse analysis of a document reveals the grouping of acts into moves, then functions such as heading or titling apply in general to entire moves

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(though it is, of course, possible for a move to contain just one act). However, it appears that pragmatic functions such as labels on images are not generally grouped into moves; and in cases where the layer of the move is superfluous, the pragmatic functions concerned have to be regarded as applying to individual acts. Further examples of NPs with the functions of titling or label can be found abundantly in web pages. A web page regularly contains a title and display of body material which is in general multimodal in character. This material often includes clickable items that facilitate links to other parts of the document or to other documents. These items are frequently (though by no means always) picked out in some special way, for instance through underlining or through mounting on a button-icon. Such items serve as labels for the relevant clickable areas in the display, for the purpose of indicating the information to be accessed, or the action to be performed, by clicking on the screen-areas concerned. At this point we may return briefly to advertisements, but this time to consider those in which language-text is combined with one or more images. It turns out that the pragmatic functions of titling, label and caption are all applicable to freestanding NPs attached to such advertisements. For instance, a page of advertisements for cars may include a series of entries, each of which consists of a picture of a particular type of car, together with a titling giving the make and model. Possibly some of these pictures might contain labels, such as 3B%**4, attached to the appropriate region of the image. Alternatively, an advertisement for car-interior upholstery might consist of picture of a car interior, devoid of any titling or label, but accompanied simply by the caption '%*6 (Whether other pragmatic functions would also be needed to deal adequately with the use of freestanding NPs in advertisements will be left as an open question.) 3  <&'    Dik (1997a: 1-4) envisages that a functional account of grammar should form part of a broader theory of verbal interaction, to be described (at least in part) in terms of #   Q    L  $ (2007). Let us now give some consideration to this issue. As stated earlier, the syntactic structure of the freestanding NPs with which this paper is concerned is relatively simple. Consequently, the interpretation of these NPs is not assisted very substantially by the grammatical information embodied in them. Therefore, the reader has to place consider-



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able reliance also on other factors in order to interpret the NPs appropriately. How, then, do we recognize an item such as a titling or heading for what it is? In fact, there are at least four sources of cues to aid the interpretation of freestanding NPs: (22) a. Information in the linguistic expression, describable in terms of content and structure b. Information at the graphetic level The graphetic level is the counterpart, in the written language, of the phonetic level in the spoken language. It is concerned with linguistically nonsignificant attributes of text, such as the size of alphanumeric characters and the physical layout of text. (To describe a phenomenon as %3 * non-significant is to state that it is not part of the language system. It does not, however, in any way imply that the phenomenon in question is & /%* irrelevant.) c. Discourse-pragmatic factors d. Contextual factors In relation to information within the linguistic expression, we have to take account of basically two considerations. Firstly, there is the internal composition of the NP concerned. If the latter takes the form of block language, then this is itself a cue as to the expression  atus. Secondly, there is the possibility that the NP will be accompanied by an explicit descriptor, such as . 1, or a heading number such as 9(1. Graphetic-level cues often serve as an aid to the identification of titlings and headings of discourse units, which are typically distinguished from body text through the use of bold or italic styles of typeface. Sometimes they are also set in larger-sized characters. In addition, titlings, labels and captions relating to images may differ from the body text in terms of typeface (font, style and/or size). Furthermore, the physical layout of text on the page can provide interpretive cues. Titlings, headings and prelims precede the body text to which they relate, while finishes occur at the end of it. Moreover, titlings and headings of discourse units may be centred, whereas certain prelim items, such as the date at the top of a letter, may be right-justified. Titlings of images are normally placed immediately above or below the images concerned, while labels and captions are placed either within or adjacent to the images to which they relate.

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Under the rubric of discourse-pragmatic factors comes the fact that titlings and headings clearly occur at the boundaries of discourse units, encapsulating and ushering in the text within their scope, while titlings, labels and captions relating to images are not directly part of a larger languagetext. These matters of discourse organization and coherence make themselves apparent to readers, who are thus able draw upon them as a guide to interpreting what they perceive. Contextual factors, too, play their part. For instance, suppose that a web page contains a series of button icons, each of which contains a freestanding NP. In this case the context makes it fairly clear that each NP should be taken as a label applying to the button on which it is displayed. To take another example, the interpretation of the NP $

*$  within Figure 1 as a caption rather than a label depends not only on the content of NP but also on the context of the whole figure. It is only because the other freestanding NPs in the context of the same image (namely the titling and the labels of the axes of the chart) serve to indicate what information is conveyed by the curve that we can appreciate why the NP should be interpreted as a caption rather than as yet another label. Not surprisingly, different types of factors can combine and intertwine. For instance, suppose that a document contains a left-justified boldface NP, followed by a left-justified italic NP, followed by a paragraph in Roman typeface. The interpretation of these NPs intended by the author (it will be assumed) is as follows: (23) a. * 39> left-justified boldface NP. b. * 3<> left-justified italic NP. c. )*%:%> Roman-type paragraph. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the first of these NPs has already been interpreted by the reader as a layer-2 heading. What cues will then help in the interpretation of the second NP as a layer-3 heading? The fact that it is some kind of heading will be suggested by its non-Roman typeface and by its position on the page, separate from the paragraph that ensues and hence clearly located at the starting boundary of a discourse unit. (Thus, graphetic and discourse-pragmatic cues combine.) The fact that it is in a similar position on the page to the layer-2 heading that precedes it, but in a different style of typeface, suggests that it a heading of the next layer down, namely layer-3. (Here, graphetic and contextual factors work together, since the significance of the italic typeface is affected by the context, given that the interpretation of the italic style is conditioned by the



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interpretation of the boldface style which occurred earlier in the same document.) In the light of the above, we may now address the question of how to formulate pragmatic rules aimed at incorporating the principles behind the process of interpretation in cases like the one just outlined. A thoroughgoing solution to this problem is not possible at present. Nonetheless, it will be instructive to make a first attempt. The following will serve as an illustrative example: (24) $%> a. Expression (xi) precedes a paragraph of text (0 *) b. Expression (xi) is freestanding (0 *) c. Expression (xi) is an NP d. Expression (xi) is in a non-Roman style of typeface 2% & %%> Expression (xi) is a heading This pragmatic rule consists of a set of conditions, of which at least a subset needs to be satisfied in order to give rise to the interpretation. Conditions (24a) and (24b) seem to be mandatory, while the rest serve to corroborate them, and the more that are fulfilled, the more confidence there may be in the interpretation. Hence, the interpretation has the status of a hypothesis or conjecture. Of course, as stated above, (24) constitutes only an illustration of one possible pragmatic rule, and much work remains to be done before a reasonably definitive set of rules can be proposed. Nevertheless, if we were, indeed, able to develop an accurate set of pragmatic rules, then this would represent an important contribution to the theory of verbal interaction. It would also have practical applications in fields such as the automatic analysis and interpretation of documents by computer; see further Casey (1997) for an overview of this field, or Bunke and Wang (1997) for a more detailed coverage. The formalization of pragmatic rules will be aided by the new architecture proposed for FDG by Hengeveld (2004b), which provides for: (25) a. A grammatical component, with interpersonal, representational and structural levels. b. An output component: acoustic in the case of the spoken language, while the written language has a counterpart in the optical patterns discerned in the shapes of characters and so on. c. A contextual component and a cognitive component.10

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This architecture affords the advantage of accommodating all the various information sources upon which the pragmatic rules draw. Accordingly, referring back to (22) above, we see that information in the linguistic expression (22a) is derived from the grammatical component (25a), while information at the graphetic level (22b) is associated with the output component (25b). Discourse-pragmatic factors (22c) also lie within the scope of the grammatical component of FDG in conjunction with the cognitive (25c) activity of discourse management (that is to say, coherent arrangement by the author and interpretation by the audience), while contextual factors naturally find their home in the contextual component (25c). 2 "   The pragmatically-oriented, FDG-based treatment of freestanding NPs within documents that has been offered in the present paper leads to two main conclusions. Firstly, it seems feasible to extend the coverage of the FDG framework to incorporate such extra-clausal NPs, by introducing a small number of additional pragmatic functions, including  # ding   '     !  - 9 %   of course, encompassed all types of block language within our treatment here, but nevertheless, it is hoped that we have enhanced the FDG apparatus in a manner which is useful and which has reasonably broad applicability. Secondly, it is possible to expand the pragmatic treatment of freestanding NPs beyond the grammar into the field of verbal interaction. A key step has been to address the task of formulating pragmatic rules, as envisaged by Dik (1997a: 3-4). However, this is a field where a great deal of further, interesting research remains to be undertaken, within the supportive framework provided by FDG. &    1. 2. 3.

This paper has benefited from comments by Chris Butler and three anonymous referees. See Hengeveld (this volume) in relation to matters of representation. It may be helpful to make clear the position taken here on the description of discourse in terms of smaller units (for instance, chapters, sections and subsections) within FDG. Historically, the standard FG approach has been to recognize units only if they have some reflex in the grammar. However, in my



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own work, notably Connolly et al. (1997)) and Connolly (2004), I have found (unsurprisingly, I feel) that if a comprehensive description of discourse is desired, then it is necessary to treat discourse in its own terms, and to employ whatever analytical categories appear to be illuminating, whether they have grammatical reflexes or not. For instance, in Connolly et al. (1997) a purely discourse-oriented notion of  #

     !!     $   ' some transcripts of dialogues between product-designers in an experimental situation. This aspect of the analysis revealed an element of cyclicity (as opposed to hierarchy) inherent in the structure of the dialogues concerned. This was a significant finding, which would have been missed if we had confined ourselves to grammatically-realized units only. I shall, therefore, persist here with the stance that I have taken in my earlier writings. 4. A rhetorical question, to be answered by the author rather than the reader. 5. This style of discourse representation is inspired by Dik (1997b: 409-441). It assumes that discourse (D) can be analysed into smaller units, including transactions (T), moves (M) and acts (A). Each of these units is preceded by an ENTER line and followed by a LEAVE line, which serve as brackets to enclose them. Each act is described in terms of its function in communicating a message from its author to its audience and in terms of its illocutionary force, both from the point of view of the speaker (ILLS) and from the point of view of the hearer (ILLA). For further details, see Connolly (2004). 6. Explanatory comments /* like this */ are intended as aids to readability, but are not part of the discourse-representation proper. 7. More precisely, a  %    !% #  ding under the bridge. However, I retain the term !% !")W for the sake of consistency with my earlier writings. It is acknowledged that for other drivers, the road-sign would merely be informative, but these are not the principal addressees; the sign would not have been erected for their benefit. 8. It is possible that another discourse analyst might regard the commonality of current interest as sufficient to treat all the articles as related, especially in the case of a newspaper with an overall theme, such as sport. However, for expository purposes, we shall here take the view that the articles constitute different discourse strands. 9. If the numerals calibrating the axes of the graph are regarded as freestanding NPs, then they, too, should be classified as labels. 10. Whether these should be two components or one single component is a matter of debate which, however, lies outside the scope of the present paper; but see Butler (this volume), Garc   (this volume), Keizer (this volume) and Rijkhoff (this volume) for relevant discussion.

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*    Barthes, Roland, tr. Heath, S. 1977 2/5;5,:%( London: Fontana Press. Bunke, H. and Wang, P.S.P. (eds.) 1997 #$ % %/%2/-*( Singapore: World Scientific. Butler, Christopher S. this vol. Interpersonal meaning in the noun phrase. Casey, Richard G. 1997 Document image analysis. In: Ronald A. Cole, Joseph Mariani, Hans Uszkoreit, Giovanni B. Varile, Annie Zaenen, Antonio Zampolli and Victor Zue, (eds.), ' *%'%%%- %/ ,*, 6871.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Connolly, John H. 2000 Diagrams as components of multimedia discourse: a semiotic approach. In: M. Anderson, P. Cheng, and V. Haarslev (eds.), , * -&&% />+ %. %2% % $ 5  / 9PPP5 "# 5 '%5 I5 '&%/#  9PPP, 479482. Berlin: Springer. 2004 The question of discourse representation in Functional Discourse Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar !  J#   G&-GonzE & (eds.), - 04 - %%    .% /3 / , 211242. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2007 Mental context and the expression of terms within the English clause: An approach based on Functional Discourse Grammar. In: Mike Hannay and Gerard J. Steen, (eds.), '% % 3%'% " // , 193-208. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Connolly, John H., Clarke, Anthony A., Garner, Steven W. and PalmD2 $K1997 A functionally oriented analysis of spoken dialogue between individuals linked by a computer network. In: John H. Connolly, Roel M. Vismans, Christopher S. Butler and Richard A. Gatward (eds.), 3  + /%.% // 5 3358. (Functional Grammar Series 18.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Cook, Guy 2001 , - %( 2nd edition. London: Routledge. Dik, Simon C. 1997a , , *  .% // ( + % 2> , '% %   % $ (Functional Grammar Series 20.) Second, revised edition. Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.



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,, *.% // (+ %22>$/&:  $% % (Functional Grammar Series 21.) Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Garc   ; this vol. Functional Discourse Grammar and extraction from (complex) noun phrases. Hengeveld, Kees 2004a The architecture of a Functional Discourse Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar! J#  &-GonzE &"! --04 - %%    .% // , 121. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2004b Epilogue. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzieand Mar !  J#   N mez-GonzE &"! - -04- %%  .% // , 365378. (Functional Grammar Series 24.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. this vol. Prototypical and non-prototypical noun phrases in FDG. Keizer, Evelien this vol. Reference and ascription in FDG: an inventory of problems and some possible solutions. Kosslyn, S.M. 1994 "/% &(New York: Freeman. Kress, Gunther and van Leeuwen, Theo 1996  2/> , //    ( London: Routledge. Mackenzie, J. Lachlan and Mar! J#eles G&-GonzE & (eds.) 2004 - 04 - %%    .% // ( Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Quirk, Randolph, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech and Jan Svartvik 1985 - $/&  //   % " . London: Longman. Rijkhoff, Jan this vol. Layers, levels and contexts in FDG. Rush, Susan 1998 The noun phrase in advertising English.    + /% 29: 155171. 1997b



<     (  #

   !   <!< ) +

   1 Although order phenomena within the noun phrase and the semantics underlying them have been discussed quite extensively in Functional Grammar (Dik 1997: 127ff.; Rijkhoff 2002), as yet not much work within the FG framework has been devoted to morphological and syntactic aspects of the noun phrase. We are not aware of any fully worked out example of the process of term expression in the literature. It may be expected that the expression rules, as they are presented in Dik (1997), will not be found fit to do the job. In Bakker (2001), it is argued that the expression rule component as it stands has several fundamental shortcomings, especially with respect to agreement phenomena, and a new version of the FG expression rules is proposed. Bakker (2001) takes the ingredients of the original rules  primary and auxiliary operators, templates, and placement rules  as a point of departure. However, as opposed to the original proposal, he integrates these components in a dynamic framework, in which matters of form and order are interleaved. In Bakker (2005), it is shown that these dynamic expression rules can handle complex cases of agreement at the level of the clause. On the basis of some notorious examples from Arabic, it is demonstrated that the dynamic rules may not only provide a descriptively adequate treatment of the cases at hand; they may also give insight into the processing aspects of the data, and thus potentially add an explanatory flavour to the expression component. In other words, an attempt is made to provide arguments for the psychological reality of theoretical constructs (Matthews 1991). In this article, we seek to implement dynamic expression at the level of the noun phrase (NP), thus filling the above-mentioned gap in the formal component of the theory. We will do this on the basis of agreement phenomena within the German NP, which is noted for its relative complexity. Another reason for choosing that language is the availability of a corpus of spontaneous German speech errors, which includes a fair number of agreement errors within NPs. As is commonly assumed in

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ment errors within NPs. As is commonly assumed in speech error research, we take these agreement errors, i.e. cases of rule misapplication, to shed some extra light on the way the same rules work when they do not misfire. We will argue that it is precisely the dynamic nature of the expression component which allows us to describe the possible mechanisms behind certain types of speech errors which occur in German NPs. We will concentrate on gender errors since gender is the morphosyntactic feature most frequently responsible for the NP-internal agreement errors we have at our disposal. We hope to show that these errors may be described in terms of a slight deviation in the execution of the expression rules during the production of formal structures (NPs) deriving from underlying semantic and pragmatic representations (URs). This deviation may well be explained on the basis of the organization of the (mental) lexicon in terms of semantic and phonological networks and local activation patterns, combined with occasional slips of attention during the complex process of sentence production. The article is organized as follows. In section 2, we will give a short account of dynamic expression rules, an elaboration of the standard FG expression rules first presented in Bakker (1999). We will argue that the original rules are inadequate in the sense that they both overgenerate and undergenerate. On the basis of the expression of a simple German NP it will be shown that the dynamic version of the expression rules does not have these shortcomings and furthermore is in full compliance with the discourse model of FG. In section 3, we will turn to the speech error data and discuss some of the more common error patterns as attested in German NPs. In section 4, we will study the implications for the expression rules. Finally, section 5 will present some conclusions. Before starting out on our journey we have to say a few words about the status of the notion      $- #  #  perspective, this notion refers to a specific type of syntactic structure, i.e. it is a formal notion. If we want to define it in terms of FG, two ways are open to us, at least in principle. A strictly formal approach, typically taken by syntactic theories, would define NPs as syntactic structures with a nominal head. From a more functional perspective, NPs may be defined as the (infinite) set of forms in a language which are the expression of a term.2 In the latter case, the term would cover not only prototypical noun phrases such as the one from English in (1), but also the  mplete  '  Dutch in (2), the discontinuous one from Polish (Anna Siewierska, p.c.; for extraction from the NP see Garc   this volume) in (3) and even the adpositional phrase from Abkhaz (Nichols 1992: 51) in (4).3



- /%%& 

289

(1)

,%*/*%%%# % /'&(

(2)

 #3%       %         2.SG have-2.SG ART.INDEF big house and 1.SG ART.INDEF small d  %#  !0   -

(3)

 &3/  -&- five buy-PAST.1.SG pencil-GEN.PL 0 # '% -

(4)

-3T*  &/ 0 ART-river 3.SG-at  %

For the purpose of this article we will interpret the notion Noun Phrase more or less dynamically as the structure that results from the expression of a term provided that it does not have an adposition for its syntactic head. This negative characterization leaves open the possibility of including headless and discontinuous structures such as the ones in (2) and (3) and also those that have pronouns for their heads. However, it excludes adpositional phrases such as the one in (4). As we will see, this fits in nicely with the dynamic expression rules to which we will now turn. % ( )#

*   ! As was mentioned in the introduction, the standard FG expression rules (ER) have a number of shortcomings, which fall in two general categories: overgeneration and undergeneration. We speak of overgeneration when a model of grammar produces utterances which are not well-formed in a language and of undergeneration when it fails to produce certain utterances which are considered to be well-formed. In cases where form and order are mutually dependent, the strategy of first generating the right morphological form of words and then linearizing them will run into problems. We will give an example from Koegu, a Surmic language from Ethiopia. In this language, the verb optionally agrees with the subject when it is postverbal (5a and b), and obligatorily when it is preverbal (5c and d).

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 (Hieda 1998:367) (5) a. -3/%3*    1.SG-drink-3.SG 1.SG b. S3;%3*   drink-3.SG 1.SG c. - 3/%3* 1.SG 1.SG-drink-3.SG d. *- S3/%3* 1.SG drink-3.SG 0!3- The standard ER rules will first generate the verb form and then determine the placement of the pronoun vis-g-vis the verb. Thus, there is no way in preventing the standard ER rules from generating (5d), unless we also give up on (5b), which is grammatical. As shown in Bakker (2001), form-order interdependency is very common in the languages of the world. Thus, in a more constrained mode, the ER module will systematically miss out on a number of well-formed constructions, such as the one in (5b), which makes it descriptively inadequate. In a less constrained, more     !  will produce a number of ungrammatical utterances, which will make it inadequate in the explanatory sense.

2.1. Some properties of Dynamic Expression Rules A potential solution to this problem is to integrate into one dynamic process the rules which generate the forms and the ones that order them. In this process, a tree is produced with traditional order templates as intermediate structures (i.e. constituents) and word forms at the end of the branches. As a result of this organization, the right form of a word may be computed precisely when enough information is available, about both its semantic and pragmatic aspects and its eventual position in the linear ordering, or rather, in the syntactic structure. The resulting tree should not be seen as a static morphosyntactic structure associated with a specific underlying representation URi, as in most syntactic theories both of a formal and a functional orientation (cf. Haegeman 1994 for the former and Van Valin and La Polla 1997 for the latter). Rather, it is the result of a dynamic process starting out from URi, and in fact reflects its own history. This process takes place in a top-down fashion, from left to right and depth first. Functional and formal features may be inherited from higher nodes, or percolate up-



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wards from lower nodes. In Bakker (2005) it is shown that a limited amount of  3 !  !!!!       in order to cater for cases of anticipatory gender agreement. As we will show in section 3, this extra feature will be very helpful in explaining certain speech errors. As in the case of other constituent structures, dynamic expression trees consist of a number of nodes, which should be interpreted as the constituents of the tree. However, in this case, they are considerably more than mere labels. Each node expresses a specific part of the combined pragmatic-semantic underlying representation URi, including its lexical material, operators, functions, and layered structure. A node explicitly specifies the primary and auxiliary     %    !# # ' the expression process. In fact, some nodes may only contain     and no lexical material at all. On the basis of its complex of lexical and grammatical material, a node selects a template from the grammar, which specifies the linear order of the actual elements of the URi element handled by the node. For each of the slots in that template a new daughter node is created, in a left-to-right fashion, which then will deal with the element of the mother node that has been assigned to it, and so on recursively. In that sense, a node can be seen as a device for mapping a specific set of underlying functional material (e.g. a term) onto a formal expression (e.g. a noun phrase). This process continues until each lexical element resulting from the original URi has been assigned its own terminal node. In contrast to the standard model of expression, grammatical elements such as articles, auxiliaries and plural suffixes are not created before but rather during the process of linearization, at the moment at which precisely enough information is available to determine the right form and in time for them to introduce features that derive from them, such as case. Typically, grammatical markers such as articles and auxiliaries are the expression of a terminal node, which contains only     !   /    whatsoever. The corresponding grammatical element is then selected by the grammar. Some terminal nodes may even be prespecified for a form, which is then considered to be completely grammaticalized. This may be the case for bound forms such as plural suffixes, which only have phonologically determined allomorphs.

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2.2. Exemplary derivation of a term Let us now illustrate the relevant processes with a simple example. The aforementioned top-down process starts with the creation of a node for the fully specified underlying representation being expressed, typically a clause, but it may also be a term or any other well-formed underlying construct. For the German term in (6) below, the top node for its expression may appear as in (7). In node specifications,       !ifies the node in the grammar. It corresponds to the notion of functional slot in the traditional order templates. L     $egory of the constituent to be expressed via this slot. L '#  ' ! that prespecifies the type of configuration to be expressed by this type of node, in this case a term. The (infinite) set of all possible configurations that fit this description could be seen as the recursive definition-byenumeration of the    -   !      functional (i.e. primary) and formal (i.e. auxiliary)     %'    node, respectively. Finally, L!   % #   of L!     !   !   the subconstituents will be expressed. It could be seen as the (recursive) definition-by-enumeration of the L   !  '      !'ition of morphosyntactic constituency in the corresponding language.4 (6) 

(def pl x1 : Katze [n, fem] : schwarz [a])Patient 4 %  (  3 

(7)

Node k (uninstantiated) Slot: term Cat: np Config: (DEF NUM VAR: PRED [n, GEN]: ( RESTRn [CATn] ) ) SEMFNC FncFtrs: SEMFNC, DEF, NUM FrmFtrs: GEN, CASE SubCat:

(7) gives the node in its abstract, uninstantiated form, as it appears in the language-specific grammar. It is selected on the basis of certain formal aspects of the UR that is being expressed, in this case a noun phrase. The configuration field of this node will now be filled by the term under (6), which may or may not be part of a more complex structure being expressed, such as a clause. This leads to the partially instantiated version in



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(8) below. Note that the two types of feature sets are instantiated at the same time, to the extent that their values are available. (8)

Node 1 (partially instantiated) Slot: term Cat: np Config: (def pl x1 : #katze [n, fem] : #schwarz [a])Patient FncFtrs: patient, def, pl FrmFtrs: fem, CASE SubCat:

In the next step, the formal features which are still unbound will be instantiated. Since there is no higher node from which to inherit, CASE will be given a value by local rules. In this case, since the semantic function is Patient and the term does not have Subject function, the default value will be accusative.5 (9)

Node 1 (partially instantiated) Slot: term Cat: np Config: (def pl x1 : #katze [n, fem] : #schwarz [a])Patient FncFtrs: patient, def, pl FrmFtrs: fem, acc SubCat:

In the last step, the right template will be selected for the expression in the SubCat field of Node 1. This will give us its fully instantiated version in (10). (10) Node 1 (fully instantiated) Slot: term Cat: np Config: (def pl x1 : #katze [n, fem] : #schwarz [a])Patient FncFtrs: patient, def, pl FrmFtrs: fem, acc SubCat: det, adjectival, nominal The process now continues in a left-to-right, top-down fashion with the expansion of the determiner slot, !-       %   rnative nodes will be available, a situation comparable to the alternative placement

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rules for the P1 slot in the standard theory (cf. Dik 1997: 421). The right candidate node will then be selected, and the corresponding element of the Config field of node 1 will be inserted into the Config field of this newly created node 2  in this case the information pertaining to the article. This happens to be a grammatical node, i.e. one that leads to the direct expression of a grammatical morpheme without further expansion. Before and after instantiation, node 2 appears as in (11) below. Grammatical node 2 is prespecified for the category  -B   '  ! from the mother node 1. With the relevant feature values instantiated, the right form will be retrieved from the grammatical subsection of the lexicon.6 (11) Node 2 (uninstantiated) Slot: det Cat: art Config: FORM [art, DEF, GEN, CASE, NUM] FncFtrs: DEF, NUM FrmFtrs: GEN, CASE SubCat: FORM

Node 2 (fully instantiated) det art ! [art, def, fem, acc, pl] def, pl fem, acc !

The next slot that is expanded is the adjectival one. This node may be complex, and have subcategories for the adjective and its adverbial modifiers, as in   4 (%$  3-          %  e will assume that the expression rules will make         nodes catered for, in this case to the node for the expression of a single adjective. In other words, dynamic expression trees do not have any superfluous structure, only precisely what is relevant. In the grammar of German, the node which expands an adjective may be morphologically complex, in order to cater for the inflectional case/number suffixes (as well as for derivational affixes, such as the comparative and superlative). This is node 3 under (12).



(12) Node 3 (uninstantiated) Slot: adjectival Cat: adjcmp Config: PRED [a] FncFtrs: DEF, NUM FrmFtrs: GEN, CASE SubCat:

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Node 3 (fully instantiated) adjectival adjcmp #schwarz [a] def, pl fem, acc adjhead adjsfx

This leads to the following expansions, first !O !% !@")U! then !O '/% !V")@(13) Node 4 (uninstantiated) Slot: adjhead Cat: adj Config: PRED FORM [a] SubCat: FORM

(fully instantiated) nomhead adj #schwarz   &-78   &-

(14) Node 5 (uninstantiated) Slot: adjsfx Cat: asfx Config: FORM [asfx, GEN, CASE, NUM] FncFtrs: NUM FrmFtrs: GEN, CASE SubCat: FORM

(fully instantiated) adjsfx asfx -en [asfx, fem, acc, pl] pl fem, acc -en

Subsequently, the rightmost element of the NP template  the position of the nominal head of the term  will be expanded. This will not be a terminal node either, since it has internal morphological complexity as a result of the values for CASE and NUM. Thus, this node is expressed via a node for the stem and one for the plural suffix. (15)(17) below give the three nodes necessary for this process. Node 6 is the top node of this local structure. Only after partial instantiation with the corresponding nominal predicate and inspection of noun specific information is it possible to expand this node.7 In this case, the regular rules for the German plural feminine noun apply.

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(15) Node 6 (uninstantiated) Slot: nominal Cat: nouncmp Config: PRED [n, GEN] FncFtrs: NUM FrmFtrs: GEN, CASE SubCat:

(partially inst.) nominal nouncmp #katze [n, fem] pl fem, acc

(fully instantiated) nominal nouncmp #katze [n, fem] pl fem, acc nomhead nounsfx

(16) Node 7 (uninstantiated) Slot: nomhead Cat: noun Config: PRED FORM [n] SubCat: FORM

(fully instantiated) nomhead noun #katze 3&-78 3&-

(17) Node 8 (uninstantiated) Slot: nounsfx Cat: nsfx Config: FORM [nsfx, GEN, CASE, NUM] FncFtrs: NUM FrmFtrs: GEN, CASE SubCat: -n

(fully instantiated) nounsfx nsfx -n7 '/' 8 pl fem, acc -n

The result of the whole process can be represented as the tree in figure 1 below, being the expression of the term in (6) above. Note again that this is not the (static) tree stipulated for the term structure but a result of the expression process as such. The figures next to the branches indicate the order in which node expansion has taken place. No special provisions are necessary to fit the Dynamic Expression Rule module (DER) into the extended model of FG, Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG; Hengeveld 2004, this volume). Both for the old and the new model, expression starts off when all relevant pragmatic and semantic material is available. In the old model, all information, with the inclusion of pragmatic and even syntactic functions, is compiled in the so-called underlying clause. In the FDG model, this information is distributed over the interpersonal and the representational layers, respectively. In principle, all this pragmatic and semantic information is considered to be accessible to the expression rule component, but it is an empirical question what the constraints on this accessibility could be. Bakker and Siewierska (2004) discuss more extensively the implications of dynamic expression for the structure of the interface between the underlying and expression levels of



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the model. They also demonstrate how the dynamics of the expression rules may be added to the construction of the underlying representations of the interpersonal and representational layers as well, giving the model the full flavour of a model of the speaker, including the explanatory aspects that such a model may provide.

 

Node 1

1

4

3

 Node 2

Node 3 5

2

!

7

19

12

11





8

Node 6 13

10

Node 4

Node 5

Node 7

6

9

14

-en

3&

  &

15 16 

18 Node 5 17 -n

. 1. Full tree expansion

This concludes our example of the expression of the German NP. In order to further motivate the structure-building processes proposed in this section, let us now have a look at some spontaneous German speech errors in which structural regularities within the noun phrase are disrupted in one way or another. 4 <      In a comprehensive study of the processing of morphosyntactic categories and features in language production, Pfau (2000) investigates, amongst other things, the manipulation of morphosyntactic features in on-line production, above all by studying the role these features play in spontaneous German speech errors. The theoretical perspective taken is that of Distributed Morphology (Halle and Marantz 1993; Harley and Noyer 2003). Ul-

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timately, Pfau (2000) tries to show how the derivational processes assumed in Distributed Morphology (merger, morpheme insertion, feature copy, vocabulary insertion, phonological readjustment) can be mapped onto a top-down multi-level model of language production (e.g. Fromkin 1971; Garrett 1980; Levelt 1989) in order to account for a wealth of speech error data.

3.1. The error corpus As is well-known, the collection of speech errors has a very long history. Anwar (1979) points out that evidence exists that Arab linguists were collecting and analysing slips of the tongue as far back as the eighth century. More than one thousand years later, Rudolf Meringer, a linguist from Vienna, collected his famous and extensive error corpus (Meringer and Mayer 1895). Apart from some scattered references, however, it was only in the late sixties of the 20th century that linguists regained interest in the investigation of speech errors (Fromkin 1968; Nooteboom 1969). For his study, Pfau (2000) compiled a corpus of speech errors the current version of which contains 612 errors. This corpus is biased  albeit deliberately  in the sense that it contains only errors which are relevant in the context of that study. On the one hand, it includes relevant slips from the existing Frankfurt speech error corpus compiled by Prof. Helen Leuninger and her team since the early 80 -G    !5' ! fair number of slips himself. These were sampled in a paper-and-pencil fashion with as much of the error context as possible (e.g. embedding of the error element(s) in a sentence or discourse as well as possible nonlinguistic influences). Subsequently, the data were classified according to a number of criteria (type of error, error element, relevant feature, accommodation, self-correction, and so on) and fed into a database. Of the 612 slips in Pfau   UU@"V@-Wirrors due to feature mismatches, be they agreement errors (due to person, number, gender, or case mismatch) or subcategorization errors (due to case mismatch). Out of a total of 252 agreement errors, 155 are errors in subject-verb agreement (see Pfau 2003 and Pfau and Bakker 2004 for discussion). In this article, we will draw upon 97 slips from the corpus that involve a feature mismatch within the noun phrase. These can be categorized as follows.



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,#1( Types of feature mismatch within NP Error in:

N

%

1. GENDER

86

88.7 %

2. NUMBER

6

6.2 %

3. GENDER + CASE

2

2.1 %

4. GENDER + NUMBER

2

2.1 %

5. CASE

1

1%

 

E6

3.2. Errors involving gender mismatch Let us first look at mismatches that involve the gender feature. In the German noun system, three genders occur, viz. Masculine (M), Feminine (F) and Neuter (N). The assignment of a particular noun to a gender is highly idiosyncratic. None of the three genders is particularly rare. Looking at Table 1, we observe that gender is by far the most frequently affected feature in slips.8 Three representative examples involving gender, each being of a different error type, are given in (18) to (20). In (18), we are dealing with a form-based noun #%%%; the intruding noun $ (   !   !!    (    onologically similar but are of a different gender. Example (19) is a # of two competing noun phrases, which contain the (near) synonymous nouns G%%/& (  !. ('inal-0  ! !O% & (/# '   #!' '  mpeting noun, which is not part of the utterance. Note that in the nominative, the indefinite article is homophonous between masculine and neuter gender; therefore, the gender mismatch is only visible on the adjective. In (20), the : of two nouns gives rise to gender conflicts in both positions. In this example, the self-correction reveals that we are in fact dealing with a noun exchange and not with an exchange of definite articles.9 Note that all three slips contain self-corrections.10 (18) //    2  5  always the.M same chaos(N),  $   same case.

e5 er,

 case(M)

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(19)  4       &  , 5  e5. that be.FUT a.M/N very exciting-N competition(M), er, final(N)  &3 . CC &3 G%%/&  exciting-N final(N) // exciting-M competition(M) .  e a very exciting final // competition. (20)  #3   3   /%  4  3% 35 I have-1.SG the.F Lothar(M) with the.M Rosi(F) PPT-meet-PPT     /% / %  the.F Rosi(F) with the.M Lothar(M) 0:  #  6  . In all, gender is involved in 93% of all errors (types 1, 3, and 4 in table 1). However, it is not always clear whether we are in fact dealing with a #!     !   nvolved. As shown in Table 2 below, there are a great many instances of (vertical) homophony within the three paradigms of the German definite article (in bold), as well as (horizontal) homophony between the genders (in italics). ,#9( Homophony in the German definite article. DEF

DEF

DEF

MASC

NEUT

FEM

SG NOM



 



SG GEN







SG DAT

/

/



SG ACC

 

 



PL NOM







PL GEN



 



PL DAT

 





PL ACC







Example (21) below is a case in point. Actually, this error is ambiguous in two respects. First, the neuter definite article  is homophonous in the nominative and accusative. It can therefore not be decided whether the observed mismatch is due to gender only or rather to gender and case. If we



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assume that the wrong choice of article for the first noun ) ( 3  caused by anticipating the gender of the second noun G (kend  #       '    ! too (the preposition  (# %   %-2 wever, due to the homophony mentioned above, the only error we can be sure of is the wrong choice of gender. All such ambiguous cases were conservatively treated as gender only errors (type 1 in Table 1). Secondly, since the error is selfrepaired by the speaker immediately after the mismatch occurs, it is not clear whether we are dealing with an %&% or with an incomplete exchange. The error in (22), in turn, is one of the only two instances which unambiguously involve a combination of gender and case (type 3). Note that proper names can take definite determiners in German. (21)        55     ) now the.N.NOM/ACC look(M), the.N.NOM look(M)      G at.the.N.ACC  weekend(N) B   3 3!- (22)     5 5  e5     the.M.ACC Bettina(F), er, the.F.DAT e%%3%        have.COND-2.SG you the.M.ACC also d   !  %#% M-

)%% Bettina(F) #3 N3 give-INF can-INF

Finally, to more or less complete the picture, we give one slip in (23)  a blend  in which the mismatch is only due to the number feature (type 2): the definite article is singular while the noun % (     $ plural. (23)    35 e5    the.M.NOM people, er, the.M.NOM      ; CC    the.M.NOM man(M) // the.PL .   AA    % !

; % man(M) has % people

33% PPT-say-PPT

The gender feature is inherent in nouns and prominent across noun phrase errors while number is a term feature and case a contextually specified feature. For the sake of clarity, we will therefore restrict our attention to the 86 examples of type 1, with gender unambiguously being the only fea-

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ture responsible for the error. As the examples given above make clear, gender errors in German are typically manifested in the choice of article, in some cases such as (19) also in adjectives, and in yet other cases in possessive and relative pronouns.

3.3. Distribution of gender errors Let us now have a look at the distribution of gender mismatches across error types. Note that slips which are ambiguous between anticipation and exchange (e.g. (21)) were treated as anticipations. Actually, most of the errors classified as anticipations below are of this type. Apart from the four types of gender errors already exemplified above, we found seven gender errors due to a &  %, one of which is given in example (24) below. In this case, the gender of a noun phrase seems to be carried along to a noun phrase that appears later in the expression. (24)    a4 +   %#    "  

the.F.NOM two(F) spades(N) is next.to the.F.DAT ace(N)hearts(N)  /   -  

 the.N.DAT ace(N) hearts(N) .   ' !  /   '  - In table 3 below, we give the frequency distribution across the five error types of the 86 gender agreement errors which, in one way or another, involve two nominal predicates. Blends and substitutions we call paradigmatic errors since they make the wrong choice between an intended noun and a noun which is semantically or phonologically related to it, but which is not part of the intended utterance. In contrast, exchanges, anticipations and perseverations we call syntagmatic because they imply some sort of interaction between two elements which are both part of the intended utterance. In the table, the figures in brackets represent the number and the percentage of self-corrections for each of the five types. For instance, 20 out of 42 blends (i.e. 47.6 % of all blends) are self-repaired. 



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,#<( Distribution of gender mismatches across error types Gender mismatch due to:

N

%

1. Blend

42 (20)

48.8 (47.6) %

2. Substitution

12 (8)

14.0 (66.7) %

3. Exchange

12 (7)

14.0 (58.3) %

4. Anticipation

13 (7)

15.1 (53.8) %

5. Perseveration

7 (1)

8.1 (14.3) %

7134

FF2FB

PARADIGMATIC ERROR

SYNTAGMATIC ERROR

 

Almost half of the gender errors (48.8%) are the result of a blend. As the self-repairs show, these errors are typically caused by the fact that two (near) synonyms, both compatible with the intention of the message, are selected in parallel. Gender information, and in connection to it the form of the article, is based on the intended noun. When a (near) synonym is selected as the nominal head of the noun phrase, which has a different gender, this will lead to a gender conflict.11 As mentioned above, substitution errors are considered paradigmatic, too, in that the error element is not part of the intended utterance but rather phonologically or semantically related to one of the elements contained in the utterance, in this case the intended noun. Interestingly, all the gender mismatches in the corpus are due to formal substitutions, as in example (18), while all semantic substitutions in the corpus that could in principle have given rise to a gender conflict involve accommodation, that is, the erroneous utterance is brought into line with the grammatical requirements. An example of this is found in (25) below. Note that in contrast to the formal substitution in (18), an ungrammatical string ,7 ( -N door(F)) does not surface.

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(25)  /%   ,7    %%3, you must the.F.ACC door(F) then hold-INF, A%5   .%  rubbish, the.N.ACC window(N) d   %  ! ! then. Pfau (2000, 2007) claims that this well-formedness is due to the fact that semantic substitutions take place early during the language production process (Garrett 1980; Levelt 1989) while formal substitutions take place only after gender agreement has been computed and can therefore not be repaired anymore. In contrast, exchanges, anticipations, and perseveration are syntagmatic in nature in that the source of the error is part of the intended string. It is either an abstract feature that is shifted or a word, be it a noun or an article. While the latter is true for the examples in (20) and (22), the former holds for the slip in (26) below.12 Clearly, this error does not involve the anticipation of a phonological word. Rather, it might be the female gender feature of the noun '%  ('  !   !!    the definiteness of '4f ( .13 (26) /   %%     (6      '%  1.SG.DAT stands the.F.NOM sweat(M) on the.F.DAT forehead(F)      '4f       '%   the.M.NOM sweat(M) on the.F.DAT forehead(F) 4$'  !   $- Of the 86 errors in table 3, 69 involve nouns, 11 involve misplaced articles, and six are clear instances of gender feature shifts (as in (26)). However, all examples involving articles are ambiguous in the sense that it cannot be decided whether the article itself, i.e. a phonological form, has been misplaced or whether it is only an abstract feature which is responsible for the mismatch. Hence, in (27) either the whole definite article / of the second NP may have been anticipated or only its masculine feature. (27)  43%     /%    7, I want-PAST only DEM with the.M.DAT time(F), /%     a%   /   / 43 with the.F.DAT time(F) and the.M.DAT space(M) know-INF 0  $! 3  " #  !  -



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If we opt for the second interpretation, then all 17 cases of errors in articles can actually be considered the result of a feature misplacement. Note that in exactly 50% of the cases, self-corrections provide information about the intended utterance. This shows that speakers are also hearers in the sense that they monitor their own output, and regularly repair it in the case of an error (Levelt 1983, 1989). As a result, we can tell with certainty in cases like (18) and (19) what the intended noun was, while without self-repairs we could only speculate about that. Let us now see how these different types of speech errors may be fitted into the model of FDG, and implemented in the dynamic expression rules as discussed in section 2. 3 +  ( #

  Let us first try and define the five types of errors in terms of the FDG model. Thus, we distinguish between terms in the underlying representation (UR) on the one hand and noun phrases as part of the actual expression on the other hand. In the case of paradigmatic errors, only one NP is relevant, i.e. the one that is the locus of the gender error. This will be called NP1, its article ART1 and its nominal head NOUN1. When a second NP is relevant, expressed before or after NP1, as in the case of syntagmatic errors, this will be called NP2, with ART2 and head NOUN2. The term in the underlying representation of which NP1 is the expression will be called T1 and its head noun Nt1. In case of an NP2, its underlying term will be called T2 with head noun Nt2. In an error-free expression, we would have the situation shown in Figure 2. GND = Nt1 should be read as  #! 'Bt1Q;CZ.1 as   definiteness value of T1- 0   @-)      !# errors can be accounted for in such a model, while in section 4.2, we will discuss syntagmatic errors in more detail.

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T1 (Nt1)

NP1

ART1 DEF = T1 GND = Nt1

UR



NOUN1 = Nt1

T2 (Nt2)

NP2

ART2 DEF = T2 GND = Nt2

NOUN2 = Nt2

. 9( Relation between terms and noun phrases

4.1. Paradigmatic errors In the case of paradigmatic errors, we have only NP1 and T1. Furthermore, feature DEF derives its value from T1 and feature GND derives its value from Nt1. However, NOUN1 is not the form of nominal predicate Nt1. Rather, it is the form of some nominal predicate Nx in the lexicon which is either phonologically similar (form-based substitution, as in example (18) repeated below) or synonymous to Nt1 (blend, as in example (19) repeated below). Interestingly, in 8 of the 42 blends, the two competing nouns are also phonologically related. The slip in (28) exemplifies this phenomenon (see Dell and Reich 1981 and Harley 1984 for discussion of such multicausal errors and the implications for the assumed independence of processing levels in top-down models of speech production).14 (18) //    2  5 e5 always the.M same chaos(N),er, case(M)  $    -



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(19)  4         &  , 5  e5 . that be.FUT a.M/N very exciting-N competition(M), er, final(N)  &3. // &3 G%%/&  exciting-N final(N) // exciting-M competition(M) .  %$/#' AA  - (28)  8 5  5  e5 the.M chin(N), the.N chin(N), er, The chin, the chin, eh, the jaw.

  

the.M jaw(M)

The expression process of NP1 may run more or less as follows. Initially, reference will be made to the correct nominal predicate, Nt1. If we consider the expression of both (18) and (19) above we see that gender for the erroneous NP is taken into consideration not only for the expression of the article, the leftmost node of the NP, but also for the expression of the adjectival modifiers. This suggests that all prenominal modifiers express a common auxiliary operator, which is retrieved only once on the basis of the inspection of the lexical entry of the intended Nt1. This availability at a relatively early stage of expression of the semantic and lexical aspects of predicates is fully compatible with the findings of Garrett (1980) and Levelt (1989) referred to above. For blends like the one in (19), we assume that when the process backtracks to fetch the phonological shape of the nominal head, something goes wrong, arguably along the following lines. Since the lexical entry of Nt1 has been accessed at an earlier stage in order to provide the gender information, we may assume that its immediate lexical vicinity has been activated and has therefore become more accessible as a whole. There is a higher chance now for the retrieval of lexical items which are part of the same semantic domain since we may assume that these semantic neighbours have received some activation due to their proximity to the entry for Nt1 in the semantic lexicon. This explains why the vast majority of erroneous NOUN1 in the corpus are of this type: 42 out of 54, or 78% have a semantic similarity. Crucially, phonological similarity cannot play a role since lemmas within the semantic lexicon have no phonological specification. In the remaining 22%, the intruding noun has a more or less clear phonological similarity to Nt1. The nouns interacting in formal substitutions belong to the same phonological cohort in the phonological lexicon, i.e. the subset of lexical items which start out with the same sequence of phonemes. Phonologically similar forms therefore receive activation from the

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intended noun once the initial phonemes of the form under selection are available. Under certain circumstances, speakers may then stray to another entry in the cohort, and select the wrong form, as in (18).15 As we have seen above, in example (28), these two error strategies may strengthen each other: in 8 out of 42 semantic substitutions, the intended and the intruding noun are also phonologically related. We may implement the two types of paradigmatic errors as follows in the model of dynamic expression. When the node for NP1 is created on the basis of T1, its grammatical features will be instantiated, gender being one of them. For this, a first inspection of the lexical entry of Nt1 will take place. We then proceed to the expression of the article and, possibly, other modifiers of the nominal head, all of which will get the functional and formal features stemming from T1. When we backtrack to the NP node and reach the slot for the nominal head, the lexicon has to be accessed again to fetch the corresponding phonological material. Assuming that the organization of the FG lexicon is in keeping with psycholinguistic evidence for it (i.e. spreading activation from target noun to semantically and phonologically related nouns), this will lead to blends and substitutions.

4.2. Syntagmatic errors In the case of errors of a syntagmatic nature matters are quite different. Here we are dealing with two terms, T1 and T2 and their respective nominal heads, Nt1 and Nt2. For the three types of errors in this category, we established the following error numbers, mainly on the basis of self-corrections and logic. ,#L. Nature of syntagmatic errors NOUN dislocated

ART dislocated

Exchange

9

3

Anticipation

5

8

Perseveration

1

6

 

2

6



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Where semantic or phonological similarity in the lexicon may provide a good explanation for the paradigmatic errors, we assume that for the syntagmatic ones, there are two related factors which may cause them. Firstly, terms T1 and T2 are both elements of the UR being expressed. The semantic/syntactic link between them is typically quite tight. They may, for example, be arguments of the same predicate, be part of the same complex term, have parallel positions in a nominal or clausal coordination, or are otherwise intimately related, for instance, in an idiomatic expression. Secondly, as a result of the relatedness of their underlying terms, NP1 and NP2 may be sister nodes or otherwise end up as immediate neighbours in the resulting syntactic structure. Indeed, this is the case for the vast majority of these errors. (29) is an example. (29) 3%   /      9  fetch-2.SG you me in the.F.DAT towel(N)     7% the.N.ACC kitchen.towel(N)       7     7%  in the.F.DAT kitchen(F) the.N.ACC kitchen.towel(N) 9  !$ get me the kitchen towel from the kitchen? We will assume that gender errors of the syntagmatic type may be explained by a combination of the two factors mentioned above. Thus, the semantic closeness of the two terms in the underlying representation makes them candidates for confusion, especially during the retrieval of their very central nominal heads, more or less in the manner of lexical entries in the case of paradigmatic errors. And this confusion may be heightened by the dynamics of the syntactic process in which the NPs are created. For the latter we will invoke the mechanism of parallel processing, briefly introduced in section 2 as  3 !-.     #!' Mkker (2005) in order to explain the following cases of agreement in Arabic. The examples under (30) and (31) below are taken from Mohammad (2000: 112ff).

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(30) a. 3#% 4334 B   %# the-girls and-the-boys read.3.PL.M book . # !  $ ! 3- b. A   34 433#% read.3.SG.M the-boys and-the-girls .  $ ! # ! 3-

%# book

c. A %  3#% 4334 %# read.3.SG.F the-girls and-the-boys book . # !  $ ! 3- As exemplified by (30a), in the case of preverbal compound NPs, gender agreement on the verb is always masculine, irrespective of the order of the coordinated NPs, provided that one of them is masculine. However, in the case of a postverbal subject, the gender is taken from the leftmost of the coordinated NPs, irrespective of the gender of the rightmost NP (30b/c). This may be explained by assuming for the V-S case that during the expression of the verb, processing of the next constituent, i.e. the subject term, has already started in parallel. Apparently, the gender of the leftmost daughter of the Subject noun phrase is available before the final form of the verb has been established.16 Further evidence for an analysis of Arabic subject-verb agreement along these lines comes from examples such as those in (31) where we have a V-X-S situation, i.e. there is a constituent between the verb and the postverbal subject. In such configurations gender agreement is either with the subject, as in (31a), or we get the default masculine agreement, as in (31b). Apparently, the intermediate locative constituent renders the gender information of the subject inaccessible, at least in some cases. (31) a. A

3%   *3% 3 B3 was-3.SG.F settle-3.SG.F the-Iraq-ACC // /:%% people.F.PL different PRT







b. A 3  *3  3 B3 PRT was-3.SG.M settle-3.SG.M the-Iraq-ACC  // /:%% people.F.PL different ;''    !  !0?-



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Now let us see to what extent these mechanisms may be applied to the syntagmatic gender errors. The five examples of nominal anticipation, as in example (29), seem to be the most straightforward cases. As in the case of the paradigmatic errors, first comes the expression of the (correct) article, and then, assuming that T2 is either pragmatically prominent or already being processed in parallel, Nt2 is selected for expression in NP1. The single case of nominal perseveration is the mirror image of this: T1 is more prominent than T2 and as a result its nominal head is retrieved when NP2 is being expressed despite the fact that T1 has already been expressed. Nominal exchanges may be seen as anticipations which are not interrupted halfway by a self-correction, but which are continued and  ! $ nserting the non-expressed Nt1 in NP2. If taken literally, the dislocated articles are somewhat problematic for the dynamic expression rules as they stand. Articles, and most other grammatical elements come into existence very late in the derivation of an utterance, i.e. when they are about to be expressed. This would mean that they are not available for exchange with grammatical entities earlier on, unless we assume that parallel processing may make them available prematurely. We would predict, then, that these phenomena happen more often in languages with prenominal articles than in those with postnominal ones. However, we have no evidence for this. Therefore, it seems to be safer to assume that all cases of article dislocation are in fact cases of gender dislocation, as has already been suggested above. This would be more in accordance with the model and what we observed above in relation to example (26). Further evidence for this analysis may be derived from errors like the one in (21) above, repeated below for convenience. In this slip, the gender of NP2 is anticipated in NP1 rather than the article as such since it is merged with the preposition ( +   ). (21)        55     ) now the.N.NOM/ACC look(M), the.N.NOM look(M)      G at.the.N.ACC weekend(N) B   3 3!- The difference between noun dislocation and article dislocation boils down, then, to a difference between the //% of inspection. So for anticipations, selecting Nt2 instead of Nt1 leads to noun dislocation when done while NOUN1 is about to be expressed and to article dislocation while expressing ART1. To the extent that any statistically robust conclusions

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may be drawn on the basis of the rather low figures in Table 4, they seem to suggest that both scenarios are more or less equally likely for anticipations. A corollary of this analysis is that article dislocation would affect the gender but not the definiteness of the respective NPs. Indeed, we have not found one example of an error in definiteness in the available data.17 Although article dislocations are relatively rare for exchanges, they do occur. We may speculate that, while noun exchanges are in fact the most common error, it is not very likely that speakers will   '   wrong choice of gender in NP1 by expressing the gender of Nt1 on NP2, since their contribution to the semantics of the utterance is close to zero. For perseverations, articles are by far the most common error location. For these cases, we assume that when the gender for NP2 is retrieved in order to compute the right form for ART2, T1 is still in the last stage of expression, which in German typically concerns the head noun, Nt1. At this stage it may compete with the local Nt2 and provide the wrong gender feature. 2 " <@  The dynamic expression rules were initially introduced to implement morphosyntax in the original FG model without the obvious problems inherent in the original expression rules as discussed briefly in section 2. In Bakker and Siewierska (2004) it was shown that they fit very well into the FDG model, especially when this is seen as a model of language production, or rather a model of the Speaker. The diachronic implications of the proposal were first introduced in Bakker and Siewierska (2002), where the trajectory from relational noun via the two types of adposition to case affix was discussed. In the current article, we hope to have shown that the dynamic expression rules may be applied to the noun phrase as well, where they take care of the order of the lexical and morphological material and the several types of agreement in these constituents. In order for a theory to be cognitively adequate, it should obviously be in harmony with existing models of language production and perception. However, given two theories which fare equally well at these points, we think that the more adequate of the two is the theory which also tells us what can go wrong during speaking, and why. Thus, a theory should not only tell us how to derive all grammatical utterances of a specific language, it should also tell us which speech errors are more likely to be made than others. Thus, a theory should not be based solely on assumptions concern-



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ing the well-formedness of utterances. As an empirical basis, all human linguistic output should be taken seriously, and this includes frequently made speech errors and, importantly, the self-corrections that speakers make and do not make. Only then may we arrive at a fully fledged theory of human linguistic behaviour rather than a theory about linguistic competence. The former happens to be the final objective of FG. The latter is at best only part of such a theory. It is the mechanism which is activated in laboratory experiments about well-formedness and, probably more interestingly, in the case of self-corrections. It is the experience of linguists, formalists and functionalists alike, that grammaticality judgements often vary between native speakers, and are often not of a clear-cut yes/no nature. It is precisely here where grammaticality shades off into ungrammaticality, and synchrony into diachrony. One way of measuring the strength of an empirically oriented theory is the number of phenomena it successfully describes (and explains), i.e. its empirical coverage. Arguably more interesting, however, are predictions concerning phenomena which may not be encountered, i.e. to what extent that theory is falsifiable. Put in the slightly more modest terms of a theory about probabilities rather than possibilities, this is the question of the (un)likelihood of certain structures occurring in linguistic output, in a specific language or in languages at large. Restricting ourselves to agreement errors in German noun phrases, and taking the static FDG model and our current view on dynamic expression as points of departure, we would argue as follows.18 Definiteness and number are determined during term formation, at the interpersonal and representational levels, respectively. In the current view on node instantiation during expression, these values are assigned as functional features upon the creation of the NP node which expresses the term, presumably with semantic features being in the scope of pragmatic features. They are established just once and never reassessed during the expression of that node, only copied to the relevant daughter nodes via inheritance. Therefore, it seems to be less likely that they change during the expression of the noun phrase under that node. Indeed, as is clear from the figures in Table 1, errors with number as a factor are relatively rare, and definiteness is absent altogether. As for gender, not a feature of the term but of the nominal head, matters are quite different. Initially, gender is established as a formal feature of the NP node by inspecting the lexical entry of the nominal head. As such it is inherited by the prenominal modifiers, and expressed. However, once we turn to the expression of the nominal head, the lexicon is accessed again, now in order to fetch the phonological and morphological specifications of the noun. As

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we have argued, this complex process may sometimes result in fetching the information from a lexical entry or a term next door. In this process, no direct inspection takes place of the gender features of the noun, which would prevent the noun from being uttered. The clash may become only evident after the utterance, and this may lead to self-correction, or not. Although case errors are extremely rare as the single cause for mistakes (only 1 instance), there are no fewer than 21 instances where they combine with gender errors. On face value, this is not what one would expect on the basis of the theory. Case is a formal feature of the NP node, either inherited from the mother node or established locally. Just like number and definiteness, it has scope over the whole NP and is never reassessed after being established. It is therefore quite unlikely that its value will change while the term is in the process of being expressed. However, given the high degree of homophony between the German article paradigms, 20 of these might as well be interpreted as instances of just the wrong gender rather than a combination of wrong gender and case.19 Thus, the model seems to !?  ?%! ution of the different types of possible errors in German. Another prediction which could be made is that one would expect fewer errors of this type in languages which have gender distinction in their articles but N-Art order. In such languages, the optimal way of determining gender in the NP seems to be by percolating the gender feature after expressing the nominal head. Under such conditions there seems to be less reason to re-inspect the lexical entry, with a possible change of the feature value. Until a corpus of speech errors in such a language is available we rest our case. &   1.

2.

The authors are grateful to three anonymous reviewers who proposed a number of improvements to the original text. Only we, however, are to blame for any mistakes and inconsistencies that remain. Authors -mail addresses: [email protected] and [email protected]. Here and below we will refer to FG as the theory most recently presented in Dik (1997), and to FDG as the extended model for FG proposed in Hengeveld (2004). In the latter, a distinction is made between the pragmatic (Interpersonal) and semantic (Representational) levels. As a result, the elements which traditionally belong to a specific term are assigned to their own levels. Below, we will use a term structure which contains all and only the relevant semantic information. Pragmatic information, such as topicality and focality, is derived



3.

4.

5.

6.

7. 8.



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from the interpersonal level. Syntactic functions are assigned by the expression component. Throughout this article, the following abbreviations are used: 3 = third person, ACC = accusative case, ART = article, COND = conditional, DAT = dative case, DEF = definite, F = feminine (gender), FUT = future tense, GND = gender, INF = infinitive, M = masculine (gender), N = neuter (gender), NOM = nominative case, NP = noun phrase, PPT = past participle, PL = plural, SG = singular, UR = underlying representation. In the formalizations below, upper case notions indicate feature names (NUMBER) and lower case notions indicate feature values (sg). Symbols preceded by # represent a link to an entry in the lexicon (#girl). Forms in quotes indicate phonological representations in the object language (# - 9  there may be ambiguity among feature names, they are made more specific by way of an extension: e.g. NUMBER.subject means the Number value of the Subject term. All these notations are relatively informal, and meant only to illustrate the points under discussion. A formally more rigorous version, based on feature-value logic and unification, was introduced in Bakker (1989). A computer implementation is discussed in Bakker (1994). Obviously, this is too simplistic. Verbal predicates may directly assign specific cases to their arguments which deviate from the standard marking on the basic semantic functions. For a discussion of the contents of the lexicon in relation to dynamic expression see Bakker and Siewierska (2002). In contrast to the standard view in FG, it is assumed that grammatical elements such as auxiliaries and adpositions are also located in the lexicon, albeit with a grammatical rather than a lexical meaning. They are not accessible during the construction of underlying representations, only during expression. In terms of standard FG, this implements the procedure of lexical priority. In another study on German speech errors, Berg (1987) presents similar NPinternal agreement errors. In his corpus, too, most of the errors are due to a gender mismatch. Two comparable slips from Spanish (Berg 1987: 287) and French (Rossi and Peter Defare 1995: 28), respectively, are given in (i) and (ii): (i)   B%35   3 the.M.PL jacket(F)-PL, the.M.PL vest(M)-PL  O3  %   (ii) %   /g/ 5   /g/    V  that.is the.M same line(F), the.M same book(M) to the.F    & T line(F) exact .   / $   3-

316 9.

 

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

) + Exchanges of articles also occur, as is exemplified by the error in (i) where, again, we find a gender clash in two positions: (i) % % #  #       9  hand(F) now have I myself the.M.ACC        ) 5 in.front.of the.F.ACC mouth(M),  e5          ; 3%3 er, the.F.ACC hand(F) in.front.of the.M.ACC mouth(M) PPT-hold-PPT B 0have put the hand in front of my mouth myself. In the examples below, we use the following notational conventions: the utterance containing the error is always given first followed by the intended utterance on the right hand side of the arrow. Whenever there is no arrow in an example, the error was self-corrected by the speaker. The error elements, i.e. the loci of gender mismatch, are in bold type. For blends, even if the error was self-corrected, the two competing noun phrases are given in the form NP // NP. Except for blends, a translation is given only for the intended utterance. Obviously, there is a certain chance that the wrong choice of noun would not lead to a gender conflict in such cases. Given the semantic compatibility of the two nouns, such errors would become apparent via self-corrections only. Since they do not lead to speech errors in the grammatical sense, speakers may leave them uncorrected much more often than the cases that do lead to errors. In the speech error database, such errors are not available, so we can only speculate about the total number of them. Possibly, (21) should be added to (20) and (22). However, in that case it would not be the copy of a concrete form, since in this case we have a merged form of the article with a preposition: b. This suggests that anticipations are probably based on the wrong transfer of features rather than forms. We will come back to this issue in the next section. Of course, we may see these errors simply as a   '  ##der- However, one would then expect a random choice for any of the two other available genders, or consistently a choice for some default gender. In all our examples, however, it is the gender of the noun which heads the NP in the immediate context. Note that (28) is particularly interesting since it also contains an erroneous self-correction, i.e. first the article is adapted to Nx and then finally the intended Nt1 is uttered. Possibly, speakers make an internal shift to hearer mode here, i.e. they retrieve a lexical item on the basis of incoming phonological material rather than retrieving the phonological material belonging to a specific preselected lexical entry. The interesting fact that in postverbal situations number agreement is neutralized does not play a role in our analysis.



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17. A hypothetical example could look like the one given in (i) where only the specification for (in)definiteness is exchanged: (i) 2#3  /    '4      DEF.SG.F.ACC cherry(F) I give-1.SG INDEF.SG.N.DAT pig(N)  #3  /   '4        I give-1.SG DEF.SG.N.DAT pig(N) INDEF.SG.F.ACC cherry(F) 0#% $  #- 18. But see Bakker and Siewierska (2004), who argue for a dynamic interpretation of the pragmatic and semantic modules of FG as well. 19. Another explanation may be that the speaker is not fully confident about the formal aspects of the respective paradigms. Unlike the gender system, case seems to be on its way out in at least some dialects of German (Hans den Besten, p.c.).

*    Anwar, Mohamed S. 1979 Remarks on a collection of speech errors. 2% %    +*%6: 5972. Bakker, Dik 1989 A formalism for FG expression rules. In: John H. Connolly and Simon C. Dik (eds.), .% //   % $/&% , 45 64. Dordrecht: Foris. 1994 . /  $/&%% -&%  .% //   ,*&*. Amsterdam: IFOTT. 1999 FG Expression Rules: from templates to constituent structure. G 3 +& .% // 67. 2001 The FG expression rules: a dynamic model. %$ "3 %2 42: 1554. 2005 Expression and agreement: Some more arguments for the dynamic expression model. In: Casper de Groot and Kees Hengeveld (eds.), ; &*%% ":&   .% // , 140. (Functional Grammar Series 27.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Bakker, Dik and Anna Siewierska 2002 Adpositions, the lexicon and expression rules. In: Ricardo Mairal Us ! Mar >- 5Dz Quintero (eds.), 04 + &%  - 3 /% '% %   .% // , 125178. (Functional Grammar Series 25.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 2004 Towards a speaker model of Functional Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Mar! J#eles G&GonzE & (eds.), 325 364.

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Berg, Thomas 1987 The case against accommodation: Evidence from German speech error data.  ;/ * 26: 277299. Dell, Gary S. and Peter A. Reich 1981 Stages in sentence production: An analysis of speech error data.   #  #) 20: 611629. Dik, Simon C. 1997 , , *  .% // ( (Functional Grammar Series 20.) Second, revised edition. Edited by Kees Hengeveld. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Fromkin, Victoria A. 1968 Speculations on performance models.    % 4: 47 68. 1971 The non-anomalous nature of anomalous utterances.  47: 2752. Garc   ; this vol. Functional Discourse Grammar and extraction from (complex) noun phrases. Garrett, Merrill F. 1980 Levels of processing in sentence production. In: Brian Butterworth (ed.),  + %5 ( 1, 177220. London: Academic Press. Haegeman, Liliane 1994 2% %%  /%), *. Oxford: Blackwell. Halle, Morris and Alec Marantz 1993 Distributed Morphology and the pieces of inflection. In: Kenneth Hale and Samuel J. Keyser (eds.), , 4  / ) 9P( "3 *  %     '* ) /#  , 111176. Cambridge, M.A.: The MIT Press. Harley, Heidi and Rolf Noyer 2003 Distributed Morphology. In: Lisa Cheng and Rynt Sybesma (eds.), ,' %2% %'%%33%3 %)(,%% %, 463496. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Harley, Trevor A. 1984 A critique of top-down independent levels models of speech production: Evidence from non-plan-internal speech errors. $% '3  8: 191219. Hengeveld, Kees 2004 The architecture of a Functional Discourse Grammar. In: J. Lachlan Mackenzieand Mar! J#  &-GonzE &"! -121. this vol. Prototypical and non-prototypical noun phrases in FDG.



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Hieda, Osamu 1998 A sketch of Koegu grammar. In: Gert Jan Dimmendaal and Marco Last (eds.), ' /  $% , 345373. KP (:  %  % +%, 114132. The Hague: Mouton. Pfau, Roland 2000 Features and categories in language production(Ph.D. diss., Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University, Frankfurt am Main. 2003 Defective feature copy and anti-agreement in language production. ,: % . / 53, 95108 (Special Issue ,   - /%0% (+ %Z%$  %,:%'%*; available at: http://uts.cc.utexas.edu/ ~tls/2001tls/Pfau.pdf). 2007 Cheap repairs: A Distributed Morphology toolkit for sentence construction. In: Carson T. Sch<& and Victor S. Ferreira (eds.), , '%%%- %'&"

   (;2,G +&  % 53), 9-33. Cambridge, M.A.: MITWPL.

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Pfau, Roland and Dik Bakker 2004 The implementation of agreement in the FDG model: Evidence from anti-agreement phenomena. Paper presented at the J2%2% % $   .% // . University of Oviedo, Gij 2225 September, 2004. Rijkhoff, Jan 2002 , 0 + . (Oxford Studies in Typology and Theoretical Linguistics.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rossi, Mario and Evelyne Peter Defare 1995 Lapsus linguae: Word errors or phonological errors? 2% %  +*% 11: 538. Van Valin, Robert and Randy LaPolla 1997 '*%:. '% % 5 ;  .%( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



   #    #       

   1 Within formalist models of grammar, much research has been devoted to the conditions under which constituents can be extracted out of their natural syntactic domains. One of the specific restrictions widely cited in the literature is known as the Complex Noun Phrase Constraint (CNPC), which forbids displacement of constituents out of clauses if they are dominated by a Noun Phrase (NP). As noted by Van Valin (1996), extraction constraints2 have been formulated in terms of syntactic movement and, therefore, they are taken as evidence in favour of an autonomous syntactic module whose rules and principles do not derive from discourse-pragmatic factors. Together with the fact that most work on NPs in both Functional Grammar (FG) and Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG) has so far centred on the simple NP,3 the CNPC and related principles provide an interesting challenge to the theory from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. In this article, I will take the opposite route and argue that the extraction of a syntactic unit out of a complex NP causes a conflict in the pragmatic organization of the utterance and thus gives rise to anomalous expressions with different degrees of acceptability across languages.4 In so doing, I will examine the compatibility of FDG with Lambrecht ")**@  $ 'nformation structure, which views the informational organization of utterances in direct relation to the speech participantsgmatic knowledge. This article is organized as follows. In section 2 I will introduce the main aspects of Lambrecht ")**@  $ '' ation structure and its potential compatibility with FDG. Section 3 will be devoted to presenting the original formulation of the CNPC in classical generative grammar. I will also discuss data from six languages which indicate that the CNPC and related constraints cannot be explained on the basis of configurational restrictions alone. In section 4 I will show how a careful study of the informational organization of complex noun phrases contributes to a better un-

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derstanding of extraction restrictions. Finally, I will show how the previous observations can be accommodated in FDG. %      There is a long tradition in the functionalist literature of the study of how pragmatic factors influence the syntactic structure of linguistic expressions. FG has mostly concentrated on the formal impact of the status of referents on linguistic expressions through the assignment of the pragmatic functions Topic and Focus. Dik (1997a: 310) defines pragmatic functions as 'ctions which specify the informational status of the constituents in relation to the wider communicative setting in which they are used! rizes the notion  % #     ' !  '%  interaction based on the speaker  ! !!

   imates of each other #3  !#-  # ;3     $ %mpact on the pragmatically relevant structuring of linguistic expressions (1997a: 11), the truth is that, as noted by Siewierska (1991: 148), pragmatic functions in FG are only recognized if they have a formal impact on the linguistic expression. This justifies Cornish ",^^@()U)  %  that the form-oriented aspect of pragmatic functions    3  $ over the discourse-cognitive dimension- G'    ;3 ")**+a: 311) is well aware of the relevance of the notions given and new information and topicality and focality in his model of verbal interaction, but the relation between these notions and the intraclausal pragmatic functions Topic and Focus remains unclear. This problem has long been noted in the FG tradition (see e.g. Siewierska 1991: 155ff.; Mackenzie and Keizer 1991; Hannay 1991; Bolkestein 1998; Cornish 2004) and different solutions have been suggested to bridge the gap between grammar and discourse in FG. However, possibly due to the priority granted to the theoretical problem itself, to my knowledge no studies of specific linguistic processes have been offered in the FG tradition in which formal marking is linked to the cognitive status of referents. This is unfortunate, for if Topic and Focus assignment relates to the informational status of referents with respect to the pragmatic knowledge of both speaker and addressee in a given communicative setting, constraints on pragmatic function assignment can only be discovered if the role of the cognitive status of referents is taken into account in grammatical description. One of the most important differences between FDG and standard FG, as presented in Dik (1997a, b), is the top-down orientation of the former,



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which now intends to construct its internal architecture in such a way that it becomes compatible with well-established findings in the field of psycholinguistics. In particular, Levelt (1989) views linguistic behaviour as a process running from communicative intention to actual speech generation. In accordance with this top-down organization, FDG takes the   -% rather than the clause as the basic unit of linguistic description. Discourse Acts can be decomposed into Subacts of Reference and Ascription to which, following the practice in classical FG, the pragmatic functions Topic and Focus are assigned. Another important novelty in FDG is the introduction of both a cognitive and a contextual (also named  %      !Oacent modules to the linguistic generator. Hengeveld (2004a: 3) characterizes them as follows: The cognitive component represents the (long-term) knowledge of the speaker, such as his communicative competence, his knowledge of the world, and his linguistic competence. (...) The communicative component represents the (short-term) linguistic information derivable from the preceding discourse and the non-linguistic, perceptual information derivable from the speech situation.

Even though these two components are not part of the grammatical system proper, they are introduced into the theory in the belief that some grammatical processes may be best understood if reference is made to them. In my view, the cognitive and contextual components can be useful in understanding the grammatical coding of referents in discourse and in discovering significant correlations between the syntactic expression of Topic and Focus and the status of referents in the pragmatic knowledge of both speaker and addressee.5 An articulated pragmatic theory along those lines is presented in Lambrecht (1994), who argues that the information structure of an utterance depends on the mental states of the interlocutors and thus is not a constant function associated with a sentence but, rather, a function of the communicative situation in which the expression is uttered. Two information structure categories that will be relevant in this article are Identifiability and Activation, which are characterized as follows (Lambrecht 1994: 76): -IDENTIFIABILITY, which has to do with a speaker 



 '   a discourse representation of a particular referent is already stored in the hearer !  "-.   !  ACTIVATION, which has to do with the speaker 



 '    '    '!' 

324

   

referent as already %!  $

   nactive in the mind of the hearer at the time of the speech act.

The cognitive distinction between identifiable and unidentifiable referents is coded in many languages through the formal distinction between definite and indefinite noun phrases, although other means such as word order and case markers are also relevant. Unidentifiable or brand-new referents can be of two types: anchored or unanchored, a distinction taken from Prince (1981), who claims that an entity is anchored if the NP representing it is linked to another referent contained in it. The crucial thing here is that anchored entities should contain at least one anchor that it is not itself brand-new or it wouldn %   #$-6 Prince (1981: 236) offers the following examples to illustrate the contrast: (1)

a. -*2CC%&/# C4/244 ?@4% b. H*4/4 4%

 (1b) is anomalous because the anchoring entity is marked as indefinite and, therefore, assumed not to be known to the addressee. Note, additionally, that anchoring constructions may allow definite descriptions of entities without any prior mention of them in discourse (cf. , * 2CC% &/# C 4/ 2 4 work(s) with-  ding to Hawkins (1991: 411fn), an anchoring construction makes a context available in which the referent can be interpreted as unique by the hearer, and, therefore, the use of a definite article in the anchored NP is acceptable. Lambrecht (1994: 95) notes that activation has correlates in grammar: phonological attenuation and zero coding in morphosyntax are properties of activated referents or presuppositional structure, whereas prosodic prominence and full lexical coding typically entail the inactive status of a given referent (see also Chafe 1994).7 Accessible or semi-active referents (those which are peripheral, but not directly focused upon) can be of three types: deactivated or / $ ccessible '! '   '  schema or 'ally accessible ! /-externally accessible     $ 

 - .    ation between the areas of identifiability and cognitive activation is given in the following table (Lambrecht 1994: 109):



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,#1(Identifiability and Activation according to Lambrecht (1994) IDENTIFIABILITY Unidentifiable Anchored Unanchored Identifiable ACTIVATION Inactive Accessible Textually Situationally Inferentially Active

What is the role of the topic and focus functions in this model? According to Lambrecht (1994: 115116) the activation states of referents should be seen as preconditions for topic and focus function. Thus, the same activation state may be reflected in topic or focal status. This is illustrated with the following contrast in Italian and French (emphasis in original): (2)

a. IO PAGO / MOI je PAYE. I PAY. b. Pago IO / C MOI qui paye. I $-

The pronominal expressions in (2) have the same activation state in both examples, but receive focus function only in (2b). This expression is likely to be uttered in a context in which it is presupposed that someone has to pay something and two or more people intend to do so. Therefore, the sentences differ only in the pragmatic function of the pronominal expressions but their referents are necessarily active since they are speech participants themselves. Topic and focus thus relate to the status of a referent with respect to a given proposition, whereas identifiability and activation relate to the mental representation of referents. Obviously, there are important relations among both parameters to the extent that, for instance, a referent is interpretable as the topic of a sentence only if it has certain activation properties or a significant degree of pragmatic accessibility. In Lambrecht  !   3%    '   !!   topic of the expression. However, before making this communicative deci-

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sion he also evaluates the status of that referent in his interlocutor ! and decides upon the formal properties of the sentence. Activation properties act, therefore, as a precondition for topic status and, consequently, (Lambrecht 1994: 165)     ''iently accessible topic referents must pose certain difficulties of interpretation, hence will tend to be perceived as ill formed-  $     ' llowing scale: ,#9(Lambrecht ")**@.  $  TOPIC ACCEPTABILITY SCALE Active Accessible Unused Brand-new anchored Brand-new unanchored

Most acceptable

Least acceptable 

Lambrecht (1994: 262) notes the complementarity of the topic accessibility scale with focal prominence: those referents which are low on the scale are likely to be coded as non-topics, i.e. focal constituents. Hence, the scale predicts that the more inactive a given referent is, the more likely it is to function as a focal constituent. Activation and Identifiability are mental notions which are undoubtedly dependent upon properties of the human mind. Different authors have stressed the relevance of cognitive processing in the efficient identification of referents. Deane (1992) claims that topicality and focality are discourse concepts which can be defined in cognitive terms as both can be subsumed under the more general concept of %%% (see also Chafe 1994, who introduces the term %% %); according to Deane (1992: 30), apacity to attract attention is a logical prerequisite of topic status, since it would be difficult to talk about something to which the audience could not be expected to attend-0!!'  nformation, by virtue of being new or more important, is likely to attract attention immediately. New topics and focal (i.e. new) information are introduced on-line according to current communicative needs and decisions. Consequently, active topics by definition require little attention and hence little processing effort. New topics (typically introduced via special constructions) should require more attention since they demand a greater effort on the addressee     linguistic expression with the right referent.



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Given that the human mind has limitations as to the amount of information that can be processed at a given time, we expect to find relevant restrictions on the attention load that linguistic expressions can demand. One such limitation has been formulated in various ways in the literature: Giv ")*1@ -chunk-per-clause QL ' ")**@()^1= 04 2 $% % or Lambrecht  ")**@()1@+ &'& %  ), all of which roughly amount to claiming that each unit of discourse or proposition cannot contain more than one chunk of new information. In terms of the Activation notion introduced above, this amounts to saying that there can only be one % !  activation applies to a single referent, event or state, but not to more than one"L ')**@()^*- 0    @     out to be crucial in a pragmatic account of the CNPC; it is to the CNPC that I now turn. 4  "#&'  "   3.1. The CNPC in classical Generative Grammar: A brief history In the early days of Generative Grammar, restrictions on the application of movement operations were built into the structure of the rules themselves, which led to the postulation of rules of enormous complexity and obscured the fact that different constructions were subject to similar constraints. In his dissertation, L      $/> :

observed that certain structural configurations function as slands blocking the operation of syntactic rules, since their constituents cannot be extracted and moved to other syntactic positions. One of those syntactic environments immune to extractability is the so-called L  / B  5   which Ross defined as an NP dominating a clausal unit. The behaviour of this environment as a syntactic island can be observed in the following examples (Ross [1967] (1986): 75): (3)

a. 2#D'%%=%%44 %%E( b. ,%42#D'%%=%%44 FFFE (

(4)

a( 2#D0+%/D'%%=%%44 %%E( b. * ,%42#D0+%/D'%%=%%  44 FFFEE (



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As noted by Ross, these sentences differ only in that the sentential object of # is embedded in an NP headed by / in (4a), but not in (3a). This difference must then be connected to the fact that the complement of the verb 4 can be extracted in (3b) but not in the corresponding (4b). A similar situation obtains if the dominated clausal constituent is not a complement but a relative clause, as in example (6a). As relative clauses are necessarily embedded within NPs, extraction appears to be blocked, as shown in (6b) (Ross 1986: 71): (5)

a. 2 D0+%%/%#%%%/E( b. ,/42 D0+%%/%#%FFFE(

(6)

a. 2 D0+%%/%D'44#%%%/EE( b. R,/42 D0+%%/%D'44#%FFEE  (



But it is not only relativization that is impossible out of a complex NP. Questioning elements in this syntactic context also yield ungrammatical sentences, as in (8b): (7)

a. 2#D'%%=%%44 %E( b. G%*#D'%%=%%44 FFFEH

(8)

a. 2#D0+%/D'%%=%%44 %EE( b. *G%*#D0+%/D'%%=%%  44 FFFEEH



Again, a similar paradigm is obtained if we try to question an element within a relative clause modifying a lexical noun: (9)

a 2 D0+%%/%#%+% E( b. G* D0+%%/%#%FFFEH

(10) a. 2 D0+%%/%D'44#%+% EE( b. *G* D0+%%/%D'44#%FFFEEH These facts led Ross to propose the following principle (1986: 76), which he named



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,$/&:0+$% %?$0+$@ No element contained in a sentence dominated by a noun phrase with a lexical head noun may be moved out of that noun phrase by a transformation.

In a number of subsequent publications, Chomsky ([1973] 1977a, 1977b) pursued this line of inquiry. He suggested that the CNPC be derived from a more general principle of '#*, a locality constraint, which had the effect of banning all long distance movements. Roughly, the concept of Subjacency prohibited movement out of a constituent if it meant crossing two bounding (cyclic) categories. The number and syntactic category of the bounding nodes seem to be subject to language variation, but in the case of English, the data suggest that the NP and the Sentence (S) impede syntactic movement. Chomsky (1977b) examines further properties of the rule of whmovement and assumes that the process of topicalization presents essentially the same syntactic features. Thus, it is not possible to topicalize a constituent if that entails a violation of Subjacency, as can be observed in (11): (11) a. *,#52&%D0+% /%D'%%    FFFFEE  This also explains why it is not possible to have both processes at the same time: both extracted constituents must end up in the same syntactic position, resulting in ungrammatical examples such as those in (12b and c): (12) a. 4*%#%/ ( b. R,4/%#4*H c. RG/%#4*%H One of the consequences of identifying NPs as bounding nodes is that leftward wh-movement out of * NP is banned, given the fact that the moved constituent has to cross two bounding nodes (S and NP). This seems to be correct for a great number of examples, such as the ungrammatical extractions in (13):8

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(13) a. b. c.  

$/* % D0+%4 % E( *G D'$/* % D0+%4 FFFFEEH *, 4 D'$/* % D0+%4 FFFFEE & (

However, there are cases which may seem rather problematic. This is the case of so called cture   /  ")@( (14) a. 24&% . b. GD'*D0+&% FFFEEH In order to explain the grammaticality of (14b), Chomsky suggests a reanalysis process in which the PP  is extraposed out of the NP, thus allowing extraction without violating Subjacency (see Bach and Horn 1976 for the underlying reasoning). However, as Chomsky (1977b: 114) himself acknowledges, the conditions on the application of the rule are rather obscure. For example, it does not seem to apply to the verb % *, witness the ungrammaticality of (15b), where the bracketing indicates the resulting structure after the application of the reanalysis rule:9 (15) a. % *&% . b. *GD'% *D0+&% ED++FFFEEH A second source of problems is exemplified with the ungrammatical construction (16b): (16) a. 4)&% % . b. *GD'D0+)&% ED++FFFEEH (Chomsky 1977b: 115; ex. 206) (16b) is ungrammatical, in spite of the fact that, after the application of the reanalysis rule, the moved element only crosses one bounding node. Clearly, an additional explanation is needed to account for these cases; Chomsky proposes the '& '#% $%, which prohibits movement out of structures with an overt constituent in subject position (e.g. ) in (16b)). To summarize so far, we have seen that it is not possible to extract an element from a complex NP, and that the structural machinery introduced in Generative Grammar to account for this fact, the Subjacency condition in particular, leads to banning movement out of any NP. There are two



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exceptions to this generalization:   !



%   - Consequently, two solutions have been proposed to account for each of them: the reanalysis of nominal PPs as verbal PPs and the Specified Subject Condition.10 In the following section I will present data from a number of languages to defend the view that island constraints cannot be fully accounted for on the basis of configurational restrictions only. This will lead me to propose an alternative analysis in section 4.

3.2. The CNPC in six languages In the generativist tradition long distance displacement is generally formulated in terms of syntactic movement. However, a brief look at (part of) the typological data available seems to suggest that wh-movement and subjacency effects do not necessarily go hand in hand. The existence of island violations in several languages is well-known in the generativist tradition and different authors, both formalists and functionalists, have remarked on the importance of pragmatic factors in arriving at a full understanding of this phenomenon. In what follows I will present some relevant data from a number of languages as well as the most interesting aspects of the theoretical analyses proposed to explain them. <(9(1(&?1OOQM'/9PP9@ Japanese does not show visible wh-displacement in relative clause formation and topicalization. Although Generativists claim that this language obeys subjacency in non-visible movements at the level of Logical Form, Haig (1996) maintains that this position is simply incorrect. The author examines a wide range of extraction processes and concludes that subjacency is for the most part inoperative in Japanese. However, he also admits the existence of a number of examples which prove that subjacency effects are visible in Japanese to some extent. In a proposal reminiscent of Kuno  (1987) analysis, Haig argues that relative formation and topicalization are examples of topic/focus-comment structures which are subject to an  

 !   equires the comment portion of the sentence to be about the focus or topic- .  'equent variation in grammaticality judgements is then attributed to speakers %  $   O!#  

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comment portion of a sentence as appropriate in a given context. Consider the following example (1996: 84): (17) DDe1 e2 4%%  %E %1   %%E 9  taking-care-of was person NOM died dog NOM  /#    /    /  %( every-night station to master ACC greet to came . ! #2 that the person1 who e1 was keeping e2 died came to the station every evening to greet his master. According to Haig, (17) is an acceptable to his informants, even though structurally similar expressions are considered ungrammatical. Haig believes that the acceptability of the example derives from the fact that the context (a popular Japanese story of a faithful dog) makes it clear that the whole sentence should be interpreted as being about the dog. In a similar vein, Shimojo (2002) elaborates upon Haig  $  !   !gnostic test for the aboutness condition. He furthermore argues that the aboutness condition is supported on cognitive grounds. <(9(9(%?1OOQ@ Van Valin   ' !     '  $   '?stion formation in Lakhota, a Siouan language which does not displace whelements in interrogative constructions. He argues that if movement is an essential factor in the account of subjacency phenomena, languages in which wh-elements remain % should not show these effects. However, Lakhota, and reportedly other languages as well, do show the relevant effects, from which it follows that movement is not the mechanism at issue in the explanation of subjacency (see Dik 1997b: 362 for the same reasoning).11 Consider the following examples (Van Valin 1996: 36-37): (18) a. G!  D0+D'   4 /i d% 4!*:%E Man the [NP [S dog a cat many bite ]     E 4* (  the this] saw .   ! #  $ -





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b. G!  D0+D'   4 %i     *:%!E Man the[NP [S dog a *what/something bite ]    E 4*  H the this] saw Q [9 !!   ! #  jjS ;!   ! #    #S

According to Van Valin, replacing the object within the relative clause in (18a) (i.e. /id%) with the interrogative element %i yields an acceptable sentence, but one which can only be interpreted as a yes-no question. Hence, this is an example of a language in which subjacency effects are not linked to overt movement. The author proposes the following condition on extraction phenomena:  %:% %% %> the displaced element must be linked to an argument position in the semantic representation of a clause within the Potential Focus Domain (PFD) of the Illocutionary Force (IF) operator.

As he acknowledges, for this account to be satisfactory it must be possible to predict where the PFD lies in a sentence. He proposes a general structural principle which governs the PFD in complex sentences: A subordinate clause may be within the PFD if and only if it is a direct daughter of (a direct daughter of, and so on iteratively) the clause node which is modified by the IF operator.

Consequently, this proposal relies on a structural definition of the PFD, which is in accordance with Van Valin  ' /   ' extraction phenomena should involve a careful examination of the interaction between structure and function. <(9(<( ?9PP<@ Just like Lakhota and Japanese, Korean is an % language, but it does not seem to obey subjacency, with the exception of the wh-island constraint. The author mentions the following contrast between English and Korean as regards the CNPC (Hong 2003: 102):

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(19) a. ? G*D0+#D'%% % EE( b. ; *3 D0+D'%1 /43 3E /1E3 /3H Mary-NOM what-ACC buy-REL person-ACC meet-Q 9 !!4$    # S As Hong operates within a generativist framework his proposal to account for the different behaviour between both languages as regards the CNPC is not based on extragrammatical factors. He argues that the explanation should rely on the different nature of English wh-elements and its Korean counterparts, which require different processes to be correctly interpreted. <(9(L(?" %3' &&1O[O@ According to these authors, Danish generally obeys the CNPC, but they note a number of counterexamples in extraction processes of relative formation which they attempt to explain in terms of their theory of ! inance- 0   C  3-Shir and Lappin believe that extraction is only possible out of those relative clauses that can be interpreted as being dominant. They define the notion of dominance as follows: />A constituent c of a sentence S is dominant in S if and only if the speaker intends to direct the attention of his hearers to the intension of c, by uttering S.

Relative clauses, they claim, are generally used non-dominantly, the dominant part of the sentence being in the matrix clause, which accounts for the impossibility of extracting linguistic material out of them.12 However, the following sentences are grammatical precisely because the relative sentences in them are used dominantly (1979: 55):13 (20) a. %      /    ( That are there many who can like . $  ke that. b. %    /    ( That know I many who can like 03 $  3 - The crucial question, then, is how to establish the circumstances under which relative clauses can be used dominantly. The authors believe that



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this is connected to the low information status of the matrix clause; in their own words, when the matrix functions as an    ' !   rest of the sentence is used dominantly. For example, if the matrix contains an existential operator or if the main verb is semantically neutral, the relative clause becomes dominant and extraction of constituents may be possible. The following examples, in which the matrix predicate sequentially increases its complexity, illustrate the relevance of this factor: (21) a. ?%    & % /      %( That have I asked many who have done 0 % 3!$  %!  - b. *%     %   /      %( That have I made-fun-of many that have done 0 % made fun of many that have done that. c. *%      //   j#%( That house know I a man who has bought 03     #    - A similar paradigm is obtained in the following English examples (1979: 58): (22) a. b. c. 

,%4% %%%  /*&&4( ?,%4% %%24/*&&4( *,%4% %%2// 4%/*&& 4(

As will be shown in section 4.1.2., the nature of the matrix predicate will turn out to be a relevant factor in accounting for the informational properties of extraction processes. <(9(Z('&?2% 9PP9@ D0   ",^^,( U)+        $  O$   /ction from complex noun phrases is not allowed. He offers the following examples:

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(23) a. ; /% D0+ D' B  * %  To-me bothers thefact of that not have.3PL built   /% % EE( a tube in this city 0    $ have not made a tube in this city.



b. Rk%    This is the   B thefact of that ? .    y not made a tube.

  B  /  /% city in thewhich to-me bothers  * %  /% ( not have.3PL built a tube in which it bothers me the fact that they have

c. k      B  / /% This is the city in thewhich to-me bothers B  * %  /% ( that not have.3PL built a tube .    $ which it bothers me that they have not made a tube. In compliance with the CNPC, the ungrammaticality of the examples in (23) must be attributed to the presence of the NP (  (((), which introduces a bounding node for movement. However, the author himself states that in some varieties of Spanish, expressions which violate subjacency seem acceptable to most speakers: (24) a. 0 &   B  # D0+   Not can.1SG not even conceive the idea   D' B    B     B/EE( of that leave.3PL that that city REFL burns 0 %#" !  $  $-



b. "% 5 B   &   B  This city which not can.1SG not even  #    B   B   B/5 conceive the idea of that leave.3PLthat REFL burns   /! #   B . ( is more beautiful than Florence .   $    0   % # "  !    $ would let it burn, is more beautiful than Florence.



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And there are even examples in which the extracted element crosses two S nodes and one NP, resulting in a grammatical sentence. This is something which, as D0  3  !#  %    $ ' O$ explain: (25) a. 0    D'  B    

d  Not know.1SG to whom REFL him occurred    D0+  /* /  D'  %    % %%  the very bad idea of reconstructing this theatre   /  EEE( with wood old 0 !  3    !   %$ ! ! '   ructing this theatre with old wood.   

b. "% %% 5 B        B    This theatre which not know.1SG to whom REFL him  

d  /* /   %     occurred the very bad idea of reconstructing   /  5 %!  &%  with wood old is to point of fall.REFL .     0! 3   ! %$!! ' reconstructing with old wood, is about to collapse.

He attributes the difference in grammaticality to the fact that /% in (23) is a factitive verb, whereas # in (24) and 

 in (25) are not. He furthermore argues that expressions of the type #   5 %   C /& d, etc. should be taken as being complex verbs syntactically.14 Even in English, Deane (1992: 9) notes that there are cases of what he calls !/    ement is extracted across two, three and even four levels of embedding within a NP. According to the author, the following example, which is to be understood as uttered in a sarcastic tone of voice, illustrates the case: (26) ;* ' 5%%*//%%D' %%2%%:3 % D0+ % % D0+ *  & %   D0+ &&%/% % %D0+ /&FFEEEE(

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<(9(Q('4?-41O[Q@ In his study on the CNPC in Swedish, Allwood (1976) notes that the principle is systematically violated in that language. He offers a battery of examples in Swedish containing extractions from complex NPs: Topicalizations, Question formation and Relative clause formation. The following examples illustrate extraction of the object within an embedded intransitive relative clause (1976: 4): (27) a.  e  / / e  % ( I know a man who is strong 03ow a man who is strong. b. "/ e   / e  % ( A man know I who is strong 03     #- c. / e   / e  % H Who know I who is strong? 9 ! 03     #S d. "/ /  e  / e  % ?e e @( A man who I know who is strong     03     #  - Although the acceptability of these and other extractions of different types of constituents out of complex NPs varies among speakers, Allwood believes that  '' $ $  ! $   kers for us to be able to claim that, for example, the constraints formulated by Ross and Horn against movement from NPs cannot hold")*+W(+-2  ms that the differences and regularities in acceptability judgements must take semantic and pragmatic factors into account. As far as semantic factors are concerned, Allwood notes the relevance of the definiteness of the extracted NP (demonstratives in particular contribute to making the extraction more acceptable), and the choice of verb in the matrix clause, which also contributes to acceptability if it focuses on the state of affairs as a whole. Moreover, since expressions containing a topicalized or focalized unit require a context to be interpreted as natural utterances, they can only be accepted in isolation if speakers can imagine a reasonable context in which they might be used (cf. Kuno 1987; Shimojo 2002). If that is not the case,



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acceptability is reduced. Anticipating the aboutness condition and similar observations, Allwood (1976: 17) states that %$ #     except for the topicalized constituent must be interpretable as a reasonable predication (comment) of the referent of the topicalized constituent. To sum up, this short survey of the cross-linguistic manifestation of the CNPC shows that the degree to which this structural constraint is reflected in the grammar of languages is anything but uniform and appears to be influenced by a number of intervening factors of different types. Since the extraction processes considered revolve around the notions of topicalization and focusing, most functional analyses, in accounting for the CNPC effects, have centred on aspects of the organization of information within expressions, but the lack of uniformity in the characterization of pragmatic functions in the functionalist literature has somehow undermined their potential as explanatory notions for syntactic constraints. In the following section I will defend the view that the CNPC effects emerge from a conflict between the activation states of the referents of the NPs involved in the mind of the speaker and the communicative function of the extraction processes (topicalization and focusing). It is hoped that this will show that a full understanding of the phenomenon requires the careful integration of insights stemming from both syntactic and pragmatic theory. 3  "&'"     The preceding discussion has made clear that there are more factors involved than just configurational restrictions in an account of the CNPC.15 In particular, the following features have been identified by several authors: (in)definiteness, the informational load of the matrix predicate, the communicative setting and topical or focal attention, and the pragmatic structuring of the expression. The number of factors involved is obviously an added complication in providing a full account of the phenomenon. Moreover, the relative weight of each factor is different according to the type of construction involved and possibly also the particulars of the communicative situation. Consequently, my aim in this section is not to provide a full explanation of the problem, but rather to suggest a general line of inquiry on the basis of Lambrecht ")**@  $ '' ation structure as laid out in section 2 above.

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4.1. Towards a pragmatic account of the CNPC The CNPC relies on a definition of the complex NP as a syntactic unit headed by a noun which dominates a clausal constituent. The clausal constituent may be either a complement to the head noun or a relative clause. The nouns that can take clausal complements in English are mostly lexically derived from verbal predicates (#545 , etc.) as well as a few other items such as %5 or / . As pointed out to me by Jan Rijkhoff (pc), nouns like % and  are special in that they introduce a referent which can be definite on first mention. Hawkins (1991: 432) argues that NPs headed by nouns like % make an  ?eness claim  /   $ $ ! $ !   indefinite article (cf. G 4   % ?R@ % %%   % #*%%/& ). The precise role of the complement is to anchor the specific referent for the noun and, therefore, make it identifiable for the addressee. Similarly, Rijkhoff (2002: 177), who refers to Lehmann (1984), notes that restrictive relative clauses typically serve a localizing function, as when they express the situation in which the head NP participates and therefore localize it in time or cognitive space. This explains why the typical relative clause modifies a definite matrix NP and, in many languages, this seems to be the only possibility.16 Another important aspect of extraction which is not usually discussed in sufficient detail in the relevant literature is the fact that the extracted element serves different pragmatic functions in spite of the formal similarity of the displacement processes. Therefore, an explanation on the basis of the pragmatic status of the displaced element is likely to be different for topicalization and relativization, which involve topic displacement, as against wh-movement, which involves focal displacement.17 Ideally, however, both explanations should rely on similar principles in order to account for the parallel syntactic behaviour of the two processes. We are now in a position to understand some relevant properties of extraction from complex NPs. Let us begin with topicalization processes; I think we can safely assume that the role of topicalization and relativization is to promote to active status a referent which otherwise would present a low activation state. As noted by Chafe (1994: 73), converting an idea from the inactive to the active state is a costly mental effort. It follows that active topics will typically not receive special grammatical marking to signal their pragmatic status whereas non-active topics may be more readily subject to special grammatical treatment. At the same time, if a constituent is assigned a special pragmatic status within an utterance, it is to be expected



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that the extracting domain in the expression should contain presupposed information. Let us illustrate the discussion with Ross  # xamples in (3) and (4), repeated here for convenience: (3)  (4) 

a 2#D'%%=%%44 %%E( b. ,%42#D'%%=%%44 FFFE ( a. 2#D0+%/D'%%=%%44 %%E( b. R,%42#D0+%/D'%%=%%  44 FFFEE (

The difference caused by the presence of % / in (4) is that a new referent is introduced which is anchored by the complement clause. Hence, the complex NP relates to a referent which is brand-new anchored (i.e. unidentifiable), or, in Hawkins  ")**)  logy, inherently unique. However, what is displaced in (4b) is another NP (%%) within the complement clause. If the sequence %%=%%44 %% contributes to identifying the referent of %/ it must necessarily be understood as given or shared knowledge. Promoting %% to topic status is thus communicatively anomalous since it must be assumed to be already active in order to anchor %/. The presence of the demonstrative % in Ross  original examples (3a) and (4a) is significant in this respect, as well as its absence in both (3b) and (4b). If the sentences are to be related via a transformation, one would not expect them to have different determiners. I assume that the demonstrative in the embedded clauses indicates a prominent activation status of the referent, which is incompatible with the role of a restrictive relative clause as an anchoring unit in both (3b) and (4b). As Hawkins (1991: 414) observes, demonstratives usually require   physical perception of entities in the world or explicit textual mentioning of entities-.      ivation status of the referent is crucial in the topicalization process. The advantage of using the categories Activation and Identifiability in explaining these facts is seen by the fact that they do not correlate with the notions topic and focus in a one-to-one fashion. As mentioned above, referents with similar activation states may be coded as focus or topic, sometimes with significant formal differences. The analysis of wh-extraction goes along similar lines. Independently of the traditional interpretation of the wh-element as the focus of the utterance, what is relevant in this context is its activation status. Typically, though not necessarily always, focal elements denote new information and

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are, therefore, brand-new and unidentifiable (i.e. inactive). Hence, whdisplacement would serve to promote them to active status. The problem relates to the previous discussion: the constituents present in the complement clause must be regarded as shared knowledge to identify the referent of %/, etc. Therefore, questioning them makes no sense communicatively. It would be impossible to identify the referent of the head noun of the complex NP if the sequence used for that purpose (i.e. the complement clause) itself contained an unidentified referent. Thus, both processes entail a violation of Chafe  G B 0!    !  '   strate an example of expressions in which two referents compete for cognitive attention and exceed the capacity of the human processor. In short, I believe we can tentatively conclude that complex NPs constitute a syntactic configuration which by virtue of the nature of the elements involved introduces a conflict in the information structure of the expression, giving rise to a communicatively anomalous utterance. The data from six languages examined in section 3 corroborate this observation: languages and speakers differ in the degree of acceptability that can be assigned to extractions form complex NPs, a fact which is to be expected if the felicity of the expression depends on pragmatic and syntactic factors rather than on syntactic factors alone. In the following section I will try to extend this explanation in order to account for extraction from possessive NPs. L(1(1(+0+ In section 3.1 I mentioned the problem posed by so-called    in the classical generative grammar account of the CNPC. In short, examples such as (14b) and (16b), repeated here for convenience, (14b) G*&% FFFH (16b) *G)&% FFFH forced Chomsky to introduce a rather  reanalysis rule to account for cases like (14b) and the Subject Specified Condition for those like (16b). I will postpone discussion of the former to the following section and concentrate now on examining the information structure organization of possessive NPs in search of an alternative explanation. In Rijkhoff   !     



%  !'  ! relative clauses typically serve a localizing function in a definite matrix NP. Thus, they



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both help the addressee identify the intended referent of the matrix NP. This observation is confirmed by the fact that in many languages there is a formal relation between both categories (Rijkhoff 2002: 194fn.). Moreover, Haspelmath (1999: 232) observes that, cross-linguistically, possessed NPs overwhelmingly tend to be definite. In his view, this is connected to the anchoring function of the possessor. Now, if the possessor noun serves as an anchor, it follows that the referent of the sequence  ' a   !'       ' speaking. Extraction of the most embedded NP is thus pragmatically anomalous: the identifiability of the head noun    #    nchor M      %  ''    ' a sequence denoting an unidentifiable referent. Such a conflict does not arise if the focused constituent is an adjunct to the matrix verb (e.g. G )&% $*$ 4 FFFH) as the focused constituent is outside the relevant NP. Unfortunately, the problem is a bit more complex. Kuno (1987) notes that extraction from NPs with a genitive possessor in English may be possible if certain pragmatic conditions are met. Consider the extractions in (28) and (29):18 (28) a. 2#%D0+; *& % %; *; E( b. RG*#*D0+; *& % %FFFFFE (29) a. b.   c.

2%##%%D0+; * %% *E ,%% *%%2%##%%D0+; *  FFFFFE ,%%%%2D0+$)' & %FF#%E

Kuno claims that examples (29b) and (29c) are perfectly acceptable, even though they entail a violation of the Specified Subject Condition. The author observes a crucial difference between the NPs ; * & % %  ; *;  in (28a) and ; * %% * in (29a), in that the latter, even without any prior context, immediately suggests that there are other people %    '   $-  #    ",* in that the expression $)' & %  % %, together with our knowledge of the world, suggests that there may be other TV channels reportings of the same event. From these facts, Kuno hypothesizes that extraction from noun phrases with a specified subject may be possible if the possessor NP is readily interpretable contrastively (i.e. if it is the focus of the expression).19

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But the question now is why extraction from possessive noun phrases is only possible when the possessor noun is in focus. Kuno claims that this may be connected with a conflict in topic-focus organization. Consider example (30): (30) The man bought the woman   ' 

According to Kuno, this sentence can be interpreted as being a statement about %/ and next about %4/& % %, but not about %3 % , who does not qualify as a potential topic. Consequently, it is possible to form relative clauses out of every NP in the sentence but %% , as shown in the examples in (31): (31) a. ,%/4#%%4/& % %%%  *% *( b. ,%4/& % %%% 4%/#% *% *( c. ,%4/4& % %%% %/#% *% *( d. *,%% 4%/#%%4/& % % *% *( The question is then what makes extraction in (29b) possible. Kuno claims that in (29b) ; * does not qualify as a topic, because of the nature of the noun  , which fosters its interpretation as a contrastive focal constituent. As a consequence, %% * becomes eligible as the topic and can undergo relative formation. The problem with Kuno   ysis, however, lies in its rather obvious circularity. The author claims that only those constituents that qualify as potential topics can undergo extraction processes. Yet, he does not offer a definition of topic function and one is left to believe that the possibility of being extracted is a natural condition for topical status. Obviously, in those cases in which the possessor noun is likely to be interpreted as a focal constituent, the information structure of the expression is significantly different. Kuno (1987: 13) notes that in examples (29b and c) both ; * and $)' receive focus intonation. He thus seems to assume that prosodic marking indicates contrastive focus. If that is the case, ; * and $)' should be understood as active referents, since they are contrasted with a shared alternative in the form of a potential set of candidates for the different versions or reportings. Following Lambrecht (1994: 323), I will



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assume that the role of accentuation on an active referent as in Kuno  examples is           '  #% '       '   argument in a pragmatically structured proposition-0'      of the possessor NP in (29b and c) is not that of an anchor to help the addressee identify the referent of the possessed NP as in the non-contrastive reading of genitives, but, rather, to direct the addressee   !  what he considers the most relevant piece of information in that particular communicative setting. Given the contrastive flavour of the possessor NP, both the possessed noun and its complement should be understood as having identifiable referents. Hence, extraction of the embedded NP is acceptable as there is no interference with the identifiability of the referent of the possessed noun. Undoubtedly, the acceptability of examples like (29b and c) very much depends on the possibility of interpreting the possessor NP contrastively (which in turn depends on the nature of the matrix noun), and on the activation status of the referent of the embedded NP. Presumably, discourseactive referents are not likely candidates for topicalization or focusing strategies, but it seems sensible to assume that the contrastive reading of the possessor NP contributes to analysing the referent of the embedded NP as peripheral in a person '   '    

!    extraction. Significantly, the pragmatic marking of an active referent involves no %   in Chafe   ! ' !    ntribute to violating the One New Idea Constraint by exceeding the speaker    $  #   

#- .      'equency of examples such as those in (29b and c) is related to their anomalous pragmatic configuration, which, in Gricean cooperative spirit, forces speakers to come up with a context in which they can be interpreted as contrastive NPs. L(1(9(, %/% :& % The previous section illustrated the fact that the information structure most readily associated with complex NPs may be modified through intonational means or on the basis of the inferences drawn from the lexical items employed in a particular utterance. In this section I will show that the choice of lexical items in the matrix clause can also have important consequences for the possibility of extracting constituents out of complex NPs. As mentioned in section 2, several scholars have noted the relevance of the informational value of the matrix predicate in the grammaticality of

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extraction processes (Allwood 1976; Grosu 1982). Van Valin (1996) observes that extraction is possible out of neutral verbs of saying, such as *, but the same does not seem to hold in the case of -of-speaking verbs, as shown in (32): (32) a. G%**%%; *#%FFFH b. *G%*/ / C&%%; *#%FFFH He believes that there is a straightforward explanation for this contrast: the selection of a neutral verb (together with an unmarked intonation pattern) indicates that the focus of the utterance is the content of the message, which is encoded in the verbal complement. However, when a manner-ofspeaking verb is selected the focus shifts to the verb itself, because its introduction only makes sense if it is relevant to the main point of the expression. Otherwise, Van Valin claims, we would have a violation of Grice 4/ ': %- '   '   the main verb, extraction out of the verbal complement is blocked. A tentative attempt at classifying verbal predicates in terms of their informational value is found in Chafe (1994: 110 ff.), who introduces a category of  -content% which are characterized by the fact that they do not present an idea of their own, but are subservient to the idea expressed by the object. Verbs in this category include the unaccented light predicates , %, /, etc., as well as a miscellaneous class of items expressing typical ways in which an object is used (e.g.   ), introducing whatever is expressed by the object (e.g %) or specifying how a referent is perceived (e.g. +% ). Although Chafe leaves open the question of the relation between verbal predicates and activation cost, his observation of the interaction of the verb and its object in the pragmatic organization of expressions is deeply connected with the discussion on extraction from   - L  3$ (1977b: 114) admitted, the conditions for the application of his reanalysis rule seemed to depend on the nature of the main verb in obscure ways. Kuno (1987) observes the contrasts in (33): (33) a. G%*#*#FFFFH b. * G%*#FFFFH and those in (34), taken from Bach and Horn (1976):



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(34) a. G%*4 %##%FFFFH b. *G%*% *##%FFFFH One might think that the grammaticality of some extractions is connected to the fact that the PP can be interpreted as a verbal adjunct. Indeed, this does seem to be the case for the concept 4 %#%/%. However, this does not explain the acceptability of the expression (34a), since the concept #*/% does not make sense. Kuno (1987: 23) observes that in the examples in (35): (35) a. K% *5/*4*/52#%#2 ( b. K% *5/*4*/52%#2 (  the fact that the book was about John Irving is much more relevant in (35a) than in (35b), because one does not lose books because of their content. Hence, it may be possible to claim that the sequence # requires much more attention load than #*#5since it involves a rather unexpected lexical combination in that context. It thus seems plausible to assume that the focus of the expression falls naturally on the verbal predicate and, again, extraction of the wh-element would imply the existence of two entities in the expression competing for focus status and, consequently, a violation of Chafe  nstraint. As expected, if one can invoke a context in which the use of an informationally rich predicate sounds natural and does not require a focal interpretation, extraction may be possible. Consider Kuno  xample with the verb % *: (36) A: % %  $ / ; 5 %* % % % &%   $% $//%%;/# %4( B: G%*% */ &% 5$ /;  AH According to Kuno, the reason why (36B) is a possible sentence derives from the fact that the speaker knows that the destruction of the pictures was carried out on the basis of who they portrayed. This makes the embedded noun a relevant entity to the entire utterance. However, this does not account for all cases, as the same verb may present conflicting results:

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(37) a. G*&% FFFFFH b. *G%*##%FFFFFH c. G* ##%FFFFH The reason may be due to the different information loads of the expression # vs &% . Intuitively one feels that pictures are there to be seen whereas books are not there to be seen but to be read (cf. (37c)). Hence # in (37b) demands more attention and the focalization of the embedded unit results in an anomalous sentence. This means that lexical influence on extraction processes is not to be seen purely as a matter of lexical choice of the matrix predicate, but as a consequence of the naturalness of the inferences that can be drawn from the verb plus object relation.20 Significantly, D0  ",^^)(,*@     #  same lines in Spanish. He considers the data in (38): (38) a.    %C/& #  #  have.1SG written / bought a book on the 0 %/bought a book on chimps.

/&( chimps



b. k   /& #  B   Those are the chimps on the which have.1SG   % #  written a book .       0 % 3-



c. *? k    /& #  B Those are the chimps on the which      /&   #  have.1SG bought a book Lit.: .   imps on which I have bought a book.

D0      # /& can be considered an adjunct of  # , but not of /&  , for obvious semantic reasons, which accounts for the ungrammaticality of (38c). But personally, I see nothing wrong with example (38c) as long as it is uttered in the right context. This context could be one in which the addressee has been previously informed that the speaker had bought a book on chimpanzees and at the moment of speaking are both walking by the primate enclosure in a zoo. In such a situation, the expression /&  # # /& is shared knowledge, and cannot be interpreted as the focus of the expression. What



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is more, in this situation even less natural lexical combinations seem to be possible: (39) k    /&  #  B  Those are the chimps on the which   %C%  C& % # ( have.1SG seen / destroyed / introduced a book Lit.: .       0 % A!  yed / introduced a book. Admittedly, though, some combinations are downright ungrammatical: (40) *k   /&  Those are the chimps    /C C have.1SG loved / adored / hated Lit.: .       book.

#  B on the which # ( a book 0 % %!A! !A !

It thus seems that verbs of psychological perception do not readily accept extraction in Spanish (see Lorenzo 1995: 180 for some discussion), which also reveals the need for a careful study of the lexical-semantic properties of the matrix predicates and their interaction with focus structure if we are to achieve a better understanding of extraction phenomena.21 I believe the conclusion that can be drawn from this section is that a model of information structure which relies on the cognitive status of referents in discourse may offer interesting insights into the nature of syntactic processes and the CNPC in particular. Moreover, not only is syntactic structure sensitive to pragmatic demands, but lexical choice, too, can be influenced by general principles of verbal interaction, which, in turn, may affect the possibility of topicalizing or focusing linguistic units. It should also be noted that the syntactic properties of individual languages may also have an influence on the acceptability of extractions from complex NPs. Thus, speakers of languages in which topicalizations and focusing structures are frequent will possibly react in different ways to CNPC effects than speakers of languages with a more rigid word order. The CNPC appears to be not simply a constraint on syntactic structures; rather it is the case that complex NPs should be seen as syntactic configurations which, in combination with pragmatic and lexical factors, favour the construction of communicatively anomalous expressions. Therefore, linguistic models

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must at the very least provide the tools for analysts to make reference to these different factors and provide integrated accounts of grammatical phenomena. In the following section, I will explore the extent to which FDG can meet this requirement. 2 ! 

   "&'"!  In section 2 I claimed that classical FG is to be understood as a grammatical component which aims at being compatible with or integrated within a model of verbal interaction. However, given the fact that the general workings of this model have never been explored in detail by FG practitioners, it is no wonder that the search for correlations between syntactic processes and the activation states of referents in discourse has not been a major line of research in the theory. Unsurprisingly, then, the exclusively syntactic nature of the CNPC is simply taken for granted; Dik ")**+(UV+  $ of accessibility, defined as  $ '    # of some grammatical operation    !    $  '    ( intrinsic, functional, and hierarchical. Hierarchical constraints involve the position of a term within the clause structure in which it occurs. As a matter of fact, Dik (1997b: 361) specifically mentions Ross  !''   a type of hierarchical constraint on the application of grammatical rules and therefore accepts the existence of configurational restrictions in extraction processes which, in his view, can be accommodated in the FG layered structure of the clause. However, no detailed indications are given as to how this can be implemented and no attempt is made at relating this restriction to extragrammatical factors. In his presentation of FDG, Hengeveld (2004b: 370) follows a similar route in describing FDG as  #mmatical component of a wider theory of verbal interaction-2 % /  !  '  contextual and a conceptual component reflects the recognition of the complex interplay between syntactic, semantic and discourse-pragmatic factors in the construction of linguistic expressions. Consequently, as Hengeveld himself observes, a necessary line of research in the theory relates to working out the internal structure of these two components and their relation with the grammatical one.22 The introduction of the cognitive and contextual components, together with the top-down orientation of the model, offers a natural environment in which to integrate the categories of Activation and Identifiability as presented above. Moreover, it allows us to ground the pragmatic functions



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Topic and Focus, as reflected in the interpersonal level, in the activation status of referents at the moment of speech or, to put it more accurately, the speaker     '   %    ' ' - .  ' # quote from Lambrecht (1994: 162163) is illustrative: In selecting a topic for a sentence, a speaker makes a communicative decision as to the   '!'  '  --   ntity that she wishes to convey information about. But before making this communicative decision, the speaker must make certain hypotheses concerning the status of the referent of the topic in the mind of the addressee at the time of the utterance. On the basis of these hypotheses, the speaker then decides upon the form of the sentence in which the topic is to be coded.

This position has a natural correlation with the general organization of FDG, which is presented in Figure 1 (Hengeveld 2005: 61; see also Hengeveld, this volume). Communicative decisions and the relevant conceptualizations are made in the conceptual component, which serves as a trigger for the grammatical component to start the linguistic generation process (Hengeveld 2004b: 369). As noted by Lambrecht in the quote above, speakers % decisions are made on the basis of an assessment of their addressee  pragmatic knowledge (see also Dik 1997a: 11), whether this is part of the speaker   #-term knowledge or inferred from the current speech situation. The next step will be the creation of a communicative intention and the construction of a conceptual preverbal structure that will serve as input to the Formulator. The process of Formulation translates this preverbal conceptual message into a linguistic structure which, if relevant, will encode the cognitive status of referents through the assignment of pragmatic functions at the interpersonal level. We can assume that linguistically relevant aspects of the speech situation are captured at the contextual level, which serves as a source of information for the speaker to construct a felicitous utterance. Rijkhoff (this volume) divides the contextual component into two parts: the situational component (E-context), which relates to the extralinguistic setting and is thus potentially infinite, and the discourse or textual component (Dcontext), which is finite and purely linguistic (i.e. the co-text). Each one of these subcomponents defines a context which may be potentially relevant for the construction of utterances, although, according to Rijkhoff, only the latter is amenable to linguistic description.

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"  " 

Frames Lexemes Primary operators

Formulation

Representational Level Templates Auxiliaries Secondary operators

Morpho-syntactic Encoding

Structural Level Prosodic patterns Morphemes Secondary operators

Phonological Encoding

Phonological Level

$  " 

Articulation Utterance

. 1( General layout of FDG

" # " 

  " 

Interpersonal Level



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There is a significant difference between the contextual and the conceptual components, at least in the way they are understood here: the contextual component represents an objective reality, which is then subjectively interpreted by the speaker in the conceptual component in order to evaluate referents as identifiable for his addressee or not. In other words, the speaker constructs a mental model of the objective situational and linguistic context,23 on the basis of which he makes his communicative decisions and choices. This obviously allows for the possibility of wrongly evaluating active referents as inactive or vice versa, and thus producing pragmatically anomalous utterances. Thus, it is possible to adapt Lambrecht  #   ' %ation and Identifiability to Rijkhoff   !  '   ontextual component in FDG. This gives us the following possibilities for identifiable referents:24 +       E-active D-active E-inactive D-inactive Situationally Accessible Textually Accessible . 9(Cognitive status of identifiable referents

A referent is E-active if the speaker assumes that it is active in the mind of the hearer thanks to evidence from the E-context. Similarly, a referent is Dactive if the evidence for the activation is assumed to stem from the Dcontext. Note that both statuses may coincide in a single referent as in cases in which the verbal interaction deals with a referent which is the focus of the perceptual attention of the speech participants (e.g. two people contemplating a painting at a museum and talking about it). This would be an example of the maximum activation of a referent. Conversely, referents may be E-inactive if the speaker assumes that there is no evidence in the surrounding context to conclude that the referent is active in the addressee !-As expected, D-inactive referents are those which, in the speaker    %  !!  #  linguistic material into the interaction. Again, both parameters may coincide in a single referent, giving rise to the highest degree of inactiveness possible. Thus, Rijkhoff !%   '  /       to further specify the Activation status of the referent according to the location of the referent itself and to established finer-grained distinctions in Lambrecht #ories.

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Note that this approach shares a number of assumptions with Hannay  (1991) modes of message management. Hannay intends to account for word order variation in English declarative sentences through the identification of a number of planning strategies available to speakers. The selection of one particular strategy may have significant effects on the syntax of expressions. For example, his Topic Mode defines an option for the speaker to single out topical information for special treatment by placing it in clause-initial (P1) position. In some cases, however, speakers need not !!  ' rmation status of a given unit, which may be imposed by the linguistic context itself. Thus, as usually assumed, a response to a wh-question will typically introduce a focal (active) entity into the discourse. This would be an example of Hannay  :eaction Mode. At the same time, languages may offer specific constructions or syntactic positions to encode a pragmatically salient unit. Hannay  5esentative Mode refers to the use of special constructions to introduce a new discourse topic, typically through the presence of a  #  -initial position. In a similar vein, the approach introduced here enables us to view pragmatic functions as grammatical notions of cognitive origin, whose assignment in the linguistic generation process is sensitive to the communicative intentions and contextual relations represented in both the conceptual and contextual components. Moreover, a speaker !   ! ptions (including Hannay   !  $   !!      representation of the contextual component and, in particular, on the assumed cognitive status of referents. Let us see how this model works in actual practice with the analysis of D0   /  ! "U1 %( (38) c. *? k    /& #  B Those are the chimps on the which       /&   #  have.1SG bought a book Lit.: . are the chimps on which I have bought a book. As mentioned above, D0  3   /  # ! accounts for that status on syntactic grounds only. I have claimed, however, that it can be felicitous in a particular communicative setting. This setting may be formalized in a very simplified manner as follows:25



. :% % /?/&:@0+ )5" #       +  : Speaker and addressee are visiting a zoo. They walk by the monkey enclosure.

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5  #       +   Discourse (i.e. verbal exchange) does not deal with the relevant chimpanzees.

*  (x1) Property: chimpsQ Status: perceptually visible to speech participants . <(Example of communicative setting for (38c).

On the basis of the properties of the communicative setting, the speaker assesses the status of referents in the addressee !-.   #   relevant assumptions on the addressee  # 3  !# ''    following conceptual component (Rijkhoffs C-context) at the time of speaking (again, only relevant details are given):  '  '!!

3  3   #   3"/2) on chimps (x3) '   % '% /1 (in E-context) and x3 refer to the same type of entities '   4 '4 :' /1 is situationally accessible and Dinactive for Addressee '   3 '3 :' /2 is both E-inactive and D-inactive for Addressee '  2'2:'/3 is D-inactive and situationally accessible for Addressee "    : promote referent x3 to active status "    : Inform addressee that x1 and x3 refer to the same type of entities.

. L( Example of Speaker L  L  "L-context) for (38c).

Of course, figure 4 exemplifies only one of the different potential estimations of the addressee #3  !#-B    %'rent    % !    $

 ! #  $nactive for the addressee. Hence, all in all, it shows a rather low activation

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status, which makes it a good candidate for a topicalizing or focusing strategy in case the speaker decides to activate it. The assumption is that the D-context deals with a different discourse topic at time t1, which means that the speaker will force a rather abrupt topic-shift in the flow of the verbal interaction. The use of a marked linguistic construction is therefore grounded on the communicative need to shift the focus of attention in discourse. This communicative decision will be transmitted to the interpersonal level, where the referent x1 will be coded as the topic of the sentence and promoted to clause initial position by the morphosyntactic encoder. Obviously, the felicity of the expression will very much depend upon the status of Proposition 1 (P1) in the addressee !-. ddressee may have been informed in the past of P1, but, even though the referent is situationally accessible, the radical shift in the topic of the discourse may severely slow down the retrieval of that piece of information from his mental database. If that is the case, the inactive content  3   #  3 /3 ?  ntion and thus the activation of x3 will imply a violation of Chafe  ! constraint. Thus, body language (e.g. pointing) or expressions like  3 that  3  - $  !  !   #   $! $   speaker to promote a referent from situationally accessible to E-active in the hearer ! /      ne described so as to reduce the activation cost in the identification of the referent. 1 "   In this article, I have argued that the cognitive status of referents is crucial in accounting for restrictions on pragmatic function assignment to constituents within complex NPs. Although much more research is obviously needed to evaluate the extent to which this approach can account for island effects in diverse languages, I hope to have shown that a full understanding of the nature of extraction constraints requires the integration of insights stemming from various linguistic angles. From an FDG viewpoint, extraction constraints point up the need to refine the concepts of Topic and Focus in the theory. Standard FG only assigns pragmatic functions to those constituents which have received special syntactic or morphological treatment. Thus, there is no way to predict which constituent can be extracted out of a given configuration; rather, the theory can only assign Topic or Focus status to those constituents which have been extracted. The present article has shown that the assignment of Topic and Focus is deeply dependent



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upon the status of referents in the speaker       '   verbal interaction and that an adequate theory of pragmatic function assignment can only be proposed if reference is made to them (a similar conclusion is arrived at in Cornish 2004: 144, who also refers to G&GonzE & 2001: 165 for the same point). In that sense, the introduction of both a conceptual and a contextual component in FDG is a positive step towards understanding the relation between grammar and discourse. &   1.

I am extremely grateful to JosD6  &E &C  , Jan Rijkhoff and an anonymous reviewer whose very detailed comments on a first draft of this article have meant significant improvements in both its content and general organization. However, I have been obstinate enough not to follow their advice in all cases and, therefore, all remaining errors are my sole responsibility. 2. The term /       / "; does not make use of movement operations. 3. Cf. Rijkhoff (2002: 2), who notes the lack of typological data on the order of constituents within the NP. 4. In the same line, Goldberg (2006: ch. 7) shows that both information structure and processing constraints underlie an adequate account of island effects. 5. Butler (this volume) notes that the interpretation of the conceptual and contextual components as mere adjacent modules to the grammar is in line with the traditional reluctance of FG to fully undertake the description of the discourse and psychological factors which contribute to shaping language. 6. But see Lambrecht (1994: 91) for discussion of some exceptions to this. 7. Although active referents can also receive special pragmatic treatment in certain circumstances (see section 4.1.1 below). 8. Obviously, examples (13b and c) are grammatical if the prepositional phrase %  is interpreted as a verbal adjunct (a second layer satellite in FG terms), and not as a nominal adjunct, which is the intended reading here. 9. Extractions from  B5   O   !''   #icality judgements among speakers and, therefore, I have restricted myself to the judgements given in the original sources. Undoubtedly, not all readers will agree with them. As a matter of fact, an anonymous reviewer, a native speaker of English, considers both (15b) and (16b) marginally acceptable. Chomsky (1977b: 115) claims that this is to be expected    '#   such as this. 10. I do not wish to claim that this is the end of the picture in the generativist tradition. Quite on the contrary, a great deal of research has been devoted to subsuming island constraints and related effects under more general and ex-

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11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17. 18.

19.

    planatory rules, such as the so-called Empty Category Principle (see e.g. Hornstein and Weinberg 1995). Yet, these proposals, apart from the technical implementation details, do not modify the general formalist strategy presented in the previous lines (see Carnie 2006 for a brief sketch of the treatment of islands constraints up to the Minimalist Program). Note that the existence of CNPC effects in languages not showing whdisplacement is a serious problem for characterizations of island violations as structures difficult for the human parser to process due to the distance between the extracted unit and the gap. For some examples of this strategy see Pritchett (1991), Kluender (1992), and Hawkins (1999). It is important to observe that (i) Erteschik-Shir and Lappin do not equate the notion of dominance with that of focus and (ii) dominance is defined as a discourse property which is assigned to a constituent in a given context. Hence, the same relative clause may be used dominantly or non-dominantly in different settings. Erteschik-Shir and Lappin do not use glosses consistently and some of their English translations of Danish examples may sound odd to the native ear. However, I have preferred to keep the examples as in the original source in the belief that this does not affect the point to be made. Note that similar problems appear in English in cases like /C % /, etc. which are also treated as reanalysed structures by generativists (see the discussion in Erteschik-Shir and Lappin 1979: 60ff.). Of course, pragmatic notions such as Topic and Focus have also been employed in Generative Grammar and they are assumed to be relevant in the motivation of movement operations. Yet there has been an unfortunate tendency to reinterpret them as abstract syntactic features, possibly in an attempt at preserving the autonomy hypothesis (Lambrecht 1994: 27). Zubizarreta (1998) is a recent approach to focus accentuation as a syntactic marker. Significantly, some of Ross  /     

ural if the head noun is turned into an indefinite NP: ? -%42#%% =%%44  MH-/42 %%/%#%( Van Valin (1996) notes that topicalized constituents can also be interpreted as foci. I will not take that possibility into account here. Hawkins (1999: 272) argues that the introduction of a possessor modifier containing a referring expression in (16b) increases the amount of semantic processing and the structure becomes difficult to process. Although this explanation is in line with the one advocated here, it does not account for the contrasts in (28) and (29), which indicates that other factors may well be involved. As pointed out to me by Jan Rijkhoff (p.c.), the nouns in example (29) ( 3 5 & %) refer to abstract non-first order entities and, therefore, require different identification strategies. This may well be behind the contrastive interpretation that Kuno observed.



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20. This could be easily formalized by assuming that retrieving a lexical item activates a number of properties related to its prototypical use or function (cf. Pustejovsky  )**V ?  - ;% '     $     would most likely demand focal status. 21. Kluender (1992: 244-247) notes the relevance of the aspectual class of the matrix verb in extraction processes. Building upon Kluender !23

(1999: 272) proposes a hierarchy of semantic specificity for matrix verbs. Roughly, if the meaning of a verb accepting an extraction process entails the meaning of another (e.g. 4& entails *), then the latter should also accept the process. His assumption is that less specific verbs are more likely to allow extractions, since they require less semantic processing. 22. See Butler (this volume), Connolly (2004), Escribano (this volume) and Keizer (this volume) for discussion on the nature of the contextual and conceptual components in FDG. 23. Hence, the World of Discourse, understood as the interpretation constructed by the speech participants as the interaction unfolds, can be conceived of as part of the conceptual component. 24. It is not clear to me whether Lambrecht  ' $ 

  '  relate to the E-context, D-context, to the conceptual component (Rijkhoff Lcontext) or to all of them. I assume this may be related to the nature of the frame or schema which gives access to a referent or even to one  ption of the notion '25. Of course, I do not wish to suggest that the communicative setting presented here is the only one possible. One could say that the characterization of the general and verbal situation in Figure 3 does not contain necessary but sufficient features for the felicitous use of (38c).

  *     Allwood Jens S. 1976 The complex NP constraint in Swedish. I %*;%% =& % 2. Bach, Emmon and George M. Horn 1976 Remarks on L !    . '   - % 2B * 7: 265299. Bolkestein, A. Machtelt 1998 What to do with Topic and Focus? Evaluating pragmatic information. In: Mike Hannay and A. Machtelt Bolkestein (eds.), .% //    # 2% %, 193214. Amsterdam / Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

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Mackenzie, J. Lachlan and Evelien Keizer 1991 On assigning pragmatic functions in English. + /% 1: 169 215( Prince, Ellen F. 1981 Toward a taxonomy of given-new information. In: P. Cole (ed.), + /%s, 223256. New York: Academic Press. Pritchett, Bradley L. 1991 Subjacency in a principle-based parser. In: Robert C. Berwick, Steven P. Abney, and Carol Tenny (eds.), + &3# + > $/&%%+*%, 301345. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Pustejovsky, James 1995 ,  %:. Cambridge, M.A.: The MIT Press. Rijkhoff, Jan 2002 , 0 + . (Oxford Studies in Typology and Theoretical Linguistics.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. this vol. Layers, levels, and contexts in Functional Discourse Grammar. Ross, John R. 1986 Reprint. 2% '*%:. Norwood: Ablex Publishing Company. Original edition $% %   #  '*%:. Ph. D. diss., MIT, 1967. Shimojo, Mitsuaki 2002 Functional theories of island phenomena. The Case of Japanese. '% 26: 67123. Siewierska, Anna 1991 .% // . London: Routledge. Van Valin, Robert D. 1996 Toward a functionalist account of so-called extraction constraints. In: Betty Devriendt, Louis Goossens and Johan van der Auwera (eds.), $/&:'% % (-.%%+ &%, 2960. (Functional Grammar Series 17.) Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Zubizarreta, Mar6  1998 + *5.G =  . Cambridge, M.A.: The MIT Press.



#    Ahrens, Kathleen, 104 Akman, Varol, 106 Allan, Keith, 215, 216 Allwood, Jens S., 338, 346 Anstey, Matthew P., 2, 56, 9, 20, 3435, 181 Anwar, Mohamed S., 298 Auwera, Johan van der, 51 Bach, Emmon, 164, 330, 346 Bakker, Dik, 14, 16, 30, 32, 168, 287, 288, 290291, 296, 298, 309, 312, 314315, 317 Barbosa, Pilar, 170 Barthes, Roland, 276 Barwise, Jon, 136 Bazzanella, Carla, 106 Beale, Stephen, 240 Behrens, Leila, 104 Berg, Thomas, 315 Bernstein, Judy, 160 Biber, Douglas, 232, 249 Bolinger, Dwight, 49, 256 Bolkestein, A. Machtelt, 4, 322 Brousseau, Anne-Marie, 26, 73 B< Karl, 22 Bunke, H. 281 Butler, Christopher S, 2, 4, 27, 29, 30, 32, 3435, 49, 63, 7576, 90, 97, 102103, 125, 165 166, 173, 174, 214, 225, 243, 256, 282283, 357, 359 Bybee, Joan L., 78 Carlson, Robert, 53 Carnap, Rudolph, 214 Carnie, Andrew, 358 Casey, Richard G., 281 Chafe, Wallace, 324, 326327, 340, 342, 345347, 356

Chappell, Hillary, 105 Chomsky, Noam, 2, 144, 167, 174, 329330, 342, 346, 357 Chung, Sandra, 104 Churchward, C. Maxwell, 105 Cinque, Guiglielmo, 123, 160, 164, 170 Clark, Eve V., 104 Clark, Herbert H., 104 Coates, Richard, 60, 215 Comrie, Bernard, 76 Connolly, John H., 6, 30, 32, 34, 90, 98, 197, 203, 226, 240, 268, 277278, 283, 359 Cook, Guy, 274 Cooper, Robin, 136 Cornish, Francis, 322, 357 Coseriu, Eugenio, 167, 174 Craig, Colette Grinevald, 73 Crisma, Paola, 160 Cruse, David Alan, 105 Dasher, Richard B., 104 Davidson, Donald, 123, 164, 215 Deane, Paul D., 326, 337 Declerck, Renaat, 186187, 189, 196, 213 Defare, Evelyne Peter, 315 Dell, Gary S., 306 Deutsch, Georg, 242 Dik, Simon C., 13, 5, 1315, 17 20, 22, 23, 27, 3032, 3435, 51, 58, 60, 74, 8486, 9091, 93, 9899, 101102, 118, 122, 124133, 136145, 149150, 152, 154155, 159, 161169, 174, 181, 183188, 197, 238, 263, 265266, 270, 278, 282 283, 287, 294, 314, 322, 332, 350351

366

2:% 

D0  , Francesco, 335337, 348, 354 Dixon, Robert M.W., 86 Dowty, David, 164 Ernst, Thomas, 159 Erteschik-Shir, Nomi, 334, 358 Ervin-Tripp, Susan, 90 Escribano, JosD6 -19, 3031, 3435, 60, 66, 118, 125, 128, 130, 134, 137, 142, 144148, 154, 157161, 164, 168, 172 174, 212, 214, 357, 359 Faber, Pamela, 230 Farsi, A.A., 8283, 104 Foley, William A., 48, 185 Fortescue, Michael, 97 Frajzyngier, Zygmunt, 79 Frege, Gottlob, 106, 120, 136, 168 169, 189191, 214 Fries, Peter H., 104 Fromkin, Victoria A., 298 Garc   Daniel, 16, 30, 33 34, 103, 163, 214, 283, 288 Garnier, K. von, 79 Garrett, Merrill F., 298, 304, 307 Geach, Peter T., 214 Gerds, Donna B., 83 Giegerich, Heinz J., 83 Gildea, Spike, 79 Giusti, Giuliana, 160 GivTalmy, 106, 327 Goddard, Cliff, 257 Goldberg, Adele E., 357 Golla, Victor, 50 G&oli JosD-4 G&-GonzE &Mar!  J#   357 Goulet, Pierre, 242 Greenberg, Joseph H., 78 Groot, Casper de, 13

Grosu, Alexander, 346 Haegeman, Liliane, 290 Haig, John H., 331332 Halle, Morris, 297 Halliday, Michael A.K., 22, 76, 83, 97, 102, 105, 225, 230, 243 Hanna, Patricia, 201, 215 Hannay, Mike, 4, 210, 256, 322, 354 Hannequin, Didier, 242 Harder, Peter, 214215 Harley, Heidi, 297 Harley, Trevor A., 306 Harrison, Bernhard, 201, 215 Haspelmath, Martin, 343 Hawkins, John A., 78, 157, 324, 340, 341, 358, 359 Heim, Irene, 122, 164 Hendrick, Randall, 105 Hengeveld, Kees, 24, 67, 915, 18, 20, 2223, 2732, 3435, 43, 48, 52, 54, 58, 60, 6364, 75, 79, 86, 8889, 9192, 95 99, 102, 104106, 118, 125 130, 133135, 137138, 141, 158, 161, 163167, 169, 174, 181, 183, 185189, 192197, 200201, 207, 212214, 221 227, 232, 238, 243, 246, 250, 255257, 265, 281282, 296, 314, 323, 350351 Hetzron, Robert, 104 Heusinger, Klaus von, 104 Hieda, Osamu, 290 Higgins, F. Roger, 186, 213 Hong, Sun-ho, 333334 Horn, George M., 330, 338, 346 Hornstein, Norbert, 358 Huang, Chu-Ren, 104 Huddleston, Rodney, 232 Jackendoff, Ray, 164 Joanette, Yves, 242 Jurafsky, Daniel, 74

 Kamp, Hans, 104 Karttunen, Lauri, 71 Kayne, Richard S., 147, 159, 162, 164, 171 Keizer, Evelien, 19, 3031, 35, 58, 60, 75, 88, 104, 118, 124126, 128131, 133, 135, 137138, 141, 147, 160161, 164166, 168, 170174, 181, 183, 186 190, 192, 195, 209210, 213 216, 226, 283, 322, 359 Kluender, Robert, 358359 Koptjevskaja-Tamm, Maria, 81 Kosslyn, S.M., 276 Kratzer, Angelika, 122, 164 Kress, Gunther, 264 Kripke, Saul, 215 Kroon, Caroline, 4, 10, 99 Kuno, Susumu, 331, 338, 343344, 346347, 358 Kutsch Lojenga, Constance, 79, 80 Lambrecht, Knud, 321, 323327, 339, 344, 351, 353, 357359 LaPolla, Randy, 2, 77 Lappin, Shalom, 334, 358 Lee, K., 83 Lefebvre, Claire, 26, 73 Lehmann, Christian, 340 Levelt, Willem J., 5, 6, 298, 304 305, 307, 323 Levi, Judith N., 82 Levinson, Stephen C., 96, 257 Locke, John, 121, 201 Locke, John L., 242 Longobardi, Giuseppe, 160 Lorenzo, Guillermo, 349 Loux, Michael J., 121 Lyons, John, 3435, 60, 202, 214 Mackenzie, J. Lachlan, 24, 6, 7, 9 13, 20, 27, 29, 30, 3335, 43, 52, 54, 60, 86, 99, 103, 105, 118, 125128, 130, 133134,

2:% 

367

137, 138, 158, 163167, 177, 192, 193194, 196, 212, 214, 222, 238, 256257, 322 Mahesh, Kavi, 240 Mairal UsRicardo, 230 Malinowski, Bronislaw, 90 Marantz, Alec, 297 Martin, Laura, 73 Mart Mingorance, Leocadio, 230 Matthews, Robert J., 287 Matthiessen, Christian, 225, 230 Mayer, Karl, 298 McCawley, James D., 201, 215 McGee Wood, Maty, 164 McGregor, William, 105 Meringer, Rudolf, 298 Merlan, Francisca, 83 Mill, John Stuart, 214215 Miner, Kenneth L., 83 Mithun, Marianne, 57, 79, 83 Mohammad, Mohammad A., 309 Montague, Richard, 136, 164 Newman, Paul, 79 Ney, J.W., 104 Nichols, Johanna, 288 Nirenburg, Sergei, 240 Nooteboom, Sieb G., 298 Noyer, Rolf, 297 Nuyts, Jan, 6, 34, 257 Olbertz, Hella, 35 Parsons, Terence, 123 Partee, Barbara H., 122 Pederson, Eric, 257 Pesetsky, David, 169 Pfau, Roland, 16, 30, 32, 168, 297, 298, 304, 314 Prince, Ellen F., 324 Pritchett, Bradley L., 358 Pullum, Geoffrey, 232 Pustejovsky, James, 161, 164, 171, 359

368

2:% 

Quirk, Randolph, 32, 78, 82, 105, 264, 266 Reich, Peter A., 306 Reichenbach, Hans, 133, 168 Rijkhoff, Jan, 1, 1920, 2227, 29 32, 3435, 48, 56, 60, 6367, 69, 7778, 8485, 90, 101, 104, 106, 125126, 128130, 133143, 146147, 150, 153 161, 163174, 181, 191192, 200, 214, 221226, 230, 243, 255, 283, 287, 340, 342, 351, 353, 355, 357359 Roberts, John R., 7071 Ross, John R., 327328, 338, 341, 350, 358 Rossi, Mario, 315 Rush, Susan, 274 Russell, Bertrand, 120, 215 Sadock, Jerrold M., 102 Saeed, John I., 15 Schmid, Hans-JP#, 91 Schumann, John H., 242, 257 Scott, Gary J., 160, 170 Searle, John, 90, 183 Seibt, Johanna, 26, 35, 63, 67 Seiler, Hansjakob, 78 Shimojo, Mitsuaki, 331332, 338 Sichelschmidt, Lorenz, 104 Siewierska, Anna, 4, 14, 288, 296, 312, 315, 317, 322 Smit, Niels, 56 Smith, John Charles, 104, 267

Solms, Mark, 242, 257 Springer, Sally P., 242, 284 Staden, Miriam van, 95 Steedman, Mark, 164 Stokes, Bronwyn, 72 Strawson, Peter F., 120, 183, 184 Stroomer, Harry, 84 Taylor, John R., 36 Timberlake, Alan, 104 Tomasello, Michael, 105 Traugott, Elizabeth C., 104 Turnbull, Oliver, 242, 257 Ungerer, Friedrich, 91 Van Valin, Robert D. Jr., 2, 48, 77, 185, 290, 321, 332333, 346, 358 Vendler, Zeno, 34 Vet, Co, 4, 18, 19, 197 Wang, P.S.P., 281 Wechsler, Stephen, 105 Weinberg, Amy, 358 Wierzbicka, Anna, 257 Wilkins, David P., 82 Willemse, Peter, 36 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 121, 215 Wray, Alison, 242, 257 Vries, Lourens de, 5 Zubizarreta, Mar6 358 Zwicky, Arnold, 102



#  ?  act (see also  %), 4, 6, 9, 10, 18, 2122, 27, 32, 43, 60, 70, 9091, 9799, 106, 118, 123, 126127, 129130, 135, 160, 165, 167, 181, 183184, 187, 191, 193, 196, 199, 209, 210, 212222, 227, 238, 241 242, 249, 256, 267270, 276 277, 283, 323324, 326 activation, 33, 288, 307, 308, 323 327, 339, 340341, 343, 345 346, 350, 351, 353, 355356 activation cost, 326, 345346, 356 addressee, 9, 10, 22, 32, 43, 60, 70, 82, 94, 96, 98, 102, 166, 193, 197, 222, 226227, 266, 322 324, 326, 340, 343, 345, 348, 351, 353, 355356 adicity, 122123, 144145, 153, 163, 171 adjective, 1617, 2324, 35, 4950, 60, 6466, 7577, 79, 8283, 86, 96, 105, 109, 127, 147, 150, 154, 156157, 163, 171, 173, 184, 196, 223224, 232, 237, 251, 254, 294, 299, 302 advertisement, 270, 274275, 278 agreement, 32, 145, 226, 287288, 298, 309310, 312313, 315 316 Aktionsart, 23, 84 anaphor, 216 anaphoric relation, 188, 192 anaphoricity, 205 anchor, 324, 340341, 343, 345 anti-symmetry, 69, 72, 74 appositive construction, 182, 207, 212 article, 26, 55, 64, 72, 85, 104, 150,

166, 172173, 236237, 255, 291, 294, 301305, 307308, 311312, 314, 316 ascription, (see also #%) 10, 31, 39, 111, 181182, 192, 208, 211212 attitude, 25, 28, 32, 48, 54, 74, 77, 80, 98, 101103, 221, 223, 225, 228229, 235, 237, 239 241, 243, 246, 249, 251, 254 255, 257 attitudinal meaning, 31, 225, 228 229, 243 augmentative, 228 binary branching, 31, 141142, 150 152, 154155, 157, 159160, 169 block language, (see also & /% %C %0+) 264, 278, 297, 282 British National Corpus, 227231, 233238, 241, 246247, 249 250, 256257 competence, 167, 313, 323 Complex NP Constraint (CNPC), 321, 327, 329, 331, 333334, 336, 338339, 340, 342, 349 350, 358 component affective/interactional, 243 conceptual, 6, 34, 91, 9495, 103, 106, 193, 214, 222, 225, 240241, 255, 257, 350351, 353, 355, 359 contextual, 6, 31, 33, 63, 88, 90, 92, 182, 193, 197, 200, 203 204, 206, 212, 214, 222, 226, 231, 240241, 246, 249, 251,

370

2:#%

254255, 257, 281282, 323, 350351, 353354, 357 C-context, 88, 9192, 9495, 103, 355 D-context, 88, 90, 92, 9496, 103, 226, 351, 353, 355356, 359 E-context, 31, 63, 88, 90, 92, 94, 9697, 103, 226, 351, 353, 355, 359 G-context, 88, 9195, 97, 103 grammatical, 69, 13, 27, 31, 63 64, 77, 9199, 102103, 193, 199200, 204, 211212, 222, 231, 238, 250, 255, 281282, 350351 situational, 31, 90, 98, 103, 351 Compositionality, 159, 178 conceptual content, 241, 242 context immediate context, 214, 226, 316 situational context, 90, 92, 96, 226 contextual factor, 63, 88, 103, 231, 249, 280, 282 copular construction, 182, 184, 186 188, 194, 199, 205, 211213 classificational sentence, 199 classifying construction, 186 identificational sentence, 182, 196 identity statement, 182, 187, 189, 191, 196199, 206208 co-text, 88, 90, 92, 95, 98, 103, 221, 226, 351 definiteness, (see also  ) 17, 2324, 6669, 7174, 104, 168, 170, 186, 213, 224225, 304305, 312313, 317, 338 339

demonstrative, (see also   / C& % ) 65, 7677, 109, 236, 244245, 341 diachrony, 313 diminutive, 74, 76, 228 Discourse discourse context, 32, 88, 120, 221, 226227, 254255, 257 Discourse Act, 4, 10, 35, 323 discourse entity, 190, 198, 204, 206207, 212, 214 discourse organization, 266, 270, 280 discourse world, 69, 7374, 101, 104, 197198, 200, 203, 227 discourse-strand, 272 Domain Integrity (DI), 117, 143, 146147, 150, 153, 156157, 159, 172 Dynamic Expression, 32, 287289, 290, 296, 305, 311312 Encoding, 9, 45 expression rule, 12, 14, 93, 143, 152, 158, 173, 287289, 294, 296, 312 extra-clausal constituent (ECC), 263, 265 extraction processes, 288, 321322, 328331, 333 350, 356359 focusing, (see also & /% %) 339, 345, 349, 356 topicalization, (see also & 3 /% %) 150, 329, 331, 339, 340341, 34 extraction constraint, 321, 356 (see also ) feature mismatch, 298299 form-function relationship, 1416, 2327, 6566, 8083

 Formulation, 6, 9, 45, 351 Functional Lexematic Model, 230 gender agreement, 291, 302, 304, 310 feature, 239, 299, 301, 304, 312, 314 mismatch, 299, 302303, 315, 316 genitive, (see also & ) 83, 343 Head Proximity (HP), 123, 143, 153163, 165, 177179 headline, 264, 270272 iconicity, 5, 48, 75, 7778, 147, 153, 159, 243 identifiability, 214, 223224, 323 325, 343, 345 Image, 32, 149, 263, 267, 276280, 311 indefiniteness (see also  ), 67, 225 information structure, 321, 323, 339, 342, 344345, 349, 357 interpersonal meaning, 32, 221, 225 231, 234, 249, 255256 interpersonal level (see ) interpersonal modifier (see / ) intonation, 213, 230, 242243, 344, 346 Irrealis, 26, 6774, 104 island, 327, 331333, 350, 356, 357, 358, 361, 363 island constraint, 331333, 357 Layout, 279 level interpersonal level, 6, 9, 11, 43 44, 4748, 53, 59, 125, 165 166, 181182, 185, 193196, 199, 203, 205206, 208212, 214, 221222, 240241, 249, 254, 264, 315, 351, 356

2:#%

371

representational level, 6, 11, 13, 22, 27, 3031, 45, 4748, 53 60, 86, 99, 102, 118, 120, 129, 163, 165166, 181182, 185, 193212, 222, 225, 250 251, 264, 313 lexical entry, 144, 251, 307308, 313314, 316 lexicon, 5, 52, 105, 202, 230, 246, 249, 250251, 255, 288, 294, 306309, 313, 315 Linear Co-occurrence Axiom (LCA), 147162 linearization, 291 mental extension set, 31, 129, 201211, 215 lexicon, 202 modifier, 1518, 20, 22, 2526, 29 35, 4749, 5457, 6068, 75 76, 79, 8486, 97106, 120 127, 132137, 141142, 152 174, 186, 194, 209210, 223 232, 238, 243246, 249, 264, 294, 307308, 313, 342, 358 attitudinal, 63, 7475 classifying, 2426, 6364, 80, 101 discourse-referential, 24, 26, 31, 35, 6364, 66, 99, 10 illocutionary, 25, 101 interpersonal, 29, 32, 64, 67, 76, 97, 221, 227, 231, 234, 238, 246, 249, 255 localizing, 15, 22, 2526, 63, 66, 77, 99, 101 proposition, 101 qualifying, 16, 22, 25, 77, 80, 86, 101, 105 quantifying, 22, 25, 6667, 101 Move, 10, 106 multimodal, 264, 274, 276, 278

372

2:#%

node, 241, 290296, 307309, 313, 329, 330, 333, 336337 terminal, 291, 29 nominalization, 5152 noun incorporation, 56 possessive, 344 proper, 16, 32, 5455, 60, 120, 165, 182, 199, 207209, 212, 215, 232, 235, 301 noun phrase ascriptive, 59 possessive, 342, 344 prototypical, 16, 31, 34, 43, 195, 213, 223, 288 referential, 56 standard, 43, 46, 50, 57, 59 noun stripping, 83 numeral, (see also B%* / C& % ) 65, 75, 84, 168, 173, 184, 236, 245

ontology, 1, 20, 31, 117, 120123, 126, 162167, 174, 239241, 251 operator, 9, 12, 1731, 40, 45, 47 48, 54, 59, 6568, 77, 81, 84 87, 91, 9394, 99, 103106, 117, 123124, 126127, 131 142, 146, 149152, 154, 158, 160, 163, 165166, 168170, 174, 183, 190192, 194, 199, 201206, 215, 223229, 232, 287, 291292, 307, 333, 335 classifying, 27, 84, 87 discourse-referential, 26, 6667, 77, 87, 94, 99 localizing, 23, 65, 6667 qualifying, 27, 66, 8486, 103, 224 quantifying, 23, 66, 168 R-operator, 228

P1 position, 9, 10, 13, 34, 43, 54, 98, 119, 139140, 193, 222, 294, 354356 parallel, 22, 31, 41, 79, 97, 127, 132, 138, 141, 165, 168, 224226, 250, 255, 303, 309311, 340 possessor, (see also %, &C0+) 17, 65, 343345, 358 pragmatic function (freestanding NP) Caption, 266, 276278, 280, 282 Finish, 266267 Heading, 17, 264275, 277, 279 282 Label, 266, 276, 277, 278, 280, 282, 292 Prelim, 266, 267 Titling, 266270, 272, 274280, 282 pragmatic function, 1011, 32, 208, 256, 269270, 277278, 282, 322323, 325, 339340, 350 351, 354, 356 Focus, 11, 34, 77, 150151, 172 173, 256, 322323, 333, 351, 356, 358 Topic, 11, 14, 34, 150151, 172, 256, 322323, 325326, 351, 354, 356, 358 pragmatic rule, 32, 278, 281282 pragmatics, 4, 32, 77, 105, 242, 265, 276 predication, 10, 12, 1718, 21, 51, 123, 181, 183184, 188, 212, 214, 339 embedded, 18, 51, 154, 156157, 164, 166, 173, 238, 240, 264, 328, 338, 341, 343, 345, 347 348 priority, 148, 315, 322 pronoun, 15, 19, 20, 32, 5355, 58 59, 9697, 153, 182, 188, 19 192, 195, 199, 204205, 207

 209, 212, 216, 232, 235236, 264, 289290, 302 prototypicality, 213 quantifier, (see also B%* / C& % ) 119122, 136, 146, 163, 184

Realis, 26, 6774, 98, 101, 104 reference (see also #%), 3, 10, 15, 20, 26, 31, 48, 50, 54, 56, 58, 60, 67, 6973, 104, 118, 124, 126129, 136, 141, 152, 160, 163, 165167, 172, 181182, 185, 191194, 196, 198200, 203204, 208212, 222223, 230, 237, 250, 254, 256, 307, 323, 350, 357 definite reference, 26, 55, 69, 71, 105, 121, 237, 255, 299301, 304, 324 indefinite reference, 192, 299, 324, 340 non-specific reference, 7273, 104 reference modification, 49, 50, 54, 223, 254, 256 specific reference, 9, 12, 1415, 45, 7172, 74, 104, 118, 124, 154, 156157, 162, 165, 204 205, 214, 239, 257, 269, 276, 288, 290292, 295, 312316, 322, 340, 354, 359 referent, 17, 20, 26, 3135, 4749, 54, 57, 6364, 66, 6972, 74, 76, 82, 87, 94, 103105, 118 119, 125, 128129, 132133, 145, 161, 166, 182188, 190, 191, 193195, 199200, 202 211, 214215, 221, 223224, 227, 238240, 244245, 249 257, 322327, 339346, 349 351, 353357, 359

2:#%

373

accessible, 69, 146, 210, 296, 307, 315, 324, 326, 355356, 359 active, 324326, 340, 341342, 344345, 353357 inactive, 353 prototypical, 190, 214 referent modification, 48, 54, 223, 254, 256 relative clause, 1618, 2324, 51, 64, 66, 154, 160, 168, 176, 328, 331, 333334, 338, 340 342, 344, 358 Role and Reference Grammar, 77, 243 satellite, 15, 21, 23, 25, 3435, 66, 78, 80, 8387, 99, 105106, 134, 139140, 142, 147, 149, 156, 168, 171, 214, 224, 357 satisfaction, 144145, 156, 161 ' %, 23, 35, 84 scope, 9, 23, 29, 3031, 4850, 67, 75, 117118, 131, 136139, 142143, 148155, 158160, 165, 168169, 173, 186, 202, 224, 238, 265, 280, 282283, 313 speaker, 6, 910, 2122, 32, 43, 46 49, 54, 60, 64, 6877, 80, 82, 85, 9496, 98, 102105, 118, 125, 126, 129130, 132, 190 193, 196, 198, 200203, 206 212, 221223, 225226, 228, 230, 238241, 243, 249, 251, 254257, 283, 297, 301, 316 317, 322323, 325, 334, 339, 345, 347348, 351, 353357 speech error, 32, 287288, 291, 297, 298, 305, 312, 314316 agreement, 288, 298, 313, 315 blend, 299, 301, 303, 306 anticipation, 301302, 304, 311

374

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exchange, 10, 25, 63, 97, 99 102, 299, 301302, 311, 35 paradigmatic, 302, 305306, 308309, 311 perseveration, 302304, 308, 311 self-correction, 298299, 302, 305, 308, 311, 313314, 316 syntagmatic, 305, 308 Stepwise Term Construction (STC), 131, 134, 139, 141148, 151 152, 159, 162, 169 strong domain, 146 Subact, 10, 28, 44, 46, 193196, 199, 203, 205, 209210, 222, 256, 323 ascriptive, 28, 29, 46, 58, 60, 106, 181, 193, 196, 199, 205, 210, 222 referential, 2829, 4647, 53, 58, 106, 127, 207, 222223 Subjacency, 329, 330 subject-verb agreement, 298, 310 symmetry, (see also %3*//% *) 27, 69, 7172, 74 Systemic Functional Grammar, 105, 225, 231, 243, 256 typology, 1, 2, 40, 45, 79, 187, 256, 331, 357

underlying representation, 1213, 77, 91, 186, 193, 203, 290 292, 297, 305306, 309, 315 variable, 1, 1012, 14, 1720, 22, 26, 2831, 3435, 51, 53, 60, 63, 6566, 8687, 99, 102, 117142, 145, 152, 158, 161, 163169, 174, 182186, 188, 191194, 199, 200204, 208 213, 224, 251 f-variable, 11, 25, 60, 183, 185 186, 188, 205, 208, 210 individual, 122, 124 unbound, 134, 136, 163 x-variable, 11, 19, 35, 66, 100, 182, 188, 200, 205, 210212 zero sense, 126, 133, 135 variable-binding, 133135, 152, 167, 174 verbal interaction, 34, 32, 197, 238, 265, 278, 281282, 322, 349 350, 353, 356357 vocative, 4, 55 web page, 278, 280 WordSmith Tools, 231, 256



# <<  Abkhaz, 288 Aghem, 78 Alamblak, 78 Amele, 70, 71, 113 Arabic, 293, 309, 319, 319 Arrernte, 82, 115 Bambara, 78 Basque, 78 Berbice Dutch Creole, 78 Bisaya, 90 Bislama, 78 Burushaski, 78 Caddo, 57 Danish, 334, 358 Dutch, 15, 34, 42, 48, 75, 76, 78, 97, 184, 288 English, 13, 16, 19, 32, 52, 72, 7880, 82, 91, 93-95, 117, 120, 137, 147148, 151160, 172, 182, 210, 212, 217217, 221, 227 228, 231, 239, 241, 246, 248, 254257, 263264, 285, 288, 329, 333335, 337, 340, 343, 354, 357358.

Jacaltec, 73, 77 Japanese, 331333 Kayardild, 78 Ket, 78 Kikuyu, 78 Koegu, 289290 Kombai, 5 Korean, 90, 333334 Kusaiean, 83 Lakhota, 332333 Lithuanian, 81 Nahuatl, Modern, 83 Nama Hottentot, 78 Ngiti, 7980 Noni, 78 Nyigina, 72 Ojibwa, 78 Oromo, 78, 84 Panare, 79 Pipil, 78 Polish, 288 Portuguese, Brazilian, 5455 Quechua, Imbabura, 78

Fa d, 78 Fongbe, 26, 73, 77 French, 78, 147, 315, 325 Georgian, 78 German, 32, 287288, 292317 Guaran, 78 Hmong Njua, 78 Hungarian, 78 Hupa, 5051

Sango, 78 Spanish, 96, 147, 166, 221, 227 230, 256, 315, 335337, 348 349 Sranan, 78 Supyire, 5253 Swedish, 81, 338 Tamil, 78 Tidore, 95

376

2:

Tongan, 105 Turkish, 78 Zande, 78