The logics of the mind: a clinical view

J O R G E L. A H U M A D A

THE L O G I C S O F THE M I N D

A Clinical View

Foreword by

R. HORACIO

ETCHEGOYEN

K A R N A C BOOKS



THE L O G I C S

O F THE M I N D

Jorge i.

Ahumada

THE LOGICS

OF THE MIND

A Clinical View

Jorge L Ahumada

Foreword by

R. Horacio Etchegoyen

London & N e w York

KARNAC BOOKS

First published in 2001 by H. Karnac (Books) Ltd, 118 Finchley Road, London NW3 5HT A subsidiary of Other Press LLC, New York Copyright © 2001 Jorge L. Ahumada The rights of Jorge L. Ahumada to be identified as the author of this work have been asserted in accordance with §§ 77 and 78 of the Copyright Design and Patents Act 1988, Published in Portuguese under the title, Descobertas e refutaes: a logica do metodo psicoanalttico (Rio de Janeiro: Imago Editora, 1999); published in Spanish under the title, Deseubrimientos y refutaciones: La logica de la indagacion psicoanalttica (Madrid: Editorial Biblioteca Nueva, 1999). All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A C L P , for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 1 85575 247 4 10

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Edited, designed, and produced by Communication Crafts Printed and bound in Great Britain by Biddies Ltd, www.biddles.co.uk www.karnacbooks.com

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

vii

FOREWORD

ix

PREFACE

xi

Introduction

T h e crisis of culture a n d the crisis of psychoanalysis 1

1

W h a t is a clinical fact? C l i n i c a l psychoanalysis

as inductive m e t h o d

15

2

T h e analyst as " b a s e "

37

3

O n the transposition of self a n d object

51

4

T h e unconscious d e l u s i o n of " g o o d n e s s "

65

5

Perverse a n d symbiotic organizations

i n narcissistic object relationships v

83



Vi

6

CONTENTS

On narcissistic identification and the shadow

of the object

95

7

Trauma, identification, evolution

115

8

On the limitations and the infiniteness of analysis

125

Epilogue

The role of writing and psychoanalytic writings

139

REFERENCES

155

INDEX

169



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

M

y debt of gratitude to m y training analyst, the late D r Joel Z a c , w h i c h cannot b u t be recognized, m u s t be

m e n t i o n e d first a n d foremost. F r o m D r H a r o l d F . Searles

I w a s able to grasp, at the start of m y training, the concreteness of psychic reality as it is enacted i n the analytic situation. D r R.

H o r a c i o Etchegoyen, m y clinical supervisor for m o r e t h a n five years a n d m y mentor d u r i n g some two decades, w a s crucial to m y respect for the psychoanalytic m e t h o d , m y interest i n its study, a n d m y ability, if any, to p u t ideas i n w r i t i n g . D r D a r i o Sor g u i d e d m y a p p r o a c h to Bion's thought; it w o u l d be futile for m e to guess to w h a t extent some of the ideas are " h i s " or " m i n e " . D r s M a r i a Rosa Senet de G a z z a n o , A l f r e d o G a z z a n o , a n d F e r n a n d e Santa C o l o m a gave invaluable personal a n d intellectual support, as is true also of m y wife, Lie. L u i s a C . B u s c h de A h u m a d a . D r Elias M . d a R o c h a Barros I m u s t thank for, i n a d d i t i o n to m a n y other things, encour­ aging m e to p u t these papers together as a book.

***

viii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

T h a n k s are d u e to the following persons a n d institutions for their p e r m i s s i o n to p u b l i s h the following papers: T o D r Jose T . C a l i c h , editor of Revista Psicanalitica

de Porto Alegre,

de Psicandlise

da

Sociedade

for ' T h e Crisis of C u l t u r e a n d the

Crisis of Psychoanalysis" (1997) [Introduction]. T o Professor D a v i d Tuckett, M . A . , M . S c , editor of the Journal

International

for " W h a t Is a C l i n i c a l Fact? C l i n i c a l

of Psycho-Analysis,

Psychoanalysis as Inductive M e t h o d " (1994) [Chapter 1], p u b ­ lished i n the International

Journal of Psycho-Analysis,

as w e l l as for

" O n Narcissistic Identification a n d the S h a d o w of the Object" (1990) [Chapter 6], a n d " O n the Limitations a n d the Infiniteness of A n a l y s i s " (1989) [Chapter 8], p u b l i s h e d i n the Review

of

International

Psycho-Analysis.

T o D r M a r i a Ines Raitzin de V i d a l , editor of Psicoandlisis,

for " T h e

A n a l y s t as ' B a s e ' " (1984) [Chapter 2], " T h e U n c o n s c i o u s D e l u ­ sion of ' G o o d n e s s ' " (1982) [Chapter 4], a n d " T r a u m a , Identifica­ tion, E v o l u t i o n " (1986) [Chapter 7]. T o D r C a r l o s Chagas Diefenthaeler, editor of Revista

de

Psiquiatria

de Rio Grande do Sul, for " T h e Role of W r i t i n g a n d Psychoanalytic W r i t i n g s " (1996) [Epilogue].

FOREWORD R. Horacio Etchegoyen

T

he revised v e r s i o n of m y b o o k The Fundamentals of Psycho­ analytic Technique (1986 [1999]) gave m e a recent occasion to a c k n o w l e d g e a n d m a k e due place for the relevant c o n t r i b u ­ tions m a d e b y Jorge A h u m a d a to our grasp of the operation of the psychoanalytic m e t h o d , most p a r t i c u l a r l y as far as the central topic of the d y n a m i c s of insight are concerned. It has been A h u m a d a ' s core endeavour to deepen the u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g of our c l i n i c a l m e t h o d based o n the n e w instruments w i t h w h i c h the e v o l u t i o n i n the r e a l m of logic has p r o v i d e d us d u r i n g this last century. I a m confident that the contributions i n c l u d e d i n this v o l u m e w i l l be of significant use to the reader i n the h a n d l i n g of his or her practice a n d also that they w i l l p r o v e to be of lasting v a l u e for the psychoanalytic d i s c i p l i n e .

ix

PREFACE

T

his book puts together papers published in diverse lan­ guages over some fifteen years, written on the assumption that much is to be gained by expanding the epistemic frames at the basis of our outlook on psychoanalytic experiences. In agreeing with Imre Lakatos to the effect that "We cannot get rid of the problem of the 'empirical basis', if we want to learn from experience" (1970, p. 131), I rely on Russell, Richfield, Bateson, von Wright, and Matte-Bianco for conceptual bearings in order to ex­ pand the lines of research inaugurated by Strachey, Racker, and Etchegoyen. Understanding of ongoing paradoxes is thereby found to underlie insight on emotional turmoil and the defences it raises, opening the road to psychic evolution. The manifold diversity encompassed by the terms "empirical basis" admits of many approaches, but as far as method is con­ cerned, not all roads lead to Rome. As regards our peculiar empiri­ cal basis—unconscious mental processes—my tenet is that the psychoanalytic situation affords a privileged observational field to analyst and analysand, allowing us to test theories informally and at different levels: not only the analysand's and the analyst's " u n ­ xi

Xll

PREFACE

conscious theories", but our common-sense theories too; a n d then our psychoanalytic theories a n d our theories o n our m e t h o d . T h e impact o n our practice a n d our discipline of current socio­ cultural changes, g o i n g f r o m a culture of the written w o r d to one of " v i s u a l p o w e r " action-images, is the subject of the Introduction: " T h e Crisis of C u l t u r e a n d the Crisis of P s y c h o a n a l y s i s " . T h e n I go into the issues of what can be considered a clinical fact i n p s y c h o ­ analysis, illustrating the attainment of the representability of c l i n i ­ cal material a n d the counter-inductive operation i n the session of the psychoanalytic m e t h o d . Subsequent chapters establish a clinical distinction, at the level of narcissistic structures, between a p r o p e r l y parasitic perverse organization a n d a symbiotic organization, g i v e n the p r e s u p p o s i ­ tion that it is o n the evolution of the symbiotic structure that that of the analytic process w i l l mostly d e p e n d . This stance posits a p e c u ­ liar a p p r o a c h to the topography of m i n d — w h a t I call the

transposi­

tion of self and Object defined i n terms of functions. S u c h decentring of the t o p o g r a p h y of m i n d vis-a-vis

the anatomy of the i n d i v i d u a l

illustrates m y debt to W i l f r e d Bion's w o r k . A n apparently b e n i g n f o r m of the parasitic structure, the delusion of one's o w n goodness, is described a n d l i n k e d to identification a n d trauma. T h i s , i n turn, serves to r e w o r k the technical problems brought u p b y F r e u d i n " A n a l y s i s Terminable a n d Interminable" (1937c), a n d then b y the F r e u d i a n standpoints o n narcissistic identification a n d o n grief. T h e E p i l o g u e considers the present-day shift f r o m a culture of w r i t i n g into one of images t h r o u g h the action of mass m e d i a . M y interest i n the logics of the psychoanalytic m e t h o d is e v i ­ dence of m y conviction that clinical a n d conceptual h o n i n g of the analytic instrument s h o u l d keep firmly away f r o m mimetic b o w s to cultural or intellectual fashions. A more explicit grasp of the w a y s of the psychoanalytic m e t h o d w i l l help us to further the ostensiveness of p h e n o m e n a i n the session a n d an i n - d e p t h u n d e r ­ standing of our patients. Putting d o w n our findings a n d o u r c l i n i ­ cal interventions more precisely advances, i n turn, F r e u d ' s clinical m e t h o d at a time of crisis. Fluctuat

nec

mergitur.

THE LOGICS

O F THE M I N D

Introduction The crisis of culture

and the crisis of psychoanalysis

The so-called ''crisis of psychoanalysis" derives in the main from a crisis of reflective thought in society as a whole, in the context of the passage from family-rearing and a culture of writing to­ wards acculturation in 'Virtual" realities. Avoidance of early grief and identificatory deficits leads to unending adolescence and the use of mind-as-muscle as a substitute for reflection. If we follow Eugenio Gaddini on the changes in psychopathologies in recent decades, up to today's pathologies of peremptory gratifi­ cation, we meet increasing ambiguity. Mimetic defences expe­ rienced as essential to psychic survival lead to an "autarchy", while insight becomes a threat. Other issues are internal to our societies or come from academic vulgarizations of psychoanal­ ysis; these assume that they are rescuing its "concepts" while giving short shrift to its method.

This is an expanded version of a paper published i n Revista de Psicandlise da Sociedade Psicanalitica de Porto Alegre, 6 (1997): 51-69. 1

2

THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

T

he early epochs of psychoanalysis were m a r k e d b y some degree of o p t i m i s m regarding its ability to shape culture. Now,

the general consensus

is that its clinical practice

comes u p against ever greater hurdles. This c a n be v i e w e d f r o m

various standpoints. A s indicated b y the title, Edelson's w i d e l y read b o o k Psychoanalysis: A Theory in Crisis (1988) puts the onus o n o u r discipline: he maintains that w e must revise a n d sharpen o u r theoretical core concepts a n d further validate o u r therapeutic re­ sults i n order to refute the ever-present critique o n the scientificity of psychoanalysis. T h e present b o o k is, I hope, proof e n o u g h of m y w i s h to clarify a n d p o l i s h the glass through w h i c h w e see the psychoanalytic experience. Rather than focusing o n our theories, m y m a i n concern refers to the logic u n d e r l y i n g our clinical m e t h o d . T o m y m i n d , the m e t h o d is the central g r o u n d i n g of psychoanalysis, a n d its proper use grants to analysand a n d analyst the fertility of thought that nurtures genuine advances i n our theories. T h i s does not m e a n , however, that the current problems of practice stem f r o m a weak­ ness i n its m e t h o d or theories. T h e issues at play here are of a quite different sort. But, before going into this theme, let m e state that the initial o p t i m i s m o n the influence of psychoanalysis o n culture rested u p o n a trust, more lively then than n o w , o n what A n d r e G r e e n (1993b) has called a " c i v i l i z i n g project" i n society as a whole. Psychoanalysis felt itself to be, w i t h some reason, a p r i v i l e g e d part of that civilizing project, i n a s m u c h as it opened doors to the u n d e r ­ standing of heretofore u n k n o w n dimensions of h u m a n endeavour., T h e crisis of the civilizing project that is a sign of m o d e r n i t y is usually traced to the "crisis of subjectivity" brought u p b y Nietzsche a n d characterizing m u c h of Heidegger's w o r k . T h e crisis of subjectivity emerges f r o m a n awareness of the superficiality of consciousness w h i c h , once u n m a s k e d , leaves n o place for secure foundations: w h i c h a m o u n t s — a c c o r d i n g to the hermeneutic p h i l ­ osopher G i a n n i Vattimo (1992)—to the demise

of all ultimate

foundations, leading to the " d e a t h of v a l u e s " a n d the " d e a t h of metaphysics"

that are the m a r k of p o s t - m o d e r n

hermeneutics.

INTRODUCTION

3

S u c h a w a y of t h i n k i n g tacitly attributes to philosophical thought the role of ultimate context for what takes place i n society as a w h o l e . T o m y m i n d , though, the links between philosophical post­ m o d e r n i s m a n d the issues, social a n d psychological, i n present-day society are looser, w i t h philosophical p o s t - m o d e r n i s m p l a y i n g mostly the role of the G r e e k chorus, its chant narrating a n d reflect­ i n g o n what goes o n rather than influencing events. It seems fitting, then, i n respect, to follow B a u d r i l l a r d (1988), w h o maintains that signs a n d then w r i t i n g , w h i c h h a d originally emerged for the p u r ­ pose of indicating realities, passed d u r i n g the last century, b y w a y of p r o p a g a n d a a n d advertising, to being u s e d to mask reality a n d today, i n the hyper-real context of radio a n d television, go o n to cloak the absence of reality of m e d i a culture. In any case, what I want to point out as the "crisis of c u l t u r e " is at the opposite pole of the H e i d e g g e r i a n Andenken—of

the thought of remembrance w h e r e b y

one rescues one's roots i n a cultural tradition. R e t u r n i n g to present-day criticism of psychoanalysis, the initial epistemic step, w h i c h I address i n several papers (1994,

1995,

1997a, 1997b, 1997c), requires the epistemic a priori of s u c h criticism to be examined. In a d d i t i o n , one must take heed of the shifts i n the culture itself a n d , last but not least, of h o w the attempts to p o p u l a r ­ ize psychoanalysis tend to backfire on its bona fide practice. This w i l l allow us to sidestep two major hurdles: o n the one h a n d , attention to the inadequacies of current epistemic postures a n d to present-day cultural changes helps us to a v o i d p a y i n g u n d u e h o m a g e to positivist or hermeneutic epistemic views. These d o not d o justice to the workings of our clinical psychoanalytic m e t h o d — E d e l s o n ' s yardstick of scientificity is that Procrustean b e d , the " l a w f u l " m o d e l of G a l i l e a n science. M o r e importantly, w e shall better discern the role of the social a n d cultural contexts of w h i c h psychoanalysis is a part. W e must not miss the chance that our clinical m e t h o d provides of scrutinizing the p r o f o u n d a n d w o r r y i n g implications of current sociocultural changes. Bluntly said, the obstacles to psychoanalytic w o r k demonstrate a crisis of reflective thought i n society.

4

THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

The changes in the psychopathologies There have been clear warnings i n recent decades that there is n o guarantee that psychoanalysis, emerging from the study of n e u ­ roses, c a n shoulder the b u r d e n of otherwise articulated p a t h o l ­ ogies. It is a t r u i s m that neuroses have mostly been replaced b y the pathologies

of peremptory

gratification.

In such a v e i n , Winnicott

(1956) c o m m e n t e d that the psychoanalytic situation w a s f o r m u ­ lated for patients w h o d i d not present severe early deficits. S u c h is not the case today, a n d it redefines the functions of p s y c h o a n a l ­ ysis, w h i c h h a d its start b y rescuing psychosexuality i n the V i c t o ­ r i a n era. N o w a d a y s , i n the era of " z a p p i n g ' ' , mass m e d i a , a n d v i r t u a l reality, psychoanalysis merits a w i d e r a n d more important role. U n d e r s t a n d i n g present-day issues means a d u m b r a t i n g the changes i n psychopathologies that threaten not only the future of psychoanalysis b u t also the future of culture at large. T h e passage f r o m the culture of the written w o r d to one of action-images gives shape to the most drastic global experiment that the h u m a n species has w i l l i n g l y submitted to. V i r t u a l reality m a y be likened to c h i l d r e n p l a y i n g or to the theatre—an enacted mythical reality that has furthered social catharsis since the time of the Greeks. Yet such comparisons are m i s l e a d i n g . T h e impact of the mass m e d i a radically involves the omnipresence

i n time a n d space of substitute

realities:

initially

t h r o u g h its more d i l u t e d forms of radio a n d cinema, then tele­ v i s i o n , a n d lately through the u p - a n d - c o m i n g computer m e d i a , w h i c h i m p i n g e o n ego defences a n d o n the ego's ability to deal w i t h emotions a n d conflicts. This can be clinically observed often e n o u g h i n the addictions to virtual realities i n b o t h c h i l d a n d adult analytic patients. Specifically, "substitute realities", acting as spuri­ ous substitutes

i n M o n e y - K y r l e ' s (1971) sense, obstruct emotional

m a t u r i t y a n d symbol-formation, w h i c h require contact w i t h a n d tolerance for unconscious affects a n d feelings. Winnicott's pioneering paper, " T r a n s i t i o n a l Objects a n d T r a n s i ­ tional P h e n o m e n a " (1951), suggests that, e n route to emotional pathology, the transitional object is replaced b y the fetish.

Such a

shift i n the " u s e of the object" happens when hope is absent and the object is used to abolish spontaneous

separation

(p. 19). U n l i k e what happens i n

children's play, w h i c h , while subject to repetition,

INTRODUCTION

5

keeps to a b e g i n n i n g a n d a n e n d , it is easy to observe that the electronic addictions that come u p even i n m i d d l e - a g e d analysands a n d c a n thus be grasped analytically take place i n , a n d keep u p , a n atemporal frame whereby " v i r t u a l reality" is a context for unfet­ tered escapades of annihilatory omnipotence. There, where everything happens a n d n o t h i n g has h a p p e n e d , it is neither possible n o r fitting to bear the frustration that allows thought to proceed: thinking takes place at a p u r e l y operational level that abolishes both absence a n d separateness. Being at the opposite e n d of the scale f r o m the w o r k i n g - t h r o u g h of early anxie­ ties gained i n play, this w i l l h i n d e r the emotional w o r k i n g - t h r o u g h and symbol-construction that, o n the basis of the affects i n v o l v e d , M e l a n i e K l e i n n a m e d the "depressive p o s i t i o n " . In order to illustrate the role of v i s u a l m e d i a i n abolishing the k i n d of t h i n k i n g that w o u l d allow a n access to separateness, let m e m e n t i o n a n adult patient i n analysis w h o h a d a symbiotic relation­ ship to his w i f e — h e r e I a m u s i n g the term " s y m b i o t i c " i n M a h l e r ' s (1961) s e n s e — w h o came to realize a n d to reconstruct i n the session, m u c h to his surprise, h o w , w h e n confronted w i t h a melancholic or angry face o n her part, he took flight into television. H e was not o n l y unable to realize that something h a d h a p p e n e d w i t h , or to, his w i f e — h e w o u l d fall into a dementalized state to the point that half a f i l m w o u l d r u n t h r o u g h without his h a v i n g the slightest idea what he h a d been l o o k i n g at. S u c h a loss of separateness a n d the stimulus to dementalization are greatest i n the case of the v i d e o ­ clip, where the flow of images does not even a p p r o a c h h a v i n g a narrative structure a n d thus does not permit, stricto sensu, a n y chance for thought. The

analysis of m i d d l e - a g e d neurotic patients affords us a

chance to observe closely the obstruction i n the w a y of contact w i t h , a n d a tolerance for, a separateness of m i n d — t h a t is, o n o u r keeping reflectively i n contact w i t h ourselves. A

similar encroachment o n the capacity for separateness of

m i n d can be seen to operate i n child development. I shall take a n example narrated b y a mother. H e r three-year-old girl entered into m u t i s m o n starting nursery school. She w o u l d stand at h o m e , i m ­ passive, i n front of a w a l l ; after m u c h questioning she told her mother " I a m l o o k i n g at T V " — w h i c h immediately p r o m p t e d the parents to go out a n d b u y a television set. T o the m o t h e r — a n d this

6

THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

w o u l d , n o doubt, be the usual response—the episode was evidence of the social isolation of television-deprived children. In n o w a y d i d she take it as proof of the addictive p o w e r of the v i s u a l m e d i a — o f their p o w e r to abolish, b y w a y of the external e q u i v a ­ lent of a v i s u a l hallucination, the psychic p a i n that ensues f r o m contact w i t h separateness i n the w i d e r emotional context of separa­ tion f r o m the p r i m a r y object. A s a pervasive p r o v i d e r of "autistic f o r m s " , i n Tustin's (1984) sense, the " d u m b - b o x " obliterates c o n ­ tact w i t h object loss. This results i n a visual addiction that c a n p r o v i d e a fertile soil for later addictions: f r o m d r u g addiction, to a d d i c t i o n to antidepressives used as stimulants, to s u c h socially v a l i d a t e d addictions as to the g y m or extreme physical exercise, p r o v i d i n g b o d i l y auto-sensorial forms o n the one h a n d a n d endor­ p h i n s o n the other. It is likely that w e m a y f i n d here, especially i n the case of male patients, the genesis of the fetishization u n d e r l y i n g the u p s u r g e of the perversions. A n d , i n a s m u c h as the abolition of separateness

involves the whole population, it w i l l u n a v o i d a b l y

come to give shape to what is taken as n o r m a l i n our social reality. B y w a y of contrast w i t h the denial of temporality a n d of per­ sonal grief a n d achievement i n m e d i a culture, I shall present a n admirable example

f r o m the carajd Indians of the A m a z o n , of

w h i c h D a v i d A z o u b e l N e t o (1996) was the p r i v i l e g e d witness a n d narrator. W h i l e he w a s speaking w i t h the chief of the tribe, a girl came i n , m a d e a brief comment, a n d then left. After a few m o ­ ments, he asked the chief what h a d she h a d said, a n d the chief r e s p o n d e d that she h a d a n n o u n c e d that she h a d just h a d her first menstruation. A z o u b e l asked what w o u l d h a p p e n after this, a n d he w a s told that she w o u l d spend a few weeks w i t h her mother a n d grandmother, w h o w o u l d teach her what it w a s to be a w o m a n . N e i g h b o u r s w o u l d leave food at the entrance of the h u t ; then a feast w o u l d take place, because the tribe h a d gained a w o m a n . W h e n they were leaving the chief's hut, they heard a distant song of lament, a choro. O n being asked, the chief replied that the tribe cried because they h a d just lost a girl. D e n i a l of contact w i t h loss a n d grief a n d the evasion of sepa­ rateness i n v o l v e d i n s u c h denial leads easily to today's u n e n d i n g a n d often u n w o r k a b l e adolescences, to the pathologies of enact­ ment, a n d to the addictions the use of w h i c h as fetishes Winnicott adumbrates i n a 1969 a d d e n d u m to his paper. A d d i c t i o n s serve to

INTRODUCTION

7

bolster the omnipotent m a n i c denial that finds its roots i n the culture of v i s u a l m e d i a . O v e r a decade ago, i n a p o s t h u m o u s paper that remains re­ q u i r e d reading, G a d d i n i (1987) h e l d that the data of h u m a n experi­ ence cannot be fixed "objectively", as does the D S M - I I I a n d its updates. T h e data of h u m a n experience, he argues, are not experi­ m e n t a l but experiential T h e y emerge i n the context of a relationship a n d so they m u s t be continually objectified as m u c h as possible, thereby m a k i n g requisite the l o n g training that psychoanalysts g o t h r o u g h . G a d d i n i distinguishes t w o steps i n objectifying experien­ tial data: therapeutic objectification of subjective experience w i t h i n a particular therapeutic relationship, w h i c h is essential to the p s y ­ choanalytic process itself, a n d scientific objectification, d e r i v i n g f r o m the first a n d r e q u i r i n g emotional self-exposure vis-a-vis other ana­ lysts. A t a mental level, it involves complex operations s u c h as f i n d i n g the eventual links between selected data f r o m diverse clini­ cal situations. It also involves logical operations, l e a d i n g to theo­ retical formulations that are not b o u n d to the subjectivity of a g i v e n clinical situation. H e finds a conspicuous trend i n the exacerbation of i n d i v i d u a l pathologies i n recent decades, w h i c h poses a serious p r o b l e m for the future. Suffice it to say that he notes, starting f r o m W o r l d W a r I, ever more seriously d o m i n a n t pathologies, r a n g i n g f r o m hysterias a n d character disorders to the d o m i n a n c e of b o r d e r ­ line states a n d narcissistic personalities. The social impact of psychoanalysis a n d the social defences to this impact p r o v i d e d G a d d i n i w i t h the occasion for w r i t i n g m e m ­ orable pages, w h i c h I shall m e n t i o n briefly o n s p e a k i n g of the problematic administration of psychoanalysis b y institutions. H e remarks that for society psychoanalysis is a n enemy, liable to dis­ cover a n d overtake the defences of u n k n o w i n g that g u a r d against deep a n d dangerous abysses that s h o u l d be forever inaccessible. In the same w a y , at the b e g i n n i n g of their analysis, w h e n some patients advertise to all a n d s u n d r y that they are i n analysis, it spreads a superficial b r a n d of psychoanalytic i n f o r m a t i o n i n so­ ciety. T h a t psychoanalysis seems to penetrate language, customs, a n d all k i n d s of visible p h e n o m e n a is but a n imitative defence whereby

everyone

magically

becomes

a n analyst.

Everyone,

G a d d i n i continues, thus takes magical possession of p s y c h o a n a l ­ ysis a n d becomes a n equal to anyone. Imitators—intellectuals of all

8

THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

b r a n d s — d i s c u s s psychoanalysis i n newspapers, magazines, a n d books. T h e y organize symposia a n d congresses: the echo of F r e u d ' s n a m e resounds all over, as if he were understood. T h i s validates the imitative imposture. In s u c h a context, i n d i v i d u a l psychopathology becomes irrel­ evant, a n d w e enter the d o m a i n of mass psychology, where m i m ­ etic imitation makes us all " e q u a l s " . Identity means " i d e n t i c i t y " , a n d , as happens w i t h mobs, everybody is one a n d one is e v e r y b o d y a n d everyone feels " n o r m a l " . M i m e t i c p h e n o m e n a hide social a n d i n d i v i d u a l psychopathology. Identity, i n the sense of i n d i v i d u a l a u t o n o m y , is replaced b y a n autarchy

based o n imitative, magic,

omnipotent functioning. It c a n be a d d e d — a n d w e f i n d p r o o f e n o u g h i n newspapers a n d the academic press—that once the i m i ­ tative intellectual imposture immerses psychoanalysis i n banality, it is just as easy to dismiss as it is easy to d r o p a n y intellectual or cultural v o g u e . T h e erosion of i n - d e p t h thought i n today's light­ weight culture does not i m p i n g e o n psychoanalysis alone. A s ex­ p l a i n e d b y a N e w Y o r k cinema critic turned literary author, D a v i d D e n b y (1996), the m e d i a operate i n the now,

a n d the

now, now,

electric excitement of television turns everything else d i s c o l o u r e d a n d bizarre; a n d , furthermore, the m e d i a deliberately trivialize the arts, d r a i n i n g them, m o c k i n g them, to then discard t h e m as d e a d . T h e false, warns D e b o r d (1992), creates a f o r m of feeling reinforced b y the deliberate erasure of all references to the authentic; i n s u c h a context the genuine is immediately reconstructed to approximate it to the false. Several years ago, K e r n b e r g (1989) rightly stressed that w h o e v e r , i n any area, attempts to keep u p a measure of i n d i ­ v i d u a l i t y that stands i n opposition to implicit but prescribed g r o u p conventionalities exposes himself to consensual attack.

Social

mimesis

in the culture

of visual

media

T h e mimetic p h e n o m e n a that G a d d i n i describes i n his masterly fashion p r o v i d e a fair a p p r o a c h to present-day psychopathologies. W h a t i n the E p i l o g u e I call the display-window appropriately n a m e d the mimesis

culture

can be just as

culture. In the w o r l d - w i d e dis­

p l a y - w i n d o w of v i s u a l m e d i a , a n e w p r o g e n y — t h a t of

communica­

INTRODUCTION

tors—sows

9

a n d harvests the seeds of magical, omnipotent imitative

p h e n o m e n a of g r o u p mimesis, substituting, as B i o n (1965) w o u l d say, the place where a thought u s e d to be. G r o u p mimesis is as o l d as the hills. It predates mass m e d i a a n d does not d e p e n d directly o n them: witness the age-old search for v i s u a l mass impact i n architecture, or the rites of religions a n d empires, or, closer to o u r times, i n Hitlerian scenography. Yet m e d i a that allow v i s u a l a n d auditory impact at a distance radically changes mimetic p h e n o m e n a . Changes b r o u g h t about b y w a y of r a d i o a n d cinema, s u c h as the w o r l d - w i d e w a v e of suicide u p o n the death of R u d o l f V a l e n t i n o or the collective hysteria over O r s o n Welles's radio r e a d i n g of The War of the Worlds,

were e x p a n d e d b y

television. T h e y are absorbed f r o m c h i l d h o o d o n a n d often take more time out of a child's life than does school. T h i s is further escalated i n virtual reality, where the annihilation of thought not o n l y occurs, b u t becomes p r o p a g a n d a . O n e manufacturer of v i r ­ tual-reality helmets publicizes them as mind-blowing

(Meyer, 1996).

In truth, this term can be taken i n t w o w a y s — a s expansion a n d as dismissal: the ambiguity is, i n d e e d , v a l i d . C a u g h t b y the v i s u a l explosion, the press incorporates images where ideas u s e d to be, i n language that fits the normative ambiguity. A l l this gives weight to the w a y the m e d i a redefine a n d i n ­ corporate psychopathologies into a n ever m o r e p l u r a l n o r m a l c y . E v e r y d a y life brings grist for the mills of entertainment, w h i c h b e c o m e the overall euphoric n o r m that society is m a d e to resemble. Political leaders behave as communicators,

and from Ronald Reagan

o n entertainers go o n into politics. A s G a d d i n i also noted, the v e r y idea of p s y c h o p a t h o l o g y — e s p e c i a l l y

sexual

psychopathology—

blends into a n all-absorbing n o r m a l c y based o n adhesive identifi­ cations. T h u s , bisexuality turns into a n alternative

lifestyle,

" A new

sexual identity. . . . Bisexuals almost defy definition. Erotic life is for t h e m a fluid affair, not confined b y gender

expectations"

( L e l a n d , 1995, p . 1). B i s e x u a l i t y — a deconstructed, decentred v e r ­ s i o n of every conceivable sexual i m p u l s e — e m b o d i e s

a current

p a r a g o n , the p o l y s e m i c ideal of a n unfettered self-realization i n e v e r - e x p a n d i n g ambiguity. W h e r e i n resides the attraction of s u c h ambiguity? A p a r t f r o m the obvious transgressive gains, g i v e n that aggression is simultane­ o u s l y enacted a n d d e n i e d , it w o u l d seem that unfettered ambiguity

is

10

THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

taken to confer an ability to abolish contact with unbearable feelings of loss and lack. It is u s u a l at present, for adolescent groups a n d for those n o longer so i n chronological terms, to float freely i n the atemporality of the unconscious. Terms like " c r a z y " , " b l o w n u p " , " h a l l u c i n a t ­ i n g " become w o r d s of praise. M o r e a n d more, f r o m the earliest age o n , thought signs the death warrant of euphoria. W o r k is n o t h i n g but a bore, if y o u are to trust a child o n c o m i n g into session: " I g o i n g to d r a w "

immediately a d d i n g : " T o t h i n k . . . too m u c h

w o r k . " M i m e t i c excitement-fusion, w i t h or without the use of d r u g s , leads to a gulf between generations, disturbing the trans­ m i s s i o n of experience a n d the advent of temporal cohesion be­ tween a personal past, a present, a n d a future. This effectively rules out hope. T h i n k i n g about oneself a n d the rescue of a personal identity turns psychoanalysis into a n " e n e m y of the p e o p l e " — a threat to the precarious but all-important feeling of

autarchy—in

G a d d i n i ' s w o r d s — a feeling g r o u n d e d i n omnipotence a n d equated to psychic s u r v i v a l . Joan S y m i n g t o n (1985) relates the baby's cata­ strophic anxieties to its early u n h e l d precariousness, a n d , as m e n ­ tioned i n the E p i l o g u e , omnipotent defences at the level of b o d i l y sensations a n d g r o u p mimesis cover u p a n u n d e r l y i n g level of annihilation anxieties experienced as a " b l a c k h o l e " . T h i s image, arising f r o m the w o r k of Ferenczi, was, to P i c h o n Riviere, at the core of psychopathology under the name of "basic d e p r e s s i o n " a n d was later stressed b y T u s t i n i n her studies of c h i l d h o o d autism. H o p e b e i n g absent, thinking becomes a ghastly a n d strenuously resisted excursion to the hyper-aesthesic zones of the infantile self u n d e r l y i n g omnipotent defences a n d m u c h too close to the u n a p ­ proachable " b l a c k h o l e " . W h i l e the issue of the genesis of present-day psychopathologies is complex a n d conjectural, acculturation v i a the m e d i a as a s p u r i ­ ous substitute for the nuclear family seemingly plays a m a i n role. T h e m e d i a culture's communicational ideology has as its p a r a d i g m of psychic development a n informational

Lamarckism

that equates

information w i t h mental growth. Such a n idea runs directly counter to F r e u d ' s notion of thought as emerging i n the absence of the object, or Bion's theory of thinking as tolerance to the no-breast. M e d i a culture prohibits the idea of the existence of quite differ­ ent types of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d even more so the idea that some

INTRODUCTION

11

of these—primarily electronic games—may, beyond a threshold, be deleterious. Their circular, repetitive, quasi-magical, everlast­ ing rivalry exacerbates the mechanisms for omnipotent evacuation at the level of the mind-as-muscle that Bion (1962) described as the "beta-screen". The slogan "Happiness is Kids Online" denies the rather obvious fact that virtual reality is different from human emotional interaction, and its psychic effects should be assumed to be different. As said, the equation information = mental growth is naively Lamarckian. It assumes that an increase in "information", of what­ ever kind, brings about an expansive adaptation. Thus, in a note entitled "Electronic Bliss", a media guru—the founder of the MIT Media Lab Nicholas Negroponte—argues: 1

2

. . . when we can display holographic images that we can enter, when we develop a tactile interface that we can explore with our other senses, the Internet will provide us something that will be almost indistinguishable from the real w o r l d . . . . I find this exhilarating. I am a self-proclaimed optimist about the digital age. [1996, p. 52] In contrast to Negroponte's jubilant panegyric of fetishization (in Winnicott's sense) of the indiscernible spurious substitute as the newfangled Holy Grail, may I present an alternative, the natural­ ism of which may shock prophets of technology: Harlow's findings at the Wisconsin Primate Laboratory. While it was easy enough under experimental conditions to raise female monkeys with var­ ied and predictable flaws in their mothering abilities, they could not, in the "virtual" conditions of the laboratory, raise good moth­ ers. It is a platitude to say that emotional development depends on personal, intimate emotional contact in a human family and group, and it is symptomatic that a such platitude must be stated. The -parasitic organization of the personality depicted in Chapter 3 is set up

The only exceptions to the assumption of the beneficial effects of "infor­ mation" being massive violence, pornographic visual communication—euphe­ mistically called "adult" material in media jargon—and, lately, direct "online" seductions of children, going beyond the "virtual" context. There is no reason to believe that J.-B. Lamarck would have approved of such a crude idea of instant adaptation. 1

2

12

T H E LOGICS O F THE M I N D

to abolish genuine emotional dependence. T h i s is socially r e i n ­ forced b y the content a n d , m a i n l y , b y the v e r y structure of the v i s u a l mass m e d i a .

Gresham's law and psychoanalytic institutions Disciplines that study m a n , says G r e g o r y Bateson (1979, p . 5), are subject to a n equivalent of Gresham's l a w . A c c o r d i n g to this eco­ n o m i c l a w dating f r o m the eighteenth century, w h e n t w o (or more) coins circulate, the most valuable disappears (people treasure it), a n d the least v a l u e d replaces it. That a trend towards the substitution b y versions of lesser or n o value rules over the destiny of psychoanalysis i n society c a n be expected, g i v e n i n d i v i d u a l a n d group resistance to psychic growth. F r e u d k n e w this w e l l . In the " H i s t o r y of the Psychoanalytic M o v e ­ m e n t " , he says that it was to prevent s u c h a n eventuality that he institutionalized psychoanalysis: I considered it necessary to form an official association because I feared the abuses to which psychoanalysis w o u l d be sub­ jected as soon as it became popular. There should be some headquarters whose business it w o u l d be to declare: " A l l this non-sense is nothing to do with psychoanalysis; this is not psychoanalysis." [1914d, p. 43] In the same v e i n , G a d d i n i ' s advice o n the mimetic a p p r o p r i a t i o n of psychoanalysis b y intellectual milieux, c o u p l e d w i t h w h a t every­ d a y life shows, is, I believe, illustrative e n o u g h of what Lakatos (1970) terms the degenerative problem shift i n its en vogue versions. These c l a i m to adopt its " c o n c e p t s " w h i l e simultaneously disre­ g a r d i n g the m e t h o d . W e meet here the basic d i l e m m a at the basis of the efforts to disseminate psychoanalysis: o n the one h a n d , it depends o n being socially k n o w n ; o n the other, given that its genuine explication d e p e n d s o n its use i n session, what w e strive to disseminate turns into a n intellectual ideology a la page. W h e n teaching according to the university m o d e l replaces i n - d e p t h exploration of one's o w n unconscious o n the couch, what w e attain is the tomb of p s y c h o ­ analysis.

INTRODUCTION

13

It goes b e y o n d m y objective here to consider the attempts of the International P s y c h o - A n a l y t i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n a n d its c o m p o n e n t societies to counter, i n its o w n structures, the effects of G r e s h a m ' s law. Psychoanalytic societies oscillate between attention to a n d d e v e l o p m e n t of the analytic instrument a n d theory a n d mimesis to fashionable ideologies, be they scientific, p h i l o s o p h i c a l , or cultural. F o r G a d d i n i , the H a r t m a n n i a n attempt to t u r n psychoanalysis into a general p s y c h o l o g y w a s mimetic. T h e same c a n be said of at­ tempts to reshuffle it after p o s t - m o d e r n linguistic philosophies. Psychoanalytic institutions are easy p r e y to g r o u p processes i n the eternal conflict of the candidates' a n d m e m b e r s ' egalitarian wishes a n d their u n a v o i d a b l y less egalitarian abilities to e m b o d y a n d develop psychoanalysis. Yet, as a f o u n d i n g father of L a t i n A m e r i c a n psychoanalysis, E n r i q u e P i c h o n Riviere, often said: the

prognosis of an analysis depends on the analyst's quality. T h e same h o l d s true, I surmise, for its societies, w h o s e l o n g - t e r m prognosis rests o n w h a t they s p a w n . T h e conflict between egalitarianism a n d e v o l u t i o n takes m a n y forms; societies alternate between political times m a r k e d b y conflicts over equality or d o m i n a n c e a n d times of scientific creation. M o r e o v e r , as reiterated b y G a d d i n i , F r e u d i a n creativity gave rise to splitting a n d mimesis i n the w i d e r society. L i k e it or not, scientific creativity exacerbates political issues. T w o m a i n examples are the Controversial Discussions of the British Society i n the 1940s, w h i c h were partly d u e to problems w i t h as­ similating M e l a n i e K l e i n ' s thought, a n d the three-stage political split i n the A r g e n t i n e Psychoanalytic A s s o c i a t i o n i n the 1970s f o l ­ l o w i n g a time of lively scientific creativity. H o w e v e r , o n l y the fruits of k n o w l e d g e c a n genuinely help the prestige a n d s u r v i v a l of psychoanalysis. L a c a n ' s disciple a n d biographer Elisabeth R o u d i n e s c o (1993) admits that I P A analysts have a l l o w e d w i d e l y theoretical d i v e r ­ gences a n d kept s o m e stability as to m e t h o d , whereas L a c a n i a n currents have a r r i v e d i n a n a-methodical a p p r o a c h a m i d extreme theoretical orthodoxy. So, i n spite of the dire problems of p s y c h o ­ analytic institutions i n d e a l i n g w i t h the transmission of received k n o w l e d g e a n d the absorption of n e w ideas, F r e u d ' s f o u n d i n g of the International P s y c h o - A n a l y t i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n w a s perhaps not in vain.

CHAPTER

ONE

What is a clinical fact? Clinical psychoanalysis as inductive method

This chapter is an inquiry into the nature of clinical facts in psychoanalysis. The attainment of the representability of psychic reality being a requisite for insight, the author examines induc­ tive processes on the part of both analyst and analysand, which are to be considered proper aspects of the study of clinical facts. It is argued that the analyst chooses his interpretations guided in good measure by non-verbal material that is based on how he intuits that he is "used" by the analysand and the ways the analysand feels "used" by him; such non-verbal clues to the nature of the unconscious relational "frames" operating in ses­ sions guide him to select relevant associations from the universe of the analysand's verbal utterances. He thus comes to voice his interpretations, purveying a "mapping" of psychic reality that typically makes use of a new viewpoint for description. Insight is Presented at the IJPA's 75th-Anniversary Celebration Conference, Sao Paulo, 31 March-2 April 1995. Published in International Journal of PsychoAnalysis, 75 (1994): 949-962.1 want to thank Eric Rayner, Ross Skelton, and the London Bi-Logic Group, Juan Francisco Jordan, Danielle Quinodoz, and the IJPA Editor, David Tuckett, for their friendly help. 15

16

THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

achieved when the analysand attains ostensive refutation or re­ definition of his unconscious "theories" about the relationship, and this happens only in concrete individual situations, when the effects of his relational unconscious "theories" come to be contrasted observationally in diverse "screens", perceptual and mnemic, against the background of the analyst's neutrality: in such a way unconscious "theories" attain the Pcs.-Cs. domain of the "no". Science, as you know, is not a revelation; long after its beginnings it still lacks the attributes of definiteness, immutability and infallibility for which human thought so deeply longs Sigmund Freud (1926e, p. 191)

linical facts are part of a process, a n d that w h i c h c a n be taken as our m a i n question t o d a y — " w h a t does the analyst ^ attend to i n the clinical situation?"—is of a piece w i t h a less often considered b u t equally cardinal question: " w h a t does the a n a l y s a n d attend to, consciously a n d u n c o n s c i o u s l y ? " , or, i n w i d e r terms, " h o w does the analysand operate i n d u c t i v e l y ? " A s w e are aware, not all analysts allow even a modest degree of independence to clinical facts: it is a premise of the " c r e a t i v e ­ h e r m e n e u t i c " stance that there are n o facts, a n d then n o clinical ones; hence it holds that what matters is that the analyst constructs a coherent w h o l e , w h i c h does not reproduce a phantasy pre-exist­ ent i n the subject's unconscious but causes it to exist b y v o i c i n g it (Viderman,

1970). In such a n outlook facts become radically

t h e o r y - d e p e n d e n t — i n the case of V i d e r m a n ' s outspoken creation­ i s m , facts are deemed to be " l a n g u a g e - d e p e n d e n t " i n a s m u c h as the analyst's w o r d s are d e e m e d to cause psychic facts. A quite differ­ ent matter is to allow that our a p p r o a c h to facts is not a s s u m p t i o n ­ free, as d i d that eminent empiricist, S i g m u n d F r e u d : E v e n at the stage of description it is not possible to avoid applying certain abstract ideas to the material at hand, ideas derived from somewhere or other but certainly not from the new observations alone. [1915c, p. 117]

W H A T IS A C L I N I C A L F A C T ?

17

H e r e w e m a y follow W h e w e l l , w h o states: The distinction of Fact and Theory is only relative. Events and phenomena, considered as Particulars which may be colligated by Induction, are Facts; considered as Generalities already ob­ tained by colligation of other Facts, they are Theories. [1858, p. 161] Assumptions

a n d theories, following F r e u d , have n o c l a i m to

p r i m a c y , b e i n g "scaffoldings ready to be d i s c a r d e d " (1914c, p. 77) as s o o n as n e w clinical findings require. W h i l e I c a n agree w i t h Spence (1994) that m u c h of w h a t w e listen to is not ostensive b y any stretch of the imagination, I h o l d that it is o u r task to arrive, a n d help the analysand arrive, at a n ostensiveness

of " f a c t s " ,

w h i c h , as o u r colleague Jean-Michel Q u i n o d o z (1994) emphasizes i n his c o m p a n i o n paper, are both relational a n d subjective. T h e emergence of " f a c t s " i n a g i v e n clinical situation depends less o n the analyst's theories than o n his ability to b u i l d a n i n t u i ­ tional a n d observational field for the patient a n d for himself, o n his k e e p i n g to his neutrality, o n his intuitive a n d observational capaci­ ties, a n d o n whatever countertransference insights he is capable of. A h a p p y guess, a n act of invention of a conception not p r e v i o u s l y apparent, the f i n d i n g , that is, of " o n e s u p p o s i t i o n that succeeds i n b i n d i n g together the F a c t s " (Whewell, 1858, p. 136), a l l o w i n g d e ­ scription f r o m a n e w a n d m o r e adequate standpoint, is necessary for successful i n d u c t i o n . W h i l e a framework of conceptions or theories is the b a c k g r o u n d to the emergence of s u c h h a p p y conjec­ tures, these d o not derive f r o m theory i n a n y direct w a y . A g a i n s t the p r i m a c y of theory, B i o n (1977, p. 18) quotes D a r w i n : " i t is fatal to reason whilst observing, t h o u g h so necessary beforehand a n d so useful afterwards". D e e m i n g the psychoanalytic d o m a i n intuitable, B i o n holds that m e m o r y , desire, a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g h i n d e r i n t u i ­ tion (1992, p . 315). Psychoanalytic facts must, i n m y v i e w , evolve, for b o t h analyst a n d analysand, f r o m the intuitable to the observable: i n Peirce's terms (1901-1903), f r o m abduction to i n d u c t i o n : f r o m the emer­ gence of a hypothesis to its experiential, observational testing. In­ tuition is not e n o u g h . F r o m Aristotle o n , i n d u c t i o n has d e p e n d e d o n observation, a n d our field is n o exception: effective insights are, as w e have learnt f r o m Richfield (1954), ostensive ones, built o n the

18

THE LOGICS O F THE M I N D

direct observational grasp of psychic facts. W e c a n usually expect these to be consciously available first to the analyst o n the basis of whatever intuitional a n d observational grasp of the analysand's (and of his own!) psychic reality he can muster, a n d then, w i t h the help of his descriptive verbal m a p p i n g s — t h e interpretations— eventually to the patient. M y purpose here is to inquire h o w i n the analytic situation the

analysand operates within the frame of a system of inductive testing of his unconscious ''theories"; here ostensive "facts" w i l l come u p m a i n l y against the analysand's unconscious "theories" a n d assumptions, a n d often against ours too—that is, as I w i l l explain later o n , cown­ terinductively.

T o this e n d , I offer two clinical vignettes: the first

describes the protracted struggles of a post-autistic adolescent for a n d against awareness of " c l i n i c a l facts"—that is, of his psychic r e a l i t y — i n the frame of a n unremitting negative transference; the second approaches i n logical terms a n aspect of the process of distinguishing between psychic a n d factual reality. Ostensive, says logician Susanne Langer (1953), is that w h i c h m a y be pointed to b y saying " t h i s " , s u c h also being her definition of individual—be

it a person, event, or thing. A g a i n s t the current

"flight into hermeneutics" i n the appraisal of the interpretive m e t h o d , Cheshire a n d T h o m a (1991, p. 429) h o l d that f r o m the " P r o j e c t " (1950 [1895]) onwards, F r e u d , the former neuropatholo­ gist, struggled for a w a y of " s t a i n i n g " (i.e. turning into something observable) the unconscious states a n d processes inaccessible even to introspection—a w a y he f o u n d , they state, i n free association a n d d r e a m interpretation, to w h i c h the setting, transference, a n d analytic neutrality must also be a d d e d . Laplanche (1992) notes that F r e u d ' s Deutung is m u c h less hermeneutic than is o u r term " i n ­ terpretation": deuten auf is to point w i t h the finger or to indicate w i t h the eyes, so i n Freud's usage it is a n ostensive term. N o t that I think that a hard-and-fast line divides intuition f r o m observation; m u c h if not all of our intuition is, I surmise, d i m l y observational i n w a y s of w h i c h w e are not conscious: a favourite term of Bion's was adumbrate. W i l l i a m Blake puts it more poetically: wise men see out­ lines. Let us turn n o w to our first clinical example.

W H A T IS A C L I N I C A L F A C T ?

First

clinical

example:

1 9

"John"

" J o h n " , a 13-year-old b o y , was brought to consultation because he w a s w i t h d r a w n a n d i n d e e d lethargic at school; o n vacations he was livelier, but aloof a n d c o l d to adults. H i s parents were d i v o r c e d w h e n he was 4, at w h i c h time his mother h a d gone t h r o u g h a depressive episode. H i s father, a n emotionally iso­ lated m a n w h o w o r k e d abroad, saw or telephoned h i m quite r a n d o m l y . T h e mother, an o v e r l y dedicated teacher p r o n e to feelings of failure, volunteered that she felt the strain of b e i n g b o t h mother a n d father to John. A brother one year y o u n g e r w a s subject to sporadic immoderate bouts of rage. J o h n was u s u a l l y c o m p l i a n t a n d n o n - c o m m i t t a l , but he gave w a y to g r o ­ tesque grimaces i n p u b l i c or i n front of m i r r o r s , w h i c h i n f u r i ­ ated his mother. A t school a n d w i t h h o m e w o r k his attention s p a n w a s n i l ; he attended a special school. In step w i t h the diagnostic impression of secondary e n c a p s u ­ lated autism (Tustin, 1986), i n his four-times-weekly sessions J o h n took to a " d e a d l y serious" silence save for bouts of g r i m ­ acing, at once m o c k i n g a n d self-demeaning; his few isolated comments

he d i d not p u r s u e . H e answered questions

tele­

graphically, if at all: if, for example, at the start of session I asked h i m , " H o w are y o u , J o h n ? " , he w o u l d just say, " V e r y w e l l " . It was p o i n t e d out to h i m i n m a n y w a y s that he d i d not think that talking about himself to m e — o r to anyone else, for that m a t t e r — c o u l d be of h e l p ; i n fact, he h a d little use for w o r d s . H o w e v e r , he w o u l d listen to m y attempts at guessing w h a t was g o i n g o n , a n d often he w o u l d n o d w h e n he felt I was right; then he w o u l d curl u p o n his sofa a n d fall s o u n d asleep. H e w o u l d not d r a w a n d , m o r e generally, he refused to p l a y w h a t he felt to be the analyst's game—that is, to be a collabora­ tor. But as the months went b y , o n g r o w i n g more confident, he p l a y e d repetitive games w i t h objects he brought along, s u c h as coins or a steel ball-bearing that he w o u l d balance o n his d r a w ­ i n g b o a r d , or else he w o u l d grab one of m y pipes a n d gently p l a y w i t h it w h i l e l o o k i n g sideways at m y reaction. A s l o n g as he kept m o v i n g at his games a n d I kept quiet, he w o u l d be lively; if I i m p o s e d m y " g a m e " b y interpreting, he w o u l d listen eagerly, but he w o u l d soon become lethargic a n d fall asleep.

THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

20

O f John's scant utterances, w h i c h came out of the blue, I w i l l single out one o n poor little toads run over by trucks o n country roads. T h i s seems to be a clinical " f a c t " that is of a different type f r o m those c o m i n g f r o m observations s u c h as John's silences or lethargy or his d e a d l y serious demeanour. I take it to be a n unconscious

abduction,

a conjecture that i n this case is not k n o w n to its beholder a n d refers to the h e r e - a n d - n o w . There c a n be few doubts that to John the conscious referent of this statement is unrelated to the clinical situ­ ation b u t can be taken as a verbal m o d e l of a central d i m e n s i o n of his enacted unconscious relationship to m e as a n external object—that

phantasy

is, as a verbal " d i a g n o s i s " of the w a y i n w h i c h I, as a n

external object, have come to " i n c a r n a t e " his unconscious internal one. H o w e v e r , it is useful to introduce at this point a logical dis­ tinction between the two levels of the analyst's role: as a transfer­ ence "object", h a v i n g some degree of conscious ostensiveness, a n d as a transference-relational "frame", w h i c h is not consciously o b ­ servable to the patient a n d must be intuited or inferred b y the analyst. S u c h a distinction is implicit i n Betty Joseph's (1985) c o n ­ sideration of transference as a "total s i t u a t i o n " . Q u o t i n g K l e i n (1952, p. 55) to the effect that " i t is essential to think i n terms of total situations

transferred f r o m the past to the present", Joseph adds:

She [Klein] went o n to describe how for many years transfer­ ence h a d been understood i n terms of direct references to the a n a l y s t . . . . It seems to me that the notion of total situations is fundamental. . . . What he [the analysand] brings i n can best be gauged b y focusing our attention on what goes o n i n the rela­ tionship, how he uses the analyst, alongside and beyond what he is saying. [1985, p. 447, italics added] So, transference can be understood restrictively as direct cognitive references to the analyst, or i n a w i d e r , more unconscious sense as a pragmatic level of " u s e " : John's comment points to this w i d e r , " f r a m e " level of the relationship. T h e remark about p o o r little toads r u n over b y trucks alludes to the projected covert m u r d e r o u s r i v a l r y a n d its denial, w h i c h very m u c h lead the process; it puts into w o r d s his attitude i n the session a n d i n his games. W h a t it alludes

to can be described as the pragmatic

proposition-.

enactment

of a

relational

I, his analyst (but more generally, adults), a m to poor

little J o h n as trucks are to little toads (analyst = overbearing truck;

W H A T IS A C L I N I C A L F A C T ?

21

John = r u n - o v e r toad). T h i s free association is, then, John's u n ­ k n o w n interpretive m a p p i n g of an aspect of his o n g o i n g u n c o n ­ scious link to m e ; h a v i n g no immediate effect o n his o v e r r i d i n g denial of his p s y c h i c reality, it does not b r i n g h i m nearer to a n insight. It m u s t be noted that it was essential that neither of us overtly act out this rivalry; once, he started m a k i n g s m a l l paper bullets, w h i c h , i n a lively a n d increasingly manic m o o d , he w o u l d shoot i n seemingly r a n d o m fashion, i n a k i n d of R u s s i a n roulette a i m e d at h i t t i n g / n o t hitting m e ; w h e n a " b u l l e t " d i d hit m y p i l l o w close to m y face a n d he thought he h a d scored a hit, he froze into the state of unmitigated terror, w h i c h T u s t i n (1991) puts at the core of autism. H e interrupted his shooting game forever, interpretation p r o v i n g ineffectual W h i l e l o o k i n g at a C a p e H o r n clipper's l a m p that lights m y office, its vent-holes abruptly r e m i n d e d John of the B e r m u d a Triangle. W o r k o n this led to some inroads into his denial of psychic reality: he grasped m y saying that both the session a n d his inner w o r l d are to h i m a sort of B e r m u d a Triangle where emotional contents are felt to v a n i s h without trace (it h e l p e d that w e h a d already explored h o w , for example, o n vacations his playmates w o u l d fade away i n town). Shortly thereafter he recounted a nightmare in which he was falling

in front of a tall

building, and then the scene changed and he was looking with no feelings or anxieties at his badly torn, dead body after hitting the pavement. A s he brought n o associations to the d r e a m , I asked h i m to d r a w it, w h i c h to m y surprise he d i d , i n several scenes (see F i g . 1). These depict what I take to be his m a i n transference defence: his devitalization i n the face of the oversized a n d over­ bearing phallic analyst (note that he draws himself as a m i n i m a l stick puppet), as w e l l as the m a i n transference conflict, an over­ arching unconscious phallic rivalry. Let me underline that there was n o overt anxiety or hostility addressed at me: unconscious hostility leads to autotomy (Ferenczi, 1924), to a

dematerialization

illustrated b y the lizard's sacrifice of its tail to the predator. T h e d r e a m , a n d then its d r a w i n g , are steps i n the " s t a i n i n g " process that to Cheshire a n d T h o m a (1991) is at the core of F r e u d ' s m e t h o d ; his devitalization i n the frame of unconscious rivalry attains representability i n the passage f r o m an enacted a n d

22

THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

FIGURE

1

Pesadilla [Nightmare]

until then unrepresentable a n d unthinkable "concrete represen­ tation b y identification", i n M o n e y - K y r l e ' s terms, to a v i s u a l "ideographic

[To M o n e y - K y r l e the u n c o n ­

representation".

scious operates i n terms of class notions, imageless preconcep­ tions of the objects, or situations of major biological import. These " c l a s s " notions w e cannot consciously imagine, although w e c a n recognize their members: what m a y later become a representation of a n absent or separate object is, he says (1965, p. 400), first experienced concretely as a n identification, intro­ jective or projective, w i t h the object, i n a k i n d of "concrete representation b y i d e n t i f i c a t i o n " — a subject studied i n m u c h of M e l a n i e Klein's w o r k belongs.

T h e second stage, of " i d e o ­

graphic representation", occurs m a i n l y through " v i s u a l meta­ p h o r s " ; to this level pertains F r e u d ' s d r e a m - t h i n k i n g . T h e third stage, of verbal thought, rules

consciousness.]

W H A T IS A C L I N I C A L F A C T ?

23

In-session sleeping went o n for months. Interpretations, e v e n those agreed to subtly b y John a n d leading to s u c h changes i n his liveliness a n d his relationships to his peers a n d family (but not at this time i n his studies) that friends a n d relatives w o u l d say " t h i s is a different c h i l d " , d i d not make a dent o n his leth­ argy i n the session—so m u c h so that I h a d to shake h i m to wake h i m u p w h e n time r a n out. After w a t c h i n g a f i l m o n television about the discovery of the s u n k e n remains of the Titanic, he dreamt that it hit a big iceberg

and slowly sank into the deep in utter silence. This came to be interpreted b o t h ways: as his hitting what he unconsciously felt to be m y " w a l l " of icy coldness towards his enthusiasms a n d , increasingly, as his h a v i n g m a d e m y therapeutic enthusiasm hit the w a l l of his c o l d aloofness. Disappointments were, I surmise, a component of the " w a l l " , a n d hence he w o u l d evade enthus­ iasms or needs. In a third d r e a m he had come in a run-down bus to

a service station; on his asking for some water, the attendant became angry and chased him as he fled up a thorny hill. W h i l e , as far as I can gather, John feels n o discernible anger or depression o n listening to m e , a n d he admits that he m a y be quite interested i n what I was saying, it is a clinical fact that m y voice was b y itself e n o u g h to turn the o v e r r i d i n g , annihilating phallic-rivalry " f r a m e " o n a n d hence to t u r n h i m off, the d e v i ­ talization a n d collapse into sleep (into the pavement i n the first d r e a m , into the deep i n the second) b e i n g the unconsciously chosen alternative to annihilating collision. C o v e r t explosive rivalry a n d intolerance to need a n d disillusion are interrelated unconscious relational " f r a m e s " , w h i c h , w h i l e not ostensively seen b y John as m y individual

attributes, act as a pragmatic

" f r a m e " — t h a t is, as a meta-level to most of his verbalizations a n d to the content of m y interpretations. T h u s , while John re­ gards m e consciously as " f a i r l y g o o d " , the same as his uncles a n d his grandfather, or even " q u i t e g o o d " , as he has v o l u n ­ teered to his mother sometimes, unconsciously the general rela­ tional "frame"—annihilating

phallic a n a l y s t / t r u c k , J o h n / l i t t l e

t o a d — h o l d s , m y voice being a " r e a l i z a t i o n " , i n Bion's sense, of the truck's noise.

THE LOGICS OFTHE MIND

24

A s I argued i n a n earlier paper ( A h u m a d a , 1991), the antinomy between John's unconscious relational perception of m e as " a n n i h i ­ lating [phallic] t r u c k " a n d his conscious perception of m e as " f a i r l y g o o d " amounts to a pragmatic paradox: the analyst archaic

is/is not the

object. A necessary step for the resolution of the paradox is

the d i s p r o v i n g of the unconscious relational proposition, a n d a requisite for this is the achievement of representability: o n l y w h a t comes to be " s h o w n " can be inductively refuted. T h e attainment of representability demands adequate descriptions: such is the task not o n l y of interpretations but also, as noted i n the case of the remark o n the poor little toads, of free associations w o r k i n g as indications—as deuten auf—of

as-yet " u n t h o u g h t " unconscious r e ­

lational levels. T h e analyst's interpretations can often receive p r i v i ­ leged support f r o m such verbal associations. In any case, as John gained some tolerance towards his psychic reality a n d towards m e , he came to speak i n sessions of his explosive games at home, i n w h i c h he emptied shotgun car­ tridges to procure p o w d e r a n d , relying more o n m y neutral­ i t y — t h a t is, that I s h o u l d not m u r d e r o u s l y collide w i t h h i m — h e w o u l d spend sessions o n e n d watching his d r a w i n g sheets b u r n i n all kinds of w a y s — p r o c l a i m i n g himself a researcher, w h i c h i n a sense he was, as l o n g as he d i d not feel i m p i n g e d o n b y i n t r u d i n g adults or their allotted tasks. Close to N e w Year's E v e , a n d as a dire test of that w h i c h I w o u l d consider m y neutrality b u t to John's unconscious is m y being a " w a l l " , he e x p l o d e d a s m a l l rocket while carefully gauging m y reaction; it was after this pragmatic test that he brought i n , o n m y question­ i n g , his first ever explicit comment o n his intentionality i n a session: he h a d wanted me to be scared. W e came to understand that i n his " d e m a t e r i a l i z i n g " b u r n i n g games he becomes the " B i g P r i c k " b y b u r n i n g rival pricks. In fact, h e exclaimed jubilantly at the charred remains of a rolled sheet he w a s h o l d i n g " a p r i c k " — p e r h a p s the charred remains of the interpretive ana­ lyst's prick. In s u c h a w a y he himself came to act what some time before he h a d brought u p i n an expansive a n d e v e n m a n i c m o o d as the narrative of a f i l m , Home Alone,

i n w h i c h a child,

lost to his parents, wages a n utterly m o c k i n g w a r against m a ­ levolent i n t r u d i n g adults. S u c h games, while they lasted, p u t a n

W H A T IS A C L I N I C A L F A C T ?

25

e n d to John's lethargy; he d i d keep some boundaries as far as soiling m y office w a s c o n c e r n e d — h e w o u l d , for example, deftly b u i l d paper trays to keep the ashes i n , if o n l y then to start penetrating the trays w i t h spots of fire. W h i l e protesting l o u d l y at h o m e about h a v i n g to come to his sessions, he w o u l d come i n p u n c t u a l l y i n a n u n a c k n o w l e d g e d show of enthusiasm for his therapy.

Indefiniteness

and ostensiveness of clinical pragmatics and cognition

facts:

E v e n a lengthy report is b o u n d to choose a few f r o m a m y r i a d of facts. T o quote Eric Rayner: A t the start of any session the analyst gives his free-floating attention; he tunes in and resonates with affects and ideas from the patient until an underlying theme is distinguishable. H e can then begin to think about verbal interpretation. Resonances and unfolding sequences early i n an analysis are likely to be sporadic and undefined. However, later i n treatment sequences are likely to have vital and distinctive features so that deep resonances often occur between patient and analyst and inter­ pretative verbalization is richer. [1992, p. 39, italics added] Resonances a n d u n f o l d i n g sequences evolve thus f r o m b e i n g u n d e ­ f i n e d — t h a t is, intuitable—to able or ostensive—features,

acquiring distinctive—that is, observ­ a process i n w h i c h a p s y c h i c reality that

has n o distinct geometry evolves " i n " or " t h r o u g h " factual p e r ­ sons—the analyst a m o n g them. That s u c h pragmatic " f a c t s " (i.e. unconscious action-and-emotion relational proposals) are at the same time concrete a n d immaterial makes their inductive k n o w l ­ e d g e — w h i c h , I w o u l d r e m i n d the reader, f r o m Aristotle o n w a r d s depends o n observation—difficult a n d peculiar i n d e e d . T h e idea u n d e r l y i n g m y account of the psychoanalytic m e t h o d as a n i n d u c t i v e system—that

conscious

cognitions

of p s y c h i c

" f a c t s " come out of a n d are construed u p o n a b a c k g r o u n d of u n ­ conscious (i.e. consciously u n k n o w n ) action-and-emotion m e a n ­ i n g s — f i n d s s u p p o r t w i t h i n psychoanalysis, for example, i n F r e u d ' s ideas of unconscious Triebe a n d "thing-presentations" as the " p s y ­

26

THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

chic r e a l i t y " f r o m w h i c h a l l verbal meanings

derive, or f r o m

Sharpe (1940), to w h o m verbal meanings come f r o m unconscious b o d i l y ones; a n d f r o m a w i d e array of logicians, such as Russell (1948) w i t h his conception of " a n i m a l inferences" as the basis of all k n o w l e d g e , a n d of object-language as b o u n d to a pragmatic c o m ­ ponent; as w e l l as i n the field of ethology, i n Bateson's (1973, 1979) evolutionary studies of the pragmatics of m a m m a l i a n c o m m u n i c a ­ tion, f r o m w h i c h the semantic universe evolves (see Etchegoyen & A h u m a d a , 1990). In his Elements of Symbolic Logic, Reichenbach (1947) explains that i n statements made i n the flesh b y one person to another, the pragmatic component supersedes the semantic one, so they cannot be considered p u r e l y cognitive, a n d the logic-semantic categories of " t r u e " or " f a l s e " fail to apply. Renunciation (partial) of this pragmatic component w i l l establish the analyst's neutrality, this b e i n g a requisite for the inductive operation of the analytic situa­ tion as cognitive context. Reichenbach holds that, contrary to A r i s ­ totelian-scholastic definitions i n terms of genus et differentia, w h i c h define one element i n terms of other more abstract ones, e m p i r i c a l "definitions i n u s e " are not p u r e l y verbal a n d define their elements i n terms of concrete observational ones: i n s u c h a w a y w e define m e t a b o l i s m , says Reichenbach, i n terms of observational measures of biological variables, not i n purely verbal terms. In the actual process of k n o w l e d g e , a verification of abstract statements is a l ­ w a y s g i v e n b y verification of statements about directly observable things. F o r Rougier (1960), these indicative or ostensive definitions can be h i g h l y complex, as they must include the theory of the instruments

v a l i d a t i n g the observation.

Concepts

so defined,

w h i c h r e m a i n o p e n to redefinition i n new contexts, P a p calls " o p e n concepts" (1958). M y first clinical example has striven to s h o w h o w a verbal allusion, a series of dreams, a n d a d r a w i n g represent a n d m a k e explicit a transference-relational " f r a m e " of w h i c h the analysand is not consciously aware, but whose detectable effects, s u c h as John's d e a d l y serious demeanour, give the analyst a basis for his analo­ gies a n d help h i m select those relevant f r o m the w i d e s p e c t r u m of the patient's verbal associations. Pragmatic enactments are u n c o n ­ scious "definitions i n u s e " the patient makes of the a n a l y s t — b o t h

W H A T IS A C L I N I C A L F A C T ?

27

of h o w h e uses h i m , as Joseph (1985) emphasizes, a n d of h o w he feels " u s e d " b y h i m . These, a n d the deuten auf that arise i n free associations, are the g r o u n d s for the intuitions a n d observations the analyst w i l l verbalize i n interpretations, w h i c h c a n lead the analysand to "descriptive insights"

(Richfield, 1954); b u t o n l y

t h r o u g h observational refutation of his psychic facts w i l l these evolve into structural psychic change. T h e second clinical material represents i n logical terms a struc­ tural psychic change, i n the achievement of seriation as a m a p ­ territory distinction of psychic a n d factual reality—this b e i n g a n instance of the " w o r k of the negative" (Green, 1993a).

Second clinical example: "Andrew" " A n d r e w " , a gifted, schizoid fellow i n his mid-20s w h o h a d achieved joint degrees i n quite diverse sciences,

h a d long

k n o w n that his intellect p r o v i d e s continuity to his sense of a n identity. H e consulted m e , at his girlfriend's p r o m p t i n g , about troubles w i t h his sexuality; he feared losing her a n d , h a v i n g just f o u n d out that his brother w a s homosexual, he w a s i n d r e a d of also b e c o m i n g one. Q u i t e w a r y of treatment, at first he said he c o u l d come for just a year, as he w o u l d then leave for studies abroad, a n d that for financial reasons—his father w a s p a y i n g m y fees—it w o u l d have to be just thrice w e e k l y .

1

Fears of the

analyst/father a n d of the h o m o s e x u a l transference p l a y e d a role i n this reticence, b u t w e came i n d u e course to u n d e r s t a n d that it w a s largely d u e to a dread of a n annihilating fusional d e p e n d e n c y o n the analyst as oral mother. D u r i n g his w h o l e second year of treatment, A n d r e w w a s e n ­ m e s h e d i n the t u r m o i l of the b r e a k - u p of his first love affair, i n

I often find it unavoidable in my present practice, with so many patients presenting what amount to interpersonal claustrophobias in which intimacy and the ensuing dependency are felt as annihilating, to start with less than the optimum frequency of sessions. In such cases a proper analytic setting must be constructed over time; Lutenberg's 1991 case, going to a four-times-weekly schedule from a once-weekly one, is a relevant example. If we keep an analytic attitude, a proper setting will often eventually evolve. a

28

THE LOGICS O F THE M I N D

a n at times extreme replay of his early symbiotic link to the p r i m a r y Object. T h e three-year affair w a s not his first " c r u s h " : 2

at school he h a d been i n love from afar, w a i t i n g for hours o n e n d just to see this girl pass b y ; later o n he h a d gone out w i t h another girl for a short time, never d a r i n g b o d i l y contact—a timidity for w h i c h he w o u l d then harshly blame himself. So, p r i o r to his current affair he h a d h a d n o p h y s i c a l contacts; S y l v i a , his girlfriend, took the initiative i n the relationship a n d s o o n after hustled h i m , i n spite of his evasiveness, into his first sexual relations. H e spaced them out as m u c h as possible ("not m o r e than once a w e e k " ) , d i d not have a n orgasm for some time, a n d was m u c h disturbed d u r i n g a n d afterwards. T h i s clear-cut " c l i n i c a l fact", impotentia ejaculandi, l e d m e to point out, o n the basis o n his behaviour i n that relationship a n d o n his d r e a d of the analyst's violence i n the session, his fear of w h a t he felt to be a n explosive component of himself. A t first this d i d not m a k e sense to h i m , but then he brought u p a " f a c t " f r o m his early c h i l d h o o d , of the start of w h i c h he h a d n o conscious memories: at the age of 2 years, o n the birth of a sibling he h a d gone into a frank hyperkinetic s y n d r o m e , f u r n i t u r e - c l i m b i n g a n d all. H e d i d remember later examples of his i m p u l s i v i t y , one of t h e m b e i n g that at the age of 7 he h a d gone t h r o u g h a glass door, getting deep gashes i n his arms a n d face—a m e m o r y that still makes h i m shudder. H e n o w came to realize h o w afraid he h a d been all along of his impulses, a n d that his motor h y p e r k i ­ nesis w a s the reason for his intellectual one, intellect being the sole d o m a i n i n w h i c h he h a d felt comfortable. A fear of d a m a g i n g S y l v i a w i t h what he unconsciously felt to be his h i g h l y intrusive explosive penis shaped u p as a motive for his ejaculatory troubles; later o n w e were able to u n d e r s t a n d that he felt coitus to involve violent clashes w i t h father's penis­ inside-the-mother (as s h o w n i n some illustrative dreams) a n d a catastrophic loss of the idealized oral mother. D r e a d of the father's penis a n d the oral-mother transference jointly l e d to a p l e a d i n g needy " g o o d - b o y "

attitude to the m o t h e r / a n a l y s t ,

A capital " O " , here and throughout, indicates that I a m referring to the p r i m a r y psychic Object. 2

W H A T IS A C L I N I C A L F A C T ?

29

w e e k e n d breaks b e c o m i n g quite d i s o r g a n i z i n g ; d r e a d of the annihilating analyst/father s h o w e d i n his fearfulness a n d i n passive h o m o s e x u a l dreams, w h i c h he recognized as referring to the analyst a n d , i n d e e d , were meant to appease m e . T o w i n Sylvia's heart, he appeased her, too, w i t h his endearing " g o o d ­ b o y " d e m e a n o u r , u p o n w h i c h he relied to a nearly delusional degree; alternatively, he w o u l d try to guess a n d tend i n a m o t h ­ erly w a y to her every w i s h , c o o k i n g special foods, b u y i n g her sweets a n d chocolates, or s u r p r i s i n g her w i t h gifts. W h e n these tricks failed, as they d i d more a n d more as time went b y , he w o u l d stay b e f u d d l e d at her reproaches a n d dismissals, w i t h n o k n o w n anger o n his part; b u t w h e n quarrels came u p w h i l e d r i v i n g he w o u l d s u d d e n l y enact the d r e a d e d f a t h e r / p e n i s a n d go u p to 100 miles a n h o u r , w h i c h scared S y l v i a out of her wits. T o cut a l o n g story short, more a n d more A n d r e w f o u n d himself " p a s s e d f r o m the cunt to the ass", as they say i n some parts of L a t i n A m e r i c a — t h a t is, losing his place at the g o o d side of Sylvia's affects a n d b e c o m i n g increasingly subject to her expel­ l i n g , d e m e a n i n g outbursts. T h e d a y came w h e n she told h i m of her infidelity w i t h a fellow student; i n a panic that she m i g h t notice his anger a n d chastise h i m b y departing, he repressed his jealous fury a n d thoroughly forgave h e r — a n d went o n to tell the b o y i n v o l v e d that he was not angry w i t h h i m either! But some time later, w h e n S y l v i a left her d i a r y open, at his h o m e , at a point where she recounted what she h a d felt d u r i n g another affair, A n d r e w d i d become angry, a n d f r o m then o n things went f r o m b a d to worse. U n a b l e n o w to m a s k his reproachful­ ness, he f o u n d himself accused, a n d he d u l y accused himself, b o t h of not b e i n g m a n l y a n d not b e i n g caring e n o u g h — t h a t is, not b e i n g maternal e n o u g h . A g a i n he resorted to his enticing submissiveness, w h i c h enraged her, m a k i n g things worse; this he knew, but he c o u l d not stop himself. T h e failure of his " g o o d ­ b o y " appeasements l e d to feelings of annihilation, to a " b l a c k v o i d " v i v i d e n o u g h for h i m to feel that on looking at himself in a mirror, he would see nobody. T h i s feeling was apt to appear d u r ­ i n g analytic breaks, w h e n , i n the context of the loss of the ana­ lyst as p r i m a l Object, rifts w i t h his girlfriend w o u l d p u s h h i m to the b r i n k of non-existence. H e was unable to feel—or, later, to

30

THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

sustain—anger or hate either at her or at me, felt at this level as one a n d the same, as he came to recognize, a n d so he w o u l d come out of his " b l a c k v o i d " b y massive denial i n nearly delusional phantasies of regaining her love, be it years away. D u r i n g this l o n g process, A n d r e w thought at times of seeking other girls, but this he felt to be impossible because at a feelings­

level there were just no other girls. A t the time of the session w e shall n o w go into, he strove, as he said, " t o fortify m y self­ esteem" for what against all o d d s he felt as a decisive meeting w i t h a b y n o w estranged love w h o , he knew, was prone to f l y i n g into a rage at any approach; this he denied, i n order to a v o i d the " b l a c k v o i d " . H e w a n t e d to take S y l v i a b y surprise w i t h his u n c o n d i t i o n a l love, i n what a m o u n t e d to a magical " i f ­ I - a m - y o u r s - t h e n - y o u - a r e - m i n e " equation, o n her leaving a c o n ­ cert to w h i c h they u s e d to go together—and this magical character of his a p p r o a c h was d u l y p o i n t e d out to h i m . A t the e n d of the previous session he h a d brought u p a d r e a m , w h i c h , he said, he remembered p o o r l y , that he was anxious about snip­ ers, w h i c h earlier I h a d l i n k e d to his d r e a d of the analyst's phallic rivalry at any assertive attitude of his. T o his surprise, o n w a k i n g he felt n o anxieties; this time, he said, there were n o snipers, w h i c h he thought important but he d i d not k n o w w h y . A s a closing comment I said, i n passing, that it was not u n u s u a l that w h e n a psychic situation starts being dreamt, w a k i n g life is relieved of it. O n taking to the c o u c h , A n d r e w told m e smilingly that he was u n d e r w h a t economists w o u l d call an "external s h o c k " d u e to a variable not pertaining to the m o d e l studied. It h a p p e n e d that he h a d f o u n d o n his answering machine a message f r o m a n u n k n o w n girl—let's call her " V a n " — s a y i n g : " w h a t a nice voice y o u h a v e " ; after m a k i n g other pleasing comments, she h a d said she w o u l d p h o n e again. A t that he u n d e r w e n t a complete change, a n d that was w h y , he said, " y o u never saw m e

so

h a p p y " . H e felt it important to be aware that his m o o d change h a d to d o w i t h a quite phantasmic girl whose chance of being satisfactory he rated as remote. Thereafter he felt i n better shape to meet S y l v i a a n d take whatever response she might give h i m . H e n o w realized, he said, h o w true was that w h i c h w e h a d

W H A T IS A C L I N I C A L F A C T ?

31

w o r k e d at for so m a n y months: his extreme d e p e n d e n c y o n a deified maternal object projected into S y l v i a . H e k n e w that the p h o n e message h a d its impact at the level of this p r i m a r y Object felt as a deity; he was aware all along b o t h of its massive " r e a l ­ i t y " a n d of the illusory quality of his enthusiasm for someone u n k n o w n . H e a d d e d , as h a v i n g s o m e h o w something to d o w i t h this, that he h a d felt w e l l after yesterday's session, feeling m y c o m m e n t o n closing as an acknowledgement of his efforts to progress i n his analysis. I t o l d h i m that he seemed i n d e e d surprised that the w a y his self-esteem f o l l o w e d u p o n his relation to his female " D e i t y " — that is, to a p r i m a r y O b j e c t — h a d s u d d e n l y become, i n s u c h a chance m a n n e r , a neat observable, a n d that, as far as I c o u l d gather, he h a d p u t to joint use two vertices of observation: that of w h a t has gone o n i n his relationship to S y l v i a , a n d also to m e , w i t h its sharp swings f r o m ecstatic recognition to annihilating rejection; a n d that of an attention to the impact of V a n ' s voice a n d her message as an a c k n o w l e d g e d phantasmic " a p p a r i t i o n " of the said female deified Object, recognizing h i m a n d fortify­ i n g h i m against annihilation b y rejection. I also told h i m that w h a t he felt as m y recognizing his efforts b y m y

comment

yesterday seems to have p l a y e d a role, a n d that a m a i n part of his joy s t e m m e d f r o m the fact that o n v i s u a l i z i n g this p r i m a r y link, he felt disentangled. H e agreed a n d then went o n rather m a n i c a l l y to assert that he p l a n n e d to meet this girl V a n after his meeting w i t h S y l v i a , so that " m y b a l l o o n does not burst before that"; i n this w a y , he said, " I ' l l be able to meet S y l v i a w i t h a higher self-esteem;

my

p r o b l e m is that I have a m u c h too l o w self-esteem". I told h i m that w h i l e this was true i n a w a y , it seemed to m e that the trouble w i t h his t h i n k i n g of his predicament i n terms of self­ esteem was that it lead h i m to a solipsistic " t h e o r y " of himself, blotting out w h a t he h a d just h a d the o p p o r t u n i t y to observe: his self-esteem's extreme d e p e n d e n c y o n feeling a c k n o w l e d g e d b y a phantasmic female Deity, i n this w a y e n d i n g u p t r y i n g to p u l l himself u p b y his o w n b o o t s t r a p s — u n t i l the time came for some traumatic rejection b y his " D e i t y " . After a silence he ac­ k n o w l e d g e d this, but, he said, i n t r y i n g to think i n those terms,

32

THE LOGICS O F THE MIND

he h a d to bear feeling like the people i n the cave i n Plato's dialogue, w h o see only shadows a n d d o not k n o w it; o n l y o n getting out of the cave d o they come to realize that these are shadows. T h e n , a n d perhaps sensing that the session was d r a w ­ i n g to a close, at w h i c h time he brings i n his dreams as a w a y of retaining m e , he said he h a d h a d a d r e a m , one he c o u l d not remember w e l l either. It had to do with a trip and someone who had

taught him to fish; this man was doing some repairs at his home, repairs my patient was not sure he was satisfied with; but he did know he had helped him by teaching him to fish. A n d r e w a d d e d that he thought this m a n was me, but he d i d not k n o w w h a t the fishing meant. I volunteered that " f i s h i n g " i n o u r slang often means " b e c o m i n g aware of"; he answered that it c o u l d be that, but he w o u l d rather think he's asking m e to help h i m " f i s h " a girl. U n s u r p r i s i n g l y , the following d a y , after meeting S y l v i a , he said: " I come all bruised u p . " She h a d accepted his invitation to dinner, b u t i n the midst of it she h a d left, furious. Bruised a n d sad as he w a s , he said he was glad that throughout Sylvia's outburst he h a d kept feeling v e r y m u c h himself; also, he h a d discerned there is n o h u m a n reason to stand s u c h mistreatment. A n d he said, too, that he realized for o n c e — s o r r o w f u l b u t re­ l i e v e d — t h a t his rupture w i t h S y l v i a was, i n d e e d , final. [But, as at the unconscious level i n w h i c h the relationship enacts the symbiotic link to the p r i m a r y Object, "the f i n d i n g of an object is always a r e - f i n d i n g " (Freud, 1903d, p . 222)—things can never be final.] W h a t opens u p at this p o i n t — a n d this I consider a structural p s y ­ chic c h a n g e — i s what m a y be called the seriation of the unconscious class i n diverse individuals;

i n d e e d , this material w a s selected for

the p u r p o s e of s h o w i n g this "clinical fact" i n concrete terms. I shall presently go into this. A n d r e w h a d come to analysis to extricate himself f r o m the anxieties raised b y the annihilating vicissitudes of a n archaic l i n k enacted i n the amorous relationship to S y l v i a , w h o is concretely his archaic Object actualizing the up-to-then split-off " c l a s s " of " s e x u a l women"—a

" c l a s s " equated to a relationship w i t h what Matte­

W H A T IS A C L I N I C A L F A C T ?

33

Blanco (1975) calls " t h e p o w e r of the class". In s u c h a class-Object w i t h n o map-territory distinction the archaic oral a n d genital O b ­ ject a n d a g i v e n i n d i v i d u a l coincide fully, [Puget & Berenstein (1988) speak i n a related sense of the U n i q u e Object.] Factual seriation—that is, the " c l a s s " of " s e x u a l w o m e n " that come to be felt as a series encompassing diverse i n d i v i d u a l s as distinct f r o m b e i n g p l u r a l i n conscious thought only, is, to p u t it briefly, part a n d parcel of a renunciation of the class-Object's actu­ ality i n a g i v e n i n d i v i d u a l . (It is likely that the enactments i n the transference link to the analyst are steps towards this seriation of the unconscious class into diverse individuals.) In the lapse of days, a n d m u c h to his surprise, a veritable series of females came to be felt as sexual: apart f r o m S y l v i a a n d V a n , w i t h w h o m he took some initiatives, there w a s " M a r g a r e t " , " w h o I realize is the first girl w h o m I have asked for a phone n u m b e r " , a n d others too, i n a passage to activity towards females (though I w i l l not go into this, w h a t I a m describing is i n some w a y s coincident w i t h w h a t K l e i n assigns to early obsessive

mechanisms).

T h i s access

to genital

strivings seems quite different f r o m the impulsiveness of the motor a n d intellectual hyperkinesis concomitant w i t h e x p u l s i o n f r o m the fusional o r a l - g e n i t a l maternal Object: at this p r i m i t i v e level the i m p u l s i v e - p e n e t r a t i n g component is felt as destroying the oral mother, this b e i n g a m a i n deterrent to the access to genitality. It m u s t be noted that A n d r e w ' s access to a renunciation of his "class-Object i n S y l v i a " came o u t of a n ostensive, correlational grasp of h o w he p u t f o r w a r d — b y projective

mechanisms—this

U n i q u e Object, a n d that this i n t u r n resulted f r o m his ability to attain w h a t B i o n (1959) called " b i n o c u l a r v i s i o n " a n d Bateson (1979) called a " d o u b l e d e s c r i p t i o n " of his psychic reality—that is, of his p s y c h i c " f a c t s " . T h i s " d o u b l e d e s c r i p t i o n " uses findings o n a mnemic screen (the remembrance of the vicissitudes of w h a t he felt a n d w h a t I h a d interpreted i n the l i n k b o t h to S y l v i a a n d to me) a n d those i n a -perceptual screen (his grasp of the impact o n his m o o d of V a n ' s phantasmic call). Ostensive " d o u b l e d e s c r i p t i o n " o n the screens of m e m o r y a n d perception allows m u l t i p l e correlation, a n d thus a grasp of the " p s y c h i c reality" he puts into p l a y . After this ostensive cognisance, the plenitude of the " s e x u a l

(oral-genital)

class i n S y l v i a " w a s r e n o u n c e d , a n d seriation of the sexual " c l a s s " i n diverse i n d i v i d u a l s came through.

34

THE LOGICS O F THE M I N D

The

operation

of the

method

M y argument, based o n Strachey's (1934) a n d Richfield's (1954) v i e w s o n insight a n d those of M o n e y - K y r l e (1978b), Matte-Bianco (1975, 1988), a n d Bateson (1973, 1979) o n the logics of the u n c o n ­ scious, c a n be s u m m a r i z e d b y saying that the psychoanalytic m e t h o d aims at disproving, by consciously ostensive refutation in indi­ vidual concrete instances, unconscious pragmatic general propositions that have b e e n left out of inductive operation a n d function not as hypotheses but as unconscious certainties. [I a m u s i n g the term "relational unconscious p r o p o s i t i o n s " instead of " u n c o n s c i o u s propositional functions", as Matte-Bianco does, because i n strict logical terms propositional functions d o not state anything, w h i l e unconscious pragmatic propositions are concrete enacted rela­ tional statements, w h i c h can only affirm.] A s it operates only i n specific—that

is,

individual—instances,

ostensive refutation requires that unconscious general p r o p o s i ­ tions be "objectified" i n concrete i n d i v i d u a l s ; this Strachey (1934) discerns i n masterly fashion, speaking of the analyst as external phantasy object i n w h i c h unconscious phantasy becomes "object­ i f i e d " , analytic neutrality being the " f r a m e " that allows descriptive insights p u r v e y e d b y transference interpretations to give rise to ostensive insights. A s A n d r e w ' s vignette shows, analytic neutrality not o n l y plays a role i n the "judgement of reality" of transference interpretations, but also serves as a " f r a m e " to insights outside the transference proper. U n c o n s c i o u s pragmatic relations (and their semantic c o m p o ­ nents) are " k n o w n " b y the analysand t h r o u g h unconscious acquaint­ ance, but, not being k n o w n i n consciously ostensive w a y s , they are not " o p e n " to refutation or redefinition. O n this basis w e can c o n ­ sider the unconscious as a tautology of pragmatic propositional forms or "theories" applied "deductively" by the analysand to the universe of his external factual objects. H i s " d e d u c t i v e " applications of such tautology are interpreted b y the analyst (a) i n intention, at the level of the intrinsic m e a n i n g of verbal statements as such, that is, as "sentences"; a n d m a i n l y (b) i n extension, describing the w a y s both verbal a n d n o n - v e r b a l state­ ments are pragmatically enacted especially, b u t not at all exclu­ sively, i n the link to the analyst.

W H A T IS A C L I N I C A L F A C T ?

35

In other w o r d s , our i n q u i r y into the analysand's n o n - v e r b a l a n d verbal utterances is m a i n l y i n search of the operation of " c l o s e d " patterns or concepts " d e d u c e d " f r o m unconscious " t h e o r i e s " that have not attained inductive re-evaluation i n his e v e r y d a y life, w h i c h he applies w i t h diverse degrees of rigidity to his external objects,

the analyst i n c l u d e d . But these unconscious relational

" t h e o r i e s " are i n themselves partly a p r o d u c t of early failed i n d u c ­ tions, of " m i s c o n c e p t i o n s " ( M o n e y - K y r l e , 1968), a n d they certainly d o keep some amount of dependence o n relational contexts w h i c h can increase or reduce their closedness. In " R e m e m b e r i n g , Repeat­ i n g a n d W o r k i n g - T h r o u g h " F r e u d (1914g) says that the repetition c o m p u l s i o n is rendered harmless, a n d i n d e e d useful, w h e n w e a d m i t it into the transference

as a playground,

i n w h i c h it is a l l o w e d

to e x p a n d i n almost complete freedom, the transference thus creat­ ing an intermediate

region between illness a n d real life. It is a piece of

real experience, b u t one m a d e possible b y special conditions a n d h a v i n g a p r o v i s i o n a l character (p. 154). M a y I a d d that the analyst's pragmatic

(and semantic)

neutrality allows

a n attenuation of

annihilatory p h e n o m e n a : i n A n d r e w ' s case, a lessening b o t h of the annihilating expulsive anxieties of the early maternal transference a n d of the d r e a d e d phallic rivalry projected into the analyst. W i t h i n the pragmatic context given b y his neutrality, it is the role of the analyst to p u r v e y a " m a p p i n g " t h r o u g h interpretations l e a d i n g to descriptive insights, i n a n attempt to " o p e n "

these

closed " d e d u c t i v e " unconscious pragmatic levels, w h i c h , i n turn, w i l l contribute to their re-evaluation a n d / o r refutation b y the ana­ l y s a n d , w h i c h w i l l , i n m y o p i n i o n , be u n a v o i d a b l y ostensive. T h i s fits w e l l w i t h F r e u d ' s idea that the unconscious k n o w s " n o nega­ tion, n o doubts, n o degrees of certainty" (1915e, p. 186). Ostensive refutation, w h e n attained, brings unconscious processes Pcs.-Cs.

to the

d o m a i n of the " n o " . W h i c h brings m e to a final comment.

Inductive and counter-inductive systems After explaining m y v i e w o n the inductive workings of clinical psychoanalysis, i n w h i c h m a i n l y pragmatic facts evolve within

a

pragmatic relational field i n w a y s that allow cognitions about it to

THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

36

emerge, I w a n t to make it clear that I use the term " i n d u c t i o n " i n the w i d e r sense i n w h i c h W h e w e l l (1858), Russell (1948), v o n W r i g h t (1957), a n d Q u i n e (1961) conceive it, a n d not i n the more restrictive sense of M i l l (1852), Braithwaite (1953), or G r u n b a u m (1984). V o n W r i g h t (1957, p. 169) sets apart counter-inductive postures that, contrary to inductive generalization, operate o n the m a x i m that " t h e future w i l l differ from the past": if the evolution of p s y ­ chic " f a c t s " i n psychoanalysis brings unconscious processes to the Pcs.-Cs.

d o m a i n of the " n o " , counter-induction

becomes central to

the psychoanalytic m e t h o d as far as the analysand is concerned. I shall e n d b y recalling that, after W h e w e l l , the distinction between facts a n d theories is only relative. W h a t the analyst w i l l describe interpretively as " p s y c h i c facts" are m a i n l y the w a y s the analysand puts into p l a y his unconscious patterns or " t h e o r i e s " ; the analy­ s a n d , for his part, attains a n ostensive

insight into his " c l i n i c a l facts"

w h e n , h e l p e d along b y the descriptive m a p p i n g s c o n v e y e d b y the interpretations, he accedes by double (or multiple) vidual concrete instances "theory".

to the empirical falsification

observation of an

in indi­

unconscious

CHAPTER

TWO

The analyst as "base"

It is unjustifiable to require in analysis that something is remembered consciously when it has never been conscious. Only repetition is possible with subsequent objectivation for the first time in the analysis. Repetition of the trauma and interpretation (understanding)... is therefore the double task of the analysis. Sandor Ferenczi, Notes and Fragments (1932)

. . . shadow is of the nature of universal things, all of which are more potent at the start... Darkness is the first grade of shadow, and light the last. Take care then, painter, to make shadow darker close to its origin, and that its end becomes light, so that it comes to seem endless. Leonardo da Vinci, Trattato della Pittura

When anyone speaks, it gets light. Sigmund Freud (1905d, 224n) Published in Psicoanalisis, 6 (1984): 585-605. 37

38

THE LOGICS O F THE M I N D

T

he analytic situation involves a patient a n d a n analyst i n a relationship that is subject to rules that—as is the case for the analyst's functions—are i n a w a y restated anew b y each

session a n d each analytic intervention (Zac, 1971). That patient a n d analyst are so evidently there—that there is a patient a n d a n ana­

lyst a n d n o r m s implicit i n their relationship—is b o t h obvious a n d essential. This m a y , however, obtrude o n the gap between those aspects of p a t i e n t — a n d analyst—that d o k n o w this, a n d other less evident b u t perhaps no less active aspects i n relation to w h i c h n o s u c h experience exists. In other chapters I examine, i n terms of transposition of func­ tions of self a n d Object, a psychopathological structure i n w h i c h infantile aspects l i n k e d to need are kept " o u t " of the patient, split off

into partenaires.

O f s u c h patients, i n w h i c h this splitting

amounts to a clinical form of unconscious m e g a l o m a n i a ( M o n e y K y r l e , 1965), it seems v a l i d to say that u p to the time w h e n this unconscious psychotic structure evolves, there is n o unconscious experience of the analyst as such. Centrally, the patient's self c o ­ opts the function of the need-satisfying-Object: whatever

"base"

seems to exist is spurious. Self-Object transposition is, clinically, a pre-catastrophic configuration, I shall a p p r o a c h here a necessary step i n the analyses of these patients, a n d perhaps i n others as w e l l : those moments i n the p r o ­ cess that evidence that the analysand has lost, b o t h inside himself a n d i n his link to the analyst, a contact w i t h the " b a s e "

(Money-

K y r l e , 1969, p. 437)—that is, w i t h the primitive object-link to the breast or n i p p l e o n w h i c h sanity depends. T h e " b a s e " w o u l d not seem to exist at s u c h moments to the analysand's psychic reality. W h e n e v e r this takes place, the sensorially perceptible presence of the analyst obscures the fact that there is not, i n psychic reality, a n analyst functioning as such. U s u a l l y , the analysand feels that there is a n analyst to w h o m , w i t h w h o m , against w h o m , or " i n " w h o m he c a n come to experi­ ence, b y w a y of projective identification, this or that. T o assume that the unconscious feeling is that there is n o analyst or, expressed differently, that there is n o unconscious experience that a n analyst

39

T H E A N A L Y S T AS " B A S E "

exists poses a quite different emotional issue. Let us say that the patient has come late. W e can interpret s u c h lateness as anal spite, addressed to the analyst or to his setting. W e can interpret it as a n envious attack o n the analyst's capacity for thought or for " f e e d ­ i n g " the analysand. Alternatively, it can be seen as a w a y of " s p l i t ­ ting o n t o " the analyst a part of the analysand that cannot bear w a i t i n g , a n d / o r as an attempt to have the analyst feel the p a i n of w a i t i n g , or as a revenge o n the analyst b y e x c l u d i n g h i m or expos­ i n g h i m to jealousy. These a n d other possibly apt interpretations share an assumption: the existence, to the analysand's unconscious, of an analyst w h o can either be attacked or be m a d e to feel this or that, or w h o can be m a d e the depository of unbearable aspects of his m i n d . W h a t I try to explore is that this m a y not be v a l i d for a part of the analysand's unconscious, a n d h o w this m a y be e v i ­ d e n c e d i n the analytic process. Non-existence, to the analysand's psychic reality, of the analyst as " b a s e " can perhaps be s u b s u m e d i n the concept of e n v y . T h e analyst is not felt to exist because he has been e n v i o u s l y destroyed; this is h o w M o n e y - K y r l e (1965, p. 402) sees it, a d d i n g that e n v y addresses the mother's apparent lack of distress. Yet this m a y be reinforced b y the mother's resistance to introjecting the baby's p a i n f u l mental states. These points w i l l be taken u p later o n , but first I shall present two brief examples of clinical material f r o m the t h i r d year of a n analysis further illustrated—as M r s A — i n

my

chapter o n delusional goodness (Chapter 4). T h e d r e a m i n the first material came u p i n the context of the patient's decision to stop treatment because of a fear of d e p e n d i n g a n d the m o u n t i n g sensa­ tion, b l a m e d o n the analysis, of losing her clarity of thought. " . . . 7 had gone to my aunt's

house, to the dining-room

. . . a house I

liked a lot, I haven't been there since I was 16 . . . but instead

of my

aunt being there, my mother and sister were there, and my mother said to me 'you always many children, sitting

try to be the centre of attention'.

on the window

realized anxiously,

children,

sill; I was seeing them through a curtain,

they were going

to fall..

. . I said this several times,

but nobody paid any attention.

close the window,

. . there were

my nephews and perhaps some of my own

but they said this couldn't

and I very

They ignored me. I tried to be done. So I lowered the

shutters . . . but in spite of this I was still afraid that a child would

fall,

40

THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

that a very special nephew would fall through don't know how, lieved.

I am walking

the shutters.

Then, I

on the street by myself, quite

re­

..."

O n w a k i n g , the patient thought about the w a r m t h of her aunt's kitchen a n d then about a game they u s e d to p l a y there i n c h i l d ­ h o o d , stepping o n a skylight. Other children downstairs w o u l d try to guess w h o s e feet they were. She then went o n to describe a fight i n w h i c h her h u s b a n d h a d accused her of h a v i n g n o feelings, of not u n d e r s t a n d i n g her father-in-law's needs. H e accused her, I gather, of not b e i n g a faultless " c o n t a i n e r " of others' emotions, w h i c h m y a n a l y s a n d has always striven to be, this being her basic acting-out. W h a t needs to be u n d e r l i n e d is the intense feeling of coldness, of non-response to her emotional needs, that she projected onto the analyst, f r o m the v e r y b e g i n n i n g of her analysis on. U p to n o w , s u c h coldness was a premise; at this point it started to become a quality the analyst c o u l d be accused or reproached for. A s I u n d e r ­ stand it, s u c h assumed coldness o n m y part a l l o w e d her to c o n ­ tinue i n analysis. A s the need for the analyst's w a r m t h came u p , her unconscious

aspects

l i n k e d to affect—the

c h i l d r e n of

the

d r e a m — w o u l d lose all emotional containment. T h e y w o u l d " f a l l t h r o u g h the w i n d o w " , lose a " b a s e " . In Bion's terms, w e c o u l d speak of a p p r o a c h i n g the turn f r o m a parasitic to a symbiotic link. E m o t i o n a l isolation, u p to then projected into the analyst, brings i n some relief ("I lowered the shutters. myself, quite

. .. I am walking

on the street by

relieved").

I shall go back to this d r e a m , but let m e go n o w o n to other clinical material, f r o m a few months later. I shall explore w h a t seems to be the patient's m a i n fear, the unconscious experience of non-existence of the Object. It emerged o n a w e e k e n d before a h o l i d a y , the unconscious impact of w h i c h h a d been totally d e n i e d . In the last session before the w e e k e n d , the patient spoke at length about a long-time friend w h o was leaving the country because

"I

h a v e n o t h i n g to d o h e r e " . M o s t l y , she was w o r r i e d that he seemed unable to feel any p a i n about leaving. It w o u l d seem, but I d i d not m e n t i o n this at the time, that she felt as if he were l e a v i n g a n o ­ place. T h e n , " c h a n g i n g the subject", they h a d talked about o l d films f r o m their y o u t h , of w h i c h the c o m m o n subject was (as it

T H E A N A L Y S T AS " B A S E "

41

became m o r e a n d more obvious as the session went on) a c h i l d exposed to the loss of a dearly l o v e d object—a loss that threatened to be strictly unbearable. O n M o n d a y she called to say she w o u l d not be c o m i n g . In the next session, o n a W e d n e s d a y , she asked m e if I h a d been i n f o r m e d that she was not c o m i n g . She then c o m m e n t e d that she d i d not k n o w w h y she h a d not come. There was n o reason for that, because " n o t h i n g h a p p e n e d " . I told her that I assumed something must have h a p p e n e d . After some doubt a n d a silence she a d d e d that b y S u n d a y evening she h a d k n o w n that she w o u l d not go a n y w h e r e o n M o n d a y . After a silence I asked her h o w she h a d k n o w n a n d then she said that " S u n d a y was a catastrophe". T o cut a l o n g story short, they h a d visited friends where she was w a r m l y w e l c o m e d , to the p o i n t of h a v i n g a special gift: some antique prints f r o m w h i c h she was to choose the one she liked most. But the l a d y of the house (who is i n analysis) d i d not seem to feel w e l l a n d told her she was depressed. T h e n a couple of friends came i n , w i t h a sister w h o was g o i n g into a psychiatric hospital the following d a y , " d i v o r c e d , w i t h two c h i l d r e n she d i d n ' t e v e n m e n t i o n " . T h e w o m a n h a d been i n treatment " w i t h three analysts for a y e a r " . She was agitated, i n c o ­ herent, g o i n g f r o m suicide threats to attempts to f i n d , i n a frivolous m o o d a n d "as a sort of lifesaver", someone to go out w i t h that night. T h e others helplessly tried to follow her tune b u t s h o w e d signs of long-felt frustration at this k i n d of behaviour. M y patient seemed to have felt s u c h alternating non-containments as mistreat­ m e n t — t h a t the w o m a n was b e i n g d e p r i v e d of the lifesaver-that­ should-have-been-there. She d i d not say a w o r d ; she left a n d she forgot her gift, the antique print. O n M o n d a y she stayed at h o m e . O n T u e s d a y she went " f o r a t a l k " to see her favourite sister. There were other relatives there, so she was unable to f i n d the p r i v a c y she w a n t e d ; but at least she was able to get angry about this. T h i s material c a n be a p p r o a c h e d i n different w a y s . Both e x a m ­ ples seem to show, as polarities i n a c o n t i n u u m , o n the one h a n d , object losses that " e x i s t " at her psychic reality, losses that can be delineated a n d tolerated to diverse degrees, a n d , o n the other h a n d , a level w h e r e the lost object lacks psychic reality ( " n o t h i n g h a p p e n s " ) . A t this pole of " d a r k n e s s " of the psychic c o n t i n u u m w e d o not d e a l w i t h an analyst-that-exists-but-is-not-there. W e deal

THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

42

w i t h a " n o n - p l a c e " where, i n her psychic reality, a n analyst is not felt to exist.

The "base" and catastrophic change M o n e y - K y r l e ' s complementary aspects, e n v y of the mother's seem­ i n g lack of distress a n d the mother's resistance to introject the b a b y ' s p a i n f u l mental states, can be understood as factors that configure catastrophic change: i n Bion's terms (1965, p. 8) a shift, " a s u b v e r s i o n of the order or system of t h i n g s " , i n the c o n t a i n e r ­ contained emotional relationship. A third factor elicited i n the c l i n i ­ cal material (probably indistinguishable to the analysand f r o m the feeling of a resistance of the breast) seems to coincide w i t h w h a t B i o n (1962, p. 10) described as enforced splitting:

love is indiscernible

f r o m e n v y , a n d it reinforces the obstruction to a contact w i t h the breast. M y central argument is that such moments of non-existence of the analyst as " b a s e " are a perhaps a n essential m o m e n t i n e v o l v ­ i n g f r o m the pre-catastrophic to the post-catastrophic state. T h e sequence w o u l d be as follows: a " b i t of b a b y " ( M o n e y - K y r l e , 1965, p. 328) of the analysand's unconscious a p p r o a c h i n g i n transference to experience the need of a breast (for relief, support, food, etc.) is perhaps, as M o n e y - K y r l e suggests of primitive preconceptions, image-less

a n d idea-less. It w o u l d then be m a x i m a l l y exposed,

either to the feeling of a resistance of the breast to introject p a i n f u l states or, at the " d a r k n e s s " pole of the c o n t i n u u m , to the n o n ­ existence of such a breast. Experience of the non-existence of a breast able to introject p a i n f u l states, establishing a " p a i r " to feelings of love, is not easy for patients to access a n d not easy to name. W h e n it comes to be reconstructed a n d , to some extent, to be " t h o u g h t " , it is referred to as insensitiveness or coldness. T h e transference experience of n o n ­ existence of the analyst as " b a s e " c a n be understood as the limit case of the experience of insensitiveness or coldness of the object. Image-less a n d idea-less as far as both breast a n d m o u t h are c o n ­ cerned, s u c h qualities of the " b i t of b a b y " , a p p r o a c h i n g the trans­ ference, appear clinically as the lack of a n as yet u n r e c o g n i z e d

T H E A N A L Y S T A S " B A S E "

43

object. L a c k itself is not recognizable—it must be intuited b y the analyst based o n the feelings of desperation. T h e fact that, as B i o n says (1965, p. 90), verbalized language is action

gives rise to special technical problems because the analyst

becomes trapped i n a d i l e m m a . [Writing o n female homosexuality, Etchegoyen (1970) refers to a similar d i l e m m a as a double

bind.]

W h e n e v e r , f r o m the transferential status of the analyst-that-is­ not—that is, the analyst-whose-goodness-is-not—the analyst inter­ prets the situation as a n attack o n the link to h i m as " b a s e " (or the attack o n " t h i n k i n g " at the analysand's m i n d ) , he becomes to the analysand's psychotic part a n " e x i s t i n g " analyst w h o inoculates " b a d n e s s " . T h u s he is b o u n d to be felt as a " b a d " analyst, as a " s u p e r e g o " (Bion, 1962, p. 97) enacting a -K m o r a l attitude, r o b ­ b i n g h i m of his desperation a n d his desire to live a n d leading h i m to nameless d r e a d . T h i s cannot b u t exacerbate the emotional p r o b ­ l e m : the felt analyst differs from—that is, " w i l l not approximate e n o u g h t o " (Bion, 1965, p. 106-107)—the (good) analyst that s h o u l d be, obstructing the attempts to contact h i m . A m p l i f y i n g M o n e y - K y r l e ' s ideas o n e n v y a n d the breast's r e ­ sistance, w e meet the interplay i n transference of t w o discernible aspects: 1.

T h e " b i t of b a b y " is searching for what Ferenczi's school called the d u a l unity ( H e r m a n n , 1936), a " b i t of b a b y " o v e r l o a d e d b y a lack, seeking a n as yet u n d i s c o v e r e d emotional container a n d exposed to the risk that the failings of s u c h a n emotional c o n ­ tainer d o not allow that it be " r e c o g n i z e d " . " R e c o g n i z e d " here is u s e d i n the sense of the preconception " f i n d i n g " a n u p - t o ­ then u n k n o w n object, of its " c l a s s i f y i n g " a n object of w h i c h it has n o experience.

2.

T h e part of the patient's personality " i n the place of the Object", w h o s e interplay w i t h the analyst enacts the rules of transforma­ tion i n hallucinosis. If the analyst is felt to exist, he is " t o p " i n the sense of hallucinosis. H e "acts as centre", to put it i n terms of the first material transcribed, a n d this elicits the accusation that this reveals the analyst's envy. T h e r e u p o n the " s e a r c h for a n O b ­ ject" of the patient's " b i t of b a b y " w i l l aggravate the envious rivalry towards the analyst o n the side of the patient's aspects u s u r p i n g " t h e place of the Object".

44

T H E LOGICS O F T H E MIND

Destructive projective and desperate projective

identification identification

C l i n i c a l l y , the analyst is b o u n d to assess what is the case: whether, a n d h o w , there is an attack o n , or an evacuation of a part of p e r s o n ­ ality onto, a n analyst felt as being there as a " s p a c e " for projective identification, or, alternatively, whether there is not, to the patient's psychic reality, a n analyst functioning as such. S u c h a choice can lead to what M o n e y - K y r l e (1978a, p. 463) describes as an error that is b o t h easy a n d terrible: " t o mistake a desperate projection for a destructive one. For b y this means, I think, the beginnings of a constructive link between patient a n d analyst m a y be d e s t r o y e d . " In the opposite case, however, w e usually have the o p p o r t u n i t y to redress our interpretive stance. M o n e y - K y r l e does not detail this crucial distinction between desperate projective identification a n d destructive projective i d e n ­ tification. W e can ascribe to desperation the function of a biper­ sonal anxiety signal that appeals to the primitive psychobiological emotional container. O r i g i n a l l y , it is the set of maternal functions k n o w n to psychoanalysis as the "breast". W h e n e v e r s u c h a n appeal finds its " p a i r " , w e can assume that, " t o " or " f o r " this part of the symbiotic infantile self, the unconscious feeling of the breast's real­ ity, o n w h i c h sanity rests, is established. Desperate projective i d e n ­ tification w o u l d be a n attempt to link w i t h a "breast-Object", the aliveness of w h i c h w o u l d allow re-establishment at primitive levels of m i n d of a " d u a l u n i t y " ( H e r m a n n , 1936). This w o u l d be at the base of the emerging "constructive link between patient a n d ana­ l y s t " to w h i c h M o n e y - K y r l e refers. S u c h a constructive link cannot be counted o n at s u c h m o m e n t s of analysis, only as a preconception "realization"

in the session—that

that has to find

its "pair",

its

is, i n the contact w i t h the analyst.

E v o l u t i o n proceeds b y w a y of " p a i r i n g " a " b r e a s t - i m a g e " w i t h the emotional qualities of a real breast. It is i n this sense, I gather, that realization of an aliveness of the " b r e a s t " must be e m b o d i e d i n the link to the analyst i n session. This is w h a t Meltzer (1978b, p. ix) says he learnt f r o m M o n e y K y r l e : that modesty, patience, kindness, a n d forbearance are more important ingredients of a n analyst's contribution to the p s y c h o ­ analytic process than are theories. S u c h emotions e m b o d i e d i n the

T H E ANALYST AS "BASE"

45

l i n k to the analyst p r o v i d e the indispensable " r e a l i z a t i o n " , so that the " b i t of b a b y " of the analysand's unconscious m a y , o n e m e r g i n g i n session, evolve i n w a y s that w i l l , initially, partake of the u n c o n ­ ditionality a n d the intolerance that A l i c e Balint describes (1939). A t s u c h a level, the psychic existence of the analysand's infantile s y m ­ biotic self a n d a contact w i t h the existence of the analyst are closely l i n k e d , as K l e i n (1957) k n e w w e l l . A t this level, the link of a " p a i r " entails the fear of falling f r o m the mother's a r m s — a description that w e also o w e to A l i c e Balint (1939). Fear of f a l l i n g — s h o w n so v i v i d l y i n the d r e a m transcribed—is b r o u g h t about w h e n the u n ­ conscious " b i t of b a b y " , the symbiotic infantile self, comes closer i n transference to the search for a breast-Object, the existence of w h i c h cannot be taken for granted.

Conceptual

implications

T w o technical aspects were m e n t i o n e d before: the d i l e m m a i n w h i c h the analyst m a y be trapped w h e n interpretations are lis­ tened to as actions at the level of transformations i n hallucinosis, a n d the emotional qualities that must be e m b o d i e d i n the l i n k to the analyst for image-less preconception of the breast to evolve. T h i s has implications for conceptualizing the transference, projec­ tive identification, a n d the psychotic personality. In w h a t concerns conceptualization of transference—which,

ar­

gues M o n e y - K y r l e , is still the most mysterious concept of p s y c h o ­ a n a l y s i s — w e m u s t account for at least t w o transferences at a time. N o n e of these is m i n i m a l l y distorted as, according to B i o n (1965, p. 19), w o u l d be the case for the type of transference described b y F r e u d (1905e) i n the D o r a case. O n e of these levels of transference occurs at the level of trans­ formations i n hallucinosis. T h e other, that of the infantile symbiotic self, of the " b i t of b a b y " a p p r o a c h i n g the link to the analyst, corre­ s p o n d s to the patient's prehistory rather than to history. It c a n , h o w e v e r , come about i n term of historical myths: "I am at my aunt's house . . . " , s h o w n as fleeting screens for formulations at r o w C i n B i o n ' s G r i d . Distinctions are not neat, b u t transference at the level of r i g i d m o v e m e n t transformations, i n v o l v i n g displacement a n d

46

THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

m i n i m a l deformation i n passing f r o m past to present, c o r r e s p o n d generally to m o r e evolved levels of m i n d i n w h i c h historical situa­ tions are re-edited.

Regarding the implications for the conceptualization identification,

of projective

s u c h a concept was b o u n d f r o m the start to K l e i n ' s

use of the death-instinct as a n explicative hypothesis: deflection of the death-instinct is the first task for the baby's m i n d . T h e idea that the princeps function of m i n d relates to discharge follows a line of thought dear to F r e u d : affects as discharge processes a n d discharge as the basis of pleasure. W e find a central discrepancy between theory a n d technique, b o t h i n F r e u d a n d i n K l e i n b u t especially i n F r e u d : that between a one-person theory of m i n d , w h i c h is a n " i n t r a p s y c h i c " metapsychology, a n d a clinical theory, m o r e a n d m o r e is built u p o n mental evolutions based o n l i n k i n g processes. In K l e i n ' s w o r k , the concept of projective identification plays a core role i n p u l l i n g her theory of m i n d towards bi-personal terms. Bion's (1962) theories of the emotional container-contained rela­ tionship a n d of preconceptions make explicit along t w o axes the b i n a r y , bi-mental quality of m i n d a n d the m i n d ' s evolutions. T h e first axis is that of n o n - e v o l v e d levels, ranging f r o m description of the g r o u p mentality a n d the basic assumptions to that of the beta­ elements, fit only for evacuation b y w a y of projective identifica­ tion, a n d it extends to the description of transformations i n the d o m a i n of hallucinosis, pertaining to the sphere of action a n d espe­ cially to that of enactment of rivalry: b y w a y of these, the patient p u r p o r t s to s h o w his independence f r o m everything that is not his o w n creation (Bion, 1965, p p . 136-137). The second axis, b i - m e n t a l i n a more e v o l v e d sense, includes the container-contained relation­ ship a n d its internalization i n the K link. Both axes can be a d u m ­ brated i n K l e i n ' s w o r k ; their differences c o u l d lead to questioning the conceptual unity of what the editors of her Writings call the w i d e field of projective identification.

Regarding the implications for conceptualizing

the psychotic per­

sonality, I shall recall the patient's experience, w h i c h i n v o l v e d the interruption of her treatment, o n the loss of clear t h i n k i n g . W h a t I earlier called the u s u r p i n g self " i n the place of the Object" fits, i n Bion's terms, into a capacity for transformation i n hallucinosis. It claims sanity a n d can be taken b y the analyst to be such. B i o n (1965, p. 144) warns that a tendency to transform at the hallucinatory

T H E A N A L Y S T AS " B A S E "

47

level c a n be conceptualized b y the analyst as characteropathic. M e l t z e r (1975) falls into this trap i n his paper o n c o m p u l s i v e gener­ osity. " C l a r i t y of t h i n k i n g " , the loss of w h i c h threatens the patient, belongs, I believe, to " t h o u g h t " i n hallucinosis. It belongs to the operation of a part of the self functioning crazily as if it were sane, establishing its independence f r o m whatever is not its o w n crea­ tion. Diversely, the image-less—as respects the b r e a s t — " b i t of b a b y " , w h i l e reality-less, is not crazy, a n d it w o u l d seem to be the part of the personality able to evolve towards sanity b y attaining, i n the transference link, a n experience of a n analytic realization of the breast felt as real rather than phantasized. So the clinical e p i ­ sode described can be seen, f r o m different vertices, as the e v o l u t i o n of the infantile self towards the symbiotic link a n d as the collapse of the capacity for transformation i n hallucinosis.

Non-existence of the "base" and the container-contained relationship T h e distinction of moments of non-existence of the " b a s e "

from

those i n w h i c h a link is permeated b y alternating feelings to the "base-Object" can be illustrated b y a clinical episode f r o m the start of the fourth year of analysis. After a session i n w h i c h I announced a n inflation adjustment of m y fees, "Patient A " left feeling b a d l y , w a n t i n g to stop the analysis. A l t h o u g h she never talks about her analysis, she m e n ­ tioned this to h e r favourite sister. In her next session she said that the w o r d " i n f l a t i o n " , w h i c h , according to her, I h a d never m e n t i o n e d before, h a d m a d e her react. She felt she c o u l d n o longer trust her analysis because I h a d i n t r o d u c e d the idea of inflation " a s a third party sitting here, a n d w h o neither y o u or m e c a n k n o w where it m a y go; your inflation is different f r o m mine, each one lives it i n his o w n manner. Y o u c a n adjust, a n d I'll be able or not able to pay, but y o u shouldn't make out that it is because of inflation, w h i c h is a p r o b l e m of y o u r s . " She c o m ­ m e n t e d that at times of inflation y o u cannot get a mortgage or

48

THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

b u y a flat o n credit because the debt m a y e n d u p being more than its value. That is, y o u never k n o w whether credit c o u l d r u i n y o u . W h e n I mentioned inflation, I destroyed her trust i n analysis. I h a d become an

outsider (Meltzer, 1973), w h i c h

p r o m p t e d her to gain the upper h a n d i n obliterating her g o o d , "felt as r e a l " , link to me. S u c h a clinical event, differently from those illustrated earlier, retains a link permeated b y alternating emotions. Patient A is capable of both benevolence a n d hostility, a n d , as B i o n (1965, p. 78) says of the symbiotic link, the analyst's contribution is sub­ ject to close scrutiny. A dream was brought u p i n w h i c h she,

as

part of a commando group, skilfully and effortlessly took over emptyfortress of rounded, smooth walls. However, what they ob was meagre indeed: a button, an epaulet. In the second part of the d r e a m — w h i c h she c o u l d not remember whether it was succes­

carefully and with great effort explained to me what each part of the dream meant. She w o k e u p v e r y tired,

sive or simultaneous—she

a n d she d i d not remember what she h a d said to me. She called to say she w o u l d not come because, after the d r e a m , she was v e r y tired, "as if she h a d h a d a h u n d r e d sessions". It was, I think, her first acknowledged contact w i t h a need to be u n d e r ­ stood b y her analyst. This was different f r o m her u s u a l attitude of "If y o u understand, it's O K ; if y o u don't, it's just the same to m e . " T h i s is an attitude that, similarly to the first part of the d r e a m or her statement that she came to analysis " n o t because I can a n d need do so, just because I want t o " , expresses transfor­ m a t i o n i n hallucinosis. E v e n explicitly " i n t r a p s y c h i c " stances o n m i n d require bi-mental models to approach mental evolution. A t the core of s u c h an e v o l u ­ tion stand " c o u p l i n g s " built o n m a i n l y unconscious observational data that the analysand obtains o n the w o r k i n g of the analyst's m i n d , used as the "introjective base" of evolution. T h e binarity of the analytic relationship comes to evolve, i n m y view, b y w a y of a n

unconscious mapping of the realizations emerging i n the analytic link. It is centred o n the capability of the analyst's m i n d to bear the emotions emerging transferentially, w h i c h can only be

"object­

i f i e d " , to use Ferenczi's (1932) term, o n f i n d i n g a n appropriate

THE A N A L Y S T AS " B A S E "

49

container i n the analyst's m i n d . Interpretation also exposes the analyst's ability to bear the emotions that the analysand cannot bear. Other patients unconsciously " m a p " the analyst's m i n d as operating w i t h i n a restricted emotional m a r g i n , delimited o n the one h a n d b y w h a t they feel as the analyst's inability to r e s p o n d to their emotions a n d , o n the other h a n d , b y a zone i n w h i c h the emotional turbulence brought u p b y the i r r u p t i o n of their emotions is felt to explode the analytic link. In order for evolution to proceed, interpretation must be able to metacommunicate o n the emotional link to w h i c h it refers. W h e n Ferenczi says, i n the quotation at the start of this chapter, " . . . interpretation (understanding) . . . " , is he perhaps h i n t i n g that the contents interpreted must be s u p p o r t e d b y a meta-communicational function of " u n d e r s t a n d i n g " ? I c a n only point here to Bion's (1977) hints o n constructions (as o p p o s e d to interpretations) as essential instruments to demonstrate s y m m e t r y . S u c h polyvalent use is something w e need learn more about.

The non-objects

and the

"pair"

A metapsychological issue can be posited n o w . Is the Object that i n psychic reality does not exist, strictly speaking, a b a d object? A classical K l e i n i a n answer w i l l be tied to K l e i n ' s a n c h o r i n g to a concrete, quasi-material conception of the death-instinct, the d e ­ flection of w h i c h is the first a n d foremost task of the infant m i n d . H o w e v e r , i n practice badness does not seem to be a quality of the analyst-that-is-not C o n v e r s e l y , if w e centre o n the negative quality of the statement, as M o n e y - K y r l e (1968, p . 419) does w h e n he d e ­ limits the class of objects that d o not frustrate, o n the one h a n d a n d , o n the other, the class of objects that d o not satisfy, the analyst-that­ is-not c o u l d be m a x i m a l l y i n c l u d e d a m o n g these. This obscure topic deals w i t h s u c h themes as innate preconceptions of hostile objects, as H e r m a n n a n d Peto assumed (see Peto, 1969). In a n y case, I shall assume that a persecutory object implies some distinc­ tion between self a n d object a n d a mental structure that is able to be permeated b y alternating emotions. H e r e I a m i n q u i r i n g o n p r i m o r d i a l or later failures i n setting u p s u c h structure—issues pertaining to autistic

levels of the personality.

50

THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

H o w does the zone of the non-Object come to be? W h i l e i n the case of b a d objects persecution is located out of the self a n d is a threat to it, i n the zone of non-objects trauma w o u l d seem to fall u p o n a " p a i r " formed b y a symbiotic aspect of the infantile self a n d a n object w i t h w h i c h a fusional link m a y have been attained. In s u c h a case, w e w o u l d contact not so m u c h persecution as such, but the remains of a n emotive short-circuiting. W h i l e badness w o u l d seem to involve some sort of presence, the psychic quality of the Object-that-is-not is perhaps closer to what Borges (1969) suggests of the universe depicted b y M e l v i l l e i n Moby Dick—an

atrocious

quality of non-response to humaneness. F r o m this standpoint the issue of non-objects is one of a self-Object pair that has lost psychic existence. But, as Dario Sor noted d u r i n g a discussion of this chap­ ter, i n the attempt to describe them non-objects mutate into objects. Something similar happens, too, i n analytic sessions where a n y m o d e l l i n g — f o r example, i n d r e a m s — i m p l i e s , i n terms of Bion's G r i d , a C formulation, a m a i n step from non-existence to psychic existence. This viewpoint implies a trust i n the w i s d o m , o n the part of the preconceptual apparatus, to recognize apt realizations i n a n e v o l v i n g analytic link. M i c h a e l Balint (1949) states that Ferenczi's favourite tale, told o n a n u m b e r of occasions, referred to a " w i s e b a b y " w h o , f r o m the cradle on, is wiser than all the family, than all the adults p u t together. H o w e v e r , as opposed to what happens n o r m a l l y i n tales, where the baby easily meets his goals, i n the real w o r l d his desperate efforts (my italics) to traverse the barrier of misunderstandings a r o u n d h i m are d o o m e d to failure. M y h o p e is that attention to instances of the analysis approaching those nar­ rated above m a y help the baby i n w h o m w e perforce trust i n each analysand a n d i n ourselves to a v o i d some of these failures.

CHAPTER

THREE

O n the transposition of self and object

In all our patients, regardless of age, the clinical material presents us with the task of assisting in the differentiation of levels in psychic life. Donald Meltzer, (1973, p. 64)

T

his chapter extends the metapsychological description of

two organizations i n narcissistic object relationship w h e r e , as said, objects are partial, omnipotence is p r o m i n e n t , a n d

projective-introjective identification processes erase the identity of, a n d the limits between, the self a n d the object. T h e perverse or­ ganization m a r k e d b y e n v y shows the destructiveness that M e l t z e r (1973) ascribes to perversion, whereas the symbiotic organization

partly tolerates the object's goodness a n d the fusional needs to­ w a r d it. A mature part of the self, a c k n o w l e d g i n g the object's identity, m a y operate where there is less conflict. M y differences w i t h H e r b e r t Rosenfeld (1964a, 1969, 1971) a n d M e l t z e r (1967,

Presented to the Buenos Aires Psychoanalytic Association in August 1980. 51

52

THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

1973) arise f r o m : (a) m y distinction of t w o narcissistic o r g a n i z a ­ tions, perverse a n d symbiotic, (b) m y use of Bion's (1962) n o t i o n of the need-for-a-breast/bad-breast, (c) m y a p p r o a c h to lack, pleas­ ure, terror, a n d internal tyrannical links. In sane object relationships, the infantile self depends for its s u r v i v a l o n the mature, adult object feeding a n d caring for h i m . T o H e r b e r t Rosenfeld (1969), the infantile self comprises the aspects i n n e e d of a n d able to receive f r o m a n o u r i s h i n g object. T h i s p r o v i d e s g r o u n d s for m y distinction between a perverse a n d a symbiotic organization i n the personality. The perverse organization reverses the sane positions of the infantile self a n d the object as a n envious, voracious self takes over the object's qualities. T h e goodness of the Object, a l l o w i n g the infantile self's dependency, is thus destroyed 1

i n this area of psychic reality. The u s u r p i n g self's superiority comes f r o m its location " i n the function of the Object". Seizure a n d u s u r ­ p a t i o n are exacerbated b y the need to receive f r o m the Object, w h i c h leads to a delusional self-idealization that is o p p o s e d to receiving. T h e perverse organization enacts p o w e r activities to abolish feelings of lack. N e e d leaves its place to p o w e r a n d to annihilation of need. A t this level there is n o suffering or pleasure, n o introjective p h e n o m e n a or evolution. T h e symbiotic organization partly respects need a n d the g o o d ­ ness of objects, b u t not their separateness regarding the self. Self a n d Object preserve their metapsychological places a n d functions, b u t not their limits. T h e often intense pleasure of perverse acts occurs i n this area, fusional cutaneous sensoriality u s u a l l y b e i n g p r o m i n e n t . T h e actual presence of the partner is a must. Intoler­ ance of the non-presence of the Object is extreme; that the " r e a l i t y " of its presence be actually felt m a y involve stringent conditions. In the perverse organization, o n the other h a n d , pleasure happens o n l y i n the sense i n w h i c h it is said that revenge is the " p l e a s u r e " of the gods. A l t h o u g h prominent, the transposition of self a n d Object is not l i m i t e d to p e r v e r s i o n or to psychopathology. Its classic description

r h e u s e of a capital letter for "Object" denotes the unconscious primary Object, w h i c h , strictly speaking, is not a n i n d i v i d u a l but a relational p r e p o ­ sitional form. lr

O N T H E T R A N S P O S I T I O N O F SELF A N D O B J E C T

53

comes f r o m the s t u d y of perversion i n F r e u d ' s Leonardo (1910c). P r e v i o u s l y , i n a 1910 footnote to Three Essays (1905d), F r e u d notes that the future inverts, i n the earliest years of their childhood, pass through a phase of very intense phase but short-lived fixation to a w o m a n (usually their mother), and . . . after leaving this behind, they identify themselves with a w o m a n and take them­ selves as their sexual object. That is to say, they proceed from a narcissistic basis, and look for a young m a n w h o resembles themselves and w h o m they m a y love as their mother loved them. [p. 145n] T h i s first m e n t i o n of narcissism a n d a second, m o r e extended one i n Leonardo assign a central role to the transposition of self a n d Object. H o w e v e r , it earns n o place i n F r e u d i a n m e t a p s y c h o l o g y . C l i n i c a l references a b o u n d i n K l e i n i a n literature o n transference a n d countertransference—for example, i n G r i n b e r g (1956, 1957, 1958) a n d i n H . Racker's (1968) w o r k , where they gain a s o m e w h a t neater metapsychological status. Before extending b e y o n d overt perversion the use of the meta­ p s y c h o l o g i c a l m o d e l of transposition of self a n d Object, I shall m e n t i o n t w o issues. First, the conception of a mental apparatus " w i t h i n " the i n d i v i d u a l ' s b o d i l y limits arises f r o m F r e u d ' s attempt, i n the " P r o j e c t " (1950 [1895]), at a p s y c h o l o g y for neurologists; this w a s tied to p u r p o r t e d b r a i n function, w h i c h leads, i n C h a p t e r VII of the Interpretation

of Dreams (1900a), to m o d e l l i n g the mental

apparatus o n the reflex arch. S u c h m e t a p s y c h o l o g y " w i t h i n the skin's l i m i t s " was questioned b y the K l e i n i a n concept of projective identification a n d Bion's m o d e l (1962,1963,1970) of the c o n t a i n e r ­ contained relationship. In his terms: " S o m e t i m e s it becomes clear to the psycho-analyst that the boundaries of the p e r s o n d o n o t c o r r e s p o n d to the person's anatomical structure" (Bion, 1977, p . 30). T h e transposition m o d e l conceptualizes aspects of the breach between p s y c h e a n d i n d i v i d u a l anatomy: core u n r e c o g n i z e d as­ pects of p s y c h i c function are p l a c e d outside, " i n " another p e r s o n . A second issue involves the use of psychopathological terms. A r i s i n g f r o m the s t u d y of m a x i m a l l y perverted areas of the u n ­ conscious i n overt perversion, the m o d e l , as I n o w u n d e r s t a n d it, spans events f r o m overt perversion to the socialization of p e r v e r ­

54

T H E L O G I C S O F T H E M I N D

s i o n a n d extends to manifestly sublimatory p h e n o m e n a . T h e c l i n i ­ cal example to be presented arises f r o m unconscious perversion of m o t h e r h o o d . Some choices of profession—those i n teaching or the health professions (mental health i n c l u d e d ) — r e s p o n d to this pat­ tern. Socialization of perversion is more noticeable i n social situa­ tions where a regressive scale, lack^money—>power, governs the passage f r o m unconscious need to power, p r o m p t i n g the demise the infantile self's dependency. S u c h a w i d e n i n g of the field of perversion, f o l l o w i n g Meltzer (1973), m a y or m a y not be d e e m e d apt; the term "parasitic o r g a n i z a t i o n " can alternatively n a m e this n e e d — a n d dependency-erasing p o w e r structure. E n q u i r i n g o n the use of the m o d e l outside clinical perversion, m y clinical material accesses the operation of the perverse struc­ ture i n the overt climate of kindness a n d help where its destruc­ tiveness is least apparent. This helps to specify the roles a n d results of substituting the sane infantile self's dependence for the d e l u ­ sional structure. These analysands are non-patients i n the sense that the analyst m u s t f i n d out where, or i n w h o m , the p a i n they do not " s u f f e r " is. Suffering is not " i n " the analysand. Their non-suffering is part of n o n - l i v i n g , as is apparent i n an arrest of time, a pattern that exists f r o m c h i l d h o o d o n a n d l o n g antedates treatment. In its m a n y forms, the enactment " r e a l i z i n g " the transposition of self a n d O b ­ ject shares a strong "altruistic d e d i c a t i o n " , w h i c h , b r i n g i n g c o n s i d ­ erable social esteem, becomes a core aspect of identity. Belief i n the omnipotence of the patient's " g o o d n e s s " is enacted but not c o n ­ sciously admitted or p r o c l a i m e d . A crisis of this unconscious e n ­ acted d e l u s i o n leads the patient to treatment. A double cleavage-and-projective identification describes the constellation: 1.

Projective identification of an envious aspect of the self u p o n a n internal part-Object whose n u r t u r i n g kindness it u s u r p s . T h e patient enacts a pseudo-adult self w h o " r e a l i z e s " the d e l u s i o n of h i s / h e r omnipotent " g o o d n e s s " .

2.

C l e a v a g e a n d identificatory projection i n a suitable partenaire of the infantile self, i n the most concrete terms. O n e ' s o w n n e e d y infantile self is passed o n to the partner. In other w o r d s , the

O N T H E T R A N S P O S I T I O N O F SELF A N D O B J E C T

55

other becomes the " r e a l i z a t i o n " of one's infantile self. S u c h cleavage-and-projective identification seems to be a n invariant. Important differences i n diverse patients w i l l r e s p o n d to: a. Psychic levels not caught i n the double cleavage a n d trans­ position of self a n d Object. These include intensely fusional aspects of the symbiotic organization as w e l l as psychic levels where discrimination of self a n d Object is stable a n d is m a i n t a i n e d i n the absence of the Object. T h e i r relative weight is important for prognosis. b. T h e " c o n g l o m e r a t i o n " of the u s u r p i n g self a n d the Object makes different qualities possible. " R e a l i z a t i o n " of the d e l u ­ s i o n of goodness a n d help involves a m a x i m u m of k i n d l i ­ ness, the perverse structure operating w i t h seeming success as a " r e v e r t e d s y m b i o s i s " . D a m a g e to the d e n u d e d , split-off infantile self seems p r i m a r y : damage to the partenaire is real but contingent. T y r a n n y can range f r o m seduction to d e n i ­ gration, f r o m hostile attack to annihilation, w h i c h , as I shall illustrate clinically, correspond to different m o m e n t s of a personality i n its control of the split-off needful aspects. c. T h e preconceptions a n d affects of the split-off infantile self a n d the damage they suffer differ. W e can at the most o n l y glimpse this sort of terra

incognita.

2

T h i n k i n g i n terms of the double cleavage-and-projective identifica­ tion is useful because the concept of projective identification, w h i c h covers a w i d e range of d y n a m i s m s that v a r y as to reversibil­ ity a n d change, does not of itself l e n d itself to conceptualization i n terms of psychic structures. T o single out metapsychologically the almost-stable structure of double projective identification i n terms of self-Object transposition conjoins conceptually a g r o u p of p h e ­ n o m e n a that need to be investigated clinically i n each case. In fact, the m o d e l implies a double transposition:

The case studied in Chapter 5 has as its cleavages an internal projective identification of the baby's penis upon the breast and a splitting-off of the baby's needful mouth upon the vagina, the mouth, or the anus of the partner. 2

56

1.

THE LOGICS O F THE MIND

V o r a c i o u s l y envious aspects of the self swallow the n o u r i s h i n g Object, u s u r p i n g its function. This shapes a first t r a n s p o s i t i o n — the u s u r p i n g self in-the-place-of-the-Object

It stages, at the

point of full destructiveness, an overt destructive omnipotence a n d , at the relatively more benign point of the " d e l u s i o n of g o o d n e s s " , the pretence of all-containment. T h e seizure of the function of the Object entails damage to or the demise of its real n o u r i s h i n g capacities. 2.

T h e infantile self is transposed to an external partner, w h o tends to be equated to it i n the psychic reality. This split-off infantile self contains m a i n l y n o n - e v o l v e d parts of primitive preconcep­ tions, m a i n l y the preconception of the breast—or the m o u t h ­ breast preconception, as M o n e y - K y r l e (1965) calls i t — f r o m w h i c h , he says, are d e r i v e d b y b u d d i n g or fission the successive preconceptions.

T h e cleavage of the infantile self can, presumably, arise at different levels of evolution or mis-evolution of primitive preconceptions. A part of the split-off infantile self remains, I believe, y o k e d i n m u t u a l d e n u d a t i o n to the u s u r p i n g self-nourishing part-Object conglomer­ ate. E n v y is the emotion that permeates b o t h terms of the c o n ­ tainer-contained relationship: denudation falls m a i n l y o n needful feelings a n d the aliveness of psychic pain. In the delusion of " g o o d ­ n e s s " , need a n d suffering pass onto the partner, o n w h o m a " r e ­ verted s y m b i o s i s "

is enacted. Its effectiveness,

if any, does not

attain the split-off infantile self. A t any rate, the structure of the split-off infantile self, its damaged parasitic aspects, its transforma­ tions a n d evolution away f r o m the perverse organization, its b o n d s w i t h the u s u r p i n g in-the-place-of-the-Object,

are o p e n to enquiry.

" P a s s i v i t y " , w h i c h Meltzer (1973) ascribes to the infantile self's l i n k w i t h the perverse organization, does not explain the range of inter­ actions. A l s o , interactions between the split-off infantile self a n d the partner's psyche are s e l d o m dealt w i t h i n the literature, a l ­ t h o u g h B i o n (1962) deemed them central to his c o n t a i n e r - c o n ­ tained m o d e l of the m o t h e r - b a b y relationship. L i n k i n g this to M o n e y - K y r l e ' s concept of " s p u r i o u s substitute", I shall say that although transposition is spurious, its defensive function s h o u l d be stressed, since it protects the patient f r o m the

O N T H E T R A N S P O S I T I O N O F SELF A N D O B J E C T

57

u p s u r g e of massive anxieties, p a i n , helplessness, hate, a n d despair that are equated i n his m i n d w i t h psychosis. Disagreement exists between what analyst a n d patient w i l l consider sane, because to the patient the " c r a z y " transposition is the only possible

good

sense. Contacts w i t h the infantile self " w i t h i n " the personality be­ come unbearable, catastrophic frustration that leads to suicidal i m p u l s e s — t h e exception b e i n g events where the particular r e q u i ­ sites for achieved symbiosis are felt as present.

A brief

clinical

example;

"Patient

B"

T h i s patient, w h o illustrates unconscious delusions of " g o o d ­ n e s s " a n d help, can be considered severely neurotic. She started analysis o n m e d i c a l advice for protracted illness, i n c l u d i n g fevers of an u n k n o w n origin. In recent years she suffered panic attacks w i t h tachycardia a n d fears of i m m i n e n t death, w h i c h were g r a d u a l l y recognized as being of emotional origin. She arrived late to the sessions, a n d attendance w a s erratic. She always h a d other things to d o , m a i n l y i n connection w i t h her children, w h o m she experienced as overbearingly jealous a n d d e m a n d i n g a n d as fighting for her u n d i v i d e d attention. She was at the h u b of the family, selflessly at the service of her regressive h u s b a n d a n d children: her o w n intense symbiotic d e p e n d e n c y was m a s k e d b y the strongly " m o t h e r l y " family scheme she i m p o s e d . Despite her severe symptoms, for quite some time the analysis was peripheral. It was not felt as " h e r s " , as o p p o s e d to " h e r " activities, " h e r " c h i l d r e n , a n d " h e r " h u s b a n d - c h i l d . R e ­ sentment of the analysis's demands o n her time a n d attention was silent but intense. H e r m a i n goal was to alleviate her panic a n d s y m p t o m s , to get r i d as soon as possible of a n analyst she h a r d l y tolerated i n her emotional life, n o matter h o w m u c h this last was a v o i d . Despite her s y m p t o m s a n d panic, Patient B saw 3

herself as " n o r m a l " a n d " h a p p y " , m u c h a d m i r e d for her i n d e ­

This psychic "void" relates to Bion's (1962) "without-ness", to destructive­ ness intrinsic to the link between the usurping self and the infantile self, on which more later. 3

58

THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

pendence, self-confidence, a n d decisiveness. In fact, her m a n y acquaintances consulted her, as a k i n d of overall " t h e r a p i s t " , o n matters r a n g i n g f r o m their marriages to real estate. In her u n ­ conscious efforts to appease i n others her split-off infantile self, full of jealousy, neediness, helplessness, a n d anxiety, she was also the life a n d soul of the party. A n incident the d a y before a h o l i d a y illustrates the d i v i s i o n between b o t h psychic organizations, reverted a n d not reverted. W h e n Patient B arrived at the session she " r e a l i z e d " , w i t h a l ­ most hallucinatory vividness, that a door i n front of the e n ­ trance to m y office was the " s a m e " as the one to the entrance of a n aunt's house, where, i n her c h i l d h o o d , the d o o r m a n h a d k i l l e d his unfaithful lover. M y seemingly obvious

comment

about h o m i c i d a l feelings towards the unfaithful analyst expos­ i n g her to a n equivalent of the p r i m a l scene o n leaving for h o l i d a y s , met w i t h her benevolent incredulity. She saw h o l i ­ days as a test as to whether she c o u l d d r o p the analysis a n d as a n opportunity to be fully i n charge of her family. A l t h o u g h it was u n a c k n o w l e d g e d at the time, such contact w i t h her aban­ d o n e d , jealous, m u r d e r o u s infantile self was crucial to e v o l u ­ tion i n treatment—that is, to the difficult task of " u n - r e v e r t i n g " her m i n d . T h i s clinical note w i l l prove familiar. T h e patient is not u n u s u a l . I w i l l consider two m a i n psychic forms: what she calls her " n o r m a l " state a n d her " c r i s e s " : 1.

In w h a t Patient B, a n d those a r o u n d her, consider her " n o r m a l " state, she operates " f r o m " the place of a n omnipotently n u t r i ­ tious a n d omnicontinent part-Object. In fact, she spoils her family a n d evades the needs of her (split-off) infantile self. H e r o w n f u n c t i o n — " i n d e p e n d e n t " , of course—is to (pseudo) help a n d relieve those w h o are " h e r s " , the depositories of her split­ off infantile self intolerant of frustration a n d defenceless i n front of need, jealousy, a n d envy. H e r u n a c k n o w l e d g e d feelings of " e m p t i n e s s " a n d " f a l s e h o o d " signal the system's failure.

2.

T h e pathological cleavage of her peremptory (symbiotic) affects a n d anxieties is derailed o n her " c r i s e s " . W h e n it fails o n the

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59

basis of contacts w i t h unsatisfied infantile needs felt as c o m i n g " f r o m " the partner, the onslaught falls u p o n the infantile-self­ in-the-partenaire.

T h u s she often goes " o u t of her m i n d " , w i t h

her y o u n g daughter experienced as intolerably i n v a d i n g a n d voracious, w i t h the intent to annihilate need a n d d e p r i v a t i o n . W h e n , conversely, the crisis responds to contacts w i t h the i n f a n ­ tile self felt to be " i n s i d e " herself, the unconscious attack falls u p o n the Object—as i n the case of the analyst's h o l i d a y . T h i s happens more a n d more as she progresses, a n d a need-satisfy­ i n g Object is felt to exist as such. Attacks o n the infantile self are twofold: (1) whenever she feels exposed to terrifying, annihilat­ i n g objects, w h i c h unchains a felt i m m i n e n t death; (2) w h e n possessiveness, hate, lack, a n d intolerance to frustration come close to b e i n g recognized as her o w n , catastrophic feelings of desolation a n d despair, feelings of " b e i n g h e l d b y a slack r o p e " arise as she cannot feel contained securely e n o u g h . These seem to be the two poles of Bion's (1962) concept of a " n e e d - f o r - a ­ b r e a s t / b a d breast". Patient B's " c r i s e s " involve explosive genuine affects: m u r d e r o u s jealousy, extreme possessiveness w i t h regard to the Object w h e n it is felt as existing, envy, a n d unconscious contact w i t h the fact that the n e e d y infantile self is unable to survive if a b a n d o n e d b y the Object. Feeling " h e l d b y a slack r o p e " is the counterpart to the d e l u s i o n of her o w n omnipotent " g o o d n e s s " .

Clinically, uncon­

scious contacts w i t h a felt " i n d i f f e r e n c e " of the Object are i m p o r ­ tant i n u n c h a i n i n g the crises. These contacts impact o n the area of symbiotization sensitized to lack, w h i c h becomes critical w h e n e v e r feelings of d e p r i v a t i o n are not controlled b y the " n o r m a l " perverse structure. In her " n o r m a l " state, she activates a jealous possessive­ ness, helplessness, a n d need i n others to reinforce transposition. W h e n this fails, it becomes evident that she cannot contain affects, or a feeling infantile self, " w i t h i n " the personality.

Self-Object

transposition gives a structure a n d b u l w a r k to the flaws of a p e r ­ sonality that does not h o l d itself, especially its infantile self. T h e n o r m a l passage f r o m bipersonal to intrapsychic containment that B i o n (1962) describes i n the e v o l u t i o n of thought has not been achieved. Later o n I w i l l try to w i d e n m y u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the self­

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THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

Object transposition as a parasitic structuring of the c o n t a i n e r ­ contained m o d e l .

A note on childhood

trauma

W h a t I described above as a metapsychological m o d e l i n terms of a transposition of self a n d Object can be taken i n terms of i n f a n ­ tile t r a u m a as a n identification w i t h the aggressor, i n A n n a F r e u d ' s (1936) terminology. T h e aggressor is the breast-that-may-not-be­ there a n d therefore " c o l d " — t h a t is, not attentive e n o u g h to the baby's needs. T h e reverted functioning felt as " n o r m a l " operates o n the m a x i m of " a l l w h o are m i n e are d e p r i v e d beings whose s u r v i v a l depends o n m y omnipotent c a r e " . H o w e v e r , i n its " c r i s i s " , w h e n self-Object

transposition is not operant, the unconscious

m a x i m becomes: " T o the extent to w h i c h I need care a n d affection, I a m exposed to a n n i h i l a t i o n . " It is pertinent to note that Patient B's mother is a n ambulatory psychotic w h o has been prescribed long-term hospitalization for h o m i c i d a l tendencies several times. She was first hospitalized at the time of m y patient's adolescence. T h e fears of f o l l o w i n g i n her mother's footsteps were a m a i n , t h o u g h u n a c k n o w l e d g e d , motive for her seeking therapy. D u r i n g the first year a n d a half i n treat­ ment, whenever interpretations focused o n her fears that n e e d i n g m e w a s equivalent to b e i n g exposed i n the session to the psychotic " c o l d " mother, she firmly h e l d that her mother h a d h a d n o e m o ­ tional difficulties u p to her internment. This was based o n her father's o p i n i o n , even t h o u g h she k n e w w e l l that he was e n t w i n e d i n a folie a deux w i t h the mother. H e r long-cherished image of herself as the h a p p y , " n o r m a l " daughter of a not yet disturbed mother gave w a y to isolated memories of contacts w i t h a h i g h l y erratic mother. H e r mother w o u l d , for example, s u d d e n l y give her daughter's dolls away without even asking. In the analytic situa­ tion it is m y patient w h o " c o l d l y " removes f r o m the analyst's care her needy infantile self, projecting it onto outside partners, so that it does not exist i n the session. A c h i l d h o o d m e m o r y of emotionally " c l o s i n g the d o o r " o n her parents a n d the absence, i n her c h i l d h o o d memories, of c r y i n g l e d to her o w n u p to then u n a c k n o w l e d g e d indifference, from c h i l d h o o d o n , as concerns her n e e d y infantile

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61

self. She oscillates between forcing her n e e d y self into non-exist­ ence a n d t r y i n g to retain a n d recover it b y depositing it o n others. T h i s m o d e of functioning is not limited to, n o r created for, the analytic situation. It re-enacts a n d defends her, i n the role of the " a g g r e s s o r " , f r o m the impact of the infantile traumatic situation. T h i s is especially the case i n her l i n k to her daughter. A g a i n s t formal m e d i c a l counsel, Patient B h a d sought for years to get p r e g ­ nant " w i t h a g i r l " ; she w a s unable to carry the b a b y to full term, a n d so her daughter w a s b o r n prematurely. A t the b e g i n n i n g of treatment she h a d trouble containing her daughter, d u e to the unconscious confusion w i t h her o w n possessive infantile self, intol­ erant of frustration. H e r angry outbursts p o i n t e d to annihilation, " i n " the daughter, of her o w n neediness a n d envious possessive­ ness. T h i s seems to be the p o i n t of m a x i m u m repetition, c h a n g i n g roles, of her infantile t r a u m a ; she enacts there the maternal terrify­ i n g agent of the pathological container-contained relationship to w h i c h B i o n (1962) refers as "nameless d r e a d " . K l e i n (1952) states, about acting-out i n the transference: the patient is b o u n d to deal with conflicts and anxieties re­ experienced towards the analyst by the same methods he used i n the past. That is to say, he turns away from the analyst as he attempted to turn away from his primal objects; he tries to split the relations to him, keeping h i m either as a good or as a b a d figure: he deflects some of the feelings and attitudes experi­ enced towards the analyst on to other people in his current life, and this is part of "acting-out", [pp. 55-56] H o s t i l e (cold) d e t a c h m e n t — m y patient's core attitude i n the ses­ s i o n i n her subjectively " n o r m a l " state of self-Object

transposi­

t i o n — c o n v e y s a n envious detachment, debasing dependence o n the p r i m a r y objects. It b o t h perpetuates a n d defends against c o n ­ tacts w i t h the traumatic situation: the infantile needful self is not available. A " f r e e z i n g " of the analytic process, d e n u d e d of m e a n ­ i n g , ensues. Its counterpart, w h e n transposition becomes u n d o n e , is Patient B's feeling of d a n g l i n g " o n a slack r o p e " w h e n e v e r a n i n d w e l l i n g infantile self attempts to address a n e e d e d analytic breast-Object. These m o m e n t s are times of helplessness, of fear of p s y c h i c death, of internal contact w i t h her o w n e n v y , w h i c h a p ­ p r o a c h the traumatic infantile situation, a n d these are the occasion for insight a n d g r o w t h w h e n they can be tolerated.

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THE LOGICS O F THE M I N D

Falsehood

in the

transposition

of the self

and

Object

In a d r e a m of a m i d d l e - a g e d patient, transposition occurs faced w i t h a current trauma, the a n n u a l vacations h a v i n g h a d little a p ­ parent emotional impact. Because of w o r k engagements, the p a ­ tient h a d m i s s e d the previous session, the last of the first analytic w e e k after the holidays. A t the b e g i n n i n g of the M o n d a y session, " M r C " related h o w b a d l y he h a d felt o n f i n d i n g out that a n elderly, depressed patient attempted suicide w i t h a hypnotic he h a d prescribed her. T h o u g h he knew it was not feasible, he felt that he s h o u l d have hospitalized her. T h e n he spoke of a d r e a m previous to the m i s s e d session: He came to my office by car, and a few

blocks away a

stopped him. He was in the car with a disintegrated patient, and he told the policeman

policeman

schizophrenic

that he must go on, given that he

was a doctor in charge of the patient. He knew that the policeman stopped him maliciously

had

to find fault and get a bribe. H e associated

that a few days before he h a d been stopped because of a m a l ­ functioning headlight, a n d he h a d lied, saying he was a p u b l i c health officer. W h e n I asked h i m about the patient i n the d r e a m , w h o m he h a d called b y her first name but h a d not m e n t i o n e d again, he said that they h a d gone to the same school, a n d she was a classmate of his younger brother. She was a d o p t e d but d i d not k n o w it, a n d she acted most childlishly. W e can see that before the missed session a n d the w e e k e n d e v o k i n g the u n a c k n o w l e d g e d impact of analytic vacations, a n d as a n alter­ native to his extreme need a n d suicide, the analysand (to w h o m I refer again i n C h a p t e r 5) falsely becomes a n " o m n i p o t e n t d o c t o r ­ breast" i n charge of his " s c h i z o p h r e n i c , n o t - a d o p t e d - e n o u g h " i n ­ fantile aspects. U n r e c o g n i z e d feelings of falsehood are u s u a l i n self-Object transposition, together w i t h a susceptibility to criticism that they u s u a l l y take for perfectionism. C r i t i c i s m is equated to i n t r u s i o n a n d envious robbery because what the self possesses is felt as u s u r p e d or stolen a n d is therefore exposed to retaliation. Reversal of the feeding situation is obvious i n the d r e a m : instead of

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63

b e i n g fed a n d cared for b y the analyst, he bribes a voracious, b l a c k m a i l i n g a n a l y s t - p o l i c e m a n w h o feeds o n faults. Distrust or rebelliousness against the s u p p o s e d

possessiveness,

voraciousness, a n d e n v y of the therapist comes u p frequently, w h e n he feels u n f e d i n the analysis, as i n his diverse emotional b o n d s . T h e E n g l i s h term " b r i b e " derives f r o m the o l d F r e n c h bribe (Webster's,

1969), defined as " a piece of bread, u s u a l l y g i v e n beg­

g a r s " . T h i s can illustrate that reversion of feeding a n d denigration of the n o u r i s h i n g Object go together a n d are immanent to selfObject transposition. In the context of only dream-material, self-Object transposition requires n o real external partner, just t w o internal ones. T h e struc­ ture

is nevertheless

similar:

the catastrophic,

"quasi-schizo­

p h r e n i c " crisis results f r o m contacts w i t h the infantile self c o m i n g to analysis. Transposition holds off such crises, b u t it does so at a price. T h e position, directionality, a n d quality of the link are d i s ­ torted a n d t u r n parasitic f r o m the container-contained standpoint. A n omnipotent, p s e u d o - a d u l t self " i n the place of the Object" takes charge as spurious substitute for the u n a d o p t e d infantile self. A n intrapsychic, s c h i z o p h r e n i z i n g accomplice p s e u d o - a d o p t i o n e n ­ sues. T h e omnipotent self " i n the place of the Object" enacts its envious rivalry i n a d e m e a n i n g " p s e u d o - c o n t a i n m e n t " b y means of b r i b e - c o r r u p t i o n of the external adult object (or the internal adult object external to the self) whose " n e e d - e n g e n d e r i n g " care is felt as a threat. This double falsehood, i n the contact w i t h the infantile self that is needful of a d o p t i o n a n d i n the contact w i t h the Object that is able to p r o v i d e truth-food, adds detail to Bion's (1970) description of the parasitic link i n the container-contained relationship: In a parasitic relationship between thought and thinker there is a correspondence but the correspondence is category 2, mean­ ing that the formulation is known to be false but is retained as barrier against truth which is feared as arinihilating to the con­ tainer or vice versa, [p. 118] Inasmuch as it takes into account this double destructive falsehood towards the infantile self a n d u p o n the p r i m a r y Object, the descrip­ tion of the transposition of self a n d Object is a step towards a metapsychology of the parasitic

organization

of the personality. A s I

64

THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

said, destructiveness a n d damage involve p r i m a r i l y the n e e d y i n ­ fantile self. T h e partner, though, is not spared. That a s o n of the analysand, evaluated b y another analyst, was f o u n d to present strong suicidal impulses illustrates the concreteness of the o n g o i n g emotions a n d the eventual damage to the needful aspects of the partner.

* * * R e v i s i n g these clinical contributions, a n d i n no w a y forsaking the o n g o i n g double destructiveness towards the p r i m a r y Object a n d towards the infantile self, as w e l l as towards those d e p e n d i n g o n s u c h pseudo-care, let me a d d that the re-issue i n or out of the session of the ongoing traumatic situations rules the t i m i n g of interpretations. In fact, dependent contacts w i t h the p r i m a r y O b ­ ject at the symbiotic level, i n daily life as i n the link to the analyst, become h i g h l y persecutory, especially whenever they stop being urcfelt as m a i n l y " s e n s o r y " a n d come to be felt to focus emotionally o n a g i v e n p e r s o n as i n d i v i d u a l . Feeling at the m e r c y of the Object comes close to nameless dread, w h i c h m a y , i n turn violently acti­ vate splitting or expulsion of the b o n d w i t h the p a r t n e r — o r the b o n d w i t h the analyst. M y paper " C o u n t e r - I n d u c t i o n i n P s y c h o ­ analytic Practice: Epistemic a n d Technical A s p e c t s "

(Ahumada,

1997b) reworks these themes i n terms of the class-Object.

CHAPTER

FOUR

The unconscious delusion of "goodness"

Indeed, there is not one child with conflicting feelings, but several "bits of child", with different feelings which may temporarily unite only to be again split by the next conflict. A n d then the dominant bit, which most nearly has the sense of being an ego, will feel threatened and persecuted by the other bits which, like evil spirits, seem to be endangering its world. Money-Kyrle (1956, p. 328)

'There is none like me" says the Cub in the pride of his earliest kill; But the Jungle is large and the Cub he is small. Let him think and be still. Rudyard Kipling, "Maxims of Baloo", The Jungle Book (1894r-95, p. 34)

Published i n Psicoanalisis, 4 (1982): 405^30.

65

66

THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

O

ften e n o u g h i n psychoanalytic practice, w e f i n d patients

w h o s e emotional needs are met b y caring for others. E n ­ thusiastically dedicated, they are praised a n d a d m i r e d as

courageous,

reliable, generous, a n d vital a n d often as a m u s i n g

w h e n they tend to alleviate t e d i u m or depression placed p r o ­ jectively o n others. " I m m a t u r e "

aspects of their personality that

require support, love, understanding, relief are sharply split off a n d allocated to suitable partners. T h e y live for others a n d d o so selflessly, h a v i n g but remnants of a self of their o w n . Attempts to rescue a life that c a n be p r o p e r l y their o w n meet violent r i v a l r y f r o m the psychic structures based o n dedication, so these u s u a l l y fail f r o m the start. D e d i c a t i o n , at the axis of identity, enacts a phantasy of inex­ haustibly p r o v i d i n g for the depositories of their split-off

needy

aspects. Their children, s p o u s e s , clients, friends are, o n the basis of unconscious projection, felt as unable to survive a n d i n u n f a i l i n g n e e d of help. C o m p a s s i o n , conscious or not, joins strong attraction to the destitute, real or i m a g i n e d . Cleavage of need engenders self­ confidence. In their o w n w o r d s , they feel " m o n o l i t h i c : strong, f i r m , m a t u r e " . Enthusiastic generosity masks, f r o m t h e m a n d f r o m others, an inability for enjoyment

a n d for genuine p a i n , w h i c h

often gives place to a felt falsehood, hypocrisy, a n d internal v o i d . Self-confidence borders o n arrogance. Often h i d u n d e r a mantle of h u m i l i t y , it attests to a n unconscious belief i n the omnipotence of their o w n " g o o d n e s s " , to a n unconscious d e l u s i o n ( M o n e y - K y r l e , 1965) that is a f o r m of unconscious megalomania. T h e unconscious delusion of " g o o d n e s s " a n d help organizes the psychotic part of the personality, i n Bion's (1956, 1957) sense, w h i c h , h i d d e n b y the neurosis, must be discovered a n d focused o n as a c o n d i t i o n for analytic progress. A c c o r d i n g to B i o n (1957), the psychotic personality substitutes projective identification for the regression, repression, a n d introjection used b y the neurotic part. Belief i n one's omnipotent " g o o d n e s s " can be sketched as i n v o l v ­ i n g a d o u b l e cleavage of the self, a double identificatory projection transposing the functions of self a n d Object:

THE

1.

67

U N C O N S C I O U S DELUSION OF " G O O D N E S S "

A n omnipotent, envious part of the self engulfs the need-fulfill­ i n g g o o d internal object, leading to the unconscious d e l u s i o n of o w n i n g its " g o o d n e s s " . This delusional self u s u r p i n g the n o u r ­ i s h i n g Object's feeding, support, love, a n d relief becomes the core self-identity,

2.

Aspects needy of a n o u r i s h i n g Object—the infantile self i n H e r b e r t Rosenfeld's (1971) terms—are split off a n d projected, either internally, i n parts of the internal w o r l d felt as not-self, w h e r e they are dealt w i t h as alien (clinically, this shows u p as anaesthesia to psychic p a i n a n d insensitivity to experience of b o d i l y p a i n or fatigue), or, a n d p r i n c i p a l l y , into external part­ ners w h o " r e a l i z e " the peremptorily needy aspects. T o w a r d s t h e m " g o o d n e s s " is enacted b y w a y of help.

A n e n g u l f i n g part of the self, p o s i n g as a p r i m a r y Object, takes over, then, support a n d love for other aspects of the self, for the infantile self e m b o d y i n g unrecognized neediness.

Money-Kyrle's

contribution

Transposition of functions a n d the unconscious d e l u s i o n of " g o o d ­ n e s s " relate closely to the ideas of M o n e y - K y r l e (1965, 1968). In fact, as explored i n the next chapters, these issues have long-stand­ i n g roots: F r e u d ' s first m e n t i o n of narcissism i n a 1910 footnote to Three Essays

(1905d, p. 145n), a n d a more extensive one i n

Leonardo

(1910c, p. 100), describe clearly a self-Object transposition. M o n e y ­ K y r l e ' s " M e g a l o m a n i a " (1963) refers to the delirious element of excessive self-confidence that, i n its unconscious, latent f o r m , originates in a particular kind of identification with the parents and, as Melanie Klein believed, ultimately with the feeding breast. Its delusional quality consists in that which distin­ guishes it from the internalisation of parental figures as super­ ego, between which and the ego a barrier remains intact. The delusion arises only when the barrier is obliterated by the en­ vious penetration of the superego, as suggested by Freud i n his reconstruction of the Primal Feast. In both cases, what is

68

T H E LOGICS O F T H E M I N D

delusional is not the desire for the envied identification be­ tween what in the inner, as once i n the outer world, was infant and parent (or part-object), but the assertion that the identification

is a fact.

1

Some degree of this delusion I suppose to be inevitable i n infancy. The infant might well be unable to support the sense of its o w n helpless insignificance without it. M y point is that it is something the human race as a whole seems unable fully to outgrow. [1963, p. 377] In " C o g n i t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t " , M o n e y - K y r l e (1968) adds that some people, "especially if their actual abilities a n d real success enable t h e m to give substance to their delusion, retain it all their lives. These are the narcissistic m e n or w o m e n w h o live i n projective identification w i t h father's idealized penis or mother's idealized breast" (p. 426), H e brings as evidence a patient's d r e a m of b e i n g breast-fed, w h i c h she felt painfully humiliating, l e a d i n g her to r e ­ v e r s e d roles: she is the one w h o feeds (analyses) the analyst. Essential aspects of a double identificatory projection, transpos­ i n g self a n d Object, were described b y M o n e y - K y r l e as a double d e l u s i o n of superiority a n d inferiority that shapes status differ­ ences: Since all statuses are relative, their comparison implies, I think, not merely a single, but a double delusion—a delusional inferi­ ority on the one hand, a delusional superiority on the other. Of course, many possible emotions may be aroused between people when they become aware of the sense of a difference i n status. Compassion towards the supposed inferior m a y be as common as arrogance and contempt; and, o n the other side, pleasant feelings of admiration and gratitude m a y override painful feelings of inferiority, hate and envy. But it is the feel­ ings of arrogance and contempt, and the response to their real or supposed presence, that I w o u l d first try to trace to their source. In so doing, we might start with the fact that the idea of inferiority is very often associated with the idea of dirt. The lowest and most despised caste in India is composed, I believe,

Though he uses the term "identification", M o n e y - K y r l e here refers, as the above makes clear, to a n envious psychotic equation to the breast. Use of the same terms i n neurotic a n d psychotic realms, though not unusual, tends to obscure their differences. lr

THE

69

U N C O N S C I O U S DELUSION OF " G O O D N E S S "

of lavatory attendants, crossing sweepers, grave-diggers, and

all those whose role is directly concerned with the disposal of

dirt and corruption. A n d , i n general, the "proletariat" or the

"masses", whenever these terms are used in contempt, they are

always thought of as unwashed. The aristocratic nose is pro­

verbially narrowed or held high to avoid their stench. [1963, p.

380]

Later o n M o n e y - K y r l e describes h o w , i n a direct reversion of roles, the baby projects himself onto the breast a n d , i n phantasy, becomes the sole valuable person. S u c h grandiose fantasy delusionally avoids the unpleasant truth: that it is the mother's breasts that give m i l k a n d the baby's b o t t o m faeces, a n d not the other w a y a r o u n d . T h i s truth can, b y means of the baby's suppressed contempt to­ w a r d itself, give place to another, o p p o s i n g d e l u s i o n — t h a t the mother sees the b a b y arrogantly as a n object of contempt. H e points out that the same envious mechanism which began by claiming the breast goes on to claim all other envied objects too [and this,] since the latent awareness of the falsehood of these claims persists, serves only to increase the underlying sense of worth­ lessness—which is further augmented by the fact that growth in the capacity to love has been sacrificed i n the pursuit of adoration. Thus, to maintain the delusion of a special merit, and the sense of being adored, or at least admired for it, there

must always be some other object on which to project the opposite delusion of worthlessness. [p. 382, italics added] L e a v i n g aside n o w M o n e y - K y r l e ' s thoughts o n the equation of the baby's b o t t o m w i t h the breast a n d his thoughts o n faeces a n d c o n t e m p t — a line M e l t z e r (1966) stresses o n the issue of anal m a s ­ turbation—I shall focus o n death feelings a n d mortification. A s I u n d e r s t a n d it, at the core role of the d o u b l e identificatory projection is, above all, a w a y to split off needy "bits of c h i l d " ( M o n e y - K y r l e , 1956)

that are threatened w i t h a lack felt as eqivalent to death,

damage, or death i n psychic reality. T h i s takes u p K l e i n ' s core line of thought: death-anxiety as the basis of all anxieties (see M o n e y K y r l e , 1955). C l i n i c a l l y , self-Object transposition is pre-catastro­ p h i c i n Bion's (1965, p. 9) sense. Further o n I e x p a n d o n this point. A r i s i n g f r o m the s t u d y of the structuring of the psychotic part i n perversions, self-Object transposition takes a somewhat

more

70

THE LOGICS O F THE M I N D

b e n i g n f o r m i n patients w h o enact their need for h e l p a n d e m o ­ tional sustenance b y taking care of others. H e r e the transposition m o d e l alerts the analyst to social structurings of psychotic aspects that h i d e b e h i n d sublimatory facades. Therapeutic roles readily fit i n . Searles's (1965b) " T h e D e d i ­ cated P h y s i c i a n i n Psychotherapy a n d P s y c h o a n a l y s i s " how

studies

dedication obstructs analytic understanding. Similarly, i n

L i b e r m a n ' s (1980) notion of a core split i n psychosomatic patients between a n over-adapted environmental self a n d a s u b d u e d b o d i l y self, dedication helps to split off parts of the d a m a g e d infantile self. T h i s leads patients to attempt to carry out emotionally impossible tasks, w h i c h leads quickly to overexertion. That therapeutic a n d educational activities c a n organize, i n valuable social roles, the expulsion of destitute aspects of the self i n the d o u b l e identificatory projection described helps to clarify the p r o f u s i o n of m e d i c a l a n d psychological vocations a n d the slight or not so slight m e g a l o m a n i a that they often promote. T h e clinical material shows other valuable roles, such as marriage a n d mother­ h o o d , orchestrating the structure.

Clinical

material:

"Mrs

A"

A v i v a c i o u s , intelligent, fragile w o m a n i n her early 30s, M r s A seemed at first sight well-motivated to start analysis. She w a s b r o u g h t i n b y a severe crisis w i t h depersonalization a few days before consultation, whereby she became u n h i n g e d o n f i n d i n g a love letter i n her husband's pocket. She stressed, t h o u g h , that she h a d w a n t e d analysis for some time a n d h a d k n o w n for years that she d i d not stand o n stable g r o u n d . T h e unconscious basis for cooperation seemed shaky nonetheless. Interviews s h o w e d that her life was built u p o n altruistic d e d i ­ cation to her h u s b a n d a n d c h i l d r e n a n d , at times, to a b a n d o n e d 2

The term "altruistic" merits some comments, given that altruism is at the core of pathology. "Pseudo-altruistic" w o u l d not reflect that the patient feels it as genuine, even as solely genuine. Dedication is selfless i n the most literal sense (self-less): taking the place of a self of one's o w n . 2

THE

U N C O N S C I O U S DELUSION OF " G O O D N E S S "

71

animals. O n first being pregnant, she h a d lost interest i n her fairly a d v a n c e d university studies, w h i c h she gave u p . She b e ­ came depressed w h e n , after she h a d h a d several c h i l d r e n one after the other, her obstetrician advised her to wait for some t i m e . Before getting m a r r i e d , she h a d taught at a quite h u m b l e 3

school, a n d she longed for the enthusiasm she felt w h e n she w o r k e d with such underprivileged children. T h u s dedication to family followed an unconscious pattern, a n d her apparent cooperation w i t h analysis as a " w e l l - m e a n i n g f u ­ ture a n a l y s a n d " consisted mostly of h e l p i n g m e i n the session, g r o u n d e d o n her splitting off her o w n n e e d y aspects, rather than o n a genuine contact w i t h her needs. She d i d , h o w e v e r , have some awareness

that her identity w a s built o n false

g r o u n d a n d that her dedication was not unrelated to s u c h false­ ness. T o give a n example, she realized that she was afraid of her children growing up. A s is u s u a l i n s u c h cases, resistances emerged quite q u i c k l y . W h e n discussing the session schedule, M r s A started to ques­ tion whether she needed i n d i v i d u a l or g r o u p therapy. She came to realize, t h o u g h , that i n a g r o u p she w o u l d start taking care of the others. T h e idea of a g r o u p was f o u n d e d o n the c o n v i c t i o n that " i n a g r o u p one does not come to d e p e n d , as i n a n a l y s i s " . A w a r e n e s s of her fears of d e p e n d i n g o n the analysis finally a l l o w e d us to agree o n the setting a n d the fees. O n arrival at her first session, M r s A r e s p o n d e d " B a d l y " to m y greeting a n d sat o n the c o u c h , s a y i n g she was not starting treat­ ment. After the last interview her h u s b a n d h a d asked h e r to c o m e to his temporary accommodation, to see for herself h o w he s u p p o r t e d t h e m , a n d then he h a d said that analysis was to be

In an unpublished study on motivation for contraception at the University Hospital at Buenos Aires, a reversal of dependence was prominent in about half those consulting, who came in when their last baby started to walk, realiz­ ing that they were unable to resist the temptation to get pregnant and thus feel whole and satisfied again. Evacuation of unconscious dependency by way of pregnancy is, I believe, at the core of the ever-increasing adolescent preg­ nancies. 3

72

THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

too m u c h of an economic load u p o n them all. She d i d her best not to s h o w her fury. She d e c i d e d there a n d then not to start treatment a n d told h i m that whenever she w a n t e d to start something, he m a n a g e d to destroy it. She was o b v i o u s l y p u t t i n g herself into a n emotionally untenable stance, a n d I told her so. O n his part, the h u s b a n d , facing her psychic suicide, h a d q u i c k l y shifted to asking her to start analysis without delay. She requested m y o p i n i o n , letting it be clear that it was just a n o p i n i o n . I told her that m y o p i n i o n was the same as it h a d been before. H e r economic situation h a d not changed, a n d w e b o t h k n e w about her violence i n the face of d e p e n d e n c y o n starting analysis a n d her option to be v i c t i m rather than victimizer. F o r c e d to choose, she chose the role of v i c t i m - d e p r i v e d - o f ­ analysis despite the personal costs. W e were at the e n d of the session, so I h a d to say good-bye to her. She came to her next session a n d went to the couch. Entrance into treatment thus illustrates the violence of identifica­ tory projection. O n agreeing to the setting, Patient A becomes a breast-needy c h i l d , forsaking her role of indefatigable emotional p r o v i d e r ; i n turn, her h u s b a n d goes f r o m his role of emotionally spoilt child to that of maliciously drained breast or penis. T h i s is controlled b y his wife's threat of psychic suicide, her emotional s u r v i v a l b e i n g , I believe, rather concretely at stake. A t t e n t i o n to s u c h episodes, to the l i n k to the analyst, a n d to their impact o n the next of k i n helps us to bear the patient's a n d the family's u n c o n ­ scious d i l e m m a s a n d alerts us to transference violence i n the forth­ c o m i n g analysis. Let m e n o w take u p two dreams f r o m the first w e e k i n treat­ ment. First dream.

After m e n t i o n i n g that she h a d not yet s p o k e n of

her h u s b a n d , M r s A spoke lengthily about his indecisiveness a n d irresponsibility a n d his lack of response to her emotional needs. She said: " H e ' s just another k i d , I m u s t be always at h a n d for whatever he m a y need, without taking m e at all into account: he just takes it or leaves it as it suits h i m . " T h e n she r e m e m b e r e d last night's d r e a m :

THE

UNCONSCIOUS DELUSION OF " G O O D N E S S "

73

"I was talking to several women, none of whom I know, except one, who is a relative of my husband and about my age. She also has several children. I always thought she was happy in her marriage. .. but a couple of weeks ago she brought up a lot of complaints about her husband, similar to my own .. . they brought in cakes from a refrig­ erator, cakes and more cakes . . . innumerable cakes which they put on the table and all over the furniture,

everywhere...

doubtless many

more cakes, than anyone could eat." W h e n she awoke, M r s A thought she w a s the (singular) cake of the d r e a m : the cake that everyone—essentially, her h u s b a n d a n d c h i l d r e n — f e l t it w a s their right to help themselves to. I m e n t i o n e d that i n the d r e a m there w a s not one cake b u t i n ­ n u m e r a b l e c a k e s — m a n y more than anyone c o u l d possibly eat, as she h a d just said. I then a d d e d that her narrative about her h u s b a n d h a d mentioned n o proper names, not e v e n her c h i l ­ dren's. A t first (without saying it to her), I thought that this reflected her unconscious attempt not to overload m y m e m o r y . I told her that she w a s trying not to need m e — n o t to " h e l p herself" f r o m m e as the one w h o w a s i n charge of her-needs. I a d d e d that, as far as I c o u l d see, the d r e a m s h o w e d her b e c o m ­ i n g the cake so as not to need it, a n d that p r o b a b l y the i n n u m e r ­ able cakes p o i n t e d to her innumerable u n a c k n o w l e d g e d n e e d y aspects, felt unconsciously as more than c o u l d ever be satisfied. In the w o r d s of a familiar o l d tango, that she felt, but c o u l d not acknowledge that she felt, like " a v o i d that it's impossible to f i l l " . She w a s m u c h surprised b y this, t h o u g h it w a s unclear to m e w h y she w a s , a n d she said that, incredible as it m a y seem, she h a d h a d this tango phrase i n her m i n d a l l m o r n i n g , not connecting it at all w i t h the d r e a m . She a d d e d that, c o m i n g to think of it, n o one h a d eaten i n the d r e a m . Second dream.

M r s A has been angry since last night, w h e n , at

bedtime, the h u s b a n d said that his father h a d asked w h a t the matter w a s w i t h her. H e h a d r e s p o n d e d that he h a d misbe­ h a v e d (in his extramarital affair) a n d that she h a d been most generous. M e n t i o n of her generosity d r o v e her m a d , a n d she w e n t to sleep i n a n angry m o o d . She r e m a i n e d so o n w a k i n g a n d realized that she w a s getting ready for a fight, w h i c h she

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THE LOGICS O FTHE M I N D

attributed to a d r e a m but c o u l d not remember. She then re­ called a scene: " I n the d r e a m I saw a very beautiful realized,

much to my annoyance,

something

synthetic,

tree, but on getting

sort of plastic, built with small cones one beside

the other. . . . 7 was talking

to an elder cousin but cannot

what we talked about. . . . J had a bundle smallish

chains

copper.... generous. chains....

such as children

7 was giving

of chains

use, some golden,

remember

in my

hands,

some made of

some to her, and she was telling

me I wasn't

If such was the case, I would have only given I thought

closer I

that it wasn't a real tree. It was

her gold

that while not gold, copper chains are

useful

anyway/' She then told m e about her anger o n f i n d i n g that the tree w a s not real a n d alive but m a n u f a c t u r e d — p l a s t i c — a n anger that she feels whenever she sees something artificial. She then c o m ­ mented o n a plant here at m y office: " I f it weren't natural, I w o u l d n ' t like it at a l l . " She said that her cousin h a d been v e r y independent u p until a couple of years ago, a n outstanding teacher of disabled children, whereas n o w she lives for her spoilt h u s b a n d and her son. H a v i n g nothing to wear herself, she w o u l d go a n d b u y sweaters for her h u s b a n d , w h o has plenty, a n d not for herself, even t h o u g h she has few or none. T h e n w e examined h o w the cousin, obviously a n alter represents

her " o u t s t a n d i n g "

aspects that assist

ego,

"disabled"

others—her o w n need for care a n d w a r m t h , the emotional sweaters she lacks. Megalomaniac generosity shows u p too as the " m a n u f a c t u r e d " tree, beautiful a n d immense. T h e manufac­ tured, n o n - v i t a l quality results, I believe, f r o m the internal seiz­ ure of the qualities of the object, robbed of its natural vitality, w a r m t h , relief a n d turning into a manufactured, gelid Perhaps the immense, megalomaniac tree conflates

breast.

countless

devitalized cone—nipples, standing for the unsatisfied, devital­ i z e d aspects of her internal w o r l d . T h e refrigerator f r o m w h i c h the cakes came i n the first d r e a m illustrates, too, I believe, a d e n u d i n g of w a r m t h a n d tenderness d u e to the engulfment of the n o u r i s h i n g Object b y the u s u r p i n g self at the core of i d e n ­ tity. T h i s usurps g o o d sense i n the second dream, as it does i n reality. In both cases, a " m i x t u r e of c h a i n s " remains.

THE

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75

On the infantile self Herbert Rosenfeld (1971) defines the sane infantile self as those aspects i n need of, a n d able to receive from, a n o u r i s h i n g object. In sane object relationships, the infantile self depends for its s u r v i v a l o n the mature or adult object w h o cares for a n d feeds it. T h i s n o n ­ omnipotent sane self must be distinguished, he argues, f r o m the mature personality or its remnants o n the one h a n d , a n d f r o m psychotic narcissistic aspects, creating or maintaining a delusional w o r l d , o n the other. It seems clinically useful to distinguish, f o l l o w i n g Bion's (1965) symbiotic a n d parasitic links, between t w o non-sane, narcissistic organizations—symbiotic a n d p a r a s i t i c — i n the infantile self. T h e kinds of e m o t i o n i n object l i n k i n g lead to three areas i n the infantile self: 1.

The area of the parasitic

infantile

self, where m u t u a l d e s p o i l i n g

substitutes the dependency of the infantile self o n the n o u r i s h ­ i n g Object; d a m a g e d preconceptions are d e n u d e d of e m o t i o n (Bion, 1962,1963). There is here no notion of a g o o d object. T h e breast, f r o m the standpoint of the parasitic infantile self, lacks the qualities that B i o n (1962, p. 10) attributes to it i n the relation­ ship w i t h the n u r s i n g infant, the ability to p r o v i d e m i l k but also love, u n d e r s t a n d i n g , solace. In the case of the d e l u s i o n of g o o d ­ ness, the parasitic infantile self is split off into a partner u p o n w h o m it is enacted. T h i s explains the tolerance to the parasitic activities of these partners, w h i c h reinforce the core cleavage. Its reintrojection involves a terrifying contact w i t h the n e e d of the b r e a s t / b a d breast (Bion, 1962,1963), a contact w i t h a breast d e p r i v e d of its qualities—a gelid breast where coldness is less a quality than a d e n u d a t i o n of quality. 2.

T h e area of the symbiotic

infantile

i s h i n g Object that is present

self, w h i c h depends o n a n o u r ­

and satisfactory

in psychic

reality,

i n a s m u c h as it abolishes all distress ( M o n e y - K y r l e , 1965). It becomes persecutory w h e n it is not present or w h e n it is present but not satisfactory. Violence, emotion, intolerance, sensorial­ ity, a n d the interplay of projective identification d o not abolish here the differences i n the function of self a n d object. 3.

T h e area of the sane infantile

self—Herbert

Rosenfeld's n o r m a l

76

THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

non-ornnipotent part that achieve separateness f r o m the object a n d is thus able to bear the inevitable separations. T o s u m m a r i z e , these three areas of the infantile self—parasitic, symbiotic, a n d s a n e — l i n k to the Object as follows: the parasitic infantile self c o n n e c t s — f r o m the partenaire

i n transposition—with

the engulfing self that substitutes the n o u r i s h i n g Object a n d w o r k s as a gelid breast. The symbiotic part links fusionally to a n object, abolishing all discomfort. T h e sane infantile self can connect w i t h the mature object whose qualities, i n c l u d i n g n o n - o w n e r s h i p b y the self, are recognized. If, according to B i o n (1962, p p . 34-37), the need for a breast is, i n itself, a persecutory b a d breast to the n o n - e v o l v e d psychotic part of the personality, it w o u l d then follow that strategies that obviate the n e e d for a breast, w h e n successful, w i l l control persecution i n that part of the personality. F r o m this point of v i e w , what I describe as transposition of functions of self a n d object is a strategy w h e r e b y the n e e d of a breast is obviated. C o m i n g back to Patient A ' s statement that she is the cake f r o m w h i c h all eat, what appears as delusional is the certainty that the identification is a fact, the self's equation to the n o u r i s h i n g Object. H e r certainty indicates that seizure b y the self of the Object's e n ­ v i e d qualities, w h i c h can be endorsed mythically to early history, is b e i n g reissued i n the internal w o r l d . S u c h seizure is not really successful, only parasitically

so. N o b o d y ate i n the d r e a m , as the

patient came to realize. This non-feeding situation engineered b y the engulfing refrigerator-self, arrogantly p r o p o s e d as superior to b e i n g breast-fed, is " a n envious assertion of m o r a l superiority w i t h o u t a n y m o r a l s " (Bion, 1962, p. 97), a m i n u s c o n t a i n e r - c o n ­ 4

tained relationship that is clinically evidenced i n without-ness

(p.

97); this is, i n the unconscious a n d sometimes conscious feelings of

In his novel La Chute (1956), Albert Camus pointed to many of these elements: "generous" dedication, indefatigable effort, unconscious duplicity, reversal of dependency, denuding of objects, lack of genuine feelings, clemency at the service of arrogant self-idealization: "that I only attributed superiorities to myself explained my benevolence and serenity", say Clamence (p. 48), whose interlocutor, striped of all personal qualities, has no identity of his own. Camus describes, too, in a masterful way the unchaining of catastrophic change by contact in psychic reality with a damaged/dead aspect of the infantile self. 4

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77

falseness l i n k e d to a v o i d , the " v o i d that is impossible to f i l l " — a s was the case for the tree i n the second d r e a m , u s u r p e d structures lack vitality. T h e y are m a d e - u p rather than g r o w n . T h e u n a c k n o w l e d g e d damage to the infantile self i n this p a r a ­ sitic zone m u s t be stressed. T h e non-feedable parasitic infantile self d e n u d e d of emotion m a y be grasped i n the second d r e a m i n the cousin's d e m a n d to be " g e n e r o u s l y " p r o v i d e d w i t h g o l d e n chains. T h i s is to be c h a i n e d b y d e n u d i n g voraciousness to i d e a l i z e d , n o n ­ vital contacts as distinct f r o m useful ones; these last can become strongly persecutory i n the clinical situation.

On

a childhood

model

A s M o n e y - K y r l e suggests, some degree of the d e l u s i o n of b e i n g ­ the-object is u n a v o i d a b l e i n infancy (and later). It can be observed often e n o u g h that at the start of the second year of life c h i l d r e n rejoice i n feeding M u m , D a d , other c h i l d r e n , or small animals w h o s e helplessness seems an u n e n d i n g source of solicitude. F i s h a n d turtles, w h o s e ability to express affection is less than over­ w h e l m i n g , are indefatigably taken care of b y c h i l d r e n o n the basis, it m a y be assumed, of a n identificatory projection of the child's o w n needy aspects. T o give a n example: A t the age of 14 months, a girl began to take charge of feeding her turtle. In the m o r n i n g , just after d r i n k i n g her bottle, she led her mother b y the h a n d to the kitchen, l o n g i n g l y repeating " t u t u " . She d e m a n d e d that the refrigerator be o p e n e d , a n d she p o i n t e d to some lettuce until she got a leaf . T h i s — t h e " t u t u ' s " f o o d — s h e took to the box where the turtle l i v e d its m o n o t o n o u s life, m a k i n g sure that the turtle h a d her food. T h i s h a p p e n e d several times a day, a n d the child c a l m e d d o w n o n l y w h e n she c o u l d be sure that the turtle h a d some lettuce to eat. T h e turtle's liveliness, s u b d u e d as it was, seemed essential. N o t h ­ i n g like it h a p p e n e d w i t h mechanical, toy animals. That she was not p l a y i n g but serious about it, her joy o n g i v i n g away the lettuce, a n d the receiver's characteristics leads m e to assume that the

78

THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

identificatory projection was of a needful, destitute aspect. T h i s , i n a d d i t i o n to the quasi-non-existent requirements of the receiver, evokes omnipotent generosity. Bion (1977, p. 34), a n d perhaps others before h i m , stressed the essential link between helplessness a n d omnipotence. W e cannot k n o w whether this observation corre­ sponds to b e i n g the Object, or whether the projection of the n e e d ­ f u l / destitute self acknowledges a g o o d object, separate f r o m the central self. That s u c h behaviours occur i n well-cared-for infants b u t not i n autistic ones fits i n w i t h the assumption that it is part of " n o r m a l " development. It w o u l d be reassuring to suppose that n o r m a l l y the psychotic part of the personality ceases to operate, but this is not m y assumption. I w i l l assume that these incidents illustrate a bifrontal reality: o n the one h a n d , a n o u r i s h i n g link, symbiotic i n Bion's sense, w i t h the receiver a n d to a smaller measure w i t h her o w n infantile self; o n the other h a n d , some degree of parasitism of the infantile self y o k e d to the omnipotent self. It is the exultation i n " f e e d i n g the o t h e r " that leads m e to think so. Persons h a v i n g , i n a part of their personality, a delusion of goodness usually abhor damage a n d the i m a g i n a r y or real sufferings of others, especially of children, w h i c h w i l l include g r o w i n g pains. These suffering " o t h e r s " are felt to be exposed to meanness a n d to the emergent idea of a need-of-a­ breast. Contact w i t h the idea of need—that of oneself a n d that of others—is felt as sufficient proof of l i v i n g i n a w o r l d the emotional indifference of w h i c h annihilates aliveness, of contact w i t h a " g e l i d breast" that offers itself to the n e e d f u l - d a m a g e d infantile self. In w o r k i n g w i t h these patients, the analyst s h o u l d be p r e p a r e d to feel identified projectively w i t h this " g e l i d breast". W h i c h leads to a general, clinically relevant, q u e r y — o n e that patient a n d analyst seem often e n o u g h to be able to solve i n prac­ tice: the d i s t i n c t i o n — w h i c h m a y only be partial—between the p a ­ thology of kindness a n d kindness itself. It w o u l d be v a l i d , t h o u g h perhaps too general, to argue that genuine kindness is o n l y reached b y the part of the personality attaining the depressive position. It c o u l d be argued also that i n genuine kindness the others' n e e d s — a n d those projected into others—are kept i n reson­ ance w i t h those of one's o w n infantile self, w h i c h continues to be contained a n d felt " i n s i d e " one's personality. It is o n an ability to

THE U N C O N S C I O U S D E L U S I O N O F " G O O D N E S S "

79

contain a n d contact inside oneself one's o w n destitute n e e d y as­ pects I believe that the capacity for genuine emotional resonance, for b e i n g compassionate,

depends,

a n d also, perhaps, o n the

e v o l v e d aspects of m i n d , w h a t B i o n describes as a tolerance to a sense of infinite. In the case of the d e l u s i o n of " g o o d n e s s " , there is n o felt n e e d o n the part of a n infantile self e m b o d i e d " i n " oneself, so the seem­ i n g kindness tends to m a i n t a i n a n envious unconscious d e s p o i l i n g towards the expelled infantile self, projected into the " p o o r " ones, of any nature, t o w a r d w h o m the dedication a n d the c o m p a s s i o n is extended. W i l l i a m Blake m a y have h a d something akin i n m i n d w h e n he wrote, i n " S o n g s of E x p e r i e n c e " (1789-1794): Pity w o u l d be n o more if we d i d not make somebody Poor a n d M e r c y n o more could be if all were as h a p p y as we.

A note on altruism W h a t was said above is b y w a y of a metapsychological m o d e l : altruism w o u l d require a chapter for itself. But let m e m e n t i o n that F r e u d (1916-17, p. 418) opposes altruism to a n egotism he considers self-evident, a n d he differentiates it f r o m l i b i d i n a l object cathexis b y the fact that altruism does not aspire to sexual satisfac­ tion. O n describing falling i n love, F r e u d sketches a n altruistic transposition of sexual egotism. A n n a F r e u d (1936) dedicated a chapter of The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense to s t u d y " a f o r m of a l t r u i s m " , describing "altruistic r e n u n c i a t i o n " as a n o r m a l a n d less perverse m e c h a n i s m of projection, w h i c h establishes important positive b o n d s that consolidate h u m a n relationships, w h e r e i n ­ stinctive impulses are resisted i n other people's favour; one dis­ regards, i n favour of others, the right to unfettered satisfaction. A l t h o u g h she mentions that i n fact renunciation has a selfish base a n d that selfishness a n d altruism combine i n the most diverse forms, she m a i n l y emphasizes anxiety i n the face of the superego a n d conflict w i t h parental authority. H o w e v e r — a n d this is i m p o r ­

80

THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

tant for m y p u r p o s e s — s h e finally reassesses altruism f r o m the standpoint of death anxiety, masterfully p o i n t i n g out that s u c h anxiety is lacking whenever the i n d i v i d u a l projects his o w n i n ­ stinctive impulses thoroughly o n others. In that case, he does not experience real apprehension for his o w n life. Rather, he becomes distressed a n d cares intensely for the life of his love objects. In a footnote she underlines the similarities between altruistic r e n u n ­ ciation a n d the determinants of male homosexuality, a n d that the intoxication of g i v i n g to a n d h e l p i n g others is i n itself a n instinctive satisfaction. In altruism, i n the same w a y as i n identification w i t h the aggressor, passivity becomes activity, a n d narcissistic mortifi­ cation is compensated for b y the invigorating feeling of one's o w n p o w e r i n the role of benefactor. A n n a F r e u d leaves u n d e c i d e d the issue of the existence of a genuinely altruistic relationship, a n d she adds that another r o a d towards apparently altruistic b e h a v i o u r is that of masochism. T o conclude, I shall refer to a then u n p u b l i s h e d p a p e r b y M e l t z e r (1975), " C o m p u l s i v e G e n e r o s i t y " , w h i c h H o r a c i o Etche­ g o y e n brought to m y attention after the essentials of this w o r k h a d been completed. This leads me to point to coincidences a n d to try to explain our differences. A c h a r m i n g but c o m p u l s i v e

generosity

can, i n some circumstances, Meltzer holds, result f r o m a confusion, due to projective identification, between the mother's breasts a n d the child's buttocks, this being such a satisfactory solution to m u l ­ tiple infantile anxieties a n d later social anxieties that it turns into a core source of character formation. T h e economic p r o b l e m , he says, of g i v i n g to others without being d r a i n e d completely tends, however, to generate a certain fragility that appears i n v a r i e d w a y s , u n d e r l y i n g depressive episodes, anorexias, diarrhoeas, m a n i c or h y p o m a n i c reactions, phobias to examinations,

pseudo-nympho­

m a n i a , a n d ruminations, suicidal or otherwise. T o these one c o u l d a d d migraine, vertigo, h y p o c h o n d r i a c or psychosomatic

episodes

(fever, hypertension, abrupt hypercholesterolemia, biliary stasis), a n d , crucially, fears of death that approach terror. O u r conceptual differences c o u l d be s u m m a r i z e d b y s a y i n g that w h i l e Meltzer considers generosity the anchor of character, I prefer to consider it as a pre-catastrophic structure of the psychotic part of the personality. T h e term " a n c h o r of character" describes

THE

UNCONSCIOUS DELUSION OF "GOODNESS"

81

w e l l the ego-syntonicity a n d sterotypy of the structure of generos­ ity, but it misses, I think, the flexibility that is necessary to account for a n emotional d y n a m i c s that, below a n apparent sterotypy, is fragile a n d potentially violent. A s a pre-catastrophic structure, it retains its connection w i t h this violence. Reintrojection of the split­ off infantile self involves a catastrophic change, i n Bion's (1965, p p . 8-9) sense: subversion of the order or system of things, a c c o m p a ­ n i e d b y feelings of disaster i n the participants, w i t h a n almost p h y s i c a l abruptness or violence resulting f r o m a w i d e externaliza­ tion of internal objects. T h e clinical material presented of the initial interview w i t h M r s A is a sample of a subversion a n d violence that arises i n the patient a n d i n her close relatives o n contact w i t h the analytic situation. Rather than focusing, as Meltzer does, o n the economic p r o b l e m of g i v i n g without b e i n g d r a i n e d completely, I prefer to link the fragility to the failings of the megalomaniac structure of goodness: failures i n the face of factually impossible emotional tasks, failures i n the control of the e n v y unconsciously attributed to others, fail­ ures of patients' bodies i n maintaining the h y p o m a n i c activity their furor curandi d e m a n d s , failures i n abolishing needfulness. W h a t is characteristic of the part of the personality that operates w i t h i n the d e l u s i o n of " g o o d n e s s " is not fragility but p o w e r , the " m o n o l i t h ­ i s m " , to use the patient's apt term, hinting at the felt strength but also at imperviousness a n d devitalization. T h e p r o b l e m between g i v i n g a n d receiving arises i n the non-psychotic, symbiotic area of the personality. In the parasitic area g i v i n g is superior to receiving a n d so does not cause conflict. That g i v i n g does not need to give rise to economic issues as l o n g as the structure of goodness undergoes n o fissure

appears

s u r p r i s i n g to Meltzer, g i v e n that it can endure for a lifetime w i t h ­ out apparent pathology.

Clinically, the emergence

of economic

issues a r o u n d g i v i n g a n d receiving indicates a fracture of the m e g a l o m a n i c structure at the base of the pathological generosity, w h i c h allows for contacts " i n " the personality w i t h the n e e d f u l ­ d a m a g e d infantile aspects of the self. These often appear, especially in

dreams,

as babies-that-cannot-be-sustained—as

irreparable

Rosemary's babies. T h e ensuing anxiety is catastrophic, a n d the tendency to split these aspects off again is intense. It is a u s u a l

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THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

characteristic of these patients that they experience intense difficul­ ties w i t h h o l d i n g babies a few days o l d i n their arms, because these babies' vulnerability, equivalent to damage, becomes terrifying. A s far as the central role that Meltzer grants to anal masturba­ tion i n the genesis of the delusion of being-the-Object is concerned, I w o u l d rather take recourse to our vast ocean of ignorance, as B i o n said. Meltzer's m o d e l w o u l d then come out as one of the possible w a y s i n w h i c h the baby's efforts at self-containment i n v o l v e seiz­ ure of functions of the objects.

CHAPTER

FIVE

Perverse and symbiotic organizations in narcissistic object relationships

A

c c o r d i n g to Herbert Rosenfeld (1964a), clinical situations relating to F r e u d ' s description of p r i m a r y narcissism cor­ respond

to p r i m i t i v e object relationships. Objects

are

m a i n l y partial, omnipotence is prominent, a n d projective-intro­ jective identification processes obviate awareness of the separate identities or limits between the self a n d the object. This is so be­ cause recognition of the separateness

of self a n d object leads to

feelings of dependence o n the object a n d thus to anxiety. D e p e n d ­ ence o n the object, says Rosenfeld, implies b o t h love for a n d recog­ nition of the value of the object, resulting i n aggression, anxiety, a n d p a i n because of the unavoidable frustrations; also, recognition of the object's goodness stimulates envy. O m n i p o t e n t narcissistic relationships obviate aggressive feelings i n the face of frustration a n d e n v y . W h e n the infant possesses the mother's breast o m n i p o ­ tently, it cannot frustrate h i m or spark his envy. T h e purpose of this chapter is to trace a distinction, i n the area of omnipotent narcissistic relationships, between two

organiza-

Presented to the Buenos Aires Psychoanalytic Association i n A u g u s t 1979. 83

84

T H E L O G I C S O F T H E M I N D

tions that serve to evade awareness of the separateness of self a n d object. T h e first of these, the perverse organization, reflects the full weight of e n v y , w i t h the qualities Meltzer (1973) attributes to per­ version. A t the other, w h i c h I shall call the symbiotic organization of the personality, the goodness of the object, t h o u g h not a c k n o w l ­ e d g e d , is to a degree respected. I shall point out their clinical a n d metapsychological differences a n d outline h o w they interact. I shall take as a starting point the unconscious structure d e ­ tected i n the analysis of a severe neurotically depressed patient. This

unconscious

structure, a p r o p e r l y perverse

organization

l i n k e d to the primitive oral form of the c o m b i n e d b r e a s t - n i p p l e couple (Meltzer, 1973), involves omnipotent possession of mother's breast whose functions it incorporates, thereby a v o i d i n g frustra­ tion, lack, a n d envy. This perverse organization w i l l be described clinically as a result of cleavage a n d transposition of the self a n d object of the oral p r i m a r y scene, a n d as a result, of the genital p r i m a r y scene also. I shall try to s h o w h o w this unconscious penis-breast structure is f o r m e d , i n v o l v i n g : 1.

a h i d d e n area of the patient's life, where it is most active;

2.

the character disturbance o n w h i c h the analysand defined h i m ­ self as a "non-existent gentleman";

3.

b y w a y of its failure, its bearing o n neurotic depressive s y m p ­ toms a n d , potentially, o n psychotic self-destruction (suicide);

4.

the transference link.

Further o n , I shall explain the distinction a n d interrelation between the perverse a n d the symbiotic organizations. T r y i n g to describe aspects of the " g e o g r a p h y of unconscious p h a n t a s y " (Meltzer, 1967) that embraces part-objects a n d early forms of the self comes u p against the notation problems met b y M e l t z e r (1967, 1973) a n d W i s d o m (1962), whose terms I shall e m ­ p l o y . Bion's (1959) w a r n i n g that "the part-object relationship is not w i t h anatomical structures only but w i t h function . . . not w i t h the breast b u t w i t h feeding, poisoning, l o v i n g , h a t i n g " (pp. 310-311) sharply illustrates the pitfalls of u s i n g anatomical terms such as " b r e a s t " or " n i p p l e " to nominate a n d describe psychic links.

NARCISSISTIC OBJECT RELATIONSHIPS

85

The "daily routine" versus "within four walls": "Mr C" " M r C " , a professional m a n entering his later years, came to analysis because

of m o u n t i n g difficulties w i t h suicidal i m ­

pulses. K i n d a n d elegant i n bearing a n d manners, he fitted each of W i s d o m ' s (1962) s y m p t o m s for depression: (1) affect of dejec­ tion, feelings of exhaustion; (2) feeling u n l o v e d , loss of capacity to love a n d of contact w i t h others, a l i k i n g for solitude; (3) loss of interest; (4) overall inhibition of activity; (5) loss of self-es­ teem; (6) guilt, remorse, a n d self-reproaches; (7) delusional ex­ pectation of punishment, w i s h for death, suicidal tendencies. H e h a d been i n a n analysis for five years, w h i c h he described as a "gentleman's agreement". This was followed b y couple a n d g r o u p therapy w i t h the same analyst for another five years. It seemed to be true that to h i m , i n his o w n w o r d s , "life means n o t h i n g " . It turned out that the present analysis was to be a n ­ other gentleman's

agreement

i n which nothing w o u l d hap­

p e n — t h a t is, m o r e meaningless analysis. H i s complaints i n the session were legion, as were references to suicide. H e h a d kept a l o a d e d g u n to h a n d for m a n y years. It was l o a d e d w i t h explo­ sive bullets, so he w o u l d be sure to die rather than s u r v i v e a suicide attempt i n a vegetative state. T w o of his close relatives, b o t h victims of a swindle, h a d committed suicide i n s u c h a manner. M r C was terrified of p o v e r t y — o f " n o t h a v i n g a place to live i n " a n d " g o i n g h u n g r y " . T h i s h a d scant bearing o n reality. H e carried out his duties mechanically a n d w i t h great effort. H e declared that he d i d not k n o w h o w l o n g he w o u l d be able to sustain the effort, because it w a s also felt as meaningless. H i s l i v i n g d e p e n d e d o n these " d a i l y r o u t i n e s " , as he called them. Therefore as soon as he neglected them, he w o u l d descend into misery a n d suicidal thoughts. T h e analysis was another routine, one that was b o t h unavoidable a n d empty. G r a d u a l l y , a m i d strong resistance, w e gained access into a n area of his life he kept h i d d e n a n d isolated. In this h i d d e n d o m a i n was the nucleus of the w h o l e of his felt wishes: his extramarital life, mostly w i t h m a r r i e d w o m e n " w h o place n o

86

T H E L O G I C S O F T H E M I N D

d e m a n d s o n m e " . H e describes himself, falsely, as unable to seduce; also, more truthfully, as being unable to resist tempta­ t i o n — " i t is stronger than I a m " . A fragment of this k i n d of material illustrates what, i n the course of the analysis, was n a m e d " w i t h i n four w a l l s " : " O n F r i d a y night I was w i t h Ines . . . only then I was not de­ pressed . . . m y relationship w i t h her is the most intense I can remember . . . w h e n w e left I again became controlled. Ines n o ­ ticed the change a n d she cried . . . it is incredible h o w I change w h e n I a m w i t h i n four walls a n d then later o n . . . but I cannot m a r r y all of them, have children w i t h twenty different w o m e n a n d leave c h i l d r e n everywhere . . . Ines has l o v e d m e the most, b u t the same happens to m e w i t h M a r t a , w i t h H e l e n a , w i t h Silvia a n d , before that, w i t h Florencia . . . a n d I think that what happens w i t h Ines happens because she lives 5,000 k m a w a y ; w h e n she l i v e d i n Buenos A i r e s w e

stopped seeing each

other . . . it is a crazy, crazy thing, w a n t i n g to have c h i l d r e n w i t h every w o m a n that comes into m y head. . . . " T h i s material contrasts two different areas of M r C ' s psychic life: the symptomatic neurotic area of " d a i l y routines" a n d the narcis­ sistic object relationships " w i t h i n four w a l l s " .

the "daily routines"

"within four walls"

1 .

a lack of desire

1.

explosive wishes

effort, both e m p t y and difficult

2.

effortlessness

omnipotence;

2 .

to sustain 3.

impotence

3.

4 .

repetitive and endless t i m e .

4.

quasi-atemporality.

5.

constant failure

5.

triumph fullness of m e a n i n g

6.

meaninglessness

6.

7.

suicidal

7.

elation

fears of b e c o m i n g m a d or d y i n g from excitement

NARCISSISTIC OBJECT RELATIONSHIPS

87

Different f r o m his " d a i l y routines", the situations w i t h i n four walls are filled w i t h sensoriality, s k i n contact, m e a n i n g , a n d atempor­ ality, o v e r b l o w n as o p p o s e d to being empty a n d " m e a n i n g l e s s " i n the absence

of affect. T h e " w i t h i n four w a l l s " r e a l m gives

the

s p r i n g b o a r d to the structure of his narcissistic object relationships.

The

split

and

the

of the

combined

enthronement

object

of the

baby's

penis



After just over a year of analysis, M r C , w h o at the start h a d

stayed i n b e d all weekend

a m i d intense suicidal

fantasies,

spoke i n his M o n d a y session of a better w e e k e n d . H e h a d been

able to rest a n d h a d h a d a most satisfying coitus w i t h his wife.

H o w e v e r , he began to attack the analysis as repetitive, destruc­

tive, a n d h a v i n g a potential for wickedness. C o n t i n u i n g , he

d e n i e d the importance of feeling better at the w e e k e n d . H e then

d e n i e d his o w n attacks, saying that nothing h a d h a p p e n e d .

Next, he related a d r e a m f r o m Saturday night:

"It was

in the house at.

. . [his c h i l d h o o d h o m e , where he h a d

I don't know why I dream so often of that house. I was in the bathroom naked, shaving in front of the mirror, some twenty years old ... the bathroom had a skylight, like a small greenhouse when we were small we used to -put boards on its floor, made of glass with an iron structure. It was dangerous because we could fall through and also cut ourselves with the glass. My motherforbade it, but we did it just the same, as a challenge. . . . In the dream a girl was at the skylight, young, beautiful, blonde like German girls are, she looked at my prick, saying "what a pretty half-pound you have".. . then I stood on the lavatory and she sucked my prick, fascinated .. . and I came at once, in the dream and in reality, I woke up all wet." l i v e d till he m a r r i e d rather late i n life].

Associations previous to the d r e a m illustrate the issues of the w e e k e n d , h o w contact w i t h a meaningful w e e k e n d resulted i n a n attack o n the analysis, enviously d e p r i v e d of benefit a n d m a d e meaningless.

T h e d r e a m repeats a n d amplifies this theme.

The

skylight, a source of light, a n d the blonde G e r m a n girl stand for the breast's a n d / o r the nipple's fascinating qualities, w h i c h he seizes,

88

THE LOGICS O F THE M I N D

attributing them to his penis. T h e baby's penis (Meltzer, 1967), as a n idealized part of the self enthroned as supreme g o o d , attributes to itself the breast's functions. It is adored instead of, a n d i n e n v i ­ ous rivalry w i t h , the breast. Aspects of the infantile self i n need of the breast are split off a n d located i n the m o u t h , or i n the v a g i n a - m o u t h (often i n the anus) of the female w o r s h i p p e r of the penis-breast. In situations " w i t h i n four w a l l s " this cleavage, w h i c h amounted to a n enacted delusion, is successfully realized, i n Bion's m e a n i n g of the term " r e a l i z a ­ t i o n " . Sensory erotization requires, i n reality a n d i n the d r e a m , the partner-receiver's actual presence. Self-object transposition seems central to the realization. T h e link to the breast is attempted i n a reversed form. T h i s psychic system, w i t h its intense z o n a l c o n f u ­ sion, its erotization of sensoriality, its denigration of love to sensu­ ality (Meltzer, 1973), a n d its self-object transposition reverting the l i n k to the breast I d e e m to be the patient's perverse structure. When,

lacking a n appropriate partner, the cleavage

of the

b a b y / i n s a t i a b l y needful aspects fails a n d the sensorial perverse structure described is not active, M r C remains i n the state of d a i l y routine, w h i c h is characterized b y a n intolerable lack. E m e r g i n g symbolic contacts, w h i c h d o not fit the perverse sensorial system, are often evacuated anally. In the d r e a m , the skylight-breast becomes lavatory-toilet, i m p l y i n g a fecalization of the n i p p l e : "then I stood on the lavatory. . . . " Herbert Rosenfeld (1964a) highlights that often i n the analysis of narcissistic patients the analyst is represented b y a toilet. Transference enactment follows similar lines. M r C invades a n d obstructs m y thinking through rationalizations, changes of topic, a n d stories c o m i n g out of the patient's penis-breast, p u r p o r t i n g to fascinate m e . H e thus reverses the analytic situation: needy aspects of the breast are switched off b y w a y of such techniques as w e l l as b y his concealments.

A n a l y s i s thus becomes d o u b l y

"meaning­

less". Firstly, it is not felt affectively, a n d secondly, it does not gain significance, b e c a u s e — " s t a n d i n g

o n the l a v a t o r y " — h e turns the

analyst's interpretations into flatus vocis, w h i c h he expels anally. H e cannot receive from me as analyst-breast but he c a n seize co­ vertly, b y means of what w e came to recognize as his " V a s e l i n e ways".

NARCISSISTIC OBJECT RELATIONSHIPS

89

A series of dreams, w h i c h I w i l l not go into for reasons of space, seemed to c o n f i r m these formulations a n d stress the damage to the infantile aspects needful of the breast. These were b o u n d i n the d r e a m of the skylight to the envious challenge o n the m o t h e r ­ breast. T h e c o m b i n e d breast-nipple object is split, a n d the n i p p l e , expelled anally, becomes a p u r s u e r - i n t r u d e r as concerns his seiz­ ure of the breast. A g a i n , at the level of the genital p r i m a r y scene, the father's penis is apparently split into (1) a n ideal object equated to the breast a n d conflated w i t h the baby's penis, a n d (2) a perse­ cutory, v o i d i n g object assimilated to the n i p p l e , u p o n w h i c h the baby's penis triumphs i n the " w i t h i n four w a l l s " scenes. This illustrates the oral genesis, i n this case, of the outsider M e l t z e r describes (1973) i n the p r i m a l scene of perversions. F o r Etchegoyen a n d A r e n s b u r g (1977) it is a role assignable to a n y m e m b e r of the p r i m a l scene, w h i c h then conflates w i t h the super­ ego. Seizure a n d intrusion m a r k e d M r C's a s s o c i a t i o n s — " c h a n g i n g the subject"—to the dreams; he centred o n his cousin P, an inveter­ ate fact-twister, a swindler w h o drove his next of k i n to destruction a n d suicide. T h e patient does just this i n his session, so that, instead of d e p e n d i n g o n m y understanding, I d e p e n d o n his narrative. Intrusive seizure leads a n y libidinal contact to be felt as a robbery that must be kept h i d d e n . Retaliatory phantasies centre o n b e i n g deprived-castrated b y a persecutory object, perhaps c o n ­ d e n s i n g n i p p l e a n d father's penis. Gratification brings expectations of retaliatory deprivation, w h i c h are " r e a l i z e d " i n the d a i l y r o u ­ tines.

The non-existent

gentleman

T h e characteropathic m a r k of the unconscious perverse structure can be seen i n M r C ' s self-definition—following Italo C a l v i n o ' s n o v e l , II cavalieri inesistente—as the "non-existent g e n t l e m a n " . T h i s summarizes both the enthronement of the penis a n d its u n a v o i d ­ able failings. T h e " g e n t l e m a n " is he w h o enthrones his penis i n the place of the breast. O l d , rich friends, phallic-narcissistic personalities of v a r y i n g

90

THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

degrees of sadism, are the acolytes to the enthronement. O m n i p o ­ tent possession of money-breast allows them, i n their o w n terms, to lead their lives " h o w the fuck they w a n t " . T h i s he admires intensely. A n a l y s i s as a gentleman's agreement is a pact against the existence of b o t h breast a n d need. It recreates the baby's penis enthronement i n session. T h i s includes denigration a n d anal expulsion of b o t h n e e d y self a n d breast. These activities are perverse, i n Meltzer's (1973) sense of being p r i m a r i l y destructive of the goodness of the breast a n d the creativity of parental coitus. T h e i m p u l s e to pervert relates to criminal impulses to make the g o o d objects destitute, this attack being p r o m p t e d b y the v e r y fact of their o w n positive q u a l i ­ ties. Because of the partial failure of this perverse intent of the baby's penis enthronement, M r C is a pervers rate. T h e neurotic suf-fering rests outside the characteropathic structure enthroning the baby's penis. W h e n suffering a n d the infantile aspects are projected onto others, M r C , as a k i n d a n d solicitous gentleman, feeds them w i t h special favours issuing f r o m his omnipotent penis-breast. Proof of the partial failure of the enthronement is the " n o n ­ existent gentleman's" very non-existence. H e describes h i m / h i m ­ self as " h a v i n g s p l e n d i d armour, a place of h o n o u r i n combat a n d i n tournaments, h a v i n g w o m e n fall i n love, but inside the a r m o u r there is nothing. . . . " That he laughs a n d jeers i n so saying shows c y n i c i s m , pseudo-logic at the service of denigration, misrepresen­ tation, a n d p s e u d o - c o n f o r m i s m i n session, arising out of the p e r ­ verse

character structure. T h e suicide threat is the threat to

annihilate the d e p r i v i n g object a n d the infantile needful aspects. These u s u a l l y appear i n dreams as attacks o n the affectful infantile aspects a n d the organ where affect is placed (dreams of heart­ attacks).

The

libidinal

aspects

of

narcissism

I have focused o n the transposition of functions of the self a n d object i n the perverse unconscious core of the destructive aspects of narcissism. T h e baby's penis self is the inexhaustible breast, a n d the v a g i n a a n d b o d y of the partner take the role of the baby's m o u t h ,

NARCISSISTIC OBJECT RELATIONSHIPS

91

effectively creating a reversed sensory system. T h u s structured, the p e r v e r s i o n accounts for some qualities of the " w i t h i n four w a l l s " situation: t r i u m p h over

the n i p p l e - f a t h e r - p e n i s ,

exaltation

of

fellatio a n d , m a i n l y , the v a g i n a - m o u t h ' s insatiability. T h i s often becomes persecutory as it threatens to e m p t y the penis-breast, w h i c h w o u l d be equivalent to its death. In order to explore the relation between the fusional link that M e l t z e r stresses i n perversions, a n d sensory pleasure w i t h the per­ verse structure, I shall compare the patient's mental states o n jour­ neys a n d vacations w i t h those " w i t h i n four w a l l s " . These can be described as follows: 1.

isolation i n time a n d space regarding " d a i l y r o u t i n e s " ;

2.

absence of threatening third-parties;

3.

quasi-atemporality;

4.

n o effort or privations;

5.

erotization of specific sensory qualities, mostly oral a n d cuta­ neous: delicious foods, the caress of the s u n a n d water o n the s k i n , w h i c h he feels exists for h i m alone a n d creates a p r i v i l e g e d situation;

6.

others, i n c l u d i n g the analyst, are left out as e x c l u d e d , jealous, a n d envious;

7.

obtaining pleasant situations b y means of " o i l y techniques" (invitations, deferred payments) where seduction is felt to lead to gratuitousness of pleasure.

T h e h i g h l y pleasurable feelings of fusion w i t h the object, losing b o d i l y limits i n the sexual setting " w i t h i n four w a l l s " ("We

were

b o t h a single thing, r o u n d as a b a l l " ) , a fusion w i t h a skin-object rather than w i t h a p e r s o n as such, has its equivalent i n h o l i d a y s , m a i n l y i n the erotization of the sun's caresses o n the skin. T r i u m p h over a t h i r d party is here an accessory, but the absence of this p e r s o n is a requisite for pleasure i n twofold fusion, strongly narcis­ sistic as to erasing limits a n d separate identities of self a n d object i n Rosenfeld's (1964a) terms. W h e n sensory fusion is attained, the external object w h o cares a n d gratifies is admitted, t h o u g h not r e c o g n i z e d fully.

THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

92

T h e t w o systems, ascertainable " w i t h i n four w a l l s " a n d i n the transference, are: 1.

the perverse organization, w i t h transposition a n d reversion of self-object contact;

2.

the twofold fusional system, also basically sensorial a n d requir­ i n g the presence of the oral-cutaneous object i n the absence of a third party: here self a n d object preserve their positions a n d their p r i m i t i v e functions but not their limits, w h i c h partly or completely fuse. This implies disregarding the object's mature psychic qualities, not to say her autonomy. This narcissistic l i b i d i n a l system is the symbiotic organization.

1

"It is i n c r e d i b l e , " says M r C : " m y changes w i t h i n four walls, a n d later o n " . These small " m a r r i a g e s " w i t h the external object cannot be recognized because they activate twisting, whereby the self is perversely p u t i n the place of the object a n d its kindness. T h e feeling

that he receives

unchains the reversal, the robbery a n d self-attribu­

tion o n the part of the perverse self. F o r Rosenfeld (1969), only sane infantile-self aspects bearing the analyst's separateness

attain genuine introjective

identifications

p r o m o t i n g g r o w t h . H e does not link "narcissistic s u p p l y " to intro­ jection. T h o u g h there is interference b y the perverse organization, introjective p h e n o m e n a maintain the aliveness of the self's n o n ­ perverted aspects. H o w e v e r , they cannot further psychic growth. A

transference

example

of perverse d y n a m i s m s

above. T h e analytic achievement

was given

of a better w e e k e n d

brought

about self-attribution for the enthroned baby's p e n i s — t h e d r e a m of the s k y l i g h t — w i t h denigration of analysis. W h e n perverse p r o ­ cesses prevail, M r C listens to interpretations m o c k i n g l y , seeking

^or Bleger (1967a), transference symbiosis pertains to the psychotic part of personality, whereas I distinguish between psychotic perverse phenomena and symbiotic ones, where self and object retain their positions and functions. Mahler (1961) holds that a dim awareness of the need-satisfying object starts the symbiotic phase of normal development, as does Searles (1965a) for "genu­ ine symbiosis"; my own stance is closer to Bion's (1970) distinction of symbiotic and parasitic links: the reverted perverse organization is parasitic as to both the object and the needful aspects of the self. Bion seems to regard these links as alternative, while I focus on their clinical coexistence and interplay.

NARCISSISTIC O B J E C T RELATIONSHIPS

93

w e a k points to distort a n d ridicule, a n d then expels t h e m jointly w i t h his needy aspects. Alternatively, he is p a r a n o i d l y attentive w h e n they are felt as the n i p p l e - f a t h e r - p e n i s ' retaliative incursions. Yet moments of close, devoted attention, i m m o b i l e , eyes closed, evince that—perhaps more i n tone than i n content—interpretations w o r k as the " f o u r w a l l s " , where he feels i n c l u d e d . S u c h moments of achieved symbiosis, activate, i n turn, the perverse organization v y i n g to possess for its o w n ends what w a s received. Transference symbiosis is manifested, too, i n the intense hate of the nipple-setting, felt i n itself like a third-party. T h e e n d of the session, contact w i t h h o l i d a y breaks, or the adjustments of fees c o n f i r m Bleger's (1967b) o p i n i o n that symbiosis, like c h i l d r e n or love, is felt w h e n it cries. O n l y , it does not just cry. It emboldens the perverse organization, threatening the analysis, w h i c h is intensely questioned before holidays or, i n h i g h l y inflationary epochs, i n the face of fee adjustments. W h a t impacts o n the fusion-of-two i n treat­ ment heightens the p o w e r o n the self of the substitute perverse organization. Wishes for mother's a n d breast's exclusive symbiotic possession m a i n t a i n a n intense distrust of the addictive analysis, of m u t u a l a n d endless addiction i n a separate, " w i t h i n four w a l l s " r e a l m . Symbiosis is not part of Rosenfeld's conceptual apparatus, but he advises (1964b) that narcissistic patients c a n go into deep regressions, a b a n d o n i n g most ego functioning, a n d that they m a y develop strong dependency i n analysis. In a n y case, transference symbiosis shows that the perverse reversed organization allots itself the functions of the breast b u t does not fulfil them. Privation of needy aspects persists. T h e actu­ ality of the original conflict w i t h the breast retains its initial marks: intolerance to separateness of the object, intense jealousy a n d e n v y , a tendency to splitting of the nipple-breast c o m b i n e d object a n d the parental couple. T h e original conflict reappears i n the session i n h i d d e n symbiotization a n d intolerance of the setting, as it intro­ duces separateness a n d intolerance to receiving f r o m the analyst as an other. T h e analysand mythically attributes his depression to marriage as a recognition of the external object's alterity ("I s h o u l d have r e m a i n e d a single m a n " ) . C l i n i c a l evidences of transference symbiotization i n this a n d other cases lead m e to h o l d , contrary to what Rosenfeld (1971) says, that i n perversions the destructive self does not necessarily control

94

THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

all libidinal aspects of the personality. The u s u a l thing is the p a r a l ­ lel coexistence of a symbiotic organization, w h i c h s h o u l d be fo­ cused o n interpretatively. T h e patient's emotional g r o w t h

will

d e p e n d o n the evolution of this area. S u c h a n idea is closer to F r e u d ' s o n the structure of the ego i n perversion. In " S p l i t t i n g of the E g o i n the Process of Defence" (1940e [1938]) a n d i n C h a p t e r VIII of the Outline (1940a [1938]), F r e u d recaptures the n o t i o n of splitting of the ego sketched i n " F e t i s h i s m " (1927e) a n d extends it f r o m psychoses a n d perversions to the neuroses. Splitting of the ego explains that generally fetishism is partial a n d leaves space for a degree of n o r m a l sexuality. F r e u d also gives a significant place to fears of loss of affection. M o n e y - K y r l e (1971) agrees that usually, if not always, w e find a n admixture: one part of the personality develops n o r m a l l y or healthily while others stop g r o w i n g or develop perversely or insanely, w i t h a d e p e n d e n c y o n a variety of spurious substitutes.

CHAPTER SIX

O n narcissistic identification

and the shadow of the object

Freud introduced narcissism as "narcissistic identification" in 1910 upon a two-person-psychology "clinical" model of "mu­ tual erotic bliss"—with a sinister side; from this the self is torn. Loss-as-trauma entails a splitting of the ego, with the emergence of two mental functionings: direct (primal object-relational) and transposed (the narcissistic identification as "alteration of the ego"). There is, additionally, a splitting-off of traumatized (and secondarily erotized) parts of mind: towards these, split onto partenaires, the narcissistic identification spuriously enacts the place of the object. Two vignettes on actual losses illustrate, respectively, the enactment of transposition in a dream and the splitting of the ego and then the redressal of transposition by finding again a "place

Published i n International Review of Psycho-Analysis, 17 (1990): 177-186. Thanks are due to Drs R. Horacio Etchegoyen and Alfredo Gazzano for their generous contributions to this chapter.

95

96

THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

within the (primal) object". Freud's 1910c and 1917e concepts of narcissistic identification are compared: identification in mel­ ancholia is a "shadow" stage, a loss stage, of narcissistic identi­ fication.

To Joel Zac, in memoriam.

N

arcissism has always been a controversial concept, a n d Freud

h a d strong

misgivings

about

it at the start

(Grunberger, 1979, p. xvi). It has, been a fertile concept

too, w o r k e d o n i n m a n y ways b y each generation of analysts. It is

p r o b a b l y i n their d i v e r g i n g views about narcissism that theoretical differences between analytic schools become most distinct. It is not often realized, though, that F r e u d (1910c) initially intro­ d u c e d narcissism as a " t w o - p e r s o n p s y c h o l o g y " (Rickman, 1951) based o n a m o d e l of early loss. O n l y subsequently, i n the Schreber case (1911c [1910]) a n d i n what has become the official theoretical paper, " O n Narcissism: A n Introduction" (1914c), d i d he b r i n g his ideas o n narcissism i n line w i t h his one-person psychology, his m a i n theoretical m o d e l . In this chapter, I firstly examine Freud's two-person p s y c h o l ­ o g y clinical m o d e l of narcissistic identification, i n v o l v i n g loss-as­ trauma a n d leading to an "alteration of the e g o " . I w i l l try to s h o w that the d y n a m i c s of narcissistic identification u n v e i l e d i n Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory

of His Childhood (Freud, 1910c) i m p l y a

transposition of self a n d p r i m a l object. A s explained later on, trans­ position of self a n d object is a two-person psychology structure i n w h i c h a central enacted " f a l s e " self in-the-place-of-the-Object

keeps

split off into a partenaire the (unconscious) needy emotional " b a b y " self. (Partenaire means here the external real person w h o acts as a depository for the split-off aspect of the self.) Secondly, I w i l l ex­ plore F r e u d ' s m a n y - s i d e d struggles w i t h the complex issues of narcissistic identification, loss, and "alteration of the e g o " , to at­ tempt some conceptual ties between his early views o n narcissistic identification i n Leonardo (1910c) a n d his later ones, m a i n l y i n " M o u r n i n g a n d M e l a n c h o l i a " (1917e). M y purpose is to b u i l d a

O N NARCISSISTIC I D E N T I F I C A T I O N

97

f o u n d a t i o n for a conceptual distinction between narcissistic identi­ fication a n d melancholic identification (and between a rivalrous a n d a restitutive narcissism). I n o w must ask the reader to follow F r e u d ' s w o r d s closely.

The clinical

model of the L e o n a r d o the splitting of the ego

paper:

F r e u d ' s first p u b l i s h e d uses of the w o r d " n a r c i s s i s m " , i n a

1910

footnote to Three Essays (1905d) a n d i n Leonardo (1910c), rely o n a t w o - p e r s o n psychology. O n homosexual object choice, he says: the future inverts, i n the earliest years of their childhood, pass through a phase of very intense but short-lived fixation to a w o m a n (usually their mother), and . . . after leaving this be­ hind, they identify themselves with a w o m a n and take them­ selves as their sexual object. That is to say, they proceed from a narcissistic basis, and look for a young man who resembles themselves and w h o m they may love as their mother loved them. [1905d, p. 145n] M o n t h s later, i n the Leonardo paper, F r e u d explains that The boy represses his love for his mother: he puts himself in her place, identifies himself with her, and takes his own person as a model i n whose likeness he chooses the new objects of his love. In this way he has become a homosexual. What he has in fact done is to slip back to auto-erotism: for the boys w h o m he now loves as he grows up are after all only substitutive figures and revivals of himself i n childhood—boys w h o m he loves i n the way in which his mother loved h i m when he was a child. H e finds the objects of his love along the path of narcissism. . . . [1910c, p. 100] Pages earlier, he h a d traced L e o n a r d o ' s c h i l d h o o d m e m o r y to a situation i n which we a l l . . . took our mother's nipple into our mouth and sucked at it. The organic impression of this experience—the first source of pleasure in our life—doubtless remains indelibly printed on us . . . [this] reminiscence of suck­

98

THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

irtg—or being suckled—at his mother's b r e a s t . . . he . . . under­

took to depict with his brush, in the guise of the mother of G o d

and her child, [p. 87]

O f L e o n a r d o ' s " p l a y instinct", he says: its long duration can teach us how slowly anyone tears himself from his childhood if in his childhood days he has enjoyed the

highest erotic bliss, which is never again attained, [pp. 128-129 italics added] T h e instinctuality e n d o w i n g the infant is a v o w e d i n telling w o r d s , a n d this is also true of the mother: A mother's love for the infant she suckles and cares for . . . is in

the nature of a completely satisfying love-relation, which not

only fulfills every mental wish but also every physical need . . .

satisfying, without reproach, wishful impulses which have

long been repressed and which must be called perverse, [p.

117]

In his art L e o n a r d o has represented, says F r e u d , the wishes of the boy, infatuated with his mother, as fulfilled i n

this blissful union of the male and female natures, [p. 118, italics added] A s w e can readily note, F r e u d intertwines two sexual levels i n the blissful u n i o n — s u c k i n g a n d (genital) u n i o n of male a n d f e m a l e — tracing, t h r o u g h Leonardo's art, the surge of genitality to the time of his s u c k l i n g p e r i o d . H e goes o n to weave several lines of thought o n the genesis of the trauma, leading, i n part of L e o n a r d o ' s m i n d , to repression-cum-identification: the difficulty of tearing oneself f r o m the bliss of sucking, being put passionately band

w i t h precocious

sexual

in lieu of a h u s ­

activity, actual separation

from

mother, a n d — i n a 1915 a d d e n d u m to Three Essays—"frustration

(in

the f o r m of a n early deterrence, b y fear, f r o m sexual activity)" (1905d, p. 146n). In m y v i e w , F r e u d sketches here a splitting of the ego, w h e r e b y i n a part of the m i n d the narcissistic repression-cwm-identification at the level of the instinctual "blissful u n i o n " to mother is

enacted,

w i t h the roles reversed, i n adult life: i n overt homosexuality, this entails additionally a displacement

of sexual excitement

from

99

O N NARCISSISTIC I D E N T I F I C A T I O N

w o m e n to m e n (1905d, p. 146n). W h e n crude sensuality is a v o i d e d , as was the case w i t h L e o n a r d o , the reverse of the early roles is enacted i n tender maternal care of his p u p i l s (1910c, p. 102). That this m e c h a n i s m of transposition b y w h i c h a part of the self takes the place of the p r i m a l object is a n "alteration of the e g o " is ac­ k n o w l e d g e d b y F r e u d , i n Group Psychology and the Analysis

of the

Ego, w h e n he says that the startling thing about this identification is that " i t r e m o u l d s the ego i n one of its important features—in its sexual c h a r a c t e r — u p o n the m o d e l of w h a t has hitherto been the object" (1921c, p p . 108-109). A n o t h e r part of L e o n a r d o ' s m i n d , heir, says F r e u d , to the erotic bliss, retains its relation to the (unconscious) object as such, as exemplified b y the " p l a y i n g instinct". F r e u d goes o n to say that this "normal"

untransposed

and

unaltered

part

of

the

mind

is

able to attain a remembrance of the blissful relation: L e o n a r d o recovers " h i s m e m o r y of his mother's h a p p y smile of sensual r a p ­ t u r e " (1910c, p. 134) a n d recreates it i n the M o n a L i s a a n d i n St. A n n e ' s smile. It is precisely this recovery, i n his mature age, of a l i n k w i t h the unconscious m e m o r y of the blissful relation that leads, according to F r e u d , to emotional g r o w t h a n d a r e a w a k e n i n g of L e o n a r d o ' s art. M a y I a d d here that F r e u d discloses a double m e a n i n g i n that earliest m e m o r y of mother's smile: "the promise of u n b o u n d e d tenderness a n d at the same time sinister m e n a c e " (p. 115); this is d u e to the passions of a forsaken mother r o b b i n g L e o n a r d o , b y precocious sexual stimulation, of a part of his masculinity; but the sinister menace m a y , i n m y v i e w , be taken as the counterpart to the fact that this is " t h e most defenceless p e r i o d of o u r l i v e s " (p.

137,

italics added). It w o u l d be unfair not to mention, a l o n g this line of thought, A l m a n s i ' s (1960) study of the breast-face equation a n d Peto's (1979) s t u d y of Michelangelo's infantile neurosis, p u t t i n g i n the f o l l o w i n g stark terms the life-long emotional d i l e m m a e m b o d ­ i e d i n the R o n d a n i n i Pieta: " w h e t h e r the maternal breast was life­ g i v i n g a n d u n i o n w i t h it represented eternal bliss, or whether fusion w i t h it meant annihilation for the s o n " (p. 197). If the sinister side of the l i n k w i t h the mother's smile (and breast) is not kept i n m i n d , this m y t h of origins can, as Etchegoyen (1985) warns, be­ come h i g h l y idealized.

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THE LOGICS O F THE M I N D

The "psychoanalytic and as remembrance

Leonardo

novel" insight

(1910c) is not considered a " c l i n i c a l case", o n a par w i t h

the Schreber study; as F r e u d ' s intent w a s to write a psychoanalytic n o v e l , it passes as a study i n biography: Strachey (1957) a n d Grunberger

(1979) assign it just historical interest; L a p l a n c h e

a n d Pontalis (1967) ignore it, as d o Schafer (1968), M e i s s n e r (1970), a n d G r i n b e r g (1976). F o r Balint (1968, p. 47) o n the contrary, the 1910 footnote to

Three Essays

is the strongest argument, c o n f i r m e d

b y analyses of homosexuals, for the secondary nature of narcissistic object-choice

a n d , recognizing

Leonardo

as clinical

thinking,

M e l t z e r (1978a) adds that " i n [this] first statement of narcissism 'narcissistic identification' plays a central r o l e " (p. 71), anticipating b y thirty-five years K l e i n ' s concept of projective identification as the m e c h a n i s m of narcissistic identification. T o M e l t z e r the paper is autobiographical w i t h regard to a split i n F r e u d between the investigator a n d the artist, b u t for m e this psychoanalytic n o v e l about a genius b y a genius is autobio­ graphical i n the w i d e r sense i n w h i c h every n o v e l is autobiographi­ cal—that is, as a displaced piece of F r e u d ' s self-analysis. Just as, according to F r e u d , L e o n a r d o depicted the remembrance of his s u c k i n g bliss i n the guise of the mother of G o d a n d her c h i l d , F r e u d masterfully depicts the remembrance of his forgotten past i n the guise of L e o n a r d o ' s mythic infancy. U n d e r s u c h guises, these insights d i d not m o d i f y F r e u d ' s m o d e l of the m i n d . T h e turn back to a one-person p s y c h o l o g y theory of "narcissistic object-choice" comes soon e n o u g h i n the Schreber case, where narcissism is a step of libido o n its w a y f r o m auto­ erotism to object-love: " h e begins b y taking himself, his o w n b o d y , as his love-object, a n d only subsequently proceeds from this to the choice of some person other than himself as his object" (1911c [1910], p p . 60-61). The "clinical" model in 1.

Leonardo

A m u t u a l instinctual situation of

m a y be delineated thus:

"highest erotic bliss ", i n v o l v i n g ,

o n the infant's part: a. s u c k i n g mother's n i p p l e as the first a n d foremost pleasure, w h i c h remains indelibly i m p r i n t e d ;

O N NARCISSISTIC I D E N T I F I C A T I O N

101

b. precocious sexual stimulation; 2. Rupture of the mutual blissful situation a m o u n t i n g to a prototype of early trauma a n d early grief, a n d leading to, 3.

A "splitting of the ego", i n v o l v i n g a. a " n o r m a l " part of the ego w i t h a direct (untransposed) link to the object, o n the oral a n d / o r the genital level; b. a n "alteration of the e g o " , w i t h i.

repression-cwm-identification w i t h the " o p p o n e n t " car­ i n g object;

ii. splitting into a partenaire of the (orally a n d / o r genitally) defenceless needy self l i n k e d to the transposed self in-the­ place-of-the-object.

The oral stage: bliss, trauma, grief, and identification It m a y be objected that the clinical m o d e l o n the psychic d y n a m i c s i n Leonardo p r o p o s e d here is built u p o n traumatic o r a l / g e n i t a l loss, w h i l e the concept of a n oral stage was a d d e d to the Three Essays only i n 1915 (see Strachey, 1953, p. 198n). A s a matter of fact, b y this time i n F r e u d ' s w o r k there is no dearth of references to oral loss. A s early as 1905, F r e u d said that " a c h i l d s u c k i n g at his mother's breast has become the prototype of every relation of love. T h e f i n d i n g of a n object is i n fact a re-finding of i t " ; a n d , furthermore, i n t r o d u c i n g object loss as a n unavoidable step i n the p a t h to mental evolution: " i t is only later that the instinct loses that object, just at the time, perhaps, w h e n the c h i l d is able to f o r m a total idea o f the p e r s o n to w h o m the organ that is g i v i n g h i m satisfaction b e l o n g s " (1905d, p . 222). T h i s sentence of F r e u d ' s seems especially i m p o r ­ tant, a d u m b r a t i n g what m a n y years later M e l a n i e K l e i n called the depressive position. T h e central role of the organization of the unconscious object is taken u p again s o o n after Leonardo i n the " A Special T y p e of C h o i c e of Object M a d e b y M e n : Contributions to the P s y c h o l o g y of L o v e " as " t h e psychical constellation connected w i t h the mother"(1910h p . 169) from which the conditions for loving /

arise.

102

THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

It c a n be readily argued that i n describing m u t u a l erotic bliss, F r e u d is quite close to the " p r i m a l introjection" m o d e l of m i n d , hinted at one year earlier b y Ferenczi (1909), i n w h i c h there is n o distinction between a "self" a n d a n "object". H e n c e the overall erasing of difference i n his approach to the earliest stages: the m u t u a l i t y of the erotic bliss; the intensity of the instinctual i n v o l v e ­ ment; the ambiguities of activity and passivity ( " s u c k i n g — o r being suckled . . . " , p. 87), of normality and perversion, of oral a n d genital impulses, a n d of love a n d hate as evinced from the remembrance of mother's smile. C o m i n g n o w to the d i m e n s i o n of trauma i n loss depicted i n Leonardo, it must be noted that while i n one-person (meta-)psychol­ ogy trauma is defined i n economic terms, i n clinical theory it n o m i ­ nates, f r o m a n early moment i n psychoanalysis, " a n event i n the subject's personal history that can be dated a n d that has subjective importance o w i n g to the unpleasurable affects it c a n trigger off" (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1967, p . 466). A s early as 1893, F r e u d (with Breuer) exemplifies a n event traumatic i n its nature b y " t h e appar­ ently irreparable loss of a loved p e r s o n " (Freud, 1893a, p . 10, italics added). F r e u d ' s w o r d i n g i n Leonardo, that he "tears himself f r o m . . . the highest erotic bliss" (p. 129), is explicitly applied not o n l y to L e o n a r d o , but to everyone. H i s use of a " p r i m a l introjection" m o d e l for the bliss f r o m w h i c h the self is torn masterfully

encompasses

b o t h meanings of tearing: laceration, r i p p i n g apart, a n d the s h e d ­ d i n g of tears—that is, grief. T h e " d e f e n c e " elicited b y the t r a u m a — repression-and-identification w i t h m o t h e r — i m p e d e s

integration

of the experience, while grief, if allowed, ushers i n " t h e n o r m a l w e a r i n g away processes" (Freud, 1893a, p . 10). W e have come n o w to a fundamental p r o b l e m of p s y c h o a n a ­ lytic theory. F o r W i d l o c h e r , the most constant pillar of F r e u d i a n theory is " t h e establishment of a fundamental d u a l i s m f r o m the beginning, of the w i s h to identify w i t h the object a n d the w i s h to relate to i t — o f p r i m a r y identification a n d object relation" (1985, p. 39), but the fact is that Balint (1968) has f o u n d three different a n d coexistent "theories of o r i g i n s " i n Freud's w o r k : p r i m a r y object­ love, p r i m a r y auto-erotism, a n d p r i m a r y narcissism. F r e u d ' s point of departure i n Leonardo—a " u n i o n " i n v o l v i n g oral a n d genital impulses, lends, i n m y view, clinical substance to his saying, i n The

O N NARCISSISTIC I D E N T I F I C A T I O N

103

Ego and the Id (1923b), that " A t the v e r y b e g i n n i n g , i n the i n d i v i d u ­ al's p r i m i t i v e oral phase, object-cathexis a n d identification are n o d o u b t indistinguishable f r o m each other" (p. 29). O n l y after the t r a u m a of rupture of the blissful, t h o u g h also sinister, u n i o n , d o object-cathexis a n d identification become distinguishable, disclos­ i n g the essential d u a l i s m W i d l o c h e r points to.

On

the "integrative", the and the "emotional"

"enacted", self

G o i n g back to the m o d e l p r o p o s e d , w e saw that, according to F r e u d , a part of L e o n a r d o able to evolve t h r o u g h grief a n d differ­ entiation retains the ability to p l a y , a n d i n its direct ambivalent relation to the object is capable of remembrance, of a r e - f i n d i n g of a " p l a c e w i t h i n the o b j e c t " — L e o n a r d o t h r o u g h art, m y patient M r s F (of w h o m I speak further on) i n more u s u a l w a y s . A s h i n t e d b y F r e u d (1910c, 1912d), the p r i m a l object endures i n unconscious psychic reality as " t h e place where the self i s " for the part of the ego that has come to a n ambivalent relation w i t h the object— a d u m b r a t i n g the depressive position. It sounds too p s y c h o p a t h o ­ logical to call it the "depressive self", so I w i l l follow G a r m a (1974), w h o calls K l e i n ' s depressive position the "integrative p o s i t i o n " ,

"inte­ (to the unconscious) " i n t e r n a l "

a n d I w i l l call this ambivalent, primal-object-related self the

grative self".

T h i s "integrative self" is

to the p r i m a l object; o n l y this n o r m a l " u n a l t e r e d " part of the self— w h i c h is capable of b o t h love a n d hate (Bion, 1965)—retains a capacity for e v o l u t i o n t h r o u g h introjective identification. A n o t h e r part of the ego, " a l t e r e d " as a consequence of the trauma of l o s s — b y " t h e s h a d o w of the o b j e c t " — a n d enacting the defence against trauma "becomes the object"; this

transposed

or

enacted self is l i n k e d to " a c t i o n " i n the manner of a "beta s c r e e n " (Bion, 1962). A third part of the self, the (split-off) needy emotional self, w h i c h , i n m y o p i n i o n , is a n early e g o - i d , a n " e m o t i o n i n search of a c o n ­ tainer", is (unconsciously) felt, a n d reacted to, as actually exposed to trauma.

104

T H E LOGICS O F T H E M I N D

"Genital"

— a clinical

transposition vignette:

of loss-as-trauma

"£"



In order to convey the clinical use of the m o d e l of a transposi­ tion of self a n d object i n relation to trauma a n d grief, I w i l l present two vignettes o n actual losses while i n analysis. T h e first one shows enactment i n a d r e a m of a transposition of self a n d object, a n d of oral loss into genital excitement, as a " d e f e n c e " — i n F r e u d ' s (1893a) sense—against actual a n d early trauma, w h i c h is genitalized a n d then expelled as (faecalized) " m i l k " , reversing the roles i n loss. A n adolescent " E " , learnt that a n aunt he was close to was i l l : to

evade felt loss, he was certain she w o u l d die. W h e n she d i d die,

intense grief soon gave w a y to a confused state of m i n d that was

unbearable o n going to b e d — w h e n , as F r e u d (1905e, p.

224)



noted, darkness is equated to a separation from l o v e d ones. H e

r o a m e d the house i n his underpants, following a cousin w h o

h a d come to stay for some days; seemingly oblivious of his

erection, they chatted, a n d later on w h e n i n b e d he w o u l d mas­

turbate w h i l e fantasizing her excitement a n d fall asleep. T h i s

acting out came u p as an association to a dream.

roamed after his cousin, and he met her "in the laundry-room or in the dining-room"; excited at the sight of his erect penis, she took off her blouse and then her bra, and she had very big teats, which he tried to get hold of with one arm, getting hold of one nipple with the hand and "cupping" the other with his forearm—turning his dependent needs into a trick he is fond of in his amorous life. Then she very excitedly sucked his penis, a n d he w o k In the d r e a m — a s at night-time—he

u p w h i l e ejaculating. After some insight he shamefully, but i n contact w i t h sorrow, recalled that i n puberty o n visiting his aunt, he w o u l d feign backache, a n d she w o u l d massage his back, arousing h i m sexually. Imagining her excitement,

he

w o u l d then masturbate i n her b a t h r o o m w h i l e l o o k i n g at, or smelling, her panties, "that h a d been i n contact w i t h h e r " , i n intense projective identification into her (and mother's)

body

and genitals. These sexual states underlie E's present terrors of b e i n g b u r i e d

alive w i t h his aunt: against this most traumatic side of loss—the

O N NARCISSISTIC I D E N T I F I C A T I O N

1 05

sinister menace of the mother's smile—transposition of self a n d object is enacted. Possessiveness a n d rivalry towards the breast are evident i n the d r e a m , i n his c o m p a r i n g his beauty w i t h that of girls a n d — r e v e r s e d — i n a quasi-delusional idea of the " e x ­ citement" of his mother towards h i m ; this also allays his fears of her g r o w i n g o l d .

Grief

and

—second

the

object

clinical

space"

as "potential

vignette:

"Mrs

F"

W h i l e i n the first vignette transposition is enacted as a substi­ tute for grief, the second vignette attempts to show the split i n the ego i n consequence of massive loss, a n d then the e v o l u t i o n of the structure of transposition towards resolution i n the r e - f i n d i n g of a " b l i s s f u l " place within the object. " M r s F " came to analysis i n her mid-40s because of her depres­ sion. She felt a lack of enthusiasm to be i n her nature, but things h a d gone f r o m b a d to worse since her psychotic mother's final illness, two years earlier. She felt remorse at not h a v i n g g i v e n her mother e n o u g h care a n d at the relief o n her death. U n a b l e to stand changes, after a m o v e into t o w n it was taking her years to feel her h o m e a n d the city as hers. C a r e of her family was her task, a n d their w e l l - b e i n g was her p r i d e : a joyous breast-feeder, her best time h a d been w h i l e n u r t u r i n g her c h i l d r e n , b u t n o w that they were g r o w n , she resented the independence she h a d e n d e a v o u r e d to support. She h a d n o mental space for herself; she came to analysis as a d u t y to her family, w i t h no expecta­ tions of her o w n . L a c k of a mental space h a d ample back­ g r o u n d : her mother h a d been too disturbed to take care of her d u r i n g her first m o n t h of life; she was not w a n t e d , a n d was often told so. H e r task as a " b u r d e n " h a d been to take emotional care of an o r p h a n mother w h o s e l d o m f o u n d relief. T h e p o i g n a n c y of a long-standing fantasy i n w h i c h M r s F felt she w o u l d not be there to accompany her c h i l d r e n w h e n , i n their o l d age, they w o u l d come to their last moments illustrates v i v i d l y the transposition into her c h i l d r e n of her o w n split-off

106

THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

d a m a g e d o r p h a n self. M a n y instances, i n a n d out of the session, elicited the pervasiveness of her unconscious needs. In sessions she expected f r o m me a silent, unobtrusive attention, a n d she was careful not to i m p i n g e o n me w i t h emotional states felt as omnipotently burdensome a n d therefore destructive of—to use Winnicott's (1971) t e r m — h e r fragile "potential space" i n me. T h e n tragedy struck, a n d M r s F lost G , the daughter to w h o m she was closest, a n d the happiest. D u r i n g the first confused days she was mostly i m m e r s e d i n an acute melancholic e p i ­ sode. In w h a t appeared to be the beginnings of a break w i t h reality, she b l a m e d herself strongly for not b e i n g able to foresee w h a t h a d been utterly impossible to foresee, a n d then for not b e i n g at G's side, a n d she felt her daughter's death as s o m e h o w d e r i v e d f r o m her a n d her husband's failure as parents. G ' s death was felt, nearly delusionally, as the enactment of a n o l d curse of her mother that, as b y m a r r y i n g a n d h a v i n g c h i l d r e n she h a d a b a n d o n e d her, so she w o u l d lose her children. Predict­ ably, this was the m a i n theme of her self-reproaches for a l o n g time. But, b e y o n d this identification w i t h the " s h a d o w " of the (internal) p r i m a l object, it is to the further splitting of the ego u n d e r the impact of acute loss that I must t u r n n o w . W h e n told of G's unexpected death, i n the m i d s t of her despera­ tion, M r s F h a d the s u d d e n thought that F was n o w b e y o n d suffering, a n d this was her only relief i n the first days; this " m a n i c defence" (Klein, 1935, 1940) d e r i v e d f r o m equating her lost daughter w i t h her o w n extremely d a m a g e d unconscious self, n o w projectively sent into a space b e y o n d suffering. H e r relief, years earlier, that her o w n mother was finally b e y o n d suffering h a d h a d the same basis. This " s p l i t t i n g off"

of the

most d a m a g e d aspects of the unconscious self seems to be an essential " d e f e n c e " to ensure s u r v i v a l of the ego. So w e have here the d y n a m i c s F r e u d evinces i n the infancy of L e o n a r d o : identification w i t h the " s h a d o w " of the (internal) maternal ob­ ject a n d the splitting off of the o r p h a n self. Thereafter, M r s F's grief w o r k has i n v o l v e d , firstly, a

ment in the analytic link

reinstate­

of her infant self " w i t h i n " the internal

mother enacted b y the analyst. O n l y i n a s m u c h as this was i n

O N NARCISSISTIC I D E N T I F I C A T I O N

107

some measure accomplished was a stable e n o u g h distinction d r a w n i n her inner w o r l d between her daughter as a lost real p e r s o n a n d her o w n suffering, d a m a g e d unconscious self. A n d o n l y after the attainment of this essential distinction d i d her r e n o u n c i n g of her lost daughter as an object i n the external w o r l d a n d reinstating her i n her inner w o r l d become attainable. C o n c o m i t a n t l y w i t h the beginnings of the reestablishment of her infant self i n the session " w i t h i n " the analyst enacting the internal mother, M r s F's confusion began to clear, a n d signifi­ cant relief took the place of her self-demands of omnipotent life­ rescuing care. G r a d u a l l y , omnipotent guilt shifted o n to others: her daughter's fiance, w h o , i n the role of the d e v i l , h a d p l a y e d some part, a n d her o w n h u s b a n d , a n d she came to be h e l p e d b y the c o m p a n y of her friends a n d G ' s friends, w h o rallied r o u n d . A s weeks a n d months went by, M r s F's grief w o r k t u r n e d more a n d more to a reinstating of an early p l a y f u l relation to the internal mother, subtly actualized i n the transference. V i s i t i n g G ' s grave became less imperative, a n d she began to f i n d a space of her o w n i n the g a r d e n where she p i c k e d the flowers for the tomb, h e l p e d along b y the remembrance of G ' s comments to her that she s h o u l d enjoy herself more. A n incident a year after G ' s death shows the equation of " g r o w t h s " i n the g a r d e n to her d e a d daughter a n d her o w n defenceless self, w h i l e the g a r d e n stands for the p r i m a l mother as the context inhabited b y the self. H e r h u s b a n d h a d ordered that a hedge be severely p r u n e d , a n d o n f i n d i n g it " m u t i l a t e d " , she sobbed for hours before p u l l ­ i n g herself together. W h i l e the h u s b a n d incarnated her o w n m u t i l a t i n g envious part, she was at this point unable to " c o n ­ t a i n " this fact, w h o s e interpretation w o u l d have been felt at a psychotic level as a d e m o n i z a t i o n by, a n d of, the analyst. In a few brief dreams M r s F saw her daughter come back; w h i l e distraught that it was o n l y a d r e a m , she felt comforted b y G ' s " p r e s e n c e " . A s grief w o r k e v o l v e d , after some eighteen months she came to a M o n d a y session w i t h a n u n u s u a l l y peaceful look; after a silence to get " i n t o " the session, she said that she h a d h a d

with G coming from school in her uniform, and they had a long chat, as was usual many years before. a good weekend and a long dream

108

T H E LOGICS OF THE MIND

She did not recall what they had talked about, but it was a close, pleasurable talk... she was aware that G had died, but it was a pleasant dream. She was surprised, o n w a k i n g , at her a c k n o w l ­ edgement of G ' s death. A s k i n g herself w h y she dreamt of G at weekends, she said it

was because she h a d enjoyed w o r k i n g i n the garden. I told her

that it seemed to m e that the contented, p l a y f u l climate of the

d r e a m was a remembrance of joyful times w i t h G but also of

better moments of herself as a small girl w i t h her o w n m o t h e r —

better times she was unable to remember—because

somehow



she h a d achieved a capacity for joy. She d i d not agree w i t h this

" c o n s t r u c t i o n " , but neither d i d she reject it outright, as she

customarily d i d any reference to support f r o m , or affect

to­

w a r d s , her mother or her analyst-as-breast.

Care

of

G - i n - h e r - g r a v e — a n d , later o n , of her

memory-as­

presence—gave w a y to an attention to the presence of her v i t a l ­

ity, joy, a n d emotional closeness. M r s F quietly rejoiced w h e n

a sibling grew into these roles, instigating outings w h e n , its

"strangeness"

mitigated, the city became more of a receptive

place. A s the splitting of her " e m o t i o n a l self" d i m i n i s h e d , ses­

sions came to be felt, to some extent, as b e i n g there for her

profit.

Narcissistic

identification

from

1910 to

1926

In terms of the " p r i m a r y n a r c i s s i s m " theory of origins (1911c [1910], 1914c) F r e u d comes back, i n " M o u r n i n g a n d M e l a n c h o l i a " , to narcissistic identification, i n the f o l l o w i n g famous w o r d s : But the free libido was not displaced on to another object: it

was withdrawn into the ego. There, however, it was not em­

ployed in any unspecified way, but served to establish an iden­

tification

of the ego with the abandoned

object.

Thus

the

shadow of the object fell u p o n the ego, and the latter could

henceforth be judged by a special agency, as though it were an

object, the forsaken object. In this way an object-loss was trans­



109

O N NARCISSISTIC IDENTIFICATION

formed into an ego-loss and the conflict between the ego and the loved person into a cleavage between the critical agency of the ego and the ego as altered by identification. [1917e, p. 249] T h e preconditions for this fixation to the l o v e d object a n d a n object­ cathexis w i t h little p o w e r of resistance i m p l y that the object-choice has been effected on a narcissistic basis, so that the object-cathexis, when obstacles come i n its way, can regress to narcissism. The narcissistic identification with the object then becomes a substitute for the erotic cathexis, the result of which is that in spite of the conflict with the loved person the love relation need not be given up . . . identification is a preliminary stage of object-choice.. . . But F r e u d acknowledges that The conclusion which our theory w o u l d require—namely, that the disposition to fall ill of melancholia . . . lies i n the predomi­ nance of the narcissistic type of object-choice—has

unfortu­

nately not yet been confirmed by o b s e r v a t i o n . . . . [p. 250] Object-choice is defined as " a n attachment of l i b i d o to a particular p e r s o n " (p. 249),

that is, i n terms of an external object, not a n

unconscious internal object, as was the case w i t h " t h e p s y c h i c a l constellation connected w i t h the m o t h e r " (1910h). A n d i n terms of the link to the external

object, F r e u d says that

the difference . . , between narcissistic and hysterical identifica­ tion may be seen in this: that, whereas i n the former the object­ cathexis is abandoned, in the latter it persists and manifests its influence, though this is usually confined to certain isolated actions and innervations. [1910h, p. 250] Group

Further differences w i t h his ideas of 1910 come u p i n Psychology

and the Analysis

of the Ego (1921c), i n his fuller statement

o n " t h e so-called identifications,

insufficiently k n o w n processes a n d

h a r d to describe" (p. 104). In the first " C o n t r i b u t i o n to the p s y c h o l ­ ogy of l o v e " (1910h), i n a sequitur

to his thoughts o n Leonardo,

Freud

subsumes identification to the father into the link to mother, tracing it, i n the reawakening i n puberty of memory-traces of wishes a n d impulses of infancy, to the boy's w i s h to give m o t h e r — i n gratitude a n d rivalry, a n d , let me a d d , Narcissus-like—a son who is like self: " a l l his instincts, those of tenderness, gratitude,

him­

lustfulness,

110

T H E LOGICS OF T H E M I N D

defiance a n d independence find satisfaction i n the single w i s h to be his own father" (1910h, p . 173). O n the other h a n d , i n Group Psychology (1921c), F r e u d antedates the masculine identification w i t h father to the sexual cathexis to­ w a r d s the mother (p. 105), postponing the homosexual's (and Leonardo's) putting himself into mother's place to "after the e n d of puberty, w h e n the time comes for exchanging his mother for some other sexual object" (p. 108). This identification remoulds the ego o n a n ample s c a l e — i n its sexual c h a r a c t e r — u p o n the m o d e l of the object r e n o u n c e d ; rather astoundingly, F r e u d adds that whether the renunciation is complete " o r i n the sense of being preserved o n l y i n the unconscious is a question outside the present discus­ s i o n " (p. 109). W h i l e i n Leonardo infancy was " t h e most defenceless p e r i o d i n our l i f e " (1910c, p. 137), here he traces the " c r u e l p i e c e " — the piece that i n melancholia, i n " t h e ego d i v i d e d , fallen apart into t w o pieces" (1921, p. 109), rages against the piece altered b y intro­ jection of the lost object—to "the 'ego i d e a l ' . . . heir to the original

narcissism in which the childish ego enjoyed self-sufficiency"

(p. 110,

italics added). T h i s line of thought of a n original narcissism continues i n The Ego and the Id, putting the origin of the ego ideal i n " a n i n d i v i d u a l ' s first a n d most important identification, his identification w i t h the father i n his o w n personal p r e h i s t o r y . . . a direct a n d immediate identification a n d [it] takes place earlier than any object-cathexis" (1923b, p. 31). But then F r e u d turns again to the object-cathexis: A t a very early age this little boy develops an object-cathexis for his mother, which originally related to the mother's breast and is the prototype of an object-choice on the anaclitic model; the boy deals with his father by identifying himself with him. For a time these two relationships proceed side b y side, until the boy's sexual wishes in regard to his mother become more intense and his father is perceived as an obstacle to them; from this the Oedipus complex originates. [1923b, p p . 31-32] O n l y i n 1926, o n taking as the c o m m o n quality of the threat of a traumatic situation, to w h i c h the ego responds w i t h " a n x i e t y as s i g n a l " , " t h e separation from, or loss of, a l o v e d object, or a loss of his l o v e " (Strachey, 1959, p. 81), does F r e u d return to the trauma of separation (1905d, 1910c, 1910h, 1912d) where the p r i m a l mother

O N NARCISSISTIC I D E N T I F I C A T I O N

111

as internal object is adumbrated. A n d here, c o n t i n u i n g u p o n his ideas of 1910 o n the genital impulses i n the " b l i s s f u l u n i o n " , castra­ tion anxiety is taken u p , not at the phallic level but, q u o t i n g Ferenczi (1924), as a threat of separation i n the b o n d to mother: The high degree of narcissistic value which the penis possesses can appeal to the fact that that organ is a guarantee to its owner that he can be once more united to his mother—that is, to a substitute for h e r — i n the act of copulation. Being deprived of it amounts to a renewed separation from her . . . [Freud, 1926d, p. 139] "Narcissistic v a l u e " is here acknowledged as p r i m a l object-rela­ tional. F r e u d ' s comings a n d goings i n what he calls the intricate p r o b ­ l e m of identification result not only f r o m " t h e triangular character of the O e d i p u s complex a n d the constitutional bisexuality of each i n d i v i d u a l " (1923b, p. 31) b u t f r o m his uncertainties of the distinc­ tion between the external a n d the internal object, a n d f r o m the fact, taking his v i e w s i n " O n N a r c i s s i s m " o n anaclitic a n d narcissistic object choice, that " a h u m a n b e i n g has originally t w o objects: h i m ­ self a n d the w o m a n w h o nurses h i m " (1914c, p . 88), establishing a bipolar structure of object-relation. L a c a n (1951) uses this sentence as a foundation for a narcissistic theory of the ego, w h i l e m y e m p h a ­ sis, f o l l o w i n g Ferenczi (1909, 1924), is u p o n the p r i m a l object-rela­ tional side of this bipolar structure. N o w , if w e agree w i t h N o y ' s (1977) v i e w of psychoanalysis as a m u l t i m o d e l system where each m o d e l attempts to cover a n aspect of a complex subject, w e can see these comings a n d goings as a n attempt to e m p l o y t w o different vertices i n complementary w a y s . W h i l e it m a y be, as N o y says, that F r e u d kept o n seeking a u n i f y i n g m o d e l , his respect for clinical facts l e d h i m to m u l t i p l e models i n search of a conceptual " b i n o c u l a r v i s i o n " (Bion, 1961). F r o m the "himself-as-object"

pole, F r e u d thinks i n terms of one­

p e r s o n psychology, " p r i m a r y autoerotism", " p r i m a r y n a r c i s s i s m " , a n d "narcissistic object-choice", this being the part of p s y c h o a n a l ­ ysis m a i n l y seen as " t h e o r e t i c a l " . F r o m the vertex of the object­ relation to " t h e w o m a n w h o nurses h i m " , he relies o n bi-personal theories of separation-as-trauma. The theory of instincts is written m a i n l y as a one-person psychology. Identification highlights the

112

T H E LOGICS OF T H E M I N D

dilemma:

narcissistic identification, introduced as bi-personal

trauma, was soon i n c l u d e d i n a theory of p r i m a r y narcissism.

On narcissistic and identification

in

identification melancholia

It is possible, i n m y v i e w , to say that already i n 1910 " t h e s h a d o w of the object falls u p o n the e g o " a n d a n "alteration of the e g o " results, because

i n repression-and-identification the role of the

mother is enacted a n d "her" feelings are felt, while the " b a b y ' s " p r i m i t i v e dependent a n d lustful emotions lose their place i n the self a n d r e m a i n , split off, i n what unconsciously is felt as actual trauma; so F r e u d ' s assertion (1917e) that a n object loss is trans­ f o r m e d into a n ego-loss applies here. A n d it is i n quite similar w o r d s to those u n v e i l i n g repression-cwra-identification i n

Leonardo

that F r e u d returns (1923b) to narcissistic identification a n d the alteration of the ego: " W h e n it happens that a person has to give u p a sexual object, there quite often ensues a n alteration of his ego w h i c h can only be described as a setting u p of the object inside the ego, as it occurs i n m e l a n c h o l i a " (p. 29). F r e u d ' s d i c t u m o n " t h e shadow of the object" seems to m e not metaphorical, as W i d l o c h e r

(1985) says, b u t descriptive. W h a t

"falls u p o n the e g o " is the negative of the object, the s h a d o w as the relational

quality

to the non-present, non-satisfying, over-exciting,

or fear-engendering object falling u p o n the ego as a n " a l t e r a t i o n " . A n d so w e come u p o n a crucial difference between the "narcissistic identification" of 1910 and what F r e u d takes u p u n d e r this term i n " M o u r n i n g a n d M e l a n c h o l i a " (1917e). In melancholia, the s h a d o w of the object falls u p o n the e g o — that is, the ego establishes a n (internal) object relation to the " n e g a ­ tive of the (primal unconscious) object": i n the beautiful w o r d s of G e r a r d de N e r v a l , to the soleil noir de la melancholic

In "narcissistic

identification" of 1910, a further splitting of the traumatized e g o - i d allows a degree of " d e f e n c e " , i n Freud's (1893a) sense. So, i n what Ferenczi (1932) calls "identification w i t h the stronger

opponent",

a n d A n n a F r e u d (1936) "identification w i t h the aggressor", a part of the " s h a d o w y "

ego "becomes the object" a n d spuriously

"ac­

O N NARCISSISTIC I D E N T I F I C A T I O N

1 13

q u i r e s " — a s w i t h m y adolescent patient i n the d r e a m — t h e light of the object. What follows

upon

the Narcissus

myth

i n F r e u d ' s 1910 clinical

description is not the m o d e of identification w i t h the object but the restitutive

erotized link to the split-off

traumatized

ego-id. So " n a r c i s ­

s i s m " is here not only secondary, as Balint (1968) says: it is i n the m o d e of a restitution i n the sense F r e u d introduces i n the Schreber paper. T h i s restitutive

narcissism

s h o u l d , i n m y v i e w , be conceptu­

ally distinguished f r o m the rivalrous

narcissism

towards b o t h father

a n d mother i n the O e d i p u s complex (Freud, 1910h, p p . 171-173). It is b e y o n d m y purpose here to enter fully into the relations of the

"enacted"

self

in-the-place-of-the-object

w i t h the split-off

" e m o t i o n a l " self; a type of these, where the link i s — p h e n o m e n o ­ l o g i c a l l y — o f rescue, is dealt w i t h as self-less altruism i n Chapters 4, 7, a n d 8. Sexualization as i n the d r e a m of m y adolescent patient is similar to the mechanisms that become structured i n clinical perversion. If this line of thought is correct, it is not the lost external object that is set up in the ego in melancholia, (primal

unconscious)

seen, Janus-like,

Object",

but the relational

its "shadow".

from the complementary

"negative

of the

The "shadow" should

be

vertices of loss and envy. [This

last vertex, e n v y , w a s the central point of Etchegoyen's

(1985)

H a m b u r g paper.] A t this point, the p r i m a l object does not exist as s u c h i n psychic reality, o n l y the "soleil noir"; it is not to the object that the " r a g i n g " — a n d e n v i o u s — c r i t i c i s m is addressed, b u t to its negative: its " s h a d o w " , set u p i n the ego. A s L e o n a r d o d a V i n c i r e m i n d s us i n the Trattato

delta Pittura,

s h a d o w is of the nature of

darkness. If so, the term "narcissistic identification" i n " M o u r n i n g a n d M e l a n c h o l i a " is not fortunate; melancholic identification is, i n d e e d , a " s h a d o w " stage of narcissistic identification, b u t what p r o p e r l y characterizes this last concept is the second, " m a n i c " stage, i n w h i c h splitting off—be it into partenaires,

or into a " p s y c h i c n o ­

w h e r e " — o f t r a u m a allows the " a l t e r e d " ego to assume the r a d i ­ ance of the object.

CHAPTER

SEVEN

Trauma, identification, evolution

I

n a n o v e l l a some of y o u m a y recall, Siddhartha,

H e r m a n n Hesse

depicts a d i l e m m a often faced i n our analytic development.

Siddhartha a n d his friend G o v i n d a hear the w o r d s of G a u t a m a ,

the itinerant B u d d h a . H i s alter ego, G o v i n d a , follows the B u d d h a ,

listening to his teachings. Siddhartha chooses to stay, b e l i e v i n g that it is does not suffice to listen to the teaching—one m u s t follow i n the footsteps. T h e d i l e m m a between the teachings a n d re-treading the r o a d comes u p w h e n w e think t h r o u g h our psychoanalytic task. T o take a n example, c a n F r e u d ' s or K l e i n ' s thinking o n identification be taken as established concepts, or s h o u l d w e not see ourselves as confronting the same problems or needing to follow similar paths? T h e life-force of psychoanalysis is here at stake: w e m u s t be u p to the evolutions

(Bion, 1965) that discussing psychoanalysis a n d our

clinical tasks require. H o w c a n w e p u t together identification, the establishment of the similar, a n d evolution, the emergence of the different i n patient a n d analyst? It is i n our contacts w i t h patients,

Published i n Psicoandlisis, 8 (1986): 431-451. 115

116

THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

as i n Siddhartha's w i t h the river, that the paths can be a d u m b r a t e d , so I w i l l keep m a i n l y to a clinical approach.

From the pre-catastrophic configuration to the evolved post-catastrophic one C h a p t e r 2, i n speaking of the unconscious experience of the " b a s e " , suggested the existence of three moments of transference a n d p s y ­ chic structure i n some analytic processes, i n v o l v i n g t w o diverse configurations a n d the passing from one to the other. T h e first configuration, of w h i c h the unconscious

delusion

of goodness is a c o m m o n but not unique form, can be u n d e r s t o o d i n several different ways. F r o m the standpoint of classical p s y c h o ­ analytic psychopathology, it can be seen as a narcissistic character disorder; f r o m a K l e i n i a n one, as a projective identification into a n internal object; i n terms of Meltzer (1967), it can be u n d e r s t o o d as a geographical confusion. Earlier o n , I studied it as a clinical f o r m of unconscious megalomania ( M o n e y - K y r l e , 1965) resulting f r o m a double projective identification. F r o m a transformational standpoint (Bion, 1965) it can be envisaged as a pre-catastrophic configuration operating i n the d o m a i n of hallucinosis. P l a c i n g the unconscious delusion of goodness i n this frame forces us to r e ­ examine a n d re-enounce the fourth rule for transformation i n hallucinosis (p. 133) because i n this case of transposition giving is

"top" in relation to receiving. T h e clinical issues i n v o l v e d were approached b y A b r a h a m (1919) i n terms of "narcissistic character resistance", w h i l e i n her paper o n the negative therapeutic reaction Riviere (1936) took it to be a m a n i c defence i n w h i c h the link to the analyst turned into a "false transference"; Resnik's (1977) term, " c l o s e d transference", is perhaps even more apt. M y o w n papers dealt w i t h this issue as a transposition offunctions of self and object: it must be a d d e d here that i n a p a p e r written i n H u n g a r i a n i n 1927, Imre H e r m a n n u s e d these terms w i t h a different m e a n i n g (see H e r m a n n , 1980, p . 4). In the unconscious d e l u s i o n of goodness the patient w i l l act the function of the ideal object, a megalomanically coopted ideal-breast object (or the ideal-penis object), to the point that he becomes the " b a s e " for

T R A U M A , IDENTIFICATION, EVOLUTION

117

others a n d w i l l often feel " f r o m " these others. T h u s transference becomes false or closed, a n d the analysand's m a i n goal is to p r o ­ mote this narcissistic configuration, the failures of w h i c h have b r o u g h t h i m to analysis. A s befits the realm of hallucinosis, the analyst's

interpretations, m a i n l y

transference

ones,

are

often

e n o u g h felt as action that indicates the analyst's m e g a l o m a n i a , his possessiveness, or his professional s k e w i n g — t h e analyst's bent for transforming at the level of hallucinosis. O n l y f r o m the time w h e n the analysand accedes to a contact w i t h the non-existence of the " b a s e " , w h i c h i n actual practice e n ­ tails a series of crucial moments of change i n the system, does the analyst come to be felt i n transference as a " b a s e " i n the analytic p r o c e s s — a " b a s e " experienced as real. This allows the transference l i n k to start functioning i n terms of the container-contained rela­ tionship, as a symbiotic link i n Bion's (1965) sense—that is, as a l i n k that is likely to be permeated b y alternating feelings of benevolence a n d hostility. T h i s set of facts corresponds to the second configura­ tion m e n t i o n e d : the evolved post-catastrophic one.

The charred crab: "Mrs A" T h e first of two vignettes, f r o m the fourth year of analysis of patient A (Chapters 2 a n d 4), w i l l be presented n o w . In the interval between the two vignettes, a few weeks before h o l i d a y - t i m e , the patient s u d d e n l y d r o p p e d briefly out of treat­ ment, leaving m y fees w i t h the d o o r m a n w i t h n o explanation. D a y s later she p h o n e d to tell m e that "I just c o u l d n ' t d o other­ w i s e " . T h e d r e a m at the core of this first vignette was part of a series of dreams p o i n t i n g to d e a d objects a n d charred spaces.

In the d r e a m she was in her garden, and a huge crab was there. The crab and her plants were charred. They kept their form, but their substance was what left after something is burnt down. She was surrounded by bits of soap, with which she had been trying hard to clean the charred objects. She was unable to make associations to the d r e a m , but then she went o n to speak of an event the previous e v e n i n g — a " s p i d e r ' s w e b " i n w h i c h she h a d felt caught u p . H e r m o t h e r - i n - l a w h a d

118

THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

called a n d h a d violently a n d to all purposes unjustly accused her of endangering the life of a relative, w h o was exposed to s u d d e n death, w i t h u n d u e requests for time a n d attention. W h i l e it was clear to her that this relative h a d actively sought her c o m p a n y o n his o w n , m y analysand froze a n d d i d not r e s p o n d to the accusations. She put the event to one side; only i n the session, after narrating the d r e a m , d i d it take o n some k i n d of mental reality that allowed it to be thought through. T w o perspectives seem arguable o n this material: 1.

If w e think, as happens i n M e l a n i e Klein's theoretical thought, i n terms of a d'emblee distinction of self a n d object a n d , m o r e ­ over, if w e take u p the observer's " o u t s i d e " standpoint i n our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the series crab —> spider's web —> w r a p p i n g , p a r a l y s i n g mother-in-law, then w e m a y think of the crab i n the d r e a m as evidence for the projective arousal of a n intensely persecutory object. In such an outlook, persecution precedes a n d causes damage.

2.

C o n v e r s e l y , instead of thinking of the d r e a m i n terms of a persecutory object separate f r o m a n d m e n a c i n g to the self, w e m a y assume that the violence, essential to the situation, falls u p o n the part or function of the self that tries to grasp or b i n d to the Object, forming a " p a i r " : harm to the establishment of the "pair" m a y , from this perspective, be seen to precede the consti­ tution of a persecutory object.

O n l y i n the session, i n the context of bipersonal emotional contain­ ment, d i d she come to experience the reality of the blame, of h a v i n g felt accused. T h i s h a p p e n e d despite the fact that to an external observer the external persecutory object is obvious e n o u g h , so that u p to the m o m e n t w h e n setting apart of self a n d object comes to take place i n this area of experience, need w o u l d seem to have functioned i n psychic reality as a n e e d - c r a b - c a n c e r ushering i n a traumatic situation i n w h i c h need, h a r m , a n d persecution cannot be distinguished. T h e needy self " i n " the analysand a n d

the

persecutory object threatening it are not adequately set apart, w h i c h happens only later o n , i n the frame of bipersonal emotional contact w i t h the analyst i n the session.

T R A U M A , IDENTIFICATION, E V O L U T I O N

119

This d r e a m of the charred crab can thus be thought of as de­ scriptive of a crucial internal-external enactment, where

needy

aspects are charred b y contact w i t h the object's coldness. S u c h enactment, i n the m a n n e r of an internal hallucination, appears as the m a x i m a l l y parasitic point of the operation of the

self-object

" p a i r " . It is also a reaction w i t h i n the " p a i r " to the analyst's felt coldness, i n a s m u c h as she was unable to fit her h o l i d a y time to the u s u a l analytic holidays. T h i s d r e a m m a y predict the acting out b r o u g h t u p b y the discrepancy i n our holidays, whereby d e p e n d ­ ency-clinging is " s i m p l y " ejected a n d charred " i n t o " the analyst, w h o w i l l soon e n o u g h come to be dealt w i t h , i n actual reality, as the crab of the d r e a m .

The

headless

second

pigeon:

clinical

vignette



T h i s clinical material pertains to a more e v o l v e d m o m e n t i n the analysis, w h e n needy infantile aspects came, to some degree, to be better delimited a n d tolerated. I shall be presenting a d r e a m a n d then describe h o w the traumatic situation a n d M r s A ' s basic enact­ ment was repeated t o w a r d the e n d of session. PATIENT

A : O n T u e s d a y I h a d terrible d r e a m . . . terrible, terri­

ble. . . . I was on the patio, looking at a beautiful, really beautiful small pigeon ... it was on a red mosaic, which made it even more beautiful... a very small pigeon, perhaps you have seen one . . . at that moment Bolt (one of her dogs) came up, on two legs, it was Bolt but immense, immense . . . I then ask her what she means b y immense. PATIENT A :

I d o not k n o w — i m m e n s e . . .

if y o u want,

im­

mensely t e r r i b l e . . . . I tried to speak to him, to tell him what I

had to say but very feebly, without any firmness . . . and this part of the dream ended with Bolt having the small pigeon in his mouth . ., the most noticeable thing was horror and impotence. .. . Then—I do not know well how—/ was in the garden, in a very green section where my two favourite trees are, trees I planted myself. . . it was all deeply green. . . . I had a terrible sensation at

120

THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

the nape of my neck, I knew it was the small pigeon; I wanted to tell Mary to take it off, but at first no sound would come out. .. . Mary listened but did not say anything, at last she took it out. . . it was the pigeon, headless, with open wings and a black edge all around .. . in the first part of the dream the small pigeon had the softness of rounded curves, but that was edge ...

lost with the black

it was a small pigeon but it was terrible, what was terrible

was the fact that it had no head. I do not k n o w what it has to do w i t h the d r e a m . . . [pause] the small p i g e o n must have to d o w i t h last night's dinner, o n the restaurant's m e n u there was a chef's suggestion of " p i g e o n s a la I don't k n o w w h a t " w h i c h d i s m a y e d a n d a n ­ gered m e . . . M r s A says that i n the fields she enjoys l o o k i n g at birds f l y i n g

free, but she has never been able, as far as her memories go, to

bear contact w i t h birds. H e r sons sometimes have b i r d s , a n d

Bolt has killed some of these, w h i c h horrifies her. She is totally

unable to p i c k u p those d e a d b i r d s — M a r y does that.

T h e n I m e n t i o n that what is terrible i n the dreams m a y have to

d o w i t h her feelings about h a r m that she cannot bear . . . s u c h as

seeing d e a d birds so terribly damaged that M a r y has to take

over for her; that the birds, a n d the small p i g e o n i n the d r e a m ,

stand for parts of hers that cannot be defended as f i r m l y as it

w o u l d be necessary—something that often happens to her, b o t h

out of a n d i n the session. This m a y be represented b y the d o u b l e

reference to h a r m i n the head, the pigeon's a n d hers, felt as

exposed to attacks f r o m the outside a n d f r o m me, m a i n l y faults

i n m y understanding. A l s o , it w o u l d seem that M a r y i n the

d r e a m stands for m e as her*analyst.

PATIENT A :

A n immense p e r i o d of time passed before M a r y u n ­

derstood. A t first m y w o r d s w o u l d n ' t come out, then I m a n ­ aged to speak but an immensity of time went b y until she listened a n d took the p i g e o n off m y neck . . . this was most noticeable, the contrast between m y urgency a n d M a r y ' s tak­ i n g her time, she was there but she was into her o w n things. T o w h i c h I say that this seems to be something she v e r y m u c h

feels here of her urgency a n d m y being into m y o w n things. . . .

T R A U M A , IDENTIFICATION, E V O L U T I O N

121

W h i l e m a n y aspects of the material must be left aside, I w i l l m e n ­ tion t w o associations. Firstly, that the headless p i g e o n r e m i n d e d her of falcons as they appear i n m e d i e v a l shields. Really, M r s A said, at this time of the d r e a m it w a s n o longer a p i g e o n b u t a f a l c o n — a n d she m e n t i o n e d its great speed a n d predatory nature. T h e second association related to the terrible sensation i n the nape of her neck; her h u s b a n d ' s a r m was, at the time, u n d e r her neck. T h e d r e a m of the charred crab shows annihilation of alive­ n e s s — a dematerialization, i n Ferenczi's sense (1932), of the selfObject pair. T h e d r e a m of the small p i g e o n brings out a context where persecutory aspects are delineated, infantile aspects meet some tolerance, a n d there is some maintenance of the symbiotic functioning of the " p a i r " . It pertains to a transformational cycle u n d e r the aegis of identification w i t h the aggressor ( A . F r e u d , 1936) or, to use Ferenczi's (1932) w o r d i n g , identification w i t h the stronger, victorious opponent. W h i l e b o t h dreams share a transformational d i l e m m a , they succeed to different degrees. T h e crab d r e a m is m a r k e d b y the autotomy of calcination, w h i l e i n the pigeon's d r e a m failure i n the experience of receptivity of the object a n d the defence of the infan­ tile self leads to a n identification w i t h the victorious opponent. A s for the p i g e o n - f a l c o n transformation, the latter stands for m y ana­ lysand's h y p e r - l u c i d , imperious aspect, sharp a n d precise o n the attack, illustrating the transition f r o m autoplasty (autotomy) to alloplasty, w i t h respect to the traumatic situation, at the e n d of the session. It is likely that identification w i t h the aggressor is here a necessary step i n w o r k i n g the w a y out f r o m autotomy.

Immenseness and the emergence of an evolving

"pair"

I shall n o w take u p some of the dimensional elements of b o t h dreams, their context, a n d their associations, seeking a w i d e r u n ­ derstanding of the traumatic d i l e m m a : 1,

the enormous crab i n the first d r e a m ;

2.

the extreme quality of calcination (annihilation of aliveness);

122

THE LOGICS O FTHE M I N D

3.

the d o g , Bolt, immense,

a n d immensely

4.

the extreme speediness a n d predatoriness of both Bolt a n d the

terrible;

falcon; 5.

the extreme beauty of the small pigeon, standing for the n e e d y self a n d its link to the Object ( " . . . the softness of c u r v e d lines...").

A n o t h e r series of elements differs radically i n its dimensions: 6.

the futility of w a s h i n g what is charred;

7.

the precariousness of attempts to contain predation (". . . w i t h ­ out any firmness . . .");

8. 9.

the difficulties i n articulating w o r d s that can be listened to; the (immenseness of the) time span while waiting to be listened to.

Points 1 to 5 above illustrate h o w primitive felt as non-measurable

(immense),

emotional

processes

are

w h i c h F r e u d often mentioned a n d

w h i c h came to Bion's attention ("basic g r o u p " , "beta

element",

"transformations i n the d o m a i n of hallucinosis"). T h e enormous or immense is what is not susceptible to being measured. G o i n g further, it is what cannot be thought a n d cannot

be experienced

as

psychic. Points 6 a n d 7 illustrate precariousness evolved mind

in the attempts

of the

to contain primitive emotional processes, or, more

precisely, the precariousness of the e v o l v e d m i n d to the measure that it is not permeated b y the bipersonal symbiotic pair's e m o ­ tions. " I m m e n s i t y " appears also i n 9, this time as a verbal " m e a s ­ u r e " of the difficulty of passing from the n o n - e v o l v e d p r i m i t i v e mental stages to evolved stages. Points 8 a n d 9 illustrate, then, the d i l e m m a confronting the analyst both o n interpreting a n d as the­ person-emotionally-there, at the level of attaining, or failing to attain, bi-personal psychic containment of n o n - e v o l v e d emotional processes. These issues—the establishment

of an evolving

lytic link a n d the emergence of harm by way of

"pair" i n the ana­ distance-coldness—can

be illustrated b y the effect, i n the interval between b o t h dreams, of

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T R A U M A , IDENTIFICATION, E V O L U T I O N

the apparently immense (non-measurable)

discrepancy

between

analytic h o l i d a y s a n d her o w n h o l i d a y time. T h e violence of the e n s u i n g acting-out is a faithful measure of that discrepancy. A t ­ t e m p t i n g to m o v e , not just f r o m dreams to facts, b u t also f r o m facts to d r e a m (Bion, 1980, p . 115), the discrepancy between " h e r " a n d " m y " holidays raises the issue of " f i t t i n g " — o r not—the " r e a l i z a ­ t i o n " w i t h the preconception l i n k e d to p r i m i t i v e emotions, w h i c h w i l l or w i l l not allow containment to emerge. T h e attainment of a n e v o l v i n g " p a i r " i n the session

depends,

then, o n a v o i d i n g a re-editing of h a r m b y w a y of distance-coldness i n the h e r e - a n d - n o w , a reediting to w h i c h both analyst a n d analy­ s a n d contribute. T h i s can be s h o w n b y a n event near the e n d of the session of the d r e a m about the small pigeon, w h e n I, u n h a p p i l y , u s e d the term " m a t e r i a l " to refer to an aspect of her contribution. She immediately distanced herself and questioned the w h o l e rela­ tionship, c l a i m i n g that n o u n d e r s t a n d i n g w a s possible between us because " i t is material to y o u — t o m e they are real-life situations". M y " c o l d " use of the term " m a t e r i a l " — a n d , t h o u g h she does not m e n t i o n it, the e n d of the session—encapsulate the t r a u m a a n d its effect: h a r m to the link, damage to the felt capability of our heads to be able jointly to contain live e n o u g h situations. Intolerance to the analytic link w i l l result not o n l y f r o m the avoidable (such as m y use of the term " m a t e r i a l " ) or u n a v o i d a b l e coldness o n the part of the analyst (such as the e n d i n g of each session), b u t also f r o m the fact that the analyst has not l i v e d the d r e a m a n d w i l l not be able to live it. H e c a n only listen to the narrative a n d try to interpret it. A t this point of contact in

reality,

intolerance is m a x i m a l because, as happens w i t h contact w i t h her h u s b a n d ' s a r m i n the d r e a m , it reveals that the " r e a l i z a t i o n " is not the expectation, w h i c h brings u p what T u s t i n (1981) calls the crisis of two-ness.

Similarly, small children, o n w a k i n g f r o m a d r e a m

where mother appeared, d o not understand that mother herself was not i n the d r e a m a n d cannot k n o w about it unless she is t o l d — a n d also, that she is not responsible for the d r e a m or her actions or omissions i n it: the domains of d r e a m i n g a n d facts cannot yet be discerned. A t the level of primitive e m o t i o n s — w h i c h , w e can agree w i t h B i o n , last all life l o n g — i t w o u l d be p r o p e r to speak of p r i m a r y identity rather than p r i m a r y identification.

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THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

The relational

"pair"

and mental

evolution

T h o u g h it w o u l d seem obvious today that a conception of m a n cannot but take into account the fact of his being a primate, most psychoanalytic conceptual schemes do not fit D a r w i n i s m w e l l e n o u g h as overall paradigms. F r o m this outlook, what i n psychoanalysis we call

"object"

w o u l d , at its basic level, be an enacted relational pair that is partly capable of e v o l v i n g , whereas non-dimensionable levels of p r i m i ­ tive emotion establish an enacted preverbal mutuality i n v o l v i n g not thoughts as such but things-in-themselves. H e r e the l i n k — w h a t K l e i n i a n literature describes as object relation being a n e m o ­ tional l i n k — p r e c e d e s the notion of an object. G r e g o r y Bateson (1966) concisely describes s u c h transition to a relational perspective, stating that w h e n y o u r cat wants to be fed, his message s h o u l d be understood not as "I want m i l k " , but as be mother. Bateson's " m e s s a g e " is, at the level of primitive emotion, a p r o p o s a l for " p a i r i n g " . This gives rise to " r e a l i z a t i o n s " , o n the basis of w h i c h a relational psyche can evolve. Inasmuch as this occurs, the emerging pair sustains the aliveness (protodiacrisis) o n w h i c h later evolutions to separateness of thought d e p e n d . If not, it shifts to dematerialization, to enforced splitting, a n d to a reversal of functions—that is, t o w a r d negative or positive hallucination.

CHAPTER

EIGHT

O n the limitations and the infiniteness of analysis

The limitations of psychoanalysis and its applicability in the session in "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (Freud, 1937c) are examined in terms of one-person and two-person psychology conceptual frameworks. Freud's requirement of "dis­ tance" between past and present, as well as his emphasis on uncovering the influences of the past and on crisis as a limita­ tion, relate to his use of a one-person (meta)psychology with a biological bent. Selfless altruism, involving a transposition of self and object, illustrates the conceptual limitation of one-person psychology. The transposed configuration corresponds to the early conflict; prior to the establishment of preconscious memories, it appears through repetition as an actual conflict with the analyst. This early conflict is to be distinguished from childhood conflict that

Presented at the 35th international Psychoanalytical Congress, July 1987, Montreal, Canada. Published i n International Review of Psycho-Analysis, 16 (1989): 297-304.

125

THE LOGICS O F THE MIND

126

appears through the verbal associations and screen memories of the transference neurosis. Acknowledgement of the infiniteness of emotions is a component of the depressive position.

A

s a n y dictionary attests, "die endliche Analyse"

und die

unendliche

can be translated i n two ways. Riviere's transla­

tion, " A n a l y s i s terminable a n d interminable", a l t h o u g h

true to F r e u d ' s purpose, is more restrictive than the G e r m a n title; "analysis finite a n d infinite" appears less relevant to F r e u d ' s c o n ­ cerns, b u t it opens perspectives o n problems of evolution w i t h w h i c h every analyst grapples.

An

overview

of the limitations

of

analysis

In his Editor's Introduction to " A n a l y s i s Terminable a n d Intermi­ n a b l e " , Strachey (1964, p p . 211-212) points out that the limitations of psychoanalysis are constantly stressed. A s the obstacles F r e u d postulates are of a physiological a n d biological nature, they are i n the m a i n not susceptible to psychological influences; this is true a fortiori

of the death instinct, a n d so, according to Strachey, the

paper gives an impression of pessimism. F r e u d selects three factors as "decisive" for the success of our therapeutic efforts: the more favourable prognosis for cases of "traumatic" rather than " c o n ­ stitutional" origin, the importance of "quantitative" considera­ tions, and the question of an "alteration of the ego". [Strachey, 1964, p. 212] A n o t h e r limitation, that of crisis, can be singled out a n d a d d e d to Strachey's listing. T o quote F r e u d (1937c): the work of analysis proceeds best if the patient's pathogenic influences belong to the past, so that his ego can stand at a distance from them. In states of acute crisis analysis is to all intents and purposes unusable. The ego's whole interest is taken up by the painful reality and withholds itself from analy­ sis, which is attempting to go below the surface and uncover the influences of the past. [p. 232, italics added]

L I M I T A T I O N S A N D INFINITENESS O F A N A L Y S I S

127

In acute crisis, difficulties met i n analysis are, then, predicated o n the ego's inability to establish a n d maintain a n alliance w i t h the analyst; u p o n this inability, posited n o w i n terms of control, the " a l t e r a t i o n " of the ego is defined. T o quote F r e u d again: A s is well known, the analytic situation consists in our allying ourselves with the ego of the person under treatment, in order to subdue portions of his i d which are uncontrolled—that is to say to include them in the synthesis of his ego. The fact that a co-operation of this kind habitually fails in the case of psy­ chotics affords us a first solid footing for our judgement. The ego, if we are to be able to make such a pact with it, must be a normal one. But a normal ego of this sort is, like normality in general, an ideal f i c t i o n . . . . Every normal person, i n fact, is only normal o n the average. H i s ego approximates to that of the psychotic i n some part or other and to a greater or lesser extent; and the degree of its remoteness from one end of the series and of its proximity to the other will furnish us with a provisional measure of what we have so indefinitely termed an "alteration of the ego", [p. 235] A sequitur to this p a r a g r a p h appears i n Part II of the Outline of 1938, w h e n F r e u d (1940a [1938]) explains that, for analysis to be possible, the ego m u s t have retained a certain amount of coherence and some fragment of understanding for the demands of reality. But this is not to be expected of the ego of the psychotic; it cannot observe a pact of this k i n d , indeed it can scarcely enter into one. It w i l l very soon have tossed us away and the help we offer it and sent us to join the portions of the external world which no longer mean any­ thing to it. Thus we discover that we must renounce the idea of trying our plan of cure upon psychotics—renounce it perhaps for ever or perhaps only for the time being, till we have found some other plan better adapted for them. [p. 173, italics added] T o this p u r p o s e analysts h a d striven for years, a n d the names of A b r a h a m , Ferenczi, F e d e r n , a n d v a n O p h u i j s e n , to m e n t i o n o n l y the earliest a n d most p r o m i n e n t , are l i n k e d to the attempt to f i n d a m e t h o d suitable for psychotics. But, as F r e u d ' s insight o n the s i m i ­ larities of the " n o r m a l " ego a n d that of the psychotic makes clear, the search for a better p l a n is relevant for every case w h o s e ego approximates i n some w a y to that of the psychotic—that is, for

128

THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

every patient a n d every analyst. So, h o w best to preserve the frag­ ment of u n d e r s t a n d i n g of (psychic) reality i n both patient a n d analyst is part a n d parcel of every analysis. This leads us back to the subject of crises, the frequently unavoidable moments w h e n the fragment of u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the demands of (psychic) reality is to a greater or lesser extent lost. A n objection m a y be raised here, as F r e u d is speaking of a pact as a factual r e a l i t y — u s i n g his term i n Totem and Taboo (1912-13, p. 159)—while I a m speaking i n terms of psychic reality. But the pact between patient a n d analyst is a pact of understanding of the psychic reality, a n expectation to be v a l i d a t e d i n practice that u n d e r s t a n d i n g of psychic reality is b o t h possible a n d useful. W h i l e i n acute crisis analysis m a y , as F r e u d points out, become unusable, the ability to make analytic use of crises is a not unfaith­ ful measure of a n analyst's capacity. Crisis is frequently the o n l y access to a n understanding of psychic reality; Bion's concept of catastrophic change (1965) is a formalization of this l o n g - h e l d k n o w l e d g e . It m a y come to be true that "the ego's w h o l e interest is taken u p b y the p a i n f u l reality a n d withholds itself f r o m the analy­ s i s " , b u t this is far more likely if analysis restricts its g o i n g b e l o w the surface, to the u n c o v e r i n g of the influences of the past. G r a n t e d that, as F r e u d taught us, there is n o past or present for the u n c o n ­ scious, a n d that crises are i n a w a y a past m a d e present, the fact remains that crises are usually wholeheartedly felt to be i n the n o w , a n d so one c o u l d question F r e u d —close here to the forthcom­ i n g paper o n " C o n s t r u c t i o n s " (1937d)—whether expecting the p a ­ tient to go into the past just w h e n he is o v e r w h e l m e d b y the present is n o t a f o r m of "active t h e r a p y " . Strachey's (1934) paper o n tech­ n i q u e is closer to present views, as it attempts, t h r o u g h a rigorous u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the transference, to achieve an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the past m a d e present. K e e p i n g alive the fragment of u n d e r s t a n d ­ i n g u s u a l l y — a n d especially so i n crises—involves going below the surface i n the n o w — m o s t l y , though i n n o w a y exclusively, the h e r e - a n d - n o w of the analytic situation. A l s o , attention to the n o w has p r o m p t e d our taking less for granted the analyst's h a n d l i n g of his side of the alliance, our frequently u n a c k n o w l e d g e d d e m a n d s a n d constraints u p o n the patient. O u r contribution to " r e a l i t y " m u s t be subject to close scrutiny, as it is subject to the patient's unconscious a n d conscious scrutiny.

129

L I M I T A T I O N S A N D INFINITENESS O F A N A L Y S I S

The range of applicability In this last technical paper F r e u d (1937c) draws t w o boundaries o n the range of applicability of psychoanalysis. T h e first, w h i c h w e m a y call the " c r i s i s " limit, arises from the side of overt psychosis a n d , m o r e usually, f r o m the psychotic-like part of the " n o r m a l " ego, especially i n case of crisis; it involves too little " d i s t a n c e " , too m u c h "past-become-present",

too m u c h aliveness of the u n c o n ­

scious for our u n d e r s t a n d i n g to deal w i t h : not b e i n g u p to the task, the analyst is discarded. T h e other limit, brought u p b y F r e u d i n C h a p t e r IV, involves, conversely, too m u c h control, too m u c h " d i s ­ tance", too little aliveness of the unconscious, a n d then sleeping d o g s — t o o often too m a n y sleeping d o g s — a r e left asleep. In w h a t w a y s m a y these boundaries reflect technical a n d c o n ­ ceptual restrictions of psychoanalysis as it was envisaged,

fifty

years ago, b y its creator? T w o comments seem pertinent: the first, technical one about " d i s t a n c e " as a requirement for analysis, the second about metapsychology as a conceptual framework. A s to the first, F r e u d calls " p a s t " what has already taken f o r m suffi­ ciently for a mental " d i s t a n c e " to be able to be established between a "now"—the

analytic s i t u a t i o n — a n d a " t h e n " — t h e

pathogenic

influences. C o n v e r s e l y , what is too m u c h " p r e s e n t " is w h a t is f o r m ­ less a n d so distance-less. T h i s requirement of a well-established differentiation between a " n o w " a n d a " p a s t " resulting i n a " d i s ­ tance" echoes throughout the polemics of the 1930s a n d 1940s between A n n a F r e u d a n d M e l a n i e K l e i n as to whether there is transference i n c h i l d analysis a n d , consequently, whether c h i l d ­ h o o d itself is a limit for analysis proper. T o d a y it echoes i n t w o views of transference, as a distortion of the present b y the past a n d as a n enactment of psychic reality, a n d i n two views of counter­ transference. A s for the limitations i n t r o d u c e d b y metapsychology,

suffice

it to say that F r e u d deals w i t h the boundaries of analysis f r o m two different frames

of reference. T h e m o r e obvious one, the

metapsychological framework, presents the fact that something overwhelms

the analysis—or, conversely,

does not appear i n

a n a l y s i s — i n terms of instinctual intensity o n the one side a n d strength of the ego o n the other—that is, i n terms of too little or too m u c h control as a quantitative consideration. So stated, the p r o b ­

130

THE LOGICS O F THE M I N D

l e m becomes quasi-biological a n d fosters therapeutic pessimism. A m o r e clinical framework is adopted i n Chapter VII, w h e n F r e u d brings u p , quoting Ferenczi's 1927 paper o n the termination of analysis, that as a n important supplement to this theme " m u s t be reckoned not only the nature of the patient's ego but the i n d i v i d u ­ ality of the analyst" (p. 247), a n d that " F e r e n c z i makes the further important point that success depends very largely o n the analyst's h a v i n g learnt sufficiently from his 'errors a n d mistakes' a n d h a v i n g got the better of the 'weak points of his o w n personality'." O n shifting from a metapsychological to a more clinical frame­ w o r k , F r e u d takes here a leap f r o m a unitary m o d e l of the m i n d — w h a t R i c k m a n (1951) called one-person p s y c h o l o g y — t o a m o d e l of the analytic situation as a bipersonal process, as a two-person p s y ­ chology. A few paragraphs later, speaking about training analysis, F r e u d goes o n to e x p o u n d that after his necessarily brief personal analysis, the candidate continues " i n all subsequent e x p e r i e n c e s " — referring, I gather, to his experiences as an a n a l y s t — " t h e processes of r e m o d e l l i n g the ego started b y his personal analysis" a n d that " i n so far as it happens it makes the analysed subject qualified to be a n analyst himself" (p. 249). If I understand h i m rightly, F r e u d puts i n the forefront of the candidate's capacity for b e c o m i n g a n analyst his ability to preserve a n d increase, i n analysing patients, the frag­ ment of understanding of his psychic reality gained i n his "neces­ sarily brief" personal analysis. B y this account, b y p l a c i n g the b u r d e n of evolution o n both members i n the analytic situation, F r e u d himself opens u p a more suitable p l a n , the w i d e r u n d e r ­ standing of countertransference that has m a r k e d analysis i n the last thirty years. This seventh chapter of " A n a l y s i s Terminable a n d Intermin­ a b l e " does not reflect the pessimism of the paper as a whole. In a quasi-final rebus bene gestis termination becomes a practical matter that a competent analyst can be relied u p o n to attain a n d deal w i t h , as l o n g as he does not become overly ambitious. In fact, it can be a s s u m e d that m u c h of the pessimism i n " A n a l y s i s Terminable a n d Interminable" stems f r o m theoretical sources. This is especially so of the polarity of "constitutional" versus " t r a u m a t i c " , w h i c h i n ­ volves i n practice a petitio

principii:

" t r a u m a t i c " is what c a n be

u n d e r s t o o d b y the analyst from the patient's life experiences,

L I M I T A T I O N S A N D INFINITENESS O F A N A L Y S I S

131

whereas " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l " is what has not been " e x p e r i e n c e d " b y the patient a n d so does not come into analysis a n d does not allow e n o u g h k n o w l e d g e to be gathered. C o n c e p t u a l a n d technical frames inevitably d r a w the limit to analytic understanding, as can be illustrated b y a type of patient w h o s e d y n a m i c s require a w i d e r frame, w h i c h cannot be p r o v i d e d b y one-person psychology.

On

the

conceptual limitations of one-person psychology: the patient who is not within himself

It has l o n g been k n o w n that m a n y patients—called s c h i z o i d i n older literature—are not i n d w e l l i n g w i t h i n themselves. These p a ­ tients, w h o d o not live w i t h i n their skins, w h o s e emotions reside m a i n l y i n others, are eminently apt not to " c o m e into analysis" i n the analytic situation. Nowadays

these patients fall under the rubrics of false self

(Winnicott, 1956) or narcissistic disorders. In fact, F r e u d ' s first p u b ­ lished account of narcissism i n Leonardo (1910c, p. 100) as w e l l as Ferenczi's (1914) distinctions i n the nosology of male homosexual­ ity rely o n the fact that a crucial aspect of the patient's self is split off into a partner towards w h o m a role is then enacted: that is, o n a n "object-related defence", as Sandler (1983) has called it, tracing it back to A n n a F r e u d ' s description of altruism i n The Ego and

the

Mechanisms of Defense (1936). It was Melanie K l e i n (1946) w h o p r o ­ v i d e d , w i t h her concept of projective identification, the essential step into two-person psychology. T h e m a n y cases where t h r o u g h splitting of the needy infantile self the patient feels a n d acts as the needed object towards those p a r t n e r s — u s u a l l y a quite omnipotent, faultless object—can be said to involve a transposition of self a n d object. A n example of the coexistence i n the patient's psychic real­ ity of the transposed a n d the non-transposed n o r m a l constellation is g i v e n b y the following d r e a m :

I had gotten a telegram with my appointment as a substitute teacher, and I asked my mother to accompany me . . .we went from one school

132

THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

to another, because no address was given in the telegram, and I becam anxious because time for reporting was drawing close. . .. I knew al I had to come for my session and that I was going to be late. T h e d r e a m pertains to a patient (Mrs A , Chapters 2,4, a n d 7) w h o s e dependent

infantile self—to use Rosenfeld's

(1969) t e r m — h a d

been, at the beginning of analysis, quite stably split off into a h u s ­ b a n d a n d c h i l d r e n to w h o m she was selflessly

dedicated a n d

t h r o u g h w h o m she l i v e d her life; small w o n d e r she often felt that her emotions were unavailable to herself. "Self-less"

dedication

was apparent, to take just one example, i n the enactment of the transposition o n c o m i n g into the session. Quite unable to wait for her session, she was usually late; it was only b y chance, so to say, that she ever h a p p e n e d to be o n time. She came b y taxicab, a n d s o m e h o w drivers h a d all kinds of troubles—troubles she patiently listened t o — a n d took the most circuitous roads c o m i n g to

my

office. This she " u n d e r s t o o d " too, as she felt it was their right to choose whatever r o a d they felt most comfortable w i t h . She then spent a g o o d part of her session o n the " p o o r " taxi-driver's troubles. Coexistence i n the d r e a m of the transposed altruistic a n d the healthier i n d w e l l i n g self—indwelling as to need—reflects c o n s i d ­ erable analytic progress i n the acceptance of dependence i n M r s A ' s four years of analysis. She acknowledges her u s u a l acting out as a substitute—the substitute teacher—and has some acquaint­ ance w i t h the fact that i n her transposed "substitute" states of m i n d she u n a v o i d a b l y misses (the m e a n i n g of) her session. A s need is not i n d w e l l i n g , u p to the time self-Object transposition is u n d o n e , transference is, to use Riviere's (1936) term, "false transference". Object-related

defences cannot be encompassed

i n the i n ­

stincts-ego polarity u p o n w h i c h F r e u d relies i n " A n a l y s i s T e r m i ­ nable a n d Interminable". F r o m the psychic apparatus i n C h a p t e r VII of

The Interpretation of Dreams

(1900a) to the structural theory,

F r e u d ' s models of m i n d are built u p o n the m o d e l of the nervous system of the "Project" (1950 [1895]) a n d delineated b y anatomical boundaries: m i n d is defined as indwelling. Clinically, this limitation is c i r c u m v e n t e d b y recourse to the p a s t — a past that allows the d r a m a to u n f o l d experientially through the actors; this is p r o b a b l y a n important source of the emphasis o n the past as the stage neces­

LIMITATIONS A N D INFINITENESS O F A N A L Y S I S

133

sary for analysis to proceed (p. 232). E m p h a s i s o n the h e r e - a n d ­ n o w of the session d e m a n d s , as R i c k m a n (1951) pointed out, a two­ person psychology.

Analysis

finite

and

infinite

W h i l e i n a w a y it goes counter to F r e u d ' s emphasis o n the limita­ tions of analysis, this alternative translation opens u p perspectives o n the experiences of the analytic process. A consideration of Matte Blanco's The Unconscious as Infinite Sets (1975) w o u l d be i n order, but for reasons of space I can o n l y m e n t i o n it, along w i t h Rayner's (1981) s u m m a r y . Let m e say that for Matte Blanco (1975, p . 107) a considerable part of o u r analytic w o r k deals w i t h unconscious contents that have not been repressed, because early introjections, projections, splittings, a n d denials are unconscious f r o m the start. In this he follows Ferenczi's (1932) idea that it is impossible to remember w h a t has never been conscious a n d so only repetition is possible, w i t h subsequent objectification for the first time i n the analysis. By w a y of introduction I shall n o w take u p some points f r o m a session of this same patient i n the fifth year of analysis, w h e n the idea of her treatment b e i n g terminable is a d u m b r a t e d for the first time. It m u s t be mentioned that i n the last weeks she h a d entered an authors' w o r k s h o p that she h a d considered for years, b u t for w h i c h she h a d felt unfit u p to n o w . M r s A started the session talking about a visit to the w o r k s h o p by

a noted

author, w h o spoke

at some length about his

sufferings a n d those of other artists u n d e r his country's regime. H e was intelligent, or at least not totally s t u p i d , but she w a s not really interested; she asked h i m , however, h o w he m a n a g e d to do useful w o r k , as his suffering w a s so m u c h present. H e h a d answered—this is w h y she h a d brought this to session—that he h a d been i n analysis for three years a n d h a d " g o t t e n all the shit out of himself", seemingly i m p l y i n g that everything h a d be­ come clear to h i m . A l s o , they s o u n d e d like a n epic, those three

134

T H E LOGICS OF THE MIND

years of analysis. She went o n about others a r o u n d her w h o , after analysis, also h a d everything clear-cut, to the point of attaining some sort of (perverse) innocence; one of them says quite openly, "I k n o w I a m e n v i o u s " , a n d goes o n a n d o n acting enviously. S o m e h o w things have been quite different for her. After five or six years of analysis—she does not quite k n o w h o w l o n g she has been c o m i n g — s h e feels things are anything but clear. She asks, then, what is the m a t t e r — w h y s h o u l d her analysis feel so different. I told her she seemed to be bringing her surprise at getting some well-being from her analysis, but this raises new p r o b ­ lems, m a i n l y putting her i n contact w i t h guilty feelings w i t h w h i c h she has m u c h difficulty i n dealing. She replied that this was part of the p r o b l e m , a n d — k n o w i n g that she either disre­ gards any reference to her guilt feelings or feels the interpreta­ tions themselves as a c c u s a t i o n s —I told her I believed it was a sizeable part of the problem. After some thought she agreed, but she said that her question went b e y o n d that: she felt two things were h a p p e n i n g at the same time—that each time some­ thing became clear i n her analysis, new puzzles came u p , each p u z z l e h a v i n g ever-deepening roots into the unconscious. A n d so her question was: if problems have ever-deepening roots into the unconscious, h o w can analysis ever finish? I told her then that she was starting to think about analysis as something that can, or must, finish at some point; u p to n o w , she h a d felt her analysis as something that can be interrupted i n an angry m o o d , but not something that can or must finish sometime. She replied, somewhat

angrily but mostly

dejected:

" B u t then

everything loses all m e a n i n g . " Suffice it to say, for the sake of brevity, that the remainder of the session d r e w o n variants of this d i l e m m a : as contacts w i t h the finitude of the analytic link were felt as the annihilation of affect a n d consequently of meaning, only i n a s m u c h as the relation to the analyst was posited as a temporal (i.e. as infinite) was it felt as meaningful. T h e d a w n i n g awareness of the finitude of the analytic link presupposes a tolerance of infiniteness, of need of

L I M I T A T I O N S A N D INFI N I T E N E S S O F A N A L Y S I S

an indwelling

135

needy self; this comes about as the furthering of

omnipotence arising f r o m the transposition of self a n d object is i n some measure resolved. E v o l u t i o n f r o m the transposed "substitute" configuration to a tol­ erance of a n i n d w e l l i n g needy self involves several, often severe, crises i n therapy. Etchegoyen's distinction i n his H e l s i n k i paper (1982) between a n actual conflict, a c h i l d h o o d (oedipal) conflict, a n d an early conflict integrated i n the personality is relevant at this point: the childhood mostly

conflict is manifest i n the transference neurosis,

t h r o u g h verbal representations

whereas the early conflict, when

a n d screen

memories,

c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the preverbal p e r i o d

there is n o preconscious

record of memories,

appears

t h r o u g h a language of action a n d psychotic mechanisms. W e c a n approach, based o n this distinction, the arguments a d v a n c e d b y F r e u d (1937c) i n Chapter I V — n a m e l y , that " i f a n instinctual c o n ­ flict is not a currently active one, is not manifesting itself, w e can­ not influence it even b y analysis" (p. 231), a n d , further o n , that "patients cannot themselves b r i n g all their conflicts into the trans­ ference; nor is the analyst able to call out all their possible instinc­ tual conflicts f r o m the transference situation" (p. 233). F r e u d is here relying u p o n the theory of repression, w h i c h is operative u p o n the c h i l d h o o d conflict but not u p o n the early conflict that, p r e c e d i n g a preconscious record of memories, cannot be evinced w e l l e n o u g h f r o m the screen of the past. It comes into analysis not t h r o u g h r e m e m b e r i n g but t h r o u g h repetition; it is not the analyst w h o calls it u p but the rigorous comprehension of the transference. Transposition of self a n d object, w h i c h is the part of these p a ­ tients' ego that most approximates the psychotic, does not arise w e l l e n o u g h f r o m the scene of the past; b e i n g an enactment of the early conflict, it comes into treatment m a i n l y as a n actual

conflict

w i t h the analyst. A s its language is the language of action, transfer­ ence is b o u n d to i n v o l v e a succession of crises as this object-related defence, to use Sandler's term, evolves i n the analytic situation t h r o u g h a n object-related

offensive

against the humaneness of the

analyst; further o n i n the analysis, if all has gone w e l l , it can come to evolve t h r o u g h crises at a more symbolic level, such as dreams w i t h earthquakes a n d life-threatening storms. W h e n sleeping dogs awake, they bark a n d bite.

136

THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

The range of operation of analysis in the here-and-now of the session F r e u d ' s range of the operation of the analytic situation, between a " c r i s i s " b o u n d a r y where emotions become too alive for control a n d a " d e f e n c e " b o u n d a r y where too m u c h distance obtrudes u p o n analytic w o r k , does not find justification e n o u g h i n terms of the negative transference. A s i n the w e l l - k n o w n d r a w i n g that can be seen either as a Greek vase or as t w o profiles face to face, the boundaries can be seen alternatively as evincing negative transfer­ ence or as manifestations of a positive transference that cannot be borne. M o n e y - K y r l e (1978a) alerts us i n a final paper to this clinical d i l e m m a : " i t [is] both easy a n d terrible to mistake a desperate projection for a destructive one. F o r b y this means . . . the b e g i n ­ nings of a constructive link between patient a n d analyst c a n be d e s t r o y e d " (p. 463); i n the countertransference the d i l e m m a comes t h r o u g h as intensely contradictory feelings (Pick, 1985). T h e following vignette, a couple of sessions later, discloses the intolerance to the " t o o m u c h e m o t i o n " of b e a r i n g / b e i n g the (beau­ tiful) fruit of analytic creativity, o n one h a n d , a n d the intolerance to the finitude of the analytic link, o n the other. It can be conceptual­ i z e d alternatively i n terms of envy, following K l e i n (1957), or i n terms of a n intolerance of affects based o n the assumption of a p r i m a r y traumatic situation, as proposed b y Racker (1957). O n p r o d u c i n g her first story for the w o r k s h o p , M r s A was taken aback b y the favourable impact it made o n both the g r o u p a n d the instructor, w h o m she respected as sincere; she w a s unable to believe it w h e n she was told that the story was v e r y beautiful. It was beautiful i n spite of its h a v i n g n o punctuation, w h i c h she h a d been unable to i n t r o d u c e — t h o u g h she realized it was nec­ essary for others to read it—as, she felt, something was thereby lost. She m a d e another story for herself—just as she does a n ­ other draft of the analysis—but then she realized it w a s just another draft. W h e n I told her she seemed unable to bear the fact that her story w a s not every possible story, just as she is unable to bear the fact that her analysis is not every possible analysis, she said that to write a story that is not every possible story is resignation—that is, loss of meaning. What, then, is the w a y out?

L I M I T A T I O N S A N D INFINITENESS O F A N A L Y S I S

137

F r e u d ' s search for a better p l a n a n d m y patient's question, " W h a t is the w a y o u t ? " , require a suitable approach to p h e n o m e n a of crisis a n d e v o l u t i o n m u c h too sketchily covered b y metapsychology a n d the concept of sublimation. In the case of m y patient, the w a y out has e v o l v e d t h r o u g h a tolerance for the i n d w e l l i n g of need a n d the emergence of n e w " m e n t a l spaces" i n w h i c h it is possible for a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g object, initially felt as infinite, to exist, a n d c o n c o m i ­ tantly a capacity for, a n d pleasure i n , expression, w h i c h for this patient includes w r i t i n g . Perhaps only inasmuch as it is felt (uncon­

sciously) as infinite and actual in the analytic situation can an under­ standing object evolve a n d then be renounced after the infiniteness of emotional need has become bearable a n d acknowledged. A c k n o w l ­ edgement of the infiniteness of need a n d , more generally, of e m o ­ tion is, i n m y o p i n i o n , a n important aspect of the sparing of the object, a n d so of what M e l a n i e K l e i n (1940) called the depressive position. A better u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the p h e n o m e n a of crisis a n d e v o l u ­ tion is furthered i n m y v i e w w h e n w e can be aware, i n terms of the two-person p s y c h o l o g y of the session, of both boundaries of the range, a range that enacts i n the here-and-now of analytic w o r k the universality of emotional trauma F r e u d insists u p o n i n the Outline (1940a [1938], p. 185). Based o n the lack of dimensions—that is, the infiniteness of primitive emotion explored i n Chapter VIII—the crisis limit of the range emerges w h e n w e — b o t h patient a n d ana­ l y s t — a p p r o a c h too closely the repetition of a trauma of emotions that cannot fit into dimensions. T h e " d e f e n c e " — t h a t is, the " t o o little e m o t i o n " — b o u n d a r y encompasses the defensive

pole of

trauma; at the extreme, the annihilation of emotion m a y make neurosis appear as "constitutionally fixed illnesses" (Freud, 1933a, p. 153). Insofar as the conceptual rigidities of one-person p s y c h o l o g y are accountable for the emphasis o n the constitutional a n d the oft­ mentioned pessimism of " A n a l y s i s Terminable a n d Interminable" (1937c), it m a y w e l l be that the shift to a more clinically based t w o ­ person (meta)psychology w i l l bolster o u r confidence i n F r e u d ' s m e t h o d . Be that as it m a y , it is fitting to the genius of F r e u d a n d the e n d u r i n g actuality of " A n a l y s i s Terminable a n d Interminable" that even today w e still reflect u p o n a n d discuss the master's thoughts.

Epilogue The role of writing

and psychoanalytic writings

Ihe topic of psychoanalytic w r i t i n g admits diverse perspec­ tives that are relevant to its current a n d future place i n the X

culture. E a c h t e r m — " w r i t i n g " a n d " p s y c h o a n a l y s i s " — c a n

encompass the other, neither b e i n g per se the most general context. T h i s , b e i n g u n k n o w n , c a n only be a d u m b r a t e d — w h i c h o b v i o u s l y does not meet the Cartesian aspiration to indubitable, clear, a n d distinct concepts.

Writing as the encompassing

realm

T a k i n g w r i t i n g as overall context a n d psychoanalysis as just one sub-class of the literary does justice to the fact that, f r o m its origins t o w a r d the year 1800 BC, written notation has represented histori­ cal time, social m e m o r y across generations, a n d accretion of expe­ riences a n d n o r m s . O r a l m y t h i c a l narratives a n d the literatures

Published i n Revista de Psiquiatria de Rio Grande do Sul, 18 (1996): 23-33. 139

140

THE LOGICS O F THE M I N D

that arose therefrom allowed peoples to think of themselves i n terms o f a n e v o l v i n g history. This ushered i n i n d i v i d u a t i o n , a p r o ­ cess D o d d s traces i n The Greeks and the Irrational (1951) at the pas­ sage f r o m H o m e r i c to historical times. C o n t r a r i l y to classical G r e e k m a n , H o m e r i c m a n largely lacked the unified concept w e call " p e r ­ s o n a l i t y " . T h i s w a s b u t a n aggregate of concrete events not felt as personal a n d experientially attributed to diverse i n d i v i d u a l s . A c ­ tions d i d not have a n " I " as their start. Rather, they issued f r o m the concreteness of other actions or events, or from the interventions of the gods. H e r e the dreamer " s a w " dreams as "objective" events: he " s a w " the d r e a m approach and then leave. Violent anger a n d s u d ­ d e n impulses were not personal but g o d l y events. H o m e r i c narra­ tive harnesses the multiplicity and autonomy of these events to the lineal succession of the story and the text. T h e written w o r d weighs o n social a n d cultural e v o l u t i o n far m o r e m i g h t i l y than psychoanalysis. Witness the place granted, f r o m antiquity o n , to the first letters as fundamental to intellect, sociability, a n d m o r a l strength. ( O n s u c h basis stood Japan's r e ­ fusal to shorten their w r i t i n g f r o m five thousand to some thousand characters, fearing that this w o u l d hinder the strengthening of the Japanese character.) W r i t i n g i n c o m m o n languages is at the core of cultural development. Specific issues of notation play their roles: an example f r o m the history of science is p r o v i d e d b y mathematics, w h i c h was stuck for some twenty centuries after E u c l i d ' s great synthesis for lack of a suitable notation. These facts are w e l l - k n o w n , so I w i l l not d w e l l o n the l o n g p e r i o d of illiteralization of the West after the fall of the R o m a n empire, o n the fundamental role, as enclaves of the letter, of thought, a n d of knowledge, that was p l a y e d i n E u r o p e b y m o n a s ­ teries a n d i n the N e a r East b y B y z a n t i u m a n d the Jewish a n d A r a b i c communities of A l e x a n d r i a . Their role w a s taken u p i n later centuries b y the first universities. Gutenberg's

p r i n t i n g press,

w h i c h a l l o w e d w i d e r groups a n access to the written text, is a b e a c o n i n Western intellectual history. Does this basic role of the written w o r d involve a " p s y c h o a n a ­ lytic function of the literary" i n society? A prominent A m e r i c a n literary critic, H a r o l d B l o o m (1994), argues vehemently that, i n d i ­ v i d u a l l y a n d socially, literatures fulfil a role that is a k i n to Bion's " p s y c h o a n a l y t i c function of the personality". B l o o m ' s The Western

EPILOGUE

141

Canon h o l d s that literary w o r k s , i n c l u d i n g theatre, essays, a n d poetry, w i t h canonical texts at their core, support historically a n d presently Western m a n ' s chance to speak not w i t h others b u t w i t h ourselves, b u i l d i n g a psychic space or, i n Bion's terms, a n a p p a r a ­ tus for t h i n k i n g thoughts. O n e n e e d not join B l o o m i n his avowals that Shakespeare dis­ c o v e r e d psychoanalysis, w i t h F r e u d p l a y i n g his d u l l part half-way between reporter a n d plagiarist, or that h o w w e speak to ourselves c a n be m a d e to fit a corpus that takes n o account of the Bible, the Gospels, Cicero, or V i r g i l — w o r k s o n w h i c h , i n A u g u s t i n e ' s time a n d according to his Confessions, was based the teaching of g r a m ­ marians. N o r need one agree that a b u i l d - u p of psychic spaces sticks to the strictly literary, i n c l u d i n g the theatre, w h i l e casting aside the Aristotelian Organon, the Elements of E u c l i d , cosmology, mathemat­ ics, the v i s u a l r e a l m of p a i n t i n g a n d architecture, or legal codes, w h i c h were, for H e g e l , a m a i n realm of objectivization of the Spirit. But, to his credit, B l o o m bravely u p h o l d s the role of the written w o r d , the often arduous contact w i t h the ideas of the text, i n b u i l d ­ i n g a space for t h i n k i n g thoughts, i n d i v i d u a l l y a n d s o c i a l l y — w h i c h is n o small merit a m i d the current social shift f r o m text to image. L o o k i n g at the larger scene, I shall m a i n t a i n that a gap i n the b u i l d - u p of psychic spaces results f r o m the shift f r o m the culture of text to that of action-in-images. In turn, this gap i n mental spaces furthers omnipotent enactments, i n Bion's sense of a h y p e r t r o p h y of the m i n d - a s - m u s c l e . A l l o w m e a n example f r o m ethology: w h i l e a d o g recognizes images of other dogs i n m o v e m e n t a n d reacts to s u c h images, it does not recognize other dogs if p u t to the intellec­ tual ascesis of static photographic images. A s F r e u d says, after Goethe, i n Totem and Taboo (1912-13), " I n the b e g i n n i n g w a s the F a c t " — i n the b e g i n n i n g w a s action. It m u s t be u n d e r l i n e d that spaces for reflective thought d o not come about b y themselves f r o m p r i m o r d i a l action, as M i n e r v a s p r a n g f r o m Jove's thigh. F r e u d aptly quoted the L a t i n a p h o r i s m , per aspera ad astra. Spaces for t h i n k i n g t h r o u g h emotional experi­ ences are fragile i n d e e d . T h e omnipresent banality of today's light culture extends over to h o w texts are dealt w i t h : i n our p s y c h o a n a ­ lytic institutes, not to say i n universities, one often sees students s t u d y their photocopies i n stark ignorance of the texts f r o m w h i c h they derive, if not of the author's name.

142

THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

Banality i n light culture is i m p o s e d b y the inflow of images-in­ action received. T h i s , i n turn, prioritizes protagonism, one's o w n image-in-action c o m m u n i c a t e d to others. E v e r y o n e is part of a world-wide

"display

window"

engendering

its

theophanies:

sports stars, communicators, screen artists, a n d top models, often called " g o d d e s s e s " . D o m i n a n c e of the image is maintained b y , a n d p r e s u m a b l y exacerbates, the ongoing virtual reality. Starting f r o m a scientific net, the Internet, the G l o b a l Village e x p a n d e d explo­ sively w h e n it latched o n to the service of the image. T h e institutionalization of banality i n m e d i a culture has enter­ tainment at its axis. Attempts at maintaining thought are seen as depressing, as lethal aggressions to the normative frivolous excite­ ment. T e l e v i s i o n communicators pretending to intellectual leader­ ship m a y invite people w h o p u r p o r t e d l y have something to say, but they p r o m p t l y intervene w h e n these try to raise a concept to some precision. T h e tacit, omnipresent n o r m s of entertainment d o not permit complex ideas. A s bluntly stated b y a reporter to S p a n ­ i s h philosopher Julian M a r i a s (1995): thought h a v i n g gone out of fashion, kids s h o u l d throw out their books a n d look at v i d e o clips. O n their part, newspapers change their language a n d l o a d u p o n images: market surveys indicate their average reader ages, w h i c h is their regal r o a d to oblivion. Establishments a n d countercultures forego their borders. C o u n ­ tercultures become privileged parts of culture, as is the case for " r o c k c u l t u r e " . Intellectually h u m b l e but p o w e r f u l players s u c h as sports footwear enterprises influence global o p i n i o n b y counter­ cultural slogans: " t h o u g h y o u were not b o r n i n H a r l e m a n d are not 2.10 meters tall, y o u can still get yourself h a t e d " , or, better yet, " T h e u m p i r e w i l l request s i l e n c e — i n m e m o r y of y o u r r i v a l . " A d ­ vertisement theophanies b l e n d hate, death, a n d happiness into wished-for universes: tennis star M a r t i n a N a v r a t i l o v a introduces a R a i n b o w credit card for lesbian a n d gay groups; what i n F r e u d ' s Leonardo (1910c) was a traumatic alteration of the sexual character of the ego becomes exalted as a n ideal, a sales pitch paradigmatic for peace, beauty, promise. Self-attribution of ideal universes at the service of a painless reality a n d psychic anaesthesia turn into the ego ideal of addict groups. Cool is the m a r k of leadership, a n d n o n ­ addicts are just masks, hypocritical non-people.

EPILOGUE

143

T h i s sociocultural trend goes w e l l b e y o n d advertising a n d i n ­ formal codes. T h e A m e r i c a n Psychoanalytical Association h a d to declare formally that it d i d not s h i m homosexual candidates for training, w h i c h w o u l d violate Federal laws i n the U n i t e d States. T h o u g h issuing perhaps f r o m the best of intentions a n d lacking the mise en scene of the Inquisition, the structure of the Galileo case fits nonetheless: a n empirical q u e s t i o n — i n one case cosmological, i n the other the psychopathological character of a psychic structure as a factor for the psychoanalytic task—is resolved de jure. F r e u d ' s "alteration of the e g o " admits cultural prescription a n d is s u p ­ p o r t e d b y the reasons of the state. T h e cultural shift is patent i n the current exaltation of the b o d y a n d sports, a n d i n a g r o w i n g i l l - w i l l of the m e d i a towards psychoanalysis—postures

both once maintained b y N a z i s m . It is

apparent also i n the notorious difficulties w i t h t h i n k i n g about themselves that our present patients s h o w a n d often ideologize. So it is o p e n to doubt whether n o w a d a y s a n analyst can earn his keep b y w o r k i n g w i t h neurotic patients. T h o u g h it is unpleasant to say it a n d unpleasant to bear it i n o u r daily task, w e are n o w mostly analysts of narcissistic a n d borderline patients. T h i s s h o u l d come as n o surprise. Instead of p r o m o t i n g insights, the culture of the image promotes a "concealment i n the s o c i a l " of i n d i v i d u a l p s y ­ chopathologies, as was stressed b y G a d d i n i (1987). G i v e n that the current shift goes m u c h b e y o n d s u c h obvious events as the counter­ cultural cult of death o n the part of skinheads or of " h a r d r o c k " culture, it m a y merit being considered as a step towards a borderline

culture. T h e psychoanalytic task, Freud's a n d ours, depends, then, o n a " p s y c h o a n a l y t i c function of p r i n t " i n society—not just o n literature or o n the theatre, b u t o n whatever helps people to think, be it as readers o r as writers. In The Fundamentals of Psychoanalytic nique Etchegoyen (1986) reminds us that the analysand's

Tech­

foremost

insights are those that h a d lead h i m to analysis i n the first place: a psychoanalytic process depends o n previous insights, w h i c h re­ quires the activity of a mental apparatus able " t o speak to oneself", the written w o r d a n d the literary being here essential. O n e can thus agree w i t h B l o o m that the w o r d builds a playing-field, a psychic space. O n the same track as children's games a n d stories, identifi­

144

THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

cations mediated b y literary or theatrical narratives allow the reader a n d the social g r o u p to bear speaking to themselves. T h e b o d i l y i m m e d i a c y a n d the emotional spontaneity of c h i l ­ dren's games (and b a b y - m o t h e r games) is p u r s u e d b y those p e c u ­ liar narratives, children's stories. B o d i l y i m m e d i a c y , affective a n d enacted, makes place for the verbal: enacted gesture a n d b o d i l y emotional b o n d s are the more general frame into w h i c h the p r o p ­ erly verbal a n d later o n the written w o r d come to fit, i n b o t h c h i l d r e n a n d adults. T h i s line of thought underlies a psychoanalytic contribution to language that hermeneuticians a n d linguists, b o t h i n a n d out of psychoanalysis, ignore: Ella Sharpe's paper (1940), o n w h i c h , a m o n g others, Matte-Bianco (1975) builds. In s u c h a line of reasoning, the m e a n i n g of verbal descriptions of the psychic rests o n u n f o l d i n g metaphors of a " k n o w l e d g e b y acquaintance" rooted i n b o d i l y emotions, o n w h i c h ultimately m e a n i n g depends. In the culture of images, children's games are increasingly re­ placed b y electronic games. M y wife Lie. L u i s a Busch advises m e that, i n diagnostic play sessions, children n o w often refuse toys, saying: " A t home, I p l a y N i n t e n d o . " The emotive, b o d i l y , i m a g i n a ­ tive, a n d identificatory i m m e d i a c y of personal games, w h i c h i n the infant i n v o l v e gesture a n d sounds, as Rayner (1992) highlights, incorporate objects, w o r d s , a n d verbal stories a n d start private " r e v e r i e s " that pave the w a y to self-understanding. In electronic games, activation of the mind-as-muscle, of annihilatory battles—omnipotent

a stereotyped

reissue

both as concerns the rival's

powers a n d the w a y s to control a n d destroy h i m — u s u r p s the place of the interpersonal identificatory games, the reveries, a n d the thought that characterize a healthy u p b r i n g i n g . A s I see it, this brings about a psychic split between two levels: a surface defensive level of omnipotent denial that is addicted to " m u s c l e - l i k e " sensa­ tions of psychic omnipotence (at the extreme, addiction to horror) w i t h i n ideal universes p r o p p e d u p , if need be, b y group ideologies, o n the one h a n d , a n d a n u n d e r l y i n g level where vulnerability, p a i n , a n d felt contact w i t h split-off aggression turn unbearable, o n the other h a n d , w h i c h reinforces a reliance o n splitting. If this is correct, then an addiction to image

protagonisms

becomes a prototype for addictions, i n w h i c h case M a c L u h a n ' s slogan, " t h e m e d i u m is the message", takes o n a tragic bent i n d e e d . A n ever-increasing experience of visual-electronic

communica­

EPILOGUE

145

tional u p b r i n g i n g is hailed b y its Pangloss-like prophets as the best of all possible w o r l d s : " H a p p i n e s s is K i d s O n l i n e . " A t the source of our discipline w e f i n d , conversely, that the p r i v a c y that w r i t i n g affords helps b u i l d an apparatus for t h i n k i n g thoughts: a c c o r d i n g to M a h o n y (personal communication), F r e u d undertook his self­ analysis largely i n written form.

The

experiential and the literary in psychoanalysis

G r a n t i n g a psychoanalytic role, i n the w i d e sense of the term, to w r i t i n g a n d to the literary i n society, h o w , we can ask, does clinical psychoanalysis relate to literary art? N o n e e d to posit alternatives here. O p p o s i n g art a n d craft a n d distinguishing art a n d science are recent trends, issuing f r o m the emergence of G a l i l e a n science. A r t critic E r w i n Panofsky (1955) reminds us i n his b o o k The Life and of Albert

Durer

that, i n the same w a y as the L a t i n ars

Castilian art, so the G e r m a n w o r d Kunst

Art

a n d the

h a d two different m e a n ­

ings, the second n o w almost foregone. In a w i d e r sense, it denoted the konnen, the practical ability of manufacturers, doctors, beekeep­ ers to p r o d u c e things purposively—effects a n d p h e n o m e n a — i n the same w a y as nature generates beings a n d p h e n o m e n a . M o r e re­ strictedly, it denoted the kennen,

the theoretical penetration that

acknowledges a rule, w i t h no attempt to derive it f r o m general principles or s u p p o r t it w i t h formal proof. A r t theoreticians, at the b e g i n n i n g of the Renaissance, were the first naturalists: A n t o n i o Polaiuolo, Panofsky affirms, dissected cadavers at a time w h e n m e d i c a l training was still based o n readings of G a l e n a n d A v i ­ cenna. Galileo owes m o r e to L e o n a r d o d a V i n c i , w h o set d o w n the foundations of anatomy, mechanics, meteorology, a n d m o d e r n geology, than to commentaries

o n Aristotle's Physics.

Scientist

Peter M e d a w a r (1984) plays o n Shelley's sentence, " p o e t r y e m ­ braces all science": imaginative qualities guide scientific a n d artis­ tic creativity. Nevertheless, it w o u l d be difficult to contest K u h n ' s (1969, p. 342) point that, as distinct f r o m the artist's aesthetic crea­ tivity, the scientist's aesthetic creativity must, to reach its goals, fit i n w i t h w h a t nature has to offer.

146

THE LOGICS OFTHE MIND

O u r answers

to the relation between

art a n d science

will

deeply influence o u r notions of m e t h o d a n d evidence i n p s y c h o ­ analysis a n d our conception of the psyche. H e r e w e f i n d t w o m a i n currents w i t h n o lack of inner controversy. Schematically, w i t h n o attempt to d o full justice to quite disparate personal postures, w e f i n d , o n the one h a n d , the narrative stances of the Geisteswissen­ schaft outlook, where, w i t h the hermeneutic emphasis o n the " t e x t " (Gadamer, 1959), clinical psychoanalysis is taken to be a d e p t h hermeneutics. Ricoeur (1970) holds that psychoanalysis sets the m o d e l for hermeneutics: here the analogy, or equation, of the liter­ ary a n d the psychoanalytic is notable. F o r W a x (1995): " f r o m F r e u d until the present-day, analysts are w e l l aware of the central role of jointly constructing w i t h each analysand a set of organized narra­ tives that constitute a coherent b i o g r a p h y " (p. 551); he argues that the m a i n pitfall affecting the psychoanalytic enterprise is that nar­ rative is not felt to shape u p its methodological foundation. S u c h a coincidence of psychoanalysis a n d literature begets, explicitly or not, a n ontic p r i m a c y to language. Put i n the terms of the classic polemic o n the " u n i v e r s a l s " of the late M i d d l e A g e s , it follows the line of thought of n o m i n a l realism. But, then, as E n g l i s h logician M a x Black (1961) points out, language taken as universal metaphor becomes an ontology. A l o n g this line, Figueira (1994) affirms that psychoanalysis, being language, is a narrative signed b y metaphor a n d m e t o n y m y , a n d Schafer (1995) considers as dis­ tinctive of current psychoanalytic thinking that language consti­ tutes thought. T h e origin of this idea is usually attributed to Saussure. H o w e v e r , his Cours de Linguistique Generate (1916) is c a u ­ tious o n the issue: he is careful not to equate language a n d thought, a r g u i n g only that i n language ideas acquire clarity a n d precision. T h e idea that the w o r d constitutes b o t h thought a n d the u n i ­ verse has remote origins i n our myths of creation ( " A t the b e g i n ­ n i n g w a s the W o r d " ) . That language constitutes thought defines p o s t - m o d e r n i s m through what its advocate, R i c h a r d Rorty (1990), calls the "linguistic t u r n " . French structuralism granted linguistics, o n its assumed level of formalization, the role of leading science i n the r e a l m of social sciences. [Opponents speak of linguistic ideal­ i s m , this being, for Blackburn (1994), the m a i n f o r m taken b y i d e a l ­ istic philosophies at the e n d of the twentieth century.] G i v e n that this posture has complex, diverse roots, the Reformation biblical

EPILOGUE

hermeneutics,

147

H u s s e r l i a n a n d H e i d e g g e r i a n philosophies,

the

structuralism of Levy-Strauss, a n d the o r d i n a r y language l i n g u i s ­ tics of the second Wittgenstein a n d A u s t i n , I shall m e n t i o n here o n l y w h a t its G a d a m e r i a n version takes as its axis: a search for consensus

i n a Socratic dialogue g r o u n d i n g intersubjectivity i n

psychoanalysis. A t the extreme of p o s t - m o d e r n linguisticism, as put f o r w a r d b y its spokesman, p h i l o s o p h e r G i a n n i V a t t i m o (1985), rhetoric totally replaces logic. Psychoanalysis is here a m o d e of the literary, a n d its transmission is seen as substantively achievable b y p u r e l y l i n ­ guistic means, verbal or written. T h u s the later L a c a n , t u r n i n g to F o u c a u l t i a n discoursivite, holds that F r e u d ' s merit was to invent a " p s y c h o a n a l y t i c d i s c o u r s e " (Julien, 1986).

Writing

and

psychoanalytic

ostensiveness

Those of us w h o keep w i t h F r e u d to an e m p i r i c i s m that its detrac­ tors disparage as naive, restrict the analogy between clinical p s y ­ choanalysis a n d narrative, i n the o p i n i o n that psychoanalysis loses thereby m u c h of its clinical core, m a i n l y its anchor to i m m e d i a c y of contact w i t h psychic a n d external reality as a m u s t for ostensive­ ness. T h i s stance's nominalism

distinguishes between w o r d s a n d

facts, t h o u g h often w e do not k n o w w h a t s u c h facts m e a n , a n d it distances the literary f r o m the psychoanalytic. L a n g u a g e takes here an instrumental role of objectivization. Therefore, t h o u g h quite differently, both linguistic a n d e m p i r i ­ cist postures stress language's

objectivating role. F o r linguistic

stances, this role is, however, f o u n d i n g a n d ontic, be it i n itself, be it as final interpretant of a semiotic universe. Ricoeur (1983) stresses " M e d i a t i o n b y the signs: that is to say, it is language that is the p r i m a r y c o n d i t i o n of all h u m a n experience" (p. 16).

Which

seems u n l i k e l y e n o u g h for, say, sexuality. E m p i r i c i s t stances, for their part, admit at least two levels, both e n d o w e d w i t h reality: a process level of psychic facts a n d an observational a n d inferential level where psychic facts are m a p p e d , this m a p p i n g b e i n g requisite for w o r k i n g - t h r o u g h . In F r e u d ' s w o r k s u c h levels are called the p r i m a r y process, the drives, a n d thing-presentations at the u n c o n ­

148

THE LOGICS O F THE M I N D

scious process level, a n d the secondary process, w h i c h involves word-presentations—that is, the conscious verbal tautologies, that are eventually able to m a p unconscious meanings. F r e u d articu­ lates these levels i n reality-testing, a n d he keeps to them all along, also w h e n he goes o n to his structural theory. Objectivization involves a n ability to speak to oneself—the abil­ ity to speak to oneself about oneself, as B l o o m stresses, a n d this f r o m diverse points of v i e w , i n " m u l t i p l e descriptions". That this s h o u l d be the case w i l l d e p e n d i n society as a w h o l e o n a " p s y c h o ­ analytic function of the literary". A s far as psychic facts are c o n ­ cerned, objectivization demarcates—by w a y of negation (Green, 1993a)—the process a n d the descriptive levels—the m a p p i n g onto a tautology, i n v o n N e u m a n n ' s terms. It thus helps refine n o t - m e / m e distinctions

On the role and limits of literary

insight

Let us n o w , if only succinctly a n d tentatively, take a look at b o t h the inner a n d the psychosocial analogies of the tasks of the literary author a n d the psychoanalyst. Psychoanalytic treatment of literary authors shows that artistic creation focuses o n emotional experi­ ences. It is o n these that they b u i l d , often painfully, sometimes taking as their starting point oneiric images the m e a n i n g of w h i c h m a y be initially u n k n o w n to them. T h e author's "self-analysis" of his emotional experiences is a m a i n part of the insights his w o r k conveys, contributing to a "sociocultural apparatus for t h i n k i n g " , recreating a n d elaborating the emotional situations of the w i d e r groups. Note that here I d o not rely o n the classic theory of s u b l i ­ m a t i o n t h a t — a n d here I agree w i t h M e l t z e r — i s perhaps the least w e l l - w o r k e d notion of psychoanalysis's, or, o n the role of fantasies i n the writer's w o r k that F r e u d mentioned i n " C r e a t i v e Writers a n d D a y Dreaming"(1908e [1907]). H e r e m y thoughts are closer to F r e u d ' s n o t i o n of the psychoanalytic situation as " p l a y i n g - f i e l d " . F o r Bateson (1955), play is a logical category that implies, i n all m a m m a l s , a negation of aggression, while for Parsons (1995), fol­ l o w i n g F r e u d , insight o n given psychic elements coexists w i t h denial. W e c a n find a n example i n Greek theatre i n the catharsis

EPILOGUE

149

b r o u g h t b y the trilogy of tragedies: denial translocates the scene of action to m y t h i c a l times, a n d is thereafter reinstated b y the apothe­ osis of p l a y i n the c o m e d y that closes the cycle. T o go i n some d e p t h into this theme w o u l d require literary a n d historical k n o w l e d g e far b e y o n d mine. Yet, following Wooster (1995), one cannot but w o n d e r at the w o r k i n g - t h r o u g h role of Shakespeare's theatre i n the turbulent political context of E l i z a ­ bethan E n g l a n d . T h e characters o n the stage were often k i n g s — m y t h i c a l ones, like H a m l e t a n d perhaps M a c b e t h , or real a n d recent ones, such as R i c h a r d I I I — s h o w i n g the audience i n all their crudeness, kings i n c l u d e d , a double (or multiple) perspective o n current times b y w a y of their predecessors. T h r o u g h the analogies the roles portray, such terrible parables c a n perhaps a p p r o a c h — deliberately, as far as the author is concerned—the p l a y w i t h i n the p l a y so dear to Shakespeare. S u c h b e i n g sharply told f r o m the theatrical scene about the emotional experiences that went o n i n the o n g o i n g games of p o w e r m a y been seen as not far r e m o v e d f r o m what w e try to achieve w i t h our interpretations. It c o u l d be s u r m i s e d that s u c h theatrical descriptions b r i n g i n g i n a psychic d u a l perspective contributed to attain some degree of insight o n the emotional element of the individuals c o m p r i s i n g the audience a n d , i n the manner of Bion's " w o r k g r o u p " (1961), m a y have h e l p e d to articulate social "basic assumptions"—that

is, a social

self-consciousness of what political p o w e r implies a n d the need for social w a y s to limit its excesses. A b u r n i n g issue i n d e e d not only there a n d then, but also here a n d nowadays. A t a n y rate, the liter­ ary field is h i g h l y varied i n its dealing w i t h " e v e n t s " ,

and we

w o u l d d o w e l l to be w a r n e d b y novelist Isabel A l l e n d e (1993), w h o confessed her great relief w h e n she passed f r o m j o u r n a l i s m to the novel. T r u t h , as agreement w i t h facts, being left aside i n the novel, she said, lies m a y become assets rather than faults there.

The

psychoanalytic

as a privileged

field

session for

ostensiveness

O n c e the essential function of language and literature i n construct­ i n g a space for thought i n society has been addressed, coinciden­

150

THE LOGICS OF THE M I N D

tally i n the m a i n w i t h hermeneuticists like G a d a m e r or Ricoeur, it is time to delimit the social roles of literature f r o m what happens i n psychoanalysis. W e must n o w distinguish w h a t verbal m a p p i n g captures i n the literary playing-field f r o m what s u c h a m a p p i n g gains i n that quite different playing-field, the psychoanalytic ses­ sion, o n w h i c h , i n turn, w i l l d e p e n d the transcription of its happenstances to w r i t i n g (for a more detailed explanation of h o w m a p p i n g proceeds i n the session for both patient a n d analyst, see A h u m a d a , 1991, C h a p . 1, 1997b, 1997c). T h e insights obtained i n literature w i l l , as d o self-analytic efforts, b e at the mercy of undetectable a n d thereby unrectifiable distortions b y unconscious defences. T h e psychoanalytic session involves

t w o interacting people, w i t h their respective

uncon­

sciouses a n d the communicational games they enact i n the here­ a n d - n o w . If the analyst has the requisite training a n d events i n sessions have not gone awry too b a d l y , w e can expect that these unconscious communicational games w i l l be better recognized a n d enacted to lesser measure b y analyst than b y analysand. O n s u c h a basis the analyst w i l l be able to describe them more precisely than w h a t the analysand can achieve b y himself, i n or out of the session. A l t h o u g h formally the task of the analysis is defined b y the ana­ lyst's descriptive m a p p i n g of h o w the analysand's unconscious operates, the crucial point here is that, if it is the case that it fits the " p s y c h i c reality" it approaches, description of his unconscious modus operandi w i l l eventually allow the analysand to access a n ostensive k n o w l e d g e b y acquaintance, w h i c h , i n turn, w i l l allow h i m to attain a " n e g a t i o n " of the affective-communicational u n ­ conscious frames a n d to access hitherto split-off levels of himself. Ostensiveness o n the enacted unconscious a n d stress o n those as­ pects o f the m e t h o d aimed at it constitute the crucial difference between empiricist a n d narrative-hermeneutic stances i n p s y c h o ­ analysis. Ostensiveness o n the part of the analyst is twofold. G i v e n that his interpretation leans o n his countertransference i n the w i d e sense, it has double referents: that w h i c h refers to the patient's psyche is m a d e manifest verbally i n the session, a n d that w h i c h furthers a n awareness of interpretations i n the analyst's counter­ transference scrutiny is not verbalized a n d kept b y the analyst privately.

EPILOGUE

Rhetoric

and

logic in psychoanalytic

151

writing

Psychoanalytic w r i t i n g ranges f r o m descriptive attempts or narra­ tives based o n the facts i n session d r a w n f r o m some vertex or other to attempts at c o m p a r i n g i n different authors the advantages a n d disadvantages of their disparate attempts at conceptualization. These are theoria i n the older, w i d e sense of the term, as F r e u d used it, not i n the sense theory takes o n i n G a l i l e a n - N e w t o n i a n science. In addressing clinical events, psychoanalytic w r i t i n g attempts to be descriptive, but it m u s t be noted that awareness of clinical events depends o n a d u a l referent, given that it derives also f r o m the analyst's self-analysis i n a n d out of the session. T h i s fact leads M e l t z e r to say, i n Sexual States of Mind (1973), that the identity of one patient b e i n g approached—that is, the analyst—is k n o w n to the reader, a d d i n g , i n Studies in Enlarged Metapsychology (1986), that effective analysis proves therapeutic for both participants. A m a i n narrative exponent, D o n a l d Spence (1994), c o m p l a i n e d recently that i n clinical psychoanalytic writings rhetoric a n d data-less gen­ eralizations plaster over the crack opened u p b y a lack of detailed descriptions o n clinical exchanges carried o n for l o n g periods; thus, w e generally cannot outline a n d base alternative postures o n the material. W h i l e he recognizes that "the context is c r u c i a l " , Spence evinces his narrative lineage i n the manner i n w h i c h he restricts the n o t i o n of clinical fact to verbal exchanges. I consider, o n the other h a n d , that the metacommunicational context, accessed m a i n l y b y the analyst's countertransference, provides the overall m e a n i n g frame to verbal exchanges i n the session. It is the psychoanalyst's task to make sure that exchanges at this frame level attain repre­ sentability. U n c o n s c i o u s aspects that d i d not sufficiently evolve spontaneously i n the playing-fields of c h i l d h o o d are, as w e k n o w f r o m Ferenczi (1932), enacted i n the transference repetition. T h e y come into this other playing-field, the psychoanalytic session, as clinical facts to be m a d e ostensively accessible to analyst a n d a n a ­ l y s a n d . T h e analyst's pragmatic neutrality, w h i c h is central to this e n d , s h o u l d not i m p e d e his spontaneity. Spence is s u r p r i s e d that the clinical significance of a g i v e n event fades w h e n it is exposed to daylight i n written narratives. H e deems it crucial for the future health of psychoanalysis that w e f i n d presentational w a y s that w i l l preserve clinical facts f r o m distortion

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THE LOGICS OF THE MIND

a n d enable a n accumulation of " b a l d facts", so that theories arise f r o m these, just as, he affirms, happens i n other disciplines. T h i s makes the differences between the narrative a n d the e m p i r i c a l focuses i n psychoanalysis manifest i n two ways: firstly it s h o w s — a n d I can f i n d no exceptions—that those w h o , c o m i n g f r o m narra­ tive a n d hermeneutic stances, firmly dismiss science w i l l consider u n i v o c a l certainties to be at the core of empirical sciences. T h e y generally assume an " i n d u c t i v e ascent"—that is, a s u p p o s e d rigor­ ous deductivity starting from isolable b a l d facts. O n l y i n s u c h a case it w o u l d be conceivable for scientific theories to arise directly out of facts. T h i s scheme fits N e w t o n i a n notions of the genesis of the k n o w l e d g e i n physics, a "justificationism" that, at least f r o m D u h e m (1906) a n d f r o m q u a n t u m mechanics o n w a r d , is not v a l i d i n the exact sciences themselves. In psychoanalysis, as i n other e m p i r i c a l sciences, it is just as illusory to expect an increasing accretion of b a l d facts free from theory, as it is to suppose that theory can arise b y itself out of an inductive ascent f r o m the a s s u m e d l y b a l d facts. Secondly, if, rather than restricting clinical facts to v e r b a l enunciations, we admit that contact w i t h clinical facts depends o n a p r i m a c y of a knowledge b y acquaintance w i t h what is enacted unconsciously i n the session, it w i l l come" as n o surprise that clinical psychoanalytic narratives pale i n daylight, to use Spence's terms, w h e n transposed to written texts. Let m e stress, against pretences of b a l d data-gathering, that what years as an editor a n d author have taught me is a u s u a l w a y to defeat creativity i n attempts to make a contribution to our discipline: to start b y trying to gather, just as Spence supposes b a l d facts s h o u l d , the extant b i b l i o g r a p h y o n a topic. S u c h attempts to substitute for i n ­ d e p t h thought o n one's o w n materials a n d ideas result, at best, i n m o n o g r a p h i c a l d i l u t i o n a n d a demise of originality. It is difficult e n o u g h for the analyst to attain representability of the enacted unconscious i n the session—that is, a tentative k n o w l ­ edge b y acquaintance allowing for appropriate i n t e r p r e t a t i o n — a n d h a r d e n o u g h , too, for the analysand to attain, t h r o u g h the descriptive interpretive conjecture, their ostensivity " i n presence" i n the session. H a r d e r still w i l l it be to convey, i n the " k n o w l e d g e byxdescription" of a clinical narrative, the evidences to those h a v ­ i n g h a d no access to the emotional experiences a n d the m e t a c o m ­ m u n i c a t i o n a l "contexts" that framed the description of what went

EPILOGUE

153

o n i n sessions. A t best, the psychoanalyst's talents as author m a y help to shorten distances between knowledge b y description a n d k n o w l e d g e b y acquaintance. In any case, a n d i n a s m u c h as he abides b y e v o l v i n g " e v e n t s " , obscure as they m a y be, the p s y c h o ­ analyst-author is closer to the reporter than to the novelist. H e p u r v e y s a transcription of u n k n o w n origin (Green, 1977), b u t a transcription nevertheless. A s Elisabeth L i m a d a R o c h a Barros (1992, p. 210) says, rich as our clinical descriptions m a y be, the reader cannot bear testimony to our practice. W h a t a clinical narra­ tive describes w i l l be recreated a n d validated b y what the a n a l y s t ­ reader c a n rescue out of his psychoanalytic experiences, d r a w i n g o n his o w n ostensive screens. " V a l i d a t i o n " does not here m e a n " c e r t a i n t y " , o n l y a modest a n d conjectural empirical congruence. In order to be effective, verbal and written transmission of p s y ­ choanalysis outside of the experience of the session w i l l d e p e n d u p o n the reader's experiential b a c k g r o u n d , built firstly o n his per­ sonal analysis a n d later o n i n his confrontations w i t h patients i n analytic situations. Otherwise it w i l l be opaque or, worse, deceiv­ i n g , a k i n to what P a u l Feyerabend (1987) called "intellectual p o l l u ­ tion". T h e w o r k of eminent philosophers w h o spent years s t u d y i n g the literature of psychoanalysis a n d n o doubt feel they have some genuine k n o w l e d g e of it is witness to the opacity of the written transmission

of knowledge

of the unconscious.

Ricoeur a n d

G r u n b a u m can illustrate the magnitude of the obstacles erected to the transferability of our discipline w h e n it purports to rely s i m p l y o n the k n o w l e d g e that descriptive w r i t i n g conveys. In the case of G r u n b a u m (1984, 1993) it m a y be argued that his p h i l o s o p h i c a l optic allows h i m little or n o grasp of what he questions, b u t the obstacles are also there for those w h o studied it closely a n d s y m p a ­ thetically, as has Ricoeur. H i s later papers, gathered i n From the Text to Action (1983), s h o w that the author of the m o n u m e n t a l Freud and Philosophy (1970) reaped n o t h i n g f r o m the F r e u d i a n discoveries o n w h i c h he expended s u c h efforts. Perhaps i n the idea that p h i l o ­ sophical reflection is, as i n the M i d d l e A g e s , a p r i v i l e g e d science of sciences soaring over the particularities of empirical discoveries, G r u n b a u m a n d Ricoeur took to psychoanalytic writings w i t h n o experience of a personal analysis, emerging therefrom just as they started. That another philosopher, Steven G o l d b e r g (1988), rashly

154

THE LOGICS O F THE M I N D

concludes f r o m his readings that a psychoanalytic process is a narrative akin to Augustine's Confessions evinces that, as argued b y the last of the great E n g l i s h Hegelians, the philosopher of his­ tory R. G . C o l l i n g w o o d (1945): " a m a n w h o has never enjoyed of a certain type of experience cannot reflect o n it; a philosopher w h o has never studied a n d w o r k e d at natural science cannot p h i l o s o ­ p h i z e about it without m a k i n g a fool of himself" (pp. 2-3). O r , i n the w o r d s of M i l l (1852), w i t h w h i c h his translator into G e r m a n , S i g m u n d F r e u d , w o u l d probably agree: " n o t only what m a n c a n k n o w , but what he can conceive, depends o n what he has experi­ e n c e d " (p. 338).

REFERENCES

Abraham, K. (1919). A particular form of neurotic resistance against the psycho-analytic treatment. In:

Selected Papers on Psycho-Analy­

sis (Chapter 15). London: Hogarth Press, 1973 [reprinted L o n d o n : Karnac Books, 1979]. A h u m a d a , J. L . (1991). Logical types and ostensive insight.

Interna­

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Indianapolis, IN, & Cambridge: Hackett, 1989. Widlocher, D . (1985). The wish for identification and structural effects in the work of Freud.

International Journal ofPsycho-Analysis, 66:

31­

46. Winnicott, D. W . (1951). Transitional objects and transitional phenom­

ena. In: Playing and Reality (Chapter 1). London: Routledge, 1994. Winnicott, D . W . (1956). O n transference. International Journal of Psy­ cho-Analysis, 37: 386-388. Winnicott, D . W . (1971).

Playing and Reality.

London: Routledge, 1994.

W i s d o m , J. O . (1962). Comparison and development of the psychoana­

lytical theories of melancholia. International Journal of PsychoAnalysis, 43: 313-332. Wooster, G . (1995). Shakespeare's " P l a y within the P l a y " . U n p u b ­ lished paper presented at the Buenos Aires Psychoanalytic A s s o ­ ciation. Zac, J. (1971). U n enfoque metodologico del establecimiento del encuadre.

Revista de Psicoandlisis, 28: 493-510.

INDEX

abduction, unconscious, 20

Abraham, K., and narcissistic

character resistance, 116

action images, culture of, 4

addiction to image protagonisms as

prototype for addictions, 6

Ahumada, J. L., 24, 64,150

Allende, I., on lies as assets in fiction,

149

Almansi, R., on breast-face equation,

99

alteration of ego:

in media culture, 142

in narcissistic identification, 99

altruism and altruistic dedication, 66,

79, 125, 133

ambiguity in media culture, 9f

analysis:

end of, adumbrated, 134

felt as doubly meaningless, 88

range of applicability of, 129

range of operation of in here and

now, 136f

violence on start of, 72

analyst:

alliance of analysand's ego with,

127

as base:

and catastrophic change, 42, 81

and container-contained

relationship, 47

his non-existence to analysand's

psychic reality 38, 40f, 47

coldness of, avoidable and

unavoidable, 123

as external phantasy object, 20, 34

loss of, as primal object, 27

as oral mother, 27

as pragmatic frame vs, individual

attributes, 23

pragmatic paradox in link to, 24

as transferential relational frame,

20

use of, 15

analytic neutrality as background to

interpretation and insight, 34

annihilating phallic rivalry as overall

frame, 21

169

170

INDEX

Aristotle, 26,146 autarchy 1, 8,10 autistic levels as remains of trauma, 19f, 50

autotomy (Ferenczi), 21,121

Azoubel Neto, D., on Caraja Indians, 6

baby's penis, 88

enthronement of, 87

Balint, A., on unconditional primitive

affect, 45

Balint, M.:

on Ferenczi's wise baby, 50

on Leonardo and narcissistic object

choice, 100

on three theories of origins in

Freud's work, 102

banality in light culture, 141 f

base, unconscious:

in primitive link to breast or

nipple, 38

unconscious experience of, 117

Bateson, G., xi, 26

on Gresham's law, 12

on logics of the unconscious, 34

on play as logical category, 148

on relational perspective, 124

Baudrillard, J., on virtualization of reality, 3

beta-screen, 11, 46,103, 122

bimental models to approach psychic

evolutions, 48,133

binocular vision, 33, 111

Bion, W. R., 9f, 17-18, 33, 43-52, 58­ 69, 75-79, 81-82, 85, 88, 93,

104,123,149

apparatus for thinking thoughts,

141

beta-screen, 11, 46,103,122

catastrophic change, 42, 76, 81,128

container-contained relationship,

40, 42f, 47f, 53, 57f, 63

enforced splitting, 42

- K moral despoiling, 43

links:

parasitic, xii, 11, 40, 5^60, 63,

75f, 81, 92n, 119

symbiotic, xii, 5, 28, 32, 40, 44­ 52, 55, 57f, 64, 75f, 80, 83f, 92f,

117, 121f

mind-as-muscle, 1,11,141,144

need-for-a-breast-bad-breast, 52,

59,75

non-evolved and evolved mind, 46,

56, 76, 79,107,116f, 122,157

part-object relationships, 54, 56, 58,

68, 84

psychotic personality, 45, 66

realizations, clinical, 23

thought as tolerance to no-breast,

10

Black, M., 146

Blackburn, S., 146

black hole, 10

Blake, W., 18

on songs of experience, 79

Bleger, J., on transference symbiosis,

92n, 93

bliss, erotic, in Leonardo, 95, 98f, 105,

111

Bloom, H., 140f, 144

on speaking to oneself, 148

borderline culture, 143

Borges, J. L„ 50

Braithwaite, R. B., 36

breast:

felt as real rather than phantasized, 44

gelid, 74f, 78

resistance to introject painful

states, 42f Camus, A., on La Chute, 76n catastrophic change, 42f, 57f, 63, 76n, 80f, 116

charred crab, dream of, 117

Cheshire, N., and Thoma, H . , 18, 21

class, unconscious, 22

seriation into individuals, 32

class-Object, 33, 64

claustrophobia, interpersonal, 27

clinical facts, 15f, 28, 36

counter-induction of, 36f

ostensiveness of, 25

as unconscious abductions, 20

clinical narrative as "knowledge by description", 147

coldness, projected on analyst, 40

Collingwood, R. G., 154

combined object, split of, 87

INDEX

concealment in social in image

culture, 143

concepts, open, 26

conflict: early, childhood, and actual,

125, 135

container-contained relationship, 118

parasitic link in, 60

permeated by envy,

crisis:

of culture, xii, 1, 3

as limit to analytic process, 123

of psychoanalysis, xi, 1

of reflective thought in society, 1, 3

of subjectivity, 1

of two-ness, 123

culture of action images, xi, 3,142

denial of grief in, 6

of written word, 1

171

enforced splitting, 42,124

Etchegoyen, R. H 11, 99

actual, early, and childhood

conflict, 125, 135

and Ahumada, 26

on analysand's foremost insights,

143

double bind, 43

on envy, 113

evolution, psychic, 115

evolved mind, precariousness of in

attempt at containment, 122

v

facts and theories, distinction of, 17

father's penis, splitting of, 89

Ferenczi, S., 43, 130-131

on autotomy and

dematerialization, 10, 21,121

on identification with stronger

Darwin, C , on observing, 17

opponent, 112,121

on primal introjection, 102, 111

Debord, G., on impact of media, 8

on repetition and objectivation, 37,

dedication, self-less, 54f, 132

48,133, 151

definitions, ostensive or indicative, 26

fetish, as pathology of "use of object",

delusion of one's own goodness, 54f

4

dematerialization, 21, 121

Denby, D., on effects of media, 8

fetishization, 6

dependency, evacuation of, through

panegyric of, 11

Feyerabend, P., on intellectual

getting pregnant, 71 n

pollution, 153

depressive position, 5, 78,101,103,

fiction, lies as assets in, 149

126,137

Figueira, S., 146

Deutung, Freudian, 18

Freud, A.:

Dodds, E. R., on passage from

on altruism, 79f, 131

Homeric to historical times,

on identification with aggressor,

140

60, 112,121

double description, 31 f, 36

Freud, S., 53, 67, 95-113,125-137,

dual unity, 44

141-143

Duhem, P., 152

altruism, 79

Edelson, M., 2, 3

constitutional vs. traumatic, 130

ego, alteration of, 127,142f

crises and defence boundaries in

in narcissistic identification, 95f,

range of applicability of, 126f

112f

discrepancy between theories and

electronic games and children's

technique, 46

games, 143

ego:

empirical basis, xi

normal and psychotic, 127

empiricism, 147

splitting in psychosis,

empiricist stances, 16,147

perversions and neuroses, 94

enthronement of baby's penis, 87

identification remoulding ego, 110

envy and trauma as alternative

Leonardo as remembrance and

explanations, 136

insight, 100

172

INDEX

Freud, S. (continued):

melancholia, object choice in, 96,

108f, 112-113

Narcissus myth, 109,113

object:

re-finding of, 32

-relationship, bipolar structure

of, 111

shadow of, 95f, 103,109,112­ 113

oral loss, 101

psychic reality as unconscious

Triebe and thing­ presentations, 26,147

psychoanalytic institutions, need

for, 12

reality testing, 127f

science and theories, 16f

transference as playing field, 35,

148

trauma of separation, 102

Gadamer, H . G., 146f, 150

Gaddini, E., 1, 7-13,143

on human data as experiential, 7

on imitative defences to

psychoanalysis, 7-8

on mimetic appropriation by

intellectuals, 8,12

on psychopathology (ies):

changes of, 4

demise of idea of, 8f

Galilean science and its lawful model,

3

Garma, A., on integrative position,

103

goodness, unconscious delusion of,

39f, 54f, 65f, 78f, 116

Goldberg, S. E 153

Green, A.:

on "civilizing project", 2

on clinical narrative, 153

on work of negative, 27

Gresham's law, 12

Grunbaum, A., 153

Grunberger, B., on narcissism, 96

headless pigeon, dream of, 119

Heidegger, M., 2

Hermann, L, on dual unity, 44

hermeneutic primacy of text, 2,16f,

144f homosexual object-choice, dynamics of, in Leonardo, 97f identification, 115f

impotentia ejaculandi as clinical fact,

28

induction, 17

counter-inductive use in insight of,

35f, 64

wide and restrictive sense of, 36

inductive method, clinical

psychoanalysis as, 15f, 34f

infantile self, 10, 34, 44f, 50f, 61f, 70,

75f, 89f, 99,119,131f

infiniteness of emotion,

acknowledgment of, 126,134

information, equated to mental

growth, 10

insight, xi, 15, 61, lOOf

descriptive and ostensive, 17f, 27,

34f

dynamics of, 27, 34

in literature and in analysis, 148

as threat, 1,143

interpretation:

listened to at level of hallucinosis,

45

as mapping of psychic realities,

15f, 35,150

Joseph, B., on transference as total

situations, 20, 27

Julien, P., 147

v

hallucinosis, 43f, 116f

clarity of thinking in, 47

interpreting in realm of, 45

Kernberg, O., on conventionality, 8

Kipling, R 65

Klein, M., 20, 22, 45-49, 64,100-103,

118, 136-137

on acting out in transference, 61

and death instinct, 46, 49

on depressive position, 5,13,101,

137

and early obsessive mechanisms, 33

on manic defence, 106

and projective identification, 131

v

INDEX

Lacan, J.:

narcissistic theory of ego, 111

on "psychoanalytic discourse", 147

and theoretical orthodoxy, 13

Lakatos, I., xi, 26

Langer, S., on definition of individual,

18

language as action, 43

Laplanche, J., on Freudian Deutung,

18

Leland, J., on bisexuality as lifestyle, 9

Leonardo, 53, 57,97f

as clinical model, 97

as displaced piece of Freud's self­ analysis, 100

normal ego and its disposition, 97

Levy-Strauss, C , 47

Liberman, D., on environmental and

bodily self, 70

linguistic and empiricist stances, 147

literary insight, scope and limits of,

147f

Lutenberg, J., 27

Mahler, M., on symbiosis, 5, 92n

Matte-Bianco, I., on logic of the

unconscious, 133

on power of class, 33

meanings, bodily and verbal, 26

Medawar, P., 145

media cultures, ambiguity in, 9,142

counter-cultures as their privileged

parts, 142

and denial of temporality 6

melancholic identification and

narcissistic identification, 112

Meltzer, D., 44, 47f, 51f, 148,151

altruism in compulsive generosity,

80f

anal masturbation, 69, 82

analyst's contribution to process,

44, 151

on baby's penis, 88

on denigration of love to

sensuality, 88

on differentiation of levels, 51

on geography of unconscious

phantasy, 84,116

on Leonardo as narcissistic

identification, 100

173

on outsider, 48-49

on passivity in perversions, 56

on perversion, 51, 56, 84, 90f

method, as central grounding of psychoanalysis, xi

Mill, J. S., 36,154

mimetic imitation leading to

identicity, 8-10

Money-Kyrle, R., 34, 42, 94

on "bits of child", 43, 45, 65, 70

on class:

of objects that do not frustrate, 49

of objects that do not satisfy, 49

on cognitive development, 68

on contact with base, 38f

destructive and desperate

projection, 44,136

on double delusion of superiority

and inferiority, 69

on envious equation to breast, 67f,

77

on infantile delusion of being

object, 77

on misconceptions, 35, 67f

and primitive preconceptions, 4,

42f, 50, 56

on representation, by identification

and ideographic, 22

on spurious substitutes, 4, 56

on unconscious class notions, 22

on unconscious megalomania, 38,

66-69,116 Mrs A., 47,72, 76, 117f nameless dread, 43, 61, 64

narcissism, in Leonardo and Three

Essays, 67, 96f

libidinal aspects, 90f

rivalrous and restitutive, 113

in two- and one-person

psychology, 83, 111

narcissistic area "within four walls",

85f

narcissistic identification:

and identification in melancholia,

108f, 112f

and shadow of object, 112f

as two-person psychology, 95f

narcissistic value as primal object

relational, 111

174

INDEX

narrative, Homeric, 140

paradox, pragmatic, in link to analyst,

narrative-hermeneutic stances, 146,

xi, 24

150f

parasitic infantile self, 75f

need-for-a-breast bad breast, 52, 59,

parasitic organization of personality,

75

11, 52f, 63, 75f, 119

Negroponte, N on electronic bliss, 11 Parsons, M., 148

neurotic area of "daily routines", 85f

Peirce, C , on abduction and

Nietzsche, R, 2

induction, 17

penis-breast structure, 84, 88

nipple, fecalization of, 88

peremptory gratification, pathologies

nominalism, 147

non-objects and "pair", 49

of, 4

perverse organization, 51 f, 83f, 92f

Noy, R, on psychoanalysis as

perversion, socialization of, 53

multimodel system, 111

Peto, A., on Michelangelo's infantile

object(s):

neurosis, 99

goodness of, 76

Pichon-Riviere, 10,13

hostile, preconceptions of, 49

Pick, 1,136

primary, non-existence of, 52, 61

play, children's, 4

-related defences, 131

playing instinct in Leonardo, 98f

-related offensive, 135

postmodernism, 2,3

-relationships, sane, 38, 52, 75-76,

pre-catastrophic and evolved post­ catastrophic configurations,

92

38, 42, 64, 81,116

symbiotic link to, 90-93

transitional, 4

preconceptions, 56

primary object as Deity, 31

usurpation of place of, 38, 44, 46,

primitive emotional processes, non­ 55f, 67, 76

dimensionability, 121

omnipotence:

projective identification, 22, 39, 46, 51,

and helplessness, 117

54f, 66f, 75, 80, 83,100,104,

as primitive survival, 10

116,131

one- and two-person psychology, 131f

destructive and desperate, 44

open concepts, 26

psychic reality:

oral-mother transference, 28

and factual reality, 18, 27,128,150

oral stage: bliss, trauma, grief, and

representability of, 15,18, 21, 24f,

identification, lOlf

33, 38, 41f, 52, 56, 69,103,113,

ostensive or indicative definitions, 26

118,128

ostensive refutation, and insight, 17f,

psychic split as result of media

27, 34f

culture, 142

ostensiveness:

psychic void, 29f, 57, 66, 73, 77

on part of analyst, 150

psychoanalysis:

psychoanalytic situation as

experiential and literary in, 145

privileged field, 17,149

limits of, in Analysis Terminable and

outsider, oral genesis of, 89

Interminable, 129

pairing:

psychoanalytic function:

to breast felt as real, 45

of print, 140

damage to establishment of, 118

of the literary, 140,148

and immenseness of emotion, 121f psychoanalytic institutions, 7

and non-objects, 49

psychoanalytic situation as

and psychic evolutions, 45,122f

observational field, xi, 148f

Panofsky, E., 145

psychoanalytic writing, 139f, 151f

Pap, R, on open concepts, 26

rhetoric and logic in, 151

v

INDEX

175

psychopathologies, changes in, 4f, 142 Searles, H.:

on dedication, 70

psychotic personality, 38, 46, 66, 75,

92n

on genuine symbiosis, 92n

Puget, J., and Berenstein, I., on

self:

-containment, baby's efforts at, 82

Unique Object, 33

-esteem, thinking in terms of, as

obstacle to insight, 30

Quine, W. O., 36

infantile:

Quinodoz, J. M., 17

damage to, 59

Racker, H., xi, 53

sane, symbiotic and parasitic,

on primary traumatic situation,

52, 67, 75f, 92

133, 144

integrative, enacted and emotional,

Rayner, E., 25,133

103f

pseudo-adult, 54, 63

on children's games as reveries,

separateness of mind, encroachment

144

on unfolding sequences, 25

by media, 5, 6

reality, factual and psychic:

sexual identities as alternative

understanding of demands of, 127

lifestyles, 9

see also psychic and factual reality

Sharpe, E., on bodily and verbal

Reichenbach, H.:

meanings, 26

on definitions in use, 26

Spence, D., 17

on verbal statements as

on clinical facts, 151f

pragmatics, 26

splitting of ego: representability, as essential for

on massive loss, 106,112' disproving, 152

by trauma in Freud's Leonardo, 97f Resnik, S., on closed transference, 116 spurious substitute, 11, 56, 63, 94

Richfield, J., on descriptive and

Strachey, J., xi, 34,100-101,110,126,

128

ostensive insight, 16-18, 25f, 34, 147f subjectivity, crisis of, 2

Rickman, J., and one- and two-person sublimation, 54, 70, 137

psychology, 133

substitute realities, effects on symbol­ Ricoeur, P., 146f, 150,153

formation, 4, 5, 9,11,142

Rocha Barros, E. L., 153

sucking, erotic bliss in Leonardo of, 98

Rorty, R., on linguistic turn, 146

symbiotic infantile self, 64, 75f, 83f,

Rosenfeld, H.:

92f, 117, 121f

analyst as toilet, 88

clinical replay of, 28, 32, 40, 44f

on infantile self, 52f, 75f, 92f, 132

symbiotic organization, 44f, 57f, 83f,

my differences with, 51

92f

on narcissism, 91

Symington, J., on omnipotence and

Roudinesco, E., 13

primitive survival, 10

Rougier, L., on indicative or ostensive

theory and technique, discrepancies

definitions, 26

of, 129

Russell, B., xi, 36

transference:

on animal inferences, 26

acting out, 61

addressed to analyst as "frame",

Sandler, J., on object-related defences, 131

20, 26

Saussure, E , 146

dual character, 46

Schafer, R., 146

and hallucinosis, 45

science and theories, Freud's views

interpretation, leading to ostensive

on, 16f insight, 34

176

INDEX

transference (continued):

as playground, 34

and psychic reality as distortion

and as enactment, 88,93,135

symbiosis, 63

as total situations, 20

transformations in hallucinosis, 43­ 47, 116f

transitional object, 4

transposition of self and object, 38,

43, 51f, 59, 67

as actual conflict with analyst,

135

coexistence with sane indwelling

self, 51

crisis of, 59f

and denigration of nourishing

object, 63

and early conflict, 125

falsehood in, 62

in Freud's Leonardo, 53, 95f

as parasitic structuring, 55, 60

as pre-catastrophic structure, 38

as transformation in hallucinosis,

43^7, 116f

trauma, 102,104,115f

from autoplasty to alloplasty, 121

childhood, 60

and envy as alternative

explanations, 136

Tustin, F , 19

on autistic shapes, 6

on crises of two-ness, 123

on unmitigated terror, 21

tyranny, 55

unconscious:

class, seriation in individuals, 32

relational frames, 15, 23

as tautology of propositional

forms, 34, 52

theories:

counter-induction of, 36

refutation or redefinition, 16

Vattimo, G., 2,147

Viderman, S., 16

virtual reality as substitute realities,

4-5, 9-11,142

visual media:

addictive power of, 6

as obstacles to tWnking, 9f

void, psychic, 29, 57,66, 73, 77

von Wright, G. H., on counter

induction, xi, 36

Wax, M . L., 146

Whewell, W., on facts and theories,

17, 36

Widlocher, D., on primary

identification and object

relation, 102-103

Winnicott, D. W.:

on false self, 131

on potential space, 106

on transitional objects and their

fetishization, 4, 6,11

Wisdom, on symptoms of

depression, 85

Wooster, G., on Shakespeare, 149

writing:

and psychoanalytic ostensiveness,

147

role of, 139f

Zac, J., on setting, 38

T H E L O G I C S O F T H E M I N D : A Clinical View Jorge L . A h u m a d a T h i s c o l l e c t i o n of p a p e r s , s p a n n i n g the last fifteen y e a r s , presents a s p i r i t e d defence of F r e u d ' s c l i n i c a l m e t h o d , c o n s i d e r i n g the ' c r i s i s of p s y c h o a n a l y s i s ' i n the w i d e r context

of a c r i s i s of reflective t h o u g h t i n society as a w h o l e .

E x p r e s s i n g the w i s h to ' c l a r i f y a n d p o l i s h the glass t h r o u g h w h i c h we see the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c e x p e r i e n c e ' , J o r g e A h u m a d a seeks to redefine the f u n c t i o n s o f p s y c h o a n a l y s i s f o r the e r a of mass m e d i a , i n w h i c h the classic F r e u d i a n neuroses

have

mostly

been

replaced

by

what

he t e r m s

'pathologies

of

peremptory gratification'. ' T h e L o g i c s of the M i n d ' c o n s i d e r s the i m p a c t on p s y c h o a n a l y t i c t h e o r y a n d p r a c t i c e of the c u r r e n t shift f r o m a c u l t u r e of the w r i t t e n w o r d to one of " v i s u a l p o w e r " ; i n d u c t i o n , e m p i r i c i s m , a n d the p o s s i b i l i t y o f e s t a b l i s h i n g a " c l i n i c a l f a c t " ; a c c u l t u r a t i o n v i a the m e d i a as a s p u r i o u s s u b s t i t u t e f o r the n u c l e a r f a m i l y ; a n d t e l e v i s i o n as a p e r v a s i v e p r o v i d e r of " a u t i s t i c f o r m s " . It discusses a t o p o g r a p h y of the m i n d w h i c h b u i l d s on the w o r k of W i l f r e d B i o n , a n d the " a p p a r e n t l y b e n i g n d e l u s i o n " of one's o w n goodness. Rather than focusing underlying

clinical

on t h e o r y , A h u m a d a stresses t h r o u g h o u t

method,

which

the

logic

he sees as the c e n t r a l g r o u n d i n g

of

p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , a n d the p r i m a r y source o f genuine advances i n t h e o r y itself. H e m a k e s a s t r o n g case t h a t " t h e c l i n i c a l a n d c o n c e p t u a l h o n i n g of the a n a l y t i c a l i n s t r u m e n t s h o u l d keep f i r m l y a w a y f r o m c u l t u r a l o r i n t e l l e c t u a l f a s h i o n s , " w h i c h c a n be d e t r i m e n t a l to a c t u a l c l i n i c a l p r a c t i c e . "It has been Ahumada's

core endeavour to deepen the understanding

of our

clinical method... I am confident that this volume will be of significant use to the reader in the handling

of his or her practice,

psychoanalytic discipline."

and of lasting value for

R. Horacio Etchegoyen, from his foreword

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