t h e luc r e t i a n r e n a i s s a n c e
The Lucretian Renaissance phi l ol o gy a n d t h e a fter life of tr a d...
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t h e luc r e t i a n r e n a i s s a n c e
The Lucretian Renaissance phi l ol o gy a n d t h e a fter life of tr a dition
* Gerard Passannante
The University of Chicago Press * Chicago and London
ger a r d passa n na n te is assistant professor of English and comparative literature at the University of Maryland. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London © 2011 by The University of Chicago All rights reserved. Published 2011. Printed in the United States of America 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11
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isbn-13: 978-0-226-64849-1 (cloth) isbn-10: 0-226-64849-4 (cloth) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Passannante, Gerard Paul, 1978– The Lucretian renaissance : philology and the afterlife of tradition / Gerard Passannante. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn-13: 978-0-226-64849-1 (cloth : alk. paper) isbn-10: 0-226-64849-4 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Lucretius Carus, Titus—Influence. 2. Materialism—History. 3. Philosophy, Ancient. 4. Philosophy, Renaissance. I. Title. pa6484.p36 2011 187—dc22 2011016217 o This paper meets the requirements of ansi/niso z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper).
For my parents
contents
Introduction 1 1. Extra Destinatum 15 2. The Philologist and the Epicurean 78 3. Homer Atomized 120 4. The Pervasive Influence 154 Epilogue 198
* Acknowledgments, 217 Bibliography, 221 Index, 245
Introduction
Like Raphael’s School of Athens, the fantasy was one of synchronic time: a barge floating down the Tiber River carrying a flock of Renaissance humanists dressed as ancient poets. The story comes to us from the imagination of a Jesuit called Famiano Strada (1572–1649), a professor at the Collegio Romano who had a talent for metaphor and a decidedly baroque sensibility. As Strada tells us, the vessel was outfitted like Mount Parnassus, carrying Apollo and the Muses, with branches of laurel concealing its machinery and Pegasus jutting from the side. It was on this barge that the humanists were said to have staged a competition at the request of Leo X, each performing his role by imitating a different ancient author. Among the group was Pietro Bembo, a scholar, poet, and later a cardinal, who had authored a short treatise on literary imitation. Playing the part of the scientific poet Lucretius in a philosopher’s cloak and toga, Bembo delivered a poem in Latin hexameters that described a device composed of a magnet, a dial plate displaying the letters of the alphabet, and an iron needle, which together made possible an early form of text messaging. By spelling out a word on the dial, letter by letter, a person could communicate with another with the same device, “so that if one of [the needles] was moved by chance at Rome, although it was far away, the other shared in the motion, being impelled by some hidden law of nature [arcano naturai foedere].” “By this means,” as Joseph Addi1. Strada may have been thinking of a similar device that Leon Battista Alberti described in De cifris, a treatise on cryptography, perhaps even drawing a connection between the idea of coded messages and the hidden world of atoms Lucretius envisioned in the letters of the alphabet. 2. Strada, Prolusiones academicae, 306: “Ut si forte ex his aliquis Romae moveatur, / Alter ad hunc motum, quamvis sit dissitu’ longe, / Arcano se naturai foedere
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son later explained to a woman who was pining for her absent husband, “they talked together across a whole continent, and conveyed their thoughts to one another in an instant over cities or mountains, seas or deserts.” When readers stumbled across Strada’s account in the nineteenth century, some wondered whether the real Pietro Bembo had been hiding an early prototype of the magnetic telegraph in his famous collection of manuscripts, sculptures, and mystical Egyptian tablets. Blurring the line between object and metaphor, between talking long distance and speaking with the dead, Bembo’s “iron interpreter” looks back to an ancient history of magnets and technological desire— from Plato’s description of the magnetic furor of the Homeric rhapsode in the Ion to Philo’s account of the transcription of Mosaic law by Jewish scribes guided by the hand of an “invisible prompter.” As both ancient and Renaissance readers understood, Lucretius’s poem itself was something of a wonder in this regard: an instrument designed to broadcast the Greek wisdom of the philosopher Epicurus and explain the physical workings of the universe in the material concourse of atoms. In book 6 of his De rerum natura (On the Nature of Things), Lucretius himself spends a good deal of time discussing the physical workings vertat.” The word naturai is a deliberate archaism designed to imitate Lucretius’s habit of mixing old words with new ones. 3. Addison, Works, 1:351. With tongue firmly in cheek, Addison said that he could only think of one improvement to the device: “In the meanwhile, if ever the invention should be revived or put in practice, I would propose that upon the lover’s dial-plate there should be written not only the four-and-twenty letters, but several entire words which have always a place in passionate epistles, as flames, darts, die, languish, absence, Cupid, heart, eyes, hang, down, and the like.” And so modern technological romance was born. 4. See Pearson, “On Sympathetic Needles.” Like the Mensa Isiaca that Bembo had supposedly bought from a soldier in Rome, which was thought to contain the occult mysteries of ancient Egypt, the device could easily be imagined as another object of wonder to be collected in a Kunstkammer. 5. See Plato, Ion 533d; and Philo, Life of Moses 2:37– 39 (in vol. 6 of the Loeb Philo). For a modern history of technological desire, see Ronell, Telephone Book. 6. Statius famously wrote of the “towering frenzy of learned Lucretius” (et docti furor arduus Lucreti), and in the Quattrocento Marsilio Ficino listed the Epicurean poet among those who, like Homer, had been possessed by a divine furor. See Statius, Silvae 2.7.73; and Ficino, Platonic Theology, 4:126–27.
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of magnets, describing the ways that the atoms of iron and loadstone jostle in relation to one another, generating a subtle game of fullness and emptiness that could make an iron needle sigh and weep across great distances. In having Bembo dress up as Lucretius and sing about magnets, however, Strada was not only using the ancient poet to explain the function of the iron interpreter; he was also using the device to describe the effects of Lucretius on his readers. If any poet ever knew anything about collapsing time and space in an instant or transforming absence into presence it was the author of De rerum natura—the one who taught Virgil and Milton how to make an epic simile into an engine of physics, who took his readers from a vision of dust swirling in a ray of sunlight to a hidden world of causes. Merely to read Lucretius after his own miraculous recovery from seeming oblivion in 1417 was to be transported long-distance—from Renaissance Italy to ancient Rome, from Rome in the heat of a civil war to the green shade of an Epicurean garden. The sixteenth-century poet Giovanni Pontano perhaps put it best when he said that Lucretius “drags the reader wherever he wants to go.” I have begun with the fantasy of humanists sending messages wirelessly with magnets because the story dramatizes a problem of visibility at the center of Lucretius’s poem and its Renaissance reception, namely, the problem of reading a history of materialism into a history of letters. I am using the word letters here in the sense of individual characters of the alphabet, such as the letters that make up this book, but also in the larger sense of a history of literature, a historia literaria. In trying to picture Bembo’s iron needle moving across an alphabetic dial plate, or whole words translated through a chain of invisible atoms, we are reminded of one of the central analogies of De rerum natura, an analogy that the poet himself echoes again and again in a kind of refrain: the letters of the alphabet are like the atoms of the universe. As individual letters are combined to form words, so atoms are combined in different 7. On Lucretius’s personal witnessing of a magnet in Samothrace, see esp. Sedley, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom, 51–54; and Wallace, “ ‘Amaze Your Friends!’ ” 8. Pontano, I dialoghi, 238–39: “Rapit quo vult lectorem.” Cited and translated in Haskell, “Religion and Enlightenment,” 189.
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arrangements to form things. In the most basic sense, The Lucretian Renaissance might be described as an attempt to recover this analogy for the period, and to understand it as a way of thinking about the nature of intellectual history and reception. How did the idea that letters are like atoms, for example, become meaningful for the development of textual criticism, for thinking about the transmission of ancient knowledge in print, or for understanding the Renaissance itself as a material relation to a classical past? To even begin to ask these questions in their broadest outlines is to discover the central thesis of this book, which is, simply, that the history of materialism in the Renaissance is inextricably tied to a history of literature and the material text. Well before its more familiar scientific and philosophic appearance in the age of Descartes, Boyle, and Newton, the ancient philosophy of Lucretius and Epicurus reemerged in the Renaissance imagination as a story about reading and letters—a story that unfolded in the volatile fortunes of texts, in their physical recomposition, and in their scattering. There is a world of invisible bodies behind every letter and word. This was the secret of the iron interpreter. In recent years, there has been another renaissance of Lucretius in contemporary scholarship, with the poet reappearing at the thresholds of modern political, social, and scientific thought. Generally speaking, my own book seeks to build upon this new wave of scholarship 9. Among many important studies are Reid Barbour’s English Epicures and Stoics, which traces the impact of Epicurean atomism on the political and religious imagination of the seventeenth century; Richard Kroll’s meditation on materialism in England after Gassendi; Susanna Gambino Longo’s, Valentina Prosperi’s, and Alison Brown’s studies of the philosophical and literary fortunes of Epicureanism in Italy; Catherine Wilson’s book on the philosophical impact of Epicureanism in the seventeenth century; Jonathan Goldberg’s rethinking of the stakes of Lucretian materialism for the history of sexuality; and Natania Meeker’s recent study of materialism and reading in the eighteenth century. One must add to this list the formidable collection of articles in The Cambridge Companion to Lucretius; Jacques Lezra’s study on the concept of the “event”; David Quint’s reading of Lucretian influence in the poetry of Milton; Charlotte Goddard’s unpublished dissertation, “Epicureanism and the Poetry of Lucretius in the Renaissance”; and Stephen Campbell’s interpretation of Lucretius’s presence in Giorgione’s Tempest and the poet’s importance for the larger intellectual context in which the painting was produced.
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but takes a somewhat different approach to the question of influence, focusing on De rerum natura as a poem that dramatizes its materiality and theorizes its own receptions. In this sense, The Lucretian Renaissance seeks to remedy what Jonathan Goldberg has described as a relative lack of interest in materialism on the part of historians of the book by showing how the history of the book is itself an object of philosophy. In the process of exploring the ways in which the dynamic, invisible world of De rerum natura came to reflect ideas about the production of literature and knowledge, we will see the poet’s elemental analogy between letters and atoms realized in and through the work of readers and their texts—that is, in the making of humanist thought and scholarly practice. Because the primary vehicle of Epicurus’s revival in the Renaissance was a poem (a fact that is sometimes overlooked or obscured), the history of materialism as a philosophy in this period is also fundamentally a history of words and poetic tropes, a history of philology. The word “philology” has come to mean many things to many people. The notion of philology that I refer to in the title of this book naturally includes the emergent science of textual criticism, and I will try to show just how dramatically the practices of the textual critic were transformed in the atomic light of De rerum natura. The sense of philology that I am invoking here is not, however, entirely limited to the work of humanists putting texts back together. Rather, it gestures to the writings of authors such as Giambattista Vico and Erich Auerbach, for whom philology, as Charles Breslin has explained, “designates the whole residual corpus of the historical process in all its staggering complexity.” The ancient poet who attempted to compress the entire history of “things” into six books still has something to teach us, I believe, about reading complexity, and about the ways that we represent historical processes, or at least try to. As Auerbach once put it: “It is a difficult and infinite task to understand the particular character of historical forms and their interrelations”—as difficult perhaps as understanding 10. For other authors who have recently called for a rethinking of the materiality of reception, see esp. Hamilton, Soliciting Darkness; O’Brien, Anacreon Redivivus; Gurd, Iphigenias at Aulis; Harris, Untimely Matter; and Butler, Matter of the Page. 11. Breslin, “Philosophy or Philology,” 373.
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the material relations between invisible bodies that is the subject of Lucretius’s poem. In moving freely from philology in the narrow sense of textual criticism to philology in this much larger, almost cosmological sense, we may begin to understand what is at stake in Lucretius’s influence—an influence that brings us from the correction of an individual letter or word to the frame of the world itself. It is in this way, we might say, that the ancient Epicurean poet not only transformed the language of modern science and philosophy in this period, but transformed the very language of interconnection—the ways Renaissance readers imagined the network of links, both seen and unseen, that make up the “residual corpus” of texts and traditions. This brings us to the basic problem of how we define the text and how the poet himself defined or imagined it. Whereas scholars sometimes like to distinguish between a classical text and its reception, in this case the reception of De rerum natura is understood in the poet’s own terms as an extension of the text, and the material history of the poem as a dynamic expression of its philosophy. For this reason, the story of atoms and the void in the Renaissance cannot be strictly limited to the discourses of science and philosophy, at least in our own sense of those disciplines. Rather, the history of materialism must be discovered again in the most familiar Renaissance practices such as literary imitation, in the work of the author and the printer, and in the shifting concept of the classical text itself. In other words, it must be recovered from our own most familiar narratives of literary and intellectual history. In a late unfinished manuscript, the troubled philosopher Louis Althusser once spoke of “the existence of an almost completely unknown materialist tradition in the history of philosophy.” If that narrative has become somewhat less unknown in recent years, what we are exploring in these pages might still very well be called “an almost completely unknown materialist tradition” in the history of letters. As I will show, the materialism of the Renaissance took shape not as something marginal 12. Auerbach, Studia philologica et litteraria, 34. Unlike Vico, Lucretius did not draw a sharp line between our knowledge of nature and culture. 13. Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 167. Cited and discussed in Goldberg, Seeds of Things, 5.
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to an established classical tradition (as something foreign or other); rather, it was enacted within the very body of tradition itself. Readers have sometimes misunderstood the nature of this particular story because they have begun with a distorted idea of Lucretius’s revival in the Renaissance, and forgotten that the poem is and was an unstable material text. As Lucretius himself reminds us, the magnet only looks as if it works without touching, and what might appear at first as an unmediated phenomenon unlocks a story that is all about mediation (i.e., the mediation of atoms). We might recall here, for example, Michel Serres’s claim that the age of modern physics was “there to welcome [Lucretius’s poem] intact and as yet unread.” As we shall see, the fortunes of the text—a text that no one could have called “intact” in the Renaissance—occasioned a number of key philosophical reflections on the work of the humanist and poet, and what we might call the matter of the text. What Serres misses when he laments that we have been forced to “read Lucretius’s De rerum natura as humanists and philologians, and not as a treatise on physics,” is just how coextensive those histories of reading once were. In the age of Bembo’s iron interpreter—which is to say, in the age of movable type—the poet’s materialism lent the physical encounter with ancient texts a kind of material depth, inviting readers to envision a world of knowledge broadcast across vast seas of time, to see in the disintegrating reflection of Homer a vision of matter and tradition in the process of becoming. The poet John Donne captured something of what I’m describing here in a smaller and more personal way when, worried that his letters might not arrive in the right sequence, he wrote from Paris to a friend: “If our letters come not in due order, and so make not a certain and concurrent chain, yet if they come as atoms, and so meet at last by any crooked and casual application, they make up and they nourish bodies of friendship.” 14. Serres, Birth of Physics, 71. 15. Serres, Birth of Physics, 4. 16. Donne, Letters, 1:305–6. I am grateful to Marshall Grossman for bringing this passage to my attention. For a discussion of the passage and Donne’s knowledge of Epicureanism, see Targoff, John Donne, Body and Soul, 33.
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In imagining the vagaries of his correspondence in the language of matter, Donne adumbrates a sense of how Lucretius’s startling picture of material change and transformation gave expression to the tumultuous and uncertain world of Renaissance knowledge and its making. For the printed text, Adrian Johns has described this shifting uncertainty as the “nature of the book,” arguing for a dynamic print culture against the notion of textual fixity proposed by Elizabeth Eisenstein. In De rerum natura, behind the idea of a solid, fixed text was the idea of a poem in perpetual motion, a tradition in the process of being made and unmade and made again in time. The temporality of atomism, by which I mean both its late recovery in the Renaissance and its description of time in relation to matter, posed a radical challenge to any reader reflecting on antiquity and the “stuff ” of tradition, the multiple and evolutionary forms of literary and intellectual history, and the future of the past in the pages of the printed book. Against the formal stability of the atom—that irreducible unit of Lucretian physics—Renaissance readers of De rerum natura came to discover the poet’s vision of flux and change and to see it in themselves and their texts. For some this idea of textual flux represented an increasingly crumbling and fragmented tradition on the brink of resolving into chaos and nonsense: an image of the void. For others, however, it represented something quite different: a figure of creative potential, progress, and generativity that reflected the poet’s use of the word semina for atoms and the raw potential of atomism as philosophy and metaphor. In looking at both of these kinds of responses, we will explore more fundamentally how the poet’s description of the physical world and the world of the material text came to influence one of the most enduring questions of the period: what does it mean for a text, a poem, a philosophy to be reborn? By its very nature, this study does not and cannot aim at any kind of completeness. Here we are reminded of the “infinite task” that Auerbach describes as the work of the philologist. Lucretius, of course, 17. See Johns, Nature of the Book, 1–57. 18. In his book Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future, James I. Porter has uncovered an important development of this story in the early philological work of Nietzsche, showing how some of the philosopher’s most important ideas were worked out in a fragmentary encounter with the atomism of Democritus.
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understood this in his own way. As the poet once said of his arguments for the void: “But for a keen-scented mind, these little tracks are enough to enable you to recognize the others for yourself.” Each of the various poets, philosophers, and humanists that I treat in this book represents a significant material encounter with both the poetry of De rerum natura and its text, and each was more than casually affected by the poet’s ideas of matter and material change. We might even speak of a kind of sympathy, a word suspended between an ancient history of magnetic force and a modern history of reading. By the term “sympathy,” I do not necessarily mean an assent to the poet’s materialism—rather, something like a vulnerability to it. Arthur O. Lovejoy once called it a “susceptibility” to “metaphysical pathos.” As he explained, perhaps even intentionally echoing the title of Lucretius’s poem, “ ‘Metaphysical pathos’ is exemplified in any description of the nature of things, any characterization of the world to which one belongs, in terms which, like the words of a poem, awaken through their associations, and through a sort of empathy which they engender, a congenial mood or tone of feeling on the part of the philosopher or his readers.”At first it may seem strange to speak of any kind of sympathy at all with regard to an author who has for so long been characterized by the force of repulsion he has inspired—a poet still best known for arguing that the soul is mortal and that there is no such thing as divine Providence. This, however, is only one part of the complex story of the poet’s influence. In what follows in these pages, I will be less concerned with the question of atheism or impiety that has haunted Lucretius since antiquity (and has been well documented) than with the question of how a poem about invisible bodies and what passes between bodies crept into the Renaissance literary and historical imaginations—sometimes in spite of a reader’s more orthodox positions. As Michel de Montaigne once put it, the poetry of 19. Lucretius, De rerum natura 1.400– 401: “Verum animo satis haec vestigia parva sagaci / sunt, per quae possis cognoscere cetera tute.” All references to the text of De rerum natura refer to the Oxford Classical Texts edition by Bailey (hereafter referred to as DRN) unless otherwise noted. Translations follow the Loeb edition by Rouse and Smith unless otherwise noted. 20. Lovejoy, Great Chain of Being, 11. As its etymology suggests, “congenial” in this passage means sympathetic in mind or spirit rather than merely pleasant.
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De rerum natura “does not so much please as fill and ravish; and it ravishes the strongest minds most.” In trying to capture something of the ravishment of the poet and his readers, this book proceeds not only chronologically, but also occasionally backward and forward through time, in a double motion that I hope will begin to make visible the deep homologies that connect the Renaissance inventions of Lucretius and his text to the history of our own critical practices. If most of the recent scholarship on the poet’s reception has had a relatively narrow focus, marooning him either in Italy, France, or England, this study deliberately takes a much longer view, tracing the latent interconnections between readers responding to one another across time and space, and exploring the idea of interconnectedness itself. Like the shifting scale of Lucretius’s poem, which slips between the minute and the universal, the scale of this project is itself closely connected to its story, moving from the pen marks of readers through large shifts in reference that span the space of the continent and the length of several centuries. In occupying this unstable perspective, I am attempting both to describe the effects of Lucretian influence in the Renaissance from the kind of measured distance that the poet celebrates at the start of book 2 (“Pleasant it is, when over a great sea the winds trouble the waters, to gaze from shore upon another’s great tribulation”), and to bear witness to my own vulnerability to the turbulence of the poet’s imagination. In a letter to a good friend and colleague, the German art historian Aby Warburg once imagined the Renaissance philosopher Giordano Bruno in vivid terms “as an antenna for European modes of thought, which received waves equally from Italy, France, England, and Ger21. Montaigne, Essais 3.5; trans. Frame, 665; ed. Villey and Saulnier, 873: “Qui ne plaict pas tant comme elle remplit et ravit, et ravit le plus les plus forts espris.” Tellingly, Montaigne here is speaking both of Lucretius and arguably his “strongest” reader, Virgil. For the English translation of Montaigne, in this chapter I follow Frame, Complete Works of Montaigne. All references to the French text are to the Villey-Saulnier edition of Les essais. 22. Lucretius, DRN 2.1– 2: “Suave, mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis, / e terra magnum alterius spectare laborem.”
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many.” Since, as scholars have recently shown, Bruno himself was so vulnerable to Lucretius, Warburg might very well have added ancient Rome to the list. Looking back to the iron interpreter and forward now to Warburg, The Lucretian Renaissance might be described finally as another story of waves and antennae—a history embodied in the figure of dynamic, material change and reflected in our own materialist models of reception and influence. It seems somehow appropriate that this scholarly renaissance of Lucretius is taking place now in what we might call the late age of print, when the fantasy of sending messages, books, and even whole libraries instantly across great distances has suddenly become a commonplace reality. To trace the dynamic movement of a Lucretian sympathy in the Renaissance is in the end not just to follow the fortunes of a single ancient poet moving from one “antenna” to another, but rather to explore our own materialist idea of the Renaissance unfolding between them—what we might call the form of the “wave” itself. Because the character of this sympathy has for the most part been forgotten or obscured for so long, I shall try in my own way to turn another absence into presence. *
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I have broken down the book into four chapters that deal with different, though overlapping, material stages in the transmission of De rerum natura—from Lucretius’s latent presence in the poetry of Virgil to the text’s physical reconstruction at the hands of philologists to its later dissemination in print and scattering in the minds of readers. Each of these chapters contributes to an evolving description of Lucre23. Warburg Institute Archive, General Correspondence, Aby Warburg to Fritz Saxl, 13 December 1928: “Giordano Bruno stellt sich mir im Augenblick als Drehscheibe im Denkgeleissystem [sic] des 16. Jahrh. dar, und bildet durch Personalunion eine Antenne europäischer Denkweise, die ihre Wellen gleichermassen aus Italien, Frankreich, England und Deutschland empfing.” I am grateful to Elizabeth Sears for sharing this passage with me and for allowing me to use her translation. For Warburg’s lifelong interest in Bruno, see Mann, “Denkenergetische Inversion: Aby Warburg and Giordano Bruno.” 24. See Gatti, Essays on Giordano Bruno, 70– 90; and Monti, “Incidenza e significato.”
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tius’s influence in the Renaissance—a description that examines both the historical specificity of the reader and his engagement with the text and the transformation of a single idea over time, the idea of the text in flux. The story begins, paradoxically, in the period when scholars have for the most part agreed that there was very little reception of Lucretius to speak of—the period roughly from late antiquity to the Middle Ages, when the text of De rerum natura is thought to have been dormant or its readers asleep. It is in the midst of this long period that I want to begin to recover a forgotten strain of Lucretian influence. As we shall see, the Epicurean poet was not exactly lost during this crucial moment of transmission; on the contrary, his influence was detected within the writings of later poets—poets such as Virgil, who was thought to have absorbed a great deal from De rerum natura, especially concerning the matter of the plague. In following the traces of Lucretius’s indirect transmission through the eyes of Macrobius, Petrarch, and Angelo Poliziano, we will explore how the poet’s absent presence powerfully shaped the development of humanist thought on the work of literary transmission, the relationship between philosophy and poetry, and the nature of intellectual debt. In theorizing about what passes invisibly between a poem and its reader, Petrarch throws into relief the question of what it means to recognize a Lucretian subtext, to sense the presence of the poet across a distance. The second chapter moves from the matter of Lucretius’s transmission through Virgil to the ways his text was pieced back together, letter by letter. In this case I want to explore what happens when a poem which says that letters are like atoms coincides with an emergent history of textual criticism, and the philologist begins to look like an Epicurean. From Karl Lachmann’s famous nineteenth-century archetype to Michele Marullo’s Lucretian furor to the flyleaves of Montaigne’s copy of the poem, we will see how the historical rebuilding of the poem from a few fragmented manuscripts occasioned a deep analogy between a humanist casting his mind into the text and an Epicurean imagining the world of invisible matter. In working with a text so profoundly concerned with the poetics and physics of renewal, even
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the most well-worn metaphors of philology became vulnerable to another Lucretian sympathy. The Renaissance humanist read the poem, one could say, as the poem read the humanist. In chapter 3 we follow the larger consequences that the analogy between atoms and letters holds for an account of Renaissance intellectual history. At the heart of this discussion is a silent dialogue between two other readers who absorbed Lucretius intensely and who remade the poetic materialism of De rerum natura to suit their own very different ends: Michel de Montaigne and Francis Bacon. The conversation I have in mind concerns the nature of the Homeric tradition and the problem of atomizing or breaking down tradition into its component parts. Whereas Montaigne, for example, saw in the scattered idea of Homer’s poetry a vision of a gaping Epicurean void opening out into deep time, Bacon found a generative vision of knowledge in constant flux—a vision that reflected his own engagements with materialism— and an idea of the past and future of knowledge. It turns out that a vulnerability to Lucretius’s atomic imagination could lead one either to a world of French skepticism or to an Advancement of Learning. As both Montaigne and Bacon knew all too well, sometimes the difference lay in only a single letter or word. The final chapter follows closely upon Bacon’s notion of a scattered and diffuse tradition that is constantly evolving to explore how the influence of the Epicurean poet came to pervade the idea and practice of literary and intellectual history in the seventeenth century. In the first section, on Edmund Spenser, I show how defining Lucretius’s influence in Spenser’s posthumously published Mutability Cantos (a task that has proved curiously difficult) leads to another meditation on the matter and form of literary history and of Spenser’s own poetry. In the second part, we move from the character Mutabilitie’s “Epicurean revival” to Pierre Gassendi’s philosophical revival of Epicurus in France some years later and the “atomization” of Lucretius’s poem. In breaking up the text of De rerum natura and scattering it throughout his own books, Gassendi would lend another expression to Lucretius’s poetic materialism even as he tried to forget the poet himself. The chapter ends with the Cambridge Platonist Henry More and his own attempt to capture
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and contain the influence of Lucretius in an imitation of Spenser, helping us to see the connections that join the notion of a pervasive literary influence with the idea of a real pervasive force in the world. In each of these cases, I will show how Lucretius’s atomic vision of an influence that was unseen and everywhere continued to transform the material practices of poets and philosophers well into the seventeenth century, and to inflect what we might properly call the physics of thought.
*1* Extra Destinatum
In the early 1840s, the sole manuscript copy of Gabriele de Mussis’s Historia de Morbo—a fourteenth-century narrative account of the origins of the Black Death—was discovered by a German physician and published as part of the second volume of the Archiv für die gesammte Medicin, a new journal for a burgeoning discipline called the history of medicine. Heinrich Haeser, the first editor, following the celebrated example of Leopold von Ranke, argued that a history of medicine was not a fruitless philological enterprise, but rather a necessary corrective to the “ ‘materialism’ and skepticism that had been infecting the ‘new’ scientific medicine.” “To us,” he explained, “history is no longer an enumeration of ‘deviations’ of the human mind, thus flattering our vanity. Rather, it is mirroring our weakness; it has grown into a shining torch to recognize the finger of God—the rule of an eternal law in the doings of mankind.” Framed by a series of apocalyptic warnings, de Mussis’s account of the plague fit Haeser’s purposes nicely as a dramatic prelude to his own multivolume history of epidemic diseases. Beyond the frame, however, de Mussis told a very different story, one that Haeser 1. Henschel, “Document zur Geschichte des schwarzen Todes,” 45–57. De Mussis’s account has been translated into English in Horrox, Black Death, 14–26. 2. Huisman and Warner, Locating Medical History, 9. 3. Haeser, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Medicin, 1:xviii–xix: “Aus solchen Träumen sind wir längst erwacht; wir sind demüthiger, sind gerechter geworden, und die Geschichte ist uns nicht mehr eine Aufzählung der ‘Verirrungen’ des menschlichen Geistes, nicht mehr ein Kitzel unsrer Eitelkeit, sondern ein Spiegel unsrer Schwachheit und eine Leuchte geworden, um auch hier den Finger Gottes zu erkennen—das Walten eines ewigen Gesetzes in dem Thun der Menschen.” Cited and translated in Huisman and Warner, Locating Medical History, 10. In this passage, Haeser might have had in mind Friedrich Schiller’s promise to enumerate man’s Verirrungen (deviations) in the preamble to his Philosophische Briefe; see Schiller, Sämtliche Werke, 5:336–58.
* 15 *
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and his contemporaries were perhaps less inclined to hear—not of the finger of God or of eternal law, but of digression and contingency. The story begins with an incident in Tana, an ancient trading city on the banks of the River Don that Strabo once described as the dividing line between East and West. It was here, we are told, that an argument erupted between Italian merchants and Muslim locals, perhaps over the price of perfume or silk. What began as a seemingly small argument quickly grew into a full-fledged riot that drove the Italians to the city of Kaffa, a place with its own history of political instability. For nearly three years the Muslim forces besieged the walls of Kaffa until one day a disease infected their whole army. The Christians thought that the hand of Providence had reached down “to strike and crush the Tartars’ arrogance.” The sky was darkened not, however, by the vengeance of a Christian God, but by the shadow of human bodies being hurled headlong into the city. “What seemed like mountains of dead” accumulated inside the walls, and “soon the rotting corpses tainted the air and poisoned the water supply, and the stench was so overwhelming that hardly one in several thousand was in a position to flee.” For the men searching for deliverance and a happy ending at Kaffa, things took an ironic turn, for when the Italians finally sailed home they were carrying with them the Black Death. With his dramatic play of scale and the quick movement between invisible disasters and their visible effects, de Mussis unlocks a troubling question about the nature of causes and our ability (or failure) to digest them in narratives. Perhaps that is why his account was lost for so long or why it was interpreted the way it was when it was finally found. In what follows in this chapter, I want to explore another his4. Horrox, Black Death, 17; Haeser, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Medicin, 3:157: “Et ecce Morbo Tartaros inuadente totus exercitus perturbatus languebat et cottidie Infinita millia sunt extincta videbatur eis, sagittas euolare de celo, tangere et opprimere superbiam Tartarorum.” 5. Horrox, Black Death, 17; Haeser, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Medicin, 3:158: “Sic sic proiecta videbantur Cacumina mortuorum, nec christiani latere, nec fugere, nec a tali precipicio liberari valebant, licet deffunctos, quos poterant marinis traderent fluctibus inmergendos. Moxque toto aere inffecto, et aqua uenenata, corrupta putredine, tantusque fetor Increbuit, ut vix ex Millibus unus, relicto exercitu fugere conaretur qui eciam uenenatus aliis ubique uenena preparans, solo aspectu loca et homines morbo Infficeret uniuersos.”
e x t r a de st i nat u m * 17
tory of contagion that turns on an accidental transmission: the story of one buried strain of Lucretius’s literary influence in the Renaissance. Our story begins, however, not as one might expect, with Poggio Braccilioni’s monumental rediscovery of De rerum natura in 1417 (the starting point of so many narratives about Lucretius). Rather, it begins with the familiar texts of Virgil, and with Virgil’s ancient and late-antique readers who sensed and recorded the lingering presence of the Epicurean poet beneath the surface of imitations. My first question is: what gets passed on through Virgil’s poetry during the period when Lucretius and his poem were thought to be lost? How did this largely forgotten transmission come to transform some of the period’s most fundamental ideas about intellectual debt, the theory and practice of literary imitation, and the relationship between philosophy and poetry? In answering these questions, my intention is not so much to demonstrate that the author of De rerum natura is present, or not, in any given passage from Virgil, but rather to explore the association between the two poets as it was perceived, understood, and remembered historically by readers who were theorizing about the nature of literary borrowing and dependence. I begin with the grandfather of humanism, Francis Petrarch, reading Virgil during the years of and just following the Black Death (1348– 1350), trying in his own way to make sense of the kind of story de Mussis was telling about the nature of chance events and the spread of influence. For Petrarch, Virgil’s debt to Lucretius provided a disturbing example, representing an alternative model of agency that ran decidedly counter to his own emergent ideals of literary practice. The second part of the chapter shifts backward in time to explore the seeds of Petrarch’s rare sensitivity to Lucretius in the lost world of Virgil’s ancient readers. Here we trace a number of crucial passages from De rerum natura as they were transmitted through the distorted mirror of Macrobius’s Saturnalia and other late-antique discussions of Virgil’s literary debts. The chapter ends with the afterlife of this figure of contagion in the work of the Florentine poet Angelo Poliziano, who, in his own way, lends expression to a history of invisible influence and philosophical contamination. What emerges finally from the subtle web of this story is an idea of transmission that links the poetic materialism of De rerum natura to a material account of literary practices. It is in this sense that
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we may see both the recasting of an ancient materialism through the Renaissance literary imagination and the Renaissance literary imagination itself transformed. As in the case of de Mussis’s story, how this strain of influence developed over time, how it was recognized or felt, is inextricable from what we may think it means.
Invisible Disasters After the real Laura, the glittering subject of his Rime, was stricken down by plague in Avignon in 1348, Petrarch would meticulously note the month, the day, and the time of her death in the flyleaves of his copy of Virgil, an enormous manuscript filled with notes that he is said to have carried with him almost everywhere he went: “I thought I should write these words as a bitter reminder of the facts, yet with a certain bitter sweetness [amara quadam dulcedine], and put them in this place that is so often before my eyes, so that I may realize when I look at them that there is nothing left in the world that should delight me.” As men and women historically have sometimes recorded deaths and other significant events in the front matter of their Bibles, Petrarch buried Laura in the flyleaves of his most important book, though it would seem that not even Virgil could help him now—and perhaps for the first time in his life. For the author of the Rime sparse, the devastation of the plague was perhaps the ultimate test of the idea that a cultivated devotion to the literature of the ancients was the best “remedy” to the slings and arrows of fortune—a test of the sometimes-necessary fiction that reading is enough. Two years later, in 1350, Petrarch would compile the Rerum familiar6. “Hec autem ad acerbam rei memoriam amara quadam dulcedine scribere visum est, hoc potissimum loco qui sepe sub oculis meis redit, ut scilicet cogitem nihil esse debere quod amplius mihi placeat in hac vita.” Cited and translated in Watkins, “Petrarch and the Black Death,” 199. On Petrarch’s manuscript copy of Virgil and its history, see Ratti, “Ancora del celebre codice manoscritto”; de Nolhac, “Virgile chez Pétrarque”; Lord, “Petrarch and Vergil’s First Eclogue”; and Billanovich, “Il Virgilio del Giovane Petrarca.” 7. Petrarch explores the consolation of literature throughout his life and work, but especially in his De remediis utriusque fortunae.
e x t r a de st i nat u m * 19
ium libri, having barely overcome a desire to commit his letters to Vulcan’s correcting hand. Teetering on the fire’s edge (where Virgil is said to have once dangled his Aeneid), this collection of letters is fraught with an all-too-understandable anxiety about the fragile permanence of the written word and a sense of temporality sharpened by disaster. As Petrarch knew, the competing desires for remembrance and amnesia were not easily disentangled in the act of writing. This was especially true in the letters he wrote during and in the wake of the plague. In the Rerum familiarium libri is a letter to his friend Socrates from 1348 that begins with another poignant reflection on the difficulty of reading in a time of disaster: Oh brother, brother, brother (a new kind of beginning for a letter, indeed an ancient one used by Marcus Tullius almost fourteen hundred years ago); alas dearest brother, what shall I say? Where shall I begin? Where shall I turn? Everywhere we see sorrow, on all sides we see terror. In me alone you may see what you read in Virgil concerning so great a city, for “on all sides there is cruel mourning, everywhere there is trembling and countless images of death.”
In not knowing where to turn, the author turns to what he knows best: to the only two authors who survived his father’s bonfire of the pagans years ago when Petrarch was piddling around with ancient books instead of studying the law. These opening words of the letter selfconsciously evoke Cicero’s own letter to his brother Quintus on the occasion of his exile from Rome. There the ancient orator had described a sense of sheer desperation that would become the dizzy mirror of Petrarch’s own: “You can imagine how I weep as I write these lines as I am 8. Petrarch, Rerum familiarium libri (hereafter cited as Fam.) 8.7.1; trans. Bernardo, 1:415; ed. Rossi, 2:174: “Mi frater, mi frater, mi frater—novum epystole principium, imo antiquum, et ante mille fere quadringentos annos a Marco Tullio usurpatum—; heu michi, frater amantissime, quid dicam? unde ordiar? quonam vertar? undique dolor, terror undique. In me uno videas quod de tanta urbe apud Virgilium legisti, nam ‘crudelis ubique / Luctus, ubique pavor et plurima mortis imago.’ ” All citations of the Rerum familiarium libri follow Vittorio Rossi’s and Umberto Bosco’s edition and Aldo S. Bernardo’s English translation. 9. Petrarch recounts the story of his father burning his books in letter 16.7 of Rerum senilium libri (trans. Bernardo et al., 2:600–601).
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sure you do as you read them.” Amplifying his grief, Petrarch then asks us to recall a passage from Virgil, who is also imagined as both a sympathetic partner and an all-too-distant friend. The passage that “every schoolboy knows,” as Petrarch described it in the Secretum, conjures up a vision of a devastated Aeneas watching Troy burn to the ground, his wife Creusa, like Laura, dead. “In me alone you may see what you read in Virgil,” he writes, though even the supreme gravitas and piety of Virgil strain under the weight of the present circumstance. There are no Augustan consolations, no reassurances to be had where the plague is concerned. To Petrarch’s troubled and wandering mind even the promise of Rome seems out of reach. From its opening cry, the letter vacillates between hyperbole and understatement, though what one feels perhaps most urgently here is Petrarch’s desperate desire for identification with his ancient authors and with a reader he could not even be sure was alive to receive the letter— a desire that resolves quickly into despair. “Is it perhaps true as is sus10. Cicero, Ad Quintum fratrem 1.3.3: “Haec ipsa me quo fletu putas scripsisse? Eodem, quo te legere certe scio. An ego possum aut non cogitare aliquando de te, aut umquam sine lacrimis cogitare?” (How do you suppose I am weeping as I write these very words? Just as you are weeping, I am sure, as you read them. Can I for a moment cease from thinking about you, or ever think of you without tears?). All citations of Ad Quintum fratrem follow the Loeb edition, Letters to His Brother Quintus, Letters to Brutus, Handbook of Electioneering, Letter to Octavian, by Williams, Cary, and Henderson. On the importance of intimacy in Petrarch’s writing, see esp. Eden, “Petrarchan Hermeneutics.” 11. See Virgil, Aeneid 2.361– 69: “Quis cladem illius noctis, quis funera fando / explicet aut possit lacrimis aequare labores? / urbs antiqua ruit, multos dominata per annos; / plurima perque vias sternuntur inertia passim / corpora perque domos et religiosa deorum / limina . . . crudelis ubique / luctus, ubique pauor et plurima mortis imago” (Who could unfold in speech that night’s havoc? Who its carnage? Who could match our toils with tears? The ancient city falls, for many years a queen; in heaps lifeless corpses lie scattered amid the streets, amid the home and hallowed portals of the gods . . . . Everywhere is cruel grief, everywhere panic, and full many a shape of death). All references to Virgil follow the Loeb edition by Fairclough unless otherwise noted. 12. Petrarch, Secretum, in Prose, 102. 13. For the evolution of Petrarch’s thinking on the plague, see esp. Watkins, “Petrarch and the Black Death”; and Baron, From Petrarch to Leonardo Bruni, 9–10 and 70–81.
e x t r a de st i nat u m * 21
pected by certain great minds that God cares not for mortal things?” the author asks slightly further on. “Let such madness not even enter our minds.” But the thought, of course, already had. As Petrarch takes a sharp turn into a world of skepticism and doubt, the letter reveals itself as a dense palimpsest of emotions, hesitations, and partial erasures that we are invited to read in many tenses: “I shall not deny that I did feel some shame, for without the control of reason I felt my mind and my style [stilum] pulled along [trahi] with my feelings beyond what I intended [extra destinatum], something I find most disturbing.” The fantasy of the letter, like that of so many letters, is the fantasy of co-presence. As Cicero had suggested to his brother, we feel the letter as it is being written, and it pulses across the page in waves of grief. At the start of the collection Petrarch himself had insisted that his correspondence underwent very little revision once it had been written and irrevocably sent out into the world, but in this last passage we find what would appear to be the evidence of a later return. In this place where he tells us that he felt his pen pulled beyond what he intended, the author dramatically interrupts the forward movement of the letter, shifting tenses as if it had already been written and he were looking back upon his own words (words he finds hard to recognize or acknowledge as his own). This interruption is, in fact, our first clue to understanding 14. Petrarch, Fam. 8.7.18; trans. Bernardo, 1:418; ed. Rossi, 2:177: “An illud fortasse verius, quod magna quedam ingenia suspicata sunt, Deum mortalia non curare? Sed absit a mentibus nostris hec amentia: si non curares, illa non subsisterent.” As we will see, when Petrarch speaks of “certain great minds” in this passage and their “madness,” he is thinking of Epicurus and Lucretius, among others. Petrarch refers explicitly to the biographical tradition of Lucretius’s madness in Fam. 24.11 (trans. Bernardo, 3:340) and in Rerum senilium libri 5.5 (trans. Bernardo et al., 1:184). 15. An echo of these “certain great minds” “still reverberates,” as Timothy Kircher has argued, “for the very reason that the plague remains inexplicable” (Kircher, Poet’s Wisdom, 91). 16. Petrarch, Fam. 8.7.10; trans. Bernardo, 1:416; ed. Rossi, 2:176: “Nec me tamen erubuisse negaverim; sensi enim animum ac stilum, excusso rationis freno, extra destinatum iter affectibus iunctos trahi; quo nichil molestius pati possum.” 17. As Watkins has suggested: “The letter presented as Fam. 8, 7 . . . may also, on the model of the changes visible in Fam. 8, 9, be the work of 1350, for no original has been preserved. It is a rhetorical expression of inner turmoil” (Watkins, “Petrarch and the Black Death,” 201–20).
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the subtle traces of Lucretius in the letter—traces that become visible again in what Timothy Kircher has described as Petrarch’s “fluctuation of feeling.” This was not the first time Petrarch was disturbed by what he had put down on paper. The failure of destinatum or intention to console himself and his friend, for example, recalls what he had said earlier, in the preface to the collection, about his style becoming “weaker” as the letters progressed—a literary and moral declination he wished he could revise or blot out entirely. “It is that style especially,” he wrote, “that I beg you to try to conceal [occultare]. What can one expect others to say when I myself blush at rereading those portions?” In the letter to Socrates, the author is clearly embarrassed by his weakness of faith, his inability to control his emotions or to reign in his doubt in the face of the plague. In this fraught context, as it were, the word destinatum can also mean Providence in the very largest sense, hinting that our author was pulled not only beyond what he intended when he set out to write the letter, but also beyond the idea of a divine plan. Here again Petrarch reminds us of those “certain great minds” who believed “that God cares not for mortal things.” This sense of doubt manifested itself in a number of ways, especially, as Petrarch suggests, in the act of writing itself, which becomes the site of his struggle. If we take the word stilus here to mean both pen and literary style, as Cicero sometimes used it figuratively, then we might understand what it meant to be dragged extra destinatum in a slightly different way. A man who once said that he had absorbed the writings of antiquity so thoroughly that they had become part of his very marrow opens himself up here to another, more dangerous possibility: that those same influences may possess him. As 18. Kircher, Poet’s Wisdom, 88. 19. Petrarch, Fam. 1.1.38; trans. Bernardo, 1:11–12; ed. Rossi, 1:12: “Illa precipue ut occultare studeas, precor. Quid enim alii dicerent, cum ipse relegens erubescam?” 20. See, for example, Cicero, Brutus 45.167: “Huius orationes tantum argutiarum, tantum exemplorum, tantum urbanitatis habent, ut paene Attico stilo scriptae esse videantur” (His orations have such refinements of expression, such wealth of anecdote and example, such urbanity, that they would seem almost to have been written by an Attic pen). On the figure of writing in Cicero, see Butler, Hand of Cicero. 21. As Petrarch describes this intimacy in Fam. 22.2.13: “Hec se michi tam familiariter ingessere et non modo memorie sed medullis affixa sunt unumque cum ingenio facta sunt meo, ut etsi per omnem vitam amplius non legantur, ipsa quidem
e x t r a de st i nat u m * 23
he once imagined the hunter Actaeon accidently stumbling upon the goddess Diana at the bath just before he was ripped apart by his own hounds: “I felt myself drawn from my own image” (ch’i senti’ trarmi de la propria imago). Or, as he tellingly described his “weakness” of style in the preface to his letters: “A serious disease is not easily hidden [non facile occultatur] since it breaks out and becomes visible [proditur] through its own peculiar features [indicio suo].” The indicia of this deadly metamorphosis pervade the letter to Socrates, and if we read them symptomatically—to use Petrarch’s metaphor rather than Althusser’s—we may begin to detect this subtle shift in “style” and “intention.” We might look, for example, at the passage from the letter that follows closely upon the author’s account of this troubling loss of control: How can posterity believe that there was once a time without floods, without fire either from heaven or from earth, without wars, or other visible disaster, in which not only this part or that part of the world, but almost all of it remained without a dweller? When was anything similar either seen or heard? In what chronicles did anyone ever read that dwellings were emptied, cities abandoned, countrysides filthy, fields laden with bodies, and a dreadful vast solitude covered the earth? Consult the historians: they are silent; question the scientists: they are stupefied; ask the philosophers: they shrug their shoulders, their finger to their lips. hereant, actis in intima animi parte radicibus” (ed. Rossi, 4:106) (I have thoroughly absorbed these writings, implanting them not only in my memory but in my marrow, and they have so become one with my mind that were I never to read them for the remainder of my life, they would cling to me, having taken root in the innermost recesses of my mind [trans. Bernardo, 3:212– 13]). On Petrarch’s intimate relation to the Latin language, see Celenza, “Petrarch, Latin, and Italian Renaissance Latinity.” 22. Petrarch, Rime 23, line 157; trans. Robert M. Durling, Petrarch’s Lyric Poems, 66–67. The irony of the hunter transformed into the hunted is, as Gordon Braden has put it nicely, the irony of “alienated speech, now definitively failing of its object and returning upon its helpless creator” (Braden, Petrarchan Love, 42). 23. Petrarch, Fam. 1.1.38; trans. Bernardo, 1:11; ed. Rossi, 1:12: “sed ingens morbus non facile occultatur; erumpit enim et indicio suo proditur.” 24. Petrarch, Fam. 8.7.12–13; trans. Bernardo, 1:417; ed. Rossi, 2:176: “Quando hoc posteritas credet, fuisse tempus sine diluvio sine celi aut telluris incendio sine bellis aut alia clade visibili, quo non hec pars aut illa terrarum, sed universus fere orbis
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Petrarch is here interrogating not only the plague, which presents a crisis of epistemology, but also the very value of past experience in interpreting the present—that is, the value of humanistic study itself, of reading. His library was shaken, as he later described the effects of an earthquake which occurred that same year, his books fallen upon him and his faith in them disturbed. In citing the various authorities that had failed to account for the plagues of the past, however, Petrarch leaves one out. In this sense, we might say, the passage represents a simultaneous act of remembering and forgetting, for at the very moment the author seems to forget the disasters of the past (or to suggest that they were, as he put it, a “delight” by comparison), he quietly calls upon another ancient source, scattering enough footprints for us to discern its outlines. He leaves us a hint, for example, when he conspicuously omits poets from the list of men—scientists, philosophers, and historians—who have fallen silent on the subject. I say conspicuously, for it is in this precise instance of literary and spiritual crisis that Petrarch will draw our attention back to the poets and, in particular, back to the memory of Lucretius, who had lent an unforgettable expression to Thucydides’ description of the Athenian plague in book 6 of De rerum natura. Compare, for example, the passage above to the following lines from the poem: Nec requies erat ulla mali: defessa iacebant corpora. mussabat tacito medicina timore. sine habitatore remanserit? Quando unquam tale aliquid visum aut fando auditum? Quibus hoc unquam in annalibus lectum est, vacuas domos, derelictas urbes, squalida rura, arva cadaveribus angusta, horrendam vastamque toto orbe solitudinem? Consule historicos: silent; interroga physicos: obstupescunt; quere a philosophis: humeros contrahunt, frontem rugant, et digitulo labris impresso silentium iubent.” 25. Kircher, Poet’s Wisdom, 89–90. 26. Petrarch recounts having experienced an earthquake while sitting in his library in Verona in Rerum senilium libri 10.2 (trans. Bernardo et al., 2:373). Writing in the wake of a series of earthquakes in 1505, Filippo Beroaldo would echo this image from Petrarch, lamenting that his library had trembled and that the only thing certain was that nothing was certain. Beroaldo, De terraemotu et pestilentia, sig. B6. 27. See Petrarch, Fam. 8.7.15. 28. Lucretius, DRN 6.1178–79.
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[Nor was there any rest from pain: outwearied the bodies lay. Medicine muttered below her breath, scared into silence.]
Petrarch translates this image of silent medicine into the image of doctors who put their fingers to their lips, who shrug their shoulders in the face of invisible disease. With a similar subtlety, he brings us to a passage from Lucretius that imagines the city devastated of its inhabitants: Haec ratio quondam morborum et mortifer aestus finibus in Cecropis funestos reddidit agros vastavitque vias, exhausit civibus urbem. [Such a cause of disease and death-bringing current once in the realms of Cecrops poisoned the countryside, made the roads a desert, and drained the city of men.]
The poet who explained the origins of everything in the random encounters of matter—indeed, one of those “great minds” who suspected that “God cares not for mortal things”—is both the ideal and the deeply troubled source for the conflicted author “pulled” disturbingly beyond his own destinatum and beyond the idea of divine intentionality. Here these vestiges of Lucretius in Petrarch’s writing, however faint, correspond directly with his plunge into doubt, even give voice to it. “Why is it, then, oh blessed judge,” Petrarch addresses God himself, “why is it that the violence of your vengeance lies so extraordinary upon our times? Why is it that when guilt is not absent, examples of just judgment are lacking?” 29. Lucretius, DRN 6.1138–40. 30. Petrarch, Fam. 8.7.14; trans. Bernardo, 1:417; ed. Rossi, 2:177: “Quid est ergo, iudicum iustissime, quid est quod insigniter adeo in nostrum tempus ultionis tue fervor incubuit? Quid est quod cum culpe non desint, desunt exempla supplicii?” Petrarch’s questions here should remind us of the exordium of Claudian’s In Rufinum, which has historically been thought to contain echoes of Epicurean doubt. See Claudian, In Rufinum 1.1–18: “Saepe mihi dubiam traxit sententia mentem / curarent superi terras an nullus inesset / rector et incerto fluerent mortalia casu. . . . sed cum res hominum tanta caligine volui / aspicerem laetosque diu florere nocentes / vexarique pios, rursus labefacta cadebat / religio causaeque viam non sponte sequebar / alterius, uacuo quae currere semina motu / adfirmat magnumque novas per inane figuras / fortuna non arte regi” (My mind has often wavered between two opinions: have the gods a care for the world or is there no ruler therein and do mortal things drift as dubious chance dictates? . . . But when I saw the impenetrable
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In this place where the specter of Lucretius appears in the letter, the idea of being extra destinatum powerfully crosses with the idea that the author has lost control of his imitation, as if imitation itself were a form of intention or control, a way of policing the relation between the self and the other. Clearly, this was not always so simple. The turn to Lucretius in the letter to Socrates—a turn that has remained invisible to modern readers—unlocks for us a more complicated reflection on the nature of influence and transmission, for Petrarch’s encounter with Lucretius (like Dante’s and Boccaccio’s) was probably not a direct one. The two passages from De rerum natura that Petrarch recalls here in the letter were, in fact, transmitted indirectly through the veil of Virgil and his commentators. Petrarch, for example, learned a great deal about Virgil’s debt to Lucretius from the text of Macrobius’s Saturnalia, an early fifth-century dialogue which Petrarch read carefully and which was roughly contemporary with the commentary by Servius that accompanied his manuscript of Virgil. The context of Macrobius’s use of Lucretius, as we shall see, is an extended section of the dialogue in which one of the interlocutors discusses the nature of Virgil’s borrowing of whole passages from the history of Latin literature. In book 6, Macrobius goes to extravagant lengths to show how extensively Virgil had used Lucretius’s representation of the Athenian plague in his own description of the Noric one: “The general ‘color,’ and almost all the details, of a description of the plague in the third Georgics are taken [tracta sunt] from the demist which surrounds human affairs, the wicked happy and long prosperous and the good discomforted, then in turn my belief in God was weakened and failed, and even against mine own will I embraced the tenets of that other philosophy which teaches that atoms drift in purposeless motion and that new forms throughout the vast void are shaped by chance and not design). Unless otherwise noted, citations to In Rufinum follow the Loeb edition, Claudian, by Maurice Platnauer. 31. de Nolhac, Pétrarque et l’humanisme, 1:159– 60. For the debate concerning the transmission of Lucretius during the Middle Ages, see Bignone, “Per la fortuna di Lucrezio”; Reeve, “Italian Tradition of Lucretius,” “Italian Tradition of Lucretius Revisited,” and “Lucretius from the 1460s to the 17th Century”; and Lokaj, “Strepitumque Acherontis avari.” In his article for the Cambridge Companion to Lucretius, Reeve nicely summarizes the various routes to Lucretius that a medieval author might have taken without having read the poem directly. See Reeve, “Lucretius in the Middle Ages and Early Renaissance.”
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scription of the plague in the sixth Book of Lucretius.” If a fourteenthcentury reader such as Petrarch knew nothing about Lucretius’s poem (besides that it dealt with atoms and was supposedly impious), he knew that Virgil himself had absorbed and learned much from it—and that he had been intensely drawn to Lucretius’s example. As the character of Reason explains the matter to an overly confident Joy in Petrarch’s De remediis utriusque fortunae: “Such riches are excellent, but they are uncertain and subject to many hurtful events, fraud, robbery, and plagues that occur so often and with such vehemence that entire flocks and entire herds may be destroyed. You know the plague as described by Lucretius and, based on him, by Virgil.” In this account of the trouble with resting on one’s good fortune, Virgil’s literary debt is elided with the problem of chance and contingency, as if Virgil’s imitation of Lucretius in the Georgics were itself some kind of unforeseen disaster. As Pierre de Nolhac pointed out long ago, it was from the traces of this literary disaster that Petrarch gleaned the great part of his knowledge of De rerum natura. He even carefully transcribed all of the passages from Lucretius that he found in Macrobius, putting them in the margins of the same copy of Virgil where he bitterly inscribed the loss of Laura. In channeling Lucretius in the letter, then, Petrarch was not only borrowing from the fragmented remains of the poet that Macrobius had preserved for posterity, but also remembering and isolating Virgil’s own dependence on the Lucretian plague, recovering the memory of an ancient association that lingered in Virgil’s poetry. At the same time, 32. Macrobius, Saturnalia 6.2.7; trans. Davies, 399; ed. Willis, 358: “Ipsius vero pestilentiae, quae est in tertio Georgicorum, color totus et liniamenta paene omnia tracta sunt de descriptione pestilentiae quae est in sexto Lucretii.” 33. As we shall see, Macrobius himself borrowed most of the Saturnalia from other books. For this reason, there is a possibility that Macrobius knew no more of De rerum natura than Petrarch did. 34. Petrarch, Remedies 1:177; Les remèdes aux deux fortunes, 1:286: “Laudate divitie, sed incerte, & casibus multis obnoxie, fraudibus, rapinis, pestibus, que tam crebre, tamque valide sunt, ut sepe totos greges, totaque lacerent armenta, nota pestis quam Lucretius, quamque illum sequens Maro descripsit.” 35. de Nolhac, Pétrarque et l’humanisme, 1:159–60. 36. Lokaj describes Petrarch’s interest in the Lucretian echoes in Virgil nicely, though in a different context: “Consequently, Lucretius became a model to emulate
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he was also raising a question about the nature of literary dependence, and about what it might mean to reproduce whole passages from another poet nearly intact. As scholars of Renaissance imitation know very well, Petrarch had a great deal to say on this matter of literary practice, and as we read him it becomes even more clear that Virgil’s imitation of De rerum natura was not exactly what he would have called an ideal one. In a famous letter to Boccaccio, the author recounts a conversation with his student, who he says was excessively overtaken (captus) by a love for Virgil. The proper way to imitate, he insists, is to disguise: We must thus see to it that if there is something similar, there is also a great deal that is dissimilar, and that the similar be elusive and unable to be extricated except in silent meditation, for the resemblance is to be felt rather than expressed. Thus we may appropriate another’s ideas as well as his coloring but we must abstain from his actual words; for, with the former, resemblance remains hidden, and with the latter it is glaring.
The emphasis here is on the author’s mastery and control. It is the diligent author who actively transforms influence into honey or, in a slightly different version of the same story, hides influence from himself. The keen-scented reader may gather (intellectere) or feel the presence of a subtext that resists an easy description—that, like pollen broken down by bees or the invisible strains of sound or the mixing of perfume, lies “hidden away below the surface” and, for the reader, between the lines. “But there is I don’t know what hidden presence [occultum] that has this power.” In The Light in Troy, Thomas Greene classifies these kinds of imitations broadly as ”heuristic” imitations that “come to us advertising their also for Petrarch, the latter-day Vergil, who presents him as if he knew him directly” (Lokaj, “Strepitumque Acherontis avari,” 373). 37. Petrarch, Fam. 23.19.13; trans. Bernardo, 3:302; ed. Rossi, 4:206: “Sic et nobis providendum ut cum simile aliquid sit, multa sint dissimilia, et id ipsum simile lateat ne deprehendi possit nisi tacita mentis indagine, ut intelligi simile queat potiusquam dici. Utendum igitur ingenio alieno utendumque coloribus, abstinendum verbis; illa enim similitudo latet, hec eminet.” 38. Petrarch, Fam. 23.19.12; ed. Rossi, 4:206: “Sed est ibi nescio quid occultum quod hanc habeat vim.” I have used my own translation for emphasis.
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derivation from the subtexts they carry with them, but having done that . . . proceed to distance themselves from the subtexts and force us to recognize the poetic distance traversed.” As Greene shows, Petrarch was a master of generating and manipulating this distance, though sometimes not even the author himself was able to follow his own good advice about hiding his influences, as his precocious student was all too happy to point out to him: I was amazed, and replied, “If ever you have found such things in my works, my son, you may be sure that it is due to some oversight, and is very far from being my deliberate intention. I know that cases of this sort, where a writer makes use of another’s words, are to be found by the thousands in the poets; but I myself have always taken the utmost pains, when composing to avoid every trace both of my own work and, more particularly, of my predecessors’, difficult though such avoidance is.”
One catches a glimpse in this passage of the author’s almost compulsive desire to control his literary sources, and the anxiety that a failure to control them produced. Petrarch even laments that he can’t correct his mistake because the letter had already been sent out into the world—something that clearly bothered him. The author ends the letter by bringing us back pointedly to a question of intention. Although, he insists, he had not intended to steal (ego sibi non rapui), Virgil had “stolen [rapuerit] outright many and many a time, from Homer, and Ennius, and Lucretius, and many another poet.” This, he suggests, was one instance in which he could not follow his ancient master. 39. Greene, Light in Troy, 40. 40. Petrarch, Fam. 23.19.14–15; trans. Bernardo, 3:302; ed. Rossi, 4:206–7: “Hic ego admirans: ‘Siquid unquam, fili, tale meis in carminibus invenis, scito id non iudicii mei esse sed erroris. Etsi enim mille passim talia in poetis sint, ubi scilicet alter alterius verbis usus est, michi tamen nichil operosius in scribendo nichilque difficilius se offert, quam et mei ipsius et multo maxime precedentium vitare vestigia. Sed ubinam, queso, est unde hanc tibi licentiam ex me sumis?’ ” 41. Petrarch, Fam. 23.19.17; trans. Bernardo, 3:302; ed. Rossi, 4:207: “Postremo et mecum ipse Virgilium ores, det veniam nec moleste ferat si, cum Homero, Ennio, Lucretio multisque aliis multa sepe rapuerit, ego sibi non rapui, sed modicum aliquid inadvertens tuli.”
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In absolving himself of any wrongdoing, Petrarch is again quietly leading us back to the pages of the Saturnalia, and in particular to the section where Virgil was said to have lifted whole passages from other poets such as the ones that involve the plague. There, as Macrobius had made clear, the question of Virgil’s debts was conspicuous—too conspicuous to ignore. But how was one to make sense of these debts? What did they mean for Virgil? Macrobius himself had written earlier in the Saturnalia that Virgil’s thefts “may even have the appearance of being accidental, since he sometimes skillfully conceals the debt, although at other times he imitates openly.” In the fifteenth century, Bartolomeo Scala made a similar point when he hailed “that admirable poet Lucretius—whose poem Virgil himself, the king, so to speak, of Latin writers, did not blush to integrate into his own work.” The question then becomes: if Virgil himself wasn’t particularly embarrassed by his thefts from De rerum natura, if indeed he was imitating Lucretius “openly” and he “stole outright,” what made Petrarch blush at the thought? To put the question another way, what would it mean to understand the author’s desire to render his own imitations “below the surface” in light of Virgil’s relation to the Epicurean poet? These questions might at first seem surprising because we have learned to take for granted the author’s model of imitatio, forgetting that this model was still being worked out in a fraught, sometimes contradictory, and uneven dialogue with his ancient sources. If, in the letter to Boccaccio that we just read, Petrarch draws a distinct line, insisting that Virgil’s borrowings were deliberate, in his letter to Socrates on the plague, the relation between intentionality and imitation is decidedly more ambiguous. There Petrarch appears to be disguising his debt to Lucretius, following his own advice, but he still feels ironically that his pen was somehow dragged beyond what he intended, opening up the 42. Macrobius, Sat. 1.24.18; trans. Davies, 157; ed. Willis, 131: “Maxime, inquit, praedicarem quanta de Graecis cautus et tamquam aliud agens modo artifici dissimulatione, modo professa imitatione transtulerit.” 43. Scala, Essays and Dialogues, 236: “Et Lucretius poeta admirandus, cuius etiam carmina rex ipse, ut ita dicam, Latinorum Virgilius suo inserere operi integra non erubuit.” Cited and translated in Brown, Return of Lucretius, 32.
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space for another idea of influence and agency. As Petrarch departs from Virgil’s example, we are reminded that “a serious disease is not easily hidden. . . .” The literary and philosophical subtext appears to “overwhelm” the author in spite of his efforts to control or subdue it, to render it “below the surface”: an eruption that displays not the “distance traversed,” but an uncomfortable intimacy. Lucretius emerges here as another “hidden presence” that does not inhere in individual words or phrases, though in this case the hiddenness of the influence, like the hiddenness of the plague, reflects not the author’s mastery of his sources, but his vulnerability to them. The very fact that De rerum natura was not straightforwardly available to Petrarch—that the poem was experienced through the lens of Virgil—further dramatizes this play of the seen and the unseen, and the uncanny sense that a reader could be possessed by an influence that he could not entirely possess himself. In sketching these connections across Petrarch’s work, my intention is not to collapse all of the author’s imitative theory into an anxiety about Lucretius; rather, it is to show how the unexpected encounter with Lucretius creatively interrupts the familiar terms of the conversation about influence. What we discover in the shadow of Petrarch’s moving pen is an idea of contamination that silently undoes the figure of imitative control that the author wants, sometimes desperately, to maintain in his own writing. To further understand how this contamination was figured as a literary effect, I want to turn now to some other books that Petrarch had at his disposal. Macrobius, as I’ve suggested, provides a rich source for thinking through the relationship between Lucretius and Virgil, particularly on the matter of the plague. Another key source on the shelves of Petrarch’s library was Gellius’s Noctes Atticae—like the Saturnalia, a late-antique text that dealt with the problem of Virgil’s literary debts, among many other topics. In the passage from Gellius that I have in mind, the author is concerned not with Virgil’s borrowing of whole passages, but with the borrowing of a single word, in this case, the rare Latin word amaror (bitterness): 44. See Greene, Light in Troy, 45–47.
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For Virgil was not the first to coin that word arbitrarily, but he found it in the poems of Lucretius and made use of it, not disdaining to follow the authority of a poet who excelled in talent and power of expression. The passage, from the fourth book of Lucretius, reads as follows: and when we see wormwood [absinthia] being mixed with water in our presence, we have a sense of bitterness [amaror].
The image that Gellius evokes here is one of a number of images used by Lucretius to demonstrate the continual flow and scattering of invisible matter from bodies—bodies that are constantly in the process of shedding their skins, or simulacra, as he calls them. According to the poet, we see wormwood (absinthia) being mixed across a room and we literally sense (tangit) its bitter presence by the journey of unseen particles traveling through the air. With the word amaror, which Gellius understands as a kind of Lucretian signature, a problem of diction in Virgil opens out into a question of “sensing” the influence of another and, as it were, rethinking the relation between presence and absence. What Gellius doesn’t mention here, though it is hard to get around, is that the word amaror, in fact, has a specific philosophical resonance in De rerum natura—one that inextricably links this problem of literary borrowing to a problem of philosophical transmission. At the start of book 4, Lucretius had already used the figure of wormwood sharply to describe his philosophical project, linking the bitter substance (amarum) to the harshness of Epicurus’s wisdom—a bitterness, he said, that could be assuaged by honey applied to the rim of the medicinal cup: nam veluti pueris absinthia taetra medentes cum dare conantur, prius oras pocula circum contingunt mellis dulci flavoque liquore, ut puerorum aetas improvida ludificetur 45. Gellius, Noctes Atticae 1.21.5– 6: “Non enim primus finxit hoc verbum Vergilius insolenter, sed in carminibus Lucreti invento usus est, non aspernatus auctoritatem poetae ingenio et facundia praecellentis. Verba ex IV. Lucreti haec sunt: ‘dilutaque contra / cum tuimur misceri absinthia, tangit amaror.’ ” Gellius is citing Lucretius, DRN 4.223–24. Servius makes the same connection between Virgil and Lucretius in his commentary at Commentarii in Virgilium 2:247.
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labrorum tenus, interea perpotet amarum absinthi laticem deceptaque non capiatur, sed potius tali pacto recreata valescat, sic ego nunc, quoniam haec ratio plerumque videtur tristior esse quibus non est tractata, retroque vulgus abhorret ab hac, volui tibi suaviloquenti carmine Pierio rationem exponere nostram et quasi musaeo dulci contingere melle. [But as with children, when their physicians try to administer rank wormwood, they first touch the rim of the cups all about with the sweet yellow fluid of honey, that unthinking childhood may be deluded as far as the lips and meanwhile that they may drink up the bitter juice of wormwood, and though beguiled be not betrayed, but rather by such means be restored and regain health, so now do I: since this doctrine commonly seems somewhat harsh to those who have not used it, and the people shrink back from it, I have chosen to set forth my doctrine to you in sweet-speaking Pierian song, and as it were to touch it with the Muses’ delicious honey.]
Petrarch might have come across this passage among the scattered fragments of Quintilian, or in the letters of Jerome, where the good Christian had used it to warn his friend against being duped by the seductions of heretical writings. For Jerome, the honey on the rim of the cup was disguising a bitter poison. In the larger context, Virgil’s borrowing of amaror poses a question of what exactly of this “bitterness” lingers. Is it possible to touch Lucretius—in this case, a single word from the poet—without being infected by his philosophy? Virgil himself gives us something like an answer in the very lines in question: “But the taste will tell its tale full plainly [indicium faciet manifestus], and with its bitter [amaro] flavour will distort the testers’ soured mouths.” We might 46. Lucretius, DRN 4.11–22. 47. Quintilian, Institutio oratorio 1:372–73; Jerome, Epistle 133.3, in Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum 56:246. On the history and reception of this topos, see esp. Prosperi, Di soavi licor gli orli del vaso, chap. 1. 48. Virgil, Georgics 2.246–47: “At sapor indicium faciet manifestus et ora / tristia temptantum sensu torquebit amaro.” Macrobius cites the same comparison at Sat. 6.1.47; trans. Davies, 393; ed. Willis, 354.
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recall here that Petrarch himself had pointedly used the Lucretian word amaror to describe the “bitter sweetness” of rereading Virgil after the death of Laura. Petrarch, as we have seen, was particularly sensitive to the possibility of this kind of contamination in his letter to Socrates, where the matter of literary style had become mixed up with a troubling Epicurean idea of the world. One of the problems was trying to understand the nature of an invisible disaster, a disaster the very mechanism of which was hidden. “Yet, whatever the causes [of the plague] may be, however much you conceal them,” Petrarch addressed God again, “the effects are most visible.” How does one picture the nature of an influence, whether God’s or the plague’s, that is invisible and seemingly everywhere? Petrarch may have found one answer to this question close to home in the learned commentary by Servius that he had before his eyes when he read Virgil. I am thinking now of Servius’s response to a wellknown passage in the Georgics in which the poet explains how the presence of God “pervades all things [ire per omnia].” In Servius’s words: “In proving this by like things, [Virgil] follows Lucretius, who says that the things which are not able to be tested for themselves, must be proven by comparisons: for he teaches that the wind is corporeal, which we are not able to see or possess, but which he proves is like water, which is evidently corporeal.” At first glance, the connection that Servius is draw49. In Rime 215, Petrarch also uses the figure of the embittered honey and sweetened wormwood to describe Laura’s effect on him, possibly suggesting another Lucretian echo: “Et non so che nelli occhi che ’n un punto / po far chiara la notte, oscuro il giorno, / e ’l mel amaro, et addolcir l’assenzio” (And I know not what in her eyes, which in an instant can make bright the night, darken the day, embitter honey, and sweeten wormwood) (Petrarch, Petrarch’s Lyric Poetry, 370–71). 50. Petrarch, Fam. 8.7.19; trans. Bernardo, 1:418; ed. Rossi, 2:178: “Ceterum quecunque sint causae, quamlibet abditae, effectus apertissimi sunt.” 51. Virgil, Georgics 4.219–22: “His quidam signis atque haec exempla secuti / esse apibus partem divinae mentis et haustus / aetherios dixere; deum namque ire per omnia, / terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum” (Led by such tokens and such instances, some have taught that the bees have received a share of the divine intelligence, and a draught of heavenly ether; for God, they saw, pervades all things, earth and sea’s expanse and heaven’s depth). 52. Servius, Commentarii in Virgilium 2:295: “Ut autem hoc exemplis, id est, rebus similibus comprobaret, Lucretium secutus est: qui dicit ea quae inter se pro-
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ing here makes good sense. Both Virgil and Lucretius are using analogies to deal with how to perceive invisible things—in one instance, the nature of God, in the other, the wind. In his commentary, however, Servius forgets one crucial detail. The analogy between wind and water is, in fact, only one part of Lucretius’s own master analogy, which moves the reader through various levels of perceptibility: the water is like the wind, he says, and the wind is like atoms, invisible but also embodied. Moreover, the proof that atoms are like the wind is swept through and drenched with examples of chance destruction that Lucretius deploys to argue against the idea that God is “in” everything. As Lactantius explained it in another passage Petrarch could have known, Epicurus “says that it is not the work of Providence [that governs the course of nature]. There are seeds flying about through the void, and when these have massed together at random among themselves, all things are born and grow.” When Servius (or his ancient source) appropriates a Lucretian mode of analogy making to explain the presence of the divine, he is strategically putting the destinatum back into a world of unseen atoms. It is no wonder Petrarch was so worried in the letter about both Virgil’s and his own relationship to Lucretius—a relationship that led bare non possumus, a similibus comprobanda: ventum namque docet esse corporalem, non quod eum tenere vel cernere possumus, sed quod eius similis atque aquae effectus est, quam corporalem esse manifestum est”; my translation. Cited and discussed in Setailoli, “Interpretazioni stoiche ed epicuree in Servio,” pt. 2, 37. Here Setaioli detects an “an unresolved shadow of doubt that crosses the great poem of Providence”; my translation. See also Delvigo, “Servio e la poesia della scienza.” 53. See Lucretius, DRN 1.277– 86: “Sunt igitur venti nimirum corpora caeca, / quae mare, quae terras, quae denique nubila caeli / verrunt ac subito vexantia turbine raptant; / nec ratione fluunt alia stragemque propagant / et cum mollis aquae fertur natura repente / flumine abundanti, quam largis imbribus auget / montibus ex altis magnus decursus aquai, / fragmina coniciens silvarum arbustaque tota, / nec validi possunt pontes venientis aquai / vim subitam tolerare” (Therefore undoubtedly there are unseen bodies of wind that sweep the sea, that sweep the earth, sweep the clouds of the sky also, beating them suddenly and catching them up in a hurricane; and they flow and deal devastation in the same way as water, which soft as it is, suddenly rolls in overwelling stream when a great deluge of water from the high mountains swells the flood with torrents of rain, dashing together wreckage of forests and whole trees, nor can strong bridges withstand the sudden force of the coming water). 54. Lactantius, Divine Institutes 3.17.21; trans. McDonald, 210.
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either to the idea of God’s pervasive presence in everything or to the invisible disaster of the plague. This could be one of the reasons that neither the plague nor Lucretius plays any significant role in Greene’s seminal account of Petrarch’s imitative technique (still our best account). Perhaps Greene was finally too sympathetic with Petrarch as “a persistent striver asserting his personal coherence and mastery” to see him as the “helpless pawn of Fortune whirled about by a ceaseless flux.” In the letter to Socrates, we might say that Petrarch is either demonstrating the effects of this “ceaseless flux” or is staging an uncontrolled encounter with the Epicurean poet in order to exert another level of mastery. With Petrarch it is hard to tell. In either case, when the Black Death cast its long shadow backward across the world of Virgil’s Georgics, the idea of a contagious transmission lent another poignant expression to Petrarch’s anxieties and ambivalence about mastering the world through texts. In the case of Lucretius, the need to render influence “below the surface” seems to emerge at least partially out of a desire to control the unseen. If it is true, as Charles Trinkaus once suggested, “that Petrarch understood classical philosophy better through Vergil and Horace than the philosophers he came to know,” the author’s subtle engagement with the philosophy of Epicureanism was also primarily a literary affair. Sensing the “bitter” strain of Lucretian influence in the honey of Virgil’s poetry, Petrarch would rediscover the figure of the Epicurean poet in himself. One might even call it Lucretius’s first Renaissance recovery.
Digesting Lucretius In total, about forty passages of De rerum natura were transported through the seas of late antiquity and the Middle Ages via the great leaky ship of the Saturnalia. As we have seen, many of the passages from Lucretius (particularly the ones that Petrarch copied out in his own hand in Virgil) can be found in a section of the Saturnalia where the author discusses whole parts of other poems that Virgil borrows— 55. Greene, Light in Troy, 109. Here Greene himself tellingly cites Lucretius as a source for Virgil in a key passage in the Georgics. 56. Trinkaus, Poet as Philosopher, 2.
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less moments of subtle transformation than glaring neon signs of imitation or theft. Presumably such passages would have presented Virgil’s ancient detractors with their most compelling evidence that he was a plagiarist who stole freely and extensively from his forebears. For the author of the Saturnalia, however, they represented something quite different: proof of the poet’s synthesizing powers, of an ability to render discordant elements into the body of a coherent whole. In turning our attention now to the context of these passages, we may begin to trace Petrarch’s anxiety about Lucretius in his letter to Socrates back to the latent tensions he found in Macrobius’s text. While attempting to capture something of Petrarch’s sensibility as a reader here, I want to explore, on the one hand, the way Virgil’s dramatic imitations of whole parts from Lucretius are explained by the Saturnalia’s logic of reading and, on the other, the way these imitations figure the very limits of that logic. Petrarch, whose love for Virgil was perhaps rivaled only by his love for Laura, could have found much to delight him in the garrulous pages of the Saturnalia and had an unusually developed sense of its peculiar jocus, or wit, as well as its serious learning. More than a mere collection of trivia (as the text is still sometimes understood), the Saturnalia is a sustained series of dialogues in the tradition of philosophical banter and dialectical quibbling made famous by Plato’s banquet of love. For 57. For example, in a letter addressed to the ghost of Homer (Fam. 24.12.18– 19), Petrarch refers directly to Macrobius’s discussion of Virgil’s literary borrowing: “Tu qui maiorem victoremque non metuis, imitatores equanimis fer; quanquam et de victoria inter te et eum de quo multa quereris Virgilium, in libris Saturnalium magna lis pendeat. . . . Que tamen ex ordine ipsis in Saturnalibus scripta sunt, quamvis hoc loco ille suus iocus innotuerit” (ed. Rossi, 4:257–58) (You who fear not that anyone be greater than you or overtake you, bear your imitators with patience, even though in the Saturnalia there is the unsettled controversy on the question of superiority between yourself and the one about whom you most complain. . . . The main points are discussed in order in the Saturnalia along with his witty report [trans. Bernardo, 3:345]). 58. On the dating of Macrobius, see the seminal piece by Cameron, “Date and Identity of Macrobius.” In Last Pagans of Rome, 243, Cameron has revised the date of Macrobius’s fictional literary gathering (from 384 to 382) but has maintained his essential position. As Cameron has argued, the Saturnalia represents a nostalgic, literary paganism that few Christians would have seen as a genuine threat to their faith.
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a large part of this long dinner party, the topic of conversation is Virgil—the poet’s use of ancient astronomy, his reliance on the example of Homer, his borrowings from earlier Latin authors, and his secondhand imitation of poets who had previously sipped from the fountain of the Greeks. There was, as one might imagine, a lot to say. For Macrobius, all of this learned talk served a clear didactic function—as he explained it, to teach his son and to pass on knowledge that was already being forgotten, since “our generation has deserted . . . all our old literature.” As Alan Cameron has argued, the dialogue was put together in or around AD 430, a moment of literary nostalgia more or less fifty years after the date of its literary fiction—not a pagan machine de guerre, as historians once argued, but a backward-looking antiquarian reflection on the idea of a classical tradition itself. The various figures attending this learned gathering on the feast of the Saturnalia (from which the text borrows its name) were not Macrobius’s immediate contemporaries, but the great pagans of a previous generation who had all since died and who were chosen to reflect their associations to the author’s own living circle in the early fifth century. In this sense, the encyclopedic discussion of Virgil’s poetry by well-connected ghosts was not merely the occasion for displays of erudition, but also embodied and reflected the central aims of the Saturnalia and its author—the conservation of a once-shining literary inheritance that was now giving off the slight glow of decaying wood. Lucretius’s own guest appearance in the Saturnalia, along with the appearances of Homer, Ennius, and others, was part of Macrobius’s exhaustive documentation of Virgil’s literary debts—an index of the poet’s own careful preservation of his sources, which could serve as a kind of working model. Very little in Macrobius’s text was original in 59. Macrobius, Sat. 6.9.9; trans. Davies, 438; ed. Willis, 394: “Bene, inquit Servius: haec tibi quaestio nata est ex incuria veteris lectionis. Nam quia seculum nostrum ab Ennio et omni bibliotheca vetere descivit, multa ignoramus, quae non laterent, si veterum lectio nobis esset familiaris.” 60. On the Saturnalia as a machine de guerre, see Türk, “Les ‘Saturnales’ de Macrobe,” 348. 61. On the history and function of the late-antique grammarian, see esp. Kaster, Guardians of Language.
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our sense of the word. Macrobius, in fact, had absorbed most if not all of this literary criticism from more ancient sources that are now almost entirely lost to us. Many of these critics were explicitly concerned with catching the poet in flagrante delicto, which in this case means stealing from other poets. As Donatus reminds us in his Life of Virgil, the poet “never lacked disparaging critics.” Macrobius was well aware of this tradition and frequently exploited it with a certain touch of wit. Indeed, one of Macrobius’s main interlocutors even quipped that by drawing attention to the ways Virgil had borrowed from other writers, he was providing his enemies with ammunition—making their nasty arguments for them. The punch line of the joke, of course, was that the author of the Saturnalia was already assuming the negative arguments of Virgil’s disgruntled or jealous readers, stealing their examples and wittily playing their own literary evidence against them. In rehashing the famous loci where Virgil borrowed from other ancient writers—sometimes stealing from the writings of Virgil’s worst detractors—Macrobius was ingeniously making a virtue of what others had perceived as a sin. He was also working out the logic of his own text, redirecting the barbs of this ancient tradition of criticism toward a vision of intellectual community. In the course of the dialogue, another of the guests sums up the idea: “But if all poets and other writers are allowed to act among themselves in this way, as partners holding in common, what right has anyone to accuse Vergil of dishonesty, if he has borrowed from his predecessors to embellish his poems?” The character of Albinus here describes a shift in values that epitomizes the general spirit of the text—a shift not only that Macrobius’s interlocutor explains, but also that the text enacts as a matter of instruction. 62. See Aelius Donatus, Vita Vergili 43, in Ziolkowski and Putnam, Virgilian Tradition, 186: “Obtrectatores Vergilio numquam defuerunt.” This “Life of Virgil” is sometimes attributed to Suetonius. 63. See Macrobius, Sat. 6.1.2; trans. Davies, 385; ed. Willis, 346. 64. Jocelyn, “Ancient Scholarship, Part 1,” 285–86. 65. Macrobius, Sat. 6.1.5; trans. Davies, 386; ed. Willis, 347: “Quod si haec societas et rerum communio poetis scriptoribusque omnibus inter se exercenda concessa est, quis fraudi Virgilio vortat, si ad excolendum se quaedam ab antiquioribus mutuatus sit?”
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Throughout the pages of the Saturnalia, as Robert Kaster has observed, Macrobius consciously attempts to eschew the idea of poetic imitation as a form of competitive rivalry, offering in its place a “common” inheritance secured by and reflected in the grammarian’s virtues of modesty and diligence—virtues the author shares with the poet, or at least aspires to. In this idealizing vision, Virgil is held up as the gleaming star in an ancient firmament and also made transparent to a universal scheme of linguistic and cultural evolution. All the sources the poet borrows from—all the dissonances he tames—are woven into a universal fabric that represents the very fabric of tradition itself. In putting together the Saturnalia, Macrobius sought to embody this idea of intellectual harmony in the material organization of his own text, appropriating the synthesizing powers of the poet and in so doing modeling them himself. In the preface, he draws upon the language of Seneca’s eighty-fourth epistle almost verbatim, comparing his text to the work of bees digesting pollen, the happy blending of different flavors, the absorption of various foods by the stomach, the sound of a choir composed harmoniously of different voices, and, with his own flourish, the mixing of different scents to form the body of a perfume. All these images refer us back to an ordered world beyond the threshold of perception, to the mysterious processes of intellectual assimilation by which unlike elements are combined in one “invisible event.” For Macrobius, this idea of assimilation takes place on every scale—from the smallest particles combining after digestion to the organization of limbs in a body: Moreover, things worth remembering have not been heaped together in confusion, but a variety of subjects of different authorship and divers dates have been arranged to form, so to speak, a body, in such a way that the notes which I had made without plan or order, as aids to memory, came together like the parts of a coherent whole. 66. Kaster, “Macrobius and Servius,” 232. 67. See Macrobius, Sat. 1.1.6–9; trans. Davies, 27; ed. Willis, 2–3. 68. “Seneca’s analogies . . . may have had such an extraordinarily long life because he is tactful enough to leave a space for an invisible event” (Greene, Light in Troy, 74). 69. Macrobius, Sat. 1.1.3; trans. Davies, 26; ed. Willis, 2: “Nec indigeste tamquam in acervum congessimus digna memoratu: sed variarum rerum disparilitas, aucto-
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As Macrobius had borrowed his bees from Seneca, here he is borrowing the image of disordered notes from Gellius’s Noctes Atticae, though once again he is being sly about it. Indeed, whereas Gellius had said that his own book was purposefully disordered and random “to divert and stimulate the mind,” Macrobius makes one minor change, turning a heap of textual confusion into a coherent and organized whole. The result is an idea of the work that resembles Plato’s vision of discourse as a harmonious symmetry of the limbs in the Phaedrus. As the philosopher imagined it there: “Every discourse must be organized, like a living creature, with a body of its own, as it were, so as not to be headless or footless, but to have a middle and members, composed in fitting relation to each other and to the whole.” As I mentioned earlier, these images of coherence and integration were for Macrobius descriptive of and modeled on Virgil’s own synthetic practice in his poetry. In reflecting the poet in this way, the author invites the readers of the Saturnalia to engage in a kind of circular logic by which the values of intellectual harmony and the common share are posited and then recognized and affirmed, as in a mirror. This ribus diversa confusa temporibus, ita in quoddam digesta corpus est, ut quae indistincte atque promiscue ad subsidium memoriae annotaveramus in ordinem instar membrorum cohaerentia convenirent.” 70. Gellius, Noctae Atticae, preface, 16: “Ad oblectandum fovendumque animum.” 71. Plato, Phaedrus 264c. If Macrobius did not have access to the Platonic dialogue, he could have found a similar description in Cicero, De officiis 1.28.98: “Ut enim pulchritudo corporis apta compositione membrorum movet oculos et delectat hoc ipso, quod inter se omnes partes cum quodam lepore consentiunt, sic hoc decorum, quod elucet in vita, movet approbationem eorum, quibuscum vivitur, ordine et constantia et moderatione dictorum omnium atque factorum” (For, as physical beauty with harmonious symmetry of the limbs engages the attention and delights the eye, for the very reason that all the parts combine in harmony and grace, so this propriety, which shines out in our conduct, engages the approbation of our fellowmen by the order, consistency, and self-control it imposes upon every word and deed). See also Pseudo-Cicero, Rhetorica ad Herennium 4.45: “Huic exemplum satis idoneum subici non potuit, propterea quod hic locus non est a tota causa separatus sicuti membrum aliquod, sed tamquam sanguis perfusus est per totum corpus orationis” (I have been unable to subjoin a quite appropriate example of the figure [commoratio], because this topic is not isolated from the whole cause like some limb, but like blood is spread through the whole body of the discourse).
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drama of assimilation played out in a number of ways in the Saturnalia, though especially in the author’s account of how Virgil absorbed and reconciled various literary sources into the body of his own poetry. The humanist and poet Basinio Basini (1425–1457) no doubt had something like this in mind when he adapted the figure of the integral body to describe the difficulty of translating Homer into Latin and Virgil’s own role as a “translator”: “Therefore, Virgil, who was no religious translator, as they say, re-ordered the parts [of Homer], changing the themes around; he took many parts and left many by design, which, as if they were all his verses, he formed into the well-connected members of a single body.” Basini here demonstrates exactly the kind of blurring that the Saturnalia encourages and exemplifies. As he himself adapts the language of Macrobius’s preface and its ancient sources, the critic, the translator, and the poet merge in the mind of the reader. For Macrobius, Virgil’s ability to reconcile and absorb all kinds of dissonance was modeled on nature itself. In fact, the poet imitates nature so closely in his technique that his poetry might even be described as an extension of it. In a particularly rich passage from the Saturnalia, one of the speakers goes so far as to suggest that the harmony of literary styles in Virgil’s poetry mirrors the harmonious construction of the universe and even approaches the work of a divine creator: You see—do you not?—that the use of all these varied styles is a distinctive characteristic of Vergil’s language. Indeed, I think that it was not without a kind of foreknowledge that he was preparing himself to serve as a model for all, that he intentionally blended his styles, acting with a prescience born of a disposition divine rather than mortal. And 72. Basini, Le poesie liriche, 122–23: “Ergo / Virgilius partes aliena in parte reponit, / Argumenta locis mutans, non fidus, ut aiunt, / Interpres; multas rapuit multasque reliquit / Consulto partis, quas, ut sua cuncta, redegit / Carmina in unius bene iunctos corporis artus.” Cited and translated in Sowerby, “Early Humanist Failure (II),” 166–67. 73. “This is a nature recreated by the grace of intertextuality, of learned allusion: although Macrobius recommended the imitation of nature, he does not draw his inspiration any less from Virgil” (Lecompte, La chaîne d’or des poètes, 359; my translation).
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thus it was that with the universal mother, Nature, for his only guide he wove the pattern of his work—just as in music different sounds are combined to form a single harmony. For in fact, if you look closely into the nature of the universe, you will find a striking resemblance between the handiwork of the divine craftsman and that of our poet. Thus, just as Vergil’s language is perfectly adapted to every kind of character, being now concise, now copious, now dry, now ornate, and now a combination of all these qualities, sometimes flowing smoothly or at other times raging like a torrent; so it is with the earth itself, for here it is rich with crops and meadows, there rough with forests and crags, here you have dry sand, here, again, flowing streams, and parts lie open to the boundless sea.
Writing loosely in the tradition of Plato’s Timaeus, Macrobius asks us to understand the ways in which Virgil’s poems reconcile competing, discordant elements—the elements of different literary styles, but also presumably the influences of other poets, such as Homer, whose swirling chaos Virgil absorbs and transforms into his own body. As God had created variety, so too Virgil was a poet of variety—another creator of a world or literary kosmos in which “good” style could be equated with natural order and “bad” style might be described as a disaster not easily assimilated into the Providential scheme. It is against the background of this Platonizing vision that the presence of Lucretius in the Saturnalia comes into high relief. If, as Macrobius claims, Virgilian poetry was a kind of engine that resolved all dissonance, a reflection of the divinely ordered universe itself, the passages from Lucretius, such as the ones concerning the plague that Petrarch 74. Macrobius, Sat. 5.1.18– 19; trans. Davies, 285; ed. Willis, 243: “Videsne eloquentiam omni varietate distinctam? quam quidem mihi videtur Virgilius non sine quodam praesagio quo se omnium profectibus praeparabat de industria permiscuisse, idque non mortali sed divino ingenio praevidisse: atque adeo non alium ducem secutus quam ipsam rerum omnium matrem naturam hanc praetexuit velut in musica concordiam dissonorum. Quippe si mundum ipsum diligenter inspicias, magnam similitudinem divini illius et huius poetici operis invenies. Nam qualiter eloquentia Maronis ad omnium mores integra est, nunc brevis nunc copiosa nunc sicca nunc florida nunc simul omnia, interdum lenis aut torrens: sic terra ipsa hic laeta segetibus et pratis ibi silvis et rupibus hispida, his sicca arenis hic irrigua fontibus, pars vasta aperitur mari.”
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copied out in his margins, pose another question about the “nature” of the poet’s literary practice and about his intentions. The first comparison in the section that concerns Virgil’s borrowing of whole passages from other poets takes the form of a contest, awkwardly confusing the question of poetic debt with a slightly trickier question of poetic agon. As Macrobius shows, Virgil’s own claim for originality was lifted wholesale from the author of De rerum natura: virgil: nec sum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere magnum quam sit, et angustis hunc addere rebus honorem. sed me Parnasi deserta per ardua dulcis raptat amor: iuvat ire iugis qua nulla priorum Castaliam molli devertitur orbita clivo. lucretius: nec me animi fallit quam sint obscura; sed acri percussit thyrso laudis spes magna meum cor, et simul incussit suavem mi in pectus amorem Musarum: quo nunc instinctus mente vigenti, avia Pieridum peragro loca nullius ante trita solo. [virgil: “Nor am I in any doubt in my mind how great a task it is to triumph here with words and thus add dignity to a theme so slight. But a sweet desire hurries me along the lonely steeps of Parnassus, and it is my pleasure to traverse ridges where no forerunners’ track turns aside down a gentle slope to Castalia.” lucretius: “Nor do I fail to see in my mind how dark the theme is: but high hope of praise has smitten my heart with a magic wand and therewith has struck into my breast a sweet love of the Muses. This is the love which has inspired me now to traverse in eager thought the lonely haunts of the Pierides, never before trodden by the foot of man.”]
This first instance of Virgil’s imitation of whole sections from Lucretius is at once an homage to a literary predecessor and, if we take Macrobius’s ideal of verecundia (modesty) seriously, a dangerous flirtation 75. Macrobius, Sat. 6.2.1; trans. Davies, 398; ed. Willis, 357. Macrobius is citing Virgil, Georgics 3.289–93, and Lucretius, DRN 1.922–27, respectively.
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with exactly the kind of poetic values that the Saturnalia seeks to replace with an appeal to cooperation and intellectual community. Virgil stares into the mirror of Lucretius, but what does he see? Has the Augustan poet yielded to a negative model of rivalry—been tempted into competition—or has he instead managed to master and assimilate the influence of the other and make conventional a claim for originality? The comparison raises the question even as it attempts to subdue or control it—an irony that an author who liked to invert the meaning of his sources could hardly have missed. Certainly Petrarch himself didn’t miss it. When, later, he rehearsed the same set of passages in his discussion of his own originality, he couldn’t help but elicit the irony in Macrobius and make a kind of serious joke: “Nor am I like Lucretius: ‘Alone do I wander over the remote pathways of the Muses, previously trodden by no man’; nor like Virgil: ‘I love to climb gentle slopes to the heights where never had earlier footsteps gone to the Castalian fount.’ ” So much for the path’s being untrodden. Unlike Petrarch, modern readers of late antiquity generally have been loath to recognize this kind of irony in such comparisons. Henri Marrou, for example, once described the “psychological atomism” of the late-antique grammarian, who used his myopic vision to read a text word for word without any sense of a larger meaning or significance. For someone like Servius, he argued, the concentration was on verbal effects and very little else. Similarly, Kaster has argued for a kind of reader for whom thematic and structural forms of literary imitation had virtually no meaning; even “if the idea of such imitation were explained to Macrobius, he would not have been much impressed.” The problem is further complicated by the arrangement of passages in this sec76. This fits nicely into the way that Jocelyn has described this section of the Sat., the sources for which he places “in the earliest period of Virgilian scholarship when, through the efforts of Horace and others, the reputation of the republican poets had sunk so low that a modern poet could be smeared by the accusation of imitating them” (Jocelyn, “Ancient Scholarship, Part 1,” 289). 77. Petrarch, Fam. 22.2.19; trans. Bernardo, 3:214; ed. Rossi, 4:107: “Nec cum Lucretio, ‘Avia Pyeridum perago loca nullius ante Trita solo’; nec cum Virgilio: ‘. . . Iuvat ire iugis qua nulla priorum / Castaliam molli divertitur orbita clivo.’ ” 78. Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique, 25–26. 79. Kaster, “Macrobius and Servius,” 233–34.
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tion, which, if we believe H. D. Jocelyn, was “established either through chance or through the agency of a plagiarist who deliberately obscured his source by arranging the parallelisms in such a way.” In other words, it is difficult, maybe even impossible, to read anything other than verbal effects when the passages themselves are taken out of context and arranged in no easily discernible order. However, meanings can emerge outside of the grammarian’s myopic gaze; associations can take shape extra destinatum and have a material history all their own. In this case, the parallel passages from Lucretius and Virgil in the Saturnalia tend to generate (or preserve) a second order of meaning perhaps even in spite of Macrobius’s intentions, at least as Kaster and the others have described them. Remembering Macrobius’s idea of Virgil’s divinely ordered poem, we might take, for example, this loaded set of passages, which explicitly concerns the formation of the universe: virgil: Namque canebat uti magnum per inane coacta semina terrarumque animaeque marisque fuissent, et liquidi simul ignis, ut his exordia primis omnia et ipse tener mundi concreverit orbis: tum durare solum, et discludere Nerea ponto coeperit, et rerum paulatim sumere formas, iamque novum terrae stupeant lucescere solem. lucretius in quinto, ubi de confusione orbis ante hunc statum loquitur: His neque tum solis rota cerni lumine claro altivolans poterat, neque magni sidera mundi; nec mare nec caelum, nec denique terra nec aer, nec similis nostris rebus res ulla videri. sed nova tempestas quaedam molesque coorta. 80. Jocelyn, “Ancient Scholarship, Part 2,” 135. 81. The friction between Lucretius and Virgil that I am describing in Macrobius has been taken up in our own time by such scholars as Philip R. Hardie and Monica Gale. See esp. Hardie, Virgil’s “Aeneid,” chap. 5; and Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things.
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diffugere inde loci partes coepere, paresque cum paribus iungi res et discludere mundum, membraque dividere et magnas disponere partes. [virgil: “For he sang how through the great void had been massed together the seeds of earth and air and sea and of liquid fire withal, how from these elements all beginnings and the world’s young orb itself grew into shape, how then the earth began to harden and to shut apart Nereus in the sea and little by little to take on the forms of things; and now in amazement the lands see the new sun shining.” lucretius (speaking of the chaos which preceded the present state of the universe) says: “Then, at that time, neither could the sun’s disk be discerned flying on high with its brilliant light, nor the stars of the great firmament nor sea nor sky, nay, nor earth nor air, nor could anything be seen like to the things we know but a certain strange and stormy disturbance and a conglomerate mass. Therefrom the parts began to fly asunder and things to be joined, like with like, and to shut apart the universe and to apportion its members and to arrange its mighty parts.”]
The comparison here is made presumably on the basis of the poet’s style, but because the passages themselves deal so explicitly with the matter of cosmogony, as Macrobius points out, it becomes difficult to quarantine the philosophical questions that underlie the matter of imitation. As Boccaccio put it later in the fourteenth century: “For who . . . will be so foolish and idiotic that, when reading in the Bucolics of Virgil: ‘For he sang how, through the great void [seeds] were thrust together’ . . . [he] would not see clearly that Virgil was a philosopher.” When Servius, in his commentary, glossed the same passage from Silenus’s inspired song, he also linked the lines explicitly to an Epicurean 82. Macrobius, Sat. 6.2.22–23; trans. Davies, 403; ed. Willis, 362–63. Macrobius is citing Virgil, Eclogues 6.31–37, and Lucretius, DRN 5.432–39, respectively. I have followed the ordering of the lines from Lucretius in the Saturnalia, which departs from the Oxford text. 83. Boccaccio, Genealogie deorum gentilium libri 2:710: “Quis enim . . . tam demens tamque vecors erit, qui, legens in Buccolicis Virgilii: ‘Namque canebat uti magnum per inane coacta’ . . . non videat liquido Virgilium fuisse phylosophum.” The translation follows Ziolkowski and Putnam, Virgilian Tradition, 467.
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philosophical position, even remembering the name of Virgil’s Epicurean teacher, Siro, with whom he is said to have studied as a young man in Naples. Servius claims that in this case Virgil was speaking the wisdom of his old philosophical teacher, “almost under the guise of Silenus.” In a text that is so much about Virgil, on the one hand, and about the transmission of ancient wisdom from an earlier generation to a later one, on the other, the question of Virgil’s own Epicurean education seems relevant, though Macrobius never mentions it explicitly. 84. As the story goes, the young Virgil supposedly gave up traditional forms of education (including poetry) to pursue his study with the Epicurean Siro. In a group of poems traditionally ascribed as Virgil’s juvenilia, the author writes fondly of his teacher as he bids farewell to the world: “Nos ad beatos vela mittimus portus, / magni petentes docta dicta Sironis, / vitamque ab omni vindicabimus cura” (We are setting sail for blissful havens, in quest of noble Siro’s learned lore, and will free our life from all worries) (Catalepton 5.8–10). In another poem that is part of the same group, the author writes nostalgically of that “little villa, once Siro’s” (villula, quae Sironis eras), which he supposedly purchased for himself later on (Catalepton 8.8). Translations of the Catalepton follow the Appendix Vergiliana in Fairclough’s Loeb edition. Discussed in Armstrong, Fish, Johnston, and Skinner, Vergil, Philodemus, and the Augustans, 2. Pierre Boyancé called these poems from the Catalepton “the most precious document for Virgil’s Epicureanism” (Boyancé, “Virgile et l’epicurisme,” cited in ibid., 33). In recent years, the story of Virgil’s early interest in Epicureanism has gained some new weight in light of a carbonized papyrus recovered from Herculaneum that displays Virgil’s name among the dedicatees of a text by the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus. See in general Armstrong, Fish, Johnston, and Skinner, Vergil, Philodemus, and the Augustans; Gigante, Philodemus in Italy; and Gigante and Capasso, “Il ritorno di Virgilio a Ercolano.” 85. Servius, Commentarii in Virgilium 133: “Et quasi sub persona Sileni Sironem inducit loquentem.” Like so many things in Servius’s commentary, this was probably not original. On Servius’s Epicurean glosses, see Setailoli, “Interpretazioni stoiche ed epicuree in Servio,” pts. 1 and 2; and Delvigo, “Servio e la poesia della scienza.” 86. Macrobius shows little interest in the matter of the poet’s biography overall, which may have something to do with his desire to pass over the usual problems of the grammarians. We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that a discussion of Virgil’s Epicureanism came into play in the now lost part of the text where the character Eustathius is meant to speak on the subject of Virgil’s borrowing from the Greek philosophers (part of the enormous lacuna between books 2 and 3 of the Saturnalia). Interestingly, at Sat. 6.7.15, Macrobius does flirt briefly with the question of Virgil’s debt to Epicurean philosophy: “Epicurus quoque simili modo maximam
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When he begins to demonstrate the poet’s literary reliance on the text of De rerum natura, however, the matter of Virgil’s Epicurean inheritance creeps in again, if silently. As Macrobius had suggested earlier with his natural description of the poet’s synthesizing powers, even the most aesthetic or literary questions concerning Virgil’s style may lead a reader to consider the structure of the world. And because we are dealing here not only with single words or phrases, but with whole passages, as Alieto Pieri has suggested, Macrobius’s comparisons bring us “by necessity” from matters of verbal formulae, clauses, and images to questions of content—in this case, philosophical content. Take, for example, these two passages from the same section of book 6 that we’ve been looking at so far. The first is Virgil’s own description of Jove from the Aeneid: tum pater omnipotens, rerum cui summa potestas, infit: eo dicente deum domus alta silescit, et tremefacta solo tellus, silet arduus aether. tum venti posuere, premit placida aequora pontus. [Then the almighty Father, to whom belongs supreme power over the world, begins; and, as he speaks, the lofty palace of the gods grows silent; the earth too grows silent, trembling from its foundations; hushed in the firmament on high; then the winds are laid, and the sea stills its waters into calm.] voluptatem privationem detractionemque omnis doloris definivit his verbis: ‘Oρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις.’ Eadem ratione idem Virgilius inamabilem dixit Stygiam paludem. Nam sicut inlaudatum κατὰ στέρησιν laudis, ita inamabilem per amoris στέρησιν detestatus est” (ed. Willis, 387) (Epicurus, too, in like manner defined the height of pleasure as the removal and withdrawal of all pain, in these words, “The measure of the greatness of pleasure is the removal of all that causes pain.” And it is on the same principle that Virgil has called the Stygian pool “unlovable”; for just as he has expressed his abhorrence of the “unpraised” by the negation of praise, so he has expressed his abhorrence of the “unlovable” by the negation of love [trans. Davies, 430]). Macrobius appears to have borrowed this discussion from Gellius, Noctes Atticae 2.6.12–15. I would like to thank Robert Kaster for helping me think through this set of problems. 87. Pieri, Lucrezio in Macrobio, 79. 88. Macrobius, Sat. 6.2.26; trans. Davies, 404; ed. Willis, 364. Macrobius is citing Virgil, Aeneid 10.100–103.
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Jove is clearly another god in control of his natural and rhetorical effects. The idea fits nicely into Macrobius’s views about the powers of Virgil’s poem and the Providential poem that is the world. Shortly after this passage, however, Macrobius will cite a fragment from Lucretius in another comparison that presents a radically different picture of nature and influence. These are the lines from Lucretius: sed tamen interdum magno quaesita labore, cum iam per terras frondent, atque omnia florent, aut nimiis torrens fervoribus aethereus sol, aut subiti perimunt imbres gelidaeque pruinae, flabraque ventorum violento turbine vexant. [But after all, at times, when things won with great labor put forth their leaves throughout the land and are all in bloom, either the sun in heaven, burning them with too much heat, or sudden rains and chill frosts destroy them, and blasts of winds with violent storms harass them.]
Lucretius here is giving us the bad news that the objects of our labor are subject to chance and contingency, to the whims of blind fortune and the flux of matter. For the Epicurean poet, the threat of bad weather was more evidence that we don’t live in a world controlled by Jove—or by any divine intelligence, for that matter. If we introduce the question of content, it is hard not to hear the dissonance or sense the conflict in the poetry of two opposing cosmologies when they are put into such close contact with one another. Tellingly, when Virgil imitates this passage from De rerum natura, he absorbs the natural violence that Lucretius describes back into the structure of a divine plan: “The great Father himself has willed that the path of husbandry should not be smooth.” Read back into the context of the Saturnalia, passages such as these unlock a number of thorny questions about the poet’s unwavering ability to restore a divine order to the Epicurean universe he inherited from his troubled model. The explosive clash of literary style and cosmology is perhaps nowhere more pressing, finally, than where Macrobius dis89. Macrobius, Sat. 6.2.29; trans. Davies, 404–5; ed. Willis, 364–65. Macrobius is citing Lucretius, DRN 5.213–17. 90. Virgil, Georgics 1.121–22: “Pater ipse colendi / haud facilem esse viam voluit.”
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cusses Lucretius’s description of the Athenian plague and Virgil’s alltoo-faithful imitation of it in the Georgics. Here again we find Macrobius’s grand ideals of intellectual and literary harmony encountering a vision of the world and its causes that is less than ideal. What, after all, does it mean to talk about the integral arrangement of limbs—the synthesis of orderly parts—in passages that deal with the ravages of the plague, the decomposition of physical bodies, and the threat of radical incoherence? As these comparisons unfold, Macrobius’s logic of assimilation labors under the weight of Lucretius’s descriptions, and the idea of an orderly body gives way to the image of an infected one: Multaque praeterea mortis tunc signa dabantur: perturbata animi mens in maerore metuque, triste supercilium, furiosus vultus et acer, sollicitae porro plenaeque sonoribus aures, creber spiritus aut ingens raroque coortus, sudorisque madens per collum splendidus umor, tenvia sputa, minuta, croci contacta colore, salsaque, per fauces rauca[s] vix edita tussi[s]. [And many another sign of death was then to be seen, a mind disordered in all this sorrow and fear, a gloomy brow, a mad and fierce look, ears also troubled and full of droning, quick pants or deep breaths rising at long intervals, dank sweat streaming and shining over the neck, fine thin spittle, salty and yellow in colour, expelled with an effort through the throat by hoarse coughing.]
Read together, the thirteen sets of passages that pertain to the plague represent in miniature a vivid picture of the reign of death that we find haunting Petrarch in his letter to Socrates: cities emptied of their people, the disgusting symptoms of contagion and decomposition, the failure of doctors in the face of the disease, and so on. “Since it would be long and tedious enough to quote the whole passage from each poet,” Macrobius says of the section concerning Virgil’s use of Lucretius’s plague, “I shall cite extracts, to show how closely the two accounts resemble one 91. On this problem, see esp. Butler, Matter of the Page, chap. 3. 92. Lucretius, DRN 6.1182–89. Cited in Macrobius, Sat. 6.2.11; trans. Davies, 400; ed. Willis, 359–60.
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another.” Or, again, as Lucretius had put it for his own arguments: “But for a keen-scented mind, these little tracks are enough to enable you to recognize the others for yourself.” We have already caught a glimpse of Petrarch’s sensitivity to the idea of Lucretius’s lingering presence in these passages from the Georgics. He wasn’t the only one to feel the tension generated by this intertextual relation. For readers across many centuries, how one interpreted the nature of Lucretius’s influence in Virgil has been closely connected to how one viewed the structure of the universe itself and the tone of Virgil’s poem as a whole. Writing her dissertation in the midst of World War II, for example, Herta Klepl argued that the threat of contamination in the Georgics overshadowed Virgil’s teleological view in the poem and was given a kind of “universal” significance. In the words of another critic: “Where is the pius poeta now?” Other readers saw the picture very differently, warding off the disastrous implications of the Lucretian plague. Answering this strain of pessimism, E. L. Harrison insisted that Virgil had placed the animal plague explicitly outside of Italy, literally outside the pastoral world of the Italian farmer and, at this point historically, outside the Roman Empire: a disaster properly quarantined. For him, it was impossible to imagine that Virgil had introduced any serious trouble into his cosmology. About four centuries earlier, the philosopher Peter Ramus had taken a similar position, explaining that Virgil had “implied the plague was sent by God to punish evil.” 93. Macrobius, Sat. 6.2.8; trans. Davies, 399–400; ed. Willis, 359: “Sed quatenus totum locum utriusque ponere satis longum est, excerpam aliqua ex quibus similitudo geminae descriptionis adpareat.” 94. Lucretius, DRN 1.400–401: “Verum animo satis haec vestigia parva sagaci / sunt, per quae possis cognoscere cetera tute.” 95. Klepl, Lucrez und Virgil, 73. Cited and translated in Harrison, “Noric Plague,” 28. 96. Wilkinson, Georgics of Virgil, 207 n. Cited in Harrison, “Noric Plague,” 27. 97. Harrison, “Noric Plague,” 23: “The view I shall be seeking to establish is that in presenting his plague account Vergil not only retained his usual orthodoxy, but actually offered the episode as a kind of working model of how Roman religion operated with regard to such disasters.” 98. Ramus, P. Vergilii Maronis Georgica, sig. R8: “Saevit [551]: Amplificatione poetica significatur pestem divinitus immissam ad ultionem malorum.” Cited and
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If we believe Marrou and Kaster, however, a reader such as Macrobius would not have been particularly interested or troubled by the insidious philosophical questions that were passed on through Virgil’s acts of literary borrowing. Had he discussed these passages in Macrobius, Basinio of Parma might have said that Virgil was merely rearranging the parts of Lucretius’s poem into the body of a coherent whole, absorbing and transforming the raw material into a larger comprehensive order. Earlier in the Saturnalia, Macrobius himself had emphasized the decidedly structural role of Virgil’s endings of various books in the Georgics, endings such as the description of the plague he said that the poet inserted “to refresh . . . the reader’s mind or ear.” This is one way of explaining the problem of Lucretius’s contagion. What Macrobius’s text preserves, however—maybe even unwittingly brings to the surface—is another possibility, one that would be activated again in the minds of later readers such as Petrarch, for whom the scent and sound of intellectual assimilation found its nightmare opposite in the “invisible event” of the plague. In the hands of such a reader, the threat of Lucretian disaster appears as an attack not only on the integrity of Virgil’s great Providential machine, but, by extension, on Macrobius’s own ideals of assimilation and community. As Petrarch came to know all too well, it was not easy to have a symposium during a time of plague. translated in Mack, “Ramus Reading,” 139. See my discussion of this passage and of Ramus’s use of Lucretius in “Art of Reading Earthquakes.” 99. Macrobius, Sat. 5.16.5; trans. Davies, 354–55; ed. Willis, 311: “In omnibus vero Georgicorum libris hoc idem summa cum elegantia fecit. Nam post praecepta, quae natura res dura est, ut legentis animum vel auditum novaret, singulos libros acciti extrinsecus argumenti interpositione conclusit, primum de signis tempestatum, de laudatione rusticae vitae secundum, et tertius desinit in pestilentiam pecorum, quarti finis est de Orpheo et Aristaeo non otiosa narratio” (He has certainly used this technique with consummate taste in all the Georgics, for, after his practical instructions, which naturally make hard reading, he has inserted at the end of each book a story drawn from some outside source, to refresh the reader’s mind or ear. Thus the first Book ends with an account of the signs which foretell the weather; the second, with an eulogy of country life; the third, with a description of a cattle plague; the fourth, with the by no means inapposite story of Orpheus and Aristaeus). 100. Petrarch, indeed, would learn this the hard way in 1348 when two of his surviving friends were attacked and killed by bandits on the way back from his home, where they had hoped to live together until their death (Fam. 1.9). His other friend,
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Having carefully studied Virgil’s reliance on the Lucretian plague in the margins of his manuscript copy, Petrarch clearly thought a good deal about what it meant to “digest” an influence, and about what it meant for an author such as Virgil or Macrobius to reproduce whole passages of another author. For whatever reason, however, the Macrobian or Senecan model of common property did not work in the same way for Petrarch, who was perhaps too deeply attuned to the ironies and discontinuities of the tradition to ignore them. As far as I know, Petrarch was the first to point out the latent irony in Macrobius’s use of Seneca’s famous bees: Macrobius in his Saturnalia reported not only the sense but the very words of Seneca so that to me at the very time he seemed to be following this advice in his reading and writing, he seemed to be disapproving of it by what he did. For he did not try to produce honey from the flowers culled from Seneca but instead produced them whole and in the very form in which he had found them on the stems.
By drawing our attention here to the conflict between Macrobius’s theory and practice, Petrarch registers the gulf of sensibility and intention that separates him from his late-antique forebear. Petrarch, we recall, spoke repeatedly of hiding or disguising his influences beneath the surface. Macrobius, on the other hand, was a man with his eyes trained securely on the poetry of Virgil (as he said Virgil’s were on Homer). He seemingly had nothing to hide. In showing how Macrobius was not doing what he said he was doing, Petrarch was cleverly laying the Socrates, to whom the letter is addressed, also fell silent, which naturally caused him no small anxiety: “Audio enim pestem illam anni alterius, que finita videbatur, rursum Rodani ripas invadere, unde utinam abesses!” (Fam. 8.9.27; ed. Rossi, 2:185) (For I hear that the plague of last year which seemed to have ended, is again invading the banks of the Rhone, and I certainly hope that you are not dead! [trans. Bernardo, 1:427]). 101. Petrarch, Fam. 1.8.3; trans. Bernardo, 1:41; ed. Rossi, 1:39: “Eius autem non sensum modo, sed verba Macrobius in Saturnalibus posuit; ut michi quidem uno eodemque tempore quod legendo simul ac scribendo probaverat, rebus ipsis improbare videretur; non enim flores apud Senecam lectos in favos vertere studuit, sed integros et quales in alienis ramis invenerat, protulit.” 102. George W. Pigman explains Macrobius’s practice nicely: “This coalescing is not the transformation of pollen into honey, in which the pollen loses its iden-
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ground for his own idea of imitation—much, indeed, as Macrobius before him had wittily used Seneca. He was also making another serious joke at the author’s expense. In a part of the same letter that is less often quoted, Petrarch went on to nurse the irony he found in the preface to the Saturnalia by demonstrating that even this was not original. As he put it with his own touch of Macrobian wit: “Although how can I say something another wrote is not mine, when Epicurus’s opinion, as recorded by Seneca himself, is that anything said well by anyone is our own? Macrobius must therefore not be blamed because he not only reported but actually transcribed a large part of one letter in the proem of his work.” A number of problems begin to emerge as Petrarch puts pressure on Macrobius, Seneca, and their apiaries, and the question of common property that is so central to the Saturnalia becomes entangled in a discussion of a philosophical inheritance. As he reminds us, the context of Seneca’s own appeal to the common share is an apology for the use of the sayings of Epicurus. As Seneca poses the question in the place that Petrarch has in mind: “Is there any reason why you should regard them as sayings of Epicurus and not common property? How many poets give forth ideas that have been uttered, or may be uttered, by philosophers!” Here the problem of literary and intellectual borrowing leads tity and becomes something else, but the redisposition of individual excerpts in an organized collection, a florilegium. Macrobius conceives of imitation as a type of redistributive reproduction; for him making something different means setting it in a new context” (Pigman, “Versions of Imitation,” 6). We might contrast Macrobius here to Aelius Donatus, who, according to his student Saint Jerome, once said: “Pereant qui ante nos nostra dixerent” (May those perish who have said our ideas before us). See Jerome, Commentarius in Ecclesiasten, in Migne, Patrologiae cursus completus, series latina (hereafter cited as PL) 23:390. 103. Petrarch, Fam. 1.8.3–4; trans. Bernardo, 1:41; ed. Rossi, 1:39–40: “Quanquam quid ego alienum aliquid dixerim, licet ab aliis elaboratum, cum Epycuri sententia sit ab eodem Seneca relata, quicquid ab ullo bene dictum est, non alienum esse sed nostrum? Non est itaque cur Macrobius culpandus sit, quod magnam epystole unius partem in prohemio operis illius non tam transtulit quam transcripsit.” 104. Seneca, Ad Lucilium epistulae morales 8.8: “Potest fieri, ut me interroges, quare ab Epicuro tam multa bene dicta referam potius quam nostrorum. Quid est tamen, quare tu istas Epicuri voces putes esse, non publicas? Quam multi poetae dicunt, quae philosophis aut dicta sunt aut dicenda!” At Epistle 12.11, Seneca makes a similar point about common property: “ ‘Epicurus,’ inquis, ‘dixit. Quid tibi cum
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us to consider the material that poets take from philosophers. The question is: could Seneca have avoided thinking of Lucretius or Virgil when he made this point—and in the context of thinking specifically about his own Epicurean inheritance? As Petrarch hints in drawing the connection, Seneca’s discussion of common property is particularly apt with respect to the question of assimilation. The philosopher suggests that one may borrow, pillage, and steal from another without being particularly indebted or, as it were, contaminated. Even the sayings of Epicurus may be rendered common property (though, ironically, Seneca keeps reminding us that they are Epicurean to begin with). We might compare this to the way Lucretius describes his own relationship to the “stuff ” of Epicurean philosophy. As Lucretius tells us, he too draws heavily from the example of his great master Epicurus, like a bee—though, unlike Seneca later, he is not interested in transforming the philosopher’s sayings into common property. More than “common,” the author of De rerum natura insists, Epicurus’s sayings are “golden”: tu pater es rerum inventor, tu patria nobis suppeditas praecepta, tuisque ex, inclute, chartis, floriferis ut apes in saltibus omnia libant, omnia nos itidem depascimur aurea dicta, aurea, perpetua semper dignissima vita. [You are the father, the discoverer of truths, you supply us with a father’s precepts, from your pages, illustrious man, as bees in the flowery glade feed on all your golden words [aurea dicta], your words of gold, ever most worthy of eternal life.]
This is, of course, a very different picture of intellectual debt from the one we get in Seneca, where everything worth thinking is held in comalieno?’ Quod verum est, meum est. Perseverabo Epicurum tibi ingerere, ut isti, qui in verba iurant, nec quid dicatur aestimant, sed a quo, sciant, quae optima sunt, esse communia” (“Epicurus,” you reply, “uttered these words; what are you doing with another’s property?” Any truth I maintain, is my own property. And I shall continue to heap quotations from Epicurus upon you, so that all persons who swear by the words of another, and put a value upon the speaker and not upon the thing spoken, may understand that the best ideas are common property). 105. Lucretius, DRN 3.9–13.
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mon, including the “golden sayings” of Epicurus. Lucretius, for one, is not exactly shy about being a follower of Epicurus or telling us where he gets his philosophy. What Petrarch was picking up on when he said that Macrobius was not following his own advice was a tension that was already present in the Saturnalia—a discordia that sometimes comes from a desire for too much concord. “For if the Saturnalia offers a vision of an ideal unity,” Kaster concedes, “it is a vision which exacts, as the price of that unity, an anxious defensiveness which underlies, and ultimately belies, the self-confident surface.” In the last book of the Saturnalia, Macrobius will lend a voice to any lingering doubts about the work of intellectual assimilation in the persona of Dysarius, a doctor and one of the text’s famous uninvited guests. The question is whether the body can assimilate a “variety of matter”—a question well suited to a dinner party. As the doctor explains: But the man who feeds on a number of different foods feels the effects of divers qualities, resulting from the different kinds of juice produced. There is no harmony among the fluids, seeing that they issue from a variety of matter, and the blood into which they are transformed by the agency of the liver is neither free-flowing nor pure, but they pass tumultuously into the veins. This is the source of a stream of diseases which have their origin in the discord of incompatible fluids.
For Dysarius, not all food eaten at the same time is absorbed equally; “some of it is digested more quickly and some more slowly, with the result that the sequence of the process is disarranged.” Dysarius here is, in fact, closely following the text of Plutarch, who went on in the Moralia to say that “when a number of divergent qualities of food are 106. Kaster, “Macrobius and Servius,” 239. 107. Macrobius, Sat. 7.4.11; trans. Davies, 458; ed. Willis, 410: “Qui autem multiplici cibo alitur diversas patitur qualitates ex diversitate sucorum: nec concordant humores ex materiae varietate nascentes, nec efficiunt liquidum purumve sanguinem, in quem iecoris ministerio vertuntur, et in venas cum tumultu suo transeunt. Hinc morborum scaturigo, qui ex repugnantium sibi humorum discordia nascuntur.” 108. Macrobius, Sat. 7.4.12; trans. Davies, 458; ed. Willis, 410: “Deinde quia non omnium quae esui sunt una natura est, non omnia simul coquuntur, sed alia celerius, tardius alia: et ita fit ut digestionum sequentium ordo turbetur.”
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united . . . they encounter each other prematurely and are destroyed. Like a mob of ill-assorted riff-raff in a community, these elements cannot easily establish unity and harmonious order among themselves, but each pulls in its own direction and will not come to terms with an alien kind.” This is decidedly not the harmonious vision of tradition that Macrobius proposes in the Saturnalia, and in fact, Macrobius might be said to be preempting the objections of his critics by putting Plutarch into the mouth of an uninvited guest. Dysarius ends his discourse with a winking gesture that not so subtly drives home its relevance to Macrobius’s text: “But at this point, I end my argument, for I should be sorry to be thought to be finding fault with this very banquet at which we find ourselves, since—sober though it is—we are enjoying nevertheless a variety of dishes.” In raising questions about the food at Macrobius’s party, Dysarius, I would suggest, is bringing us back implicitly to the question of Virgil’s own ability to absorb and reconcile passages such as the ones from Lucretius concerning the plague. If, indeed, as Macrobius said, variety or disorder can be digested and transformed into a coherent body, by the doctor’s account too much mixed matter can lead to serious indigestion and is “the source of a stream of diseases.”
Invisible Disasters In the course of his late nineteenth-century dissertation on the idea of movement in Botticelli, Aby Warburg drew upon an example from De rerum natura to prove that the painter had been talking to his friend Angelo Poliziano: “A passage in Poliziano’s Rusticus (a bucolic poem in Latin hexameters, written in 1483) shows that Poliziano not only knew 109. Plutarch, Moralia 661c. 110. Macrobius, Sat. 7.4.33; trans. Davies, 461; ed. Willis, 413: “Sed modum disputationi facio, ne videar hoc ipsum in quo sumus, licet sobrium sit, tamen, quia varium est, accusare convivium.” 111. Macrobius, Sat. 7.4.11; trans. Davies, 458; ed. Willis, 410: “Hinc morborum scaturrigo.” Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus 2.2.3: “We must therefore reject different varieties, which engender various mischiefs, such as a depraved habit of body and disorders of the stomach. . . . Antiphanes, the Delian physician, said that this variety of viands was the one cause of disease.”
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this passage in Lucretius but added to it almost exactly the same figures that are found in Botticelli’s painting. This alone would be enough to prove that Poliziano was Botticelli’s adviser for this as well as the former work.” In showing us exactly where he felt that the Renaissance poet had borrowed from Lucretius’s poem, Warburg was highlighting a persistent problem, for even though De rerum natura had been brought back into view more than fifty years earlier, it was still not easily “digested,” to borrow again the language of Macrobius and Seneca. When he writes, “this alone would be enough,” the art historian is in his own way reminding us that literary imitations of De rerum natura were still relatively rare in this period. And as he put it with a more casual authority later on, the verses of the Epicurean poet were “interpreted for [Botticelli], not by some monkish moralist, but by Poliziano.” But what did Poliziano make of the literary contagion we’ve been tracing so far? In what sense does the presence of Lucretius in Poliziano signal another kind of absence? In moving now from the worlds of Macrobius and Petrarch, I want to explore the afterlife of this figure of contagion in the mind of the Florentine poet and the ways it came to inform his own notions of literary history and poetic practice in light of Lucretius’s manuscript recovery in 1417. The poem Warburg has in mind, the Rusticus, was among only a handful of Greek and Latin compositions that Poliziano authorized for publication during his lifetime and part of a collection called the Silvae. The poem, supposedly written while Poliziano was staying in the suburbs of Florence, paints a vivid picture of the idyllic existence of the “countryman” or rural dweller. Like Petrarch, who had read the 112. Warburg, Renewal of Pagan Antiguity, 129–130; Gesammelte Schriften, 2:41– 42: “Aus einer Stelle in Polizians Rusticus (einem lateinischen bukolischen Gedicht in Hexametern, das er 1483 gedichtet hatte) ersieht man, daß Polizian diese Stelle des Lucrez nicht allein kannte, sondern sie fast mit denselben Figuren erweiterte, die sich auf den Bildern Botticellis finden. Diese Tatsache allein würde schon für den Beweis genügen, daß Polizian auch für das zweite Bild der Ratgebar Botticellis gewesen ist.” While E. H. Gombrich has contested the Lucretian source of the painting, Charles Dempsey has supported and enriched Warburg’s reading. See Gombrich, “Botticelli’s Mythologies,” and Dempsey, “Mercurius Ver.” 113. Warburg, Renewal of Pagan Antiquity, 585; Gesammelte Schriften, 2:47: “Den ihm Polizian, kein moralisierender Mönch, deutete.”
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Georgics almost religiously, keeping his own daily notes on the changes in the weather, the right temperature for planting, and the phases of the moon, Poliziano’s rural dweller sought to know the physical world around him so that he might better understand and control it: Ergo in consilium maria advocat aethera terras naturamque omnem vivitque auctoribus astris, cura deum, agricola atque animo praescita recenset et rerum eventus sensu praesagit acuto. [Thus the farmer, beloved of the gods, takes counsel with the seas, the air, the lands, and all of nature, and lives by the guidance of the stars and goes over in his mind what is known of the future with acute understanding.]
The entire poem is imbued with this air of confidence in the ability of man to read and decode the signs of nature as they make themselves known to him, unfolding as in a moving picture: “He observes a flash of lightning, thunder, and fleecy clouds in the heavens, the winter solstice—in a word, the whole year.” In addition to being a kind of poetic almanac full of useful information and a lesson on the poetry of Hesiod and Virgil, the poem was dedicated to Lorenzo de’ Medici, whose Golden Age ideology it celebrated in the countryman’s simplifying idea of the natural world, the causes of its phenomena, and its organic myths: a Providential vision of nature suffused with Neoplatonic undertones. To a student with an ear for the arte allusiva, however, Poliziano’s improvisational rhapsody on the bucolic life was anything but simplistic or simplifying. On the contrary, the poem was a virtuoso exercise illustrating the poet’s complex and dynamic vision of literary history, his rather terrifying erudition, and his taste for intellectual alchemy. As his rival, Paolo Cortesi, complained of the poet’s style: “It is unavoid114. Bishop, Petrarch and His World, 269–70. 115. Poliziano, Rusticus, lines 547–50. All citations and translations of the Silvae follow Fantazzi’s edition. 116. Poliziano, Rusticus, lines 502– 3: “Fulgores, tonitrus, inspersaque vellera caelo / brumalemque diem et totum semel aspicit annum.” 117. On Poliziano and his influence, see Grafton, Joseph Scaliger, vol. 1, chaps. 1–3; Godman, From Poliziano to Machiavelli, chaps. 1–3; Greene, Light in Troy, chap. 8; and, in general, Maïer, Ange Politien.
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able that various types of food digest together badly and that, as a result of the impure mixture of dissimilar types of speech, their words clash with one another.” Here again we hear the voice of Macrobius’s doctor echoing the ancient sources. This pluralism, of course, was precisely the effect that Poliziano was after. To read or, as it were, to hear the Rusticus was to enter a world of images drawn from Hesiod, Aratus, Lucretius, Virgil, and Pliny that were unexpectedly combined with details from the contemporary Florentine landscape; Poliziano was a master of both harmony and dissonance. In this sense, the Rusticus might be said to exemplify the very nature of the Silvae, a word Poliziano would define in his commentary on Statius as indigesta materia. By reworking this “raw material,” the poet sought to correct the literary biases of his contemporaries, to cast the idea of the classical tradition under the lamps of a shining new philology. Poliziano himself explained it nicely: “New reasonings produce new examples, and new examples require new modes of thought.” Having been recovered only in 1417, De rerum natura was a prime example—a thread that had to be carefully rewoven into the fabric of literary history, discovered where it had previously been ignored or unseen. Poliziano’s own interest in De rerum natura appears to have been first and foremost as a philologist. Such a poem was, among other things, a master class in the uses of old Latin and the invention of new 118. Cortesi to Poliziano, in DellaNeva, Ciceronian Controversies, 12– 13: “Fieri enim non potest quin varia ciborum genera male concoquantur, et quin ex tanta colluvione dissimillimi generis inter se verba collidantur.” 119. On Poliziano’s literary pluralism, see esp. Godman, From Poliziano to Machiavelli, chap. 2. As Godman notes: “The claims of modernity demanded a pluralism that opened up a new perspective, without limits or barriers, on Latin literature” (Godman, From Poliziano to Machiavelli, 51). On the history of Ciceronianism and Poliziano’s reaction against it, see Sabbadini, Storia del ciceronianismo; on his argument with Cortesi, see Greene, Light in Troy, 149–51. 120. As the notes to Francesco Bausi’s edition of the Silvae show, to read the Rusticus is to be profoundly disoriented in one’s knowledge of the classical tradition. 121. See Fantazzi’s introduction to Poliziano, Silvae, xi. 122. Poliziano, I detti piacevoli, no. 384 (p. 101): “Nuovi ragionamenti fanno nuovi casi: e nuovi casi vogliono nuovi modi.” Cited and translated in Greene, Light in Troy, 149. 123. On Poliziano’s interest in the text of Lucretius, see Pizzani, “Angelo Poliziano e il testo di Lucrezio.”
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words to compensate for what Lucretius described as the poverty of language. As the poet wrote: “Nor do I fail to understand that it is difficult to make clear the dark discoveries of the Greeks in Latin verses, especially since we have often to employ new words because of the poverty of language and the novelty of matters.” A scholar who “came to insist that only a critic who had mastered Greek literature could hope to deal competently with Latin” could well appreciate the ancient poet’s own transformation of the Greek poetic and philosophic traditions. More than merely a thesaurus of Epicurean philosophy (as it is still sometimes read), De rerum natura was, for such a reader as Poliziano, a poem about tradition and, moreover, a dynamic instrument for re-viewing the survival and transformation of a lost Greek wisdom through the Latin literary tradition. Like the doctus Lucretius, as Statius once called him, the author of the Rusticus was a maverick of generic manipulation and hybridity, a philosopher and historian of the Latin language, and a crucial intermediary between often conflicting cultural inheritances. Lucretius also spoke to Poliziano, the poet, as a literary example that could provide a different perspective on familiar conventions. “Let us enter new paths, virtually untrodden before, leaving behind those old and well-worn,” Poliziano wrote in his notes on Statius, invoking the words of Cicero with a touch of irony, as well as reminding us of Lucretius’s and Virgil’s own claims of blazing new ground. Slightly later in the same text, a passage from De rerum natura both provides a background for Poliziano’s own pluralistic model of literary practice and is a good example of it at work: “Since it is a very great fault to intend to imitate only one person, we shall not err if we place before us as 124. Lucretius, DRN 1.136– 39: “Nec me animi fallit Graiorum obscura reperta / difficile inlustrare Latinis versibus esse, / multa novis verbis praesertim cum sit agendum / propter egestatem linguae et rerum novitatem.” 125. Grafton, “On the Scholarship of Politian,” 172. 126. For a modern account of Lucretius’s use of Greek sources, see Sedley, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom. 127. See again Statius, Silvae 2.7.73: “Et docti furor arduus Lucreti.” 128. Poliziano, Oratio, 870: “Novas tamen quasique intactas vias ingrediamur, veteres tritasque relinquamus.” Cited, translated, and discussed in Godman, From Poliziano to Machiavelli, 40. See also Mengelkoch, “Mutability of Poetics,” 93.
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models Quintilian and Statius as well as Cicero and Virgil, if we take from everywhere what we can use, as in Lucretius, ‘just as the bees taste everything in the flowering pastures, we likewise feed on all Epicurus’ golden sayings.’ ” Practicing the literary promiscuity he preaches, Poliziano brings the problem of literary digestion and assimilation to the surface again, slyly shifting our attention away from the usual suspects buzzing in the ears of Plato, Horace, and Seneca. By this subtle play, we find the bee, the most celebrated icon of Renaissance imitatio, sipping from flowers in the garden of an Epicurean dogmatist—an example emblematic of Poliziano’s exquisite taste for irony. What the Florentine poet learned from his Lucretius, among other things, was a habit for making the seemingly familiar strange again. But what did it mean to acknowledge the presence of an ancient author who had been nearly forgotten for centuries and, as some thought, not without good reason? Poliziano’s friend Pico della Mirandola summed up the problem when, in comparing Lucretius to Duns Scotus, he said that the honey on the rim of the poet’s cup was disguising not the bitter medicine of philosophy, as Lucretius had said, but a kind of poison. Pico here was, in fact, channeling the indignation of Saint Jerome and a long tradition of anxiety about the poet who said the soul was mortal. What did it mean to taste the bitterness in the honey? A man who could hardly resist a literary problem when he encountered one, Poliziano was among the first to take this question seriously as a 129. Poliziano, Oratio, 878: “Itaque cum maximum sit vitium unum tantum aliquem solumque imitari velle, haud ab re profecto facimus, si non minus hos nobis quam illos praeponimus, si quae ad nostrum usum faciunt undique elicimus atque, ut est apud Lucretium, Floriferis ut apes in saltibus omnia libant / omnia nos itidem depascimur aurea dicta.” Cited, translated, and discussed in Pigman, “Versions of Imitation,” 6. See Lucretius, DRN 1.11–12. 130. See Barbaro and Pico, Filosofia o eloquenza?, 50; cf. Lucretius, DRN 4.11–25. For a discussion of the exchange between Pico and Barbaro, see esp. Kraye, “Pico on the Relationship of Rhetoric and Philosophy.” In contrast to Pico, readers such as Bartolomeo Scala, Marcello Adriani, and Machiavelli were drawn to some of the more dangerous elements of De rerum natura. As Alison Brown has recently shown, these men discovered in Lucretius a potent alternative both to the Medici’s Golden Age rhetoric and the demagoguery of Savonarola. See Brown, Return of Lucretius, chaps. 3 and 4.
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poet. The problem was already framed, in a sense, in the title of Poliziano’s Rusticus: An Introduction to Lectures on the Poet Hesiod and the “Georgics” of Virgil. About a century before, in a letter addressed to the ghost of Homer, Petrarch had attempted to quell Homer’s anxieties about not being acknowledged by name in the Aeneid—acknowledged, he said, as Hesiod had been recognized and celebrated in the Georgics. Had he believed in the afterlife, Lucretius might have had a similar complaint about the Renaissance poet who omitted his name from the title of his own poem. It was Lucretius, after all, who had already recast the myths of Hesiod in a sobering rational light, who literally came between the Greek didactic tradition and Virgil’s own remediation of it in the Georgics. By remembering (and forgetting) the Epicurean poet in his own poem, Poliziano was in another way dramatizing the problem of coming to terms with the long shadow of materialism Lucretius had cast across the historia litteraria. The traces of Lucretian influence in the Rusticus correspond nicely to the way Perrine Galand-Hallyn has described Poliziano’s use of literary sources to generate subtle counterpoints in what would otherwise seem a harmonious imitation. For Galand-Hallyn, this technique was a form of “equivocation” that allowed the poet to explore the meaning of different subtextual associations at once—a practice that led to sometimes potentially explosive combinations. In this case, however, the poet’s equivocation takes a slightly different form. Warburg, we recall, had pointed out where Poliziano borrowed from Lucretius; here I want to show how this imitation sheds light on a conspicuous absence 131. Poliziano, Silvae, ed. Fantazzi, 32: “Angeli Politiani silva cui titulus Rusticus in poetae Hesiodi Vergilque Georgicon enarratione pronuntiata.” 132. Petrarch, Fam. 24.12.22; ed. Rossi, 4:259: “Nempe ille Theocritum in Bucolicis ducem nactus, in Georgicis Hesiodum, quemque suis locis inseruit. ‘Et cur’ inquies, ‘tertium in heroyco carmine ducem habens, nulla eius operis in parte me posuit?” (Naturally, with Theocritus as his guide in the Bucolica and Hesiod in the Georgica, he named each in his proper place. “And why,” you will say, “having chosen me as his third guide in his heroic poem, does he make no mention of me in his work?” [trans. Bernardo, 3:346]). 133. Gale’s Virgil on the Nature of Things is in many ways a response to this very problem. 134. See Galand-Hallyn, “Ange Politien et l’équivoque intertextuelle.”
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in Poliziano’s poem. In reading a poetic introduction to the Georgics, as Poliziano describes it, we might expect at least some reference to the long passages on the Noric plague that Macrobius documented at length in the Saturnalia and that dragged Petrarch’s pen beyond what he intended. What we find, however, is that this central figure of the plague is completely absent from Poliziano’s mind in the Rusticus. With almost no exaggeration, in fact, Virgil’s extensive imitation of book 6 of De rerum natura turns out to be the only section of the Georgics that Poliziano does not touch in his exhaustive rehashing of the poem. It was not, of course, that he had simply forgotten the Lucretian echoes in Virgil’s description of the plague. In fact, like Petrarch, he had scrupulously copied out all of the relevant passages from the Saturnalia in his personal manuscript. By obscuring in the Rusticus the traces of Virgil’s disaster, even attempting to write around them, Poliziano was actively avoiding the deadly strains of the Epicurean poet in Virgil—an omission as meaningful in this context as a literary allusion. In a way, this is not entirely surprising. Though Lucretius insisted that the Athenian plague reached both country and city, the plague had no place in the golden world of the Rusticus, and literally none in the allusions of Poliziano’s poem. Some men and women of Quattrocento Florence fled the city precisely to escape contagion, and Poliziano himself was no stranger to running from the plague. In a letter he wrote in 1478 to Lucrezia, Lorenzo de’ Medici’s mother, the beleaguered poet describes the less-than-ideal conditions of his stay at the suburban villa 135. Poliziano, Commento inedito, 185–88. Poliziano even copies out Macrobius’s observation that Virgil had borrowed Lucretius’s plague episode in nearly all its details. 136. As H. S. Commager Jr. has pointed out: “Thucydides records the crowding into the city of the country people, compelled, of course, by the Spartan invasion of Attica. Lucretius rather allows the plague to embrace the countryside as well, broadening its scope rather than concentrating it. Every shepherd, herdsman, and farmer is affected” (“Lucretius’ Interpretation of the Plague,” 108). 137. Ann G. Carmichael points out that “in contrast to the devastating effects of plague on rural areas in the fourteenth century, the countryside was usually spared this scourge during the fifteenth century” (Carmichael, Plague and the Poor, 1). On the experience of chance and misfortune in this period, see esp. Santoro, Fortuna, ragione e prudenza.
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of Cafaggiolo, where he escaped the plague with Lorenzo’s irritable wife and children. Written several years before the publication of the Rusticus, the letter paints a very different picture of country life from the one Poliziano later imagined in the poem: Here I stand by the fireside, in my great coat and slippers, that you might take me for the very figure of melancholy. Indeed I am the same at all times; for I neither see, nor hear, nor do any thing that gives me pleasure, so much am I affected by the thoughts of our calamities; sleeping and waking they still continue to haunt me. Two days since we were all rejoicing upon hearing that the plague had ceased—now we are depressed on being informed that some symptoms of it yet remain. Were we at Florence we should have some consolation, were it only that of seeing Lorenzo when he returned to his house; but here we are in continual anxiety, and I, for my part, am half dead with solitude and weariness. The plague and the war are incessantly in my mind. I lament past misfortunes and anticipate future evils; and I have no longer at my side my dear Madonna Lucretia, to whom I might unbosom my cares.
A persistent anxiety possesses the poet, who describes himself in this letter as virtually reduced to the image of Melancholia that Dürer would engrave in the next century. Unlike the happy rural dweller of his Rusticus, Poliziano was stuck indoors, unable to get the plague off his mind. Besides this very personal experience, Poliziano gives us another ex138. Poliziano to Lucrezia de’ Medici, 18 December 1478. Translated in Roscoe, Life of Lorenzo de’ Medici, 2:126; Poliziano, Prose volgari e poesie latine e greche, 67– 68: “Io mi sto in casa al fuoco in zoccoli et in palandrano, che vi parrei la malinconia, se voi mi vedessi; ma forse mi pajo io in ogni modo, et non fo, nè veggo, nè sento cosa che mi dilecti, immodo mi sono accorato per questi nostri casi. Et dormendo et vegliando sempre ho nel capo questa albagia. Eravamo due di fa tutti in su l’ale, perchè intendemo non esser costà più moria: hora tutti siamo rimasti basosi, intendendo, che pur va pizzicando qualche cosa. Quando siamo costà, habbiamo pur qualche refrigerio, quando non fussi mai altro se non vedere ritornare Lorenzo a casa. Quì tuttavia dubitiamo, et d’ogni cosa: et quanto a me vi prometto, che io affogo nell’accidia, in tanta solitudine mi truovo. . . . rimangomi solo, et quando sono restucco dello studio, mi do a razolare tra morie et guerre, et dolore del passato et paura dell’advenire. . . . Non truovo quì la mia Mona Lucretia in camera, colla quale io possi sfogarmi, et muojo di tedio.”
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cuse to forget the plague when he celebrates his good friend Marsilio Ficino. Ten years before the publication of the Rusticus, in a verse letter to Bartolomeo Fonzio, Poliziano had paid homage to Ficino, the great Renaissance reviver of Platonic philosophy and the man, he said, who taught him everything he knew about the universe. At the end of describing the various achievements of his friend, Poliziano makes an implicit connection between the Epicurean philosophy of Lucretius and the threat of contamination: Hinc me digressum Marsilius excipit ingens, Non minus ingenio qui favet usque meo. Hic aperit, quanto currunt vaga sidera lapsu, Altus agit quali tramite Phoebus equos; Hic docet, undeni resecant ut sidera circi, Cur nitido tantum lacteus orbe patet, Ut cum patre Venus miseris mortalibus aequa est, Cur saepe obscuris Luna laborat equis, Aurea cur celso pendentia vincula mundo Maeonii finxit Musa beata senis, Cur saepe aerii luctantur in aequore venti, Cur glacie et saeva grandine terra riget Atque eadem Icario cur mox perrumpitur aestu, Cur pluvius madidas combibit arcus aquas, Quae causa est vernum laxari fulmine coelum, An ruat e puro stella serena polo. Et modo pallentes humano corpore morbos, Qua valeam, medica pellere monstrat ope. Impia non sani turbat modo dicta Lucreti, Imminet erratis nunc, Epicure, tuis. [From here, the great Marsilio Ficino, who always supported my talent no less, receives me as I digress. In this place, he reveals to me on what great course the errant stars run, on what kind of path lofty Phoebus drives his horses. He teaches how the eleven orbits trim the stars, 139. On Poliziano’s relation to Ficino, see Maïer, Ange Politien, 34–36. 140. The text of the poem may be found as an appendix in Maïer, Ange Politien, 72– 77; my translation. On Poliziano’s elegy to Fonzio, see Bettinzoli, Daedaleum iter, 11–37.
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why the milky one stands open so far with its gleaming orbit, so that to wretched mortals Venus is equal to her father; why the moon often toils with her darkened horses; why the blessed muse of old Homer invented golden chains hanging from on high; why the airy winds often wrestle on the surface of the sea; why the earth stiffens with ice and savage hail; and why the same is broken through with Icarian heat; why the rainbow drinks up the moist waters; why the spring sky is loosened by the thunderbolt, and the skies are shaken with lightning; or why the serene star falls from the pure zone of the heavens. And now he shows how to expel diseases pallid in the human body with the help of medicine, through which I am made well. And now he overturns the impious sayings of insane Lucretius, and now, Epicurus, he threatens your errors.]
Reading this portrait of Ficino, Ida Maïer once suggested that it was reminiscent of the one Pseudo-Plutarch painted of the vates Homer, which elsewhere Poliziano drew upon to praise the bard. What is most striking here, however, is the curious sympathy between Poliziano’s portrait and his description of the countryman in the Rusticus. Both the philosopher and his poetic counterpart had read the Georgics and had been schooled in the rules of astronomy, the laws of eclipses and the phases of the moon, and the “fires” of Phoebus in the sky. Both understood the governing principles of the universe and were able to apply their practical knowledge to the divination of causes and the amelioration of man’s wretched state. Here, however, Poliziano adds one important detail to his account of Ficino that is only implicit in the Rusticus: Ficino expels (pellere) diseases of the body, driving out the author of De rerum natura and his wicked philosopher. These curious last few lines remind us that Ficino himself was something of an expert at avoiding the plague, and other dangerous influences. Indeed, just three years before the publication of the Rusticus, the Platonist had stepped down from his lofty philosophical heights to compose a practical handbook on how to recognize the signs of the plague and to avoid the threat of contamination—a text that was writ141. Maïer, Ange Politien, 35 n. 85. 142. Bettinzoli, Daedaleum iter, 33 n. 60. 143. See Poliziano, Rusticus, lines 448–550.
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ten in the vernacular for the benefit of “every Tuscan person.” As a practical Ficino advised in the pages of the Consilio, “flee quickly and long and return late.” Some version of this advice seemed to apply to literary matters as well, particularly when they involved the text of De rerum natura and its wicked author. Toward the end of his life, Ficino would recount the story of how he once produced a “little commentary” (commentariolum) on Lucretius in his youth—a commentary that he was later compelled to burn, as the divine Plato was said to have burned his own juvenilia. To quote his contemporary Janus Pannonius, Ficino had done everything “within [his] power to remove [Lucretius] from men’s consideration.” 144. Ficino, Consilio contra la pestilenza, 55: “ogni persona toscana.” 145. Ficino, Consilio contra la pestilenza, 108: “Sopra tucto fuggi dal luogo pestilenziale presto et di lungi, et torna tardi.” 146. See Ficino, Opera omnia, 1:933: “Adeo ut neque commentariolis in Lucretium meis, quae puer adhuc (nescio quomodo) commentabar deinde pepercerim; haec enim, sicut et Plato tragoedias elegiasque suas, Volcano dedi” (Hence, I did not even spare the little commentary I prepared (somehow or other) on Lucretius when still a boy, but consigned it to the flames, as Plato did with his tragedies and elegies). Cited, translated, and discussed in Hankins, Plato in the Italian Renaissance, 2:457. We do not know the exact date of the commentary, though Kristeller has suggested it was probably written during the period of De voluptate in 1457. See Kristeller, in Ficino, Supplementum Ficinianum, 1:163. In a letter written to Poliziano, Ficino vehemently denounces epistles written in a “Lucretian” style that he insists had been wrongly attributed to him. I deal with this loaded episode in Ficino’s biography and the long history of its interpretation in more detail in a forthcoming article, “Burning Lucretius: On Ficino’s Lost Commentary.” 147. Pannonius uses Ficino’s early dalliance with Lucretius to challenge the notion that the philosopher’s revival of Platonism was divinely ordained. See Ficino, Opera omnia, 1:871: “Quod autem haec non tam providentia quam fato quodam fiant abs te illud etiam argumento est quod ante haec omnia antiquum quendam philosophum sive poetam, utpote adhuc adolescens, leviter propagasti, quem deinde meliori fretus consilio suppressisti, & (ut audio) pro viribus extraxisti, neque fuerat illud divinae providentiae munus quod ipse aetate prudentior factus merito iudicasti damnandum” (However, the argument that you did these things not guided by providence but at a time that fate alone determined is clearly demonstrated by the fact that, before you embarked on all these projects, you had rather unthinkingly championed the cause of a certain ancient philosopher and poet [i.e., Lucretius]. At the time you were still young. Subsequently, relying on better counsel
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If, indeed, Ficino was one of the models for Poliziano’s Rusticus, then it would make sense that the plague would be foreign to his idealized vision of a world without the threat of uncertain disaster. Like Ficino, Poliziano would attempt to blot out the disastrous strains of Lucretius and the contagion that loomed large in the background of Virgil’s poem—something not lost on Poliziano’s early readers, some of whom were especially sensitive to it. In the preface to his commentary edition of the Rusticus (1514), Nicolas Bérault laid bare exactly what was at stake in reading Poliziano’s poem for philosophy: For what, I ask, is better suited for asserting the Providence of immortal God? What is more appropriate than to learn about the works of nature, that is to say, of Providence? For as Cicero writes in his book on the divine nature of the universe, many great and noble philosophers, who believed that the whole world is administered and ruled by divine reason, that God cares for the lives of men, that He provides them with the fruits of the earth and the changing of the seasons (by which everything that the earth brings forth and supplies for men with such generous abundance grows to fruition), took divine Providence as a first principle; and from their understanding of the works of nature, or rather the works of some heavenly intelligence, they grasped the fact that this highest nature is in no way indifferent or idle, as Epicurus had dreamed up. you withdrew your support, and since then, I hear you have done all within your power to remove him from men’s consideration. This cannot have been the gift of divine providence, if later you appropriately judged him worthy of condemnation, having arrived at an age of greater discretion). Cited, translated, and discussed in Allen, Synoptic Art, 5–6. 148. Bérault, preface to Poliziano, Rusticus, ed. Bérault, sig. A2r: “Etenim quid, obsecro, ad adserendam immortalis dei prouidentiam aptius? Quid convenientius quam naturae, id est, providentiae opera cognoscere? Nam quod Cicero de divina natura scribit, philosophi magni & nobiles, qui divina mente ac ratione mundum omne administrari ac regi censuerunt, & a deo Optimo Maximo uitae hominum consuli & provideri ex variis terrae frugibus, vicibusque temporum ac coeli mutationibus, quibus omnia, quae terra mortalibus abunde gignit, ac indulgentissime suppeditat, maturata pubescunt, divinam primum adstruxere providentiam; atque ex naturae seu coelestis cuiuspiam intelligentiae operibus primum intellexerunt supremam illam naturam neutique esse ociosam ac desidem, quod Epicurus somniabat”; my translation.
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The Epicurean idea of a universe governed only by chance was the direct opposite of Bérault’s glittering vision of Providence and divine synthesis epitomized by the literary magic of Poliziano’s poem. Here again we might be reminded of Macrobius’s vision of Virgil’s poem as a reflection of divine creation and synthesis, a second nature. In digesting the poetry of Virgil, it would seem, Poliziano had inherited some of the ancient poet’s syncretic powers. Indeed, as Bérault describes it in his commentary, the Rusticus was another Neoplatonic livre du monde that signaled the presence of the divine in its spectacle of varietas, a vision embodied and reflected in the very copiousness of the poet’s literary technique. In a context such as this, where literary allusions are mapped onto philosophical ones (however imperfectly), is it a surprise that the plague went missing from the harmonious world of the Rusticus? Bérault gives us another clue to understanding this absence in Poliziano’s poem, this time in a short letter of dedication that he composed for the second edition of Giovan Battista Pio’s De rerum natura, published in Paris the same year as his commentary on the Rusticus. In 149. See Poliziano, Rusticus, ed. Bérault, sig. 4r. See also Galand-Hallyn, “Nicolas Bérault, lecteur de Politien,” 423–24. 150. For a reader such as Bérault, there was much at stake in Poliziano’s literary allusions—nothing less perhaps than the structure of the world itself. In a moment toward the end of his notes on the Rusticus, for example, Bérault would express a serious concern about the authority of the textual traditions on which the poet had based his knowledge of the natural world—and, more specifically, a concern about the didactic authority of Hesiod. In the lines in question, Poliziano is borrowing directly from Hesiod in order to discuss which days of the month are suitable for marriage—a literary allusion that left the commentator scratching his head. The “reasons” (rationes) for selecting these days might seem “ridiculous and frivolous,” Bérault wrote, and he would not “bind [his] faith” to them. As he reminds us here, even Poliziano himself had his doubts and “did not wish to uphold these things superstitiously, which to a great degree had been brought forth by the credulity of the vulgar, rather than by any causes of nature [naturae causis].” Bérault is referring us here to a well-known letter that Poliziano had written to his friend Pico della Mirandola in which the poet himself had taken another look at the Rusticus, calling into question the “laws of the ancient poets” (antiqui vatis legibus) that he had followed so closely in the poem in light of Pico’s skepticism. Poliziano, Rusticus, ed. Bérault, sig. 50v, and Opera omnia, 1:168. See Grafton, Commerce with the Classics, 124.
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Bérault’s words: “Therefore it happened that those who had previously recoiled from [the poet’s] works as being overly gloomy and, in their own words, infected, as though from a disreputable and plague-ridden house, now eagerly read and welcome this new commentary on Lucretius and Lucretius himself, and they openly praise Pio for the breadth and depth of his learning and the brilliance and ease of his style.” Because Bérault was writing this dedication around the same time that he was working on Poliziano’s poem or just after, it seems very likely that he was thinking of Poliziano or Ficino when he spoke of those who were running from the plague of Lucretius. In the movement from his learned commentary on the Rusticus to his dedication in Pio’s edition of De rerum natura, Bérault himself appears to have experienced something like a change of heart. Yet if Poliziano was indeed running from the plague in the poem, as all of this suggests, he did not (and perhaps could not) forget about it entirely. This compulsive ironist knew very well that influence (like contagion itself) was not something easily controlled, and that writing around a literary problem was another way of drawing attention to it. At the end of the day, not all diseases could be predicted and cured by Platonists. According to Lucretius, not even the countryman was immune to the threat of disaster—the kind of invisible disaster that, Petrarch knew, ravages you from the inside out. As Lucretius had written it: “By this time the shepherd and the herdsman and also the brawny guide of the curved plough were all fainting; their bodies lay huddled up in the recesses of their huts, given over to death by poverty and disease.” A glance at Poliziano’s Sylva in scabiem (a poem com151. Bérault, dedication to Lucretius, De rerum natura, ed. Pio, 2nd ed.: “Qua re factum ut qui antehac ab eius scriptis ceu morosis nimium &, ut eorum ipsorum verbo utar, putidulis non aliter quam ab infami aliqua ac pestilente domo abhorruerant novam hanc in Lucretium interpretationem, Lucretiumque ipsum avide nunc legant & amplectantur, ingenue fatentes Pio praeter variam reconditamque doctrinam nec stili candorem facultatemque deesse”; my translation. 152. Lucretius, DRN 6.1252–55: “Praeterea iam pastor et armentarius omnis / et robustus item curvi moderator aratri / languebat, penitusque casa contrusa iacebant / corpora paupertate et morbo dedita morti.”
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posed roughly between 1475 and 1478 and rediscovered by Paul Oskar Kristeller in 1952) reveals an intense preoccupation with the images of contagion that were displaced in the Rusticus. In this weird experimental poem, Poliziano records in grotesque detail the symptoms and course of scabies, which he claims to have suffered from himself, and makes a plea to Lorenzo de’ Medici to cure him. Attilio Bettinzoli has described the poem nicely as a “masterpiece of the absurd and a voyage to the limits of language”—a poem in which Poliziano’s polymorphous literary practice reaches a density that is nearly “unsustainable.” Then there was Poliziano’s meditation on contagion in an elegy written on the occasion of the death of a young woman in 1473 in which the poet lends his pen to the personification of Fever. As Alessandro Perosa has shown, it is here, finally, that Poliziano returns to the horrific images of the Athenian plague from De rerum natura that were banished from the golden world of the Rusticus, giving a new and perhaps darker valence to what scholars sometimes like to call the poet’s technique of contamination. The troubling figures of contagion in the Sylva in scabiem and the characterization of Fever are emblematic of a deeper tension in the work of a poet who frequently wavered between a fantasy of the total integration and wholeness of tradition and its seductive and terrifying opposite, the nightmare of Orpheus violently ripped apart limb from limb—as Greene has described it, “the past dismembered.” To invoke Petrarch again: “A serious disease is not easily hidden since it breaks out and becomes visible through its own peculiar features.” As a source for Poliziano, Lucretius represented at once a prophet of scientific rationalism, tranquility, and pleasure and a fierce critic of modernity whose poem ends unhappily, not in the optimism of the Rusticus, 153. Poliziano, Sylva in scabiem. 154. Bettinzoli, Daedaleum iter, 59–65. 155. Perosa, “Febris,” 93–94. On Poliziano’s contaminatio, see esp. Greene, Light in Troy, 156–62 and 168–69; and Galand-Hallyn, “Ange Politien et l’équivoque intertextuelle.” 156. “The Past Dismembered” is the title of Greene’s chapter on Poliziano in Light in Troy.
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but in the horrific memory of the Athenian plague. Behind Poliziano’s own attempt to assimilate Lucretius into the texture of the Rusticus, we discover a question about the limits of the poet’s ability to be “happy” knowing the “causes of things,” to borrow the famous words from Virgil’s Georgics that Poliziano echoes loudly in the opening of his poem. What E. H. Gombrich once wrote in his intellectual biography of Aby Warburg might well be said here of the literary fiction of the Rusticus: “All these human attempts to achieve order and detachment in the welter of frightening impressions which impinge on the mind are by themselves precarious. Man is surrounded by chaos, by fear, and the serenity promised by the activity of art is no less unstable than the rationality achieved by the causal explanations of science.” Warburg himself was frequently haunted by irrational fears, including the fear of catching epidemic diseases even from vast distances. Perhaps this was part of what made him so sensitive to the presence of Lucretius in the world of the Rusticus, and to the Epicurean wind he felt blowing through the hair of Botticelli’s figures and their garments. We might observe here in passing that in his clinical notes Warburg’s psychotherapist, 157. See Virgil, Georgics 2.490–94: “Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas, / atque metus omnis et inexorabile fatum / subiecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari. / fortunatus et ille, deos qui novit agrestis, / Panaque Silvanumque senem Nymphasque sorores” (Blessed is he who has succeeded in learning the laws of nature’s working, has cast beneath his feet all fear and fate’s implacable decree, and the howl of insatiable Death. But happy, too, is he who knows the rural gods, Pan and aged Silvanus and the sisterhood of the Nymphs). As Monica Gale and others have argued, Virgil here is framing a tension between two incompatible worldviews: Epicurean rationalism and Hesiodic superstition. For the modern debate concerning the presence of Lucretius in these lines see Gale, “Virgil’s Metamorphosis,” 96, and Virgil on the Nature of Things, 8–11; Thomas, Virgil: Georgics, 1:253; Hardie, Virgil’s “Aeneid,” 40; and Nelis, “Georgics 2.458–542.” Cf. Poliziano, Rusticus, lines 17–22: “Felix ille animi divisque simillimus ipsis, / quem non mendaci resplendens gloria fuco / sollicitat, non fastosi mala gaudia luxus, / sed tacitos sinit ire dies et paupere cultu / exigit innocuae tranquilla silentia vitae, / urbe procul, voti exiguus” (Happy in spirit and comparable to the gods themselves is the man who is not attracted by the lure of glory with its false splendors or by the evil pleasures of haughty luxury, but allows the days to go by quietly and in his modest way of life spends his days in the silent tranquility of a blameless life, far from the city, with few desires). 158. Gombrich, Aby Warburg, 79.
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Ludwig Binswanger, would tellingly recall Ovid (and not Lucretius) as the source of Warburg’s great discovery. I want to end this chapter with one last figure of absent presence that both dramatizes the problem of integrating Lucretius into the classical tradition and invites us to reimagine the very idea of tradition itself in light of the Epicurean poet. The passage I have in mind is from another piece by Poliziano from the Silvae called the Nutricia, which was composed as the inaugural lecture for his course on poetics in 1486–87—a poem that celebrates the divine art of poetry in already Lucretian terms as a force “that carries off human minds with her to the secret recesses of the starry heavens.” It is here, in the context of this sweeping vision, that Poliziano vividly imagines the furor of the inspired poet—a furor he hoped to exemplify in practice in the Silvae: Ipsaque Niliacis longum mandata papyris carmina Phoebeos videas afflare furores et caeli spirare fidem; quin sancta legentem concutiunt parili turbam contagia moto deque aliis alios idem proseminat ardor pectoris instinctu vates, ceu ferreus olim anulus, arcana quem vi Magnesia cautes sustulerit, longam nexu pendente catenam implicat et caecis inter se conserit hamis. 159. Binswanger and Warburg, Die unendliche Heilung: Aby Warburgs Krankengeschichte, 261: “Studierte ziemlich lange, Examen bei Janitschek, Strassburg, Doktorarbeit über Botticelli mit erheblichen Entdeckung (Rückführung der Flora auf Stelle in Ovid). War sehr systematischer Arbeiter, minutiöses Zettelkasten” (Studied for quite a long time, took finals with Janitschek, Strassburg, Ph.D. thesis on Botticelli with important discovery (the tracing back of Flora in a passage from Ovid). Was a very systematic worker, had a most detailed system of index cards); my translation. What starts out here in the doctor’s note as a description of Warburg’s working habits quickly devolves into an account of his neuroses. 160. Poliziano, Nutricia, lines 21–22: “Humanas augusta Poetica mentes / siderei rapiens secum in penetralia caeli.” All citations and translations of the Nutricia follow Fantazzi’s edition of the Silvae. For the sustained pattern of Lucretian echoes in the Nutricia, see Pizzani, “L’erramento ferino.” 161. Poliziano, Nutricia, lines 188– 98. Cited and discussed in Coppini, “L’ispirazione per contagio,” 128.
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[You could see that the poems themselves, committed long ago to the Nile’s papyruses, transmitted the Apollonian inspiration and breathed the music of the celestial lyre; indeed a sacred contagion [contagia] excites the throng of readers with a like enthusiasm and the same ardor passes from one poet to engender inspiration in the heart of others, like the iron ring lifted up by the hidden force of a Magnesian stone that attaches to itself a long chain in a pendant bond and fastens them together with invisible hooks [caecis hamis].]
The image is, as we know, highly conventional, originating in the rhapsodic singer from Plato’s Ion (533D–E). What is surprising here is that Poliziano is slyly integrating the invisible hooks of Lucretius’s description of magnetic force, in his own way recalling what Statius had once said about “the high frenzy of learned Lucretius” (docti furor arduus Lucreti). In the Platonic Theology, Ficino himself listed the author of De rerum natura among the various ancient vates who had been possessed by a divine frenzy, though later in the same text he would say that the Epicurean poet was prone to a state of melancholy rather than furor. By holding the Platonic and Lucretian traditions in a kind of invisible suspension in the passage above, Poliziano is laying bare the conflict 162. Poliziano uses this metaphor again in a letter to his friend Girolamo Donà when he describes his debt to Pico della Mirandola. See Poliziano, Letters, 1:118– 19. For Poliziano’s use and transformation of this topos, see in general Coppini, “L’ispirazione per contagio.” 163. See Lucretius, DRN 6.910– 16: “Hunc homines lapidem mirantur; quippe catenam / saepe ex anellis reddit pendentibus ex se. / Quinque etenim licet interdum plurisque videre / ordine demisso levibus iactarier auris, / unus ubi ex uno dependet subter adhaerens / ex alioque alius lapidis vim vinclaque noscit: / usque adeo permanantur vis pervalet eius” (This stone astonishes men, because it often makes a chain out of little rings hanging from it. For you may sometimes see five or more hanging in a string and swayed by a light breeze, where one hangs from another attached beneath it, and one from another learns the stone’s power and attraction: to such a distance does its power hold force, oozing through and through). Donatella Coppini notes this Lucretian contamination but suggests that it operates “exclusively on the expressive level” (Coppini, “L’ispirazione per contagio,” 128– 29). Ubaldo Pizzani has argued that the presence of Lucretius represents a kind of dialectical tension, but one that is ultimately resolved into a Christian-Platonic viewpoint (Pizzani, “L’erramento ferino,” 405). 164. Ficino, Platonic Theology, 4:126–27 and 308.
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between these philosophical and literary sources even as he attempts to resolve it. In the meantime, he is also giving us another figure of contagia, here imagined as a “sacred contagion” but also pointing to a deadly one. As James I. Porter reminds us, there is only a short space in De rerum natura between Lucretius’s account of the physics of magnetism and his account of plague, the poet’s “fatal attraction.” In its own subtle way, this instance of imitative contaminatio in the Nutricia allegorizes the “hidden force” of materialism in the work of a poet transmitting his knowledge, making Poliziano the heir to the literary contagion he inherited from Virgil, Macrobius, and Petrarch. What finally surfaces in this story is not only a forgotten strain of Lucretian influence, but what we might properly call an idea of transmission itself. From the figure of Petrarch’s pen, dragged beyond what he intended, to Poliziano’s technique of contamination, we may see a form of literary materialism emerging again in the very practice of these humanists and poets, a materialism made visible in the sympathetic intercourse between one reader and another. 165. Lucretius himself uses the word contagia to describe the ravages of disease at DRN 6.1236. 166. See Porter, “Lucretius and the Sublime,” 219–20.
*2* The Philologist and the Epicurean
In 1850 Karl Lachmann dazzled his contemporaries by tracing the manuscript tradition of De rerum natura back to its lost “archetype.” Describing this phantom object with “an almost mathematical certainty,” Lachmann told his readers the number of pages the archetype contained, the lines per page, and even the kind of script that had been used to write it (a thing, he said, that can be known by its many signs). And so the philologist became another German magician—a Faustus conjuring up the ghostly remains of Helen, “the face that launched a thousand ships,” or, in this case, all of the existing manuscripts of De rerum natura. In what seems like a flash, Lachmann’s Lucretian archetype was celebrated as the glittering icon of a method of recension and emendation and thought to be, as his fellow philologist H. A. J. Munro described it, “a landmark for scholars as long as the Latin language continues to be studied, a work, perfidiae quod post nulla arguet aetas [which no subsequent age will accuse of falsehood].” Munro, it turns out, was hardly a prophet, a matter to which we will return shortly. For now, the story of Lachmann’s archetype is our point of entry into another episode in the material history of Lucretius’s poem: its physical reconstruction. In the previous chapter we looked at the ways in which the poet’s materialism crept into humanist thought and literary practice through an indirect transmission; in this chapter I want to explore how the poetry of atoms and the void came to reflect the material idea of the text itself. My question is: how did reading a poem which said that let1. On the concept of the archetype, see Timpanaro, Genesis of Lachmann’s Method, 49–51; and Rizzo, Il lessico filologico, 308–17. 2. Hertz, Karl Lachmann, 142. Cited in Timpanaro, Genesis of Lachmann’s Method, 108. 3. Munro, in Lucretius, De rerum natura, ed. Munro, 2:16. Munro is citing a wellknown passage from Catullus 64.321–22.
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ters are like atoms inform the practice of the philologist piecing the text back together from near ruins? This kind of question might at first seem counterintuitive with respect to our modern notion of what a philologist is or should be. In his essay on Hermann Usener, for example, Arnaldo Momigliano went out of his way to insist that Lachmann had no particular investment in De rerum natura or its philosophy and “could pass from Lucretius’s poetry to the prose of the Roman land-surveyors (agrimensores) when the task was to produce an honest text.” There were, after all, reasons for Lachmann to turn his attention to the poetry of Lucretius, even if they were not always as “honest” as the text he hoped to produce. If some readers saw the textual critic as a man unmoved and, more important, untouched by what he read, however, others discovered in Lachmann’s edition of De rerum natura the traces of an intimacy that one suspects he did not share with the Roman land surveyors. As E. J. Kenney has explained, Lachmann’s “apparently inexorable logic . . . offered the incentive to the entranced reader to see in [him] the Epicurus of his subject and to hail him in the very words of the poet, ‘O tenebris tantis tam clarum extollere lumen / qui primus potuisti . . .’ [O you who first amid so great a darkness were able to raise aloft a light so clear].” Recalling Lachmann in the preface to his late nineteenth-century edition, Munro too had demonstrated precisely how “difficult” it was “not to be reminded of Lucretius”: [Lachmann’s] native sagacity, guided and sharpened by long and varied experience, saw at a glance [the manuscripts’] relations to each other and to the original from whence they were derived, and made clear the arbitrary way in which the common texts had been constructed. His zeal warming as he advanced, one truth after another revealed itself to 4. Momigliano, “New Paths of Classicism,” 39. 5. One of them surely was the paucity of manuscripts of De rerum natura—a fact that allowed Lachmann’s so-called method to be “fully adapted” in ways that were ultimately unfeasible for other textual traditions. Timpanaro, Genesis of Lachmann’s Method, 123. 6. Kenney, Classical Text, 106. Kenney is citing Lucretius, DRN 3.1–2. 7. Kenney, Classical Text, 108.
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him, so that at length he obtained by successive steps a clear insight into the condition in which the poem left the hands of its author in the most essential points.”
This should sound familiar. In fact, Munro was adapting a well-known passage from De rerum natura, taking the poet’s words as much-needed advice for the self-doubting philologist. As Lucretius had explained to his readers: “So you will gain a thorough understanding of these matters led on with very little effort; for one thing will become clear by another, and blind night will not steal your path and prevent you from seeing the uttermost recesses of nature: so clearly will truths kindle light for truths.” For the Epicurean initiate, it was the truth of a nature that lay beyond the threshold of sensory perception. For the textual critic, it was the poem itself imagined beyond the oldest existing manuscript— the fantasy of the text as it left the hands of its ancient author, or at least “in the most essential points.” As we shall see, the analogy between the philologist and the Epicurean that we have begun to uncover (if imperfectly) in Lachmann has a much longer history, one that spans from the idea of the poem’s archetype in the nineteenth century back to its most ancient readers, who struggled to make it whole, or even to imagine it as whole. Saint Jerome once claimed that Cicero first “emended” or “corrected” the text of De rerum natura, though what he meant by “emend” is hard to say. Cicero 8. Munro, in Lucretius, De rerum natura, ed. Munro, 2:15. 9. Lucretius, DRN 1.1114– 17: “Haec sic pernosces parva perductus opella; / namque alid ex alio clarescet, nec tibi caeca / nox iter eripiet quin ultima naturai / pervideas: ita res accendent lumina rebus.” 10. Jerome gives the following short account of Lucretius and his poem in his continuation of the Eusebian chronicle: “Titus Lucretius poeta nascitur. Qui postea amatorio poculo in furorem versus, cum aliquot libros per intervalla insaniae conscripsisset, quos postea Cicero emendavit, propria se manu interfecit anno aetatis XLIIII” (Titus Lucretius, the poet, was born. Later he was driven mad by a lovephiltre, after he had written several books in the intervals of insanity; Cicero subsequently corrected these books; Lucretius died by his own hand in the forty-fourth year of his life) (Jerome, Interpretatio chronicae Eusebii Pamphili, in Migne, PL 27:523; trans. Hadzsits, Lucretius and His Influence, 5). Reading this passage, Lachmann insisted that it was not Cicero but rather his brother Quintus who corrected the text, for, as he explained it, Quintus was not partial to any one philosophical
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himself only mentions Lucretius once, in a letter to his brother Quintus: “Lucretius’s poetry is as you say—sparkling with many lights of genius, but plenty of technical skill.” Jerome also famously reported that Lucretius composed his poem between “fits of madness,” which raises other questions about the text and its production, and about the uneasy relation between genius, madness, and technical skill. A poem written in such a haphazard way, as Luciano Canfora has wittily suggested, must have demanded some form of philological attention from its first inception. The history of philology has been entangled with the poetry of materialism ever since. In what follows in these pages, I want to explore specifically what was transacted between the Epicurean poet and his Renaissance readers at a moment when both the discipline of philology and the text of De rerum natura were beginning to take shape for the first time since antiquity. To quote one of those readers, Michel de Montaigne: “Anyone I regard with attention easily imprints on me something of himself.” This is the story of the quelque chose that was imprinted on a group of readers who beheld Lucretius with at least one form of the very closest attention.
Poeticus Afflatus The Bolognese humanist Filippo Beroaldo was famous the world over for his way of teaching ancient texts, sometimes attracting three hundred students at a time to hear his lectures in the crowded halls of the University of Bologna. It was a gift that allowed him to inhabit the school. On this point, see Butler, Matter of the Page, 37. On Lucretius’s biography, see Holford-Strevens, “Horror vacui in Lucretian Biography”; and, in general, Canfora, Vita di Lucrezio. 11. Cicero, Ad Quintum fratrem 2.10.3: “Lucreti poemata ut scribis ita sunt, multis luminibus ingeni, multae tamen artis.” I have altered the Loeb translation slightly. 12. Canfora, Vita di Lucrezio, 24. 13. Montaigne, Essais 3.5; trans. Frame, 667; ed. Villey and Saulnier, 875: “Qui que je regarde avec attention m’imprime facilement quelque chose du sien.” 14. Gaisser, “Teaching Classics in the Renaissance,” 2. See also Sabbadini, Storia del ciceronianismo; and D’Amico, “The Progress of Renaissance Latin Prose.”
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mind of his author and to interject himself and his city into the world of the text. Commenting on the description of the house of Cupid and Psyche in Apuleius, for example, Beroaldo described in detail the architecture of a villa outside Bologna. At other times he scattered personal details such as the announcement of his marriage to his wife, Camilla, and the birth of his child. More than a mere affectation (as some inevitably complained), for Beroaldo this practice was a habit of mind that allowed him to get closer to the text he was reading, to enter into its linguistic and cultural domains and see it through his own eyes. In composing his digressions—or flosculi, as they were sometimes called— Beroaldo would even imitate the style of the author he was working on, whether it was Cicero, Apuleius, or Suetonius, exhibiting what Julia Haig Gaisser has described as “an almost necromantic ability.” For Beroaldo the cultivation of this intellectual sympathy allowed for a powerful exchange between a text and its commentator. It was a transference, he said, that reflected the inspiration of the poet, who composed his works in a state of furor—an image that looks back to the figure of the Platonic rhapsode that Poliziano had described with Lucretian undertones in the Nutricia and to the image of Bembo’s iron interpreter with which we began. “A poet is not good without divine inspiration,” Beroaldo wrote, “nor is a commentator good without a poetic spirit [poeticus afflatus].” In unwrapping the text and illuminating its obscurities, the commentator was transformed into another ring on the 15. On the history and form of Beroaldo’s literary practice of scattering anecdotes in his commentaries, see esp. Casella, “Il metodo dei commentari umanistici”; Gaisser, Fortunes of Apuleius and the “Golden Ass,” 197–242; Krautter, Philologische Methode und humanistiche Existenz; and Gombrich, “Beroaldus on Francia.” 16. Gaisser, “Teaching Classics in the Renaissance,” 4. Not everyone appreciated Beroaldo’s style of commentary. One of his less generous sixteenth-century critics, Francesco Florido Sabino (1511– 47), complained that Beroaldo’s “style” had become so popular, had spread so far and wide—like a kind of disease—that it would be almost impossible to eradicate it unless all his pupils died off or there was a law forbidding the sale of his work. See Sabino, Lectiones subcisivae II, in Gruter, Lampas, 1:1121. 17. Beroaldo, Commentarii in Propertium, fol. a2r: “Non est sine deo bonus poeta, non est sine poetico afflatu bonus interpreter.”
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magnetic chain—an extension of the poet’s wisdom. Unfortunately for us, Beroaldo did not feel the pull of Lucretius’s invisible hooks—at least not entirely. Despite having borrowed extensively from the Epicurean poet in his short treatise on earthquakes and plagues in 1505, the Bolognese commentator never got around to producing his own edition of De rerum natura—a poem whose “many lights of genius,” he said, echoing Cicero, were “obscured by the all-consuming darkness of error.” But what would it mean for a reader, and in particular a Renaissance reader concerned with reconstructing the text, to absorb the afflatus of a poet who said that the soul was mortal? We come upon one kind of answer in the first commentary edition of the poem in the Renaissance by Beroaldo’s student Giovan Battista Pio, whose own scattered digressions—on earthquakes and the deaths of both his beloved parents and teacher—mark the commentary in a particularly somber way. By imitating Beroaldo’s famous anecdotal style in the service of Lucretius’s poem, Pio was putting some pressure on his teacher’s notion of the poetic afflatus, and perhaps even making a kind of serious joke in the midst of all of the somberness. If Beroaldo had said that the reader must be possessed by the “spirit” of an author, as a Platonic rhapsode was possessed by Homer, to absorb the afflatus of Lucretius, that most un-Platonic of poets, was ironically to confront 18. Beroaldo, Commentarii in Propertium, fol. a2r. On this point, Beroaldo seems to be drawing upon the Neoplatonic wells of Ficino and Poliziano. On Ficino’s active revision of the rhapsode figure, see Allen, “Soul as Rhapsode”; and Coppini, “L’ispirazione per contagio.” 19. Beroaldo, Annotationes centum (1488), in Gruter, Lampas, 1:308–9: “Sed de Lucretii locis obscurioribus alibi plura, cum eius poemata adeo mendosa circumferantur, ut non lita multis luminibus ingenii videri possint, sicut Quinto Ciceroni videbantur, sed oblita tenebris errorum, praescatentibus” (But I will have more to say elsewhere about the obscure passages in Lucretius, since his poems circulate with so many flaws that seem impossible to erase even by the ‘many lights of genius,’ as they seemed to Quintus Cicero, but instead are consigned to oblivion by the allconsuming darkness of error); my translation. 20. I treat Pio’s digressions at greater length in my forthcoming “Reading for Pleasure: Disaster and Digression in the First Lucretian Commentary.” On Pio’s commentary, see also Raimondi, “Il primo commento umanistico a Lucrezio.”
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the poet’s “melancholic bent,” as Ficino once called it, and also to confront one’s own. This was one way of dressing up like a poet who supposedly went insane and committed suicide. Leaving aside Pio’s melancholy, we come across a very different answer to the question of capturing the poet’s afflatus about a half century later in Denys Lambin’s groundbreaking edition of De rerum natura. It is to that edition now that I want to turn. I am thinking in particular of one curious note in the commentary—not exactly a digression in Beroaldo’s sense, but not far from the kind of engagement the Bolognese humanist advocated and modeled for his readers. The note addresses a hypothetical question in the poem, a question that gave the commentator pause. If, after death (and presumably much time), the atoms that made up a person came together in exactly the same arrangement, would that person, suddenly recomposed in time and space, be able to mourn or remember himself? For Lucretius, who insisted that the soul dies with the body, the answer was a vehement “no.” As he explained: “Even if time should gather together our matter after death and bring it back again as it is now placed, and if once more the light of life should be given to us, yet it would not matter one bit to us that even this had been done, when the recollection of ourselves has once been broken asunder.” This was clear enough, but for the Renaissance commentator, the poet’s answer was hard to believe. As Lambin wrote in the notes that accompany the passage in question: “A Denys Lambin who is offended at having been born a mortal, who laments his condition, does not see, I repeat, does not see that in real death there will be no other Denys Lambin who—alive and standing by—could look upon him dead, and grieve over him lying there.” 21. Ficino, Platonic Theology, 4:308–9. 22. Lucretius, DRN 3.847–51: “Nec, si materiem nostram collegerit aetas / post obitum rursumque redegerit ut sita nunc est, / atque iterum nobis fuerint data lumina vitae, / pertineat quicquam tamen ad nos id quoque factum, / interrupta semel cum sit repetentia nostri.” 23. Lambin, in Lucretius, De rerum natura, ed. Lambin, 277: “Nec videt . . . Dionysius Lambinus, qui indignatur se mortalem esse natum, suamque conditionem deplorat, non videt (inquam) in vera morte nullum alium fore Dionysium Lambinum, qui viuus & stans possit se mortuum, & iacentem lugere, &c.”; my translation.
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The commentator’s note is extraordinary for a number of reasons, not least of which for the kind of engagement it represents. What we find here is Lambin actually performing the sense of disbelief that the poet describes slightly later on in the poem after he gives us the bad (or is it good?) news that we won’t keep consciously living the same existence over and over again ad infinitum. The commentator is, in fact, taking the poet’s words as if they were his own: “Hence he resents that he was born mortal, and does not see that in real death there will be no other self that could live to bewail his perished self, or stand by to feel pain.” But what exactly is Lambin doing here by mimicking the poet, and, moreover, how are we meant to understand this kind of gesture in the context of the edition? On the one hand, the answer seems very simple. We could say that the commentator is being playful by “signing” his name twice in the notes, winking at the reader, who is invited to participate and project himself or herself into the conceptual world of the poem. And, of course, he is being playful. By the same logic, however, we might say that Lambin is also making a more serious methodological point, one that is crucial for a text considered as dangerous as De rerum natura: to read the poetry of Lucretius, one first has to take his inhuman and senseless world of atoms and the void as one’s own. For the textual critic working through the troubled manuscripts of the poem, this proposition had some important consequences, which Lambin seems to have understood all too well. In being asked to imagine the Renaissance commentator recomposed or collected in time and space, for example, aren’t we also being asked to think of Lambin’s own work as a philologist piecing the text back together letter by letter, collecting Lucretius? In this context, how could we forget what the poet himself said about the letters of the alphabet being like the atoms of the universe? Lucretius, as we know, had used this analogy many times in the course of De rerum natura, calling attention to the dynamic world 24. Lucretius, DRN 3.884–87: “Hinc indignatur se mortalem esse creatum, / nec videt in vera nullum fore morte alium se / qui possit vivus sibi se lugere peremptum / stansque iacentem se lacerari urive dolere.” 25. Earlier, Pio himself had insisted that the textual critic should not be ignorant either of grammar or philosophy if he wished to emend a text such as De rerum natura. See Pio, Annotamenta (1505), in Gruter, Lampas, 1:397.
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of invisible particles hiding beneath a seemingly stable act of reading. Consider this passage: quin etiam passim nostris in versibus ipsis multa elementa vides multis communia verbis, cum tamen inter se versus ac verba necessest confiteare et re et sonitu distare sonanti. tantum elementa queunt permutato ordine solo; at rerum quae sunt primordia, plura adhibere possunt unde queant variae res quaeque creari. [Moreover, all through these very lines of mine you see many elements common to many words, although you must confess that lines and words differ one from another both in meaning and in the sound of their soundings. So much can elements do, when nothing is changed but order: but the elements that are the beginnings of things can bring with them more kinds of variety, from which all the various things can be produced.]
Something startling happens here, and in other moments of De rerum natura, where the poem reflects upon its own material status as an object in time and space: suddenly the text in one’s hands begins to unsettle. If letters are like atoms and matter is always in the process of coming together and dispersing and coming together in different ways, then the text itself is vulnerable to the very physics the poet describes— we might even say, is expressive of the poet’s physics. By writing his name in the commentary, Lambin was confronting not only his own mortality, but also the inevitable mortality of the text and the threat of disintegration and nonsense. The question might be reframed now in slightly different terms: if all of the letters of De rerum natura were put back together in precisely the same arrangement, would the poem still be the same? Can a text mourn or remember itself? It seems no small irony that the rediscovery of the poem in the Renaissance occasioned the most profound vision of its loss and destruction. Lambin’s friends, indeed, made much of the pregnant irony of his working on a poet who said that every living thing was subject to death, 26. Lucretius, DRN 1.823– 29. Lucretius repeats this idea several times in the course of the poem at 1.196–98, 1.912–14, 2.688–90, and 2.1013–14.
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even the lines of his own poem. In the front matter of Lambin’s edition of De rerum natura, Jean Dorat, a fellow reader and friend at the Collège Royal, described the nature of Lambin’s philological work on Lucretius in characteristically witty and loaded terms: If there is no way for immortal things to be created from mortal elements [ex elementis], and the verses which you continue composing on the nature of things are the product of your mind, learned Lucretius, then I am surprised that you were eager to prove the mind mortal which could fashion such immortal texts. For if the damaging effects of time chanced to pour some marks onto your pages, Denys Lambin, as Cicero before him, has recently washed these away in an instant with his keen-scented mind.
In these dedicatory verses, Dorat is borrowing Lucretius’s own language, breathing new life into the familiar conflict between the conventions of poetic immortality and a poem that insists that everything is subject to change. As all of the letters, if not exactly the atoms, of the text are put back together in the same arrangement, the poet is seemingly proven wrong by the French philologist. Calling the ruinous text of De rerum natura back from the jaws of oblivion, following in the very footsteps of Cicero, Lambin was able to save the Epicurean poet from his own bad news—and by virtue of his clever mind. For the literati of the 1550s and 1560s, the kind of mens sagax that Dorat praises here referred primarily to one thing: the practice of conjectural emendation. This was the practice that defined French philology at this particular moment and, according to its practitioners, made 27. See Segal, “Poetic Immortality.” Segal demonstrates how Lucretius’s desire for poetic immortality in a poem that denies it may be read as part of a process of gradual renunciation. 28. Dorat, in Lucretius, De rerum natura, ed. Lambin (1563), sig. a1v: “Immortalia si mortalibus ex elementis, / Non est, ut possint ulla ratione creari: / Mentis opusque tuae sunt carmina, docte Lucreti, / Quae tu de rerum natura pangere pergis: / Miror, te mortalem animi studuisse probare / Mentem, talia quae scripta immortalia condat. / Nam si quas maculas iniuria temporis (ut fit) / Chartis forte tuis alleverat, ilicet illas, / Ut quondam Cicero, sic nuper mente sagaci / Detergens Lambinus, in antiquumque nitorem / Carmina restituens”; my translation. See Pantin, “Dorat et la poésie de la nature,” 350–52.
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it superior to the Italian model, which represented a more careful and circumspect approach to working with manuscripts and documenting their provenance. The French were famous (or infamous) for their ability to conjure up readings from manuscripts that were seriously corrupted, sometimes even restoring whole lines of poems that had been previously lost or mangled. It was an instantaneous act of reason and will, as Dorat imagines it in the dedication above, a stroke of learned genius that pointed back to the commentator upon whose singular mind the text was dependent. In light of his work, Lambin appears as a kind of artist. No wonder he felt so comfortable signing his name. Not everyone, however, appreciated the genius of the French conjectural mind at work, or the arrogance all too frequently associated with it. And the opponents weren’t just the Italians. In a heated war of words, Peter Ramus and Omer Talon once angrily accused Lambin’s friend and collaborator Adrien Turnèbe of mangling the text of De rerum natura with specious emendations. “Here you fill two pages with other people’s things,” they wrote witheringly, “you correct Lucretius, you keep selling your old copies: and yet from these learned emendations of yours, no better book comes to light.” These, in fact, were the very same emendations that were to earn Turnèbe a place on the title page of the second edition of Lambin’s De rerum natura. For readers such as Ramus and Talon, the kind of conjectural savvy that characterized the philology of Turnèbe and Lambin was “haughty and arrogant in the extreme” (superbissimum, arrogantissimum), “covered with the skin of an elephant” (elephantis corio tectum), and, perhaps worst of all, “comparable in slowness and ignorance to Epicurus” (traditate & inscitia Epicuro similem). So much for the claim that Lambin emended Lucretius “in an instant.” In the midst of this vigorous exchange of insults, Ramus and Talon stumbled upon the analogy between the philologist and the Epicurean
29. See Grafton, Joseph Scaliger, vol. 1. 30. Talon, Admonitio, 7: “Hic rebus alienis paginas duas exples, Lucretium corrigis, vetera tua exemplaria venditas: & tamen ex his eruditis correctionibus tuis, nullus liber correctior exit in lucem”; my translation. 31. Talon, Admonitio, 22–23.
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that we have been circling around. Notwithstanding the venom, their point is worth taking seriously, for the conjectural philologist and the Epicurean held a number of things in common—especially when it came to the matter of method. We might begin to make sense of this analogy with a passage from De rerum natura, in which the poet explains his own inductive procedure of scattering only a few vestigia or footprints of his arguments so that the clever reader might fill in the rest by means of his own reason. We came across a few lines of this passage earlier; here it is in full: Quapropter, quamvis causando multa moreris, esse in rebus inane tamen fateare necessest. multaque praeterea tibi possum commemorando argumenta fidem dictis corradere nostris. verum animo satis haec vestigia parva sagaci sunt per quae possis cognoscere cetera tute. namque canes ut montivagae persaepe ferarum naribus inveniunt intectas fronde quietes, cum semel institerunt vestigia certa viai, sic alid ex alio per te tute ipse videre talibus in rebus poteris caecasque latebras insinuare omnis et verum protrahere inde. [Therefore, however you may demur by making many objections, confess you must, nevertheless, that there is a void in things. Many another proof besides I can mention to scrape together credit for my doctrines. But for a keen-scented mind, these little tracks [vestigia] are enough to enable you to recognize the others for yourself. For as hounds very often find by their scent the leaf-hidden resting-place of the mountainranging quarry, when once they have hit upon certain traces of its path, so will you be able for yourself to see one thing after another in such matters as these, and to penetrate all unseen hiding-places, and draw forth the truth from them.]
The poet will not go through exhaustive explanations to prove what he means; for those with a “keen-scented mind”—the same phrase Dorat had used to describe Lambin—the vestigia should be enough. Among 32. Lucretius, DRN 1.398–409.
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other things, these vestigia represent a kind of textual insurance policy taken out by a man who knew he would need one. They also served as a means of transmitting the philosophy while teaching the way it works. Throughout the text of De rerum natura, the poet explains how to use a “keen-scented mind” to get beyond the threshold of perception—to move, for example, from the figure of dust colliding in a ray of sunlight to an unseen world of atoms. “So far as it goes,” Lucretius says, “a small thing [dust] may give an analogy of great things [atoms], and show the tracks [vestigia] of knowledge.” For the philologist, one could say, the analogy worked through the “small thing” of the text. Renaissance humanists, of course, were used to following the footsteps and footprints of reason. For readers from Petrarch onward, the figure of vestigia and the proverbial pack of hounds were Renaissance clichés that applied widely to the book hunter seeking out the remains of textual traditions or the humanist filling in the holes of corrupted manuscripts. Pierre Galland, for example, once described himself and Adrien Turnèbe as a pack of “keen-scented” dogs sniffing out the manuscripts in old monasteries in Northern France and Flanders. Galland had even supplied Lambin with one of the precious manuscripts of De rerum natura for his edition, which nicely illustrates the connection we’re pursuing here. In the place where these various kinds of footprints cross in the unstable text of Lucretius’s poem, an old metaphor is granted a new materialist life. Working on Lucretius’s poem, Lambin and his colleagues would discover that the practice of conjecture that allowed them to supplement the poet’s incomplete and scattered text was very similar to the practice that the Epicurean poet 33. Lucretius, DRN 2.121– 24: “Conicere ut possis ex hoc, primordia rerum / quale sit in magno iactari semper inani. / dumtaxat rerum magnarum parva potest res / exemplare dare et vestigia notitiai.” 34. Galland and Turnèbe, preface to De agrorum. See Lewis, Adrien Turnèbe (1512–1565), 38. In suggesting nearly eight hundred emendations (his own inflated estimate), Lambin repeatedly claims that he followed the antiquae scripturae vestigia, comparing all of the extant manuscripts of the poem and all of the available printed editions, as well as using the fragments quoted by grammarians and passages imitated by poets to establish his authoritative text. As we might expect, in certain instances he says that he employed nothing but his own reason to divine what had seemingly been lost forever. For a short history of following vestigia, see Ginzburg, “Clues.”
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said would allow them to transport their minds into a world of unseen particles. Indeed, in piecing De rerum natura back together— confronting the very materiality of the poem in order to read and understand it—the commentator was being led beyond the threshold of perception. If the exchange between the text and the commentator sounds like an act of initiation, in a way it was. In the seventeenth century, the philosopher Francis Bacon explained this kind of exchange neatly in his account of the “initiative method”—a method he likened to the ancient mysteries in which an initiate suffers or experiences knowledge rather than simply being taught. As he describes it in The Advancement of Learning (1605): But knowledge that is to be delivered to others as a thread to be spun on ought to be insinuated (if it were possible) in the same method wherein it was originally invented. . . . Yet certainly it is possible for a man in a greater or less degree to revisit his own knowledge, and trace over again the footsteps [vestigia] both of his cognition and consent; and by that means to transplant it into another mind just as it grew in his own.
Bacon’s “method” here may help us to understand what is at stake in Lambin’s reading of a didactic poem such as De rerum natura. We have already seen this kind of insinuation in the poet’s description of the Epicurean initiate following vestigia, penetrating the hidden places of nature and discovering “one thing after another.” Slightly earlier in the poem, Lucretius spoke of “weaving” (pertexere) the web of his discourse, implicitly linking the act of imagining a world of invisible atoms and the void with the material composition of his verses. A poet who understood the irony of monumentality as poignantly as any Renais35. Bacon, Works, 4:449; 1:664: “Atque hoc ipsum fieri sane potest in scientia per inductionem acquisita; sed in anticipata ista et praematura scientia (qua utimur), non facile dicat quis quo itinere ad eam, quam nactus est scientiam pervenerit. Attamen sane secundum majus et minus possit quis scientiam propriam revisere, et vestigia suae cognitionis simul et consensus remetiri; atque hoc pacto scientiam sic transplantare in animum alienum sicut crevit in suo.” I have included Bacon’s Latin translation of the passage here for emphasis. 36. Lucretius, DRN 1.418: “Sed nunc ut repetam coeptum pertexere dictis” (But now to resume my task begun of weaving the web of this discourse).
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sance humanist could well have anticipated the need to re-create his text from its inevitable ruins, making the poem’s physical reconstruction an extension of its philosophical method—as Bacon describes it here, “a thread to be spun on.” For Lucretius, the philology of the future was another act of Epicurean initiation. It was thus that the very reconstruction of De rerum natura as a text in the Renaissance occasioned a deep analogy between the philologist and the Epicurean. In reading De rerum natura, the commentator’s own familiar practices of conjecture were suddenly reimagined in the strange light of Epicurean philosophy, his method reflected and transformed in a mirror that called for his attention. It was this, I suspect, that the learned Hellenist Jacob Helias was playing upon when he celebrated the commentator’s acumen in his own dedicatory poem: Prodiit ante tua, Lambine, Lucretius arte, Vulgus iners quem atris obruerat tenebris . . . innumerosque locos, acri quos lumine mentis clarasti, obscurat sordibus & maculis . . . Restituisque suae una opera Carum integritati, et linguae expugnas dira venena malae. Si duplici ergo Titus Λαμπίνου lampade claret, Quae nox, quae tenebrae iam superesse queant? [By your art, Lambin, Lucretius, whom the sluggish multitude had buried in deadly shadows, has appeared in view. [Another man] obscures countless places with stains and blemishes, which you have made clear by the keen light of your mind. You restore Carus to his wholeness in one undertaking, and conquer the dreadful poisons of bad speech. If therefore by the strong light of Lampinos Titus should shine forth, what night, what darkness, is now able to survive?]
In Helias’s verses we find the humanist playing with the ancient poet’s full name, Titus Carus Lucretius, breaking it up, presumably to avoid repetition, but also to dramatize the restitution of the name itself (and, by extension, Lucretius’s poem) by Lambin’s hand. Here we also come upon another curious instance of discovering Lambin’s own name in the commentary. Indeed, the word Λάμπινος, “Lampinos,” is not a stan37. Helias, in Lucretius, De rerum natura, ed. Lambin (1563), 2v; my translation.
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dard Greek word, but a clever play on the humanist’s name that links it to the idea of light or a lamp, to the humanist’s lampas or torch by which he makes clear the obscurities of texts, and to the Greek word λαμβάνω, which means to seize or to grasp. By recasting Lambin’s name in Greek, Helias, I suspect, was also making a reference to Lucretius’s famous description of Epicurus as a bringer of light, an inventor who raised men’s eyes to the truth by reason: E tenebris tantis tam clarum extollere lumen qui primus potuisti inlustrans commoda vitae, te sequor, o Graiae gentis decus, inque tuis nunc ficta pedum pono pressis vestigia signis, non ita certandi cupidus quam propter amorem quod te imitari aveo. [O you who first amid so great a darkness were able to raise a light so clear, illuminating the blessings of life, you I follow, O glory of the Grecian race, and now on the marks you have left I plant my own footsteps [vestigia] firm, not so much desiring to be your rival, as for love, because I yearn to copy you.]
With this passage in mind, we see that Helias’s playful Greek rendering of Lambin’s name looks both forward and backward in time—backward to Epicurus and his philosophy and forward to the commentator himself, who was the heir to what Cicero, agreeing with his brother, described as the poet’s “many lights of genius.” The “lamp” here is called duplex in the sense of “thick” or “strong,” but also in the sense of “double.” By using his reason to piece back together a fragmented tradition, “Lampinus’s” keen-scented mind borrowed and redoubled the light of Epicurus, refracted through the lens of the poem. Lucretius himself tellingly uses the word lampas in the place where he describes 38. For example, Jan Gruter’s seventeenth-century collection of scholarly contributions is called Lampas, which I’ve already cited a number of times in the notes above. I am grateful for the light of James Porter here. 39. Lucretius, DRN 3.1–6. 40. Helias may also be thinking of Lucretius, DRN 1.140– 45, where, after the poet claims to make clear the “dark discoveries of the Greeks,” he writes: “Sed tua me virtus tamen et sperata voluptas / suavis amicitiae quemvis efferre laborem / suadet et inducit noctes vigilare serenas / quaerentem dictis quibus et quo carmine demum / clara tuae possim praepandere lumina menti, / res quibus occultas penitus
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the generations of men who “pass the torch of life” (vitai lampada tradunt), a metaphor for the Epicurean cycle of life and death and a figure for tradition itself. As the poet planted his footsteps in those of his Epicurean master and the torch was passed, Lambin was practicing his own kind of imitation. In a certain light, the philologist begins to look a lot like an Epicurean.
Capta lepore As a sympathetic reader who was attempting to inhabit the world of his author, Lambin clearly got caught up in the poem. Some have said that he got carried away. Could a poeticus afflatus be felt too deeply? Could an identification with an author go too far? To understand how these questions arose in a history of method, and how they were answered, we will have to go back slightly earlier to the birth of conjectural philology in the Renaissance and the heated argument that surrounded it. In the dedication to book 4 of De rerum natura, addressed to his sometime friend (and sometime enemy) Antoine Muret, Lambin remembers his time with Muret at the Vatican Library exchanging notes, poring over old manuscripts together, and discussing the fine bones of method: two Frenchmen in Rome. For all their later disagreements and personal animosities, Lambin clearly learned a great deal from Muret about the practice of textual criticism. As he recalled: “It was you who first encouraged me, when I was in Rome, to undertake this work and see it to completion, and you helped me tirelessly as I compared the commonly accepted text of Lucretius with older editions and manuscripts. And that was not all: when I found a reading that differed from the common convisere possis” (But still it is your merit and the expected delight of your pleasant friendship, that persuades me to undergo any labour, and entices me to spend the tranquil nights in wakefulness, seeking by what words and what poetry at last I may be able to display clear lights before your mind, whereby you may see into the heart of things hidden). 41. Lucretius, DRN 2.77– 79: “Augescunt aliae gentes, aliae minuuntur, / inque brevi spatio mutantur saecla animantum / et quasi cursores vitai lampada tradunt” (Some species increase, others diminish, and in a short space the generations of living creatures are changed and, like runners, pass on the torch of life).
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text, over and over again it was you who sniffed out the true reading from the obliterated tracks [vestigia] of the old writing.” It might seem like a conventional thing for one humanist to say to another, but in the context of Lambin’s edition of De rerum natura, it was tantamount to a statement of philological allegiance in a long-running argument that Muret had started some years earlier. Thanks to Anthony Grafton, the story of that argument is wellknown among scholars of textual criticism. It begins when Muret traveled—or, rather, was forced to flee—to Italy to escape a lingering charge of sodomy. We find him in Rome cavorting with the great lights of the Vatican Library and picking a fight with Pietro Vettori, perhaps the best-known classical philologist in Italy at the time. Muret found Vettori’s work—scholarship known for its careful manuscript comparison and the attribution of sources—to be too conservative. With the help of his friend Paulo Manuzio, son of the great Venetian printer Aldo Manuzio, he sought to promote the method of conjectural emendation that he had brought with him from Paris and to embarrass his Italian rival. Aggressively criticizing Vettori’s more sober practices, Muret produced a flurry of sometimes brilliant readings, demonstrating just where and how Vettori’s lack of imagination led him far astray from an accurate reading of a text. In this bloody act of philological assassination, Muret attacked his rival directly with examples from Vettori’s own work. What is even more interesting, however, is that he attacked him indirectly too, focusing his crosshairs on Vettori’s great Florentine model, Angelo Poliziano. The target could not have been better chosen, for, as Grafton has shown, by going after Poliziano, Muret was attempting to undercut the founder 42. Lambin, in Lucretius, De rerum natura, ed. Lambin (1563), 300– 301: “Tu enim mihi, cum Romae essem, princeps acerrimos ad hoc negotium suscipiendum, ac perficiendum stimulos admovisti, mihique vulgata Lucretii exempla cum exemplaribus antiquis, ac manuscriptis conferenti assiduam operam dedisti. Neque hoc tantum fecisti, verum etiam, cum in scripturam aliquam a vulgata discrepantem ac diversam incideremus, atque in ea haereremus: tu saepe ex obscuris, & propemodum oblitteratis veteris scripturae vestigiis veram lectionem (quo ingenio, quoque acumine es) sagacissime odorabaris”; my translation. 43. This controversy is recounted in detail in Grafton, Joseph Scaliger, 1:71–100 and 170–71.
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of a tradition of textual criticism that had been flourishing in Italy since his death—and to insult Vettori with a touch of irony. He was also picking up allies. Indeed, in dredging up the terms of an old argument like this, Muret discovered an imagined friend in the Greek philologist, soldier, poet, and admirer of Lucretius, Michele Marullo (ca. 1450–1500)— Poliziano’s famous rival. In Muret’s hands Marullo became a crucial forebear in the use of the conjectural method and a key point of reference in the ongoing argument against Poliziano and his Italian ilk. The connection with Marullo, of course, also proved useful for the opposition, who found in him a lot to complain about. For Vettori, the Greek poet was a prime example of the kind of bad conjectural scholar he felt was crossing the line and further corrupting ancient texts with unsound emendations: Now Marullo was a man of remarkable wit, and a most elegant poet, so ardent a student and admirer of Lucretius that he almost never put down [his work]. Furthermore, he labour